Court Opinion

ID: 9666435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:14:54.685863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:28.797518
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ROBERTSON, Justice.
After the trial court overruled a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search pursuant to a search warrant, appellant entered a plea of not guilty before the court to possession of LSD. The trial judge found appellant guilty, after she had stipulated what the state’s evidence would be if the state’s witnesses were called to testify, and assessed punishment at confinement for five years. The sole issue before us is the validity of the affidavit for the search warrant. We affirm.
The search was conducted under authority of a search warrant issued by a federal magistrate. Following its execution, the warrant, along with all other papers, was ordered sealed. The record does not disclose the efforts to secure a copy of the warrant and the state asserts that appellant has therefore waived any error. However, because appellant is contending that the affidavit failed to state probable cause, she asserts, and we believe, she has preserved the question of the validity of the affidavit for the search warrant. We will address the issue.
The affidavit for the search warrant is some twenty pages in length and chronicles, in great detail, the drug dealing activities over a period of some 15 years of appellant’s husband and one Sam Stewart. Several references in the affidavit concern appellant’s activities associated with such drug dealing. The affidavit was signed by Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Gallman and the basis for the desired search, as contained in the opening paragraphs of the affidavit, was:
A. Your affiant alleges that probable cause exists to believe that concealed within an apartment residence designated as Number 116-C, being described as a multi-unit apartment complex, at 2400 Westheimer, Houston, Harris County, Texas, are the following items:
1. books, records, sales and/or purchase invoices, receipts, notes, ledgers, bank records, money orders and/or other papers relating to the transportation, ordering sale, manufacture and distribution of illegal controlled substance and/or records relating to the receipt and/or disposition of the proceeds from the distribution of illegal controlled substance.
2. currency, financial instruments, precious metals, jewelry, and/or other items of value and/or proceeds of drug transactions and evidence of financial transactions relating to obtaining, transferring, laundering, secreting or spending large sums of money made from engaging in illegal controlled substance activities.
3. telephone and address books or papers which reflect names, addresses and/or telephone numbers of individuals associated in dealing in illegal controlled substance.
*3614. photographs of individuals, property and illegal controlled substance.
5. materials used in the packaging, cutting, weighing and distributing illegal controlled substance; 3,4 — me-thylenedioxy methamphetamine, also known as MDMA, MDM, ecstasy, eve and cocaine, and marijuana.
The items listed in paragraphs A above constitute evidence of DANIEL GLASS BERNARD and IRENE RUTH BERNARD’S ongoing and continuing involvement in the distribution of illegal controlled substance and the resulting financial crimes in violation of various sections of Title 21, United States Code (U.S.C.), including sections 841(a)(1), 846 and 848 and Title 26, U.S.C. Sections 7201 and 7203.
It is clear to us that the search warrant was sought for the purpose of recovering the records and other evidence detailed above which constituted evidence of the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances (21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(a)(1)), conspiracy to engage in the acts prohibited by Sec. 841(a)(1) (21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 846), engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in the acts prohibited by Sec. 841(a)(1) (21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 848), attempt to evade taxes (26 U.S.C.A. Sec. 7201) or willful failure to pay taxes (26 U.S.C.A. Sec. 7203).
In a broad-sided attack, appellant contends: (1) the facts in the affidavit were “stale” because “none of the activities described lend themselves to any reference that on December 19,1988, there was probable cause to think that drugs or the related items mentioned in the affidavit would be found in appellant’s apartment;” (2) “the information in the affidavit failed to establish an adequate connection between the residence which was searched and the drug smuggling activities of Sam Stewart and any other crime;” (3) “the affidavit fails to particularize the description of the property or the records that were being sought;” (4) the affidavit was made in bad faith because Agent Gallman failed “to inform the magistrate that Dan Bernard (appellant’s husband) had been in jail for two months at the time of the affidavit;” and (5) the affidavit, as to appellant, is deficient because “there is not a single fact which reasonably suggests that appellant would be likely to possess any of the documentation or records alluded to.”
In analyzing the affidavit before us we must keep in mind two issues. First, both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have mandated that we are not to interpret the affidavit for a search warrant “in a hyper-technical” sense but rather we are to look at it in a “commonsense manner.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) and Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611. Second, the search warrant was sought for the purpose of searching a residence. Appellant’s attack upon the affidavit for failure to state any facts which would reasonably suggest appellant would be in possession of the documentation has been seized upon by the dissent and it appears to us totally immaterial to the issue of the validity of the affidavit because it was not even necessary that appellant be named in the warrant. Rule 41(b) Fed.R.Crim.PROC. authorizes the issuance of a search warrant to search for and seize property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense or which has been used as a means of committing a criminal offense and if the search warrant is for that purpose it is not necessary that the person in charge of the premises be named. Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 292, 21 L.Ed.2d 270. It is only where the warrant is issued to search for and seize a person for whose arrest probable cause is stated, that Rule 41(b) requires that the person be named. While the warrant is not in the record and appellant has not preserved any complaint concerning it, it appears obvious that the warrant did not command her arrest because the evidence shows that appellant was not arrested at the time of the search, was not placed under arrest until some 4 months later and, then, only after a chemical analysis had been conducted on the illegal drugs found in her purse.
*362With these principles in mind we will examine the affidavit to weigh appellant’s complaints. First, appellant states the facts in the affidavit were stale. Agent Gallman detailed in the affidavit that he had been a special agent in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service for some six years; that he had been involved in numerous investigations of individuals who derive substantial income from illegal importation, manufacture, distribution and sale of illegal controlled substances, and that he had extensive experience in investigating financial crimes committed by people who traffic in illegal controlled substances. He stated that the grounds for the issuance of the sought-after search warrant were derived from surveillances, physical evidence, review of reports, discussions with investigators of the Austin Police Department, Department of Public Safety, Drug Enforcement Administration and others individually detailed in the affidavit. He swore that based upon his experience and training he knew that those individuals who deal in illegal controlled substances:
1. maintain books, records, money orders and other papers relating to the manufacture, transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of such drugs. Further, since many of the drugs are furnished on consignment, records of monies owed are normally kept. There records are normally kept where the individuals have ready access to them and they are kept over long periods of time;
2. routinely conceal in their residences caches of such drugs, large amounts of currency, financial instruments, precious metals, jewelry and other items of value derived from such drug transactions;
3. in attempts to legitimize profits from their illegal operations, utilize false and fictitious business records, foreign and domestic banks, securities, cashiers checks, money orders, letters of credit, brokerage houses, real estate shell corporations and business fronts;
4. maintain addresses and telephone numbers in books or papers which reflect names, addresses and/or telephone numbers of associates in their illegal organization;
5. take, or cause to be taken, and keep photographs of themselves, their associates and their illegal product; and
6. keep paraphernalia including scales, plastic bags and cutting agents, for purchasing, cutting, weighing and distributing such drugs.
Gallman swore that the statements of fact contained in the affidavit supporting probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for the search of the residence were made to him by Department of Public Safety Investigator Stone. Such statements as related by Stone were recited in detail and included:
1. Stone had been investigating the illegal conduct of Sam Stewart and his associate Daniel Glass Bernard (appellant’s husband) since April 1988 (some 9 months prior to the executing the affidavit for search warrant);
2. A first-time confidential informant, whose credibility Stone had corroborated through other informants and independent investigation, told Stone:
a. he had observed, in the fall of 1987, Stewart and Bernard sell large quantities of a designer drug known as ecstasy, and/or eve. He stated he had been present in Stewart’s residence when Stewart had sold these substances to his (Stewart’s) dealers. He further stated Stewart told him that Bernard was his business partner;
b. he had observed Stewart in possession of thousands of dollars in cash money which he had derived from the sale of ecstasy and eve;
c. that Stewart and Bernard lost some 250,000 tablets of ecstasy and eve as a result of a seizure during a border crossing in the McAllen, Texas, area in February or March 1988;
d. he had personally observed Stewart using cocaine at his (Stewart’s) residence in the 8100 block of North Mo-*363pac Expressway, North Castle Apartments, #227, Austin, Texas.
3. Investigator John Jones of the Austin Organized Crime Unit had told Stone that:
a. as a result of his investigation of the distribution of drugs by Stewart, he determined that Daniel Glass Bernard was an associate and assisted Stewart in the distribution of the drugs ecstasy and eve;
b. a confidential informant, whose reliability had been proven through previous seizures based upon his information, stated Stewart, in association with other individuals, were large traffickers in ecstasy and eve;
c. another confidential informant, whose reliability was established through other informants and independent investigation, stated that during 1986 he had personally observed Stewart, and other individuals associated with him, selling ecstasy and eve;
d. a third confidential informant whose reliability was likewise established, stated he had personally observed Stewart and his associates trafficking in ecstasy and eve in thousand-lot quantities and that Stewart often used local motel rooms to facilitate the transfers. Investigator Jones stated he had confirmed Stewart’s rental of local motel rooms.
4. One of his confidential informants, whose reliability he had established through other informants and independent investigation, told Stone:
a. he had personally observed Stewart and Daniel Glass Bernard during the fall of 1987, deal in thousand-lot quantities of ecstasy and eve;
b. he had sold cocaine to both Stewart, who was an avid user of cocaine, and Bernard on several occasions during 1987;
c. he had purchased ecstasy from Stewart and Bernard during 1987, usually in quantities of 700 tablets for $4.00 each;
d. that one of Stewart’s and Bernard’s drug dealers told the confidential informant that during February or March 1988, one of Stewart’s and Bernard’s loads of 260,000 tablets of ecstasy had been seized on the Mexican border;
e.that Stewart is married to a Katia Wah who uses the name of Marylin Stewart and they had purchased a Mercedes Benz 190E automobile.
5. Stone checked the records of the named automobile company and found that Sam and Marylin Stewart, had purchased a Mercedes 190E on January 6, 1988, and that the balance owed after allowance for 2 trade-in automobiles was $5,700, which amount was paid by Marylin Stewart in $20 bills.
6. Stone has reviewed records of the Drug Enforcement Administration which show:
a. on February 21, 1988, U.S. Customs seized approximately 265,000 tablets of ecstasy and eve and arrested the courier;
b. a post-arrest investigation resulted in the discovery of documentation and phone toll records indicating numerous contacts between the courier, Bernard and Stewart immediately prior to the seizure.
7. Stone had analyzed long distance toll records of telephones in Stewart’s and Bernard’s homes and numerous telephone calls were made between October, 1987 and September 1988.
8. Stone received information from U.S. Customs that on October 28, 1988, while Stewart was clearing customs at Dallas-Ft. Worth airport upon entering the United States from France, he was found in possession of 11 tablets of an opiate derivative and $6,982 in U.S. currency.
9. Stone talked to DPS Narcotics Investigator Jones, who stated that on December 7, 1988, while maintaining surveillance of Stewart, he observed him leave the home of his father-in-law on Margalene Way carrying a bag which Stewart subsequently delivered to Giorgio Piaget. Shortly thereafter Piaget was stopped by DPS Trooper *364Aleman and upon recovery of the bag, it was found to contain approximately 25 pounds of ecstasy and/or eve;
10. Stewart moved from his residence on Baldridge Drive in Austin in September 1988, to apartment 13109, The Village at Walnut Creek Apartments;
11. Agent Gallman stated that on December 7, 1988, a federal search warrant was executed on apartment 13109 and the residence of Stewart’s father-in-law on Margalene Way. During the search the Mercedes automobile and a pick-up truck were seized for forfeiture; $45,500 in currency was seized from Stewart’s house, and $146,000 in currency was seized from a briefcase in the home of Stewart’s father-in-law. Edwardo Wah, Stewart’s father-in-law, stated the brief case belonged to Mary-lin Stewart;
12. In addition to the money recovered, many documents were also seized, some bearing the name of Daniel Glass Bernard. Gallman stated that based upon his experience and training, these records reflected sales of ecstasy and eve;
13. As a result of reviewing Drug Enforcement Administration records, Investigator Stone found that:
a. following an arrest of appellant (Ruth Irene Bernard) in May, 1986, some $151,504 in U.S. currency was seized from her automobile, along with a small amount of marijuana and suspected cocaine. In response to a forfeiture action, Daniel Glass Bernard filed an affidavit stating the source of the currency was from the sale of designer drugs;
b. Daniel Glass Bernard is the subject of at least four Drug Enforcement files;
c. When Daniel Glass Bernard was arrested in May 1973, he was in possession of marijuana and $10,174 in U.S. currency;
d. in April 1984, Daniel Glass Bernard and Robert Zeissel, a documented narcotics smuggler, were in a plane crash in which Zeissel y/as killed.
14. Stone has reviewed the records of the Carrollton Police Department in reference to Daniel Glass Bernard and found:
a. During August 1986, he was arrested in possession of some 16 grams of cocaine and $47,051.53 in U.S. currency, along with an additional amount of marijuana and cocaine found in the 1985 BMW automobile;
b. the forfeiture records on the BMW automobile contains an affidavit from the automobile salesman who swore that Daniel Glass Bernard had paid him $33,000 in U.S. currency for the car.
15. Stone has reviewed the records of the Houston Police Department and found that Daniel Glass Bernard was arrested in February, 1987, for possession of cocaine and found in possession of $25,260.77 in U.S. currency.
16. On December 14, 1988, DPS Sergeant Pagel checked the records of Houston Lighting and Power Company and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and determined that the residence sought to be searched was the residence of Daniel Glass Bernard. Additionally Stone checked the DPS driver’s records and they also revealed Bernard’s address to be the residence sought to be searched.
Agent Gallman then swore that based upon all of the above information he believed that Sam Stewart, Daniel Glass Bernard and Irene Bernard have been involved in a continuing enterprise involving the distribution of ecstasy and eve and that a search of the residence would reveal substantial evidence of their illegal conduct.
We do not agree that the facts stated in the affidavit are stale. When the affidavit is considered in its entirety, it merely details, for a period of some years, the past history of the participants, their dealings in drugs, the recovery of large sums of cash money on several occasions and the recovery — only 12 days previously — of various records from Stewart’s residence revealing drug dealing.
*365The timeliness of information upon which an affidavit is based is dependent upon the type of criminal activity involved. United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.1972). There, some three weeks had passed after the last factual incident recited in the affidavit and the execution of the affidavit for the search warrant. In rejecting a staleness claim, the court stated:
Initially, it should be noted that the vitality of probable cause cannot be quantified by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts relied upon and the issuance of the affidavit. Together with the element of time we must consider the nature of the unlawful activity. Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. However, where the affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.
461 F.2d at 287. Neither does the court of criminal appeals set an arbitrary time the passage of which destroys the basis for a reasonable belief as to the continuance of the situation set forth in the affidavit. See Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611. In the case before us, the affidavit was executed only 12 days following the successful execution of the search warrant on Stewart’s living quarters in Austin, Texas and only 5 days following the agent’s verification of the address of appellant and her husband in Houston. We hold that the passage of this time did not destroy the probable cause stated in the affidavit.
We also reject appellant’s contention that “the information in the affidavit failed to establish an adequate connection between the residence which was searched and the drug smuggling activities of Sam Stewart and any other crime.” Looking at the totality of the circumstances as stated in the affidavit, Agent Gallman swore that persons engaged in the illegal drug business keep many books,' records and other detailed evidence, normally where they have ready access to them which records provide evidence of their involvement. The facts and circumstances as stated in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause to believe both Stewart and Bernard were involved in the illegal drug business. The affidavit shows that only 12 days previously a federal search warrant was executed on the home of Stewart, Bernard’s asserted partner, and evidence of illegal distribution of drugs and other resulting crimes was discovered. We hold this was adequate probable cause to support Gallman’s belief that a search of Bernard’s residence would likewise reveal “substantial evidence of David Glass Bernard and Irene Bernard’s illegal conduct.” Our holding on this assertion likewise disposes of appellant’s fifth contention that “there is not a single fact which reasonably suggests that appellant would be likely to possess any of the documentation or records alluded to.”
Relying upon United States v. Le Bron, 729 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.1984), appellant contends the affidavit was deficient because it failed “to state with sufficient particularity the items to be seized.” There the court held a warrant authorizing a search of a residence for “any records which would document illegal transactions involving stolen property” was impermissi-bly broad. However, it is interesting to note that the court, in reaching its conclusion, reviewed and distinguished several of its prior decisions, all of which are more analogous to the description of the records as described in the affidavit before us: United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 792-93 (8th Cir.1980) (warrant authorizing search for “books and records (or items of evidence) relating to the extortionate credit transaction business”); United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683, 686-87 (8th Cir.1980) (“books, records, chemical equipment, and personal papers relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine”); United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 745-46 & n. 5 (8th Cir.1980) (“records of banking, personal address books, records and notation of narcotics *366purchases and sales”). In Le Bron, the court stated:
In each of these cases, we held that the records to be seized were described with particularity sufficient to pass constitutional muster. However, in each case the records described are of a specific character. The reference in the warrant to the specific illegal activity that the records allegedly document gives a substantive limitation to the investigating officer’s exercise of discretion when executing the warrant. Records of narcotic sales, manufacturing and distribution of drugs, and a credit transaction business all provide a particularized description and inherent guidelines, which are clearly absent here. Had the warrant limited the records to be seized to those documenting transactions regarding the items specifically described in the warrant, we would not be presented with the present difficulty.
We have quoted at the beginning of this opinion the detailed items listed by Agent Gallman which he states probable cause exists to believe are concealed in appellant’s residence. These include financial records relating to the illegal drug business, currency, other valuables and evidence of financial transactions relating to the illegal drug business, address books, papers and telephone numbers of individuals associated in the illegal drug business, photographs associated with and relating to the illegal drug business and materials used in the packaging, cutting, weighing and distribution of illegal controlled substances. We hold this was a sufficient description of the evidence sought to be seized.
Next, appellant contends the affidavit was made in bad faith because Agent Gallman failed to inform the magistrate that Dan Bernard had been in jail for two months at the time the affidavit was made, thus rendering the search constitutionally invalid. We disagree.
While a panel of this court held in Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) that claimed material omissions in an affidavit for a search warrant “are treated essentially the same as claims of material misstatements”, such holding appears to be at variance with Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), where the court of criminal appeals stated:
Appellant’s reliance upon Franks, supra, in this ground of error is misplaced. That case relates not to omissions of facts about an informant but, only to false statements by the affiant which are made knowingly and intentionally or made in reckless disregard of the truth. Absent such a showing as would warrant a Franks hearing, this Court will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit.
We should follow this statement by the court of criminal appeals and hold that the omission of a statement in the affidavit that appellant’s husband had not been at the residence for approximately 60 days was totally immaterial. However, since a panel of this court has previously spoken on the issue and since the fifth circuit has recognized that allegations of material omissions are to be treated “essentially similarly” to claims of misstatements, United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.1976), we will address appellant’s contention.
While appellant filed a motion to suppress, she made no attack therein concerning the alleged material omission of the statement that her husband was in custody and not present at the apartment at the time of the search. This was fatal to her challenge to the search on this basis because in the absence of the preliminary showing mandated by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), one is not entitled to subfacially challenge the affidavit. The trial court therefore erred in permitting the parties to go behind the allegations contained within the four corners of the affidavit.
However, since the trial court permitted the hearing we will further address the issue. Where a subfacial challenge is made, our duty is to examine the record of the suppression hearing to determine whether appellant proved by a preponder-*367anee of the evidence, first, that the omission was in fact made, and, second, that it was made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.1980). If appellant carried this burden, we must finally determine whether, if the omitted material had been included in the affidavit, the affidavit would still establish probable cause for the search. Martin, id. Only if it would not is the court required to suppress the evidence seized under the warrant. Martin, id.
In Martin, 615 F.2d at 329, the court stated:
Under Franks, a proven misstatement can vitiate an affidavit only if it is established that the misstatement was the product “of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth_ Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” 98 S.Ct. at 2685. By analogy, it must be proven that the omissions were made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit; negligent omissions will not undermine the affidavit. See United States v. House, supra, 604 F.2d [1135] at 1141 [8th Cir.1979],
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, appellant only had Agent Gall-man affirm that the affidavit did not mention “Daniel Bernard having been in custody for a month and a half or two months.” When the agent then attempted to answer about “the relevant part of the affidavit,” appellant stated “That’s for the judge to decide.” There is absolutely no evidence in the record illuminating the state of mind of Agent Gallman as to why he omitted from the affidavit the fact that appellant’s husband was in custody. Appellant did not even prove the omission was a negligent act, but even if we assumed the evidence is sufficient to show negligence, she bore the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission was more than that. Martin, id.
Therefore, we find that the omission was not fatal for three reasons: first, appellant did not meet her burden; second, even if the omission had been included in the affidavit, the affidavit would still establish probable cause for the search of the residence and, finally, the omission of the fact that appellant’s husband was in custody and therefore was not at the residence at the time is totally immaterial and of no moment because the search was for the residence — not appellant or her husband.
We find no basis under the law for voiding this search. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.