Court Opinion

ID: 9552762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:16:16.364575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:53.437173
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J., Dissenting.
While I concur with the majority’s conclusions that, as general propositions, (1) the juvenile court has the power to place a minor oh Welfare and Institutions Code section 654 probation, (2) restitution may be required in proper instances, and (3) an abuse of discretion occurs when a minor is denied informal probation solely because of inability to pay restitution, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s application of these principles to the present case. The nub of my disagreement is (1) that we should respect the trial court’s discretionary act, and (2) that the record shows there were valid reasons, other than the minor’s indigency, which fully justified the trial court’s rejection of informal probation.
*752The majority’s holding is premised in part on the factual assertion that probation department “policy requires that restitution be paid as a condition of probation.” (Ante, p. 744.) Although the majority recognizes that full restitution is not always required, I find that the record does not show that restitution, whether in full or in part, is required in every case. When questioned, the probation officer who testified at the minor’s hearing on the issue of probation stated that a determination had been made “that according to departmental policy he [the minor] is not qualified for 654 probation.” After being asked what departmental policy prevented qualification, he answered “That we would have a reasonable expectation that he could meet with all of our conditions in a six-month voluntary program.” In this case the particular condition which was not met was compliance with the restitution requirements the probation department had determined were necessary. One factor in the probation officer’s determination regarding the minor’s ability to pay and the appropriate amount of restitution, was his conclusion that “He [the minor] is working pretty steadily and he could make restitution, substantial restitution, over a period of a year.” As the majority indicates, the probation officer attempted to establish a program to meet the minor’s problems in making restitution, but no successful plan could be developed.
Finally, on redirect examination, the probation officer specifically stated that no full restitution was required and that adjustment could be made “based on the ability to pay[,] based on our responsibility to the community and based on the reasonableness of our ability to collect that amount given the period of time.” From the above, I see no definitive indication that in every case, pursuant to departmental policy, restitution was required or informal probation must be denied. While I fully agree with the premise that a requirement of restitution in every case which might penalize a minor for poverty would be improper, such a policy is not reflected in the record here. The factual issue is important because I think that it colors the majority’s later analysis of the trial court’s actions.
As the majority notes, the juvenile court has the power to dismiss a section 602 petition in favor of informal probation if it believes that to do so serves the interests of the minor and the community. “Only the court may dismiss the section 602 petition, and neither the district attorney, the minor’s counsel nor the probation officer can interfere with the exercise of judicial power. (Raymond B. v. Superior Court [1980] 102 Cal.App.3d 372, 378-379 [162 Cal.Rptr. 506].)” (Ante, p. 747.) The principal issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to place the minor on informal probation following the filing of a section 602 petition.
The majority finds the critical question to be “whether the court and a probation officer abused their discretion in refusing informal probation ...” (Ante, *753p. 744, italics added.) After concluding that the probation officer abused his discretion, the majority asserts that it is “apparent” that the trial court’s determination not to grant informal probation was “based in part” on its conclusion that there had been no abuse of discretion by the probation officer. However, contrary to the suggestion of my colleagues, it appears from the record that the trial court, in refusing to dismiss the section 602 petition once filed, did not rely upon the minor’s inability to pay restitution nor upon the belief that the probation officer had not abused his discretion. Rather, independently exercising its discretion, the trial court concentrated on the vagueness and lack of direction evident in petitioner’s circumstances. The majority expressly recognizes that once a section 602 petition has been filed, “Only the court may dismiss the section 602 petition, and neither the district attorney, the minor’s counsel nor the probation officer can interfere with the exercise of judicial power. ” (Id., at p. 747, italics added.) However, my colleagues fail to consider independently the trial court’s exercise of that power.
The trial court first questioned its ability to refer the matter again to the probation department which, as the majority concludes, it surely had the power to do. The court noted further, however, that even if it had the power to do so, it would not use it, explaining: “One of the things that concerns me as judge, when I hear about somebody who has now turned 16, who is not in school, is waiting to take a test sometime in the future a month or more away here that he may or may not pass—these are times and periods that cannot be recovered. What is he doing in the meantime? He is working in a business that may or may not enjoy success where he is being paid $10 a week salary here. This is not, as I see it, the way to develop skills for the future that may help him in a future life here.” Thus, rather than focusing on the minor’s inability to pay, the court stressed the uncertainty and lack of direction in the young man’s life.
In my view, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that it would be more appropriate under the circumstances to require a more formal supervision or one of longer duration than that available under section 654. “[A]s long as the section 602 petition is pending before the juvenile court, the juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether or not to dismiss the petition . . . .” (Raymond B. v. Superior Court, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 378-379.) The trial court acted properly in concluding that the minor’s status, including his vague plans, and his inability to pay restitution, disqualified him from a program of informal probation. Under circumstances as uncertain and indefinite as these, I do not read the applicable statutes as requiring the trial court to grant informal probation. The trial court could reasonably have rejected this alternative.
Giving sufficient and fair credence to the effect of the trial court’s full statement of its reasons for denying probation and considering the proper scope of *754our review of the trial court’s discretionary exercise of its judgment in a section 602 proceeding, I believe that the record before us demonstrates no abuse of the trial court’s authority.
Accordingly, I would deny the writ.
Reynoso, J., concurred.