Court Opinion

ID: 9829132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:01:08.501993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.647271
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, BY STATE.
The State insists that witness Ellis was not and could not be an accessory because, as contended, he was a domestic servant, and under the terms of Art. 78 P. C. such person can not be an accessory. The State cites three cases, Coleman v. State, 44 Tex. 109; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. 387, and Douglas v. State, 225 S. W. Rep. 536. We have been unable to locate the Taylor case, supra, and neither of the other two authorities support the proposition that Ellis was a domestic servant. In Coleman’s case two women were washing and ironing for a family, and on the second day of such employment took a pocketbook with money in it; one kept the money, the other the pocketbook. The latter turned State’s evidence. The point was raised by the refusal of the court to instruct for a mitigated penalty sought on the ground that the accused was a domestic servant, the appellate court holding erroneous such refusal. It is interesting to note in the opinion that the other woman — the State witness whose *503relationship to the family was exactly that of the accused — is referred to in the opinion as an accomplice. We find no discussion in that case of what is or is not a domestic servant, and the only thing we learn is that our Supreme Court regarded the fact that the women were washing and ironing for a family seemed to require the submission of the issue as to whether they were domestic servants. In the Douglas case, supra, we held the issue of domestic servant not to be raised in a burglary case where the duties of the accused were to sweep, wash and clean windows on the fifth floor of the building, he being charged with burglary of a room on the sixth floor of the same building.
From the statement of facts we learn that the witness Ellis had been working at the restaurant where this killing occurred, some two months. He testified:
“I was waiting tables at that time. I did something else, working around the house sweeping and dusting. That cafe had four rooms on the first floor. . . . While I was working tables, working in the house, I was getting four dollars. From time to time I was hauling wood and waiting tables, and I was getting five. I was hauling wood for Charlie Littles. Part of the time that I was working I was helping haul wood. ... I live in Bettin’s rent house in Victoria, Texas. . . . That is a two story house there. I don’t know who lives upstairs, if anyone. They had rooms, I know.”
Witness’ reference to the two story house was to the restaurant where he worked. We have tried to state all that is in the testimony bearing on thé question as to whether Ellis was a domestic servant. He worked in a public restaurant, sometimes he hauled wood, sometimes he swept and dusted in other rooms whose occupance is not stated. Where he slept is not stated, but it is inferred that he slept in another house than the restaurant. In Waterhouse v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App. 663, this court said a domestic servant means a servant who resides in the house with the master he serves, and does not include- a servant whose employment is outside. In Richardson v. State, 43 Tex. 456, we said a domestic servant is one who is employed as a house servant or outdoor worker and has general access to the premises. In Ullman v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App. 220, we held substantially as in Waterhouse case, supra. So in Wakefield v. State, 41 Tex. 556, it was held that a domestic servant is one who lives.in the house, and does not extend to one whose employment is out-of-door. A gardener, having charge of the garden and sleeping in a house in the garden, was held not a domestic servant. Vaughan *504v. Booth, 13 Eng. Law & Eq. 351. So a cook, valet, etc., employed in a public tavern or hotel was held not a domestic servant. Cook v. Dodge, 6 La. Ann. 276. The term “domestic servant” is held to relate to one’s home or household employees and would not include a maid in a hotel. Barres v. Hotel Co., 244 S. W. Rep. 308, 196 Ky. 100. These expressions from decisions construing what is meant by a domestic servant, as'that term is used in various statutes, seem in substantial accord, and leád us to the conclusion that Ellis, witness in this case, being employed in a public restaurant, which occupation was varied occasionally by hauling wood, and sometimes sweeping and dusting rooms not shown to be occupied by any members of the family, will be held by us to fall outside the pale of such domestic servant.
Nor have we any doubt of the correctness of our holding that one who affirmatively aids in any way another who has committed a crime, to evade arrest or escape prosecution or punishment, is an accessory to such crime; and if in the course of human events he turns against the person so aided and give testimony against him in a criminal judicial proceeding, his testimony should be characterized as that of an accomplice. Ellis did render such aid to this appellant, according to his own admission, purposely telling the authorities after the homicide that same was an accident, caused' by the throwing of a broom and the consequent accidental discharge of a pistol.
Believing the matter rightly decided in our original opinion, the motion for rehearing will be overruled.

Overruled.