Court Opinion

ID: 9900951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 20:02:40.705041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:23.019735
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 Gibson v. Wingfield CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 JACQUELINE GIBSON et al.,                                            B317857

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. Nos. 19STCV02988,
           v.                                                         19STCV03722)

 RICHARD BERNARD WINGFIELD
 et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.
      Liddy Law Firm, Donald G. Liddy, Marshall J. Shepardson;
Thon Beck Vanni Callahan & Powell and Gregory R. Vanni for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
      Sims Law Firm, Michael Murphy, Selim Mounedji; Krutcik
Law Group and James A. Krutcik for Defendants and
Respondents.
                   _________________________
      On April 16, 2018, Jacqueline Gibson cut across active
railroad tracks near the Doheny State Beach campground in
Orange County with her 71-year-old husband Ernest following
close behind. Where they sought to traverse was not a pedestrian
or automobile crossing, nor near one. Neither Mr. nor Mrs.
Gibson looked to their left (south) before crossing, and thus did
not see a passenger train barreling towards them. When the
train engineer blew a warning horn, Mrs. Gibson froze on the
tracks. Mr. Gibson pushed his wife off the tracks to safety but
was hit by the train and killed.
      Mrs. Gibson and her daughter Colleen Gibson (together,
plaintiffs) thereafter sued National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) and the train’s engineer and operator
Richard Bernard Wingfield (together, defendants). Plaintiffs
acknowledged that Mr. and Mrs. Gibson acted negligently.
Plaintiffs claimed Wingfield was also negligent and a substantial
cause of the accident because he had been distracted, eating
carrots and ranch dip while operating the train in the seconds
before the accident. The jury found Wingfield negligent, but that
Wingfield’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing
harm to plaintiffs, and returned a verdict in defendants’ favor.
      Plaintiffs challenge the verdict on three grounds. First,
they claim a special jury instruction improperly suggested
defendants were not liable if Mr. and Mrs. Gibson bore any fault
for the accident. Second, they contend we should reverse because
the evidence at trial compelled a finding as a matter of law that
Wingfield’s negligence was a substantial factor in Mr. Gibson’s
death. Finally, plaintiffs assert the trial court abused its
discretion in permitting cross-examination of Mrs. Gibson

                               2
concerning her negligence because she did not dispute she was
partially at fault.
      We conclude plaintiffs have not demonstrated prejudicial
error warranting reversal, and thus affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDRAL BACKGROUND
A.     Doheny State Beach Campground and Surrounding
       Area
       The accident occurred on the railroad tracks adjacent to the
Doheny State Beach Campground (the campground). Parallel to
and inland from the campground is a paved road with parking.
Continuing inland are (in order from west to east) a fence,
railroad tracks surrounded by ballast and dirt, a sidewalk, and
then Pacific Coast Highway (PCH). On the east side of PCH are
a sidewalk and buildings, including the Riviera Beach and Shores
Resort (Riviera Resort).
       Near the campground to the north, the railroad tracks
curve to the east and continue over a trestle bridge above PCH.
An underpass beneath the trestle bridge provides pedestrian
access to the campground from the sidewalk along PCH. The
area of impact was south of and “close to” the trestle bridge. In
addition to this pedestrian crossing near the campground, there
are two other crossings—both to the south of the area of impact.
Approximately 2,500 feet south of the area of impact is a
pedestrian bridge over the railroad tracks. It is undisputed the
pedestrian bridge was closed on the day of the incident.
Approximately 4,300 feet south of the area of impact is Beach
Road, where there is a public railroad grade crossing with lights,
bells, and gates and pedestrian crosswalk traversing PCH.

                                3
B.     The Accident
       Earlier on April 16, 2018, Mr. and Mrs. Gibson walked from
the campground, where they were vacationing, to the Riviera
Resort. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. Gibson
attempted to return to the campground by crossing over the
railroad tracks. After crossing, they intended to walk to the end
of the fence where they could reestablish access to the public road
and sidewalk leading into the campground. The Gibsons
approached the railroad tracks at an angle. Mrs. Gibson did not
look at the track to her left (towards the south) before stepping
onto it. Wingfield was operating a passenger train that day,
traveling northbound between Oceanside and Los Angeles. He
began sounding the train horn two to three seconds before
impact. When Mrs. Gibson heard the train horn, she froze on the
track until her husband came towards her and pushed her off.
Mr. Gibson was struck by the train before he could get clear of its
path and died at the scene.
C.    Pre-trial Procedural Background
     Mrs. Gibson and her daughter Colleen1 each filed a
complaint against Amtrak and Wingfield, alleging Wingfield’s
negligence caused Mr. Gibson’s wrongful death.2 Mrs. Gibson
also alleged Wingfield’s negligence caused her to suffer emotional
distress. In discovery responses, Mrs. Gibson admitted that she
and her husband were “comparatively negligent” without any

      1 We refer to Colleen Gibson by her first name not out of
disrespect but for ease of reference and clarity.
      2 Mrs. Gibson also sued Southern California Regional Rail
Authority, also known as Metrolink, but dismissed it with
prejudice during trial.

                                 4
explanation of why that was so. By the time of trial, plaintiffs
chose to pursue only non-economic damages.
D.    Evidence at Trial
      At trial, plaintiffs conceded Mr. and Mrs. Gibson bore some
responsibility for the harm to plaintiffs, but argued defendants
were also to blame and should be held accountable.
      1.    Jon Landerville
       Plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert Jon Landerville
analyzed information from the Event Data Recorder (EDR),
videos of Wingfield’s conduct as captured on two cabin cameras
(one situated to Wingfield’s left and another above his hands and
the control panel), and a video of the view from the front of the
train (the forward camera). The forward camera video depicts a
zoomed-in and at least twice magnified view as compared to the
engineer/operator’s view. Landerville opined, however, that “the
resolution of the human eye is better in terms of the ability to
see” than the forward camera. These videos and/or a composite
video syncing the three views (two cabin cameras and forward
camera) were played for the jury numerous times during trial.
The synchronized video, provided as part of the record, captures
the four minutes between 15:58:00 and 16:02:00 on April 16,
2018.
       Landerville testified that the train entered the “beach
access road area” at a speed of 69 miles per hour (mph) and
began to decelerate in anticipation of the curve that required the
train’s speed to be 45 mph or less. The area was a quiet zone,
meaning the train could not use its horn unless there was an
emergency.
       Landerville opined that nothing kept Wingfield from seeing
the Gibsons at 14 seconds prior to impact and that if Wingfield

                                 5
sounded the horn at that time, the Gibsons could have heard it.
At 14 seconds prior to impact, however, the cabin camera video
showed Wingfield removing a carrot from a plastic sandwich bag
with his right hand. Landerville opined that at eight seconds
prior to impact, the Gibsons were visible to Wingfield. At four
seconds prior to impact, Mrs. Gibson had not yet stepped on the
track. The train struck Mr. Gibson at 15:59:14 and was
travelling at 45 mph at that time.
       Landerville testified that Wingfield activated the horn 2.3
seconds before impact. It took Wingfield approximately half a
second from the time he saw the Gibsons to hit the horn.
Landerville opined “that if [Wingfield] had looked up and ahead
of the train” to see the Gibsons as late as five seconds before
impact, he could have sounded the horn at 4.5 seconds before
impact, giving Mr. Gibson approximately two additional seconds
to react and to save his wife and himself. Landerville further
testified that Wingfield misapplied the throttle with his left hand
in which he held a small container of ranch dip before applying
the emergency brake with his right hand.
       When asked on cross-examination what effect Wingfield
hitting the throttle had, Landerville testified, “We don’t have
enough resolution in the [EDR] readout to say what it is. It’s just
an indication of misapplication and, clearly, you would not want
to throttle when you’re about to hit somebody.” After further
questioning, Landerville acknowledged Wingfield hit the throttle
at nearly the same time of impact; and therefore, misapplication
of the throttle did not make a difference because it was already
too late. Wingfield applied the emergency brake one second after
impact. After Wingfield applied the emergency brake, the train
took approximately 700 feet to come to rest.

                                 6
      Landerville further testified that Doheny State Beach is a
popular area with high pedestrian and bicycle traffic due to the
beach, campground, and hotels. When he visited the accident site
in April and September 2021, he saw that portions of the fence
dividing the beach and campground from the tracks appeared to
have been cut and bent down where people had gone over it. He
also described the train he observed there as “very quiet.”
Landerville did not know why Wingfield did not wait to arrive at
the next station, which was four to five minutes away, before
eating his snack.
      On cross-examination, Landerville testified that according
to the video, the Gibsons did not make an effort to look for a
train. He acknowledged that the Gibsons were moving at a very
slow speed of 1.4 mph (two feet per second), that it took them
about 40 seconds to walk the 75 to 80 feet from the sidewalk to
the point of impact, and that if they had walked at an average
human speed of three to five feet per second, they would have had
plenty of time to clear the track. He further acknowledged there
were eight to 10 signs in the area warning pedestrians to not
walk on the track. However, Landerville did not know whether
the Gibsons would have seen those signs. Landerville
acknowledged Wingfield was wearing sunglasses while
conducting the train. Although Landerville could not see where
Wingfield’s eyes were focused, Landerville determined where
Wingfield was looking based on Wingfield’s head position.
      2.    Jimmy Scott
      Plaintiffs’ expert in train operations, Jimmy Scott, testified
that the industry rules relating to railroad operations known as
the General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) require train
operators to be alert and attentive at all times. He opined that

                                 7
Wingfield was not alert and attentive nor maintaining a proper
lookout because he was focused on carrots and ranch dip rather
than the track. Scott acknowledged that neither the GCOR nor
national railroad safety practices specifically prohibited train
engineers from eating while operating a train, but claimed the
Amtrak Standards of Excellence prohibited train personnel from
eating or smoking while interacting with the public. Scott
further opined that Wingfield misapplied the throttle because he
was distracted or inattentive. Additionally, Wingfield violated
GCOR, rule 5.8.2, paragraph 1, which requires that a train
operator blow a succession of horn blasts when people are on the
track. Scott opined that if Wingfield had remained alert and
attentive as required, he would have seen the Gibsons in time to
blow the horn at least eight seconds before impact. Immediately
after the accident, Wingfield called his conductor and stated that
he had been staring at the positive control (PTC) screen.3 Scott
testified he did not believe the PTC screen played a part in
distracting Wingfield.
       On cross-examination, Scott acknowledged there are times
when a train engineer did not need to use hands to operate the
train. He also testified that when he inspected the site of the

      3 Scott testified the federal government requires PTC
screens on trains as a safety measure. The screen “displays any
track restrictions that you have, curve restrictions, or you may
even have an area that you have what’s called a slow order or you
could have an area where you have . . . a work order . . . and the
signal indication from the one—the signal closest to you. And the
second out signal away from that one, which lets the engineer
know what’s out there as far as proceeding or traction issues.” It
also displays the train’s speed.

                                8
accident, he did not step off of the sidewalk because he did not
know “where the railroad right-of-way was” and did not want to
“trespass on it.”
      3.    Rami Hashish, PhD
       Plaintiffs’ expert in biomechanics, Dr. Rami Hashish,
opined that Mr. Gibson pushed his wife to the other side of the
tracks and then tried to step backwards from the tracks. The
Gibsons each needed 1.2 seconds to react and run, but it took Mr.
Gibson between 1.5 to 1.7 seconds to push his wife off the track.
After doing so, Mr. Gibson still needed 1.2 seconds to clear the
path of the train. In other words, Mr. Gibson needed a total of
2.7 to 2.9 seconds to push his wife and clear the track. Wingfield
hit the horn 2.3 seconds prior to impact. Thus, according to Dr.
Hashish, if Wingfield sounded the horn approximately a half-
second earlier, Mr. Gibson could have saved both his wife’s life
and his own. Dr. Hashish acknowledged, however, that both of
the Gibsons had enough time to perceive, react, and move off the
track to avoid the accident after Wingfield sounded the horn if
both the Gibsons had just run. He testified that it was not
ordinarily the case for people to freeze when they hear a loud
sound. Rather, “[t]he typical response is to move and to move
fast.”
      4.    Mrs. Gibson
      Outside the jury’s presence, counsel and the court
discussed whether defendants could examine Mrs. Gibson
concerning her negligence notwithstanding her response to a
request for admission that she was “comparatively negligent.”
Plaintiffs argued that because Mrs. Gibson admitted negligence,
any further inquiry would be irrelevant or unnecessary under
Evidence Code section 352. The trial court observed that because

                                9
the trier of fact would need to assign percentages of negligence,
the details were important to determining the degree of
negligence. The court permitted counsel to cross-examine Mrs.
Gibson on the issue.
       During cross-examination, Mrs. Gibson testified that after
arriving at the campground on April 16, 2018, the Gibsons
decided to walk to the Riviera Resort, where they had had a
timeshare for 15 to 20 years. They walked south, along the
beach. They walked past the pedestrian bridge and saw that it
was closed. Approximately 45 minutes after they started their
walk, they arrived at Beach Road where they crossed the track,
used a crosswalk to cross PCH, then walked on the sidewalk,
heading north toward the Riviera Resort.
       Instead of turning south to retrace their steps after the
Gibsons exited the Riviera Resort, they walked north and crossed
PCH near the Riviera Resort’s swimming pool, where there was
no crosswalk. They then continued north on the sidewalk.
       The Gibsons left the sidewalk and walked over the dirt and
ballast towards the tracks. Mrs. Gibson acknowledged that she
did not look to her left before walking onto the track. She
testified, “I heard the horn. I looked—I saw the train and I
froze.”
       She further testified, “I believe that we’re responsible for
being on the railroad tracks, and I don’t know how to legally
say—am I legally responsible for the entire thing? No. We made
a mistake. I admit we made a mistake that I will admit. I’ll take
that. It was a decision made from a situation that we thought it
would be okay.”
       When the Gibsons left the Riviera Resort, they planned to
go under the trestle bridge underpass but changed their course

                                10
because Mrs. Gibson was frightened by a biker and two
backpackers near the bridge. She acknowledged she and Mr.
Gibson could have waited to see if the backpackers would leave,
gone back to Beach Road to cross, or asked the Riviera Resort to
call them a cab to the campground. She further acknowledged
that if they had chosen one of the alternatives, Mr. Gibson would
not have been struck by the train. As she stepped onto the
tracks, she was not thinking about the fact that it was safest to
cross them quickly; she walked at a normal pace. She looked for
an oncoming train to the right, but not to the left. When asked if
she looked to the left in the 20 feet before she reached the tracks,
she responded, “I’m not real good on the distance. I just
remember the overview. We were just looking. Couldn’t hear
anything. Did look all the way down the track when we started
approaching to the left, looked to the right, didn’t see anything.”
Counsel then asked if she looked to the left around “10 paces or
so.” Mrs. Gibson responded, “I think I did not look to the left
when I got up on the track. I may have missed that over there
too.” She knew that when they deviated from the sidewalk onto
the dirt and ballast that they were in an area that they should
not have been.
      5.    Wingfield
      At the time of the accident, Wingfield had operated a train
on that route hundreds of times in both directions but had never
seen trespassers between Beach Road and the area where the
accident occurred. He had never seen anyone trying to get into
the campsite through the fence.
      On April 16, 2018, Wingfield looked out at the track
multiple times, but as was usual, after he passed the pedestrian
bridge, “that’s really the last time that my focus is on the tracks.

                                 11
Because if they’re clear by then, then it’s—just it’s more
important for me at that point to start focusing on my gauges and
my speed to try to get the train down to 45 [mph].” He testified it
takes time to slow the train because of its weight, because
slowing with the least amount of braking is safer and more
comfortable for the passengers, and because slowing gradually
gave him time to react if there was anything wrong with the
brakes. Wingfield also testified that operating a train requires
him to do several equally important things that divide his
attention, including looking at the track, looking at the gauges,
looking at the PTC screen, monitoring and adjusting the train’s
speed, and looking at and calling in the block signals.4 When he
looked at the tracks as he passed the pedestrian bridge location
that day, he did not see anything on the track. He was aware the
pedestrian access bridge over the tracks was closed that day.
       Wingfield’s practice was to blow the horn before using the
emergency brake because, according to Wingfield, it was the most
effective way to get someone away from the track and because
pulling the emergency brake can be violent for passengers. He
testified that “as soon as I saw [the Gibsons], I sounded the horn
and I didn’t understand why . . . it happened.” Wingfield testified
it was not a true statement that he had been staring at the PTC
screen before the accident. He agreed that if he had seen the
Gibsons eight or five seconds before impact, he would have

      4 Signals, which are visible beside the track, divide sections
of railroad tracks into blocks. Before entering a block, the signal
informs the operator about the condition of the block that the
train is about to enter. The operator calls the signal over the
radio to the conductor. The signal Wingfield called was that the
track was clear.

                                12
sounded the train’s horn. When he blew the horn, he believed the
Gibsons had time to get out of the way, but he remembered Mrs.
Gibson “freezing.”
      6.    Timothy Long
       Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert Timothy Long
testified that the train’s forward camera captured images
beginning at approximately 150 feet in front of the train. He
explained that if the train was parked on the goal line of a
football field, the first image that could be seen on the forward
camera would be the mid field. To demonstrate the perspective,
Long presented a slide to the jury of an orange traffic cone on the
tracks as recorded by the forward camera and as seen through
the windshield. Long opined that when Mrs. Gibson stepped onto
the railroad track, she was 150 feet away from the train. He
agreed with Dr. Hashish that if the Gibsons had run when they
heard the horn, they could have cleared the track.
      7.    Foster Peterson
       Defendants’ expert in railroad accident reconstruction and
train operations, Foster Peterson, testified that on April 16, 2018,
40 trains were scheduled to go through the area of impact. Per
the schedule, five trains other than Wingfield’s train went
through the area between noon and 4:00 p.m.
       Peterson described that three lights on the front of the
train form a triangle pattern, which was designed to make trains
conspicuous and unique from other vehicles. The lights can be
seen from miles away under certain conditions and are “really
really bright and really really hot.” Further, there is always
some amount of sound emanating from the train due to the steel
wheels against the track, rotating machinery, and the wind being
pushed out of the way. The sound level depends on numerous

                                13
factors including the speed, whether the train is accelerating, and
whether the train is going through a curve.
       Peterson testified that under federal regulations, an
engineer can operate a train for 12 hours. Peterson was not
aware of any rule that restricts an engineer from eating while
operating the train during these 12 hours. He has eaten while
operating a train and has seen other engineers do so. He opined
it was not difficult to do as there were times when an engineer
may operate a train with their hands free. For example, the
brake lever and throttle may be “set” for some time.
       Peterson presented a summary of the EDR information
correlated with Wingfield’s action as seen on the video. The
summary includes, inter alia, what Wingfield was doing at
different times and distances from the point of impact. Peterson
described several actions Wingfield took, including calling in the
signal, adjusting the throttle and brake to decelerate for the
upcoming curve as early as seven-eighths of a mile before, and
hitting a button to reset the alerter5 which had stared to flash
but not yet beep. He testified that in the first five of the eight
seconds before impact, the PTC screen showed the train’s speed
was at 46 mph, consistent with Wingfield looking at the screen to
monitor his speed as he tried to reach 45 mph before the curve.
He further testified that while operating a train, an engineer may
look at the PTC screen, the speedometer, the gauge reporting

      5 A button, known as an alerter, ensures the engineer is
still alert. It will flash and then beep every so often if the
engineer has not touched any of the controls for a while. The
engineer may reset the alerter by pushing the button or pushing
a different button or moving the throttle or brake.

                                14
how much electrical power is being generated by the locomotive,
and the brake gauges.
       Peterson testified that contrary to what Landerville stated,
Wingfield applied the emergency brakes first, and a fraction of a
second later, hit the throttle. Hitting the throttle had no effect
because the train’s emergency brakes deactivate the throttle. He
further opined that if Wingfield had hit the emergency brake at
2.3 seconds before impact instead of the horn, there would not
have been enough time for the brakes to apply and materially
slow the train. Indeed, according to the EDR, the train took
approximately 700 feet and 19 seconds to come to rest after
Wingfield applied the emergency brake.
       Peterson opined Wingfield acted within the standard of
care for a certified locomotive engineer. Peterson also testified
that eating at the prior stop would not have been a good choice as
the stop was 40 seconds long, the engineer needed his hands to
manipulate the controls to prepare to move, and because the
engineer acts as a back-up for the conductor to ensure the
platform is clear of people. Peterson further opined that eating
carrots and ranch dip did not cause Wingfield to be distracted.
Rather, the actions on the videos and captured by the EDR
demonstrated Wingfield was alertly and attentively operating the
train.
      8.    Gavin Huntley-Fenner, PhD
      Defendants’ expert, Dr. Gavin Huntley-Fenner, has a
doctorate in cognitive sciences. He has education and experience
in, among other things, conspicuity. “Broadly defined[,
conspicuity] is the ability to pick out an object, let’s say visually,
against a background. . . . There are specific characteristics of

                                  15
on[e] that might make them more or less conspicuous, it depends
on the context and, of course, the ability of the viewer, et cetera.”
       Dr. Huntley-Fenner observed that the video depicted the
Gibsons walking behind a pile of rocks on their approach to the
tracks and then transitioning onto bluish-colored ballast, into
which Mr. Gibson’s blue jeans blended. He opined that this
blending helped to explain why Wingfield did not see Mr. Gibson
earlier. He also explained that movement plays a factor in being
able to see an object. An object moving perpendicularly to the
viewer is easier to see than one that is still or moving towards the
viewer. The slower something moves, the less likely it is to draw
attention. Additionally, what a person expects to see will affect
their ability to perceive and react to it. If Wingfield had never
seen anyone cross the track at that location, it would lengthen his
perception response time. Because the people watching the video
expect to see an accident, they are inclined to see it more clearly.
However, a person watching the video, expecting to see the
accident, may not have noticed there was a pedestrian on the
sidewalk, two bicyclists waiting at the grade crossing, a
pedestrian walking in the parking lot, and another pedestrian on
the sidewalk.
       Dr. Huntley-Fenner opined that “in the area where the
collision occurred that there was enough information for a
rational[ ], attentive, alert pedestrian to understand that there
was regular train traffic and to appreciate the risks of
trespassing.”6 That Mrs. Gibson felt for vibrations on the track

      6 Dr. Huntley-Fenner noted there were enough trains in
the area that the Riviera Resort disclosed to its guests that the
trains would be audible.

                                 16
or looked north (right) to check for a train indicated she
understood a train may be coming along. He opined that Mr. and
Mrs. Gibson, if they had looked, would have been able to see the
train after it emerged from the pedestrian bridge, which
according to the video was approximately 30 to 35 seconds before
impact, “and then it would become increasingly obvious.” He
testified, “It is baffling how an attentive alert person would not
have their attention captured by a train that’s coming up on you
very fast, 50 miles an hour is fast. And when you’re out there,
they are big and they are fast. And you see them [a] thousand
feet away, 500 feet away your eye is drawn to them, your ear
picks them up. So I’m trying to understand that, how would that
happen, how does an alert attentive person deal with that. . . .
The only thing that comes to mind to help explain that is Mrs.
Gibson’s own testimony that she was in conversation with her
husband. And you can see that there’s some interaction between
them on the video.” He agreed with Dr. Hashish’s opinion that
the normal reaction is not to freeze, but to run and that if the
Gibsons had done so, given normal expected perceptions and
reactions of humans under these circumstances, they both would
have cleared the track. Dr. Huntley-Fenner also emphasized that
the forward camera video did not capture the last 150 feet before
impact.
       He opined that the Gibsons were in a better position to
notice and avoid an imminent collision than the engineer. The
train would have been perceptible for a longer time to the
Gibsons than they would have been to the engineer due to the
Gibsons’ relatively small size and low conspicuity. At the time
the Gibsons were 500 feet away from the train, they were smaller
than the train cabin buttons from Wingfield’s perspective.

                               17
      Dr. Huntley-Fenner also opined Wingfield’s reaction time
was astoundingly fast and indicated he was alert and attentive.
“[A]s he’s pressing the button for the horn, the thought process
that began that press . . . occurred at least a second before that.”
Thus, Wingfield saw the Gibsons closer to 225 feet away than 150
feet away.7 He clarified that multi-tasking is not the same as
being distracted. He further testified that moving one’s head is
not necessarily an indication of where your eyes are focused.
Thus, determining where someone is looking without looking at
their eyes is not possible to do with scientific certainty.
      On cross-examination, Dr. Huntley-Fenner testified that
there was no physical object between Wingfield and the Gibsons
that prevented Wingfield from seeing them five seconds before
impact. Further, if Wingfield had blown the horn eight seconds
before impact, the Gibsons would have heard it.
      9.    Officer Jacqueline Labarbera
       Officer Jacqueline Labarbera testified that immediately
after the accident, Mrs. Gibson told her that she had wanted to
avoid going under the trestle bridge because there were usually
homeless people there, and she had decided to take a shortcut
over the tracks.
      10.   Kevin Banks
     Kevin Banks, superintendent of operations for Amtrak, was
responsible for relevant day-to-day operations and ensuring rule
compliance. He testified locomotive engineers, who can legally
work up to but no more than 12 hours a day, are allowed to eat

      7 The forward camera video shows Wingfield beginning to
move his right hand toward the horn at 15:59:11, approximately
three seconds prior to impact.

                                18
snacks while operating trains and that there are no federal rules
or regulations that prohibit the engineer from eating while
operating a train. Wingfield chose an appropriate area to do so
because the area was straight, flat track, which would not require
throttle and grade manipulations, and because the area is not
known for heavy pedestrian traffic. Thus, he had no criticism of
where Wingfield chose to eat.
       Banks further testified that he reviewed the videos shortly
after the accident to determine whether there were any rule
violations. After reviewing the video, Banks “didn’t see any
improper train handling, any rule violations associated with the
trespasser strike and that, you know, as far as I was concerned
the engineer operated the train according to Amtrak’s rules,
policies and procedures.” He testified Wingfield was alert and
attentive.
E.      The Verdict Form
        Before closing arguments, the court and parties discussed
the verdict form and jury instructions. The first two questions on
the special verdict form asked the jury: “1. Was [Wingfield]
negligent?” and “2. Was [Wingfield]’s negligence a substantial
factor in causing harm to [p]laintiffs?” The trial court mused, “I’ll
probably tell the jury if they answer 1 yes, they’ve got to answer 2
yes. . . . I haven’t decided yet. But this is not a causation case.”
Defense counsel disagreed, and explained, “Wingfield sounds the
horn 2.3 seconds before impact. [Dr.] Hashish, their own expert,
says that the Gibsons had plenty of time with time to spare to get
off the track. 1.1 seconds to spare. . . . [Dr.] Hashish also says
that the typical average reasonable reaction is to run when you
hear a train horn. . . . Mrs. Gibson froze in the center of the
track.” The trial court responded, “If they answer question two

                                 19
wrong, I’m very likely to overturn that finding. That’s all I’m
going to say. . . .”
       Questions 8 through 11 on the verdict form asked whether
Mrs. Gibson, and separately Mr. Gibson, were negligent and
whether for each of them, their negligence was a substantial
factor in causing harm to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs asked that each of
the four questions be pre-marked with the answer yes on the
verdict form before it was distributed to the jury. The form also
asked, “If 100% represents the total fault that was the cause of
[Mr. Gibson]’s death, what percentage of this 100% was due to
the fault of each of the persons listed below?” The form then
listed Wingfield, Mrs. Gibson, and Mr. Gibson with blank lines
and percentage marks after each of their names.
       Additional relevant trial-related background is described in
the Discussion section, post.
F.    The Verdict
      The jury found Wingfield was negligent but that his
negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs’
harm. Seven out of the nine jurors responded yes to the question
of whether Wingfield was negligent and nine out of nine
responded no to the question of whether Wingfield’s negligence
was a substantial factor in causing the harm to plaintiffs.
G.     Motion For New Trial
       On November 18, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion for a new
trial on the issue of causation. Plaintiffs argued one of the
special instructions (No. 3) misled the jury and that substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s causation finding in the
special verdict form. Special instruction No. 3 was entitled, “A
RAILROAD TRACK IS A WARNING OF DANGER” (bold
omitted) and stated, “The mere presence of railroad track in and

                                20
of itself is an adequate warning of danger as a matter of law. The
danger posed by railroads is obvious and there is no duty to warn
adults of obvious dangers.”
       On December 22, 2021, the trial court heard and denied the
motion. Before ruling the trial court explored whether the jury’s
two factual findings were inconsistent. It observed that plaintiffs
had presented more than one theory of negligence, including
eating while operating the train and hitting the throttle. It also
observed there was testimony that Wingfield’s “reaction was
almost superhuman,” indicating that he was alert, and that even
if he had not been eating, “the ordinary reasonable prudent
engineer in that situation would not have seen . . . the Gibsons in
time.” Further, the court observed that, “I must have said it 50
times that—just because the plaintiffs were negligent, doesn’t
mean they lose. That there’s going to be a comparison . . . [a]nd
the verdict would be lowered” based on the comparative
negligence of the parties in causing the accident.
       The trial court thereafter entered judgment.
                         DISCUSSION
A.    The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in Giving
      Special Instruction No. 3
      Plaintiffs first argue we should reverse because special
instruction No. 3’s statement that active railroad tracks are an
obvious danger misled the jury into believing plaintiffs were
barred from obtaining any recovery as a matter of law. We do not
find this claim persuasive.
      1.    Standard of Review
     We review the propriety of jury instructions de novo.
(Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 254, 265.) We

                                 21
evaluate the propriety of a challenged instruction in the context
of the instructions as a whole. (Ibid.) We will not reverse a
judgment for instructional error unless the error results in a
miscarriage of justice. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 548, 574.) “When deciding whether an instructional error
was prejudicial, ‘we must examine the evidence, the arguments,
and other factors to determine whether it is reasonably probable
that instructions allowing application of an erroneous theory
actually misled the jury.’ ” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37
Cal.4th 659, 682, quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, at
p. 581, fn. 11.)
      2.    Additional Relevant Background
            a.    Voir Dire
      During voir dire, the trial court advised the venire about
comparative fault at least four times.8 For example, the trial
court explained, “The law does allow for more than just one
person to be a cause of the accident and negligent. There’s a
possibility under the law that both the plaintiff and the
defendant can be negligent. . . . So it would be your job under my
instructions to still analyze whether the defendant did anything
wrong that was negligent as a matter of law . . . [a]nd that that
negligence caused—was a substantial factor in one of the causes
of the accident. . . . [T]here’s a possibility that there could be
negligence on both sides and this is when you would attribute the
negligence percentages of both sides, okay, under the
instructions. . . . [Y]ou’re not just going to shut down just
because the plaintiff admits they did something wrong by

      8 The entirety of the jury voir dire was not transcribed.
This number reflects only what appears in the record.

                                22
walking on the railroad tracks. . . . Because it’s not the end of the
case under the law. . . . They will have to produce evidence that
persuades you under the law that the defendant was also
negligent and that was a substantial factor in the accident.”
            b.    Opening Statements
       During plaintiffs’ opening statement, Mrs. Gibson’s counsel
told the jury, “So you understand that your job is to [find]
percentages of fault, of course.” Defense counsel did not argue
that if the Gibsons were negligent, defendants could not also be
negligent.
            c.    Jury Instructions
      During discussion concerning proposed jury instructions,
the court indicated it would give what was eventually numbered
as special jury instruction No. 3: “The mere presence of railroad
track in and of itself is an adequate warning of danger as a
matter of law. The danger posed by railroads is obvious and
there is no duty to warn adults of obvious dangers.”9 Plaintiffs’

      9 In support of proposed special instruction No. 3,
defendants cited the following authorities: “CACI [No.] 806; see
Joslin v. So[uthern] Pac. Co. (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 382, 386-387
[‘[n]o adult in possession of his faculties could claim nondiscovery
of the danger or non-realization of the unreasonable risk which
entering the area [of a railroad track], or intermeddling, would
entail’]; Green v. Los Angeles [etc. Ry.] Co. (1904) 143 Cal. 31, 36
[‘ [“ ‘t]he railroad track of a steam railway must itself be regarded
as a sign of danger, and one intending to cross must avail himself
of every opportunity to look and listen for approaching
trains[’ ”] ’]; Christoff v. Union Pac[ific] Railroad Co. (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 118, 126-127 [‘ [“]A railroad track upon which trains
are constantly run is itself a warning to any person who has

                                 23
counsel argued the instruction was unnecessary because Mrs.
Gibson admitted fault. Counsel further argued the instruction
suggested that Wingfield did not have to do anything and
“look[ed] like a directed verdict.” Defendants’ counsel argued the
instruction was relevant to comparative fault, which remained a
jury issue even with Mrs. Gibson’s concession. The trial court
ruled it would give the instruction.
       Relevant here, the court also indicated it would give (and
did in fact give) jury instructions concerning the burden of proof
(CACI No. 200), plaintiff’s contributory negligence (CACI
No. 405), apportionment of responsibility (CACI No. 406),
comparative fault of decedent (CACI No. 407), substantial factor
(CACI No. 430), and “[c]ausation: [m]ultiple [c]auses” (CACI
No. 431). CACI No. 200 instructed the jury, that, inter alia,
“After weighing all of the evidence, if you cannot decide whether
a party has satisfied the burden of proof, you must conclude that
the party did not prove that fact.” CACI Nos. 405 to 407 each
referred to percentages of responsibility. CACI No. 431 stated,
“Wingfield cannot avoid responsibility just because some other
person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in
causing [p]laintiffs’ harm.”
            d.     Closing Arguments
      During closing arguments, both counsel for plaintiffs
reminded the jury no less than eight times that its task would be
to assign percentages of fault between Wingfield and the

reached years of discretion, and who is possessed of ordinary
intelligence, that it is not safe to walk upon it, or near enough to
it to be struck by a passing train[”] ’].”

                                 24
Gibsons.10 In one instance, Mrs. Gibson’s counsel stated,
“[W]hen I first saw this, this video, I said to myself, . . . it’s 50/50
. . . . The Gibsons saw the train about two seconds before impact.
The operator saw them around two, three seconds before
impact. . . . [M]aybe this should be divided 50/50. But as I
thought a little bit more about it, and I thought about the duties
of someone who’s getting paid to do a job that safety is so
important in, this is—this is your decision. What percentage to
put on the . . . defendants. . . . [Mrs. Gibson has] told me from the
beginning, she—she takes blame. So this is not going to the issue

      10 During closing argument, plaintiffs’ counsel also stated:
      “The verdict form asks simple questions. No. 1, was
defendant negligent? And it asks whether that negligence was a
substantial factor. And then it asks for you to value the loss and
harm suffered by this family. We’ve admitted that [Mr. and Mrs.
Gibson] were negligent. So that is not an issue in this case.
Then you’ll be asked to decide the percentages of fault between
defendant and the Gibsons. That’s it.”
      “I just want to remind you as you deliberate about the
careless conduct of the operator, during that discussion, you don’t
consider the fault of the Gibsons. That’s been admitted and that
comes up when you go into the percentages.”
      “As you’re discussing the Amtrak negligence, if someone
says well, I think the Gibsons were at fault. You say that’s right.
They admit it. But you focus on the Amtrak responsibility, and
then at the end, you talk about percentages.”
      The operator’s negligence “does not have to be the only
cause of harm.”
      “So you don’t consider—when you’re considering
comparative fault, the judge reduces the damage by the
percentage of responsibility. So if you were to find say 10
percent, your judgment, your verdict gets reduced by 10 percent.
The judge does that.”

                                  25
of whether [Mrs. Gibson] takes blame or not. . . . This goes to the
issue of percentages. Who should have the biggest percentage.
It’s your decision.”
       Colleen’s counsel explained, “Some jurors may say I have a
lot of trouble with this case because the Gibsons never looked.
You can say in response to that, that’s true. They’ve admitted
that. In fact, we have admitted it so strongly that we asked the
judge to precheck the box for you . . . . [W]e’ve admitted that [the
Gibsons] were negligent, but Amtrak cannot escape responsibility
just because [the Gibsons] were also a substantial factor. So they
don’t get to go home just because the Gibsons made a mistake.
We have to evaluate Amtrak’s conduct as well.”
       Defense counsel twice reminded the jury that if it found
Wingfield liable, its job was to allocate blame.
       During rebuttal argument, Mrs. Gibson’s counsel stated,
“The last thing I’m going to talk about is percentages. . . . [For
Mr. Gibson,] I would suggest to you a very low percentage. One
or [2] percent for [Mr. Gibson]. [Mrs. Gibson has] accepted
responsibility. We went through the—the huge responsibility
that an operator of a million pound train has. . . . So that is a
huge percentage of negligence compared to a lady who’s out for a
walk who’s not going to hurt anybody. I would suggest to you [5]
to [10] percent. And the reason—even though we’ve admitted
responsibility, the reason they made this whole trial about
criticizing [the Gibsons], is to try to get you to give the 50/50. If
you give them 50/50, they’ll be clanking the champagne glasses
out there in their hotel room after your verdict.” Plaintiffs asked
the jury to value Mrs. Gibson’s and Colleen’s damages at $20
million and $15 million, respectively.

                                 26
      3.    Analysis
       Plaintiffs argue special instruction No. 3 caused the jury to
apply the pre-Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 doctrine
of strict contributory negligence, which barred a plaintiff from
obtaining any recovery when the plaintiff’s own negligent conduct
contributed to causing the harm suffered. (Id. at p. 808.)
Because we conclude it is not reasonably probable that the
instruction misled the jury, we need not also determine whether
the instruction was erroneous. (See Soule v. General Motors
Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 [“A judgment may not be
reversed for instructional error in a civil case ‘unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)”].)
       First, the special instruction does not refer to strict
contributory negligence expressly or indirectly. It states only
that, “A Railroad Track Is a Warning of Danger [¶] The mere
presence of railroad track in and of itself is an adequate warning
of danger as a matter of law. The danger posed by railroads is
obvious and there is no duty to warn adults of obvious dangers.”
(Bold and capitalization omitted.) In other words, there is no
duty to warn an adult that a railroad track is dangerous.
Plaintiffs make no serious attempt to argue this is incorrect or
that there was a duty to warn by posting signs, placing additional
fencing, or something else.
       Plaintiffs instead argue the instruction was prejudicial
because it can be read as a directive to absolve the defendants by
giving the impression that Wingfield had no legal duty to sound
the train’s horn to warn Mr. and Mrs. Gibson of the train’s
approach. As stated above, that is not a commonsense reading of

                                27
the instruction. Instead, it is reasonably construed as addressing
testimony elicited at trial suggesting defendants were negligent
because Mrs. Gibson was able to access the track where she did
and did not see any warning signs before she attempted to cross.
       Moreover, nothing suggests plaintiffs’ interpretation is how
the jury understood special instruction No. 3. The trial court and
counsel repeatedly made clear to the jury throughout the
proceedings that both the Gibsons and defendants could be
negligent and a substantial cause of the harm and, if so, the
jury’s duty was to apportion blame between them: during jury
selection, during opening statements, and during closing
arguments.
       Additionally, several jury instructions explained to the jury
that both the Gibsons and Wingfield could be substantial factors
in causing plaintiffs’ harm. CACI No. 431 directly dispelled the
misimpression plaintiffs argue the jury was under in stating,
“Wingfield cannot avoid responsibility just because some other
person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in
causing [p]laintiffs’ harm.” CACI Nos. 405 and 407 informed the
jury that if it found Mr. or Mrs. Gibson negligence was a
substantial cause, plaintiffs’ damages would be reduced by the
jury’s determination of the percentage of her or his responsibility.
CACI No. 406 reinforced that if the jury found more than one
person was a substantial factor, “you must then decide how much
responsibility each has by assigning percentages of responsibility
to each person listed on the verdict form.”
       Finally, we observe that the verdict form directed the jury,
“If 100% represents the total fault that was the cause of [Mr.
Gibson]’s death, what percentage of this 100% was due to the
fault of each of the persons listed below?” The form then listed

                                28
Wingfield, Mrs. Gibson, and Mr. Gibson with blank lines followed
by percentage marks after each of their names. These questions
are not readily reconcilable with the misimpression that plaintiffs
claim the special instruction created.
      We find it highly improbable in the face of these repeated
admonitions, arguments, jury instructions, and special verdict
form that the jury would somehow misinterpret special
instruction No. 3 as prohibiting it from finding defendants liable
as a matter of law. Indeed, the jury’s verdict that Wingfield was
negligent indicates it found Wingfield had a legal duty and
breached it. If the special instruction had misled the jury as
plaintiffs claim into thinking plaintiffs’ negligence was the end of
the story, the jury would have considered any finding as to
defendants being superfluous; indeed, it would have wondered
why it was even being sent to deliberate given Mrs. Gibson’s
admission of negligence. The jury instead asked no such
question.
      Thus, plaintiffs have not carried their burden on appeal to
demonstrate that special instruction No. 3 misled the jury and
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
B.    The Evidence Does Not Compel a Finding that
      Wingfield’s Negligence Was a Substantial Factor as a
      Matter of Law
      1.    Standard of Review
      Plaintiffs next contend that substantial evidence does not
support the jury’s finding that Wingfield’s negligence was not a
substantial factor in causing the accident. However, “ ‘[i]n the
case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded
that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden
and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the

                                 29
failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports
the judgment. . . . [Instead,] the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Dreyer’s Grand Ice
Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
“This is ‘an onerous standard’ [citation] and one that is ‘almost
impossible’ for a losing plaintiff to meet, because unless the trier
of fact made specific factual findings in favor of the losing
plaintiff, we presume the trier of fact concluded that ‘plaintiff’s
evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
burden of proof.’ [Citation.]” (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 636, 651.)
      2.    Analysis
      Plaintiffs suggested Wingfield could have been negligent in
more than one way, including that he was not alert and attentive,
his hands were occupied by eating carrots and ranch dip, and he
misapplied the throttle. “Where, as here, there is no special
finding on what negligence is found by the jury, the jury’s finding
is tantamount to a general verdict. As long as a single theory of
negligence is lawfully rebutted on a lack of causation theory, it
matters not that another theory of negligence is not so rebutted.”
(Jonkey v. Carignan Construction Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 20,
26.)
      The jury could have found Wingfield was negligent for
hitting the throttle, but that doing so did not cause plaintiffs’
harm. Plaintiffs contend that misapplication of the throttle “was
never presented or argued as an independent ‘negligent act.’ ”
This ignores that one of their experts testified that Wingfield
erred by hitting the throttle as the train approached Mrs. Gibson.
Or the jury could have found Wingfield negligent for eating a

                                 30
snack, but found that plaintiffs failed to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that eating the snack caused him to be inattentive
or that it was a substantial factor contributing to the accident
given testimony about how difficult it was for Wingfield to see the
Gibsons from a distance.
       Plaintiffs argue the jury’s “incongruous” causation finding
had no basis because it was “undisputed” that the train colliding
with Mr. Gibson caused his death and “that the engineer’s
conduct contributed to that collision.” They base their argument
on the testimony of defendants’ expert, Dr. Huntley-Fenner, who
they claim acknowledged the Gibsons “were visible to Mr.
Wingfield, at the latest, eight seconds before impact,” implying
Wingfield was inattentive for not seeing them at that time.
       However, Dr. Huntley-Fenner did not testify as plaintiffs’
claim. He did testify that five seconds prior to impact, there was
nothing obstructing Wingfield’s view of the Gibsons and that
eight seconds prior to impact, they would have heard the train
horn. But the gravamen of Dr. Huntley-Fenner’s testimony was
that Wingfield’s failure to see the Gibsons sooner was not
necessarily a result of inattentiveness. Rather, several factors
could affect his ability to perceive the Gibsons, including the color
of the clothes they wore relative to the background, their small
size from his relative distance, their slow gait, and Wingfield’s
expectation, based on his experiences, that pedestrians would not
cross at that location, especially because there was a pedestrian
underpass nearby.
       Moreover, as Wingfield and Peterson testified, an
engineer’s attention may be properly and necessarily diverted
from looking outside of the windshield to accomplish other
operational tasks, such as monitoring and adjusting speed.

                                 31
Further, plaintiffs suggested to the jury that Wingfield was
negligent not only because eating carrots and ranch dip
distracted him visually, but because the hands that “activate
controls are occupied with eating food.” Yet, defendants
presented substantial evidence that an engineer could safely
operate a train without his hands from time to time. Thus, the
jury had an evidentiary basis for doubting plaintiffs’ claim that
Wingfield was unalert and inattentive, notwithstanding its
possible determination that his eating carrots and ranch dip was
negligent.
       Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
362 provides a helpful comparison. In that case, a general
contractor was killed when a construction truck backed over him
at a job site. (Id. at p. 364.) The truck’s driver had a high level of
marijuana metabolite in his urine in violation of federal safety
regulations. (Id. at pp. 365, 367.) However, several witnesses
had spoken with the driver before and after the accident and
observed no signs of impairment. (Id. at p. 368.) Other witnesses
testified the driver had checked his mirrors and backed up
slowly, activating a backup alarm that could be heard as far as
200 feet away. (Ibid.) The decedent, who suffered from ongoing
health problems and rarely visited jobsites, had been standing in
a blind spot behind the truck, in violation of his own safety rules.
(Id. at pp. 368-369.) The jury found the driver was negligent, but
that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the
fatality. (Id. at p. 364.) The Court of Appeal affirmed,
concluding, “this accident would have happened whether or not
[the] defendant driver was under the influence of marijuana.
[The d]ecedent was run over because he was just not paying
attention to the hazards of the jobsite.” (Id. at p. 370.) Here, the

                                 32
jury could have similarly found that the accident would have
occurred even if Wingfield had not been eating carrots and ranch
dip.
       Additionally, the undisputed testimony from both sets of
experts was that Wingfield had sounded the horn early enough
for the Gibsons to clear the track if they had both run. Instead of
running, Mrs. Gibson froze on the tracks, causing her husband to
step in harm’s way. Given this evidence as well as Dr. Huntley-
Fenner’s testimony relating to Wingfield’s ability to perceive the
Gibsons, the jury could have found that plaintiffs simply did not
carry their burden of proof on the element of causation. Indeed,
the trial court had instructed the jury, “After weighing all of the
evidence, if you cannot decide whether a party has satisfied the
burden of proof, you must conclude that the party did not prove
that fact.” Because the evidence at trial did not compel a finding
of causation in favor of plaintiffs as a matter of law, we find no
reversible error. (See Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of
Kern, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
C.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
      Allowing Cross-examination of Mrs. Gibson
      1.    Standard of Review
       Plaintiffs lastly claim the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to restrict defendants’ cross-examination of Mrs.
Gibson. Generally, an appellate court may not disturb a trial
court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence absent an abuse of
discretion. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446-
447). “An abuse of discretion is found if the court exercises
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner
resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Shaw
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.)

                                 33
      2.    Analysis
       Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in permitting
defendants to cross-examine Mrs. Gibson concerning her “errors
in judgment” and “numerous trivial subsidiary [matters]” when it
was “self-evident” that she was negligent and admitted she was
partially to blame for the accident. In particular, plaintiffs
identify a portion of defendants’ cross-examination that relates to
two transients or backpackers Mrs. Gibson saw near the trestle
bridge. They argue the defense raised the topic “entirely for the
purpose of creating the appearance that [Mrs. Gibson was] trying
to excuse her conduct.”
       Permitting such cross-examination was not an abuse of
discretion. “ ‘The comparative fault doctrine “is designed to
permit the trier of fact to consider all relevant criteria in
apportioning liability. The doctrine ‘is a flexible, commonsense
concept, under which a jury properly may consider and evaluate
the relative responsibility of various parties for an injury
(whether their responsibility for the injury rests on negligence,
strict liability, or other theories of responsibility), in order to
arrive at an “equitable apportionment or allocation of loss.” ’
[Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (David v. Hernandez (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 578, 591-592.)
       It is true Mrs. Gibson admitted she and Mr. Gibson bore
some responsibility for the accident. It is not true, however, that
this concession meant there was nothing left to prove about the
magnitude of Mrs. Gibson’s fault. The jury had yet to determine
the level of responsibility to assign to each of the Gibsons and to
Wingfield. In doing so, the jury was not limited to deciding only
how much responsibility Wingfield should bear and then
subtracting that number from 100 percent. It could “ ‘ “ ‘consider

                                34
and evaluate the [parties’] relative responsibility.’ ” ’ ” (David v.
Hernandez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 591-592.)
       Plaintiffs’ citation to Fuentes v. Tucker (1947) 31 Cal.2d 1 to
argue that Mrs. Gibson’s admission precluded such cross-
examination is inapposite. In Fuentes, the defendant admitted
full legal responsibility for the wrongful death; there was no issue
of comparative negligence. (Id. at pp. 3, 5.) The court found the
defendant’s concession of full responsibility meant the court
should have excluded evidence offered only to prove liability, but
“[t]his, of course, does not mean that an admission of liability
precludes a plaintiff from showing how an accident happened if
such evidence is material to” other issues. (Id. at p. 5.) Unlike
the defendant in Fuentes, Mrs. Gibson did not concede full
responsibility for the accident; she conceded only that she was
comparatively negligent without anything more. This meant the
parties’ relative negligence was thus very much at issue, and
additional evidence on that topic relevant and admissible.
       Defendants’ questions probed whether the presence of the
two backpackers prevented the Gibsons from safely using the
nearby trestle bridge underpass to access the campground
instead of crossing over the tracks. Whether the Gibsons could
have chosen a different, safe route to the campground is relevant
to the jury’s determination of the Gibsons’ degree of fault.
Indeed, although it may have been “self-evident”11 that Mrs.

      11 Plaintiffs point to the trial court’s comment that it was
“self-evident” that it was negligent for Mrs. Gibson not to look
and that the court ruling to permit the testimony was therefore
“a mystery.” However, plaintiffs ignore that just moments before,
the trial court stated, “If there was no issue of comparative

                                 35
Gibson was negligent not to look for the train, the jury could have
also found she was negligent for choosing to cross the tracks in
the first instance. Thus, this questioning was not irrelevant,
cumulative, or unduly prejudicial. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350,
352.)12

negligence . . . and they’re admitting full negligence, then maybe
the details are not relevant . . . [b]ut here the details are relevant
because they go to the percentage of negligence that the jury . . .
would want to attribute to that particular negligence.”
      12 Plaintiffs erroneously claim the topic of the backpackers
“was raised entirely by the defense.” Mrs. Gibson first raised the
issue by claiming immediately after the accident that the
presence of persons under the trestle bridge explained why she
and her husband cut across the tracks where they did. Before
Mrs. Gibson took the stand, her attorney questioned Orange
County Deputy Sheriff Wesley Dean. In providing an offer of
proof as to a certain line of questioning of Deputy Dean, Mrs.
Gibson’s attorney stated, “I just wanted to get some background
about—there’s an issue as to whether there’s people around the
track, whether they are homeless people or that kind of thing.”
The trial court asked, “Because it might corroborate your client’s
testimony about—she was concerned about some transients or
unseemly people across the street?” Mrs. Gibson’s counsel stated,
“Sure.” Plaintiffs also called the Gibsons’ friend, Christine
Ullerich. During Ullerich’s cross-examination, defense counsel
asked Ullerich what Mrs. Gibson had told her about the date of
the accident. She responded, “She told me that they were trying
to cross to go to the beach but the pedestrian gate had been
closed off, the one that they would have normally taken, across
the tracks. And she told me that they had—that there was a
group of homeless people that were there that had made her feel
very, very uncomfortable.”

                                  36
       Plaintiffs further argue the trial court erred in permitting
other portions of the cross-examination because they were
cumulative and “had no bearing on the issues actually in
dispute.” However, plaintiffs do not identify what testimony they
contend should have been excluded and instead cite generally to
72 pages of the transcript—not all of which is even Mrs. Gibson’s
cross-examination. The defense cross-examined Mrs. Gibson on a
variety of topics, including her familiarity with the area, the
route she took that day, her knowledge concerning whether the
railroad tracks there were active and dangerous, her awareness
of other paths to return to the campsite that did not involve
crossing over the tracks and her reasons for not taking them,
whether and when she looked for a train, and her ability to hear
the train or feel the train’s approach. Each of these topics was
relevant to how the jury might apportion blame. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants’
cross-examination of Mrs. Gibson.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.            CHANEY, J.

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