Court Opinion

ID: 9375601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 14:10:26.037477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.319205
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges O’Brien, Ortiz and Raphael

              JAMARA CLAIBORNE
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1165-22-2                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 FEBRUARY 28, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
                                              Claire B. Cardwell, Judge

                               (Maureen L. White, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
                               on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Appealing her criminal sentence, Jamara Claiborne argues that Code § 53.1-187 required

              the trial court to credit her for time served while on home-electronic monitoring, awaiting trial.

              We squarely held in Maryland v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 483 (2022), that the statute does

              not permit such sentencing credit. Accordingly, after examining the briefs and record, the panel

              unanimously finds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue” in this

              appeal has been “authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law

              should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).

                                                          BACKGROUND

                     Claiborne was arrested in May 2021 on multiple assault and firearms charges after

              directing her brother to shoot at her children’s father. Claiborne was granted bail on a cash bond

              of $2,500 and released on home-electronic monitoring while awaiting trial. In October 2021, the

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
trial court amended the terms of release to permit Claiborne “to seek and maintain verified

employment while on the home electronic monitor program.” In March 2022, pursuant to a plea

agreement, the trial court convicted Claiborne of two counts of unlawful wounding (Code

§ 18.2-51) and one count of cruelty and injuries to children (Code § 40.1-103). In May, the court

sentenced Claiborne to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with thirteen years and five months

suspended. The court denied Claiborne’s request that she be given credit for time served while

on home-electronic monitoring. This appeal followed.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Claiborne argues that the trial court violated Code § 53.1-187 by failing to credit her for

time served while on home-electronic monitoring. The interpretation of the statute presents a

question of law that we review de novo. Maryland, 75 Va. App. at 487. Code § 53.1-187

provides, in pertinent part:

               Any person who is sentenced to a term of confinement in a
               correctional facility shall have deducted from any such term all
               time actually spent by the person in a state hospital for
               examination purposes or treatment prior to trial, in a state or local
               correctional facility awaiting trial or pending an appeal, or in a
               juvenile detention facility . . . .

               In no case shall a person be allowed credit for time not actually
               spent in confinement or in detention. In no case is a person on bail
               to be regarded as in confinement for the purposes of this statute.

(Emphases added).

       This Court recently held in Maryland that “[t]he language in Code § 53.1-187 is clear,

unambiguous, and does not permit credit for time ‘not actually spent in confinement or in

detention.’ Code § 53.1-187 states that ‘[i]n no case is a person on bail to be regarded as in

confinement for the purposes of this statute.’” 75 Va. App. at 488 (quoting Code § 53.1-187).

We read the term “confine” to mean “the state of being imprisoned or restrained.” Id. (quoting

Bing v. Haywood, 283 Va. 381, 387 (2012)). We concluded that “Code § 53.1-187 grants a trial

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court no authority to grant credit against a sentence for the time a defendant was admitted to

pretrial bail and was not actually confined,” even when the defendant was on home-electronic

monitoring. Id.

       Like the defendant in Maryland, Claiborne was admitted to bail while awaiting trial and

placed on home-electronic monitoring as a condition of release. Thus, we find no basis to

distinguish this case from Maryland.1 To her credit, Claiborne’s counsel noted that the appeal in

Maryland had been argued and was pending when she filed her appellate brief here on

September 19, 2022. Maryland, decided the very next day, now binds this Court under the

interpanel-accord doctrine. E.g., Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 397 n.6 (2020).

                                           CONCLUSION

       Under Maryland, the trial court correctly rejected Claiborne’s argument that she had a

right to credit for time served while on home-electronic monitoring.

                                                                                         Affirmed.

       1
          Like the defendant in Maryland, Claiborne relies on King v. Commonwealth, 73
Va. App. 349, 353-54 (2021), arguing that being on home-electronic monitoring meant that she
was in “custody” while awaiting trial. But Maryland made clear that King involved the felony-
escape statute, “Code § 18.2-479(B), which applies to any person who is charged or convicted of
a felony and ‘in the custody of any court, officer of the court, or of any law-enforcement
officer.’” 75 Va. App. at 489. We explained that “the definition of ‘custody’ under Code
§ 18.2-479, as construed in King, was not synonymous with actual ‘confinement’ as stated in
Code § 53.1-187.” Id. at 490.
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