Court Opinion

ID: 9840611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:05:14.70704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:09.934670
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                  JUSTIN WADE HARWOOD, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0254
                               FILED 9-19-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2019-114688-001
            The Honorable Kathleen H. Mead, Judge (Retired)

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ashley Torkelson Levine
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Cory Engle
Counsel for Appellant
                          STATE v. HARWOOD
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1            Justin Wade Harwood appeals from his convictions and
sentences for multiple counts of sexual assault and voyeurism, arguing that
one charge was time-barred and that some charges should have been
severed from the others. We affirm because Harwood waived these
arguments in the superior-court proceedings and fails to establish
fundamental, prejudicial error on appeal.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2             In April 2019, a grand jury indicted Harwood for sexual
assault and voyeurism perpetrated against one victim in 2008; sexual
assault and voyeurism perpetrated against a second victim in 2018; and
multiple instances of voyeurism perpetrated against several other victims
in 2015, 2017, and 2018.

¶3           Before trial, Harwood moved to sever the 2008 counts based
on their remoteness. He did not argue that those counts were time-barred.
The State opposed severance, asserting that the offenses were of the same
or similar character and that the evidence of the two groups of offenses
would be cross-admissible in separate trials. The superior court summarily
denied severance.

¶4             At trial, evidence established the following facts. Harwood
and Allison were engaged in an on-again, off-again sexual relationship in
             1

2008. Late one evening, after Allison and Harwood had been drinking in
the pool area at his apartment complex, Allison began feeling sick. She went
to Harwood’s unit and laid down on his bed in her swimsuit. At some point
she lost consciousness. Her next recollection was being roused by
firefighters responding to Harwood’s 911 call reporting that she “blacked
out.” She learned from Harwood the next day that he had intercourse with
her while she was unconscious. Then, some weeks later, she discovered

1     We use pseudonyms to protect the victims’ privacy.

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                          STATE v. HARWOOD
                           Decision of the Court

videos of the encounter on the internet when she accepted a friend request
from a MySpace account bearing her name. The videos showed her lying
unconscious in her swimsuit top, with Harwood engaging in vaginal and
anal intercourse. Allison had not consented to the intercourse, to being
filmed, or to having the recording published.

¶5           Once Allison discovered the videos, she contacted law
enforcement, and a detective arranged for her to make a recorded
confrontation call to Harwood. In that call, Harwood admitted taking and
posting the videos to MySpace. When Allison commented that the videos
appeared to show him raping her, he responded “I know.” He then
continued to claim that she had been awake at the outset and that she later
approved of him recording the events. After the call, the detective did not
do any further investigation or submit the case to the prosecutor for review.

¶6            Ten years later, Harwood and his girlfriend Savannah went
over to his former roommate Chelsea’s house for an evening of drinking
while her boyfriend was out of town. As midnight neared, Chelsea told
them that she was going to bed. The couple headed in the direction of the
door and Chelsea assumed they left the house together. She did not realize
Harwood was still in the house. Chelsea got in bed and promptly fell asleep.
In the early morning hours, she was roused from sleep by Harwood leaning
over her from behind, inserting his penis in her vagina—an act to which she
had not consented. He told her that he had ejaculated. She immediately got
up, took a shower, and dressed. She felt disgusted, confused, and shocked,
but Harwood did not leave. He started talking to Chelsea as if things were
normal, telling her how much he liked her. When the conversation turned
to the sexual encounter, he told her that she could call the police and tell
them that he raped her.

¶7           Chelsea left for work. When she arrived, she spoke to her boss
about what happened with Harwood. Her boss allowed her to go home for
the day. On the way home, she called her boyfriend, who was still out of
town. Once she arrived at home, she began a second phone call with her
boyfriend. While she was on the phone, Harwood arrived. She told him that
she was going to call the police. Harwood acted confused, left, and later
removed belongings he had left at the house. A day or two later, Chelsea
and her boyfriend contacted the police together. Chelsea agreed to have a

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                          STATE v. HARWOOD
                           Decision of the Court

forensic examination, which revealed Harwood’s sperm on her external
and internal genitals.2

¶8            About a month later, Harwood moved into an apartment with
Savannah and her roommates Kelly and Andrea. Harwood and Savannah
then broke up a few months later. While collecting Harwood’s things from
her apartment, Savannah found his computer and some flash drives inside
a wooden chest on the patio. After successfully guessing the computer’s
password, she saw that the desktop contained, among other things, videos
of multiple women alone in bathrooms, engaged in various hygiene
activities while at least partially nude. Savannah recognized herself and
Harwood’s ex-wife Sawyer in some of the clips. Savannah called Sawyer to
tell her about the videos, and she then called the police.

¶9            A forensic examination of the computer revealed
photographs and videos of many women, each labeled with victims’ names
or recognizable abbreviations of them. The photographs and videos
included the 2008 videos of Allison and a collage containing a facial image
taken from the Facebook profile of Sienna, with whom Harwood and
Sawyer had resided in 2015, along with a pixelated image of a female breast
that Sienna thought might be hers. There were also hidden-camera-type
videos of Sienna, Chelsea, Sawyer, Savannah, Kelly, and Andrea while they
were in their bathrooms and a similar video of Andrea in her living room,
all of which showed the women in various states of nudity. Another video
showed Harwood viewing the bathroom video of Sawyer on his phone
while he was apparently masturbating.

¶10           When questioned by the police, Harwood denied
wrongdoing. With respect to the videos of unconscious Allison, he stated
that she was awake at the start of the encounter, had at some point in the
past authorized him to continue intercourse if she passed out, and had
retroactively approved of the videos. As for Chelsea, he stated that he was
drunk and asleep when she initiated sex by grabbing his penis. He said that
he penetrated her before realizing she was not his then-girlfriend Savannah.
With respect to the hidden-camera recordings, he claimed that they were
accidentally made on a surveillance device that he used to monitor his child.
He denied masturbating to any of the videos.

¶11         The jury found Harwood guilty of sexual assault and
voyeurism against Allison (Counts 2 and 4), sexual assault and voyeurism

2       Testimony established that there is a 120-hour (or 5-day) window to
collect DNA evidence in a sexual assault investigation.

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                           STATE v. HARWOOD
                            Decision of the Court

against Chelsea (Counts 1 and 3), one count of voyeurism against Savannah
(Count 5), two counts of voyeurism against Andrea (Counts 6 and 7), two
counts of voyeurism against Sawyer (Counts 8 and 9), one count of
voyeurism against Kelly (Count 11), and one count of voyeurism against
Sienna (Count 12). The court entered judgment on the verdicts and
sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of 7 years for each sexual assault
count, 1.5 years for the voyeurism against Allison, and probation for the
remaining voyeurism offenses.

¶12           Harwood timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶13              Harwood raises two arguments on appeal: (1) his conviction
for voyeurism against Allison (Count 4) must be vacated as time-barred;
and (2) a new trial is required because that count, along with the sexual
assault charges against Allison and Chelsea (Counts 1 and 2), should have
been severed from the hidden-camera-type voyeurism charges of Counts 3,
6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12.

    I.    Statute of Limitations

¶14           We first address Harwood’s argument that Count 4, the
voyeurism charge involving the videos of unconscious Allison, was
time-barred.3 Under the statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 13-107, the State has
seven years “after discovery” to initiate prosecution for felonies classified

3    Voyeurism is a class 5 felony when the defendant discloses, displays,
distributes, or publishes a recording of the victim made without her consent
or knowledge, via a knowing invasion of her privacy for the purpose of
sexual stimulation. A.R.S. § 13-1424(A), (B), (E). Such voyeurism becomes a
class 4 felony when the victim is recognizable. A.R.S.
§ 13-1424(E). We note that here, Harwood was indicted and sentenced for
voyeurism as a class 4 felony on Count 4, but the jury was not instructed on
the added element required for that classification. Harwood, however,
neither objected to the instruction at trial nor identified it as an issue on
appeal. Further, in view of Allison’s undisputed testimony that she was
recognizable in the relevant recording—which was played for the jury and
showed her face clearly—the omitted instruction constituted harmless
error. See State v. Garcia, 200 Ariz. 471, 475, ¶¶ 23–24 (App. 2001) (holding
that reversal is not warranted if court can say beyond a reasonable doubt
that omitted jury instruction did not contribute to verdict, and affirming
because undisputed evidence proved missing element).

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                            STATE v. HARWOOD
                             Decision of the Court

as 2 through 6, unless the period is tolled for a reason specified by the
statute. See, e.g., § 13-107(D) (limitations period does not run when the
accused is absent from the state).

¶15             The primary goal of the statute of limitations is to minimize
the risk of erroneous convictions by ensuring that prosecutions are based
on reasonably fresh—and therefore more reliable—evidence. Taylor v.
Cruikshank, 214 Ariz. 40, 45, ¶ 21 (App. 2006). The statute’s application does
not turn on whether the passage of time has degraded the evidence in a
particular case. Id. at 46, ¶ 22. Instead, the statute is strictly a time-based
restriction on the State’s authority, and is considered jurisdictional in
Arizona, which follows the minority view on this issue. Id. at 42, ¶ 9. But
contrary to Harwood’s position, the statute implicates personal jurisdiction,
not subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Banda, 232 Ariz. 582, 584, ¶ 9 (App.
2013); see also State v. Jackson, 208 Ariz. 56, 62–63, ¶¶ 20–21, 23 (App. 2004).
The limitations period is not an automatic bar to prosecution, but is an
affirmative defense subject to waiver and rebuttal. Banda, 232 Ariz. at
584–85, ¶¶ 8–9; Jackson, 208 Ariz. at 62–63, ¶¶ 22, 26.

¶16           Harwood had a colorable argument that Count 4 was time-
barred because ten years passed between the police’s initial investigation
and the indictment. But Harwood never raised the limitations issue in the
superior court. Though he argued before trial that Count 4 should be
severed because it was remote in time, he never argued that it was time-
barred. The first time defense counsel mentioned a limitations period was
at sentencing, when he queried, “[W]as there any kind of statute of
limitations?” and the court appropriately responded that any such issue
should have been raised before trial.

¶17           On this record, we conclude that Harwood waived the
limitations defense. He is not entitled to relief absent fundamental error. See
State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, 134, ¶ 15 (App. 2005) (recognizing that
defendants who fail to object at trial “do not, strictly speaking, ‘waive’ their
claims,” but “forfeit the right to obtain appellate relief unless they prove
that fundamental error occurred”). Reversible fundamental error is
prejudicial error that goes to the foundation of the case, takes away an
essential defense right, and is of such magnitude that the defendant could
not possibly have received a fair trial. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567,
¶¶ 19–20 (2005). Harwood has not shown such error here because there is
no constitutional right to the limitations defense. See Jackson, 208 Ariz. at 63,
¶¶ 25–26. On this record, we are unable to determine whether the State
could have rebutted the defense based, for example, on when prosecution

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                            STATE v. HARWOOD
                             Decision of the Court

could have commenced or on tolling, and there is no indication that
Harwood was prejudiced by stale evidence.

¶18          We conclude that Harwood is not entitled to relief on appeal
on limitations grounds. We express no opinion about whether he may
develop a factual record sufficient to establish a claim for relief under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.

   II.     Joinder of Charges

¶19          We next address Harwood’s argument that the sexual assault
charges involving Allison and Chelsea (Counts 1 and 2) and the related
voyeurism charge involving Allison (Count 4) should have been severed
from the hidden-camera voyeurism charges.

¶20            To begin with, Harwood’s pretrial motion for severance
addressed the charges involving Allison only, and he did not re-urge
severance at trial. The criminal rules specify that a defendant waives any
right to severance if he does not timely move for severance before trial and
renew that motion by the close of evidence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(c). That
provision, which prevents strategic sandbagging by the defense and
facilitates the court’s ability to reassess the propriety of joinder as the
evidence is developed, is strictly enforced and precludes all but
fundamental error review. State v. Flythe, 219 Ariz. 117, 119–20, ¶¶ 4–5,
9–10 (App. 2008).

¶21            We read the joinder and severance rules together to determine
whether the court committed fundamental error here. See State v. Kinkade,
140 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). We bear in mind that joinder is preferred because it
promotes judicial economy, and that the superior court has broad discretion
to deny severance absent a showing of compelling and unavoidable
prejudice. State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 309, ¶¶ 55–56 (2022); State v. Grannis,
183 Ariz. 52, 58 (1995).

¶22             Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 13.3(a)(1),
offenses may be joined in an indictment or complaint when they are of the
“same or similar character.” But under Rule 13.4(b), if offenses are joined
solely under Rule 13.3(a)(1), a defendant is entitled to sever the charges—
as a matter of right—before the case goes to the jury “unless evidence of the
other offense or offenses would be admissible if the offenses were tried
separately.” That exception to of-right severance recognizes that there is no
prejudice in joinder if the evidence would be cross-admissible at either trial.
See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 596 (1993) (judicially recognizing exception
under prior version of Rule 13.4(b), which did not expressly include it).

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                           STATE v. HARWOOD
                            Decision of the Court

¶23            We first address Harwood’s contention that though the sexual
assault charges and the related voyeurism charge were properly joined
with each other, they should not have been joined with the hidden-camera
voyeurism charges because they were not of the “same or similar
character.” See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a)(1). Harwood relies on our decisions
in State v. Garland, 191 Ariz. 213 (App. 1998), and State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590
(App. 1997). In Garland, we found the offenses too different to be joined
when both involved the use of a gun to take property, but in one instance
the defendant merely pulled out a gun and took property after the victims
left, and in the other instance he held the victim at gunpoint while making
demands. 191 Ariz. at 216, ¶¶ 11–12. In Lee, by contrast, we found two
murders to be sufficiently similar when they shared many unique
characteristics, and the only substantial difference was that one of the
victims was stabbed in addition to being shot. 189 Ariz. at 598. But contrary
to Harwood’s suggestion, neither Garland nor Lee define the boundaries for
what may qualify as the “same or similar character”—they merely illustrate
that the inquiry is fact-specific. And here, we cannot say that the offenses
were so dissimilar as to make their joinder under Rule 13.3(a)(1)
fundamental error. Though the sexual-assault offenses were distinctive in
that they involved physical violations of unconscious victims, they were
similar to the other offenses in different ways. All the offenses involved
Harwood pursuing sexual gratification from unaware, non-consenting
female acquaintances while they were wholly or partially naked. And
Harwood saved images or recordings of every victim on his computer
under identifying labels.

¶24            We next address Harwood’s argument that even assuming
proper joinder under Rule 13.3(a)(1), he was entitled to of-right severance
under Rule 13.4(b). We detect no fundamental error in view of Rule 13.4(b)’s
cross-admissibility exception. Evidence of a defendant’s other crimes may
be admitted in sexual-offense cases to show “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,”
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2), or to show that he “had a character trait giving rise
to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged,” Ariz. R.
Evid. 404(c). Of course, admissibility is subject to the general limitation that
evidence is inadmissible when its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
When used to show an aberrant sexual propensity, the court must also
consider factors such as the remoteness of the other act, the similarity or
dissimilarity of the other act, the strength of the evidence of the other act,
the surrounding circumstances, relevant intervening events, and other
similarities or dissimilarities. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(C). Harwood failed to
demonstrate how the evidence would not have been cross-admissible in

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                           STATE v. HARWOOD
                            Decision of the Court

separate trials to show Harwood’s motive and intent (and lack of mistake
or accident) or to show his aberrant sexual propensity for exploiting
unaware, non-consenting female acquaintances for his sexual gratification.
Thus, Harwood has not established fundamental error.

¶25           We finally address Harwood’s assertion that he was entitled
to severance under Rule 13.4(a) because it was “necessary to promote a fair
determination of [his] guilt or innocence.” We reiterate—the superior court
has broad discretion to deny severance absent a showing of unfair prejudice
that cannot be avoided. Allen, 253 Ariz. at 309, ¶¶ 55–56; Grannis, 183 Ariz.
at 58. Unfair prejudice may be avoided when the jury is instructed to
consider the counts separately and the evidence is properly presented. State
v. Tucker, 231 Ariz. 125, 142, ¶ 43 (App. 2012); see also State v. Johnson, 212
Ariz. 425, 430, ¶ 13 (2006). Here, the jury was instructed to “decide each
count separately on the evidence, with the law applicable to it,
uninfluenced by your decision on any other count.” We presume that the
jury followed that instruction, State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 446, ¶ 67
(2016), which Harwood also emphasized in closing argument. Further, the
record reveals substantial independent evidence to support each
conviction.

¶26            Harwood claims that the State improperly argued in closing
that the jury should consider the charges cumulatively. But the prosecutor
merely noted—accurately—that all the offenses involved non-consenting
victims, and that the jury could draw reasonable inferences about
Harwood’s motive and intent based on the number of videos and his
masturbation to one of them. On this record, Harwood has not established
prejudice from the joinder, and he is not entitled to relief based on the lack
of severance.

                               CONCLUSION

¶27           We affirm Harwood’s convictions and sentences for the
reasons set forth above.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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