Court Opinion

ID: 9957733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 06:05:11.708518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:36.615703
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                   April 4, 2024
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  9:20 a.m.

v                                                                  No. 363998
                                                                   Kent Circuit Court
MOHAMED NADIR BOUKHATMI,                                           LC No. 21-004765-FC

              Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

SWARTZLE, P.J.

        A jury convicted defendant of one count of engaging in sexual contact with his daughter,
RB, when she was under the age of thirteen. Defendant does not challenge that verdict on appeal,
but maintains that the trial court violated his due-process rights at sentencing by considering
acquitted conduct in its scoring decision. Because we agree with defendant that the trial court
erroneously concluded that his conviction was part of felonious criminal activity involving three
or more crimes against RB under Offense Variable (OV) 13, we vacate defendant’s sentence and
remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

        RB disclosed that, after her parents divorced, defendant touched her buttocks and vagina
when she and her brother spent parenting time at defendant’s apartment. The prosecutor charged
defendant with four felonies that occurred “on or about” March 1, 2021, including three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (sexual
penetration with a person under 13 years of age by a person over 17 years of age); and one count
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MCL 750.520c(2)(b)
(sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age by a person over 17 years of age). The
prosecutor subsequently filed an amended felony information charging defendant with two counts
of CSC-I and two counts of CSC-II for offenses alleged to have occurred on or about March 1,
2021. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor filed a second amended felony information charging
defendant with two counts of CSC-I and two counts of CSC-II, and alleging that the offenses
occurred “on or about” March 1 to March 15, 2021.

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        RB testified at the preliminary examination, during which she offered several statements
about when and how many times defendant touched her vagina or buttocks. RB testified at
different points of the proceeding that defendant first touched her in 2019 when she was six years
old and that it occurred “[m]ore than one time,” “a couple of times,” “maybe” ten times, and
“[s]ometimes.” RB also offered varying statements about when defendant last touched her, first
stating that the last incident happened in 2020 or 2021, then testifying that she did not remember
what occurred, but she remembered that the last incident occurred in 2019.

         At defendant’s subsequent trial, RB’s testimony about the number of times defendant
touched her and when the touching occurred was similarly equivocal. RB and her brother visited
defendant at his apartment periodically between August 2019 and March 15, 2021. When the
prosecutor asked how many times defendant “ever” touched her vagina or buttocks, RB testified
at different points that it happened three times, “a couple of times,” and more than one time. When
asked when it first happened, RB said she was seven or eight years old, and when asked when it
last happened, RB testified she was eight years old. Later, RB testified that she did not remember
the last time defendant touched her or what day it occurred.

         Critically for purposes of this appeal, despite the prosecutor’s decision to limit the four
charges to defendant’s conduct from March 1 to March 15, 2021, the case was submitted to the
jury without any party argument or court instruction that the jury must only consider defendant’s
conduct within that two-week period of time. The jury did not receive a copy of the second felony
information, nor did the verdict form indicate a particular date range. In fact, during deliberations,
the jury sent a question to the trial court asking what the difference was between the two sets of
identical counts, and the trial court explained that the counts alleged offenses that occurred on
separate occasions, with no dates specified.1 Indeed, the only significance attached to March 2021
in the trial record is that RB last visited defendant on March 15, 2021.

       The jury convicted defendant of one charge of CSC-II and acquitted him of the other three
charges.

        At defendant’s sentencing for his lone CSC-II conviction, the prosecutor argued that OV
13 should be scored at 25 points because “[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal
activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43(1)(c). Under MCL
777.43(2)(a), the trial court could consider all crimes within a five-year period, including the
sentencing offense. The prosecutor emphasized that defendant was charged for conduct from
March 1 to March 15, 2021 and, therefore, defendant was convicted of CSC-II for sexual contact
with RB during that date range. The prosecutor also emphasized that, although defendant had been

1
  The jury question and answer are not found in the trial transcript, though both parties on appeal
include the detail in their recitation of the background. It is not particularly surprising that the
question and answer are not part of the transcript, as it is not uncommon for a jury question to be
answered promptly, but at a time when a court reporter may not be not available. In any event,
when this specific matter was raised by defense counsel at sentencing, the trial court did not
suggest that counsel was mistaken, a reaction we would expect if, in fact, the question and answer
had not actually taken place.

                                                 -2-
acquitted of three CSC counts, those counts related solely to conduct that occurred within that
same March 2021 time period.

        Given this, according to the prosecutor, the trial court could consider any conduct by
defendant before March 2021 in scoring OV 13 because it would not be “acquitted conduct” under
People v Beck, 504 Mich 605; 939 NW2d 213 (2019). In the prosecutor’s view, that would mean,
for example, that the trial court could consider RB’s testimony that defendant touched her vagina
or buttocks when she was seven or eight years old because, if a preponderance of evidence showed
that defendant did so when RB was seven, the conduct would have occurred prior to March 2021.
Defendant opposed the prosecutor’s proposed scoring of OV 13, arguing that such scoring would
violate Beck.

       The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that OV 13 should be scored at 25 points and
explained its rationale as follows:

       [G]iven the testimony by the victim at the prelim, that there was multiple sexual
       contacts from the time that she was six-years-old up until eight-years-old, that
       obviously that conduct will not result in—or has not resulted in a conviction.
       However, can still be considered by the Court. And, I think the fact that—that there
       was testimony and that [defendant] was convicted, that that does provide at least to
       my satisfaction a preponderance that it’s likely that other—other events occurred,
       or other offenses occurred, especially since it was reported and testified to by the
       victim in this case.

Although somewhat difficult to parse, the trial court appears to have reasoned that RB testified at
defendant’s preliminary examination that sexual contact occurred more than once between 2019,
when she was six years old, and 2021, but that defendant was not convicted for those sexual
contacts. The trial court then concluded that, because the jury convicted defendant of one count
of CSC-II, it is likely that other sexual contacts occurred that RB referenced in her disclosure of
and testimony about defendant’s conduct.

        With an OV 13 score of 25 points, defendant’s total OV score was 70 points. Because the
trial court scored defendant’s Prior Record Variables (PRVs) at zero points, defendant’s minimum
sentencing guidelines range for CSC-II as a Class C felony, was 19 to 38 months in prison. The
trial court sentenced defendant to 3 to 15 years in prison, which was at the high end, but within the
guidelines, as scored. Had the trial court set OV 13 at zero points, defendant’s total OV score
would have been 30 points, and his minimum sentencing guidelines range for CSC-II as a Class C
felony would have been 10 to 19 months in prison. MCL 777.64.

       Defendant appealed his sentence.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

         On appeal, we review the trial court’s factual determinations at sentencing for clear error.
People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” People v Antwine, 293 Mich App 192, 194; 809 NW2d 439 (2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the

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scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question
of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Hardy, 494 Mich at 438.

        This case involves another application of our Supreme Court’s holding in Beck, 504 Mich
at 609, that “[o]nce acquitted of a crime, it violates due process to sentence the defendant as if he
committed that very same crime.” In Beck, a jury convicted Eric Beck of second-offense felony-
firearm and felon-in-possession of a firearm, but acquitted him of open murder, carrying a firearm
with unlawful intent, and two felony-firearm charges for those offenses. Id. at 610. The trial court
sentenced Beck to five years in prison for second-offense felony-firearm, and to a consecutive
sentence of 20 years in prison for the felon-in-possession, even though the minimum guidelines
range for felon-in-possession was 22 to 76 months. Id. In part, the trial court exceeded the
guidelines range because, although the jury acquitted Beck of open murder, some evidence at trial
suggested that defendant may have been the person who shot the victim. Id. The trial judge
reasoned that, although the jury may have concluded that the prosecutor failed to prove Beck guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard to find facts in support of a sentence is a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. Because the trial court concluded that a preponderance of evidence showed
that Beck shot and killed the victim, it considered those facts during Beck’s sentencing. Id. at 612.

        Beck challenged the constitutionality of the trial court’s consideration of those facts at
sentencing and, in analyzing the issue, the Beck Court considered the United States Supreme
Court’s opinions in McMillan and Dowling v United States, 493 US 342, 349; 110 S Ct 668; 107
L Ed 2d 708 (1990) and United States v Watts, 519 US 148; 117 S Ct 633; 136 L Ed 2d 554 (1997).
In McMillan, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a state statute that allowed a sentencing
court to impose an additional five-year sentence if the court found, by a preponderance of evidence,
that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the crime. Beck, 504 Mich at 615. Our
Supreme Court in Beck found McMillan inapplicable to Beck’s appeal because McMillan
addressed uncharged conduct, not acquitted conduct, McMillan was substantially overruled by
Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013), and McMillan did
not address a defendant’s due-process and jury-trial rights. Id. at 623.

        In Watts, the Supreme Court ruled that it does not violate double-jeopardy principles for a
sentencing court to rely on acquitted conduct if proved by a preponderance of evidence. Id. The
Beck Court found Watts inapplicable to Beck’s appeal, however, because the Supreme Court
subsequently clarified that Watts only addressed the use of acquitted conduct for double-jeopardy
purposes. Beck, 504 Mich at 624-625. Further, in Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct
2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), the Supreme Court ruled that due process requires that a jury find
facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt if the sentencing court relies on those facts to impose
a penalty greater than the statutory maximum. Beck, 504 Mich at 616.

       Citing decisions from other state courts as well as “the volume and fervor of judges and
commentators who have criticized the practice of using acquitted conduct as inconsistent with
fundamental fairness and common sense,” the Beck Court ruled that a defendant is presumed
innocent of acquitted conduct and reliance on that conduct for sentencing purposes violates a
defendant’s due-process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 626-627; US
Const, Am XIV. Applying that reasoning, our Supreme Court vacated Beck’s sentence and
remanded for resentencing because, although a jury found that the prosecutor failed to prove
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentencing court relied on its own finding that Beck

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murdered the victim to increase Beck’s sentence for the felon-in-possession conviction. Id. at 629-
630.

        In People v Brown, 339 Mich App 411; 984 NW2d 486 (2021), this Court applied our
Supreme Court’s ruling in Beck and vacated Curtis Brown’s sentence for felon-in-possession of a
firearm. Although a jury acquitted Brown of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter
based on Brown’s defense of self-defense, the trial court sentenced Brown above the recommended
guidelines range for his felon-in-possession conviction based, in part, on Brown’s involvement in
the victim’s death. Id. at 416-418. The trial court in Brown reasoned that it was not considering
acquitted conduct but that, among other things, it was indisputable that the victim would not have
died if Brown had not shown up to a confrontation outside a barber shop with a gun, Brown knew
it was likely he would use the gun during the fight, and he cocked the gun to prepare for the
confrontation. Id. at 418. The trial judge emphasized that he was not punishing Brown for the
victim’s death, but was putting Brown’s felon-in-possession charge “in context” to determine his
sentence. Id. at 419. Although Brown’s minimum advisory sentence range was 9 to 46 months in
prison, the trial court sentenced Brown to a term of 84 to 250 months in prison for the felon-in-
possession conviction. Id. at 417, 419.

         Brown argued on appeal that the trial court based its scoring decision on acquitted conduct
which violated his due-process rights under Beck. Brown, 339 Mich App at 419. In considering
the issue in light of Beck, this Court noted the distinction our Supreme Court made between
acquitted conduct—conduct a jury has determined the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt—and uncharged conduct—conduct about which the jury has made no finding.
Id. at 419-420. The Court further observed that the rule announced in Beck is often easier stated
than applied. Id. at 421. Because a jury’s acquittal is a “legal term of art based on evidentiary
absence or negation,” the Court explained how trial courts should apply the rule to specific facts.
Id. at 423. The Court concluded that sentencing courts should use a test akin to the rational-jury
standard employed in double-jeopardy cases, which requires an examination of the record to
determine whether the jury grounded its verdict on conduct the trial court deemed relevant at
sentencing—i.e., “the focus would be on the grounds that the parties actually put in dispute at
trial.” Id. at 423-424. As explained in Brown:

       [U]nder the rational-jury approach, the sentencing court could consider facts and
       circumstances that were not, in a practical sense, put in dispute at trial, as long as
       those facts and circumstances were otherwise consistent with the jury’s acquittal
       on a particular charge. Moreover, if a specific fact or circumstance was relevant to
       both the acquitted charge and the convicted charge—i.e., if there was an overlap of
       relevant conduct—then the trial court could consider that fact or circumstance when
       sentencing on the convicted charge. This rational-jury standard appears to be
       consistent with Beck and its progeny, and it is a workable standard that trial courts
       can use when sentencing a defendant who was convicted of a particular charge but
       also acquitted of another related charge. [Id. at 425.]

        Applying this test, the Court ruled that the standard required it to vacate Brown’s sentence
for his felon-in-possession conviction because, although the sentencing court could consider that
Brown knew that he could not possess a firearm as a convicted felon, much less carry that firearm
in public, and although Brown knew that he was bringing a gun to a fistfight and even chambered

                                                -5-
a round before he arrived at that fight, the conduct for which Brown could be sentenced ended
there. Id. at 426. Indeed, notwithstanding that Brown conceded that he shot the victim, the
sentencing court could not consider that fact or that the shot caused the victim’s death because
Brown was acquitted of that conduct. Id. at 427.

         Applying Beck and Brown to this case, we are similarly compelled to vacate defendant’s
sentence and remand for resentencing. Under Brown’s rational-jury standard, we look at the
conduct actually disputed at trial to determine the basis of the jury’s acquittal and whether the
evidence the trial court considered at sentencing was consistent with that acquittal. Id. at 423-425.
In beginning our rational-jury analysis, we note that the trial court found persuasive RB’s
preliminary-examination testimony about defendant’s conduct. Considering evidence presented
at a preliminary examination is generally permissible at sentencing, People v McChester, 310 Mich
App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015), but, much like RB’s trial testimony, RB offered varying
assertions at the preliminary exam about when and how many times defendant touched her vagina
or buttocks. Moreover, to the extent that preliminary-examination testimony would fall within the
scope of evidence of acquitted conduct if it had been offered at trial, such testimony would be
precluded from consideration at sentencing under Brown’s rational-jury standard.

         Looking to what the parties actually put in dispute at trial, defendant never admitted
touching RB inappropriately—thus, essentially all alleged acts of sexual touching were put at issue
at trial. On appeal, the prosecutor tries to limit this “scope of dispute” by pointing out that
defendant was only charged with unlawful conduct from March 1 to March 15, 2021. Evidence
of any act that took place prior to March 1, 2021, would be evidence of “uncharged conduct” under
Beck, according to the prosecutor.

        The fatal flaw in the prosecutor’s argument, however, is that the jury was never told or
instructed that any acts before March 1, 2021, constituted “uncharged conduct” or were otherwise
off-limits with respect to the four counts. Although the felony information charged defendant for
conduct between March 1 to March 15, 2021, the prosecutor did not tell the jury that any date
range applied to any of the CSC charges. The prosecutor did not mention the March 2021 date
range in her opening or closing arguments, she did not ask the trial court to instruct the jury that it
must consider only what occurred during the first two weeks of March 2021, and she did not send
a copy of the charging document to the jury for its deliberations. Most importantly, the prosecutor
did not elicit testimony or present other evidence about defendant’s conduct during the March
2021 timeframe.

         To the contrary, the prosecutor asked RB whether defendant “ever” touched her during
parenting time visits, if she remembered what year defendant touched her, and if she knew how
old she was when the touching occurred. Because RB’s allegations involved conduct that occurred
during parenting time at defendant’s apartment, the only temporal bookends the jury had in
deciding defendant’s guilt were that defendant moved into the apartment in August 2019, and RB
and her brother last visited defendant at his apartment on March 15, 2021. This was more than a
mere oversight by the prosecutor to emphasize the two-week period listed in the information; it
amounted to an affirmative decision to adjudicate RB’s allegations of CSC between August 2019
and March 15, 2021. In the words of Brown, the prosecutor “actually put in dispute at trial” the
entire time period of August 2019 to March 15, 2021, not just the final two weeks. Thus, so far as

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the jury was concerned, it could consider evidence of any sexual acts for purposes of the charges,
regardless of date.

        The jury acquitted defendant of all but one instance of sexual contact involving RB at any
point during parenting-time visits with defendant, and the evidence presented to the jury showed
that the time period when such visits occurred was August 2019 to March 15, 2021. Thus, in line
with Beck and Brown, for purposes of defendant’s sentence, (i) the jury found only one instance
of CSC-II occurred, and (ii) the jury rejected the prosecutor’s argument that three other CSC crimes
occurred. Because the prosecutor lacked sufficient evidence to convict defendant of any instance
of CSC other than one count of CSC-II, the trial court could not find that defendant committed
three or more CSC crimes against RB to increase his punishment under OV 13. Doing so was
precisely what Beck forbade—it punished defendant as though he were convicted of four counts
of CSC, when he was convicted of one count and acquitted of three.

       As previously noted, had the trial court scored OV 13 at zero points, defendant’s minimum
sentencing guidelines range would have been 10 to 19 months. The trial court sentenced him
above this range, and therefore we must vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

                                        III. CONCLUSION
         As Beck and Brown instruct, a trial court cannot accept at sentencing what the jury rejected
at trial, even when sussing out what precisely the jury rejected is not always straightforward.
Because the trial court violated defendant’s due-process rights by impermissibly considering
acquitted conduct to increase his punishment at sentencing, we vacate defendant’s sentence and
remand for resentencing. We do no retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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