Court Opinion

ID: 9782813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:19:25.046811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:12.964743
License: Public Domain

Ciparick, J.
(dissenting in People v Sharlow and People v Rodriguez). I join the majority opinion in only four of these cases, dissenting in People v Sharlow and People v Rodriguez.

People v Sharlow

On October 31, 2000, Sharlow pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [1]) and one count of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25). Sharlow entered this guilty plea with the understanding that, if he successfully completed a drug treatment program in the ensuing 18 to 24 months, the burglary charge against him would be dismissed and that Supreme Court would sentence him to a conditional discharge on the petit larceny count. Supreme Court advised Sharlow, however, that if he failed to complete the drug treatment program or was rearrested during this period, the court would impose a seven-year determinate term of imprisonment. Supreme Court made no mention of the mandatory five-year term of postrelease supervision (PRS).
Sharlow did not complete the drug treatment program. Consequently, on November 1, 2002, Supreme Court sentenced defendant, as promised, to seven years. The court did not impose PRS at sentencing.
On May 14, 2008, after Sharlow became eligible for release from prison having served six sevenths of his term of imprisonment, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) conditionally released him pursuant to Correction Law § 803 (1). At that time, Sharlow began to serve a purported term of PRS that had been administratively imposed unlawfully by DOCS while he was in custody. Unfortunately, Sharlow violated the terms of his release and was reincarcerated on July 11, 2008. On July 31, 2008, DOCS notified Supreme Court that Sharlow was a “designated person,” meaning that the original sentencing court had not properly imposed PRS (see Correction Law § 601-d [1]). As a result, Sharlow was brought back to court on September 17, 2008. Over Sharlow’s objection, Supreme Court resentenced him by adding five years PRS to the original term of imprisonment. Sharlow appealed.
*637Citing our holding in People v Williams (14 NY3d 198 [2010]), the Appellate Division reversed and vacated the term of PRS. The court concluded that Sharlow’s “release from prison erected a bar under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution ... to the addition thereafter of a period of PRS” (People v Sharlow, 75 AD3d 568, 569 [2d Dept 2010]). A Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal (15 NY3d 924 [2010]). The majority now reverses the order of the Appellate Division and I respectfully dissent.
In Williams, we recognized that despite a court’s “inherent authority to correct illegal sentences . . . , there must be a temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant” (14 NY3d at 217). Thus, we held “that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing [a] defendant to the mandatory term of PRS after [a] defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and has been released from confinement by DOCS” (id.). This is so because “once a defendant [has been] released from custody and returns to the community after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court. . . there is a legitimate expectation that the sentence, although illegal under the Penal Law, is final” (id. at 219 [emphasis added]). In adopting this rule, we cited federal authority standing for the proposition that “the resentencing of a defendant who has been released from confinement would be unconstitutional” (id. at 216, citing DeWitt v Ventetoulo, 6 F3d 32, 35-36 [1st Cir 1993], cert denied 511 US 1032 [1994]; United States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 986-987 [4th Cir 1985], cert denied 474 US 1064 [1986]; Breest v Helgemoe, 579 F2d 95, 101 [1st Cir 1978], cert denied 439 US 933 [1978]).
Here, Sharlow’s release from confinement clearly bars resentencing under our holding in Williams. Sharlow duly served the period of incarceration ordered by the sentencing court (cf. Williams, 14 NY3d at 218 n 3 [“(t)his analysis has no application to a person who, for example, is erroneously released early by DOCS”]). Moreover, once DOCS calculated Sharlow’s precise release date by operation of statute (see Correction Law § 803 [1] [a], [c]), he was discharged and returned to the community (see id.). These factors, as discussed in Williams, entitle Sharlow to a “legitimate expectation” that he will no longer be subject to additional punishment, thereby making his sentence final for all purposes.
Nonetheless, the majority construes our holding in Williams differently and now finds “that an expectation of finality arises *638for purposes of double jeopardy when a defendant completes the lawful portion of an illegal sentence” (majority op at 630). Thus, under the majority’s rationale, Sharlow’s release from custody into the community is of no moment because Sharlow was still subject to DOCS supervision for the remaining one seventh of his prison term. In my view, this goes beyond what we held in Williams. Indeed, we did not create a rule that, upon a defendant’s proper release from custody into the community, as here, a legitimate expectation of finality would not arise until such defendant was no longer subject to DOCS supervision. In fact, we never considered the maximum expiration date of a sentence in Williams, but rather focused our entire discussion on an inmate’s release from confinement. Notably, we observed that “[s]ome [federal] courts have held that a reasonable expectation of finality arises upon completion of the imposed sentence, resulting in the attachment of jeopardy precluding resentencing” (14 NY3d at 216 [citations omitted]). Ultimately, however, we rejected this reasoning in favor of a rule, adopted by other federal courts, that double jeopardy bars resentencing once a defendant has been duly released from custody (see id. at 217).
Furthermore, other departments of the Appellate Division, in applying Williams, have also held that the conditional release of a defendant from prison bars the imposition of PRS on double jeopardy grounds (see e.g. People v Velez, 79 AD3d 542, 542 [1st Dept 2010] [“When a person serving a determinate sentence is conditionally released, the determinate sentence is still in effect, but the person has clearly been released from imprisonment within the meaning of Williams”]; People v Peterkin, 71 AD3d 1402, 1402 [4th Dept 2010] [although defendant returned to DOCS custody for violating the terms of his release, “County Court erred in resentencing him to a period of (PRS) after he had been conditionally released from the previously imposed determinate sentence of incarceration”]).
The Appellate Division in this case properly applied our holding in Williams and held that, following Sharlow’s conditional release from custody into the community double jeopardy barred the imposition of PRS at a resentencing proceeding. That this resentencing occurred before the maximum expiration date of the original sentence does not change the proper understanding and application of Williams by the Appellate Division here, which drew the double jeopardy line at Sharlow’s release from custody. Accordingly, I would vote to affirm.

*639
People v Rodriguez

On June 17, 2002, a jury convicted Rodriguez of gang assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.07). Supreme Court sentenced Rodriguez to a determinate prison term of 25 years. Although the court sheet initialed by the trial judge and the commitment sheet prepared by the court clerk indicated a five-year period of PRS, Supreme Court made no mention of PRS during the sentencing proceeding.
Rodriguez pursued his direct appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of his conviction and sentence (People v Rodriguez, 33 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2006]). On appeal to this Court, Rodriguez argued that the PRS component to his case was unlawful because Supreme Court failed to pronounce it orally at sentencing. A Judge of this Court granted Rodriguez leave to appeal (9 NY3d 881 [2007]). We consolidated his case with People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) wherein we agreed with Rodriguez that his PRS had been unlawfully imposed and remitted his case to Supreme Court for resentencing.
Upon remittal to Supreme Court, Rodriguez requested a reduction of his 25-year prison term. Supreme Court denied the request and resentenced defendant to the originally imposed 25 years followed by three years PRS. Initially, on May 18, 2010, the Appellate Division modified the judgment of resentence, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence to a term of 20 years, and, as so modified, affirmed (see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d 541, 541 [1st Dept 2010]). The court concluded that a Sparber resentencing was not a plenary proceeding that “presented] the sentencing court with an occasion to revisit the original prison sentence” (id.). Nonetheless, finding the prison term to be excessive, the court exercised its interest of justice discretion to modify the sentence as noted (see id. at 542).
The People moved for reargument at the Appellate Division. While that application remained pending, a Judge of this Court granted both Rodriguez and the People leave to appeal (15 NY3d 855 [2010]). Subsequently, on March 3, 2011, the Appellate Division granted the People’s reargument motion and recalled its May 18, 2010 decision. (People v Rodriguez, 82 AD3d 418 [1st Dept 2011].) Although the court adhered to its prior conclusion that a Sparber resentencing is not a plenary proceeding that gives “occasion to revisit the original prison sentence” (id. at 418), the court now held that it was “without authority” to *640reduce Rodriguez’s term of imprisonment “as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” (id. at 419). In light of the Appellate Division’s holding, the People’s appeal to this Court became moot. However, a Judge of this Court once again granted Rodriguez leave to appeal (16 NY3d 836 [2011]). The majority now affirms the order of the Appellate Division and I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, pursuant to our holding in Sparber, a resentencing court is not empowered to revisit the incarceratory component of a defendant’s sentence (see majority op at 634-635). In Sparber, we found that the lower courts “intended to impose a sentence . . . that consisted of a determinate sentence and a period of PRS” (10 NY3d at 472). Absent any evidence to the contrary, we held the error in failing to pronounce PRS in those cases was “a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error” (id.). However, in concluding that vacatur of a defendant’s sentence was the appropriate remedy in these cases, we never sought to limit the trial court’s inherent power to revisit the incarceratory period of a sentence, if warranted.1 The majority’s assertion that a holding which allows a resentencing court to reconsider the incarceratory component of a defendant’s sentence would “Great [e] a situation where thousands of Sparber resentencings might have to be repeated” (majority op at 634) is purely speculative and assumes that resentencing courts, following our decision in Sparber, did not believe they had such authority in the first instance.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Appellate Division is without authority to modify a defendant’s resentence upon appeal to that court (see majority op at 635). It is axiomatic that “[a]n appeal to an intermediate appellate court may be taken as of right by [a] defendant from” a judgment of sentencing (CPL 450.10 [2]). “An appeal from a sentence . . . means an appeal from either the sentence originally imposed or from a resentence following an order vacating the original sentence” (CPL 450.30 [3] [emphasis added]). The appeal from a sentence “may be based upon the ground that such sentence either was (a) invalid as a matter of law, or (b) harsh or excessive” (CPL 450.30 [1]).
*641Here, Rodriguez does not assert that the sentence imposed by Supreme Court at the resentencing proceeding was invalid as a matter of law. Rather, he maintains that the Appellate Division may consider whether the sentence imposed by the lower court at resentencing was unduly “harsh or excessive” in its interest of justice discretion. I agree.
Indeed, CPL 470.15 (3) (c) specifically permits the Appellate Division to modify a sentence “[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of justice.” Moreover, CPL 470.15 (6) (b) defines “[t]he kinds of . . . modification[s] deemed to be made as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” to include a modification of “a sentence [that], though legal, was unduly harsh or severe.” Thus, contrary to the conclusion drawn by the majority, the Appellate Division’s authority to modify a judgment of resentence is not limited to a resentencing where it has been established that an “error or defect” has occurred (see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780, 783 [1992] [even though a sentence may be lawful, “(a)n intermediate appellate court has broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe”]).
The majority decision here has the effect of stripping the Appellate Division of the broad discretionary authority it enjoys to reduce a sentence in the interest of justice upon an appeal from a resentencing to that court as a matter of right. Thus, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit the case to that court for the exercise of its interest of justice discretion.2
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division in People v Sharlow and reverse in People v Rodriguez.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
In People v Lingle, People v Parisi, People v Murrell, People v Prendergast: Order affirmed.
*642Judges Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur with Judge Read; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Jones concur.
In People v Rodriguez: Order affirmed.
Judges Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur with Judge Read; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm in another opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Jones concur.
In People v Sharlow: Order reversed, etc.

. In that regard, we observed that a defendant is also free to make a motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 at any time alleging that the original sentencing court failed to consider PRS when determining the appropriate term of imprisonment (see Sparber, 10 NY3d at 471 n 6).

. The majority opines that my position in Rodriguez is inconsistent with my decision to affirm in Lingle and Prendergast (see majority op at 635-636 n 2). I disagree. In Lingle, the Appellate Division considered whether Lingle’s request for a reduction in the incarceratory portion of his sentence should be granted “as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” but found such request to be “without merit” (People v Lingle, 66 AD3d 582, 583 [1st Dept 2009]). By contrast, the Appellate Division in Rodriguez held that it had no interest of justice discretion to modify a sentence imposed in a Sparber resentencing.
Moreover, unlike Rodriguez, Lingle and Prendergast do not stand for the proposition that a resentencing court is precluded from revisiting the incarceratory component of a defendant’s prison sentence.