Court Opinion

ID: 2964362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:36.243233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.193182
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                  __________________

          No. 96-1217

                                    JAMES FERRARA,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                A. & V. FISHING, INC.,
                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                  __________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of  this Court  issued on October  21, 1996,  is
          amended as follows:

               On  page  15,  after  the  first  full  paragraph,  add  the

          following additional two paragraphs:

                    It may be helpful to add one further word.  In the
               district court, before the  plaintiff moved for summary
               judgment on unseaworthiness, a pretrial  conference was
               held  in  which defense  counsel  stated:  "This is  an
               unseaworthiness case, essentially," a point on which he
               elaborated  at some  length without  contradiction from
               plaintiff's  counsel.   When plaintiff  then  moved for
               summary judgment  on  this issue,  the  district  judge
               evidently  believed  that  the  entire  case  had  been
               submitted and  that plaintiff had  narrowed his  entire
               case to the unseaworthiness issue.  

                    Having lost on the summary judgment motion, and on
               its  motion  for reconsideration,  plaintiff eventually
               sought  to press again  on the negligence  claim and on
               the  maintenance and  cure claim.   We  think  that the
               subsequent confusion is largely due to the way in which
               counsel presented  the case  at the  initial conference
               and in  subsequent pleadings; but neither  is there any
               indication   that    plaintiff's   counsel   explicitly
               abandoned  the  negligence  or  maintenance   and  cure
               claims.    Under   these  circumstances,  and   without
               expressing  any view  whatever on  the merits  of these
               latter claims, we think that they have to be addressed.

             [FOR COPY WITH ADDENDUM, PLEASE CONTACT THE CLERK'S OFFICE]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1217

                                    JAMES FERRARA,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                A. & V. FISHING, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Joseph M.  Orlando with whom Paul L. Lees and Orlando & Associates
            __________________           ____________     ____________________
        were on brief for appellant.
            Leonard  H.  Kesten with  whom Steven  C.  Sharaf, Deidre  Brennan
            ___________________            __________________  _______________
        Regan,  and Brody,  Hardoon,  Perkins  &  Kesten  were  on  brief  for
        _____       ____________________________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 21, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   The first appeal in
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            this  admiralty case foundered on the final judgment rule, 28

            U.S.C.    1291.  That  procedural shoal has  been cleared and

            the  case now  refloats  to us  as  an appeal  by  plaintiff-

            appellant James  Ferrara from summary judgment for defendant-

            appellee A. & V.  Fishing, Inc.   In order to  understand the

            issues  before us we must  navigate the procedural history of

            the case.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                      The facts are  not in dispute.   Plaintiff was  the

            captain  of the fishing  vessel Josephine Marie.   The vessel

            was  on an  extended fishing  trip during  January and  early

            February  of 1992.    On January  28,  1992, the  vessel  was

            inspected  at sea by the Coast Guard; no safety violations or

            unsafe conditions were found.  On its way home on February 2,

            the ship struck  an unknown  submerged object.   It began  to

            take on  water, and after a  number of hours, sank.   It sank

            stern first and as the stern went deeper into the waters, the

            bow was raised.   As  a result, the  stairs running from  the

            pilothouse  were pitched at a steep angle.  Plaintiff fell as

            he descended the stairs and injured his knee.  Because of his

            injury, he was  unable to make it to  a life raft and  had to

            jump into the sea in order to avoid going down with the ship.

            The  sea at  the  time  was  running  rough  and  it  took  a

                                         -2-
                                          2

            considerable time before he  was rescued.  Plaintiff suffered

            physical and psychological injuries.  

                      Plaintiff filed  a three count  complaint on  March

            16, 1993.  Count  one sounded in Jones Act  negligence, count

            two  alleged  unseaworthiness,  and count  three  invoked the

            doctrine of maintenance and cure.

                      On May  5, 1994,  after a pretrial  conference, the

            district court  ordered that motions for  summary judgment be

            filed.  Plaintiff filed  a motion for summary judgment.   The

            first paragraph stated:

                        Now comes the plaintiff, James Ferrara,
                      in   the   above-captioned  action,   and
                      respectfully requests pursuant to Rule 56
                      of  the Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure
                      that this Honorable  Court grant  summary
                      judgment  in his  favor  on the  issue of
                                               ________________
                      unseaworthiness  of  the F/V  JOSEPHINE &
                      _______________
                      [sic] MARIE.  (Emphasis ours.)

            Plaintiff's memorandum  in support of his  motion for summary

            judgment focused  solely on unseaworthiness.   Negligence and

            maintenance  and  cure  were   not  mentioned.    Plaintiff's

            statement of facts admitted that the vessel had no mechanical

            problems,  the   pumps   were  operational   and  had   never

            malfunctioned,  and there had been  no problems with the main

            rudder,   the  steering   mechanism,  or  the   main  engine.

            Plaintiff's theory of unseaworthiness was that, as the vessel

            began to sink,  "she became entirely  unfit for her  intended

            purpose; that is to float and to fish."  He also claimed that

            because of  the steep angle,  the stairs from  the pilothouse

                                         -3-
                                          3

            were  no  longer  fit for  their  intended  purpose and  this

            rendered the vessel unseaworthy.

                      Defendant filed an opposition to plaintiff's motion

            for summary judgment and  a cross-motion for summary judgment

            in which it argued that the vessel was not unseaworthy.

                      On May 11, 1995, the district court ordered summary

            judgment  for  defendant.     In  its  three-page  memorandum

            explaining its judgment, the court found that  the sinking of

            the  Josephine  Marie  was due  to  its  striking  an unknown

            submerged object and that this fell within the "perils of the

            sea" doctrine.  It held:

                         The court therefore concludes that, on
                      the facts presented here, the  "perils of
                      the  sea" defense covers not only damages
                      caused by  the collision with  the sunken
                      object, but also  the resulting  injuries
                      to the plaintiff.2

                      __________

                         2It  is  important  to recognize  that
                      unseaworthiness may sometimes arise after
                      the ship  has left  harbor.   Mitchell v.
                                                    ___________
                      Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50
                      ___________________
                      (1960).  For  the purposes of this  case,
                      the  crucial issue  is the  cause  of the
                      unseaworthy condition, not  the point  at
                      which the condition arose.

                      Like the parties, the  court did not address either

            negligence  or  maintenance  and  cure.    Nevertheless,  the

            district  court docket  shows an  entry dated  May 12,  1995,

            stating:  "Case closed."

                                         -4-
                                          4

                      On  June 12,  1995,  plaintiff filed  a motion  for

            reconsideration  of  the  summary  judgment order.    In  his

            supporting memorandum,  plaintiff claimed that  the court had

            misunderstood   the  plaintiff's   factual   claim   on   the

            unseaworthiness  count.    Defendant opposed  the  motion for

            reconsideration on the grounds  that it was too late  for new

            theories  and the  court  did  not misunderstand  plaintiff's

            original theory.

                      The     district    court     denied    plaintiff's

            reconsideration  motion  on June  29, 1995.   It  also denied

            defendant's  motion  for  costs  and sanctions.    Its  order

            states, "Summary Judgment having been entered with respect to

            Counts  I and II of  plaintiff's complaint the  above case is

            hereby closed."   This was the first mention by  the court of

            count one.

                      On  July 19,  1995,  plaintiff moved  to amend  the

            order of June 29,  closing the case.  The motion  pointed out

            that  count  one  (Jones  Act  negligence)  and  count  three

            (maintenance and cure) had  not been briefed by  either party

            for summary judgment disposition.  The record shows that this

            assertion is correct.  The motion also tried to resurrect the

            unseaworthi-ness count.   Defendant opposed the  motion.  The

            court  denied plaintiff's  motion on  August 19,  1995.   The

            court's order stated:

                         This court's May  11, 1995  Memorandum
                      and  Order  disposed  of all  Plaintiff's

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      claims.   The Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
                      Order Dismissing and  Closing the Case is
                      therefore DENIED.

                         IT IS SO ORDERED.

                      Plaintiff then appealed,  referencing the  district

            court's orders of May 11, 1995, June 29, 1995, and August 19,

            1995.    There was  a flurry  of motions,  now of  no moment,

            addressed to the question of whether the appeal was late.

                      On  January  12,  1996,  we  dismissed  the  appeal

            because  it   was  from  orders  not   meeting  the  finality

            requirements of the final judgment rule.  A copy of our order

            is attached to this opinion as an addendum.  After discussing

            the procedural situation, we ended by stating:  "If it is the

            district court's  intention to  dismiss all three  counts and

            enter  a  final  judgment,  it should  enter  a  judgment  so

            providing, from which an appeal may be taken."

                      The  district  court  responded  to  our  order  on

            January 19,  1996,  by  issuing  an  amended  order  stating:

            "Summary Judgment having been  entered with respect to Counts

            I, II, and III  of plaintiff's complaint, the above-captioned

            case is closed."

                                         II.
                                         II.

                      Before   considering   the   appeal   directly,   a

            recapitulation of  the pertinent  admiralty law is  in order.

            It has long been established under admiralty law  that claims

            for  unseaworthiness, Jones  Act negligence,  and maintenance

                                         -6-
                                          6

            and cure are  separate and  distinct causes  of action,  each

            with its own unique elements.  In fact, 

                      [a] major burden of the [Supreme Court's]
                      decisions  spelling  out  the nature  and
                      scope   of  the   cause  of   action  for
                      unseaworthiness has  been insistence upon
                      the point  that it  is a remedy  separate
                      from, independent of,  and additional  to
                      other   claims  against   the  shipowner,
                      whether  created  by  statute [the  Jones
                      Act]  or  under   general  maritime   law
                      [maintenance and cure].  

            Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 498 (1971),
            __________________________________

            reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 1015; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,
            _____ ______                 _______________________________

            362  U.S. 539,  550  (1960)("What has  evolved is  a complete

            divorcement  of  unseaworthiness liability  from  concepts of

            negligence.").    The  distinctions  between  these  separate

            claims  retain validity  today.   See  Miles  v. Apex  Marine
                                              ___  ______________________

            Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29 (1990).
            _____

                      We have  consistently held that liability under the

            doctrine of unseaworthiness is not dependent upon theories of

            negligence.  CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d  694, 700 n.6
                         _________________________

            (1st Cir.  1995)("[A] plaintiff . . . could bring a Jones Act

            claim,  which  required a  showing  of  negligence, and/or  a

            general  maritime  unseaworthiness claim,  which  required no

            showing  of fault.").  We have also distinguished a claim for

            maintenance and  cure as separate from  other maritime causes

            of action.   LeBlanc v. B.G.T. Corp., 992  F.2d 394, 397 (1st
                         _______________________

            Cir. 1993)(Maintenance  and cure  "is curative in  nature and

            thus to be distinguished from other admiralty rights, such as

                                         -7-
                                          7

            the right to recover lost wages or the right to recover for a

            shipowner's negligence, which are compensatory."). 

                      The  distinctions are  not purely  academic borders

            separating the same substantive law for purposes of pleading.

            Indeed, a  district court's failure to  acknowledge the three

            doctrines' substantive differences usually requires reversal.

            In  Vargas v.  McNamara,  608 F.2d  15  (1st Cir.  1979),  we
                ___________________

            vacated the district court's  denial of plaintiff's motion to

            amend the complaint to  add a count of unseaworthiness  after

            the court had raised the issue  sua sponte.  Id. at 19.   The
                                            ___ ______   ___

            district  court  denied leave  to  amend  as futile  "because

            unseaworthiness had  not been  established by the  evidence,"

            which had focused exclusively  on the question of negligence.

            Id.   at   18.      We  responded   that   "liability   under
            ___

            unseaworthiness principles is not dependent upon fault."  Id.
                                                                      ___

            at 19 (citing  Mitchell, 362 U.S. at  549).  We  remanded the
                           ________

            case for  reconsideration  of the  motion  to amend,  and  if

            allowed, trial on the claim of unseaworthiness.  Id. at 21. 
                                                             ___

                      Other  circuit  courts agree  that unseaworthiness,

            Jones  Act negligence, and maintenance and cure are causes of

            action distinct from each other.  Stanislawski v. Upper River
                                              ___________________________

            Servs.,  Inc., 6 F.3d 537,  540 (8th Cir.  1993); Chisholm v.
            _____________                                     ___________

            Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 60,  62 (5th Cir.
            _________________________________

            1982); Liner  v. J.B. Talley and Co., Inc., 618 F.2d 327, 332
                   ___________________________________

            (5th Cir.), reh'g denied 623 F.2d 711 (1980).  
                        ____________

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      A brief  examination of the contours  of each cause

            of  action  demonstrates  the  necessity  of maintaining  the

            distinctions.

                                 A.  Unseaworthiness
                                 A.  Unseaworthiness

                      A  claim  based  on  unseaworthiness  enforces  the

            shipowner's "absolute duty to provide to every member  of his

            crew  'a vessel  and appurtenances  reasonably fit  for their

            intended use.'"  Hubbard v.  Faros Fisheries, Inc., 626  F.2d
                             _________________________________

            196, 199  (1st Cir. 1980)(quoting Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550);
                                              ________

            McAleer v. Smith, 57 F.3d 109, 112 (1st Cir. 1995).  The duty
            ________________

            includes maintaining the  ship and her equipment in  a proper

            operating condition, and can be breached either by transitory

            or  by permanent defects in the equipment.  Hubbard, 626 F.2d
                                                        _______

            at  199.     A "temporary  and  unforeseeable malfunction  or

            failure of a piece of equipment under proper and expected use

            is   sufficient  to   establish  a   claim  of   damages  for

            unseaworthiness."    Id. (citing  Usner,  400  U.S. at  499).
                                 ___          _____

            Finally, the  injured seaman must prove  that the unseaworthy

            condition  was  the sole  or  proximate cause  of  the injury

            sustained.    Id.   Although  the  duty  is absolute,  "[t]he
                          ___

            standard  is not  perfection, but  reasonable fitness;  not a

            ship that will weather every imaginable peril of the sea, but

            a  vessel  reasonably  suitable  for  her intended  service."

            Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550.  
            ________

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      Most important  to this discussion is  that a claim

            of  unseaworthiness  is  not  dependent  upon  a  finding  of

            negligence.  "The reason,  of course, is that unseaworthiness

            is a condition,  and how  that condition came  into being  --
                 _________

            whether by negligence or otherwise  -- is quite irrelevant to

            the owner's  liability for  personal injuries  resulting from

            it."  Usner, 400 U.S. at 498 (emphasis in original).
                  _____

                               B.  Jones Act Negligence
                               B.  Jones Act Negligence

                      A short description of the origins of the Jones Act

            illustrates the historical distinction between claims brought

            under  the Act, and those brought under general maritime law.

            Early in  this century, the  Supreme Court ruled  that seamen

            could recover under general  maritime law for unseaworthiness

            and  for maintenance and cure,  but not for  negligence.  The
                                                                      ___

            Osceola,  189 U.S. 158 (1903).   In response, Congress passed
            _______

            the  Jones Act which provided  injured seamen with "an action

            for  damages  at  law."    46  U.S.C.    688.    Seamen  may,

            therefore, maintain an action  where an employer's failure to

            exercise  reasonable  care  causes a  subsequent  injury even

            where  the  employer's negligence  did  not  render the  ship

            unseaworthy.  See Toucet v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d
                          ___ _________________________________

            5, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).

                      Jones Act negligence differs, however, from that of

            ordinary  common law  negligence.   Under  the  Jones Act,  a

            plaintiff's  burden for  proving  causation  is  considerably

                                         -10-
                                          10

            lower  than  what the  common law  requires.   "A plaintiff's

            burden  of   proving  causation   under  the  Jones   Act  is

            'featherweight.'"  Toucet, 991 F.2d at 10 (citation omitted).
                               ______

            Liability,  therefore, "exists  if the  employer's negligence

            contributed even in the slightest to the plaintiff's injury."

            Id.  
            ___

                               C.  Maintenance and Cure
                               C.  Maintenance and Cure

                      "From  time  immemorial, the  law  of  the sea  has

            required  shipowners to  ensure the  maintenance and  cure of

            seamen who fall ill or become injured while in service of the

            ship."    LeBlanc,  992  F.2d  at  396  (citing  Benedict  on
                      _______                                ____________

            Admiralty,    41-42 (6th ed.  1993)); see Aguilar v. Standard
            _________                             ___ ___________________

            Oil  Co. of  N.J., 318  U.S. 724,  730-33  (1943).   The term
            _________________

            refers to "the provision of, or payment for, food and lodging

            ('maintenance') as well as any necessary health-care expenses

            ('cure')  incurred  during the  period  of  recovery from  an

            injury or malady."   LeBlanc,  992 F.2d  at 397.   The  right
                                 _______

            attaches  "largely  without regard  to  fault;  a seaman  may

            forfeit   his   entitlement   only  by   engaging   in  gross

            misconduct."   Id.  The entitlement attaches until the seaman
                           ___

            is  "so  far cured  as possible."    Id. (quoting  Farrell v.
                                                 ___           __________

            United States, 336 U.S.  511, 518 (1949)).  And  finally, the
            _____________

            right  is available only to a  "seaman" who is "in service of

            the ship" at the time of the injury or onset of illness.  Id.
                                                                      ___

                                         -11-
                                          11

            (citing Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 732);  Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
                    _______                     _______

                                         -12-
                                          12

                                         III.
                                         III.

                      We  now  examine  plaintiff's  appeal  from summary

            judgment  for defendant on all  three counts.   We employ the

            well-established  standard  of review  of  summary judgments.

            Our review is  plenary, and the facts are viewed in the light

            most favorable to the non-moving party -- here the plaintiff.

            Borschow Hosp. and Medical  Supplies, Inc. v. Cesar Castillo,
            _____________________________________________________________

            Inc., No. 96-1113, slip  op. at 3 (Sept. 23,  1996).  We  may
            ____

            not affirm an order granting summary judgment unless there is

            no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party

            is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 8.
                                                         ___

                      We start with the unseaworthiness claim, count two.

            Based  on the facts as  stated by plaintiff  in his complaint

            and in his  papers filed in the district court  on the cross-

            motions  for summary  judgment,  we agree  with the  district

            court that the  "perils of the sea" doctrine mandated summary

            judgment for defendant.

                      In  the context of this case, the perils of the sea

            doctrine  excuses  the  owner/operator  from  liability  when

            "those perils which are peculiar to the sea, and which are of

            an extraordinary  nature or arise from  irresistible force or

            overwhelming power,  and which  cannot be guarded  against by

            the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence" intervene

            to cause the damage or  injury.  R.T. Jones Lumber  Co., Inc.
                                             ____________________________

                                         -13-
                                          13

            v. Roen S.S. Co.,  270 F.2d 456, 458 (2d  Cir. 1959)(citation
            ________________

            omitted).

                      Two  characteristics  of  the doctrine  inform  the

            discussion as it relates to the present case.  First, a peril

            of the sea  is an unforeseeable situation.  Pace, 838 F.2d at
                                                        ____

            577   (peril   of  the   sea   described   as  "unknown   and

            unascertainable")  (quoting  Boston Ins.  Co.  v. Dehydrating
                                         ________________________________

            Process Co., 204 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1953)).  Second, the
            ___________

            determination of whether a peril of the sea exists "is wholly

            dependent on the facts of each case and is not  amenable to a

            general standard."    Thyssen, 21  F.3d  at 539;  see  Taisho
                                  _______                     ___  ______

            Marine & Fire Ins.  Co., Ltd. v. M/V Sea-Land  Endurance, 815
            ________________________________________________________

            F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1987). 

                      The  memorandum opinion includes  recitation of two

            facts  important to  this analysis:  (1) both  parties agreed

            "that  the ship  was seaworthy  at all  times until  the ship

            struck  the submerged object and began to take on water," and

            (2) both  parties agreed that a submerged object qualifies as

            a "peril of the sea."  

                      The  court  below  determined that  in  striking  a

            submerged  object,  the   wholly  seaworthy  Josephine  Marie

            encountered  a  peril of  the sea  which  caused the  hull to

            rupture  and   the  vessel   to  sink,     thereby  defeating

            plaintiff's claim  of unseaworthiness.  Ferrara,  slip op. at
                                                    _______

            3.   Certainly, a submerged  object lurking below the surface

                                         -14-
                                          14

            of apparently navigable  waters satisfies the requirement  of

            unforeseeability.  Applying the perils of the sea doctrine to

            the stipulated facts, the collision with the submerged object

            was  "unknown  and  unascertainable."    Plaintiff    himself

            stipulated both that the vessel was seaworthy until it struck

            the submerged object, and that a submerged object constitutes

            a  peril  of the  sea.   The  district court  was, therefore,

            correct when it determined  that a peril of  the sea was  the

            cause  of  the  vessel's  sinking  and   consequentially  the

            plaintiff's injuries.

                      Plaintiff  has attempted  to change  the stipulated

            facts  and   his  theory  of  unseaworthiness  after  summary

            judgment issued.   He did this by alleging, in his motion for

            reconsideration below and in argument to this court, that the

            district  court misunderstood  his claim  of unseaworthiness.

            As he put it in his motion for reconsideration:

                         It is not  the plaintiff's  contention
                      that  the  sinking   vessel  caused   Mr.
                      Ferrara's  injuries.   Rather, it  is the
                      plaintiff's position that the collapse of
                      the bulkhead wall  between the  lazarette
                      and  the fish  hold  was the  unseaworthy
                      condition  which   caused  Mr.  Ferrara's
                      injury.

            This contention  was not made either  explicitly or impliedly

            in plaintiff's summary judgment  submissions.  His claim that

            the  district court "misunderstood" his unseaworthiness claim

            is an egregious contrivance to avoid our firmly embedded rule

            that  we will  not  consider on  appeal  theories not  timely

                                         -15-
                                          15

            advanced in the district court.  United States v. Alzanki, 54
                                             ________________________

            F.3d 994,  1009 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909
                                             _____ ______

            (1996); Sandstrom  v. ChemLawn  Corp., 904  F.2d 83,  86 (1st
                    _____________________________

            Cir. 1990).   

                      As already  noted, neither the Jones Act negligence

            count nor  the maintenance and  cure count were  submitted to

            the court for summary judgment decision or argued to it.  Nor

            does  the record  indicate that  the court  in fact  gave any

            consideration to  either of these issues, before or after our

            first remand order in this case.  The judgments on counts one

            and three  must, therefore,  be vacated and  remanded to  the

            district court for further proceedings.

                      It may  be helpful to add one further word.  In the

            district  court,  before  the  plaintiff  moved  for  summary

            judgment on unseaworthiness,  a pretrial conference was  held

            in which defense counsel  stated: "This is an unseaworthiness

            case,  essentially," a point  on which he  elaborated at some

            length  without contradiction from plaintiff's counsel.  When

            plaintiff then moved for summary judgment  on this issue, the

            district judge  evidently believed  that the entire  case had

            been  submitted and  that plaintiff  had narrowed  his entire

            case to the unseaworthiness issue.  

                      Having lost on the  summary judgment motion, and on

            its motion  for reconsideration, plaintiff  eventually sought

            to press again on the negligence claim and on the maintenance

                                         -16-
                                          16

            and  cure claim.  We  think that the  subsequent confusion is

            largely due to the way in which counsel presented the case at

            the  initial  conference  and  in  subsequent  pleadings; but

            neither  is  there any  indication  that plaintiff's  counsel

            explicitly abandoned the negligence  or maintenance and  cure

            claims.   Under these  circumstances, and  without expressing

            any  view whatever on the  merits of these  latter claims, we

            think that they have to be addressed.

                      Although the  district court  is free to  treat the

            remanded counts as  it deems  best, we note  that the  record

            discloses that discovery was completed as to all counts.  

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion

                      The summary  judgment on  count one is  vacated and

            remanded for further proceedings.

                      The summary judgment on count two is affirmed.

                      The summary judgment on  count three is vacated and

            remanded for further proceedings.

                      No costs to either party.  

                      So Ordered.
                      So Ordered.
                      ___________

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