Court Opinion

ID: 8896280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 00:04:02.649683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:30.652414
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I disagree that standing for Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission (WUTC) should be based on the alternative ground of parens patriae. Not only is the parens patriae reasoning unnecessary to decide this case but application of the doctrine appears to be barred by Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). There Massachusetts, acting as parens patriae, sued to prevent enforcement of the Maternity Act of 1921, alleging that it was an unconstitutional usurpation of state power. The Court stated:
We need not go so far as to say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress; but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here. [T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United States. It cannot be conceded that a state, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the state, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens (Missouri v. Illinois and Chicago District, 180 U.S. 208, 241 [21 S.Ct. 331, 45 L.Ed. 497]), it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that status.
Id. at 485-86, 43 S.Ct. at 600.
The Supreme Court has relied upon Massachusetts v. Mellon to deny Florida standing to act as parens patriae in an action to enjoin collection of federal inheritance taxes in Florida. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18, 47 S.Ct. 265, 71 L.Ed. 511 (1927). The Court has also denied standing to the Governor of Louisiana to bring an original action on behalf of the state to enjoin the enforcement of a regulation under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 fixing maximum prices for strawberries. Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 707, 64 S.Ct. 1043, 88 L.Ed. 1551 (1944) (Per Curiam). See H. Hart and H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 276 (2d ed. 1973).
*1170The holding of Massachusetts v. Mellon has not been, as the majority contends, “eroded by time.” This phrase is from the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 889, 91 S.Ct. 128, 27 L.Ed.2d 130 (1970), a case in which Massachusetts sought to adjudicate the constitutionality of the participation of the United States in the Vietnam war. The majority, however, denied the state leave to file a complaint either because it lacked standing or because it did not present a justi-ciable controversy. See id. at 887, 91 S.Ct. 128 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Solicitor General had argued that Massachusetts v. Mellon barred the suit. See id. Thus, if anything, this case implies that the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon is alive and well.
Moreover, I believe the majority is wrong in asserting in footnote 16 that South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), “allowed a state to challenge as parens patriae an allegedly unconstitutional congressional statute.” Quite the contrary, the Court held that Massachusetts v. Mellon barred a parens patriae suit by South Carolina. Id. at 324, 86 S.Ct. 803. Standing was granted to the state, not as parens patriae but in its own right, because the Voting Rights Act of 1965 arguably invaded powers reserved to the states. See id. at 323-327, 86 S.Ct. 803.
Finally, our decision in Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816, 87 S.Ct. 35, 17 L.Ed.2d 54 (1966), cites Massachusetts v. Mellon with approval in a situation identical to that presented by this case. There the California counterpart to WUTC challenged an ICC public notice that invited telephone companies to propose tariffs reducing interstate rates. We reasoned that public utility regulation has historically been a legislative function and that rate fixing by a regulatory commission is an essentially legislative act. Id., 356 F.2d at 241. In a footnote we then discussed the parens patriae issue:
This raises the question of whether petitioner has standing to maintain this suit in its capacity as a representative of the people of the State of California. It has long been recognized that a state, as parens patriae, cannot institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of federal statutes because it is the United States, not the state, to whom citizens of the United States must look as parens patriae for protection of whatever rights they might have under federal legislation. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 61 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).
Id. 356 F.2d at 241 n.1 (dictum).
I must also specifically dissociate myself from footnote 17 of the majority opinion, which states that National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) has standing in its own right. As with the parens patriae discussion, this ground for standing is not needed to decide this case. True, the majority has admitted it to be dicta and placed it in a footnote. Nevertheless, the argument should not go unchallenged.
The majority asserts that NARUC has standing because “Congress has accorded NARUC official status as the representative of- state regulatory agencies in dealing with the basic problem underlying these petitions for review.” I believe this to be incorrect. Congress has created a Federal-State Joint Board to consider the problems of allocating common carrier property and expenses between interstate and intrastate operations (which is one basis for determining telephone rates). 47 U.S.C. § 410(c). Each time the Federal Communications Commission has a proceeding which concerns the separation problem, it creates a Joint Board to act as a hearing examiner. The board then forwards its recommended decision to the full FCC. The board is composed of three FCC members and four state commissioners “nominated by the national organization of *1171State commissions,” which is NARUC. The state members may participate in the subsequent FCC deliberations, but they do not have a vote. Id.
Thus it is inaccurate to say that NA-RUC has “official status as the representative of state regulatory agencies,” at least with respect to the functions of the Joint Board. First, NARUC only nominates the state members — the commission still has the responsibility to select them. The FCC’s dominant role in the selection process is illustrated by the parallel provisions of subsection (a) giving the commission discretion to reject any nominee. 47 U.S.C. § 410(a). Second, only the state agency members actually appointed to the Joint Board serve as representatives of state commissions. They, not NARUC, sit on the board as hearing examiners; they, not NARUC, participate in the subsequent FCC deliberations.
NARUC’s role is, therefore, rather limited. The organization itself cannot be injured by the FCC’s action in the present matter: Its’ right to nominate will remain unimpaired. Certainly NA-RUC has an interest in the matter but only as an interest group like the Sierra Club. It may indeed have standing to challenge FCC decisions but only by asserting injury in fact to its members. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734— 735, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).
Finally, I do not believe the reliance upon and quotations from National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 443 F.2d 689, 694 (1971), in the footnote are persuasive. That case was decided prior to Sierra Club v. Morton and, in my judgment, is inconsistent with the latter’s requirement of injury in fact to organization members. See 405 U.S. at 738—740, 92 S.Ct. 1361.