Court Opinion

ID: 9788716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:09.400892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.154316
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting: I would find that forcing Bunyard to defend against the three unrelated charges in a consolidated trial deprived him of a legal advantage and denied him a fair trial.
I agree with the majority’s assertion that “[w]hen the offenses are only of the same general character, there should be separate informations and separate trials.” I disagree with the majority’s *870finding that E.N.’s case was sufficiently similar to the other two cases to warrant joinder. The charges involving A.P. and L.B. alleged the victims were unwilling participants from the beginning. Those victims described nonconsensual clothing removal and forcible, unwanted penetration.
On the other hand, E.N. was “okay” with kissing Bunyard and continued that kissing while her clothing was being removed. Although she testified that the removal of her pants made her uncomfortable, she acknowledged that she did not give any indication that it was unacceptable behavior. Only after Bunyard had put on a condom, laid E.N. back onto the car seat, and placed his penis inside her vagina did E.N. state, “I don’t want to do this. Please don’t make me do this.”
As indicated in the majority’s analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence issue, E.N.’s case presents an issue of first impression in this state, i.e., whether the withdrawal of consent during coitus transforms the act into the crime of rape. That scenario is dissimilar to the traditional forcible rapes alleged in the other two cases. By consolidating the two types of r.ape cases, “ ‘there would inevitably be some jumbling of the two cases at the trial, which would tend to prevent that concentrated consideration of each case which is indispensable in matters of such gravity.’ ” State v. Barksdale, 266 Kan. 498, 508, 973 P.2d 165 (1999) (quoting State v. Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 62, 29 P.2d 1101 [1934]). The theoiy of Bunyard’s culpability in the E.N. incident was unique. The joinder of the two charges alleging forcible penetration “jumbled” Bunyard’s legal advantage of arguing that E.N. consented to the commencement of sexual intercourse.
The majority accepts the State’s argument that Bunyard’s desire to testify in only one of the cases is not controlling because it would allow the defendant to dictate severance, rather than leaving the decision to the trial court’s discretion, and because Bunyard had the option of not testifying at all. The “tail should not wag the dog” rationale is less than compelling. The test enunciated by the majority includes a determination of whether joinder will deprive the defendant of some legal advantage. Because of differing factual patterns in the three cases, Bunyard had a credible reason for want*871ing to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent in only two of the cases. In other cases, the trial court will have the opportunity to assess whether joinder will legitimately compromise the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. The State’s forcing Bunyard into an all or nothing situation was unnecessary to preserve the authority of future trial courts to determine whether joinder is appropriate. Just as Bunyard had the option of not testifying in all three cases, the State had the option of trying the three unrelated cases separately.
Missing from the State’s argument is a persuasive reason for consolidating the three cases. The State’s brief does allege that “several witnesses would have had to repeatedly testify to the numerous times had separate trial [sic] been granted.” However, of the State’s 15 witnesses, only one provided testimony on more than one charge and that was a police chemist who testified about the results from the rape kits. The only way that the State’s witnesses would have testified in more than one trial is if the State could establish admissibility of the prior bad acts. However, the State, citing Barksdale, asserts that joinder is not dependent on the consolidated crimes meeting the admissibility test of K.S.A. 60-455. Apparently, the State may argue that the other crimes would be admissible in separate trials, but the defendant is not permitted to argue that joinder permits otherwise inadmissible evidence to be introduced.
Most conspicuous is the absence of an explanation as to why the State delayed prosecuting the rapes. A.P. reported her rape in December 1999; E.N. reported her rape in August 2000; L.B. reported her rape in January 2001. Bunyard was charged with all three crimes in Februaiy 2001. In contrast, Barksdale, relied upon by the State and the majority, presented a situation in which the State learned of both murders at the same time. It is inconceivable that even the busiest prosecutor would leave a rapist on the street for a year in the interest of judicial economy. One can only surmise that by consolidating the accumulated rape reports in one prosecution, the State hoped to strengthen all three cases by inferring that Bunyard was disposed to commit date rape. Promoting the jury’s use of character propensity reasoning would not be allowed *872in a separate trial. See K.S.A. 60-455. It should not be permitted via the use of joinder.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the charges involving E.N., without evidence of the other two incidents. Upon retrial, the jury would be entitled to an explanation of when, if ever, a rape can occur following consensual commencement of sexual intercourse.
Although one might ponder whether a person’s criminal culpability for refusing to prematurely terminate sexual intercourse should be equated with that of a person who forcibly penetrates an unwilling participant, that policy decision is not ours to make. The legislature has defined rape, as applied to E.N.’s case, as having three elements: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) without consent; and (3) when the victim is overcome by force or fear. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3502(a) (1) (A). The statute does not prescribe the order in which the elements must occur.
Ordinarily, the absence of consent and the presence of force or fear precede the penetration, making tire rape complete upon the slightest penetration. However, penetration does not complete the sexual intercourse; rather, that term would apply to the continuing copulation until terminated by withdrawal. However, a participant is not required to complete the act of coitus; consent may be withdrawn. At drat point, two of the rape elements are present, i.e. sexual intercourse and lack of consent. The rape only becomes complete when the culprit effects continuation of sexual intercourse by overcoming the victim by force or fear. The evidence presented in E.N.’s case would have supported a jury’s finding of rape on the basis of forcible continuation of sexual intercourse after the withdrawal of consent.