Court Opinion

ID: 9678347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:17:13.940771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:03.739363
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that prosecution of the defendant was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
Section 628.26 (1980) provides:
Indictments for murder may be found at any time after the death of the person killed; indictments for violation of section 609.42, subdivision 1, clauses (1) or (2) shall be found and filed in the proper court within six years after the commission of the offense; in all other cases, indictments shall be found and filed in the proper court within three years after the commission of the offense; but the time during which the defendant shall not be an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, this state, shall not constitute any part of the limitations imposed by this section.
This statute is explicit. The legislature amended this section in 19761 by providing that the statute of limitations for bribery involving public officials be six years, but continued to provide that “in all other cases,” except murder, the limitations would remain at three years. For example, the serious crime of manslaughter remains at three years.
It seems that this is a matter of substantive law for the legislature to determine. Had the legislature wished to except or extend the limitation on the crime of concealing stolen property 2 or other crimes, it could easily have done so.
In recognition of the dangers associated with allowing prosecutions to “ferment endlessly in the files,”3 legislative bodies enact *255statutes of limitations such as Minn.Stat. § 628.26 (1980). The majority’s holding that the legislature’s intent was to make this crime a continuing offense contravenes three general rules concerning the construction of statutes of the type in question. The first general rule, endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, is “that criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.’ ” United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227, 88 S.Ct. 926, 929, 19 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1968) (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522, 52 S.Ct. 416, 417, 76 L.Ed. 917 (1932)); subsequently reaffirmed by Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 860, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). Second, where a criminal statute of limitations sets a specific limited period for a particular class of crimes, it has been recognized that the particular offense should not be construed as a continuing one “unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. at 860 (emphasis added).4 Finally, the majority’s position is not in keeping with the general practice of construing criminal statutes liberally in the defendant’s favor. See United States v. Satz, 109 F.Supp. 94, 96 (N.D.N.Y.1952).
To agree with the state’s position will yield absurd and unintended results. Prosecutions for “receiving stolen property” could be brought 20 or more years after the original theft. The issues presented by such prosecutions would inevitably involve the presentation of stale evidence or create an untenable situation where the defendant could not obtain sufficient evidence for a proper defense. See Note, Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev. 630, 632, 642 (1954). In view of the fact that limitations of greater than three years are reserved for the most serious offenses of murder and bribery of public officials, I cannot agree that the legislature intended to place this type of property crime in the same category.
Consequently, neither the policies that gave rise to criminal statutes of limitations nor the wording of the statute supports the majority’s conclusion that the legislature intended the offense with which the defendant was charged to be a continuing crime.5 Therefore, the three-year period having run prior to the defendant’s prosecution, that prosecution was barred,6 and I would reverse.

. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 184, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 636.

. The crime involved in this case is Minn.Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1(1) (1980):
Any person who receives, possesses, transfers, buys or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery, knowing the same to be stolen or obtained by robbery, may be sentenced as follows:
(1) If the value of the property received, bought or concealed is $150 or more, to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
The words “possesses, transfers” (above) were added by Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 232, § 1, 1979 Minn.Laws 484, which also provides:
This act is effective August 1, 1979 and applies to all offenses committed on or after that date and to all persons convicted of a crime committed on or after that date.
Id., § 3.

. “Statutes of limitation are founded upon the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the *255government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.” United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F.Supp. 777, 781 (D.N.J.1942).

.The Toussie court was interpreting the federal criminal statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).

. See State ex rel. Sargent v. Tahash, 280 Minn. 507, 160 N.W.2d 139 (1968) (holding that the crime of child abandonment under Minn.Stat. § 617.55 (1961) (since repealed) was generally recognized as a continuing offense which is not committed by any overt act but by omission and neglect).

. Such a holding would not preclude appropriate civil litigation. See In re Estate of Congdon, 309 N.W.2d 261 (Minn.1981).