Court Opinion

ID: 9379836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 16:07:12.079874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.390198
License: Public Domain

J-S44006-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PURNELL RUDOLPH NELSON                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 614 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 30, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001113-2012

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                   FILED: MARCH 16, 2023

        Purnell Rudolph Nelson (“Nelson”) brings this pro se appeal from the

order denying his third petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        Nelson was implicated in the December 15, 2011, shooting death of

Travis Vogelsong. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, on December 19,

2012, Nelson openly pled guilty to third degree murder - mentally ill. He was

sentenced to serve a term of incarceration of fifteen to forty years on February

14, 2013.

        Nelson filed a timely PCRA petition on September 16, 2013. Appointed

counsel was permitted to withdraw, and the PCRA court denied relief on

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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December 18, 2013. On January 17, 2017, Nelson filed, pro se, his second

PCRA petition, and the PCRA court denied relief on March 21, 2017.

      On September 1, 2021, Nelson filed the instant PCRA petition. The PCRA

court dismissed the petition on March 30, 2022. This timely appeal followed.

      On April 25, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order directing Nelson to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days, i.e., May 16, 2022.

Nelson failed to comply. Rather, in a pro se letter to the Clerk of Courts dated

May 18, 2022, and filed in the PCRA court on May 23, 2022, Nelson requested

additional time to file his Rule 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court denied

Nelson’s request for an extension of time on June 8, 2022. The PCRA court

received Nelson’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement on June 16, 2022. In his

Rule 1925(b) statement, Nelson asserts his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for

failing to advise him of the right to file post-trial and sentencing motions and

so his right to appeal should be reinstated nunc pro tunc.” Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 6/16, 22, at 1.

      In his appellate brief, Nelson argues that the PCRA court erred and

abused its discretion in failing to grant him an extension of time to file his Rule

1925(b) statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-10. Nelson alleges that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him meeting the filing deadline.

Specifically, Nelson, who suffers a mental disability, claims that a Covid-19

outbreak in his prison unit kept him under quarantine and prevented him from

requesting an extension of time until the restriction was lifted. See id.

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Therefore, we are compelled to address the ramifications of Nelson’s failure to

file the court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement in a timely manner.

      Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is whether the

record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s

determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d

317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See id.

      A Rule 1925(b) statement “is a crucial component of the appellate

process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues

the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d

1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020). Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii) directs that “[i]ssues not

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions

of   this   paragraph   (b)(4)   are   waived.”   Pa.R.A.P.   1925(b)(vii).    In

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court

established the bright-line rule that “in order to preserve their claims for

appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders

them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule

1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”

Id. at 309. See also Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011)

(Pa.R.A.P. 1925 “obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b)

statement, when so ordered”).

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      Regarding appeals under the PCRA, our Supreme Court has reiterated

that “a litigant appealing from the denial of PCRA relief is required to strictly

comply with the provisions of Rule 1925(b), or his or her appellate issues are

deemed to be waived.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa.

2020) (citation omitted).

      However, Rule 1925(b)(2) permits a party to seek an extension for filing

a Rule 1925(b) statement “for good cause shown.” Examples of good cause

as provided in the note to Rule 1925(b)(2) include the retaining or appointing

of new counsel, “a serious delay in the transcription of the notes of testimony

or in the delivery of the order to appellate counsel.” Id. The note to Rule

1925(b)(2) further explains that “nunc pro tunc relief is allowed when there

has   been    a   breakdown    in   the   process   constituting   extraordinary

circumstances. … Courts have also allowed nunc pro tunc relief when ‘non-

negligent circumstances, either as they relate to appellant or his counsel’

occasion delay.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2), note.

      Also, our Supreme Court clarified that “an appellant who seeks an

extension of time to file a Statement must do so by filing a written application

with the trial court, setting out good cause for such extension, and requesting

an order granting the extension.” Commonwealth v. Gravely, 970 A.2d

1137, 1143 (Pa. 2009). An appellant’s failure to seek an extension as

prescribed by Rule 1925(b) will result in waiver of the additional issues not

timely raised.

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       In   addition,    we    note    that    Nelson   directs   our   attention   to

Commonwealth v. Pruden, 2256 EDA 2020, 268 A.3d 404 (Pa. Super. filed

November 5, 2021), a non-precedential memorandum decision of this Court

to support his request that the matter be remanded for a hearing to address

whether he is entitled to nunc pro tunc acceptance of his Rule 1925(b)

statement.1 See Appellant’s Brief at 9-11. In Pruden, the appellant had

difficulty complying with the timing requirements of Rule 1925(b). Pruden

alleged his noncompliance was caused by mailing delays that postponed

timely receipt of the trial court’s order and Covid-19 emergency restrictions

at the courthouse. Pruden sent multiple letters to the trial court explaining his

difficulty in timely filing his Rule 1925(b) statement and seeking an extension

of time. However, the trial court did not address the concerns in Pruden’s

letters. Rather, the trial court entered an order that “denied and dismissed”

the appeal.

       In concluding that Pruden’s request for relief should be considered by

the trial court, we observed that “[the a]ppellant’s Letter … offered further

factual averments that [the a]ppellant’s delay was neither intentional nor

negligent.” Pruden, 2256 EDA 2020, 268 A.3d 404, at *12. We further noted

that “[w]hile [the a]ppellant’s concise statement was untimely, his contentions

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1 Under amended Pa.R.A.P. 126, non-precedential decisions are not binding
but may be cited as “persuasive” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (stating
that unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after
May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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within his letters …, if supported by evidence deemed credible by the trial

court, may demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or a breakdown in the

judicial process that warrant relief from waiver for untimeliness.” Id.

Consequently, we remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing

to address whether Pruden’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement warrants nunc

pro tunc relief due to a breakdown in the judicial process or other

extraordinary circumstances. See id.

     Instantly, our review of the record reflects that, on April 25, 2022, the

PCRA court ordered Nelson to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. The deadline for

filing the statement was May 16, 2022. Nelson sent a letter addressed to the

Clerk of Court, which was dated May 18, 2022, two days beyond the filing

deadline. In the letter that contained a “Re:” line stating: “Delay in Filing

Concise Statement,” Nelson attested the following:

     • my housing unit has been under [quarantine] for the last two
     weeks because of COVID-19. And

     • just now, today to be exact, I was able to make it down to the
     library for only 45 minutes.

     • This was not sufficient time for me to complete the concise
     statement.

     Please I am asking for more time to file my concise statement.

Letter, 5/18/22, at 1. The record further reflects that on June 8, 2022, the

PCRA court denied, as untimely filed, Nelson’s request for an extension of

time. See Order 6/8/22, at 1.

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       As Nelson explains in his brief, he “attempted to remedy the [timeliness]

problem as soon as the quarantine was lifted.”2 Appellant’s Brief at 9. If the

averments in Nelson’s letter concerning the Covid-19 outbreak and multi-

week quarantine are true, these are circumstances caused through no fault of

his own. As was the case in Pruden, if proven, the circumstances raised by

Nelson may warrant nunc pro tunc relief.

       However, we need not follow Pruden’s lead, as we have Nelson’s

proposed 1925(b) statement, and we conclude that even if it had been timely

filed, Nelson would be due no relief as he has not established his current, third

PCRA petition was eligible for an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.

       We must raise issues with the timeliness of a PCRA petition sua sponte:

       Because the time limitations established by the PCRA are
       jurisdictional in nature, a court lacks jurisdiction to address the
       claims raised in an untimely petition. The PCRA provides that a
       petition for relief must be filed within one year of the date final
       judgment is entered. A judgment becomes final for purposes of
       the PCRA at the conclusion of direct review or after the time
       provided for seeking direct review has lapsed, if no direct review
       has been taken.

Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40, 45 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

____________________________________________

2 We note that in his brief Nelson has cited to two exhibits to support his claim
that his housing unit was under quarantine and that he wrote additional letters
explaining the circumstances and requesting an extension of time. See
Appellant’s Brief at 9. However, we have not been able to locate these items
in the certified record.

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       Here, Nelson was sentenced on February 13, 2013, and his judgment of

sentence became final on March 15, 2013. Therefore, the PCRA’s one year

time-bar expired on March 17, 2014.3 This current petition, filed in 2021, is

patently untimely, unless Nelson pleaded and proved that an exception to the

time-bar applied.

       In his petition, Nelson alleged that his mental illness prevented him from

knowing earlier that trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the

trial court’s failure to advise him of his right to file post-sentence motions.

See PCRA Petition, 9/1/2021, at 3. He argued this constituted a previously

unknown fact, therefore qualifying for an exception to the time-bar under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Nelson bore the burden of establishing his petition

was subject to the previously unknown fact exception. See Commonwealth

v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012).

       Broad claims of mental illness generally do not qualify as a previously

unknown fact under section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Commonwealth v. Ali, 86

A.3d 173, (Pa. 2014). The one narrow exception to this general rule is if the

petitioner can establish he was mentally incompetent during the time he was

eligible to timely raise the claim under the PCRA. See id., at 178.

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3 We note that a PCRA petition needed to be filed on or before Monday, March
17, 2014, because March 15, 2014, was a Saturday. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
(stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such
period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be
omitted from the computation).

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      Here, Nelson merely alleged that he is mentally ill. Since his claim is one

of trial counsel ineffectiveness, he was required to plead and prove that he

was mentally incompetent from March 15, 2013, to March 17, 2014. To the

contrary, he has not pleaded that he was incompetent at that time, whether

he was mentally ill at that time, or even what mental illness he claims to

suffer. Further, Nelson was represented by counsel for the purpose of his first,

timely PCRA petition in 2013. Even if we were to find that he was incompetent

at that time, he would be required to establish PCRA counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise this claim at that time. As a result, his third PCRA petition

did not qualify for an exception to the time-bar. The PCRA court therefore did

not have jurisdiction to entertain his untimely third petition, and properly

denied relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/16/2023

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