Court Opinion

ID: 9663911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:54:55.380986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:58.962246
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. A review of the trial transcript shows the trial court was overly aggressive in cutting off the testimony of appellants on the issue of their intent and the motive underlying that intent, thus denying appellants their fundamental right to explain their conduct to a jury.
The trial started with a questionable decision by the state to move in limine to keep from the jury any and all evidence the defendants might want to offer to establish the defense of necessity or justification, and to exclude any evidence offered by defendants as to their motive and intent as it would relate to a claim of right. This specific prosecutorial tactic was criticized in Minnesota’s leading case on political trespass, State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745 (Minn.1984).
The use of a motion in limine against a defendant in a criminal case * * * is questionable considering the constitutional rights of defendants.
Id. at 748.
I can agree with the majority that the trial court did not commit reversible error by limiting appellants’ use of the necessity defense. Other means are available to protesters, including their constitutionally protected right to peacefully picket, assemble, and speak against a Planned Parenthood Clinic. However, appellants’ claim of right issue is distinct and different from the claim of necessity. I find Brechon controlling. Appellants had at least a color of claim of right. Minn.Stat. § 145.412, subd. 1(4) (1988) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful to willfully perform an abortion unless the abortion is performed:
* * * * * *
with the consent of the woman submitting to the abortion after a full explanation of the procedure and effect of the abortion.
*721This statute has been held constitutional. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1356 (8th Cir.1976); see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2840, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). Violation of this statute is a felony. Minn.Stat. § 145.412, subd. 4 (1988). Appellants offered to prove that abortions are being performed at Planned Parenthood in violation of these statutes. I find the trial court improperly limited appellants’ offered testimony on the issue of claim of right.
Appellants’ evidence on the claim of right issue should have gone to the jury. The prosecution is entitled to ask for and the trial court is entitled to give appropriate jury instructions on that defense. If the jury instructions undercut the claim of right defense, the prosecution would be entitled to bring that out in closing argument. The point is, it should have gone to the jury. The Brechon court considered the issue in depth and concluded:
[W]e hold that the jury, not the court, decides the sufficiency of the evidence presented to establish a claim of right. The court may not require a pretrial offer of proof in order to decide as a matter of law that defendants have no claim of right. This is so because claim of right evidence is evidence tending to disprove an essential element of the state’s case: that the actor trespassed without claim of right.
Brechon, 352 N.W.2d at 750 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Contrary to Brechon, here the trial court decided for itself the issue of claim of right, kept appellants’ offered evidence from the jury, and refused appellants’ requested jury instruction on a claim of right.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that appellants were given a full opportunity to explain their conduct to the jury. My review of the transcript shows the trial court interrupted appellants several times sua sponte to cut off testimony on intent, motive and belief, and repeatedly sustained prosecutorial objections on the grounds of irrelevancy when appellants would move into the area of intent. I agree that under Brechon, a trial court retains the right to sustain objections to otherwise admissible evidence if it becomes cumulative or repetitious. I also believe, however, a careful reading of the spirit and letter of Brechon admonishes the trial court to be cautious in cutting off admissible evidence on intent merely because it remotely resembles other evidence previously offered.
Brechon was not a classic common law trespass case where a poacher hunts the king’s land or a stranger cuts through the farmer’s hay field. It involved a “political/protest” trespass by anti-war protesters who were on Honeywell property deliberately provoking an arrest for trespass so as to obtain a forum to bring attention to Honeywell Corporation’s contracts to supply various types of munitions and armaments to the United States Department of Defense. Any other interpretation of Bre-chon would be goldplated naivete. There is an exact parallel between Brechon and this case in the nature of the protests.
With full knowledge of the clear political/protest nature of the acts of the Bre-chon trespassers, the Minnesota Supreme Court went out of its way in a carefully crafted opinion to protect the rights of those trespassers/protesters to tell a criminal jury what they were doing, why they were doing it, and why they felt they had a right to do it. The special concurrence pointed out that even though good motives might not be a full defense and the trespassers’ explanations might be unavailing, they still had a right, as criminal defendants, to take the stand under oath and tell their story.1
*722Minnesota’s trespass statute reads in part:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person intentionally:
* * * * * *
trespasses on the premises of another and, without claim of right, refuses to depart from the premises on demand of the lawful possessor.
Minn.Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(3) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
The Minnesota Jury Instruction Guide defines “claim of right” as follows:
[1] a bonafide claim by defendant of title to or ownership of the premises; or
[2] a bonafide claim by defendant or expression of limited permission given defendant by the lawful possessor of the premises, or someone authorized by said lawful possessor to give such permission; or
[3] a bonafide claim by defendant that permission is given to defendant to be upon the premises by a statute, rule, or regulation duly promulgated by a federal or state agency.
Comment, 10A Minnesota Practice, M-JIG 1.2 (1986).
The Brechon protesters did not bother to tailor their testimony as to intent and motive to carefully and neatly fit within one of the enumerated subdivisions of claim of right, nor did the supreme court’s analysis limit itself to the trespass statute and corresponding M-JIG 1.2. Thus, we need not so limit our analysis here. Rather, Bre-chon was an expansive statement about the right of people charged with a crime to explain their conduct, and Brechon repeated the warning that criminal statutes are construed strictly against the state and in favor of defendants. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d at 750.
When a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case, it is a powerful personal choice with far reaching consequences. By taking the stand, the defendant irrevocably waives the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Incriminating statements and confessions previously suppressed on the basis of illegal and irregular conduct by the state can now be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony. Finally, the defendant exposes himself to what the prosecution hopes will be a piercing cross examination that shatters the defendant’s case, makes the defendant’s stated excuse for the charged act appear foolish and unbelievable, and aids the prosecution in obtaining a conviction. This is often the case.
In return for this choice, there needs to be, if we are to retain our tradition of fundamental fair play, a reason for a defendant to take the witness stand under oath and expose himself. That reason is the right, for better or for worse, to tell the jury your story, your full story, through your own eyes. The defendant’s story does not have to track the trial court’s forthcoming final instructions to the jury. If the defendant’s reasons for what happened are at odds with what the court instructs the jury is a legal defense to the charge, the prosecution is entitled to beat the defendant over the head with that in closing argument. That is the state’s protection. The state should try criminal cases to the jury, not in chambers.
This case does not present a complex legal issue, nor does it turn on semantics. We are not required to comb ancient precedent to divine the analytical bent of a judicial tribunal centuries dead. Rather, this case simply presents a question of “whose ox is getting gored.” As a political/protest *723trespass case, this case is indistinguishable from the supreme court’s deliberate analysis in Brechon. The only difference is Brechon involved defendants who were anti-war and this case involves defendants who are anti-abortion.
Both the issues of war and abortion produce a deep split in America’s fabric. Of-tentime an ugly split. Although it is not pretty, at least it proves that Americans feel strongly on both sides of the issue. Courts do not determine whether anti-war protests are more “politically correct” than abortion protests. It is not up to courts to pass judgment on the “worthiness” of appellants’ cause. Trespass is a crime. This is a criminal case. I do not bother my head with whether appellants should protest against “X” (because I disagree with “X”) but not protest against “Y” (because I agree with “Y”). As criminal defendants, appellants are entitled to certain constitutional rights. We do not differentiate between “good” defendants and “bad” defendants. We treat all the same.
Under Brechon, appellants were denied the fundamental right to fully explain their conduct, including their motives and intent, to a jury of their peers. Thus, I'dissent and would remand for a new trial.

. Justice Wahl states:
It makes no difference that good motive is not a defense, that favorable instructions may not be given or that an explanation may be unavailing, these defendants must be given the opportunity to testify fully and freely on the issue of criminal intent and the motive underlying that intent. United States v. Hawk, 497 F.2d 365 (9th Cir.1974) (defendant permitted to testify without restriction to his motive and intent in failing to file income tax returns); United States v. Cullen (defendant given unlimited opportunity to testify to his character and motivation in burning Selective Service *722records); United States v. Owens, 415 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir.1969) (defendant allowed to testify at great length to his reasons for refusing induction); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1973) (defendants permitted to give testimony “as to their motivations in their actions on the day of their alleged trespass as well as to their beliefs about the nature of the activity carried on by Honeywell Corporation and the nature of their beliefs about their rights and duties with respect to that corporation.’’). The strength of our democratic society lies in our adherence to constitutional guarantees of the rights of the people, including the right to a fair trial and the right to give testimony in one’s own behalf.
State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d at 752 (Wahl, J., concurring specially).