Court Opinion

ID: 9809366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:10:17.832925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:34.065965
License: Public Domain

Brogden, J.,
dissenting: The Turlington Act by express terms declares that it shall not be unlawful for a person to possess liquor in bis own dwelling provided it is to be used only for the personal consumption of the owner and bis family therein residing and bis bona fide guests when entertained therein by such owner.
In construing the statute it has been held that possession of liquor even within the home of the owner is prima facie evidence that be is keeping it for the purpose of violating the law. In other words a lawful act is prima facie evidence of an unlawful purpose. Albeit, this is water that has long since gone over the wheel.
Tbe judge charged in accordance with the decisions applicable, that the possession of liquor in the home of the defendant was prima facie evidence that be bad it there in violation of the law. This carried the case to the jury. Under the law, the defendant bad two alternatives. He could offer evidence in bis defense, or be could decline to offer evidence and rely upon the weakness of the State’s case supported in either event by the presumption of innocence which the law raised in bis favor. Tbe defendant pleaded not guilty. His plea denied the possession of the whiskey and every other element of the crime. He offered no evidence.
Tbe trial judge, however, went further and instructed tbe jury: “Tbe burden is upon bim to show that be bad it for bis own consumption or for tbe use of bis bona fide guests.”
This charge, as I see it, is erroneous for tbe following reasons:
1. It deprived tbe defendant of tbe right to rely upon tbe weakness of tbe State’s case, because it imposed upon bim tbe burden of showing that tbe possession was not unlawful or to state tbe proposition differently, tbe burden was upon bim to rebut tbe prima facie case made out by tbe State.
*5302. It deprived tbe defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence, because the presumption of innocence and the burden of rebutting the prima facie evidence of the State cannot exist at the same time and run concurrently throughout the trial.
The opinion of the Court, however, proceeds upon the theory that the proviso of section 10 of the Turlington Act is a matter of defense and therefore the burden is upon the defendant to show that he comes within the proviso, that is to say, he possessed the liquor in his home for his personal use or for the entertainment of his bona fide guests. The authorities cited in support of this position are S. v. Connor, 142 N. C., 700; S. v. Moore, 166 N. C., 284; S. v. Hege, 194 N. C., 526. In the Hege case the liquor was found in the basement of defendant’s store and not in his dwelling at all. Obviously the proviso referred to did not apply. In the Moore case the main question involved was sufficiency of allegations in the warrant, and related to what the State ought to allege and prove. In the Connor case the judge charged the jury “that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the woman in the case was neither innocent nor virtuous,” but the Court held that this instruction was error and awarded a new trial for such specific error. The opinion declares: “In such circumstances, a defendant charged with the crime who seeks protection by reason of the exception, has the burden of proving that he comes within the same.” As I interpret it, it does not support the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, but is rather to the contrary. Moreover the defendant in this case did not go upon the witness stand or offer evidence to the effect that the whiskey was possessed by him for his own consumption or for his bona fide guests. If he had sought the protection of the proviso, then the charge complained of would perhaps have been correct.
In S. v. Wilkerson, 164 N. C., 434, it is declared: “How can we say that prima facie evidence, or that which is apparently sufficient, excludes all reasonable doubt of guilt, and by its own force overcomes the presumption of innocence? The bare statement of the proposition is sufficient to show its fallacy. It would destroy the presumption of innocence and take away the protection of the other rule as to reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence attends the accused throughout the trial and has relation to every essential fact that must be established in order to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He is not required to show his innocence; the State must prove his guilt.” It will be noted that in the Wilherson case the court charged that if the jury had a reasonable doubt they should acquit the defendant. Liquor cases do not involve the “shifting of the burden” as pointed out in S. v. Redditt, 189 N. C., 176, and that line of cases.
*531In S. v. Hammond, 188 N. C., 602, the defendant offered no evidence as in the case at bar, and requested the court to charge the jury as follows : “If the jury find from the evidence that the house in which the intoxicating liquors in question were found was at the time used and occupied as the dwelling only of defendant and such liquors were for her personal consumption only and her bona fide guests, when entertained by her therein, the jury will return a verdict of not guilty.” The court refused to give this instruction. Chief Justice Hoke, writing the opinion, said, “We think the prayer embodies a correct proposition, so far as the charge of unlawful possession is concerned, and should have been given if restricted to that count, but the failure or refusal to give the instruction may not be held for reversible error because such refusal does not necessarily or probably affect the verdict on the other counts in the bill. As heretofore stated, there is a general verdict of guilty, amounting to a conviction on each and every count in the bill, and the prayer could not have been properly given because of the requested direction therein of a general verdict of not guilty.”
In the case at bar there was a nonsuit as to all counts except the fourth and fifth, and both of these counts charge unlawful possession. Applying the rule announced in the Hammond case to the case at bar, the defendant would have been entitled to the charge referred to in the Hammond case, which charge or instruction has no reference whatever to any “burden” to show that he had the whiskey for his own consumption, etc.
„ Upon the facts disclosed by the present record, it appears to me that the Hammond case is decisive of the point.
In Casey v. United States, referred to in the opinion of the Court, the question involved was one of purchase and not of possession. Moreover, the decision was rendered by a sharply divided Court. Mr. Justice Butler dissenting, declared: “And above all, the statutory rule of evidence should be construed having regard to the ancient and salutary doctrine known and rightly cherished as fair play by the people, the bar and the courts of this country,, that every person on trial for crime is presumed to be innocent; and, that in order to convict him, the evidence must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . The connection, if any, between the possession shown and the substance of the offense charged is too remote. Attention has not been called to any decision that goes so far. None can be found.”