Court Opinion

ID: 9530903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:05:00.45564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:17.130435
License: Public Domain

Hood, RJ.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that its inteipretation of the ordinance does not lead to absurd results.
On appeal, defendant asserts that he may engage in farming operations in Marlette, Michigan, and still qualify for the exemption. I disagree. Plaintiff’s zoning ordinance addressed the storage of vehicles on private property and provides:
10. Parking and storing of commercial trailers, trucks and or equipment with a rated capacity exceeding 10,000 pound G.V.W. subject to the following conditions:
A. Minimum acreage required shall be 10 acres.
B. Not more than 3 vehicles or vehicles and mobile equipment in combination shall be parked or stored on the property.
C. All vehicles and equipment shall be parked or stored in completely enclosed building(s).
The restrictions in item 10 of this section do not apply to vehicles and equipment that are used on a bona fide farm *427and in farming operations as defined by article III of this ordinance.
The interpretation of a zoning ordinance presents a question of law subject to review de novo. Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 459 Mich 659, 662; 593 NW2d 534 (1999). We interpret ordinances in accordance with the rules of statutory interpretation. Ahearn v Bloomfield Charter Twp, 235 Mich App 486, 498; 597 NW2d 858 (1999). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, additional judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted, and the language must be applied as written. Id. However, if reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is appropriate. Adrian School Dist v Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement System, 458 Mich 326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). Where a statute does not define a term, its ordinary meaning applies. Popma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich 460, 469-470; 521 NW2d 831 (1994). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislative body. Ballman v Borges, 226 Mich App 166, 167; 572 NW2d 47 (1997). We may depart from a strict literal interpretation of a statute that is inconsistent with the purposes and policies underlying the provision and would lead to absurd and unjust results. Albright v Portage, 188 Mich App 342, 350, n 7; 470 NW2d 657 (1991).
Plaintiff township set forth the purpose for enacting regulations governing rural estate districts as follows:
The following reasons are given in evidence to support the purposes for which this zoning district is intended to accomplish.
*4281. Land containing agricultural value should be preserved because it is a vital resource.
2. Land with agricultural value justifies a design technique which attempts to support a town-country spatial relationship creating intrinsic urban-rural values.
3. Rural Estate zoning permits the timing of land allotments to urban purposes in keeping with a theory of maximizing supporting public utilities so as to achieve the greatest amount of service for each dollar of capital expenditure.
4. Indiscriminating urbanizing of agricultural lands adversely affects the remaining owners of land pursuing agricultural endeavors, by creating urban land values.
Defendant’s interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose for enacting the rural estate district. The ordinance governing rural estates was designed to protect agricultural land. The ordinance allowing for an exemption for storage of farming equipment on land in plaintiff’s township is consistent with the protection given to rural estates. That is, it would be impractical to require that farmers in plaintiff township remove their equipment off the farm into a storage facility at the end of the day only to retrieve it the following day for continued farming activities. Defendant’s interpretation, that the equipment may be used for farming in other jurisdictions, would not further the purpose of the ordinance. Defendant does not foster agricultural land in plaintiff township; rather, he merely uses his land in plaintiff township as a parking lot for equipment used in other jurisdictions. Defendant’s use merely creates an eyesore and does not increase the value of agricultural land in plaintiff township. Accordingly, I would hold that defendant’s interpretation is contraiy to the intent enunciated for enacting the ordinance and leads to absurd results. Albright, supra.
*429Furthermore, MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1) provides that a township board may regulate land development by zoning ordinance in the portions of the township outside the limits of cities and villages. Defendant’s contention, that plaintiff’s failure to place limiting language to limit the regulations to the township precludes enforcement against him, is without merit. It is absurd to suggest that plaintiff was required to indicate that its ordinance was limited to properties contained within the township when the township has no authority to regulate farming activities outside its jurisdiction.1 Albright, supra. Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff township may be seeking to preserve agricultural land outside its borders as well as inside and would be rewarding *430its property owners for socially useful activities they conduct elsewhere. There is no evidence that plaintiff township, by enacting its ordinance, intended to foster agricultural land around the globe, and I would not impart that intent based on “mays” or “perhaps.” It is an attractive notion that local governments would act to benefit surrounding communities, near or far, but there is no indication in the record that plaintiff township had the time, resources, authority, or inclination to do so.
Defendant also argues that plaintiffs failure to uniformly enforce the ordinance bars enforcement against him. I disagree. Specifically, defendant argues that case law provides that enforcement of a zoning ordinance against one party while an identical noncomplying use has been permitted constitutes a denial of equal protection. Indeed, in Walker’s Amusements, Inc v Lathrup Village, 100 Mich App 36, 43; 298 NW2d 878 (1980), this Court acknowledged the rule that disparate enforcement of zoning ordinances could be a denial of equal protection. However, in Walker, this Court declined to hold that a violation of equal protection had occurred because the facts were so dissimilar and disparate that identical noncomplying uses could not be identified. In the present case, the parties have merely stipulated that defendant provided sixty photographs depicting commercial equipment located on private residential property. Only eleven of the sixty photographs “represented situations which violated the Brandon Township zoning ordinance Rural Estate (re) provisions, but had not, previous to that date, been enforced by the Township.” Defendant’s stipulation is insufficient to apprise this Court of a denial of equal protection in enforce*431ment of identical noncomplying uses. The moving party must make and support his request for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(G)(4). Conclusions, devoid of detail, are insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden of MCR 2.116(C)(10). Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 371; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Furthermore, a municipality cannot be estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance on the basis of unauthorized action of employees in granting authority contrary to the terms of an ordinance. Blackman Twp v Koller, 357 Mich 186, 189; 98 NW2d 538 (1959).
I would affirm.

 While the ordinance does not define “bona fide farm” or “farming activities,” the ordinance does define “farmland” as:
(a) A farm of 40 or more acres, in one ownership which has been devoted primarily to an agricultural use.
(b) A farm of 5 acres or more in one ownership, but less than 40 acres, devoted primarily to an agricultural use, which has produced a gross annual income from agriculture of $200.00 per year or more per acres [sic] of cleared and tillable land.
(c) A farm designated by the department of agriculture as a specialty farm in one ownership which has produced a gross annual income from an agricultural use of $2,000.00 or more.
(d) Parcels of land in one ownership which are not contiguous but which constitute and [sic] integral part of farming operation being conducted on land otherwise qualifying as farmland may be included in an application under this act.
Application of this definition of “farmland” to the statute at hand would also lead to absurd results. That is, plaintiff township would have to expend resources to travel to other jurisdictions to verify whether land is of a sufficient acreage and verify the ownership to determine whether the exemption applies. Irrespective of the fact that the parties to this appeal stipulated that defendant engaged in “bona fide farming operations,” plaintiff township would still have to investigate other claimed exemptions based on farming activities outside the township. There is no evidence to suggest that plaintiff township intended such consequences.