Court Opinion

ID: 9810723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:57:03.39357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:10.421940
License: Public Domain

AlleN, J.
(concurring in part only). I agree to that part of the-opinion of the Court which holds that the defendant, the State Tax Commission, cannot raise the question of the constitutionality of the tax of 25 cents on each bale of cotton ginned, and I think the writ of mandamus ought to issue to require the performance of the only duty imposed on the Commission by the statute, which is to “provide and enforce the machinery for the collection of this tax,” although there is-authority for the position that an executive officer may refuse to .obey a statute upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, when so advised' by the Attorney-General (S. v. Williams, 232 Mo., 56), and I think *446there can be no criticism of the Attorney-General. When asked for his opinion he could not do otherwise than exercise his best judgment, and the opinion given cannot be said to have no foundation on which to rest.
The writ, therefore, while it should issue, ought to be in the alternative and not peremptory, as no one has shown any disposition to defeat the purpose of the act, and there is every reason to believe the defendant will at once perform its duty as declared by this Court, and if it should not do so the peremptory writ would then issue.
This may appear to be technical, and as indicating too much deference to form, but it involves the principle that the Judicial Department will not interfere with either the Legislative or Executive departments when it can be avoided, and then only to the extent absolutely necessary.
The authorities, denying the right to public officers to raise the constitutional question when not injuriously affected, are collected in the notes in 6 R. C. L., 92, where the editor says: “Under the general principle that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be questioned by one whose rights it does not affect and who has no interest in defeating it, the question has arisen whether a public officer has such interest as would entitle him to question the constitutionality of a statute and refuse to comply with its provisions; and it has generally been answered in the negative, since the interest of such officer is official and not personal, and if the rule were otherwise petty rpinisterial officers of the State could ignore any law which they deem to be invalid. This is especially true of subordinate officials.”
It is doubtful if the exception from this rale approved by the Missouri Court in S. v. Williams, supra, ought to prevail in any case, but certainly not, I think, when, as appears in this record, the head of the Executive Department, the Governor, is asking that the statute be enforced, and when the defendant is required to do nothing except provide machinery for the collection of the tax,' which it is lawful for it to do.
My agreement with the Court, however, on this question forces me to the conclusion that we ought not now to decide whether the tax of twenty-live cents is constitutional or unconstitutional, because “Courts will not assume to pass upon constitutional questions unless properly before them, and the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the courts as a hypothetical question. It is only when a decision on its validity is necessary to the determination of the cause that the same will be made, and not then at the instance of a stranger, but only on the complaint of those with the requisite interest. These principles have been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribunal has announced that it rigidly adheres to the rule never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance *447of tbe necessity of deciding it, never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by tbe precise facts to wbicb it is to be applied, and never to consider tbe constitutionality of State legislation unless it is imperatively required.” 6 R. C. L., 76.
“Courts never pass upon tbe constitutionality of statutes except in cases wherein tbe party raising tbe question alleges tbat he is deprived ■of some right guaranteed by tbe Constitution, or some burden is imposed upon him in violation of its protective provisions.” St. George v. Hardie, 147 N. C., 97.
Tbe authorities, in great numbers, are unanimous in support of this principle, and they proceed upon the idea tbat as tbe different departments of government are separate, and neither should interfere with tbe other except from necessity, tbat tbe same rule wbicb requires the Court to resolve all doubts in favor of the constitutionality of an act, also enjoins tbe duty of withholding its band without considering or passing on its validity, unless tbe question is directly presented by one who will be injured by its enforcement, and here tbe question is raised by tbe Tax Commission, wbicb pays nothing, and tbe cotton growers, who will pay the tax, under tbe opinion of tbe Court, either directly or through tbe ginner, are not parties, have not been beard, are not complaining, and we are assured by counsel tbat they will pay without objection, if given an opportunity to do so, wbicb they would have tbe right to do although the tax might be invalid.
"Why, then, should we decide the question at tbe instance of one who is not required to pay anything when those upon whom tbe tax is assessed are not resisting it, and when, if invalid, they may waive any constitutional objection and pay, and the question may never arise?
No principle of taxation of more serious import nor one with greater possibilities has been before the Court, and if once established it must be followed to its legitimate and logical conclusion.
It is conceded by counsel for tbe plaintiffs, and this is not controverted in tbe opinion of tbe Court, tbat tbe tax cannot be sustained as one on tbe bale of cotton as property, because violative of Art. Y, sec. 3, of tbe Constitution, which requires taxes on property to be uniform and at its true value, and this tax is levied without regard to the weight, grade, or value of tbe cotton.
Counsel are then forced to resort to tbe latter part of Art. Y, sec. 3, of tbe Constitution, which says “Tbe General Assembly may also' tax grades, professions, franchises,” and to contend tbat. tbe tax is not on tbe cotton but on tbe trade, profession or franchise of ginning cotton, and ' this is tbe position sustained by the Court.
I cannot agree to this construction of tbe statute, and in my judgment it is subversive of its plain unequivocal language. .
*448The statute says “on each hale of cotton ginned . . . twenty-five-cents shall Toe collected through the ginner,” which to my mind can only mean that a tax is levied on the cotton and that the ginner is'the collecting agent.
Nor am I prepared to say that the occupation of ginning cotton falls-within the meaning of “trades, professions, franchises,” and the language used in the statute does not justify the conclusion that the General Assembly so intended, and up to this time no one has contended that a privilege tax can be charged for producing materials for clothing and food from the soil.
It is true the tax is small and not burdensome, but if a tax of twenty-five cents a bale can be levied it can be increased to $5, and if this can be done for safeguarding a warehouse system it will be equally legal for any other public purpose, and the same rule will apply to tobacco, com, wheat, potatoes, etc.
In other words, if a privilege tax of twenty-five cents a bale can be' assessed against the grower of cotton, the same will be legal against any other producer from the soil. If it is legal for protecting a warehouse system, it is legal for other public purposes, and as the only limitation on privilege taxes is uniformity within the class, and none as to amount, the tax may be increased at the pleasure of the General Assembly.
This is a new and fruitful field of taxation, which I must decline to enter at least until those who are to pay the tax, the cotton growers, are before the courts and have an opportunity to be heard, and they are not individually parties to this record:
The General Assembly was evidently in- grave doubt as to constitutionality of this tax as otherwise it would not have provided in section 19, “If any particular section of this act shall be held to be unconstitutional such holding shall not invalidate any other portion thereof.”