Court Opinion

ID: 9723170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:04:59.242359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.260607
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KUEHN, dissenting: I respectfully take issue with the majority opinion on two fronts. It seems clear to me that the defendant was convicted of a crime, and treated to more severe punishment because of it, even though that crime did not exist, and the punishment could not have been imposed, when he committed the acts that compose his criminal behavior. When he performed the acts that caused this infant’s death, the defendant exposed himself to a 60-year prison term, the maximum punishment that he could receive for his criminal conduct. Subsequently, our legislature authorized juries to determine whether a murder victim is an infant and, if so, attached greater penalties for the crime of killing that infant. Unlike my colleagues, I believe that this new crime and the penalties it carries must be reserved for those who commit an infant killing on a date after the crime’s statutory conception. Its retroactive application is constitutionally unsound. I also disagree with the conclusion that the defendant was afforded his constitutional right to a speedy trial. I cannot imagine what set of circumstances would have to exist, if what happened here does not constitute a deprivation of the fundamental constitutional right to swift and expeditious justice. The determination of whether pretrial delay offends the constitutional imperative of a speedy trial requires us to identify and weigh such things as the length of the delay, the reason for it, the genuineness of a defendant’s desire for a swift process to decision, and any resulting prejudice from a trial’s delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 116-17, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). My colleagues correctly identify these factors but fail to properly apply them in reaching their decision. They seem to treat each factor as if the Supreme Court required it to exist before a speedy trial violation could occur. This view is reflected in the declaration, the “defendant cannot meet the last prong of Barker — that prejudice resulted.” (Emphasis added.) 339 Ill. App. 3d at 356. I disagree with this conclusion. We are told that prejudice should be assessed in light of the interests which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. While Justice Powell recognizes an impairment of the defense as the most serious interest, he points out that oppressive pretrial incarceration, in and of itself, establishes prejudice. He writes: “We have discussed previously the societal disadvantages of lengthy pretrial incarceration, but obviously the disadvantages for the accused who cannot obtain his release are even more serious. The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Undeniably, the length of pretrial detention imposed here visited this kind of harm upon the defendant. He rang in the new year four times, confined to a jail cell, before authorities attended to the business of deciding his guilt or innocence. Even so, the defendant did not have to “meet a prejudice prong” for there to be a constitutional violation. As Justice Powell made it clear: “We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118-19, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. The majority tells us that each factor identified in Barker v. Wingo “must be weighed and considered in light of the circumstances of the case as reflected by an examination of the entire record.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 354. If so, we should set forth that record in a way that does it justice. The majority’s treatment of what happened is far too kind to the State. The defendant was arrested and incarcerated on October 31, 1997. The public defender’s office was immediately appointed to represent him. Neil Hawkins, an experienced assistant public defender with that office, was assigned as trial counsel. On November 5, 1997, he filed a speedy trial demand on the defendant’s behalf. By December 1, 1997, the State and defense counsel had exchanged formal discovery in the case. Ultimately, the evidence in this case consisted of the testimony of 17 prosecution witnesses. The actual evidence took less than three full days of trial to present. Nothing was presented on behalf of the defendant. The defense amounted to a reasonable doubt challenge, based solely upon the circumstantial nature of the State’s proof with regard to who actually committed the abuse that resulted in this infant’s death. Defense counsel framed the question for the jury: “Obviously, this child was abused. There is no doubt about that. *** The question is, [W]ho committed the acts that caused the death ***[?]” It was an easy question for the jury to decide. Having taken two hours to read the transcript of the trial proceedings from start to finish, I have no doubt that the jury decided it correctly. It seems abundantly clear that there was little to save this defendant from conviction, something that commends defense counsel’s plea-bargaining effort. I can only imagine the frustration he felt when the defendant scoffed at the fortunate fruit of that labor. In considering how much weight to assign the length of the delay as a factor in deciding whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we are told: “[Bjecause of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke [a constitutional] inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. This case was simple and uncomplicated, with hardly a defense to prepare. The case was placed on a trial docket call for December 8, 1997. On that date, someone other than Neil Hawkins appeared and affixed his signature to an order that continued the case to a future trial docket call in either January or February of 1998. This tolled the 120-day statutory speedy trial constraint at day 39. The apparent practice in Madison County criminal courts is to employ a form order to deal with continuances. The order of December 8, 1997, is like every order that followed. For illustrative purposes, each form order used to continue this trial is attached as an exhibit to this dissent. There is nothing in the record, other than the order, to indicate that a motion for a continuance was made. There is nothing in the record to indicate either the reason for making the motion or the reason for granting it. Immediately after the December 8, 1997, order is an identical order file-dated December 22, 1997, that continues the case until March of 1998. There is no written motion for a continuance. Section 114—4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114—4(a) (West 1996)) states: “The defendant or the State may move for a continuance. If the motion is made more than 30 days after arraignment[,] the court shall require that it be in writing and supported by affidavit.” This provision sets forth a host of specific reasons that a defendant could offer to advance the grant of a continuance and warrant trial’s delay. Important to the analysis of the delay factor are the reasons for continuances. As the Supreme Court points out: “Closely related to length of delay is the reason *** to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The sole written motion for continuance to be found in this record was filed on April 2, 2001. The need for delay was stated in it, but the case proceeded to a trial. Not a single written motion for a continuance accompanied a ruling postponing this case. Not a single order of continuance states the reason a further continuance would be warranted. I would expect some reason of record for a 3½-year delay in bringing someone to trial. The majority does not question the complete absence of reason. It simply notes, “We can find no basis in the record for why so many continuances were requested.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 354. Then, it sidesteps the issue by quoting a passage from Barker v. Wingo that acknowledges that delay can be a defense tactic. Perhaps the delay was strategic. Maybe keeping the defendant locked up without a trial for so long had some method to it. We have no way of knowing. Notwithstanding, this accused made it known three years before he was afforded a trial that he wanted a speedy one. When the defendant asked for a new lawyer who would engage in a trial rather than further delay, it was incumbent upon the State to question the tactic’s continued use. Since the majority speculates that delay was strategic, I will indulge in some speculation of my own about that possibility. The State offered the most inviting plea bargain imaginable. No defense lawyer worth salt would have failed to urge the defendant to accept the State’s offer. Defense counsel made his exhortations in this regard known before the trial began. Had the defendant heeded his advice, he would already be reunited with family and friends instead of appealing his murder conviction and his 70-year prison term. Could it be that 28 abstruse continuances were procured to accrue more jail time so that the defendant would accept the State’s offer? Mindful of the apparent outcome that the trial would produce, could defense counsel have decided that pretrial delay would improve his chances of convincing the defendant to plead guilty? Only a few more trial postponements would have transformed the State’s offer into a key to the defendant’s jail cell, promising him an immediate release in return for a guilty plea. A little more delay would have forced the defendant to weigh the severe risks attendant to a first-degree-murder trial against the option of surrendering his innocence and going home. If such a strategy was employed, it could not justify the State’s failure to provide a speedy trial. Beneficent as it might have been, its design to diminish the trial’s worth by having the defendant address the State’s desire for punishment, and its desire for a disposition without a trial, through endless pretrial detention, would subvert a fundamental constitutional right. The fact that defense counsel may have viewed this design as a means to promote the defendant’s best interests could not absolve the State of its duty to see that the United States Constitution was followed. The State would almost certainly have to be a knowing partner in such a design. It would have to allow for 28 postponements over 3V2 years without good reason or purpose, knowing what defense counsel knew — that further delay improved its chance of disposing of the case without a trial while, at the same time, imposing the punishment that it deemed appropriate. A constitution that ensures the criminally accused a speedy trial could never abide such an alliance between the State and an accused’s lawyer, particularly when that accused notifies the State and complains about his lawyer’s unwelcome continuances and their effect upon his speedy trial rights. Condoning such a practice would fashion a prosecutorial tool ripe for abuse. The present-day criminal code arms prosecutors with a wide range of offenses and penalties, many of which are applicable to the same criminal acts. Multiple charges enhance bonds, increase pretrial detention, and allow considerable room for plea bargaining. Allowing defense counsel to continue the trial to accrue the necessary punishment to meet a plea bargain recommendation would license the State to dispense with a lot of trials that it would otherwise have to afford. Provided the State could suborn defense counsel to its purpose with a decent-enough plea bargain, the State could impose all of the deprivation of freedom that it felt someone deserved by confining that individual in the county jail to await an illusory trial. By the time an accused would be afforded the right to a trial, freedom’s call would invite its surrender. The defendant made it clear that he did not wish to plead guilty. He insisted in his innocence, something that he had the right to do. And he personally asserted his right to an immediate trial in March of 1998, three years prior to the State affording him that right. No matter how well-meaning a defense lawyer may be, no matter how beneficial a plea bargain may seem, it is not a valid defense option to allow a client to sit in a jail cell for years on end in order to coerce him into pleading guilty. The best that the majority can say about the lack of reason behind the 28 continuances is that defense counsel asked for them and that defendants are generally bound by their lawyers’ deeds. However, the record does not indicate that defense counsel always asked for the continuances. More importantly, on March 18, 1998, the defendant made it known that he was unhappy with the delay already incurred. He took a jail pencil in hand and wrote a letter to the Court in which he “humbly” petitioned the court to do something about the delay and about his appointed lawyer, who kept continuing the case without his consent and against his will. The letter is a part of the record. What is not a part of the record is what anyone did about addressing this complaint. On April 27, 1998, another continuance order was entered, again without a written motion or a stated reason. The form order bore no signature from either an assistant State’s Attorney or the defendant’s lawyer. It continued the trial to June 15, 1998, on the defendant’s motion. The order was entered just five weeks after the court, and presumably the attorneys, knew that another continuance was not what the defendant wanted. It was entered in the defendant’s absence. He remained in jail and his speedy trial concerns went unaddressed. On June 29, 1998, an order was entered continuing the trial until August 10, 1998, on the defendant’s motion. There was no written motion, no stated reason for the delay, and no attesting signatures from either of the attorneys. Since nothing seems to have happened on June 15, 1998, the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial rekindled on that date. The State used up another 14 days of the 120 days allowed to bring the defendant to trial on time. It had 67 days left, but the time tolled. On July 21, 1998, the defendant again wrote to the court, requesting a habeas corpus form, a subtle reminder of the disdain for further delay that he had expressed earlier. The only documents filed of record between August 5, 1998, and March 13, 2000, are 15 consecutive form orders of continuance, repeatedly resetting the trial to future trial dates and attributing the resulting delay to the defendant. Neither the State nor defense counsel filed anything, in anticipation of a trial, prior to any of the 15 trial settings. The trial was delayed for 17 months. The defendant rang in the new millennium from the same cell that had been his home for two previous new years. There is nothing setting forth the need for delay and nothing that gives a reason for allowing it. An August 5, 1998, trial date became an August 31, 1998, setting, which, in turn, was postponed to an October 5, 1998, trial date. On October 5, 1998, the trial was postponed to November 1998. When November arrived, 11 days passed before the next form continuance order was executed, continuing the case to November 30, 1998. The statutory time within which the defendant had to be brought to trial diminished to 56 days. The November 30, 1998, trial date was postponed to a January 4, 1999, setting. On December 21, 1998, a form order continued the case to February T, 1999, which was subsequently continued to a February 22, 1999, setting. On February 22, 1999, the trial was postponed to an April 5, 1999, trial setting. That setting was continued to June 7, 1999. The June 7, 1999, setting was postponed to a July 12, 1999, trial date. There was never any stated need for further delay, and there was never any finding to give a reason for allowing it. On July 12, 1999, the same kind of form continuance order was entered, continuing the case for the rest of the summer. The trial was next set for September 20, 1999. On September 20, 1999, the trial was again postponed by form order until October 18, 1999. On October 18, 1999, the case was continued in like fashion to November 15, 1999. On November 15, 1999, the case was continued and set for a trial on December 6, 1999. On December 6,1999, another form continuance order was entered and continued the case to February 7, 2000. This order was akin to all of the other orders in that there was no written motion and no stated reason for why it was allowed. However, this time the order was different. The judge who entered it finally addressed the defendant’s wishes. The following passage appears upon the continuance order: “No further continuances. Case to be resolved either by plea or trial.” As a third new year ushered in with the defendant still confined in jail awaiting trial, it finally appeared that he would receive one. As this series of continuance orders marks the passage of time, there is absolutely no other activity in the record. There is nothing to indicate that either the State or the defense seriously prepared for the trial in advance of any approaching trial setting. Not one court proceeding took place, other than those proceedings necessary to produce another form continuance order. The defendant sat in jail for another 17 months without known reason. On the day mandated for a trial or a plea, another form order of continuance was entered, postponing the trial until March 13, 2000. The record is silent on the manner in which the court’s previous mandate was dealt with. No written motion was filed and no reason was given for why the added delay was necessary. The February 7, 2000, form order, continuing the case to March 13, 2000, was different in one significant way. Instead of being marked as a motion by the defendant, it stated that the motion was by agreement, and it contained a judicial finding that the delay was attributable to the State. Since the year 2000 was a leap year, the State’s allowable statutory time within which it had to provide a speedy trial diminished by 35 more days, to a total of 21 remaining days. On March 13, 2000, another form continuance order was entered, continuing the case to April 17, 2000, at the defendant’s request. It was like all the others. However, on March 21, 2000, a new form of order appeared of record. It followed 16 consecutive form orders of continuance spanning almost two years. The March 21, 2000, order was an “Order of Pre-Trial and Trial Setting.” It set the trial for 9 a.m. on April 17, 2000, ordered a pretrial conference at 9:30 a.m. on April 14, 2000, and declared that the case would be either tried or pleaded on April 17, 2000. The record does not reflect that anything happened on April 14, 2000. No pleadings in anticipation of an impending trial were filed by either party. Whether the pretrial conference was held is not known. There is nothing in the record to indicate that anyone believed that April 17, 2000, was a date on which the trial would commence. On April 17, 2000, another form order of continuance was entered, delaying the trial to a July 10, 2000, setting. The trial was later postponed by another form continuance order and was reset for September 5, 2000. On July 12, 2000, the defendant sent the court a handwritten motion to dismiss his appointed attorney. Here is what it said, in pertinent part: “That due to ineffective assistance of counsel Mr. Neil Hawkins[,] Attorney for the Plaintiff herein[,] should be dismissed from His case for the following reasons: A. Mr. Hawkins has continued Plaintiff’s case without his consent, thereby violating his rights to a fast and speedy trial. B. Mr. Hawkins has never discussed trial strategies with Plaintiff!,] nor has he been to see Him since Dec[.] 1997. C. Mr. Hawkins never gave Plaintiff copies of his Grand Jury [ ] Transcrips [sic] nor [sic] copies of His Motion of Discovery requested in 1997. D. Mr. Hawkins has not gotten in contact with Plaintiff’s witness’s [sic].” Whether any of the allegations were true or not does not matter. When this pleading was filed in July of 2000, it reiterated the March 18, 1998, complaint, after which 20 additional continuances had been sought and received by defense counsel. We might expect some inquiry into the defendant’s concerns — some proceeding at which defense counsel at least refuted the claim that he was continuing this case against the defendant’s will and doing nothing to prepare the case for trial. We might expect a record in which he explained why the continuances were necessary to the defense. Instead, there was nothing. Neither the court nor the State did anything, despite an extremely peculiar pattern of repeated trial postponements, all of which were promoted by defense counsel in the defendant’s absence. More importantly, we would fully expect some scrutiny of any further request for a continuance made by defense counsel in the defendant’s absence. The next document of record after the defendant’s written request to discharge his lawyer is another form continuance order entered September 5, 2000, continuing the trial to October 2, 2000, with the resulting delay attributable to the defendant. The State agreed to this continuance. We have nothing to indicate why the State would agree to another continuance after the defendant reiterated that defense counsel was exceeding his charge. And nothing explains the identity of John Kelly, whose signature appears on the form order as the attorney acting on the defendant’s behalf. The September 5, 2000, continuance order is Bate-stamped C 59. The next document of record, Bate-stamped C 60, is another form continuance order. It is dated December 11, 2000, and continues the case by agreement to January 22, 2001, the resulting delay being attributable to the defendant. Neil Hawkins signed the form. We do not know what happened at the trial setting of October 2, 2000, or even if there was such an event. We are not told why the State was again willing to agree to the further delay of the case. We do know that the allowable statutory time within which the State had to bring the defendant to trial clearly ran out between October 2, 2000, and December 11, 2000. No one ever filed for a discharge based upon this violation of the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, and that right lays forfeit by virtue of this failing. However, in assessing all of the factors involved in the constitutional inquiry, it is hardly insignificant that the State would have entertained a discharge for unacceptable delay had a motion been made. The defendant saw the year 2001 arrive while confined in a Madison County jail cell. It was the fourth new year to arrive while he awaited a speedy trial. On January 22, 2001, the trial was continued to March 12, 2001, at the defendant’s request. Like all of the orders before it, no reason was given why another delay was necessary. There was no written motion for a continuance, accompanied by an affidavit, filed to obtain the continuance. On March 12, 2001, another form continuance order was filed, continuing the case at the defendant’s request and attributing the delay to the defendant. The case was set for trial on April 2, 2001. Although the March 12, 2001, order continuing the trial to April 2, 2001, looked identical to all 27 form orders that preceded it, it was not the same. Something had changed. The order did not indicate that the court would tolerate no further continuance or that the case would be resolved by a trial or plea on April 2, 2001. But one has only to look at the pleadings filed after the March 12, 2001, order to know that the case was finally going to go to trial. Between June 29, 1998, and the last continuance order, for more than 21k years, not one document was filed by either party in this case. The only documents filed, other than form continuance orders, were the defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss and the one-page order setting April 17, 2000, as the trial date. No one filed supplemental discovery motions. No one filed any motion in limine. No one filed a motion to alter the charging instrument. No one filed a motion to dismiss. No one filed anything for more than 2V2 years, despite the seeming approach of an impending trial month after month. The record is completely barren of anything to indicate that either the State or defense counsel truly anticipated an approaching trial on any occasion prior to April 2, 2001. It clearly appears as if no one took any of the other trial settings seriously. It appears as if everyone knew that the case was not really going to proceed to a trial at any time between June 29, 1998, and the March 12, 2001, setting. I am left to wonder why the State would not have filed the supplemental discovery motion that it filed on March 15, 2001, prior to some earlier setting, if it truly anticipated a trial at that setting. I can only speculate why the State did not file the additional witness list it filed on March 15, 2001, prior to an earlier impending trial date. So, too, I wonder why the State waited until March 27, 2001, to file a motion for leave to amend its charging instrument and waited until March 28, 2001, to file an extensive motion in limine to limit the evidence admissible by the defense. Somehow, it took no interest in filing such matters before any other approaching trial date. Yet, it managed to file a flurry of requests prior to the trial setting that actually advanced to a trial. The same is true of defense counsel. He filed nothing prior to any trial setting between June 29, 1998, and the March 12, 2001, docket call. On March 30, 2001, he filed 11 separate motions in limine to exclude or limit the admission of evidence in the case, two motions to dismiss, and a written motion to continue the case, which tendered as a reason that the defendant was not prepared in light of the State having altered the charge one week prior to the trial date. As previously noted, there is a logical explanation for this phenomenon. However, such explanation, if it indeed exists, cannot excuse the defendant’s lengthy pretrial detention, particularly when everyone involved knew of his assertion of the right to a speedy trial. In Barker v. Wingo, the pretrial delay was four years. But the defendant was released on bond after the first 10 months of that delay. Here, the defendant’s 3V2 years of pretrial detention makes the trial’s delay untenable. It is something that should not be tolerated under our constitution, at least so long as we profess that it ensures the fundamental right to a speedy trial. An examination of the trial proceedings compounds the egregiousness of the delay’s duration. The need to delay for the purpose of preparing the defense tendered in this case could not justify one year of the delay. When we conduct a search for the reason such a lengthy delay occurred, none exists. The only time the statutory method for requesting a continuance was followed, and defense counsel tendered a valid reason to postpone the trial, the case proceeded to a trial. Month after month, year after year, defense counsel continued the case at proceedings the defendant did not attend. On many occasions the State agreed to the continuances. But no reason for the trial’s postponement was ever tendered or required prior to the entry of continuance orders. The absence of any valid reason for the trial’s delay, coupled with that delay’s length and the fact that the defendant was confined throughout, commends the finding of a constitutional deprivation. Clearly, this defendant expected the State to afford the constitution’s promise of a speedy trial, and he made that expectation clear. It seems indisputable that a person confined to a county jail cell awaiting a trial would be genuine in his desire to be afforded one. Inexplicably, no one paid any heed to his repeated assertion that his lawyer was assisting the State in an ongoing violation of his desire for a prompt disposition of his case. No one honored his requests for an attorney who would stop asking for continuances. No one cared that, after two years of delay, he asked the court to dismiss his lawyer and give him his day in court. I cannot imagine a more insidious assault on the right to a speedy trial than the one that occurred here. Finally, the defendant was severely prejudiced by the delay, and that prejudice was as egregious as the delay’s length — the complete absence of reason for the delay and the inexplicable routine postponement of the trial in the face of an incarcerated accused’s repeated complaints about his attorney continuing every trial date. The majority notes, “Although it can be argued that defendant spent a lengthy amount of time in prison, resulting in unnecessary anxiety and concern, defendant cannot show that this length of time caused his defense to be impaired.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 356. It then analyzes the defendant’s attempt to show impairment and concludes, “Defendant offers no explanation of how this would have helped his defense and is therefore unable to make the showing of prejudice required by this prong of Barker.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 356. The majority does not make mention of one of the key interests the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial exists to protect — oppressive pretrial detention. It is completely silent about the profound and inexplicable pretrial detention, ignoring its visceral harm. Instead, the majority redefines a lengthy delay’s harm solely in terms of whether the recipient of that harm can demonstrate an adverse effect upon his ability to defend against the charge. We are told that one year of pretrial confinement is presumptively prejudicial. People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 52-53, 743 N.E.2d 555, 562 (2001). This legal tenet is offered without consideration of how a year’s delay would impair the ability to defend against a criminal charge. This principle raises an interesting question in light of the majority’s analysis. Provided that a defendant could not show any adverse effect to his defense, would my colleagues find that a defendant was “unable to make the showing of prejudice required by this prong of Barker” (339 Ill. App. 3d at 356) if an incarcerated defendant had to await trial for a decade? How much time would an individual have to serve in a county jail awaiting trial before the majority could perceive some harm inflicted from that fact alone? The Madison County jail is a fine facility, but it is still a county jail. Inmates are multibunked and have no privacy. There are no outside grounds in which to recreate or, for that matter, in which to see the sun and breathe fresh air. There are no windows in the cellblock. Confinement in the facility necessarily visits day after day of idleness and the boredom attendant to it. Time passes slowly. I wonder if any of us could say that we would be unharmed by being confined there tomorrow to await a trial set for November of 2006. Even though each of the four factors to consider in a speedy trial examination does not have to be met for a constitutional deprivation to occur, all four factors are present here. In my view, this record compels the vindication of the accused’s right to a speedy trial specifically affirmed in the constitution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118-19, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. The majority opinion observes, “By this finding we do not wish to promote the type of delay that occurred in this case, but we do not believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the delay reaches the level of a constitutional violation ***.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 356-57.1 would respectfully disagree. If what happened here fails to reach a level of constitutional infirmity, if an individual can be held without a trial for so long without any reason, despite repeated protestation, the constitutional promise is not worth the paper upon which it is written. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 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