Court Opinion

ID: 9372042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 17:07:51.432133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.899367
License: Public Domain

J-A26023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    ROBERT LUMPKIN                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2287 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 30, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003183-2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 17, 2023

        Appellant, Robert Lumpkin, appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

On May 7, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging

Appellant with multiple offenses related to the murder of Jeffrey Johnson. On

November 27, 2019, Appellant executed a written guilty plea colloquy. The

colloquy indicated that Appellant would plead guilty to two (2) counts of

robbery and one count each of third-degree murder and persons not to

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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possess firearms.2 In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to drop all other

charges and recommend an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven and one-half

(27½) to fifty-five (55) years’ imprisonment. (See Written Plea Colloquy, filed

11/27/19, at 1). In the written colloquy, Appellant acknowledged that the

judge had the power to deviate from the plea bargain. (Id.) Appellant also

confirmed that he was “satisfied with the advice and service [he] received

from [his] lawyer,” and his “lawyer spent enough time on [the] case and

[Appellant] had enough time to talk with [his] lawyer about the case.” (Id.

at 3).

         Also on November 27, 2019, Appellant appeared for a guilty plea

hearing.     At that time, the court proceeded with an oral colloquy.       After

accepting Appellant’s pleas, the court immediately imposed the agreed-upon

sentence. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a notice of appeal.

         On November 18, 2020, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition.

The court appointed counsel, who filed a “no-merit” letter on June 20, 2021.

In it, PCRA counsel concluded that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his

claim that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter unknowing guilty

pleas. On August 24, 2021, the court provided Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro

se response to the Rule 907 notice on September 17, 2021. On September

____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 2502(c), and 6105(a)(1), respectively.

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30, 2021, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition.3

       Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 27, 2021. On

November 22, 2021, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.         Appellant

ultimately complied with the court’s Rule 1925(b) order.           This Court

subsequently remanded the matter for the PCRA court to clarify the status of

counsel.    On February 7, 2022, the PCRA court entered a formal order

permitting counsel to withdraw.

       Appellant now raises one issue for our review:

           Did PCRA counsel err when he determined that [plea]
           counsel was effective and determined [the] PCRA petition
           had no merit?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

       “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

____________________________________________

3 Although the docket entries indicate that the court permitted PCRA counsel
to withdraw at this time, the court did not enter a formal order permitting
withdrawal.

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256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

      On appeal, Appellant reiterates the claim raised in his pro se PCRA

petition: plea counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter unknowing guilty

pleas. Appellant acknowledges that PCRA counsel addressed this issue in the

“no-merit” letter, finding that no relief was due.       Nevertheless, Appellant

disagrees with PCRA counsel’s assessment.         Appellant emphasizes that he

“initially planned to exercise his right to trial,” but plea counsel did not conduct

“any investigation into the particulars in the case[.]” (Appellant’s Brief at 8).

Rather, plea counsel “simply stated that [neither] he nor his office had the

resources to prepare a proper strategy for trial.” (Id.) Appellant claims that

plea counsel undermined Appellant’s desire to go to trial by telling Appellant’s

family members “unsubstantiated … horror stories of what would occur should

[Appellant] choose to go to trial.” (Id. at 10). Appellant insists that the “sole

purpose” of plea counsel’s efforts “was to get [Appellant’s family] to convince

[Appellant] to take a plea.” (Id.)

      Appellant argues that plea counsel’s “singular focus on obtaining a guilty

plea had no strategic basis[.]” (Id. at 14). Further, Appellant asserts that he

suffered prejudice because plea counsel’s “lack of investigation in his pursuit

of a guilty plea meant he relied solely on the Commonwealth’s ‘evidence’ and

‘theory in the case.’” (Id. at 16). Appellant concludes that PCRA counsel

erroneously concluded that the ineffectiveness issue lacked merit, and this

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Court must remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.

      Before counsel can be permitted to withdraw from representing a

petitioner under the PCRA, Pennsylvania law requires counsel to file a “no-

merit” brief or letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491,

544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213

(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940

(Pa.Super. 2003).

         [C]ounsel must … submit a “no-merit” letter to the [PCRA]
         court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature
         and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing
         the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed,
         explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and
         requesting permission to withdraw.

                                  *     *     *

         If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without
         merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny
         relief. By contrast, if the claims appear to have merit, the
         court will deny counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least
         instruct counsel to file an advocate’s brief.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal

citations omitted).

      “Counsel   is   presumed    to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence

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         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

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         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).          “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      “Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty

plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused [the

defendant] to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v.

Allen, 557 Pa. 135, 144, 732 A.2d 582, 587 (1999). “In order to make a

knowing and intelligent waiver, the individual must be aware of both the

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nature of the right and the risks and consequences of forfeiting it.”

Commonwealth v. Houtz, 856 A.2d 119, 122 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 700 (Pa.Super. 1999)).

      “To determine a defendant’s actual knowledge of the implications and

rights associated with a guilty plea, a court is free to consider the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Allen, supra at 146, 732 A.2d at

588-89. “A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the

charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the

presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s

power to deviate from any recommended sentence.”           Commonwealth v.

Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super. 2005)). “Furthermore, nothing in

[Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a

written colloquy that is read, completed and signed by the defendant and

made a part of the plea proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d

1209, 1212-13 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 742, 964 A.2d 893

(2009). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.

      “A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he

makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003).

“Our law does not require that a defendant be totally pleased with the outcome

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of his decision to plead guilty, only that his decision be voluntary, knowing

and intelligent.” Id. at 524. Further, “[t]he entry of a negotiated plea is a

‘strong indicator’ of the voluntariness of the plea.”      Reid, supra at 783

(quoting Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa.Super. 1994)).

        Instantly, Appellant executed a written guilty plea colloquy that provided

the terms of the plea bargain and explained the court’s power to deviate from

it. (See Written Plea Colloquy at 1). Appellant confirmed that no one had

forced him to enter the plea, and he “cannot come back to court later and say

that I was not guilty.”       (Id. at 3).      Appellant also acknowledged his

understanding of the maximum possible sentence, his right to a jury trial, the

presumption of innocence, the elements of the offenses, and the facts of his

case. (See id. at 1, 3).

        At the oral colloquy, the court emphasized that Appellant had “the

absolute right to have a jury trial.” (N.T. Plea Hearing, 11/27/19, at 3). The

court    explained    that   Appellant   was    presumed    innocent,   and   the

Commonwealth bore the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.    (See id. at 7-9).     The court explored the nature of the charges

Appellant was facing, and it provided the applicable sentencing ranges. (See

id. at 15-19).    Thereafter, the court instructed the prosecutor to read the

factual basis into the record. (See id. at 22-31).

        The court also reviewed the written colloquy with Appellant, who

indicated that he understood the form and did not have any questions about

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it. (See id. at 12). The court elaborated on the written colloquy as follows:

          THE COURT: If you complained later to the Superior Court
          and said that your plea wasn’t voluntary, they would take a
          look at this form and they would see that you signed it.
          People do not usually sign legal documents this important
          that they haven’t gone through with their attorneys and that
          they don’t fully understand. So that by signing this form,
          that would tend to show the Superior Court that your plea
          is voluntary. Do you understand that?

          [APPELLANT]: Yes.

(Id. at 13). Appellant later stated that he was satisfied with the advice of

counsel, and he did not have any further questions for counsel. (See id. at

13-14).

     Although Appellant complains that plea counsel provided inadequate

representation, the record undermines his claim. The colloquies reveal that

Appellant was aware of his rights, he was satisfied with counsel’s

representation, and he was not forced to enter the plea. Appellant is bound

by his statements.      See Pollard, supra.      Under the totality of these

circumstances, we agree with PCRA counsel’s conclusion that Appellant’s

ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit. See Allen, supra. Accordingly,

we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.

     Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/17/2023

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