Court Opinion

ID: 9408942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 14:01:38.957972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.956151
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14181    Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-14181
                           ____________________

        PABLO GUZMAN,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
        ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
        STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                                  Respondents-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-20220-CMA
USCA11 Case: 20-14181     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023   Page: 2 of 13

        2                       Opinion of the Court              20-14181

                            ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
               The question here is whether Pablo Guzman was prejudiced
        when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument.
        But there is a catch: while the neglected argument may have
        succeeded at the time of his appeal—and even during his state
        court habeas petition—it fails under current Florida law.
                Guzman’s counsel may have erred in the past, but that error
        does not prejudice him in the present—at least not according to
        Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993). There, the Supreme Court
        instructed that when the law has changed in a way to render a legal
        problem obsolete, prejudice is measured against current law. See
        id. at 371–72. That direction decides this case. We do not need to
        decide whether Guzman’s counsel made an error—though by all
        accounts, he did. But prejudice review in habeas corpus is
        dedicated to deciding whether a proceeding was truly unfair or
        unreliable—so much so that to let the result stand would violate
        the Constitution. Here, the result for Guzman may have been
        unlucky, but it was neither unfair nor unreliable because under
        current Florida law, Guzman got the correct result. We affirm the
        district court’s denial of Guzman’s petition.
                                         I.
              In 2013, Pablo Guzman was tried by a Florida jury. He had
        been charged with attempted ﬁrst-degree murder, and the state
USCA11 Case: 20-14181      Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 07/14/2023     Page: 3 of 13

        20-14181               Opinion of the Court                        3

        court instructed the jury to consider three lesser-included crimes
        as well: attempted second-degree murder, attempted voluntary
        manslaughter, and aggravated battery. Ultimately, the jury
        convicted Guzman of attempted second-degree murder, and he
        was sentenced to forty years in prison.
              Guzman now claims that the jury instructions on attempted
        voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an
        explanation of “excusable homicide.” Under Florida law, a killing
        qualiﬁes as excusable homicide when it was committed “by
        accident and misfortune,” with “sudden and suﬃcient
        provocation,” or “upon a sudden combat,” without “any dangerous
        weapon being used.” Fla. Stat. § 782.03. When Guzman’s counsel
        asked for an instruction explaining excusable homicide, the
        prosecution protested that such a theory of the case had not been
        pursued and could not possibly apply. The court agreed with the
        prosecution and omitted the instruction.
                Here is the problem—the decision should have gone the
        other way at the time. The Florida Supreme Court had said that a
        “complete instruction on manslaughter requires an explanation
        that justiﬁable and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime.”
        State v. Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis added). And
        it did not matter that Guzman was convicted of attempted second-
        degree murder—not manslaughter. Under Lucas, the jury needed
        to hear the complete instructions on manslaughter, even if the
        evidence was suﬃcient for second-degree murder. See id. at 426–
USCA11 Case: 20-14181         Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 07/14/2023         Page: 4 of 13

        4                          Opinion of the Court                      20-14181

        27. So at the time of Guzman’s trial, Florida law required the
        missing instruction.
                Even so, Guzman’s counsel did not raise this missing
        instruction on direct appeal, and the conviction was aﬃrmed.
        Guzman v. State, 151 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
        (unpublished table decision). In 2015, Guzman petitioned that
        same state appellate court for habeas relief based on ineﬀective
        assistance of appellate counsel. Among the enumerated errors was
        failure to appeal the omitted excusable homicide instruction. The
        appellate court denied the petition without explanation. Guzman
        v. State, 206 So. 3d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table
        decision).
                In 2017, Guzman turned to federal court. He ﬁled a habeas
        petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and raised several grounds for relief,
        including ineﬀective assistance of appellate counsel. Before the
        district court ruled on the petition, Guzman ﬁled another habeas
        petition in state court—nearly identical to his 2015 petition—which
        was also denied without explanation. See Guzman v. State, 348 So.
        3d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (unpublished table decision). That
        same year, the Florida Supreme Court reaﬃrmed its Lucas line of
        cases in State v. Spencer, 216 So. 3d 481, 485–86 (Fla. 2017). 1

        1 Spencer recognized two exceptions to the rule in Lucas that the jury must have

        complete manslaughter instructions, but neither applies to Guzman’s case.
        See 216 So. 3d at 485–86.
USCA11 Case: 20-14181     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023    Page: 5 of 13

        20-14181               Opinion of the Court                       5

               But Lucas did not last much longer. Two years later—before
        the district court ruled on Guzman’s § 2254 petition—the Florida
        Supreme Court walked back this line of cases in Knight v. State, 286
        So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2019). Like Guzman, the defendant in Knight was
        convicted of attempted second-degree murder. Id. at 148. He
        argued that the jury instructions for attempted voluntary
        manslaughter were incorrect, and thus reversible error. Id. at 150–
        51. But this time the court disagreed. Because “there was no error
        in the jury instruction on the oﬀense of conviction”—attempted
        second-degree murder—nor any claim that the evidence at trial
        was insuﬃcient to support that conviction, reversal was not
        required. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
               The district court recognized this change in the law and
        rejected Guzman’s Lucas-based arguments. “If Lucas remained
        good law,” the court conceded, then his claim for ineﬀective
        assistance of counsel would have succeeded. But relying on
        Lockhart v. Fretwell, which held that the prejudice step of such a
        claim turns on current law, the court analyzed Guzman’s claim
        under Knight instead. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371–72. And based on
        Knight, the court denied Guzman’s petition.
               When Guzman appealed, we granted him a certiﬁcate of
        appealability on this issue. As stated by Guzman, “the determinative
        fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v.
        Fretwell” to his claim.
USCA11 Case: 20-14181      Document: 53-1       Date Filed: 07/14/2023    Page: 6 of 13

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14181

                                         II.
               We review a district court’s denial of a § 2254 federal habeas
        petition de novo. Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1332
        (11th Cir. 2009).
                                         III.
               The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
        right to counsel at trial and on direct appeal. See Strickland v.
        Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984); United States v. Berger, 375
        F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). And “the right to counsel is the
        right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
        686 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). To show that trial
        counsel or appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a
        defendant generally must prove two things: deficient performance
        by counsel, and prejudice to the defendant. See id. at 687; Johnson
        v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001).
                We take for granted that Guzman’s counsel was likely
        deficient for failing to raise the excusable homicide instruction. But
        Strickland still requires a conclusion that the petitioner was
        prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency. A typical description of the
        prejudice inquiry is that a defendant must show “a reasonable
        probability of a different result in the appeal had the claim been
        presented in an effective manner.” Butts v. GDCP Warden, 850 F.3d
        1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2017). The logic of Guzman’s prejudice
        argument flows from this typical standard—he says that if his
        counsel had challenged the omission of the excusable homicide
USCA11 Case: 20-14181      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023     Page: 7 of 13

        20-14181               Opinion of the Court                         7

        instruction, there is a “strong probability” that his conviction
        would have been vacated.
               But not every case is typical. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, the
        Supreme Court faced the same atypical issue animating this appeal:
        a change in the law. There, as here, the petitioner claimed that his
        counsel was ineffective for failing to make an objection (at trial
        rather than on appeal). Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 367. And there, as here,
        by the time the district court decided his federal habeas case, the
        legal basis for the objection no longer existed because the necessary
        precedent had been overruled. Id. at 367–68. Relying on the older
        law, the district court granted habeas relief (and the appellate court
        affirmed) because the omitted objection would have succeeded had
        it been made at the time of trial. Id.
                The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Strickland
        prejudice analysis “focusing solely on mere outcome
        determination, without attention to whether the result of the
        proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”
        Id. at 369. Put another way, even if a defendant can show “a
        reasonable probability of a different result” without counsel’s
        error, that is not always the end of the matter under Strickland. See
        id. at 369–70. “The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that
        counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance
        between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair
        and the verdict rendered suspect.” Id. at 369 (quoting Kimmelman
        v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986)). Thus, Strickland prejudice
USCA11 Case: 20-14181        Document: 53-1       Date Filed: 07/14/2023       Page: 8 of 13

        8                        Opinion of the Court                    20-14181

        also requires that the result of a defendant’s proceeding be “unfair
        or unreliable.” Id.
               In refining the prejudice analysis in this way, the Court
        emphasized that it was “neither unfair nor unreliable” to evaluate
        the result of an earlier proceeding through the lens of current law.
        Id. at 371. More specifically, no prejudice exists “if the
        ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any
        substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him”—
        present tense. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). So unless the defendant
        would be entitled to habeas relief under current state law, there is
        no prejudice.
               That case decides this appeal. Under Fretwell, current
        Florida law is the proper basis for the prejudice inquiry. Guzman
        does not argue that he can show prejudice under current law, so
        we conclude that the result of his direct appeal is “neither unfair
        nor unreliable.” Id. at 371. He has not been deprived of “any
        substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him,” and
        so his conviction does not offend the Constitution’s guarantee of
        effective counsel on direct appeal. 2 Id. at 372.
             Guzman contends that, in spite of the facial similarity
        between his case and Fretwell, the Supreme Court’s holding there

        2 To be clear, this is no technicality. Guzman was convicted of attempted
        second-degree murder, and the jury received a correct instruction on second-
        degree murder.
USCA11 Case: 20-14181       Document: 53-1       Date Filed: 07/14/2023     Page: 9 of 13

        20-14181                Opinion of the Court                           9

        does not apply to his ineffective assistance claim for three reasons.
        Each is unpersuasive.
                First, he argues that Fretwell applies only to claims of
        ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level—not on appeal.
        This misses the thrust of Fretwell, which is based on the prejudice
        analysis, not the procedural posture. Fretwell does nothing to limit
        itself to the trial context—no language cabins its reasoning or
        holding in that way. To the contrary, the Fretwell court frequently
        refers to Strickland writ large, and Strickland’s analysis applies to
        both trials and appeals. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369–73; Philmore v.
        McNeil, 575 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). Fretwell must also
        apply to both.
               We are not alone in reading Fretwell this way. Several other
        circuits have already applied that case when evaluating Strickland
        prejudice for an appellate ineffective assistance claim. See Bunkley
        v. Meachum, 68 F.3d 1518, 1521–22 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
        Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2013); Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d
        440, 448 (5th Cir. 2003); Evans v. Hudson, 575 F.3d 560, 566 & n.2
        (6th Cir. 2009). Others have applied it when considering different
        parts of the Strickland analysis or otherwise considering ineffective
        assistance of appellate counsel claims. See Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d
        908, 918 (7th Cir. 2013); Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1195
        (10th Cir. 2009); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545–46 (8th Cir.
        2005). No circuit has limited Fretwell to the trial context, and we
        see no reason to be the first.
USCA11 Case: 20-14181     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023    Page: 10 of 13

        10                     Opinion of the Court                20-14181

                Second, Guzman emphasizes that in Fretwell the repudiated
        objection had been available for only four years and clearly never
        should have been. Here, he points out, Lucas was good law for
        almost twenty years, and was less obviously a mistake. But
        Fretwell’s basic logic does not turn on how long a case was good
        law or the degree of its error. And nothing suggests that the case
        is limited to its facts.
              Guzman argues that Justice O’Connor’s Fretwell
        concurrence states otherwise. She said, as he points out, that the
        case was “unusual.” Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 373 (O’Connor, J.,
        concurring). But she did not stop there. What she termed
        “unusual” was the defendant’s attempt to rely on an argument that
        was “wholly meritless under current governing law.” Id. at 373–74
        (O’Connor, J., concurring). So too here.
               Finally, Guzman tries to persuade us that AEDPA either
        overruled or modified Fretwell. See generally Antiterrorism and
        Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214,
        codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA was enacted in 1996, three
        years after Fretwell was decided, and added a new subsection (d) to
        the existing § 2254. Id.; see also Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 364. The new
        provision tightened a federal court’s ability to overturn state
        convictions:
              An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
              of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
              State court shall not be granted with respect to any
              claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
USCA11 Case: 20-14181     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023     Page: 11 of 13

        20-14181               Opinion of the Court                        11

              court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
              claim—

                     (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
                     or involved an unreasonable application of,
                     clearly established Federal law, as determined
                     by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

                     (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
                     unreasonable determination of the facts in
                     light of the evidence presented in the State
                     court proceeding.

        28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). According to Guzman, this
        past-tense language repudiates Fretwell and creates a new federal
        habeas right. In his view, § 2254(d) requires federal courts
        reviewing habeas petitions to look to the law at the time of the state
        decision rather than the law of the present, as Fretwell demands.
        Section 2254(d)’s past-focused language, he says, shifts the inquiry
        to the time of the state habeas petition.
               But AEDPA offers no new habeas power to the federal
        courts. In fact, it restrains their power. Under § 2254(d)’s text, a
        writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim
        that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
        unless” it resulted in a decision contrary to clearly established
        federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). That
        provision’s only affirmative instruction is that federal courts cannot
        grant habeas corpus except in a few limited circumstances. What
        it does not say is that habeas must be granted—in any circumstance.
USCA11 Case: 20-14181      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023      Page: 12 of 13

        12                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14181

        The limits AEDPA sets on federal courts considering habeas corpus
        petitions from state prisoners do not create a new right to grant
        those petitions by freezing the law at some point in the past.
               This conclusion is consistent with how the Supreme Court
        has described AEDPA. In general, the “federal habeas scheme
        leaves primary responsibility with the state courts,” and § 2254(d)
        in particular “demands that state-court decisions be given the
        benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82
        (2011) (quotations omitted). Against the backdrop of this renewed
        deference to state courts, § 2254(d) “places new constraints on the
        power of a federal habeas court”—not new avenues for relief.
        Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quotation omitted
        and alteration adopted); see also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (noting that
        AEDPA “sets several limits on the power of a federal court”).
               What’s more, both the Supreme Court and this Court have
        reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or
        modification. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 166–67 (2012);
        Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391–94 (2000); Allen v. Sec’y, Florida
        Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 754 (11th Cir. 2010). We see no reason
        to change course. AEDPA’s restrictions on prisoners’ federal
        habeas rights do not create an end run around Fretwell.
                                    *      *      *
              Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s
        proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when
        current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to
        vindicate. To blind ourselves to current Florida law would grant
USCA11 Case: 20-14181      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023     Page: 13 of 13

        20-14181                Opinion of the Court                        13

        Guzman “a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.”
        Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370. Because the district court correctly applied
        Fretwell to this case, we AFFIRM the court’s denial of his § 2254
        petition.