Court Opinion

ID: 9958921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:04:14.418139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:05.085360
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                      THOMAS ALBERT PANNIER,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                             No. 4D2022-1361

                              [April 10, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Martin County; Darren Steele, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2018-CF-001694-
B.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy Jack, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

    Appellant appeals his convictions for possession of oxycodone and
hydromorphone, raising five issues: (1) fundamental error in closing
argument, (2) fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on an
affirmative defense, (3) error in denying appellant meaningful access to the
courts, (4) error in denying appellant a twelve-person jury, and (5) error in
imposing investigative costs and $200 in prosecution costs. We affirm on
all issues, except we reverse on the last issue regarding investigative and
prosecution costs.

   Appellant was charged with trafficking in oxycodone and
hydromorphone following a joint Martin County Sheriff’s Office and DEA
investigation of appellant and his wife. Appellant was convicted of the
lesser-included offenses of possession of oxycodone and hydromorphone.

   Initially, appellant argues fundamental error occurred when the state
argued that appellant admitted he had just purchased the drugs when the
state never elicited such testimony from the detective. We find no
fundamental error occurred because the state introduced other evidence
regarding appellant’s admission and participation in the drug buy,
including the testimony of appellant’s wife who testified as a cooperating
witness. See Cannon v. State, 315 So. 3d 732, 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Further, defense counsel herself referred to appellant’s admission during
closing arguments. Appellant also argues that the state improperly shifted
the burden of proof in closing. We find no error occurred, much less
fundamental error, because the state’s arguments were permissible
comments on the evidence presented. See Bell v. State, 108 So. 3d 639,
648 (Fla. 2013); Reyes v. State, 700 So. 2d 458, 460-61 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997); Wilchcombe v. State, 842 So. 2d 198, 199-200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

    Next, appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that appellant’s affirmative defense of valid prescription applied to the
lesser-included offense of possession. We find appellant waived this issue
because defense counsel affirmatively agreed to the instruction. Universal
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel, 82 So. 3d 47, 65 (Fla. 2012); Laws v. State,
149 So. 3d 104, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Even if this issue had not been
waived, no fundamental error occurred because the defense of valid
prescription was not appellant’s primary defense, which was that the
illegal drugs were actually possessed by appellant’s wife. See Martinez v.
State, 981 So. 2d 449, 456 (Fla. 2008). Further, the valid prescription
defense was “weak” because it would not apply to all the drugs appellant
was charged with possessing, specifically the hydromorphone, since
appellant had a prescription for only a low dose of oxycodone. 1 See id. at
456-57.

    Appellant further argues the trial court denied appellant meaningful
access to the courts by not requiring the state to provide discovery to
appellant, who appeared pro se for a period, in a form he could view.
Initially, we find this issue was not raised below and therefore is not
preserved. Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985). Even if it had
been preserved, appellant was not denied meaningful access to the courts
because appellant’s counsel had meaningful access to discovery for
approximately eight months before trial.

   Appellant’s next claim, that he was entitled to a twelve-person jury, has
been rejected by this court. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla.
4th DCA 2022), review denied, SC2022-1597, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla.
June 6, 2023), cert. pending, No. 23-5173 (U.S. July 21, 2023).

1 Appellant had a prescription for a 10-milligram dose of oxycodone, but was
charged with a 30-milligram dose, which was not covered by the prescription.

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   Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing costs of
investigation and $200 in costs of prosecution. The state concedes the
costs of investigation should be stricken, as there was no agency request
or evidence of the amount. Jackson v. State, 137 So. 3d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2014). Further, the investigative costs may not be reimposed on
remand. Richards v. State, 288 So. 3d 574, 577 (Fla. 2020); Beauford v.
State, 375 So. 3d 923, 924 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). The state also agrees the
costs of prosecution must be reversed because the state did not request or
submit proof of prosecution costs exceeding $100. Cabrera v. State, 375
So. 3d 924, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Thus, we reverse and remand with
instructions to reduce the prosecution costs to $100 or impose additional
prosecution costs upon request and sufficient proof by the state. See id.
We also reverse and remand with instructions to strike the investigative
costs.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

WARNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                           *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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