Court Opinion

ID: 9556649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 05:09:31.439514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:27.583502
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     August 17, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

V                                                                    Nos. 361757; 361762
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
MENDEL MARK MOORE,                                                   LC Nos. 19-001972-01-FC;
                                                                             19-002884-01-FC
               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and LETICA and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In these consolidated appeals, defendant appeals by right his resentencing for his jury-trial
convictions of two counts of delivery of less than 50 grams of fentanyl, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv),
one count of tampering with evidence, MCL 750.483a(6)(b), and one count of concealing the death
of an individual, MCL 333.2841(3). The trial court originally sentenced defendant, as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve concurrent prison terms of 20 to 40 years for each
fentanyl-delivery conviction, 6 to 20 years for the tampering-with-evidence conviction, and 4 to
20 years for the concealing-death conviction. Following a remand for resentencing, the trial court
sentenced defendant to prison terms of 10 to 40 years for each of the delivery convictions, 6 to 20
years for the tampering conviction, and 4 to 20 years for the concealing-death conviction. We
affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        For many years, Defendant supplied heroin for others to package and sell at a duplex in
Detroit. Defendant’s product was known as the “good stuff” because of its potency. William
Coffey, a regular customer who purchased and used drugs with one of the sellers at the home, died
after using drugs purchased at that location. According to the evidence, while defendant was
present, persons involved in the drug-sales operation placed Coffey’s body in a van and disposed
of it. Acting on a tip, the police discovered the body in a garbage-strewn area near the subject
premises.

                                                -1-
        Another man, Kyle Vasicek, also purchased drugs at defendant’s operation and died after
consuming them at home. The physician who performed autopsies on Coffey and Vasicek
concluded that each died from an overdose of fentanyl and acetylfentanyl. The police conducted
a controlled purchase of heroin at the duplex then searched the premises, finding illicit drugs and
related contraband. Defendant was tried in connection with the deaths of Coffey and Vasicek, and,
in each case, the jury found defendant not guilty of delivery of a controlled substance causing
death but guilty of the other charged offenses.

        Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for
resentencing because the trial court had considered acquitted conduct when assessing the offense
variables. People v Moore, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 23, 2021 (Docket Nos. 352833 and 352873), pp 3-6.

       On appeal after resentencing, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing unreasonable and disproportionate sentences for the fentanyl-delivery convictions whose
minimums exceeded the recommended range under the sentencing guidelines.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an
appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502
(2015). A sentence that departs upward is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and this Court
considers whether the sentence violated the principles of reasonableness under the proportionality
test. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). A trial court does not
abuse its discretion when it chooses an outcome within the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

                                 III. DEPARTURE SENTENCE

        When imposing a sentence, a court must use the sentencing guidelines. MCR 6.425(D).
This requires the court to score the sentencing variables, calculate the recommended range for the
minimum sentence, and take that range into consideration when determining a sentence. Lock-
ridge, 498 Mich at 391-392. The court is not obligated to impose a sentence within that range, id.
at 365, and may depart from that range without stating substantial and compelling reasons for
doing so, id. at 392.

        In this case, the guidelines range for the sentencing offense, delivery of less than 50 grams
of fentanyl, was 19 to 76 months (6 years, 4 months), and the trial court sentenced him to serve a
minimum of 10 years. Thus, defendant’s minimum sentence was a 44-month (3 years, 8 months),
or 58%, upward departure.

       Defendant argues that the trial court did not provide a justification for the extent of the
departure sentence. We disagree.

       The trial court explained as follows:

                                                -2-
       It is undisputed that [the subject house] in the city of Detroit . . . was an
ongoing and thriving drug house, so much so that there were at least three additional
men hired to keep an eye on things, to manage the place, to provide security and to
take out the trash, including a dead body . . . .

        The testimony . . . established that [defendant] stopped by his business at
[the subject house] almost every night and sometimes multiple times throughout
the day. As the Court previously found and underscored, [defendant], you did not
stop by to check on your brother who worked there and you did not stop by to check
on your childhood friend, Guela Cole, both struggling addicts.

       They were employed by you and instead you came by to collect unearned
and untaxed money. [Defendant], this business afforded you a lifestyle to purchase
luxury cars and to provide handsomely to [sic] you and your family.

        Instead, you stopped by to pick up money, check on the supply and to
deliver more poison, further underscoring that the original presentence investiga-
tion report find[ing]s that you were unemployed and have little to no work history.

        [Defendant’s] relationship to the criminal justice system allows for the
conclusion that you have not benefitted from past rehabilitation efforts including
prison and probationary terms closed without improvement.

       This was previously outlined and, again, I incorporate those paragraphs in
my entire previous sentencing statements into this hearing.

        The original presentence investigation report provided no evidence to
suggest that you, [defendant], sought self improvement by way of counseling,
education or employment skills. There is no evidence to suggest that notwith-
standing multiple years of probation, two years of incarceration, that that caused
you to reflect on your need to change your behavior.

       Instead your criminal record continued to grow. [Defendant], you turned a
blind eye to the lives that were being destroyed and the neighborhood you were
destroying because of your business . . . .

        I believe it’s also important to underscore the math. Guela Cole testified
that she lived and worked there for on or about four years. She also testified that
she sold upwards of a hundred packs of heroine [sic] per day. Heroine [sic] with
Fentanyl. A hundred packs a day times three hundred and sixty-five days a year,
times four years is staggering mathematics and each individual packet continued to
contribute to a slow and painful death to those individuals buying the same.

       [Defendant], this allows for the conclusion that you refused to rehabilitate
yourself and allows for further conclusion that society was not safe and is not safe
with you in it.

                                        -3-
        Defendant argues that the trial court considered factors already accounted for in the scoring
of the guidelines. Our Supreme Court in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 660; 461 NW2d 1
(1990), cautioned, “A departure from the recommended range in the absence of factors not
adequately reflected in the guidelines should alert the appellate court to the possibility that the trial
court has violated the principle of proportionality and thus abused its sentencing discretion.”
However, the trial court explained as follows:

                The guidelines for the delivery convictions do not take into consideration
        that [defendant] ran a drug house for a minimum of four years, a drug house so
        successful that he needed to employ a number of individuals both to service the
        large volume of patrons and to provide ongoing security for this illegal operation
        and perhaps I should underscore what I’ve read previously, upwards of a hundred
        packs a day every day times four years. Staggering.

                . . . Mr. Moore closed his eyes to the destruction of his childhood friend
        Guela [Cole] and other employees who he, frankly, held hostage linked to the
        poison in the substandard shelter he provided. For years [defendant] closed his
        eyes to the carnage of this drug house to every person who knocked on his door and
        the drug house that was forced upon the neighbors who lived nearby.

               For years, [defendant], you closed your eyes to the obvious destruction of
        human life. Instead you sought out greater profit by providing a more lethal
        concoction of heroine [sic] and Fentanyl . . . .

                [T]his record reflect[s] testimony about wanting the good stuff and forget
        the color of the packet that was known to be [defendant’s] good stuff. Therefore,
        the Court continues to conclude that the guidelines for delivery convictions do not
        accurately reflect the seriousness of these offenses.

                Additionally prior attempts at probation, jail terms levied and prison term
        has not demonstrated a change to [defendant’s] behavior. [Defendant] has five
        prior low severity felony convictions. [Prior Record Variable (PRV)] 2 stop[s] at
        four prior low severity convictions.

                Thus, one of [defendant’s] prior low severity felony conviction[s] is not
        accounted for in the scoring of the guidelines. The Court must also underscore that
        [defendant] was convicted of four felonies, thus, the twenty point scoring on PRV-
        7 does not account for the third concurrent felony conviction. His previous con-
        viction of possession of controlled substance in 2014 has now escalated to two cases
        of delivery of a controlled substance, but perhaps most importantly [defendant’s]
        character, integrity did not temper his behavior.

                 [Defendant’s] absence of a moral decency allows for the conclusion that the
        guideline sentence on delivery does not reflect the danger of [defendant’s] presence
        in society. For the reasons previously articulated . . . and today’s reasoning, a
        sentence outside of the guideline range on delivery convictions is more proportion-
        ate to the offense and the offender in this case.

                                                  -4-
         Defendant notes that the “sentencing guidelines already take into account [defendant’s]
past criminal behavior and [he] had a habitual 4th notice.” The trial court thoroughly explained
why the sentencing guidelines accounted for less than the entirety of defendant’s previous
convictions. Most importantly, the court noted that defendant’s record of “prior attempts at
probation, jail terms levied and prison term has not demonstrated a change to [defendant’s]
behavior.” And no sentencing variable accounts for a defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation that
the trial court reviewed and considered. Therefore, defendant has not shown that the trial court
errantly based its departure on variables that the guidelines already, and adequately, considered.

       Defendant argues that the trial court’s statement that defendant lacked moral decency was
not an objective and verifiable reason for a departure. This objection is inapt, because, since
Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365, a sentencing court no longer needs objective and verifiable
reasons for imposing a departure sentence.

        Defendant additionally argues that the court’s statement that defendant lacked moral
decency indicated that bias influenced the decision. In Milbourn, 435 Mich at 645, the Supreme
Court commented that, although “a measure of subjectivity in judicial decisions is unavoidable,”
a sentencing decision should not be based on completely subjective personal value judgments.
Nevertheless, the background of the offender remains an important consideration in sentencing.
See People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 45; 880 NW2d 297 (2015). The trial court’s statement
that defendant’s “absence of a moral decency allows for the conclusion that the guideline sentence
on delivery does not reflect the danger of [his] presence in society” was a summation the court
offered upon concluding that a departure sentence was in order. The court discussed its reasons at
length, including defendant’s history of drug involvement, his failures at opportunities for
rehabilitation, the large volume of drug sales over an extended time, and the destructive effects of
drug consumption to users including his brother and childhood friend, the persons defendant
engaged in order to profit from his crimes, and the community in general.

       Defendant argues that the statements regarding his character ignored the letters of support
from his mother and two daughters, and his positive record while incarcerated. The trial court’s
judgment was well grounded in the record, including the testimony regarding the sentencing
offense that the court heard at trial. The statement regarding defendant’s character did not pertain
to a particular sentencing factor, but rather was the culmination of the factors the trial court
highlighted. As the court stated, it was “[f]or the reasons previously articulated . . . and today’s
reasoning” that the court issued the departure sentence.1

        The reasonableness of a sentence is determined by evaluating whether “ ‘that sentence
violate[d] the principle of proportionality, which require[s] sentences imposed by the trial court to
be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. This Court recited
several factors bearing on the proportionality of a sentence:

1
  Because the trial court stated that the reasons it had previously set forth were a part of the
justification of the instant sentence, we take judicial notice of the reasons articulated at the original
sentencing.

                                                  -5-
       (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) factors not considered by the guidelines, such
       as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s
       misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the
       defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, and (3) factors that were inadequately
       considered by the guidelines in a particular case. [Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 46
       (citations omitted).]

A court should also take “ ‘into account the nature of the offense and the background of the
offender.’ ” Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 45, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 651.

         We conclude that the challenged departure sentence was within the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. In People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 44-45; 755 NW2d 212 (2008), this
Court stated that “repeated offenses and failures at rehabilitation” may “constitute an acceptable
justification for an upward departure.” This Court elaborated that it is permissible to base a
departure sentence “on concrete factors that established a firm probability of future offenses,
namely, the defendant’s past criminal history, [and] his past failures at rehabilitation.” Horn, 279
Mich App at 45. The key holding of Horn was that “specific characteristics of an offense and an
offender that strongly presage future criminal acts may justify an upward departure from the
recommended sentencing range if . . . they are not already adequately contemplated by the
guidelines.” Id.

        Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s determination that he had poor prospects for
rehabilitation, pointing out that he defendant had apologized and acquired only one misconduct
while incarcerated. The trial court acknowledged defendant’s efforts, but viewed defendant’s
potential in light of his long history of criminal conduct interspersed with judicial intervention.
The court listed defendant’s previous convictions not as reasons themselves for the departure, but
as facts relating to the court’s concerns over defendant’s repeated failures at rehabilitation.

       Further, another basis for the trial court’s justification for the departure was the destructive
impacts of the sentencing offense on the affected persons and community. Defendant’s users
included a person who died at the subject drug house, whose death defendant was convicted of
concealing. The trial court highlighted the “staggering” amount of potentially lethal packets of
drugs that the testimony showed that defendant provided for packaging and sale, and how
defendant displayed indifference to those concerns.

         Defendant argues that the trial court’s statements indicated that it erroneously judged
defendant’s character negatively and used that assessment as a basis for the departure. In
particular, defendant asserts that the court mischaracterized defendant’s relationship with Guela
Cole as a childhood friend whom he exploited rather than as a mere acquaintance. But Cole
testified that she had known defendant “since we was young,” meaning 15 or 16 years old or
“younger than that,” and that “all of us grew up together.” Despite Cole’s not being asked to define
her relationship with defendant, it is apparent that she had a relationship with defendant as they
grew up together. Defendant argues that he was not responsible for Cole’s decisions to use illegal
drugs or associate with the subject drug house, but Cole testified that defendant routinely supplied
large amounts of crack cocaine and heroin for her to package and sell at that location, which was

                                                 -6-
also reported in the presentence investigation report (PSIR),2 and which indicates that defendant
was no passive observer of Cole’s plight.

        Defendant also argues that the trial court mischaracterized his role in the drug house by
stating that defendant owned and operated it, and that Cole had sold only his drugs there for four
years. Defendant points out that the evidence indicated that Cole sold other suppliers’ drugs as
well, so other suppliers contributed to what went on at the subject drug house. The trial court
referred to the drug house as defendant’s business, rather than a place that he owned, which was
supported by Cole’s testimony that defendant frequently delivered drugs to her at that location for
her to package and sell. Further, the court acknowledged that others were involved in those
operations, and also that the actions of other suppliers were not properly a consideration when
fashioning an individualized sentence for defendant. Further, the PSIR specified, consistent with
Cole’s testimony, that Cole was active at that location for four years.

       Defendant additionally disputes the characterization of the drug house as providing
substandard housing, but this argument is belied by the testimony that drugs were sold and
consumed at the house to the extent that illicit drug activities dominated the premises.

        Defendant has thus failed to show that any of the trial court’s statements were clearly
erroneous, or, more importantly, how any alleged misstatements might have affected the
departures sentences that, as the court laboriously explained, were based on defendant’s high rate
of recidivism despite numerous opportunities for reform, and the “staggering” volume of delivery
of dangerous substances underlying those convictions.

         Defendant also argues that the trial court indicated that it issued a disproportionate sentence
by it blaming him alone for the destructive effects of his drug-trafficking operations on the persons
and community involved, despite evidence that others were involved in drug trafficking at the
subject house, and points out that the effects over which the trial court expressed concern are
common results of drug trafficking in general. It was the trial court’s task to decide defendant’s
sentence on the basis of his individual behavior in relation to the sentencing offense, and the court
discussed at length the characteristics particular to defendant, the sentencing offense, and decided
the matter accordingly. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court improperly applied the
particular facts of the crime, or of defendant’s conduct, in determining the departure sentence.

       For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly established by reference to
matters of record that its departure sentence was “proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474.

2
  “When calculating the sentencing guidelines, a court may consider all record evidence, including
the contents of a PSIR.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015).
Defendant does not dispute the contents of the PSIR, and does not argue that his sentence was
invalid because it was based on inaccurate information.

                                                  -7-
Affirmed.

                  /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                  /s/ Anica Letica
                  /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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