Court Opinion

ID: 9727770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:09.381693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.508139
License: Public Domain

MORRIS, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, having concluded that the statutory provisions regulating cemeteries, are “almost nonsensical,” proceeds to render them so by focusing on the literal meaning of each word considered in isolation, and ignoring both the statutory scheme and the legislative purpose.
Admittedly the definitional sections contain ambiguities. However, in performing our judicial function, we should observe the well-established rules of statutory construction. The pertinent rules are summarized in Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 172, 179 [143 Cal.Rptr. 641], as follows:
“On passing upon this issue this court adverts to those well established rules of statutory construction which require first and foremost that the statutory scheme be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. [Citation.] It is the golden rule of statutory construction that where several alternatives exist that interpretation which appears the most reasonable shall be favored. [Citation.] ‘Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable interpretation, with due regard to the language used and the purpose sought to be accomplished. (Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of L. A. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 729, 734-735 [221 P.2d 31, 15 A.L.R.2d 1045]; People v. Sciortino (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d Supp. 905, 908-909 [345 P.2d 594].) Words of a statute must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general purpose and policy of the law. (City of L. A. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 253, 256-257 [330 P.2d 888].) . . .’ (Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 603-604 [130 Cal.Rptr. 110].)
“With respect to the statutes presented for interpretation in the present-case, we are further reminded of the elementary rule of statutory construction which dictates that effect be given, if possible to every word, clause and sentence. [Citation.] As a corollary, a statute should be *860construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, leaving no part superfluous or inoperative, void or insignificant and so that one section will not destroy another. [Citation.]”
In my opinion, the construction adopted by the majority defeats the obvious legislative purpose which is to regulate the disposition of dead bodies through the licensing of those entities engaged in such disposition. Moreover, the emphasis on the literal meaning of each word or phrase in isolation from the total legislative scheme, renders nonsensical and inoperative significant sections of the relevant codes, to wit, Health and Safety Code sections 7003 and 8340.
The majority concludes that defendant is not a cemetery corporation within the statutory definition of Health and Safety Code sections 7019 and 7020, and is not operating a cemetery which is subject to the provisions of the Cemetery Act. They reach this result because they first conclude that defendant neither makes interments nor performs cremations within the definition of Health and Safety Code sections 7009 and 7010.
It seems to me more appropriate to seek to determine whether a crematory is a cemetery by first examining the definition of cemetery contained in the Health and Safety Code.
Initially, we note that a “crematory” is “a building or structure containing one or more furnaces for the reduction of bodies of deceased persons to cremated remains.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 7006.) The majority concedes that defendant operates a crematory within the statutory definition.
Health and Safety Code section 7003 provides: “ ‘Cemetery’ means any one, or a combination of more than one, of the following, in a place used, or intended to be used, and dedicated, for cemetery purposes: [H] (a) A burial park, for earth interments. [If] (b) A mausoleum for crypt or vault interments. [H] (c) A crematory, or a crematory and columbarium, for cinerary interments.” (Italics added.)
If a crematory is a cemetery, then the place where a crematory is located is a place “used for cemetery purposes,” and the operation of a crematory is a “cemetery purpose.” “Cemetery purposes” is defined in section 7020 to mean “any and all . . . purposes requisite to, necessary *861for, or incident to, establishing, maintaining, operating, improving, or conducting a cemetery, interring human remains, and the care, preservation, and embellishment of cemetery property, including, but not limited to, any activity or business designed for the benefit, service, convenience, education, or spiritual uplift of property owners or persons visiting the cemetery.” (Italics added.) We can sympathize with the trial court and the majority, for not only does this section ignore the elementary principle that a term should not be used to define itself (cemetery purposes are purposes related to operating a cemetery), it refers to the very word (cemetery) that was originally sought to be defined. In other words, this section defines one unknown in terms of itself and another unknown.
Because the section uses the word cemetery to define cemetery, it is useless to seek to learn from section 7020 whether the operation of a crematory is a cemetery purpose without first determining whether a crematory is a cemetery. We must therefore return to the definitional section, Health and Safety Code section 7003.
The trial court, focusing on the underlined phrase in section 7003, paragraph (c) “a crematory, or a crematory and columbarium, for cinerary interments [italics added],” and recognizing that the defendant makes no interments, decided that defendant’s crematory, i.e., its building containing a retort, is not for interment, but just for reduction of the bodies to cremated remains. Neither the trial court nor the majority considered the possibility that a crematory can be for interment whether or not the remains are interred on the premises. In fact, it would seem that that is the only reasonable interpretation in the light of the definition of crematory (Health & Saf. Code, § 7006, supra)1 and the fact that section 7003 itself defines cemetery as “any one, or a combination of more than one [italics added],” of the enumerated categories. The list includes the various places of interment, any one of which could be in combination with a crematory. Moreover, why “a crematory, or a crematory and columbarium, for cinerary interments [italics added],” if a crematory was not intended to constitute a cemetery except in combination with one of the other categories?
Since the section is obviously ambiguous, it is helpful at this point to follow a cardinal rule of construction, and look to other sections in the statutory plan in an effort to ascertain the legislative intent.
*862Health and Safety Code section 8340 reads as follows: “No crematory shall conduct, or shall hereafter be constructed, established, or authorized to conduct, any business unless there is in connection therewith in the same fireproof building or structure or in a separate fireproof building within the same cemetery, either: [IT] A columbarium, a burial park or mausoleum amply equipped at all times for the interment of remains of bodies cremated at the crematory [italics added].” It is apparent from a reading of this section that the Legislature contemplated the possibility of a crematory without any facilities for interment, and decided to require such facilities. Despite the confusion engendered by the definitional sections and the fact that most sections of the codes envision conventional cemeteries, it can hardly be argued, in light of this section, that the codes were not intended to apply to an operation such as defendant’s. Based upon the obvious usage of the term in section 8340, I conclude that a crematory, even without interment facilities, is a cemetery within the meaning of section 7003. (See 55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 402, 405 (1972).)
This construction promotes the legislative purpose and gives effect to every word and sentence of the statutory scheme. Consider the effect of the majority’s construction upon sections 7003 and 8340. If a “cemetery” means a crematory only when the crematory has a place for interment on the premises, then any crematory may escape regulation simply by not providing a place for interment on the premises. This, of course, constitutes a violation of section 8340, which ceases to be a violation simply because the violation prevents the crematory from being subject to regulation.
It is true that at the time section 8340 was enacted, there was no provision for interment of cremated remains by burial at sea, thus the section in effect required crematories to have available at least one of the then statutory (and now traditional) means of interment. But in 1965 when the Legislature enacted section 7117 providing for burial at sea, it did not amend section 8340. (See Stats. 1931, ch. 1148, §§ 2, 5, pp. 2436-2437; Stats. 1939, ch. 60, §§ 7009, 8340, pp. 670, 701; Stats. 1965, ch. 1421, § 8, p. 3346; see generally 55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 402, 406 (1972).) Perhaps this was an oversight, perhaps not; and if it was not, perhaps the needs and attitudes of society have since changed to warrant authorization of an operation such as defendant’s. In any event, faced with the clear purport of section 8340, defendant’s remedy is with the Legislature, not the courts. I conclude that defendant’s crematory is within the purview of the provisions of the Business and Professions Code *863and Health and Safety Code relating to cemeteries and, within the meaning of those provisions, defendant is operating a cemetery subject to the jurisdiction of plaintiff.2
The majority, in an obvious effort to justify their nullification of Health and Safety Code section 8340, raises the spectre of unconstitutionality if the section is applied to defendant’s operation.
Although I have considered section 8340 for the limited purpose of ascertaining legislative intent, I am of the opinion that the section remains a reasonable exercise of the police power.
I submit that the addition of burial at sea as a new means of interment does not render unreasonable the requirement of section 8340 that a crematory have available one of the traditional means of interment. I agree with the reasoning expressed in 55 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen., supra, at page 406, as follows: “As stated, a burial park, a mausoleum, and a columbarium have become the traditional places of interment. The legislature has now recognized burial at sea as a lawful means of interment but that recognition should not be construed as a right to operate a crematory exclusively servicing remains to be buried at sea. Thus, even though burial at sea has been recognized as a new means of interment, a requirement that each crematory have available one of the traditional means of interment is well within the broad discretion granted the legislature in the exercise of the police power and we cannot say that such a requirement does not bear a reasonable and substantial relationship to the operation of a crematory and the interment of cremated remains.”
Plaintiff, as the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the Cemetery Act, is entitled to judgment enjoining the defendant from operating a cemetery without a certificate of authority as required by the act.
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 21, 1979. Manuel, J., did not participate therein.

 A “crematory,” as defined in Health and Safety Code section 7006, supra, need simply have “one or more furnaces for the reduction of bodies of deceased persons to cremated remains.”

 The court also concluded that defendant was not a “cemetery corporation,” which is defined in section 7019 to mean “any corporation . . . which, is or may be authorized by its articles to conduct any one or more or all of the businesses of a cemetery . . . .” If, as I have concluded, defendant is operating a cemetery, defendant is a cemetery corporation.