Court Opinion

ID: 9771039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:29:39.398837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:56.894690
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Regardless of whether the court of appeals erred, or whether that error constituted an abuse of discretion, I believe that National Union’s rights could be adequately protected through the normal appellate process.
Since mandamus is supposed to be an extraordinary remedy, we have historically used care to ensure that litigants do not make frivolous or misguided attempts to secure the writ. In our recent writings, we have emphasized that mandamus is not available where the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, see Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840-44 (Tex.1992) (and cases cited therein), and we have explained that seeking mandamus relief is never a prerequisite for obtaining full appellate review. Id. at 842 n. 9; Pope v. Stephenson, 787 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.1990).
Today’s decision departs from this tenor of restraint by granting mandamus relief despite National Union’s clearly adequate remedy by appeal. Assuming it does not ultimately prevail in the court of appeals, National Union could challenge that court’s refusal to extend the time for filing the statement of facts by application for writ of error. How, then, could the court of appeals’ ruling inflict irreparable harm justifying expedited review by mandamus?
We addressed this precise question in Pat Walker & Co. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.1981), holding that the court of appeals’ refusal to extend the time for filing a statement of facts was not reviewable by mandamus because the ruling “may be addressed by this Court when properly presented in an Application for Writ of Error.” I can discern no good reason for the Court’s sub silentio overruling of that holding today.
The Court purportedly rests its decision on the principles of Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992). There we held that a party does not have an adequate appellate remedy from a trial court’s discovery error if that error vitiates the party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense to such an extent that “the trial would be a waste of judicial resources.” 827 S.W.2d at 843. While imprecise, I am convinced this is as good a standard as we can articulate. But it has no application here, for at least two reasons. '
First, National Union has not demonstrated that its ability to prosecute the appeal has been so severely compromised that the proceeding would truly waste judicial resources. Since National Union has not provided us with its appellate points of error, we cannot determine to what extent its appeal has been vitiated by the absence of a statement of facts. At argument, however, National Union conceded that it intends to assert at least one point of error — concerning the trial court’s charge — which may be considered without a statement of facts. If National Union were to prevail on that issue, its complaint regarding the statement of facts would be moot.
Even if the court of appeals’ failure to permit the filing of the statement of facts doomed National Union’s chances of intermediate appellate success, however, I would not grant the writ of mandamus.. However erroneous the appellate court’s ruling, the delay in obtaining review in our Court by ordinary writ of error would virtually never be sufficient to justify mandamus relief. When a trial court abuses its discretion in the discovery phase of the pre-trial process, a litigant might have to wait literally years for relief. The enormous expense and delay of a full trial, requisite post-trial procedures, preparation of a full appellate record, full appellate briefing on all points, and oral argument *63before obtaining vindication can be of such significance as to mandate immediate attention. Our writing in Walker v. Packer was directed to that type of hardship.
The same circumstances are almost always lacking when the courts of appeals abuse their discretion. Errors of those courts can be reviewed through the normal writ of error process with little if any more delay, and little if any additional expense to the parties, than the mandamus action will entail. Thus, most of the writs of mandamus we have previously granted or conditionally granted against appellate courts have involved those courts’ review of interlocutory trial court orders by mandamus,1 not errors of first impression or of review in the ordinary'appellate process. See, e.g., Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.1992); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.1990); Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.1989); Packer v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 764 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.1989); Champion Int’l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 762 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.1988); Hoffman v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.1988); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.1986); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.1986); Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1985); Jordan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.1985); Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.1985); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.1985). The eases I have found where we granted mandamus relief based on a court of appeals’ error of first impression have either not addressed the critical issue of whether relator had an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal, see Head v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 811 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.1991); Chojnacki v. First Court of Appeals, 699 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.1985); Crites v. Second Court of Appeals, 516 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.1974), or have involved circumstances where relator clearly did not have an adequate appellate remedy. See O’Connor v. First Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.1992) (court of appeals’ refusal to allow non-panel member justice to publish dissenting opinion on motion for en banc reconsideration); Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.1990) (refusal of court of appeals to forward application for writ of error to Supreme Court); Doctors Hosp. Facilities v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 750 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.1988) (refusal of court of appeals to rule on motion for rehearing, thereby impeding Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over application for writ of error); Cowan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.1987) (same). Notably, the eases on which the Court relies in finding an abuse of discretion both reached this Court through the normal appellate process, not by mandamus. See Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774, S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1989); Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.1977).
The salient principle of Walker v. Packer was that mandamus relief should be restricted to compelling situations. Today’s decision, far from being an extension of Walker, stands that principle on its head.
The total number of mandamus actions we passed upon in the last five years is nearly twice as great as the number during the preceding five year period.2 If the standards for mandamus review are not carefully confined to truly extraordinary circumstances, we risk even greater escalation of such filings. An increased diversion of appellate resources to mandamus review would, in my opinion, serve neither the bar, the litigants, nor the public.
Perhaps there are cases, where constitutional questions are implicated or rights could be irrevocably lost, that call for issuance of a conditional writ of mandamus against a court of appeals for an error committed in the ordinary appellate process. This is not such a case. I am hard pressed to think of any preliminary ruling by any *64lower court in Texas which, if clearly erroneous, would fail to qualify for mandamus review under today’s standard. Even if this ruling is not taken as an invitation to a mandamus firesale, I see no reason to inject such uncertainty into an already cumbersome and confusing appellate structure. Therefore, I dissent.
GONZALEZ and ENOCH, JJ., join in this dissent.

. When mandamus relief is sought against a court of appeals for its ruling in a mandamus action, we make an independent inquiry as to whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.1985).

. From September 1, 1988, to August 31, 1993, the Court decided 1322 mandamus actions, or 17.7% of all cases decided during that period. From September 1, 1983, to August 31, 1988, the Court decided only 708 mandamus actions, or 10.9% of all decided cases.