Court Opinion

ID: 9953433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 05:06:27.110883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:18.359169
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

HOVITA A. SMITH,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 365495
                                                                     Clinton Circuit Court
KEVIN RADEMACHER,                                                    LC No. 21-012104-NZ

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Defendant, a licensed electrician, owned a residential property in Portland. He was in the
process of remodeling the property when plaintiff approached him about purchasing it. On
November 3, 2020, the parties entered into a real estate purchase agreement that provided for
plaintiff to purchase the property for “a total purchase price of $125,000.” Due to financing issues,
the November 3, 2020 purchase agreement failed and the parties subsequently entered into a new
real estate purchase agreement (which we will sometimes hereafter refer to as “the purchase
agreement”) on January 19, 2021.

        The purchase agreement provided, “Purchase Price Includes: Property, tear out, [r]eversal
of stairs, rough-in of improvements per buyer, structural repairs as needed, exterior doors (3).
Exterior improvements provided where removal of large trees and stump removal.” The purchase
agreement also provided (as did the November 2020 purchase agreement) that defendant would
correct at his own expense any “violations” found in connection with a building inspection.
Additionally, the purchase agreement (and its predecessor) contained a merger clause stating,
“This Agreement, when executed by both Buyer and Seller, shall contain the entire understanding
and agreement between Buyer and Seller and Agent, if any, with respect to the matters referred to
herein and shall supersede all prior or contemporaneous agreements, representations and

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understanding with respect to such matters.” Neither purchase agreement contained any additional
provisions regarding repairs to the property.

        The sale of the property was completed in January 2021. In November 2021, plaintiff filed
suit against defendant for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, fraudulent
misrepresentation, silent fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The basis
for plaintiff’s contract and fraud claims was her allegation that she and defendant had reached a
“verbal agreement” for the sale of the property before either written purchase agreement was
executed. According to plaintiff, the terms of this alleged oral agreement required defendant to
make several repairs and improvements to the property prior to closing, specifically, repairs and
improvements that were not contained in the written purchase agreements. Plaintiff’s IIED claim
was based on defendant’s alleged behavior towards her and her daughter when plaintiff spoke to
defendant about performing repairs on the property.

        Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the
parties did not have an oral agreement and that plaintiff did not provide any evidence to support
the remaining claims against defendant. Defendant’s motion was accompanied by plaintiff’s
uniform residential loan application reflecting that plaintiff had applied for a $90,000 construction
loan for “[a]lterations, improvements, [and] repairs.” Defendant also produced a $90,000 estimate
and sworn statement prepared for plaintiff by “Jeff Sager Builder,” reflecting the estimated costs
of repairs to the property. The repairs in the estimate included repairs that defendant had
supposedly agreed to complete, according to plaintiff’s understanding of the alleged oral
agreement. Plaintiff admitted during her deposition that she hired a general contractor to work on
the property, and she admitted to paying several subcontractors, including defendant, to complete
the repairs included in the estimate.

         Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
It relied on the parties’ written purchase agreements, which governed the purchase price of the
property and defendant’s obligation to make repairs, and the conflict that existed between the terms
of the alleged oral agreement and the purchase agreements. The court also noted plaintiff’s
testimony, which established that plaintiff hired a general contractor and paid subcontractors to
complete the repairs and improvements provided in the alleged oral agreement. The trial court
subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed. On appeal,
plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Bailey v Antrim Co, 341 Mich App 411, 421; 990 NW2d 372 (2022) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by
the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might
differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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       This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for
reconsideration. Farm Bureau Ins Co v TNT Equip, Inc, 328 Mich App 667, 672; 939 NW2d 738
(2019). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it chooses an outcome outside the range of principled
outcomes.” Id.

                                    III. ORAL AGREEMENT

       Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by holding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether she and defendant had entered into an enforceable oral agreement.
We disagree.

        To establish a breach-of-contract claim, plaintiff “must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) there was a contract (2) which the other party breached (3) thereby resulting in
damages to the party claiming breach.” Bayberry Group, Inc v Crystal Beach Condo Ass’n, 334
Mich App 385, 393; 964 NW2d 846 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A valid
contract requires five elements: “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3)
legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” AFT Mich v
Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235; 866 NW2d 782 (2015).

        Whether a contract exists between plaintiff and defendant is a question of law. Aguirre v
Michigan, 315 Mich App 706, 713; 891 NW2d 516 (2016). The requisite elements of a contract
reflect that the parties must have “a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of a contract.”
Calhoun Co v Blue Cross Blue Shield Mich, 297 Mich App 1, 13; 824 NW2d 202 (2012) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “A meeting of the minds is judged by an objective standard, looking
to the express words of the parties and their visible acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where mutual assent does not exist, a contract does not
exist.” Quality Prod and Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 372; 666 NW2d 251
(2003).

        Although plaintiff indicated in her complaint, in her reply to defendant’s summary
disposition motion, and in her deposition testimony, that she believed that the alleged oral
agreement for repairs was essentially part of the purchase agreement for the property, on appeal
plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to recognize that the parties’ purchase agreement and
alleged oral agreement were “separate and distinct issues.” Apart from the inconsistency of
plaintiff’s positions, neither position has merit. The purchase agreement contained a merger clause
indicating that the agreement “supersede[s] all prior or contemporaneous agreements,
representations and understanding with respect to such matters.” The agreement states that the
purchase price includes certain repairs, which defendant completed, and is silent as to the
additional repairs that plaintiff claims defendant agreed to complete. “When a contract contains
an express integration or merger clause, it is conclusive evidence that the agreement is the entire
agreement, and parol evidence is not admissible.” Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ, 340 Mich
App 448, 476; 986 NW2d 427 (2022).

        Regarding the alleged existence of a separate, oral agreement, a reasonable trier of fact also
could not conclude that an oral agreement existed between the parties, separate from the written
purchase agreement governing the sale of the property. See El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. Plaintiff
has not shown that she provided defendant with any consideration for this alleged oral agreement.

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See Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 508-509; 885 NW2d 861 (2016). The record
contains no evidence that plaintiff provided any consideration to defendant other than the purchase
price required by the written purchase agreement. On the contrary, plaintiff consistently stated in
her testimony and in her response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition that she paid
defendant the purchase price for the property and expected defendant to complete the alleged oral
agreement’s repairs and improvements in exchange. Therefore, without any evidence of
consideration in the record, plaintiff cannot establish a valid, separate contract for defendant to
have breached. See AFT Mich, 497 Mich at 235; Bayberry Group, 334 Mich App at 393.

        The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition with
respect to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Bailey, 341 Mich App at 421.

                                 IV. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

       Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of plaintiff’s
promissory estoppel claim. We disagree.

        Promissory estoppel requires “(1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have
expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and
(3) that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature in circumstances such that the
promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.” Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land &
Home Dev, Inc, 330 Mich App 679, 713; 950 NW2d 502 (2019) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “To determine whether a promise existed, courts must objectively evaluate the
circumstances of the transaction, including the parties’ words, actions, and relationship.” Bodnar
v St John Providence, Inc, 327 Mich App 203, 227; 933 NW2d 363 (2019).

        Quasi-contractual remedies such as promissory estoppel are inapplicable when the parties
have made an express contract covering the same subject matter. See H. J. Tucker & Assoc, Inc v
Allied Chucker and Engineering Co, 234 Mich App 550, 573; 595 NW2d 176 (1999). In this case,
the existence of the written purchase agreement with a merger clause is fatal to plaintiff’s claim.
Id.; see also UAW–GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 504-
505; 579 NW2d 411 (1998). The parties’ January 2021 purchase agreement indicated that the
purchase price included the following, specified work that defendant would complete: “tear out,
[r]eversal of stairs, rough-in of improvements per buyer, structural repairs as needed, exterior
doors” as well as “removal of large trees and stump removal.” According to plaintiff, the alleged
oral agreement included additional work to replace windows, HVAC installation, drywall
installation, roof repair, and building a closet prior to closing. The purchase agreement directly
addressed repairs to be completed by defendant and contained a merger clause. It would have been
unreasonable for plaintiff to rely on a prior, oral agreement or promise that was not included in the
written purchase agreement. See id.

        Moreover, even if the express contract did not cover the same subject matter as the alleged
promise, plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she relied upon a
promise from defendant, separate from the purchase of the property. See Bodnar, 327 Mich App
at 227. Plaintiff’s actions in closing on the property when repairs were not completed, hiring a
contractor, obtaining a construction loan, and paying defendant as a subcontractor to complete
electrical work all contradict her allegation that defendant had promised to repair the property and

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that she relied on the promise. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence establishing her reliance
on defendant’s alleged promise, and the record establishes that any reliance by plaintiff would
have been unreasonable in light of the parties’ purchase agreement. See Bodnar, 327 Mich App
at 227; UAW–GM, 228 Mich App at 504.

        The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition with
respect to plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim. Bailey, 341 Mich App at 421.

                                       V. FRAUD CLAIMS

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition regarding her fraud claims. We disagree.

       A claim of fraudulent misrepresentation requires that:

       (1) the [party] made a material representation; (2) the representation was false; (3)
       when the [party] made the representation, the [party] knew that it was false, or made
       it recklessly, without knowledge of its truth as a positive assertion; (4) the [party]
       made the representation with the intention that the [opposing party] would act upon
       it; (5) the [opposing party] acted in reliance upon it; and (6) the [opposing party]
       suffered damage. [Maurer v Fremont Ins Co, 325 Mich App 685, 695; 926 NW2d
       848 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original).]

Generally, “an action for fraud must be predicated upon a false statement relating to a past or
existing fact; promises regarding the future are contractual and will not support a claim of fraud.”
Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App 677, 696; 770 NW2d 421 (2009). “Further, to establish
a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must have reasonably relied on the false
representation. There can be no fraud where a person has the means to determine that a
representation is not true.” Id.

         A reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that defendant made false representations to
plaintiff or that plaintiff reasonably relied on any such representations. See El-Khalil, 504 Mich
at 160. Plaintiff generally alleges that defendant made false representations to plaintiff regarding
the parties’ alleged oral agreement. However, the record reflects that the alleged oral agreement
related to future conduct. See Maurer, 325 Mich App at 695; Cummins, 238 Mich App at 696.
Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that defendant’s alleged oral promise to perform repairs was
in relation to future conduct. The record also reflects that if a representation from defendant about
completing repairs existed, plaintiff had the means to determine that the representation was not
true. See Cummins, 238 Mich App at 696.

        To support a claim of silent fraud, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew of a
material fact but concealed or suppressed the truth through false or misleading statements or
actions and with the intent to deceive. Roberts v Saffell, 280 Mich App 387, 405; 760 NW2d 715
(2008). For a claim of silent fraud to be actionable, there must be a party with a “legal or equitable
duty to disclose” that has concealed a material fact “with an intent to defraud.” Maurer, 325 Mich
App at 695. “[A] legal duty to make a disclosure will arise most commonly in a situation where
inquiries are made by the plaintiff, to which the defendant makes incomplete replies that are

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truthful in themselves but omit material information.” Hord v Environmental Research Institute
of Mich, 463 Mich 399, 412; 617 NW2d 543 (2000).

        In this case, the record contains no evidence that defendant had a legal or equitable duty to
disclose information to plaintiff. See Maurer, 325 Mich App at 695. Further, although plaintiff
has alleged that defendant made affirmative misrepresentations, plaintiff has not produced
evidence of any omission by defendant that could be considered fraudulent. See Maurer, 325
Mich App at 695; Roberts, 280 Mich App at 405. “An appellant may not merely announce his
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he
give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” In re Warshefski,
331 Mich App 83, 87; 951 NW2d 90 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
        The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition with
respect to plaintiff’s fraud claims. Bailey, 341 Mich App at 421.
                 VI. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition regarding her IIED claim. We disagree.

        “To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove
the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3)
causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Swain v Morse, 332 Mich App 510, 534; 957 NW2d
396 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Liability attaches only when a plaintiff can
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore,
“[l]iability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities.” Lucas v Awaad, 299 Mich App 345, 359; 830 NW2d 141 (2013) (quotation
marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

        Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether defendant acted in an “extreme and outrageous” way or whether plaintiff experienced
severe emotional distress as a result. See El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160; Swain, 332 Mich App at
534. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that defendant was “belligerent” toward her and her
daughter, and that he threw equipment into a trailer, entered plaintiff’s “personal space,” and called
plaintiff a “bitch” and an “a**hole.” While the conduct alleged by plaintiff would not be
considered well-mannered, this conduct did not go beyond “mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” so as to be considered extreme and outrageous.
Lucas, 299 Mich App at 359.

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        The trial court did not err by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition with
respect to plaintiff’s IIED claim. Bailey, 341 Mich App at 421.

       Affirmed.

                                                          /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                          /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                          /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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