Court Opinion

ID: 9369289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:03:54.872621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.060612
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                                  FOURTH DISTRICT

                                UREL A. BARRETT,
                                   Appellant,

                                          v.

                               STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                    Appellee.

                                   No. 4D21-1693

                                 [February 8, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Martin S. Fein, Judge; L.T. Case No. 06-008971CF10B.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ross Frank Berlin, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

    The defendant appeals from the circuit court’s final order finding the
defendant violated probation and from the defendant’s resulting sentence.
The defendant argues the circuit court erred in two respects, by: (1) not
repeating a full Faretta 1 inquiry about the risks of proceeding pro se at
first appearance on the VOP allegations, the final hearing, and the
immediately subsequent sentencing hearing; and (2) not offering counsel
to the defendant at the sentencing hearing.

    On the defendant’s first argument, we affirm. See Noetzel v. State, 328
So. 3d 933, 951 (Fla. 2021) (“[A]bsent a substantial change in
circumstances that would cause the trial court to question its original
ruling on the defendant’s request for self-representation, there is no
concomitant requirement to revisit Faretta every time the offer of counsel
is subsequently renewed and rejected.”).

1   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
    On the defendant’s second argument, we conclude the circuit court
erred in not offering counsel to the defendant at the sentencing hearing.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5) (“If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the
proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the
court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant
appears without counsel.”) (emphasis added); Birlkey v. State, 220 So. 3d
431, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[T]he trial court erred in failing to renew
an offer of counsel before the sentencing hearing on [the defendant’s]
probation violation even though the hearing occurred immediately
following the conclusion of the VOP hearing.”).

   Contrary to the state’s argument, the trial court’s error in failing to
renew an offer of counsel before the sentencing hearing was not harmless.
As we held in Birlkey:

          The State suggests that any error in not renewing the offer
      of counsel to appellant was harmless because immediately
      after sentencing, appellant maintained his desire to proceed
      pro se at his trial on the underlying charges. This presumes
      that, after a proper colloquy by the trial court, appellant would
      likely have maintained his decision to proceed pro se for his
      sentencing as well, leading the court to impose the same
      sentence he received. “Where the error concerns sentencing,
      the error is harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility
      that the error contributed to the sentence.” Hurst v. State,
      202 So. 3d 40, 68 (Fla. 2016).

         ….

         Given the firmness of [the defendant’s] desire to represent
      himself as expressed after sentencing, the series of events that
      the State posits would have happened is indeed highly
      probable, but without engaging in speculation, it is not
      entirely certain. See, e.g., C.D.C. v. State, 211 So. 3d 357, 360
      (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[W]e cannot say no reasonable
      possibility exists that the error did not contribute to the
      sentence.”).

         Thus, because the trial court erred in not renewing an offer
      of counsel to [the defendant] prior to sentencing, we reverse
      and remand for the trial court to conduct a new sentencing
      hearing that includes an offer of counsel at the outset.

Id. at 436.

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   Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s finding that the
defendant violated his probation as alleged, but we reverse the defendant’s
resulting sentence. We remand for the circuit court to vacate the
defendant’s sentence, and to conduct a new sentencing hearing which
includes an offer of counsel at the outset and, if necessary, a revisiting of
Faretta.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and ARTAU, J., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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