Court Opinion

ID: 9836910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:29.061261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.277851
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in the result):
I agree with the majority that appellant’s conviction of violating Article 134, UCMJ, 10 USC § 934, by unlawfully terminating his wife’s pregnancy may be affirmed in part. However, I cannot logically or legally distinguish this case from Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 118 S.Ct. 1135,140 L.Ed.2d 271 (1998), and Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946). Involuntary manslaughter is covered by Article 119(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 119(b), and, therefore, we should not be assimilating Ohio’s involuntary-manslaughter statute. See generally United States v. McGuinness, 35 MJ 149, 151-52 (CMA 1992). Nevertheless, I have chosen a different route to reach a result similar to the majority’s.
Here, appellant pleaded guilty to the following offense under Article 134:
Specification 2: In that [appellant], Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, a place under exclusive or federal concurrent jurisdiction, did, at or near Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, on or about 12 September 1996, commit involuntary manslaughter by caus[e]mg the unlawful termination of the pregnancy of Karlene A. Robbins as a proximate result of the said [appellant’s] committing a felony or misdemeanor offense, to wit: assault upon Kar-lene A. Robbins, in violation of Section 2908.01/ of the Ohio Revised Code assimilated into Federal law by 18 United States Code, Section 18.
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, he admitted in his guilty-plea inquiry that his conduct in terminating his wife’s pregnancy by means of an assault on her person was a service disorder and service discredit. That inquiry shows:
MJ: Now, conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline is conduct which causes a reasonably direct and obvious injury to good order and discipline. Service discrediting conduct is conduct which tends to harm the reputation of the service or to lower it in public esteem. Do you agree that your conduct in unlawfully terminating the pregnancy of your wife while committing an aggravated assault upon her, intending to inflict grievous bodily harm upon her, that that is service discrediting conduct, or is conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline?
ACC: Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: Which one do you think it is? Or do you think it’s both?
ACC: It’s both, Your Honor.
MJ: Okay, and can you tell me why you think that’s so?
(Accused conferred with counsel.)
ACC: Your Honor, the fact that I’m a member of the service, it reflects on the whole service, the Air Force, and the fact that the behavior — that explains that it is wrong.
MJ: Do you agree that members of the general public might think less of the United States military forces if they knew that a member of the military unlawfully terminated his wife’s pregnancy by — while in the course of committing an assault upon her which resulted in grievous bodily harm to her?
ACC: Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: And do you agree that that would discredit the service, perhaps, in the public’s eyes?
ACC: Yes, Your Honor.
Under this Court’s decision in United States v. Epps, 25 MJ 319, 322-23 (1987), and United States v. Felty, 12 MJ 438 (1982), appellant’s conviction for unlawfully termi*165nating his wife’s pregnancy by means of a criminal assault might be sustained as a service disorder or discredit. This is appropriate without regard to its characterization as involuntary manslaughter under state law. See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 731 (2d edition 1920 reprint) (assault of wife or any other woman is service disorder or discredit). Accordingly, I would strike the above underlined language concerning involuntary manslaughter and Ohio law from the specification noted above and otherwise affirm the findings of guilty and sentence.