Court Opinion

ID: 9540996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:21:28.76227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:05.483999
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I join in all sections of the majority opinion except the last, dealing with the issue of attorney’s fees. As to the latter issue, I concur in the majority’s disposition but differ with its analysis of the relevant law.
My ground for disagreement with the majority’s analysis concerns the majority’s statement of the standard by which a trial court must consider a request for attorney’s fees. The majority states that the standard is “actual need”. I agree that in most cases purely financial considerations will *164ultimately dictate whether an award of fees is appropriate. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diamond, 360 Pa.Super. 101, 519 A.2d 1012 (1987). However, where the facts of a particular case indicate the presence of considerations other than or in addition to financial ones, the trial court may consider those in awarding counsel fees. See Johnson v. Johnson, 365 Pa.Super. 409, 529 A.2d 1123 (1987) (Beck, J., concurring); Williams v. Williams, 373 Pa.Super. 143, 540 A.2d 563 (1988). As I stated in my concurrence to Johnson, application of a standard that looks to actual need alone will improperly restrict the court in those cases where other factors, such as conduct by one party resulting in a materially increased fee expenditure by the other, are relevant. Johnson, 365 Pa.Super. at 421-24, 529 A.2d at 1129-30 (Beck, J., concurring).
In this case, I agree that wife merited the limited counsel fees award she received. Since there are no equitable considerations that would militate to the contrary, I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the counsel fees award.