Court Opinion

ID: 9898318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:54.998031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:15.335619
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                           AUGUST 10, 2023
                                                      In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                     WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 38436-5-III
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
SHANE MICHAEL PEARSON,                         )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       SIDDOWAY, J.P.T.⁎ — Shane Pearson appeals his conviction for second degree

assault. He demonstrates an error in his sentence that requires correction, but no other

error or abuse of discretion. We affirm his conviction and remand for a ministerial

correction of his term of community custody.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On an evening in late May 2021, Cle Elum police were dispatched to the home of

Randi Chalmers in response to a 911 call. According to responding officer Richard Albo,

Ms. Chalmers told him that her son, Shane Pearson, had been holding a knife and

threatened to stab her. She told the officer that her son was still at the home, upstairs.

Officer Albo yelled up to announce a police presence and told Mr. Pearson to come

       ⁎
        Judge Laurel H. Siddoway was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time
argument was held on this matter. She is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court
pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

down. After some delay (Mr. Pearson feared arrest on an outstanding warrant), Mr.

Pearson joined officers and his mother downstairs, where he was read his Miranda1 rights

and agreed to speak. Mr. Pearson told officers he had been holding a knife and told his

mother he was going to stab her, but he was being sarcastic.

       Officers also questioned Jill Smith, a former girlfriend of Mr. Pearson, who was

living with Ms. Chalmers at the time. They collected as evidence the steak knife

identified as the knife Mr. Pearson had been holding. Based on the officers’ interviews

with Ms. Chalmers and Ms. Smith, Mr. Pearson was charged with second degree assault

(with a deadly weapon) of both women. Both were charged as domestic violence crimes.

       The charges proceeded to a jury trial less than two and one-half months later. At

trial, the prosecutor told jurors in opening statement that she would be calling as

witnesses both alleged victims—Ms. Smith and Ms. Chalmers—but warned jurors that

Ms. Chalmers had not wanted her son to be prosecuted and was expected to be a reluctant

witness.

       Jill Smith’s testimony

       Jill Smith was the State’s first witness. She said Ms. Chalmers had been putting

pressure on her not to testify, telling Ms. Smith that she would be to blame if Mr. Pearson

went to jail. She said Ms. Chalmers had told her as recently as that morning that if she

testified against Mr. Pearson, she would not allow her to live at her home anymore.

       1
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

                                              2
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State v. Pearson

       Ms. Smith testified that on the evening of Mr. Pearson’s arrest, she and Ms.

Chalmers had both been arguing with Mr. Pearson. She said it was common for them to

argue. In her case, she testified, she was trying to get ready to go out and did not want

Mr. Pearson in their bedroom, but he insisted on coming in to discuss something. She

said she was not dating Mr. Pearson at the time, but they still shared the room,

characterizing their situation as “complicated.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 111. At some

point, Mr. Pearson left and went downstairs. Ms. Smith then went downstairs herself to

use the bathroom and encountered Mr. Pearson in the downstairs hallway, holding a knife

and arguing with his mother. She was “a little worried” at that point, she testified,

adding, “I didn’t want him to harm her, you know.” RP at 112. She acknowledged

fearing for a brief moment “[t]hat he might actually use the knife” against “either one of

us” but she “was more concerned about his mother.” RP at 113. Asked what made her

fearful, she answered, “He just—he—seemed enraged and—irrational at the time.”

RP at 113. She added, “he wasn’t in—right state of mind to have the knife, and it felt—

it felt threatening at the time.” RP at 114.

       Ms. Smith testified that she went back upstairs and, at some point, Mr. Pearson

followed her. When he reached the top of the stairs, she saw that he was still holding the

knife. She and Mr. Pearson continued to argue, yelling at each other, as she “debat[ed] in

[her] own head” whether he would do something violent toward her. RP at 115. She

testified that he made a couple of threats: one was to burn the house down; the other was

                                               3
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

to kill her and her friends. She testified that she “[didn’t] think he meant it,” but “he was

enraged.” RP at 117. She did think he was trying to scare her.

       When cross-examined, Ms. Smith testified that she did not know why Mr. Pearson

had the knife when she first saw him with it, but said, “I honestly thought he had picked it

up to be threatening.” RP at 125. Asked if he could have picked it up to trim some

rubber from his bicycle tires (an explanation he later offered), Ms. Smith testified it was

possible, but she did not see how that would be the reason. She later explained that she

had no recollection of Mr. Pearson going outside to work on his bike during that time

frame, and she also did not think that was something he would be doing “if he was that

enraged.” RP at 130.

       Ms. Smith was asked by defense counsel if she told Officer Albo that Mr. Pearson

threatened her upstairs, and Ms. Smith admitted that she did not. She added, “It was

difficult to say anything at that time because his mother was there as well.” RP at 128.

She was also asked by defense counsel if she might have misread the situation when she

saw Mr. Pearson holding the knife and arguing with his mother, and answered:

       A      No.
       Q      Why not.
       A      They weren’t joking.
       Q      Okay. What makes you say that.
       A      The—seriousness in their voice.

RP at 131.

                                              4
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

       Randi Chalmers’s testimony

       Ms. Chalmers was the State’s second witness. She acknowledged having been

subpoenaed and that she had not wanted to appear at the trial. She testified that her

argument with Mr. Pearson on the day of his arrest was started by her, over his failure to

wash dishes he had left in her kitchen for a few days. She said they yelled at each other.

She professed trouble remembering what she told police when they arrived, explaining “I

don’t have a very good memory.” RP at 139. She admitted that when she and her son

argue “we say mean things, we—hurtful things.” RP at 140.

       Asked about particulars, Ms. Chalmers admitted that Mr. Pearson had a knife, but

claimed to not remember much else:

       Q      Did he have a knife?
       A      Yeah, he did.
       Q      Okay. And do you remember him making any threats to you.
       A      Oh, we make threats to each other all the time.
       Q      What did he threaten you that day?
       A      I don’t know. I know he’s threatened [to] burn my house down but
       he did that quite often.
       Q      Okay. Did he threaten to smash your head in.
       A      I don’t think so honestly. I don’t know on that one.
       Q      Did you tell the police that he threatened to smash your head in.
       A      I don’t know.
       Q      Okay. Did he threaten to—stab you.
       A      I don’t know.
       Q      Okay. Did—tell the police that he threatened to stab you.

                                             5
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

      ....
      A         Honestly I don’t know.
      Q         Okay.
      A         I could have. I may have. I may not have.

RP at 140-41.

      Asked if she believed Mr. Pearson was going to hurt her that day, Ms. Chalmers

answered, “I don’t think that he would have done it, honestly. You know, he’s threatened

to—like I say, he’s threatened to burn my house down, threatened to—you know, kick

my butt, whatever, you know. . . . We say mean things when we’re arguing . . . I’m sure

I’ve said plenty of mean things to him back.” RP at 143.

      Officer Richard Albo’s testimony

      Officer Albo was the State’s last witness. Before his testimony, there was

discussion outside the presence of the jury about defense counsel’s concern that the State

intended to ask Officer Albo about statements Ms. Chalmers had made to him. The trial

court ruled that the State could question him for impeachment purposes, and the court

would give the jury a limiting instruction. The court said impeachment could include

statements that Ms. Chalmers claimed not to remember, stating that Ms. Chalmers’s lack

of memory “maybe 70 days after the . . . incident” “seems very convenient.” RP at 168.2

      2
       The alleged assaults occurred on May 31, and Ms. Chalmers was testifying on
August 10.

                                             6
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

      Officer Albo testified that he arrived at Ms. Chalmers’s home in response to a

dispatch at about 6:00 p.m. He said Ms. Chalmers, who he recognized, “seemed afraid to

me,” describing her as wide-eyed, very excited, and speaking to him loudly and quickly.

RP at 179. She told him that Mr. Pearson had a knife and threatened to stab her. He also

spoke with Ms. Smith, who he described as shy and unwilling to make eye contact; he

testified that she, too “seemed afraid.” RP at 179. He spoke to Mr. Pearson when he

came downstairs and testified about Mr. Pearson’s version of what happened:

      A         . . . [H]e said he was arguing with Ms. Chalmers, and—at one point
                during the argument he picked up the knife, and Ms. Chalmers said,
                “What are you going to do with that? Stab me”, and he said, “Yeah,
                I’m gonna stab you,” but he described that as being in a sarcastic
                manner.
      Q         Okay. So he told you he—he may have said—stab her but that he’d
                done it in a joking way.
      A         Correct.
      Q         Okay. Anything else he told you that was pertinent—He admitted
                they were arguing?
      A         Yes.

RP at 180-81.

      In cross-examination, defense counsel established that Ms. Smith had not told

Officer Albo about Mr. Pearson bringing the knife upstairs or that he threatened to stab

her with the knife when they were upstairs.

                                              7
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

       Shane Pearson’s testimony

       The sole witness for the defense was Mr. Pearson. He, too, testified that the

argument with his mother on the day of his arrest started because he had not done his

dishes. She had told him to get his stuff and get out, and if he did not take his things, she

would throw them out. Mr. Pearson said he began to gather his things as he and his

mother continued arguing. At one point, he said, he got a knife to cut some rubber off his

bike tires because the weight of what he was going to take in his backpack was causing

the tires to scrape the frame. He testified:

       My mom came around the corner and said, “Where”—‘cause I had the
       knife in my hand, and—she said, “What, are you gonna stab me.” And I
       said, “Yeah, Mom, I’m gonna stab you.” And it was totally sarcastic. It
       was not—That was it.

RP at 195. At that point, he testified, Ms. Smith came down the stairs and his mother

“mentioned to Jill that I’d threatened her.” RP at 196. He testified,

       at that point I said, “Yeah, Mom,” and I said it to Jill, and I was saying,
       “Yeah, Mom, I’m gonna kill you guys and smash your heads in.” And then
       at that point the knife was out of my hands on the counter, the kitchen
       counter.

RP at 196-97. He denied ever following Ms. Smith upstairs with the knife or ever

threatening her upstairs.

       In closing argument, the prosecutor spoke three times about the fact that the 911

call had been made by someone outside Ms. Chalmers’s home. The fact that someone

outside the home called 911 was in evidence. It had come in through Ms. Smith, who

                                               8
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

testified that at one point Mr. Pearson’s cousin came in the house and saw what was

going on; she also testified that she heard it was the cousin who called police. Mr.

Pearson had also testified that he, his mother, and Ms. Smith did not make the 911 call;

he testified that “[s]omebody not in [the] house called the police.” RP at 202.

       The prosecutor’s first mention of the call was in the context of arguing that jurors

should find that Ms. Chalmers was assaulted even though Ms. Chalmers denied it. The

prosecutor told jurors, “And somebody outside the home calls 9-1-1. That’s how serious

this was, regardless of what Randi says.” RP at 243. In wrapping up her initial closing

argument, the prosecutor touched on the topic again, stating, “[I]f this was all a big joke,

just a sarcastic comment made in jest during a somewhat volatile argument, why did

someone who was outside the home call 9-1-1.” RP at 244. Defense counsel did not

object to either reference to the call.

       The prosecutor brought the topic up a third time in her rebuttal closing, telling

jurors that defense counsel had not provided an answer for why someone outside the

home would have called police. She argued,

       There’s no answer to that. Why did somebody outside—because this
       situation was ridiculously scary and intense. Somebody outside the house
       called 9-1-1 and said something about “There’s a domestic going on and
       you’ve got to get there.” Does that happen when you sarcastically say to
       your mom, “Oh, yeah, Mom, I’m gonna kill you.”

RP at 254 (emphasis added). Again, defense counsel did not object.

                                              9
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

       The jury found Mr. Pearson guilty of the second degree assault of Ms. Smith, but

acquitted him of the charge of assaulting Ms. Chalmers.

       At sentencing, given the opportunity to allocute, Mr. Pearson said of some of his

prior convictions, “they’re all old, and with those convictions, I pled out to a lot of

those. . . . I didn’t take ‘em to trial because I knew I was guilty of—of those offenses, so

I did plead out to those offenses. This I took to trial because I am innocent.” RP at 279.

For the first time at sentencing, Mr. Pearson stated that he had been high on drugs the day

of the assault,3 and his lawyer requested a prison-based drug offender sentencing

alternative (DOSA) while admitting that by statute, Mr. Pearson did not qualify. The

court agreed that Mr. Pearson was not eligible for a DOSA and said it would not impose

one even if it could, which evidently angered Mr. Pearson because he lashed out after that

a couple of times. He said at one point, “It would have given me (inaudible) too if the—

if the prosecutor wouldn’t have maliciously prosecuted me and gave me a lesser charge

instruction too in my instructions.” RP at 288. Mr. Pearson later said to the court, “So,

who pays for all this? I mean, who—who can I sue, your Honor? Who—who—who

pays for all this? Who pays for my time—” RP at 289.

       The court imposed a mid-range sentence of 73 months’ confinement and imposed

36 months of community custody. Mr. Pearson appeals.

       3
        He stated, “You know, I know that I haven’t told you that, ‘Hey, I was high that
day,’ but, your Honor, I was. And that’s—honest truth.” RP at 290.

                                              10
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

                                        ANALYSIS

       Mr. Pearson assigns error to ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial

misconduct, and that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing 36 months of

community custody. The court had completed the community custody provision of his

judgment and sentence as if Mr. Pearson was found guilty of a serious violent offense.

       The third assigned error is clear. Second degree assault is a violent offense

under former RCW 9.94A.030(55)(a)(viii) (2020), not a serious violent offense under

RCW 9.94A.030(46). RCW 9.94A.701(2) states that the court “shall, in addition to the

other terms of the sentence, sentence an offender to community custody for eighteen

months when the court sentences the person to the custody of the department for a

violent offense that is not considered a serious violent offense.” “The word ‘shall’ in a

statute . . . imposes a mandatory requirement unless a contrary legislative intent is

apparent.” Erection Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 121 Wn.2d 513, 518, 852 P.2d 288

(1993). We remand with directions to correct the community custody term.

       Mr. Pearson’s remaining assignments of error relate to his complaint that his trial

lawyer did not request an inferior degree offense instruction for fourth degree assault, and

the prosecutor’s statement in rebuttal closing that the 911 caller had said “something

about ‘There’s a domestic going on and you’ve got to get there.’” RP at 254.

                                             11
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

I.     MR. PEARSON DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Mr. Pearson argues that his statement at sentencing, “if the prosecutor wouldn’t

have maliciously prosecuted me and gave me a lesser charge instruction,” RP at 288,

shows he did not understand that the defense can ask that the jury be instructed on an

inferior degree offense. He asks us to infer that his trial lawyer failed to consult with him

about that option and, indeed, that rather than make the strategic decision to pursue an

“all or nothing” strategy, his trial lawyer was unaware of the alternative. Mr. Pearson

argues that this was ineffective assistance of counsel, and we should order a new trial.

       RCW 10.61.003 provides that when a defendant is charged with an offense

consisting of different degrees, “the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree

charged in the indictment or information, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto . . . .”

For a jury to be instructed on an inferior degree offense, however, the evidence must

permit a jury to rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense. State v. Coryell,

197 Wn.2d 397, 415, 483 P.3d 98 (2021). There must be evidence that affirmatively

establishes the inferior degree offense. Id. at 414-15. The defendant must be entitled to

the inferior degree instruction based on the evidence actually admitted. Id. at 406. A

defendant is not entitled to the instruction merely because a jury could ignore some of the

evidence. Id. at 406-07.

       The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of

the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

                                             12
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must meet the

Strickland test adopted by Washington from the United States Supreme Court, showing

both (1) deficient performance and (2) resulting prejudice. State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d

450, 457-58, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Performance is deficient if it falls “below an

objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The prejudice prong

requires the defendant to show that “but for the ineffective assistance, there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” State v. Cienfuegos,

144 Wn.2d 222, 227, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001).

       “When counsel’s conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or

tactics, performance is not deficient.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 863, 215 P.3d 177

(2009). A defendant alleging ineffective assistance must overcome a strong presumption

that counsel’s representation was effective and reasonable. State v. McFarland, 127

Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

       Our Supreme Court has recognized that even if a defendant is entitled to

instruction on an inferior degree offense, a trial lawyer’s decision to forgo the instruction

in favor of an “‘all or nothing’ approach” is not necessarily evidence of deficient

performance. Cf. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 20, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011) (entitlement to

instruction on a lesser included offense). After considering guidelines provided by the

American Bar Association Standards and Washington’s Rules of Professional Conduct,

                                             13
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

the court in Grier characterized the decision as “[p]art tactic, part objective,” and held

that while it requires input from both the defendant and her counsel, the decision

ultimately rests with defense counsel. Id. at 30.

       Applying these principles, for Mr. Pearson to establish the deficient representation

prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must demonstrate that (1) he was

(a) unaware of the option to request instruction on fourth degree assault, (b) was not

consulted by his trial lawyer, (c) would have favored asking for the instruction, and

(d) would have obtained the all-important agreement of his lawyer to that strategy; and

(2) would have been entitled to the instruction. To establish the equally necessary

prejudice prong, Mr. Pearson must demonstrate that had the jury been instructed on

fourth degree assault as an inferior degree offense, it would not have found him guilty of

second degree assault.

       We doubt Mr. Pearson’s ability to make most of these showings. Of the 23 prior

convictions included in his criminal history, 3 were for domestic violence fourth degree

assault, committed in 2004, 2010, and 2013, so he was familiar with the inferior degree

offense. He told the court at sentencing that the reason he had gone to trial rather than

negotiate a plea in this case was “because I am innocent,” RP at 279, a position

inconsistent with giving the jury an additional basis on which to find him guilty. His

briefing on appeal points to no evidence actually admitted from which the jury could find

                                             14
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

(without just ignoring evidence) that he committed an intentional assault of Ms. Smith

while not armed with a knife.

       We can most readily dispose of Mr. Pearson’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for two other reasons, however. As earlier observed, we presume counsel was

effective. An “all or nothing” approach can be legitimate strategy. State v. Conway,

24 Wn. App. 2d 66, 71-73, 519 P.3d 257 (2022), review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1032, 525

P.3d 151 (2023). Mr. Pearson fails to show that it was not legitimate strategy in his case.

Absent evidence of a failure of counsel to consult with a defendant, Strickland’s highly

deferential standard requires us to presume that consultation occurred. State v. Breitung,

173 Wn.2d 393, 400-01, 267 P.3d 1012 (2011). If Mr. Pearson has competent evidence

to challenge this, he could present it in a personal restraint petition, but our second reason

for rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would still prove fatal.

       The second reason for rejecting the claim is that Mr. Pearson cannot show the

required prejudice. Had the jury been instructed on an inferior degree offense, it would

have been instructed to first fully and carefully deliberate on second degree assault. Only

if it was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Pearson was guilty of that

charge, would it be instructed to consider fourth degree assault. 11 WASHINGTON

PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 4.11, at 104 (5th

ed. 2021). As the Supreme Court reasoned in Grier, “[a]ssuming, as this court must, that

the jury would not have convicted Grier of second degree murder unless the State had

                                             15
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

met its burden of proof, the availability of a compromise verdict would not have changed

the outcome of Grier’s trial.” 171 Wn.2d at 43-44. The same is true here: Mr. Pearson’s

jury found him guilty of second degree assault and he offers no reasoned argument that

instruction on an inferior degree offense would, within reasonable probabilities, change

that.

II.     ERROR IN THE PROSECUTOR’S ATTRIBUTION OF CONTENT TO THE 911 CALL WAS
        WAIVED BY THE FAILURE TO OBJECT

        Mr. Pearson’s remaining assignment of error is to the prosecutor’s statement in her

rebuttal closing argument that the 911 caller had “said something about ‘There’s a

domestic going on and you’ve got to get there.’” RP at 254.

        Prosecutorial misconduct is not attorney misconduct in the sense of violating rules

of professional conduct. State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 740 n.1, 202 P.3d 937 (2009).

It is, instead, a term of art that refers to “prosecutorial mistakes or actions [that] are not

harmless and deny a defendant [a] fair trial.” Id. To succeed on a prosecutorial

misconduct claim, an appellant has the burden of establishing that the prosecutor’s

conduct was improper (as being at least mistaken) and was prejudicial. State v. Stenson,

132 Wn.2d 668, 718-19, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). A defendant demonstrates prejudice by

proving there is a “‘substantial likelihood the . . . misconduct affected the jury’s

verdict.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wn.2d 467, 481-82, 965 P.2d 593 (1998)

(quoting State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 672, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)).

                                               16
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

       Because Mr. Pearson failed to object at trial, his claimed error is considered

waived “unless he establishes that the misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that

an instruction would not have cured the prejudice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann,

175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). “[T]he focus of this inquiry is more on

whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured, rather than the flagrant or ill-

intentioned nature of the remarks.” State v. Pierce, 169 Wn. App. 533, 552, 280 P.3d

1158 (2012).

       As earlier noted, evidence was presented that the 911 call was made by someone

outside the home. That fact had also been fleetingly mentioned in both party’s opening

statements, without objection.4 There was no evidence that the 911 caller said something

about, “[t]here’s a domestic going on and you’ve got to get there.” The gist of the

prosecutor’s argument, however, was that the jury could infer from the fact that an

outsider made the call, that what could be heard outside sounded dangerous or

threatening. Only the prosecutor’s attribution of content to the call was unsupported by

the evidence, and the content of the call was not her point.

       4
         The prosecutor stated during opening statement, “On May 31st of 2121 [sic] the
police were called, and somebody who wasn’t involved said, ‘You need to get to this
address. Something bad is happening there.’” RP at 94.
       Defense counsel said during his opening statement that Mr. Pearson and his
mother had been “screaming at the top of their lungs at each other, in the kitchen—you
know, there’s no microphone but it would be definitely be rated X if—if there was. And
they’re screaming loud enough that the lady that lives in the property in her trailer hears
‘em, and, ‘Oh, my god, they’re really goin’ at it.’” RP at 99.

                                             17
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

       A relatively common basis for objection during closing argument is when one of

the lawyers tells the jurors something about events that was not part of the evidence

presented during the trial. Both sides’ lawyers know more about the factual background

of the case than gets presented during the trial, and they sometimes misremember what

was presented. For either lawyer to provide jurors with information outside the trial

record is misconduct. But it does happen and the Washington pattern concluding

instruction anticipates it. When it does happen, and an objection is made, trial judges are

typically ready with a reminder from the concluding instruction: “[T]he lawyers’

statements are not evidence. The evidence is the testimony and the exhibits. . . .

You must disregard any remark, statement, or argument that is not supported by the

evidence . . . .” See Clerk’s Papers at 15.

       This instruction (or one like it) is regularly used to cure any prejudice and could

have cured any prejudice here. Error was waived by failing to object.

       If we reject Mr. Pearson’s allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, he asks us to

find that his trial lawyer’s failure to object was ineffective assistance of counsel. He is

unable to demonstrate the required prejudice, however. The trial court would

undoubtedly have provided a curative instruction, but it would have echoed the

instructions that had been read immediately before the closing arguments. And nothing

about the content that the prosecutor attributed to the 911 call would have been

                                              18
No. 38436-5-III
State v. Pearson

prejudicially different from what jurors would assume was said by someone making a

911 call from outside the home.

      We affirm the conviction and remand with instructions to correct the judgment and

sentence to reflect an 18-month term of community custody.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                                 C)dbw~ TPr
                                             Siddoway, J.P.T.
                                                                   1

WE CONCUR:

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