Court Opinion

ID: 9884921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:24:43.444803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:42.543089
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: My disagreement with the court’s holding respecting the concurrent sentence imposed for escape has been stated with sufficient frequency [People v. Lerch, 52 Ill.2d 78; People v. Whittington, 46 Ill.2d 405), and I would not dissent again here for that reason alone. I am moved to do so for the reason that the court vacates this sentence in the context of a post-conviction proceeding. This action, in my opinion, is clearly beyond the scope of the post-conviction statute (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1 et seq.) which embraces only “a substantial denial of [petitioner’s] rights under the constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois.” The court’s opinion does not suggest that the imposition of a concurrent sentence for escape is prohibited by either constitution. No other opinion of this court says it is. The Supreme Court of the United States has held consecutive sentences for different offenses arising from the same act are not constitutionally proscribed [Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405, 78 S.Ct. 1280), so that concurrent sentences for different offenses regarding different acts, as here, are obviously permissible from the viewpoint of the constitution. Nor are Whittington and People v. Lerch (52 Ill.2d 78) authority for the court’s action. The constitutional issue was neither raised nor discussed in Whittington. Lerch involved an appeal from the conviction itself, and is completely inapposite on this issue. I would affirm the conviction and sentence. MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this dissent.