Court Opinion

ID: 1001819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:01:23.234609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:07.503665
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 00-4023

ALBERT MCCOY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-99-106)

Submitted: June 6, 2000

Decided: June 16, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Lisa B.
Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Albert McCoy, Jr., was convicted by a jury of one count of con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and one
count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. On appeal,
McCoy contends that: (1) the district court abused its discretion by
not allowing him to plead guilty; (2) the out-of-court identification
procedure was unduly suggestive and the in-court identification
should have been suppressed; and (3) the court erred by limiting evi-
dence of his trusting nature. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Although McCoy had a right to plead guilty, the district court did
not have to accept his guilty plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) ("Our holding does not mean that a trial judge
must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a
defendant wishes so to plead."). "A court may reject a plea in exercise
of sound judicial discretion." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971). Given that McCoy denied an essential element of the
offense, that he believed his attorney could have done more of an
investigation, that he believed it was possible that a jury could acquit
him of the charges, and that he was probably not eligible for any
reduction in the base offense level or a downward departure based on
his guilty plea because he denied that he voluntarily joined the con-
spiracy, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to accept McCoy's guilty plea.

We agree with the district court that the out-of-court photographic
identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. In any event, the
witness' in-court identification was reliable. See Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).

We find that the district court did not err by limiting opinion testi-
mony as to McCoy's trusting nature. We also find that the court did

                     2
not err by refusing to permit evidence of specific instances of conduct
reflecting McCoy's trusting nature. See Fed. R. Evid. 405(a), (b).

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3