Court Opinion

ID: 9925680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:02:14.360952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.614407
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Wilson CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096792

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE000917)

           v.

 MARQUESS TRAVON WILSON,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Marquess Travon Wilson was convicted of several offenses related to
the armed robbery of a woman and her son. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 62
years to life. On appeal, he claims instructional error deprived him of his right to a fair
trial. He also claims the trial court made erroneous sentencing decisions, including that it
misunderstood its discretion to impose concurrent sentences on his two robbery
convictions. We agree the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing so the
trial court can exercise its discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences on
the two robbery convictions, but otherwise affirm defendant’s convictions.

                                                             1
                        LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
         When S.D.1 arrived at her home after 10:00 p.m. one night, a man approached her
car with a handgun and put it to her head, demanding money. The man followed S.D.
into her home. Once inside, the man ordered her to lie down on the floor in her room
while he took her watch from the dresser, her rings from her person, purses, shoes,
perfume bottles, designer sunglasses, makeup bag, makeup products, and her hair
straightener (collectively worth many thousands of dollars) and stuffed them into a red
suitcase owned by S.D. Although the man was masked and wore gloves, S.D. was able
to identify him as defendant.
         Defendant then went into S.D.’s eight-year-old son E.B.’s room, and took E.B.’s
PlayStation5 and its controller, and E.B.’s red iPhone, both of which S.D. had bought for
him. E.B. did not see a gun while defendant took the items. The defendant left the house
with S.D.’s red suitcase.2
         S.D. called 911.3 She told the 911 operator that she recognized the man who
robbed her as “Roach,”4 an acquaintance whom she later learned was defendant.
         Officer Ricky Lazaro took S.D.’s statement at her home, which was recorded on
his body-worn camera.5 S.D. said she recognized the person who robbed her as

1      S.D. was a reluctant witness and often stated she did not recall the incident or her
contact with law enforcement. However, she also testified that the account of the
incident she gave to the police was true. The details of the incident were largely
introduced through her recorded interviews with law enforcement.
2        Ring camera video recordings (People’s exhibit No. 46) were played at trial.
3        Recordings of S.D.’s 911 calls (People’s exhibit No. 39) were played at trial.
4        Defendant’s Instagram account handle was “off_white_Roach.”
5        A video recording of S.D.’s interview (People’s exhibit No. 40) was played at
trial.

                                              2
“Marcus,” also known as “Roach” and she identified a photo of defendant as the
offender. S.D. later told Detective Bogdan Kostyuk that she recognized the gunman’s
voice as defendant’s voice, although she also told Detective Kostyuk that she had never
spoken with defendant.
       At trial, S.D. said that she did not recognize defendant, claimed that she had never
seen or spoken with him before, and denied having a dating relationship with him. S.D.
denied that defendant had ever bought her or given her anything. S.D. testified that the
watch was a gift from someone other than defendant. She also testified that she “had
those rings for a really long time.”
       Detective Kostyuk testified that about 20 minutes before S.D. was robbed, a car
associated with defendant was seen at an intersection close to S.D.’s home. Officers later
found that car a few hundred feet from defendant’s known address. L.D., defendant’s
wife, was at the car. L.D. told the officer that her cousin and her cousin’s boyfriend had
driven her car that day. A search of the car’s trunk revealed S.D.’s red suitcase. The
police later returned several items to S.D., including the suitcase, E.B.’s PlayStation5 and
its controller, E.B.’s red iPhone, S.D.’s shoes, purses, and a bag of perfumes.
       L.D. testified that her marriage to defendant began as an open relationship during
which he had relationships with about four other women, with an implication that S.D.
was one of them. L.D. knew that defendant had bought items for other women. L.D.
understood that defendant supposedly had bought high-end items for S.D., but L.D. did
not know what those items were. L.D. maintained that defendant did not have access to
her car the night of the robberies. She asserted that she had no idea how the suitcase got
into her car’s trunk.
       Defendant told L.D. that he had gone to S.D.’s to get his “stuff back.” Defendant
did not specifically tell L.D. that stuff included items that he had bought for S.D.

                                              3
       Defendant’s mother testified that she recognized S.D. from Facebook photos as
someone whom she had seen defendant kiss and hug several times, while he was married
to L.D.
       K.A., who knew defendant and S.D. as family friends, saw them together on many
occasions and he knew that they had dated on and off from the end of 2018 into 2020.
On four or five occasions, K.A. dropped defendant off at S.D.’s home late at night. K.A.
occasionally shopped with defendant for gifts — jackets, shoes, purses, perfume,
including stolen or bootleg knockoff items — for K.A.’s girlfriend and defendant’s wife
and girlfriend.
       K.A. never shopped with defendant at a jewelry store because “[defendant] don’t
really do the jewelry thing.” K.A. testified that defendant would drop off some of the
gifts, including non-knockoff sets of matching shoes and purses, at S.D.’s home. From
what K.A. saw, defendant bought S.D. about $15,000 worth of clothes. K.A. testified
that defendant’s gifts to S.D. would be for her to keep because that is “usually how you
do gifts.”
       The prosecutor charged defendant with: two counts of first degree robbery (Pen.
Code, § 211;6 counts one & two); possessing a firearm as a prohibited person (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count three), and first degree burglary (§§ 459, 462, subd. (a); count four)
while a person other than an accomplice was present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). Counts one
and two alleged that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that he
committed the offenses while released on bail (§ 12022.1) in two other cases. And the
information alleged that he had prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12)
in 2014 for battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and in 2011 for assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).

6      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              4
        The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found true the firearm
allegations associated with counts one and two.
        During the sentencing hearing, defendant admitted both prior strike conviction
allegations. The court then struck the firearm enhancement associated with count two
pursuant to section 1385. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his prior strike
convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Despite
defendant’s earlier admission that he had been on bail on the date of the offenses, the
prosecution withdrew the on-bail allegations, which the court dismissed.
        The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an aggregate term of 62 years to
life: 25 years to life, plus 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement on count one; a
consecutive term of 25 years to life on count two; and a consecutive term of two years on
count three. On count four, the court imposed a four-year term, which it stayed pursuant
to section 654.
        Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                       Jury Instructions
        Defendant argues that instructional error deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
Specifically, he claims that the jury should have been instructed on his defense that he
had a claim of right to the property he took from S.D.’s home (CALCRIM No. 1863) and
the instruction allowing the jury to infer guilt from his flight from S.D.’s home
(CALCRIM No. 372) was improper and not supported by the evidence. We disagree.
        Errors in jury instructions are questions of law, which we review de novo. (People
v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569; People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340,
358.)

                                               5
       A. Claim of Right
       Defendant first contends that the jury could have concluded from the evidence that
he was simply retrieving his own property from S.D. Consequently, he argues, the trial
court had a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on claim of right as a defense with
CALCRIM No. 1863. Alternatively, he asserts that his attorney was ineffective in failing
to request such an instruction. Neither claim has merit.
       “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another,
from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of
force or fear.” (§ 211.) In People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 947, the California
Supreme Court affirmed that, as at common law, claim of right remains a viable defense
to a charge of robbery. “The claim-of-right defense provides that a defendant’s good
faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that he has a right or claim to property he takes from
another negates the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.” (Id. at
p. 938.) Such a belief, even if mistakenly held, is sufficient to preclude felonious intent
because “[f]elonious intent exists only if the actor intends to take the property of another
without believing in good faith that he has a right or claim to it.” (People v. Butler
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573, overruled on another ground in Tufunga, at p. 956.)
       The bench notes to CALCRIM No. 1863 state that there is a split of authority
among appellate courts as to whether a court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a claim
of right. However, this split appears to have been resolved when, several years after
Tufunga was decided, our state Supreme Court clarified that because the asserted claim of
right serves only to negate the intent to steal (mens rea) element of the robbery charges,
where the trial court otherwise properly instructed the jury on this element, it has no sua
sponte duty to instruct on the defense. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
874.) Defendant does not argue that the instructions on mens rea were otherwise
deficient. In his reply brief, defendant concedes that, in light of Covarrubias, the trial
court here had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury and that any request for the jury

                                              6
instruction had to have come from counsel. (See ibid.) Thus, we reject defendant’s claim
that the court had a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1863.
       Moreover, we will not fault defense counsel for failing to request the instruction
on a claim-of-right defense because the evidence in this case did not warrant giving it. In
arguing otherwise, defendant maintains that he was in a relationship with S.D. and
frequently took things to her house. When they broke up, defendant argues, he merely
“got his stuff back” from S.D. Yet defendant’s good faith belief in a claim of right must
relate to specific property (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 950), and “ ‘be
something more than a vague impression’ ”; defendant must have a bona fide claim
(People v. Photo (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 345, 353). Defendant has failed to establish the
nature of his claim of right or to relate it to the specific property he took from S.D. (See
People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 875 [insufficient evidence to support
instructing the jury on claim of right where, in part, there was no evidence that either
defendant claimed an ownership interest in the two handguns the defendant took from the
victims].) Instead, defendant vaguely asserts that he had a claim of right to everything he
took, by virtue of his relationship with S.D. As a matter of law, this is insufficient to
support a claim-of-right defense.
       Additionally, there is no factual support for his claim. We first note that common
sense informs that most people who seek the return of property they believe they
rightfully own, don’t wear a mask concealing their identity, or display a firearm when
seeking the property’s return. Additionally, there is no evidence that defendant owned
the property he took from S.D.’s home. Nor is there any evidence that defendant bought
or gifted S.D. any of the items he took from her home. The evidence demonstrates that
many of the items taken were those that defendant did not purchase or own at all. For
example, E.B. testified that his mother bought him the PlayStation5 and iPhone. S.D.
testified that her watch was a gift from someone other than defendant and that she had her
rings “for a really long time.” Indeed, K.A. testified that defendant did not really buy

                                              7
jewelry for his girlfriends. S.D. also testified that either she bought or was gifted by
someone other than defendant, several purses. There was no evidence introduced to the
contrary.
       Although witnesses testified that defendant often bought items for S.D., the
testimony regarding the gifts was vague and did not necessarily include the items taken.
L.D. testified she knew defendant had bought items worth thousands of dollars for S.D.
but could not identify the items. Defendant’s mother also testified she knew defendant
and S.D. were dating and that “he was buying stuff for the girl that he was dating,” but
never specified the items bought. Finally, K.A. testified that he had shopped with
defendant to get gifts for defendant’s girlfriends, who included S.D. According to K.A.,
these gifts fell into the same category as those taken: “Jackets, shoes, like, purses, just
stuff that — perfume or something, earrings, okay, something you think your girl would
like.” Like the other witnesses, however, K.A. never identified the items taken as gifts
originally bought by defendant. Finally, even if we were to assume defendant bought the
items he later took from S.D.’s home, there is no evidence he retained any ownership
interest in any item.
       We conclude there is not substantial evidence to support a claim-of-right defense.
Therefore, even upon request, defendant was not entitled to instruction on such a defense.
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 875; see also People v. Alvarado (1982)
133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1022 [the trial court’s refusal to give instruction on claim-of-right
defense was proper where the defendants “conducted a general ransacking of the
bedroom indiscriminately taking items of value never specifically related to any claim of
right”].) Defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to request an instruction for which
there was no evidentiary support. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387
[“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or objections
that counsel reasonably determines would be futile”], superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161-1165.)

                                              8
       B. Defendant’s Flight
       During the conference on jury instructions, defendant objected to CALCRIM
No. 372, which instructed the jury that his flight could be considered as a factor to infer
his guilt. Defendant argued that because there was no evidence he knew S.D. had called
911 and that he simply walked away from her house, there was no evidence he fled after
retrieving his property. The prosecution disagreed, arguing that the circumstances around
the robbery, i.e., wearing a mask, gloves, driving away from the scene, and being absent
when the police arrive at his known address, all support the conclusion that defendant
acted in a manner to avoid arrest. The court overruled defendant’s objection, finding that
because the prosecution planned to argue flight, the court had a sua sponte obligation to
issue the instruction. The court noted, however, that the language of the instruction
allowed the jury to conclude whether defendant fled at all and, if so, the meaning and
importance of that conduct.
       Section 1127c requires a trial court to give a flight instruction “where evidence of
flight . . . is relied upon as tending to show guilt.” (§ 1127c; see also People v. Howard
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1020.) In such cases, the statute requires the court to “instruct
the jury substantially as follows: [¶] The flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime, or after [the person] is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish [the person’s] guilt, but is a fact which, if
proved, the jury may consider in deciding [the person’s] guilt or innocence. The weight
to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (§ 1127c.)
“CALCRIM No. 372 is merely a distillation of the instructional duty imposed . . . by . . .
section 1172c.” (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 499.)
       Our Supreme Court has interpreted section 1127c as mandating a rule that when
the prosecution introduces evidence the defendant fled, “ ‘and if such evidence is relied
on as tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007)
41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522.) Specifically, “ ‘[a] flight instruction is proper whenever

                                                9
evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime scene . . .
logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge.’ ”
(Id. at p. 522.) “ ‘ “ ‘[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching
of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to
avoid being observed or arrested.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 607.)
“Evidence that a defendant left the scene is not alone sufficient.” (People v. Bonilla
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328.)
       Section 1127c notwithstanding, “[i]t is error to give an instruction which, while
correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.” (People v.
Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) There must be “ ‘substantial evidence of flight by
the defendant . . . from which the jury could reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt.’ ”
(People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245.) “ ‘The evidentiary basis for the
flight instruction requires sufficient, not uncontradicted, evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.)
       Defendant contends the evidence is too slight to support the inference that he fled
from S.D.’s home, since there is no evidence that he knew the police had been called, nor
any indication that he left because he feared apprehension or arrest. Similar challenges to
the predecessor standard jury instruction on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) were rejected in
Abilez and Bonilla.
       In Abilez, the defendant contended that “giving the [flight] instruction was error
because there were ‘no facts’ suggesting his decision to leave the victim’s home was
motivated by a desire to avoid detection or apprehension for the murder.” (People v.
Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 522.) Our state Supreme Court disagreed that the facts at
trial (showing that after the victim was killed, the defendant and codefendant loaded
items from the victim’s home into her car and drove off before being apprehended several
miles away) were insufficient to support the instruction. It explained, based on the
evidence, that “the jury could reasonably infer that [the] defendant’s decision not to stay

                                              10
in the house [after the victim was killed], but instead to leave, manifested a consciousness
of guilt.” (Ibid.)
       Similarly in Bonilla, the defendant challenged the flight instruction, claiming
“there was no substantial evidence he fled” after the murder. (People v. Bonilla, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 328.) The court clarified that “[t]o obtain the instruction, the prosecution
need not prove the defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, only that
a jury could find the defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt from
the evidence.” (Ibid.) Based on evidence that the defendant “immediately left the scene”
(id. at p. 329) and did nothing that “might have led to [his] detection at the scene or
otherwise connected him with the attack” (such as calling out or attempting to render
aid), the court concluded it was not error to give the instruction. (Ibid.) In so concluding,
the court reasoned that while “[t]he jury could attribute an innocent explanation to [the
defendant’s] conduct, . . . it could also infer that his departure and the circumstances
thereof were consistent with and supported the prosecution’s theory,” thus justifying the
giving of the instruction. (Ibid.)
       Here, the evidence at trial was that defendant robbed S.D. In preparation to leave,
he packed several of S.D.’s items into one of her suitcases and walked away. He kept his
gloves on while he left. Finally, the suitcase full of the items taken from S.D. was found
in defendant’s wife’s car. A jury could find defendant committed those acts in an attempt
to avoid a connection between himself and the robbery and the jury could infer that
defendant demonstrated consciousness of guilt as he left S.D.’s house. We conclude the
court did not err in instructing the jury on flight.
       Nevertheless, defendant claims that the purported error violated his right to state
and federal due process because it relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Our state Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected that
argument. (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691; see also People v. Jackson
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224, abrogated in part on another point as stated in

                                               11
McGee v. Kirkland (C.D.Cal. 2009) 726 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1080.) Rather, we review this
type of error for prejudice under the state-law standard, asking whether it was
“reasonably probable [the defendant] would have fared any better had the trial court not
given the flight instruction.” (People v. Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 502;
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
       Even if the court erred in providing the flight instruction, we conclude any
potential prejudice was minimal. First, as the parties both recognize, the prosecution did
not argue that the jury should infer guilt from defendant’s flight. Next, other aspects of
the jury instructions minimized any prejudicial impact from the flight instruction.
CALCRIM No. 372 itself does not assume that flight is established, instructing the jury
that “[i]f you conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning and
importance of that conduct.” (Italics added.) Also, the jury was instructed under
CALCRIM No. 200 that some of the instructions read “may not apply, depending on [the
jury’s] findings about the facts of the case.” Thus, the jury was informed that it had “to
decide for itself” whether defendant’s departure from the scene “had any relevance when
deciding guilt and . . . if it decided the evidence was irrelevant, it knew to disregard the
flight instruction.” (People v. Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 502.)
       Finally, evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong. The evidence suggested a prior
dating relationship between defendant and S.D. and that defendant had been to S.D.’s
house on several previous occasions. Immediately after the robbery, S.D. identified
defendant as the robber. Defendant told L.D. that he had gotten his things back from
S.D. and S.D.’s red suitcase with her belongings were later found in L.D.’s car at an
address associated with defendant. No evidence suggested someone other than defendant
robbed S.D.
       In short, even if insufficient evidence supported the flight instruction, there is no
reasonable probability of a better result had the instruction not been given. Defendant’s
claim of instructional error fails.

                                              12
                                              II
                                         Sentencing
       Defendant argues, and the People agree, that the trial court misunderstood the
scope of its discretion to impose concurrent terms on defendant’s two robbery
convictions. We agree with the parties, and we remand the matter for a full sentencing
hearing.
       A. Additional Background
       At the sentencing hearing, the parties disagreed as to whether consecutive
sentences were mandatory. Defense counsel argued, inter alia, that the court had the
discretion to impose concurrent sentences under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425. In
response, the prosecutor argued that, although “section 654 provides it in the abstract,”
concurrent sentences were inappropriate because two victims were involved and that,
given defendant’s prior strikes, consecutive sentences were mandatory.
       The trial court observed that section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(B) provided “the
indeterminate term described in subparagraph (a) shall be served consecutive to any other
term of imprisonment for which the consecutive term may be imposed.” After
researching the issue further, the court stated: “The statute is clear it’s consecutive. [¶]
The question becomes do we have any recent decisions like we’ve had recently that are
saying the Court does have discretion.” After a pause in the proceedings, the court
remarked, “I’m not finding anything to lead me to believe the statute has been changed
by case law” and that subdivision “([e])(2)([B]) is the controlling law.”
       The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 62 years to life, which included two
terms of 25 years to life on both robbery convictions and a two-year term for being a
felon in possession of a weapon on count three. The court remarked that, if on appeal it
was determined that the court had discretion, then it would impose a concurrent sentence
on count two. The court reasoned: “[T]his was really a sweep through” and “[t]he
intended target really of the whole thing . . . was [S.D.] and that it was sort of a pass by,

                                              13
run in, grab that Play[S]tation5.” The court mentioned that in “looking at some of the
factors, [rule] 4[.]425 for consecutive[,] the [crimes] and objectives were predominantly
independent of each other, I don’t think so. I think it’s the same sweep.” The court
further stated: “The crimes here involved separate acts of violence, that’s the potential,
except there was really no violence or overt threats to [E.B.] [¶] They weren’t really
committed at separate times and places. Again, this was a sweep.”
       B. Analysis
       When a defendant has two strikes, as does defendant here, he receives an
indeterminate term under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A). Section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(B) provides: “The indeterminate term described in subparagraph (A) shall be
served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for which a consecutive term may
be imposed by law. Any other term imposed subsequent to an indeterminate term
described in subparagraph (A) shall not be merged therein but shall commence at the time
the person would otherwise have been released from prison.” Finally, section 667,
subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant
has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one
or more prior serious or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court
shall adhere to each of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (6) If there is a current conviction for
more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the
same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each
count pursuant to subdivision (e).” (§ 667, subd. (c)(6).)
       Our Supreme Court has interpreted section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(B) as speaking
of both the “ ‘indeterminate term described in subparagraph (A)’ and ‘any other term of
imprisonment for which a consecutive term may be imposed by law.’ ” (People v.
Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 514.) The Hendrix court considered the language of
section 667, subdivision (c)(6), which provides: “ ‘If there is a current conviction for
more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the

                                              14
same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each
count pursuant to subdivision (e).’ ” (Hendrix, at p. 512, quoting § 667, subd. (c)(6).)
“By its terms,” said the court, “this subdivision applies to any current felony conviction”
and “clearly provides that consecutive sentencing is mandatory for any current felony
convictions ‘not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of
operative facts.’ ” (Hendrix, at p. 512.) The Hendrix court continued: “By implication,
consecutive sentences are not mandatory under subdivision (c)(6) if the multiple current
felony convictions are ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of
operative facts.’ ” (Ibid., quoting § 667, subd. (c)(6); see also People v. Cartwright
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1140-1141.)
       The Hendrix court also analyzed section 667, subdivision (c)(7). It noted that
“Subdivision (c)(7) provides: ‘If there is a current conviction for more than one serious
or violent felony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the sentence for
each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the
defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.’ ” (People v.
Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 513.) It similarly reasoned that “[b]y implication,
consecutive sentences are not mandated under subdivision (c)(7) if all of the serious or
violent current felony convictions are ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from
the same set of operative facts.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Thus, under both subdivision (c)(6) and (7) to section 667, the trial court is not
mandated to impose consecutive sentences if it finds that the offenses were committed on
the same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts. (Cf. People v. Henderson
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 56 [“after the Reform Act, a trial court retains the Hendrix
concurrent sentencing discretion when sentencing on qualifying offenses committed on
the same occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts”].) Because the trial
court’s comments at sentencing demonstrated it did not believe it had discretion to
impose concurrent terms in counts one and two, and that it would have imposed

                                              15
concurrent sentences if it had discretion to do so, we remand the matter for a new
sentencing hearing. (Ibid., citing People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893-895.) At
that hearing the trial court must determine, pursuant to section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and
(7), whether the offenses of counts one and two were committed on the same occasion or
arise from the same set of operative facts. Also at that hearing, under the full
resentencing rule, the trial court is free “ ‘to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when
resentencing a defendant’ (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425).”
(Henderson, at p. 56.)
                                              III
                         Senate Bill No. 81 and the Three Strikes Law
       Defendant urges this court to find that sentencing pursuant to the “Three Strikes”
law qualifies as an enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c). He then argues
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 81) on January 1, 2022, requires his prior strikes be dismissed.
Alternatively, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
under People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497. In light of the remand
for a full sentencing hearing, we need not consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling on defendant’s Romero motion, as he may renew that request upon
remand. However, to provide further guidance for the new sentencing hearing, we agree
with the holding of our colleagues in People v. Burke that recent amendments to section
1385 to add specific mitigating factors a trial court must consider when deciding whether
to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice, do not apply
to the Three Strikes law. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242-243.)
Therefore Senate Bill 81’s amendments to section 1385, specifically subdivision (c)(2),
are not relevant to whether a prior strike should be dismissed.

                                              16
         A. Additional Background
         At the hearing, defense counsel requested the trial court strike defendant’s prior
strike convictions and the current sentence enhancements under section 1385. Counsel
argued that new items listed in subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385, added through Senate
Bill 81, provide factors to consider — not only in favor of dismissing the enhancement —
but also in determining whether defendant came under the purview of the Three Strikes
law.
         As to count two, the trial court reduced the enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) for insufficient evidence and ultimately ordered it stricken under section
1385. In striking the enhancement, the court stated, “I’ve given great weight and
considered the fact that more than one enhancement was charged on sentencing factors.
[¶] Then the 12022.1 out on bail, those are dropped [by the prosecution]. They would
otherwise have been stricken pursuant to 1385.” The court noted the only remaining
enhancement was pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b)(1) attached to count one.
         The court further stated, “On the issue of whether 1385, pursuant to [Senate Bill]
81 includes prior strike convictions as alleged here, I’m of the opinion . . . that they are
two different schemes. [¶] . . . [¶] It is clear to me that there is a . . .distinction between
an alternative sentencing scheme under three strikes and a sentence enhancement. [¶]
I’m of the belief that the prior strikes are subject to Romero. The enhancements are
subject to a Romero analysis within the context of 1385.”
         With respect to the prior strikes, the court stated that while it “looked at ways to
strike” them, defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law and denied
the motion. The court stated, “If it turns out that I’m wrong on the determination that the
recent laws actually do apply to a motion to strike, that is to say 1385 as modified by
[Senate Bill] 81 would apply to these prior strikes, there could definitely be a different
analysis on how this turns out. [¶] It certainly adds factors that I’m not considering
here.”

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       B. Analysis
       Whether the amendments to section 1385 apply to prior strike convictions is a
question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 694.) “To resolve whether defendant’s interpretation of the . . . statute[ ]
is correct, we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction. ‘[I]n construing a
statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first examine the words of
the respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “then the
Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the
language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear, courts will not ‘interpret
away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.’ [Citation.]” ’
[Citation.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts
may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history. [Citation.] ‘We must select the construction that comports most
closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than
defeating the general purpose of the statute and avoid an interpretation that would lead to
absurd consequences.’ ” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)
       Under section 1385, subdivision (a) the trial court “may, . . . in furtherance of
justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This authority under section 1385, subdivision
(a) includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes
law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent
felony . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) amended
section 1385 to add specific mitigating factors the trial court must consider when
deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c); People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) Section 1385,
subdivision (c) now provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall

                                              18
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of
that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances . . .
are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.”
       In People v. Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 237, a different panel of our court
reasoned that the plain language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 expressly applies to
the dismissal of an “enhancement” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) and that the term
“enhancement” has a well-established meaning as “ ‘an additional term of imprisonment
added to the base term.’ ” (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101, italics omitted;
see People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 695, fn. 9; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.405(5).) As the court in Burke further noted, it is “equally well established that the
Three Strikes law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the
current offense. ([People v. Superior Court (]Romero[), supra, 13 Cal.4th] at p. 527;
People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744.)” (Burke, at p. 243; see id. at
pp. 242-244.) We agree with the conclusion in Burke that the plain language of section
1385, subdivision (c) is unambiguous, and applies only to enhancements, not alternative
sentencing schemes. Because the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement, section 1385,
subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to the Three Strikes
law. (Burke, at p. 244.) The trial court was not required to consider the factors in section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) when determining whether to dismiss defendant’s prior strikes
and did not abuse its discretion when it failed to do so.

                                             19
                                     DISPOSITION
       The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct a new
sentencing hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
RENNER, J.

    /s/
ASHWORTH, J.*

*     Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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