Court Opinion

ID: 9903169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:31:20.48657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:19.928771
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

           Petitioner,

v.                                         Case No. 5D22-2883
                                           LT Case No. 2022-CA-1729

APM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,

           Respondent.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 19, 2023

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Seminole County,
Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

Michael C. Sasso, David F. Tegeler, and
Christian Bonta, of Sasso & Sasso, P.A.,
Winter Park, for Petitioner.

Rosemary Hanna Hayes, Carly Marie
Newman, and Paula Marie Bird, of Hayes
& Newman, PL, Orlando, for Respondent.

LAMBERT, C.J.
      Petitioner, Seminole County, Florida (“Seminole County”), seeks

certiorari review of the trial court’s order denying its motion to dismiss the

complaint filed against it by Respondent, APM Construction Corporation

(“APM”). Seminole County asserts that APM filed suit before exhausting the

presuit administrative remedies required under the parties’ contract and that

the trial court’s denial order allowing the litigation to proceed prior to the

exhaustion of these remedies is a departure from the essential requirements

of the law causing it irreparable harm. For the following reasons, we grant

the petition.

      The parties entered into a written contract for the construction of the

Seminole County Fire Station Number 11. Prior to the project’s completion,

Seminole County terminated the contract for cause. Not long thereafter,

APM filed suit alleging causes of action for breach of contract (count one);

prompt payment under the Local Government Prompt Payment Act (count

two); violation of Florida’s Sunshine Law (count three); and violation of

Florida’s Public Records Act (count four). 1

      Seminole County moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that, under

the contract documents, which consist of the contract itself, the General

      1
       Seminole County is not seeking relief regarding the denial of its
motion to dismiss counts three and four.

                                      2
Conditions, and the Seminole County Administrative Code, APM was

required to first exhaust the administrative dispute resolution procedures

prior to filing suit. Seminole County points to section 18 of the contract, titled

Dispute Resolution, that provides, in pertinent part:

            (a) In the event of a dispute related to any
                performance or payment obligation arising under
                this Agreement, the parties shall exhaust
                COUNTY administrative dispute resolution
                procedures prior to filing a lawsuit or otherwise
                pursuing legal remedies. . . .

            (b) In any lawsuit or legal proceeding arising under
                this Agreement, [APM] hereby waives any claim
                or defense based on facts or evidentiary materials
                that were not presented for consideration in
                COUNTY administrative dispute resolution
                procedures set forth in subsection (a) above of
                which [APM] had knowledge and failed to present
                during COUNTY administrative dispute resolution
                procedures.

      APM does not dispute that it filed suit without first pursuing or

exhausting the presuit administrative remedies under the contract.2            Its

position below and here is that the alternate dispute resolution provisions of

the parties’ contract were intended to resolve disputes that arose during

construction, not after Seminole County’s unilateral termination of the

contract.

      The nature of the administrative dispute resolution procedures under
      2

the County’s Administrative Code are not critical to our resolution.

                                        3
      The trial court denied Seminole County’s motion to dismiss by

unelaborated order without a hearing. The County timely filed its instant

petition.

      To obtain a writ of certiorari, a petitioner, such as Seminole County

here, must show that the nonfinal order entered is “(1) a departure from the

essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the

remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.”

Golub v. Golub, 325 So. 3d 164, 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (quoting Williams

v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011)). These “second and third prongs

are sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘irreparable harm’ element, and

they are jurisdictional.” Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.

Mahon, 293 So. 3d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)).

      We first address whether Seminole County has shown the requisite

irreparable harm. Typically, certiorari relief is not available for the denial of

a motion to dismiss. Cuneo v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 899 So. 2d 1139, 1140

(Fla. 3d DCA 2005). This rule, though, is not without exceptions. Pertinent

here, certiorari jurisdiction is properly exercised when a trial court permits a

party to litigate when there is a contractual or legal obligation to first proceed

administratively. Univ. of Cent. Fla. Bd. Of Trs. v. Turkiewicz, 21 So. 3d 141,

144–45 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Metro Dade Cnty. v. Recchi Am., Inc., 734 So.

                                        4
2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The rationale for an appellate court

exercising its certiorari jurisdiction in these circumstances is that any error

committed by the trial court in not requiring a party to exhaust presuit

administrative remedies cannot be rectified post-judgment since one of the

purposes of the presuit administrative remedy is to avoid the filing of the

lawsuit in the first instance.    Cf. Turkiewicz, 21 So. 3d at 145 (finding

irreparable harm because the statutory requirement of presuit notice and

screening cannot be meaningfully enforced post-judgment where the

purpose of presuit screening is to avoid the filing of the lawsuit).

      Applying this reasoning, we find that irreparable harm has been shown

and certiorari jurisdiction properly lies. This leaves the remaining question—

whether the trial court’s order denying Seminole County’s motion to dismiss

constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Our

standard of review is de novo. Cf. Serchay v. State Farm Fla. Ins., 25 So.

3d 652, 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (applying the de novo standard of review

to trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for the plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies).

      We conclude that the trial court’s order constitutes such a departure.

Our ruling is supported by the Third District Court’s opinion in Recchi. There,

Dade County moved to dismiss the plaintiff/contractor’s complaint for breach

                                        5
of the parties’ construction contract because the contractor had not

exhausted the administrative remedies required under the contract before

filing suit. 734 So. 2d at 1124. The trial court denied the county’s motion to

dismiss, and Dade County sought certiorari relief. Id.

      The Third District Court granted the writ of certiorari. Id. The court

observed that the contractor signed the construction contract knowing that it

contained required presuit dispute resolution procedures and that it was not

at liberty to thereafter proceed in circuit court without first exhausting the

administrative remedy. Id. at 1125.

      APM argues that Recchi is distinguishable because in that case, Dade

County had not terminated the contract prior to plaintiff filing suit while here,

Seminole County terminated the contract. APM asserts that, under these

circumstances, Seminole County cannot now attempt to enforce a contract

with presuit administrative remedy requirements that it had terminated. For

the following reasons, we are not persuaded.

      First, the parties’ contract specifically provides that where APM’s

services have been terminated by Seminole County, the termination “shall

not affect any rights that Seminole County may have against [APM] then

existing or which may thereafter accrue.” Second, nothing in the contract

shows that the parties intended to expressly exclude post-termination

                                       6
disputes such as the one brought by APM from the scope of its presuit

administrative dispute resolution provisions. See Silverpop Sys., Inc. v.

Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2016) (“While

contractual obligations may expire upon the termination of a contract,

provisions that are structural (e.g., relating to remedies and the resolution of

disputes) may survive that termination.”); see also Fla. Woman Care LLC v.

Nguyen, 329 So. 3d 146, 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Generally, dispute-

related provisions, such as forum selection clauses, are enforceable beyond

the expiration of the contract if they are otherwise applicable to the disputed

issue and the parties have not agreed otherwise.” (quoting U.S. Smoke &

Fire Curtain, LLC v. Bradley Lomas Electrolok, Ltd., 612 F. App’x 671, 672–

73 (4th Cir. 2015))); Auchter Co. v. Zagloul, 949 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2007) (holding that “[a]rbitration provisions are to be construed to

require arbitration of disputes arising after the cancellation of the underlying

contract unless such disputes are specifically excluded from arbitration,” and

therefore reasoning that where “post-termination disputes are not expressly

excluded from the scope of the dispute resolution provisions of the contract,

[the court] must construe them as intended to be included”). We therefore

conclude and hold that the presuit administrative remedy provisions of the

contract were intended to and did survive its purported termination.

                                       7
     In summary, APM signed a contract in which it agreed that: (1) disputes

regarding contract performance shall require the exhaustion of the

administrative dispute resolution procedures prior to the filing of a lawsuit;

and (2) the termination of APM’s services under the contract by Seminole

County shall not affect any rights Seminole County may have against APM.

Furthermore, the contract contained no language that expressly excluded

post-termination disputes—such as the claims being asserted in counts one

and two of APM’s complaint—from the scope of the presuit administrative

dispute resolution process. Lastly, we discern no present basis in the record

to conclude that the required presuit administrative dispute resolution

procedures will be futile. See State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. PZ Constr. Co.,

633 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“A court should not infer that an

administrative remedy is not available in the absence of a showing that the

party seeking relief has pursued the administrative remedy without

success.”).

      We therefore grant Seminole County’s petition for writ of certiorari,

quash the order denying its motion to dismiss, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.

MAKAR and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

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