Court Opinion

ID: 9574366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:25.653569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:26.736563
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
(concurring specially) — I agree with the majority's uniform extension of religious exemptions to employees regardless of religious affiliation. I believe that such a conclusion is compelled by both federal and state *821constitutional law.
In its original opinion this court interpreted RCW 41.56.122 as only granting religious exemptions from union security clauses to persons affiliated with churches or other recognizable religious groups. Grant v. Spellman, 96 Wn.2d 454, 635 P.2d 1071 (1981) (Grant I). Noting this interpretation and the distinction being made between persons whose religious beliefs spring from such affiliation and persons whose beliefs exist outside of any organized group, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded Grant I for action consistent with Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 72 L. Ed. 2d 33, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982). See Grant v. Washington Pub. Empl. Relations Comm'n, 456 U.S. 955, 72 L. Ed. 2d 479, 102 S. Ct. 2028 (1982). It should be noted initially that Valente applies only to those laws interpreted as granting a preference to one class of religious beliefs and denying that same preference to other classes. Valente, at 252.1 The United States Supreme Court was bound by this court's original interpretation of the statute. Thus, this court, by its own action, has brought this case squarely within the ambit of Valente. Yet, for fear of becoming lost in the "uncertainties of the First Amendment", the majority rejects the Valente analysis. Majority opinion, at 818. Rather than causing us to become mired in a First Amendment bog, Valente presents a sound and easily manageable basis upon which to decide this case. Moreover, this case presents First Amendment issues of paramount importance and should be addressed as such. Using the Valente analysis I would reach the same result as the majority. I therefore concur only in that result.
In Valente, the Minnesota Legislature enacted legislation regulating the collection of charitable contributions. The law contained rather rigorous registration and reporting requirements. Minnesota later granted religious *822organizations receiving at least 50 percent of charitable contributions from members an exemption from these requirements. Members of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church), which received far less than 50 percent of its contributions from members, sued claiming that the legislation violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. In deciding the issue, the United States Supreme Court noted: "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Valente, at 244. Further, the establishment clause is so inextricably intertwined with free exercise that equality of exercise is impossible in an atmosphere of official denominational preference. As such, it has been long established that no state may pass laws which aid one religion or prefer one religion over another. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 91 L. Ed. 711, 67 S. Ct. 504, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1947). Since this freedom is so important, the Court in Valente held that governing bodies must show that laws which distinguish between religions are necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest and that the statute is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Valente, at 246-47 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981)). See also State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). Indeed in religious exemption cases there must be a close fit between the preference and the interest. Valente, at 247. These same principles should apply in a labor setting.
In addressing the interests advanced by regulating labor union operations and religion, a court must engage in a 2-step process. First, it must determine the legitimacy of union security clauses and secondly determine the propriety of allowing religious exemptions from these clauses. See Association of Capitol Powerhouse Eng'rs v. State, 89 Wn.2d 177, 180, 570 P.2d 1042 (1977) and Grant I, at 461.
In this first step, courts have relied upon Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). In Abood, the Court noted that union *823security clauses foster industrial peace and stabilize labor-management relations. Abood, at 219. Further, such clauses have been found to avoid the confusion which so often results from attempts to enforce two or more collective bargaining agreements with differing terms. Because of these benefits, according to Abood, there exists a compelling interest for allowing these clauses. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that requirement of financial support of a collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work does not violate the First Amendment. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238, 100 L. Ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714 (1956).
The recognition that states have a compelling interest in union security clauses does not mean that we should not recognize the equally compelling nature of allowing exemptions based upon religion. Even in its first decision in Grant, this court upheld religious exemptions for church members. Also, as I originally stated in dissenting in Grant I, RCW 41.56.122(1) evinces our Legislature's intent to require employers to "make reasonable accommodation to the religious beliefs of employees." Grant I, at 463 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1974)).
Accommodating religion was also recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963). There, in reversing a state's decision on rights to unemployment benefits, the Court held that states must modify unemployment compensation laws in order to accommodate the needs of persons religiously opposed to working on nontraditional sabbaths. Sherbert has been read by one commentator as standing for the proposition that "failure to accommodate religion when the government could substantially achieve its legitimate goals while granting religious exemptions [results in] hostility toward religion rather than [epitomizing] the essence of neutrality." (Footnote omitted.) L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 852 (1978). Based upon Sherbert then, this court *824should agree that the First Amendment commands the State to be vigilant in protecting the freedom of religion.
Accommodation clauses are in no way diminished when used in concert with union security clauses. Granting exemptions from security clauses serves the same ends as the clauses themselves. With such provisions employees are not placed in a situation of having to choose between religious beliefs and employment as in Sherbert. This unburdening of religious conscience can serve only to enhance and stabilize employer-employee relationships. Similarly, such exemptions "foster industrial peace", an interest held compelling in Abood. Because of these benefits, any decision striking down religious exemptions would amount to hostility toward religion.
But, in this case we are not to merely determine whether exemptions are compelling. Rather we are to determine whether the County can show a compelling interest for denying religious exemptions to nonchurch members. In its brief, the County offers no suggestions as to the interests it seeks to protect. However, it is arguable that the County has an interest in avoiding the administrative burden of processing more numerous requests for the exemption and in avoiding spurious requests. These added burdens, whether real or imagined, should not affect the rights of the appellant in this case. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) has already accepted the sincerity of his religious beliefs. As for any future burden, PERC is free to require would-be users of the exemption to make a factual showing of the legitimacy of beliefs.
Such a requirement of proof of true religious sentiments was aptly handled by the court in United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). There, the defendant, in a drug possession case, claimed to be an ordained minister of the Neo-American Church. Members of the "church" were supposedly allowed to use LSD, marijuana and other "consciousness expanding" substances. She therefore moved for dismissal of all criminal charges. In determining whether the defendant asserted true religious beliefs, the court *825stated:
Obviously this question is a matter of delicacy and courts must be ever careful not to permit their own moral and ethical standards to determine the religious implications of beliefs ...
Subtle and difficult though the inquiry may be, it should not be avoided for reasons of convenience. . . . In a complex society . . . those who seek immunity . . . on religious grounds must at the very least demonstrate adherence to ethical standards and a spiritual discipline.
(Italics mine.) Kuch, at 443-44.
These same principles can be applied by PERC. Moreover, in addressing similar arguments against exemptions for religious beliefs, the Court in Sherbert stated: "[E]ven if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund . . ., it would plainly be incumbent upon the [governing body] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses". Sherbert, at 407. In this case the County offers no such alternatives.
Further, this requirement of additional factfinding was held not to be insurmountable by the Court in Valente. In holding that Minnesota must grant an exemption to the Unification Church, the Court noted: "Nothing in our opinion suggests that appellants could not attempt to compel the Unification Church to register under the Act . . . and put the Church to the proof of its bona fides as a religious organization. . . . [N]othing . . . disables the State from denying exemption ... to persons or organizations proved to have engaged in frauds upon the public." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 n.30, 72 L. Ed. 2d 33, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982). Also, speculative arguments concerning possible administrative burdens should not be used to justify a denial of individual rights. It is well settled that constitutional protections cannot be denied for administrative expediency. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
This court should therefore conclude that the County has failed to demonstrate a compelling need to deny the appellant an exemption under RCW 41.56.122 and has thus vio*826lated the establishment clause. Accordingly, I would hold that based on Valente the appellant cannot be denied a religious exemption.
Apart from Valente, this court is also compelled by our own constitution to extend the exemption to the appellant in this case. In instances where state constitutional language is substantially different from federal constitutional language, this court has recognized the efficacy of granting relief based upon independent state grounds. See State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 108, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788 (1967). No lesser protection is available in cases of religious freedom. Unlike the federal constitution, Const. art. 1, § 11 provides, in relevant part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and . . . [njo religious qualification shall be required for any public office or employment
(Italics mine).
As a deputy sheriff, the appellant is most definitely within the public employ. As this court originally interpreted RCW 41.56.122, to continue in that employment, the appellant would have been required to denounce his religious beliefs either by joining some established organization or by giving up his beliefs altogether. Either of these alternatives would constitute a denial of the absolute freedom of conscience guaranteed in our own constitution. Moreover, since continued employment with the County is conditioned upon union membership, the County would also be placing a religious qualification upon employment in violation of Const. art. 1, § 11. Such a violation cannot be allowed to stand. Even under the federal constitution, which outlines the minimum protection available to individuals, persons "may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation *827in an otherwise available public program." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981). The majority's new holding in this case prevents the necessity of such a choice.
 This new result not only comports with Valente and our own constitution, but is also in keeping with established concepts of statutory construction. As the majority notes, we are to presume that the Legislature acted "with integrity and with a purpose to keep within constitutional limits." Majority opinion, at 818 (citing Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964)). Stemming from the presumption of legislative integrity is the presumption that statutes are constitutional. Seattle v. Shepherd, 93 Wn.2d 861, 865, 613 P.2d 1158 (1980). This court has used these two presumptions to authoritatively construe statutes attacked as being constitutionally invalid. See State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 601 n.3, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973) (citing United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 37 L. Ed. 2d 500, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973)); State v. Regan, 97 Wn.2d 47, 640 P.2d 725 (1982). Therefore, though it is arguable that the County's failure to show a compelling interest for denying the appellant an exemption renders the statute invalid, we need not strike down this statute. Under the principle of authoritative construction, this court may legitimately construe RCW 41.56.122 in such a manner as to cure any constitutional infirmity. The majority's reassessment of this case provides such a cure. I therefore concur.
Stafford, Utter, Brachtenbach, and Pearson, JJ., concur with Williams, C.J.

 Statutes interpreted as affording uniform benefits to all religions are tested for constitutionality under the 3-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).