Court Opinion

ID: 9899261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:10:54.180031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:15.103209
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Copeland, 2023-Ohio-4131.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 112762
                 v.                                  :

ANTHONY COPELAND,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 16, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                   Case Nos. CR-87-214421-B and CR-86-213510-ZA

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Anthony Copeland, pro se.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Anthony Copeland (“Copeland”), appeals the

denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his sentences in two separate cases.

He claims the following errors:
       1. The trial court erred or abused its discretion by denying appellant’s
       motion to vacate unlawfully imposed sentence, especially when the
       sentence is void for having been imposed contrary to statute.

       2. The trial court’s failure to strictly comply with the necessary
       procedural requirements of the processes established by the general
       assembly when it imposed the mandatory firearm specification
       sentences and mandatory sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a),
       did not invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court.

              We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                        I. Facts and Procedural History

              Copeland was convicted of and sentenced to multiple offenses in two

cases. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-87-214421-B, a jury found Copeland guilty of one

count of aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01, with a three-year firearm

specification, one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12,

with violence specifications, and one count of having a weapon while under

disability with a three-year firearm specification. The court found that the firearm

specifications applied to different acts and transactions and sentenced Copeland to

three years on each of the firearm specifications, to be served consecutively for a

total of six years.

              On the base counts, the court sentenced Copeland to ten to 25 years on

the aggravated-robbery conviction, four to ten years on the carrying a concealed

weapon conviction, and three to five years on the having weapons while under

disability conviction, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to

the six years on the firearm specifications. Copeland’s convictions were affirmed in
State v. Copeland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 54766, 1988 Ohio App.LEXIS 5033 (Dec.

15, 1988).

             In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-86-213510-ZA, a jury found Copeland guilty

of two counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), and one count of

kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01. The court sentenced Copeland to ten to 25

years on each count to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to

and prior to the sentence in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-87-214421-B.

             In April 2023, Copeland filed a motion to vacate his sentences in both

Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-86-213510-ZA and CR-87214421-B, arguing that his

sentences were not authorized by law and were, therefore, void. The trial court

denied the motion. Copeland now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

                              II. Law and Analysis

             In the first assignment of error, Copeland argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to vacate his sentences because the sentences were not

authorized by statute and are, therefore, void. In the second assignment of error,

Copeland argues the sentences on the firearm specifications are void because the

trial court failed to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court when it

imposed sentences on the specifications. We discuss these assigned errors together

because they both relate to Ohio’s void sentence jurisprudence as articulated in State

v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 4, and State v.

Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34.
             In Henderson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[i]f the court has

jurisdiction over the case and the person, any sentence or judgment based on an

error in the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction is voidable.” Henderson at ¶ 37. A

voidable judgment may only be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.

Harper at ¶ 26. And, “[t]he failure to timely—at the earliest available opportunity—

assert an error in a voidable judgment, even if that error is constitutional in nature,

amounts to the forfeiture of any objection.” Henderson at ¶ 17, citing Tari v. State,

117 Ohio St. 481, 495, 159 N.E. 594 (1927). Thus, “[i]f a judgment is voidable, the

doctrine of res judicata bars a party from raising and litigating in any proceeding,

except a direct appeal, claims that could have been raised in the trial court.” Id. at

¶ 19, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178-179, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967),

paragraph nine of the syllabus.

             Copeland argues his sentences are void and should have been vacated

because they were not authorized by law. If a judgment is void, “[i]t is a mere nullity

and can be disregarded” and “[i]t can be attacked in collateral proceedings.” Id.,

citing Tari at 494. However, a trial court’s judgment is only void if the court lacked

personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.; Harper at ¶ 42.

              Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court’s constitutional or

statutory power to adjudicate a case. Harper at ¶ 23. R.C. 2931.03 gives the

common pleas courts original jurisdiction over “all crimes and offenses, except in

cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior

to the court of common pleas.” R.C. 2931.03. This original jurisdiction includes
subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases. Henderson at ¶ 35. Copeland was

convicted and sentenced on multiple felony counts in both cases. Therefore, the trial

court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate both cases.

             “Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to render a valid

judgment against a particular individual.” Henderson at ¶ 36. “In a criminal matter,

the court acquires jurisdiction over a person by lawfully issued process, followed by

the arrest and arraignment of the accused and his plea to the charge.” Id., citing

Tari, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N.E. 594. Copeland does not dispute that the trial court

had personal jurisdiction to render a valid judgment against him; he contends his

sentences were not authorized by law.

             Because the trial court had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction

over Copeland, any potential sentencing errors are voidable rather than void.

Copeland’s claims that his sentences are contrary to law should have been raised on

direct appeal and are now barred by res judicata. Therefore, the trial court properly

overruled the motion to vacate Copeland’s sentences.

             The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR