Court Opinion

ID: 9677805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:00:27.660594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:05.946247
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because KRS 533.060(1) does prevent the granting of probation to an accused who has pled guilty to burglary in the first degree which is an offense involving the use of a firearm.
When Haymon stole the two shotguns which were both operable although unloaded, he came within the definition of the word “use” for the purposes of the statute.
The real question is how the word “use” is defined for purposes of KRS 533.060(1). I believe Haymon’s conduct is the use of a weapon in the commission of a felony.
I agree with the majority of the Kentucky Court of Appeals panel which was persuaded by the California case of People v. Reaves, 42 Cal.App.3d 852, 117 Cal.Rptr. 163 (1974). The legislative intent of the Kentucky General Assembly was to prevent death and injury as the result of the involvement of firearms in the commission of a crime. The California court was exactly correct when it determined that the underlying intent of the legislature is to deter persons from creating a potential for death or injury resulting from the very presence *241of a firearm at the scene of a crime. Kentucky’s legislature was obviously motivated by similar concerns when it established KRS 533.060(1). Our statute provides for no exceptions from the meaning of “use.” The Kentucky Court of Appeals was exactly correct when they construed the use of a firearm consistent with our legislature’s intent to include the creation of a potential for death or injury by the very presence of a firearm in the hands of the criminal.
Both parties cite Websters Dictionary as a basis of their position concerning the construction of the word “use” as set out in the statute.
The ordinary and accepted meaning of the word “use” includes both an active and passive sense. “Use” in this statute is a noun. The definition of the noun “use” in Websters Third New International Dictionary includes the ability or power to use something. Clearly the thief had the ability to use the shotguns in display. Mere display escalates the situation to a dangerous and risky level. Actual display is not required. Haymon had “use” of the weapons.
The definition of “use” in Black’s Law Dictionary, includes the purpose served, a purpose, object or end for useful or advantageous nature. Here Haymon’s commission of first-degree burglary involved a firearm which had the capacity of being used for an advantageous purpose. His crime came within the prohibition of the statute.
It should be recognized that the statute in question involves restricting the legislative grant of the privilege of probation. The power to grant probation is not inherent in the courts but is conferred by the legislature. Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 326, 147 S.W.2d 1029 (1941). The legislature has authorized the courts to grant probation with the limitation that probation may not be granted where the offense is a Class A, B or C felony and the commission of the crime involved the use of a firearm. The provisions of the statute must be strictly construed. The trial judge properly ruled that it was not permitted to consider probation because the offense involved a firearm.
In order to more correctly reflect the true legislative intent, I would hold that being armed with a weapon is a “use” of the weapon within the meaning of KRS 533.-060(1).