Court Opinion

ID: 9904823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 23:13:41.986407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.504401
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 144

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

            STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF R.G.,
            A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

                             G.G.,
                           Appellant,
                               v.
                         STATE OF UTAH,
                           Appellee.

                            Opinion
                        No. 20220635-CA
                    Filed November 24, 2023

       Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
                The Honorable Tasha Williams
                          No. 1183589

        Keith Andrew Fitzgerald, Attorney for Appellant
               Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson,
                     Attorneys for Appellee
                Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
  in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1     G.G. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to R.G. (Child). Father argues the
juvenile court erred in finding that termination of his parental
rights was strictly necessary, because placement of Child with
Father’s sister in another state was an option. Because Father has
not persuaded us that the court committed reversible error, we
affirm its order terminating Father’s parental rights.
                            In re R.G.

                        BACKGROUND 1

¶2      Child was born in January 2020. The following day, the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
indicating that Child’s mother (Mother) 2 had tested positive for
illegal substances both at the time of Child’s birth and during her
pregnancy. Thereafter, a DCFS caseworker put a safety plan in
place and Child was allowed to leave the hospital and return
home with Father and Mother.

¶3     Almost exactly one month later, the juvenile court held a
pretrial shelter hearing, which Father did not attend. Following
the hearing, the court entered an order removing Child from
Father’s and Mother’s custody and placing Child in the temporary
custody of DCFS. That same day, a DCFS caseworker
(Caseworker) held a kinship meeting to discuss placement
options for Child. Despite being informed of the meeting, neither
Father nor Mother chose to attend. Nevertheless, Caseworker
identified an in-state kinship placement with a foster family
(Foster Family) that had previously adopted two of Child’s
biological half-siblings.

¶4      A verified petition for custody and legal guardianship was
filed one day after the shelter hearing. A few days later, Mother
told Caseworker that she wanted Child to be placed with Father’s
sister (Aunt), who lived in Georgia. Father made the same request.

1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court findings.” In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, n.1, 463 P.3d 66
(quotation simplified).

2. Mother’s parental rights to Child were terminated at the same
time as Father’s. See In re R.G., 2023 UT App 114. Because this
appeal does not concern Mother, we recount the facts that relate
specifically to Father.

 20220635-CA                    2               2023 UT App 144
                             In re R.G.

¶5     In March 2020, Father attended a pretrial hearing on the
verified petition. Based on Father’s admissions to the allegations
in the petition, the juvenile court adjudicated Child neglected as
to Father. 3 Child was placed in DCFS’s custody, and the court set
Child’s permanency goal as reunification with a concurrent goal
of adoption. The court ordered that reunification services be
provided to Father and that Father comply with a child and family
plan.

¶6      In May 2020, Caseworker contacted Aunt to begin the
placement process provided by the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (the ICPC). 4 Caseworker explained that the
next step was to fill out paperwork to send to the Utah state office.
She noted that the time required to complete the paperwork
would depend on how soon she could obtain the necessary
documents, including Child’s social security card and birth
certificate. Because Caseworker did not have those documents for
Child on file, she requested them from the parents and from the
social security office.

¶7    For the remainder of 2020, the juvenile court held periodic
review hearings as required by statute. At the first hearing in June,

3. Father appealed the juvenile court’s neglect adjudication. This
court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
On remand, the State filed an amended verified petition for
custody and legal guardianship alleging that Child was
dependent as to Father. Thereafter, the juvenile court adjudicated
Child dependent as to Father. The other aspects of the court’s
original ruling—including Child’s permanency goals—remained
the same.

4. The ICPC is an interstate agreement that has been adopted by
all fifty states. See Utah Code § 80-2-905. The ICPC allows child
welfare agencies from different states to more easily cooperate
regarding placement of children across state lines.

 20220635-CA                     3               2023 UT App 144
                              In re R.G.

the court ordered DCFS “to move forward with the ICPC.” At a
hearing in August, the State informed the court that “the ICPC has
been put on hold due to [DCFS] not having a social security
number, or birth certificate for [Child].”

¶8      After multiple failed attempts to obtain Child’s social
security card and birth certificate from the parents, Caseworker
was finally able to obtain the documents from the social security
office, which had taken several extra months due to closures
related to the COVID-19 pandemic. On November 6, 2020, DCFS
informed the juvenile court that it had completed its portion of
the ICPC paperwork and asked the court to send the paperwork
to Georgia so that the Georgia state office could complete its part.
The juvenile court signed the order on November 10.

¶9     Reunification services to Father were terminated in
February 2021 due to Father’s noncompliance with the child and
family plan. In June, the State filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights.

¶10 In September 2021, the juvenile court held a pretrial
hearing on the termination petition, during which the status of the
ICPC was discussed. Father’s counsel indicated that Aunt had
“completed and submitted” to Georgia all the required
paperwork. However, DCFS reported that Caseworker had
contacted the Georgia state office regarding the ICPC but there
had been no information provided as to its status. Father then
addressed the court. He explained that Aunt notified him that
morning that she had completed the ICPC paperwork. Father also
informed the court that he was willing to relinquish his rights to
Child if Aunt could adopt her, and he reminded the court that his
desire “from the get-go” had been to place Child with Aunt. Based
in part on the unresolved questions related to the status of the
ICPC, the court scheduled a second pretrial hearing to take place
in October.

 20220635-CA                      4               2023 UT App 144
                            In re R.G.

¶11 At the October pretrial hearing, the State reported the
status of the ICPC:

      [DCFS] was able to get an update from the state of
      Georgia and that update was filed with the Court. It
      does show that there were some additional
      documents that need to be turned in. There was a
      deadline of July 30th for those to be submitted and
      as of the date of the report which is dated September
      13th, they have not been turned in. I don’t think we
      have anything more current than that as far as
      what’s happening with the ICPC but it appears that
      is stalled until the family turns in the necessary
      documents.

In response to this update, Aunt told the court that she had
submitted the completed ICPC paperwork, completed a required
class, and was currently participating in a home study. After
discussing the status of the ICPC, the parties discussed its
relevance. The guardian ad litem (the GAL) and the State
indicated that the ICPC was a “backup plan” because Child was
in a kinship placement with Foster Family and had been there for
a “long” time. Mother and Father disagreed with this assessment.
Counsel for both parents stated that the original reason for
requesting the ICPC was to allow Aunt to be the primary
placement. Following this discussion, the court concluded that
regardless of Child’s placement goal, the parties were in “a
holding pattern” and Child could not yet be placed with Aunt
because “the home study hasn’t been approved” and the ICPC
was therefore not complete.

¶12 Trial on the State’s petition to terminate parental rights
began in November 2021. Despite having proper notice, Father
failed to appear at the termination trial. Father’s counsel moved
to be released due to this failure, and the juvenile court granted
counsel’s motion. The trial then proceeded by proffer. At the close

 20220635-CA                    5               2023 UT App 144
                            In re R.G.

of trial, the court entered an order terminating Father’s parental
rights, which Father subsequently appealed. Thereafter, the State,
the GAL, Father, and Mother filed a stipulated motion for
summary reversal. This court granted the motion and accordingly
vacated the termination order and remanded the matter for a new
trial.

¶13 The second termination trial occurred over the course of
three days in April 2022. The juvenile court heard testimony from
Caseworker, Father, and Child’s foster parents (Foster Parents).
Caseworker testified that at the beginning of the case, Father
expressed interest in having Child placed with Aunt in Georgia.
Caseworker explained that because Aunt lives out-of-state, DCFS
cannot place Child with Aunt unless Aunt has an approved ICPC.
Caseworker testified that she started the ICPC process in April
2020 and that she completed the ICPC paperwork and sent it to
Georgia in November 2020. Caseworker stated that she would
have been able to submit the paperwork sooner had Father
provided Child’s social security card and birth certificate to her
directly, but because he did not, Caseworker had to obtain the
documents from the social security office, which had been closed
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

¶14 Caseworker testified that since submitting the ICPC
paperwork, she had received “minimal updates” from Georgia—
despite the fact that she had followed up “[a]bout every month”
—and that she did not have any control over the Georgia state
office. She explained that she did not contact Aunt directly during
the ICPC process because the “proper channel” for all
communication related to an ICPC is between the state offices;
however, Caseworker testified that had Aunt contacted DCFS and
requested visitation, DCFS “would have given it to her.”
Caseworker noted that the most recent ICPC update from Georgia
was given on February 3, 2022, which stated, “Home study is
being written with an expected completion date of 2/14/2022. Will
be sent for approval at that time.” At the time of trial, however,

 20220635-CA                    6               2023 UT App 144
                            In re R.G.

Caseworker had not been informed whether the home study had
been approved or not, nor had she received any kind of final
report on the ICPC.

¶15 Lastly, Caseworker testified that under DCFS guidelines,
Child was considered to be in a kinship placement because she
was placed with Foster Family—the family that had adopted two
of Child’s biological half-siblings. Caseworker also noted that
DCFS has no “level of preference” for different kinship
placements. Therefore, even if the approved ICPC had been
received, DCFS had already satisfied its “internal standards” by
placing Child with kin.

¶16 Regarding placement options, Father testified that
although Child “is in good hands” with Foster Family, he wanted
her to be placed with Aunt, a desire that he had expressed since
the beginning of the case. Father acknowledged that Aunt has
never met Child and that removing Child from Foster Family
would be a “disruption.” However, Father blamed DCFS for the
delay in the ICPC approval, claiming that Aunt had done
“everything she possibly could.”

¶17 Foster Parents both testified about Child’s strong
relationship with Foster Family. Child’s foster mother (Foster
Mother) stated that Child is “almost inseparable” from her foster
sibling and that Child and her biological half-siblings “have a
great relationship.” Foster Parents expressed their desire to adopt
Child, and Foster Mother explained that it would be
“devastating” for the entire family, including Child, if Child were
to be removed from their home.

¶18 In addition, Foster Mother testified that allowing Child to
remain in contact with Father might not be in her best interest
because “[t]here’s just a lot of anxiety that happens with [Child]
after visits.” Specifically, Child “was having night terrors . . .
when we were doing visits. She would wake up crying, but you
couldn’t actually wake her up. She was just crying . . . .” Foster

 20220635-CA                    7               2023 UT App 144
                            In re R.G.

Mother stated that the night terrors stopped when the visits with
Father stopped.

¶19 Moreover, Father had a history of engaging in violent and
threatening behavior. Specifically, Father threatened Caseworker
when she canceled a visit after Father failed to check in, and from
then on, DCFS was required to provide extra security during
Father’s visits. Father also threatened Foster Parents and had been
found looking up Foster Parents’ contact information. And Father
admitted to committing violent acts against Mother on several
occasions.

¶20 On June 28, 2022, approximately two months after the
termination trial, the juvenile court entered a thirty-page order
terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. The court found that
DCFS made “reasonable efforts” in pursuing the ICPC, including
that Caseworker had worked to obtain the necessary
documentation and complete the ICPC paperwork as quickly as
possible, that Caseworker followed up on the status of the ICPC
“about every month,” that Georgia had provided “minimal
updates” on the ICPC throughout the case, and that Father’s
testimony that Aunt had completed the ICPC and was “cleared”
was not credible. Further, the court found that it was in Child’s
best interest to remain with Foster Family because Child had
become “integrated” into Foster Family, because Child had
developed strong bonds with her foster sibling and half-siblings,
and because removing Child from her existing placement would
be difficult. Moreover, the court found that Aunt “did not request
contact with [Child] and has not met her.” Based on these
findings, the court concluded that termination was strictly
necessary to protect Child’s best interest. It explained:

      [T]his Court must consider all the permanency
      options for [Child] and whether she can be equally
      protected and benefitted by an option other than
      termination. One option is for a placement with

 20220635-CA                    8               2023 UT App 144
                             In re R.G.

       [Aunt] in Georgia. However, at the time of trial the
       ICPC had not been approved, legally barring such
       placement. Further, at this point, the placement is
       not in [Child’s] best interest. [Child] has never met
       [Aunt] and [Aunt] has never requested visits with
       her. [Child] has no familial relationship with
       [Aunt]. . . . When viewed from [Child’s] point of
       view, as required by statute, termination is strictly
       necessary so that the loving family attachments she
       has made with [Foster Family] and her biological
       [half-siblings] can be preserved through adoption.

¶21 Father filed a notice of appeal of the juvenile court’s
termination order on July 7, 2022. On July 18, the court held a post-
termination review hearing. Because Father’s parental rights had
been terminated, he did not attend the hearing; only the State,
Caseworker, and the GAL were present. The parties discussed
Child’s welfare as well as the status of the ICPC. Following the
hearing, the court issued an order indicating that the ICPC had
been approved but declining to alter Child’s placement. The court
reasoned as follows:

       [DCFS’s] court report indicates that [Child]
       continues to do well in the foster placement with her
       biological siblings. In June, 2022 [DCFS] received an
       approved ICPC from Georgia for [Aunt]. [Aunt] has
       never met [Child] and has no relationship with her.
       She never requested contact or updates during the
       case. It would not be appropriate or in [Child’s] best
       interest to change placements at this point in the
       case so [DCFS] sent a Case Closure Form to Georgia.

             ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights to Child, arguing that the court erred in

 20220635-CA                     9               2023 UT App 144
                              In re R.G.

concluding it was strictly necessary to terminate his parental
rights. “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest
determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to
consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its
decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the
evidence.” 5 In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 18, 520 P.3d 38
(quotation simplified). However, Father acknowledges that he
did not raise this issue below, and he therefore asks us to review
the court’s strictly necessary determination for plain error.6 To

5. Father devotes a significant portion of his briefing arguing that
we should review the juvenile court’s strictly necessary
determination de novo. We decline to do so. In In re E.R., 2021 UT
36, 496 P.3d 58, our supreme court was specifically asked to
replace the deferential standard of review applied to best interest
determinations with a non-deferential, de novo standard. Id.
¶¶ 5–6. The court declined to do so, see id. ¶ 26, and we are bound
by that decision, see State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 28, 325 P.3d
855 (“Vertical stare decisis compels a court to follow strictly the
decisions rendered by a higher court.” (quotation simplified)),
cert. denied, 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014).

6. The question of whether plain error review is available in
ordinary civil cases has not yet been answered by the Utah
Supreme Court. See In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12 n.3, 506 P.3d 606.
But the question of whether plain error review is available in the
context of a parental rights termination proceeding—which,
although civil in nature, “involve[s] significant interests on par
with those at issue in criminal cases,” see Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 42 n.10, 507 P.3d 357—is
currently pending before our supreme court. For purposes of this
appeal, we assume, without deciding, that plain error review is
available in termination proceedings. This assumption is
academic here, however, because Father has not demonstrated
that the juvenile court erred, let alone plainly so. Therefore, “we
                                                        (continued…)

 20220635-CA                      10               2023 UT App 144
                              In re R.G.

succeed on a claim of plain error, Father must show that “(1) an
error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the juvenile
court; and (3) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.” In re S.T.,
2022 UT App 130, ¶ 14, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified).

                             ANALYSIS

¶23 Father argues the juvenile court erred in determining that
it was strictly necessary to terminate his parental rights because
the court did not adequately consider other feasible placement
options for Child. Father’s challenge largely concerns the court’s
consideration of the ICPC and whether Aunt was a feasible
placement option. Because Father did not raise this issue below,
to succeed on appeal he must show that a harmful error exists and
that the error should have been obvious to the juvenile court. See
In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12, 506 P.3d 606.

¶24 “Because the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected, a court may only terminate parental
rights upon a finding that termination is strictly necessary to the
best interest[] of the child.” 7 In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 33, 521
P.3d 887 (quotation simplified). Here, the juvenile court
determined it was strictly necessary to terminate Father’s parental
rights because there was no option available, short of termination
and adoption, that would equally protect and benefit Child. In

simply hold that [Father] has not carried [his] burden of showing
plain error.” See In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12 n.3.

7. To terminate a parent’s rights, the State must prove both that
statutory grounds for termination are present and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re S.T., 2022 UT
App 130, ¶ 25 n.5, 521 P.3d 887. Because Father challenges only
the juvenile court’s best interest determination, our discussion is
limited to this portion of the court’s ruling.

 20220635-CA                      11               2023 UT App 144
                            In re R.G.

making this determination, the court considered, among other
options, permanent guardianship with Foster Parents and
permanent guardianship with Aunt. Ultimately, the court
decided against placement with Aunt for two reasons. First, Aunt
was in Georgia, and “at the time of trial the ICPC had not been
approved, legally barring such placement.” Second, placement
with Aunt was not in Child’s best interest because Child “has
never met [Aunt] and [Aunt] has never requested visits with her.
[Child] has no familial relationship with [Aunt].”

¶25 Father assails the juvenile court’s reasoning on both points.
As to the first, Father contends the ICPC was approved before
termination was ordered and therefore it should have been
adjudicated with the termination petition. And as to the second,
Father contends the court’s analysis was inadequate and based on
categorical concerns. For the reasons discussed below, his attack
is unavailing.

¶26 First, Father mischaracterizes the record regarding the
ICPC. Father asserts that the ICPC “was definitively completed
before the written order of termination of parental rights [was]
entered” but that the results were “concealed by DCFS until post-
termination proceedings.” 8 But Father’s position on this point is
undermined by his concession that “[n]one of the parties can
conclusively state [when the ICPC was approved] because [DCFS]
never presented this information.” Indeed, it is unclear from the
record whether DCFS received the approved ICPC before or after
the court entered its final order terminating Father’s parental
rights. The only definitive information available in the record is

8. In his opening brief, Father also argued that “DCFS had
received the approved [ICPC] before the termination trial
commenced.” (Emphasis added.) Although Father concedes in his
reply brief that this assertion is not explicitly supported by the
record, he nevertheless maintains that the “chronology” of the
case is sufficient to support such presumption.

 20220635-CA                   12              2023 UT App 144
                             In re R.G.

that the termination trial was held in April 2022; the court entered
its termination order on June 28; and on July 18, the court held a
post-termination review hearing, during which DCFS reported
that in June 2022 it had “received an approved ICPC from
Georgia” for Aunt. Therefore, while the approved ICPC may have
been received by DCFS while the matter was still under
advisement by the court, Father has not demonstrated that this
was absolutely the case.

¶27 Furthermore, regardless of whether the approved ICPC
was presented to the juvenile court pre- or post-termination, on
the facts of this case, Father cannot demonstrate that the court’s
strictly necessary determination would have been any different
had it received the ICPC earlier. 9 As an initial matter, it is
undisputed that DCFS informed the court about the approved
ICPC and the court considered the implications of that approval
during a post-termination review hearing. Indeed, during the
review hearing, the court stated that although the ICPC for Aunt
had been approved, “[i]t would not be appropriate or in [Child’s]
best interest to change placements at this point in the case.” The
court reasoned that Child “continues to do well in the foster
placement with her biological [half-]siblings,” whereas Aunt “has

9. Father asserts in passing that the two-year delay in approving
the ICPC was caused by DCFS “drag[ging] its feet.” While such a
delay in approving an ICPC may be troubling and unfortunate,
see In re A.H., 2022 UT App 114, ¶ 45, 518 P.3d 993, cert. granted,
525 P.3d 1279 (Utah 2023), there is no indication that DCFS was
responsible for the delay here. Rather, the record indicates that
Caseworker started the ICPC process at the beginning of the case
and followed up on its progress throughout the case and that any
delay was likely attributable to a combination of Father’s inaction
in providing Child’s social security card and birth certificate, the
time it took Aunt to submit her paperwork and complete the
required classes, and general administrative delays caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic.

 20220635-CA                    13              2023 UT App 144
                              In re R.G.

never met [Child] and has no relationship with her. [Aunt] never
requested contact or updates during the case.” Because the court’s
decision to not change Child’s placement post-termination rested
at least in part on Aunt’s lack of engagement throughout the
duration of the years-long case—including after the ICPC was
approved—there is no indication that an earlier receipt of the
approved ICPC would have had any bearing on the court’s
reasoning. See In re G.D., 2021 UT 19, ¶ 81, 491 P.3d 867 (finding
that a juvenile court’s strictly necessary analysis was not deficient
where the court declined to “admit and consider the evidence [the
appellants] presented after trial” because neither Utah law nor
Utah caselaw “requires a juvenile court to consider supplemental
evidence that merely elaborates on a factor the court already
considered in its ‘strictly necessary’ analysis—especially when
that evidence does not address or refute the considerations on
which the court relied to reach its conclusion”).

¶28 Relatedly, Father glosses over the import of an approved
ICPC. While an approved ICPC is a precursor to any out-of-state
placement, an approved ICPC does not guarantee placement.
After a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile
court must “determine whether there is a relative . . . who is able
and willing to care for the child.” Utah Code § 80-3-302(6)(a). If
the court identifies an out-of-state relative as a potential
placement, the court must comply with the procedures and
requirements outlined in the ICPC before ordering that the child
be placed in another state. See id. § 80-2-905. Following the
approval of an ICPC, the court “shall give preferential
consideration to a relative’s . . . request for placement of the child,
if the placement is in the best interest of the child.” Id. § 80-3-
302(7)(a)(i) (emphasis added). In other words, the plain language
of the statute “does not guarantee that an identified relative . . .
will receive custody of the child.” Id. § 80-3-302(18). Accordingly,
the court was not required to place Child with Aunt if doing so
was not in Child’s best interest. And as discussed below, the

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                              In re R.G.

court’s best interest analysis was adequate to foreclose placement
with Aunt.

¶29 Moreover, contrary to Father’s assertion, the juvenile court
properly considered feasible placement options other than
termination and adoption. As stated above, the court articulated
two reasons in support of its strictly necessary determination. In
addition to concluding that Aunt was legally barred as a
placement option because the ICPC was still pending, the court
found that placement with Aunt was not in Child’s best interest
because Child “has never met [Aunt] and [Aunt] has never
requested visits with her. [Child] has no familial relationship with
[Aunt].” On the facts of this case, this determination was not
erroneous.

¶30 Our legislature has expressed a strong preference for
maintaining familial bonds. To that end, a court may terminate a
parent’s rights only if termination is strictly necessary to promote
a child’s best interest. Courts ordering termination “must start the
best interest analysis from the legislatively mandated position
that ‘[w]herever possible, family life should be strengthened and
preserved.’” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 66, 472 P.3d 827 (quoting
Utah Code § 80-4-104(12)(a)). However, once a parent is found to
be unfit, a court may terminate the parent’s rights if doing so “is
strictly necessary for the welfare and best interest of the child.” Id.
¶ 62. At this stage, the court must “consider the welfare and best
interest of the child of paramount importance in determining
whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered.” Utah
Code § 80-4-104(12)(a).

¶31 In evaluating whether termination is strictly necessary, a
juvenile court must consider, “among other relevant factors,”
whether “the efforts to place the child with kin who have, or are
willing to come forward to care for the child, were given due
weight.” Id. § 80-4-104(12)(b)(ii). This requires the court to
“explore whether other feasible options exist that could address

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                             In re R.G.

the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of
imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights.”
In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 67 (quotation simplified). This inquiry
cannot be satisfied merely by relying on the “categorical concern”
that adoption offers the highest degree of permanency.” In re
J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 25. Instead, the court must analyze the
“particularized circumstances of the case” and explore whether
an alternative arrangement “can equally protect and benefit the
children in the case before it.” Id. (quotation simplified). And
“when two placement options would equally benefit a child, the
strictly necessary requirement operates as a preference for a
placement option that does not necessitate termination over an
option that does.” In re G.D., 2021 UT 19, ¶ 75.

¶32 Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding that
termination was strictly necessary because the court ignored that
Aunt “was the preferred placement” and instead relied on
“categorial concerns” to support its determination. However,
neither point is well taken, and the court’s rationale is sufficient
to justify its decision to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶33 Father asserts that Aunt “was the preferred placement”
because “[t]his is a case where both placement options would
equally benefit” Child and “placement with [Aunt] did not
necessitate termination of parental rights.” This assertion is
without merit. Our caselaw is clear that the preferential status
afforded to a placement option that does not necessitate
termination exists only where the two placement options “equally
benefit” the child. See id. But here, there is no evidence to suggest
that placement with Aunt would “equally benefit” Child.

¶34 Indeed, the juvenile court’s comprehensive termination
order included multiple findings concerning Aunt. Specifically,
the court found that Caseworker had contacted Aunt in May 2020
to start the ICPC process. Despite this contact, at the time of trial
approximately two years later, Aunt had “not request[ed] contact

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                            In re R.G.

with [Child] and [had] not met her.” Although Aunt may have
not been available as a placement option prior to approval of the
ICPC, nothing was preventing her from contacting Child and
forming a relationship with her. And given the duration of the
proceedings, Aunt was given ample time to do so.

¶35 Conversely, the juvenile court found that Child was in an
appropriate adoptive placement with Foster Family. Among
other things, Child had been living with Foster Family since
“shortly before she turned one month old,” and Child had
developed strong bonds with her foster sibling and two half-
siblings. Yet Father does not grapple with the import of these
relationships. Notably, Child is in a kinship placement with Foster
Family since Child’s biological half-siblings were adopted into
Foster Family. Moreover, as this court has recently recognized,
“the biological connection between siblings matters.” See In re
A.H., 2022 UT App 114, ¶ 42, 518 P.3d 993 (“The importance of
sibling relationships is well recognized by courts and social
science scholars, because a sibling relationship can be an
independent emotionally supporting factor for children in ways
quite distinctive from other relationships, and there are benefits
and experiences that a child reaps from a relationship with his or
her brother(s) or sister(s) which truly cannot be derived from any
other. Such bonds are often especially important to children who
experience chaotic circumstances like abuse or neglect, because in
such circumstances, they learn very early to depend on and
cooperate with each other to cope with their common problems.”
(quotation simplified)), cert. granted, 525 P.3d 1279 (Utah 2023).
Given the court’s competing findings about each potential
placement, we cannot say that placing Child with Aunt—an
individual she has never met—would equally benefit Child where
Child is already in a kinship placement with her half-siblings. As
a result, Aunt was not a preferred placement.

¶36 Moreover, the juvenile court did not merely rely on
categorical concerns when determining that termination was

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                              In re R.G.

strictly necessary. On this point, Father contends the court’s
decision was based on the categorical concern that removing a
child from a foster family with whom the child is bonded will
disrupt and negatively impact the child’s life. See id. ¶ 56. To be
sure, the court’s determination hinged in large part on Child’s
attachments to Foster Family, including to her two biological half-
siblings, and the potential detriment to Child that would result
from removal from that placement. However, the court’s
conclusion was also based on the fact that Aunt’s relationship
with Child was nonexistent and that placing Child with Aunt
would therefore be particularly destabilizing. Consideration of
the effects of a potential disruption, when based on case-specific
facts, is entirely proper. Indeed, courts are statutorily required to
consider continuity of care when determining whether to
terminate parental rights. See Utah Code § 80-4-303(1)(a)
(requiring courts to consider “the physical, mental, or emotional
condition and needs of the child”); id. § 80-4-304(5) (requiring
courts to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a
stable, satisfactory foster home and the desirability of the child
continuing to live in that environment”). And this court has
recently recognized as much, noting that the potential effect of
changing a placement is “a legitimate concern, and one that courts
should take into account.” In re A.H., 2022 UT App 114, ¶ 56. In
sum, the court’s determination here was not based on a
categorical concern inasmuch as the court considered case-
specific facts such as the impact of the potential disruption in light
of Child’s nonexistent relationship with Aunt.

¶37 Finally, and very importantly, even if Father is correct in
his assertion that the ICPC was completed before the termination
trial, the ICPC approval and resulting potential for placement
with Aunt was not the lynchpin of the juvenile court’s strictly
necessary determination. As discussed above, placement with
Aunt was not in the best interest of Child because of the
shortcomings in that option as identified by the court. And a
permanent guardianship with Foster Parents put in place to

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                             In re R.G.

preserve Father’s residual parental rights and ensure Child’s
connection to her half-siblings was also not in Child’s best interest
as the court identified significant problems with Father’s
continued parental connection to Child vis-à-vis Foster Family.
Specifically, the court found that Child had “already experienced
anxiety and night terrors during visits” with Father and that
Father’s “threats toward [Foster Family] and his propensity for
violence puts [Child and Foster Family] at risk.”

                          CONCLUSION

¶38 Father has not shown the juvenile court clearly erred in
determining that it was strictly necessary to terminate his parental
rights. Regardless of when the court received the approved ICPC,
it adequately considered the results. Further, an approved ICPC
does not guarantee placement, and Father has not demonstrated
that the court plainly erred when considering other feasible
placement options. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order
terminating Father’s parental rights.

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