Court Opinion

ID: 9900522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:02:20.714667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.152020
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                   HOLIFIELD, HACKEL, and BAKER
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                      v.

                   Emanuel R. SANTOS CRUZ
                   Corporal (E-4), U.S. Marine Corps
                               Appellant

                             No. 202200063

                        Decided: 11 September 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                            Military Judges:
                      Andrea C. Goode (arraignment)
                         Stephen F. Keane (trial)

 Sentence adjudged 3 December 2021 by a general court-martial con-
 vened at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of
 a military judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: re-
 duction to paygrade E-1, confinement for 56 months, and a dishonorable
 discharge. 1

                             For Appellant:
                Lieutenant Jackson M. Beach, JAGC, USN

 1 Appellant was credited with having served 296 days of pretrial confinement.
             United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                              Opinion of the Court

                                 For Appellee:
                   Lieutenant James P. Wu Zhu, JAGC, USN
                    Lieutenant R. Blake Royall, JAGC, USN

   Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge
   HOLIFIELD and Senior Judge HACKEL joined.

                            _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                            _________________________

BAKER, Judge:
    Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of
wrongful distribution of a controlled substance, one specification of possession
with intent to distribute, one specification of possession, one specification of
possessing a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, one specification
of possessing firearms not identified by a serial number, and three specifica-
tions of disorderly conduct, in violation of Articles 112a and 134, Uniform Code
of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 2 In his sole assignment of error [AOE], Appellant
asserts the Government violated his speedy trial rights under Article 10,
UCMJ, by confining him for 296 days before trial despite his demands for a
speedy trial. 3 We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

    On 23 December 2020, the Oceanside, California Police Department [OPD]
contacted Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] regarding its ongoing
investigation of Appellant. On 8 January 2021, NCIS joined the investigation.
On 13 and 15 January 2021, OPD conducted controlled purchases of unserial-
ized firearms and 3.5 grams of cocaine from Appellant. On 10 February 2021,
Appellant was apprehended and placed into pretrial confinement at the Ma-
rine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Brig.

   2 10 U.S.C. §§ 912a, 934 (the two specifications under Art. 134 were charged as

violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i), applicable through the Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act).
   3 10 U.S.C. § 810.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

A. Investigation
   NCIS agents secured a warrant to search Appellant’s residence on 4 Feb-
ruary 2021. On 10 February 2021, the same day Appellant was apprehended
and placed in pretrial confinement, his home and vehicle were searched and
some 27 pieces of evidence were seized. Shortly after his apprehension, NCIS
Special Agent Tango worked with an OPD detective to interview Appellant and
began reviewing and processing the seized evidence. 4 Special Agent Tango re-
ported that the complexity of the case increased due to working with civilian
law enforcement. Evidence previously seized by OPD was transferred to NCIS
on 18 February 2021.
    During February 2021, Special Agent Tango engaged with forensic consult-
ants to determine what evidence would be sent to the U.S. Army Criminal In-
vestigative Laboratory [USACIL] to be tested and analyzed. The USACIL has
a pre-submission process requiring NCIS to work with the lab to determine
what evidentiary items the lab will accept for examination. On 8, 15, and 21
April 2021, respectively, USACIL provided NCIS with an audio enhancement
of the recording from a controlled purchase, its completed analyses of latent
prints and controlled substances, and a firearms report.
   Early in March 2021, Special Agent Tango traveled to attend NCIS training
and was out of the office for seven days. Upon her return, she had to go into
quarantine due to COVID-19 exposure for an additional five days. She reported
that she continued to work on the investigation remotely during this period.
    From 4 to 22 March 2021, NCIS worked to extract information from Appel-
lant’s laptop computer. On 16 March 2021, NCIS issued its first interim Report
of Investigation [ROI]. In late March 2021, NCIS requested assistance from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives [ATF] to conduct a
database query of the firearms seized and to test a seized firearm suppressor.
    Special Agent Tango began the process of securing a command authoriza-
tion to search Appellant’s phone on 29 March 2021, which had been seized
along with other evidentiary items. Authorization was granted on 5 April 2021.
Shortly after that date, on 7 April 2021, the phone was delivered to the NCIS
Cyber Directorate. The NCIS Cyber Directorate was unable to break the en-

   4 All names used in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and

appellate counsel, are pseudonyms.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

cryption on all of the phone’s contents. However, the Cyber Directorate did re-
cover and extract some 35,670 unencrypted Snapchat messages. NCIS issued
its second ROI on 13 April 2021.
   Special Agent Tango received a spreadsheet version of the recovered mes-
sages from the NCIS Cyber Directorate on 27 April 2021 and, on 29 April 2021,
began her review. She reported reviewing several hundred Snapchat messages
per day. Special Agent Tango’s Supervisory Special Agent testified that this
manner of manual searching, while slower than a keyword or similar search
process, is a best practice. During Special Agent Tango’s search she identified
contacts suspected of being Marines. Among those identified by Special Agent
Tango was a Marine interviewed by NCIS on 3 June 2021, who reported pur-
chasing cocaine, marijuana, lysergic acid diethylamide, Percocet, and a firearm
from Appellant. Special Agent Tango completed her review of the Snapchat
messages by 24 June 2021.

B. Charges, Preliminary Hearings, and Referral of Charges
    Concurrent with the then-ongoing investigation, on 4 March 2021 the
United States preferred a single charge and specification against Appellant for
distributing cocaine (Charge Sheet 1). Then on 16 March 2021 an additional
charge, with three specifications of wrongful possession of a controlled sub-
stance, was preferred (Charge Sheet 2). On 18 March 2021 a second additional
charge was preferred with three specifications for wrongful possession of un-
serialized firearms (Charge Sheet 3). The Government dismissed specifications
1 and 3 of the additional charge (Charge Sheet 2) and specification 3 of the
second additional charge (Charge Sheet 3) on 16 April 2021. On the same day,
the Government preferred a third additional charge with two specifications for
wrongful possession of a controlled substance (Charge Sheet 4). On 30 April
2021, the Government dismissed all of the remaining charges on Charge
Sheets 1-4, and preferred new charges (Charge Sheet 5).
    This case involved two preliminary hearings, the first of which was sched-
uled for 19 March 2021. After multiple defense continuance requests, the pre-
liminary hearing was ultimately rescheduled for 21 April 2021, and the con-
vening authority granted 32 days of delay attributable to the defense. Appel-
lant then waived his preliminary hearing on the initial charges (Charge Sheets
1, 2, 3, and 4), and later waived the preliminary hearing on Charge Sheet 5, on
20 April 2021, and 4 May 2021, respectively.
   The convening authority referred charges on Charge Sheet 5 to a general
court-martial on 21 May 2021. The military judge issued a Trial Management
Order on 25 May 2021 with trial scheduled for the week of 20 September 2021.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

Appellant was arraigned on 27 May 2021, at which point he had been in pre-
trial confinement for 106 days. 5
    The Government dismissed all charges and specifications of Charge Sheet
5 without prejudice on 28 June 2021, and preferred Charge Sheet 6 on 14 July
2021. Prior to preferral of Charge Sheet 6, trial counsel requested 30 days of
excludable delay from the convening authority on 8 July 2021, which the con-
vening authority granted on 13 July 2021. On 16 July 2021, a preliminary
hearing was held and the hearing officer found probable cause. On 21 July
2021, the convening authority referred Charge Sheet 6 to a general court-mar-
tial. Appellant was arraigned on Charge Sheet 6 on 27 July 2021. Appellant
had been in pretrial confinement for 167 days.
    The military judge issued a new Trial Management Order on 27 July 2021.
The parties agreed to a schedule that included a motions hearing on 21 October
2021, and trial dates for the week of 29 November 2021. 6 Appellant entered
into a plea agreement on 1 November 2021, which was approved by the con-
vening authority on 3 November 2021. In accordance with the plea agreement,
a final additional charge, with two specifications of Article 134 (disorderly con-
duct), was referred on 22 November 2021 (Charge Sheet 7). At this point, Ap-
pellant had been in pretrial confinement for 285 days. Appellant pleaded guilty
pursuant to the plea agreement and was sentenced on 3 December 2021, 296
days after he was placed in pretrial confinement.

C. Speedy Trial Demands and Defense Motion to Dismiss
   Appellant submitted two demands for a speedy trial. The first was included
with his civilian defense counsel’s Notice of Representation dated March 4,
2021. He renewed his demand on 9 July 2021. Appellant also filed a motion to
dismiss due to violations of Article 10, UCMJ, and Rule for Courts-Martial
[R.C.M.] 707 on 4 October 2021. Oral Argument was held on 21 October 2021;
the military judge denied the motion via a written ruling on 18 November
2021. 7 In his written ruling denying the defense motion to dismiss for speedy

   5 This was the first of two arraignments.

   6 Government reported originally proposing trial dates that aligned with an unex-

ecuted TMO: 22 and 25 to 29 October 2021. See App. Gov. Br. at 25. See also App. Ex.
VII at 121-122.
   7 App. Ex. XLVIII. During the 3 December 2021, Art. 39(a), UCMJ, session the

military judge also indicated that he was denying the defense motion for additional
confinement credit for claimed violations of Article 13, UCMJ.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

trial, the military judge concluded that the Government had exercised reason-
able diligence in bringing Appellant to trial. 8
   Additional facts necessary to resolve the AOE are discussed below.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

    “[A] litigated speedy trial motion under Article 10 is not waived by a sub-
sequent unconditional guilty plea.” 9 We review Article 10, UCMJ, speedy trial
claims de novo. 10 Article 10 demands that when a servicemember is placed in
pretrial confinement, “immediate steps shall be taken . . . to try the person or
to dismiss the charges and release the person.” In reviewing Article 10 claims,
courts do not require “constant motion” from the Government, but do require
“reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial.” 11 This “duty imposed on
the Government immediately to try an accused who is placed in pretrial con-
finement does not terminate simply because the accused is arraigned.” 12 Ra-
ther, it extends to “at least the taking of evidence.” 13
    In conducting our review, we give substantial deference to the military
judge’s findings of fact, reversing only if they are clearly erroneous. 14 Here we
find no clear error in the military judge’s findings of fact. 15 Based upon the
submissions from the Government and Defense, he created a timeline laying
out the dates from Appellant being placed in pretrial confinement on 10 Feb-
ruary 2021, through the 27 July 2021, arraignment. 16 He further provided a
summary of the investigation and other dates relevant to the ruling. 17 As these

   8 App. Ex. XLVII at 9. The military judge concluded there was no violation of Arti-

cle 10, UCMJ, or R.C.M. 707.
   9 United States v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122, 127 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

   10 United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54, 58 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

   11 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 127 (quoting United States v. Tibbs, 15 C.M.A. at 353).

   12 Cooper, 58 M.J. at 60.

   13 Id.

   14 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 127.

   15 App. Ex. XLVII at 1-4.

   16 At which point Appellant had been in pretrial confinement for 167 days.

   17 App. Ex. XLVII at 1-4.

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             United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                              Opinion of the Court

dates are firmly established by the record, we find no cause to find that they
are “clearly erroneous.”
    “Our framework to determine whether the Government proceeded with
reasonable diligence includes balancing the following four factors: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the Appellant
made a demand for speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the Appellant.” 18

A. Length of Delay
    The length of delay constitutes a triggering mechanism under Article 10. 19
Here, Appellant spent 296 days in pretrial confinement. We conclude this delay
is sufficient to trigger a full analysis using the remaining factors.

B. Reasons for the Delay
    For this factor, “different weights should be assigned to different rea-
sons.” 20 First, a deliberate effort by the Government to delay the trial in order
to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the Government. 21 “[M]ore neu-
tral reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts also weigh against the
Government, though less heavily.” 22 “[A] valid reason, such as a missing wit-
ness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” 23 In addition, “the Government
has the right (if not the obligation) to thoroughly investigate a case before pro-
ceeding to trial.” 24 In contrast, “delay caused by the defense weighs against the

   18 United States v. Wilson, 72 M.J. 347, 351 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (quoting Mizgala, 61

M.J. at 129 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972))).
   19 United States v. Thompson, 68 M.J. 308, 312 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (holding that the

145-day period the appellant spent in pretrial confinement was sufficient to trigger an
Article 10 inquiry); United States v. Cossio, 64 M.J. 254, 257 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (holding
that a 117-day period of pretrial confinement triggered a full Article 10 inquiry).
   20 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

   21 Id.

   22 United States v. Cooley, 75 M.J. 247, 260 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing Barker, 407 U.S.

at 531) (alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
   23 Id.

   24 Cossio, 64 M.J. at 258.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

defendant.” 25 So, “outside of an explicit delay caused by the defense, the Gov-
ernment bears the burden to demonstrate and explain reasonable diligence in
moving its case forward in response to a motion to dismiss.” 26
   The delay in this case was almost entirely attributable to the Government,
excepting 32 days from 19 March to 20 April 2021, during which the Defense
requested delays prior to the first scheduled preliminary hearing. As such, the
Government bears the burden of demonstrating reasonable diligence for 264
days.
    In his ruling, the military judge found that the “[G]overnment acted with
reasonable diligence in bringing the Accused to trial.” 27 In support of this con-
clusion, the military judge concluded that there was a “certain amount of com-
plexity involved with the investigation.” 28 He added that there was voluminous
seized physical and electronic evidence to examine and new evidence was in-
troduced by a co-conspirator, who wasn’t identified until June 2021. 29 It is well
established that the delay that courts will tolerate for a serious complex crime
is considerably more than that for an ordinary street crime. 30
   NCIS investigators took significant investigative steps from February to
June 2021. They prepared two ROIs, dated 16 March 2021 and 13 April 2021.
They engaged in the preliminary process with USACIL to provide evidence for
analysis, and received responses from USACIL on 8, 15, and 27 April 2021.
NCIS provided evidence to ATF for analysis. After receiving a command au-
thorization for search and seizure, NCIS provided Appellant’s phone to the
NCIS Cyber Directorate on 7 April 2021. NCIS Cyber Directorate provided a
spreadsheet of the 35,670 Snapchat messages they extracted to Special Agent
Tango on 27 April 2021. Special Agent Tango then began the process of going
through several hundred messages per day, concluding her review on 24 June
2021. According to Special Agent Tango’s Supervisory Special Agent, while
more time-consuming, individually reviewing messages in this manner is a
best practice. As a result of Special Agent Tango’s review, additional investi-
gative steps were pursued, including an interview on 3 June 2021 of a Marine

   25 Cooley, 75 M.J. at 260 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972)).

   26 Id. (citing Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 125).

   27 App. Ex. XLVII at 8.

   28 App. Ex. XLVII at 8.

   29 App. Ex. XLVII at 3, 8.

   30 Cooley, 75 M.J. at 260 (quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009)).

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             United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                              Opinion of the Court

who reported purchasing further controlled substances and a firearm from Ap-
pellant.
    During the investigation the Government concurrently took procedural ac-
tions necessary to get the case to trial, including the service of charges, discov-
ery, and coordination of preliminary hearings. The initial charge (Charge
Sheet 1) was preferred shortly after Appellant was placed in pretrial confine-
ment on 4 March 2021. Within a few weeks the additional charges contained
in Charge Sheets 2 and 3 were preferred. Then, on 16 April 2021, the third
additional charge sheet (Charge Sheet 4) was preferred. On 30 April 2021, the
Government dismissed the original charge and additional charges to this point
(Charge Sheets 1-4), and preferred another set of charges (Charge Sheet 5).
These charges (Charge Sheet 5) were referred to a general court-martial on 21
May 2021, and Appellant was arraigned on 27 May 2021.
    One month later, on 28 June 2021, the Government again withdrew and
dismissed all charges and specifications (Charge Sheet 5) without prejudice.
On 8 July 2021, trial counsel requested that the General Court-Martial Con-
vening Authority grant 30 days of excludable delay for purposes of R.C.M. 707,
listing the litany of investigative actions taken by NCIS after Appellant’s con-
finement, and describing myriad pending “major investigative steps.” 31 Appel-
lant objected to the General Court-Martial Convening Authority’s grant of ex-
cludable delay and repeated his requests for discovery and a speedy trial. 32
Over Defense objections, the General Court-Martial Convening Authority ap-
proved 30 days of excludable delay on 13 July 2021. 33 The Government pre-
ferred Charge Sheet 6 on 14 July 2021.
    A preliminary hearing was held on Charge Sheet 6 on 16 July 2021, and
the preliminary hearing officer issued his report on 21 July 2021. Charge Sheet
6 was referred to a general court-martial that same day. Appellant was ar-
raigned on 27 July 2021. On the day of the arraignment the military judge
issued a Trial Management Order with the agreement of the Government and
Defense. 34 Appellant did not object to the timeline contained within the Order,
although the Order provided that the trial would begin on 29 November 2021
– 125 days after the date of arraignment, and 292 days since the initiation of

   31 App. Ex. III at 99-100.

   32 App. Ex. III at 94-96.

   33 App. Ex. III at 98.

   34 App. Ex. V.

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              United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                               Opinion of the Court

pretrial confinement. On 4 October 2021, the Defense filed a motion to dismiss
for violations of Appellant’s right to a speedy trial. 35
    We agree with the military judge’s analysis of this portion of the timeline—
the case was substantially complex, involving new evidence introduced follow-
ing an investigatory interview and search in early June, and voluminous phys-
ical and electronic evidence. The many investigative steps of this investigation
were both practical and necessary, particularly given the complex nature of the
charges and evidence. Moreover, the pace at which they were accomplished
shows reasonable diligence on the part of law enforcement. And once the in-
vestigation was completed, the Government moved expeditiously to prefer the
ultimate charges (Charge Sheet 6). 36 The timeline reveals no significant gaps
or inactivity in the law enforcement investigation or trial counsel’s efforts. 37
Arguably, NCIS could have hastened its investigation by sooner seeking au-
thorization to seize and search Appellant’s phone or assigning additional per-
sonnel to review the thousands of messages found on it, and thereby acceler-
ated the Government’s preferral actions. However, the requirement is not for
maximum possible speed, but for reasonable diligence, which we find here.
    Similarly, we also find the subsequent delay from arraignment until trial
to be reasonable. Following arraignment, “a change in the speedy-trial land-
scape has taken place. This is because after arraignment, ‘the power of the
military judge to process the case increases, and the power of the [Government]
to affect the case decreases.’” 38 In short, once Appellant was arraigned, the mil-
itary judge had the “power and responsibility to force the Government to pro-
ceed with its case if justice so require[d].” 39
    In the Trial Management Order, issued by the military judge on 27 July
2021, he scheduled Appellant’s trial to begin on 29 November 2021, 125 days
after his arraignment. During this period, the military judge held the parties
accountable for trial milestones and demonstrated an urgency towards motions
practice, including holding a robust Article 39(a) session to cover a number of

    35 App. Ex. II.

    36 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129.

    37 Id. at 127 (Short periods of inactivity are not fatal to an otherwise active prose-

cution.) (citing Tibbs, 15 C.M.A. at 353).
    38Cooper, 58 M.J. at 60 (quoting United States v. Doty, 51 M.J. 464, 465-66
(C.A.A.F. 1999)) (alternation in original).
    39 Id.

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             United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                              Opinion of the Court

motions. As such, the record is clear that the military judge firmly and effec-
tively kept the Government on task in accordance with the trial dates and mile-
stones—to which Appellant offered no objections or reservations. In fact, due
to civilian counsel’s schedule, Appellant requested a later trial date than that
proposed by the Government. 40
    Viewing the entire period of delay, we agree with the military judge that
the length of delay is reasonable. The pace of the Government’s actions was
not for the purpose of delaying trial or increasing the amount of time Appellant
spent in pretrial confinement. We find that the reasons for the delay in this
case were reasonable and that this factor favors the Government.

C. Demand for Speedy Trial
    “The [Accused’s] assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the [Accused] is deprived of the
right.” 41 Appellant made his first demand for a speedy trial in his civilian coun-
sel’s Notice of Legal Representation letter dated 4 March 2021. 42 The letter’s
penultimate paragraph concludes with: “My client demands speedy trial.” 43
The Defense renewed Appellant’s demand for a speedy trial on 9 July 2021, at
which point he had been in pretrial confinement for 149 days. While we con-
clude that this factor favors the Defense, the fact Appellant requested several
delays gives this factor slight weight.

D. Prejudice to Appellant
    “Prejudice . . . should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.” 44 We, therefore, examine
the question of prejudice in light of three important interests the Supreme
Court identified in Barker: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern; and (3) to limit the possibility that the
Defense will be impaired. 45 “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the

   40 App.Ex. II at 12.

   41 Wilson, 72   M.J. at 353 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 17 M.J. 255, 259
(C.M.A. 1984)).
   42 App. Ex. III at 3.

   43 Id.

   44 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).

   45 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.

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             United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                              Opinion of the Court

inability of [an accused] adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.” 46
    Appellant contends that he suffered oppressive pretrial confinement condi-
tions. 47 Before trial, Defense filed a motion for appropriate relief, alleging vio-
lations of Article 13, UCMJ, for illegal pretrial punishment. 48 The military
judge concluded that the defense did not meet its burden in establishing an
Article 13 violation. Appellant later agreed that his Article 13, UCMJ, claim
was waived by his unconditional guilty plea. 49 We concur with the military
judge; the conditions of confinement were not oppressive. We also conclude that
the length of Appellant’s pretrial confinement was not oppressive. 50 This factor
favors the Government.
    Appellant further contends that he suffered unwarranted anxiety and con-
cern as a result of the length of his pretrial confinement and the number of
charge sheets preferred by the Government. But Appellant fails to articulate
how the Government’s practice of continuing to prefer and refer charges until
just prior to his arraignment on 27 July 2021 equates to particularized anxiety.
Appellant cannot reasonably argue that he was unaware of the general nature
of the charges, despite the Government’s disjointed efforts to perfect its case
prior to arraignment. Further, in addition to detailed military defense counsel,
Appellant had legal representation by civilian defense counsel from 4 March
2021 through both of his arraignments, pretrial motions, plea negotiations,
and eventual conviction and sentencing. 51 We do not find that the anxiety and
concern caused by Appellant’s pretrial confinement exceeded the norm. 52 This
factor also favors the Government.
   As to the final Barker prong, impairment of the Defense, the Defense con-
ceded that “Appellant makes no specific claim of impairment of the defense”

   46 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).

   47 See App. Ex. XII. Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief (Article 13: Illegal Pre-

trial Punishment).
   48 App. Ex. XII.

   49 R. at 289-290; R. at 299-304; App. Ex. LV at 4.

   50 App. Ex. XLVII at 8. Cossio, 64 M.J. at 257. See also, Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129

(finding conditions of confinement were not unduly harsh or oppressive).
   51 App. Ex. III at 3.

   52 Mizgala, 61 M.J. at 129.

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            United States v. Santos Cruz, NMCCA No. 202200063
                             Opinion of the Court

and, other than time, provided no argument in support of such impairment. 53
While we concur that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not es-
sential to every speedy trial claim,” 54 we note that neither this Court, nor our
Superior Court, has ever “held that the mere fact of pretrial confinement con-
stitutes prejudice.” 55 Additionally, there is no indication of any loss of evidence
or impact to the preparation of Appellant’s case. 56 Accordingly, this factor, too,
favors the Government.
    Balancing these factors, we conclude that Appellant was not denied his
right to a speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ.

                                III. CONCLUSION

    After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the approved findings and sentence are correct in law
and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial
rights occurred. 57 The findings and sentence as approved by the convening au-
thority are AFFIRMED.

                                  FOR THE COURT:

                                  MARK K. JAMISON
                                  Clerk of Court

   53 App. Def. Br. at 21.

   54 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654-55 (1992).

   55 Cooley, 75 M.J. at 262.

   56 United States v. Danylo, 73 M.J. 183, 189 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

   57 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866.

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