Court Opinion

ID: 9788883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:21:35.867244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.158399
License: Public Domain

Justice EISMANN,
Dissenting.
Because the majority applies a different standard to the Industrial Commission’s exercise of its discretion than we have to district courts exercising their discretion in similar circumstances, I respectfully dissent.
This Court has adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which are intended to govern the procedure and apply uniformly in the courts throughout the state of Idaho. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that a party who claims costs may file and serve a memorandum of costs within fourteen days after entry of judgment and that the failure to do so timely constitutes a waiver of the costs. Rule 54(d)(6) provides that any party may object to the costs claimed by another party by filing and serving a motion to disallow costs within fourteen days of the service of the opposing party’s memorandum of costs and that the failure to timely object constitutes a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed. In Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 596 P.2d 798 (1979), this Court upheld a district court's consideration of an untimely motion to disallow costs, stating that the time period for objecting to costs claimed may be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court. Likewise, in Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), this Court upheld a district court’s allowance of an untimely request for attorney fees by the filing of an amended memorandum of costs. Citing Wheeler v. McIntyre, this Court stated that the time periods allowed under Rule 54 may be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court and that there was no harm or prejudice shown to the other party. We held that there was no abuse of discretion and no error. In Crowley v. Lafayette Life Insurance Company, 106 Idaho 818, 683 P.2d 854 (1984), this Court cited Wheeler v. McIntyre when upholding a prematurely-filed memorandum of costs. When doing so, this Court stated, “The Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to renounce the strict rules of Code pleading which existed at common law.” 106 Idaho at 823, 683 P.2d at 859.
Although the Industrial Commission has adopted Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers’ Compensation Law to govern cases arising within its jurisdiction under the Idaho Workers’ Compensation Law, those rules, unlike our rules of civil procedure, do not provide any time limit within which a prevailing party must submit a request for costs and attorney fees. Therefore, any such time limit is imposed on a case-by-case basis within the discretion of the Commission. If the Commission had the discretion to initially direct that the memorandum of costs and attorney fees and a supporting affidavit be submitted within ten days, it also had the discretion to extend that time.
In this case, the employer Steve Neibaur has not argued or even alleged that he was prejudiced by the failure of the claimant’s attorney to file the memorandum of costs in a timely manner. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how the employer could be prejudiced. Absent any prejudice to the employer, I would hold that the Industrial Commission had the discretion to extend the time limit it imposed and that its doing so, even without good cause shown by the claimant’s attorney, was not an abuse of discretion. We did not require a showing of good cause in Wheeler v. McIntyre or in Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, and in both of those cases there was a court rule of general application setting forth the applicable time limits. Because there is no comparable rule setting the time limit for filing and serving a *771memorandum of costs in cases before the Industrial Commission, it should have at least as much, not less, discretion than our district courts when faced with an untimely request for or objection to costs and attorney fees. The Commission has the discretion to fix the amount of a reasonable attorney fee, Swett v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 385 (2001), and the $250 award in this case is clearly not an abuse of its discretion.