Court Opinion

ID: 9704674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:42:47.739914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.360198
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
In this case, we are asked to decide if evidence obtained from the defendant’s car during an inventory of its contents after impoundment was admissible. The car was impounded by the police after the defendant was arrested by the Grand Rapids Police Department at the Kent County Airport. The police had been alerted by authorities in San Diego, California, that the package picked up by the defendant contained cocaine. *683The car was parked by the air freight office and the defendant’s purse was left on the front seat of the car. The trial court in this case found the evidence admissible, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was unlawfully obtained in an improper impoundment.
We affirm the trial court’s determination that the impoundment and inventory of Sandra Krezen’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that therefore the cocaine found in her purse consequent to the inventory was validly admitted into evidence. The impoundment in this case was in accord with departmental procedures, the departmental procedures were within the constitutionally mandated power of the municipality, and no violation of the state or federal constitution occurred. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the trial court’s admission of the evidence obtained during the inventory of Krezen’s car is reinstated.
I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS NOT VIOLATED BY THE POLICE IMPOUNDMENT AND INVENTORY OF KREZEN’S CAR
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364; 96 S Ct 3092; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), the United States Supreme Court upheld an inventory of a lawfully *684impounded vehicle.1 The police inventoried the car according to standard procedure, after observing a "number of valuables inside the car” in plain view. Id., pp 375-376. The inventory was seen as a care-taking function rather than an investigative search. A majority of the Court found that the police conduct2 was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether the warrantless inventory in Opperman was unconstitutional, the Court looked "to all the facts and circumstances of this case,” Cooper v California, 386 US 58, 59; 87 S Ct 788; 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967), to determine that the police conduct was not "unreasonable”:
The inventory itself was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the car. As in Cady [v Dombrowski, 413 US 433; 93 S Ct 2523; 37 L Ed 2d 706 (1973)], there is no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. [428 US 375-376.]_
*685The actual inventory in the instant case was carried out in conformity with Opperman. The police acted according to departmental procedure, completing a standard inventory form. Furthermore, the defendant’s purse was located in plain view on the front seat of the car. The inventory " 'was a routine administrative caretaking function performed pursuant to standard departmental procedures ....’” People v Long (On Remand), 419 Mich 636, 647; 359 NW2d 194 (1984).
The true issue is whether the initial impoundment of Krezen’s car was a constitutional violation. The impoundment occurred within the context of a standard departmental policy that, upon arrest of the driver, all vehicles not released to another driver were to be impounded. The defendant argues that the policy is unconstitutionally overbroad, since it does not allow an exercise of discretion by the officer.
The actual departmental policy is unclear. One officer testified that impoundment was required when the owner/driver is arrested "unless that car is released to another person by authority of the owner.” Another officer testified that when an arrest is made, the car is impounded "if it is not released to another party in the vehicle.” If the policy is written, it was never entered into evidence as an exhibit. The Court of Appeals decision described the Grand Rapids policy as "to impound and inventory all motor vehicles following the arrests of their drivers . . . .” 143 Mich App 34, 40; 371 NW2d 882 (1985).
If the departmental policy is indeed that all arrests require impoundment, regardless of the surrounding factual circumstances, there may well be situations in which an impoundment would violate the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable seizure. However, the actual policy is unclear, and *686the specific facts in this case render the impoundment decision eminently reasonable. Since this is not an alleged First Amendment violation, the reasonableness of the impoundment as applied to the facts of this case is what is determinative — the mere fact that the regulation might in some case be overbroad is not pertinent where the police activity vis-á-vis this defendant was constitutional. See, e.g., United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21; 80 S Ct 519; 4 L Ed 2d 524 (1960).
The simple fact that the impoundment occurred without a warrant does not make it unconstitutional per se. In Cooper v California, supra, p 59, the United States Supreme Court observed:
[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case[;] . . . searches of cars that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property.
While the issue in this case deals with impoundment — a species of "seizure” rather than of "search” — the analysis used in relation to searches is instructive.
In Cady, the Court upheld the "search” of the trunk of an automobile which, after being in an accident, was towed to a private garage. The search was instituted because the defendant was a Chicago policeman and the Wisconsin police did not want his service revolver, which might have been in the car, to fall into the wrong hands and endanger public safety. Id., p 443. In the course of looking for the revolver, the police found other incriminating evidence which led to the defendant’s conviction for murder. The Court deter*687mined that lack of a warrant was not fatal and that the trunk search was reasonable under the facts of the case:
The Court’s previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places leads us to conclude that the type of caretaking "search” conducted here of a vehicle that was neither in the custody nor on the premises of its owner, and that had been placed where it was by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely because a warrant had not been obtained. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general standard of "unreasonableness” as a guide in determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions . . . and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as this. Where, as here, the trunk of an automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, we hold that the search was not "unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id., pp 447-448.]
In the instant case, the impoundment of Krezen’s car without a warrant was not unreasonable per se. As in Cady, the car was not on the premises of its owner, and, once the arrest occurred, it was no longer in the owner’s actual possession. While "impounding” a house without a warrant just because the defendant was arrested outside of the house could, under certain circumstances, be unreasonable per se, a car is a different matter. Its very nature as a transportable nonfixed item makes it and its contents more subject to theft or damage. Cady, pp 441-442. A number of courts *688have recognized that the possibility of theft or vandalism is a valid reason for impounding a car upon the arrest of the driver, especially where no other person is present to take control of the car. See, e.g., United States v Staller, 616 F2d 1284 (CA 5, 1980); United States v Scott, 665 F2d 874 (CA 9, 1981); Cabbler v Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 528 F2d 1142 (CA 4, 1975); State v Sims, 426 So 2d 148 (La, 1983). Other courts have recognized that leaving a car parked in a private location may be a nuisance. United States v Brown, 787 F2d 929 (CA 4, 1986). The impoundment was a caretaking function rather than an investigative one, instituted according to standard departmental policy to protect the defendant and the police from unnecessary thefts, recriminations, and civil suits. The trial court found the following as true:
It is the opinion of this Court that the search of the vehicle was an inventory search and obviated the need for a warrant; that the reason for the search was to protect the items from being stolen or protect the police against any claims of loss or stolen property; that it was not for the pretext of trying to unearth any further criminal activity upon the part of the Defendant.
The impoundment, even without a warrant, was likewise not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.3 As the people describe in brief:
The officers were arresting the defendant prop*689erly for a serious felony. It was Saturday morning. They knew the defendant would not be arraigned until Monday. Her car was parked away from the main part of the airport. Her purse was plainly visible on the front seat of her car. The officers had been sued in the past for not following police policy in this area. How can the actions of the police in impounding the defendant’s vehicle and conducting an inventory of its contents, under all these circumstances, be held unreasonable?
The Court of Appeals was concerned that a less intrusive means could have been used to obtain the same insurance against theft, vandalism, and suit against the police. People v Krezen, 143 Mich App 41-42. However, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Cady, supra, p 447, "[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.” See also United States v Sharpe, 470 US 675, 687; 105 S Ct 1568; 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985).
The impoundment of Krezen’s car in this case was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable given the surrounding circumstances.4 Therefore, it did not *690violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5
II. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE IMPOUNDMENT AND INVENTORY OF KREZEN’S CAR
Once it has been determined that the federal constitution does not require suppression of the cocaine residue found in Krezen’s purse, the plain language of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 prohibits exclusion of the evidence under the Michigan Constitution:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, ñrearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.
While some state courts have construed their state constitutions as barring evidence obtained in inventory searches valid under the federal constitution,6 the plain language of art 1, § 11 prohibits such a result: “The provisions of this section shall *691not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.” Cocaine was discovered in an inventory of Krezen’s car which occurred at the Grand Rapids airport. Thus, there is no basis for excluding this evidence under the Michigan Constitution.
III. THE GRAND RAPIDS POLICE HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOUND KREZEN’S CAR
The officers acted in conformity with the standard procedure of the police department of impounding all vehicles where the defendant was placed under arrest and there was no other driver present in the vehicle to take control of the vehicle. The reason for this policy, according to the officers who testified at the suppression hearing, was to protect officers7 from claims filed by persons *692who suffered, or claimed to have suffered, thefts or other losses involving vehicles not impounded while the driver was under arrest.8 Under our constitution, the powers granted generally to municipalities, and the specific powers granted by the Grand Rapids charter to its police, the Grand Rapids police had basic authority to impound the car of Sandra Krezen.9
*693Const 1963, art 7, §21 requires the Legislature to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages:
The legislature shall provide by general laws for the incorporation of cities and villages. Such laws shall limit their rate of ad valorem property taxation for municipal purposes, and restrict the power of cities and villages to borrow money and contract debts. Each city and village is granted power to levy other taxes for public purposes, subject to limitations and prohibitions provided by this constitution or by law.
The Legislature has indeed provided for the incorporation of villages, MCL 61.1; MSA 5.1201, cities of the fourth class, MCL 81.2; MSA 5.1592, and cities of the fifth class and home rule cities, MCL 117.7; MSA 5.2086. For villages10 and fourth *694class cities,11 the Legislature specifically provides statutes delineating the authority of the local governing bodies over their police and the general powers of the police. For fifth class and home rule cities, the Legislature provides two relevant provisions. First, MCL 117.3(j); MSA 5.2073(j) provides that a mandatory charter provision is "[f]or the public peace and health and for the safety of persons and property.” MCL 117.4j; MSA 5.2083 provides more generally for municipal powers:
Each city may in its charter provide:
(1) For the establishment of any department that it may deem necessary for the general wel*695fare of the city, and for the separate incorporation thereof: Provided, however, That these provisions shall not be construed to extend to and include public schools;
(2) For altering, amending or repealing any special act affecting any municipal concerns or existing municipal department, but the department in control of the public schools shall not be construed to be a municipal department;
(3) For the exercise of all municipal powers in the management and control of municipal property and in the administration of the municipal government, whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants and through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns subject to the constitution and general laws of this state. [Emphasis added.]
The general grant of power to municipalities which is authorized by Const 1963, art 7, § 21, and which is activated in the various state statutes concerning the charters for local municipalities, is further highlighted in Const 1963, art 7, § 22:
Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section.
There is simply no basis to assume that Grand *696Rapids does not have the power to authorize, implicitly or expressly, its police department to engage in activities incident to valid arrests such as impounding vehicles. Art 7, § 22 expressly states that such cities "have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law.” The Convention Comment to art 7, § 22 states that "[t]he new language is a more positive statement of municipal powers, giving home rule cities and villages full power over their own property and government, subject to this constitution and law.”
The Grand Rapids City Charter establishes the city manager as the director of public safety, in charge of the police department. Grand Rapids Charter, § 96(a). The city manager "shall prescribe all rules and regulations for the control and management of the police force ....”§ 96(d). Most important is the general grant of authority given by the charter to police officers:
The Director of Public Safety and all City police officers and detectives shall have and possess the power and authority usually conferred upon metropolitan police. [§ 96(g).]
So long as the local municipalities and their agents, such as the police in the instant case, do not circumvent the constitution or a preeminent state statute, the constitutional authority of the municipality is not abridged. Absent such a violation, this Court cannot hinder the local government’s exercise of the police power. In the instant case, the parties have not briefed or argued whether or not the Grand Rapids police possess *697the basic power to impound cars.12 Given the constitutional framework and the apparent grants of authority to the police, there is no basis in this case for abridging that authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
There was no constitutional or statutory violation by the Grand Rapids police in their impoundment and inventory of Sandra Krezen’s car. Under the facts of this case, the police activity was reasonable. The impoundment and inventory were part of a normal caretaking function, carried out pursuant to standard departmental policy which was within the constitutionally mandated authority of the municipal government. We would, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction.
Brickley and Riley, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 The Court discussed some of the typical circumstances in which impoundments occur:
In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called "community caretaking functions,” Cady v Dombrowski [413 US 433, 441; 99 S Ct 2523; 37 L Ed 2d 706 (1973)], automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge. [Id., pp 368-369. Citations omitted.]

 The Opperman Court did not determine whether the inventory was a "search.” 428 US 370, n 6.

 Even if we were to hold that the police should have left Krezen’s car in the parking lot, the police could not have reasonably left her purse sitting in plain view on the front seat. The purse would most likely have been returned to Krezen’s possession, which would require a protective search for weapons at the site of the arrest and an inventory search at the station subsequent to her booking, see Illinois v Lafayette, 462 US 640; 103 S Ct 2605; 77 L Ed 2d 65 (1983).

 Krezen was not parked in the long-term parking lot at the Kent County Airport — she parked outside the air freight offices, housed in a building only one-hundred feet long. While she originally testified that the parking area was "huge,” she later said that no more than around seven cars — a few cars — were parked there. She also said that she parked "directly in front of the air freight office.” The only inference to be drawn from the record is that this was a small parking area intended for vehicles parked temporarily while the drivers made a quick trip into one of the air cargo offices. No references in the record indicate that people customarily leave their cars there for days on end.
Justice Levin asserts that "[t]he 'caretaking’ rationale for impoundment is inapposite when the person arrested does not desire that the police safeguard the person’s property and accepts responsibility for possible losses.” The issue here is whether the police decision to impound the car was reasonable — the police purpose is certainly a relevant factor in such a determination. Had the trial court found *690that the impoundment was a pretext to search Krezen’s car, surely Justice Levin would consider the police purpose to be relevant in determining reasonableness.

 Justice Levin, p 717, misstates the holding of this opinion: that under the facts and circumstances in the instant case, the police conduct was not unreasonable under either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 6, § 1.

 See South Dakota v Opperman (On Remand), 247 NW2d 673 (SD, 1976); Wagner v Commonwealth, 581 SW2d 352 (Ky, 1979).

 Justice Levin asserts that there is no police liability under Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for lost or damaged property where the police make an arrest and fail to impound personal property. That question has, of course, not yet been decided by this Court, and its relevance relates to whether the police belief that there might be some form of civil liability adds to the reasonableness of the impoundment. The two officers in this case were sued for damage to an unimpounded car by a person arrested by them. Ironically, the officers failed to impound the car solely at the request of the arrestee. Furthermore, even if governmental immunity protected the officers from a state law tort claim for property damage or loss, it clearly cannot immunize them from suit under federal law. It is an understatement to observe that the current state of federal law is unclear on whether such an omission is a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws . . . .” 42 USC 1983. The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the absence of a state remedy because of sovereign immunity would make that remedy "inadequate” for § 1983 purposes. Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, —, n 1; 106 S Ct 662, 669, n 1; 88 L Ed 2d 662, 669, n 1 (1986). Thus, under the circumstances of the instant case, the asserted fear of civil suit was hardly unreasonable. It hardly seems necessary to say that we are not holding "that unfounded police fear of civil suit justifies a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” (Levin, J., p 721, n 47.)

 Q. Are you familiar with occasions, sir, where members of the police department and perhaps people even in this very room have been sued for items that are missing from cars?
A. Very much so.
Q. Are you familiar specifically with someone in this courtroom that’s been sued for items that were alleged to be missing from a car that was not impounded?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Who would that be, sir?
A. Officer Price and also myself.
Q, You were part of that, too?
A. Yes, sir. It was erroneous, but I was named in the lawsuit.
Q. Was that a case where a vehicle was not impounded pursuant to the request of the person arrested?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
Q. And later allegations were made that items were missing from the car?
A. That is correct.
Q. And as a result, you and other members of the police department, the police department itself were all sued, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.

 This discussion is made necessary by Justice Levin’s view that the impoundment was improper because it was not authorized by statute or judicial decision. "In the absence of statutory authority, it becomes a matter for judicial or common-law decision whether the police are authorized to impound or move private property . . . .” (Post, p 714.)
No source of judicial power is cited in support of the imposition of Justice Levin’s proposed rule on the local governments of this state. Const 1963, art 6, § 1 vests “the judicial power of the state” in our judicial system. Justice Levin’s proposed rule is not, however, an exercise of a power vested in the judiciary. No violation of the state or federal constitutions by the Grand Rapids police is found to justify the proposed judicial alteration of an apparently reasonable police power regulation. Since the dispute here involves a local government official and a private citizen, this is not an application of a common-*693law determination of what is right and just between private individuals in respect to private disputes, Bugbee v Fowle, 277 Mich 485, 492; 269 NW 570 (1936).
While the rule proposed by Justice Levin is one which could appropriately be adopted by the Grand Rapids governing body, it is not one which this Court should impose on the municipality. "There may be some concern that the Legislature may not act quickly or at all, but that surely is not a proper basis for this Court acting in the name of the Legislature.” People v Gilbert, 414 Mich 191, 198; 324 NW2d 834 (1982) (Levin, J.).

 MCL 67.44; MSA 5.1328 provides:
The council of any village may provide for and establish a police force, and may authorize the president to appoint, by and with the consent of the council, from time to time, such number of policemen and night watchmen as they shall deem expedient for the good government of the village, and for the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants, and they may authorize the president of the village, in cases of emergency and danger, to appoint, temporarily, such number of policemen as in his judgment the occasion may require.
MCL 67.45; MSA 5.1329 provides:
The council shall make all necessary rules for the government of the police, and proscribe the powers and duties of *694policemen and watchmen, and they may invest them with such authority as may be necessary for the preservation of quiet and good order in the village.

 MCL 92.1; MSA 5.1749 provides:
The council of any city may provide, by ordinance, for a police force and for the appointment by the mayor of such number of policemen and nightwatchmen as they may think necessary for the good government of the city and for the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants; and may authorize the mayor to appoint special policemen from time to time, when in his judgment the emergency or necessity may so require.
MCL 92.2; MSA 5.1750 provides:
The council may make and establish rules for the regulation and government of the police, prescribing and defining the powers and duties of policemen and nightwatchmen, and shall prescribe and enforce such police regulations as will most effectually preserve the peace and good order of the city, preserve the inhabitants from personal violence, and protect public and private property from destruction by fire and from unlawful depredation. The mayor is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it necessary for the preservation of peace and good order in the city, to appoint and place on duty such number of temporary policemen as in his judgment the emergencies of the case may require; but such appointments, unless made in accordance with some ordinance or resolution of the council shall not continue longer than 3 days.

 Part IX of Justice Levin’s opinion relies predominantly upon his conclusion that the impoundment in the instant case was unlawful under Michigan common law. To the contrary, a majority of this Court agrees that the impoundment was within the lawful authority of the police.