Court Opinion

ID: 9633421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:46:55.371455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:35.329380
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.
— I dissent.
In this case the majority opinion gives no heed to the statutory provisions for judicial review. Sections 7090-7098 of the Business and Professions Code authorize the Registrar of Contractors to suspend the license of a contractor for specified misconduct, after notice and a hearing of “all relevant and competent evidence material to the issues.” Section 7099 provides that any decision of the Registrar “shall *821be subject to review by the- superior court” for which the party may “file his petition,” but is silent as to the scope of such review. It is not identified as certiorari, mandamus, or any other standard procedure set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure. Had the petitioner followed the statutory language he would have filed a petition for review in the superior court. It would not be unreasonable to infer that the Legislature intended a complete retrial in the superior court; the reference in section 7101 to “a judgment of suspension or cancellation of license by the superior court” seems to imply an independent judgment. Had certiorari review been intended one would look for a different terminology, such as “setting aside or affirming” the decision of the Registrar. This court, however, might have followed the Texas cases relied upon in the majority opinion in Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, ante, p. 790 [136 P.2d 304], and arrived at the conclusion that the Legislature did not mean trial de nova. There should at least have been an inquiry into the scope of the review intended by the Legislature.
If the majority opinion exemplifies the new system of trial de nova in mandamus proceedings it is at the opposite pole from Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners. Not only was the transcript of oral evidence before the board struck from the record, but the evidence before the board was reiterated in the trial court, contrary to the principles in the majority opinion in the Dare case and without regard for the rules set forth in that opinion regarding the admission of new evidence. There is no clue as to what would constitute an abuse of discretion. So much latitude has been given the trial court as to suggest that the problem whether a petitioner should be accorded a trial de nova or a review with the scope of a certiorari review is in effect shifted to the superior courts.
Gibson, O. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.