Court Opinion

ID: 9412788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:06:09.699259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:25.351694
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/1/23 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B325845
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. VA124544)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 EDWARDO ALFREDO
 RODRIGUEZ,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Edwardo Alfredo Rodriguez appeals the denial of his
petition for resentencing on his 2013 conviction of second degree
murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a); 189, subd. (b).) pursuant to
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).2 We affirm.

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

         2 Effective June 30, 2022 section 1175.95 was renumbered

section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58. §10).
       The facts underlying appellant’s conviction are derived
verbatim from our unpublished opinion affirming the conviction.
(People v. Rodriguez, May 27, 2014, B248552 [nonpub. opn.].) “At
about midnight on May 10, 2011, appellant and Eduardo ‘Dingo’
Gonzalez were driving in an Isuzu Trooper in South Gate when
they saw Guillermo Elisea. Gonzalez fatally shot Elisea twice in
the back and the Trooper sped away. [¶] Several weeks later,
the police went to Gonzalez’s residence and recovered a .40-
caliber pistol. Tests confirmed that expended casings and a
bullet found at the scene of the shooting were fired from the
pistol.
       “Following his arrest, appellant was placed in a cell along
with two sheriff's deputies posing as inmates. In a recorded
conversation that was played for the jury, appellant told the
deputies he was riding with his ‘brother’ Dingo when Dingo
spotted Elisea standing in front of an apartment building. Dingo
had been ‘hunting’ Elisea due to a dispute over a woman. Dingo
switched seats with appellant and shot Elisea multiple times in
the back before appellant drove away. Appellant took the
expended casings and flushed them down a toilet. He then
parked the Trooper in Riverside on property owned by his
girlfriend’s brother. Appellant also said the police found the
murder weapon when they searched Dingo’s house. [¶] The
police subsequently found the Trooper where appellant said he
had parked it.”
       A jury convicted appellant of second degree murder and
found true allegations that a principal personally used and
intentionally discharged a firearm in committing the offense (§§
12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The trial court sentenced him to 15
years to life in state prison.

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       In February 2022, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. Appellant’s petition alleged
among other things that “[a] complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against me that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . .”
       After counsel was appointed, the prosecution filed an
opposition to the petition on the ground that appellant had not
been tried on theories of felony murder or the natural probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice
might have been improperly imputed to him. For support, the
prosecution offered the jury instructions given at appellant’s
trial, which demonstrated he had been prosecuted on the theory
that he directly aided and abetted the murder of which he was
convicted and that no instructions on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine were given. The
trial court denied the petition on that ground.
       We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel filed a brief raising no issues
in accordance with People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo) and requested that we independently review the
record for error. We advised appellant of his right to personally
submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider.
Appellant subsequently filed a supplemental brief in which he
claims that the jury in his case was instructed on the natural and

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probable consequences theory of aider and abettor liability.3 The
record belies this claim.
       Section 1172.6 was enacted pursuant to Senate Bill (SB)
1437, which amended sections 188 and 189 to limit the reach of
the felony murder rule in cases of first and second degree murder
and eliminated the natural and probable consequences liability
for murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) Section
1172.6 was added to provide a procedure for convicted persons
who could not be convicted under the statutes as amended to
retroactively obtain relief. (Id., § 4.) To meet his burden under
the statute, appellant had to make a prima facie showing that all
of the components of section 1172.6, apply, i.e., that “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted
a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be
convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The
petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.”
       After receiving the petition and appointing counsel, the
trial court was required to evaluate the petition to determine
whether it set forth a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(a)-(c); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) This showing

      3 Because appellant filed a supplemental brief, we are

“required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that
brief and . . . issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 232.)

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is not made if “‘the record [of conviction], including the court’s
own documents, “contain[] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition . . . .”’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th, 952 971.)
If the record demonstrates that the petition fails as a matter of
law, the trial court may summarily deny it. (Id. at p. 974.)
       The trial court correctly found that appellant had failed to
set forth a prima facie case for resentencing relief under section
1172.6 because the record of his conviction conclusively
demonstrates he was neither tried nor convicted of murder on a
theory of imputed malice rather than actual or implied malice.
Appellant’s argument to the contrary misquotes CALJIC No.
3.00, which defines principals to crimes and makes no reference
to felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Although appellant notes that the instruction on malice
aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11) allowed the jury to find he acted
with implied malice if, among other things, the killing resulted
from an intentional act and “[t]he natural consequences of the act
[were] dangerous to human life,” this theory of second degree
implied malice murder remains valid notwithstanding the
changes effected by SB 1437. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th.
981, 990.)
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.
We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.                 YEGAN, J.

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                     Lee S. Tsao, Judge
            Superior Court County of Los Angeles
              ______________________________

     Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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