Court Opinion

ID: 9399135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 00:00:44.957277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.989816
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50611      Document: 00516772067         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/01/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                          FILED
                                                                    June 1, 2023
                                   No. 22-50611
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                          Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Robinson Mendoza-Gomez,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:22-CR-52-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:
          Defendant-Appellant Robinson Mendoza-Gomez (“Mendoza”)
   entered a guilty plea to assaulting, resisting, or impeding various officers or
   employees, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). Mendoza appeals the
   district court’s application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of
   justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). For
   the following reasons, we affirm Mendoza’s sentence.
Case: 22-50611        Document: 00516772067        Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/01/2023

                                    No. 22-50611

                           I.    Facts and Proceedings
          On or about December 14, 2021, U.S. Border Patrol agents observed
   approximately eleven suspected undocumented aliens walking north through
   the desert near Highway 90, at a location near Van Horn, Texas. Those
   agents responded to the area and detained several of the aliens, but a group
   of four escaped and began fleeing in another direction. A few minutes later,
   U.S. Border Patrol agent Valles made contact with the group and attempted
   to apprehend one of the suspected illegal aliens, later identified as Mendoza’s
   brother. As agent Valles was attempting to apprehend Mendoza’s brother, a
   second subject, later identified as Mendoza, stopped fleeing, turned around,
   and ran towards agent Valles. As Mendoza ran towards agent Valles, he
   yelled out “dejalo ir hijo de la chingada,” which translates to “let him go you
   son of a bitch.”
          Mendoza then tackled agent Valles and began striking him in the face
   and head, causing him to fall to the ground. While agent Valles was on the
   ground, Mendoza continued to strike him. Agent Valles then used his
   flashlight in self-defense, striking Mendoza twice in the head. As the attack
   continued, agent Valles dropped his flashlight to protect his head and face
   from the assault. Agent Valles then felt Mendoza’s hands drop towards the
   agent’s gun belt, causing him to roll towards his service weapon on his right
   side and to continue defending himself with his left hand. Agent Valles then
   pulled his service weapon and commanded Mendoza in Spanish to get off or
   he (Valles) would shoot Mendoza. At this time, two more U.S. Border Patrol
   agents arrived at the scene to assist agent Valles and were able to pull
   Mendoza off of him. Mendoza, however, ignored the commands from the
   agents and continued to resist. Eventually, Mendoza began to yell “ya ya”

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   which translates to “ok ok,” finally allowing agents to place him under arrest
   without further incident.
          The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated Mendoza’s base offense
   level as 10. The PSR applied a three-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.
   § 2A2.4(b)(1) for an offense involving physical contact, plus (1) a two-level
   increase under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4(b)(2) because the victim sustained bodily
   injury and (2) a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of
   justice. The PSR also included a three-level reduction for acceptance of
   responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The result was a total offense
   level of 14. With a criminal history category of I, the PSR determined that
   Mendoza’s Sentencing Guidelines range was fifteen to twenty-one months
   of imprisonment. Mendoza filed an objection to the PSR, specifically related
   to the application of the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
          At sentencing, Mendoza’s counsel again objected to the two-level
   enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1. Mendoza’s attorney
   contended that Mendoza’s conduct did not constitute obstruction of justice;
   that this enhancement should not apply automatically, simply because
   Mendoza assaulted a federal officer; and that the application of this
   enhancement constituted impermissible double counting. The district court
   overruled those objections, relying on the government’s statements and the
   response of the probation officer. After considering and weighing the
   sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court sentenced
   Mendoza to twenty-one months imprisonment. Mendoza timely filed a
   notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).
          Mendoza contends on appeal that that the district court clearly erred
   in applying a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1. Mendoza asserts that the
   imposition of the enhancement for obstruction of justice was erroneous
   because he did not obstruct the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of

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   his offense of conviction. He also claims that assaulting an officer to evade
   arrest is not the type of conduct to which § 3C1.1 is meant to apply. Mendoza
   finally contends that the application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4(a) to determine his
   base offense level and the enhancement under § 3C1.1 constituted
   impermissible double counting, but he concedes that such a contention is
   foreclosed by this circuit’s precedent.1
           The government insists that the district court plausibly found that
   Mendoza impeded the administration of justice when, after he fled into the
   desert, he returned to the scene to assault the border patrol agent who was
   attempting to arrest his brother. The government contends that Mendoza
   obstructed justice twice: first, when he impeded the arrest and administration
   of justice of his brother; then when he resisted his own apprehension, thus
   delaying his arrest. The government asserts that any potential sentencing
   error was harmless because Mendoza’s conduct also warranted a two-level
   enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a substantial
   risk of death or serious bodily harm to another while fleeing from law
   enforcement.
                                II.     Standard of Review
           This court reviews the district court’s interpretation and application
   of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual determination that
   Mendoza obstructed justice for clear error. United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d
   228, 233 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Wright, 496 F.3d 371, 374
   (5th Cir. 2007). There is no clear error if a factual finding is plausible in light

           _____________________
           1
             The Fifth Circuit has held that “double counting is prohibited only if the
   particular guidelines at issue specifically prohibit it.” United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d
   392, 403 (5th Cir. 2021). Mendoza “concedes that neither U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4 nor U.S.S.G.
   § 3C1.1 explicitly prohibits the application of both.” We shall therefore not address that
   argument here.

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   of the record as a whole. United States v. Castro, 843 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.
   2016). This court “will conclude that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous
   only if a review of all the evidence leaves [the court] with the definite and
   firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
   Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
                             III.    Law and Analysis
          Under § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s offense
   level is increased by two levels if he or she (1) “willfully obstructed or
   impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice
   with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
   offense of conviction and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the
   defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely
   related offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. To determine whether an enhancement
   applies, “courts must evaluate the acts or omissions of the defendant that
   occurred during the commission of the offense, the preparation for the
   offense of conviction, or the course of attempting to avoid detection or
   responsibility for the offense of conviction.” United States v. Southerland, 405
   F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
          Here, Mendoza contends that the application of § 3C1.1 was
   erroneous because (1) he did not impede or obstruct the administration of
   justice and (2) assaulting an officer to evade arrest is not the type of conduct
   targeted by § 3C1.1. Mendoza does not dispute the factual findings proposed
   by the PSR, which were adopted by the district court. He even concedes that
   the purpose of his assault was to “obstruct his brother’s and his detention for
   an immigration inspection.” He points out, however, that he was not charged
   with any other crime and that he “could not possibly have obstructed the
   investigation of the very act that was occurring.” Mendoza contends that
   when “the acts comprising the assault constitute the totality of the offense,

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   the offense level as determined in guidelines chapter 2 adequately captures
   the extent of the offense.” In other words, he claims that the base level
   offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) already factors in the act of
   obstructing or impeding a federal officer.
          The district court overruled Mendoza’s objection at sentencing for
   the reasons expressed by the government and by the U.S. Probation Officer
   in the presentencing report (“PSR”). During the proceedings, the
   government contended that Mendoza obstructed justice “by absconding
   while the agents were searching for him” and “while they were apprehending
   his brother.” The government asserted that, although 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)
   includes the word “impede,” it also includes the word “assault,” and
   Mendoza’s offense was assaultive in nature. The government therefore
   claimed that the obstruction of justice enhancement is not duplicative of, but
   is instead sufficiently related to, Mendoza’s “instant offense.” The PSR
   states that an enhancement is warranted because “[t]he defendant tackled
   and continuously struck the USBP agent that was attempting to arrest an
   individual who had fled from law enforcement officers.”
          On appeal, the government restates these contentions and clarifies
   that Mendoza obstructed justice (1) when he resisted his own arrest and (2)
   when he impeded the arrest of, and the administration of justice to his
   brother. The government asserts that the district court, in applying the
   enhancement, properly considered Mendoza’s obstructive conduct relating
   to his uncharged offense of illegal entry, as well as his brother’s offense of
   illegal entry. Each of these theories, which the district court adopted during
   sentencing, is examined below.
          A. Did Mendoza obstruct justice by impeding his own arrest?
          We turn first to whether Mendoza could have obstructed his own
   arrest with conduct leading up to and during his arrest, which included

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   fleeing from the U.S. Border Patrol, running back and yelling—in Spanish—
   “let him go you son of a bitch,” and assaulting agent Valles. Neither § 3C1.1
   nor its commentary specifies whether an arrest may be considered the
   “investigation,” “prosecution,” or “administration of justice” of the instant
   offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. In United States v. Chavarria,
   however, we took the position that an arrest “is an event that occurs during
   the investigation and prosecution of a case” and is thus “part of the
   administration of justice as to that case.” 377 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2004),
   judgment vacated on other grounds by, 543 U.S. 1111 (2005), judgment reinstated,
   162 F. App’x 306 (5th Cir. 2006). In doing so, we affirmed a § 3C1.1
   enhancement based on conduct that occurred while the defendant was being
   arrested. Id. It is therefore temporally possible for § 3C1.1 to apply both to
   conduct leading up to and during Mendoza’s arrest, because the arrest was
   part of the administration of justice in Mendoza’s case.
          We next consider whether the conduct leading up to and during
   Mendoza’s arrest is the type of conduct contemplated by § 3C1.1. The §
   3C1.1 commentary explains that obstructive conduct may warrant an
   enhancement “if the conduct was purposefully calculated, and likely, to
   thwart the investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction.”
   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.1. Mendoza insists that § 3C1.1 is inappropriate here
   because his conduct was spontaneous and thus lacked premeditation. It is
   true that a § 3C1.1 enhancement typically involves “egregiously wrongful
   behavior whose execution requires a significant amount of planning and
   presents an inherently high risk that justice will in fact be obstructed.” Greer,
   158 F.3d at 235 (emphasis added). In United States v. Greer, we
   distinguished decisions “made on the spur of the moment and reflect panic,
   confusion, or mistake” from “deliberate attempt[s] to obstruct justice.” Id.
   at 235. Note 4 to § 3C1.1’s commentary provides a non-exhaustive list of

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   examples of the types of conduct to which such an enhancement applies, and
   impeding an arrest is not included. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4.
          The commentary to § 3C1.1 provides, however, that “obstructive
   conduct can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and seriousness.”
   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3. Our recent precedent instructs district courts to
   focus on the intent underlying the obstructive conduct. For example, in
   Chavarria, we held that a defendant who verbally threatened a police officer
   with violence during his own arrest was subject to § 3C1.1. 377 F.3d at 480.
   We explained that this enhancement will apply “if a threat is made with the
   specific intent of obstructing or impeding the administration of justice in the
   case in which the arrest was made.” Id. We held that, in light of the
   defendant’s references to his gang affiliation and his history of violent
   conduct, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that the defendant’s
   threats were intended to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. Id.
   at 479–80.
          Here, it is helpful to think of Mendoza’s conduct in three parts: (1) his
   flight from the U.S. Border Patrol, (2) his return to the scene with oral threats
   to agent Valles; and (3) his tackling and continued striking of agent Valles.
   Given our precedent and § 3C1.1’s commentary that “avoiding or fleeing
   from arrest” does not usually warrant the application of § 3C1.1, Mendoza’s
   flight from the U.S. Border Patrol cannot be considered obstructive conduct
   under § 3C1.1. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5(D). Instead, Mendoza’s flight was
   a “spur of the moment” decision that “reflect[ed] panic.” Greer, 158 F.3d at
   235. Categorizing Parts 2 and 3 of Mendoza’s conduct is less straightforward.
          As explained above, it is possible for a defendant to obstruct a
   defendant’s own arrest as long as he or she “had the specific intent of
   obstructing the administration of justice in the case in which the arrest was
   made.” Chavarria, 377 F.3d at 480. However, unlike the defendant in

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   Chavarria, the shouting of “let him go you son of a bitch,” in Spanish, does
   not relate to Mendoza’s imminent arrest—only to his brother’s. The district
   court did not address this theory in depth at the sentencing, only “agree[ing]
   with the Government with the response of the U.S. Probation Officer.”
   Neither the government nor Mendoza’s counsel explored this issue during
   sentencing. Moreover, the PSR states that the enhancement was based on
   Mendoza’s tackling and prolonged assault of agent Valles in an effort to
   impede Mendoza’s brother’s arrest—not Mendoza’s. Accordingly, the
   record does not show that Mendoza specifically intended to obstruct his own
   arrest, and we cannot affirm the application of § 3C1.1 on that ground.
   However, we may affirm Mendoza’s sentence on an alternative ground, as
   we explain below.
          B. Did Mendoza obstruct justice by impeding his brother’s arrest?
          This case also poses the question whether a court may apply § 3C1.1
   when a defendant obstructs another person’s arrest, which in this case is that
   of Mendoza’s brother. In other words, we must determine whether § 3C1.1
   applies when the obstructive act is not alleged to pertain to the defendant’s
   own “instant offense” of conviction—in this case, assaulting a federal
   officer, per 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b).
          Section 3C1.1 originally stated that the enhancement applied if a
   defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded . . . the administration of justice
   with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
   offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (emphasis added). Before § 3C1.1
   was amended, there was no conjunctive portion that followed, and a circuit
   conflict arose over whether § 3C1.1 applies only to acts specifically related to
   the offense of which the defendant was convicted or if it can also apply to
   conduct that obstructs a closely related offense. See, e.g., USA v. Perry, 908
   F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990); USA v. Mollner, 643 F.3d 713 (10th Cir. 2011). In

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   1998, the Sentencing Commission amended § 3C1.1 to resolve the circuit
   conflict and to clarify the meaning of “instant offense.” U.S.S.G. app. C,
   amend. 581; Mollner, 643 F.3d at 716. The amendment, which adopted the
   majority view, adds more content to § 3C1.1 and clarifies that an obstructive
   act may relate either to the defendant’s offense of conviction (including any
   relevant conduct) or to a closely related offense. Id. (holding that “§ 3C1.1
   applies not only to the defendant’s obstructive conduct involving his offense
   of conviction, but also to any of his obstructive conduct involving cases that
   are closely related to the defendant’s case”); U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 581.
   Section 3C1.1 now states:
          If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
          obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
          investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
          conviction and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the
          defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or
          (B) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (emphasis added). The commentary to the Guidelines
   explains that “a closely related offense” means “an otherwise closely related
   case, such as that of a co-defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.1. Note 1 of
   the commentary to § 3C1.1 was also amended in an attempt “to clarify . . .
   that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, indeed, includes a ‘temporal element,’” or “during an
   investigation of the defendant’s instant offense.” United States v. Clayton,
   172 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 581).
          Although this circuit has not yet explored a similar fact pattern under
   § 3C1.1, we have previously analyzed the required nexus between the
   conduct and the instant offense under Chapter 3 enhancements generally. In
   United States v. Southerland, we held that “in determining adjustments under
   Chapter Three . . . courts must evaluate the acts or omissions of the
   defendant that occurred during the commission of the offense, the

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   preparation for the offense of conviction, or ‘the course of attempting to
   avoid detection or responsibility for’ the offense of conviction.” 405 F.3d
   263, 267 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)). In doing so, we
   “engage in a familiar analysis, that is, the discrimination between relevant
   and irrelevant conduct.” Id. We pointed out that § 1B1.3, which defines
   “relevant conduct” under the Chapter 2 and 3 enhancements, “requires the
   connection of the enhancement not only to commission, preparation, or
   evasion, but also to the specific offense of conviction.” Id. at 268 (citing
   U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)).
          We now turn to whether § 3C1.1 applies when Mendoza’s obstructive
   acts were admittedly aimed to impede his brother’s apprehension and arrest.
   As noted above, we do not consider Mendoza’s initial flight from the U.S.
   Border Patrol an obstructive act under § 3C1.1. Instead, we only consider
   Mendoza’s return to the scene with verbal threats as well as his tackling and
   continued striking of agent Valles. Mendoza asserts that (1) he could not have
   obstructed the investigation of an assault that he was simultaneously
   committing and (2) the base offense level under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b)
   already incorporates the act of impeding a federal officer. Although
   compelling, we find these contentions unavailing because, under § 1B1.3, it
   is proper to consider “all acts and omissions committed . . . during the
   commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
   the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
   offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
          When Mendoza assaulted agent Valles, he violated § 111 and triggered
   the base offense level in § 2A2.4. Then, when Mendoza physically prevented
   agent Valles from arresting another member of Mendoza’s group, he
   obstructed the administration of justice in an offense that was closely related
   to his instant offense of conviction. In other words, there is a sufficient nexus
   between Mendoza’s relevant conduct (the tackling and prolonged assault of

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   agent Valles intended to impede his brother’s arrest) and his conviction for
   assault of a federal officer. It is therefore plausible, in light of the record as a
   whole, for the district court to have found that Mendoza’s conduct is
   properly categorized as an obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1. We therefore
   conclude that the district court’s application of § 3C1.1 was not clearly
   erroneous.
          C. Was any error made by the district court harmless?
          The government also asserts that, in the event the district court erred,
   any error was harmless because Mendoza’s conduct also warranted a two-
   level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a
   substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm when fleeing from law
   enforcement. For the reasons stated above, we do not consider Mendoza’s
   initial flight from the U.S. Border Patrol to be obstructive conduct because it
   did not sufficiently relate to his offense of conviction. Here, too, we conclude
   that a sufficient nexus is lacking between Mendoza’s flight and his conviction
   for assault of a federal officer. Because the district court did not err in
   determining that Mendoza’s acts of tackling and prolonged assault of agent
   Valles obstructed justice under § 3C1.1, we do not need to consider this
   argument any further.
                                   IV.     Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under
   U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

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