Court Opinion

ID: 9881892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 16:28:22.200782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.179242
License: Public Domain

J-S17017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 DENISE SPANGLER                         :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JAMES SPANGLER                          :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :    No. 1368 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered October 24, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Civil Division at No(s):
                               20-90305-D

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: October 4, 2023

      Appellant, James Spangler (“Husband”), appeals from a decree entered

on October 24, 2022 that dissolved his marriage to Denise Spangler (“Wife”).

On appeal, Husband challenges an equitable distribution of the marital estate

and alimony award also entered on October 24, 2022. We affirm.

      We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. Husband and Wife married on March 4, 2000. Wife filed a complaint

of divorce on June 2, 2020. After Wife filed for divorce, the parties disputed

the date of their separation. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter

on February 16, 2022. Thereafter, the trial court determined that April 19,

2020, constituted the date of separation.    Trial Court Memorandum Order,

2/23/22, at *1-*10 (unpaginated).

      The matter proceeded to trial on April 5, 2022, July 25, 2022, and July

26, 2022. On October 24, 2022, the trial court entered a memorandum and
J-S17017-23

divorce decree adjudicating the parties’ claims and issued an equitable

distribution award granting 50% of the marital estate to Husband, and 50%

of the marital estate to Wife. Trial Court Memorandum and Divorce Decree,

10/24/22, at *1-*4 (unpaginated). The trial court also awarded Wife alimony

in the amount of $4,500.00 until she turned 65 years old. Id. This timely

appeal followed.

       Husband raises the following issues on appeal:1

____________________________________________

1 Husband’s statement of the questions involved on appeal is as follows:

        1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it
           determined the date of separation to be April 19, 2020, even
           though Husband had manifested an intention to live separate
           and apart in July 2018, moved out of the marital residence,
           provided Wife with a written divorce settlement, and both
           parties had retained counsel prior to that date.

        2. The court erred and abused its discretion in that the
           equitable distribution and alimony award does not achieve
           economic justice for Husband and failed to properly consider
           the equitable distribution factors at 23 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3502
           and the alimony factors at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701[.]

        3. The court erred and abused its discretion in calculating the
           marital debt and equity in the marital residence as of the
           date of separation and not the date of distribution, despite
           the fact that the court recognized that assets should be
           valued as of the date of distribution, that Husband continued
           to contribute to the mortgage payment, and that Husband
           was not awarded the fair rental market value while Wife had
           exclusive possession.

        4. The court erred in assigning Husband the value of the Honda
           Civic, which was a lease and therefore not an asset owned
           by the parties during the marriage.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
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____________________________________________

        5. The court erred in failing to consider certain advances,
           credits, and other debts attributable exclusively to Wife,
           including the $8,000[.00] borrowed by Wife from the parties’
           home equity line of credit, Wife’s CostCo Credit Card debt,
           and Husband’s contribution to the marital residence after
           separation.

        6. The court erred in valuing Wife’s Met Life Life Insurance
           policy at $76,196.31 rather than $89,093.76, as the
           evidence reflected.

        7. The court erred and abused its discretion in its evaluation of
           Wife’s earning capacity and in finding that Wife made
           sufficient efforts to find gainful employment commensurate
           with her earning capacity.

        8. The court erred in failing to consider the relative value of the
           parties’ retirement and investment accounts in its equitable
           distribution and alimony award, including the fact that Wife
           has far more separate property than Husband; that Wife had
           more opportunity to accumulate separate retirement savings
           than Husband; that Husband must spend his remaining
           income-earning years contributing the Wife’s support,
           depriving Husband of the same opportunity to accumulate
           separate retirement savings as Wife had; that most of Wife’s
           retirement savings are in secure and guaranteed investment
           vehicles while Husband’s retirement accounts are dependent
           upon the market.

        9. The court erred and abused its discretion in failing to
           consider Wife’s substantial separate assets, including
           investment and retirement income which is available to her
           currently, in its calculation of her alimony.

        10. The court erred in awarding Wife $4,500[.00] per month
           [in] alimony until the age of 65 based upon an inflated
           budget that was not supported by the evidence and that did
           not reflect Wife’s actual needs and separate assets, Wife’s
           ability to immediately access employment history and
           earning capacity, Wife’s history of dissipation of assets, that
           uncertainty of Husband’s income tax owed by Husband on
           Wife’s alimony.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -3-
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        1. [Whether the trial court erred in determining that the parties’
           date of separation was April 19, 2020?]

        2. [Whether the trial court erred in its equitable distribution
           award?]

        3. [Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
           Wife alimony?]
See generally Husband’s Brief at 7-8.

       In his first appellate issue, Husband claims the trial court erred in

concluding that the parties separated on April 19, 2020. Husband’s Brief at

16. This Court previously stated:

        “Our standard of review in divorce actions is well settled. [I]t
        is the responsibility of this [C]ourt to make a de novo evaluation
        of the record of the proceedings and to decide independently of
        the . . . [trial] court whether a legal cause of action in divorce
        exists.” Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1107 (Pa. Super.
        2003) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). See Thomas
        v. Thomas, 483 A.2d 945 (Pa. Super. 1984). However, “in
        determining issues of credibility, the [trial court's] findings must
        be given the fullest consideration for it was the [trial court] who
        observed and heard the testimony and demeanor of various
        witnesses.” Jayne v. Jayne, 663 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. Super.
____________________________________________

Husband’s Brief at 7-8. Undoubtedly, Husband’s statement of questions
involved utterly fails to comport with Pa.R.A.P. 2116’s requirements as it is
anything but concise. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“The statement of the questions
involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in terms
and circumstances but without unnecessary detail”); see also id. at cmt.
(explaining that, while “the page limit for the statement of questions involved”
was eliminated, “verbosity continues to be discouraged. The appellate courts
strongly disfavor a statement that is not concise”). It is within this Court’s
power to quash an appeal for clear violation of our appellate rules. See
Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the Sisters of Christian Charity, 32 A.3d
800, 804 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), aff'd, 91 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2014)
(citations omitted). While we caution against the failure to abide by our
appellate rules, we conclude that Husband’s brief is not so defective as to
hamper our review. See id. We will therefore consider Husband’s claims on
the merits.

                                           -4-
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       1995) (quotation omitted). … When considering a challenge to
       the trial court's determination of the date of separation, we
       have applied the following standard:

           The Divorce Code defines ‘separate and apart’ as follows:
           ‘Complete cessation of any and all cohabitation, whether
           living in the same residence or not.’ 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3103.
           In Thomas[, supra,] this [C]ourt held that ‘cohabitation’
           means ‘the mutual assumption of those rights and duties
           attendant to the relationship of husband and wife.’ Thus,
           the gravamen of the phrase ‘separate and apart’ becomes
           the existence of separate lives not separate roofs. This
           position follows the trend of Pennsylvania case law in which
           a common residence is not a bar to showing that the
           parties live separate and apart.

       Wellner v. Wellner, 699 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa. Super.1997)
       (citations and quotations omitted). “The ties that bind two
       individuals in a marital relationship involve more than sexual
       intercourse.” Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa. Super.
       1986) (citations, quotation, and quotation marks omitted).

Frey v. Frey, 821 A.2d 623, 627–628 (Pa. Super. 2003).

     The trial court conducted a hearing to determine the date of separation.

At the hearing, and currently on appeal, Husband argued that July 31, 2018

was the proper date of separation. Husband proffered the following evidence

supporting his position: (1) On July 28, 2018, Husband informed Wife that he

was leaving the marital residence; (2) Husband left the marital residence on

July 31, 2018, and never resided there again; (3) Husband purchased a

significant amount of furniture for his new residence in July 2018; (4) on

August 1, 2018, Husband removed Wife from a Marriott credit card with Chase

Bank and removed himself from a CostCo credit card with CitiBank; (5)

Husband opened a checking and savings account in his name only at Dollar

Bank; (6) in August 2018, Husband changed his registered address with his

                                    -5-
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employer to his new apartment address and removed all business files from

the marital residence; and (6) approximately one month after Husband left

the marital residence, he and Wife informed his parents as such. See Trial

Court Memorandum Order, 2/23/22, at *2-*4 (unpaginated).

     Wife, however, maintained that the parties did not separate until April

19, 2020.   To support her proposed date of separation, Wife set forth the

following evidence: (1) Husband did, in fact, leave the marital residence on

July 31, 2018, but indicated it was temporary so that he could “miss [her]”

and work on his “marital love;” (2) after Husband left the marital residence,

the parties spent almost every weekend together and were sexually intimate

during that time; (3) the parties celebrated Thanksgiving and Christmas

together in 2018 and 2019; (4) for Christmas 2018, Husband gave Wife a

“very romantic” Christmas card which was signed “Merry Christmas Sweet,

Love You, Jim (Hubby);” (5) in July 2019, the parties traveled to Husband’s

son’s wedding together, approximately 400 miles, and stayed together in a

three bedroom rented house, with Husband and Wife sleeping in the same

room, in the same bed; (6) at Husband’s son’s wedding, the two held

themselves out to be Husband and Wife, with several photos showing Husband

and Wife with their wedding rings on, and Husband’s arm around Wife;

(7) Husband and Wife went to a nice restaurant for Valentine’s Day, 2020;

(8) Husband and Wife celebrated their 20th wedding anniversary on March 4,

2020 and, on that day, Husband sent flowers to Wife with a note saying:

“Happy Anniversary, Sweet. May the next 20 years be the best 20 years of

                                    -6-
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our life! Love, Jim;” and, lastly, (9) a text message from Husband, to Wife,

on July 25, 2020, “in response to Wife suggesting Husband may have a

significant other” wherein Husband stated:

       Just friends, no relationship, no different [than] my guy friends
       here. Did [not] know anyone here when we separated so it had
       nothing to do [with] that. Plus you can see if I was interested
       in another girl then I would [not] have spent all the time
       together me and you in the past two years. No dates, no
       Maryann situation, if I would have some girl I was interested
       in[,] I would [not] have just spent every holiday [with] you over
       the past two years. I have guy friends and girls that are friends
       but none that I would spend the rest of my life with . . .

       Do [not] look for something that [is] not there as a solution.
       You made mistakes, I made mistakes[,] and we grew apart
       however in the past two years I think you can see and feel that
       I tried to get it back by all the times we were together.

Id. at *4-*5 and *7 (unpaginated).

     Upon review of the foregoing evidence, the trial court concluded:

       We first address [July 31, 2018 as a proposed date of separation
       for the parties]. As we have indicated above Husband was
       required to establish “an independent intent . . . to dissolve the
       marital union” and “the intent must be clearly manifested and
       communicated to the other spouse[.]” Sinha v. Sinha, 526
       A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. 1987).

       The actions by Husband leading up to July 31, 2018 can
       arguably show he had an independent intent to dissolve the
       marital union. He arranged for a new place to reside. He
       changed the credit cards so that each spouse had their own
       card. He established his work location at his new residence and
       he opened a bank account to deposit his work commission
       checks and told Wife he would deposit $9[,]000[.00] into the
       still joint bank account for her to pay certain living expenses
       including those regarding the marital home and health
       insurance for the parties and their children.

                                     -7-
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      We however are not satisfied he met his burden of
      communicating that intent to Wife.          She maintains he
      [temporarily left] the marital residence to work on his feelings
      for her and she believed they were going to be able to live
      together again.

      The parties acted within what Wife believed [to be a continuing
      marital relationship] for the next almost two years. They had
      fairly frequent contact and engaged in [some form of]
      occasional] sexual intimacy.       They walked together and
      kayaked together. They filed their income tax returns together
      using the marital residence address. We recognize Husband
      maintains that was done for financial benefit of the parties but
      in the context of everything else we find it was an indication
      they were still a [married] couple.

      At the wedding in July[] 2019[,] there are photos of the couple
      which show touching and affection beyond what might be
      expected of a separated couple trying to act civil at a child's
      wedding. Three of the photos are just of the couple with the
      Husband's arm around the Wife and with their wedding rings on
      in all photos. Husband maintains he wore his ring to make Wife
      and his son happy but he appears to be quite happy with Wife
      in the photos.

      The parties continued to act as a couple at major [family
      holiday] functions and Wife even had a family 50th birthday
      party for Husband at Thanksgiving in 2018. Further, in late
      2019 or early 2020 when Wife borrowed money from her
      cousin[,] that cousin called Husband and then first learned the
      parties were separated.

      Further[,] while Husband maintains in March of 2019 the parties
      went to look at a house [just for Wife,] the customers were
      listed as [“both”] suggesting they were still acting as Husband
      and Wife.

      Other evidence suggests Husband did not communicate to Wife
      his independent intent to dissolve the marital union [i]f [he
      harbored] such an intent. His first apartment lease had a fairly
      reasonable buyout[, of] which Wife was aware[.]

      Further[,] the Christmas card th[at] Husband sent to Wife for
      Christmas 2018 (we accept Wife's testimony as to the date of
      that card) was very romantic and loving.      Further[,] the
      message with the flowers Husband sent Wife for their

                                   -8-
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       anniversary in March of 2020 suggested they would spend the
       next 20 years together and they enjoyed an anniversary dinner
       together.

       Also, they spent what we determine to be a romantic Valentine's
       Day in 2020 with a nice dinner after Wife received [two] dozen
       red roses from Husband. We reject that the dinner was a
       business dinner that happened to be on Valentine's Day. That
       just does not make sense.

       Finally, perhaps the most telling evidence was the text sent by
       Husband to Wife on July 25, 2020. While that was after even
       the Wife's proposed date of separation[,] it strongly suggests
       Husband intended to work on their relationship rather than
       move on with finding another relationship.

       Thus[,] we cannot find Husband has met his burden of
       establishing July 31, 2018 as the date of separation.

       At first glance one would conclude that September 11, 2019[,]
       or within weeks after that would be the date of separation since
       Husband had his attorney send a proposal for the distribution
       of the parties[’] assets as part of a divorce. Wife reacted by
       getting counsel and it seemed that things might move in the
       direction of divorce[, a clearly-expressed and formalized
       cessation of cohabitation, and the commencement of fully
       separate lives].

       But for several of the same reasons we indicated above[,] that
       [arrangement was set] aside and they continued to act like a
       couple still moving forward in repairing their relationship until
       April 19, 2020.

       We cannot find that Husband has proven what is required for a
       clear separation before April 19, 2020.

       Therefore[,] it is ordered and directed that the date of
       separation of these parties is April 19, 2020.

Id. at *8-*10 (parallel citation omitted). We have reviewed the testimony

and conclude that the trial court’s opinion is supported by the record. We

therefore decern no abuse of discretion.

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      In his second appellate issue, Husband raises several challenges to the

trial court’s equitable distribution order.

       We review an equitable distribution order for an abuse of
       discretion.

       A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
       equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing
       the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution
       of marital property is whether the trial court abused its
       discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
       proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of
       discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing
       evidence. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless
       the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment
       exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
       partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence
       in the certified record. In determining the propriety of an
       equitable distribution award, courts must consider the
       distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the circumstances
       of the case against the objective of effectuating economic
       justice between the parties and achieving a just determination
       of their property rights.

Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 62

A.3d 380 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).       Similarly, “[o]ur scope of review

requires us to measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of

effectuating economic justice between the parties in discerning whether the

trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedure.”

Gates v. Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      First, Husband claims the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the

marital residence and calculating the marital debt and equity in the marital

residence. Husband’s Brief at 29. In particular, Husband claims that the trial

court valued the marital residence, as well as the marital debt and equity in

                                      - 10 -
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the residence (the mortgage and home equity line of credit (“HELOC”)), as of

the date of separation, not the date of distribution. Id. In addition, Husband

argues that, in using the date of separation, rather than the date of

distribution, the trial court failed to consider other factors, including Husband’s

contribution to the debt and equity of the marital residence from July 2018

until the date of distribution when he no longer resided there. Id. at 29-33.

      This Court previously explained:

       The Pennsylvania Divorce Code does not specify what date
       marital property should be valued for purposes of equitable
       distribution.   Although the Code establishes the date of
       separation as the demarcation point to identify marital
       property, it does not specify the time when marital assets must
       be valued. Absent a specific guideline, trial courts are given
       discretion to choose a date of valuation which best provides for
       “economic justice” between the parties. Miller v. Miller, 577
       A.2d 205, 209 (Pa. Super. 1990). “To recognize a specific
       valuation date as a matter of law would deprive the trial court
       of the necessary discretion required to effectuate economic
       justice.” Sergi v. Sergi, 506 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. Super. 1986).
       However, “equitable results will most likely flow from providing
       the court with the most recent information available[.]” Id.

       The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the analysis in
       Sergi and held:

            It is implicit, however, in the statutory provisions
            governing equitable distribution that a valuation date
            reasonably proximate to the date of distribution must, in
            the usual case, be utilized.

       Sutliff [v. Sutliff, 543 A.2d 534, 536 (Pa. 1988)].

       Despite a preference for valuing marital assets at or near the
       time of distribution, there may be circumstances where it is
       more appropriate to value marital assets as of the date of
       separation. Naddeo v. Naddeo, 626 A.2d 608, 611 (Pa.
       Super. 1993). For example, in situations where one spouse
       consumes or disposes of marital assets following separation

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         without the other spouse's consent, it may be more equitable
         to value the marital asset as of the date of separation. See
         Sutliff, supra[.]    Likewise, when valuing a closely held
         business which is largely controlled by one spouse during the
         period of separation, it may be appropriate to value the
         business as of the date of separation. See Benson v. Benson,
         624 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. 1993); McNaughton v.
         McNaughton, 603 A.2d 646 (Pa. super. 1992).

Smith v. Smith, 653 A.2d 1259, 1270–1271 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal

citations omitted).

        We first address Husband’s challenge to the trial court’s valuation of the

marital residence. In its distribution order, the trial court detailed its valuation

scheme as follows:

         The June 6, 2021 appraisal of the marital home valued it at
         $650,000[.00]. Husband provided some comparable sales
         when he testified in July[] 2022[,] which caused him to opine
         that the marital residence was now worth at least
         $699,000[.00].

                                        ***

         Clearly the price of real estate increased since the June[] 2021
         appraisal of the marital home and the husband’s estimate of
         $699,000[.00] was not unreasonable in July[] 2022. But now
         in October[] 2022 when distribution will be occurring we
         can certainly take judicial notice that the real estate market has
         changed substantially with inflation like we have not seen for
         decades raising 30[-]year mortgage interest rates well above
         [six percent] and moving the market to more of a buyer’s
         market.

         Thus, while the marital residence is worth more than it was in
         June[] 2021, it is not worth $699,000[.00]. We conclude the
         value of the marital home at this time to be $675,000[.00].

Trial   Court   Memorandum      and   Divorce    Decree,   10/24/22,     at   *6-*7

(unpaginated) (emphasis added). Contrary to Husband’s argument on appeal,

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the trial court valued the marital residence as of the date of distribution, not

the date of separation. Thus, Husband’s claim of error is belied by the record.

      We now turn to the trial court’s valuation of the debt and equity attached

to the marital residence, namely, the mortgage and HELOC. The trial court’s

distribution order states:

       The balance on the PNC mortgage on May 15, 2020 (just after
       the date of separation) was $177,839.70. Husband indicated
       that the current mortgage balance is $117,866[.00,] which
       could be correct if most of the monthly mortgage payment of
       $2,647.74 has been going toward the principal. However, we
       must keep in mind [that] during that time, with the exception
       of the extra $638[.00] payment made by Husband, Wife was
       paying the mortgage down with her income from earnings and
       [alimony pendente lite (“APL”)] due to her. Thus, the debt will
       be attributed to her at the [time-of-separation] balance.

       The PNC HELOC [] had a balance of $76,569.59 on January 21,
       2022. It appears that because of overdrafts from Wife as she
       was not making ends meet with her earnings and APL[,] the
       HELOC balance remained around $76,000[.00].              We will
       therefore attribute the debt to her in the equitable distribution.

       While we realize only part of the $638[.00] a month paid by
       Husband would have reduced the principal on the mortgage[,]
       we will credit him with 18 months of that amount or
       $11,484[.00] for essentially an advance payment on the joint
       debt to the benefit of both parties since he did so [while]
       residing at the marital residence.

       We will not give Husband credit for the fair rental value of the
       marital home from the date of separation. Husband left the
       home in July[] 2018 and[,] from the date of separation [on,]
       Wife kept the payments made on the marital home debt, and
       for real estate taxes and insurance. Consistent with the
       testimony of Husband[,] we have found that there was some
       increase in value of the marital home even from the 2021
       appraisal until now. Thus, under Wife’s watch the joint asset
       increased in value which benefits both parties in equitable
       distribution.

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Id. at *11-*12 (unpaginated).

      In this instance, the trial court determined that the parties’ mortgage

loan and HELOC should be valued as of the date of separation, rather than the

date of distribution, because Wife remained in the marital residence, she was

solely responsible for paying the mortgage and HELOC, and, under her watch,

the marital residence increased in value.    This it was entitled to do.   See

Smith, 653 A.2d at 1271. Hence, in asking this Court to overturn the trial

court’s determination, Husband, in essence, is seeking to obtain credit for the

APL he paid Wife. See Husband’s Brief at 31-32 (stating that the trial court

“ignored Husband’s contribution to the mortgage and the fact that Husband

was unable to reside in the home and was forced to pay for a separate

residence pending trial. While Wife was responsible for paying the mortgage

as she occupied the residence, she paid for it out of the tax-free support,

including the upward mortgage deviation, that Husband was ordered to pay

her out of his separate, post-separation income.”).      Husband lodges this

request even though the trial court awarded him credit for the additional

$638.00 per month contribution he made as part of the parties’ APL order,

totaling $11,484.00.   Husband’s demand is, undoubtedly, contrary to the

purpose of APL. See Melton v. Melton, 831 A.2d 646, 655 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(holding that the appellant was not entitled to a “dollar-for-dollar credit at

equitable distribution for APL payments” because such an order “would have

effectively thwarted the purpose of granting APL in the first place” and “not

effectuate economic justice.”). We therefore conclude that the trial court did

                                    - 14 -
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not err in valuing the marital residence’s mortgage and HELOC as of the date

of separation, as opposed to the date of distribution.

      Second, Husband contends the trial court erred in “assigning [him] the

value of the Honda Civic, totaling $19,687.00.”          Husband’s Brief at 34.

Husband claims that the Honda Civic was leased by the parties in 2020, not

owned by them. Id. Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion.

      Herein, Husband testified that the Honda Civic was, in fact, a lease at

the time of separation. See N.T. Trial, 7/26/22, at 193. At the same time,

however, Husband admitted that he “bought out the lease.” Id. The issue,

therefore, was when Husband did so. At trial, Wife introduced into evidence

the parties jointly filed 2019 tax return, which listed two vehicles, a 2019

Volvo XC90 and the 2018 Honda Civic. N.T. Trial, 4/6/22, at 93. On the tax

return, the 2019 Volvo XC90 is clearly held under a lease. Id. at 94. The

Honda Civic is not. Id. In addition, at trial, Wife testified that Husband, at

some point, bought out the lease for the Honda Civic, but she did not know

the exact date. Id. at 95. Thus, the trial court considered the 2019 tax return

as evidence that Husband bought out the lease of the Honda Civic in 2019 and

prior to the date of separation. The trial court’s decision to include the Honda

Civic in its distribution award is therefore factually supported and not an abuse

of discretion.

      Third, Husband argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider

“certain advances, credits, and other debts incurred or received solely by Wife,

for Wife’s sole benefit,” as a part of the marital estate. Husband’s Brief at 34.

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In particular, Husband points to the following: “[funds] borrowed by Wife

against a [MetLife Whole] Life Insurance Policy, the loans taken by Wife from

the parties’ [HELOC, and] Wife’s CostCo Credit Card debt.” Id.

      Upon review, we conclude Husband’s claim lacks merit.          In sum,

Husband asks this Court to re-weigh the trial court factual assessments and

attribute additional debt to Wife. Husband, however, misinterprets the role of

the trial court and, currently, this Court, which is to consider the economic

distribution award as a whole and determine whether it “effectuate[s]

economic justice between the parties and achieve[s] a just determination of

property rights.” Reber, 42 A.3d at 1134. In its distribution order, the trial

court attributed a $313,946.59 of marital debt to Wife, and only $3,647.12 to

Husband. In view of this difference, it cannot be said that the trial court’s

decision not to attribute an additional $35,000.00 of debt to Wife amounts to

an abuse of discretion.

      Fourth, Husband claims that the trial court incorrectly valued Wife’s

MetLife Whole Life Insurance Policy. Husband’s Brief at 39. Husband contends

that Wife “should have been credited with having received the full value -

$97,087[.00],” not $76,196.31. Id. at 39-40.

      The trial court relied upon Wife’s Exhibit Q to calculate the value of

Wife’s MetLife Whole Life Insurance Policy, which reflected, as of April 19,

2020, a net cash value of $88,962.86. See Trial Court Memorandum and

Divorce Decree, 10/24/22, at *8 (unpaginated).         There was evidence,

however, that Wife’s pre-marital portion of the policy totaled $12,766.55. Id.

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The trial court then subtracted Wife’s pre-marital portion ($12,766.55) from

the net cash value amount ($88,962.86) and concluded that the value of the

policy was $76,196.31.     Our own review confirms the court's assessment.

Hence, no relief is due on this claim.

      Fifth, Husband claims that the trial court abused its discretion in

evaluating Wife’s earning capacity. Husband’s Brief at 41. Husband argues

that, in light of Wife’s experience and training, “Wife should [be] able to find

a job as an administrative assistant making at least $50,000[.00] per year.”

Id. Husband further contends that Wife made “no effort to find a job that is

commensurate with her education and experience during the parties’

separation.” Id.

      With respect to Wife’s earning capacity, the trial court stated:

       [W]e note that Wife was born on April 20, 1962 and is therefore
       [60-years-old]. Husband was born on November 22, 1968 and
       therefore will be [54-years-old] next month.

                                         ***

       As for their respective earnings[,] Husband’s income has been
       consistently $18[,]000[.00] or $19[,]000[.00] net a month
       from his employment as a financial planner and with some
       unemployment       compensation     during     the   [COVID-19]
       pandemic. He first worked for MetLife where Wife worked for
       years prior to him and at the end of 2009[,] they both started
       their own financial planning business affiliated with a company
       as “1099 employees.” Wife retired from the business to care
       for the children (the parties[’] daughter was 14 years old] at
       the time) and Husband indicated also because in his opinion she
       was not really working that much and he was concerned that it
       would be a problem if the business was audited by the company
       with which they were affiliated. … Wife gave her “book” of
       business (existing clients) to her Husband at the time of her
       retirement[.]

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                                         ***

           It does not appear to be disputed by Husband that it would be
          difficult for Wife to again become a financial planner at her
          current age since she gave up all of her licenses in 2015 when
          the parties agreed she would retire from the business and even
          if she had the necessary licenses[,] she would have to build her
          book of business back up again. [Husband], however, believes
          she can find employment in the financial industry as an
          administrative assistant earning around $50,000[.00] a year.
          We are satisfied[,] however,] that [Wife] has tried to explore
          that option unsuccessfully and her current employment netting
          about $1[,]860[.00] a month is consistent with her earning
          capacity.

          Essentially, [Wife’s] skills were as a financial planner all of her
          adult working life until 2015 and she is probably fortunate to
          have obtained the employment she has since the parties
          separated.

Trial    Court   Memorandum       and   Divorce   Decree,   10/24/22,    at     *2-*3

(unpaginated). We discern no grounds for granting relief on Husband’s claim.

The records supports the trial court's findings and its conclusions are

consistent with the objective of achieving economic justice between the

parties. Husband again asks us to re-weigh the facts placed before the court,

which we are not inclined to do. For each of these reasons, Husband’s claim

fails.

         Finally, Husband argues that the trial court “failed to consider the

relative value of the parties’ retirement and investment accounts in its

equitable distribution award,” resulting in “Wife’s financial situation [following

distribution being] far superior to Husbands.” Husband’s Brief at 43-44. We

disagree.

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      In issuing its equitable distribution award, the trial court specifically

noted that “Husband’s income has been consistently around $18[,]000[.00]

or $19[,]000[.00] net a month” while Wife’s income nets only $1,860.00 per

month.     Trial Court Memorandum and Divorce Decree, 10/24/22, at *2

(unpaginated).     The trial court also noted that Husband continues to have

“substantial cash available” as he recently paid a downpayment and closing

costs to purchase a nearly $400,000.00 townhouse.          Id. at *16-*17.   In

addition, the trial court found that, unlike Wife, Husband was “in a position to

continue to have significant income to acquire [] assets and earn significant

income based on his income history.” Id. at *4. Based upon the foregoing,

the trial court stated:

         When we consider all these factors it would appear at first
         glance that Husband has a clear economic advantage. Husband
         will most likely be able to grow his assets and increase his
         retirement benefits while Wife will not be able to grow her
         assets and her only new retirement contribution will be through
         her employment and therefore somewhat limited.

         However, Wife has available non-marital assets [by way of
         retirement and investment accounts] of $269,122.38 and
         Husband has only $36,597.36 of non-marital assets.

         Secondly, we will be awarding the marital home to Wife which
         is tax free compared to the bulk of Huband’s distributed assets
         being retirement assets that are taxable at least for federal tax
         purposes.

         We therefore will distribute the marital property on a 50%-50%
         basis.

Id. at *5-6. Hence, contrary to Husband’s claims, the trial court specifically

considered Wife’s non-marital assets in crafting its distribution award and

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found that, because of Husband’s current income, as well as his potential to

acquire significantly more income (including the amount of the sale of his

business, Spectrum Financial Planning Group, upon retirement, for which Wife

made no claim), the fact that Wife owned a substantial amount of non-marital

assets “equalized the distribution of marital assets.” Id. at *6. We discern

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination.

      In his last appellate issue, Husband challenges the trial court’s decision

to award Wife alimony. Husband’s Brief at 48-63. Our standard of review

regarding questions pertaining to the award of alimony is whether the trial

court abused its discretion.

         We previously have explained that “[t]he purpose of alimony is
         not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to
         ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable
         to support himself or herself through appropriate employment,
         are met.”     Alimony “is based upon reasonable needs in
         accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living established
         by the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor's ability
         to pay.”     Moreover, “[a]limony following a divorce is a
         secondary remedy and is available only where economic justice
         and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by
         way of an equitable distribution award and development of an
         appropriate employable skill.”

Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted); citing Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1096-1097 (Pa. Super.

2003).

      In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the

nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court must

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consider numerous factors as set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. Specifically,

pursuant to section 3701:

       (a) General rule.—Where a divorce decree has been entered,
       the court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either
       party only if it finds that alimony is necessary.

       (b) Factors relevant.—In determining whether alimony is
       necessary and in determining the nature, amount, duration and
       manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all
       relevant factors, including:

           (1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the
           parties.

           (2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional
           conditions of the parties.

           (3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but
           not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other
           benefits.

           (4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

           (5) The duration of the marriage.

           (6) The contribution by one party to the education, training
           or increased earning power of the other party.

           (7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or
           financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of
           serving as the custodian of a minor child.

           (8) The standard of living of the parties established during
           the marriage.

           (9) The relative education of the parties and the time
           necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
           enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate
           employment.

           (10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

           (11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

           (12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

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            (13) The relative needs of the parties.

            (14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during
            the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the
            parties from the date of final separation shall not be
            considered by the court in its determinations relative to
            alimony except that the court shall consider the abuse of
            one party by the other party. As used in this paragraph,
            “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under section
            6102 (relating to definitions).

            (15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the
            alimony award.

            (16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient
            property, including, but not limited to, property distributed
            under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide
            for the party's reasonable needs.

            (17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of
            self-support through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a) & (b).

      As stated above, the trial court distributed the marital estate on a

50%-50% basis. The trial court, however, recognized that the basis for its

decision to issue such an award, i.e., Wife’s non-marital assets, would “not

fairly provide income to her now” and reviewed Wife’s demand for alimony in

light of this conclusion.   Trial Court Memorandum and Divorce Decree,

10/24/22, at *6 (unpaginated).     The trial court then considered all of the

statutory factors at Section 3701. Id. at *12-16. Of chief importance to the

trial court was that: (1) Husband’s earning capacity was significantly higher

than Wife’s; (2) Husband’s income was substantially more than Wife’s; (3) the

fact that Wife contributed to Husband’s earning capacity when she retired from

the financial planning business and transferred her book of business to

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Husband without return consideration; (4) the parties’ upper middle class

lifestyle established during their marriage; (5) Wife’s pre-marital assets were

not liquid until she turned 65-years-old; and (6) Wife’s incapability of

self-support through appropriate employment. Id. Based upon the foregoing,

the trial court determined that Wife should receive alimony in the amount of

$4,500.00 per month until she turned 65 because, at that time, Wife

“reasonably has income from [her] retirement accounts.” Id. at *16. We

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

      Overall, the trial court achieved economic justice between the parties

and justly determined their property rights.

      Order and decree affirmed.

Date: 10/4/2023

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