Court Opinion

ID: 9725169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:30.269263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.696231
License: Public Domain

CARR, Acting P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the judgment except as to part II, to which I dissent. In my view defendant’s act in forcing Heather to lick his scrotum does not constitute oral copulation within the meaning of Penal Code section 288a. I shall explain why this is not an absurd result, as the majority holds.
In part II, the majority undertakes to define the male sexual organ as that term is used in section 288a. Essentially that definition is of the entire male reproductive system, comprising the penis, the scrotum and testes together with the internal workings thereof. I observe at the outset that section 288a since its inception has never used the words reproductive system to define sexual organ. Nor does the majority’s definition withstand historical scrutiny.
The initial California statute passed in 1915, Penal Code section 288a, criminalized “[t]he acts technically known as fellatio and cunnilingus.” (Stats. 1915, ch. 586, § 1, p. 1022.) This statute was found to be unconstitutional not because the word fellatio failed to describe the prohibited conduct but because it was not in the English language as required by former article IV, section 24 of the California Constitution, its usage was not in the common parlance and it was therefore uncertain in meaning to a person of common understanding, presumably those persons who might be expected to violate the section. (In re Lockett (1919) 179 Cal. 581 [178 P. 134].)1 The Lockett court recognized that when foreign words had by usage become anglicized and were readily understood by reference to “lexicons,” “in the *1453interests of decency, courts should sanction such words, euphemistically employed to describe offenses against morality, thus avoiding the bald nastiness involved in the use of the vernacular, . . .” (Id. at p. 583.)2The word fellatio, while sufficiently euphemistic, had not become sufficiently anglicized that it was a part of the English language with a meaning acquired by such use. The Lockett court observed the word “does not occur in any of the English dictionaries in common use” (at pp. 584-585), but was used and defined only in works such as Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, Dorland’s American Illustrated Dictionary, Havelock Ellis’s “Studies in the Psychology of Sex,” and Krafft-Ebing’s “Psychopathia Sexualis.” The common man, not being exposed to such literature could not be expected to know what conduct was proscribed.
While modesty of the times doubtless prevented the Legislature from defining the crime more clinically,3 presumably such members of the Legislature in 1915 had access to the medical texts and literature available to the courts if not the man of common understanding. It is reasonable to assume that to avoid the “bald nastiness involved in the use of the vernacular” (In re Lockett, supra, 179 Cal. at p. 583), the Legislature “euphemistically employed” fellatio to describe this offense against morality. In such texts and dictionaries of that era, the term itself had a definitive meaning and that was oral stimulation, euphemistically speaking, of the penis.4
Since its original enactment in 1915, section 288a has been amended or reenacted 15 times.5
In 1921 the statute was rewritten to prohibit sex perversion, defined as “the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another . . . .” (Stats. 1921, ch. 848, § 2, p. 1633.) In People v. Parsons *1454(1927) 82 Cal.App. 17, 19 [255 P. 212], the court rejected a contention that the new statute was vague, uncertain or indefinite. Any person who participated in the proscribed conduct was guilty of the offense, whether as an active or passive participant, thereby putting to rest the active passive concern of the Lockett court.
Initially, in People v. Angier (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 417 [112 P.2d 659], the term “copulation” was construed narrowly: “A mere kiss or lick of the private organ, even though lewdly done (Pen. Code, [ § ] 288), is not a copulation.” The court arrived at this conclusion by assessing the meaning of the term copulation, stating “[t]he word copulation has never had the meaning of mere contact. It has always had the significance of the verb, to ‘couple’, which ... is derived form the Latin copulare, which is translated ‘to couple, join, unite, band or tie together.’ ” (Id. at p. 419.) That view was subsequently repudiated even by its own author (People v. Harris (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 84, 88 [238 P.2d 158]), the court acknowledging the holding of People v. Angier, supra, did not comport with the legislative intent of section 288, subdivision (a). “[W]e were led into a discussion of the significance of the word ‘copulate.’ While that discourse was philologically correct it was calculated to lead to the erroneous doctrine that the use of the word in section 288a signifies a legislative intent that an offender of the statute is guilty only when he has committed the repulsive act of sex perversion. Such was not the purpose of the lawmakers or the intention of this court. A person is guilty of violating the statute when he has placed his mouth upon the genital organ of another.” (Id. at p. 88.)
Consensual oral-genital contact was decriminalized by our Legislature in 1975. (Stats. 1975, ch. 71, § 10, p. 134.) The conduct now prohibited by the statute depends on the status of the participants, i.e., minors or prisoners, or the use of force by a sexual aggressor.
The present statute, Penal Code section 288a, retains the 1921 definition of oral copulation: “(a) Oral copulation is the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ or anus of another person.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 1299, § 5, p. 4595.)
Despite the numerous amendments and revisions made to section 288a, the Legislature has continued to leave the word sexual organ undefined in such section. The defendant contends, not implausibly, that, as to a male sexual organ, section 288a refers to the penis. The People, in an argument accepted by the majority, urge the statute refers to all external genitalia, the penis, the testicles and the scrotum.
The Legislature was free to use “genitalia” or such similar term in lieu of “sexual organ” but chose not to do so. In Penal Code section 311.3, *1455subdivision (b)(1), the sexual exploitation of children statute, sexual conduct is copiously defined, among other listed conduct, as “[s]exual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, . . .” The sexual battery statute, Penal Code section 243.4 criminalizes the touching of “an intimate part of another person.” “Intimate part”, is defined by section 243.4, subdivision (f)(1), as the “sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female.” The term “private parts” which is certainly euphemistic enough, is employed in the indecent exposure statute, which makes it a crime for any person to wilfully and lewdly “[e]xposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place” (Pen. Code, § 314). I think it reasonable to assume that persons of common understanding know what private parts are. If the term were private part, there might be some uncertainty but with private parts, an all-encompassing term, there is no uncertainty.
Unless it can be said that sexual organ means genitalia as used in section 288a, defendant’s assertion has merit.
The historical derivation of section 288a and the usage of sexual organ in that section strongly suggests that as to a male, the statute refers to the penis. As noted, the original statute proscribed “fellatio,” from the Latin fellare, to suck, and while there may have been some initial uncertainty as to its meaning as to whether both passive and active conduct was included, the term referred to the penis and it was so defined in the dictionaries and treatises current at the time of original enactment as well as present day dictionaries. Nowhere is such term defined to cover oral-scrotal contact. The subsequent statutes describe the conduct as “oral copulation.” Copulation normally involves penile-vaginal contact. Oral copulation by its terms suggests the replacement of either the penis or vagina with a mouth. People v. Angler, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 417, focused on the word “copulating” in determining (at p. 419) that licking or kissing the “private organ” was not proscribed: “The word copulation has never had the meaning of mere contact. It has always had the significance of the verb ‘to couple.’ ” The cases which distinguished or criticized Angier did not expand the organs capable of being assaulted, but expanded the manner of the assault, i.e., licking or osculating (kissing) were proscribed. (See People v. Cline (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 989, 992-993, fn. 2, 996 [83 Cal.Rptr. 246]; People v. Harris, supra, 108 Cal.App.2d at p. 88.) A man does not copulate with his scrotum but with his penis. “Oral” copulation, when referring to the male body, as a matter of common sense, involves oral contact with a penis.
The Legislature has devised an elaborate structure of penal sanctions for various types of sexually-oriented conduct. The forcible lick or kiss of a scrotum could violate section 288, lewd and lascivious conduct, if the victim were under the age of 14 or section 243.4, sexual battery. I conclude such *1456conduct, however, is not oral copulation. At best the Legislature’s choice of the term “sexual organ” is ambiguous, in light of the historical derivation of the statute.
In construing ambiguous statutes, we have certain well-defined rules. The provisions of the Penal Code “are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to eifect its objects and to promote justice.” (§ 4.) They “ ‘are to reach no further in meaning than their words; no person can be made subject to them by implication; and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused.’” (People v. Tisdale (1880) 57 Cal. 104, 107 [57 Cal. 104].) Where the language of a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions the statute must be construed in favor of defendant. (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1145-1146 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]; Dunn v. United States (1979) 442 U.S. 100, 112 [60 L.Ed.2d 743, 754, 99 S.Ct. 2190].) Under such construction, the male sexual organ, within section 288a, refers to the penis.
The majority holds this result is “absurd,” citing to People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420], and Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]. These two cases enunciate the rule of statutory construction that the language of an unambiguous statute will not be given a literal meaning if such a construction would result in absurd consequences not intended by the Legislature.
The rule sought by the majority is summarized in People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165], at page 599: “The rule of statutory interpretation that ambiguous penal statutes are construed in favor of defendants is inapplicable unless two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable. [Citations.]” (See also People v. Alday (1973) 10 Cal.3d 392, 395 [110 Cal.Rptr. 617, 515 P.2d 1169].) The position of the majority is that it is not reasonable that “sexual organ” when referring to a male means “penis.” But the Legislature has constructed an intricate, almost byzantine, maze of laws criminalizing sexual depradations (see generally 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against Decency and Morals, § 760 et seq.), and often the definitions seem arbitrary. Had the Legislature sought to prohibit more than “fellatio” and “cunninlingus” when it enacted the 1921 statute, it could easily have done so. The fact that reasonable minds may differ on this question suggests the answer, that each interpretation of the statute is equally plausible, and therefore defendant should not have to guess which is the law.
*1457The majority cites People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078], at page 330, that “The gravamen of the offense is the revulsion and harm suffered by one who is forced to unwillingly touch his or her mouth to the genitals of another.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1450.) Harrison did not so hold, did not involve oral copulation but digital penetration and concerned the propriety of multiple convictions, a wholly different issue. The issue here is the definition of the offense, not the nature of the harm sought to be avoided.
The majority turns the history of the statute on its head. When the Legislature rewrote the statute in 1921 to avoid the holding in In re Lockett, supra, 179 Cal. 581, it was no doubt reluctant to “stain the pages” (People v. Carrell, supra, 31 Cal.App. at p. 795) of the Statutes of California with an explicit list of the conduct to be proscribed. But the modesty of that era cannot be used as a shield today to obscure what this case is about: Since it was within the power of the Legislature to specify with exactitude the conduct to be proscribed, the defendant is entitled to a reversal as he has tendered an alternate, reasonable construction of the statute, that sexual organ in section 288a denotes the penis only.7
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 16, 1991. Mosk, L, was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 This court, under the guidance of Presiding Justice Chipman, had reached a similar conclusion prior to Lockett, in People v. Carrell (1916) 31 Cal.App. 793 [161 P. 995],

 The Lockett court, with unusual if somewhat unsophisticated concern, found that some definitions of the term referred to active conduct and others to passive and this rendered uncertain the prohibited conduct. (179 Cal. at pp. 585, 590.)

 “So squeamish are some English-speaking people on this point that they have no terms to designate the ‘nameless crime’ that moves in the dark.” (2 Witthaus & Becker, Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology (2d ed. 1907) Unnatural Crimes; Buccal Coitus, p. 750.)

 Fellatio is derived from the Latin fellare, meaning “to suck.” (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1971) p. 836.)

 Statutes 1921 chapter 848 section 2, page 1633; Amended Statutes First Extraordinary Session of 1950, chapter 56 section 1, page 512; Statutes First Extraordinary Session of 1952, chapter 23 section 2, page 380; Statutes 1955, chapter 274, section 1, page 729; Statutes 1975, chapter 71, section 10, chapter 877, section 2; Statutes 1976, chapter 1139, section 178, operative July 1, 1977; Statutes 1977, chapter 490, section 2; Statutes 1978, chapter 579, section 18; Statutes 1979, chapter 944, section 7; Statutes 1980, chapter 915, section 2; Statutes 1981, chapter 896, section 2; Statutes 1982, chapter 1111, section 5; Statutes 1983, chapter 949, section 3; Amended Statutes 1986, chapter 1299, section 6; Amended Statutes 1988, chapter 404, section 1.

 1 note further that the dictionary expressly lists “penis” as a synonym for organ. (Webster’s Third New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1971) p. 1589.) There is no equivalent reference to testicles.