Court Opinion

ID: 9695893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:31:01.621357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.160120
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Bohe’s prior felony convictions and in doing so, committed reversible error. I therefore respectfully dissent.
In admitting the nine prior burglary convictions, the trial court not only gave no reasons, it gave no hint of an explanation. The majority is simply too gentle when it observes that the trial court was “not as explicit as it could have been [in] identifying and weighing the relevant factors...." Not only was the trial court not explicit, it was downright cryptic.
It is obvious that the only reason for seeking admission of nine prior burglary convictions is to make clear to a jury that a defendant is an unmitigated scoundrel who *283did it, and did it, and did it before, and obviously did it again. I have little doubt that the evidence achieved its intended purpose. My only question is: Why bother with the presentation of any other evidence? Nine priors should be more than sufficient to nail a defendant.
We have said that similar-crime convictions are not “per se” excludable. State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18, 35 (N.D.1983).' Implicit in that statement is our recognition that similar-crime convictions are inherently prejudicial and unfair and should be admitted only if there is a compelling reason other than to show the bad character of the defendant and one which outweighs the obvious prejudice. But the trial court has not shared with us its reasons for admitting the nine prior burglary convictions and I do not believe that it could have reached its decision to admit them had it weighed the relevant factors and articulated its rationale.
Same-crime convictions should be “sparingly” admitted. 3 Weinstein’s Evidence H609[03] at 609-68 (1989). Judge Wein-stein suggests that impeachment be limited to use of a single, prior similar-crime conviction and then only where there are strong reasons for disclosure and where the conviction relates directly to veracity. Id. at 609-68 to 609-69. However, we have already upheld the admission of two prior same-crime convictions as not prejudicial. State v. Eugene, supra. That holding should prescribe the outer limits of admissibility of prior same-crime convictions and our line-drawing should hold fast at that number. It seems to me we had already stretched to its permissible limits the fiction that the prejudice from the admission of two same-crime (burglary) convictions, crimes which are, at best, only generally relevant to credibility, is outweighed by the probative impeachment value. That is as far as we should go.
Every defendant, even one with nine pri- or convictions, enjoys the presumption of innocence. A defendant should not be compelled to choose between taking the stand and having his record of nine prior convictions admitted.
In any event, there is no disagreement that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence defendant’s prior convictions for misdemeanor theft. That error, in conjunction with what, at the very least, ought to be fairly characterized as the problematic admission of nine prior same-crime convictions, should be deemed prejudicial.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of conviction.