Court Opinion

ID: 9770776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:18.142375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.679305
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. The majority concludes that prejudicial error occurred in the penalty phase of the trial because State’s Exhibit 18 contained references to murder, rape and robbery, whereas appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. As to the charge of murder, no error can be assigned to this point. Page five of the exhibit (the verdict) was admitted without objection. It reads in part: “We the jury find the defendant, Bruce Earl Ward, on the charge of: Murder:_ Voluntary Manslaughter:_GUILTY Involuntary Manslaughter:_ Thus the jury’s awareness of the charge of murder was not preserved for review for the lack of an objection. Moreover, Officer Dominic DiPaolo of the Erie Police Department testified, without objection, that Janet Needham was strangled with the strap of her own purse. In fact, it was undisputed that appellant was charged with murder but the jury convicted on voluntary manslaughter. Thus no claim of error can be grounded on the fact that the appellant was charged with murder. As to the rape and robbery, those were never issues in this case. They were never argued to the jury at any point, indeed, were never mentioned. The only reference to either throughout this record is buried in the fine print within a five page photocopy which is for all practical purposes illegible. (See attached). There is nothing to indicate the jury was even aware of them and, as counsel for the appellant noted (referring to this segment of Exhibit 18), “It takes a legal scholar to decipher all that.” The state was not attempting to show that appellant was charged with rape or robbery. The state was attempting to show, as an aggravating circumstance, that appellant had committed a previous felony involving violence, and did so simply by offering a certified copy of his conviction papers from Pennsylvania where that conviction occurred. When the exhibit was offered, the appellant readily agreed that pages four and five were admissible and made only a general objection to the relevancy of the remainder of the exhibit, although the trial court pointedly invited specific objection: THE COURT: Any objections? [Counsel for Defense] Your Honor, I’d like to look at them. (Thereupon, there was a pause in the proceedings; then the following proceedings occurred:) THE COURT: Any objections? COUNSEL: Your Honor, I do have some. THE COURT: On what grounds? COUNSEL: Y our Honor, I think part of the State’s exhibits would be inadmissible as to relevancy. They’ve clearly got a conviction and I think that, of course, would come in. THE COURT: Well, let’s take them one at a time and be specific. The first one apparently is a certified copy of the judgment that you have admitted that he got convicted of. Right? COUNSEL: It’s more than that, your Honor. It’s the other material that we would object to. THE COURT: Let me see the judgment. Specifically what is your objection to this? COUNSEL: The first few pages, your Honor. I don’t see that they’re relevant. I mean clearly they have the judgment and commitment order and conviction of voluntary manslaughter. It takes a legal scholar to decipher all that. I think they’ve got it in the last two pages. And I have no problem with the last two pages. THE COURT: Well, without going through this, is this the information, charging — MRS. LaRUE: That’s the information that was filed. THE COURT: That’s already before the jury. You asked about it. You asked on redirect that he was disappointed that he didn’t get more. I don’t know what the prejudice is. They know this. So, if your only objection is relevancy — COUNSEL: Your Honor, I think it’s confusing to the issue. THE COURT: Well, they probably couldn’t understand this. And, if your objection is relevancy, I’ll overrule it. COUNSEL: That’s my objection, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. I’ll let it in for whatever weight they want to give it. His conviction for voluntary manslaughter is admitted. And that’s what this purports to prove by the rules of evidence. So, we’ll let that in. [My emphasis.] Had counsel objected because the state had not offered evidence of rape or robbery and it would be prejudicial to the appellant for that part of the exhibit to be admitted, the alleged error might well have been averted. The incident illustrates why our cases recognize the need for specific objection so that trial errors will not occur by inadvertence. The case of Moore v. State, 304 Ark. 257, 801 S.W.2d 638 (1990), is instructive. The court had granted a motion to suppress the statement of a co-defendant implicating the appellant in various crimes, and appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in then admitting the statement. We said that there was no showing that appellant had requested that specific or implied references to her be expunged before introduction of the statement. “It cannot be said the entire statement [of the co-defendant] was inadmissible; therefore, the appellant had the burden of pointing out any alleged inadmissible portions at or prior to the admission of the statement.” As to the robbery, there is an additional reason why no error occurred. There was evidence of robbery properly before the jury from sources independent of Exhibit 18. Officer DiPaolo testified that Ms. Needham’s purse was opened and its contents were scattered near her body. Other contents, including the appellant’s photograph, had been thrown down a window well near where the body was discovered. State’s Exhibit 16 depicts a scene consistent with that testimony. That evidence would, I suggest, support a conviction of robbery, it will certainly support the lesser standard of evidence applicable to the penalty phase. The state is not required to prove the appellant was convicted of robbery in order to submit the aggravating circumstance to the jury — only that he committed the felony. Arkansas Code Ann. § 5-4-604 (Supp. 1990). Moreover, we have held that any evidence, even slight, of an aggravating circumstance justified submitting that issue to the jury. Wainwright v. State, 302 Ark. 371, 790 S.W.2d 420 (1990); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980). The state was entitled to prove the circumstances of the previous crime relevant to the issue of violence for such probative force as the jury might have given it. The crime of rape, having no evidentiary support, was admittedly not germane, but it’s miniscule role in this trial could have been avoided by a proper objection and as it was neither argued nor even mentioned to the jury any error can be treated as harmless. Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982). We have often said the law cannot guarantee a perfect trial, only a fair one. [[Image here]]