Court Opinion

ID: 9568348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:50.976005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:39.635031
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s statement of the controlling standard for appellate review of an alleged waiver of the right to counsel and assertion of the obverse right to self-representation. As described in the majority opinion, “substantial compliance” with People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 *738(1976), and MCR 6.005(D)1 provides adequate protection of a defendant’s rights.2
I also agree with the majority’s application of this standard in People v Adkins. However, I dissent in People v Suggs because the majority fails to heed the threshold inquiry of a proper analysis.
i
In assessing the adequacy of a defendant’s alleged assertion of his right to self-representation, a court first must determine whether a defendant’s request to proceed in propria persona is unequivocal. Anderson, 398 Mich 367. Only if that question is answered in the affirmative does the analysis proceed to the second step, which is “whether defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.” Id. at 368.
The following statement made by defendant Suggs to the trial judge, and the trial judge’s response, is evidence that defendant’s alleged desire to represent himself was anything but unequivocal.
The Court: You still wish to represent yourself?
The Defendant: Yes. Your Honor, you recall when I dismissed the attorney, Mr. Craig Daily [sic], I sent a letter to the Court besides the letter I sent to Craig Daily explaining to the Court why I was dismissing Craig Daily. It’s not that I don’t want an attorney to represent me, it’s just that Craig Daily never spoke to me. I had a trial date and never had a *739chance to talk to my attorney. I couldn’t understand it, it’s unprofessional.
The Court: Look, I am telling you I do not have a problem with you representing yourself and recognizing the fact that there is case law that says you can. I am also obligated to tell you the problems and pitfalls of that and have you unequivocally indicate on the record you understand those and you do wish to represent yourself.
The Defendant: I understand — I understand what you said, yes.
The Court: Okay, fine. [Emphasis added.]
This emphasized language, and the trial judge’s complete disregard of it, indicates that defendant’s attempted dismissal of Mr. Daly was not the result of his unequivocal desire to represent himself, but was instead the result of a justifiable dissatisfaction with that attorney’s failure to consult with him.3 This understanding of defendant’s actual motivation is an integral factor in the analysis of his alleged waiver of counsel immediately before trial on June 19, 1989.
On March 17, 1989, immediately after granting Mr. Daly’s request to be excused from his appointment as defendant’s counsel, the trial judge, without any recourse to the procedural safeguards of Anderson or MCR 6.005(D), said to defendant: “Mr. Suggs, I’m going to — you can represent yourself if you want to. . . . I’m going to appoint at least advisory counsel to assist you and you can, you and that counsel can discuss whatever you might want to do in representing yourself.” Ante, p 715, n 8. On June 19, immedi*740ately before trial began, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and the attorney appointed as “advisory counsel” on March 17:
“The Court: Understanding, Mr. Moore, that Mr. Suggs wishes to represent himself and proceed in pro per?
“Mr. Moore: That is my understanding.” [Ante, p 716.]
In light of the trial judge’s statement on March 17 and the majority’s acknowledgment that it was not until immediately before trial began on June 19 that defendant made his “initial attempt at waiving his right to counsel,” id., it is clear that the trial judge simply (and erroneously) assumed that defendant wanted to represent himself and that this understanding was unquestioningly conveyed to replacement counsel, Mr. Moore, right from the start.4
n
The majority correctly notes that “[application of the waiver of counsel procedures is the duty of the court.” Id., p 723. However, the majority fails to heed the real import of this principle. The burden is on the trial court to determine inter alia that a defendant’s attempt to waive his right to counsel is unequivocal, not on the defendant to prove that an alleged waiver was not unequivocal. The right to counsel, as a guarantor of a fair trial, is a fundamental right that should not be deemed waived unless the record clearly and unequivocally evidences such waiver, a record that *741must be made by the trial judge’s diligent inquiiy into the relevant factors.
In Suggs, then, where the trial court, without conducting the proper inquiry, operated at all relevant times under the mistaken and uninvestigated assumption that defendant had unequivocally waived his right to counsel and asserted his right to self-representation, and where the defendant explicitly stated, “It’s not that I don’t want an attorney to represent me,” neither the first prong of the Anderson inquiry nor the requirements of MCR 6.005(D) have been complied with, substantially or otherwise.
Levin, J. (dissenting). Because People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), and MCR 6.005(D), require that a waiver of counsel be unequivocal before it will be given effect, I agree with Justice Cavanagh’s conclusion in People v Suggs that Suggs’ waiver of his right to counsel was not valid.
On the day the trial was to begin, two days after Suggs stated that he did not wish to proceed with his court-appointed lawyer, the judge explained to Suggs that he had a right to represent himself. He questioned Suggs concerning whether he understood this right. The judge asked Suggs, “You still wish to represent yourself?” Suggs responded “Yes,” and then stated:
Your Honor, you recall when I dismissed the attorney, Mr. Craig' Daily [sic], I sent a letter to the Court besides the letter I sent to Craig Daily explaining to the Court why I was dismissing Craig Daily. It’s not that I don’t want an attorney to represent me, it’s just that Craig Daily never spoke to me. I had a trial date and never had a chance to talk to my attorney. I couldn’t understand it, it’s unprofessional.
*742The Court: Look, I’m telling you I do not have a problem with you representing yourself and recognizing the fact that there is case law that says you can. I am also obligated to tell you the problems and pitfalls of that and have you unequivocally indicate on the record you understand those and you do wish to represent yourself.
The Defendant I understand — I understand what you said, yes.
The Court: Okay, fine. Do you have any other preliminary issues that you want to bring up?
Die Defendant: No, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.]
The judge’s response to Suggs’ statement that he did not “want” to represent himself indicates either that he was not paying attention to what Suggs said or that he chose to ignore what he said. Either way, the equivocation in Suggs’ answer is undeniable.
The majority dismisses Suggs’ statement that he did not really want to continue alone as a mere “hesitation.”1 It further states that any equivocation was removed by Suggs’ subsequent responses indicating his preference for proceeding in propria persona.
Suggs’ answer was not a mere hesitation. It was a clear and unequivocal statement that he did not want to represent himself. Although Suggs subsequently indicated on some level that he wished to proceed in propria persona, this indication should be discounted both because his later statements at most make his earlier statement that he did not want to represent himself equivocal and because the leading manner in which the judge posed the questions suggested to Suggs that the judge expected an affirmative answer.
I also part company from the majority in assessing the trial judge’s conduct respecting defendant Adkins. *743Although Adkins’ waiver was unequivocal, it was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary as required by this Court in Anderson.
This Court stated in Anderson, supra at 368, that “[t]he trial court must make the pro se defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” According to the court rule, making a defendant sufficiently knowledgeable includes advising him of the charge, the maximum and mandatory minimum prison sentences, and determining whether the defendant understood the risk of representing himself. MCR 6.005(D)(1).
The judge did not apprise Adkins of the possible range of sentences associated with the offense. He failed to particularize the risks involved. The majority acknowledges these deficiencies, but dismisses them as inadequate to disturb what was otherwise “substantial compliance” with the waiver procedure.2
i
The majority writes, “[p]roper compliance requires that the court engage, on the record, in a methodical assessment of the wisdom of self-representation by the defendant.”3 (Emphasis supplied.) The majority further asserts that “ [substantial compliance requires that the court discuss the substance of both Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a short colloquy with the defendant, and make an express finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees *744to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.”4 The “methodical assessment” or “short colloquy” with Adkins consisted only of the judge’s admonition that this “is a very serious case” and a solitary question asking Adkins whether he understood “that there is always a hazard in representing yourself.”
In addition to the cursory nature of the questioning, the judge exacerbated this flimsy questioning by phrasing the question asking Adkins whether he understood the hazards of self-representation in a leading manner and including it in a sentence that also contained two other questions.5 While there is no rule against using compound or leading questions in this type of proceeding per se, it is noteworthy that such questions provide grounds for objection during a trial because they are considered confusing and suggestive.
Given the importance of the questioning conducted by the judge and the limited cognitive skills of many defendants, one would expect that the judge would have phrased his questions in a form that is clear and readily understood. Instead, it is apparent from the judge’s method of questioning that he treated the proceeding much as one might treat a trip to the supermarket — perfunctorily checking things off the shopping list as he went along, with his mind as much focused on the next errands as the task immediately before him.
*745The majority finds the judge’s efforts sufficient to effectuate a knowing and intelligent waiver. Apparently, the majority believes either that Adkins knew or should have known exactly to what “hazards” the judge was referring, or that warning a defendant that there is, generally, “a hazard in representing [one]self,” is enough.
The fallacy of either belief is clear on its face, and only becomes clearer once the particulars of this case are considered. Adkins stated during questioning that he only had a tenth grade education and that until recently he had held only odd jobs. Actually, Adkins was functionally illiterate. It is clear that Adkins had no idea what he was about to face in the forthcoming trial when he opted to represent himself. Nor was he aware of how his case might be prejudiced if he proceeded without legal counsel, the judge’s “warning” notwithstanding.
Adkins was, by all accounts, quite inept in representing himself. While cross-examining the victim, Adkins prefaced a question stating, “When I was making love . . . .” The prosecutor objected on the ground that Adkins was stating facts not in evidence. An obviously frustrated Adkins then rephrased the question, “When I was raping you . . . .”
Even if Adkins’ inability to understand the perils of self-representation was not so profound, it is incorrect to equate a question asking whether Adkins understood the “hazard” involved with a sufficiently detailed colloquy in which the judge explains what the risks axe.6 The colloquy was so inadequate that the majority could not properly conclude that the *746judge “indulge [d] every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the right to counsel.7 Indeed, I can scarcely imagine a judge doing less to ensure that a defendant is making his decision with his “eyes open.” Substantial compliance requires at least what those words imply. It demands that some, i.e., a “substantial,” effort be made to ascertain whether in fact this particular defendant actually understands the consequences of his decision to represent himself.
The majority’s approval of this most cursory of questioning does not comport with the approach in other jurisdictions. The plurality opinion in People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412; 519 NW2d 128 (1994), contains a comprehensive review of what the federal courts require.8
*748Federal trial judges employ an outline in a bench book (appendix A) as a guide to ensure that the waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary. The bench book suggests that the judge not only apprise the defendant of the crime of which he is charged, and the maximum and minimum sentences, including the possibility of consecutive sentencing, but also admonishes the judge to warn the defendant that he may not provide the defendant with any advice concerning how to try the case, and encourages the judge to advise the defendant that he “would be far better defended by a trained lawyer . . . ,”9
Similarly, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice provides that “[a]n accused should not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry into the accused’s comprehension of the offer and capacity to make the choice intelligently and understandingly has been made.” To satisfy this guideline, the commentary on the standard notes that “the court should inquire whether the accused apprehends the nature of the charges, the offenses included within them, the allowable punishments, possible defenses to the charges, and circumstances in mitigation thereof, among other factors.”10
*749Requiring, at a minimum, some discussion of the risk involved is currently the policy both in federal and other state courts. Recently, in United States v Moscovits, 86 F3d 1303 (CA 3, 1996), the defendant sought a new trial on the ground that the colloquy with the judge regarding waiver of the right to counsel did not include a discussion of the possible range of punishments. The court agreed that the absence of such a discussion rendered the proceedings inadequate. It wrote,
To ensure that a defendant “truly appreciates the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,’ ... ‘[a defendant’s] waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, [and] the range of allowable punishments thereunder.’ ” [Id. at 1306, quoting United States v Welty, 674 F2d 185, 188 (CA 3, 1982), quoting Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), and Von Moltke v Gillies, 332 US 708, 724; 68 S Ct 316; 92 L Ed 309 (1948) (plurality).]
We should require that this approach, as spelled out in the federal bench book and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and applied in Moseovits, be followed by Michigan judges. Taking the little time needed at the trial level to apprise the defendant of the specific risks involved provides some assurance that the defendant has not lightly waived his right to proceed with counsel. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated:
[T]he more searching the inquiry at this stage the more likely it is that any decision on the part of the defendant is going to be truly voluntary and equally important that he will not be able to raise that issue later if he does then decide to represent himself. It is simply a question of taking *750enough time at the moment to make a meaningful record and thus to avoid the very real dangers of reversal should the defendant not prove himself up to the task of his own self-defense. [United Stales v McDowell, 814 F2d 245, 252 (CA 6, 1987).]
The more searching inquiry approach has been employed in the past by Michigan trial judges. See, e.g., colloquy between Branch Circuit Judge Michael Cherry and the defendant in People v Lane, 453 Mich 132; 551 NW2d 382 (1996) (attached as appendix B). We should expect other trial judges in this state to follow the same approach of their colleagues and judges in other jurisdictions.11
h
I also question the majority’s assertion that “Anderson does not favor a litany approach” because of the difficulty of assuring compliance by the trial court in *751every instance and the likelihood that an omission may create an appellate parachute for the defendant.12
The majority operates under a misconception that the litany is somehow arduous or long. It is not. The only requirements laid out in MCR 6.005(D)(1) are that the trial judge apprise “the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation . . . .”
The majority’s suggestion that a litany approach has somehow been universally discredited is without support. The majority relies in large part on federal cases that admittedly, do not adhere to this strict approach. There is a good reason for such departure, however. In contrast with MCR 6.005(D)(1), which occupies a mere four lines, the bench book sets forth sixteen questions or comments that a trial judge is expected to ask or make before approving the waiver of the right to counsel.13 It is thus understandable that on review an appellate court might not require the trial court to have phrased the questions exactly as they read on their face.
The majority also relies on Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), for support. However, like the bench book, the litany involved when a defendant pleads guilty is substantially longer than that called for when a defendant seeks to represent himself. A minor deviation is thus again understandable for reasons not applicable in the present case.
*752m
Because we recognize, as the United States Supreme Court has, “the enormous importance and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial,” this Court has a responsibility to assure that a defendant waives his right only after he is fully apprised of the risk that he is taking.14 For this reason, a trial court’s primary function should be to assure that the defendant is making the decision to proceed alone only after he has been apprised of all necessary and relevant information.
The majority stresses that the defendant made the request to proceed in propria persona as part of a “intentional manipulation”15 of the judicial system. There should be but one paramount concern for the trial judge as he questions the defendant regarding his desire to proceed in propria persona, however. That is whether his waiver is unequivocal and knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Resolving the question whether defendant is seeking to proceed in propria persona in an effort to manipulate the system is not of the same level of concern as the Anderson factors or even the substance of MCR 6.005(D)(1).
I also question the deferential treatment the majority accords the trial court’s finding that the defendant was attempting to delay the start of the trial and manipulate the system when he sought to represent himself. While it is true that Adkins did not previously bring to the court’s attention his disapproval of Ellis’ representation, nor did he provide any concrete rea*753sons for his disapproval when he ultimately did address this issue, this aspect of Adkins’ conduct is at best only marginally probative of bad intent.
Adkins had only a minimal educational background. It is thus likely that Adkins delayed in bringing his concerns to the judge’s attention, and failed to express them in a detailed and articulate fashion once he did, simply because he lacked the intelligence level and verbal skills that more highly educated persons, judges included, often take for granted.
The record contains precious little that would suggest an intent to manipulate or delay. The record is devoid of evidence that Adkins made any motions for an adjournment or obviously frivolous motions. Rather, the record shows that Adkins only moved to have his bail reduced and have evidence suppressed, both of which were understandable under the circumstances, as well as fairly routine given the type of case.
The majority also points to Adkins’ motion to move the case to another courtroom.16 The impetus for this request was Adkins’ attorney Ellis, not Adkins himself.
IV
The majority opines that “[t]he Anderson and court rule requirements are merely vehicles to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel with eyes open.”17 They are much more, however. They are, in fact, under these circumstances, the guardians of defendant’s right to a fair trial.
*754The majority today, by excusing the woefully inadequate procedures undertaken by these trial judges, condones sloppy conduct. It condones a process that fails to assure that a defendant will proceed without counsel only when he has indicated a desire to do so knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and unequivocally.
APPENDIX A
VOLUME 1, BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES,
§ 1.02, ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL OR PRO SE REPRESENTATION
3. If defendant does not wish counsel:
An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself if he chooses to do so. A defendant’s waiver of counsel must, however, be knowing and voluntary. This means that you must make clear on the record that the defendant is fully aware of hazards that he faces and the disadvantages of self-representation.
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent himself, you should therefore ask questions similar to the following:
(a) Have you ever studied law?
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action?
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: (Here state the crimes with which the defendant is charged.)
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count I the court must impose an assessment of $50 ($25 if a misdemeanor committed before Nov. 18, 1988; $25 if a Class A misdemeanor, $10 if Class B. $5 if Class c or infraction committed on or after Nov. 18, *7551988)1 and could sentence you to as many as_years in prison and fine you as much as $_.?
(Then ask him a similar question with respect to each other crime with which he may be charged in the indictment or information.)
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than one of those crimes this court can order that the sentence be served consecutively, that is, one after another?
(f) [If the conduct occurred Nov. 1, 1987, or later] You realize, do you not, that the United States Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will affect your sentence if you are found guilty?
(g) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself you are on your own? I cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to try your case.
(h) Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?
(i) You realize, do you not, that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules?
G) Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?
(k) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a criminal action is tried in federal court?
(l) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.
*756(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found guilty and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the affirmative, you should then say something to the following effect:
“I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will therefore permit him to represent himself.”
(jp) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted to represent himself. [Id. at 1.02-2 to 1.02-5 (emphasis in the original).]
APPENDIX B
COLLOQUY IN PEOPLE v LANE, 453 Mich 132; 551 NW2d 382 (1996)
The Court: Thank you. The Defendant has indicated— has filed a — a number of motions. The first of which the Court wishes to address is the motion to discharge counsel and to proceed in propria person [sic].
Mr. Lane, is there anything that you would wish to say in that regard?
Defendant: No, sir.
The Court: Mr. Lane, certainly in any matter as grave as this one, with the supplemental information, a maximum penalty of up to 15 years in prison is possible. On each of the other three counts, maximum penalties of up to four years and/or fines of not to exceed $2,000 are possible.
Do you have any schooling or training in the law?
Defendant: I have just a little bit. I’ve been studying, so I don’t — you know. I’m not as advanced as Mr. Goodwin here, but I feel I’m capable of representing myself in this matter.
*757The Court: What is your educational background?
Defendant: I’ve been to Ja — Jackson Community College, you know. I participated in a paralegal class.
The Court: Okay. Have you a high school degree or a GED?
Defendant: GED.
The Court: Okay. When did you obtain that, please?
Defendant: In ’89.
The Court: And then you’ve been taking some community college courses through Jackson Community College?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: And among those is one paralegal class?
Defendant: Right.
The Court: Did you prepare the documents in the court file, the motions, or did you have assistance in doing that?
Defendant: I prepared them.
The Court: Did you have the assistance of a paralegal?
Defendant: No, I did it myself.
The Court: Certainly, Mr. Lane, one of the adages often quoted in circumstances such as this is the old homily that anyone who represents himself has a fool for a — for a client.
The fact is that Mr. Goodwin is vastly experienced and well-qualified in — in criminal matters such as these. Indeed, one of the reasons that he among other attorneys happens to be appointed on — on criminal cases — and, as a matter of fact, he and another attorney share the public defender contract on all non-prison cases in which people are indigent— is because of his — his experience.
And, quite frankly, I think that you would be far better off with — with Mr. Goodwin as an attorney than trying to represent your — yourself, at least as far as trying the case is concerned, if it goes to trial.
Unless you are well-schooled and versed in the rules of evidence, evidence might get in that would be prejudicial to you that an attorney, knowing the rules of evidence, could make appropriate motions and have the Court exclude.
*758Certainly the Court is in no position, on its own, to decide such matters as — as hearsay or leading questions or anything else that sometimes objections could be made to.
As far as assisting you in other ways, knowing the — the law, knowing the sufficiency of evidence that the Prosecutor must present in order to fulfill his burden, and knowing which witnesses to call and in asking questions appropriately of the — the particular witnesses also are functions that I believe an attorney would be far better schooled at least, and experienced attorneys trained in providing for you.
Is it still your desire, at this point, to — to represent yourself?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: What the Court will do is first ask Mr. Live-say, are there any additional questions that you would ask?
Mr. Livesay: No, your Honor.
The Court: Certainly I can’t force you to — to have an attorney represent you. What I will do is to have Mr. Goodwin available to — to assist you, to answer any questions that you may have. As well, at the time of trial, I wall have him available for you to — to assist.
If you persist in your motion to represent yourself, certainly you have that — that right, but the Court would give appropriate instructions to the jury as well that certainly they’re not to hold that against you, but you are not to get any benefit from that in their eyes as — as well.
Can you understand that?
Defendant: Yes, sir.

 I also understand the “substantial compliance” standard to be equally applicable to cases in which MCR 6.005(E) is at issue.

 I expressly disagree with Justice Boyle’s concurrence because of its strongly implied and inappropriate message to the bench and bar: that procedural safeguards authoritatively set forth by this Court in case law and court rules are merely precatory.

 The majority acknowledges that when the issue of defendant’s dissatisfaction with Mr. Daly was first discussed in open court on March 17, 1989, the court did not inquire into the nature of defendant’s dissatisfaction, nor did it inquire about his alleged desire to proceed in propria persona. See ante, pp 714-715.

 The majority acknowledges that Mr. Moore’s “appointment was not on the record,” but opines, contrary to the actual evidence adduced, that “it appears that Mr. Moore was a full-fledged counsel, not merely standby counsel . . . .” Id., p 716, n 9.

 Ante at 733, n 29.

 Ante at 731.

 Id. at 721.

 Id. at 726-727.

 The Court: You understand, sir, that there is always a hazard in representing yourself, and that is you are not schooled in the Rules of Evidence and the like, but you still must abide by my rulings, do you understand that?
Defendant Adkins: Yes, I do.

 As the Oregon Supreme Court noted:
*746A colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant wherein the court, in some fashion explains the risks of self-representation is the preferred means of assuring that the defendant understand[s] the risks of self-representation. The more relevant information that a trial court provides to a defendant about the right to counsel and about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the more likely it will be that a defendant’s decision to waive counsel is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege and that the record will so demonstrate. [State v Meyrick, 313. Or 125, 133; 831 P2d 666 (1992) (emphasis added).]
See also State v Frampton, 737 P2d 183, 187 (Utah, 1987) (generally, a determination whether a defendant has waived his right to counsel knowingly can only be made “after penetrating questioning by the trial court”); Daniels v State, 921 SW2d 377, 382 (Tex App, 1996) (the trial court should take an “active role,” which includes making the defendant aware of “the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter”).

 Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938).

 The opinion states:
The majority of federal courts, while acknowledging Von Moltke [v Gillies, 332 US 708; 68 S Ct 316; 92 L Ed 309 (1948)], have taken *747a nonformalistic approach in ascertaining the right of self-representation. See Hsu v United States, 392 A2d 972, 983 (DC App, 1978). For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[w]hile no particular form of interrogation is necessary, the court must assure itself that the defendant understands the charges and the manner in which an attorney can be of assistance.” United States v Gillings, 568 F2d 1307, 1308-1309 (CA 9, 1978). See also United States v Balough, 820 F2d 1485 (CA 9, 1987); United States v Aponte, 591 F2d 1247, 1250 (CA 9, 1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has stated that “the trial judge should conduct an inquiry sufficient to establish a defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the factors” relevant to his decision to waive counsel, United States v Padilla, 819 F2d 952, 959 (CA 10, 1987). See also Sanchez v Mondragon, 858 F2d 1462, 1465 (CA 10, 1988); United States v Gipson, 693 F2d 109, 111 (CA 10, 1982), cert den 459 US 1216 (1983); United States v Bennett, 539 F2d 45, 50 (CA 10, 1976), cert den 429 US 925 (1976).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit does not require a detailed listing of advice similar to that mandated for guilty plea proceedings conducted pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but does require a “searching inquiry” sufficient to satisfy the trial judge that the defendant’s waiver was understanding and voluntary. United States v Welty, 674 F2d 185, 189 (CA 3, 1982). See also United States v Gallop, 838 F2d 105, 109-110 (CA 4, 1988); Wiesner v Abrams, 726 F Supp 912, 917 (ED NY, 1989), aff'd without opinion 909 F2d 1473 (CA 2, 1990).
Several courts have stated that a waiver hearing expressly addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense is much preferred but not absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v Wainwright, 800 F2d 1057, 1064 (CA 11, 1986); United States v Bailey, 219 US App DC 67, 78, n 17; 675 F2d 1292 (1982), cert den 459 US 853 (1982); Tuitt v Fair, 822 F2d 166 (CA 1, 1987), cert den 484 US 945 (1987).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit now requires trial judges to follow the model inquiry set forth in 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges (3d ed), 1.02-2 to 1.02-5. See United States v McDowell, 814 F2d 245 (CA 6, 1987),. cert den 484 US 980 (1987). Other examples of a model inquiry format are set forth in People v Arguello, 772 P2d 87 (Colo, 1989); and People v Lopez, 71 Cal App 3d 568, 571-573; 138 Cal Rptr 36 (1977).
The common thread that can be gleaned from these cases is that “[t]he ultimate test is not the trial court’s express advice, but rather the defendant’s understanding.” Fitzpatrick, supra, p 1065. See also United States v Harris, 683 F2d 322 (CA 9, 1982), appeal after remand 726 F2d 558 (CA 9, 1984). The most reliable assurance of *748an awareness by the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation is by means of a colloquy on the record between the judge and the defendant. Bailey, supra, p 74. [Den-nany, supra at 429-431.]

 See 1 Bench Book for United States District Court Judges (3d ed), § 1.02-3(1), p 1.02-4 (1986) (attached as appendix a).

 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), pp 5-72 to 5-73.

 See McDowell, supra at 249-250 (adopting the procedure laid out in the Bench Book as a model inquiry to be undertaken by trial judges); Meyrick, n 6 supra; Commonwealth v Monica, 528 Pa 266, 275; 597 A2d 600 (1991) (trial court committed error requiring reversal by allowing the defendant to represent himself “without first conducting a thorough on-the-record colloquy”); Daniels, n 6 supra; Prater v State, 220 Ga App 506, 509; 469 SE2d 780 (1996) (reversal was required where there was no evidence that the defendant “understood the nature of the charges; the statutory offenses included within them; the range of allowable punishments thereunder . . .; possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof; or other facts essential to establishing a knowing waiver,” citing Clarke v Zant, 247 Ga 194; 275 SE2d 49 (1981); State v Dowler, 80 Hawaii 246, 250-251; 909 P2d 574 (App, 1995) (“the trial court should malee [the defendant] aware of the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses available, the punishments which may be imposed, ... all other [essential] facts . . . and should inform the defendant . . . that self-representation is detrimental to himself”); Moore v Commonwealth, 556 SW2d 161, 163 (Ky App, 1977) (adopting the approach of the Gillies plurality that a waiver of the right to counsel is not knowing and voluntary, and hence not valid, unless the defendant is apprised of the charges and range of sentences).

 Ante at 725.

 See Bench Book, n 9 supra.

 Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285, 298; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988).

 Ante at 723.

 Id. at 730.

 Id. at 725.

 The federal savings [sic] clause, 1 U.S.C. § 109, appears to apply to the provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, effective Nov. 18, 1988, that changed the fine amounts for misdemeanors. See, e.g., U.S. v. Schumann, 861 F.2d 1234 (11th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 990 (1973).