Court Opinion

ID: 9675333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:49:36.25354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.415407
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I must note, at the onset, the unusual posture of this case. While the majority states that this court previously denied a writ of habeas corpus, Savery v. State, 767 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no pet.), what was actually before this court was an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus filed in a lower court. In fact, the opinion so stated at 247: “We have viewed this proceeding, as we now should, as an appeal from a denial of an application for habeas corpus.... We stress, as stated above, that this proceeding is an appeal concerning the denial of habeas corpus.” As noted in this writer’s concurring opinion, the previous majority, while noting “WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED”, actually affirmed the lower court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus then went on to allow an ordinary appeal. I continue to assert that TEX.R.APP.P. 44 does not allow this court to affirm the denial of a writ of habeas corpus and simultaneously allow an appeal. Therefore, this court, in my opinion, is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Having done so, I dissent to the majority’s disposition of the search warrant issue. Specifically, I dissent to the majority’s holding that the probable cause affidavit meets the totality of circumstances test under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) or the requirements of Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). The defect in the affidavit is that it contains nothing to allow the magistrate to judge the credibility of the sub-informant. I felt the exact issue was properly presented to our *332Court of Criminal Appeals in Roldan v. State, 698 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.App.— Beaumont 1985) when the court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review. However, the court viewed this statement: “I would hold that the facts in this case do not meet the requirements of Gates, supra, and Hennessy, supra", as a factual disagreement among the justices and consequently dismissed the review as improvidently granted. Roldan v. State, 739 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). They were wrong; there was no factual disagreement, only an inarticulate statement which meant to state that the majority had misapplied the law to the facts.
Let there be no doubt in this case. There is NO factual disagreement. The affiant swore that he received information from Bunky Henry while giving sufficient information to establish the credibility of Bunky. The affiant further swore that Bunky had received materials from his son Brad who had told Bunky the materials had come from the home of appellant. There is absolutely nothing in the affidavit from which the magistrate could determine the credibility of Brad except that Brad was Bunky’s son. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that Gates and Hennessy have completely abandoned the requirement that an affiant receive information from a reliable, credible person and that there be some information in the affidavit to establish the credibility of each informant and sub-informant. The majority misinterprets the law in that regard.
The trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress and admitting the items found as a result of the search. Therefore, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Because the majority affirms, I respectfully dissent.