Court Opinion

ID: 9382397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 17:00:39.035473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.219939
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1137       Document: 010110832938      Date Filed: 03/27/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                               FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          March 27, 2023
                           _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
     BROOKS TERRELL,

          Petitioner - Appellant,
                                                               No. 22-1137
     v.                                              (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02935-WJM)
                                                                (D. Colo.)
     TRUE, Warden,

          Respondent - Appellee.
                         _________________________________

                               ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                           _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

          Brooks Terrell, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative

 Maximum, appeals the lower court’s order denying his pro se application for a writ of

 habeas corpus under § 2241 and dismissing his case with prejudice.1 Mr. Terrell

 challenges the calculation of his federal sentence, arguing he is entitled to additional

 good conduct time credits under the First Step Act. Pub. L. 115–391, 132 Stat. 5194.

 *
   After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
 1
   There is also a pending motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment
 of costs or fees filed by Mr. Terrell. That motion is granted.
Appellate Case: 22-1137     Document: 010110832938         Date Filed: 03/27/2023     Page: 2

 Because the Bureau of Prisons correctly calculated Mr. Terrell’s good time credits,

 we affirm the district court.

                                      I. Background

       After Mr. Terrell was convicted of several federal felonies, a judge sentenced

 him to 382 months in prison. The passage of the First Step Act, which provided

 eligible inmates the opportunity to earn time credits for participation in certain

 programs, prompted the Bureau to recalculate the amount of time for which Mr.

 Terrell was potentially eligible. Under the Bureau’s policy, inmates who are not

 making progress toward their GED are only eligible for 42 days of good time credit,

 instead of 54 days, in those years of incarceration where an inmate has not earned, or

 is not making progress toward earning, a GED. For nine years, Mr. Terrell did not

 make the required progress towards a GED, resulting in the loss of 108 days of good

 time credits. He has also been convicted of numerous disciplinary infractions,

 resulting in the loss of 674 days of good time credits.

       Under the First Step Act, the Bureau calculated that Mr. Terrell was eligible

 for 1,718 days of good time credit at the outset of his sentence (54 days per year with

 the final year prorated). That number, however, was reduced to 936 days because

 Mr. Terrell did not make satisfactory progress towards earning a GED and was

 convicted of prison disciplinary infractions. Mr. Terrell now claims he is eligible for

 2,625 days of good time credit. In his supplemental briefing,2 he alternatively asserts

 2
   The court appointed counsel and requested supplemental briefing on Mr. Terrell’s
 arguments.
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Appellate Case: 22-1137    Document: 010110832938         Date Filed: 03/27/2023       Page: 3

 that the congressional intent behind the First Step Act is to provide inmates with

 seven additional days of good time credit per year.

                                      II. Discussion

       We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

 In reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2241 application, we “review the district

 court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual findings unless clearly

 erroneous.” Al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013).

       We find no error in the district court’s denial of Mr. Terrell’s habeas petition.

 Mr. Terrell advances three arguments: (1) the First Step Act requires the Bureau to

 reinstate all good time credit he would have initially been eligible for, regardless of

 his disciplinary history; (2) the Bureau’s method of prorating eligible good time

 credit conflicts with the language of the First Step Act; and (3) the congressional

 intent behind the First Step Act is to provide inmates with a potential seven

 additional days of good time credit. We are unpersuaded.

       The First Step Act made significant changes to the calculation of good time

 credit, but it does not explicitly require restoration of good time credit properly

 revoked for disciplinary convictions. Mr. Terrell does not supply any authority to

 suggest otherwise. Indeed, he acknowledges as much in his supplemental briefing.

 While the Tenth Circuit has not addressed this particular question, the Third Circuit

 rejected the same argument in Powers v. Warden Allenwood USP, 824 F. App’x 95

 (3d Cir. 2020). We agree with the Third Circuit.

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Appellate Case: 22-1137     Document: 010110832938        Date Filed: 03/27/2023      Page: 4

       In Powers, the Third Circuit explained that the First Step Act amended the

 previous statute to modify the process for calculating good time credit. Id. at 96. The

 First Step Act kept the same language allowing the Bureau to determine whether an

 inmate “displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.”

 Compare § 3624(b)(1) (effective December 21, 2018 to July 18, 2019), with

 § 3624(b)(1) (effective July 19, 2019). The plain language of the statute

 demonstrates that Congress meant to continue allocating the Bureau the authority to

 revoke good time credit for disciplinary infractions. And there is no language in the

 statute suggesting that the Bureau must restore good time credit already revoked for

 disciplinary issues.3

       Mr. Terrell’s challenge to the validity of the Bureau’s policy of prorating

 eligible good time credit where an inmate’s remaining sentence is less than a year

 likewise fails. The First Step Act is silent as to how to calculate good time credit for

 a partial year of imprisonment, and agencies like the Bureau have leeway in

 interpreting and implementing arguably ambiguous statutory provisions. Pub. L.

 115–391, 132 Stat. 5194.4 Because the Bureau’s interpretation of the First Step Act’s

 good time credit requirements is “based on a permissible construction of the statute,”

 3
   Mr. Terrell asserts that the good time credits are “vested” in him. But this is
 contrary to the plain language of the statute: “credit awarded . . . shall vest on the
 date the prisoner is released from custody.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2).
 4
    Mr. Terrell also argues that 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 is the Bureau’s attempt to “re-
 litigate” the belief that the First Step Act is ambiguous. He, however, does not
 provide any examples where the regulations and the First Step Act conflict.
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Appellate Case: 22-1137    Document: 010110832938        Date Filed: 03/27/2023       Page: 5

 we affirm the district court. Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder, 753 F.3d 1165, 1168 (10th

 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Finally, Mr. Terrell’s seven-day argument fails, too. For the first time on

 appeal, Mr. Terrell contends that Congress intended the Bureau of Prisons to dock

 fewer good time credits from inmates not making satisfactory educational

 advancement. But even liberally construing Mr. Terrell’s filings below5 does not

 permit us to recognize such an argument as properly preserved. See Singleton v.

 Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (explaining that generally a court of appeals will not

 consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal). Regardless, we reject this

 argument because it is not rooted in the text of the First Step Act and lacks support in

 the record or congressional documents.

                                     III. Conclusion
     The district court’s order is AFFIRMED.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                             Circuit Judge

 5
   Mr. Terrell proceeded pro se before the district court and for a portion of this
 appeal, requiring the court to liberally construe those pleadings that were filed
 without representation. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir.
 2009).
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