Court Opinion

ID: 9718050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:16:01.219849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.076884
License: Public Domain

MAY, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the trial court should not have determined Gerst-bauer’s attorney fees by looking only to the amount of the judgment. However, the majority’s decision to award fees based solely on evidence presented by Gerst-bauer’s opponent amounts to an improper reweighing of the evidence that was before the trial court. I would remand so the trial court could properly recalculate attorney fees based on its analysis of the evidence before it in light of the legal standards the majority has articulated.
This court may in certain situations direct final judgment without new factfind-ing, but “this power is to be utilized only if the court is reviewing a pure question of law or a mixed question of law and fact.” Rebel v. National City Bank of Evansville, 598 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Cases involving resolution of disputed material facts should be referred back to the trial court. Id.
This case requires the resolution of disputed material facts on the attorney fees issue. The majority would award $79,577.89 instead of the $161,280 Gerst-bauer requested or some other figure the facts might support, but when reviewing an award of attorney fees, we should not *385reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. E.g., Davidson v. Boone County, 745 N.E.2d 895, 900 (Ind.Ct.App.2001).
The trial court misapplied the law in determining the amount of Gerstbauer’s attorney fees, and the majority purports to resolve that error by adopting in full the evidence presented by an expert retained by Styers, Gerstbauer’s opponent. However, Gerstbauer also presented evidence of attorney fees. As the trial court noted, Gerstbauer presented evidence he had expended $161,280 in attorney fees, and he “argued by brief that every dollar of the $161,280.00 expenditure is reasonable.” (Slip op. at 12.)
Because the majority has reweighed the evidence, its award is not a proper application of our authority under App. R. 66(C)(4) to “order entry of judgment in an amount supported by the evidence.” See Simon Property Group, L.P. v. Brandt Const., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 981, 993 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), transfer denied 855 N.E.2d 997 (Ind.2006). There we awarded damages on appeal where the only evidence of the fair market value of damaged property was in the amount of $86,874.45. The jury found Simon 50% at fault, so we awarded $43,437.23. “Because the evidence supported only one amount as the total loss in fair market value, we may order judgment for Landlord as a matter of law in this undisputed amount, and hereby do so.” (Emphasis supplied.) The attorney fees evidence before the trial court in the case before us is not “undisputed,” nor does the evidence support “only one amount.”
The majority has determined the fee amount by improperly weighing that conflicting evidence, choosing to believe Gerst-bauers opponent in every respect and to discredit the evidence Gerstbauer offered. We should not so invade the trial court’s province as the finder of fact.
I fully appreciate the majority’s reluctance to remand when doing so would undoubtedly extend this remarkably lengthy litigation. But our standard of review requires it, and I would not usurp the trial court’s factfinding authority for the sole purpose of bringing this action to an earlier resolution. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.