Court Opinion

ID: 9412036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:27.670749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.892959
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GREGORY A. NORNHOLD                        :   No. 1134 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-21-CR-0003108-2021

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED JULY 27, 2023

       The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered on July 18, 2022 in

the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County that granted in part and

denied in part the habeas corpus petition filed by Appellee, Gregory Nornhold

(“Nornhold”). The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting

Nornhold’s request to dismiss charges of third-degree murder and aggravated

assault, as well as charges of homicide by motor vehicle and aggravated

assault by vehicle.1      The Commonwealth also contends that the trial court

erred in finding evidence of Nornhold’s failure to use car seats inadmissible

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732(a) and
3732.1(a).
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despite Nornhold’s special training as a foster parent in the use of car seats.

Upon review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

      On August 3, 2021, at approximately 3:40 PM, [Nornhold] and his
      four minor passengers were travelling northbound on Interstate
      81 around mile marker 54, within the bounds of Cumberland
      County. [Nornhold] was driving a Volkswagen Tiguan which
      departed the northbound left lane of Interstate 81, crossed the
      75-foot grass median, and hit a Ford F-150 pickup trick which was
      travelling southbound, which then impacted a Ford Focus. During
      their investigation, the Pennsylvania State Police uncovered
      evidence that [Nornhold] made no effort to brake, accelerate or
      otherwise steer the vehicle after it left its lane of travel, crossed
      the median and entered the opposing lanes of travel. Additionally,
      several THC cartridges and vape pens were discovered inside
      [Nornhold’s] vehicle following the collision.

      Two of [Nornhold’s] minor passengers, two-year-old L.N. and four-
      year-old M.G., were ejected from the vehicle and ultimately
      succumbed to their injuries. Six-year-old B.A. and eight-year-old
      G.A. were also injured, though they survived their injuries. Only
      L.N. and B.A. were in car seats, although L.N. was only in the seat
      portion of a booster seat. The driver of the F-150 suffered a
      broken rib and contusions to his lung, and the driver of the Ford
      Focus suffered multiple lacerations, as well as neck and back pain.
      [Nornhold] was also injured in the crash. Following the crash,
      [Nornhold] was transported to Penn State Holy Spirit Medical
      Center for treatment.

      Sometime after his arrival at the hospital, [Nornhold’s] blood was
      drawn.     The results of that blood draw demonstrated that
      [Nornhold] had both active and inactive metabolites of marijuana
      in his system, as well as prescription medications, notably Zoloft
      (Sertraline) and Wellbutrin (Hydroxybupropion). Several hours
      after [Nornhold] arrived at the hospital, Trooper Jacob Fackler of
      the Pennsylvania State Police arrived to speak to him about the
      accident. [Nornhold] gave vague and multiple statements at this
      time, indicating he may have been cut off by another vehicle,
      something may have happened in front of him, he may have been
      distracted by his phone, or he may have been distracted by the
      children. [Nornhold] also indicated that he possessed a medical

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       marijuana card, but that he only used marijuana at home when
       his husband is present, and when [Nornhold] would not be driving.
       [Nornhold] was later interviewed a couple of months after the
       incident, with his attorney present, during which he posited that
       either the air bags or an unknown medical condition had rendered
       him unconscious, causing him to lose control of his vehicle.

       Ultimately, charges were filed against [Nornhold] on November
       18, 2021, and the criminal information was filed on February 3,
       2022. The instant Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed on
       February 11, 2022, and a hearing held on April 22, 2022. Initial
       briefs were timely filed by both parties . . . and a reply brief was
       filed by [Nornhold] on June 15, 2022, prompting this opinion and
       order of court.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/22, at 1-3.

       In its July 18, 2022 order, the trial court granted Nornhold’s petition

“with respect to the dismissal of the charges of Criminal Homicide—Third

Degree Murder, Aggravated Assault, Homicide by Vehicle (Non-DUI) and

Aggravated Assault by Vehicle (Non-DUI).” Order, 7/18/22, at 1. The order

also granted the petition to the limited extent that two charges of endangering

the welfare of a child were properly charged as third-degree, rather than

second-degree, felonies. In all other respects, the petition was denied, thus

preserving numerous additional charges, including Homicide by Vehicle While

DUI and Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI along with various restraint

system violations.2

____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3735(a)(1)(ii), 3735.1(a), and 4581.

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       The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s July

18, 2022 order.3 Both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4

       The Commonwealth presents two issues for our consideration:

       I.     Did the trial court err when it granted [Nornhold’s] writ of
              habeas corpus when the Commonwealth presented
              sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to warrant
              the belief that [Nornhold] committed the crimes charged?

       II.    Did the trial court err when it suppressed evidence regarding
              [Nornhold’s] failure to properly secure the victims in child
              car seats, as required by law?

Commonwealth Brief at 5 (numbering corrected and some capitalization

omitted).

       In its first issue, the Commonwealth asserts trial court error for granting

Nornhold’s writ of habeas corpus with regard to four charges brought against

Nornhold, i.e., criminal homicide—third-degree murder, aggravated assault,

homicide by vehicle (Non-DUI), and aggravated assault by vehicle (Non-DUI).

“We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus

by examining the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a

____________________________________________

3 With its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth filed an affidavit certifying that

the July 18, 2022 order handicapped its prosecution, thus permitting an
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). See Notice of Appeal, 8/12/22, at 1 n.1
(unnumbered).

4 We remind counsel for the Commonwealth that a copy of an appellant’s Rule

1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal is to be attached to an
appellant’s brief. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11) and (d).

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light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Dantzler,

135 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (citation omitted). Whether

the Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial prima facie burden is a question

of law. Id. at 1112 (citations omitted). “Indeed, the trial court is afforded no

discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts

presented    to   it,   the    Commonwealth     has   carried   its   pre-trial, prima

facie burden to make out the elements of a charged crime.” Commonwealth

v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005).

      As our Supreme Court explained in Karetny:

      At the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal prosecution, the
      Commonwealth need not prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
      reasonable doubt, but rather, must merely put forth sufficient
      evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt.        A prima
      facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of
      each of the material elements of the crime charged and
      establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused
      committed the offense. Furthermore, the evidence need only be
      such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge
      would be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the
      jury.

Id. at 513-14 (internal citations omitted).

      We first consider whether the trial court committed error of law in

dismissing   charges      of   criminal   homicide    (third-degree    murder)    and

aggravated assault. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501, “[a] person is guilty of

criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently

causes the death of another human being.” In accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2502(c), third-degree murder is any murder that is not murder in the first

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or second degree, i.e., not an intentional murder or one committed in the

commission of a felony. “Murder in the third degree is an unlawful killing with

malice but without the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy,

20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).

      In Dunphy, this Court reiterated that malice is defined as:

      A “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
      recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social
      duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be
      injured.” Malice may be found where the defendant consciously
      disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions
      might cause serious bodily injury.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super.

2001) (brackets and additional citation omitted)). “Malice may be inferred by

considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

      With respect to aggravated assault, “a person is guilty of aggravated

assault if he . . . attempts to cause serious injury to another, or causes such

injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2702(a)(1).

As our Supreme Court has stated, “the mens rea required for a conviction of

aggravated assault, like third-degree murder, is malice; only the result of the

crimes differ.” Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017).

      In its opinion, the trial court recognized:

      “There is no distinction between the malice essential to third
      degree murder and that necessary for aggravated assault.”
      [Packer, 168 A.3d at 168, citing] Commonwealth v. Kling, 731
      A.2d 145, 147 (Pa. Super. 1999). “A defendant must display a
      conscious disregard for almost certain death or injury such that it

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       is tantamount to an actual desire to injure or kill; at the very least
       the conduct must be such that one could reasonable anticipate
       death or serious bodily injury would likely and logically result.”
       Kling, supra, 731 A.2d at 148. “In view of this heightened mens
       rea, motor vehicle crashes seldom give rise to proof of the malice
       needed to sustain a conviction for third degree murder or
       aggravated assault.” Id. See also Packer, supra, 168 A.3d at
       170 (“In the DUI context, this Court has held that the decision to
       drive while under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled
       substance does not, standing alone, constitute malice.”).

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/22, at 7.

       The trial court conducted a comprehensive review of the dueling lines of

cases relied on by the Commonwealth and by Nornhold. See id. at 8-14.5

____________________________________________

5  Cases cited by the Commonwealth include Packer, supra (defendant
demonstrated requisite malice for third-degree murder and aggravated
assault by driving under the influence of Difluoroethane, which she huffed
before and while driving, despite knowing of her history of losing
consciousness after huffing); Dunphy, supra (defendant acted with malice
and a complete disregard of unjustified risk of causing death or serious injury
by driving while intoxicated, speeding at more than twice the speed limit,
speeding up to make a traffic light, striking and killing a pedestrian crossing
the street, and fleeing the scene); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545
(Pa. 1975) (intoxicated defendant who struck two children riding their bicycles
home from a public swimming pool, killing one of them, despite specific
knowledge that children frequently traveled in that area to and from the pool,
and failed to stop after the collision, demonstrated malice). Conversely,
Nornhold cites case in which there was no finding of malice, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. McHale, 858 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2004) (unlicensed,
uninsured, intoxicated driver who struck and injured two pedestrians before
fleeing the scene did not exhibit malice sufficient to support aggravated
assault conviction; Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1998)
(superseded by statute on other grounds) (driver who operated vehicle at high
rate of speed after drinking and ingesting muscle relaxers, jumped a curb and
struck two people waiting for a bus, killing one of them, did not demonstrate
mens rea sufficient to support conviction for third-degree murder and
aggravated assault); Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1995)
(running a red light, striking another vehicle and injuring its driver, insufficient
to sustain aggravated assault conviction for intoxicated driver).

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The court quoted Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1995), in

which our Supreme Court held that

     mere recklessness is insufficient to support a conviction for
     aggravated assault, which requires a higher degree of culpability,
     i.e., that which considers and then disregards the threat
     necessarily posed to human life by the offending conduct. There
     must be an element of deliberation or conscious disregard of
     danger not present to the same extent in, e.g., either reckless
     endangerment . . . or driving while intoxicated.

Id. at 9 (quoting O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d at 618). Further:

     for the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated assault
     statute to occur, the offensive act must be performed under
     circumstances which almost assure that life threatening injury will
     ensue. The recklessness must, therefore, be such that life
     threatening injury is essentially certain to occur. This state of
     mind is, accordingly, equivalent to that which seeks to cause
     injury.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. 1998), in

turn citing O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d at 618).

     After analyzing the competing cases and considering the parties’

arguments, the court concluded:

     [T]he facts of this case align more closely with Comer and its
     progeny than Taylor and Packer. Here, there was no testimony
     or evidence presented that [Nornhold] was fleeing from the scene
     of a crime . . . or that [Nornhold] knew he had a history of passing
     out after using marijuana and still drove despite that knowledge
     (compare Packer, supra). Nor was there any testimony or
     evidence that [Nornhold] was speeding or driving dangerously
     before the collision, that he observed a dangerous condition or
     hazard ahead, or that he made a deliberate choice to disregard
     that condition (compare Dunphy, supra[]).             Instead, like
     Comer and its subsequent line of cases, [Nornhold] was driving
     with an intoxicant in his system which, even weighing that
     evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, is not enough on its own
     to demonstrate the existence of malice. . . . Further, there was

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      no evidence that [Nornhold’s] conduct rose to the level of “almost
      assur[ing] that life threatening injury will ensue,” as the Comer
      court stated would be required to meet the degree of recklessness
      contemplated in the aggravated assault statute. Comer, supra,
      [716 A.2d at 596]. In short, there was no evidence or testimony
      presented that [Nornhold’s] state of mind at the time of the
      collision was “equivalent to that which seeks to cause injury.”
      Comer, supra, [716 A.2d at 596] (citing to O’Hanlon, supra,
      653 A.2d at 618). Further, . . . this court cannot consider the
      improper use, or lack of use, of child safety restraints as evidence
      supporting these charges. Ultimately, [Nornhold’s] conduct failed
      to rise to the level of legal malice, and as such the Commonwealth
      failed to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie case of either
      third-degree murder of aggravated assault.

Id. at 14-15.

      Cognizant that we are to examine the evidence and reasonable

inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude, as did the trial court, that the Commonwealth has failed to carry

its pre-trial, prima facie burden to make out the elements of criminal

homicide—third degree murder, or aggravated assault. As Nornhold admits,

“While the outcome of this case is tragic, it is clear that the required malice is

missing.” Nornhold’s Brief at 18. We agree. Therefore, we will not disturb

the trial court’s ruling in regard to those charges.

      We next consider whether the trial court erred in finding the

Commonwealth failed to carry its pre-trial, prima facie burden to make out

the elements of homicide by motor vehicle (non-DUI) and aggravated assault

by vehicle (non-DUI). Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(a):

      Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the
      death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law
      of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the

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      operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except
      section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol
      or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a
      felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

Id. (emphasis added). Further, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a):

      Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes serious
      bodily injury to another person while engaged in the violation of
      any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to
      the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic,
      except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of
      alcohol or controlled substance), is guilty of aggravated
      assault by vehicle, a felony of the third degree when the violation
      is the cause of the injury.

Id. (emphasis added).

      Here, the Commonwealth relies chiefly on this Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793 (Pa. Super. 2017), in which an

intoxicated driver, travelling at a right rate of speed and passing vehicles in a

no-passing zone, ultimately collided with a vehicle travelling in the opposite

direction, causing a fatal collision. However, with respect to Grays’ conviction

for aggravated assault by vehicle (non-DUI), Grays challenged only whether

one of his victims suffered a “serious bodily injury,” a necessary element of

the crime.   With regard to the interplay between homicide by vehicle and

aggravated assault (DUI) and their non-DUI counterparts, the issues were

sentencing issues, i.e., whether the non-DUI convictions merged with the DUI

convictions. This Court noted that all elements of the crimes are not the same

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and, therefore, the crimes did not merge for sentencing. 6 Therefore, Grays

is not helpful in analyzing, let alone resolving, the issue before us.

       Nornhold notes that the THC in his system cannot be considered for the

non-DUI homicide and aggravated assault charges. “As a result, the Court

has no evidence of [] any improper conduct on the part of Mr. Nornhold.”

Nornhold’s Brief at 18. As Nornhold observes, because the charges in question

are non-DUI offenses, “any evidence relating to the DUI is specifically

excluded from consideration.”         Id. at 20.   Further, “[s]imply crossing the

grassy median separating lanes of travel on an interstate and impacting

another vehicle is not sufficient to establish the recklessness necessary for the

[non-DUI crimes].” Id. at 20-21 (citing Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 203 A.3d

1115 (Pa. Super. 2019)).

       As the trial court recognized,

       In Wyatt, the trial court granted habeas relief based on the
       Commonwealth presenting evidence that the defendant was not
       speeding prior to the collision, that no mechanical failure was at
       fault for the collision, and that there was no erratic driving prior
       to the collision. Because the other factors were ruled out, the
       Commonwealth inferred that the defendant had to be distracted
       by something in the cab of his truck, which caused him to leave
       his lane, cross the center median and cause the fatal collision.
____________________________________________

6 The Court noted that “the crimes require proof of different elements.
Homicide by Vehicle requires the cause of death to be the result of a violation
of a motor vehicle law or ordinance other than a DUI violation; for example,[
as the appellant pled guilty to in Commonwealth v. Neupert, 684 A.2d 627
(Pa. Super. 1996),] racing on highway and failure to yield. On the other hand,
Homicide by Vehicle–DUI explicitly requires a DUI conviction as an element of
the crime.” Grays, 167 A.3d at 814-15 (quoting Neupert, 684 A.2d at 629).

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      The Superior Court, in affirming the grant of habeas relief, held
      that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden, and that simply
      speculating that the defendant must have been distracted because
      no other explanation appeared to fit was insufficient to prove the
      mens rea for homicide by vehicle or aggravated assault by vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/22, at 17.

      The trial court continued by distinguishing Grays, noting that the facts

in that case demonstrated “that the defendant did more than just drift into

opposing traffic, but instead was actively engaged in illegally passing other

vehicles in a no-passing zone, which is a clear display of erratic driving before

the collision.” Id. at 18. By contrast, because evidence of driving under the

influence cannot be considered for the non-DUI charges, “the Commonwealth

is only able to present evidence that [Nornhold] departed his lane of travel,

drifted across the center median and caused the fatal collision. There was no

evidence presented that [Nornhold] was distracted, or displayed other erratic

driving before the fatal collision.” Id. (footnote omitted). Due to the lack of

evidence or testimony that Nornhold “recklessly or with gross negligence”

caused death or serious bodily injury, the trial court concluded that the

Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case supporting the charges of

homicide by vehicle (non-DUI) and aggravated assault by vehicle (non-DUI).

Id. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion. The Commonwealth’s first

issue fails.

      In its second issue, the Commonwealth contends the trial court erred by

suppressing evidence regarding Nornhold’s failure to secure the victims in car

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seats.      “We evaluate the trial court’s determinations regarding the

admissibility    of   evidence     by   an   abuse   of   discretion    standard.”

Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960 972 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted). “We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless that ruling reflects

manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.”          Id. (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

         As the Commonwealth correctly observes, “It is undisputed in this case

that [Nornhold] failed to follow the law and did not have the children in the

appropriate car seats” as required by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581(a)(1)(i), (ii).

Commonwealth Brief at 25. The Commonwealth quotes the second sentence

of Section 4581(f), indicating that “[n]o criminal proceeding for the crime of

homicide by vehicle shall be brought on the basis of noncompliance with this

subchapter.”      Id. at 26.     However, the Commonwealth ignores the first

sentence of Section 4581(f), which provides that “[t]he requirements of this

subchapter or evidence of a violation of this subchapter are not admissible as

evidence in a criminal proceeding except in a proceeding for a violation

of this subchapter.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581(f) (emphasis added). Therefore,

the prohibition against evidence of a violation of the subchapter applies not

only to homicide charges, but also to the remaining charges, with the

exception of those relating to restraint systems. As the trial court recognizes,

“It is axiomatic, an initial, undisputable rule of statutory construction, that

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‘[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and

according to their common approved usage[.]’” Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/22,

at 5 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a)). “Under any reading of § 4581(f), it

cannot be argued that the fact that the children were not in proper safety

seats would be admissible in the underlying criminal matter, as the language

of the law specifically prohibits the same.” Id.

      The Commonwealth is not entitled to relief on its evidentiary claim.

      Because neither of the Commonwealth’s issues merits relief, we affirm

the trial court’s July 18, 2022 order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/27/2023

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