Court Opinion

ID: 9891415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 15:10:18.192929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:20.228772
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kamaladeen Mohammed and             :
Shanta M. Mohammed and              :
Kamal Trucking, Inc.                :
                                    :
      v.                            : Nos. 65 C.D. 2022 and 988 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Tobyhanna Township Zoning           :
Hearing Board                       :
                                    :
      v.                            :
                                    :
Tobyhanna Township,                 :
               Appellant            : Argued: September 11, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                 FILED: October 18, 2023

      Tobyhanna Township (Township) appeals to this Court from a December 16,
2021 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (Trial Court), which
granted an appeal from the Tobyhanna Township Zoning Board’s (ZHB) denial of a
variance sought by Kamaladeen Mohammed, Shanta M. Mohammed, and Kamal
Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Mohammeds). The Order also denied the Township’s
appeal, filed at a separate docket number, from a Notice of Deemed Approval
published by the Mohammeds. For the reasons below, we affirm.
                                     I. Background
       In 2001, Kamaladeen and Shanta M. Mohammed purchased a lot at 1335
Summit View Drive in Long Pond, an unincorporated portion of Tobyhanna
Township, Pennsylvania. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 129-30.1 The Mohammeds
soon afterward began work on a residence on the property that would also function
as an office for their trucking business. Id. at 150-51. In 2002 or 2003, the
Mohammeds constructed a paved entrance onto the rear portion of their property
from Long Pond Road, a state highway that runs alongside the property, to
accommodate their trucking company’s vehicles. Id. at 153-54. In 2006, the
Mohammeds constructed a seven-vehicle garage at the rear of their property, also to
accommodate company trucks, which they expanded in 2019. Id. at 44. On July 17,
2019, the Mohammeds received an enforcement notice from the Township
informing them that their trucking business was a nonconforming use of the property
under the Township’s zoning provisions. Id. at 34.
       The Mohammeds filed an appeal of the Township’s enforcement notice, and
the ZHB held hearings on the appeal on October 24, 2019, and November 7, 2019.
R.R. at 276. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the parties agreed to a 90-day
continuance of the third hearing so that the Township would have an opportunity to
consider a zoning change. Id. The parties agreed on February 4, 2020, to a second
90-day continuance, and a third 90-day continuance effective May 4, 2020. Id. at
277. On August, 18, 2020, the Township informed the Mohammeds via e-mail that
it had decided against a zoning change, but it did not schedule a third hearing. Id. at
284. The Township requested a conference call with the Mohammeds’ counsel on

       1
        The page numbers in the Township’s Reproduced Record lack the lowercase “a” required
by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2173. For consistency, we refer to specific page
numbers as they appear, albeit incorrectly, in the Reproduced Record.

                                             2
September 17, 2020, but, because their counsel was out of town, the conference call
did not occur until September 28, 2020. Id. at 278. During that discussion, the
Mohammeds argued that the time to schedule a final hearing had expired, and that a
deemed approval of the requested zoning change thereby occurred. Id. Accordingly,
the Mohammeds filed a motion with the ZHB to dismiss the July 17, 2019
enforcement notice. Id. While maintaining that a deemed approval occurred, the
Mohammeds asked the ZHB for a zoning variance in the alternative.                             See
Township’s Br., App. A, Trial Court Opinion (Trial Ct. Op., 12/16/2021) at 2. Two
final hearings were held on October 26, 2020, and November 18, 2020. Id. at 4.
Finally, on December 18, 2020, the ZHB issued a written decision denying the
appeal of the enforcement order, denying the variance request, and denying the
assertion that a deemed approval had occurred. Id.
       On January 19, 2021, the Mohammeds filed a Land Use Appeal in the Trial
Court, to which the Trial Court assigned the docket number 318 CV 2021. R.R. at
11. Therein, the Mohammeds reiterated their argument that a deemed approval had
occurred pursuant to Section 908(9) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. as amended, 53 P.S. § 10908(9).2 See R.R.
at 11. The Mohammeds explained that any hearings that the ZHB intended to hold

       2
           Section 908(9) of the MPC provides, in relevant part:

       Except for [landowners’ challenges to the validity of ordinances or maps restricting
       use or development] where the board fails to render the decision within the period
       required by this subsection or fails to commence, conduct or complete the required
       hearing as provided in subsection (1.2), the decision shall be deemed to have been
       rendered in favor of the applicant unless the applicant has agreed in writing or on
       the record to an extension of time.

53 P.S. § 10908(9).

                                                 3
on the matter were subject to the time limits provided by Section 908(1.2);3
accordingly, no hearing could have been scheduled beyond August 2, 2020, the
conclusion of the third and final 90-day continuance agreed to by the parties. Id. at
13. Alternatively, the Mohammeds argued that they were entitled to a variance by
estoppel due to the ZHB’s failure to enforce the zoning code, despite the ZHB’s
awareness of the nonconforming use for well over a decade. Id. at 15. The Township
filed a Notice of Intervention on February 5, 2021, in which it argued against the
Mohammeds’ appeal from the enforcement order. Id. at 4. In response, the
Mohammeds filed a motion to quash the Township’s appeal as improperly filed. Id.
at 2.
        Notwithstanding the still-pending Land Use Appeal, the Mohammeds
published a Notice of Deemed Approval of the variance request on May 19, 2021,
pursuant to Section 908(9) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10908(9).4 Id. at 119. On June

        3
            Section 908(1.2) of the MPC provides, in relevant part:

        The first hearing before the board or hearing officer shall be commenced within 60
        days from the date of receipt of the applicant’s application, unless the applicant has
        agreed in writing to an extension of time. Each subsequent hearing before the board
        or hearing officer shall be held within 45 days of the prior hearing, unless otherwise
        agreed to by the applicant in writing or on the record.

53 P.S. § 10908(1.2).

        4
            Section 908(9) of the MPC provides, in relevant part:

        When a decision has been rendered in favor of the applicant because of the failure
        of the board to meet or render a decision as hereinabove provided, the board shall
        give public notice of said decision within ten days from the last day it could have
        met to render a decision in the same manner as provided in subsection (1) of this
        section. If the board shall fail to provide such notice, the applicant may do so.
        Nothing in this subsection shall prejudice the right of any party opposing the
        application to appeal the decision to a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  4
28, 2021, the Township filed an appeal of the Notice of Deemed Approval as a
separate action, to which the Trial Court assigned docket number 3362 CV 2021.
Id. at 8. The Mohammeds then filed a motion to quash the Township’s appeal of
their Notice of Deemed Approval, arguing that the Township failed to file it within
the 30-day period provided by Section 1002-A(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 11002-
A(a).5 See Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 10. The Township filed a motion to
consolidate the two matters, which the Trial Court granted on October 7, 2021. See
O.R., Item No. 15.
       Before the Trial Court, the Township argued that the October 26, 2020 hearing
was not untimely as a matter of law. Trial Ct. Op., 12/16/2021, at 8. The Township
referred to the Act of April 20 of 2020, P.L. 82, No. 15, § 1.3 (Act 15), which, inter
alia, “suspended and tolled” certain actions by municipal governments beyond the
normal deadlines provided in the MPC.6 Id. Act 15’s tolling provision, the

53 P.S. § 10908(9) (emphasis added).

       5
           Section 1002-A(a) of the MPC provides, in relevant part:

       All appeals from all land use decisions rendered pursuant to Article IX shall be
       taken to the court of common pleas of the judicial district wherein the land is located
       and shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the decision as provided in 42 Pa.C.S.
       § 5572 (relating to time of entry of order) or, in the case of a deemed decision,
       within 30 days after the date upon which notice of said deemed decision is given as
       set forth in section 908(9)2 of this act.

Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, as amended, 53 P.S. § 11002-A(a).

       6
         The relevant provision of Act 15, now codified at 35 Pa.C.S. § 5741(g)(1), provides that,
for “an action required by law in consideration of any application, plat, plan or other submission
for an approval or for an action on an appeal or curative amendment,” the statutory time limits on
review, hearings, and decisions “shall be suspended and tolled as of the date of the disaster or
emergency declaration or as of the date received if received during the disaster or emergency
declaration, and shall resume 30 days after the effective date of this section.”

                                                 5
Township argued, effectively extended the second 90-day continuance, agreed to by
the parties on February 4, 2020, by 75 days, so that it ended not on August 2, 2020,
as asserted by the Mohammeds, but on October 16, 2020. The Township argued that
the time available for a hearing should then be extended by another 11 days due to
the unavailability of the Mohammeds’ counsel for the requested conference call,
until September 28, 2020. Id. at 5. In response, the Mohammeds asserted that Act
15 only tolled the limits imposed by Section 908(1.2) of the MPC, and was
inapplicable to instances where parties contractually agreed to alternative deadlines.
Id. at 9.
       In its December 16, 2021 Order, which bore a double caption at the top with
both of the consolidated matters’ docket numbers, the Trial Court denied the
Township’s appeal of the Notice of Deemed Approval at 3362 CV 2021, dismissed
as moot the Mohammeds’ motion to quash that appeal, and granted the
Mohammeds’ motion to quash the Township’s previous appeal on that matter at the
same docket number.7 Id. at 22. While rejecting the Mohammeds’ argument that
Act 15 had no effect on the 90-day continuances agreed to by the parties, the Trial
Court nonetheless agreed that the final hearing on the matter could have properly
taken place by October 16, 2020, at the latest.8 Id. at 16. When that date passed

       7
          The Trial Court’s Order also granted the Township’s motion to consolidate the two
matters, reflecting a previous order issued on October 7, 2021.

       8
         In fact, the Trial Court expressed the opinion that Act 15 only extended the statutory
deadline by 16 days, from August 2, 2020 (the end of the final 90-day continuance period) to
August 18, 2020. Trial Ct. Op. at 12. The Trial Court reached this conclusion because it did not
believe that Act 15 added consecutive periods to both the February 4, 2020 and May 4, 2020
continuance agreements. Id. However, the Trial Court reasoned that even if it accepted the
Township’s proposed interpretation of Act 15’s tolling provision, that would only extend the
deadline to October 16, 2020. Id. The unavailability of the Mohammeds’ counsel for 11 days in
September, 2020, “did not negate the duty of the ZHB to conduct a timely hearing on or before
October 16, 2020, assuming that was the deadline.” Id.

                                               6
without further action by the Township, the Trial Court explained, a deemed zoning
approval occurred by operation of law. Id. at 19. Since it found that a deemed
approval did occur, the Trial Court did not rule on the issue of the timeliness of the
Township’s appeal at 3362 CV 2021. Id.
       The Township filed a single notice of appeal to this Court on January 26, 2022.
See Notice of Appeal, 1/26/2022. In a June 14, 2022 per curiam order, this Court
directed the parties to address “whether [the Township’s] filing of a single notice of
appeal complies with the mandates set forth by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Young,
265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2021), in their principal briefs on the merits or in an appropriate
motion.” Order, 6/14/2022. The Township filed a separate appeal on July 18, 2022,
in which it explained that an “appeal to No. 2021-CV-3362 is pending in the
Commonwealth Court [at] No. 65 C.[D]. 2022.” See Notice of Appeal, 7/18/2022.
The Mohammeds filed an Application to Quash regarding that appeal, in which they
argued that it was untimely filed under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b).9
       Pursuant to our June 14, 2022 order, the Mohammeds filed an additional
Application to Quash on August 5, 2022, in which they argued that this Court should
quash the Township’s appeal due to the failure to file separate appeals for both
docket numbers as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341.10 See
Mohammeds’ Application to Quash, 8/5/2022. The Township filed an Answer to

       9
         42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b) provides that “an appeal from a tribunal or other government unit
to a court or from a court to an appellate court must be commenced within 30 days after the entry
of the order from which the appeal is taken, in the case of an interlocutory or final order.”

       10
          The Note to Rule 341 provides that “where . . . one or more orders resolves issues arising
on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must
be filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note (citing Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa.
2016)).

                                                 7
the Application to Quash on August 17, 2022, in which the Township asserted that
it had “remedied the failure to file separate appeals in the two consolidated matters
in the [T]rial [C]ourt.” Answer to the Appl. to Quash. The Township further argued
that quashal was unwarranted as “the issues underlying the appeal are identical.” Id.
In an October 5, 2022 order, we consolidated both appeals on the basis that “the
matters were consolidated before the [T]rial [C]ourt, involve appeals from a single
trial court order dated December 16, 2021, and involve a single record.” Order,
10/5/2022. Finally, we stated that the Applications to Quash “shall be listed for
disposition with the merits of the appeal.” Id.
                                             II. Issues
       On appeal,11 the Township argues that the ZHB “acted quickly and
purposefully” with regard to the Mohammeds’ appeal from the July 17, 2019
enforcement notice. The Township further maintains that the deadline for a final
hearing on the matter occurred on October 27, 2020, rendering timely the hearing
that occurred on the day before. Regarding its initial filing of a single notice of
appeal in this Court, the Township maintains that “the issues raised in the Order
below are identical as to both underlying matters.” Township’s Br. at 22.

       11
          In a case where the trial court takes no additional evidence, but makes its own findings
based on the record before a local zoning hearing board, we must examine the trial court’s decision,
not the board’s, for evidentiary support. E. Consol. and Dist. Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of
Hampden Twp., 701 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Where an appeal presents issues of law,
including issues of statutory interpretation, this Court’s scope of review is plenary and our standard
of review is de novo. 1050 Ashbourne Assocs., LLC v. Cheltenham Twp. Bd. of Comm’rs, 167
A.3d 828, 831 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

                                                  8
                                   III. Discussion
                A. Quashal Pursuant to Rule 341(a) and Walker
      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a) provides that an appeal may
be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.
In relevant part, the Official Note to Rule 341 provides:
      A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to secure review of
      prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry of a final order.
      See, e.g., K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003) (notice of
      appeal following trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa.
      2012) (notice of appeal of summary judgment); Laster v.
      Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 80 A.3d 831, 832 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
      2013) (petition for review of agency decision). Where, however, one
      or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or
      relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal
      must be filed. Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 2016)
      (“[C]omplete consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not
      occur absent a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions
      lacking such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct
      judgments”); Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa.
      Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single notice of appeal from
      order on remand for consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two
      persons’ judgments of sentence).

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note (emphasis added).
      In Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77, our Supreme Court characterized Rule 341(a)
as “a bright-line mandatory instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of
appeal” for each docket. More recently, however, in Always Busy Consulting, LLC
v. Babford & Company, Inc., 247 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. 2021), the Supreme Court—
while reaffirming the general rule that separate notices of appeal must be filed—held
that a narrow exception applies. Specifically, the Court explained, “a single notice
of appeal from a single order entered at the lead docket number for consolidated civil
matters where all record information necessary to adjudication of the appeal exists,

                                          9
and which involves identical parties, claims and issues, does not run afoul of Walker,
Rule 341, or its Official Note.” Id.
      In Always Busy Consulting, a party filed a petition to vacate an arbitration
ruling in a county court of common pleas; the prevailing party filed a petition to
confirm the ruling, also in the common pleas court, at a separate docket number. Id.
at 1035. The common pleas court granted a joint motion to consolidate the actions
and, following the submission of briefs and oral argument, confirmed the arbitration
award. Id.    The appealing party filed a single appeal in the Superior Court, and
attempted to remedy the error with a second notice of appeal at the other docket
number; the Superior Court nonetheless quashed on Walker grounds. Id. at 1036.
In its reversal, the Supreme Court explained that the Superior Court’s strict
application of Walker “improperly elevated form over substance.” Id. at 1043. In
contrast to Walker, in which a criminal trial court granted motions to suppress by
“multiple defendants in separate, unconsolidated cases,” the consolidated dockets in
Always Busy Consulting featured “complete identity of the parties and claims.” Id.
Thus, the trial court’s order “disposed of . . . litigation which involved two sides of
the same coin, i.e., competing petitions to vacate or confirm the same arbitration
award.” Id.
      In Young, 265 A.3d at 477, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Always Busy
Consulting exception to the Walker rule, holding that “nothing practical is achieved
by the reflexive quashal of appeals for easily corrected, non-jurisdictional defects.”
The Court acknowledged that the appeal at issue in Young did not fit within Always
Busy Consulting’s narrow exception, because it did not involve “different sides of
the same coin—that is, different ways of litigating the exact same dispute,” and there
was no lead docket number. Id. at 475. However, the Court analyzed the issue not

                                          10
only in light of Rule 341 but also Rule 902(b)(1), which provides that a party’s
failure to comply with normal procedural requirements “does not affect the validity
of the appeal, but the appeal is subject to such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate.” Pa.R.A.P. 902(b)(1). Reasoning that “there were two timely-filed
notices of appeal in this case . . . that listed additional docket numbers for each
defendant,” the Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to reconsider the
appellant’s request to remedy its error “so that the omitted procedural step may be
taken.” Young, 265 A.3d at 477-78 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 902(b)(1)).
      Instantly, the Mohammeds argue that the Walker bright-line rule applies to
the Township’s appeal because the actions initiated in the Trial Court raise distinct
legal issues. Specifically, at 318 CV 2021 (the basis of the appeal now docketed in
this Court at No. 988 C.D. 2022), the Mohammeds raised the issue of a deemed
approval pursuant to Section 908(1.2) of the MPC, whereas the matter docketed at
3362 CV 2021 (the basis of the appeal now docketed in this Court at No. 65 C.D.
2022) concerned the Township’s separate appeal of the Notice of Deemed Approval,
in opposition to which the Mohammeds raised the issue of timeliness pursuant to
Section 1002-A of the MPC.         The Mohammeds maintain that the issues are
meaningfully distinct because, even if no deemed approval had occurred on the basis
of Section 908(1.2), the Mohammeds “would still be entitled to deemed approval
under” Section 1002-A. Appl. to Quash ¶ 7. Additionally, the Mohammeds argue
that the Township’s belated effort to perfect its appeal with its separate filing at No.
988 C.D. 2022 is improper because it occurred well beyond the 30-day deadline for
appeals, and because the Township never sought permission from this Court or the
Trial Court to correct its error, but rather “proceeded on its own to file an untimely
appeal.” Id. ¶ 10.

                                          11
      In response to the Mohammeds, the Township asserts that “the issues
underlying the appeal[s] are identical.” Answer to Appl. to Quash ¶ 4. The
Township explains, puzzlingly, that the “issues raised in the [3362 CV 2021, now
docketed at No. 65 C.D. 2022,] matter are not subject to appeal.” Id. Furthermore,
the Township does not deny that its filing of a second appeal was untimely, but
simply states that it “corrected” its error “by filing a Notice of Appeal to [318 CV
2021].” Id. ¶ 3.
      We do not agree entirely with the Township that the issues underlying the
instant appeals are identical. As the Mohammeds demonstrate, each appeal involves
distinct provisions of the MPC, on which the parties make different sets of
arguments. Nonetheless, we reject the Mohammeds’ claim that the Township’s
appeal is subject to automatic quashal pursuant to Walker, for three reasons. First,
even though there is a difference in issues such that the two docket numbers may not
exactly represent “two sides of the same coin,” Always Busy Consulting, 247 A.3d
at 1043, the Supreme Court’s holding in Young instructs that this does not itself
preclude remediation of a timely appeal “erroneously filed at only one docket.” 265
A.3d at 477. The two matters consolidated by the Trial Court in this case lack the
complete symmetry of the competing petitions in Always Busy Consulting.
Nonetheless, they involve directly opposing arguments for and against the same
ZHB decision, regarding a single, nonconforming use at a single property, and the
Trial Court disposed of the issues in a single order. Furthermore, the record
presented to this Court following the Township’s first filing of an appeal contains
the information required for appellate review of the Trial Court’s decision regarding
both docket numbers. See Always Busy Consulting, 247 A.3d at 1043 (permitting
appeal “where all record information necessary to adjudication of the appeal exists”).

                                         12
      The second reason that we reject the Mohammeds’ arguments regarding
quashal is that the Township’s failure to seek this Court’s permission before
attempting to remedy its procedural error is, though perhaps inadvisable, not fatal to
its appeal. Neither Always Busy Consulting, nor Young, nor the relevant Rules of
Appellate Procedure expressly require an appealing party to take such a step before
a defective appeal can be perfected.         Recently, in Landlord Service Bureau,
Incorporated v. City of Pittsburgh, 291 A.3d 961, 970 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), an
appealing party failed to seek leave of court to remedy a procedural defect identical
to the one at issue in this case, but (as in the instant case) did so in its merits brief;
we declined to quash the appeal on that basis. In keeping with our recent decision
in Landlord Service Bureau, we see no reason to quash the Township’s appeal
simply because it had not sought our permission before its second appeal filing. In
a similar vein, we disagree with the Mohammeds that the second appeal is invalid
because it was not filed within the 30-day appeal period mandated by Pa.R.A.P. 903.
It is the initial, albeit defective, filing that is subject to the 30-day deadline, not its
purported correction. See Young, 265 A.3d at 477 (holding that, “where a timely
appeal is erroneously filed at only one docket, Rule 902 permits the appellate court,
in its discretion, to allow correction of the error, where appropriate”) (emphasis
added).
      The third, final reason that we find the Mohammeds’ arguments unavailing is
that we disagree on the extent to which Walker’s bright-line rule continues to exist.
In Walker, the Supreme Court did not take into account the tension between the
strictness of its holding and Rule 902(b)(1), which instructs leniency toward
erroneously filed appeals. While addressing that discrepancy in Young, the Court
acknowledged that it was “largely blunt[ing] the bright line rule the Walker Court

                                            13
sought to impose with respect to Rule 341(a).” 265 A.3d at 477. The Court
concluded that Rules 341(a) and 902(b)(1) must be read in relation to one another;
thus, while Rule 341(a) requires separate notices of appeal when a single order
resolves issues arising on more than one docket, Rule 902(b)(1) grants an appellate
court discretion, where appropriate, to allow correction of the error. While quashal
indeed remains one option available to this Court, Walker’s bright-line rule, insofar
as it mandates quashal, has been supplanted by Always Busy Consulting and Young.
       There may indeed be circumstances in which quashal of an appeal is
warranted where separate notices of appeal should have been, but were not, filed:
for example, where an order disposes of largely unrelated issues, involves different
parties, or requires an examination of different records before it may be reviewed by
the appellate court. As the Supreme Court observed in Walker, the failure to file
separate appeals may force the reviewing court to “‘go behind’ the notice of appeal
to determine if the same facts and issues apply to all of the appellees.” 185 A.3d at
977. In this case, however, since the Township’s failure to file separate appeals
neither encumbers appellate review nor results in prejudice to the Mohammeds,12 we
decline to quash the appeal.
                                 B. The Deemed Approval
       Section 908 of the MPC governs the manner in which municipal zoning
hearing boards are to conduct hearings and issue their decisions. In relevant part,
Section 908(1.2) provides that the first hearing “shall be commenced within 60 days”
from the date of receipt of an application, unless the applicant has agreed in writing

       12
          See Young, 265 A.3d at 477 (agreeing with appellant’s arguments that “there would have
been no prejudice” to the opposing parties if the Superior Court had allowed correction of the
procedural defect, and that “nothing practical is achieved by the reflexive quashal of appeals for
easily corrected, non-jurisdictional defects”).

                                               14
to an extension of time. 53 P.S. § 10908(1.2). Each subsequent hearing “shall be
held within 45 days of the prior hearing, unless otherwise agreed to by the applicant
in writing or on the record.” Id. Section 908(9) further provides, in relevant part,
that the board shall render a written decision within 45 days of the last hearing. 53
P.S. § 10908(9). Significantly, Section 908(9) further provides:
      [W]here the board fails to render the decision within the period required
      by this subsection or fails to commence, conduct or complete the
      required hearing as provided in subsection (1.2), the decision shall be
      deemed to have been rendered in favor of the applicant unless the
      applicant has agreed in writing or on the record to an extension of time.

Id. The purpose of the given time limits, which are mandatory, is protect the
applicant from dilatory conduct by the municipality. State Signz Co. v. Burgettstown
Borough, 154 A.3d 416, 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
      Instantly, the Township held two initial hearings on its enforcement notice on
October 24, 2019, and November 7, 2019; at the conclusion of the latter, the
Township persuaded the Mohammeds to agree to a 90-day continuance before an
additional hearing. R.R. at 276. On February 4, 2020, the parties agreed to an
additional 90-day continuance, and a third 90-day continuance on May 4, 2020. Id.
at 277. On September 17, 2020, the Township requested a conference call, for which
the Mohammeds’ counsel was unavailable until September 28, 2020. Id. at 278.
When the conference call occurred, the Township requested a final hearing on the
matter, and the Mohammeds’ counsel, though maintaining that the Township was
“out of time,” agreed. Id. When the final hearing occurred, on October 26, 2020,
the Mohammeds maintained that the time for a final hearing had passed. Id. at 280.
Accordingly, the Mohammeds published a Notice of Deemed Approval on May 19,
2021. See id. at 119.

                                         15
       On appeal, the Township argues that the October 26, 2020 hearing was timely
held for two reasons. First is that Act 15, which tolled Section 908’s statutory
deadlines from March 6, 2020, to May 20, 2020, extended the 90-day continuances
agreed to by the parties by a full 75 days (the length of time between the Governor’s
disaster declaration relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and the effective date of
Act 15). Thus, the Township argues that Act 15 moved the last day on which a
hearing could be held from August 2, 2020, to October 16, 2020.                         Second, the
Township maintains that the unavailability of the Mohammeds’ counsel for 11 days
following the Township’s initial request for a conference call should be tacked onto
the October 16, 2020 deadline, with the result that the October 26, 2020 hearing was
timely.13
       The Mohammeds assert that a deemed approval occurred by operation of
Section 908(9) after the last 90-day continuance elapsed without action by the
Township. In support, the Mohammeds rely largely on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wistuk v. Lower Mount Bethel Township Zoning Hearind Board, 925
A.2d 768 (Pa. 2007). In that case, the Court held that a deemed zoning approval
occurred where “nothing in writing or of record fairly reflects any kind of affirmative
agreement on [the applicant’s] part to an extension of the [45-]day period” required
for a final hearing. Id. at 773. The Mohammeds argue that Wistuk controls in this

       13
           We note our displeasure with the Township’s failure to develop this argument properly
in its Brief to this Court. After referring to the argument in its Statement of the Questions Involved,
the Township seems to drop the issue from the remainder of the Brief. See Township’s Br. at 7.
This Court has repeatedly held that we will not consider the merits of an issue that is not properly
raised and developed in a brief. Am. Rock Mech., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bik &
Lehigh Concrete Tech.), 881 A.2d 54, 56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); see also Commonwealth v.
Rompilla, 983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009) (explaining that appellant’s failure to develop its
arguments or support its bald assertions with sufficient citation to legal authority impedes
meaningful judicial review of its claims).

                                                 16
case, because the last 90-day continuance to which they agreed ended on August 2,
2020. Act 15 extends that period either to August 18, 2020 or, at the latest, to
October 16, 2020. By either interpretation of Act 15’s effect on the relevant
deadlines, the Mohammeds argue that a deemed approval occurred under Wistuk.
      We reject the Township’s argument that the October 26, 2020 hearing was
timely, as there is simply no basis for assuming that the deadline for that hearing
occurred any later than October 16, 2020. The Township cites no legal authority for
its contention that its inability to arrange a conference call with the Mohammeds’
counsel for 11 days in September, 2020, tolls the deadline period any further. As
the Mohammeds correctly note in their Brief, the October 26, 2020 hearing was not
timely “[u]nder any possible construction of Act 15.” Mohammeds’ Br. at 8. Thus,
we agree with the Trial Court that a deemed approval occurred under Section 908(9)
of the MPC.
                                 IV. Conclusion
      The Township’s failure to file separate notices of appeal for both docket
numbers consolidated by the Trial Court does not warrant quashal of the instant
appeal. However, the Township fails to establish any reasonable basis for reversing
the Trial Court’s conclusion that a deemed approval occurred when the Township
failed to act within the deadline imposed by Section 908(1.2) of the MPC. Thus, we
affirm the Trial Court.

                                      __________________________________
                                      ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                        17
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kamaladeen Mohammed and             :
Shanta M. Mohammed and              :
Kamal Trucking, Inc.                :
                                    :
     v.                             : Nos. 65 C.D. 2022 and 988 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Tobyhanna Township Zoning           :
Hearing Board                       :
                                    :
     v.                             :
                                    :
Tobyhanna Township,                 :
               Appellant            :

                                 ORDER

     AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2023, the order of Court of Common
Pleas of Monroe County in the above-captioned matter, dated December 16, 2021,
is hereby AFFIRMED.       The Applications to Quash filed by Kamaladeen
Mohammed, Shanta M. Mohammed, and Kamal Trucking, Inc. are DENIED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge