Court Opinion

ID: 9855005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:18:11.636398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.465516
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not believe that our constitution allows the city council, the very entity that appointed this judge, to remove her from office for judicial misconduct. Indeed, under the constitution, only this court may remove or suspend this judge before her term expires. And we have done precisely that. See In re Jett, 180 Ariz. 103, 882 P.2d 414 (1994).
The court argues that by allowing the city to remove its magistrates from office, the magistrates are placed in “the same position as all other judges in the state.” Ante, at 120, 882 P.2d at 431. But this is not the case. First, no other judge in the state is subject to removal by the very entity that appoints the judge. And city magistrates are the only judges who serve for specific terms subject to reappointment. Second, although the court correctly points out that all other judges holding elective office may be removed by various methods, these other methods are expressly provided by the constitution. Thus there is no separation of powers problem because the constitution itself provides for the methods of impeachment or recall. Moreover, neither impeachment nor recall are conducted by the institution that appoints the judge. In contrast to impeachment and recall, there is no provision in our constitution that empowers a city council to remove a judge. I believe, therefore, that the court’s argument by analogy is without justification.
The court refers to the city charter as “itself of constitutional origin.” Ante, at 121, 882 P.2d at 432. But the city charter is a document authorized by the constitution. It is not itself the constitution. Therefore, the charter provision must be tested against the constitution and our cases interpreting it.
The seminal case is Winter v. Coor, 144 Ariz. 56, 695 P.2d 1094 (1985). Even though no express contrary constitutional provision existed, we struck down a city code provision that allowed the city to remove town magistrates at will. We held that “the magistrate courts are indeed part of the integrated judicial department of this state.” Id. at 59, 695 P.2d at 1097. We said that “[t]his view is reinforced by the necessity of judicial independence for all judges,” id. at 60, 695 P.2d at 1098, and city magistrates are judicial officers, not “officers and agents of the town.” Id. at 62, 695 P.2d at 1100. We specifically held that “service by a magistrate at the pleasure of an elected executive or legislative body does not constitute a ‘term’ for purposes of Article III and Article VI, § 32 of the Arizona Constitution.” Id. at 63, 695 P.2d at 1101. Any term shorter than two years would compromise judicial independence and would not be constitutional. Id. at 64, 695 P.2d at 1102. We noted that a magistrate “may still be removed at any time for cause after a due process hearing.” Id. We did not say, however, that the town council had authority to remove the judge and hold the hearing. That issue, of course, was not before the court.1
After Winter, the Arizona Constitution was amended to include magistrates under article 6.1, § 5. This expressly put due process hearings in the Commission on Judicial Conduct and removal power in this court.
The court argues that “when magistrates may be removed only for cause after a due process hearing, their judicial independence is adequately safeguarded.” Ante, at 121, 882 P.2d at 432. But no one disputes that a magistrate can be removed after a due process hearing. The threat to judicial independence depends upon who does the removing. The city council is not a neutral body like the Commission on Judicial Conduct or this court. The city council is the entity that appointed the magistrate in the first instance, and it has the power to either reappoint or not reappoint at the conclusion of *125the term. Vesting removal authority in an essentially political entity does not safeguard judicial independence. Indeed, our system nowhere vests the power to remove judges in the appointing body. Why would we do so here?
The court argues that by not allowing a city council to remove a judge, we would afford magistrates greater protection than article 3 affords to all other judges. Ante, at 123, 882 P.2d at 434. This is simply not the case. Indeed, by holding that the city council has the authority to remove a magistrate, we are affording magistrates less protection under article 3 than all other judges, for no other judge can be removed by the appointing authority. This is reason enough not to reach the court’s result.
Nor is today’s decision necessary. Recall that we can remove a judge under article 6.1 of the constitution, and the city council can always choose not to reappoint a judge for any legal reason. There are even further safeguards. Under article 6, § 3 of the constitution, “[t]he Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all the courts of the State.” We have increasingly exercised our administrative supervision over limited jurisdiction judges. We have audited them, investigated them, and barred them from exercising judicial powers.
I am of the view that when the constitution provides this court with administrative supervision over all the courts of this state, it leaves no room for the city council to have administrative supervision over them. Unitary administrative supervision over all of the courts of this state is a critical element of what it means to have an integrated judicial department. Today the majority agrees with the city council. But what happens in a case in which there is disagreement? Suppose a city council removes a judge, but we believe a lesser sanction is appropriate. On judicial review of the removal proceeding, do we substitute our judgment for that of the city council as to what constitutes good cause? Do we substitute our judgment for that of the city council as to the propriety of a particular sanction? If unitary administrative supervision is to mean anything, we will have to do so. But this would eviscerate the very power that the court now creates within the city council. This unsettling prospect is reason enough to find that the constitution contemplates a unitary power of removal and has vested it in this court.2
The court argues that by upholding the power of the city council, town magistrates are put on a par with superior court judges. But superior court judges are not answerable to, and cannot be removed by, a county board of supervisors. Indeed, just the thought of it is distasteful to judicial independence. How, then, can it be appropriate here? The court argues that its result is necessary, but the power of the city council to not reappoint, and the power of this court to remove as well as administer, leave no constitutional void to fill through necessity.
In defending the Constitution of the United States, its provision for independent Article III judges, and its rejection of periodic appointments, Alexander Hamilton said:
If the power of making them [reappointments] was committed either to the executive or legislature there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mentor ed., 1961). The need to be reappointed, which Hamilton condemned, already serves as a powerful engine of accountability for municipal court judges. To also allow the appointing authority to be the very body that can remove that judge fastens the lid on the coffin of judicial independence. I respectfully dissent.

. Given the provisions of article 6, § 3, discussed infra, there is every reason to think that when this court in Winter v. Coor referred to a due process hearing and removal, it was referring to a hearing before this court and removal by this court, not by the City Council. Article 6.1, § 5 resolves any ambiguity that might exist under article 6, § 3 in favor of that interpretation. The hearing, wherever it was before, is now in the Commission.

. Indeed, in the companion case of In re Jett, 180 Ariz. 103, 112, 882 P.2d 414, 423 (1994) the majority yields to the city council’s sanction in order to avoid this very problem.