Court Opinion

ID: 9958889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:03:19.914457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:55.576492
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-0478
                  _____________________________

DANIEL K. MAXWELL,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Francis Allman, Judge.

                           April 10, 2024

TANENBAUM, J.

     This appeal, at first glance, seemed to seek review of the trial
court’s order denying Daniel Maxwell’s motion to withdraw his so-
called “plea” to alleged violations of the terms of his probation—a
motion he filed about three weeks following the trial court’s
revocation of his probation and imposition of a new sentence.
Maxwell filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of the order
denying his motion, but more than thirty days after rendition of
the revocation and sentencing orders. As we explain below,
however, an admission to an alleged probation violation is not
formally a “plea,” as that term is used in Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.170(l) and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure
9.020(h)(1)(I) and 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c. That means the motion to
withdraw Maxwell filed did not toll the rendition date of the
revocation and sentencing orders, and his current appeal as to
those orders is untimely. We asked Maxwell to address whether
the appeal instead should be considered as one travelling under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141, which covers appeals
from orders on post-conviction motions. While the State agreed
with this approach, Maxwell opposed it and asked that his appeal
be treated as timely filed. Maxwell independently may have a post-
decretal claim regarding the legality of his resentencing following
the revocation of his probation, but we cannot reconstrue the
motion Maxwell filed below as asserting such a claim. Cf. Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.850(c) (setting out required contents of a motion filed
under the rule). All we can do here is dismiss the appeal before us
as untimely.

                                 I

     Maxwell served time in prison after a trial court adjudicated
him guilty of witness tampering and felony battery based on a plea
of nolo contendere back in 2013. 1 The sentence on each count was
eighteen months in prison, the sentences running concurrently. A
term of forty-two months of probation followed. In 2018, sometime
after Maxwell began serving his probation, his supervising officer
charged him with violating the conditions of his probation (“VOP”)
by breaking the law again. Pursuant to an agreement with the
State, Maxwell admitted that he had violated probation. The trial
court revoked probation and imposed a new sentence of seventy-
one months in prison, giving stipulated credit for jail time served
and directing the Department of Corrections to calculate the
appropriate credit for the time Maxwell had already served on the
convictions under section 921.0017, Florida Statutes. Maxwell did
not appeal.

     About eight months later, Maxwell sought clarification
regarding his sentence. The trial court in response rendered a
corrected sentence to reflect that his new sentences were to run
concurrently with another sentence. A week after that, the trial
court once again corrected the sentence. Twenty-eight days later,
Maxwell filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea.” This filing came ten
months after the trial court originally had imposed the modified

    1 Maxwell moved to withdraw that plea in 2014. The trial
court denied that motion.

                                2
sentence based on the probation violation. In his motion, Maxwell
alleged the following: 1) that he was incompetent at the time of his
admission; 2) that the court failed to “address [his] demands”; 3)
that his attorney refused to provide him with discovery; 4) that he
believed he was going to be processed and released immediately
upon arriving to the Department of Corrections; 5) that his
scoresheet contained errors; and 6) that he previously had
submitted Bar complaints against his court-appointed attorney,
which allegedly created a conflict of interest. The trial court denied
the motion six months later without a hearing. Maxwell filed this
appeal within thirty days of rendition of that denial.

                                  II

     Confusion arises when courts persist in the loose use of the
term “plea” in the context of VOP proceedings. There simply is no
such thing as a plea to a charged VOP. The principal statute
governing VOPs, section 948.06, Florida Statutes, does not refer to
such a plea. Rather, the statute gives a probationer the option to
“admit” that the charged VOP is true, or to not admit it to be true.
§ 948.06(2)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(b) (setting
out procedure by which a probationer either “admits” the charged
violation to be true or does not “admit”).

     Pleas do not occur after disposition in a criminal case. A
defendant will enter his “plea” at the beginning of a criminal
matter—at arraignment, typically—but at all events, before trial.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.160 (“Arraignment”); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.170(a) (identifying three types of pleas regarding a criminal
“charge”—“not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, no
contest”—and requiring that “[e]very plea [] be entered of record”);
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(b) (allowing for “plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to any and all charges pending against [the defendant]
in the State of Florida over which the court would have
jurisdiction”); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f), (l) (treating guilty and
no-contest pleas as coming before sentencing); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.171 (treating plea negotiations and agreements as coming before
sentencing).

     For example, if a defendant pleads not guilty and persists in
that plea, there will be a trial on the charges filed in the criminal
case. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(e) (providing that a “plea of not

                                  3
guilty is a denial of every material allegation in the indictment or
information on which the defendant is to be tried”). Alternatively,
if a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, changes his plea to
one of these before trial, or is found guilty at trial, there will be a
judgment of conviction. See § 921.0021(2), Fla. Stat. (defining
“conviction” to mean “a determination of guilt that is the result of
a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld”
(emphasis supplied)); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.650 (defining “judgment”
to mean “the adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty
or not guilty”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.670 (providing for rendition of
“judgment of guilty” upon a finding of guilt, but allowing for a
“withhold [of] an adjudication of guilt if the judge places the
defendant on probation”).

      The point here is that a plea—one way or the other—precedes
a judgment of conviction, which means a plea necessarily precedes
imposition of probation. That is, there cannot be the imposition of
probation without a formal determination of guilt, which always
comes after a defendant enters his plea to the criminal charges
filed against him. See § 948.01(1), Fla. Stat. (authorizing probation
as an alternative sentencing disposition for “a defendant in a
criminal case, except for an offense punishable by death, who has
been found guilty by the verdict of a jury, has entered a plea of
guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, or has been found guilty by the
court trying the case without a jury.” (emphasis supplied));
§ 921.187(1), Fla. Stat. (authorizing probation as component of
sentencing “alternatives provided in this section for the disposition
of criminal cases” (emphasis supplied)); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(a)
(treating probation as part of sentencing).

     To say that a trial court took a plea from a defendant after
disposition of a criminal case—regardless of whether adjudication
has been withheld—makes no sense because, at that point, the
defendant’s guilt as to the criminal charges in the case had already
been formally determined. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(c)(4), (5)
(requiring that trial court ensure that a defendant wishing to plead
guilty or nolo contendere understands that such plea waives his
right to further litigate the question of his guilt and to have a trial
on the criminal charges against him). By the time a defendant
finds himself on probation in a criminal case, there no longer is a
dispute over his guilt, so nothing left to plead to. Cf. Peters v. State,

                                   4
984 So. 2d 1227, 1232 (Fla. 2008) (acknowledging “that while
probation is not necessarily a sentence, the criminal prosecution
has ended with either a sentence of incarceration or a suspended
sentence of probation”).

     This difference in terminology in the VOP context is
commensurate with where in the criminal process probation falls.
A VOP proceeding does not involve a new question of criminal
culpability that could lead to another formal adjudication of guilt.
Put another way, a VOP affidavit does not initiate a separate
process by which a criminal conviction is sought. See Id. at 1233
(“Because a probationer has already been found guilty of the crime
charged before being placed on probation or under community
supervision, the revocation proceeding implicates only a limited,
conditional liberty interest rather than the absolute liberty
interest enjoyed by a criminal defendant prior to trial.”); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (“Probation revocation, like
parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does
result in a loss of liberty.”); cf. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S.
216, 222 (1932) (“The question, then, in the case of the revocation
of probation, is not one of formal procedure either with respect to
notice or specification of charges or a trial upon charges. The
question is simply whether there has been an abuse of discretion
and is to be determined in accordance with familiar principles
governing the exercise of judicial discretion.”).

     Probation, instead, is more properly considered as a
component of sentencing. Cf. Peters 984 So. 2d at 1231–32 (noting
that the purpose of probation is “rehabilitation of a party whose
guilt has been established” and acknowledging “that while a
defendant is not incarcerated when placed on probation, the
defendant is nonetheless serving a type of suspended sentence”);
Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1985) (agreeing that a
probation violation proceeding “constitutes a deferred sentencing
proceeding”); Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla. 1974)
(explaining that the “underlying concept of probation is
rehabilitation rather than punishment and presupposes the fact
that probationer is not in prison confinement”). To be more specific,
when a trial court imposes a “probationary split sentence,” as it did
here, the court stops short of giving the defendant the maximum
authorized sentence. Instead, the court in essence utilizes

                                 5
probation as a mechanism to assess the defendant’s “amenability
to reform” from his conduct after the original sentencing. Poore v.
State, 531 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1988), (approvingly quoting
Williams v. Wainwright, 650 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1981), for the
proposition that an increased sentence may be “imposed upon the
revocation of probation . . . based upon the defendant’s subsequent
conduct demonstrating his lack of amenability to reform”); cf. id.
at 164–65 (treating a violation of probation as a new, relevant
sentencing fact that may justify an increased sentence when a
“probationary split sentence” had been imposed).

     As part of the sentencing continuum, probation allows the
trial court the flexibility to try out varying (and likely
progressively increased) lengths of incarceration, up to the
statutory maximum, to find, cumulatively, a bespoke period of
incarceration appropriate to the defendant’s “past life, health,
habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.” Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949); see also id. at 247, 249
(explaining how probation can serve as an “investigation
technique[]” that can help a trial judge select “an appropriate
sentence” based on “the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics . . . rather than on guesswork
and inadequate information”); cf. Pa. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (explaining that in determining a sentence,
“justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the
circumstances of the offense together with the character and
propensities of the offender,” such that the defendant’s “past may
be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies and
significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of
discipline that ought to be imposed upon him”).

     Here, then, we see the true service that probation provides to
the sentencing endeavor. It allows the trial court to impose a
prison sentence based on all the individualized information
available to it at the time regarding the defendant; and then to
constitutionally “impos[e] a new sentence, whether greater or less
than the original sentence,” based on the defendant’s conduct
while on probation that might “throw[] new light upon the
defendant’s life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral
propensities.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969)

                                  6
(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court
continued as follows:

    The freedom of a sentencing judge to consider the
    defendant’s conduct subsequent to the first conviction in
    imposing a new sentence is no more than consonant with
    the principle . . . that a State may adopt the prevalent
    modern philosophy of penology that the punishment
    should fit the offender and not merely the crime.

Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). To be clear here: The
modified sentence imposed on a revocation of probation is
appropriately enhanced punishment for the original offense of
conviction, based on new information gleaned from the defendant’s
behavior while on probation; it is not punishment for the conduct
determined to be a violation of probation.

     As we already mentioned, when we look at Maxwell’s case, we
see that the only plea Maxwell entered in this case occurred way
back in 2013—when he pleaded nolo contendere to the charges
reflected in the information. Based on that plea, the trial court
adjudicated Maxwell guilty and imposed a soi-disant
“probationary split sentence”—a prison time of specified duration,
followed by a term of probation. See Poore, 531 So. 2d at 164
(describing “a ‘probationary split sentence’ consisting of a period of
confinement, none of which is suspended, followed by a period of
probation” as an authorized “sentencing alternative in Florida”);
see also Glass v. State, 574 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1991)
(reaffirming the court’s “position that courts are authorized to
impose probationary split sentences”); but cf. § 948.012, Fla. Stat.
He sought way back to withdraw that plea, and when the trial
court denied the request, the adjudication of guilt stood.

     Later, when the probation officer charged Maxwell with
violating the conditions of his probation, the officer initiated the
process spelled out in section 948.06—and not a new criminal
prosecution. See § 948.06(1)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. That process, in turn,
does not include an arraignment or entry of a plea to the charged
violations. When Maxwell was brought before the trial court on a
VOP warrant, the trial court simply “advise[d] him [] of such
charge of violation,” at which point Maxwell had the option to
“admit” that the charge was true, or not (rather than to plead

                                  7
guilty or not guilty). Id. (2)(a); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(b).
For a violation, the statute authorizes resentencing (read:
imposition of an increased term of incarceration or modification of
other terms of the original sentence) on the same conviction, and
there is no double-jeopardy problem as long as the new, as-
modified sentence—which has the effect of increasing the total
incarceration above what was originally imposed on the offense of
conviction—is not “based solely on the same facts at issue” before
the trial court at the time of the original sentence. Poore, 531 So.
2d at 163 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)).

      Key here is that the enhanced sentence imposed on Maxwell
under section 948.06 truly must be based on new information
gleaned from the defendant’s behavior while on probation, not
merely on a trial judge’s change of heart. That is, there must be “a
relevant new fact not previously considered” before the trial court
“constitutionally is permitted to impose a greater sentence” under
section 948.06. Id. at 164. The statutory authorization for
resentencing on a revocation is contingent on the proper
demonstration of this new relevant fact, “not previously
considered,” by sufficient evidence. Id. Maxwell’s violation of the
conditions of his probation, of course, would be that relevant new
fact.

     Indeed, Maxwell entered an admission to the truthfulness of
the charged violation. That admission did not change Maxwell’s
legal status in the criminal case, as he already had been
adjudicated guilty in 2013. The only legal effect of that admission
is that it supported the trial court’s authority at that point to
resentence Maxwell to any term of incarceration that “it might
have originally imposed.” § 948.06(2)(b), (e), Fla. Stat.; but cf. State
v. Rabedeau, 2 So. 3d 191, 193 (Fla. 2009) (noting, in a probation
revocation context, that a defendant sentenced upon conviction of
a crime who “serves some portion of that sentence . . . is entitled to
receive credit for the actual service of that sentence, or any portion
thereof, in a resentencing for the same crime” (emphasis supplied)).

     This is not to say that an admission in a VOP is legally—or
constitutionally—insignificant. Though the trial court has broad
discretion to determine whether to revoke probation and impose a
new sentence, “this discretionary power must be exercised in

                                   8
accordance with certain due process requirements.” Bernhardt,
288 So. 2d at 495; see also Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610
(1985) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the
conditional liberty created by probation.”). The probationer, for
instance, is entitled to the provision of effective assistance of
counsel “before he is required to respond in any manner to the
revocation charges.” State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985).
There also must be a hearing at which evidence is presented that
is “sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court that a condition
of probation has been violated.” Bernhardt, 288 So. 2d at 495; see
also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (enumerating the minimum due-
process requirements for a probation-violation proceeding);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (“This hearing must
be the basis for more than determining probable cause; it must
lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and
consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation.”); cf. Burns, 287 U.S. at 223 (“While probation is a
matter of grace, the probationer is entitled to fair treatment, and
is not to be made the victim of whim or caprice.”).

     When Maxwell “admit[ted] to be true” the charged VOP, then,
he effectively waived this process that ordinarily would be due him
for determination of that new sentencing fact. Cf. § 948.06(b), (d),
Fla. Stat. (authorizing revocation upon admission but requiring a
hearing if the violation is not admitted); see generally United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining that
“forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right”
but “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). An
admission has the effect of waiving the probationer’s entitlement
to “an opportunity to be fully heard on his or her behalf in person
or by counsel.” § 948.06(2)(d), Fla. Stat. It also waives his right to
require the State “establish by greater weight of the evidence that
the violation of probation occurred.” Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d
642, 646 (Fla. 2008). In the light of these due-process parameters,
the validity of the probationer’s admission of the probation
violation takes on constitutional and legal import.

                                  9
                                  III

     This brings us back to Maxwell’s “Motion to Withdraw Plea.”
As we explained above, the admission to a VOP was not a plea, so
there was nothing to be withdrawn. An appeal of the revocation
and resulting sentence would have been pursuant to Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D) and (E) (relating to a post-
judgment order “revoking or modifying probation” and to “an
unlawful or illegal sentence”), not rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c.
(regarding “an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea”). The motion, then, did not postpone the deadline
for taking an appeal under the subdivisions of (b)(1), and the thirty
days for doing so consequently had run before Maxwell invoked
this court’s jurisdiction here.

     This basically ends the current appeal for Maxwell. It,
however, may not end his access to relief. Despite its title (and the
absence of a plea), the motion effectively lodged several collateral
attacks related to Maxwell’s decision to admit to the charged VOP.
His motion in essence purported to challenge the legal validity of
the admission and the efficacy of counsel during the proceeding.
Because a VOP proceeding involves the question whether the
defendant should be resentenced (as we already have discussed),
Maxwell’s challenge necessarily was directed to the latest
sentencing that resulted from his admission. That is, insofar as
Maxwell challenged the validity of his admission, he attacked the
authority of the trial court to resentence him with an enhanced
prison term. Central to that attack is Maxwell’s contention that
the VOP proceeding did not comport with due-process
requirements.

     We do not comment here on the legal sufficiency of Maxwell’s
claims or what might constitute a proper collateral attack on a
resentencing that stems from a VOP proceeding. 2 All we are saying

    2 It is conceivable that one or more of the claims could have

been raised in a direct appeal of the revocation and further
sentencing order—which he failed to perfect—and those would be
procedurally barred from consideration in any collateral attack.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c); Adams v. State, 380 So. 2d 423, 424
(Fla. 1980) (noting that “asserted issues . . . could have been raised”

                                  10
here is that rule 3.850 may be read broadly enough to serve facially
as the vehicle by which Maxwell could assert the collateral claims
adumbrated in Maxwell’s motion. The rule authorizes a motion to
vacate a sentence that has been illegally imposed, imposed without
jurisdiction, or otherwise subject to collateral attack. Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850(a)(1), (3), (6). 3 As we have explained, the trial court’s
authority to resentence Maxwell turned on the legal comportment
of the process surrounding Maxwell’s admission, a process that he
purported to attack from several angles in his “post-resentencing”
motion.

    With this stated, we must recognize the limit of our authority
when reviewing a final order on appeal. As we suggested above,
Maxwell’s motion did not comply with the requirements of rule
3.850 and was not framed as a motion under that rule. We cannot
recharacterize a motion filed in the trial court as something
completely different and then review the court’s disposition of the
motion as originally framed as if it were a disposition on a motion
that was not actually before it. All we have now is an untimely
appeal from an order revoking probation and imposing a prison
sentence. There is but one disposition in this case.

    DISMISSED.

WINOKUR and NORDBY, JJ., concur.

on direct appeal “and these matters thus will not support a
collateral attack”); Sullivan v. State, 372 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla.
1979) (characterizing issues that “could have been raised in” a
direct appeal cannot “support a collateral attack”); Spenkelink v.
State, 350 So. 2d 85, 85 (Fla. 1977) (finding that a failure to raise
an issue on direct appeal “waives the right to raise that claim” in
a collateral proceeding); cf. Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 676
(Fla. 2014) (holding that claim regarding competency was
“procedurally barred because [the defendant] did not raise this
issue on direct appeal”).
    3 The rule also allows for a motion for relief if “the plea was

involuntary.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5). As we already have
explained, however, an admission to a VOP is not a plea, so this
subdivision does not apply.

                                 11
                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Candice Kaye Brower, Regional Counsel, Melissa Joy Ford,
Assistant Regional Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, David Welch, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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