Court Opinion

ID: 9381716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:07:17.088681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.247983
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re S.D.L., 2023-Ohio-929.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                 :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,           :
                                                          No. 111791
                 v.                            :

S.D.L.,                                        :

                 Defendant-Appellant.          :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CR-16-611872-A

                                         Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Erika B. Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for
                 appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                Appellant S.L. (“S.L.”) appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County

Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to seal records of his criminal
conviction. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

                          I. Factual and Procedural History

             S.L. was indicted in December 2016 on charges of failure to comply, a

felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B); tampering with evidence,

a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C.

2923.16(B), with accompanying forfeiture specifications; carrying a concealed

weapon, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(1), with

accompanying forfeiture specifications; and resisting arrest, a misdemeanor of the

second degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A).

             In March 2017, S.L. ultimately pled guilty to the charges for failure to

comply and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, along with the

accompanying forfeiture specifications. The remaining charges were nolled.

             In April 2017, the trial court sentenced S.L. to two years of community

control on each count and ordered S.L. to pay court costs. The sentencing entry

stated that S.L.’s community control would terminate after he writes a letter of

apology to the Euclid Police Department and obtains his GED. In June 2017, the

trial court entered an order allowing S.L. to complete court community service in

lieu of fees and costs.

             The docket reflects that S.L.’s community control was terminated in

April 2019. Three years later, S.L. filed an application for sealing of the record of
conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). The court then ordered an expungement

report/investigation to be prepared within 45 days.

             The state filed a brief in response to S.L.’s application, stating that it

deferred to the court’s discretion regarding whether to grant the application. The

state acknowledged that S.L. was an eligible offender under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1) but

noted that he still had an outstanding financial obligation.          According to the

expungement investigation report, S.L. still owed $436 in court costs and $480 in

supervision fees.

             The trial court denied S.L.’s motion without holding a hearing, finding

that “[S.L.] needs to meet his financial obligations.” S.L. then filed the instant

appeal, raising one assignment of error for our review:

      The trial court violated S.L.’s right to due process when it denied his
      application to seal this [sic] criminal record; and in doing so without a
      hearing.

                                II. Law and Analysis

             We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the denial of a

petition to seal a record under R.C. 2953.32.1 Bedford v. Bradberry, 8th Dist.

      1 Preliminarily, we note that while the words “sealing” and “expungement” have, at
times, been used interchangeably in this case, they are not the same thing. “Expungement
occurs when a conviction is completely erased from one’s record. Sealing is when the
records of a conviction are filed in a ‘separate, secured location’ and ‘cannot be seen by
most people.’” State v. D.D.G., 2019-Ohio-4982, 136 N.E.3d 1271, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting
The Ohio Justice & Policy Center’s Criminal Records Manual, Understanding and
Clearing Up Ohio Criminal Records, and Overcoming the Barriers They Create,
http://ohiojpc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/OJPCs-Criminal-Record-Manual.pdf
(accessed Sept. 18, 2019).
Cuyahoga No. 100285, 2014-Ohio-2058, ¶ 5, citing State v. Hilbert, 145 Ohio

App.3d 824, 827, 764 N.E.2d 1064 (8th Dist.2001).              However, an abuse-of-

discretion standard is not appropriate when a lower court’s judgment is based on an

erroneous interpretation of the law. State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-

Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6. A trial court’s interpretation of a statute is a

question of law that we review de novo. State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-

Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9.

             Only an “eligible offender” may apply to have his or her record of

conviction sealed. R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). Hence, the court to which the application is

made “shall” first “[d]etermine whether the applicant is an eligible offender * * * .”

R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(a). “If the court finds the applicant is an eligible offender, it must

then employ its discretion in weighing a number of substantive considerations in

favor or against the sealing of the applicant’s record.” State v. T.D., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111307, 2022-Ohio-3741, ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2953.32(C).

              There is no dispute in this matter that S.L. is an eligible offender. The

only question therefore is whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing

before denying S.L.’s application. We find that it did.

              R.C. 2953.32(B) states, “Upon the filing of an application under this

section, the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the

case of the hearing on the application.” (Emphasis added.) As we have previously

explained, the statute’s explicit language does not, in fact, require a trial court to

“hold” a hearing; instead, the statute only requires a trial court to “set” a date for the
hearing. See D.D.G., 2019-Ohio-4982, 136 N.E.3d 1271, at ¶ 26, citing State ex rel.

Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989,

¶ 27-29 (R.C. 2953.32(B)’s plain language does not require the trial court to “hold a

hearing,” but, instead, only requires it to “set a date for a hearing.”).

              We noted in D.D.G. that “[w]e believe that the General Assembly

intended to have a trial court set a hearing to set a deadline for the prosecutor, with

the understanding that not all applications for sealing require a hearing to actually

be held, i.e., when an offender is not eligible as a matter of law.” Id. at ¶ 28.

              The state, citing D.D.G., argues that the failure to set a hearing was

harmless error because a hearing would not have changed S.L.’s outstanding

financial obligations, which it argues were a valid basis for the court to deny S.L.’s

application. However, this matter can be easily distinguished from D.D.G., where

the offender was patently ineligible, and thus there was no need for a hearing. In

the case sub judice, as noted above, there is no dispute that S.L. is an eligible

offender under the statute.

              R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) requires the court to do the following:

      (a) Determine whether the applicant is an eligible offender * * * .

      (b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the
      applicant;

      (c) If the applicant is an eligible offender who applies pursuant to
      division (A)(1) of this section, determine whether the applicant has
      been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court;
      (d) If the prosecutor has filed an objection in accordance with division
      (B) of this section, consider the reasons against granting the application
      specified by the prosecutor in the objection;

      (e) Weigh the interests of the applicant in having the records pertaining
      to the applicant’s conviction or bail forfeiture sealed against the
      legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records

              In State v. J.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96574, 2011-Ohio-5675, we

recognized that this court has repeatedly held that an oral hearing on an application

for sealing is mandatory; the failure to hold such hearing is grounds for reversal and

remand. Id. at ¶ 15. The rationale that a trial court must first hold a hearing is

“‘obviously predicated upon the fact that, under normal circumstances, a trial court

would be required to hear evidence prior to rendering its decision in order to make

several determinations pursuant to [R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(a) through (e)].’”          Id.,

quoting State v. Haney, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-159, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS

5524 (Nov. 23, 1999). The objective of the hearing is to gather information; the

proceedings are not adversarial. State v. T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102648, 2017-

Ohio-7395, ¶ 15, citing State v. Simon, 87 Ohio St.3d 533, 721 N.E.2d 1041 (2000).

              From the record before us, we can only determine that S.L. is an

eligible offender under the statute. There is no evidence before us as to the

remainder of the determinations required by R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). Such evidence

would normally be presented at the hearing and reviewable on appeal. We find that

the trial court was required to both set and hold a hearing in order to make the

determinations required by R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). S.L.’s sole assignment of error is

sustained, and we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.
      It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR