Court Opinion

ID: 9428246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:13.729998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.553640
License: Public Domain

Justice Makshall,
with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
Under §§ 309 (a) and 310 (d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. *605(Act), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) may not approve an application for a radio license transfer, assignment, or renewal unless it finds that such change will serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” 1 Any party in interest may petition the Commission to deny the application, § 309 (d)(1), and the Commission must hold a hearing if “a substantial and material question of fact is presented,” §309 (d)(2). In my judgment, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in certain limited circumstances, the Commission may be obliged to hold a hearing to consider whether a proposed change in a licensee’s entertainment program format is in the "public interest.” 2 Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it vacated the Commission’s “Policy Statement.” 3
I
At the outset, I should point out that my understanding of the Court of Appeals’ format cases is very different from the Commission’s.4 Both in its Policy Statement and in its brief before this Court, the Commission has insisted that the format doctrine espoused by the Court of Appeals “favor[s] a system of pervasive governmental regulation,” 5 requiring “ 'comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil*606lance.’ ” 6 The Commission further contends that enforcement of the format doctrine would impose “common carrier” obligations on broadcasters and substitute for “the imperfect system of free competition ... a system of broadcast programming by government decree.” 7 Were this an accurate description of the format doctrine I would join the Court in reversing the judgment below.8 However, I agree with the Court of Appeals that “the actual features of [its format doctrine] are scarcely visible in [the Commission’s] highly-colored portrait.” 197 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 332, 610 F. 2d 838, 851 (1979).
In fact, the Court of Appeals accepted the Commission’s conclusion that entertainment program formats should ordinarily be left to competitive forces. The court emphasized that the format doctrine “was not intended as an alternative to format allocation by market forces,” and “fully recognized that market forces do generally provide diversification of formats.” Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) It explained that “the Commission’s obligation to consider format issues arises only when there is strong prima facie evidence that the market has in fact broken down,” ibid., and suggested that a breakdown in the market may be inferred when notice of a format change “precipitate [s] an outpouring of protest,” id., at 323, 610 F. 2d, at 842, or “significant public grumbling,” ibid. The Court of Appeals further stated that “[n]o public interest issue is raised if (1) there is an adequate substitute in the service area for the format being abandoned, (2) there *607is no substantial support for the endangered format as evidenced by an outcry of public protest, (3) the devotees of the endangered format are too few to be served by the available frequencies, or (4) the format is not financially viable.” Id., at 332, 610 F. 2d, at 851. Finally, the Court of Appeals indicated that the Commission’s obligation to hold an eviden-tiary hearing is limited to those situations in which the record presents substantial questions of material fact. Id., at 324, 610 F. 2d, at 843.
The Court of Appeals thus made clear that the format doctrine comes into play only in a few limited situations. Consequently, the issue presented by these cases is not whether the Commission may adopt a general policy of relying on licensee discretion and market forces to ensure diversity in entertainment programming formats. Rather, the question before us is whether the Commission may apply its general policy on format changes indiscriminately and without regard to the effect in particular cases.
II
Although the Act does not define “public interest, convenience, and necessity,” it is difficult to quarrel with the basic premise of the Court of Appeals’ format cases that the term includes “a concern for diverse entertainment programming.” Id., at 323, 610 F. 2d, at 842.9 This Court has indicated that one of the Act’s goals is “to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 217 (1943).10 *608And we have recognized “the long-established regulatory goals of . . . diversification of programming.” FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 699 (1979). At the same time, our cases have acknowledged that the Commission enjoys broad discretion in determining how best to accomplish this goal. See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 776 (1978); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra. The Commission has concluded that a general policy of relying on market forces is the best method for promoting diversity in entertainment programming formats. As the majority notes, ante, at 695, this determination largely rests on the Commission’s predictions about licensee behavior and the functioning of the radio broadcasting market.
I agree with the majority that predictions of this sort are within the Commission’s institutional competence. I am also willing to assume that a general policy of disregarding format changes in making the “public interest” determination required by the Act is not inconsistent with the Commission’s statutory obligation to give individualized consideration to each application. The Commission has broad rulemaking powers under the Act,11 and we have approved efforts by the Commission to implement the Act’s “public interest” requirement through rules and policies of general application. See, e. g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra.
The problem with the particular Policy Statement challenged here, however, is that it lacks the flexibility we have required of such general regulations and policies. See, e. g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra; National *609Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra. The Act imposes an affirmative duty on the Commission to make a particularized “public interest” determination for each application that comes before it. As we explained in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 225, the Commission must, in each case, “exercise an ultimate judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity.’ ” The Policy Statement completely forecloses any possibility that the Commission will re-examine the validity of its general policy on format changes as it applies to particular situations. Thus, even when it can be conclusively demonstrated that a particular radio market does not function in the manner predicted by the Commission, the Policy Statement indicates that the Commission will blindly assume that a proposed format change is in the “public interest.” This result would occur even where reliance on the market to ensure format diversity is shown to be misplaced, and where it thus appears that action by the Commission is necessary to promote the public interest in diversity. This outcome is not consistent with the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, our cases have indicated that an agency’s discretion to proceed in complex areas through general rules is intimately connected to the existence of a “safety valve” procedure that allows the agency to consider applications for exemptions based on special circumstances. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112, 128 (1977); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 771-772 (1968); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, at 204-205; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 207, 225. See also WAIT Radio v. FCC, 135 U. S. App. D. C. 317, 321, 418 P. 2d 1153, 1157 (1969); American Airlines v. CAB, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 359 P. 2d 624 (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 843 (1966); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F. 2d 601, 618 (CA2), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 914 (1968). *610For example, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, we upheld the Commission’s Chain Broadcasting Regulations, but we emphasized the need for flexibility in administering the rules. We noted that the “Commission provided that 'networks will be given full opportunity, on proper application ... to call our attention to any reasons why the principle should be modified or held inapplicable.’ ” Id., at 207. And we concluded:
“The Commission therefore did not bind itself inflexibly to the licensing policies expressed in the regulations. In each case that comes before it the Commission must still exercise an ultimate judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.’ If time and changing circumstances reveal that the 'public interest’ is not served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations.” Id., at 225.
Similarly, in upholding the Commission’s Multiple Ownership Rules in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, we noted that the regulations allowed an opportunity for a “full hearing” for applicants “that set out adequate reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended.” Id., at 205.12
*611This “safety valve” feature is particularly essential where, as here, the agency’s decision that a general policy promotes the public interest is based on predictions and forecasts that by definition lack complete factual support. As the Court of Appeals admonished the Commission in a related context:
“The Commission is charged with administration in the 'public interest.’ That an agency may discharge its responsibilities by promulgating rules of general application which, in the overall perspective, establish the 'public interest’ for a broad range of situations, does not relieve it of an obligation to seek out the ‘public interest’ in particular, individualized cases. A general rule implies that a commission need not re-study the entire problem de novo and reconsider policy every time it receives an application for a waiver of the rule. On the other hand, a general rule, deemed valid because its overall objectives are in the public interest, may not be in the 'public interest’ if extended to an applicant who proposes a new service that will not undermine the policy, served by the rule, that has been adjudged in the public interest.” WAIT Radio v. FCC, supra, at 321, 418 F. 2d, at 1157.
In my judgment, this requirement of flexibility compels the Commission to provide a procedure through which listeners can attempt to show that a particular radio market differs from the Commission’s paradigm, and thereby persuade the Commission to give particularized consideration to a proposed format change. Indeed, until the Policy Statement was published, the Commission had resolved to “take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of any proposal which would deprive a community of its only source of a particular type of programming.” 13 As I see it, the Court of Appeals’ format doctrine was merely an attempt by that court to de*612lineate the circumstances in which the Commission must temper its general policy in view of special circumstances. Perhaps the court would have been better advised to leave the task of defining these situations to the Commission.14 But one need not endorse every feature of the Court of Appeals’ approach to conclude that the court correctly invalidated the Commission’s Policy Statement because of its omission of a “safety valve” procedure.
This omission is not only a departure from legal precedents; it is also a departure both from the Commission’s consistent policies and its admissions here. For the Commission concedes that the radio market is an imperfect reflection of listener preferences,15 and that listeners have programming interests that may not be reflected in the marketplace. The Commission has long recognized its obligation to examine program formats in making the “public interest” determination required by the Act. As early as 1929, the Commission’s predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, adopted the position that licensees were expected to provide a balanced program schedule designed to serve all substantial groups in their communities. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32, 34, rev’d on other grounds, 37 F. 2d 993, cert. dism’d, 281 U. S. 706 (1929). The Commission’s famous “Blue Book,” 16 published in 1946, reaffirmed the emphasis on a well-balanced program structure and declared that the Commission has “an affirmative duty, in its public interest determinations, to give full consideration to program service.” 17 As the Commission explained:
“It has long been an established policy of broadcasters themselves and of the Commission that the American *613system of broadcasting must serve significant minorities among our population, and the less dominant needs and tastes which most listeners have from time to time.” 18
This theme was reiterated in the Commission’s 1960 Program Statement,19 which set forth 14 specific categories of programming that were deemed “major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community,” 20 and which emphasized the necessity of each broadcaster’s programming serving the “tastes and needs” of its local community.21 To ensure that licensee programming serves the needs of the community, the Commission has, for example, decreed that licensees have a special obligation to provide programs for children, even going so far as to declare that licensees must provide “a reasonable amount of [children’s] programming which is designed to educate and inform — and not simply to entertain.” 22
Moreover, in examining renewal applications, the Commission has considered claims that a licensee does not provide adequate children’s programming,23 or programming for women and children,24 or for a substantial Spanish-American community,25 or that the licensee has ignored issues of significance to the Negro community,26 or has not provided programming of specific interest to residents of a particular *614area.27 In each case, the Commission reviewed submissions ranging from general summaries to transcripts of programs, to determine whether the licensee’s programming met the public-interest standard.
There is an obvious inconsistency between the Commission’s recognition that the “public interest” standard requires it to consider licensee programming in the situations described above and its Policy Statement on review of entertainment program formats. Indeed, the sole instance in which the Commission will not consider listener complaints about programming is when they pertain to proposed changes in entertainment program formats. The Policy Statement attempts to explain this exceptional treatment of format changes by drawing a distinction between entertainment and nonentertainment programming. The Policy Statement suggests that the Commission reviews only nonentertainment programming, and even then, only in special circumstances. Thus, the Policy Statement argues that the fairness doctrine and political broadcasting rules issued pursuant to § 315, 47 U. S. C. § 315, allow the Commission to exercise direct con*615trol of programming. In these areas, reasons the Statement, the Commission’s role “is limited to directing the licensee to broadcast some additional material so as not to completely ignore the viewpoints of others in the community.” 28 This “limited involvement in licensee decisionmaking in the area of news and public affairs” 29 is contrasted, in the Commission’s view, to “the pervasive, censorial nature of the involvement in format regulation.”30 The majority presumably concludes that the Commission has provided a rational explanation for distinguishing between entertainment and nonentertainment programming. With all due respect, I disagree.
In the first place, the distinction the Commission tries to draw between entertainment and nonentertainment programming is questionable. It is not immediately apparent, for example, why children’s programming necessarily falls on the “nonentertainment” side of the spectrum, and the Commission has provided no explanation of how it decides the category to which particular programming belongs. Second, I see no reason why the Commission’s review of entertainment programming cannot be as limited as its review of nonenter-tainment programming. Nothing prevents the Commission from limiting its role in reviewing format changes to “directing the licensee to broadcast additional material,” thereby ensuring that the viewpoints of listeners who complain about a proposed format change are not completely ignored. Third, and most important, neither the fairness doctrine nor the political broadcasting rules have anything to do with the various situations described above in which the Commission has not hesitated to consider program formats in making the “public interest” determination. The fairness doctrine imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a “reasonable per*616centage” of broadcast time to controversial issues of public importance, and it requires that the coverage be fair in that it accurately reflect the opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). The political broadcasting rules regulate broadcasts by candidates for federal and nonfederal public offlce. See The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F. C. C. 2d 2209 (1978). The Commission’s examination of whether a broadcaster’s format includes programming directed at women or at residents of the local community, or its requirement that licensees provide programming designed to serve the unique needs of children, simply has nothing to do with either the fairness doctrine or the political broadcasting rules. Thus, the Commission’s purported justification for its inconsistency is no explanation at all, and I am puzzled by the majority’s apparent conclusion that it provides a rational basis for the Commission’s policy.
The majority attempts to minimize the inconsistency in the Commission’s treatment of entertainment and nonenter-tainment programming by postulating that the difference “is not as pronounced as it may seem,” ante, at 602. This observation, even if accurate, is simply beside the point. What is germane is the Commission’s failure to consider listener complaints about entertainment programming to the same extent and in the same manner as it reviews complaints about nonentertainment programming. Thus, whereas the Commission will hold an evidentiary hearing to review complaints about nonentertainment programming where “ ‘it appears that the licensee has . . . act Ted! unreasonablv or in bad faith,’ ” ibid, (quoting Mississippi Authority for Educational TV, 71 F. C. C. 2d 1296, 1308 (1979)), the Commission will not consider an identical complaint about a licensee’s change in its entertainment programming. As I have indicated, see supra, at 614-616, neither the Commission nor the majority is able to offer a satisfactory explanation for this inconsistency.
*617Nor can the Commission find refuge in its claim that “‘[e]ven after all relevant facts [h]ad been fully explored in an evidentiary hearing, [the Commission] would have no assurance that a decision finally reached by [the Commission] would contribute more to listener satisfaction than the result favored by station management.'” Policy Statement, 60 F. C. C. 2d 858, 865 (1976), quoting Notice of Inquiry, 57 F. C. C. 2d 580, 586 (1976). The same must be true of the decisions the Commission makes after reviewing listener complaints about nonentertainment programming, and I do not see why the Commission finds this result acceptable in one situation but not in the other. Much the same can be said for the majority’s suggestion that the Commission should be spared the burden of “presuming to grasp, measure and weigh . . . elusive and difficult factors” such as determining the number of listeners who favor a particular change and measuring the intensity of their preferences, ante, at 601. But insofar as the Commission confronts these same “elusive and difficult factors” in reviewing nonentertainment programming, it need only apply the expertise it has acquired in dealing with these problems to review of entertainment programming.
Ill
Since I agree with the Court of Appeals that there may be situations in which the Commission is obliged to consider format changes in making the “public interest” determination mandated by the Act, it seems appropriate to comment briefly on the Commission’s claim that the “ 'acute practical problem [s]’ inherent in format regulation render entirely speculative any benefits that such regulation might produce.” 31 One of the principal reasons given in the Policy Statement for rejecting entertainment format regulation is that it would be “administratively a fearful and comprehen*618sive nightmare,” 32 that would impose “enormous costs on the participants and the Commission alike.” 33 But at oral argument before the Court of Appeals, Commission counsel conceded that the “ 'administrative nightmare’ ” argument was an “ 'exaggeration’ ” which was not “ 'very significant at all’ ” to the Commission’s ultimate conclusion. 197 U. S. App. D. C., at 330, 610 F. 2d, at 849. The Commission’s reliance on claims that its own counsel later concedes to lack merit hardly strengthens one’s belief in the rationality of its decisionmaking.
Although it has abandoned the “administrative nightmare” argument before this Court, the Commission nonetheless finds other “intractable” administrative problems in format regulation. For example, it insists that meaningful classification of radio broadcasts into format types is impractical, and that it is impossible to determine whether a proposed format change is in the public interest because the intensity of listener preferences cannot be measured.34 Moreover, the Commission argues that format regulation will discourage licensee innovation and experimentation with formats, and that its effect on format diversity will therefore be counterproductive.
None of these claims has merit. Broadcasters have operated under the format doctrine during the past 10 years, yet the Commission is unable to show that there has been no innovation and experimentation with formats during this period. Indeed, a Commission staff study on the effectiveness of market allocation of formats indicates that licensees have been aggressive in developing diverse entertainment formats under the format-doctrine regime.35 This “evidence”— *619a welcome contrast to the Commission’s speculation — undermines the Commission’s claim that format regulation will disserve the “public interest” because it will inhibit format diversity.
The Commission’s claim that it is impossible to classify formats, is largely overcome by the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that the Commission could develop “a format taxonomy which, even if imprecise at the margins, would be sustainable so long as not irrational.” 36 197 U. S. App. D. C., at 334, 610 F. 2d, at 853. Even more telling is the staff study relied on by the Commission to show that there is broad format diversity in major radio markets, for the study used a format classification based on industry practice.37 As the Court of Appeals noted, it is somewhat ironic that the Commission had no trouble “endorsing the validity of a study largely premised on classifications it claims are impossible to make.” Ibid.38 To be sure, courts do not sit to second-guess the as*620sessments of specialized agencies like the Commission. But where, as here, the agency’s position rests on speculations that are refuted by the agency’s own administrative record, I am not persuaded that deference is due.39
IV
The Commission’s Policy Statement is defective because it lacks a “safety valve” procedure that would allow the necessary flexibility in the application of the Commission’s general policy on format changes to particular cases. In my judgment, the Court of Appeals’ format doctrine was a permissible attempt by that court to provide the Commission with some guidance regarding the types of situations in which a re-examination of general policy might be necessary. Even if one were to conclude that the Court of Appeals described these situations too specifically, a view I do not share, I still think that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Commission’s Policy Statement must be vacated.
I respectfully dissent.

 The pertinent portions of 47 U. S. C. §§ 309 (a) and 310 (d) are quoted in the majority opinion, ante, at 584-585, n. 2.

 I will follow the majority, see ante, at 586, n. 4, in referring to a broadcaster’s change in entertainment programming as a format change.

 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F. C. C. 2d 858 (1976) (Policy Statement), reconsideration denied, 66 F. C. C. 2d 78 (1977) (Denial of Reconsideration).

 The opinion of the Court traces the development of the Court of Appeals’ “format doctrine” and the Commission’s “Policy Statement,” see ante, at 586-593. I will not repeat that discussion here.

 Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 F. C. C. 2d 580, 582 (1976) (Notice of Inquiry).

 Policy Statement, supra, at 865 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619-620 (1971)).

 Denial of Reconsideration, supra, at 81.

 Even the Court ot Appeals agreed that “[t]here would no doubt be severe statutory and constitutional difficulties with any system that required intrusive governmental surveillance, dictated programming choices, forced broad access obligations, or imposed an obligation to continue in service under any and all circumstances.” 197 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 331-332, 610 F. 2d 838, 850-851 (1979).

 See D. Ginsburg, Regulation of Radio Broadcasting 294 (1979) (“An argument against the desirability of ‘diversity’ in broadcast programming is difficult to imagine”). See generally Note, A Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial Television Entertainment, 89 Yale L. J. 694 (1980).

 Section 303 (g) of the Act, 47 U. S. C. § 303 (g), directs the Commission to “encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”

 The Commission is authorized to promulgate “such rules and regulations . . . not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act].” 47 U. S. C. §303 (r).

 The majority argues, ante, at 601, n. 44, that although the Court considered the presence of a “safety valve” procedure in upholding the rules challenged in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court “did not hold that the Commission may never adopt a rule that lacks a waiver provision.” Since this general question was not before the Court in those cases, it is hardly surprising that it did not render an advisory opinion to this effect. What is instructive, however, is the majority’s inability to explain why a waiver provision was necessary in those cases, but is not required in the instant situation. As the cases cited in text make clear, this Court and the lower federal courts have insisted on a “safety valve” feature in upholding general rules promulgated by a variety of agencies. I believe it is incumbent on those who would depart from this practice to explain their reasoning.

 Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F. C. C. 2d 223, 231 (1973) (additional views of Chairman Burch) (joined by a majority of the Commissioners).

 Confronted as it was by the Commission’s resistance to its format doctrine, it is easy to understand why the Court of Appeals felt compelled to undertake this task.

 Policy Statement, 60 F. C. C. 2d, at 863.

 Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946).

 Id., at 12.

 Id., at 15.

 Em Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F. C. C. 2303 (1960).

 Id., at 2314

 Id., at 2312.

 Children’s Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F. C. C. 2d 1, 6 (1974).

 Channel 20, Inc., 70 F. C. C. 2d 1770 (1979).

 Community Television of Southern California, 72 F. C. C. 2d 349 (1979).

 Central California Communications Corp., 70 F. C. C. 2d 1947 (1979).

 Mississippi Authority for Educational TV, 71 F. C. C. 2d 1296 (1979); Alabama Educational Television Comm’n, 33 F. C. C. 2d 495 (1971), renewal denied, 50 F. C. C. 2d 461 (1975).

 Educational Broadcasting Corp., 70 F. C. C. 2d 2204 (1979).
As the majority notes, ante, at 602-603, the Commission recently voted to reduce its role in regulating several aspects of commercial radio broadcasting, including regulation of nonentertainment programming. Thus, the Commission has announced its intention of eliminating its current guideline on the amounts of nonentertainment programming that radio stations should air. And the Commission has indicated that petitions to deny license renewals based on only the quantity of a licensee’s non-entertainment programming will no longer be sufficient to support a challenge. For example, a petitioner would have to show that a licensee is doing little or no programming responsive to community issues in order to successfully challenge renewal of the license. Nonetheless, the Commission reiterated that nonentertainment programming is still a relevant issue for petitions to deny, that licensees have an obligation to offer non-entertainment programming addressing issues facing the community, and that the Commission will continue to inquire into the reasonableness of licensee programming decisions. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13888, 13890-13897 (1981) (to be codified at 47 CFR Parts 0 and 73).

 Denial of Reconsideration, 66 F. C. C. 2d, at 83 (emphasis in original).

 Ibid.

 Ibid.

 Brief for Federal Communications Commission and United States 35.

 Policy Statement, 60 P. C. C. 2d, at 865.

 Id., at 864.

 The Commission also insists that any findings about the financial viability of a particular format would be entirely speculative.

 See Policy Statement, supra, at 873-881.

 There have been a number of comments and suggestions about how the Commission might best accomplish this task. See, e. g., 57 F. C. C. 2d, at 587-589 (concurring statement of Commissioner Hooks); D. Ginsburg, supra n. 9, at 316; Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 401, 436-437 (1975).
The Court of Appeals suggested that the Commission could consider an alternative approach of “dispensing altogether with the need for classifying formats by simply taking the existence of significant and bona fide listener protest as sufficient evidence that the station’s endangered programming has certain unique features for which there are no ready substitutes.” 197 U. S. App. D. C., at 334, n. 47, 610 F. 2d, at 853, n. 47. The court indicated that “this approach would focus attention on the essentials of the format doctrine, namely, that when a significant sector of the populace is aggrieved by a planned programming change, this fact raises a legitimate question as to whether the proposed change is in the public interest.” Id., at 334-335, n. 47, 610 F. 2d, at 853-854, n. 47.

 See Policy Statement, supra, at 875-880.

 Nor do I find merit in the Commission’s claim that there are serious First Amendment problems with format regulation. In the first place, I see no reason to find constitutional defect in limited review of entertainment formats when no such defect arises with review of nonentertainment *620programming. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 395 (1969), we held that the Commission does not transgress the First Amendment “in interesting itself in general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees.” Indeed, First Amendment principles, if anything, would support format review as requested by listeners, for as we indicated in Red Lion “[i]t is the [First Amendment] right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Id., at 390.

 All this suggests that the “practical difficulties” the Commission has identified are not intractable, and that these problems could be solved if the Commission channelled as much energy into devising workable standards as it has devoted to mischaracterizing the Court of Appeals’ format doctrine.