Court Opinion

ID: 9390528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 18:02:39.731637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.210460
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 In re Ke.I. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re Ke.I. et al.,                                              B325074

 Persons Coming Under the                                         (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                              Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00104)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 S.J.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Steff Padilla, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
      Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, David Michael Miller, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   __________________________

       When assuming jurisdiction over the children of appellant
S.J. (Mother), the juvenile court sustained allegations that
Mother exposed the children to domestic violence between her
and Keith I. (Father), failed to protect the children from Father’s
physical abuse, herself physically abused one of the children, and
abused alcohol and marijuana in a manner posing substantial
risk to the children. The court also made jurisdictional findings
against Father based on domestic violence and his physical abuse
of the children.
       On appeal, Mother does not dispute the jurisdictional
findings against her based on domestic violence or her failure to
protect; instead, she challenges only the findings concerning
substance abuse and that she abused one of the children. Mother
contends that she was denied due process during the jurisdiction
hearing because the court failed to inform her of certain rights
applicable to that hearing, and that substantial evidence does not
support either of the two challenged findings. Father has not
appealed; the jurisdictional findings made against him are
uncontested.
       While this appeal was pending, dependency jurisdiction
based on the jurisdictional findings at issue in this appeal
terminated. Soon thereafter, the juvenile court reasserted
jurisdiction over both children after the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a new
petition making allegations only as to Father. DCFS argues we
should dismiss this appeal as moot because the dependency

                                 2
action it addresses has concluded, and because the challenged
findings are non-justiciable given the other grounds for the
original assertion of jurisdiction. If we decline to dismiss the
appeal, DCFS argues that any alleged due process violation was
harmless, and that substantial evidence supports the challenged
jurisdictional findings. Mother argues we should consider this
appeal, and her arguments about two of the prior jurisdictional
findings, on the merits.
      Although we find Mother’s appeal moot, we exercise our
discretion to consider its merits. We reject Mother’s claims that
any due process violation occurred at the jurisdiction hearing
mandating reversal, and find that substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s findings that Mother physically abused one of
her children and had substance abuse issues that posed a
substantial risk of harm to both children. We accordingly affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGOUND
      Mother and Father have two children together, son Ke.I.
(born September 2007) and daughter Ka.I. (born October 2011).
As Mother’s appeal does not dispute the jurisdictional findings
based on Father’s conduct, or those against Mother based on
domestic violence and her failure to protect both children from
Father’s physical abuse, we limit our factual recitation
accordingly.
A.     October 2019 Incident and Other Relevant Conduct
       On October 13, 2019, Ke. and Ka. witnessed a violent
altercation between Mother and Father to which police
responded. According to the police report for this incident, the
parents had previously engaged in “multiple unreported incidents
of [d]omestic [v]iolence.” When police interviewed the family,

                                3
both children reported Mother was drunk, engaged in a verbal
altercation with Father, and then ransacked the home as the
children ran into their room to hide. Father confirmed the
children’s statements, noting Mother yelled as he attempted to
calm her down. Father said Mother then hit him with a closed
fist approximately 10 times. In addition, Mother grabbed a belt
and attempted to hit Father with it. Father then grabbed
Mother, placed her outside the home, and shut the door. Police
observed a one-inch abrasion on Father’s left shoulder.
       Police found Mother in a neighbor’s apartment crying.
Mother refused to speak with law enforcement about what had
occurred, and refused medical treatment. Mother was arrested
for assaulting Father. Responding officers said Mother was
“extremely belligerent” during their interactions with her; the
police call log further described Mother as “extremely
intoxicated” and said that Mother continued to act belligerently
after her arrest and during transport to jail.
       Following this incident, DCFS interviewed the family in
November and December 2019. Mother said on the day of the
incident she had two glasses of wine “and could not remember
anything” about what happened other than “people trying to
aggressively grab her” and “being beaten so bad that she could
not get up.” Mother acknowledged a video recording of the
incident showed her intoxicated, but she professed confusion as to
how she became inebriated when she only drank two glasses of
wine. Mother said that she knocked things down in the home
only because she did not have her glasses. Father stated Mother
was drunk during the altercation, and Father found a container
with liquor that Mother had been drinking from throughout the
day.

                                4
       Ke. said he witnessed Mother take three shots of an
unknown substance and smoke marijuana on the day of the
altercation. When ransacking the home, Mother kicked and
broke a television and computers. Ke. also stated Mother
“whoops” him with a belt “anywhere” on his body as a form of
discipline. According to Ke., Mother hits him with a belt about
three times per month when he is in trouble. Ke. stated he
sustained bruises in the past from these beatings, but “that the
last time[ ] was when he was seven years old and [M]other does
not do that anymore.”
       Ka. was hesitant to speak with DCFS, saying she wanted to
keep Mother’s business private. Ka. denied Mother smoked or
drank alcohol. Ka. said she felt safe living with Mother, not
Father, and spoke negatively about Father including stating that
he was the aggressor during the October 2019 domestic violence
incident. Later in the same interview, Ka. said she witnessed
Mother take a shot of Hennessey and vodka on October 13, and
said she believed that was Mother’s first time drinking alcohol.
B.     Section 300 Petition
       On January 8, 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging, among other things, that Father and Mother engaged in
domestic violence placing Ke. and Ka. at risk of serious physical
harm (§ 300, subds. (a), (b); counts a-1, b-1), that Father
physically abused Ke. and Ka. and that Mother failed to protect
the children from such abuse (id., subds. (a), (b); counts a-2, a-3,
b-2, b-3), that Mother physically abused Ke. (id., subds. (a), (b);
counts a-4, b-4), and that Mother’s abuse of alcohol and
marijuana placed the children at risk of serious physical harm.
(Id., subd. (b); count b-5).

                                 5
      On January 9, 2020, Mother appeared in court and was
appointed counsel. The court asked whether Mother’s counsel
wished to “waive reading of the petition, statement of rights, and
enter a denial.” Counsel for Mother responded, “Yes, your honor,
on behalf of [M]other.” The minute order from the hearing noted
Mother was personally served with a written advisement of
rights pursuant to section 316.1
      Through her counsel, Mother submitted on the issue of
detention. Thereafter, the court made a prima facie finding the
children were described by section 300, and ordered them
detained from parental care. DCFS temporarily placed the
children with maternal grandmother pending the dispositional
hearing.
      In February 2020, DCFS re-interviewed the family.
Despite her previous inability to recall details from the October
2019 domestic violence incident, Mother now remembered Father
was drinking when he attacked her. Mother now claimed she
drank only one glass of wine during the day of the altercation, as
opposed to the two glasses she previously stated. Mother denied
she ever drank any alcohol other than wine, stated that when she
drank wine it was usually only one or two glasses, and said that a
bottle of wine lasted her about a month. Mother denied ever

      1 That section provides that, “Upon his or her appearance
before the court at the detention hearing, each parent or
guardian and the minor, if present, shall first be informed of the
reasons why the minor was taken into custody, the nature of the
juvenile court proceedings, and the right of each parent or
guardian and any minor to be represented at every stage of the
proceedings by counsel.” (§ 316.)

                                 6
being intoxicated to the point that she could not parent the
children. Mother denied smoking marijuana.
      Mother asserted Ke. was exaggerating about Mother’s
physical discipline. Mother did admit she had recently
threatened to hit Ke. with a belt, but said she never followed
through with her threats. Mother admitted she spanked Ke. in
the past with a belt, but not within the past five years. Mother
denied ever leaving any marks or bruises on Ke. when she hit
him.
      Father stated Mother was drinking tequila before the
October 2019 altercation and said there was no wine in the home.
Father said Mother was drunk during the October 2019 incident
but denied Mother had a problem with alcohol. Father further
denied any knowledge of Mother using marijuana, and denied
Mother had ever hit the children.
      Contrary to his prior statement, Ke. now denied ever seeing
Mother drink alcohol or smoke marijuana. Ke. said both Mother
and Father hit him in the past, and Father hit Ka. Ke. stated
Mother had hit him with her hand and a belt but could not give a
timeframe of when these incidents occurred. Ke. indicated in this
interview that Mother’s physical abuse left marks but not
bruises.
      Ka. now denied witnessing any physical violence between
the parents. Ka. also denied Mother or Father ever hit either of
the children. Ka. said she never witnessed either parent drink
alcohol or smoke marijuana.
      DCFS also interviewed extended family members.
Maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather said they never
witnessed Mother hit the children. Maternal grandmother said
Mother used to smoke marijuana in the past, but maternal

                               7
grandmother never witnessed Mother under the influence of
drugs or alcohol while caring for the children. Maternal
grandfather was aware that Mother drank alcohol but had never
seen her drink in the children’s presence. Paternal uncle denied
any history of domestic violence between the parents, although
he witnessed Mother become belligerent and argumentative over
minor topics whenever she drank alcohol. Paternal uncle stated
Mother was unable to control herself when she drank alcohol.
Paternal uncle did not believe Mother physically abused Ke., but
had witnessed Mother verbally belittle Ke. as well as Father.
Paternal uncle said he had no knowledge of any drug abuse
issues Mother might have, stating he was not involved in
Mother’s personal life.
C.     Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
       In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed February 19, 2020,
DCFS requested the juvenile court sustain the section 300
petition, remove the children from parental care, and order
family reunification services with monitored visitation for the
parents. Attached to jurisdiction/disposition report was a copy of
a “Notice of Hearing on Petition” mailed to Mother’s residence;
among other things, the notice indicated the date of the
jurisdiction hearing and that Mother had “the right to be present
at the hearing, to present evidence, and to be represented by an
attorney.” The jurisdiction hearing was continued several times
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. DCFS mailed Mother additional
notices for these continued hearing dates containing the same
advisement of rights.
       The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing took place on
June 26, 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties and
counsel participated remotely by WebEx. Mother was present by

                                 8
telephone and represented by counsel. The juvenile court stated
it was conducting the hearing remotely for everyone’s safety and
protection against the COVID-19 virus. The court made clear
that despite these safety protocols, the hearing “will be a trial as
you have discussed with your attorney.”
       The juvenile court admitted, without objection, several
DCFS reports into evidence. Counsel for DCFS rested on those
reports, without calling any witnesses. Both counsel for the
children rested without introducing any further evidence.
Father’s counsel introduced two exhibits, which the juvenile court
admitted into evidence. The court then asked if Father rested or
wished to call witnesses; Father rested and offered no additional
evidence.
       Mother’s counsel then introduced three exhibits, which the
juvenile court admitted into evidence. Those exhibits showed
Mother had completed programs related to anger management,
parenting, and domestic violence. After the court admitted the
exhibits, Mother’s counsel rested.
       Counsel then argued. With regard to the domestic violence
allegation, Mother’s counsel asked the court to conform the
petition to proof by indicating Mother was defending herself and
Father was the “primary aggressor.” Counsel also noted that
Mother and Father were no longer living together. Concerning
the failure to protect allegations, counsel for Mother highlighted
Mother’s statements to DCFS that she was unaware of any
physical abuse by Father and asked the court to dismiss those
counts. Mother’s counsel also argued the facts before the court
did not demonstrate any current risk of physical abuse by Mother
of Ke., or that Mother was drinking to excess regularly or had
any substance abuse problem.

                                 9
      In assuming jurisdiction over the children, the juvenile
court found that Mother’s substance abuse and violence were
central to the risk of harm to the children, regardless of whether
the parents were still involved in a relationship. The court
accordingly rejected Mother’s arguments, and sustained
allegations related to Mother’s domestic violence, failure to
protect the children, physical abuse of Ke., and alcohol and drug
abuse.
      As for disposition, the juvenile court declared the children
dependents of the court, removed them from parental care, and
ordered family reunification services. The court ordered Mother
to participate in a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare, a
12-step program, weekly drug testing, parenting education,
domestic violence for perpetrators, and individual counseling to
address anger management, domestic violence, and child
protection. The court modified Mother’s visitation with the
children so that it was unmonitored.
      On July 9, 2020, mother filed a timely notice of appeal from
the orders made at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. For
reasons that are unclear, that notice of appeal was not
transmitted to this court and docketed until November 7, 2022.
                         DISCUSSION
A.   Mootness
     DCFS requests we dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot
because while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction over Ke. in October 2021, and over Ka. in

                                10
February 2022.2 Mother opposes, noting that in July 2022, DCFS
filed a new section 300 petition regarding Ke. and Ka. involving
alleged physical abuse by Father; Mother is non-offending with
regard to this new petition. As of September 2022, the juvenile
court had sustained allegations against Father involving his
physical abuse of the children, removed Ke. and Ka. from Father,
and released the children to the home of Mother; the matter
remains pending. Mother argues in the alternative that even if
the case is moot we should exercise our discretion to consider its
merits.
      1.     Mother’s Appeal is Moot
       We agree with DCFS that Mother’s appeal is moot. A case
is moot when it is “ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it should decide
the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant [her] any effect[ive] relief.” ’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the plaintiff must
complain of an ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or capable
of being rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks.” (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276).) A case is not moot, for
example, where the jurisdictional finding affects parental custody
rights such as curtailing contact with a child. (Id. at pp. 277-
278.) Speculative future harm, however, is insufficient to avoid
mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)
       Mother does not dispute that reversal of the challenged
jurisdictional findings could not have deprived the juvenile court
of jurisdiction; the jurisdictional findings based on Mother’s
domestic violence and her failure to protect Ke. and Ka., along

      2 We grant DCFS’s unopposed request that we take judicial
notice of the October 2021 and February 2022 orders terminating
dependency jurisdiction.

                                   11
with the allegations sustained as to Father, were all
independently sufficient to create jurisdiction over the children
and have not been challenged on appeal. (See In re Jonathan B.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [“The reviewing court may affirm
. . . if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several
grounds”]; see also In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438,
451 [same].) Nor has Mother demonstrated that the challenged
jurisdictional findings provided the sole basis for subsequent
orders affecting Mother’s rights regarding either child given the
other, uncontested jurisdictional findings against Mother.
         Mother argues that her appeal is not moot because the
challenged jurisdictional findings could potentially affect the re-
opened dependency proceedings. That concern, however, is
speculative rather than concrete. The children are now in
Mother’s care; she is no longer burdened by the restrictions on
her visitation that resulted from the prior proceeding. Mother is
a non-offending parent in the new petition, removal was ordered
only as to Father, and nothing before us suggests potential
reversal of only some of the prior findings against Mother would
definitively impact those on-going proceedings. Mother’s
concerns about the potential effect of the challenged findings in
the current dependency proceedings are therefore insufficient to
find her appeal is not moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.
281-282.)
      2.    Exercising Discretion to Consider the Merits of
            Mother’s Appeal is Appropriate Here
      Although we agree with DCFS that Mother’s appeal is
moot, we decline to dismiss it. Where a dependency appeal is
moot, “[an appellate] court has discretion to decide the merits” of
that moot appeal and concerns about possible future effects of a

                                12
jurisdictional finding may provide a basis for an appellate court
to exercise that discretion. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 283.) In D.P., our Supreme Court laid out a nonexhaustive list
of factors for assessing “whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Specifically, the court noted that courts may consider
(1) “whether the challenged jurisdictional finding ‘could be
prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction” ’ ”;
(2) “whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”; and (3) “why the appeal
became moot.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.)
       We exercise our discretion to consider the merits of
Mother’s appeal because two of these three factors are satisfied.
As to the first factor, Mother and Father are again enmeshed in a
dependency proceeding regarding Ke. and Ka. involving alleged
physical abuse of Ke.; the court’s findings as to Mother’s abuse of
Ke., as well as to her substance abuse, have some hypothetical
potential to impact those on-going proceedings. As to the second
factor, although the jurisdictional findings against Mother carry
some stigma, we do not consider them so stigmatizing as to weigh
in favor of review given that (1) uncontested findings were made
against Mother involving domestic violence and failure to protect
the children from Father’s physical abuse, and (2) Mother does
not challenge any of the orders made upon the juvenile court’s
assumption of jurisdiction. The final factor, the reason Mother’s
appeal was rendered moot, weighs in favor of discretionary
review. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal that, for unknown
reasons, was not docketed with this court until two years and

                                13
four months later. This delay occurred through no fault of
Mother. Had the appeal been docketed in the normal course, we
likely would have considered Mother’s appeal before the juvenile
proceedings at issue concluded and rendered her appeal moot.
B.     Mother’s Due Process Claims
       Mother asserts we should reverse the challenged
jurisdictional findings because the juvenile court deprived her of
due process by failing to comply with two California Rules of
Court that require certain advisements, queries, and findings in
connection with jurisdiction hearings.
       In dependency proceedings, “Parents have a due process
right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the
allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so
that they can make an informed decision whether to appear,
prepare, and contest the allegations.” (In re S.V. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1038.) California Rules of Court, rule
5.534(g)(1) (rule 5.534(g)(1)) requires the court to advise a parent
in a section 300 case of “(A) The right to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination; [¶] (B) The right to confront and cross-
examine the persons who prepared reports or documents
submitted to the court by [DCFS] and the witnesses called to
testify at the hearing; [¶] (C) The right to use the process of the
court to bring in witnesses; and [¶] (D) The right to present
evidence to the court” at any of the hearings. (Rule 5.534(g)(1).)
       California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(a) requires a court to
give the advisements listed in rule 5.534(g)(1) at the
commencement of the jurisdiction hearing. After these
advisements are given, as relevant here, California Rules of
Court, rule 5.682 requires the court to advise the parent of “[t]he
right to a hearing by the court on the issues raised by the

                                14
petition” (id., subd. (a)(1)), to inquire if the parent intends to
admit or deny the petition’s allegations (id., subd. (b)), and if the
allegations are admitted, submitted, or there is a no contest plea
to find that the parent “has knowingly and intelligently waived
the right to a trial on the issues by the court, the right to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to use the process of
the court to compel the attendance of witnesses on the parent[’s]
. . . behalf” (id., subd. (e)(3)).
        Mother asserts the court did not advise her as required by
rule 5.534(g)(1) at the commencement of the jurisdiction hearing,
and that her counsel “de facto” submitted on the allegations of
the petition without the court making the advisements, queries,
or findings required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.682.
Beginning with rule 5.534(g)(1), we agree with Mother that the
court did not advise Mother as required at the beginning of the
jurisdiction hearing. Nor did her counsel waive such an
advisement. That, however, is not the end of the story because
violations of rules such as rule 5.534(g)(1) “require[ ] reversal
only if prejudice is shown.” (In re Monique T. (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 1372, 1377.)
        The cases analyzing failures to give the advisements
required by rules like rule 5.534(g)(1) involve situations where no
contested hearing occurred, and the parent instead waived their
right to a hearing and submitted on the evidence presented by
DCFS. (E.g., In re S.N. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 665, 670-671; In re
Monique T., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1376-1377.) In those
cases, courts have applied the harmless error standard of
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.3d 705] (Chapman), namely whether the error was

                                 15
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re S.N., supra, at p. 672
[applying Chapman error standard]; In re Monique T., supra, at
pp. 1377-1387 [applying Chapman, but declining to decide
whether error should be analyzed under Chapman “or the more
easily met reasonable probability test” of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)].)
       These precedents are rightly focused on the concerns
created by a judicial officer accepting parent’s waiver of a right to
a contested jurisdictional hearing without court advisement and
oversight to make sure such a waiver is knowing and voluntary.
(E.g., In re S.N., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 672.) Because the
hearing below did not involve any waiver of the jurisdiction
hearing but instead proceeded as a contested hearing, it is a
significant question whether the Chapman standard should
apply here instead of the Watson standard. We need not address
this question, however, because even if the Chapman standard
applies any error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Mother was present at the jurisdiction hearing and
represented by counsel. Rule 5.534(g)(1) requires the court to
advise a parent of the right to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination. Mother did not testify at the hearing, so we do not
perceive any prejudice from a failure to advise Mother of the risks
should she testify, and of her right not to do so if it would
incriminate her.
       The remainder of Mother’s claims are much more in the
nature of ineffective assistance of counsel complaints rather than
due process violations. Rule 5.534(g)(1) requires the court to
advise a parent of the right to present evidence. Mother was
advised in writing multiple times before the jurisdiction hearing
of her right to present evidence at the jurisdiction hearing in the

                                 16
notices for the hearing; the court’s failure to repeat this
advisement was therefore not prejudicial.3 Additionally, the
court explained at the commencement of the jurisdiction hearing
that it would “be a trial as you have discussed with your
attorney,” meaning a contested proceeding, and Mother in fact
introduced evidence at the hearing. Mother now asserts she also
“could” have testified on her own behalf. Putting aside any
tactical reasons her counsel may have had for not putting Mother
on the stand, we fail to see on the record before us how testimony
from Mother had the potential to change the outcome of the
hearing. Mother’s statements denying any physical abuse of Ke.

      3 Mother filed a separate appeal (B318678) from the denial
of a section 388 petition she filed in propria person in January
2022; that section 388 petition asserted she received ineffective
assistance of counsel and that the court “sustained a perjured
petition without jurisdiction based on denial of due process.” As
part of the section 388 petition, Mother filed a declaration stating
she did not discover until “mid 2021 that she had due process
rights to an evidentiary hearing to cross examine the social
worker and present evidence.” We appointed counsel for Mother,
who filed a brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
835. The appeal was dismissed on February 24, 2023, after
Mother failed to personally submit any appellate contentions for
court consideration. Although we granted Mother’s request to
take judicial notice of the record in B318678, that does not mean
we take judicial notice of the truth of the factual statements
made in Mother’s section 388 petition. (E.g., Bach v. McNelis
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 865 [courts “may not judicially notice
the truth of assertions in declarations or affidavits filed in court
proceedings”].) We accordingly do not accept Mother’s assertions
as true when weighing other record evidence such as the multiple
notices of hearing sent to Mother that explained she had a right
to a jurisdiction hearing at which she could present evidence.

                                 17
or any substance abuse were presented to the court in the
exhibits admitted into evidence, and Mother’s counsel relied on
them to argue against those jurisdictional allegations. Mother
does not articulate what else she would have said that was not
already before the court. While Mother does not have the burden
to show harm from the error, her failure to identify any such
testimony is properly weighed when analyzing whether the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
       The remaining advisements required by rule 5.534(g)(1)
concern the right to subpoena witnesses, and to confront and
cross-examine witnesses. (Id., subd. (g)(1)(B)-(C).) Mother
suggests she “could” have called the preparer of the police report,
the social worker that interviewed the children, and Ke. to
examine (or cross-examine) them. With regard to the police
report, Mother suggests she “could” have asked about the
statement in the report about other unreported domestic violence
incidents and potentially have excluded it as hearsay. However,
Mother’s appeal does not challenge the jurisdictional finding
based on domestic violence rendering any such testimony
irrelevant. With regard to the social worker and Ke., Mother
fails to articulate what information she would have elicited
beyond what was already before the court. Mother points to
ambiguities in Ke.’s statements to the social worker about
physical abuse perpetrated by Mother, but Ke.’s statements in
this regard were already self-contradictory and Mother’s counsel
highlighted those inconsistencies when arguing against the
jurisdictional allegations, noting that Ke.’s “interviews for the
detention report and the jurisdiction report differ on key details.”
       We similarly find harmless any error in failing to comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 5.682. The court did advise

                                 18
Mother, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(a)(1)
of her right to a hearing—it told Mother the jurisdiction hearing
would “be a trial as you have discussed with your attorney.” In
addition, as noted above, Mother was advised in writing multiple
times before the hearing that there would be a hearing on the
jurisdictional allegations. The court did not specifically inquire
whether Mother intended to admit or deny the allegations as
required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(b); any such
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record
makes clear Mother intended to, and did, deny the allegations of
physically abusing Ke. and substance abuse. Failing to advise
Mother that she had a right to do something that she
nevertheless did anyway is clearly harmless error.
       The remaining queries and findings requirements in
California Rules of Court, rule 5.682 relate to situations where a
parent admits, pleads no contest, or elects to submit the matter
to the court. (See id., subds. (d), (e), and (f).) These portions of
rule 5.682 do not apply here because Mother did not admit to
physical abuse of Ke. or substance abuse, nor did she plead no
contest or submit those issues for decision. We reject Mother’s
claim her trial counsel “de facto” submitted the matter for court
decision. That is manifestly not what occurred; instead, a
contested hearing took place. Mother (and Father) both
introduced additional evidence beyond what DCFS offered. (See
In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 136, fn. 8 [where
parent submits additional evidence at jurisdiction hearing, she
does not submit the matter to the court within the meaning of
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.682].) Mother’s counsel then argued
against the jurisdictional allegations at issue in this appeal,
asserting the court should dismiss them because DCFS failed to

                                19
meet its burden of proof on those allegations and explaining the
reasons why counsel believed that was so.
C.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Challenged
      Jurisdictional Findings
      Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s sustaining of the allegations she physically
abused Ke. and that she had a substance abuse problem that
posed a substantial risk of harm to the children.
      1.    Standard of Review
       “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which
adequately supports a conclusion; it is evidence which is
reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value.” (In re R.C.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941.) Under the substantial
evidence standard, we do not “evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
(In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Rather, we must
“draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings,
consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order,
and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if
other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (Ibid.) We
“ ‘ordinarily look[ ] only at the evidence supporting the successful
party, and disregard[ ] the contrary showing.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, disapproved on another ground in
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)
      2.    Substance Abuse
      The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) based on Mother’s alcohol and marijuana use.
That statute authorizes dependency jurisdiction where “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will

                                 20
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” “[t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child” or by “[t]he inability of the parent
. . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . .
substance abuse.” (Id., subds. (b)(1)(A) & (D).) “Although ‘the
question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time
of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm’
[citation], the court may nevertheless consider past events when
determining whether a child presently needs the juvenile court’s
protection. [Citations.] A parent’s past conduct is a good
predictor of future behavior. [Citation.] ‘Facts supporting
allegations that a child is one described by section 300 are
cumulative.’ [Citation.] Thus, the court ‘must consider all the
circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur.’
[Citation.]” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.)
         During the October 2019 domestic violence incident, law
enforcement documented that Mother was “extremely
intoxicated.” Video taken by Father during the incident showed
the same thing.4 Father stated that Mother was drunk during
the altercation, that he witnessed Mother drinking tequila before
matters escalated, and that he found a container with liquor that
Mother had been drinking from during the day. Although he
later made different statements, soon after the October 2019
incident Ke. said he witnessed Mother take three shots of an
unknown liquid and smoke marijuana on the day of the incident.
Ka. also gave contradictory statements, but one stated she saw

      4 This video recording is not in the appellate record.
However, as noted above Mother acknowledged to DCFS that the
video showed her intoxicated.

                                  21
Mother take a shot of Hennessey and vodka before the
altercation. A paternal uncle indicated Mother became
belligerent and argumentative whenever she drank alcohol.
Maternal grandmother said Mother used marijuana in the past.
       The evidence shows Mother failed to take responsibility for
her alcohol and marijuana consumption, and one may draw a
reasonable inference from Mother’s denials that she failed to
recognize she had a substance abuse problem. Mother’s claim to
only have had one or two glasses of wine cannot be squared with
evidence such as the video showing her level of intoxication on
October 13, 2019. Additionally, Father denied there was even
any wine in the home. Mother denied any marijuana use despite
maternal grandmother and Ke. saying Mother had used it. In
short, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude Mother
was not telling the truth about the potency of the alcohol she was
drinking, the amount she drank, when she drank, or her
marijuana consumption. When parents minimize their substance
intake and fail to accept responsibility for it, a court may
justifiably conclude a parent’s alcohol and/or drug use pose a
continuing and future risk to children. (In re M.R. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 101, 109-110.)
       The October 2019 incident further demonstrated the risk to
the children from Mother’s alcohol and drug consumption, given
the domestic violence that occurred after Mother consumed hard
liquor and marijuana to the point of inebriation. One family
member observed Mother on other occasions to have been
extremely belligerent while drinking. Mother’s frankly absurd
claim that she trashed the television and computers in the home
only because she could not find her glasses, and not because she
was intoxicated, further demonstrates her lack of insight and the

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potential danger her substance abuse posed to the children.
Mother’s alcohol and drug use, which the evidence showed was
more extensive than she was willing to acknowledge, when
combined with Mother’s demeanor when intoxicated, thus posed
a substantial risk that Ke. and Ka. would suffer serious physical
harm as a result of Mother’s inability to adequately supervise
and protect the children, and her inability to provide regular care
due to her substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).) The
juvenile court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction” and take the necessary steps to
protect the child from the risk of harm. (In re Kadence P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383.) “ ‘The purpose of dependency
proceedings is to prevent risk, not ignore it.’ [Citation.]”
(Jonathon L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074,
1104.)
      3.    Physical Abuse of Ke.
       The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a), based on physical abuse of Ke. by Mother. That
statute provides for jurisdiction where “The child has suffered, or
there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the
child’s parent or guardian. For purposes of this subdivision, a
court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury
based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted,
a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the
child’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the
parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious
physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, ‘serious physical
harm’ does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking

                                23
to the buttocks if there is no evidence of serious physical injury.”
(Ibid.)
       Mother and Ke. both stated that when Ke. was younger,
Mother hit him with a belt. Mother said it was a form of
spanking, while Ke. said he was hit “anywhere” on his body. Ke.
said these “whoopings” occurred approximately three times a
month, and Mother left bruises that lasted for about two days.
The juvenile court was entitled to discount Ke.’s later statements
to the extent they were contradictory. It appears that Mother
ceased any physical discipline of Ke. harsh enough to leave marks
several years ago. Mother did, however, recently threaten to hit
Ke. with a belt although she denied following through on that
threat.
       This history (including past hittings with a belt harsh
enough to leave bruises)—especially when combined with the
evidence of Mother’s loss of control while intoxicated including
belligerence and physical aggression, and the reasonable
inference that Mother was drinking stronger liquor than she
claimed more often than she claimed—are substantial evidence
that Ke. was at substantial risk of serious future physical injury
from Mother as required by section 300, subdivision (a) based on
her past physical abuse of him. To the extent Mother argues she
was only exercising her parental right of discipline when she
struck Ke., that right does not extend to excessive punishment
such as hitting a child with a belt “anywhere” on his body hard
enough to leave bruises for several days. (In re D.M. (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 634, 641.)

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                          DISPOSITION
     The jurisdictional orders are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

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