Court Opinion

ID: 9909531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:09:09.390113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:33.349360
License: Public Domain

J-S39007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PHILLIP B. BAKER                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 295 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered November 29, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-38-CR-0000585-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 13, 2023

       Appellant, Phillip B. Baker, appeals pro se from the November 29, 2022

Order entered in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas denying his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 9541-46, as meritless.          Appellant raises numerous layered ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. After careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On October

25, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of one count each of Involuntary Deviate

Sexual Intercourse with a Child (“IDSI”), Indecent Assault—Complainant Less

than 13 Years of Age, Corruption of Minors (“COM”), and Endangering Welfare

of Children (“EWOC”)1 arising from the sexual abuse of his grandson between

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 4304(a)(1),
respectively.
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January 2009, and May 2016.2 On April 17, 2019, the trial court imposed an

aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years of incarceration and ordered Appellant

to pay $2,500 in fines. On June 15, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

Judgment of Sentence and our Supreme Court subsequently denied

Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. See Commonwealth v. Baker,

237 A.3d 1057 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,

240 A.3d 104 (Pa. 2020).

       On August 2, 2021, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA Petition raising

numerous allegations of error.          In particular, Appellant asserted his trial

counsel had been ineffective for failing to, inter alia: (1) file a pre-trial motion

to dismiss the charges or seek a judgment of acquittal on statute of limitations

grounds; (2) not “alert[]”3 the trial court that the Commonwealth did not

prove the “serious bodily injury,” “forcible compulsion” and mens rea elements

of the offense of IDSI, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a); (3) object to the court instructing

the jury that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction;

(4) object to the admission of the victim’s videotaped statement to a

Children’s Resource Center (“CRC”) child advocate as cumulative; and (5)

object to the imposition of fines without holding an ability to pay hearing.

____________________________________________

2 The victim was born in April 2006.

3 PCRA Petition, 8/2/21, at ¶ 42.

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       The PCRA court appointed counsel who, on October 15, 2021, and

September 8, 2022, filed Amended PCRA Petitions reasserting the grounds for

relief set forth by Appellant in his original petition.

       The PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on November 29,

2022. Following the hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition in

open court.4, 5

       On December 8, 2022, Appellant filed a motion requesting a Grazier6

hearing. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order granting

the motion and scheduling a Grazier hearing for January 30, 2023.

       Following the Grazier hearing, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s

request to proceed pro se and notified Appellant that he had 30 days to file

an appeal.

       This appeal followed.7 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
____________________________________________

4  The court did not, however, notify Appellant of his appellate rights as
required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E) (“If the judge disposes of the case in open
court in the presence of the defendant at the conclusion of the hearing, the
judge shall advise the defendant on the record of the right to appeal from the
final order disposition of the petition and of the time within which the appeal
must be taken.”).

5 The court entered a written order dismissing the petition that same day.

6 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

7 The PCRA court’s failure to notify Appellant of his appellate rights on
November 29, 2022, as required by Rule 908(E), constitutes a breakdown in
the operation of the court. Because the court finally informed Appellant of his
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant raises the following five issues on appeal:

       1. Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the [IDSI] crime
          of violence, where no serious bodily injury was claimed, nor
          proven, and Appellant’s jury was not charged to find the
          heightened culpability/mens rea required to commit this crime
          of violence, and, whether trial court’s failure to seek a
          judgment of acquittal constitutes ineffective assistance of
          counsel, and, whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these
          discrete issues did not violate Appellant’s right to effective
          representation as relief would be available under the PCRA[?]

       2. Whether Appellant was unconstitutionally convicted of crimes
          whose statute of limitations expired as his jury was not charged
          to determine whether the element of negating a defense to the
          expired charges was proven by the prosecution, and, whether
          trial counsel’s failure to move for judgments of acquittal
          thereon constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and,
          whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete facts
          rendered his representation ineffective as relief would have
          been available under the PCRA[?]

       3. Whether the sentencing court erred as a matter of law in
          imposing fines absent the conduct of the required ability to pay
          colloquy under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9726(c), and whether trial
          counsel’s failure to object to this deficiency constitutes
          ineffective assistance of counsel, and, whether PCRA counsel’s
          failure to advocate this discrete issue did not violate Appellant’s
          right to effective representation as relief would be available
          under the PCRA[?]

       4. Whether the testimony alone instruction violated Appellant’s
          due process right to a fair trial where his jury was directed that
          the mere words spoken by the complainant was sufficient to
          convict, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3106, and, whether trial
          counsel’s failure to object to this patently erroneous instruction
          constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and, whether
          PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete issues did not

____________________________________________

right to appeal on January 30, 2023, we deem Appellant’s appeal from the
November 29, 2022 order dismissing his petition, filed on February 21, 2023,
timely filed.

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         violate Appellant’s right to effective representation as relief
         would be available under the PCRA[?]

      5. Whether admission of the CRC video violated Appellant’s right
         of confrontation and his constitutional rights to due process of
         law, and, whether trial counsel’s failure to object to its
         admission constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and,
         whether PCRA counsel’s failure to advocate these discrete facts
         rendered his representation ineffective as relief would be
         available under the PCRA[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6-8.

                                         A.

      We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014).

“This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings.”         Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9543(a)(2). These circumstances include ineffective assistance of counsel,

which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”      42 Pa.C.S. §

9543(a)(2)(ii).

      The   law   presumes   counsel   has    rendered   effective   assistance.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he

burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To

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satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) there

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding

would have been different absent counsel’s error.             Commonwealth v.

Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the

test will result in rejection of the appellant’s claim. Id.

      To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been

different but-for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012).         Importantly, “counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.

      In each of his issues, Appellant asserts that both trial counsel and PCRA

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise certain claims.     He has, thus,

presented layered ineffectiveness claims. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple

layers of ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness

relevant to each layer of representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273

A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022).           “In determining a layered claim of

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be

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deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Commonwealth

v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

                                      B.

      In his first issue, Appellant asserts a layered ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on his contention that the Commonwealth presented

insufficient evidence to convict him of IDSI because the complainant did not

claim, and the Commonwealth did not prove, that Appellant caused the victim

serious bodily injury. Appellant’s Brief at 15-38. Appellant claims that trial

counsel’s “failure to move for a judgment of acquittal at any time available to

him” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Id. at 31. Appellant

intertwines this claim with a claim that both trial and plea counsel were

ineffective for not objecting to what Appellant characterizes as a “missing

mens rea” instruction to the jury.    Id. at 36.   Appellant asserts, without

citation to any authority that “it was incumbent on the trial court to charge

Appellant’s jury to find” that he acted with “a mens rea of, at least,

recklessness[.]” Id. at 19. He, thus, concludes, that the instruction the court

provided the jury was “fatally deficient” because it did not “direct[] the jury

to find any standard of culpability” let alone the “heightened mens rea

required to commit [IDSI] and an instruction on the requirement of forcible

compulsion is entirely absent.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).

      In considering whether this claim had merit, the PCRA court aptly noted

that the Commonwealth charged Appellant with violating Section 3123(b) of

the Crimes Code. Unlike Sections 3123(a) and 3123(c), Section 3123(b) does

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not require proof of forcible compulsion or that the defendant caused serious

bodily injury.8 Because conviction of this offense does not require proof of

forcible compulsion or serious bodily injury, the PCRA court concluded that

Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to

prove these elements was meritless. Given that this claim was meritless, the

PCRA court then concluded that neither trial nor PCRA counsel provided

ineffective assistance for failing to raise it.

       The record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that neither trial nor

PCRA counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a claim that the

Commonwealth did not prove elements of an uncharged offense. Moreover,

the record belies Appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to move for a judgment of acquittal. In fact, at the conclusion of the

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, trial counsel did move for a judgment of

acquittal, asserting that the Commonwealth had not “met the elements of the

crimes to get this to the jury.” N.T. Trial, 10/24/18, at 165.

       With respect to his claim that the jury instruction was deficient, we are

mindful that “[a] trial court’s charge to the jury must contain a correct

statement of the law.” Commonwealth v. Patosky, 656 A.2d 499, 505 (Pa.

Super. 1995) (citations omitted).              When addressing challenges to a jury

instruction, we consider the challenged portion in light of the entire

____________________________________________

8 “A person commits [IDSI] with a child, a felony of the first degree, when the

person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less
than 13 years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b).

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instruction. Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 88 (Pa. 2009). Here, our

review of the court’s comprehensive instruction reveals that it correctly stated

the law, including the elements of IDSI that the Commonwealth was required

to prove, i.e., the age of the victim and whether Appellant engaged in deviate

sexual intercourse with him.         See N.T. Trial, 10/25/18, at 99-101.

Accordingly, the PCRA court properly found that neither trial nor PCRA counsel

were ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue. Appellant is, thus, not

entitled to relief on this claim.

                                           C.

      In his second issue, Appellant claims that his counsel were ineffective

for failing to assert a claim that his convictions of Indecent Assault, COM, and

EWOC are illegal because a 2-year statute of limitations applied to those

offenses. Appellant’s Brief at 39-46.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(3) provides that, with respect to offenses whose

period for prosecution has expired, the Commonwealth may still prosecute

      [a]ny sexual offense committed against a minor who is less than
      18 years of age any time up to the later of the period of limitation
      provided by law after the minor has reached 18 years of age or
      the date the minor reaches 55 years of age.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(c)(3).        Section 5552(c)(3) includes Indecent Assault,

EWOC, and COM in the enumerated list of “sexual offenses.”

      The PCRA court found this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

meritless based on the plain language of Section 5552. We agree. Section

5552 is clear and unambiguous that the statute of limitations does not begin

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to run on these offenses when the victim is a minor. Because the victim in

this case was a minor, Appellant’s claim that the statute of limitations for

bringing these charges had expired lacks merit.        This claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, thus, fails.

                                       D.

      In his third issue, Appellant asserts that his trial and PCRA counsel were

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s imposition of fines without

conducting a hearing to determine Appellant’s ability to pay. Appellant’s Brief

at 47-52.     He contends that evidence of his financial resources—what

Appellant “had” in the way of a job, a house, the ability to pay for counsel—

contained in, inter alia the pre-sentence investigation report was insufficient

to prove his ability to pay. Id. at 49 n.1. He argues, without citation to any

authority, that the court was required to consider Appellant’s “future prospects

of income creation” before imposing fines. Id. at 49 n.21.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c) permits the trial court to include the payment of

discretionary fines in a defendant’s sentence only if “it appears of record that[]

the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c)(1).

      Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2009), in

support of his claim that the trial court was required to hold a hearing to

determine his ability to pay fines before imposing them as part of his judgment

of sentence. Ford is, however, inapposite.

      In Ford, our Supreme Court held that the defendant’s agreement to pay

a specific fine as part of a negotiated plea agreement did not constitute

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evidence that he can or will be able to pay the fine. The Court noted that

there was no record of the defendant’s ability to pay because “no inquiry was

made, and no record existed, as to [the defendant’s] ability to pay the agreed-

upon fines.”   Id. at 827 (citation omitted).   The Court opined that, in the

negotiated plea context, the trial court “should simply consider whether the

defendant is or will be able to pay any negotiated fines.”     Id. at 830-31.

Notably, the Ford Court did not impose a requirement that the trial court hold

a hearing to determine the defendant’s ability to pay.

      Rather, we find Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274 (Pa.

Super. 2013), controlling.      In Boyd, this Court held that a sufficient

evidentiary basis for the imposition of fines exists where the court has the

benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report detailing the

defendant’s employment history and existing assets. Id. at 1274.

      In explaining its conclusion that Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims based on his alleged illegal sentence lacked merit, the court

noted that the evidence of record, including the findings in Appellant’s pre-

sentence investigation report, indicated that

      [e]ven though Appellant was retired, Appellant had a job that paid
      him $100,000 a year, had a house, and had the ability to pay for
      counsel. The pre-sentence investigation report provided relevant
      information, the trial provided information too, and nothing was
      presented to this [c]ourt that Appellant was unable to be
      employed, unable to work, was unable to hold a job, or has a low
      intelligence quotient. Notably, Appellant was an educated man,
      was gainfully employed throughout his years, and was in the
      military.

PCRA Ct. Op., 4/21/23, at 17.

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      The record supports the PCRA court’s findings. Our review confirms that

the pre-sentence investigation report contained information that Appellant

had a job earning $100,000 per year for 40 years prior to his retirement. He

served in the National Guard for six years prior to his discharge. He had assets

in the form of a house and a car, and no mortgage or rent obligations.

Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that there was sufficient evidence

in the record to indicate that Appellant had the ability to pay the $2,500 fine

imposed by the trial court. Because Appellant’s claim lacks merit, neither trial

counsel nor PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise it. Accordingly,

this claim does not garner Appellant relief.

                                       E.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that his counsel were ineffective

for not raising a claim regarding trial court’s instruction to the jury that the

victim’s testimony alone, if believed, is sufficient to convict Appellant.

Appellant’s Brief at 53-61. Appellant claims that this instruction violates his

due process rights because it is a “patent violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3106.”

Id. at 53.   He argues, without citation to any authority that, because the

instruction directs the jury to convict him if it believes the victim’s testimony,

the instruction permits the jury to convict simply because the victim made an

accusation—“the victim’s credibility needs not be tested [and] elements of the

crime can be ignored . . .”. Id. at 55. He assails this as “patently ludicrous,

unconstitutional and amounts to the utter abrogation of Appellant’s right to a

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fair trial[]” because it “removes from the jury the duty to determine the actual

elements of crime[.]” Id. at 55-56.

      Our review indicates that the trial court instructed the jury, in

accordance with the Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.13B, as

follows:

      The testimony of [the victim] standing alone, if believed by you,
      is sufficient proof upon which to find the defendant guilty in this
      case. The testimony of [the victim] in such as case as this need
      not be supported by other evidence to sustain a conviction.
      Thus[,] you may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [the
      victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defendant is guilty.

N.T. Trial, 10/26/18, at 95 (emphasis added).

      Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.13B was derived from

18 Pa.C.S. § 3106, a statute pertaining to sexual assault cases, which

provides:

      The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this chapter
      shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility of
      a complainant of any other crime.          The testimony of a
      complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions
      under this chapter. No instructions shall be given cautioning the
      jury to view the complainant’s testimony in any other way than
      that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3106.

      The PCRA court found Appellant’s claim meritless because the trial court

gave the appropriate instruction to the jury. We agree that the trial court

properly instructed the jury that the victim’s testimony alone—if believed by

the jury—is sufficient proof of guilt. This instruction does not require the jury

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to believe the victim, nor does it—as Appellant insists—permit the jury to

convict a defendant simply because an accusation has been made against him.

Appellant’s bald claim to the contrary, thus, fails.

                                       F.

      In his final issue, Appellant asserts that his counsels’ failure to raise a

claim regarding the admission of the CRC video-recorded interview of the

victim as cumulative constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s

Brief at 62-72. He claims that the victim’s “unchallenged testimony [] was

repetitive/cumulative and did not introduce distinctly corroborative claims.”

Id. at 62. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly relied on the Tender

Years Hearsay Exception to admit the recording because “the complainant was

not unavailable and testified, rendering reliance thereon misplaced.” Id. at

66. See also id. at 67-68 (characterizing the court’s “Tender Years” review

“moot because the complainant testified.”).

      The “[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). “Accordingly, a ruling admitting

evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of

support to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d

168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

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      The record here indicates that the trial court admitted this evidence over

Appellant’s counsel’s objection pursuant to the Tender Years Hearsay

Exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1. The Tender Years Hearsay Act creates an

exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence to

allow the Commonwealth to present to the factfinder of a statement made by

a child who was sixteen years old or younger at the time of the statement.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a). Relevant to this appeal, a court may admit a child-

victim’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted when (1)

“the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and

that the time, content[,] and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient

indicia of reliability;” and (2) the child testifies at the proceeding or is deemed

unavailable to testify. Id. at § 5985.1(a)(1)(i)-(ii). “Pursuant to this statute,

indicia of reliability include, inter alia, the spontaneity of the statements,

consistency in repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terms

unexpected in children of that age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate.”

Strafford, 194 A.3d at 173 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Our review of the Notes of Testimony from the PCRA Hearing, as well as

the PCRA court’s opinion, indicates that Appellant argued at the hearing that:

(1) his trial counsel attempted to prevent the trial court from admitting the

CRC interview recording as evidence; and (2) the recording was at the same

time both redundantly cumulative because the victim testified at trial and

uniquely dissimilar from the victim’s trial testimony because of his

mannerisms, way of speaking, and level of specificity.          N.T. PCRA Hr’g,

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1/30/23, at 15-16, 37-41, 47-50. The Commonwealth countered that the trial

court had properly admitted it pursuant to the Tender Years Hearsay

Exception. Id. at 16, 47-50.

      The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the trial court misapplied the

Tender Years Hearsay Exception because the victim testified at trial.       This

argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the exception, which

expressly permits the admission of an out-of-court statement of a child victim

where, as here, the victim testifies at the proceeding.           42 Pa.C.S. §

5985.1(a)(1)(ii)(A). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the recording should

have been excluded because the victim’s statements in it were duplicative or

cumulative of the victim’s trial testimony lacks merit. Appellant’s trial counsel

and PCRA counsel were, therefore, not ineffective for declining to raise this

meritless claim.

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                                         G.

      In sum, the PCRA court did not err in finding that each of Appellant’s

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

      Judge McLaughlin concurs in result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/13/2023

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