Court Opinion

ID: 9947636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:04:58.298444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:11.807012
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: March 5, 2024

     S24Y0099. IN THE MATTER OF ANDREA JO ANNE DAVID-
                           VEGA.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review

Board”) that the Court adopt the findings and conclusions of Special

Master Adam Marshall Hames, who recommends Respondent Andrea

Jo Anne David-Vega (State Bar No. 364871) receives at least a two-

year suspension for her violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 3.4

(a), 8.1 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional

Conduct (“GRPC”).1 David-Vega, who was admitted to the State Bar in

2008, has filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report, challenging

the Special Master’s recommended discipline and requesting a six-to-

        1 The maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 8.1 (a),

and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of
Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, and 9.3 is a public reprimand.
nine-month suspension. The State Bar did not file exceptions to the

Review Board’s report. However, the State Bar did file a response to

David-Vega’s exceptions, noting that disbarment is the presumptive

discipline in this case but that it was satisfied with the Special

Master’s recommendation of at least a two-year suspension. We agree

with the Special Master and the Review Board that significant

discipline is warranted. However, given the facts of the underlying

matter and David-Vega’s admitted violations of the GRPC, we

conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.

     The record shows that on June 30, 2020, David-Vega’s long-time

client, Fadi L. Milan, filed a grievance against her with the State Bar.

On or about July 22, 2020, the State Bar mailed the grievance to

David-Vega and directed her to respond to the grievance no later than

August 10, 2020. After David-Vega failed to timely respond, the State

Bar sent her a letter on or about March 3, 2021, and directed her to

respond to the grievance no later than March 13, 2021. David-Vega

again failed to respond to the grievance, and on or about March 30,

2021, the State Bar issued a Notice of Investigation against her,

informing her that, based on Milan’s grievance, it appeared that
                                   2
David-Vega had violated several GRPC Rules. On January 14, 2022,

following the investigation, the State Bar filed the underlying formal

complaint. Although David-Vega acknowledged service of the

complaint, she did not timely file an answer and, on March 24, 2022,

the State Bar filed a motion for default pursuant to Bar Rule 4-212 (a).

     On May 20, 2022, David-Vega filed a motion to stay, asserting

that she intended to submit a petition for voluntary discipline, in

which she would acknowledge wrongdoing but would include

significant mitigating evidence. On May 31, 2022, counsel for David-

Vega represented that David-Vega was in the process of drafting the

petition for voluntary discipline and would “share” the petition with

the State Bar and the Special Master “in a couple of weeks.” The State

Bar informed David-Vega and the Special Master that it had no

objection to David-Vega filing a petition for voluntary discipline and

agreed   to   David-Vega’s    proposed    timeline.   Based   on    this

representation, the State Bar did not file a formal response to the

motion to stay. However, David-Vega never filed the petition. Instead,

on July 21, 2022—over four months after her answer to the formal

complaint was due—David-Vega filed an answer and a motion to open
                                   3
default. On July 29, 2022, the State Bar filed a timely response to

David-Vega’s motion to open default, requesting that the Special

Master grant the State Bar’s motion for default and deny or dismiss

David-Vega’s motion on the ground that the State Bar had relied on

David-Vega’s representation that she intended to file a petition for

voluntary discipline and that the State Bar, the disciplinary process,

and the public would be prejudiced by opening David-Vega’s default.

      On August 8, 2022, the Special Master issued his first Report and

Recommendation, in which he granted the State Bar’s motion for

default, noting that David-Vega failed to articulate a legitimate basis

to reopen the default. The Special Master, citing In the Matter of

Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737, 738 (791 SE2d 776) (2016), granted David-

Vega a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circumstances so that

she could offer evidence related to the recommended sanction.2 The

      2 We note that although, generally speaking, the opening of default
should be liberally applied, we cannot say that the Special Master abused his
discretion in refusing to open the default here, given that David-Vega failed to
show providential cause, excusable neglect, or that this is a proper case for
opening default. See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). David-Vega produced no evidence
suggesting she had been trying to timely respond to the formal complaint,
continued to practice law during this period, and failed to cooperate with the

                                       4
Special Master then summarized the facts alleged and violations

charged in the formal complaint, which were deemed admitted

pursuant to David-Vega’s default. See Bar Rule 4-212 (a).

      As recounted by the Special Master, the admitted facts show the

following. In August 2016, Milan retained David-Vega to pursue his

personal injury claim based on an automobile accident, in which he

suffered a serious brain injury. David-Vega met with Milan to discuss

his claim and then contacted the liability insurer for the defendants,

identifying herself as the attorney representing Milan. However,

David-Vega did not provide Milan with a written contingency fee

agreement. In March 2018, after not hearing from David-Vega for a

disciplinary proceedings and the concurrent legal malpractice action that
Milan filed against her. See In the Matter of Turk, 267 Ga. 30, 30 (471 SE2d
842) (1985) (declining to allow attorney to open default and noting in part that
the attorney was actively practicing law during the relevant time period). Cf.
In the Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390, 394 (882 SE2d 339) (2022) (case remanded
for a hearing on the motion for default where respondent dutifully responded
to the grievance and subsequent investigation and alleged that her failure to
file an answer to the formal complaint was based on a series of
miscommunications). We further note that although some facts may have been
admitted only by default, as discussed below, David-Vega also made certain
admissions in her testimony at the hearing on aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, including admitting that she fabricated evidence that she
provided in the underlying disciplinary matter and in the related civil
malpractice case.

                                       5
“[l]ong time,” Milan emailed her, informing her that his injuries from

the accident had worsened. In May 2018, David-Vega discussed with

Milan the status of his claim and his desire to update his will and

scheduled a time for Milan to come to her office to sign the necessary

documents. However, when Milan arrived for his appointment, David-

Vega was not in the office and had arranged for her husband, who is

not a lawyer, to provide Milan with the paperwork.

     On May 26, 2018, following this meeting, Milan emailed David-

Vega to schedule a time to discuss his case. David-Vega did not respond

to Milan, cut off communication with the insurer, and failed to file the

suit by August 2018, at which point the limitation period had run.

Between January 2019 and February 2020, Milan called David-Vega’s

office over 65 times to ask about the status of his case and continued

contacting her via email and text message through April 2020. During

this time, David-Vega’s staff scheduled six different conference calls

for Milan to speak with David-Vega, but David-Vega missed each of

the calls. Occasionally, David-Vega would respond via email or text

message, claiming that his email had been sent to her spam folder or

                                   6
that she had another obligation and needed time to respond to his

questions. On April 30, 2020, Milan texted David-Vega the following:

     Good morning Miss Andrea I’m glad you’re OK and safe can
     we please start somewhere On my case since January of
     2019 when I visited your office to drop off some documents
     and met your husband and he told me that I will have an
     update. Since then I have no update on my case and I called
     text emailed for so many times and no one is replying to me
     it’s like I don’t exist or I don’t even have a case as I told you
     I’m preparing to leave Georgia to state of Florida and I need
     to know the status of my case I tried so many times
     following up with your office and they keep telling me Ms.
     Andrea has the file and she’s the only one know about the
     case. I know you for almost 13 years and you always Took
     care of me well please update me Thank you.

     David-Vega did not respond to this message. On May 5, 2020,

Milan notified David-Vega by email and U.S. mail that he was

terminating her representation and requested that she provide him

with his file. Less than five minutes after David-Vega received this

email, she texted Milan asking, “Mr. Milan, are you firing me? Why?”

Milan and David-Vega had no further contact and David-Vega failed

to provide Milan with the requested files.

     Milan then filed the underlying grievance with the State Bar and

a professional malpractice complaint against David-Vega on October
                                    7
19, 2020. According to the process server, David-Vega repeatedly

refused to accept service of the malpractice complaint. However, on

December 23, 2020, David-Vega filed her answer to the malpractice

complaint, in which she denied that Milan had been injured in the

accident, that she agreed to represent him, that she failed to file suit

on his behalf prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of

limitation applicable to his personal injury claim, that Milan had

terminated her representation on May 5, 2020, and that she failed to

provide him with the requested files.

      Although David-Vega failed to timely respond to the grievance—

or the subsequent formal complaint—David-Vega did respond to the

State Bar’s Notice of Investigation against her, providing a sworn

response stating that on March 18, 2018, she received an email from

Milan dated March 9, 2018, in which he advised her that he would no

longer need her services and that she had emailed Milan his entire

accident file. Per the State Bar’s request, David-Vega sent several

email exchanges purporting to be between her and Milan. However,

the   March   9   email   terminating   David-Vega’s    representation

supposedly sent from Milan was in a different format and font than
                                   8
the others and, unlike in the other emails, Milan appeared to use

perfect diction, capitalization, and punctuation. Milan denied having

sent this email, and the State Bar determined that the email was likely

falsified by David-Vega.

     On or about April 1, 2021, Casey Stevens, Milan’s counsel in the

malpractice matter, served requests for production on David-Vega,

demanding all agreements and written correspondence between

David-Vega and Milan and Milan’s file. Stevens also served

interrogatories upon David-Vega, demanding that she identify any

facts or documents supporting her denial of liability. David-Vega failed

to timely respond to the discovery request. On June 23, 2021, after

attempting to contact David-Vega several times to ask her to respond

to the discovery requests, Stevens filed a motion to compel and a

motion for sanctions. On September 3, 2021, David-Vega filed her

response to the motions, asserting that she had “responded in full” to

the discovery requests, but was unable to provide any proof. The trial

court judge granted the motion to compel and instructed David-Vega

to send the requested documents and her responses to the

                                   9
interrogatories by October 14, 2021. David-Vega failed to provide the

discovery requests in a timely manner, but she did deliver the

requested responses on October 18, 2021. However, the responses were

incomplete, unresponsive, and untruthful, as David-Vega claimed that

she had not been named as a party in a civil lawsuit within the past

ten years, even though she had another professional malpractice

lawsuit against her pending since May 28, 2021. On December 9, 2021,

Stevens filed a second motion to compel, requesting that David-Vega

provide the requested documents and Milan’s file by January 8, 2022.

Once again, David-Vega failed to file a timely response.

                                  10
      Based on these admitted facts, the Special Master concluded that

David-Vega knowingly violated Rules 1.2,3 1.3,4 1.4 (a),5 1.5 (c),6 1.16

      3 GRPC Rule 1.2 states in pertinent part that “a lawyer shall abide by a

client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and . .
. shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
      4 GRPC Rule 1.3 states in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall act with

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable
diligence as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause
to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard
a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
      5 GRPC Rule 1.4 (a) states in pertinent part that “ [a] lawyer shall: (1)

promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client’s informed consent . . . is required; (2) reasonably consult with
the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter; [and] (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”
      6 GPRC Rule 1.5 (c) states in pertinent part that “[a] contingent fee
agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to
be determined.”

                                       11
(d),7 3.4 (a),8 8.1 (a),9 8.4 (a) (4),10 and 9.311 of the GRPC, found in Bar

Rule 4-102 (d).

      On October 5, 2022, after issuing his first Report and

Recommendation, the Special Master held a hearing on aggravating

and mitigating circumstances. At the hearing, David-Vega admitted to

fabricating the email allegedly sent by Milan dated March 9, 2018,

terminating her representation, and also to fabricating a text message

to make it appear as though Milan had terminated her representation

      7 GRPC Rule 1.16 (d) states in pertinent part that “[u]pon termination of

representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of
fee that has not been earned.”
      8 GRPC Rule 3.4 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall not

unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value.”
      9 GRPC Rule 8.1 (a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer . . . in

connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact.”
      10 GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides in pertinent part that “[a lawyer may

not] engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”
      11 GRPC Rule 9.3 provides in pertinent part that “[d]uring the
investigation of a grievance filed under [the GRPC], the lawyer complained
against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar
Rules.”

                                      12
prior to the statute of limitation expiring. She explained that she did

not have a “good answer” for why she fabricated the documents and

asserted that she “had so much going on” and “probably should have

reached out for help.”12 David-Vega was also unable to provide a reason

for failing to timely file Milan’s claim.

      In mitigation, David-Vega called as a witness her licensed

counselor, Jennifer Hawkins, who testified that in 2016, David-Vega

expanded her existing practice by becoming a Special Assistant

Attorney General representing DFCS in Gwinnett County with a

caseload of 200 cases. She later acquired an additional 150 cases from

a neighboring county while still managing her own practice, which

handled family law, business law, bankruptcy, personal injury,

juvenile, and criminal law cases. David-Vega became overwhelmed

with her case load, but continued to take cases because she “did not

know how to say no” and felt unable to ask for help. Hawkins testified

     12 The record shows that David-Vega submitted the fabricated email in

both the underlying disciplinary matter and the civil malpractice case. David-
Vega submitted the fabricated text message in the malpractice case but did not
submit this fabricated evidence to the State Bar as part of this disciplinary
matter.

                                     13
that David-Vega’s inability to ask for help stemmed from childhood

trauma. Around this same time, she was assisting in providing care

for her mother and stepfather, who had become ill. According to

Hawkins, David-Vega eventually “reached a point where she

completely unplugged.” David-Vega then began seeing Hawkins for

treatment and was diagnosed with General Anxiety Disorder and

ADHD.

     Additionally, counsel for David-Vega announced that, right

before the hearing commenced, the parties had reached a settlement

in the legal malpractice claim. As mitigating evidence, David-Vega

also submitted character evidence consisting of depositions of a

superior court judge and three juvenile court judges, all of whom

David-Vega had appeared before. The judges described David-Vega as

“a hardworking, dedicated, and zealous advocate for her clients.”

     In aggravation, Milan testified that he had suffered permanent

injuries to his eye, neck, head, back, and brain as a result of the

accident for which he sought David-Vega’s legal representation; that

he had been subject to debt collectors calling and was unable to access

                                  14
his medical records because they had been sent to David-Vega; and

that he felt betrayed by David-Vega because they had a long-existing

attorney-client relationship prior to the accident, as she had

represented him in nine different matters. Milan’s counsel in the

malpractice case, Stevens, testified that David-Vega had lied on

numerous occasions and failed to cooperate in the legal malpractice

case; that David-Vega failed to show any accountability until the day

of the hearing; and that David-Vega had drawn out the settlement

negotiations in the civil malpractice action for two years.

     On December 14, 2022, the Special Master issued his second

Report and Recommendation, in which he recounted his factual

findings following the hearing on aggravating and mitigating

circumstances and made a discipline recommendation. In determining

the appropriate level of discipline, the Special Master considered the

ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”).

See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (ABA

Standards are instructive in determining the appropriate level of

discipline). Those standards require consideration of (1) the duty

                                   15
violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury

caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating

or mitigating factors. See ABA Standard 3.0. The Special Master

concluded that “David-Vega violated a duty to her client, the legal

system, and her profession”; that she “acted knowingly”; and that “the

injury to the client was significant.” The Special Master also concluded

that nine out of the eleven aggravating factors set forth in ABA

Standard 9.22 applied: dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of

misconduct; multiple offenses; bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary

proceedings; submission of false evidence during the disciplinary

process; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct;

vulnerability of the victim; substantial experience in the practice of

law; and the indifference to making restitution.13 See ABA Standard

9.22 (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j). Additionally, the Special

Master concluded that out of the thirteen mitigating factors set forth

in ABA Standard 9.32, “only a few [we]re in her favor,” as she had no

      13 The Special Master found that the only two aggravating factors that

did not apply were prior disciplinary offenses and illegal conduct. See ABA
Standard 9.22 (a) & (k).

                                      16
prior disciplinary history and recently expressed remorse for her

actions. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a) & (l). The Special Master also noted

in mitigation that she was suffering from personal and emotional

problems and that, apart from the disciplinary matter at issue, she had

a reputation as a “stellar” and “professional” lawyer among the judges

whom she had appeared before. See ABA Standard 9.32 (g) & (i).14

      Based on the lack of prior disciplinary history and the character

and reputation evidence, the Special Master recommended a

suspension of at least two years. The Special Master further noted that

the violations admitted by David-Vega, particularly her fabrication of

evidence, were among the most serious violations under the rules and

that the Court may decide that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.

See In the Matter of Dorer, 304 Ga. 442, 445 (2018) (rejecting petition

for voluntary discipline seeking reprimand for admitted violation of

Rule 8.4 (a) (4), noting that this “violation is among the most serious

      14 Although, when discussing factors in mitigation, the Special Master

stated that David-Vega’s “core argument . . . w[as] that she was suffering from
personal and emotional problems,” it is unclear whether he found that she had
a “mental disability” as provided in ABA Standard 9.32 (i).

                                      17
charges that can be leveled against an attorney—it is a violation that

commonly warrants disbarment”).

     We appreciate the Special Master’s careful analysis in this

matter. We agree with the Special Master’s determination that nine

out of the eleven aggravating factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.22

are applicable to this matter, while only a few of the mitigating factors

set forth in ABA Standard 9.32 are applicable. We also agree with the

Special Master that David-Vega’s false statements as to when she was

terminated by Milan and her fabrication of evidence during the

underlying disciplinary proceeding and in the malpractice case against

her implicate some of the most serious violations under the Rules, and

that severe discipline is warranted. After consideration of the record

in this matter, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate

sanction for David-Vega’s violations of the GRPC. We conclude that

this sanction is consistent with prior disciplinary matters in which we

have disbarred attorneys who have made false statements to a tribunal

and in connection with disciplinary proceedings and have fabricated

evidence. See, e.g., In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 417-418 (877

SE2d 248) (2022) (disbarring attorney in part because he had made
                                   18
false statements to a tribunal and in connection with the disciplinary

proceeding); In the Matter of Jefferson, 307 Ga. 50, 55-56 (834 SE2d

73) (2019) (same); Nicholson, 299 at 741 (disbarring attorney who

submitted a false affidavit to the court); In the Matter of Koehler, 297

Ga. 794, 795-796 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarring attorney, in part

because he made materially deceitful and misleading statements in

federal civil action); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152, 153 (765 SE2d

361) (2014) (disbarring attorney for making knowingly false and

misleading statements to his client, to the court, and to third parties

in connection with a bankruptcy case); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis,

295 Ga. 861, 862 (764 SE2d 549) (2014) (disbarring attorney, in part

because she made false statements to the juvenile court); In the Matter

of Mann, 293 Ga. 664, 665 (748 SE2d 914) (2013) (disbarring attorney,

in part because he made a false statement to the court in a contempt

hearing); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96, 97 (727 SE2d

502) (2012) (disbarring attorney who submitted false evidence to a

tribunal, made materially false statements about the evidence to the

tribunal, and failed to take any remedial action afterwards); In the

Matter of Shehane, 276 Ga. 168, 168-169 (575 SE2d 503) (2003)
                                   19
(disbarring attorney who fabricated evidence submitted to the

investigative panel to make it appear as though he had handled his

client’s case).

      Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Andrea Jo

Anne David-Vega be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to

practice law in the State of Georgia. David-Vega is reminded of her

duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

      Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

                                   20