Court Opinion

ID: 9481587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:24:56.245186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:26.620331
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the court’s judgment but differ with the analysis in the majority opinion. The first question in this case is whether the district court was required to review de novo FMC’s decision to deny Govindarajan benefits, or whether the court was required to review that decision to determine only if it was arbitrary and capricious. The majority holds that the proper standard of review is irrelevant because FMC’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Given that this case involved a close factual question based on disputed facts, I would have difficulty concluding that FMC’s decision exceeds the very deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. However, I would not reach that question because I conclude that the district court was required to review the plan administrator’s decision de novo.
FMC argues that de novo review is inappropriate because, unlike Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), this case involves resolving a factual question (was Govindarajan really disabled?) rather than interpreting the Plan. Whether or not the proper standard of review varies depending upon whether a factual or interpretive question is presented is an issue we considered, but did not decide, in Petrilli v. Dreschel, 910 F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir.1990). I would decide that question today and approve a de novo review by the district court. Even if FMC’s characterization of this case is correct, I see no basis for distinguishing between factual and interpretive questions when determining the proper standard of review. It is true that Bruch involved a plan interpretation. But *638there is language in Bruch supporting a broader interpretation of the Court’s holding. See Petrilli, 910 F.2d at 1446. More importantly, Bruch’s holding was based on an analogy to trust law. As we noted in Petrilli, “the [Bruch ] rationale focuses on whether the written terms of the plan confer discretion on the administrator, and not on the type of decision — factual or interpretive — that the administrator is rendering.” Id. FMC has pointed to nothing in trust law to support its proposed distinction between factual and interpretive decisions.
The district court’s standard of review in this case thus depends on whether FMC’s plan gives the administrator “discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S.Ct. at 956. Without going into detail, I agree with the district court’s decision that nothing in FMC’s plan gives the administrator such discretionary authority. Therefore, de novo review was proper. Although this case comes to us ostensibly from a grant of summary judgment for Govindarajan, FMC argues that the district court’s “findings” (including its ultimate finding that Govin-darajan was disabled) are clearly erroneous. In effect, FMC has treated this case as if the district court had tried the case and entered findings and judgment on stipulated facts. That being the case, it is appropriate for this court to review the district court’s decision for clear error, rather than applying the normal summary judgment standard. See May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1115-16 (7th Cir.1986). As the majority’s analysis of the evidence demonstrates, the district court did not clearly err in finding Govindarajan disabled. Therefore, I concur in the court’s judgment affirming the district court’s decision that Govindara-jan was disabled and entitled to benefits.