Court Opinion

ID: 9945197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 15:16:34.223516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.560548
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Ortiz, Lorish and Senior Judge Petty
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Lexington, Virginia

            THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR THE
             COUNTY OF LOUISA, VIRGINIA
                                                                                  OPINION BY
            v.        Record No. 0023-23-2                                   JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
                                                                               FEBRUARY 27, 2024
            VALLERIE HOLDINGS OF VIRGINIA, LLC

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY
                                              Timothy K. Sanner, Judge

                             Kristin B. Wright (Jennifer D. Royer; Royer Law Firm, P.C., on
                             briefs), for appellant.

                             H. Clark Leming (Peter R. Basanti; Leming and Healy, P.C., on
                             brief), for appellee.

                             Amicus Curiae: Virginia Electric and Power Company, d/b/a
                             Dominion Energy Virginia (Andrew P. Sherrod; Randolph Critzer,
                             Jr.; Hirschler Fleischer, A Professional Corporation, on brief), for
                             appellant.

                      Upon appeal of a circuit court decision reversing the decision of a board of zoning

            appeals (“BZA”), this Court evaluates whether the circuit court’s factual findings were plainly

            wrong or without evidence to support them. Vallerie Holdings of Virginia (“VHOV”) applied to

            the Louisa County BZA for a variance for an existing staircase and deck that extends into the

            five-foot setback for property bordering Lake Anna. After the BZA denied the variance, the

            circuit court reversed, finding that the strict application of the zoning ordinance unreasonably

            restricted VHOV’s use of the property and that VHOV did not create its own hardship. Because

            the circuit court’s findings were not plainly wrong or without evidence to support them, we

            affirm.
                                          BACKGROUND

       In December 2015, VHOV purchased land at 349 Pleasants Landing Road in Bumpass,

Louisa County, bordering Lake Anna, including a two-story house and a large marina building.1

The house serves as a commercial office on the first floor, with a 400-square-foot private

residence on the second floor. Under Louisa County Code § 86-117(a), residential structures

fronting Lake Anna must be at least five feet from the property line.2

       Before VHOV’s purchase, Mike Averett owned the property. Averett began renovations

on the house in fall 2005, including moving the exterior door to the upstairs from the east side of

the building to the south side and covering over the old door. Averett also removed the staircase

to the upper floor, so that at the time of VHOV’s purchase, VHOV could access the upstairs only

by ladder. Though Averett began remodeling the upstairs kitchen, he stopped due to financial

difficulties, leaving the property vacant for several years. When VHOV bought it, the building’s

interior had been destroyed by vandalism, with broken windows and doors, “punched out” walls,

and broken fixtures and appliances.

       In early 2016, without applying for a building permit, VHOV owner Michael Vallerie

built a staircase on the east side of the house, near the location of the old staircase. VHOV

connected the stairs to a deck outside the new south-side door with a 50-square-foot “bridge,”

which encroached on the five-foot setback and crossed the Dominion property line.3 In March

2016, VHOV notified county leaders that “an attempt to repair the steps leading to the upstairs of

       1
         VHOV operates the Pleasants’ Landing Marina as a recreational destination out of the
larger building, running events on the surrounding shoreline and accessing the lake by agreement
with Dominion Power, the owner of Lake Anna.
       2
        Walkways and steps that access the lake directly may encroach into this setback, but
decks and porches that merely overlook the lake may not. Louisa Cnty. Code § 86-117(a).
       3
         In August 2016, VHOV trimmed the portion of the bridge that protruded across the
property line, but left the bridge in the setback.
                                                  -2-
the residential structure shown on the site plan, evolved into a rebuild of the stairway which

requires a permit. . . . We will immediately submit a building permit for the stairs already in

progress.”4 In October 2016, the County approved VHOV’s site plan for the property, noting

that a deck “was constructed after survey work was completed” in February 2016, and was

“within the [five-foot] building setback line,” thus requiring a variance.5

       Between 2017 and 2020, VHOV submitted several unsuccessful applications for a

variance or special exception.6 In December 2021, the BZA considered a new application for the

same variance. The BZA heard testimony from Robert Gardner, the Louisa County Zoning

Administrator, who said that VHOV had removed and replaced the stairway to the second floor

without a permit in 2016. Gardner, relying on a staff report, alleged that VHOV had relocated

the door from the east side of the building to the south side. He emphasized that any hardship

was created by VHOV because it failed to get a permit before constructing the staircase, moved

the door, and made “poor remodeling choices” in building the upstairs kitchen.7 Gardner also

       4
         This letter contradicts both photo evidence and trial testimony by Vallerie that the stairs
did not exist at the time of his purchase. Vallerie addressed this confusion at the BZA hearing,
affirming that there were no steps at the time of the purchase, and suggesting that he had used the
wrong word in saying that he “repaired” the steps.
       5
         The document also noted that the building could not be used until VHOV either obtained
both a variance or special exception and a building permit, or removed the nonconforming deck
and stairs. VHOV did not apply for a building permit.
       6
          In 2018, following two denials, VHOV removed the staircase and applied for a variance
again. The BZA voted 3-1 to grant the variance, and VHOV rebuilt the staircase, again without a
permit. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the variance approval because a majority of the
BZA had not approved the variance, as required by Code § 15.2-2312. Early in this litigation,
the BZA filed a plea in bar and motion to dismiss, claiming that the denial of the variance was
res judicata because of the earlier reversal. The circuit court denied the plea in bar, finding that it
had not reviewed the hardship issue on the merits, and thus res judicata did not apply. That issue
is not part of this appeal.
       7
        Gardner highlighted a VHOV social media post that placed the damage to the house
(and implicitly the cost of the remodel) at $38,000.
                                                -3-
argued that VHOV could remove the encroachment by moving the door back to its original

location and shifting the kitchen to the opposite interior wall (“kitchen option”), or by

constructing an interior spiral staircase (“interior option”).8

        VHOV provided the BZA with emails from Averett and Stephanie Koren, a third party

familiar with the property, that stated that the prior owner, not VHOV, had relocated the

doorway and removed the staircase. VHOV stated that it had simply replaced the appliances and

cupboards in the same place where they had been installed by Averett previously, relying on

existing plumbing and electrical. VHOV estimated that the kitchen option would cost between

$25,000 and $30,000, asserting that such a remodel would be unreasonable. VHOV also argued

that the interior option was infeasible because the only available location for the staircase

downstairs would end up in the upstairs kitchen, requiring the same relocation and remodeling as

the kitchen option.

        After the public hearing, BZA member Joe Leslie suggested that VHOV created its own

hardship by spending $38,000 on remodeling without first determining that the steps and the

door were in a legal location. Following some discussion, Leslie suggested that granting the

variance would alleviate the hardship of lacking access to the second floor, but VHOV created

the hardship, and thus the BZA should deny the variance. Chairperson Susan Fletcher disagreed,

stating that the hardship was the location of the building, which VHOV did not create. While the

BZA members seemed to agree that the interior option would make upstairs access difficult,

Leslie and BZA member Juanita Jo Matkins suggested that VHOV had “other options” for

accessing the second floor, even without moving the doorway. Leslie said that was what they

would “hang their hat on.” His motion to deny the variance was seconded and passed 6-1.

        8
         A Dominion representative and an Assistant County Attorney also testified, in support
of enforcement of the setback requirements.
                                            -4-
         Following VHOV’s petition for certiorari in the circuit court, the circuit court held a

hearing in August 2022. Russell Stevens, an expert in building and contracting who had worked

in and around the property, testified first. He testified that the kitchen option would likely cost

between $35,000 and $40,000 and would require moving all of the electrical and plumbing to the

other wall, and then replacing the walls and repairing the floors. He discussed the possibility of

“other options” relied upon by Mr. Leslie and the BZA, testifying that no possible location in the

southern or western side of the house could comply with a building code requirement that the

staircase be at least ten feet from the building.9 Stevens also testified that the interior option

would take up a lot of space and an obvious location for the staircase inside the building did not

exist.

         Vallerie then testified that the building lacked stairs when he bought it. He described the

vandalized state of the building when he bought it, stating that “[e]very window was broken.

Every door was broken . . . . [E]very pipe was broken.” He testified that despite the vandalism,

the eastern wall still contained plumbing and 220-volt electrical wiring which he used to rebuild

the kitchen. He also testified that relocating the stairs to the northern side of the house would be

difficult due to the onsite sewage and water utilities.

         On cross-examination, Vallerie admitted that he had built the stairs without permits, at an

initial cost of $12,000. He said that initially he built the staircase without a permit to protect and

secure the property, and then he used the staircase to begin repairs. He testified that when he

bought the house, the upstairs had only “remnants of a kitchen.” He said that the pipes, which

         9
          In January 2022, a building official notified VHOV that the property was unsafe
because of several building code violations related to the stairs. Among other things, the stairs
allegedly violated a fire separation requirement that “exterior exit stairways and ramps shall have
a minimum fire separation distance of” ten feet from adjacent lot lines and other parts of the
building. The notice of violation is the subject of separate enforcement proceedings, and the
circuit court found that any issue of building code violations was not relevant to this variance
application.
                                                -5-
had burst because of cold weather, needed to be “repaired,” as did the cabinets and counters,

denying that all of the plumbing had required replacement.

       John Grubbs, from the County building division, was the sole witness for the Board of

Supervisors (“Board”). He testified that he inspected the property in January 2022 and issued a

building code violation letter. He stated that because the building included an upstairs residence

and a downstairs commercial space, which were not fire-separated, any exterior staircase needed

to comply with a ten-foot separation requirement for safety reasons. Such fire-proofing would

require removing the floor and ceiling between the two levels and inserting sheet rock in its

place. He testified that when pipes have burst from freezing, they must be replaced, not simply

repaired. He also stated that moving electrical to another part of a building was standard in

renovations.

       The circuit court reversed the BZA decision and granted the variance. The court found

that the BZA had not articulated the reasons for its denial of the variance. In contrast, it found

VHOV’s evidence “credible and compelling.” The court concluded “by a preponderance of the

evidence” that the application of the setback requirement unreasonably restricted the property

because the building was set so close to the property line without access to the second story—a

challenge predating VHOV’s purchase of the property. The court found that other options “were

not reasonable in the terms of cost, complexity, and feasibility.”

       Finding that VHOV had proven an unreasonable restriction under Code § 15.2-2309(2),

the court found it unnecessary to address whether VHOV had also proven a hardship. The court

found that the BZA did not make findings on the five secondary factors of Code

§ 15.2-2309(i)-(v), since it declined to find hardship or unreasonable restriction. The court

evaluated each factor, finding that each was satisfied, including that “the property was acquired

                                                -6-
in good faith and the hardship was not created by VHOV.” Thus, the court ordered that VHOV

be granted a variance. The Board appeals.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                      I. Standard of Review

       This appeal requires us to determine the standard of review which applies on appeal when

a circuit court reverses the decision of a BZA to deny a variance. In doing so, we must

harmonize the different presumptions of correctness afforded to a variance decision by a BZA

and the factual findings of a circuit court. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30,

34-35 (1980) (assimilating the presumption of legislative validity with the presumption of

correctness of circuit court factual findings in a rezoning case where a board of supervisors and

circuit court reached opposite conclusions). Virginia law establishes procedures for a property

owner to apply for a variance from the zoning laws, after which the matter is to be placed on the

docket to be acted upon by the relevant BZA. See Code § 15.2-2310. The Code sets forth the

substantive standards governing decisions to grant or deny variances in some detail. See Code

§§ 15.2-2201 (defining “variance”); 15.2-2309(2).

       Under Code § 15.2-2314, any person aggrieved by a BZA decision may petition the

circuit court for a writ of certiorari for the court to review the BZA decision. When the court

reviews the grant or denial of a variance application, “the decision of the board of zoning appeals

shall be presumed to be correct.” Code § 15.2-2314. “The petitioner may rebut that presumption

by proving by a preponderance of the evidence, including the record before the board of zoning

appeals, that the board of zoning appeals erred in its decision.” Id. “[A]ny party may introduce

evidence . . . in accordance with the Rules of Evidence of the Supreme Court of Virginia.” Id.

“A writ proceeding under Code § 15.2-2314 presents a unique circumstance in which, although

the court is hearing an appeal, it is also authorized to take new evidence—a practice typically

                                                -7-
prohibited at an appellate hearing.” Graydon Manor, LLC v. Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun

Cnty., 79 Va. App. 156, 163 (2023); see also School Bd. v. Nicely, 12 Va. App. 1051, 1064

(1991) (noting that a similar administrative appeal of a school board decision under Code

§ 22.1-214(D) “is not a trial de novo in the purest sense” but is a “quasi trial de novo,” giving

deference to the agency’s factual findings but taking new evidence and making new rulings on

issues of fact and law). This unusual “hybrid” posture creates tension between the usual

deference owed to decisions of a BZA and to factual findings made after taking evidence at trial.

See generally Graydon Manor, 79 Va. App. at 165.

       The Board asserts that Code § 15.2-2314 required the circuit court to give deference to

the BZA’s factual findings and that VHOV failed to rebut those findings. But the statute makes

clear that, in relation to variances, only the “decision” of the BZA is presumed to be correct.

Code § 15.2-2314. “When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain

meaning of that language.” Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425

(2012) (quoting Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349 (2011)). The plain language only

requires a circuit court to defer to the ultimate decision of the BZA, not any underlying factual

findings the BZA makes.10

       10
           We also note that the General Assembly used different language in outlining the circuit
court’s review of the determination of a zoning administrator. See Code § 15.2-2314. For those
cases, “the findings and conclusions of the board of zoning appeals on questions of fact shall be
presumed to be correct.” Id. (emphasis added). “[W]hen the General Assembly includes
specific language in one section of a statute, but omits that language from another section of the
statute, we must presume that the exclusion of the language was intentional.” Halifax Corp. v.
First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100 (2001). The different language used to describe the
standard of review for variance cases underscores our holding that only the BZA’s decision to
grant or deny the variance is presumed correct.
         Because we hold that a circuit court need only defer to the BZA’s decision, it does not
matter that here the circuit court found the BZA had not made any factual findings or articulated
the reason for its decision.
                                                 -8-
       In 2015, the General Assembly amended Code § 15.2-2314, modifying the standard for

rebutting the presumption of correctness afforded to a BZA decision to grant or deny a variance.

See 2015 Va. Acts ch. 597. Before 2015, the presumption of correctness of a BZA decision

could be rebutted only “by showing to the satisfaction of the court that the board of zoning

appeals applied erroneous principles of law,” or, in matters of the BZA’s discretion, “the

decision of the board of zoning appeals was plainly wrong and in violation of the purpose and

intent of the zoning ordinance.” See id. In contrast, the presumption may now be rebutted by

“proving by a preponderance of the evidence” that the BZA “erred in its decision.” See id.

       On appeal, “[t]he factual determinations of the [circuit] court . . . are binding on this

Court, and we will reverse such findings ‘only if they are plainly wrong or without evidence to

support them.’” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 408 (2007) (second alteration in original)

(quoting Mercer v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 243 (2000)). Relying on Lovelace v. Orange

County Board of Zoning Appeals, 276 Va. 155 (2008), the Board asserts that the presumptions of

validity owed to the findings of the circuit court and the findings of the BZA on appeal are

equivalent. See id. at 158 (“On appeal before a circuit court, the BZA’s findings and conclusions

on questions of fact are presumed correct. . . . Likewise, on appeal to this Court, the circuit

court’s findings of fact are presumed correct.”). But Lovelace pre-dates the 2015 revisions to

Code § 15.2-2314.11

       We must decide, then, as a matter of first impression, the weight to give to these two

presumptions. When the circuit court and the BZA disagree, the presumptions are in conflict.

       11
          Notably, in the cases leading up to Lovelace, the Supreme Court consistently held that
“[a] circuit court decision affirming a board of zoning appeals determination is . . . accorded [the]
presumption of correctness on appeal,” the same presumption given to the BZA. Masterson v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Natrella v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 451, 456 (1986). We find no authority, however, delineating the proper
standard of review in cases where the circuit court reversed the decision of a BZA.
                                                 -9-
Cf. Lerner, 221 Va. at 34-35 (analyzing a similar conflict between presumptions in rezoning

matters). In Lerner, the Supreme Court considered how to harmonize the presumption of

correctness given to a circuit court’s factual findings with the presumption of legislative validity

given to zoning decisions by a BZA or other local body. See id. Unlike the presumption as to

the BZA’s variance decision, which may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, other

legislative action must be upheld so long as there is “some evidence” that the decision is

reasonable. Compare id. at 34, with Code § 15.2-2314. In that case, the Court found that the

presumption of legislative validity “accompanies the legislative action when [it] is brought to

this [C]ourt for review, and it is viable until this [C]ourt holds with the trial court that the

legislative action is unreasonable.” Lerner, 221 Va. at 35. Here, in contrast, the presumption of

validity may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence and is therefore more easily

rebutted than the presumption of correctness afforded to factual findings of a circuit court. See

id.; Code § 15.2-2314. Accordingly, so long as the circuit court applies the presumption as

required by Code § 15.2-2314, the presumption in favor of the BZA’s decision does not directly

apply to review by this Court. Therefore, we apply the ordinary presumption on appeal from a

circuit court, and the circuit court’s factual findings “shall not be set aside unless it appears from

the evidence that [they are] plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them].” Code

§ 8.01-680; see also Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 408. In doing so, we “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and . . . accord to that party the benefit of all

reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.” Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 407.

        We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Sarafin v. Commonwealth, 288

Va. 320, 325 (2014).

                                                 - 10 -
                      II. Amendments to the Statutory Variance Framework

       This case also requires us to consider the proper application of Code §§ 15.2-2201

and -2309, which have not been applied by this Court or the Supreme Court since they were

amended in 2015. See 2015 Va. Acts ch. 597. Under the revised Code § 15.2-2201, a variance

is

               a reasonable deviation from those provisions regulating the shape,
               size, or area of a lot or parcel of land or the size, height, area, bulk,
               or location of a building or structure when the strict application of
               the ordinance would unreasonably restrict the utilization of the
               property, and such need for a variance would not be shared
               generally by other properties, and provided such variance is not
               contrary to the purpose of the [zoning] ordinance.12

“[A] variance shall be granted” by a BZA if either (1) “the strict application of the terms of the

ordinance would unreasonably restrict the utilization of the [applicant’s] property,” or (2) “the

granting of the variance would alleviate a hardship due to a physical condition relating to the

property or improvements thereon at the time of the effective date of the ordinance.”13 Code

§ 15.2-2309(2). An applicant must also satisfy five secondary conditions: (1) “the property

interest for which the variance is being requested was acquired in good faith and any hardship

was not created by the applicant for the variance;” (2) “the granting of the variance will not be of

substantial detriment to adjacent property and nearby properties;” (3) “the condition or situation

of the property concerned is not of so general or recurring a nature as to make reasonably

practicable the formulation of a general regulation to be adopted as an amendment to the

[zoning] ordinance;” (4) “the granting of the variance does not result in a use that is not

       12
          Before 2015, a variance was defined in relevant part as “a reasonable deviation” from
various zoning provisions “when the strict application of the ordinance would result in
unnecessary or unreasonable hardship to the property owner.” 2015 Va. Acts ch. 597 (emphasis
added) (amending Code § 15.2-2201).
       13
          The statute provides for a third possibility, related to reasonable modifications for
individuals with disabilities, not relevant here. See Code § 15.2-2309(2).
                                                 - 11 -
otherwise permitted on such property or a change in the zoning classification of the property;”

and (5) “the relief or remedy sought by the variance application is not available through a special

exception process . . . or the process for modification of a zoning ordinance.”14 Id.

       Previously, a BZA was authorized—though not compelled—to grant a variance “when,

owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions will result in unnecessary

hardship”; the statute did not include the “unreasonable restriction” alternative present today.

See 2015 Va. Acts ch. 597 (emphasis added) (amending Code § 15.2-2309(2)). The property

owner was also required to show

                 that his property was acquired in good faith and where by reason of
                 the exceptional narrowness, shallowness, size, or shape of a
                 specific piece of property at the time of the effective date of the
                 ordinance, or where by reason of exceptional topographic
                 conditions or other extraordinary situation or condition of the piece
                 of property, or of the condition, situation, or development of
                 property immediately adjacent thereto, the strict application of the
                 terms of the ordinance would effectively prohibit or unreasonably
                 restrict the utilization of the property, or . . . that the granting of the
                 variance will alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship, as
                 distinguished from a special privilege or convenience sought by
                 the applicant, provided that all variances shall be in harmony with
                 the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance.

Id. A 2009 amendment removed language requiring the property owner to show “a clearly

demonstrable hardship approaching confiscation.” 2009 Va. Acts ch. 206 (emphasis added).

Further, a BZA was expressly prohibited from issuing a variance unless it made findings that (1)

“the strict application of the ordinance would produce undue hardship relating to the property;”

(2) “the hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the . . . vicinity;” and (3) “the

authorization of the variance will not be of substantial detriment to adjacent property and . . . the

character of the district will not be changed by the granting of the variance.” Id.

       14
            The parties contest only the application of the first factor here.
                                                 - 12 -
       Analyzing the prior variance statute, the Supreme Court noted that the language used “to

define ‘unnecessary hardship’ clearly indicates that the General Assembly intended that

variances be granted only in cases where application of zoning restrictions would appear to be

constitutionally impermissible.” Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122 (1980) (emphasis

added).15 “[T]he BZA ha[d] authority to grant variances only to avoid an unconstitutional

result”—in other words, a taking. Cochran v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756,

764 (2004). Thus, a BZA could only grant a variance in the narrowest of circumstances—when

the zoning ordinance “interfere[d] with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a

whole.” Id. at 765 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cnty. Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534, 542 (1982)).

       We review the changes to Code §§ 15.2-2201 and -2309 in light of this history. “[The

General Assembly] is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in the

enactment of a statute.” Isbell v. Com. Inv. Assocs., 273 Va. 605, 614 (2007) (alteration in

original) (quoting Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 276 (1974)). “The common law

will not be considered as altered or changed by statute unless the legislative intent is plainly

manifested.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349 (1988). Even so, we do not “construe

legislative action in a manner that would ascribe to the General Assembly a futile gesture.”

Shaw v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 331, 334 (1990). “We will not read into the statute

language which the legislature purposefully deleted.” Id.

       Here, the text of the statute combined with the Supreme Court precedents makes clear

that the legislature intended to expand the availability of variances. See Code § 15.2-2309(2).

Rather than merely authorizing variances in narrow circumstances, the statute now orders BZAs

to issue a variance in certain circumstances. Id. The amendments eliminated language that

       15
          Foreshadowing the 2015 amendments, the Supreme Court noted, however, that “[a]
statute may, of course, authorize variances in cases where [an] ordinance’s application to
particular property is not unconstitutional.” Packer, 221 Va. at 122.
                                               - 13 -
property conditions must be “exceptional” or “extraordinary”; removed the possibility that a

variance could be granted when conditions “effectively prohibit[ed]” rather than simply

“unreasonably restrict[ed]” the use of the property; and cut phrases describing any hardship as

“undue,” “unnecessary,” “unreasonable,” or “clearly demonstrable.” 2015 Va. Acts ch. 597

(amending Code §§ 15.2-2201 and -2309(2)). The 2009 elimination of confiscation language

also separates the variance standard from the constitutional takings standard. See 2009 Va. Acts

ch. 206 (amending Code § 15.2-2309(2)); Cochran, 267 Va. at 764. Now, the zoning ordinance

need only “unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property,” or cause “hardship due to a

physical condition relating to the property or improvements thereon.” Code § 15.2-2309(2). The

General Assembly intended a lower bar for property owners seeking a variance, abrogating the

common-law rule. See Boyd, 236 Va. at 349. We thus exercise caution in relying on case law

interpreting the prior variance standard.

                               III. Application of Code § 15.2-2309(2)

   A. The circuit court did not err in finding that the strict application of the zoning ordinance
                       unreasonably restricts VHOV’s use of its property.

        An applicant for a variance must show that “the strict application of the terms of the

ordinance would unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property” or “the granting of the

variance would alleviate a hardship due to a physical condition relating to the property or

improvements thereon.” Code § 15.2-2309(2). The Board first argues that VHOV is not eligible

for a variance because the zoning ordinance does not unreasonably restrict the use of the

property. The circuit court, reversing the BZA’s decision to deny the variance, found that “the

strict application of the . . . ordinance . . . unreasonably restrict[s] the utilization of the property.”

See Code § 15.2-2309(2). We must defer to the circuit court’s factual finding unless it is

“plainly wrong or without evidence to support [it].” Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 408 (quoting Mercer,

259 Va. at 243).
                                                  - 14 -
       Historically, an owner could prove that a zoning ordinance “unreasonably restrict[ed] the

use of the property” as one of several “‘special conditions’ which would cause compliance with a

zoning ordinance to result in an ‘unnecessary hardship.’” Natrella v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 231

Va. 451, 457 (1986) (quoting Packer, 221 Va. at 121). In amending Code § 15.2-2309, the

General Assembly retained the phrase “unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property,”

though it is no longer rolled up into a finding of “unnecessary hardship.” See Code

§ 15.2-2309(2). The limited case law expressly discussing the “unreasonable restriction” path

provides little guidance for VHOV’s situation. See, e.g., Natrella, 231 Va. at 457-62 (upholding

a variance to convert a non-conforming apartment building to a condominium, because in light

of statute providing for non-discrimination against condominium-style buildings, and the

absence of other land use impacts, preventing such a variance would be an unreasonable

restriction); Azalea Corp. v City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, 643-44 (1960) (holding that denial of

a variance to build private driveways leading to commercial land on the other side of the city line

was an unreasonable restriction based on the extraordinary impact to the entire large parcel,

mostly located outside the city; the inability to develop the in-city portion residentially; and the

limited public benefit of the restriction); Burkhardt v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 192 Va. 606,

617-18 (1951) (affirming the grant of a variance to a retail store from a setback requirement that

“serve[d] no useful purpose” because there were no adjoining owners; other stores fronted the

street; and the building was the “minimum [size] needed” to meet customer needs).

       “When construing a statute, our primary objective is ‘“to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent,”’ as expressed by the language used in the statute.” Cuccinelli, 283 Va. at 425

(quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)). A restriction is “reasonable” if

it is “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; sensible.” Reasonable, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In contrast, an “unreasonable” restriction is one “[n]ot guided by

                                                - 15 -
reason; irrational or capricious.” Unreasonable, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. In the context

of property law, a “restriction” is “[a] limitation . . . placed on the use or enjoyment of property.”

Restriction, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. Thus, under Code § 15.2-2309(2), a BZA “shall”

issue a variance if the effect of the zoning ordinance is to limit the use or enjoyment of the

property in a way that is irrational, capricious, or not fair or sensible under the circumstances. A

BZA must decide whether to grant a variance based on “the particular facts of an application,

including the precise extent of the relief sought.” Spence v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 255 Va. 116,

120 (1998). Reasonableness and fairness thus include evaluating the unique circumstances of the

property, the applicant, and the proposed deviation from the ordinance. See id.; see also Chilton-

Belloni v. Angle, 294 Va. 328, 339-40 (2017) (holding that res judicata does not bar

reconsideration of a variance application, in the context of changing and evolving zoning laws

and factual circumstances). Though financial loss is a factor, alone it is not enough to prove an

unreasonable restriction. See Natrella, 231 Va. at 458.

       Here, denial of the variance would require VHOV to dismantle the bridge connecting the

only entrance to its upper residential floor to the stairs reaching the ground. That removal would

at least temporarily require VHOV to access the upstairs by ladder, which would not provide

reasonable access to the upstairs part of the building. While the Board contends that VHOV

could access the building via the “kitchen option,” the “interior option,” or some other

configuration of the stairs, at trial, VHOV put forward evidence that each option was unfeasible

within the constraints of other legal obligations. The kitchen option, which would require

relocating the internal appliances, plumbing, and electrical wiring to the opposite wall, would

cost somewhere between $25,000 and $40,000. The interior option would similarly require the

relocation of the appliances, plumbing, and wiring at the same cost, as there was no location for

the stairs to reach the upstairs without running into the existing kitchen area. VHOV submitted

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evidence that other potential locations for the staircase would be unfeasible given the location of

existing water and sewer lines and fire-proofing requirements. The effect of the ordinance,

strictly applied, is thus to deny VHOV access to its upper floor unless it can pay tens of

thousands of dollars for a complete remodel or relocate the building altogether. The circuit court

was not “plainly wrong” in finding that this was an unreasonable restriction on the use of the

property.16 See Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 408 (quoting Mercer, 259 Va. at 243); Code

§ 15.2-2309(2).

 B. The circuit court’s finding that VHOV did not create its own hardship is not plainly wrong.

       The Board also argues that VHOV is not eligible for a variance because any hardship was

self-inflicted. A variance applicant must show that “the property interest for which the variance

is being requested was acquired in good faith and any hardship was not created by the applicant

for the variance.” Code § 15.2-2309(2)(i). This requirement codifies prior case law that “a self-

inflicted hardship, whether deliberately or ignorantly incurred, provides no basis for the granting

of a variance.” Steele v. Fluvanna Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 246 Va. 502, 507 (1993).

       The Board argues that VHOV created its own hardship by constructing the stairs without

a building permit and without awaiting the results of the survey of the property. Further, even

though the interior of the residence was “destroyed,” providing an ideal window to adjust the

layout, VHOV constructed its kitchen around the preexisting door, rather than moving the door

to a location where the stairs would not violate the setback. The Board asserts that any

“hardship” is merely VHOV’s personal preference about where to locate the stairs. While the

Board frames the hardship as the financial cost and inconvenience of remodeling to comply with

       16
          Having found that the circuit court did not err in finding that the ordinance
unreasonably restricts VHOV’s use of the property, we need not determine whether granting a
variance “would alleviate a hardship due to a physical condition relating to the property or
improvements thereon.” Code § 15.2-2309(2).
                                               - 17 -
the setback, VHOV argues that the hardship arises from the preexisting locations of the door,

kitchen plumbing and wiring, and property line, which together make it difficult to access the

upstairs without intruding on the setback.

        The evidence, including testimony from Vallerie and letters from Averett and Koren,

supports the circuit court’s finding that when VHOV purchased the residence, it lacked stairs.

The evidence also showed that Averett, not VHOV, moved the door to its new position on the

south wall. Though Vallerie’s testimony was somewhat inconsistent about the extent of damage

to the pipes and whether any remained intact after the vandalism, the guts of the interior kitchen

were in the same place as they are now, including the 220-volt electrical fixtures. VHOV built

the deck, bridge, and stairs to reach the existing door, and then re-modeled the kitchen, at an

estimated cost of $38,000. VHOV did not consult the County about whether the position of the

doors and the exterior stairs satisfied zoning requirements. After hearing all the evidence, the

circuit court found that the hardship “was created when the property was built as close as it was

to the property line and . . . the structure included no access to its second story, the residential

part of the building,” concluding that the hardship was not self-inflicted.

        Merely purchasing property that will require a variance is not enough to qualify as a self-

inflicted hardship. Spence, 255 Va. at 120. Though VHOV took steps following purchase that

might increase the cost of moving the stairs, the circuit court’s finding that the hardship pre-

existed VHOV’s purchase is not “plainly wrong.” Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 408 (quoting Mercer,

259 Va. at 243). VHOV did not build the house near the property line. VHOV did not re-locate

the door from the southeastern side of the house, where stairs would have more easily avoided

the setback area, and close up the wall where the door once existed. VHOV did not build the

original pipes or install the electrical wiring that runs into the now-functional kitchen. Had the

hardship originated solely from the fact that moving the kitchen and the door would be

                                                 - 18 -
unreasonably costly, we would be bound to find that the hardship was self-inflicted. See Steele,

246 Va. at 506-07 (finding that hardship was self-inflicted when homeowners unintentionally

built their house in violation of residential setback based on inaccurate information about the

property line, requiring homeowners to relocate the northern part of their already-completed

house). On these facts, however, the circuit court, empowered to take evidence and make factual

determinations, was not plainly wrong. See Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 408 (“As an appellate court,

we are not permitted to reweigh the evidence.”); Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 11

(2004) (“Our function [as an appellate court] . . . is not to preside de novo over a second trial.”).

We thus affirm the circuit court’s finding that VHOV did not create its own hardship.

                                            CONCLUSION

       Upon review before an appellate court, a circuit court’s factual findings about an

application for a variance under Code § 15.2-2309(2) will “not be set aside unless it appears

from the evidence that [they are] plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them].” Code

§ 8.01-680. We find that the circuit court was not plainly wrong in finding that the strict

application of the zoning ordinance here would unreasonably restrict the use of VHOV’s

property and that the hardship VHOV faced was not self-inflicted. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the circuit court ordering the BZA to grant VHOV a variance.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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