Court Opinion

ID: 9691611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:43:39.841901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:23.473588
License: Public Domain

Smolensk, J.
In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, defendant Secretary of State and intervening defendant Michigan Chamber of Commerce appeal by leave granted a September 24, 1997, preliminary injunction enjoining the secretary from enforcing emergency rules. We affirm.
This case concerns a preenforcement challenge to the validity of emergency rules promulgated by the secretary. This case arises out of the secretary’s efforts to implement the annual affirmative consent requirement contained in § 55(6) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (mofa), MCL 169.201 et seq.) MSA 4.1703(1) et seq. Specifically, § 55(6) provides that certain entities, including labor organizations, may solicit or obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund on an automatic basis, including a payroll deduction plan, “only if the individual who is contributing to the fund affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year.” See *5MCL 169.255(6); MSA 4.1703(55)(6).1 2A person who knowingly violates § 55(6) is guilty of a felony punishable by either a fine or up to three years’ imprisonment. MCL 169.255(7); MSA 4.1703(55)(7).
The mcfa requires the secretary to “ [promulgate rules and issue declaratory rulings[2] to implement this act” pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq. See MCL 169.215(l)(e); MSA 4.1703(15)(l)(e). The MCFA also provides that when a person requests a declaratory ruling, the secretary “may issue an interpretative statement providing an informational response to the question presented.” MCL 169.215(2); MSA 4.1703(15)(2). Finally, the MCFA provides that
*6[a] declaratory ruling or interpretative statement issued under this section shall not state a general rule of law, other than that which is stated in this act, until the general rule of law is promulgated by the secretary of state as a rule pursuant to the [apa], or pursuant to judicial order. [MCL 169.215(2); MSA 4.1703(15)(2).]
Ordinarily, agencies must follow the notice-and-participation rule-making procedures contained in the apa. Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 222 Mich App 385, 392; 564 NW2d 130 (1997). However, § 48 of the APA provides for the promulgation of emergency rules:
(1) If an agency finds that preservation of the public health, safety, or welfare requires promulgation of an emergency rule without following the notice and participation procedures required by sections 41 and 42 and states in the rule the agency’s reasons for that finding, and the governor concurs in the finding of emergency, the agency may dispense with all or part of the procedures and file in the office of the secretary of state the copies prescribed by section 46 indorsed as an emergency rule, to 3 of which copies shall be attached the certificates prescribed by section 45 and the governor’s certificate concurring in the finding of emergency. The emergency rule is effective on filing and remains in effect until a date fixed in the rule or 6 months after the date of its filing, whichever is earlier. The rule may be extended once for not more than 6 months by the filing of a governor’s certificate of the need for the extension with the office of the secretary of state before expiration of the emergency rule. An emergency rule shall not be numbered and shall not be compiled in the Michigan administrative code, but shall be noted in the annual supplement to the code. The emergency rule shall be published in the Michigan register pursuant to section 8.
(2) If the agency desires to promulgate an identical or similar rule with an effectiveness beyond the final effective date of an emergency rule, the agency shall comply with the procedures prescribed by this act for the processing of a *7rule which is not an emergency rule. The rule shall be published in the Michigan register and in the code.
(3) The legislature by a concurrent resolution may rescind an emergency rule promulgated pursuant to this section. [MCL 24.248; MSA 3.560(148).]
In this case, the Chamber of Commerce, through its general counsel, Robert S. LaBrant, submitted to the secretary a request for a declaratory ruling and interpretative statement in April 1997.3 The request for a declaratory ruling sought answers to questions concerning what constituted annual affirmative consent for purposes of § 55(6). The request for an interpreta*8five statement sought answers to questions concerning the applicability of the annual affirmative consent requirement to certain contributions and elections.
On July, 11, 1997, the secretary issued the requested declaratory ruling and interpretative statement. The declaratory ruling outlined the secretary’s interpretation of what constituted annual affirmative consent for purposes of § 55(6). In particular, the declaratory ruling provided that beginning July 20, 1997, affirmative consent was required to be evidenced by a writing signed by the contributor (the signed writing requirement) and would be effective only until the end of the calendar year for which it was given (the December 31 expiration requirement). On both July 11 and 14, 1997, the secretary issued memorandums summarizing how separate segregated funds obtaining contributions on an automatic basis, including payroll deduction plans, would be affected by the declaratory ruling.
On July 31, 1997, plaintiffs Michigan State AFL-CIO and its president, Franklin D. Garrison (collectively referred to as the union), filed a complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court against the secretary. The complaint contained three counts and was entitled “Verified Complaint For Declaratory Judgment And Injunction And/Or Petition For Review.” In count one, the union asserted that the secretary’s declaratory ruling concerning the requirements for annual affirmative consent, particularly the signed writing and December 31 expiration requirements, constituted “a general rule of law, other than that which is stated in the [mcfa]” and therefore was required by § 15(2) of the MCFA to be promulgated by the secretary as rules pursuant to the apa. The union requested that the circuit *9court enter a declaratory judgment that the declaratory ruling and interpretative statement was “invalid and without effect.” The union also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining the secretary from enforcing the declaratory ruling and interpretative statement against the political committees of the union and other labor organizations. In count two, the union sought judicial review of the declaratory ruling and interpretative statement for the reasons asserted in count one. Count two also requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Count three challenged certain actions taken by the secretary with respect to the affiliation requirements contained in § 52(10) of the MCFA, MCL 169.252(10); MSA 4.1703(52)(10).
On August 26, 1997, the chamber was permitted to intervene in this action as a defendant. Following oral argument on August 28, 1997, the circuit court issued a preliminary injunction that, in relevant part, enjoined the secretary from applying the declaratory ruling and interpretative statement to the “Plaintiff Michigan State AFL-CIO and its political committee and its affiliated organizations and their political committees.” In so doing, the court noted that the express language of § 55(6) did not include either a signed writing or December 31 expiration requirement. The court also suggested that the secretary’s interpretation of the annual affirmative consent requirements had to be promulgated as a rule under the apa.4
*10That same day, the secretary filed the following emergency rules pursuant to § 48 of the APA:
FINDING OF EMERGENCY
Act No. 117 of the Public Acts of 1994 amended the Michigan campaign finance act, Act No. 388 of the Public Acts of 1976, as amended, being § 169.201 et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws, to prohibit corporations, joint stock companies, domestic dependent sovereign and labor organizations from soliciting or obtaining contributions for separate segregated funds from certain individuals on an automatic or passive basis including but not limited to payroll deductions or reverse checkoffs. The amendment permits contributions to be solicited or obtained on an automatic basis, including but not limited to payroll deductions, only if the contributing individual affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year.
In a declaratory ruling dated July 11, 1997, issued to Robert S. LaBrant, the secretary of state construed the Michigan campaign finance act to mean that the affirmative consent must be in writing and that the consent is effective only through December 31 of the year for which it is given.
In the case of Michigan State AFL-CIO and Franklin D. Garrison v Candice Miller, Case No. 97-86692 AZ, the Ingham county circuit court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the July 11, 1997 declaratory ruling because of the absence of administrative rules.
Therefore, the promulgation of administrative rules requiring written affirmative consent and establishing the effective length of that consent will eliminate this issue and will enable the policy of the state of Michigan, as embodied in Act No. 117 of the Public Acts of 1994, to be effectuated. The permanent rule-making process will take several months to complete. That delay could allow political contributions to be made in contravention of the current policy of the state of Michigan.
The governor has indicated that an injunction which frustrates state policy adversely affects the public welfare and justifies the promulgation of emergency rules under section 48 of Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, *11being §24.248 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The department of state finds that preservation of the public welfare requires the promulgation of these emergency rules. Definitions.
Rule 1. (1) As used in these rules, “act” means Act No. 388 of the Public Acts of 1976, as amended being § 169.201 et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(2) Unless the context requires otherwise, a term defined in the act has the same meaning when used in these rules. Affirmative consent; effectiveness.
Rule 2. The affirmative consent required by section 55(6) of the act shall be effective only through December 31 of the year for which it is given.
Affirmative consent; form.
Rule 3. The affirmative consent required by section 55(6) of the act shall be given in writing in substantially the following form:
AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TO POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION Section 55(6) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act provides that a coloration, a joint stock company, a domestic dependent sovereign, or a labor organization “may solicit or obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund established on an automatic basis, including but not limited to a payroll deduction plan, only if the individual who is contributing to the fund affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year.”
I,_, authorize_
First Name, Middle Name, Last Name, Name of Employer
to withhold $_per: pay period/week/month from
Circle one
my earnings in order to make political contributions to
Name of Committee
This consent is for calendar year [ ].
Signature:_Date:
On September 4, 1997, the union moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement or applica*12tion of the emergency rules. The union argued that it was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that the emergency rules were invalid, in part, because (1) no genuine emergency existed and the emergency rules were simply promulgated under § 48 of the apa in order to “evade and neutralize” the court’s August 28, 1997, preliminary irijrmction, and (2) the signed writing and December 31 expiration rules exceeded the language and intent of the MCFA and were unreasonable, arbitrary, and unduly restrictive on political entities regulated by the mcfa. The union also contended that if a preliminary injunction were not issued, it would suffer irreparable injury, and that if a preliminary injunction were issued, the secretary would suffer no harm while the public interest would be served. In response, defendants contended that the emergency rules were valid.
Following oral argument on September 24, 1997, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the secretary,
her officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, be and are hereby enjoined, pending further order of the Court, from applying, enforcing, publicizing or otherwise putting into effect the emergency rules promulgated on August 28, 1997.
In so doing, the court concluded that no emergency had existed. The court reasoned that the secretary had had “plenty of time” and “years” to promulgate rules pursuant to the general notice-and-participation procedures contained in the apa. When the secretary’s counsel contended that the August 28, 1997, preliminary injunction — which enjoined the enforcement of *13the declaratory ruling only with respect to the political committees of the union and its affiliated organizations but not the chamber or other entities — created an unequal enforcement scheme that constituted an emergency, the court expressed amazement that this argument could even be made where the secretary’s counsel had participated in negotiating and drafting the August 28, 1997, preliminary injunction.
The court also concluded that the emergency rules, like the declaratory ruling, exceeded the statutory language contained in § 55(6) of the mcfa. The court reasoned that the union would be irreparably injured if a preliminary injunction did not issue in light of the criminal penalties for violation of § 55(6). The court reasoned that issuing a preliminary injunction would maintain the status quo and therefore cause the secretary no harm. Finally, the court reasoned that issuing a preliminary injunction was in the public interest.
On October 14, 1997, this Court entered orders granting defendants’ applications for leave to appeal the September 24, 1997, preliminary injunction, denying defendants’ motions for a stay of this preliminary injunction, and consolidating defendants’ appeals. On November 17, 1997, the union filed a first supplemental complaint pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. The supplemental complaint reiterated the original complaint’s first three counts and added a fourth count that challenged the validity of the secretary’s emergency rules and requested declaratory and injunctive relief.
On appeal, the secretary and the chamber contend that the trial court erred in granting the Union’s request to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the emergency rules.
*14As explained in Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 376; 575 NW2d 334 (1998):
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must consider four factors: (1) harm to the public interest if the injunction issues; (2) whether harm to the applicant in the absence of temporary relief outweighs the harm to the opposing party if relief is granted; (3) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; and (4) a demonstration that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted. Other considerations surrounding the issuance of a preliminary injunction are whether it will preserve the status quo so that a final hearing can be held without either party having been injured and whether it will grant one of the parties final relief prior to a hearing on the merits. The trial court’s decision must not be arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular case. [Citations omitted.]
A trial court’s decision to grant injunctive relief is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
The secretary and the chamber primarily challenge the trial court’s determination with regard to factor 3. They contend that the trial court erred in determining that the union is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief that the emergency rules are invalid. We initially note that the parties disagree concerning the legal status of the emergency rules. The secretary and the chamber contend that the emergency rules are legislative rules that have the force and effect of law. See Clonlara v State Bd of Ed, 442 Mich 230, 239-240; 501 NW2d 88 (1993). The union contends that the emergency rules are simply nonbinding interpretative rules. Id. We agree with the secretary and the chamber. The mcfa requires the secretary to promulgate rules pursuant to the apa. Rules adopted by an agency in accordance with the apa are *15legislative rules that have the force and effect of law. Clonlara, supra. In this case, the secretary adopted the emergency rules pursuant to § 48 of the APA. We conclude that the emergency rules are legislative rules that, if valid, have the force and effect of law.
The applicable test for determining the substantive validity of an agency’s legislative rules is as follows:
“Where as here, an agency is empowered to make rules, the validity of those rules is to be determined by a three-part test: (1) whether the rule is within the subject matter of the enabling statute; (2) whether it complies with the legislative intent underlying the enabling statute; and (3) whether it is arbitrary or capricious.” [Blank, supra at 406, quoting Dykstra v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 198 Mich App 482, 484; 499 NW2d 367 (1993), citing Luttrell v Dep’t of Corrections, 421 Mich 93, 100; 365 NW2d 74 (1984).]
In Thomas Bros, Inc v Secretary of State, 90 Mich App 179, 185-186; 282 NW2d 273 (1979), after remand 107 Mich App 805; 310 NW2d 249 (1984), this Court utilized the three-part test stated in Blank to determine the substantive validity of emergency rules.
In this case, the enabling statute, § 15(l)(e) of the mcfa, specifically requires the secretary to promulgate rules under the apa for the purpose of implementing the MCFA. See MCL 169.215(l)(e); MSA 4.1703(15)(l)(e). The mcfa regulates campaign financing and contributions, including contributions to separate segregated funds and the manner in which certain entities can obtain automatic contributions for such funds. See, e.g., MCL 169.252; MSA 4.1703(52) and MCL 169.255; MSA 4.1703(55). The MCFA also contains reporting requirements and requires the secretary to develop a system for filing such reports. See, e.g., MCL 169.215(l)(b); MSA 4.1703(15)(l)(b) and *16MCL 169.224; MSA 4.1703(24). It thus appears that the secretary’s emergency rules are within the subject matter covered by the enabling statute.
Second, the rules must comply with the legislative intent underlying the enabling statute. In this case, § 55(6) of the MCFA provides that a labor organization may obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund on an automatic basis “only if the individual who is contributing to the fund affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year.” It is true that § 55(6) does not specifically prescribe the form or expiration date for annual affirmative consent. However, the plain language of the enabling statute, § 15(1) (e) of the mcfa, “not only defines its scope and reveals its subject matter, but also manifests the legislative intent behind it.” Blank, supra at 406. “It is clear from the general language used that the Legislature was aware of the great responsibility” placed on the secretary and intended to vest the secretary with wide discretion to implement and enforce the provisions of the mcfa. Id. It thus appears that promulgating rules that specify the form and expiration date for annual affirmative consent is consistent with the legislative intent underlying the enabling statute.
Finally, the rules must not be arbitrary or capricious. As explained in Blank, supra at 407 (citations omitted):
A rule is arbitrary if it was fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without giving consideration to principles, circumstances, or significance. A rule is capricious if it is apt to change suddenly or is freakish or whimsical. If a rule is rationally related to the purposes of the statute, it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Further, if *17there is any doubt about the invalidity of a rule in this regard, the rule must be upheld.
It thus appears that the emergency rules, which specify the form and expiration date for annual affirmative consent, are rationally related to the requirement of annual affirmative consent for automatic contributions to separate segregated funds. The rules are presumed valid and no argument has been presented that persuades us that the challenged rules are substantively invalid. Id.
Accordingly, for purpose only of our preliminary injunction analysis, we conclude that the trial court apparently misjudged the strength of the union’s demonstration that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief that the secretary’s emergency rules are substantively invalid. However, we emphasize that if and when this matter comes to trial, the actual determination of this claim is for the trial court in the first instance.
Next, the secretary and the chamber contend that the trial court erred in determining that no emergency existed.
In Michigan Petroleum Ass’n v State Fire Safety Bd, 124 Mich App 187; 333 NW2d 506 (1983), the State Fire Safety Board adopted proposed rules to establish hazardous-material inspection fees and, as required by the apa, submitted these rules for approval by the Legislature’s Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (jcar).5 Id. at 189. When the jcar reported that it had reached an impasse concerning the board’s proposed *18rules, the board adopted emergency rules substantially similar to the original proposed rules pursuant to the following finding of emergency:
“Fees were established by the State Fire Safety Board after a time and cost study and were processed through the regular rule promulgation procedures established by [the apa]. These rules received an impasse certification from the joint committee on administrative rules. Without the funds which these rules will generate, the department will not be able to perform inspections of hazardous materials vehicles and facilities and will not be able to respond to assist local agencies with the handling of incidents, the result being a threat to the safety of the people of the state.” [Id. at 189-190.]
The plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the circuit court, contending that the emergency rules were invalid, in part, because no emergency had existed. Id. at 188-190. The trial court disagreed and found that the emergency rules were validly enacted. Id. at 189. The plaintiffs appealed. Id.
This Court affirmed. Id. at 194. In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that no emergency had existed to justify the issuance of the rules, this Court stated as follows, id. at 193-194:
In holding that the board had a substantial basis for enacting emergency hazardous material inspection fee rules, the trial court reasoned:
“Plaintiffs argue that the board’s finding of emergency was ‘merely a statement of motivation’ and that the finding did not ‘reflect a crisis situation emergent or actual.’ They note that the Legislature created the inspection program and the Legislature, through its committee, held up the promulgation of the rules through its certification of an impasse. It is argued this adds credence to the position that no crisis situation existed. As previously noted, however, *19the APA scheme is that the agency first determines whether ‘the preservation of public health, safety and welfare requires promulgation of an emergency rule,’ and if the Legislature is of the position that an emergency situation does not exist, it may rescind the emergency rules by concurrent resolution.”
“Based on the record, this court cannot hold that the board lacked substantial basis for its finding that the public interest required promulgation of the Hazardous Materials Inspection Fees Emergency Rules for the 1979-1980 fiscal year. The inspection and certification program grew out of the passage of 1978 PA 3, amending the Fire Prevention Act, and provided for annual inspections and annual certifications of tank vehicles and storage locations. Inspection fees are authorized and must be paid annually to the fire marshal before the issuance of a certificate. The amount of fees was left to be determined by the board.”
We are in agreement with the trial court’s foregoing analysis. Furthermore, we do not find that the board abused its rule-making authority.9
Thus, it appears that the test adopted by Michigan Petroleum “was whether the adopting agency ‘lacked a substantial basis for its finding that the public interest required promulgation’ of the emergency rule.” LeDuc, Michigan Administrative Law, § 4:37, ch 4, p 58. “The opinion also seemed to include an abuse of discretion aspect to the test.” LeDuc, supra.
However, the “substantial basis” test used in Michigan Petroleum is not supported by any citation of authority. The “substantial basis” test does evoke the *20“competent, material and substantial” evidence test used by reviewing courts. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.306(d); MSA 3.560(206)(d). However, the “competent, material and substantial” evidence test is used by the courts for the purpose of reviewing judicial or quasi-judicial factual findings by an agency following a hearing. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 24.271; MSA 3.560(171), MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201), MCL 24.306(d); MSA 3.560(206)(d). For the purpose of § 48 of the apa, an agency’s finding of emergency is not made after a hearing and, made as it is in the context of rule-making, is quasi-legislative in nature. Moreover, the cases cited by Michigan Petroleum as authority for including an abuse of discretion aspect to the test for emergency are distinguishable. Specifically, Coffman applied the abuse of discretion test in the context of the review of the substantive validity of a rule.6 Mississippi Valley, to the extent it even applies an abuse of discretion test, concerns the review of factual findings in a rate-making case. Thus, we are not convinced that the “substantial basis” or “abuse of discretion” tests are the appropriate tests.
We therefore turn to a consideration of the nature of and policies underlying the apa. The apa is not substantive. LeDuc, § 1:10, ch 1, p 14. Rather, the apa contains complex procedures governing, among other things, the development of rules. LeDuc, supra; see also Blank, supra at 402. As further explained by our Supreme Court:
*21“[B]ecause the adoption of a rule by an agency has the force and effect of law and may have serious consequences for many people, the legislature prescribed an elaborate procedure for rule promulgation in Chapter 3 of the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act .... These provisions are calculated to invite public participation in the rule-making process, prevent precipitous action by the agency, prevent the adoption of rules that are illegal or that may be beyond the legislative intent, notify affected and interested persons of the existence of the rules and make the rules readily accessible after adoption.” [Detroit Base Coalition For The Human Rights Of The Handicapped v Dep’t of Social Services, 431 Mich 172, 189-190; 428 NW2d 335 (1988) (quoting Bienenfeld, Michigan Administrative Law, P 4-1).]
However, under § 48 of the apa, an agency can “short-cut” the notice and hearing provisions when there is “justification for the use of the emergency rulemaking procedures . . . .” LeDuc, § 4:37 and § 4:43. In this case, the trial court determined that there was no emergency to justify the filing of the emergency rules. Thus, we construe the secretary’s and the chamber’s argument to be that the trial court erred in determining that the emergency rules were proceduraily invalid.
An emergency rule is justified if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the agency “finds that preservation of the public health, safety, or welfare requires promulgation of an emergency rule without following the notice and participation procedures required by section 41 and 42;” (2) the agency “states in the rule the agency’s reasons for that finding”; and (3) “the governor concurs in the finding of emergency.” MCL 24.248(1); MSA 3.560(148)(1). In this case, we consider only the first two conditions. In so considering, we are mindful that rules have the force and effect of *22law and may have serious consequences for many people. Detroit Base Coalition, supra at 189. We therefore examine the substantive meaning of the phrase “preservation of the public health, safety, or welfare” in order to determine exactly the standard or threshold intended by the Legislature before an agency can “short-cut” the general rule-making procedural protections intended by the apa.
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) defines “public welfare” as follows:
The prosperity, well-being, or convenience of the public at large, or of a whole community, as distinguished from the advantage of an individual or limited class. It embraces the primary social interests of safety, order, morals, economic interest, and non-material and political interests. In the development of our civic life, the definition of “public welfare” has also developed until it has been held to bring within its purview regulations for the promotion of economic welfare and public convenience.
Thus, in order to bypass the general rule-making procedural protections contained in the apa, the secretary in this case was required to find that the preservation of the political interests “of the public at large, or of a whole community, as distinguished from the advantage of an individual or limited class” required promulgation of an emergency rule.
With this substantive standard in mind, we turn to the relevant portion of the secretary’s finding of emergency:
In a declaratory ruling dated July 11, 1997, issued to Robert S. LaBrant, the secretary of state construed the Michigan campaign finance act to mean that the affirmative consent must be in writing and that the consent is effective only through December 31 of the year for which it is given.
*23In the case of Michigan State AFL-CIO and Franklin D. Garrison v Candice Miller, Case No. 97-86692 AZ, the Ingham county circuit court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the July 11, 1997 declaratory ruling because of the absence of administrative rules.
Therefore, the promulgation of administrative rules requiring written affirmative consent and establishing the effective length of that consent will eliminate this issue and will enable the policy of the state of Michigan, as embodied in Act No. 117 of the Public Acts of 1994, to be effectuated. The permanent rule-making process will take several months to complete. That delay could allow political contributions to be made in contravention of the current policy of the state of Michigan.
The governor has indicated that an injunction which frustrates state policy adversely affects the public welfare and justifies the promulgation of emergency rules under section 48 of Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being §24.248 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The department of state finds that preservation of the public welfare requires the promulgation of these emergency rules.
Thus, the basis for the secretary’s finding of emergency was the August 28, 1997, injunction that enjoined the enforcement of the secretary’s declaratory ruling. However, the August 28, 1997, injunction only enjoined the secretary from enforcing the declaratory ruling against the political committees of the union and its affiliated organizations. As recognized by the secretary in its “unequal enforcement” argument, the secretary was not prohibited during this litigation from attempting to enforce its interpretation of § 55(6) of the mcfa, as expressed in the declaratory ruling, against all other entities subject to this statute. In Michigan Petroleum, the preservation of the safety of the whole community was threatened by the agency’s inability to conduct any hazardous-materials inspections because of a lack of funding. However, *24we fail to perceive how preservation of the political interests of the whole community is threatened where the secretaiy is generally free to attempt to enforce its interpretation of § 55(6) of the mcfa except against the limited class of the political committees of the union and its affiliated organizations. It thus appears that the secretary’s finding does not meet the statutory substantive standard of “preservation of the public .. . welfare,” i.e., of the “public at large, or of a whole community.” Rather, it appears that the secretary’s finding relates only to “the advantage of a[] . . . limited class.”
A rule is invalid and may be stricken by a court if the agency failed to follow proper procedure. Clonlara, supra at 240; Detroit Base Coalition, supra at 183; Blank, supra. Generally, this principle applies where the agency fails to promulgate a rule in accordance with the APA’s notice-and-participation procedures. However, we see no reason why this principle should not apply to emergency rules should the agency fail to follow the procedures and standards enunciated in § 48 of the apa, particularly where these procedures and standards take the place of the general rule-making procedural protections contained in the APA. It thus appears that the secretary’s emergency rules are proceduraJly invalid because the secretary’s finding did not meet the statutory threshold imposed by the Legislature. We note that we have treated this issue as an issue of statutoiy construction, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Dickerson v Raphael, 222 Mich App 185, 190; 564 NW2d 85 (1997). However, we would arrive at the same conclusion even if the “substantial basis” and *25“abuse of discretion” tests enunciated in Michigan Petroleum are the appropriate tests.
We conclude, therefore, albeit for different reasons, that the trial court did not err in determining that the union is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief that the emergency rules are procedurally invalid.
We have considered the secretary’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s grant of the September 24, 1997, preliminary injunction and find them to be without merit.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court apparently misjudged the strength of the union’s demonstration that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief that the secretary’s emergency rules are substantively invalid. However, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the union is likely to prevail on the merits of its claim for declaratory relief that the emergency rules are procedurally invalid. No persuasive arguments have been made that the trial court erred in its consideration of the other preliminary injunction factors, and we will not, therefore, second-guess the trial court in this regard. The grant of a preliminary injunction with respect to the emergency rules preserved the status quo pending a final hearing and did not grant any of the parties final relief before a hearing on the merits. Thermatool, supra at 376. Accordingly, we conclude that on the facts of this particular case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of the emergency rules.
Affirmed.
*26McDonald, P.J., concurred.

 Specifically, § 55(6) provides as follows:
Contributions shall not be obtained for a separate segregated fund established under this section by use of coercion or physical force, by making a contribution a condition of employment or membership, or by using or threatening to use job discrimination or financial reprisals. A corporation organized on a for profit or nonprofit basis, a joint stock company, a domestic dependent sovereign, or a labor organization shall not solicit or obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund established under this section from an individual described in subsection (2) , (3), (4), or (5) on an automatic or passive basis including but not limited to a payroll deduction plan or reverse checkoff method. A corporation organized on a for profit or nonprofit basis, a joint stock company, a domestic dependent sovereign, or a labor organization may solicit or obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund established under this section from an individual described in subsection (2), (3), (4), or (5) on an automatic basis, including but not limited to a payroll deduction plan, only if the individual who is contributing to the fund affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year. [MCL 169.255(6); MSA 4.1703(55)(6).]

 Unlike rules, “[a] declaratory ruling is binding on the agency and the person requesting it unless it is altered or set aside by any court.” MCL 24.263; MSA 3.560(163).

 The annual affirmative consent requirement was added by 1994 PA 117 and scheduled to take effect on April 1, 1995. However, because of proceedings in federal court, enforcement of the annual affirmative consent requirement was enjoined from March 31, 1995, until, as represented by the parties on appeal, May 19, 1997.
Specifically, on February 14, 1995, certain plaintiffs, including the instant plaintiffs Michigan State AFL-CIO and its president, Franklin D. Garrison, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court against, among others, the secretary. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v Miller, 103 F3d 1240, 1244 (CA 6, 1997). The complaint contended that various sections of the mcfa, including the annual affirmative consent requirement, were unconstitutional. Id. at 1244, 1249-1253. On March 31, 1995, the district court issued an opinion holding that various sections of the mcfa were unconstitutional. Id. at 1244. In particular, the district court held that the annual affirmative consent requirement violated the First Amendment. Id. at 1253. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of various sections of the mcfa, including the annual affirmative consent requirement. Id. at 1244. The secretary appealed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction with respect to the annual affirmative consent requirement. Id. at 1244. On January 7, 1997, the federal appeals court reversed the district court’s holding that the annual affirmative consent requirement violated the First Amendment and vacated the preliminary injunction to the extent that it enjoined the enforcement of this requirement. Id. at 1253. On March 19, 1997, the appeals court denied a rehearing. Id. at 1240. Although we find nothing in the record to support this contention, the parties on appeal represent that enforcement of the annual affirmative consent requirement was further enjoined until May 19, 1997, when the federal appeals court issued a mandate vacating the preliminary injunction.

 The secretary, on August 29, 1997, and the chamber, on September 3, 1997, applied for leave to appeal the August 28, 1997, preliminary injunction. This Court denied leave to appeal. AFL-CIO v Secretary of State, unpublished orders of the Court of Appeals, entered September 9, 1997 (Docket Nos. 205745, 205821).

 In Blank, swpra, this Court held that the apa was unconstitutional to the extent that it required the jcar to approve proposed administrative .rules.

 For the standard applied by appellate courts in reviewing decisions rendered by administrative bodies, see Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co v United States, 292 US 282, 286-287; 54 S Ct 692; 78 L Ed 1260 (1934); Coffman v State Bd of Examiners in Optometry, 331 Mich 582, 587-591; 50 NW2d 322 (1951). See, generally, Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d ed), §§ 29.01-29.02, pp 525-530.

 We also note that after Coffman was decided, our Supreme Court subsequently adopted in Luttrell the three-part test we apply today to determine the substantive validity of the emergency rules.