Court Opinion

ID: 9615249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:33:20.332427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:43.858527
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring specially.
The City of McDonough (“the City”) appeals from the trial court’s ruling (1) finding the zoning classification for property owned by Tusk Partners to be unconstitutional, and (2) ordering the City to rezone the property in a constitutional manner. Because I believe that Tusk Partners satisfied its burdens before the trial court to show by clear and convincing evidence both that it would suffer a significant detriment under the City’s zoning and that the zoning bore an insubstantial relationship to the public interest, and because I believe that the City failed to rebuff that evidence, I would uphold the trial court’s ruling. I write separately, however, in order to clarify and reiterate the appropriate standards of review to be utilized by trial and appellate courts in zoning cases.
1. The focus in all zoning cases is, of course, whether the party challenging existing zoning has suffered a significant deprivation that is insubstantially related to the public health, safety, morality, or welfare.2 An existing zoning ordinance always is presumed to be valid, and a reviewing court must accord deference to that presumption of validity.3 In order to prevail in the trial court, and before the *697zoning authority is required to present any evidence, a party challenging existing zoning “is required to show by clear and convincing evidence both that it will suffer a significant detriment under the existing zoning, and that existing zoning bears an insubstantial relationship to the public interest.”4 Only if this initial burden is met is the zoning authority required to bring forth justification for the zoning as reasonably related to the public interest.5 Furthermore, the inquiry into the reasonableness of a zoning classification concerns constitutional reasonableness, not economic reasonableness.6
On appeal, this Court applies the “clearly erroneous” standard to its review of the trial court’s findings of fact.7 However, as is true with all cases, this Court owes no deference to the superior court’s conclusions of law.8 Because whether a landowner has satisfied his burden of showing the unconstitutionality of a zoning ordinance by clear and convincing evidence is a mixed question of law and fact, as is whether a zoning authority has established that its zoning classification is so related to the public interest as to uphold it in the face of a palpable challenge, this Court is free to independently review the basis of a trial court’s ruling that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional without any deference to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion.9 Only if this Court agrees with the trial court’s conclusions of law is it bound to affirm.10 In this regard, the majority opinion’s statement that this Court “will affirm the ruling of a trial court on the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance unless that ruling is ‘clearly erroneous’ 11 is true only to the extent that it applies to the trial court’s findings of fact. Otherwise, this broad statement contradicts longstanding precedent concerning our standard of review.
2. This case concerns what this Court has referred to as “fringe property” — a residential property bordering commercial property, with the economic value of the property for residential use lessening with encroaching commercial development. When considering the *698zoning of “fringe properties,” this Court has held that, “ ‘the local governing body is the more appropriate one to shape and control the local environment according to the best interests of the locality and its citizens. The local government has drawn the line as to these encroachments,’ ” and unless a property owner has satisfied its burden to bring forth clear and convincing evidence showing a significant deprivation and an insubstantial relationship to the public interest, the classification must be upheld.12 Accordingly, our precedent indicates that when reviewing a superior court ruling that declares the zoning of a “fringe property” to be unconstitutional, extra scrutiny must be given to the basis of the trial court’s ruling.
3. The majority states that so long as a property owner brings forth evidence showing “a down turn in viability of property under its current zoning, and a decrease in land value if the property remains under its current zoning,” a trial court does not err by concluding the property owner has established a significant detriment. To the extent this statement means that the value of the property as it presently is zoned is a relevant consideration in determining whether there has been a significant detriment, it is correct.13 However, it is established that in zoning controversies such as this one, the fact that property will be more valuable if rezoned is irrelevant.14 Moreover, while property need not be rendered worthless in order for its owner to suffer an unconstitutional deprivation, where a landowner shows only that, unless it is permitted to sell property for commercial use, it will suffer economic loss, a trial court errs by concluding that an existing zoning classification is unconstitutional.15
Furthermore, the majority opinion states that if “the evidence conflicts as to the impact of the use on the public health and welfare, the trial court does not clearly err by concluding the property owner” has shown the classification is insubstantially related to the public interest. This conclusion not only accords undue deference to the trial court’s conclusions of law, it overlooks this Court’s obligation to examine the record for benefits to the public inuring from the challenged zoning classification.16
4. Turning to the facts of this case, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: (1) Tusk Partner’s property (“the *699property”) faces Jonesboro Road, a major thoroughfare scheduled to be widened to four lanes with a dividing median, and a smaller connector road, and is “bracketed” between two major intersections; (2) nearby properties — parcels directly across Jonesboro Road from the property and within 4,000 feet to the east and west of the property — are zoned as C-l for commercial use; (3) other nearby parcels are zoned as O-I for institutional office use; (4) a convenience store and gas station are located on property diagonally across Jonesboro Road from the property; (5) traffic on Jonesboro Road in the past several years has increased significantly, and that trend is predicted to continue; (6) long-time residents of nearby properties also located on Jonesboro Road stated on the record that their properties are no longer desirable for residences, primarily due to the dramatic increase in traffic; (7) the City acknowledged that residential properties along Jonesboro Road had been impacted by the increase in traffic; (8) with one exception, the development of new residential communities along the Jonesboro Road corridor where the property is located has occurred away from Jonesboro Road, with entrances located on streets that intersect Jonesboro Road; and (9) the proposed rezoning is consistent with the written guidelines of the Henry County/Joint Cities Land Use Plan, although inconsistent with the Land Use Map. These findings are supported by the record. Since they are not clearly erroneous, they may not be set aside by this Court.17
Based upon these findings, the trial court reached the following conclusions: (1) commercial development in and of itself is not harmful to the public health, safety or welfare (citing Sellars v. Cherokee County, 254 Ga. 496 (330 SE2d 882) (1985)); (2) the City’s argument that adequate commercial development already exists on Jonesboro Road was legally insufficient (citing Sellars, supra); (3) Tusk Partners met their burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the current R-100 zoning was significantly detrimental to them, and insubstantially related to the public interest, and the City failed to rebut that showing; (4) the R-100 zoning must be struck down as unconstitutional.
While the trial court’s conclusions are incomplete — it fails to explain why Tusk Partners satisfied its burden and why the City failed to rebut that showdng — I nonetheless agree with its ultimate determination that the R-100 zoning is unconstitutional. The record *700shows that the classification significantly damages Tusk Partner’s interest in its property. Because of its precise location on Jonesboro Road, the property’s present suitability for residential development under R-100 appears to be negligible. The evidence of record also demonstrates that residential development under R-100 at this location will not become more feasible in the future, as the expansion of Jonesboro Road, and development along its corridor, continues. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that surrounding properties already have been, or soon will be, developed commercially, and the fact that noteworthy residential development abutting this portion of Jonesboro Road has essentially ceased.
Decided November 3, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied November 21, 1997.
Jenkins & Nelson, Kirk R. Fjelstul, Peter R. Olson, for appellants.
Troutman Sanders, Richard A. Newton, Charles F. Palmer, Robert W. Kamerschen, for appellee.
A zoning classification may be set aside if it “ ‘results in relatively little gain or benefit to the public while inflicting serious . . . loss to the owner.’ ”18 The City argues that the property has value as zoned. While a relevant consideration, that argument standing alone does not show a gain or benefit to the public sufficient to justify the serious damage inflicted by the current zoning to Tusk Partner’s ownership interest.19
As found by the trial court, and as supported by the evidence of record, because the R-100 zoning classification seriously damages the property’s owner, and is not substantially related to the public health, safety, or welfare, the classification is unconstitutional and must be set aside.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this special concurrence.

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church v. Clayton County, 257 Ga. 21 (354 SE2d 151) (1987); Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs., 256 Ga. 469, 470 (349 SE2d 707) (1986); see Delta Cascade Partners II v. Fulton County, 260 Ga. 99, 100 (390 SE2d 45) (1990).

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra; Gradous, supra; Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Rd. *697Corp., 238 Ga. 322 (232 SE2d 830) (1977). SeeDeKalb County v. Chamblee-Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. 186, 190 (281 SE2d 525) (1981).

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra (emphasis in original). See Gradous, supra; Delta Cascade, supra; Flournoy v. City of Brunswick, 248 Ga. 573, 574 (285 SE2d 16) (1981).

 City of Roswell v. Heavy Machines Co., 256 Ga. 472, 474 (349 SE2d 743) (1986); Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra; Gradous, supra; Delta Cascade, supra; Flournoy, supra.

 Heavy Machines Co., supra; Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra; Flournoy, supra; Chamblee-Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. at 189.

 Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474, 477, n. 3 (350 SE2d 457) (1986); Heavy Machines Co., supra; Bd. of Commrs. v. Skelton, 248 Ga. 855 (286 SE2d 729) (1982).

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra; Dougherty County, supra.

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra; Skelton, 248 Ga. at 856-857; see Bickerstaff Clay Products Co. v. Harris County, 89 F3d 1481, 1486, 1488-1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (construing Georgia law).

 Skelton, supra; Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra.

 Op. at 695.

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, supra (citation omitted). See Flournoy, supra; Gradous, supra.

 Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. at 189.

 Id.; Delta Cascade, supra.

 Holy Cross Lutheran Church, 257 Ga. at 23; Gradous, 256 Ga. at 472. See Delta Cascade, 260 Ga. at 100; Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, 248 Ga. at 189; Koppar v. Griswell, 246 Ga. 539, 540 (272 SE2d 272) (1980).

 See Skelton, 248 Ga. at 857; Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 266 (219 SE2d 399) (1975).

 Skelton, 248 Ga. at 857; City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407 (240 SE2d 881) (1977). The trial court also made findings regarding the value of the property as presently zoned versus its value as commercial property. As has been stated repeatedly by this Court, however, the fact that property will be more valuable if rezoned is immaterial. Delta Cascade, supra; Chamblee Dunwoody Hotel Partnership, supra.

 Skelton, 248 Ga. at 856 (quoting Barrett, 235 Ga. at 266).

 Id.