Court Opinion

ID: 9741595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:58:42.845513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.905254
License: Public Domain

White, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While it is clearly consistent with the public policy of this state, as expressed in subsection 30302(l)(c) of the wetlands protection act, MCL 324.30302(l)(c); MSA 13A.30302(l)(c), to permit and facilitate operation of a commercial cranberry-growing facility in a wetland area, I agree that the farming exception to the permit requirement, MCL 324.30305(2)(e); MSA 13A.30305(2)(e), when construed in the context of the entire act, does not evince a legislative intent to except from the permit requirement “all activities necessary to commence . . . farming in a commercially viable manner and to bring land into agricultural production,” without regard to the scope or nature of those activities. I agree that plaintiffs’ proposed alterations in preparation for farming were subject to the permit requirement.
I do not agree that plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s reversionary interest in the property is barred by res judicata. The prior proceeding was a foreclosure action. The state was included as a party because of its reversionary interest in the property. Huggett stipulated the superiority of the state’s interest. In so stipulating, Huggett acknowledged that the state’s interest would survive the foreclosure proceeding and that his *201interest in the property was subject to the state’s reversionary rights under the deed from the state to Michigan National Bank. Acknowledging the superiority of the reversionary rights in the deed (whatever their scope and interpretation) over Huggett’s interest as the mortgagee, and after foreclosure, fee owner, is not tantamount to acknowledging that the reversionary rights themselves are valid and not subject to challenge on the basis of mistake1 or because based on nominal conditions. In sum, the stipulation in the prior action was a concession that the state’s reversionary interest would survive the foreclosure action as superior to Huggett’s rights; it was not a concession that the interest is valid and enforceable.
I agree, however, that the state’s reversionary interest is not based on conditions that are “merely nominal” “evinc[ing] no intention of actual and substantial benefit to” the state, and that the interest is not unenforceable as violative of the rule against perpetuities.

 This was one of the claims asserted below.