Court Opinion

ID: 9418946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:43:33.474557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:13.338204
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
The district court held that the commission refused to consider the company’s evidence of the cost of reproduction and failed to find the value of the property used to furnish the gas covered by the challenged rates. On that basis of fact, it was bound by our decisions to set aside *402the order as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
This Court holds that the commission did consider the cost of reproduction and that error, if any, in appreciation of that item of evidence would not be a denial of due process. But as to whether the commission found or did not find value, the opinion is not clear. It states that the commission “specifically found what it considered to be the rate base,” found “that rate base to be reasonable,” and that “The import of its opinion is that the rate base represented the Commission’s conclusion as to the value which should be placed upon respondent’s [appellee’s] property for the purpose of fixing rates.”2 If the decision goes on the ground that the commission found and based its order on the value of the company’s property, it rests on a fundamental fact without support in the record and contrary to the special master’s opinion and the district court’s finding, which appellants do not here challenge. If the decision goes on the ground that the commission based its determination upon historical cost, then it is directly contrary to our earlier decisions, and reverses the lower court for doing what they required it to do— enter a decree setting aside the order as having been made without procedural due process of law.
As to value. — Since by legislation fixing their charges, public utilities are compelled to use their properties in the service of the public, due process of law requires that *403the rates prescribed shall be sufficient to yield them just compensation; i. e., reasonable rates of return upon the value of their properties.3 The value to be ascertained is the money equivalent of the property, the amount to which the owner would be entitled upon expropriation.4 It is elementary that cost is not the measure of value.5
In Smyth v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, the Court said (p. 546): “We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to ask is a *404fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience. On the other hand, what the public is Entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.”
In Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, the Court said (p. 434): “The basis of calculation is the ‘ fair value of the property’ used for the convenience of the public. . . . The ascertainment of that value is not controlled by artificial rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts. ... [p. 454.] It is clear that in ascertaining the present value we are not limited to the consideration of the amount of the actual investment. ... As the company may not be protected in its actual investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the making of a just return for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost. The property is held in private ownership and it is the property, and not the original cost of it, of which the owner may not be deprived without due process of law. . . .”
The principle applied in Smyth v. Ames has long governed wherever judicial action has been invoked to enforce the rule of just compensation.6 It is binding upon *405state courts and commissions. But the California commission refuses to follow the established rule. It does not ascertain or use present value but in its place takes historical cost, actual or estimated, as the basis of its determination in rate judging and rate making.
In Rules, etc., of Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., (1930) 35 C. R. C. 443, 445, the commission said: “This commission for many years . . . has fixed rates to yield upon the historical or actual cost of the property, taking land, however, at current values and depreciation calculated on a sinking fund basis, a return somewhat in excess of the cost of the money invested in the property. . . .”7
So, in the practice of the commission, actual cost of all items other than land, which is included at its market value, comes to be called “historical cost,” which when found to be, or modified to make it “reasonable,” is called *406“prudent investment” or “rate base.”8 The commission takes cost without regard to age of the items, changes in price levels, present cost to construct, depreciation, obsolescence or usefulness.
In that case, Commissioner Decoto, dissenting, said (p. 474): “The California Commission . . . has clung ostensibly and theoretically to the historical rate base. In reality it has given effect to the different elements mentioned by the federal courts including fair value including going value by allowing a rate return between 8 per cent and 8% per cent on historical cost if there be added to the historical rate base an amount between 10 per cent and 12% per cent, the rate base so obtained will approximate fair value including going value. So, also if there is deducted from 10 per cent to 12% per cent from a rate of return of 8 per cent or 8% per cent on an historical cost rate base, it is readily seen that there is an actual return varying from 7 per cent to 7.75 per cent upon fair value including therein a reasonable amount for going value. . . . During the last two years this commission has shown a tendency to cut the rate return upon an historical rate base from between 8 per cent and 8% per cent to 7 per cent, which reduced the rate of return upon a fair value base to 6.12% per cent and 6.3 per cent.”
While the dissenting opinion is not authoritative and may not be taken to express the views of the commission, it usefully interprets and discloses the opinions, attitude and practice of the commission as to ascertainment of the figure or base on which it tests existing and prescribes future rates.
*407In the case now before us, the commission used the formula generally applied by it. Its report states (39 C. R. C. 49, 57): “During its entire history in establishing reasonable rates for utilities similar to this company, to determine a proper rate base this Commission has used the actual or estimated historical costs of the properties undepreciated, with land at the present market value. . . . This historical method has dominated the Commission’s findings for several principal reasons. It is well grounded upon established facts, is not subject to the vagaries of pet theories, unlimited imagination and abrupt fluctuation of current prices and passing conditions, and therefore indicates a truer measure of value. ... At the same time it prevents unwarranted demands upon the consumer through the projections of future rates on ephemeral values and stabilizes rates so that economic shocks from such changes are reduced to a minimum.”
The commission’s figures show that it did not attempt' or intend to find value. Historical cost was not fully disclosed by the company’s records. A part was estimated. The company’s total was $104,043,472; the commission found $103,252,004. From historical cost ascertained by it, the commission deducted “Donations in Aid of Construction, $34,325,” added to the remainder “Materials and Supplies, $638,828,” and “Working Cash Capital, $773,300,” making a total of $104,629,807; and took the round figure, $105,000,000 as rate base. The commission made no appraisal to ascertain value, as distinguished from cost incurred for the original plant plus additions and betterments through all the years of operation. The exclusion of “Donations in Aid of Construction” is inconsistent with ascertainment of the value, for obviously the worth of property is the same whatever the source of the title or the money with which it was purchased.9
*408The report states that “In this case a return will be allowed substantially in excess of the reasonably determined cost of money in order that there be provided a safety factor in accordance with the principles adopted by this Commission to protect the financial structure as well as to allow for intangible values not covered by business development costs allowed in the operating expenses.”10
The commission included nothing in its rate base to cover intangible elements of value. It said (p. 65): “Even if going value could be found here in a definite amount there are no proper elements of physical value found to which it might be related to obtain fair value. Under the record there is no tenable depreciated reproduction cost figure and it is wholly inconsistent to attempt to relate going value to undepreciated historical cost.” This statement clearly and rightly implies that properly ascertained reproduction cost — condition and usefulness considered — indicates only the value attributable to the tangible elements and that to it there must be added the amount attributable to the intangible elements in order to find the value of both; i. e., the worth of the plant as a going concern.
Having taken cost of physical elements, the commission deemed it inappropriate to add anything to cover *409existing going value. It must have found that in fact a large amount was justly attributable to going value, for it declared (p. 65) that it would accredit the company with “a reasonable recognition of going value through allowance as an operating expense of over $800,000 a year for development expense, which is approximately 7 per cent on the company’s claimed going value figure, and by the additional allowance of return over reasonable cost of money.”
But an allowance in operating expenses adds nothing'to value or to return on value. It is not the equivalent of and may not be substituted for inclusion of an appropriate amount to cover intangible elements. Inclusion of an amount for development expenses increases deductions from gross revenue and so reduces annual net earnings, if any, by that amount, whereas the addition of $800,000 capitalized at 7 per cent would increase by over $11,-000,000 the base on which to calculate return. The commission’s treatment of donated property, going value and rate of return shows that it did not find value, and that it intended to and did adopt cost figures as the basis on which it condemned existing rates and ordered the new schedule.
Immediately after announcement of the report the company filed a petition for rehearing, in which it directly charged that the commission failed to find value, “considered solely the historical cost . . . and failed to consider or give any effect to the cost” of reproduction. The commission denied rehearing, but without in any manner suggesting that these allegations were not true.
In this suit, the complaint alleges that the commission failed to give any weight or effect to reproduction cost; “that, in fixing the rate base, the Commission gave-weight and effect solely to- the historical cost”; and that it prescribed the rates “without any finding of fair value.”
*410The answer is a studied denial. The defendants do deny that the commission failed to give due weight to competent evidence of reproduction cost and allege that it gave proper weight to all the evidence, including evidence of reproduction cost; deny that the commission gave weight solely to the historical cost; “admit that in fixing and prescribing rates . . . the Commission did so without any specific finding as to 'fair value’ . . . but . . . allege that in substance and effect the Commission concluded and found in its said decision that the fair value of the used and useful properties before allowing for accrued depreciation did not exceed the sum fixed therein as a reasonable rate base, to wit: $105,000,000.”
The district court referred the case to a special master. There was introduced before him evidence in addition to that submitted to the commission. The record here does not contain the evidence, his findings or report.11 But the trial court’s opinion (13 F. Supp. 931, 932) states that, “While the master expressed the opinion that it appeared plain to him that the Commission used cost as the only measure of the rate base, itself offering no evidence on reproduction cost and rejecting that offered upon the subject by the company, he preferred not to pass upon the question of law thus presented, but to examine the whole matter on the merits.”
In its opinion on temporary injunction (5 F. Supp. 878, 881), the court found that the commission rejected the company’s estimates of reproduction cost, did not have *411any detailed estimates of reproduction cost before it, and did not determine the reproduction cost of the property. Upon final submission of the case, the court found that the commission on its own motion instituted the investigation and “caused to be introduced evidence as to the past or so-called historical cost . . . solely for the purpose of determining such past or historical cost as in and of itself constituting the rate base by which to judge the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s existing rates and to' prescribe new rates, and . . . neither introduced nor caused to be introduced any evidence for the purpose of determining the fair value of the plaintiff’s property or any evidence as to its reproduction cost. . . . Plaintiff introduced evidence as to the reproduction cost of its said property and as to its fair value.” No evidence was introduced to rebut that offered by the plaintiff.
. . On the conclusion of said hearings . . . the Commission made its order . . . finding that the existing rates of the plaintiff were unjust and unreasonable and prescribing lower rates whereby the plaintiff’s income would be reduced by approximately $2,100,000 annually. In so finding . . . the Commission declined to give and did not give consideration or effect to the reproduction cost ... or to the fair value of said property, but, except for lands constituting less than 5% in value of the property, . . . took into consideration for the purpose of determining the rate base . . . only the past or historical cost.” The commission applied for rehearing. Its petition indicates no claim that it did find value or that the court erred in holding that it did not; nor does the petition suggest that historical cost is value or was found or intended by the commission to be the value of the property. Indeed it sought a rehearing on the ground that the court failed to find the value of the property.
There is nothing in the commission’s statement as to the jurisdiction of this Court, Rule 12, or in its briefs *412here to indicate that it ever claimed or now claims that it found present value or that historical cost was not the sole basis of its calculations. Reversal is sought, not on the ground that the court erréd in holding that the commission failed to find the value of the property, but upon the claim that the court is without power to restrain the enforcement of the prescribed rates “unless it be found that the enforcement of the order will result in the actual confiscation of the utility’s property.”
But that contention is directly contrary to our decisions. It may be taken as certain that if in truth it could claim that it did base its determination on present value, the commission would rely on that fact, for then it would not be necessary to have overruled, distinguished, explained away, glossed over or disregarded the line of decisions rightly followed by the lower court.
As to reproduction cost. — It is true that sometimes estimates of present cost of construction are not reasonably made and are therefore worthless as evidence of value.12 It is also true that, when reasonably made, estimates of reproduction cost as of the valuation date constitute good evidence of present value.13
In Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U. S. 276, we said (p. 287): “It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair return upon properties devoted to public service without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast *413of probable future values made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances, is essential. If the highly important element of present costs is wholly disregarded such a forecast becomes impossible. Estimates for tomorrow cannot ignore prices of to-day.”
In McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400, the court said (page 410): “It is well established that values of utility properties fluctuate, and that owners must bear the decline and are entitled to the increase. The decision of this court in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 547, declares that to ascertain value ‘the present as compared with the original cost of construction’ are, among other things, matters for consideration. But this does not mean that the original cost or the present cost or some figure arbitrarily chosen between these two is to be taken as the measure. The weight to be given to such cost figures and other items or classes of evidence is to be determined in the light of the facts of the case in hand. By far the greater part of the company’s land and plant was acquired and constructed long before the war. The present value of the land is much greater than its cost; and the present cost of construction of those parts of the plant is much more than their reasonable original cost. In fact, prices and values have so changed that the amount paid for land in the early years of the enterprise and the cost of plant elements constructed prior to the great rise of prices due to the war do not constitute any real indication of their value at the present time. . . .”14 The passage which includes the statement quoted on page 398, ante, of this Court’s decision just given, follows: “Undoubtedly, the reasonable cost of a system of water*414works, well-planned and efficient for the public service, is good evidence of its value at the time of construction. And such actual cost will continue fairly well to measure the amount to be attributed to the physical elements of the property so long as there is no change in the level of applicable prices. And, as indicated by the report of the commission, it is true that, if the tendency or trend of prices is not definitely upward or downward and it does not appear probable that there will be a substantial change of prices, then the present value of lands plus the present cost of constructing the plant, less depreciation, if any, is a fair measure of the value of the physical elements of the property. The validity of the rates in question depends on property value January 1, 1924, and for a reasonable time following. While the values of such properties do not vary with frequent minor fluctuations in the prices of material and labor required to produce them, they are affected by and generally follow the relatively permanent levels and trends of such prices.”
The estimate of reproduction cost that the company submitted to the commission in this case is not before us. It is referred to in the commission’s report, but it is not disclosed sufficiently to enable this Court to decide whether it was made reasonably, was admissible in evidence or was entitled to any weight. This Court may not speculate concerning it. The record in this case and earlier reports of the commission above referred to compel the conclusion that no estimate of reproduction cost as of valuation date would have influenced the commission to modify or abandon the basis of historical cost.
The commission was bound by our decisions to ascertain and consider present cost as compared with original cost of construction. It refused to do so. The method it followed conflicts with fundamental principles established here in that it condemned the company’s existing rates as excessive and prescribed lower ones without any *415basis of fact to warrant that action. When the State, acting through the commission, set aside existing rates and ordered lower ones for the future, it exerted power to take, or to compel use of, private property for service of the public. Due process required just compensation— rates sufficient to yield a reasonable rate of return on the value of the property used to furnish the gas. Without a finding of value it is impossible to ascertain the required amount. To take mere cost of physical elements, instead of total value, and to deduct development expenses from revenue instead of including in value the amount found properly attributable to intangible elements and going value, and then, because of that error, to fix a rate of return on historical cost greater than would be required on value, is to leave the order without known or discoverable foundation. It is to make individual views as to what is just serve in place of the definite principles. The formula followed by the commission prevents consideration of present value or of the estimated present cost, in comparison with the original; i. e., the historical cost of the property. The commission gave no weight to the company’s evidence of present cost of construction. It made no investigation to ascertain, did not attempt to find and would not use, present cost or present value. It seems to me very clear that, save merely to reject it as inadmissible, the commission refused to pay any attention to the company’s evidence of reproduction cost.
The commission having failed to find value, our decisions required the district court to enter the decree appealed from.
In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dept. Public Works (1925), 268 U. S. 39, the superior court and the supreme court of Washington upheld an order of the state commission reducing railroad rates for intrastate transportation of logs as against attack by the carriers on the grounds *416that the order was made without evidence and that the rates were confiscatory. This Court held the order would deprive carriers of their property without due process of law, upon the sole ground that the commission found cost of service without any evidence, or upon evidence that did not clearly support the finding. We said (p. 44): “The mere admission by an administrative tribunal of matter which under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings would be incompetent, United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 288, or mere error in reasoning upon evidence introduced, does not invalidate an order. But where rates found by a regulatory body to be compensatory are attacked as being confiscatory, courts may enquire into the method by which its conclusion was reached. An order based upon a finding made without evidence, Chicgo Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 263, or upon a finding made upon evidence which clearly does not support it, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 547, is an arbitrary act against which courts afford relief. The error under discussion was of this character. It was a denial of due process.” That decision was reached without regard to any question of confiscation.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, (1927) 274 U. S. 344, presented the question whether an order of the Idaho commission reducing railroad rates for intrastate transportation of logs would deprive carriers of their property without due process of law. On the carriers’ appeal to the state supreme court, the action of the commission was upheld. Following the state practice, the case was there heard on the record made before the commission. The evidence introduced by the carriers was sufficient to warrant a finding that as to the lines of all the carriers, the intrastate log rates were low in comparison with rates on other commodities, and that as to two of the carriers they were confiscatory. But *417the state court held the commission authorized to reduce the rates without finding them unjust or unreasonable. And, as to the carriers’ insistence that the prescribed rates were confiscatory, it ruled that, even if the evidence showed existing rates insufficient, the prescribed lower rates would not necessarily be confiscatory, and supported that view by the suggestion that the intrastate haul from forest to saw mills was only one step in production and transportation to markets in other States.
Writ of certiorari brought the case here. We reversed the judgment of the state court, and in the opinion said (p. 350): “But, as appears from their opinions, the respondent [commission] and the court refused to consider and give weight to that evidence because, as they held, the intrastate log rates were not to be dealt with separately but were to be considered in connection with the interstate lumber rates, and because the carriers made no showing as to the gains or losses resulting from the interstate transportation. That cannot be sustained . . . This case is in principle the same as Northern Pacific v. Dept. of Public Works. ... It is impossible to sustain the refusal to consider the evidence introduced by the carriers to show that the rates in question are too low and confiscatory. The commission and the court erred in holding that the reasonableness or validity of the intrastate log rates depends on the amounts received by petitioners for the interstate transportation of lumber. It is clear that the methods by which respondent reached its conclusion were arbitrary and constitute a denial of due process of law.”
In West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., (1935) 295 U. S. 662, the company brought suit in the federal district court for Maryland to set aside as confiscatory an order of the Maryland commission reducing telephone rates. The controversy involved value, depreciation expense, and return. The commission made no appraisal of the prop*418erty, but attempted to determine present value by translating the dollar value of the plant as it was found in an earlier case, as of December 31, 1923, plus net additions in dollar value in each subsequent year, into an equivalent dollar value at December 31, 1932, its theory being (p. 667): “Value signifies in rate regulation the investment in dollars on which a utility is entitled to earn.” After pointing out fundamental defects in the commission’s method of finding value, we held that the case was controlled by the principle announced and applied in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dept. Public Works and Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n. No decision here has challenged the principle established by these cases. West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., supra, 675.
I cannot refrain from protesting against the Court’s refusal to deal with the case disclosed by the record and reasonably to adhere to principles that have been settled. Our decisions ought to be sufficiently definite and permanent to enable counsel usefully to advise clients. Generally speaking, at least, our decisions of yesterday ought to be the law of today.
I would affirm the decree of the district court.
MR. Justice McReynolds joins in this dissent.

 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dept. Public Works, (1925) 268 U. S. 39; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, (1927) 274 U. S. 344; West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., (1935) 295 U. S. 662. See also the opinions of the district court in this case, 5 F. Supp. 878, 13 F. Supp. 931 and 16 F. Supp. 884.

 See the Court’s opinion, ante, p. 400. It there quotes part of a sentence near the end of the commission’s report: “assure the Company a fair return on its properties.” (39 C. R. C. 49, 76.) Taken with other parts of the report, these words emphasize the commission’s purpose not to find value.

 Railroad Commission Cases, (1886) 116 U. S. 307, 331; Dow v. Beidelman, (1888) 125 U. S. 680, 691; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, (1888) 128 U. S. 174, 179; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, (1890) 134 U. S. 418, 458; Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & T. Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 399; Ames v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (1894) 64 F. 165, 176; Smyth v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 526, 541, 542, 544, 546.

 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, (1893) 148 U. S. 312, 327; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, (1923) 261 U. S. 299, 304; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, (1924) 265 U. S. 106, 123; Jacobs v. United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 13, 16-17; Olson v. United States, (1934) 292 U. S. 246, 255.

 Smyth v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 546, 547; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 19, 52; Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 287.

 For example, see:
San Diego Land Co. v. National City, (1899) 174 U. S. 739, 757; San Diego Land Co. v. Jasper, (1903) 189 U. S. 439, 442; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., (1904) 192 U. S. 201, 215; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 1, 13, 18; Willcox v. Consolidated Cas Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 19, 41; Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, (1912) 223 U. S. 349, 358; Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 454; Missouri Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 474, 498; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 178, 190; Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 287; Bluefield Co, v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) *405262 U. S. 679, 690; Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, (1924) 263 U. S. 456, 481; Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n (1925) 267 U. S. 359, 362; Board of Comm’rs v. N. Y. Tel. Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 23, 31; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 408, 409; United Railways v. West, (1930) 280 U. S. 234, 253-254; Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, (1933) 289 U. S. 287, 305, et seq.; West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., (1935) 295 U. S. 662, 671.
Alton Water Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, (1922) 279 F. 869, 872; Minneapolis v. Rand, (1923) 285 F. 818, 827; Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, (1923) 293 F. 208, 214; New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, (1924) 300 F. 822, 825; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, (1925) 5 F. (2d) 77, 91, 92; Middlesex Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Comm’rs, (1926) 10 F. (2d) 519, 533; Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, (1927) 19 F. (2d) 547, 552.

 See, e. g.: Re Coast Valleys Gas & Electric Co., (1917) 14 C. R. C. 460; Southern Sierras Power Co., (1920) 18 C. R. C. 818; Southern California Edison Co., (1921) 19 C. R. C. 595 and (1923) 23 C. R. C. 981; San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., (1922) 21 C. R. C. 545; Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (1922) 22 C. R. C. 744; Great Western Power Co., (1923) 22 C. R. C. 814; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (1929) 33 C. R. C. 737.

 For convenience these phrases, “historical cost,” “actual cost,” “prudent investment,” and “rate base,” will be used to mean the figure produced by the application of the formula expressed by the commission in Rules, etc. of Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., (1930) 35 C. R. C. 443, 445, without pausing to point out that land is included at present value.

 San Joaquin Co. v. Stanislaus County, 233 U. S. 454, 459; Board of Comm’rs v. N. Y. Tel. Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 23, 31; Smith v. *408Illinois Bell Tel. Co., (1930) 282 U. S. 133, 158; Public Service Co. v. Public Utility Comm’rs, 84 N. J. L. 463, 481; 87 Atl. 651. See also Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 456. Cf. dissenting opinion, United Railways v. West, (1930) 280 U. S. 234, 257.

 Our decisions unquestionably show that cost of development of the business is not the measure of the amount to be attributed to intangible elements of the property, or the measure of going value. Des Moines Cas Co. v. Des Moines, (1915) 238 U. S. 153, 168-171; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 178, 191, 192; Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 395, et seq.; Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, (1933) 289 U. S. 287, 314, 315.

 It does contain the complaint, to which are attached the opinion and order of the commission; the company’s petition for rehearing and order denying it; appellants’ answer; the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and final decree; the commission’s petition for rehearing and affidavit in support of it; the company’s answer to that petition, a supporting affidavit and one replying to it; the opinions of the court on motion for temporary injunction, on permanent injunction, and on petition for rehearing.

 Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 452; Lindheimer v. Illinois Tel. Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 151, 163, 164.

 Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 452, 455; Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 287, 288; Bluefield Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 679, 691, 692; Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., (1925) 268 U. S. 146, 156; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 410; Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, (1933) 289 U. S. 287, 307,

 The opinion here cites: Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., (1925) 268 U. S. 146, 157; Georgia Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 625, 630, 631; Bluefield Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 679, 691-692; Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 287.