Court Opinion

ID: 9942001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:06:29.062362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:35.131128
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                                          OPINION
Court of Appeals                                            This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
                                                              before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 11
 Srecko Bazdaric et al.,
         Appellants,
      v.
 Almah Partners LLC, et al.,
         Respondents.

 Brian J. Isaac, for appellants.
 Scott A. Korenbaum, for respondents.
 New York State Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.

 RIVERA, J.:

        Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability on their Labor Law § 241

 (6) cause of action for workplace injuries resulting from a fall on a plastic covering placed

 over a stopped escalator as part of a renovation project paint job. Plaintiffs established that

 the covering was a slipping hazard that defendants failed to remove in violation of

 Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), rendering defendants liable under Labor Law § 241

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(6). Additionally, contrary to the Appellate Division’s conclusion, the plastic covering was

not integral to the paint job but was created by use of a nonessential and inherently slippery

plastic that caused plaintiff employee’s injuries. We therefore reverse.

                                              I.

       Plaintiffs Srecko Bazdaric and his spouse Zorka filed this action for damages arising

from disabling injuries that Srecko sustained at a renovation project worksite when he

slipped on a plastic covering on an escalator in an area he was assigned to paint. The

injuries left Srecko unable to work. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, violations of

Labor Law § 241 (6) under various sections of the Industrial Code against defendant

owners of the premises where the injury occurred—Almah Partners LLC, Almah Mezz

LLC, 180 Maiden Lane LLC, Downtown NYC Owner LLC—and defendant general

contractor J.T. Magen & Company, Inc (J.T. Magen).1 Defendant J.T. Magen hired non-

party subcontractor Kara Painting (Kara), which employed Srecko as a painter on the

project.

       Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241

(6) based on violations of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) and 12 NYCRR 23-1.7

(e) (1) and (2). In support, they submitted Srecko’s testimony that he complained to Kara’s

1
 Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under Labor Law § 200, and neither party
moved on the Labor Law § 240 claim, so neither are at issue on this appeal.

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                                              -3-                                        No. 11

foreman, “this is no way to work on this,” when he saw the unsecured plastic covering the

escalator that he was required to stand on to complete the paint job. In response, the

foreman cursed at him, chastised him for complaining, and told him he “ha[d] to do” the

job on the plastic. Srecko thus walked to the middle of the escalator, put his paint can down,

took a step to begin the job, and slipped and fell on the plastic covering. A three-gallon

paint can fell on his leg, a paint can hit his back, and his body hit the metal of the escalator.

To establish the plastic was not appropriate to the task, plaintiffs relied on Srecko’s

testimony, including his assertion that drop cloths were available on the premises. Plaintiffs

also submitted testimony from Lucas Calamari, defendant J.T. Magen’s superintendent,

that the plastic was the wrong type of covering for the escalator steps, and that if he had

seen that covering before Srecko’s fall, he would have directed that it be removed and

replaced with a safer covering on the steps. Calamari admitted that Kara was using drop

cloths at this particular site, and that in his experience drop cloths are less slippery than the

plastic that was placed on the escalator. He also acknowledged that he had previously seen

escalators instead covered with wood. After Srecko’s fall, Calamari directed that the plastic

covering be removed, and “it was removed right away” and “wasn’t used anymore.”

Defendants opposed and cross-moved to dismiss the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action,

arguing, as relevant here, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) and (e) (1) were inapplicable and the

plastic covering was integral to the work. Defendants further asserted that Srecko was at

fault, relying on an affidavit from the foreman that Srecko placed and used the plastic

covering even though canvas drop cloths were available, a characterization of the events

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denied by Srecko. Supreme Court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the Labor Law

§ 241 (6) cause of action based on violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) and (e) (1).2

       A divided Appellate Division reversed and granted defendants’ cross-motion for

summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action over a two-Justice

dissent (203 AD3d 643 [1st Dept 2022]). As relevant here, the majority applied the maxim

ejusdem generis to conclude that the plastic covering was not a foreign substance under 12

NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) because the plastic covering was “not similar in nature to the foreign

substances listed in the regulation, i.e., ice, snow, water, or grease” (id. at 643). The

majority also concluded that plaintiffs’ claim was barred because the plastic covering was

integral to the work (id.).3 The dissent maintained that the plastic sheeting, as “a physical

material not normally present on an escalator,” constituted a foreign substance under the

ordinary meaning of the term and therefore comes within the scope of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7

(d), and further that the plastic covering was not integral to Srecko’s work because there

was nothing intrinsic to the plastic used that was essential to the paint job (id. at 643

[Moulton, J., dissenting]). The Appellate Division granted plaintiffs leave to appeal and

certified the question whether its decision and order was properly made (2022 NY Slip Op

67803[U] [1st Dept 2022]). We answer that question in the negative.

2
  Plaintiffs do not appeal Supreme Court’s rejection of their claim under 12 NYCRR 23-
1.7(e) (2).
3
  The Appellate Division majority also rejected plaintiffs’ claim under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7
(e) (1) as similarly inapplicable.
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                                               II.

       Plaintiffs argue that the plastic covering was a foreign substance for purposes of 12

NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) because it was not a part of the escalator, and that this interpretation

best supports the broad remedial purposes of the Labor Law. Plaintiffs further argue that

the majority below misapplied the “integral to the work” doctrine on the facts of this case.

We conclude that plaintiffs established their entitlement to summary judgment under Labor

Law § 241 (6) because they demonstrated, prima facie, that the plastic covering created a

slippery surface in violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) and it was not integral to Srecko’s

paint job assignment. In response, defendants failed to raise any triable issue of fact.

                                                      A.

       “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed ‘in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party’ ” (Vega v Restani Const. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503

[2012], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 335 [2011]). The movant

“must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering

sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” (Alvarez v

Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). “Once this showing has been made, . . .the

burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce

evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues

of fact which require a trial of the action” (id.).

       Labor Law § 241 (6) provides:

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       “All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being
       performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged,
       operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and
       safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.
       The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions of this
       subdivision, and the owners and contractors and their agents for such work,
       except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not
       direct or control the work, shall comply therewith.”

       Labor Law § 241 (6) is a “hybrid” statute, as the first sentence “reiterates the general

common-law standard of care,” while the second sentence imposes a nondelegable duty

with respect to compliance with rules of the Commissioner which contain “specific,

positive command[s]” (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 503-504

[1993]; see also Toussaint v Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 38 NY3d 89, 93 [2022] [“It is the

second sentence, mandating compliance with the rules of the Commissioner, that creates a

nondelegable duty—but only with respect to certain regulations.”]). Thus, an owner or

general contractor “is vicariously liable without regard to [their] fault,” and “even in the

absence of control or supervision of the worksite,” where a plaintiff establishes a violation

of a specific and applicable Industrial Code regulation (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co.,

91 NY 2d 343, 348-350 [1998]; see Toussaint v Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 38 NY3d 89, 94

[2022]; Nostrom v A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 NY3d 502, 507 [2010]). As the Court has

emphasized, “[t]he Industrial Code should be sensibly interpreted and applied to effectuate

its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace” (St. Louis

v Town of N. Elba, 16 NY3d 411, 416 [2011]).

       Plaintiffs argue that defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), “General Hazards,

slipping hazards”, which provides:

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                                              -7-                                         No. 11

          “Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a floor,
          passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface
          which is in a slippery condition. Ice, snow, water, grease and any other
          foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed,
          sanded or covered to provide safe footing.”

In Rizzuto the Court explained that this section:

          “unequivocally directs employers not to ‘suffer or permit any employee’ to
          use a slippery floor or walkway, and also imposes an affirmative duty on
          employers to provide safe footing by requiring that any ‘foreign substance
          which may cause slippery footing shall be removed to provide safe footing.’
          As such, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) mandates a distinct standard of conduct,
          rather than a general reiteration of common-law principles, and is precisely
          the type of ‘concrete specification’ that Ross requires.” (91 NY2d at 350-351
          [internal citations omitted]).

Thus, an owner or general contractor is liable where the negligent act of some party to or

participant of the construction project violated the provision and caused the employee’s

injury.

          To meet their summary judgment burden, plaintiffs here were required to show that:

(1) section 23-1.7 (d) applied under the circumstances; (2) defendants or Kara violated that

section’s specific commands; (3) this violation alone, or considered with other undisputed

factual evidence, constitutes negligence; and (4) the violation caused plaintiffs’ injuries

(see Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 351; Ross, 81 NY2d at 501-505; Morris v Pavarini Constr., 22

NY3d 668, 675 [2014]). In support of their motion, plaintiffs submitted Srecko’s testimony

that he was assigned to paint in an area where an escalator was covered with a slippery

plastic covering, he informed his supervisor the plastic was not appropriate for the paint

job, he slipped and fell as he started his assigned task in the middle of the escalator, on the

                                              -7-
                                            -8-                                       No. 11

way down his back hit a paint bucket and the escalator steps, and that, as a result of the

injuries from the fall, he can no longer work. Plaintiffs submitted Calamari’s corroborating

testimony that the plastic covering was “the wrong type of covering for the escalator steps”,

if he had seen the covering before Srecko fell he would have directed Kara and the foreman

to remove the plastic and put a safer covering on the steps, in accordance with his

instructions the covering was removed after Srecko’s fall and was not used again, he had

seen drop cloth coverings on the work site that, in his experience, were less slippery than

plastic, and that he had previously observed wood coverings being used for these types of

paint jobs. Plaintiffs also submitted evidence of Srecko’s injuries and Zorka’s loss of

consortium. In their opposition, defendants conceded that Srecko slipped on a plastic

covering intentionally placed on the escalator and that the “[p]lastic sheeting was

admittedly a poor choice for the purpose it was used.” Thus, plaintiffs established all the

factual predicates for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) if Industrial Code § 23-1.7 (d)

applies on the facts of this case. We now turn to that question.

                                             B.

       The textual requirements of section 23-1.7 (d) are satisfied here. The escalator is

clearly the type of work surface enumerated in this section.4 Plaintiffs also established that

4
  Although defendants argued that the escalator was not a “passageway,” their argument
was directed to a different subsection of the Industrial Code, 12 NYCRR 23.1-7(e), and
premised on the fact that this section is split into two subdivisions, 23.1-7(e)(1)
(“passageways”) and 23.1-7(e)(2) (“working areas”), which 12 NYCRR 23.1.7(d) is not.
Though plaintiffs originally also argued for liability under 12 NYCRR 23.1-7(e)(1), they
                                            -8-
                                            -9-                                      No. 11

the plastic covering was not part of the escalator and this foreign substance created a

slippery condition. Thus, defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d)’s express prohibition

against the use of this work surface without providing safe footing from a slipping hazard.

       Defendants’ argument, adopted by the Appellate Division majority, that the plastic

covering is not a “foreign substance” for purposes of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) because it is

unlike the substances listed in this section is unpersuasive. Defendants rely on the maxim

of ejusdem generis that “general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in

nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words” (Circuit City Stores,

Inc. v Adams, 532 US 105, 115 [2001], quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and

Statutory Construction § 47.17 [1991] ). Defendants ignore that “canons of construction

need not be conclusive” (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v Adams, 532 US 105, 115 [2001]), and

that “however helpful the maxims when discriminately used, they should not be abused as

talismanic” (Becker v Huss Co., 43 N.Y.2d 527, 540 [1978]). Instead, these interpretive

aids are deployed to achieve the legislative goals.

       Whether this particular covering was a foreign substance within the meaning of 12

NYCRR 23-1.7(d) depends on its relation to the area where Srecko was assigned to work,

and the covering’s uniform properties. As to its relation to the work area, the plastic

covering was not a component of the escalator and was not necessary to the escalator’s

functionality. Quite the opposite, as it would have been impossible to operate the escalator

do not argue for liability under that section before this Court. Accordingly, we do not
address this argument.
                                            -9-
                                            - 10 -                                    No. 11

if covered with plastic. Therefore, it was, by definition a substance foreign to the escalator

(see     Merriam-Webster.com           Dictionary,      foreign      [https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/foreign] [“not normally found in an area or part”], substance

[https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substance] [“physical material from which

something is made or which has a discrete existence]).

       As to whether the covering’s properties are the type encompassed within the

affirmative mandate of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), because that section specifically lists ice,

snow, water and grease, the catchall reference to “other foreign substance” includes those

substances that share a quality common to the enumerated items. The listed items are, by

their nature, types of material that are slippery when in contact with an area where someone

walks, seeks passage, or stands, and, when the substance is present, would make it difficult

if not impossible to use the work area safely, necessitating one of the affirmative mitigating

measures set forth in section 23-1.7 (d) as a means to provide safe footing. The plastic

covering used here similarly made Srecko’s work area slippery upon contact, with the

result that Srecko could not traverse the plastic-covered escalator without risking a fall.

       Interpreting 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) as we do, to include the plastic covering, accords

with the text and achieves this section’s specific purpose of protecting workers against

slipping hazards. Defendants’ proposed limitation on “foreign substance” is nonsensical

and would thwart this purpose.

                                             III.

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       Defendants also argue that the plastic covering was integral to the work and

therefore they cannot be liable for plaintiffs’ fall and attendant injuries under Labor Law §

241 (6). Defendants, and the Appellate Division majority, misconstrue this doctrine, which

applies only when the dangerous condition is inherent to the task at hand, and not, as is the

case here, when a defendant or third party’s negligence created a danger that was avoidable

without obstructing the work or imperiling the worker.

       Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp. (18 NY3d 134 [2011]) is instructive. The plaintiff

in that case sued under Labor Law sections 240 (1) and 241 (6) for injuries sustained when

he stepped into a partially-filled basement trench while laying a concrete floor over the

basement. The Court concluded that defendants were entitled to summary judgment

dismissing both claims and held that the provision of the Industrial Code at issue—a

different subsection of section 23-1.7, which applies to hazardous openings which are

falling hazards—did not apply because “covering the opening in question would have been

inconsistent with filling [the trench], an integral part of the job” (id. at 140 [emphasis

added]) (see also O’Sullivan v IDI Constr. Co., Inc., 7 NY3d 805 [2006] [permanently

installed protruding electrical pipe plaintiff tripped on was integral to the work of

constructing the high-rise building]). The doctrine thus recognizes that certain work

assignments are, by their nature, dangerous but still permissible, and the particular

commands of the Industrial Code may not apply if they would make it impossible to

conduct the work. Thus, in Salazar it was inherent to the job of filling a trench that the

plaintiff work near an unfilled opening, an obvious falling hazard. The doctrine does not,

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                                           - 12 -                                   No. 11

as the Appellate Division majority mistakenly concluded, absolve a defendant of liability

for the use of an avoidable dangerous condition or for failure to mitigate the danger,

including as specifically provided by the Industrial Code, if preventive measures would not

make it impossible to complete the work.

       Here, standing on a stopped escalator while painting required that the steps be

covered to prevent the paint from falling on the escalator machinery and potentially

damaging the escalator, and also to prevent the work area from becoming slippery and thus

hazardous to Srecko or any other worker who needed to walk on the steps. Thus, the use

of some cover was integral to Srecko’s assignment to paint around the escalator. But that

does not mean that any cover used—even one that was inherently slippery—was

necessarily “integral,” particularly where a safer alternative would have accomplished the

same goal. The plastic covering that was placed on the escalator was not integral to the

paint job because it made Srecko’s work area slippery, creating one of the hazards that the

cover was intended to avoid. Contrary to defendants’ and the Appellate Division majority’s

view, this was not merely a poor choice of material but an inherently dangerous one.

Defendant was in a position to avoid this danger because, as Calamari testified, there were

alternative coverings—drop cloths and wood panels—that were familiar, previously-used

options that would have achieved the goal of protecting the worker from injuries caused by

a slipping hazard and also protected the escalator from possible damage. A contrary

holding would absolve employers of liability for using any means of accomplishing a task,

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                                          - 13 -                                    No. 11

even if it is the most dangerous. This distorted interpretation finds no support in the

Industrial Code or our case law.

                                           IV.

       Plaintiffs demonstrated the applicability and a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d)

that resulted in Srecko’s fall and injury. In response, defendants failed to produce any

evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the plastic covering was a foreign

substance or caused a slippery footing. Moreover, defendants failed to establish their

defense that the plastic covering was integral to Srecko’s work and safe to use under the

circumstances. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability based on

12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d).

       Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs,

plaintiffs’ motion insofar as it sought summary judgment as to liability on their Labor Law

§ 241 (6) cause of action granted, defendants’ motion insofar as it sought summary

judgment on the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action denied, and the certified question

answered in the negative.

                                          - 13 -
GARCIA, J. (concurring):

      The issue on this appeal is whether defendant owners—Almah Partners LLC,

Almah Mezz LLC, 180 Maiden Lane LLC, Downtown, NYC Owner, LLC—and defendant

general contractor—J.T. Magen & Company, Inc.—can be held vicariously liable for

                                      -1-
                                              -2-                                        No. 11

plaintiff Srecko Bazdaric’s workplace injury. Plaintiff, who had been assigned by his

employer to paint the walls and ceiling of an escalator, slipped and fell on the protective

plastic sheeting which covered the escalator steps. To hold defendants liable for this

accident under Labor Law § 241 (6), plaintiff must allege a violation of an Industrial Code

provision “mandating compliance with concrete specifications” (Ross v Curtis-Palmer

Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505 [1993]). While I concur in result with the majority

denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, I write separately to make clear

that to qualify as a “concrete specification[],” 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) requires that a foreign

substance cause the slippery condition referred to in the first sentence of the provision (see

id.).

        Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) motion for summary

judgment to the extent it relied on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d). The court did not address

whether the plastic was a foreign substance because it found “[d]efendants have violated

12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) if they permitted a slippery condition on the escalator.” The

Appellate Division reversed and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment (203

AD3d 643, 643 [1st Dept 2022]). The Court invoked the principle of ejusdem generis to

conclude that the plastic sheeting was not a foreign substance because it “is not similar in

nature to the foreign substances listed in the regulation, i.e., ice, snow, water or grease” (id.

at 644). The Court then determined that “even if the regulation arguably contemplates

plastic sheeting to be a slipping hazard, under the factual circumstances here, the integral

to the work defense bars plaintiff’s reliance on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d)” (id.).

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       “As a general rule, when an employee is injured in the course of his employment,

his sole remedy against his employer lies in his entitlement to a recovery under the

Workers’ Compensation Law” (Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 156

[1980], citing Workers’ Compensation Law § 11; see also Williams v Hartshorn, 296 NY

49, 50 [1946]; Gonzalez v Armac Indus., 81 NY2d 1, 8-9 [1993]). Workers’ compensation

is an exclusive remedy with only limited exceptions, such as where the employer commits

an intentional tort against the employee (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994, 995 [3d

Dept 1981], affd 55 NY2d 893 [1982]). However, while Workers’ Compensation generally

does not allow actions against employers for accidental injuries suffered in the course of

employment, employees may bring actions against owners and general contractors under

certain circumstances.

       One avenue for doing so is Labor Law § 200 (1), which codifies a “common-law

duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe construction site”

(Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 352 [1998]). However, it is well settled

that to recover under Labor Law § 200 (1), a plaintiff must show that an owner or general

contractor had “the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury to enable it to

avoid or correct an unsafe condition” (id., quoting Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54

NY2d 311, 317 [1981]). In Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. (82 NY2d 876,

877 [1993]), to take one example, we held that the Appellate Division correctly dismissed

a Labor Law § 200 (1) claim where “there [was] no evidence that defendant exercised

supervisory control” over the moving of a steel beam.

                                             -3-
                                           -4-                                      No. 11

       Labor Law § 241 (6), at issue here, provides another means for seeking recovery

from owners and general contractors, imposing a nondelegable duty to “ ‘provide

reasonable and adequate protection and safety’ for workers and to comply with the specific

safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of

Labor” (Ross, 81 NY2d at 501-502, quoting Labor Law § 241 [6]). Because the duty is

nondelegable, unlike the duty imposed by Labor Law § 200 (1), plaintiffs “need not show

that defendants exercised supervision or control over [the] worksite in order to establish

[a] right of recovery” (id. at 502). However, this vicarious liability is limited: “only

‘provisions of the Industrial Code mandating compliance with concrete specifications’ give

rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6)” (see Toussaint v Port Auth. of N.Y.

& N.J., 38 NY3d 89, 94 [2022] [emphasis added], quoting Ross, 81 NY2d at 505). The

Court in Ross reasoned that allowing plaintiffs to use “broad, nonspecific regulatory

standard[s] as predicate[s]” under Labor Law § 241 (6) would “seriously distort the scheme

of liability for unsafe working conditions,” render Labor Law § 200 (1) “all but

superfluous,” and run contrary to legislative intent (81 NY2d at 504-505).

       The Industrial Code section at issue here must be interpreted within this framework:

              “Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a
              floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other
              elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition. Ice,
              snow, water, grease and any other foreign substance which
              may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or
              covered to provide safe footing” (12 NYCRR 23-1.7 [d]).

While we have held that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) “mandates a distinct standard of conduct”

(Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 351) and satisfies Ross, that conclusion flows from reading the second

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                                             -5-                                       No. 11

sentence of the regulation to inform the meaning of the first. Absent any context, the first

sentence is clearly a general reiteration of common law principles. To qualify as mandating

compliance with a “concrete specification[]” (see Ross, 81 NY2d at 505), the “slippery

condition” referenced in the first sentence must be caused by the “foreign substance”

described in the second. Taken as a whole, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) “mandates a distinct

standard of conduct” by requiring that employees not be permitted to use a floor or any

other elevated surface which is in a slippery condition due to “[i]ce, snow, water, grease

[or] any other foreign substance” and by further requiring that such a substance be removed

or otherwise remedied “to provide safe footing.” In Rizzuto, the plaintiff alleged that diesel

fuel—clearly a “foreign substance”—inadvertently sprayed into his work area and caused

the slippery condition (81 NY2d at 347). A contrary reading of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7

(d) would indeed create common law negligence liability under the first sentence of the

provision (see Toussaint, 38 NY3d at 110 [Wilson, J. dissenting] [supporting a broad

interpretation of Rizzuto that would in fact create common law negligence liability]).

       The majority’s holding that “defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d)’s express

prohibition against the use of this work surface without providing safe footing from a

slipping hazard” (majority op at 9) is somewhat ambiguous. However, the preceding

sentence concluding that “[p]laintiffs . . . established that the plastic covering was not part

of the escalator and this foreign substance created a slippery condition” thereby

establishing a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) (majority op at 8-9), combined with the

significant attention given to the question of whether the plastic sheeting was a foreign

substance (majority op at 9-10), makes clear enough that the foreign substance referred to

                                             -5-
                                              -6-                                      No. 11

in the second sentence must cause the slippery condition referred to in the first. Clarity in

our interpretation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), always important, is especially crucial in this

case, where Supreme Court based its holding on an overly broad reading of the first

sentence of that provision, untethered to any requirement that the plastic sheeting was a

“foreign substance.”

         Although a close question, I agree that the plastic sheeting was a “foreign substance”

within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d).1 I do not agree, however, that any substance

“not part of the escalator” (majority op at 9) would qualify as such. I would hold instead

that plastic sheeting shares the same qualities that make “ice, snow, water and grease”

hazardous when introduced into a qualifying work area.

Order reversed, with costs, plaintiffs' motion insofar as it sought summary judgment as to
liability on their Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action granted, defendants' motion insofar
as it sought summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action denied, and
certified question answered in the negative. Opinion by Judge Rivera. Chief Judge Wilson
and Judges Troutman and Halligan concur. Judge Garcia concurs in result in an opinion,
in which Judges Singas and Cannataro concur.

1
    I also agree that the integral to the work exception does not apply.
                                              -6-