Court Opinion

ID: 9684952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:19:18.377595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.276055
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Criminally negligent homicide is a Class A misdemeanor. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.07. Once an information has been filed by the prosecuting attorney, Articles 2.05 and 21.21, § 9, V.A.C.C.P., that officer has the option of causing a capias or summons to issue from the court having jurisdiction of the cause, and the latter may issue “only upon request of the attorney representing the State,” Article 23.04, id.1 A capias is a command to any peace officer of the State of Texas to arrest the named accused and bring him before the court at a time therein prescribed, either instanter or a day certain, Articles 23.01 and 23.02, id. After it is issued, the capias may be “mailed to the sheriff of the county where the defendant resides or is to be found,” Articles 23.03 and 23.04, id. Any officer making an arrest under a capias in a misdemeanor may take a bail bond of the defendant, Article 23.14, id., and having done so shall return such bond together with the capias to the proper court, Article 23.17, id., reporting on return of capias “what disposition has been *780made of the defendant,” Article 23.18, id. See also Article 15.18, id.2 Essentially that is what had happened here by on or about September 15,1979 — some thirty days after filing for information.
So far the process prescribed by the code of criminal procedure — initiated by the prosecuting attorney and carried out respectively by officers of the court and others, has not implicated the “warrant section” of the Harris County Sheriff, and I have not found any provision of the code of criminal procedure that authorizes it to “reject” a bail bond taken and approved by the Sheriff of Robertson County, or to treat appellant’s arrest and bond as a nullity.3
We need not hold, and as I read the majority opinion it is not even implied, that a prosecutor “has any control over or responsibility for” conduct of the duties of any sheriff. But, having opted for a capias rather than summons at the outset, and thereby in effect made every peace officer of the State its instrument for properly executing it, the prosecution in this, or any other similar situation, is obliged by its own assigned responsibility to exercise due diligence to follow through in the endeavor to obtain the presence of an accused for trial. After all, investigators employed by district and county attorneys are peace officers, Article 2.12, Y.A.C.C.P., and as such are authorized to execute all lawful process, as well as sheriffs.
A simple inquiry by the prosecuting attorney or his investigator would have revealed the position adopted by the “warrant section,” and corrective measures could have been timely invoked by the prosecution.
For example, deferring to the view of the warrant section, the prosecutor was authorized to make it appear by affidavit to the judge of the court that bail taken by the Sheriff of Robertson County was “insufficient in amount, or that the sureties [were] not good for the amount, or that the bond [was] for any reason defective or insufficient,” and obtain a fresh warrant of arrest, requiring of appellant “sufficient bond and security.” Article 16.16, V.A.C.C.P. For another, by passing completely the warrant section, the prosecution was authorized, as it ultimately did, to request that the case be set for trial and that a summons issue for appellant to appear at the stated time and place of trial.4
I adhere to my interpretation of germane provisions of the Texas Speedy Trial Act, first expressed in Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 915-920 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Indeed, what has been written today builds on the “diligence” provisions of the Act then “reasonably construed” to support the since accepted conclusion that “ ‘the state’ means the affected district attorney or other prosecuting attorney...,” id., at 917-918. As I read it, the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, is in harmony with those interpretations and constructions.
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
McCORMICK, MILLER and CAMPBELL, JJ., join.

. All emphasis is supplied by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. One arrested under a warrant issued in a county other than the one in which the person is arrested shall be taken before a local magistrate “who shall take bail, if allowed by law, and immediately transmit the bond taken to the court.”

. Had the situation been one in which appellant refused to give bail in Robertson County, the Harris County Sheriff would have been authorized by Article 15.20 id. forthwith to “go or send for” him and have him brought before the proper court; but, a failure to do so within ten days of commitment entitled appellant to be discharged from custody.

,Together, in a misdemeanor case, Articles 23.04 and 23.03, supra, provide that a summons “need not” issue for an accused in custody or under bond. Thus, the attitude of the warrant section should not have inhibited the prosecutor in his own efforts to secure the presence of appellant for trial.