Court Opinion

ID: 9781484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:40:22.006744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.965640
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I agree with the majority’s analysis of the proper standard, I write in this case because I do not agree that we should usurp the authority of the trial court and ourselves apply that standard to the disputed facts of this case. In particular, I do not agree that we should be deciding issues of credibility based solely on a dry record, which itself highlights credibility issues in this case, and without the benefit of live testimony. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to part-III of the majority opinion.
As the majority points out, the trial court did not find the testimony of Deputy Chase particularly credible. However, the trial court also seriously questioned the Defendant’s credibility. The trial court specifically stated in its ruling that it did “not find [the Defendant] particularly credible. She was manipulative, evasive, and at times, untruthful on the stand.” Additionally, the record reveals that the Defendant had been convicted of felonies including fraud and deceit, criminal impersonation, and false statements. The Defendant’s own psychiatrist testified that at times the Defendant manipulated events and that she was not an honest person. Furthermore, despite the alleged failure of service of process, the Defendant filed an untimely answer brief, but did not bring up the lack of service. The Defendant did not address lack of service until two years later.
*383Although the trial court ultimately found in favor of the Defendant, it prefaced its discussion by stating that the Defendant had established “by a preponderance of the evidence that she had not been served.” When analyzing the credibility of the witnesses, the court noted only that due to other pending legal matters, it was “unlikely” that the Defendant would falsely claim non-service of process. I find it particularly troublesome that the trial court used the word, “unlikely,” which is more suggestive of the preponderance standard than of the greater “clear and convincing” standard. For all of these reasons, review of the trial court’s decision does not provide assurance that the decision would have come out the same way had the court used the proper standard of clear and convincing evidence.
We have held innumerable times before that issues of credibility should be decided by the trial court. “It is the function of the trial court, and not the reviewing court, to weigh evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Colo.2000). “The credibility of the witnesses, the sufficiency, probative effect and weight of the evidence, the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, of necessity, are all within the province of the trial court....” Broncucia v. McGee, 173 Colo. 22, 25, 475 P.2d 336, 337 (1970); see also People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 157 (Colo.1999) (“When confronted with a choice of competing facts upon which the trial court has not passed, we are hesitant, as an appellate court, to weigh the evidence and determine credibility.”); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1019 (Colo.1995) (“this court may not speculate on witness credibility”); Wilson v. Bd. of County Commrs., 703 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Colo.1985) (“it is not the province of this court to judge the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses”).
Therefore, consistent with our previous case law, I would remand this case to the trial court to reexamine the credibility of the witnesses given the higher standard for motions to set aside default judgment that we reiterate today.