Court Opinion

ID: 9919038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 15:00:45.535106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:00.493831
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10028    Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 01/17/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10028
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JAMES ALEXANDER SMITH, III,
       a.k.a. Squirrel,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00005-AW-GRJ-1
USCA11 Case: 22-10028         Document: 47-1         Date Filed: 01/17/2024         Page: 2 of 7

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10028

                               ____________________

       Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              James Alexander Smith, III, argues for the first time on
       appeal that the district court plainly erred in sentencing him as an
       armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act
       (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, he argues that (1) his
       prior Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
       weapon does not categorically constitute a violent felony for
       purposes of the ACCA because it can be committed by “reckless”
       conduct; and (2) his prior Florida conviction for sale of cocaine is
       not categorically a serious drug offense for purposes of the ACCA
       because it does not necessarily involve the conduct of distribution
       because it encompasses the mere “attempt” to distribute a
       controlled substance. Because both of Smith’s claims are
       foreclosed by binding precedent, we affirm.
                                     I.      Background
              In 2021, Smith pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
       distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine (Count One),
       possession of a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime (Count
       Two), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count
       Three). 1 At sentencing, the district court determined that Smith

       1 The ACCA mandates a minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years for “a

       person who violates section 922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . .
       for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions
USCA11 Case: 22-10028         Document: 47-1          Date Filed: 01/17/2024          Page: 3 of 7

       22-10028                   Opinion of the Court                                  3

       qualified as an armed career criminal because he had three prior
       convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. 2 Smith
       did not object. The district court sentenced Smith to a total of 240
       months’ imprisonment to be followed by 10 years’ supervised
       release. 3 This appeal followed.

       different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added). Possession
       of a firearm by a convicted felon is a § 922(g) offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
       At the time of Smith’s offense, without the ACCA enhancement, a violation
       of § 922(g) carried a statutory maximum of only 10 years’ imprisonment. Id.
       § 924(a)(2) (2018). Notably, in 2022, Congress amended § 924 and a violation
       of § 922(g) without the ACCA enhancement now carries a statutory maximum
       of 15 years’ imprisonment. Id. § 924(a)(8) (2022).
       2 Smith’s presentence investigation report identified the following prior
       Florida convictions as supporting the ACCA enhancement: (1) possession of a
       controlled substance with intent to sell and sale of a controlled substance;
       (2) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; (3) possession of cocaine (one
       conviction in 2002 and one in 2006); (4) possession of a controlled substance
       (one conviction in 2005 and one in 2018); and (5) sale of cocaine. At
       sentencing, the district court indicated that a number of these convictions did
       not qualify as ACCA predicates, but it did not specify which ones.
       Nevertheless, the district court determined that at least three of the listed
       convictions qualified as ACCA predicates, although it did not indicate on
       which offenses it relied. Smith did not object to either the PSI or the district
       court’s ACCA determination.
       3 Specifically, the district court sentenced Smith to concurrent terms of 180

       months’ imprisonment on Counts I and III—the statutory mandatory
       minimum—and a consecutive term of 60 months’ imprisonment on Count
       II—also the statutory mandatory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i),
       924(e)(1).
USCA11 Case: 22-10028           Document: 47-1          Date Filed: 01/17/2024            Page: 4 of 7

       4                            Opinion of the Court                          22-10028

                                        II.      Discussion
              Smith argues for the first time on appeal that the district
       court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence under the ACCA
       because he did not have three qualifying convictions. 4 He contends
       that his prior Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a
       deadly weapon does not categorically qualify as a violent felony
       and that his prior Florida conviction for sale of cocaine does not
       categorically qualify as a serious drug offense. Both of his
       challenges are foreclosed by binding precedent.
               With regard to his conviction for Florida aggravated assault
       with a deadly weapon, Smith argues that it does not categorically
       qualify as a violent felony because it can be committed with a mens
       rea of recklessness, and in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817,
       1821–22 (2021), the Supreme Court held that offenses with a mens
       rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies for purposes of
       the ACCA’s elements clause. However, while Smith’s appeal was
       pending in this Court, we rejected a virtually identical Borden-based
       challenge in Somers v. United States and held that “aggravated

       4 Because Smith failed to challenge the ACCA enhancement below, we review

       this claim for plain error only. United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1295
       (11th Cir. 2013). Under this stringent standard, “there must be (1) error,
       (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are
       met, we may then exercise our discretion to correct the error, but only if
       (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
       judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1296 (quotations and internal citation omitted).
       For an error to be plain, it must be “contrary to explicit statutory provisions
       or to on-point precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court.” United States v.
       Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
USCA11 Case: 22-10028          Document: 47-1         Date Filed: 01/17/2024           Page: 5 of 7

       22-10028                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

       assault under Florida law categorically qualifies as a ‘violent felony’
       under the ACCA’s element clause.” 66 F.4th 890, 894–96 (11th Cir.
       2023); see also Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d
       1328, 1341 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding pre-Borden that a Florida
       aggravated assault conviction categorically qualified as a violent
       felony under the ACCA). We are bound by our decision in Somers,
       and it squarely forecloses Smith’s claim. 5 See United States v. Archer,

       5 Smith points to prior decisions from Florida’s intermediate appellate courts,

       which he argues demonstrates that, at the time of his aggravated assault
       conviction, Florida courts had construed the crime of aggravated assault to
       encompass reckless conduct. However, our decision in Somers was premised
       on the Florida Supreme Court’s response to a certified question concerning
       the necessary mens rea required for an aggravated assault conviction under
       Florida law. Somers, 66 F.4th at 893. As we explained in Somers, in response to
       the certified questions, “[t]he Florida Supreme Court . . . told us
       unambiguously that assault under Florida law requires a mens rea of at least
       knowing conduct; it cannot be committed recklessly. [And] [w]hen the
       Florida Supreme Court . . . interprets [a] statute, it tells us what that statute
       always meant.” Id. at 896 (quotation omitted). Thus, like Somers, Smith
       “cannot rely on earlier decisions of Florida’s intermediate courts of appeal to
       avoid [the Florida Supreme Court’s] clear holding” to the contrary. Id.
               To the extent Smith argues that the Florida Supreme Court essentially
       got the law wrong in response to the certified question, his arguments are
       unavailing as we are bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of
       Florida law. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (explaining in
       the context of an ACCA challenge that “we are . . . bound by the Florida
       Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, including its determination of the
       elements” of a particular state offense); United States v. Hill, 799 F.3d 1318, 1322
       (11th Cir. 2015) (“[F]ederal courts are bound by a state supreme court’s
       interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of the
       underlying state offense.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-10028         Document: 47-1         Date Filed: 01/17/2024         Page: 6 of 7

       6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10028

       531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that under our
       prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all
       subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined
       to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court
       sitting en banc”).
               Turning to Smith’s conviction for sale of cocaine in violation
       of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a), he argues that it does not categorically
       qualify as a serious drug offense because it includes the mere
       attempted transfer of cocaine, and, therefore criminalizes a broader
       range of conduct than that embodied in the ACCA’s definition of a
       serious drug offense. 6 As with his first claim, while Smith’s appeal
       was pending in this Court, we rejected an identical challenge in
       United States v. Penn and held that Florida convictions for sale of
       cocaine categorically qualify as serious drug offenses for purposes
       of the ACCA. 63 F.4th 1305, 1310–17 (11th Cir. 2023). In so
       holding, we rejected the identical arguments that Smith makes
       here. 7 See id. at 1316–17. We are bound by our decision in Penn,

       6 The ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” as including “an offense under

       State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to
       manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of
       the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 802)), for which a maximum term
       of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). No one disputes that cocaine is a controlled substance and
       that a violation of § 893.13(1)(a)(1) involving cocaine is punishable by up to 15
       years’ imprisonment.         See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(1)(a)(1), 893.03(2)(a)4,
       775.082(3)(d).
       7 Specifically, we rejected the argument that the sale of cocaine under Florida

       law—which includes attempted transfers—does not satisfy the requirements
USCA11 Case: 22-10028         Document: 47-1         Date Filed: 01/17/2024          Page: 7 of 7

       22-10028                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

       and it squarely forecloses Smith’s claim. 8 See Archer, 531 F.3d at
       1352.
               Accordingly, Smith’s claims are foreclosed by binding
       precedent, and, therefore, he cannot show that any error, much
       less plain error occurred. Consequently, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.

       set forth in Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), because the attempted
       transfer of a controlled substance does not “necessarily entail” the conduct of
       distributing. Penn, 63 F.4th at 1316. As in Penn, “Shular’s use of the phrase
       ‘necessarily entail[s]’ does not help [Smith]. Because ‘distributing’ means
       attempting to transfer drugs, Florida law’s proscription of attempted transfers
       is a proscription of distribution itself. There is a perfect match between what
       the state offense proscribes and what is ‘distributing.’” Id. In other words,
       “[t]he conduct that Section 893.13(1)(a) prohibits—attempting to transfer—is
       not merely related to distributing, it is ‘distributing.’ Shular’s reading of
       ‘involving’ as ‘necessarily entails’ has no bearing on this case.” Id.
                Likewise, we also rejected the argument that sale of cocaine under
       Florida law could not be a serious drug offense because it encompasses
       attempted transfers, which is an inchoate offense. See id. We reasoned that
       “Florida’s prohibition on drug sales, even if defined to include an attempted
       transfer, is not an inchoate offense. Rather, . . . attempts to transfer drugs are
       part of completed sale offenses.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
       8 After our decision in Penn, the government filed a notice of supplemental
       authority arguing that Penn squarely foreclosed Smith’s challenge to the
       qualification of his sale of cocaine conviction as an ACCA predicate. In
       response, Smith filed a notice of supplemental authority requesting that we
       hold the appeal in abeyance pending the resolution of a petition for rehearing
       en banc that had been filed in the Penn case. We deny Smith’s request to hold
       his appeal in abeyance as moot because the petition for rehearing en banc in
       Penn has since been denied.