Court Opinion

ID: 9478307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:45:33.721277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:21.399887
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s result that Abdul-Wadood was not entitled to a lay advocate at his classification hearing. However, I dissent from the majority’s determinations (1) that Abdul-Wadood raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the question of whether the restrictions placed upon him were disciplinary in nature, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of defendants; (2) that the district court improperly dismissed Abdul-Wadood’s damages claim; and (3) that the district court should reexamine its determination of whether Abdul-Wadood’s request for counsel should be granted.
In addressing the summary judgment issue, the majority appropriately realizes that, in response to the January 1983, escape attempt, “prison officials had the authority to take any necessary emergency action, ‘including temporarily restricting the rights of inmates like plaintiff who were not charged with disciplinary violations.’ ” Majority Opinion at 6-7 (footnote omitted). The conclusion that prison authorities have the right to respond decisively to this type of emergency is required under Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 602 (7th Cir.1986), in which we rejected a procedural due process attack upon a similar “lockdown” at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. We observed:
“We acknowledge that the lockdown restrictions significantly impair Caldwell’s ability to associate with other inmates, to entertain outside visits, to move about within Marion, to exercise outside his cell, and possibly, to worship. Yet, that does not end the inquiry. The determinative factor in a Due Process Clause analysis is the nature of the interest involved, not its weight. Even assuming that the lockdown restrictions caused Caldwell to suffer a substantial personal deprivation, it in no way follows that these restrictions trigger the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. This is so irrespective of whether that deprivation might be characterized as a ‘grievous loss.’ To hold otherwise *290‘would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than that of the federal courts.’ ”
(Quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)) (citations omitted).
Caldwell is grounded upon the Supreme Court’s recognition that prison confinement deprives an inmate of many of life’s amenities. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Court observed: “ ‘Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’ ” (Quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948)). Whether denominated as rights or privileges, these amenities of life may be rightfully restricted because: “Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and correctional personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized entry.” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. In Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547-48, 99 S.Ct. at 1878-79, the Court went on to explain:
“[T]he problems that arise in the day-today operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide range and deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. ‘Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of correction officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’ Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. [817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)].... [Judicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.’’
(Citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement that we accord deference to prison officials’ responses to emergency situations, we also held in Caldwell that the indefinite continuation of “lockdown” conditions does not raise procedural due process problems:
“Even assuming that the lockdown restrictions are permanent, it cannot be said that they brought about conditions of confinement that are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a convict. These conditions in no way constitute an additional punishment. Nor can it be said that they intrude upon Caldwell’s personal security in a way that would set them apart from normal confinement, unlike the action of prison officials challenged in Vitek [v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980)]. As such, the continuation of the lockdown restrictions does not implicate a protected liberty interest, and is hence not subject to judicial review under the Due Process Clause.”
Caldwell, 790 F.2d at 604-605 (footnotes and citations omitted).1
*291As the majority realizes, in a summary judgment posture, Caldwell requires that Abdul-Wadood “raise[ ] a genuine issue as to whether restrictions were placed on [him] pursuant to disciplinary action, a fact material to his claim that the defendants violated his right to due process.” Majority Opinion at 287. As the majority also states: “[t]he issue [is] whether the restrictions placed on Abdul-Wadood were for the purpose of punishing him — for being a troublemaker generally or for committing as yet unidentified bad acts — or, alternatively, served to secure the NSB Unit from further escape attempts.” Id. at 285. If the restrictions were merely part of a general prison “lockdown” such limitations cannot raise due process questions.
However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that Abdul-Wadood raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the individual “disciplinary” nature of the involved restrictions. It is well settled that:
“[W]hen confronted with a motion for summary judgment, a party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party must do more than simply ‘show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted). ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party there is no “genuine issue for trial.” ’ Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). ‘The court should neither “look the other way” to ignore genuine issues of material fact, nor “strain to find” material fact issues when there are none..., ’ Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir.1972)).”
Beard v. Whitley County, REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 409-10 (7th Cir.1988). The majority’s decision ignores the “deference [prison administrators are to be accorded] in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”2 The majority erroneously “strain[s] to find” a genuine issue of material fact in concluding that Abdul-Wadood’s proferred evidence met this standard. A rational trier of fact would not have been able to find in favor of Abdul upon the facts presented.
It is clear that the restrictions were placed on Abdul and the other inmates on January 25,1983, immediately following an escape attempt. It is also apparent from the record that these were unit-wide sanctions, which were not limited to Abdul-Wa-dood.3 The affidavits and statements Abdul presented cannot under any circumstances meet the standards required to permit a rational trier of fact to reach a conclusion that these sanctions were personalized discipline. His generalized statements in his affidavits and at the hearing that he “was reduced to disciplinary, punishment segregation,” and that he “was forced to be upon disciplinary segregation for approximately six months without having violated or being found guilty of a rule [violation]” are classic examples of conclusory “self-interested assertions” which fail to *292provide a basis for finding the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.1986). Failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact is especially clear because even certain of these “self-interested assertions” contained admissions that the challenged restrictions became effective on the very day of the escape attempt. Abdul’s reliance on the alleged statement of the officer in charge of his unit that he was subject to “discipline” is also insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in a case in which there is no showing that the officer had authority to speak for the prison on this issue and it is, at best, unclear that he understood the distinction between a “lockdown” and specific discipline of an individual prisoner. Cf. Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir.1983) (“No property interest can arise from the ... assurances since the County Board is not bound by the unofficial acts and statements of its individual members, and therefore cannot be a party to any mutually explicit understanding”). Finally, the Duckworth interrogatory answers cited by the majority fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. A fair reading of these answers indicates that Abdul-Wadood was subject to additional disciplinary time as the result of a Conduct Adjustment Board determination held pursuant to procedures consonant with due process. Because Abdul did not allege that he was deprived of procedural due process rights with respect to any disciplinary hearing actually held, no genuine issue of material fact has been raised. In sum, the entire record, including affidavits and hearing testimony, is devoid of evidence upon which a trier of fact could base a rational, well-reasoned decision that the restrictions placed on Abdul-Wadood were the results of disciplinary action lacking due process safeguards.
The majority also implies that additional discovery might have aided Abdul-Wa-dood’s ability to present a genuine issue of material fact. I disagree, as the timing of the restrictions placed on Abdul-Wadood clearly establish that these limitations were part of the prison officials’ immediate response to the other existing security problems in the population of Abdul-Wadood’s area of the NSB segregation unit resulting from the contemporaneous escape attempt. The most ably conducted additional discovery would only confirm that conclusion.
In approaching the issue of whether the district court properly dismissed Abdul-Wadood’s damages claim, it should be noted that a proper determination of the summary judgment issue would have resulted in a conclusion that this issue is moot. As I have just demonstrated, Abdul-Wadood failed to present an appropriate claim that he was deprived of due process of law as a result of defendants’ unit-wide response to the escape attempt. Because he had no legitimate claim for relief, obviously he cannot be entitled to damages.
However, even if I agreed that the majority had reasoned properly in its summary judgment determination, I would be forced to disagree with its resolution of the damages issue. The majority does not and cannot dispute the fact that damages were unavailable against the defendants in their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Instead, the majority argues that the damage claims “of a section 1983 litigant, proceeding pro se, should not be dismissed on the basis of an unclear complaint and the answer to a single, somewhat suggestive, question.” Majority Opinion at 288.
It is difficult for me to understand how the judge could have acted more carefully and appropriately in addressing this issue. The majority admits that the district court explained to plaintiff-appellant Abdul-Wa-dood on two occasions that the unavailability of damages claims against the defendants in their official capacities did not prevent claims against them in their personal or individual capacities. Majority Opinion at 287-88 n. 10. The judge stated during hearing, “there is no doubt ... [that] in [the defendant’s] official capacities money damages cannot be secured against them under the Eleventh Amendment. Absolutely clear and unequivocal. That doesn’t mean that there can’t be some damages *293secured against them in their personal capacities. That point has been very well made also.” Id. at 287 n. 10. When dismissing the damages claim the court further explained “there is absolutely no way that any damage claim can be collected against either Duckworth of [sic] Cohen [sic] in their official capacities. I underline in their official capacities. And such damage claims are now dismissed____ I am not talking about in their individual capacities.” Id. at 287 n. 10. However, the majority, over-reaching again, feels that the explanations were inadequate because the district court “did not explain to Abdul-Wadood how properly to seek damages from Duckworth and Cohn.” Id.
In the case of some pro se plaintiffs, it possibly might have been advisable for the court to explain in greater depth the distinction between personal and official capacity actions. However, such extended explanation was certainly unnecessary in this case. During the hearing the district court specifically mentioned the fact that Abdul-Wadood had previously been before the same judge in an action against one of the same defendants in the case of Love v. Duckworth, 554 F.Supp. 1067 (N.D.Ind.1983).4 In that case, decided on January 12, 1983, just seven months prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, the district court, in clear and unambiguous language, noted another closely related difficulty which would preclude recovery of damages even in an individual capacity action, a defendant’s lack of personal involvement:
“[T]he only defendant is the Superintendent, Jack R. Duckworth, against whom plaintiff seeks damages. Therefore, plaintiff must prove personal involvement, or at least a knowing disregard, on the part of the defendant concerning alleged deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. No evidence was proffered which would establish any personal involvement of Defendant Jack Duck-worth. Therefore, even were there a violation of some constitutional right, the Defendant could not be found liable. It is axiomatic that merely being in a supervisory capacity does not render one liable for every action or incident at the institution. Plaintiff has offered no proof of personal involvement, and it would be inconsistent with the personal involvement requirement to hold the Superintendent liable for any act or omission of which he could possibly have been apprised at some time.”
554 F.Supp. at 1069 (citations omitted). It is not clear that the majority has read and considered this earlier decision. Nonetheless, where a court’s previously published decision has explained to the plaintiff the impropriety of a damages claim against a defendant and where two statements are made at a hearing to exactly the same effect, a court should not be found to have acted improperly in dismissing such a claim. While pro se plaintiffs are appropriately given some indulgence in review of their complaints, see, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175-76, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980), there is no requirement that a court actually aid a plaintiff in pursuing damages claims which have been explained in a previous case and twice in the current case as lacking legal warrant.
In addition, we have held that:
“Where a complaint alleges that the conduct of a public official acting under color of state law gives rise to liability under Section 1983, we will ordinarily assume that he has been sued in his official capacity and only in that capaci-ty____ If a plaintiff intends to sue public officials in their individual capacities or in both their official and individual capacities, he should expressly state so in the complaint.”
Kolar v. County of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir.1985) (citations and footnote omitted). I know of no case mandating, even in a pro se matter, that a court is required to strain to find a basis for an individual capacity action and a defendant’s personal involvement when neither the allegations nor the facts presented on summary judgment materially support an individual capacity action and a defend*294ant’s involvement. Although a court would not be considered to act improperly if it explained that the plaintiff could amend his action to properly allege an individual capacity action and personal involvement, such action should not generally be required and certainly not in the case of this experienced pro se plaintiff who has had the distinction between individual and official capacity suits explained to him in this case and the necessity for allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement in another. To require a court to take such measures before it can dismiss an improper damages claim might very well compromise the impartiality required of a tribunal and would place an extreme burden on district court judges who already face great pressures resulting from crowded dockets.
In its discussion of Abdul-Wadood’s request for counsel, the majority appropriately holds that “we cannot say that [the district court] abused its discretion at the time it denied counsel.” Majority Opinion at 289. However, the majority somehow reasons that it is necessary for the district court on remand “ ‘to make a fresh determination’ [of] whether Abdul-Wadood is entitled to court appointed counsel.” Id. This action is wholly inappropriate. On remand the district court will consider the same factual situation with the same plaintiff and the same legal issues. As noted earlier, this case is a simple one in which either the strongest or weakest discovery will inevitably lead to the obvious conclusion that the restrictions placed on the plaintiff-appellant Abdul were the direct result of the escape attempt. Since the district court did not abuse its discretion in its initial rejection of counsel, and there are no changes in the relevant factors to be addressed on remand, it is improper and a waste of judicial resources to require the district court to make another determination of this issue.
With respect to the issue of whether Abdul-Wadood was entitled to a lay advocate in his administrative segregation hearing, I agree with the majority’s determination that a lay advocate was not constitutionally required. However, I find its discussion of this issue gratuitous and, in effect, an attempt to alter prison regulations by judicial mandate. The majority correctly notes that “we need not decide [the issue of whether Indiana statutes and regulations have created a protected liberty interest in remaining free from the restrictions of administrative segregation], for, even if triggered, the procedural guarantees of the due process clause, as interpreted in Helms, do not entitle [Abdul-Wadood] to a lay advocate at his classification hearing.” Majority Opinion at 284. However, prior to making this holding the majority indulges in a far-reaching and completely unnecessary discussion of whether the Indiana statutes and regulations, in fact, provide such an interest. Id. at 283 n. 3. Essentially the discussion appears designed to cast some doubt on the validity of a prior district court decision that such an interest is not created by these statutes and regulations. In Shropshire v. Duckworth, 654 F.Supp. 369, 375 (N.D.Ind.1987), the same district court judge involved in this case held that the Indiana “procedures and policies controlling administrative segregation do not create a liberty interest and do not contain the heavy mandatory language which existed in the Pennsylvania statutes which were reviewed in Hewitt [v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ].” (Emphasis in original). I would remind the majority that:
“[W]e have recognized that district court decisions construing the law of the state in which it sits are entitled to some deference. We give weight to these decisions because we presume that a district judge is likely to have a special familiarity with the law of the state in which he or she sits.”
Beard v. J.I. Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097 (7th Cir.1987) (citations and footnote omitted). Certainly this principle, along with the deference we accord to the decisions of prison administrators, requires us as appellate court judges to abstain from commentary which might be seen as casting doubt on the validity of a district court determination of an important state law issue not properly presented for our review.
*295The majority’s wide-ranging attempt to second-guess actions of Indiana prison administrators is a classic example of why the United States Supreme Court was compelled to warn its subordinate members in the Judicial Branch that
“judicial deference is accorded [decisions of prison administrators] not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.”
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 548, 99 S.Ct. at 1879. The majority ignores this directive, and I must dissent.

. It should be briefly noted that Indiana state law provides:
"Any of the rights or procedures enumerated in this chapter [pertaining to the discipline of prisoners] may be suspended upon declaration by the official in charge of the facility or program that there exists an emergency situation threatening the general security of the facility or program. The rights or procedures again apply upon declaration by the official in charge of the facility or program that the emergency has been resolved.”
Ind.Code Ann. § 11-11-5-8.
Indiana state law further provides that even in cases involving personalized discipline, "[a] person charged with misconduct may be confined or separated from the general population of the facility or program for a reasonable peri*291od of time if his continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to himself, others, property, or the security of the facility or program.” Ind.Code Ann. § 11-11-5-6. This temporary segregation is subject to periodic review before the final disciplinary determination.

. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878.

. A series of documents introduced by defendants clearly demonstrate that the various sanctions were applicable to all prisoners, including Abdual-Wadood, on the South side of the New Service Building Segregation Unit.

. Transcript at 24-26. Abdul-Wadood is also known as Lincoln Love.