Court Opinion

ID: 9845287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:18:28.363088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:59.863696
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge.
As an inmate at the Dodge Correctional Institute in Chester, Georgia, Frank Whitehead commenced this action in the Dodge County Superior Court against Bobby Lavoie as warden of the facility, seeking injunctive relief from allegedly inadequate and unsanitary preparation of prison food. Before the matter was called for hearing on January 29, 1985, Whitehead was transferred to the Lowndes Correctional Institute in Valdosta, Georgia. Whitehead failed to appear at the hearing, presumably because of his incarceration, and the trial court, noting Whitehead’s failure to appear and the fact that he sought only injunctive relief at an institution in which he no longer was an inmate, dismissed the action as moot. The trial court also assessed court costs of $59 against Whitehead, and instructed the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to seize his inmate account for payment of these costs. Whitehead appeals from that dismissal and assessment of costs. Held:
The trial court properly dismissed the action as to the appellant on grounds of mootness, since the appellant no longer was an inmate at the facility against which he sought injunctive relief. This court also will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of costs against the appellant. Whitehead was liable for costs under OCGA § 9-15-1, and he filed no affidavit of indigency with the trial court to relieve himself of that liability under OCGA § 9-15-2 (a). Newsome v. Graham, 254 Ga. 711 (334 SE2d 183) (1985); see also D’Zesati v. Poole, 174 Ga. App. 142 (329 SE2d 280) (1985); Portis v. Evans, 249 Ga. 396 (291 SE2d 511) (1982).
The dissent argues that the superior court could not assess costs against the plaintiff-appellant, simply because the clerk of the superior court actually filed the complaint without requiring payment of a deposit of costs due under OCGA § 15-6-77 (b) (1). In effect, the dissent proposes to create a rule of waiver of costs where the clerk fails to insist upon payment of the deposit before filing the complaint. OCGA § 9-15-4 (a) authorizes a clerk of the superior court to refuse to file a complaint until such a deposit is paid, but it certainly contains no implicit, corollary authorization for the clerk to waive the county’s right to such funds.
As indicated above, if a litigant is unable to pay any deposit or other court costs, under OCGA § 9-15-2, he has only to file a valid affidavit of indigency to be relieved from that expense (unless that *667claim of indigency is successfully contested by the other party). Where a party fails to observe that simple procedure, it is neither heinous nor erroneous to assess costs against that party where otherwise appropriate, and this rule applies even though the party is incarcerated in our state penal system and the clerk of court has failed to require prior payment of the deposit. “It is sound public policy that no one be denied the remedies of the court by reason of poverty. It is equally sound that the unsuccessful litigant — and not the general public — bear the cost of private litigation, when the trial judge shall so determine.” Newsome v. Graham, supra at 712.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Pope and Benham, JJ., concur.

McMurray, P. J., concurs in the judgment only.

Beasley, J., concurs specially in part and also dissents in part.