Court Opinion

ID: 9750093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:18:22.466478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.576640
License: Public Domain

ALOK AHUJA, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s finding that the State breached its contracts with Asamoah-Boa-du by terminating those contracts based on his purported violation of federal law. I also concur in the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s damages award, based on its conclusion that Buckley v. Coe, 385 S.W.2d 354, 358-59 (Mo.App.1964), and Machine Maintenance & Equipment Co. v. Cooper Industries, 634 F.Supp. 367, 371 (E.D.Mo.1986), limit Asamoah-Boadu’s recoverable damages to those which accrued during the 30-day notice period contained in the contracts’ termination-for-convenience provision. I write separately, however, because I believe the damages issue presents a close question, and one on which — but for the prior decisions in Buck*798ley and Machine Maintenance — Asam-oah-Boadu might well be entitled to prevail.
The State did not invoke the termination-for-convenience provision when it terminated Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts on March 6, 2007. Instead, it relied solely on Asamoah-Boadu’s purported violation of federal immigration law. After a trial, the circuit court found that Asamoah-Boadu had not in fact violated federal law, and that the termination of Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts was therefore unlawful. The circuit court also found, as a fact, that the State had not relied on the termination-for-convenience provision, and that no evidence was presented that the State would have terminated Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts under the termination-for-convenience provision:
Defendants did not terminate Plaintiffs contracts based upon any 30-day provision. Defendants produced no evidence indicating that they would have terminated Plaintiff’s contracts for any reason other than the charge that he violated Federal employment law.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority of cases involving this situation — a defective for-cause termination6 —appear to reach the same result we do here, and hold that the terminated party’s damages are limited to the notice period contained in the termination-without-cause provision. See cases cited in the majority opinion at note 4. There are cases reaching contrary outcomes, however. Thus, in Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, 42 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.1930), the court refused to permit an automobile manufacturer, which had improperly terminated a dealership for cause, to limit its damage exposure based on the 60-day notice period applicable to terminations without cause:
When a party to a contract elects to cancel it under one or more alternative provisions conferring such a privilege, he should assign his cause and abide by it. He cannot assign one cause and cancel it, then, after being sued for wrongful cancellation, come into court and say he erred in respect of the cause assigned, but another cause does exist, and he is not liable.
Id. at 445. And in Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F.Supp. 998 (D.Del.1985), the court held that whether a defective termination for cause should be treated as a termination without cause was a factual question not amenable to resolution as a matter of law. Id. at 1009.
In the absence of Buckley and Machine Maintenance, I believe a strong argument could be made for deferring to the trial court’s factual findings that the State did not invoke, and would not have invoked, the termination-for-convenience provision. In seeking to limit Asamoah-Boadu’s damages to the 30-day notice period, the State makes what seems to be, at bottom, a factual argument: that it would have ter*799minated Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts for convenience, even in the absence of any violation of federal law. After a trial, the circuit court found no evidence that this would, in fact, have occurred (I presume the burden of proof on this issue would properly fall on the defendant). I have difficulty understanding why, in the face of such a factual finding, we must irrebvM-ably presume that the State would have terminated Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts for convenience — even if Asamoah-Boadu was in full compliance with the contracts’ material terms — merely because it attempted to terminate the contracts based on the erroneous belief that cause existed.7
The State could have included language in the contracts “converting” a defective for-cause termination into a termination for convenience. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires the inclusion in certain government contracts of a specific provision stating that “[i]f it is determined that the Government improperly terminated this contract for default, such termination shall be deemed a termination for convenience.” See 48 C.F.R. 52.212-4(m) (2010). Similar provisions have apparently been included in federal government contracts for some time. See, e.g., United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 316 ¶ 5 (2d Cir.1955). I am troubled that, even though the State failed to include such language in Asamoah-Boadu’s contracts, and address the issue explicitly, we now give it the benefit of that omitted provision by limiting Asamoah-Boadu’s damages to those which would be available under the termination-for-convenienee provision.
Despite these reservations, Missouri caselaw appears to follow the majority approach on this issue, and I accordingly concur in the majority opinion, including its reversal of the damages award.

. I believe the present case — which involves a wrongful exercise of for-cause termination authority — must be distinguished from cases in which the terminating party terminates a contract without cause, but fails to give the terminated party the benefits (such as notice, or severance payments) which the contract requires in the event of such a without-cause termination. See, e.g., Smalley Transp. Co. v. Bay Dray, Inc., 612 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Ala.1992); Royal’s Reconditioning Corp. v. Royal, 293 Ill.App.3d 1019, 228 Ill.Dec. 365, 689 N.E.2d 237, 240-41 (1997) (collecting cases). In those cases, the termination was not itself wrongful; the terminating party simply failed to give the other contracting party what was bargained for in the event of such a termination. Those cases do not involve the more difficult question presented here: whether a defective for-cause termination, invoking one provision of a contract, should be treated as if it were a without-cause termination under a separate contractual provision.

. Framing the issue in terms of the parties’ reasonable expectations as of the time of contracting does not necessarily remove this difficulty. It is not self-evident that at the time of contracting the parties reasonably expected that an unfounded for-cause termination would be read to include an invocation (in the alternative) of the termination-for-convenience provision, particularly when language could have been included in the agreement, or in the notice of termination, to make that result explicit.