Court Opinion

ID: 9474044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:46:20.872382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:52.354519
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in which VANCE, Circuit Judge joins:
On May 25, 1982, Leonhardt’s attorneys sought and obtained a writ of attachment against bunkers and stores owned by Bot-tacchi, which property was aboard a ship. In seeking to attach Bottacchi’s property, Leonhardt’s attorneys followed the maritime attachment procedures specified in Rule B(l) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the present case, Bottacchi challenged the constitutionality of Rule B(l). The majority holds that, although Leonhardt sought a writ of attachment pursuant to Rule B(l), the attachment procedures followed by the district court in issuing the writ were derived from the court’s inherent admiralty powers, independent from the statutory powers granted by Rule B(l). Consequently, the majority does not reach the question of the constitutionality of Rule B(l). Because I conclude that the district court’s power to issue the writ derived exclusively from Rule B(l), and that Rule B(l) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, I dissent.
I. Rule B(l) Provided Exclusive Authority For The Writ.
In 1966, the Supreme Court promulgated a set of amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, which amendments unified civil and admiralty procedures. The Supreme Court’s promulgating order of February 28, 1966, explicitly rescinded the Admiralty Rules of 1920 that had been in effect, and stated that the 1966 amendments “shall govern all proceedings in actions brought thereafter....” 383 U.S. 1031-32.
Rule B(l), governing maritime attachment and garnishment procedures, was included among the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims that were part of the 1966 amendments. Rule A of the Supplemental Rules stated *1540that the Supplemental Rules were to apply to the procedure followed in admiralty and maritime claims with respect to four specific types of remedies: (1) maritime attachment and garnishment; (2) actions in rem; (3) possessory, petitory, and partition actions; and (4) actions for exoneration from or limitation of liability.
In explaining the scope of the Supplemental Rules, the advisory committee indicated that the Rules were not intended to limit or impair the traditional power of a district court, acting consistently with the Supplemental Rules, “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Supplemental Rule A advisory committee note. The majority interprets the advisory committee note to support the view that the maritime rules “were not intended to be the exclusive source of maritime procedure available to the courts.” Supra at 1533. It is apparent that the advisory committee sought to instruct district court judges that the Supplemental Rules did not prevent them from devising appropriate procedures to cover situations other than the four covered by the Supplemental Rules. However, the advisory committee note does not mean that, with respect to actions that are covered by the Supplemental Rules, district courts are free either to follow or to disregard the Rules, depending upon what the situation requires.
The majority’s argument trivializes Rule B(l) into a guideline that may or may not be followed, depending on whether the district court chooses to resort to its statutory authority or to its “inherent power to apply traditional maritime law.” Supra at 1533. Contrary to the majority’s view, Rule B(l) is now the exclusive source of authority for a district court to issue a maritime writ of attachment. Since the present case involved a maritime writ of attachment issued pursuant to Rule B(l), the majority erroneously avoids addressing appellee’s challenge to the constitutionality of that rule.
II. Rule B(l) Violates Due Process.
The defendants in the present case argue that Rule B(l) fails to provide adequate due process protections in the context of a prejudgment deprivation of property. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975). A pre-seizure hearing may be foregone under certain circumstances of an emergency nature, but only where other protections adequately safeguard the interests of the defendant. These protections include the requirements that: (1) the plaintiff make a specific, detailed factual showing of its need for the attachment, see Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 615-16, 94 S.Ct. at 1904-05; North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 607, 95 S.Ct. at 722; (2) a judge, who has discretion to deny the issuance of the appropriate writ, approve the seizure, Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 533-34 (5th Cir.1978); and (3) the defendant be afforded an immediate post-seizure hearing at which time the plaintiff must prove entitlement to the writ of attachment. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 618, 94 S.Ct. at 1905; North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 607, 95 S.Ct. at 722.
Rule B(l) provides that in maritime in personam actions the plaintiff may obtain a prejudgment attachment of a defendant’s goods or chattels, usually a vessel and its contents, if the defendant is not found within the district. The. rule requires that the plaintiff submit a verified complaint asking for the writ of attachment. The complaint must be accompanied by an affidavit that states, on information and belief, that the defendant cannot be found within the district. The affidavit must be signed by either the plaintiff or his attorney. Upon the receipt of the verified complaint and accompanying affidavit, the clerk of the court is required to issue the writ of attachment.
Rule B(l) authorizes the attachment of property without a prior hearing, and without any of the protections that are constitutionally required to protect the interests of *1541the defendant. The creditor is not required to make a specific, detailed showing of the efforts made to ascertain whether or not the defendant can be found within the district. Rather, the creditor need only allege the conclusion that, on information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within the district. The judge has no discretion to deny the writ of attachment if he is not satisfied that the writ should be granted. Indeed, a judge has no part in the process at all; it is a court clerk who must grant the writ of attachment when the appropriate complaint and affidavit is presented. Finally, although in the present case Bot-tacchi was afforded a hearing one day after its property was attached, a prompt postattachment hearing is not required by Rule B(l). In short, Rule B(l) has virtually the same deficiencies as the statute held unconstitutional in North Georgia Finishing. See 419 U.S. at 607, 95 S.Ct. at 722.
In arguing that additional procedural protections were not required in the present case, the majority emphasizes the unique context of admiralty law, in which a defendant can easily remove his property from the jurisdiction of the court on short notice. In essence, the majority argues that, because additional procedural protections will not necessarily prevent wrongful attachments and may provide the defendant with the short time needed to remove his property, such protections are not required by due process. Most significantly, the majority claims that, because of the difficulty in determining whether an attachment is appropriate, a preattachment ex parte hearing and judicial issuance of the writ of attachment would prove ineffective in discerning wrongful attachments and therefore can be foregone. Supra at 1538-1539.
The fact that it may be difficult to discern accurately when a writ of attachment should issue does not justify the failure to require any preattachment effort to determine the appropriateness of the writ. On the contrary, this difficulty justifies heightened procedural protections for maritime property owners. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 617-18, 94 S.Ct. at 1905-06. A preattachment ex parte hearing before a judge, at which time the plaintiff would be required to provide a specific, detailed basis on which the judge could determine the appropriateness of the writ, would afford some protection from the erroneous attachment of maritime property. A judge’s review of the plaintiff’s submissions might indicate not only that the defendant might be found within the district or that the defendant does not own the property sought to be attached, but also that there is no danger that the defendant will remove his property from the jurisdiction. In that case, where no emergency exists, there would be no reason to dispense with the full due process protection of prior notice and a hearing.
Although plaintiffs might have a heightened interest in expedited procedures in the context of maritime commerce, property owners do not have lessened property interests just because their property is connected with a ship. Maritime property owners, like other property owners, have a constitutionally protected interest in not having their property wrongfully attached. Rule B(l) does not provide adequate protections from the wrongful attachment of maritime property. Accordingly, I would hold that Rule B(l) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.