Court Opinion

ID: 9380156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 15:05:46.999483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.005911
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-502

              ADOPTION OF SOLEDAD (and a companion case1).

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        On appeal from decrees entered in the Juvenile Court, the

 mother and the father challenge the trial judge's denial of

 their joint motion to withdraw their stipulations to their

 unfitness and consents to the entry of decrees terminating their

 parental rights.      They contend that the time of over fifteen

 months period between their stipulations and the hearing on the

 guardianship petition made their stipulations stale, and thus

 they were entitled to a full trial on the merits of their

 fitness.    The father also argues that the judge improperly found

 him unfit at a hearing in which he was not present.              We affirm.

        Background.    We recount the relevant, mostly undisputed

 facts, reserving certain details for later discussion.               In June

 2018, the Department of Children and Families (department) filed

 a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, alleging that Soledad

 1   Adoption of Hugo.    The children's names are pseudonyms.
and Hugo were in need of care and protection and should be

temporarily removed from the custody of the mother and the

father.   The department was awarded emergency temporary custody

of the children on the day the petition was filed.    Temporary

custody of the children was then granted to the step-grandmother

of the children’s half-sister (foster mother) in August, 2018.

     A termination of parental rights trial was scheduled on

March 12, 2020.   Both the mother and father were present and

represented by counsel.    At that time, the mother and the father

entered into agreements for judgment stipulating to their

unfitness and consenting to the entry of decrees terminating

their parental rights.    The judge conducted a colloquy with each

parent and found that they both knowingly and voluntarily waived

their rights.   Pursuant to Adoption of Malik, 84 Mass. App. Ct.

436 (2013), the judge deferred issuing the termination decrees

in order to allow the mother and the father to participate in a

hearing on the competing guardianship plans for the children.2

The hearing was scheduled to take place two weeks later.

     The next day, on March 13, 2020, a state of emergency was

declared because of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic; after

that, the guardianship hearing was rescheduled multiple times.

During those months, the court held several scheduling

2 Both the foster mother and another individual (who was favored
by the parents) had filed a petitions for guardianship.

                                  2
conferences.   The hearing eventually took place on May 10, 2021.

In the interim, on February 26, 2021, during a hearing, the

judge adjudicated the parents unfit, found Soledad and Hugo to

be in need of care and protection, and awarded permanent custody

of the children to the department.    On April 8, 2021, the mother

and the father filed a joint motion requesting a "full best

interest trial in lieu of trial on competing plans only."    In

essence, the motion sought to withdraw their stipulations as to

unfitness and their agreements to terminate their parental

rights.3   After hearing arguments from the parties, the judge

denied the mother and the father’s motion and held hearings

regarding the competing guardianship plans.4   On June 4, 2021,

the judge issued findings, adjudication, commitment orders, and

orders to issue decrees that approved the plan submitted by the

department for permanent guardianship with the foster mother.

He also declined to order posttermination visitation between the

children and the mother and father.   The judge then issued 339

findings of fact and forty-six conclusions of law on April 29,

2022.   The mother and the father appealed.

     Discussion.   "Motions for relief from judgment are

addressed to the discretion of the judge, . . . and the court's

3 The parties agreed that the joint motion was essentially a
motion to vacate.
4 After the testimony concluded, one of the potential guardians

withdraw her petition.

                                 3
action will not be reversed on appeal save for abuse"

(quotations and citation omitted).     Adoption of Reid, 39 Mass.

App. Ct. 338, 341 (1995).     A parent may stipulate to both

unfitness and the entry of a judicial decree of termination

pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.    See Adoption of Malik, 84 Mass.

App. Ct. at 438.   Before accepting stipulations terminating

parental rights, the judge must "make an appropriate inquiry to

establish that the parent’s consent was knowing and voluntary."

Adoption of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 435 (2001).     There is

no dispute that the judge did so here.     However, the mother and

the father contend that their stipulations became ineffective

because the amount of time that had elapsed between their

stipulations and the "best interests" hearing caused the

stipulations to be "stale."

    The mother and the father fail to account for the fact that

the stipulations and agreements that they entered expressly

waived their rights to a trial and their rights to appeal the

decree of unfitness.   The agreements stated:

         "[Parent] expressly and voluntarily waives [parent's]
    right to a trial on the merits of the Department's pending
    care and protection petition and petition to terminate
    parental rights, and expressly and voluntarily waives
    [parent's] right to appeal the final judgment or decree
    entered pursuant to this Agreement for Judgment."

    The mother and the father point to no legal authority

giving them the right to rescind the agreements solely because

                                  4
of the length of time between the acceptance and the entry of

the resulting orders.5    The mother and the father do not dispute

that their stipulations were knowing and voluntary at the time

they were made.     The judge conducted a thorough inquiry of both

parents.     He inquired as to whether the parents had an

opportunity to consult with their attorneys, ensured that both

understood the significant rights they were giving up, and

confirmed that neither had been coerced or threatened into

giving up their rights.    The colloquies were sufficient to

establish that the waivers of each parent were knowing and

voluntary.    See Adoption of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 435-436.

Thus, where the waivers were knowing and voluntary, the decrees

terminating parental rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3, were

properly issued.6    The judge did not abuse his discretion in

5 The mother argues that because of the elapsed time it is in the
interests of justice to allow the mother and father to withdraw
the stipulations. See Adoption of Cesar, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 708,
715 (2016). In the circumstances of this case, we do not agree.
6 The father's argument that G. L. c. 210, § 2, was not followed

is inapposite. Where a proceeding takes place pursuant to G. L.
c. 210, § 3, the requirements of G. L. c. 210, § 2, need not be
observed. See Adoption of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 433-434.

                                   5
denying the parents' motion seeking to withdraw their

stipulations and agreements because too much time had elapsed.7,8

                                    Decrees affirmed.

                                    By the Court (Massing,
                                      Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.9),

                                    Clerk

Entered:   March 17, 2023.

7 Any argument that the facts the judge relied on to terminate
parental rights were insufficient was waived when the mother and
the father stipulated to their unfitness. See Adoption of
Douglas, 473 Mass. 1024, 1029 (2016)("Where orders involving
termination, placement, and visitation are issued as part of the
same adjudication of a termination proceeding, a parent has
standing to press an appeal any challenge that he or she has not
expressly waived to that adjudication" [emphasis added]).
8 The father's claim that the judge improperly found him unfit

outside his presence is waived because the father stipulated to
his unfitness. Additionally, we are aware of no requirement
that a judge make a finding of unfitness in the presence of
anyone.
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                6