Court Opinion

ID: 9772597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:32.516101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.118656
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion sanctions both juror and prosecutorial misconduct by condoning the secreting of information necessary to a defendant’s right to a fair trial, I dissent.
I.
The pertinent facts are as follows. During voir dire, the trial judge propounded the following question to the venire:
Now, are there any of you who have any — well, I will say are so well acquainted with Mr. Wells [The County Attorney] — I know that most of you know him, he hopes that all of you know him — or with Mr. Ashmore in his office, or Mr. Chuck Super-vine, that’s another assistant, or Mr. Scott McDowell? They are the prosecution staff. Are there any of you who are so weU connected with them or acquainted or associated with them that it might affect your verdict? I take it there are none.
When no one responded, the trial judge continued: “Are there any of you who have any special connection with the prosecutor’s office, perhaps a close friend in the office, secretary, investigator or the like?” Again, no one on the venire responded.
Later, at the conclusion of the State’s voir dire, the County Attorney asked the following question:
Sometimes we fail to ask a question that touches on your qualifications. My question to you at this time is there anything that any of you can think of that touches on your qualifications not in just any case but in this specific case that you think needs to be pointed out to me and Mr. Jackson and the court at this time? ... If so, would you raise your hand at this time and let’s talk about it?
Although a number of veniremembers responded to this question, venirewoman Thornburrow did not. Relying on the candor of the veniremembers with the trial judge and the County Attorney, appellant did not again ask whether any veniremembers had relationships with the County Attorney or any members of his office. Thornburrow was ultimately seated on the jury and served as forewoman. The jury found appellant guilty of murder, Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1), and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.32.
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial alleging prosecutorial and juror misconduct as a result of the County Attorney’s and Thornburrow’s failure to divulge during voir dire that the County Attorney was a longtime friend of Thornburrow and her husband. Appellant submitted evidence showing the County Attorney had served as “best man” in Thornburrow’s wedding and that Thornbur-row’s husband had served as “best man” in the County Attorney’s wedding. In an amended motion for new trial, appellant submitted further evidence showing Thornbur-row’s husband had been the County Attorney’s campaign treasurer and was currently serving as treasurer in the County Attorney’s re-election campaign.
*367In a hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, Thornburrow testified she and her husband had been friends with the County Attorney for more than twenty-five years. The County Attorney had served as “best man” in her wedding and her husband had served as “best man” in the County Attorney’s wedding. She further stated that her husband served as the County Attorney’s campaign treasurer in his first election campaign and was currently serving in that capacity in his re-election campaign. Thornburrow acknowledged that the County Attorney had a “close relationship” with her husband. When questioned about why she had not responded to the trial judge’s question she explained that she felt her relationship with the County Attorney would not affect her ability to be impartial. She further explained that she believed the trial judge’s second question did not pertain to the County Attorney, but only to the auxiliary staff. Although she acknowledged her relationship with the County Attorney was important information, she did not disclose that relationship because appellant’s attorney did not ask the venire whether anyone specifically knew the County Attorney. With regard to the County Attorney’s question, Thornburrow explained that she did not respond because she felt she had already answered the question by declining to respond to the trial judge’s questions.
The County Attorney testified that he knew his relationship with Thornburrow was the type of information considered in deciding to exercise a peremptory challenge.1 The County Attorney declined to inform appellant of his relationship with Thornburrow because he did not believe the relationship *368would influence her deliberations in the instant case.
The trial judge denied appellant’s motion for new trial.
II.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a trial before “an impartial jury.” U.S. Const., amend VI. A defendant’s right to a trial before an impartial jury is ingrained within our fundamental precepts of justice. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). See also, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”). The voir dire process is designed to effectuate a defendant’s right to a fair trial by insuring to the fullest extent possible, that the jury will be intelligent and impartial. See, Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); and, De La Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). An impartial jury favors neither the State nor the defendant; it is disinterested, equitable and able to follow the principles of the law. Shaver v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 15, 280 S.W.2d 740, 742 (App.1955). Further, because the jury deliberates as a unit, the biases of even one of its members is sufficient to destroy its impartiality. Salazar, 562 S.W.2d at 482; Shaver v. State, 280 S.W.2d at 742; and, Norwood v. State, 123 Tex.Crim. 134, 58 S.W.2d 100, 101 (App. 1933). See also, Petteway v. State, 758 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988). Accordingly, the parties may question the venire during voir dire for possible bias. See, Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.16(a)(9).
A. Material Omission
A defendant is entitled to a reversal because a juror has withheld information if two criteria are met: (1) the omission is material and, (2) the defendant has exercised due diligence in eliciting that information. See, Jones v. State, 596 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex.Cr. App.1980). Under these circumstances, a reversal is merited because withholding material information denies the defendant the opportunity to knowingly and intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges, hence jeopardizing his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Salazar, 562 S.W.2d at 482. See also, Petteway, 758 S.W.2d at 865; and, Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 1985). Material information includes information regarding a juror’s relationship with any party in a criminal proceeding, Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), including law enforcement authorities. Bolt v. State, 112 Tex.Crim. 267, 16 S.W.2d 235 (1929).
In Bolt, a bootlegging prosecution, a juror was asked during voir dire whether he had ever been involved in any manner in a prosecution for a violation of the state liquor laws. Id., 16 S.W.2d at 235. Although the juror answered negatively, it was discovered after trial that the juror had previously assisted police “in raiding some parties who had been engaged in violating the liquor laws. One of the parties arrested had been placed in the custody of this juror, where he remained until he made bond.” Id. We reversed the conviction, holding the juror’s failure to disclose upon questioning that he had assisted the police in liquor raids was a material omission and deprived the defendant of the right make an effective peremptory challenge. Id.
B. Due Diligence
In addition to showing the information withheld was material, a defendant must show he exercised due diligence to solicit the information. Jones, 596 S.W.2d at 137. ‘When a partial, biased or prejudiced juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, who has acted in good faith upon the answers given to him on voir dire unaware that they are inaccurate, [or incomplete] good ground exists for a new trial.” Von January, 576 S.W.2d at 45. See also, Norwood, 58 S.W.2d at 101. Although a defendant has the obligation to ask questions designed to bring out biases in the venire, Jones, 596 S.W.2d at 137, the majority nevertheless concedes that a defendant is entitled to rely upon a veniremember’s response to questions by the trial judge and prosecution. Majority op. 897 S.W.2d at 364. See also, Herrera v. State, 665 S.W.2d 497, *369502 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1983, PDR refd); and, Ruiz v. State, 747 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1988, PDR refd). A defendant must demonstrate Ms actions were in good faith and that he was unaware that a juror’s responses were inaccurate or incomplete. Von January, 576 S.W.2d at 45; and, Petteway, 758 S.W.2d at 865. Consequently, when withheld information is material and does not result from a defendant’s lack of due diligence in eliciting that information, a trial judge errs in failing to grant a new trial.
C. The Instant Case
The majority does not dispute the information Thornburrow withheld concerning her relationsMp with the County Attorney was material, and so the only contention is whether appellant exercised due diligence in eliciting this information.
Appellant’s reliance upon the responses by the venire to the questions propounded by the trial judge and the County Attorney was reasonable in light of the questions. “The purpose of the voir dire examination is to expose any bias or interest of the prospective jurors wMch might prevent full consideration of the evidence presented at trial. The term ‘voir dire’ literally means ‘to speak the truth.’ ” Price v. State, 626 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1981) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Ed.1979). The venire is bound by oath to truthfully respond the questions asked by the trial judge and the parties. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.02. In Jones, we explained:

The voir dire examination is not an exercise to test the ability of defense counsel to joust with a prospective juror in an attempt to see what quantum ofinformation he may or may not be withholding.

2

Id., 596 S.W.2d at 137.
Because a defendant is entitled to rely upon the candor of a veniremember’s response to questions by the trial judge and prosecution, it is not reasonable to require a defendant to delve into areas where a venire-member has given a response wMch is neither suspicious nor questionable. To be certain, “[i]t is not lack of due diligence for an accused to believe what a prospective juror states. To require an accused to assume a prospective juror is untruthful and irritate the juror with accusing questions, would most certainly result in a prejudiced juror.” Ruiz, 747 S.W.2d at 537. Consequently, a defendant should not be faulted for presuming candor on the part of the venire. See, Jones, 596 S.W.2d at 137.
The majority nevertheless maintains appellant could not rely upon the questions by the trial judge and the County Attorney because “... neither the court nor the prosecutor asked the jury panel the necessary question — did anyone know Wells.”3 Majority op., 897 S.W.2d at 364, n. 1. However, the import of the trial judge’s question is plainly evident:
*370Now, are there any of you who have any — well, I will say are so well acquainted with Mr. Wells — I know that, most of you know him, he hopes that all of you know him — or with Mr. Ashmore in his office, or Mr. Chuck Superville, that’s another assistant, or Mr. Scott McDowell? They are the prosecution staff. Are there any of you who are so well connected with them or acquainted or associated with them that it might affect your verdict? I take it there are none.
Are there any of you who have any special connection with the prosecutor’s office, perhaps a close friend in the office, secretary, investigator or the like?
Clearly, the trial judge’s question was meant to determine if any of the veniremembers personally knew anyone in the County Attorney’s office, including the County Attorney. The County Attorney subsequently asked a follow up question inviting the jury to reveal any information which needed “to be pointed out.” Thornburrow failed to respond to any of these questions.
It is apparent from Thornburrow’s testimony during the motion for new trial hearing that she understood her relationship with the County Attorney to be important but did not disclose the relationship because no one asked her specifically whether she knew the County Attorney.
The Court of Appeals held the trial judge’s question was open to a subjective interpretation and, therefore, Thornburrow did not withhold material information because she did not believe her relationship with the County Attorney would affect her ability to be impartial. Armstrong v. State, 850 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1993). The majority finds no fault with this analysis. See, Majority op., 897 S.W.2d at 364-65.
The conclusion, however, that a Court may review a question during voir dire from the veniremember’s subjective viewpoint runs directly counter to this Court’s opinion in Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43. In Von January, it was learned following trial that a juror withheld information of his long-standing relationship with the deceased’s family despite questions to the venire concerning such relationships. The juror was a regular customer at a restaurant owned by the deceased’s family, and would frequently associate with the deceased’s father and grandfather when he patronized the establishment. Id., at 44. In a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the juror explained that
... although he knew and recognized the [deceased’s family] he did not answer defense counsel’s question because he did not have any close personal dealings with the family. He believed that it was only this personal type of relationship that counsel was interested in when he propounded the question.
Id., at 45. Nonetheless, we explicitly rejected the juror’s subjective interpretation of the meaning of counsel’s question:
It was not [the juror’s] function to second-guess defense counsel. It was for defense counsel, and not the prospective juror, to decide whether the jurors relationship to the [complainant] made him unacceptable and subject to a peremptory challenge.
Id., at 45.
Although Von January clearly controls the present ground for review, the majority attempts to distinguish that case on the ground that the defense attorney in Von January asked the venire a direct question while the trial judge in the instant case asked a more general one. Majority op., 897 S.W.2d at 364 n. 2. In the case before us, the trial judge and the County Attorney each propounded questions clearly designed to discover whether any veniremembers had friendships with members of the County Attorney’s office. Although the majority contends the trial judge asked the venire only whether they knew any of the prosecutors so well that it might affect their verdict, ibid, the record is patently clear that the trial judge asked a second question regarding whether anyone had “any special connection with the prosecutor’s office.... ” Thornburrow was a friend of the County Attorney. She did not possess the discretion to subjectively determine whether the questions posed to the venire “rang the bell” and required her to disclose that friendship. “Rather, juror [Thornbur-row] consciously censored the information ... [and] ... believed that it was [her] place, *371and not the place of the court or defense counsel, to detemune whether [her] relations were a bar to jury service in this case.” United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir.1988). Insofar as the majority passively accepts the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Thornburrow had such discretion, the majority seriously errs. See, Von January, 576 S.W.2d at 45.
In light of the foregoing, the majority’s conclusion that appellant did not exercise due diligence in detecting Thornburrow’s relationship with the County Attorney is erroneous. Despite questioning from both the trial judge and the County Attorney, Thornbur-row withheld information of the relationship. Because appellant was entitled to rely on Thornburrow’s silence, he had no reason to pursue that ground of inquiry. Consequently, the majority errs in holding his reliance on Thornburrow’s silence constitutes a lack of diligence.
III.
The majority further holds a prosecuting attorney has no affirmative duty to disclose his relationship with a veniremember because neither Rule 3.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, nor Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 2.01, explicitly lists such an obligation.4 Majority op., 897 S.W.2d at 365. Nevertheless, I believe the majority’s narrow obeisance to the Disciplinary Rules entirely misses one Constitutional principle from which those rules were promulgated, namely, the obligation to disclose information which is material to a defendant’s trial. See, Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
A. Disclosure as Substantive Fairness
The State’s withholding information which is favorable to the defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it conceals information which is necessary to effectively mount a defense against the charges brought against him. See, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194,1196-1197,10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 106-107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See also, Ex parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993); Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 404; and, Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tex.Cr. App.1989). This principle is rooted in the concept of fairness: “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197. Accordingly, the State is prohibited from relying upon unfair methods, such as the suppression of material information, in order to obtain a conviction. See, Id., 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1197, and, Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 404. Further, a prosecutor is required to disclose information within his knowledge, but unknown to the defendant, independent from any request to do so. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, *372682, 105 S.Ct. 3875, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); and, Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 407.
B. Affirmative Duty to Disclose Relationship
At least three appellate courts have recognized that an attorney has an affirmative duty to reveal a relationship between himself, or a member of his staff, and a prospective juror. See, Implement Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Castleberry, 368 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App. — Beaumont 1963); Marshall Durbin, Inc. v. Tew, 381 So.2d 152 (Miss.1980), and, Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1 (Del.Supr.1977). In Castleberry, a juror who had been represented by the plaintiffs attorney did not respond to the defendant’s question whether any veniremembers had ever been represented by the plaintiffs attorney. Id., 368 S.W.2d at 254. Upon completion of voir dire, as the parties reviewed their lists of jurors, the plaintiffs attorney discovered he had previously represented the juror. Id. He disclosed this relationship to the defendant, who had already submitted his list of challenges to the district clerk, and offered to disqualify the juror. Defendant refused the offer, but asked the trial judge for a mistrial, which was refused. On appeal, defendant contended a mistrial should have been granted because the juror’s relationship with plaintiffs attorney rendered her subject to challenge. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held defendant was not entitled to a mistrial because he refused plaintiffs offer to disqualify the juror. The Court explained:
... It is important to determine whether or not the attorney-client relationship has existed between the attorneys and the jurors. ... In the instant case counsel for defendant was entitled to know the juror ... had been represented by [plaintiffs counsel]. However, in this case the information came from the attorney, rather than the juror, os it does in many instances, and counsel for defendant knew of the relationship before the selection of the jury had been completed, and the jury for this case sworn.

Id.

In Marshall Durbin, 381 So.2d 152, although a juror had been recently been represented by plaintiffs attorney, neither the juror nor plaintiffs attorney disclosed that relationship during voir dire. Id., 381 So.2d at 154. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the judgment, stating:
The record in this cause being silent as to any valid reason why appellee’s attorney failed to disclose that he had represented the juror approximately two weeks before the trial, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the defendant was prejudiced.
Plaintiff’s attorney, as an officer of the court, was under a duty to disclose his relationship with the juror, and his failure to do so, under the facts presented, causes us to reverse this case.
Id., 381 So.2d at 155.
Finally, in Jackson, 374 A.2d 1, a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his nephew was a deputy prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office. Id., 374 A.2d at 2. Although the nephew did not prosecute the case, jury information cards used by the prosecutors’ office noted the relationship. Id. Recognizing the. nondisclosure of a relationship between a juror and an attorney hinders a defendant’s intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges during voir dire, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating:
Impartiality must be maintained, not only in the interest of fairness to the accused in the given case, but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process itself. Jury prejudice and bias, either actual or apparent, may not be allowed to derogate from society’s confidence in its judicial system. Indeed, as was well stated nearly seven decades ago:
“Aside from protecting the rights of the parties, in the fair and impartial administration of justice, respect for the courts calls for their condemnation of any improper conduct, however slight, on the part of a juror, of a party, or of any other person calculated to influence the jury in returning a verdict. So delicate are the balances of weighing justice that what might seem trivial under some circumstances would turn the scales to its perversion. Not only the evil, in such cases, but the appearances of evil, if *373possible, should be avoided” (Emphasis added.)
George F. Craig & Co. v. Pierson, 169 Ala. 548, 53 So. 803 (1910).
Jackson, 374 A.2d at 2-3. See also, United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir.1973) (although no harm shown in record, defense counsel should have disclosed that he and juror were acquaintances).
As the foregoing cases make clear, an attorney’s duty as an officer of the court to disclose his relationship with a juror is not limited to those ethical obligations prescribed in state codes of professional conduct. The codes of professional conduct represent the minimum, not the maximum, of fair play demanded from the civil and criminal bar. See, Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble, 11 (“The rules and Comments do not ... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should guide a lawyer_”). In the case of prosecuting attorneys, the obligation of fairness assumes a heightened importance, both because of the immediate effect that unfair conduct bears upon a defendant at trial, and because unfair conduct reduces society’s confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole. See, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197; and, Jackson, 374 A.2d at 2-3 (citing, George F. Craig & Co. v. Pierson, 169 Ala. 548, 53 So. 803 (1910)).
The Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a general duty of fairness on all parties participating in a criminal trial:
It is the duty of the trial court, the attorney representing the accused, [and] the attorney representing the State ... to so conduct themselves as to insure a fair trial for both the state and the defendant. ...
Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 2.03(b). In addition, however, the Legislature specifically sought to make clear that prosecuting attorneys have a special obligation as officers of the court:
... It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys ... not to convict, but to see that justice is done.
Art. 2.01. Consequently, the majority errs in holding a prosecuting attorney’s obligation to conduct himself in a fair manner is coterminous with the Disciplinary Rules. See, Majority op., 897 S.W.2d at 364-65.5
C. The Instant Case
As previously noted, the County Attorney declined to inform appellant of his relationship with Thomburrow because he did not believe the relationship would influence her deliberations in the instant case. While the County Attorney may have believed in good faith that Thomburrow would be an impartial juror, we are not yet to the point in this State where the prosecution may substitute its judgment concerning peremptory challenges for that of the defense. The extent to which the relationship between Thomburrow and the County Attorney would influence Thornburrow’s deliberations was a decision better left to appellant. By withholding information about that relationship, the County Attorney deprived appellant of the opportunity to make his own judgment regarding Thornburrow’s impartiality, thereby depriving appellant of a fair trial.
IV. Conclusion
Because the majority opinion sanctions juror and prosecutorial misconduct, namely the secreting of information necessary to the intelligent use of peremptory challenges, thereby denying appellant a fair trial, I dissent.

. During appellant's motion for new trial hearing, the following exchange occurred:
Defense Counsel: While the voir dire question was going on, did you or did you not recognized Marilyn Thornburrow as a person who you knew?
County Attorney: I did.
Q: And you knew during the voir dire examination the entire time the relationship that you had to Mrs. Thomburrow's husband, did you not?
A: I did.
Q: And the relationship that you had to Mrs. Thornburrow, you knew that, didn’t you?
A: I knew that.
Q: Did you ever at any time make any of that information known to the defense attorney?
A: No, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, when the case was over after the defense had filed a motion for new trial in the presence of some men out here you stated that the only reason I was mad is because [appellant] paid me a bunch of money and I had missed the ten dollar question?
The State: Your honor, we are going to object.
Defense Counsel: Did you make that statement?
The State: That has nothing to do with this hearing.
The Court: Sustain the objection.
Defense Counsel: Well, your honor, if I may—
The Court: You may not. The court has ruled. No argument.
Defense Counsel: Mr. Wells, you knew, did you not, the entire voir dire examination you knew, did you not, that the information about your relationship to Mrs. Thornburrow had never been made known to the court or the defense? You knew that, didn’t you?
County Attorney: I knew that all the questions that had been asked as far as I was concerned had been answered correctly.
Q: Did you ever make it known to the defense that Robert Thornburrow was your campaign chairman?
A: No, sir.
Q: Or campaign treasurer?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you ever make it known to the defense that you had served in the foreman of the jury’s wedding as the best man?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you ever make it known that her husband had served as best man in your wedding?
A: No, sir.
Q: You didn't feel as an officer of the court that was your responsibility to give that information?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not? Okay. As a matter of fact, you felt the entire time [during voir dire] that the defense had just missed something, is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And you felt it was to your advantage, did you not?
A: I thought that Marilyn Thornburrow would be a fair juror and I had some questions in my mind as to whether or not I would take her on the jury. I weighed striking her just like you did and I didn't feel that I owed you any duty to do anything more than what I did.
Q: But, Mr. Wells, you were privy to information in your assessment of Marilyn Thorn-burrow that the defense was not, weren’t you?
A: You had the same opportunity as I did to review the jury panel.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Although not noted by the majority, the federal courts of appeals have held that information is not "withheld" by a juror unless he fails to honestly respond to a direct question on the matter by counsel or by the trial court. See, Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 619-620 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1994) (written questions provided to juror did not require him to disclose that his deceased son-in-law had been employed by law enforcement agency); Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1483 (10th Cir.1987) (juror, whose brother had been police officer in past, had no duty to respond to counsel's questions during voir dire whether any jurors had family or friends who were presently in law enforcement); Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (spousal abuse victim’s failure to disclose abuse in response to questions during voir dire about veniremember’s experience with spousal and child abuse warranted new trial); and, United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1988) (where juror failed to respond to questions about relation in law enforcement that his brother was an officer in sheriff's department which investigated the offense, a new trial was warranted). Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the federal courts utilize a standard of review for determining jury misconduct from withheld information significantly different from our own. See, McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Under the federal standard, not only must a party show that a juror failed to honestly answer a material question, but must also show that the correct response would have rendered the juror subject to a challenge for cause. Id., 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850.

. Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Rule 3.09 [Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor] provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
(b) refrain from conducting or assisting in a custodial interrogation of an accused unless the prosecutor has made reasonable efforts to be assured that the accused has been advised of any right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not initiate or encourage efforts to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pre-trial, trial, or post-trial rights;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
(e)exercise reasonable care to prevent persons employed or controlled by the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Ride 3.07.
Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, App. A, Art. 10, § 9.
Further, Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 2.01 provides in pertinent part:
... It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done.

. Of course, the majority is correct in noting that the State Bar is the appropriate forum in which to undertake disciplinary proceedings addressing the County Attorney’s misconduct. However, such disciplinary action does not cure the error in the instant case, namely the secreting of information necessary for appellant to make an intelligent use of his peremptory challenges, thereby denying him a fair trial.