Court Opinion

ID: 9904733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 17:08:27.307114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.318075
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Madison, 2023-Ohio-4261.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   WASHINGTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                                  :

                                                 Plaintiff-Appellee,        :    Case
                                                 No. 22CA23

                                                 v.                         :

DAVID W. MADISON,                                          :    DECISION AND
                                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                     :

________________________________________________________________

                                              APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant.

Nicole Tipton Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney,
Marietta, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:11-16-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Washington County Common

Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence.                       A jury found

David W. Madison, defendant below and appellee herein, guilty of

two counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).                       The

trial court sentenced him to serve (1) a term of life in prison

with parole possibility after ten years on the first count, and

(2) a term of life in prison without parole possibility on the
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                      2

second count.

    Appellant assigns the following error for review:

           “DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS OF TWO
           COUNTS OF RAPE ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
           WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

    {¶2}   On December 15, 2021, a Washington County Grand Jury

returned an indictment that charged appellant with two counts of

rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).    The first count

involved A.N.M., an 11-year-old child.     The second count

involved K.G.M.-H., a 9-year-old child.    Appellant entered not

guilty pleas.

    {¶3}   In September 2022, the trial court held a jury trial.

K.G.M.-H. testified first and stated that appellant is her

grandfather and she sometimes stayed overnight at his house

along with A.N.M. (appellant’s daughter) and another of

appellant’s daughters.   K.G.M.-H. reported that she watched

“[i]nappropriate videos” with appellant.    She explained that one

video depicted “a boy and a girl and they were doing something

weird,” and she thought the boy looked older than the girl.       She

additionally testified that she and A.N.M. sometimes showered

with appellant.   K.G.M.-H. could not, however, recall many other

details.

    {¶4}   Sarah Crookshanks, whose father dated A.N.M.’s mother,

stated that on November 6, 2021, A.N.M. told her that she
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                      3

showered with appellant.     Sarah gave A.N.M. a notebook and

suggested that if she felt uncomfortable discussing the

incident, she should write in the notebook what had happened.

Sarah observed A.N.M. write her account in the notebook.        Sarah

testified that A.N.M. wrote, “my dad touched me when I’m in the

shower with him.     This happened more than – more times than I

can count.    For two years, my dad has done it to me.”   A.N.M.

also wrote that appellant “did it to her niece and my dad has

done it to me.     The last time my dad did it, was on November

2nd, 2021.”    The next morning, they called the police and the

police stated that A.N.M.’s mother should bring A.N.M. to the

police station.

    {¶5}   A.N.M. testified that appellant “made bad decisions”

and that she told her mother and her grandparents about these

“bad decisions.”     She then talked with children services and

stated that “it” was not true.     A.N.M. explained that she later

told Sarah what had happened.     She eventually spoke with a

forensic interviewer from children services, Johnnie Wigal.

    {¶6}   A.N.M. stated that she talked to Johnnie a couple of

days after the most recent incident.     She explained that she

watched television in the bedroom with appellant and after a

couple of hours, appellant went to shower.     After showering, he

watched videos on his computer that showed naked “girls and this
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                    4

boy having inappropriate contact together.”     One video showed a

female child with “an older man.”     A.N.M. did not watch the

video with appellant, but caught it “out of the corner of her

eye.”   Appellant, however, asked her to watch the videos on

other occasions.

    {¶7}   After appellant watched the videos, he asked A.N.M. to

accompany him to the bedroom.     She knew what would happen

“[b]ecause it happened before.”     A.N.M. explained that appellant

has been doing “it” to her for about five years and to K.G.M.-H.

for about two years.    A.N.M. stated that, if she tried to “stop

it, [appellant] would beat” her.

    {¶8}   A.N.M. reported that, when she went in the bedroom,

appellant asked her to “get on the bed” and “take [her] pants

off.”   Appellant also told K.G.M.-H. to remove her clothes.

When appellant finished with K.G.M.-H., he told A.N.M. to remove

all of her clothes and he used his “private part” and placed it

inside her vagina.     A.N.M. stated that appellant did “the same

things” to K.G.M.-H.     She saw “white stuff” “c[o]me out of”

appellant.   A.N.M. reported that appellant “put [the white

stuff] inside of K.G.M.-H.,” but did not “put it inside of

[her], because he knew it would happen.”     She has observed the

“white stuff” fall on the floor and on the bed.     After appellant

finished, he told her and K.G.M.-H. to shower and he sprayed
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                       5

their private areas with a hose.

    {¶9}    A.N.M. further stated that appellant “had this stuff

in his drawer that he would put inside of” her and K.G.M.-H -

one a pink sex toy and one purple.     A.N.M. also observed

Vaseline and “a bottle with a purple lid.”     The prosecutor

showed A.N.M. a photograph of items recovered during the search

warrant execution, and A.N.M. identified one item as “[t]he

yellow one” that “would burn.”

    {¶10} A.N.M. stated that on another occasion, appellant “was

doing stuff to” her, and her stepmom, Carrie Madison, walked

into the room.    Her stepmom “just gave [appellant] the food”

that she had prepared “and walked out.”     A.N.M. explained that,

other than this occasion, adults typically were not present when

appellant had sexual contact with her.     She stated that the

sexual conduct usually occurred on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, when

her stepmom was not home.     During these incidents, appellant

placed sex toys or his fingers inside her and K.G.M.-H.’s

vaginas or “butt,” and sometimes he asked A.N.M. to place her

lips on his “private part.”

    {¶11} A.N.M. testified that she did not talk to her stepmom

about what was happening, but she had told her mother.        A.N.M.’s

mother then asked the stepmother about it, but “she would just

say, no.”   A.N.M. stated that one time after she told her mother
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                    6

and her mother’s parents about what had happened, they took her

to children services.    When children services asked her about

the allegations in the presence of appellant, she denied the

allegations.   A.N.M. instead reported that her mother told her

to fabricate the allegations.   She later informed appellant that

her mother advised her to fabricate the allegations so that

appellant would not “beat” her.    Appellant then instructed

A.N.M. to concoct a story that she “was mad at him.”

    {¶12} Patrolman Jesse Whittington testified that on November

9, 2021, he helped obtain and execute a search warrant upon

appellant’s residence.    During the search, officers took “a

purple sex toy, a pink sex toy, about four other sex related

items * * * and then [appellant’s] cell phone.”

    {¶13} Washington County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Scott Smeeks

testified that when he helped execute the search warrant, he

used a blue light to detect the presence of semen on the floor.

Smeeks found “all the signs of a lot of semen” beside the bed

and on the floor leading into an attached bathroom.     Smeeks also

looked at appellant’s computer search history and discovered

that he viewed websites with “father-daughter type porn.”

    {¶14} Lieutenant Smeeks further explained that he

interviewed appellant and reported that appellant “pretty much

knew why I was there.    It was obvious when I was talking to him,
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                    7

he knew why I was there.”     Smeeks stated that appellant “totally

denied” the allegations and believed that one of the girls’

mothers urged the girls to make these allegations.     Appellant

informed Smeeks that he has genital warts and, if he had done

anything to the girls, they would test positive.

    {¶15} Two forensic scientists testified.    One stated that

two of the sex devices contained DNA consistent with A.N.M.’s

DNA profile.   The other witness reported that YSTR testing

indicated that one device contained DNA consistent with

appellant’s profile.

    {¶16} Belpre Police Sergeant Michael Stump testified that,

on December 12, 2021, he visited appellant’s residence to

follow-up on a report of an individual making suicidal threats.

When Stump arrived, appellant was on the telephone.     Stump asked

him about his well-being, and appellant denied any suicidal

thoughts.   Stump, however, heard appellant speak to someone on

the phone and appellant “seemed to be making arrangements for

someone to care for some pets or animals in the residence and

was describing where important documents were.”     At that point,

Stump informed appellant that he could voluntarily go to the

hospital for a wellness check.     Appellant agreed, and Stump

transported him.     After their arrival at the hospital, Stump

informed hospital staff of the circumstances and concern for
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                   8

self-harm.   Appellant agreed to stay.

    {¶17} Marietta Police Patrol Sergeant Tyson Estes testified

that he responded to appellant’s residence and assisted Sergeant

Stump.    Estes was aware of the allegations against appellant and

informed appellant that “in general,” when “a person * * * is

remorseful,” they “could be treated better” or “looked more

positively on.”    Appellant stated, “well, even if I tell you

that I did do it, it wouldn’t help anything, because of their

age.”    He denied, however, that he sexually abused either child.

Appellant did admit that, at some point within the past year, he

showered with one of the girls because they had worked “on a car

and had gotten dirty.”    But, nothing sexual about the shower

occurred.

    {¶18} Carrie Madison testified that she had been married to

appellant until their February 2018 divorce.    She continued to

live nearby, and, in 2020, she visited appellant’s house five

days a week for the girls.    She left two days each week to “get

a break” from arguing with appellant.

    {¶19} Carrie stated that she and appellant attempted to get

back together, but “he’s not a very nice man sometimes.”    She

explained one incident when he “threatened to stab [her] through

the chest so hard it would go through the floor.”

    {¶20} Carrie never observed appellant physically harm A.N.M.
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                    9

She did know that he showered with A.N.M., and told “him that

wasn’t appropriate.”     Carrie stated that if anything had “been

going on,” she “would have heard it.”

    {¶21} Belpre Police Detective Kerry Nichols testified that

A.N.M. and her mother came to the police department with the

notebook.   A.N.M. reported that the incident she described in

the notebook occurred “Tuesday last week.”     In response, Nichols

visited appellant’s residence.    Appellant stated that the last

time that he would have showered with a child would have been

when the child was around four or five years of age.    He also

denied the sexual-abuse allegations.     Nichols then examined

appellant’s phone and found pornography searches related to

“daddy daughter porn and teen tits.”

    {¶22} Appellant testified in his defense and stated that, in

2018 or 2019, A.N.M. alleged that he had sexually abused her.

She, however, later recanted.     Appellant claimed that A.N.M.

told his former wife, Carrie, “that it never happened” and that

A.N.M.’s mother told A.N.M. to fabricate the allegation.    He

believed that “it was a ploy for custody.”

    {¶23} When police visited appellant’s home in November 2021

to investigate the recent allegations and the detective

explained the reason for his visit, appellant was

“flabbergasted.”     He could not believe that A.N.M. made these
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                     10

allegations “again.”   Appellant stated that the “first words out

of [his] mouth” were that A.N.M.’s mother “put her up to it

again.”

    {¶24} Appellant further testified that he was present when

the officers executed the search warrant a few days later.        He

had installed cameras throughout his residence with one in his

bedroom.   Appellant explained that he placed a camera in his

bedroom “to catch” A.N.M. rummaging through his drawers.     He

claimed that she did it often, and when confronted, “she would

lie about it.”   Appellant did not tell the officers about the

existence of these cameras, however, because the officers did

not tell him when the alleged conduct occurred.     Appellant

related that, if the officers told him a date, he “could have

directed them towards video footage, anything that could have

helped them.”

    {¶25} Appellant indicated that one item officers discovered

during the search is “a penis pump.”     He stated that he suffered

from erectile dysfunction and he tried Viagra, but it did not

work “as well as [he] would hope.”     Appellant also testified

that he has genital warts that resurface every few years.

Appellant explained that another item officers discovered is “a

numbing agent for tattooing.”   He suggested that this numbing

agent “would definitely hurt somebody if they would put it on a
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                   11

soft tissue.”    He denied, however, that he used it for sexual

activity.

    {¶26} Appellant also reported that his bathroom shower is

small and he helped the children with their showers when they

were younger and unable “to fend for themselves.”     He denied,

however, any type of sexual activity with either child.

    {¶27} After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant

guilty of both offenses as charged in the indictment.

    {¶28} On December 2, 2022, the trial court sentenced

appellant to serve (1) a term of life in prison with parole

possibility after ten years for count one, and (2) a term of

life in prison without parole possibility for count two.     The

court also found appellant to be a Tier III sex-offender

registrant.     This appeal followed.

    {¶29} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court’s judgment is against the manifest weight

of the evidence.     He contends that the state’s primary witness,

A.N.M., “is a known and repeated liar” and “she confused several

key facts like upon who [appellant] may have allegedly used the

sex toys.”    Appellant further claims that A.N.M.’s testimony

that appellant placed his “private part” inside her vagina does

not constitute “substantial evidence that survives a manifest

evidence review.”
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                 12

    {¶30} The state responds that appellant’s convictions are

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.   The state

argues that (1) A.N.M.’s testimony provided the jury with

substantial evidence that appellant committed two counts of

rape, and (2) the jury did not lose its way crediting A.N.M.’s

testimony and choosing not to believe appellant’s testimony.

    {¶31} We observe that the “question to be answered when a

manifest-weight issue is raised is whether ‘there is substantial

evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all

the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d

229, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193–194,

702 N.E.2d 866 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169,

383 N.E.2d 132 (1978), syllabus.   A court that is considering a

manifest-weight challenge must “‘review the entire record, weigh

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the

credibility of witnesses.’”    State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d

497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 208, quoting State v.

McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶

328; accord State v. Hundley, 162 Ohio St.3d 509, 2020-Ohio-

3775, 166 N.E.3d 1066, ¶ 80.   The reviewing court must bear in

mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                   13

trier of fact to resolve.     State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67,

752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No.

07CA2953, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31.     “‘Because the trier of fact

sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to

decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of

particular witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to

its determinations of credibility.’”     Barberton v. Jenney, 126

Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20, quoting

State v. Konya, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 21434, 2006-Ohio-6312,

¶ 6, quoting State v. Lawson, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16288

(Aug. 22, 1997).     As the court in Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio

St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, explained:

         “‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is
    manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every
    reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption
    must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of
    facts. * * *
         If the evidence is susceptible of more than one
    construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it
    that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
    and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict
    and judgment.’”

Id. at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10

Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn.3, quoting 5 Ohio

Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192

(1978).   Thus, an appellate court will generally leave issues of

weight and credibility of the evidence to the fact finder, as
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                14

long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.

State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012-Ohio-

1282, ¶ 24; accord State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2948,

2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (“We will not intercede as long as the trier

of fact has some factual and rational basis for its

determination of credibility and weight.”).

    {¶32} Consequently, if the prosecution presented substantial

credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements

of the offense had been established, the judgment of conviction

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.    E.g., Eley;

accord Eastley at ¶ 12, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th ed.1990) (a judgment is

not against the manifest weight of the evidence when “‘“the

greater amount of credible evidence” ” supports it).   A court

may reverse a judgment of conviction only if it appears that the

fact finder, when it resolved the conflicts in evidence,

“‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’”   Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983);

accord McKelton at ¶ 328.   A reviewing court should find a

conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence only in
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                15

the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against the conviction.’”   Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175; accord State v. Clinton,

153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 166; State

v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).

    {¶33} We additionally note that “a verdict is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the fact

finder opts to believe the state’s witnesses.”   State v.

Donohue, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3637, 2018-Ohio-4819, ¶ 20.

“Moreover, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of

the evidence even if the ‘evidence is subject to different

interpretations.’”   State v. Sims, 2023-Ohio-1179, 212 N.E.3d

458, ¶ 119 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Adams, 2d Dist. Greene

Nos. 2013CA61, 2013–CA–62, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24.

    {¶34} In the case sub judice, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) sets

forth the essential elements of the rape offenses as alleged in

the indictment.   The statute provides:

         No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
    another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is
    the spouse of the offender but is living separate and
    apart from the offender, when any of the following
    applies:
         * * * *
         (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of
    age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the
    other person.

    {¶35} Appellant asserts that the testimony presented at
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                 16

trial to support the elements of the offenses is not credible.

Specifically, appellant claims that A.N.M. is not a credible

witness primarily due to past sexual-abuse allegations she

levied against appellant that she later recanted.     He points out

that A.N.M. provided the only testimony that sexual conduct

occurred between appellant and the two girls.     Appellant thus

argues that because her testimony is unbelievable, substantial

evidence of sexual conduct does not exist.

    {¶36} We first observe that “a rape conviction may rest

solely on the victim’s testimony, if believed.”     State v.

Daniels, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92563, 2010-Ohio-899, ¶ 58;

e.g., State v. Bennett, 4th Dist. Ross No. 21CA3751, 2023-Ohio-

2734, ¶ 61; State v. Lykins, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1079, 2019-

Ohio-3316, ¶ 48; State v. Horsley, 2018-Ohio-1591, 110 N.E.2d

624, ¶ 74 (4th Dist.).   Consequently, “[c]orroboration of victim

testimony in rape cases is not required.”    State v. Johnson, 112

Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 53; e.g.,

State v. Galloway, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 84AP-890, 1985 WL

10237, *1 (Apr. 9, 1985) (“there is no basis in law or logic

that a conviction of rape must have corroborative supporting

evidence”).

    {¶37} Additionally, in rape cases that involve children,

“[m]any courts have determined that inconsistencies in the
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                 17

statements of children regarding sexual conduct do not render

judgments against the manifest weight of the evidence; jurors

may simply take note of such inconsistencies and resolve or

discount them accordingly.”   State v. Steible, 9th Dist. Lorain

No. 21CA011787, 2023-Ohio-281, ¶ 20, citing State v. Williams,

5th Dist. Stark No. 2021CA00081, 2022-Ohio-2245, ¶ 58

(“inconsistencies in the five-year-old child victim’s statements

regarding the sexual conduct does not render the judgment

against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence”);

State v. Long, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-08-078, 2020-Ohio-

2678, ¶ 27 (“[w]hile the child’s testimony and interviews

exhibited some inconsistencies, the jury was in the best

position to judge the credibility of her trial testimony and her

explanation for the inconsistencies”); State v. Tiggett, 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2018-T-0036, 2019-Ohio-1715, ¶ 35 (“[w]hile

there may have been other minor inconsistencies or issues with

the testimony, it was again for the jury to determine [the

victim’s] credibility”); State v. McCluskey, 4th Dist. Ross No.

17CA3604, 2018-Ohio-4859, ¶ 33 (“to the extent [the] testimony

indicated an inconsistency in the child’s statements, the jury

was able to hear, evaluate and weigh that inconsistency in their

deliberations”); accord State v. Sampson, 9th Dist. Wayne No.

22AP0026, 2023-Ohio-2342, ¶ 32 (even though some of child
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                 18

victim’s testimony “varied, [the child] consistently maintained

that [the defendant]– at a minimum – touched her buttocks with

his penis and touched her vagina with his finger”).

    {¶38} Moreover, “[i]t is not inconceivable for a young child

to not recall every specific detail of a sexual assault that

occurred years ago with one hundred percent accuracy.”     Steible

at ¶ 20 citing State v. Jackson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

210466, 2022-Ohio-2562, ¶ 76 (“[i]t is not inconceivable that [a

10-year-old] child would not recall the specific details * * *

with 100 percent accuracy”); see State v. Stratford, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110767, 2022-Ohio-1497, ¶ 28 (“There is no playbook

for how a child would react to sexual assault * * *.”).

    {¶39} In the case sub judice, we disagree with appellant

that A.N.M.’s testimony that appellant placed his penis inside

her and the other child’s vaginas fails to constitute

substantial evidence that he committed the offenses.     We believe

that the jury could have found appellant’s assertion that

A.N.M.’s testimony is unbelievable because she is “a known and

repeated liar” to be meritless.   Instead, A.N.M. explained that

she had recounted a previous allegation against appellant

because children services had asked her about those allegations

in appellant’s presence.   A.N.M. stated that she was afraid

appellant would harm her if she did not recant the allegations.
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                   19

See generally State v. McPherson, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

08CA009377, 2009-Ohio-1426, ¶ 41 (upholding conviction even

though victim admitted that she lied during initial interview

with officers when testimony showed that “recanting is a normal,

expected element of the process because children often feel

responsible for breaking up the family”).   A.N.M. thus offered a

plausible reason why she initially recanted her allegations, and

the jury is entitled to weigh it accordingly during

deliberations.

    {¶40} Additionally, although physical or other evidence is

not necessary to corroborate a rape victim’s testimony, in the

case before us physical evidence does corroborate A.N.M.’s

testimony and helps to bolster the credibility of her testimony.

A.N.M. testified that appellant’s semen fell to the floor beside

the bed, and, during the search-warrant execution, officers

discovered “a lot” of semen on the floor next to the bed.     This

discovery corroborates A.N.M.’s testimony that “white stuff”

fell on the floor.

    {¶41} A.N.M. also testified that appellant sometimes used

sex toys on her and the other child.   Forensic scientists found

A.N.M.’s DNA on two of the sex toys and “Y-STR DNA” consistent

with appellant’s or a male relative’s profile on one toy.    This

evidence helps to corroborate A.N.M.’s testimony that appellant
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                 20

used sex toys on her.

    {¶42} Furthermore, A.N.M. stated that appellant made her

watch pornographic videos, and officers found in appellant’s

search history phrases “daddy porn” and “teen tits.”    This

discovery likewise helps to corroborate A.N.M.’s testimony that

appellant forced her to watch pornographic videos.

    {¶43} Moreover, even if A.N.M.’s testimony contains some

inconsistencies or inaccuracies, the jury is in a position to

hear, evaluate, and weigh any inconsistencies or inaccuracies

during deliberations.    In addition, we do not believe that the

record suggests that A.N.M.’s testimony “suffers from such

serious discrepancies that we, as a reviewing court relying on

‘a cold, paper record,’ must supplant the jury’s determination

of credibility.”     State v. Thomas, 2015-Ohio-5247, 54 N.E.3d 732

(9th Dist.), ¶ 30, quoting In re B.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

81948, 2003-Ohio-5920, ¶ 31.    Here, the jury obviously weighed

A.N.M.’s testimony and ultimately found it credible.    We, a

court of review, are ill-equipped to second-guess the jury’s

decision.   See State v. Dyke, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 149,

2002–Ohio–1152, ¶ 13, citing State v. Gore, 131 Ohio App.3d 197,

201, 722 N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist. 1999) (“[w]hen there exist two

fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting

versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                21

our province to choose which one we believe”).

    {¶44} Appellant also asserts that the state “masked its lack

of evidence by setting out improper showering and the use of sex

toys which did not even happen” on November 2, 2021.    To the

extent that appellant argues that the trial court erred by

admitting this type of evidence, we point out that appellant did

not raise this issue as an assignment of error.    We therefore

will not consider it as a basis for reversal.     See App.R.

16(A)(3) (appellant’s brief “shall include * * * [a] statement

of the assignments of error presented for review, with reference

to the place in the record where each error is reflected”);

App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) (appellate court “shall * * * [d]etermine the

appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in

the briefs under App. R. 16”); State v. Harlow, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 13CA29, 2014-Ohio-864, ¶ 10 (“[a]ppellate courts

review assignments of error - we sustain or overrule only

assignments of error and not mere arguments”).

    {¶45} Moreover, as we stated above, A.N.M.’s testimony,

which the jury obviously believed, establishes the elements of

the offenses.   Thus, we disagree with appellant that the state

adduced a lack of evidence to establish the elements of the

crimes.

    {¶46} Consequently, after our review we do not believe that
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                22

the case at bar is one of those exceptional cases in which the

evidence weighs heavily against appellant’s convictions.     We

therefore disagree with appellant that his convictions are

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

    {¶47} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                               JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
WASHINGTON, 22CA23                                                23

                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellee shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to
carry this judgment into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail
has been previously granted, it is continued for a period of 60
days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay
is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the
expiration of the 60-day period.

     The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a
notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the 45-day
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court
dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of said 60 days,
the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. A
certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

                                   BY:__________________________
                                      Peter B. Abele,
Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL
     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.