Court Opinion

ID: 9737722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:33:01.974271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.942342
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 158. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). The principal issue in this case is stated by the petitioners: "Does the Wisconsin school finance system violate the Uniformity Provision of the Education Article, article X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution?" A majority of the court holds that it does not. Three justices, however, would rule otherwise. Moreover, these three justices and Justice Crooks interpret art. X, § 3 in a manner that encourages future litigation and will plunge the judiciary into the legislature's domain.
¶ 159. I join the concurring opinion of Justice Sykes not because I am unwilling to apply standards embedded in the text of the constitution or in statutory law-whatever the field, regardless of the consequences-but because I am unwilling to impose legal standards that did not exist before this decision.
I
¶ 160. A majority of the court embraces the proposition that art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives Wisconsin students "a fundamental right to an *665equal opportunity for a sound, basic education. An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally." Majority op. at ¶¶ 3, 51, 87. Chief Justice Abraham-son's concurrence/dissent at ¶ 94.
¶ 161. Constitutional principles must be rooted in constitutional text. Four members of the court maintain that the standard they embrace is rooted in art. X, § 3. They are mistaken. Article X, § 3 was part of the original constitution. The relevant text now reads:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school hours.
Our analysis must begin with the language of the constitution. Two phrases in art. X § 3 stand out: "district . schools" and "as nearly uniform as practicable."
¶ 162. First, the text emphasizes the term "district schools" not "school districts." There is danger in assuming that these terms are synonymous. They are not. A 1972 amendment to art. X, § 3 authorizing the release of students for religious instruction repeated the term "district schools." The 1972 amendment altered the text of the original section, substituting "4" for "four" and "20" for "twenty," but it did not change the term "district schools."
¶ 163. Section 3 uses the term "district schools" followed by the phrase "such schools" and the clause *666"no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein," although religious instruction "outside the district schools" is permitted (emphasis added).
¶ 164. By contrast, art. X, §§ 2 and 5 both employ the term "school district." These sections also were part of the original constitution. Article X, § 2 refers to "support and maintenance of common schools, in each school district." Article X, § 5 provides that no appropriation shall be made from the school fund to "any school district for the year in which a school shall not be maintained at least three months." The constitution is precise in avoiding state payments from the school fund to individual schools.
¶ 165. A fair reading of these sections suggests that "school districts" are political entities, whereas "district schools" are literally schools. The legislature distributes state aid to the political entities — to the school districts. Consequently, it is troublesome to base a cause of action that school districts must be made uniform on a section of the constitution, art. X, § 3, that does not apply to them.
¶ 166. It is even more unsettling to give Wisconsin students "a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education" and to ground that right in a section that makes no reference to individual rights, only to "district schools." The responsibility of this court in constitutional interpretation is to state the law, not make the law.
¶ 167. Second, art. X, § 3 contains the phrase "as nearly uniform as practicable." The uniformity in the text is indisputably diluted by the adjacent phrases "as nearly" and "as practicable." "As nearly uniform as practicable" does not mean "equal." "As nearly uniform as practicable" is not as strong or uncompromising as the storied phrase "equal protection of the law." The *667words in the text suggest a goal; they do not impose a rule.
¶ 168. Article X, § 3 may be compared to art. IV, § 23 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which addresses town government and provides in part: "The legislature shall establish but one system of town government, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable" (emphasis added). Because this section closely parallels art. X, § 3, this court should look to the experience with town government for guidance in interpretation.1 This court has declared that the "uniformity requirement [in art. IV, § 23] has been consistently interpreted not to require absolute uniformity in the system of government, but only practical uniformity. . . .[T]he framers of the constitution recognized that some latitude had to be provided to enable the legislature to authorize departures from absolute uniformity." State ex rel. Wolf v. Town of Lisbon, 75 Wis. 2d 152, 162, 248 N.W.2d 450 (1977).
*668I — I I — I
¶ 169. Over the years, both the legislature and Wisconsin courts have interpreted the Education Article, including art. X, § 3. They have not required uniformity among school districts. The legislature has never required that school districts be equal or uniform in terms of population or enrollment or geographic area. School districts have been created in different ways, T.B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida County, 72 Wis. 158, 161 (1888); Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 260, 128 N.W. 899 (1910), and they have not been uniform in their organization or reorganization. Joint Sch. Dist. v. State Appeal Board, 56 Wis. 2d 790, 794, 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973). The state authorizes common school districts, union high school districts, and unified school districts. Wis. Stat. §§ 120.001-120.44. These districts may serve different grades. Not all school districts have kindergarten for four-year-olds. Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1., Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977). Compensation among the school districts is not uniform, and employee benefits are not uniform. In Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 570, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), this court recognized the obvious fact that not all school districts have equal revenue raising power and held that art. X, § 3 did not require equalization of revenue raising power.
¶ 170. Given the text of art. X, § 3, the immense diversity of school districts and district schools and the precedent of prior decisions about what art. X, § 3 does not mean, the court should have dismissed claims that the legislature has a constitutional obligation to equal*669ize educational opportunity among school districts in terms of dollars.2
¶ 171. What the court has done instead is to embrace two conflicting theories of what the section requires: Equality of resources for school districts and special attention to special needs, beyond equality. In short, EQUALITY PLUS. This may be desirable social and educational policy but it does not arise from the text of our constitution. It is distinctly legislative in character.
¶ 172. Until today, this court has had difficulty imposing uniformity on much of anything based upon the language of art. X, § 3. The court attempted to explain this section in State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860, (1928). In response to arguments about detachment from a school district, the court said:
An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions, *670when they were framing the article relating to schools, were concerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that should be given in those schools after the districts were formed, — with the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin.
Viewing the terms of this constitutional provision in the light of its express terms as well as of the purpose which actuated those who drafted it, we conclude that the requirement as to uniformity applies to the districts after they are formed, — to the character of the instruction given, — rather than to the means by which they are established and their boundaries fixed.3
¶ 173. The court cited no authority for these passages. In fact, the language was inspired by the brief of respondent (Zilisch) who did not point to constitutional debates. Rather, counsel relied on a Wisconsin case, State ex rel. Dick v. Kalaher, 145 Wis. 243, 129 N.W. 1060 (1911), which defines a school: "School is a generic term, and denotes an institution for instruction or education" (citing American Asylum v. Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. 172 (1822); 7 Words & Phrases, 6343). Then counsel argued:
It is this institution and not the district to which the constitutional provision applies. This is shown by the plain wording of the constitution which limits the requirement of uniformity to "schools" and merely prefixes the word "district" to denote the type of schools.
*671This plain and natural construction has been followed by the courts, under similar constitutional provisions. The decisions hold that such uniformity relates only to the character of the institution, called the school.
Respondent's Brief at 64. Today, a new constitutional right is founded on the argument of counsel in a school detachment case almost three-quarters of a century ago.
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¶ 174. In the early years of statehood, the hiring and licensing of teachers was entirely a local matter. Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 432 (1999-2000). For a number of years, state support of public education consisted of money derived principally from the sale of public lands that the federal government had granted to the state. Id. In Chapter 287, Laws of 1885, the legislature levied a one-mill state property tax to be collected by the state and distributed to counties for school support. Id. The state's first attempt to equalize tax support for schools in property-poor districts was the Wisconsin Elementary Equalization Law of 1927 (Chapter 536).4 Id.
¶ 175. In 1995, the legislature appropriated more than $4 billion to provide 66.7 percent of the revenue for public K-12 schools in Wisconsin beginning in the 1996-97 school year. The money included general aid, delivered through a three-tier formula, *672categorical aid, and school levy credits. The increase over the 1995-96 school year was more than $950,000,000. School funding was increased 5.9 percent for the 1997-98 school year and 5 percent for the 1998-99 school year. Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 1997-98 Wisconsin State Budget, Comparative Summary of Budget Provisions, Public Instruction, at 862-63. These are the school finance plans under challenge.5
¶ 176. This court on many occasions has observed that all legislative acts are presumptively constitutional. If doubts exist about a statute's constitutionality, we must resolve them in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. "Our task is not to judge the merits of the statute or the wisdom of the legislature. Our task is to determine whether the statute clearly contravenes some constitutional provision." Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 583 (Abrahamson, J., Day, J., and Heffernan, J. dissenting).
¶ 177. We do not hide from the deficiencies that exist in this state's system of public education. We are not insensitive to the fact that fiscal resources are not equal. We might even have salutary proposals for improvements. But it is not the role of the supreme court to shape education policy or provide revenues. *673This vital responsibility is reserved to the executive and the legislative branches. The judiciary's task is to determine whether the acts or omissions of other branches clearly contravene some constitutional provision. In my view, they do not.
¶ 178. I join the majority opinion in affirming the court of appeals and in holding the present school finance system constitutional. In other respects, I dissent.
¶ Í79. I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES joins this concurring/dissenting opinion.

 Jack Stark summarizes the litigation under this section in his book, The Wisconsin State Constitution, A Reference Guide at 100 (1997):
According to this section "the principal organizational features of town government must be the same," but, as the section specifies, only "practical" uniformity is required, so general enactments that make reasonable distinctions among towns are constitutional [State ex rel. Wolf v. Town of Lisbon, 75 Wis. 2d 152, 161-62, 248 N.W.2d 450 (1977)]. As to reasonable distinctions, this section "provides for the exercise of different powers by the boards of different towns, when there is anything in a town which calls for the exercise of such different or additional powers" [Land, Log & Lumber Co. and others v. Brown and others, 73 Wis. 294, 40 N.W. 482 (1889)]. That is, a law that applies throughout the state and makes reasonable distinctions based on differences among towns does not violate this section [Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 221 N.W. 845 (1974)].

 In his brief, Governor Thompson argues that the equalized share of state support for public education has increased from 72.3 percent of state aid in 1986-87 to 77.6 percent in 1998-99. Non-Party Brief by Governor Tommy G. Thompson at 4. The first tier of the three-part general school aid formula is for costs shared between the state and school district up to a primary cost ceiling of $1,000 per student. The state's share at this level is calculated using a guaranteed property valuation of $2 million per student. 1997-98 Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 291. Plaintiffs argue that the first tier creates disequalizing spending disparities by its hold harmless feature. The Governor responds that this disequalization has fallen from 0.7 percent of total equalization payments in 1996-97 to 0.52 percent in 1999-2000. Id. at 5.

 In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled State ex rel. Brown v. Haney, 190 Wis. 285, 209 N.W. 591 (1926).

 According to the 1999-2000 Wisconsin Blue Book, Chapter 536, Laws of 1927, was promoted by State Superintendent of Public Instruction John Callahan, who urged a 40 percent level of state support for local school costs. This figure was not reached until after 1970. There was no state support for high schools until 1875.1999-2000 Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 432.

 The court obtained printouts of school referenda in the 1990s from the Department of Public Instruction. According to our calculations, there were 166 successful referenda to exceed revenue caps in the four years 1996-1999. These referenda totaled approximately $85,000,000. There also were approximately 335 successful referenda on long term debt during these same four years. The value of these referenda exceeded $2.5 billion. Local school referenda are part of the state school finance system. A number of the school district plaintiffs in this case participated in successful referenda.