Court Opinion

ID: 9770483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:06:15.73755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.745090
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
In the Caldwell case, supra, plaintiffs employed only non-union labor upon a home construction project in St. Louis County. Having *588been unable to persuade plaintiffs to employ union labor upon tbe construction project, defendants peacefully picketed the construction project. The purpose of the picketing was to compel plaintiffs to agree to employ upon the project only persons belonging to certain union organizations. We held the contract there sought was not unlawful and did not establish conspiracy. That ease is not determinative of the issue presented to us in the instant case.
In the Douds case, supra, the petition filed on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board against the Sheet Metal Union sought injunctive relief on the ground that the union was engaged in a “secondary boycott” which the National Labor Relations Act had made an unfair labor practice. The court there ruled that the petition before it failed to allege facts which would establish a secondary boycott. The Douds case does not rule any issue now before us.
The motion for rehearing calls to our attention that in Case No. 14-CD-27, reported in 101 N.L.R.B., page 346, No. 87, it was the plaintiffs’ charges of unfair labor practices which were dismissed'. That fact can make no difference whatever in our conclusions in this case. The Union and the Company had each filed against the other charges of unfair labor practices before the N.L.R.B. The Union’s charges of unfair labor practices by the Company were disposed of on August 17, 1953, and at a time when the fact of the issuance of the instant injunction was before that Board. The Union’s charges were disposed of in “Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, Case No. 766,’’found in C.C.H. Labor Law Reporter — Fourth Edition — 2, Par. 12776, wherein it is stated: “A union charged each of four brewing companies with unlawful refusal to bargain. * * * Union also alleged that by seeking and obtaining an order from a State Court restraining the employees in engaging in striking and picketing, Company No. 1 (plaintiff in the instant case) violated Section 8(a) (1) of the [National Labor Management Relations] Act. * * # N.L.R.B. General Counsel sustained the Regional Director’s refusal to issue a complaint.”
It is not at all clear from defendants ’ briefs, nor from their motion for rehearing, just what section of what Act of Congress they are in fact relying on. If defendants’ reliance be upon Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley Act it is obvious that the N.L.R.B. ruled that the instant facts were not of such character that Section 8(b) (4) (D) of that Act has any application thereto. Both the N.L.R.B. and its General Counsel, in his ruling, concluded that the N.L.R.B. had no jurisdiction whatever because neither a labor dispute nor an unfair labor practice was involved, and that there was no situation presented by the instant facts to which the Taft-Hartley Act applied.
The other points attempted to be asserted in appellants’ motion for *589rehearing are but a re-argument of the issues and matters ruled and determined in our opinion heretofore filed.
The motion for rehearing, or in the alternative to transfer the case to the Court En Banc, is accordingly overruled.