Court Opinion

ID: 9411230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 00:00:52.595505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.539878
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10620    Document: 00516833401        Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/25/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                               FILED
                                                                     July 25, 2023
                                No. 21-10620
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                               Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Caesar Mark Capistrano; Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu;
   Wilkinson Oloyede Thomas,

                                         Defendants—Appellants.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 4:20-CR-290-4
                          USDC No. 4:20-CR-290-8
                          USDC No. 4:20-CR-290-5
                 ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
         A jury convicted a medical doctor and two pharmacists of drug-related
   crimes under the Controlled Substances Act for their roles in a pill-mill
   operation. We AFFIRM.
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                                         No. 21-10620

                                              I.
           A grand jury indicted Dr. Caesar Capistrano and two pharmacists,
   Wilkinson Oloyede Thomas and Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu (“Bubu”),
   (collectively, “Appellants” or “Defendants”) for roles in a “pill-mill”
   operation. 1 Prosecutors charged Appellants with three drug-distribution
   conspiracies that each spanned from 2011 to 2020. 2 Bubu and Thomas, who
   both owned pharmacies, were also charged with possession with intent to
   distribute controlled substances. 3
           While Capistrano is a medical doctor, he also owned multiple clinics.
   The Government’s theory was that he prescribed controlled substances and
   Bubu and Thomas filled those prescriptions and others, on a host of
   occasions, for which there was no legitimate medical purpose. The
   conspiracy involved recruiters coordinating with pill mills and complicit
   pharmacies to fill unlawful prescriptions for street-level distribution.
   Recruits posed as patients, getting prescriptions issued in their names in
   exchange for cash. The recruiters would then fill the recruits’ prescriptions
   at complicit pharmacies, paying exclusively in cash. Charged with
   drug-distribution conspiracies and with possessing with intent to distribute
   controlled substances, 4 defendants invoked § 841(a) of the Controlled
   Substances Act, which exempts doctors and pharmacists from criminal

           _____________________
           1
             A “pill mill” is a colloquial term for a medical clinic in which practitioners
   distribute controlled substances without “medical necessity or therapeutic benefit.” See
   United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (describing a “pill mill” as a “a
   medical practice that serves as a front for dealing prescription drugs”).
           2
               21 U.S.C. § 846.
           3
               21 U.S.C. § 841.
           4
               21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

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   liability for distributing “authorized” controlled substances. 5 By regulation,
   prescriptions are “authorized” if they are (1) “issued for a legitimate medical
   purpose” and (2) “by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of
   his professional practice.” 6 At trial, the Government offered extensive
   evidence, including text messages, wiretaps, surveillance, cooperator
   testimony, and records from Defendants’ businesses and homes. The jury
   found Defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced
   Capistrano and Bubu to 240 months’ imprisonment and Thomas to 151
   months. Defendants timely appealed.
                                                 II.
           We turn first to the standard of our review and then challenges to the
   sufficiency of the evidence.
                                                 A.
           “The standard of review for insufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
   depends on whether the claims were preserved.” 7 As the three defendants
   preserved their challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence against them by
   motions filed at trial, our review is de novo. 8
           Nonetheless, a “defendant seeking reversal on the basis of insufficient
   evidence swims upstream.” 9 Our review is “highly deferential” to the jury’s

           _____________________
           5
               21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
           6
               21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
           7
               United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2018).
           8
            See United States v. Dailey, 868 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted);
   United States v. Zamora, 661 F.3d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 2011).
           9
            United States v. Gonzalez, 907 F.3d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States
   v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 1997)).

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   finding of guilt.10 We will uphold the jury’s verdict so long as “any rational
   trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
   reasonable doubt.” 11 A verdict can be supported by “reasonable inferences
   from the evidence,” 12 but “may not rest on mere suspicion, speculation, or
   conjecture, or on an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.” 13
   “Circumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately considered, may, by
   their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral
   coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof.” 14 “[T]he jury is
   free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” 15
                                                   1.
           Bubu challenges two counts of possession with intent to distribute
   controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 16 which requires
   the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bubu knowingly
   possessed a controlled substance—here, Hydrocodone and Carisoprodol—

           _____________________
           10
                United States v. Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation
   omitted).
           11
              United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
   (citation omitted). A “reasonable doubt” is “one ‘based on reason which arises from the
   evidence or lack of evidence.’” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.9 (1979) (quoting
   Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972)).
           12
               United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
   v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903, 910 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           13
                Id. (quoting United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2006)).
           14
             United States v. Rodriguez–Mireles, 896 F.2d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting
   The Reindeer, 69 U.S. 383, 401 (1864)) (alteration removed); see also Vargas-Ocampo, 747
   F.3d at 303.
           15
                United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
           16
             One is for possessing with intent to distribute Hydrocodone to Cynthia Cooks,
   and the other is for possessing with intent to distribute Carisoprodol to Johnnie Parks. The
   challenges relate to Count 7 and Count 22 of the indictment, respectively.

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   which she intended to distribute. 17 Bubu’s “[p]ossession may be actual or
   constructive, may be joint among several defendants, and may be proved by
   direct or circumstantial evidence.” 18 “Constructive possession is ‘the
   knowing exercise of, or the knowing power or right to exercise, dominion and
   control over the proscribed substance.’” 19
           Bubu argues that there was “no evidence that [she] knew of the
   particular medical conditions of Ms. Cooks and Mr. Parks.” The
   Government counters that there was abundant evidence of Bubu’s
   involvement with recruiters—including her instructing recruiters to
   “remove [her] logo from vials” and leaving their recruits in the car, as having
   so many people in the area was a bad look—as well as other “numerous red
   flags” about Bubu’s pharmacy operations, including only accepting cash and
   charging unusually high prices for controlled substances, priced per pill
   rather than by a typical prescription quantity.
           While § 841 does not require that Bubu knew the patients’ medical
   conditions, there must be sufficient evidence that Bubu knew the
   prescriptions she filled for Cooks and Parks were unauthorized. 20 Bubu
   concedes that she “knew some of the prescriptions emanating from Dr.
   Capistrano’s clinic were invalid.” Cooks was one of Capistrano’s recruiters
   who filled her and her recruits’ prescriptions at Bubu’s pharmacy. 21 Bubu
   filled Cooks’s Hydrocodone prescription from Capistrano for the highest

           _____________________
           17
                United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2001).
           18
             United States v. Valdiosera–Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting
   United States v. Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1987)).
           19
                Id. at 1096 (quoting Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d at 45).
           20
                See United States v. Ferris, 52 F.4th 235, 242–43 (5th Cir. 2022).
           21
                Cooks pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy in this case.

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   possible prescription strength. Cooks testified that she directly interacted
   with Bubu, including phone calls. Parks was one of Cooks’s recruits, and
   Cooks filled his prescriptions at Bubu’s pharmacy. Bubu’s dispense log,
   signed by Bubu, shows that Bubu filled Parks’s and another one of Cooks’s
   recruit’s prescriptions from Capistrano for controlled substances.
           In sum, given the evidence of Bubu’s knowledge of Capistrano’s
   clinic’s practices and her involvement with recruiters, “a rational trier of fact
   could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 22
                                                  2.
           Thomas argues that the evidence cannot show he knew any
   prescriptions were “invalid,” and both Thomas and the Government point
   to “red flags.” 23 We turn to the evidence, asking whether a rational jury
   could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas knew the prescriptions
   were unauthorized. 24
           The testimony of recruiter Wayne Kincade, and his text messages
   with Thomas, played a prominent role in the Government’s case. Kincade
   started using Thomas’s pharmacy to fill his recruits’ prescriptions after
   another recruiter recommended the pharmacy. Kincade told Thomas he was
   picking up other people’s prescriptions because they did not want to drive to
   the pharmacy. Kincade regularly texted and called Thomas about
   prescriptions and sent pictures of recruit’s IDs if needed. Kincade testified
   that Thomas operated “by the book,” but also that Thomas “fronted”

           _____________________
           22
                Dailey, 868 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
           23
               Yet to overcome the medical defense, the appropriate inquiry is not about red
   flags, but about knowledge.
           24
                See Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d at 303; Ferris, 52 F.4th at 242–43.

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                                           No. 21-10620

   Kincade prescriptions—once more than $1,000 worth—because Thomas
   trusted that he would pay for the drugs later.
           Kincade paid for the prescriptions in cash—three or four at a time for
   $265 each—sometimes outside of business hours. When Kincade tried to fill
   more prescriptions each time, Thomas told him it was best to space them out
   so he would fill some now and the rest the next day. Thomas warned Kincade
   to “be careful cashing those Capistrano prescriptions because he [is] in the
   black book.” Thomas’s pharmacy stopped accepting Capistrano’s
   prescriptions but still filled prescriptions from Dr. Noel, another defendant
   who pleaded guilty. Kincade never told Thomas he sold drugs or suggested
   that he was breaking the law, but Kincade affirmed that, like everyone else
   involved in the conspiracy, Thomas “knew what [he] was doing.”
           Thomas argues that Kincade’s statement that Thomas “wasn’t like
   some of the other pharmacists” and was “by the book” means “it was clear
   to Mr. Kincade that Mr. Thomas was not a party to a pill mill case.” But this
   view is not the only one fairly drawn from Kincade’s testimony that Thomas
   “knew what [he] was doing.” While Thomas imposed some requirements on
   filling other people’s prescriptions, a reasonable jury could infer that Thomas
   was trying to cover himself, as the Government argued. We may not reweigh
   the evidence, or second-guess “[c]redibility choices that support the jury’s
   verdict.” 25 Juries are “entitled to weigh . . . circumstantial evidence, drawing
   inferences for or against [a defendant’s] knowing and voluntary participation
   in a conspiracy with others.” 26 Where, as here, there are multiple reasonable
   constructions of the evidence, “the jury is free to choose among [them].” 27
           _____________________
           25
                Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d at 832 (citation omitted).
           26
                Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d at 303.
           27
             Pennington, 20 F.3d at 597 (citations omitted). Thomas argues that a reasonable
   jury cannot find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the “evidence gives equal

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   “[T]he ‘relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
   most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
   the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 28
   Considered in the requisite light, the evidence was sufficient for a rational
   juror to find the requisite mens rea here.
                                                 3.
           To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the
   Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) an agreement
   between two or more persons to violate the narcotics laws, (2) the
   defendant’s knowledge of the agreement, and (3) the defendant’s voluntary
   participation in the conspiracy.” 29
           Capistrano argues he cannot be convicted of conspiracy because there
   was no record that he “had any contact, of any type whatsoever,” with the
   pharmacists. Capistrano also argues that there was “no testimony
   whatsoever that [he] said []or did anything.” The Government counters that
   there was abundant evidence of a conspiracy, and Capistrano’s involvement
   with it as well—including Capistrano instructing individuals to issue
   prescriptions when he was not there, and prescribing significant quantities of
   Alprazolam, Carisoprodol, and Hydrocodone, which accounted for 99.7% of
   his prescriptions—as well as other actions with respect to Capistrano’s
   operations. We have long held that “all members of a conspiracy are not

           _____________________
   or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt, as well as a theory of innocence.”
   Moreland, 665 F.3d at 149. But this Court “abandon[ed] any reliance on the ‘equipoise
   rule’” in Vargas-Ocampo. 747 F.3d at 302.
           28
              United States v. Xu, 599 F.3d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
   Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           29
             Zamora, 661 F.3d at 209 (quoting United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 409 (5th
   Cir. 2003)).

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                                            No. 21-10620

   required to know every other member for a conspiracy to exist.” 30 Given the
   attendant record, Capistrano’s claim falls short.
                                                  B.
           In sum, our highly deferential review compels us to conclude that
   “‘the totality of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a
   reasonable doubt’” for all Appellants on all challenged claims. 31
                                                 III.
           Bubu and Capistrano challenge the jury instructions given at trial. The
   challenges fail.
                                                 A.
           Generally, “this court reviews jury instructions for abuse of discretion
   and harmless error.” 32 “However, when a defendant fails to object to jury
   instructions, we review for plain error.” 33 Since neither Bubu nor Capistrano
   objected to the jury instructions, we review for plain error. 34
           To establish plain error, one must show that: “(1) the district court
   erred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, (3) the error affected his substantial
   rights, and (4) this court should exercise its discretion to correct the error
   because the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

           _____________________
           30
              Gonzalez, 907 F.3d at 874 (citing United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 325 (5th
   Cir. 1977)).
           31
             United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
   Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 533 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           32
             United States v. Vasquez, 677 F.3d 685, 692 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing
   United States v. Betancourt, 586 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2009)).
           33
                Id.
           34
                See United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2016).

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   of judicial proceedings.” 35 By the metric of plain error review of jury
   instructions, a district court does not err when “the instruction, taken as a
   whole, is a correct statement of the law.” 36 “[W]hen a jury instruction omits
   . . . an essential element of an offense, the error may be severe enough to meet
   the plain-error standard.” 37 When reviewing a jury instruction, we must
   “consider the jury charge as a whole” and reverse only if the entire charge
   leaves us “with the substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has
   been properly guided in its deliberations.” 38 In other words, to amount to
   plain error, the instruction “must ‘have meant the difference between
   acquittal and conviction.’” 39
           After Appellants filed their initial briefs, the Supreme Court issued
   Ruan v. United States. 40 Ruan addresses the state of mind requirement to
   convict doctors under the Controlled Substances Act. 41 In Ruan, the
   Supreme Court overturned the convictions of two doctors for violating 21

           _____________________
           35
                In re Deepwater Horizon, 824 F.3d 571, 583 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
           36
             Nagin, 810 F.3d at 350 (quoting United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 151–52 (5th
   Cir. 2012)).
           37
               United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 378 (5th Cir. 2018) (first alteration in
   original), as revised (Aug. 24, 2018) (quoting United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198, 208 (5th
   Cir. 2018)).
           38
                Septimus v. Univ. of Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
   omitted).
           39
              Vasquez, 899 F.3d at 378 (quoting Fairley, 880 F.3d at 208). This is because the
   party must show that their substantial rights were affected, and to establish that one’s
   substantial rights were affected, defendants bear the burden of showing a reasonable
   probability that absent the error, they would have been acquitted. See United States v. Oti,
   872 F.3d 678, 693 (5th Cir. 2017).
           40
              142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022). The Government’s brief and Bubu and Capistrano’s
   reply briefs address Ruan. Thomas does not address Ruan.
           41
                Id. at 2375.

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   U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it a federal crime, “[e]xcept as authorized .
   . . for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or
   dispense . . . a controlled substance.” 42 Although the defendants could
   prescribe such substances to their patients, prescriptions are authorized only
   when a doctor issued it “for a legitimate medical purpose . . . acting in the
   usual course of his professional practice.” 43 The specific question at issue
   was whether it was “sufficient for the Government to prove that a
   prescription was in fact not authorized,” or whether the Government must
   also “prove that the doctor knew or intended that the prescription was
   unauthorized.” 44 The Court held that “the statute’s ‘knowingly or
   intentionally’ mens rea applies to authorization.” 45 So, “[a]fter a defendant
   produces evidence that he or she was authorized to dispense controlled
   substances, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
   defendant knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner, or
   intended to do so.” 46
          This Court then decided United States v. Ferris, which applied Ruan
   to pharmacist violations of § 841. 47 Emphasizing that it is the unauthorized
   nature of prescriptions that renders conduct wrongful, not the dispensation
   itself, this Court held that the Government must prove that a pharmacist

          _____________________
          42
               21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added).
          43
               21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
          44
               Ruan, 142 S. Ct. at 2375.
          45
               Id.
          46
               Id.
          47
             52 F.4th at 242–43. Ferris was decided two days after Bubu submitted her Reply
   Brief. This Court allowed Bubu, Capistrano, and the Government to file supplemental
   briefs addressing Ferris’s impact on this case.

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   “knowingly or intentionally filled unauthorized prescriptions for a
   patient.” 48
                                                  1.
           Bubu raises two challenges regarding the jury instruction. We address
   each in turn.
           First, Bubu challenges the district court’s use of “or” rather than
   “and” in instructing the jury when a prescription is unauthorized. Section
   841 makes it unlawful, “[e]xcept as authorized[,] . . . for any person
   knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a
   controlled        substance.” 49      A    two-pronged       definition     provides      that
   prescriptions for controlled substances are authorized if they are (1) “issued
   for a legitimate medical purpose” and (2) “by an individual practitioner
   acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” 50 Bubu argues that
   the district court erred in instructing the jury that “it could convict upon a
   finding that she acted either without legitimate medical purpose or outside the
   usual practice of medicine, measured objectively.” 51

           _____________________
           48
                Id. at 243.
           49
                21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
           50
             21 C.F.R. § 1306.04. In United States v. Armstrong, we held that because “[b]oth
   prongs are necessary for a prescription to be legitimate[,] . . . a practitioner is unauthorized
   to dispense a controlled substance if the prescription either lacks a legitimate medical
   purpose or is outside the usual course of professional practice.” 550 F.3d 382, 397 (5th Cir.
   2008).
           51
              Bubu’s opening brief argues that the “‘knowing and intentional’ language of
   § 841 applies” to both prongs, and that convictions require both prongs. However, Bubu
   conceded this argument was foreclosed by Armstrong. See Armstrong, 550 F.3d at 397 (“[A]
   practitioner is unauthorized to dispense a controlled substance if the prescription either
   lacks a legitimate medical purpose or is outside the usual course of professional practice.”
   (emphasis removed)). In the interim, the Supreme Court decided Ruan, and Bubu’s reply
   brief urges that intervening decision “fully vindicates” her argument. We do not see it that

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           The district court’s jury instructions incorrectly stated the law by
   omitting the mens rea element. 52 This satisfies the first two prongs of the plain
   error test. 53 That said, we find that this error does not warrant a plain error
   reversal. While it is true the district court erred, and that error was clear, “an
   instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render
   a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining
   guilt or innocence.” 54 To justify reversal on plain error review, Bubu must
   show that the error affected her substantial rights. 55 “‘As a general rule, an
   error affects a defendant’s substantial rights only if the error was
   prejudicial.’” 56 “‘Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that
   the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.’” 57
           _____________________
   way. Ruan held that “§ 841’s ‘knowingly or intentionally’ mens rea applies to the ‘except
   as authorized’ clause.” 142 S. Ct. at 2376. The decision does not require that both prongs
   of authorization be lacking, which Bubu appears to recognize in her reply. Accordingly, a
   defendant can be convicted either for knowing prescriptions were issued for an illegitimate
   purpose or knowing they were dispensed outside the usual course of professional practice.
   We view Ruan as ridding the Government of the option—previously accepted under
   Armstrong—that a defendant can be convicted without knowledge for distributing
   prescriptions outside the objectively usual course of professional practice. 550 F.3d at 397.
           52
              See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); Nagin, 810 F.3d at 350–51; see
   also Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) (holding second prong of plain
   error review considers the law as clarified during time of appeal); United States v. Kahn, 58
   F.4th 1308, 1316 (10th Cir. 2023) (“Ruan expressly disallows conviction under § 841(a)(1)
   for behavior that is only objectively unauthorized. The [G]overnment must prove that a
   defendant ‘knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.’” (quoting Ruan,
   142 S. Ct. at 2376)).
           53
              See In re Deepwater Horizon, 824 F.3d at 583 (“[T]he district court erred [and]
   the error was clear or obvious.”).
           54
                Neder, 527 U.S. at 9.
           55
                Vasquez, 677 F.3d at 693.
           56
             United States v. Johnson, 943 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting
   United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 2010)).
           57
                Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 363).

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   In other words, the likelihood of a different result must be enough to
   undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. 58 Bubu fails to
   make this showing.
           Bubu’s failure to meaningfully address the third and fourth prongs of
   the plain error test either in her opening brief or in reply undermines her
   challenge. 59 Bubu’s initial brief does not argue that but for the error, there
   would be a reasonable probability she would be acquitted. Bubu even
   “assume[s] for the purpose of [substantial rights] that the [G]overnment
   presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant’s guilty
   knowledge under the correct standard,” but that because of the error, Bubu
   did not have a chance to defend herself. 60
           Bubu’s concession shows that she did have the “chance to defend
   herself”—the opportunity to present evidence that could have raised doubts
   about her knowledge. 61 Additionally, the record shows that Bubu’s counsel
   spent substantial time arguing that Bubu did not knowingly commit a crime.
   Because Bubu failed to argue that but for the incorrect jury instruction there
   was a reasonable probability that she would have been acquitted, she does not
   satisfy the plain error test. Accordingly, although the district court erred—
   based on an intervening Supreme Court case it could not know about at the
   time—in instructing the jury, such error does warrant reversal.

           _____________________
           58
           United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 365 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
   Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004)).
           59
                Bubu addresses the third and fourth prongs in only six sentences.
           60
             In support, Bubu cites her procedural history section, which includes a four-page
   discussion of the evidence the Government introduced to establish knowledge and a single
   paragraph noting that “some evidence tended to raise doubts about [Bubu’s] knowledge.”
           61
            We note that the two pieces of evidence Bubu points to “to raise doubts” are (1)
   a codefendant’s witness’s testimony and (2) testimony from a Government’s witnesses.

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                                             No. 21-10620

           Bubu’s second challenge argues the district court erred by “tethering
   the pharmacist’s criminal liability to a doctor’s misconduct.” She argues that
   the instructions exclusively address doctors’ practices and not pharmacists’
   practices and that any doctor’s unauthorized act—whether known or
   unknown by the doctor or pharmacist—could be imputed to a pharmacist.
   We conclude that reasonable minds can differ as to whether the instructions
   impute doctors’ misconduct to pharmacists, as the instructions simply ask
   the jury to consider each defendant’s “usual course of professional
   practice.” “[L]egal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
   reasonable dispute.” 62 This was not.
                                                   2.
           Capistrano raises three jury-instruction challenges. First, Capistrano
   challenges the instruction given by the district court. The written jury charge
   correctly instructed the jury to determine whether the controlled substances
   were “(1) prescribed for what the defendant subjectively considered to be a
   legitimate medical purpose.” However, at trial, the district court misread the
   charge, telling the jurors to consider objectively legitimate medical purposes.
   Capistrano contends this warrants reversal.
           To be sure, we have recognized the problematic nature of inconsistent
   jury instructions. 63 And we have found reversible error when written
   instructions were contradictory on an issue that neither party addressed
   during closing argument. 64 But when reviewing jury instructions, we “rarely

           _____________________
           62
                See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
           63
              Aero Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 1106, 1113 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
   that “it is impossible after verdict to ascertain which instruction the jury followed”
   (internal quotation omitted)).
           64
                Nowell ex rel. Nowell v. Universal Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1316–17 (5th Cir. 1986).

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                                             No. 21-10620

   will reverse a conviction based on a district court’s insignificant slip of the
   tongue.” 65 A “district court’s apparent mistake [is] sufficiently remedied to
   render any resulting error harmless” when the jury is given a copy of the
   instruction, in which “[t]he contradictory, erroneous statement is nowhere
   to be found.” 66 “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the instruction ‘could
   have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a
   reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.” 67
           Here, not only was there no error in the written instructions, the
   parties also spent extensive time discussing the subjective knowledge
   requirement during closing arguments. 68 Even though the district court
   misspoke, when “consider[ing] the instructions as a whole, the evidence
   presented, and the arguments of counsel[,]” we do not believe this error is
   “so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice.” 69 Accordingly, we
   find there was no reversible error. 70

           _____________________
           65
              United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no reversible
   plain error where one reference was made to proof by a preponderance of the evidence).
           66
             United States v. Sanders, 70 F.3d 1268 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (per curiam).
   In that event, “the district court’s ‘slip of the tongue,’ [is] cured by the straightforward
   and accurate statement of the applicable law subsequently furnished in writing to the
   jurors” and “d[oes] not constitute reversible error.” Id.; see also Phipps, 319 F.3d at 190
   (holding that a judge’s “single slip of the tongue” in mentioning in one count the
   preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
   standard in the jury instructions was not plain error).
           67
                Phipps, 319 F.3d at 190 (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994)).
           68
               See United States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming a
   conviction despite a slip of the tongue, because the “[i]solated statements which appear
   prejudicial when taken out of context [were] innocuous when viewed in the light of the
   entire trial”).
           69
                Nowell, 792 F.2d at 1316.
           70
           See Vaccaro v. United States, 461 F.2d 626, 636 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting the
   “numerous cases in which convictions have been upheld despite erroneous instructions”

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                                            No. 21-10620

            Second, like Bubu, Capistrano challenges the district court’s use of
   “or” rather than “and” in instructing the jury when a prescription is
   unauthorized. Unlike Bubu, however, Capistrano does not argue that the
   knowledge requirement applies to both authorization prongs. Rather, like
   Bubu, Capistrano argues that both prongs must be satisfied. Because the
   Government need not prove both prongs, Capistrano fails to establish plain
   error.
            Lastly, Capistrano argues that “the trial court did not clearly explain
   nor adequately define to the jury what good faith means.” The district
   court’s jury instructions make no mention of good faith. However, good faith
   is not a required element of the offense. 71 Capistrano fails to show any error,
   plain or otherwise. 72
                                                  B.
            In sum, neither Bubu nor Capistrano have shown that any errors
   affected their substantial rights or that we should exercise our discretion to
   correct any such errors. 73 We reject Bubu and Capistrano’s arguments that
   we must vacate their convictions because of the jury instructions.

            _____________________
   when it was confidently declared that the instructions “did not contribute to the verdict of
   guilt”).
            71
               Cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The
   first step in plain-error review is to determine whether there was error.”).
            72
                 See Nagin, 810 F.3d at 350–51.
            73
             See United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 553 (5th Cir. 2012) (“To affect the
   defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the
   outcome of the district court proceedings.”); United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415,
   425 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Additionally, we do not view the fourth prong as automatic if the
   other three prongs are met.”).

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                                               No. 21-10620

                                                   IV.
           We next address Bubu’s other claims. Her challenges all fail.
                                                   A.
           Bubu contends that the district court deprived her of her
   constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding—during
   sentencing—by allowing her to proceed pro se without a clear and
   unequivocal waiver. 74 “Sixth Amendment challenges to the validity of a
   waiver of counsel are reviewed de novo.” 75 To determine whether the district
   court violated Bubu’s right to counsel, we ask whether Bubu properly waived
   her right to counsel and whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. 76
                                                    1.
           A criminal defendant, by virtue of the Sixth Amendment, has the right
   to counsel at trial. 77 The right extends to the sentencing phase just as
   forcefully as to the guilt phase. 78 “Where a fundamental constitutional right,
   such as the right to counsel, is concerned, courts indulge every reasonable
   presumption against waiver.” 79 Without a clear election to forgo counsel, “‘a
   court should not quickly infer that a defendant unskilled in the law has waived

           _____________________
           74
              The parties do not dispute that sentencing is a critical stage in which defendants
   are entitled to be represented by counsel. See United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312–13
   (5th Cir. 1991).
           75
                United States v. Mesquiti, 854 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
           76
                Id. at 271–72.
           77
                See Taylor, 933 F.2d at 312.
           78
                Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Taylor, 933 F.2d at 312).
           79
             Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 272 (quoting United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 517 (5th
   Cir. 2008)).

                                                    18
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                                             No. 21-10620

   counsel and has opted to conduct his own defense.’” 80 Defendants “can
   waive [their] right to counsel implicitly, by [their] clear conduct, as well as by
   [their] express statement.” 81 Further, defendants’ “‘refusal without good
   cause to proceed with able appointed counsel constitutes a voluntary waiver
   of’ the right to counsel.” 82 “To constitute waiver, such a refusal must take
   the form of ‘a persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel.’” 83
           But the right is not limitless. Applied here, a criminal defendant is not
   entitled to a particular counsel, just a competent one. 84 As we have described
   this right previously, “‘[a] defendant is entitled to counsel capable of
   rendering competent, meaningful assistance. . . . No defendant has a right to
   more.’” 85
           The issue regarding Bubu’s representation was no minor dispute, but
   instead a continuous and long-running issue. At sentencing, Bubu repeatedly
   stated she did not want her current attorney, J. Stephen Cooper, to represent
   her. Bubu did not like the attorney previously appointed to her, so the district
   court allowed Bubu to hire Cooper, who was Bubu’s fourth attorney. The
   district court then instructed Bubu: “he is either going to be your lawyer, or
   you’re going to proceed pro se.” Cooper explained there was “some conflict”

           _____________________
           80
             Burton v. Collins, 937 F.2d 131, 133 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Brown v. Wainwright,
   665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1982)).
           81
                Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 272 (citation omitted).
           82
                Id. (quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 350 (5th Cir. 2007)).
           83
                Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983)).
           84
             Moore, 706 F.2d at 540; see also Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.
   1984) (“Although the sixth amendment’s right to counsel in criminal cases is absolute, an
   accused’s right to a particular counsel is not.”).
           85
             McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Moore, 706
   F.2d at 540).

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                                      No. 21-10620

   between Cooper and Bubu and that Bubu refused to talk to him. 86 The district
   court instructed Cooper to discuss the PSR and the dangers of self-
   representation with Bubu. After a 47-minute break, Cooper reported that
   Bubu refused to look at any documentation with him and when he spoke
   about the dangers of self-representation, she turned her back to him and said:
   “I’m representing myself.” Bubu told the district court she wanted a
   different lawyer to represent her. The district court spoke with the attorney
   Bubu wanted, who said he had not yet been retained to represent Bubu and
   that it would “not be feasible” to represent her at that time. The Government
   objected to Bubu bringing on a fifth attorney because “it seem[ed] like . . . a
   delay tactic” since Bubu had received “competent representation from her
   first lawyer through her fourth lawyer.” The district court agreed and, not
   wanting to keep delaying sentencing and recognizing Bubu’s “pattern” of
   “refus[ing] to talk to [her] attorneys[,]” denied Bubu’s request to fire
   Cooper and hire new counsel.
          When asked if she desired to represent herself, Bubu responded “No”
   but also insisted that Cooper could not represent her. When told she had to
   choose between two options: either Cooper representing her or representing
   herself, Bubu refused to answer the question, reiterating: “I want new
   counsel.” After more back and forth, the district court concluded: “you’ve
   made clear that you do not want Mr. Cooper to represent you in this case . . .
   So that means, ma’am, you are going to represent yourself.” The district
   court proceeded, then Bubu interjected to say: “I cannot represent myself
   right now, sir.” The district court asked Bubu to not interrupt him, and Bubu
   again said, “I cannot represent myself.” The district court asked if she

          _____________________
          86
             Cooper claims Bubu asked him to withdraw but refused to sign a motion to
   withdraw. Bubu claims there is “no record” that she spoke to Cooper and asked him to
   withdraw.

                                           20
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                                           No. 21-10620

   wanted Cooper to come back, which she eventually agreed to. Cooper
   returned and argued that Bubu “needs some credit for an exemplary life prior
   to this event,” asked for a minimum guidelines sentence, and introduced
   Bubu’s children to speak on her behalf.
           Bubu’s conduct—which she concedes was “frustrating”—waived
   counsel. Bubu persistently and unreasonably demanded that her counsel be
   dismissed. After having already dismissed multiple attorneys and refusing to
   cooperate and communicate with Cooper—and even turning her back to
   him—she insisted she would represent herself. Although Bubu never told the
   court she wished to represent herself, her actions relinquished her right to
   counsel. 87 Bubu does not argue that she had good cause to not proceed with
   Cooper. 88 And we have long-held that “[a] defendant’s refusal without good
   cause to proceed with able appointed counsel constitutes a voluntary” decision
   to proceed pro se. 89 We find Bubu’s actions as a voluntary waiver of the right
   to counsel.
                                                 2.
           While Bubu may have voluntarily waived the right to counsel, we must
   next ask if it was done knowingly and intelligently. 90 Defendants must “be

           _____________________
           87
            See Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 274 (“Mesquiti stated, ‘I don’t accept [current counsel]
   as my lawyer and I don’t consent to these proceedings.’”).
           88
              See United States v. Simpson, 645 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding a
   defendant does not have “good cause” to appoint substitute counsel where the defendant
   refused to communicate with his attorney).
           89
             United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299, 313 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added)
   (quoting Dunn v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also In re Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d
   109, 114–15 (5th Cir. 1993).
           90
            To be sure, the waivable right to counsel does not force a requirement of counsel
   on an unwilling criminal defendant. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 833–35 (1975).

                                                 21
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                                            No. 21-10620

   made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” 91 We
   require “district courts to exercise discretion in determining the precise
   nature of the warning provided to a defendant seeking to represent himself,
   depending on the circumstances of the individual case.” 92 “Although . . . the
   precise nature of appropriate warnings depends on the particularities of the
   case, we have generally required trial courts to provide warnings of
   substance, including at least a modicum of specificity.” 93
           Bubu argues that even if she waived her right to counsel, it was not a
   knowingly and intelligent choice because the court did not advise her that
   repeatedly requesting a new lawyer or asking for a continuance would result
   in immediate self-representation. The record shows otherwise.
           The district court told Bubu, “I am not continuing the case any longer.
   And so that means today, you can represent yourself . . . or you can be
   represented by Mr. Cooper.” The sentencing transcript reveals the district
   court repeatedly advised Bubu against self-representation and of the
   disadvantages of self-representation. For example, the district court
   cautioned Bubu: “I’m going to advise you that, in my opinion, you will be far
   better off remaining with your retained attorney, Mr. Cooper. I think it is
   unwise of you to try to represent yourself.” The district court even instructed

           _____________________
   A defendant may only relinquish this right, however, if it is knowingly and intelligently. Id.
   at 835; see also Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 272 (quoting Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81).
           91
                Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citation omitted).
           92
             Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 272–73 (citation omitted). “The trial court must consider
   various factors, including ‘the defendant’s age and education and other background,
   experience, and conduct.’” Id. at 273 (quoting McQueen, 755 F.2d at 1177).
           93
              Id. at 273. “The court must ensure that the waiver is not the result of coercion
   or mistreatment of the defendant and must be satisfied that the accused understands the
   nature of the charges, the consequences of the proceedings, and the practical meaning of
   the right [being waived].” Id. (quoting McQueen, 755 F.2d at 1177).

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                                              No. 21-10620

   Cooper to discuss “dangers and disadvantages” of self-representation with
   Bubu. Bubu argues that the court should have to warn defendants that their
   conduct could result in self-representation. While sometimes district courts
   do this, 94 we have never imposed such a requirement 95 and we decline to do
   so today. Given the district court’s multiple warnings and attempts to reason
   with Bubu, we hold Bubu knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to
   counsel.
                                                    B.
           Bubu challenges the district court’s refusal to grant a continuance. “A
   district court’s denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” 96
   “Trial judges have ‘broad discretion’ in ruling on motions for a
   continuance.” 97 “[T]he movant must show that the denial resulted in
   specific and compelling or serious prejudice.” 98 “This is true even where the
   denial of the continuance will shorten the amount of time available for
   preparation of the defendant’s case.” 99 “In review, we evaluate each
   situation on a case-by-case basis and normally consider only the reasons for
   continuance presented to the trial judge.” 100 To establish that denying a
           _____________________
           94
             See Moore, 706 F.2d at 539 (noting the court warned it was “highly likely” that
   the defendant’s “failure . . . to cooperate with [his attorney] in preparation of his case will
   be construed . . . as a waiver of his right to counsel”).
           95
                See generally, e.g., Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 267.
           96
                United States v. Piper, 912 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citations
   omitted).
           97
             Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 275 (quoting United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1393 (5th
   Cir. 1995)).
           98
                 United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
   omitted).
           99
                United States v. Gates, 557 F.2d 1086, 1088 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
           100
                 Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 275 (quoting Scott, 48 F.3d at 1393).

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                                             No. 21-10620

   continuance was an abuse of discretion, Bubu “must show that the denial
   resulted in ‘specific and compelling or serious prejudice.’” 101 We will uphold
   the decision below so long as it was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 102
           Bubu argues the district court abused its discretion in denying her
   continuance request made at sentencing because she was unprepared to
   represent herself. While Bubu’s briefs identify the correct standard, she fails
   to address the “specific and compelling or serious prejudice” that resulted
   from the denial of the continuance. To be sure, Bubu maintains that she
   needed more time to prepare to discuss her PSR objections. That said, she
   fails to explain how this discussion would have aided her defense. She
   therefore cannot establish prejudice. 103
           The record also indicates that prior to Bubu’s request, the district
   court paused proceedings and instructed Bubu and her counsel to review the
   PSR. She refused to do so. Any resulting prejudice was by her own hand.
   Bubu’s counsel was available and capable of representing her, and she may
   not indefinitely postpone hearings to seek representation. 104 The district
   court acted well within its discretion in refusing to grant the requested
   continuance.
                                                   C.
           Bubu argues that the district court erred by adopting the PSR without
   first hearing objections from her attorney, violating her Rule 32 rights, which

           _____________________
           101
                 Id. (quoting Barnett, 197 F.3d at 144).
           102
                 United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
           103
                 See Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 276.
           104
              See Gates, 557 F.2d at 1088 (“[A] defendant ‘may not indefinitely postpone trial
   by continued applications for more time to seek representation.’” (quoting United States v.
   Arlen, 252 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 1958))).

                                                   24
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                                          No. 21-10620

   require sentencing courts to “allow the parties’ attorneys to comment on the
   probation officer’s determinations and other matters relating to an
   appropriate sentence.” 105 Because Bubu did not object to the PSR below,
   plain error review applies. 106
           Bubu argues neither she nor her attorney had a chance to object.
   Nowhere does the Rule require courts to hear comments before ruling on PSR
   objections. The Rule governing parties’ opportunities to speak, Rule
   32(i)(4)(A), provides that defendants and their attorneys must have an
   opportunity to speak “[b]efore imposing sentence,” not before adopting the
   PSR. 107 Bubu argues but cites no support for the assertion that “[a]t least
   where the defendant proceeds pro se, the same reasoning suggests that the
   court errs when ruling on PSR objections without soliciting argument from
   the defendant.” We have noted that “‘[t]he touchstone of [R]ule 32 is
   reasonable notice’ to allow counsel adequately to prepare a meaningful

           _____________________
           105
               FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(C). Bubu’s initial brief quotes the correct
   subsection—Rule 32(i)(1)(C)—but incorrectly cites to 32(i)(4)(C), which is not relevant
   to Bubu’s appeal. Bubu’s Reply Brief cites the correct provision in some places and the
   incorrect in others.
           106
               See United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). While
   Bubu did not object to this below, she argues that we should review for harmless error
   because she was not given an opportunity to object. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b) (“If a
   party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection
   does not later prejudice that party.”). However, the sentencing transcript reveals that Bubu
   did not attempt to object to the PSR. Bubu points to the judge telling her: “Please don’t
   interrupt me.” But not only was Bubu interrupting to object to her self-representation, this
   occurred after the court acknowledged and ruled on the PSR objections. We have long held
   that “[a] party must raise a claim of error with the district court in such a manner so that
   the district court may correct itself.” United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir.
   1995) (quoting United States v. Bullard, 13 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1994)). Bubu did not do
   so here.
           107
                 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A).

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                                          No. 21-10620

   response and engage in adversary testing at sentencing.” 108 Here, both Bubu
   and her attorney were given opportunities to speak at sentencing. While the
   Federal Sentencing Guidelines say that “[w]hen any factor important to the
   sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given
   an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that
   factor[,]” it notes that counsel’s “[w]ritten statements” may suffice. 109 That
   is what happened here. Bubu’s attorney filed written objections.
   Additionally, unlike Rule 32(i)(1)(B) and Rule 32(i)(4)(A), Rule 32(i)(1)(C)
   does not require courts to “give [defendants] a reasonable opportunity to
   comment,” 110 “address the defendant personally,” 111 or “provide the
   defendant’s attorney an opportunity to speak.” 112 Rule 32(i)(1)(C) instead
   requires that parties’ attorneys be allowed to comment. 113 At no point did the
   district court prohibit Bubu’s attorney from commenting. Bubu has not
   established that the district court committed a clear or obvious violation of
   Rule 32(i)(1)(C).

           _____________________
           108
                United States v. Angeles–Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 749 n.12 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 845 (5th Cir. 2004));
   see also Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008) (“Sound practice dictates that
   judges in all cases should make sure that the information provided to the parties in advance
   of the hearing, and in the hearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront
   and debate the relevant issues.”).
           109
           U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 & cmt (U.S. Sent’g
   Comm’n 2016).
           110
                 Rule 32(i)(1)(B).
           111
                 Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).
           112
                 Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i).
           113
                 Rule 32(i)(1)(C).

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                                             No. 21-10620

                                                  D.
           Bubu challenges as improper hearsay the admission of an
   investigator’s testimony about an intercepted conversation between
   LaTonya Tucker, a receptionist for Capistrano who secured money from
   patients, and Ritchie Milligan, a recruiter, in which the two discuss “Little
   Barry Hill.” 114 Although evidentiary rulings are usually reviewed for abuse of
   discretion, a defendant must preserve the challenge through an objection. 115
   We review unpreserved challenges for plain error. 116
           Bubu argues she preserved the challenge by objecting to and
   referencing the presence of double hearsay in the challenged testimony at
   trial. But at trial, Bubu objected to a wiretapped conversation between
   Tucker and Milligan as double hearsay because it included “two different
   people talking.” The testimony about Jonathan McGillivray that Bubu
   challenges on appeal occurred after the district court overruled Bubu’s
   double hearsay objection. That objection did not preserve the error Bubu now
   urges because it was not “sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the
   nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” 117
   We therefore review for plain error. 118

           _____________________
           114
              See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); see also, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664
   F.3d 467, 501–03 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised (Dec. 27, 2011) (discussing Rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
   The conversation revealed (1) that Bubu allowed Little Barry Hill to fill fraudulent
   prescriptions, and (2) that Little Barry Hill is a street name for Jonathan McGillivray.
           115
            United States v. Morin, 627 F.3d 985, 994 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
   Sanchez-Hernandez, 507 F.3d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 2007)).
           116
                 United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 2014).
           117
             United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
   Ocana, 204 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2000)).
           118
                 Akins, 746 F.3d at 597.

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            Bubu contends this testimony is double hearsay because “[i]t
   reflected both the conversation between Ms. Tucker and Mr. Milligan and
   some prior conversation relating these facts about Mr. McGillivray to either
   Ms. Tucker or Mr. Milligan.” Bubu does not contest that the conversation
   between Tucker and Milligan is admissible under the conspiracy hearsay
   exclusion. She rather argues that Turner and Miller do not have personal
   knowledge of the information about McGillivray. But this contention brings
   no comfort. The record is insufficient to determine whether Turner or Miller
   obtained the information about McGillivray first-hand or in the furtherance
   of a conspiracy. 119 Any error was neither plain nor obvious. And there was
   substantial     evidence      about     McGillivray       and     Bubu’s      fraudulent
   transactions,120 so even if we did find errors, they did not affect Bubu’s
   substantial rights or seriously affect her trial’s fairness. We find no reversible
   error.
                                               E.
            Bubu challenges the district court’s allowing a DEA agent to
   authenticate her signature as a lay witness. Since Bubu objected at trial, the
   district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse

            _____________________
            119
              The parties argue about this possibility in their briefs. A statement is “not
   hearsay” if “[t]he statement is offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the
   party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” FED. R. EVID.
   801(d)(2)(E).
            120
               Evidence at trial included text messages between McGillivray and Bubu
   disputing cash payments. McGillivray sent Bubu text messages saying things like “I will
   draw [sic] off the patients I owe you tomorrow” and “I have all the patients and all my
   money.” Bubu told McGillivray to “Please remove [her pharmacy’s] logo from vials.” And
   on the day the Texas State Board of Pharmacy went to Bubu’s pharmacy, Bubu sent
   McGillivray a series of frantic texts, including: “Emergency” and “They say all X are fake.
   Call me.”

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                                             No. 21-10620

   of discretion subject to harmless error. 121 The metric is “unless manifestly
   erroneous,” we will not reverse. 122
           At trial, the district court overruled Bubu’s objection to a DEA
   agent’s lay testimony identifying two of her signatures. 123 The agent gained
   familiarity with Bubu’s handwriting during the course of the investigation.
   Bubu argues that familiarity developed during a criminal investigation is
   “acquired for purposes of the litigation” and not admissible as lay witness
   testimony. While we have not addressed whether an investigator who
   develops familiarity about handwriting during an investigation may
   authenticate the handwriting as a lay witness, our sister circuits have. We are
   persuaded by their reasoning.
           Under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a signature can be
   authenticated by “[a] nonexpert’s opinion that handwriting is genuine, based
   on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.” 124
   “Testimony based upon familiarity acquired for purposes of the litigation,”
   on the other hand, must be provided as expert testimony. 125 The First,
   Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all allow investigators who
   become familiar with handwriting in the process of solving a crime to testify
   at trial as lay witnesses. 126 “Each of those circuits has drawn a distinction,

           _____________________
           121
                 United States v. Moparty, 11 F.4th 280, 295 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
           122
              Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
   Tucker, 345 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2003)).
           123
              Bubu concedes in her reply that the third signature she objected to, Tomlinson’s
   signature on a patient consultation log, has no bearing on her case.
           124
                 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2).
           125
                 FED. R. EVID. 901(b) advisory committee’s note.
           126
              See United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155, 1167 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v.
   Harris, 786 F.3d 443, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ali, 616 F.3d 745, 753–54 (8th

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                                             No. 21-10620

   either explicitly or implicitly, between becoming familiar with someone’s
   handwriting ‘for the current litigation’ and doing so for the purpose of
   determining if the defendant has committed a crime.” 127 We found no sister
   circuit holding differently, nor did Bubu identify one.
           Here, the agent’s testimony was not merely a “one-shot comparison”
   where a witness identifies handwriting for the first time in the courtroom
   during trial.128 Rather, over the course of the investigation, the agent
   reviewed 20,000 pages of prescriptions with witness signatures. Given that
   an “investigator is in the same position as any other lay witness who, as part
   of his job or in his day-to-day affairs, has seen examples of the defendant’s
   handwriting, such as the defendant’s ‘accountant, employee[,] or family
   member[,]’” 129 we join our four sister circuits in holding that the district
   court did not err in admitting the agent’s testimony.
                                                 V.
           Finally, we address Capistrano’s other claims. None is meritorious.

           _____________________
   Cir. 2010); United States v. Samet, 466 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Scott,
   270 F.3d 30, 48–50 (1st Cir. 2001).
           127
                 Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1166.
           128
             Cf. United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding lay testimony
   was properly excluded when the “familiarity” was gained “solely by comparing the
   signature” to the witness’s signature on day of trial).
           129
               Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1167 (first alteration in original) (quoting Samet, 466 F.3d at
   256); see also United States v. Kilgore, 518 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding witnesses
   with experience viewing a defendant’s initials and the types of documents they would sign
   could prove that by affidavit).

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                                             No. 21-10620

                                                   A.
           Capistrano objects to statements made during the Government’s
   closing argument as mischaracterizing the facts. The statements were
   objected to at trial. We review for abuse of discretion. 130
           “A criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a
   prosecutor’s comments standing alone,” and “[t]he determinative question
   is whether the prosecutor’s remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of
   the jury’s verdict.” 131 To determine whether there was prosecutorial
   misconduct, we ask whether “the prosecutor made an improper remark” and
   whether “the defendant was prejudiced.” 132 Prejudice is a “high bar.” 133
           Capistrano objected to the Government’s assertion that he had “zero
   cancer patients.” The district court overruled the objection and instructed
   the jury: “you will remember what the evidence shows.” “The closing
   argument must be analyzed in the context of the entire case to determine
   whether it affected substantial rights of the accused. In making this
   determination, [we] should consider the strength of the [G]overnment’s case
   and the trial court’s instructions to the jury.” 134 The evidence shows that a
   “few” of Capistrano’s patients were diagnosed with cancer. But Capistrano
   did not treat patients for cancer, he treated them for “pain.” So when one of
   Capistrano’s employees was asked if they saw “any cancer patients at all[,]”

           _____________________
           130
                 See United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 361 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
           131
                 United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (citations
   omitted).
           132
                 Fields, 483 F.3d at 358 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
           133
              United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 492 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and
   citation omitted).
           134
                 United States v. Chase, 838 F.2d 743, 749 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

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                                            No. 21-10620

   she responded “No.” Given the substantial evidence against Capistrano and
   the district court’s instructions to “remember what the evidence shows,” we
   find no reversable error. Indeed, the Government’s argument is consistent
   with the evidence. Moreover, if the evidence in the case to support a
   conviction is strong, it is unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by any
   improper arguments made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. 135
                                                  B.
           Capistrano argues his counsel was ineffective because he did not
   request home detention, failed to make various objections, failed to
   investigate claims, failed to object to jury instructions, and failed to request a
   Franks hearing. 136 Yet we review a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
   (“IAC”) on direct appeal “[o]nly when the record is sufficiently developed
   with respect to such a claim.” 137 That is, evidence or examples establishing
   deficient performance or prejudice. 138 We have none here. As the record is
   not sufficiently developed to evaluate Capistrano’s IAC claim, we decline to
   consider the claims on direct appeal. 139

           _____________________
           135
              See United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1990). Even if we
   did credit this claim, after reviewing the record and considering the relevant factors, we
   cannot conclude that remark undermines the correctness of the verdict.
           136
                 See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
           137
              United States v. Rosalez-Orozco, 8 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal
   quotation and citation omitted).
           138
                 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
           139
               See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States
   v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“If we cannot fairly evaluate the
   claim from the record, we must decline to consider the issue without prejudice to a
   defendant’s right to raise it in a subsequent proceeding.” (citations omitted)).

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                                          No. 21-10620

                                                C.
           Capistrano is proceeding pro se, so we must “interpret his brief
   liberally to afford all reasonable inference which can be drawn from them.” 140
   By the rules, pro se “litigants must still brief the issues and reasonably comply
   with the standards of Rule 28 in order to preserve them.” 141 Failure to
   comply with this Court’s rules results in dismissal. 142 We will not address his
   remaining arguments as they either are frivolous or inadequately briefed. 143
                                               VI.
           In sum, we AFFIRM Appellants’ convictions and sentences. There
   is sufficient evidence for a jury to draw reasonable inferences to support
   Appellants’ convictions. Bubu and Capistrano fail to make the showings
   necessary to warrant plain error reversal. Bubu’s refusal to be represented by
   her retained attorney amounted to a knowing and voluntarily waiver of
   counsel. Bubu fails to show the necessary prejudice for her challenges to the
   denial for a continuance, as well as permitting a DEA agent to authenticate
   her signature as a lay witness. The Government’s closing argument was

           _____________________
           140
                 In re Tex. Pig Stands, Inc., 610 F.3d 937, 941 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation
   omitted).
           141
              Arredondo v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 950 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir.
   2020) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
           142
                 Id. (citation omitted)
           143
                These include claims: (1) that the district court lacked subject matter
   jurisdiction over him because Article III does not mention “district court[s]”; (2) the
   Government lacked standing because the United States of America cannot be a named
   party; (3) he cannot be convicted for a Title 21 offense because he did not sign a contract
   with the United States; (4) he was not allowed to testify before being charged by a grand
   jury; (5) he was a victim of selective prosecution; (6) he had a right to a hearing of which
   he was deprived; (7) the district court inappropriately engaged in usurping the power of the
   State of Texas’s medical board; (8) the evidence offered at trial was falsified; and (9) the
   government failed to turn over his patient files.

                                                33
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                                     No. 21-10620

   consistent with the evidence. The record is not sufficiently developed to
   evaluate Capistrano’s IAC claim. And Capistrano’s additional claims are
   either frivolous or insufficiently briefed.
          AFFIRMED.

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                                           No. 21-10620

   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
   dissenting in part:
           Decades ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Judge Learned
   Hand, two of our nation’s preeminent legal minds, were having lunch, and
   after breaking bread, “as Holmes began to drive off in his carriage, Hand, in
   a sudden onset of enthusiasm, ran after him, crying, ‘Do justice, sir, do
   justice.’ Holmes stopped the carriage and reproved Hand: ‘That is not my
   job. It is my job to apply the law.’” 1
           “The exchange between the two judges is part of an age-old struggle
   to define the relation of law and justice and to determine to which the judge
   owes loyalty.” 2 In Hand’s telling of the story, he did so only “to provoke a
   response” from Holmes, knowing full-well that he agreed with Holmes’s
   view of his juridical responsibility. 3 And, indeed, as students of these two
   stalwarts and their jurisprudential philosophy know both believed their duty
   and fidelity was strictly to the law rather than to one’s individual concept of a
   just outcome. 4 By contrast, those like Chief Justice Earl Warren or Judge J.

           _____________________
           1
             ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6 (1990). Over the years, this
   story has been told with slight variations. See, e.g., Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations
   of A Thirce-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 111–12 (1996) (retelling the story as told by Hand
   himself, Bork, and Prof. Abram Chayes).
           2
               Herz supra n.1 at 112–13.
           3
            Id. at 111 (quoting Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty
   302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)).
           4
             See id. at 114–15 & n.11–13; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: J. Skelly
   Wright, 102 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1988) (“If useful at all, the labels may be more serviceable
   to distinguish the judge who sees his role as guided by the principle that ‘justice or
   righteousness is the source, the substance and the ultimate end of the law,’ from the judge
   for whom the guiding principle is that ‘courts do not sit to administer justice, but to
   administer the law.’ Such legendary names as Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand
   have been associated with the latter view.”).

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                                           No. 21-10620

   Skelly Wright, two luminaries of their day, fall into the latter category. 5 With
   regard to Bubu’s conviction on Count 3, the majority is loyal to neither.
           Though I join the remainder of the Court’s opinion vis-à-vis Bubu’s
   other convictions as well as those of her co-defendants, as I believe there is a
   miscarriage of justice afoot, I would not affirm the sentence imposed for her
   drug trafficking conviction in Count 3.
                                                   I.
           One month after oral argument, Bubu’s counsel moved to file
   supplemental briefing raising a new claim: “whether the Court reversibly
   erred in imposing a sentence of 20 months on Count Three, when 21 U.S.C.
   §§ 841(b)(1)(E)(3) and 846 set forth a maximum of 12 months.” 6 The
   unopposed motion for leave to file was directed to me as a single judge matter
   and granted, with a request that the Government respond. 7 It did,
   “agree[ing] [that] the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and that the
   sentence could not be greater than 12 months” and urging that “the Court []
   reform the judgment to reduce the sentence” in accordance with the
   statutory maximum rather than remanding altogether. 8 In other words, the
   Government conceded plain error urging that the panel correct the error
   rather than remand for a new sentencing hearing.

           _____________________
           5
               See Brennan, supra n.4 at 361–62;
           6
             Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Letter Brief Regarding
   Statutory Maximum on Count Three at 1, United States v. Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu, No. 21-
   10620 (Dkt. No. 455).
           7
               See generally Order, United States v. Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu, No. 21-10620 (Dkt. No.
   459).
           8
            Government’s Response to Supplemental Letter Brief at 2, United States v. Ethel
   Oyekunle-Bubu, No. 21-10620 (Dkt. No. 455).

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                                               No. 21-10620

                                                     II.
              When the Government confesses that a person is facing nearly a year
   in prison for which there is no legal basis—it matters. Nigh a century ago, the
   Supreme Court made clear that “[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in
   criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own
   motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are
   obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.” 9 Twenty-six and a half years later, the
   High Court reaffirmed that principle. 10 Since that pronouncement, our Court
   has taken that principle to heart, “recogniz[ing] an exception to” the general
   waiver rule “whereby we will consider a point of error not raised on appeal
   when it is necessary ‘to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” 11 The Federal
   Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically endow us with the authority to
   reverse a sentence on the basis of plain error, even though the defendant has

              _____________________
              9
                   United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (emphasis added).
              10
                   See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962) (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S.
   at 160).
              11
              United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 346 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United
   States v. Montemayor, 703 F.2d 109, 114 n.7 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also, e.g., United States v.
   Douglas, 910 F.3d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (Dec. 19, 2018) (“The threshold
   question is whether we should address the district court’s error at all because Douglas did
   not object below or raise this issue in his opening brief. We answer in the affirmative.”);
   United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[I]n very rare
   instances, we have applied the plain-error standard to errors neither preserved below nor
   argued on appeal.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We may
   raise an issue sua sponte ‘even though it is not assigned or specified’ when ‘plain error is
   apparent’” (quoting United States v. Pineda–Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 105 (5th Cir. 1992)));
   United States v. Musquiz, 445 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1971) (“We notice this error on our
   own motion, as we think we are required to do when the error is so obvious that failure to
   notice it would ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.’” (quoting the above passage from Atkinson quoted in Silber)).

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                                             No. 21-10620

   not raised the issue on appeal. 12 And of course, this issue was raised on
   appeal, albeit not in a timely fashion. To these eyes, the error at issue here
   falls squarely within this exception. This is no minor error, but one the
   Government concedes will subject Bubu to nearly one year of prison beyond
   her legal sentence.
           If the point is to impose discipline upon counsel for their
   shortcomings, it misses the mark. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote just over
   two centuries ago, “the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not
   in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to
   define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” 13 Affirming this sentence beyond
   what Congress permits, as our Court does today, exceeds our power and
   usurps that of the Congress. Indeed, I can think of no clearer subject of
   “exceptional circumstances” worthy of action than an unlawful sentence. 14
   And in conceding the error, the Government asked this Court to correct the
   error and otherwise affirm rather than remand for resentencing. 15

           _____________________
           12
              See Whitfield, 590 F.3d at 346–47 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b): “A plain error
   that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the
   court’s attention”).
           13
                United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
           14
             Accord, e.g., United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 522 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Both
   the Supreme Court and this circuit have found sua sponte consideration of plain error to be
   appropriate to remedy unlawful sentences imposed by the district court.”); cf. Bartone v.
   United States, 375 U.S. 52, 53 (1963) (holding that district court’s error in increasing
   sentence by one day in the absence of the defendant “was so plain . . . that it should have
   been dealt with by the Court of Appeals, even though it had not been alleged as error”).
   And beyond fairness, “judicial economy [also] dictate[s] that we address now this issue
   that would doubtless otherwise be raised in a subsequent habeas proceeding.” Pineda-
   Ortuno, 952 F.2d at 105.
           15
               See generally Government’s Response to Supplemental Letter Brief, United
   States v. Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu, No. 21-10620 (Dkt. No. 455).

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                                          No. 21-10620

           Our Court has corrected errors in unlawful sentences without remand
   for unlawful terms of supervised release 16 or where the modification of the
   carceral term for one count did not impact the total imprisonment. 17 I would
   remand the case and allow the able district judge to exercise his discretion.
           The form of the remedy aside—affirm with a modification or
   remand—inaction ought not be countenanced, as the Court’s opinion
   demands Ethel Oyekunle-Bubu stay in prison eight months more than
   Congress deemed permissible.

           _____________________
           16
              See United States v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Although
   McWaine does not raise this issue, we have the discretion to sua sponte modify the term.
   . . . This Court has modified terms of supervised release that exceeded the statutory
   maximum without remanding for re-sentencing. Accordingly, this Court hereby modifies
   the district court’s sentence of five years’ supervised release for Count 1 to three years.”);
   United States v. Castenada, No. 00-40929, 2002 WL 334721, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (“We find that Castenada’s four-year term of supervised
   release exceeds the statutory maximum of three years. . . . We therefore modify
   Castenada’s supervised release to the statutorily mandated three-year term.”).
           17
              See United States v. Sotelo, 401 F. App’x 967, 969 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
   (per curiam) (“Sotelo’s 87–month sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of 60 months
   for the conspiracy offense. Accordingly, we MODIFY Sotelo’s sentence for the conspiracy
   charge to 60 months in prison. . . . The modification does not affect the overall term of
   imprisonment because Sotelo's concurrent sentence for his exportation charge exceeds the
   modified sentence. . . . Sotelo’s sentences are thus AFFIRMED as modified.”); United
   States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 354 F. App’x 133, 134 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per
   curiam) (“The maximum term of imprisonment allowed for a violation of §
   1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(ii) is five years. . . . As the Government concedes, Hernandez-
   Muniz’s sentence of 65 months of imprisonment for transporting an alien exceeds the 60-
   month maximum and constitutes plain error that affects his substantial rights and affects
   the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. . . . Accordingly,
   we modify the term of imprisonment imposed for Hernandez-Muniz’s conviction for
   violating § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(ii) to 60 months. . . . The modification does not affect
   the overall term of imprisonment because Hernandez-Muniz’s concurrent sentence for his
   illegal reentry conviction exceeds the modified sentence for his violation of §
   1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(ii).”).

                                                39
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                                         No. 21-10620

                                            *****
           No jurisdictional bar prevents this Court from correcting this error. 18
   With respect, to these eyes, refusing to do so works a manifest injustice
   without principled justification.
           I accept the necessity of maintaining the guardrails of our court with
   its myriad rules of preclusion, but I would correct this error—and in doing so
   would be attending these rules, enabling their function without blinking at an
   injustice we are duty-bound to correct. This is not the pursuit of justice and
   fairness in the abstract. It is simply a citizen’s government refusing to enforce
   a prison sentence it confesses is illegal.
           With respect, I must DISSENT from affirming Bubu’s sentence for
   Count 3.

           _____________________
           18
              See United States v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d 270, 282 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding
   “we have jurisdiction to review even unpreserved arguments”); United States v. Arellano-
   Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862, 865 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that while “‘[t]he proper time to
   closely examine the record and develop legal defenses is before the completion of
   briefing,’” and that “[w]e are even more reluctant to consider arguments raised after oral
   argument is complete and the case has been submitted for decision” because “[t]he proper
   time to closely examine the record and develop legal defenses is before the completion of
   briefing, not in the months after oral argument,” the Court retains discretion to consider
   such issues where “‘exceptional circumstances’” exist (quoting Martinez v. Mukasey, 519
   F.3d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 2008); and then quoting Silber, 370 U.S. at 718)); United States v.
   Guillen-Cruz, 853 F.3d 768, 777 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Whether we will consider an unpreserved
   argument is a matter of discretion.”).

                                               40