Court Opinion

ID: 9852713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:35:15.966344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:32.749956
License: Public Domain

WALTERS, Justice Pro Tem.,
specially concurring.
I concur with the conclusion reached in the foregoing opinion to the effect that Julian was informed of the cause of his arrest as required by I.C. § 19-608.
The Court’s lead opinion ably and thoughtfully applies the holding of Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.1969). However, I believe the issues of this case can be decided by construing Idaho Code § 19-603(6) alone, and thus write separately. In my view, the district court erred in its interpretation and application of I.C. § 19-603(6). To the contrary, I think Julian’s arrest for domestic battery was proper and that his motion to suppress evidence seized following his arrest should not have been granted by the district court. Accordingly, I agree that the district court’s order granting Julian’s suppression motion on the ground that the evidence was discovered during a search after an illegal arrest, should be reversed.
The crime for which Julian was arrested, domestic battery, was created by the legislature in 1993. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. *139344, § 1, p. 1283. Codified as I.C. § 18-918, the statute provides:
(1)For the purpose of this section, “adult household member” means a person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and is a spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time.
(3) An adult household member who commits a battery, as defined in section 18-903, Idaho Code, against another household member is guilty of domestic battery.
Subsection (4) of the statute sets forth three penalties for domestic battery. Under that subsection, a domestic battery may be a misdemeanor, or a felony, depending upon the offender’s prior record of convictions for the same offense, provided that the prior conviction or convictions occurred within specified periods of time. The citation given to Julian when he was arrested recited that he was charged with misdemeanor domestic battery.
Julian moved to suppress the cocaine found in his possession during the search following his arrest, asserting that his arrest was illegal because he was arrested without a warrant upon a charge of misdemeanor domestic battery and his arrest did not occur at a location where any act of alleged domestic violence had occurred. In response to Julian’s motion, the state contended that Julian’s arrest was valid and legal.
The district court recognized that the legality of an arrest is governed by state law and, in Julian’s case, the particular rules authorizing warrantless arrests. In this regard, the district court focused on Idaho Code § 19-603, the statute defining the arrest powers of peace officers. That statute, as it existed when Julian was arrested, recited:
When Peace Officer May Arrest. A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
(2) When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
(3) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(4) On a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
(5) At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony.
(6) When at the scene of a domestic disturbance there is reasonable came to believe, based upon physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the officer upon immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person arrested has committed an assault or battery. [Emphasis supplied.]
In analyzing the application of I.C. § 19-603 to Julian’s case, the district court held:
In this case, there is no dispute that the deputies arrested Julian for domestic battery. All of the officers testified at the preliminary hearing that Julian was arrested for domestic battery, and the citation issued to Julian indicates that Julian was arrested for misdemeanor battery. Because domestic battery is a misdemeanor charge, I.C. § 18-918(3), sections two, three, four and five of the arrest statute are facially inapplicable. None of the officers testified that they were aware any offense was being committed in their presence prior to or at the time of arrest [as referred to in I.C. § 19-603(1) ].
The remaining provision in the arrest statute, I.C. § 19-603(6), permits arrest for a domestic battery only “[w]hen at the scene of a domestic disturbance____” The arrest took place at the hospital, and there is no allegation in the record that any domestic disturbance occurred at the hospital. The citation issued to Julian upon his arrest indicates that the offense for which Julian was arrested took place at [Julian’s home address, and] the same citation states that the arrest took place at the “St. Luke’s E.R. parking lot.” There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Julian was arrested at the scene of a domestic disturbance. The pertinent facts conceded by the state establish *140that Julian’s arrest exceeded the scope of the arrest statute.
I think the district court erred in concluding that an arrest, without a warrant, is valid under I.C. § 19-603(6) only when the arrest is effected at the scene or location where the domestic disturbance has taken place. In my opinion, I.C. § 19-603(6) does not evince any legislative intent to specify where the arrest may occur. My conclusion results from a review of the legislative history of subsection 6 of I.C. § 19-603.
Subsection 6 of I.C. § 19-603 has as its genesis Senate Bill 1174 which was introduced in 1979 during the first regular session of the 45th Legislature.3 The title to Senate Bill 1174 recited:
RELATING TO WHEN PEACE OFFICERS MAY ARREST; AMENDING SECTION 19-603, IDAHO CODE, BY PROVIDING FOR ARRESTS WHEN THERE IS REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED AN ASSAULT OR BATTERY.
Following recitation of the provisions of then existing I.C. § 19-603, including subsections 1 through 5, Senate Bill 1174 proposed the addition of a new subsection, number 6, reading as follows:
6. When there is reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed an assault or battery.
Clearly, neither the title nor the text of the proposed amendment indicated that an arrest, to be valid, must occur either in the presence of the arresting officers or at the “scene” where the alleged assault or battery had occurred. Instead, the focus of the proposal seems to have been upon the point in time when “reasonable cause” may be found to exist so as to permit an arrest without a warrant.
After the Idaho Senate had adopted Senate Bill 1174, the bill was sent to the Idaho House of Representatives for consideration. There, the bill was referred to the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee for an initial review and recommendation. According to a copy of the minutes of that Committee dated March 19, 1979 (attached as an appendix to the state’s brief on the appeal in this case), Senator Black appeared before the Committee, and the following action was taken with respect to Senate Bill 1174:
Arrest for reasonable cause in assault and battery cases. Senator Black said this bill was designed to permit a police officer to arrest a person who is battering a family member to put an immediate stop to the violent situation. Rep. Paxman asked why under present law a police officer could not make such an arrest. Rep. McDermott replied that under present law a police officer cannot arrest under assault because it is a misdemeanor. A police officer can only arrest for a misdemeanor if he is an actual witness. He can arrest for a felony with reasonable cause.
Lloyd Webb spoke in opposition to this bill because it is in effect a warrantless arrest that could be expanded to other than domestic relations matters.4 Rep. McDermott asked if Mr. Webb would be willing to draft something that would limit it to domestic relations matters.
Rep. Harris moved that [Senate Bill] 1174 be sent to the floor with a “do pass” recommendation. Motion seconded by Rep. Smith. Rep. McDermott made an amended motion that [Senate Bill] 1174 be sent to general orders with amendments attached. Motion seconded by Rep. Horvath. The motion carried. Chairman Stivers asked Mr. Webb, Senator Black, and Jane Leeson to immediately prepare an amendment to the bill that would eliminate Mr. Webb’s problem with the bill. [Emphasis in original; footnote added.]
*141The bill was then presented to the floor of the House in an amended form. With the amendment underlined, the submitted bill read as follows:
6. When at the scene of a domestic distúrbame there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evideme observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the officer upon immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person arrested had committed an assault or battery.
The title to the bill remained the same: “Relating to when peace officers may arrest; amending section 19-603, Idaho Code, by providing for arrests when there is reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed an assault or battery.” The title refers only to when, i.e., the circumstances (existence of reasonable cause) under which an officer may make an arrest, not to where the arrest may occur.5
The bill, as amended, passed the House by a vote of 69 to 1 and was returned to the Senate. The Senate approved the amendment to the bill made by the House, and Senate Bill 1174 (as amended) was signed into law by Governor John Evans on April 3, 1979. See 1979 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 307, § 1, p. 832. This enactment was codified as I.C. § 19-603(6).
The interpretation given to I.C. § 19-603(6) by the district court below seems to have reworded, and added to, the statute’s provisions. As applied by the district court, the relevant portion of the statute, I.C. § 19-603, in shortened form would read:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person only at the scene of a domestic disturbance and when there is reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed an assault or battery.
To the contrary, I find nothing in the history of this legislation indicating that the Idaho Legislature intended that an arrest for a battery which happened during a domestic disturbance must be made only at the site where the disturbance occurred. Certainly, the enactment of subsection 6 of I.C. § 19-603 overrides the provision in subsection 1 which authorizes a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor only where the misdemeanor has occurred in the presence of the arresting officer.6
Instead, based on the legislative background regarding the insertion of the words “at the scene of a domestic disturbance” into the statute, I believe the phrase “when at the scene,” refers only to the circumstance giving rise to the existence of reasonable cause on the part of a peace officer who has responded to a report of the disturbance. The statute provides that such an officer, who has reasonable cause based upon his observation of physical evidence at that scene and considering any statements made to the officer, may make an arrest of the person who has committed an assault or battery. The reference to “the scene” can only mean the location where the information is generated which gives rise to reasonable cause on the part of the officer in order to subsequently arrest the offender.7 The statute does not require that the person arrested still be at the scene of the antecedent disturbance, or, indeed, at any specified location.8
*142It stands to reason that the officer may then arrest the offender wherever the offender may be found. This approach comports with the indicated intent of the legislature in enacting subsection 6 of I.C. § 19-603. An offender should not be allowed to circumvent the intent of the legislature allowing warrant-less arrests for assaults and batteries committed during domestic disturbances, and insulate himself or herself from an immediate arrest, by leaving the “scene” of such a disturbance and going to another location or other part of an area where the disturbance may have occurred, whether it be to another room, another building, another yard, or by going into the street, across the street, or moving a block or two away, or by taking the victim to a hospital for treatment. The location of the offender when the arrest is effected is simply not an element of the authority given to peace officers by the legislature in order to make a warrantless arrest under I.C. § 19-603(6) for having committed an assault or battery during a domestic disturbance.
Consequently, I conclude that the district court erred when it determined that Julian’s arrest was invalid. Because the arrest was valid, the order by the district court, granting Julian’s motion to suppress the evidence found in conjunction with his arrest, should be reversed.
DRESCHER, J. Pro Tern., concurs.

. Neither Senate Bill 1174 nor the subsequent amendment proposed by the Idaho House of Representatives to Senate Bill 1174 were submitted as part of the appellate record in this case. Those documents, however, are contained in the public records maintained by the Office of Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Budding.

. At the time, Mr. Webb was an attorney practicing in Twin Falls, and was the President of the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association.

. For the purpose of the appellate review in this case, it is well settled that a court may consider the title included with enacted legislation, in order to ascertain the intended scope of the legislation. State v. Mead, 61 Idaho 449, 102 P.2d 915 (1940).

. When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment. Lincoln County v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981).

. The same may be true with respect to the recent amendments to subsection 6 to include the crime of stalking and for violation of protection orders, recognized in footnote 1, ante, which may or may not have occurred precisely at the scene of a domestic disturbance but where sufficient information is gleaned from that scene to give an officer reasonable cause to believe that the crime or violation has occurred previously at any location.

.This conclusion parallels other provisions in § 19-603, i.e., subsections 2, 3, 4 and 5, which likewise do not make the validity of an arrest depend upon the location where the arrested person is found.