Court Opinion

ID: 9641864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:41:47.094141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:40.388940
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
Appellant claimed he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial judge forbade him to discuss his testimony with his attorney during a lunch recess. The majority found no denial of counsel and no harm because the restriction was brief and appellant showed no actual prejudice. I disagree.
Under no circumstances should a judge deny a litigant, particularly a criminal defendant, the opportunity to consult with counsel. To do so is a fundamental interference with the attorney-client relationship, regardless of the duration of the restriction. I would reverse appellant’s conviction because he was denied his right to the assistance of counsel in his defense, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The majority adopted the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Perry v. Leeke, 882 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.1987), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1269, 99 L.Ed.2d 480. In that case, the court created two categories of error. Where the recess is extreme in duration and the quality of a defendant’s representation overall is suspect, prejudice will be presumed and reversal is automatic. In other circumstances, the appellate court must inquire into prejudice. Perry, 832 F.2d at 841. Then a conviction will be reversed only if it offends notions of fundamental fairness. Id. at 843.
The per se rule applied in U.S. v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir.1976), and in Mudd v. U.S., 798 F.2d 1509 (D.C.Cir.1986) is more consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). After finding that restrictions for a lunch recess in Bryant and a weekend recess in Mudd violated the Sixth Amendment, both courts reversed the defendants’ convictions, without an inquiry into prejudice.
Based on both the policy concerns and our reading of Geders we conclude that [the appellant] is not required to show actual prejudice to his right to consult with counsel; it is enough to show that the ... court restricted this right.
Mudd, 798 F.2d at 1513.
Two problems arise from the Perry approach. First, the distinction between instances in which prejudice can be presumed and when it cannot is subject to the arbitrariness inherent in I-know-it-when-I-see-it standards of measurement. Second, and more importantly, the inquiry into prejudice mandated in many cases where prejudice would not be presumed threatens to violate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
We find that a per se rule best vindicates the right to the effective assistance of counsel. To require a showing of prejudice would not only burden one of the fundamental rights enjoyed by the accused, but also would create an unacceptable risk of infringing on the attorney-client privilege. The only way that a defendant could show prejudice would be to present evidence of what he and counsel discussed, what they were prevented from discussing, and how the order altered the preparation of his defense. Presumably the government would then be free to question defendant and counsel about the discussion that did take place, to see if defendant nevertheless received adequate assistance.
Mudd, 798 F.2d at 1513 (references omitted).
Whether the opportunity to consult with counsel results from a fortuitous or a fore*43seeable recess, a defendant may not be denied the right to take advantage of the occasion. Because appellant Moore was directed, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, not to discuss his testimony with counsel, I would reverse his conviction.