Court Opinion

ID: 9520727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:48:08.28778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:46.410638
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: I am unable to agree with the majority opinion. Clearly, as the majority recites, there are two lines of authority. The majority has chosen the least persuasive line of cases to follow. The cases cited by the defendant — Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. (1968), 12 Mich. App. 145,162 N.W.2d 676, Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Chahalis (Sup. Ct. 1972), 72 Misc. 2d 207, 338 N.Y.S.2d 348, Republic Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Buehl (1973), 295 Minn. 327,204 N.W.2d 426, McDonald v. Home Insurance Co. (N.J. App. 1987), 97 N.J. Super. 501, 235 A.2d 480, and Upland Mutual Insurance, Inc. v. Noel (1974), 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737 — are better reasoned and simply hold that the issuing insurance company was obligated to defend and that there was coverage under the homeowners policy because there was a failure to malee an express exception, exemption, or limitation for the liability at issue here. “Homeowners insurance,” as the court reasoned in Upland, is insurance upon which the insured is entitled to rely as a broad promise of coverage except to the extent of certain delineated exclusions. As is argued, one could not obtain liability coverage separately for a 14-year-old driver. Here there is a tort of negligent entrustment, and such coverage is promised by the policy here and is not excluded by the language of that policy. The exclusion as quoted applies to liability arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle — clearly an exclusion relating to insurance otherwise purchasable. Negligently entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to a 14-year-old is a separate and distinct tort and the injuries resulting from such entrustment do not arise out of the use or operation of the vehicle, but rather arise out of negligent entrustment.