Court Opinion

ID: 9908491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 21:00:33.184172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.655758
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4526

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JOHNNY KONG MENG VANG,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00105-KDB-DCK-1)

        Submitted: August 18, 2023                                    Decided: December 7, 2023

        Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded in part with instructions by unpublished
        per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Eric J. Foster, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph
        Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Johnny Kong Meng Vang pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to receiving and

        attempting to receive child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B),

        (b)(1). The district court sentenced Vang to 168 months’ imprisonment and a supervised

        release term of life. The court also imposed a $35,000 assessment on Vang. Vang’s

        counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating

        that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising as an issue whether the

        168-month prison term is substantively unreasonable. Vang filed a pro se supplemental

        brief in which he suggests that the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct at the

        sentencing hearing and that his sentence is unreasonable. After conducting review pursuant

        to Anders, this court ordered supplemental briefing to address the potentially meritorious

        issues of whether there is reversible error in this case under United States v. Rogers,

        961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021),

        and whether the district court reversibly erred in imposing the $35,000 assessment. In his

        supplemental brief, Vang’s counsel argues that the district court erred in imposing the

        $35,000 assessment because—contrary to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(c) and

        18 U.S.C. § 3572—it failed to consider the amount of restitution it ordered and to identify

        sentencing factors supporting imposition of an assessment at the statutory maximum.

        Counsel also argues that the district court erred in imposing on him several discretionary

        conditions of supervised release because it failed to provide a sufficient explanation for

        them. Invoking the appeal waiver in Vang’s plea agreement, the Government has moved

        to dismiss the appeal. Vang’s counsel has filed a response opposing the motion.

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               Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive his appellate rights. United

        States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, the Government seeks

        enforcement of an appeal waiver and there is no claim that it breached its obligations under

        the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver to preclude an appeal of a specific issue if

        the waiver is valid and the issue falls within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Soloff,

        993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021). Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal

        is a question of law we review de novo. Id. The validity of an appeal waiver depends on

        whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. United

        States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018). To determine whether a waiver is

        valid, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct

        of the defendant, his educational background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement and

        its terms.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally . . . if a district court

        questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.]

        11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of

        the waiver,” the waiver is both valid and enforceable. Id. (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that Vang knowingly and

        voluntary waived his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence, except based on claims

        of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. We therefore conclude

        that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the sentencing issues raised by counsel in

        the Anders and supplemental briefs and Vang in the pro se brief fall squarely within the

        scope of the waiver.

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               Turning to Vang’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we review them for plain

        error because Vang did not raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the district court.

        United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 689 (4th Cir. 2005). To succeed on a claim of

        prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the prosecution

        engaged in misconduct and that such conduct “prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights

        so as to deny the defendant a fair trial.” Id. We have reviewed the record and find no

        improper conduct on the part of the prosecution that prejudiced Vang. We thus discern no

        plain error warranting correction in this regard.

               Next, whether there is reversible error under Rogers with respect to discretionary

        conditions of supervised release is a matter we review de novo. United States v. Cisson,

        33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022). A district court must announce all nonmandatory

        conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296-99.

        This “requirement . . . gives defendants a chance to object to conditions that are not tailored

        to their individual circumstances and ensures that they will be imposed only after

        consideration of the factors set out in [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(d).” Id. at 300. In Singletary,

        this court explained that a challenge to discretionary supervised release conditions that

        were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of an appeal waiver

        because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first

        time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the defendant.” 984 F.3d at

        345.

               An inconsistency between the description of a condition of supervision announced

        at sentencing and in the written judgment may be reversible Rogers error where the

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        Government fails to explain the alleged inconsistency. See Cisson, 33 F.4th at 193-94. In

        imposing Vang’s supervised release conditions at sentencing, the district court ordered as

        to discretionary condition 11 that he “work full time, at least 30 hours per week[,] at lawful

        employment, actively seek such gainful employment, or be enrolled in a full-time

        educational or vocational program unless excused by the probation officer” and “notify the

        probation officer within 72 hours of any change regarding employment or education.” The

        written judgment, by contrast, directs Vang to “work full time (at least 30 hours per week)

        at lawful employment unless excused by the probation officer” and “notify the probation

        officer within 72 hours of any change regarding employment.” In the context of this record,

        however, it is clear the district court’s intention was to require that Vang work at lawful

        employment, seek gainful employment, or be enrolled in an educational or vocational

        program during the period of his supervised release. “The proper remedy is for the [d]istrict

        [c]ourt to correct the written judgment so that it conforms with the sentencing court’s oral

        pronouncements.” United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 29 n.1 (4th Cir. 1965).

               In accordance with Anders, we also have reviewed the entire record in this case and

        have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s

        motion to dismiss the appeal in part, affirm in part, and remand in part to the district court

        with instructions to correct the written judgment to conform with the court’s oral

        pronouncement of discretionary condition 11, leaving the remainder of Vang’s sentence

        undisturbed. This court requires that counsel inform Vang, in writing, of the right to

        petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Vang requests that a

        petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

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        may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

        state that a copy thereof was served on Vang.

              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                 DISMISSED IN PART,
                                                                  AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                            AND REMANDED IN PART WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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