Court Opinion

ID: 9960769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 02:00:53.914579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:52.173551
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
PENLAND, MORRIS, and ARGUELLES!
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Specialist TAYRON D. DAVIS
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20220272

Headquarters, 21st Theater Sustainment Command
Charles L. Pritchard, Jr., Military Judge (arraignment)
Thomas P. Hynes, Military Judge (trial)
Colonel Tony Y. Kim, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Bryan A. Osterhage, JA (argued); Major Bryan A. Osterhage,
JA; Jonathan F. Potter, Esquire (on brief); Colonel Philip M. Staten, JA; Jonathan F.
Potter, Esquire; Major Bryan A. Osterhage, JA (on reply brief).

For Appellee: Captain Stewart A. Miller, JA (argued); Colonel Christopher B.
Burgess, JA; Major Chase C. Cleveland, JA; Captain Stewart A. Miller, JA (on
brief).

27 March 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

PENLAND, Senior Judge:

The interests of impartial justice prevail over concerns about docket delay.
Where a supervisory judge details a non-impartial judge in order to obtain a
particular result and avoid interlocutory appellate review, reasonable doubt emerges
about the trial’s fundamental fairness, and we grant relief.

' Judge ARGUELLES decided this case while on active duty.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

A military judge, sitting alone as a general court-martial, convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of sexual assault in violation of Article
120, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 920. The military judge
sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge and 120 days of confinement.

We review the case under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant raises one assignment
of error, which merits discussion and relief.”

BACKGROUND

For context, it is necessary to briefly mention a previous case. In United
States v. Dial, Colonel (Judge) Charles Pritchard, Chief Judge of the Army’s 5th
Judicial Circuit, granted a defense motion for a unanimous verdict. The government
petitioned this court for extraordinary relief, and we stayed the case to consider it.’

In this case, we responded to appellant’s motion for appellate discovery by
ordering affidavits from Judge Pritchard and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hynes, who
ultimately presided at trial.

In his affidavit, Judge Pritchard wrote that he anticipated he would continue
to receive similar unanimous verdict motions from other accused soldiers appearing
before him while Dial was stayed. While not certain, Judge Pritchard anticipated he
would make similar decisions in future panel cases, including appellant’s, depending
on appellate review of his previous rulings. Judge Pritchard was concerned about
prospective appellate stays in future cases and their effect on the circuit’s docket.

Based on this concern, Judge Pritchard removed himself from future panel
cases, at least until after interlocutory appellate review in Dial. As discussed in
greater detail below, this “removal” was the functional equivalent of a recusal under
Rule for Court Martial [R.C.M.] 902.

* We have fully and fairly considered appellant’s remaining matter under United
States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). Our disposition renders it moot,
but we do harbor concern that an impartial observer could reasonably conclude that
the interests of speed improperly influenced the military judge to deny appellant’s
motion for expert assistance. See also United States v. Kornickey, ARMY 20210636,
2023 CCA LEXIS 336 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 31 July 2023) (mem. op.); United
States v. Gunkle, 55 M.J. 26, 31 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

3 We ultimately granted the government’s petition. United States v. Pritchard, 82
M.J. 686 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2022), pet. denied, 82 M.J. 446 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

Judge Hynes had previously offered to preside in this case, and Judge
Pritchard detailed him on 4 April 2022. According to Judge Pritchard; “Because
Judge Hynes was in his first year on the bench, was eager to gain experience, and his
docket had not been busy, he routinely offered to take cases from me.” In his
affidavit, Judge Hynes wrote:

At some point in March or April 2022 I asked to be detailed to U.S. v. Davis
in Kaiserslautern. On 4 April 2022 I was formally detailed to the case. In an
earlier discussion with the Chief Circuit Judge we talked about the U.S. v.
Dial ruling and the potential for a case backlog in the 5th Circuit related to
the automatic stay provision in R.C.M. 908(b)(4) while U.S. v. Dial was
pending appeal. I asked to take U.S. v. Davis to do my part to mitigate any
potential case backlog while U.S. v. Dial was pending appeal.*

Judge Pritchard also told Judge Hynes that, depending on appellate review in
Dial, among other things, he:

[M]ight or might not take the case back from him. This was not an indication
to him that he should rule on any motion in any particular manner; rather, it
reflected my trigger for presiding over non-bench trials again....When my
Clerk of Court informed me later that SPC Davis had elected a judge-alone
trial, I did not take the case back.°

On 11 April 2022, Judge Hynes announced he was the presiding judge in an
Article 39a session:

I...have replaced Colonel Jack Pritchard, who was the Military Judge at the
arraignment on 14 February 2022. I’ve been properly certified and sworn, and
detailed to this court-martial by Colonel Pritchard. I’m not aware of any
matter that might be a ground for challenge against me.

* Government appellate counsel filed subsequent affidavit-based motions; we will
briefly address them later in this decision.

> Judge Pritchard could not have “take[n] the case back” after his recusal and
resultant disqualification. In any event, the military judge is generally not fungible
after assembly, which usually occurs immediately after approving a request for trial
by judge alone; good cause must justify replacement. And even then, the
“replacement” judge may only hold a bench trial after an accused waives his right to
a panel in order to be tried by that particular military. judge sitting alone.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

On the same day he made his initial appearance, Judge Hynes orally denied
appellant’s motion for unanimous verdict, following up with a written ruling on 14
April 2022. He also denied appellant’s motion for expert assistance. The next
month, he accepted appellant’s waiver of his right to trial by members, approved his
request to be tried by military judge alone, and went to trial.

On 13 April 2022, counsel in another case emailed Judge Pritchard, asking for
an opportunity to speak with him about “how judges are detailed to cases in the
circuit.” The counsel copied appellant’s defense counsel, cited five other cases in
which the detailed judge had changed (including appellant’s), and suggested a single
interview with Judge Pritchard for efficiency’s sake. Judge Pritchard responded on
14 April 2022, “Consistent with RCM 505(e)(1), I do not intend to discuss my pre-
assembly detailing decisions.”

On direct appeal, appellate defense counsel emailed Colonel Tyesha Smith,
the Army’s Chief Trial Judge, asking about the change in military judges:

Our concern is whether COL Pritchard’s removal in United States v. Davis
and United States v. Coley was due to his decision to rule favorably for the
accused in United States v. Dial. If that was the case, it may have relevance
to our clients’ respective appeals.

Consequently, we are attempting to understand the reason(s) for COL
Pritchard’s removal. Our understanding is that this occurred in other cases as
well, and we are aware that COL Pritchard specifically declined to provide
reasons for his departure in all of these cases. The docket does not show any
logistical conflict.... ,

Colonel Smith responded:

COL Pritchard was not removed from either Davis or Coley, nor am I aware
of any case that COL Pritchard has ever been removed from in the nine years
that he has been a military judge. For our process to work and for the accused
to receive a fair trial, judges must be (and are) independent and free from
external influences, to include any influence from the Chief Trial Judge. COL
Pritchard would absolutely never be removed from a case for a decision that
he made and believed to be right. I concur in COL Pritchard’s declination and
also decline to speak with you further on this matter.®

° Judge Pritchard wrote in his affidavit: “Before making that decision [recusal], I
sought the advice of the Chief Trial Judge, Colonel Tyesha Smith, and we discussed
the positive and negative aspects of such a decision on the phone. Colonel Smith

(continued...)
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

As we indicated above, the government filed two subsequent motions
regarding affidavits. Considering the unique circumstances, they warrant
discussion. Nearly two weeks after oral argument on 25 January 2024, the
government moved this court to order a “clarifying affidavit” from Judge Hynes.
According to the government, the catalysts for this motion were the parties’ briefs,
appellant’s appellate affidavit regarding forum selection, and matters covered in oral
argument. We denied the motion.

Notwithstanding our denial of the government’s request for a “clarifying
affidavit,” on 15 February 2024, the government filed a motion to attach a 13
February 2024 affidavit from Judge Hynes, “providing clarification to the statements
offered in his 6 June 2023 affidavit.” According to the motion, “Following this
Court’s denial, undersigned counsel contacted Judge Hynes, and asked if he would
like to voluntarily provide an additional affidavit to clarify his initial affidavit. On
13 February, Judge Hynes provided the attached affidavit.” (Motion to Attach
Government Appellate Exhibit 6, 3-4)’

Appellant responded on 22 February 2024, opposing attachment and
emphasizing, among other things, its ex parte nature. However, appellant did write,
“To the extent this court believes it is necessary to grant the government’s motion to
do so, then it should grant the government’s motion, despite the government’s
failure to show good cause.” The government did not reply. We granted the motion
on 4 March 2024.

LAW
I. Due Process
“No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law....” U.S. Const. amend. V. From this founding principle, an accused has a

constitutional right to an “unbiased and impartial” judge, and a military accused has
an additional “military due process right to a judge who appears fair and impartial.”

(... continued)
did not express or intimate that I should pursue any specific course of action, and
she explicitly said the decision was entirely mine.”

’ The motion also included, “Rather than speculate as to what Judge Hynes meant in
his affidavit, this court should order another affidavit to allow him to clarify his
previous statement.” We interpret this as a scrivener’s erroneous holdover from the
first motion, for it is otherwise obvious the government had already obtained another
affidavit from Judge Hynes.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

United States v. Cooper, 51 M.J. 247, 249-250 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citing Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 523-35 (1927); United States v. Ramos, 42 M.J. 392, 396
(C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Reynolds, 24 M.J. 261, 264 (C.M.A. 1987).

“There is a strong presumption that a judge is impartial, and a party seeking to
demonstrate bias must overcome a high hurdle, particularly when the alleged bias
involves actions taken in conjunction with judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2001)

2. Judicial Duty and Disqualification

Army judges shall disqualify themselves when required by Rule for Courts-
Martial [R.C.M.] 902 or other provision of law. Code of Judicial Conduct for Army
Trial and Appellate Judges (16 May 2008). “Although a judge has a duty not to sit
when disqualified, the judge has an equal duty to sit on a case when not
disqualified.” United States v. Witt, 75 M.J. 380, 383 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing Laird
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972). “The refusal of a judge who is present for duty
and not disqualified to participate amounts to disqualification.” Witt, 75 M.J. at 384
(citing United States v. Roach, 69 M.J. 17, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2010). “Once disqualified,
the judge is prohibited from further participation in the case.” Id.

“A recusal means a judge may not preside over any subsequent proceedings in
the case or perform any other judicial actions with respect to it.” Roach, 69 M.J. at
19 (citation omitted). “When a judge is recused, the judge should not take action to
influence the appointment of his or her replacement.” Walker, 60 M.J. at 358.

A military judge has a “fundamental responsibility to ensure that the record of
trial set[s] forth a complete account of the out-of-court events bearing upon [their]
actions and the issue of judicial impartiality.” United States v. Quintanilla, 56 MJ
37, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

A ground for disqualification may be waived, if the waiver is preceded by a
full disclosure on the record of the basis for the disqualification. R.C.M. 902(e).
On the other hand, as we have previously held, no waiver exists where the military
judge does not disclose the basis for his disqualification. United States v. Springer,
79 M.J. 756, 759 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2020). We review waiver questions de
novo. United States v. Black, 80 M.J. 570, 574 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (citing
United States v. Davis, 79 M.J. 329, 331 (C.A.A.F. 2020)).

A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary. Guide to Judiciary Policy, Ch. 2: Code of Conduct
for United States Judges (12 March 2019). A judge should not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications concerning pending or impending matters. Jd.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272
3. Prejudice

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [C.A.A.F.] has held that
“structural error,” which affects “the framework within which the trial proceeds,
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself,” requires mandatory reversal.
United States v. Upham, 66 M.J. 83, 86 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing Arizona v.
Fulmante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).

For non-structural errors, “[w]here a forfeited constitutional error was clear
and obvious, “material prejudice” is assessed using the “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87S. Ct.
824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).” United States v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458, 460
(C.A.A.F. 2019).° The standard is met where a court is confident that there was no
reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction.” /d.
(citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). Just as the government bears the burden to
disprove prejudice in the event of forfeited constitutional error, it similarly bears
this burden in the event of constitutional error that is neither forfeited nor waived.
Id. at 462 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).

Even absent material prejudice, we are still required to determine if reversal
is warranted under circumstances pertaining to the public’s confidence in the
military justice system, using the three-part test from Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). United States v. Martinez, 70 M.J. 154, 159
(C.A.A.F. 2011). In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the
civilian counterpart to R.C.M. 902(a) is to promote confidence in the judicial
system. /d. (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860). Liljeberg states “it is appropriate to
consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the
denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the
public’s confidence in the judicial process.” Id.

ANALYSIS

We first emphasize what this case is not about. Try as the government might
in its brief and at oral argument, it cannot reframe it as one where appellant is
somehow continuing to futilely argue that he is entitled to a unanimous verdict.

That is a red herring, for appellant has not raised that issue before this court.
Likewise, because appellant did not know about the undisclosed judicial activity, the
government’s waiver argument lacks merit. See Springer, 79 M.J. 756 at 759.

8 We apply this standard and burden but decline to find forfeiture, because appellant
did not know about the error until long after trial.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

The dispositive issue is appellant’s right to an impartial judge. We start our
analysis by determining whether the error at issue is structural or non-structural.
While we recognize one might reasonably see this as unknown error (to the parties at
trial), if we find the alleged error to be non-structural, we will follow our precedent
in Springer and review this case under the plain error standard of review. Springer,
79 M.J. at 759-60 (holding that even when a military judge fails to disclose the
reasons requiring his recusal or disqualification, we analyze the facts to determine if
there was plain error in that the error materially prejudiced the substantial rights of
the appellant pursuant to Article 59(a), UCMJ).

Rule for Court Martial 902(a) provides that a military judge shall disqualify
himself or herself “in any proceeding in which the military judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” Rule for Court Martial 902(b) sets forth a non-
exclusive list of mandatory disqualifications to include personal bias or knowledge,
prior specified involvement, or the potential to be called a witness. In this case, we
find that Judge Pritchard’s stated reason for “removing himself” from this case - that
is, his concern about how prospective appellate stays on his unanimous verdict
rulings would impact his circuit’s docket - does not seem to fit neatly into any of the
categories recognized under R.C.M. 902. Nevertheless, whether he termed it as a
“removal” or a “recusal,” we find that the end result was the same: once he took
himself off the case, under R.C.M. 902 Judge Pritchard was disqualified from taking
any further action regardless of his stated reason. As such, he clearly erred in
detailing the case to Judge Hynes after he made the decision to “remove” himself.
See Roach, 69 M.J. at 19 (“A recusal means a judge may not preside over any
subsequent proceedings in the case or perform any other judicial actions with respect
to it.”); Walker, 60 M.J. at 358 (“When a judge is recused, the judge should not take
action to influence the appointment of his or her replacement.”).

Moreover, in refusing to answer counsel’s questions or otherwise explain his
rationale for not hearing this case, Judge Pritchard violated R.C.M. 902(d)(2), which
provides that “(e)ach party shall be permitted to question the military judge and to
present evidence regarding a possible ground for disqualification before the military
judge decides the matter.”

We recognize R.C.M. 505(e)(1) allows a Chief Circuit Judge [CCJ] like Judge
Pritchard to reassign military judges to courts-martial “without cause shown on the
record.” And, we realize there are many reasons why a CCJ might change the
detailing of military judges, i.e., to manage workload, manage leave schedules,
allow reserve judges the opportunity to try cases, etc. But, that is not what
happened in this case. In short, a military judge may not recuse himself under
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

R.C.M. 902 and then cite the provisions of R.C.M. 505 to avoid having to explain
that action.’

Beyond its ultra vires nature, Judge Pritchard’s decision to detail Judge Hynes
was also not for a lawful reason; instead, it was in pursuit of a particular result on an
anticipated issue in the case. Turning to Judge Hynes, and assuming his detail was
not void ab initio, he did not approach appellant’s case impartially. He volunteered
with one stated purpose, “to do my part to mitigate any potential case backlog while
Dial was pending appeal.” We interpret this as a predetermined intent to deny a
likely motion in appellant’s case, especially given that Judge Hynes confirmed in his
affidavit that he made this statement while fully aware of the “U.S. v. Dial ruling
and the potential for case backlog in the 5th Circuit related to the automatic stay
provision in R.C.M. 908(b)(4) while U.S. v. Dial was pending appeal.” This was
antithetical to a judge’s required impartiality and warranted disqualification alone,
even if Judge Hynes believed he had been properly detailed.

Neither Judge Pritchard, who specifically declined to do so almost two years
ago, nor Judge Hynes disclosed these facts during appellant’s trial. These
nondisclosures fell far short of Quintanilla’s admonition that military judges have a
“fundamental responsibility to ensure that the record of trial set[s] forth a complete
account of the out-of-court events bearing upon [their] actions and the issue of
judicial impartiality.”

Roach found non-structural error, but appellant’s case is different in several
material respects: neither party has conceded this issue, the trial judge was not
detailed in accordance with applicable law, and the trial judge was not impartial.
Moreover, these facts present obvious prejudice to our military justice system’s
credibility: an already-recused judge detailed a non-impartial replacement judge to
hear the case because the recused judge expected the replacement judge would likely
rule a certain way on an anticipated motion therein and, therefore, avoid possible
interlocutory appellate stay; the replacement judge requested to take the case in
order to reach a certain result on the anticipated motion and avoid delay; the recused
judge failed to explain his reasons for recusal but instead improperly indicated the
reassignment was for routine administrative reasons under R.C.M. 505; and neither |
judge disclosed these facts until we ordered it.

This sub rosa episode violated the 5th Amendment’s Due Process clause and
raised reasonable doubts about whether appellant got a fair trial. Under the

? In his affidavit to this Court, Judge Pritchard did not mention his previous
declination on the basis of R.C.M. 505, nor did he continue to raise that rule as an
impediment.
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

circumstances, we find structural error mandating reversal, because the improper
conduct of both trial judges “affected the framework within which the trial
proceed[ed.]”

Alternatively, even if we were to find that the error was non-structural and
that there was no material prejudice to appellant’s rights,'° for all of the same
reasons, we would reach the same result under Roach and the third prong of the
Liljberg test: the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.

In Roach, the Chief Circuit Judge of the Air Force Criminal Court of Appeals
(CCA) commented on the case during two public events. 69 M.J. at 18-19. After
appellant moved for recusal of the original panel hearing his case, the Chief Judge
recused himself and then recommended his replacement to The Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force (TJAG). After TJAG favorably acted upon this
recommendation, the replacement judge authored the opinion. Jd. at 19.

The C.A.A.F. first held that although the Chief Judge’s actions in
recommending his replacement after he recused himself was an “error in recusal,”
under the circumstances of that case, to include the fact the influence from the Chief
Judge’s recommendation was minimal and there was no discernible prejudice to
appellant, there was no structural error. Jd. Nevertheless, after analyzing the error
under Liljberg, the C.A.A.F. vacated the ruling of the lower court affirming
appellant’s conviction. Notwithstanding the lack of prejudice to appellant from the
Chief Judge’s conduct in taking action in the case after recusal, the C.A.A.F.
squarely held:

Nonetheless, either a military judge is recused or he is not. A military judge
who acts inconsistently with a recusal, no matter how minimally, may leave a
wider audience to wonder whether the military judge lacks the same rigor
when applying the law.

The appearance of impartiality may be especially important in the military
justice context. From an outsider’s perspective, it might well appear that at a
court-martial and at the CCA, the critical players are invariably uniformed
officers, usually if not always from the same service, and in many cases
drawn from what are relatively small communities of military judge
advocates. In this context, it is all the more important for the participants to

'0 The government has not disproven prejudice to appellant beyond a reasonable
doubt.

10
DAVIS — ARMY 20220272

engage in their assigned duties without blurring legal and critical lines,
however well intentioned.

Id. at 21, citing United States v. Greatting, 66 M.J. 226, 232 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

While Roach dealt with this issue at the appellate level, the same recusal
principles apply here. Considering the facts of this case as detailed above are far
more egregious, we readily conclude that the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the military judicial process warrants setting aside appellant’s
convictions and sentence. While we recognize Quintanilla’s presumption of judicial
impartiality, the circumstances here overcome it.

In most cases, alleged irregularities are limited to circumstances at the trial
level; they do not continue on direct appeal. This naturally tends to have a
moderating effect on any appropriate relief, and we frequently authorize rehearings
in some form. In this case, irregularities persist. While not technically in defiance
of our decision not to order a second affidavit from Judge Hynes, government
appellate counsel’s decisions — first, to obtain the affidavit anyway, and second, to
offer it - have not benefitted their case. First, we are troubled by the ex parte
exchange between the government and Judge Hynes that resulted in his second
affidavit. Moreover, among other things from the second affidavit, we are concerned
by Judge Hynes’s adversarial tenor, and his solicitous remarks about the defense in
this case and the defense function in general.

Notwithstanding the Rule of Judicial Conduct generally prohibiting
consideration of ex parte matters, after careful reflection we granted the motion to
attach the Supplemental Affidavit of Judge Hynes because its content, nature and
circumstances of its submission further support our ultimate determination to
dismiss this case with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The findings of guilty and the sentence are SET ASIDE. The charges are
DISMISSED with prejudice.

Judge MORRIS and Judge ARGUELLES concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court

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