Court Opinion

ID: 9664851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:31:51.38344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.767407
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, concurring. While I concur in the affirmance I do not agree that the trial court’s discretion was abused under the circumstances of the case. Well within the time for response an attorney for the appellees called appellants’ counsel to ask for an extension of time in which to plead, a common practice. It was agreed and an order was entered extending the time to May 10, 1984. On the morning of May 11 counsel for appellees called opposing counsel to explain that the answer had been prepared the previous afternoon but had not been filed due to the events outlined in the majority opinion. Counsel for appellant neither agreed nor objected to the late filing but said he would consider the matter and call back, which he did. In this conversation it was arranged that appellees’ motion would be presented to the trial court at 1:30 p.m. ARCP Rule 6(b) gives the trial court the discretion to grant a motion made after the expiration of the specified period to permit an act to be done where the failure is the result of excusable neglect, unavoidable casualty or other just cause. The majority opinion regards this case as indistinguishable from DeClerk v. Tribble, 276 Ark. 316, 637 S.W.2d 526 (1982). But the problem there was neglect, pure and simple, extending over four days rather than overnight. And here, there were mitigating circumstances which the trial court found to justify the brief default. The case more nearly resembles Cammack v. Chalmers, 284 Ark. 161, 680 S.W.2d 689 (1984), where we held the trial court’s discretion was not abused. Citing Burns v. Shamrock Club, 271 Ark. 572, 609 S.W.2d 55 (1980), we said: It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment, and the question on appeal is whether there has been an abuse of that discretion. Default judgments are not favorites of the law and should be avoided when possible, (citations omitted). (My emphasis). Furthermore, ARCP Rule 55 provides that a default judgment should be entered when a party “fails to appear or otherwise defend.” Here, the appellees defended when they filed their motion to dismiss. This holding is also consistent with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1160 (Repl. 1979) which provides that, “The court must in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” There was no prejudice to these appellants by the appellees’ delay in filing their answer. Under the circumstances in their entirety, I cannot conclude the trial court’s discretion was abused in refusing to enter a default judgment in this case.