Court Opinion

ID: 9540274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:12.217333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:48.362094
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD, dissenting: I must dissent from the majority opinion. In my view of the facts, this appeal concerns the validity of the agreed order entered by the trial court on May 9, 1973. On that occasion, Roy Spears appeared before the court with counsel pursuant to a rule to show cause why he should not be compelled to pay alimony according to the January 26, 1973, decree entered nunc pro tunc as of December 8,1971. Also on that occasion the parties negotiated and entered into an agreed order which modified the January 26, 1973, decree as it pertained to alimony. As the majority holds, the trial court had no authority to enter the January 26, 1973, decree in the first instance, because the trial court’s authority over the parties expired 30 days after the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. But when Roy Spears voluntarily appeared with counsel and negotiated with opposing counsel for the terms of the May 9, 1973, agreed order which was inconsistent with the prior order of dismissal, the trial court was revested with authority in the matter. It was stated in Stark v. Roussey & Associates, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 379, 381 (1970): “When a court loses jurisdiction, after expiration of 30 days following a dismissal order, the parties may, by appearing voluntarily and participating in further proceedings, revest the court with jurisdiction. The elements essential to revesting are (1) the active participation of the parties without objection and (2), further proceedings inconsistent with the prior order of dismissal. Ridgely v. Central Pipe Line Co., 409 Ill. 46, 97 N.E.2d 817.” It would seem apparent these elements of revesting have occurred in the present case. Accordingly, I would reach the merits.