Court Opinion

ID: 9726927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:13:01.593531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.898083
License: Public Domain

Opinion
WORK, J.
Today we hold, in the absence of an express agreement, a person whose guilty plea is obtained in exchange for a promise any future confinement will be for a specified period, may not be later sentenced to a longer term where sentencing follows revocation of probation, even though imposition of sentence was originally suspended.
James Andrew Alkire, an alcoholic and a drug abuser, entered a bargained guilty plea to felonious assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)); committed during a drinking episode. The plea was induced by the court’s promise further confinement, if any, would not exceed two years, the mitigated term. Eventually, Alkire received probation, under a suspended imposition of sentence, served one year as a condition, and was ordered not to use alcoholic beverages during the probation term. Five days after his release from jail he was arrested for being under the influence. Probation was then revoked and he was sentenced to state prison for a three-year term. He correctly claims this violates the promise which induced his change of plea.
Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (c) states: “Upon any revocation and termination of probation the court may, if the sentence has been suspended, pronounce judgment for any time within the longest period for which the person might have been sentenced. However, if the judgment has been pronounced and the execution thereof had been suspended, the court may revoke such suspension and order that the judgment shall be in full force and effect. In either case, the person shall be delivered over to the proper officer to serve his sentence, less any credits herein provided for.” (Italics added.)
Although, “the longest period for which ... [Alkire] may have been sentenced” is susceptible to two possible interpretations: (1) the four-year maximum term prescribed by Penal Code section 245, or (2) the two-year cap enunciated in the plea bargain agreement—“[w]here the statute is susceptible of two reasonable constructions ... a defen*122dant is ordinarily entitled to that construction most favorable to him. [Citations.]” (Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 488 [134 Cal.Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081].)
Moreover, rule 435(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court requires: “(b) Upon revocation and termination of probation pursuant to section 1203.2, when the sentencing judge determines that the defendant shall be committed to prison:
“(1 j If the imposition of sentence was previously suspended ....
“The length of the sentence shall be based on circumstances existing at the time probation was granted, and subsequent events may not be considered in selecting the base term nor in deciding whether to strike or specifically not order the additional punishment for enhancements charged and found.” (Italics added.)
Here, at the time probation was granted Alkire could have been sentenced to a term no longer than two years—pursuant to the negotiated plea arrangement. The plea bargain, therefore, constituted the only relevant circumstance existing when probation was granted, and necessarily determines the length of Alkire’s sentence upon revocation of probation. To hold otherwise ignores the language of the statute.
Under different circumstances, if the court had not suspended sentence but pronounced the two-year cap under the plea bargain and then suspended its execution before granting probation, Alkire would face only his promised two years upon violation of the probation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 435(b)(2);1 see also Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (c), supra.) There is no reasonable purpose in subjecting him to an additional two years—simply because the court chose to suspend imposition, rather than actually impose, sentence.
Finally, had Alkire waived probation, opting instead for immediate incarceration, under the plea bargain (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 433(a)(2)) he would only have been subject to an actual term of two years—less 115 days credit for time already served. Nowhere does the record show he voluntarily waived his right to be sentenced in this man*123ner, nor that he understood the conditions of his probation included the possibility of serving four years state prison time in the event he violated its terms. The colloquy during the change of plea hearing does not show otherwise:
“The Court: Now, is this crime a felony or misdemeanor?
“Defendant Alkire: A felony.
“The Court: What is the maximum sentence you could receive?
“Defendant Alkire: Two years.
“Mr. Smith: Four years for the crime, two years on the plea bargain.
“The Court: Four years in state prison and a fine of $5,000 is the maximum?
“Defendant Alkire: Yes.
“The Court: And if you were sent to state prison and parole revoked, you could be sent back to state prison for four years. Do you understand that?
“Defendant Alkire: Yes, Sir.”
Although the dissent believes this admonition adequately informed Alkire of his maximum penalty—in the event he violated probation, a close reading of the transcript reveals probation was not anticipated at this stage. Rather, the statement was an attempt to advise him of the parole consequences of his guilty plea—as set forth in Penal Code section 3000.2 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 433(e).)
Each party agrees the precise issues presented here were resolved in People v. Turner (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 753 [118 Cal.Rptr. 924], and in People v. Allen (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 583 [120 Cal.Rptr. 127]. However, Allen does not involve, or even discuss, our issue, and Turner is factually different.
*124First of all, in this case, the plea bargain form stated as follows: “Judge promises that should further custody be imposed, a term no greater than 2 years, the mitigated term shall be imposed.” (Italics added.) The court orally read this exact phrase (albeit piecemeal) to insure Alkire’s awareness of the judge’s promise. There is no limitation on when, or in what manner, the further custody is imposed.
People v. Allen is not in point. There the prosecution unsuccessfully appealed a postjudgment probation term modification releasing Allen from custody earlier than contemplated in a plea bargain. The Court of Appeal ruled only on the question of whether such a plea bargain, setting specific custodial probation terms, deprived the court of its inherent judicial power to modify those terms in the absence of express language to that effect. Then, in dicta, irrelevant to its resolution of that issue, the court stated: “post-judgment modification of probation can make the ultimate disposition of the case more onerous to defendant than originally bargained for.” (Id., at p. 590.) The People tell us this language is a statement a defendant violating probation may be sentenced accordingly, notwithstanding the terms of any plea bargain. This misstates the holding which was concerned only with the power of the court to modify continuing terms of probation, a proposition with which we need not quarrel since our case does not involve a modification of existing probation terms.
In Turner the defendant was not promised any specific limitation on the length of his incarceration, only that he would do his time, if any, locally. After violating probation by pulling an armed robbery,3 he was sentenced to prison. Before entering his bargained plea, the court expressly advised he faced a maximum sentence of one to fifteen years in state prison. At sentencing Turner was asked if he accepted each term of his probation, and he did so. (Alkire was never advised he had the right to object to probation, nor was he advised one of the consequences of his failing to fulfill each condition of probation could be his being sent to state prison for a term in excess of the “promised” two years.)
In Turner the court stressed there was nothing in the plea bargain providing for what would happen should probation be violated. Here, implicit in the judge’s promise is a two-year limitation on any state prison time should it be imposed. The language would not alert anyone of a *125potential exposure to a longer term. If we take the prosecution’s position, that granting of probation somehow affects the promised incarceration maximum, we could find it really means, as the trial court apparently felt, no more than two years each time you have the opportunity to revoke, or modify probation. This inappropriately relegates the bargaining process to one of dealing in sleight-of-hand, shadows and illusions when dealing with substantial legal and constitutional rights.
Even here, the sentencing judge was uncertain whether he was bound by the bargain made and accepted by the “promising” judge, and believed he was honoring the plea bargain because the midterm, three-year commitment really resulted in a new, current two years of service (because the one year already served as a condition of probation must be credited against that term).
In every case involving a bargain setting a maximum term of incarceration, the prosecution would have us insert implied language essentially as follows: “we will give you the mitigated two-year prison term if we decide to send you to prison now, but if you are successful in convincing the court you deserve a chance on probation, and fail, all bets are off and you may be sentenced to the aggravated term.”
Assuming such a bargain may be struck, it must at least be expressed at a time when a defendant still has the ability to negotiate, not after negotiations are closed.4
The appropriate relief where a plea bargain is expressly, or impliedly, rejected by the court before imposing any restrictions on a defendant by way of sentence, or probation while suspending sentence imposition, is to give a defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, go back to square one and put the People to their proof. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5.) Alkire has already served time as a condition of probation and the preplea status quo cannot be restored. He is entitled to his bargain.
*126Judgment is modified to show the state prison commitment to be two years, the mitigated term. The trial court and the Department of Corrections are ordered to change their records accordingly.
Langford, J.,* concurred.

 California Rules of Court, rule 435(b)(2) reads: “If the execution of sentence was previously suspended, the judge shall order that the judgment previously pronounced be in full force and effect and that the defendant be committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections for the term prescribed in that judgment.”

 Even under Penal Code section 3000, however, in the event Alkire’s parole was revoked, he could be sent back to the state prison only for the remainder of his term as bargained for under the plea arrangement (616 days).

 The opinion stressed the significance of the manner in which the probation terms were violated. If this is significant, we point to the gross disparity between Alkire’s breach and that of Turner.

 It might be said, Alkire cannot complain the court is now reneging on its part of the bargain since his probation default violates the bargain. However, Alkire agreed only to waive his constitutional rights to trial, confrontation, etc., enter a plea of guilty to the charge and expose himself to a potential two-year state prison sentence. When he withdrew his not guilty plea, and entered the plea upon which he stands convicted, he gave the prosecution all it bargained for.

 Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.