Court Opinion

ID: 9666730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:26:29.045262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.412012
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with Justice Griffin’s result and much of his rationale. I write separately first to observe that I do not agree with Justice Levin’s description of the majority opinion. Specifically, I do not agree that the majority "concedes” that the veil of secrecy was fractured. Cf. separate opinion of Levin, J., p 322, n 16. Justice Levin’s characterization implies that the majority and separate opinions diverge because the majority finds a partial fracture as a matter of law.
This appeal raises only an issue regarding sufficiency of the evidence of secret confinement. The defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of the duration of the confinement for obvious reasons; the confinement oc*315curred over the course of several hours. I read the majority opinion to hold that the evidence of secret confinement was sufficient, not to agree that there are artificial parsing points in the continuity of activity, past which secret confinement must be reestablished.
For the same reason, this is not an appropriate vehicle for either the majority or the separate opinion to address in dicta unraised issues regarding length of confinement.1 The defendant did not argue before the trial court or in his brief to this Court that evidence of the length of confinement in the basement was insufficient.
Further, although the separate opinion does not indicate how this case should be decided, to the extent that it implies that the incident was no more than a relatively "minor confinement,” I strongly disagree.2 The defendant aided and abetted in a course of conduct so extreme in relation to its provocation that common sense suggests that it was likely to end, as it did, in someone’s death. Indeed, it would appear that the Model Penal Code would permit a conviction of the most serious degree of kidnapping on the evidence presented. Model Penal Code, § 212.1(c) (quoted post at 324, n 20).
Finally, as the trial judge observed, there was no evidence that defendant Jaffray said anything to anybody about where the victim was, nor was there a "[b]illboard saying who is being held . . . .” If, as defendant Jaffray himself observed, the victim’s screams are heard by those whom the captor can trust not to call the police, is *316the confinement still secret? Such observations simply underscore the fact that speculation regarding the "absurd results” of "relatively minor confinements” is without empirical support in this record or the thousands of cases this Court has reviewed in the decade since the decision in People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375; 365 NW2d 692 (1984). Post at 324.
Riley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Levin, J.
(separate opinion). Jaffray was convicted of kidnapping for "forcibly or secretly con-fin[ing]” Bruce Williams and for "forcibly seiz[ing] or confin[ing]” him with intent to cause Williams "to be secretly confined or imprisoned.”1
The penalty for kidnapping is imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.
The prosecutor asserts that the crime of kidnapping was committed at the moment Bruce Williams was seized, handcuffed and his feet were tied.
The prosecutor has, in effect, conceded that there is no evidence that Jaffray intended to cause physical harm to Williams.2
I question whether the Legislature intended to *317make secret confinement a capital offense where, although the manner or length of confinement may not have been insignificant, there was evidence only of an intent to confíne and no evidence of an intent to harm the victim or hold the victim as a hostage for ransom or other felonious purpose. In the instant case, the purpose of the confinement was to recover a dog that had been stolen by the victim.
I
I am concerned that the majority opinion in the instant case, and this Court’s opinion in People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375; 365 NW2d 692 (1984), may be read to permit charging a defendant with kidnapping and an underlying felony whenever the underlying felony involves an element of confinement, and to permit transforming a simple assault or false imprisonment into kidnapping.
Because the majority adopts the Wesley view that " 'no movement is required where the victim was secretly confined,’ ”3 an offender might be charged with both kidnapping and another underlying crime that involves an element of confinement in any situation in which the underlying crime was committed in a private or secret place. Thus, a stairwell robbery in which the victim was confined might now be kidnapping and robbery as long as the victim was unable to communicate his plight to the outside world during the duration of the robbery. Similarly, a nighttime sexual assault in which the victim is wrestled to the ground and rendered unable to call for help might be both kidnapping and sexual assault.
The majority’s approach might facilitate the avoidance of the strictures of People v Adams, 389 *318Mich 222; 205 NW2d 415 (1973), aff'g 34 Mich App 546, 550; 192 NW2d 19 (1971),4 simply by substituting a charge of secret confinement kidnapping, rather than forcible confinement kidnapping, along with the underlying felony.
The majority opinion could be read to allow a trier of fact to convict a defendant of secret confinement kidnapping where the offender’s actions are closer to the common-law offense of simple assault than to the capital offense of kidnapping.
The majority does not construe the kidnapping statute as requiring a "significant type or amount of detention,” as did the Court of Appeals in People v McNeal, 152 Mich App 404, 412; 393 NW2d 907 (1986). Thus, any detention in which the victim is unable to communicate his plight to the outside world might now constitute kidnapping. Under the majority’s approach, a frustrated worker might be said to have committed secret confinement kidnapping if he blocks the door of the office restroom and says to another employee who had already entered something like "let’s settle our disagreement once and for all. We’re not going anywhere until we work this thing out.” Clearly, there is a distinction between the behavior of the frustrated worker and a criminal who, after forcibly seizing his victim, secretly binds and gags that person. Yet, it appears that under the majority’s approach both the frustrated worker and the criminal have each committed the same offense.5_
*319I believe that, just as this and other courts have read an asportation requirement into the forcible confinement portion of the kidnapping statute to remedy that provision’s potential overbreadth, it might be necessary to construe the secret confinement provision of the kidnapping statute as requiring some significant manner or length of detention. Otherwise, defendants might be convicted of "true kidnapping” when they have merely committed false imprisonment.6
II
When the Penal Code was enacted in 1931,7 a sentence of life imprisonment or for any term of years8 could only be imposed where an assault was *320"with intent to commit the crime of murder”9 or "with intent to rob and steal” by a person armed with a dangerous weapon,10 or for an assault ("forcibly seizing] or confining]”) with intent to cause the victim "to be secretly confined or imprisoned.”
The maximum sentence that could be imposed for an assault with "intent to do great bodily harm, less than the crime of murder”11 is ten years, for an assault with force and violence, and with intent to rob and steal (unarmed)12 it is fifteen years, and for an assault with "intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration”13 it is ten years.
In light of the legislative judgment that a sentence for life or any term of years should be imposed where the assault involved an intent to commit murder or armed robbery, and that the maximum sentence for an assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder or with intent to commit unarmed robbery or with intent to commit rape should be a maximum of ten or fifteen years, I doubt that the Legislature intended that a person be subject to conviction of the capital offense of kidnapping, subjecting the offender to a life sentence or a box score sentence,14 where the assault — "forcibly seizing] or confining]” — was committed only with the intent to "secretly confine” and without intent to cause physical harm or hold the victim for ransom or to facilitate the commission of another felony.
*321III
The majority holds that a rational trier of fact could have found that Jaffray in fact secretly confined Bruce Williams because:
1) From the time Jaffray initially bound Williams on the living room floor to the time that Curtis Kennedy learned that Williams was being held in the house and heard Williams’ screams, nobody outside the house knew of Williams’ confinement.
2) After Jaffray learned that Williams’ screams may have been audible outside the house, he moved Williams to the basement, "clearly an area of greater isolation.”
3) After moving Williams to the basement, Jaffray was part of a concerted effort to "maintain the secrecy of Williams’ location.” [Ante, pp 310-311.]
Taking the last factor first, an accused could not be convicted of secret confinement kidnapping however strong his desire to secretly confine the victim if the confinement was not in fact secret. Jaffray’s participation in a concerted effort to maintain the secrecy of Williams’ confinement is not pertinent to a determination whether Williams was in fact secretly confined. Indeed, the majority notes that a specific intent to confine is not an element of secret confinement kidnapping.15
Nor did Jaffray commit secret confinement kidnapping by carrying Williams to the basement. By the time Williams was carried to the basement, he had already communicated his plight to the outside world — and thereby foiled his captors’ efforts to keep his confinement secret — by screaming *322through the window of the upstairs bedroom where he was being held.16
The majority implies, however, that Jaffray’s carrying Williams to the basement is relevant to whether Jaffray secretly confined Williams because transporting Williams to the basement reestablished the secrecy of Williams’ confinement.
The majority stresses that, while the outside world may have known of Williams’ confinement and of his need for help, nobody outside the house knew that Williams was being held in the basement, and his confinement there was thus secret.
Curtis Kennedy and his mother were aware that Williams was being held captive in the house and were aware that Williams needed help. While it is true that neither Kennedy nor his mother knew exactly where in the house Williams was being held, they had enough information — as a result of Williams’ earlier communication of his plight — to summon help for Williams, and the officers who responded to their call went into the basement17 and would probably have been able to rescue Williams from the basement if he had not been killed before their arrival.
JafFray’s movement of Williams to the basement did not reestablish the secrecy of his confinement. It did not disable Kennedy and his mother from sending assistance to Williams. The veil of secrecy that was broken by Williams’ screams from the bedroom was not "temporarily” but, rather, "permanently” shattered by those screams. The loca*323tion of Williams’ confinement was not secret after he was moved to the basement.18
The majority emphasizes that a reasonable fact-finder could find that Jaffray committed secret confinement kidnapping because nobody in the outside world knew of Williams’ confinement between the time that Williams was initially bound in the living room and the time that Curtis Kennedy learned of his condition.19 I agree with the majority that the confinement during this indeterminate period was secret.
It is again noteworthy that Jaffray had no intent to harm Williams. He sought to assure that Williams did not run away before the dog was found.
IV
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that what occurred here should not be subject to more serious penalties than for an ordinary assault. Nor would I contend that this particular defendant is *324guilty of nothing more than the common-law offense of false imprisonment.
The Model Penal Code establishes a carefully tiered offense and sentencing system to address the tendency of broadly worded kidnapping statutes to yield absurd results in many cases of relatively minor confinements.20
*326In a recent case, one of the justices called upon the Legislature to address the problem of sentencing youthful offenders for capital offenses. In the same spirit, I call upon the Legislature to address the many problems created by our kidnapping statute. I respectfully suggest that the Legislature study the Model Penal Code provisions for kidnapping and the accompanying commentaries21 with a *327view to reconstructing the kidnapping statute.
v
The concurring opinion makes a number of points to which I now respond.
A
The concurring opinion states "Specifically, I do not agree that the majority 'concedes’ that the veil of secrecy was fractured.”22
The referenced sentence in the majority opinion reads as follows: "When Ronald Normandin disclosed to Curtis Kennedy that Williams was 'dog tied’ upstairs, and Kennedy allegedly heard Williams upstairs screaming for help, the veil of secrecy was temporarily fractured, but it was not completely destroyed.”23 Thus, the reference to the majority opinion is accurate.
B
The concurring opinion states:
The prosecutor has not "conceded” that the *328defendant did not intend to cause physical harm to the victim.[24]
The following is an excerpt from the prosecutor’s brief:
What is truly remarkable about this case is that two "technically” separate offenses were committed by different defendants during the same criminal episode. The evidence adduced at the trial of Jaffray and the Normandin brothers showed that their only intent was to commit secret confinement kidnapping. They only intended to confine Bruce Williams in order to force him to reveal the location where he sold Ronald Normandin’s dog for crack cocaine. Jaffray’s written statement shows that they intended to release him after the dog was retrieved. Due both to a pre-existing grudge and to the fact that Williams had stolen his friend’s dog, Francis Hamilton apparently took it upon himself to beat Williams to death with a baseball bat.[25]
While there is evidence that Jaffray bound and gagged Williams, there is no evidence that he beat Williams or encouraged others to do so. Nor would "common sense suggest” that, from the beginning, this incident "was likely to end, as it did, in someone’s death.”26 When Jaffray and the Norman-dins initially bound Williams, they had no intention of harming him, and they had no reason to believe that Hamilton would, in the prosecutor’s words, take "it upon himself” to kill Williams. When the incident began, there was no indication that Hamilton might become involved in the situation, much less kill Williams.
Because Jaffray did not intend to harm or terrorize Williams, it does not appear that the Model *329Penal Code would permit a conviction of the most serious grade of kidnapping as the concurring opinion suggests.27 Rather, under the Model Penal Code, the crime of false imprisonment appears to most appropriately apply to Jaffray’s conduct, although Jaffray might also have committed felonious restraint.28
c
The concurring opinion asserts that in none of *330the "thousands of cases this Court has reviewed in the decade since the decision in People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375; 365 NW2d 692 (1984),”29 has this Court been presented with a situation in which a defendant was convicted of kidnapping on the basis of a relatively minor confinement.
While this Court has reviewed thousands of cases, indeed even thousands of criminal cases, in the decade since Wesley was decided, it most assuredly has not reviewed thousands, or even hundreds, of kidnapping cases. It has reviewed even fewer secret confinement kidnapping cases.
This Court generally sees an application for leave to appeal only in a case in which a lengthy term of imprisonment has been imposed. Thus, we do not know to what extent charges of secret confinement kidnapping are washed out in plea bargaining in exchange for charge or sentencing concessions. Because an accused charged with a capital offense carrying a potential life sentence might be constrained to plead guilty to a lesser offense or to agree to the imposition of a particular sentence, it is especially important that the substantive law of kidnapping recognize the risk and potential for overcharging.

 The fact that the focus of the trial and appeal was on the entire length of confinement in the house accounts for the fact that the record does not reflect the length of time the victim was confined in the basement.

 The prosecutor has not "conceded” that the defendant did not intend to cause physical harm to the victim.

 Kidnapping is proscribed and defined in § 349 of the Penal Code:
Any person who wilfully, maliciously and without lawful authority shall forcibly or secretly confine or imprison any other person within this state against his will, or shall forcibly carry or send such person out of this state, or shall forcibly seize or confine, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to extort- money or other valuable thing thereby or with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or in any way held to service against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years. [MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581.]

 See part V(B).

 Ante, p 299.

 Our kidnapping statute, like most, is so all-encompassing in its literal breadth that unless its operative effect is confined by objective standards it would be void for overbreadth.
Where a kidnapping statute does not in terms require a "carrying away” of the victim, an asportation requirement or, as a substitute, the element of secrecy, has been judicially read into and made a part of the definition of the crime.

 The majority states that "consideration of the totality of the *319circumstances is required when determining whether the confinement itself or the location of confinement was secret, thereby depriving the victim of the assistance of others,” ante, p 309, and it states that " 'secret confinement’ is not predicated upon a single factor.” Ante, p 312. While the majority takes a flexible approach to the question whether the confinement was in fact secret, it does not seem willing to take into account the totality of the circumstances when considering whether a given confinement, even if secret, can truly be said to constitute the capital offense of secret confinement kidnapping.

 For the same reason, it might be necessary to construe the "seizure or confinement with the intent to secretly confine” provision of the kidnapping statute as requiring an intent to confine for a significant time or in a significant manner. Such a construction of the statute would prevent convictions for kidnapping where a defendant seized or confined his victim with the intent to secretly confine the victim for a very short period of time or in a relatively nonthreatening or harmful manner.

 Years before, laws were enacted providing for lengthy mandatory sentences, including life imprisonment without possibility of parole for certain drug offenses.
The Penal Code, when enacted in 1931, similarly provided a maximum penalty of ten years for an assault of a female with intent to commit the crime of rape. 1948 CL 750.85. That provision was repealed when the criminal sexual conduct provisions were added by 1974 PA 266.

 Sentences of thirty to sixty years and forty to eighty years have been imposed by some judges under the authority of the "any term of years” language. Such sentences are, in effect, life sentences without possibility of parole under this Court’s decisions.

 MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278.

 MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284.

 MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279.

 MCL 750.88; MSA 28.283.

 MCL 750.520g(1); MSA 28.788(7)(1).

 In effect, a life sentence without possibility of parole under this Court’s decisions.

 Ante, p 298.

 The majority concedes that the veil of secrecy was "temporarily fractured” when Curtis Kennedy heard Williams’ screams. Ante, p 310. See part v(A).

 Officer Richard Hudson testified that when he and his partner David Mitchell first visited the Normandin home, he searched for Williams in the basement, but did not find him at that time.

 State v Randall, 137 Mont 534, 539; 353 P2d 1054 (1960), in which the Montana Supreme Court found secret confinement on the following facts:
Cozzens [a prison guard] was seized by defendant and his associates, all of whom were armed with knives; that he was taken by a concealed route to an underground cell in another part of the prison from that where he was seized; that he and the other hostages were later moved from cell to cell and warned not to make their location known to persons outside the prison who desired to rescue them ....
In the instant case, unlike in Randall, individuals who wanted to rescue the victim knew with a high degree of specificity where the victim was being held captive. In Randall, the authorities apparently had to stage an armed assault on the prison and search through the entire prison in order to locate the victims. In this case, though, the information supplied by Williams’ screams were sufficient to bring help to the exact location where he was being held captive: the basement. Again, had Williams been alive when the police arrived, the police almost surely would have found him tied to the pole in the middle of the basement.

 Ante, p 310.

 The Model Penal Code provides:
212.1 Kidnapping
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the following purposes:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is a felony of the second degree. A removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this Section if it is accomplished by force, threat or deception, or, in the case of a person who is under the age of 14 or incompetent, if it is accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for general supervision of his welfare.
212.2 Felonious Restraint
A person commits a felony of the third degree if he knowingly:
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
212.3 False Imprisonment
A person commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
212.4 Interference with Custody
(1) Custody of Children. A person commits an offense if he *325knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, when he has no privilege to do so. It is an affirmative defense that:
(a) the actor believed that his action was necessary to preserve the child from danger to its welfare; or
(b) the child, being at the time not less than 14 years old, was taken away at its own instigation without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.
Proof that the child was below the critical age gives rise to a presumption that the actor knew the child’s age or acted in reckless disregard thereof. The offense is a misdemeanor unless the actor, not being a parent or person in equivalent relation to the child, acted with knowledge that his conduct would cause serious alarm for the child’s safety, or in reckless disregard of a likelihood of causing such alarm, in which case the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(2) Custody of Committed Persons. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any committed person away from lawful custody when he is not privileged to do so. "Committed person” means, in addition to anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected or delinquent child, mentally defective or insane person, or other dependent or incompetent person entrusted to another’s custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of law.
212.5 Criminal Coercion
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another’s freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to:
(a) commit any criminal offense; or
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, refraining from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.
(2) Grading. Criminal coercion is a misdemeanor unless the threat is to commit a felony or the actor’s purpose is felonious, *326in which cases the offense is a felony of the third degree. [ALI, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, part II, §§ 212.1 to 212.5, pp 209-210, 237, 244, 248, 262-263.]

 The commentary to § 212.1 of the Model Penal Code states, in part:
2. Rationale. The central problem in the law of kidnapping is to restrict the drastic sanctions authorized for this offense to instances of misbehavior warranting such punishment. The challenge, in other words, is to define the crime in terms that identify a distinct kind of wrongful act. This goal requires avoidance of two related dangers.
First, the entire range of misconduct based on unlawful confinement of another must not be lumped together in one undifferentiated offense for purposes of grading. The person who physically restrains another on a public street in order to drive a point home is guilty of wrongful interference with the other’s personal liberty, but a rational penal code must distinguish such conduct from prolonged confinement and isolation from the protection of the law. Even instances of more serious misbehavior, such as locking another in a closet for several hours, should be treated differently from abduction for ransom. Finally, the extreme gravity of sanctions authorized under existing law is related to the prospect that the victim will not emerge alive. This danger is precluded if the kidnapper voluntarily releases his captive, and the law should take some account of such action.
The Model Code addresses these concerns by defining three progressively less serious offenses and distributing them across a wide range of felony and misdemeanor sanctions. The reasoning behind the definition of the lesser crimes of felonious restraint and false imprisonment is explained in the commentary to Sections 212.2 and 212.3, respectively. Grading within the kidnapping offense is discussed in Comments 4 and 5 below.
The other potential danger which a rational penal code must avoid is that the definition of kidnapping will sweep within its scope conduct that is decidedly wrongful but that should be punished as some other crime. Thus, for example, the robber who forces his victim to move from one room to another in *327order to find a cashbox or open a safe technically may commit kidnapping as well as robbery. This reasoning raises the possibility of cumulative penalties or of higher sanctions for kidnapping, even though the "removal” of the victim to another place was part and parcel of the robbery and not an independent wrong. Similarly, many instances of forcible rape involve some coerced movement of the victim or unlawful restraint for enough time to complete the sex act. Again, the actor may be liable for both kidnapping and rape, even though such asportation or detention of the victim is a criminologically insignificant circumstance in a course of conduct constituting rape. Definition of kidnapping to exclude such cases is a task of special subtlety for, unless particular care is taken, trivial aspects of robbery, rape, or some other crime will end up classified as the most serious version of kidnapping.

 Ante, p 314.

 Ante, p 310.

 Ante, p 315, n 2.

 Prosecutor’s brief, p 15.

 Ante, p 315.

 Ante, p 315.
The concurring opinion suggests that Jaffray could be guilty of kidnapping under § 212.1(c) of the Model Penal Code, which provides:
212.1 Kidnapping
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the following purposes:
(c) to indict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another .... [Emphasis added.]
Jaffray intended only to confine Williams until he and the Norman-dins could retrieve the dog. He did not intend to harm or terrorize Williams (see text accompanying n 25), and therefore would not be guilty of kidnapping under § 212.1(c) of the Model Penal Code.

 Section 212.3 of the Model Penal Code provides:
False Imprisonment
A person commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
This provision appears to apply to Jaffray who intended to restrain Williams so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
Section 212.2 of the Model Penal Code provides:
Felonious Restraint
A person commits a felony of the third degree if he knowingly:
(a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury ....

 Ante, p 316.