Court Opinion

ID: 9580603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:43.449275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:23.465284
License: Public Domain

Justice Huskins
dissenting.
The evidence recited in the majority opinion provides overwhelming support for the verdict returned by the jury. Thus, unless prejudicial error is made to appear, the verdict should be upheld.
In my view, the error relied on by the majority is inflated all out of proportion to its actual significance. Granted that Mr. Dodge, the privately employed prosecutor, erred when he argued to the jury: “ . . . you will answer the question whether this defendant is guilty of first degree murder. If found guilty, he gets an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina — it is necessary. If any error is made in this court; that Court will say.” Upon objection the able and conscientious trial judge immediately said: “Sustained. Members of the jury, don’t consider what he said about the Supreme Court.” This was sufficient, in my opinion, to remove any harmful effect the mildly improper argument of counsel might have had. But the judge went further and at the beginning of his charge to the jury stated: “I want to go back to the argument that was objected to in the argument of counsel that the Supreme Court has a right to send this case back on mistakes. The reason I sustained that objection, I want you all to understand is that the Supreme Court will review this case. That they would only send the case back if I make a mistake on a legal question. They will not re*411view the decisions of the facts by the jury. The jury is the sole trier of the facts of this lawsuit.” (Emphasis added.) While this instruction is not a model of good grammar or sentence structure and does not depict the wisest choice of words, it nevertheless informs the jury in understandable language that a review by the Supreme Court would entail only an examination of the case for errors of law, not errors of fact — “they will not review the decisions of the facts by the jury.” Thus it seems to me that any prejudicial effect the improper argument might have had was decisively removed by the instructions of the court. I see little else the court could have done; and unless we are to say that this impropriety was so gross it could not be corrected, the effects of the episode should be regarded as cured and the conviction upheld.
Moreover, I attach no significance whatever to the report by Mrs. Larzalere that, after the jury had been discharged, she heard one of the jurors say: “They always take it to the Supreme Court.” Once a jury is discharged its verdict cannot be impeached by statements, and rumors of statements, allegedly made by some of the jurors. Selph v. Selph, 267 N.C. 635, 148 S.E. 2d 574 (1966) ; State v. Hollingsworth, 263 N.C. 158, 139 S.E. 2d 235 (1964) ; 7 Strong’s N. C. Index 2d, Trial § 46 (1968).
I am in thorough agreement with the majority holding that defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine Mrs. Langley with reference to her employment of private counsel. This evidence was competent to show bias on the part of Mrs. Langley, and the rule to that effect is so generally recognized as to require no citation of authority. Even so, defendant was on trial for killing Mrs. Langley’s husband who was shot down before her eyes, and every member of the jury knew she was bitterly biased against defendant and intensely interested in seeing him convicted. Hence exclusion of evidence that she had employed counsel to assist the prosecution was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 31 L.Ed. 2d 340, 92 S.Ct. 1056 (1972) ; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.Ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969) ; Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963) ; State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677 (1972) ; State v. Brinson, 277 N.C. 286, 177 S.E. 2d 398 (1970).
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion granting a new trial. I vote to uphold the conviction.