Court Opinion

ID: 9401900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 16:07:43.368706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.980511
License: Public Domain

J-S17037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    JAMALL JACKSON                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1337 WDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 13, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007067-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: JUNE 14, 2023

        Appellant, Jamall Jackson, appeals from the order entered in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition filed

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

        A prior panel of this Court summarized some of the relevant facts and

procedural history of this case as follows:

          At approximately 1:30 p.m. on May 8, 2015, Pittsburgh
          Police received several 911 calls indicating that a firearm
          had been discharged multiple times near the intersection of
          Sacramento Avenue and Minton Street. The shooter was
          described as a bearded African–American man, who had
          fired shots at the feet of a woman just before they entered
          a red car, which the assailant was driving.

          Police Officer Jeffrey Brock arrived at the scene. Officer
          Brock found no one and did not see blood, but he did
          retrieve eight shell casings from the sidewalk and a grassy
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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          area near the described intersection, as well as a cell phone
          owned by Jenna Cox, Appellant’s girlfriend. While Officer
          Brock was investigating the area, a bearded African-
          American male drove a red Impala along Minton Street.
          Police unsuccessfully attempted to stop the vehicle in
          question, which was found parked about .2 miles from the
          scene of the shooting. The Impala was registered to Ms.
          Cox.

          Several days later, Officer Brock called Ms. Cox, who was
          evasive and appeared frightened.        On May 13, 2015,
          Detective Dawn Mercurio called Appellant, who agreed to
          come to the police station for an interview. After being
          given his Miranda[2] warnings, Appellant made a
          statement, which the trial court described:

              Appellant told Detective Mercurio that he had been in
              a romantic relationship with Jenna Cox and that he
              had acted as a surrogate father for her five-year-old
              son. The natural father was incarcerated so he was
              acting in that individual’s place.     Appellant told
              Detective Mercurio that on the 8 of May, he was
                                                 th

              angry at Cox because he had learned that Cox and the
              natural father of her five-year-old had been talking
              behind his back and that the natural father had
              recently been released from incarceration. Appellant
              found out that Cox had taken her son’s natural father
              to his son’s school so that he could meet with the
              teachers and become more involved in his son’s life.
              Appellant called Cox’s cell phone and confirmed the
              fact that Cox was at her son’s school with the child’s
              natural father and he demanded that she leave him
              there and that she come pick him up at the 300 block
              of Minton Street.

              When Cox arrived, Appellant got in the passenger seat
              and he was very angry and pulled out a gun from his
              right pocket and set it on his lap while he was talking
              with her. The gun was a nine-millimeter Ruger
              handgun. He was yelling at her, telling her that he
              did not appreciate how deceitful she was and he
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2   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

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          demanded to know where the natural father was living
          because he needed to die. Cox then got out of the car
          and was walking down the street when Appellant
          followed her, telling her to get back in the car. When
          she refused to listen to him, he fired several rounds
          at her feet and she took off running. Appellant then
          got into the driver’s side of the vehicle and was
          pursuing her down Minton Street. He told her to get
          back into the car and if she did not, he was going to
          harm her. She got back into the car and then they
          drove away. Appellant then drove to his father’s
          house in McKees Rocks so that he could dispose of the
          firearm. After giving the firearm to his father, they
          drove back to Minton Street to look for the cell phone
          that Cox had dropped.         Appellant told Detective
          Mercurio that his father still had the gun and then
          agreed to call his father to tell him that they at least
          wanted to obtain the weapon. His father agreed and
          then they rode to his father’s house and his father
          came out to the police car with the gun and magazine
          in a bag and gave it to Detective Mercurio.

        Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/17, at 4-5. The Commonwealth
        also presented evidence that Appellant was previously
        convicted of three counts of robbery [and one count of
        aggravated assault].

        In response to this Commonwealth evidence, Appellant’s
        father denied receiving the gun from Appellant and claimed
        that he found it in some bushes. Appellant also denied the
        entirety of the statement that he gave to Detective
        Mercurio.

        The jury rejected Appellant’s proof and convicted him of
        [persons not to possess firearms per 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
        6105(a)(1), on March 29, 2016].

Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 1599 WDA 2016 at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed

Nov. 16, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). The court sentenced Appellant

on June 27, 2016, to four to eight years’ imprisonment plus two years’

probation. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 16,

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2017. See id. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal

following reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, but he

discontinued that filing on May 21, 2019.

      On June 24, 2019, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The

court subsequently appointed PCRA counsel. Following a change of counsel,

newly-appointed PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on February

8, 2021. The court held a PCRA hearing on October 5, 2021. On October 13,

2021, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal

on November 10, 2021. On December 3, 2021, the court ordered Appellant

to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) by January 3, 2022. Appellant timely complied.

      Appellant raises two issues for our review:

         Whether appellate counsel gave ineffective assistance for
         failing to raise an issue regarding prior bad acts in violation
         of Pa.R.E. 404(b)?

         Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for
         failing to properly object to admission of prior bad acts
         evidence in violation of Pa.R.E. 404(b)?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

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PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

      For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant

argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge on direct

appeal the Commonwealth’s introduction of improper “prior bad acts”

evidence.     Appellant claims that the Commonwealth sought to introduce

evidence of his prior 2003 conviction for aggravated assault under Rule

404(b)(2) to demonstrate modus operandi and/or to identify Appellant as

someone who previously possessed a firearm, alleged to be the same one

used in the instant case. Appellant maintains that trial counsel objected to

introduction of this evidence.   Appellant claims the court permitted the

Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the prior conviction but only to show

that Appellant was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm based on

the prior conviction, as a required element for the charge on trial of persons

not to possess firearms. Appellant contends that the court did not admit such

evidence under Rule 404(b)(2).

      Appellant insists that Commonwealth witness, Deputy District Attorney

Jan Necessary, then testified not only that Appellant was previously convicted

of aggravated assault, but also regarding the facts of that underlying

conviction.    Appellant emphasizes that the underlying facts of his prior

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conviction involved Appellant firing shots at his former girlfriend while she was

in her car driving away with her four-year-old son in the back seat. Appellant

contends that Ms. Necessary’s testimony should have been limited to “what

Ms. Necessary tried Appellant for, what the verdict of the case was, and a

certified copy of the conviction.” (Appellant’s Brief at 26). Appellant suggests

that Ms. Necessary’s testimony went beyond what was required to establish

an element of the offense on trial and, instead, demonstrated that Appellant

was a person with the propensity to commit crimes as prohibited by Rule

404(b)(1). Appellant avers that such testimony was inadmissible under a Rule

404(b)(2) exception, as made clear by the court’s ruling.

      Appellant acknowledges that the court gave a cautionary instruction, but

he complains that the instruction did not ameliorate the prejudicial effect of

the testimony. Appellant concedes that the instruction informed the jury to

consider Appellant’s prior aggravated assault conviction solely as it pertained

to establishing an element of the offense of persons not to possess firearms.

Nevertheless, Appellant suggests that the instruction did not remove “the

passions of the jury regarding the fact that Appellant shot at a former girlfriend

while a child was in the car, and ultimately, it did not cure the deliberate

violation of [the court’s] ruling to limit the admissibility of the previous

conviction to satisfy the element of” the firearms offense on trial. (Id. at 34).

Appellant asserts that appellate counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to

raise this issue on direct appeal, and that the failure to do so deprived

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Appellant of receiving a new trial.

      Alternatively, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise a proper and timely objection to Ms. Necessary’s testimony.

Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel objected pre-trial to introduction of

Ms. Necessary’s testimony and again at trial.            Nevertheless, Appellant

suggests that trial counsel failed to lodge a proper objection to Ms. Necessary

testifying about the underlying facts of the prior aggravated assault

conviction during or after Ms. Necessary’s testimony. Appellant highlights trial

counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that there would have been no

strategic basis for failing to object to such testimony.     Appellant maintains

that the Commonwealth improperly presented the facts of a prior case under

the guise of proving an element of the crime for persons not to possess

firearms. Appellant insists that had trial counsel made a timely objection, the

facts of the previous conviction would have been stricken from the record,

removing it from consideration for the jury when rendering a verdict.

Appellant concludes that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, and this

Court must grant him a new trial. We disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed    to   have   rendered    effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

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         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

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         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).          “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404 provided at the time of Appellant’s

offense: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove

a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (effective March

18, 2013 to March 31, 2022).         Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may

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introduce such evidence for another purpose, “such as proving motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to

March 31, 2022). “When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the

common plan exception, the trial court must examine the details and

surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the

evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive[.]” Commonwealth v.

Green, 271 A.3d 393, 402 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 280

A.3d 329 (2022).        “Additionally, in order to use Rule 404(b) evidence to

establish identity, the crimes must be so similar that logically the same person

has committed both acts.”           Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks

omitted). Moreover, Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible only if the probative

value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.     Pa.R.E.

404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to March 31, 2022).3

       We further note that “[a]n appellate court will not attribute error when

the [t]rial [j]udge provides a [cautionary] instruction that fully explains the

purpose for which the jury may consider specific evidence.” Commonwealth

v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 502 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 671,

916 A.2d 1101 (2007).           “[U]nless evidence to the contrary is shown, a

presumption exists that the jury will obey the trial court’s instructions.” Id.

____________________________________________

3The current version of Rule 404(b) contains almost identical language as the
previous version. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2) (effective April 1, 2022).

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at 501.

       The Crimes Code defined the offense of persons not to possess firearms

at the time Appellant committed the crime at issue as follows:

          § 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
          control, sell or transfer firearms

          (a) Offense defined.—

          (1) A person who has been convicted of an offense
          enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
          Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or
          whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not
          possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain
          a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
          manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) (effective December 16, 2008 to January 2, 2017).

Aggravated assault is an enumerated offense under subsection (b).            18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b) (effective December 16, 2008 to January 2, 2017).

       Instantly, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine on March 23,

2016, seeking to present evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts. Specifically,

the Commonwealth sought to admit evidence that Appellant previously

possessed a 9mm firearm and fired approximately three rounds at Naomi King

on or around September 6, 2001.4 The Commonwealth claimed, generally,

that such evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)(2).

       On the first day of trial before opening arguments, the parties discussed

____________________________________________

4 These were the underlying facts of Appellant’s 2003 aggravated assault
conviction. We note that the victim in that matter, Naomi King, has no familial
relationship to this authoring jurist.

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the Commonwealth’s motion in limine. The Commonwealth claimed that the

handgun Appellant used in the 2001 incident was the same handgun Appellant

possessed in the instant case. The Commonwealth claimed the similarities

between the past incident and the facts of the instant case demonstrated a

modus operandi such that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)(2).

Appellant’s trial counsel refuted the Commonwealth’s position, arguing that

the proffered evidence did not satisfy any exception under Rule 404(b)(2),

and would be more prejudicial than probative in any event.        Trial counsel

further acknowledged that the Commonwealth would already be introducing

the fact that Appellant was previously convicted of aggravated assault to

establish an element of the firearms offense on trial; thus, to introduce

evidence of the underlying facts of that case would be “in the nature of piling

on” and prejudicial. (N.T. Trial, 3/28/16, at 9).

      After hearing argument from the parties, the following exchange took

place:

         THE COURT:                What conviction disqualifies him
         [from possessing a firearm]?

         [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Aggravated assault.

         THE COURT:                 Arising out of what?

         [THE COMMONWEALTH]: This incident, these 404(b).

         THE COURT:                 You will be permitted to put it in.

         [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Thank you, Judge.

         THE COURT:                 It is part of elements of the

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         crime now. It is not 404.

         [TRIAL COUNSEL]:            Understood.

         THE COURT:                  Anything else?

         [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, Your Honor. I would just
         submit to the [c]ourt, and I have explained to defense
         counsel, that I will be calling Deputy District Attorney Jan
         Necessary to testify to the facts underlying that prior
         conviction. I think we were in agreement that rather than
         go through the process of using a transcript, with the
         [c]ourt’s permission I will be calling Deputy Jan Necessary
         because she prosecuted the case and she is available to
         testify.

         THE COURT:                  [Trial counsel].

         [TRIAL COUNSEL]:           I don’t agree. I don’t disagree.
         I’m not sure there is any better way to introduce that
         testimony but I’m not giving up any objection to hearsay or
         any others as the case may be.

         [THE COURT]:                You will be permitted to do so.

(Id. at 11-12) (emphasis added).

      Just prior to Ms. Necessary’s testimony, trial counsel “renew[ed his]

objection to this line of questioning to preserve the record for purposes of

appeal.” (Id. at 137). Ms. Necessary testified that she prosecuted Appellant

in 2003 for aggravated assault based on an incident that occurred in

September of 2001. Ms. Necessary confirmed that Appellant was convicted

of aggravated assault at the conclusion of trial, and that a conviction of

aggravated assault renders you unable to possess a firearm in Pennsylvania.

(Id. at 139). Ms. Necessary identified a trial exhibit as a certified copy of the

conviction and judgment of sentence for Appellant in the aggravated assault

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case. (Id. at 140). The Commonwealth then asked Ms. Necessary to explain

the underlying facts of Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction.        Ms.

Necessary responded:

        The victim in this case was a woman named Naomi King.
        She was 24-years-old. She was the former girlfriend of
        [Appellant]. She was, on the date of the incident, she was
        in her car driving away from her home with her 4-year-old
        son in the back seat when [Appellant] emerged from some
        bushes or trees near the street where she was driving near
        her home and fired several shots at her vehicle while she
        was driving.

(Id. at 140-41). Ms. Necessary identified the gun involved in the aggravated

assault case as a 9mm handgun. (Id. at 141). Trial counsel did not object at

any point during Ms. Necessary’s testimony.

     Following the close of all testimony, trial counsel had the following

exchange with the court:

        [TRIAL COUNSEL]:            I have one additional matter to
        raise with the [c]ourt. Your Honor allowed the 404(b)
        evidence to come in. We respect the decision. That ship
        sailed to keep it out. What I respectfully request Your Honor
        to do is give a limiting or cautioning instruction that they
        only consider that 404(b) for the purpose laid out in Rule
        404(b)[(2)] knowledge, mistake, the litany that I’m sure
        Your Honor is familiar with.

        [THE COMMONWEALTH]: I have no objection to that, Your
        Honor.

        THE COURT:                    It will be covered in the
        information given to them with respect to prior conviction is
        given to them for two purposes with respect to the 404(b)
        violation where it was a disqualification for the weapon but
        part of the elements for a particular crime and use it for that
        purpose to see if, in fact, the Commonwealth met its burden
        of proving the elements of that particular crime. …

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(Id. at 178-79).

      When instructing the jury, the court stated:

         Now you have heard evidence of the fact that [Appellant]
         has convictions for the crimes of aggravated assault and
         robbery. These pieces of information have been given to
         you for a very limited purpose. With respect to the charge
         of aggravated assault, it is an element of the offense that
         has been charged, that is a person not to possess a firearm.
         …

(N.T. Trial, 3/29/16, at 196). Following the instructions, the court asked the

parties if there were any additions or corrections, to which both parties

responded negatively.

      Significantly, regardless of whether trial counsel lodged a specific

enough objection at trial, we cannot agree with Appellant’s assertion that any

failure to properly object to Ms. Necessary’s testimony regarding the

underlying facts of the aggravated assault conviction resulted in prejudice. As

this Court explained on direct appeal when analyzing Appellant’s challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence:

         Herein, Appellant does not contest that he was convicted of
         an enumerated offense… On appeal, Appellant challenges
         that the Commonwealth proved, beyond a reasonable
         doubt, that he was in possession of a firearm. Although
         Appellant confessed to Detective Mercurio that he had a gun
         in possession on the day in question, Appellant suggests
         that his confession must be discounted since it was not
         written or recorded, even though it could have been. [T]he
         jury assesses the credibility of the trial witnesses. Detective
         Mercurio outlined the contents of Appellant’s statement, and
         the jury was free to credit her testimony, regardless of
         whether Appellant’s statement was written or recorded.
         Hence, we reject Appellant’s first position.

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Jackson, supra at 6. (See also N.T. Trial, 3/28/16, at 86-107) (discussing

Appellant’s interview with Detective Mercurio).5       Additionally, Officer Jason

Farrell testified at trial that a 911 caller had reported that a vehicle of interest

involved in the crime was a red Chevy Impala with a black male wearing all

black. (Id. at 75). When the officer was at the crime scene collecting shell

casings, he observed a vehicle fitting that same description driving by the

officers. The officer identified the driver as Appellant. Because the vehicle

drove off at a high rate of speed, however, the officers were unable to make

contact with the driver that day. (Id. at 75-76).

       Further, the court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury to consider

the aggravated assault conviction for the “limited purpose” of analyzing “an

element of the offense that has been charged, that is a person not to possess

a firearm.”    (See N.T. Trial, 3/29/16, at 196).      We can presume the jury

followed the court’s instruction.          See Dargan, supra.     In light of the

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, and the court’s issuance of a

cautionary instruction in this case, we cannot say that the results of

Appellant’s trial would have been different had Ms. Necessary not testified

about the underlying facts of Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction, to

____________________________________________

5 Appellant testified in his own defense at trial and denied implicating himself
in any statement to Detective Mercurio. (See id. at 158-59). The jury
obviously rejected this testimony in favor of testimony from the
Commonwealth’s witnesses.

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establish prejudice on Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims. See Spotz, supra.

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.

     Order affirmed.

     Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.

     Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2023

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