Court Opinion

ID: 9831816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:23:25.635174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.318331
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Appellant has filed a very interesting motion for rehearing in the above cause, covering substantially the same contentions made on original submission and alleging error in our holdings as to several of them, one of which is, that since appellant owned only a royalty interest in an undivided one-fourth of the minerals, which interest was nonpossessory, appellees could not compel a partition as against her. As pointed out in our original opinion, such interest was a royalty, contingent on production under a lease which she had executed to defendant Grimes. We held in our original opinion that whatever posses-sory rights appellant previously had, was conveyed to Grimes in said lease, who held same subject to performance of the condition of the lease. Therefore, appellant could not compel a partition, neither was she in position to defeat a partition. However, appellees very wisely made her a party defendant along with Grimes who held the lease. Thus the said undivided one-fourth interest was before the court and the judgment for partition was binding on both appellant and Grimes, irrespective of which of them was entitled to possession. It is not denied that partition could be had as to the Grimes lease. It certainly would not be consistent to hold that such partition could not reach and bind any royalty interest incident to the lease.
Appellees were entitled to a complete and effective partition. It is not difficult to envision the confusion that easily could result from partitioning the lease, but allowing appellant to retain a “spread” over the entire section. The purpose of partition is to segregate ownership and to allow to *194each owner the free use, control and possession of the interest set apart to- him to the exclusion of all other former joint owners. Otherwise, there would be no statutory partition. Furthermore, should we hold as contended by-appellant, such holding would place it within the power of appellant "to defeat or postpone a partition indefinitely by the simple expedient of renewing or extending the existing lease, or by executing a new one. It would contravene and render ineffective Article 6082, which provides that, any joint owner or claimant “may compel a partition,” and contravene the construction thereof by the courts.
Appellant further contends that it would be inequitable to her to segregate her royalty interest. It might be argued in reply that not to segregate it would be very inequitable to appellees. In the Supreme Court case of Moseley v. Hearrell et al., 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338, opinion by Chief Justice Alexander, the Court had under consideration Article 6106, together with Articles 6082 and 6096. In construing said statutes the court said:
“The above statutes confer the right to compel partition in the broadest terms. There is no requirement for the showing of equitable grounds as a prerequisite to the exercise of the right, nor is there any provision that the right may be defeated by the showing of inequities. Article 6082 confers upon any joint.owner or claimant of land the absolute right to demand segregation of his interest from that of his co-owner. 32 Tex.Jur. p. 162, § 17; 40 Am.Jur. p. 88, § 106; 47 C.J. p. 28, § 48; Caldwell v. Farrier, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 452; Williamson v. McElroy, Tex.Civ.App., 155 S.W. 998; Morris v. Morris, 45 Tex.Civ.App. 90, 99 S.W. 872.
“The above statute, Article 6082, was amended in 1917 by adding thereto the words ‘or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas lands, whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise.’ This amendment enlarges the purpose of the statute so as to give the right of partition not only to joint owners of real estate, or of any interest therein, but as well to joint owners of any oil or gas lands, ‘whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise.’ 31 Tex.Jur. p. 567, § 34; Henderson v. Chesley, 116 Tex. 355, 292 S.W. 156; Rolls v. Woods, Tex.Com.App. 291 S.W. 532; Goodloe & Meredith v. Harris, 127 Tex. 583, 94 S.W.2d 1141.”
Upon construing Article 6106, the Court concludes:
“It may sometimes be inequitable to one or more of the joint owners if another co-owner is permitted to enforce partition of the jointly owned property; but this is one of the consequences which one assumes when he becomes a co-tenant in land. If he does not provide against it by contract, he may expect his co-tenant to exercise his statutory right of partition at will.”
As pointed out in the original opinion and agreed to by appellant, appellant has only a contingent royalty interest, if and when production is obtained, and a contingent reversionary interest in the minerals. Oil and gas when produced and severed, become personal property. As owner of a royalty interest, she is not a joint owner or claimant of an interest in the land, and therefore, not in position to prosecute or defeat a suit for partition. However, if the possibility of a reverter gives her an interest in the land, she would have a possessory right along with other joint owners.
Appellees, in their petition, prayed, and the court granted a partition as to the two leases and a segregation of the mineral interests to correspond. Under the decree, as well as under the lease, appellant would receive her royalty, if any, from the one-fourth of the section allotted to Grimes. Appellees would be limited in their royalty, if any, to the three-fourths of the section allotted to Hall. Appellees would be excluded from participating in any production from the Grimes lease and vice versa. But we' cannot conceive of a court granting a partition as to the leases and a “spread” as to what the leases produced. To grant a “spread” would be tantamount to a finding that the mineral interests were not susceptible of partition in kind and a sale of the minerals and distribution of the proceeds according to ownership would be indicated.
In the motion for rehearing, appellant discusses “joint owner,” “joint tenancy,” “co-tenancy” and “right of possession,” the *195elements of joint tenancy and concludes that “the lessor and lessee under the mineral lease are not co-tenants with each other, there being no unity of possession.” We deem it unnecessary to discuss the matters mentioned 'further than to say that said lessor and lessee were defendants in the suit and whatever may have been their relationship, the right of plaintiffs to sue for partition was not affected thereby. It will be recalled that the right to partition, Article 6082, is conferred upon “any joint owner or claimant of land,” and “the above statutes confer the right to compel partition in the broadest terms.” Moseley v. Hear-rell, supra. We have only to look to the statute itself to determine who may sue for partition. The relationship of the defendants as between themselves is of little materiality. The plaintiffs were fully qualified under the statutes to sue, being joint owners, which is not questioned. The court found as to the specific interest owned by plaintiffs in the said minerals, subject to the Ellis A. Hall lease, and that appellant owned an undivided one-fourth mineral interest, subject to her lease to Grimes. All owners or claimants were before the court.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.