Court Opinion

ID: 9376806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 22:06:53.305683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.554605
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Wall-Meiring v. Gibson, 2023-Ohio-664.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

Sylvia Wall-Meiring                                    Court of Appeals No. L-22-1083

        Appellant                                      Trial Court No. CI0202003091

v.

Kim Gibson, Individually and
as Executor of the Last Will and
Testament of Nancy Meiring
and as Trustee of the Trust of
Nancy Meiring, et al.                                  DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                       Decided: March 3, 2023

                                                   *****

        Braden A. Blumenstiel, for appellant.

        Jeffrey M. Kerscher, for appellee.

                                                   *****

        DUHART, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal filed by appellant, Sylvia Wall-Meiring, from the February

23, 2021 and January 20, 2022 judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments.

        {¶ 2} Appellant sets forth three assignments of error:
       1. The trial court erred in ruling defendant-appellee did not wrongfully

       convert assets or intentionally interfere with the expectancy of inheritance

       of appellant and the other trust beneficiaries through acts of self-dealing,

       fraud, dress, [sic] and/or undue influence.

       2. The trial court erred in ruling defendant did not breach any of her

       fiduciary duties to appellant and the other trust beneficiaries.

       3. The trial court erred in ruling defendant sufficiently rebutted the

       presumption of undue influence that applies in this case due to the

       fiduciary/confidential relationship appellee had with decedent when the

       challenged transfers of assets occurred.

                                        Background

       {¶ 3} In 1969, Nancy and Robert Meiring married.1 Prior to their marriage, Nancy

had three children and Robert had three children. Nancy and Robert had a biological

child together, thus the family (“Meiring family”) consisted of seven children. Nancy

and Robert never considered any of the children as step-children or children, they were

all just considered children. Sylvia is one of those children.

       {¶ 4} Nancy and Robert, during their marriage, operated a real estate company in

which they managed numerous Toledo, Ohio rental properties they had accumulated.

1
 Since some of the parties and individuals share the same last name, we will refer to the
parties by their first names only.

2.
Nancy and Robert also owned a home in Fulton County, Ohio. Robert passed away in

2008, and Nancy inherited all of the rental properties and the home.

       {¶ 5} On July 16, 2013, Nancy executed a will and created a living trust (“Trust”),

naming herself as trustee. Sylvia, the other children in the Meiring family and their

descendants were beneficiaries of the Trust, as was a church. Nancy also executed a

durable limited power of attorney, appointing daughter, Kim Gibson, attorney-in-fact.

       {¶ 6} In October 2013, Nancy transferred the legal titles of the rental properties

and legal title of the home to the Trust.

       {¶ 7} On March 20, 2014, R&N Rentals, LLC (“Rentals”) was created and was

co-owned equally by the Trust and Kim. Thus, the assets of the Trust were made assets

of Rentals. That same day, an operating agreement by and among Rentals, the Trust and

Kim became effective, and provided that the Trust and Kim were the two members of

Rentals, and the Trust and Kim were each entitled to 50% of the profits of Rentals.

       {¶ 8} Nancy passed away on January 9, 2017. Kim became the successor trustee

of the Trust, as provided in the Trust.

       {¶ 9} On April 30, 2017, Sylvia, as a beneficiary, signed an Approval of Sale

document, acknowledging that she was notified of the plan to sell the home to another

beneficiary (“buyer”) for $262,500, which would initially be paid by a mortgage note

from the Trust, and after the buyer received her inheritance, the buyer would pay off the

mortgage to the Trust. The document further provided “I hereby approve of this sale and

distribution process.” Seven other beneficiaries each signed an Approval of Sale

3.
document. Thereafter, a mortgage from the Trust to the buyer for the home was given for

$105,000.

         {¶ 10} On July 23, 2018, R&N Sales, LLC (“Sales”) was created to hold

properties (previously owned by Rentals) equal to the Trust’s 50% stake. Kim retained

ownership of Rentals, and has been the sole owner of Rentals since 50% of the properties

were distributed to Sales.

         {¶ 11} On August 1, 2018, an operating agreement of Sales became effective by

and among the members, who are the beneficiaries of the Trust, except Kim who gave up

her interest. The Sales’ operating agreement provided that all of the members had signed

it and agreed to be obligated by its terms.2 Kim was designated the initial manager of

Sales.

         {¶ 12} On January 9, 2019, Sylvia filed her complaint against Kim, Rentals and

others, then dismissed her claims, without prejudice, and refiled her complaint on

September 21, 2020. In the refiled complaint, Sylvia set forth six causes of action: in the

first cause of action, she sought an accounting; in the second cause of action, she alleged

breach of fiduciary duties against Kim; in the third cause of action, Sylvia alleged

common law accounts; in the fourth cause of action, Sylvia alleged conversion against

Kim; in the fifth cause of action, Sylvia sought an injunction; and in the sixth cause of

2
 The Sales’ operating agreement in the record is only signed by Kim, as manager of
Rentals.

4.
action, Sylvia alleged intentional interference with expectation of inheritance against

Kim.

          {¶ 13} On November 13, 2020, Kim and Rentals filed a motion for partial

summary judgment as to Sylvia’s second, fourth and sixth causes of action. Kim and

Rentals subsequently withdrew their motion as to the second cause of action. On

February 23, 2021, the trial court granted the motion as to the fourth and sixth causes of

action.

          {¶ 14} On August 24, 2021, Kim filed a motion for partial summary judgment on

Sylvia’s second and fifth causes of action. On January 20, 2022, the trial court granted

the motion, and dismissed the second and fifth causes of action with prejudice.

          {¶ 15} On March 18, 2022, Sylvia dismissed her remaining claims. Thereafter,

Sylvia appealed the trial court’s judgments.

                                  First Assignment of Error

          {¶ 16} Sylvia argues she presented evidence to the trial court that Kim unduly

influenced Nancy and wrongfully converted Nancy’s assets for Kim’s own benefit, which

interfered with Sylvia’s expectation of inheritance.

          {¶ 17} Sylvia’s arguments concern the fourth and sixth causes of action alleged in

her complaint, which were the subject of Kim and Rentals’ first motion for partial

summary judgment. As such, we will review those causes of action, and undertake an

examination of the first motion for partial summary judgment.

5.
                                         Complaint

       {¶ 18} In her fourth cause of action, Sylvia alleged her “ownership or right to

possession of [T]rust assets was diminished as a result of [Kim’s] wrongful conversion of

Trust assets for her personal benefit by converting Trust assets into assets held by

[Rentals] to which [Kim] was one of two members who is allegedly entitled to 50% of

the income from the [Rentals’] assets.” Sylvia further alleged in her complaint that Kim,

in violation of her fiduciary duties, played an integral role in converting the Trust assets

into assets of Rentals, which constitutes self-dealing. Sylvia also alleged the conversion

of the Trust assets into assets of Rentals and/or the creation of Rentals was done at a time

that Nancy was not of sound mind and memory, and/or was procured through undue

influence, fraud, duress, forgery, mistake, coercion and/or other wrongful acts or

omissions by Kim.

       {¶ 19} In the sixth cause of action, Sylvia alleged Kim intentionally interfered

with Sylvia’s expectation of inheritance by subjecting Nancy to duress, fraud, and/or

undue influence to convert Trust assets into assets held by Rentals.

           Kim and Rentals’ First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

       {¶ 20} Kim and Rentals argued the fourth and sixth causes of action were

dependent on the allegation in the complaint that “* * * the conversion of the Trust assets

into assets of [Rentals] and/or the creation of [Rentals’] Operating Agreement was done

at a time [Nancy] was not of sound mind and memory and/or was procured as a result of

undue influence, fraud, duress, forgery, mistake, coercion, and/or other wrongful acts

6.
and/or omissions by * * * Kim, as a result of which the conversion of assets from the

Trust to [Rentals] and/or the creation of [Rentals] was not [Nancy’s] free and voluntary

act and, therefore, are invalid, null and void.”

       {¶ 21} Kim and Rentals offered the affidavit of attorney Timothy Alley, in which

he averred, inter alia: he was Nancy’s attorney and at her direction, he drafted and created

her estate planning documents, including her will and Trust; at Nancy’s direction, he

drafted the operating agreement for Rentals and the deed work to transfer the Trust assets

into Rentals; he observed Nancy freely and voluntarily execute the operating agreement

for Rentals and sign the deeds; Nancy appeared in all respects to be of sound mind and

memory; Nancy did not appear to be acting under fraud, duress, coercion or undue

influence; had Nancy appeared to be not of sound mind or subject to undue influence,

fraud, duress or coercion at the signing of the operating agreement for Rentals and deeds,

he would not have advised her to sign the documents; Nancy was strong-willed and

independent; and he was not concerned Nancy was not acting of her own free will.

       {¶ 22} Sylvia countered that for years, Nancy and Robert had a real estate

company through which they managed about 40 rental units. Sylvia contended that after

Robert passed away in 2008, Nancy became distraught and had difficulty managing her

own affairs, and Kim became more involved and started handling many aspects of

Nancy’s life. Sylvia argued on July 16, 2013, Kim became Nancy’s power of attorney,

which created a confidential/fiduciary relationship between Kim and Nancy which results

in a presumption of undue influence for any transfers that benefit Kim.

7.
       {¶ 23} Sylvia noted on May 29, 2014, a subscription for membership interests in

Rentals was signed by Kim, but was not signed by Nancy, and on that same day,

certificates assigning 50% of the ownership units of Rentals to Kim and the other 50% to

the Trust was signed by Kim, and not signed by Nancy.

       {¶ 24} Sylvia asserted Nancy’s health deteriorated during the last few years of her

life, and Nancy was forgetful, disoriented and had difficulty concentrating. Sylvia argued

that for the last two years of Nancy’s life, Kim exerted control over Nancy and her assets.

For example, Sylvia claimed when she asked Nancy about Sylvia’s daughter renting one

of Nancy’s houses, Nancy said Sylvia would have to check with Kim. Sylvia submitted

that during the last few years of Nancy’s life, Kim put Nancy on a budget and would only

allow Nancy to spend a certain amount of money. In support of her position, Sylvia

offered several documents, including three affidavits.

       {¶ 25} In reply, Kim and Rentals observed that Sylvia argued the mere fact that

Kim was the power of attorney for Nancy established undue influence, but Sylvia did not

cite a single instance in which Kim used the power of attorney. Kim and Rentals asserted

Sylvia was unable to rebut attorney Alley’s affidavit.

                Standard of Review – Motion for Summary Judgment

       {¶ 26} We consider whether a trial court properly granted a motion for summary

judgment on a de novo basis. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671

N.E.2d 241 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R.

8.
56(C). A motion for summary judgment should be granted if “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and

written stipulations of fact,” show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “No evidence or

stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.” Id.

       {¶ 27} Civ.R. 56(E) states:

       Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,

       shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall

       show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters

       stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of

       papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the

       affidavit.

       {¶ 28} “Thus, an affiant’s statements must set forth facts admissible in evidence.”

Tomlinson v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio St.3d 66, 67, 446 N.E.2d 454 (1983). “Where an

affidavit containing opinions is made part of a motion for summary judgment, it is

properly considered by a trial or reviewing court when it meets the requirements set forth

in Civ.R. 56(E) and Evid.R. 701.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶ 29} “‘Documents submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment

which are not sworn, certified, or authenticated by affidavit have no evidentiary value

and may not be considered by the court in deciding whether a genuine issue of material

fact remains for trial.’” Battaglia v. Conrail, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1332, 2009-Ohio-

9.
5505, ¶ 42, quoting Green v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 85 Ohio App.3d 223, 228, 619 N.E.2d

497 (9th Dist.1993).

       {¶ 30} The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of

material fact exists. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide evidence showing that a

genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 293.

                                        Conversion

       {¶ 31} “The essential elements of a conversion claim are (1) ownership or right to

possession of the property at the time of conversion, (2) a wrongful act or disposition of

that property right by the defendant, and (3) damages.” Hutchings v. Hutchings, 2019-

Ohio-5362, 150 N.E.3d 548, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.), citing Peirce v. Szymanski, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-11-1298, 2013-Ohio-205, ¶ 19.

               Intentional Interference with Expectation of Inheritance

       {¶ 32} The elements of a claim of intentional interference with expectation of

inheritance are: (1) the existence of an expectancy of inheritance by the plaintiff; (2) an

intentional interference by a defendant with the expectancy of inheritance; (3) conduct by

the defendant involving the interference which is tortious, such as fraud, duress or undue

influence; (4) a reasonable certainty the expectancy of inheritance would have been

realized, but for the interference by the defendant; and (5) damage resulting from the

interference. Firestone v. Galbreath, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, 88, 616 N.E.2d 202 (1993).

10.
                        Undue Influence/Fiduciary Relationship

       {¶ 33} “‘Undue influence occurs when the wishes and judgment of the transferor

are substituted by the wishes and judgment of another.’” (Citation omitted.) Grimes v.

Grimes, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA35, 2009-Ohio-3126, ¶ 36. “General influence,

however strong or controlling, is not undue influence unless brought to bear directly upon

the act of making the will. If the will or codicil, as finally executed, expresses the will,

wishes and desires of the testator, the will is not void because of undue influence.” West

v. Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 501, 184 N.E.2d 200 (1962).

       {¶ 34} To establish undue influence, the challenging party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence: (1) the testator was susceptible to undue influence; (2) another

person had an opportunity to exert influence over the susceptible testator; (3) improper

influence was exerted or attempted; and (4) a result showing the effect of that influence.

Id. This same standard applies in establishing undue influence with respect to a trust.

See R.C. 5804.06.

       {¶ 35} Clear and convincing evidence requires proof which “produce[s] in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus. Since the person who can give the best evidence is deceased, most

of the evidence of undue influence “will be circumstantial, leaving the factfinder to draw

permissible inferences.” Redman v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. of Pennsylvania, 69

Ohio St.3d 98, 102, 630 N.E.2d 676 (1994).

11.
       {¶ 36} Undue influence is presumed if the challenging party establishes that a

fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between the decedent and a beneficiary. See

In re Estate of Kiefer, 2017-Ohio-6997, 95 N.E.3d 687, ¶ 8 (2d.Dist.). “The holder of a

power of attorney has a fiduciary relationship with [the] principal. Such a relationship is

‘one in which special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of

another * * * by virtue of this special trust.’” In re Scott, 111 Ohio App.3d 273, 276, 675

N.E.2d 1350 (6th Dist.1996), quoting Stone v. Davis, 66 Ohio St.2d 74, 78, 419 N.E.2d

1094 (1981).

       {¶ 37} “Any transfer of property from a principal to his attorney-in-fact is viewed

with some suspicion.” Bacon v. Donnet, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21201, 2003-Ohio-1301,

¶ 30, citing Studniewski v. Krzyzanowski, 65 Ohio App.3d 628, 632, 584 N.E.2d 1297

(6th Dist.1989). What is more, “the existence of a relationship giving rise to undue

influence does not depend on the use of a power of attorney.” Bayes v. Dornon, 2015-

Ohio-3053, 37 N.E.3d 181, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). See also Bernholtz v. Bernholtz, 6th Dist.

Fulton No. F-22-002, 2022-Ohio-4764, ¶ 48.

       {¶ 38} The holder of a power of attorney may rebut the presumption of undue

influence by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the transfer was free of undue

influence or fraud, and the principal acted voluntarily and with a full understanding of her

actions and consequences. Fox v. Stockmaster, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-01-34, 2002-

Ohio-2824, ¶ 51, citing In re Guardianship of Blumetti, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 92-T-

4752, 1994 WL 45250, *3 (Jan. 14, 1994). A preponderance of the evidence means

12.
evidence which is more probable, more persuasive or of greater probative value. See In

re K.P., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1196, 2019-Ohio-2045, ¶ 59.

       {¶ 39} Thus, the holder of a power of attorney has the initial burden of proving the

validity of a transfer, while the challenging party retains the ultimate burden of proving

undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. MacEwen v. Jordan, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-020431, 2003-Ohio-1547, ¶ 13. See also Bernholtz at ¶ 45.

                                         Analysis

       {¶ 40} Upon review, in her fourth and sixth causes of action, Sylvia alleged Kim

played an integral role in converting Trust assets into assets held be Rentals, which

benefitted Kim, as the conversion occurred when Nancy was not of sound mind and

memory, and/or was procured through undue influence, fraud, duress, forgery, mistake,

coercion.

       {¶ 41} The record shows in 2013, Nancy created the Trust and appointed Kim as

her attorney-in-fact. Thus, we find that Kim, as the holder of a power of attorney, was in

a fiduciary relationship with Nancy. During this relationship, in 2014, Nancy formed

Rentals, of which Kim had a 50% stake and the Trust had a 50% stake.

       {¶ 42} The Rentals’ operating agreement set forth, inter alia: the initial members

of Rentals were the Trust and Kim; Kim was nominated as the initial manager of Rentals;

as the manager, Kim had the authority to execute all filings relating to the operation and

management of Rentals. The operating agreement was signed by Nancy, as trustee, and

Kim, as manager. We therefore find Kim had the authority, pursuant to the Rentals’

13.
operating agreement, to sign the subscription for membership interests in Rentals, and

certificates assigning 50% of the ownership units of Rentals to Kim and the other 50% to

the Trust.

       {¶ 43} Since Kim was in a fiduciary relationship with Nancy, undue influence is

presumed. Therefore, we find Kim had the burden to show her conduct was free of

undue influence, and Nancy voluntarily acted with full knowledge of the consequences of

her actions by a preponderance of the evidence.

       {¶ 44} Our de novo review of the record, construing the evidence in a light most

favorable to Sylvia, reveals, and we find, that Kim presented the following evidence, in

attorney Alley’s affidavit: Nancy, who was strong-willed and independent, directed Alley

to draft the documents creating the Trust, the operating agreement for Rentals and the

deeds to transfer the Trust assets into Rentals; Alley observed Nancy freely and

voluntarily execute the Rentals’ operating agreement and sign the deeds; Nancy appeared

in all respects to be of sound mind and memory; and Nancy did not appear to be acting

under fraud, duress, coercion or undue influence.

       {¶ 45} Also in the record were averments presented by Sylvia, in her affidavit and

the affidavits of Robert Meiring, Jr., and Linda Kline, Nancy’s daughter-in-law,

including: Nancy became more distraught and was having a very difficult time managing

things after her husband’s death; during Nancy’s life, she became disoriented

periodically; over the last few years of her life, Nancy demonstrated difficulty

concentrating; Kim was seen demeaning and threatening Nancy; in 2015 or 2016, Kim

14.
yelled at Nancy while at a restaurant; and over the last two years of her life, Nancy

demonstrated forgetfulness.

       {¶ 46} Upon review, we find the averments in the affidavits offered by Sylvia are

not evidence that Kim exerted undue influence over Nancy when Nancy created Rentals

or transferred Trust assets into assets held be Rentals, nor are they evidence that Nancy’s

creation of Rentals and transfer of Trust assets into assets held by Rentals was the result

of fraud, duress, forgery, mistake or coercion. We further find that Sylvia did not submit

any medical records or other properly authenticated documents to rebut the averments in

Alley’s affidavit.

       {¶ 47} We therefore conclude that Kim satisfied her burden of establishing the

creation of Rentals and the transfer of Trust assets into assets held be Rentals was

accomplished when Nancy was of sound mind and memory, and was not the result of

undue influence, fraud, duress, forgery, mistake or coercion. We further conclude Sylvia

presented no evidence to meet her ultimate burden of proving that Nancy was unduly

influenced by Kim with respect to the creation of Rentals and the transfer of Trust assets

into assets held be Rentals. As such, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment to Kim and Rentals on Sylvia’s fourth and sixth causes of action.

Accordingly, Sylvia’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.

15.
                              Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 48} Sylvia argues the trial court erred in its January 20, 2022 judgment when it

ruled that Kim did not breach any of her fiduciary duties to Sylvia and the other

beneficiaries, as the evidence demonstrates numerous breaches.

       {¶ 49} Sylvia’s arguments concern the second cause of action alleged in her

complaint, which was the subject of Kim and Rentals’ second motion for partial summary

judgment. As such, we will review that cause of action, and undertake an examination of

the second motion for partial summary judgment.

                                        Complaint

       {¶ 50} In her second cause of action, Sylvia alleged she was a beneficiary of the

Trust, as defined in R.C. 5801.01, and in accordance with the statute and the terms of the

Trust, Kim had a duty of loyalty and impartiality to the Trust beneficiaries, to avoid self-

dealing. Sylvia further alleged Kim had a duty to take reasonable steps to take control of

and to protect the Trust property, and to keep adequate records of the administration of

the Trust and its assets. Sylvia alleged Kim breached the fiduciary duties by failing to

properly account for Trust assets and/or by converting assets for her own benefit.

          Kim and Rentals’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

       {¶ 51} Kim and Rentals argued the second cause of action should be dismissed

because: Sylvia was barred from her claim regarding the sale of Nancy’s home, as Sylvia

consented to the transaction in writing, pursuant to R.C. 5810.09; Sylvia cannot produce

evidence of bad faith or reckless indifference, under the Trust’s exculpatory provision, as

16.
modified by R.C. 5810.08, or evidence of damages; and Sylvia conceded her breach of

fiduciary duty claims do not relate to transfers of assets to Rentals by Nancy before Kim

became trustee. Kim and Rentals also argued Sylvia’s fifth cause of action for an

injunction should be dismissed.3

       {¶ 52} In support, Kim and Rentals offered a second affidavit of attorney Timothy

Alley, in which he averred, inter alia: as Nancy’s attorney and at her direction, he drafted

and created the Trust which included an exculpatory provision in Section 13.07; Nancy’s

home was sold to Kim’s daughter and son-in-law with a written Approval of Sale

document signed by Sylvia and each of the other Trust beneficiaries; the note and

mortgage were referenced in the Approval of Sale document; and the sale never involved

a land contract. Attached to Alley’s second affidavit were several documents, including

the Approval of Sale document and the note and mortgage. The Approval of Sale

document states:

       I, _____________, have been notified of the plan to sell [Nancy’s] home

       located at * * * to [J.H.]. The sale is to be for $262,500. This amount will

       be initially paid in the form of a Mortgage Note that will be issued from

       [J.H.] to the * * * Trust * * *. Upon receipt of an inheritance that is being

       paid to her, she will then pay off the mortgage to the Trust. These funds

3
 Sylvia has raised no argument on appeal regarding her fifth cause of action, thus we
need not address this cause of action.

17.
       will then be distributed as called for in the Trust. I hereby approve of this

       sale and distribution process.

The note provides the amount of the loan is $105,000, the lender is Kim as trustee,

interest is charged at the yearly rate of 4% and the maturity date is June 1, 2047.

       {¶ 53} In opposition, Sylvia conceded that she signed an Approval of Sale

document regarding the sale of Nancy’s home, but “it was the understanding the sale

would result in full payment of the $262,500 at the time the sale was concluded.” Sylvia

also argued Nancy owned multiple pieces of real estate, and after Nancy passed away,

Kim, as trustee, divided the pieces of real estate so Kim had the more valuable real estate

located in better areas of town, and the other beneficiaries were left with the less valuable

real estate. Sylvia asserted she asked Kim multiple times to get the properties officially

appraised, but Kim failed and refused to do so. Sylvia further submitted Kim, as trustee,

failed to properly care for and maintain the pieces of real estate allotted to Sylvia and the

other beneficiaries, so the properties are less valuable. Sylvia claimed Kim either failed

to rent or sell the property or Kim rented and sold pieces of property, but failed to make

payment to Sylvia and the other beneficiaries.

       {¶ 54} In addition, Sylvia argued Kim failed to: keep her updated as to the assets

in which Sylvia and the other beneficiaries have an interest; produce any property tax

records for 2018, 2019 and 2020; and produce income and expense reports for all of the

properties of the Trust, Rentals and Sales. In support of her position, Sylvia submitted a

18.
second affidavit, and attached photographs and a copy of a note, and other documents

including Kim and Rentals’ answers to Sylvia’s second set of interrogatories.

       {¶ 55} In reply, Kim and Rentals argued Sylvia was drastically broadening the

breach of fiduciary duties alleged in her second cause of action. Yet, Kim and Rentals

asserted that Sylvia failed to cite to sufficient evidence establishing each element of her

the breach of fiduciary duties claims. As to the element of damages, Kim and Rentals

submitted Sylvia’s affidavit is based on conclusory and speculative statements, without

specific operative facts that Sylvia suffered damages caused by Kim.

       {¶ 56} In support, Kim and Rentals cited to several cases including DeMeo v.

Provident Bank, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89442, 2008-Ohio-2936, ¶ 61 (“[C]ompensatory

damages must be shown with certainty and damages which are merely speculative will

not give rise to recovery.”).

                                            Law

       {¶ 57} To prove breach of fiduciary duty, the challenging party “must establish the

existence of a fiduciary duty, breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by the

breach.” Newcomer v. Natl. City Bank, 2014-Ohio-3619, 19 N.E.3d 492, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.),

citing Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 216, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988). The burden

of proof for breach of fiduciary claims is clear and convincing evidence. Newcomer at ¶

48.

       {¶ 58} “The general rule for the recovery of compensatory damages is that injury

and the resulting damage must be shown with certainty and not be left to conjecture and

19.
speculation.” Pietz v. Toledo Tr. Co., 63 Ohio App.3d 17, 22, 577 N.E.2d 1118 (6th

Dist.1989). “Injury or damage is a necessary element of a cause of action for negligence,

without which summary judgment can be granted.” Id.

       {¶ 59} R.C. 5810.08 states:

       A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is

       unenforceable to the extent that it relieves the trustee of liability for breach

       of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes

       of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries * * *.

       {¶ 60} “‘[C]onduct is reckless if it creates risk substantially greater than that

which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.’” (Citation omitted.) Newcomer at ¶

62, 64. “[R]eckless indifference ‘require[s] an act done in reckless disregard of the rights

of others which evinces a reckless indifference of the consequences to the life, limb,

health, reputation or property of others.’” Id. “‘Reckless conduct is characterized by the

conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that

is unreasonable under the circumstances * * *. (2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts,

Section 500 (1965), adopted.)’” Id. at ¶ 63, quoting Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio

St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraph four of the syllabus.

       {¶ 61} R.C. 5810.09 provides:

       A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of trust if the beneficiary *

       * * consented to the conduct constituting the breach, released the trustee

       from liability for the breach, or ratified the transaction constituting the

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      breach, unless the consent, release, or ratification of the beneficiary or

      representative was induced by improper conduct of the trustee or, at the

      time of the consent, release, or ratification, the beneficiary or representative

      did not know of the beneficiary’s rights or of the material facts relating to

      the breach.

      This section applies regardless of whether the conduct being consented to,

      released, or ratified constitutes one or more breaches of fiduciary duty,

      violates one or more provisions of the Revised Code, or is taken without

      required court approval.

                                    Trust Provisions

      {¶ 62} Section 13.07 of the Trust entitled “Limitations on Trustee Liability” reads:

      I recognize that some persons or institutions may be reluctant to serve as

      Trustee because of a concern about potential liability. Therefore, I direct

      that any individual or corporate fiduciary that serves as my Trustee will not

      incur any liability by reason of any error of judgment, mistake of law, or

      action or inaction of any kind in connection with the administration of any

      trust created under this trust, unless my Trustee’s decision is shown by

      clear and convincing evidence to have been in bad faith. * * *

21.
       {¶ 63} Section 13.12 of the Trust entitled “Trustee Accounting” states in

relevant part:

       After my death, my Trustee must provide an annual accounting to the

       Qualified Beneficiaries of any trust created under this trust unless waived

       by the Qualified Beneficiaries.

                                          Analysis

       {¶ 64} Upon review, in her second cause of action, Sylvia alleged Kim had a duty

of loyalty and impartiality to the beneficiaries, and a duty to avoid self-dealing, to take

reasonable steps to control and protect Trust property and to keep adequate records

regarding the Trust and its assets, and Kim breached her fiduciary duties by failing to

properly account for Trust assets and/or by converting assets for her own benefit.

       {¶ 65} The record shows in 2013, Nancy created the Trust and named Kim as her

successive trustee. After Nancy’s death in 2017, Kim was appointed trustee of the Trust.

As trustee, we find that Kim had a duty, pursuant to the terms of the Trust and R.C.

5810.08, to not act in bad faith in connection with the administration of the Trust, and to

not act in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the Trust or interests

of the beneficiaries. We further find that Sylvia had the burden to show, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Kim breached her duty by acting in bad faith or with reckless

indifference, and Sylvia was injured as a result of that breach.

       {¶ 66} Our de novo review of the record, construing the evidence in a light most

favorable to Sylvia, reveals the following, with respect to the sale of Nancy’s home. Kim

22.
presented evidence, in attorney Alley’s second affidavit, that the home was sold after a

written Approval of Sale document was signed by Sylvia, which referenced a mortgage

note and set forth the terms of sale and the distribution process of funds from the sale.

Sylvia offered evidence, in her second affidavit in which she averred, inter alia:

“Although I approved of the sale of the home, it was my understanding any mortgage

obtained by the buyers would result in full and complete payment of the $262,500 cost of

the home, which would result in me * * * receiving the full amount of [my] share

immediately. Instead [Kim] entered into an agreement by which the buyers were to make

monthly payments over a period of [30] years.”

       {¶ 67} Applying the relevant law, R.C. 5810.09, to the evidence presented, we

find Kim is not liable to Sylvia for any claimed breach of trust regarding the sale of

Nancy’s home, since Sylvia consented to the sale and the distribution of funds from the

sale. Sylvia did not allege or prove that her consent was induced by improper conduct of

Kim, or, that at the time of her consent Sylvia did not know of her rights or of the

material facts relating to the breach. Despite the averment in her affidavit, that she

thought she would be receiving the full amount of her share from the sale of the home

immediately, the Approval of Sale document signed by Sylvia clearly states otherwise.

Had the Approval of Sale document not mentioned the buyer’s receipt of an inheritance,

then there may be evidence of Sylvia not knowing material facts relating to the claimed

breach. However, the Approval of Sale document did not indicate Sylvia would be paid

immediately. We therefore find Kim is not liable to Sylvia for any claimed breach of

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trust concerning the sale of Nancy’s home, as Sylvia consented to the sale and the

distribution of funds.

       {¶ 68} With respect to Sylvia’s allegations that Kim breached her fiduciary duties

by failing to properly account for Trust assets and/or by converting assets for her own

benefit, our de novo review of the record, construing the evidence properly before the

court, in a light most favorable to Sylvia and in accordance with the terms of the Trust

and R.C. 5810.08, reveals Sylvia did not meet her burden of establishing that Kim acted

in bad faith in connection with the administration of the Trust, or that Kim acted in bad

faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the Trust or interests of the

beneficiaries.

       {¶ 69} The record includes many arguments by Sylvia, without proper evidentiary

support, that Kim breached her duties to the beneficiaries. For instance, in Sylvia’s

September 22, 2021 affidavit she averred, inter alia: “[Kim] unilaterally decided to divide

the real estate properties once owned by my mother in a manner that benefitted her to the

detriment of myself[.] * * * Not only did [Kim] keep the more valuable property for

herself after she became acting trustee, she regularly refused to properly care for and

maintain the property allotted to me * * *. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are photographs

of various properties Kim allotted to me * * * [which] show the state of disrepair

associated with these properties * * *. As a direct and proximate result of [Kim]’s failure

to properly maintain and repair these properties, they have lost value * * *.”

24.
       {¶ 70} Evid.R. 901(A) provides “[t]he requirement of authentication or

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient

to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” With

photographs, a witness with personal knowledge of the subject may authenticate the

photos by testifying that the photographs fairly and accurately depict the subject at the

time they were taken. State v. Hannah, 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 374 N.E.2d 1359 (1978).

       {¶ 71} Here, the copies of photos attached to Sylvia’s affidavit included no

suggestion of who took them, when they were taken, or what properties were depicted

(other than Sylvia’s contention that they were various properties Kim allotted to her.)

We therefore find the photographs are not properly authenticated, and have no

evidentiary value. In addition, Sylvia presented no evidence of the amount of her alleged

damages, she merely offered unsubstantiated, conclusory statements in her affidavit that

she was damaged.

       {¶ 72} Other examples of arguments by Sylvia, without proper evidentiary

support, are found in Sylvia’s supplement to memorandum contra, filed November 15,

2021. Sylvia set forth “[t]he available evidence would easily permit a reasonable juror to

conclude [Kim] is in breach of her fiduciary duties. In response to [Sylvia’s] recent

discovery requests, [Kim] supplied information regarding the 30 real estate properties at

issue in this case. Ex. 1.” The first exhibit is entitled “Real Estate Posse[s]sion Summary

Created February 4, 2021.”

25.
       {¶ 73} Upon review, while Sylvia represented Kim supplied information regarding

30 properties, there are only 26 properties listed on the document. In addition, there is no

calculation of the amount of alleged damages in the exhibit, nor is there an affidavit

stating or explaining the amount of alleged damages. We find this is not sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable juror to conclude Kim breached her fiduciary duties.

       {¶ 74} Sylvia also set forth “[a]ccording to [Kim], the sale of the properties * * *

were sold for over $205,000. * * * However, none of that money has ever been

distributed to the beneficiaries such as [Sylvia]. See Ex. 1 to [Sylvia’s] * * *

Memorandum * * * filed * * * on September 21, 2021. This is direct proof of [Kim’s]

breach of fiduciary duties to the trust beneficiaries.” The exhibit to which Sylvia referred

is her affidavit, where she averred “[t]o date, I have received no money from either the

sale of one of these properties or rental income received as a result of these properties

being rented to others * * * [and Kim] has failed to distribute any income from the sale

and/or rental of the trust and/or R & N properties to the beneficiaries on a yearly basis.”

       {¶ 75} Upon review, Sylvia cited to no authority which mandated that Kim

distribute money to Trust beneficiaries on a yearly basis, upon the sale of property, or

when rental income is received. Further, we note the record includes evidence, in Kim

and Rentals’ answers to Sylvia’s second set of interrogatories, that on “August 1, 2018[,]

Sylvia * * * received $15,371.86, including funds from the sale of [Nancy’s home] * * *.

To date, no other monies have been disbursed to any owners of [Sales] or beneficiaries of

[the Trust] due to this ongoing lawsuit.” We therefore find the evidence offered by

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Sylvia is insufficient proof of Kim’s breach of fiduciary duties to the Trust beneficiaries

or evidence of Sylvia’s damages.

       {¶ 76} We conclude Sylvia did not offer evidence which could potentially raise an

issue of material fact that Kim, as trustee, engaged in conduct amounting to bad faith or

reckless indifference, or that such conduct caused damages to Sylvia. At best, some

evidence submitted by Sylvia alleges errors in judgment by Kim or erroneous acts and

omissions by Kim, such as not providing annual accountings to the Trust beneficiaries.

However, those errors are immunized by Trust provision 13.07.

       {¶ 77} We further conclude Sylvia did not satisfy her burden that Kim breached

her duty by acting in bad faith or with reckless indifference, and Sylvia was injured as a

result of that breach. Accordingly, Sylvia’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.

                               Third Assignment of Error

       {¶ 78} Sylvia argues the trial court erred in ruling Kim sufficiently rebutted the

presumption of undue influence due to the fiduciary relationship Kim had with Nancy

when the challenged transfers of assets occurred. Sylvia asserts this error is reflected in

the trial court’s February 23, 2021 and January 22, 2022 judgments. Sylvia submits at all

times the asset transfers which benefitted Kim occurred, Kim was the power of attorney

for Nancy. Sylvia contends “[t]hrough various legal maneuvers after [Kim] became

power of attorney in July 2013, the assets of Nancy Meiring went from Nancy personally

owning them, to being property of Nancy’s trust * * * to becoming the property of

[Rentals] * * *. Furthermore, [Kim] unilaterally created [Sales] and transferred

27.
approximately half of the real estate to that company without the consent or knowledge of

[Sylvia] * * *.” Sylvia maintains due to the fiduciary relationship Kim had when these

transfers of property occurred, Kim has the burden of proving those transfers were not

done by Nancy under her own free will and without any undue influence being exerted,

but Kim has failed to do so.

         {¶ 79} Upon review, for the reasons set forth in our analyses under Sylvia’s first

and second assignments of error, we find Sylvia’s third assignment of error not well-

taken.

         {¶ 80} On consideration whereof, we affirm the February 23, 2021 and January

20, 2022 judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Pursuant to App.R.

24, appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.

                                                                        Judgments affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                             ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                 ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

28.