Court Opinion

ID: 9762762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:30:37.936273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:37.284033
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice
concurring and dissenting.
I join the Court’s opinion except for Parts I, II, and III. I disagree with the Court’s refusal to apply Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.1993), to the “no damages for delay” provi*393sion at issue in this ease. In Dresser, we held that a release purporting to relieve a party in advance for its own negligence must meet two “fair notice” requirements to be enforceable: (1) the parties’ intent must be clear from the four corners of the writing; and (2) the operative language must be “conspicuous.” Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 508-11.
Under Dresser, a release is “ ‘[a] contractual arrangement whereby one party assumes the -liability inherent in a situation, thereby relieving the other party of responsibility ... [, or an] [a]greement or contract in which one party agrees to hold the other without responsibility for damage or other liability arising out of the transaction involved.’ ” Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 508 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 658 (5th ed.1979)). A release, we said, “surrenders legal rights or obligations between parties to an agreement. It operates to extinguish the claim or cause of action as effectively as would a prior judgment between the parties and is an absolute bar to any right of action on the released matter.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Delay damages” is a term of art in the construction industry referring to compensa-ble damage from a delay that could have been avoided by due care. The relevant provisions of the subcontracts in this case read as follows:
[E]xcept as provided for in this paragraph ..., [Green] shall not be hable to [Sohs] for delay to [Solis]’s work by the act, neglect or default of the Owner, [Green], or the Architect, or by reason of fire, act of God, riot, strike, action of workmen or others, or any cause beyond [Green]’s control.
(a) [Green] will be hable to [Sohs] for damages incurred as a result of any acts, or failures to act, by the Owner which delays the Work, only if and to the extent the Owner is hable and pays [Green] for such damages.
(b) Should [Green] delay [Sohs] in the work, [Sohs] shah receive an extension of time for completion equal to delay if a written claim is made within forty-eight hours, and under no circumstances shah [Green] be hable to pay to [Sohs] any compensation for such [Green]-caused delays.
This clause transfers ah risk of delay damages to Sohs. If operative, it reheves Green in advance of any liability for such damages and surrenders Sohs’s right to recover them from Green. In very plain language, it releases Green from any liability resulting from delays. I therefore disagree with the Court’s conclusion that “this clause is not a release as defined in Dresser.” 853 S.W.2d at 507.
Additionally, the delay-damages provision would exculpate Green in advance for delays caused by its own neghgenee. The only significant difference between this release and the one at issue in Dresser is that this release is broader. It is not limited to negligence, but may also be construed to absolve Green of liability for its own intentional acts that delay Sohs’s work. The pohcy underlying Dresser’s imposition of fair-notice standards, which protect parties from waiving their right to recover for neghgenee, apphes with even greater force here. Because the delay-damages provision meets Dresser’s definition of release, and because the same pohcy concerns arise regarding this particular risk-shifting provision, I would apply the two-part Dresser test to the facts of this case.
The court of appeals, having reached the same conclusion, determined that the release language did not meet the fair notice requirement of conspicuousness. 932 S.W.2d 39, 61. A release is conspicuous “[w]hen a reasonable person against whom a clause is to operate ought to have noticed it.... For example, language in capital headings, language in contrasting type or color, and language in an extremely short document, such as a telegram, is conspicuous.” See Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 511 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 1.201(10)). I agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the release violates Dresser’s conspicuousness element. The release is located within a multi-page, single-spaced contract typed solely in black ink. Unlike later-appearing indemnity provisions, it has no special heading setting it apart, and its typeface is the same as the rest of the document. Nothing calls one’s attention to it while skimming the surrounding page. Because the printed release language is not of a *394nature that would advise a reasonable person of its potential detrimental effects, I would hold that the clause is inconspicuous.
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in the court of appeals’ opinion, 932 S.W.2d at 59-61,1 would hold that Dresser’s fair notice requirements apply to this case and that Green’s attempt to exculpate itself from delay damages is unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, I would affirm that part of the court of appeals’ judgment reinstating the jury’s award of delay damages to Solis.