Court Opinion

ID: 9376808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 22:06:55.729779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.566421
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Martorana, 2023-Ohio-662.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   SANDUSKY COUNTY

State of Ohio                                      Court of Appeals No. S-22-011

        Appellee                                   Trial Court No. 21-TRC-3644

v.

Alisha Martorana                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                  Decided: March 3, 2023

                                               *****

        Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Alexis M. Otero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Nathan VanDenBerghe, for appellant.

                                               *****

        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Alisha Martorana, appeals the May 13, 2022 judgment

of the Sandusky County Court #1, convicting her of operating a vehicle while under the

influence of drugs or alcohol and driving left of center, and denying her motion to

suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.
                                     I.     Background

       {¶ 2} Alisha Martorana was charged with operating a vehicle while under the

influence of drugs or alcohol, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree

misdemeanor, and driving left of center, a violation of R.C. 4511.25, a minor

misdemeanor. She filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied in a

judgment entered February 15, 2022. After her motion was denied, Martorana entered a

plea of no contest to both charges. The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her to

180 days in jail with 170 days suspended. Her conviction and sentence were

memorialized in a judgment entered on May 13, 2022.

       {¶ 3} According to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, on August

3, 2021, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Trooper Rebecca Tent, of the Ohio State Highway

Patrol, was dispatched to a reckless operation call on U.S. Route 6 near County Road

298. The caller—who provided his name and phone number—reported that he was

following behind a vehicle that was being operated recklessly, unable to maintain its lane,

driving westbound on U.S. Route 6. Tent was driving eastbound, and observed the

vehicle veer left of center into her lane—half a car length over the centerline—prompting

her to apply her brakes to avoid being hit. She pulled around into the westbound lane and

caught up to the vehicle. The vehicle was “bouncing between the lanes” and following

too closely behind the truck in front of it. Tent activated her lights to initiate a stop of the

2.
vehicle. When the vehicle did not immediately pull over, Tent activated her sirens, and

the vehicle pulled to the side of the road.

       {¶ 4} Upon approaching the vehicle, the driver—Alicia Martorana—told Tent, “I

don’t blame you for stopping me.” She said she was tired. Tent asked for her driver’s

license and, at some point, requested her registration and proof of insurance. Martorana

began reaching around in the vehicle, looking for her driver’s license. Not able to see

exactly where Martorana was reaching, Tent told her to stop reaching around and just

give her her social security number; Martorana complied. Tent again asked for her

registration and Martorana produced an image of her insurance card from her cellphone.

Tent observed that Martorana’s eyes were red, bloodshot, and glassy.

       {¶ 5} Based on the information known to Tent at that time—the reckless operation

call, Martorana driving left of center, driving too closely behind the truck, and

“bouncing” within her lane, her red eyes, her demeanor, her reaching around and inability

to focus on one task, and her presentation of her insurance card instead of her

registration—Tent suspected that Martorana was under the influence of drugs, and she

ordered Martorana out of the vehicle to determine whether she was impaired.

       {¶ 6} Before performing any field-sobriety tests, Tent asked Martorana if she had

any recent head or neck injuries or was currently taking any prescription medications.

Martorana told Tent that she had a hip replacement and was currently taking

antidepressants, acid medication, and suboxone.

3.
       {¶ 7} Tent administered the horizontal and vertical gaze nystagmus tests (“HGN”

and “VGN”) and observed four clues of impairment. She attempted to administer the

walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests, but Martorana was having problems following

instructions and was so unbalanced that Tent was concerned about her performing these

tests so close to the roadway. Martorana attributed her inability to perform the tests to

her hip surgery, but also told Tent, “I couldn’t even do this sober.” Tent determined that

she had probable cause and arrested Martorana for operating a vehicle while under the

influence of drugs or alcohol (“OVI”). The recording from Tent’s dashboard camera was

presented at the hearing.

       {¶ 8} Following her conviction and sentencing, Martorana appealed. She assigns

a single error for our review:

              The Trial Court erred when it denied Appellant’s Motion to

       Suppress Evidence.

                                 II.    Law and Analysis

       {¶ 9} Martorana’s sole assignment of error challenges the constitutionality of the

initial traffic stop and the trooper’s continued detention of her for the purpose of

conducting field sobriety tests. She argues that Tent lacked probable cause or reasonable

articulable suspicion for either. She maintains that the trial court erred when it denied her

motion to suppress evidence.

4.
       {¶ 10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

When the trial court considers a motion to suppress, it acts as the factfinder and is in the

best position to resolve factual questions and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id.

We, therefore, must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence. Id. Our role then is to independently determine, without

deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal

standard. Id.

       {¶ 11} The trial court made findings of fact in its judgment denying Martorana’s

motion. It found that Tent was dispatched based on a call from a truck driver who

observed Martorana driving recklessly in the westbound lane of U.S. Route 6. While

driving eastbound, Tent observed the vehicle veer half a car width into her lane of travel,

prompting her to brake to avoid a collision. Tent turned around into the westbound lane

and once she was behind Martorana, she observed that she was following too closely

behind a semi-truck and “drift[ed] over the double yellow line.” The resolution of the

video was not of sufficient quality to portray the initial left of center, however, “the left

of center after she began the pursuit was observable.”

       {¶ 12} The court found that Martorana stopped her vehicle within a reasonable

time after Tent activated her siren, but “did not seem to respond to the lights only.” Tent

observed that Martorana’s eyes were red and “she was unable to focus on the task of

5.
finding her registration.” Tent administered the HGN and observed four clues, but

Martorana was “unwilling” to complete the one-stand test, and stated, “I couldn’t even do

this sober.”

       {¶ 13} Before addressing the specifics of Martorana’s arguments, we address three

of the trial court’s factual findings. First, we agree with the trial court that the initial left-

of-center is not visible in the recording taken from Tent’s dashboard camera; there is

significant glare from the headlights of the westbound traffic and the resolution is poor.

The finding that Martorana’s vehicle veered left of center is based on Tent’s hearing

testimony. As the trial judge was in the best position to determine the credibility of

Tent’s testimony, we will not disturb this finding, and we conclude that it is supported by

competent, credible evidence.

       {¶ 14} Second, we disagree with the trial court’s finding that after Tent got behind

her, Martorana’s vehicle drifted “over the double yellow line.” (Emphasis added.) We

find—and the state concedes—that there was no double yellow line; dotted, broken lines

divided the eastbound and westbound lanes. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that

the highway was divided by a double yellow line is not supported by competent, credible

evidence.

       {¶ 15} Third, we disagree with the trial court’s finding that once Tent was behind

Martorana’s vehicle, Martorana “drift[ed] over” the line. (Emphasis added.) The video

shows that Martorana’s vehicle certainly drifted within her lane, but it is impossible to

6.
see whether her vehicle drifted over the line. Tent clarified at the hearing that

Martorana’s vehicle was “bouncing between the lanes,” but she testified that she had not

stated that Martorana’s vehicle had veered over the line at that time (“I did not state that

she went left of center here).” Because it is not clear from the video that Martorana’s

vehicle drifted over the line, and Tent clarified that she “did not state that she went left of

center” while Tent was following her, the trial court’s finding that Martorana’s vehicle

drifted “over” the line is not supported by competent, credible evidence.

       {¶ 16} All of the trial court’s other factual findings are supported by competent,

credible evidence, except that it may have been more appropriate to say that Martorana

was “unable”—rather than “unwilling”—to perform the one-stand test.

       {¶ 17} Having reviewed the trial court’s factual findings, we address Martorana’s

specific arguments.

                                    A. The Initial Stop

       {¶ 18} Martorana first challenges Tent’s initial stop of her vehicle. She argues

that Tent lacked “probable cause or reasonable suspicion” of a traffic violation to initiate

the stop. Martorana claims that (1) Tent’s contention that she crossed into the eastbound

lane of traffic is not supported by the dash cam video; (2) “bouncing between”—but not

over—the lanes, did not provide a basis for initiating a traffic stop; (3) although Tent

testified that a vehicle should maintain a distance of one car length for every ten miles per

hour, the statute does not say this, Tent did not testify how fast Martorana was driving,

7.
Tent was too far away to estimate the distance between Martorana’s vehicle and the

truck, and the video does not show that she was following too closely; and (4) the area in

question was a marked passing zone, so if she did, in fact, drive left of center, it could

have been a lawful attempt to pass the vehicle ahead of her.

       {¶ 19} The state responds that (1) Tent was provided with presumptively reliable

information from a citizen eyewitness who said that the vehicle was unable to maintain

its lane; (2) Tent personally observed Martorana cross the center line into the eastbound

lane even though it was not visible on the recording; (3) the information provided by the

caller suggested that Martorana did not cross the center line in an attempt to pass a

vehicle; (4) Tent’s observation of Martorana’s vehicle crossing left of center provided

reasonable suspicion for the initial stop; and (5) Tent did not initiate the stop based on

Martorana’s vehicle bouncing between lanes or following too closely, but when

combined with the tip and the trooper’s observations, these factors added to the totality of

the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion. As noted above, the state concedes

that the dividing line was a broken yellow line and not a double yellow line, but it

emphasizes that the recording also showed Martorana’s vehicle bouncing between lanes

and following the truck too closely.

       {¶ 20} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d

8.
1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391, 745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001). “A traffic

stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and

therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). This type of seizure

is justified if an officer has a “reasonable suspicion”—i.e., “a particularized and objective

basis” to suspect—that the person stopped has broken the law. Id. at 60. In other words,

a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and articulable

suspicion that a motorist has committed a traffic violation. Mays at ¶ 7-8.

       {¶ 21} Martorana repeatedly states that Tent lacked “probable cause or reasonable

suspicion” to initiate an investigatory stop. As the authority cited above demonstrates,

only reasonable suspicion was required. See Heien at 60, quoting Prado Navarette v.

California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (clarifying that

“only ‘reasonable suspicion’—that is, ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting

the particular person stopped’ of breaking the law”—is required to justify a traffic stop).

       {¶ 22} Under R.C. 4511.25(A), “[u]pon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle

* * * shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway * * *.” This court has recognized

that “[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle travel left of the centerline, the officer has a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.25.” State v.

Pelham, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-13-020, 2013-Ohio-4524, ¶ 9. Accordingly, Tent’s

observation of Martorana veering left of center provided her with reasonable suspicion

9.
that Martorana violated R.C. 4511.25(A) and provided a sufficient basis to initiate a

traffic stop.

       {¶ 23} Martorana points out that under R.C. 4511.25(A)(1), “a driver may enter

the opposite lane of travel in order to overtake and pass another vehicle proceeding in the

same direction.” This is true, and it could provide a legal defense to a charged violation

of R.C. 4511.25(A). Pelham at ¶ 9. But the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Mays,

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 17, that “[a]n officer is not

required to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime

might have a legal defense to the charge.” Applying this principle to the same statute at

issue here, this court has held that a driver’s possible defense to driving left of center

under R.C. 4511.25(A)(1)-(5) does not render a stop of the vehicle illegal. Pelham at ¶ 9,

citing State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 13. See

also State v. Rubsam, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0089-M, 2019-Ohio-2153, ¶ 10.

       {¶ 24} Accordingly, we conclude that Tent had reasonable suspicion of a violation

of R.C. 4511.25(A) when she saw Martorana’s vehicle veer left of center. The initial

stop of Martorana’s vehicle was legally justified.

                                B. The Field Sobriety Tests

       {¶ 25} Martorana argues that Tent lacked reasonable suspicion of impairment to

justify further detaining her to administer field sobriety tests. She emphasizes that (1) she

did not admit to consuming drugs or alcohol and the trooper saw none; (2) red eyes are

10.
consistent with fatigue; (3) the video does not support Tent’s claim that Martorana was

driving erratically; (4) the tipster did not correctly describe Martorana’s vehicle and

stated only that Martorana was not maintaining her lane of travel, without providing any

more specific information; (5) she didn’t fumble or drop documents; (6) she wasn’t

uncooperative or belligerent; (7) while she provided a copy of her insurance instead of

her registration, Tent had asked her for proof of insurance at the beginning of the stop.

       {¶ 26} The state responds that several factors weigh in favor of Tent’s reasonable

suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests, including (1) the time of night (10:00 p.m.); (2)

the call from a concerned motorist who reported that Martorana’s vehicle was unable to

maintain its lane; (3) Tent’s observation of Martorana’s vehicle veering into the

eastbound lane, bouncing between lanes, and following too closely; (4) the fact that

Martorana did not stop until both lights and sirens were activated; (5) Martorana reaching

around, having trouble focusing on one task at a time, and showing her insurance card

instead of her registration; (6) Martorana telling Tent that she “did not blame her” for

pulling her over; (7) Martorana’s red, bloodshot, glassy eyes; and (8) the fact that

Martorana “did not remember” almost hitting her and apologized for it.

       {¶ 27} Ohio courts recognize that the administration of field sobriety tests invade

one’s liberty interests, therefore, “‘they must be separately justifiable by specific,

articulable facts which show a reasonable basis for the request.’” State v. Wright, 2015-

Ohio-2600, 38 N.E.3d 485, ¶ 52 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d

11.
56, 62, 711 N.E.2d 761 (11th Dist.1998). Courts consider many factors—taken “together

with the officer’s previous experience in dealing with drunken drivers”—in determining

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the administration of roadside field

sobriety testing, including:

       (1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to,

       e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop (whether near

       establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of erratic driving before the

       stop that may indicate a lack of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual

       braking, etc.); (4) whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may

       be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy,

       glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred

       speech, overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from

       the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person or

       breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very

       strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s demeanor

       (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the suspect after the

       stop that might indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over,

       fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol

       consumption, the number of drinks had, and the amount of time in which

       they were consumed, if given.

12.
Evans at f.n.2

       {¶ 28} In State v. Colby, 2021-Ohio-4405, 181 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 19-20 (6th Dist.), the

trial court determined that the trooper had the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct

field sobriety tests during a 2:54 a.m. traffic stop where he observed appellant drive over

the fog line three times, appellant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, and appellant fumbled

with personal items and dropped his wallet when he was requested to produce his license

and evidence of insurance. We reversed the trial court judgment. We noted that the

trooper smelled no odor of alcohol or marijuana, there was no admission of drinking, no

allegation of slurred or rambling speech, no observation of drugs or alcohol in the

vehicle, no allegation that appellant was uncooperative or belligerent, and no report from

911 dispatch or another driver alleging impaired driving. Under such facts, we concluded

that the trooper lacked articulable facts that would give rise to a reasonable suspicion

justifying the administration of field sobriety tests.

       {¶ 29} In State v. Clinger, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-028, 2022-Ohio-723, ¶ 19, the

trial court granted the appellee’s motion to suppress and the state appealed. There,

appellee called the police after his vehicle was hit by a driver who fled. While

investigating the incident, the officer believed that appellee exhibited signs that he was

operating his vehicle under the influence of a narcotic. He testified that appellee

appeared drowsy and sluggish, his eyelids were droopy, his speech was slow and slurred,

and his eyes appeared glassy or bloodshot. The officer also smelled the odor of raw

13.
marijuana. The trial court, after listening to a recording of the encounter, found that

appellee’s speech was not slurred, leaving only the following factors to be considered:

appellee’s glassy eyes and tired appearance, and the odor of raw marijuana. We

concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that the officer lacked reasonable

suspicion to perform field sobriety tests based only on these factors.

       {¶ 30} And in State v. Daniels, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-50, 2018-Ohio-

3113, ¶ 24, the Fifth District reversed a trial court decision denying a motion to suppress

evidence obtained during a 2:28 a.m. traffic stop. The appellate court concluded that the

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests where the only

“erratic” driving he observed was an improper right-hand turn, appellant’s eyes appeared

red and bloodshot, and appellant was on the phone calling someone to pick up his

vehicle. The court noted that the officer did not detect an odor of alcohol, appellant did

not admit to consuming any alcohol that night, appellant did not slur his speech in any

way, and appellant offered an explanation for why he disagreed that he had made an

improper turn.

       {¶ 31} But the Fifth District reached a contrary conclusion in State v. Marcum, 5th

Dist. Delaware No. 18-CAC- 11 0083, 2019-Ohio-2293. There, the trooper initiated a

stop at 9:03 p.m. after witnessing the appellant’s truck travel over the lane markings on

the highway several times. The truck took longer than usual to come to a complete stop,

and upon approaching appellant, the trooper noticed that his eyes were glassy and

14.
bloodshot, his speech was slow, he could not easily locate his vehicle information, he

fumbled with the paperwork on the passenger seat, and the trooper had to instruct him

several times to keep his hands on the steering wheel. The trooper did not observe any

odor of drugs or alcohol. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying

appellant’s motion to suppress, and concluded that based on the totality of the

circumstances, the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain him to perform field

sobriety tests.

       {¶ 32} Here, Martorana was pulled over on a Tuesday night at 10:00 p.m. This

does not strike us as a day and time that should be afforded any special weight. Nor do

we believe that Martorana reaching for her driver’s license or showing her insurance card

instead of her registration weighs in favor of reasonable suspicion. Tent asked for

Martorana’s driver’s license, then as soon as she started reaching around in her car trying

to find it, she became apprehensive and told her to stop reaching. As far as the insurance

card, Tent testified that she asked for both registration and proof of insurance (Q: “You

asked also for her registration, insurance?” A: “Right.”), and that’s a piece of

information that any driver who has ever been stopped for a traffic violation knows will

be requested. Martorana quickly produced the image of her proof of insurance from her

cell phone. Instead of giving her the opportunity to also produce her registration, Tent

regarded this as a potential sign of impairment and commanded her out of the vehicle.

15.
       {¶ 33} On the other hand, Tent saw Martorana cross the divider line into the

eastbound lane, weave back-and-forth within her lane, touching the lines but not crossing

them, and follow behind a truck too closely. This occurred right after another motorist—

who provided his name and phone number and remained behind Martorana’s vehicle

until Tent pulled behind her—called to report that the vehicle could not maintain its lane.

Tent observed that Martorana’s eyes were red, bloodshot, and glassy. And one of the

first things Martorana said to Tent upon being pulled over is “I don’t blame you”—not a

typical response from a motorist upon being subjected to a traffic stop. These are all

factors that weigh in favor of reasonable suspicion.

       {¶ 34} It is often a close issue whether the specific facts of a case provide an

officer with reasonable suspicion for conducting field sobriety tests. State v. Beeley, 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1386, 2006-Ohio-4799, 2006 WL 2640228, ¶ 16. Such decisions

are “very fact-intensive.” State v. Burkhart, 2016-Ohio-7534, 64 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 15 (4th

Dist.). Ohio courts often reach differing conclusions when faced with seemingly similar

circumstances. Numerous factors may be considered, and small differences between

officers’ descriptions of an encounter can form the basis for opposite outcomes. State v.

Watkins, 2021-Ohio-1443, 170 N.E.3d 549, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).

       {¶ 35} Here, having considered the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that

Tent had reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Martorana for the purpose of

administering field-sobriety tests.

16.
       {¶ 36} We find Martorana’s assignment of error not well-taken.

                                    III.    Conclusion

       {¶ 37} The trial court properly denied Martorana’s motion to suppress evidence.

Trooper Tent had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when she saw Martorana

veer left of center while driving westbound on U.S. Route 6. She had reasonable

suspicion of impairment to justify further detaining Martorana to administer field sobriety

tests based on the information obtained from the motorist who observed that Martorana’s

vehicle was unable to maintain its lane, the left-of-center violation Tent witnessed,

Martorana bouncing within her lane and following too closely, Martorana’s red,

bloodshot, and glassy eyes, and Martorana’s comment that she did not blame Tent for

pulling her over.

       {¶ 38} We find Martorana’s assignment of error not well-taken and affirm the

May 13, 2022 judgment of the Sandusky County Court, #1. Martorana is ordered to pay

the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

17.
                                                                             State of Ohio
                                                                      v. Alisha Martorana
                                                                                 S-22-011

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

18.