Court Opinion

ID: 9545694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:17:49.891884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:21.732382
License: Public Domain

HERNDON, J.
I dissent.
I regard it as a close and debatable question whether the record discloses substantial evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that the Packard automobile was “furnished for regular use to the named insured.” I incline to the view that this finding is adequately supported.
However, I base my dissent primarily upon the view that insurance coverage in this case is excluded by clear and unambiguous provisions of the policy. In reaching this conclusion I have accepted as entirely correct the general canons of construction as stated in the majority opinion. As I read the words of the instant contract, giving them meaning as they *124are generally understood “in their ordinary and popular sense,” I find room for only one reasonable interpretation. The added or extended coverage of the policy with respect to vehicles other than that specifically insured does not apply to “any automobile owned by ... the named insured or a member of his household.” To my mind, the only natural and reasonable construction of the words “his household” is that they mean the household of which he is a member. “In normal speech, one’s household is the familial or residential group with which one lives; a wife or child, as well as the pater familias, has a household.” (Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 2 Cir., 123 F.2d 692, 695.) “One of the definitions of the word ‘household’ given in Webster’s New International Dictionary is, ‘Those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family; a domestic establishment.’ . . .” (Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.2d 541, 547 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896].) “Whether the term ‘household’ or ‘family’ is used, the term embraces a collection of persons as a single group, with one head, living together, a unit of permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a ‘collective body of persons living together within one curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness.’ ” (Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F.Supp. 249, 251-252; cf. Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d 541, 548.) “Persons who dwell together as a family constitute a ‘household’ . . .” (Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 500 [5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825].) “We do not doubt that a son living under the parental roof is a member of the household even though he has reached his majority and supports himself ...” (Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co. v. Schmidt, 46 F.2d 269, 270.)
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821 is cited as a case in which the majority of a divided court held identical language to be “quite ambiguous.” I prefer the reasoning of Judge Miller’s dissenting opinion in that case, and also the reasoning of Judge Chesnut in Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 92 F.Supp. 620 where the identical excepting clause was held unambiguous and was given the same interpretation given it by the trial court here.
A later case, dealing with the same policy language is Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., 91 So.2d 123, 136, decided by the Louisiana Court of Appeals. After citing numerous decisions, including Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, and Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, supra, the Louisiana *125court comments ‘‘ [p] robably the leading case on the particular narrow problem here involved, and the case most frequently cited, is Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., D.C. Md. 1950, 92 F.Supp. 620.” “The great weight of authority is in accord with the interpretation of this provision by Judge Chesnut in Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., D.C. Md. 92 F.Supp. 620, 623 ...” (Campbell v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 211 F.2d 732, 736.) The Louisiana appellate court appraises the majority opinion in the Pray case as follows: “Bearing in mind the established rules of interpretation and the reason for such exclusion clauses as shown in the cited jurisprudence, we believe that the interpretation placed upon the exclusion clause by the majority in the Pray case not only stands alone but is in error. The great weight of authority is contra.” (Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 91 So.2d 123, 139-140.)
While I fully agree with the rule that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer, I think it incorrect to find ambiguity by the process of suggesting a'strained and quite unnatural interpretation as the basis of possible conflict.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 15, 1959.