Court Opinion

ID: 9898357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:10.359427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:22.807726
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of:         No. 84502-1-I

 JILL S. OLSON FKA YANGO,                  DIVISION ONE

                         Appellant,
               v.                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 HERMINIO M. YANGO,

                         Respondent.

       SMITH, C.J. — Jill Olson appeals a superior court order denying her motion

to modify child support. Among other things, Olson contends that the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to impute income to the father, Herminio Yango,

and declining to order postsecondary educational support for the parties’ younger

child. Because the father’s financial circumstances provided a tenable basis for

the court to decline to order postsecondary educational support, we affirm.

                                      FACTS

       The parties were formerly married and have two children in common, a

daughter and a son. The court entered an initial child support order in 2012. In

June 2020, the trial court entered an amended child support order that adjusted

the amount of support for the parties’ minor son and ordered Yango to pay a

proportionate share, 58 percent, of the postsecondary educational expenses for

the parties’ daughter. Those expenses were capped at the cost of in-state tuition
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at the University of Washington. The 2020 order calculated Olson’s monthly net

income as $6,786 and imputed monthly net income of $9,454.69 to Yango.

       In May 2022, Olson filed the underlying petition at issue to modify the

2020 child support order, seeking an order requiring both parents to pay a set

amount or a percentage of the postsecondary educational expenses for the

parties’ son.1 The parties’ daughter had by then graduated from college and their

18-year-old son planned to enroll at Seattle University in the fall. Olson filed a

financial declaration in support of her motion, reporting monthly net income

of $7,164.

       Yango opposed court-ordered postsecondary educational support

because he was not in a position to financially contribute to college expenses.

He suggested that all remaining funds in an educational savings account

established by the parties should be available to his son. 2 Yango also filed a

financial declaration, dated June 8, 2022, and reported net monthly earnings of

$3,480.62, monthly expenses of $4,906, and available assets of $913. Yango’s

monthly expenses included a payment toward a $75,272 debt owed to the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and he reported $25,232 in consumer debt.

       1 Olson filed an initial petition on May 9, 2022 and an amended petition

about a week later. The two petitions were identical except for Olson’s
designated county of residence.
       2 Yango indicated that, according to the most recent statement he had

seen, the account had a balance of $67,501.85 in June 2018. Olson reported
that as of August 2022, the account had balance $18,630 after a withdrawal of
$12,184 for fall 2022 tuition.

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       Although Yango reported actual earnings that were less than half of the

earnings imputed to him in 2020, Olson argued that the court should again

impute gross income of $12,870.52 to Yango, consistent with the 2020 order.3

Olson did not directly dispute Yango’s income or suggest that he had additional

unreported financial resources, but pointed to several other factors, including her

son’s aptitude and the parties’ longstanding expectation that he would pursue a

college degree, that weighed in favor of continued support. Olson also requested

an award of costs and attorney fees, claiming that Yango was intransigent

because he had the ability to earn income at the level previously imputed to him.

       Yango claimed that he never earned a gross monthly income of $12,000.4

Yango explained that to meet his child support obligations and make payments

toward his IRS debt, he had depleted his assets. He stated that the pandemic

had “dramatically” reduced his income as a sales representative for two

companies, “TV EARS” and “JBird.” Yango also reported that he had no health

insurance or retirement savings, and was several months behind on his rent. As

of August 2022, Yango maintained that he was “on track to make about $50,000,

gross” in 2022. Based on the parties’ relative financial positions, Yango

requested that the court order Olson to pay all or a portion of his costs and

attorney fees.

       3 The 2020 child support order designates only Yango’s imputed monthly

net income, but Yango does not appear to dispute that the court previously
imputed to him gross income of more than $12,000 per month.
       4 Yango stated that income was imputed to him in 2020 because he

comingled funds deposited in an account jointly held with his significant other and
his income could not be segregated.

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       Following an August 2022 trial by affidavit, King County Superior Court

Commissioner Pro Tempore Heritage Filer orally ruled that while the court had

authority to order postsecondary educational support, an order of support was

not warranted under RCW 26.19.090, in consideration of the parties’ financial

resources and the father’s inability to pay. The court listed all of the financial

information it considered from both parties, including for Yango, two years’ worth

of statements for two bank accounts.5 The court found that according to Yango’s

tax returns, his income had declined from over $92,000 in 2020 to approximately

$55,000 in 2021, and that $55,000 was a reasonable projection for Yango’s

annual income for 2022. The court observed that it was unfortunate that

postsecondary educational support was court-ordered for one child and not the

other, but noted that it would be untenable to order postsecondary support where

doing so would create a significant financial hardship. The court declined to find

Yango intransigent. At the same time, in light of the fact that the mother did not

bring her motion in bad faith, the court also declined to award attorney fees to

Yango. The court entered a written order denying Olson’s petition consistent

with its oral ruling.

       Olson appeals.6

       5 The court found that although Olson provided tax returns, pay stubs and

bank statements, “nothing was updated after March” of 2022 and also found that,
in calculating her income, Olson included only her standard pay and improperly
excluded bonuses.
       6 Olson filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s order, as authorized by

RCW 2.24.050, but voluntarily struck the motion after Yango moved to dismiss
the motion because it was filed more than ten days after entry of the
commissioner’s order.

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                                     ANALYSIS

       “We review child support modifications and adjustments for abuse of

discretion.” In re Marriage of Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. 462, 467, 38 P.3d 1033,

(2002). The trial court likewise has broad discretion to order support for

postsecondary education. In re Marriage of Newell, 117 Wn. App. 711, 718, 72

P.3d 1130 (2003). The court abuses that discretion when its decision is

manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Newell,

117 Wn. App. at 718. This court will not substitute its judgment for the trial

court’s if the record shows the court considered all relevant factors and the

decision is not unreasonable under the circumstances. In re Marriage of Griffin,

114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990). In addition, the trial court’s findings

of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of

Schumacher, 100 Wn. App. 208, 211, 997 P.2d 399 (2000). Substantial

evidence is that which is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth

of the declared premise. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wn.2d 236, 246, 692 P.2d

175 (1984).

       RCW 26.19.090(2) outlines the standard for awarding postsecondary

educational support. It requires the court to “determine whether the child is in

fact dependent and is relying upon the parents for the reasonable necessities of

life.” Then, in considering whether and for how long to award postsecondary

educational support, the court must consider the following non-exclusive factors:
       Age of the child; the child’s needs; the expectations of the parties
       for their children when the parents were together; the child’s
       prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities or disabilities; the nature of

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       the postsecondary education sought; and the parents’ level of
       education, standard of living, and current and future resources . . .
       [and] the amount and type of support that the child would have
       been afforded if the parents had stayed together.

RCW 26.19.090(2). As long as the court considers the relevant statutory factors

for determining postsecondary support, it does not abuse its discretion. In re

Marriage of Kelly, 85 Wn. App. 785, 792-93, 934 P.2d 1218 (1997).

                         Sufficiency of Findings and Order

       Olson contends that the court abused its discretion by (1) making no

finding as to whether the parties’ son is dependent; (2) failing to expressly

consider all the statutory factors under RCW 26.19.090; (3) failing to enter

sufficiently detailed findings concerning Yango’s inability to pay college

expenses; and (4) failing to calculate the parties’ net incomes and then determine

the advisory support obligation.

       Regarding the sufficiency of the court’s order, the trial court is not

obligated to enter written findings of fact as to the statutory factors. In the

Marriage of Morris, 176 Wn. App. 893, 906, 309 P.3d 767 (2013). We therefore

“review the record to determine whether the court engaged in the appropriate

analysis,” which includes a presumption “ ‘that the court considered all evidence

before it in’ reaching its decision.” Morris, 176 Wn. App. at 906 (quoting Kelly, 85

Wn. App. at 793). Although not required to do so, the court made an express

finding that Yango had no financial ability to contribute to his son’s college

expenses and that ordering such support would create a hardship. And although

there is no finding of dependency, it was not disputed. Where a parent opposing

a request for support essentially concedes that some factors do not weigh

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against ordering support—and here, Yango raised only his lack of financial

resources as weighing against the request—the court is entitled to rely on the

absence of an objection or dispute. Cf. Morris, 176 Wn. App. at 906 (examining

the record for adequate consideration of only those factors that were disputed in

the trial court). The parties presented evidence and argument with regard to

most, if not all, of the factors. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we

presume that the court considered all of the factors and the evidence relative to

those factors. We reject Olson’s claim that the findings were inadequate.

       And no authority supports Olson’s contention that, in determining whether

to order postsecondary educational support, the court must not only consider the

statutory factors, but must also set forth both parties’ monthly net incomes and

then apply the uniform child support schedule.7 Olson relies on Newell, but that

case involved a dispute about the “percentage allocation between the parents for

college expenses,” and not a dispute about whether the court should order

postsecondary support. 117 Wn. App. at 717. And Olson’s reliance on In re

Marriage of Brockopp, 78 Wn. App. 441, 445-46, 898 P.2d 849 (1995), is likewise

misplaced. Brockopp involved a determination of the parents’ child support

obligation for minor children and the question of whether a parent was voluntarily

unemployed, not a discretionary award of postsecondary educational support.

78 Wn. App. at 445-46.

       7 The record does not reflect that either party proposed advisory support

amounts or filed child support worksheets.

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                         Sufficiency of Evidence of Income

       While Olson maintains that the trial court “made no attempt” to determine

the parties’ current incomes, she also claims that Yango did not produce

sufficient evidence to establish his current income. As a consequence, Olson

contends that the court should have imputed income to Yango as it did in the

2020 order.

       The court considered substantial evidence of the parties’ incomes to

determine the extent of their financial resources and whether to order

postsecondary educational support. For Yango, the court reviewed (1) two years

of bank statements from Yango’s checking and savings accounts, (2) an income

summary; (3) tax returns from 2020 and 2021; (4) a document substantiating

Yango’s debt to the IRS; and (5) multiple credit card statements. But Olson

maintains that Yango did not comply with King County Superior Court Local

Family Law Rule (LFLR) 10(b)(1) because he did not supply evidence of his

income for the six-month period prior to June 8, 2022, the date he filed his

financial declaration. In making this argument, Olson appears to suggest that the

only document Yango provided as proof of income was an unauthenticated

document that listed distributions from JBird between May and December of

2021, but did not list any distributions in 2022.

       First, Olson did not object below. In fact, Olson expressly clarified at the

trial on affidavits that she was disputing Yango’s calculation of his income based

on the documents provided, not claiming he failed to produce documents.

Second, Yango’s declaration testimony established that he is an independent

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No. 84502-1-I/9

contractor paid exclusively with direct deposits from both companies. Yango’s

bank statements between November 2021 and May 2022, reflect the distributions

from both sources of income during the 6-month timeframe preceding his

financial declaration. The evidence in the record was sufficient to enable the

court to determine Yango’s current income.

      Olson further contends the court abused its discretion by accepting

Yango’s explanation for the decline in his income without scrutiny. Olson claims

that Yango simply blamed the pandemic, and that explanation was unworthy of

credence given that Yango earned over $90,000 in 2020, the year that the

pandemic had its most acute effect. But Yango informed the court that his

income from one company ceased entirely in June 2022, after its product was

discontinued from Costco’s online sales platform. And he explained that

payments from the other company decreased because shutdowns in early 2022

in major Chinese cities reduced the volume of production so he was unable to

sell that company’s product to Costco. The trial court found that Yango’s

explanation was credible. Olson fails to establish an abuse of discretion.

                       Determination of Projected Income

      Olson next claims that substantial evidence in the record does not support

the court’s calculation of Yango’s projected 2022 annual income. Specifically,

Olson points out that bank statements from November 2021 to May 2022 show

average monthly deposits of $6,200 in income. She asserts that this figure yields

a higher annual gross income than the amount found by the court (i.e., $74,400,

not $55,000) and is higher than the monthly gross income, $4,355.56, reported

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No. 84502-1-I/10

by Yango in his financial declaration. But the evidence before the court indicated

that the decline in income Yango had experienced since April 2022 would

continue. And as Yango points out, the trial court considered evidence of his

income after April 2022 that was included in his discovery responses and

provided to the court as working papers. Those documents included bank

records spanning from June 2020 to June 2022. We can discern from the record

that those additional statements revealed that Yango’s income continued to

decline in the months before trial and he earned gross income of $3461, $1061,

$1509, in May, June, and July, respectively. The inclusion of these amounts

results in an average monthly income figure that corresponds to annual income

of approximately $55,000, as found by the court. Substantial evidence supports

the court’s projection of Yango’s income.

       In her reply, Olson suggests that Yango’s responsive brief makes it clear,

“for the first time,” that the court considered documents “not supplied to opposing

counsel and not filed into the court record.” Olson relies on this purported new

information to claim reversible error because Yango violated local court rules

governing working papers and engaged in prejudicial ex parte communication,

and because the court violated her right to due process by considering Yango’s

working papers. See LCR 7(b)(4)(F) (working copies must be provided to the

judicial officer and served, in the same form, on all parties).

       As a general matter, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in

reply. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828

P.2d 549 (1992) (“An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is

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too late to warrant consideration.”). The record does not support the position that

Olson could not have appreciated that the court considered financial documents

beyond those filed as sealed financial source documents before Yango filed his

responsive appellate brief. In his declaration filed just before trial, Yango

explicitly stated that he had provided the court with his responses to discovery

propounded by Olson to establish his income. 8 And before the court issued its

ruling, it was abundantly clear that the court heavily relied on two years’ worth of

bank statements. For instance, when Olson disputed Yango’s calculation of his

current earnings, the court specifically referenced the two years’ of bank

statements and invited counsel to direct its attention to any evidence within those

records to support her argument. Yango’s oral remarks also referred to the

responses to Olson’s discovery requests that he provided to the court as working

papers and explained his reasoning for supplying extensive bank records. And,

as noted, in ruling on the motion, the court listed all the documents it relied on.

Neither Olson’s motion for revision nor her appeal asserted any claim of error

based on the court’s consideration of working papers not filed or submitted to

opposing counsel along with Yango’s declaration in response to the petition to

modify. Because Olson failed to raise these issues in the trial court and because

       8 Olson also admits that Yango also made an “oblique reference” to his

discovery responses submitted to the court in his document submission list, but
that document is not included in the record before this court.

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No. 84502-1-I/12

they could have been raised in her opening brief, we decline to address claims of

error raised for the first time in Olson’s reply brief.9

                      Finding of Father’s Inability to Contribute

       Olson asserts that substantial evidence does not support the finding that

Yango was unable to contribute to his son’s college expenses. Therefore, she

claims that the court abused its discretion in declining to order postsecondary

educational support. In particular, Olson points out that Yango’s employment

status had not changed since 2020. She also contends the trial court failed to

consider that Yango was relieved of his prior support obligations and ignored

evidence of $2,000 of “cash withdrawals at Washington casinos” between

January and May 2022.10 But nothing in the record suggests that the court failed

to appreciate changes Yango’s child support obligations or notice discretionary

spending documented in his banking records. As to the latter, the court

referenced Yango’s “miscellaneous” spending, but concluded that the amount

was “not concerning” or significant enough to “raise [ ] eyebrows.” The court

appropriately weighed this evidence against other evidence establishing that,

       9 We also note that although Olson states that Yango failed to provide

copies of the discovery answers submitted as working copies as required by the
local rules, see KCLR 7(b)(4)(F), she does not claim that Yango did not provide
responses and responsive documents in the normal course of discovery or that
his discovery responses did not include two years of bank records. Nothing in
the record indicates that Olson filed a motion to compel discovery and she raised
no objection at the trial on affidavits. Since Olson does not dispute that she
received Yango’s discovery responses and documents at an earlier point, and
given that she did not object at the time of the hearing, it is not clear that she was
prejudiced by the court’s consideration of those materials.
        10 The 2020 order provided for support for the parties’ son until he reached

age 18 or graduated from high school, whichever occurred first.

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No. 84502-1-I/13

despite maintaining the same employment, Yango’s earnings had substantially

declined, his expenses exceeded his income, and he had limited assets and

substantial debt. See Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787

(2009) (on appellate review, we do not reevaluate credibility, weight, or

persuasiveness of the evidence). Because substantial evidence in the record

supports the court’s finding that Yango lacked ability and resources to contribute

to college expenses, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the

imposition of a postsecondary educational support obligation would result in

substantial hardship. See In re Marriage of Shellenberger, 80 Wn. App. 71, 84,

906 P.2d 968 (1995) (postsecondary support obligation that would force the

obligor parent into bankruptcy or prevent the parent from meeting their obligation

to another minor child would in most cases amount to an abuse of discretion).

                       Apportionment of Support Obligation

       Finally, Olson contends that the trial court was required to (1) apportion

the postsecondary support obligation in the same ratio as the basic child support

obligation and (2) was required to find facts to support its decision to deviate from

the standard support obligation. See In re Marriage of Daubert, 124 Wn. App.

483, 505, 99 P.3d 401 (2004) (“postsecondary support must be apportioned

according to the net income of the parents as determined under the” child

support statute), overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of McCausland,

159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007); In re Marriage of Casey, 88 Wn. App.

662, 668, 967 P.2d 982 (1997) (when a trial court deviates from the basic support

obligation, supported by findings in the child support order, it may also allocate

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No. 84502-1-I/14

special expenses in a manner that is not proportional). These arguments are

unavailing. Because the trial court denied the request to order postsecondary

educational support, it did not reach the issue of how to allocate that obligation.

                                    Intransigence

       Olson challenges the court’s finding that Yango was not intransigent and

its decision declining to award attorney fees to her. Olson argued below that

Yango was intransigent because he failed to earn sufficient income and because

the documents produced did not substantiate his claimed income. On appeal,

Olson identifies different conduct as intransigent, including: the failure to provide

authenticated statements to establish current income; the failure to produce the

bank statements of Yango’s significant other or explain certain cancelled checks;

and the objection to her untimely motion for revision, which forced her to appeal.

None of Olson’s allegations involve foot dragging, delay tactics, failure to

cooperate, or other conduct that made the litigation unduly difficult or costly. See

In re Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 708, 829 P.2d 1120 (1992).

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Yango was not intransigent

in this proceeding.11

                             Attorney Fees on Appeal

       Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. As below,

Olson contends that fees are warranted based on the father’s intransigence.

       11 Olson also relies, in part, on an alleged finding of intransigence in the

prior modification proceeding that resulted in the 2020 order. But Olson’s factual
assertions about the court’s ruling are unsupported by any evidence in the
appellate record.

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Yango requests fees under RCW 26.09.140. As explained above, the record

does not support a finding of intransigence. And while RCW 26.09.140 provides

discretion to award fees in consideration of the arguable merits and the parties’

respective financial circumstances, Yango has not filed a financial declaration to

establish his current financial need. See RAP 18.1(c) (in action where applicable

law requires consideration of financial resources, parties must file and serve

financial affidavit at least 10 days prior to date case is set for consideration). We

deny both parties’ requests.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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