Court Opinion

ID: 9697368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:02.309648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.085917
License: Public Domain

*257BLOODWORTH, Justice.
The principal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence and in directing a verdict for defendants. We have concluded that the trial court did err and therefore reverse and remand this cause for a new trial.
The rule of our cases is that a case must go to the jury if there is a scintilla of evidence for the plaintiff.1 Moreover, on appeal from a directed verdict for defendants, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and we must allow all inferences favorable to plaintiff which the evidence, or a scintilla of the evidence, supports. These rules are so well known as hardly to require citation of authority. However, see Blackwell v. Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 123, 152 So.2d 670 (1963).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we are constrained to do, it appears that after the plaintiff’s intestate awoke sick on the morning of December 4, 1970, her daughter, the plaintiff, called her mother’s physician, Dr. Jordan, about 8:35 a. m. at the Baptist Memorial Hospital and related to him that her mother was nauseated, was hurting in the chest and felt real funny. She told the doctor she was going to take her mother to meet him at the hospital emergency room, but Dr. Jordan directed her not to bring her mother to the hospital but to bring her to his clinic. Defendant, Dr. Jordan, did not advise his clinic to expect the intestate nor did he meet her, examine her, or give her any treatment upon her arrival. He had been the, intestate’s doctor since 1955 and knew she had a hypertensive cardiovascular disease and diabetes. Further, he had given the intestate two prescriptions for her high blood pressure and an oral diabetic tablet for her diabetes. Dr. Jordan testified he knew that a patient with the condition from which the intestate suffered would eventually have a heart attack. His testimony was, viz.:
“A She had never had any significant heart disease per se that would cause an angina pectoris, or alert me to think she had an impending heart attack situation, except that you know that this sort of thing will eventually happen in that type of patient.
“Q You were familiar with her history and knew that this could happen?
*258“A I guess you could say that.” [Our emphasis.]
The intestate, accompanied by her husband and her daughter, was driven immediately to the clinic arriving about 9:05 a. m., and the husband advised the receptionist that Dr. Jordan was to meet them. They were told to take seats in the lobby. The intestate was registered as a patient and her admission slip was marked “Emerg.” “Nurse-sick.” After approximately a fifteen-minute wait, intestate became nauseated and went to the bathroom, where she vomited. Intestate’s head was lying in her daughter’s lap in the waiting room. She had trouble breathing. She was in the waiting room at least 10 more minutes before being sent to another room by a nurse, after her daughter and husband complained a number of times of the delay in her being treated by a doctor. Dr. Jordan’s nurse, at some point, reported to him that the intestate had vomited, was nauseated, was having chest pain, and that the pain radiated down into the left arm. It was at this time that he prescribed a shot, which was administered by the nurse. (Intestate was in the other room 10 to 20 minutes before the shot was given. At this point in time, the intestate had been at the clinic at least 30 to 45 minutes.) Dr. Jordan’s testimony was, viz.:
“Q Do you recall exactly the symptoms —was Mrs. Tolbert the one that described the symptoms to you, or told you that Mrs. Stewart—
“A She told me she had vomited or had been nauseated at least, and that she was having chest pain, and the pain was going down into her left arm some.
“Q Did that indicate any specific type of illness to you at that time, or problem, those complaints?
“A Well, they certainly might be associated with a specific type of illness.
“Q All right, what type, sir?
“A Maybe heart pain, you know.” [Our emphasis.]
During a part of this time, Dr. Jordan was busy with other patients, as were other doctors at the clinic; but during a part of the time before the intestate’s- death there is testimony that one of the doctors had no patients in his office. There was also testimony that the doctors in the clinic “covered” for one another in emergencies and that patients in intestate’s condition were to be given priority in seeing a doctor. While in the room to which she was directed, the intestate had trouble breathing. Her husband tried to administer oxygen to her but found the oxygen did not work. After the shot was given to the intestate, the nurse left the room. The intestate then fell off the table onto the floor and appeared to be dead. The plaintiff rushed from the room screaming, and several doctors and nurses immediately rushed in and tried unsuccessfully for about thirty minutes to revive the intestate.
There was medical testimony from two clinic doctors that such a patient as the intestate should have seen a doctor as soon as possible in order that a diagnosis could be made and that if the diagnosis proved to be a heart .attack, the proper standard of treatment and care would be (1) bed rest, (2) sedation, (3) analgesics, (4) oxygen, and (5) an EKG. One of the doctors testified additionally to the need for oxidation, serial x rays, and enzyme station. Following is a part of Dr. Jordan’s testimony on this point, viz.:
“Q All right. You say the first thing would have to be a diagnosis?

“A Yes, sir.

“Q All right, sir, who would do this?

“A Who would?

“Q In the Gadsden community, who would have done that, on December the 4th of 1970?
“A Whatever doctor the person went to.
“Q Who would that have been in Mrs. Stewart’s case?
*259“A If she had come to me with a heart attack ?
“Q Yes, sir.
“A I would be the one who would diagnosis it, most likely."
* * * * * *
“Q All right, sir, and then if, you — or what would have been the proper treatment for a person who has this type involvement—
“A All right—
“Q —at the time you noticed she had some pain?
“A —put the patient at rest, primarily at rest, and relieve their pain, which she was given. This is standard for all heart attacks, first of all, give something for relief of pain, and to relieve anxiety. That is first and foremost in all heart attacks.”
* * * * * *
“Q Is it designed — is relief of pain designed to stem a myocardial infarction?
“A It will in no wise at all stem what is going on.
“Q But it may. Is that not one of the purposes given?
“A I don’t know that it even may. It just—
“Q One of the purposes for giving it?
“A For the relief of tension so the patient will relax, and the relaxation itself —you know — might help to impede further damage in that respect. It is sort of an indirect thing, you know.
“Q Indirectly then, the early administration of drugs would have been a standard routine procedure in Gadsden in 1970, is that correct?
“A If you — I suppose you would say that, yes, sir." [Our emphasis.]
There is testimony from Dr. Hawkins, quoted in the dissenting opinion, to the effect that the standard of care obtainable in the Gadsden area was given to the intestate, and, further, that no other treatment or medication could have been given to intestate, which would have altered or deferred a cardiovascular infarction. Considering the testimony most favorable to plaintiff, this testimony is easily explained by the doctor’s testimony on cross-examination to the effect that he was testifying as to what was done for intestate from the time he got there, which was after the intestate’s demise.
r
Dr. Hawkins testified that, although sedation for pain, analgesics, bed rest, etc. “would not stave off a massive infarct, it may delay or even prevent a terminal arrythmia or abnormal heart rhythm,” viz.:
“Q In your opinion. You are not telling the jury that any time anybody gets a pain in the chest when it goes down the arm, it is no use to have any of these shots, you said, sedation for relief of pain, that that doesn’t help?

“A No, sir, I didn’t say that.

“Q Would it have been helpful? Would it possibly help to stave off one, a massive infarct?

“A In my opinion, it would not stave off a massive infarct. It may delay 01 even prevent a terminal arrythmia or abnormal heart rhythm.

“Q That is the purpose of the drugs and the Vest, was it not?

“A Yes, sir.” [Our emphasis.]
Taken together, and in the light most favorable to plaintiff (in accord with our rule), the medical testimony shows that although prompt diagnosis and treatment might not have prevented a massive heart attack, such could have delayed or even prevented a terminal attack and impeded further damage to the heart. This, in our judgment, supplied at least a scintilla of evidence on the issues of negligence and *260proximate cause, and the case should have been submitted to the jury.
“The rule of our cases in malpractice suits is that there must be something more than a mere possibility — something more than one possibility among others —that the negligence complained of was the cause of the injury. There must be some evidence to the effect that such negligence probably caused the injury. Pappa v. Bonner, 268 Ala. 185, 105 So.2d 87; McKinnon v. Polk, 219 Ala. 167, 121 So. 539. But this does not eliminate Alabama’s ‘scintilla’ rule. If there is a scintilla of evidence that the negligence complained of probably caused the injury, a jury question is presented. Pappa v. Bonner, supra, and cases there cited.” Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So.2d 236 (1969).
In taking the case from the jury by granting the motion to exclude, the trial court erred to a reversal.
Reversed and remanded.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., dissent.

. See Rule 50(e), A.R.C.P. retaining the scintilla rule.