Court Opinion

ID: 9626644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:20:23.241484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:31.707657
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice SCOTT.
Respectfully, I dissent. I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the Commonwealth’s statements during the direct examination of Reggie Bell constituted reversible error. If there was any error, it was harmless.
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), a case cited by the majority, the United States Supreme Court held that a United States Attorney’s statements at trial were so prejudicial against the defendant that a new trial had to be ordered. The attorney’s acts in Berger included:
misstating the facts in his cross-examination of witnesses; of putting into the mouths of such witnesses things which they had not said; of suggesting by his questions that statements had been made to him personally out of court, in respect of which no proof was offered, of pretending to understand that a witness had said something which he had not said and persistently cross-examining the witness upon that basis; of assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence; of bullying and arguing with witnesses; and in general, of conducting himself in a thor*740oughly indecorous and improper manner.
295 U.S. at 84, 55 S.Ct. at 631. Yet, despite all of the acts by the United States Attorney in Berger, the Supreme Court plainly pointed out that
[i]f the case against Berger had been strong, or, as some courts have said, the evidence of his guilt ‘overwhelming’ a different conclusion might be reached. Moreover, we have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential.
295 U.S. at 89, 55 S.Ct. at 633 (citations omitted). The main evidence against Berger other than the United States Attorney’s statements was the testimony of an accomplice with a long criminal record. Id.
The statements of the Commonwealth’s Attorney in this matter do not come close to the level of intentional malfeasance demonstrated by the United States Attorney in Berger. A review of the trial tape clearly demonstrates that the Commonwealth’s Attorney acted not with an intent to testify, but simply out of frustration with a hostile witness. And, since Bell demonstrated a hostility by evading the questions of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, she had a right to use leading questions to prompt him.1 KRE 611(c) (Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ testimony) (emphasis added). See Brown v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Ky.1969) (a pre-KRE 611(c) rule ease holding that the Commonwealth could treat a witness as hostile and ask leading questions even though the witness was called by the Commonwealth since the witness was reluctant to answer the questions asked), Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 27 (Ky.1998) (stating that the prohibition against leading questions in direct examination is not an absolute principle).
The testimony of Bell lasted for five minutes in a trial that stretched on for three days. During the trial, the Commonwealth presented multiple witnesses who testified for hours and provided adequate evidence to convict Holt without the testimony of Bell. Such evidence included, but was not limited to, testimony from witnesses stating that Holt was present during discussions planning the robbery, that one of the robbers was referred to by Holt’s nickname at the robbery, that Holt’s DNA was found in the car stolen during the robbery, a witness stated that Holt did not believe he could be convicted of the crime because he wore gloves, and the fact that some stolen goods were found in the trash across the street from Holt’s residence after apparently being moved at his mother’s request.2 Thus, differing from Berger, there is overwhelming evidence to convict Holt regardless of the statements of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and any implications they may have had on Holt’s guilt. See Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 787 (Ky.1987), order amended, 488 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 256, 102 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), and judgment affirmed, 492 *741U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (admission of codefendant’s redacted confession which implicated the defendant as his accomplice was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because of the presence of overwhelming evidence). So much evidence is present that were there error here, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the statements given at trial actually helped Holt’s case, given the “bumbling” on direct. Holt’s cross examination is one example:
Counsel: Just to reiterate then, your testimony then Mr. Bell, is that Junie Holt never told you he committed any robbery?
Mr. Bell: Naw, he ain’t actually tell me he just did it. Naw, he just said that’s what they was charging him with.
Counsel: You just discussed what he was being charged with?
Mr. Bell: Yeah
Counsel: Not that he did it?
Mr. Bell: Naw.
Holt was clearly able to use the cross examination to clear up any statements by the Commonwealth’s Attorney and to emphasize her inept misunderstanding of what was actually said. Thus, it was the credibility of the Commonwealth Attorney that was hurt; not Bell’s.3
Putting this event in context, the jury was told by the trial court during voir dire that:
Ladies and Gentlemen you can accept as a principle of this trial and any trial that you may sit upon that the evidence you should consider is that which is presented to you by the witnesses who testify live before you. What I say isn’t evidence. What counsel says isn’t evidence. Now there are exceptions to that rule that you consider as evidence only that which is presented by the witnesses. There are exceptions. And if there should be one of those exceptions during the course of this trial we’ll tell you of that very clearly, very specifically. But unless you hear one of those exceptions you can accept as a rule of this case that evidence is presented only by witnesses who testifies live before you.
(emphasis added). The jury was clearly instructed that it was to accept nothing that the lawyers said as evidence unless prompted to do so. A general principle of trial is that a jury is able to ignore evidence when told to do so by the trial court. See Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky.1993), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky.1997) (“It is normally presumed that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence that is inadvertently presented to it, unless (1) there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s admonition; and (2) a strong likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant.”). The statements made by the Commonwealth’s Attorney were definitely not strong enough to lead one to believe the jury could not disregard them and the contents of her statements were obviously not damaging to the defendant within the context of the cross-examination and the court’s prior admonition.
There may be situations in the future when a prosecutor may commit reversible error by asserting statements through his *742questioning that constitute improper evidence. This is not one. Here the Commonwealth’s Attorney tried to make the best of a bad situation with a difficult witness and did not intend to impermissi-bly testify. There is simply no indication that the Commonwealth’s Attorney intended in this instance to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
CUNNINGHAM, J., joins this dissent.

. It is not clear from the trial record that Holt’s counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s questions because they were leading. The only ground for objection stated on the record was that the first question was "asked and answered.”

. Holt in his brief to this Court admitted that there was adequate evidence to support a finding that he did in fact commit the robbery.

. Because the Commonwealth’s Attorney knew the testimony of Bell did not help her case, and was a waste of time, she made the statement in her closing argument that "The Commonwealth would never have wasted your time, if it had known what it was going to get out of Mr. Bell.”