Court Opinion

ID: 9522729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:31:46.970925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:46.055356
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority but arrive at this conclusion by a slightly different route. To the extent that the majority relies upon a rationale that sections 103 — 5(c) and 114 — 4 are separate and unrelated provisions setting forth separate and unrelated procedures, I disagree. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the appellate court for the First District in People v. Grant (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 790, 356 N.E.2d 933, rev’d on other grounds (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 1, 368 N.E.2d 909. There the court ruled that the trial court had erred in granting a continuance beyond the 120-day period when the defendant had agreed to stipulate to the testimony of the prosecution witness whose unavailability was the basis for the motion. Section 114 — 4(c) provides that a motion for continuance based upon unavailability of a prosecution witness shall not be allowed if the defendant agrees to stipulate to what the witness’ testimony would be as alleged by the prosecution. The Grant court concluded that section 114 — 4(c) and 103 — 5 should be considered not as separate provisions but as interrelated ones. Thus, under that ruling, motions to continue beyond the 120-day period are required to meet the requirements of both sections. In reversing upon other grounds the supreme court expressly avoided passing upon the validity of the appellate court’s reasoning. However, I agree with the majority in the instant case that the information before the court on November 17, 1977, when the continuance was granted was insufficient to meet the requirements of section 103 — 5. The court was informed that Meyers had recently been returned to the penitentiary after an escape. No showing was made that he could not be brought before the court in time for a jury trial starting within the 120-day period. The trial judge was not informed that an extension of the 120-day period was in issue and decided the motion without reference to the requirements of section 103 — 5. I agree that the subsequent motion for discharge should have been allowed.