Court Opinion

ID: 9458930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:05:44.209698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.050447
License: Public Domain

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Section 223(a)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), provides for disability insurance for every person who (1) is insured for disability insurance benefits, (2) has not attained the age of 65, (3) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and (4) is under a disability.
The appellant here, Harold E. Bledsoe, fulfilled the first three requirements and had the burden of proving that he was under a disability, defined as “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
There are four elements of proof to be considered in determining whether a claimant is disabled: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s age, education and work history. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962).
The objective medical facts showed that Bledsoe was suffering from generalized osteoarthritis, including calcification of the abdominal aorta, iliac arteries, aortic arch and thoracic spine; hiatal hernia; gastritis; bilateral varicose veins; active duodenal ulcer deformity; grating of the right knee on passive extension and flexion; one plus edema of the left ankle; right wrist fracture in 1944; service-sustained shrapnel in right shoulder; fracture of the patella in 1950; aehilles and olecra-non spurs; and a 16-pound weight loss in one-and-one-half years in a 5'8", 144 pound male.
Three doctors had treated Bledsoe for low back pain; buckling of both legs; trouble with food digestion; sinus trouble; generalized arthritis; severe hy-pertrophic changes in the cervical spine with several areas of encroachment on the neural canal and abnormal straightening of the cervical curve; peptic ulcer disease; frequent colds; and acute paroxysmal tachycardia.
Bledsoe complained of arthritic pain in his right knee, left and right wrists, right elbow and neck; that his legs buckle and cramp on walking; that his stomach pains him continuously; that he suffers from indigestion and constipation. He is on medication consisting of nerve pills three times a day, Darvon pain pills once or twice a day, and a sleeping pill at night. His doctor prescribed pills for his stomach but he gave up taking them because they afforded him no relief.
One of Bledsoe’s treating doctors concluded that “[m]y opinion is that this man is unable to make a living.”
The government referred Bledsoe to Dr. Byron C. Wheeler for a vocational *1293disability determination Dr. Wheeler concluded: examination.
“Prognosis for return to work is fair. His pain of his joints and muscles and attacks of weakness of his legs would interfere with him performing manual labor. It is felt that he could safely return to his previous occupation. His mal function appears to be slightly progressive. . . . It is felt that his mal function will persist for more than 12 months.”
Bledsoe at the time of his administrative hearing was 56 years old; his education ended with 3% years of high school; his employment consisted of manual labor in the Civilian Conservation Corps, in a milk plant and in a foundry; assembly line work; operation of a grocery store; lathe operator; inspector at an automobile plant; highway manual labor; and fruit picking. His last employment (aside from a short period of orchard work) was tending a bar owned by his aunt, for six years from 1963 to 1969.
It has been held repeatedly that the Social Security Act should be liberally construed in favor of disability and the intent is inclusion rather than exclusion. Polly v. Gardner, 364 F.2d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1966); Rowe v. Finch, 427 F.2d 417, 419 (4th Cir. 1970); DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1972).
Although our review is limited to a determination of whether the Secretary’s findings are supported by substantial evidence (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), I conclude that in this case they were not.
Bledsoe’s last substantial employment was for his aunt as a bartender in her tavern for six years. When the tavern was sold, the new owners terminated his employment. He testified that during that job “[m]y wife was helping and we was only running in the daytime. She has worked lots of days when I wasn’t able to work.”
Substantial evidence does not support the hearing examiner’s finding that “[t]he claimant retains the physical capacity to perform substantial gainful activity of a light physical nature on a regular basis.” Presumably it is based on Dr. Wheeler’s conclusion that “[i]t is felt that he could safely return to his previous occupation.” But Dr. Wheeler had also concluded that Bledsoe’s ailments “would interfere with him performing manual labor.” Bartending requires manual labor to carry cases of bottles and other such tasks which the ordinary, non-relative employer would require. Bledsoe testified that on frequent occasions his legs would buckle and he would fall to the ground. The normal employer would not countenance this nor would he permit the employee’s wife to take his place during absences necessitated by physical impairments.
It would be difficult to find a person with a greater number of objective ailments than Bledsoe. Nevertheless Dr. Wheeler found him “alert, cooperative, and oriented” and the hearing examiner found him to be likewise, which appeared to influence both of their judgments as to his disability. Bledsoe’s forthright demeanor merely demonstrated in another way that he was not a malingerer feigning incapacity. It had no bearing on his objectively and subjectively proved ailments which combined to disable him. See Dillon v. Celebrezze, 345 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1965) ; DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Swihel v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 930 (D.Neb.1972).
I would reverse.