Court Opinion

ID: 9845150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:15:59.836555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.990794
License: Public Domain

PARKER, J.
dissenting. Even if I concede that what was said by the Court in S. v. Rippy, 127 N.C. 516, 37 S.E. 148, quoted in the majority opinion, is dictum, yet it became law iby reason of the decision of this Court in S. v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 126 S.E. 417, which was rendered by a strong and unanimous Court. The opinion in the Swindell case was filed on 18 February 1925. On 22 January 1936 the Court filed its opinion in S. v. Cain, 209 N.C. 275, 183 S.E. 300, holding that the -decision in the Swindell case is determinative of this appeal. The decision in the Cain case was rendered by a strong .and unanimous Court. Of the five judges who- decided the Swindell case, two were not members of the Court that decided the Cain ease, but had been replaced by two- distinguished judges. On 29 April 1942 the opinion in S. v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 19 S.E. 2d 863, was filed, *358which states: “Is a provision in a criminal statute ‘that the punishment ©hall be in the discretion of the Court and t'he defendant may be fined or imprisoned or both/ the prescribing of a ‘specific punishment’ within the meaning of section 4172 of the Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina? The answer is in the affirmative. S. v. Rippy, 127 N.C. 516, 37 S.E. 148; S. v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 126 S.E. 417.” This decision was rendered -by a strong and unanimous Court of seven judges, of Which four of the associate justices afterwards became chief justice. Of the seven judges who decided the Richardson case, only Chief Justice Stacy participated in the decision ¡in the Swindell case. Of the ©even judges who decided the'Richardson case, only Chief Justice Stacy ■and Justices Sohenck and Devin participiajted in the Cain decision. Subsequent to the decision in the Cain case, the membership of the Court was increased from five to ©even. The decisions in the Swindell, Cain, and Richardson cases were participated 'in by eleven members of this Court, five of whom have been chief justice and one of whom is the present distinguished chief justice of this Court. In addition, the so-called dictum in the Rippy case was written by Justice Walter Clark, afterwards for over twenty years chief justice of this Court and one of the most learned legal ¡scholar© who ever sat on the bench in thi© State, and concurred in by a unanimous Court.
The Court held .in ith© Swindell case in 1925 and in the Cain oaise in 1936, adopting ¡as law what was said .in -the Rippy case in 1900, and repeating it again in the Richardson case in 1942, that a provision in a ¡criminal statute “that the punishment ©hall be in the discretion of the court and the defendant may be fined or imprisoned or both” is the prescribing of a “specific punishment” within the meaning of what is now C.S. 14-2, .and the General Assembly has met in Raleigh and gone many times since and has not seen' fit to disagree with our interpretation of the language of the .statute.
I do not agree with the following statement in the majority opinion: “Therefore, .if the punishment to ¡be imposed in the discretion of the court, ¡as provided i-n G.S. 14-55, for the possession of tire implements of housebreaking, is not limited by the provisions of G.S. 14-2, then we have the .anomalous ¡situation of upholding the imposition of a sentence in the State’s Prison three times as long as could be legally imposed for the ¡actual commission of the crime of housebreaking 'Under G.S. 14-54. We have come to the conclusion' that the Legislature never intended to authorize any ¡such disparity.
“Therefore, the cases of S. v. Swindell, supra, and S. v. Cain, supra, are overruled. Likewise, so much of the opinion in S. v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 19 S.E. 2d 863, as holds where -there is a provision in a *359.statute to the effect that punishment shall be in the discretion of the count and the defendant may be fined or imprisoned, or both, that this is equivalent to a ‘specific punishment’ within the meaning of G.S. 14-2 and is not controlled thereby, is modified to the extent herein indicated.”
G.S. 14-54 is concerned with breaking into or entering houses other than burglariously. G.S. 14-55 is concerned with preparation to commit burglary ox other housebreakings. There is a vast difference between burglary and housebreaking, -and I am sure the General Assembly realized this when it enacted what is now G.S. 14-55, authorizing more severe punishment than G.S. 14-54. See the drastic punishment prescribed for burglary, as defined in G.S. 14-51, set forth in G.S. 14-52.
I do not agree in the overruling of our former decisions in the Swin-dell 'and Cain cases, and in the modification of (the Richardson case. There is no assurance but that in the years ahead, when all, or moist, of the present members of the Court are gone, a future Court of learned judges will decide that the majority opinion here is erroneous and will overrule it, and hold that the Swindell and Cain cases, .and what iis said in the Rippy and Richardson cases, are correct and sound law. If a change is to be made, in my opinion it should be done by the General Assembly. I vote to affirm the judgment below on the authority of tire Swindell and Cain cases.