Court Opinion

ID: 9478741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:08.830259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.047170
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
As the majority notes, the result in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), precludes judicial review of a mere “refusal to reopen.” But the Sanders rule does not necessarily apply to a “reopening and reconsideration on the merits,” even where the ultimate result is a refusal to change the original outcome. Since the circumstances we have before us might be characterized as fitting into the latter rather than the former category, the jurisdictional question is not clear-cut. Were it not for the difficult issue which lies beyond jurisdiction — alleged estoppel against the government in a benefits case, see Sckweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (per curiam) — the inclination to find jurisdiction here might seem pressing indeed.
In any event, there is a mushrooming body of case law on reviewability of attempted reopenings of Social Security determinations. None of this, as the majority points out, was cited to us by the parties, but a number of the pertinent cases are noted in the majority opinion,1 and there are additional cases. I would point particularly to McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir.1981) (where any subsequent claim that has been considered on merits is substantively identical to earlier claim, earlier claim has been reopened) and related cases: Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 653 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987) (adopting reopening analysis of McGowen v. Harris); Poulin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 865 (D.C.Cir.1987) (ALJ who states that claim is being “adjudicated on the merits” has reopened case); Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 696 (3d Cir.1985) (where AU gave claimant full hearing on merits of entire claim from time of original application, court finds “de facto reopening” of prior claims); Wilson v. Califano, 580 F.2d 208 (6th Cir.1978) (where ALJ rules on merits of disability claim for entire period of disability in reviewing second application, first application has been effectively reopened); McGee v. Bowen, 647 F.Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D.Ill.1986) (“Regardless of how the AU labeled his actions, if he in fact considered evidence and reached a decision on the merits of the claim, ... then the old claim was reopened”); Reinhart v. Schweiker, 590 F.Supp. 78 (W.D.Mich.1984) (where AU considers merits of disability claim dating back to time of original application, original application “effectively” reopened); Brown v. Heckler, 565 F.Supp. 72 (E.D.Wis.1983) (where AU reviews old and new evidence in assessing second claim, first claim has been reopened).
Whether or not, in the case before us, the original claim was “effectively” (as opposed to formally) reconsidered on the merits seems considerably more puzzling in light of these cases than the majority opinion suggests.

. Cases such as Anderson v. Heckler, 805 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.1986), and Rohrich v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.1986), are not completely analogous to the case before us, because they deal with disability determinations in which the earlier and later claims raise distinct issues. Thus in Rohrich, the court determined that any discussion by the AU of the claimant’s condition at the time of an earlier application was simply a consideration of "preliminary facts required to assess rationally the question at issue, i.e., whether Rohrich was disabled at the time of the second application.” 796 F.2d at 1031. The issues are not similarly separable in the case before us, for if Palmore was Gervase Bolden’s father at the time of the later application, then he surely was also Gervase’s father at the time of the earlier application. The AU of necessity reconsidered the merits of the earlier claim when granting the later one, because the claims were identical.