Court Opinion

ID: 9931066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 15:06:46.023705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:13.225724
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                     CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          FEBRUARY 8, 2024
                                                                      STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT
                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 24

Valerie Sherwood,                                                    Petitioner
      v.
Derrick Sherwood,                                   Respondent and Appellant

                                No. 20230230

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central
Judicial District, the Honorable Lolita G. Hartl Romanick, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice.

Derrick R. Sherwood, self-represented, Grand Forks, ND, respondent and
appellant.

Philip J. Axt, Solicitor General, Bismarck, ND, for amicus curiae State of North
Dakota.
                           Sherwood v. Sherwood
                               No. 20230230

Bahr, Justice.

[¶1] Derrick Sherwood appeals a district court order denying his motion to
vacate a domestic violence protection order (“DVPO”) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60.
We hold the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s
request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness, in denying Derrick
Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO, and in awarding Valerie Sherwood
attorney’s fees. We further hold Derrick Sherwood does not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g). We affirm.

                                       I

[¶2] Valerie Sherwood petitioned for a DVPO against Derrick Sherwood in
May 2022. The district court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining
Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood and their two
minor children for two years, and requiring Derrick Sherwood to surrender his
firearms to law enforcement. Derrick Sherwood petitioned to amend the DVPO
in October 2022. The court held a hearing and amended the DVPO.

[¶3] In March 2023, Derrick Sherwood moved to dismiss the DVPO. The
parties stipulated to amend the DVPO. The stipulation stated the parties
resolved their divorce by stipulation, and agreed in the divorce stipulation,
“Valerie will not object or prevent Derrick from petitioning the Court to get his
firearms back in [the DVPO case]. The remaining provisions of the [DVPO]
shall remain the same.” The stipulation further stated, “Valerie raises no
objection to Derrick having a firearm, and Derrick understands the provisions
of the [DVPO] which do not involve firearm ownership shall remain
unchanged.” In May 2023, the district court held a hearing on Derrick
Sherwood’s motion. Derrick Sherwood called Valerie Sherwood as a witness
and requested the court certify Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness. The
court ruled, “At this time I am not going to certify her as a hostile witness but
if things proceed where you believe that may need to be renewed, you may

                                       1
proceed to renew that request.” After the hearing, the court amended the
DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms.

[¶4] Derrick Sherwood filed a motion to vacate the DVPO under N.D.R.Civ.P.
60(b) in June 2023. The district court denied the motion and awarded Valerie
Sherwood attorney’s fees.

                                       II

[¶5] Derrick Sherwood argues the district court erred by not certifying Valerie
Sherwood as a hostile witness during the May 2023 hearing.

[¶6] “A district court has broad discretion over the presentation of evidence
and the conduct of trial, but it must exercise its discretion in a manner that
best comports with substantial justice.” Asiama v. Asumeng, 2023 ND 114, ¶
22, 992 N.W.2d 543 (quoting Jalbert v. Eagle Rigid Spans, Inc., 2017 ND 50,
¶ 9, 891 N.W.2d 135). “A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary,
unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, if it misinterprets or misapplies the
law or if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process.” Id. “The
court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.” N.D.R.Ev. 611(a)(3). Rule 611(c),
N.D.R.Ev., provides, “Leading questions should not be used on direct
examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily,
the court should allow leading questions . . . when a party calls a hostile
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.”

[¶7] Derrick Sherwood called Valerie Sherwood as a witness. Before asking
Valerie Sherwood a single question, Derrick Sherwood asked the district court
to certify Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness. Valerie Sherwood’s attorney
opposed the request, stating she does not believe that is necessary and she does
not believe Valerie Sherwood, a victim of domestic violence, should be treated
as a hostile witness by her abuser. The court ruled, “At this time I am not going
to certify her as a hostile witness but if things proceed where you believe that
may need to be renewed, you may proceed to renew that request.” Derrick

                                       2
Sherwood did not renew his request Valerie Sherwood be certified as a hostile
witness.

[¶8] Valerie Sherwood filed the petition for the DVPO and, thus, was an
adverse party to Derrick Sherwood. Under Rule 611(c), when a party calls an
adverse party as a witness, a district court will “ordinarily” allow leading
questions. However, here the court previously found Valerie Sherwood to be
the victim of domestic violence by Derrick Sherwood. To protect Valerie
Sherwood from harassment, the court took a wait and see approach, declining
to certify Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness, but permitting Derrick
Sherwood to renew his request if he felt the circumstances warranted him
doing so.

[¶9] Under these circumstances, Derrick Sherwood has not shown the district
court abused its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s initial request to
certify Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness.

                                      III

[¶10] Derrick Sherwood argues the district court erred when it did not grant
his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion and vacate the amended DVPO. He argues the
parties’ stipulation is a contract, that he contracted to receive his firearms
back, and that the only way to fulfill the contract is for the court to vacate the
DVPO.

[¶11] “The court may amend its order or agreement at any time upon
subsequent petition filed by either party.” N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(6). Here, the
district court amended the DVPO based on Derrick Sherwood’s request and the
parties’ stipulation. The amended DVPO was not contrary to or inconsistent
with the stipulation. The stipulation provided, “Valerie will not object or
prevent Derrick from petitioning the Court to get his firearms back in [the
DVPO case].” In compliance with the stipulation, Valerie Sherwood did not
object to Derrick Sherwood getting his firearms back. Moreover, although not
required by the stipulation, the court entered an amended judgment that
removed the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms under
state law.

                                        3
[¶12] The stipulation did not require the district court to vacate the DVPO, as
requested by Derrick Sherwood in his motion. Rather, the stipulation
specifically provided the non-firearm “provisions of the [DVPO] shall remain
the same.” The stipulation also represented that Derrick Sherwood
“understands the provisions of the [DVPO] which do not involve firearm
ownership shall remain unchanged.”

[¶13] The district court did not err when it declined to dismiss the amended
DVPO on the ground it was contrary to the stipulation.

                                      IV

[¶14] Derrick Sherwood argues the district court misapplied the law when it
denied his motion to vacate the judgment. Derrick Sherwood argues the court
should have vacated the DVPO because, due to intervening facts, Valerie
Sherwood was no longer in imminent danger of domestic violence.

[¶15] “An appeal from a [district] court’s refusal to vacate an order under Rule
60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., does not permit the appellant to attack the underlying
order from which an appeal could have been, but was not, brought.” Kautzman
v. Doll, 2018 ND 23, ¶ 5, 905 N.W.2d 744 (quoting Anderson v. Baker, 2015 ND
269, ¶ 8, 871 N.W.2d 830). Rather, our review is limited to the order which was
appealed. Matter of Est. of Bartelson, 2019 ND 107, ¶ 12, 925 N.W.2d 416.

[¶16] Derrick Sherwood did not appeal the original or amended DVPO. He
cannot now do so by appealing the district court’s order denying his Rule 60(b)
motion to vacate the DVPO. Kautzman, 2018 ND 23, ¶ 5 (appeal of district
court’s denial of motion to reconsider did not permit appellant to challenge the
underlying disorderly conduct restraining order); Anderson, 2015 ND 269, ¶ 8
(appeal of district court’s denial of motion for reconsideration did not permit
appellant to challenge the underlying order holding appellant in contempt of
court).

[¶17] Moreover, Derrick Sherwood’s argument a DVPO must be vacated when
there is no longer an imminent danger of domestic violence lacks merit. This
Court has held, once a petitioner succeeds in obtaining a domestic violence

                                       4
protection order, “the petitioner is not required to prove actual or imminent
domestic violence in order to succeed on a motion to extend that order under
N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(6).” Gaab v. Ochsner, 2001 ND 195, ¶ 5, 636 N.W.2d 669.
“[I]f the district court issued the original protection order after holding a
hearing on the merits and finding actual or imminent domestic violence, the
petitioner is not required to make a second showing to obtain an extension.”
Odden v. Rath, 2007 ND 51, ¶ 16, 730 N.W.2d 590. If a petitioner is not required
to prove actual or imminent domestic violence to obtain an extension of a
DVPO, a petitioner need not prove actual or imminent domestic violence to
maintain the original DVPO.

[¶18] The district court did not err in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to
vacate the judgment.

                                        V

[¶19] Derrick Sherwood asks this Court to consider a challenge to the
constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g). In its amicus brief, the State
argues Derrick Sherwood does not have standing to challenge the statute.

[¶20] “A party is entitled to have a court decide the merits of a dispute only
after demonstrating the party has standing to litigate the issues placed before
the court.” Finstad v. Gord, 2014 ND 72, ¶ 23, 844 N.W.2d 913 (quoting Dakota
Res. Council v. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2012 ND 114, ¶ 5, 817 N.W.2d
373). “Standing is the concept used to determine if a party is sufficiently
affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court.”
Great Plains Royalty Corp. v. Earl Schwartz Co., 2021 ND 62, ¶ 12, 958 N.W.2d
128 (quoting Schmidt v. City of Minot, 2016 ND 175, ¶ 13, 883 N.W.2d 909).
“Because courts do not render advisory opinions or decide purely abstract
questions, parties seeking relief from a court must demonstrate they have
standing by alleging such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy to
justify the court’s exercise of remedial powers on their behalf.” Dakota Res.
Council, at ¶ 5.

[¶21] Section 14-07.1-02(4)(g), N.D.C.C., provides a DVPO may require, under
certain circumstances, that the respondent “surrender for safekeeping any

                                        5
firearm or other specified dangerous weapon . . . in the respondent’s immediate
possession or control or subject to the respondent’s immediate control[.]” Here,
N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g) does not prevent Derrick Sherwood from having
access to his firearms. The district court amended the DVPO to allow Derrick
Sherwood to possess firearms. Because Derrick Sherwood is not prohibited
from possessing or controlling firearms under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), he
does not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of
section 14-07-02(4). See Finstad, 2014 ND 72, ¶ 23.

[¶22] We hold Derrick Sherwood does not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g).

                                      VI

[¶23] Derrick Sherwood argues the district court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees to Valerie Sherwood under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2).

[¶24] Under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2), a district court has discretion to
determine whether a claim is frivolous and, if it is, the amount and
reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees. Bolinske v. Sandstrom, 2022 ND
148, ¶ 30, 978 N.W.2d 72. However, if the court finds the claim is frivolous, it
“must award costs and attorney’s fees[.]” Id. A claim is frivolous “if there is
such a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could
not have thought a court would render judgment in that person’s favor[.]”
N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2). We will not overturn a court’s discretionary
determinations under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) absent an abuse of discretion.
Sagebrush Res., LLC v. Peterson, 2014 ND 3, ¶ 15, 841 N.W.2d 705. “A district
court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner, its decision is not the product of a rational mental
process leading to a reasoned determination, or it misinterprets or misapplies
the law.” Tillich v. Bruce, 2017 ND 21, ¶ 7, 889 N.W.2d 899.

[¶25] The district court found Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate was
frivolous because it raised issues that had already been determined in the case
and it made baseless accusations. The court awarded Valerie Sherwood
attorney’s fees of $775. Based on the record, including the substance of Derrick

                                       6
Sherwood’s N.D.R.Civ.P. 60 motion and the divorce stipulation, we conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion when it found Derrick Sherwood’s motion to
dismiss was frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to Valerie Sherwood.

                                    VII

[¶26] Having considered the parties’ other arguments, we conclude they are
either unnecessary to the decision or are without merit. We affirm.

[¶27] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                      7