Court Opinion

ID: 9664813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:30:43.270493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.537657
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DUGGAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule the motion for rehearing (without opinion). I would grant South Loop National Bank’s motion for rehearing and affirm the summary judgment because the bank conclusively established that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause.
Proximate cause consists of both “cause in fact” and “foreseeability,” and both of these elements must be present to prove proximate cause. Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.1985). The evidence recited in the original opinion addresses only the element of “cause in fact.” I agree that South Loop National Bank did not establish as a matter of law that the bank’s actions were not the probable cause of Clark’s injury. See Lenger v. Physician’s Gen. Hosp., 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.1970). Dr. Dougherty equivocated on the issue of “cause in fact,” vacillating between medical “probability” and “possibility”; therefore the bank could not totally negate this element of proximate cause.
*474However, “cause in fact” is only one element of proximate cause. The majority opinion does not address the second element of proximate cause, whether the heart attack was “foreseeable.” “Foreseeability” means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have perceived that the same or a similar injury would have occurred as a result of his negligent act or omission. Ortiz v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 702 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The basis for “foreseeability” in negligence rests on the following analysis:
Human beings in their common dealings with each other in society should be required to exercise some degree of deliberation or forethought. It would be unreasonable to require them, before doing or refraining from doing a particular act, to exhaust the field of speculation concerning every possible or conceivable consequence which might result from their conduct. It is just that one should be charged with the duty to anticipate those consequences which in the ordinary course of human experience might reasonably be expected to result therefrom, and therefore that he should be held legally responsible for those consequences.
Dallas v. Maxwell, 248 S.W. 667, 670 (Tex.Comm’n.App.1923, holding approved).
Legal liability does not attach to an act or omission unless the alleged wrongdoer could have reasonably anticipated the probable harm from his or her conduct. In determining whether the actor should have known that the conduct involved a risk to another, the actor is to be judged by the standard of the reasonable person, and the actor is said to have known of the risk actually or constructively if he would have known of it by exercising “such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man could have.” Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 289 (1965).
As indicated in the majority opinion, the only evidence before the trial court was the deposition testimony of Dr. Doughtery. The following testimony concerned foreseeability:
Q: Would you, based upon your opinion as a doctor, an expert in cardiology, expect a person using ordinary care to have foreseen if they treated Mr. Clark the way the bank treated him that he would have gone home and had a heart attack? A: Well, I am sure that there are a lot of people who have been treated similarly who have not had heart attacks.
⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ *
Q: If — would you expect that heart attack to be the result of that activity? A: In most people, it probably would not have been.
⅜! ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅝
Q: Would it have gone through your mind as an expert in cardiology that Mr. Clark may have a heart attack because of this?
A: Yes, I would certainly have considered it a risk.
Q: Looking perspectively [sic]?
A: If I had known that he had coronary disease.
Q: If you had known that he had coronary disease?
A: Right.
⅜: * # * * *
Q: You would not consider the heart attack to be the natural result of that, would you, or the usual result?
A: In Mr. Clark?
Q: In anyone?
A: In anyone. I would say that in most people with similar experiences one would not expect a heart attack.
(Emphasis added.)
Dr. Doughtery’s testimony negated the element of foreseeability. Therefore, because both “cause in fact” and “foreseeability” must be present to prove proximate cause, and because the bank negated the “foreseeability” element with the testimony of Clark’s own doctor, the bank was entitled to a summary judgment. Proximate cause was negated as a matter of law. If the bank could not reasonably fore*475see any physical injury as a result of its acts, there is no negligence and no liability.
For these reasons, I would grant South Loop National Bank’s motion for rehearing and affirm the summary judgment.