Court Opinion

ID: 9642734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:07:57.505172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:14.500411
License: Public Domain

Holden, C. J.,
dissenting. I am unable to turn aside the errors assigned by the plaintiffs to the court’s instructions. The record pre*258sents' to my mind- issues.,of negligence and cont-ributory-.negligence for the. jury to decide. It is my opinion that the trial court .properly denied the defendants’ motion for directed verdicts, but submitted the case on instructions that were inadequately prejudicial. This is particularly true of the infant plaintiff Georgia Winters on- the question of contributory negligence.
■ The evidence is clear, and substantially conceded in the defendants’ brief, that the shed which housed the dynamite caps, and the platform by which access was gained were used by the Winters family in common with their adjoining tenants. The common use of the area where the danger resided, in legal contemplation, served the interests of both landlord and tenant. .Wool v. Larner, 112 Vt. 431, 436, 26 A.2d 89.
- Passageways, platforms, stairways and other structures used by the various tenants of a single building are deemed to be retained under the landlord’s control. As to these areas, the owner owes -a duty to the tenants and their guests as invitees. The duty imposed-is one of reasonable care. The duty does not arise from the landlord and tenant relationship. It develops from lessor’s character as.- the owner and occupant of the retained area. As to this part of the premises, he owes a duty of reasonable care for the safety of tenants, their families and others on premises at their invitation. It is from these concepts of control and invitation that the law imposes responsibility for injuries to persons lawfully there on the owner rather than the tenant. As Justice Sturtevant has pointed out — “The invitation carries with it some assurance of safety, which the owner must make good, by the exercise of active care if necessary.” Wool v. Larner, supra, 112 Vt. at 346; Beaulac v. Robie, 93 Vt. 275, 279, 107 Atl. 396. See also Beaulac v. Robie, 92 Vt. 27, 33, 102 Atl. 88.
It is the opinion of the majority that the defendant land owners should be discharged from this responsibility for the reason that there is no affirmative evidence that either of the defendants had knowledge of the presence of the explosives on the premises over which they had. retained control. My search of the record discloses facts.-from which the jury could infer that the defendant John Unaitis either knew, or should have preceived the presence of danger by the exercise of reasonable vigilance.
This defendant had been on the dairy farm for some seventeen years. The last nine years of this time he had owned and operated the farm. Prior to going on the farm, he had served for three years *259in'the ordnance department of the Air Force. He had caused blasting operations to be conducted on the premises in the construction of a drainage silo behind one of his barns that was' three hundred feet from the shed where the caps were found.
The defendants’ son found the detonators on a low shelf against which he was leaning. The shelf was below shoulder height of the boy. The caps were apparently exposed to casual view when he discovered them. The boy testified that he and the other children, including the plaintiff Georgia, “were fooling around” in that area. “I happened to look down and saw the caps.” He gave one to the plaintiff.
The defendant John Unaitis testified in a pre-trial deposition that he knew that his children as well as the “tenement kids” played in this area. Before the Winter family moved in, he checked the tenement and the shed area to see if it was presentable. He caused them to be swept up although he made no inspection of the loose parts that had accumulated in the corner area of the platform and shed. There was evidence that prior to the accident, in response to a request by Georgia’s mother he had told Mrs. Winter — “some day, when it rained, he would have the men remove the refrigerators, stove and clean out the shed for us.”
The defendant Unaitis made no specific denial of knowledge of the presence of the dynamite caps in the shed area. And unlike the other witnesses to the events which preceded the accident, this defendant did not disclaim the ability to identify the cylindrical objects as dynamite caps. See Southern Cotton Co. v. Clements 25 Ariz. 124, 213 P. 1005, 1008.
To be sure, there was no direct proof that this defendant knew of the presence of the explosives in this area of his premises. But the opportunity for knowledge, when available by the exercise of reasonable care, is the equivalent to knowledge itself. Actual knowlédge is not essential. Voluntary ignorance may amount to culpable negligence if the means for detecting danger is available by the exercise of reasonable vigilance. Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 483, 144 A.2d 786.
I find no error in the decision of the trial court in submitting the case for the jury to judge the defendants’ conduct in the light of what he then knew, or should have known by exercising reasonable care for the child’s safety.
*260Although the trial of this cause embraced two actions, — the claim of the parent and that of the child — the trial court made no distinction in its instructions on the issue of contributory negligence. A single blanket instruction was made applicable to both plaintiffs without regard to their respective ages or maturity. This shortage and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that any contributory negligence on the part of the father could not be imputed to the daughter were adequately and seasonably called to the court’s attention by proper exceptions.
These assignments of error are well founded. The plaintiff Georgia was entitled to an instruction that in encountering the danger which caused her injuries, she was not required to exercise the same degree of care expected of her father. She should have been held only to the exercise of prudence reasonably to be expected of a child of eight, of like mental capacity and experience. Johnson’s Admr. v. Rutland Railroad Co., 93 Vt. 132, 139, 106 Atl. 682.
The evidence afforded ample room for the jury to find tire father guilty of contributory negligence. The defendants stressed i the point. Yet, the court made no attempt to separate the issue of contributory negligence in its application to the child as being any different from the standard of care required of her parent. And no precautionary instruction was given to guide the jury away from the tendency to impute the parent’s negligence to his daughter. Indeed, the tenor of the charge and the manner in which the case was submitted was such as might lead reasonable triers to believe that this was permissible. Such a consequence would be contrary to our established rule of law. Johnson’s Admr. v. Rutland Railroad Co., supra, 93 Vt. at 142; Trepeni v. Walker, 120 Vt. 510, 517, 144 A.2d 836.
The instructions further omitted any reference to the importance of common passageways, platforms and other structures used by tenants of multiple dwellings in determining the issue of the owner’s control and responsibility. This shortage was not corrected after proper exception.
The failure of the charge to properly instruct on these questions resulted in the submission of the case on an incomplete statement of the issues and the law. In consequence the jury received the case without the ingredients essential to a true verdict.
These deficiencies require a reversal. Blondin v. Carr, 121 Vt. 157, 161, 151 A.2d 121; Wortheim v. Brace, 116 Vt. 9, 11, 68 A.2d *261719; Clark v. Demars, 102 Vt. 147, 151, 146 Atl. 812. I would remand these cases for a new trial.