Court Opinion

ID: 9698791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:04.328922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.363004
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
I join the Majority’s Opinion in its analysis with regard to the three issues discussed, namely, racial discrimination in jury selection, the failure to include an “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter charge and its application of Commonwealth v. Ramos, 366 Pa.Super. 624, 532 A.2d 22 (1987) to permit evidence of drug dealing at the trial to establish intent and motive.
However, I cannot accept the Majority’s conclusion that the actions of the prosecutor in this case did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Having reviewed the record in this matter, I find that it is replete with actions by the prosecuting attorney that are unprofessional, uncivil and amount to misconduct. One example deals with the testimony of Mr. Howell, a witness who stated that he saw an *163individual armed with a .38 revolver in a bar located about seven blocks from the scene of the shooting. Following direct examination the Assistant District Attorney asked one question and this is demonstrated as follows:
Q. (by A.D.A.) How many other bartenders in this city does Mr. Johnson have in his pocket?
Mr. Medway: Objection.
Ms. Smarro: Objection. Move for mistrial.
Mr. Medway: Move to strike and move for mistrial. Mr. Compolongo: I have no questions of this witness.
The Court: Don’t get excited. Disregard the last comment by the Assistant District Attorney. That stricken from the record. You are excused. Thank you.
Mr. Medway: Excuse me, Your Honor, may we see you at side bar, please?
(Sidebar discussion held on the record as follows:)
Ms. Smarro: Judge, I think the case law is in my favor when I move for a mistrial. I have the cases over there on my desk.
The Court: Mistrial is denied. I have stricken it from the record. I told them to disregard it.
The Court: I will not declare a mistrial. I will instruct the jury to disregard it. Okay?
(Sidebar discussion concluded at this time.)
(N.T. 6/6/88, 89-91)
This attempt by the prosecutor was to impinge the testimony of a crucial defense witness by propounding what purported to be a question, knowing that the question was improper and he did not even seek to justify the question asked. A review of this record shows that the prosecutor in this case engaged in a course of conduct that is not designed to seek the truth but rather to prejudice the jurors. *164Admittedly, the trial court gave cautionary instructions, the trial court was required to do that throughout the trial because of the actions of the prosecutor and one of the defense attorneys. It is obvious that the trial judge in this case sought to get this matter concluded and, in my view, excused actions which should not be tolerated in a courtroom. Instructive on this issue is the- Commonwealth’s brief on this point dealing with the witness, Mr. Howell. The Commonwealth argues:
There was no prejudice resulting from the question since an objection to it was sustained, the question was stricken from the record, and the jury was twice instructed at length to disregard it because it was not evidence and cannot be considered in way.
(Commonwealth Brief, p. 29)
Interestingly, the Commonwealth in its brief cannot justify the asking of the question by the prosecutor. It merely seeks to excuse the prosecutor’s action by saying that the court acted to strike the prejudicial question. This is not the way cases should be tried and, when one reads the entire record in this case, one cannot avoid the inescapable conclusion that the prosecutor’s action was extremely prejudicial not a search for truth and should no be excused because the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard what the prosecutor said. I would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case for' new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.