Court Opinion

ID: 9704846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:48:08.336296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.820071
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent. The jury has found more than one aggravating circumstance and one or more unspecified mitigating circumstances and determined that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the unspecified mitigating circumstances, thus requiring the imposition of the death penalty. The majority has properly concluded that "... one of the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the jury in setting the sentence of death is not, therefore, supported by the evidence ...” (J-190-86-11), but the majority unexplainedly concludes the sentence by saying, “... we are required under the sentencing statute to vacate the sentence of death and remand to the Court of Common Pleas for appellant to be sentenced to life imprisonment. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h).”
I do not read the cited subsection so restrictively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h) reads at (3):
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d).
The evidence before us most assuredly, and confirmed by the majority, fully supports “the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d),” that being aggravating circumstance # 10, the conviction of another felony for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
*109The majority reads 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3)(ii) as directing that if any one aggravating circumstance found by the jury is not supported by the evidence then the penalty of death must be set aside and life imprisonment be imposed where there are mitigating circumstances irrespective of the number of remaining aggravating circumstances supported by the evidence.
Perhaps the majority espouses this narrowest of readings because it feels inadequate to scan the record and conclude whether the jury could, or would, have found the remaining aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweighing the unspecified but identifiable mitigating circumstances.
I feel no such inadequacy. In fact, I believe it is our responsibility to determine whether the remaining aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, the mitigating circumstances appearing of record.
I read § 9711(h)(ii) as directing us to set aside the death penalty only if we can not find an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence. Since we have found an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence, I believe it is our duty to determine whether the jury would, or could, find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the supported aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances found in the record.1
Any other conclusion could lead to ridiculous results such as the finding of all twelve aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance (youth) by the jury, but *110our setting aside of one aggravating circumstance would require the vacation of the death penalty, because we are incapable of determining that a jury would, without a reasonable doubt, determine that the remaining eleven aggravating circumstances outweigh the one mitigating circumstance. I cannot believe that our legislature or our jurisprudence intends such an emasculation of our abilities on review of the sentence of death.
If such is the conclusion of our majority, then I urge the legislature immediately to review § 9711 and affirm the majority’s holding or clarify the statute to conform to the will of the legislature.
In reviewing the record, I have no reticence in concluding that the Appellant was properly convicted and that the aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence outweighs, without a reasonable doubt, the mitigating circumstances appearing of record. I would affirm the convictions of murders of the first degree, reverse the two convictions as to the two counts of kidnapping (I concur with the majority in this respect), and affirm the penalty of death.
Finally, I strenuously object to the loose use of the phrase “the issue of the constitutionality of the execution of children” (J-109-86-12). There is only one recorded instance in the constitutional history of our Commonwealth that we have ever strapped a child (under the age of 18) to the electric chair and pulled the switch. If we mean by this misleading phrase “the constitutional issue of executing adults for crimes committed when they were children” then let’s say so in order that the whole world, English speaking and non-English speaking people, understand us clearly. I join Mr. Justice Larsen’s reasoning as it appears on pages 11 through 15 of his Dissenting Opinion in holding that the death penalty is constitutional when applied to persons for crimes committed when they were juveniles.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the two convictions of murder of the first degree and the penalty of death.

. I find support in this conclusion by language found in the recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements in Charles E. Strickland, Superintendent, Florida State Prison, et at, Petitioners v. David Leroy Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):
When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors (the improperly found aggravating circumstances in the case sub judice), the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. (Emphasis and parenthetical expression added.)