Court Opinion

ID: 9530532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:38.446153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.483259
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring. I concur with the majority’s conclusions on both of the issues before us. I agree that the factual findings made by the circuit court as to the paucity of evidence that the Macks received the forum selection clause are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence presented by both sides would have provided a basis for the circuit court to rule in either party’s favor. While it would seem to be extremely easy for the defendant to have retained a copy of the forum clause signed by the plaintiffs, the defendant did not take this precaution. Consequently, I agree with affirming the circuit court’s finding on this issue. As to the issue of whether a vicarious liability claim may be stated by a passenger against a shipowner for alleged negligent treatment by its shipboard doctor, I concur with the majority that, on the facts of this case as presented to us, the circuit court correctly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. It is important to note that in reaching this conclusion, this court acknowledges that we are bound by section 1333(1) of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act to follow federal maritime law in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000). See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 174, 190, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1986). Unfortunately, federal maritime law may charitably be described as in a state of flux at this time. The defendant argues that De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 87 L. Ed. 1065, 63 S. Ct. 814 (1943), is dispositive. There, the Supreme Court reviewed the claim of a seaman against his employer based on the alleged negligence of a shipboard doctor in treating the seaman’s injuries. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000)), a shipowner is liable in damages for injuries suffered by a seaman as the result of any negligence on the part of the ship’s physician in treating the seaman. In a footnote, the Supreme Court pointed out that “liability to a passenger injured by the negligence of a ship’s doctor has been denied” by several lower courts on grounds that the medical service was the doctor and the patient’s business and the treatment was not in pursuance of the doctor’s duty to the ship or the ship’s duty to the passenger. De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. at 666 n.2, 87 L. Ed. at 1070 n.2, 63 S. Ct. at 818 n.2. While the Supreme Court referred to these lower court holdings as being decided by “judges of great learning,” the Court’s ruminations on this point were clearly dicta as the plaintiff before them was employed as a seaman by the shipowner and was therefore protected under the Jones Act. In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, we are compelled to consider the other federal court decisions which have addressed the issue of vicarious liability of shipowners for the actions of their shipboard doctors. As explained by the majority, in Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959), Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line Ltd., 1993 A.M.C. 1633 (S.D. Fla. 1993), scad Huntley v. Carnival Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2004), federal district courts held that a shipowner may be held liable for the negligent treatment of a passenger by a shipboard physician employed by the shipowner. As the majority acknowledge, several federal courts have rejected the reasoning of these cases and have adhered to the rule that an on-board physician’s negligence will not be imputed to the carrier. See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988), Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Di Bonaventure v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 103-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Also see Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1990), 1990 A.M.C. 1452 (1990) (and cases cited therein). My concurrence with the majority’s holding that the plaintiffs complaint alleging that Royal Carribean Cruises may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its shipboard doctor states a claim sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss is dependent upon the fact that the doctor is an employee of Royal Carribean Cruises. Defendant has not asserted that the doctor in this case was an independent contractor. While the court in Fairley v. Royal Cruise Line Ltd., 1993 A.M.C. at 1639-40, considered whether a theory of apparent agency might apply in cases where the doctor is not an employee of the carrier, thankfully, we do not have to consider this issue. Finally, I agree with the majority that we should not limit our ruling on the certified questions to merely reviewing the questions themselves; rather, we should also consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal. Billerbeck v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356-57 (1997), appeal denied, 176 Ill. 2d 570 (1998).