Court Opinion

ID: 9477837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:32:44.751066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:04.819302
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I believe this case must be remanded to the district court for that court to issue a supplemental order stating the findings of fact that underlie its decision. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
After a magistrate conducts a hearing on a motion to suppress, the magistrate submits to the district court proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A party may then file objections. Id. § 636(b)(1). The district court, in making a de novo determination, id., renders the “final determination of the facts and the final adjudication,” H.R.Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6162, 6163 (quoting Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196, 207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974)) (hereinafter Report); see Sims v. Wyrick, 552 F.Supp. 748, 750 (W.D.Mo.1982). In doing so, the court may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed findings or recommendations, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and at bottom, the district court “alone acts as the ultimate decision-maker,” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2415, 65 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1980); see id. at 681-82, 100 S.Ct. at 2415-16.
Here, the Government submitted objections to specific, proposed fact-findings and to the magistrate’s recommendation to grant Longbehn’s motion. After reviewing the record, the district court rejected the magistrate’s recommendation to grant the motion because the court concluded Long-behn was not in custody when he made the false statements. The district court, however, gave no indication of the findings of fact that supported its decision. Instead, the court included in its written decision only that it had “read and reviewed the transcript * * * [and the] submissions of both parties.”
On appeal this court relies on the magistrate’s proposed findings for its factual recitation. Under the statute, however, the district court must find the facts, and the magistrate’s proposed findings are not binding on that court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Report, supra, at 3-4, 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6163, 6171; see United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Sims, 552 F.Supp. at 750. The district court clearly did not accept the *454proposed findings as its own, and thus, the proposed findings do not control in this case. In rejecting the magistrate’s recommendation, the district court did not mention the magistrate’s proposed findings. Instead, the district court stated that its decision was made from “the totality of circumstances” and was “[b]ased upon the court’s review of the transcript of the proceedings.” Thus, we are in no position to adopt the magistrate’s proposed findings or substitute our own interpretation of the evidence, see ante at 452-53, for that of the district court. See Baggett v. Program Resources, Inc., 806 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir.1986); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 758 F.2d 319, 327 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir.1977). In sum, this court cannot use the district court’s failure to articulate its findings as an invitation to “engage in impermissible appellate [fact-finding].” Amadeo v. Zant, — U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988).
Undoubtedly, the district court in its de novo review of the record, which included reading the transcript and holding oral arguments, made factual determinations to support its decision to deny Longbehn’s motion. In support of its decision, the district court may have found persuasive the following evidence in the record not mentioned by this court: (1) Longbehn was asked to wait at the firing range after his class was dismissed, but Lieutenant Dugan arrived within five to ten minutes; (2) Lieutenant Dugan told Longbehn he would like to speak with him, but was careful to ensure the other officers at the range did not see Dugan with Longbehn to avoid embarrassing Longbehn; (3) Lieutenant Dugan asked Longbehn to accompany him to Longbehn’s house, but also told Longbehn he was free to leave; (4) Longbehn was made aware of the planned search as a professional courtesy to a fellow officer; (5) officials repeatedly told Longbehn, an experienced police officer, that he was not under arrest or in custody; (6) during the search, Longbehn could have left his home at any time; (7) Longbehn stated his willingness to cooperate with the officers, asked whether the search related to his uncle, and indicated his desire to clarify matters; (8) only after Longbehn followed Agent Jacko into the bedroom did Jacko ask Longbehn about his uncle, and Long-behn then made false statements; and (9) Longbehn initially entered his home alone while officers waited outside to begin the search, and thus, Longbehn was allowed access to anything inside the house including two weapons. This last point clearly undercuts Longbehn’s assertion he was in custody or significantly deprived of his freedom.
If the evidence previously listed played an integral part in the district court’s analysis, this court’s reliance on findings proposed by the magistrate would be misplaced, particularly in light of the clearly erroneous standard of review that is applicable here. See United States v. O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1414 (8th Cir.1988). In any event, we must have the district court’s findings to complete our appellate review. The findings in this case are the touchstone of an analysis that must be based on the totality of the circumstances, which “includ[es] the individual’s ‘freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place and length’ of the questioning.” Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1320 (8th Cir.1985)). Thus, we should remand to the district court for it to articulate the fact-findings underlying the court’s conclusion Longbehn was not in custody. See Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 671 F.2d 1185, 1186-87 (8th Cir.1982).
Arguably, under some circumstances, the court may affirm the district court rather than remand when the district court has relied on the magistrate’s summary of the evidence and the full record supports that summary. See Thompson v. Scurr, 668 F.2d 999, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883, 103 S.Ct. 189, 74 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982); see also United States v. Tovar, 687 F.2d 1210, 1215 n. 2 (8th Cir.1982). It is an entirely different matter, however, for this court to reverse on the strength of the magistrate’s proposed findings or this *455court’s own review of the record evidence when the district court has not completed its fact-finding role. Without the essential findings of the district court, this court will be completing the de novo review that is reserved to the district court.
Accordingly, I would remand to the district court.