Court Opinion

ID: 9794581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:14.946087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.103538
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J., Dissenting.
As a matter of policy I agree with many of the broadsides which the majority aims at section 290 of the Penal Code. Nevertheless, I cannot agree that it is unconstitutional as applied to persons convicted of having violated section 647, subdivision (a). There is, of course, much in' the majority opinion which should make the Legislature stop, look and listen. Perhaps it will have that effect—either by causing the ambit of the section to be broadened or, conversely, by triggering its outright repeal. The question before us, however, is whether the section, as applied to section 647, subdivision (a) violators, is “cruel or unusual” within the meaning of article I, section 17 of our own fundamental law or “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Our power to hold laws invalid if they violate these constitutional precepts is simply not a general mandate to get rid of all punishments which, in our view, do not fit the crime. The constitutional standards are more severe. While I agree that reasonable men can differ over the wisdom or efficacy of section 290,1 cannot get myself to say that, as a matter of law, it is repugnant to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (Trap v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101 [2 *927L.Ed.2d 630, 642, 78 S.Ct. 590]; see People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 647 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880].)
I therefore dissent.