Court Opinion

ID: 9732842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:38:47.703887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:41.725423
License: Public Domain

Kenison, C.J.,
dissenting-. How far is too far and how long is too long in any given situation has been a thorny problem in the judicial process which has vexed bench and bar for a long time. Nevertheless both the extent of and the time for detention and interrogation of persons suspected of crime are *194being limited and shortened under recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Where and when to draw the line may not be delineated until another case on another Monday. But, as of today and henceforth, it is my understanding that the detention and intermittent interrogation incommunicado of the defendants for a period of “more than fifty-six (56) hours,” coupled with the refusal to allow them “to contact legal counsel” for approximately forty-two hours, will not pass muster under a fair reading of existing decisions.
Reliance is placed on the closely divided decisions in 1957 of Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U. S. 504. It is true that these decisions have not been overruled but they have been undermined. Note, Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 573 (1962). Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503. Although we are not dealing with a confession of guilt in the present case, we are confronted with convictions based in part on incriminating evidence obtained from the defendants in custody while they were undergoing interrogation incommunicado during denial of counsel. In White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59, 60, the absence of counsel at arraignment was fatal and the court added the significant statement “. . . we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.” It is difficult to see how the secret detention and denial of counsel during lengthy interrogation can be approved if the right to counsel demanded by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 355, and White v. Maryland, supra, is to be meaningful and effective. Professor Sutherland, a perceptive commentator on the constitutional scene, has pointed out the inconsistency of the Crooker-Cicenia doctrine with the rationale of White v. Maryland: “Time seems to be running against Crooker and Cicenia.'1'’ Sutherland, Detention, Interrogation, and The Right to Counsel. Address, Conference of Chief Justices (August 15, 1963).
No case precisely parallel to the present one has been cited by counsel. Whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 is applicable to this proceeding may be debatable but I think that it is. The combination of detention, interrogation, and denial of counsel for the time and under the circumstances set forth in the stipulated facts resulted in evidence to convict just as much as would an illegal search and seizure. Whether some other court will consider this prejudicial (Fahey v. Connecticut, 372 U. S. 928), or below “the PI im soil line of due process,” a new trial should *195be required. See People v. Donovan, 13 N. Y. 2d 148; Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States, A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 483, 606 (1963); Lee v. United States, 322 F. 2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963).