Court Opinion

ID: 9948894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 14:07:43.750884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.470206
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re J.L., 2024-Ohio-850.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                            HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: J.L. and C.L.                          :   APPEAL NO.     C-230140
                                                   TRIAL NO.      F21-219Z
                                               :

                                               :     O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 8, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michelle Browning,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job
and Family Services,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Kathleen A. Kenney,
Assistant Public Defender, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem,

Christopher P. Kapsal, for Appellant Mother.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Judge.

       {¶1}    Appellant mother A.L. appeals from the decision of the juvenile court

placing her two children, C.L. and J.L., in the permanent custody of the Hamilton

County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”). HCJFS was granted

emergency custody of the children after J.L. tested positive at birth for methadone,

methamphetamine, and fentanyl. Because mother has not demonstrated long-term

stability and sobriety, as required by her case plan, we affirm the decision of the

juvenile court.

                        I. Procedural and Factual History

       {¶2}    J.L. was born in January 2021. At the time of J.L.’s birth, A.L. and J.L.

both tested positive for methadone,1 methamphetamine, and fentanyl. A.L. claimed

that she had been engaged in substance-abuse treatment during her pregnancy, but

admitted that she continued to use illegal substances.

       {¶3}    HCJFS began a safety plan for J.L. and her then-ten-year-old brother

C.L. Under the safety plan, the children’s maternal grandmother would provide

supervision of the children while they remained in their home with their parents. A.L.

completed a diagnostic assessment of functioning, which recommended intensive

outpatient treatment for opioid use disorder; severe, amphetamine-type use disorder;

severe, major depressive disorder; and alcohol use disorder.

       {¶4}    A.L. did not submit to drug screenings as scheduled in February and

March 2021, nor did she begin treatment. When HCJFS, accompanied by police,

conducted an unannounced wellness check on March 10, maternal grandmother had

1 Methadone is a medication used to treat opioid use disorder. See Substance Abuse and Mental

Health    Services   Administration,      What  Is    Methadone?     (Feb.    5,    2024),
https://www.samhsa.gov/medications-substance-use-disorders/medications-counseling-related-
conditions/methadone (accessed Feb. 12, 2024).

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

left the home. A.L. did not allow HCJFS to conduct the wellness check, nor did she

allow maternal grandmother access to the home. In response, HCJFS requested and

was granted emergency custody of both children.

        {¶5}    Following an adjudication hearing in April 2021, J.L. was adjudicated

abused, and C.L. and J.L. were adjudicated dependent. At the subsequent

dispositional hearing, the children were placed in the temporary custody of HCJFS.

        {¶6}    In the following months, A.L.’s participation in substance-abuse

treatment was sporadic. A.L. participated in several different programs without

successfully completing any prior to the March 2023 permanent-custody hearing. A.L.

tested positive for methamphetamines in June 2021 and missed several screenings

ordered by HCJFS in the first half of 2021. In September 2021, a hair-follicle test

showed a positive result for fentanyl. A.L. subsequently refused to cooperate with

HCJFS drug screenings, with limited exceptions. A.L. provided a negative urine test in

April 2022, but refused to provide a hair-follicle sample. A.L. subsequently tested

positive for fentanyl in August 2022, and she was positive for alcohol, amphetamines,

and methamphetamines in September 2022. In November 2022, emergency services

were dispatched to A.L.’s home to respond to a report of an unconscious woman

suspected of having overdosed. First responders found A.L. unconscious and

administered Narcan, which caused A.L. to regain consciousness.2

        {¶7}    HCJFS received no documentation of A.L. engaging in any mental-

health services, as recommended by her case plan.

        {¶8}    A.L. was fairly consistent with her visitation with her children at the

2 Narcan is a brand name of the drug naloxone. See National Institute on Drug Abuse, Naloxone

DrugFacts (Jan. 2022), https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugfacts/naloxone (accessed Feb. 12,
2024). It is “a medicine that rapidly reverses an opioid overdose.” Id. Notably, “naloxone has no
effect on someone who does not have opioids in their system.” Id.

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Family Nurturing Center (“FNC”). Her caseworker reported no concerns with her

parenting skills based on the supervised visits. However, despite repeated requests

from the FNC facilitator that A.L. not engage C.L. in discussions about topics such as

the ongoing dependency case, A.L.’s financial situation, and speculation about the

inaccuracy of drug testing, A.L. insisted on engaging in such conversations with C.L.

       {¶9}   At the permanent-custody hearing in February 2023, HCJFS

caseworker Barry Drizin testified that he had no concerns about A.L.’s housing or

employment. However, A.L. had not provided any documentation about successful

completion of a substance-abuse treatment program, nor had A.L. engaged in any

mental-health treatment.

       {¶10} A.L. testified that she had attended multiple treatment programs, but

none for more than a few months. At the time of the hearing, she was in the Gateways

program, which is affiliated with Talbert House. A.L. testified that the Gateways

program is the one that she has most connected with and has learned the most from.

A clinical counselor from Talbert House testified that A.L. first came to her for an

assessment in December 2022. Since that time, A.L. had been compliant with the goals

of the program. A.L. also produced documentation of clean urine screenings for drugs

from multiple dates in January and February 2023.

       {¶11} Following the permanent-custody hearing, the magistrate entered a

decision granting HCJFS’s motion for permanent custody in March 2023. Through his

In re Williams attorney, C.L. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision. See In re

Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110. Specifically, C.L.

argued that the magistrate’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶12} Shortly after C.L. filed his objection, A.L.’s attorney filed a notice of

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

appeal. This court stayed the appeal and remanded the cause for the juvenile court to

rule on C.L.’s objection.

        {¶13} In August 2023, the juvenile court held an objection hearing. At the

hearing, A.L.’s attorney joined C.L.’s objection. The juvenile court overruled the

objection. This court then lifted the stay on the appeal.

                                     II. Analysis

        {¶14} In her sole assignment of error, A.L. argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion when it found that placing her children in the permanent custody

of HCJFS was in the best interest of the children because the court’s decision was not

supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

        {¶15} A.L. contends that the juvenile court “abused its discretion” in reaching

its permanent-custody decision. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently

clarified that an appellate court does not review the juvenile court’s decision on

permanent custody for an abuse of discretion. In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No.

2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 17. The statute that governs the juvenile court in granting

permanent custody of a child to a children services agency requires the court to

determine that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child “by clear and

convincing evidence.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the

juvenile court’s decision for the legal sufficiency of the evidence and/or the manifest

weight of the evidence, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. In re

Z.C. at ¶ 11.

        {¶16} A.L. did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision in the juvenile

court. Instead, A.L. filed a premature notice of appeal. However, C.L. did file an

objection, and A.L. joined C.L. in that objection at the hearing. A.L. addresses her

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

failure to strictly comply with Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) in her brief, but she argues that the

essential purpose of the rule has been satisfied because C.L. raised the objection, and

it was heard and ruled on by the juvenile court. See Cecil v. Cottrill, 67 Ohio St.3d 367,

372, 618 N.E.2d 133 (1993), quoting Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 297

N.E.2d 113 (1973) (“The spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon their

merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.”).

       {¶17} Under the present circumstances where A.L. filed a premature notice of

appeal from the magistrate’s decision, C.L. timely filed an objection to the magistrate’s

decision, and A.L. joined C.L.’s objection at the hearing, the purpose of Juv.R. 40(D)

in requiring an appellant to raise her arguments by objection to the juvenile court

before assigning error is satisfied. In order to “effect the just determination” of the

proceeding before us, Juv.R. 1(B)(1), we entertain A.L.’s appeal within the scope of

C.L.’s objection. Because C.L. objected only to the manifest weight of the evidence, and

not to the sufficiency of the evidence, under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv), we consider only

A.L.’s manifest-weight argument.

       {¶18} When we review the manifest weight of the evidence supporting the

juvenile court’s decision, we “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts

in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” In

re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio

St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20. We are to “always be mindful of the

presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id., quoting Eastley at ¶ 21.

       {¶19} R.C. 2151.414(B) provides that the juvenile court may grant permanent

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

custody of a child to a public children services agency if it finds by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and (2) that one of

the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. In re M., R., & H.

Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170008, 2017-Ohio-1431, ¶ 17. “To determine the

best interests of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors within R.C.

2151.414(D)(1).” In re Z., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190026, 2019-Ohio-1617, ¶ 18.

       {¶20} At the time HCJFS filed its motion for permanent custody, the children

had been in the custody of HCJFS for 14 consecutive months. This satisfies the 12-of-

22 standard under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

       {¶21} In evaluating the best interest of the child, the court must consider all

of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and “[t]here is not one element

that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re K.T.1, 1st

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170667, C-170687, C-170701, C-170702, and C-170707,

2018-Ohio-1381, ¶ 13, quoting In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513,

857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

       {¶22} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the juvenile court considered the

relationships between the children and their mother, and the children and the foster

family. The court found that A.L. had consistently visited the children and has

maintained a positive relationship with them. The HCJFS caseworker testified that the

children were bonded with A.L.

       {¶23} The court also found that the children had been living with the same

foster parents throughout their time in HCJFS custody and had made a positive

adjustment to living in the foster home. The foster parents desire to adopt C.L., and

the foster parents’ adult daughter wishes to adopt J.L.

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶24} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the juvenile court found that C.L. wished

to be reunited with A.L., as relayed by his In re Williams attorney. J.L. is too young to

express her custodial wishes. The children’s guardian ad litem supports granting

permanent custody to HCJFS.

       {¶25} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the juvenile court considered the

custodial history of the children. At the time of the permanent-custody trial, the

children had been in custody of HCJFS for more than two years. C.L. had lived with

A.L. for most of his life prior to the current period of HCJFS custody. J.L. has been in

HCJFS custody since birth.

       {¶26} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), the juvenile court considered the

children’s need for a legally secure placement. A legally secure placement refers to

more than just a roof over one’s head. Rather, a legally secure placement

“ ‘encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more

dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’ ” In re P. & H., 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-190309 and C-190310, 2019-Ohio-3637, ¶ 42, quoting In re K.W.,

2018-Ohio-1933, 111 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 87 (4th Dist.). The juvenile court found that no

other relatives could provide a permanent placement option for the children. A.L. has

not completed a substance-abuse treatment program, nor has she demonstrated long-

term stability and sobriety, as required by her case plan.

       {¶27} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the juvenile court considered the factors

under divisions (E)(7) to (11). The juvenile court found that the children’s father had

abandoned them, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). None of the other factors apply.

       {¶28} Considering all of the best-interest factors and the evidence supporting

them, it does not appear that the juvenile court “lost its way and created such a

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicts in the evidence that its judgment

must be reversed.” See In re J.W. and H.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190189,

2019-Ohio-2730, ¶ 13; In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14.

Accordingly, we overrule A.L.’s sole assignment of error.

                                  III. Conclusion

       {¶29} We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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