Court Opinion

ID: 9473488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:31:19.139171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:33.708179
License: Public Domain

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This case is controlled by INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 622 F.2d 1341 (1980), rev’d. 450 U.S. 139, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981).
It is not often that two cases are so substantially parallel. In both Wang and Saldana deportability was virtually conceded and was so ordered by the Immigration Judge, who was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. In both cases the aliens sought to invoke the statutory discretionary power of the Attorney General, exercised by the BIA, to suspend deportation under § 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).
In Wang the motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, was not substantiated by affidavits or other proofs of the facts alleged. Saldana’s attorney, who undoubtedly learned from Wang, submitted affidavits and statements supporting the allegations in the motion to reopen. In both cases we attempted to substitute our discretion for that of the agency and ordered the proceedings reopened to find hardship.
Despite the sizeable number of cases that have come before us involving 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, this court seems not to have adhered to a cohesive standard of review of Board actions in this area. While the Supreme Court has severely restricted our review of the Board’s discretionary actions, see INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 584, 589 n. 6, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984) (whether to grant a motion to reopen “is entirely within BIA’s discretion”), this court still finds cases in which we reverse under an abuse of discretion standard because we disagree with the Board’s discretion.
Several of our post-Wang cases have recognized the limited role of this court in reviewing Board decisions not to reopen deportation proceedings. See Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir.1985) *830(“The scope of our review is further circumscribed by the discretion conferred upon the Attorney General ... [which] extends beyond requiring proof of a prima facie case.” [emphasis original]); Samimi v. INS, 714 F.2d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1983) (“The BIA has sole discretion to determine under what circumstance a proceeding should be reopened.”); Sida v. INS, 665 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1981) (“BIA has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the alien establishes a prima facie case”).
Despite these genuflections in the direction of Wang, our eases from time to time seem to favor a broader review of cases arising under either the regulation (motion to reopen) or the statute (definition of extreme hardship), in some cases finding support in pre-Wang decisions. In Samimi, after noting that the granting a motion to reopen is within the sole discretion of the BIA, 714 F.2d at 994, we concluded that “refusing to reopen when the petitioner has presented a prima facie showing” is reversable as an abuse of discretion. 714 F.2d at 995. In Reyes v. INS, 673 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir.1982), we held that “[t]he responsibility of this court is to review the Board’s exercise of discretion [in construing extreme hardship] to guard against abuse. When the Board distorts or disregards important aspects of the alien’s claim, denial of the alien’s motion to reopen is arbitrary and the Board has abused its discretion,” [citing Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1981)]. In Batoon v. INS, 707 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir.1983), we held that this court reviews denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion: “[t]he BIA may not act in any way that is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law____ It must consider all relevant factors cumulatively in deciding whether extreme hardship has been established.” [citation omitted].
The majority fails to cite Chae Kim Ro v. INS, 670 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1982), which is closely on point. In that case, petitioners moved to reopen deportation proceedings based upon the birth of an American-citizen child, whose birth occurred after the Immigration Judge had denied their application for suspension of deportation. We held that, although the BIA has discretion “in determining in what circumstances a proceeding should be reopened,” 670 F.2d at 226, it abused its discretion in not reopening the proceeding to consider evidence of the newly born child. Id. As in the present proceedings, the BIA should have reopened if Chae Kim Ro is read as holding that the birth of a citizen child confers on the deportable alien an automatic right to reopening. But such a reading is inconsistent with Wang, and accordingly the case must be considered as falling among our aberrations in the field.
We have muddled the distinction between our review of a denial of a motion to reopen and review of a Board determination that extreme hardship had not been shown. If the former is reviewable at all under Wang, then is is subject to only very deferential review.
I realize that these cases are difficult, and in many of them the equities tend to favor the alien, but unless we reconcile ourselves to following the Wang decision, we merely invite more difficult cases and probably hold out false hopes. Under §§ 224(a)(1), Congress has delegated to the Attorney General and his delegates the decision whether to reopen a deportation proceeding. The Attorney General’s regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, commit that discretion to the BIA, not to this court.
If the majority opinion prevails here one would believe the Supreme Court must either reverse us again or overrule Wang. I would affirm.