Court Opinion

ID: 9384172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:40.10778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.086818
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20634      Document: 00516696784           Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                  FILED
                                                                          March 31, 2023
                                   No. 21-20634                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 Summary Calendar                               Clerk
                                 ____________

   United States of America,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

   Andrew Blake Delacruz,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:20-CR-334-1
                   ______________________________

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Andrew Blake Delacruz pleaded guilty to possessing, producing, and
   distributing child pornography and was sentenced to a total of 720 months of
   imprisonment followed by concurrent, lifetime terms of supervised release.
   For the first time on appeal, he challenges the imposition of a discretionary
   condition of supervised release which imposes a lifetime ban on his use of

          _____________________
          *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Judge
   Oldham concurs in the judgment only.
Case: 21-20634      Document: 00516696784            Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                      No. 21-20634

   computers and other electronic communications, data-storage, and media
   devices without prior approval from his probation officer.
          Our review is for plain error, as Delacruz did not object to the
   condition when the district court pronounced it at sentencing. See United
   States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). To demonstrate plain
   error, Delacruz must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that
   affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
   (2009). If he makes such a showing, we have the discretion to correct the
   error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
   judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation
   omitted).
          Delacruz argues that the challenged condition is unreasonably
   restrictive to the extent it requires him to request permission every time he
   needs to use a covered device. The Government argues that when the
   condition is read in conjunction with a related supervised release condition
   regarding ongoing computer monitoring, it is reasonably clear that the district
   court did not intend to require Delacruz to seek prior approval for every
   instance of Internet access.
          While we have found an absolute lifetime ban on computer and
   Internet access to be a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonable, United
   States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), we have
   previously approved restrictions that were, like Delacruz’s, conditioned on
   approval by the court or by a probation officer, see United States v. Ellis, 720
   F.3d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). However, even where access is
   conditioned on probation officer approval, such conditions are still
   “unreasonably restrictive” to the extent they require the defendant “to
   request permission every time he needs to use a computer, or every time he

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Case: 21-20634      Document: 00516696784          Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                    No. 21-20634

   needs to access the Internet.” United States v. Sealed Juvenile, 781 F.3d 747,
   756 (5th Cir. 2015).
          Against this backdrop, it is not obvious to us that the district court’s
   decision to impose this condition was error. Even if there were error, we
   cannot hold that the error was plain. Although it is not entirely clear whether
   the challenged condition, as written, would require separate, pre-use
   approvals by Delacruz’s probation officer each time Delacruz sought to use
   a covered device or access the Internet, “[t]his circuit has repeatedly stated
   conditions of supervised release . . . should be read in a commonsense way.”
   Ellis, 720 F.3d at 226 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   Applying this commonsense interpretation, we conclude the challenged
   condition does not require Delacruz to seek prior approval every time he uses
   a covered device or accesses the Internet. See United States v. Naidoo, 995
   F.3d 367, 384 (5th Cir. 2021); Sealed Juvenile, 781 F.3d at 756–57. So
   construed, the conditions are not unreasonable or over restrictive.
   Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit any plain error.
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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