Court Opinion

ID: 9545552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:30.492153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:07.079821
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(concurring in the result):
I join the Court in affirming Lamper’s convictions. I write separately because I believe there is a basis for holding that the child victim’s videotaped interview was admissible at trial. During oral argument, counsel for the State asserted that the videotape was admissible as non-hearsay under rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 801(d)(1) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him....
In the present case, the declarant/victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. During her cross-examination, the victim was asked:
Q. Did your Uncle Jimmy ever put his finger in your peepee?
A. No way.
Q. Did he ever put anything in your bumbum?
A. No way. Nobody else talked to me.
Q. ..., did you ever tell somebody that he did?
A. No way.
Q. Do you remember talking to Nancy [Fieldman]?
A. Yeah, Hmm. Yep. Yep. Yep.
Q. When you talked to Nancy who were you talking about when you said that they put their finger in your bum-bum?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know.
Q. Was it Uncle Jimmy?
A. No way. It was other Uncle Jimmy. My Uncle Jimmy doesn’t have any hair.
In contrast, during her videotaped interview at the Tooele police station, the victim stated:
Q. ... do you remember when you were talking to Tina and LaRue about your Uncle Jim?
A. [Nods yes.]
Q. Can you tell me what you told them?
A. [Unintelligible].
Q. Jim did what?
A. Jim stuck my — stuck his tail in my peepee.
Q. He stuck his tail in your peepee?
A. Uh huh — No, he stuck his finger in it — in my tail.
Q. He stuck his finger in your tail? What is your tail?
A. No, in my peepee.
Q. In your peepee. OK, he stuck his finger in your peepee. Is that what you said?
A. [Nods yes.]
[[Image here]]
Q. You stated that Jim had stuck his finger in your peepee — right? Did he do anything else to you down around your body?
A. He stuck his tail in my bum.
Q. He stuck his what in your bum?
A. Jim’s tail.
The videotape established that the victim made statements prior to trial which were inconsistent with her trial testimony. Because the declarant/victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination concerning her inconsistent statements, I be*1131lieve that the videotape was admissible as nonhearsay under rule 801(d)(1)(A). If the videotape was admissible as a nonhearsay statement, the reliability and trustworthiness findings required by section 76-5-411 and State v. Nelson were unnecessary.1
Section 76-5-411 “allows into evidence hearsay statements that would not be admissible in other criminal or civil proceedings.” State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 432 (Utah 1987). Before out-of-court statements may be admitted under section 76-5-411, however, trial judges must evaluate the trustworthiness of those statements and enter detailed findings in support of their conclusions. See State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 n. 3 (Utah 1986).
Section 76-5-411 was enacted in 1983 “as part of a package that made it easier to introduce children’s testimony in child sexual abuse cases and that imposed harsher sentences on offenders.” State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, -(Utah 1989). The legislature enacted section 76-5-411, as well as other child sexual abuse legislation, in order to assist prosecutors who handle child sexual abuse cases.
Nothing in the language or legislative history of section 76-5-411 indicates a legislative intent that that section’s “reliability and trustworthiness” requirements supersede basic evidentiary rules promulgated by this Court. There is even some question regarding the legislature’s power to impose evidentiary requirements in the first instance.2 In any event, it is ironic that this Court now uses a statute intended to facilitate child abuse prosecutions in a fashion which will render inadmissible evidence that would otherwise pass muster under the Rules of Evidence if the statute did not exist. In other words, the analysis undertaken by the majority subjects the prior inconsistent statements of child witnesses to higher admissibility standards than those of adults by resort to a statute intended to enhance the admissibility of such statements. I believe we will have to confront this problem directly in the future.

. Section 76-5-411 applies only to hearsay statements which do not qualify for admission under existing hearsay exceptions. See State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 430 (Utah 1987) (section 76-5-411 is an extraordinary rule of evidence which allows “otherwise-inadmissible evidence to be used in trying a person charged with sexual abuse of a child”).

. Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution provides: "The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state.... The legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the legislature."