Court Opinion

ID: 9964538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:07:34.703688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.546288
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
       This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                       DOCKET NO. A-3072-22

IN THE MATTER OF
N.C.S., a minor.1
______________________

                  Argued March 19, 2024 – Decided April 30, 2024

                  Before Judges Paganelli and Whipple.

                  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                  Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County,
                  Docket Nos. FD-19-0040-21 and FD-19-0141-21.

                  Matheu D. Nunn argued the cause for appellant S.B.
                  (Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, PC, and
                  Donahue, Hagan, Klein & Weisberg, LLC, attorneys;
                  Matheu D. Nunn, Jessie M. Mills, and Alyssa
                  Engleberg, on the briefs).

                  Ryan Patrick Campi argued the cause for respondent
                  N.C.S., Jr. (Graziano & Campi, LLC, attorneys; Ryan
                  Patrick Campi and Kathleen McCormick Campi, of
                  counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
  Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d), we use initials to protect the confidentiality of the
participants and the minor involved in these proceedings.
      S.B. (Sue) appeals from a trial court order dated May 1, 2023, denying her

motion to change her child's name to include a hyphen and her surname after

N.C.S., Jr.'s (Nick) last name. We affirm.

      We glean the pertinent facts and procedural history from the motion

record.    Sue and Nick met in 2009 and began dating in 2010. The parties

"cohabitated" for several years, separated, and reunited in 2017. The parties

discussed marriage, having a family, and "decided to undergo fertility

treatments." Sue learned she was pregnant in January 2019.

      The parties discussed names for the child, Nick wanted to name the child

after his grandfather if the child was male. Also, the parties continued to discuss

marriage. The child, a son, was born in September 2019. While still in the

hospital, Sue and Nick agreed to the child's current name. Sue provided the

information regarding the child's last name for the birth certificate.

      The child, Sue, and Nick resided together. Sue and Nick continued to

contemplate marriage. However, in December 2019, Nick decided he no longer

wanted to marry Sue. Nick did not inform Sue of this decision. In March 2020,

Sue asked Nick to move out of their residence—he complied, and the child

remained with Sue.

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       In May 2021, Sue filed a verified complaint to change the child's last

name. The complaint sought to switch the child's first and middle names and,

as to the child's last name, include a hyphen with Sue's surname.2

       The court conducted a plenary hearing over three days. Sue testified, as

well as her mother and her brother. Nick testified on his own behalf, as well as

father, the child's grandfather. The judge found the witnesses to be credible, but

found the child's grandfather's testimony "to be the most relevant and

persuasive." The grandfather claimed to be the paternal side's oldest family

member and the family historian, and testified regarding several generations

using the same first and surname. The grandfather explained he felt a connection

with the prior generations, and he wanted "his grandson to feel that same

connection."

       The judge noted Sue "conceded" that she and Nick agreed on the child's

name. The judge made findings of fact and analyzed the facts, in detail, under

the applicable "best-interest-of-the-child" factors.3

       Ultimately, the judge concluded:

2
   Sue does not appeal the part of the order that addressed switching the child's
first and middle names.
3
    See Emma v. Evans, 215 N.J. 197, 222-23 (2013).
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            The decision to change a child's name is a major
            decision. The court places a significant amount of
            weight on the fact that both parties participated and
            ultimately selected the child's name at the time of the
            child's birth . . . . The court has not been provided with
            a good and sufficient reason for changing the child's
            name. There were other names that were considered
            and rejected by both [Sue] and [Nick]. Both parties
            contemplated including [Sue's] and rejected it in favor
            of only [Nick's].

            In conclusion, based upon the evidence and testimony
            provided by the parties and the witnesses, when
            considering the name change factors, this court finds
            that it is in the child's best interest to maintain the name
            ....

      Sue contends the judge erred in finding an "unequivocal," not

"conditional" agreement to name the child. In addition, since the condition—

marriage and Sue taking Nick's surname—was not satisfied, "the court should

have imposed a presumption in favor [of] the surname chosen by [Sue] the

custodial parent." Moreover, compounding these errors, Sue argues the judge's

analysis was flawed because it "was impermissibly slanted toward [Nick's]

paternal heritage."

      Our review of a trial judge's fact-finding function is limited. Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). A judge's fact-finding is "binding on appeal

when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 411-12

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

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"Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court fact[-]finding."

Id. at 413. "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely

testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Id. at 412 (quoting In re

Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). This is so because the

judge has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses as they testify, thereby

developing a "'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold

record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009)

(quoting N.J. Div of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

      We will not interfere with "'the factual findings and legal conclusions of

the trial [court] unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by

or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence

as to offend the interests of justice' or when we determine the court has palpably

abused its discretion." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). We will reverse the Family Part's decision

"[o]nly when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of

the mark' . . . to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." E.P., 196 N.J. at

104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605

(2007)).

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      A judge's purely legal decisions, however, are subject to our plenary

review. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378

(1995)).

      For our purposes, name change disputes between parents fall into two

categories: when the parents have not agreed to a child's name at birth and when

they have so agreed. In the first category, "the surname selected by the custodial

parent—the parent primarily charged with making custodial decisions in the

child's best interest—shall be presumed to be consistent with that child's best

interests, a presumption rebuttable by evidence that a different surname would

better serve those interests." Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120, 123 (1995).

The presumption is "strong . . . in favor of the surname chosen by the custodial

parent." Id. at 144. "The non-custodial parent bears the burden of demonstrating

by a preponderance of the evidence that despite the presumption favoring the

custodial parent's choice of name, the chosen surname is not in the best interests

of the child." Id. at 145. "[I]n resolving disputes over surnames we apply the

best-interests-of-the-child standard free of gender-based notions of parental

rights." Id. at 141.

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      In the second category, "in renaming disputes between parents who agreed

on a surname at birth but find themselves later in a dispute over whether to alter

the surname, the proper standard to apply is the best interests of the child."

Emma, 215 N.J. at 221. "[T]he parent seeking the name change in a subsequent

dispute must bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence

that the name change is in the child's best interest." Id. at 222.

      "Applying the best-interests-of-the-child test in the context of a dispute

over whether to change a child's name requires a fact-sensitive analysis." Ibid.

Although non-exhaustive, the New Jersey Supreme Court provided eleven

factors to be "considered as part of the gender-neutral and child-centered

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the child's interest in retaining or

having altered his or her given surname." Id. at 223.

      Governed by these principles, we discern no reason to question the judge's

findings. The judge found the parties reached agreement on the child's name.

This finding is supported by Sue's testimony that she "conceded" to the child's

name, and her providing the child's name for the birth certificate. Moreover,

our review of the record reveals Sue's trial argument was founded on the Emma

factors, not Gubernat, which reflects Sue's recognition that the parties agreed to

the child's name. Sue's contention the judge "arrived at [a] naked conclusion"

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or "blindly concluded the parties unequivocally agreed to the name" is belied by

the record.

        Further, after finding the parties reached agreement on the child's name,

the judge applied the analysis required by Emma. The judge explained "the

parent seeking the name change in a subsequent dispute must bear the burden of

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the name change is in the

child's best interest." See Emma, 215 N.J. at 222.

        In analyzing the factors, the judge concluded certain factors did not weigh

in favor for or against changing the child's name. She found: (i) the child

identified with both sides of the family; (ii) since the child was only three years

of age, his preference would not be considered; (iii) there was no parental

misconduct or neglect; (iv) both families' names had a degree of community

respect; (v) Sue was not improperly motivated in bringing the action; (vi) Sue

had no intention of changing her surname; and (vii) there were no sibling

considerations. 4

        In addition, the judge found since "the child ha[d] not utilized the name

for a significant period of time and would not remember a time when his name

4
    Emma factors two, four, six, seven, eight and nine. 215 N.J. at 222-23.

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was different if the court were to permit the name change," that factor would

weigh in favor of granting the name change.5

        Moreover, the judge found: (i) "the child would not have any potential

anxiety, embarrassment or discomfort in having a different surname from" Sue.

Indeed, the judge noted the parties agreed to the child having a different surname

from Sue at his birth; (ii) while both parties "testified that their respective

surnames ha[d] important ties to family heritage and ethnic identity"—there

were five generations with the same first and surname as the child; and (iii) "the

name change would negatively [a]ffect the relationship between [Nick] and the

child" because "[c]hanging the child's name would sever th[e] connection"

between the child and the five generations. By contrast, keeping the agreed upon

name "would not [a]ffect the relationship the child ha[d] with" Sue or Nick.6

        Therefore, the judge imposed the proper burden of proof for a name

change and conducted the required "fact-sensitive analysis" by rendering

detailed factual findings and carefully applying those facts to each of the Emma

factors.

5
    Emma factor one. Ibid.
6
    Emma factors three, ten, and eleven.
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      Sue contends the judge's Emma review "was impermissibly slanted toward

[Nick's] paternal heritage." She asserts the judge erred by "fail[ing] to elaborate

upon [Sue]'s testimony and the proofs that were admitted into evidence." Sue

argues the judge's "focus in favor of the father's lineage was impermissible and

directly contrary to the directive set forth in Gubernat."

      However, there is nothing in the judge's analysis that reveals favoritism

to the father's lineage. Indeed, Sue acknowledges the judge considered both

surnames and "the important ties to family heritage and ethnic identity."

Unquestionably, we are to "resolv[e] disputes over surnames . . . [by] apply[ing]

the best-interests-of-the-child standard free of gender-based notions of parental

rights." Gubernat, 140 N.J. at 141. This analysis guarantees a neutral approach,

it does not foretell a result. Here, the judge undertook the appropriate neutral

analysis and we have no reason to question her conclusion.

      To the extent we have not addressed any of Sue's remaining arguments,

we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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