Court Opinion

ID: 9557980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:01:20.238706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:03.324856
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSA PEDRO-VICENTE; MARI LUZ                    No.    19-72957
VIVIANA MIGUEL-PEDRO,
                                                Agency Nos.       A206-455-157
                Petitioners,                                      A206-455-158

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted August 17, 2023**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Rosa Pedro-Vicente and her minor daughter Mari Luz Viviana Miguel-Pedro

(“Petitioners”) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

decision dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioners also appeal the BIA’s

affirmance of the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to suppress evidence and

terminate immigration proceedings for alleged violation of Petitioners’ Fourth

Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the

petition.

      We review questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence. See Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1198–99 (9th Cir.

2012).

      1. Petitioners’ argument that their Notices to Appear are defective for

failure to list the date and time of their hearing is unexhausted. We therefore

decline to address it on the merits. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544,

550 (9th Cir. 2023).

      2. The BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to

suppress their Form I-213s and terminate proceedings. Petitioners argue that their

Form I-213s, which indicate that they entered into the United States without

inspection or admission, contain statements made during an initial encounter with

border patrol agents within a mile of the border with Mexico. Petitioners assert

that the agents failed to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion under the

Fourth Amendment to question Pedro-Vicente and her daughter, and that,

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therefore, the Form I-213s should be excluded from evidence under the

exclusionary rule.

      The exclusionary rule applies to immigration proceedings only “(1) when

the agency violates a regulation promulgated for the benefit of petitioners and that

violation prejudices the petitioner’s protected interests; and (2) when the agency

egregiously violates a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Sanchez v. Sessions,

904 F.3d 643, 649 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). It is well-

established that immigration authorities may seize a noncitizen based solely on

reasonable suspicion, which cannot include “race and ethnicity alone.” Id. at 650–

53, 656. Where there is no seizure, however, immigration officers do “not need

reasonable suspicion to ask [a noncitizen] for [their] name, date and place of birth,

or immigration status.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005). Questioning

by an officer rises to the level of a seizure only when, “taking into account all of

the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have

communicated to a reasonable person that [they were] not at liberty to ignore the

police presence and go about [their] business.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,

437 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While Pedro-Vicente

argues that she did not feel free to leave when approached because the agents were

armed and clearly identified, she does not allege any additional facts to establish an

objectively reasonable belief that her liberty was restricted. Without more, this

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encounter does not involve a sufficient display of authority or coercion to render it

a seizure. United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding

that no seizure occurred where officers were armed but did not attempt to draw

attention to their weapons or use physical force during a daytime encounter in

public). Accordingly, we need not address whether the border patrol agents had

reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to seize Pedro-Vicente and her

daughter. Petitioners have not made a prima facie showing that their Fourth

Amendment rights were egregiously violated.

      3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal

of the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. Even assuming that

Petitioners did not waive the issue of nexus, there is no evidence that the gang

members targeted Pedro-Vicente and her daughter on the basis of any protected

ground. Although Pedro-Vicente testified that a vendor told her that gang

members were looking for her and wanted to kill her “because of my situation,”

Petitioners have not offered any additional facts to show a nexus to a protected

ground. And as both the BIA and IJ noted, Petitioners claim only that they fear

general future criminal violence. The record does not compel the conclusion that

Pedro-Vicente and her daughter face persecution on the basis of a protected ground

as required for asylum or withholding of removal. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by

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criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus

to a protected ground.”).

      4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal

of the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ CAT claim. Although Petitioners allege that the

Guatemalan police have been corrupted by cartels, the record does not compel the

conclusion that Pedro-Vicente and her daughter will more likely than not be

tortured with the government’s acquiescence if returned to Guatemala. See

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Petitioners’

generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not particular to

Petitioners and is insufficient to meet this standard.”).

      PETITION DENIED.

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