Court Opinion

ID: 9596082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:45:56.596814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:32.296013
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice, dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reinstates the verdict herein. I would hold that the trial court erroneously permitted the introduction of evidence of Endicott’s character trait of peacefulness in rebuttal to Higgs’ evidence of specific prior threats and violence by Endicott. As stated in Lawson, the introduction of evidence offered to show a fear of the victim by the accused “does not ... open the door for the prosecution to introduce evidence of the character of the alleged victim for peacefulness.” Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.15, at 70-71 (3d ed.1993). The defense in this case was that Higgs acted in self-defense, not because Endicott was the initial aggressor, but because Higgs was afraid of Endicott, who had previously threatened him. Thus, it was impermissible for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Endicott’s peacefulness to rebut evidence that he was the first aggressor, the ground upon which the trial court allowed introduction of the evidence on rebuttal.
“[R]ebuttal evidence is competent only when it is evidence in denial of some affirmative case or fact which the adverse party has attempted to prove, or repels or explains it.” Keene v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 307 Ky. 308, 210 S.W.2d 926, 928 (1948) (overruled on other grounds). Evidence of Endicott’s peacefulness did not meet that standard because the defense did not launch an attack on Endicott’s character, but limited itself to establishing Higgs’ fear of the victim and his belief that the victim would kill him or inflict serious physical injury. Higgs is entitled to a new trial.