Court Opinion

ID: 9847657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:04:14.464812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:25.537557
License: Public Domain

Phipps, Judge,
concurring specially.
The Minnixes brought this action for damages against various defendants including the Department of Transportation (DOT). Plaintiffs charge the DOT with negligent design of a highway through acts and omissions of professionals employed by the DOT. *526But plaintiffs did not file an expert affidavit with the complaint because the professionals are not named as defendants.
Prior to its 1997 amendment, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) required an expert affidavit to be filed with the complaint “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice.” Under that version of the statute, it was clear that the affidavit requirement applied in actions for damages against entities such as governmental agencies based upon the professional negligence of their agents or employees regardless of whether the agents or employees were party defendants. See Drawdy v. Dept. of Transp., 228 Ga. App. 338, 339 (491 SE2d 521) (1997) and cits. The question in this case is whether the affidavit requirement continues to apply in such settings.
Immediately following the initial phrase “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice,” the 1997 amendment to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) adds the following language:
against a professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (f) of this Code section or .against any licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (f) of this Code section.
Did the 1997 legislature intend the statute to apply in an action for damages against an employer of a subsection (f) professional based on allegations of malpractice by the professional?
Although the statutory language is somewhat ambiguous on this point, the above question is resolved by examining the unquestioned purposes of the amendment. Clearly, the amendment was intended to change prior law by listing the professional occupations to which the affidavit requirement applies in the new subsection (f), Mug A Bug Pest Control v. Vester, 270 Ga. 407, 408 (1) (509 SE2d 925) (1999), something the unamended statute failed to do. See Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 (414 SE2d 197) (1992). And the legislative history of the statute shows that reference to licensed health care facilities was included in subsection (a), not to change existing law, but rather to ensure that the statute continues to apply where damages are sought against a licensed health care facility based on allegations of malpractice by a professional employed by the facility. 14 Ga. St. Univ. L. Rev. 4, 6 (1997). Therefore, it does not appear that the legislature intended to restrict application of the statute to actions in which damages are sought against a licensed health care facility or subsection (f) professional. This conclusion is bolstered by the caption to the 1997 Act, which indicates that it continues to apply “in any action for damages alleging professional malpractice.” Ga. L. *5271997, p. 916.
Decided October 12, 1999
Reconsideration denied October 27, 1999
Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield, Knowles & Devine, Foy R. Devine, David S. Hagy, Mundy & Gammage, William D. Sparks, for appellants.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, Lawson, Davis, Pickren & Seydel, Paul R. Jordan, Alison H. Price, G. Thomas Davis, for appellees.
For these reasons, I agree that the superior court did not err in dismissing those claims that involve allegations of professional negligence by subsection (i) professionals employed by the DOT.