Court Opinion

ID: 9712007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:44:16.310592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:09.036491
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting*: I believe that the referendum presented here, overwhelmingly approved by Peoria County voters, is valid and enforceable, and I therefore respectfully dissent. The majority acknowledges that the Peoria County voters have the power to change their county board from multimember to single-member districts. The opinion concludes, however, that the voters lack the referendum power to reduce the total number of board members, with the result of changing from a total of 27 members elected from nine three-member districts to nine members elected from nine single-member districts. In reaching its conclusion, the majority incorrectly holds that section 3(a) of article VII of the Illinois Constitution prohibits change in the number of county board members by referendum. Section 3(a) provides: “(a) A county board shall be elected in each county. The number of members of the county board shall be fixed by ordinance in each county within limitations provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §3(a).) The initial question is whether a referendum may be considered a “law.” Although until now no Illinois reviewing court has addressed this issue, numerous other courts have determined that a properly approved referendum is a law. (See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt (1916), 241 U.S. 565, 568, 60 L. Ed. 1172, 1176, 36 S. Ct. 708, 709; Bachman v. United States (D.C. 1986), 516 A.2d 923, 926; Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics (D.C. 1981), 441 A.2d 889, 896; Opinion of the Justices (1941), 309 Mass. 631, 637, 35 N.E.2d 676, 680; Iman v. Southern Pacific Co. (1968), 7 Ariz. App. 16, 20, 435 P.2d 851, 855 (“When the people act in their legislative capacity through an initiative measure, their enactments are as much ‘law’ as those enacted by the legislature”).) Consistent with these decisions, the definition of an “initiative,” which under our constitution is interchangeable with “referendum,” is “the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls, independent of legislative assembly.” Black’s Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1979). In support of its narrow interpretation of “law” as meaning only enactments of the General Assembly, the majority points to the following language in section 6(f) of article VII: “only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(f).) This language, however, supports the plaintiffs’ argument that a referendum may be a law because use of the word “otherwise” indicates that a referendum is one of the ways of authorizing some action by law. The majority also relies on the fact that the phrase “the General Assembly shall provide by law” is used in article VII. This language, however, as I read it, simply indicates that legislative enactments are also included in the word “law” and that the provisions that include this language may only be acted on by the General Assembly. It is clear that the word “law” in section 3(a) includes referenda, and therefore section 3(a) is not a bar to the Peoria County referendum. The referendum power envisioned by section 3(a) is found in section 3(b), where the voters retain the specific power to change the number of county board members by referendum. Section 3(b) provides: “(b) The General Assembly by law shall provide methods available to all counties for the election of county board members. No county, other than Cook County, may change its method of electing board members except as approved by county-wide referendum.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §3(b).) The majority acknowledges that under this provision the voters may, by referendum, change from multimember districts to single-member districts, as was done in Peoria County. The majority holds, however, that in changing from nine three-member districts to nine single-member districts, the voters may not change the total number of county board members from 27 to 9. The majority’s stated reason for this anomalous result is that “[t]he number of members elected is independent of the method of election and a change in method does not always necessarily result in a change in number.” (121 Ill. 2d at 246.) This statement, however, is not dispositive of the issue, because although it is true that a change in method does not always result in a change in number, in this case it did result in a change in number. It is obvious that a change in number of board members would often go hand in hand with a change from multimember to single-member districts. See, e.g., Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 236 (upholding referendum proposing change in Illinois House of Representatives to single-member districts and reduction in the number of representatives). An examination of the official explanation of section 3 that was disseminated to the voters before they voted on whether to adopt the 1970 Constitution makes it clear that section 3(b), when read together with section 3(a), permits the voters to change by referendum the number of board members when they change from multimember to single-member districts. Although the majority relies on several statements made by the drafters of the 1970 Constitution in their debates, this court has previously stressed that it is citizens’ intent in adopting a constitution that is the most probative evidence of how the document should be construed, not statements by individual delegates: “It is possible to lift from the constitutional debates or almost any provision statements by a delegate or a few delegates which will support a particular proposition; however, such a discussion by a few does not establish the intent or understanding of the convention. * * * Although the constitutional debates may often be helpful in understanding the meaning of doubtful constitutional provisions, the true inquiry concerns the understanding of its provisions by the voters who, by their vote, have given life to the product of the convention.” (Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 208, 221-22.) (See also Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492-93; People ex rel. Consentino v. County of Adams (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 565, 569; Wolfson v. Avery (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 78, 88.) The official explanation of section 3 as a whole, as disseminated to the voters, stated: “This replaces Article X, Sections 5, 6, and 7, of the 1870 Constitution. It simplifies the requirements of those sections and allows the form of county government to be changed by a vote of the people involved. Subsection (c) provides a more flexible procedure for election of the members of the Cook County Board.” (Emphasis added.) (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2725.) The official explanation stressed one point: the voters’ power to change the form of county government through referendum. A change in the form of county government is a broad and all-inclusive concept. It may include a change in the number of county board members as well as a change from multimember to single-member districts. If section 3 were intended to limit changes in the “form of county government” to changes from multimember to single-member districts or vice versa, while at the same time prohibiting any accompanying change in the number of board members, certainly this important restriction would have been spelled out in the official explanation. I do not think that the restrictions the majority opinion imposes on sections 3(a) and 3(b) are compatible with this broad and general explanation. I believe that under section 3 the Peoria County voters had the power to change from multimember districts to single-member districts, which the majority concedes, and at the same time reduce the number of board members from 27 to 9. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.  As Justice Simon was no longer on the Court when its opinion in this matter was modified on denial of rehearing, his dissent remains unchanged from the original filing.