Court Opinion

ID: 9472202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:52:34.549704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:47.919190
License: Public Domain

*1566STARR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With respect, I am unable to join the majority’s opinion reversing this order.1 While this is, in my view, a close case, the Commission’s position regarding repayments of unqualified expenditures by campaign committees is neither contrary to law nor “patently unreasonable.” Majority Opinion at 8 (emphasis in original). This court owes deference to the Commission’s construction of the statute; it should not, even if its interpretation reflects the better view, “interpret the statute as it thinks best.” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 S.Ct. 38, 46, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981) [hereafter DSCC],
DSCC provides us with the principal learning as to the methodology we are to employ in walking through the labyrinthine precincts of this complex statute, the wording of which partakes of the same qualities found in the Internal Revenue Code. In DSCC, the Supreme Court upheld an FEC regulation promulgated under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1982) (“FECA”). That regulation permitted state committees of political parties to designate the national senatorial campaign committee of that party as its agent for making certain expenditures. Id. at 42-43, 102 S.Ct. at 47-48. In upholding the regulation, the Court first recognized the well established principle that “[t]he interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, ... but [that] the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction.” Id. at 31-32, 102 S.Ct. at 42 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965)). According to the DSCC Court, courts “must reject administrative constructions of statutes ... that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.” DSCC, 454 U.S. at 32, 102 S.Ct. at 42. Thus, before determining whether an agency’s construction of a statute is entitled to deference, a reviewing court must first decide whether the construction is inconsistent with the statute. In DSCC after concluding that the FEC’s construction did not exceed its statutory authority under FECA, the Court analyzed whether the Commission’s construction was entitled to deference. This inquiry, although obviously intertwined with the question whether the construction comports with the mandate of the statute, is nonetheless distinct. It requires an examination of the “thoroughness, validity, and consistency” of the agency’s decision. Id. at 37, 102 S.Ct. at 45.
The first, and most critical, inquiry under DSCC, therefore, is whether the FEC’s regulation is inconsistent with the language or the policies of the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act (“the Act”). 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-41 (1982). The majority concludes that the “straightforward meaning” of section 9038 expressly limits the repayment obligation for unqualified expenditures to the amount of federal matching funds used for such unqualified expenditures. Maj.Op. at 1561. The FEC’s regulations under this provision, in contrast, require repayment of “any payment made to a candidate from the matching payment account or any contributions received by the candidate” that are used for unqualified expenditures. 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(a)(2) (1982). Thus, the majority reasons, not without force, that the regulations’ requirement that the entire amount of unqualified expenditures be repaid goes beyond and thus conflicts with the statuto*1567ry mandate. That perceived conflict is created by the regulations’ allowing the FEC to “shirk its statutory responsibility to make a reasonable determination that the repayment sum represents the matching funds used for unqualified purposes.” Maj.Op. at 1562. In a word, the majority reads the plain language of the statute to forbid the Commission’s dragnet approach.2
The FEC’s regulation, in my view, contravenes neither the Commission’s statutory authority nor the policy sought to be implemented by Congress through that statute. First, section 9038, by its terms, does not forbid the Commission from requiring repayment of all non-qualified expenditures. Rather, the precise requirement of section 9038 is to mandate repayment of the amount of federal matching funds used for unqualified expenditures. The Commission’s regulation, by requiring repayment of the entire amount of unqualified expenditures, ensures that this mandate is achieved. We will return to this point in a moment in examining the difficulty of full compliance with the statute unless the Commission’s interpretation here is followed.
Second, a venerable rule of statutory construction assists the Commission in its interpretation. While such rules are simply aids to understanding, and are emphatically not to be viewed as rigid and unyielding principles, the common sense and experience embodied in such precepts can helpfully illuminate the otherwise dark path toward determining legislative intent. One such rule is that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, ... Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusions and exclusions.” Maj.Op. at 1563. This principle suggests that Congress knew what it was doing when it elected not to incorporate in the provision before us the allocation formula found elsewhere in the statutory scheme and enthusiastically embraced for adoption by the Kennedy Committee. This further suggests that the FEC’s refusal to apply the proportional formula advocated by the Committee is consistent with the Act. Another provision in the statute, section 9038(b)(3), which governs repayment of surplus matching funds after the primaries have concluded, requires that the amount of surplus funds attributable to matching funds be calculated pursuant to the proportion of federal funds to private funds received by a candidate. If Congress had intended the application of the repayment formula sought by the Committee and apparently approved by the majority,' Maj.Op. at 1563-64, it presumably would have so specified in that statutory provision.
The majority, however, suggests that Congress’ failure to use here the same formula that governs recapture of surplus funds merely evidences its intent to give the FEC discretion to devise an appropriate method of computing the amount of federal funds used for unqualified expenditures. But it is difficult to see what other approach might be taken by the FEC than to transplant the allocation formula from the surplus funds provision. Both the Commission and the Committee acknowledge that the commingling of private and federal funds precludes tracing to determine which federal funds were used for unqualified expenditures.3 Thus, the majority’s suggestions to the contrary not*1568withstanding, the only practicable alternative to the Commission’s approach appears to be the Committee’s proportional approach. Yet, as we have seen, Congress did not specify this proportional formula which it mandated for another use. The Commission’s construction of the statute thus avoids rendering the exclusion of the proportional formula in section 9038(b)(2) a nullity.
Third, and related to the point just discussed, the FEC promulgated this regulation pursuant to the procedures of informal rulemaking. When the Commission submitted the regulation to Congress pursuant to section 9039, neither House expressed disapproval. Although the Supreme Court has, subsequent to the promulgation of this regulation, invalidated a comparable legislative veto provision, INS v. Chadha, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), Chadha does not diminish the meaning of such indications of congressional intent with respect to these regulations. In fact, the Court in upholding an FEC regulation in DSCC relied explicitly on the absence of congressional disapproval in the review process. 454 U.S. at 34, 102 S.Ct. at 43. Thus, the clear “indication that Congress does not look unfavorably,” id., upon the regulation at issue here further strengthens the Commission’s interpretation.
Finally, the FEC’s repayment requirement furthers the purposes of the Act by discouraging candidates from exceeding statutory limits on campaign expenditures in each State. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(l)(A) (specifying campaign expenditure limits for presidential primaries). As this court observed in Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee v. FEC, 711 F.2d 279, 280 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1983), most such unqualified expenditures result from exceeding these spending limits. By imposing these repayment requirements, the regulation in effect deems all unqualified expenditures to be from federal matching funds rather than from private sources.4 The regulation is thus aimed at remedying the situation where a candidate, prior to establishing eligibility for federal matching funds under section 9033, spends private funds on unqualified expenditures. Subsequent to qualifying for funds, the federal matching funds become available and the candidate thus has the use of federal funds that he or she will later be required to repay by virtue of their expenditure for unqualified purposes. See id. The regulation discourages such practices — including the practice of front-loading unqualified expenditures in the early caucus or primary States, such as Iowa and New Hampshire — by ensuring that the candidate will repay the full amount of unqualified expenditures.5
As we have noted, the amount of deference given to an agency’s construction of a statute depends upon the thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency’s reasoning. DSCC, 454 U.S. at 37, 102 S.Ct. at 45. In deciding whether the construction should be upheld, our inquiry is the narrow one of whether the Commission’s construction “was ‘sufficiently reasonable’ to be accepted by a reviewing court.” It is not the court’s best reading of the statute that governs. Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in DSCC, “[t]o satisfy this standard, it is not necessary for a court to find that the agency’s construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 39, 102 S.Ct. at 46.
*1569The majority passes over these admonitions and instead construes the statute as it thinks best. To be sure, the majority’s interpretation is entirely sensible and has the not inconsiderable benefit of preventing an FEC “windfall” in recovering funds beyond those federal monies disbursed for unauthorized expenditures. Nonetheless, as the DSCC Court emphasized, the FEC is “precisely the type of agency to which deference should be presumptively afforded.” Id. at 37,102 S.Ct. at 45. The regulation at issue here was promulgated in 1979 and represents the agency’s consistent interpretation of this provision.6 See Carter/Mondale, 711 F.2d at 280. Thus, this regulation, like that reviewed by the Supreme Court in DSCC, merits this court’s deference.
In sum, the regulation challenged here is neither contrary to the Commission’s statutory authority, nor inconsistent with its purposes. In such circumstances, under DSCC, the Commission’s construction is entitled to deference.

. I do, however, agree with the majority’s conclusion that this court is not precluded from addressing the merits of the repayment formula issue. Maj.Op. at n. 2. As the majority observes, the Commission in fact considered the issue as to the Committee after it raised the issue months before the final determinations were made. Further, the regulations in effect at the time did not provide an express limitation on the timing of such objections. Under such circumstances, this court properly may address the merits of the Committee’s claims.

. A unanimous Supreme Court has recently reminded us that the force of a literal reading of a statute does not sweep away all other factors and considerations that properly obtain in the construction of statutes. Heckler v. Edwards, — U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 1532, 1537-38, 79 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984).

. See FEC Brief at 23; Reagan for President Committee v. FEC, 734 F.2d 1569, Joint Appendix 177-180 (letter from Arthur Young & Co. to Mr. Ronald E. Robertson) (recognizing that commingling of private and federal funds renders it impossible to determine whether federal or private funds were used for unqualified expenditures and suggesting that, if the FEC’s approach were not followed, proportional formula would be the only practicable alternative).

. See 44 Fed.Reg. 20,336 (1979) (explaining that purpose of requirement is to prohibit "candidate who accepts public funding from using private contributions received after becoming a candidate including those received prior to establishing eligibility, for expenses which are not qualified campaign expenses”).

. The majority notes that the Commission’s regulation could result in requiring repayment of more than the total amount of matching federal funds. Maj.Op. at n. 4. With all due respect, this concern is not presented by this case. Moreover, the situation in which unqualified expenditures would exceed total federal matching fund payments would seem highly unlikely to arise at all.

. The regulation, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Maj.Op. at 1565, does not supplant the Act’s criminal penalties, since those penalties are available only if the candidate willfully violates the spending ceilings. The regulation here would discourage nonwillful violations as well by stimulating more effective oversight of campaign committee expenditures in the first instance.