Court Opinion

ID: 9410503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 16:10:24.39962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.115223
License: Public Domain

J-A29024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 M.W.M.                                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant            :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
 JOSEPH A. BUZOGANY, M.D.,              :
 ARMSTRONG-INDIANA BEHAVIORAL           :
 AND DEVELOPMENTAL HEALTH               :
 PROGRAM, INDIANA REGIONAL              :
 MEDICAL CENTER, BARBARA A.             :
 MCKEE AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF          :
 THE ESTATE OF DONALD L. MCKEE,         :
 ESQUIRE, THE COUNTY OF INDIANA,        :
 PA, AMY CLINE, LOUISE KELLER           :
 BIVENS, MSW, AND SALLY PRUGH           :   No. 379 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Civil Division at No(s):
                             12227 CD 2018

 M.W.M.                                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant            :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
 JOSEPH A. BUZOGANY, M.D.,              :
 ARMSTRONG-INDIANA BEHAVIORAL           :
 AND DEVELOPMENTAL HEALTH               :
 PROGRAM, INDIANA REGIONAL              :
 MEDICAL CENTER, BARBARA A.             :
 MCKEE AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF          :
 THE ESTATE OF DONALD L. MCKEE,         :
 ESQUIRE, THE COUNTY OF INDIANA,        :
 PA, AMY CLINE, LOUISE KELLER           :
 BIVENS, MSW, AND SALLY PRUGH           :   No. 380 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Civil Division at No(s):
                             12227 CD 2018
J-A29024-22

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                 FILED: July 21, 2023

      I respectfully dissent from the Majority both on the appellate-jurisdiction

issue and on the merits.

      First, this appeal falls under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court

of Pennsylvania. My learned colleagues in the Majority acknowledge that any

appeal from a final order in this case properly lies in the Commonwealth Court,

because (1) Indiana County is a party and (2) “appeals from final orders of

the court of common pleas involving statutes regulating the affairs or general

operations of counties or potential immunity defenses available to counties

fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.” Majority at

12, n.11 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(4)(i)(A) and (7);

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8541-8564; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8501; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102; and

Wheatcroft v. Auritt, 312 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. 1973)). I agree.

      However, the Majority decides not to transfer this appeal to that court,

in part, because M.W.M. did not appeal from a final order. See Majority at

11-15, n.11. This is erroneous on several grounds.

      To begin, the Majority disregards the Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 701

Under that Rule, “an appeal authorized by law from an interlocutory order

shall be taken to, and petitions for permission to appeal from an interlocutory

order and petitions for specialized review shall be filed in, the appellate court

having jurisdiction of final orders in such matters.” Pa.R.A.P. 701 (emphasis

added). This mandatory rule makes clear that interlocutory orders must be

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appealed to the same appellate court that would have jurisdiction over an

appeal from the final order in a given case. Thus, M.W.M. violated Pa.R.A.P.

701 by appealing to this Court, rather than the Commonwealth Court.

      Moreover, the Majority’s reliance upon the words “final order” in Section

762(a) is dubious, when considered in light of the other statutory sections on

appellate jurisdiction. The other sections all use the same “final order” order

language as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a) (concerning appellate jurisdiction of the

Commonwealth Court). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 722, 723, and 724 (stating only

“final orders” when vesting direct and discretionary appellate jurisdiction in

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania); See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742 (stating

only “final orders” when vesting direct appellate jurisdiction in this Court).

Hence, taking the Majority’s interpretation of Section 762 to its logical end, no

appellate court in Pennsylvania would ever have jurisdiction over an appeal

from an interlocutory order, because none of the jurisdiction-positing statutes

include “interlocutory orders” in their language. See id.

      Fortunately, the General Assembly, in establishing the division of labor

for our appellate courts, recognized that parties take interlocutory appeals.

Where, as here, a party appeals “from an interlocutory order [the appeal] shall

be taken to the appellate court having jurisdiction of final orders in such

matter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a). Thus, the fact that M.W.M. appealed from

an interlocutory order does not strip the Commonwealth Court of jurisdiction.

      The Majority’s makes no mention of Section 702(a).          This is error,

because “statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as

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one statute.” 1 Pa.S.C.A. § 1932(b). “Statutes . . . are in pari materia when

they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or

things.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a).

      The sections of Chapter 7 of the Judicial Code deal with the same thing

– namely, “Jurisdiciton of Appellate Courts.”       Therefore, this Court should

construe the sections of that chapter “together . . . as one statute.”            1

Pa.S.C.A. § 1932(b). Reading the sections of Chapter 7 in pari materia reveal

that the legislature intended the appellate-jurisdiction statutes to include the

words “interlocutory order” wherever the words “final orders” appear.            42

Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a).     In short, the legislature intended the Commonwealth

Court to have appellate jurisdiction over this collateral-order appeal, because

it likewise has appellate jurisdiction over any final order in this case. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a).

      Still, I recognize that, notwithstanding Pa.R.A.P. 701 and Section 702 of

the Judicial Code, the legislature granted discretion to appellate courts to

decide a case that has been wrongly appealed to them when neither party has

objected. See Trumbull Corp. v. Boss Constr., Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 398-

399 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 704(a) (stating, “[t]he failure

of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court within

such time as may be specified by general rule, shall, unless the appellate court

otherwise orders, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate

court, notwithstanding any provision of this title, or of any general rule

adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters),

                                       -4-
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vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court”). In this regard,

we have explained:

                When the legislature established the separate
         jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth
         Court, and the Superior Court, it recognized that two distinct
         problems could arise. First, if a party inadvertently or
         unwittingly appealed to the wrong court, his appeal time
         might run before the error was discovered, and he might
         lose his right of appeal. Second, the legislature sought to
         protect appellate court decisions from collateral attack in
         those cases where neither party objected to jurisdiction. To
         avoid these two pitfalls, the legislature provided a flexible
         and efficient means of transferring cases from the court to
         which the appeal was taken to the court to which the
         legislature allocated subject matter jurisdiction. At the
         same time, it reserved to the court to which the appeal was
         erroneously taken the discretionary power to hear and
         decide the merits of the appeal when no jurisdictional
         objection is raised.

Valley Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Const., Inc., 374 A.2d 1312, 1316

(Pa. Super. 1977) (citations omitted).

      As the Majority notes, in determining whether to exercise discretion to

keep this appeal, we must balance the interests of the parties and matters of

judicial economy against other factors such as: (1) whether the case has

already been transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the

legislatively ordained division of labor between the intermediate appellate

courts; and (3) whether there is a possibility of establishing two conflicting

lines of authority on a particular subject. Trumbull, 747 A.2d at 399.

      More recently, this Court, sitting en banc, unanimously held: “If any

potential substantive issue (or participation of a particular party) invokes the

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Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction, transfer is appropriate, and we must

transfer prior to reaching the merits of the appeal.” Mohn v. Bucks Cnty.

Republican Comm., 218 A.3d 927, 934 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc)

(emphasis partially added and partially in original). “Otherwise, we invade

the Commonwealth Court's exclusive jurisdiction to decide those substantive

issues and to develop its own, consistent line of precedents.” Id. Today, a

panel of this Court ignores this en banc holding.

      The Majority concludes that the interests of judicial economy, as well as

the interests of the parties, are best served by this Court retaining jurisdiction

of this appeal. I disagree. I believe our disposition could disrupt the division

of labor between this Court and the Commonwealth Court, and it may result

in conflicting lines of authority. See Trumbull, 747 A.2d at 399. The issues

to be resolved in this interlocutory appeal involve substantive matters

enumerated in Section 762.

      The relevant part of Section 762 of the Judicial Code provides:

         (a) General Rule. —Except as provided in subsection (b),
         the   Commonwealth      Court   shall   have    exclusive
         jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of
         common pleas in the following cases:

                                  *     *     *

            (4) Local government civil and criminal matters.

                (i) All actions or proceedings . . . where is drawn in
                question      the   application,    interpretation  or
                enforcement of any:

                     (A) statute regulating the affairs of political
                     subdivisions, municipality and other local

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                     authorities or other public corporations or of the
                     officers, employees or agents thereof acting in
                     their official capacity.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(4)(i)(A). (Emphasis added.)

      The crux of this lawsuit involves whether Indiana County, through the

actions of its employees in the public defender’s office, can be held civilly liable

for violating statutes set forth in the mental health treatment programs and

facilities act. See 50 P.S. §§ 4301-4305 and 16 P.S. §§ 9960.1-9960.13. The

collateral issue raised on this appeal is whether the plaintiff’s mental health

records from the last several years are discoverable in the lawsuit against the

hospital and the county.

      By deciding this issue, we weigh in on matters that could affect the civil

liability of Indiana County. This is an area that the legislature specifically and

exclusively reserved to the Commonwealth Court under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a).

And, because we could decide this discovery issue differently than the

Commonwealth Court might, we risk creating divergent lines of authority.

Therefore, under the binding precedent of this Court, “we must transfer” the

instant matter to Commonwealth Court. Mohn, 218 A.3d at 934.

      I appreciate that the parties and this Court have spent significant time

on this appeal already. Judicial economy will always be affected if we decide

to transfer a case that has been wrongly appealed to our Court.            But, on

balance, for the reasons noted above, I believe we should transfer this appeal

to the Commonwealth Court.

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J-A29024-22

      That said, because my colleagues have asserted jurisdiction based on

the appellees’ failure to seek a transfer to the Commonwealth Court, I also

dissent on the merits.

      The Majority correctly sets forth the law on the confidentiality of mental

health records, so I need not restate it here. See Majority at 17-22. Indeed,

the Majority acknowledges that courts must use great caution in finding that

a plaintiff impliedly waived the confidentiality of these records when bringing

a personal injury lawsuit. Id. at 22 (citing Octave v. Walker, 103 A.3d 1255,

1262 n.8, 1263 (Pa. 2014)) (“[a]llowing a defendant to initiate a fishing

expedition into a plaintiff’s mental health records to explore whether any

information may be potentially relevant or contradictory to the subject of the

action would destroy the purpose of the “confidentiality protections”). Yet,

the Majority ultimately concludes that        M.W.M. impliedly waived the

confidentiality privileges afforded to him pursuant to the MHPA and the DAA.

I disagree.

      M.W.M.’s lawsuit is narrowly focused on the defendants’ actions during

a specific time period. He concedes that his mental health records for the 30

days preceding his commitment on December 20, 2016, are relevant to this

case. See M.W.M.’s Brief at 10, 27. As such, M.W.M.’s appeal is limited to a

challenge of the production of medical, mental health, and substance abuse

treatment records generated prior to the 30-day period leading up to

December 20, 2016.

                                     -8-
J-A29024-22

      The basis for all of M.W.M.’s claims is that, after arriving at the hospital

and during the commitment process, he was denied the use of a telephone,

denied his right to contact private counsel, denied the right to communicate

with individuals outside of the hospital, denied adequate notice of his 303

hearing, and denied adequate assistance of counsel. See M.W.M.’s Third

Amended Complaint at 4-15, 17, 35.

      The trial court acknowledged that all of his claims are for events that

occurred after he arrived at the hospital:

         [M.W.M.] specifically argues that [the doctor] held [him]
         against his will without a timely medical examination,
         extended [M.W.M.’s] commitment under 50 P.S. § 7303
         without proper cause, failed to advise [M.W.M.] of his rights,
         provided inadequate notice and denied a continuance of the
         303 hearing to advance [the doctor’s] own interests,
         restricted [M.W.M.’s] phone access and his ability to contact
         counsel of his choice, and breached the professional duties
         owed to [M.W.M.] under the MHPA.

Trial Court Order, 3/10/22, at 2.

      As M.W.M. argues, the trial court ignored that the MHPA states that only

information within 30 days is relevant and the records the defendants were

seeking from beyond that time frame could not be used for the purpose for

which the trial court ordered their disclosure. In other words, even if M.W.M.

suffered from mental illness in the prior three to five years, any records from

more than 30 days prior are beyond the scope of review. Such records are

irrelevant as to whether he met the statutory requirements for involuntary

commitment on December 20, 2016. Moreover, M.W.M. correctly states:

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           The [trial] court’s holding creates a shockingly broad new
           precedent whereby any person who files a claim contending
           that his or her rights were violated when subjected to
           involuntarily commitment has necessarily and impliedly
           authorized the release of years of mental, medical, and
           substance abuse treatment records. This Court should not
           permit such a dangerous precedent.

M.W.M.’s Brief at 23.

        To obtain both a 302 and/or a 303 commitment, the facility must

determine that a patient is “severely mentally disabled.” 50 P.S. § 7302(b)

and 7303(c)(1). In order to be adjudged as “severely mentally disabled,” a

patient must have been “a clear and present danger of harm to others or to

himself” which “shall be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days

the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another

and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.”

50 P.S. § 730 1 (b)(1)(emphasis added).1 Thus, by statute, only events within
____________________________________________

1   The full text of the statute provides:

           (b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger. --(1)
           Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by
           establishing that within the past 30 days the person has
           inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on
           another and that there is a reasonable probability that such
           conduct will be repeated. If, however, the person has been
           found incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by
           reason of lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising
           from conduct involving infliction of or attempt to inflict
           substantial bodily harm on another, such 30-day limitation
           shall not apply so long as an application for examination and
           treatment is filed within 30 days after the date of such
           determination or verdict. In such case, a clear and present
           danger to others may be shown by establishing that the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

          conduct charged in the criminal proceeding did occur, and
          that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will
          be repeated. For the purpose of this section, a clear and
          present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by
          proof that the person has made threats of harm and has
          committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.

          (2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by
          establishing that within the past 30 days:

                  (i) the person has acted in such manner as to
                  evidence that he would be unable, without care,
                  supervision and the continued assistance of others,
                  to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or
                  medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
                  and that there is a reasonable probability that death,
                  serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation
                  would ensue within 30 days unless adequate
                  treatment were afforded under this act; or

                  (ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there
                  is the reasonable probability of suicide unless
                  adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the
                  purposes of this subsection, a clear and present
                  danger may be demonstrated by the proof that the
                  person has made threats to commit suicide and has
                  committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat
                  to commit suicide; or

                  (iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or
                  attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that
                  there is the reasonable probability of mutilation
                  unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act.
                  For the purposes of this subsection, a clear and
                  present danger shall be established by proof that the
                  person has made threats to commit mutilation and
                  has committed acts which are in furtherance of the
                  threat to commit mutilation.

50 Pa.C.S.A. § 7301 (emphasis added).

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the most recent 30 days could have been considered when determining

whether M.W.M. was properly committed. Appellees cannot justify their

actions with information that they were either aware or unaware of from

beyond that time period.

       In short, the information Appellees seek to discover is not relevant and

is unlikely to lead to any other relevant evidence regarding their actions when

they committed M.W.M. on December 20, 2016. As such, I would find that

the trial court erred in compelling M.W.M. to disclose his prior mental health

history for the past three to five years beyond the relevant 30-day window.2

       For these reasons, I dissent.

____________________________________________

2  As a final note, because the Majority here believes the documents are
discoverable, the only ruling I agree with in the Majority decision is that the
trial court should impose limitations on the use of this information. See
Majority at 30-31.

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