Court Opinion

ID: 9894308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 14:09:58.982649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:34.050921
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Payne v. Rowlands, 2023-Ohio-3957.]

       STATE OF OHIO                     )                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                         )ss:                       NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
       COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

       STATE OF OHIO EX REL. BROLIN D.
       PAYNE
                                                                    C.A. Nos.   30688
               Relator                                                          30689

               v.

       JUDGE MARY MARGARET                                          ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS
       ROWLANDS, ET AL.                                             AND PROHIBITION

               Respondents

Dated: November 1, 2023

       PER CURIAM.

       {¶1}    Relator, Brolin D. Payne, has filed two complaints seeking writs of mandamus and

prohibition to order Respondents, Judge Mary Margaret Rowlands and Visiting Judge Richard

Reinbold, to vacate his judgment of conviction and denial of his motion to suppress and motion in

limine. The Judges have moved to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and Mr. Payne has

replied. For the following reasons, we grant the motion to dismiss.

       {¶2}    When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must

presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489,

490 (1994). A complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed the complaint in this way,

it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to the relief

requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 389, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. With this standard

in mind, we turn to the facts of the complaint. The two complaints filed by Mr. Payne are virtually
                                                                             C.A. Nos. 30688 and 30689
                                                                                            Page 2 of 6

identical, except that one seeks a writ of mandamus and the other seeks a writ of prohibition. This

Court consolidated the two cases and, therefore, they will be referred to as one complaint.

       {¶3}    The complaint alleges that Mr. Payne was charged in a criminal case and that case

was assigned to Judge Rowlands. Judge Rowlands recused herself from the case because she had

a pending malpractice case to preside over and to protect Mr. Payne’s right to a speedy trial. There

is no allegation in the complaint, or in any of the attachments to the complaint, that Judge

Rowlands recused herself because of any bias or conflict.              Judge Rowlands asked the

Administrative Judge to request assignment of a visiting judge. The Administrative Judge made

that request to the Supreme Court and Judge Reinbold was assigned. Before a certificate of

assignment was filed, Judge Reinbold presided over a suppression and motion in limine hearing

and issued an order.

       {¶4}    The complaint further alleges that Judge Reinbold presided over Mr. Payne’s jury

trial. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Judge Rowlands signed an order reflecting that the trial

occurred and the jury returned verdicts of guilty. A few days later, Judge Rowlands also signed

an amended order.      Judge Reinbold signed the final judgment of conviction following the

sentencing hearing. Having reviewed the facts set forth in the complaint, we turn to the applicable

standards.

       {¶5}    “For a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) the relator has

a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty

to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.” State ex

rel. Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union, Dist. 925 v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 173, 176

(1998). The relator must demonstrate all three elements for this Court to grant the writ of

mandamus.
                                                                             C.A. Nos. 30688 and 30689
                                                                                            Page 3 of 6

          {¶6}   For this Court to issue a writ of prohibition, relator must establish that: (1) the

judge is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law,

and (3) the denial of the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State

ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court, 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448 (1997). “[T]he purpose of a writ

of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction.” State

ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). A writ of prohibition “tests and determines

solely and only the subject matter jurisdiction” of the lower court. State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v.

Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1988).

          {¶7}   The complaint also claimed that the alleged lack of jurisdiction is patent and

unambiguous. In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack

of an adequate remedy at law need not be proven because the availability of alternate remedies

would be immaterial. State ex rel. Goldberg v. Mahoning Cty. Probate Court, 93 Ohio St.3d 160,

162 (2001).

          {¶8}   Viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light required by Civ.R. 12(B)(6),

the complaint does not state a claim for mandamus or prohibition upon which relief can be granted.

Unless a trial court lacks jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter has

the authority to determine its own jurisdiction to hear a cause, and the party challenging the court’s

jurisdiction has an adequate remedy through an appeal. Brooks v. Gaul, 89 Ohio St.3d 202, 203

(2000).

          {¶9}   The first count of the complaint alleges that Judge Reinbold acted without

jurisdiction because he presided and entered orders before his certificate of assignment was

completed and filed. Mr. Payne relies on Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312 (1937), to support his
                                                                             C.A. Nos. 30688 and 30689
                                                                                            Page 4 of 6

argument. That case involved the appointment of a judge in a federal court, a procedure unique to

the federal system and not relevant to Ohio’s system for the assignment of a visiting judge.

       {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed a claim like Mr. Payne’s and

concluded that appeal provided an adequate remedy to challenge any error in the assignment of a

visiting judge:

               Moreover, “[l]ike other extraordinary-writ actions, habeas corpus is not
       available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In re
       Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-
       5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6. “[A] claim of improper assignment of a judge can
       generally be adequately raised by way of appeal.” State ex rel. Key v. Spicer, 91
       Ohio St.3d 469, 470, 746 N.E.2d 1119 (2001). There is an exception to the
       adequate-remedy requirement: “‘when a court’s judgment is void because it lacked
       jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of
       appeal.’” Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d
       1236, ¶ 9, quoting Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282
       (1995), overruled on other grounds, Smith, 159 Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148
       N.E.3d 542, at ¶ 29. But even if Judge Schott were somehow improperly assigned,
       “[i]n a court that possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, procedural irregularities in
       the transfer of a case to a visiting judge affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
       particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void.” In re J.J., 111 Ohio
       St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, paragraph one of the syllabus; see
       also State v. Baumgartner, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-03-013, 2004-Ohio-3907,
       2004 WL 1662193, ¶ 11 (“even if the certificate of assignment was entirely absent
       from a case record, it would not void the jurisdiction of the court or [the visiting
       judge's] authority to issue judgments and orders”).

State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 160 Ohio St.3d 506, 2020-Ohio-2901, ¶ 13. See, also, State ex rel.

Payne v. Reinbold, 154 Ohio St.3d 83, 2018-Ohio-2704.

       {¶11} Mr. Payne has not argued that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case. Accordingly, even if Judge Reinbold were

improperly assigned, irregularities in the transfer of the case to the visiting judge affect the trial

court’s jurisdiction over the particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void. Turner at

¶ 13. The Supreme Court’s decision further establishes that the trial court did not patently and

unambiguously lack jurisdiction. Id. Appeal provided Mr. Payne with an adequate remedy to
                                                                            C.A. Nos. 30688 and 30689
                                                                                           Page 5 of 6

challenge the assignment, so he cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus or

prohibition.

         {¶12} The second count of the complaint alleges that Judge Rowlands’s authority over his

case was terminated when she recused herself from the case and Judge Reinbold was assigned.

There is no allegation in the complaint that Judge Rowlands recused herself because she had a

conflict of interest. To the contrary, the request for a visiting judge, according to the complaint,

was to allow Judge Rowlands to preside over a civil trial while protecting Mr. Payne’s right to a

speedy trial.

         {¶13} The Supreme Court has held that “a nonassigned judge is permitted to perform

purely ministerial acts.” Payne at ¶ 13. This would include signing a judgment of conviction. Id.

If there were any error, Mr. Payne could have challenged that on direct appeal. Id. Because appeal

provided an adequate remedy, Mr. Payne is not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.

         {¶14} Considering the allegations in the complaint as true, we conclude that Mr. Payne’s

complaint does not state a claim for mandamus or prohibition upon which relief can be granted.

         {¶15} Because Mr. Payne cannot prevail on the facts he alleged, the petition is dismissed.

Costs of this action are taxed to Mr. Payne. The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon

all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R.

58(B).

                                                      JENNIFER A. HENSAL
                                                      FOR THE COURT
                                                             C.A. Nos. 30688 and 30689
                                                                            Page 6 of 6

CARR, J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

BROLIN PAYNE, Relator.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JENNIFER M. PIATT, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondents.