Court Opinion

ID: 9889863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:10:53.870765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:01.758787
License: Public Domain

J-S23020-23

                                   2023 PA Super 197

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANTHONY J. BANNIGER                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1612 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 27, 2022,
            in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000335-2021.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 11, 2023

       Anthony Banniger appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after

he was convicted of rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse by forcible compulsion,1 and other offenses committed against

J.Z., a minor in his extended family. We affirm.

       In this case we must determine whether a conviction for a sexual offense

“by forcible compulsion” can stand if the victim was unconscious when the

assault began. For reasons discussed herein, we hold that evidence that a

defendant had intercourse with an unconscious person, without more, is

insufficient to prove forcible compulsion. Such conduct is fully proscribed in

other statutory subsections.         However, the person’s unconsciousness is a

relevant circumstance as to whether the defendant used force while having
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1) and 3123(a)(1), respectively.
J-S23020-23

intercourse. Further, evidence that a victim is unable to move out of fear of

a defendant can be sufficient to prove forcible compulsion.

       Banniger had a non-jury trial on October 26, 2021. At trial, J.Z. testified

that Banniger started touching her body with his hands when she was 10 years

old, first over her clothes and then under them.        The escalating physical

contact rendered J.Z. unable to move: “[Banniger] would like rub all over me,

like, just rub me. And I would be real disgusted, but there was nothing I could

do. It was like a fear, like, a frozenness. You can’t really move your body.”

N.T., 10/26/21, at 20.

       J.Z. moved out of state at age 14. At age 15, she returned and lived in

the same house as Banniger. Banniger would provide marijuana to J.Z., and

they would smoke together while they were alone in the house. At times,

Banniger told J.Z. that he liked her and wanted to be with her; J.Z. told

Banniger to stop. After J.Z. smoked with Banniger, she went to her room to

lie down. On two such occasions, Banniger proceeded to sexually assault J.Z.

       In the first incident,2 J.Z. woke up in her aunt’s room. Her shorts were

pulled to the side, and Banniger had his head between her legs and his tongue

on and inside her vagina. J.Z. did not testify that she was frozen with fear in

the first incident or that Banniger used any force in the first incident. She did

not testify how long Banniger continued or how the first incident ended.

____________________________________________

2 J.Z. said the first incident described here was “the most recent one” and the

second incident described here was “the second time,” which “happened just
like it happened the first time.” N.T., 10/26/21, at 21, 26–27.

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       In the second incident, J.Z. woke up in her grandmother’s room. Like

the first time, J.Z.’s clothes were to the side and Banniger’s tongue was in her

vagina. Banniger then pulled J.Z.’s pants off and penetrated her vagina with

his penis. As Banniger progressed, J.Z. was “frozen with fear” and “just let it

happen to [her] because [she] didn’t know what else to do.” Id. at 27–28.

J.Z. then “had to fight a little bit” to push Banniger off of her because “[h]e

was being forceful.” Id. at 29. J.Z. ran to another room. She later told her

older sister about the abuse.

       The trial court found Banniger guilty of rape by forcible compulsion,

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, unlawful

contact with a minor, statutory sexual assault, corruption of a minor, indecent

assault of a person less than 13, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse of an

unconscious person, and sexual assault.3         On May 27, 2022, the court

sentenced Banniger to an aggregate term of 14 to 34 years of imprisonment,

followed by three years of probation.

       Banniger filed a post-sentence motion on June 5, 2022, which the trial

court denied on June 7, 2022. Banniger timely appealed on June 15, 2022.

Banniger filed a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal in

compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). The trial

court entered an opinion on October 13, 2022.

____________________________________________

3  18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 6318(a)(1),              3122.1(b),
6301(a)(1)(ii), 3126(a)(7), 3123(a)(3), and 3124.1.

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      Banniger presents four questions for review:

      1. Was the evidence insufficient to prove Banniger guilty of
         involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion?

      2. Was the evidence insufficient to prove Banniger guilty of rape
         by forcible compulsion?

      3. Did the trial court err by denying Banniger’s request for a new
         trial as the weight of the evidence should have resulted in an
         acquittal of all charges?

      4. Did the trial court err by imposing a manifestly excessive and
         unreasonable sentence?

Banniger’s Brief at 5 (reordered).

      Banniger’s first two issues concern the sufficiency of the evidence.

“Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law,

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 489 (Pa. 2015) (citing

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 37 (Pa. 2011)). Our inquiry is

“whether viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-

finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc)).

Further, a complainant’s testimony does not need to be corroborated to

constitute sufficient evidence of a sexual offense.        Commonwealth v.

Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth

v. Gabrielson, 536 A.2d 401 (Pa. Super. 1988)); see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3106.

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      The crimes of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse are

defined in relevant part as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the first
      degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a
      complainant:

            (1) By forcible compulsion.

            (2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
            resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.

            (3) Who is unconscious or where the person knows that the
            complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
            occurring.

            (4)  Where the person has substantially impaired the
            complainant’s power to appraise or control his or her
            conduct by administering or employing, without the
            knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other
            means for the purpose of preventing resistance.

            (5) Who suffers from a mental disability which renders the
            complainant incapable of consent.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a) (rape).

      (a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the first
      degree when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse
      with a complainant:

            (1) by forcible compulsion;

            (2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
            resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;

            (3) who is unconscious or where the person knows that the
            complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
            occurring;

            (4)  where the person has substantially impaired the
            complainant’s power to appraise or control his or her
            conduct by administering or employing, without the
            knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other
            means for the purpose of preventing resistance; [or]

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              (5) who suffers from a mental disability which renders him
              or her incapable of consent[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1)–(5) (involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).

       Both statutes require proof that a defendant engaged in a form of

intercourse, as well as an additional element. “Sexual intercourse,” used in

Section 3121, is defined: “In addition to its ordinary meaning, includes

intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight;

emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. “Deviate sexual intercourse,”

used in Section 3123, is: “Sexual intercourse per os or per anus[4] between

human beings,” as well as intercourse with an animal and certain penetration

with a foreign object. Id.

       Oral sex, intercourse per os, is included in the definitions of both sexual

intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse. Commonwealth v. Brown, 159

A.3d 531, 534 (Pa. Super. 2017).                 This includes licking a vagina.

Commonwealth v. Westcott, 532 A.2d 1140, 1145–47 (Pa. Super. 1987)

(holding “penetration of the vagina by the tongue” meets these definitions);

Interest of J.R., 648 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding “some form of

oral contact with the genitalia of the female victim” sufficient for deviate

sexual intercourse, even without “actual” penetration).

       Vaginal sex—inserting a penis into a vagina, the “ordinary meaning” of

sexual intercourse—is not included in the definition of deviate sexual
____________________________________________

4 Intercourse “per os or per anus” refers to oral and anal sex.
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 555 (Pa. 2002) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 565 A.2d 1159 (Pa. 1989), and
Commonwealth v. Lee, 638 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

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intercourse. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 555 (Pa. 2002)

(citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 711 A.2d 444, 450 (Pa. 1998), for the

ordinary meaning of sexual intercourse).

      Under Subsections 3121(a)(1) and 3123(a)(1), the Commonwealth

must prove that the defendant engaged in intercourse “by forcible

compulsion.” By statute, forcible compulsion includes “[c]ompulsion by use

of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either

express or implied.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. Thus, in addition to “sheer physical

force or violence,” forcible compulsion encompasses “an act of using superior

force, physical, moral, psychological or intellectual[,] to compel a person to

do a thing against that person’s volition and/or will.”   Commonwealth v.

Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 720–21 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth

v. Ables, 590 A.2d 334, 337 (Pa. Super. 1991)). For these sexual offenses,

the object of the force is “to compel a person to engage in sexual intercourse

[or deviate sexual intercourse] against that person’s will.” Commonwealth

v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).

      Whether a defendant used forcible compulsion depends on the totality

of the circumstances, including this non-exhaustive list of factors:

      the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the respective
      mental and physical conditions of the victim and the accused, the
      atmosphere and physical setting in which the incident was alleged
      to have taken place, the extent to which the accused may have
      been in a position of authority, domination or custodial control
      over the victim, and whether the victim was under duress.

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Id. Our courts have not specified every set of circumstances that can show

forcible compulsion, which turns on the facts of each case. Id. at 1226.

      Proof of forcible compulsion does not require evidence that the victim

resisted. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1227 n.14 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3107). This

recognizes that a victim may not struggle against the attack of an assailant

who can physically overpower the victim. Commonwealth v. Lee, 638 A.2d

1006, 1008 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Gabrielson, 536

A.2d 401, 407 (Pa. Super. 1988)). The inquiry is whether the defendant’s

physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force compelled the

victim to submit to intercourse against the victim’s will, not whether the victim

resisted the compulsion. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226, 1227 n.14.

      Similarly, the law distinguishes forcible compulsion by a defendant from

a lack of consent by a victim. While “[e]ffective consent to sexual intercourse

will negate a finding of forcible compulsion,” forcible compulsion is “‘something

more’ than mere lack of consent.” Commonwealth v. Buffington, 828 A.2d

1024, 1225 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 383 A.2d 503

(Pa. 1978)); Gonzalez (quoting Commonwealth v. Smolko, 666 A.2d 672,

676 (Pa. Super. 1995)); see Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161,

1164 (Pa. 1994) (“[W]here there is a lack of consent, but no showing of either

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J-S23020-23

physical force, a threat of physical force, or psychological coercion, the

‘forcible compulsion’ requirement . . . is not met.”).5

       Relatedly, forcible compulsion subsumes a lack of consent. Buffington,

828 A.2d at 1031–32 (citing Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165). That is, if the

Commonwealth proves that a defendant exercised forcible compulsion, then

it has proved that the victim did not consent. Thus, sexual assault (sexual

intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse without consent) is a lesser-included

offense of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion (and,

by the same logic, of rape by forcible compulsion). Id. at 1032 (comparing

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.1 and 3123(a)(1)). Along these same lines, proof that

a defendant had intercourse with an unconscious victim implies that the victim

did not consent. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56, 58–59

(Pa. 1997), and concluding that sexual assault is a lesser-included offense of

Sections 3121(a)(3) and 3123(a)(3)).

       From this legal landscape, it does not follow that every person who has

intercourse with an unconscious victim does so by forcible compulsion. While

an unconscious victim cannot consent to intercourse, forcible compulsion

requires something more than non-consent. Buffington, 828 A.2d at 1031–

32. A victim’s “mental and physical condition[],” which can include lack of
____________________________________________

5 After Berkowitz, the General Assembly enacted Act 10 of 1995 (Spec. Sess.

1), to establish the crime of sexual assault, codified at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
This statute prohibits sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse without
consent. It does not require proof of forcible compulsion. Act 10 also codified
the definition of forcible compulsion in Section 3101, using language following
Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).

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consciousness, is only one circumstance to be considered under the totality

test for forcible compulsion. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226. We therefore hold

that evidence that a victim was unconscious, without more, is insufficient to

prove that the defendant used “forcible compulsion.” Cf. Commonwealth v.

Titus, 556 A.2d 425, 429–30 (Pa. Super. 1989) (reaching a similar holding

that a parent–child relationship, without more, is insufficient to prove forcible

compulsion).

       This holding fits within the statutory scheme. The General Assembly

has subdivided the relevant statutes to proscribe intercourse by forcible

compulsion and against an unconscious person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1),

(3), and 3123(a)(1), (3).         These subsections cover different conduct and

protect different interests of victims—the interest against being forcibly

compelled to submit to intercourse and the interest against being subjected

to intercourse while unconscious.6 To presume forcible compulsion from every

instance of intercourse with an unconscious person would render portions of

the statutes nullities.        See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thompson, 2

Pa.D.&C.4th 632, 655 (C.P. Phila. 1989).

       Here, J.Z. described two incidents where Banniger put his tongue in her

vagina. This meets the definition of deviate sexual intercourse. Westcott,
____________________________________________

6 Nothing here would prohibit charging a defendant under multiple subsections

given the factual allegations in each case. See Commonwealth v. Price,
616 A.2d 681, 683–84 (Pa. Super. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of rape
by forcible compulsion and rape of an unconscious person where the victim
woke up during sexual intercourse and the defendant continued penetration
and physically struggled with her).

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supra; J.R., supra.          Both incidents began while J.Z. slept after using

marijuana from Banniger; J.Z. woke up to find Banniger’s head between her

legs. Regarding the first incident, J.Z. did not describe Banniger continuing

the deviate sexual intercourse after she woke up. However, as to the second

incident, J.Z. testified that she was frozen with fear as the abuse progressed.7

She was awake and “just let it happen” because she was unsure what to do.

Under the totality of the circumstances, including Banniger’s extended familial

relationship with J.Z., the use of marijuana with no one else at home, and

J.Z.’s unconsciousness and subsequent fear that rendered her unable to move,

the evidence sufficiently established that Banniger committed deviate sexual

intercourse by forcible compulsion.8 We therefore affirm this conviction.

       In the second incident, J.Z. testified that Banniger pulled her pants off

and penetrated her vagina with his penis. This meets the definition of sexual

intercourse. Kelley, 801 A.2d at 555. When Banniger did this, J.Z. was frozen
____________________________________________

7 J.Z. testified that after she awoke, Banniger then proceeded to pull off her

pants and put his penis in her vagina. As addressed infra, this is sexual
intercourse. However, it does not meet the definition of deviate sexual
intercourse. The relevant inquiry under Section 3123(a)(1), involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, is whether Banniger had
deviate sexual intercourse—i.e., oral sex—by forcible compulsion.

      Here, J.Z. woke up to perceive Banniger’s head between her legs, which
he kept there long enough for her to feel frozen with fear before he proceeded
to do other actions. Therefore, J.Z.’s fear is relevant in determining forcible
compulsion for this offense.
8 We observe that Banniger was also properly convicted of involuntary deviate

sexual intercourse of an unconscious person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(3); see
Price, 616 A.2d at 684 (finding evidence sufficient of an analogous rape
charge where the victim woke up to find the defendant’s penis in her vagina).

                                          - 11 -
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with fear, similar to how she felt when Banniger rubbed her body with his

hands going back to when she was ten years old. Given that Banniger was an

adult in J.Z.’s extended family, who had previously abused her, J.Z.’s

testimony that she was frozen with fear during this incident was sufficient to

allow the trial court to conclude that Banniger forcibly compelled J.Z. to submit

to sexual intercourse against her will.       We therefore affirm Banniger’s

conviction for rape by forcible compulsion.

      Banniger’s third issue concerns the weight of the evidence, which he

preserved by filing a post-sentence motion for a new trial. Banniger argues

that the trial court should have granted a new trial because J.Z.’s testimony

was inconsistent with her previous statements, J.Z. had a motive to lie, and

the Commonwealth did not introduce physical evidence or corroborating

testimony. Unlike a sufficiency challenge, we review a weight challenge to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion:

             The weight given to trial evidence is a choice for the
      factfinder. If the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a
      criminal defendant then files a motion for a new trial on the basis
      that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, a trial
      court is not to grant relief unless the verdict is so contrary to the
      evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

            When a trial court denies a weight-of-the-evidence motion,
      and when an appellant then appeals that ruling to this Court, our
      review is limited. It is important to understand we do not reach
      the underlying question of whether the verdict was, in fact,
      against the weight of the evidence. We do not decide how we
      would have ruled on the motion and then simply replace our own
      judgment for that of the trial court. Instead, this Court determines
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in reaching whatever
      decision it made on the motion, whether or not that decision is the
      one we might have made in the first instance.

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            Moreover, when evaluating a trial court’s ruling, we keep in
      mind that an abuse of discretion is not merely an error in
      judgment. Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will,
      manifest unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law. By
      contrast, a proper exercise of discretion conforms to the law and
      is based on the facts of record.

Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

      Notably, the trial court’s role changes in ruling on a post-sentence

motion after a non-jury trial. “Post-trial, the court cannot re-deliberate[,] as

it is no longer the fact finder.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227 A.3d 928,

938 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 33 A.3d 89,

94 (Pa. Super. 2011)). “Although weight of the evidence claims have been

addressed in non-jury cases, there is a logical inconsistency in asking a trial

judge to conclude that his non-jury decision shocked his own conscience.”

Commonwealth v. Wise, No. 1145 EDA 2021, 2022 WL 2442141, at *5 (Pa.

Super. July 5, 2022) (non-precedential decision).         “[I]t would be highly

incongruous for a trial judge presiding over a non-jury trial to find [his] own

decision shocks [his] conscience. . . . [A] judge in a non-jury trial has the dual

duties of determining the weight and admissibility of evidence. A trial court

sitting as fact-finder is unlikely to find, in response to a post-sentence motion,

that it reached a verdict contrary to the evidence.”        Commonwealth v.

Matthews, No. 125 MDA 2020, 2020 WL 7047114, at *5 (Pa. Super. Dec. 1,

2020) (non-precedential decision) (Strassburger, J., concurring).

      With this standard in mind, the trial court thoroughly addressed

Banniger’s arguments about the deficiencies in the evidence against him,

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concluding that the verdict was not “shocking to the conscience.” Trial Court

Opinion, 10/13/22, at 15–20. We discern no abuse of discretion. As the trial

court reasoned, the minor inconsistencies in J.Z.’s recollection did not disturb

her testimony about the specific incidents of abuse that Banniger committed.

Further, J.Z. was a witness to Banniger’s crimes, and her testimony did not

need to be corroborated for the court, as fact-finder, to accept her testimony

as credible. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Banniger’s post-sentence motion for a new trial, Banniger’s third issue fails.

      Banniger’s fourth issue concerns the discretionary aspects of his

aggregate sentence of 14 to 34 years of imprisonment followed by three years

of probation.   To determine whether an appellant has invoked this Court’s

jurisdiction over a discretionary-aspects claim, we evaluate:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Aulisio, 253 A.3d 338, 343–44 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

      Here, Banniger complied with the first three requirements to invoke our

jurisdiction by filing a post-sentence motion to reconsider his sentence, filing

a notice of appeal, and including a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. He

urges us to find a substantial question by asserting that the trial court imposed

an excessive sentence disproportionate to his conduct without considering

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certain factors. Banniger’s Brief at 11 (listing his “age, rehabilitative needs,

traumatic childhood, mental health issues, family support, and employment

history” as factors not carefully considered). “[A]n excessive sentence claim—

in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216

A.3d 307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.

White, 193 A.3d 977, 983 (Pa. Super. 2018)).          Therefore, Banniger has

invoked this Court’s jurisdiction, and we proceed to the merits of his claim.

      Once our jurisdiction is established, we proceed to review whether the

sentencing court abused its discretion, bearing in mind the following statute:

      (c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall vacate
      the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with
      instructions if it finds:

            (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
            sentencing   guidelines   but   applied  the   guidelines
            erroneously;

            (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
            guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
            application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable;
            or

            (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
            guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

      In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence
      imposed by the sentencing court.

      (d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate
      court shall have regard for:

            (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
            history and characteristics of the defendant.

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            (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
            defendant, including any presentence investigation.

            (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

            (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d); see Aulisio, 253 A.3d at 344–45.

      Banniger argues that the sentencing court discredited mitigating factors,

including that he was physically and sexually abused as a child, received

deficient treatment, obtained training and employment as a truck driver

despite his prior convictions, and supported his own children. Banniger’s Brief

at 17–18.   He further notes that his sentence was years longer than the

Commonwealth’s recommendation of 8 to 16 years.

      The trial court noted that Banniger’s sentence at each count was within

the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.         Trial Court Opinion,

10/13/22, at 23–25. Further, all but one term of imprisonment was ordered

to run concurrently.   The court explained its rationale for sentencing as

follows:

      [Banniger’s] sentences were reasonable considering the nature of
      [Banniger’s] crimes. [Banniger] began sexually assaulting J.Z.,
      who he had known for practically her entire life . . . , when she
      was ten years old. [Banniger’s] conduct worsened as J.Z. got
      older to the extent that he raped J.Z. and engaged in involuntary
      deviate sexual intercourse without her consent when she was
      fifteen years old. [Banniger’s] contentions that his sentences
      were excessive and disproportionate to his conduct and that [the
      sentencing court] failed to consider the sentencing guidelines are
      therefore without merit.

            [Regarding Banniger’s claims that the court did not consider
      relevant factors, the court ordered a presentence investigation
      and mental health screening prior to sentencing.] At sentencing
      it was discovered that a mental health evaluation was never

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     completed for [Banniger]. [Banniger’s] counsel conferred with
     [Banniger], who subsequently agreed to waive the mental health
     report.

           During the sentencing hearing, [the sentencing court] heard
     argument from the Commonwealth and [Banniger’s] sentencing
     counsel and observed [Banniger] when he was given opportunity
     to address the [court. The court] also reviewed the presentence
     investigation report prepared prior to sentencing, which contained
     relevant information about [Banniger’s] character, including
     abuse he suffered as a child and incidents that he was involved in
     at several juvenile placements. Subsequently, [the court] plainly
     stated its reasons on the record for imposing [Banniger’s]
     aggregate sentence and why it exceeded the sentence
     recommended by the Commonwealth:

        I do recognize this was a waiver trial. But what was testified
        to here and what happened, coupled with the defendant’s
        background, incidents in juvenile facilities, in the state
        prison, repeatedly going to the state prison over and over
        again not for sex offenses, but for drug dealing and other
        things and still coming out and doing these things…

        You’re an individual who both has ability and can perpetrate
        what occurred here, which did not come out for a number
        of years.

        …

        I give this sentence because I don’t think, Mr. Banniger,
        until you’ve had years of sufficient treatment and been away
        [you] are safe to be around younger people.             What
        happened here is going to have a lifelong effect on the
        complainant as she testified. She didn’t want to bring it out.
        I saw the texts; I heard the testimony.

        What you’ve created because she wanted to protect others
        in the family by putting up with this for years, and the
        grooming that was involved starting with not penetration,
        but other things, in my opinion makes you very, very
        dangerous in the future.

        I hope you will get the treatment because you will get out,
        and I hope when you do get out none of this will ever happen
        again.

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J-S23020-23

          Accordingly, the record reflects that [the sentencing court]
     imposed [Banniger’s] aggregate sentence of fourteen to thirty-
     four years of confinement and three years of sex offender
     probation based on multiple factors. These factors included the
     need to protect the community from dangerous offenders like
     [Banniger], the gravity of [Banniger’s] offenses in grooming and
     sexually assaulting J.Z. at such a young age, and [Banniger’s]
     rehabilitative needs for his eventual release.

Id. at 25–27 (numerals and record citations omitted). We discern no abuse

of discretion. The court demonstrated that it carefully considered the case

and imposed a sentence within the guidelines.    Because Banniger has not

shown that the application of the guidelines was clearly unreasonable, we

affirm. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).

     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: October 11, 2023

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