Court Opinion

ID: 9646784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:11:13.266728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.774963
License: Public Domain

BASKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I strenuously dissent.
Appellant was convicted of rape of a child upon trial to the court and' sentenced to confinement of sixteen years.
The majority opinion correctly states that the State offered the testimony of only two witnesses, that of the minor victim and that of her mother. It also correctly points out that the victim’s mother was indicted, along with appellant, for the offense of rape of a child.
The testimony of the victim and of her mother was substantially as follows: Ema C_, mother of the victim, was married, but the record is unclear whether she was divorced or separated from her husband. The two or three oldest children lived with the father and the remainder lived with Ema. The victim was the oldest of those living with the mother.
At the time of the offense as alleged in the indictment, on or about April 28, 1978, appellant was living with Ema. At about 11:00 p. m. that day, appellant told Ema “he was going to have sex” with the victim.
Ema called the victim into the living room in which Ema and appellant slept. When the victim complied, appellant told her to take off her clothes and to get into bed. Out of fear of appellant, the victim complied. Ema then came into the room, and appellant got on top of the minor victim. Appellant ordered Ema, in Ema’s words, to “put her [the victim’s] feets up.” The victim described it: “Then Ema held my legs.” After receiving such assistance from Ema, appellant ordered Ema to leave the room and she did so.
*624The victim variously described what happened to her was that appellant put his “private thing” in her “private thing” and that appellant “had sex with me,” and that “he got on top of me, and he did it to me.” Ema testified that appellant had intercourse with the victim.
At the time these events took place, the child was eleven years old and had not yet begun to menstruate. Both the victim and her mother testified that the victim bled a small amount at the time of the sexual encounter, and the victim testified that it was painful.
The first point of error complains that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of rape of a child. The argument was limited to evidence regarding penetration.
I fully concur with the majority that the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish the penetration required in a rape ease, and I concur in the citation of cases by the majority to support their conclusion. I would take the additional step of overruling appellant’s first ground of error.
I must strongly disagree with the majority in their conclusions with regard to the second and third points of error. In his second point, appellant asserts that his conviction may not be sustained, under the provisions of Tex.Code Crim.Pro. art. 38.07 (Vernon 1979) because the minor victim failed to make an “outcry” within six months of the alleged offense and there was insufficient corroborative evidence to support the testimony of the prosecutrix. In his third point, appellant says that his conviction cannot be supported because there was insufficient corroboration by the victim of the testimony of the mother who was indicted as an accomplice of the appellant in this rape of a child. The majority agree, taking the position that the testimony of the child required corroboration because she did not “outcry” but that her mother could not corroborate her because she, the mother, also required corroboration. Similarly the majority rule that the minor victim cannot furnish corroboration of her mother’s testimony required by the mother’s status as accomplice, because the child’s testimony must be corroborated. The argument of appellant, as adopted by the majority, is circular, and such sophistry must not be allowed to set aside the conviction found by the trial judge.
The opinion of the majority tracks the history of legislation and court rulings regarding the requirement of corroboration of testimony of victims of sex offenses, with particular reference to application of a rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of minors who could not, because of age, give consent to sexual activity. The majority then suppose that “surely” the Legislature envisioned that a child under the age of consent might fall victim to “some lecherous scoundrel” of the opposite sex who would be assisted by the child’s mother. The Legislature, assume the majority, must have realized that the child might never be able to make an “outcry” since her own mother had participated in the “dastardly deed.” With these suppositions in mind (and with the imputed knowledge that the Court of Criminal Appeals had held that art. 38.07 did not apply if the victim was of such an age that legal consent could not be given), the majority conclude that the Legislature undertook to apply art. 38.07 to all convictions under Chapter 21, Penal Code, intending to require corroboration of the testimony of a victim of a sex offense, even though the victim is of tender years and unable to give consent unless that child has made an outcry within six months after the date of the alleged offense.
I cannot ascribe such reasoning to our Legislature. I believe that the Legislature, knowing that the courts had excepted minors from application of art. 38.07 if consent was not in issue, see Hindman v. State, 211 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Cr.App.1948), assumed that the courts would continue so to hold. Furthermore, I believe that the courts, under constitutional separation of powers, had properly so held and can do so now.
Furthermore, the words of art. 38.07 describe the person to whom “outcry” must be made as “any person, other than the defendant, ...” The defendant in this case *625was Ralph Hernandez; and Ema C_, even though an accomplice witness, was any other person. It requires artful construction to read Ema out of the picture when she was informed of the offense by sight, by hearing, and by touching her minor daughter.
My real quarrel with the opinion of the majority arises, however, from the fact that the provisions of art. 38.07 are not applicable in this case. This is not a case in which the conviction is supported on “the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” The victim’s testimony was alone sufficient to support a conviction unless art. 38.07 prevented it from doing so. That testimony was clearly and in considerable detail corroborated by the testimony of her mother, Ema.
Wilmeth v. State, 629 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no petition) has great similarity to the case before us. In that case Wilmeth was convicted of sexual abuse of a child upon the testimony of the complainant and of “complainant’s mother, an accomplice, who substantially corroborated complainant’s testimony.” Wilmeth complained that the trial judge erred in not charging the jury pursuant to art. 38.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After quoting the section verbatim, the court, in a unanimous decision, said:
Prior to the enactment of article 38.07, the complainant’s testimony in a sexual offense case had to be corroborated by some other evidence. See 1965 Tex.Gen. Laws, ch. 722; Code Crim.Pro. art. 38.07 at 466. The present article 38.07 was enacted to permit conviction to be supported solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. See Hargrove v. State, 579 S.W.2d 238,239 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Thus, article 38.07 applies only to those situations where the State seeks a conviction based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant and the instruction in article 38.07 need not be given where the complainant’s testimony is corroborated. Since complainant’s testimony in this case was substantially corroborated by her mother, article 38.07 is inapplicable and the trial judge was not required to charge pursuant to it. [Emphasis added.]
In the case at bar, the mother’s testimony also substantially corroborated that of her daughter; and, by the reasoning in Wil-meth, art. 38.07 is inapplicable in this case.
The standard of corroboration under art. 38.07 is the same as the standard of corroboration under art. 38.14; and the standard of sufficiency under art. 38.14 is that the corroboration tends to connect the defendant with the offense charged. Nemecek v. State, 621 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). In Pinson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) the Court of Criminal Appeals, after quoting art. 38.14, said:
In Edwards v. State, 421 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), this Court laid down the following rule:
The test as to the sufficiency of the corroboration is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then to examine the evidence of other witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpato-ry evidence, that is evidence of incriminating character which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. If there is such evidence, the corroboration is sufficient; otherwise, it is not. [Emphasis added.]
Application of such standard of sufficiency of corroboration under art. 38.07 supports the conviction. Ema’s testimony corroborated that of her daughter, the victim, in at least the following respects:
1. Identification of appellant;
2. Identification of time and place;
3. Placement of appellant in bed with her unclothed daughter;
4. Observation that appellant had sexual intercourse with her daughter;
5. The fact that she, the mother, positioned the legs or feet of her daughter to accommodate appellant;
6. The fact that her daughter was eleven years old at the time;
7. The fact that her daughter had not begun to menstruate at the time;
*6268. The fact that her daughter bled as the result of the intercourse; and
9. The fact that appellant told Ema that the daughter would need to take birth control pills in the future when she began to menstruate.
It cannot be seriously contended that the mother’s testimony did not corroborate the victim’s testimony so as to tend to connect appellant with the crime charged. The majority instead assume that because the mother was indicted along with appellant, her testimony had to be corroborated. The circular holding is that the mother’s testimony could not be used to corroborate the testimony of the victim. The two articles do not require such drastic restriction of supportive evidence, and no case so holds. The majority choose to ignore the Dallas Court’s holding in Wilmeth and fashion their own rule with regard to corroboration of the testimony of a minor victim of statutory rape, thus making it impossible to convict a rapist if he has secured assistance of the minor’s mother. The Legislature could not have intended such a monstrous result; the language of art. 38.07 does not require it, and no court has so held. Appellant’s second ground of error should be overruled.
If the victim’s testimony was, under art. 38.07, corroborated by her mother’s testimony, then that corroboration is sufficient to support the conviction. It would follow that appellant’s third ground of error could be summarily overruled, because it is not necessary to support the conviction under art. 38.14 if it is fully supported under art. 38.07.
Even if I am wrong in that assertion, the third ground of error should be overruled. Article 38.14 provides that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. Nemecek and Pinson, supra, once more lay out the standard of sufficiency of corroboration.
Application of that standard under art. 38.14 supports the conviction. The victim’s testimony tended to and indeed and in great detail did connect appellant with the commission of the offense of rape of a child. If Ema were not an accomplice witness, her testimony would have been enough to support appellant’s conviction. The child’s testimony was overwhelming corroboration of her mother’s testimony. The third ground of error is therefore without merit.
Grounds of error numbers four and five cumulatively argue the same issues asserted in the first three grounds of error. For the reasons given above, these grounds of error should also be overruled.
If the points of error relating to sufficiency of evidence, including corroborative evidence, are overruled, then the final three grounds of error raised by appellant need to be addressed briefly.
By his sixth ground of error, appellant maintains that the record does not affirmatively disclose that the court-appointed counsel in this case had ten (10) days to prepare for trial or that said counsel filed a written waiver of this privilege as is required under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 26.04(b) (Vernon 1966). Contrary to this contention, the record before this court reflects the appointment of counsel on March 7, 1979, and the trial of this case on March 21, 1979. The requirements of art. 26.04(b) were satisfied, and ground of error six should be overruled.
Appellant also asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant appellant’s motion for a continuance pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 29.03 (Vernon 1982). Appellant based his motion on an alleged need for more time to conduct discovery procedures. The decision to grant or to refuse a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reversible only upon an abuse of that discretion. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Corley v. State, 582 S.W.2d 815, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 238, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). An abuse of discretion will not be shown unless the record reflects that the defendant was deprived of material evidence resulting in harm or prejudice. Leach v. State, 548 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); *627Robinson v. State, 454 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). There is no affirmative indication that a continuance would have allowed appellant to produce evidence meeting this standard. Appellant failed in his motion for new trial to show what the evidence would have been or the materiality of the alleged missing evidence. Leach v. State, supra, at 385; McCloud v. State, 494 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Palasota v. State, 460 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denial of the motion for continuance. Ground of error number seven should be overruled.
Finally, appellant claims that the trial court erred by taking no action upon appellant’s timely request for an examining trial, thus impliedly denying the request. Appellant says that he made a pro se motion for an examining trial on or about February 26, 1979, but that no action was taken upon his motion which became moot when he was indicted on March 5, 1979. The trial court found that the motion was never filed with the clerk of the court nor presented to the court, holding that it could not be considered a part of the record.
Since no such motion exists in the record, the return of the indictment by the grand jury terminated appellant’s right to an examining trial. White v. State, 576 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Ground of error number eight should be overruled.
Since none of appellant’s grounds of error is meritorious, the judgment should be affirmed.
The precise rule adopted by the majority has never been announced by any other court; and to that extent, this is a case of first impression. By inference, however, this rule is contrary to the rule announced in Wilmeth v. State, supra; and to that extent, there are contrary rules adopted by different courts of appeals. I respectfully urge the Court of Criminal Appeals to grant discretionary review, whether or not the State so moves, in order to instruct us with regard to whether a minor victim’s testimony may be corroborated by an accomplice and to whether an accomplice’s testimony may be corroborated by a minor victim under arts. 38.07 and 38.14.