Court Opinion

ID: 9363315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 20:01:53.348647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.891800
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/13/23 Beauchesne v. Schmidt CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 RICHARD BEAUCHESNE,                                                 H047448
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 2015-1-CV-287472)

           v.

 JEANNE SCHMIDT,

           Defendant and Respondent.

 RICHARD BEAUCHESNE,                                                 H047861
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 2015-1-CV-287472)

           v.

 THOMAS KENEFICK,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff Richard Beauchesne appeals from a May 8, 2019 judgment following a
September 2, 2016 order striking his first amended complaint and sustaining defendant
Jeanne Schmidt’s demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Beauchesne also
appeals the December 3, 2019 order on his motion to vacate the order granting defendant
Thomas Kenefick’s motions to quash. Finding no error, we affirm both orders.
                                 I.     BACKGROUND 1
A.     Dissolution Proceeding
       On August 19, 2009, Beauchesne’s then-wife petitioned for dissolution of
marriage. On August 5, 2011, on Beauchesne’s ex parte application, the family court
appointed Jeanne Schmidt, Beauchesne’s sister, as his guardian ad litem in the dissolution
action. Schmidt remained in that role until July 25, 2016. Defendant Bradford Baugh
had represented Beauchesne but was permitted to withdraw as Beauchesne’s counsel on
April 29, 2013. Baugh thereafter represented Schmidt in her capacity as guardian ad
litem, with the consent of the family court, upon his representation that Beauchesne and
Schmidt had waived any conflict. Attorney Paul Nesse thereafter represented
Beauchesne until at least December 13, 2013, when Nesse too sought to withdraw as
counsel.
B.     2014 Civil Lawsuit
       On April 23, 2014, 51 weeks after Baugh had withdrawn from representation of
Beauchesne, Beauchesne filed a civil lawsuit against Baugh, Schmidt, and Kenefick.
Beauchesne alleged causes of action for negligence, intentional tort, and fraud against all
three and prayed for exemplary damages. The gravamen of his complaint was (1) that
attorneys Baugh and Kenefick had engaged in legal malpractice in their discharge of
duties owed to him in connection with the dissolution, including their failure to obtain
waivers of conflict and of statutory and other rights; (2) that Schmidt was negligent in the
discharge of her duties to him as his guardian ad litem and “de facto conservator” by
waiving his statutory rights in the dissolution without his authorization; (3) that all had
deprived him of property and property rights, including by conversion of property to their

       1 We take the background from our prior opinion in Beauchesne v. Baugh (May
25, 2022, H047054) [nonpub. opn.] with additions from the complaint and procedural
history that are relevant to these appeals. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of
that prior opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
                                              2
own use and by payment to Baugh of “illegal” fees to which he was not entitled; (4) that
all had engaged in intentional and negligent misrepresentation and concealment,
including by promises without intent to perform; and (5) that Baugh “regularly and
routinely placed his own interests in . . . fees ahead of [p]laintiff’s.”
       Beauchesne filed a first amended complaint on January 20, 2015. The parties
disagreed as to whether the first amended complaint operated as a dismissal of Baugh
because it was titled “ ‘First Amended Complaint Against Defendant Jeanne Schmidt.’ ”
On April 29, 2015, Beauchesne dismissed Schmidt from the lawsuit without prejudice.
       On January 30, 2017, the court on Baugh’s motion dismissed the entire action
without prejudice.
C.     2015 Civil Lawsuit
       Beauchesne filed a complaint in a new action on October 29, 2015, against the
same defendants named in his 2014 lawsuit: Baugh, Schmidt, and Kenefick. The
complaint, which incorporates by reference the 2014 complaint, attached as an exhibit,
comprises the following causes of action: (1) fraud; (2) negligence; (3) conversion and
civil extortion; (4) elder abuse; and (5) conspiracy with attorney(s).
       Elaborating on his 2014 theory that Schmidt became his de facto conservator upon
her appointment as guardian ad litem in the dissolution case, Beauchesne alleges that
Schmidt engaged in a number of fraudulent and malicious activities, including:
(1) paying Baugh attorney fees and costs to which he was not entitled; (2) paying certain
purported obligations of Beauchesne that should not have been paid; (3) refusing to
invest Beauchesne’s funds as a prudent person and conservator would; (4) refusing to
return money to Beauchesne despite his demand; (5) refusing to return personal property
to Beauchesne; (6) refusing to act when informed that Baugh had lied to the judge in the
dissolution proceeding; (7) ceding her obligations as guardian ad litem and conservator to
Kenefick, her lawyer-boyfriend-fiancé; (8) permitting Kenefick to review Beauchesne’s
medical records; (9) falsely representing to the judge in the dissolution proceeding that
                                                3
Baugh did not represent her; (10) violating a court order that certain information be
submitted only to the court in the dissolution proceeding; (11) serving without a
conservator’s bond; (12) failing to assert claims against Baugh on Beauchesne’s behalf;
(13) failing to obtain probate court approval of an August 2012 dissolution settlement
agreement; (14) submitting proposed judgments to the court without Beauchesne’s
approval; (15) refusing to appeal the judgments; (16) refusing to send money that
Beauchesne needed to pay rent; (17) agreeing to be named the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on the life of Beauchesne’s ex-wife that had been intended to secure the ex-wife’s
obligation to pay spousal support; and (18) agreeing that she would seek a
conservatorship of Beauchesne and that she would serve as conservator.
       Beauchesne alleges Baugh and Kenefick conspired with Schmidt in committing
these acts. He alleges that “Kenefick, who is licensed as an attorney in Massachusetts,
also undertook to represent Plaintiff in the Dissolution of Marriage proceeding. And
since Kenefick is Defendant Schmidt’s boyfriend and supposed fiancé, Kenefick stood to
potentially gain financially from any financial gains reaped by Defendant Schmidt.”
       In June 2016, Schmidt filed a demurrer to the 2015 complaint. Beauchesne’s only
argument in opposition to the demurrer was that Schmidt had failed to meet and confer.
The day before the hearing on the demurrer, Beauchesne filed a first amended complaint.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the basis that Beauchesne had failed to file any
opposition papers and had “failed to present any credible opposition at the hearing,” and
that there was “good cause appearing from the papers filed in support of [Schmidt’s]
demurrer.”2 In its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court
also struck the first amended complaint because it had been filed untimely and without
leave of court. The court entered judgment in favor of Schmidt on May 8, 2019.

       2 It is not apparent from the record why the trial court stated that Beauchesne had
not filed any papers in opposition to the demurrer. Beauchesne filed an opposition, albeit
brief and nonsubstantive, on July 8, 2016.
                                             4
       In 2016, Kenefick filed motions to quash in both the 2014 and 2015 lawsuits,
which the trial court consolidated for hearing. The trial court first declined to consider a
“supplemental” opposition Beauchesne filed August 5, 2016, in the 2015 action. In
discussing whether personal jurisdiction existed over Kenefick, the court noted that the
jurisdictional facts stated in Beauchesne’s and Kenefick’s declarations conflicted; the
court found “Kenefick’s version of events to be more plausible and persuasive.” It
therefore granted both motions to quash.
       On November 9, 2019, Beauchesne moved for an order vacating the order granting
Kenefick’s motions to quash. Beauchesne stated the motion was made on the following
grounds: “(1) That the Court’s September 2, 2016, Order is void and must be set
aside/vacated pursuant to CCP §473(d); (2) That the Order was obtained through
Defendant Thomas Kenefick’s ‘fraud on the Court;” (3) That the Court has the statutory
authority under CCP§128(8) ‘to amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conform to law and justice. . . .’; (4) That the Court should exercise its inherent
authority and powers to preserve and protect the integrity of the judicial process by
setting aside/vacating the September 2, 2016, Order obtained through Defendant Thomas
Kenefick’s extrinsic fraud; and (5) That, in his deposition taken in this matter on May 22,
2019, in Pittsfield, MA, Defendant Thomas Kenefick effectively conceded that this Court
has personal jurisdiction over him in this action; such concession was made by Defendant
Kenefick in May, 2019, when he acknowledged that he represented at least Jeanne
Schmidt – in the Beauchesne marital dissolution proceeding – in her capacities as
[guardian ad litem and trustee].” The trial court denied the motion.
       Beauchesne timely appealed both orders. On our own motion we have ordered the
two appeals considered together in one opinion.

                                              5
                                    II.    DISCUSSION
A.     Demurrer
       Beauchesne argues that the judgment is corrupt because it was entered without any
“ ‘notice of a motion to dismiss or intention to dismiss and without any hearing or
opportunity to be heard’ ” and because no notice of entry of judgment was sent by the
clerk of the court or any party. He also contends that the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for him in a different legal proceeding should have stayed his 2015 lawsuit until the
August 24, 2016 order terminating his guardianship ad litem, which Beauchesne asserts
marked the restoration of his competency for all purposes. We reject both contentions.
       1.       Legal Standard
       We review de novo a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer. (T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) In the exercise of our independent
judgment, “we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative
complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also
consider matters subject to judicial notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.)
       When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment . . . .” (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion.
(Ibid.) However, “[t]he burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
       2.       Discussion
       The first of Beauchesne’s two main arguments is that the May 8, 2019 judgment is
corrupt because there was no “notice of a motion to dismiss or intention to dismiss.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 5813 provides that the court may dismiss the complaint

       3   Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                              6
as to a defendant in certain circumstances, including “after a demurrer to the complaint is
sustained without leave to amend and either party moves for dismissal.” (§ 581, subd.
(f)(1).) But “[o]rdinarily, in the absence of a request for a reconsideration, after a
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, … no formal motion to dismiss the action
is necessary. The entry of a judgment of dismissal follows as a matter of course.” (Berri
v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856,
860 (Berri).)4
       Beauchesne relies on Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761 (Vaccaro), in
which the defendants moved to strike the first amended complaint under section 128.7,
subdivision (a) and section 436, because the plaintiff’s attorney had neglected to sign it.
(Vaccaro, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) The plaintiff’s attorney signed and filed a
copy of the first amended complaint before the hearing on the motion to strike, but the
court granted the motion and denied leave to amend on the ground that the attorney had
not acted “ “promptly,’ ” and dismissed the plaintiff’s action with prejudice—despite the
absence of any such request by the defendants or prior notice by the court. (Ibid.) The
appellate court, in reversing the judgment of dismissal, stated that the trial court had acted
“hastily and unreasonably” and cited to section 581, subdivision (f)(3), which states that a
court may dismiss the complaint as to a defendant “ ‘[a]fter a motion to strike the whole
of a complaint is granted without leave to amend and either party moves for dismissal.’ ”
The Vaccaro court noted that “defendants had not requested dismissal in the motion to

       4 “It is only by the entry of the judgment that plaintiff is in a position to test the
correctness of the court’s ruling since there is no appeal from a ruling on a demurrer but
only from the ensuing judgment.” (Berri, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 860.) Even where there
has been no judgment at all, “when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of the
complaint’s causes of action, appellate courts may deem the order to incorporate a
judgment of dismissal, since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality
of the entry of a dismissal order or judgment.” (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1396.)

                                              7
strike nor had the court given any prior notice it intended to dismiss.” (Vaccaro, supra,
63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 768-769.)
       We do not find Vaccaro to be controlling. First, unlike the defendants in Vaccaro,
Schmidt had in fact expressly argued for dismissal in the memorandum of points and
authorities in support of her demurrer. Second, beyond section 581, the reviewing court
in Vaccaro relied principally on the curable nature of the defect there at issue. (Vaccaro,
supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.) Given the curable nature of that technical defect,
Vaccaro did not address the California Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Berri. Rather,
the Vaccaro court relied on Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186 (Reid), in which
the trial court—without notice—dismissed the action as a sanction for plaintiffs’ failure
to appear for a status conference. (Id. at pp. 1193-1194.) Because Reid involved neither
a demurrer sustained without leave to amend nor section 581, it therefore supports the
Vaccaro court’s holding only to the limited extent that a plaintiff should normally be
given notice prior to the dismissal of the case.
       Even if we were to find some procedural irregularity here, Beauchesne does not
assert he suffered any prejudice. There can be no reversal “unless an error was
prejudicial and a different result was likely in the absence of the error. Prejud ice is not
presumed.” (In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1269.)
       Beauchesne’s second, and more extensive, argument is that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in the dissolution case was a judicial determination of incompetency,
which should have resulted in a stay of the proceedings in this action until Beauchesne
was restored to competency in 2016. Beauchesne made essentially the same argument in
his previous appeal, in which he relied on sections 340.6 and 352 to contend that the
appointment of Schmidt as guardian ad litem in his family proceeding tolled the time
period for him to commence the instant lawsuit. 5 As we then noted, the appointment of a

       5Section 340.6 provides that “[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services
                                              8
guardian ad litem is not a determination of incapacity for all purposes but is unique to the
litigation in which the court makes the appointment. (§ 372, subd. (a)(1); Regency
Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1498, fn. 2; Poaster
v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 948, 951 [the status of guardian ad litem exists
only in that specific litigation in which the appointment occurs].) “ ‘In the absence of a
conflict of interest, . . . the appointment [of a guardian ad litem] is usually made on
application only and involves little exercise of discretion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re
Marriage of Caballero (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149).
       Beauchesne accordingly specified on the face of his application for Schmidt’s
appointment that his unexplained disability was limited to “handling this matter” only,
and the application was handled as an apparently ministerial matter, solely on
Beauchesne’s conclusory representation that he “need[ed] someone to make decisions on
settlement or trial of issues, see to it his assets are gathered and debts are paid.” We
concluded that it was Beauchesne’s actual capacity, not the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for his dissolution, that controlled, and that Beauchesne had not demonstrated or
even alleged any actual incapacity.
       The record in this appeal reflects no facts or allegations that would merit a
different conclusion. As a threshold matter, Beauchesne never asked the trial court to
appoint a guardian ad litem in this civil litigation he himself initiated. Beauchesne made
no allegation in his 2014 complaint or any iteration of his 2015 complaint of any inability

shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act of omission, whichever occurs
first.” (§ 340.6, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a)(4) of section 340.6 provides that the time
period to commence a legal action under section 340.6 is tolled when “[t]he plaintiff is
under a legal or physical disability that restricts the plaintiff’s ability to commence legal
action.” Section 352 states, in relevant part, that if a person lacks the legal capacity to
make decisions at the time a cause of action accrues, “the time of the disability is not part
of the time limited for the commencement of the action.” (§ 352, subd. (a).)
                                              9
to competently prosecute his civil claims; he has made no suggestion that whatever
incapacity led to his seeking Schmidt’s appointment as guardian ad litem in his
dissolution matter impaired his ability to proceed without a guardian ad litem in the civil
litigation he had initiated. As we did in Beauchesne’s prior appeal, we again conclude
that the appointment of a guardian ad litem in Beauchesne’s dissolution case has no
impact on the instant lawsuit and did not require the trial court to stay this case or take
any other action.
       As a final matter, Beauchesne appears to contend that the trial court should have
given him leave to amend when sustaining the demurrer. “The burden is on the plaintiff
to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint can be amended.” (Ross v. Creel
Printing & Publishing Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 748.) Having filed no
substantive opposition to the demurrer, Beauchesne failed to meet his burden in this
respect.
B.     Motion to Vacate6
       Beauchesne appeals the December 3, 2019, order on his motion to vacate the order
on Kenefick’s motions to quash. Because Beauchesne did not timely move to vacate the
order on the motions to quash, he relies on section 473, subdivision (d), which authorizes
a court to set aside a void judgment or order, and has no time limit. 7 (Pittman, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 1021 [“There is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face.”].)

       6  Kenefick’s motion to augment the record and related request for judicial notice
are denied. The documents he provides pertain to separate and more recent motions to
quash by Kenefick in this case and in a similar lawsuit filed in Contra Costa County and
then transferred to Santa Clara County. Kenefick contends the additional records relate
to the issue of prejudice. Kenefick acknowledges, however, that Beauchesne has not
raised the issue of prejudice in his appeal. These documents are therefore not necessary
to a resolution of this appeal.

       7  Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020
(Pittman) [“The trial court’s determination whether an order is void is reviewed de novo;
its decision whether to set aside a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”].)
                                              10
        Recognizing that Kenefick’s statements do not make the order void on its face,
Beauchesne relies on footnote 14 in Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San
Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20, footnote 14, where the court quoted from Thompson
v. Cook (1942) 20 Cal.2d 564, 569: “ ‘It is well settled in this state that a court has no
power to set aside on motion a judgment or order not void on its face unless the motion is
made within a reasonable time, and it has been definitely determined that such time will
not extend beyond the limited time fixed by section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
at present in force. [Citations.] However, to the rule just stated there is a
well[-]established exception which provides that although the judgment or order is valid
on its face, if the party in favor of whom the judgment or order runs admits facts showing
its invalidity, or, without objection on his part, evidence is admitted which clearly shows
the existence of such facts, then it is the duty of the court to declare the judgment or order
void.’ ”
        Beauchesne contends that Kenefick conceded in a May 22, 2019 deposition that
the California trial court has personal jurisdiction over him. The deposition took place in
Massachusetts for a lawsuit filed by Beauchesne in that state against the same defendants
in the instant case. Beauchesne reads too much into Kenefick’s deposition testimony.
        The relevant deposition testimony from Kenefick follows:
“Q. . . . So I want to be sure that I understand correctly. Your position is that you
represented Jeanne Schmidt as an individual but not as a guardian ad litem, is that
correct?
“A. I represented Jeanne Schmidt as an individual. And part of that representation, I
think at times, was giving her advice regarding part of her role as GAL.
“Q. So that – well, how do you make the difference between representing her as an
individual and representing her in her capacity as GAL?
“[¶] . . . [¶]

                                             11
“[A.]: Obviously part of my representation of her, generally, I think incurred giving her
some advice in terms of how to [sic], in terms of her role as a GAL.
“Q. . . . You understood all along, by all along I mean from the time that she was initially
appointed as GAL through her release at a hearing in July of 2016, that Miss Schmidt
owed me fiduciary duties, correct?
“A. I’m sure.
“Q. And I’m sure you understood that in giving her advice with respect to her fiduciary
obligations you were in effect representing me indirectly?
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[A.]: No.”
        In his supplemental declaration in support of his motions to quash, Kenefick stated
that he is not licensed to practice law in California and has never appeared in any court in
California. He also stated that he had communications with Baugh, and with Anthony
Boskovich, Beauchesne’s criminal attorney, but did not collaborate with either attorney
on a California case. He asserted that he was physically present at the courthouse for the
two-day settlement conference in Beauchesne’s family law case, but was only there to
offer “moral and emotional support” to Schmidt. He stated that he provided services for
Beauchesne on a Massachusetts criminal matter, but did not give Beauchesne any advice
regarding his California divorce.
        We agree that Kenefick’s role as Schmidt’s partner and personal lawyer—advising
her “regarding part of her role as GAL”—is less than clear, but we discern no conflict
with the statements in his supplemental declaration. To establish the judgment is void on
its face, Beauchesne has the burden of demonstrating that Kenefick admitted facts
showing its invalidity, or that admitted evidence clearly shows the existence of such
facts. Kenefick in his deposition testimony does not concede that any California court
has jurisdiction over him, that he practiced law in California, or that he represented
Schmidt in Beauchesne’s dissolution or in any California proceeding. The trial court
                                             12
therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that the order granting Kenefick’s
motions to quash was not void.
       As he does in connection with his appeal of the demurrer, Beauchesne again
argues that the appointment of a guardian ad litem constitutes a judicial determination of
incompetency. He asserts that the motions to quash were filed, served, briefed, and heard
while he was determined to be incompetent, and that the resulting orders are therefore
void on their face. For the reasons we discussed in connection with Schmidt’s demurrer,
we again reject the argument regarding incompetency.
       Beauchesne’s final argument is that, because Kenefick represented Schmidt as her
attorney, he also represented Beauchesne as a derivative client and as a third party
beneficiary. This is similar to the argument made by Beauchesne in his prior appeal that
Baugh, who represented Schmidt in her capacity as guardian ad litem, in effect
represented Beauchesne as a “derivative” client. We rejected the argument, concluding
that an intended third-party beneficiary of an attorney-client relationship is not a client of
the attorney. (Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d
264, 283 [a trust beneficiary is not a client of the trustee’s counsel]; see also Shen v.
Miller (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [a shareholder who brings a derivative action on
behalf of a corporation acts in a fiduciary capacity substantially as guardian ad litem for
the corporation, but that does not give rise to an attorney-client relationship between the
attorney for the shareholder and the corporation].) We have no reason to adopt a
different conclusion here.
       Beauchesne also asserts that he considered Kenefick as an attorney who gave him
legal advice because he trusted Kenefick, who had been the live-in boyfriend of Schmidt
for many years, and because Kenefick claimed to have substantial expertise in the areas
of family law and criminal law. That Beauchesne has the subjective view that he
received legal advice from Kenefick is insufficient to evidence the creation of an
attorney-client relationship. (Zenith Ins. Co. v. O’Connor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 998,
                                              13
1010 [“California law is settled that a client’s subjective belief that an attorney-client
relationship exists, standing alone, cannot create such a relationship, or a duty of care
owed by the attorney to that plaintiff.”].)
                                   III.   DISPOSITION
       The orders are affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Schmidt and Kenefick
for their respective appeals.

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                                ____________________________
                                LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.

_____________________________
GROVER, J.

Beauchesne v. Schmidt
H047448
Beauchesne v. Kenefick
H047861