Court Opinion

ID: 9747192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:02:00.797526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.868321
License: Public Domain

ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting and concurring.
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of the hearsay issue as I find the instant facts to be sufficiently similar to those in Commonwealth v. Watson, 426 Pa.Super. 496, 627 A.2d 785 (1993) as to be indistinguishable. I would therefore affirm the judgment of sentence imposed upon Wanda Vining. I also concur and dissent in the result reached by the Majority in the appeal by Lee Jones.
¶ 2 In the Vining appeal the majority, in exploring the factors that allegedly distinguish this case from Watson, incorrectly assumes that “the response in Watson was more proximate in time to the incident.” Majority Opinion at 318. My reading of Watson indicates there was no evidence of the time frame between when the child was burned and when the ambulance was called. The defense in Watson, as in the present case, argued the statement was influenced by the lapse of an undisclosed period of time after the child had been injured and therefore lacked the spontaneity of an excited utterance. In finding the statement admissible as an excited utterance the Watson Court noted that “[l]ength of time is an element that must be weighed along with other considerations. It varies with the circumstances and from case to case. It does not alone decide admissibility.” Id. at 788. In Watson, the only evidence of when the child was burned was the doctor’s opinion that it would have been within the last twenty-*325four hours. Hence, proximity cannot be a distinguishing factor.
¶ 3 Next, the majority relies upon the fact that the child in Watson was described as ‘crying and scared and nervous’ contrasted with the description of the instant victim being “lethargic and subdued and uncomfortable.” Majority Opinion at 819. The actual complete description of the doctor’s observation of the victim reads as follows:
Q. And could you tell me, please, Doctor, what you observed when you examined the child?
A. I examined — I observed that the child was in discomfort, was somewhat lethargic, was very irritable and appeared to be in pain.
N.T. Volume II, 2/7-19/97, at 975. The majority’s paraphrasing of this testimony does not do justice to the victim’s condition. Moreover, the Doctor further testified that he prescribed morphine for the pain. Surely this child was still suffering from a traumatic event and the severe physical pain which accompanied it.
¶ 4 The majority next finds a distinction based upon the number of people the respective victims came in contact with prior to making the statement. In this regard the only contacts the child had were with her mother, while being transported to the hospital, and with the medical personnel. The mother testified that she merely held her child on the way to the hospital and did not ask her any questions, believing what she had been told that it was an accidental burning. The mother’s testimony was not contradicted and her credibility was a matter for the trial judge to resolve.' I am not persuaded that contact with various medical personnel could have in any way caused the statement to emanate from the child’s reflective faculties. I am satisfied that there is ample evidence here to support the trial court’s conclusion that insofar as the child was concerned, the startling event was on-going and she was still under its influence. It is doubtful that a 2^-year-old child, who only had limited contact with her parents during the time she was being treated, would have engaged in independent thought sufficient to fabricate a statement to be made to others.
¶ 5 The excited utterance exception properly understood relates to a lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to fabricate. Therefore, the question is not whether it is likely that the child’s statements were falsely made but rather whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements suggest reliability and lack of opportunity for the deliberation and preparation attendant to giving a false statement. Generally, there are three essential components to this exception. First, there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. Second, the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Third, the statement must have been made before there had been time to contrive or misrepresent.
¶ 6 There is no bright line test by which to measure the length of a permissible time gap for the number of hours or days that the excitement can be said to continue from the stress of a crime. All that is required is a showing that the time was sufficiently short under the facts to fall within the limits of the exception. I believe under the compelling circumstances of child abuse a liberal evaluation of this exception should be employed. Moreover, I note that the special circumstance attendant to child abuse victims and witnesses has also been recognized by our legislature’s enactment of the Child Victims and Witnesses Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5981-5988.7
*326¶ 7 The final distinction raised is that the instant victim responded to a leading question as opposed to a general question. The question “who burnt you” does not suggest the answer, thus I fail to see how it is leading. In any event the form of the question does not bear upon whether or not a statement is an “excited utterance.” As noted in Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 141, 383 A.2d 858, 862 (1978), our Supreme Court has repeatedly held “that the mere fact that a statement is made in response to a question does not prevent its admission as a res gestae statement.” (citing Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 311 A.2d 576 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Edwards, 431 Pa. 44, 244 A.2d 683 (1968)).
¶ 8 I would also point out that the trial court conducted an in camera hearing where all of these factors were examined and weighed by the trial court. In reaching its decision the court stated:
This has been a question that I have been grappling with for several days and trying to resolve in my own mind. And I needed to hear everything that there was to hear before making the decision. The only condition that’s really disposi-tive, the only factor really dispositive, the declarant must have been subjected to some shocking event. After that point all other surrounding circumstances are to be considered. And all those other factors that are listed in the case law are not in an [sic] of themselves dispositive but are factors to consider along with everything else. Obviously in this case the victim’s mind was made subject to the overpowering emotion that was caused by the unexpected and shocking event of being burned. The statement to Doctor Meyers in my estimation was made in response obviously to the questions of the doctor. But in my mind there’s no indication that the statements that were made by this child were the result of some premeditation and consideration by the child or by some design on her part. I do believe that the spontaneity of the statement was maintained even though they were in response to the questions of the doctor. As I indicated previously, there is no clear-cut rule as to the time period that must pass before such statement should or must be excluded. And as I said to Mr. Huffman ..., this statement was made during a continuing course of treatment of the child for her injuries. This continuous course of treatment at the various hospitals was in my determination actually really a continuation or closely related to the shocking event that took place earlier in the day. In addition, I have not heard any evidence to establish that the child, in fact, was subjected to any influence or coaching. Nor do I believe the circumstances indicate that this statement was the result of some confabulation on the part of the child. For all those reasons I’m going to determine and find that the statement is admissible and will hear the doctor,
N.T. Volume II, 2/7-19/97, at 968-970.
¶ 9 It is important to remember that the admissibility of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that we may only reverse rulings on admissibility upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Weber, 549 Pa. 430, 701 *327A.2d 531 (1997). Keeping this standard in mind, I fully agree with the trial court’s analysis of this issue and can find no abuse of discretion.
¶ 10 Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of sentence as to Wanda Vining.
¶ 11 As to Lee Jones, I join the majority’s determination to reverse as to counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12 and 13 of the information. However, as to the reversal on counts 2 and 7, I would merely vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial for the following reason. Applying the Majority’s analysis with respect to the endangering the welfare of a child charges at counts 4 and 10, I likewise would find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions at counts 2 and 7, relating to reckless endangerment 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, based upon the failure to seek prompt medical attention. In Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992), this Court held that criminal liability for the offense of reckless endangering another person can be based upon an omission if an omission, where a duty to act was recognized, created a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. However, since this theory was not charged and a jury is not permitted to base its verdict on a theory not charged, see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 471 A.2d 1228 (1984), I would merely vacate these convictions and remand for a new trial.
¶12 HUDOCK, EAKIN and JOYCE, JJ., join in this dissenting and concurring opinion.

. The tender years exception to the hearsay rule provides:
§ 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements
(a) General rule. — An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 12 years of age or younger, describing *326physical abuse, indecent contact or any of the offenses enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses) performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding if:
(1) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) the child either:
(i) testifies at the proceeding; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness.
(Emphasis added). This provision was amended in 1996 to make it applicable to cases of physical as well as sexual abuse. However, at the tithe of the start of the instant trial it had not yet become effective.