Court Opinion

ID: 9559172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:23:58.892178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:54.004409
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting)—This court has frequently asserted that every presumption favors the validity of an act *635and that all doubts must be resolved in support of the act. Lenci v. Seattle, 63 Wn.2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964). We have also held that, if one construction presents constitutional difficulties and another does not, the court will, if at all possible, reject the former in favor of the latter. State ex. rel. Morgan v. Kinnear, 80 Wn.2d 400, 494 P.2d 1362 (1972); Stale v. Dixon, 78 Wn.2d 796, 479 P.2d 931 (1971).
A charge of vagueness raises the question of whether a statute provides fair notice, measured by common practice and understanding, of that conduct which is prohibited. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). A reasonable person could clearly determine from a reading of RCW 42.17.100(1) that a contributor is required to report a campaign expenditure in excess of $100. The language is clear and precise. The respondents made no attempt to comply with that statute at any time. Rather than acting in a reasonable manner and inquiring of the Commission or checking the regulations to determine the specific time at which to file, they chose to ignore the law entirely. The record shows that even after the statute, the regulations and the requirements for filing were brought to the attention of respondents, they still refused to report. Now, they attempt to exploit the omission of a time limitation in the statute, claiming that they could not determine what conduct was prohibited. This is hardly a convincing argument.
The legislature granted the Commission broad powers to implement RCW 42.17. Under RCW 42.17.370,
The commission is empowered to:
(1) Adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable administrative rules and regulations to carry out the policies and purposes of this chapter,
In interpreting this section of the public disclosure act, I am mindful of RCW 42.17.010, which provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote complete disclosure of all information respecting the financing of political campaigns and lobbying .. .
*636If the argument of the majority were to prevail, there would be little reason for a citizen to be concerned with any of the rules and regulations of the Commission. Yet, surely, any reasonable person would be put on notice that, in order to comply with the act generally, the rules and regulations authorized in RCW 42.17.370 should be read.
I find that the statute in question is not fatally defective as a result of the omission of a reporting time. Pursuant to RCW 42.17.370 and through a valid exercise of its power, the Commission adopted WAC 390-04-180 which specified the time for filing. The policy and purpose of the act is to require that certain campaign expenditures be reported. The duty to report is clear and unequivocal. The Commission is empowered to adopt rules and regulations in order to carry out the policy and purpose of the act. WAC 390-04-180 does not amend the statute nor does it change the legislative enactment. It does carry out the policy and purpose of the act. No reasonable person would be misled by the act; the respondents were not. No reasonable person would allege the language of WAC 390-04-180 was either obscure or unreasonable; the respondents did not. The validity of RCW 42.17.100 should be upheld.
Utter and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.