Court Opinion

ID: 9386566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 21:00:20.357589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.377282
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4566

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        SHANTAI MONIQUE SHELTON, a/k/a Tai, a/k/a Lady Blaze, a/k/a Boss Lady,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Charlottesville. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00016-MFU-2)

        Submitted: March 21, 2023                                         Decided: April 11, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Rhonda E. Quagliana, MICHIEHAMLETT, PLLC, Charlottesville, Virginia,
        for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, Laura Day Rottenborn,
        Assistant United States Attorney, Kari K. Munro, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Shantai Monique Shelton of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer

        Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), Hobbs Act

        robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a), brandishing a

        firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), violent crimes in aid of

        racketeering (VICARs), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(3), discharging a firearm

        during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii),

        VICARs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(1), and tampering with a witness, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1512(a)(1)(C). The district court sentenced Shelton to life

        imprisonment plus a consecutive prison term of 82 years. In Shelton’s first appeal, this

        court vacated her conviction on count 27 for discharging a firearm during and in relation

        to a crime of violence, remanded for resentencing, and affirmed the remainder of the

        criminal judgment. United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2019). At

        resentencing on remand in October 2021, the district court sentenced Shelton to life

        imprisonment plus a consecutive prison term of 34 years. In this appeal of the amended

        criminal judgment, Shelton challenges her prison sentence, arguing that the district court

        erred in determining that she did not qualify for a reduction to her offense level under U.S.

        Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.

               This court reviews a sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness,

        applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41,

        51 (2007). When reviewing a district court’s application of a Sentencing Guideline, this

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        court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United

        States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018). Under the clear error standard, this

        court “will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

        committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Shelton contends that the district court

        erred in failing to award her credit under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility

        because her post-conviction statements expressing remorse justified the reduction.

               Under the Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for a reduction to her offense level if

        she “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility” for her offenses. USSG § 3E1.1(a).

        “To earn the reduction, a defendant must prove to the [district] court by a preponderance

        of the evidence that [s]he has clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal

        responsibility for h[er] criminal conduct.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914

        (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a defendant

        has satisfied this standard, a district court may consider, among other matters, whether the

        defendant truthfully admitted the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction, the

        defendant’s post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and the timeliness of her conduct in

        manifesting acceptance of responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1. Although the reduction

        “is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the [G]overnment to its burden of proof

        at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits

        guilt,” proceeding to trial does not “automatically preclude” the reduction. Id. cmt. n.2. In

        “rare situations,” such as when the “defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues

        that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a

        challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct),” a reduction still may be

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        appropriate. Id. “In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has

        accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.” Id.

        Because the district court “is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of

        responsibility,” id. cmt. n.5, this court affords great deference to the district court’s

        determination, Bolton, 858 F.3d at 915.

               There is no evidence here Shelton demonstrated acceptance of responsibility prior

        to her trial or initial sentencing. She contested her factual guilt at trial and made no

        statement regarding acceptance of responsibility at initial sentencing. It was not until the

        case was on remand—over seven years after some of her criminal conduct and more than

        five years after she contested her guilt at trial—that Shelton expressed some remorse for it

        in a letter she wrote to the district court and in allocution she made at the resentencing

        hearing. According to Shelton’s letter, however, at the time of her crimes and when she

        was first incarcerated for them, she did not care about her victims or their families; it was

        not until some unspecified point during her incarceration post-conviction that she reflected

        on her criminal conduct and its effect. The district court determined that Shelton’s

        statements expressing remorse—although genuine—did not warrant an offense-level

        reduction under USSG § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. Given Shelton’s conduct

        in expressing acceptance of criminal responsibility well after putting the Government to its

        factual burden of proof at trial, being convicted and sentenced, and serving part of her

        prison sentence, we conclude the district court did not reversibly err in determining that

        she did not deserve a reduction to her offense level under USSG § 3E1.1.

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              Accordingly, we affirm the amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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