Court Opinion

ID: 9856470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:48:08.384863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:50.194586
License: Public Domain

Justice KIRSHBAUM
dissenting.
This interlocutory appeal requires application of what we have heretofore recognized as the appropriate standard for interlocutory appellate review of trial court orders granting suppression motions in the course of criminal proceedings. We have on numerous occasions held that such a trial court order will not be overturned unless the trial court fails to apply the correct legal standard or unless the record fails to support the trial court’s factual findings. See, e.g., People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo.1990). Both parties to this appeal have acknowledged the applicability of that standard of review to this appeal, and the majority purports to adopt it. Maj. op. at 1011, 1014, 1015, 1016-17. Because I am convinced that the record as a whole does support the trial court’s factual findings, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.
Of additional concern is the suggestion raised by the majority’s mode of analysis and reflected by certain dicta in the majority’s opinion that a de novo standard of appellate review should be applied to interlocutory appeals of trial court orders granting suppression motions in criminal cases. To the extent the majority purports to adopt this novel standard of appellate review without overruling our long-standing precedent, I also respectfully decline to join the opinion.
In this case the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress a statement he made to a police officer during custodial interrogation. The defendant alleged, inter alia, that assuming he was properly advised of his constitutionally protected rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he did not knowingly and intelligently waive such rights. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion. The majority concludes that the trial court applied the correct legal standards in this case. Maj. op. at 1014, 1015. I agree with that conclusion. The majority also states that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence in the record. Id. at 1014, 1015, 1017. I disagree with that conclusion.
We have recognized that in considering a motion to suppress custodial statements “a [trial court] must engage in fact finding — a specific inquiry into the historical phenomena of the case — and law application, which involves the application of the controlling legal standard to the facts established by the evidence.” People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo.1987); see H.P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 229, 235 (1985). It is also well established that when such a motion is filed the prosecution is *1018required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived such rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1993); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1993). Finally, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in making its ultimate legal conclusions. May, 859 P.2d at 883; see People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792, 796 (Colo.1990) (voluntariness determined on the basis of the totality of circumstances).1
This court has long adhered to the following principles in reviewing trial court orders granting defendants’ motions to suppress custodial statements:
Our role as an appellate court is to review the record and determine whether the trial court’s findings of historical fact are adequately supported by competent evidence and whether the court applied the correct legal standard to these findings in resolving the issue before it.
Trujillo, 784 P.2d at 792; accord People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1663, 128 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo.1983) (where adequate evidence exists in the record to support trial court’s finding that the People failed to prove that defendant waived his Miranda rights, appellate court will not reverse); People v. Medina, 180 Colo. 56, 58, 501 P.2d 1332, 1332 (1972); People v. Kelley, 172 Colo. 39, 40, 470 P.2d 32, 33 (1970) (if trial court’s findings on pertinent issues in a suppression hearing are supported by evidence in the record, a reviewing court must affirm); cf. People v. Founds, 621 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo.1981) (trial court’s factual finding that defendant’s statements were product of illegal interrogation is supported by the record and cannot be disturbed on review); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 327, 608 P.2d 342, 346 (1980) (where evidence exists to support trial court’s findings regarding voluntariness of a confession, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal); People v. Parks, 195 Colo. 344, 349, 579 P.2d 76, 79 (1978) (trial court’s findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of a confession will be upheld on review if supported by adequate evidence in the record); People v. Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 387, 513 P.2d 452, 453 (1973) (same); Gould v. People, 167 Colo. 113, 118, 445 P.2d 580, 582 (1968) (trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding voluntariness of confession which are substantiated by adequate evidence will not be reversed on appeal). Such deference to the fact finding authority of trial courts reflects our recognition that a trial court is in a unique position to determine the credibility of witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence in determining historical facts. Trujillo, 784 P.2d at 792; Fish, 660 P.2d at 509 (an appellate court is in no position to weigh conflicting testimony presented to the trial court); Traubert, 199 Colo, at 327, 608 P.2d at 346; Kelley, 172 Colo, at 40, 470 P.2d at 33 (it is the function of the trial court, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence and make a finding on the pertinent issues at a suppression hearing); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 373, 600 P.2d 68, 69 (1979) (appellate court is in no position to weigh the conflicting testimony presented to the trial court). It is precisely because “[a] cold record is a poor substitute for live testimony” that we do not intrude upon the trial court’s domain except in the clearest of eases. Scott, 198 Colo. at 373, 600 P.2d at 69.
During the suppression hearing in this case, the trial court accurately observed that the critical issue to be resolved was “whether [the defendant] can not only assimilate the Miranda warnings, but use them to protect himself.” In its opinion the trial court thoroughly addressed conflicting testimony and matters of credibility. It also referred to evidence that could support factual determinations contrary to those found by the trial court. The trial court concluded, on the basis of its factual findings, that the prosecution did not sustain its burden of proving that *1019the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutionally protected rights.
The majority, to the contrary, concludes that “the defendant had a sufficient understanding of his rights, and a sufficient understanding of the consequences of relinquishing those rights, so that his waiver was a knowing and intelligent one.” Maj. op. at 1015. In reaching that conclusion, the majority has catalogued numerous evidentiary matters disclosed by the record and, in addition, the majority apparently has made inferences of credibility and has made its own factual findings in light of both conflicting and uncontra-dicted evidence. Such de novo review of the record is inconsistent with the standard of review we have heretofore embraced. Furthermore, whatever method is deemed appropriate for appellate review of trial court orders granting motions to suppress evidence in criminal proceedings, this court may not speculate on witness credibility or resolve evidentiary conflicts.
A description of the evidence in the record and a summary of the trial court’s findings will prove helpful in resolving the issue before us. Three witnesses testified at the suppression hearing: Detective Dailey, Dr. Robert Fairbairn, and the defendant. In its order, the trial court repeatedly stated that it was required to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the prosecution had satisfied its burden of proving that the defendant’s waiver of his constitutionally protected rights was made knowingly and intelligently. Each of the trial court’s factual findings is directly supported by the testimony of one of those three witnesses.
In reviewing Detective Dailey’s testimony, the trial court concluded that the officer properly informed the defendant of the latter’s constitutional rights and did not threaten, coerce, or intimidate the defendant. Because the trial court’s ultimate determination was based on its findings of fact with respect to the defendant’s state of mind during the custodial interrogation, review of Detective Dailey’s testimony is not necessary.2
The trial court summarized the defendant’s testimony as follows:
[Jordan] stated that he knew he had a right of some sort to remain silent, but that he’d have to talk to the detective sooner or later, he didn’t know to whom he could be silent.
He said he knew he could have a lawyer but he didn’t think so during questioning.
Based on his experience he felt that his lawyer would appear for him in court....
He did not think that he could stop talking once he knew that Mr. — Detective Dailey was a police officer, felt that he had to keep on going and didn’t apparently in his mind understand his right to terminate conversation at any time.
On cross-examination it was made clear that the Defendant does have a degree of some level of organization in his thinking; however, it was never completely made clear to me whether he understood, as I said earlier, what this meaning of the right is and how you use the right, what it is and how he gets a lawyer then and there.
In addition to the evidence described by the majority,3 the record contains additional testimony by the defendant. The defendant testified that he not only had very little sleep the night of his arrest but that when he was awakened prior to his interrogation he felt “tired and confused”; that he had a headache from alcohol which he had consumed that day *1020but that the “marijuana had calmed down”; that when he was attending school he had trouble with long words and concentration and did not presently know the meaning of the words “oath,” “approximation,” or “distinct”; that although the detective told him he had the right to remain silent, he “didn’t know who [he] was supposed to remain silent to”; that he had appeared in court as a juvenile, had no prior arrests as an adult, and had never been questioned by a police officer before going to court; that he had never been given a Miranda advisement prior to the one given by Detective Dailey; and that he did not think that he could terminate the interview with Detective Dailey because he thought he “had to talk to him anyway.”
Based on all of the evidence, the trial court found as matters of historical fact that the defendant was sleep-deprived at the time he was interrogated; that the evidence was conflicting with respect to possible alcohol or drug consumption which might have affected the defendant during the interrogation, but that these factors were not “critical in this determination”; that the defendant’s education is “deficient by any definition”; that the defendant was on a “strong psychotropic drug” (Prozac) within six months of the time of his arrest; and that the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system.
The majority opinion also contains descriptions of much of Dr. Fairbairn’s testimony. Maj. op. at 1012-13. In my view, the evidence summarized by the majority in itself fully supports the trial court’s findings. However, the record also contains additional testimony by Dr. Fairbairn that the trial court considered in determining historical facts concerning the circumstances of the custodial interrogation of the defendant.
Dr. Fairbairn explained that he conducts forensic psychiatric examinations of how an examinee’s mental processes are functioning. He stated that he utilized relatively routine questions to determine the mental status of an examinee, looking for possible psychosis or organic difficulties, testing the examinee’s memory, and determining whether the exam-inee can think abstractly. Dr. Fairbairn testified that the defendant came from a “tragic background”; that one of the defendant’s earliest memories was of playing with a lighter, ultimately setting his house on fire and thus causing the death of his mother and two brothers; that this early trauma partially led the defendant to develop a poor self-concept; and that the defendant’s defense mechanism to escape the pain of his self-contempt includes sleeping excessively and using marijuana and alcohol.
Dr. Fairbairn stated that in his expert opinion the defendant had an IQ of 85 or 90; the defendant was deficient in making decisions that have future rewards or distant goals behind the rationale of a decision; although Miranda warnings require an individual to assess his current circumstances and realize that how he answers will affect what happens to him in the future, the defendant has an inadequate understanding of that process; the defendant did not understand the phrase “the right” in that portion of the advisement stating that “you have the right to remain silent”; and the defendant did not understand the statement, “You can decide at any time to exercise these rights.” Dr. Fairbairn also stated that in his expert opinion the defendant “rotely gave an affirmative answer” during the interrogation because “he was operating on autopilot” and just gave a “hostile authority figure” — Detective Dai-ley — what he wanted; the defendant’s lack of sleep impaired his ability to understand his Miranda rights; the defendant’s vague answers and contradictory stories indicate that he “didn’t think that ... he dare use silence, that he felt required to give an answer to the authority figure, whatever the question was”; and the defendant had a “seriously inadequate understanding of the consequences of his affirmative answers.”
The majority deprecates and apparently disregards the defendant’s testimony by characterizing it as “self-serving.” Maj. op. at 1016. An appellate court may not ignore testimony in the record based upon that court’s determination that such testimony is “self-serving”; such credibility evaluations are within the sole province of the fact finder. Fish, 660 P.2d at 509. In this case, the trial court expressly noted that it perceived a substantial difference in the demeanor of the *1021defendant during the latter’s testimony at the suppression hearing in comparison to the defendant’s demeanor during the interrogation session.4
The majority states that Dr. Fairbairn’s conclusion “that the defendant had difficulty with abstract concepts and did not understand his Miranda rights” was “refuted” by the expert’s testimony on cross-examination. Maj. op. at 1016. This court has not previously suggested that contradictory evidence, whether elicited by cross-examination of a single witness or introduced by means of testimony of other witnesses, does not constitute evidence in the record subject to trial court evaluation. Assessment of the credibility and probity of contradictory evidence should not be performed by an appellate court.
We have previously observed that the use of opinion testimony in a suppression hearing provides the court “potentially valuable assistance in understanding and evaluating a defendant’s mental condition_” Parks, 195 Colo, at 348, 579 P.2d at 79; see In re Estate of Painter, 628 P.2d 124, 125 (Colo.App.1980) (issues of credibility of expert witness and probative effect of that testimony are reserved for a trial court, not an appellate court). Any alleged deficiencies or unreliability in an expert physician’s testimony relate to the credibility and the weight to be afforded that opinion and may be explored through cross-examination and the introduction of opposing expert testimony. Parks, 195 Colo, at 348, 579 P.2d at 79.
As the majority recognizes, Dr. Fairbairn stated his opinions with respect to the defendant’s ability to engage in abstract reasoning and the defendant’s general level of intelligence. Maj. op. at 1013. The prosecution did not challenge Dr. Fairbairn’s expertise. The trial court made the following pertinent statements with respect to Dr. Fairbairn’s testimony:
Dr. Fairbairn, who ... has testified on both sides of the aisle in terms of being he has been at one time a police or a DA’s witness and a defense witness, that is during the course of his history, and it was never challenged in any way that he was anything other than an objective observer. Although there was plenty of opportunity to do it, the People didn’t challenge that in any way.
The trial court properly considered all of Dr. Fairbairn’s testimony on direct and on cross-examination. That testimony amply supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant did not understand the Miranda warnings he received.
In my view the record amply supports the trial court’s determinations of historical fact. Whether this or some other court could make different factual findings based on the evidence in the record has heretofore not been considered a component of our standard of appellate review of trial court orders granting suppression motions in criminal eases.
The analysis of the record employed by the majority in effect constitutes de novo appellate court evaluation of evidence and necessarily requires appellate court assessment of witness credibility and resolution of conflicting evidence.5 Adoption of that mode of analysis would require this court to overrule countless decisions defining the appropriate standard of appellate review. The parties have not invited us to take such action in this case, and I am unprepared to do so.
The record fully supports the trial court’s findings, and the trial court applied the correct legal standard. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s order, and therefore respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion.
LOHR and SCOTT, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The majority acknowledges this standard, see maj. op. at 1014, although in describing the events that occurred during the suppression hearing the majority states that "the defendant presented evidence attempting to show that the waiver of his rights was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.” Maj. op. at 1012.

. The majority concludes that the evidence with respect to the adequacy of Detective Dailey's advisement does not support the trial court's characterization of that advisement as being "very, very perfunctory.” Maj. op. at 1015. That characterization, however, is immaterial to the trial court's conclusion that the people failed to establish that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutionally protected rights.

. As the majority notes, the defendant also testified that he normally slept for ten to twelve hours each day. Maj. op. at 1012. The majority opinion describes much of the defendant's testimony; by necessity the majority could not detail all of that testimony. However, because the majority concludes that the record as a whole does not contain evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact, it is necessary to emphasize that the record contains evidence not alluded to in the majority opinion but relied upon by the trial court.

. An audiotape of the interrogation session was introduced in evidence by the prosecution.

. Unlike a few other jurisdictions, Colorado appellate courts have no authority to find facts de novo. See Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 752 P.2d 1116 (Okla.1988); Neiman v. Common Sch. Dist., No. 95, 232 P.2d 422 (Kan. 1951).