Court Opinion

ID: 9859833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:46:35.617177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:23.580267
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring: I agree with the majority opinion that the home of a probationer is entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment and its reasonableness requirement for a valid search, albeit to a lesser extent than that of the general public. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 122 S. Ct. at 591 (“ ‘Probation, like incarceration is “a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” ’ [Citations.] *** Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” ’ [Citations.] *** [A] court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens”). Here, the majority reaches the correct result by reversing the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence found in defendant’s dresser drawer in defendant’s private bedroom. Nonetheless, I write separately to address the parameters of the specific language of the probation condition at issue in this case, as well as to note my exception to comments made in the dissent. As noted in the majority opinion, defendant’s probation order required her to “ ‘[s]ubmit to warrantless searches of [her] person, property, residence, motor vehicle and effects at the request of [her] probation officer or law enforcement authorities.’ ” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Thus, the probation order purports to constitute defendant’s waiver of her fourth amendment rights and is in essence treated as a consent to search, although it is certainly different than a traditional consensual search, where consent is often obtained by a police officer from a person suspected of criminal behavior. In the case at hand, the consent embodied in the probation order is given only at the outset of probation, purportedly to allow for ,any number of searches in any number of places and without any restrictions. As recently noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent is that of ‘ “objective” reasonableness,’ which requires consideration of what a ‘typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.’ ” People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 593 (2003), quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991). The supreme court further stated that “[i]n most instances, this determination is easily made because courts ordinarily define the scope of a search by its express object or purpose.” Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 593, citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 1804. “By indicating to the suspect the intended object of the search either directly or by revealing a suspicion of specific criminal activity, a police officer not only ‘apprises the suspect that his constitutional rights are being impacted, but he also informs the suspect of the reasonable parameters of his inquiry.’ ” Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d at 593, quoting People v. Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d 146, 150, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1998). In my view, it is inconceivable, as the dissent seems to suggest, that a typical reasonable person would understand the consent here to be so sweeping as to authorize probation or law enforcement officers to conduct searches at any time, under any circumstances, and by any means, without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a probation violation. While I do not agree the consent is without limitation, I do agree it significantly diminishes the probationer’s rights. For example, I believe it is objectively reasonable that the language “shall submit” to searches “at the request” of probation or law enforcement authorities advises a probationer that it is quite conceivable .probation or law enforcement officers may show up at the probationer’s door, unannounced and with no prior notice, advise the probationer they are there to conduct a search pursuant to the terms of the probation order, and immediately conduct the search even though the officers had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a probation violation. I do agree with the dissent that “at the request of your probation officer” means “at the direction” of the probation officer and does not mandate that consent of the probationer is required. (Emphasis omitted.) 342 Ill. App. 3d at 310. The Fifth District has found almost identical language in a condition of probation to be a reasonable response to the “special needs” of the Illinois probation system. People v. Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d 250, 257, 576 N.E.2d 1185, 1191 (1991). However, the court went on to hold that a “probationer’s waiver of fourth amendment rights extends only to searches conducted upon a reasonableness standard, as any probation condition imposed must be ‘reasonable’ under the language of section 5 — 6—3(b) [of the Unified Code of Corrections]. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—3(b).” Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 576 N.E.2d at 1191. In Eiland, probation officers searched the defendant’s apartment and automobile. Prior to doing so, the probation officers informed the defendant they were there to conduct a search pursuant to a condition of his intensive probation, and the defendant did not deny them permission to search. Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 255, 576 N.E.2d at 1189. At the time of the search, the probation officers possessed information previously provided by a law enforcement official that the defendant was committing a criminal offense, and the probation officers were aware that two of the defendant’s prior urinalysis tests were positive for cannabis and cocaine. Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 258-59, 576 N.E.2d at 1191. Thus, the search was deemed justifiable and reasonable. Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 259, 576 N.E.2d at 1191-92. Here, defendant was on probation for DUI and DWR. A police officer went to defendant’s residence to conduct a random probation check. The police officer had no reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a probation violation or was otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, unlike in Eiland, defendant was not present to be directed or advised that her residence and personal effects were subject to an immediate search pursuant to her probation condition. In my view, her absence is a significant factor in weighing the reasonableness of the search because I find the language of the probation order at issue implied that defendant had an expectation of being present during the search of her home and personal effects. In so stating, I note that in the proper circumstances, the probationer’s expectation of being present may be outweighed by other factors under a reasonableness standard. Under the totality of the circumstances here, however, the search of defendant’s dresser drawer was not reasonable. The dissent likens my interpretation of the probation condition to a requirement to give a probationer prior notice, which may allow the probationer to “refuse to answer the door, escape, or dispose of the evidence of drug use.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 310. But such actions would offer ample grounds for a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation. Moreover, the conduct would certainly constitute reasonable suspicion of a probation violation and thus be grounds for an immediate search under the authority of Knights. The dissent seems in favor of giving probation officers or law enforcement authorities the keys to a probationer’s residence, or removing the front door altogether, to come and go as they please. Yes, the State’s “interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law *** may therefore justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 122 S. Ct. at 592. But, “ ‘the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.’ ” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 827, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1999), quoting Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604). “[Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the [flourth [ajmendment is directed ***.” United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). Recognizing the fourth amendment jurisprudence, I further note that even a search warrant requires officers to “knock and announce” their presence unless exigent circumstances exist. See People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 66, 675 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1996), citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 981, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1917 (1995) (the basic principle behind the fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement “is that an officer may not enter a dwelling, even pursuant to a valid warrant, without first requesting admittance and announcing the reason why the officer is there”). Further, a search warrant is limited in scope to a specific place and to specific items. While probationers may be subject to a lesser expectation of privacy than the general public, the protections of the fourth amendment are not completely extinguished. Instead, as earlier stated, “a probationer’s waiver of fourth amendment rights extends only to searches conducted upon a reasonableness standard.” Eiland, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 576 N.E.2d at 1191. In the case sub judice, law enforcement authorities were fully justified in making an unannounced visit to defendant’s residence to conduct a search pursuant to the probation order, even though they possessed no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a probation violation. Although defendant was not at home when they arrived, officers fortuitously obtained consent from defendant’s son to peacefully enter the residence and conduct a search. As noted in the majority opinion, "however, the consent from defendant’s son extended only to those areas over which he possessed common authority with defendant. And here, “the State failed to establish that defendant’s son possessed common authority over a dresser drawer located in his parents’ bedroom.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 300. The dissent complains that “[t]his majority will render probation officers ineffectual and useless.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 310. However, the majority opinion limits its holding to the unique facts and circumstances of this case. Nonetheless, the dissent predicts that “[w]ith no ability to conduct surprise searches, courts will be loath to sentence defendants to probation given the potential danger to the public, and the consequential cost to our legal system will be astronomical.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 310. I find this dire prediction unfounded because I reject its underlying premise that probation officers will be disabled from conducting surprise searches. For the reasons stated, I specially concur in reversing the trial court’s judgment.