Court Opinion

ID: 9524492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:53:18.99968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:38.306473
License: Public Domain

PETTY, J.,
dissenting.
In analyzing statutes, we employ principles of statutory construction to construe those statutes in a way that comports with the intent of the legislature. Indeed, the majority uses *709several such principles in order to construe Code § 15.2-2825 in a way that would prohibit smoking in the She-Sha Café and Hookah Lounge, a business that unquestionably is engaged in the retail sale of tobacco products.6 In doing so, however, the majority ignores the express intent of the General Assembly prohibiting such construction. The plain and unambiguous language of Code § 15.2-2821 explicitly states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to ... [rjegulate smoking in retail tobacco stores, tobacco warehouses, or tobacco manufacturing facilities.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, by doing exactly what Code § 15.2-2821 expressly prohibits, the majority glosses over the plain language of the statute and applies the Indoor Clean Air Act to a business the General Assembly clearly intended to exclude. Therefore, I dissent.
The General Assembly passed the Indoor Clean Air Act in 1990 as Chapter 28 of Title 15.2 of the Virginia Code. The Act banned smoking in various government buildings and in some public areas. It also required certain restaurants to provide separate smoking and non-smoking areas. See Code §§ 15.2-2800 to -2810. In 2009, the General Assembly repealed Chapter 28 and replaced it with Chapter 28.2. The new Indoor Clean Air Act banned smoking in all restaurants and bars in the Commonwealth. See Code § 15.2-2825.7 However, *710the General Assembly carried over an express provision from the repealed Act that exempted retail tobacco stores from any of the Act’s provisions that regulated smoking. Code § 15.2-2821. Thus, it would seem to me that before we engage in an analysis of whether She-Sha is a restaurant as defined in Code § 15.2-2820, or whether the Department of Health may enforce the provisions of the Act pertaining to restaurants, we first must determine if the business is a retail tobacco store. If it is, no amount of statutory-construction gymnastics can overcome the definite and precise language of Code § 15.2-2821—“[njothing in this chapter shall be construed to regulate smoking in retail tobacco stores____” In other words, if SheSha is a retail tobacco store, we do not need to concern ourselves with any of the provisions of the Indoor Clean Air Act, including its definition of a restaurant, because they simply do not apply.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that because She-Sha meets the definition of a restaurant, as defined in Code § 15.2-2820, the Indoor Clean Air Act applies to it regardless of whether it is primarily a retail tobacco store. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that the General Assembly did not intend to exempt from Code § 15.2-2825 those businesses mentioned in Code § 15.2-2821, if that business also operates as a restaurant. Specifically, the majority reasons that smoking is prohibited in any establishment that prepares or serves food to the public unless the establishment is specifically exempted by Code § 15.2~2825(A). In advancing its construction of the Act, the majority points to the specific exemption in Code § 15.2-2825(A) for “any restaurants located on the premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products.” The majority states that because a tobacco manufacturing facility is also specifically exempted in Code § 15.2-2821, the General Assembly intended for Code § 15.2-2825 to apply to any business listed in Code § 15.2-2821 unless there is a specific exemption in Code § 15.2-2825(A). The majority *711applies the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to reach the conclusion that “[t]he legislature’s express inclusion of tobacco manufacturers and exclusion of retail tobacco stores and tobacco warehouses is evidence of the intent that the latter be subject to compliance with the restaurant smoking ban.”
This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions. Code § 15.2-2821 exempts “tobacco manufacturing facilities” from the application of the Indoor Clean Air Act. Code § 15.2-2825(A) exempts restaurants “located on the premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products” from the application of the Indoor Clean Air Act. “Tobacco manufacturing facilities” and “premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products,” as used in the Indoor Clean Air Act, are not synonymous; they describe completely different things.8 We know this to be true because
“[w]e look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute.” Moreover, when the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.
Zinone v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowner’s Ass’n, 282 Va. 330, 337, 714 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2011) (quoting Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 208, 704 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2011)).
While the Indoor Clean Air Act does not provide a definition for “tobacco manufacturing facilities,” as used in Code § 15.2-2821, Code § 15.2-2820 does provide a definition for “facility,” as used in connection with other terms in the Indoor Clean Air
*712Act: “ ‘Educational facility’ means any building used for instruction of enrolled students”; “ ‘Health care facility’ means any institution, place, building, or agency....”; “ ‘Recreational facility’ means any enclosed, indoor area used by the general public and used as a stadium, arena, skating rink, video game facility, or senior citizen facility.” Looking at the various definitions of “facility” in the Indoor Clean Air Act, the common theme running throughout each one is that “facility” includes some type of building or structure which facilitates the desired function. Indeed, the plain and ordinary meaning of facility is “something (as a hospital, machinery, plumbing) that is built, constructed, installed, or established to perform some particular function or to serve or facilitate some particular end.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 812 (1981). Thus, the plain meaning of “tobacco manufacturing facility” is some type of building or structure which facilitates the manufacture of tobacco.9
The Indoor Clean Air Act does not provide a definition for “premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products.” However, the key term in this phrase, for our purposes, is “premises.” The plain and ordinary meaning of premises is “a specified piece or tract of land with the structures on it,” or “the place of business of an enterprise or institution.” Webster’s, supra, at 1789. Thus, “premises of any manufacturer of *713tobacco products” would include any land with structures on it that a tobacco manufacturer uses as its place of business.
Accordingly, “premises,” as used in Code § 15.2-2825(A), has a different meaning than “facilities,” as used in Code § 15.2-2821. Code § 15.2-2821 exempts tobacco manufacturing facilities from the Indoor Clean Air Act. This means that any buildings or structures which facilitate the manufacture of tobacco are exempt from the Indoor Clean Air Act under Code § 15.2-2821. This exemption would apply to restaurants located within a tobacco manufacturing facility; it would not apply to restaurants located on the premises of a tobacco manufacturer. This is where Code § 15.2-2825(A) presumably fills the gap left by Code § 15.2-2821. Code § 15.2-2825(A) exempts “restaurants located on the premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products.” This means that a restaurant located on land with structures on it that the tobacco manufacturer uses as its place of business is exempt from the Indoor Clean Air Act under Code § 15.2-2825(A). Accordingly, a tobacco manufacturer could have a restaurant in its manufacturing facility, and that restaurant would be exempt from the Indoor Clean Air Act under Code § 15.2-2821. On the other hand, a tobacco manufacturer could have a stand-alone restaurant located on its premises, and that restaurant would be exempt from the Indoor Clean Air Act under Code § 15.2-2825(A).
The language of Code § 15.2-2821 is clear. If a business is a retail tobacco store, tobacco warehouse, or tobacco manufacturing facility, then it is exempt from all provisions of the Indoor Clean Air Act. Nothing in the Indoor Clean Air Act can be construed to regulate smoking in the business.
The Department of Health argues that a restaurant could avoid the requirements of the Indoor Clean Air Act by selling packets of cigarettes and labeling itself as a retail tobacco store. Indeed, a restaurant’s ability to masquerade as a retail tobacco store would undermine the General Assembly’s purpose in implementing the Indoor Clean Air Act. I am not unmindful of the Department’s public policy concerns. Accordingly, I would adopt a primary purpose test to determine *714whether a business is a retail tobacco store, and therefore, exempt from the provisions of the Indoor Clean Air Act under Code § 15.2-2821. In order for a business to fall under the Code § 15.2-2821 exemption for a retail tobacco store, the primary purpose of the business must be the sale of tobacco. I do not propose a bright-line, formulaic approach to the classification of a business. Instead, the primary purpose of a business can be determined by looking at the totality of the evidence, including whether the business derives the majority of its revenue from the sale of tobacco. Both the Department and the trial court refused to determine whether She-Sha was a tobacco retail store. Because of this refusal, I would remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Department of Health for it to make a determination whether She-Sha is a retail tobacco store and thus exempt from the operation of the Indoor Clean Air Act.

. The business model for She-Sha involves charging patrons for a flavored, wet tobacco which is heated by a burning coal and then smoked through a water-filled pipe known as a hookah. She-Sha sells tobacco and tobacco-related products as well as food and alcohol to its customers. However, it derives the majority of its revenue from the sale of tobacco. Tobacco and tobacco-related sales, e.g., hookah rentals, accounted for sixty-six to sixty-seven percent of She-Sha's revenue in the three months preceding the citations from the Department of Health. These sales figures have been consistent since September 2008. She-Sha has a license from the Virginia Department of Taxation classifying it as an "Other Tobacco Products Retailer.” As of February 2010, She-Sha has paid over $7,200 in taxes, as required for retail tobacco sales. While food and alcohol are also sold, the revenue from these sales is less than one-third of the total revenue.

. Code § 15.2-2825(A) provides various exemptions to the restaurant smoking ban. The only Code § 15.2-2825(A) exemption at issue in this *710case is an exemption for "restaurants located on the premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products.” Code § 15.2—2825(A)(5).

. I note that the premises of Philip Morris USA, a tobacco manufacturer in the Richmond area, is "[[located on a 200-acre site.” However, the actual tobacco manufacturing facilities on this premises consist of "six connected buildings that cover a total of 43 acres.” Offices & Facilities, Philip Morris USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/ Company/Corporate-Structure/ Offices_Facilities/default.aspx?src= top_nav (last visited February 19, 2013).

. This definition accords with the definition of "manufacturing facility” used in Code § 15.2-5000. Although, Code § 15.2-5000 is not applicable here, and it specifically states that the definition is to be used for bonding purposes only, it is nonetheless instructive in our quest for an acceptable definition of tobacco manufacturing facilities. Code § 15.2-5000 states,
"Manufacturing facility” means (i) any facility which is used in the manufacturing or production of tangible personal property, including the processing resulting in a change of condition of such property, (ii) any facility which is used in the creation or production of intangible property as described in § 197(d)(1)(C)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, to be any patent, copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, knowhow, format, or other similar item, or (iii) any facility which is functionally related and subordinate to a manufacturing facility if such facility is located on the same site as the manufacturing facility.