Court Opinion

ID: 9459718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:29:41.629815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:18.154503
License: Public Domain

PELL, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in Judge Sprecher’s opinion that the district court’s judgment must be reversed with judgment to be entered for the defendants on remand.
I do, however, have some question as to whether the provisions pertaining to the second five years of noncompetition rise to the dignity of an option situation. See, e. g., Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 Ill.2d 583, 588, 121 N.E.2d 785 (1954). Southwest had no option right to further employment services. The most it could be opting for would be that the Sharfsteins would refrain from competing if Southwestern was “willing” to extend the employment contract for five years.
Irrespective, however, of nomenclature, Southwestern’s willingness, as demonstrated in Judge Sprecher’s opinion, must have been a legal willingness which it was not. A corporation may be en-ceinte with the ideas, hopes and intentions of its human representatives but when they involve a corporate commitment of the nature here involved, viability requires formal action which was not shown to exist. This is not a matter of communication. There was no corporate act of willingness in existence.
The Sharfsteins pointedly refrained from refreshing the memory of Southwestern as to the time for legalization of the willingness. Had they done so it may well have been that corporate action *929would have been taken. I agree with Judge Sprecher that the Sharfsteins had no legal duty in this respect.
As hereinbefore indicated and principally for the reasons expressed herein, I concur in and approve of the result reached in Judge Sprecher’s opinion.