Court Opinion

ID: 9657798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:38:22.712865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.173120
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), until overruled, is controlling precedent and mandates a holding that sec. 49.015, Stats., is unconstitutional. It is clear that the reasoning of Shapiro is applicable to this case. Applying the strict scrutiny mandated by Shapiro, I conclude that the County fails to show a compelling state interest supporting the 60-day residency requirement. Accordingly, I dissent.
In Shapiro, the United States Supreme Court reviewed three separate statutes requiring one year of residency to qualify for welfare assistance. The Court reasoned that the statutes created "two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. In this case, the identical classes are created by sec. 49.015, Stats., except that 60 days, rather than one year, is the dividing line. The Court in Shapiro held that because this classification impinged upon the fundamental right to travel, the classification must be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. The review in this case should be no different.
The majority concludes that strict scrutiny is not required in this case. They point to the following language of Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974):
Although any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel, the Court in Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitutional. The Court's holding *908was conditioned, 394 U.S., at 638 n.21, by the caveat that some 'waiting-period or residence requirements . . . may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.' [Emphasis in original.] The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling state-interest test was not made clear.
The majority concludes that because the 60-day waiting period is "substantially less onerous" than the one year waiting period in Shapiro, it does not penalize the exercise of the right to travel. Majority op. at 902. I disagree. A brief examination of the full "caveat" in Shapiro reveals that it was not at all referring to the length of the residence requirement, but rather to the nature of the right or interest impinged upon.
Note 21 of Shapiro provides:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21 (emphasis in original). Nothing in Shapiro indicates that the length of the residence requirement measured impact on the right of interstate travel. Rather, it is the nature of the right or interest impinged upon which determines the impact, and the holding of Shapiro is simply that the denied of the basic necessities of life penalizes the exercise of the right to travel and warrants strict scrutiny of the governmental classification. Thus the majority erroneously *909interprets both Shapiro and Maricopa County in reaching the result it desires.
Even assuming however that the length of the residence requirement rather than the nature of the right or interest impinged upon was a relevant inquiry, sec. 49.015, Stats., warrants strict scrutiny. The "amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling state-interest test" must be determined by considering whether the waiting period will deter migration, whether impeding travel is the law's primary goal, and the extent to which the waiting period serves to penalize the exercise of the right to travel. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257; Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62 n.9 (1982). I conclude that sec. 49.015, Stats., will deter migration, was intended to deter migration, and that the denial of general assistance for 60 days penalizes the exercise of the right to travel. Thus I would accord the statute strict scrutiny.
To paraphrase Shapiro, indigent individuals desiring to migrate to Wisconsin, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if they know that they must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during the first two months of residence, when the need may be most acute. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. Representative David Prosser, Jr., one of the authors of the sec. 49.015, Stats., filed an amicus brief which amply demonstrates that the express purpose of the law is to deter migration — to discourage welfare recipients of neighboring states from migrating to Wisconsin to obtain greater welfare benefits.1
*910Most importantly, however, denial of the basic necessities of life for 60 days, as well as one year, penalizes the right to travel. As the circuit court stated in its well-reasoned decision:
Numerous courts have found that residency requirements of less than one year unconstitutionally implicated the right to travel. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (90-day residency in county to vote); Hawk v. Fenner, 396 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.D. 1975) (90-day residency in county for general relief); Hinnant v. Sebesta, 363 F. Supp. 398 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (60-day residency in state to vote); Young v. Gnoss, 101 Cal. Rptr. 533, 496 P.2d 445 (1972) (90-day residency to vote). See also, Nielsen v. Social Service Board of North Dakota, 216 N.W.2d 708 (N.Dak. 1974). No cases have been cited in which a *911durational residency requirement of less than one year was upheld. The issue is not whether 60 days is a reasonable time period, but whether such a delay in the provision of aid to which the applicant is otherwise entitled constitutes a penalty on the right to travel. General relief is a program providing subsistence level assistance with food and shelter needs. These basic necessities of life are viewed with greater constitutional significance, and the withholding of such assistance constitutes a penalty on plaintiffs' right to travel.
I agree. Shapiro specifically concluded that denial of the basic necessities of life is a penalty. Sixty days without food and shelter is no less devastating than one year without food or shelter. Language in Maricopa County indicates that the conclusion in Shapiro that denial of basic necessities is a penalty was unequivocal: " [I]t is at least clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance." Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 259. Thus strict scrutiny is required.
Milwaukee County and Representative Prosser assert that the punitive nature of the 60-day residency requirement is softened by the exceptions listed in sec. 49.015(1)(b) 1-4, Stats. That subsection exempts persons from the residency requirement if they were born in Wisconsin, previously resided in Wisconsin for at least one year, moved to Wisconsin to join a close relative, or came to Wisconsin to accept a bona fide offer of employment. The obvious implication of these exceptions is that the residency requirement is designed merely to apply to those who move to Wisconsin solely to obtain general assistance. Shapiro emphatically rejected such a rationale:
[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it *912may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this consideration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others [sic] factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its better educational facilities.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631-32. The point of Shapiro is that the state may not create classifications among those seeking general assistance which penalize the right to travel unless the classifications are supported by compelling governmental interests. The additional classifications of sec. 49.015(1)(b) 1-4, Stats., serve only to underscore the statute's deterrent purpose, and do not in any way lessen the punitive impact upon the right to travel of those indigents who do not meet one of the exceptions.
Finally, the provision in sec. 49.015(3), Stats., which allows a waiver of the residency requirement in cases of "medical emergency" or "unusual misfortune or hardship" does not remove the statute from strict scrutiny. The "ordinary" misfortune and hardship which occurred in this case and which presumably may occur to other indigents migrating to Wisconsin are a sufficient penalty on the right to travel to warrant strict scrutiny. Moreover the terms "medical emergency" and "unusual misfortune or hardship" are not defined in the statute, and the deterrent intent and effect of the law is abated *913little if at all by allowing local general relief agencies the discretion to grant occasional waivers.
Thus, under Shapiro, sec. 49.015, Stats., should be upheld as constitutional only if supported by compelling governmental interests. It is not.
While Milwaukee County and Representative Pros-ser offer several public policy reasons supporting the 60-day waiting period, it is evident that none are compelling governmental interests. In fact, neither the County nor Prosser even argues that the interests are compelling — they both assert only that they provide a rational basis for the classification. Indeed, one of the interests put forth in support of the statute is the need to protect the public fisc, which Shapiro and Maricopa County clearly held is not compelling. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633; Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 263. Wisconsin's need to avoid being a "welfare-magnet" may well be significant, but it is insignificant in a constitutional analysis under precedents we are obliged to follow. The County also argues that Wisconsin must be allowed to protect itself from welfare fraud. While undoubtedly this is true, the underpinnings of such need are little different than protecting the public fisc, and no more compelling.2
The 60-day waiting period is intended to deter travel to Wisconsin, will deter travel to Wisconsin, and penalizes those who travel to Wisconsin and seek welfare benefits. This is invidious discrimination, and it should *914not be tolerated. The state has failed to show a compelling governmental interest supporting the classification created by sec. 49.015, Stats. Thus, sec. 49.015, Stats., violates the plaintiffs' right to equal protection. I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice William A. Bablitch join this dissenting opinion.

 At p. 1 of his amicus brief, Representative Prosser states:
State and county governments and the taxpayers who support them *910will have no defense against persons who enter Wisconsin in order to take advantage of this state's generous welfare benefits. The state will have no defense against officials in other states who encourage indigents to come to Wisconsin to receive welfare. We will have to surrender to these persons ... or alter our welfare system in ways that may adversely affect the most deserving of our own long-time residents.
The basic thrust of Representative Prosser's brief is that Shapiro represents bad policy, and therefore this court should ignore it. "[Shapiro] was runaway judicial lawmaking, which disregarded history, massively invaded the authority of the states, enormously expanded the power of the federal courts, and created its own hardships. The ruling in Shapiro ... arguably violates the Constitution." This court can not, for public policy reasons, ignore a controlling United States Supreme Court decision.
Representative Prosser also states that a certain law review article "decimated” the Shapiro decision. See Raoul Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post Mortem, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 853 (1981). While the article is critical of Shapiro, the article obviously did not overrule Shapiro. Shapiro, not Raoul Berger, decides the law on this subject.

 The majority does not contend that the public policy factors supporting the law distinguish this case from Shapiro, or that there are any compelling governmental interests served by the waiting period. Nor could it under Shapiro. Rather, flowing from its erroneous conclusion that the 60-day waiting period does not penalize the right to travel and therefore that strict scrutiny is unnecessary, the majority concludes that the public policy supporting the statute provides a "reasonable basis" for the law.