Court Opinion

ID: 9351773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 17:06:37.236048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:45.069226
License: Public Domain

J-A20026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RYAN STANFORD LEE                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2471 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
                Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0006593-2016

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 3, 2023

        Appellant, Ryan Stanford Lee, appeals from the October 29, 2021 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County dismissing his

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

        The factual background and procedural history are not at issue here.

Briefly, following his guilty pleas to third-degree murder and criminal

conspiracy, Appellant, on August 17, 2017, was sentenced to an aggregate

term of 17½ to 35 years of imprisonment. Appellant appealed to this Court,

and on May 6, 2019, we affirmed the judgment of sentence.                 See

Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 2819 EDA 2017, unpublished memorandum (Pa.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20026-22

Super. filed May 6, 2019). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of

appeal in our Supreme Court.

        Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on December 21, 2020. The PCRA

court proceeded to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in connection with his

first PCRA petition. Subsequently, on May 4, 2021, appointed counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition. In the amended petition, Appellant acknowledged

that the petition was facially untimely, but argued that the delay in filing his

first PCRA petition was attributable to the Department of Corrections (SCI

Somerset).1

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1   The PCRA court also noted the following:

        Counsel attached several exhibits to the petition, including a copy
        of the telephone expert’s report marked as Exhibit A and SCI
        Somerset documents marked as Exhibit D. Specifically, Exhibit D
        consists of three (3) documents either drafted by or addressed to
        Appellant concerning Appellant’s request to access the law library
        at SCI Somerset. The first document, an Inmate’s Request to
        Staff Member form, submitted by Appellant on February 23, 2021,
        asks what is required to “attend” the law library. A stamped
        response from a staff member dated February 28, 2021, on the
        same form reads:

              We are currently scheduling Library for time-dated
              deadlines ONLY.[FN] If you have a deadline of 30
              days or less and are pro se, have your unit staff
              contact the Library to be scheduled the next available
              session with your Zone.

        [Appellant’s Amended PCRA petition, filed 5/4/21, Exhibit D)
        (emphasis added).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Upon review, on August 2, 2021, the PCRA court entered a notice of

intention to dismiss the amended PCRA petition without a hearing because the

PCRA petition was facially untimely and failed to meet the government

interference exception. Appellant filed a response, disputing the PCRA court’s

conclusions.

       On October 29, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first

amended PCRA petition. This appeal followed.

____________________________________________

              [FN]: Although Counsel asserts that Appellant’s
              requests to use the law library to perfect a PCRA
              petition were denied because “no court-ordered
              deadline” existed, the denial submitted by Appellant
              does not state that a court order is required.

       The second document, a Rejection Form from the facility
       grievance coordinator at SCI Somerset dated February 22, 2021,
       is a response to Appellant’s grievance. The response indicates
       Appellant’s grievance is untimely. Moreover, the response notes
       that Appellant’s suspension from attending the law library from
       January 2019 through January 2020 was a disciplinary action
       taken based upon Appellant’s own behavior. Additionally, the
       response notes that although Appellant could not physically enter
       the law library, he could still access materials from the library on
       request.

       The third document, an Inmate Grievance Appeal to Facility
       Manager Form, is a typewritten administrative appeal signed by
       Appellant and dated February 24, 2021. Therein, Appellant states
       that he has attempted to gain access to the law library for the past
       two (2) years and has been unsuccessful. Appellant did not attach
       any evidence of denied attempts to gain access inside the library
       or attempts to request material from the library prior to February
       2021.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 5-6.

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       “[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to

determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its

conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1). The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a

petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in

Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this

exception within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       As noted above, Appellant filed the instant petition on December 21,

2020, more than one year and six months after his judgment of sentence

became final. As such, the instant petition is facially untimely.2

       On appeal, Appellant argues that his failure to file timely the instant

petition was the result of government interference, Section 9545(b)(1)(i), and

that the PCRA court erred in not recognizing that he met that exception.

____________________________________________

2 The record reflects Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June
5, 2019, at the expiration of the 30-day term to petition our Supreme Court
for allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
Appellant had one year from June 5, 2019 (i.e., June 5, 2020), to file a timely
PCRA petition. His present petition, which was filed on December 21, 2020,
is therefore facially untimely.

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Appellant also argues the PCRA court erred in not holding a hearing on his

petition.3 We disagree.

        In order to establish the governmental interference exception, a

petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to raise the claim previously

was the result of interference by government officials and (2) the petitioner

could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due

diligence. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa.

2008).     In other words, a petitioner is required to show that but for the

interference of a government actor “he could not have filed his claim earlier.”

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310.

        In response to Appellant’s argument, the PCRA court noted that

        Appellant admits that his law library access privileges were
        suspended from January 2, 2019, to January 2, 2020[,] as a
        consequence of him returning late to his housing unit from library.
        Additionally, Appellant also admits that he was then placed in
        disciplinary custody until February 19, 2020, as a result of his
        behavior. Then, beginning on March 13, 2020, the law library was
        closed for entry due to Covid-19 restrictions. Appellant presents
        an investigation report dated August 19, 2021[,] completed on
        behalf of his attorney, by an investigator. The report does not
        allege that Appellant could not access materials but, rather,
        reaffirms that typically inmates who have deadlines sooner were
____________________________________________

3   Appellant articulated his claim before us as follows:

        Did the lower court err in dismissing [Appellant]’s amended PCRA
        petition on timeliness grounds without holding an evidentiary
        hearing where [Appellant] alleged his pro se petition had been
        rendered untimely by the interference of Department of
        Corrections officials?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

                                           -5-
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       accepted into the library first. In the report, the investigator
       describes that she was informed by an SCI Somerset staff member
       that an inmate on suspension from the library could obtain library
       materials by sending a request to the library to have the librarian
       make a copy. This only serves to confirm that Appellant’s physical
       access to the library was restricted, and not that SCI Somerset
       denied his access to needed materials from the library.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 13 (quotation marks and internal citations

omitted).

       We agree. There is no indication that Appellant was prevented from

using the law library. The restrictions in place resulting from his suspension

from the law library or the restriction in place due to COVID-19 merely changed

how to access the library.       While Appellant could not physically access the

library, he had nonetheless access to the materials in the library.4         Thus,

Appellant was never prevented from accessing any materials he would need to

file a timely PCRA petition.

       Additionally, other than bald allegations, Appellant fails to provide any

evidence that he was prevented from accessing the library materials. While

Appellant furnished copies of requests and grievances relating to access to the

library, said requests and grievances were submitted in 2021, when his PCRA

____________________________________________

4 “Documentation provided by Appellant . . . demonstrates that while physical
entry into the law library may have been precluded, due first to the
consequences of Appellant’s own actions and then to Covid-19 precautions,
Appellant was not precluded from requesting and receiving materials from the
library.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 14.

                                           -6-
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petition was already untimely.5 As the Commonwealth noted, “they show that

he did not attempt to gain access to the library until more than eight months

after the deadline to file a timely petition passed.” Commonwealth’s Brief at

11; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 14.

        To the extent that Appellant, in the argument section of his brief before

us, focuses on the allegation that the untimeliness of the petition was due to

the Department of Corrections’ refusal “to honor [Appellant’s] request for

materials from the law library because he did not have a court-ordered

deadline,” Appellant’s Brief at 9, we must agree with the PCRA court (and the

Commonwealth) that the instant claim is based on a misunderstanding of the

very same evidence he provided to the PCRA court. To this end, the PCRA

court noted: “Although Counsel asserts that Appellant’s requests to use the

law library to perfect a PCRA petition were denied because ‘no court-ordered

deadline’ existed, the denial submitted by Appellant does not state that a court

order is required.”       PCRA Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 5, n.1; see also

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12; see infra n.1.          Indeed, the Department of

Corrections consistently indicated to Appellant that (1) those inmates with

deadlines will be accommodated before those who did not have set deadlines,

which does not mean, as Appellant suggests, that absent a court-ordered

deadline, inmates will not have access to the library; and (2) regardless of

____________________________________________

5   See supra, footnote 1.

                                           -7-
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lockdown or suspension, inmates still have access to the materials of the

library by simply submitting a request.

        Finally, and equally importantly, it should be noted that Appellant did

not argue that “any of the conditions of his incarceration were illegal, as

required to meet the governmental interference exception to PCRA’s

timeliness requirement.        See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (governmental

interference must violate United States or Pennsylvania Constitution or laws).”

Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding

restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the

governmental interference exception);6 see also Commonwealth v.

Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245 (Pa. Super. 2019).

____________________________________________

6   In Rizvi, we also noted:

        In Commonwealth v. Barrett, 761 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 2000),
        a prison’s restrictive housing unit policy permitted petitioner to
        obtain library materials only by request slips and prohibited him
        from seeking legal assistance from other inmates. This Court
        affirmed the PCRA court’s rejection of petitioner’s governmental
        interference claim based on these restrictions. We stated
        “although [petitioner] may not have been permitted to prepare his
        PCRA petition in the manner he would have wished, prison officials
        did not prevent him from filing his petition in accordance with the
        timing requirements by reason of his confinement in the
        [Restricted Housing Unit].”

Rizvi, 166 A.3d at 348 n.3.

Similarly, here, Appellant’s bald allegations do not permit the inference that
the Department of Corrections prevented him from filing a timely PCRA
petition.

                                           -8-
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       Considering the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant failed to establish

the governmental interference exception. Accordingly, the underlying PCRA

petition is untimely.

       Next, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition

without holding a hearing.7 We disagree. Pursuant to the Rules of Criminal

Procedure, a PCRA court must hold a hearing when a PCRA petition raises any

issues of material fact. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)). As explained, however,

we have concluded that Appellant’s petition was untimely, and the PCRA court

properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it.      Thus, we

conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant's petition

without a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 723

(Pa. 2008).

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2023

____________________________________________

7The hearing issue, while mentioned in the questions for our review, is not
addressed in the argument section of Appellant’s brief. While we would
generally find it waived, we have addressed it only for sake of completeness.

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