Court Opinion

ID: 9807996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:24:04.611201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:04.745933
License: Public Domain

*656Oonnob, J.
At the trial of this action, the defendant did not object to the issue submitted by the court to the jury. His assignment of error on his appeal to this Court, with respect to the issue, is not supported by an exception appearing in the case on appeal, and for that reason cannot be considered on this appeal. See S. v. Bittings, 206 N. C., 798, 175 S. E., 299, and cases cited in the opinion in that case by Stacy, C. J.
An affirmative answer to the issue was sufficient to support the judgment and the order contained therein that upon the return of an execution on the judgment unsatisfied, an execution against the person of the defendant should be issued upon the application of the plaintiff for such execution. If the defendant retained and converted to his own use property which the plaintiff had delivered to him as its agent, and failed to account for such property in accordance with his contract with the plaintiff, it is immaterial whether or not he did so with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff. In such case, the defendant was guilty of a breach of trust, and plaintiff is entitled to an execution against his person on the judgment which plaintiff has recovered of the defendant in this action. C. S., 673.
In Organ Co. v. Snyder, 147 N. C., 271, 61 S. E., 51, it is said: “The fact that the defendant detains the property and refuses to deliver it to the plaintiff, who he admits is the true owner, is evidence of a breach of trust and of a wrongful and fraudulent conversion. In a civil action for the wrongful and fraudulent conversion of property by an agent the question of intent is not material. If such conversion took place, the plaintiff is entitled to his remedy. The intent does not enter into it. ‘Good intentions/ says Mr. Justice Burwell, ‘do not at all lessen the wrongfulness of a breach of trust; or, rather, the law will not allow one to say that he violated its plain precepts with good intentions.’ Boykin v. Maddrey, 114 N. C., 90; Fertilizer Co. v. Little, 118 N. C., 808; Gossler v. Wood, 120 N. C., 69; Doyle v. Bush, 171 N. C., 10.” See, also, Guano Co. v. Southerland, 175 N. C., 228, 95 S. E., 364.
There is no error in the judgment in the instant case, and the same must be affirmed, unless there was error in the trial.
The burden on the issue submitted to the jury was on the plaintiff. It was therefore error for the court to instruct the jury peremptorily and thereby direct an affirmative answer to the issue. In Phillips v. Giles, 175 N. C., 409, 95 S. E., 772, it is said:
“It is a fixed principle in our system of procedure, both by statute and approved precedents, that a judge in charging a jury shall not give an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, ‘such matter being the true office and province of the jury/ and it has been held with us in many well considered cases that the inhibition extends not only to the ultimate facts, but to all essential inferences of fact arising from the testimony and upon which the ultimate facts necessarily depend. This *657principle, recognized by the Court in Bank v. Pugh, 8 N. C., 198, has been again and again approved in our cases. Forsyth v. Oil Mill, 167 N. C., 179; S. v. R. R., 149 N. C., 508-512; S. v. Daniels, 134 N. C., 671. In the Forsyth case, supra, the correct principle is stated by Brown, J., as follows: 'the converse of the rule is true and for a stronger reason a verdict can never be directed in favor of a plaintiff when there is any evidence from wbieb the jury may find contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, or wben there.is evidence that will justify an inference to the contrary of such contention.”
Eor tbe error of tbe court in instructing tbe jury peremptorily to answer tbe issue in tbe affirmative, tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered.
ETew trial.