Court Opinion

ID: 9659236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:36:09.98443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.394178
License: Public Domain

Kavanagh, J.
(for reversal). Jesse James Jones was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury and was sentenced to life imprisonment. MCL 750.316; *357MSA 28.548. The conviction was based in part on his confessional statement, admitted into evidence over his objection.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding under the "totality of circumstances” that the defendant’s confession was admissible. Defendant asserts that the statement made by him pursuant to a plea agreement that he later refused to carry out was improperly admitted into evidence.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the statement made by the defendant required by the plea agreement is inadmissible per se. We remand for a new trial.
On December 28, 1977, Thomas Chiavares was murdered at the Hockstad Pharmacy in Flint, Michigan, during the course of an armed robbery. On April 27, 1978, defendant Jones was arrested for unlawfully carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Sergeant Darby of the Flint Police Department met with Jones on April 28, 1978, while Jones was in custody for federal and state weapons offenses. Jones was advised of his rights under Miranda,1 and, upon a waiver of his rights, he discussed the weapons charges.
During that interview, Jones was told that he was a suspect in the Hockstad murder case. Sergeant Darby asked Jones if he wanted to discuss that crime and reminded him of his Miranda rights. Jones denied knowing anything about the murder, and the discussion returned to the weapons charges. Jones asked about the possible penalty for the federal and state weapons offenses. Darby told Jones that the federal firearms charge had a ten-year maximum sentence and that the *358state charge had a possible sentence of five years. Jones was also told that he could possibly be sentenced to prison for violating parole. Jones inquired as to what consideration he would be given if he were to discuss the Hockstad murder. He said he knew a great deal and could clear up the case.
Sergeant Darby contacted the prosecutor and a federal agent and advised Jones that if he would give a statement implicating himself in the Hock-stad murder and would testify against the others involved, the federal and state gun charges would be dropped and Jones could plead guilty to manslaughter. Jones was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he voluntarily waived his right to counsel and agreed to tell all he knew about the Hockstad case. He then made the confessional statement now at issue to the police. His statement detailed the planning and carrying out of the robbery attempt and killing, fully implicating himself and two others.
Later Jones refused to carry out the plea agreement. He was charged with murder in the perpetration of an armed robbery. A pretrial motion to suppress the confession was filed by defendant’s trial attorney, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntary and thus was admissible as evidence.
On the morning of the trial, the prosecutor acknowledged a willingness to fulfill the plea agreement, but Jones again refused. At trial, defendant’s confession was admitted into evidence and presented to the jury over the objection of defendant’s attorney. Jones was convicted of first-degree murder and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
*359The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction and found under the "totality of the circumstances” that the trial court’s decision that defendant’s confession was properly admissible as evidence was not erroneous.2
The use of involuntary admissions in a criminal prosecution is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination:
"In criminal trials, in courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ ” Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 542; 18 S Ct 183; 42 L Ed 568 (1897).
The Fifth Amendment’s right against compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the states. Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 6; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964).
The reason that involuntary confessions are not admissible evidence was set forth by the Court in Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534, 540-541; 81 S Ct 735; 5 L Ed 2d 760 (1961):
"Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods. used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system — a system *360in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth. See Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227; 60 S Ct 472; 84 L Ed 716 (1940); Lisenba v California, 314 US 219, 236; 62 S Ct 280; 86 L Ed 166 (1941); Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 172-174; 72 S Ct 205; 96 L Ed 183 (1952); Spano v New York, 360 US 315, 320-321; 79 S Ct 1202; 3 L Ed 2d 1265 (1959); Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199, 206-207; 80 S Ct 274; 4 L Ed 2d 242 (1960). And see Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49, 54-55; 69 S Ct 1347; 69 S Ct 1357; 93 L Ed 1801 (1949).”
In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the test is whether the confession was " 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’ ” Bram, supra, pp 542-543. (Emphasis supplied.)
This test has been applied by several recent federal and state courts, which have found that confessions induced by promises of leniency are inadmissible.3 The decision of the court in Gunsby *361v Wainwright, 596 F2d 654 (CA 5, 1979), cert den 444 US 946; 100 S Ct 307; 62 L Ed 2d 315 (1979), is particularly noteworthy because of the similarity of its factual situation to the case at bar. In Gunsby, in exchange for a maximum sentence of 7-1/2 years and no objection from the state to probation, the defendant agreed to plead guilty and testify against two codefendants. Additionally, pursuant to the plea bargain, the defendant gave a statement incriminating himself and a codefen-dant. However, the plea bargain was set aside after the defendant testified because his testimony tended to exculpate rather than incriminate his codefendant. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial over objection, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
In granting the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus, the Fifth Circuit held that because the statement was given as a result of promises made by the state in the plea bargain, "[t]he district court’s conclusion that the statement was legally involuntary and inadmissible at Gunsby’s state trial was thus compelled under Hutto v Ross, 429 US 28; 97 S Ct 202; 50 L Ed 2d 194 (1976).” "The [Hutto] Court held that the confession was not the result of any direct or implied promise and was voluntarily given. Conversely, a confession given as the result of a direct or implied promise would be legally involuntary.” Gunsby, supra, p 656.
In the instant case, the confession was made as *362part of an agreement. In return for a statement implicating himself in the Hockstad murder and testimony against the others included, Jones would be permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter for the Hockstad murder, and the unrelated federal and state gun charges would be dropped. There is no question but that Jones’s confession was "obtained by” the prosecutor’s promise.
The people contend that where an accused initiates the bargaining session with the police and prosecuting authorities, he should not be heard to complain that his statement was involuntary. Several state courts,4
5along with the Michigan Court of Appeals,6 have held that a confession is not "induced” when a defendant initiates the bargaining. However, the distinction is irrelevant.® The confession is a product of the plea agreement whether the defendant, the prosecutor, or a police officer initiates the bargaining.
The fact that the defendant initiates the bargaining does not mean that the defendant is not influenced by the state’s promises. The confession is no more reliable simply because the defendant begins the negotiating. In People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615; 17 NW 78 (1883), Justice Cooley agreed with the reasoning of many other courts and found that no reliance can be placed on admis*363sions of guilt obtained by assurances of leniency "for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them.” (Citations omitted.) However, it is no less in the defendant’s interest to accept a plea bargain when he initiates the bargaining than when bargaining is initiated by the state. Therefore, because the defendant is still influenced by the state’s promises of leniency and there is no reason to conclude that a confession pursuant to a plea bargain initiated by the state is any more reliable than the same confession when bargaining is initiated by the defendant, we find no reason to conclude that a confession is voluntary merely because the defendant initiates the bargaining.
Similarly, while Miranda warnings and advice of counsel (defendant Jones voluntarily waived his right to counsel) tend to support a conclusion that a plea was a well-advised, intelligent exercise of choice, they do not negate the pressure or inducements of the plea bargain.7
The Court of Appeals held that the issue of the applicability of MRE 410 was not properly subject to review because the defendant did not raise the issue at trial. MRE 410 is not the basis of our decision today, but the rule and its rationale support our decision.
Under MRE 410, defendant’s confessional statement could not be used against him:_
*364"Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo conten-dere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement.” (Emphasis supplied.)
MRE 410 is similar to Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 The purpose of these rules is to promote the disposition of criminal cases by compromise9 and to permit the unrestrained candor which produces effective plea discussions.10
*365The plea-bargaining process is an asserted component of the administration of criminal justice. It has become an accepted fact of life. Chief Justice Burger expressed the need and desirability of the plea-bargaining process in Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260-261; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971):
"The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.
"Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. See Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 751-752 [90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 747] (1970).”
For plea bargaining to work effectively and fairly, a defendant must be free to negotiate without fear that his statements will later be used against him. In excluding a defendant’s plea-related statements, Judge Coleman of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
"If, as the Supreme Court said in Santobello, plea bargaining is an essential component of justice and, *366properly administered, is to be encouraged, it is immediately apparent that no defendant or his counsel will pursue such an effort if the remarks uttered during the course of it are to be admitted in evidence as proof of guilt. Moreover, it is inherently unfair for the government to engage in such an activity, only to use it as a weapon against the defendant when negotiations fail.” United States v Ross, 493 F2d 771, 775 (CA 5, 1974). See United States v Herman, 544 F2d 791 (CA 5, 1977).
This decision is consistent with prior Michigan law holding inadmissible at a subsequent trial a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn. People v Street, 288 Mich 406; 284 NW 926 (1939); People v Trombley, 67 Mich App 88; 240 NW2d 279 (1976). In People v George, 69 Mich App 403; 245 NW2d 65 (1976), the Court held that statements made in connection with withdrawn guilty pleas are likewise inadmissible at the defendant’s subsequent trial. It follows that when the defendant merely offers or agrees to plead guilty, the offer and statements made in connection therewith should also be inadmissible at the defendant’s subsequent trial. To hold otherwise would put the defendant who merely offers or agrees to plead guilty in a worse position than the defendant who actually pleads guilty and later withdraws his plea.
The people are not prejudiced by our decision today. In the words of Circuit Judge Goldberg:
"the government’s inability to introduce the statements made in a bargaining session does not place it in a worse position than it would occupy if an accused chose not to engage in plea bargaining at all.” Herman, supra, p 797.
The government must fulfill its obligation of independently assembling and proving its case against the defendant.
*367Williams and Levin, JJ., concurred with Kav-anagh, J.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

 People v Jones, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals decided April 25, 1980 (Docket No. 78-3255).

 Gunsby v Wainwright, 596 F2d 654 (CA 5, 1979), cert den 444 US 946; 100 S Ct 307; 62 L Ed 2d 315 (1979); McLallen v Wyrick, 498 F Supp 137, 139 (WD Mo, 1980) ("A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise.”); United States v Harris, 301 F Supp 996, 999 (ED Wis, 1969) ("Having found that the defendant confessed in return for what he believed to be the promise of the law enforcement officials to secure certain reciprocal treatment, I hold that his confession * * * was not voluntary and hence is inadmissible.”); People v Quinn, 61 Cal 2d 551, 554; 393 P2d 705, 707; 39 Cal Rptr 393, 395 (1964) (Traynor, J.) ("A confession or admission induced by promises of leniency or by threats is involuntary and therefore inadmissible.”); Bradley v State, 356 So 2d 849, 850 (Fla App, 1978) ("[A]n accused may not be improperly urged by direct or implied promises to make a statement, in violation of the basic tenet of law that a confessing defendant should be entirely free from the influence of hope or fear.”); People v Overturf, 67 Ill App 3d 741; 385 NE2d 166 (1979); State v Tardiff 374 A2d 598, 600 (Me, 1977) ("That a confession which has been extracted from a defendant as the result of assurances or promises of leniency is inadmissible, is well established.”); Common*361wealth v Meehan, 377 Mass 552, —; 387 NE2d 527, 534 (1979), cert dis as improvidently granted 445 US 39; 100 S Ct 1092; 63 L Ed 2d 185 (1980) ("An officer may suggest broadly that it would be 'better’ for a suspect to tell the truth, may indicate that the person’s cooperation would be brought to the attention of the public officials or others involved, or may state in general terms that cooperation has been considered favorably by the courts in the past. What is prohibited, if a confession is to stand, is an assurance, express or implied, that it will aid the defense or result in a lesser sentence.”) (Footnotes omitted.)

 State v Harwick, 220 Kan 572; 552 P2d 987 (1976), State v Jordan, 114 Ariz 452; 561 P2d 1224 (1976), Taylor v Commonwealth, 461 SW2d 920 (Ky App, 1970), and State v Hutson, 537 SW2d 809 (Mo App, 1976).

 People v Jones, fn 2 supra, and People v Langford, 76 Mich App 197, 199; 256 NW2d 578 (1977).

 The fact that the defendant initiated the bargaining was apparently of no significance to the court in United States v Harris, supra, fn 3. In Harris, the defendant indicated that he would be willing to provide information if he would receive certain considerations, and then proceeded to name three conditions. The court found that the defendant’s confession was involuntary without discussion of the fact that the defendant defined the terms of the bargain.

 See, e.g., People v Overturf, 67 Ill App 3d 741, 744; 385 NE2d 166, 168 (1979) ("It is a well settled rule that even where constitutional rights have been waived, promises of leniency which induce defendant to make a statement or confession may well render such statement or confession involuntary.”) State v Tardiff, 374 A2d 598, 601 (Me, 1977) ("The fact that the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to making his confession does not cure the improper inducement which led to it.”)

 Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which supplanted Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended April 30,1979, to read:
"(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements, Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
"(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
"(B) a plea of nolo contendere;
"(C) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under this rule regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
"(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
"However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.”

 FRE 410, Advisory Committee’s Notes.

 F R Crim P 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.