Court Opinion

ID: 9880811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 18:00:41.743256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:57.855874
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60377        Document: 00516912139             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                    FILED
                                                                             September 28, 2023
                                       No. 22-60377                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                    Clerk

   Rafael Villegas-Lopez,

                                                                                Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.
                     ______________________________

                        Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A047 437 100
                     ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s appeal
   from an immigration judge’s order sustaining a charge of removability based
   on a state criminal conviction. The central issue before us is whether the
   petitioner’s state conviction constitutes a “crime of child abuse, child
   neglect, or child abandonment” under federal immigration law.                           We
   conclude that it is. The petition for review is DENIED.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60377      Document: 00516912139             Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/28/2023

                                       No. 22-60377

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Rafael Villegas-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, adjusted his
   status to lawful permanent resident in May 2000. In January 2020, Villegas-
   Lopez pleaded nolo contendere in Texas to criminal solicitation of a minor
   under Texas Penal Code §§ 15.031 and 22.011. The state court ordered
   deferred adjudication with 90 days of imprisonment and four years of
   community supervision. In April 2020, the Department of Homeland
   Security issued a notice to appear charging Villegas-Lopez with removability
   on the basis of that conviction.
          Villegas-Lopez admitted only that he was not a citizen of the United
   States. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found all of the other allegations in
   the notice to appear to be true. Villegas-Lopez sought cancellation of
   removal. In August 2020, following a hearing, the IJ found that Villegas-
   Lopez was removable but was eligible for cancellation. The IJ declined to
   exercise discretion to cancel removal and ordered him removed.
          Villegas-Lopez appealed to the BIA. In June 2022, the BIA affirmed
   the IJ’s determination that Villegas-Lopez was removable and the IJ’s denial
   of cancellation. The BIA determined that solicitation of a minor under Texas
   Penal Code § 15.031(b) is categorically a “crime of child abuse, child neglect,
   or child abandonment” as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
          Villegas-Lopez timely petitioned for review.

                                      DISCUSSION
          “We review the BIA’s decision and only consider the IJ’s decision to
   the extent that it influenced the BIA.” Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 863
   (5th Cir. 2009). Determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a

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                                    No. 22-60377

   removable offense is a question of law; we review the BIA’s determination de
   novo. See Adeeko v. Garland, 3 F.4th 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2021).
          The only issue before us is whether Villegas-Lopez’s state conviction
   is a removable offense. Villegas-Lopez argues his statute of conviction is
   broader than the generic federal offense of “child abuse.” First, the statute
   criminalizes attempts and does not specify any particular risk of harm.
   Second, it does not require the involvement of an actual child.
          We start with the relevant statutory background.
          I.     Statutory background
          Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), an alien is removable if convicted
   of “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” The
   generic definition of that offense used by the BIA encompasses “any offense
   involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or
   omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s
   physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.”
   Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of Velazquez-
   Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 512 (BIA 2008)). The BIA has explained that
   “child abuse ‘is not limited to offenses requiring proof of injury to the
   child.’” Id. at 133 (quoting Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378, 381 (BIA
   2010)).
          Texas Penal Code § 15.031(b) defines “Criminal Solicitation of a
   Minor” as follows:
          [W]ith intent that an offense under Section . . . 22.011[, sexual
          assault,] . . . be committed, the person by any means requests,
          commands, or attempts to induce a minor or another whom the
          person believes to be a minor to engage in specific conduct that,
          under the circumstances surrounding the actor’s conduct as
          the actor believes them to be, would constitute an offense
          under [this section] or would make the minor or other believed

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                                           No. 22-60377

          by the person to be a minor a party to the commission of an
          offense under one of those sections. 1
   We will defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the meaning of “a crime of child
   abuse” in the removal statute because there is some ambiguity, but “we
   review de novo whether a particular state crime fits that definition.” Garcia,
   969 F.3d at 134.
          The parties agree that the “categorical approach” applies here.
   Under that approach, we compare the state offense to the generic federal
   offense, “look[ing] to the statutory definition of the [state] offense of
   conviction, not to the particulars of an alien’s behavior.” Mellouli v. Lynch,
   575 U.S. 798, 805 (2015). “A state offense is a categorical match with a
   generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense would
   necessarily involve proving facts that would establish a violation of the
   generic federal offense.” Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (citation omitted). Therefore, this court “must presume that the conviction
   rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then
   determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal
   offense.” Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
   Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)). “Where there is a
   categorical match, a conviction under the state statute ‘triggers removal
   under the immigration statute.’” Vazquez v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 862, 871 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (quoting Mellouli, 575 U.S. at 806).
          We now address Villegas-Lopez’s arguments.
          II.        Attempts and risk of harm
          Among the offenses under Section 15.031(b) are “attempts to induce”
   an individual to engage in prohibited conduct. Villegas-Lopez argues that
          _____________________
          1
              Section 22.011, the completed offense of sexual assault, is not at issue here.

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   Section 15.031(b) encompasses “attempt convictions” that do not fall under
   the generic federal offense. The argument is that the generic federal offense
   requires a “completed” offense. He cites Matter of B-Q-, A XXX XXX 485
   (BIA June 20, 2017), as support.
            Section 15.031(b) falls under Title 4 of the Texas Penal Code, which
   sets forth “Inchoate Offenses.”             We agree with the BIA that Section
   15.031(b) is not an attempt crime. Though the provision uses the word
   “attempts,” it does not do so in the formal sense. Attempt crimes are
   identified in a separate section. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.01 (Criminal
   Attempt). Villegas-Lopez was not convicted under that section. The BIA
   reasonably concluded that “[s]oliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct
   necessarily involves the exploitation of a child’s vulnerabilities and
   susceptibility to coercion — and is thus abusive.”
            Matter of B-Q- is not to the contrary. That case involved a conviction
   specifically under a state attempt statute. 2 In short, Section 15.031(b)’s
   “attempts to induce” language does not remove it from the scope of the
   generic federal offense.
            Next, Villegas-Lopez asserts that Section 15.031(b) does not specify
   any particular “risk of harm” to a child and is therefore not a categorical
   match.
            The Government argues that a “risk of harm” analysis is only
   necessary when analyzing child-endangerment statutes. The BIA has held
   that “because States use a variety of terms to describe the degree of threat

            _____________________
            2
             It is true that Matter of B-Q- reasoned that the state statute was not a categorical
   match in part because an individual could be convicted “even if the ‘child’ victim was a
   fictious creation of an undercover police officer.” A XXX XXX 485 (BIA June 20, 2017).
   We address the relevance of that feature in the next section.

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   required under endangerment-type offenses, a State-by-State analysis is
   appropriate to determine whether the risk of harm required by the
   endangerment-type language in any given State statute is sufficient to bring
   an offense within the definition of ‘child abuse’ under the” INA. Matter of
   Mendoza Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. 703, 704 (BIA 2016) (emphasis added)
   (citation and quotation marks omitted).
           Texas punishes child-endangerment elsewhere in the penal code. See
   TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.041 (Abandoning or Endangering Child). Because
   Section 15.031(b) is not an endangerment statute, a risk of harm analysis is
   not required. Villegas-Lopez has not identified other circumstances where
   this argument is required.
           III.    Involvement of an actual child
           Villegas-Lopez next argues that a conviction under Texas Penal Code
   § 15.031(b) does not require that the victim be a child, whereas the generic
   federal offense of child abuse does. Thus, Villegas-Lopez argues that Section
   15.031(b) is not a categorical match with the generic federal offense.
           It is true that Section 15.031(b) does not require that a victim be a child
   — only that a person “believes [another] to be a minor.” TEX. PENAL CODE
   § 15.031(b) (emphasis added). Texas courts have sustained convictions
   under Section 15.031 where the victim was not a minor. 3
           There is no indication that the federal statute allowing removal for
   convictions of child abuse requires that the victim be a child. Villegas-Lopez
   cites a series of unpublished BIA cases holding that a state statute was not a

           _____________________
           3
             See, e.g., Shams v. State, 195 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet ref’d)
   (affirming a Section 15.031 conviction that involved a cybercrimes investigator posing as a
   minor); Chen v. State, No. 05-05-00206-CR, 2006 WL 1085729 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr.
   26, 2006, pet. ref’d) (same with undercover detective).

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   categorical match with 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) where the state statute
   did not require that a child be involved. The BIA holds that unpublished
   decisions are not binding precedent. See Matter of Echeverria, 25 I. & N. Dec.
   512, 519 (BIA 2011).
          During oral argument, Villegas-Lopez contended a decision it had
   simply cited in its briefing here on the issue of attempt crimes actually was
   relevant on the separate issue that there needed to be an actual child involved
   in the offense. See Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo, 27 I. & N. Dec. 782 (BIA 2020).
   There, the BIA held that a Maryland state conviction was not a crime of child
   abuse because “no actual child was ever involved.” Id. at 794. Though
   barely mentioned in his brief here and not on this issue, the Jimenez-Cedillo
   decision was the focus of supplemental briefing ordered by the BIA before
   the ruling that is now before us. The BIA discussed its own decision and one
   of ours, and then held that our decision controlled and no actual child needed
   to be involved:
          The respondent’s argument is foreclosed by the United States
          Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s recent holding in
          Adeeko v. Garland, 3 F.4th 741 (5th Cir. 2021). In Adeeko, the
          Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a similar Texas statute,
          defining a minor as “an individual who is younger than 17 years
          of age; or an individual whom the actor believes to be younger
          than 17 years of age,” rendered the statute overbroad. Id. at
          747 (quoting TPC § 33.021(a)(l)).
          The BIA did not discuss or even cite Jimenez-Cedillo in its opinion,
   though it did mention having required supplemental briefing.               The
   Government in its supplemental briefing sought to limit Jimenez-Cedillo by
   arguing that, prior to that opinion, “the Board had never stated, much less
   held, in a precedent that an actual child must be involved in a crime of child
   abuse.” Villegas-Lopez does not cite to any other prior opinions. We see
   merit in the Government’s argument that the BIA’s statement on the last

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   page of its opinion in Jimenez-Cedillo is cursory and without explanation. See
   Jimenez-Cedillo, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 794 (saying it could not hold that the
   respondent was “convicted of a crime of child abuse . . . because no actual
   child was ever involved in this case”).
          The BIA had the arguments about its own decision before it in the
   supplemental briefing, and none of the three members hearing the appeal
   disagreed that Adeeko applied. Citing its own precedent, the BIA stated that
   it “appl[ies] the law of the circuit in cases arising in that jurisdiction.” See
   Matter of U. Singh, 25 I. & N. Dec. 670, 672 (BIA 2012). We conclude the
   BIA did not err when it applied Adeeko as the controlling authority.
          We now examine the broader question of whether Section 15.031(b) is
   a categorical match with the generic federal offense of “child abuse.”
   Section 15.031(b) requires an individual act with “intent,” which is greater
   than the BIA’s requirement that the conduct be done with criminal
   negligence. See Adeeko, 3 F.4th at 748. Moreover, Section 15.031(b), as we
   described earlier, meets the generic offense’s requirement that conduct
   constitutes “maltreatment of a child,” because the statute involves engaging
   in communications for an illicit sexual purpose. See id. Thus, we agree with
   the BIA that Section 15.031(b) is a categorical match with 8 U.S.C. §
   1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and is therefore a removable offense.
          The petition for review is DENIED.

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