Court Opinion

ID: 9706532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:42.101514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.428524
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting:
The Court today resurrects some earlier cases which held that the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be directly appealed.1 It declines to follow more recent cases, in particular Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 303, 429 A.2d 1029 (1981), which took the position that the denial of such a motion is directly appealable. In my view, the earlier opinions upon which the majority relies misinterpreted the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. I would instead adhere to the position expressed in our more recent opinions. Therefore I dissent.
It is not disputed that before the enactment of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Ch. 44 of the Acts of 1958, Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A, the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence could be directly appealed. Roberts v. Warden, 206 Md. 246, 111 A.2d 597 (1955). In Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 101, 175 A.2d 775 (1961), this Court held that the Post Conviction Procedure Act had abolished that right of direct appeal. Accord Harris v. State, 241 Md. 596, 598, 217 A.2d 307 (1966). See Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 160 A.2d 912 (1960).
The Post Conviction Procedure Act, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
“(a) Right to institute proceeding to set aside or correct sentence. — Any person convicted of a crime and either incarcerated under sentence of death or imprisonment or on parole or probation, including any person confined or on parole or probation as a result of a *122proceeding before the District Court who claims that the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error which would otherwise be available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common-law or statutory remedy, may institute a proceeding under this subtitle in the circuit court for the county or the Criminal Court of Baltimore to set aside or correct the sentence, provided the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceedings resulting in the conviction, or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from his conviction.
* * * * * *
“(e) Not substitute for remedies incident to trial proceedings; ... other common-law and statutory remedies superseded. — The remedy herein provided is not a substitute for, nor does it affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court or any remedy of direct review of the sentence or conviction____ No appeals to the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals in habeas corpus or coram nobis cases, or from other common-law or statutory remedies which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentence of death or imprisonment shall be permitted or entertained____” (Emphasis added.)
In Wilson, supra, 227 Md. at 101, 175 A.2d 775, the Court held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was provided for in Maryland Rule 744 a at the time, was a “statutory remedy” within the meaning of the Act and that, therefore, the denial of such a motion was not appealable unless the procedures of the Post Conviction Procedure Act *123were followed. This holding was incorrect for several reasons.
First, a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a “statutory” remedy. Statutes are enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland.2 The Maryland Rules are adopted by the Court of Appeals. As the Wilson court noted, the Maryland Constitution does provide that rules adopted by the Court “shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.” Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 18(a). Nonetheless, the fact that the Maryland Rules have the force of law does not mean that a rule is a statute.
In addition, the rulemaking power of the Court of Appeals is limited in scope. The Court is authorized to “adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State____” Art. IV, § 18(a). It is doubtful if this grant of authority includes the power to create a new cause of action comparable to a writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis. Consequently, the motion authorized by former Rule 774 a and present Rule 4-345(a) should not be deemed an “other common-law or statutory” remedy within the meaning of the Post Conviction Procedure Act.
Moreover, the Post Conviction Procedure Act, by its terms, “is not a substitute for, nor does it affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court or any remedy of direct review of the sentence or conviction.” Code § 645A(e). See State v. D’Onofrio, 221 Md. 20, 28-29, 155 A.2d 643, 647 (1959); Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of 1958, Proposed Bills, at 107 (Dec. 31, 1957). A motion to correct *124an illegal sentence is clearly both incident to the proceedings in the trial court and a direct review of the sentence. Such motions are directed to the trial court and decided pursuant to the revisory power which the trial court has over a judgment. See former Rule 774 and present Rule 4 — 3453; Coles v. State, supra; State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 325 A.2d 573 (1974); Harris v. State, supra; Wilson v. State, supra.
The Court’s decision today is also inconsistent with rule making actions taken by this Court subsequent to the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act. As pointed out in State v. D’Onofrio, supra, 221 Md. at 29, 155 A.2d 643, quoting from the Commissioners On Uniform Laws, one purpose of the Post Conviction Procedure Act was “ ‘to bring together and consolidate into one simple statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are at present available for challenging the validity of a sentence of imprisonment.’ ” If a motion to correct an illegal sentence were viewed as one of the common law or statutory remedies to be consolidated into the Post Conviction Procedure Act, *125there would have been no reason for the subsequent enactment of rules providing for a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Nevertheless, since the enactment of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, this Court has on several occasions enacted new rules containing the provision for a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Finally, the Court’s decision promotes inefficiency and the waste of valuable judicial resources. Where a convicted defendant’s complaint relates solely to the legality of the sentence imposed, the normal proceeding for him to institute would be one under present Rule 4-345(a) to correct an illegal sentence. If at the conclusion of such proceeding the defendant is denied relief, even though as here his complaint is clearly meritorious, he will have to institute a second trial court proceeding, this time under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, as a prerequisite for obtaining appellate review. As a result of the majority’s decision today, two trial court proceedings instead of one will be required. This makes little sense in light of the already heavy work load imposed on the trial judges of this State.
For the above reasons, I would follow Coles v. State and State ex rel. Sonner in which this Court took the position that a trial court’s refusal to correct an illegal sentence may be directly appealed.
I also note that defendant’s argument on the merits is clearly correct. The trial court had originally sentenced Valentine to twelve years in prison, to commence running on April 27, 1983, the date of his incarceration on the child abuse charge. The sentence imposed ran concurrently with Valentine’s remaining parole time. See Burkett v. Warden, 214 Md. 603, 134 A.2d 77 (1957). Pursuant to the Assistant State’s Attorney’s request for modification of sentence, the trial court changed the sentence, ordering that Valentine’s two sentences run consecutively. This modification amounted to an increase in sentence. Wilson v. State, 45 Md.App. 675, 415 A.2d 605 (1980); Schultz v. United States, 384 F.2d 374, 375 (5th Cir.1967). Rule 774 a states *126that the court “may not increase the length of ... a sentence” pursuant to a motion for modification. More importantly, such an increase violates the Fifth Amendment and the Maryland common law prohibition against double jeopardy. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492, 503, 207 A.2d 103 (1965); Schultz v. United States, supra. A situation like that here was presented in the Schultz case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit specifically held that changing a sentence to run consecutively instead of concurrently “increased appellant’s ... sentence” in “violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.” 384 F.2d at 375.
Judges COLE and COUCH have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. Former Maryland Rule 774 a provided: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” Rule 4-345(a) now contains an identical provision.

. A statute is
"[a]n act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of government; the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1264-1265 (5th ed. 1979).

. Rule 4-345 provides as follows:
"Rule 4-345. SENTENCING — REVISORY POWER OF COURT
(a) Illegal Sentence. — The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
(b) Modification or Reduction — Time for. — The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. The court may modify or reduce or strike, but may not increase the length of, a sentence. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (d) of this Rule.
(c) Open Court Hearing. — The court may modify, reduce, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.
(d) Desertion and Non-support Cases. — At any time before expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and non-support of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may modify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court imposes.”