Court Opinion

ID: 9673210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:24.867882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.758484
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal.
The memorandum opinion notes the generalizations thát evidence admissible for one purpose may be received although it would be excluded if it were offered for another purpose, and that the court may exclude relevant evidence where its probative value is outweighed by other considerations. The opinion does not reflect, however, the need for a careful arid informed assessment of the worth of the proffered evidence and of the validity of the asserted considerations weighing against admission arid for balancing the competing concerns in the search for truth through the processes of a fair trial.
While a criminal trial and, also, a civil trial, is in a sense a "truth-seeking adventure”, it begs the question to say that "all evidence which meets the requirements for admissibility should be received”. One of the requirements for admissibility is that the probative valiie of the evidence not be outweighed by other considerations.
If all evidence of probative value were admissible, there would be no law of evidence. Trial judges would merely decide ad hoc whether proffered evidence would aid the jury in seeking the truth.
All relevant evidence is, indeed, admissible, unless excluded under the constitution, by statute, by court rule or by rule of law.1 "The rules of evi*323dence áre, for the most párt, rules of exclusion.”2 It is the exclusions ánd their application in individual cáses which require our attentidii and constitute the body of law known as the law of evidence.
The rules of the law of evidence — rules excluding relevant and probative evidence — are the product of the jury trial system and experience. They reflect the concern that the truth-seeking process be a fair and orderly process;
For policy reasons illegally obtained evidence,hearsay, privileged communications, opinion testimony, secondary evidence, offers in compromise, withdrawn guilty pleas, subsequent remedial measures and character evidence are excluded altogether or aré admissible only for limited purposes and in limited circumstances.
Similarly, for policy reasons the general rule is thát other crimes evidence is riot admissible:
"While to the layman’s mind a defendánt’s criminal disposition is logically relevant to his guilt or innocence of a specific crime, the law regards the inference from general to specific criminality so weak, and the danger of prejudice so great, that it attempts to prevent conviction on accoünt of a defendant’s bad character. Thus, evidence of 'other crimes’ which is relevant only to prove á criminal disposition is universally acknowledged to be inadmissible.” United States v Foutz, 540 F2d 733, 736 (CA 4, 1976).
In United States v Cook, 538 F2d 1000, 1005 (CA 3, 1976), the Court of Appeáls for the Third Circuit held thát it was an abuse of discretion to permit the government to introduce evidence of a prior sodomy conviction for the purpose of refuting an inference that the defendant was in lawful posses*324sion of a pistol seized when he was arrested. The court spoke of the considerable erosion of the general rule against the admissibility of other crimes evidence, of the need for "a less mechanical balancing test in order to preserve the fundamental rule”3 and declared that the government could have used "the more abstemious approach” of asking the defendant to stipulate that he had been convicted of a felony "thereby avoiding undue prejudice from the introduction of proof of the sodomy conviction. To have made the jury aware of the nature of the offense went beyond the purpose for which the government asserted the right to introduce evidence of other crimes.”4
*325In holding, in the instant case, that the circumstances of the prior encounter between the victim and the defendant should have been excluded, the Court of Appeals adopted a "more abstemious approach”.
This Court will soon have the report of its Committee on Rules of Evidence. The report will be promulgated for consideration by bench and bar with a view to eventual adoption by this Court. The proposed rules are modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The subject matter should be reconsidered in future cases on plenary submission in light of the experience of the Federal courts in the case-by-case development of the concept that probative evidence may be excluded or received with limitations where its worth is counterbalanced by other considerations. The search for truth in our system of justice is advanced by a fair trial.5

 McCormick on Evidence (2d ed), § 184; FR Ev 402.

 Tracy, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, p 4.

 "The Fifth Circuit has outlined some of the considerations relevant to the balancing process:
" ' * * * we must balance the actual need for that evidence in view of the contested issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution, and the strength of the evidence in proving the issue, against the danger that the jury will be inflamed by the evidence to decide that because the accused was the perpetrator of the other crimes, he probably committed the crime for which he is on trial as well. * * * The treasured principles underlying the rule against admitting evidence of other crimes should be relaxed only when such evidence is genuinely needed and would be genuinely relevant,’ [United States v Goodwin, 492 F2d 1141, 1150 (CA 5, 1974).]
"This balancing test is the modern bastion of a long standing tradition that protects a criminal defendant from 'guilt by reputation’ [Government of the Virgin Islands v Toto, 529 F2d 278, 283 (CA 3, 1976)]; and from 'unnecessary prejudice.’ [United States v Ring, 513 F2d 1001, 1004 (CA 6, 1974).] Because the weighing entails competing interests, it is delicate, and must be employed with care lest accommodation to the prosecutor’s needs result in subverting a principle that is central to our concept of fairness. [Footnote omitted.] We are not the first Court to caution against allowing exceptions to swallow this important rule. [United States v Miller, 500 F2d 751 (CA 5, 1974); United States v San Martin, 505 F2d 918, 923 (CA 5, 1974).]” 538 F2d 1003.

 The analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is instructive:
"Nor was the probative value of the alarm evidence 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury * * * .’ FR Ev 403; United States v Eatherton, 519 F2d 603, 611 (CA 1, 1975) cert den 423 US 987; 96 S Ct 396; 46 L Ed 2d 304 (1975); Green v United States, [176 F2d 541 (CA 1, 1949)]. The task of 'balancing the prejudicial potential of the evidence *325against its probative value * * * is committed primarily to the trial court.’ United States v Eatherton, supra. The court limited the evidence to that reasonably related to showing Barrett’s expertise; it refused to admit evidence of speciñc criminal incidents which would be more prejudicial. Nor did this evidence receive disproportionate emphasis in the Government’s total case. See United States v Clemons, 503 F2d 486, 491 (CA 8, 1974); Mills v United States, 367 F2d 366 (CA 10, 1966). Under the circumstances we find no error in the court’s balancing of the Government’s right to introduce probative and competent evidence against defendant’s right not to be placed unfairly in a bad light.” United States v Barrett, 539 F2d 244, 248-249 (CA 1, 1976) (emphasis supplied).

 "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” FR Ev 404(b).
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FR Ev 403.