Court Opinion

ID: 9657540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:57.221519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.287213
License: Public Domain

*672Souris, J.
(dissenting). The principal issue in this appeal is whether a will c'ontest can be “settled” in this State by agreement of less than all parties whose beneficial interests are affected by the proposed settlement. For reasons to be stated,' I believe the chancellor erred in approving the proposed settlement of the contest over Mrs. Reeder’s 1961 will, absent agreement by the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney in behalf of the uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the charitable trust provisions of the 1958 will.
At the outset it should be noted that I do not dispute the appellees’ generalization that equity has jurisdiction over trust estates. Furthermore, had the will contest gone to judgment on the merits, the circuit judge’s statutory1 power to render judgment thereon would not be conditioned upon the attorney general’s and the prosecutor’s agreement, nor upon any other litigant’s agreement. But that is not the factual posture of this matter. The contest has not been heard by the circuit judge. No judgment on the merits of the contest has been rendered. Indeed, it is sought by some of the litigants, over the objections of others, represented by the attorney general and prosecutor, to abort the contest; to call off the litigation; to “settle” all of the controversies between the contending parties, but, unfortunately, without the agreement of all parties whose interests would be affected by such a settlement. Conceding the statutory jurisdiction of a circuit judge to hear and determine will contests and equity’s common-law jurisdiction over trusts, I do not believe that the common law or statutory law2 of this State allows some, but.not all, of the bene*673ficially interested parties3 to a will contest to “settle” such, litigation over tbe objections of nonparticipating parties whose beneficial interests may be affected, even with the approval of a circuit judge sitting as a chancellor. That, as I view this record, is what the chancellor was asked, and undertook, to do here.
There are two wills involved in this appeal. The proposed settlement agreement provides that the will of 1961 be denied admission to probate and that the will of 1958 be admitted to probate. It is under the provisions of the 1958 will that the attorney general and prosecutor claim the right, properly in my view, to represent the interests of uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the trust provided in that will.
Appellees do not summarize accurately, in a chart inserted in their brief, the provisions of the 1958 will. Their chart describes the 1958 will’s trust provision as “in effect” directing the payment of net income to 10 named charities. If it did that, there would be merit in their claim that there are no uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries the attorney general and prosecutor could represent.
The fact is, however, that the 1958 will’s trust provisions clearly empower the trustees to exercise discretionary authority not only in determining how much each of the 10 named charities shall receive annually, but also whether they shall receive anything and whether and to what extent other unnamed charities possessing stated qualifications should participate in the testatrix’s beneficence. The *674pertinent provisions of the 1958 will are set forth in the margin.4
*675Because there are uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the 1958 will’s trust, the attorney general and prosecuting attorney, in behalf of such beneficiaries, filed their appearance in the proceedings to probate the 1958 will and filed objections to the petition for admission to probate of the 1961 will. Those steps were taken in January and March of 1964. At that time, the prosecuting attorney’s right and duty to act in behalf of the uncertain and *676indefinite beneficiaries of the 1958 will’s charitable trust were contained in PA 1915, No 280 (CL 1948, § 554.351 et seq. [Stat Ann 1953 Rev § 26.1191 et seq.])5 and the attorney general’s were contained in PA 1961, No 101 (CLS 1961, § 14.251 et seq. [Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 26.1200(1) et seq.]).6
*677My conclusion in this case is supported by this Court’s decision in Rose v. Southern Michigan National Banli (1931), 255 Midi 275. That case involved a will contest compromise agreement entered into pursuant to tbe predecessor of our currently applicable Dodge act.7 Tbe Court beld that it was not necessary to tbe jurisdiction of tbe chancery court to which the agreement was presented for approval that tbe testamentary trustee have signed the agreement, since be bad only a legal title to tbe trust estate and no beneficial interest therein. Had be a beneficial interest, however, bis signature on tbe agreement in advance of its submission to tbe court would have been essential under tbe statute:
“It must be signed by all those whose interests may be limited or diminished by tbe agreement if consummated. It may be conceded that unless tbe agreement is so signed tbe court has no jurisdiction to approve it or to authorize its execution by others. But an executor or trustee has no such interest in tbe estate as will or may be limited or diminished by tbe agreement if consummated. Therefore, under our statute, their signatures are not required in advance of its submission to tbe court.” 255 Mich 275, 278.
In this case of Reeder, tbe uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of tbe charitable trust, represented by tbe attorney general and tbe prosecuting attorney, have beneficial interests which may be affected by tbe settlement agreement proposed. Without tbe approval of their statutory representatives, tbe attorney general and prosecuting attorney, tbe chan*678cellor bad no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for approval of tbe compromise agreement proposed by tbe other beneficially interested parties.
I would reverse tbe chancellor’s order of approval. Appellants should be allowed to tax their costs.

 CL 1948, § 701.36 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178[36]).

 CL 1948, § 702.45 et seq. (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [115] et seq.).

 Trustees, of course, are not beneficially interested parties in such contests and may be ordered, even over their objections, to execute settlement agreements entered into by all those beneficially interested. See, for example, Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank (1931), 255 Mich 275, and Merkel v. Long (1962), 368 Mich 1,

“X give, devise and bequeath the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to the Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co., of Flint, Michigan, in trust, to have and to hold the same for and upon the following uses and purposes and subject to the conditions and powers hereinafter set forth, as follows:
“A. My trustee shall pay and distribute either principal or net income in accordance with the specific provisions relative thereto, as hereinafter set forth, to sueh community fund, hospital, educational, charitable, religious or scientific organizations, or to such other types of similar agency organization or institution as in the sole and final judgment of my trustee shall be worthy beneficiaries of this trust. However, my trustee shall only make distributions of principal or net income to organizations which are exempt from Federal income tax liability at the time of sueh distributions and contributions to which qualify for deductions under the applicable provisions of the internal revenue code governing charitable deductions as now in effect or as hereafter amended. In no event shall any distribution be made to any organization which allows any part of its earnings to inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, which devotes a substantial part of its activities to the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, which engages in any 'prohibited transaction’ as defined under applicable provisions of the internal revenue code as now in effect or as hereafter amended, or which would not qualify for exemption under the then applicable provisions of the Michigan inheritance tax statutes.
“B. At least once a year, and at such additional times as my trustee may deem it advisable, my trustee is directed to distribute the net income of the trust to the organizations of the types stated in paragraph 6A above. Primarily, I request my trustee to make such distributions in equal shares to the ten organizations hereinafter stated, so long as they qualify under the provisions of paragraph 6A above, but if the presently designated purposes of any such organization shall, in the sole opinion of my trustee, be or beeome impossible of attainment, impracticable or unnecessary by reason of changed conditions or otherwise, then my trustee in the exercise of its sole discretion shall apply the funds available for expenditure hereunder to such similar purposes as in its opinion will most nearly fulfill the general charitable purpose of this trust; and my trustee may, in such circumstances as may appeal to its discretion from time to time, add or delete beneficiaries of the types contemplated in paragraph 6A above to those hereinafter named as benefieiaries under this subparagraph, and may further, in its own discretion, determine from time to time what percentage, and whether any, of said net income shall be paid to any beneficiary, whether hereinafter named or added by my trustee. The ten organizations which I desire my trustee to primarily consider are as follows:
“(1) The Young Women’s Christian Association, a Michigan corporation, of Flint, Michigan.
“(2) The Young Men’s Christian Association of Flint, a Michigan corporation, of Flint, Michigan.
*675“(3) The American Caneer Society, Michigan Division, Inc., for the exclusive use and benefit, so far as is legally possible, of the Genesee County, Michigan, Unit.
“(4) The National Foundation (formerly the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, Incorporated), a corporation organized under the membership corporations law of the State of New York, having its principal office at 800 Second avenue, New York 17, N. Y. for the exclusive use and benefit, so far as is legally possible, of the Genesee County, Michigan, Chapter.
“(5) The Tall Pine Council, Boy Scouts of America, of Flint, Michigan.
“(6) The Fair Winds Girl Scout Council, Inc., of Flint, Michigan.
“(7) The Bed Feather Fund of Flint and Genesee County, at Flint, Michigan.
“(8) The First Presbyterian Church of Flint, Michigan.
“(9) The Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, a corporation, to be used exclusively for the benefit of the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, Chicago Unit, located in the City of Chicago, Illinois, owned, operated and maintained by said corporation.
“(10) The Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Michigan, to be used exclusively for the use and benefit of the Michigan Masonic Home and Hospital at Alma, Michigan, funds received hereunder to be devoted to the support and maintenance of said Masonic Home in accordance with, for the purposes, and upon, the conditions set forth in the articles of incorporation, corporate by-laws, and the resolutions of said Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Michigan, creating the Masonic Home and the Masonie Home Endowment Fund.
“C. It is primarily my intention that the trust herein created continue for an indefinite period of time, and that my trustee only make distribution of the net income therefrom. However, I do not direct that the trust be perpetual, and to that end I hereby give my trustee the right and authority, whieh I request that it use sparingly, to distribute to any of the organizations named in paragraph 6B above, and to such other organizations of the type stated in paragraph 6A above as it may in its sole discretion seleet, such portions of the principal of this trust, from time to time, as it believes, in its sole discretion, may be of some special assistance to, or fulfill some special need of, the organization receiving such funds, so long as such funds are used for purposes "which Pieet "the qualifications above prescribed in paragraph 6A.’J

 The pertinent provisions of Aet No 280 read tlien as follows:
“See. 1. No gift, grant, bequest or devise, whether in trust or otherwise to religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses, or for the purpose of providing for the care or maintenance of any part of any cemetery, publie or private, or anything therein contained which shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this State, shall be invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object of sueh trust or of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same, nor by reason of the same contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities. * * *
“See. 2. The court of ehaneery for the proper county shall have jurisdiction and control over the gifts, grants, bequests and devises in all cases provided for by section 1 of this aet. Every sueh trust shall be liberally construed by such court so that the intentions of the creator thereof shall be carried out whenever possible. The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the court of chancery shall have jurisdiction and control shall represent the beneficiaries in all cases where they are uncertain or indefinite, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court, but he shall not be required to perform any duties in connection with such trusts in any court outside of this state.”
By PA 1965, No 12, given immediate effect on April 13, 1965, before filing of the petition for approval of settlement and over seven months before the chancellor decreed approval of the purported settlement, the legislature amended section 2 of Act No 280 by substituting the attorney general for the prosecuting attorney. See Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 26.1192.

 The pertinent provisions of Act No 101 read then as follows:
“See. 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that the people of the state are interested in the administration, operation and disposition of the assets of all charitable trusts in the state; and that the attorney general shall represent the people of the state in all courts of the state in respect to such charitable trusts. This act applies to all trusts and trustees holding property for charitable purposes over which the state or the attorney general has enforcement or supervisory powers. * * *
“Sec. 4. (a) The attorney general shall have jurisdiction and control and shall represent the people of the state and the uncertain or indefinite beneficiaries in all charitable trusts in this state, and may enforce sueh trusts by proper proceedings in the courts of this state. * * *
“Sec. 11. The attorney general may institute appropriate proceedings to secure compliance with this aet and to secure the proper administration of any trust or other relationship to which this aet applies. The powers and duties of the attorney general provided in *677this aet are in addition to Ms existing powers and duties. Nothing in this aet shall impair or restrict the jurisdiction of any court with respeet to any of the matters covered by it.”
Dor current provisions, as amended by PA 1965, No 353, see Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 26.1200(1) et seq.

 CL 1948, § 702.45 et seq. (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [115] et seq.),