Court Opinion

ID: 9961200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 13:00:50.533261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:27.671102
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JIMMY I. DAVIS,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                  NY-0752-22-0089-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: April 17, 2024
              Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Jimmy I. Davis , Newark, New Jersey, pro se.

      Krista M. Irons , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                 REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the agency’s chapter 75 removal action. For the reasons set forth herein,
we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
REMAND the matter to the New York Field Office for further adjudication.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON REVIEW
      The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s conclusions that (1) the
agency proved its charge of “Violation of the Zero Tolerance Policy (Physical
Altercation with a Co-worker on the Workroom Floor)” and (2) he failed to prove
any of his affirmative defenses. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 4
at 3; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 10. The appellant also asserts that the
penalty of removal was unreasonable under the circumstances and that the
administrative judge failed to consider mitigating factors. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
An initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize
the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s
conclusions of law and legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that
reasoning rests. Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587,
589 (1980); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(b) (setting forth the regulatory requirements
for initial decisions).
      Here, we find that the initial decision did not comply with the requirements
of Spithaler. For instance, the initial decision contained minimal discussion of
witness testimony; instead, the administrative judge relied largely on unsworn
written witness statements, reasoning that “all of [these statements indicated that]
the appellant participate[d] in [a physical] altercation.”    IAF, Tab 38, Initial
Decision at 4 (citing IAF, Tab 6 at 14-20).      These cited statements, however,
provided very different accounts of the events underlying the agency’s charge;
indeed, one statement indicated that the appellant had been the innocent victim of
a physical assault, IAF, Tab 6 at 14, and another statement indicated that the
appellant and the other employee had simply “collide[d],” id. at 17. Given the
conflicts in these statements, the administrative judge erred in denying certain
witnesses in an Order and Summary of Prehearing Conference based upon a
finding that the testimony of such witnesses would be “duplicative.” IAF Tab 23
at 3; see IAF Tab 21 (agency’s initial witness list). Accordingly, we vacate the
initial decision and remand the matter for a new adjudication.
                                                                                    3

      When, as here, an appeal involves a dispute as to genuine issues of material
fact, an appellant has a right to a hearing at which the administrative judge may
observe the testimony of witnesses either in person or via videoconference. See
Robertson v. Department of Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 16, ¶ 11 (2009). On
remand, the administrative judge should inform the appellant of his right to an
in-person or videoconference hearing and should hold a telephonic hearing only if
the appellant requests one.      See Koehler v. Department of the Air Force ,
99 M.S.P.R. 82, ¶ 7 (2005) (explaining that an administrative judge may not order
a telephonic hearing over an appellant’s objection).
      The appellant contends that the administrative judge was rude, biased, and
exhibited egregious behavior during the adjudication of his appeal. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 5-6. To support this contention, he provides a copy of a May 18, 2022
letter sent to the appellant by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Northeastern
Regional Office and the New York Field Office acknowledging receipt of a
complaint filed by the appellant regarding the administrative judge. Id. at 8; IAF,
Tab 22 at 3. In this letter, the Chief Administrative Judge indicates, among other
things, that he is “sorry that [the appellant feels that he was] treated with
disrespect during [a] prehearing teleconference.”      PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.      The
record does not support a finding of bias on the part of the administrative judge,
nor do we find any basis for recusal in this matter. See Williams v. U.S. Postal
Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 12 (2000) (explaining that the presumption of
honesty and integrity that accompanies all administrative adjudicators can be
overcome only by a substantial showing of personal bias).          Nevertheless, we
exercise our discretion under the particular circumstances of this case to reassign
this matter to a new administrative judge for a new adjudication. 2 See Keefer v.
Department of Agriculture, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 20 (2002) (reassigning an appeal

2
  Further, because sufficient credibility determinations were not made in the first
instance and we have ordered that a different administrative judge be assigned to this
matter, a hearing de novo is required. See Muzzipapa v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 53, 61 n.3 (1992).
                                                                                4

to a new administrative judge on remand, recognizing that, although there was no
showing of bias or impropriety, friction between the administrative judge and the
appellants had developed throughout the adjudication of the matter).

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the initial decision and remand
this case to a different administrative judge in the New York Field Office for a
new adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.           On remand, the
administrative judge assigned to the matter shall provide the parties with the
opportunity to provide additional evidence and argument to support their
respective positions, hold a hearing de novo, and issue a new initial decision on
the merits of this appeal.     The administrative judge shall also provide the
appellant with proper notice of his burden of proof and the requirements to prove
his affirmative defenses.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.