Court Opinion

ID: 9716168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:29:31.263148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:54.638514
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. To paraphrase the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, mens rea, which in Latin means “the guilty mind” is defined as the state of mind that the prosecution must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime in order to secure a conviction. Black’s Law Dictionary 999 (7th ed. 1999). It can be shown as either criminal intent or recklessness. Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus, or “the guilty act.” The record demonstrates that, without the largely exculpatory statement of defendant Williams, there would be little or no evidence of his involvement other than his being seen outside the building long before the shooting took place. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 426-28. Williams was convicted of murder under the accountability theory. The issue of accountability is pertinent to cases involving deaths resulting from conflicts between street gangs or informal youth groups. People v. Horton, 43 Ill. App. 3d 150 (1976). Under Illinois law, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another if “[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 140 (1995). Conviction under the accountability theory requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Groves, 294 Ill. App. 3d 570 (1998). One must have the mental state requisite to an offense and aid in its commission in order to be accountable for it. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995). Mere presence at the scene, with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish accountability. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 338. While active participation is not a requirement for conviction under an accountability theory, more than presence at the scene of a crime plus knowledge that a crime is being committed is required. Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting. However, one may aid and abet without actively participating in the overt act. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 140. In order to prove that the defendant possessed the intent to promote or facilitate the crime, the State may present evidence that a given defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141. Such evidence would, depending on the facts of the individual case, also support an inference that he shared the common purpose such that one defendant can justifiably be convicted for the offense committed by another. This is not such a case. It is clear that a reasonable doubt remains in this case, as it stretches the limits of believability to conclude, on these particular facts and circumstances, that Williams is responsible for the murder of Andrew Webb. Williams neither fired the gun that killed Webb nor did he hide it after the crime was committed. Williams is not a higher-up in the Gangster Disciples. He is, at best, a low level soldier who had joined the gang about four months earlier, probably as a self-defense measure for the summer because the gang controlled his high-rise public housing. He was still in high school and was to be in his junior year when school resumed in the fall. He did not participate in the meetings at which the decisions were made by the Gangster Disciples to go to war with the Black Disciples. Since the accountability doctrine requires that the accused actively participate either before or diming the commission of the offense, and conspicuously does not mention the accused’s activities after the commission of the offense, this court’s inquiry is limited. Williams did not participate in the planning of the offense. He was not present at any of the relevant meetings. He also did not have authority to make policy for the gang. When Narvel Salter took out his gun and shot Webb, Williams was among the gang members who were in the lobby of the building, who only heard the shots fired, and who later scattered. Williams ran back to his apartment. The gun used in the shooting was given by the shooter to Black James, who switched it for another gun and brought that new gun to Williams’ apartment. This suggests that, while Williams did come into possession of a gun, he never actually touched the murder weapon. Also, in this case, the scene of the crime is in the building where the defendant resided and it was not unusual for him to be in the lobby of his residence for legitimate purposes. He had every right to be in that lobby without any strained leap of logic that he was there to commit a crime. When asked why he was in the lobby at the time of the murder, Williams said he was merely “in the lobby *** sitting on a crate.” He also indicated he was sitting with his “back lying on the security guard booth.” He was then asked leading questions by the. assistant State’s Attorney who took the statement whether he was working security at the time of the incident. Williams responded, “Not really. But I was around there so I just did it.” When asked if the position in which he was sitting was the point where normally people who work security are, Williams responded “when you work security, ain’t no sitting down. Supposed to stand by the door.” He was not standing by the door.1  While Williams, a Gangster Disciple gang member with no rank, was socializing near the official security booth, Andrew Webb came, unarmed, to visit his girlfriend, another resident of the building. “It looked like he was going up to his girlfriend’s house, but he didn’t get a chance to make it. As soon as he turned the corner, right behind the mailbox room, that is where he got killed.” Williams also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the gang crimes expert. He argues that the testimony of the expert was so inflammatory and irrelevant as to outweigh any probative value, since there had already been considerable testimony from Fannie Branch which would tend to establish the fact that there was a gang war going on between the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples at the time of this murder. Williams argues that, since he was not a part of the decision-making process to kill Webb, a discussion of the gang hierarchy was completely unnecessary in this trial. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Pursley, 284 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603 (1996). There is a three-part analysis when determining whether the admission of the gang expert testimony is inappropriate. People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d 143, 150-51 (1998). First, it must be determined whether the person tendered as an expert is in fact an expert. Second, the testimony must be relevant. Finally, does the prejudicial effect outweigh the probative value? Although a deep and widespread public prejudice may exist against street gangs, gang-related evidence will not necessarily be excluded if it is relevant and admissible. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489 (1991). Generally, gang-related evidence is admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990). However, such evidence must relate to the crime charged. This is a murder, only connected to Williams based upon his membership in the gang and his presence in the lobby of his home that also turns out to be the scene of the crime. He was neither the shooter nor was he involved in the decision that resulted in the shooting. Here we have a 15 year old who was simply there at the time the victim was killed, not someone looking to make a name for himself or advance in the gang hierarchy by the killing. Certain evidence relating to the terminology of the gang hierarchy probably was appropriate, but to bring in alleged narcotics traffic by the gang clearly was too prejudicial and clearly outweighed any possible probative value to have been allowed by the trial judge. Because this case is so closely balanced I would have found the admission of the testimony of the “gang expert” to be plain error. For the majority to have considered the testimony of Detective Bloore, that this 15-year-old relatively new gang member somehow acted with common purpose and common criminal design stretching from the death of Andrew Webb to the gang masterminds currently incarcerated, would be laughable if the practical effect was not such a sad commentary on the state of our high-risk children. The majority has turned its back on certain facts. First, Williams was socializing in the lobby of his place of residence with his friends, not standing guard. Second, at best, his knowledge and input in the decision-making process involving whether the gang would go to war was virtually nonexistent. Did he know the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples were at war? Yes, he did, in the same way a private in the United States Army does. That is to say, he knows what he has been told and what he hears from his fellow soldiers. To impute the knowledge of his seniors in the gang to Williams, using the inflammatory testimony of a gang expert to equate Williams and his facts to gang problems in general should, were it not for the obvious bias in favor of getting rid of gangs, shock the conscience. While I generally understand and applaud the efforts of our legislature, courts and law enforcement to rid our streets of the pestilence of gangs, I cannot in good conscience wear blinders so as to allow the rights of even a single child to be trampled. I believe Charles Williams is that child, or was at time of his arrest and trial. Had he fired the gun, hidden the gun from law enforcement, or even been told specifically that he was to kill or help kill someone, I would not blink an eye when the proverbial book was thrown at him. Based on the facts of this case, with due deference to the standard of review, while the defendant is guilty of the lapse of judgment which made him join the gang in the first place, assuming he had any real choice in the matter, this court should have had a reasonable doubt of Williams’ guilt of the murder of Andrew Webb.  The record shows that his codefendant, Dwight Peal, was standing by the door and clearly the only one pointed out by an eyewitness as working security. Williams was never mentioned by that witness as even being present in the lobby before or at the time of the shooting.