Court Opinion

ID: 9564298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:57:38.553572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:20.419315
License: Public Domain

Price, J.,
dissenting in part: I agree with our holding that the allowance of damage for loss of crops should be reversed and set aside, but I disagree with the affirmance of that portion of the judgment allowing damage for destruction of the pump.
We are dealing here with specific findings of a jury on disputed questions of fact and are required to take them at their literal face value.
Answer No. 5 says that the engineer realized, or, in the exercise of due care under the circumstances, should have realized the pump could not be removed from the track when the train was 1445 feet away.
Answer No. 4 says the brakes were applied when the train was 700 feet away.
Answer No. 6 says the negligence of the railroad was the negligence of the engineer in not seeing the pump in time.
I think the only logical construction of these three answers, considered together, is that when 1445 feet away the engineer should have applied the brakes, but he did not do so until after the train had travelled 745 feet — therefore he was negligent.
So far, so good — but that is not all this jury found!
In answer No. 3 it also found that with maximum service-application of the brakes it would take 1970 feet to stop the train.
This jury found, therefore, that even if the engineer had applied the brakes at the instant he first realized, or should have realized, the pump could not be removed from the track, the train still could not have been stopped in that distance (1445 feet) and therefore would have struck the pump anyway.
Under the facts as found, failure to do an act which is physically impossible does not constitute negligence. (Gibbs v. Mikesell, 183 Kan. 123, 131, 132, 325 P. 2d 359.) The effect of these special findings is to acquit defendant of negligence, thus entitling it to judgment.