Court Opinion

ID: 9908671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:03:26.072371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:28.980874
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Dec 11 2023, 8:43 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Talisha Griffin                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender Agency                      Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Jodi Kathryn Stein
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas Owens,                                             December 11, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-985
        v.                                                Appeal from the
                                                          Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Shatrese Flowers, Judge
                                                          The Honorable
                                                          James Snyder, Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D28-2301-F5-1626

                                 Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                             Judges Bradford and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023                            Page 1 of 21
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Indiana Trial Rule 34 governs requests for production of documents and

      electronically stored information during discovery and responses to such

      requests. For a party to invoke Rule 34 as the basis for an alleged discovery

      violation, that party must have first made a discovery request. In a criminal

      case, if the defendant made no discovery request to the State, the defendant

      cannot later challenge the admission of documents or electronically stored

      information on the ground that the State violated Rule 34 in its production of

      the materials.

[2]   Here, Thomas Owens was convicted of Level 5 felony battery by means of a

      deadly weapon after getting in a fight that was captured on a CVS surveillance

      camera. CVS provided the State with a disk containing the surveillance footage

      and a media-player application. During discovery, the State provided Owens

      with the footage but not the media player, which affected the speed at which

      Owens could view the footage. Owens argues this was a violation of Rule 34.

      But because Owens never made a request for production, he can’t invoke Rule

      34 on appeal as the basis for his challenge to the State’s production of the

      footage. Owens raises several other issues, including whether the trial court

      properly instructed the jury, whether the State presented sufficient evidence of

      the victim’s identity and the use of a deadly weapon, and whether the trial court

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023     Page 2 of 21
      erred in denying his motion to supplement the record. We find these arguments

      without merit and affirm his conviction.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   The evidence most favorable to the conviction is as follows. One night in

      January 2023, Owens’s wife was with Jacob Dugas in Dugas’s SUV at a CVS

      Pharmacy in Indianapolis. Owens went to the CVS and fought with Dugas in

      the parking lot. Surveillance footage provided to police by CVS showed that

      Owens ran from his car to the driver’s side of Dugas’s SUV holding a long,

      stick-like object. Dugas and Owens’s wife got out of the SUV, and after an

      interaction between Owens and Dugas behind the SUV, Owens and his wife

      walked away. As they were heading to Owens’s car, Dugas stepped in front of

      Owens, blocking his path. Owens swung the stick-like object at Dugas and

      struck him with it. Owens and his wife got into his car and left.

[4]   Dugas called 911, and Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD)

      Detective Eric Parrish and Officer Jack Tindall, an evidence technician,

      responded to CVS. Officer Tindall took photos of Dugas, which showed a

      bleeding cut on his head and blood on his ear, neck, and cheek. Detective

      Parrish spoke with Dugas and others at the scene and determined Owens was a

      suspect.

[5]   Later that night, Detective Parrish and IMPD Captain Christopher

      Boomershine found Owens at a gas station. When they asked Owens about the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023   Page 3 of 21
      incident at CVS, he stated that Dugas attacked him with a stun gun, he never

      hit or touched Dugas, and Dugas was known to injure himself and blame it on

      other people. Captain Boomershine recorded the conversation on his body-

      worn camera.

[6]   The State charged Owens with Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly

      weapon, alleging he “did knowingly touch Jacob Dugas in a rude, insolent, or

      angry manner; said touching being committed with a deadly weapon, that is, a

      baseball bat[.]”1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27. Owens’s counsel subpoenaed

      Dugas for a deposition on three dates, but Dugas failed to appear at any of the

      depositions. As a result, the trial court excluded Dugas as a witness and ordered

      the exclusion of “any and all testimony and/or other evidence referring or

      related to Jacob Dugas.” Id. at 95. This included Dugas’s 911 call.

[7]   CVS provided police with a disk of the surveillance footage, which included the

      Click It Media Player application and a long list of application extensions. The

      disk also contained a file folder with the same footage broken into thirteen

      separate “M4V” video files. The State produced these thirteen M4V files to the

      defense “via eDiscovery[.]” Id. at 69. The State didn’t produce the Click It

      1
       The State initially charged Owens with Level 5 felony intimidation as well, but the trial court later
      dismissed this charge upon motion by the State due to evidentiary problems.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023                               Page 4 of 21
      Media Player application or the associated files. Owens didn’t follow up with

      any discovery requests about the surveillance footage.2

[8]   A jury trial was held in March 2023. The trial court’s preliminary instruction on

      the elements of the charge used the exact language from the charging

      information. Before the court read the preliminary instructions to the jury, the

      State moved to strike “baseball bat” from the elements instruction so that it just

      said, “committed with a deadly weapon” because the State was unsure if it

      could introduce evidence of a baseball bat without the 911 call from Dugas. Tr.

      p. 101. The court denied the motion but noted that the parties could revisit the

      request for final instructions.

[9]   The State offered into evidence the disk from CVS with the surveillance footage

      of the fight, which the trial court admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. The State moved

      to publish three specific video files from the disk to the jury, which the court

      categorized as State’s 1A, 1B, and 1C.3 When the State started playing 1A using

      Click It Media Player, defense counsel objected, and the following sidebar was

      held:

      2
       The State asserts that Owens “did not make any discovery request,” Appellee’s Br. p. 30, which Owens
      does not dispute.
      3
       State’s 1A is the file named “20230114_0012_0058_103.m4v.” 1B is the file named
      “20230114_0012_0059_104.m4v.” 1C is the file named “20230114_0012_0100_105.m4v.” These were the
      only clips of the surveillance footage shown to the jury.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023                         Page 5 of 21
        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This video is altered from what was
        discovered to us. The video we received was not slowed down to
        this degree. It’s not an original, what was disclosed to us.

                                      *        *       *        *

        THE COURT: How am I supposed to know that? Do you have
        the original?

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. I can play it for the Court if you’d
        like. But this is substantially slowed down. The original copy that
        we have is sped up.

        THE COURT: . . . [H]ow do you slow this down?

        [THE STATE]: I don’t know. This was original disc [sic] that we
        received and then we uploaded it into discovery and then sent it.

        THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Well, at this point, State’s Exhibit 1
        has been admitted.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, it’s my understanding the video
        that was discovered was -- did not have another player with it . . .
        . You had to use Windows Media Player.

                                      *        *       *        *

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it’s playing at about one quarter
        of the speed that we were prepared for trial on, and so that’s the
        problem that we have.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023         Page 6 of 21
       Id. at 119. The court overruled the objection, and the State played the rest of 1A

       for the jury. Defense counsel renewed his objection to State’s 1B and 1C, which

       the court overruled, and the State also played 1B and 1C using Click It Media

       Player. The CVS employee who provided the surveillance footage to police

       testified that Click It was the specific media player used by CVS.

[10]   The State also presented the photos of Dugas from the crime scene (without

       identifying him by name), which the court admitted as State’s Exhibits 2-8 with

       no objection by the defense. Officer Tindall confirmed the exhibits were the

       photos he took of the alleged victim’s injury. He testified that the cut was

       consistent with an object striking a person and that a blunt object could cause a

       similar injury. Detective Parrish testified that the person in the photos was the

       person he saw when he responded to CVS.

[11]   The court also admitted the recording of Owens’s conversation with Detective

       Parrish and Captain Boomershine as State’s Exhibit 9, with no objection by the

       defense. In the video, when Captain Boomershine asked Owens if he battered

       “him” with a baseball bat, Owens said he never had a baseball bat. Ex. 9 at

       1:51. Captain Boomershine then asked Owens what he hit “him” with, and

       Owens said he “never hit Jacob.” Id. at 1:58.

[12]   After the State rested, Owens moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to

       Indiana Trial Rule 50(A), which the court denied. During review of the final

       jury instructions, the State again asked the court to omit “baseball bat” from the

       elements instruction, arguing that “the evidence has shown that there could

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023      Page 7 of 21
have been a deadly weapon used, but that could have been anything, not just a

baseball bat, and therefore, it should be removed.” Id. at 164-65. Defense

counsel responded, in part, as follows:

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, the charging instrument is a
        pretty important thing, the information. And so we believe that it
        should remain in there . . . . And Judge, we prepared a defense
        today based on the allegation that this is a baseball bat . . . .

        THE COURT: You did? I thought it was self-defense?

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, that’s part of it.

        THE COURT: Okay. [S]o your preparation involved arguing
        that it was something other than a baseball bat?

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . [T]he Defense believes that if the
        State cannot prove that it is a baseball bat, it speaks to the nature
        of the investigation and the quality of the investigation.

                                      *        *       *        *

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think my concern too is . . . [t]he
        allegations are that he hit him with a baseball bat . . . so I believe
        that the State has to prove that in order for them to find him
        guilty.

Id. at 165-66. The court ultimately struck “baseball bat” from the instruction,

which subsequently read “and the offense was committed with a deadly

weapon against Jacob Dugas.” Id. at 167, 186; Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 133.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023            Page 8 of 21
       Defense counsel noted for the record that “the appropriate remedy in this case

       for the State would have been to move to amend the information.” Tr. p. 167.

[13]   After jury instructions were finalized, the defense rested without presenting any

       evidence. Defense counsel’s closing argument centered on Owens’s claim of

       self-defense. During final instructions, along with the revised elements

       instruction, the court instructed the jury on the definitions of “deadly weapon”

       and “serious bodily injury.” Id. at 187-88; Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 136-37.

       The jury found Owens guilty as charged.

[14]   Owens later moved the court to supplement the trial record with Defendant’s

       Exhibit A, three video files from the CVS surveillance footage the State

       produced during discovery, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 32. Owens

       claimed Exhibit A “must be made a part of the record in this case for purposes

       of appellate review of the merits of Counsel’s objection” because “[t]he current

       record does not fully and accurately reflect the circumstances surrounding the

       admission of State’s Exhibit 1A, 1B, 1C over Defense objection[.]” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 169. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel noted that

       he was not alleging any misconduct by the State and did not believe the State

       knew about the discrepancy in the video speed ahead of time. The trial court

       said it was denying Owens’s motion because Rule 32 did not apply but would

       admit Defendant’s Exhibit A for purposes of appellate review.

[15]   Owens now appeals.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023       Page 9 of 21
       Discussion and Decision
       I. The trial court did not err in admitting the surveillance
       footage
[16]   Owens argues the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 1, the CVS

       surveillance footage. He claims the court should have excluded the exhibit

       because the State violated Indiana Trial Rule 34 by producing the M4V video

       files but not the Click It Media Player application during discovery. Trial courts

       have broad discretion in reviewing a challenge to discovery matters, and we will

       affirm a court’s determination as to a discovery violation absent clear error and

       resulting prejudice. Fleming v. State, 833 N.E.2d 84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[17]   In criminal cases, much discovery is provided automatically by the State

       without a request from the defendant. Under the Marion County local criminal

       rule governing discovery, “[n]o written motion is required” by the defendant

       because the court “automatically order[s] the State to disclose and furnish all

       relevant items and information[.]” Marion LR49-CR00-107. Pursuant to this

       rule, the State provided Owens with a variety of materials, including video files

       from CVS. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 69. Owens doesn’t claim the State

       violated the local rule by producing only some of the files.

[18]   Instead, Owens argues the State violated Trial Rule 34. Indiana’s Rules of Trial

       Procedure apply to criminal proceedings as long as there is no conflicting

       criminal rule. Ind. Crim. Rule 21; Minges v. State, 192 N.E.3d 893, 897 (Ind.

       2022). The trial rules that govern discovery, including Rule 34, are designed to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023    Page 10 of 21
       facilitate “‘liberal discovery’ in order to provide the maximum amount of

       information possible to both parties[.]” Minges, 192 N.E.3d at 897. To this

       effect, Rule 34 enables parties to seek discovery directly from each other by

       serving requests for production of documents and electronically stored

       information. Id. If one party requests electronically stored information from the

       other but does not specify the form of production, under Rule 34(B), the

       “responding party must produce the information in a form or forms in which it

       is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.”

[19]   In a criminal proceeding, the defendant can use Rule 34 to request additional

       documents or electronically stored information that the State didn’t already

       produce. This is where the problem lies for Owens. He never made a request for

       production, but he nonetheless claims the State violated Rule 34, arguing that it

       did not produce the surveillance footage in a form in which it is ordinarily

       maintained or a reasonably usable form.4 But the State was not bound by Rule

       34 because it is not a “responding party” within the meaning of the rule. The

       rule presupposes that a request for production has been made, and since Owens

       never made such a request, he cannot claim a violation of the rule.

[20]   Even if the State had been responding to a Rule 34 request for production, there

       would be no violation because the State produced the footage in a reasonably

       usable form. The State provided Owens with the footage in the M4V file type,

       4
           Notably, Owens did not mention Rule 34 when he objected to State’s Exhibit 1 at trial.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023                         Page 11 of 21
       which is compatible with a variety of media-player applications. While the

       Click It Media Player application was also on the disk from CVS, this is merely

       one application that can be used to play the M4V files. Owens used Windows

       Media Player, which allows users to adjust the speed as they are watching video

       files, so Owens could have viewed the footage at the same speed at which the

       State played it at trial.

[21]   We acknowledge that, where the State possesses electronically stored

       information in multiple files, it would be better practice for the State to provide

       the defense with all of those files. Here, the State should have just sent Owens

       all the files on the disk from CVS. But because Owens didn’t request discovery

       from the State, he can’t challenge the State’s production of the information

       based on a rule that concerns responses to discovery requests. The trial court

       did not err in admitting State’s Exhibit 1.

       II. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements
       of the charge
[22]   Owens also contends the trial court erred by omitting from its final instruction

       on the elements of the charge the words “baseball bat,” which were included in

       the charging information, as the deadly weapon used to strike Dugas. To begin,

       Owens argues the proper procedure for the State to eliminate this language

       would have been to amend the charging information, not ask the trial court to

       strike it from the elements instruction. We are faced here with an unusual

       situation in which the charge was effectively amended even though the State

       never formally moved to amend the information. But because the outcome (the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023      Page 12 of 21
       trial court striking “baseball bat” from the elements instruction) would have

       been the same even if the State filed a formal motion, for purposes of our

       review, we will consider the State’s request for alteration of the jury instruction

       as a motion to amend. See Rodriguez v. State, 385 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1979) (“Although the State did not formally move to amend the

       information . . . , the instructions given by the court and approved by the State

       created the same effect.”).

[23]   Amendments of charges are governed by Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5.

       Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part, that the charging information may be

       amended in matters of substance at any time before the commencement of trial

       if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.

       Under subsection (c), the court may permit an amendment of form any time

       before, during, or after trial, so long as the amendment does not prejudice the

       defendant’s substantial rights.

[24]   In determining whether the trial court properly allowed the State to amend its

       charging information, we must first determine whether the amendment was one

       of form or of substance. Jones v. State, 863 N.E.2d 333, 337 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2007). This is a question of law that we review de novo. Erkins v. State, 13

       N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied. Our Supreme Court has held that an

       amendment is of form “if a defense under the original information would be

       equally available after the amendment and the accused’s evidence would apply

       equally to the information in either form,” and “an amendment is of substance

       only if it is essential to making a valid charge of the crime.” Id. at 406.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023          Page 13 of 21
[25]   Here, “baseball bat” was not essential to making a valid charge of Level 5

       felony battery by means of a deadly weapon; the essential element to enhance

       battery to a Level 5 felony is the use of a deadly weapon, which remained in the

       jury instruction. See, e.g., Jones, 863 N.E.2d at 338 (concluding amendment was

       not of substance where the class of the offense, the essential elements of the

       crime, and the specific statutory provision alleged to have been violated all

       remained the same). Nor did the amendment cause Owens to lose any

       defenses—his only defense was self-defense, which was just as available

       whether or not “baseball bat” was in the charge. The removal of “baseball bat”

       from the charge was an amendment of form, not of substance.

[26]   Because the amendment was of form, the trial court could allow it at any time

       before, during, or after trial, so long as it did not prejudice Owens’s substantial

       rights. “A defendant’s substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and

       an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge[.]” Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d

       607, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. An amendment as to either form or

       substance does not prejudice these rights if it does not affect any particular

       defense or change either party’s position. Id. at 610-11. “Ultimately, the

       question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for

       and defend against the charges.” Id. at 611.

[27]   Owens claims “his defense was centered on rebutting the specific object alleged

       as a deadly weapon under the statute,” Appellant’s Br. p. 23, but we find no

       support for this in the record. The court altered the language of the elements

       instruction before the defense rested, but defense counsel still presented no

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023      Page 14 of 21
       evidence and only argued self-defense in closing. Additionally, Owens had

       notice before the start of trial that the State intended to amend the elements

       instruction; when the State moved to alter the preliminary instruction, it

       advised it would renew the motion for final instructions, and the trial court

       noted the parties could revisit the request then. See Mays v. State, 120 N.E.3d

       1070, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding amendment to information did not

       prejudice defendant’s substantial rights where defendant had notice of the

       anticipated amendment and his defense remained the same before and after the

       amendment), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Because the charge of Level 5 felony

       battery by means of a deadly weapon did not change, and the amended charge

       did not affect Owens’s defense, he had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for

       and defend against the charge. His substantial rights were not prejudiced.

[28]   Although the State did not follow the statutorily prescribed procedure for

       amending the charge, because the removal of “baseball bat” from the elements

       instruction did not prejudice Owens’s substantial rights, the trial court did not

       err in altering the instruction. See Nash v. State, 545 N.E.2d 566, 567 (Ind. 1989)

       (“The purposes of the motion to amend were therefore fulfilled, and the lack of

       that formal motion to amend did no prejudice to substantial rights. There is

       therefore no error warranting remedy.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023     Page 15 of 21
       III. There was sufficient evidence to support Owens’s
       conviction
[29]   Owens next argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. 5

       When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the

       evidence nor judge witness credibility. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066

       (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the verdict and any

       reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. Id. We will affirm a conviction

       if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the

       offense such that a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty

       beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[30]   To obtain a conviction for Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon,

       the State had to prove Owens knowingly touched “Jacob Dugas” in a rude,

       insolent, or angry manner with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1),

       (g)(2); Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 27, 133. Owens argues the State failed to

       prove both that Dugas was the victim and that Owens used a deadly weapon.

       A. Identity of the Victim

[31]   Owens maintains there was insufficient evidence of the identity of the victim

       named in the charging information because the victim’s full name was never

       established at trial. He contends the State failed to prove that the injured man in

       5
        Owens makes a separate argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the
       evidence under Trial Rule 50(A). See Appellant’s Br. pp. 13-16. Because “[t]he standard of review for a denial
       of a motion for judgment on the evidence is the same as that for a challenge to the sufficiency of the
       evidence,” Dye v. State, 943 N.E.2d 928, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), we consider these arguments together.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023                            Page 16 of 21
       the evidence photos and the “Jacob” that Owens mentions in the body-cam

       video are “Jacob Dugas,” the victim alleged in the information. Appellant’s

       Reply Br. p. 4. Owens claims that “[a]t most, the State’s evidence sufficiently

       proves Owens was in an altercation with a Jacob.” Id. at 6. We disagree.

[32]   While officers questioned Owens about the incident at CVS, Owens referred to

       the other person involved as “Jacob” multiple times. See Ex. 9 at 1:24, 2:02,

       2:57, 3:09. Part of the CVS surveillance footage shows a person stepping in

       front of Owens as Owens is walking to his car. When describing the events in

       the footage during closing argument, defense counsel stated, “Mr. Dugas blocks

       Thomas from returning to his vehicle . . . . Jacob blocked his path.” Tr. pp. 178-

       79. The footage also shows Owens hitting the person blocking his path with a

       long, stick-like object. Officer Tindall was called to CVS to take “photographs

       of a victim that had been hit.” Id. at 124. After the trial court admitted the

       exhibits showing Dugas’s injury, Officer Tindall confirmed the exhibits were

       “the photographs that [he] took that night . . . of the alleged victim.” Id. at 125.

       Detective Parrish also testified that the person in the photos was the same

       person he saw when he arrived at CVS.

[33]   Taken together, although Dugas was never identified by his full name at trial,

       the State’s evidence and defense counsel’s reference to the victim as “Mr.

       Dugas” were sufficient for the jury to find that the victim referenced at trial was

       “Jacob Dugas,” as named in the charging information. See Davis v. State, 796

       N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding although victim’s name was not

       specifically mentioned at trial, evidence was sufficient for trial court to conclude

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023      Page 17 of 21
       unnamed victim identified in testimony was the same victim referenced in the

       charging information), trans. denied.

       B. Use of a Deadly Weapon

[34]   Owens also contends the State failed to establish that he committed the battery

       with a deadly weapon. As stated above, the State was not required to prove

       Owens specifically used a baseball bat, so we consider only whether the State

       proved whatever object Owens used could be considered a deadly weapon.

       Whether an object is a deadly weapon is a question of fact determined from the

       nature of the object, how the defendant actually used the object, and the

       circumstances of the particular case. Burgh v. State, 79 N.E.3d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2017).

[35]   The statutory definition of “deadly weapon” is broad and fact-sensitive. Id. As

       relevant here, “deadly weapon” is defined as:

               (2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser . . . or electronic
               stun weapon . . . , equipment, chemical substance, or other
               material that in the manner it:

                        (A) is used;

                        (B) could ordinarily be used; or

                        (C) is intended to be used;

               is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-985 | December 11, 2023          Page 18 of 21
       I.C. § 35-31.5-2-86(a). And “serious bodily injury” means “bodily injury that

       creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious permanent

       disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or

       protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or

       (5) loss of a fetus.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292.

[36]   Owens claims that to prove the object he used in the battery was a deadly

       weapon, the State had to establish what the object was. But there is no

       requirement in our statutes or case law that the State must prove exactly what

       object a defendant used to convict for battery by means of a deadly weapon.

       Instead, in determining whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon, the

       factfinder looks to its capacity to inflict serious bodily injury under the

       circumstances. Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind. 1994); see also Grogg

       v. State, 156 N.E.3d 744, 750-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding “flashlight type

       electrical device” qualified as deadly weapon because it had the ability to cause

       serious bodily injury, even though State did not establish whether it was a taser

       or stun gun), trans. denied. Put another way, the State must prove whatever

       object a defendant used to commit battery meets the statutory definition of

       deadly weapon, not what the object was.

[37]   In the surveillance footage from CVS, Owens can be seen swinging and striking

       Dugas with a long, stick-like object. The photos taken at the crime scene show a

       cut on the side of Dugas’s head bleeding down onto his neck and ear. See Exs.

       3-8. Officer Tindall testified that the cut went into Dugas’s scalp, the injury was

       consistent with an object striking a person, and a blunt object could cause a

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       break in the skin like the one shown in State’s Exhibit 5. Although the State did

       not establish what exactly the long, stick-like object was, based on how Owens

       used it—swinging it at Dugas and striking him with it—and the extent of

       Dugas’s injury, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the object could

       inflict serious bodily injury. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Owens

       battered Dugas using a deadly weapon.

       IV. The trial court did not err in denying Owens’s motion to
       supplement the record under Appellate Rule 32
[38]   Finally, Owens argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to supplement

       the record with Defendant’s Exhibit A, the video files he received from the

       State during discovery. Owens asked the court to make Defendant’s Exhibit A

       part of the trial record under Indiana Appellate Rule 32(A):

               If a disagreement arises as to whether the Clerk’s Record or
               Transcript accurately discloses what occurred in the trial court . .
               . , any party may move the trial court . . . to resolve the
               disagreement. The trial court retains jurisdiction to correct or
               modify the Clerk’s Record or Transcript at any time before the
               reply brief is due to be filed.

[39]   Owens claims that because trial courts have jurisdiction under the rule to

       modify or correct the record, “the court was permitted to supplement the

       record, and Owens’s request to do so was procedurally proper.” Appellant’s Br.

       p. 34. But Rule 32 does not apply here. There is no disagreement as to whether

       the record accurately reflects what occurred at trial—both parties acknowledge

       that while defense counsel said he could play Defendant’s Exhibit A for the

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       court, he never actually presented it. Because the exhibit never came before the

       court, its absence from the record is accurate, so Rule 32 was not the proper

       procedure for adding it to the record. See Chesterfield Mgmt., Inc. v. Cook, 655

       N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“As the Unfiled Documents were never

       before the trial court, their exclusion from the Record on appeal is neither an

       omission nor a misstatement of the record. [The Rule] does not authorize

       including in the Record evidence that was never before the trial court.”), reh’g

       denied, trans. denied.

[40]   Owens’s motion to supplement the record amounted to an untimely offer of

       proof, and his counsel admitted as much at the hearing on the motion. See Tr.

       p. 230 (asking the trial court to admit Defendant’s Exhibit A to correct “the lack

       of proffer on my part Judge, as to what was disclosed to Defense . . . because I

       did not introduce the . . . sped-up video”). Failure to make an offer of proof at

       trial results in waiver of the asserted evidentiary error. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d

       1126, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And in any event, although the trial court

       denied Owens’s motion under Rule 32, it still admitted Defendant’s Exhibit A

       for purposes of appellate review, so the goal of the motion was satisfied. Owens

       doesn’t explain how denial of the motion caused him any harm or what

       difference it would have made if the court had granted it. The trial court didn’t

       err in denying Owens’s motion to supplement the record.

[41]   Affirmed.

       Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.

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