Court Opinion

ID: 9409586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 19:06:37.2564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.696438
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/18/23 Schneider v. Bank of America CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Amador)
                                                            ----

CHRISTOPHER D. SCHNEIDER,                                                                    C093540

                   Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       (Super. Ct. No. 19-CVC-
                                                                                           11425)
         v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,

                   Defendants and Respondents.

         Christopher D. Schneider appeals from a judgment of dismissal after Bank of
America, N.A. and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (together, respondents)
successfully demurred to his complaint. He contends we should reverse for four reasons:
respondents omitted his ZIP Code in most of their proofs of service, the trial court’s
actions in a separate proceeding caused him to be homeless, the trial court committed
perjury, and the trial court violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. We affirm.

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                                      BACKGROUND
       Schneider sued respondents for, among other things, allegedly breaking into his
home, stealing and destroying his possessions, and taking possession of his home. At the
top of his complaint, Schneider—who describes himself as homeless—listed his address
as “General Delivery,” “Jackson, CA,” with no ZIP Code included. On most of his other
filings, Schneider added a ZIP Code. He usually listed 95642, though, on one occasion,
he mistakenly listed 95685.
       Respondents afterward filed a demurrer and motion to strike parts of Schneider’s
complaint. In their demurrer, they argued all of Schneider’s causes of action should be
dismissed because he failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and
because each alleged cause of action was vague and uncertain. They added that one of
Schneider’s causes of action, for breach of contract, should also be dismissed because he
failed to indicate whether the alleged contract was written, verbal, or implied by conduct.
In their proofs of service for the demurrer and motion to strike, respondents used the
same mailing address listed on Schneider’s complaint—“General Delivery,” “Jackson,
CA,” with no ZIP Code included. But in a later filing titled Notice of Non-Receipt of
Opposition to Demurrer and to Motion to Strike, respondents added the 95642 ZIP Code
for the City of Jackson.
       With no filed opposition from Schneider, and following several continuances by
the trial court, the trial court granted respondents’ motion to strike and sustained their
demurrer without leave to amend. The court later entered judgment in respondents’
favor. Schneider timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Schneider urges us to set aside the trial court’s judgment for four reasons. First,
he contends reversal is required because the proofs of service for most of respondents’
filings omitted his ZIP Code, reasoning that the omitted ZIP Code “promotes lost and/or
undelivered mail.” As covered above, several filings omitted Schneider’s ZIP Code.

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Schneider initiated this practice with his complaint, which listed his address as “General
Delivery,” “Jackson, CA,” with no ZIP Code included. Respondents afterward used this
address in the proofs of service for their filings concerning their demurrer and motion to
strike. But most other proofs of service included Schneider’s ZIP Code. The trial court,
for example, included Schneider’s ZIP Code when it mailed several notices that the
hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike was being continued. And respondents also
included Schneider’s ZIP Code when they mailed notice that they never received an
opposition to their demurrer and motion to strike, though they later omitted the ZIP Code
in the proof of service for the notice of entry of judgment.
       Schneider has not shown these circumstances require reversal. Respondents,
again, used the very address that Schneider provided in his complaint. Schneider never
even acknowledges this detail. Nor has Schneider shown, or even attempted to show,
that respondents’ omission of the ZIP Code prevented him from receiving their mailings.
Nothing in the record shows that the absence of the ZIP Code for the City of Jackson
hindered the United States Postal Service’s ability to deliver the mail to the City of
Jackson. Schneider, for instance, cites no declaration or other evidence showing he failed
to receive respondents’ mailings. Nor does he claim he was unaware of respondents’
demurrer and motion to strike before the trial court’s ruling. And as far as we have
found, nothing in the record shows respondents’ mailings were returned to sender. Under
similar facts, another court inferred that a document mailed without a ZIP Code was
nonetheless delivered to the intended recipient. (In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723,
730 [inferring a party received a document mailed without a ZIP Code because the listed
address was otherwise correct, the document was not returned to sender, the intended
recipient offered no declaration stating she did not receive the document, she did not
claim in her brief on appeal that she was unaware of the document, and, in one filing, she
did not claim she did not receive the document].) We find similarly here.

                                              3
       Second, Schneider argues the trial court harmed him by “rubber stamping in
unlawful detainer case 19cvc11334 and forcing him into homelessness.” Schneider
appears to challenge the trial court’s decision in a separate proceeding involving
respondents’ earlier unlawful detainer action. But that action is not the subject of this
appeal. (See OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 1318, 1327-1328 [a trial court’s decision in a separate case is generally not
subject to collateral attack].) And regardless, Schneider has not shown the trial court’s
decision in that action was in any way flawed. The limited record we have for that case
shows respondents filed their unlawful detainer action in late 2019 and, less than a month
later, voluntarily dismissed their action without prejudice. Attempting to show
impropriety in that case, Schneider claims he “was never given any hearings, due process,
or ‘chance’ to object” before the dismissal. But he never explains the basis for his
purported right to a hearing or a chance to object before the dismissal, and we
consequently find his unsupported argument forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails
to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived”].)
       Next, Schneider accuses the trial court of perjury and hypocrisy. To support his
claim, he cites parts of the record showing several proofs of service and the envelopes
apparently associated with these proofs of service. But he never explains the relevance of
these materials, and we cannot discern his intended point. We find his claim forfeited as
a result. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
       Finally, Schneider claims the trial court’s procedures violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. He reasons the trial court
wrongly employed “ ‘dual’—Plessy style (1896)—systems of filing, service, and
information access,” and he asserts “whenever one party has limitations—every other
party—and court—shall have those ‘exact’ same limitations (e.g. 4 x tracing to carbon

                                              4
paper).” But Schneider never describes the referenced “dual” systems, nor explains his
claim that all parties and the court must be subject to the “same limitations.” We thus
find these claims forfeited too. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

                                                        /s/
                                                    BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

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