Court Opinion

ID: 9881916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:01:21.998578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.580933
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10858     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 10/04/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-10858
                            ____________________

        PHYLLIS EDWARDS,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        DOTHAN CITY SCHOOLS,
        DOTHAN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
        MICHAEL SCHMITZ,
        individually and in his oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        BRENDA GUILFORD,
        individually and in her oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        FRANKLIN JONES,
        individually and in his oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        SUSAN VIERKANDT,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-10858

        individually and in her oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        BRETT STRICKLAND,
        individually and in his oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        AMY BONDS,
        individually and in her oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,
        CHRIS MADDOX,
        individually and in his oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Dothan Board of Education,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00248-ECM-JTA
                           ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
              Dr. Phyllis Edwards appeals the district court’s dismissal of
        her wrongful termination suit against Dothan City Schools and
        Dothan City Board of Education (collectively, the Board), as well
        as Michael Shmitz, Brenda Guilford, Franklin Jones, Susan
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        22-10858               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Vierkandt, Brett Strickland, Amy Bonds, and Chris Maddox (collec-
        tively, the Board members). Dr. Edwards alleged three claims: (1)
        denial of due process; (2) conspiracy to deprive her of her due pro-
        cess rights; and (3) breach of contract by the Board members in
        their official and individual capacities. After reviewing the record,
        and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse the district
        court’s denial of Dr. Edwards’ due process claim and affirm the de-
        nial of the conspiracy and breach of contract claims.
                                I.        Background
               On January 16, 2018, Dr. Edwards was hired as the Superin-
        tendent of Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. Her employ-
        ment contract term spanned from February 26, 2018, until June 30,
        2023. The employment contract stated Dr. Edwards could only be
        terminated for cause. Furthermore, the contract stated that the ter-
        mination would not be effective until the Board provided Dr. Ed-
        wards with a statement of the cause for termination and allowed
        her an opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, the employment contract
        provided that Dr. Edwards could resign with or without cause as
        long as she gave at least 120 days’ notice in writing of her resigna-
        tion to the Board.
               During Dr. Edwards’ term of employment, she claims she
        experienced various interpersonal difficulties with the Board. The
        complaint alleges Dr. Edwards fielded criticism and accusations by
        Board members outside of official Board meetings. Due in large
        part to this treatment, Dr. Edwards emailed her “intent to resign”
        to the Board on September 8, 2020. Her letter states: “I intend to
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        4                         Opinion of the Court              22-10858

        tender my resignation to the Dothan City School Board. Please let
        me know who I should deal with to iron out the details.” The com-
        plaint alleges that, because this was only an intent to resign and not
        an official resignation, Dr. Edwards did not offer a date on which
        she planned to leave.
               On September 14, 2020, six days after the intent to resign
        was sent, the complaint alleges that the Board voted to terminate
        Dr. Edwards’ contract. The minutes, mentioned in the complaint
        but first supplied by the Board’s motion to dismiss, detail the
        Board’s vote to “accept” Dr. Edwards’ resignation.
                Consequently, Dr. Edwards filed the instant action in the
        district court. She brought claims for deprivation of due process
        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
        conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
        and breach of contract. In response, the Board and the Board mem-
        bers filed a motion to dismiss on April 26, 2021. On February 28,
        2022, the district court dismissed: (1) the due process and conspir-
        acy claims with prejudice; (2) the breach of contract claim against
        the individual Defendants in their official capacity without preju-
        dice on the basis of sovereign immunity; and (3) the breach of con-
        tract claim against the Board members in their individual capacities
        with prejudice. Dr. Edwards timely appealed.
                            II.         Standard of Review
               We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a com-
        plaint. FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1295
        (11th Cir. 2011). We must “accept the [factual] allegations in the
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        22-10858                Opinion of the Court                           5

        complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
        the plaintiff.” Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1001 (11th Cir.
        2021). But we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
        couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
        (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))
        (quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
        complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
        to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. “A claim
        has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
        allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
        ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While the plausibility
        standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” it re-
        quires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted un-
        lawfully.” Id.
                                   III.       Analysis
               Dr. Edwards claims (1) denial of procedural due process; (2)
        conspiracy to deprive her of her due process rights; and (3) breach
        of contract by the Board members in their official and individual
        capacities. We will address each claim in turn.
           A. Procedural Due Process
               When a public employee is in a position where they can only
        be discharged for cause, the public employee has a constitutionally
        protected property interest in their employment and cannot be
        fired without due process. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29
        (1997). When bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plain-
        tiff must show that the conduct was committed under the color of
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10858

        state law and deprived her of her constitutional rights. However,
        when an employee voluntarily resigns, the employee is not de-
        prived of any protected interest in her employment. Hargray v. City
        of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
               The Supreme Court held that it is sufficient to uphold tak-
        ings of property without any predeprivation process if the taking is
        the result of a “random and unauthorized” act by a state employee.
        Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
        Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Further, postdeprivation
        remedies alone are appropriate if there is a need for exigency by the
        State in the taking or if providing predeprivation process would be
        impracticable. Id. at 538–39. But we previously found that when
        there is a procedural due process violation, Parratt does not apply
        “when the state is in the position to provide predeprivation pro-
        cess.” Burch v. Apalachee Cmty. Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d
        797, 801 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Importantly, we have not ad-
        dressed whether an unanticipated mistake is included in random
        and unauthorized conduct.
               Our circuit encountered a similar case to the one at issue in
        Fetner v. City of Roanoke. 813 F.2d 1183 (11th Cir. 1987). In Fetner, a
        public employee was terminated without a formal hearing,
        whether the employee resigned or was terminated was at issue,
        and the claim was dismissed by the district court at the motion to
        dismiss stage. Id. at 1184, 1186. We decided that, when a state pro-
        cedure exists to provide for the deprivation of property and it is
        practicable for the State to abide by those predeprivation measures,
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        22-10858               Opinion of the Court                         7

        disregarding of the same constitutes a procedural due process vio-
        lation. Id. at 1186. Further, we held that determining whether the
        employee voluntarily resigned or was terminated was a question
        of fact that precluded summary judgment. Id.
               Dr. Edwards argues that she is a public employee dismissible
        only for cause, thereby ensuring a protected property interest in
        her employment. As such, she asserts that she could not be termi-
        nated without due process. She states that the district court erred
        in finding that the Board engaged in “random and unauthorized
        conduct” by misinterpreting her letter as a voluntary resignation.
        Dr. Edwards alleges that the Board, with premeditation, acted in-
        tentionally and willfully by terminating her, which deprived her of
        due process. She maintains her letter expressed an “intent to re-
        sign,” with no date specified, and was subject to further discussion.
               In arguing for its interpretation of the facts, the Board urges
        us to consider Dr. Edwards’ letter, the minutes of the relevant
        Board meeting, and the employment contract. The Board argues
        these documents demonstrate that Dr. Edwards left of her own vo-
        lition and support the district court’s characterization of the
        Board’s conduct as “random and unauthorized.” Dr. Edwards re-
        ferred to this group of documents in her complaint, and the Board
        attached the documents to the motion to dismiss the complaint
        without objection.
              Normally, we will not consider anything beyond the face of
        the complaint and documents attached thereto when considering
        a motion to dismiss. Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10858

        F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). However, we will
        consider outside documents attached to a defendant’s motion to
        dismiss when: (1) the plaintiff mentions the document(s) at issue in
        the complaint; (2) the document is central to the claim; and (3) the
        contents are not in dispute, i.e., the document’s authenticity is un-
        questioned. Id.; Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th
        Cir. 2023). When a document considered at the motion to dismiss
        stage contains “ambiguities . . . subject to interpretation,” courts
        should interpret all ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor. Baker, 67
        F.4th at 1277.
               Here, there is no disagreement as to the contents of Dr. Ed-
        wards’ letter or the employment contract, and these can properly
        be considered. But while neither party contests the minutes’ au-
        thenticity, disagreement surrounds their consideration. The
        minutes refer to Dr. Edwards’ letter as a resignation, while Ed-
        wards’ allegations reflect that the Board terminated her without
        cause and in violation of the due process provisions contained in
        her contract. Though the minutes do present ambiguity as to
        whether Dr. Edwards’ letter should be interpreted as a resignation
        or termination, this does not bar their consideration. Thus, the
        minutes were properly considered by the district court.
                What was improper, however, was the district court’s inter-
        pretation of the ambiguity against Dr. Edwards. Instead of constru-
        ing all ambiguities in Dr. Edwards’ favor, the district court used the
        minutes to recharacterize the allegations within Dr. Edwards’ com-
        plaint. When taking the factual allegations in Dr. Edwards’
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        22-10858               Opinion of the Court                         9

        complaint as true, there is a plausible claim for relief. In paragraph
        18 of the complaint, Dr. Edwards classifies her communication as
        an “intent” to resign, not an actual resignation. In paragraphs 19
        and 21, Dr. Edwards alleges that in the Board’s “haste to get rid of”
        her, it did not give her a statement of cause or an opportunity to be
        heard, as required by the contract, before terminating her employ-
        ment. These allegations, when taken as true, meet the plausibility
        standard that there is more than a sheer possibility that the Board
        and its members acted to deprive Dr. Edwards of due process. It is
        plausible that, based on the face of the complaint: Dr. Edwards did
        not voluntarily resign but was terminated; as in Fetner, there were
        no exigent circumstances necessitating a lack of predeprivation
        process; in such a scenario, the “random and unauthorized” excep-
        tion under Parratt would be inapplicable; therefore, the lack of pre-
        deprivation process violated Dr. Edwards’ procedural due process
        rights.
                While our analysis should not be considered determinative
        on the merits, it is illustrative that Dr. Edwards alleged, at mini-
        mum, a plausible case worthy of surviving a motion to dismiss. The
        district court erred by ignoring that Dr. Edwards had a plausible
        claim to relief and not drawing reasonable inferences in her favor.
        We therefore reverse the dismissal of Dr. Edwards’ due process
        claim.
           B. Conspiracy
              Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights occurs when two
        persons conspire to prevent another person from performing their
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10858

        duties or deprive them of their rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C.
        § 1985. A plaintiff seeking recourse under § 1985(3) must allege that
        the defendant had a “class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
        mus behind the defendant’s action taken in furtherance of the con-
        spiracy.” Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted).
               Furthermore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine pro-
        vides that a corporation’s employees, acting as agents of the corpo-
        ration, are unable to conspire among themselves or with the cor-
        poration. Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th
        Cir. 2000). We have not addressed exceptions to the intracorporate
        conspiracy doctrine. See id. at 770 (reserving consideration of ex-
        ceptions); Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1263 (11th Cir.
        2010) (same); but see Greenville Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector, Inc.,
        496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding the intracorporate con-
        spiracy doctrine may not apply if “the officer has an independent
        personal stake in achieving the corporation’s illegal objective”).
               Dr. Edwards argues that the Board members acted in con-
        cert when terminating her contract, failed to afford her a hearing,
        and prevented her performance of duties for the 120-day period
        mandated by her contract. Dr. Edwards further encourages this
        court to adopt the exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doc-
        trine the Fourth Circuit identified in Greenville, as she claims the
        Board acted outside their lawful authority.
               Dr. Edwards’ complaint does not sufficiently allege a con-
        spiracy. Her complaint contains several legal conclusions, stating
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        22-10858                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        the Board conspired and caused her to be injured, as well as having
        acted in concert when terminating the contract. She does not allege
        any factual scenarios to support these claims. Indeed, no infor-
        mation is provided regarding how two or more Board members
        supposedly worked together. This dearth of information regarding
        the Board members’ conduct necessitates finding that the com-
        plaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to establish a conspir-
        acy claim. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, Dr. Edwards failed to
        allege that the Board discriminated against her under a “class-
        based, invidiously discriminatory animus,” preventing her from
        seeking recourse under § 1985(3). Dean, 12 F.4th at 1255.
                Based on the deficiencies in Dr. Edwards’ complaint, she
        fails to show that the district court erred. Thus, we affirm the dis-
        trict court’s dismissal of Dr. Edwards’ conspiracy claim. 1
            C. Sovereign Immunity Law
               The State of Alabama generally enjoys absolute immunity
        from lawsuits under Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitu-
        tion. This immunity applies to arms or agencies of the state. Ex
        parte Tuscaloosa Cnty., 796 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (Ala. 2000). According
        to Alabama law, boards of education are considered state agencies,

        1 Even had Dr. Edwards properly alleged a conspiracy, the intracorporate con-

        spiracy doctrine would bar her claim. See Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 767. Dr. Ed-
        wards encourages us to adopt an illegality exception. Due to the lack of factual
        allegations regarding the illegal actions, we need not reach the issue.
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        12                         Opinion of the Court               22-10858

        thus providing immunity from suit. See Ex parte Phenix City Bd. of
        Educ., 67 So. 3d 56, 60 (Ala. 2011).
               However, there are limited exceptions where sovereign im-
        munity does not apply to breach of contract claims. Ex parte Jackson
        Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 164 So. 3d 532, 536 (Ala. 2014). The Alabama Su-
        preme Court has identified six exceptions to sovereign immunity:
             (1)    actions brought to compel State officials to perform
                    their legal duties;
             (2)    actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing
                    an unconstitutional law;
             (3)    actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial
                    acts;
             (4)    actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments
                    Act . . . seeking construction of a statute and its applica-
                    tion in a given situation;
             (5)    valid inverse condemnation actions brought against
                    State officials in their representative capacity;
             (6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in
                    their representative capacity where it is alleged they
                    acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority,
                    or in a mistaken interpretation of law; and
             (6)(b) actions for damages brought against State officials in
                    their individual capacity where it is alleged that they
                    acted . . . beyond their authority.
                   Id. at 535–36 (citations omitted).
               Dr. Edwards argues that sovereign immunity does not apply
        because her allegations fall within exceptions (1) and (3). She claims
        that the legal and ministerial obligations apply because the parties
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        22-10858                   Opinion of the Court                                 13

        had a legally binding contract, and the Board members have no dis-
        cretion over whether to comply with the contract. Thus, the Board
        members are left with a ministerial duty to perform according to
        the terms of the contract.
               Dr. Edwards heavily relies on Burch v. Birdsong, 181 So. 3d
        343 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), to support her claim against the Board
        members in their official capacities. This support is misplaced. In
        Burch, the plaintiff did not sue for damages or backpay; both the
        court and the plaintiff acknowledged that § 14 immunity barred
        this recovery. Burch, 181 So. 3d at 351. Instead, the plaintiff was
        seeking prospective relief in the form of an order compelling the
        school board members to comply with their legal duties under the
        employment contract. Id.
                Here, Dr. Edwards is seeking money damages—the very re-
        lief the plaintiff in Burch disclaimed. Because her suit does not seek
        prospective relief, exceptions (1) and (3) are inapposite. Dr. Ed-
        wards’ claim against the Board members in their official capacities
        is, therefore, barred by sovereign immunity. 2
               Dr. Edwards’ claims against the Board members in their in-
        dividual capacities also must fail. While individual capacity claims
        against the Board members are not barred by sovereign immunity,

        2 As this court has firmly established, issues not raised in the initial brief on

        appeal are typically deemed abandoned. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
        871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); see also Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 385
        F.3d 1324, 1330–32 (11th Cir. 2014). Dr. Edwards did not argue the other ex-
        ceptions to sovereign immunity. Therefore, we do not address them here.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10858

        “agents cannot be held liable for a principal’s breach of contract.”
        Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1389 (Ala. 1986); see
        also Whitehead v. Davison Oil Co., 352 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Ala. 1977).
        Dr. Edwards’ contract was with the Board, not the Board members
        in their individual capacities. The Board members were acting as
        the Board’s agents to accomplish the Board’s objectives. Thus, the
        breach of contract claims against the Board members in their indi-
        vidual capacities are necessarily unsuccessful.
               In sum, Dr. Edwards did not plausibly plead an exception to
        sovereign immunity, and the district court properly dismissed both
        breach of contract claims. We affirm the district court’s dismissal
        of Dr. Edwards’ breach of contract claims.
                                 IV.       Conclusion
               For the reasons above, we reverse the district court’s denial
        of Dr. Edwards’ due process claims and affirm the district court’s
        denial of Dr. Edwards’ conspiracy and breach of contract claims.
             AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
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        22-10858               BRASHER, J., Concurring                        1

        BRASHER, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
               I concur in the Court’s opinion. I write separately to flag an
        issue for the parties and district court.
               We have long recognized that tenured public employees
        have a right to continued employment that is a constitutionally
        protected property interest under the Due Process Clause. Ed-
        wards says that her employment contract creates a protected prop-
        erty interest in continued employment because it prohibited her
        termination without cause.
               At oral argument, the Board argued for the first time that
        Edwards lacks a constitutionally protected property interest in con-
        tinued employment because her right to employment derives
        solely from a contract, not a state statute.
                Although I do not know the right answer to the Board’s ar-
        gument, the issue is not as straightforward as the Board suggests.
        We have recognized, as a general matter, that “[t]he existence of
        an enforceable contract with a state or local government entity
        does not give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest.”
        Key W. Harbour Dev. Corp. v. City of Key W., Fla., 987 F.2d 723, 727
        (11th Cir. 1993). But, as to continued employment, our predecessor
        court has said that “[t]he source of such a right can be a state stat-
        ute, a local ordinance, or an express or implied contract.” White v.
        Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 650 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. Unit A.
        May 29, 1981). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207
        (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(recognizing that Fifth Circuit decisions
        issued before Oct. 1, 1981 are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
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        2                     BRASHER, J., Concurring               22-10858

                The Court wisely declines to address this issue, as it was not
        briefed in this Court or the district court. But, considering the ap-
        parent tension in our precedents, I suggest the parties and the dis-
        trict court carefully evaluate this issue on remand.