Court Opinion

ID: 9672460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:55:27.772008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.340341
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL DISSENTING OPINION ON REHEARING
DOGGETT, Justice,
dissenting.
In response to the dissenting opinion, the majority no longer
hold[s] that Craig waived any objection [to pretrial discovery abuse] when he certified to the trial court that his pleadings were in order and that discovery was complete.
36 Tex.Sup.CU. 547 (Feb. 10, 1993). As I had written, “[n]othing in the record reflects that Craig made any such certification.” Dissenting Opinion at 176 (Doggett, J., dissenting). Now the majority has corrected the facts, but not the law.
While rewriting the key sentence containing its holding, the majority leaves unaltered its extraordinary conclusion that an innocent party harmed by conduct found by *178a trial judge to be callous and in bad faith has no right whatsoever to sanctions once trial has commenced. Continuing to rely on two irrelevant authorities addressing only the need to obtain a ruling on special exceptions prior to trial,1 the majority attempts a quick fix:
We [now] hold that Craig waived any objections to these matters by failing to request a pretrial hearing on the alleged discovery abuse and by requesting a preferential trial setting. See McKinney v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.1989); Rule 3.02(a)(4), Local Rules of Practice of the 23rd Judicial Districts of Texas.
Majority Opinion at .170-171 (footnote omitted). A great deal is accomplished with the revision of this single sweeping sentence, A trial judge’s considered finding — that the discovery process was callously and in bad faith obstructed — suddenly vanishes, becoming merely “alleged discovery abuse.” Next, the majority mandates a completely new timing requirement in no way imposed by Rule 215 nor ever recognized by any Texas court or commentator. Finally, this sentence deprives a party of substantive rights based on a local rule.
Rule 215 contains no timing requirement for sanctions motions and hearings. As one commentator has concluded, “Motions for sanctions ... may be made at any time during the proceeding.” David E. Keltner, Texas Discovery § 12:8 at 12-1 (1992). McKinney v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. did not involve the imposition or timing of sanctions. Rather, it held that a party objecting to discovery did not waive its objections by failing to obtain a pretrial hearing. 772 S.W.2d at 75.2 Moreover, McKinney did not restrict the imposition of sanctions but encouraged the “judicious use of sanctions against those who would abuse the discovery process.” Id.
Reliance on a local rule to conclude that Craig waived the impositions of sanctions is particularly troublesome. While local rules in Brazoria County provide for party certification that discovery is complete in requesting a trial setting,3 something that there is no indication that any party — even Remington — did in this case, the making of such a certification should have no effect on the power of the court to impose sanctions for callous and bad faith abuse of the discovery process. This court has made quite clear that such local rules “may not be inconsistent with” the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Tex.R.Civ.P. 3a. Craig could not have forfeited a right to sanctions based on a certification he never made under a local rule that does not and cannot alter the provisions of Rule 215 governing their imposition.
The law written for Remington in this cause can only encourage it and others to obstruct discovery and the search for truth.
GAMMAGE, J., joins in this supplemental dissenting opinion on rehearing.

. Olney Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Farmers Mkt., Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, writ denied) ("The record exhibiting the lack of evidence of filing of the exceptions and showing an affirmative announcement of ‘ready’ without requesting a ruling constitutes a waiver of any possible error by Appellant.”); 3 Roy W. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 17:9 (1992) (section entitled "Special Exceptions”).

. Additionally, this situation is expressly covered by Rule 166b(4), stating that “The failure of a party to obtain a ruling prior to trial on any objection to discovery or motion for protective order does not waive such objection or motion.”

.Rule 3.02(a)(4) of the Local Rules of Practice of the 23rd, 149th, 239th & 300th Judicial Districts of Texas, provides that "Requests for setting will ... contain ... Certification that pleadings are in order, discovery is complete, requesting attorney has no conflicting settings and that settlement has been attempted.”