Court Opinion

ID: 9571287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:31.464464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:47.701241
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion of Smith, J. This case is one dealing with a fee simple determinable and a possibility of reverter. Whether or not a possibility of reverter consists of a vested or unvested interest in realty, it is clear that the contract or conveyance setting it up has provided for certain contract rights which vested upon the execution and delivery of the deed. In the past, such contract rights have ordinarily been held to be constitutionally protected against invasion by retrospective legislation. See Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N. W. 2d 62. It is a well-recognized rule that property and contract rights may not be interfered *792with unless such interference can be justified under the police power. Unless so justified, the retrospective features of section 76-2,102, R. R. S. 1943, are clearly unconstitutional.
Changing or modern conditions have a direct bearing upon the interpretation of the police power. In Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 413, 88 A. L. R. 1481, it is said: “The great clauses of the Constitution must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely as they would be interpreted by its framers in the conditions and with the outlook of their time.” It is further stated that the contract clause must be construed in harmony with the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of her people. Reservation of such essential sovereign power is read into contracts. The legislation is to be tested, not by whether its effect upon contracts is direct or is merely -incidental, but upon whether the end is legitimate and the means reasonable and appropriate to the end.
Possibilities of reverter or reentry when incorporated in real estate conveyances frequently, as in the case before us, extend over long periods of time and from generation to generation. As a result, the present-day owners of such possibilities often cannot be ascertained or located and it becomes impossible to- obtain releases in the ordinary manner. In the meantime, the use of affected property is restricted, its merchantability is destroyed, improvement and development are prohibited, it may rim afoul of zoning regulations, and an entire community may be detrimentally affected. Determinable fees are akin to various types of restraints on alienation. Such restraints are contrary to public policy, are subject to strict construction, and frequently voided. Formerly, when this nation consisted primarily of rural areas and small villages, little if any harm resulted from such restrictive conveyances. With the increase in population and the growth of our cities, a different pic*793ture is presented. Were we to set down in the center of a modem city a 1-acre tract of land, the use of which was so circumscribed, it can be readily seen that the development of the city could be restricted and delayed.
Until. the occurrence of the event which converts a fee simple determinable or possibility of reverter into a fee simple, the owner of the possibility has something of very little value,, yet the damage to the community by reason of the existence of the determinable fee may be great. The benefits to be derived from the alleviation of such conditions, the correction of titles, and the restoration of affected properties to the market would appear to far outweigh the loss sustained by the individual holders of possibilities of reverter. Such legislation is in the public interest and promotes the public welfare. It is within the purview of and a reasonable exercise of the police power. The discretion of the Legislature is very large in the exercise of the police power, both in determining what the interests of the public require and what measures and means are reasonably necessary for the protection of such interests. Whether an exercise of the police power bears a real and substantial relation to the public interest and welfare, and whether it is reasonable or arbitrary are questions committed in the first instance to the Legislature and its decisions will not be interfered with by the courts unless clearly erroneous. See, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 281, p. 544, and § 282, p. 548.