Court Opinion

ID: 9854478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:08:10.470166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:06.409351
License: Public Domain

*696Bealsey, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all except Division 1 which reverses the conviction for the crime of terroristic threat.
“OCGA § 16-11-37 ‘does not specify how the testimony must be corroborated. “As in rape cases, the quantum of corroboration need not in itself be sufficient to convict, but need only be that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged. [Cit.] Slight circumstances may be sufficient for corroboration and the question of corroboration is one solely for the jury. If there is any evidence of corroboration, this court will not go behind the jury verdict and pass on its probative value. [Cit.] . . .” ’ Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937, 939 (1) (274 SE2d 49) (1980). See also Hornsby v. State, 139 Ga. App. 254, 256 (2) (228 SE2d 152) (1976).” Ellis v. State, 176 Ga. App. 384, 386 (3) (336 SE2d 281) (1985).
As noted, the statute does not specify or limit the type or nature of the corroborating evidence required. It need not be the hearing of the threat by another person. In Ellis, “the . . . threat against the officer was not actually overheard by anyone else, . . . .” Id. at 387. Yet the court found that the circumstances tended to prove the incident occurred.
There the circumstance particularly singled out by the court was the evidence of a similar previous threat. Here the circumstances include the use of the pillow in such a way as to be able to execute the threat, as well as the evidence of the resistance and struggle of the victim of the forced intercourse which provided a setting and gave rise to the threat. As quoted and applied in Ellis, the threat was included in “ ‘a system of mutually dependent crimes.’ [Cits.]” Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 531 (8) (292 SE2d 389) (1982). That is, the other crimes tended to prove that the terroristic threat was made. See Harper. The idea is that the evidence of the other crimes tends to corroborate the testimony that a terroristic threat was made, for it provides the environment and atmosphere for such a threat. Thus it gives the protection against contrived accusations of terroristic threat which the legislature sought to guard against by requiring some corroboration other than the accuser’s mere say-so.
In Hornsby, one of the corroborating facts was that defendant possessed a pistol when he confronted the victim. Although another person testified that he heard the threat, this does not diminish the corroborative effect and value of the pistol possession.
In Burnett v. State, 236 Ga. 597, 598 (1) (225 SE2d 28) (1976), and in Morgan v. State, 229 Ga. 532, 533 (1) (192 SE2d 338) (1972), fresh complaints were regarded as corroborative evidence of rape. Here, the victim, who lived alone and was weakened by the experience, complained of the incident the next morning.
Thus we must affirm, for “[i]f there is any corroborating evi*697dence, we will not go behind the jury and pass upon its probative value. [Cits.]” Burnett, supra.
Decided March 18, 1988
Rehearing denied April 1, 1988
Alfred D. Fears, Jr., for appellant.
E. Byron Smith, District Attorney, Thomas R. McBerry, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Pope join in this opinion.