Court Opinion

ID: 9855094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:24.435672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.104458
License: Public Domain

T. U. Kavanagh, J.
(concurring). I agree that the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court for determination of the issues raised by the pleadings, for as was held in the second Detroit Edison Case  the administrative remedy is not exclusive.
I do not perceive the administrative procedures act2 to be the source of this requirement, however, for I do not regard the contest here between the corporation and securities commission and the taxpayer to be a “contested case” as defined in that act.
“ ‘Contested case’ means a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a specific party or parties are required by law or *508constitutional right to be determined after an opportunity for an agency hearing” says the statute (CLS 1961, § 24.101, Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 3.560 [21.1]).
I cannot find in the statute3 providing for the imposition of the franchise fee any provision for an opportunity for a hearing before the agency either in the determination, or redetermination, of the tax. Hence, whatever the fierceness of this controversy at this point it is not a “contested case”. See discussion of what constitutes a “contested case” in Sherwin v. State Highway Commissioner (1961), 364 Mich 188, 195.
The corporation tax appeal board is improperly constituted. The problem stems from Constitution of 1963, art 5, § 2, which requires that all executive and administrative offices, agencies, and instrumen-talities of the executive branch of State government and their respective functions, powers, and duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in the Constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within' not more than 20 principal departments.
The membership of the corporation tax appeal board, as presently constituted, consists of the attorney general, State treasurer who is appointed by the governor, and the director of the department of licensing and regulation designated by executive order of the governor,  Under the provisions of section 90 of the executive organization act of 1965, being PA 1965, No 380, as amended by PA 1966, No 324 (MCLA § 16.190, Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.29 [90]), all powers, duties, and functions relating to the collection of fees and charges to be paid by profit cor*509porations, both domestic and foreign, have been transferred to the department of treasury of which the appointed State treasurer is the head. Since this reorganization took place, the former corporation and securities commission is no longer autonomous but such existence as it has is within the department of treasury. The State treasurer, as the department head, is responsible for making the determination of the franchise and privilege fees to be imposed on profit corporations pursuant to the statute. If a redetermination is requested, it is to be made by the State treasurer. Appeal from such a determination or redetermination is made to the corporation tax appeal board now composed of the same State treasurer, the attorney general, and the director of the department of licensing and regulation.
The attorney general is the legal adviser to the State treasurer (CL 1948, § 14.32 [Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.185]). In addition, he is required when requested to prosecute and defend all suits relating to matters connected with the department of treasury (CL 1948, § 14.29 [Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.182]). This places him in the untenable position of an advocate and a judge.
Thus two of the three present members of the corporation tax appeal board do not meet the Constitutional test for due process as set forth in In re Murchison (1955), 349 US 133 (75 S Ct 623, 99 L Ed 942).
In such circumstance, PA 1961, No 236, § 63l (CLS 1961, § 600.631, Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.631) authorizes appeal to the circuit court and accordingly the matter should be remanded to that court for trial.
In view of the provision that the circuit court shall “exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto as in non-*510jury cases,” since there is no record here, the court should be directed to permit either party to introduce such evidence as may be necessary properly to establish its case.
I would award no costs as a public issue is involved.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. G-. Kavanagh, J

 PA 1952, No 197, as amended (CLS 1961, §'24.101 et seq., Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 3.560 [21.1] et seq.).

 PA 1921, No 85, § 9, as amended by PA 1954, No 153 (CLS .1961, § 450.309, Stat Ann 1963 Eev § 21.210).