Court Opinion

ID: 9376725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:43.189887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.641399
License: Public Domain

J-A26026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    CAROLYN T. CAMPER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    BRADLEY S. WERNER                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :        No. 3 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered November 17, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                  Civil Division at No(s): A06-13-60988-D-37

BEFORE:       BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                  FILED MARCH 3, 2023

        Appellant, Bradley S. Werner (“Husband”), appeals from the decree

entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which finalized the

divorce between Husband and Appellee, Carolyn T. Camper (“Wife”).           In a

separate order, the court completed the equitable distribution of the marital

property. We affirm.

        This Court previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

as follows:

           Husband and Wife were married in 2005 and separated in
           2013. This was the second marriage for Wife, age 56. Wife
           has two adult children from her prior marriage. Husband is
           58 years old and has had four previous marriages. Prior to
           his marriage to Wife, Husband formed Werner Athletic
           Management, LLC (WAM) and Pennsbury Racquet and
           Athletic Club, LLC (PRAC) in anticipation of purchasing a
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       pre-existing tennis club, Pennsbury Racquet Club (tennis
       club). Husband, through PRAC, purchased the tennis club
       approximately 16 months prior to marrying Wife.1

          1 While still married to her first husband, Wife
          contributed $110,000 towards the acquisition of PRAC
          and WAM. In exchange, Wife acquired a 3.57%
          ownership stake in PRAC. Later, Husband gifted Wife
          a 1% ownership share in WAM.

       Wife filed a complaint in divorce on June 19, 2013,2 seeking
       equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets, alimony,
       alimony pendente lite (APL), counsel fees, costs, and
       expenses. On August 1, 2014, an interim order of court
       (interim support order) was entered directing Husband to
       pay Wife $5,000 per month in APL.3 In addition to directing
       Husband to pay Wife APL, the interim support order also set
       forth Husband’s and Wife’s individual obligations with
       respect to three jointly-owned properties.4

          2The parties stipulated that, for equitable distribution
          purposes, June 19, 2013, was also the date of
          separation.

          3   The interim support order was later terminated.

          4 By way of further background, Husband and Wife
          jointly owned and resided together in the marital
          residence (Yardley Road property) during their
          marriage. Additionally, the parties jointly owned a
          rental property (Blough Court property) and a
          vacation home (Beach Avenue property). Following
          the parties’ separation, Wife remained in the Yardley
          Road property and paid all real estate carrying costs
          prior to its sale. Husband resided in the Blough Court
          property with his mother and sister from the date of
          separation through November 2014, when Husband
          decided to reside elsewhere. His mother and sister
          remained in the home until it sold in 2018. In addition
          to paying the carrying costs for that property,
          Husband was also directed to pay all costs for the
          Beach Avenue property. With respect to this property,
          the interim support order preserved Husband’s “right
          to claim any credits he may have at the time of

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          equitable distribution.” Following the sale of all three
          properties, the proceeds were held in escrow pending
          equitable distribution.

       On March 22, 2017, a master’s hearing was held before
       Roger E. Cullen, Esquire (the Master), to address the issues
       of equitable distribution, alimony, and counsel fees. At the
       conclusion of the hearing, the Master entered a master’s
       report recommending, inter alia, that the marital estate be
       distributed 60% to Wife and 40% to Husband.5 Pertinent to
       this appeal, the Master made recommendations regarding
       the proposed distribution of several assets, including: (1)
       the increase in value of PRAC and WAM during the parties’
       marriage; (2) Wife’s irrevocable trust, gifted to her by her
       mother during the parties’ marriage (the Trust);6 (3) a
       Merrill Lynch investment account titled in the names of both
       Husband and Wife as joint tenants with a right of
       survivorship (Merrill Lynch account); and (4) the proceeds
       from the sale of the parties’ three properties.

          5 The Master also recommended that Wife’s claims for
          alimony and counsel fees be denied.

          6 Wife’s mother established the Trust for Wife on
          December 21, 2012 by depositing $10.00 into the
          Trust. That same day, Wife’s mother made a second
          deposit, this time in the amount of $700,000.
          According to Wife’s inventory, as of the date of
          separation, the value of the Trust was [estimated to
          be] $800,000.

       Husband timely filed a motion for a hearing de novo,
       asserting that he took “exceptions to the recommendation
       of” the Master. Thereafter, the trial court presided over an
       equitable distribution hearing, which spanned three days.
       Upon the conclusion of testimony and the submission of
       proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
       parties, the trial court issued an order, in which it concluded
       that “an equal split of the marital estate is appropriate.” In
       relevant part, the trial court determined that the increase in
       value of PRAC and WAM during the marital coverture, which
       constituted marital property, was $2,300,000. Additionally,
       the court found that “Husband’s personal use of and/or
       mismanagement of PRAC/WAM [p]rofits/[a]ssets” post-

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         separation totaled $400,000, which the court determined
         was subject to equitable distribution. Neither the increase
         in value of the Trust nor the Merrill Lynch account was listed
         as a marital asset to be distributed. Additionally, neither
         party received any credits for the carrying costs the parties
         were directed to pay on their three jointly-owned properties.

Camper v. Werner, No. 2726 EDA 2018, unpublished memorandum at 1-4

(Pa.Super. filed December 3, 2019) (internal citations omitted) (“Camper I”).

      Husband subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the equitable

distribution order. On December 3, 2019, this Court vacated the order and

remanded for further proceedings. Among other things, this Court determined

that the trial court failed to provide “any analysis of how the court arrived at

a $2,300,000 valuation for PRAC and WAM.” Id. at 10. This Court provided

the following remand instruction:

         For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the portion of the trial
         court’s order valuing the marital portion of PRAC and WAM
         at $2,300,000. Upon remand, we direct the trial court to
         address the … tax and cost of sale consequences [as set
         forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(10.1)-(10.2)] and, if
         necessary, set forth a new valuation based on the same.
         Regardless of whether the trial court accepts the valuation
         offered by either expert, or again formulates its own
         valuation, the trial court shall set forth reasons on the record
         to support the chosen valuation.

Id.

      We also addressed the increase in value of Wife’s trust. “[W]hile the

entirety of the Trust is not marital property, the trial court should have

recognized that the increase in value of the Trust during the marital coverture

constituted marital property.”    Id. at 17.    Because the trial court did not

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address the increase in value of the Trust, we remanded for a determination

on this point. Finally, this Court determined that Husband’s post-separation

actions with respect to PRAC and WAM funds should not have impacted the

marital portion of these assets, and we vacated the portion of the equitable

distribution order that awarded $200,000 to Wife. See id. at 10-15.

       In response to the remand instructions, the trial court entered a new

equitable distribution order on February 23, 2021. On November 17, 2021,

the court entered a final divorce decree.        Husband timely filed a notice of

appeal challenging the new equitable distribution order on December 17,

2021.1 That same day, the court ordered Husband to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Husband timely filed his

Rule 1925(b) statement on December 28, 2021.

       Husband now raises three issues for our review:

          Whether the [trial] court erred on remand by failing to
          properly consider the dispositional costs of [PRAC and WAM]
          under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(10.1) & (10.2) in its
          determination of their value.

          Whether the [trial] court erred on remand by modifying its
          prior 50/50 equal division of the marital estate to a 60/40
          division in favor of Wife without adequate lawful basis.

          Whether the [trial] court erred on remand by disregarding
          Wife’s judicial admission regarding the value of the marital
          component of the … Trust established at trial.

____________________________________________

1 Issues in divorce are reviewable after entry of the divorce decree and the
resolution of all economic issues. See Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d
211 (1985).

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(Husband’s Brief at 10).

      The following principles apply to this Court’s review of an equitable

distribution order:

         A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award
         of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when
         assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the
         equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial
         court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or
         failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly
         find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear
         and convincing evidence. This court will not find an abuse
         of discretion unless the law has been overridden or
         misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly
         unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or
         ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. In
         determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,
         courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole.
         [W]e measure the circumstances of the case against the
         objective of effectuating economic justice between the
         parties and achieving a just determination of their property
         rights.

            Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to
            weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this
            [c]ourt will not reverse those determinations so long
            as they are supported by the evidence. We are also
            aware that a master’s report and recommendation,
            although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
            consideration, particularly on the question of
            credibility of witnesses, because the master has the
            opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and
            demeanor of the parties.

Goodwin v. Goodwin, 244 A.3d 453, 458 (Pa.Super. 2020), aff’d, ___ Pa.

___, 280 A.3d 937 (2022) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      In his first issue, Husband contends that this Court provided explicit

remand instructions in Camper I. Husband emphasizes this Court’s directive

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that the trial court needed to address the tax ramifications and sale expenses

impacting the valuation of the marital portion of PRAC and WAM. Husband

insists that the trial court “ignored the remand directions and attributed the

same $2,300,000 value” to the marital portion of the assets. (Husband’s Brief

at 19). “By simply reiterating its prior determination, the [trial] court … wholly

disregarded competent … evidence offered by Husband’s expert witness …

setting forth and explaining the tax repercussions” and other costs that would

arise out of the sale of PRAC and WAM. (Id.) Husband maintains that the

trial court’s “stated intention to effectuate a 60/40 split of the equitable value

of PRAC and WAM between [the parties] can only be achieved through division

after the costs of liquidating the asset are determined and considered.” (Id.

at 27) (emphasis in original).       Husband concludes that the trial court

committed an error of law by not adequately considering the tax/liquidation

expenses, and this Court must reverse the new equitable distribution order.

We disagree.

      Regarding remand directives from this Court:

         [A] trial court has an obligation to comply scrupulously,
         meticulously, and completely with an order of [the appellate
         court] remanding a case to the trial court. The trial court is
         required to strictly comply with the mandate of the appellate
         court. Issues not included in the mandate cannot be
         considered by the trial court.

Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC, 185 A.3d 380, 389

(Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 650 Pa. 671, 201 A.3d 725 (2019) (internal

citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).

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      Further, the Domestic Relations Code governs the equitable distribution

of marital property as follows:

         § 3502. Equitable division of marital property

             (a) General rule.—Upon the request of either party in
         an action for divorce or annulment, the court shall equitably
         divide, distribute or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital
         property between the parties without regard to marital
         misconduct in such percentages and in such manner as the
         court deems just after considering all relevant factors. The
         court may consider each marital asset or group of assets
         independently and apply a different percentage to each
         marital asset or group of assets. Factors which are relevant
         to the equitable division of marital property include the
         following:

                  (1)          The length of the marriage.

                  (2)          Any prior marriage of either party.

                  (3)            The age, health, station, amount and
            sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
            estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.

                  (4)         The contribution by one party to the
            education, training or increased earning power of the
            other party.

                  (5)          The opportunity of each party for
            future acquisitions of capital assets and income.

                  (6)        The sources of income of both parties,
            including, but not limited to, medical, retirement,
            insurance or other benefits.

                  (7)          The contribution or dissipation of each
            party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or
            appreciation of the marital property, including the
            contribution of a party as homemaker.

                 (8)           The value of the property set apart to
            each party.

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                  (9)         The standard of living of the parties
            established during the marriage.

                   (10)      The economic circumstances of each
            party at the time the division of property is to become
            effective.

                   (10.1)      The Federal, State and local tax
            ramifications associated with each asset to be divided,
            distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be
            immediate and certain.

                   (10.2)     The expense of sale, transfer or
            liquidation associated with a particular asset, which
            expense need not be immediate and certain.

                  (11)        Whether the party will be serving as
            the custodian of any dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).

      Instantly, Camper I provided a lengthy analysis of the trial court’s

original valuation of the marital portion of PRAC and WAM. We concluded that

“the trial court did not provide any analysis of how it arrived at the $2,300,000

valuation.” Camper I, supra at 8. “Furthermore, the trial court made no

mention about whether it considered the statutory factors in [S]ection 3502.”

Id. at 10. Accordingly, this Court vacated the original equitable distribution

order, remanded the case, and instructed the trial court to: 1) address the tax

and cost of sale consequences as contemplated by Section 3502(a)(10.1),

(10.2); and, if necessary, 2) set forth a new valuation based on these factors.

See id. at 10. We also ordered the court to provide on-the-record reasons in

support of the chosen valuation for the marital portion of PRAC and WAM.

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      On February 23, 2021, the trial court entered the new equitable

distribution order.   The eight-page order analyzed each factor set forth in

Section 3502(a).      (See Order, entered 2/23/21, at 5-6).     Regarding the

valuation of the marital portion of PRAC and WAM:

         This court determines the marital value of PRAC and WA[M]
         to be $2,300,000. This is in line with Wife’s expert’s
         testimony which valued the increase of these business
         interests at $2,300,000. This court found Wife’s expert’s
         testimony credible, and Husband’s expert’s testimony not
         credible. While Wife argued that the value of the PRAC and
         WA[M] should be increased by an additional $110,000 to
         $2,410,000, this court does not adopt this addition to value
         as the overall increase in value accounts for Wife’s
         premarital contribution to this business.

         This court has considered both the possible tax
         consequences of a sale as well as all other possible
         liquidation cost[s]. However, the court does not find it
         appropriate to deduct for those possible costs.          Said
         deductions are not mandatory, and a further reduction of
         the value of this marital asset would not serve to effectuate
         economic justice in this matter. Most importantly the court
         finds that a sale of the business is extremely unlikely. The
         business is very profitable. It provides Husband with a
         substantial direct income. In addition, as we previously
         found, the business supports Husband’s expenditure of
         substantial sums for his personal expenses. As noted below,
         the court determines that Wife shall receive 60% of the
         marital assets. Wife’s 60% of this asset is $1,380,000. If
         the court did deduct the theoretically possible dispositional
         costs (taxes, liquidation costs, etc.), the court would award
         Wife substantially more than 60% of the asset, as the court
         finds that awarding Wife $1,380,000 of this asset is
         equitable.

(Id. at 1-2) (some capitalization omitted).

      The text of the new order confirms that the trial court complied with the

remand instructions set forth in Camper I. The court considered Husband’s

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expert’s testimony regarding the possible tax consequences and costs

associated with a sale of PRAC and WAM. Nevertheless, the court did not find

such evidence credible, which was within its province. See Goodwin, supra.

The court also found that the likelihood of Husband retaining these assets

outweighed the need to reduce their valuation based upon the possibility of a

sale. Thus, the court complied with the Camper I directive requiring an on-

the-record statement of reasons for the chosen valuation.

      Husband now argues that the trial court erred by failing to reduce the

valuation of the marital portion of PRAC and WAM to reflect the potential tax

consequences and costs associated with liquidation of the assets.      On this

point, we find the precise language of Camper I to be instructive. Although

this Court acknowledged that the tax ramifications and expenses associated

with the sale of a marital asset are relevant considerations regardless of the

likelihood of a sale, we did not mandate that the trial court automatically

deduct such costs from the chosen valuation upon remand. See Camper I,

supra at 9-10 (citing Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 134 (Pa.Super.

2017)). Rather, this Court instructed the trial court to “address” the “tax and

cost of sale consequences, and if necessary, set forth a new valuation based

on the same.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). On this record, we conclude that

the trial court satisfied its obligation to comply with this Court’s remand

instructions, and it did not abuse its discretion in failing to calculate a new

valuation.    See Goodwin, supra; Carmen Enterprise, Inc., supra.

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Consequently, Husband is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

      In his second issue, Husband asserts that the trial court originally

ordered a 50/50 split of the marital assets. Upon remand, however, the new

equitable distribution order changed the distribution percentage to 60/40 in

favor of Wife.     Husband argues that the court altered the distribution

percentages “based upon a wholly unchanged factual record[.]” (Husband’s

Brief at 27).    Husband acknowledges that “there is no standard formula

guiding the division of marital property and the method of distribution derives

from the facts of the individual case.” (Id. at 29) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Husband insists, however, that the court’s modification

of the distribution percentages upon remand was guided by “a desire to

vindicate its prior monetary award to Wife.” (Id. at 31). Husband concludes

that the “modification from a 50/50 equal apportionment to a 60/40 share in

favor of Wife was erroneous and should be reversed.”         (Id. at 37).   We

disagree.

      “In the context of an equitable distribution of marital property, a trial

court has the authority to divide the award as the equities presented in the

particular case may require.”      Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 639

(Pa.Super. 2005). “The trial court need not distribute assets equally among

the parties, as economic justice often requires otherwise.”      Dalrymple v.

Kilishek, 920 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa.Super. 2007).           “Relevant factors in

fashioning an equitable distribution or reimbursement award are set forth at

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).” Id.

       Instantly, Camper I acknowledged that its holdings might disturb the

original equitable distribution scheme such that some alterations were needed

to effectuate economic justice. See Camper I, supra at 25-26. For example,

Camper I held that the trial court committed reversible error in considering

Husband’s post-separation mismanagement of $400,000 in PRAC and WAM

funds. See id. at 10-15. Consequently, the new equitable distribution order

provided as follows:

          On remand, the marital estate is valued at less. Also, some
          of Wife’s assets previously attributed as her non-marital
          estate are now part of the marital estate, thereby
          decreasing Wife’s non-marital estate.[2] Also, Husband’s
          non-marital estate has now increased by the aforesaid
          $400,000. As a result, this [c]ourt determines that an equal
          distribution of the marital estate would not effectuate
          economic justice between the parties. Instead, the marital
          estate (subject to the above determinations) shall be
          divided 60% to Wife and 40% to Husband based on the
          following analysis of the equitable distribution factors
          outlined at 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3502[.]

(Order, entered 2/23/21, at 4-5). Thereafter, the court provided its analysis

of each of the Section 3502(a) factors.

       Contrary to Husband’s argument, the trial court did not modify the

distribution    percentages      in   some     attempt   to   “vindicate”   any   prior

____________________________________________

2  Regarding the decrease in Wife’s non-marital estate, we reiterate the
following findings in Camper I: 1) the trial court did not address the increase
in value of the Trust, which should have been considered a marital asset; and
2) the trial court erred in determining that Wife’s Merrill Lynch account could
not be considered a marital asset. See Camper I, supra at 17, 21.

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determinations. Rather, the holdings from Camper I forced the trial court to

rethink the allocation of assets in order to effectuate economic justice. In this

matter, which involves extensive litigation over a complex marital estate, we

decline Husband’s invitation to reweigh the Section 3502(a) factors and

interfere with the trial court’s thoughtful distribution scheme.            See

Dalrymple, supra. The new equitable distribution order provides the court’s

reasoning for implementing the 60/40 split. We cannot say that the court

committed an abuse of discretion, especially where the 60/40 split comports

with the Master’s original recommendation.            See Goodwin, supra.

Therefore, Husband is not entitled to relief on his second claim.

      In his third issue, Husband reiterates that Wife’s mother created the

Trust for Wife’s benefit during the marriage, and the initial value of the Trust

was $700,000. Citing Wife’s 2016 statement of inventory, Husband insists

that the value of the Trust was $800,000 on the date of separation. Further,

Husband argues that the valuation listed in Wife’s statement “constitutes a

judicial admission, [and Wife] is bound by the same, and cannot simply choose

to ignore it in an effort to make a better argument.” (Husband’s Brief at 39).

Under these circumstances, Husband concludes that the trial court committed

reversible error in finding that the value of the Trust had increased by only

$9,356.76 on the date of separation. We disagree.

      This Court has addressed judicial admissions as follows:

         Statements of fact by one party in pleadings, stipulations,
         testimony, and the like, made for that party’s benefit, are

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         termed judicial admissions and are binding on the party.
         Nasim v. Shamrock Welding Supply Co., [563 A.2d
         1266, 1267 (Pa.Super. 1989)] (“It is well established that a
         judicial admission is an express waiver made in court or
         preparatory to trial by a party or his attorney, conceding for
         the purposes of trial, the truth of the admission.”). As we
         held in John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun Co., 831 A.2d 696,
         712 (Pa.Super. 2003)[, appeal denied, 577 Pa. 697, 845
         A.2d 818 (2004)],

            For an averment to qualify as a judicial admission,
            however, it must be a clear and unequivocal
            admission of fact. Judicial admissions are limited in
            scope to factual matters otherwise requiring
            evidentiary proof, and are exclusive of legal theories
            and conclusions of law. The fact must have been
            unequivocally admitted and not be merely one
            interpretation of the statement that is purported to be
            a judicial admission. Jones v. Constantino, [631
            A.2d 1289, 1293–94 (Pa.Super.1993)] (finding no
            admission where “the evidence could be reasonably
            construed to admit of more than one meaning”)…. An
            admission is not conclusively binding when the
            statement     is   indeterminate,      inconsistent,    or
            ambiguous. When there is uncertainty surrounding a
            conceded fact, it is the role of the judge or jury as fact
            finder to determine which facts have been adequately
            proved and which must be rejected.

Coleman v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 6 A.3d 502, 524-25 (Pa.Super.

2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 638, 24 A.3d 361 (2011) (some internal

citations omitted).

      Instantly, Wife filed her statement of inventory on May 4, 2016. The

“non-marital property” section of the statement included the Trust.       (See

Statement, filed 5/4/16, at 5 (unnumbered)).           The same page of the

statement provided a space for Wife to supply the “Estimated Value at DOS”

of the Trust. (Id.) (emphasis added). Here, Wife estimated that the value of

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the Trust was $800,000 on the date of separation. Because this amount was

nothing more than an estimate, we cannot say it amounted to a “conclusively

binding” judicial admission. See Coleman, supra.

        After remand, the parties filed a joint submission “outlining issues that

are agreed upon and issues still in dispute” following this Court’s remand.

(Joint Submission, filed 10/13/20, at 1). Significantly, the joint submission

addressed the value of Wife’s trust as follows:

           The parties agree that the date of separation value of Wife’s
           Trust was $709,356.76. We agreed that that statement was
           not submitted in Court at the time of trial. Rather, a
           statement was submitted long after the date of separation
           indicating an increase in value of approximately $100,000.

(Id. at 2).    Thereafter, the court relied upon the information in the joint

submission to address the marital portion of the Trust in the new equitable

distribution order. (See Order, entered 2/23/21, at 3; Trial Court Opinion at

7-8).

        Here, the court properly determined that the clear, unequivocal

statement in the joint submission constituted a judicial admission regarding

the value of the Trust on the date of separation.        See Coleman, supra.

Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by assigning this asset a date

of separation value of $709,356.76.       See Goodwin, supra.       Accordingly,

Husband is not entitled to relief on his final claim, and we affirm the divorce

decree and corresponding equitable distribution order.

        Decree and order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2023

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