Court Opinion

ID: 9392797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-06 17:10:50.372513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.908184
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-23-00131-CV & 13-23-00132-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                       IN RE CITY OF EDINBURG AND
                 HIDALGO COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 1

                            On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides1

        On April 4, 2023, relators City of Edinburg (City) and Hidalgo County Drainage

District No. 1 (Drainage District) filed a petition for writ of mandamus arising from: (1) trial

court cause number C-1779-21-A in the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas,

docketed as our appellate cause number 13-23-00131-CV, and (2) trial court cause

         1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that
addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the
differences between opinions and memorandum opinions).
number C-2226-21-A in the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, docketed as

our appellate cause number 13-23-00132-CV.2 Relators contend that the trial court

abused its discretion by “failing to rule on the pending pleas to the jurisdiction filed by

governmental entities more than a year after holding a hearing as it orders the parties to

prepare for trial.” We conditionally grant the petitions for writ of mandamus.

                                          I.      BACKGROUND

       These original proceedings arise from related premises liability cases filed against

relators for injuries allegedly sustained during construction on drainage ditches. Benita

Escobar de Garcia filed suit against relators in cause number C-1779-21-A alleging that

she tripped and fell on dirt and debris arising from the installation of concrete irrigation

culverts at the side of the road near Gardenia Street in Edinburg, Texas. Similarly,

Carmina Garza filed suit against relators in cause number C-2226-21-A asserting that

she suffered injuries in a separate incident when she stepped into a hole at this same

location, “catching her foot and causing her to fall backwards.” Both Garcia and Garza

alleged that they suffered personal injuries as a result of their falls.

       On February 4, 2022, the City and Drainage District filed pleas to the jurisdiction

in these cases. The City alleged that it did not own, occupy, or control the premises in

question. See Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 8 S.W.3d 634, 635 (Tex. 1999) (per

curiam) (“As a rule, to prevail on a premises liability claim a plaintiff must prove that the

defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where

injury occurred”; however, “a party who does not own, occupy, or control premises may

nevertheless owe a duty of due care if it undertakes to make the premises safe for

       2   The respondent in these original proceedings is the Honorable Luis Singleterry. See id. R. 52.2.

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others.”). The Drainage District alleged that Garcia’s and Garza’s claims failed under the

notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) because it did not receive notice

of the alleged incidents made the basis of the lawsuits until more than two years after

they occurred. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (governing the requisite

notice of claims against a governmental entity under the TTCA).

        The trial court issued orders setting relators’ pleas to the jurisdiction to be heard

on March 22, 2022, and held a non-evidentiary hearing on that date. On May 20, 2022,

relators sent correspondence to the trial court advising that they had filed pleas to the

jurisdiction, the trial court had held a hearing on the pleas but had not yet issued rulings,

and that relators “hereby request[ed] that the Court consider ruling on the Pleas before

the parties engage in further litigation.” Relators further informed the trial court that Garcia

and Garza had propounded discovery to them that they were required to answer by May

25, 2022. On October 31, 2022, relators sent correspondence to the trial court, again

advising it that their pleas remained pending without rulings. Relators informed the trial

court that a separate lawsuit, “with almost identical facts and jurisdictional issues,” had

been resolved in their favor by the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. Relators

provided the trial court with copies of the pleas to the jurisdiction and the orders issued in

that separate trial court proceeding. Relators conceded that the actions of a separate

district court had no precedential value, but were “instructive and persuasive,” and

relators requested the trial court to grant their pleas. On February 8, 2023, Garcia and

Garza filed motions requesting the trial court to set telephonic docket control conferences

for their cases. On February 9, 2023, relators filed responses to these motions stating

that:

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       Over a year ago, on February 4, 2022, [relators] filed Pleas to the
       Jurisdiction which the Court has heard and taken under advisement.
       [Relators’] Pleas are dispositive of all causes of action [Garcia and Garza
       have] asserted against them. [They] now seek[] an order forcing [relators]
       to engage in discovery and meet deadlines to prepare for trial in a case
       where [relators] assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction. On this basis,
       [relators] object to a docket control order before the Court makes a definitive
       ruling on [relators’] Pleas.

Relators thus requested the trial court to deny Garcia’s and Garza’s requests for docket

control conferences until their pleas to the jurisdiction were “fully and finally resolved.”

Nevertheless, the trial court subsequently proceeded to hold docket control conferences

in each case and set these cases for trial on the merits to be held on March 4, 2024.

       These original proceedings ensued. By one issue, relators assert that the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to rule on the pending pleas to the jurisdiction “more than

a year after holding a hearing as it orders the parties to prepare for trial.” We requested

Garcia and Garza, or any others whose interest may be directly affected by the relief

sought, to file responses to the petitions for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4,

52.8. However, the real parties did not timely file responses, and have since informed this

Court that any responses to the petitions for writ of mandamus will not be forthcoming.

                               II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem.

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836,

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148

S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that (1) the trial

court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re

USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

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839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “The relator bears the burden of proving these two

requirements.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

                      III.   MINISTERIAL DUTY TO RULE ON A MOTION

       To obtain mandamus relief for the trial court’s refusal to rule on a motion, a relator

must establish: (1) the motion was properly filed and has been pending for a reasonable

time; (2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion; and (3) the trial court refused to

rule. See In re Greater McAllen Star Props., Inc., 444 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, orig. proceeding); In re Craig, 426 S.W.3d 106, 106 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d

225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). Thus, a relator must establish that

the trial court: (1) had a legal duty to rule on the motion; (2) was asked to rule on the

motion; and (3) failed or refused to rule on the motion within a reasonable time. See In re

Pete, 589 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (per

curiam). The relator must show that the trial court received, was aware of, and was asked

to rule on the motion. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2008, orig. proceeding); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003,

orig. proceeding). In this regard, merely filing a document with the district clerk neither

imputes the clerk’s knowledge of the filing to the trial court nor equates to a request for

the trial court to rule on the motion. See In re Pete, 589 S.W.3d at 322; In re Craig, 426

S.W.3d at 107.

       Whether a reasonable time for the trial court to act has lapsed is dependent upon

the circumstances of each case. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662; In re Chavez,

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62 S.W.3d at 228. The test for determining what time period is reasonable is not subject

to any exact formulation, and no “bright line” separates a reasonable time period from an

unreasonable one. See In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, LP, 538 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding); In re Greater McAllen Star Props., Inc., 444

S.W.3d at 748; In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228. We

examine a “myriad” of criteria, including the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion,

its overt refusal to act, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other judicial

and administrative matters which must be addressed first. See In re Greater McAllen Star

Props., Inc., 444 S.W.3d at 748–49; In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re Chavez, 62

S.W.3d at 228–29.

       Courts have applied the foregoing rules to grant mandamus relief in cases

concerning various different periods of delay. See In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, LP,

538 S.W.3d at 159 (granting relief for a delay of more than eight months in rendering a

final judgment); In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d 623, 624 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2015, orig. proceeding) (granting relief for a delay of more than seven months in ruling on

a motion to compel arbitration); In re Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d 676, 679–80 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding) (granting relief for a delay of more than six months in

ruling on a motion to compel arbitration); In re Greenwell, 160 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding) (granting relief for a six-month delay in ruling

on a motion for partial summary judgment); In re Kleven, 100 S.W.3d 643, 644–45 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2003, orig. proceeding) (granting relief for delays of more than three

and five months on motions for discovery, sanctions, and for a trial setting); City of

Galveston v. Gray, 93 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.

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denied) (combined appeal & orig. proceeding) (granting relief for a thirteen-month delay

in ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction); In re Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 990 S.W.2d

459, 461 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])

(granting relief for a seven-month delay in ruling on a “no evidence” motion for summary

judgment); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig.

proceeding) (granting relief for a delay of eighteen months in ruling on a motion for default

judgment); Kissam v. Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265, 266–67 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1976, orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (granting relief for a thirteen-month delay in ruling on a petition

for incorporation); see also In re McAllen Hosps., L.P., No. 13-20-00210-CV, 2020 WL

2611272, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 22, 2020, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.) (granting relief for an eleven-month delay in ruling on a motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment); In re Nomarco, Inc., No. 14-20-00129-CV, 2020 WL

1181705, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 12, 2020, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.) (per curiam) (granting relief for an eight to nine-month delay in ruling on a

special appearance); In re Roland’s Roofing Co., No. 13-19-00469-CV, 2019 WL

5444399, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 23, 2019, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.) (granting relief for an eight-month delay in ruling on a special appearance); In

re ABC Assembly LLC, No. 14-19-00419-CV, 2019 WL 2517865, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (granting

relief for an eight-month delay in ruling on a motion for entry of judgment on the jury’s

verdict); In re Harris Cnty. App. Dist., No. 14-19-00078-CV, 2019 WL 1716274, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 18, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting relief for

a six-month delay in ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction); In re Coffey, No. 14-18-00124-

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CV, 2018 WL 1627592, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 5, 2018, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (granting relief for a four-month delay in ruling on an

unopposed motion to confirm an arbitration award when the delay in ruling was causing

substantial harm).

       In considering the alleged period of delay, we recognize that trial courts have broad

discretion in how they conduct business in their courtroom and control their docket. See

Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); Jacobs v. State, 594 S.W.3d 377,

382 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.). Nevertheless, this discretion is not unlimited,

and the trial court has a duty to schedule its cases to expeditiously dispose of them. King

Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez, 443 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. 2014); Clanton, 639

S.W.2d at 930; In re Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters, 374 S.W.3d 651, 658 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 663.

                                     IV.    ANALYSIS

       We examine the specific circumstances of this case to determine whether the

relators’ pleas were properly filed and have been pending a reasonable time. See In re

Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662. The pleas to the jurisdiction were filed on February 4, 2022,

and were submitted to the trial court at a hearing held on March 22, 2022. The trial court

did not issue rulings and instead took the pleas under advisement. Relators requested

the trial court to rule on its pleas on May 20, 2022, and again on October 31, 2022.

Relators assert that they “have tried to obtain a ruling from the trial court on multiple

occasions—not to mention the multiple phone calls . . . to the trial court’s coordinator to

obtain a status on the case.” On February 9, 2023, relators objected to Garcia’s and

Garza’s requests for docket control conferences and to proceeding with the cases

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pending a ruling on their pleas to the jurisdiction. On March 20, 2023, the trial court held

docket control conferences and set these cases for trial. There is no dispute that relators’

pleas were properly filed and that relators have affirmatively requested the trial court to

rule on their pleas. The pleas have been pending after being heard for more than thirteen

months. The record before this Court fails to indicate that any special docket conditions

or other matters have prevented the trial court from ruling on relators’ pleas.

       The subject matter of the pending motion or plea is relevant to our analysis, and

we have stated that the failure to rule on a jurisdictional matter is a “pivotal factor” in

determining whether mandamus should issue given that jurisdiction presents a threshold

issue in any case. In re First Mercury Ins., No. 13-13-00469-CV, 2013 WL 6056665, at *5

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 13, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); see

also In re Torres, No. 04-18-00573-CV, 2018 WL 5269227, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Oct. 24, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Generally, a ruling on jurisdiction should be

made “as soon as practicable.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 227 (Tex. 2004). It is a “fundamental precept that a court must not proceed on the

merits of a case until legitimate challenges to its jurisdiction have been decided.” Id. at

228; see W. Travis Cnty. Pub. Util. Agency v. CCNG Dev. Co., 514 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2017, no pet.). In this regard, mandamus relief is available when a trial court

litigates the merits of a case and delays ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. See City of

Galveston v. Gray, 93 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.

denied) (combined app. & orig. proceeding); see also In re Torres, 2018 WL 5269227, at

*1–3; In re Torres, No. 13-17-00172-CV, 2017 WL 2665986, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg June 21, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Health Res., No.

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05-16-01135-CV, 2016 WL 5937790, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 12, 2016, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.).

       Having considered all the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion in failing to rule within a reasonable period on relators’

pleas to the jurisdiction and instead setting the cases for trial. See In re Mesa Petroleum

Partners, LP, 538 S.W.3d at 159; In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d at 624; In re

Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d at 679–80. Further, balancing the benefits of mandamus

review against the detriments, we conclude that there is no adequate appellate remedy

to address the trial court’s failure to rule. See, e.g., In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, LP,

538 S.W.3d at 159; In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d at 624. Accordingly, we

sustain relators’ sole issue presented in these original proceedings.

                                     V.     CONCLUSION

       The Court, having examined and fully considered relators’ petitions for writ of

mandamus, the lack of any responses, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that

relators have met their burden to obtain relief. Relators’ pleas were properly filed and

have been pending a reasonable time, they requested rulings on the pleas, and the trial

court has failed to rule. See In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d at 624; In re

Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d at 679; In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d at 685; In re Chavez, 62

S.W.3d at 228. Accordingly, without addressing the merits of relators’ pleas to the

jurisdiction, we conditionally grant the petitions for writ of mandamus and direct the trial

court to rule on relators’ pleas prior to proceeding with any merits-based issues in these

cases. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 (“While we have jurisdiction to direct the

trial court to make a decision, we may not tell the court what that decision should be.”);

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see also In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d at 624; In re Cunningham, 454 S.W.3d

139, 143 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, orig. proceeding); O’Donniley v. Golden, 860

S.W.2d 267, 269–70 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding). The writs will issue only

if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this memorandum opinion.

                                                               GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                               Justice

Delivered and filed on the
1st day of May, 2023.

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