Court Opinion

ID: 9623702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:40:56.260584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:53.353109
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
specially concurring,
I write separately because I disagree with a portion of the majority opinion which pertains to the lawyer’s right to make public statements regarding a sitting judge. I do not believe that it is necessary in this case to attempt to draw a line between the first amendment rights of the lawyer and the general power of the court to control the conduct of counsel. I have no hesitancy, however, in joining with the holding that comments from a lawyer participating in a trial which characterize a ruling or the judge as “crazy” or “insane” {see majority opinion, ante at 705-706) are inappropriate and may form a proper subject for imposition of discipline under DR 1-102(A)(5). See In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo.1957). Lawyers are not free to try their cases in the newspaper, nor are they free to bring their appeal to a board of newspaper editors rather than the appellate court. Thus, I believe that respondent may be disciplined for comments made about Judge Riley and during the pendency of a case in which he was appearing before Judge Riley.
I also agree with the majority that respondent may be disciplined for criticizing Judge Riley for entering an order which was required by the mandate of a higher court. Lawyers have a special obligation to uphold the existence and integrity of the judicial system (DR 1 — 102(A)(5)), and their first amendment rights may be curtailed, at least a little, in order to accomplish this objective. Therefore, lawyers may criticize a judge or his decisions, but they are not free to mislead or to misrepresent the facts. When respondent criticized Judge Riley for entering the mandated order without indicating that Judge Riley had no choice in so doing, he intentionally and knowingly distorted and misrepresented the facts. While criticism of a judge or his decisions is not a breach of the lawyer’s duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial system, criticism accomplished by knowing distortion or misrepresentation of fact does breach the lawyer’s special duty and is the proper subject of discipline.
I do not believe that respondent may be disciplined for his other comments or criticisms of Judge Riley or Judge Riley’s decisions. Whether respondent was right or wrong, he had a first amendment right to criticize a judge, a judge’s qualifications and a judge’s performance in office. This is especially true in states such as Arizona *617where some judges are elected and where the retention of other judges is a matter for the voters. Ariz. Const, art. 6, §§ 12, 38. Thus, I do not believe that respondent can be disciplined for all of the comments made.
Because I do believe he may be disciplined for the comments involving the pending case and those relating to the entry of the mandated order, I concur in the result. I specifically join in the portion of the opinion relating to jurisdiction of the bar disciplinary process over sitting judges. We cannot establish a rule which would permit an erring lawyer to avoid discipline for unethical conduct because he or she happened to get elected or appointed to the judiciary. The bench is not a sanctuary for miscreant attorneys.