Court Opinion

ID: 9843308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:32:53.039798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:38.003185
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully disagree with the majority that the district court’s decision to impose a condition of supervised release authorizing the probation officer to require unlimited drug and alcohol testing outside of treatment did not constitute plain error that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-15, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-1784, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
It is “indisputable” that “the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative.” Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916). There are no federal common law crimes. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985). Legislative action defines crimes and criminal procedure; therefore, a court has no power to impose a sentence in excess of statutory authority.' United States v. Doe, 53 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (9th Cir.1995). It is Congress that “has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.” Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991). “Harmless error cannot give the district court authority it does not possess.” United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir.1983).
In United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir.2005), we held that the district court lacked the statutory authority to delegate the number of drug and alcohol tests administered to a person subject to supervised release 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), stating that “the court, not the probation officer, [must] set the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests to which a defendant may be subjected.” Id. at 882.
As noted by the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the delegation of a sentencing decision from an Article III judge to another entity is plain error because “imposing a sentence not authorized by law seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings.” United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir.1998)); see also United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.2006). The Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have similarly held that such delegation constitutes plain error. United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1255-56 (10th Cir.2002) (delegation of restitution payment schedule); United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Albro, 32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir.1994) (same); but *998see United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir.2005) (en banc) (holding that the improper delegation of determining the number of non-treatment drug tests to impose as a condition of supervised release to the probation officer cannot be plain error).
In an individual context, I can understand why one might reach the conclusion that a particular sentence does not appear to affect the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings. However, in my opinion, there is a broader principle at stake when an extra-statutory punishment is imposed. In my view, imposing a sentence in violation of statutory authority, particularly one involving improper delegation of judicial authority, is the type of error that necessarily and inherently must affect the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings, regardless of the individual context. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.