Court Opinion

ID: 9483911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:35:12.022398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:54.746982
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the court that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding Mrs. Amaral’s proffered testimony. Regretfully, I cannot agree with my brothers in approving a two-level increase in the offense level based on a finding that there was more than minimal planning by the defendant. This ruling is contrary to the guideline itself as well as common sense and logic.
A sentencing increase for “more than minimal planning” under U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(2) based upon post-offense conduct is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Previously, when we have found more than minimal planning for purposes of approving a sentencing increase, the offense itself involved significant planning. See, e.g., United States v. Resurreccion, 978 F.2d 759, 763 (1st Cir.1992) (transporting forged securities into the United States); United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir.1992) (falsifying many travel vouchers submitted for reimbursement to the State of Massachusetts over a four year period); United States v. Tardiff 969 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (1st Cir.1992) (falsifying financial records for several years to hide losses in investment pool); United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 343-44 (1st Cir. 1992) (filing false residential mortgage loan documents with a federally insured bank); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 361 (1st Cir.1989) (obtaining two fraudulent bank loans). In this case, neither the district court nor the majority found that the defendant’s offense, forging the payees’ names on a stolen check and then writing his own name and address on the check in order to deposit it in a newly-created bank account, required more than minimal planning.3 The district court enhanced the de*7fendant’s offense level based on his attempts to mislead investigators long after the offense had been committed.
The guideline provides for a two-level increase “[i]f the offense involved (A) more than minimal planning[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2). The application notes following the guideline refer to the Commentary to § 1B1.1, General Application Principles, for the definition of “more than minimal planning.” As the majority noted, the commentary explains that, “ ‘More than minimal planning’ also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense, other than conduct to which § 3Cl.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) applies.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(f). Reading the definition into the guideline, it seems clear to me that the focus remains on conduct preceding and involving the offense. Attempts to conceal the offense, which are planned and occur after the offense, fall within the definition of obstructing justice, and should not be considered for purposes of a sentencing increase for “more than minimal planning.”4 The majority points out correctly that in this case the defendant’s concocted story did not significantly impede or obstruct the official investigation or prosecution of the case and, therefore, U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1 would not apply. This, however, does not justify imposing a two-level increase by distorting the meaning of the “more than minimal planning” guideline.
I do not think we should disregard common sense, logic, and the plain meaning of words when we enter the labyrinth of the sentencing guidelines. “Plan” is defined in the dictionary as “a scheme or method of acting, doing, proceeding, making, etc., developed in advance.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1480 (2nd Ed.Unabridged 1987) (emphasis added). I agree with the Seventh Circuit that a story concocted after the offense, false as it may be, should not be included within the term “more than minimal planning,” unless there is some evidence that the story was fabricated as part of the pre-offense planning. United States v. Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404, 407-08 (7th Cir.1992).
In this case, the defendant told a false story, and recruited a friend to help mislead the investigation more than a year after he committed the offense. I have examined the presentence report, and the record of the sentencing hearing and have found no evidence that the defendant concocted the story before the offense, but waited until the investigation began to put his plan into action, as the court seems to assume. In fact, the defendant did not contact his friend until after the investigation had begun, 16 months after the offense.5 Under the facts of this case, the application of the “more than minimal planning” guideline was error. It is contrary to the guideline and accompanying commentary, and it completely distorts the meaning of the word “planning.”
I respectfully dissent.

. The presentence report prepared by the Rhode Island probation department recommended the two-level increase for "more than minimal planning" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2) based on conduct of the offense: opening a bank account to deposit the stolen check, depositing the check, withdrawing all of the funds, and never using the account again. Defense counsel objected, and the district court agreed that the conduct relied upon in the presentence report did not constitute “more than minimal planning.” The court went on to find, however, that the defendant’s false story after the offense involved "more than minimal planning” and imposed the two-level increase based on that finding.

. The presentence report did not recommend an increase based on obstructing justice, U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1. At the sentencing hearing, the government admitted that the defendant’s story had not misled the investigation.

. At the sentencing hearing, the government characterized the defendant’s friend as "a recruit after the crime.”