Court Opinion

ID: 9424772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:12:44.053069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:52.278054
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,
concurring.
I concur solely on the ground that petitioner’s conviction under Washington’s general obscenity statute cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be sustained consistent with the fundamental notice requirements of *317the Due Process Clause. The evidence in this case, however, revealed that the screen of petitioner’s theater was clearly visible to motorists passing on a nearby public highway and to 12 to 15 nearby family residences. In addition, young teenage children were observed viewing the film from outside the chain link fence enclosing the theater grounds. I, for one, would be unwilling to hold that the First Amendment prevents a State from prohibiting such a public display of scenes depicting explicit sexual activities if the State undertook to do so under a statute narrowly drawn to protect the public from potential exposure to such offensive materials. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967).1
Public displays of explicit materials such as are described in this record are not significantly different from any noxious public nuisance traditionally within the power of the States to regulate and prohibit, and, in my view, involve no significant countervailing First Amendment considerations.2 That this record shows an offensive nuisance that could properly be prohibited, I have no doubt, but the state statute and charge did not give the notice constitutionally required.

 For examples of recent statutes regulating public displays, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-537 (Supp. 1971-1972); N. Y. Penal Law §§245.10-245.11 (Supp. 1971-1972).

 Under such circumstances, where the very method of display may thrust isolated scenes on the public, the Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 489 (1957), requirement that the materials be “taken as a whole” has little relevance. For me, the First Amendment must be treated in this context as it would in a libel action: if there is some libel in a book, article, or speech we do not average the tone and tenor of the whole; the libelous part is not protected.