Court Opinion

ID: 9519159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:10:33.080061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:50.801795
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur except to the portion of the majority opinion which reverses the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Bonnie, to which I dissent. IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-16 (1992 Supp.) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The court from time, to time may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorneys' fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceedings or after entry of judgment. The court may order the amount to be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing attorneys' fees in dissolution cases. Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98 (Ind.1996). In considering whether to make such an award and the appropriate amount, the trial court may consider factors including: the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, the superiority and availability of funds, the result achieved, the size of the estate, and the difficulty of the issues. See Riddle v. Riddle, 566 N.E.2d 78, 83 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Canaday v. Canaday, 467 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind.Ct.App.1984).
The trial court ordered Theodore to pay a portion of Bonnie's attorney's fees and expenses in the exact amount he had paid as advances for such purposes during the pen-dency of the proceedings. Theodore was ordered to pay $339,761.21, and Bonnie was ordered to pay the balance of $106,424.96. The court's order noted that the parties had agreed that the fees and expenses were necessary and reasonable.
Here, the majority reassessed the evidence in a light most favorable to Theodore to *194conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay a portion of Bonnie's attorney's fees and expenses. While acknowledging that the trial court divided the marital assets equally, the majority spins a tale of woe for Theodore based upon a lack of diversity in his assets. Suggesting an investment strategy for Bonnie which would allow her to maximize her assets, presumably so that she can pay her own fees, does not satisfy our standard of review or adequately demonstrate the required deference for the trial court's determination.
The majority erroneously supplants the trial court's findings with its own. The trial court specifically found that Theodore has a substantially greater earnings expectation than does Bonnie. Further, the trial court's findings regarding the valuation of the assets explicitly found a healthy business entity with substantial net worth, including cash in the approximate amount of five million dollars. The court found that Theodore's salary and bonus from Cadence exceeded one million dollars. Further, the court required that Bonnie reimburse Theodore for a shopping trip to Paris, a cruise and various items she purchased for the children, but represented as gifts from her solely. The marital estate was sizeable. That the complexity of the issues required substantial litigation expenses is clear. The trial court's determination is based upon substantial evidence and consideration of the relevant factors.
As noted above, the trial court's order allowing Bonnie a portion of her attorney's fees and expenses was in the sum of the advances made by Theodore during the pen-dency of the action. Because the appellate tribunal does not reweigh the evidence and the statutory authority for awarding attorney's fees does not prohibit those with equal asset distributions from receiving or paying attorney's fees, I would vote to affirm the trial court's decision.