Court Opinion

ID: 9495186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:56:45.370391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:52.299652
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
1. In my opinion, the Contract Disputes Act (“Disputes Act”) covers this dispute, and under its statute of. limitations the plaintiffs complaint was timely filed.
I view the two statutes as complementary, not mutually exclusive. That is, the Interstate Commerce Act is the general regulatory statute that governs a motor carrier’s operations, including the regulation of the service the carrier renders and the carrier’s relations with its customers. *1376The Disputes Act, on the other hand, governs the resolution of disputes between a motor carrier and the federal government over contracts, between them for transportation services, and thus covers this case. When the tender agreements stated that Inter-Coastal Xpress would provide transportation services “pursuant to” the Interstate Commerce Act, the carrier merely indicated that that Act was the regulatory basis for its operating authority. I do not read that statement, as the court apparently does, to suggest that the Interstate Commerce Act would govern any disputes the carrier might have with the government over its charges.
The Interstate Commerce Act is an old statute that, from its enactment, necessarily provided and prescribed the procedures governing disputes between carriers and their customers, including the federal government. Many years later Congress enacted the Disputes Act to unify the standards and provisions for the resolution of contract disputes between a wide variety of contractors and the government.
The language of the Disputes Act is broad. It covers “any express or implied contract ... entered into by an executive agency for (2) the procurement of services.” 41 U.S.C. § 602(a). The tender agreements in this case were express contracts for the procurement of transportation services, and are similar to the contracts we routinely consider under the Disputes Act. They resulted from a government invitation for bids. They are lengthy and detailed contracts that cover virtually all aspects of the commercial relationship between the carrier and the government, and obligate the carrier to provide transportation services for the government for three years. Each tender agreement occupies more than thirty pages of the joint appendix. The issues here — the meaning of certain provisions of the tender agreements and whether they entitle the carrier to additional compensation for certain kinds of “holdover” services it provided' — also are similar to the issues we frequently decide in cases under the Disputes Act.
I do not think the question of which statute governs the resolution of this dispute can be answered by invoking the canon of statutory construction that if an earlier more limited statute and a later more general statute appear in conflict, the earlier one trumps the later one. That principle may be invoked only if there is an otherwise irreconcilable conflict between two statutes. Here there is no such conflict. In my view, both statutes cover the carriers’ transportation services for the government in this case, although they deal with different aspects of the relationship.
To me, the question is whether it may fairly be said that when Congress enacted the Disputes Act, it intended to exempt coverage of disputes between motor carriers and the federal government about the carriers’ charges. In view of the broad purpose and broad language of the Disputes Act and the lack of any legislative history establishing that Congress did not intend to cover such disputes, I would hold that it is the Disputes Act, and not the Interstate Commerce Act that governs this dispute.
The court states that “Section 10721 of the ICA, now re-codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13712, generally exempts transportation-services agreements from the procurement procedures that ordinarily apply to other government contracts” and that the tender agreements “specifically mentioned” the Interstate Commerce Act and its provision *1377(49 U.S.C. § 13712) that “exempts transportation services from the general procurement provisions of Title 41 of the U.S.Code, the same title that houses the [Disputes Act].” The argument apparently is that since the Disputes Act is part of Title 41 (which deals with public contracts), the exception that § 13712 provides from other provisions of "Title -41 somehow also covers the Disputes Act, which is also set forth in that title. I see no basis for that conclusion.
If resort be had to 49 U.S.C. .§ 10721, § 13712’s predecessor, the conclusion is the same. Section 10721, a much longer provision, generally deals with carriers’ charges for serving the United States. It sheds no light on whether the Disputes Act covers disputes over such charges.
2.This court’s decision in Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, 50 F.3d 1014 (Fed.Cir.1995), is not inconsistent with my position. Dalton involved a dispute arising out of transportation for the government by a common carrier pursuant to government bills of lading. There was no overall contract that spelled out in detail the relationship between the two parties, pursuant to which the carrier agreed to provide transportation for a specific period, as did the tender agreements in this case.. This court held that the Interstate Commerce Act, not the Disputes Act, covered such transportation. The court, however, described its decision as:
a narrow one, limited to cases in which the government obtains transportation services from a common carrier pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10721 and in which the GBL constitutes the contract between the parties. We do not address cases in which transportation services are obtained through other means, such as contracts, for continuing transportation services over a period of time.... A different analysis may be appropriate with regard to contract-based claims arising in that setting.
50 F.3d at 1020-21.
The present case involves the issue the court expressly left open in Dalton, for which it suggested that “[a] different analysis may be appropriate.”
3. I see no reason for the court’s broad pronouncement that the Interstate Commerce Act’s limitations period governs “all actions seeking payment of the charges owed on a common carrier agreement for ‘transportation services’ with the government.” All the court need conclude to decide this case in the government’s favor is that the Interstate Commerce Act covers these particular contracts. There is neither need nor occasion to go beyond that ruling and announce the broader principle the court enunciates. Perhaps that may ultimately turn out to be the effect of the present decision, but we should not foreclose the possibility that in some future case, presently not discernable, that Act might not apply.
4. In view of the absence of any explicit Congressional discussion of this question, perhaps an appropriate solution to the problem of statutory interpretation would be.to hold that a carrier having a dispute with the federal government over its transportation charges may assert its claim under either the Interstate Commerce Act or the Disputes Act, but not under both. Under that approach, a critical question in this case would be whether Inter-Coastal Xpress filed a certified claim with the contracting officer for its holdover charges, as the Disputes Act would require it to da See 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1). If such a claim" has been submitted, the Con*1378tract Disputes Act would apply. If however, such a claim was not submitted, then Inter Coastal Xpress would be viewed as having invoked its remedy under the Interstate Commerce Act, and such an attempt would be untimely. Moreover, because Inter-Coastal Xpress invoked the administrative procedures under the Interstate Commerce Act it may be precluded from thereafter proceeding under the Disputes Act.
In answering this proposal, the court apparently suggests that the provision in the Interstate Commerce Act that a carrier suing the government for transportation charges in federal court “must begin” such action within three years precludes an alternative action under the Disputes Act. That language, however, is a familiar statute of limitations formulation. It does not address the question whether such action is the only available one for this dispute.