Court Opinion

ID: 9959735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 15:07:48.576829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:51.247133
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 126,748

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                           STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellant,

                                                    v.

                                       PAUL KEVIN KIHONGE,
                                             Appellee.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Johnson District Court; MICHAEL P. JOYCE, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed April 12, 2024. Affirmed.

        Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellant.

        Jean Ann Uvodich, of Overland Park, for appellee.

Before SCHROEDER, P.J., ISHERWOOD and PICKERING, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: The State brings an interlocutory appeal before this court after the
district court granted Paul Kevin Kihonge's motion to suppress. The district court found
that law enforcement officers unreasonably prolonged the inspection of Kihonge's
commercial vehicle to allow time for a drug-sniffing dog to arrive and sniff for narcotics.
On appeal, the State contends the district court erred in arriving at its conclusion because
a warrantless search for narcotics falls within the scope of a commercial vehicle
inspection, and there is not substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's
finding that Deputy Johnson unreasonably extended the duration of the stop. The State

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further argues that the district court erred when it sua sponte granted the motion to
suppress on grounds not raised by Kihonge without granting the State another evidentiary
hearing where it could submit supplemental briefing and call additional witnesses.

       Following a careful review of the case, we are not persuaded by the State's
arguments. A thorough review of the record reveals there is substantial competent
evidence to support the district court's finding that the officers' extension of the stop
lacked justification and was carried out to allow for the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog.
The State's second assertion of error, that the trial court sua sponte granted Kihonge's
motion on grounds not raised in the briefs, is likewise belied by the record. Both
Kihonge's motion and the State's response addressed the prolonged duration of the traffic
stop. Under these circumstances, we affirm the district court's suppression ruling.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Paul Kevin Kihonge was arrested during a commercial vehicle inspection and
charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, Kihonge
moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle, as well as inculpatory
statements he made after a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the contraband. Kihonge alleged,
among other violations irrelevant to this opinion, that police impermissibly extended the
inspection of his commercial vehicle to allow time for the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog.

       The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve Kihonge's motion,
and the State called Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Nicholas Wright as its first witness.
Trooper Wright explained the administrative regulations governing commercial vehicle
inspections, including the authorization process for vehicle inspectors. Trooper Wright
then testified that Johnson County Sheriff's Deputy Bradley Johnson, who performed the
inspection of Kihonge's vehicle, was authorized to perform commercial vehicle
inspections at the time of the stop.

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       On cross-examination, Trooper Wright explained that a Level I vehicle inspection
is a 37-step inspection which encompasses a review of the driver's credentials, license,
medical certification, annual inspection, markings on the vehicle, and the vehicle's
mechanical components. According to Wright, such inspections become even more
involved when the vehicle is equipped with air brakes, such as Kihonge's, because the
inspector is required to get under the vehicle and measure the movement of certain brake
components. Trooper Wright testified that calling a drug-sniffing dog is not part of a
typical inspection but can certainly occur if something in the inspection gives rise to
reasonable suspicion that justifies further detention of the driver.

       Trooper Wright testified that a typical Level I inspection, without major violations
or mechanical issues, usually lasts 15 to 20 minutes for a box truck without air brakes and
30 to 45 minutes for a tractor trailer. He also testified that inspections involving multiple
violations or mechanical problems take two to three hours.

       Deputy Bradley Johnson testified as the State's second witness and informed the
court that he was working as a certified motor vehicle inspector in Edgerton, Kansas, on
September 20, 2022. That day, he pulled over a box truck with air brakes driven by Paul
Kihonge for purposes of conducting a random Level I commercial motor vehicle
inspection. As a standard part of that inspection, he ran Kihonge's license and discovered
a two-year old nonextraditable warrant out of Arizona for possession of marijuana. The
deputy also observed that Kihonge was traveling from Dallas to Kansas City without a
logbook, and the truck had previously undergone maintenance after which the mechanic
left tools in the engine. Based on this collective information, Deputy Johnson called for a
K9 unit to conduct an open-air sniff for drugs. The dog arrived and waited until Deputy
Johnson completed the vehicle inspection before conducting its sniff.

       The dog alerted on Kihonge's truck prompting an inquiry to Kihonge as to whether
there were narcotics in the vehicle. Kihonge admitted there was marijuana in the ashtray.

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A subsequent search of the vehicle recovered 7.5 grams of marijuana, a vape pen with
wax residue, multiple grinders, a paper roller, and a smoke filter. The full duration of
Kihonge's vehicle inspection lasted 70 minutes.

       After considering the evidence, the district court found that Deputy Johnson was
properly certified and authorized to perform the inspection of Kihonge's vehicle. It then
noted the evidence that the typical inspection of a tractor-trailer, without issues, lasts 30
to 45 minutes, a box truck without air brakes can be 15 to 20 minutes, while one with
such brakes would run between 15 and 45 minutes, and "it can be up to two hours
depending on what kinds of violations there are" and that the inspection of Kihonge's
vehicle, with no issues noted, took 70 minutes. The district court concluded that Deputy
Johnson called the drug-sniffing dog based on the nonextraditable warrant and "this
inspection took longer than it would have normally and . . . the delay was caused by the
deputy wanting to get the dog there to do the sniff." Based on these findings, the district
court determined that the stop was unreasonably delayed and granted Kihonge's motion
to suppress.

       The State now brings its interlocutory appeal before this court to determine
whether the district court erred in granting Kihonge's motion to suppress.

                                      LEGAL ANALYSIS

The district court did not err in granting Kihonge's motion to suppress.

       The State first contends the district court erred in suppressing the evidence on the
basis of an unlawful extension of the duration of the stop because the court raised that
issue on its own accord and declined to afford the State the opportunity to provide
supplemental briefing or witness testimony on the matter. The State then also asserts
there is nevertheless a lack of substantial competent evidence to support the district

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court's factual findings that the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged and that the
involvement of the drug-sniffing dog prompted the extension.

       In response, Kihonge counters that the issue concerning whether the drug dog
impermissibly extended the length of the stop was not raised sua sponte and was
addressed by both parties prior to the hearing by virtue of his motion to suppress and the
State's response to that motion. He also maintains that the district court's factual findings
are supported by substantial competent evidence and its legal conclusions are sound.

       Standard of Review

       "On a motion to suppress, an appellate court generally reviews the district court's
findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent
evidence and reviews the ultimate legal conclusion de novo." State v. Cash, 313 Kan.
121, 125-26, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021). In reviewing the factual findings, an appellate court
does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Hanke, 307
Kan. 823, 827, 415 P.3d 966 (2018); see also State v. Talkington, 301 Kan. 453, 461, 345
P.3d 258 (2015) (applying this standard of review on State's appeal after motion to
suppress granted).

       General Rules

       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 15 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights provides identical protections from unlawful searches and
seizures. State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 498, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010). A seizure occurs
when a law enforcement officer restrains the liberty of a citizen by means of physical
force or show of authority. State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 135, 183 P.3d 788 (2008).

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One example of a seizure is when an officer stops a vehicle on a public roadway. State v.
Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 661, 215 P.3d 601 (2009). The State carries the burden to prove that
the search and seizure were lawful. State v. Goodro, 315 Kan. 235, 238, 506 P.3d 918
(2022).

       Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Heim, 312 Kan. 420, 422-23, 475 P.3d
1248 (2020). Here, the police relied on the exception allowing warrantless administrative
searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. McCammon, 45 Kan. App. 2d 482, 485-
86, 250 P.3d 838 (evidence discovered during fire department's search with
administrative search warrant), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Cooper, 29
Kan. App. 2d 177, 182-83, 23 P.3d 163 (whether individual has reasonable expectation of
privacy during administrative search of heavily regulated business is fact-specific
question), rev. denied 272 Kan. 1420 (2001).

       Unlike searches of private homes, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless
administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth
Amendment. The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial
property reflects the fact that owners of commercial property enjoy a lesser expectation
of privacy than individuals do in the sanctity of their own homes. In certain
circumstances, regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections may adequately
protect a commercial property owner's privacy interests. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 598-99, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981).

       Commercial motor carriers are highly regulated by the State of Kansas. Laws
relating to motor carriers are found at K.S.A. 66-1,105 et seq., and regulations are found
at K.A.R. 82-4-1 et seq. The Kansas Highway Patrol is authorized "to require the driver
of any motor vehicle owned or operated by any such carrier to stop and submit such
vehicle to an inspection to determine compliance with such laws and rules and

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regulations." K.S.A. 74-2108(b); see K.S.A. 66-1324. In addition to Kansas Highway
Patrol Troopers, "any law enforcement officer in the state certified in the inspection of
motor carriers and authorized in accordance with the requirements of the Kansas motor
carrier safety program" may conduct commercial vehicle inspections. K.A.R. 82-4-1(c);
see K.A.R. 82-4-2a.

       The Kansas Supreme Court has determined that K.S.A. 74-2108(b) is reasonable
in allowing officers to stop commercial vehicles at any time, any place, and under any
circumstances. The permissible scope of the search is narrowly defined and thus clearly
constitutional. Drivers of commercial vehicles are on notice by statute that an officer may
stop them for an inspection, but that inspection is limited to determining whether the
driver and vehicle are in compliance with applicable motor carrier laws, rules, and
regulations. State v. Crum, 270 Kan. 870, 873-76, 19 P.3d 172 (2001).

       Calling for a drug dog unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop.

       The district court granted Kihonge's motion to suppress after finding that Deputy
Johnson unreasonably extended the duration of the traffic stop to allow enough time for
the drug dog to arrive. The State contends that the district court's conclusion that Deputy
Johnson intentionally and unreasonably extended the duration of the stop is not supported
by substantial competent evidence.

       The testimonies of Trooper Wright and Deputy Johnson both outlined the typical
procedure for a Level I commercial vehicle inspection. The officers discussed the 37-step
procedure and what it entails. It primarily consists of a review of the driver's credentials
and a basic assessment of the truck's mechanical components. Neither officer mentioned
the involvement of a drug dog as a routine part of the inspection.

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       The officers' testimonies were in alignment with Kansas statutes and regulations.
To be clear, Kansas statutes prohibit the use or possession of drugs by drivers of
commercial motor vehicles. See K.S.A. 66-1,130(b)(2)(C) (incorporating 49 C.F.R. §
392.4[a]). Even so, the Kansas regulations governing motor carriers do not mention drugs
as a target of commercial vehicle inspections. See K.A.R. 82-4-1 et seq. Rather, the
regulations on commercial vehicle inspections mainly focus on ensuring that vehicles and
intermodal equipment are in good working condition and unlikely to break down or cause
an accident. See K.A.R. 82-4-3j(a)(3) (incorporating 49 C.F.R. § 396.9). This is because
a regulatory statute authorizing commercial vehicle inspections "must advise the owner
of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a
properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers . . . 'in
time, place, and scope.'" New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L.
Ed. 2d 601 (1987).

       Since enlisting the assistance of a drug dog is not part of a standard commercial
vehicle inspection, the normal rules for that law enforcement resource apply here. An
officer's inquiries or actions unrelated to the justification for an initial traffic stop will
convert the stop into an unlawful seizure if they measurably extend or prolong the stop.
See State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 995-96, 218 P.3d 801 (2009). Detaining a driver for
even a few extra minutes to allow for the arrival of a drug dog unreasonably extends the
stop when the officer does not otherwise require more time to effectuate the initial
purpose of the stop. See State v. Coleman, 292 Kan. 813, 822, 257 P.3d 320 (2011); State
v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, Syl. ¶ 3, 960 P.2d 200 (1998).

       The district court found that Deputy Johnson's decision to extend Kihonge's stop
was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Following a careful and thorough review of
the record, we conclude there is substantial competent evidence to support that finding.
Trooper Wright and Deputy Johnson both testified that an inspection of a box truck with
air brakes and no readily identifiable mechanical issues, such as Kihonge's vehicle,

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typically lasts between 15 and 45 minutes. Yet the inspection alone of Kihonge's vehicle
spanned nearly 70 minutes. Deputy Johnson also explicitly testified that no regulatory
violations or mechanical issues necessitated an extension of the stop, and the dog
performed its tasks after the inspection was completed. Thus, the stop was seemingly
extended by the deputy's decision to call for a K9 unit and initiate a drug investigation.
These facts support the district court's conclusion.

       The importance of properly defining the scope of an inspection and limiting the
discretion of the inspecting officers must be appreciated. For instance, in State v.
Stevenson, No. 100,238, 2009 WL 929320 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion), an
officer performing a regulatory search of a commercial vehicle discovered drugs and
paraphernalia. At the beginning of the inspection, the officer discovered an insufficient
logbook and began to look for receipts in the truck to prove the driver's whereabouts and
compliance with the regulations. Eventually, the officer opened an eyeglass case that he
found in the sleeper area and discovered two glass pipes with burnt methamphetamine
residue. A panel of this court found that the search was authorized because the officer did
not stop the truck to look for drugs and did not search the truck for drugs. Rather, drugs
were found during the search for evidence to reconstruct the missing logbook
information. 2009 WL 929320, at *4.

       In Stevenson, the purpose of the search was to complete the commercial vehicle
inspection. Here, Deputy Johnson could have performed a similar search for receipts due
to Kihonge's missing logbook. Instead, he called for a K9 unit. The intent behind the
actions clarifies why the physical search of the vehicle in Stevenson was within the scope
of the commercial vehicle inspection while calling for a drug dog here is not. The dog is
not an integral part of the standard commercial vehicle inspection. And unless there is
reasonable suspicion to further investigate, the officer can only detain the defendant's
vehicle for as long as it reasonably takes to complete the inspection which provided the

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basis for the initial detention. In this way, the commercial trucking regulations limit the
officer's discretion.

       The district court also found that Deputy Johnson called the drug dog because of
Kihonge's nonextraditable warrant out of Arizona. This was not a valid source of
reasonable suspicion to extend the detention. Information concerning a defendant's prior
drug involvement does not, without more, provide the necessary authorization for further
detainment. See State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 25, 72 P.3d 570 (2003); see also State v.
Rodenbeek, No. 93,282, 2006 WL 903145, at *8 (Kan. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion)
(Police officer did not have reasonable suspicion of drug activity to justify detaining the
defendant longer than necessary to complete the traffic stop simply because the officer
was aware that a woman previously overdosed outside the defendant's warehouse, that
said warehouse was frequented by individuals with prior narcotics violations, and that the
defendant had a prior arrest for drug possession.).

       Rodenbeek and Morris both indicate that Kihonge's warrant from Arizona was not
a valid basis for Deputy Johnson to turn this commercial vehicle inspection into a drug
investigation. The circumstances of the traffic stop did not justify detaining Kihonge any
longer than necessary to complete the vehicle inspection. Deputy Johnson's actions gave
rise to a violation of Kihonge's Fourth Amendment right and thus the district court
correctly granted Kihonge's motion to suppress.

       The district court did not sua sponte suppress evidence on grounds that were not
       raised by Kihonge.

       The State also argues that the district court erred by sua sponte suppressing
evidence on grounds not raised by the defendant without permitting the State to submit
supplemental briefing and call additional witnesses. This argument ignores the fact that
the prolonged duration of the traffic stop was not only raised in Kihonge's motion to

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suppress but also in the State's response to that motion. Under these circumstances, it was
within the district court's discretion to decline the State's request for supplemental
briefing and a successive evidentiary hearing.

       As noted in the standard of review, suppression of evidence involves factual and
legal components. The defendant's share of the burden rests on the factual side of the
analysis. State v. Estrada-Vital, 302 Kan. 549, 557, 356 P.3d 1058 (2015). K.S.A. 22-
3216(2) states that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must file a written motion
that "state[s] facts showing wherein the search and seizure were unlawful." The statute
then provides that "[t]he judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to
determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search and seizure were lawful
shall be on the prosecution." K.S.A. 22-3216(2).

       Kihonge's motion met the burden of pleading facts showing that the search and
seizure was unlawful. The motion explicitly alleged that a request was not made for the
drug dog until after the vehicle inspection was completed and that the call ultimately
extended the duration of the stop beyond the scope of the vehicle inspection. Therefore,
the State cannot claim surprise in the wake of the district court's decision to grant the
motion to suppress on this point. In fact, we know the State was not surprised because its
response to Kihonge's motion argued that "the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated because the Commercial Vehicle Inspection was not prolonged." Since
Kihonge pled facts demonstrating that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and
the State's response directly addressed those facts, it cannot be said that the district court
unfairly raised and relied upon an issue sua sponte.

       Furthermore, the district court was in no way required to grant the State's request
to file supplemental briefing and call additional witnesses. Generally, the decision to
permit either the State or the defense an additional evidentiary hearing on a suppression
issue rests within the district court's sound discretion based on the particular

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circumstances. K.S.A. 22-3216 does not require successive hearings. The statute only
calls for the district court to take such evidence as necessary to determine any fact issues
pertinent to the suppression issues. The district court did that very thing in this case. See
State v. Peach, No. 104,792, 2011 WL 4440184, at *2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished
opinion) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a second
evidentiary hearing).

                                        CONCLUSION

       Ultimately, the district court did not err here. Deputy Johnson went beyond the
scope of a typical commercial vehicle inspection when he unreasonably prolonged the
stop of Kihonge's vehicle to allow for the arrival of a drug dog. The district court
correctly reached this conclusion at the evidentiary hearing and granted Kihonge's motion
to suppress. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion by denying the State's
request for supplemental briefing and a successive evidentiary hearing.

       Affirmed.

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