Court Opinion

ID: 9704829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:47:38.343233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.672494
License: Public Domain

*97HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
We here concern ourselves with a state statute, SDCL 21-27-16.1, and how it applies.
I direct your attention to the last portion thereof: “[Ujnless the court finds grounds for relief asserted which for reasonable cause were omitted or inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application.” Now, that is the state law. We must abide by it.
CONCEPT ONE
If the grounds for relief are identical (in any given case or in this case) to those in the post-conviction action, the doctrine of res judicata applies.
CONCEPT TWO
Obviously, if the grounds for relief are dissimilar, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
CONCEPT THREE
Review the last phrase of this statute (which I have set forth above). If the circuit court finds grounds for relief for “reasonable cause” because of (a) omission in a previous application or having been (b) “inadequately raised,” there is an exception to finality of the first adjudication, namely, a “supplemental or amended application.” Hence, if the circuit court makes such a finding based upon a meritorious showing, the res judicata argument of South Dakota and SDCL 21-27-16.1 simply cannot coexist. Our Supreme Court, by a decision, cannot destroy this state law. We should not unmake that which the Legislature has made barring, of course, an unconstitutional act. County of Tripp v. State, 264 N.W.2d 213 (S.D.1978).
CONCEPT FOUR
Therefore, although I agree with the majority on the merits of this case, I cannot accede to the language (obiter dicta) contained in the last paragraph of this opinion. In light of this express statute which contains a simple declaration of legislative intent, the litany of res judicata and collateral estoppel cases found in said paragraph are inapposite. Those civil cases are repugnant to the statute which is the cornerstone/corpus of the very issue before us. As we expressed in State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911, 915 (S.D.1979): Look to “the language of the act in connection with its manifest purpose and design.” And— this — the majority opinion fails to do. To the contrary, it eradicates legislative intent. Respectfully, therefore, do I dissent to the latter substantive holding which I deem totally unnecessary to this Court’s decision.
I am hereby authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.