Court Opinion

ID: 9745969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:45:41.672116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:06.928797
License: Public Domain

Jones, J. (dissenting).
In the absence of any express legislative authorization, the trial court here lacked the authority to permit the complainant to testify from California via live two-way television. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
The Legislature provided for the taking of testimony by live two-way television only under the limited circumstances set forth under article 65 of the Criminal Procedure Law (L 1985, *41ch 505), which was enacted in response to the widespread recognition that child victims of sex abuse crimes typically suffer from acute anxiety and psychological trauma when giving live testimony (see People v Cintron, 75 NY2d 249, 254 [1990] [“The legislative purpose for permitting (certain child witnesses to testify via live two-way closed-circuit television) is the avoidance of the severe mental or emotional harm that may result from requiring a child witness to testify in the public atmosphere of the courtroom concerning the intimate sexual details of the crime”]). In enacting article 65, the Legislature promulgated a comprehensive scheme
“designed to further the aim of insulating child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in open court and also, under certain conditions, from having to testify in the presence of the defendant while, at the same time, fully preserving the defendant’s constitutional rights (see Mem of Dept of Law, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505, at 34-38; Preiser, 1985 Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 65.00, 1990 Supp Pamph, at 485-486)” (id.).
“The Legislature drafted article 65 with full recognition of the necessity of safeguarding a defendant’s confrontation rights and with the explicit aim of providing sufficient limitations and protections to meet the constitutional requirements” (id. at 260, citing Mem of Dept of Law and numerous other memoranda in support, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505). Further, the Legislature explicitly detailed that (1) article 65 applies only in prosecutions for incest or sex crimes under article 130 of the Penal Law where the testifying witness is 14 years of age or younger and found to be vulnerable to psychological harm if compelled to testify in the presence of the defendant, (2) in order for a child witness to be declared vulnerable (in such case, trial court must permit the televised testimony), the trial court must “determine[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that the child witness would suffer serious mental or emotional harm that would substantially impair the child witness’ ability to communicate with the finder of fact without the use of live, two-way closed-circuit television” (CPL 65.20 [2]), and (3) a trial court, in considering a vulnerability application, may consider whether any one or more of 12 enumerated circumstances have been established by clear and convincing evidence (see CPL 65.20 [10]).
In this case the trial court allowed the televised testimony based on its finding that the People established by clear and convincing evidence that complainant was unable to travel to *42New York without seriously endangering his health and was thus unavailable to testify. This was error.
From the exhaustive nature of the Legislature’s grant of authority permitting courts to receive televised testimony under the specific limited circumstances discussed above, there is a strong inference that the Legislature intended to exclude grants of authority under other circumstances (such as those present here).* In my view, the detail that attends CPL article 65, coupled with the CPL’s silence as to other circumstances where a court may admit live two-way televised testimony, sets the parameters of the trial court’s discretion. Thus, by allowing the instant complainant’s testimony, the trial court exceeded its discretionary authority. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the trial court did not have “preexisting authority” (majority op at 38) to admit complainant’s testimony pursuant to CPL 65.10 (3). That provision, which must be read in the context of the child witnesses covered under article 65, speaks to a court’s inherent authority to protect the well-being of such witnesses, not the general (and amorphous) “preexisting authority” the majority speaks of According to this article’s Bill Jacket,
“[s]ection 65.10 . . . clarifies that the power to order the use of closed-circuit television in no way supplants the court’s . . . inherent authority to otherwise protect the well-being of the child. The bill leaves undisturbed the court’s power to, among other measures, allow for the presence of a person who can provide emotional support to the child witness when he or she testifies or adjust the courtroom setting to make it more comfortable and less threatening to the child witness” (Mem of Dept of Law, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 505, at 21).
In light of the fact that the Legislature has with painstaking detail addressed the subject of when certain absent witnesses can testify by means of two-way television, Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) cannot serve as the basis for granting trial courts the authority to receive such testimony. Section 2-b (3) authorizes a court of record to create new procedures “necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by [the court].”
*43However, it does not authorize a court to fashion a procedure that is inconsistent with existing law. Nor does it authorize a court to disregard the critical policy decisions already made by the Legislature. In reversing the Appellate Division, the majority, under the guise of upholding the inherent powers of the courts, has recognized a trial court ruling that is wholly inconsistent with article 65 (the existing law) and accorded no weight to the substantive policy choices made by the Legislature. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, section 2-b (3) is inapposite.
If the inherent powers of the courts are sufficient to authorize the televised testimony in this case or, as stated by the majority, allow a trial court to make a “finding of necessity” (majority op at 38) regarding such testimony, these powers necessarily represent a broad source of authority that would permit trial courts to use live, two-way, televised testimony in ways not contemplated under article 65. That is, there would have been no need for the Legislature to enact article 65 in the first place. For example, a court, under its inherent powers, could be authorized to use such testimony in cases where it would be medically unsafe for any witness, regardless of age or where the witness resides, to travel to the particular New York court where the criminal matter is pending.
In addition, the majority’s use of the phrase “finding of necessity” is confusing. If the majority is arguing that allowing complainant’s testimony was “necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by [the court]” (Judiciary Law § 2-b [3]), that argument fails because the majority has not established, outside the circumstances prescribed in CPL article 65, that trial courts have the authority (discretionary or otherwise) to admit the testimony at issue. If the majority is arguing that allowing such testimony furthers an important public policy, they are necessarily referring to a policy decision the Legislature has not to this point made.
Moreover, the majority’s view of the courts’ inherent powers presents a number of problems. First, there does not appear to be any discernible limitation, within the inherent powers of the courts, on a court’s authority to allow the admission of an absent witness’s televised testimony as long as it is “necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by [the court]” (Judiciary Law § 2-b [3]). Second, what happens when individual courts, on similar facts, reach different conclusions as to whether to allow the admission of televised testimony or *44some other subject pertaining to the State’s public policy? Third, it appears that the majority’s ruling effectively circumscribes the Legislature’s role by allowing trial courts to (a) determine issues with public policy implications on a case by case basis and (b) create procedural rules for the sole purpose of allowing prosecutions to proceed (in direct contravention to state law).
In sum, because there was no express legislative authorization permitting the complainant to testify from California via live two-way television, the trial court here lacked the authority to admit complainant’s testimony.

 The level of specificity employed by the Legislature in enacting article 65 and addressing when witnesses can testify outside the courtroom (by depositions, conditional examinations [CPL article 660] and examinations on commission [CPL article 680]) implies that similar activities not specifically authorized are forbidden.