Court Opinion

ID: 9580559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:07.931473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:21.740271
License: Public Domain

Justice ORR
dissenting.
The bottom line of the majority opinion is, in effect, to totally deprive a property owner of access to a portion of that owner’s land despite the fact that the owner continues to pay taxes on and be liable for that property. In order to reach this result, the majority concludes that a clearly ambiguous ordinance is not ambiguous and that it is permissible for a term to have different meanings and application within the same ordinance without the ordinance ever specifying that such is the case. I conclude for the reasons set forth below that the Cary ordinance in question does not prohibit the petitioners from putting a gate in the fence. Furthermore, even though the constitutionality of this action by the Town of Cary was not raised below, I disagree with the majority that it is “not an unconstitutional taking.” I therefore respectfully dissent from this unwarranted disregard for private property rights.
The majority holds that the term “fence” in the conditional use ordinance has a meaning different from the meaning in the Cary ordinance and in the language of Z-664-92-PUD itself. However, such reasoning is contrary to an established canon of statutory interpretation, which also applies to the interpretation of municipal ordinances. See Woodhouse v. Board of Comm’rs of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 211, 225, 261 S.E.2d 882, 891 (1980). The rules of statutory interpretation require statutes to be “construed as a whole, and not by the wording of any particular section or part.” McLeod v. Board of Comm’rs of Carthage, 148 N.C. 77, 85, 61 S.E. 605, 607 (1908). Thus, words that carry a specific definition in one part of a statute are presumed to carry that same definition in all other parts. As the intervenor concedes, the conditional use permit is part of the Cary ordinance. Therefore, unless the language expressly states otherwise, we must presume that the application of the definition of “fence” in the conditional use ordinance is consistent with its definition in the Cary ordinance. If you can have a gate in your fence under the Cary ordinance in other situations, then you can have one under these facts unless something to the contrary specifically states otherwise.
Following this canon of statutory interpretation, the term “fence” in the ordinance must include gates. The term “fence” as used throughout the Cary ordinance indicates the Town’s intent to allow gates. For example, the ordinance requires solid fences around play areas at day-care homes. Cary, N.C., Unified Development Ordinance *311§§ 13.1.7, 13.1.8 (1992). These sections do not mention gates. However, gates must be included in the term “fence”; otherwise, children would have to be dropped over the fence in order to access the playground.
Language included in the Cary ordinance after Z-664-92-PUD was passed also provides insight on the definition of fence. The ordinance now provides that “[n]o sign or logo shall be permitted to be located on a fence.” Cary, N.C., Unified Development Ordinance § 13.1.10(d) (1992). This language does not specifically prohibit signs and logos on gates, but the drafters clearly intended to do so. Any other interpretation would result in allowing signs and logos on gates but not on fences. The language of these two sections indicates that the term fence in the Cary ordinance includes gates installed within a fence. Because we must construe statutes as a whole and because the conditional use permit is part of the Cary ordinance, we must assume that the term “fence” as used in Z-664-92-PUD is defined consistent with that term’s usage throughout the general zoning ordinance.
Aside from this established canon of statutory interpretation, the language of the conditional use ordinance itself indicates Cary’s specific intent to define terms in the conditional use ordinance consistently with the zoning ordinance. The conditional use ordinance refers to at least one definition in the Cary ordinance, providing that trees in the undisturbed buffer area should be of the “type ‘A’ buffer standard.” Reference to a “type ‘A’ buffer standard” is hopelessly unclear unless it was meant to carry the same meaning as those terms in the town ordinance. Thus, since Cary meant to use that term consistently, it follows that, absent language to the contrary, Cary intended to use “fence” consistently as well.
The assumption that terms carry the same meaning in the Cary ordinance and the conditional use ordinance can, however, be overcome by a clear indication that the terms were meant to have different meanings. That simply was not done in this case. The intervenors argue that the language of Z-664-92-PUD clearly indicates an intent to use a definition of fence that does not include gates. I disagree. The intervenors contend that because the land is an “undisturbed buffer,” it should not be accessible. However, the text of Z-664-92-PUD indicates that the Town anticipated access to the buffer zone. Z-664-92PUD requires the fence to be maintained and trees to be planted and replaced if necessary. Planting trees and maintaining a fence require people to walk in the buffer zone, thus showing that the Town anticipated some access to the buffer zone.
*312Furthermore, after Z-664-92-PUD was passed, Cary defined “undisturbed buffer” as a “unit of land containing sufficient quality and quantity of vegetation to meet the requirements of Chapter 14, Part 1 of this Ordinance. Such buffer shall not be graded, nor shall any development occur within such buffer.” Cary, N.C., Unified Development Ordinance § 2.1.4 (1992). Therefore, “undisturbed buffer” means that the land may not be graded, or developed, but it does not mean that access to the land is prohibited.
The intervenors contend that the conditional use ordinance requires the fence to preserve “continuity” and that a fence with gates is not continuous. However, “continuity” refers to the requirement that the fence connect at each end to already existing fences. They also argue that the fence must be the “same architecturally” as the Preston Woods fence and that because the Preston Woods fence has no gates, neither may the petitioners’ fence. However, the installation of gates does not prevent a fence from being the same architecturally. In fact, the gates at issue in this case are made of the same materials, are the same size, and are thus identical architecturally to the rest of the fence.
The intervenors further contend that since Z-664-92-PUD specifies one gate, additional gates are excluded. They argue the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—“to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,” Black’s Law Dictionary 602 (7th ed. 1999)—but this canon applies only when the thing mentioned and the thing excluded are sufficiently similar to warrant the inference. The gate mentioned in the ordinance is for city sewer access and was required, while the gates at issue here are for private use and are optional. The gates at issue in this case differ too much from the sewer gates to apply the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Instead of prohibiting other gates, I believe specifying one gate indicates that gates are permissible. Had the Town intended to prohibit other gates, it could have easily done so by providing the appropriate language.
Finally, this Court has held that “ ‘[z]oning regulations are in derogation of common law rights and they cannot be construed to include or exclude by implication that which is not clearly their express terms.’ ” Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966) (quoting 1 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 184 (2d. ed. Supp. 1962)). Because Z-664-92-PUD does not expressly prohibit gates, we cannot imply such a restriction, nor can we guess at what was intended.
*313While the majority quotes Robert Frost that “[g]ood fences make good neighbors,” I fail to see how a solid, seven-foot tall, wooden fence with no gates or other means of access to the owner’s property on the other side (short of pole-vaulting over the fence) is very neighborly. Perhaps the property owners from Sherborne subdivision can drive around to Harmony Hill subdivision, stop in front of their neighbors’ homes and gaze longingly at the fifty-foot strip of their property to which they have no access. Maybe even on a good day, they will be invited to walk across their neighbor’s backyard to actually stand on the property they own. Under the majority’s view, that is their only hope.
Justice Butterfield joins in this dissenting opinion.