Court Opinion

ID: 9352231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 17:08:17.846829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:28.492266
License: Public Domain

J-A25018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 ENTERPRISE BANK                :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                :                PENNSYLVANIA
                                :
            v.                  :
                                :
                                :
 MARK D. RIDGEWAY, LISA M.      :
 RIDGEWAY, DYANN HERMANN, MATT :
 HERMANN, H & R PROPERTY        :           No. 364 WDA 2022
 SERVICES, INC., PITTSBURGH     :
 HOUSING GROUP L.P., AND EQUINE :
 VISION LLC                     :
                                :
                                :
 APPEAL OF: MARK D. RIDGEWAY    :

               Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                         No(s): No. GD-20-010438

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: January 5, 2023

     Appellant Mark D. Ridgeway purports to appeal from the order granting

partial summary judgment in favor of Enterprise Bank. We quash.

     The facts of this case are well known to the parties. See Trial Ct. Op,

5/23/22, at 2-3, 4-15.   Briefly, Dyann Herrmann and Matthew Herrmann

(collectively, the Herrmanns), Mark D. Ridgeway and Lisa M. Ridgeway

(collectively, the Ridgeways), H&R Property Services, Inc. (H&R), Pittsburgh

Housing Group, L.P. (PHG), and Defendant Equine Vision, LLC (Equine Vision)

own interests in parcels of real property. Id. at 4-14. On December 29, 2006,

Enterprise Bank loaned Equine Vision $1,250,000.00 to fund Equine Vision’s
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equestrian center.    In exchange for the loan, Equine Vision executed a

promissory note to Enterprise Bank in the original principal amount of

$1,125,000.00, which the Herrmanns also executed as personal guarantors.

Id. at 5. As collateral for the loan, Enterprise Bank obtained a security interest

in eleven parcels of real property (the subject properties), which were owned,

in part, by the Herrmanns. Id. at 5-9.

      The Herrmanns and Equine Vision subsequently defaulted on the loan,

and Enterprise filed a complaint against the Ridgeways, PHG, H&R, the

Herrmanns, and Equine Vision.       Id. at 2-7.    Enterprise Bank’s complaint

alleged causes of action against all defendants for fraud and fraudulent

inducement, quiet title and request for declaratory judgment, partition, and

tortious interference and conversion. Default judgments were entered against

the Herrmanns and Equine Vision. Id. at 2.

      On December 22, 2021, Enterprise Bank filed a motion for partial

summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for partial summary

judgment that quieted title of the eleven subject properties that served as

collateral for the loan transaction by Enterprise Bank to Equine Vision as well

as clarifying ownership interests in the subject properties by concluding that

the Herrmanns possessed a 50% ownership interest in these properties that

are therefore subject to an existing Enterprise Bank judgment lien. Order,

3/14/22, at 1; see also Trial Ct. Op, 5/23/22, at 2, 3. However, the trial

court did not rule on any other issues and specifically retained jurisdiction “to

further order the filing of corrective deeds or other relief as may become

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necessary.” Id. at 2. Appellant filed an appeal on April 11, 2022. Both the

trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue:

      Whether the trial court erred in finding that, by virtue of
      certificates of ownership, [the Herrmanns] possessed a fifty
      percent (50%) ownership interest in the subject properties to this
      case, thereby assigning [Enterprise Bank] an ownership interest
      in the [subject] properties?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (formatting altered).

      Before we may address the merits of this appeal, we must determine

whether the appeal is properly before this Court, as “[t]he appealability of an

order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the

order.” Knopick v. Boyle, 189 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted)). “Accordingly, this Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua

sponte, whether an order is appealable.” Id. (citations omitted). As a general

rule, “an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as

a final order; (2) an interlocutory order as of right; (3) an interlocutory order

by permission; or (4) a collateral order.” Situs Properties, Inc. v. Jenkins

Court Realty Co., LP, 259 A.3d 993, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      On June 8, 2022, this Court directed Appellant to show cause why this

appeal should not be quashed.       Order, 6/8/22.     Appellant filed a timely

response and asserted that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

311(a)(7), which permits an appeal from an order directing partition, and

Appellant further contended that this Court has jurisdiction to address the

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merits of the appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8), which allows an appeal

from an order that was made final or appealable by statute or rule. See Resp.

to Rule, 6/17/22, at 1-2. On July 18, 2022, this Court discharged the rule and

informed the parties that the issue of appealability would be determined by

the merits panel. Order, 7/18/22. Upon review, we conclude that we are

constrained to quash the appeal.

       Our Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an interlocutory appeal

may be taken as of right from an order directing partition pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7).    Here, however, the order in question did not direct

partition or even address the issue.        Accordingly, Rule 311(a)(7) is not

applicable.

       As noted, Appellant also contends that the order is appealable pursuant

to Rule 311(a)(8). Resp. to Rule, 6/17/22, at 2. Rule 311(a)(8) provides that

an interlocutory appeal may be taken as of right from “[a]n order that is made

final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not

dispose of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8). Upon review of

Appellant’s response to this Court’s rule to show cause, we first note that

Appellant has not identified a statute or rule that permits the order in question

to be considered final. See Resp. to Rule, 6/17/22, at 1-2. However, because

the appealability of an order affects our jurisdiction, we address whether the

order is appealable pursuant to Rule 311(a)(8). See Knopick, 189 A.3d at

436.

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      As part of its complaint, Enterprise Bank requested declaratory

judgment regarding its right, title, and interest in the subject properties. See

Complaint, 9/30/20, at 12-14.       The Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act)

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

      Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have
      power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
      or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding
      shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
      judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
      affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations
      shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7532.       Accordingly, certain interlocutory orders involving

declaratory judgment claims may be appealable as of right. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n

Ins. Co. v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 188 A.3d 396, 399 (Pa. 2018); see also

Schmitt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 245 A.3d 678, 681

(Pa. Super. 2021); Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).

      However, appealing an interlocutory order under the Act is not

automatic, and courts apply a two-part test for determining whether such an

order is final and appealable. Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 684-85. The test is as

follows:

      (1) what is the effect of the lower court’s decision on the scope of
      the litigation; and (2) what practical effect does the court’s
      decision have on the ultimate outcome of the case. . . . If the
      order in question merely narrows the scope of the litigation and
      does not resolve the entirety of the parties’ eligibility for
      declaratory relief, then the order is interlocutory and not
      immediately appealable.

Id. at 685 (quoting Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 188 A.3d at 399-400).

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      In its opinion, the trial court concluded that the order on appeal was not

final because it did not dispose of all claims and all parties. See Trial Ct. Op.,

5/23/22, at 3. The trial court further explained that the order did not address

partition and opined that there is no authority permitting an appeal as of right

from an order in an action to quiet title.      Id.   Moreover, the trial court

specifically contemplated further proceedings and retained jurisdiction to

address the remaining issues including correction of the deeds.            Order,

3/14/22, at 2.

      On this record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that its order

granting partial summary judgment as to quiet title was proper and is not

appealable at this juncture. The trial court determined that partition was not

yet ripe for disposition, but there was no genuine issue of material fact solely

with respect to certain claims related to title. It entered its order that quieted

title of the eleven subject properties that served as collateral in the loan by

Enterprise Bank to Equine Vision, and further, clarified ownership interests by

concluding that the Herrmanns possess a 50% ownership interest in the

subject properties. Order, 3/14/22, at 1; see also Trial Ct. Op., 5/23/22, at

2, 3, 4. However, no determinations were made with respect to Enterprise

Bank’s claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement, partition, tortious

interference, and conversion.    Accordingly, the trial court’s order does not

resolve the entirety of Enterprise Bank’s claims nor is Appellant left without

remedy to pursue its claims in the ongoing court proceedings. See Schmitt,

245 A.3d at 684-85. Therefore, the order does not satisfy the criteria for an

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appealable order as either a final order under Pa.R.A.P. 341, nor as an

interlocutory order appealable as of right pursuant to Rule 311(a)(7) or (8).

For these reasons, we are constrained to quash the appeal.

     Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/5/2023

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