Court Opinion

ID: 9744964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:25:55.33672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.097427
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that this case must be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits and with the holding of the majority that Count I states a cause of action. In Count II, the defendant-counterplaintiff seeks redress for an unreasonable intrusion upon her privacy or right to seclusion, and Count III alleges a violation of a right of privacy when the plaintiff-counter-defendant publicly and unreasonably placed her in a false light. In my judgment, both of these counts are sufficient to state a cause of action. In Midwest Glass Company v. Stanford Development Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274, the appellate court for the First District, speaking through Mr. Justice Burman, acknowledges that there is a cause of action in Illinois for invasion of privacy. The court there stated: “With reference to counterclaimants’ first count, the right to privacy as well as the right to a remedy for invasion of such right have received both legislative (Ill. Const., art I, §§6, 12) and judicial sanction (Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434,440,259 N.E.2d 250,254) in Illinois. In analyzing the common law right to privacy, Professor William L. Prosser has delineated four distinct kinds of torts which constitute an invasion of privacy. This breakdown, which has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 652A (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) as well as many other foreign jurisdictions (e.g., Marks v. Bell Telephone Co. (1975), _ Pa._, 331 A.2d 424,430; Dotson v. McLaughlin (1975), 216 Kan. 201, 207-08,531 P.2d 1,6) comprise the following situations: (1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (2) the appropriation of another’s name or likeness, (3) a public disclosure of private facts or (4) publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before the public. Prosser, Law of Torts §117 (4th ed. 1971).” 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 133, 339 N.E.2d 274, 276. A complaint that alleges an intentional giving of unreasonable publicity to private debts without consent of the debtor for the purpose of coercing payment states a cause of action. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 154 (1970); Midwest Glass Company. Applying those statements to the facts alleged here, a cause of action is stated in Counts II and III. It is alleged that on at least seven different occasions, plaintiffs agent made loud and threatening telephone calls to the defendant at her home and on at least ten occasions made like telephone calls to her place of employment despite the defendant’s pleas to the contrary; calls were made to her parents and sister. These calls were made in the face of an express disclaimer by the defendant that she was in any way liable for the indebtedness. When a debtor establishes a debtor-creditor relationship, there is an implied consent that the creditor may undertake reasonable efforts at collection. The efforts at collection may, however, become so unreasonable or so outrageous as to transcend the implied consent. This statement is illustrated in the note to comment D in section 652B, Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967), as follows: “Thus there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiffs door, or calling him to the telephone on one occasion, or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt. It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of [harassing] plaintiff, which becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.” The majority opinion seems to hold that as a matter of law that there is no such cause of action and sees “no need to create additional remedies.” As a matter of pleading, a cause of action is stated.