Court Opinion

ID: 9692961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:13:55.909301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.373351
License: Public Domain

*472Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Palladino:
I respectfully dissent.
The only issues presented to the court in this case are (1) whether section 307(7) of the Act provides the Board with the discretion to decide not to terminate benefits when it ascertains that a widow is living in a meretricious relationship and, if so, (2) whether the Board abused that discretion. The majority did not reach the second issue because the majority concluded:
We do not believe the legislature intended to give the Board the right to pick and choose which widows or widowers living in meretricious relationships should have their benefits terminated and which should not based on economic and social factors of the Boards own choosing.
Majority op. at 469. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislature did not intend to give the Board the discretion to determine whether benefits to a widow or widower should be terminated when a widow or widower is determined to be living in a meretricious relationship.
Section 307(7) states, in part:
Should any dependent of a deceased employe die or remarry, . . . the right ... to compensation under this section shall cease . . . : Provided, however, that if, upon investigation and hearing, it shall be ascertained that the widow or widower is living with a man or woman, as the case may be, in meretricious relationship and not married, . . . the board may order the termination of compensation payable to such widow or widower. . . . (Emphasis added.)
In Jones Motors v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Moyer), 51 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 210, 414 A.2d 157 (1980), the issue was whether section 307(7) permits a suspension in lieu of termination when a mer*473etricious relationship is ascertained. This court held that the Boards power to terminate did not include the power to suspend. In the instant case, the majority concludes that if the Board does not have the discretion to suspend, “it does not have the discretion to simply not order a termination at all.” Majority op. at 468-69: The majority bases this conclusion on its belief that allowing the Board such discretion would “create arbitrary chaos.” Id. at 4. However, just because the Board might arbitrarily apply its discretion does not justify a determination that the legislature did not give it such discretion.
The legislature used the discretionary “may” in section 307(7) with respect to meretricious relationships. If the legislature had not intended to give the Board discretion to terminate benefits where a meretricious relationship has been ascertained, it would have used the mandatory “shall”, as it did with respect to death and remarriage. The majority opinion concludes that the possible arbitrary application of this discretion justifies interpreting the word “may” as “shall”. This court considered the arbitrariness argument in Nevius v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (I. Reindollar and Sons, Inc.), 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 418, 416 A.2d 1134 (1980), and indicated that arbitrary application would be an abuse of discretion and reviewable by this court.
The opinion which concurs with the majority agrees that permitting the Board discretion in these cases would result in an arbitrary determination of which surviving spouses will benefit. The concurrence opines that such a result is unconstitutional and that to avoid unconstitutionality, the statute must be interpreted as requiring termination of benefits when a meretricious relationship is found. I disagree.
In this case, the Boards exercise of its discretion not to terminate Claimants benefits was based on *474Claimants economic circumstances. Using economic circumstances as a basis upon which to determine whether benefits should be continued or terminated is not an arbitrary exercise of the Boards discretion. For example, the legislature provides in section 307(7) that to receive benefits, a surviving spouse not living with the decedent at the time of death, and not living in a meretricious relationship, must show actual dependence.1 Therefore, the Board was reasonable in using the economic dependency of the surviving spouse as the criterion when the surviving spouse is engaged in a meretricious relationship to decide whether or not to terminate benefits. Because the record contains substantial support for the Boards finding that Claimant was economically dependent on the benefits, I would affirm the Boards decision.
The majority’s argument as to the possible unconstitutionality of this portion of section 307(7), which the concurrence also raises, is premature. Although the majority correctly notes, majority op. at 467-68, n.2, that the constitutionality issue has not been raised by counsel in this case, it nonetheless fails to recognize that it is inappropriate for this court to indicate in what way it would resolve such a constitutional challenge were the issue before us.

 The actual language of section 307(7) states: “No compensation shall be payable under this section to a widow, unless she was living with her deceased husband at the time of his death, or was then actually dependent upon him and receiving from him a substantial portion of her support.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 307(7) uses the terms widow and widower and sets forth different criteria for the receipt of benefits. This court in Oknefski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 450, 439 A.2d 846 (1981), held this difference violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, U.S. Const, amend. XIV and Pa. Const, art. III, §32, and held that the less restrictrive widows standard for eligibility was to be applied to widowers as well as widows.