Court Opinion

ID: 9779311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:46:01.809739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:25.184504
License: Public Domain

TIJERINA, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The controlling question in this ease concerns the sufficiency of the evidence which we will review as unassigned error. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.08 (Vernon 1974), provides in pertinent part, viz:
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and:
(1) The person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman; ...
The indictment, omitting the formal parts, charges as follows:
On or about the 9th day of March A.D. 1982, Johnny Prince, hereinafter called defendant, did then and there intentionally and knowingly attempt to cause the death of Edward Quirk, hereinafter called complainant, by shooting at the said complainant with a gun, an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense of capital murder, having at the time the specific intent to commit the offense of capital murder, and the said complainant was a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and the said defendant knew the complainant was a peace officer.
The court’s charge defined criminal attempt as follows:
A person commits the offense of criminal attempt, if acting with the specific intent to commit some offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation toward the conclusion of such offense that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.
Thus, the State’s burden was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant’s specific intent to commit the offense of attempted capital murder, an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended. See Morrison v. State, 625 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). It has been held that a specific intent to kill is not an essential element of proof of murder and it is sufficient to show only an intent to cause serious bodily injury and that an act was committed amounting to more than mere preparation that could cause death of an individual but failed to do so. Garcia v. State, 541 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the United States Supreme Court pronounced the standard of review on a sufficiency of the evidence question based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore binding on the State, stating:
After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Instead, the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a *188reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis in original.]
443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89.
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the court ruled that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was an essential element of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “... when such a conviction [that was obtained even when no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally stand.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 317-18, 99 S.Ct. at 2788. See also Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
In the instant case we are unable to apply the standard of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution because there is simply no evidence to establish the essential elements of the offense as charged in the indictment and the court’s charge. There is no proof of the following essential elements: (1) that appellant shot at the complainant with a gun; (2) an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense of capital murder; (3) that appellant had the specific intent to commit the offense of capital murder; and (4) that appellant knew or from the position of the struggling parties should have known that the complainant was a police officer. Therefore the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly attempted to cause the death of police officer Edward Quirk. The complainant testified he saw two people struggling on the floor and upon seeing arm movement he dove into a couch in the den. He did not see a gun pointed at him, he was not threatened and he stated he did not know who fired the shots. He could not say who was holding the gun prior to the shots being fired. Detective Ritchey testified he recovered one bullet from the kitchen ceiling and the other bullet from an opposite end of the den room. This testimony is not consistent with the State’s theory that appellant was shooting at the officer. Lastly, appellant and his girlfriend (Beatrice McKinnon) both testified they were struggling for possession of the gun when it accidently discharged. We are not persuaded by the girlfriend’s prior statement wherein she stated that: “... these wounds occurred while she (Beatrice) was trying to grab the gun and keep her boyfriend (appellant) from shooting her or the policeman.” This statement standing alone does not establish the necessary proof that appellant knew he was shooting at a police officer. Therefore, considering the indictment and the court’s charge, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found; proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense of attempted capital murder.
In my view the judgment should be reversed and appellant ordered discharged. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).