Court Opinion

ID: 9905495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:08:30.021592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:41.769898
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39406

TAMMY WILLEY,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FARMERS INSURANCE OF ARIZONA,

      Defendant-Appellee,

and

DONDEE BARRICK and DARIC GARBUTT,

      Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Denise Barela Shepherd, District Court Judge

Houston Ross
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Riley, Shane & Keller, P.A.
Courtenay L. Keller
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

BACA, Judge.

{1}     Plaintiff Tammy Willey appeals six summary judgment orders entered before a
jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant Farmers Insurance of Arizona (Defendant).
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of
Rule 1-056(D)(2), (E) NMRA, failed to set forth specific material facts showing there
were genuine issues that required a trial, and that the district court erred in granting
Defendant’s motions for summary judgment on issues not raised in the pleadings.
Unpersuaded, we affirm the district court.

BACKGROUND

{2}    Because this is a memorandum opinion, we only briefly summarize the historical
facts and procedural history of this case. See State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, ¶ 48,
110 N.M. 218, 794 P.2d 361 (“[M]emorandum opinions are not meant to be cited as
controlling authority because such opinions are written solely for the benefit of the
parties,” and “[s]ince the parties know the details of the case, such an opinion does not
describe at length the context of the issue decided.”). We reserve discussion of specific
facts where necessary to our analysis.

{3}    Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging that Defendant engaged in
statutory and common law bad faith stemming from Defendant’s alleged investigation,
evaluation, and settlement of Plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits (UIM).
Relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff filed four motions for partial summary judgment.
Defendant also filed two motions for partial summary judgment concerning coverage
and recoverability of bad faith damages. All four of Plaintiff’s motions were denied by
the district court, which found genuine issues of material fact existed and summary
judgment could not be entered as a matter of law. Both of Defendant’s motions were
granted by the district court.

{4}     After a five-day jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. The jury
found specifically the following: (1) Defendant did not fail to act reasonably under the
circumstances to conduct a timely and fair investigation and evaluation of Plaintiff’s UIM
claim; (2) Defendant did not refuse to pay Plaintiff’s UIM claim for reasons that were
frivolous or unfounded; (3) Defendant did not fail to attempt in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of Plaintiff’s UIM claim when liability had become
reasonably clear; (4) Defendant did not compel Plaintiff to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under the policies by offering substantially less than the amounts
ultimately recovered in the litigation when Plaintiff made a claim for amounts reasonably
similar to the amount ultimately recovered; and (5) Defendant did not fail to promptly
provide Plaintiff a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in the policy in relation
to the facts or law for the offer of a compromise settlement.

{5}     On appeal, Plaintiff asks us to revisit the district court’s rulings on her summary
judgment motions as well as the district court’s rulings on two of Defendant’s motions
for summary judgment after there has been a jury verdict. Each of Plaintiff’s motions
concerns various aspects of Defendant’s claims handling. To illustrate, Plaintiff’s first
motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that coverage was never “fairly debatable”
and that the three-month delay in identifying coverage was caused by Defendant’s bad
faith failure to conduct a timely, reasonable and fair investigation of coverage. Plaintiff’s
second motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that Defendant’s claims adjuster did
not conduct a reasonable, fair, and timely evaluation of punitive damages when she
made a “math error” and that the adjuster failed to follow Defendant’s policies in
evaluating damages and that said violations were the sole cause of delay in evaluation.
Plaintiff’s third motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that Defendant’s conduct was
frivolous and unfounded and violated the unfair claims practices act. Plaintiff’s fourth
motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that Defendant never demanded statements
under oath and that in leveraging the resolution of the Sanchez policy to give
statements under oath in the Simmons policy Defendant committed bad faith. Plaintiff
argues that all four of her motions for partial summary judgment are reviewable
according to Gallegos v. State Board of Education, 1997-NMCA-040, 123 N.M. 362, 940
P.2d 468. Plaintiff is also seeking de novo review of both of Defendant’s motions for
partial summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A.     Plaintiff’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

{6}       As a general rule, the “denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable
after final judgment on the merits. If a summary judgment motion is improperly denied,
the error is not reversible for the result becomes merged in the subsequent trial.” Green
v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 1987-NMSC-111, ¶ 19, 106 N.M. 523, 746 P.2d 152.
“Whether this proposition is labeled ‘merger,’ or is simply accepted as a common sense
recognition that decisions made after full airing of the evidence should not be disturbed,
is of little analytic consequence.” Gallegos, 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 8. “It would be unfair to
review a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the factual presentation
made to the trial court at the time of the motion, when all the facts have subsequently
come forward at trial.” Id. However, where a motion for summary judgment is based
solely on a purely legal issue, the policy rationale and rule articulated in Green are
inapplicable and the issue is reviewable on appeal provided “(1) the facts are not in
dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a matter of law which does not depend to any
degree on facts to be addressed at trial, (3) there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there
is an entry of a final judgment with an appeal therefrom.” Gallegos, 1997-NMCA-040, ¶¶
10-12. “[A]ll doubts about whether a motion was dependent on or affected by facts
addressed at trial would be resolved against the appealing party.” Id. ¶ 12.

{7}   Plaintiff appears to argue that her four motions for partial summary judgment are
reviewable under the Gallegos exception. We observe that although Plaintiff’s briefing
recognized that she must satisfy the Gallegos test as a threshold matter, it did so in a
cursory and conclusory manner consisting of only two paragraphs.

{8}    While the third and fourth prongs are presumably not at issue, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the first and second prongs are satisfied. Regarding the first prong of
the Gallegos test, Plaintiff acknowledges that the district court concluded that disputed
issues of material fact exist that precluded summary judgment on each of her four
motions. On appeal, she attempts to counter that conclusion by framing her dispute as a
procedural challenge to whether Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts complied
with Rule 1-056. Apart from this conclusory assertion, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the facts surrounding her motions are not in dispute, and she does not point us to
any part of the record which supports this statement.

{9}    Regarding the second prong of the Gallegos test, Plaintiff again frames the
matter as a procedural issue, stating that “whether the two pleadings comply with Rule
1-056 is a matter of law which is not depend[ent] on the facts to be addressed at trial.”
Here, too, Plaintiff does not explain how the basis of Plaintiff’s four motions are purely
matters of law that do not depend on the facts to be addressed at trial, particularly given
the specific findings of the jury, which directly relate to the contentions within the
motions for partial summary judgment.

{10} Apart from these conclusory statements that the Gallegos test has been met, we
are left to guess as to what Plaintiff’s arguments in support of these statements would
be. Because Plaintiff fails to develop her arguments as to how the first and second
prongs of the Gallegos test are met we will not consider them further. See Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (“We will not review
unclear arguments, or guess at what a party’s arguments might be.” (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071,
¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not
adequately developed.”). We affirm the district court’s orders as to Plaintiff’s first,
second, third, and fourth motions for partial summary judgment.

B.     Defendant’s Motions Concerning Coverage Under the Simmons Policy and
       Recoverable ‘Bad Faith Damages’ Stemming From the 2012 Collision

{11} We now turn to Defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment. “Summary
judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo.” Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Tapia, 2023-NMCA-
051, ¶ 7, 534 P.3d 264 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In New Mexico, summary judgment may
be proper when the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case for summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Once
this prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to
demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the
merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[O]ur review of the
application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo.” Elite Well Serv., LLC v. N.M.
Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2023-NMCA-041, ¶ 6, 531 P.3d 635 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

{12} We first address Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment concerning
coverage under the Simmons Policy. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court
should not have considered, much less granted, Defendant’s motion because the
coverage issue was a matter that was outside of the pleadings. Plaintiff asserts that she
brought no cause of action relating to coverage under the Simmons policy, and
Defendant raised no affirmative defenses related to this policy. Plaintiff further argues
for the first time in her reply brief that the motion was wrongly decided. Defendant
contends, on appeal, that it was not barred from seeking summary judgment, even
though it did not raise an affirmative defense, because Plaintiff put the coverage at
issue by alleging the availability of coverage in her bad faith complaint. We agree with
Defendant. Plaintiff’s bad faith claims include the time period when her claim was
adjusted by Dondee Barrick under the Simmons policy and the complaint alleges
violations of NMSA 1978, Section 59A-16-20 (1997), relating to Defendant’s evaluations
and investigation of the claims under the Simmons policy. We conclude that the district
court did not err in considering the motion and we now look to its merits.

{13} The district court granted Defendant’s motion, concluding that at all relevant
times there was no UIM coverage under the Simmons policy. Defendant argued in its
motion that there was no UIM coverage available to Plaintiff under the Simmons policy
and that Plaintiff never had a reasonable expectation of coverage. Defendant presented
evidence that Plaintiff was not residing in the Simmons’ household, was not a named
insured, and was not driving a vehicle listed on the Simmons policy at the time of the
accident. Plaintiff was previously a rated driver of the Ford Escape that was listed on the
Simmons policy but that vehicle was removed from the policy and traded-in prior to the
collision, and neither Plaintiff nor Mr. Simmons had an expectation that Plaintiff was
covered under the Simmons policy for the collision. In response to Defendant’s motion,
Plaintiff did not dispute the evidence; rather, Plaintiff moved to strike the motion, making
the same argument that she now makes on appeal. A hearing was held whereby
Plaintiff conceded that there is no coverage under the Simmons policy. Accordingly,
because there is no dispute that Plaintiff is not entitled to UIM benefits under the
Simmons policy for the collision and Plaintiff did not demonstrate a dispute of material
fact, the district court order granting Defendant’s motion is affirmed.

{14} We turn next to Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment that damages
caused by the 2012 auto accident are not recoverable “bad faith damages.” On appeal,
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that Plaintiff could not recover
the excess $50,000 arbitration award. Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to recover
these damages under NMSA 1978, Section 59A-16-30 (1990) and in accordance with
Dydek v. Dydek, 2012-NMCA-088, 288 P.3d 872. Defendant argued in its motion for
partial summary judgment that the damages caused by the 2012 auto collision are not
recoverable as bad faith damages because, as a matter of law, those damages were
not “proximately caused by” the allegedly wrongful conduct of the insurance company.
The district court granted Defendant’s motion, concluding that (1) Defendant is not
contractually obligated to pay Plaintiff any further damages caused by the auto accident
and (2) the unpaid portion of the award is not recoverable as bad faith damages as
those damages were not “proximately caused by” Defendant’s allegedly wrongful
conduct. The court further concluded that Plaintiff’s reliance on Dydek was misplaced
because Dydek is a “failure to settle” case that involved the recovery of an excess
judgment entered in favor of a third party against the insured, whereas Plaintiff’s case is
a “failure to pay” case involving a first party claim by a Class II insured for UIM benefits
and the arbitration award awarded bodily injury damages in excess of the available UIM
benefits.

{15} The evidence presented by Defendant indicates that Plaintiff received a total of
$100,000 in compensation for bodily injury damages arising from the 2012 auto
collision. On February 11, 2014, an arbitration panel awarded Plaintiff a sum of
$150,000 in compensatory and punitive damages arising from the underlying auto
collision and no determination was made as to bad faith damages or policy limits. On
March 6, 2014, Defendant issued a check to Plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, which
was the remaining UIM policy limits after the offset by the tortfeasor’s policy limits
tender of $50,000. In her response to Defendant’ motion, Plaintiff does not challenge
Defendant’s material facts, rather Plaintiff asserts that, as a matter of law, the unpaid
$50,000 is akin to indemnification damages codified in UJI 13-1715 NMRA and are the
same type of damages the Dydek Court ruled were actual damages under Section 59A-
16-30 for violations of Section 59A-16-20.

{16} We agree with the district court’s assessment that Dydek is both factually
distinguishable and inapplicable to the present case. We do not read Dydek to hold,
much less suggest, that a damages determination in excess of UIM coverage limits is
equivalent to an excess judgment rendered against the insured. Plaintiff, for her part,
has not offered any analysis of the matter and makes only a conclusory statement that
she was seeking to recover her actual damages in excess of her policy limits as part of
her statutory claim under Section 59A-16-20. We conclude that Plaintiff failed to carry
her burden to demonstrate that the district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. See Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 26 (“The appellate court
presumes that the district court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly
demonstrate that the district court erred.”).

CONCLUSION

{17} For these reasons, the district court’s orders as to all six motions for partial
summary judgment are affirmed.

{18}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

GERALD E. BACA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge