Court Opinion

ID: 9881721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 18:00:42.282129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.780945
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30120        Document: 00516917400             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/03/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                 October 3, 2023
                                       No. 23-30120                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Raymond S. Harvey,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Preload, L.L.C.,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CV-401
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Raymond S. Harvey, a former employee of Preload, L.L.C., was
   injured when the multi-level rolling scaffold upon which he was working
   toppled. He sued Preload, alleging that its intentional misconduct satisfied
   Louisiana’s Workers’ Compensation Law’s explicit carve-out for
   “intentional acts.” The district court disagreed. After denying Mr. Harvey’s

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30120      Document: 00516917400          Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/03/2023

                                    No. 23-30120

   motion for leave to file a sur-reply, it granted Preload’s motion for summary
   judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
                                     I.   Background
             A. Facts
          Preload, a business that constructs concrete water storage tanks,
   contracted with City of Lake Charles to construct a water tank at one of the
   City’s water treatment facilities. Raymond Harvey worked as a laborer for
   Preload and was assigned to the Lake Charles water tank project.
          To complete the job, Preload leased the parts for a rolling scaffold,
   which it then erected inside the water tank. The scaffold itself was five
   sections high and one section wide, topping out at roughly thirty-four feet. It
   was not affixed with a backup base, which adds stability and prevents
   collapse, and the wheels had no locking mechanism.             The tank was
   constructed with a ten-inch ledge along the outer wall, with the floor sloping
   down twelve degrees from this ledge to the center floor, which was level. The
   scaffold’s outer wheels were situated atop the tank’s ten-inch ledge while the
   inner wheels sat on the center of the floor. This resulted in a predetermined
   and fixed path for the scaffold to move around the tank, leaving it with
   roughly six inches to maneuver inward or outward to avoid hazards. Near
   the inner wheels of the scaffold was a twenty-four-inch hole in the tank floor,
   which Preload partially covered with a loose piece of ¾ inch plywood.
          On October 5, 2020, David Jeter—the project manager for the Lake
   Charles project—instructed a crew to waterproof wall panel seams inside the
   tank. Mr. Harvey and other members of the crew mounted the rolling
   scaffold, which had been “red-tagged” as unfit for use, and began painting
   the seams. Once they finished painting the first section, a crew member
   called down for the other workers to roll the scaffold to the next seam. As
   the scaffold was being moved, one of the wheels on its base fell into the

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                                    No. 23-30120

   prefabricated, twenty-four-inch hole in the floor. Subsequently, the scaffold
   toppled backward to the floor. As a result, Mr. Harvey was injured.
             B. Procedural History
          Mr. Harvey filed a petition for damages in Louisiana state court, and
   Preload subsequently removed the case to the district court based on
   diversity jurisdiction. Preload moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district court denied. It reasoned that Mr.
   Harvey had sufficiently alleged conditions and violations of safety standards
   concerning the subject scaffold, in addition to Preload’s motivation for
   completing the job, to support its claim that there was a virtual certainty the
   accident would occur. Preload then moved for summary judgment on the
   same ground—there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Preload did
   not commit an “intentional act” within the meaning of Louisiana Revised
   Statutes § 23:1032(B). After denying Mr. Harvey’s motion for leave to file a
   sur-reply, the district court granted Preload’s motion for summary judgment.
   Mr. Harvey timely appealed.
                        II.   Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
   appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
          We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de
   novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Brand Servs., L.L.C.
   v. Irex Corp., 909 F.3d 151, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is
   proper only when it appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
   that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 156
   (quotation omitted). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
   movant and draw all inferences in his favor. Id.

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          Further, we review a district court’s decision denying a motion for
   leave to file a sur-reply for abuse of discretion. Butler v. Porter, 999 F.3d 287,
   292 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 766 (2022).
                                     III.       Discussion
          Of course, on the substantive question in this case, we are required to
   apply Louisiana law. Graper v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 756 F.3d 388, 391 (5th
   Cir. 2014). Additionally, we are bound by the Louisiana Supreme Court and
   consider decisions by the courts of appeals. Temple v. McCall, 720 F.3d 301,
   307 (5th Cir. 2013). It is important to keep in mind what we are not
   considering: whether Mr. Harvey should receive workers’ compensation.
   Rather, we are considering a statute that allows recovery beyond workers’
   compensation which is very rarely applied and only to intentional situations.
   The whole purpose of workers’ compensation is to eliminate the need for
   litigation related to workplace accidents. Thus, the statute in question
   allowing recovery beyond workers’ compensation is very rarely applied and
   only to intentional situations. Nonetheless, Mr. Harvey contends the district
   court erred in granting summary judgment to Preload and denying his motion
   for leave to file a sur-reply. Each issue is addressed below, but neither
   warrants reversal.
              A. Louisiana’s Intentional Acts Exception
          Mr. Harvey argues that he presented evidence sufficient to create a
   genuine dispute of material fact whether Preload committed an intentional
   act within the meaning of § 23:1032(B) that caused his injuries. More
   precisely, he contends that Preload’s multiple instances of negligence or
   recklessness add up to a showing that Preload knew Mr. Harvey’s injuries
   were substantially certain to follow. We disagree.
          To recover in tort against Preload in light of § 23:1032(B), Mr. Harvey
   must prove that Preload “knew that the result is substantially certain to

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   follow from its conduct, whatever its desire may be as to that result.” Danos
   v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 132 So. 3d 958, 959 (La. 2014) (per curiam). To show
   “substantial certainty,” it is not enough that an employer has “knowledge
   that a machine is dangerous and that its use creates a high probability that
   someone will eventually be injured.” Stanley v. Airgas-Sw., Inc., 171 So. 3d
   915, 916–17 (La. 2015) (quotation omitted). Likewise, “mere knowledge and
   appreciation of a risk” is not sufficient to constitute intent. Id. at 917
   (quotation omitted). “[R]eckless or wanton conduct by an employer” also
   does not “constitute intentional wrongdoing.” Id. (quotation omitted).
   Instead, “substantial certainty” requires something “more than a reasonable
   probability that an injury will occur”; it is something closer to “inevitable”
   or “incapable of failing.” See Batiste v. Bayou Steel Corp., 45 So. 3d 167, 168
   (La. 2010); see also Rolls ex rel. A. R. v. Packaging Corp. of Am. Inc., 34 F.4th
   431, 441 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting “[e]ven knowledge of a high degree of
   probability that injury will occur is insufficient to establish that the employer
   was substantially certain that injury would occur” (quotation omitted)).
           Mr. Harvey has failed to meet his burden to raise a material fact issue
   on the relevant point. He points to a myriad of evidence that he contends, in
   the aggregate, adds up to an intentional act. 1 For instance, he relies on the
   rolling scaffold’s lack of a locking mechanism on its wheels, its improper
   height-to-width ratio, the fact that it had no backup base affixed, and that it

           _____________________
           1
             Mr. Harvey mainly relies on Robinson v. N. Am. Salt Co., 865 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct.
   App. 2003) to support his contention that multiple instances of fault satisfy the substantial
   certainty requirement. We find this case unpersuasive for two reasons. First, when
   evaluating issues of state law, we “look to the final decisions of that state’s highest court,”
   which Robinson is not. Temple, 720 F.3d at 307 (quotation omitted). Second, the majority
   in Robinson relied, in part, on an expert’s after-the-fact analysis to conclude the substantial
   certainty requirement was met even though there was no evidence that the relevant
   individual had knowledge or a belief that an accident was substantially certain to occur.
   Robinson, 865 So.2d at 112 (McDonald, J., dissenting).

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   was red-tagged as unfit for use. All of this evidence certainly increases the
   likelihood that the rolling scaffold might topple, especially considering that it
   was situated on a twelve-degree slanted floor and within its fixed path was a
   two-foot hole partially covered by plywood that no one disputes could not
   support the weight of the scaffold. But, importantly, Preload was not aware
   of several of these facts prior to the accident.
           For instance, while Mr. Jeter knew the floor was sloped, he did not
   recall measuring it to determine the degree of the slope. He also believed that
   the two-foot hole was covered by a piece of plywood that was fastened into
   the concrete with nails, and did not notice a different, loose piece of plywood
   was partially covering the hole prior to the accident. 2 Moreover, neither Mr.
   Jeter nor Mr. Alvarez—the lead man for the Lake Charles project—believed
   the collapse of the rolling scaffold was a virtual certainty. 3 Nor had they ever
   seen a rolling scaffold fall. In fact, just two days before the accident, the
   rolling scaffold had been used without incident—albeit without employees
           _____________________
           2
             For purposes of this decision, we accept Mr. Harvey’s argument that we should
   not rely on Mr. Jeter’s assertion that he simply forgot about the rolling scaffold being red-
   tagged and lacking a backup base. See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (per curiam) (“[W]hen the circumstances are conducive to lying, well-supported suspicion
   of mendacity may serve as a legitimate basis for the factfinder’s reasonable inferences
   concerning the ultimate facts at issue.”). Nonetheless, even if Mr. Jeter remembered the
   rolling scaffold was red-tagged and lacked a backup base, this still would not be enough to
   satisfy the substantial certainty requirement. Stanley, 171 So. 3d at 916 (“[A]n employer’s
   mere knowledge that a machine is dangerous and that its use creates a high probability that
   someone will eventually be injured is not sufficient to meet the ‘substantial certainty’
   requirement.” (quotation omitted)).
           3
              Our conclusion that Mr. Harvey has failed to create a genuine dispute of material
   fact as to whether Preload knew to a virtual certainty that he would be injured also disposes
   of his argument that because the district court denied Preload’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
   dismiss, it also had to deny Preload’s motion for summary judgment. That is simply not
   the law—the two rules are different; one involves pleading and the other involves evidence.
   Put another way, Mr. Harvey has failed to support all of his allegations with material fact
   issue evidence.

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   atop—even though all of the same hazards were present as the day of the
   collapse. Thus, while Mr. Harvey’s evidence might raise a fact issue on gross
   negligence or even recklessness, we cannot say there is a genuine dispute of
   material fact that Preload knew to a virtual certainty that Mr. Harvey would
   be injured. See Reeves v. Structural Pres. Sys., 731 So. 2d 208, 213 (La. 1999)
   (concluding the evidence was not sufficient to satisfy the “substantial
   certainty” standard because the pot had been previously moved without
   anyone being injured, the supervisor believed the employees could move the
   pot without incident, and the plaintiff had already moved the pot halfway by
   himself with no trouble).
             B. Denial of Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply
          Mr. Harvey further contends the district court abused its discretion in
   denying his motion for leave to file a sur-reply because by denying the motion,
   it failed to consider the attached supplemental expert affidavit, which would
   have created a genuine dispute of material fact.          We disagree for the
   straightforward reason that Preload’s reply did not raise any new arguments
   warranting a sur-reply. Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th
   Cir. 2017) (concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply because the
   defendant “did not raise any new arguments in its reply brief”); see also
   Jefferson v. Christus St. Joseph Hosp., 374 F. App’x 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (concluding district court’s decision to disregard appellant’s sur-reply and
   attached exhibits in the context of a motion for summary judgment was not
   an abuse of discretion). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in denying Mr. Harvey’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply.
                                    IV.       Conclusion
          For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   order granting summary judgment in favor of Preload.

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