Court Opinion

ID: 9688405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:45:48.153461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:38.256518
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The stipulated facts reveal that plaintiff had obtained a no-fault automobile policy on a motor vehicle. Admittedly, that no-fault policy did not cover the van in this *325accident.1 Nonetheless, plaintiff had personal injury protection (pip) coverage at the time this accident occurred. I do not believe that the Legislature intended to exclude persons in this situation from receiving pip benefits. Such a result is inconsistent with the overall purpose of the no-fault act. Indeed, our Supreme Court has stated that one purpose of the no-fault act is to provide a contractual right of action against one’s insurer for medical expenses arising from a motor vehicle accident.2
In this case, defendant had to establish facts justifying the denial of pip benefits to plaintiff. At the time the accident occurred, MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113 provided in pertinent part:
A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.
It was stipulated that plaintiff was not the regis*326trant of the van involved in the accident; therefore, defendant had to establish that plaintiff was the owner of the van in order to deny her benefits. Since the no-fault act does not define "owner,” the majority relies on the broad definition provided by the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.37; MSA 9.1837. I do not agree with this approach because employing that definition can defeat the legislative purpose of providing pip benefits when an insured is injured as a result of the ownership, operation or maintenance of a motor vehicle.
I believe this case is controlled by this Court’s opinion in Michigan Mutual Ins Co v Reddig, 129 Mich App 631; 341 NW2d 847 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 877 (1984). In Reddig the seller of a motor vehicle had not transferred the certificate of title to the installment buyer and the seller had not registered the sale with the Secretary of State. This Court held that the sale was void and the buyer was not an owner of the uninsured vehicle. The same result should apply to this case. The sellers, the Prongs, failed to transfer any form of title to plaintiff.3 Moreover, the sellers apparently failed to notify the Secretary of State of the transfer. Employing the reasoning of Reddig, supra, plaintiff in this case was not the owner of the van at the time of the accident. The stipulated facts established that "the certificate of title to the 1982 gmc van was in the name and in the possession of and registered to a third party, Mark R. Prong.”4 Therefore, I believe defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing facts which justify its denial of pip benefits to plaintiff. See also Endres v Mara-*327Rickenbacker Co, 243 Mich 5; 219 NW 719 (1928); Basgall v Kovach, 156 Mich App 323; 401 NW2d 638 (1986); Karibian v Paletta, 122 Mich App 353, 357; 332 NW2d 484 (1983); MCL 257.233(4); MSA 9.1933(4).
Efforts to use provisions in the no-fault act or no-fault insurance policies to deny pip benefits to an injured person who has obtained and paid for a no-fault policy should be met with resistance. Under the no-fault act persons, not motor vehicles, are insured against loss under pip coverage. Our Supreme Court in Lee v DAIIE, 412 Mich 505, 515; 315 NW2d 413 (1981), stated:
Reference to other provisions of the no-fault act not directly implicated in the issue before us, particularly §§ 3114 and 3115, suggests strongly that the Legislature, in its broader purpose, intended to provide benefits whenever, as a general proposition, an insured is injured in a motor vehicle accident, whether or not a registered or covered motor vehicle is involved; and in its narrower purpose intended that an injured person’s personal insurer stand primarily liable for such benefits whether or not its policy covers the motor vehicle involved and even if the involved vehicle is covered by a policy issued by another no-fault insurer. [Emphasis added.]
I would reverse the trial court’s decision granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and would enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and remand for a hearing on the issue of damages.

 It is altogether plausible that plaintiff assumed that the seller and title holder to the 1982 van would have maintained a no-fault insurance policy on the van during the time she was making the installment payments on the catering business equipment. The stipulated facts do not address the matter of who obtained the license plates for the van during the two years plaintiff had possession of the van. However, since the Michigan Vehicle Code requires a purchaser or transferee of any interest in a motor vehicle to present the title and registration to obtain license plates (see MCL 257.233 and 257.234; MSA 9.1933 and 9.1934), it appears unlikely plaintiff would have been able to secure the license plates. Such a scenerio bolsters the theory that plaintiff would have assumed that insurance on the van was being provided by the sellers.

 Bradley v Mid-Century Ins Co, 409 Mich 1, 62; 294 NW2d 141 (1980).

 The Prongs could have very easily transferred title to plaintiff and retained a lien on the van which would have been noted on the title.

 Under the stipulated facts, I am not persuaded that plaintiff, lacking title, registration or even a lease, could have obtained insurance or license plates on the 1982 gmc van.