Court Opinion

ID: 9785266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:13:13.357395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:13.998599
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
To the extent that the majority reaches the truly unremarkable conclusion that, save for very limited circumstances not relevant here, a lawyer cannot ethically sue a current client, I concur. However, to the extent, in imposing discipline, the majority gives far too little weight to the insoluble quandary in which lawyers find themselves when, already in a financial hole, they are forced to hopelessly continue to dig themselves into a yet deeper and potentially bottomless financial abyss, I must dissent. In my view, the proper resolution of this matter is to adjudge respondent liable for an infraction of the Rules of Profession Conduct, but impose no discipline.
*322Through no fault of his own, respondent Richard J. Simon found himself in precisely that quandary: he already was owed tens of thousands of dollars in fees, with no reasonable prospect of payment; he was facing the likelihood of defending an all-consuming and lengthy murder trial also without hope of payment of his fees; and his entirely proper application to withdraw as counsel had been denied, seemingly without full and complete consideration of those very real and grave concerns. That combination of events was deadly and guaranteed that respondent’s financial position would only deteriorate further. For a lawyer in a large firm, those concurrent events would be onerous but perhaps ultimately bearable; for a sole practitioner like respondent—who must bear that burden alone—that combination is likely ruinous.
In those circumstances, respondent’s resort to what was no more than commonplace legal process to stem that economic hemorrhage—while at the same time taking steps to insure that his actions did not in fact adversely affect his client1—is more fairly gauged as striking a thoughtful and measured balance of what admittedly are difficult and conflicting interests. Although, as a straightforward matter of professional ethics, a lawyer suing a current client cannot be condoned in its entirety, the dire circumstances presented here are fundamentally different from the run-of-the-mill facts our ethical strictures are designed to address and, in the end, are poignantly compelling.
*323No doubt, by suing a client he simultaneously was actively representing, respondent ran afoul of RPC 1.7(a)’s clear proscription concerning concurrent conflicts of interest. That said, the difficult Hobson’s choice with which respondent was confronted deserves a greater and deeper understanding than what it has been given and, more to the point, demands that this Court temper its judgment. For those compelling reasons, respondent’s actions in the aggregate, although ethically culpable, do not warrant the imposition of discipline. Therefore, to the extent that, in the circumstances presented in this case, the majority does impose discipline and reprimands respondent, I must respectfully dissent.
For Reprimand—Chief Justice RABNER, and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, HOENS, and Judge STERN (temporarily assigned)—5.
For concurrence in part; dissent in part—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.
Not Participating—-Justice ALBIN.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that RICHARD J. SIMON of NEW BRUNSWICK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1979, be reprimanded; and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in Rule 1:20-17.

 It is uncontested that, although he named his client as a party defendant in the law suit seeking payment of his fees, respondent did so for a compelling reason: defendant clearly was an indispensable party to that contract action and the failure to name defendant as a party would have rendered respondent’s lawsuit subject to dismissal. See R. 4:28-1(a) and (b). It is also uncontested that respondent viewed the joinder of defendant as a party to the collection lawsuit as nothing more than the naming of a nominal defendant, as respondent in fact took no action, and asserted without contradiction that he intended to take no action, against defendant. Finally, the record proves beyond any doubt that, even after respondent had filed his collection action naming defendant as a party, respondent continued unabated his representation of defendant in the murder case with the same high level of skill, dedication and zealousness that had characterized the representation before the collection suit was filed.