Court Opinion

ID: 9616561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:47:42.046696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.836577
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I am at a loss to appreciate the import of Justice Tuckett’s opinion which appears to reject the ordinance because it does not provide “standards or guidelines” as to what is a public nuisance. Ordinance No. 120 authorizes the Board to determine whether any building is “a menace to public health or public safety”; and No. 123 states that any building constituting “a menace to public health or public safety” is a public nuisance. The test to be applied is whether the language is sufficiently clear and understandable that persons of ordinary intelligence and experience could understand it. See State v. Geurts, 11 Utah2d 345, 359 P.2d 12. It is basic that legislation should be presumed valid and constitutional; and that the courts should interfere with the *173legislative prerogative only with reluctance. See statements as to presumption of constitutionality in Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School, etc., 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941; Donahue v. Warner Brothers Pictures, etc., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177; Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870. An enactment should not be declared void for vagueness unless it is so deficient that it is susceptible of no reasonable construction and application which would make it operable. See State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561.
Legislation is always necessarily in somewhat general terms. It is obviously impossible to describe in detail every act and circumstance a statute or ordinance is intended to deal with. It is my opinion that the proscription of a building constituting “a menace to public health or public safety” has a sufficiently definite meaning in common usage that persons of ordinary intelligence and experience can understand what is meant. Insofar as I can see, further definition of terms of such ordinary meaning would be but a proliferation of language in synonyms or similar phrases which would in turn probably be no clearer than those already used.
There are certainly many types of noxious or hazardous situations which all reasonable people would agree would constitute “a menace to public health or public safety” and thus within the interdiction of the ordinance. The fact that there are other situations where it would be doubtful as to whether within its meaning, should not destroy it entirely. If such precision of language were required, a large amount of legislation would be nullified. A discriminating focus as to the meaning of the language in statutes or ordinances is necessary practically everywhere in administering and applying the law. Many instances could be cited, but in the interest of brevity two or three should suffice: see Sec. 47-1-1 to 47-1-8, U.C.A.1953, Nuisances; Sec. 76-11-3 Smoking in inclosed public place; Sec. 76-39-1 et seq. Lewdness; and under Sec. 76-7-9 what is taking “indecent liberties” with a child under fourteen.
Whether any given situation comes clearly within the meaning of the ordinance is subject to determination in a proper way and by proper authority; and is of course, subject to judicial review. But this is procedural and does not make the ordinance invalid for vagueness of its wording.
For the foregoing reasons I decline to join in the opinion striking down the ordinance as vague.