Court Opinion

ID: 9857058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:13:27.196449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:56.608343
License: Public Domain

MacDonald, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority opinion which, in effect, approves the imposition of penalties and interest totaling $344,328.56 upon the plaintiffs because of two unfortunate mistakes which resulted in the failure of an envelope containing a very substantial tax payment to bear a postmark showing that it was, as was undisputedly the fact, mailed on the date the tax was due.
The plaintiffs, in their complaint, sought, inter alia, “[sjuch other relief as to equity may appertain,” and the trial court obviously failed even to consider this ground. This is apparent from a reading of the court’s memorandum of decision which mentions, in passing, that the plaintiffs ask equitable relief, that the defendant’s position is that they are not entitled to equity and that the plaintiffs are presenting two arguments: “[NJamely, that the statute itself is unconstitutional on its face, and alternatively, if the statute is held to be constitutional, that the court in its equitable powers should grant relief under the particular circumstances of this case.” Without any discussion or apparent *509consideration of the equities involved, the court proceeded to render its decision on the constitutional ground urged. For this reason, I believe that the case at least should be remanded to the trial court for consideration and decision on the equitable issue raised.
Further assuming, arguendo, that the court’s passing mention of the fact that equitable relief was sought can be tortured into a conclusion that it actually was given consideration, I feel that any conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable relief under the circumstances of this case would be so unreasonable, unwarranted and unjust as to require reversal. “It is not equitable that the . . . [defendant] should be allowed to take advantage of this situation. ‘The rule is well settled that if a person to whom money is due, either by express assent or direction, or a course of dealing from which such assent may be inferred, authorizes the transmission by mail, the person from whom it was due is absolved by evidence that it was duly deposited with a proper direction in the post-office.’ ... ‘A court of equity may relieve against the effect of such provision . . . [for penalties for late payment of taxes] where the default of the debtor is the result of accident or mistake.’ ” Console v. Torchinsky, 97 Conn. 353, 356-57, 116 A. 613. This language was quoted with approval in Mackey v. Dobrucki, 116 Conn. 666, 671, 166 A. 393. Although the cases cited are distinguishable on their facts, the language quoted is applicable here, for whether the inclusion of the tax payment in the wrong envelope is viewed as an accident or a mistake on the part of an employee of the plaintiffs, it was not occasioned by “wilful neglect,” as in Mackey v. Dobrucki, supra, or by “voluntary, inexcusable and *510gross negligence,” as in Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 296, 268 A.2d 645. Here, despite tibe postmark affixed one day late because of an error beyond the control of the plaintiffs, there was uneontradicted evidence that the tax payment had been mailed, properly addressed, to the tax commissioner, on the date the tax was due.
In my opinion, the case should be remanded with direction to render judgment for the plaintiffs.