Court Opinion

ID: 9964219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 14:08:49.619429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.234384
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13258

               IN THE MATTER OF KEVIN P. CORRELL.

                         April 29, 2024.

Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension.
     Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press, Freedom of
     association.

     On February 4, 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) suspended Kevin P. Correll from practice before
the USPTO in patent, trademark, and other nonpatent matters for
sixty months (five years) on the basis that Correll violated
several of the USPTO's disciplinary rules. The matter
subsequently came before a single justice of this court on bar
counsel's petition for reciprocal discipline. The single
justice suspended Correll from the practice of law in the
Commonwealth for a period of three years, and Correll appeals.
We affirm.1,2

     1. Background. In 2019, an administrative law judge
determined that Correll had violated several sections of the

     1 We have reviewed the respondent's preliminary memorandum
and appendix, as well as the record that was before the single
justice. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015),
we dispense with further briefing and oral argument.

     2 After the respondent's appeal was filed in this court, we
remanded the matter to the single justice for an explanation of
his decision to impose a three-year suspension. The single
justice subsequently issued a detailed memorandum setting forth
the bases for his decision.
                                                                   2

USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility -- 37 C.F.R.
§§ 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(4), 10.23(b)(5), 10.23(c)(20),
and 10.40(b)(2) -- and the USPTO Rules of Professional
Responsibility -- 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.111, 11.116(a)(1), 11.505, and
11.804(d) -- by representing private parties before the USPTO
while he was employed by the Federal government (as an
electronics engineer for the United States Department of the
Navy).3 The director of the USPTO subsequently affirmed the
administrative law judge's decision in a final order issued in
February 2021.4 Among other things, Correll, while a Federal
government employee, "engage[d] . . . in conduct which is
contrary to applicable Federal ethics law, including conflict of
interest statutes and regulations of the department . . .
currently employing said practitioner," in violation of 37
C.F.R. § 11.111; engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
practicing law "in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction," in violation of
37 C.F.R. § 11.505; and engaged in "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice," in violation of 37 C.F.R.
§ 11.804(d). The detailed facts of Correll's misconduct -- of
his representation of private parties before the USPTO while he
was a Federal government employee -- are set forth in the final
order from the USPTO, as well as in two Federal court decisions,
see note 4, supra, and need not be reiterated here.

     2. Discussion. Under our bar disciplinary rules, a "final
adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been
guilty of misconduct . . . may be treated as establishing the

     3 Prior to May 3, 2013, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) Code of Professional Responsibility
applied to persons practicing before that office. Effective May
3, 2013, the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct apply to
persons practicing before that office. The respondent engaged
in misconduct that violated both the code and the rules. See
Correll vs. Vidal, U.S. Ct. App., No. 2022-1420, slip op. at 2
(Fed. Cir. July 8, 2022).

     4 Correll also filed, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, two motions in which he
sought a preliminary injunction to postpone his suspension. A
judge in that court issued an order denying the motions, see
Correll vs. Under Secretary of Commerce of Intellectual Prop.,
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 21-898 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022), and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
subsequently affirmed the order, see Correll vs. Vidal, U.S. Ct.
App., No. 2022-1420 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2022).
                                                                  3

misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in the
Commonwealth." S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (5), as appearing in
425 Mass. 1319 (1997). Additionally, a judgment of suspension
in another jurisdiction

     "shall be conclusive evidence of the misconduct unless the
     bar counsel or the respondent lawyer establishes, or the
     court concludes, that the procedure in the other
     jurisdiction did not provide reasonable notice or
     opportunity to be heard or there was significant infirmity
     of proof establishing the misconduct."

S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (3), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1319
(1997). See Matter of Mitrano, 453 Mass. 1026, 1027 (2009), and
cases cited. In considering reciprocal discipline, "[w]e
generally give effect to the disciplinary decisions of another
jurisdiction without undertaking the often difficult and
protracted task of redoing the inquiry which has already been
concluded there." Id., quoting Matter of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753,
755 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1275 (1997). Our inquiry,
therefore, is "generally limited to determining whether the
attorney received a fair hearing at which sufficient evidence
was presented to justify our taking reciprocal disciplinary
action." Matter of Mitrano, supra, quoting Matter of Bailey,
439 Mass. 134, 136 (2003).

     Correll does not specifically argue that he did not receive
a fair hearing or that the evidence was not sufficient to
support the USPTO's decision of a term suspension of his
license. And, in any event, there is no indication in the
record before us that he did not "receive[] a fair hearing at
which sufficient evidence was presented to justify our taking
reciprocal disciplinary action." Matter of Steinberg,
448 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2007), quoting Matter of Bailey,
439 Mass. at 136. Indeed, Correll does not deny that he engaged
in the actions that led to a finding of misconduct. That is, he
does not deny that while he was employed by the Federal
government, he represented private parties before the USPTO.
Instead, he argues, as he did before the USPTO and in the
Federal courts, that the USPTO's suspension of his license
violated his rights to freedom of speech and of association
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
that the Federal conflict of interest statutes do not apply to
his conduct; and that the USPTO violated his due process rights
because it failed "to appreciate the differing statutes of
limitations for trademark and patent matters." Correll vs.
Vidal, U.S. Ct. App., No. 2022-1420, slip op. at 6-10 (Fed. Cir.
                                                                  4

July 8, 2022). Each of these issues was squarely addressed by
the USPTO, and by both the Federal district and circuit courts.

     As to Correll's primary argument, in particular, that his
suspension violates his First Amendment rights to free speech
and association, it is true, as he argues, that he did not
altogether give up his First Amendment rights when he became a
Federal employee. It is equally true, however, that the
government may impose certain regulations on the speech of its
employees without violating the First Amendment. See Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The challenge is
to "arrive at a balance between the interests [of the employee]
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." Id. In
this case, Correll argues that the USPTO, and, in turn, the
Federal courts, erred in engaging in that balancing test. Our
role is, again, not to redo that inquiry, and it suffices to say
that Correll was not disciplined -- his license was not
suspended -- on the basis of the content of his speech, but
rather on the basis that in representing private parties before
the USPTO, he violated certain of the USPTO's disciplinary
rules. Moreover, as the District Court noted, "the only
prohibition on [Correll's] speech was the speech [he] exercised
when representing private clients in front of the USPTO. [He]
was free to speak on patent and trademark matters otherwise."
Correll vs. Under Secretary of Commerce of Intellectual Prop.,
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 21-898 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2022).

     We turn now to the issue of the sanction imposed by the
single justice, and whether the three-year suspension of
Correll's license to practice law in the Commonwealth is
"markedly disparate from that imposed in comparable cases."
Matter of Steinberg, 448 Mass. at 1025, citing Matter of Kersey,
444 Mass. 65, 70 (2005). "In reciprocal discipline cases . . .
our task is not to replicate the sanction imposed in another
jurisdiction but, rather, to mete out the sanction appropriate
in this jurisdiction, 'even if that discipline exceeds, equals,
or falls short of the discipline imposed in another
jurisdiction.'" Matter of Steinberg, supra, quoting Matter of
Watt, 430 Mass. 232, 234 (1999). Indeed, the three-year
suspension imposed by the single justice "falls short" of the
five-year suspension imposed by the USPTO.

     This case presents a fairly unique fact pattern, but we can
look to cases involving the same underlying misconduct -- i.e.,
practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation
                                                                   5

of the legal profession in that jurisdiction -- to assess the
propriety of the three-year suspension.5 That is just what the
single justice did in ordering the three-year suspension. He
"properly considered the facts establishing the respondent's"
actions, see Matter of Steinberg, 448 Mass. at 1025, including
the respondent's disregard for actual and potential conflicts of
interest; his knowing and continuous failure to comply with the
relevant rules; and the duration of his misconduct. The single
justice also properly took bar counsel's recommendation into
consideration -- here, although the USPTO imposed a five-year
suspension, bar counsel recommended only a three-year suspension
–- and noted that a term suspension of five years, in
Massachusetts, is quite rare. Indeed, in matters resulting in
an indefinite suspension, a respondent may seek reinstatement
after five years. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b), as
appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). With all of that in mind,
the single justice reasonably imposed a sanction that was lesser
than that imposed by the originating jurisdiction, here the
USPTO. The three-year suspension is warranted.

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a
memorandum of law.
     Kevin P. Correll, pro se.

     5 We note, in doing so, that Correll does not argue that the
three-year suspension is markedly disparate; rather he continues
to argue that the underlying disciplinary order from the USPTO
was improper and that the petition for reciprocal discipline
should be dismissed.