Court Opinion

ID: 9495178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:56:30.704908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:51.879673
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that summary judgment was properly entered for defendant on the claim for tortious interference with contract, and I therefore join parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.
I also join part VI of the Court’s opinion, having to do with taxation of costs.
As to the claim for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, however, I respectfully dissent. In my view, when this record is considered in the light most favorable to ACT, as it must be on this appeal, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Sylvan’s motivation. Questions of motive are particularly delicate, and summary judgment should be used more sparingly on such questions than on most others. The memorandum prepared by Michelle Ford, which the Court does not hold inadmissible, is sufficient evidence to support ACT’s position at this preliminary stage of the case. Ms. Ford was instructed to prepare a document describing the history of Sylvan’s dealings with NASD. She did what she was told to do. That she was a summer intern, had little knowledge of the business, and had no experience in computer-based testing, ante at 667, are considerations going to the weight of her evidence, not its admissibility. Certainly there is evidence to the contrary, and a jury could have chosen to disregard Ms. Ford’s conclusions. Indeed, one may go so far as to say, if one wishes, that ACT would probably lose this case, were it tried to a jury. But that is not the standard we are to apply at this juncture. I cannot say it would have been irrational, when all of this record, including Ms. Ford’s memorandum, is considered, for a jury to find that Sylvan was predominantly motivated by a desire to injure ACT. Among other things, the deal made with NASD was below Sylvan’s cost, certainly a potent fact. The directed-verdict standard, or, as we have learned to say, the standard on motions for judgment as a matter of law, is the same as the standard to be applied on motions for summary judgment. This case should have gone to trial on the issue of motivation.
For many of the same reasons, I also dissent from the Court’s affirmance of summary judgment for the defendant on the claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Again, Sylvan puts forward plausible business justifications, but there is evidence to the contrary, and a jury could rationally decide in favor of ACT on this issue.