Court Opinion

ID: 9876594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 15:04:24.633128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:27.227657
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                     Opinion filed September 27, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1317
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-20685
                          ________________

                       TBC Florida, LLC, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

              Infinity Biscayne Myrtle Member, LLC,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice
Butchko, Judge.

      Cohen Law, and Danielle Cohen and Keith R. Gaudioso, for
appellants.

     Zarco Einhorn Salkowski, P.A., and Robert F. Salkowski and Seth M.
Shapiro, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
      INTRODUCTION

      In the action below, Infinity Biscayne Myrtle Member, LLC (“Landlord”)

obtained an amended final judgment against TBC Florida, LLC (“Tenant”)

and Brianna Hathaway (“Guarantor”) on Landlord’s complaint for breach of

contract and breach of guaranty.            Tenant and Guarantor appeal that

amended final judgment and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Guarantor originally ran a business called BBF Miami, LLC, which

leased space from Landlord (and from Landlord’s predecessor) under a ten-

year Lease Agreement executed in early 2015 (“Lease Agreement”). Along

with that Lease Agreement, Guarantor executed a Guaranty. In June 2015,

BBF Miami assigned the Lease Agreement to Tenant. When COVID-19

resulted in the closure of gyms and similar establishments (including

Tenant’s business), Tenant stopped paying rent. Landlord declared Tenant

in default and filed suit against Tenant (for breach of contract) and against

Guarantor (for breach of the Guaranty).

      Tenant and Guarantor jointly filed an answer to the complaint,

asserting, inter alia, an affirmative defense of failure to mitigate, but asserted

no affirmative defenses specific to the Guaranty.

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     Landlord later moved for summary judgment on both counts of the

complaint, and once again, Tenant and Guarantor jointly responded, and,

relevant to the breach of guaranty claim, asserted that Guarantor’s

obligations to Landlord were released when BBF Miami assigned the Lease

Agreement to Tenant in June 2015.

     After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the

Landlord, denied Tenant and Guarantor’s motion for rehearing, and entered

final judgment against Tenant and Guarantor. This appeal followed.

     On appeal, Tenant and Guarantor assert: (1) Guarantor was released

from the guaranty as a matter of law when BBF Miami assigned the Lease

Agreement to Tenant; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

whether Landlord conducted a good faith effort to re-let the premises, and

thus the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

     ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

     Judgment on Breach of the Guaranty

     As to the first issue, which we review de novo, see Perez-Gurri Corp.

v. McLeod, 238 So. 3d 347, 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), three documents inform

the question of whether Guarantor Hathaway’s guaranty survived BBF

Miami’s assignment of the lease to TBC Florida: (1) the 2015 Lease

Agreement; (2) the Guaranty; and (3) the Assignment.

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      The Lease Agreement identifies the “Tenant” as BBF Miami,

Hathaway’s company. The Lease Agreement identifies Hathaway as the

“Guarantor.” Paragraph 22 of the Lease Agreement permits the Tenant to

assign the contract with prior written consent from Landlord. Importantly,

while this paragraph provides that, upon assignment “Tenant [BBF Miami]

shall be released from any and all liability or obligation under the Lease,”

there is no mention of the Guarantor (Hathaway) or the Guaranty attached

to the Lease Agreement. In other words, while the terms of the Lease

Agreement expressly provide that BBF Miami’s assignment of the Lease

Agreement results in a release of BBF Miami, there is nothing in the Lease

Agreement providing that BBF Miami’s assignment of the Lease Agreement

results in a release of the Guarantor.

      By contrast, the Guaranty (which is attached as an exhibit to, and

incorporated in, the Lease Agreement) provides that Guarantor guarantees

the obligations of “Tenant” and further “agrees that any modification of the

Lease . . . shall not in any way release guarantor from liability hereunder or

terminate, affect, or diminish the validity of this Guaranty.”

      Finally, the Assignment makes no mention of the Guarantor or the

Guaranty, but it does provide: “Assignee [TBC Florida] expressly assumes

assignor’s [BBF Miami’s] obligations under the lease as assigned by this

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assignment, commencing on the effective date.” The Assignment also

incorporates by reference the original 2015 Lease Agreement.

     Tenant and Guarantor contend that the assignment of the Lease

Agreement from BBF Miami to TBC Florida extinguished Guarantor’s

obligation under the Guaranty. Yet they can point to no provision in the

Lease Agreement, the Guaranty or the Assignment that would support such

a conclusion. While one might properly contend these documents could

have been written with greater clarity, perhaps including in the Assignment

some specific reference to the Guaranty, it is manifestly not the job of the

court to rewrite the agreements between the parties. Indeed, as this court

previously stated in Perez-Gurri, 238 So. 3d at 350:

     “When interpreting a contract, the court must first examine the
     plain language of the contract for evidence of the parties’ intent.”
     Murley v. Wiedamann, 25 So. 3d 27, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). A
     single term or group of words must not be read in isolation.
     American K-9 Detection Servs., Inc. v. Cicero, 100 So. 3d 236,
     238-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). “Rather, ‘the goal is to arrive at a
     reasonable interpretation of the text of the entire agreement to
     accomplish its stated meaning and purpose.’” Id. (quoting Ware
     Else, Inc. v. Ofstein, 856 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
     “[W]e are constrained by law to construe a contract as a whole
     so as to give effect, as here, to all provisions of the agreement if
     it can be reasonably done.” McArthur v. A.A. Green & Co. of Fla.,
     637 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

     The trial court, under the plain reading of the contractual agreements

as a whole, properly determined that Hathaway, as Guarantor, remained

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obligated following the Assignment.         Although the Lease Agreement

identifies BBF Miami as the “Tenant” in the original Lease Agreement, and

Guarantor guaranteed the obligations of said-defined “Tenant,” Guarantor

also agreed, under the terms of the Guaranty, that “any modification of the

lease”—which would include the Assignment— “shall not in any way release

[Guarantor] from liability hereunder or terminate, affect or diminish the

validity of the Guaranty.”    Thus, when BBF Miami assigned the Lease

Agreement to TBC Florida, TBC Florida became the “Tenant” and, given the

absence of any other provision addressing the impact of the assignment

upon the Guaranty and Hathaway’s obligation as Guarantor, the assignment

of the lease from BBF Miami to TBC Florida did not “terminate, affect or

diminish” Guarantor’s obligation and liability.

      Guarantor relies on Amerishop Mayfair, L.P. v. Billante, 833 So. 2d

806, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) for the common law proposition that “a release

of the debtor constitutes a release of the guarantor.” However, while there

are some factual similarities between Billante and the instant case, there are

significant differences which render Guarantor’s reliance misplaced.

      Although the guarantor in Billante signed a similarly worded guaranty

on behalf of the original tenant and the lease was later assigned to a new

tenant, the landlord and the new tenant thereafter entered into an agreement

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by which the lease was terminated, and the new tenant was released and

discharged from all obligations under the lease. Despite this release, the

landlord filed suit against the guarantor for breach of the guaranty. The trial

court ultimately entered judgment in favor of the guarantor, and we affirmed,

since there was no longer any tenant with a remaining obligation under the

lease, and no agreement providing that the guarantor’s obligations would

survive the landlord’s release of the new tenant. Id. at 810. We observed

that if the new tenant had remained obligated under the lease (as in our

case), so too would the guarantor:

      Hence, to the extent that the tenant had obligations under the
      lease, so did Billante. Pursuant to this agreement, if the tenant
      defaulted within the two year period described in the contract and
      the tenant remained obligated to the landlord, the landlord could
      obtain relief from Billante. It follows that once the tenant's
      obligations ceased, Billante's obligations ceased also. We
      therefore conclude that Billante's obligations terminated once the
      lease termination agreement discharged [the new tenant’s]
      obligations.

Id. at 809.

      In the instant case, TBC Florida—the assignee and new tenant—

remained obligated under the assigned Lease Agreement when the Landlord

sued both TBC Florida (as the new Tenant) and Hathaway (as Guarantor)

for breach of the contract and guaranty, and accordingly, Guarantor

remained obligated. Had the Landlord released TBC Florida or otherwise

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terminated the Lease Agreement with TBC Florida, Guarantor would also be

released from liability under Billante. See also BankAtlantic v. Berliner, 912

So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (distinguishing Billante where primary

obligor was not released before suit was filed against guarantor).

      Judgment for Breach of the Lease Agreement

      Next, TBC Florida asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Landlord conducted a good faith effort to re-let the premises,

and therefore, the trial court erred in entering final summary judgment on the

breach of contract count. We review this issue de novo. Volusia Cty. v.

Aberdeen at Ormond Beach L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Although

“[g]ood faith is generally an issue of fact which precludes summary

judgment,” Lees v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d 839, 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), it is not

always so, see Vibrant Video Inc. v. Dixie Pointe Associates, 567 So. 2d

1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and in this case, TBC Florida failed to meet its

burden, under the new summary judgment standard, of providing sufficient

evidence to support its affirmative defense of Landlord’s alleged failure to

exercise good faith in mitigating its damages.

      Landlord attached to its summary judgment motion the affidavit of

corporate representative David Berg, wherein he averred that Landlord had

made efforts to mitigate its damages, but was unsuccessful. Attached to this

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affidavit was a broker agreement and a letter establishing attempts to re-let

the space. In response, TBC Florida provided the affidavit of its manager,

Jillian Lorenz, who averred that TBC Florida had “obtained two (2) offers

from qualified candidates who submitted letters of intent to” Landlord.

Attached to the affidavit were the letters of intent and several email

exchanges between the prospective tenants, broker, and the Landlord.

However, and as Landlord points out on appeal, none of this evidence raised

a genuine issue of material fact on the good faith efforts of the Landlord to

mitigate its damages; indeed, if it shows anything, it is only that Landlord was

negotiating with potential tenants, but the parties were simply unable to

agree.

      TBC Florida’s unadorned allegation that Landlord was acting in bad

faith because it refused to lower the rent amount, or because Landlord

ignored its square footage assessment, is insufficient without competent

evidence to support it (for example, expert testimony demonstrating that the

square footage or the nature of the rental space justified rent of a certain

amount (or range) per square foot, and that Landlord was unreasonably

demanding a higher amount or range).

      Applying the new standard to our review of an order granting summary

judgment, we conclude TBC Florida’s failure to meet its burden of providing

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evidence to establish a “sufficient disagreement” on the issue of whether the

Landlord failed to mitigate in good faith is fatal. See Rich v. Narog, 366 So.

3d 1111, 1117-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (reiterating:

           “In Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain
           that ‘the existence of any competent evidence
           creating an issue of fact, however credible or
           incredible, substantial or trivial stops the inquiry and
           precludes summary judgment, so long as the
           ‘slightest doubt’ is raised. . . .’’ Under the federal
           summary judgment standard that is now applicable
           in Florida’s state courts, where, as here, the
           nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a
           dispositive issue at trial, the moving party need only
           demonstrate “that there is an absence of evidence to
           support the nonmoving party’s case.”

            Under the new standard, once the moving party
            satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to
            the nonmoving party to “make a showing sufficient to
            establish the existence of an element essential to
            that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
            the burden of proof at trial. . . .” Importantly, though,
            “[i]f the evidence [presented by the nonmovant] is
            merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
            summary judgment may be granted.”

            The trial court, therefore, must determine – as is the
            case with a motion for directed verdict – whether the
            nonmovant’s “evidence presents a sufficient
            disagreement to require submission to a jury or
            whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
            as a matter of law.” That is to say, the nonmovant’s
            evidence must be of sufficient weight and quality that
            “reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of
            the evidence that the [nonmovant] is entitled to a
            verdict.” “Where the record taken as a whole could
            not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

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           moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
           (internal citations omitted)).

We find the other arguments urged by TBC Florida unavailing.

     Affirmed.

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