Court Opinion

ID: 9567253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:13.701569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:28.206200
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. I am in disagreement with Division 3 of the majority opinion and that part of Division 4 of the majority opinion as follows: "The orders complained of, however, are void and illegal because they do not follow the mandate of the Acts nor the constitutional provisions under which they were purportedly issued ...”
I think the majority opinion misses the mark entirely when it interprets the words "classes of property” as used in the equalization statute (Code Ann. § 92-7001 (c)) to mean "constitutional classes of property.”
It is clear to me that these words in the equalization statute should not be so narrowly interpreted, and because they are so narrowly interpreted, I think the majority decision is based on a false premise.
The 1972 equalization statute provides that the State *274Revenue Commissioner may return the digest to the local board of tax assessors to make adjustments in the valuation of any class or classes of property in the tax digest of any county as may be prescribed by the Commissioner to achieve the purpose and intent of the Act.
This statute does not refer to class or classes of property "as defined in the Constitution ,”'but it refers to class or classes of property "in the tax digest.”
There are many classes of property "in the tax digest,” because the State Revenue Commissioner is given authority by law to prescribe the format of the tax digest used in every county. Code Ch. 92-63. And Code § 92-6305 provides: "Land and interest in land, together with the returns of personal estate and other interests the subject of taxation, shall be returned and set down in the digest in separate columns according to the classification furnished the receivers by the State Revenue Commissioner in each year, and their aggregate value extended.” That statute providing for the classification of property in separate columns as directed .by the State Revenue Commissioner had been with us for one hundred twenty (120) years when the General Assembly enacted the 1972 equalization statute. The 1972 statute referred to "any class or classes of property in the tax digest.”
In 1972,1 think the General Assembly knew that there were many classes of property contained in the tax digest of each county, far more than are contained in the constitutional definition. It is inconceivable to me that the majority can interpret the words "any class or classes of property in the tax digest” to mean "any class or classes of property as defined in the Constitution.”
The majority’s interpretation, to my mind, frustrates the statutory intention of allowing the State Revenue Commissioner to equalize assessments of all types of property as classified in the various columns of the tax digest within the geographical boundaries of a county *275and among the one hundred fifty-nine (159) counties within the geographical boundaries of the State.
The orders of the Revenue Commissioner in these two cases were not, in my opinion, in violation of the equalization statute or the Constitution of Georgia. These orders properly sought to accomplish what the equalization statute had mandated.
I respectfully dissent.