Court Opinion

ID: 9945215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 16:04:34.562908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.821530
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Matter of:

                 KATHERINE WHITT, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                        v.

                   MARCO MEZA, Respondent/Appellant.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 23-0256 FC
                                FILED 2-27-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FC2021-003483
                The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge

    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

                                   COUNSEL

Stanley David Murray, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley David Murray
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

State 48 Law Firm, Scottsdale
By Bryce Johnson, Robert Hendricks, & Stephen Vincent
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
                            WHITT v. MEZA
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1            Marco Meza (“Father”) appeals several rulings in the decree
dissolving his marriage to Katherine Whitt (“Mother”). In a published
opinion, we affirmed the superior court’s calculation of the community’s
equitable lien on Father’s separate property home but vacated the
characterization of a Chase bank account as community property and the
equalization judgments for the bank account and vehicles because the
evidence did not support the amount of the community’s interest. In this
decision, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees, Mother’s eligibility for
spousal maintenance, and the parenting plan.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            We do not repeat the facts or procedural background
addressed in the opinion. After entry of an appealable decree, Father
appealed from the decree, the ruling on his post-decree motion, and the
award of attorney’s fees. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1)
and (2), and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 78(c).

                              DISCUSSION

¶3            Father argues the spousal maintenance and attorney’s fees
findings are inadequate because the superior court had to make written
findings of fact and conclusions of law under 82(a). We review spousal
maintenance and attorney’s fees awards for an abuse of discretion and
accept the superior court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Myrick
v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 495, ¶ 12 (App. 2014); Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193
Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14 (App. 1998); see In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216,
219, ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

A.    Attorney’s Fees

¶4            Without a request for findings under Rule 82(a), the superior
court need not make findings of fact when awarding attorney’s fees under
A.R.S. § 25-324. Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494-95, ¶ 10. Father has not shown how

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                            Decision of the Court

the fee award constitutes an abuse of discretion. Thus, we affirm the award
of attorney’s fees.

B.     Spousal Maintenance

¶5             Father argues that the superior court also failed to make the
minimal findings of fact and conclusions of law required to support the
spousal maintenance award noted in In re Marriage of Cotter, 245 Ariz. 82,
87, ¶ 12 (App. 2018). But Cotter did not create a minimal findings
requirement. Consistent with existing caselaw and A.R.S. § 25-319(A),
Cotter held that absent a Rule 82(a) request, the superior court need not
make specific findings about the eligibility criteria in A.R.S. § 25-319(A). 245
Ariz. at 87, ¶ 12; see also Higgins v. Higgins, 154 Ariz. 87, 88 (App. 1987). But
in Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 86-87, ¶¶ 10-12, the superior court found the
requesting spouse was not eligible for spousal maintenance because she
received $36,000 in property. On appeal, we held that without more
findings, this court could not presume $36,000 in property would meet the
wife’s needs during her lifetime, citing § 25-319(A)(1). Cotter, 245 Ariz. at
86-87, ¶¶ 10-12.

¶6           In this case, Mother testified she was on disability and did not
earn enough to be self-sufficient. Her financial affidavit supports her
testimony. One of the statutory criteria for spousal maintenance eligibility
is a lack of adequate earning ability to be self-sufficient. See A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A)(2).

¶7             Without a Rule 82(a) request, the superior court did not have
to make express findings on Mother’s earning ability, her reasonable needs,
or whether Mother’s property could meet her needs. See Cotter, 245 Ariz. at
87, ¶ 12. We assume the court found every fact necessary to support its
judgment. Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 135 (App. 1990). The evidence
supports that Mother lacks the earning ability to be self-sufficient and is
thus eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(2).

¶8           Our decision to vacate two components of the equalization
judgment and remand for reconsideration may affect the spousal
maintenance analysis and award. Thus, we instruct the court to reconsider
the award on remand. If there is a change to the spousal maintenance
award, the court must also reconsider the child support order.

C.     Parenting Plan

¶9           Father contends the superior court made contradictory
findings because the parenting plan implies that Mother could work, but

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                            WHITT v. MEZA
                           Decision of the Court

the court found she could not work when discussing child support, spousal
maintenance, and attorney’s fees. We disagree that the findings are
inconsistent.

¶10            The superior court adopted Mother’s proposed parenting
plan that gave Father parenting time on the weekends when Mother
historically had to work. Mother has been disabled and not working since
February 2022. She testified that the children were doing well and were
happy with the current parenting plan, which coincided with her parenting
time with her oldest child—the children’s step-brother. Based on this
evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the court found that maintaining the
same parenting plan was in the children’s best interests. Thus, the parenting
plan is not inconsistent with findings elsewhere that Mother cannot work.

¶11          Finally, Father argues that the superior court erred because it
did not exercise independent judgment but adopted Mother’s proposed
decree. Father concedes that he lacks proof that the decree is identical to
Mother’s proposed decree. We have addressed the alleged errors in the
decree elsewhere and will not address Father’s speculative concerns.

                              CONCLUSION

¶12          Unless noted otherwise in the opinion, we affirm the decree.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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