Court Opinion

ID: 9702554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:16:43.130852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.751339
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I concur in the opinion and the result reached by the majority. However, I wish to make additional comment on the judicial use of the contempt power.
The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice has published An Advance Report of Part of Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge entitled “The Judge’s Role in Dealing with Trial Disruptions” (Final Tentative Draft, July 1971). These standards provide a sound guide for judicial conduct in this area.1
Section F.l recognizes the inherent power of a court “. . . to punish any contempt (in order to protect the rights of the defendant and the interest of the public by assuring that the administration of criminal justice shall not be thwarted).”2 This is in accord with recent *180declarations of the United States Supreme Court reaffirming long standing principles of contempt. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344-45, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061-62 (1970) (where the contempt power expounded in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77 (1888) was approved as one appropriate remedy for the unruly defendant). Accord, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390 (1925).
This power is not untrammeled. The ABA Standards contain meritorious provisions concerning admonition and warning, notice of intent to use contempt power, opportunity to be heard, and referral to another judge under certain circumstances. It is not my purpose though to set forth the Standards at length, for they are publicly available and self-explanatory.
In this area of judicial endeavor it is wise to recall the words of Chief Justice Taft in Cooke v. United States, supra: “The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice, and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court, is most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary and oppressive conclusions.” Id. at 539, 45 S. Ct. at 390. As that Court stated in its most recent declaration concerning the contempt power and the unruly defendant, “. . . justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S. Ct. 499, 505 (1971) (quoting from Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954)). See generally, Note, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 120 (1971).

 Other professional organizations have also taken steps to articulate standards in this area. See Trial 28-33 (January-February 1971) where a representative of the American Trial Lawyers Association comments on recently published principles of the American College of Trial Lawyers.

. As was so well stated in a recent English case: “. . . The archaic description of these proceedings as ‘contempt of court’ is in my view unfortunate and misleading. It suggests that they are designed to buttress the dignity of the judges and to protect them from insult. Nothing could be further from the truth. No such protection is needed. The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not bo obstructed or prevented. . . .” Morris v. Masters of the Crown Office, [1070] 2 W.L.R. 792, 801 (C.A.).
*180The purposes of a contempt proceeding were equally well stated recently by a noted American legal scholar. “Punishment for contempt is effective only if the threat of it serves as a deterrent to obstructive conduct The power is used not for retribution but for prevention.” Freund, “Contempt Power: Prevention, Not Retribution.” Trial 14 (January-February 1971).