Court Opinion

ID: 9955281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 22:10:56.05833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:25.105950
License: Public Domain

03/27/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                              September 20, 2023 Session

  STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. SULLIVAN COUNTY TENNESSEE ET
                 AL. v. AMY S. TOCHEV ET AL.

              Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sullivan County
  Nos. 20-CV-18707, 20-CB-27183, 20-CK-42361      John S. McLellan, III, Judge
                    ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00072-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began
enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The
purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer,
at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting
tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax
proceedings and violation of her due process and equal protection rights. The trial court
denied the taxpayer’s motion to set aside, concluding the taxpayer was properly served
with notice of the underlying delinquent tax proceedings. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed;
                                 Case Remanded

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Jerry W. Laughlin, Greeneville, Tennessee, and Lanny R. Norris, Elizabethton, Tennessee,
for the appellant, Amy S. Tochev.

Paul J. Krog and Nicholas W. Tsiouvaras, Brentwood, Tennessee; and Mark S. Hanor,
Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, DH RETENN 1 LLC.

Daniel P. Street, Blountville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sullivan County, Tennessee.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; and Mary Ellen Knack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the intervening
appellee, State of Tennessee.
                                         OPINION

                                      I. Background

       Amy S. Tochev, as Trustee under the Amy Tochev Life Trust Agreement dated May
30, 2003 (“Trustee”), is the former owner of the property identified as Tax Map 046L,
Group A, Parcel 013.00 and Tax Map 046L, Group A, Parcel 013.001 in Sullivan County,
Tennessee (collectively, the “Property”). Trustee failed to pay property taxes for 2016,
2017, and 2018, as a result of which, the State of Tennessee ex rel., Sullivan County,
Tennessee (the “County”) initiated delinquent tax sale proceedings against Trustee. The
Property comprises an improved parcel with a mailing address of 1501 E. Stone Drive in
Kingsport, Tennessee and an adjacent unimproved parcel. On the improved parcel is a
commercial building that was used as a medical practice by Amy Tochev’s husband, a
physician, from approximately 2003 until approximately 2016. In 2016, Dr. Tochev
discontinued providing routine medical services but continued using the building at 1501
E. Stone Drive to see individuals by appointment. The Tochevs have also resided in
Sullivan County, albeit on an unrelated property, since 2001.

       The Tochevs initially purchased the Property jointly in their individual capacities in
2003. The deed granting title to the Tochevs, individually, listed the name and address of
the property owners as Dr. Tochev “and wife, Amy S. Tochev” and listed their home
address. That deed also listed the name and address “of the Person or Entity Responsible
for the Payment of the Real Property Tax” as “Same as property owner[.]” On July 21,
2003, the Tochevs executed a Quitclaim Deed conveying the property to Trustee. That
Quitclaim Deed listed the “name & address of owner and taxpayer” as Trustee at the 1501
E. Stone Drive address.

       In addition to the tax years at issue in this appeal, Trustee also failed to timely pay
taxes on the Property in prior years. In each of those prior cases, summonses and notices
were served on Trustee via certified mail addressed to her at 1501 Stone Drive in Kingsport,
Tennessee. Various employees of Dr. Tochev’s medical practice signed for these certified
mail deliveries in 2008, 2013, and 2015. In each of those cases, Trustee ultimately paid
the overdue property taxes prior to the confirmation of any sale of the Property.

        The County initiated the first delinquent tax sale proceeding at issue in this appeal
against Trustee in the Sullivan County Chancery Court (the “trial court”) on April 2, 2018,
for any unpaid taxes for tax years 2007 through 2016 (the “2016 Case”). Two notices and
summonses to Trustee were issued in the 2016 Case (the “2016 Summonses”) and were
sent via certified mail addressed to Trustee at the 1501 Stone Drive address. A return was
filed stating that certified mail was delivered on June 18, 2018. The return includes a copy
of the certified mail receipt showing that delivery was signed for by Georgia Counts,
another employee of Dr. Tochev. The County initiated the second delinquent tax sale

                                            -2-
proceeding at issue in this appeal against Trustee in the trial court on April 1, 2019, for any
unpaid taxes for tax years 2008 through 2017 (the “2017 Case”). Two summonses and
notices to Trustee were issued in the 2017 Case; however, there is no return for those
summonses in the record. The County initiated the third and final delinquent tax sale
proceeding at issue in this appeal against Trustee in the trial court on April 1, 2020, for any
unpaid taxes for tax years 2008 through 2018 (the “2018 Case”). Two notices and
summonses to Trustee were issued in the 2018 Case and were sent via certified mail
addressed to Trustee at the 1501 Stone Drive address. That certified mail was delivered on
August 12, 2020, but it is unknown who signed for the delivery as the signature on the
certified mail receipt is illegible. However, a box was checked on the certified mail receipt
indicating that it was signed for by an agent of the addressee, Trustee.

       On April 2, 2020, the trial court entered an order consolidating the 2016 and 2017
Cases into the 2018 Case. Thereafter, on October 16, 2020, the trial court entered an order
granting the County a default judgment against Trustee in the 2018 Case (the “Default
Judgment”). Don Henderson purchased the Property at the December 16, 2020 tax sale
conducted by the County, and the trial court entered a final order confirming the sale on
December 17, 2020. The Clerk and Master of the trial court issued a Clerk & Master’s Tax
Deed conveying title of the Property to DH RETENN1, LLC (the “Purchaser”) on January
3, 2022 (the “Tax Deed”).

       On April 20, 2022, Trustee filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure and an Affidavit of Trustee in support thereof, seeking to set aside
the Default Judgment, the subsequent order that the Property be sold, and the Tax Deed.
Trustee averred that, on or about March 23, 2022, she “received in the mail both at 1501
E. Stone Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee, and at her residence” a letter notifying her that the
Property had been sold. Trustee further averred that, despite knowing that she had not paid
the relevant property taxes, she was unaware, prior to receiving the March 23 letter, that
the County had initiated the 2016, 2017, and 2018 Cases against her. Trustee denied
signing the certified mail receipt for the notices and summonses issued in the 2018 Case,
which were delivered on August 12, 2020, and further denied knowing who signed such
receipt. With respect to the 2016 Summonses, which were signed for by Georgia Counts
on June 18, 2018, Trustee averred that she had never authorized Ms. Counts – or any other
person – to receive mail, or sign for certified mail, on behalf of Trustee or the Trust. She
also denied that Ms. Counts actually delivered the mail to her. Trustee acknowledged that
the annual property tax statement for the Property had historically been mailed to her at the
1501 E. Stone Drive address, where she had retrieved them, but she stated that she had
always believed it to be a mistake that they were delivered there. Trustee argued that she
had not been properly served with the summonses and notices pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, she argued, the trial court did not have
personal jurisdiction over her, and the Default Judgment was void, as was the resulting sale
of the Property.

                                             -3-
       The County argued that Trustee’s motion should be denied because Trustee had
been properly served in accordance with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 67-5-2502, and Trustee had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
person or people who signed for the delivery of the notices and summonses were at that
time expressly prohibited in writing from accepting mail for Trustee. Trustee filed a
restated Rule 60.02 motion and Affidavit of Trustee in support thereof, wherein she denied
that she was properly served pursuant to either Rule 4 or section 67-5-2502. She also
argued that section 67-5-2502(a)(3) and (4), as interpreted by the County, violates the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.
Because she was challenging the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute, Trustee served a
copy of the restated motion upon the Tennessee Attorney General’s office, as required by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-107(b). In support of her restated motion,
Trustee filed an Affidavit of Richard L. Norris, a licensed Tennessee attorney, who stated,
in relevant part:

              3. From my computer I accessed the records in the Register’s Office
      for Sullivan County, Tennessee, and when I typed in a search for documents
      recorded under the last name of “Tochev,” with the first name “Amy,” the
      earliest deed I found was a deed recorded on October 17, 2001, indexed under
      the name of Amy Sharrett Tochev, and which is a deed for a lot in the Steele
      Creek Colony Subdivision.[1]

            3. [sic] The records of the Register’s Office for Sullivan County,
      Tennessee, reflect that the property located in Steele Creek Colony
      Subdivision . . . continues to be owned in part by Amy Sharrett Tochev.

             4. When I accessed the Tennessee Property Data website from my
      computer and searched under the property tax records for Sullivan County,
      Tennessee, and typed in the name “Tochev,” I found one parcel of property
      which states that it is owned by Tihomir Tochev and Amy Tochev, and is
      located [in the Steele Creek Colony Subdivision], and there is clearly a
      residence on that property.

            5. When I accessed from my computer the records on the website of
      Tennessee Trustee, and the records thereon for Sullivan County, Tennessee,
      and typed in the name of “Tochev,” I found listed property of Tihomir
      Tochev and Amy Tochev located [in the Steele Creek Colony Subdivision].

      1
          The referenced lot is the location of the Tochevs’ personal residence.

                                                   -4-
Finally, Trustee filed a supplement to her restated motion, wherein she argued that section
67-5-2502 requires that a diligent effort be made to give actual notice of the proceedings
and that the County did not make such diligent effort in this case.

        On July 1, 2022, the State of Tennessee filed a memorandum of law defending the
constitutionality of section 67-5-2502(a)(3) and (4). The State argued that the challenged
provisions do not violate the right to due process because, although the taxpayer in a
delinquent tax suit has a heavier burden to challenge the notice received by an agent, notice
provided in accordance with the various provisions of section 67-5-2502 is still required to
be reasonably calculated to apprise the taxpayer of the suit. The State also argued that the
challenged provisions do not violate equal protection because delinquent taxpayers are not
similarly situated to defendants in other kinds of lawsuits, at least for notice requirements.
Specifically, the State maintained that delinquent taxpayers are delinquent because they
have failed to satisfy a previously known tax obligation. Alternatively, the State argued
that, even if the classes of defendants are similarly situated, a rational basis exists to treat
such classes differently. Further, the State contended that imposing such burden on the
defendant, instead of on the taxing authority, is rationally related to the legitimate objective
of allowing the taxing authority to proceed on the basis of a receipt of service by an adult
physically present on the premises of the subject property.

       Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Trustee’s
restated Rule 60.02 motion on December 20, 2022. The trial court found, in part:

              6. Amy Tochev has a lengthy history of failing to timely pay property
       taxes on 1501 E. Stone Drive, beginning with the tax year 2007, when a
       summons and notice of legal proceedings were left with Defendant Amy
       Tochev, Trustee or her agent.

              7. Amy Tochev testified that there was no reason to authorize anyone
       to receive mail at the [1501 E. Stone Drive] address nor to accept mail
       although the County Attorney showed that the mail was accepted for the
       2006 taxes by Kelly Bailey; 2011 taxes accepted by Sarah Osborne; and,
       2013 taxes accepted by Sarah Osborne.

             8. Similarly the Summons and Notice for 2016 Delinquent tax legal
       proceedings . . . [was] accepted by mail by Georgia Counts, as agent for Amy
       Tochev, Trustee.

            9. Amy Tochev stated that it never occurred to her to make tax
       payments when she made mortgage payments.

                                             -5-
        10. Letter by regular mail from the Delinquent Tax Attorney to Amy
S. Tochev, Trustee at 1501 Stone Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee advising that
if the owner name or the address is incorrect to notify the Delinquent Tax
Attorney. Delinquent Tax Attorney Epperson stated that all notices of sale,
final sale, and any other information was sent to the [same] address and no
mailing came back to the Delinquent Tax Attorney.

                                    ***

        13. That Amy Tochev, Trustee had an affirmative duty to inquire as
to the amounts of such taxes and their payment status pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated § 67-5-2103(j).

                                    ***

      17. Service of process on the Defendant, Amy Tochev, Trustee, by
mail was proper.

                                    ***

       19. . . . The [trial c]ourt finds that Amy Tochev, Trustee, impliedly
authorized people working at her husband’s business at 1501 E. Stone Drive
to receive mail on her behalf.

       20. Amy Tochev, Trustee, failed to provide proof of a written
prohibition as she has historically accepted by other individuals in the past
other than Georgia Counts, for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 tax years; as Sarah
Osborne accepted service and Kelly Bailey, Tochev’s husband’s employee
accepted service as agent for Amy Tochev, Trustee. As Amy Tochev,
Trustee, admitted in her testimony that mail addressed to her at 1501 E. Stone
Drive was accepted and signed for by these individuals whom she knew had
worked for her husband.

                                    ***

        24. Amy Tochev, Trustee, had listed her name and address on her
deed and the summons to collect delinquent property taxes and to sell the
property was forwarded by mail to 1501 East Stone Drive and as Stephanie
Epperson, the Delinquent Tax Attorney testified she had completed several
title searches and she introduced as an exhibit to her testimony the “property
card” from which the Sullivan County Assessor of Property, and the State of
Tennessee, “Real Estate Assessment Data” shows the property owner and

                                     -6-
       mailing address as “Amy S. Tochev, Trustee, 1501 Stone Drive, Kingsport,
       TN 37660.”

              25. Stephanie Epperson, the Delinquent Tax Attorney, testified she
       had sent twelve notices of delinquent taxes and legal proceedings to sell her
       property for delinquent taxes to Amy Tochev by regular mail which the law
       presumes that a letter that has been properly mailed has been delivered to and
       received by the addressee.

(Internal citations to trial exhibits omitted). This timely appeal followed.

                             II. Issues Presented on Appeal

       Trustee raises ten issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Trustee’s motion to set aside the Default
          Judgment and the subsequent orders resulting from the Default Judgment.
       2. Whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2502(a)(4) is constitutional.

       The Purchaser raises two additional issues:

       3. Whether Trustee waived her issues raised on appeal.
       4. Whether Purchaser is entitled to its attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant
          to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

                                       III. Analysis

                              A. Trustee’s Rule 60.02 Motion

                                              i.

        “In general, we review a trial court’s ruling on a request for relief from a final
judgment under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure . . . pursuant to the
abuse of discretion standard.” Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tenn. 2015) (citing
Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012)). Despite this, we “apply de
novo review, with no presumption of correctness, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on
a Tennessee Rule 60.02(3) motion to set aside a judgment as void” due to a lack of
jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 269. “Any factual findings a trial court makes shall
be reviewed de novo, with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates
otherwise.” Id. (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). To obtain relief under Rule 60.02, the
moving party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to
relief.” Hussey v. Woods, 538 S.W.3d 476, 483 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting McCracken v.

                                            -7-
Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)).
“Evidence is clear and convincing when it leaves ‘no serious or substantial doubt about the
correctness of the conclusions drawn.’” Id. (quoting Goff v. Elmo Greer & Sons Constr.
Co., 297 S.W.3d 175, 187 (Tenn. 2009)).

         “A court obtains personal jurisdiction over a party defendant by service of process.”
Turner, 473 S.W.3d at 271 (citing Ramsay v. Custer, 387 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2012)). Typically, such service of process is governed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, the Tennessee General Assembly has enacted detailed
statutes, codified at Title 67, Chapter 5 of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“Chapter 5”),
that “provide[] for a specific and comprehensive scheme for the collection of delinquent
property taxes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2103(d)(2). In so doing, the General Assembly
expressly determined that “[s]tatutes that are not consistent with the statutory scheme for
the collection of delinquent property taxes set out in this chapter should not be applicable
to tax proceedings, tax liens, or the enforcement of such tax liens.” Id. at 67-5-2103(d)(7).
“This chapter shall be construed liberally in favor of the certainty and finality of property
titles transferred pursuant to this chapter.” Id. at 67-5-2103(e).

       “The taxes assessed by the state of Tennessee, a county, or municipality, . . . upon
any property of whatever kind, and all penalties, interest, and costs accruing thereon, shall
become and remain a first lien upon such property from January 1 of the year for which
such taxes are assessed.” Id. at 67-5-2101(a). In turn, section 67-5-2415 governs notice to
taxpayers of suits to enforce tax liens. It states in relevant part:

       (a) The court shall have jurisdiction to award personal judgment against an
       owner upon the claim for the debt upon determining that proper process has
       been served upon such owner. The court shall have jurisdiction to award a
       judgment enforcing the lien by a sale of the parcel upon determining that any
       [of] the following actions have occurred as to each owner:

          (1) That proper process has been served upon an owner; [or]
          (2) That the owner has actual notice of the proceedings by mail or
          otherwise; . . .

          ***

       (c) Notice of the pendency of the proceedings as to a parcel constitutes notice
       of the pending sale of the parcel and vice versa.

       (d) If process is to be served upon a defendant, the defendant does not have
       to receive a copy of the complaint or exhibits. The plaintiff may in lieu
       thereof furnish to the defendant a notice identifying the proceedings

                                            -8-
      sufficiently for the defendant to determine the parcel which is subject to the
      delinquent taxes for which the defendant is being sued.

      ***

      (f) Process may be served either by an authorized process server or forwarded
      by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, or by any alternative
      delivery service as authorized by Section 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code
      (26 U.S.C. § 7502).

      (g) The return of the receipt signed by the defendant, spouse, or other person
      deemed appropriate to receive summons or notice as provided for in the
      Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . and filed as a part of the record by the clerk
      shall be evidence of actual notice and shall be grounds for a default
      judgment. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2415. Similarly, section 67-5-2502 governs notice to taxpayers of
judicial tax sales. It states in relevant part:

      (a) * * *

          (3) Notice to parties or others in delinquent tax suits and sales shall be
          governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified
          in this chapter or as they may be inconsistent with the statutory scheme
          for the collection of delinquent property taxes set out in this chapter, and
          may be forwarded to the address of an owner of the property that is on
          record in the office of the assessor of property. If there is any remainder
          after the proceeds of the sale have been distributed pursuant to
          § 67-5-2501, the party receiving notice pursuant to this subdivision (a)(3)
          shall also be given notice of the amount of proceeds resulting from the
          sale, the division of such proceeds, and the remainder.

          (4) A person, who is either expressly or impliedly authorized by another
          person to receive mail on behalf of the other person, is authorized to sign
          a receipt on behalf of the other person accepting registered or certified
          mail or correspondence delivered by an alternative delivery service,
          containing either a summons, complaint, or summary of the proceeding
          or a notice that has been or is to be filed in a tax proceeding. In every tax
          proceeding, the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
          a person who signed such a receipt for a different person and was, in fact,
          at that time expressly prohibited in writing from accepting mail for the

                                            -9-
          second person, shall be upon the person challenging the sufficiency of the
          service or notice.

          ***

       (b) It is the responsibility of the property owner to register the property
       owner’s name and address with the assessor of property of the county in
       which the land lies.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502.

                                              ii.

        We turn first to Trustee’s arguments with respect to the service actually provided in
this case. Two notices and summonses to Trustee were issued in the 2016 Case and were
sent to Trustee via a single certified mailing. The certified mail return receipt reflects that
the certified mail was addressed to: “Amy S. Tochev, Trustee, 1501 Stone Dr., Kingsport,
TN 37660” and it bears the signature of Georgia Counts. While the return receipt itself
does not state the date of delivery, it is attached to a return (the “2016 Return”) executed
by the attorney who was then serving as the County’s delinquent tax attorney, which
indicates the certified mail was accepted on June 18, 2018.

       A person that is impliedly authorized to receive mail on behalf of a delinquent
taxpayer is also authorized to sign a certified mail return receipt containing a summons or
notice that has been or is to be filed in a tax proceeding. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67-5-2502(a)(4). When the 2016 Summonses arrived, they were signed for by Georgia
Counts. As she did before the trial court, Trustee argues on appeal that Georgia Counts
was not impliedly authorized by Trustee to receive mail on her behalf; however, after
hearing testimony from both Trustee and Ms. Counts, the trial court specifically found that
Trustee impliedly authorized people working at Dr. Tochev’s medical practice at the
subject property to receive mail on her behalf. Implicit in this finding of fact was a finding
that the witnesses’ testimony was not credible. See Edmunds v. Delta Partners, L.L.C.,
403 S.W.3d 812, 824–25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that a trial court’s finding on
credibility may be implied from the manner in which the trial court decided the case even
when a trial court does not make an express credibility finding (citing Richards v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 70 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tenn. 2002)). “When the resolution of the issues in a
case depends upon the truthfulness of witnesses, the trial judge who has the opportunity to
observe the manner and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying is in a far better position
than this Court to decide those issues.” Id. at 824 (citing In re Arteria H., 326 S.W.3d 167,
176 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), overruled on other grounds). “If the trial court’s factual
determinations are based on its assessment of witness credibility, this Court will not
reevaluate that assessment absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Id.

                                            - 10 -
(quoting Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Crabtree, 337 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2010)). With appropriate deference to the trial court’s implicit findings on the credibility
of Trustee and Ms. Counts, we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the
trial court’s finding that Trustee impliedly authorized people working at Dr. Tochev’s
medical practice at the subject property to receive mail on her behalf. Consequently, under
these circumstances, we conclude that Ms. Counts, an employee of Dr. Tochev’s medical
practice, was impliedly authorized to receive mail on behalf of Trustee.

       Because Ms. Counts was impliedly authorized to receive mail on behalf of Trustee,
the burden shifted to Trustee to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Counts
was expressly prohibited in writing from accepting mail for the Trustee at the time that she
signed the certified mail return receipt for the 2016 Summonses. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67-5-2502(a)(4). Trustee offered no such evidence. A certified mail return receipt signed
by a “person deemed appropriate to receive summons or notice as provided for in the Rules
of Civil Procedure, . . . and filed as a part of the record by the clerk shall be evidence of
actual notice and shall be grounds for a default judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67-5-2415(g). In turn, Rule 4.04(10) provides that service by mail may be the basis for
the entry of a default judgment when the record contains “a return receipt showing personal
acceptance by the defendant or by persons designated by Rule 4.04 or statute[.]” Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 4.04(10) (emphasis added). As discussed above, under these circumstances section
67-5-2502(a)(4) designated Ms. Counts as an individual authorized to accept the 2016
Summonses on behalf of Trustee. There was no writing expressly prohibiting Ms. Counts
from accepting mail for Trustee at the time she signed for the 2016 Summonses; therefore,
the certified mail return receipt signed by Ms. Counts provided adequate grounds for a
default judgment against Trustee.

        Despite this, Trustee argues that the trial court never gained jurisdiction over her
because the record contains no affidavit of service for the 2016 Summonses as required by
Rule 4.03(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Rule 4.03 only applies
in a delinquent taxpayer case, such as this one, to the extent it is not “inconsistent with the
statutory scheme for the collection of delinquent property taxes set out in [Chapter 5.]”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(a)(3). Furthermore, this Court must construe Chapter 5
“liberally in favor of the certainty and finality of property titles transferred pursuant to [it].”
Id. at 67-5-2103(e). This is because “[t]he certainty and finality of the titles to real estate
that have been conveyed pursuant to this chapter through the enforcement of tax liens is a
necessary prerequisite to the development of improvements thereon[,]” which is one of the
express purposes of the statutory scheme. Id. at 67-5-2103(d)(5)-(6). Trustee cites no
authority suggesting that Rule 4.03 is consistent with Chapter 5, nor did our research reveal
any such cases.2 Instead, Trustee merely relies upon cases discussing the application of

        2
        In her reply brief, Trustee cites to State ex rel. Bradley Cnty. v. #’s Inc., No. E2014-00121-COA-
R3-CV, 2015 WL 301227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2015), perm. app. denied, to support her position that

                                                  - 11 -
Rule 4.03 outside of the context of delinquent tax cases. Conversely, in this case, a strict
application of Rule 4.03 would defeat what is otherwise sufficient service of the 2016
Summonses. This result would violate the express mandate from the Tennessee General
Assembly that Chapter 5 be construed liberally in favor of finality of the Tax Deed issued
to the Purchaser. Therefore, we conclude that Rule 4.03 does not apply in this case. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(a)(3).

       Trustee also raises a number of issues regarding the notice provided to her in the
2017 and 2018 Cases. Because we conclude that she was properly served in the 2016 Case,
and in light of our analysis below regarding the effect of the consolidation of these cases,
we need not address these issues regarding the 2017 and 2018 Cases.

                                                    iii.

        Trustee argues that the Default Judgment must be set aside as to all tax years unless
it can be shown that service upon her was sufficient in each of the three cases. However,
Trustee does not cite to any authority that directly supports this argument. Instead, Trustee
merely relies upon case law setting forth the general principle that a trial court in a
delinquent tax suit does not have jurisdiction over a taxpayer unless the taxpayer is properly
served.

       The County responds by pointing out that the caption of the Complaint in the 2018
Case included the language “DELINQUENT TAX SUIT FOR THE YEARS
2008-2018[,]” and the relief requested by the County included an order of reference “to
ascertain the exact amount of property taxes, interest, penalty, and costs due the [County]
from the owners of each parcel, and that the lien for such sum be declared and enforced by
the sale of the property assessed, subject only to the statutory right of redemption.”
Additionally, the summonses and notices issued to Trustee in the 2018 Case states:
“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a lawsuit has been filed against you to enforce the lien
securing property taxes owed to Sullivan County, Tennessee for the 2018 tax year and all
prior years, if any.” (Emphasis added). Finally, the County relies upon section 67-5-2409,
which provides in relevant part:

               (a) If any other suits for delinquent taxes are pending against any
        particular piece of property, such suits shall be consolidated as a matter of
        right upon the filing of a notice of consolidation on behalf of the complainant.
        All taxes for which any given piece of property is liable and for which suits
        are pending may be included in the final decree.

Rule 4.03 applies in this case. However, unlike in this case, in #’s Inc., this Court determined that neither
the requirements of section 67-5-2415 nor Rule 4.03 were met. Id. at *5-6. Therefore, this Court did not
reach any conclusion in that case regarding whether Rule 4.03 is inconsistent with Chapter 5.

                                                   - 12 -
                (b) The consolidation shall include into one (1) proceeding all actions
       to collect and enforce all delinquent taxes owing against the parcel, including
       delinquent taxes that become delinquent after the original action was
       filed. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2409.

       In Tennessee, a suit is “pending” once a complaint is filed, even if the defendant has
not yet been served. West v. Vought Aircraft Indus., 256 S.W.3d 618, 624–25 (Tenn. 2008).
Because the 2016 Case and 2017 Case were each “pending,” they were properly
consolidated into the 2018 Case, regardless of whether Trustee had been properly served
in each of the cases. “Consolidation of the actions to include more recent delinquent taxes
owed shall not require the issuance, service, or delivery of additional leading process,
summons, or notice to interested persons who were served or notified pursuant to the
original complaint in accordance with § 67-5-2415.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2409. As
we concluded above, Trustee was properly served with leading process in the 2016 Case.
Therefore, service of additional leading process upon Trustee was not required in the 2017
and 2018 Cases and, pursuant to section 67-5-2409(a), it was appropriate for the trial court
to include the 2016 and 2017 taxes in the final decree entered in the 2018 Case.

                B. Constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(a)(4)

                                              i.

      We next turn to Trustee’s challenges to the constitutionality of section
67-5-2502(a)(4). As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court:

              In evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the
       presumption that an act of the General Assembly is constitutional. See State
       v. Robinson, 29 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tenn. 2000); Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d
       44, 51 (Tenn. 1997). We must “indulge every presumption and resolve every
       doubt in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.” State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d
       717, 721 (Tenn. 2002); see also Riggs, 941 S.W.2d at 51; In re Burson, 909
       S.W.2d 768, 775 (Tenn. 1995). This presumption applies with even greater
       force when the facial constitutional validity of a statute is challenged. See In
       re Burson, 909 S.W.2d at 775.

Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2003). Both of Trustee’s raised issues
regarding the constitutionality of section 67-5-2502(a)(4) are facial challenges.

                                            - 13 -
                                             ii.

       First, Trustee argues that “to the extent that [section] 67-5-2502(a)(4) authorizes
service of process of certified mail upon any person who is merely authorized to receive
mail on behalf of the defendant, it is surely less reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice to the defendant than the other feasible and customary substitutes for personal
service of process.” In so arguing, however, Trustee disregards the well-established
standard for due process set forth by the United States Supreme Court.

         “Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the
government may take his property.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (citing
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002)). Rather, the government must
simply provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950)) (emphasis added). “In tax lien suits, the government must provide ‘notice by
mail or other means to ensure actual notice . . . if [the party’s] name and address are
reasonably ascertainable.’” Wilson v. Blount Cnty., 207 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Tenn. 2006)
(quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)). In Tennessee,
“[i]t is the responsibility of the property owner to register the property owner’s name and
address with the assessor of property of the county in which the land lies[,]” and notice of
a tax sale may be forwarded to the address provided. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(a)(3),
(b). That is precisely what happened in this case. Trustee provided the County with the
1501 E. Stone Drive address, and the County sent the 2016 Summonses to that address.

        Trustee relies heavily upon the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v.
Haynes, 319 S.W.3d 564 (Tenn. 2010), to support her arguments. Hall was a medical
malpractice case in which the Court analyzed whether process was properly served upon a
medical corporation and/or one of its physician employees when the process was served
by certified mail directed to the defendants and signed for by “various employees” of the
medical corporation. Id. at 567. The Court ultimately held “that the authority to sign for
and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of
process.” Id. Trustee argues that this holding “is surely predicated upon the premise that
such a procedure would not be reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of
the legal proceedings.” Importantly, however, Hall was not a delinquent taxpayer case.
The decision in Hall turned on the Court’s interpretation of provisions of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure, not constitutional principles of due process. See id. at 582 n.15
(noting that “the authority to sign for certified mail in the context of determining whether
service was adequate under federal due process standards” was “a question not raised in
[that] appeal”). Therefore, Hall is not relevant to this analysis.

                                           - 14 -
       Instead, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dusenbery is instructive.
The Dusenbery Court analyzed the adequacy of notice served upon a prisoner and notifying
him “of his right to contest the administrative forfeiture of property seized during the
execution of a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested.” Dusenbery, 534
U.S. at 163. “To effect such a forfeiture, the statute required the agency to send written
notice of the seizure together with information on the applicable forfeiture procedures to
each party who appeared to have an interest in the property.” Id. at 164. The Court
explained the government’s efforts to serve defendant, to-wit:

       The FBI sent certified mail addressed to [defendant] at the correctional
       facility where he was incarcerated. At that facility, prison mailroom staff
       traveled to the city post office every day to obtain all the mail for the
       institution, including inmate mail. The staff signed for all certified mail
       before leaving the post office. Once the mail was transported back to the
       facility, certified mail was entered in a logbook maintained in the mailroom.
       A member of the inmate’s Unit Team then signed for the certified mail to
       acknowledge its receipt before removing it from the mailroom, and either a
       Unit Team member or another staff member distributed the mail to the
       inmate during the institution’s “mail call.”

Id. at 168–69 (internal citations to record omitted). Although the government could have
taken additional efforts to assure that the notice actually reached the defendant who was in
its custody, such as escorting the defendant to the post office to sign for the certified mail
himself, “the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government;
it requires only that the Government’s effort be ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise a party
of the pendency of the action[.]” Id. at 170. The Court ultimately held that “the use of the
mail addressed to [defendant] at the penitentiary was clearly acceptable for much the same
reason [the United States Supreme Court] ha[s] approved mailed notice in the past.” Id. at
172.

         Similarly, in this case, sending notice of a tax sale to the address provided by the
property owner was “‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise the property owner of the pending
tax sale.” Davidson Pabts, LLC v. Worsham, No. M2014-01061-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
4115174, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2015), perm. app. denied (citing Wilson, 207
S.W.3d at 750). “The [United States] Supreme Court [has] recognized that in order to meet
minimum due process requirements, the method of notice need not be fail proof since
‘constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances.’” Beneficial
Tenn., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. M2004-01071-COA-R3-
CV, 2006 WL 568250, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2006), perm. app. denied (quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319). Unless “the government receives new information indicating
its initial attempt at notice has failed[,] . . . when the government has attempted to provide
notice and ‘heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry,’ the notice is

                                            - 15 -
constitutionally sufficient if it was ‘reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient
when sent.’” Davidson Pabts, 2015 WL 4115174 at *5 (citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 226,
229–30). Therefore, contrary to Trustee’s contention, the County “was not required to take
additional steps to notify [Trustee] unless it learned that an otherwise reasonably calculated
attempt to notify [Trustee] had failed.” Id. at *6 (citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 226).

       This Court has previously held that section 67-5-2415(e)(1), which allows for notice
to a delinquent taxpayer to be received and signed for by the taxpayer’s spouse, “does not
violate the requirements or purposes of due process rights and, therefore, is
constitutional[.]” Pell v. City of Chattanooga, No. E1999-01712-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL
567821, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2000). The inquiry before us now is whether section
67-5-2502(a)(4), which allows for notice to a delinquent taxpayer to be received and signed
for by an individual otherwise authorized to receive mail for the taxpayer, is “reasonably
calculated” to apprise a delinquent taxpayer of an enforcement action brought by the
county. We conclude that it is and, therefore, that it does not violate the requirements or
purposes of constitutional due process.

                                             iii.

       Finally, Trustee argues that section 67-5-2502(a)(4) violates the Equal Protection
clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions because it denies defendants in
delinquent taxpayer cases the right “to limit service of process only to someone else
authorized to accept service of process for the defendant[.]” However, in doing so, Trustee
mischaracterizes section 67-5-2502(a)(4). As stated above, section 67-5-2502(a)(4)
designates individuals who are authorized to accept service of process on behalf of
delinquent taxpayers – namely, those individuals who are otherwise expressly or impliedly
authorized by the taxpayer to receive mail on behalf of the taxpayer. Conversely, in
non-delinquent taxpayer cases, “a person with the authority to sign for and receive certified
mail does not, without more, qualify as an agent authorized by appointment to receive
service of process on behalf of an individual defendant.” Hall, 319 S.W.3d at 581.

       “[B]oth the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee citizens the equal
protection of the laws.” Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 460 (citing State v. Robinson, 29 S.W.3d
476, 480 (Tenn. 2000)). The Tennessee Supreme Court “has adopted an analytical
framework similar to that used by the United States Supreme Court in analyzing equal
protection challenges.” Id. (citing Robinson, 29 S.W.3d at 481). “Under this framework,
one of three standards of scrutiny applies, depending upon the nature of the right asserted
or the class of persons affected: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced
scrutiny, applying the rational basis test.” Id.

      “Strict scrutiny applies when the classification at issue: (1) operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class; or (2) interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.”

                                            - 16 -
Id. Trustee argues that strict scrutiny applies because “the statute in question pertains to
fundamental rights that are explicitly or implicitly protected by the Due Process Clause[.]”
The State of Tennessee argues the opposite - that the delinquent tax statutes do not
implicate a fundamental right. With regard to section 67-5-2502(a)(4) specifically, we
agree with the State. Although due process provides defendants a fundamental right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard, Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, defendants do not have a
fundamental right to dictate how that notice is provided to them. See Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d
at 461 (distinguishing between a parent’s fundamental right to care and custody of their
child and the parent’s duty to support a child for the purposes of an equal protection
challenge); see also Owens v. I.F.P. Corp., 374 F.Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Ky. 1974), aff’d
mem., 419 U.S. 807 (1974) (concluding that Kentucky’s version of Rule 4.04 satisfied due
process and therefore did not implicate a fundamental right even though it provided for
different forms of service among in-state and out-of-state defendants). Because section
67-5-2502(a)(4) does not implicate any fundamental right, we review it under the rational
basis standard. Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001).

       As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

               The equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions
       demand that persons similarly situated be treated alike. See Tenn. Small Sch.
       Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993). When applying the
       rational basis test, we have observed that state legislatures have the initial
       discretion to determine what is “different” and what is “the same” and that
       they are given considerable latitude in making those determinations. See
       Robinson, 29 S.W.3d at 480 (citing Tenn. Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at
       153). Our inquiry into legislative choice usually is limited to whether the
       challenged classifications have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
       interest. See id. We have held that under the rational basis test, a statute may
       discriminate in favor of a certain class, as long as the discrimination is
       founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy. See
       Castlewood, Inc. v. Anderson County, 969 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tenn. 1998).

              . . . It is not necessary that the legislature state a rational basis for this
       differential treatment. A classification will pass constitutional muster if we
       can conceive of some rational basis for the distinction. See Riggs, 941
       S.W.2d at 53 (stating that a statutory classification is rational “if any state of
       facts may reasonably be conceived to justify it”).

Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 461–62. “Because taxes produce the revenue by which the
government operates, the legislature has wide discretion in the adoption of tax measures,
and its judgment must be accorded great respect.” Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 903
(Tenn. 2009) (citing Genesco, Inc. v. Woods, 578 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tenn. 1979),

                                              - 17 -
superseded on other grounds by 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1278 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67-1-801(a)(2) (2006)). This deference must also be extended to the methods fixed by
the legislature for the collection of such taxes. Id. at 902 (citing E. Tenn. Brewing Co. v.
Currier, 150 S.W. 541, 544 (1912)). In enacting Chapter 5, the Tennessee General
Assembly expressly found and determined that:

       (4) The economy of the state has evolved from one primarily based upon the
       agrarian use of real property to an economy based more upon the
       improvement of real property by the construction of residential, commercial,
       and industrial structures thereon. Such improvements require the investments
       of significant funds and resources;

       (5) A purpose of this chapter is to promote and encourage the development
       of improvements upon real estate that have been conveyed pursuant to this
       chapter through the enforcement of tax liens; [and]

       (6) The certainty and finality of the titles to real estate that have been
       conveyed pursuant to this chapter through the enforcement of tax liens is a
       necessary prerequisite to the development of improvements thereon[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2103(d).

       “Administrative convenience and expense in the collection or measurement of the
tax” alone is a sufficient justification for treating delinquent taxpayers differently than
defendants in other actions. See Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511
(1937). Tax enforcement actions commonly involve a large number of delinquent tax
parcels,3 and the General Assembly’s judgment in creating a more efficient means of
serving process on delinquent taxpayers – while still satisfying constitutional due process
requirements – must be respected. Accordingly, we conclude that the State has a rational,
legitimate interest in effecting service upon delinquent taxpayers in an efficient and
cost-effective manner that justifies the distinction between defendants in delinquent tax
proceedings and defendants in other legal proceedings. Because section 67-5-2502(a)(4)
passes the rational basis test, Trustee’s equal protection challenge fails.

                                    C. Issues Raised by Purchaser

       Purchaser, as appellee, raises two additional issues on appeal. First, Purchaser
argues that this Court should deem waived essentially all of Trustee’s arguments due to
Trustee’s purported failure to adequately tie her arguments to the standards by which this
Court must review Trustee’s raised issues. We disagree. “It is not the role of the courts,

       3
           The Default Judgment at issue in this case included approximately 124 individual parcels.

                                                   - 18 -
trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and
where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely
constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct.,
301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). However, although we affirm the judgment of the trial
court, we cannot conclude that Trustee failed to develop an argument or merely constructed
a skeletal argument in support of her raised issues.

       Finally, Purchaser argues that this appeal is frivolous, contending that all of
Trustee’s raised issues are waived. “‘A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or
one in which there is little prospect that [an appeal] can ever succeed.’” Morton v. Morton,
182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Indus. Dev. Bd. of the City of
Tullahoma v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). Tennessee Code
Annotated section 27-1-122 provides:

              When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court
       of record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon
       motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the
       appellant, which may include, but need not be limited to, costs, interest on
       the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal.

        In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further
decline to award Purchaser’s attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

                                        CONCLUSION

       For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court for Sullivan
County, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Amy S. Tochev, Trustee, for which
execution may issue if necessary.

                                                     _________________________________
                                                     KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

                                            - 19 -