Court Opinion

ID: 9591150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:02:37.701224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:07.720231
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur only in the result, disagreeing with the application of the principles of promissory estoppel under the facts of consequence in this case.
The trial court found that the disclaimer (stating that the handbook was not a “comprehensive policies and procedural manual, nor an employment contract”) was conspicuous because it was located on the handbook’s first page. I disagree. The fact that the disclaimer appears on the front page does not by itself make it conspicuous. I would rule, as a matter of law, that a disclaimer’s location is not the sole determinant of whether or not it is conspicuous. In this instance, the disclaimer consisted of one sentence — no different in appearance from any of the other sentences contained on the page. It is not even labeled as a disclaimer.
The United States Court for the District of Wyoming, in a case applying Wyoming law, addressed the issue whether a disclaimer in an employee handbook negates the employee’s claim that the handbook constituted an employment contract. Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Company, 690 F.Supp. 977 (D.Wyo.1988) (Johnson, J.). The Court ruled that disclaimers are effective only if they are conspicuous, which is a question of law. Id. at 980. In *871Jimenez, the employer claimed that it was not bound to follow the handbook because it contained a disclaimer stating that the handbook was not an employment contract. The District Court ruled, however, that the disclaimer was “not set off in any way that would attract attention” and, therefore, was ineffective against the employee. Id. at 980. The Court listed the disclaimer’s inadequacies: “Nothing is capitalized that would give notice of a disclaimer. The type size equals that of other provisions on the same page. No border sets the disclaimer apart from any other paragraph on the page.” Id. 980. After review of Mobil’s employee handbook, I find that its attempted disclaimer suffers from the same deficiencies found in Jimenez.
Employment agreements are typically unilateral offers to persons untutored in contract law. If an employer seeks to offset the contractual tenor of its handbook with a disclaimer, equitable and social policy concerns demand that the disclaimer be presented clearly so that employees are not misled by the handbook. A recent Idaho case involved a disclaimer located on the cover page (the disclaimer was, apparently, the cover page’s sole occupant). Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1987). The personnel manager read the disclaimer to the employee. The employee was then told the disclaimer meant that the handbook was not a contract. Finally, the manager had the employee sign the cover page, below the disclaimer. This court should hold that something similar to what the Idaho employee was afforded is required before a disclaimer is found to be conspicuous.
In addition, I am concerned that the plurality opinion leaves the issue of the disclaimer’s effect unresolved. The trial court granted Mobil summary judgment because it found that, as a matter of law, the handbook’s disclaimer was conspicuous. The plurality reasons that summary judgment was inappropriate because promissory estoppel raises issues of material fact. On remand, however, the trial court may still rule, as a matter of law, that the disclaimer is sufficiently conspicuous to constitute a defense. For the reasons set forth above, I find this result unacceptable.
Because the disclaimer is ineffective as a matter of law, and its effect now becomes a question of fact, Mobil’s attempted disclaimer has rendered the employee handbook ambiguous. The handbook provides that “union representation is unnecessary for * * * job security and * * * consistent treatment, * * *.” It also contains a detailed disciplinary procedure. In Jimenez, at 980, the Court observed that “[ujnder Wyoming decisions, handbooks that list misconduct that could result in discharge imply that cause is required.” (citing Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wyo.1986); and Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo.1985)). When these provisions are juxtaposed against the attempted disclaimer, ambiguities exist as to the parties’ intent vis-a-vis the terms of employment.
This court outlined the procedure for resolving ambiguous employee handbooks, stating:
Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a question of fact. * * * If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a question of law and fact.
Parks, 704 P.2d at 706 (citation omitted).
The handbook’s ambiguous provisions create issues of material fact and, therefore, summary judgment is improper.