Court Opinion

ID: 9926271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 15:06:16.288283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.952699
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2956-22

J.S.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHDIOCESE OF
PHILADELPHIA, ROMAN
CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL,
CORPUS CHRISTI PARISH,
and CORPUS CHRISTI
SCHOOL,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

FATHER JOHN SCHMEER and
FATHER ERNEST DURANTE,

     Defendants.
_____________________________

                   Argued December 18, 2023 – Decided January 24, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and Berdote Byrne.
            On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
            Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County,
            Docket No. L-0475-19.

            John W. Baldante argued the cause for appellant (Levy,
            Baldante, Finney, & Rubenstein, PC, attorneys; John
            W. Baldante and Mark R. Cohen, on the briefs).

            Nicholas M. Centrella argued the cause for respondents
            (Clark Hill PLC, attorneys; Nicholas M. Centrella, on
            the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually abused in the early 1970s by Father

John Schmeer and Father Ernest Durante, who were both then Roman Catholic

priests of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. 1 In 2019, plaintiff filed suit in New

Jersey, alleging that the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Roman Catholic High

School, Corpus Christi Parish, and Corpus Christi School (collectively, the

Archdiocese) were civilly liable for the abuse by Schmeer and Durante. Plaintiff

appeals from an order granting the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction. We affirm because jurisdictional discovery established

1
  Plaintiff identifies himself by name in his complaint. We refer to him by his
initials and as plaintiff to protect privacy interests concerning allegations of
child sexual abuse because, in his complaint and documents he submitted in
discovery, he referred to other children who were allegedly sexually abused by
Schmeer and other priests of the Archdiocese. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9); see also
N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f).

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that the Archdiocese did not purposefully avail itself of any benefits in New

Jersey related to Schmeer's or Durante's alleged abuse of plaintiff. Therefore,

New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese related to

this lawsuit.

                                      I.

      We discern the facts from the record developed during jurisdictional

discovery.      The Archdiocese is an unincorporated, religious, non-profit

association that operates in Pennsylvania. Its principal place of administration

is in Philadelphia, and it oversees Catholic parishes in five Pennsylvania

counties. Corpus Christi Parish and Corpus Christi School both closed in 1987.

Roman Catholic High School, Corpus Christi Parish, and Corpus Christi School

were all located in Pennsylvania and were within the geographic area controlled

by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese does not oversee or operate any churches,

parishes, or religious facilities in New Jersey. It also does not assign priests to

any parishes in New Jersey.

      The Archdiocese does not currently own any real property in New Jersey.

In the past, the Archdiocese did own several properties in New Jersey that were

given to it, but those properties were sold before 2013. The Archdiocese also

owned and operated two properties in Ventnor, New Jersey, which it used as

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vacation homes for priests. The Ventnor properties were acquired in 1963 and

sold in 2012 and 2013.

      Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania. He met Schmeer in the late 1960s

while attending Roman Catholic High School, which is in Philadelphia.

Schmeer and Durante were teachers and guidance counselors at Roman Catholic

High School. In the early 1970s, Schmeer served as a priest in residence at

Corpus Christi Parish, where plaintiff and his family were parishioners.

      Plaintiff alleges that Schmeer began sexually abusing him when he was

fifteen years old in 1970, and that the abuse continued for several years

thereafter.   Most of the abuse occurred in Pennsylvania, but plaintiff also

contends that when he was fifteen years old, Schmeer took him to the Jersey

Shore to help paint another parishioner's home. Plaintiff alleges that while they

were at the home near Sea Isle City, New Jersey, Schmeer sexually abused him

several times and that, on at least one occasion, Durante watched the abuse and,

thereafter, mocked plaintiff.

      In December 2019, plaintiff sued the Archdiocese, Schmeer, and Durante

in New Jersey.     Plaintiff contends that the Archdiocese is responsible for

Schmeer's and Durante's sexual abuse of him, and he asserted causes of action

for negligence, negligent supervision, negligent hiring and retention, gross

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary

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duties. Plaintiff also contends that the Archdiocese knew of Schmeer's history

of sexual abuse of children but did not restrict his activities with children.

      The Archdiocese moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction. The trial court initially denied that motion and directed

the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Following the completion of

that discovery, the Archdiocese again moved to dismiss the complaint.

      On April 25, 2023, after hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court

issued an order granting the motion and dismissing plaintiff's claims against the

Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2 Thereafter, we granted plaintiff

leave to appeal.

                                      II.

      On appeal, plaintiff contends that the Archdiocese is subject to specific

jurisdiction in New Jersey because Schmeer and Durante were agents of the

Archdiocese.       He argues that the Archdiocese facilitated Schmeer's and

2
  At the same time, the same trial court also dismissed three other complaints
against the Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have affirmed
those three other dismissals in separate unpublished opinions. Jane Doe v.
Archdiocese of Phila., No. A-2962-22 (App. Div. 2024); F.C. v. Roman Cath.
Archdiocese of Phila., No. A-2955-22 (App. Div. 2024); John Doe 1 v.
Archdiocese of Phila., No. A-3636-21 (App. Div. Dec. 27, 2023).

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Durante's actions in New Jersey by not restricting the conduct of Schmeer,

Durante, and other priests of the Archdiocese as it related to children.

      Personal jurisdiction is a "'mixed question of law and fact' that must be

resolved at the outset, 'before the matter may proceed.'" Rippon v. Smigel, 449

N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of

Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996)). We review a trial court's

findings of fact with respect to jurisdiction "to determine if those fin dings are

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record," but conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 358. "A trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

      Having considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and

governing law, we reject them.        The facts disclosed during jurisdictional

discovery established that the Archdiocese is not subject to jurisdiction in New

Jersey in this action because it did not purposefully avail itself of activities in

New Jersey sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" required for personal

jurisdiction. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).

      We have published two opinions that set forth the law on when a non-

resident diocese is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey for the alleged

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past sexual abuse of a minor by a priest. See D.T. v. Archdiocese of Phila., ___

N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023); JA/GG Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen, ___

N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023). Like the plaintiffs in those cases, plaintiff

here concedes that he must show specific personal jurisdiction over the

Archdiocese.

      To determine whether a non-resident defendant may be subject to specific

personal jurisdiction, courts examine the "relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323

(1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). "In order for a

state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a non[-]resident defendant, the

lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the

forum.'" Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 2019) (third

and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 127 (2014)); accord Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106,

119 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).

      "The 'minimum contacts' requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts

resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities

of the plaintiff." Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see also Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at

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126 (explaining that "the existence of minimum contacts turns on the presence

or absence of intentional acts of the defendant to avail itself of some benefit of

a forum state"). The contacts "must be the defendant's own choice and not

'random, isolated, or fortuitous.'" Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v.

Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).

      Moreover, courts determine, based on the defendant's "'conduct and

connection' with the forum state . . . whether the defendant should 'reasonably

anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state].'" Bayway Refin. Co. v.

State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 429 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in

original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). In making that

determination, a court "must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests

of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." Asahi Metal

Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). So, a court weighs "the

interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of

controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies."          Ibid. (quoting World-Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

      Neither the Archdiocese's former ownership of properties in New Jersey

nor its supervision over Schmeer and Durante as priests and teachers establishes

specific jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey related to the sexual

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abuse plaintiff alleges he suffered. There is no evidence that the Archdiocese's

former ownership of real properties in New Jersey had any relation to plaintiff's

allegations of abuse by Schmeer or Durante. Plaintiff testified that he was

abused by Schmeer and Durante at a private home near Sea Isle City in the early

1970s. The Archdiocese's former ownership of other properties in New Jersey

was not related to Schmeer's or Durante's use of that home. Specific jurisdiction

requires "a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue."

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017).

      Moreover, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese knew of, approved,

or sanctioned Schmeer taking plaintiff to the private home. While plaintiff

testified that his parents directed him to go on the trip in furtherance of his

religious obligations, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese sponsored or

even knew of the trip. Accordingly, there is no evidence demonstrating that the

Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of any benefit or activity in New Jersey

in connection with Schmeer's or Durante's alleged abuse of plaintiff.

      For the reasons we detailed in D.T., we reject plaintiff's argument that

Schmeer and Durante were acting as agents of the Archdiocese when they

sexually abused plaintiff. ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 14-19). In short,

there is no evidence that Schmeer and Durante were acting within the scope of

their responsibilities as priests, teachers, or counselors when they allegedly

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                                       9
sexually abused plaintiff. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 265;

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204; Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323.

      We also reject plaintiff's argument that the Archdiocese's failure to restrict

Schmeer's or Durante's activities confers personal jurisdiction over the

Archdiocese in New Jersey. For purposes of determining personal jurisdiction,

which in this matter was raised on a motion to dismiss, we accept plaintiff's

allegation that the Archdiocese knew of Schmeer's and Durante's sexual

behaviors with children at the time the alleged abuse of plaintiff occurred. We

also accept plaintiff's contention that the Archdiocese failed to remove Schmeer

or Durante from the ministry despite its alleged knowledge of the risk they posed

to children. While that conduct, if proven, would be inappropriate and highly

irresponsible, it does not establish specific personal jurisdiction over the

Archdiocese in New Jersey. All the alleged conduct regarding the retention and

oversight of Schmeer and Durante took place in Pennsylvania. Therefore, that

conduct does not constitute intentional acts of the Archdiocese to avail itself of

some benefit in or from New Jersey. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025; Waste Mgmt.,

138 N.J. at 126.

      Finally, we also reject plaintiff's argument that because the Archdiocese

knew that many of its priests were sexually abusing children, the Archdiocese's

failure to restrict Schmeer's or Durante's activities conferred personal

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                                       10
jurisdiction in New Jersey.     All the priests in the Archdiocese served in

Pennsylvania, and the Archdiocese oversaw the activities of those priests in

Pennsylvania from its administrative headquarters in Philadelphia. While it was

foreseeable that priests would travel outside of Pennsylvania, there is no

evidence that Schmeer took plaintiff to New Jersey on a trip sanctioned or

sponsored by the Archdiocese. More importantly, there is no evidence that t he

Archdiocese had intentionally availed itself of any benefit in or from New Jersey

in connection with Schmeer taking plaintiff to a private home in New Jersey. In

short, even if plaintiff proved all his allegations against the Archdiocese, those

proofs would not establish personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New

Jersey in connection with plaintiff's lawsuit.

      Affirmed.

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