Court Opinion

ID: 9566106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:03.648804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:10.545844
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur because even if the State showed sufficient indicia of similarity between the prior convictions and the incident on trial, the State failed to affirmatively show that the evidence was offered “not to raise an improper inference as to the accused’s character, but for some appropriate purpose.” Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2b) (409 SE2d 649) (1991).
As to similarity, the documents admitted show that all four of Harris’ prior crimes were burglaries (two in 1980, one in 1984, and one in 1990), which were perpetrated in Richmond County and were at residences. In each case Harris made the unauthorized entry with the intent to commit a theft. The prior burglaries were committed close *674in time to each other and to the one on trial, discounting the periods of incarceration. It is true that there was no evidence that the modus operandi was similar to that used in this case.
The indicia of similarity pointed out in Moore v. State, 202 Ga. App. 476, 479 (2) (414 SE2d 705) (1992), are not sufficiently described to establish admissibility of the evidence here. Moore conceded similarity, and the court merely pointed out in dicta the distinction between the prior acts and those found inadmissible in Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (405 SE2d 483) (1991). The degree of similarity must be such that “ ‘proof of the former tends to prove the latter.’ ” Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789, 791 (3) (400 SE2d 329) (1991).
Stephens and Williams, supra, do not absolutely prohibit using just the indictment and conviction when they do show sufficient similarity for the purpose for which they are admitted. See Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga. App. 27, 28 (3) (424 SE2d 638) (1992); Wheat v. State, 205 Ga. App. 388 (2) (422 SE2d 559) (1992); Dean v. State, 211 Ga. App. 28, 31 (4) (438 SE2d 380) (1993). See also Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29, 33-37 (3) (430 SE2d 35) (1993) (physical precedent only). It depends on what is contained therein and the purpose for which such evidence is offered.
The State introduced the convictions to show intent and course of conduct, that defendant followed a common design and had a bent of mind towards committing burglaries such as the one on trial, and motive. These documents were presented in the State’s case-in-chief. The defense, presented thereafter through defendant’s testimony alone, was that defendant was found in possession of items from the victim’s house because he found the duffle bag and contents at a dumpster nearby and that the clothes he was wearing, which the victim claimed were taken from her house, had been purchased by him previously. Thus the defense was that he was not involved in the burglary, was an innocent and unwitting possessor of certain stolen items, and that others claimed to have been stolen were his own. This was similar to what he had told the officers, which was part of the State’s evidence.
Identity was the issue, that is, whether defendant was involved in the burglary with the person seen or as the burglar himself. The evidence was not admitted for that purpose and the jury was not charged that this was one of the limited purposes for which it was admitted.1 The State’s attorney specifically agreed with the trial *675court’s statement that the State was not trying to prove identity through the prior transactions.
Decided March 16, 1995.
K. Emerson Gillard, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Joseph R. Neal, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
It is true that the State had to prove specific intent, but defendant had not told the officers when interviewed on the street that he had entered the residence with a legitimate intent. The prior incidents did not constitute evidence necessary to prove intent; possession of the stolen articles and the implausible explanation given by defendant when questioned proved that. Instead, they tended to prove that the explanation of innocence given the officers was at least suspect because defendant was a house burglar of long standing. That is what is prohibited. See, regarding state of mind, Prophitt v. State, 183 Ga. App. 332, 333 (358 SE2d 892) (1987) (Beasley, J., concurring specially).
The fact that the prior crimes were of the same sort is not sufficient for admission into evidence, because they were also “wholly independent, separate and distinct.” Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 263 (71 SE2d 615) (1952). See also Cox v. State, 165 Ga. 145 (1) (139 SE 861) (1927). As pointed out in Bacon, there must be a “logical connection” between the earlier act and the one on trial so that the earlier one tends to prove the fact at issue, which in that case, was defendant’s intent. Here, it was identity.
In Weems v. State, 204 Ga. App. 352 (419 SE2d 346) (1992), there were sufficient details to show a similar method of operation and therefore identity between the burglary on trial and one committed within days in the same apartment complex. By the same token, another residential burglary several years earlier was not shown to be sufficiently similar or connected and was erroneously admitted for the purpose to be served. However, the court concluded that, due to the strength of the other evidence, including fingerprints, it was “highly probable” that the inadmissible evidence did not contribute to the verdict, and the conviction was affirmed. Id. at 355. That same conclusion is not warranted here.

 The effect of the limited-purpose charge is problematic in itself, because of the unnatural compartmentalization of thinking which is required of the jurors. In a recent case before us, the transcript shows that after the trial court gave the limited-purpose charge with respect to evidence of other offenses, the court asked the jury, “Do you understand, ladies and gentlemen, what I just got through saying or is it Greek to you?” The transcript reveals:
*675‘Whereupon, a juror states it’s Greek/