Court Opinion

ID: 9588594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:06.916895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:59.694907
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, I cannot concur in Division 2 because I find appellant raised the defense of entrapment, and that under the particular circumstances of this case disclosure of the identity of the informant, the only witness to the alleged entrapment, should have been compelled.
The evidence adduced at trial revealed that the confidential informant had been dispatched by an Atlanta police investigator to locate drug dealers in the neighborhood at issue. Appellant testified without rebuttal that the informant approached him and solicited a cocaine sale, making repeated requests in response to appellant’s initial refusal. Although this was the only evidence of undue coercion, evidence also was adduced indicating that appellant was not predisposed to sell cocaine, as appellant testified that he had never sold drugs before, a statement not challenged by the State. See Bennett v. State, 158 Ga. App. 421, 422 (1) (280 SE2d 429) (1981); Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 (222 SE2d 140) (1975); compare Martin v. State, 175 Ga. App. 704, 705 (2) (334 SE2d 32) (1985). Appellant also stated that he sold the cocaine only upon the repeated and insistent requests from the informant, and that he did not even have any cocaine but had to obtain it from someone else. Conversely, he also stated that he was in severe financial difficulty and was enticed by the promise of a $300 cut from the sale. Thus, although the evidence did not demand a finding of entrapment, a question of fact was presented for determination by the jury, see State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 (275 SE2d 646) (1981); see also Marshall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 249, 251-253 (1) (237 SE2d 709) (1977), and the burden was on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) (233 SE2d 42) (1977).
*138Decided March 16, 1989
Rehearing denied March 29, 1989
A. Nevell Owens, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, R. Andrew *139Weathers, Charles Smegal, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
*138“[W]here the informer is a witness or participant [in the alleged crime], a request for disclosure requires the trial court to balance the benefits of disclosure to the defendant against the resulting harm to the government. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) (1957); [cit.] ‘Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informant’s testimony, and other relevant factors.’ Roviaro, supra at 62. Where a defendant charges that a confidential informant has entrapped him outside the presence of any other witnesses, Roviaro would ordinarily require disclosure of the informant’s identity, since the defense of entrapment would rest upon allegations which only the informant could confirm or deny.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Royal, supra at 312 (2).
I find this case to be controlled by Royal, and accordingly agree with appellant that under the circumstances the trial court should have compelled the disclosure of the informant’s identity. Unlike the defendant in Royal, here appellant filed the requisite motions, informed the court he intended to rely on an entrapment defense, and presented evidence of same. He properly sought disclosure of the identity of the informant, who was the only witness to the initiation of the cocaine sale and thus the only person who could confirm or deny appellant’s claim of entrapment. Had the informant’s name been provided to appellant, he then could have subpoenaed the informant for trial testimony central to the entrapment issue. The cases cited by the majority, Leonardi v. State, 154 Ga. App. 402 (268 SE2d 380) (1980) and Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 21 (267 SE2d 323) (1980), are not controlling here because in each of those cases this court considered whether the evidence regarding entrapment required a directed verdict of acquittal, not whether a jury question had been presented on the entrapment issue. Leonardi, supra at 403-405 (1); Jones, supra at 24-25 (2). Further, there was no question in either case of availability of the identity of the sole witness to the alleged entrapment, as either the informant or another witness to the event at issue testified at each trial.
As I find the trial court’s failure to compel the disclosure of the informant’s identity was harmful error, I would reverse. See generally Moore v. State, 187 Ga. App. 387, 392-393 (370 SE2d 511) (1988).