Court Opinion

ID: 9769043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:10:40.993249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:24.444885
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-588

                           GUARDIANSHIP OF KAYLA. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The guardian, the child's maternal grandmother, appeals

 from a decree allowing the father's petition to terminate the

 guardianship of the child and resume parental duties.               See G. L.

 c. 190B, § 5-212 (a).       Following a three-day trial in the

 Probate and Family Court, the judge found the father fit to

 parent the child, terminated the guardianship, and awarded

 custody to the father. 2      On appeal, the guardian contends that

 the judge erred in finding the father fit to parent, as well as

 in denying the guardian's requests to appoint a guardian ad

 litem and to order visitation for the guardian.             We see no abuse

 of discretion or error of law, and affirm.

       1.   Fitness.    "[P]arents have a fundamental liberty

 interest in the care, custody, and management of their

 1 A pseudonym.
 2 The mother participated at trial but is not a part of this
 appeal.
children."   Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 496 (2008).

Although a guardianship displaces a parent's rights, a parent

retains the right to "petition for removal of a guardian on the

ground that removal would be in the best interest of the ward."

G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212 (a).    See Guardianship of Kelvin, 94

Mass. App. Ct. 448, 453 (2018).    "The burden of proof rests with

the guardian to establish the [parent's] unfitness by clear and

convincing evidence."    Guardianship of Cheyenne, 77 Mass. App.

Ct. 826, 829 (2010). 3   Unfitness is evidenced by "grievous

shortcomings or handicaps that would put the child's welfare

. . . much at hazard."    Petition of the New England Home for

Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass.

631, 646 (1975).    In addition to proving unfitness, the guardian

must also show that continuation of the guardianship is in the

best interest of the child.    Guardianship of Kelvin, supra at

456.   We review the trial judge's decision for abuse of

discretion or clear error of law.     See Guardianship of Cheyenne,

supra at 829-830.

3 The father originally consented to the guardianship and thus
had never been found unfit. This relieved the father of the
burden to present evidence of changed circumstances since the
appointment of the guardian. See Guardianship of Kelvin, 94
Mass. App. Ct. at 456. Nevertheless, the judge credited the
father's subsequent efforts to attain sobriety as a change in
circumstances in favor of the father.

                                  2
     Here, there was no error in the judge's ruling that the

guardian failed to meet her burden of proving the father unfit.

The guardian argues that the father struggles with ongoing

substance abuse issues, fails to meet the child's medical needs,

and frightens the child, but the judge addressed each of these

issues with detailed findings that were supported by the record.

See Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799 (1993).   The judge

found that after the father consented to the guardianship so

that he could work on his sobriety, he promptly obtained mental

health and addiction treatment, regularly provided negative drug

tests, and had been sober for over one year at the time of the

trial.   The judge also considered that the father regularly

visited the child in both supervised and unsupervised settings,

and cared appropriately for the child by cooking, doing laundry,

and helping with the child's schoolwork.   The judge found that

although the father had refused to attend a Zoom meeting with

the child's doctor and had been asked to leave the child's

pediatrician's office, these incidents were more indicative of

the father's relationship with the guardian than the father's

ability to care for the child.   See Adoption of Querida, 94

Mass. App. Ct. 771, 778 (2019) (judge must confront "troublesome

facts").

     In considering the child's best interests, the judge also

compared the child's behaviors while with each party.   The judge

                                 3
found that while the child was with the guardian, the child

presented behavioral issues like biting and scratching and was

afraid to go to her bedroom at night.       The father testified that

the child did not exhibit any of these behaviors while visiting

him.    In light of the detailed findings provided by the judge,

we see no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that

the father was fit and that the best interests of the child

would be served by terminating the guardianship.

        2.    Guardian ad litem.   Prior to trial, the guardian

unsuccessfully moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem to

conduct an investigation of facts bearing on the father's

petition and to make a report, with recommendations, to the

court.       The judge did not err in denying the motion, or in

instead appointing a probation officer to conduct an

investigation.

       A judge has discretion in deciding whether to appoint a

guardian ad litem or other appropriate person to investigate

facts.       See G. L. c. 215, § 56A; Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct.

500, 513 (2000).       Here, the judge ordered the probation

department to investigate and report on the issues surrounding

the custody of the child.       The nature of the scope of the

investigation, as well as the person chosen to conduct it, fell

squarely within the permissible discretion of the trial judge.

See Hayden v. Hayden, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 916 (1993).         In

                                     4
addition, a wide variety of pertinent witnesses, including the

father, the guardian, the probation officer, and multiple other

witnesses familiar with the child's circumstances, were

available to testify at the trial, and statements by the child

were available in the record. 4   Presented with all this

information on which to base her decision, the judge did not err

in appointing a probation officer, or in declining the

guardian's request to appoint a guardian ad litem, to conduct

the investigation.

     3.   Visitation.   Nor did the judge abuse her discretion in

declining to order visitation time for the guardian with the

child.    Although the judge recognized that the child and the

guardian shared a close relationship, the judge credited the

testimony of the mother that she would allow the guardian access

to the child during the mother's parenting time. 5   Contrary to

the guardian's assertion, the mother plainly testified that she

would allow the guardian access to the child on alternate

4 To the extent that the guardian mentions her unsuccessful
attempts at trial to introduce statements by the child's
therapist and a video recording containing statements by the
child, her brief does not explain how this was reversible error.
See Donovan v. Gardner, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 602 (2000)
(conclusory statements in brief "do not rise to the level of
appellate argument").
5 The judge similarly declined to order visitation for the

paternal grandparents, where the father testified that they
would have access to the child during his parenting time since
he would be living with them.

                                  5
weekends if the guardian did not have her own visitation time.

See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 (1997) ("the judge's

assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of

the witnesses is entitled to deference" [citation omitted]).

See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (parents

have a fundamental right to "make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children").      Although the guardian

had been the child's primary caregiver for several years, the

child also had an ongoing relationship with the father, with the

father regularly visiting and appropriately caring for the

child.     Compare Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 784 (1999)

(guardian was entitled to visitation where guardian was "only

family [the child] knows").     The judge therefore did not err in

ordering visitation only to the father and the mother.      See id.

at 781 (controlling consideration in custody proceedings is the

welfare of the child).

                                       Decree affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                         Ditkoff & Hodgens, JJ. 6),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    August 29, 2023.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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