Court Opinion

ID: 3275991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 16:44:48.243624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:19.742653
License: Public Domain

Appellee, Arkansas Dailies, Inc., is a Tennessee corporation having a capital stock of $10,000. C. E. Palmer and members of his family owned all the corporate stock, except $700 of the stock acquired by appellant during his ten years employment by appellee as manager of his corporation. Appellee, corporation, was organized for the purpose of soliciting advertising from various manufacturers in the east and north and placing same in newspapers which appellee secured as patrons of its organization. The remuneration it received from its patrons was a percentage of the advertising fee which the various newspapers collected from the advertisers for advertisements which were procured through its representatives in the east and north and perhaps other parts of the country.
C. E. Palmer resided in Texarkana, Texas, and was engaged in other business and employed appellant to manage the business in which appellee corporation was engaged at a fixed annual salary together with bonuses and commissions. Appellant's chief duty was to obtain as many newspapers as possible as patrons of appellee, corporation, and to make and supervise contracts with them. His position was designated as that of manager of the corporation; and he also acted as secretary and treasurer and had charge of the office in Memphis and the employees of said corporation. He was also selected as a director of appellee, corporation, and served in that capacity with the other two directors, C. E. Palmer and his son-in-law, W. E. Hussman. Under the management of appellant the business expanded during the ten year period of his employment from about eight papers to fifty-four papers or patrons. Appellant during the last half of his employment had in mind a desire to acquire an interest in the business as evidenced by a conversation he had with a man by the name of Murray, an intimate friend, but he never revealed this desire to Palmer or anyone connected with appellee corporation. At the time of his employment by Palmer as manager of appellee, corporation, no definite term of employment was *Page 473 
agreed upon so it partook of the nature of a contract of employment at will. In other words, appellee had the right to discharge and appellant had the right to resign when either decided to do so. There was no provision in the contract prohibiting appellant, in case of his resignation, from setting up an independent business of his own of the same character of that of appellee or from soliciting the patrons or customers of appellee from becoming his customers in an independent business.
The time arrived for an arrangement between appellee and appellant for another year's employment. In response to a letter from C. E. Palmer, appellant, appellee and W. E. Hussman, the three directors met in Hot Springs, Arkansas, to discuss appellant's remuneration, his salary and bonus arrangement, but no agreement could be reached. Appellant wanted more salary than the others were willing to pay him, and then Palmer asked him what kind of arrangement he was willing to make, and appellant responded that if he remained with the corporation he wanted it to give him a half interest in the business and stated that unless they gave him a half interest therein he would resign, organize a similar company of his own and take all its business with him except the patrons or papers owned by Palmer. This proposal on his part was declined, whereupon appellant resigned as manager, secretary and treasurer of appellee, corporation, effective immediately. At the time, appellant proposed to sell his stock to Palmer, but Palmer replied that he would not buy the stock because the corporation was not going to furnish the capital for him to set up all independent or competitive business. Something was said about him resigning as a director, and he said that he would wait until a little later, and he did resign as a director on the 13th day of December, 1940, and his resignation was accepted.
Both appellant and C. E. Palmer returned to Memphis, and each mailed out a notice to all of the patrons to the effect that appellant had resigned and was no longer connected with appellee corporation. This notice was mailed out on October 9, 1939. In appellant's letter to the newspapers in addition to stating that he had severed *Page 474 
his connections with appellee corporation he also stated that he was going into the same business for himself with headquarters in Memphis and would operate his new business under the name of Wallace Witmer Company and would soon call upon them. Following the notice to the patrons by appellee corporation, it sent out to the patrons a rather lengthy letter confirming the notice it had sent out on October 9, and saying to the patrons that appellee, corporation, had employed H. K. Howard as its general manager who was thoroughly experienced in the business. It also stated in the letter that W. E. Jordan, the assistant manager, would continue on the staff. It also stated that appellant would not likely be able to successfully organize an agency that would render service to them equal to the service it had rendered, and that it would be able to render, and advising them that it would not be wise to form a new connection. It was also stated that the new general manager would call upon them and discuss matters in detail with them. From that time on it was a race between appellant and the new general manager as to which agency would get their business after their contracts expired with appellee. Appellee secured contracts with a Fayetteville paper, a Harrison paper, a Jonesboro paper, a Batesville paper and others. Later the appellee corporation persuaded the Fayetteville Democrat Publishing Company to make a contract with it and give it an indemnifying bond to protect it against any damages that might result from a breach of its contract with appellant. The contracts with both the Fayetteville Democrat Publishing Company and the Times Publishing Company at Harrison were entered into with appellant on December 21, 1939, after appellant had resigned as manager, secretary and treasurer and director of appellee, corporation, and was not to take effect until the expiration of their respective contracts with appellee corporation.
Appellant organized his new company and moved into offices in the same building hear the offices occupied by appellee corporation. He did not take out any of the furnishings of the office, or any of the files or any of the contracts it had with any of the papers, but later did *Page 475 
employ Mrs. Herriot who had been acting in the capacity of assistant secretary of appellee, corporation, for about ten years. He also procured the same eastern and northern representatives who had been procuring advertisements for appellee, corporation, as his representatives to procure advertisements for the new company he established. The form of contract he used in making his agreements with the papers was in substance the same kind of a contract that appellee used in contracting with its papers.
The business in which appellee was engaged involved no trade secrets, trade marks, etc. It was technically a service corporation.
About all that appellant took with him when he severed his connections with appellee was the experience and knowledge he had acquired in acting as manager and employee of appellee and the acquaintanceship he had made with appellee's patrons during the time he had served it.
Growing out of appellant's activities in soliciting business from the patrons of appellee at the expiration of their contracts with it, appellee filed a suit in the chancery court of Boone county seeking an injunction against appellant to prevent him from securing such contracts for services from any of appellee's patrons. Incidental to the main purpose of the injunction proceeding, the Democrat Publishing Company of Fayetteville and the Times Publishing Company of Harrison became parties to the suit involving the validity of any contract either of the papers had made with appellant, and the contracts he had made with them were asked to be cancelled.
Appellant filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint claiming that he was within his legal rights in soliciting business from the patrons of appellee after the expiration of their contracts with it.
After hearing the testimony responsive to the issues involved the chancery court rendered a decree canceling the contracts appellant had made with the Democrat Publishing Company and the Times Publishing Company and enjoined appellant from soliciting business from or entering *Page 476 
into any agreement with appellee's patrons for a term of one year, from which decree an appeal has been duly prosecuted to this court.
Appellee prosecuted a cross-appeal upon the ground that under the evidence the court should have rendered a decree prohibiting appellant from soliciting business or entering into contracts with appellee's former patrons for a term of three years.
It would abridge competition in business, the life of trade, if an employee who had rendered services to a business of any character for a long period of time and who had helped build up a business on account of performing his duties well should be prohibited after severing his relationship with a business concern from establishing and prosecuting a similar business in the same territory or field in which his employer had done business, especially where the employee had not contracted when entering into the employment to refrain from establishing an independent business of like nature. Legitimate competition should be encouraged rather than restricted, and, in the aid of the freedom of employment, combinations and monopolies which would result in the restraint of trade should not be tolerated in a democratic form of government. Certain restrictions have been imposed upon employee when severing their relationship with an employer. For example where the particular business in which he had been employed has trade secrets an employee is not permitted to set up an independent business of a similar nature and use the trade secrets of his employer or confidential information received from his employer in the new or independent business in which he engages, but it is allowable for him to use his experience and knowledge gained during the period of his employment in his independent business. The experience and knowledge he has acquired as an employee in no sense becomes the property of his employer. Of course during the period of his employment he must be loyal to his employer and not attempt to set up a competitive business with the business of his employer. It is said on page 219 in 39 Columbia Law Review, that: "After leaving the corporation a director may use any experience he *Page 477 
gained while working for the corporation. Similarly, once his term is ended, he may do what was prohibited to him before."
In the instant case it is not shown that appellant, in the prosecution of his new business, used any confidential information, trade secrets or anything else that he had obtained from appellee during the period of his service with it. It was said, in substance, in the case of H. W. Gossard Company v. Helene C. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155,109 N.W. 483, 6 L.R.A., N.S., 1115, that: "An employee, on leaving his employer's service is guilty of no legal wrong in profiting by the experience and knowledge gained in the service."
In the instant case it is clear that appellant severed all the connections he had with appellee corporation, except that of nominal director, until the board could meet and accept his resignation as director. His resignation as manager, secretary and treasurer had been accepted and his resignation as director had also been accepted, before he entered into any contracts with the patrons of appellee corporation. No fiduciary relation ship whatever existed between him and appellee, corporation, when the injunction in this case was issued prohibiting him from soliciting business from or entering into contracts for furnishing appellee's patrons with advertising matter. Even then he was simply trying to obtain contracts for such service with appellee's patrons after their contracts with appellee had expired. This was not making use of any trade secret or confidential information he acquired during his services with appellee corporation. He had never acquired any financial interest in the business of appellee, corporation, except the purchase of $700 worth of stock in a concern that had $10,000 capital stock. We do not think it would be sound to say that a minority stockholder in any concern might not engage in an independent similar business even though competitive in nature.
In the case of New York Automobile Company v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y.S. 781, the court said: "Mr. Wilkinson as an employee of the plaintiff had, *Page 478 
under the circumstances, a right to leave its service when he did. Concededly, he had no right to take with him any of its tangible property such as the model, the patterns, drawings; and he did not. Possibly, he had no right to use any designs which he might remember, and this he did not do. But he, as well as everyone else, had a right to plan and use a four cylinder air cooled engine. His experience, his skill, his unmatured thoughts and designs were his own. That they had been gained at the expense of the plaintiff certainly gave the latter no legal right to them. If it had possessed any unpublished inventions which Mr. Wilkinson was now using, another question would arise. But it had not. All it possessed on the 30th day of June was an unperfected model of an engine; and this it still has. Nor have Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Brown wronged it by any act as directors. True, the one, after he left the plaintiff, began at once to build a four-cylinder engine for the other, and this was ultimately sold to a corporation of which they were both directors. But I know of no rule which prohibits a director of a corporation engaging in a business similar to that carried on by the corporation, either in his own behalf or with another corporation of which he is likewise a director. True, he owes to his stockholders the most scrupulous good faith. He may not deal with the trust property for his own advantage. He may not deal in his own behalf in respect to any matter involving his rights and duties as a director. He may not seek his own profit at the expense of the company or its stock-holders. But, so long as he violates no legal or moral duty which he owes to the corporation or to its stockholders he is entirely free to engage in an independent, competitive business."
We think the case of El Dorado Laundry Company v. Ford, 174 Ark. 104, 294 S.W. 393, comes nearer fitting the facts in this case than any case we have read except the case of Fulton Grand Laundry Company v. Johnson,140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753, 23 A.L.R. 420. In the El Dorado Laundry Company case, supra was said by the late Chief Justice HART, that: "The facts in this case bring it within the rule laid down in Fulton Grand Laundry *Page 479 
Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753,23 A.L.R. 420. It was held that the names of the patrons of a laundry on a particular route did not constitute a trade secret which will be protected by injunction so as to prevent a driver employed on such route from utilizing it and soliciting the patronage of such persons when he leaves the service of his employer and enters business for himself. In a note at the end of the case, it is said that in a majority of the cases which have passed on the question, it is held that in the absence of an express contract, on taking a new employment in a competing business, an employee may solicit for a new employer the business of his former customers, and will not be enjoined from so doing at the instance of his former employer. We think that under the principle announced in these cases and under the facts in the present case, the chancellor properly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunctive relief asked, and that his decree dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff for want of equity should be affirmed. It is so ordered."
To give a concrete illustration, certainly the manager of a large department store could resign or sever his connection with it and take employment as manager of another at an increased salary or he could resign and establish a department store of his own just so he did not use in the prosecution of his new business any trade secrets or confidential information he had received from his former employer, provided, however, he had not contracted with his former employer not to establish an independent similar business within a reasonable period of time after severing his connections with his former employer.
We are struck with an argument made in the amici curiae brief filed by the Friersons as an aid to this court in the instant case. It is said in their brief that: "Every day we know that popular automobile salesmen, for instance, quit a Chevrolet agency and go into the employment of a Ford agency or vice versa, and the new employers advertise that the salesman has recently come into the employment of the new master and will be glad to see his old friends at the new address. The same *Page 480 
transactions are common regarding retail merchandise salesmen of ability. The old common law idea of apprenticeship was based upon the thought that a young man could apprentice himself until he had learned a trade or an art, and after he had learned it, he was expected to start in business for himself; and if the community was small, his activities would necessarily be in competition with his former master. Each clerk in the simple old days expected to save up, make friends and later launch his own business, which almost necessarily would compete with his former employer."
We think under the facts in this case the trial court erred in enjoining appellant from entering into a separate competitive business with that of appellee corporation, and also in canceling the contracts appellant had made with the Fayetteville Democrat Publishing Company and the Times Publishing Company.
On account of the error indicated, the decree is reversed and remanded with directions to dissolve the injunction and dismiss appellee's complaint for the want of equity.
McHANEY and HOLT, JJ., dissent.