Court Opinion

ID: 9759210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:08:38.615658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.254935
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Before today this Court has held that “improved employment and stimulation of the economy serve essential public purposes.” State ex rel. Jardon v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 570 S.W.2d 666, 675 (Mo. banc 1978). The majority now turns its back to Jardon and unnecessarily deprives Missouri of an effective tool for economic growth. The Missouri Industrial Development Board’s authority to issue revenue bonds and the allowance of tax credit under § 100.297, RSMo Supp.1985, is constitutionally sound notwithstanding the majority’s myopic reading of Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a). Unfortunately this new and overly restrictive reading of the constitution comes at a time when the need for cooperation between government and private industry was never more acute. It deprives Missouri of an important tool to forge new economic growth and the expansion of existing industries. Missouri needs jobs for its people. The farming areas of our State struggle to create work for families that the farms alone can no longer support and our State is locked in an escalating competition to attract new industries. But sadly the majority today, misunderstanding the legislative plan, carefully fashioned to accomplish these legitimate ends, scorns the concept of improved employment as an essential public purpose.
Although the legislature generally may not “grant public money or property, or lend or authorize the lending of public credit, to any private person, association or corporation,” Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a), by virtue of the “public purpose doctrine” we consistently have held that such prohibition is not violated where the grant or loan is for a public purpose, e.g., State ex rel. Wagner v. St. Louis County Port Auth., 604 S.W.2d 592, 602 (Mo. banc 1980); Menorah Medical Center v. Health & Educ. Facilities Auth., 584 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Mo. banc 1979); Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 719 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S.Ct. 653, 50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976), because “[t]he presence of a legitimate ‘public purpose’ makes society or the people of this state the direct beneficiary of the expenditures.” Id.
It has long been established that “[t]he state constitution, unlike the federal constitution, is not a grant of power, but as to legislative power, it is only a limitation; and, therefore, except for the restrictions imposed by the state constitution, the power of the state legislature is unlimited and practically absolute.” State ex rel. Farm*936ers’ Elec. Coop. v. State Envtl. Improvement Auth., 518 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. banc 1975). The burden is on appellant to demonstrate that the challenged legislative enactment is unconstitutional. Menorah Medical Center, 584 S.W.2d at 77. “An act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional provision,” and “[l]egislative enactments should be recognized and enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people unless they are plainly and palpably a violation of the fundamental law of the constitution.” Americans United, 538 S.W.2d at 716. It is only in the context of these well-settled principles that the tax credit authorized by § 100.297 can be measured against Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a).
For reasons hereafter discussed, it will be seen that the provisions of § 100.297 do not constitute the granting of public money or the lending of public credit as those phrases appear in their constitutional context. However, assuming arguendo that the challenged tax credit constitutes a granting of public money or a lending of public credit, it is not violative of the Missouri constitution because it is for a public purpose in that, as we have “reiterated through the years,” it is “for the support of the government or for some of the recognized objects of government, or directly to promote the welfare of the community, ” State ex rel. Wagner, 604 S.W.2d at 597 (emphasis added), and under the “primary purpose ” test, “if the primary purpose of a statute is public ‘the fact that special benefits may accrue to some private persons does not deprive the government action of its public character, such benefits being incidental to the primary public purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth., 517 S.W.2d 36, 45 (Mo. banc 1975)).
The Industrial Development Funding Act, §§ 100.250-.297, RSMo Supp.1985, authorizes respondent to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of financing commercial, industrial, agricultural, manufacturing, pollution control, waste control, research and development, and export trade facilities. Sections 100.255(9), .275.1, RSMo Supp. 1985. We repeatedly have held that public financing for such projects serves a legitimate public purpose. E.g., State ex rel. Wagner, 604 S.W.2d at 596-98, 602; State ex rel. Jardon, 570 S.W.2d at 675-76; State ex rel. Farmers’ Elec. Coop., 518 S.W.2d at 74-75; State ex rel. Atkinson, 517 S.W.2d at 45. Stimulation of the economy is an essential public purpose because “[t]he continued existence of an established industry and the establishment of new industry provide jobs, measurably increase the resources of the community, promote the economy of the state, and thereby contribute to the welfare of its people.” Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745, 752 (1968), quoted in State ex rel. Jardon, 570 S.W.2d at 675.
As respondent submits, the tax credit authorized by § 100.297 is an integral part of the program for economic development contemplated by the Act, and it is subject to the protection of the Missouri Industrial Development Board’s careful scrutiny. Respondent may grant a loan request to carry out a project only if it determines that the project will benefit the economy of the state. Section 100.281.1(1), RSMo Supp. 1985. Moreover, respondent may authorize the challenged tax credit only if it first determines that “[t]he availability of such tax credit is a material inducement to the undertaking of the project in the state of Missouri and to the sale of the bonds or notes. ” Section 100.297.1(1) (emphasis added). It makes little sense to hold, as the principal opinion essentially does, that issuance of the revenue bonds serves a public purpose, but that offering a material inducement for the sale of the bonds does not. By the very terms of § 100.297.1(1), the tax credit will be authorized only where such will serve a public purpose. “The public purpose being apparent, it is unimportant that incidental benefits may accrue to private interests.” State ex rel. Farmers’Elec. Coop., 518 S.W.2d at 74.
*937The legislature expressly provides in § 100.275.7 that “[n]othing contained in sections 100.250 to 100.297 shall be deemed to constitute a use of state funds or credit in violation of the provisions of article III, sections 37, 38(a) and 39 of the Missouri Constitution.” The “determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily for the legislative department and it will not be overturned unless found to be arbitrary and unreasonable.” State ex rel. Farmers’ Elec. Coop., 518 S.W.2d at 74. Appellant dismally fails in his attempt to make such a showing here. As we stated in Menorah Medical Center, 584 S.W.2d at 79, “Debates on Article III, § 38, at the 1945 Constitutional Convention, indicate the belief that Missouri’s constitution should be flexible and progressive enough to allow state public funds to be committed to new needs and purposes. See Eleven Debates of Missouri Constitution, 1945, pp. 3208-3212.” “The consensus of modem legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of activities which may be classified as involving public purpose.” Menorah Medical Center, 584 S.W.2d at 79; see also State ex rel. Jardon, 570 S.W.2d at 675. Like this Court in Americans United, 538 S.W.2d at 719, but unlike today’s majority, I am not inclined to drive the legislature back into the nineteenth century. Approval of issuance of the revenue bonds by respondent serves the legitimate public purpose of stimulating the economy; authorization of the tax credit, where the availability of such tax credit is specifically determined to be a material inducement to the undertaking of the project in the state of Missouri and to the sale of the bonds or notes, serves a similar public purpose. Therefore the tax credit authorized by § 100.297 does not violate Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a).
In sum, the tax credit provision of § 100.297 does not violate Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a) because it is for a public purpose; furthermore it is not invalid because the tax credit provision does not constitute the “lending of public credit” or the “grantjjng of] public money” as those phrases are employed in the constitution. Such would occur when the state guarantees repayment of a loan and stands liable as a guarantor in the event of default, but that is not the case here.
There are many provisions in the current tax code allowing an individual taxpayer to decrease his income tax liability if he suffers business, loan or investment losses. Eg., 26 U.S.C. §§ 165, 166, 611 (1982 & Supp.III 1985). In large part the deductions provided by the Internal Revenue Code are also allowable for the benefit of Missouri residents to decrease their state income tax liability. Section 143.141, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984. Under 26 U.S.C. § 166, for example, a taxpayer essentially may deduct from his adjusted gross income any business debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year. The great similarities between this “deduction” and the challenged tax “credit” in the case sub judice may be illustrated graphically:
Bad debt deduction
26 U.S.C. § 166; § 143.141, RSMo
(1) Entrepreneur begins or expands business.
(2) Entrepreneur solicits prospective creditor to borrow $1,000. Entrepreneur faces no restrictions as to whether creditor will be able to deduct his loss incurred through default
(3) Creditor lends entrepreneur $1,000 and takes interest bearing promissory note as evidence of debt.
(4) Creditor's promissory note is negotiable and can be sold in the market place to any purchaser.
(5) Entrepreneur defaults and creditor suffers bad debt loss.
(6) State of Missouri does not guarantee payment of the $1,000.
(7) State of Missouri does not grant public money or lend its credit to the entrepreneur or to the holder of the note.
(8) Creditor or any subsequent purchaser of the note, if he
(a) has earnings in the years thereafter and
(b) incurs state income tax liability,
may claim the bad debt as a deduction for state income tax purposes.
(9) Creditor (if in 50% tax bracket) may reduce his state income tax liability by $500.
Section 100.297 tax credit
(1) Entrepreneur begins or expands business.
(2) Entrepreneur contacts Missouri Industrial Development Board seeking issuance of revenue bonds in the amount of $1,000. Entrepreneur faces significant restrictions as to whether buyer of bonds may credit his loss in the event of default The Board first determines if the project will benefit the economy of the state and if availability of the tax credit would be a material inducement to the undertaking of the project and the sale of the bonds or notes.
(3) Missouri Industrial Development Board issues revenue bonds obligating the entrepreneur for which buyer lends or pays $1,000.
(4) Revenue bonds are negotiable and can be sold in the market place to any purchaser.
(5) Entrepreneur defaults and buyer suffers a loss on bonds.
(6) State of Missouri does not guarantee payment of the $1,000.
(7) State of Missouri does not grant public money or lend its credit to the entrepreneur or to the buyer.
(8) Buyer or any subsequent purchaser of the bond, if he
(a) has earnings in the years thereafter and
(b) incurs state income tax liability,
may claim his loss as a credit for state income tax purposes.
(9) Buyer may reduce his state income tax liability by $1,000.
*938From this illustration, a creditor who incurs the bad debt loss will be able to reduce his taxes by $500 while the buyer of revenue bonds who incurs a loss through default will be able to reduce his taxes by $1,000. In either case the noteholder (creditor) or the bondholder (creditor) knows he has a potential tax savings if his debtor defaults. But each knows the state does not guarantee payment, “grant public money” nor “lend its credit” to the transaction. Though in one instance the potential tax savings is $1,000 and in the other it is $500, such numerical difference has no constitutional significance. The point remains that if, as the majority holds today, the challenged tax credit is a “granting of public money” or a “lending of public credit,” and thus invalid, so the bad debt deduction allowable until this date under 26 U.S.C. § 166 and § 143.141, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984, is necessarily invalid. However neither appellant nor the majority advance the proposition that the “bad debt” and similar allowable deductions constitute prohibited “granting of public money” or “lending of public credit,” yet to strike down the challenged credit necessarily threatens invalidation of the bad debt deduction and similar provisions of the tax code including the mineral depletion allowance, 26 U.S.C. § 611, and the deduction for worthless securities, 26 U.S.C. § 165(g). The result reached by the majority was neither intended nor envisioned by the drafters of our constitution and today’s constitutional “interpretation” plays havoc with a substantial portion of Missouri’s income tax system.
Finally, the tax credit does not violate other constitutional provisions raised by appellant. At least for the same reason that it does not violate Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 38(a), i.e., because it serves a legitimate public purpose, the tax credit cannot be said to violate Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 39(1) and (2), or Mo. Const, art. X, § 3. Furthermore, although § 100.297 authorizes respondent to determine when the tax credit is available, such does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in violation of Mo. Const, art. II, § 1, since the legislature in § 100.297.1 has set forth the findings required by respondent before the tax credit may be authorized. See, e.g., State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Mo.1970); State ex rel. Field v. Smith, 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S.W.2d 74, 76 (1932). Additionally, the tax credit authorized by § 100.297 is not the contracting of or the authorizing of the contracting of any liability of the state, and therefore does not violate Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 37. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Bldgs, v. Crowe, 363 S.W.2d 598, 605 (Mo. banc 1962). Section 100.297 is not a “local or special law” violative of Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 40(28) because a law is not special if it applies alike to all of a given class and the classification is made upon a reasonable basis. See, e.g., Century 21 — Mabel O. Pettus, Inc. v. City of Jennings, 700 S.W.2d 809, 810-11 (Mo. banc 1985); State ex rel. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. County Court of Greene County, 667 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Mo. banc 1984). Lastly, § 100.297 does not violate Mo. Const, art. X, §§ 16-24 because the authorized tax credit does not constitute an expense incurred by state government. Mo. Const, art. X, § 20.
The principal opinion essentially holds that while issuance of revenue bonds serves a legitimate public purpose, authorization of tax credits which materially induce the sale of those bonds does not. I find this distinction untenable and would affirm the circuit court’s judgment.