Court Opinion

ID: 9882251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 16:25:19.8119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:06.448840
License: Public Domain

J-A28041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RODNEY WILLIAM GARY                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2634 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 13, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0007529-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED OCTOBER 05, 2023

       Rodney William Gary (“Gary”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after he pleaded nolo contendere to persons not to possess a firearm

and firearms not to be carried without a license.1 We affirm.

       We summarize the factual and procedural history of this appeal from the

record.2 In July 2017, the Upper Darby Police Department received numerous
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106.

2 We note with disapproval that the trial court failed to provide a full summary

of the facts or make relevant findings of fact or credibility related to the issues
raised on in this appeal.        See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/22, at 3-4
(unnumbered). We further note Gary’s brief does not address the trial court
opinion and instead asks this Court to make critical findings of fact and
credibility. See Gary’s Brief at 15, 17-19; but see BouSamra v. Excela
Health, 210 A.3d 967, 979-80 (Pa. 2019) (noting “it is not an appellate court’s
function to engage in fact finding”) (internal citation omitted); In re A.J.R.-
H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1176 (Pa. 2018) (noting that an appellate court may not
affirm a decision on a different basis when the court must weigh evidence and
engage in fact finding or make credibility determination to reach a legal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A28041-22

reports of gunshots at the 7000 block of Guilford Road.          See Affidavit of

Probable Cause, 7/30/17, at 1. Responding police officers found four 9-mm

fired cartridge casings in the area, and a witness reported that she saw a Black

man in his early twenties running from the scene. See id. The witness stated

that the man had short-cropped hair, was wearing a white shirt and black

Adidas running pants, and was carrying a black sweatshirt.          See id.    The

witness did not specifically identify the suspect as Gary.

       An hour later, the same witness told an investigating detective that the

man who fired the gunshots had just entered a green Toyota Corolla (“the

Corolla”) and gave the detective the car’s license plate number and

approximate location. See id.3 The detective broadcasted the information

over police radio. Another officer saw the Corolla, observed a Black man in

the backseat, and followed the Corolla until more officers arrived to conduct

what the affidavit of probable cause referred to as a “felony vehicle stop.”

Id.   Once officers stopped the Corolla and had its occupants exit, they

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outcome); but see Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1279 (Pa.
2020) (plurality). Because we do not have the benefit of relevant findings of
fact or credibility from the trial court, we will review the record in a light most
favorable to Gary to determine whether his legal claims have merit.

3 Gary alleges the witness who    initially described the shooter to police also
reported that the shooter got into the Corolla. See Gary’s Brief at 10. He
asserts that the report about the shooter entering a car occurred one hour
after the witness initially described the shooter. See id. Gary cites to a
suppression hearing transcript for these propositions but failed to ensure that
the certified record contains those transcripts. For the reasons stated above,
we accept these assertions as true.

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identified the driver as Maya Smith (“Smith”), the front passenger as Laquita

Priester (“Priester”), and the backseat passenger as Gary. See id.; see also

Exhibits DW-2, Priester’s Statement & DW-3, Smith’s Statement.           Officers

observed a black shirt on the backseat of the Corolla, where Gary had been

seated, and a handgun underneath the front seat. See Affidavit of Probable

Cause, 7/30/17, at 1.        Officers towed the Corolla to police headquarters,

obtained a search warrant, and recovered the handgun from the Corolla. See

id. at 1-2. The handgun was determined to be a 9-mm loaded with thirteen

rounds and an additional round in the chamber. See id. at 2.

       Officers also took Priester and Smith from the scene of the stop to police

headquarters. Both Priester and Smith gave statements that same evening.

Priester gave two, conflicting statements to police: an initial and a

supplemental statement. The substance of Priester’s initial statement was as

follows: she was at a home with Smith and Gary earlier in the day.4 See

Exhibit DW-2, Priester’s Statement, 7/29/17, at 1. Gary had a black handgun

on the table, and after using Priester’s phone, put the pistol into his waistband,

and left the home. See id. at 5. Twenty to thirty minutes after Gary left, she

and Smith left to pick up Gary’s brother. See id. at 2. Along the way, they

saw Gary standing outside of a store, and he asked them to give him a ride

back to the home. See id. Gary got in the backseat of the Corolla behind

Priester, and he directed Smith to drive around the block. See id. He then
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4 Priester stated she was dating Gary’s brother.   See Exhibit DW-2, Priester’s
Statement, 7/29/17, at 1.

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told Smith to use a turn signal because there was a police car behind them.

See id. at 3. The officer signaled for them to stop shortly after Smith made

a turn. See id. at 3. As Smith pulled over, Gary bent down to slide something

underneath Priester’s seat. See id.    Gary told Smith that she did not have

to let the police search the car. See id. at 4. Priester denied possessing or

hiding the handgun underneath her seat. See id. at 6.

      In her supplemental statement to police, Priester added when she,

Smith, and Gary were at the home earlier in the day, a female stopped by the

home and a friend of Gary’s was also present. Gary and his friend talked

about somebody wanting to fight. See id. at 7. Gary and his friend then left

the home. See id. Contrary to Priester’s initial statement, which indicated

she and Smith left the home after Gary left, her supplemental statement

asserted that Gary left, then returned to the home, and afterward, she, Smith,

and Gary left together to go “buy weed.” Id.

      Smith’s statement to police included details not contained in Priester’s

statements. Smith indicated she and Priester went shopping before returning

to the home to watch TV.    See Exhibit DW-3, Smith’s Statement, 7/19/17,

at 1. A female, and then Gary and his friend, arrived at the home. See id.

Gary and his friend left, then returned to the home. See id. Smith added

when Gary returned, he was talking excitedly about the person who wanted

to fight.   See id.   Gary removed a magazine from a handgun, put the

magazine on the table, and then got a second magazine from the couch and

put it in the pistol. See id. Although Smith stated that she, Priester, and

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Gary then left the home together, Smith asserted Gary asked them for a ride

to a barbershop, but the shop was closed. See id. They then went to a store,

after which Gary asked her and Priester to go “get weed.” Id. at 1-2. They

were unable to purchase the marijuana and began driving to the home, when

an officer stopped them. See id. at 2.5

       Upper Darby police filed the criminal complaint and accompanying

affidavit of probable cause charging Gary with persons not to possess a firearm

and firearms not to be carried without a license.6       Gary retained private

counsel (“plea counsel”), who filed a motion to suppress the handgun found

in the Corolla as the fruit of an illegal search.   The trial court denied the

suppression motion following two days of hearings. The trial court scheduled

trial in the instant case for October 29, 2019. See Order, 4/2/19.

____________________________________________

5 Smith, like Priester, stated when a police car began following them, Gary

told her to use her turn signals. See Exhibit DW-3, Smith’s Statement,
7/19/17, at 2. When the officer stopped them, Gary was leaning down behind
the front passenger seat, and he told Smith that the police did not have a right
to search her car. See id.

6 While initially on bail in the present case, Gary allegedly committed new
offenses listed at trial docket 1201 of 2018 (“the separate case”). We address
Gary’s appeal concerning the separate case at J-A28042-22.

Moreover, after Gary committed the new offenses in the separate case, the
trial court revoked Gary’s initial bail in the instant case and set a new bail
amount of 10% of $100,000. Gary signed verifications on two pro se motions
to modify the new bail amount. Both of those forms contained a preprinted
assertion that “[d]efendant denies charges against him and will plead not
guilty at trial.” See Pro Se Motions to Reduce Bail, filed 7/24/18 and 9/11/18.
The trial court denied both requests to reduce the bail amount.

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       On the scheduled trial date, Gary appeared in court with plea counsel

and pleaded nolo contendere to persons not to possess a firearm and firearms

not to be carried without a license in the instant case.7   The court accepted

Gary’s nolo contendere pleas and scheduled sentencing for December 2019.

       Thereafter, the trial court granted plea counsel’s numerous requests to

continue sentencing or status hearings until February, April, and then

December 2020, and then again until January and March 2021.8 In March

2021, plea counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representation averring

Gary wanted new counsel due to disagreements with plea counsel’s

representation and strategy. See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 3/5/21, at

1. The court granted plea counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed present

counsel in March 2021.

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7 Gary also pleaded nolo contendere in the separate case.        Plea counsel
represented Gary in both cases at the hearing.

While conducting an on-the-record colloquy, plea counsel discussed the
possibility of proceeding to trial, noted that the Commonwealth informed him
that it “had a number of witnesses available to come to [c]ourt to testify in
the case,” and confirmed Gary’s understanding that by entering his plea, he
was “relieving the [Commonwealth] of [its] duty and [its] job of having to call
witnesses to [c]ourt to prove [its] case.” N.T., 10/29/19, at 9-10.

8 We note the COVID-19 pandemic likely delayed the scheduling of a
sentencing hearing. However, most of the defense’s continuance request
forms did not state the reasons for the requests. Two used general terms
such as “negotiations” or “open matters.” Applications for Continuances, dated
2/7/20 and 1/29/21. We add that the Commonwealth filed to a third case
against Gary listed at 1511 of 2021, which involved a murder charge. See
N.T., 6/22/21, at 19.

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        In May 2021, nearly nineteen months after entering his nolo

contendere pleas, present counsel filed a motion to withdraw Gary’s pleas.

The motion asserted that Gary had maintained his innocence throughout the

case.     See Motion to Withdraw Nolo Contendere Pleas, 5/27/21, at 3

(unnumbered).

        The trial court held a hearing on Gary’s motion to withdraw his nolo

contendere pleas. Present counsel argued that the instant case against Gary

“turn[ed] on” testimony from Priester and Smith, but their statements to

police did not “make sense” and contained “serious credibility issues.” N.T.,

6/22/21, at 6-7. Present counsel claimed that Priester’s initial statement to

police that she and Smith left after Gary left the home could suggest that

Priester and Smith took part in the reported shooting. See id. at 6. Present

counsel claimed that without credible testimony that Gary placed the handgun

under the front seat of the Corolla from either Priester or Smith, the

Commonwealth could not prevail at trial. See id. at 7. Gary did not testify

at the hearing, but present counsel alleged that Gary maintained his innocence

when seeking bail reductions before entering his pleas. See id. at 8-9.

        The Commonwealth responded that Gary’s assertion of innocence was

implausible. The Commonwealth argued that Priester and Smith both stated

Gary possessed the firearm and placed it underneath the front seat of the

Corolla, and that officers recovered the handgun from underneath the seat

directly in front of Gary. See id. at 17. The Commonwealth also noted the

lengthy delay in Gary’s assertion of his innocence and suggested that Gary

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might have ulterior motives due to a third case against him involving a charge

of murder. See id. at 18-19.9 The Commonwealth cited Commonwealth v.

Carelli, 454 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Super. 1982), for the proposition that it would

suffer substantial prejudice if the court granted Gary’s request to withdraw his

nolo contendere pleas after the Commonwealth prepared for trial, subpoenaed

witness for the original trial date, and was ready to proceed with trial on the

day Gary entered his nolo contendere pleas.        Id. at 21.    However, the

Commonwealth’s argument centered on three witnesses in the separate case

and a possible hardship for one of those witnesses. See id. at 19-22. The

Commonwealth did not assert that the near nineteen-month delay between

Gary’s nolo contendere pleas and his motion to withdraw his pleas would

impair the Commonwealth’s ability to try the instant case. See id.

       The trial court denied Gary’s motion to withdraw his plea without

explanation and proceeded to a sentencing hearing on August 13, 2021. The

trial court ordered Gary to serve an aggregate term of thirty-six to seventy-

two months of imprisonment in this case.10 Gary filed a post-sentence motion

again requesting the withdrawal of his nolo contendere pleas, which the trial

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9  The Commonwealth also stated that when entering his pleas, Gary
acknowledged that the Commonwealth would be prejudiced by a subsequent
attempt to withdraw that plea. See N.T., 6/22/21, at 19-21; see also
Commonwealth’s Brief at 23.

10 The trial court sentenced Gary in the separate case on the same day.

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court denied. Gary timely appealed, and both he and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Gary raises the following issue for our review:

      Whether the [trial court] erred as a matter of law and abused its
      discretion, in denying [Gary’s] motion to withdraw his nolo
      contendere plea, filed well prior to sentencing, where a manifest
      injustice would result in denial of the motion, in that [Gary]
      maintained his innocence prior to trial and advanced a colorable,
      plausible claim of innocence by showing that Commonwealth
      witnesses against him rendered conflicting, self[-]serving
      statements to police?

Gary’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      The following principles govern our review of the denial of a motion to

withdraw a plea. There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea or a plea

of nolo contendere. See Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284,

1291 (Pa. 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 114

& n.1 (Pa. 2019) (noting that the same standards apply to motions to

withdraw a guilty plea and a nolo contendere plea). The level of scrutiny when

reviewing a motion to withdraw a plea depends on the timing of the

defendant’s request. See Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 128-

29 (Pa. Super. 2009).     A post-sentence motion requires a showing of

manifest injustice. See id. at 129. A decision regarding whether to accept a

defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea is left to the sound

discretion of the sentencing court. See id. at 128; see also Pa.R.Crim.P.

591(A).

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      A trial court must construe a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea

“liberally in favor of the accused” and “any demonstration by a defendant of

a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would

work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d

at 1292 (internal citation omitted). The trial court may exercise its discretion

when considering whether an assertion of innocence constitutes a fair and just

reason for a pre-sentence withdrawal of a plea. See Norton, 201 A.3d at

120. A defendant’s bare assertion of innocence will not establish a fair and

just reason to withdraw a plea per se. See id. The trial court may consider

the credibility or plausibility of a defendant’s assertion of innocence when

assessing whether the defendant has offered a colorable claim that the

withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. See id. at 120-

21. However, given the liberal application of the fair-and-just standard, a trial

court cannot reject an assertion of innocence based solely on the fact that the

defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty or nolo

contendere plea. See Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

      An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. Thus,

      [w]hen a trial court comes to a conclusion through the exercise of
      its discretion, there is a heavy burden on the appellant to show
      that this discretion has been abused. An appellant cannot meet
      this burden by simply persuading an appellate court that it may
      have reached a different conclusion than that reached by the trial
      court; rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must
      demonstrate that the trial court actually abused its discretionary

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       power. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere
       error of judgment, but rather exists where the trial court has
       reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or
       where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the
       result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse of
       that discretion, an appellate court should not disturb a trial court's
       ruling.

Norton, 201 A.3d at 120 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets

omitted).

       At the outset, we note the trial court reasoned, incorrectly, that Gary

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded nolo contendere and as a

result did not state a fair and just reason to withdraw his pleas. See Trial

Court Opinion, 5/21/22, at 3-4 (unnumbered) (applying Carelli).11 The trial

court’s consideration of the fair-and-just standard without finding facts or

credibility as to Gary’s assertion of innocence constituted an abuse of

discretion. See Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191.

       On appeal, Gary offers no argument that the trial court’s specific

reasoning was in error.        Instead, Gary argues his assertion of innocence

constituted fair and just reason to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas and the

Commonwealth failed establish substantial prejudice.           Although the trial

court’s reasoning concerning its rejection of Gary’s assertion of innocence was

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11 The trial court reliance on Carelli was misplaced. In that case, the
defendants asserted their pleas were invalid for numerous reasons, but they
did not assert their innocence. See Carelli, 454 A.2d at 1024-26 & n.14 (Pa.
Super. 1982). Thus, Carelli is not instructive on the question of whether a
defendant’s assertion of innocence constitutes a basis to withdraw a plea
before sentencing.

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erroneous, we discern no merit to Gary’s legal argument that his assertion of

innocence stated a fair and just reason to withdraw his pleas.

      Gary contends that his assertion of innocence was at least colorable

based on the credibility issues in Priester’s and Smith’s statements and likens

the present case to Islas, wherein this Court reversed the trial court’s decision

that Islas failed to state a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea before

sentencing. Gary contends Islas instructs that a defense based upon the lack

of credibility of witnesses supports a fair and just reason to withdraw pleas

before sentencing.

      Gary’s argument that Islas controls the outcome of this appeal lacks

merit. The differences between the circumstances discussed in Islas and the

present case are manifest. Islas consistently maintained his innocence in a

police interview and in testimony on his motion to withdraw his plea. See

Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191. Gary denied guilt and only asserted his innocence

through present counsel. Additionally, in Islas, the Commonwealth’s case

hinged on the credibility of a single complainant, and Islas asserted that his

plea counsel had not advised him of all possible defense strategies. See id.

Here, Gary acknowledged that his proffered defense required that two

witnesses, Priester and Smith, either not testify at trial or be found incredible,

and he did not assert he was unaware of their statements to police or possible

defenses.

      The timing of the motions to withdraw guilty pleas was also substantially

different in the two cases. Islas obtained new counsel and filed his motion to

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withdraw his plea one month after pleading guilty. See id. Gary filed his

motion to withdraw pleas nearly nineteen months after pleading nolo

contendere. We acknowledge that some of this delay may have resulted from

the COVID-19 pandemic.              Moreover, there was some evidence of a

disagreement between Gary and plea counsel over strategy. However, Gary

offered no specific explanation for his repeated requests for continuances of

sentencing or the related status hearings, nor was there any evidence that

Gary attempted to assert his own innocence, over these nineteen months.

       Thus, we conclude Islas is distinguishable and does not compel reversal

of the trial court’s denial of Gary’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his nolo

contendere pleas.12 Accordingly, having reviewed the record, the trial court’s

opinion, and Gary’s legal arguments, we conclude no relief is due.13

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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12 To the contrary, the circumstances of this case are far closer to our Supreme

Court’s decision in Norton, wherein the Court affirmed the rejection of
Norton’s bare assertion of innocence, when Norton asserted his innocence
four months after pleading nolo contendere, and explained he could not live
with himself for pleading, and wanted to “test the Commonwealth’s evidence.”
Norton, 201 A.3d at 121-23.

13 Because we conclude Gary failed to establish reversible error concerning
the fair-and-just reason standard, we need not address whether the
Commonwealth demonstrated that a withdrawal of Gary’s nolo contendere
pleas would result in substantial prejudice. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at
1293 n.9.

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Date: 10/5/2023

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