Court Opinion

ID: 9490650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:50:14.217291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:13.867820
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The obligation to bargain in good faith is a mutual one. If the RLA is to be effective in its promotion of the resolution of labor disputes without work stoppages, the parties must be either equally restrained or mutually entitled to engage in economic self-help in pursuit of their lawful objectives. The majority establishes a double standard as to what constitutes good faith bargaining. A carrier remains in good faith while unilaterally making at-will changes in the wages, hours, or working conditions of its employees during the course of negotiations, AMFA I, 55 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir.1995), while a union is devoid of self-help in all but the rare case in which the union can prove the carrier is negotiating in “bad faith.” The majority opinion is unsupported by legal precedent and is inconsistent with the RLA.
In AMFA I we held that a carrier has a right to make unilateral changes in the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees in the absence of a CBA. In reaching this decision, we held that the status quo provisions of the RLA were not applicable during negotiations for an initial CBA and that the Section 2 First general provision that parties to negotiations exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement did not prevent the carrier from making the changes as long as the carrier bargained in good faith. We did not address whether a union could respond to the carrier’s changes with a reasonable exercise of economic selfhelp.1 Now, the majority would answer this question by creating a requirement that the union show that the carrier acted in bad faith before permitting the union to respond to the carrier’s unilateral changes. The majority asserts that “a strike is inconsistent with the Union’s duty to negotiate in good faith” and therefore proscribed by the RLA in the absence of a finding of bad faith by the carrier. They fail to explain why union self-help is inconsistent with negotiating in good faith while carrier self-help is not.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of a union to exercise self-help without regard to a carrier’s good or bad faith acts. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 155, 90 S.Ct. 294, 302, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969). The Court stated that, “[i]f the [carrier] is free ... to take advantage of [an] agreement’s silence and resort to self-help, the union cannot be expected to hold back its own economic weapons.” Id. The majority distinguishes Detroit & Toledo by pointing out that in that case a CBA was in effect, even though the CBA did not address the terms changed by the carrier. I do not find any logical relevance to this distinction. Whether a CBA is in effect goes only to the question of whether the status quo provisions of the RLA bind the parties. The general requirement of Section 2 First applies to both parties whether the status quo provisions do or do not apply. A strike is not per se inconsistent with the RLA regardless of whether the carrier has acted in bad faith. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238, 246, 86 S.Ct. 1420, 1424, 16 L.Ed.2d 501 (1966) (recognizing availability of self-help to both sides of labor management controversy when all mediation provisions of RLA have been exhausted). The majority cites no authority for now holding' that Section 2 First has a different meaning where the status quo provisions have no effect. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 451 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1854 n. 15, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) *46(“[Section] 2 First does not contain ... a suggestion that the scope of self-help is limited.”).
The majority relies on Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1253 (2d Cir.1992), to limit the Supreme Court’s holding in Detroit & Toledo.2 In Virgin Atlantic, we held that a carrier had not violated the general duty to exert every reasonable effort to make an agreement when the carrier made unilateral changes in the rates of pay prior to the commencement of negotiations between the carrier and a newly certified union. Although I agree with the decision, I point out that in Virgin Atlantic we addressed whether the employer could make unilateral changes rather than whether the union could reasonably respond with its own economic self-help. Moreover, Virgin Atlantic only addressed the carrier’s right to make such changes where no negotiations had commenced. Here the parties had negotiated for six months prior to the carrier’s changes.
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Airline Div., Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 874 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir.1989), this court held that a union was not prohibited from striking where a carrier refused to negotiate with the union. We reasoned that the carrier’s refusal to recognize the union as the certified bargaining unit justified the union in exercising its right to strike. Id. Rather than imposing the majority’s requirement to show the carrier’s refusal was in bad faith, United Air Lines properly considered whether the union’s decision to strike was reasonable. We determined that where the union complied with the certification procedures of the National Mediation Board and the carrier refused to bargain, the court could not enjoin the union’s “lawful, albeit inconvenient, picketing.” Id. I am confident that we considered the union’s Section 2 First duty to exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement when we determined that the strike was lawful under the RLA.
We have no right to create a requirement that a union prove bad faith by a carrier before it can reasonably resort to economic self-help. We may not “impose on the union obligations that Congress has not seen fit to fashion.” United Air Lines, id. at 115. Moreover, the result of the majority’s rule frustrates the RLA’s purpose to promote the resolution of disputes and creation of agreements between common carriers and unions. This rule transforms the RLA into a protective haven for carriers to make unilateral, at-will changes of employment conditions, so long as they maintain the appearance of negotiating. The courtroom now becomes the first step in the bargaining process.3 A union must prove that the carrier is, in bad faith, avoiding an agreement that the carrier has no incentive to reach. Only then may a court permit the union to demonstrate even a threat of using its own economic tools to draw the carrier to the bargaining table.
The majority’s opinion has the practical effect of enjoining the Union from exercising self-help in response to the Airline’s unilateral changes. An injunction under the general provision of Section 2 First ought to be limited to cases where the party seeking the injunction has shown that the party to be enjoined is bargaining in bad faith. See Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 449, 107 S.Ct. at 1853 (“[A] federal court may enjoin a strike ... if a union does not comply with its obligation under Section 2 First of the RLA ‘to exert every reasonable effort’ to resolve the dispute.”); see also Chicago & N.W. Ry. *47v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579 n.11, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 1736 n. 11, 29 L.Ed.2d 187(1971) (suggesting that a bad faith finding should be made prior to issuing an injunction against self-help). The Airline has not shown, nor can it demonstrate, that the Union’s desire to exercise self-help represents bad faith. On the contrary, the Union has negotiated with the Airline for over three years in an attempt to reach an agreement. Even here, the Union sought a declaratory judgment that it could strike rather than interrupting the operation of the Airline. The Union’s desire to exercise self-help is reasonable and its motion for declaratory judgment should be granted.

. Whether a union may respond' to carrier self-help with its own is a novel issue. The issue is novel because the Eleventh Circuit is the only other circuit to address the question answered in AMFA I, and that circuit reached a different conclusion. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles Pan Americandos, S.A., 924 F.2d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir.1991) (precluding management from “making unilateral changes in working conditions after the onset of negotiations directed toward adoption of an initial bargaining agreement”).

. The majority posits that Virgin Atlantic narrowly interpreted Detroit & Toledo "to permit the recognition of objective working conditions as the status quo, but only where there is already a CBA in place." I am perplexed by the majority's reading of the case. In Virgin Atlantic, we held that "where no steps toward bargaining have been taken, the unilateral alteration of rates of pay by an employer does not violate the [S]ection 2, First duty to 'exert every reasonable effort' to make agreements.” Virgin Atlantic, 956 F.2d at 1253 (emphasis added). Requiring the commencement of negotiations to establish a status quo is quite different from the requirement that a CBA be in place.

. As we stated in United Air Lines, the Union’s desire to respond to the Airline’s unilateral changes "is not a circumstance that converts the RLA's ‘best efforts settlement’ obligation into a requirement that judicial remedies precede self-help.” 874 F.2d at 115. Nonetheless, the requirement that the Union show the Airline made the changes in bad faith before the Union can strike does just that.