Court Opinion

ID: 7958675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 00:26:19.655596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:34:21.549920
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I am unable to conclude that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter.
As noted by the majority, where there has been an intentional homicide, there must be proof of adequate or reasonable provocation before a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter may be returned. I disagree with the majority that the provocation element could be satisfied by the fact that defendant became unbalanced or deranged by his argument with the decedent.
An examination of the record reveals that defendant and the decedent were arguing over whether defendant could spend the next weekend with the decedent and her family. After extensive arguing, defendant left the house and returned with a shotgun. Although defendant and the decedent struggled over the gun, the struggle ceased after the decedent was unsuccessful in her efforts to obtain it from defendant. The decedent then walked out onto the porch and defendant followed. Defendant apparently spoke some words and then shot the decedent.
If defendant was provoked by the argument, the specific provoking actions were spoken words. The physical struggle over the shotgun had clearly ceased prior to the exit from the house onto the porch by defendant and the decedent. It is a general rule at common law that language alone, "however aggravated, abusive, opprobrious, or indecent”, is not sufficient provocation to reduce a killing committed with a deadly weapon from *588murder to manslaughter. 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 64, p 357, 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 1665, p 700. There have been a few exceptions to this rule. However, the deviations have occurred primarily in cases where the words convey information of a fact which would constitute reasonable provocation if the fact was observed, such as confession of adultery to a spouse. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 76, p 576-577. Although the rule has been deviated from in a limited number of cases, I do not believe deviation is appropriate in the instant case, which involves two nonmarried parties prone to having quarrels.
The fact that defendant may have been rendered "unbalanced” or "deranged” by the argument does not transform a legally insufficient provocation into a legally sufficient one. It is important to emphasize that defendant’s mental stability was considered by the jury, as defendant presented an insanity defense. Although the jury was unable to find that defendant was legally insane, it did render a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill”.
Finally, I am unable to conclude that, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter. I agree with the trial judge that the evidence did not indicate the occurrence of a negligent act. This viewpoint is buttressed by the fact that the defense to the killing proffered by defendant was insanity.
I would affirm.