Court Opinion

ID: 9543509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:01.115645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:26.329470
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I regret that I must once again dissent with the majority of the court in this case concerning the matter of terminating parental rights. While I do not for a moment minimize the seriousness of the matter, either generally or in this case, I believe that the court has resorted to means more drastic than are necessary under the facts in this case.
Before an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-209 (Reissue 1978) may be upheld by this court, the action taken by the lower court must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, State v. Wedige, 205 Neb. 687, 289 N.W.2d 538 (1980); In re Interest of Morford, 207 Neb. 627, 300 N.W.2d 795 (1981). I do not believe *553that the record in this case will establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the mother should be terminated.
No one who testified in this case suggested such action should be taken. As a matter of fact, all of the evidence offered in the case indicates that the visitation rights of the mother should be continued.
A report dated January 16, 1980, signed by Ann Campion, service officer; John Tiedeman, guardian ad litem; and Gladys Haines, Child Protective Services worker, and offered into evidence, recommended that, while the minor child be placed in the custody of the State Department of Public Welfare for continued foster care placement, the mother, nevertheless, continue to have regular visitation with the child. A report filed by the Douglas County Welfare Administration dated January 23, 1980, and offered into evidence, likewise recommended that the mother continue to have rights of visitation with the child. Neither report recommended that her parental rights be terminated.
A report dated January 21, 1980, prepared by Dr. K. J. Kenney, center director for Immanuel Community Mental Health Center, and offered into evidence at the hearing held on January 29, 1980, indicated that the father and mother have been obtaining outpatient counseling since September 1979 and “they have made excellent progress.” The report goes on further to provide: “Both Mr. and Mrs. Cook have made great strides in resolving the problem. They each recognize, at the present time, that the reason for Mr. Cook’s deviant behavior was his anger towards his wife Yvonne. This anger has been worked through satisfactorily and the two of them are, at the present time, getting along very well.” Dr. Kenney’s report concludes as follows: “Therefore, my recommendation would be the resumption of their living as a married couple, in their own house, with their daughter, and a continued family therapy program *554established either with Dr. Dahlke, or with us here at Immanuel Community Mental Health Center, for at least six months. If this program should be carried out here, we would be happy then to supply you with further information as to the progress the family has made.”
The guardian ad litem likewise urged the court not to terminate the rights of the mother.
The majority relies, to some extent, on the fact that the mother, though aware of what was taking place, did not remove herself and the child from the home immediately.
While we might have hoped that such action would have occurred, we must not, nevertheless, fail to recognize the realities of life. A moderately educated woman with small children, no means of support, and no place to go does not quickly remove herself from the family home for whatever reason.
Moreover, the evidence discloses that, when the episode apparently first occurred, the mother contacted Child Protective Services and advised them of what was taking place. At that point Child Protective Services did not recommend that she remove herself or the child from the home, but, rather, suggested that the entire family seek counseling. If the failure to remove the child was so negligent as to justify our terminating her parental rights, why did not Child Protective Services see the problem and suggest to the woman she take such action, rather than apparently assure her that she could remain in the family home if she sought counseling?
We must not lose sight of the fact that this entire matter came to light because the mother did, in fact, remove the child from the home. While it is true she should have done it sooner, we should not overlook the fact.that she did, in fact, take such action and report the matter to the police. We now reward her for having finally acquired the necessary strength to act by terminating her parental rights.
*555I do not believe that the evidence in this case is clear and convincing that the mother has acted in such a manner that she has, indeed, lost her parental rights or that the best interests of the child, under the facts, demand that she be separated from her mother and two brothers. As I noted in my dissent in In re Interest of Goodon, ante p. 256, 262, 303 N.W.2d 278, 281 (1981): “The options available to the juvenile court, short of terminating parental rights for the best interests of the child, are many. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-210 (Reissue 1978).” Where, as here, the evidence indicates that the mother has sought and obtained counseling and is making progress, and the child has had counseling and is making progress, I would have been inclined to follow the recommendations of the professionals and the urging of the guardian ad litem and delayed terminating the parental rights of the mother in this case for at least an additional 6 months to see whether the mother and her child could not have been successfully reunited.