Court Opinion

ID: 9373047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:20.960533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.436353
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GLORIA J. SANFORD,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                          DE-3443-17-0175-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: January 23, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Gloria J. Sanford, Littleton, Colorado, pro se.

           Nanette Gonzales, Esquire, Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her nonselection appeal for lack of jurisdiction . Generally, we grant
     petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.      Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).
¶2         In October 2016, the agency posted a vacancy announcement for a GS -14
     Supervisory Accountant. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 153 -62. To be
     qualified, an applicant was required to “possess one year of specialized
     experience equivalent to at least the GS-13 level.”      Id. at 154.    Additionally,
     applicants were also required to meet a basic education requirement in one of two
     ways. Id. Under “Method 1” an applicant could meet the education qualification
     through a “[d]egree in accounting or a degree in a related field . . . that included
     or was supplemented by 24 semester hours in accounting.” Id. at 154.
¶3         More relevant to the instant appeal, under “Method 2,” an applicant could
     meet the education qualification through “at least 4 years of experience i n
     accounting, or an equivalent combination of accounting experience, college -level
     education, and training that provided professional accounting knowledge.”         Id.
     Under    Method     2,   an   applicant’s   background     also   had    to   include
     either (1) “[24] semester hours in accounting or auditing courses of appropriate
     type and quality,” (2) “[a] certificate as Certified Public Accountant or a Certified
     Internal Auditor,” or (3):
                                                                                      3

           Completion of the requirements for a degree that included substantial
           course work in accounting or auditing, e.g., 15 semester hours, but
           that does not fully satisfy the [aforementioned] 24-semester-hour
           requirement, provided that (a) the applicant has successfully worked
           at the full-performance level in accounting, auditing, or a related
           field, e.g., valuation engineering or financial institution examining;
           (b) a panel of at least two higher level professional accountants or
           auditors has determined that the applicant has demonstrated a good
           knowledge of accounting and of related and underlying fi elds that
           equals in breadth, depth, currency, and level of advancement that
           which is normally associated with successful completion of the
           4-year course of study [previously] described; and (c) except for
           literal nonconformance to the requirement of 24 semester hours in
           accounting, the applicant’s education, training, and experience fully
           meet the specified requirements.
     Id. at 154, 156.
¶4         The appellant applied for the Supervisory Accountant vacancy, indicating
     that she met the education qualification through Method 2. IAF, Tab 11 at 148.
     The appellant indicated that, of the three ways in which such an applicant could
     satisfy the added background requirement, she satisfied the third. Id. In other
     words, using the labels from above, the appellant indica ted that her background
     included the following: 4 years of experience in accounting or a related field,
     (3) completion of substantial course work that did not total 24 hours,
     (a) successful work at the full performance level, (b) approval from an
     appropriate panel of higher level professionals, and (c) education, training, and
     experience that met specified requirements. Id.
¶5         After reviewing the appellant’s application, the agency concluded that she
     was not qualified for the vacancy. E.g., id. at 35-38, 52. Specifically, the agency
     determined that the appellant did not satisfy requirement (a) because although she
     had experience as a GS-13, she had not worked at the full performance level of
     the vacancy at issue, GS-14. E.g., id. at 52. The agency also concluded that the
     appellant did not satisfy requirement (c) because she lacked the necessary
     specialized experience. Id.
                                                                                           4

¶6         The appellant filed the instant Board appeal, alleging that she is qualified
     for the Supervisory Accountant vacancy. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. She again pointed to
     her prior GS-13 experience and alleged that she met the qualifications through
     Method 2, described above.      IAF, Tab 10 at 4-6.       The administrative judge
     responded to the appeal by issuing an order that explained the limited
     circumstances in which the Board has jurisdiction over a nonselection and
     instructing the appellant to meet her jurisdictional burden. IAF, Tab 2 at 2 -6.
     After both parties responded to the order, the administrative judge issued an
     initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 18,
     Initial Decision (ID).    He found that the appellant failed to prove or even
     nonfrivolously allege that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal. ID at 2 -4.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response and the appellant has replied. PFR
     File, Tabs 11-12.
¶8         On review, the appellant summarily asserts that “[t]here is no requirement
     that an obstruction of Justice must go before the Office of Special Counsel prior
     to the [Board]. This as I stated [below] was an obstruction of justice.” PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 4. The appellant also alleges that the administrative judge was biased,
     and she requests that a new administrative judge be assigned to her appeal. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 12 at 4-5. We are not persuaded.
¶9         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.          Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Board does not have
     direct jurisdiction over an employee’s nonselection for a vacant position. E.g.,
     Gryder v. Department of Transportation, 100 M.S.P.R. 564, ¶ 9 (2005).
     However, there are some limited circumstances in which an appellant may
     otherwise establish jurisdiction in an appeal involving her nonselection.        For
     example, an appellant may challenge her nonselection in the context of an
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal. Id.; see Linder v. Department of Justice,
                                                                                             5

      122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014) (recognizing that the Board has jurisdiction over an
      IRA appeal if an appellant exhausts her administrative remedies before the Office
      of Special Counsel and makes nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she made a
      protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
      protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D);
      and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)).
¶10         The administrative judge recognized the limited circumstances in which an
      appellant may establish the Board’s jurisdiction over her nonselection.             IAF,
      Tab 2 at 2-6. Among other things, he noted the aforementioned exception, where
      the Board may have jurisdiction over a nonselection if an appellant alleges
      improper retaliation covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b).                 Id. at 5-6.     The
      administrative judge indicated that, if the appellant responded by indicating that
      she wished to pursue any such claim, he would provide additional notice to
      further explain her burden. Id. at 6.
¶11         In her timely response, the appellant presented extensive argument and
      evidence concerning her qualifications, but no arguments implicating any of the
      avenues for Board jurisdiction recognized by the administrative judge. 2            IAF,

      2
        We recognize that the record does include indications that the appellant is entitled to
      veterans’ preference. IAF, Tab 1 at 1. However, none of her allegations appear to
      implicate the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). See generally
      Piirainen v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 194, ¶ 8 (2015) (recognizing the
      two types of VEOA claims over which the Board has jurisdiction—claims involving an
      improper denial of a right to compete and claims involving a violation of a statute or
      regulation relating to veterans’ preference); Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance
      Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶¶ 15-18 (2014) (recognizing that 38 U.S.C. § 4214
      exempts preference eligibles from minimum education requirements in some limited
      circumstances, but never in the case of a GS-14 level position), aff’d, 818 F.3d 1361
      (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ramsey v. Office of Personnel Management, 87 M.S.P.R. 98, ¶ 9
      (2000) (recognizing that nothing in VEOA exempts covered veterans from meeting
      minimum qualification standards of vacant positions). The appellant’s allegations also
      contain nothing that could be reasonably construed as a Uniformed Services
                                                                                         6

      Tab 10.      Later,   in   an   untimely   submission,    the   appellant   invoked
      sections 2302(b)(1)-(13), but she presented no corresponding allegations. IAF,
      Tab 15 at 4-6. She simply stated that “Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)-(b)(13) an
      Agency may not deceive or willingly obstruct any person from competing for
      employment.” Id. at 4, 6. The administrative judge found that this late argument
      did not change the outcome. ID at 3. Among other things, he correctly noted that
      prohibited personnel practices are not directly appealable to the Board. Id.; see
      Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012). To the extent that
      the appellant’s petition for review suggests otherwise, we are not persuaded.
¶12        The appellant’s argument throughout this appeal has been that the agency
      erred in finding that she did not meet the minimum requirements of the
      Supervisory Accountant vacancy. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at 4 -5, Tab 10 at 4-7,
      Tab 12 at 4-6. Her mere citation to sections 2302(b)(1)-(13) during one of her
      iterations of that same argument, in a context unrelated to the protections
      afforded by section 2302(b), is unavailing. See IAF, Tab 15 at 4-6. It did not
      establish jurisdiction or even amount to a nonfrivolous allegation. See 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.4(s) (defining a nonfrivolous allegation as “an assertion that, if proven,
      could establish the matter at issue” and recognizing that “[a]n allegation generally
      will be considered nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an
      individual makes an allegation that is more than conclusory; is plausible on its
      face; and is material to the legal issues in the appeal”). Moreover, the appellant’s
      allegations did not trigger the administrative judge’s offer to provide further
      information about her burden upon indication that she inten ded to pursue one of

      Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.
      §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA) claim.          See generally Clavin v. U.S. Postal Service,
      99 M.S.P.R. 619, ¶ 5 (2005) (recognizing the two types of USERRA claims over which
      the Board has jurisdiction—claims involving an agency’s failure to meet its
      reemployment obligations following an employee’s absence due to uniformed service
      and claims of discrimination involving uniformed service). If the appellant meant to
      challenge the nonselection as a claim under VEOA or USERRA, she may file a separate
      appeal on that basis. We make no finding as to whether the VEOA appeal would be
      deemed timely.
                                                                                            7

      the specific exceptions where the Board may have jurisdiction over her
      nonselection.    IAF, Tab 2 at 6.         Therefore, we discern no error in the
      administrative judge’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶13         Although we have considered the appellant’s allegations of bias and
      improper conduct by the administrative judge, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 12
      at 4-5, we find that they generally reflect a misunderstanding of the Board’s
      jurisdictional limitations and adjudicatory processes. They do not overcome the
      presumption     of   honesty   and    integrity   that   accompanies    administrative
      adjudicators. See Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386
      (1980).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      3
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                  9

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     10

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the     Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 4 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit

4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.