Court Opinion

ID: 9399162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 07:09:44.45388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.193814
License: Public Domain

In The

                           Court of Appeals

                Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                           __________________

                          NO. 09-21-00105-CV
                          __________________

                 CRISTY WILLIAMSON, Appellant

                                    V.

                     OMKAR SHARMA, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

         On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                  Montgomery County, Texas
                    Trial Cause No. 21-32146
__________________________________________________________________

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Following a bench trial, Cristy Williamson appeals and complains

the trial court erred (1) in failing to conduct the trial with a jury when

her answer included a jury demand and represents that she had paid the

appropriate fee and (2) by refusing to abate the case based on her pretrial

request for an abatement, which relied on a Center for Disease Control

and Prevention form that was on file with the court. For the reasons

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explained below, we conclude Williamson’s issues lack merit, so we will

affirm.

                              Background

     In June 2006, Cristy Williamson and Dustin Woodcock bought a

home in New Caney, Texas with the benefit of a loan, which was secured

by the property with a deed of trust. 1 Under the deed of trust, Williamson

and Woodcock were required to “immediately surrender possession of the

property to the purchaser” if the bank foreclosed and the property was

sold at a foreclosure sale.

     If the bank foreclosed, the deed of trust also explains what

Williamson’s and Woodcock’s relationship with the owner of the property

that purchased it in the foreclosure sale if they didn’t surrender the

property before the bank foreclosed. As to the owner purchasing the

property at foreclosure, the deed of trust provides that Williamson and

Woodcock would become “tenant[]s at sufferance” as to their relationship

with the party who purchased the property at foreclosure. As tenants at

     1Under   the terms of the deed of trust, the lien on the property
securing the note could be foreclosed only by a court order. In 2021, the
bank that held Williamson’s and Woodcock’s mortgage obtained an order
from the 284th District Court authorizing it to proceed with foreclosure
through an order signed in July 2019.
                                    2
sufferance, the deed of trust required Williamson and Woodcock to pay

“reasonable rental for the use of the Property.” Lastly, as tenants at

sufferance, the deed of trust made Williamson and Woodcock subject to

being removed from the property “by writ of possession in accordance

with applicable law[.]”

     After Williamson and Woodcock defaulted on the payment

obligations they had to their bank of their note, the trustee under the

deed of trust—JP Morgan Chase Bank—foreclosed on its lien. JP Morgan

Chase Bank purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Several

months later in February 2020, JP Morgan Chase Bank sold the property

to Omkar Sharma.

     In July 2020, Sharma’s agent, Texas Eviction, notified Williamson,

Woodcock, and the other occupants of 21615 Morris Street in a letter that

they were required to vacate the property within thirty days based on the

foreclosure. 2 In September 2020, Sharma filed a forcible entry and

detainer action in the Justice of the Peace Court, seeking to evict

     2Therecord reflects notice was sent to Cristy Williamson, Dustin
Woodcock, and Doris Williamson. Dustin Woodcock and Doris
Williamson are not parties to the appeal.
                                   3
Williamson, Woodcock, and all other occupants from the property on

Morris Street in New Caney.

     After she was served, Williamson, who was represented by an

attorney, filed an answer to Sharma’s forcible entry and detainer action

in the Justice Court. Her answer includes a demand for a jury trial. The

“Transcript Of Judgment From Justice Civil Court,” Precinct Number 4,

shows that Williamson paid the jury fee. The answer Williamson filed in

the justice court includes a request asking the Justice of the Peace to

abate the case based on Texas Supreme Court Miscellaneous Order 20-

9109. 3 With the answer she filed in the Justice Court, Williamson also

filed a form containing the information required by the Center for

Disease Control order referred to in Miscellaneous Order 20-9109, the

CDC Order that addresses the halting of residential evictions on a

     3Miscellaneous   Order 20-9109 refers to an order issued by the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, titled Temporary Halt in
Residential Eviction to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 (CDC
Order), which the Texas Supreme Court required Texas courts to follow
beginning September 4, 2020. See Supreme Court of Texas, Twenty-Fifth
Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc.
Docket No. 20-9109, 609 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. 2020).
                                   4
temporary basis to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. 4 Williamson

swore to the accuracy of the information that she included in the form.

      About five months later, Sharma filed a motion for summary

judgment in the Justice Court on his eviction claim, arguing the only

issue the court needed to determine was whether he was entitled to

possession of the property. 5 The Justice of the Peace granted Sharma’s

motion, and the Justice of the Peace signed an order requiring

Williamson, Woodcock, and the other occupants of the property to vacate

the property by March 4 unless they timely filed an appeal. Before March

4, Williamson appealed to the County Court at Law and perfected her

right to a trial de novo in that court. 6

      In April 2021, the County Court at Law called the case to trial. In

the County Court at Law, the parties tried the case on the pleadings they

had filed in Justice Court. Those pleadings were filed in the County Court

      4Id.
      5We   note that in Sharma’s pleading of his forcible entry and
detainer action, he did not sue Williamson or Woodcock for damages or
for rent, he only sued for possession.
      6See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.001(a) (authorizing

appeals from justice courts); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (West & West
Supp.) (allowing an appeal in an eviction suit when the premises are used
for residential purposes only).
                                     5
at Law as part of Williamson’s appeal, and they appear in the County

Clerk’s Record in a record marked as “Transcript of Documents Filed in

Justice Court.”

     In opening statement, Williamson’s attorney told the trial court

that his client had “filed a COVID CDC order back in September [with

the Justice of the Peace] that ha[d] never been ruled on[.]” That said,

when Williamson appeared in the County Court at Law, her attorney

never indicated to the trial court that Williamson wanted a trial by a

jury. 7 Even though Sharma called no witnesses in the hearing, his

attorney offered four exhibits into evidence, which were admitted into

evidence without objection: (1) a copy of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed;

(2) a certified copy of Williamson’s and Woodson’s note, titled “Texas

Home Equity Security Instrument;” (3) a copy of Sharma’s deed; and (4)

a business records affidavit, which contains a letter notifying Williamson,

     7We   are unable to determine from the Clerk’s Record whether
Williamson paid the jury fee in the County Court at Law. That said, the
transcript of the Justice Court’s records shows Williamson paid a $22
jury fee in the Justice Court. Additionally, the Appellate Record shows
that Williamson filed statements in both the Justice Court and the
County Court at Law declaring indigence and claiming she could not
afford to pay court costs.
                                    6
Woodcock and the other occupants of the property they were to leave the

premises and that if they didn’t, they would be evicted.

     When Sharma rested, Williamson’s attorney didn’t call any

witnesses, and he didn’t introduce or offer any exhibits into evidence.

Instead, Williamson’s attorney told the court: “If the court would state

that judgment should be granted, we’d ask that, of course, we have ten

days to post the bond and appeal this decision.” When trial concluded,

the trial court found for Sharma, signed a judgment awarding Sharma

possession of the property, and authorized a Writ of Possession to issue

if Williamson, Woodcock, and the other occupants of the property had not

vacated the premises by May 4, 2021. Subsequently, Williamson

perfected her appeal to this Court.

                                Jury Trial

     In Williamson’s first issue, she argues the trial court abused its

discretion by refusing to grant her request for a jury trial. We review a

trial court’s denial of a party’s demand for a jury trial under an abuse of

discretion standard. 8 On appeal, Williamson argues that because the

     8Mercedes-Benz   Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.
1996).
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County Court at Law treated the answer she filed in the Justice Court as

her answer in the County Court at Law, the jury demand that she filed

in the Justice Court preserved her right to a trial by jury in the County

Court at Law. But as we mentioned, nothing in the record shows that

Williamson’s attorney made the judge of the County Court at Law aware

that his client wanted a jury trial.

     Litigants “must take certain steps to invoke and perfect [their] jury

right” under the rules that apply to preserving error for an appeal. 9 Just

last year, the Texas Supreme Court explained that when “a trial court

indicates that it will proceed with a bench trial in a case where a jury

demand was timely perfected, a demanding party that still wishes to

have a jury trial must ensure that the court is aware of the demand.”10

Previously, the Court has held that a party waives its right to a jury trial

even if a jury demand has been filed and a jury fee paid when the party

fails to obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court after pointing out

that the party has demanded a jury trial. 11

     9Inre Troy S. Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. 2022) (cleaned up).
     10Browder v. Moree, 659 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Tex. 2022).
    11Jefferson Cty. v. Nguyen, No. 09-13-00505-CV, 2015 Tex. App.

LEXIS 8052, at *74 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 31, 2015, no pet.) (citing
                                   8
      In Williamson’s case, Williamson was notified by the County Court

at Law on April 15, 2021, that the case would be tried in a bench

proceeding on April 23. The record does not show that before the trial

occurred, Williamson made the trial court aware she had a jury demand

on file and that she wanted a jury trial. By failing to object after she was

on notice that the trial court intended to try the case to the bench,

Williamson failed to preserve her complaint that the trial court deprived

her of her right to a jury. 12 Williamson’s first issue is overruled.

                                CDC Order

      In issue two, Williamson complains the trial court erred in failing

to abate the case based on her filing of the CDC form she filed in the

Justice Court, which addresses the temporary halting of proceedings to

prevent the spread of COVID-19. 13 That said, the Texas Supreme Court

order halting trials in eviction cases expired on March 31, 2021, so it

Sunwest Reliance Acquisitions Group, Inc. v. Provident Nat’l Assur. Co.,
875 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ)).
      12See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Sunwest Reliance Acquisitions Group,

Inc., 875 S.W.2d at 387.
      13See Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the

Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020).
                                   9
didn’t prevent the County Court at Law from calling Williamson’s case to

trial in April 2021. 14

      On appeal, Williamson complains the trial court didn’t make

findings about the reasons the forcible entry and detainer action should

proceed to trial, which we acknowledge is required under the Texas

Supreme Court’s Thirty-Fourth Emergency Order, which allowed

Williamson’s trial to proceed. 15 Yet Williamson didn’t ask the trial court

for the findings required by the Thirty-Fourth Emergency Order—

specifically, the reasons the trial court determined the action should

proceed and the procedures that applied to the action. 16 Had she done so

when she was before that court, the trial court’s failure to make the

findings required by the Thirty-Fourth Emergency Order could have been

cured.

      Even more, when Williamson’s attorney told the County Court at

Law that his client had filed the CDC form in the Justice Court, he said:

“I only throw that in there because it’s not been ruled on. I don’t know if

      14SeeSupreme Court of Texas, Thirty-Fourth Emergency Order
Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 21-9011,
629 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. 2021).
     15Id.
     16Id.

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it’s even relevant. I just throw it in there. I just add it to the record, Your

Honor.” In response, Sharma’s attorney asserted the CDC declaration

didn’t apply because he wasn’t seeking to evict Williamson or the

occupants of Sharma’s property for nonpayment of rent, but instead

because it was “a post-foreclosure eviction.” In response, the trial court

stated: “I think he is definitely right on that.” Regardless of whether that

conclusion is correct, Williamson failed to challenge the trial court’s

conclusion in her appeal.

      First, we hold that Williamson didn’t challenge the trial court’s

conclusion that Williamson’s eviction was not based on her failure to pay

rent. When unchallenged, a trial court’s findings are binding on the

reviewing court. 17 Williamson has not argued, explained, or cited any

legal authority that shows the trial court erred in concluding the CDC

moratorium didn’t apply to the circumstances involved in her eviction, an

eviction resulting from a foreclosure rather than one that involved a

tenant’s eviction for failing to pay rent. And with the exception of cases

      17McGalliard   v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986).
                                   11
involving fundamental error, which did not occur here, appellate courts

may not consider issues the parties did not properly raise or brief. 18

     Second, by failing to ask the trial court for findings, Williamson

waived her complaint that the trial court didn’t provide her with the

findings required by the Texas Supreme Court’s Thirty-Fourth

Emergency Order. 19 For all these reasons, Williamson’s second issue is

overruled.

                                Conclusion

     Having overruled Williamson’s issues, the judgment of the County

Court at Law is

     AFFIRMED.

                                              _________________________
                                                   HOLLIS HORTON
                                                        Justice

Submitted on October 14, 2022
Opinion Delivered June 1, 2023
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

     18See   Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. 2006)
(citing In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350-52 (Tex. 2003)).
       19See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (preserving error for appellate review

requires the complaining party to show that he presented his complaint
to the trial court in a timely request, objection, or motion and that the
trial court ruled on the request); Supreme Court of Texas, Thirty-Fourth
Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc.
Docket No. 21-9011, 629 S.W.3d 182.
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