Court Opinion

ID: 9639700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:45:27.144336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.113747
License: Public Domain

GRONER, C. J.,
concurring in the result. I am in agreement with all that is said in the opinion of Judge Rutledge, save in one respect. In that respect, my disagreement can be stated in a few words. I think it was error to have allowed a witness for the Government to testify that, in a conversation with one of defendant’s witnesses, the latter had expressed the opinion that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial. When Miss Chamberlin, defendant’s principal witness, was on cross-examination the District Attorney asked her whether, on a visit to Utah, she had called on the mother of the prosecutrix, and conversed with her. She replied she had. She was then asked:
“Question: Now, in that conversation, did Mrs. C... ask you if you thought Ewing was guilty, and didn’t you say Yes ? Answer: No, she didn’t.”
At the close of defendant’s evidence Mrs. C... was called and sworn and was asked:
*644“Question: On that occasion, did you look at Miss Chamberlin and point and say this: ‘Do you believe that Mr. Ewing is guilty of raping my daughter,’ and did she say, T do believe it’? Answer: Yes, she did.”
I am unaware of any rule, old or new, which permits receipt in evidence of a witness’s opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. I have always understood that question to be exclusively for the jury and that any invasion of their right to determine the question solely on the facts was improper, whether coming from the judge or from a witness. The statement attributed to Miss Chamberlin could have been treated by the jury only as substantive evidence of her belief of defendant’s guilt, and considered in that light I think there can be no doubt of its inadmissibility. However far some recent cases may have gone in allowing such evidence for purposes of contradiction, it is clear that was not its purpose here, nor do I think the court could have found a phrase to limit its use to that purpose. For as Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Shepard v. U. S., 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25, 78 L.Ed. 196:
“Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds.”
I am therefore unwilling to accept, as a rule for the future, either the conclusion of the majority in this respect or the reasoning on which it is sustained.
My concurrence in the result is because the record in this case shows that the testimony to which I have referred was given without objection or exception. Nothing was said to call the trial court’s attention to the subject by motion or otherwise during the trial, and there is no bill here to bring the matter to our attention. Appellant was represented by prominent counsel of his own selection. For reasons satisfactory to themselves they allowed this evidence to be given without protest. While I am mindful of the rule frequently expressed by this court that we reserve at all times the right, in our discretion and on our own motion, to notice error in criminal cases, in the present case an inspection of the entire record, including the testimony of all the witnesses, satisfies me that- the circumstances are not such that that discretion should be exercised.