Court Opinion

ID: 9542843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:39:22.068313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:05.660253
License: Public Domain

BACA, Justice (Specially Concurring). {29} I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. I agree that the errors at issue are harmless and therefore the Defendant’s sentence should be affirmed. However, I write separately because I can not concur in the analysis contained in Part II of the majority’s opinion with regard to the admission of Magana’s statement. The majority’s legal analysis is accurate, however I can not agree with their application of the law to the facts of this case. The majority’s “lack of candor” analysis is cursory and I believe sets a dangerous precedent by unduly restricting the admission of hearsay evidence under Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA 1999. Furthermore, the facts of this case support the veracity of the statement and therefore its admission. {30} The majority sets forth the proper Confrontation Clause analysis under State v. Ross, 1996-NMSC-031, 122 N.M. 15, 919 P.2d 1080. Ross articulated the four-factor analysis used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement: (1) ambiguity; (2) lack of candor; (3) faulty memory; and (4) misperception. 122 N.M. at 24, 919 P.2d at 1089. The majority decided that Magana’s statement lacked candor and therefore its admission at the trial court violated the Federal Confrontation Clause. See ante at ¶ 19. The majority made three assertions to justify this result: (1) “Magana was under arrest and in custody [when he made the statement]”, (2) “Second, at trial Magana claimed that he talked to police because they threatened him”; and (3) “[T]he pending auto burglary charges gave Magana a motive to lie.” See ante at ¶ 18. I do not believe that these three assertions are sufficient to warrant a finding of a “lack of candor” sufficient to exclude the statement. {31} I recognize there is a presumption against the admission of hearsay statements offered under Rule 11-804(B)(5). See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)) (noting that hearsay statements that “do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... are ‘presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes----’ ”). However, I believe that sufficient evidence exists to support the veracity and reliability of Magana’s statement and overcome this presumption, and as such, I believe the statement was properly admitted. {32} First, as the majority concedes, the statement itself expressly indicates. that no promises or threats induced Magana’s cooperation. See ante at ¶ 18. A review of the taped statement reveals that a detective asked Magana if any threats or inducements were given to him and he clearly and unequivocally responded, “No Sir.” Then a detective followed up by asking if Magana was making the statement on his own prerogative, and Magana responded in the affirmative. Further, the cadence of the discussion indicates that Magana was volunteering information willingly and of his own accord. Magana often responded to very open ended questions with fact-specific answers. Therefore, I think the statement itself is strong evidence of its veracity. {33} Second, Detective Ramirez, one of two detectives who took Magana’s statement, was the sponsoring witness for the admission of the taped discussion. Therefore, Detective Ramirez was available for cross-examination regarding the circumstances surrounding the making of Magana’s statement. During the State’s examination of Detective Ramirez, he testified under oath, that no threats or promises were ever made as inducement for Magana’s statement. The defense, when given the opportunity to cross-examine Detective Ramirez, chose not to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the taping of Magana’s statement. I believe Detective Ramirez’ unchallenged, sworn testimony provides further evidence of the statement’s veracity. {34} Third, I can find no other circumstances surrounding Magana’s statement to the police that suggests a lack of candor. Magana was in police custody as the majority indicates, however he was in custody on an unrelated auto burglary charge. Therefore, Magana was not an accomplice seeking to shift blame to another individual as the United States Supreme Court has recently found troubling. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 128, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (holding, “The decisive fact, which we make explicit today, is that accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.”). The record contains little explanation of the relationship between Magana and the Defendant. I would be more suspicious of the statement if Magana harbored ill will toward the Defendant, or had some other reason to lie. However, absent further information, I do not find the same motive to lie that the majority identified. Further, I am unwilling to participate in the inference that simply because an individual is in police custody we are to distrust their statement. {35} The trial judge in this case relied on the existence of the external corroborating evidence to support the admission of Magana’s statement. I believe his reliance on this external evidence may have been error given the current status of the law. In this Confrontation Clause analysis, we are concerned with finding “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” by looking at the “totality of the circumstances.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990). The majority in Wright, limited the inquiry to, “only those [circumstances] that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” Id. This holding limits the inquiry to the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession and does not allow the statement to be corroborated by other external testimonial or physical evidence. However, the trial judge’s error points out the imprudence in our limited interpretation of the “totality of the circumstances.” I agree with the proposition stated by the dissenters in Wright, “It is a matter of common sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.” 497 U.S. at 828, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, given the current restrictive interpretation of the totality of the circumstances, in this case, I fail to see what other steps the State could have taken to ensure the statement’s veracity. {36} In the final analysis, I believe that the majority’s exclusion of Magana’s statement could be interpreted as foreclosing the use of Rule 11-804(B)(5) to admit hearsay evidence obtained by police from individuals in police custody. By deciding that Magana’s statement lacks candor in the face of such sparse facts to support such an inference, I am afraid that there are very few statements given to law enforcement that will be able to withstand the difficult burden that the majority’s “lack of candor” analysis creates. I agree with the finding of the trial judge, [T]his is precisely the circumstance under which the catch-all exception is meant for. It would be a miscarriage of justice for Mr. Magana to be able to manipulate the rules of evidence to avoid the presentation of this evidence to the jury. Magana had information relevant to the prosecution of a brutal homicide, and given his refusal to testify in the face of two contempt orders, the State properly proffered his recorded statement under Rule 11-804(B)(5) and I believe the trial court properly admitted the statement. {37} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis with regard to Magana’s statement.