Court Opinion

ID: 9704682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:42:53.084009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.422979
License: Public Domain

J. P. Noecker, J.
(dissenting). While I agree with the majority opinion’s legal interpretation, I disagree with its analysis of the issue and its result. I therefore dissent in both 83-59256 and 83-59868.
As the majority opinion states, the trial (circuit) *140judge in ruling on the motions to quash "found” that the defendant reasonably believed the police officer to be concurrently engaged in prostitution when interviewed by the defendant for the job and "found” that the complainant in 83-59868 was already a prostitute (emphasis supplied). Such is not the province of a circuit judge in reviewing the record of a preliminary examination.
It is well-settled that the standard to be observed in reviewing a magistrate’s determination at preliminary examination is that the reviewing court should not disturb the determination of the magistrate unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. [People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).]
It appears that the circuit judge here not only substituted his judgment for that of the magistrates, but made findings of fact as well.
In 83-59256 the circuit judge found that defendant reasonably believed the undercover officer to be currently engaged in prostitution based upon her statement to defendant that she had past "escort” experience and did not want to mix up her current clients with his. Such is certainly a permissible inference.
However, it is an equally appropriate inference to conclude that defendant did not believe the officer’s statement because he required her to submit to him so he could teach her "shortcuts of the profession.”
I would hold that what the defendant believed, insofar as the element of knowingly enticing is concerned, is a question of fact for the jury.
In 83-59868 the circuit judge found the complainant to be a prostitute based only upon the fact that she had been placed on probation in *141November, 1982, for prostitution. In analyzing the element of whether she could become a prostitute, the majority, while conceding that a convicted prostitute may at some future time no longer be considered a prostitute, concludes that a five to six month lapse of time is not long enough. This, of course, assumes that the complainant engaged in prostitution in November, 1982, in addition to being convicted and sentenced at that time, a fact which does not appear in the record.
I would also hold that this issue is a question of fact to be determined at trial. People v Cook, 96 Mich 368, 372; 55 NW 980 (1893).
I would reverse.