Court Opinion

ID: 9674764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:34:55.490668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.054918
License: Public Domain

R. B. Burns, J.
(concurring in result). The facts in this case are stipulated to and certified into a concise statement. On February 25, 1977, a home on Diamond Lake Island, Cassopolis, Michigan, was extensively damaged. Subsequently, a juvenile petition against defendant was issued on his 19th birthday, November 27, 1979, for allegedly breaking and entering the home on Diamond Lake Island.
Defendant was 16 years, 3 months old at the time the alleged crime took place. On December 5, 1979, the probate judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Although the judge did not cite any authority for his action, I assume such action was taken under MCL 712A.5; MSA 27.3178(598.5) which states in part:
"The juvenile division of the probate court shall not have jurisdiction over a child after he or she attains the age of 18 years * *
The next day the prosecutor filed an adult criminal complaint and warrant charging defendant with malicious destruction of property over $100. The district judge refused to sign the complaint and warrant and ruled that he did not have juris*488diction, citing MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3), which states:
"If during the pendency of a criminal charge against a person in any other court, it is ascertained that the person was under the age of 17 at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall transfer such case without delay, together with all the papers, documents, and testimony connected therewith, to the juvenile division of the probate court of the county * * *.”
The prosecutor filed a writ of superintending control in circuit court. The circuit judge ruled that the district court should issue the complaint and warrant for the arrest of the defendant. He further ruled that once the district court judge became aware that the defendant was under the age of 17 when the crime was committed he was obligated to transfer the case to probate court. The case was thereafter transferred to probate court.
The defendant attempted to plead guilty in probate court but the probate judge refused to accept the plea and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
So — apparently, a crime was committed, but no court would accept jurisdiction.
None of the courts involved mentioned MCL 712A.4; MSA 27.3178(598.4), which states in part:
"Where a child who has attained the age of 15 years is accused of any act the nature of which constitutes a felony, the judge of probate of the county wherein the offense is alleged to have been committed may waive jurisdiction pursuant to this section upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, whereupon it shall be lawful to try such child in the court having general criminal jurisdiction of such offense.”
In many ways this case is like People v Ross, *489235 Mich 433; 209 NW 663 (1926), where a youth 14 years old laid in wait for and shot a neighbor in the back and robbed him of $50. The Court stated on pages 442-443:
"Suppose a youth, one day under 15 years of age, lies in wait, deliberately shoots and kills a neighbor, robs and hides the body, conceals the weapon, and is not discovered as the murderer until he is one day past the age of 17 years, then, if my Brother is right, the offender is beyond the reach of the law, for his age at the date of the crime fixes exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court, and that court has no jurisdiction over one arrested after reaching the age of 17 years, and he cannot be charged with a felony in the circuit court, for, at the date of the murder, he was not 15 years of age. There is no limitation of time within which one committing a murder must be charged therewith, and a construction of this statute which would bar prosecution of a murderer, if a youth a few days under 15 years of age when he committed the crime, and avoids discovery until he is above the age of 17 years, cannot have my sanction. My Brother’s opinion would render this law a statute of limitations under the supposed case I have stated. Clearly the legislature never intended that, under any circumstances, a prosecution for murder should be barred.”
In Ross, supra, the majority held that the defendant’s age at the time of the charge controlled the proceedings and cited the predecessor of our present waiver statute, MCL 712A.4; MSA 27.3178(598.4).
The Court also stated on page 442:
"This clearly relates to a charge of crime pending in a court of criminal jurisdiction. Where a child under the age of 17 years and above the age of 15 years is charged in a criminal proceeding with a felony, and his age is ascertained during the pendency of a criminal case against him, the officer making the arrest, or the *490court ascertaining the age, must submit the matter to the juvenile court, and that court may, where a child over the age of 15 years is so charged with a felony, waive jurisdiction and permit the child to be tried in the court having general criminal jurisdiction of the offense. Section 2012, 1 Comp Laws 1915, before mentioned, recognized the accountability of children over 14 years of age charged with the commission of a felony.”
In the present case, the Legislature has stated that the age of the juvenile is determined at the time the offense was committed.
The defendant was 16 years, 3 months of age when he committed the breaking and entering. The probate court had jurisdiction. When it was determined at the waiver hearing that the defendant had committed an act the nature of which was a felony and that the defendant was 19 years of age the probate judge should have waived jurisdiction to the adult courts.
I would remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.