Court Opinion

ID: 9910370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 16:01:22.096519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:44.062233
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1548    Document: 58    Page: 1   Filed: 12/15/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                 PARKERVISION, INC.,
                      Appellant

                            v.

  KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
  COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
      PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                  Intervenor
            ______________________

                        2022-1548
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2020-
 01265.
                  ______________________

                Decided: December 15, 2023
                  ______________________

    JASON SCOTT CHARKOW, Daignault Iyer LLP, Vienna,
 VA, argued for appellant. Also represented by RONALD
 MARC DAIGNAULT, CHANDRAN IYER, RICHARD JUANG.

    MICHAEL S. FORMAN, Office of the Solicitor, United
 States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, ar-
 gued for intervenor. Also represented by BENJAMIN T.
 HICKMAN, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED.
                 ______________________
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 2                                 PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

     Before PROST, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 CHEN, Circuit Judge.
      Intel Corporation petitioned the Patent Trial and Ap-
 peal Board (Board) for inter partes review (IPR) of inde-
 pendent claim 3 of U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 (’444 patent),
 owned by ParkerVision, Inc. The Board determined that
 claim 3 is unpatentable as obvious, and ParkerVision ap-
 peals. Because the Board correctly construed the term
 “storage element” and did not procedurally err in how it
 treated certain arguments raised by the parties and be-
 cause substantial evidence supports the challenged factual
 findings underpinning the obviousness determination, we
 affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
                     I.   The ’444 Patent
      The ’444 patent relates to wireless local area networks
 (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology. ’444
 patent col. 1 ll. 58–61. By way of example, in a two-device
 wireless communication network using frequency transla-
 tion, a first device receives a low-frequency baseband sig-
 nal—e.g., an audible signal including voice information—
 and up-converts this baseband signal to a high-frequency
 electromagnetic (EM) signal before wirelessly transmitting
 the EM signal to a second device. When the second device
 receives the high-frequency EM signal, the second device
 down-converts the EM signal back to a low-frequency base-
 band signal (e.g., to be emitted as an audible signal). Ac-
 cording to the ’444 patent, using frequency translation can
 provide advantages including “lower power consumption,
 longer battery life, fewer parts, lower cost, less tuning, and
 more effective signal transmission and reception.” Id.
 col. 2 ll. 31–36.
    The ’444 patent describes—and claim 3 is directed to—
 apparatuses for down-converting EM signals. See, e.g., id.
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 col. 9 l. 27–col. 13 l. 31. Figure 67A (reproduced below) il-
 lustrates an example of a receiver (3906) that includes two
 down-converter modules (4002A, 4002B). Id. col. 34 ll. 17–
 20, 25–27. Each down-converter module (4002A, 4002B)
 includes a corresponding controlled switch (6702A, 6702B)
 and storage module (6704A, 6704B). Id. col. 34 ll. 18–22,
 25–29. The storage modules (6704A, 6704B) are capaci-
 tors (6706A, 6706B). Id. col. 34 ll. 22–23, 29–30. The ’444
 patent explains that U.S. Patent No. 6,061,551 (’551 pa-
 tent)—which the parties agree is incorporated by refer-
 ence—further describes down-conversion utilizing down-
 converter modules. Id. col. 9 ll. 30–38, col. 34 ll. 54–58.

                      ’444 patent fig. 67A
      A principal dispute in this appeal centers on two types
 of down-conversion systems described in the incorporated
 ’551 patent: under-sampling systems and energy transfer
 systems. ’551 patent col. 1 ll. 29–30, col. 2 ll. 53–56, col. 21
 ll. 4–7.
     In an under-sampling system (7802) as shown in Fig-
 ure 78A (reproduced below), an under-sampling sig-
 nal (7810) having a negligible pulse width (e.g., 1 to 10
 picoseconds for an input signal of 900 MHz) is used to con-
 trol a switching module (7806). Id. col. 63 ll. 40–49. A
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 holding capacitance (7808) (e.g., in the range of 1 picofarad)
 substantially charges the voltage of an input EM sig-
 nal (7804) during pulses of the under-sampling sig-
 nal (7810). Id. col. 63 ll. 53–59. According to the ’551
 patent, when a load (7812) is a high impedance load, 1 the
 holding capacitance (7808) does not significantly discharge
 between the pulses of the under-sampling signal (7810)
 such that, during a pulse, the holding capacitance (7808)
 tends to “hold” a voltage at the terminal (7816) until the
 next pulse. Id. col. 64 ll. 21–26.

                     ’551 patent fig. 78A
      In an energy transfer system (8202) as shown in Fig-
 ure 82A (reproduced below), an energy transfer sig-
 nal (8210) having a non-negligible pulse width (e.g.,
 approximately 550 picoseconds for an input signal of 900
 MHz) is used to control a switching module (8206). Id.
 col. 67 ll. 1–14. A storage capacitance (8208) (e.g., in the
 range of 18 picofarads) stores energy transferred from an
 input EM signal (8204) “without substantial concern for

     1    The ’551 patent describes that “[a] high impedance
 load is one that is relatively insignificant to an output drive
 impedance of the system for a given output frequency.”
 ’551 patent col. 63 ll. 65–67.
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 accurately reproducing” a voltage of the input EM sig-
 nal (8204). Id. col. 67 ll. 14–24. According to the ’551 pa-
 tent, the energy transfer system (8202) transfers enough
 energy from the input EM signal (8204) so that the input
 EM signal (8204) can be down-converted even when the in-
 put EM signal (8204) is very small. Id. col. 67 ll. 26–30.
 The non-negligible amounts of the transferred energy per-
 mit the energy transfer system (8202) to effectively drive a
 low impedance load. 2 Id. col. 67 ll. 37–42.

                     ’551 patent fig. 82A
    In the incorporated ’551 patent, the parties identify one
 paragraph as critical to the meaning of “storage element.”
 The critical paragraph describes storage modules, storage
 capacitances, holding modules, and holding capacitances
 and reads:
             FIG. 82A illustrates an exemplary energy
         transfer system 8202 for down-converting an
         input EM signal 8204. The energy transfer

     2    The ’551 patent describes that “[a] low impedance
 load is one that is relatively significant” to an output drive
 impedance of the system for a given output frequency. ’551
 patent col. 67 ll. 34–37.
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 6                                PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

         system 8202 includes a switching module 8206
         and a storage module illustrated as a storage
         capacitance 8208. The terms storage module
         and storage capacitance, as used herein, are
         distinguishable from the terms holding module
         and holding capacitance, respectively. Holding
         modules and holding capacitances, as used
         above, identify systems that store negligible
         amounts of energy from an under-sampled in-
         put EM signal with the intent of “holding” a
         voltage value. Storage modules and storage ca-
         pacitances, on the other hand, refer to systems
         that store non-negligible amounts of energy
         from an input EM signal.
 Id. col. 66 ll. 55–67.
     The sole claim on appeal is independent claim 3, which
 relates to a wireless modem apparatus for down-converting
 an input signal. Claim 3 recites:
     3. A wireless modem apparatus, comprising:
     a receiver for frequency down-converting an input
     signal including,
     a first frequency down-conversion module to down-
     convert the input signal, wherein said first fre-
     quency down-conversion module down-converts
     said input signal according to a first control signal
     and outputs a first down-converted signal;
     a second frequency down-conversion module to
     down-convert said input signal, wherein said sec-
     ond frequency down-conversion module down-con-
     verts said input signal according to a second control
     signal and outputs a second down-converted signal;
     and
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     a subtractor module that subtracts said second
     down-converted signal from said first down-con-
     verted signal and outputs a down-converted signal;
     wherein said first and said second frequency down-
     conversion modules each comprise a switch and a
     storage element.
 ’444 patent at claim 3 (emphasis added). The italicized
 term “storage element” is the focus of this appeal.
                    II. Procedural History
     Intel filed a petition for IPR of claims 1, 3, and 5 of the
 ’444 patent. Intel Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., No. IPR2020-
 01265, 2022 WL 212407, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2022)
 (Board Decision). After institution but before issuance of
 the final written decision, ParkerVision disclaimed
 claims 1 and 5. Id. The final written decision determined
 claim 3 to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
 Tayloe3 and TI Datasheet 4. Id. at *2 nn.4–5, *31.
     To reach this determination, the Board construed the
 term “storage element” as meaning “an element of a system
 that stores non-negligible amounts of energy from an input
 EM signal,” which tracks the description of a storage mod-
 ule in the above-mentioned critical paragraph from the
 ’551 patent. Id. at *14. At institution, the Board did not
 construe any claim terms, as no party had yet raised a
 claim construction issue. Id. at *5. ParkerVision’s patent
 owner response, however, pointed for the first time to the
 incorporated ’551 patent and proposed that the term “stor-
 age element” should be construed as “an element of an en-
 ergy transfer system that stores non-negligible amounts of
 energy from an input electromagnetic signal.” Id. at *6,

     3  U.S. Patent No. 6,230,000.
     4  SN74CBT3253 Dual 1-of-4 FET Multiplexer/De-
 multiplexer (rev. ed. May 1998).
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 8                                PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

 *13 (emphasis added). The patent owner response then
 contended that Tayloe’s capacitors are not “storage ele-
 ments” because they are not part of an energy transfer sys-
 tem. Id. at *20. Intel’s reply countered that ParkerVision
 had misread the ’551 patent, which, in Intel’s view, did not
 restrict a “storage element” to an element of an energy
 transfer system. Id. at *9–10. The Board concluded that
 Intel had the better reading. Id. at *13–14. Acknowledging
 that the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
 Texas in cases involving the ’444 patent and related pa-
 tents had adopted claim constructions inconsistent with In-
 tel’s proposed construction, 5 the Board explained that it
 understood the final sentence of the critical paragraph in
 the ’551 patent to be lexicographic. Id. at *12, *14–15.
     The final written decision also granted Intel’s motion
 to exclude certain arguments first raised in ParkerVision’s
 sur-reply. Id. at *28, *30. ParkerVision’s sur-reply argued
 that (1) Tayloe’s capacitors only hold a negligible amount
 of energy from an input EM signal and (2) the term “non-
 negligible” from the proposed constructions indicates that
 the “amounts of energy” are measured relative to an
 amount of energy available from the input EM signal. Id.
 at *22–23, *27. The Board determined that these argu-
 ments should be excluded because they “proceed[ed] in a
 new direction” compared to ParkerVision’s patent owner
 response, which exclusively focused on Tayloe’s lack of an
 energy transfer system. Id. at *27–28.
     The Board further determined claim 3 to be unpatent-
 able as obvious over Tayloe and TI Datasheet. Id. at *23–

     5   See ParkerVision, Inc. v. Intel Corp., Nos. 6:20-cv-
 108-ADA, 6:20-cv-562-ADA (W.D. Tex.); ParkerVision, Inc.
 v. Hisense Co., Nos. 6:20-cv-870-ADA, 6:21-cv-562-ADA
 (W.D. Tex.); ParkerVision, Inc. v. TCL Indus. Holdings Co.,
 No. 6:20-cv-945-ADA (W.D. Tex.); ParkerVision, Inc. v. LG
 Elecs. Inc., No. 6:21-cv-520-ADA (W.D. Tex.).
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 24, *26. Intel’s reply argued that Tayloe teaches the
 claimed “storage element” under either proposed construc-
 tion, relying on teachings pertaining to the size of Tayloe’s
 capacitors, teachings on how Tayloe’s capacitors integrate
 an input signal, and expert testimony on the structure and
 operation of Tayloe’s capacitors. Id. at *22–23. Consider-
 ing these arguments and ParkerVision’s non-excluded ar-
 guments, the Board agreed with Intel and found that
 Tayloe teaches a “storage element.” Id. at *23.
     ParkerVision appeals the Board’s final written deci-
 sion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
                         DISCUSSION
     ParkerVision challenges (1) the Board’s construction of
 the term “storage element” in claim 3, (2) the Board’s con-
 sideration of Intel’s reply analysis of Tayloe and the
 Board’s exclusion of ParkerVision’s sur-reply arguments
 that Tayloe fails to teach the claimed “storage element,”
 and (3) the Board’s finding that Tayloe teaches the claimed
 “storage element.” We address each challenge in turn.
                               I.
                               A.
      “We review claim construction de novo and review any
 subsidiary factual findings based on extrinsic evidence for
 substantial evidence.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v.
 Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
 A patentee can displace plain and ordinary meaning of a
 claim term when it acts as its own lexicographer or disa-
 vows the full scope of the claim term. Id. “To act as its own
 lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition
 of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordi-
 nary meaning and must clearly express an intent to rede-
 fine the term.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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                              B.
      In the critical paragraph in the ’551 patent incorpo-
 rated into the ’444 patent, ParkerVision acted as its own
 lexicographer to define the term “storage element.” The
 critical paragraph recites:
              [1.] FIG. 82A illustrates an exemplary en-
         ergy transfer system 8202 for down-converting
         an input EM signal 8204. [2.] The energy
         transfer system 8202 includes a switching
         module 8206 and a storage module illustrated
         as a storage capacitance 8208. [3.] The terms
         storage module and storage capacitance, as
         used herein, are distinguishable from the
         terms holding module and holding capacitance,
         respectively. [4.] Holding modules and hold-
         ing capacitances, as used above, identify sys-
         tems that store negligible amounts of energy
         from an under-sampled input EM signal with
         the intent of “holding” a voltage value.
         [5.] Storage modules and storage capacitances,
         on the other hand, refer to systems that store
         non-negligible amounts of energy from an input
         EM signal.
 ’551 patent col. 66 ll. 55–67 (emphasis added) (numbering
 added).
     The critical paragraph clearly expresses an intent to
 define the term “storage element” in sentence 5. Sen-
 tence 3 uses the phrase “as used herein” to indicate that
 the descriptions in sentences 4 and 5 that follow are appli-
 cable to the ’551 patent as a whole rather than to a specific
 embodiment. ParkerVision concedes as much. Appellant’s
 Reply Br. 2 (“[Sentence 3] includes the phrase ‘as used
 herein,’ which refers to the use of these terms (which are
 contained throughout the figures and specification) in gen-
 eral, not to a specific embodiment.” (emphasis removed)).
 In sentence 5, the phrase “refer to” links the terms “storage
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 module” and “storage capacitance” to the clause “systems
 that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input
 EM signal.” 6 The patentee’s use of the phrases “as used
 herein” and “refer to” conveys an intent for sentence 5 to be
 definitional. See Kyocera, 22 F.4th at 1378 (finding lexicog-
 raphy where the patentee used the phrase “also sometimes
 referred to herein as”).
      Sentences 1 and 2 further confirm the definitional in-
 tent reflected in sentence 5. Sentences 1 and 2 describe a
 specific embodiment in the ’551 patent and consequently
 do not indicate any intent to provide globally applicable
 definitions. See Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d
 1326, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding no lexicography where
 characterization of a claim term was “expressly quali-
 fied . . . as being exemplary”). Sentence 1 describes an “ex-
 emplary energy transfer system” of Figure 82A, and
 sentence 2 attaches a reference numeral to the “storage ca-
 pacitance” to specify that this “storage capacitance” is re-
 ferring to a specific element in Figure 82A. ’551 patent
 col. 66 ll. 55–59 (emphasis added). Critically, this para-
 graph of the ’551 patent then shifts to generally defining
 the terms “storage module” and “storage capacitance” in
 sentences 3 through 5—declining to use reference numer-
 als, referring to “storage module” and “storage capacitance”
 as “terms,” and referring to the patent document as a whole
 with the phrase “as used herein.” See Trustees of Columbia
 Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d
 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that statements in the
 specification were “not simply descriptions of the preferred
 embodiment” but, rather, were definitional); Edwards
 Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed.
 Cir. 2009) (finding a description to be definitional in part

     6   The parties agree that the term “storage module”
 used in the critical paragraph is synonymous with “storage
 element.” Appellee’s Br. 3; see Appellant’s Br. 16.
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 because the “definition was not limited to the embodiment
 being discussed”). In sum, the Board’s construction of
 “storage element”—“an element of a system that stores
 non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM sig-
 nal”—correctly tracks the lexicography provided in sen-
 tence 5. Board Decision, 2022 WL 212407, at *16.
      ParkerVision, for its part, argues sentence 5 “is com-
 parative, not definitional.” Appellant’s Br. 59. But that
 this sentence is comparative does not prevent it from being
 definitional. Indeed, sentences 4 and 5 are both compara-
 tive and definitional, defining holding modules and storage
 modules with the purpose of comparing these elements
 with one another. Contrary to what ParkerVision asserts,
 sentence 5 being comparative does not exclude the possibil-
 ity that it also is definitional.
      We are also not persuaded that the specification, when
 read as a whole, restricts a “storage element” to an element
 of an energy transfer system, as ParkerVision contends.
 Appellant’s Br. 55–59. ParkerVision invites us to read into
 claim 3 an entire system (an energy transfer system)
 simply on the basis that claim 3 recites a single component
 (a storage element) that can be part of that system. Such
 a construction is required, according to ParkerVision, be-
 cause the ’551 patent (1) provides examples in which stor-
 age modules are used in energy transfer systems and in
 which holding modules, by contrast, are used in under-
 sampling systems, id. at 56–58, and (2) favorably describes
 an energy transfer system’s ability to drive a low imped-
 ance load using a storage element, id. at 56 (citing ’551 pa-
 tent col. 67 ll. 37–46). As ParkerVision sees it, with the two
 words “storage element,” the claim requires (1) the claimed
 “first frequency down-conversion module” and “second fre-
 quency down-conversion module” to be energy transfer sys-
 tems with low impedance loads, and (2) the claimed “first
 control signal” and “second control signal” to be signals
 having sampling apertures specific to energy transfer sys-
 tems. See Appellant’s Br. 62.
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      Nothing in the intrinsic evidence, however, demands
 such a particularized meaning of claim 3’s “wireless modem
 apparatus” based merely on its recitation of a “storage ele-
 ment.” True, the ’551 patent presents several embodi-
 ments of energy transfer systems that use the term
 “storage module.” See, e.g., ’551 patent col. 66 ll. 56–59,
 col. 97 ll. 59–61, col. 101 ll. 53–55. But these examples
 merely indicate that the term “storage element” encom-
 passes storage elements that are part of energy transfer
 systems, not that this term by itself necessarily invokes an
 entire energy transfer system. See Thorner v. Sony Com-
 put. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
 (“It is not enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single
 embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all em-
 bodiments, the patentee must clearly express an intent to
 redefine the term.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
     Nor do we find the analysis proffered in related district
 court litigations to be persuasive. We recognize that the
 magistrate judge’s claim construction order in ParkerVi-
 sion v. LG 7 and the special master’s report and recommen-
 dation in ParkerVision v. Hisense and ParkerVision v.
 TCL 8 adopted ParkerVision’s proposed construction. For
 example, in Hisense and TCL, the special master, upon re-
 view of the ’551 patent specification, noted that “the key
 difference between a storage [element / module / device]
 and a holding [element / module / device] is that the former
 is used only in an energy transfer system while the latter
 is used only in a sample-and-hold system.” J.A. 5952
 (brackets in original).
      In our view, the magistrate judge and the special mas-
 ter’s analyses were unduly influenced by the energy trans-
 fer system embodiments in the ’551 patent. As discussed

     7  Parkervision, Inc v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 6:21-CV-
 00520-ADA, 2022 WL 2240465 (W.D. Tex. June 21, 2022).
    8   J.A. 5922–54.
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 above, we consider these embodiments to be exemplary and
 do not find them to be a basis for defining the term “storage
 element” or limiting the term “storage element” to an ele-
 ment of an energy transfer system. The analysis in these
 district court proceedings does not alter our conclusion that
 the Board arrived at the correct construction for the term
 “storage element.”
     We hold that the Board correctly adopted the construc-
 tion that a “storage element” is “an element of a system
 that stores non-negligible amounts of energy from an input
 EM signal.”
                               II.
     ParkerVision further contends that the Board erred in
 relying on certain arguments in Intel’s reply and in strik-
 ing certain arguments in ParkerVision’s sur-reply. Appel-
 lant’s Br. 64–76. We disagree.
                               A.
     We have held that IPR proceedings are formal adjudi-
 cations that must satisfy the relevant procedural require-
 ments of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Dell
 Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
 2016). Under these requirements, the Board must:
      “timely inform[]” the patent owner of “the matters
      of fact and law asserted,” 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3), must
      provide “all interested parties opportunity for the
      submission and consideration of facts [and] argu-
      ments . . . [and] hearing and decision on notice,” id.
      § 554(c), and must allow “a party . . . to submit re-
      buttal evidence . . . as may be required for a full
      and true disclosure of the facts,” id. § 556(d).
 Id. (alterations and omissions in original). “Pursuant to
 these provisions, the Board may not change theories mid-
 stream without giving the parties reasonable notice of its
 change.” Fanduel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, 966 F.3d
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 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Hamilton Beach
 Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018)). We review de novo the Board’s compliance with
 the formal adjudication requirements of the APA. Id.
      The APA also requires that we set aside any agency ac-
 tion that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
 otherwise not in accordance with law.”               5 U.S.C.
 § 706(2)(A); Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC, 70 F.4th
 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Rules promulgated by the
 United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) dic-
 tate that a proper “reply may only respond to arguments
 raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner pre-
 liminary response, patent owner response, or decision on
 institution.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). A proper “sur-reply may
 only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding re-
 ply and may not be accompanied by new evidence other
 than deposition transcripts of the cross-examination of any
 reply witness.” Id. We review for an abuse of discretion
 the Board’s determination that a party violated these rules.
 Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821
 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “An abuse of discretion
 is found if the decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbi-
 trary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of
 law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact finding; or (4) in-
 volves a record that contains no evidence on which the
 Board could rationally base its decision.” Axonics, Inc. v.
 Medtronic, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quot-
 ing Ericsson Inc. v. Intell. Ventures I LLC, 901 F.3d 1374,
 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
                               B.
     ParkerVision challenges the Board’s reliance on argu-
 ments allegedly first raised in Intel’s reply that Tayloe
 teaches capacitors that store non-negligible amounts of en-
 ergy from an input EM signal. Appellant’s Br. 64–66. Par-
 kerVision appears to suggest that the Board deprived
 ParkerVision of its procedural rights under the APA and
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 16                                 PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

 failed to comply with the USPTO’s rule that a reply “may
 only respond to arguments raised in the . . . patent owner
 response . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 64–65 (quoting 37 C.F.R.
 § 42.23(b)). We find neither reason persuasive.
     The Board permissibly relied on Intel’s reply argu-
 ments as to how Tayloe teaches the claimed “storage ele-
 ment.” Because the Board’s institution decision did not
 contain an express claim construction, the APA required
 the Board to give Intel “adequate notice and an opportunity
 to respond under the new construction” first proposed in
 ParkerVision’s patent owner response. Axonics, 75 F.4th
 at 1383.
     Our decision in Axonics is instructive. There, like here,
 neither the petitioner nor the patent owner expressly pro-
 posed a pre-institution construction of any claim terms,
 and the Board’s institution decision did not expressly con-
 strue any terms. Id. at 1378. Post-institution, the patent
 owner response proposed a construction of a claim limita-
 tion, which the final written decision ultimately adopted.
 Id. at 1378–79. The petitioner’s reply contended that its
 relied-upon prior art taught the disputed limitation, even
 under the patent owner’s newly-proposed construction, but
 the Board refused to consider that argument because the
 petition had not included such an argument. Id. at 1379.
 We vacated the Board’s decision, “hold[ing] that where a
 patent owner in an IPR first proposes a claim construction
 in a patent owner response, a petitioner must be given the
 opportunity in its reply to argue and present evidence of
 anticipation or obviousness under the new construction, at
 least where it relies on the same embodiments for each in-
 validity ground as were relied on in the petition.” Id. at
 1384.
     As the petitioner’s reply did in Axonics, Intel’s reply ap-
 propriately responded to ParkerVision’s new claim con-
 struction by explaining how Tayloe discloses a “storage
 element” even under that proposed construction.
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 ParkerVision’s patent owner response, for example, as-
 serted that “storage element” includes a particular storage
 requirement by proposing the term means “an element of
 an energy transfer system that stores non-negligible
 amounts of energy from an input electromagnetic signal.”
 J.A. 726 (emphasis added). The Board was obligated under
 Axonics to afford Intel the opportunity to respond to this
 construction and, in particular, to the new storage require-
 ment that emerged in ParkerVision’s response.
      Furthermore, in essentially adopting Intel’s “storage
 element” construction from its reply over ParkerVision’s
 competing construction, the Board did not “change theories
 midstream without giving the parties reasonable notice of
 its change.” Fanduel, 966 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Hamilton
 Beach Brands, 908 F.3d at 1338). Once ParkerVision in-
 troduced a claim construction argument into the proceed-
 ing through its patent owner response, Intel was entitled
 in its reply to respond to that argument and explain why
 that construction should not be adopted. And we see noth-
 ing wrong with Intel providing in that reply its own inter-
 pretation of the same intrinsic evidence ParkerVision had
 relied on to present what it believed to be a claim construc-
 tion that more accurately corresponded to the definition
 contained in the specification. See Board Decision, 2022
 WL 212407, at *10. Intel was not barred at that point from
 presenting its own competing construction. Importantly,
 in keeping with APA requirements, ParkerVision was
 given an opportunity in a sur-reply to respond to Intel’s
 proposed construction. Id. And though not dispositive, we
 note that, consistent with the facts of Axonics, Intel relied
 on the same capacitors in Tayloe that it relied on in its pe-
 tition, i.e., capacitors 72, 76. Compare J.A. 829–31, 837–
 38, with J.A. 564–67. Intel did not “rely on new prior art”
 or even “new embodiments from the prior art references
 that were relied on in the petition,” and instead “relied on
 the same embodiments as it relied on in the petition.” Ax-
 onics, 75 F.4th at 1383–84.
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     In sum, we find that the Board did not violate Par-
 kerVision’s APA procedural rights. Under the APA and Ax-
 onics, the Board was required to permit Intel to respond to
 the new claim construction. Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1383. And
 the Board, in considering Intel’s reply arguments, did not
 deprive the patent owner of notice and an opportunity to
 respond. Fanduel, 966 F.3d at 1339–40.
      Finally, we do not believe the Board, in considering In-
 tel’s reply arguments, failed to comply with its regulation
 specifying that a “reply may only respond to arguments
 raised in the . . . patent owner response . . . .” 37 C.F.R.
 § 42.23(b). Intel’s reply arguments, as discussed above, re-
 sponded to a proposed construction that originated in Par-
 kerVision’s patent owner response. We therefore are not
 persuaded the Board abused its discretion.
                              C.
     ParkerVision further argues that the Board erred in
 excluding its sur-reply arguments pertaining to the
 amount of energy stored in Tayloe’s capacitors. Appellant’s
 Br. 66–72. In ParkerVision’s estimation, its sur-reply
 properly responded to arguments raised in Intel’s reply.
 Id. at 67–71. We find that the Board did not abuse its dis-
 cretion in excluding parts of ParkerVision’s sur-reply.
      As described above, ParkerVision’s patent owner re-
 sponse proposed the construction of “storage element” re-
 quiring the “storage element” (1) to be an element of an
 energy transfer system and (2) to store non-negligible
 amounts of energy from an input EM signal. J.A. 769.
 Then, ParkerVision argued Tayloe’s capacitors “are not
 ‘storage elements’ because the capacitors of Tayloe are not
 elements of ‘an energy transfer system.’” Id. at 797. The
 patent owner response made no mention of whether Tay-
 loe’s capacitors store non-negligible amounts of energy. In
 its petitioner’s reply, Intel proposed the claim construction
 that served as the basis of the Board’s claim construction
 that we adopt in this opinion and then argued that Tayloe
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 PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL                                19

 teaches storing non-negligible amounts of energy because
 its capacitors (1) are larger than the ’551 patent’s capacitor
 and (2) integrate the input EM signal. J.A. 829–31 (citing
 J.A. 4769–74 ¶¶ 6–14 (Reply Declaration)).
     In its sur-reply, ParkerVision continued to press its
 own claim construction and reiterated that Tayloe does not
 describe an energy transfer system. J.A. 871–77, 888–89.
 ParkerVision then separately asserted that Tayloe’s capac-
 itors allegedly only store a negligible amount of energy be-
 cause the phrase “non-negligible amounts of energy” must
 be measured relative to the available energy of the input
 EM signal. Id. at 877–88 (introducing numerous new at-
 torney calculations demonstrating that Tayloe’s capacitors
 store only negligible amounts of energy). The Board ex-
 cluded this latter set of arguments because they proceeded
 in a “new direction” relative to ParkerVision’s patent
 owner’s response, which had solely attacked Tayloe for
 lacking an energy transfer system. Board Decision, 2022
 WL 212407, at *26–28 (citing Patent Trial and Appeal
 Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019),
 available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
 ments/tpgnov.pdf, at 74 (Trial Practice Guide)).
      Under the circumstances, we do not believe the Board
 abused its discretion. ParkerVision’s patent owner re-
 sponse contended that a “storage element” must store non-
 negligible amounts of energy but failed to argue that Tay-
 loe’s capacitors did not meet that requirement, instead
 choosing to focus on just the energy transfer system issue.
 The Board thus reasonably understood ParkerVision’s ex-
 cluded sur-reply arguments as offering a new theory of pa-
 tentability that ParkerVision should have included with its
 other attacks on Tayloe in its patent owner response, ra-
 ther than waiting to raise it in a sur-reply. Rembrandt Di-
 agnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
 2023) (“We have held that in some circumstances the Board
 acts within its discretion when declining to consider . . . a
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 20                                  PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

 new theory of patentability raised by patent owner in sur-
 reply.”).
    ParkerVision further argues that its sur-reply argu-
 ments were proper because they addressed allegedly new
 arguments in Intel’s reply. Appellant’s Br. 70. But as the
 Board explained:
      [I]f [ParkerVision] believed [Intel’s] Reply raised
      an issue that was inappropriate for a reply brief or
      that [ParkerVision] needed a greater opportunity
      to respond beyond that provided by our Rules (e.g.,
      to include new argument and evidence in its Sur-
      reply), it was incumbent upon [ParkerVision] to
      contact [the Board] and request authorization for
      an exception to the Rules. [ParkerVision] did not do
      so. [ParkerVision] did not request that its Sur-re-
      ply be permitted to include arguments and evi-
      dence that would otherwise be impermissible in a
      sur-reply.
 Board Decision, 2022 WL 212407, at *28 (emphasis omit-
 ted); see Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1384 (criticizing the patent
 owner for its failure to seek leave to submit an expert dec-
 laration in its sur-reply). ParkerVision failed to partake in
 available procedural mechanisms, and it cannot now fault
 the Board for this failure.
     For these reasons, we do not believe the Board abused
 its discretion in excluding ParkerVision’s sur-reply argu-
 ments.
                              III.
     Finally, ParkerVision challenges the Board’s finding
 that Tayloe teaches elements that store non-negligible
 amounts of energy. Appellant’s Br. 72–76.
      “We review the Board’s ultimate obviousness determi-
 nation de novo and underlying factual findings for substan-
 tial evidence.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations,
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 PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL                                21

 LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Factual deter-
 minations reviewed for substantial evidence include “the
 scope and content of the prior art, differences between the
 prior art and the claims at issue, the level of ordinary skill
 in the pertinent art, the motivations to modify or combine
 prior art, and any objective indicia of non-obviousness.”
 Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 902 (Fed. Cir.
 2017).
      Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that
 Tayloe discloses the claimed “storage element.” The Board
 relied on the following evidence: (1) teachings from Tayloe
 that its capacitors integrate the input signal and charge to
 the average level of the input signal, Board Decision, 2022
 WL 212407, at *23; (2) expert testimony that the accumu-
 lation of energy from such integration matches the ’551 pa-
 tent’s description of a storage module’s operation, id.;
 (3) expert testimony that “the amount of energy stored in
 one of Tayloe’s capacitors 72–78 is . . . 0.6 [microjoules]”
 and that this amount would be a “significant amount of en-
 ergy in the context of a down-conversion system such as
 that disclosed in Tayloe,” id. (omission in original); and
 (4) expert testimony comparing the capacitance of Tayloe’s
 capacitors with the capacitance of the ’551 patent’s storage
 module and concluding that Tayloe’s capacitors are “tens of
 thousands of times larger,” id. (emphasis omitted). This is
 substantial evidence.
     We do not find ParkerVision’s arguments to the con-
 trary persuasive. First, ParkerVision argues that Tayloe’s
 discussion of integrating an input signal does not teach us-
 ing “energy or energy sampling.” Appellant’s Br. 75–76.
 This, however, is another flawed attempt to read an energy
 transfer requirement into the phrase “storage element.” As
 discussed above, claim 3 does not have any such require-
 ment.
    Second, ParkerVision contends that the size of Tayloe’s
 capacitors do not establish whether Tayloe’s capacitors
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 22                               PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL

 “actually store a non-negligible amount of energy[.]” Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 74–75. But the Board did not rely on the ca-
 pacitor size alone. Rather, the Board considered capacitor
 size in combination with Tayloe’s teachings regarding the
 voltage value of the input signal and additional expert tes-
 timony that the capacitor size was significant. Board De-
 cision, 2022 WL 212407, at *23.
     Finally, ParkerVision argues that the storage calcula-
 tions performed by Intel’s expert only provide the maxi-
 mum amount of energy that Tayloe’s capacitors can store,
 not what is actually stored. Appellant’s Br. 76. But Par-
 kerVision’s only support for this argument is the attorney
 calculations in its sur-reply that the Board excluded. In-
 deed, each of the points ParkerVision raises on appeal
 against the Board’s obviousness findings consists of attor-
 ney argument that fails to undermine the evidence from
 Tayloe and from Intel’s expert. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.
 v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“At-
 torney argument is not evidence.”).
     For these reasons, we find that substantial evidence
 supports the Board’s conclusion that Tayloe teaches the
 claimed “storage element.”
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered ParkerVision’s remaining argu-
 ments and do not find them persuasive. The Board’s deci-
 sion is affirmed.
                        AFFIRMED