Court Opinion

ID: 9493435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:07:54.835065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:50.269688
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Because I would affirm the district court’s determination that Abdur’Rah-man’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective at sentencing and that the writ should be granted as to this issue, I respectfully dissent from that portion of Judge Siler’s opinion.
As an initial matter, I agree with Judge Siler that the district court properly ordered an evidentiary hearing, under its discretion to do so, and properly considered the evidence presented at this hearing. I also note that the concurrence’s invocation of the bugaboo of overreaching federal courts does not reflect the reality of federal habeas review. See 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports 482 (1990) (reporting that, in 1987 and 1988, only 1.1% of habeas corpus petitioners received a full hearing at the district court).
Abdur’Rahman’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective at sentencing due to counsel’s utter failure to investigate or present available mitigating evidence. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Abdur’Rahman must fulfill the familiar two-prong requirement of Strick*720land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687,104 S.Ct. 2052. As noted by the majority, we review this mixed question of law and fact de novo. See id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052; McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir.1996).
The district court and both Tennessee post-conviction courts that examined this case determined that Abdur’Rahman’s counsel’s performance was deficient. The state does not challenge this determination. I survey counsel’s deficiencies here because I believe that they help illuminate why Abdur’Rahman’s sentence of death “resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Counsel’s performance, as it related to preparation for and presentation at the sentencing hearing, was constitutionally inadequate. “[Wjhen a client faces the prospect of being put to death unless counsel obtains and presents something in mitigation, minimal standards require some investigation.” Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 426 (6th Cir.1999); see Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1512 (11th Cir.1995) (stating that defense counsel was obligated to investigate mitigating mental health evidence for sentencing). Counsel failed to ask the trial court to declare Abdur’Rah-man1 indigent or to ask the court for funds for investigation or experts; failed to hire an independent mental health expert; failed to investigate the nature of Ab-dur’Rahman’s prior convictions; failed to contact and present available witness testimony from Abdur’Rahman’s family at sentencing; failed to investigate Abdur’Rah-man’s numerous mental health records or educational, military, and prison records; and failed to inquire about Tennessee records regarding Abdur’Rahman’s mental health or background or introduce evidence from these at his sentencing hearing. In sum, counsel completely failed to investigate and present Abdur’Rahman’s mental health history, his institutional history, or other mitigating evidence.
The majority suggests that, armed with this evidence, defense counsel could have made a legitimate tactical decision not to present the evidence, which is now in the record but was not presented to the jury, and that we should defer to this decision. Unfortunately, defense counsel’s “tactical decision” in this case was to not prepare for the capital sentencing hearing of their client. “[Ojur case law rejects the notion that a ‘strategic’ decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.” Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir.1991).
Further, and more importantly, I disagree with the majority’s finding that Ab-dur’Rahman was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure. To demonstrate prejudice, Abdur’Rahman “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. 2052. He need not show that counsel’s performance more likely than not affected the outcome of the case. See id. at 693-94,104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, “[wjhen a defendant challenges a death sentence ..., *721the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 696,104 S.Ct. 2052.
Counsel’s failure to investigate or properly prepare for sentencing resulted in the presentation of essentially no mitigating evidence to the jury at the sentencing phase. Despite counsel’s assertion in his opening statement that he would put on other witnesses, Abdur’Rahman and his wife were the sole witnesses at sentencing and their testimony related to the circumstances of the offense for which he was found guilty. It did not address Ab-dur’Rahman’s history of abuse, his mental health treatment, or other relevant aspects of his life. This is so despite the fact that the jury should ‘“not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ ” Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
Although the jury found three aggravating factors at sentencing, it had nothing to weigh this information against; it is unsurprising that comparing those three factors with the dearth of mitigating evidence that the jury chose to impose a death sentence on Abdur’Rahman. However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment requires a jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s background and character during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.” Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.1997). The jury’s failure to consider mitigating evidence “risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence.” McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 117, n. *, 102 S.Ct. 869 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Unbeknownst to the jury determining Abdur’Rahman’s fate, mitigating evidence existed and was available for presentation at his sentencing hearing. If counsel had performed adequately, the jury could have learned that that Abdur’ Rahman has a history of traumatic abuse as a child, that he had a long history of mental health problems and treatments, and, finally, that Abdur’Rahman had previously been a productive member of society.
The abuse suffered as a child by Ab-dur’Rahman, mostly at the hands of his father, a military policeman, was inhumane and shocking.2 Dr. Raymond Winbush, *722who testified before the district court, stated that Abdur’Rahman’s “is singularly the worst case of abuse I have come across in 25 years being an academic psychologist ... I can’t even in my memory remember anything that remotely comes close to some of the things I read.”
This abuse was attested to by the petitioner, the petitioner’s half-sister, who was not contacted by counsel but was available to testify, and the petitioner’s brother, Mark Jones, who likewise was not contacted by counsel but stated in an affidavit that he would have been willing to testify at trial.3 This abuse, while not a justification for petitioner’s criminal conduct, is relevant, mitigating evidence that should have been presented to the jury.
Abdur’Rahman had a persistent history of psychiatric disorders and mental health problems. A “defendant[ ] who ,commit[s] criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse,” California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The mental health of the defendant has consistently been determined to be relevant, probative information to which the jury is entitled when making a life or death decision. See, e.g., Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir.2000) (finding that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995). The jury, however, heard nothing at sentencing regarding Ab-dur’Rahman’s mental health history.
In the record before us, we have the testimony of Dr. Samuel Craddock, who was part of the team that diagnosed Ab-dur’Rahman for the- state of Tennessee for purposes of competency to stand trial and a potential insanity defense without knowledge of his history of mental illness. Craddock testified that Thorazine and Pro-lixin, the medications prescribed for Ab-dur’Rahman in prison, were powerful anti-psychotic medications which raised a question of whether he was mentally ill, and that the symptoms exhibited by Ab-dur’Rahman were like those of someone with a borderline personality disorder. Dr. Diana McCoy testified that she diagnosed Abdur’Rahman with post-traumatic stress disorder and a possible borderline personality disorder. Dr. Robert Sadoff offered a similar diagnosis as McCoy.
Included in the records before this court are a department of social services report from the state of Washington stating that Abdur’Rahman had a “paranoid personality” and “personality pattern disorder;” Philadelphia school records which include a request for psychiatric services; and prison records, including psychiatric examinations, some which state that Abdur’Rah-man does not have a mental illness or psychosis, but does have a history of documented suicide attempts, and some which indicate that Abdur’Rahman was diagnosed with other disorders, ’including a severe psychopathic personality and a “psychotic depressive reaction and antisocial personality.” Abdur’Rahman’s prison records also indicate that Abdur’Rahman was frequently and heavily medicated during at least some of his time in prison and that he beat his head against the wall while in prison. Records from the New Jersey Department of Human Services document his 1967 stay while a youth at the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a sociopathic personality disturbance and antisocial reaction with depression, and records from the Davidson County Sheriffs Department show that Abdur’Rahman beat his head against a wall after his arrest there. Further, the record indicates that others in Abdur’Rah-man’s family had mental health problems. *723Many of these records were available to defense counsel through the MTMHI report, prepared for the purpose of determining Abdur’Rahman’s competence to stand trial;4 however, counsel failed to investigate or present any of this mitigating information to the jury. Nor did counsel present to the jury a mental health expert who could have testified regarding Ab-dur’Rahman’s mental health problems.
Further, testimony from the trial of Ab-dur’Rahman’s conviction for second-degree murder for the killing of a fellow inmate— a conviction that supported one of the aggravating circumstances — indicated, in the opinion of one expert, that Abdur’Rahman had a borderline personality disorder and schizoid personality. This evidence could have been mitigating with respect to the petitioner’s mental health, as well as with respect to the prior murder.
Abdur’Rahman’s wife could have her personal observations about his mental health, including the fact that her husband had conversations with people who did not exist, banged his head against the wall, and believed that the couple would give birth to the next Messiah. She also stated that she told defense counsel that a psychiatrist should examine her husband.
Despite his childhood abuse and extensive mental health history, Abdur’Rahman was able to comport his conduct to societal norms and to engage in productive activities. His former fiancé, about whom he informed defense counsel, but whom counsel failed to contact, later testified that, when she knew him in 1983, Abdur’Rah-man held a steady job, attended college, and volunteered with a Quaker youth group at a large housing project. She stated that the petitioner was a caring and gentle person who sincerely held Christian beliefs.
While acknowledging that some of this evidence would have been mitigating, the majority adopts the rationale of the state court of appeals that the evidence that defense counsel failed to investigate or present also contained instances of violent conduct and anti-social actions by Abdur’Rahman. This treatment of the evidence by the majority contradicts the emphasis by the courts that evidence considered mitigating by the person facing a death sentence should be allowed to the greatest extent possible to insure a full and fair determination by the jury. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Further, the majority overlooks that the jury already had much of this evidence of violent or prior criminal conduct before it and that the presentation of available, relevant evidence at sentencing would not have subjected Abdur’ Rahman to additional statutory aggravating factors. The mitigating elements of this evidence would have served, instead, to present the jury with an accurate and complete picture of the person they were sentencing — the very purpose of a capital sentencing hearing. In addition, the majority ignores the mitigating potential of nearly all of the available evidence and the fact that some of the evidence that counsel failed to investigate or present does not involve violence or harmful behavior by Abdur’Rahman. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (noting that the presence of unfavorable records did not justify “the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in [petitioner’s] favor”).
Had counsel adequately performed, the jury weighing whether a death sentence was an appropriate punishment for Ab-dur’Rahman would have had a representative picture of the person they were sentencing, instead of the one-sided account upon which they based their decision. Like the petitioner recently before the Su*724preme Court, Abdur’Rahman has “a constitutionally protected right ... to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.” Williams, — U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 1513. Given the total lack of mitigating evidence presented at Abdur’Rahman’s sentencing hearing, “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [sentencing hearing] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Austin, 126 F.3d at 848; Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1210 (6th Cir.1995). I respectfully dissent.

. I use Abdur'Rahman’s present name throughout when referring to him, even in the context of events that occurred or documents created when the petitioner went by the name of Jones.

. As the district court stated:
During the hearing in this Court, Nancy Lancaster, Petitioner's half-sister, testified about the abuse and difficulties Petitioner experienced during his childhood. Although some of the information Ms. Lancaster related was based on statements made by other family members, the Court was very impressed with Ms. Lancaster’s credibility and demeanor.
Ms. Lancaster testified that she and the Petitioner share a common mother, who abandoned Ms. Lancaster and her two brothers when she was an infant. Petitioner's mother put her three children in a taxi, drove them to the woods, and left them. Petitioner's mother later married Petitioner’s father, James Jones, Sr. Three more children were born of that marriage— James (Petitioner), Mark, and Sylvia.
Petitioner's statements to mental health providers [over the course of his life] provide a vivid description of the abuse Petitioner suffered at the hands of his father. Petitioner received regular beatings with a leather strap from his father. Petitioner's father made him take off his clothes, placed him hog-tied in a locked closet, and tethered him to a hook with a piece of leather tied around the head of his penis. Petitioner's father struck Petitioner's penis with a baseball bat. To punish him for smoking, Petitioner’s father required him to eat a pack of cigarettes, and when he vomited, was made to eat the vomit. None of this extraordinary abuse, which constitutes relevant mitigating evidence, was heard by the jury-
*722Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 999 F.Supp. 1073, 1097-98 (M.D.Tenn.1998) (footnote and citations to record omitted).

. Petitioner’s brother subsequently committed suicide.