Court Opinion

ID: 9456940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:06:54.197371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:09.150696
License: Public Domain

O’SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
“No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.”
In the case at bar, enforcement of this rule is excused by my brothers by finding that District Judge Robert L. Taylor committed “plain error” by giving the instruction set out in the majority opinion.' This accused instruction was obviously satisfactory to appellant’s attorney at the time it was given, and was consistent with and relevant to the case that the plaintiff-appellant pleaded and relied on for his recovery.' In my view, the instruction not only was not “plain error,” it was not error at all. I will, however, confine my discussion to the claim of “plain error.”
I read O’Brien v. Willys Motors, Inc., 385 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1967) as limiting our use of “plain error” to excuse obedience to Rule 51 to situations where the claimed error is “obvious and prejudicial to a party.” We there recited the United States Supreme Court’s advice as to when the “plain error” rule should be invoked. In United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555, 557 (1936), the Supreme Court said:
“ ‘In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
*280In Eaton v. United States, 398 F.2d 485, 486 (1968), we said:
“The plain error rule was intended to be and should be applied to serve rather than to subvert the ends of justice. The rule is to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice.”
In Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1943), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous court, expressed that view that “plain error” should not be employed to permit a litigant, having chosen a style of presenting his case at trial, then to obtain a new trial because of an error to which he assented at a first trial. He said:
“Any other course would not comport with the standards for the administration of criminal justice. We cannot permit an accused to elect to pursue one course at the trial and then, when that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist on appeal that the course which he rejected at the trial be reopened to him.” 318 U.S. at 201, 63 S.Ct. at 555, 87 L.Ed. at 713.
The “plain error” claimed to infect Judge Taylor’s charge resides in his statement that for there to be a violation of the Fair Employment Act, “there must be an intentional pattern and practice upon the part of the union to discriminate against the plaintiff because of his race,” and that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants “followed a practice of discrimination.” It is argued that one act of discrimination is sufficient. That may indeed be true, but that was not the cause of action pleaded or relied upon by the plaintiff in this ease. There is no allegation in the complaint that defendant’s wrong consisted in one or more instances of discrimination. In the brief to us the EEOC heads his argument in this style:
“An Isolated Instance of Discrimination May Constitute an Unlawful Employment Practice in Violation of Title VII.”
I would not take issue with such an academic and abstract assertion, but that was not what was involved in the lawsuit tried in the District Court.
I first point out that throughout its language the relevant section of the statute here relied upon — 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 — the misconduct which will violate the statute is referred to as “an unlawful employment practice” and in the subsection (g) thereof where various remedies available to a wronged employee are set out, the subsection begins:
“If the Court finds that the respondent [an employer] has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint * * (Emphasis supplied.)
and then provides for the relief which can be given upon proof of a violation of the Act.
The complaint whereby plaintiff began his action asked that defendant be enjoined from continuing its “policy, practice, custom and usage” denying plaintiff equal employment opportunities. This basic pleading recited that plaintiff was asserting an action for the prevention of “unlawful employment practices” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; it charged that plaintiff sought back pay because of defendant’s discriminatory “practices”; that it is “the policy of the defendant to first designate for picket duty those members of the Local who are unable to work at a regular job”; that “on numerous occasions” he was refused picket duty because of his race; and that the enforcement of this practice caused him injury. No “isolated instance” of discrimination is mentioned anywhere in the cause of action pleaded. The complaint recited that plaintiff King had filed a charge against the defendant union with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a copy of that Commission’s decision was attached to the Complaint filed in the District Court. The decision of the EEOC discloses that “[The] Charging *281Party [plaintiff] is totally disabled 60-year-old Negro member of Respondent Union;” that “[i]t is undisputed that Charging Party is unable to engage in the type of gainful employment which Respondent normally affords its members.” It appeared there also that plaintiff is receiving Social Security benefits as a totally disabled person. The Decision of the EEOC recites that:
“Respondent’s records reveal that, of those individuals allowed to picket from January 1968, through August 12, 1968, Charging Party [plaintiff King] was the only picket unable to engage in regular physical labor. The records also show that Caucasian members who are capable of working at a regular job have received more frequent assignments to picket for pay during the pertinent period than Charging Party. Charging Party earned $255.00 during this period while at least one able-bodied Caucasian member earned $638.00 for picketing.
“Accordingly, circumstances underlying the difference in the amount of pay received by Charging Party and Caucasian members require close scrutiny. Respondent’s record shows that, in 1967, Charging Party received the major share of picketing earnings, apparently, because all other members were regularly employed in the industry during this period.”
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission then concluded:
“While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, we are persuaded by Respondent’s failure to explain the pattern of picket duty assignment which appears to be related only to the race of the applicants.” 1
Thus, it appears that the EEOC was dealing with a “pattern of picket duty assignment” and neither the Commission, the District Court, nor the plaintiff’s pleaded cause of action was dealing with any “isolated instance of discrimination.”
The instruction given fitted the case which the plaintiff pleaded and relied upon. At the conclusion of the District Judge’s charge, the following colloquy took place:
“Does either side want the jury excused while I call for suggestions or requests? If either side wants the jury excused I will.
“Mr. Henley: [The attorney for appellant King] We have no objections or further requests.
“Mr. Slovis: We have no objections or requests, Your Honor.
“The Court: Let the record show that the Court asked the attorneys for the plaintiff if plaintiff has any objections to any part of this charge or any special requests, and what was the answer, counsel?
“Mr. Henley: [The attorney for appellant King] The answer was no.”
The District Court file discloses that in commencing this action appellant King was represented by three attorneys, one of whom was Senior Staff Attorney for the Legal Clinic of the University of Tennessee. Upon their motion and before trial, plaintiff’s original attorneys were permitted to withdraw because “Plaintiff refuses to take their best advice and desires to obtain other *282counsel who will advise him as he wishes.”
In a pretrial order, it appears that the alleged wrong charged to defendant is a pattern and practice', no “isolated instance” is referred to in the pretrial order or in any other pleading. Plaintiff’s claim was that the defendant “refused to allow plaintiff to share equally in picketing opportunities made available to members of the Local Union because of his race.” The period of the alleged violations extended from October 23, 1967, to the date of the filing of the complaint, May 1, 1969, without reference to any specific date or “isolated instance.” Included also in the pretrial order was the stipulation that:
“Parties will submit trial brief * * * and include therein anything that should be told to the jury other than under Title 42, Section 2000(e)-(2) (c) (1) race discrimination as forbidden in employment.”
On February 20, 1970, following the jury’s verdict, the attorney who tried the case for plaintiff was allowed to withdraw as counsel. On appeal, briefs for appellant were filed amicus curiae by the staff of the General Counsel for the EEOC. The cause was argued to us by a professor from the law school of Rutgers University. I cannot join in finding “plain error” in what the District Judge did in this case.
I add the further observation that upon the retrial ordered by my brothers it should be within the discretion of the District Judge whether to allow plaintiff to withdraw his demand for a jury trial and have the case tried to the Court. The appellant, aided on appeal by new counsel, asks this opportunity. I do not favor allowing a litigant to try his case first before a jury, as demanded by him, and, having lost, to permit him to choose, on retrial, a different tribunal. See Johnson v. United States, supra, 318 U.S. 189, 201, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704, 713 (1943).
I would affirm.

. It appears that appellant was totally disabled during tlie relevant periods, drawing maximum social security benefits. Thus, pay by tlie union for picketing duty was a “windfall” to appellant. He was given the “major share” of this when bis fellow unionists were regularly employed, but when they were out of work it appeared that they were given more picketing duty than appellant.
A fur-tlier paragraph of the EEOC Decision says:
“With respect to Charging Party’s allegation that he was not paid for several occasions when he picketed for Respondent because of his race, the record clearly shows that on each occasion cited by Charging Party, Respondent paid no pickets, Negro or Caucasian. Charging Party’s allegation is thus disproved by the record.”