Court Opinion

ID: 9352805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 20:02:50.458693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:45.079922
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/23 P. v. Arceo CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C093674

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. STK-MH-
                                                                                     SVPR-2010-0000774)
           v.

    ANTHONY ARCEO,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Anthony Arceo appeals from the trial court’s order committing him as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA).
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)1 He contends reversal is required because the trial
court erroneously refused to consider his request to represent himself at his SVP

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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commitment trial. We conclude the trial court erred in finding defendant had no such
right as a matter of law and denying his request. We shall vacate the commitment order
and remand the matter to the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to allow
defendant to represent himself.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        Given the narrow nature of defendant’s contentions on appeal, we recite only the
necessary facts.
        In 1983, defendant was convicted of rape, and in 1994 he was convicted of
kidnapping with attempt to commit rape. In 2010, the prosecutor filed a petition to
commit defendant as an SVP. In April 2011, after holding a contested probable cause
hearing, the trial court found probable cause existed that defendant met the criteria for
commitment as an SVP.
        In November 2019, the trial court granted defendant’s Marsden2 motion and
appointed new defense counsel.
        In November 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the SVP
petition. Defendant had argued his due process right to a speedy trial had been violated.
        On January 4, 2021, the trial court held a hearing after defendant made another
Marsden motion. Trial was set to start on February 8, and the jurors had been summoned
and both parties were prepared to proceed. The court noted defense counsel was
experienced in SVP hearings and had acted professionally. Defendant argued his counsel
had provided ineffective assistance and was unprepared for trial because his 1994
conviction was based on false testimony. The court responded that defendant had

2   People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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repeatedly tried to relitigate his prior conviction and it had no intention of retrying that
case. The court denied defendant’s Marsden motion.
        On January 14, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion to be relieved as counsel
because defendant had filed a lawsuit against her in federal court, had refused to be
interviewed by defense experts, and was refusing to communicate with her. Defendant
also instructed his family to not cooperate with his counsel. The trial court denied the
motion, stating counsel was experienced with SVP cases and well prepared. The court
also noted it would be difficult to reschedule the physician expert witnesses if trial was
postponed. In addition, the court found that defendant was manufacturing the conflict
between himself and his lawyer in order to frustrate the legal process. The court
observed that defendant had repeatedly found ways not to go to trial, including not
cooperating with his counsel and refusing to talk with the defense experts. The People, in
contrast, had always been ready to go to trial.
        On February 8, with jury selection scheduled to start the next day, defendant again
complained during a pretrial hearing about his lawyer. The court noted defendant had
refused the opportunity to speak with his lawyer the previous business day. Defendant
reiterated he wanted to introduce evidence to challenge his 1994 conviction, but the court
said it would not relitigate that case. The court invited defendant to testify but he refused.
During their exchange, the court repeatedly asked defendant to stop interrupting. When
the court asked defendant to speak with his lawyer, defendant responded, “I have no
lawyer. . . I’d rather have a Faretta[3] motion and go in pro persona.” The court replied,
“It’s not going to work. I mean . . . .” “Well, neither is she,” responded defendant. The
court replied, “Listen up. You don’t have a Faretta right in this case. You don’t have

3   Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.

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due process, it’s a civil case.” Defendant asked for a Marsden hearing, and the court
stated it considered the current hearing to be a Marsden hearing and denied defendant’s
request for new counsel. In addition, reasoned the court, defense counsel was well
prepared for trial. The court stated defendant was ranting and ordered him to step
outside. As the case involved the SVPA, the court cited People v. Fraser (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 1430 (Fraser) and People v. Sokolsky (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 814 and
explained, “You can’t represent yourself either in the trial or on appeal.”
       The jury was sworn to try the case on February 10, 2021. Throughout the
February to March trial, defendant complained at least 10 times to the court about his
counsel’s performance and regularly said he did not want to be present during the trial.
In response, the court declined to remove his counsel, noting defendant failed to raise any
new issues. The court repeatedly let defendant exit the courtroom during proceedings.
Defendant often yelled and interrupted during these hearings.
       In March 2021, a jury found defendant met the criteria for commitment as an SVP.
The trial court committed defendant to the custody of the State Department of State
Hospitals for an indeterminate term. (§ 6604.)
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to represent
himself at trial, in the mistaken belief that defendant as a matter of law could not
represent himself in an SVP commitment proceeding. The People acknowledge the trial
court’s error but argue it was harmless. Defendant argues the trial court’s error was
structural and therefore cannot be harmless.
       The SPVA “ ‘provides for “the involuntary civil commitment of certain offenders,
following the completion of their prison terms, who are found to be [sexually violent
predators] because they have previously been convicted of sexually violent crimes and
currently suffer diagnosed mental disorders which make them dangerous in that they are
likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” ’ ” (Fraser, supra,

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138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1442-1443.) Under the SVPA, a defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel, and a court must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant.
(§ 6603, subd. (a).)
       In Fraser, the defendant challenged the trial court’s denial of his Faretta motion to
represent himself, which was heard over two months before the SVP jury trial began.
(Fraser, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) Noting that a civil commitment proceeding
under the SVPA has a nonpunitive purpose and is civil in nature, the appellate court
found that such proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal prosecution. As such, there
was no Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in SVPA proceedings. (Fraser, at
pp. 1445-1446.) The appellate court also concluded there was no due process right to
self-representation in SVPA proceedings. (Id. at p. 1449; see also People v. Sokolsky,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 820 [finding no constitutional right to self-representation on
appeal from an SVPA commitment].)
       While there is no constitutional right to self-representation in SVPA proceedings,
the Fraser court noted the SVPA provides a defendant with the right to counsel, and that
language in other statutory schemes providing the right to counsel has been construed to
provide a right to self-representation by implication. (Fraser, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1450.) Other appellate courts have found (1) an implicit right to self-representation
under similar statutes such as the mentally disordered offender commitment statute (Pen.
Code, §§ 2970, 2972) and juvenile dependency proceedings (§ 317, subd. (b)) and (2) a
common law right to self-representation in civil cases. (Fraser, at pp. 1449-1450.)
Based on Fraser and the language of the SVPA, we conclude defendant had a statutory
right to represent himself at the SVPA proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court erred in finding defendant had no such right as a matter of law and denying his
request.
       Defendant cites People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 and People v. Tran
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 in support of his argument that the trial court’s error here is

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reversible per se. In Blackburn, our Supreme Court found automatic reversal was
required because the trial court committed structural error when it failed to personally
advise a defendant in a mentally disordered offender proceeding of his right to a jury trial
and obtain his personal waiver of that right. (Blackburn, at pp. 1116-1117, 1134-1135.)
In Tran, the court reached the same conclusion with respect to the involuntary
commitment of a person originally committed after pleading not guilty by reason of
insanity to a criminal offense. (Tran, at pp. 1162-1163; see Pen. Code § 1026.5,
subd. (b).)
       Defendant argues the trial court’s error should be deemed reversible per se
because its failure to recognize the statutory right to self-representation in an SVP
proceeding is similar to the statutory errors in Blackburn and Tran. The People
acknowledge that defendant “may have a point if his request to represent himself had
been timely.” Here, defendant’s request was made the day before trial was set to begin
with jury selection. The trial court did not deny defendant’s request because it was
untimely. The court never addressed timeliness because it denied the request on the
mistaken belief that there was no right to self-representation in an SVP proceeding.
Based on its mistaken belief, the trial court did not exercise any discretion in considering
the Faretta request. Thus, there is no record on whether (1) the Faretta request was
timely and (2) there was good cause to deny defendant’s request to represent himself.
Based on this record, we cannot conclude how the trial court would have exercised its
discretion.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s commitment order is vacated and the matter is remanded to the
trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether defendant still wants to

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represent himself, and, if so, whether he shall be permitted to represent himself under
applicable law.

                                                  /s/
                                                 HOCH, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

 /s/
RENNER, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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