Court Opinion

ID: 9865609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:06:57.235134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:38.346346
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION ROE EEHEAEING.
“Evidence that is relevant can not be kept from the jury by a waiver of proof on that point or admission of fact, if the party desires the testimony out.” Clayton v. Brown, 30 Ga. 490 (2). The plaintiff, under the allegations of his petition, must show that thé real-estate broker, during the agency, found a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy and who actually offers to buy on the terms stipulated by the owner [defendant]. And merely because the defendant is willing -to concede that if the interpretation, construction, and meaning of the written contract declared on, as placed thereon by the plaintiff, is the correct interpretation of the contract, that then the plaintiff did find a purchaser who was ready, able, and willing to buy the property, but on the other hand denies the plaintiff’s right to recover if the defendant’s interpretation of the contract was correct, does not preclude the plaintiff from introducing evidence to establish one- of the essential elements of his cause of action. There was no unequivocal admission or concession in the pleading that a buyer was furnished in accordance with the con*431tract. There was no reversible error in the court allowing the broker to make out his case in his own way, provided of course that was a legal way. And it was not error for the court to permit the plaintiff to introduce the purchaser as a witness, and allow him to testify as to the property he understood the broker offered to him, .and then to testify further that he was ready, able, and willing to purchase the property that he understood was offered. He was thus testifying as to what transpired between the purchaser and the broker, which we think is permissible. He was not testifying as to what transpired between the broker and the seller. Thus we think that the purchaser was testifying to independent facts which tended to establish the second essential element of the plaintiff’s ease and was relevant for that purpose. If there were two legal methods of procedure by which the plaintiff could make out the ease, the one the plaintiff preferred to follow, and the other the one that the •defendant preferred that the plaintiff should follow; there was no •error in allowing the plaintiff to elect which legal method of procedure he would adopt.

Rehearing denied.

Broyles, G. J., and Gardner, J., concur.