Court Opinion

ID: 9913104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 21:02:37.815527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:14.414678
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220912-U
                                              No. 1-22-0912

                                                                                    FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                   December 26, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
      limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
      ____________________________________________________________________________

      PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                       )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                             )     of Cook County.
               Respondent-Appellee,                          )
                                                             )
      v.                                                     )     No. 05 CR 28068
                                                             )
      DOUGLAS LEMON,                                         )
                                                             )     The Honorable
               Petitioner-Appellant.                         )     Neera Lall Walsh,
                                                             )     Judge Presiding.

      ____________________________________________________________________________

               JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.
               Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

                                                    ORDER

¶1   Held: Second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is affirmed where defendant
     failed to make a substantial showing of any constitutional violations.

¶2         On appeal from the second-stage dismissal of his amended petition for postconviction relief,

     defendant, Douglas Lemon, argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s Motion to

     Dismiss where he made a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call

     two exculpatory eyewitnesses to impeach the victim’s testimony that defendant sexually assaulted

     her. Previously, in reviewing the trial court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition, we
     1-22-0912

     remanded this case for second stage postconviction proceedings after we found that the trial court

     rendered its decision without having considered the affidavits filed by defendant. People v. Lemon,

     2016 IL App (1st) 140495-U (unpublished order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). For

     the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4      Defendant was charged with eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, four counts of

     aggravated kidnapping, two counts of criminal sexual assault, and one count of aggravated battery

     involving D.J. (“victim”), which occurred on November 15, 2005. Four of the eight counts charged

     defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault in that defendant committed an act of sexual

     penetration by the use of force or threat of force and he displaced a dangerous weapon, to wit: a

     knife. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(1) (West 2016). The other four counts charged him with aggravated

     criminal sexual assault by the use of force of threat of force and it was perpetrated during the

     commission of the felony offense of kidnapping. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(4) (West 2016).

     Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual

     assault involving the use of a dangerous weapon, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault

     perpetrated during the commission of the felony offense of kidnapping, one count of aggravated

     kidnapping, and one count of criminal sexual assault with force, which merged with one of the

     counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an

     aggregate term of 40 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

¶5      The evidence introduced at defendant’s bench trial is summarized below, relevant to the issues

     on appeal but is more thoroughly recounted in our Rule 23 order on direct appeal. People v.

     Lemon, 2012 IL App (1st) 102932-U (unpublished order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

     23).

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¶6                                       Pre-Trial Proceedings

¶7       When the pre-trial proceedings commenced, defendant was represented by an assistant public

     defender. Several times, during the pre-trial proceedings, defense counsel stated that she was

     interviewing witnesses, including “the large number of witnesses that [she] was given by

     [defendant]…” At one point, when defendant sought to proceed pro se, he stated to the trial court

     that his defense counsel only reached out to certain witnesses, with one of the witnesses being his

     brother, Johnny Lemon. Defendant stated that a defense investigator told these witnesses that they

     were not needed for trial. In response, defense counsel stated that she had visited with defendant,

     had notes from the meetings, and that she explained to defendant the types of evidence that “could

     be used to potentially prove up” the charges against him at trial. Defense counsel also explained

     that “[w]e discussed his defense as I see it, and we discussed the issue of the witnesses that he had

     given to me.” Counsel stated that two different investigators had attempted to locate his witnesses,

     they were unable to locate all of them, and that she had not been contacted by any witnesses. At

     that point, the trial court allowed defendant to proceed pro se.

¶8       Subsequently, defense counsel was reappointed to represent defendant for a fitness hearing.

     On the date of the hearing, after the trial court found him to be fit to stand trial, the trial court also

     found defendant in direct contempt of court after the trial court found that he had refused numerous

     requests to sit down, became physically combative with three sheriff officers, and damaged a table.

     The trial court sentenced defendant to six months imprisonment.

¶9       On June 23, 2009, prior to trial, defendant filed a supplemental answer to discovery in which

     he included Johnny Lemon as one of six potential witnesses. Defendant asserted the affirmative

     defense of consent.

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¶ 10      On April 5, 2010, defendant exercised his right to waive a jury trial. Immediately prior to

       opening statements in the bench trial, defendant informed the trial court that “I want to state for

       the record that I had the opportunity to talk to both my attorneys about a potential witness that I

       really would like - - wanted to testimony on my behalf. But, they felt as though they didn’t want

       him to testify, which is Johnny Lemon. I just want to state that for the record.” Defense counsel

       stated that, “I explained to him that it is a strategic decision about what witnesses will be called,

       Judge.” The trial court stated that Johnny Lemon was included on the defense witness list.

       Defendant stated, “Yes, your Honor. But, it’s just that particular part I wanted him to testify to. He

       was excluded from. I want to bring that up for the record.” The trial court informed defendant that

       this person is on the witness list and his attorneys “are making that decision about who to call.”

¶ 11                                                Trial

¶ 12       At trial, the State presented the testimony of the victim, Shirley Pearson, Willie Dennis,

       Sergeant Robert Renter, Doctor Steven Ross, Sarah Applehoff, and Detective Jose Cardo.

       Defendant presented the testimony of Detective Tracy Fanning, Calvin Lemon, and Marchella

       Winters.

¶ 13                                      Victim’s Trial Testimony

¶ 14       The victim testified that her date of birth was August 5, 1989. On November 14, 2004, after

       her friend, Shirley Pearson called defendant, he picked them up at approximately 7:30 p.m. from

       the victim’s mother’s house, located in the Austin neighborhood in the city of Chicago. This was

       the first time that the victim met defendant, and Shirley introduced him as “Vino.” Defendant, the

       victim, Pearson and others ended up “partying” in the alley behind defendant’s home. All of them

       drank alcohol, and Pearson also smoked marijuana. The victim testified that she drank one to one

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       and a half cups of vodka or gin, and denied that she was inebriated or intoxicated. She noticed that

       defendant’s speech was slurred and smelled alcohol on his breath.

¶ 15      The victim and defendant left the alley for 20 to 30 minutes to go to the liquor store at

       approximately 11:30 p.m., leaving the others in the alley. They returned to the alley, but the others

       were no longer there. The victim called Pearson from defendant’s cellular phone at approximately

       1:10 a.m. because the victim did not have a phone. Defendant then told the victim that his mother

       was sick, he had to get something from inside his house, and he did not want to leave her alone in

       the alley. The victim was unsure of the address of defendant’s home.

¶ 16      The victim testified that, on the way to defendant’s home, the two of them passed through a

       gate that had barb wire on the top of it. When she stood outside the gate, she could not see what

       was behind the gate. She described the exterior of defendant’s home as “dirty” with a window that

       was covered and “dark. You couldn’t see out of it.” She described the interior of the building as

       “mess[y], dirty, junky, little, small, compact.” She could not see out of the window from the inside

       because there “was stuff blocking…things on the wall.”

¶ 17      Prior to entering defendant’s home, he had not made any advances towards her and had not

       been aggressive. However, when the victim entered defendant’s home, his attitude changed. He

       became angry and aggressive, and pushed her backward onto the bed. She tried to get up, but

       defendant stood in front of her and drew his fist back approximately 14 inches from her face. He

       told her, “Bitch, don’t move.” The victim got scared and told defendant to stop and let her out.

       Defendant did not allow the victim to move away from him. She told defendant that she was 16.

¶ 18      At that point, defendant sexually assaulted the victim with contact between his mouth on her

       vagina and contact between his penis and her vagina. He put some type of substance on her buttock

       and then started hitting her in the buttock with his hands “quite a few times.” While this was

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       happening, defendant was cursing her and she was crying, screaming and begging him to stop. At

       one point, she heard a clicking sound, but she was unsure what was making that sound. She tried

       to turn around to see what was happening, but defendant pushed her forward. Defendant threw a

       knife towards the wall, close to the side of her waist, and then forced her to dance for him. She

       testified that defendant forced her to give oral sex to him, he performed oral sex on her, and then

       forced his penis into her vagina. The victim was unable to recall how long the sexual acts lasted.

¶ 19      Defendant fell asleep, and the victim waited “a little while” before she grabbed a “big”

       “folding” knife that she found, as well as defendant’s cellular phone. The victim found some of

       her clothing and called her boyfriend, Willie Dennis, using defendant’s cellular phone, and told

       him what happened. Then, she called 911. While she spoke to the 911 operator, she was crying,

       shaking, and trying to figure out how to get outside. At trial, the audio of her conversation with

       the 911 operator was played, and she identified photos taken showing the exterior and the interior

       of defendant’s home. Once outside, she started running. She could not tell the 911 operator of her

       location, but the police found her as she was running down the alley. She then led the police back

       to defendant’s home and identified him as the attacker. The police transported her to West

       Suburban Hospital where medical personnel performed a sexual assault kit while treating her. She

       spoke to some officers while she was in the hospital and later that day after she left the hospital.

¶ 20      On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached the victim with a telephone conversation

       when the victim called her mother’s house after returning to the alley to find that Pearson had left.

       The victim told her mother that she was on her way to her grandmother’s house, and that she was

       with Pearson, which was not the truth. The victim denied telling Detective Fanning that only she

       took off her clothing while inside defendant’s home. On redirect examination, the victim testified

       that, when standing outside defendant’s home, she could not see inside of it.

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¶ 21                                Shirley Pearson’s Trial Testimony

¶ 22       Pearson testified that at approximately 7:00 p.m. on November 14, 2005, while she was at the

       home of the victim’s mother, she called defendant. Defendant picked up the victim and Pearson,

       and then Decorion Jackson and “Gigi” and he eventually drove to a liquor store and then to an

       alley. They were “hanging out” in the alley, and people were drinking, including defendant and

       the victim. At one point, defendant and the victim left to go to the liquor store. She testified that

       she did not go with them because defendant told her not to go. During the time that she spent with

       defendant and the victim, she did not see any flirting, physical contact, or any “advances” made

       by either of them towards each other. Then, she and Decorian Jackson left the alley, and she

       eventually went to sleep at the home of the victim’s mother.

¶ 23       At approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 15, 2005, the police arrived at the victim’s mother’s

       home, and Pearson later showed the police the location of the alley where she had been with

       defendant and the victim. The victim arrived in the alley while she was still there.

¶ 24                              Willie Dennis’s Trial Testimony

¶ 25       Willie Dennis testified that the victim was his girlfriend. At approximately 6:00 a.m. on

       November 15, 2005, he received a call on his cellular telephone from a phone number that he did

       not recognize. He answered the phone and heard the victim’s voice. The victim sounded shaken,

       scared, and was whispering. The victim told him, “help me, some guy kidnapped and raped me, I

       don’t know where I am at.” Dennis told her to try to find a way out and call the police. The victim

       told him that she could not find a way, and they ended the call. Dennis then went to the home of

       the victim’s mother, and he remained there until the victim came home after being treated at the

       hospital.

¶ 26                                Sergeant Robert Renter’s Trial Testimony

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¶ 27      Sergeant Robert Renter testified that at 5:50 a.m. on November 15, 2015, he responded to a

       police radio dispatch call. At 6:14 a.m., he found the victim in an alley in the 500 block of North

       Lavergne, holding a large knife in one hand and a cellular phone in the other hand. He described

       her as being “frantic…panicked, she had tears in her eyes.” The victim was also waving a “fairly

       large” knife around, and Sergeant Renter took it away from her. The victim was also holding a

       cellular phone. Sergeant Renter told her to end her conversation on the phone, to calm down and

       to talk to him. They walked through the alley so the victim could point out where the attack

       occurred. The victim pointed to a fence and, after the sergeant opened up the gate, she pointed to

       a building in the rear of that property. Sergeant Renter testified that there was a residence in the

       front of the property, and at the rear of the property, there was a garage and another building which

       he “thought was a tool shed…” This tool shed had a door and “burglar bars” or “scissor gates” on

       it. It was approximately ten feet by ten feet in diameter and was “a makeshift little one-room

       apartment…” He described the interior as being “very dark” with a window “covered by a blanket

       or sheet, something like that.” There was a bed and some chairs inside the shed. When he

       approached with the victim, the door to the tool shed was ajar. He looked inside and saw a black

       male, who was naked, face down on a bed. The victim pointed to that person, identified in court

       as defendant, and said “That’s him, That’s him.”

¶ 28                              Doctor Steven Ross’ Trial Testimony

¶ 29      Doctor Steven Ross testified that he was the emergency room doctor at West Suburban

       Hospital who treated the victim on the morning of November 15, 2005. During his evaluation for

       a report of a sexual assault, the victim told him that she had been penetrated both orally and

       vaginally and said that a knife had been used. He did not find any evidence of bleeding, lacerations,

       bruises, or swelling. As part of a sexual assault kit, he took cultures to test for the presence of

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       sexually transmitted diseases, as well as for the presence or absence of semen. In his opinion, the

       victim did not appear to be intoxicated.

¶ 30                              Nurse Sarah Conroy Applehoff

¶ 31      Sarah Applehoff testified that she was working as a nurse in the emergency room of West

       Suburban Hospital where the victim was treated on November 15, 2005. The victim reported to a

       triage nurse that she had been sexually assaulted, including vaginal and oral intercourse, three or

       four hours before she arrived at the hospital. In Ms. Applehoff’s opinion, the victim did not appear

       to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The victim told her that the offender had penetrated

       her vagina with his penis, along with performing oral sex on each other. The victim denied that

       the offender penetrated her rectum but stated that he rubbed Vaseline on her buttocks. She was

       unsure if the offender had ejaculated, but she reported that he did not use a condom. Ms. Applehoff

       read aloud what she had written in her report as to what the victim told her, “He forced himself

       into me and threw a knife against the wall.” “I tried to make him use a condom, but he wouldn’t.”

       “He made me dance for him and kept spanking my butt.” “…[S]he was forced to perform oral sex

       on the assailant and the assailant performed oral sex on the patient.” “While lifting her legs in the

       air, she was burned on her left leg with a cigarette.” Ms. Applehoff collected a pair of blue jeans,

       a white belt, and black underwear from the victim.

¶ 32                     Chicago Police Detective Jose Cardo’s Trial Testimony

¶ 33      Detective Jose Cardo testified that he interviewed the victim at West Suburban Hospital, along

       with Detective Tracy Fanning. The interview lasted 20 to 30 seconds. The victim appeared “like

       she was going to vomit…” Based on the victim’s condition, the detectives ended the interview.

       Detective Cardo next interviewed the victim at the station at approximately 11:45 a.m. when she

       arrived with her mother. At this time, she appeared calm and was able to articulate what happened

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       to her. The defense then called Detective Cardo as a witness, and the detective testified that the

       victim never told him that she heard a clicking noise behind her, and he did not recall whether she

       told him that she told defendant that she was 16 years old.

¶ 34                                           Stipulations

¶ 35      The parties agreed to the following stipulations during the State’s case-in-chief:

          •   Erin Hanson, a supervisor and record keeper for the Chicago Office of Emergency

              Communications (OEC), would testify that at 5:50 a.m., on November 15, 2005, a 911 call

              was placed by the victim from a certain cell phone number. While the victim was able to

              provide the 911 operator with an approximate location, the OEC was able to determine her

              general location and it was dispatched to 15th District police officers. A true and accurate

              recording of this conversation was introduced into evidence.

          •   Detina Wallace, a forensic scientist in the DNA index and laboratory section of the Illinois

              State Police Forensics Sciences Command, would be qualified as an expert in the field of

              forensic biology. In 2006, she tested the criminal sexual assault evidence collection kit

              from the victim containing oral and vaginal swabs. Within a reasonable degree of scientific

              certainty, she identified semen on the vaginal and oral swabs. She preserved them for future

              DNA analysis.

          •   Kelly Biggs, a forensic scientist in the forensic biology/DNA section of the Illinois State

              Police Forensics Sciences Command would be qualified as an expert in the field of forensic

              DNA analysis. She obtained a DNA profile from the victim and defendant and conducted

              a DNA analysis on the vaginal swabs collected from the victim. Within a reasonable degree

              of scientific certainty, she determined that a mixture of DNA profiles was identified from

              the vaginal swabs, consistent with having originated from two people. A male DNA profile

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              matched the DNA profile of defendant, which would be expected to occur in approximately

              one in 840 trillion black, one in 48 quadrillion white, and one in 23 quadrillion Hispanic

              unrelated individuals. The female DNA profile matched the DNA profile of the victim. She

              did not analyze the oral swabs.

          •   Chicago Police Officer Daniel Vasquez, an evidence technician, took photographs and

              retrieved items of physical evidence from the scene. He subsequently inventoried several

              items including an “ornamental knife with an accompanying scabbard 11 inches long[.]”

              The “gold dragon folding knife” was recovered and inventoried by Sergeant Robert

              Rentner.

          •   Dina Navarro, a keeper of records for U.S. Cellular, testified as to defendant’s cell phone

              records from November 14-15, 2005, showing incoming calls and outgoing calls.

¶ 36                                        Defense Case

¶ 37      Defendant presented the testimony of Chicago Police Detective Tracy Fanning, his brother,

       Calvin Lemon, and his best friend, Marchella Winters. Detective Fanning testified that he was by

       himself when he interviewed the victim at West Suburban Hospital at 7:00 a.m. on November 15,

       2005. In his opinion, the victim appeared to be “inebriated…” but he did not detect the odor of

       alcohol and the victim did not have slurred speech. The victim told him that “she had ended up

       partying alone with [defendant] at the scene…” The victim also told him that she was drinking

       from a plastic cup and that she had taken off her own clothes. The victim did not tell him that her

       underwear had been ripped, that defendant had pulled off her clothes, or that she told defendant

       that she was 16 years old. The interview lasted two to three minutes. Detective Fanning also

       testified that she went to the scene and described the defendant’s home as a ten-foot by ten-foot

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       structure with a single entry door containing a bed, a “make-shift” toilet, a chair, a tv hanging on

       the wall, a heater, several knives, and containers of clothing.

¶ 38       On cross-examination, Detective Fanning testified that the victim told him that defendant

       forced her to remove her clothing, but she removed the clothing herself. The detective explained

       that the primary purpose for this interview was to determine the evidentiary value of items at the

       scene, and not to obtain details of what happened to the victim. Detective Fanning returned to the

       hospital a second time but was unable to interview the victim.

¶ 39       Calvin Lemon testified that on November 14, 2005, between 10 and 11 p.m., he was selling

       items in front of a liquor store when he saw defendant drive up. He saw a female passenger in the

       front seat and other people seated in the back seat. He spoke with defendant at that time, defendant

       went inside the store, and then left in his own car. Then, at 11:30 p.m., he went to defendant’s

       home to talk to him. He “couldn’t get to him at the time [because] the female came to the door.”

       He saw the female standing in the rear of the residence. The female did not appear to be upset and

       was intoxicated, “joyful” and “[l]aughing.” He testified that he had not seen the female “at any

       point earlier in the evening[.]”

¶ 40       Marchella Winters testified that she encountered the victim and defendant in the alley by

       defendant’s car and near the garage of defendant’s home. She stated that the victim told her that

       she was 18 years old.

¶ 41       The trial court found defendant guilty of five counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault,

       one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of criminal sexual assault. After merging the

       one count of criminal sexual assault with one of the counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault,

       the trial court subsequently sentenced him to an aggregate term of 40 years’ imprisonment in the

       Illinois Department of Corrections.

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¶ 42                                                Direct Appeal

¶ 43      Defendant challenged his conviction on direct appeal and alleged that the State failed to

       establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On May 29, 2012, we affirmed defendant’s

       conviction and sentence. People v. Lemon, 2012 IL App (1st) 102932-U (unpublished order

       pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 44                                         Postconviction Petition

¶ 45       On August 29, 2013, petition filed a pro se postconviction petition in which he argued, in part,

       that his constitutional right to effective assistance of trial counsel was violated where his trial

       counsel failed “to call alibi witness and eyewitness to the alleged sexual assault.” He alleged that

       his trial counsel should have called Decorian Jackson, Johnny Lemon, Joseph Wilkins Jr.,

       Arzestery Davis, and Calvin Lemon to testify on his behalf. He argued that the presumption that

       his counsel’s decision to not call these witnesses amounted to trial strategy was overcome where

       counsel’s decision appears so irrational and unreasonable that no reasonably effective attorney,

       facing similar circumstances, would pursue such a strategy. He also argued that he was prejudiced

       where the inclusion of this additional evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. He did

       not attach any affidavits to his petition.

¶ 46      On October 20, 2013, defendant filed a motion to amend his petition as well as a motion to hold

       his case in abeyance. He attached his own affidavit, three affidavits from Johnny Lemon all dated

       June 28, 2009, and one affidavit from Arzestery Davis dated February 14, 2007. Petitioner wrote

       that additional affidavits are being mailed to him, and “I will amend my affidavit exhibits to my

       original post-conviction relief petition, as soon as I recieve [sic] them, soon.”

¶ 47       On November 19, 2013, the circuit court, in a written order, summarily dismissed defendant’s

       pro se postconviction petition. In particular, as to defendant’s claim that trial counsel was

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       ineffective for failing to call Johnny Lemon, Jackson and others as witnesses, the court initially

       found that defendant had not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s conduct was a matter

       of trial strategy. It stated that defendant could not overcome this presumption because it had not

       received affidavits from those individuals despite defendant’s promise to provide them.

¶ 48       On appeal of the summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition, we found that,

       “For reasons that are not addressed by the parties or apparent from the record, the affidavits of

       Johnny Lemon did not make their way to the circuit court judge when she ruled on defendant’s

       petition.” People v. Douglas Lemon, 2016 IL App (1st) 140495-U, ¶ 16 (unpublished order

       pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We declined to consider the materials, which were

       not before the trial court when it denied the petition, for the first time on appeal. Id. Instead, we

       reversed and remanded the petition for further proceedings before the circuit court. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 49                                 Second-Stage Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 50       On remand, defendant’s case was placed back on the trial court’s call so that it could reconsider

       its ruling in light of the affidavits which were not previously provided to the trial court. Among

       the affidavits submitted to the court were three affidavits from Johnny Lemon and one affidavit

       from Joseph Wilkins.1 All of Johnny Lemon’s affidavits were dated June 28, 2009, prior to

       defendant’s trial being commenced on April 5, 2010. In one affidavit, he averred that he told

       defense counsel that what occurred between defendant and the victim on the night in question and

       that defendant was innocent. In another affidavit, Johnny Lemon averred that he received “negative

       vibes” and negative attitude” from defense counsel. He averred that defendant and defense counsel

       did not get along and defense counsel would not allow him to fully explain what happened because

       1
        During this proceeding, defendant submitted, and the circuit court considered, two affidavits from
       Arzestery Davis and three affidavits from Decorian Jackson. However, defendant does not rely
       upon these affidavits to support his claim on appeal.
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       defense counsel “being female gender and being feminism stereotype prejudice from feeling it’s a

       crime of men mainstream [sic] directly aimed towards women.” He further averred that he was

       present at trial “more than ready to testify” but defense counsel would not put him on the stand “as

       she knew that i [sic] would be key testimony which to prove [sic]” defendant’s innocence.

¶ 51       In the third affidavit, Johnny Lemon averred that on the evening of November 14, 2005, he

       saw defendant, his brother, hanging out in the alley with the victim, Decorian Jackson, Shirley

       Pearson, and “Gi Gi” around 8:00 p.m. He saw the victim “sitting up front in [defendant’s] car

       next to [defendant], as she was drinking alcohol while having a good ol’ time laughing and singing

       out loud…” He had previously seen the victim “hanging in the alley with [defendant]”

       approximately a month before. He stated that defendant sold marijuana, alcohol, and cigarettes for

       a living. He later saw the victim help defendant out of his car and to walk down the alley, through

       the back gate, and into the “cottage” that he shared with defendant. He explained that defendant

       stayed in the front half of the cottage while he stayed in the back half of the cottage. At that point,

       he was standing between the “cottage” and the garage along with defendant’s friends, “Joe &

       Candy.” He stated that defendant “was much too drunk to even walk” and the victim “took full

       control of the entire situation.”

¶ 52       Johnny Lemon averred that he was in the back part of the cottage when defendant and the

       victim walked towards him. He told “Joe & Candy” to come towards him “in order to get out of

       sight.” From the back room, Johnny Lemon saw defendant and the victim sit down on the bed,

       then the victim began to undress defendant and herself. The victim “kept trying to get [defendant]

       to wake up & focus (but [defendant] had been unconscious from the very moment he was escorted

       from the car, inside of the cottage).” The victim “continued to feed [defendant] more alcohol &

       cigarettes.” The victim attempted to engage in a sex act with defendant during which she

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       unsuccessfully attempted to put a condom on him and “tossed the condom to the side.” The victim

       climbed on top of defendant, inserted defendant’s penis into her vagina, and “began to hum away

       for a while…. for approximately 40 minutes…” At 2:30 a.m., he “had seen enough of her freaky

       stuff” so he told “Joe & Candy” that he was going into the family home for a while. Johnny Lemon

       further averred that he saw the victim put some “[w]hite powder substance” into defendant’s drink

       before he left to go into the family home. He thought that the drug was “ecstasy which is supposed

       to be considered a ‘Love Drug…’” Later, defendant told him that he would not use ecstasy.

¶ 53       Johnny Lemon averred that they were able to see everything through a “five-by-five square

       foot plexiglas[s] window” which divided the two rooms as a wall. He averred that the window was

       covered up with “dark see thru curtains…” and that the people on the other side of the window

       would not know that he was on the other side. Later, at 5:00 a.m., while he was “inside the

       residence of 506 N. Lavergne” he heard loud hollering and banging coming from the rear of the

       family residence. He heard “Joe & Candy” “fussing, banging & hollering” for the victim to open

       up the door. He went back to the cottage, and he saw the victim “franticly [sic] put on her clothes”

       and grab defendant’s “money bag.” She also grabbed defendant’s cellular phone and threatened to

       call the police if the three of them did not leave. The three of them hid, and the victim yelled “I

       know yalls [sic] out there, that’s why im [sic] calling the police!” When a police car appeared 15

       to 20 minutes later, the three of them scattered. When he saw defendant getting arrested, he “fell

       back completely” because he thought defendant was getting arrested for possessing marijuana and

       he did not want to get involved.

¶ 54        Joseph Wilkins Jr.’s affidavit, dated June 28, 2009, averred that at 8:20 p.m. on November

       14, 2005, he was looking for defendant and saw him in an alley sitting “inside the trunk of his car

       with his female friend.” The two of them were hugging and kissing while drinking gin. Wilkins

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       and defendant began to converse when the female interrupted and asked him if he wanted a drink

       to celebrate the birthday of her girlfriend. Wilkins asked her age, and she said that she was 19.

       There were also three people in the back seat of defendant’s car who were smoking marijuana. He

       and defendant agreed to meet up later that night.

¶ 55      At approximately 10:45 p.m., he was in the same alley to meet up with defendant when he

       approached the “two room cottage (in the rear of the Lemon residence at 506 N. Lavergne)…” He

       ran into “Candy” who was also looking for defendant. The two of them then ran into Johnny

       Lemon. The three of them were standing behind the “cottage” and the garage when they saw

       defendant pull up in his car. A male and a female exited defendant’s car, and defendant pulled

       away. Approximately 15 minutes later, defendant pulled up again. He saw the victim and defendant

       exit defendant’s car and “she took complete control of the entire situation” as she held up defendant

       and guided him into the cottage. Johnny Lemon told him and Candy to join him in the back room

       of the cottage “in order to get out of sight…”

¶ 56       While they were in the back room of the cottage, he “saw everything going on in the other

       room” with defendant and the victim. Wilkins’ account of what he saw at that time mirrored the

       affidavit of Johnny Lemon. When Johnny Lemon left to go into the main house, Wilkins saw the

       victim “kept doing her thang [sic]” including drinking, smoking, and dancing to the music. He also

       saw the victim put “white powder” into defendant’s drink, and he suspected that it was ecstasy. At

       approximately 5:00 a.m., he saw the victim searching the room, and she found defendant’s ‘money

       bag” under the bed. She rushed to get dressed and “jumped for joy…”

¶ 57      He and Candy suspected that the victim was trying to rob defendant so they banged on the five

       foot by five foot plexiglass window that divided the two rooms as a wall. He averred that they

       were able to see what was happening on defendant’s side of the cottage by looking through this

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       window, which was “covered with dark see through curtains…” They banged on the window and

       yelled for defendant to wake up. The victim appeared to be startled. He and Candy threatened to

       “kick her a**!” The victim grabbed a souvenir knife and defendant’s cellular phone. The victim

       called someone, hung up and threatened them that she would call the police. Approximately fifteen

       minutes later, he and Candy panicked and ran away when they saw a police car in the alley.

       “[S]ome months later” he found out that defendant was in jail for this charge, and not a marijuana

       possession charge.

¶ 58       While defendant’s postconviction petition was pending at the second-stage, defendant’s

       postconviction counsel requested several continuances based on counsel’s statements that she was

       trying to locate witnesses. On September 2, 2021, postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c)

       certificate without amendment or supplementation to the pro se petition filed by defendant. On

       October 25, 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss in which it argued, in part, that the supporting

       affidavits were inconsistent with defendant’s asserted defense of consent and therefore, would

       have prevented or hampered defendant from asserting this defense at trial. In addition, as to Joseph

       Wilkins, Jr., the State pointed out that he failed to aver that he was willing to testify for defendant

       or that he was available to testify at defendant’s trial.

¶ 59       On April 25, 2022, defendant filed a response to the State’s motion to dismiss, arguing that he

       established that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call these witnesses because “they

       would have testified that [the victim] lied about her age and that all the interactions between [the

       victim] and [defendant] were consensual.” The State subsequently filed a reply on April 27, 2022.

¶ 60       On June 9, 2022, the circuit court heard arguments from both parties. In its oral findings, the

       circuit court acknowledged that it was now in possession of the affidavits filed by defendant in

       support of the allegations raised in his petition. The trial court reviewed each of defendant’s claims,

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       recognizing that “there must be a substantial showing of a constitutional violation of due process”

       for each claim. As to Johnny Lemon’s affidavits, the trial court stated that it was “not even sure

       what to make of” his claim that there “was a negative vibe regarding trial counsel…” The trial

       court further stated that his affidavits conflicted with the affidavit of Arzestery Davis regarding

       consent. As to Joseph Wilkins Jr., the trial court stated that Davis never averred that he was willing

       or available to testify and, “how is it that trial counsel would have been able to even consider

       calling this person.” The trial court ultimately granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s

       postconviction petition.

¶ 61                                               ANALYSIS

¶ 62      On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s Motion to

       Dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition. Specifically, defendant argues that he made a

       substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two exculpatory

       eyewitnesses to impeach the victim’s testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her.

       Alternatively, defendant argues that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

       by failing to obtain a supplemental affidavit from one of the eyewitnesses when that person did

       not aver that he was willing and available to testify at trial.

¶ 63       In turn, the State contends that the circuit court’s decision to grant the State’s Motion to

       Dismiss at the second stage of postconviction proceedings was proper where defendant failed to

       make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the two alleged

       eyewitnesses at trial. Specifically, the State points out that defendant cannot establish that trial

       counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Trial counsel’s decision

       to not present these witnesses amounted to trial strategy as their testimony would have conflicted

       with defendant’s theory of defense that the victim consented to having sexual intercourse with

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       defendant. The State also contends that defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong where it is

       not reasonably likely that the result of the proceedings would have been different by the inclusion

       of this evidence. Regarding defendant’s claim that his postconviction counsel provided him

       unreasonable assistance, the State argues that postconviction counsel filed a certificate pursuant to

       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c), defendant has not rebutted the presumption that

       postconviction counsel fulfilled her duties pursuant to that rule, and record shows that

       postconviction counsel attempted to locate defendant’s witnesses. Thus, the State asks us to affirm

       the trial court’s decision to grant the State’s Motion to Dismiss.

¶ 64      The Act provides a three-stage process for a criminal defendant to allege that his conviction

       was the result of a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West

       2018). In this case, the circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition at the second stage. At the

       second stage, counsel may be appointed to an indigent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2018);

       People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10. In a postconviction proceeding, there is no constitutional

       right to the assistance of counsel. People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30. Instead, the right to

       counsel is a matter of legislative grace. Id. At the second stage, postconviction counsel may amend

       the petition. People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 27 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2010)). The

       State, as the respondent, also enters the litigation. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2018). The State may

       file a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33.

       In deciding a motion to dismiss, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any

       accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v.

       Pingelton, 2022 IL 122227, ¶ 15.

¶ 65      At this stage, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial court are to be

       taken as true. People v. Lighthart, 2023 IL 128398, ¶ 38 (citing People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310,

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       ¶ 14). The court reviews the petition’s factual sufficiency as well as its legal sufficiency

       considering the trial court record and applicable law. People v. Ryburn, 2019 IL App (4th) 170779,

       ¶ 22 (citing People v. Alberts, 383 Ill.App.3d 374, 377 (4th Dist. 2008)). If the defendant makes

       such a showing, then he is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West

       2018). We review de novo the circuit court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second

       stage. People v. Agee, 2023 IL 128413, ¶ 34.

¶ 66      Defendant’s argument concerns allegations that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

       present the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Johnny Lemon and Joseph Wilkins Jr., at trial. Claims

       of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in Strickland v.

       Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s

       performance was deficient and that such deficient performance substantially prejudiced the

       defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “More precisely, a defendant must show that counsel’s

       performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a

       reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding

       would have been different.” People v. Roland, 2023 IL 128366, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Moore, 2020

       IL 124538, ¶ 29). It is well-established that a reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to

       undermine confidence in the outcome.” Roland, 2023 IL 128366, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Pingelton,

       2022 IL 127680, ¶ 53). “Indeed, in assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not

       whether counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable

       doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently but, instead, whether it is reasonably

       likely that the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (Emphasis in original) Id.

       (citing People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705).

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¶ 67      Initially, we find that defendant has not made a substantial showing that counsel’s performance

       was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. As both parties recognize, the

       decision whether to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy, reserved to counsel’s

       discretion. People v. Enis, 194 Ill.2d 361, 378 (2000); People v. Ross, 2014 IL App (1st) 120089,

       ¶ 34. Such decisions are usually immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because

       they enjoy a strong presumption that they reflect sound trial strategy instead of incompetence,

       unless counsel’s strategy was “so unsound that no meaningful adversarial testing was conducted.”

       Enis, 194 Ill.2d at 378. Further, counsel has a duty to conduct both factual and legal investigations

       in the case. People v. Montgomery, 327 Ill.App.3d 180, 185 (1st Dist. 2001). If there is no question

       that defense counsel knows of a potential witness’s existence, the failure to call him is a matter of

       trial strategy and will not be second guessed. People v. Uselding, 217 Ill.2d 1063, 1076 (1st Dist.

       1991). “The strategies must be shown to be more than unsuccessful to overcome the presumption

       of soundness. They must appear irrational and unreasonable in light of the circumstances that

       defense counsel confronted at that time.” Id. at 1076.

¶ 68      The record shows that trial counsel’s decision to not present this testimony was made after

       counsel made a thorough investigation of the evidence, including interviewing Johnny Lemon and

       Joseph Wilkins Jr. regarding their proposed testimony. Prior to trial, defendant even acknowledged

       that his trial counsel had reached out to certain witnesses, including Johnny Lemon. Defense

       counsel listed Johnny Lemon as one of six potential witnesses in defendant’s supplemental answer

       to discovery. Then, on the day that his trial commenced, defendant informed the trial court that he

       spoken with his attorneys about presenting the testimony of Johnny Lemon. His trial counsel

       informed the court that the decision to not present this witness was a “strategic decision…”

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       Defendant also concedes that trial counsel was also aware of Joseph Wilkins Jr. as a defense

       witness.

¶ 69      Now, on appeal, defendant acknowledges that these types of issues are generally considered

       matters of trial strategy but asks us to find that counsel’s conduct amounted to a failure to call

       witnesses whose testimony would support an otherwise uncorroborated defense. According to

       defendant, these witnesses would have provided him with a defense that he did not consent to the

       sexual acts with the victim. Pursuant to IPI Criminal No. 4th 11.63(A), “consent” is defined, as it

       applies to the victim, as “a freely given agreement to the act of [(sexual penetration) (sexual

       conduct)] in question.”

¶ 70       However, defendant’s own comments in the trial record contradict his proposal to now assert

       this type of defense. Here, defendant exercised his right not to testify at trial, however, in

       allocution, he stated that this case amounted to a “false accusation. For the most part what did

       happen, it was consensual…” and that he did so after the victim told him that she was 19 years

       old. See People v. Odle, 151 Ill.2d 168, 173-74 (1992) (looking at the defendant’s statement in

       allocution in determining whether his trial counsel’s conduct amounted to ineffective assistance of

       counsel). Defendant’s previous acknowledgment that he consented to the sexual acts with the

       victim contradicts his now-asserted claim that he did not do so. Clearly, defense counsel chose to

       proceed with a defense that the victim consented to the sexual acts involving defendant, which was

       consistent the theory that defendant professed when he spoke in allocution. Had defense counsel

       proceeded with the theory that defendant did not consent to the sexual acts involving the victim,

       because he was so intoxicated and/or under the influence of the “white powder” given to him by

       the victim, it would have contradicted his assertion that he was aware that the victim had engaged

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       in consensual acts with him. Defense counsel’s conduct did not fall below an objective standard

       of reasonableness by proceeding with the defense asserted by defendant at the time of allocution.

¶ 71      Moreover, defendant asks us to accept the truth of affidavits at this stage of postconviction

       proceedings. While true, we also recognize that we must accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts

       at the second stage of postconviction proceedings unless they are positively rebutted by the trial

       record. People v. Lighthart, 2023 IL 128398, ¶ 38 (citing People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶

       14). Here, the trial record positively rebuts important aspects of the affidavits submitted by Johnny

       Lemon and Joseph Wilkins Jr. At trial, several photographs were admitted into evidence showing

       the scene where the sexual assault occurred. Moreover, the victim as well as Sergeant Robert

       Renter and defense witness Detective Tracy Fanning provided details as the exterior and interior

       of defendant’s home, where the sexual assault occurred. All of the evidence positively rebuts the

       affiants description of defendant’s home showing their ability to observe what occurred between

       defendant and the victim.

¶ 72      Both affiants averred that they were looking through a five-foot-by-five-foot wall of plexiglass

       covered by “dark see through curtains” as described in their affidavits. They described defendant’s

       home as being separated into two parts, with Johnny Lemon occupying the back half of the home

       and defendant occupying the front half of the home. They averred that both of them, as well as

       “Candy” were in the back half of the home when they saw what occurred between defendant and

       the victim. However, the scene photos, as well as the testimony of the witnesses, do not show or

       reference this wall of plexiglass. In fact, there was no divider inside the home. Sergeant Renter

       testified that defendant’s home was “a tool shed” which was ten feet by ten feet in diameter, and

       amounted to a “makeshift little one-room apartment…” He stated that there was a window to the

       outside, but it was “covered by a blanket or sheet, or something like that…” The victim described

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       defendant’s home as being “little, small, compact” with one window to the exterior and containing

       a bed. She further testified that she could not see out of the window from the inside because there

       “was stuff blocking…things on the wall.” Defense witness, Detective Tracy Fanning described the

       interior of defendant’s home as being a ten-foot by ten-foot structure with a single entry door

       containing a bed, a “make-shift” toilet, a chair, television hanging on the wall, a heater, several

       knives, and containers of clothing. In resolving this issue, we also recognize that when he reviewed

       the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal, we found that “defendant’s home actually

       resembled a garage and a tool shed in which the walls, window, and door were covered [sic] and

       the home was very dark.” Therefore, based upon the photographs of the scene, and the testimony

       of various witnesses who provided descriptions of the scene, the record positively rebuts the

       affiants’ contention that they were standing in the back half of this ten-foot by ten-foot structure,

       along with “Candy,” and able to witness what occurred between defendant and the victim.

¶ 73      Defendant relies on People v. Upshaw, 2017 IL App (1st) 151405 in support of his argument

       that he was able to make a substantial showing that counsel’s performance was deficient. In

       Upshaw, the court found that “trial counsel was deficient in failing to contact” this affiant as a

       possible alibi witness where there was evidence in the record that the defendant provided contact

       information for this witness to defense counsel prior to trial. In finding that the defendant had made

       a substantial showing, the court found that “[t]he record suggests no strategic reason that counsel

       may have decided not to investigate [the defendant’s alibi] or not to even interview [the affiant].”

       Id. ¶ 40. Here, the record shows that counsel, as defendant concedes, investigated this evidence,

       including interviewing these witnesses, and concluded that these witnesses would not be called as

       witnesses at defendant’s trial. Thus, defendant’s reliance upon Upshaw is misplaced.

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¶ 74       We also find that defendant did not make a substantial showing of the prejudice prong of

       Strickland. Initially, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. At

       that time, we found that, “[i]n light of [the victim’s] consistent testimony and outcry statements

       regard the acts of criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping perpetrated against her, we

       cannot conclude that no rational trier of fact would have found defendant guilty of these crimes

       beyond a reasonable doubt.” The victim testified that when they entered defendant’s home, he

       became angry and aggressive before pushing her onto a bed and forcing her to engage in multiple

       acts of sexual penetration. Her testimony was corroborated by her immediate outcry to her

       boyfriend, Willie Dennis, the police officers, and the emergency room nurse and doctor. The phone

       records introduced into evidence showed that she called her boyfriend and 911 from defendant’s

       own cellular phone while she was still inside defendant’s room. The victim’s demeanor and words

       to the dispatcher begging for help during the 911 further corroborates the evidence. She armed

       herself with a knife found in defendant’s home to protect herself in her escape. When the police

       arrived, she led the police to defendant’s home and immediately identified him as the person who

       sexually assaulted her. Moreover, defendant’s DNA was found on the victim’s vaginal swab.

¶ 75       Here, he is now relying upon the same challenges to the victim’s credibility as we previously

       addressed, and rejected, on direct appeal. In light of the strength of this evidence, and the extent to

       which the averments of these witnesses, Johnny Lemon and Joseph Wilkins Jr., were contradicted

       by the photographic evidence introduced at trial, would not have raised the probability of a

       different outcome at trial. Therefore, it is reasonably unlikely that evidence of defendant’s lack of

       consent would have changed the trial court’s determination that defendant forced the victim to

       engage in sexual acts with him and forcefully held her inside his home. Accordingly, we find that

       defendant’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.

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¶ 76       In light of our decision, we need not make a determination regarding defendant’s alternative

       argument that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance when counsel failed to

       shape defendant’s into appropriate legal form. In particular, defendant points out that the trial court

       stated, in part, that Joseph Wilkins Jr. did not aver that he was willing or available to testify. The

       trial court made this additional finding when considering defendant’s postconviction petition and

       its contents. In addressing defendant’s argument, we recognize that our review of defendant’s

       postconviction petition is de novo at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. People v.

       Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 29 (review of a second-stage dismissal is de novo). When applying a

       de novo standard of review, the reviewing court owes no deference to the trial court’s judgment or

       reasoning. People v. Jackson, 2021 IL App (1st) 190263, ¶ 38 (citing People v. Carlisle, 2019 IL

       App (1st) 162259, ¶ 68. We may affirm on any basis found in the record. Id. ¶ 38. Because we

       may affirm on any basis in the record, we need not determine regarding defendant’s claim that his

       postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance where we are not basing our decision on

       whether Joseph Wilkins Jr. averred that he was willing or available to testify.

¶ 77                                              CONCLUSION

¶ 78       We therefore hold that defendant’s postconviction petition failed to make a substantial showing

       that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting

       the State’s Motion to Dismiss. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling.

¶ 79   Affirmed.

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