Court Opinion

ID: 9897401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:06.640641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.536875
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                 May 12 2023, 8:22 am

                                                      CLERK
                                                  Indiana Supreme Court
                                                     Court of Appeals
                                                       and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer L. Koeth                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Raleigh, North Carolina                                     Attorney General of Indiana
                                                            Evan Matthew Comer
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Malcolm Dwight Smith II,                                    May 12, 2023
                                                            Corrected
Appellant-Defendant
                                                            Court of Appeals Case No.
        v.                                                  21A-CR-1514
                                                            Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
State of Indiana,                                           Court
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         The Honorable Jaime Oss, Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            46D01-2006-F4-766

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                           Judges Robb and Weissmann concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023                           Page 1 of 17
      Statement of the Case
[1]   Malcolm Dwight Smith II (“Smith”) appeals, following a jury trial, his

      conviction for Level 4 felony burglary.1 Smith argues that: (1) the trial court

      violated his right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when

      it admitted evidence ; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his

      conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issues
                 1.       Whether the trial court violated Smith’s right to a speedy
                          trial.

                 2.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
                          admitted evidence.

                 3.       Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Smith’s
                          conviction.

      Facts
[3]   In 2017, Brianna Neyhart (“Neyhart”) and Torez Pearson (“Pearson”), after

      being in a fourteen-year-long relationship, got married and had two daughters.

      Sometime in 2019, Neyhart separated from Pearson and entered into a

      1
          IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023                  Page 2 of 17
      relationship with Smith. Sometime later, Neyhart ended her relationship with

      Smith and returned to Pearson.

[4]   In May 2020, Neyhart and Pearson, who were then back together, and their

      two daughters were living at the Dunes Inn (“the Dunes”) in Michigan City,

      Indiana. Smith was living at the Red Roof Inn (“the Red Roof”) across the

      street from the Dunes.

[5]   On the morning of May 27, 2020, Neyhart left her room in order to smoke a

      cigarette and collect some money that her friend owed her. Neyhart left her

      one-year-old daughter (“Younger Daughter”) in her room alone. During this

      time, Pearson had left the Dunes to take their other daughter (“Older

      Daughter”) to the dentist. Pearson left his two Glock cases, each containing

      one Glock handgun (“Glock cases”), in the room.

[6]   While Neyhart was out of the room smoking, Smith entered the room. Smith

      saw Younger Daughter in the room alone along with Pearson’s Glock cases.

      Smith left the room but returned a few seconds later. Smith grabbed the Glock

      cases, tucked them under his shirt, and left. Smith also called the police to

      report that Younger Daughter was alone in the room.

[7]   LaPorte County Deputy Michael Sweet (“Deputy Sweet”) arrived at the Dunes

      and headed to Neyhart and Pearson’s room, where he found the room door

      partially open and Younger Daughter sleeping. When Neyhart returned less

      than ten minutes later, she found Deputy Sweet in her room. Deputy Sweet

      informed Neyhart that he had come to her room to perform a welfare check on

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023          Page 3 of 17
       a child who had been left alone. Deputy Sweet informed Neyhart that he had

       to file a report and that the Department of Child Services would follow up with

       her. Deputy Sweet left the Dunes. Neyhart, not noticing that the Glock cases

       were missing, packed up her things and left the Dunes with Younger Daughter.

[8]    Later that day, Pearson returned to the room with Older Daughter. Pearson,

       who had planned to go to the shooting range after Older Daughter’s dentist

       appointment, immediately noticed that his Glock cases were missing. Pearson

       called Neyhart and asked her if she had taken the Glock cases. Neyhart denied

       taking the Glock cases. Pearson met up with Neyhart, and they both returned

       to the Dunes.

[9]    Neyhart and Pearson went across the street to the Red Roof in order to ask

       Pearson’s friend, Zach Likens (“Likens”), if he had taken the Glock cases.

       However, before they could find Likens, Smith approached Pearson. Smith

       and Pearson began arguing, and Smith told Pearson that he would “bust on

       him with [Pearson’s] own guns.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 86). Pearson and Neyhart

       returned to the Dunes, and Pearson called the police to report that his Glock

       cases had been stolen.

[10]   Deputy Sweet returned to the Dunes and collected a description of the Glock

       cases from Pearson. Deputy Sweet also spoke with Hotel Manager

       Kalpeshkumar Patel (“Manager Patel”). Manager Patel, who had cameras

       installed at the Dunes, showed Deputy Sweet a video recording (“the video

       recording”) of Smith entering Pearson and Neyhart’s room and leaving with the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023        Page 4 of 17
       Glock cases tucked under his shirt. Manager Patel “was unable to provide a

       copy of the video at the time but advised that he would email” a copy to

       Deputy Sweet at a later time. (App. Vol. 2 at 17). Deputy Sweet included this

       fact in his probable cause affidavit and took photographs of the video recording

       for his report. Specifically, Deputy Sweet took photographs of the video

       recording where the image of the individual and the Glock cases tucked under

       his shirt were the clearest.

[11]   Deputy Sweet, before he left the Dunes, gave Pearson a description of the

       individual that he had seen in the video recording. This included the

       individual’s approximate height and hairstyle. Pearson, after hearing this

       description, immediately went with Neyhart to the Red Roof. There, Pearson

       and Smith got into another verbal argument. Pearson also accused Smith of

       stealing his Glock cases. Officers arrived at the Red Roof, but made no arrests.

[12]   The next day, Manager Patel emailed the video footage to Deputy Sweet.

       Deputy Sweet placed the video recordings into the police evidence locker.

       Pearson also provided the serial numbers for the handguns contained in the

       Glock cases to Deputy Sweet for his report.

[13]   A few days later, Neyhart visited the Blue Chip Casino (“the casino”) to

       gamble. Neyhart, while she was in her car and parked in the casino’s garage,

       saw Smith approaching. Smith knocked on her window, and Neyhart unlocked

       her car door. Smith joined Neyhart in the car, and they had a conversation.

       During this conversation, Neyhart asked Smith, “[w]hy would you do

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023         Page 5 of 17
       something so stupid?” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 89). Smith apologized to Neyhart and

       explained that he had called the police when he saw Younger Daughter alone

       in Neyhart’s room. Smith also admitted to taking Pearson’s Glock cases and

       selling them. Afterward, Smith exited Neyhart’s car, and Neyhart headed into

       the casino to gamble.

[14]   In June 2020, the State charged Smith with Level 4 felony burglary. At his

       June 30 initial hearing, Smith told the trial court that he was “manic

       depressive” and had not taken medication for his condition in years. (Tr. Supp.

       at 5). Smith also said that he would get an attorney, and the trial court

       responded that it was “very important” for Smith to “either hire that attorney as

       soon as possible” or “have that attorney appointed as soon as possible[.]” (Tr.

       Supp. at 8). Smith also made a speedy trial request to the trial court.

[15]   During the hearing, Smith, over a dozen times, cut off the trial court and

       attempted to discuss the facts of his case. The trial court repeatedly reminded

       Smith that this hearing was only his initial hearing and that he should not

       discuss the facts of his case. The trial court told Smith, “again - the facts - we’re

       not having a trial[.]” (Tr. Supp. 9). The trial court asked Smith to stop talking

       three more times. Afterward, the trial court told Smith that it was “concerned

       about the fact that [Smith] [was] . . . making these statements voluntarily and -

       I’m . . . going to note . . . that you made this fast and speedy trial request and

       when your public defender . . . is . . . notified of their appointment they’ll also

       be noticed of this request.” (Tr. Supp. at 10). The trial court explained to

       Smith that the public defender would ultimately decide whether or not to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023             Page 6 of 17
       maintain the speedy trial request. Smith responded that he “would go pro se”

       and that he “did not need an attorney.” (Tr. Supp. at 10). The trial court told

       Smith that he had the right to proceed pro se, but that it was concerned because

       Smith had both asked for an attorney and asked to go pro se. The trial court

       continued to express its concern because of Smith’s untreated mental illness.

       Smith interrupted the trial court and began talking about his case again. The

       trial court informed Smith that it had appointed a public defender to represent

       him and had also set a bond hearing for July 16. Smith interrupted the trial

       court and began to talk about the facts of his case and mentioned Indiana

       Criminal Rule 26. The trial court ended the hearing.

[16]   The next day, Attorney David Jones (“Attorney Jones”) entered an appearance

       for Smith. At the July 16 bond hearing, the trial court denied Smith’s request

       for a bond reduction. Attorney Jones reminded the trial court of the speedy

       trial request pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), and the trial court set a

       final pretrial conference for August 8 and a trial date for September 8.

[17]   At a July 31 hearing, the trial court noted that Smith’s trial date had been

       moved up to August 31. However, another trial had been scheduled for that

       day. Attorney Jones requested a continuance of Smith’s trial date and

       requested that the trial court “to set for status sometime in the future.” (Tr.

       Supp. at 23). When the trial court asked Attorney Jones if he wanted a new

       trial date scheduled that day, Attorney Jones replied, “[w]e waive, Your Honor,

       so we can maybe work out a plea in this case.” (Tr. Supp. at 24). The trial

       court noted that Smith had waived the “Criminal [Rule] 4 issue . . . as well”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023            Page 7 of 17
       and, at Smith’s request, set a status conference for September 10. (Tr. Supp. at

       24).

[18]   Sometime before the September 10 status hearing, Attorney David Payne

       (“Attorney Payne”) entered an appearance for Smith to replace Attorney Jones.

       At the September 10 hearing, the trial court set a final pretrial conference for

       November 12 and a trial date of December 14. Smith told the trial court that

       he, from day one, wanted to “go pro se if [his attorneys] were going to mess

       with any of [his] trial dates.” (Tr. Supp. at 29). Smith further stated that he had

       begun taking medication for his bipolar disorder and that he never wanted any

       lawyers “to be able to have any thing above or under [his] case that may take

       [his] right to a fast and speedy trial.” (Tr. Supp. at 29).

[19]   The next day, while still represented by counsel, Smith filed a hand-written

       motion to dismiss. The trial court did not respond to the motion. On

       September 24, the trial court held another hearing. At this hearing, Attorney

       Payne told the trial court that he was “not able or willing to try th[is] case on a

       speedy trial basis” and asked the trial court for a continuance. (Tr. Supp. Vol. 2

       at 4). Smith reminded the trial court that he had said that “if [his] public

       defender was gonna vacate . . . my fast and speedys, then [he] would much

       rather go pro se[.]” (Tr. Supp. Vol. 2 at 6). The trial court granted Smith’s

       motion to continue.

[20]   On February 25, 2021, the trial court released Smith on his own recognizance

       under the condition that he immediately report to the LaPorte County

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023            Page 8 of 17
       Community Corrections GPS monitoring program. Smith also agreed to not

       commit any new offense and to submit to weekly drug testing. On March 3,

       2021, Smith violated the terms of his release, and officers arrested him. On

       March 25, 2021, Smith’s counsel requested another speedy trial date under

       Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). The trial court granted Smith’s request. In May

       2021, five days before the trial, the State, when speaking with Deputy Sweet in

       preparation for trial, found the video recording. The State immediately emailed

       the video recording to Smith’s counsel.

[21]   The trial court held a jury trial, and the jury heard the facts as set forth above.

       Additionally, the State attempted to call Manager Patel as a witness in order to

       lay the foundation for the admission of the video recording as State’s Exhibit 1.

       Outside of the presence of the jury, Smith argued that the admission of

       Manager Patel’s testimony and the video recording amounted to “trial by

       ambush” and was simply unfair. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 143). The State explained that it

       had not known the video recording existed, and it had discovered it when

       speaking with Deputy Sweet in preparation for the trial. The State told the trial

       court that it had “immediately emailed it to [Smith] . . . as soon as [it] had

       knowledge [that] [the video recording] existed.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 142). The State

       argued that there was no intent to ambush Smith and that the proper remedy

       would be for a continuance. Smith conceded that there had been no “bad

       intentions on the State’s part.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 144).

[22]   After a brief recess, the trial court determined that the appropriate remedy was

       “not the exclusion of [Manager Patel’s] testimony, but [wa]s to allow [Smith] a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023             Page 9 of 17
       continuance . . . to depose [Manager Patel].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 146). The trial

       court asked Smith if he wanted a continuance and if so, for how many days.

       Smith responded that he did not want a continuance. Smith elaborated that he

       did not want the continuance “as a matter of principle” because of Smith’s

       speedy trial requests. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 146). The trial court allowed Manager Patel

       to testify over Smith’s objection and also admitted the video recording as State’s

       Exhibit 1 over Smith’s objection.

[23]   After the State rested, Smith moved for a mistrial. Specifically, Smith argued

       that the unfair surprise of witnesses and exhibits made it “impossible for

       [Smith] to get a fair trial.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 215). The trial court denied Smith’s

       motion.

[24]   At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Smith guilty of Level 4 felony

       burglary. The trial court sentenced Smith to six (6) years in the Indiana

       Department of Correction.

[25]   Smith now appeals.

       Decision
[26]   Smith argues that: (1) the trial court violated his speedy trial rights; (2) the trial

       court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence; and (3) there is

       insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction. We address each of his

       arguments in turn.

       1. Speedy Trial Request

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023             Page 10 of 17
[27]   Smith first argues that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial under

       Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). A Rule 4(B) violation must be raised through a

       motion for discharge before the trial court, and the court’s ruling on that matter

       is reviewed for clear error. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 (Ind. 2013).

       We neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Id.

       (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We consider only the

       probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and

       reverse only on a showing of clear error. Id. (internal quotation marks and

       citations omitted). Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm

       conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. (internal quotation marks and

       citations omitted).

[28]   Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides that “[i]f any defendant held in jail on

       an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged

       if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such

       motion[.]” If a defendant does not file a motion for discharge following the

       expiration of the seventy-day window, the issue is waived. Roseborough v. State,

       625 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 1993).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023            Page 11 of 17
[29]   Smith specifically argues that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial

       under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) “when the [c]ourt continued . . . Smith’s trial

       at the request of . . . Smith’s attorneys[.]” (Smith’s Br. 17).2 We disagree.

[30]   Here, our review of the record reveals that Smith never filed a motion for

       discharge after September 8, 2020, the seventieth day after his initial speedy

       trial request on June 30. Thus, he has waived this issue on appeal. See

       Roseborough, 625 N.E.2d at 1224. To the extent that Smith argues that his

       September 11 motion to dismiss constituted a motion for discharge, we note

       that when a defendant is represented by counsel, he speaks to the court through

       that counsel. Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000). The record

       is clear that Attorney Payne represented Smith at the time of his September 11

       motion to dismiss, and the trial court was not required to respond to Smith’s

       pro se motion to dismiss while he was represented by counsel. See also Flowers v.

       State, 154 N.E.3d 854, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that when a defendant

       is represented by counsel, the trial court “is not required to respond to the

       defendant’s objections or motions”).

[31]   Smith’s arguments also fail because Attorney Jones had waived his speedy trial

       request at the July 31 hearing, just a month after Smith’s June 30 initial hearing

       where he had requested a speedy trial. Even if Smith had renewed his request

       2
        Smith, in his brief, limited his Indiana Criminal Rule 4 arguments to “the continuances prior to December
       17, 2020[,]” which was the date that the Indiana Supreme Court paused all jury trials due to the COVID-19
       Pandemic. (Smith’s Br. 18).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023                               Page 12 of 17
       for a speedy trial after this point, Attorney Payne had also waived his speedy

       trial request at a September 24 hearing. Thus, we hold that the trial court did

       not violate Smith’s right to a speedy trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). 3

       2. Admission of Evidence

[32]   Smith next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       testimony of Manager Patel and the video recording. Specifically, he argues

       that it was inadmissible because the State had not disclosed this evidence to

       Smith until the week before trial. Smith contends that this alleged discovery

       violation entitled him to the exclusion of the evidence at trial or a mistrial. 4

[33]   Trial courts have broad discretion in dealing with discovery violations by the

       State in the alleged late disclosure of evidence to the defense. Alcantar v. State,

       70 N.E.3d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We may reverse the manner in which

       the trial court deals with such an alleged violation only for an abuse of that

       discretion involving clear error and resulting prejudice. Id. (internal citations

       3
         Smith also argues that the trial court violated his right to self-representation. Smith only makes this
       argument to contrast his case from Underwood, where the Indiana Supreme Court held that a defendant who
       is represented by counsel speaks to the court through counsel. Underwood, 722 N.E.2d at 832. Specifically,
       Smith argues that his case is distinguishable from Underwood because he had “advised the trial court from the
       time of his initial hearing that he wanted to proceed pro se rather than giving up his request for a speedy
       trial.” (Smith’s Br. 21). However, Smith provides no cogent argument pointing to any cases or authorities
       that support his claim that his pro se statement at his initial hearing coupled with his statements made while
       represented by counsel lead to the conclusion that his self-representation rights were violated. Thus, he has
       waived the argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).

       4
        Smith did not cite to a standard of review for a discovery violation as required by Indiana Appellate Rule
       46(A)(8)(b).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023                                  Page 13 of 17
       omitted). Generally, the proper remedy for a discovery violation is a

       continuance. Id. If a continuance would have cured the harm that arose by the

       discovery violation, failure to request one results in waiver. See Fleming v. State,

       833 N.E.2d 84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[34]   Before our analysis, we remind both parties of the importance of reviewing their

       cases. Deputy Sweet’s probable cause affidavit clearly refers to the video

       recording and the fact that Manager Patel would be sending a copy to him.

       Even a cursory review of the probable cause affidavit would have made both

       parties aware of the existence of the video recording. While the State has the

       responsibility to provide timely discovery, we advise both parties that careful

       and timely attention to the facts within their case files will prevent needless

       delays and claims of surprise. Further, we note that trial courts have the

       discretion to impose sanctions for the untimely provision of discovery,

       including the suppression or exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of charges.

       See Indiana Trial Rule 37. See also Lindsey v. State, 877 N.E.2d 190, 196 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2007) (noting that exclusion of evidence is available as a sanction for

       State’s noncompliance with discovery order); Robinson v. State, 450 N.E.2d 51,

       52 (Ind. 1983) (noting that dismissal of charges is also a sanction within the

       arsenal of the trial court when the State fails to give access to evidentiary

       materials). Thus, the cost of failing to carefully examine the facts of the case

       can be high, and parties should diligently work to avoid them.

[35]   Here, our review of the record reveals that Smith, when asked by the trial court

       if he wanted a continuance, decided against one “as a matter of principle[.]”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023           Page 14 of 17
       (Tr. Vol. 2 at 146). Thus, he has waived this argument on appeal. See Fleming,

       833 N.E.2d at 91.

[36]   In an effort to circumvent waiver, Smith cites to Dillard v. State, 102 N.E.3d

       310, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) for the proposition that “it is unfair to put a

       defendant in an untenable situation in deciding to proceed to trial unprepared

       or waive the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” (Smith’s Br. 23). In Dillard,

       the defendant moved for a continuance on the day of trial, which also happened

       to be the last possible day that the defendant could have been tried to comply

       with his speedy trial request. Dillard is distinguishable from the case before us

       because Smith never moved for discharge, never moved for a continuance, and

       still had nearly a month before the expiration of his speedy trial request.5

       3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[37]   Lastly, Smith argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

       conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well

       settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences

       supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do

       not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the

       conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime

       5
        Smith also argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial. However, Smith provides
       no cogent argument pointing to any cases or authorities that support this claim. Thus, he has waived the
       argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023                                Page 15 of 17
       proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 146-47. The evidence is sufficient if

       an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.

[38]   Smith attacks his burglary conviction by arguing that the State failed to prove

       that he “knowingly or intentionally intended to commit . . . theft.” (Smith’s Br.

       24). We disagree.

[39]   INDIANA CODE § 35-43-2-1 provides that “[a] person who breaks and enters the

       building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft

       in it, commits burglary[.]” The offense is a Level 4 felony “if the building or

       structure is a dwelling[.]” I.C. § 35-43-2-1(1). “Burglars rarely announce their

       intentions at the moment of entry, and indeed many times there is no one

       around to hear them even if they were to do so.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d

       227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Hence, a

       burglar’s intent to commit a specific felony at the time of the breaking and

       entering may be inferred from the circumstances. Id. at 229-30. There must be

       a “specific fact that provides a solid basis to support a reasonable inference that

       the defendant had the specific intent to commit a felony.” Freshwater v. State,

       853 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. 2006).

[40]   Our review of the record reveals that Smith entered Neyhart and Pearson’s

       room at the Dunes, left the room, returned almost immediately thereafter, and

       then left with the Glock cases tucked under his shirt. Smith’s entry into the

       room and his exit with the Glock cases were captured by the video recording

       provided by Manager Patel and the photos taken by Deputy Sweet of the same

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023          Page 16 of 17
       video recording. Further, both Pearson and Neyhart testified that Smith had

       threatened to shoot Pearson with Pearson’s own guns. Neyhart also testified

       that Smith had admitted entering Neyhart’s room, taking Pearson’s Glock

       cases, and selling them sometime later. All of this evidence supports the

       inference that Smith had entered Neyhart and Pearson’s room with the intent to

       commit theft. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 231 (holding that breaking and entering

       followed by opening cupboards and drawers with no evidence of anything being

       taken was enough to support the specific intent to commit theft).

[41]   Smith also challenges the credibility of Neyhart and Pearson’s testimony.

       However, these arguments amount to a request for this Court to reweigh the

       evidence, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Accordingly,

       we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Smith’s Level 4 felony

       burglary conviction.

[42]   Affirmed.

       Robb, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1514| May 12, 2023        Page 17 of 17