Court Opinion

ID: 9838804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 06:06:24.279177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:49.606577
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     September 7, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 360928
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
MING C. HO,                                                          LC No. 1994-136287-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        A jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-
firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was initially sentenced, as a juvenile offender, to life without
parole for his first-degree murder conviction and two years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm
conviction. Defendant was resentenced, in accordance with Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 461;
132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment for his first-degree murder
conviction, and 2 years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. Defendant now appeals
as of right his resentencing and challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for resentencing.
We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       This Court summarized the underlying facts in defendant’s prior appeal as follows:

               In this heinous crime, defendant murdered teen-aged Angela Garcia in cold
       blood in October of 1994, while she was working alone in a Subway restaurant in
       Troy. There were no eyewitnesses to this killing available to testify at trial. Acting
       on tips, the police initiated surveillance of defendant, a high school student who
       frequented the nearby area. Defendant was known to carry a gun, and a witness
       observed a gun in defendant’s pants’ waistband a few hours after the shooting.

                                              * * *

                                                -1-
               At trial, testimony and other evidence convincingly demonstrated that
       defendant committed first-degree murder. Testimony revealed that defendant
       admitted to [three friends] that he shot the victim after she refused to give defendant
       any money and she had seen his face. Defendant also admitted to [his friends] that
       he robbed a Mobil gas station two weeks before this crime, and shot a Mobil gas
       station employee. [People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 180-182; 585 NW2d 357
       (1998).]

In 2016, the prosecution filed a notice stating it would be seeking resentencing in accordance with
Miller, 567 US 461. The trial court entered an order granting resentencing and scheduling a
hearing on the matter.

        In a resentencing memorandum submitted to the trial court, defendant asked to be
resentenced to 27 to 60 years’ imprisonment for his first-degree murder conviction. Defendant’s
memorandum included extensive details about his upbringing, including information indicating
that his father was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia when defendant was a child, and that
his father was abusive toward him and his mother. Defendant acknowledged that he had
committed some infractions while in prison, but noted that the last infraction occurred in 2005.
Defendant explained that since then, he had been trying to take full advantage of educational and
vocational opportunities while incarcerated. Defendant stated that he completed his GED,
obtained certification in the field of automotive technology, and worked as a tutor. Defendant also
stated that he had received several positive job evaluations. He believed he had created a positive
support network outside of prison, which would help him if he were to be granted parole, and
asked that the court consider resentencing him to a term-of-years sentence of 27 to 60 years.

        Defendant further noted that his prison record overwhelming demonstrated that he has been
successfully rehabilitated. Numerous exhibits were attached to defendant’s resentencing
memorandum in support of this assessment. These exhibits included a mitigation report, which
discussed defendant’s rehabilitation, personal growth, childhood upbringing, behavior while
incarcerated, and remorse for his crimes. Defendant explained that his traumatic upbringing
contributed to the actions underlying his convictions. He also stated that his youth at the time of
the offense was a mitigating factor, because he was unable to appreciate the risks and consequences
associated with his actions. Defendant further noted that peer pressure, marijuana use, and a lack
of premeditation should also be taken into consideration during resentencing. He believed that,
but for his youth at the time of the offense, he would have had a better understanding of his
possibility of success at trial, and might have sought a plea agreement in lieu of going to trial.
Finally, defendant stated that based on his prison record, he had been adequately disciplined for
his actions.

        The prosecution disagreed with defendant’s request to be resentenced to 27 to 60 years’
imprisonment, and instead asked the court to resentence defendant to 40 to 60 years’
imprisonment. The prosecution explained that although defendant had no juvenile record or police
contacts before he committed the murder, defendant admitted to engaging in criminal activity. It
further observed that before defendant brought the issue up in his resentencing memorandum, there
was no evidence presented to support the claim that defendant came from an unstable home
environment. The prosecution also noted that defendant did not commit the murder due to a lack
of intelligence, and that there was no evidence of peer pressure. According to the prosecution,

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defendant admitted he “decided to kill people so there would be no witnesses.” Defendant’s
testimony at trial suggested that his actions were “cold and calculating,” rather than the result of
“the transient behavior of youth.” Moreover, the prosecution noted that testimony from
defendant’s trial showed that he was an active participant in the murder, and that he even bragged
about killing people.

         Although the prosecution agreed that defendant had not committed an infraction while in
prison since 2005, he spent most of his imprisonment as a Level V offender and committed
numerous assaultive offenses while incarcerated. At one point, he was convicted of being a
prisoner in possession of a weapon, MCL 800.283(4), for which he received an additional sentence
of 3 to 5 years’ imprisonment on top of the time he was already serving. Numerous attachments
were included with the prosecution’s resentencing memorandum, including a 1995 psychological
report, and a 2016 assessment narrative. The psychological report indicated that defendant was
“polite” and “friendly,” and accepted “complete responsibility for his actions and expressed his
remorse for the victims.” The assessment narrative indicated defendant had a supportive social
network, and was unlikely to have a substance abuse problem. However, the report also contained
evidence that defendant possessed some antisocial attitudes regarding the crime, including “moral
justification for his criminal behavior, minimiz[ing] the seriousness or consequences of his
criminal activity[.]” Nevertheless, the report noted that defendant presented a low risk for
recidivism.

        During the resentencing hearing, the trial court assessed the Snow1 and Miller2 factors,
expressly reviewing: (1) defendant’s youth at the time of his crimes; (2) the circumstances of
defendant’s crimes; (3) defendant’s disciplinary record while incarcerated; (4) defendant’s home
environment; (5) defendant’s educational background; (6) the influence of peer pressure on
defendant; (7) defendant’s efforts toward rehabilitation, including his job history, educational
pursuits, certifications, letters of support, and volunteer work; (8) the impact of defendant’s youth
on his ability to assist with his case; (9) defendant’s record before his period of incarceration; and
(10) defendant’s remorse for his crimes. The trial court resentenced defendant to 40 to 60 years’
imprisonment for his first-degree murder conviction and two years’ imprisonment for defendant’s
felony-firearm conviction, stating, in relevant part:

                  This definitely is a heinous crime . . . and it has impacted the [victim’s]
         family for a long, long time. And the great—I’ll say borderline smartness, close to
         an area of brilliance in helping in the prison system, and learning, and getting
         certificates, I’m not ignoring that. I think that you should continue with working
         to help others in the prison system. Continue working to improve yourself towards
         total rehabilitation. Continue towards acceptance of the egregious act that you did
         in the case before this Court, in the case that resulted in a case a couple weeks
         earlier, and everything that’s happened in prison.

1
    People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972).
2
    Miller, 567 US at 461 (2012).

                                                 -3-
               And I also think that you have not completely accepted your involvement
       in the killing . . . . I believe that you need to face that fact. I haven’t seen anything
       in any reports that were submitted to the Court that indicate that [defendant’s
       friends] engaged in shootings, or killings, or activities with guns prior to your
       involvement with a gun in your hand on the occasions that have been discussed
       here at this resentencing. I haven’t seen that.

                And I understand the argument about peer [pressure], but I also have seen a
       lot of things when you sit where I sit and that’s something that’s missing.

                                               * * *

       But the thing that I’m also cognizant of because I sit where I sit, is—it’s pretty clear
       that you, [defendant], were not diagnosed with a mental disorder at the time that
       this occurred . . . nor is there an indication that you were out of your mind due to
       drugs or alcohol at the time of the killing.

              And you’re smart. You’re very smart and I don’t really see, other than the
       representations in the Miller versus Alabama case, to the issue of brain development
       and youth. I don’t see any other typical factors in a killing this heinous because it
       was heinous.

               And so, I think that to the best of my ability I give you credit for being
       cooperative knowing that you were facing a life max with no chance for parole at
       the time . . . . But I cannot ignore the totality of circumstances and I do believe that
       [defendant] has the potential to reach full rehabilitation, but I think he’s go[t] to do
       more acceptance and I haven’t seen anything showing that. No deep, mental health
       evaluation concerning that issue.

               Therefore, considering the totality of circumstances . . . it is the order of
       this Court taking into consideration the totality of circumstances, past record or lack
       thereof, potential for rehabilitation, punishment, deterring others in committing
       similar offenses and noting that today he does have the seven prior felonies on the
       record.

        Following resentencing, defendant appealed to this Court. While his appeal was pending,
defendant moved for resentencing under MCR 6.429 in the trial court. Defendant argued that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to provide the trial court
with a copy of a psychological evaluation and risk assessment at resentencing. Defendant
submitted that defense counsel’s failure did not constitute sound trial strategy, and, but for
counsel’s error, he would have received a reduced sentence. Defendant also averred he was
entitled to resentencing because his sentence was unreasonable, disproportionate, and based on
inaccurate information.

       A hearing was held on the motion for resentencing. Defendant argued that he presented a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, or, in the alternative, enough information to

                                                 -4-
justify granting a Ginther3 hearing. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for resentencing.
The court found that defendant failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel, or that his sentence was unreasonable, disproportionate, or based on inaccurate
information. We now address defendant’s issues on appeal.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                             A. DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE

        Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion
for resentencing because the trial court relied on inaccurate information during resentencing.
Defendant argues that his 40- to 60-year sentence is unreasonable and disproportionate. We
disagree.

        Defendant was resentenced in accordance with Miller, 567 US 460. We review a trial
court’s sentencing decision, including a juvenile offender’s resentencing after Miller, for an abuse
of discretion. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that is outside the range of principled outcomes.
People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 236; 791 NW2d 743 (2010).

         Under MCL 769.25, juveniles previously sentenced to life without parole may be
resentenced “to a term of imprisonment for which the maximum term shall be not less than 60
years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years.” Thus,
defendant’s 40- to 60-year sentence falls within the statutory guidelines. In the past, provided that
a defendant was sentenced based on accurate information, this Court would be required to affirm
defendant’s sentence outright. But in People v Posey, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 162373), our Supreme Court overruled the portion of People v Schrauben, 314 Mich
App 181, 196; 886 NW2d 173 (2016), and MCL 769.34(10), requiring appellate courts to affirm
within-guidelines sentences. Prior to Posey, Schrauben and MCL 769.34(10) stated that “[w]hen
a trial court does not depart from the recommended minimum sentencing range, the minimum
sentence must be affirmed unless there was an error in scoring or the trial court relied on inaccurate
information.” Id. at 196, citing MCL 769.34(10). The Posey Court found that the portion of
MCL 769.34(10) requiring an appellate court to automatically affirm a within-guidelines sentence,
provided that it is based on accurate information, violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
because doing so “would necessarily render the guidelines mandatory.” Posey, ___ Mich at ___;
slip op at 30.

       Following Posey, appellate courts must now “review all sentences for reasonableness,
which requires the reviewing court to consider whether the sentence is proportionate to the
seriousness of the matter,” Posey, slip op at 29, in accordance with the sentencing principles
outlined in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), and People v Steanhouse,
500 Mich 453; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s term-of-years
sentence must “be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense

3
    People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

                                                 -5-
and the offender.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 472. Factors that may be considered by a trial court
under the proportionality standard include, but are not limited to:

       (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
       the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
       relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant's misconduct
       while in custody, the defendant's expressions of remorse, and the defendant's
       potential for rehabilitation. [People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 352-353; 901
       NW2d 142 (2017).]

Additionally, “[T]he guidelines remain important as an advisory resource for sentencing courts
and continue to be a highly relevant consideration on appeal.” Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op
at 29.

        Initially, defendant argues that the trial court relied on inaccurate information during
resentencing because it concluded that defendant needed to take further responsibility for his
crimes and engage in additional rehabilitation. Defendant says this conclusion was contrary to the
information in his psychological evaluation, which demonstrated that he took responsibility for his
actions, had a lower than average risk for reoffending, and had been successfully rehabilitated.
However, as previously discussed, except for the information about his risk of recidivism,
defendant’s resentencing memorandum and the attached mitigation report addressed all of the
same factors as the psychological evaluation and reached nearly identical conclusions. Further,
the 2016 assessment narrative, which was provided to the trial court, concluded that defendant
presented a low risk for recidivism. On this record, there is no support for defendant’s claim the
trial court relied on inaccurate information during resentencing.

        Defendant nevertheless says that his sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate
because the trial court adopted the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation in lieu of conducting
an individualized assessment of defendant’s characteristics and behaviors, as well as the
circumstances surrounding the offense. However, a review of the record belies this assessment.
Although the trial court did ultimately agree with the prosecutor’s recommendation that defendant
be resentenced to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment, the trial court also expressly evaluated the factors
set forth in Miller and People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972), in making its
ruling. Specifically, the trial court addressed defendant’s youth at the time of the offense, his
disciplinary record and efforts toward rehabilitation, his home environment and educational
background, the effects of peer pressure and other circumstances surrounding the case, his prior
criminal record, the impact of youth on his ability to assist with his case, and his remorse for his
actions. Despite the fact that defendant demonstrated significant efforts at self-improvement and
rehabilitation over the years, the trial court nevertheless continued to believe that defendant was
not fully rehabilitated because he continued to blame peer pressure for his actions. The court
further highlighted the severity of the crime committed, reiterating that defendant had not yet
accepted full responsibility for the murder, which it described as a “heinous” crime. The court
then expressed that defendant needed to continue his efforts toward rehabilitation. Thus, along
with the Miller and Snow factors, the court also considered the seriousness of the offense,
defendant’s past misconduct while in custody, his expressions of remorse, and his potential for
total rehabilitation. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s resentencing to a term-of-years
sentence was reasonable and proportionate. He is not entitled to resentencing.

                                                -6-
                        B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

         Defendant next claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel’s failure to provide an updated psychological evaluation to the trial court was not sound
trial strategy. Defendant contends that he likely would have been resentenced to a lesser term of
years if the psychological evaluation had been completed and submitted to the trial court before
resentencing.

        “Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 187; 891 NW2d
255 (2016). The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while the constitutional
determination of whether the defendant’s right to counsel was violated is reviewed de novo.
People v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, 741 n 8; 913 NW2d 392 (2018). A finding is clearly erroneous
if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 242; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). “Where, as here, there has
been no evidentiary hearing on the issue below . . . our review is limited to errors apparent on the
record.” People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 19-20; 776 NW2d 314 (2009).

        “To prove that his defense counsel was not effective, the defendant must show that (1)
defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is
a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” People v
Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). “In examining whether defense counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, a defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from a sound trial strategy.” People v
Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). A “defendant has the burden of
establishing the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v
Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Likewise, to establish prejudice, a defendant must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9; 917 NW2d 249 (2018)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Defendant claims his counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel failed to obtain
a psychological evaluation and submit it to the trial court before resentencing. As previously
discussed, defendant’s resentencing memorandum and mitigation report both provided extensive
details about his upbringing, the negative influence of peer pressure from his adolescent friends,
defendant’s tumultuous initial period in prison, as well as defendant’s rehabilitative efforts while
incarcerated, and his remorse for his crimes. Similarly, the later-submitted psychological
evaluation details defendant’s traumatic upbringing, the influence of peer pressure on defendant,
defendant’s personal growth and rehabilitation, and remorse for his crimes.

        When asked why a psychological evaluation was not provided ahead of resentencing,
counsel stated: “We did not believe [defendant’s] home life and prison conduct merited it.”
“[D]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and which witnesses to call are presumed to be
matters of trial strategy, and we will not second-guess strategic decisions with the benefit of
hindsight.” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 589-590; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). The mere
fact that trial counsel did not seek to admit all evidence that may have been admissible is

                                                -7-
insufficient to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel engaged in sound trial strategy.”
People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Here, given that extensive evidence
of defendant’s upbringing, incarceration, rehabilitation, and remorse was already presented to the
trial court through defendant’s sentencing memorandum and the mitigation report, counsel’s
decision to not admit duplicative evidence through a psychological evaluation is not objectively
unreasonable, nor does it overcome the “strong presumption that counsel engaged in sound trial
strategy.” Id. Any further factual development that could be gained from the admission of the
psychological evaluation likely would not have been sufficient to support defendant’s request that
he be resentenced to a lower term of years. See Hoag, 460 Mich at 6 (1999); Chapo, 283 Mich
App at 369 (2009). Because defendant has not shown that, but for counsel’s performance, the
outcome would have been different, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

        Defendant’s sentences were based on accurate information and are reasonable and
proportionate. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by resentencing
defendant to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment. We further conclude that trial counsel was not
constitutionally deficient for declining to submit a psychological evaluation prior to defendant’s
resentencing hearing. Defendant is not entitled to resentencing in this matter.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                            /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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