Court Opinion

ID: 9697402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:48.894341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.214193
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This appeal presents a constitutional issue of substantial magnitude. The question posed concerns the constitutionality of provisions of the Alternate Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act (the Act or APDRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -19, that purport to eliminate all judicial review of any order of the Chancery Division confirming, modifying or correcting an umpire’s award issued pursuant to APDRA. The Act states: “Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or decree shall be entered by the court in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree. There shall be no further appeal or review of the judgment or decree.” N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18b. -
On its face, the Act’s limitation of judicial review that eliminates appeals to the Appellate Division from Chancery Division orders confirming or modifying awards directly infringes on the right to appellate review guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution. Article VI, Section 5, paragraph 2 guarantees the right of appeal from all final decisions of the Law and Chancery Divisions and in such other cases as may be provided by law. This Court has held expressly that the right to appellate review “is a remedial procedure secured against legislative interference by Article VI, Section II, paragraph 2, Section III, paragraph 3, Section V, paragraphs 1, 2 and Article XI, Section IV, paragraph 3.” Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 205-06, 81 A.2d 155 (1951). Moreover, the statute on its face conflicts with Rule 2:2-3(a)(l), promulgated by this Court pursuant to its constitutional authority, Article VI, Section 2, paragraph 3, that Court Rule expressly authorizing appeals as of right to the Appellate Division from final judgments of the Chancery or Law Divisions. That this Court’s exclusive power to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in all courts supersedes any legislative enactment purporting to govern or limit *154the right of appeal is no longer open to debate. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S.Ct. 123, 95 L. Ed. 638 (1950).
In recognition of the potential vulnerability of APDRA to constitutional challenge, the Court has avoided the issue by construing the Act to permit parties electing to arbitrate pursuant to AP-DRA’s provisions either to preserve or waive the constitutionally protected right to appellate review. The Court holds:
Although limited judicial review is a central component of the APDRA, the APDRA’s procedures are entirely voluntary, and thus, parties are free to invoke its procedure in toto or subject to agreed upon modifications. See Tretina Printing [,Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 358, 640 A.2d 788 (1994) ] (noting in context of arbitration statute’s limited review that parties are free to expand the scope of judicial review by providing for such expansion in their contract). Had the parties to this action desired to preserve their right to appeal, they could have inserted a provision into the consent judgment reserving that right and delineating the scope and extent of any appeal. They did not do so.
[Ante at 149, 712 A.2d at 184 (emphasis added).]
In my view, the Court’s pragmatic interpretation of the Act that extends to parties who elect to arbitrate disputes pursuant to the Act’s provisions the option either to preserve or forego the constitutional right of appellate review satisfactorily addresses and resolves the constitutional challenge. The Court’s interpretation of the Act is faithful to our obligation to construe a statute in a manner that sustains its constitutionality if the statute is reasonably susceptible to such a construction. See State v. Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 534, 641 A.2d 257 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 970, 115 S.Ct. 440, 130 L. Ed.2d 351 (1994).
I disagree only with the aspect of the Court’s disposition that precludes appellate review to plaintiff. As the Court’s opinion explains, the parties’ agreement to submit disputes between them for resolution pursuant to APDRA was embodied in a consent judgment that simply identified the Act by title as the mechanism by which disputes would be resolved, ante at 144, 712 A.2d at 181, without any reference whatsoever to the right of appellate review. When the parties entered into that agreement they obviously were unaware that the Act would be construed by the Court to permit *155parties proceeding under APDRA to elect to preserve appellate review. Nor does the provision of the consent judgment relating to APDRA meet the level of specificity required to sustain a waiver of constitutional right. “ ‘[CJourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and ... ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811-12, 81 L. Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937) and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 731, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937)); State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 35, 583 A.2d 747 (1991).
The presumption against waiver of constitutional rights applies in civil cases with the same force as it does in criminal prosecutions. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n. 31, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 2001 n. 31, 32 L. Ed.2d 556, 578 n. 31 (1972); Callen v. Sherman’s, Inc., 92 N.J. 114, 137, 455 A.2d 1102 (1983). Constitutional rights may be waived in the commercial context, but such waiver must be clear and explicit. Ibid. The United States Supreme Court has held that unless the contractual language, on its face, constitutes such a waiver, no waiver of a constitutional right will be found. Fuentes, supra, 407 U.S. at 95, 92 S.Ct. at 2002, 32 L. Ed.2d at 579.
Because the right to appellate review under APDRA had not been established when the parties agreed to be bound by the Act’s provisions, and because the waiver of the constitutionally protected right of appellate review was neither clear nor explicit, I would accord plaintiff the right of review by the Appellate Division of the Chancery Division’s judgment.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 6.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part — Justice STEIN — 1.