Court Opinion

ID: 9894504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 22:12:10.681109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:23.296265
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                                                             FILED
RONALD DALE CORK, II,                                                    November 1, 2023
Petitioner Below, Petitioner                                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                        INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

vs.) No. 23-ICA-76 (Fam. Ct. Harrison Cnty. No. 22-D-156-5)                   OF WEST VIRGINIA

DAWNA ANNETTE CORK,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                             MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Ronald Dale Cork, II appeals the “Decree of Divorce” entered by the
Family Court of Harrison County on January 30, 2023. Mr. Cork asserts that the family
court abused its discretion by mischaracterizing marital and separate assets, miscalculating
equitable distribution, and failing to consider his marital waste argument or his request for
Conrad credits. 1 Respondent Dawna Annette Cork filed a response that included cross
assignments of error, asserting that the family court miscalculated equitable distribution,
failed to include the fair market value of the marital home in its equitable distribution
calculation, and failed to attribute her Conrad credits. 2 Mr. Cork filed a reply brief.

        This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2022). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the family court’s decision, but no
substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of
Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for resolution in a memorandum decision.
For the reasons set forth below, the family court’s decision is affirmed, in part, reversed,
in part, and remanded to the family court with directions as set forth herein.

       The parties were married on September 8, 2012, and separated on June 1, 2021. No
children were born of the marriage. During the marriage, Mr. Cork and his brother jointly
inherited real property (“Buffalo Lake” property) from their late father. Divorce hearings

       1
         See Conrad v. Conrad, 216 W. Va. 696, 612 S.E.2d 772 (2005) (per curiam)
(holding that the recoupment of payment of marital debt by one party prior to the ultimate
division of marital property is permitted upon final equitable distribution order).
       2
         Mr. Cork is represented by Sarah L. Petitto-Meyers, Esq. Ms. Cork is self-
represented.

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were held on November 9, 2022, and December 9, 2022. During these proceedings, Ms.
Cork alleged that the Buffalo Lake property had a marital component because a Note of
Deed and Trust was conveyed to her on February 6, 2017, and Mr. Cork paid $14,187 to
satisfy a debt associated with the Buffalo Lake property. Mr. Cork testified that the
conveyance to Ms. Cork took place solely to ensure that the property could not be sold by
Mr. Cork’s brother, with whom he was having a dispute.

       The final divorce order was entered on January 30, 2023. The final order categorized
guns and tools as marital property and held that the $14,187 debt was paid with marital
funds and is a marital asset. The family court further held that Ms. Cork did not commit
marital waste. It is from the January 30, 2023, order that the parties now appeal.

       For these matters, we use the following standard of review:

              “In reviewing . . . a final order of a family court judge, we review the
       findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
       standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion
       standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syl. Pt., [in part,] Carr v.
       Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

Amanda C. v. Christopher P., __ W. Va. __, __, 887 S.E.2d 255, 258 (Ct. App. Nov. 18,
2022); accord W. Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying standards for appellate court
review of family court order).

        Mr. Cork asserts two assignments of error, which we will address in turn. In his first
assignment of error, Mr. Cork asserts that the family court abused its discretion as to its
characterization and assignment of marital and separate assets. Specifically, Mr. Cork
contends that the family court failed to characterize the guns and tools as his separate
property. He also maintains that the family court wrongfully included the $14,187 payment
toward the lien on the Buffalo Lake property in the parties’ equitable distribution
calculation. As to guns and tools, we agree with Mr. Cork that both should have been
categorized as his separate property. Mr. Cork stated on the record before the family court
that the guns and tools were his separate property, Ms. Cork did not object below, and she
admits on appeal that they are Mr. Cork’s separate property.

       Regarding the $14,187 payment toward the lien on Mr. Cork’s inherited property,
the family court properly included that amount in its equitable distribution calculation.
West Virginia Code § 48-1-233(2)(A)(2001) defines marital property as:

       [t]he amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the
       parties to a marriage, which increase results from: (A) an expenditure of
       funds which are marital property, including an expenditure of such funds

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       which reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes liens, or
       otherwise increases the net value of separate property ….

Here, the family court found that the payment made by Mr. Cork to satisfy the lien on the
Buffalo Lake property was made from marital funds. Therefore, the family court was
correct to include the $14,187 in its equitable distribution calculation.

        Next, Mr. Cork argues that the family court abused its discretion with respect to the
distribution of the parties’ debts and assets by failing to take Ms. Cork’s marital waste into
account and by failing to consider Conrad credits paid by Mr. Cork. Regarding Mr. Cork’s
marital waste argument, we disagree. The family court ruled that “[n]either party proved
that there was a waste of marital assets nor did either party prove that the funds expended
by wife . . . were pre-marital funds.” Under these circumstances, with insufficient proof
offered by both parties, we find that the family court did not abuse its discretion in finding
there was no marital waste. The issue of Conrad credits is outside the scope of our review,
as the issue was not raised in family court by either party. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia has previously held that “[o]ur general rule is that nonjurisdictional
questions . . . raised for the first time on appeal, will not be considered.” Noble v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 821, 679 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2009) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).

        In her response brief, Ms. Cork raises three cross assignments of error, which we
will address in turn. As her first assignment of error, Ms. Cork asserts that the family court
erred when it made only a portion of Mr. Cork’s savings account subject to equitable
distribution. We disagree. Mr. Cork’s savings account had $154,000 prior to the marriage.
At the date of separation, the account had a balance of $287,420.55. The family court found
that “[b]ecause there was no contention by either party that the $154,000 had been
disturbed during the marriage, an unequal division of the account is warranted such that
Husband’s pre-marital portion of the account is preserved to him.” However, regarding the
post-marital portion of the account, the family court found that while marital funds were
deposited into the account, no documentation tracking the account between the date of
marriage and the date of separation was provided to the family court to aid in its resolution
of this issue. Therefore, the family court held that “[t]he presumption that the account is
subject to equitable distribution was not overcome.” See Syl. Pt. 4, Mayhew v. Mayhew,
205 W. Va. 490, 519 S.E.2d 188 (1999) (holding that the party seeking to exclude property
from the marital estate that is presumptively marital property has the burden of persuasion
on that issue for purposes of equitable distribution). See also In Interest of Tiffany Marie
S., 196 W. Va. 223, 231, 470 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1996) (A reviewing court may not overturn
a family court’s finding simply because it would have decided the case differently).
Therefore, we affirm the family court’s ruling that only $130,036.28 is subject to equitable
distribution.

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       In her second cross assignment of error, Ms. Cork argues that the family court failed
to apply the fair market value of the marital home at the date of separation in its equitable
distribution calculation. We agree with Ms. Cork. The divorce order states:

       Wife requested the court to consider a Homelite internet valuation pertaining
       to the current fair market value of the martial home. See respondent’s Exhibit
       5. The court did not admit the exhibit as there was no foundation for it.
       However, on the face of the document it is noted that Homelite’s valuation
       is within 7% of a home’s value half of the time. The appraised value of
       $200,000 submitted by Husband is within 7% of the Homelite estimated fair
       market value. Even if respondent’s Exhibit 5 had been admitted, due to the
       margin of error included on the face of the Homelite appraisal, the ruling
       would have been that the fair market value of the home is $200,000.

       The family court ruled that the value of the marital home was appraised at $200,000.
However, the equitable distribution calculation sheet lists the value as $143,500, which
stems from a 2013 appraisal. Our state’s highest court has held:

       Equitable distribution […] is a three-step process. The first step is to classify
       the parties’ property as marital or non-marital. The second step is to value
       the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate between the
       parties in accordance with the principles contained in [W. Va. Code § 48-7-
       103].

Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W. Va. 451, 452-53, 396 S.E.2d 413, 414-15 (1990). Here, the
family court erred in its valuation of the marital home in the equitable distribution
calculation by using an appraisal from 2013 rather than the fair market value at the time of
the divorce. Therefore, we reverse the family court’s ruling on this issue and remand for
recalculation of the equitable distribution using an updated appraisal valuation.

       Next, Ms. Cork asserts that she should also receive Conrad credits for her payment
of marital debt during the parties’ separation. As previously stated, this issue was not raised
below and is therefore waived on appeal. See Noble, 223 W. Va. at 821, 679 S.E.2d at 653.

       Although not included as an assignment of error, Mr. Cork requested that he be
awarded attorney’s fees and costs. Ms. Cork asserted that she has complied with all
requests and has not acted in bad faith. Our resolution of this issue is guided by the
following:

       In determining whether to award attorney’s fees, the family law master
       should consider a wide array of factors including the party’s ability to pay
       his or her own fee, the beneficial results obtained by the attorney, the parties’
       respective financial conditions, the effect of the attorney’s fees on each
       party’s standard of living, the degree of fault of either party making the

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       divorce action necessary, and the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee
       request.

Syl. Pt. 4 Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996). Here, the record
reflects that both parties earned roughly the same income and had similar standards of
living, nor is there any meaningful difference of degree of fault as to the divorce. Therefore,
we do not believe that attorney’s fees are warranted in this matter.

       Accordingly, as to the family court’s order entered on January 30, 2023, we affirm
the family court’s ruling with respect to its finding on marital waste, the $14,187 payment
toward the lien on Mr. Cork’s inherited property, and Mr. Cork’s savings account. We
reverse and remand the family court’s ruling regarding Mr. Cork’s guns and tools with
directions that they should not be included in the parties’ equitable distribution calculation.
As to both parties’ contention that they should receive Conrad credits, the matter was not
raised below and therefore waived on appeal. Lastly, regarding the fair market value of the
marital home, we remand the matter to family court with directions to recalculate equitable
distribution with an updated marital home appraisal.

                                        Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, and Remanded.

ISSUED: November 1, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Thomas E. Scarr
Judge Charles O. Lorensen

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