Court Opinion

ID: 9764786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:40:09.600434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.649731
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Me. Justice Allen M. Steaene,
Alfred L. Sallade, defendant appellant, appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Potter County denying motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial after a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter following an indictment for murder.
*431Defendant shot and killed Charles Yan Pelt, a young man nineteen years of age. The killing is admitted. The issue presented to the jury was whether or not the killing was in self-defense, in the protection of defendant’s property or was accidental. The jury by its verdict decided that the killing was without justification.
The deceased, with three of his boy friends and also the father of one of the boys, was spending the 1952 Labor Day weekend in the Cherry Springs Park area near Coudersport, Potter County. The boys intended to do some hunting and, therefore, carried rifles. The four young men left the cabin where they were staying in order to spend an evening camping. They met the father in his automobile, left their equipment with him, and went in search of a camp site. During the search they came across an airport on the edge of which was a lunchroom operated by defendant. The boys stopped in the lunchroom for something to eat. It was testified that about a week previously this lunchroom had been burglarized. During the course of remarks between the boys and a Yelma Turner, the person in charge of the lunchroom, a statement made by the boys aroused Mrs. Turner’s suspicion that these boys may have had something to do with the burglary. After the boys had finished eating, they chose a camp site near the airport and moved their equipment to the new spot; they then started back to the lunchroom to obtain some ginger ale. Meanwhile defendant came into the lunchroom. He was informed of the remarks which had aroused the suspicion of Mrs. Turner and also that she had seen a car driving around the place in a suspicious manner. The defendant sent Mrs. Turner and her daughter down the road in his car to burn some garbage. It was while the mother and daughter were carrying out the defendant’s instructions that the boys reached the lunchroom for the second time. They tried *432the door but found it locked. There was evidence that the. outer screen door had a connecting bell inside the room which- rang when the boys tried to enter and that they had “bucked up against the door”. These circumstances led the defendant to believe, he testified, that another burglary was about to be attempted.
■ When the boys found they could not gain entrance, they went .to the adjoining airfield and climbed into a parked plane. . At this point Mrs. Turner and her daughter returned. One of them, dressed in slacks, tried the same door by which the boys had tried to gain entrance, found it locked, returned to their car, turned off the headlights, drove to the side of the building facing the airfield, and entered the lunchroom by a side' door. Although it was light enough for the boys to witness this incident, they could not discern who was in the car. There was evidence that the boys saw a light flash on and off in a nearby plane. Thus the boys also became suspicious that everything was not right in the vicinity of the airport. They returned to their camp, procured their rifles, and again proceeded to the airport. Upon reaching the field, they split up, two of them going on each side of the building. At about 8:30 p.m. Mrs. Turner had seen the four approaching the airfield and had notified the defendant who had procured a shotgun and was waiting inside the darkened building. When he saw two of the boys coming toward the building, one of them carrying a gun, he shot through a window, fatally wounding Charles Van Pelt and injuring Erwin E. Bergdoll.
Defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to grant his motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it did not sufficiently define the alleged crime. The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, Sec. 20, 19 PS 351 provides, “In any indictment for murder - . it shall be sufficient ... to charge that *433the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased. . .”. The indictment conforms to the exact words of the statute above cited. This Court has ruled that an indictment drawn in conformity with the provisions of this Act is sufficient: Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 388; Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 175 A. 518.
The remaining assignments of error relate to alleged trial errors. Two main objections are to two sentences in the court’s charge to the jury, relating to the plea of self-defense; viz.: “. . . The guilt of the accused must be established in the first instance beyond a reasonable doubt and when it was so established he is not to be acquitted because the jury after hearing him or his witnesses, may be in doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense. In making that defense he admits his intention of the killing of another and the burden is upon him to show it could not have been avoided. . . .”
It is contended that the jury would be led to believe that it must first consider “the guilt of the accused” before considering the plea of self-defense. This standing alone might have been error under the principle laid down in Commonwealth v. Palome, 263 Pa. 466, 106 A. 783. But the next sentence of the charge reads: “. . . Where a defendant sets up sel f-defense, and undertakes to establish his excuse, the evidence both from his side and the Commonwealth must be weighed so as to show by the fair weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was established, in order to acquit. . . .” Any possible error was cured by this explanation. Of course, the burden always remains upon the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the case the guilt of defendant.
Likewise, the instruction that the plea of self-defense admitted the intent to kill was further elaborated upon and explained. At the end of the charge the trial *434judge inquired of the defense counsel if there were anything further he wished enunciated, and a request was made to develop this point further. The court then further charged: “. . . I stated that in making that defense the defendant admits his intention of killing another. By that is meant that lie admits that the act of shooting, as in this case, there is no denial that the man was shot and the defendant admits that he shot, and I further told you that the burden is on him to show that it could not have been avoided. You are not to interpret from that remarle that he intended the wilful, deliberate and premeditated hilling of another. . . .” (Italics supplied)
Immediately thereafter, the judge asked counsel for defense if that met his requirement. He answered, “Yes Your Honor”. A charge must be read in its entirety so that each thought may be scrutinized in the context that it was presented to the jury: Commonwealth v. Prescott, 284 Pa. 255, 131 A. 184; Commonwealth v. Gable, 323 Pa. 449, 187 A. 393. In reading this charge as a whole, it is evident that the jury was presented with a correct statement of the law.
Another error complained of is the failure of defense trial counsel to petition for change of venue. New counsel was obtained by the defendant to prosecute this appeal. The Act of March 18, 1875, P. L. 30, Sec. 2, 19 PS 552 provides that “All applications for changes of venue shall be made to the court. . . before the jury shall be sworn . . .”. Here counsel did not apply for a change of venue as provided by the Act. The failure to apply may not be taken advantage of for the first time on appeal.
It is further contended that the jury should have been permitted to view the scene of the killing. This is entirely a matter of discretion of the trial judge whether or not a view will be permitted: Commonwealth *435v. Miller, 139 Pa. 77, 21 A. 138. There is no evidence that this discretion was abused.
The defendant further argues that the trial judge failed to rule on certain other objections, citing four separate instances. We have carefully reviewed the record and find that in each instance the trial judge made a ruling on the objections, none of which merit discussion.
It is claimed that the Commonwealth was permitted to cross-examine its own witness over the objection of the defendant. The doctor who attended the deceased testified in direct examination that the wounds, in the extended arm position, were on the outside portion of the thumb. Defendant’s counsel emphasized in his cross-examination that the position of the arm tended to show that the deceased had raised his rifle. On redirect examination the doctor testified that the arm was in a semi-extended position which would tend to refute the inference that the rifle was aimed at defendant. The doctor was not asked in direct examination the position of the arm but the position of the wounds on the hand. It was, therefore, permissible for the Commonwealth to question the doctor on redirect examination. “. . . The examination of witnesses is to be conducted in such a manner as to discover the truth without taking any unfair advantage . . . The mouth of the witness is not to be closed, because the counsel omitted to ask a material question at first. . . .”: Curren v. Connery, 5 Binn. 488; Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 347, 38 A. 2d 425.
The judgment and sentence are affirmed.