Court Opinion

ID: 9565364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:35.142349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:35.170896
License: Public Domain

Justice Moore
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion adopted by the majority and I would hold that the claim of plaintiff against defendant, Clark Equipment Company, should be barred.
G.S. 1-15(b) provides:
“Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last *206act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.” (Emphasis added.)
Under the rules of statutory construction, a statute is to be construed by its “plain meaning.” G.S. 1-15 (b) states that it is applicable to “ ... a cause of action . . . having as an essential element ... a defect in . . . property . . . not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin. ...” The statute clearly states that the only requirement for an application of the ten-year statute is that the cause of action contain, as an essential element of proof, the fact of a defect in property. In instant case, an essential element of plaintiff’s claim is that there was a defect in the property (a crane), and therefore G.S. 1-15 (b) should operate to bar plaintiff’s claim against defendant Clark Equipment Company.
The wording of the statute, “a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death,” does not change my opinion that the ten-year limitation period applies to the case at bar. The words “cause of action” in the above quoted portion of the statute refer to a legislatively created claim for relief. In other words, the statute creates a remedy for those persons who are injured by an undiscoverable defect and extends the time for bringing such action to not more than ten years. As stated in the majority opinion, “The purpose of G.S. 1-15 (b) was to give relief to injured persons from the harsh results flowing from this previously established rule of law [as delineated in Jewell v. Price, supra, and Motor Lines v. General Motors, Corp., supra] .... Thus, the purpose of this statute was to enlarge, not to restrict the time within which an action for damages could be brought.” I would add, however, that in no event was the statute intended to extend the limitation period beyond ten years.
In my opinion, the exclusion of wrongful death actions from the operation of G.S. 1-15 (b) was intended only to preserve the two-year statute of limitations, which we already had, for wrongful death actions. Otherwise, the two-year limitation would have been meaningless. For, if wrongful death actions had not been excluded, the time for bringing such actions would have been extended to not more than ten years from the time the hidden defect caused the death.
As the majority opinion states, the wrongful death statute, G.S. 28A-18-2, creates a condition precedent to the right of *207action by a plaintiff that the death of the intestate was caused by the wrongful act, default, or neglect of the manufacturer of this crane, “such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor. . . .” The intent of the wrongful death statute was and is to require that a decedent, had he lived, have a cause of action in order for his personal representative to bring such action. The majority opinion defeats this intention and requirement.
Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action within two years of the date on which it occurred. Hence, it is not barred by the two-year statute. However, had plaintiff lived, he would have been barred by the ten-year statute which provides that for personal injuries “the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.” In this case, this period would be twenty years.
I agree with the majority that G.S. 1-15 (b) was passed to prevent tort feasors from being subjected to suits arising from facts occurring many years in the past. I cannot agree that plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action for wrongful death due to an injury caused by an alleged defect in a crane over which defendant has had no control for twenty years. To so hold would be to place an unconscionable burden upon a manufacturer and subject him to stale claims arising from defects which occurred, if at all, ten, twenty-five or even fifty years ago. In such cases, a defendant would be without records or witnesses which may have been available at an earlier date. In my opinion, the majority defeats the intent of the legislature to limit such claims to a period not to exceed ten years.
I vote to reverse and, if necessary, to overrule Causey v. R. R., supra, relied on by plaintiff, which was decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 1-15 (b).
Justice Copeland joins in this dissenting opinion.