Court Opinion

ID: 9626136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:03:19.060271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:21.911807
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with Presiding Judge McMurray and wish to make the further observation that Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (2) (409 SE2d 649) (1991) and Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (405 SE2d 483) (1991), are rules of admissibility to ensure that the prior similar crimes are relevant, similar, and thus, admissible; such protection was fully afforded upon the trial judge holding a hearing to see if the three prongs of the Williams test were satisfied prior to such evidence being admitted at trial and the determination that such evidence was in fact admissible.
*431A defendant waives a Williams objection to the admission of evidence as to prior similar criminal conduct by failure to timely object to the underlying right to exclude bad character from being placed before the jury. Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) (444 SE2d 836) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 (430 SE2d 597) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 (422 SE2d 673) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) (413 SE2d 526) (1991). How then can a defendant not waive the failure to give a Williams jury limiting instruction by: (1) the failure to request the instruction, or (2) the failure to object when such limiting instruction is not given? Clearly, the underlying right to be protected, itself, can be waived. Thus, the answer to such question is that the general law of waiver of a jury charge, or other error, by failure to timely object does apply, as Presiding Judge McMurray points out in his dissent. While it is the better practice to give such limiting instruction, whether requested or not by the defense, the majority would create a new defense right to automatic reversal absent such charge, despite the general body of law to the contrary.
OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) states in part “that no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible” for purposes of impeachment when the defendant testifies. Williams was decided to safeguard this uniquely Georgia evidentiary rule; “[i]n order to protect an accused and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, we have long embraced the fundamental principle [of Georgia rules of evidence] that the general character of an accused is inadmissible unless the accused chooses to put his character in issue.” Williams, supra at 641. In actuality, Williams does not protect a fundamental “due process right,” or even a fundamental evidentiary right under Georgia rules of evidence, because under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the vast majority of states that have adopted these modern rules of evidence, a defendant’s prior convictions are admissible, e.g., “[j]udgment[s] of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment.” Fed. Rules of Evid., § 803(22); Weinstein’s Evidence, §§ 803(2)[02]; 803(22)[02]. .
The majority of this Court seeks to fashion a new right, which runs counter to the well established criminal jurisprudence, procedure, and rules of evidence, and which is unnecessary to safeguard a defendant’s rights. Let the defendant protect himself the old fashion way, by making a timely objection to perfect the record and thereby allow the trial judge the opportunity to correct his own mistake, if any, and to rule on the objection. The appellate courts have no busi*432ness micromanaging trials, absent a violation of a fundamental right.
Decided July 16, 1997
John T. Rutherford, Lloyd J. Matthews, for appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Blair D. Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.