Court Opinion

ID: 9763183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:22.663488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.857841
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY1, Justice.
On March 28, 1995, the Wilkinsburg Education Association et al. (hereinafter “the union”) filed a complaint in equity and a motion for preliminary injunction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The union sought to prevent the Wilkinsburg School Board from entering into a contract with Alternative Public Schools, Inc. (APS) for operation and management of Turner School. Argument on this complaint was conducted the next day, and was limited to legal argument only. The board objected to proceeding without an evidentiary hearing, but the chancellor determined that a hearing was not necessary because only matters of law were at issue. The controlling statute was the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 1-101 et seq.
On March 30,1995, the chancellor preliminarily enjoined the board from entering into a contract with APS for the operation of Turner School.2 The chancellor held that if the School *338Code authorized the board to enter into a contract with a private corporation to operate one of its schools, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing, for courts will not ordinarily review the wisdom of the board’s policy decisions; and if there was no authority to enter such a contract, there was likewise no need for an evidentiary hearing, for without statutory authority, the reasons for the board’s actions were immaterial. The chancellor also determined that the harm alleged was both immediate and irreparable, particularly harm to the plaintiff-taxpayers, who might not be able to recover any monies paid to the corporation, and that there is no provision of the School Code which authorizes a school district to enter into a contract with a private entity for the education of children who live in the district. The chancellor also found that an injunction would preserve the status quo and that the union was likely to prevail on the merits. Based on these findings, the chancellor issued a preliminary injunction and ordered that any appeal would not act as an automatic supersedeas.3
The board appealed to Commonwealth Court and applied for reinstatement of the supersedeas. On May 5, 1995, Judge Kelton, of Commonwealth Court, reinstated the automatic supersedeas which had been removed by the chancellor, based on his view that it was error to grant the preliminary injunction without holding a hearing, particularly on the issue of *339irreparable harm. Judge Kelton also noted, but did not decide, that Section 1124 of the School Code, which grants the board certain powers, was claimed by the board as authority for its acts, thus raising an issue as to whether the chancellor was correct in finding that the School Code did not authorize the board’s acts.
On July 17, 1995, a three-judge panel of Commonwealth Court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the chancellor’s preliminary injunction. Commonwealth Court’s affirmance was based on the view that no evidentiary hearing was required since all material facts were undisputed, and that immediate and irreparable harm could be determined from the fact of the proposed contract. Additionally, Commonwealth Court stated that the chancellor need not rule on the merits of the controversy at the preliminary injunction stage, but only that the claim raises substantial legal questions. Moreover, Commonwealth Court held that the public interest was defined by the School Code, which requires that the board not take any action not authorized by the School Code. The court’s order affirmed the chancellor’s original order.4 The board filed an application for reconsideration on July 19, 1995. The application for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1995.
Briefs before us describe additional events which transpired as the legal proceedings progressed. On June 5, 1995, the board entered into an agreement with APS for the operation of Turner School; on July 25, 1995 the board received approval from the Secretary of Education for an alteration of its education plan to allow implementation of the contract with APS; the board made payments to APS pursuant to the agreement; and on August 1, 1995 the board notified twenty-four teachers that they had been furloughed.
On July 26, 1995, the union filed a motion for contempt, and on August 14, 1995, Commonwealth Court denied the petition for reconsideration. On August 24, 1995, the chancellor found the board to be in contempt.
*340On August 18, 1995 the board petitioned for allowance of appeal, and on August 22, 1995 the board filed an emergency petition to assume plenary jurisdiction. On August 24, 1995 this court granted both the allocatur and the petition to assume plenary jurisdiction, excluding any contempt proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. On the same day, the chancellor found the board in contempt and ordered that certain actions be taken no later than August 28, 1995. In response to a supplemental emergency petition to assume plenary jurisdiction, this court then stayed all contempt proceedings.
The board raises three primary arguments on appeal. First, it claims that it was error to enter the preliminary injunction on the grounds, inter alia, that a hearing was necessary before an injunction could be issued. Our standard of review in the issuance of a preliminary injunction is as follows:
Unless there were “apparently reasonable grounds” for the trial court to believe that it was presented with a situation of “urgent necessity”, it should not have issued the preliminary injunction. The two most important factors to be taken into account in this determination are first, whether an immediate and irreparable harm is actually threatened, and second, whether greater harm is caused by issuing the injunction than by refusing it. This limitation on the hearing court’s exercise of its equitable powers is warranted because the relief is being sought prior to a final determination of the merits of the case and without a complete development of all of the facts upon which a final judgment will depend.
New Castle Orthopedic Assoc. v. Burns, 481 Pa. at 464-65, 392 A.2d at 1385. Commonwealth Court has stated, additionally, that “where an adverse effect upon the public interest will result from granting a preliminary injunction, it should not be granted. Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 112 Pa.Cmwlth 90, 535 A.2d 231 (1987), aff'd 528 Pa. 355, 598 A.2d 256 (1991). Because we do not believe that the record in this case estab*341fishes either irreparable harm or that issuing the preliminary injunction avoided greater harm than refusing it, or that there may not be an adverse effect upon the public interest,5 we agree with the board that the injunction should not have been issued.5 Accordingly, Commonwealth Court is reversed and the injunction is dissolved.6
7
On the merits of the underlying claim, the board asserts that the lower courts were in error in determining that the Public School Code does not authorize the contract with APS; and second, that the Public School Code is unconstitutional as applied to Wilkinsburg if the APS contract is illegal. Although our jurisprudence normally requires that we address questions of law before constitutional questions, in this case we deem it appropriate to address the constitutional question first, and for that reason, we do not reach the argument as to the Public School Code.
Article III, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
*342The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.
According to -the board, should the Public School Code be interpreted to prohibit the subcontracting of teacher services, the code would be unconstitutional, for the code would prohibit the constitutionally required “thorough and efficient system of public education” in the circumstances faced by the board in Wilkinsburg. Among the circumstances which the board alleges that it would prove, given an opportunity, are the following:
1. The 1992 high school valedictorian in the Wilkinsburg School District had a grade point average of 2.667 (out of 4.0). Of the 1995 graduating class, the two highest averages were 3.125 and 3.0 and the third was 2.684.
2. Of forty students who took the Scholastic Aptitude Test between June of 1993 and June of 1994, which has a scale of 400 to 1600 (maximum), only one scored above the national average (950) on the combined math and verbal portions of the examination. The Wilkinsburg average was below 690.
3. In April, 1993, Turner School fourth, fifth and sixth graders were among students from more than 200 Pennsylvania elementary schools to take achievement tests in reading, math, language and science. Only one-third of Turner’s students scored above the national average in all subjects, compared to approximately two-thirds statewide — the worst performance in Allegheny County.
4. Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Education has approved Wilkinsburg’s proposed contract with APS and the secretary stated: “The school district’s statistics demonstrate that children are not receiving a quality education, and I share the District’s concern that major change within the District is necessary to meet the needs of students and parents.”
These and other facts would show, according to the board, that if the Public School Code prohibits the board’s subcontracting teachers, the code is unconstitutional because it would prohibit *343the board from providing a “thorough and efficient” education for Wilkinsburg children.
We recognize, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, that “A statute may be ... valid under one state of facts but not another, ... it may be valid as to one class of persons and invalid as to others.... ” Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 330, 78 S.Ct. 277, 286, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Here, it is conceivable that even if the Public School Code were to be interpreted to prohibit subcontracting of teachers, and that interpretation were to pass constitutional muster under most conditions, there may be other conditions, which the school district here insists there are, which would render this application of the Public School Code unconstitutional. We agree.
In reviewing the proceedings in this case, it is apparent that some salient principles have escaped notice. First, public education in Pennsylvania is a fundamental right. It is required by Article III, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Second, this court has consistently examined problems related to schools in the context of that fundamental right. In School District of Philadelphia v. Twer, 498 Pa. 429, 435, 447 A.2d 222, 224-25 (1982), for example, Mr. Justice Nix, now Chief Justice, wrote:
[T]he maintenance of a public school system is primarily for the education and training of our youth and the incidental financial benefit of those participating therein is of secondary concern.... The polestar in any decision requiring the assignment of priorities of resources available for education must be the best interest of the student.... [A]ny interpretation of legislative pronouncements relating to the public educational system must be reviewed in context with the General Assembly’s responsibility to provide for a “thorough and efficient system” for the benefit of our youth.
(Citations omitted). In sum, on remand, the best interest of the children is the polestar.
*344Accordingly, we remand this case for the holding of evidentiary hearings. The preliminary injunction and all ancillary contempt proceedings are vacated as indicated above.8
Vacated and remanded.
ZAPPALA, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ., join in this opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a concurring opinion joined by FLAHERTY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion which is joined by CAPPY, J.
MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation.

. This case was reassigned to this writer on September 29, 1995.

. In New Castle Orthopedic Assoc. v. Burns this court stated that the prerequisites for issuing a preliminary injunction are:
*338first, that it is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury would result by refusing it than by granting it; and third, that it properly restores the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct.... Even more essential however, is the determination that the activity sought to be restrained is actionable, and that the injunction issued is reasonably suited to abate such activity. And unless the plaintiff's right is clear and the wrong is manifest, a preliminary injunction will not generally be awarded.
481 Pa. 460, 464, 392 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1978), quoting John Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing and Repair, 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977).

. On March 30, 1995, after the court suggested that irreparable harm to taxpayers was more clear than harm to the union, the union also presented a motion for joinder of plaintiffs. The board did not oppose the motion, and four taxpayers were joined as plaintiffs. On May 15, 1995, APS was joined as a defendant.

. The dissenting judge would have vacated the preliminary injunction because an evidentiary hearing was not conducted, although the board's counsel asked for one no lower than fourteen times.

. In requesting an evidentiary hearing, counsel for the board stated:
Counsel. Material facts are in dispute.
Court. What material fact is in dispute?
Counsel. Irreparable harm is a factual argument, public interest is a factual argument. They absolutely are, your honor, they are not legal arguments, they are factual arguments.

. An evidentiary hearing on the issue of irreparable harm, the effect of the injunction, and the possible harm to the public interest would have permitted the board to introduce evidence of the reasons for its action, including the circumstances in which it acted, and that would, presumably have led the parties and the lower court to consider the possible conflict between its interpretation of the School Code and Article III, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

. See 5 Goodrich Amram 2d, § 1531(a)(6):
There is no absolute duty on the court to grant an evidentiary hearing on an application for a preliminary injunction. It is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. However, it is equally true that a decision whether to hold a hearing will be reversed where that discretion is abused. Moreover, the rules and case law clearly indicate that a hearing is customarily held and is a preferred procedure. It is a rare preliminary injunction that can correctly be denied without a hearing and no preliminary injunction can be granted and continued without a hearing whether before or after the initial grant.
(Emphasis added).

. The union claims that the constitutional issue raised by the board has been waived because it was not raised below. We disagree. This matter arose in the context of a preliminary injunction. There was neither adequate time nor an adequate opportunity during a hearing to raise the issue. See Cagnoli v. Bonnell, 531 Pa. 199, 611 A.2d 1194 (1992) (Where there is neither notice nor opportunity to research and prepare cogent legal arguments, strict compliance with the rule that matters not raised before the trial court will not be considered on appeal will not be applied).