Court Opinion

ID: 9556297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 20:04:38.53912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.319327
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/1/23; Certified for Publication 8/16/23 (order attached)

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                               DIVISION TWO

 JENNIFER ANN HATLEY,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 E080000

 v.                                                                (Super.Ct.No. DVHE2202266)

 JAMES BRADDY SOUTHARD,                                            OPINION

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey M. Zimel, Judge.

Reversed with directions.

         Morrison & Foerster, Robert W. May, James R. Sigel, Joel F. Wacks, Morgan

O’Neill Mitruka, Emani N. Oakley; Family Violence Appellate Project, Cory Hernandez,

Jodi Lewis, and Jennafer Dorfman Wagner for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Benjamin G. Shatz, Andrew Satenberg, Stephanie

Roeser, Ryan Patterson, and Lauren Chee for California Women’s Law Center as Amicus

Curiae on behalf of Planitiff and Appellant.

         No appearance by Defendant and Respondent.

                                                          1
       A woman sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her

estranged husband. The trial court denied her petition while indicating that her allegations

of a pattern of control and isolation by limiting her access to money, communication, and

transportation did not fall within the statutory definition of domestic violence or abuse.

       Under the law, attempts to control, regulate, and monitor a spouse’s finances,

economic resources, movements, and access to communications are abuse. We therefore

reverse the order denying the restraining order and remand for a new hearing on whether

a restraining order is appropriate. The trial court did not address Hatley’s request for

spousal support, and we order that considered on remand as well.

                                              I

                                          FACTS

       Hatley filed a request for a DVRO against her estranged husband of nine and a

half years, respondent James Southard, under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act

(DVPA). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq., unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code). She

also requested an order granting her spousal support.

       A. Hatley’s Allegations and Evidence of Abusive Conduct

       Hatley alleged Southard had engaged in a pattern of abuse where “[t]he abusive

behavior and control happens daily” and “occurred for the entire length of the marriage.”

She submitted a declaration and documentary evidence describing numerous incidents of

physical, financial, verbal, and emotional abuse.

                                              2
       There was an allegation of physical harm. Hatley described an incident in 2017 or

2018 when she became ill and “was losing consciousness and waking up struggling to

breathe.” She asked Southard to call 911, but he “became angry and told me that if I tried

to get medical care he would get rid of our dog.” Hatley says she then crawled to the

bathroom and lost consciousness. She woke to find Southard “yanking me up off the

floor by my arm.” Southard told her she was “being over dramatic.” The next morning

Hatley woke up with bruising on her face, chest, and near her pubic bone. She said the

bruising on her chest “look[ed] to be from fingers or a hand,” and said it had been caused

by Southard smothering her with a pillow. She submitted photographs showing these

injuries.

       On another occasion, Southard threatened her physically. Hatley asked Southard

about an exchange of sexually explicit text messages with a person who later defrauded

him and attempted to use his messages and photographs to blackmail Hatley. When

Hatley objected to his behavior, she said he “responded by leaning into me and putting

his hands up like he was going to choke me while in a fit of rage.” She said, “I was afraid

for my physical safety and afraid James might try to hurt me out of anger.”

       Southard allegedly also used suicide threats to manipulate Hatley. She asserted

that his threats of self-harm began in 2013 and continued for nearly a decade. On one

occasion, he became agitated because Hatley refused to take out or cosign for a loan

which he could not qualify for on his own. Later that night, he sent her text messages

threatening suicide. He warned her not to call 911 because if she did “there wouldn’t be a

                                             3
good outcome” and asked if she wanted to be responsible for that. She said he eventually

“told me that he had taken his Klonopin to kill himself but threw them up.” However,

after he received medical attention, “the lab report from the psychiatric hospital found no

traces of [Klonopin] in his system.” Hatley later counted his medication and found none

missing.

       Hatley described Southard as exercising control over her by limiting her ability to

earn and spend money. She said he “consistently restricted my access to funds by

canceling ATM cards, making threats against me, or preventing me from working.” She

explained Southard “had a specific way of controlling how and when [she] accessed

money.” “[H]e would deposit money from his checks into a savings account that [she]

could not access.” To get access to funds, Hatley had to tell Southard what she needed to

buy and the exact amount, and “he would transfer the requested money into the main

account if he approved it.” She said she had to ask permission for purchases as minor as a

Starbucks coffee. If there was any money left over, “it was understood that I was not to

use more than I requested, and if I did, he would cancel the card or get angry.”

       These attempts at control worsened after the couple separated and Southard moved

to Kentucky. Southard “ordered me not to use our atm card, knowing that I had to pay

rent.” When she used the card to buy necessities anyway, she said he “threatened to get

me in legal trouble for using his money and said he wouldn’t give me money until a

judge ordered him to.”

                                             4
       Southard also exercised control over her by limiting and later depriving her of her

vehicle. Hatley had put her own money down to buy the vehicle and used money from

student loans to make the payments. She said he nevertheless “forc[ed] me to depend on

him for transportation, which . . . isolated me.” It also interfered with her ability to see

her daughter without his assistance, because the child lives with her father, who is not

Southard. When Southard drove Hatley places, she said he sometimes drove erratically

and dangerously

       Eventually, Southard took Hatley’s car to Kentucky, though he knew that meant

she “would not be able to work or see my daughter or earn money to provide for myself.”

When he learned Hatley was considering asking for spousal support or the return of her

car, she said Southard “threatened to interfere with my custody of my daughter and my

relationship with my daughter’s father.”

       After moving to Kentucky, Southard told Hatley he would no longer pay for her

cell phone service. She said he did so though he knew “I could not afford a phone line

and that I communicate with my daughter via cell phone.” Hatley said Southard also used

his control over her phone to “track[] my phone calls” while they were separated “to see

if I was talking to other men.” She alleged that Southard used access to necessities as a

constant threat. “Anything I needed that was a necessity, like my cell phone, was hung

over my head.” “[D]isconnecting my cell phone service was a common threat because

James knew I spoke to my daughter on my cell phone.”

                                               5
         Hatley said “there have been incidents involving sexual abuse” but did not detail

them. She nevertheless described numerous sexually degrading comments in which

Southard expressed frustration and hostility after learning she had dated another person

when they were separated. Among other things, he said, “Go fuck your boyfriend and

leave me alone!!,” “At least I waited this long to spread my fucking legs!!,” “You’re dirty

to me now,” “[A]s soon as I found out you were fucking someone you no longer mean

shit to[] me,” “How could you move on so fast from me and have sex with another man

so fast after me??,” and “You ran out and slept with someone. That makes me want to

puke.”

         B. Hatley’s Request for a DVRO and Spousal Support

         Hatley sought a DVRO prohibiting Southard from abusing, contacting, or coming

near her or her child. She said her child needed protection because Southard had

“threatened to interfere with my custody of my daughter, and tried to use our relationship

to hurt me” and had contacted her daughter when he was unable to reach her. She also

sought protection of her animals.

         Hatley also requested spousal support. That request was supported by an Income

and Expense Declaration (Form FL-150). She also asked the trial judge to award her

temporary control of her car and her cell phone. In a supplemental declaration, Hatley

repeated her request for spousal support and noted “[t]he court can order support to a

spouse in domestic violence cases, even before proving abuse had occurred.”

                                              6
       The judge denied a temporary restraining order, because “[t]he facts as stated in

form DV-100 do not show reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” The judge set

a hearing on the DVRO.

       C. Southard’s Response

       After Hatley filed her request for a restraining order, Southard retained counsel

and filed for divorce. He also contested Hatley’s DVRO request and accused her of

requesting a DVRO only after Southard petitioned for divorce. (Hatley later pointed out

she filed the request for a DVRO before Southard filed for divorce.)

       Southard asserted that no DVRO was necessary because he had moved to

Kentucky and did not intend to return to California. He denied physically abusing Hatley

and claimed her black eye had been caused by her falling and hitting her head on the

toilet. He did not attempt to explain the other bruising. He conceded the text messages

and emails Hatley provided were accurate and said he was “embarrassed about the dialog

[Hatley] and I had over those texts.”

       Southard objected to Hatley’s request for spousal support because “[t]his matter

can be heard through the divorce proceedings.” However, he filed an Income and

Expense Declaration.

       D. DVRO Hearing

       At the hearing on the DVRO, Hatley was unrepresented, but Southard was

represented. Both appeared telephonically, Hatley due to illness and Southard due to

distance. Hatley testified about Southard’s control over her finances, harassing messages,

                                             7
and suicide threats. She also testified that Southard deprived her of her car, interfering

with her ability to work. She said he started driving the car before they separated and

after they separated drove it to Kentucky days before she was set to start a new job and

she lost the job as a result. Southard chose not to cross-examine Hatley and did not

testify.

           During her testimony, Hatley was audibly upset, and the trial court repeatedly

asked her to try to collect herself. The judge indicated he did not accept that her

testimony was evidence of abuse as defined in the DVPA. After her testimony about the

car, he asked her what abuse she was complaining about. “What abuse? Tell me what

you’re complaining of. I mean, I know that he took your car, and the car meant a lot to

you, but what else? He called you names?”

           Hatley provided additional details about Southard’s degrading insults and

unwanted contact. “It wasn’t just calling me names, it was repeatedly telling me, ‘If you

get a lawyer when you’re a college grad, well you can get F’d. You’re pathetic. I know

where you live.’ I have the text messages that I can pull up that go into more detail, but it

was just everything he could possibly think of. Like, he would go into these rages and,

‘You think you can “F” me, this, that, and things will be okay. I don’t think so.’ And

there was one conversation we had over text when he was here. This was for two hours. I

kept asking him to leave my house, and he wouldn’t leave. He refused to leave. And then

he would leave and then he would come back and he would find a reason to come back,

and I didn’t want him there. And I told him I didn’t want him there and that he needed to

                                                8
stay away for the night and he didn’t. And it’s the instances—these incidents that

happened all the time. You know, when he gets like this, I can’t get away from him, you

know, like the communication. It doesn’t matter what I do and what I say –”

       The trial judge did not accept those incidents as incidents of abuse under the

DVPA. He interrupted her and said “let’s try to focus on what Mr. Southard did to you

that you feel was either violent or abusive . . . I don’t want to hear all the problems of

your marriage and your relationship.” Hatley then testified about Southard harassing her

and taking her car, and the trial judge again directed Hatley to focus on allegations of

physical violence, asking “Has Mr. Southard ever hit you?”

       The judge also refused to allow Hatley to testify about Southard’s sexual abuse

because she had not included sexual abuse in her filings. Hatley testified “there has been

sexual abuse” and explained she hesitated to get into details. “I don’t know if I have to

get into great detail or not. It’s hard to talk about. It’s embarrassing.” The judge asked,

“Did you write about that in your request for a restraining order?” Hatley appeared to

understand the judge to be asking whether she had written about specific incidents and

answered, “No, I didn’t write about it.” At that point, the judge said, “So then if you

haven’t alleged it in your paperwork, then I’m not going to allow you to talk about it here

today.” As stated above, Hatley’s declaration avoided specifics but alleged “there have

been incidents involving sexual abuse.”

       After her testimony, the judge asked Hatley what she was hoping he would order.

She explained she wanted Southard to “stay away” and she “[didn’t] want to be

                                              9
harassed.” The trial judge then asked whether Southard lived in Kentucky and when he

last came to Hatley’s home. After Hatley answered he last came to her house on April 19,

Southard’s counsel moved for judgment on the ground that Hatley’s allegations failed to

satisfy her burden, even if taken as true, and “don’t fall within the domestic violence

prevention act.”

       The trial judge agreed and entered judgment in favor of Southard under Code of

Civil Procedure section 631.8, which provides that “[a]fter a party has completed his

presentation of evidence in a trial by the court, the other party, without waiving his right

to offer evidence in support of his defense or in rebuttal in the event the motion is not
                                     1
granted, may move for a judgment.” The trial judge said, “I do not find that the

Petitioner has met the burden of proof in the conclusion of their case.” He explained: “I

understand that you’re upset, Ms. Hatley, but what you’re telling me does not rise to

meeting the definition of domestic violence or abuse, all right? So your request for a

restraining order is denied.” The trial judge did not address Hatley’s request for spousal

support.

                                             II

                                         ANALYSIS

       Hatley argues the trial judge erred in denying her request for a restraining order

because he refused to hear her testimony regarding acts of sexual abuse Southard

       1 The minute order says the judge granted summary judgment for Southard.
However, the judge said he was ruling under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. An
oral ruling controls where there is a conflict with a minute order. (People v. Farell (2002)
28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.)

                                             10
committed against her. She also faults the trial judge for failing to consider the remaining

evidence of abuse and instead concluding the incidents could not constitute abuse under

the DVPA.

       The DVPA defines domestic violence to include abuse of a spouse, former spouse,

or the child of a party. (§ 6211, subds. (a) & (e).) The Legislature defined “abuse”

broadly to include intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily

injury, sexual assault, placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious

bodily injury, or engaging in behavior that could be enjoined under section 6320.

(§ 6203, subd. (a).) The behaviors incorporated by the reference to section 6320 include

“molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,

credibly impersonating . . . , falsely personating . . . , harassing, telephoning, . . .

destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or

otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other

party.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).)

       The last phrase, “disturbing the peace,” is itself a broad category of abuse under

the DVPA. The term “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,

destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed

directly or indirectly . . . and by any method or through any means including, but not

limited to, telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, or other

electronic technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control,

which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a

                                                11
person’s free will and personal liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Coercive control includes

unreasonably engaging in conduct aimed at, among other things, “(1) Isolating the other

party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support. [¶] (2) Depriving the other party

of basic necessities. [¶] (3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s

movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to

services.”

       “Under the DVPA, a court may issue a protective order to restrain any person for

the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of

separation of the persons involved upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.

The statute should be broadly construed in order to accomplish its purpose of preventing

acts of domestic violence.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106,

115 [cleaned up] (Marriage of F.M.).)

       In general, we will defer to the trial judge when reviewing an order granting or

denying a DVRO. We review such orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of

Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226 (Davila).) We also review a trial judge’s

failure to consider evidence for abuse of discretion. (Marriage of F.M., supra, 65

Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) And we review the judge’s factual findings under a substantial

evidence standard of review. (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.)

       However, “[j]udicial discretion to grant or deny an application for a protective

order is not unfettered. The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being

applied by the court, i.e., in the legal principles governing the subject of the action. Thus,

                                              12
we consider whether the trial court’s exercise of discretion is consistent with the statute’s

intended purpose. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of

applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has

not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based

on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of

informed discretion and is subject to reversal. The question of whether a trial court

applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of

law requiring de novo review.” (Marriage of F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 116

[cleaned up].)

       The hearing record calls into question the court’s understanding of what

constitutes abuse under the DVPA. During Hatley’s testimony, the judge repeatedly

asked her to focus her testimony on abuse or violence. For example, when she reported

the contents of some of Southard’s demeaning text messages, many of which insinuated

threats, the judge commented “let’s try to focus on what Mr. Southard did to you that you

feel was either violent or abusive . . . I don’t want to hear all the problems of your

marriage and your relationship.” Similarly, when she complained he had deprived her of

her means of transportation and threatened to cause problems if she tried to recover her

car, the trial judge asked, “What abuse? Tell me what you’re complaining of. I mean, I

know that he took your car, and the car meant a lot to you, but what else? He called you

names?” In the end, the judge concluded, “I understand that you’re upset, Ms. Hatley, but

what you’re telling me does not rise to meeting the definition of domestic violence or

                                              13
abuse,” and the judge denied her request for a protective order on that basis. This

formulation of the ruling taken together with the questions and comments to Hatley

during her testimony lead us to conclude the judge committed legal error.

       The DVPA’s very broad category of abusive conduct warranting a DVRO

includes acts of violence and threats of violence, as the trial judge suggested, and those

may well constitute the bulk of trial court DVRO cases in practice. Limiting abuse to

those categories, however, ignores the plain language of the DVPA and the legislature’s

purpose that language reflects. (See § 6203 [“Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction

of physical injury or assault”].) Abuse includes physical abuse or injury, as well as acts

that “destroy[ ] the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (In re Marriage of

Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.)

       The core of Hatley’s complaints against her estranged husband was that he used a

variety of methods to control her and limit her freedom. Actual violence and threats of

violence played but a small part of her allegations. She said Southard had smothered her

with a pillow to keep her from leaving their home to obtain medical care, an incident

which left bruises on her body. But the bulk of the evidence she submitted through

declarations and hearing testimony concerned his acts aimed at controlling, regulating,

and monitoring her movements, communications, and finances. She explained Southard

“would deposit money from his checks into a savings account that [she] could not access”

and require her to put in a request for funds before he would transfer the funds to an

account she could access. If she used more than she requested, he would cancel the ATM

                                             14
card or get angry with her. According to Hatley, these problems lasted throughout the

relationship but worsened after they separated, and Southard moved to Kentucky. By then

he ordered her not to use the card for necessities and threatened her with legal action.

These attempts at financial control, if established, would constitute incidents of

“[d]epriving the other party of basic necessities,” and “[c]ontrolling, regulating, or

monitoring the other party’s . . . finances, economic resources, or access to services,”

which are by definition abuse under the DVPA. (§ 6320, subd. (c)(2) & (3).) Treating

these incidents as just evidence of marital problems was error. (Rodriguez v. Menjivar

(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 822 [“acts of isolation, control, and threats were sufficient

to demonstrate the destruction of [petitioner’s] mental and emotional calm. . . . The trial

court erred in failing to consider this testimony as the basis for a DVPA order; this

evidence demonstrated abuse within the meaning of section 6320”].)

       The same is true of Hatley’s evidence that Southard exercised control over her by

limiting and then depriving her of her vehicle and phone. She testified he had long made

her dependent on him for transportation and interfered with her ability to see her

daughter. Though she had purchased a vehicle by the end of their relationship, he co-

opted it and later took it to Kentucky. He did this knowing that without it she would lose

her job and the ability to see her daughter. After moving to Kentucky, Southard also told

Hatley he would no longer pay for her cell phone service. She said he did so though he

knew it would have the effect of further isolating her. When he learned she might ask for

spousal support or the return of her car, she said he threatened explicitly to interfere with

                                             15
her custody of her daughter. Exercising control over a spouse by regulating her

movements and communications is defined as abuse under the DVPA, as is isolating her

from supportive relationships. (§ 6320, subd. (c)(1) & (3); see also Marriage of F.M.,

supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 119 [“[S]eeking to exercise control over a person by taking

away their phone, [is an] actionable form[] of abuse under the DVPA”].) Hatley’s

evidence was relevant to establishing abuse, and the trial court erred by not recognizing

that.

        Hatley also presented evidence that Southard tracked her phone calls. She testified

Southard used his control over her phone to track her calls while they were separated “to

see if I was talking to other men.” When he learned she was dating someone else, he

showered her with abusive text messages, which she filed. These repeated messages were

sexually degrading and plainly had the capacity to shame Hatley and disturb her peace of

mind. Such acts may also constitute abuse under the DVPA, contrary to the trial judge’s

direction that she should not present them because he didn’t “want to hear all the

problems of your marriage and your relationship.” (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1

Cal.App.5th 389, 398-399 (Perez).)

        As the First District explained in Perez, “There can be little doubt that . . . phone

calls and texts constitute continuing abuse under the statute. [Citation.] The phone calls

and texts harassed [petitioner] and disturbed her peace of mind. [Citations.] . . . He

threatened her by saying ‘[f]uck you bitch’ and telling her to stop seeking child support.

He told her she was a ‘crazy mom’ for putting her kids through the ‘trouble’ of reporting

                                              16
him for child abuse. He told her she was ‘going to pay for it’ and that children ‘pay the

consequences.’” (Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398-399.) The trial judge in that case

found the petitioner had been “subjected to ‘annoying phone calls,’” but concluded “they

did not ‘rise to the level of a pattern of harassment.’” (Ibid.) The First District held the

trial judge had erred, and we reach the same conclusion.

       Hatley presented allegations and evidence of several kinds of abusive conduct,

which could warrant a DVRO if her testimony is ultimately credited. We conclude the

trial judge’s error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability Hatley would

have obtained a more favorable result if the judge had considered whether these incidents

establish, under the totality of the circumstances, that the conduct she complained of

destroyed her mental or emotional calm. (Priscila N. v. Leonardo G. (2017) 17

Cal.App.5th 1208, 1215.) Even if every one of Hatley’s allegations of abuse, taken alone,

might not warrant a DVRO, the probability is that some of them do, or that they do taken

all together.

       We nevertheless do not follow Hatley’s request that we direct the trial judge to

enter a DVRO on remand. A trier of fact must find past abuse by a preponderance of the

evidence to issue a DVRO. (Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) Disturbing the

peace of another person requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances (§ 6320,

subd. (c)), which includes factual and credibility determinations. It is appropriate for the

trial judge, in the first instance, to make the determinations as to the acts for which there

is a reasonable proof of past abuse, and as to what circumstances disturbed Hatley’s

                                              17
mental or emotional calm. These findings will determine the scope of any restraining

order. Hatley, for example, argues the DVRO should extend protections to her daughter

and pets, which each require showings of good cause that will depend on the facts. (§

6320, subds. (a), (c).) While Hatley points out Southard admitted to sending harassing

text messages, he did not concede most of the other abusive conduct. Even if the text

messages were a sufficient ground for issuing a DVRO, the rest of Hatley’s evidence is

relevant to the appropriate scope of any DVRO that may issue. We will therefore reverse

the order denying a DVRO and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We note Hatley alleged and submitted evidence of other kinds of abuse which

we did not find it necessary to address. Our omitting these incidents from the discussion

does not imply she cannot rely on them at a new hearing.

       On remand, Hatley should be allowed to testify as to particular past acts of sexual

abuse. She correctly argues she should have been allowed to testify about those acts, as

she generally alleged sexual abuse in a supplemental declaration. Hatley’s general

allegation was sufficient to put Southard on notice, without her detailing the specifics in
        2
writing. The DVPA “does not impose on a victim of domestic abuse a pleading

       2 The trial court may have believed Hatley did not make even the general
allegation, because she did not direct the court to it at the hearing. As litigants in most
DVRO cases are unrepresented by counsel, that should “influence[] how these hearings
should be conducted—with the judge necessarily expected to play a far more active role
in developing the facts, before then making the decision whether or not to issue the
requested permanent protective order. In such a hearing, the judge cannot rely on the
propria persona litigants to know each of the procedural steps, to raise objections, to ask
all the relevant questions of witnesses, and to otherwise protect their due process rights.”
(Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 861.) While we need not here reach
                                                                  [footnote continued on next page]

                                             18
obligation that he or she describe all individual actions taken by the alleged abuser in the

DVRO request in order later to testify about those acts at the hearing, as long as the

alleged abuser is placed on notice of the general allegations.” (Davila, supra, 29

Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) On the contrary, such general allegations provide notice and a

responding party will have a “meaningful opportunity to respond to the specific

allegations at the hearing, and to request a continuance if he need[s] additional time to

respond.” (Ibid.)

       Finally, Hatley also argues the trial judge erred by failing to address her request

for a spousal support order under section 6341, subdivision (c). She rightly points out that

a finding that domestic violence occurred is not a prerequisite for awarding spousal

support under the DVPA. (In re Marriage of J.Q. & T.B. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 687,

703-704.) Thus, the denial of a protective order did not moot the issue. Moreover,

Southard was plainly on notice that Hatley had asked for spousal support. Hatley

submitted an income and expense declaration with her petition, and Southard submitted

his own income and expense declaration. (Id. at p. 704.) In any event, since we are

remanding Hatley’s petition, the trial judge “should conduct a noticed hearing to

determine whether a spousal support award is proper, and consider all relevant issues

before making an award.” (Ibid.)

Hatley’s claim that we should reverse the order denying her a DVRO on the due process
ground that the judge did not provide sufficient assistance to her as an unrepresented
party, if she lacks counsel after remand, that should influence how the trial court conducts
any hearings.

                                             19
                                           III

                                      DISPOSITION

       We reverse the order denying a domestic violence protective order and remand for

a new hearing on whether a domestic violence protective order is appropriate, the proper

scope of any such order, as well as whether a spousal support order is warranted. Hatley

is entitled to her costs on appeal.

                                                              RAPHAEL
                                                                                           J.

We concur:

MILLER
                 Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
                           J.

                                           20
Filed 8/16/23

                             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION TWO

 JENNIFER ANN HATLEY,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                  E080000

 v.                                                 (Super.Ct.No. DVHE2202266)

 JAMES BRADDY SOUTHARD,                            ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
                                                  FOR PUBLICATION
          Defendant and Respondent.

THE COURT

        The request for publication of the opinion filed on August 1, 2023 is GRANTED.
The opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 81105(c). It is ORDERED that the opinion filed in this matter on August 1, 2023 be
certified for publication.

        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                              RAPHAEL
                                                                                        J.

We concur:

MILLER
                  Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
    J.