Court Opinion

ID: 9449155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:59:10.432461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:44.228303
License: Public Domain

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The claimed unseaworthiness was in so storing laundry bags that one fell upon appellant while he was in a passageway intended for use by crewmen. The trial court made no finding as to whether the bag was stored in a rack along the passageway ; if so, whether the bag fell from the rack; and, if so, whether the bag struck appellant when it fell. Consequently, we do not know, from the conclusional finding of seaworthiness, whether the trial court thought appellant had not been struck by a bag stored in the rack, or whether it thought that, even so, this would not establish that the vessel was unseaworthy.
I think we are entitled to findings of fact which are at least sufficiently explicit so that we will know whether we are dealing with a question as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to how the accident occurred, or with a question of law as to whether insecurely stored bags could render a vessel unseaworthy. All that the majority states concerning the right of the trial court to disbelieve witnesses is beside the point if that was not the basis of the court’s conclusional finding.
There was, to be sure, a finding of fact (if such an observation may be so labeled) that appellant was an unreliable and untrustworthy witness. But the court may here have been referring only to appellant’s testimony as to injuries sustained. It is notable that there is no similar finding or observation concerning *134Freitas’ testimony to the effect that he heard a noise, turned around, and saw appellant lying on the deck with a laundry bag beside him.
What the Supreme Court said, in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24, note 8, 73 S.Ct. 956, 962, 97 L.Ed. 1427, concerning the need of findings on the preliminary facts relied upon as warranting a conclusional finding of “negligence,” is equally applicable to the concept of “unseaworthiness.” The court there said:
“ * * Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a), in terms, contemplates a system of findings which are ‘of fact’ and which are ‘concise.’ The well-recognized difficulty of distinguishing between law and fact clearly does not absolve district courts of their duty in hard and complex cases to make a studied effort toward definiteness. Statements conclusory in nature are to be eschewed in favor of statements of the preliminary and basic facts on which the District Court relied. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415 [63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485], and cases cited. Otherwise, their findings are useless for appellate purposes. In this particular case, no proper review could be exercised by taking the ‘fact’ findings of ‘negligence’ at face value. And, to the extent that they are of law, of course they are not binding on appeal. E. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153-154, and concurring opinion at 155-156 [71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162].”
I would remand the cause to the district court for findings of fact as to whether and how the laundry bag was stored, whether it fell, and if so, whether it struck appellant. If the trial court believes that the evidence is insufficient to establish any or all of these facts, a finding to that effect would suffice for purposes of appellate review, since appellant had the burden of proving the vessel unseaworthy.