Court Opinion

ID: 9901839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:03:31.925556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.769741
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 22 2023, 9:11 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul J. Podlejski                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Anderson, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
                                                          Justin F. Roebel
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Zachary W. Hileman,                                       November 22, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-518
        v.                                                Appeal from the Madison Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Angela Warner
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Sims, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          48C01-2110-MR-2746

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                             Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023                           Page 1 of 16
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Zachary Wayne Hileman (Hileman), appeals his

      conviction for murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1), and carrying a

      handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-47-2-1.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   Hileman presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we restate as

      follows:

          (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hileman’s

              proffered jury instructions on lesser-included offenses when the proposed

              instructions were not supported by the evidence presented; and

          (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain

              evidence indicating that Hileman was selling marijuana on the night of

              the murder.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   In the early morning of October 3, 2021, Shane Clark (Shane) was driving his

      vehicle in Anderson, Indiana, with his brother, Adrian Clark (Adrian), seated in

      the passenger seat and with Adrian’s friend, Hileman, seated in the backseat

      behind Shane. After Hileman sold some marijuana at two separate residences

      and while he was arranging other potential marijuana sales that night through

      Facebook messages, Shane was driving in the vicinity of the intersection

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023     Page 2 of 16
      between Broadway Street and East Webster Street, when he failed to yield the

      right of way and nearly collided with a motorcycle. Shane “stomp[ed]” on his

      brakes to avoid the collision and then continued driving. (Transcript Vol. I, p.

      178). The motorcycle, ridden by Raymond Waymire (Waymire) with Jacklyn

      Jolliff as a passenger, swerved to avoid crashing into Shane’s vehicle. After the

      near miss, Waymire circled around for a few blocks and caught up with Shane’s

      vehicle at a stop sign. The motorcycle was loud and Waymire was driving

      pretty quickly to catch up with Shane’s car.

[5]   At the stop sign, Waymire parked his motorcycle on the side of the road and

      walked over to Shane’s vehicle. Waymire approached Shane’s window, which

      was cracked open slightly, and verbally confronted him about not yielding at

      the intersection. Shane, who mistakenly believed that Waymire had

      disregarded the stop sign, responded back. Waymire then approached the

      backseat window, which was rolled down. Shane and Adrian testified that

      Waymire leaned into the window and hit Hileman on the side of the face.

      Shane stated that he “heard the sound of something connecting” and Adrian

      noted that Waymire punched Hileman “in the middle, in the side of the face.”

      (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 186, 237). Waymire then stepped back from the vehicle.

      Hileman exclaimed, “What the fuck. He hit me.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 188).

      Hileman took his gun which was lying next to him on the backseat and shot

      Waymire in the chest. The bullet pierced Waymire’s heart, right lung, and

      pulmonary trunk. Waymire walked back to the motorcycle, fell to the ground,

      and was later declared dead at the scene. The entire interaction lasted

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023      Page 3 of 16
      approximately six seconds. Immediately after the shooting, Shane drove away

      from the scene and took Hileman home.

[6]   Hileman turned himself in less than twenty-four hours after the incident. Prior

      to turning himself in, Hileman sent Adrian messages via Facebook in which he

      urged Adrian to “say it was self-defense.” (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 73-74). After being

      arrested and while he was incarcerated at the Madison County Jail, Hileman

      also had a phone conversation with Adrian in which he told Adrian that if the

      police talked to him again “make sure not to mention how [Waymire] stepped

      back and shit,” and “if you could, man, mention that, that [Waymire] tried

      reaching for something in his pocket.” (Exh. Vol. I, p. 70).

[7]   On October 7, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Hileman with

      murder, a felony, and carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A

      misdemeanor. From January 10 through January 13, 2023, the trial court

      conducted a jury trial. During his opening statement, Hileman’s counsel

      advised the jury that Hileman had a difficult childhood, that he was small, and

      that he had been bullied. He informed the panel that

              twice in five or six months prior to the shooting, [Hileman] had
              been held at gunpoint. Beat and robbed. So he did what [] we
              hear[d] a lot of the p[ro]spective jurors have done. He armed
              himself with a handgun for personal protection.

      (Tr. Vol. I, p. 98). Based on Hileman’s counsel’s statements of Hileman’s

      claims of victimization and the need for self-protection, the State argued that he

      had opened the door for the admissibility of evidence that Hileman was dealing

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023       Page 4 of 16
      marijuana on the night of the shooting. The trial court denied the State’s

      argument, concluding that the “prejudicial value [of the marijuana dealing

      evidence] outweighs the probative value at this point,” but cautioned that “if

      [Hileman] ends up testifying, I think we have a different issue on our hands

      given what was presented to the jury.” (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 150-51).

[8]   During the State’s case-in-chief, the State sought to introduce images

      downloaded from Hileman’s cell phone showing the firearm used in the

      shooting along with a large amount of currency, as well as some Facebook

      messages in which Hileman discussed drug dealing and carrying the firearm for

      protection while dealing. In one Facebook message dated the day before the

      incident, Hileman complained about losing his job but advised that he was now

      “trappin” and that he was safe because he “keep[s] a pole on me when . . . in

      traffic.” (Exh. Vol. I, p. 93). 1 Another Facebook message dated from two

      hours before the shooting, in which Hilleman is “trynna get this bud gone,” that

      “it’s not bad gas,” and explained the pricing. (Exh. Vol. I, p. 95). 2 A third

      Facebook message was a conversation with Shane a few hours before the

      shooting, in which Hileman was asking for a ride and offering to sell him some

      marijuana. The State argued that the messages were relevant to show that

      Hileman was not armed for a legal purpose and to establish his state of mind at

      1
        A police officer translated that “trappin” referred to dealing drugs and that “pole” referred to a “gun . . .
      typically a handgun.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 65).
      2
          “[B]ud” refers to marijuana and “gas” indicates the quality of the marijuana. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 66).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023                                  Page 5 of 16
       the time of the shooting. Hileman’s counsel objected and claimed that the

       evidence was irrelevant, wildly speculative, and only intended “to try and dirty

       my client.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 32-33, 37). The trial court admitted the photo of

       the handgun and the money, the Facebook message with Shane, and the

       Facebook messages explaining Hileman’s reason to carry a handgun. The trial

       court denied admission of the remaining Facebook messages about drug

       dealing.

[9]    After the State rested, Hileman commenced his defense. As part of his defense,

       Hileman’s aunt, who was his adopted mother, testified that Hileman had been

       beaten up on two recent occasions, including one incident at a fair, after which

       Hileman required stitches. She informed the jury that after the second incident,

       she and her husband talked to Hileman about acquiring a handgun. Hileman

       testified in his own defense. During the State’s cross-examination, Hileman

       acknowledged without objection that he was selling marijuana during the night

       of the shooting. As part of his questioning, the State offered into evidence

       additional Facebook messages in which Hileman was selling marijuana around

       the time of the incident, and which included a picture of his product. Hileman

       denied that the handgun was related to drug dealing and denied that his beating

       at the fair was related to him selling marijuana.

[10]   After the presentation of the evidence, the parties addressed Hileman’s request

       for jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter,

       reckless homicide, and criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. While

       Hileman contended that there was evidence of sudden heat supporting the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023     Page 6 of 16
       proffering of a voluntary manslaughter instruction because he was “punched

       and embarrassed,” the State objected and argued that Hileman had time for

       reflection after being punched. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 191). The trial court denied the

       proposed instruction on voluntary manslaughter:

               [T]he court really struggles to find that there’s evidence that
               supports . . . sudden heat in this case, particularly in light of the
               defendant’s testimony yesterday would give the court really no
               evidence that would indicate that that’s what happened, that it
               was a sudden heat situation. [] [S]o the court’s not giving the
               voluntary manslaughter in this case. The court doesn’t believe the
               record supports the sudden heat or the voluntary manslaughter in
               this case.

       (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 192-93). With respect to his proposed jury instructions for

       reckless homicide and criminal recklessness, Hileman pointed to his testimony

       that “his vision was affected, blurred, blacked out, he felt for the gun, raised it

       up and fired,” as support for their proffer. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 197). The trial court

       denied these proposed instructions without explanation. After receiving the

       case and deliberation, the jury found Hileman guilty as charged.

[11]   On February 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Hileman to concurrent sentences

       of fifty years for murder and one year for carrying a handgun without a license.

[12]   Hileman now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Proposed Jury Instructions

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023        Page 7 of 16
[13]   Hileman contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to

       tender its proffered jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter, reckless

       homicide, and criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. “The purpose of a

       jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without

       misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at

       a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Lawson v. State, 199 N.E.3d 829, 838 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022). We review a trial court’s jury instructions for an abuse of

       discretion. Id. On appeal, we review whether a tendered instruction correctly

       states the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the

       instruction, and whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other

       instructions. Id. Instructional errors are harmless where a conviction is clearly

       sustained by the evidence and the instruction would not likely have impacted

       the jury’s verdict, and we will reverse a conviction only if the appellant

       demonstrates that the error prejudiced his substantial rights. Keister v. State, 203

       N.E.3d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In other words, an instructional error

       will result in reversal only when we “cannot say with complete confidence” that

       a reasonable jury would have returned a guilty verdict even if the instruction

       had not been given. Id.

[14]   In Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995), our supreme court developed a

       three-part test that trial courts should perform when called upon by a party to

       instruct on a lesser-included offense to the crime charged. See also Webb v. State,

       963 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. 2012). First, the trial court must compare the

       statute defining the crime charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023         Page 8 of 16
       included offense to determine if the alleged lesser-included offense is inherently

       included in the crime charged. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 566. Second, if a trial

       court determines that an alleged lesser-included offense is not inherently

       included in the crime charged under step one, then it must determine if the

       alleged lesser-included offense is factually included in the crime charged. Id. at

       567. If the alleged lesser-included offense is neither inherently nor factually

       included in the crime charged, the trial court should not give an instruction on

       the alleged lesser-included offense. Id. Third, if a trial court has determined

       that an alleged lesser-included offense is either inherently or factually included

       in the crime charged, “it must look at the evidence presented in the case by both

       parties” to determine if there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the element

       or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if, in view of

       this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not

       the greater. Id. “[I]t is reversible error for a trial court not to give an

       instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser

       offense” if there is such an evidentiary dispute. Id.

       A. Voluntary Manslaughter

[15]   While both parties agree that voluntary manslaughter is the lesser-included

       offense of murder, the parties disagree on whether the evidence supported the

       proffering of the voluntary manslaughter instruction. See Watts v. State, 885

       N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2008) (voluntary manslaughter is an included offense

       of manslaughter). Although voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense

       of murder, it is not a typical lesser-included offense, because instead of requiring
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023          Page 9 of 16
       the State to prove less than all the elements of murder, it requires the State to

       prove all of the elements of murder and to disprove the existence of sudden heat

       when there is any appreciable evidence of such in the record. Roberson v. State,

       982 N.E.2d 452, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Additionally, a conviction for

       voluntary manslaughter constitutes an acquittal of murder. Id. The absence of

       sudden heat is not an element of murder, and a jury ordinarily does not have to

       be instructed that the State has the burden of disproving the existence of sudden

       heat in order to gain a murder conviction. Massey v. State, 955 N.E.2d 247, 255

       n. 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). If, however, the record contains any appreciable

       evidence of sudden heat, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is justified.

       Roark v. State, 573 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind. 1991). Additionally, such evidence

       may arise from either the State’s or the defendant’s evidence; the defendant

       does not bear the burden of placing the issue of sudden heat into question.

       Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. 2001).

[16]   “‘Sudden heat’ is characterized as anger, rage, resentment, or terror sufficient to

       obscure the reason of an ordinary person, preventing deliberation and

       premeditation, excluding malice, and rendering a person incapable of cool

       reflection.” Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

       trans. denied. Words alone do not constitute sufficient provocation to warrant a

       jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, especially when the words were not

       intended to provoke the defendant, such as fighting words. Id. Additionally,

       any alleged provocation must be such that it would obscure the reason of an

       “ordinary man,” which is an objective as opposed to a subjective standard. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023      Page 10 of 16
       at 1282-83. Unlike the right to self-defense, which ceases to exist once a danger

       has passed, “sudden heat can survive for a while beyond the act of

       provocation.” Roark, 573 N.E.2d at 883.

[17]   Here, we cannot say that the incident prevented deliberation and rendered

       Hileman incapable of cool reflection. See Suprenant, 925 N.E.2d at 1282.

       Testimony reveals that Waymire’s motorcycle was loud and revving while

       trying to catch up with Shane’s vehicle after the near collision. After catching

       up with Shane’s car at a stop sign, Waymire parked his motorcycle and walked

       over to the vehicle. The three occupants of the car noticed Waymire

       approaching. While Waymire was confronting Shane, and while Hileman felt

       “scared the whole time once [he] seen [sic] him get off the bike,” Hileman did

       not close the car’s window but instead left it open. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 130). After

       confronting Shane verbally, Waymire moved to the open passenger side

       window, which was where Hileman was sitting. According to Shane, Adrian,

       and Hileman, Waymire reached into the window and struck Hileman on the

       side of the face. Waymire then stepped back from the vehicle. Hileman

       exclaimed, “What the fuck. He hit me,” and only then took the gun which was

       lying next to him on the backseat and shot Waymire in the chest. (Tr. Vol. I, p.

       188).

[18]   This is not a situation where Hileman was unapprised of the developing

       situation. He heard the motorcycle approach, he noticed Waymire walk up to

       the vehicle, and he saw Waymire verbally accost Shane. See id. at 1284 (“words

       alone [will not] constitute sufficient provocation”). Despite claiming to be in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023     Page 11 of 16
       fear, Hileman did not close his window. Yet, it was not until Waymire

       punched Hileman, stepped back, and Hileman realized that he had been

       punched, that finally Hileman reached for his weapon and fatally shot

       Waymire. Although the entire encounter lasted a mere six seconds, the

       sequence of events allowed Hileman time to make a deliberate decision to reach

       for his weapon and to shoot Waymire. We have previously found that efforts

       to retrieve a weapon prior to killing reflects that the defendant was “capable of

       deliberation and cool reflection.” Santana v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1997) (Santana retrieved weapon from his home before shooting).

       While in Santana, the premeditation lasted approximately thirty minutes for

       Santana to retrieve his weapon and shoot the victim, our supreme court has

       recognized that premeditation—“the deliberate formation of an intent to

       perform a future act,”—“may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts,” and

       the precise duration between the inception of intent and the killing “need not be

       appreciable to constitute premeditation.” Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452,

       459-60 (Ind. 2023). Here, the escalating nature of the situation afforded

       Hileman time for “cool reflection.” See Suprenant, 925 N.E.2d at 1282.

       Accordingly, we conclude that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not

       supported by the evidence and was properly refused by the trial court.

       B. Reckless Homicide and Criminal Recklessness with a Deadly Weapon

[19]   Focusing on the mens rea element of reckless homicide and criminal recklessness

       with a deadly weapon, Hileman contends that the trial court abused its

       discretion in refusing to tender these instructions because “[i]t is reasonably

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023     Page 12 of 16
       plausible that the jury could have found that Hileman never intended to kill the

       victim; that he only intended to use lesser than deadly force, or [to] scare

       Waymire away.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 22).

[20]   Reckless homicide and criminal recklessness require a reckless mens rea, while

       murder requires a knowing or intentional mens rea. Griffing v State, 963 N.E.2d

       685, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1 (murder), -5 (reckless

       homicide), -2-2 (criminal recklessness). As the only difference between reckless

       homicide and murder is the mens rea element, reckless homicide is an inherently

       included offense of murder. Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind.

       1996). Likewise, as the “culpability [is] the sole distinguishing element,”

       criminal recklessness is an inherently lesser-included offense of murder.

       Hamilton v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1266, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

[21]   In Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (Ind. 2012), our supreme court

       determined that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give the

       proposed reckless homicide instructions because there was a serious evidentiary

       dispute as to whether the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly as evidence

       had been admitted that the gun used to shoot the victim had been unloaded at

       different points in the evening, and that individuals had been playing with the

       gun before the victim was shot. In Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 680 (Ind.

       2004), the court concluded that the jury should have been instructed on reckless

       homicide where the victim was shot once and there was evidence that the

       defendant was playing around with the gun.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023      Page 13 of 16
[22]   Here, the evidence reflects that Hileman shot Waymire through the heart after

       Waymire had stepped away from the car. Hileman claims that his vision was

       blurry, that he did not have time to aim the gun, and that he just fired in the

       direction of Waymire and did not know if he hit him or not. A person

       “‘knowingly’” kills when he is ‘aware of a high probability’ that his conduct

       might kill.” Jones v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. 2012). The “protracted

       nature” of shooting someone at close range could not have occurred “without

       an awareness that his actions could result in [] death.” Id. See also, McEwen v.

       State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 85-86 (Ind. 1998) (reckless homicide instruction properly

       denied when victim was stabbed in the chest one time, piercing the heart

       because a stabbing near the heart allows an inference of knowing or intentional

       killing). Unlike Webster and Fisher, there is no evidence suggesting that

       Hileman thought the gun was unloaded or that he somehow lacked the

       knowledge that his actions could kill Waymire. Based on the facts before us,

       Hileman’s conduct point towards a knowing or intentional killing, and the trial

       court properly refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of

       reckless homicide and criminal recklessness.

       II. Admissibility of Evidence

[23]   Next, Hileman contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

       “evidence regarding [Hileman] selling marijuana.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 22). We

       review a trial court’s decision on the admission of evidence for an abuse of the

       trial court’s discretion. Eaton v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2018). We will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023     Page 14 of 16
       effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence and

       consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

       Id.

[24]   Focusing on Evidentiary Rules 403 and 404(b), Hileman contends that the

       “repetitious drumbeat of testimony and comments regarding [his] involvement

       in the sale of marijuana and its prejudicial effect,” served to impress on the jury

       that Hileman’s involvement with the sale of marijuana would “naturally give

       rise to the inference that [he] is of bad character.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 23,24).

       Hileman further argues that the “onslaught of [evidentiary] harpoons” during

       the State’s closing argument served as the “proverbial ‘nail in the coffin[,]’” as

       its probative value was far outweighed by the prejudicial effect it served.

       (Appellant’s Br. pp. 24-25).

[25]   “An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the State deliberately places inadmissible

       evidence before the jury to prejudice the jurors against the defendant.” Turner v.

       State, 216 N.E.3d 1179, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). However, the State’s

       closing argument referred to statements and evidence that had been admitted by

       the trial court during the course of the proceedings. As such, the principle of

       the evidentiary harpoon is inapplicable because the evidence was presented to

       the jury with the approval of the trial court. Besides the generalized statements

       of the perceived existence of evidentiary harpoons, Hileman fails to direct this

       court to any specific instances of alleged improper admission of the evidence by

       the trial court and he fails to develop his argument with specific citations to the

       record. “The purpose of our appellate rules, Indiana Appellate Rule 46 in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023      Page 15 of 16
       particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the

       burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212

       N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023). We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and

       fashion arguments on his behalf. Id. “The premise of our adversarial system is

       that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and

       research,” but instead are tasked with solving disputes “as arbiters of legal

       questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Id. (citing Carducci

       v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). “We do not exist to answer

       every legal question that may exist in the ether; rather, we resolve concrete

       issues properly tested through the adversarial process: adequate and cogent

       briefing is required for that process to live up to its potential.” Id. Accordingly,

       as Hileman fails to present us with a cogent argument pursuant to Indiana

       Appellate Rule 46(A)(8), he has waived the issue for our appellate review.

       CONCLUSION
[26]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       by denying Hileman’s proffered jury instructions on lesser-includedoffenses.

       Additionally, Hileman waived review of the admissibility of certain evidence by

       failing to present a cogent argument.

[27]   Affirmed.

[28]   Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-518 | November 22, 2023      Page 16 of 16