Court Opinion

ID: 9520331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:36:33.056519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:01.071511
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence seized in the present case must be suppressed. The no-knock entry conducted in this case may be sustained on two separate grounds, and I would therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings. I would note, as a preliminary matter, that the no-knock statute was amended while the present appeal was pending in this court, and the provision at issue here is no longer in force. Effective January 1, 1998, the legislature substantially revised section 108 — 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, deleting the provision involved in this case. Pub. Act 90 — 456, eff. January 1,1998. Tracking the Supreme Court’s opinions in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995), and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997), section 108— 8(b) now permits a judge to issue a no-knock warrant upon a showing that an announced entry could lead to violence or result in the destruction of evidence. Because today’s decision involves a statutory provision that no longer exists, its precedential value is reduced to that extent. Turning to the merits of the present appeal, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence seized in the present case must now be suppressed. Even if former section 108 — 8(b)(1) was invalid, the present search may still be sustained on either of two alternative grounds. First, I must disagree with the majority’s rejection of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987). For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 76 (1996) (Miller, J., dissenting), I would apply that exception here, for in this case the police were acting pursuant to what they believed was a legitimate warrant. ■ Moreover, I believe that the police had reasonable grounds for a no-knock entry of the premises in this case, even if the underlying statute was invalid and the good-faith exception is unavailable. At the hearing on the defendant’s suppression motion, Officer Jeffrey Adam of the Elgin police department testified that a confidential source had observed cocaine and firearms in the defendant’s residence. The source had also reported that the residence was a gang location and that the defendant was a street gang member, and Officer Adam himself had seen gang members entering the premises. The source told Officer Adam that the defendant possessed a number of firearms, which were normally kept out in the open. Officer Adam testified that this combination of circumstances caused the officers executing the warrant to fear for their safety. Police are justified in making a no-knock entry if they “have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 117 S. Ct. at 1421. On this record, it is plain that the officers in the present case “certainly had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or to others.” United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191, 198, 118 S. Ct. 992, 997 (1998). In my view, the circumstances present in this case are sufficient to sustain the entry and ensuing search.