Court Opinion

ID: 9575592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:15:09.75466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:35.588495
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment as to guilt, death eligibility, and noncapital sentence. After review, no error or other defect is evident requiring reversal or vacation on any of these issues.
I dissent, however, from the judgment as to the sentence of death. As will appear, there was prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct bearing on this question.
I
In summation at the penalty phase, defense counsel urged the jury to fix the penalty for defendant at life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
By contrast, the prosecutor asked for death. In the course of his argument, he made the following comments.
“I want to respond to some of the things argued by [defense counsel]. He told you that it’s absurd to talk about life and death, that the law is absurd, that you are playing God, that it’s revenge.
*199“And that is to get you, of course, to vote for life without the possibility of parole. Well, death is a legitimate means of punishment in this state. It’s available in this state. You are called upon to impose it if you think it’s appropriate. You are a cross section of the community. People are judged by a jury of their peers. You make that determination whether the defendant should get the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole. The defense wants to make that burdensome for you. [‘]Each and everyone [sic] of you from here on must live with that decision. Push that button over there. You must live with that decision for the rest of your life.f]
“Well, if it wasn’t you called upon to carry out the will of the people of the State of California, would have been another jury, because that’s our system. That’s how the law is affected in this state.
“Don’t once think that you have to feel burdened and depressed because I voted for death. You are doing what the law says if it’s substantial, the aggravation substantially outweighs the mitigation. Don’t listen to this lawyer talk.
“[Defense counsel] says don’t play God. [‘]Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and those which are established by God. Therefore, he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God, and they who have opposed will receive condemnations upon themselves for rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise for the same for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid for it does not bear the sword for nothing for it is a minister of God an avenger who brings wrath upon one who practices evil.f]
“You are not playing God. You are doing what God says. This might be the only opportunity to wake him up. God will destroy the body to save the soul. Make him get himself right. . . .
“. . . Let him have the opportunity to get his soul right. That’s the only way to get his attention. You are not playing God. God ordains authority.”
At this point, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench, but met with summary denial.
*200II
“It is of course misconduct for a prosecutor to invoke purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death.” (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1016 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].)
“Argument of this sort by a representative of the government offends California statutes and judicial decisions, which establish the positive, secular law of this state as the rule governing the choice between life and death (see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408,483-484 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)). It also violates the United States and California Constitutions—including their respective clauses concerning establishment of religion (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), cruel and unusual punishments (U.S. Const., Amend. VIII; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), and due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15).” (People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1016-1017 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J,); see also People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107 [holding that “such an argument tends to diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court’s instructions”].)
“It is well settled that religion may not play a role in the sentencing process.” (Jones v. Kemp (N.D.Ga. 1989) 706 F.Supp. 1534, 1559; accord, People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 485 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
The jury has “a duty to apply the law of the [jurisdiction] as given by the trial judge, not its own interpretation of the law or its own interpretation of precepts of the Bible, in determining whether the [defendant] should live or die.” (Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1559; accord, People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 485 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
The invocation of “the command of extrajudicial ‘law’ from any source other than the trial judge, no matter how well intentioned, is not permitted.” (Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1559; accord, People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 485 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
Indeed, the “use ... of an extrajudicial code . . . cannot be reconciled with the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that any decision to impose death *201must be the result of discretion which is carefully and narrowly channelled and circumscribed by the secular law of the jurisdiction.” (Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1559; accord, People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 485 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
The Bible, of course, is just such an extrajudicial code. (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 483 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1559.) Its commands and prohibitions cannot be viewed as mere reliquiae of a culture separated from ours by thousands of miles and thousands of years. This is because “[t]o the average juror, . . . the Bible is an authoritative religious document . . . .” (Jones v. Kemp, supra, at p. 1559; accord, People v. Mincey, supra, at pp. 483-484 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
It is also misconduct for a prosecutor to seek to “minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death.” (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 341 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 247, 105 S.Ct. 2633]; accord, People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.) “[U]nder the Eighth Amendment ‘the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.’ ” (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, at p. 329 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 239], quoting California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 998-999 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1178-1179, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) The assumption underlying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that “a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its ‘truly awesome responsibility.’ ” (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, at p. 341 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 247].) This premise is threatened when a representative of the government attempts to undermine the jurors’ proper attitude and approach.
It hardly needs mention that “[a] prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the State.” (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204].) 1
III
On the very face of the record, prosecutorial misconduct is manifest.
*202To begin with, the prosecutor invoked purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death. That is indisputable.
As noted, the prosecutor stated: “[Defense counsel] says don’t play God. [‘]Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and those which are established by God. Therefore, he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God, and they who have opposed will receive condemnations upon themselves for rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise for the same for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid for it does not bear the sword for nothing for it is a minister of God an avenger who brings wrath upon one who practices evil.[‘] [¶] You are not playing God. You are doing what God says. This might be the only opportunity to wake him up. God will destroy the body to save the soul. Make him get himself right.” The prosecutor returned to the point: “Let him have the opportunity to get his soul right. That’s the only way to get his attention. You are not playing God. God ordains authority.”
In a word, the “rule of decision” that the prosecutor urged the jury to apply was assertedly religious. He cited the Bible to the jurors. To be sure, he did not expressly identify the relevant passage—which is Romans 13:1-4—as biblical in source and in substance. No such identification was required. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the words to be anything other than what they were.
Further, the “purpose of punishment” that the prosecutor called on the jury to serve was assertedly religious as well. He exhorted the jurors to destroy defendant’s corruptible body in order to save his immortal soul. 2
*203The majority rightly conclude that the prosecutor’s impropriety cannot be justified or even excused as “fairly responsive” to comments in defense counsel’s summation. True, the prosecutor asserted that he “want[ed] to respond to some of the things argued by [defense counsel].” But there was nothing “fairly responsive” about what he would soon say. Perhaps the matter would have been different if counsel had declared or even suggested that the death penalty was inappropriate under some religious law. He had not done so. Notwithstanding his utterance of the word “God” and his reference to lex talionis, his argument was altogether secular—to the effect that the jurors each held an absolute power of life and death over defendant; that they should reject death as empty vengeance; and that they should choose life to vindicate what is good in human beings and human society.
More important, even a “fair response” of this kind by a prosecutor would be altogether impermissible. It is plain from the analysis set out above that the government is prohibited from interjecting religion into the sentencing process. The prosecutor is its representative. The bar that constrains the principal constrains the agent as well.
In addition, the prosecutor sought to minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. That too is indisputable.
As noted, the prosecutor stated: “The defense wants to make [the penalty determination] burdensome for you. [‘]Each and everyone [sic] of you from here on must live with that decision. Push that button over there. You must live with that decision for the rest of your life.f] [f] Well, if it wasn’t you called upon to carry out the will of the people of the State of California, *204would have been another jury, because that’s our system. That’s how the law is affected in this state, [f] Don’t once think that you have to feel burdened and depressed because I voted for death. You are doing what the law says if it’s substantial, the aggravation substantially outweighs the mitigation. Don’t listen to this lawyer talk.”
The prosecutor’s impropriety in this regard cannot seriously be denied. Indeed, the majority’s efforts here are totally nonexistent—and that in spite of the fact that defendant expressly raised the claim in his briefing before this court.
I now turn from the fact of the prosecutor’s misconduct to its consequence.
It is the general rule for error under California law that reversal requires prejudice (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1253 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451,792 P.2d 251]) and prejudice in turn requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome when, as here, penalty in a capital trial is involved (.People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]).
Similarly, it is the general rule for error under the United States Constitution that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn is presumed unless the government shows that the failing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 576-579 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469-471, 106 S.Ct. 3101].)
The prosecutor’s misconduct implicates both California law and the United States Constitution. It appears to be subject to the general rule of harmless-error analysis. Thus, insofar as state law is concerned, the “reasonable possibility” standard is applied. Insofar as the federal charter is involved, the “reasonable doubt” test is employed.
The prosecutor’s misconduct went to the first, last, and only issue before the jury in the penalty phase of this capital trial, viz., whether they were to take or spare defendant’s life. The evidence in aggravation was not insubstantial. But not insubstantial too was the evidence in mitigation.
The prosecutor’s attempt to minimize the jury’s responsibility cannot be deemed unsuccessful. “A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence and argument on the issue of whether another should die, and they are asked to decide that *205issue on behalf of the community. Moreover, they are given only partial guidance as to how their judgment should be exercised, leaving them with substantial discretion.” (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, All U.S. at p. 333 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 242].) Comments like those of the prosecutor in this case offered the jurors an easy way to avoid a hard choice—in fact, an especially hard choice, to judge from the relatively close balance of aggravation and mitigation at the penalty phase and the labored progress of the deliberations thereafter.
Perhaps more significant, the prosecutor’s argument from purported religious law must have carried special force, incorporating as it did “what many consider an authoritative source—if not Authority Itself.” (People v. Mincey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 487 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
I acknowledge that the jury did not return its verdict of death immediately after the prosecutor’s misconduct and that it also returned three verdicts of life. “That fact means only that [the] impropriety did not instantly [and totally] determine the outcome. It simply does not suggest that it was without improper influence.” (People v. Mincey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 487 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The majority appear to assume that the force of the impropriety was dissipated in the course of deliberations. A contrary assumption, however, seems more reasonable on this record: the impropriety’s force actually determined the course of deliberations and thereby prevented four early verdicts of life.3
In sum, the misconduct raises a reasonable possibility of an adverse effect on the outcome, and cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV
For the reasons stated above, I would set aside the sentence of death.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 10,1993, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Because the issue is not raised in this case, I do not attempt to define “religious” misconduct by defense counsel. Certainly, the task would require some delicacy. For example, the provisions of the United States and California Constitutions that constrain the prosecution in this regard—including the clauses concerning establishment of religion (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), cruel and unusual punishments (U.S. Const., Amend. VIH; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), and due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15)—are generally inapplicable to the defense. (But see Cal. Const., art I, § 29 [“In a *202criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due process of law . . . .”].) I leave this labor to another day. The majority should do so as well. They purport to distinguish between permissible references to “religion” and impermissible references to “religious law.” Their “rule” may be suitable for sophists to debate in rhetorical exercises. It is altogether too vague for the bench and bar to apply in criminal trials.

In accord with above analysis is Commonwealth v. Chambers (1991) 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630]. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on comments that “Karl Chambers has taken a life” and “As the Bible says, ‘and the murderer shall be put to death.’ ” It found the point meritorious. Its reasoning was as follows.
“In the past we have narrowly tolerated references to the Bible and have characterized such references as on the limits of ‘oratorical flair’ and have cautioned that such references are a dangerous practice which we strongly discourage. Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990); Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986). We now admonish all prosecutors that reliance in any manner upon the Bible or any other religious
*203writing in support of the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary action.
“Here, the prosecutor argued, ‘As the Bible says, “and the murderer shall be put to death.” ’ This reference is substantially different than the references tolerated in Henry and Whitney where the prosecutor allegorically likened the Defendant to the Prince of Darkness mentioned in the Bible to establish that he was an evil person.
“More than allegorical reference, this argument by the prosecutor advocates to the jury that an independent source of law exists for the conclusion that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for [Chambers]. By arguing that the Bible dogmatically commands that ‘the murderer shall be put to death,’ the prosecutor interjected religious law as an additional factor for the jury’s consideration which neither flows from the evidence or any legitimate inference to be drawn therefrom. We believe that such an argument is a deliberate attempt to destroy the objectivity and impartiality of the jury which cannot be cured and which we will not countenance. Our courts are not ecclesiastical courts and, therefore, there is no reason to refer to religious rules or commandments to support the imposition of a death penalty.
“Our Legislature has enacted a Death Penalty Statute which carefully categorizes all the factors that a jury should consider in determining whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment and, if a penalty of death is meted out by a jury, it must be because the jury was satisfied that the substantive law of the Commonwealth requires its imposition, not because of some other source of law.” (Commonwealth v. Chambers, supra, 528 Pa. at pp. 586-587 [599 A.2d at p. 644].)

In accord on this point as well is Commonwealth v. Chambers, supra, 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630], As noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in that case held meritorious a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the comments that “Karl Chambers has taken a life” and “As the Bible says, ‘and the murderer shall be put to death.’ ” (See fn. 2, ante.) “Because the prosecutor’s argument in favor of the death penalty reached outside of the evidence of the case and the law of this Commonwealth,” concluded the court, “we are not convinced that the penalty was not the product of passion, prejudice or an arbitrary factor and, therefore, pursuant to our Death Penalty Statute, we must vacate the sentence of death ...” (528 Pa. at p. 587 [599 A.2d at p. 644].)