Court Opinion

ID: 9847607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:03:07.575085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.978044
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
For the opinions and conclusions of a witness, which relate to matters that are within the domain of a medical expert, to be received his qualification as an expert must be proved. See Martin v. Baldwin, 215 Ga. 293, 297 (110 SE2d 344); Knudsen v. Duffee-Freeman, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872, 879 (99 SE2d 370). “ ‘ “Whether a witness has such learning or experience in a particular art, science, or profession to be treated as an expert, or to be deemed prima facie an expert, is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and such discretion will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused.” ’ [Cits.]” First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 165 Ga. App. 303, 306 (3) (299 *506SE2d 567); Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 755 (2) (243 SE2d 16).
In the case sub judice, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the witness had not been qualified as a medical expert.
In Southern R. Co. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 442 (6) (136 SE2d 438), this court held: “Generally, nothing more is required to qualify an expert than that he has been educated in a particular trade or profession. This special knowledge may be derived from experience as well as study. [Cit.]” There is nothing in the record in the case sub judice to demonstrate what training or experience the witness may have had to qualify him to give testimony as to matters within the domain of an expert in the field of medicine. Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs’ attorney dismissed the witness, failing to lay a proper foundation, even after being put on notice that such a foundation would be necessary for introduction of the witness’ expert testimony. Consequently, the court did not err in excluding the witness’ opinions and conclusions which related to matters that were within the domain of a medical expert.
Next, the plaintiffs argue that it was error to strike the witness’ testimony because he was not giving his opinion as an expert witness but was merely testifying to facts that were within his knowledge as the treating physician.
The witness’ testimony concerning facts that were within his knowledge and were not opinions or conclusions which related to matters that were within the domain of a medical expert were admissible at trial. See Hammond v. State, 156 Ga. 880 (2) (120 SE 539); Southern R. Co. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 443, supra. However, I have closely examined the record and would find that the factual testimony given by the witness was cumulative in nature in that it was repeated by several different sources at trial. Consequently, the exclusion of the witness’ factual testimony was harmless in that it is highly unlikely that the testimony excluded would have contributed to the outcome of the verdict. See OCGA § 9-11-61.
Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s objection to the witness’ testimony was not timely. I do not agree.
The defendant’s objection was made prior to cross-examination, while the witness was on the stand. The plaintiffs’ attorney had ample opportunity to further examine the witness and lay a proper foundation for the witness’ qualification as an expert after the defendant’s objection. However, the plaintiffs’ attorney dismissed the witness without further examination. Consequently, I would find that the defendant’s objection was timely.