Court Opinion

ID: 9964212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 12:02:32.301188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.198719
License: Public Domain

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                             Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

         BRIAN LEPKOWSKI v. PLANNING COMMISSION OF
                THE TOWN OF EAST LYME ET AL.
                         (AC 46146)
                         (AC 46159)
                          Bright, C. J., and Moll and Westbrook, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         Pursuant to a provision of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations (§ 4-14-
            3), ‘‘[s]ubdivisions of 20 lots or more where more than 50% of the
            parcel(s) to be subdivided consist of environmentally sensitive resources
            such as wetlands, steep slopes (>25%), watercourses, flood hazard areas
            or ridge lines, shall be subject to an [Environmental Review Team]
            evaluation . . . .’’
         The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant
            Planning Commission of the Town of East Lyme, approving the defen-
            dant R Co.’s resubdivision application. The plaintiff, an abutting land-
            owner, opposed the application, claiming, inter alia, that, pursuant to
            § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations, the defendants were required to
            obtain an evaluation to assess the natural resources on the property
            before the application was approved. The defendants were unable to
            obtain such an evaluation prior to the approval of the application
            because, when the commission contacted E Co., the entity that per-
            formed the evaluations, E Co. informed the commission that it was
            forgoing such evaluations until it had time to develop a new protocol
            for the reviews. E Co. did not specify a date on which it would resume
            conducting the evaluations. In light of this, the commission determined
            that it was impossible for R Co. to comply with § 4-14-3, and it approved
            the application. The Superior Court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal only
            with respect to his claim regarding R Co.’s failure to obtain an evaluation.
            The court determined that § 4-14-3 applied to the application, that the
            evaluation was a mandatory requirement pursuant to § 4-14-3, that the
            subdivision regulations did not expressly convey to the commission the
            authority to waive the requirement, and that, therefore, the commission
            illegally waived § 4-14-3. On the granting of certification, the defendants
            filed separate appeals to this court. Held that the Superior Court improp-
            erly sustained the plaintiff’s appeal with respect to his claim premised
            on § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations: the commission complied
            with § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations, which required it to request
            an evaluation in connection with R Co.’s application and to give E Co.
            a reasonable opportunity to perform the evaluation but did not mandate
            that the evaluation had to be completed, as, in contrast to other provi-
            sions in § 4-14 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations, § 4-14-3 does
            not indicate that a report with respect to an evaluation must be submitted
            to the commission, nor does it restrict the commission’s ability to act
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                         Lepkowski v. Planning Commission
          on the application if an evaluation is not performed or assign the weight
          that the commission must afford to such a report; moreover, the interpre-
          tation that the evaluation was not mandatory aligned with the broader
          dictionary definitions of the phrase ‘‘subject to’’ as used in § 4-14-3;
          furthermore, as a municipal legislative enactment, § 4-14-3 was entitled
          to a presumption of validity and construing the regulation to mandate
          the completion of an evaluation would have rendered the provision
          invalid as an impermissible delegation of authority by the commission
          to E Co.; accordingly, by requesting the evaluation, the commission
          complied with § 4-14-3 despite that E Co. did not perform the evaluation
          and indicated that it had no intention of doing so until it established a
          new protocol for such evaluations at some unspecified future date.
                Argued January 10—officially released April 30, 2024

                                  Procedural History

          Appeal from the decision of the named defendant
       approving a resubdivision application filed by the defen-
       dant Real Estate Service of Conn., Inc., brought to the
       Superior Court in the judicial district of New London
       and tried to the court, O’Hanlan, J.; judgment sus-
       taining in part the plaintiff’s appeal, from which the
       defendants, on the granting of certification, filed sepa-
       rate appeals to this court. Reversed in part; judgment
       directed.
         Mark S. Zamarka, for the appellant in Docket No.
       AC 46146 and the appellee in Docket No. AC 46159
       (named defendant).
         Matthew Ranelli, with whom was Chelsea C. McCal-
       lum, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 46159 and the
       appellee in Docket No. AC 46146 (defendant Real Estate
       Service of Conn., Inc.).
          Paul H. D. Stoughton, with whom, on the brief, was
       John F. Healey, for the appellee in both appeals (plain-
       tiff).
                                        Opinion

          MOLL, J. The defendants, the Planning Commission
       of the Town of East Lyme (commission) and Real Estate
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                             Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

         Service of Conn., Inc. (RESC), each appeal from the
         judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part the
         appeal brought by the plaintiff, Brian Lepkowski, from
         the commission’s decision approving a resubdivision
         application filed by RESC.1 The dispositive claim
         asserted by the defendants is that the court incorrectly
         determined that § 4-14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision
         Regulations (subdivision regulations)2 required the
         completion of an Environmental Review Team (ERT)
         evaluation in connection with RESC’s application and
         that, consequently, the court improperly concluded that
         the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3 in granting
         RESC’s application without an ERT evaluation having
         been performed. We agree with the defendants and,
         accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Supe-
         rior Court.
            The following facts, as set forth by the court or as
         undisputed in the record, and procedural history are
         relevant to our resolution of these appeals. The plaintiff
         owns and resides on property located at 27 Green Valley
         Lake Road in East Lyme. The plaintiff’s property abuts
         land controlled by RESC. In 2017, RESC filed an applica-
         tion for a resubdivision of the land abutting the plain-
         tiff’s property (2017 application). In connection with
         the 2017 application, Gary Goeschel, the town of East
         Lyme’s planning director, and Jeanne Davies, the execu-
         tive director of Connecticut Resource Conservation and
         Development Area, Inc. (RC&D), the organization
         responsible for performing ERT evaluations,3
             The defendants’ respective direct appeals, although not consolidated,
             1

         were heard together at oral argument before this court.
           2
             All references to the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations are to the revised
         regulations effective March 24, 2016, which are the governing regulations
         in this case.
           Section 4-14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations provides in rele-
         vant part that certain subdivisions ‘‘shall be subject to an evaluation by the
         Eastern Connecticut Environmental Review Team. . . .’’
           3
             See footnote 11 of this opinion.
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                           Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       exchanged email correspondence, which correspon-
       dence was entered into the administrative record. The
       emails reflected that (1) on July 17, 2017, Goeschel
       asked Davies for information about requesting an ERT
       evaluation in relation to the 2017 application, and (2)
       Davies responded on July 19, 2017, writing in relevant
       part that (a) the ERT program was a ‘‘limited program
       these days . . . for municipalities and land trust[s]
       who want to evaluate the natural resources on [a] prop-
       erty,’’ (b) although RC&D was ‘‘working to expand the
       program at some point,’’ ERT evaluations for develop-
       ment applications ‘‘became rare about [five] years ago,
       due to the time constraints and the availability of volun-
       teers,’’ (c) the ERT evaluation process takes approxi-
       mately two to three months to complete, and (d) the
       commission was invited to ‘‘talk’’ if it had the ‘‘three
       months [that are] needed for an ERT [evaluation]
       . . . .’’ RESC subsequently withdrew the 2017 applica-
       tion.
         On May 18, 2018, RESC filed a new resubdivision
       application, seeking to create a twenty-three lot ‘‘Con-
       servation Design Development’’ on the land abutting the
       plaintiff’s property (2018 application). The commission
       conducted a public hearing on the 2018 application over
       the course of six days between June 26 and October 9,
       2018. The plaintiff, as an abutting landowner and a
       statutory intervenor pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-
       19 (a) (1),4 opposed the 2018 application.
         4
           General Statutes § 22a-19 (a) (1) provides: ‘‘In any administrative, licens-
       ing or other proceeding, and in any judicial review thereof made available
       by law, the Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any
       instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof,
       any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal
       entity may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting
       that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has,
       or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting,
       impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural
       resources of the state.’’
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                             Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

            During the public hearing, there were discussions
         regarding whether an ERT evaluation would be per-
         formed in connection with the 2018 application. One
         of the exhibits entered into the administrative record
         consisted of emails that Goeschel and Davies
         exchanged in September and October, 2018. The emails
         reflected in relevant part that (1) on September 4, 2018,
         Goeschel requested an ERT evaluation with regard to
         the 2018 application, and (2) on October 1, 2018, Davies
         informed Goeschel that, ‘‘[b]ased on feedback from our
         attorney . . . and the turnaround time for the subdivi-
         sion public hearing closure in East Lyme, the Executive
         Committee and ERT Task Force decided, with regret,
         to [forgo ERT] development reviews until they have
         time to develop [a] new protocol, as advised by our
         attorney, for ERT development reviews.’’
            On December 4, 2018, the commission unanimously
         voted to approve a resolution granting the 2018 applica-
         tion, with several conditions. In granting the 2018 appli-
         cation, the commission determined in relevant part that
         it was ‘‘impossible’’ for RESC to comply with § 4-14-3
         of the subdivision regulations5 in light of Davies’ corre-
         spondence reflecting that ERT evaluations were not
         being done for development applications pending the
         establishment of a new protocol.
            The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the
         commission’s decision granting the 2018 application.
         The plaintiff raised several claims on appeal, including
         that the commission improperly granted the 2018 appli-
         cation notwithstanding that an ERT evaluation had not
         been performed as required pursuant to § 4-14-3 of the
         subdivision regulations. The plaintiff further asserted
         that RESC had not requested a waiver of § 4-14-3, and,
         in any event, such a waiver was not authorized pursuant
           5
             The commission referred to § 4-13-3 of the subdivision regulations, which
         provision does not exist. We construe this reference to be a scrivener’s error.
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                           Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       to the subdivision regulations. In their respective briefs
       on the merits, the commission and RESC argued in
       relevant part that the administrative record demon-
       strated, as the commission had determined, that compli-
       ance with § 4-14-3 was impossible because RC&D was
       not performing ERT evaluations for development appli-
       cations at the time. RESC further argued that § 4-14-3
       was inapplicable to the 2018 application.
          On May 13, 2022, the trial court, O’Hanlan, J., issued
       a memorandum of decision sustaining the plaintiff’s
       appeal only insofar as the plaintiff claimed that the
       commission improperly granted the 2018 application
       because an ERT evaluation had not been completed in
       accordance with § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations.6
       The court framed the legal issue to be ‘‘whether the
       commission’s action, in not requiring the ERT evalua-
       tion, essentially waived the requirement of . . . § 4-14-
       3 for [the 2018] application without authority, and thus
       violated its own regulations.’’ The court determined that
       (1) § 4-14-3 applied to the 2018 application, (2) an ERT
       evaluation is a ‘‘mandatory’’ requirement prescribed by
       § 4-14-3, and (3) the subdivision regulations did not
       expressly convey authority permitting the commission
       to waive § 4-14-3.7 The court proceeded to conclude
       that, in granting the 2018 application without an ERT
       evaluation, the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3.8
          6
            The court stated that the plaintiff had abandoned all but seven of the
       claims raised in his brief on the merits. The court denied the plaintiff’s
       appeal as to his remaining claims, with the exception of his claim regarding
       § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations.
          7
            Section 4-13 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations provides in rele-
       vant part: ‘‘Only as specifically authorized within these Regulations, the
       Commission may waive certain requirements by a three-quarters vote of
       all members, when it is demonstrated that strict compliance with such
       Regulations will cause an exceptional difficulty or undue hardship. The
       applicant shall submit a waiver request in writing at the time of application,
       and the Commission shall require a public hearing, and shall not grant a
       waiver unless it finds the following [enumerated] conditions are met . . . .’’
          8
            With regard to the issue of whether compliance with § 4-14-3 of the
       subdivision regulations was impossible, the court stated that ‘‘[t]here is
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                              Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

         On June 1, 2022, the defendants each filed a motion to
         reargue, both of which the court summarily denied on
         August 22, 2022. Thereafter, the defendants each filed a
         petition for certification to appeal from the trial court’s
         judgment, both of which this court granted on Decem-
         ber 13, 2022. These appeals followed.
            On February 16, 2023, in response to a motion for
         articulation filed by the commission, the court issued
         an articulation of its decision. The court articulated
         in relevant part that, ‘‘[a]ccording to § 4-14-3 of the
         [subdivision regulations] . . . an [ERT] evaluation
         . . . was required. The commission did not require such
         an evaluation in its approval [of the 2018 application].
         Thus, the court concluded that the commission illegally
         ‘essentially waived’ § 4-14-3 . . . .’’9 (Citation omitted.)
            The defendants’ dispositive claim in these appeals is
         that the court incorrectly determined that § 4-14-3 of
         the subdivision regulations required that an ERT evalua-
         tion be performed in connection with the 2018 applica-
         tion and, consequently, improperly concluded that the
         commission illegally waived § 4-14-3 in granting the
         2018 application despite the absence of an ERT evalua-
         tion.10 The defendants maintain that (1) § 4-14-3 requires
         some apparent factual inconsistency about the ‘impossibility’ conclusion
         . . . .’’ The court further stated that ‘‘[t]he characterization of ‘impossibility’
         articulated in the record by [RESC] and adopted by the commission . . .
         may explain why the requirement cannot be met. But that does not explain
         how, meaning under what authority, the commission excused, or waived,
         this clear . . . requirement, if not in violation of’’ the subdivision regula-
         tions. (Emphasis omitted.)
            9
              With respect to the issue of whether compliance with § 4-14-3 of the
         subdivision regulations was impossible; see footnote 8 of this opinion; the
         court articulated that ‘‘[t]he evidence in the record does not support a finding
         of impossibility. . . . [T]he court concluded that the ‘impossibility’ of get-
         ting an ERT evaluation was simply not accurate.’’ (Citations omitted.)
            10
               RESC briefed this claim in both its principal appellate brief and its reply
         brief filed in its appeal, and the commission indicated in its appellate brief
         filed in RESC’s appeal that it was adopting RESC’s principal appellate brief.
         In its respective appeal, however, the commission briefed this claim only
         in its reply brief. Ordinarily, ‘‘we consider an argument inadequately briefed
         when it is delineated only in the reply brief.’’ Hurley v. Heart Physicians,
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                            Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       the commission (a) to request an ERT evaluation in
       connection with certain applications and (b) to give
       the Eastern Connecticut Environmental Review Team
       (ECERT) an opportunity to conduct the ERT evalua-
       tion, with no attendant mandate that the ERT evaluation
       must be completed, and (2) the commission complied
       with § 4-14-3 by requesting an ERT evaluation from
       RC&D11 in relation to the 2018 application, which
       RC&D declined to perform. The plaintiff argues that the
       court correctly determined that § 4-14-3 required the
       performance of an ERT evaluation vis-à-vis the 2018
       application and, therefore, the commission committed
       error in granting the 2018 application without an ERT
       evaluation. We agree with the defendants.12
       P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 378 n.6, 3 A.3d 892 (2010). Under the unique circum-
       stances of the present case, where (1) RESC has properly briefed this claim
       in its appeal and (2) RESC and the commission are appealing from the same
       judgment and seeking the same relief, such that resolving RESC’s appeal
       in its favor necessarily affords the commission the relief that it requests in
       its appeal, we adjudicate both appeals on the basis of this claim notwithstand-
       ing the commission’s failure to brief the claim properly in its appeal.
          11
             Although § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations refers to ERT evalua-
       tions performed by ECERT, the record reflects that the commission con-
       tacted RC&D to request an ERT evaluation. The defendants represent that
       ‘‘ECERT is a volunteer program of a nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity
       known as [RC&D] . . . .’’ The plaintiff represents that ‘‘RC&D is the entity
       with which [ECERT] is affiliated.’’ Thus, we discern no apparent dispute
       that, in submitting a request for an ERT evaluation to RC&D, the commission
       requested an ERT evaluation as contemplated by § 4-14-3.
          12
             In their respective appeals, the defendants further claim that the court
       improperly (1) determined that the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3
       of the subdivision regulations and (2) rejected the defendants’ arguments
       regarding whether compliance with § 4-14-3 was impossible. In light of our
       resolution of the defendants’ dispositive claim, we need not address the
       merits of these other claims.
          In addition, in its appeal, RESC asserts ‘‘[i]n the alternative’’ that the 2018
       application did not trigger the requirements of § 4-14-3 of the subdivision
       regulations, and, therefore, the court improperly concluded that § 4-14-3
       applied to the 2018 application. The commission adopts this claim in its
       appellate brief filed in RESC’s appeal, as well as in its reply brief filed in
       its appeal, but it failed to brief this claim in its principal appellate brief filed
       in its appeal. See footnote 10 of this opinion. We decline to address the
       merits of this claim; instead, for purposes of our analysis of the defendants’
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                           Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

            We begin by ‘‘set[ting] forth the deferential standard
         of review that applies to the administrative decisions
         made by zoning entities. In traditional zoning appeals,
         the scope of judicial review depends on whether the
         zoning commission has acted in its legislative or admin-
         istrative capacity. . . . In considering . . . an applica-
         tion for subdivision approval, a commission acts in an
         administrative capacity. . . . Generally, it is the func-
         tion of a zoning board or commission to decide within
         prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of
         [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of
         the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and
         the manner in which it does apply. The [Appellate Court
         and the] trial court . . . decide whether the board cor-
         rectly interpreted the section [of the relevant regula-
         tions] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the
         facts. . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particu-
         lar case, the board is endowed with a liberal discretion,
         and its action is subject to review by the courts only
         to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or
         illegal. . . .

            ‘‘[U]pon appeal, the trial court reviews the record
         before the board to determine whether it has acted
         fairly or with proper motives or upon valid reasons
         . . . . We, in turn, review the action of the trial court.
         . . . The burden of proof to demonstrate that the board
         acted improperly is upon the party seeking to overturn
         the board’s decision . . . . Courts are not to substitute
         their judgment for that of the board . . . and decisions
         of local boards will not be disturbed so long as honest
         judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after
         a full hearing.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Kerlin v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
         sion, 222 Conn. App. 141, 158–59, 304 A.3d 148 (2023).
         dispositive claim, we assume arguendo that the court correctly concluded
         that § 4-14-3 applied to the 2018 application.
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                           Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

          The defendants’ claim requires us to interpret the
       subdivision regulations. ‘‘Because the interpretation of
       the regulations presents a question of law, our review is
       plenary. . . . Additionally, zoning regulations are local
       legislative enactments . . . and, therefore, their inter-
       pretation is governed by the same principles that apply
       to the construction of statutes. . . . Ordinarily, [appel-
       late courts afford] deference to the construction of a
       statute applied by the administrative agency empow-
       ered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes. . . .
       Cases that present pure questions of law, however,
       invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily
       involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence,
       the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally
       or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when
       [an] agency’s determination of a question of law has
       not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . .
       the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . [I]t
       is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to
       expound and apply governing principles of law.’’ (Inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 162–63. ‘‘If a board’s
       time-tested interpretation of a regulation is reasonable,
       however, that interpretation should be accorded great
       weight by the courts.’’13 (Internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Cunningham v. Planning & Zoning Commission,
       90 Conn. App. 273, 283, 876 A.2d 1257, cert. denied, 276
       Conn. 915, 888 A.2d 83 (2005).
         ‘‘Our Supreme Court has observed that regulations
       must be interpreted in accordance with the principle
       that a reasonable and rational result was intended . . .
          13
             No special deference to the commission is warranted in this case because
       § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations has not previously been subjected to
       judicial scrutiny and there is no indication in the record that the commission
       has applied a time-tested interpretation of the provision. See, e.g., Heim v.
       Zoning Board of Appeals, 289 Conn. 709, 715, 960 A.2d 1018 (2008) (declining
       to defer to zoning board’s construction of zoning regulation when regulation
       had not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny and board did not
       indicate that it had applied time-tested interpretation of regulation).
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                         Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

          and the words employed therein are to be given their
          commonly approved meaning. . . . When construing a
          statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and
          give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .
          In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned
          manner, the meaning of the statutory language as
          applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question
          of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In
          seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Stat-
          utes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
          statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
          after examining such text and considering such relation-
          ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
          and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-
          textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
          be considered. . . .
            ‘‘Regulations must be viewed to form a cohesive body
          of law, and they must be construed as a whole and in
          such a way as to reconcile all their provisions as far
          as possible. . . . This is true because particular words
          or sections of the regulations, considered separately,
          may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a
          standard sufficient to sustain them. . . . When more
          than one construction is possible, we adopt the one
          that renders the enactment effective and workable and
          reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre
          results. . . . [W]e consider the statute as a whole with
          a view toward reconciling its parts in order to obtain
          a sensible and rational overall interpretation. . . .
          Stated otherwise, whether the board properly interpre-
          ted and applied the relevant regulations depends upon
          whether it read the particular regulations in the context
          of all of the regulations, their evident purpose and pol-
          icy, and recognized principles of zoning in general.’’
          (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
          Kerlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 222
          Conn. App. 163–64.
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                          Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

          We first examine the text of § 4-14-3 of the East Lyme
       Subdivision Regulations, titled ‘‘Environmental Review
       Team (ERT) Evaluation,’’ which provides: ‘‘Subdivi-
       sions of 20 lots or more where more than 50% of the
       parcel(s) to be subdivided consist of environmentally
       sensitive resources such as wetlands, steep slopes (>
       25%), watercourses, flood hazard areas or ridge lines,
       shall be subject to an evaluation by the Eastern Con-
       necticut Environmental Review Team.14 This require-
       ment does not preclude the Commission from
       requesting an Environmental Review Team Evaluation
       for applications which do not meet the above parame-
       ters but for which concerns about environmental
       impacts of the development and their proper mitigation
       exist.’’ (Emphasis added; footnote added.)
          The parties advance conflicting interpretations of the
       phrase ‘‘subject to’’ as used in § 4-14-3 of the subdivision
       regulations, which is not defined therein. The plaintiff
       proposes that we construe ‘‘subject to’’ narrowly, read-
       ing § 4-14-3 to provide that an ERT evaluation ‘‘must
       occur for a subdivision application that meets the rele-
       vant criteria to be approved.’’ The defendants maintain
       that the meaning of ‘‘subject to’’ is broader, contending
       that ‘‘ ‘subject to’ refers to being exposed to or the
       potential for an [ERT] evaluation by . . . ECERT but
       not that such an evaluation must be conducted by . . .
       ECERT even if it declines to do so,’’ such that ‘‘the
       commission did subject the [2018] application to an
       [ERT] evaluation by submitting it to . . . ECERT (and
       following up to urge . . . ECERT to conduct the evalu-
       ation) but . . . ECERT declined . . . to conduct the
       evaluation.’’
         We turn to dictionary definitions for guidance in inter-
       preting undefined terms in regulations. See, e.g., Rapo-
       port v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 301 Conn. 22, 45, 19
         14
            We assume that § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations applies to the
       2018 application. See footnote 12 of this opinion.
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          A.3d 622 (2011). Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary
          defines ‘‘subject to’’ to mean (1) ‘‘affected by or possibly
          affected by (something),’’ (2) ‘‘likely to do, have, or
          suffer from (something)’’ or (3) ‘‘dependent on some-
          thing else to happen or be true.’’ Merriam-Webster
          Online Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-
          webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to (last visited April
          22, 2024). Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘[s]ubject to’’
          to mean ‘‘[l]iable, subordinate, subservient, inferior,
          obedient to; governed or affected by; provided that;
          provided; answerable for.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
          Ed. 1990) p. 1425; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
          Ed. 2019) p. 1723 (defining ‘‘subject’’ to mean, inter alia,
          ‘‘[d]ependent on or exposed to (some contingency);
          esp., being under discretionary authority,’’ with sample
          sentence reading, ‘‘funding is subject to the board’s
          approval’’). These assorted definitions can support
          either a broad or limited reading of the phrase ‘‘subject
          to’’ as used in § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations.

             In accordance with the directive in § 1-2z to consider
          the statutory text in relation to other statutes, in inter-
          preting § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations, we con-
          sider the provision in relation to the two additional
          provisions found in § 4-14 of the East Lyme Subdivision
          Regulations, which is titled ‘‘Applicable Commission/
          Agency Reviews.’’ Section 4-14-1 of the East Lyme Sub-
          division Regulations, titled ‘‘Inland Wetlands Agency,’’
          provides: ‘‘If an application involves land regulated as
          an inland wetland or watercourse under the provisions
          of Chapter 440 of the Connecticut General Statutes,
          the applicant shall submit an application to the Inland
          Wetlands Agency no later than the day the application
          is filed for subdivision or re-subdivision. The Planning
          Commission shall not render a decision until the Inland
          Wetlands Agency has submitted a report with its final
          decision to the Planning Commission. In making its
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                     Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       decision, the Planning Commission shall give due con-
       sideration to the report of the Inland Wetlands Agency.’’
          Section 4-14-2 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regula-
       tions, titled ‘‘Regional Planning Commission,’’ provides:
       ‘‘Whenever a subdivision of land is planned, the area
       of which abuts or includes land in the Town of East
       Lyme and an adjacent municipality, the Commission
       of each municipality shall, before approving the plan,
       submit it to the Regional Planning Commission. Within
       thirty (30) days after receiving the submitted subdivi-
       sion plans, the Regional Planning Commission shall
       report its findings on the inter-municipal aspects of the
       proposed subdivision to the municipalities. Failure to
       submit such report back to the municipalities within
       thirty (30) days after transmittal shall be presumed to
       indicate that the Regional Planning Commission does
       not disapprove the proposed subdivision. The report of
       the Regional Planning Commission shall be advisory
       only.’’
          Sections 4-14-1 and 4-14-2 of the subdivision regula-
       tions set forth substantively distinct requirements for
       the reviews specified therein relative to § 4-14-3 of the
       subdivision regulations. In addition to mandating the
       submission of an application or subdivision plans to the
       Inland Wetlands Agency (IWA) or the Regional Planning
       Commission (RPC) for review, §§ 4-14-1 and 4-14-2
       expressly (1) indicate that the IWA or the RPC must
       submit reports of their reviews to the commission, (2)
       provide specific directions on how the commission is
       (a) to proceed if a report from the RPC is not received
       within a prescribed time period or (b) to forgo proceed-
       ing until a report from the IWA is received, and (3)
       assign the weight that the commission must give to
       such reports. In stark contrast, § 4-14-3 does not (1)
       indicate that a report with respect to an ERT evaluation
       must be submitted to the commission, (2) restrict the
       commission’s ability to act on an application if an ERT
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                         Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

          evaluation is not performed and an attendant report is
          not submitted, or (3) assign the weight that the commis-
          sion must afford to such a report. These differences
          inform our interpretation of § 4-14-3 and indicate that
          an ERT evaluation is not a mandatory review that must
          be completed to satisfy § 4-14-3. Moreover, this interpre-
          tation aligns with the broader dictionary definitions of
          the phrase ‘‘subject to’’ as used in § 4-14-3. See Merriam-
          Webster Online Dictionary, supra (definitions of ‘‘sub-
          ject to’’ include ‘‘possibly affected by (something),’’ and
          ‘‘likely to do, have, or suffer from (something)’’ (empha-
          sis added)); Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p.
          1723 (definitions of ‘‘subject’’ include ‘‘[d]ependent on
          or exposed to (some contingency)’’ (emphasis added)).

             Additionally, we are mindful that § 4-14-3 of the subdi-
          vision regulations, as a municipal legislative enactment,
          is entitled to a presumption of validity. See Pollio v.
          Planning Commission, 232 Conn. 44, 49, 652 A.2d 1026
          (1995) (‘‘a presumption of validity is accorded to munic-
          ipal ordinances’’); see also Bauer v. Waste Management
          of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 529, 686 A.2d 481
          (1996) (‘‘a zoning regulation is entitled to a presumption
          of validity’’). Construing § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regu-
          lations to mandate the completion of an ERT evaluation
          would render the provision invalid as an impermissible
          delegation of authority by the commission to ECERT.
          ‘‘The regulation and approval of subdivisions fall within
          the purview of the town planning commission in accor-
          dance with the provisions of General Statutes §§ 8-18
          through 8-30a . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) Thoma v.
          Planning & Zoning Commission, 31 Conn. App. 643,
          647–48, 626 A.2d 809 (1993), aff’d, 229 Conn. 325, 640
          A.2d 1006 (1994). In Thoma, this court concluded that
          a zoning regulation constituted an impermissible dele-
          gation of authority by the town of Canterbury’s planning
          and zoning commission to the town’s inland wetlands
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                           Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       agency when the regulation, which prohibited the plan-
       ning and zoning commission from approving an applica-
       tion for a subdivision of land containing inland wetlands
       if the inland wetlands agency failed to find that such
       a subdivision would not adversely affect any inland
       wetlands area, conflicted with what is now General
       Statutes § 8-26 (e), which requires that a planning com-
       mission give ‘‘due consideration’’ to the report of the
       inland wetlands agency. Thoma v. Planning & Zoning
       Commission, supra, 644, 651. As this court summarized,
       ‘‘[u]ltimate authority over approval of a subdivision
       rests with the [planning and zoning] commission, and
       any regulation that abrogates this authority is invalid.’’
       Id., 651.
          Pursuant to the plaintiff’s proposed construction of
       § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regulations, the commission
       would be forbidden from approving an application ‘‘sub-
       ject to’’ an ERT evaluation if, for any reason, the ERT
       evaluation could not be performed. Under this para-
       digm, ECERT effectively would be capable of vetoing,
       through inaction, any such application, thereby
       enabling a nongovernmental entity to strip the commis-
       sion of its ‘‘[u]ltimate authority over approval of a subdi-
       vision . . . .’’ Thoma v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
       sion, supra, 31 Conn. App. 651; cf. East Lyme
       Subdivision Regs., § 4-14-1 (prohibiting commission
       from acting on application for subdivision of land regu-
       lated as inland wetland or watercourse until IWA sub-
       mits report15 and directing commission to give ‘‘due
         15
            If the IWA fails to act on the application, the applicant may seek recourse
       by filing an application with the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental
       Protection. See General Statutes § 22a-42a (c) (1) (‘‘[i]f the inland wetlands
       agency, or its agent, fails to act on any application within [enumerated time
       periods], the applicant may file such application with the Commissioner of
       Energy and Environmental Protection who shall review and act on such
       application in accordance with this section’’). We are unaware of any author-
       ity providing an applicant with a similar remedy if an ERT evaluation is
       not, or cannot be, completed.
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                         Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

          consideration’’ to such report); East Lyme Subdivision
          Regs., § 4-14-2 (RPC’s failure to submit report specified
          in provision by specified deadline creates presumption
          that RPC does not disapprove of proposed subdivision
          and RPC’s report, if filed, is advisory only). We decline
          to construe § 4-14-3 in a manner that undermines the
          presumption of validity attached to it.
             In sum, we interpret § 4-14-3 of the subdivision regula-
          tions to require the commission to request an ERT eval-
          uation in connection with certain applications, such as
          the 2018 application, and to give ECERT a reasonable
          opportunity to perform the ERT evaluation, but the
          provision does not further mandate that the ERT evalua-
          tion must be completed. Applying this interpretation
          here, we conclude that the commission complied with
          § 4-14-3 as there is no dispute that (1) the commission
          requested an ERT evaluation vis-à-vis the 2018 applica-
          tion and (2) RC&D, after having received the request
          and exchanged correspondence with the commission,
          did not perform the ERT evaluation and indicated that
          it had no intention of doing ERT evaluations for devel-
          opment applications until it established a new protocol
          for such evaluations at some unspecified future date.
          Accordingly, we further conclude that the court incor-
          rectly determined that the commission committed
          error, as a matter of law, in granting the 2018 application
          notwithstanding that an ERT evaluation had not been
          completed, and, therefore, the court improperly sus-
          tained the plaintiff’s appeal on the basis of his claim
          premised on § 4-14-3.
             The judgment is reversed only as to the determination
          to sustain the plaintiff’s appeal on the basis that § 4-
          14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations required
          the completion of an Environmental Review Team eval-
          uation in connection with RESC’s application and the
          conclusion that the commission illegally waived § 4-14-
          3 in granting the application without such an evaluation
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                      Lepkowski v. Planning Commission

       having been performed, and the case is remanded to
       the trial court with direction to render judgment deny-
       ing the plaintiff’s appeal with respect to that issue; the
       judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.