Court Opinion

ID: 9851474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:13:19.519088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:56.990093
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Salina police officers did not have knowledge of facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendants had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Therefore, the stop of the defendants was not authorized by K.S.A. 22-2402.
The majority further concludes that “the detectives were interested in stopping the Cadillac and checking the occupants because of their ‘suspicious activity’ in Salina. That was the primary reason for the stop.” It was not the primary reason for the stop; it was the only reason for the stop. Both Officers Poore and Garman testified that the defendants’ car was stopped because of defendants’ “suspicious activity” in Salina, and not for speeding on 1-70. That “suspicious activity” justifying the stop was explained by Officer Garman, who was in charge of the overall operation:
“Q. Okay. Would you say that was really the basis for them being stopped, that you were going to find out why they had been in Salina, what they had been doing?
“A. Plus the items that led up to that point, yes, sir.
“Q. What items?
“A. Pardon?
*846“Q. What items?
“A. Driving a brand new Cadillac, registered under a different name, two subjects dressed as bikers, driving a brand new Cadillac, car backed in at the motel.”
One would conclude that had the defendants been cleanshaven with short hair, wearing three-piece suits, and driving a Ford Fairlane, their activities would not have been sufficiently suspicious to justify all the police activity in this case.
The majority found no problem with the police officers’ lack of knowledge to justify stopping the defendants for their activities in Salina. The majority simply concludes that the stop was justified because, at the time the defendants were stopped, the officers had observed the Cadillac being driven at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour. Officer Poore of the Salina Police Department testified that, judging from his speedometer, he estimated that .the defendants eventually exceeded 100 miles per hour. However, Officer Poore did not stop the defendants. Officer Garman radioed the Abilene Police Department to stop the defendants’ car but did not tell the Abilene Police Department the reason for stopping the defendants. There is no evidence that the Abilene officers observed the defendants speeding. Officer Norton of the Abilene Police Department testified:
“A. Well, no, sir, the Salina detectives were in pursuit of this vehicle and they asked for our backup.
“Q. They really asked you to stop them, didn’t they?
“A. To help them, yes, sir.
“Q. Did they tell you what they were chasing them for?
“A. No, sir, not at that time.
“Q. And so, when you stopped this vehicle, you had no reason why you were stopping it, did you?
“A. We were backing up Salina, sir.
“Q. But you were not — The point I’m trying to make, Officer Norton, is that at the time you and Officer Duer stopped this vehicle, you didn’t even know why you were stopping it really, did you?
“A. That’s correct.”
He further testified that Officer Jones of the Abilene Police Department was the first officer on the scene, followed by Officer Norton and the Salina officers behind him. Officer Norton testified:
“Q. You said you were called in to back up the Salina Police Department?
*847“A. To help stop the vehicle.
“Q. Your job was to stop the vehicle?
“A. Right. To help them if they couldn’t.
“Q. They weren’t anywhere near in stopping the vehicle, were they?
“A. They were within an eighth of a mile, I would say.”
I agree with the majority that the critical time for the requisite knowledge is at the time of the actual stop. The majority concludes that, at the time of the actual stop, an officer had observed the defendants’ car being driven at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour, and that observation was sufficient to cause him to reasonably conclude that the defendants were committing a traffic offense and, therefore, the stop was lawful. The Abilene police officers who actually stopped the defendants’ car did not testify that they observed the defendants’ car exceeding the speed limit nor that they concluded the defendants had committed a traffic offense. Further, it is not what the police detectives may have done but what they did do that is critical. Justice cannot be measured by what law enforcement officers might have done. Individual rights, whether protected by statute or constitution, are too important to our system of justice to allow the end to justify the means.
The trial court was correct in suppressing the evidence and I would affirm.
Prager, C.J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.