Court Opinion

ID: 9548494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:04:22.541608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:03.005273
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I.
I am in complete agreement with what Justice Huntley has written, and accordingly, have concurred in his opinion.
II.
Apparently unnoticed by any other member of the Court, the first finding made by the referee, although not truly a finding, is advice or a recitation which is somewhat unusual:
The proposed Findings of Fact of the Referee are submitted in a light most favorable to the Claimant, since this matter is presently before the Commission on the motion of the Defendants to dismiss at the conclusion of the presentation of the Claimant’s evidence on the issues raised by the motion. R., p. 8.
The referee, Robert C. Youngstrom, was 100 percent correct, assuming that by his statement he meant that he would accept as true all of claimant’s evidence and every inference of fact which might be legitimately drawn therefrom. Curtis v. Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 475 P.2d 808 (1970). Clearly, there was a tacit understanding between counsel and the referee that the *90surety would not at that time present any ease, and that the referee could evaluate the claimant’s ease under the principles which in a civil action apply to motions for a directed verdict. See Appendix A attached.
When consideration is given to the format which the parties and the referee agreed upon, it is clear that the referee’s Finding No. XIV:
The Defendants contend that the Claimant did not give written notice of the manifestation of the disease within sixty days as required by Section 72-448(1). The evidence shows that the only written notice furnished the Employer by the Claimant was Exhibit # 5. Exhibit # 5 does not specifically indicate that the Claimant had incurred an occupational disease due to her employment. Nevertheless, the Defendant’s personnel manager, upon receipt of the notice and conversation with the Claimant, understood that, at the very least, the Claimant’s occupation had aggravated a condition to the point that the Claimant could not continue her employment at that time. The Referee concludes that the Exhibit constituted sufficient written notice to the Employer of the manifestation of an occupational disease. The oral notice would also be sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of 72-448 under Miller. R., pp. 17-18,
was proper. In fact, in view of the testimony of Deanna Martin, Appendix B attached, it would have been most unusual had the referee found otherwise. Justice Huntley’s view that the cross-appeal taken by the surety and the employer is without merit is eminently correct.
Moreover, and more critical, and crucial to the referee’s Conclusion No. Ill, which reads in part: “The evidence does not establish that the Employer wilfully failed or refused to file the report required by Section 72-602(1),” R., p. 20, a reading of the testimony of Mrs. Martin is convincing that the relevant portion of Finding No. XIV, underscored above, is contradictory to and cannot support Conclusion No. III. The referee in this regard has apparently accepted the meaning of the word “willfully” as it is used in a criminal context, or, if in a civil context, then as an action which is based on malicious conduct and/or which seeks exemplary damages.
The word in question, however, is used in an entirely different sense, and reasonably can only be taken as meaning a failure to file a report which is a “knowing” failure, i.e., not accident or inadvertence. That “willful” (and “willfully”) is a word of many meanings is readily re-ascertained by a cursory resort to Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 1434. There, citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945), we can learn that it is so even as practitioners know it is so: “Willful is a word of many meanings, its construction often influenced by its context.” Not only giving consideration to what transacted as between claimant and Mrs. Martin, but considering also her slanted and reluctant testimony on being called as a claimant’s witness, there should not be any reasonable belief other than that she consciously, voluntarily, and knowingly made the determination to not file a report as the law requires. Accordingly, any statute of limitations which would technically bar her claim for compensation was tolled under the provisions of I.C. § 72-604.
A few years ago (but not so long in time that is beyond my ken) this Court had before it the claim of Fred Arnold v. Claude Lacey & Son, 73 Idaho 1, 245 P.2d 398 (1952):
The Board concluded that the claim against employer and surety for the alleged accident having been made at the latest June 9, 1949, and petition for hearing not having been filed until September 13, 1951, the claim was barred by the provisions of Sec. 72-407, I.C., and . dismissed the claim. Id. at 3, 245 P.2d at 400.1
*91As pertinent to the issue now confronting us, the opinion also contains this information:
Appellant contends that Sec. 72-1001 I.C. was not complied with by the employer. Hence the claim is not barred. The statute, Sec. 72-1001 I.C., does not extend the statute of limitations for acts that are to be performed by the employee, but penalizes the employer in a sum not exceeding $500 for not complying with the section. Non-compliance with this section, assuming it was not complied with in this case, could not be construed as tolling or extending the mandatory provisions of Sec. 72-407 I.C. above quoted. Id. at 4, 245 P.2d at 401.
Section 72-1001, which now is to be found only in superseded Yol. 11 of the Idaho Code, requiring a report to be filed, applied only to injuries, fatal or otherwise. Specifically it did not apply to occupational diseases. It provided that for each offense the employer “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500.00.” Superseded Vol. 11, p. 411.
With the sweeping changes in the law of worker’s compensation effected by the 1971 complete recodification, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 124, the case of Arnold, supra, had salutory effect. Chapter 6 of Title 72, Employer’s Reports, was changed from what it had been under I.C. § 10-7001 to do away with any fine. Instead, the clear intent of the new law was to give the working person, whether injured or having become afflicted with an occupation disease, the benefit of an employer’s failure to file a report:
72-604. FAILURE TO REPORT TOLLS EMPLOYEE LIMITATIONS.— When the employer has knowledge of an occupational disease, injury, or death and willfully fails or refuses to file the report thereof as required by section 72-602(1), the limitations prescribed in section 72-701, shall not begin to run against the claim of any person seeking compensation until such report shall have been filed. 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 124, p. 474.
In 1978 the legislature imposed a new reporting obligation upon employers. It did so by adding § 72-806 to chapter 8 of Title 72. I.C. § 72-806 has no application to Mrs. Bainbridge’s case, other than to note the adding of the new section, Notice of Change of Status, the legislature added to I.C. § 72-604 the provision that failure to give the new notice required by § 72-806 would also toll employee limitations.
Apparently in recognition that the 1971 Act had specifically mentioned the limitations of § 72-701, but had not mentioned § 72-706, the 1970 amendment now included in § 72-706. See Appendix C attached, which is a photo-copy of the 1978 Session Laws.
Obvious to the extreme, to any person of reason, the 1978 legislature simply saw that it had earlier in 1971 omitted to mention specifically any of the limitations which apply to working people other than § 72-701. So § 72-706 was added, albeit not exactly according to cricket.2 It was approved by the Governor on March 17, 1978. Under an entirely different bill, enacted as ch. 264 of the 1978 Session Laws, and which would be approved by the Governor on March 28, 1978, I.C. § 72-701 was amended to delete therefrom any reference to occupational diseases — although in the seven years intervening since 1971 it had been otherwise — and I.C. § 72-448 was amended to read as it now does. What was being accomplished in 1978 was, with regard to occupational disease, changing the limitations on an employee to be one year *92from date of disablement to one year from date of manifestation, and moving occupational disease limitations entirely out of § 72-701 where it had been partially at least since the 1971 recodification, and was in place when § 72-701 was first referred to in the 1971 version of § 72-604-
What can readily be made of this is that the 1978 legislature in specifically making mention of § 72-706 which it had not done in 1971, simply let specific mention of § 72-448 slip through the cracks, undoubtedly the result of confusion of having two different bills in the hoppers of both houses, and “occupational disease” formerly, since 1971, having been mentioned in § 72-701.
One has only to keep in mind that it was not the code headnoters who captioned the 1971 § 71-604, “Failure to report tolls employee limitations,” but rather that caption appears also in the 1971 Session Laws. No one should entertain any realistic doubt that victims of occupational disease were intended to benefit by the tolling as were victims of industrial injuries. Otherwise, there was no need whatever to even mention an “employer who has knowledge of an occupation disease ... and wilfully fails ... to file the report.”
It will be a strange Supreme Court indeed which, in the face of the history attendant to I.C. § 72-604, will indulge in the fantasy that the 1971 legislature and in turn the 1978 legislature, purposefully intended to discriminate against victims of occupational disease. It would be a clear case of unequal protection under the laws, were it intentionally done. But it was not so done. In order to avoid an unequal protection problem, it is generally a court’s obligation to interpret the legislative intent so as to comport with constitutionality — not unconstitutionality. Here, we should be quick to recognize the 1971 legislature’s intent, and thereafter its inadvertence in 1978. Instead, we seem to have a majority unwilling to solve the problem in accordance with the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation law, I.C. § 72-201, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, p. 428, and the mandate that it will be construed liberally in favor of the employee:
Process and procedure under the Workmen’s Compensation Act are designed to be as summary and simple as is reasonably possible. I.C. 72-708. As this Court has held many times, the Act is to be construed liberally in favor of a claimant. The humane purposes which it seeks to serve leave no room for narrow, technical construction. In re Haynes, 95 Idaho 492, 511 P.2d 309 (1973); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946). Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977).
Note should be taken that unlike pre-1971 § 72-102 which mentioned only the injured worker, the first sentence of § 72-201 reads as to “the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted____”
HUNTLEY, J., concurs.
APPENDIX A
MR. BARRETT: ... And we at this point'would move for a dismissal at the end of the claimant’s case. It being our assertion that number one, there has been no causation proven in this case by any evidence that this lady’s condition was caused by her work environment as an occupational disease as a matter of law.
I don’t — no, I don’t think, Your Honor, that you have had an opportunity to review, for example, the deposition testimony of Dr. Burtan or review the testimony of Dr. McConnel. I realize he testified here and this has been longer ago than I would like to think; but I doubt that you have had an opportunity with your schedule to review that transcript.
In keeping that in mind, I would have no objection at this point of going ahead and permitting counsel with what he desires. Let him save some money. Let us try to save some money, and we’ll move for a dismissal at this point on the grounds as a matter of law.
No causation has been established; and furthermore, in this case, there has been no *93evidence that there was any offending agent that is described in these proceedings that the defendant is being charged with, and furthermore the statute of limitation issue.
If the case is then decided against the claimant, that’s the end of the case. If it’s determined that, yes, there is sufficient evidence, then, the motion we make would be denied; and we could go forth with our evidence.
I have no objection to that. And it will save everybody time and money.
MR. GREENFIELD: I would have no objection to that either if — that way if you decide that I have established a prima facie case, I’ll go ahead and put on my rating then.
MR. BARRETT: Then we’ll put on our evidence to refute what he has got. In other words, handle it as a directed verdict as we would which, of course is permissible before the Commission, and this has been done on prior occasions.
THE HEARING OFFICER: Very well.
MR. BARRETT: We have no problem with that proposition.
MR. GREENFIELD: Let me understand what I’m getting into.
MR. BARRETT: You’re not losing anything. If he says our motion to dismiss is denied because there is sufficient evidence on the issues, then, what you’re permitted to do is go ahead and bring in your doctor, whoever he is, and your impairment rating, and you complete your case.
We then put on all our evidence.
MR. GREENFIELD: I much rather not do that, but if I have to, I will.
MR. BARRETT: All right. Frankly, I think that it is probably a practical way to take care of it because I don’t intend to argue our motion to dismiss here; but it is my perception of this case as it stands right now that as a matter of law it is not compensable. I’m sure Mr. Greenfield disagrees with that.
MR. GREENFIELD: I do.
MR. BARRETT: But at least I’m confident enough at this point that I’m willing to go ahead with that.
THE HEARING OFFICER: Well, it sounds reasonable to me, also.
Let the record show that the claimant rests on all issues except the extent of permanent impairment and disability, and Mr. Barrett has moved to dismiss the application for hearing. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 338-41.
APPENDIX B
DEANNA MARTIN,
a witness having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GREENFIELD:
Q State your name, please.
A Deanna Martin.
Q Is it Mrs. Martin?
A Yes.
Q What is your occupation, ma’am?
A Personnel manager.
Q Personnel manager at Boise Cascade Plywood Mill in Emmett?
A Boise Cascade, Emmett complexes.
Q Okay.
You’ve been present during the testimony of Mrs. Bainbridge this morning, have you not?
A Yes.
Q And you heard her testimony regarding writing that she took to you on Halloween, 1981; is that right?
A Yes.
Q I am going to hand you what has been marked as Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5.
Is that familiar to you?
A Yes, it is.
Q Okay.
Do you recall receiving that about Halloween of 1981?
A Yes, I do.
*94Q Do you — can you tell the Commission who in your plant at that time was responsible for filing Workmen’s Compensation claims?
A They are initiated between the employee and the supervisor and then brought to me. I type the necessary forms, et cetera, and send them to the necessary places.
Q Is that at present or at the time that—
A At the time she brought me this, I was in charge.
Q You were in charge of filing the Workmen’s Comp claims? "
A Uh-huh.
Q But you didn’t file one in this case, did you?
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, I am going to object on the grounds that counsel is, I think, misleading here. He is talking about a responsibility for filing a claim. As I understand under the Workers’ Compensation laws, the responsibility for filing the claim is with an employee. I’m going to object on the ground that this is an erroneous legal assumption to begin with, and it’s misleading because of it. I would object on those grounds.
MR. GREENFIELD: Your Honor, I think it is perfectly clear from the language of 72602.
MR. BARRETT: Well, that refers to an employer’s report of injury. That’s not a claim.
MR. GREENFIELD: That’s exactly what I am referring to.
MR. BARRETT: Oh, well, then I object on the ground that his nomenclature is absolutely confusing.
THE HEARING OFFICER: I think you could rephrase the question.
MR. GREENFIELD: All right.
Q (By MR. GREENFIELD) The notice of injury of the occupational disease, was that — did you fill those out as well?
A Yes.
Q So when you were advised that someone had contracted an occupational disease, it was your responsibility in October of 1981 to file the notice of injury; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
In this case, you did not, is that so?
A That is correct.
Q Can you tell the Commission why you did not?
A I have previous insurance papers that says it’s nonindustrial related.
Q What insurance papers are those?
A First Farm West.
Q Do you have those papers here with you this morning?
A Yes, I do.
Q Would you get them out for me, so I can see what you are talking about.
A Uh-huh.
Q These papers you have contain information that indicated to you that it was a nonindustrial disease; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Okay. I see what you mean.
But when did you receive this information from Dr. McConnel indicating that the condition was not one which arose out of her employment?
A Okay. This — at the time I was not handling the insurance papers. Mr. Snyder was.
Q Okay.
A And it was received by him around the 6th of October.
MR. BARRETT: You have got to speak up a bit.
THE WITNESS: It was around the 6th of October.
MR. BARRETT: Of what year?
THE WITNESS: 1981.
Q (BY MR. GREENFIELD) Okay. And that indicated, as you said, that Dr. McConnel didn’t think it was work related; is that right?
*95A Right.
Q And then later on October 31, 1981, you received a disability confirmation. The one we have talked about where Dr. McConnel states, “reaction to dust and chemical fumes”; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
Can you tell the Commission — was it your decision then not to make a Workmen Comp claim because of the previous information from Dr. McConnel?
A Yes.
Q How did you regard the information on the disability confirmation dated 10-30-81 that states, “Has asthma reaction to dust and chemical fumes”?
A Gee, it was an aggravation of her condition. She could not go back to work, but there was no way that said her work caused it.
Q Do you understand—
A With the previous information.
Q I understand.
Do you understand that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition can be compensable?
A In what manner?
MR. BARRETT: I am going to object. This calls for a legal conclusion.
MR. GREENFIELD: It calls for a conclusion. I’m not sure how legal it is.
THE HEARING OFFICER: Well, I’ll overrule the objection.
MR. GREENFIELD: I’ll restate the question.
Q (BY MR. GREENFIELD) Do you understand that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition can be compensable?
A I don’t know in what manner that you are referring to?
Q If somebody had asthma and it was not caused at work — it was caused some place else — and had it, but that person worked with the asthma, and then that condition was aggravated by, let’s say, dust and chemical fumes at work to the point that he wouldn’t go back, would you regard that as a — would you regard that aggravation as something that would require you to file a Workmen’s Compensation—
A Not with the information that I had from her doctor previously; that it was not work related — not caused at work.
Q So it’s a causation question in your mind?
A Yes.
MR. GREENFIELD: Okay. I guess we ought to—
MR. BARRETT: Mark them all one exhibit, the whole thing.
MR. GREENFIELD: Yeah, let’s do that. (Claimant’s Exhibit 7 marked.)
MR. BARRETT: You may want to take — so it’s not duplicating the record— well, you can put it in here because she received all that stuff. That’s what you’re concerned with. She got all that stuff that is in there. Why don’t you staple that.
MR. GREENFIELD: I move admission of Claimant’s Exhibit 7.
MR. BARRETT: We have no objection.
THE HEARING OFFICER: Exhibit 7 is admitted.
Q (BY MR. GREENFIELD) But the entire basis of your — of your action in filing this as a Workmen’s Compensation claim is the information you got from Dr. McDonnel indicated 10-1-81 that checks the boxes “no” where it says, “His condition due to injury or sickness arising out of patient’s employment.” Isn’t that the sole reason why you didn’t file it?
A Correct.
MR. GREENFIELD: Okay. That’s all I have. Thank you very much.
MR. BARRETT: Just a moment.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BARRETT:
Q All of the documents that are contained in Exhibit No. 7 with the exception of the first page were documents that were *96submitted and you reviewed as you received them; is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q And then, of course, the first page— as I understand it, it was in the same file but had been completed by Mr. Snyder?
A That is correct.
Q Or signed by Mr. Snyder; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Would you regard a person who has asthma and is reported by the doctor to be unable to work in any dust or chemical filled environment as being a subject matter of a Workmen Compensation claim?
A No, I do not.
Q That is the information that you received from Dr. McConnel; is that not correct?
A That is correct.
MR. BARRETT: No further questions of this witness. Thank you.
MR. GREENFIELD: I have got just one.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GREENFIELD:
Q Ma’am, do you know Dick Walsh?
A Yes, I do.
Q What was his — what his role in Workmen Compensation claims in the fall and winter months of 1981?
A He is in our Employee Relations Department. He has the same function as— coordinating and following through on any claims or any problems that we have in any manner.
Contractual or safety, et cetera.
Q Did he have something to do with this claim?
A Investigative as to Mrs. Bainbridge’s condition and when she could return to work.
Q You don’t investigate these things, but he does; is that right?
A Yes — well, that is correct, yes.
Q In this case, Mr. Walsh did get involved in investigating the case, didn’t he?
A Yes.
Q Do you know why he did?
A To see when Mrs. Bainbridge was concerned as to when she would be returned to work and checking to verify her condition and what manner she could be returned to work in.
Q Did he work with you on the case after you received that disability certificate from Dr. McConnel on Halloween?
A No, it was later in the — probably the following year. If our employees are off extensively, we do try and check and see at which state they’re in.
(Claimant’s Exhibit 8 marked.)
Q (BY MR. GREENFIELD) I am handing you what has been marked as Claimant’s Exhibit No. 8.
Could you tell us what that is.
A That’s a letter from Dr. McConnel to Mr. Walsh.
Q Do you recall seeing that letter?
A Yes, I have a copy of it.
Q At the point in time that — it's dated when?
A December 17th, ‘81.
Q Just a month and a half after you received that disability certificate?
A Yes.
Q On Halloween of—
A Yes.
Q Do you remember discussing this case with Mr. Walsh after that letter came in?
A Some.
Q Did that letter from Dr. McConnel make any difference in your opinion as to whether or not you should file a Work Comp claim?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A She was — it was still not caused by industrial or industrial related. There are cases where people have injuries or sick*97nesses where they are limited with their restrictions; that they cannot come back at that time. So, for example, with a broken leg, they come back to work with a full release and find they can’t stand yet. They are back off again. I don’t file a Workmen’s Comp case in that. This I considered the same.
Q If Dr. McConnel had stated to you that Mrs. Bainbridge had aggravated her asthmatic condition at work, would you have filed a Workmen Comp claim?
A If on the original form it was related to her job, I would have. At that time, it was filed non—
Q That’s not quite my question.
Assuming the original form came where Dr. McConnel says — where it says work related and he checks no and assume he had written a letter to you saying that the asthmatic condition was aggravated by her work at Boise Cascade, would you then file a Workmen’s Compensation claim or would you have stuck to your guns and not filed on the grounds that it was caused somewhere else?
A I would have probably continued this way with some checking up through the Safety Department or Employee Relations Department.
Q Sort of like the checking Mr. Walsh did?
A It would probably come out the same.
MR. GREENFIELD: Okay. Thank you. That’s all I have.
I think I’m going to offer Claimant’s Exhibit 8. It’s the letter from Mr. Walsh.
MR. BARRETT: I have no objection to Exhibit No. 8 on the same basis as the other exhibits for the restrictive purpose for which it is being offered.
THE HEARING OFFICER: Exhibit 8 can be admitted.
MR. GREENFIELD: That’s all I have of the witness, Your Honor.
MR. BARRETT: I take it, Mr. Greenfield, that we following this hearing can stipulate to the photocopying of the actual payroll records of the claimant that would indicate the periods of time she worked for Boise Cascade.
MR. GREENFIELD: Okay.
MR. BARRETT: Okay. I won’t bother to take time of this witness. We have no further questions of this witness at this time, Your Honor.
APPENDIX C
C. 264 ’78 IDAHO SESSION LAWS 589 .
SECTION 20. That Section 72-704, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
72-704. SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE — KNOWLEDGE OF EMPLOYER. A notice given under the provisions of section 72-701 or section 72-448, Idaho Code, shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the injury, or disease, or otherwise, unless it is shown by the employer that he was in *98fact prejudiced thereby. Want of notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this law if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the injury or occupational disease, or that the employer has not been prejudiced by such delay or want of notice.
SECTION 21. That Section 72-706, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
72-706. LIMITATION ON TIME ON APPLICATION FOR HEARING. (1)When no compensation paid. When a claim for compensation has been made and no compensation has been paid thereon, the claimant, unless misled to his prejudice by the employer or surety, shall have one (1) year from the date of making claim within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing and an award under such claim.
(2) When compensation discontinued. When payments of compensation have been made and thereafter discontinued, the claimant shall have five (5) years from the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, or, if compensation is discontinued more than five (5) years from the date of the accident causing the injury or the date of first manisfestatioñ of an occupational disease, within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation, within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing for further compensation and award.
(3) Relief barred. In the event an application is not made and filed as in this section provided, relief on any such claim shall be forever barred.
SECTION 22. That Sections 72-224, 72-324, 72-420 and 72-421, Idaho Code, be, and the same are hereby repealed.
Approved March 28, 1978.

. I.C. § 72-407, as pertinent, was also set out in the opinion:
"Where a claim for compensation has been made, and no compensation has been paid *91thereon, such claimant shall have one year from the date of making such claim within which to make and file with the industrial accident board, an application demanding a hearing and an award under such claim. ******
"In the event an application is not made and filed as herein provided, relief on any such claim shall be forever barred.” Arnold, supra, 73 Idaho at 3, 245 P.2d at 400.

. It was not "cricket" because the title of the 1978 amendment did not include or even mention any amendment of § 72-604 which would include giving specific mention to § 72-706.