Court Opinion

ID: 9882812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:23.981924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:01.726764
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. SuperAsh Remainderman Ltd. Partnership, 2023-Ohio-3556.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Ashland Global Holdings Inc. et al.,               :

                Plaintiffs-Appellees,              :

Speedway, L.L.C.,                                  :

                Intervenor-Appellee,               :
                                                                 No. 22AP-638
v.                                                 :          (C.P.C. No. 22CV-2398)

SuperAsh Remainderman                              :       (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Limited Partnership,
                                                   :
                Defendant-Appellant.
                                                   :

                                          D E C I S I O N

                                 Rendered on September 29, 2023

                On brief: Arnold & Clifford, James E. Arnold, Gerhardt A.
                Gosnell, II, and Michael L. Dillard, Jr., for appellees Ashland
                Global Holdings Inc. and Ashland L.L.C. Argued: Michael L.
                Dillard, Jr.

                On brief: Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Jeremy S. Young, and
                Stephen D. Jones, for appellee Speedway, L.L.C.

                On brief: Collins Roche Utley & Garner L.L.C., and
                Richard M. Garner, for appellant. Argued: Richard M.
                Garner.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant,          SuperAsh       Remainderman         Limited     Partnership
(“SuperAsh”), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
granting plaintiffs-appellees, Ashland Global Holdings Inc. and Ashland L.L.C.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 2

(collectively, “Ashland”), equitable relief from Ashland’s failure to submit a timely notice to
renew several commercial leases. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
       {¶ 2} The present dispute concerns 24 different properties located throughout
Ohio, Kentucky, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota. Eight of the properties are in
Ohio. SuperAsh leased the properties to Ashland, and Ashland subleased the properties to
Speedway L.L.C. (“Speedway”). Speedway operates retail fuel and convenience stores on
the properties.
       {¶ 3} In 1990, Ashland owned the 24 properties at issue herein and completed a
sale lease-back transaction involving the properties. Ashland sold an estate for 20 years in
the land and improvements on the properties to State Street Bank and Trust Company of
Connecticut, National Association (“State Street Bank”), an owner trust, and Ashland
leased the land and improvements back from State Street Bank for a 20-year term
commencing December 31, 1990. As part of the 1990 transaction, Ashland sold the
remainder interest in the land which would follow the owner trust’s 20-year estate to
SuperAsh.
       {¶ 4} In 1998, Ashland subleased the properties to Speedway’s predecessor-in-
interest, Speedway SuperAmerica L.L.C. The 1998 sublease occurred in connection with a
joint venture between Marathon Oil Company and Ashland; Speedway SuperAmerica
L.L.C. was a wholly owned subsidiary of the joint venture. Through the 1998 sublease,
Ashland attempted to place Speedway SuperAmerica L.L.C. “in a position as close as
possible to the position it would have been in” if the properties had been conveyed to
Speedway SuperAmerica L.L.C. as a capital contribution. (Compl. at ¶ 18.) The 1998
sublease obligated Speedway SuperAmerica L.L.C. to pay Ashland only nominal rent of $1
per year per location. Speedway has continuously subleased the properties from Ashland
since 1998.
       {¶ 5} In 2010, SuperAsh’s remainder interest in the land vested. On December 31,
2010, SuperAsh and U.S. Bank, National Association, the successor-in-interest to State
Street Bank, executed 24 identical ground leases for each of the properties (the “ground
leases”). Ashland leased the properties from U.S. Bank pursuant to a separate operating
lease agreement.
No. 22AP-638                                                                              3

       {¶ 6} The initial term under the ground leases was for a five-year period, and the
ground leases referred to the rent due under the initial term as “[b]asic [g]round [r]ent.”
(Compl., Ex. A, Ground Lease § 3.1.) The annual basic ground rent for the 24 properties
was $512,400. Jay Woldenberg, SuperAsh’s general partner, referred to the basic ground
rent as “bargain rental rates.” (Tr. Vol. I at 180.) The ground leases contained options to
renew the leases for an initial five-year renewal term and two successive one-year renewal
terms. The first one-year renewal term ended December 31, 2021 (the “2021 term”) and
the second one-year renewal term ended December 31, 2022 (the “2022 term”). During
the initial five-year and successive one-year renewal terms, the rent would be the basic
ground rent. Following the 2022 term, the ground lessee could continue renewing the
ground leases annually, but the rent would increase from basic ground rent to fair market
value rental rates.
       {¶ 7} To exercise its option to renew the ground leases, the ground lessee had to
notify SuperAsh “in writing of its election to extend the Term on or before the date which
[was] one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the expiration of the Base Lease Term or the
applicable Renewal Term.” (Ground Lease § 3.2(c).) The parties stipulated that, to comply
with the 120-day requirement, the ground lessee had to submit a renewal notice to
SuperAsh on or before September 3, 2020 for the 2021 term and on or before September 3,
2021 for the 2022 term. The ground leases also contained an option for the ground lessee
to purchase the properties. To exercise the purchase option, the ground lessee had to
provide SuperAsh with notice at least 120 days prior to the expiration of the ground leases.
If the ground leases expired and the ground lessee had not exercised the purchase option,
the ground lessee’s interest in the improvements on the land would “automatically vest” in
SuperAsh. (Ground Lease § 15.3.)
       {¶ 8} In 2013, Ashland purchased the owner trust’s position under the ground
leases and ownership of the improvements on the properties for $13,770,000. As such,
Ashland became the ground lessee and the owner of the improvements. On April 17, 2015,
Ashland provided SuperAsh with written notice of its intent to renew the ground leases for
the initial five-year renewal term.
       {¶ 9} On November 20, 2020, William D. Wallach, Ashland’s external legal counsel
located in New Jersey, sent an email to Ashland’s vice president and treasurer, William
No. 22AP-638                                                                              4

Whitaker. The email contained a draft renewal notice for the 2021 term and instructed
Whitaker to print the renewal notice, “sign, and then send both it and the exhibits by email
today, with the Federal Express copies to follow.” (Joint Ex. 5.) Whitaker printed and
signed the 2021 renewal notice on November 20, 2020. On November 23, 2020, Whitaker
sent an email to Woldenberg with the signed 2021 renewal notice attached. Pursuant to
Wallach’s request, Whitaker also forwarded the November 23, 2020 email he sent to
Woldenberg to Wallach. Woldenberg did not respond to Whitaker’s November 23, 2020
email containing the untimely 2021 renewal notice.
        {¶ 10} Whitaker stated that Ashland failed to provide SuperAsh with the 2021
renewal notice by the September 3, 2020 deadline due to “a great deal of complicating
matters,” including a “substantial amount of litigation.” (Tr. Vol. I at 41-42.) In 2017,
Ashland executed a “side-letter agreement” with Valvoline that conveyed the rights and
obligations associated with the ground leases to Valvoline. (Tr. Vol. I at 41.) Ashland and
Valvoline disputed the extent of the conveyance, including a dispute regarding which party
was responsible for sending the renewal notices to SuperAsh, and the dispute resulted in
litigation. Additionally, in October 2020, Speedway initiated arbitration against Ashland
to require Ashland to exercise the purchase option in the ground leases and transfer the
properties to Speedway.
        {¶ 11} On February 22, 2021, Woldenberg sent a letter to the SuperAsh limited
partners titled “Analysis of SuperAsh Ground Lease Renewal Matters.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 4.) The
analysis addressed Ashland’s untimely 2021 renewal notice and noted that, although there
was “an argument to be made that Ashland failed to timely execute the ground lease
renewal,” the argument was “not a clear winner.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 4.) Woldenberg ultimately
determined that the “prudent action would be to accept the [2021] renewal option at that
time,” due to the state of the COVID-19 pandemic and because the ground leases contained
a no waiver clause. (Tr. Vol. II at 32.)
        {¶ 12} On August 11, 2021, Wallach sent Whitaker an email titled “RE:
Ashland/Speedway Lease – Renewal Notice.”1 (Deft.’s Ex. 6.) Wallach attached a draft
2022 renewal notice to the email and instructed Whitaker to return a signed copy of the
renewal notice to him. Unlike the prior year, Wallach did not instruct Whitaker to send the

1 The contents of the August 11, 2021 email were redacted from defendant’s exhibit 6.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                5

renewal notice to SuperAsh. Wallach informed Whitaker he wanted to share the 2022
renewal notice “with Valvoline,” which made sense to Whitaker “given the structure of the
side letter and the litigation with Valvoline.” (Tr. Vol. I at 50.) On August 11, 2021,
Whitaker emailed a signed copy of the 2022 renewal notice to Wallach.
       {¶ 13} On August 12, 2021, Wallach sent an email to Valvoline’s attorney stating,
“[a]ttached is the Lease Renewal Notice sent by Ashland to [SuperAsh]. As was the case
last year, this notice is without prejudice to Ashland’s rights.” (Joint Ex. 9.) Wallach
attached the signed 2022 renewal notice dated August 11, 2021 to his August 12, 2021 email.
However, Ashland had not sent the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh.
       {¶ 14} Woldenberg realized that Ashland had not provided SuperAsh with the 2022
renewal notice by September 8, 2021, but he did not contact Ashland about the renewal
notice at that time. On November 3, 2021, Woldenberg sent Whitaker an email stating that
the ground leases would expire December 31, 2021 because Ashland had not exercised its
option to renew the ground leases for the 2022 term. Whitaker responded to Woldenberg’s
email 15 minutes later, attaching a copy of the signed 2022 renewal notice and stating, “I
take it that you didn’t receive the attached? I’ll connect with counsel since I’m not sure why
this wasn’t shared.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 11.)
       {¶ 15} Whitaker explained that as of November 3, 2021, “[he] didn’t realize [the
2022 renewal notice] wasn’t sent, or if it had been.” (Tr. Vol. I at 54.) On November 11,
2021, Wallach sent an email to SuperAsh’s attorney stating that the August 11, 2021 and
November 20, 2020 renewal notices “were both sent by email and by Federal Express.”
(Deft.’s Ex. 11.) Whitaker conducted an internal investigation at Ashland to determine how
Ashland sent the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh, but was unable to find any evidence
demonstrating that Ashland sent the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh. The parties
stipulated that Ashland had not sent a copy of the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh before
November 3, 2021.
       {¶ 16} SuperAsh and Ashland executed four separate tolling agreements between
December 2021 and March 2022 to “preserve the status quo” under the ground leases while
they attempted to negotiate a new lease agreement. (Tr. Vol. I at 57; Joint Exs. 12, 13, 15,
and 16.) Pursuant to the tolling agreements, Ashland paid SuperAsh $250,000 per month
in rent for January, February, March, and April 2022, as well as a tolling fee of 8 percent of
No. 22AP-638                                                                                              6

each month’s rent.2 Although the fourth tolling agreement stated that Ashland would pay
SuperAsh “$250,000 in rent for April,” the agreement also stated that it would “terminate
on April 15, 2022.” (Fourth Tolling Agreement at ¶ 3, 4.)
        {¶ 17} SuperAsh initially proposed that the parties execute a 15-year lease for the
land and buildings on the properties, with annual rent of $3,000,000 and rental increases
of 2.5 percent annually. Ashland countered proposing a one-year lease term with options
to renew, annual rent of $1,000,000, and an acknowledgment that Ashland owned the
improvements on the properties. Following Ashland’s proposal, SuperAsh decided to
suspend the lease negotiations.
        {¶ 18} The parties stipulated that from 2014 to July 31, 2022, Speedway made
capital improvements to the properties at a total cost of $11,877,976.80. Speedway’s
expenditures improved the stores at the properties and Speedway has not been reimbursed
for the improvements.
        {¶ 19} Ashland filed a complaint asserting claims for declaratory judgment and
specific performance of the ground leases on April 12, 2022. Ashland asked the trial court
to declare that it had effectively exercised the option to renew the ground leases for the
2022 term in August 2021. SuperAsh filed a counterclaim asserting claims for forcible entry
and detainer, breach of the ground leases, and declaratory judgment. SuperAsh also filed
separate actions in Kentucky seeking to evict Ashland from the properties located in that
state. Ashland and Speedway filed motions in the present case to enjoin SuperAsh from
proceeding with any eviction action concerning the properties.
        {¶ 20} SuperAsh filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the claims brought by
Ashland Global Holdings Inc., because that entity was not a party to the ground leases.
Ashland opposed the motion to dismiss.
        {¶ 21} On July 1, 2022, Speedway filed a Civ.R. 24 motion to intervene in the action
and participate as a plaintiff. Speedway asserted it held an equitable interest in the
properties because, on January 29, 2022, the arbitration panel in the Speedway/Ashland
arbitration issued an award obligating Ashland to “use its commercially reasonable best
efforts to acquire the Properties from SuperAsh” and transfer the properties “with the

2 The tolling agreements specified that, if the parties reached a new lease agreement, the rent Ashland paid

under the tolling agreements would be applied to the rent due under the new lease.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 7

improvements located thereon, unencumbered to Speedway.” (Mot. to Intervene, Ex. E,
Arbitration Award at 22.) On July 15, 2022, the court granted Speedway intervention to
assert its claim for declaratory judgment. Speedway sought the same declaratory judgment
as Ashland.
       {¶ 22} On August 12, 2022, the trial court denied SuperAsh’s motion to dismiss
Ashland Global Holdings Inc. and denied plaintiffs’ motions to enjoin SuperAsh. The court
reviewed Ashland’s corporate structure and determined that Ashland Global Holdings Inc.
was a proper party in the present action. The court concluded SuperAsh could proceed with
the out-of-state eviction actions, because the ground leases specified that the laws of the
state where each property was located governed each lease. The trial court also bifurcated
the declaratory judgment claims of all the parties from SuperAsh’s forcible entry and
detainer claim and stated it would hold a trial on the declaratory judgment claims beginning
September 19, 2022. The court noted that a judge “in another jurisdiction might elect to
invoke concepts of comity and judicial efficiency to await rulings here.” (Aug. 12, 2022
Decision at 5.)
       {¶ 23} On August 26, 2022, the court issued an entry compelling SuperAsh to
produce certain documents in discovery. The court explained that following a “heated
discussion” between counsel in open court, the court ordered an in camera inspection of
SuperAsh’s privilege log and the documents SuperAsh claimed were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product doctrine. (Aug. 26, 2022 Entry at 1.) The
court concluded that SuperAsh should have produced several of the documents with
redactions, because the documents were principally “business memoranda” and contained
only “isolated statements about what a lawyer advised Mr. Woldenberg.” (Aug. 26, 2022
Entry at 2.) The court redacted some of the documents for SuperAsh and attached the
redacted documents to the August 26, 2022 entry. The court also ordered SuperAsh to
produce several documents SuperAsh claimed were protected work product because the
documents either “[did] not qualify [as work product] at all” or “ ‘good cause’ exist[ed] for
production in the context of this case under Civ.R. 26(B)(4).” (Aug. 26, 2022 Entry at 5.)
       {¶ 24} The parties submitted pre-trial briefs to the court addressing the pertinent
issues for trial. Whitaker, Woldenberg, and SuperAsh’s external real estate advisor, B.J.
Feller, testified at the three-day trial commencing September 19, 2022.
No. 22AP-638                                                                               8

       {¶ 25} On September 27, 2022, the court issued a declaratory judgment and an
opinion. The court determined that, due to the no waiver clause in the ground leases,
SuperAsh’s acceptance of the late 2021 renewal notice did not waive SuperAsh’s right to
receive a timely renewal notice in the future. However, the court determined that “equity
[could] come to the aid of someone making an innocent, unintended error under a lease”
and the court found Ashland entitled to equitable relief. (Opinion at 12.) The court noted
that the delay between September 3 and November 3, 2021 was “slight” in the “context of
the long relationship between these parties.” (Opinion at 16.) The court found that Ashland
intended to deliver the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh in August 2021, Ashland failed to
provide SuperAsh with the 2022 renewal notice due to “an honest mistake,” Ashland and
Speedway would forfeit millions of dollars in valuable improvements on the properties if
the ground leases terminated, and that SuperAsh would suffer no harm if the court granted
equitable relief. The court found that SuperAsh’s acceptance of rent from Ashland for the
last two weeks of April 2021 after the fourth tolling agreement expired estopped SuperAsh
from claiming the ground leases terminated on December 31, 2021.
       {¶ 26} The court granted plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory judgment, granted
Ashland’s claim for specific performance of the ground leases, denied SuperAsh’s claims for
breach of the ground leases and declaratory judgment, and dismissed SuperAsh’s claim for
forcible entry and detainer. On October 3, 2022, the court issued an amended declaratory
judgment stating that, although the court’s factual findings concerned all 24 properties, the
court’s judgment was binding only as to the 8 properties located in Ohio.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 27} SuperAsh appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error for our
review:
              [I.] The trial court committed reversible error by invoking
              equity to allow Appellees Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. and
              Ashland, LLC (unless otherwise noted, collectively “Ashland”)
              to renew the leases with Appellant SuperAsh Remainderman
              Limited Partnership (“SuperAsh”) in direct contravention of
              the express terms and requirements of the leases regarding
              exercise of the renewal options.

              [II.] The trial court committed reversible error by compelling
              SuperAsh to produce materials prepared in anticipation of
              litigation and containing advice from its attorneys to Ashland
No. 22AP-638                                                                                    9

               and Appellee Speedway LLC and by allowing such materials to
               be admitted into evidence at trial and play a central role in the
               trial court’s judgment for Ashland and Speedway.

III. First Assignment of Error – Equitable Relief
       {¶ 28} SuperAsh’s first assignment of error contends the trial court erred by
invoking equity to permit Ashland to renew the ground leases for the 2022 term. The trial
court issued a declaratory judgment finding that Ashland was entitled to equitable relief
and the court granted Ashland’s request for specific performance of the ground leases.
       {¶ 29} R.C. Chapter 2721, the Declaratory Judgments Act, is remedial in nature; its
purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status, and other legal relations. T & M Machines, L.L.C. v. Atty. Gen., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-
124, 2020-Ohio-551, ¶ 15, citing Swander Ditch Landowners’ Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron
& Seneca Cty. Commrs., 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 134 (1990). An action for declaratory judgment
is “sui generis in the sense that it is neither one strictly in equity nor one strictly at law; it
may possess attributes of both. * * * [I]n determining the issues presented [in a declaratory
judgment action] such principles of law or of equity may be invoked as are appropriate.”
Sessions v. Skelton, 163 Ohio St. 409, 415 (1955). Thus, when a declaratory judgment action
“partakes of equity it calls for the application of equitable principles.” Id. Accord Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Wickham, 63 Ohio St.2d 16, 21 (1980); Pickrel v. Hrobon, 106 Ohio App. 313,
314 (10th Dist.1958). An action for specific performance of a contract is a “matter[] in
equity.” Sandusky Props. v. Aveni, 15 Ohio St.3d 273, 274 (1984). Accord Holstein v.
Crescent Communities, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1241, 2003-Ohio-4760, ¶ 13.
       {¶ 30} “ ‘The standard of review applicable to claims for equitable relief is abuse of
discretion.’ ” Byers v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, ¶ 57, quoting
McCarthy v. Lippitt, 150 Ohio App.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6435, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.). Accord RR.
Sav. & Loan Co. v. Berman, 10th Dist. No. 89AP-626 (Mar. 22, 1990) (stating that whether
to grant specific performance is a “matter[] of equitable law and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion”); Keybank, N.A. v. MRN Ltd. Partnership, 193 Ohio App.3d 424,
2011-Ohio-1934, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.) (stating that a “trial court’s decision to apply equitable
principles in a given case is discretionary”); Holstein at ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion implies
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). See also Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 10

St.3d 83, 87 (1985); Newsome v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-169, 2005-
Ohio-6853, ¶ 3, citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990) (stating that an “appellate court is not permitted to
find an abuse of discretion merely because it would have arrived at a different result if it
had reviewed the matter de novo”).
       {¶ 31} SuperAsh contends that, pursuant to the plain language of the ground leases,
the leases expired on December 31, 2021 because Ashland did not exercise its option to
renew the ground leases by September 3, 2021. See Ritchie v. Cordray, 10 Ohio App.3d
213, 215 (10th Dist.1983) (stating that an “option is an agreement to keep an offer open for
a specified time,” and that “where an offer prescribes the place, time, or manner of
acceptance, those terms must be strictly complied with by the offeree,” but that “strict
compliance can be waived by the offeror”); Mother Ruckers, Inc. v. Viking Acceptance, Inc.,
2d Dist. No. 7890 (Jan. 13, 1983). Leases are contracts and subject to traditional rules of
contract interpretation. Atelier Dist., L.L.C. v. Parking Co. of Am., Inc., 10th Dist. No.
07AP-87, 2007-Ohio-7138, ¶ 16, citing Mark-It Place Foods, Inc. v. New Plan Excel Realty
Trust, Inc., 156 Ohio App.3d 65, 2004-Ohio-411, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). “ ‘Contracts are to be
interpreted so as to carry out the intent of the parties, as that intent is evidenced by the
contractual language.’ ” Id., quoting Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2d 244
(1974), paragraph one of the syllabus.
       {¶ 32} SuperAsh contends the trial court erred by relying on equity to resolve the
present dispute because “[w]hen contracting parties ‘have fixed their contractual
relationship in an express contract . . . there is no reason or necessity’ for equity to apply.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 30, quoting Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., __ Ohio St.3d __,
2022-Ohio-4363, ¶ 39.) See also Dugan v. Meyers Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Adm.
Servs., 113 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-1687, ¶ 29, quoting Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 110
Ohio St. 168, 172 (1924) (stating that “ ‘where a contract is plain and unambiguous, it does
not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work a hardship
upon one of the parties thereto and a corresponding advantage to the other’ ”); Stanley
Miller Constr. Co. v. Ohio School Facilities Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-298, 2010-Ohio-
6397, ¶ 12, quoting Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-822,
No. 22AP-638                                                                                  11

2010-Ohio-2906, ¶ 31 (stating that courts “ ‘cannot decide cases of contractual
interpretation on the basis of what is just or equitable’ ”).
          {¶ 33} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding that “the clear and
unambiguous language of a contract cannot be altered through the application of equitable
principles * * * arose in the context of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit claims where
one party sought to recover more than it had previously bargained for during the contract
negotiations.” Sierra 76, Inc. v. TA Operating, L.L.C., 848 F.Supp.2d 812, 815 (N.D.Ohio
2012), citing Dugan at ¶ 29; Ervin v. Garner, 25 Ohio St.2d 231, 239-40 (1971); Ullmann
v. May, 147 Ohio St. 468, 476 (1947). Bunta, on which SuperAsh relies, concerned a claim
for unjust enrichment. See Bunta at ¶ 39 (holding that the “doctrine of unjust enrichment
is limited when an express contract exists that concerns the same subject”). The present
case does not involve a claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.
          {¶ 34} The appellate courts of this state, including this court, have held that a court
may grant a tenant equitable relief from the tenant’s failure to submit a notice at the time,
or in the form and manner, required as a condition precedent to the renewal of a lease. See
Ward v. Washington Distribs. Inc., 67 Ohio App.2d 49 (6th Dist.1980); Capuano v. Epic
Properties, 10th Dist. No. 94APE03-311 (Sept. 15, 1994); Vivi Retail, Inc. v. E&A Northeast
Ltd. Partnership, 8th Dist. No. 90527, 2008-Ohio-4705, ¶ 20. See also Dayton Metro.
Hous. Auth. v. Kilgore, 194 Ohio App.3d 767, 2011-Ohio-3283, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), quoting 41
Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Equity, Section 36 (stating that “ ‘[e]ven where a cause of forfeiture
is specifically mentioned in the lease, equitable considerations enter into the determination
of such forfeiture and may relieve the lessee technically subject to forfeiture’ ”); Great N.
Savings Co. v. Ingarra, 9th Dist. No. 9433 (Apr. 23, 1980). The Supreme Court “has never
applied the general prohibition against equitable intervention to a case involving a
commercial tenant’s failure to timely exercise a renewal option on a lease.” Sierra 76, Inc.
at 815.
          {¶ 35} In Ward, the court noted the “well-settled rule” that, “unless the delay in
renewing [a lease] is so great as to be inexcusable, a [tenant’s] failure to renew within the
specified time will not preclude equitable relief.” Id. at 53, citing Jones v. Gianferante, 305
N.Y. 135 (Ct.App.NY 1953). The court held that equity can relieve a lessee from the
consequences of a failure to give the notice required as a condition precedent to the renewal
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 12

of a lease “where such failure result[ed] from accident, fraud, surprise or honest mistake,
and has not prejudiced the lessor.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court further
held that, even in the absence of an honest mistake by the lessee, “where the lessee has
made valuable improvements to the leased premises, the lessee should not be denied
equitable relief from his own neglect or inadvertence if a forfeiture of such improvements
would result -- provided, there is no prejudice to the landlord.” Id. at paragraph four of the
syllabus.
       {¶ 36} In Ward, the landlord and tenant executed a lease for a specified term, and
the lease permitted the tenant to renew the lease by providing the landlord notice “at least
30 days before the end of the preceding term.” Id. at 51. The landlord and tenant
subsequently executed a supplement to the lease that altered the initial term. Id. On
June 16, 1967, the landlord wrote the tenant a letter stating that the supplemented lease
term began on December 1, 1966. However, “due to an apparent clerical error” the tenant
did not place the letter “in the proper lease file” and prepared a lease digest sheet containing
an incorrect lease expiration date for the property. Id. As a result, the tenant believed the
notice to renew the lease was due January 30, 1979, when it was due November 1, 1978. Id.
The tenant received a letter from the landlord on November 27, 1978, stating that the lease
would expire November 30, 1978. On December 1, 1978, the tenant telephoned and sent a
letter to the landlord attempting to renew the lease. Id. at 52. The Ward court found the
tenant’s failure to timely renew the lease the result of an honest mistake, “to wit, the
misreading of the lease and the misfiling of the landlord’s June 16, 1967, letter.” Id. at 53.
The court also found that the tenant would lose “$72,589 of unamortized leasehold
improvements and fixtures if they were deprived of their right of renewal.” Id. at 52.
Because the landlord would not be prejudiced by the renewal, the court held that the
tenant’s December 1, 1978 letter effectively exercised the option to renew the lease. Id. at
56.
       {¶ 37} A significant number of Ohio courts have applied the equitable principles
announced in Ward with approval. See KeyBank, N.A., 2011-Ohio-1934, at ¶ 53; Vivi
Retail, Inc., 2008-Ohio-4705, at ¶ 21-23; Gehret v. Rismiller, 2d Dist. No. 06CA1705, 2007-
Ohio-1893, ¶ 24-25; Molner v. Castle Bail Bonds, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 04CA2808, 2005-
Ohio-6643, ¶ 48-50, 72; Convenient Food Mart, Inc. v. Atwell Properties, Ltd., 11th Dist.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                                     13

No. 2003-L-174, 2005-Ohio-704, ¶ 25-26; Burns v. Norcott, 12th Dist. No. CA97-08-036
(Mar. 30, 1998); Paterakis v. Estate of Tuma, 66 Ohio App.3d 373, 376-77 (8th Dist.1990);
Gentithes Trust v. Patio Enclosures, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 89-T-4226 (July 6, 1990); Mentor
Lagoons, Inc. v. Ventra, 11th Dist. No. 89-L-14-026 (Sept. 7, 1990); Evans v. Bauer, 2d
Dist. No. 2445 (Aug. 31, 1989); Urology Servs., Inc. v. Greene, 8th Dist. No. 50205 (Mar. 6,
1986); Benton v. Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co., 6th Dist. No. WD-85-9 (Oct. 25, 1985).
See also Sierra 76, Inc. at 817 (applying the equitable principles announced in Ward to a
diversity case applying Ohio law).3
        {¶ 38} In Capuano, we held that a court could “relieve a lessee from the
consequences of a tardy renewal of a lease when the lessee meets the requirements for
obtaining equitable relief * * * set forth” in Ward. Id. The tenant in Capuano “had a copy
of the lease at all times,” was “aware” of the renewal option in the lease, did “not maintain
any system for reminding him of the renewal date,” and simply “attempted to exercise his
option about seven weeks late.” Id. As such, the record demonstrated that the tenant’s
failure to timely submit the renewal notice resulted from negligence rather than an honest
mistake. Id. The tenant had not made improvements to the leased premises and, after the
tenant failed to renew the lease, the landlord and the subtenant who occupied the premises
“entered into a new lease for the premises.” Id. Accordingly, the tenant in Capuano was
not entitled to equitable relief pursuant to the equitable principles announced in Ward.
        {¶ 39} SuperAsh notes that one Ohio court has disagreed with Ward’s holding. In
Fifth Third Bank W. Ohio v. Carrol Bldg. Co., 180 Ohio App.3d 490, 2009-Ohio-57 (2d
Dist.), the court found Ward’s holding regarding equitable relief irreconcilable “with the
supreme court’s holdings that unambiguous contractual language must be enforced as
written, even when it will work a hardship on one party (or parties) and an advantage to
another.” Carroll Bldg. Co. at ¶ 16. The tenant in Carroll Bldg. Co. defaulted on mortgage
obligations secured by its leasehold interest, and the court appointed a receiver who made
timely payments on the tenant’s obligations. Id. at ¶ 4-5. Although the receiver “had the

3 Many courts outside of Ohio also permit equity to relieve a lessee from their failure to timely submit a notice

to renew a lease. See, e.g., Duncan v. G.E.W., Inc., 526 A.2d 1358, 1364 (D.C.App.1987), quoting Annot., 27
A.L.R. 4th 266, 271 (1984) (stating that in jurisdictions that accept and enforce the honest mistake doctrine,
equity will relieve a tenant from their failure to submit a timely notice of renewal if “ ‘(1) the tenant’s delay in
renewing was slight, (2) delay did not prejudice the landlord, and (3) failure to grant relief would cause a
tenant unconscionable hardship’ ”).
No. 22AP-638                                                                                           14

authority to exercise the lease options,” the receiver did not provide the landlord with the
tenant’s renewal notice by the date specified in the lease. Id. at ¶ 6. The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the tenant was entitled to equitable relief under
Ward. The appellate court explained that it disagreed with Ward’s holding and that the
“evidence [in the case did] not support the trial court’s conclusion that the circumstances
justified” equitable relief. Carroll Bldg. Co. at ¶ 17.
        {¶ 40} SuperAsh notes that Ward is not controlling authority in this court and
contends that we should not find Ward to be persuasive authority either, considering
Carroll Bldg. Co. As an appellate court in this state, “ ‘[w]e are bound by the decisions of
the Supreme Court and generally, by past precedent produced by our own district.
Decisions from our sister districts, while assistive and many times highly persuasive,
neither bind this court nor the various trial court’s within its jurisdiction.’ ” Estate of
Auckland v. Broadview NH, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-661, 2017-Ohio-5602, ¶ 21,
quoting Keytack v. Warren, 11th Dist. No. 2005-T-0152, 2006-Ohio-5179, ¶ 51. Accord
Stapleton v. Holstein, 131 Ohio App.3d 596, 598 (4th Dist.1998). As noted, the Supreme
Court has never addressed whether equity may relieve a tenant from their failure to timely
exercise an option to renew a lease and, in Capuano, this court adopted and applied the
equitable principles announced in Ward.               The Carroll Bldg. Co. court’s conclusion
regarding Ward has not been adopted by another court in this state, while many Ohio
appellate courts have adopted Ward’s holding.4 Considering the foregoing, the trial court
did not err by following this court’s prior precedent in Capuano and applying the equitable
principles announced in Ward to the present case.
        {¶ 41} Under Ward, a court may grant a tenant equitable relief from the tenant’s
failure to timely submit a notice to renew a lease if: (1) the failure resulted from accident,
fraud, surprise, or honest mistake and the landlord would not be prejudiced, or (2) even in
the absence of an honest mistake, the tenant made valuable improvements to the leased
property and the landlord would not be prejudiced. Capuano, citing Ward. Thus, under
either scenario, a court must find that the landlord will not suffer prejudice. In this context,
the prejudice to the landlord “must arise from the delay itself. Specifically, the landlord

4 See also Starvaggi Indus., Inc. v. Weirton Plaza Dev., Ltd. Partnership, N.D.W.V. Dist. No. 5:14CV66

(STAMP) (Mar. 3, 2015) (a federal case applying Ohio law and stating that, while the court agreed with the
analysis in Carrol Bldg. Co., the “same result occur[red]” even if the court applied Ward).
No. 22AP-638                                                                              15

must have changed his position in reliance upon the late notice.” Vivi Retail, Inc., 2008-
Ohio-4705, at ¶ 22.
       {¶ 42} In Vivi Retail, Inc., the court concluded the landlord had not changed its
position in reliance on the tenant’s late notice because the landlord “had not secured
another tenant nor had it entered into a lease agreement with another tenant” following the
tenant’s late renewal notice. Vivi Retail, Inc., at ¶ 23. See also KeyBank, N.A., 2011-Ohio-
1934, at ¶ 57 (finding no evidence of prejudice because the landlord “just maintained the
status quo” and “did not invest any money, did not incur any expense, and did not obtain a
mortgage on the building” after the tenant failed to exercise a purchase option under the
lease); Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 2005-Ohio-704, at ¶ 26 (finding evidence of prejudice
because the landlord “entered into a lease agreement with another lessee subsequent to [the
tenant’s] failure to timely renew”).
       {¶ 43} The trial court concluded that SuperAsh would suffer no prejudice if the
court granted Ashland equitable relief because SuperAsh “took no action in reliance on the
absence of timely notice.” (Am. Declaratory Jgmt. at ¶ 2.) The court noted that between
September 3 and November 3, 2021, SuperAsh “did not change its position, or even
genuinely anticipate that Ashland would not renew.” (Opinion at 8.) The record supports
the court’s conclusions.
       {¶ 44} Woldenberg acknowledged that, aside from “reaching out to Speedway and
being turned down,” SuperAsh did not even attempt to market the properties for sale or
lease. (Tr. Vol. I at 203.)       Woldenberg affirmed that SuperAsh had not made any
improvements to the properties, taken mortgages out on the properties, or listed the
properties with a broker or real estate agent in reliance on the late notice. Woldenberg
admitted that in 2021, he “suspected that Ashland would want to renew [the ground leases]
for 2022.” (Tr. Vol. II at 52.)
       {¶ 45} Feller stated that SuperAsh did not even “try to negotiate” with leasing
brokers to list the properties, because SuperAsh believed that “no leasing broker would be
willing to undertake the leasing assignment” due to the present dispute. (Tr. Vol. II at 103,
119.) However, even when litigation regarding a late renewal notice seems likely, a lessor
may demonstrate prejudice by entering into a conditional lease with a prospective tenant.
See Capuano (noting that the landlord and subtenant “entered into a new lease for the
No. 22AP-638                                                                                16

premises which lease [was] contingent upon [the landlord] prevailing in th[e] litigation”);
Sierra 76, Inc. at 813 (stating that after the tenant failed to submit a timely renewal notice,
the landlord entered into a lease with another tenant which was “conditional, depending on
the outcome of this litigation”); Starvaggi Indus. v. Weirton Plaza Dev. Ltd. Partnership,
N.D.W.V. No. 5:14CV66 (STAMP) (Mar. 3, 2015). Although SuperAsh reached out to
Speedway, Speedway “refused to engage in any kind of negotiations with [SuperAsh]” and
“made it clear they didn’t want to speak to [SuperAsh].” (Tr. Vol. I at 192, Vol. II at 12.)
SuperAsh’s unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a lease with Speedway did not establish
prejudice resulting from the late notice. See Vivi Retail, Inc. at ¶ 23 (noting that although
the landlord “engaged in negotiations with another” potential tenant, the negotiations did
not establish prejudice because the landlord “did not enter into a lease” with the potential
tenant).
       {¶ 46} SuperAsh contends it will suffer prejudice if Ashland is permitted to renew
the ground leases because it “will lose its express contractual right to the property and its
improvements” and because “the rent under the [ground] leases” for the 2022 term “was
considerably less than fair market value.” (Appellant’s Brief at 48.) However, these alleged
instances of prejudice simply concern the provisions in the ground leases regarding the
improvements and rent. Neither situation amounts to a change of position by SuperAsh in
reliance on the late 2022 renewal notice.        While SuperAsh contends the trial court
“artificially limited the time period for consideration of prejudice to September 3, 2021 to
November 3, 2021,” SuperAsh does not allege that it changed its position in reliance on
Ashland’s late renewal notice after November 3, 2021. (Appellant’s Brief at 49.)
Woldenberg acknowledged at trial that, even after November 3, 2021, SuperAsh did not
secure a new tenant for the properties or attempt to sell the properties.
       {¶ 47} Had SuperAsh taken serious steps to attempt to secure new tenants or sell
the properties after Ashland failed to submit the 2022 renewal notice the balance of the
equities may have tipped in SuperAsh’s favor. However, the record demonstrates that
SuperAsh did not change its position in reliance on the late 2022 renewal notice in any way.
As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that SuperAsh would not
suffer prejudice if the court granted Ashland equitable relief.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 17

         {¶ 48} SuperAsh does not allege the trial court erred by concluding that Ashland and
Speedway would forfeit millions of dollars in valuable improvements on the properties in
the absence of equitable relief. In Capuano, we explained that, while the failure to exercise
an option “does not result in forfeiture” of the option itself, it may result in a forfeiture of
the “valuable improvements on the property [that the tenant made] in good faith, intending
to renew the lease.” Id., citing J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 397 N.Y.S.2d
958, 960-61 (1977). See also KeyBank, N.A., 2011-Ohio-1934, at ¶ 59; Benton. Ashland
purchased the improvements on the properties in 2013 for $13,770,000 and Speedway
spent $11,877,976.84 in improvements to the properties between 2014 and 2022.
Accordingly, even in the absence of an honest mistake, because plaintiffs would forfeit
millions of dollars of valuable improvements on the properties if the leases terminated and
SuperAsh would not be prejudiced, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
plaintiffs equitable relief.
         {¶ 49} We also find that, under the unique facts of the present case, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by determining that Ashland’s failure to timely submit the 2022
renewal notice resulted from an honest mistake. The Ward court explained that equity will
not tolerate a forfeiture “where the lessees’ delay [in submitting the renewal notice] was
attributable to * * * an honest mistake, where there was no willful or deliberate act or
omission of the lessees.” Ward at 54. When a tenant has full knowledge of the lease renewal
date and does not attempt to submit a timely renewal notice, the tenant’s failure to do so
results from a willful omission rather than an honest mistake. See Convenient Food Mart,
Inc., 2005-Ohio-704, at ¶ 26 (finding no evidence of honest mistake because “both
[tenants] knew exactly when the lease term ended,” and the tenants did not even “attempt
to exercise the second renewal option until they sent the [renewal notice] * * * a full month
and a half after the deadline had passed”); Gehret, 2007-Ohio-1893, at ¶ 25 (finding no
evidence of honest mistake because the option-holder had “full knowledge of the deadline
for providing written notice” and simply “failed to provide written notice by either of the
two methods available to him in the option”); Burns; Paterakis at 377; Capuano; Starvaggi
Indus.
         {¶ 50} In contrast, where a tenant is reasonably mistaken regarding the renewal date
or takes reasonable steps to submit a timely renewal notice, the tenant’s failure to submit
No. 22AP-638                                                                              18

the renewal notice may result from an honest mistake. See Ward at 53; Evans (finding the
tenant made an honest mistake regarding the renewal date because the termination date in
the lease was ambiguous); Vivi Retail, Inc., at ¶ 21-23 (finding evidence of honest mistake
because the landlord usually “notified [the tenant] in advance when he need[ed] to exercise
his renewal option by a certain date” and the landlord “testified that he believed that [the
tenant’s] failure to timely renew was an honest mistake”); Sierra 76, Inc., 848 F.Supp.2d at
817-18 (finding genuine issues of material facts regarding whether a “computer
malfunction[]” that “somehow eras[ed]” the programmed notifications in the tenant’s
president’s computer, including the notification regarding the lease renewal date,
amounted to “accident, surprise or honest mistake”).
       {¶ 51} The evidence demonstrated that Wallach prepared the 2022 renewal notice
in August 2021, Whitaker signed the 2022 renewal notice on August 11, 2021 and returned
the signed 2022 renewal notice to Wallach as instructed. On August 12, 2021, Wallach
emailed a copy of the signed renewal notice to Valvoline, stating that the renewal notice had
been “sent by Ashland to [SuperAsh]” as was “the case last year.” (Joint Ex. 9.) When
Woldenberg emailed Whitaker on November 3, 2021, Whitaker responded to the email in
15 minutes attaching the 2022 renewal notice to the email. Compare Urology Servs., Inc.
(noting that “[e]ven if [the tenant’s] failure to timely exercise the option was due to an
‘honest mistake,’ the fact that” the tenant waited “almost one month” to respond to the
landlord’s letter regarding the late renewal notice demonstrated “a lack of diligence and
good faith on the part of [the] appellant”).
       {¶ 52} SuperAsh contends that Ashland failed to present evidence demonstrating
why it did not send the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh or that it intended to renew the
ground leases for the 2022 term. However, Whitaker testified it was his “understanding
[Wallach thought he] was going to send it and [he] thought [Wallach] was going to send it.”
(Tr. Vol. I at 128.)   Whitaker stated that the failure to send the 2022 renewal notice to
SuperAsh was the result of a “miscommunication” between “[Wallach] and myself.” (Tr.
Vol. I at 128.) In Benton, the court held that where the tenant failed to timely submit a
notice under the lease due to “a failure in communication between [the tenant] and his
attorney, each believing that the other would send the required written notice,” the failure
to submit the notice resulted from an “honest mistake.”
No. 22AP-638                                                                                19

       {¶ 53} Whitaker explained that, because he “signed [the 2022 renewal notice], it was
clearly the intent that [Ashland was] planning to renew.” (Tr. Vol. I at 52.) Whitaker
admitted that due to the separate lawsuits, he was unsure exactly who would send the
renewal notice to SuperAsh. Whitaker also noted that, if there had been any need “to not
renew it, [he] would have assumed somebody at that point would have told [him] that we
weren’t renewing.” (Tr. Vol. I at 52.) However, Whitaker reiterated that “the intent after
[him] signing it was to renew.” (Tr. Vol. I at 77.)
       {¶ 54} Although SuperAsh contends Ashland may have withheld the 2022 renewal
notice “pursuant to some strategy being pursued against Speedway and Valvoline” in the
separate lawsuits, SuperAsh cites nothing to support this contention. (Appellant’s Brief at
48.) Notably, Wallach’s August 12, 2021 email to Valvoline resolved the issue of which party
would send the renewal notice to SuperAsh in that litigation. The trial court appropriately
found “no evidence that Ashland’s delay was a calculated strategy.” (Opinion at 11.)
       {¶ 55} The trial court found Whitaker’s testimony regarding the 2022 renewal
notice to be credible. An appellate court generally defers to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, because the trial court is in the best position “to evaluate the evidence by
viewing the witnesses and observing their demeanor, voice inflections, and gestures.”
Sparre v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-381, 2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 12, citing
Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Accordingly, the evidence
demonstrated that Ashland intended to renew the ground leases for the 2022 term, took
reasonable steps to timely renew the ground leases by executing the renewal notice in
August 2021, and that the failure to timely submit the renewal notice resulted from a
miscommunication between Whitaker and Wallach regarding who would send the notice.
As such, the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Ashland’s failure to timely
submit the 2022 renewal notice resulted from an honest mistake and that Ashland was
entitled to equitable relief.
       {¶ 56} SuperAsh contends the plaintiffs were ineligible for equitable relief in the
present case because they both had adequate remedies at law. However, because the
present case involved plaintiffs’ request for equitable relief with respect to their leasehold
interests in the subject properties, plaintiffs were entitled to equitable relief regardless of
whether legal remedies may have also been available. See Gleason v. Gleason, 64 Ohio
No. 22AP-638                                                                               20

App.3d 667, 672 (4th Dist.1991), quoting 71 American Jurisprudence 2d 144, Specific
Performance, Section 112 (1973) (stating that “ ‘where land is the subject matter of the
agreement, the jurisdiction of equity to grant [relief] does not depend upon the existence of
special facts showing the inadequacy of a legal remedy in the particular case’ ”); Sholiton
Industries, Inc. v. Wright State Univ., 2d Dist. No. 95-CA-101 (Sept. 20, 1996) (noting that
“this principle applies equally to leasehold interests in commercial property”); Holstein,
2003-Ohio-4760, at ¶ 16, quoting Link v. Burke, 5 Ohio Law Abs. 676, 677 (8th Dist.1926).
       {¶ 57} SuperAsh further contends that Ashland was ineligible for equitable relief
because it came to the case with unclean hands. All equitable doctrines are “subject to the
fundamental doctrine that ‘he who seeks equity must do equity, and that he must come into
court with clean hands.’ ” State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Lorain Ordinance
No. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 2002-Ohio-4194, ¶ 35, quoting
Christman v. Christman, 171 Ohio St. 152, 154 (1960). “[T]he doctrine of unclean hands
requires a showing that [the party at issue] engaged in reprehensible conduct, not merely
negligent conduct.” State ex rel. Columbus Coalition for Responsive Govt. v. Blevins, 140
Ohio St.3d 294, 2014-Ohio-3745, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 136 Ohio St.3d 371, 2013-Ohio-3867, ¶ 16. See Wiley v. Wiley, 3d Dist. No. 9-
06-34, 2007-Ohio-6423, ¶ 15. The trial court summarily rejected SuperAsh’s unclean
hands arguments, finding “no colorable showing of reprehensible misconduct by Ashland
or by Speedway.” (Opinion at 16.)
       {¶ 58} SuperAsh initially contends that Ashland had unclean hands in the present
action because it filed suit against Valvoline, Speedway, and SuperAsh. SuperAsh cites no
authority, and we find none, to support its contention that filing a non-frivolous lawsuit
could support a finding of unclean hands. SuperAsh further contends that Ashland came
to court with unclean hands due to its conduct toward Speedway and Valvoline in the
separate lawsuits. However, the unclean hands doctrine “ ‘requires only that the plaintiff
must not be guilty of reprehensible conduct with respect to the subject-matter of his suit.’ ”
Goldberger v. Bexley Properties, 5 Ohio St.3d 82, 85 (1983), quoting Kinner v. Lake Shore
& Michigan S. Ry. Co., 69 Ohio St. 339 (1904), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accord N.
Coast Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, Inc., 16 Ohio App.3d 342 (8th Dist.1984),
paragraph two of the syllabus (stating that the “ ‘clean hands’ doctrine concerns grossly
No. 22AP-638                                                                                                    21

inequitable behavior in the underlying transaction which is the subject matter of the suit”).
(Emphasis sic.) Ashland’s conduct toward Speedway and Valvoline in the separate lawsuits
was not relevant to the clean hands issue in the present case.
        {¶ 59} SuperAsh also asserts that Ashland engaged in reprehensible conduct
because it failed to comply with the renewal provisions in the ground leases and initially
“misrepresented” to SuperAsh that it had timely sent the 2022 renewal notice. (Appellant’s
Brief at 53.) Although Wallach indicated to SuperAsh on November 11, 2021 that Ashland
had timely sent the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh, on November 14, 2021 Whitaker sent
an email to Feller clarifying that Ashland was “unable to track down concrete evidence of
the delivery.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 13.) SuperAsh fails to demonstrate that Ashland engaged in
reprehensible conduct with respect to the 2022 renewal notice. SuperAsh further contends
that Ashland came to court with unclean hands because it “refused to allow Wallach, the
only person who actually knew whether an honest mistake had occurred, to testify.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 53.) While Ashland chose not to call Wallach as a witness, there is
nothing in the record to support SuperAsh’s contention that Ashland refused to allow
Wallach to testify.5 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
Ashland came to court with clean hands in the present case.
        {¶ 60} SuperAsh lastly asserts the trial court erred by finding equitable estoppel
prevented SuperAsh from claiming the ground leases terminated on December 31, 2021.
However, because we have already determined the trial court did not err by granting
Ashland equitable relief, any error in the court’s equitable estoppel analysis would amount
to harmless error. See Civ.R. 61 (stating that a court “must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”); Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hall, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1256, 2005-Ohio-3811, ¶ 19; Wallick Properties
Midwest, L.L.C. v. Jama, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-299, 2021-Ohio-2830, ¶ 20; O’Brien v.
Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 164 (1980). See also State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole

5 The record demonstrates the trial court limited each party to three depositions during discovery. See Civ.R.

26(B)(6)(a) (stating that “the court may limit the number of depositions”). After SuperAsh met its deposition
limit, it asked the trial court to allow it to depose Wallach. At a September 14, 2022 status conference, the trial
court informed SuperAsh that it could not take Wallach’s deposition before the upcoming trial date. However,
the court stated SuperAsh could “revisit this [issue] after we see the testimony,” and that the court could
“potentially leave the record open and let [SuperAsh] go take [Wallach’s] deposition” after trial. (Sept. 14,
2022 Status Conf. Tr. at 12.) There is nothing in the record indicating that SuperAsh attempted to take
Wallach’s deposition after the trial concluded.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                 22

Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, ¶ 8 (holding that “[r]eviewing courts are not
authorized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis that some or all of the lower court’s
reasons are erroneous”). As such, we need not address SuperAsh’s contentions regarding
the trial court’s equitable estoppel analysis.
       {¶ 61} Based on the foregoing, SuperAsh’s first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Second Assignment of Error – Privileged Documents
       {¶ 62} SuperAsh’s second assignment of error asserts the trial court erred by
compelling SuperAsh to produce privileged documents and by admitting the allegedly
privileged documents at trial. SuperAsh contends the trial court erred by admitting
plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, and 17.
       {¶ 63} The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987). “Error in the admission
or exclusion of evidence is grounds for reversal only where substantial rights of the
complaining party were affected or substantial justice appears not to have been done.”
Jarvis v. Hasan, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-578, 2015-Ohio-1779, ¶ 70, citing Faieta v. World
Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 73. See Evid.R. 103(A)(1).
“To show an evidentiary ruling has affected a substantial right, the party must demonstrate
that the alleged error impacted the final determination of the case.” Jarvis at ¶ 70, citing
Lips v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Med., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-374, 2013-Ohio-1205, ¶ 49.
       {¶ 64} At the conclusion of trial the parties provided the court with a list of “the
exhibits to which the parties have agreed,” which included plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 7, 9, 13, 15,
16, and 17. (Tr. Vol. III at 4.) SuperAsh did not object to any of the noted exhibits when
they were admitted at trial. SuperAsh also elicited testimony from the witnesses regarding
some of the exhibits. For instance, SuperAsh’s counsel asked Woldenberg if he created
plaintiff’s exhibit 4, the February 22, 2021 analysis, “for presentation to [the SuperAsh]
limited partners, as to whether to accept or reject the late November 2020 notice?” (Tr.
Vol. II at 36.) Woldenberg affirmed that was why he created the analysis. SuperAsh’s
counsel also asked Whitaker and Woldenberg about plaintiff’s exhibit 13, the November 14,
2021 email Whitaker sent to Feller stating that Ashland could not find evidence
demonstrating it delivered the 2022 renewal notice to SuperAsh.
No. 22AP-638                                                                                     23

       {¶ 65} “ ‘In the absence of plain error, a failure to object to evidence presented at
trial constitutes a waiver of any challenge on appeal.’ ” Brooks-Lee v. Lee, 10th Dist. No.
03AP-1149, 2005-Ohio-2288, ¶ 43, quoting Barnett v. Thorton, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-951,
2002-Ohio-3332, ¶ 20. Accord Sain v. Roo, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-360 (Oct. 23, 2001)
(stating that where a party “fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, all but plain
error is waived”); Evid.R. 103(A)(1), (D). Although SuperAsh claimed the noted exhibits
were privileged during discovery, SuperAsh needed to object and assert privilege at trial to
preserve the issue for appeal. See Akers v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-
575, 2005-Ohio-5160, ¶ 20 (holding that, even if a party “assert[ed] privilege during
discovery as to certain documents and testimony,” the party’s failure to “object and to assert
privilege at trial constituted a waiver of any privilege with [respect to the document], at a
minimum”).
       {¶ 66} In civil cases, “the plain error doctrine is not favored” and should be applied
only in the “extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which
no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the
underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-23 (1997).
The civil plain error doctrine “implicates errors in the judicial process where the error is
clearly apparent on the face of the record and is prejudicial to the appellant.” Brooks-Lee
v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-284, 2012-Ohio-373, ¶ 26, citing Reichert v. Ingersoll, 18 Ohio
St.3d 220, 223 (1985).
       {¶ 67} SuperAsh does not explain how any of the noted exhibits influenced the trial
court’s final determination in the case. The trial court referenced plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 7, 9,
and 13 in its final opinion, but these exhibits were not the basis for the trial court’s
conclusion regarding equitable relief. Indeed, the court’s opinion demonstrates that even
in the absence of plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, and 17, the court still would have found
that SuperAsh did not change its position in reliance on the late notice, that Ashland and
Speedway would forfeit millions of dollars in improvements if the ground leases
terminated, and that Ashland’s failure to timely submit the 2022 renewal notice was the
result of an honest mistake. SuperAsh does not contend that the trial court’s decision to
admit the exhibits affected the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
No. 22AP-638                                                                          24

process. As such, SuperAsh fails to demonstrate that the trial court plainly erred by
admitting plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, or 17.
       {¶ 68} Based on the foregoing, SuperAsh’s second assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
       {¶ 69} Having overruled SuperAsh’s two assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                    Judgment affirmed.
                      LUPER SCHUSTER and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.