Court Opinion

ID: 9569735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:16:51.238105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:52.234170
License: Public Domain

Pope, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, I write separately to comment on the majority’s disposition of defendant’s second enumeration of error. This enumeration was stated very generally: “The trial court committed harmful error when it gave erroneous instructions on the law in its final charge to the jury.” Yet this general enumeration of error was then elucidated by defendant in his brief, in which he set forth specific and detailed arguments challenging two of the trial court’s jury instructions.
Under the Appellate Practice Act, an enumeration of error can and often will indicate the subject matter of the appellant’s argument “ ‘only in the most general way.’ ” MacDonald v. MacDonald, 156 Ga. App. 565, 568 (1c) (275 SE2d 142) (1980). “It follows that without the aid of the brief of counsel, this court frequently cannot identify or pass upon the contention which the appellant seeks to urge as cause for reversal. Indubitably, where the error enumerated is not intelligible in itself the brief must make it so, or this court has nothing before *192it for decision.” Wall v. Rhodes, 112 Ga. App. 572 (1) (145 SE2d 756) (1965). See also MacDonald, 156 Ga. App. at 566-569 (noting that although every enumeration had to clearly specify the error alleged before passage of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, courts will now look to the notice of appeal, the record and the brief to ascertain the error complained of).1 We cannot consider an appellant’s argument if he has enlarged or changed an enumeration of error, but we can and should if he states his enumeration in the generality and then presents his argument in his brief with greater specificity. I therefore do not agree that we cannot consider defendant’s arguments under his second enumeration of error because they were not plainly and specifically set forth in his enumeration.
Defendant also set forth two assertions of error within one enumeration of error. We have held that because the practice of including more than one assertion of error in' a single enumeration of error “creates a fair risk that ambiguity, misdirection, or confusion as to the errors asserted will occur,” we may, in the exercise of our sound discretion, elect to treat one or more of the asserted errors as abandoned. West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825, 830 (4c) (397 SE2d 567) (1990). Here, there is no risk of ambiguity or confusion because although two errors are asserted under the second enumeration of error, they are clearly delineated and separately discussed as “2A” and “2B.” Under these circumstances, I think we should address the merits of both the asserted errors.
Defendant argues in this enumeration of error that the trial court erred in (a) giving an unrequested charge on good character and (b) defining the offense of aggravated assault in his charge to include assault with intent to murder as well as assault with a deadly weapon, even though defendant was only charged in the indictment with assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court did not err in charging on good character because defendant presented evidence of his good character and the instruction given was a correct statement of the law. See Barfoot v. State, 173 Ga. App. 461 (326 SE2d 791) (1985). And the allegedly overbroad definition of aggravated assault in the charge was not harmful error, as the trial court read the indictment to the jury, provided the jury with the indictment for its deliberations, and instructed the jury that the indictment formed the issue they were impaneled to decide. See Wimby v. State, 200 Ga. App. 217 (407 SE2d 773) (1991). Accordingly, both of the errors asserted in defendant’s second enumeration of error are without merit, and I agree that defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
*193Decided February 25, 1994.
Shandor S. Badaruddin, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Nate Dobson, Jr., Vivian D. Hoard, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

 Pepper v. Pepper, 169 Ga. 832 (152 SE 103), cited by the majority, is a 1930 case.