Court Opinion

ID: 9716595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:45:34.003882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.105521
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: The Illinois Human Rights Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 1 — 101 et seq.) prohibits certain types of discrimination in employment (article 2), real estate transactions (article 3), access to financial credit (article 4), and the availability of public accommodations (article 5). It also prohibits sexual harassment in higher education (article 5A). It is apparent that the only sections of the Act which could conceivably apply to the case at bar are contained in article 5, entitled “Public Accommodations. ” Section 5 — 101 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 101) provides the following pertinent definitions for purposes of article 5: “(A) Place of Public Accommodation. (1) ‘Place of public accommodation’ means a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. (2) By way of example, but not of limitation, ‘place of public accommodation’ includes facilities of the following types: inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, *** roads, omnibuses, busses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and amusement. * * * (C) Public Official. ‘Public official’ means any officer or employee of the state or any agency thereof, including state political subdivisions, municipal corporations, park districts, forest preserve districts, educational institutions and schools.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, pars. 5 — 101(A), (C). Section 5 — 102 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5— 102), provides that it is a civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to: “(A) Enjoyment of Facilities. Deny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and services of any public place of accommodation; *** (C) Public Officials. Deny or refuse to another, as a public official, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantage, facilities or privileges of the official’s office or services or of any property under the official’s care because of unlawful discrimination.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, pars. 5— 102(A), (C). The majority concludes that it does not matter whether the university is considered a place of public accommodation within the context of its academic programs because section 5 — 102(C), which prohibits discrimination by a public official, does not require that such discrimination take place within a place of public accommodation. The majority reasons that, because officers and employees of the university are clearly public officials within the meaning of the Act, they may not unlawfully discriminate even in the context of the university’s academic programs, regardless of whether such programs constitute places of public accommodation. I think the majority’s conclusion is patently wrong. A plain reading of Article 5 of the Act, and the Act as a whole, indicates that Article 5 applies only to places of public accommodation and prohibits discrimination by public officials only in places of public accommodation. If this were not the case, there would be no logical reason to include section 5 — 102(C) within article 5, which deals only with places of public accommodation. Furthermore, a plain reading of Article 5 of the Act, and of the Act as a whole, leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the university is not a place of public accommodation, at least in the context of its academic programs. Section 5 — 101(A)(1) of the Act defines a place of public accommodation as a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation or transportation facility whose goods and services are made available to the general public. When interpreting a statute, courts must give the language of that statute its plain and ordinary meaning. (Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 24, 50-51, 563 N.E.2d 465, 477.) According the words of section 5 — 101(AX1) their plain and ordinary meanings, it can hardly be said that the academic programs of a university fall "within any of these categories. The academic programs of a university cannot reasonably be classified as a business, which is ordinarily considered a commercial or mercantile endeavor. Nor can a university’s academic programs reasonably be classified as an accommodation, which is defined as, and ordinarily considered to be, something that is supplied for convenience or to satisfy a need, such as lodging, food and services as at a hotel, or a seat or berth as on a train. (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 12 (1976).) Finally, the academic programs of a university would not ordinarily be considered a refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility. Furthermore, the services and facilities of a university’s academic program are not available to the general public. Instead, they are available only to qualified students who meet rigid admission requirements. Only to those students who meet the requirements for admission are the services, facilities, and privileges of the university’s academic programs available. In this respect, the university’s academic programs resemble a private club, which is expressly exempted from the prohibitions of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5— 103(A).) Indeed, the majority acknowledges that the public at large has no right to freely partake of the university’s academic programs. My conclusion that the academic programs of a university are not places of public accommodation within the meaning of the Act is made clear by an examination of the enumerated examples of places of public accommodation contained in section 5 — 102(AX2). That section sets forth by way of example, but not of limitation, such places of public accommodation as restaurants, hotels, taverns, retail stores, barber shops, bathrooms, theatres, railroads, cemeteries “and other places of public accommodation and amusement.” This list of examples of places of public accommodations does not include schools or universities. While the list is meant to be illustrative and not exclusive, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of things and then includes “other things,” the word “other” is interpreted as meaning “other such like.” (Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 475 N.E.2d 536, 539.) Looking at the places of public accommodation enumerated in section 5 — 102(A)(2), I do not find that a university is similar to any of those places enumerated. The places listed include retail businesses, places of accommodation such as hotels and restaurants, and places of amusement or entertainment such as theatres and skating rinks. Nothing included in the list is similar to a university. Thus, I must conclude that the academic programs of a university are not considered a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the Act. I find further support for my conclusion in the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court in interpreting a similar definition of “public accommodation” in its own civil rights statute. In deciding that the academic programs of a university did not fall within the definition of a public accommodation, the court stated: “Based upon the facts of this case, we hold that the University of New Mexico is not a ‘public accommodation’ within the meaning of the New Mexico Human Rights Act [citation], and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission in this instance. In so holding, we look to the historical and traditional meanings as to what constitutes a ‘public accommodation’. The prohibition against discrimination in public accommodation arose from the common law duties of innkeepers and public carriers to provide their services to the public without imposing unreasonable conditions. See Avins, What is a Place of ‘Public’ Accommodation?, 52 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1968). The United States Supreme Court recognized these common law duties when it stated that ‘[i]nnkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.’ Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25, 3 S. Ct. 18, 31, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). Early statutes in most states tended to codify the common law by prohibiting discrimination in places of lodging, entertainment and public transportation. See Avins, supra. Universities were not considered public accommodations under the early statutes.” Human Rights Comm’n v. Board of Regents (1981), 95 N.M. 576, 577-78, 624 P.2d 518, 519-20. A court should not and cannot inject provisions not found in a statute, however desirable or beneficial they may be. (Droste v. Kerner (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 495, 504, 217 N.E.2d 73, 79; Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co. (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 53, 70, 218 N.E.2d 27, 36.) There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of a statute imports. (Droste, 34 Ill. 2d at 503, 217 N.E.2d at 78.) The legislature did not include the academic programs of a university as a place of public accommodation, either in the definition contained in section 5 — 101(A)(1), or in the list of examples contained in section 5— 101(A)(2), nor can I reasonably construe those sections to include the academic programs of a university. Finally, because I find no ambiguity in the language of the statute, I find that it is improper to resort to extrinsic aids to construction such as legislative history and legislative debates. (In re A.M.C. (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 775, 781, 500 N.E.2d 104, 108.) However, because the majority addresses the significance of the 1983 amendment to the Act (Public Act 83 — 89), which added article 5A prohibiting sexual harassment in higher education, I will do the same. Based upon its interpretation of the legislative debates surrounding this amendment, the majority concludes that unlawful discrimination in higher education was prohibited by the Act prior to the amendment, and that the addition of article 5A was an expansion on a university official’s liability rather than a limitation on it. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion, nor its interpretation of the legislative debates pertaining to Public Act 83 — 89. I interpret Representative Koehler’s remarks not as an indication that unlawful discrimination was already prohibited by the Act in higher education, but merely as an attempt to distinguish between discrimination on the basis of sex in any context and sexual harassment. Again, I find no language in the Act itself to indicate that a university is included in the definition of “place of public accommodation,” or that the legislature intended that it be so included. Furthermore, the language of section 1 — 102(A), which sets forth the public policy represented in the Act, evidences the legislature’s intent not to include universities within the purview of article 5 of the Act. That section states that the purpose of the Act is to secure for all individuals the freedom from unlawful discrimination in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations; and to prevent unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment in connection with real estate transactions based upon familial status and sexual harassment in higher education. I think that a plain reading of this section demonstrates the legislature’s intention to exclude higher education from the prohibition against unlawful discrimination, but to prohibit only sexual harassment within the academic programs of a university. I think this intention is apparent from a plain reading of the statute. The most recent amendment to section 1 — 102 (Public Act 87 — 579) does not alter my interpretation of this section. I also note the failure of a proposed bill which would have amended section 1 — 102(A) to expressly state that unlawful discrimination, as well as sexual harassment, is prohibited in higher education. I find it likely that the proposed bill failed because the legislature did not intend for the Act to address unlawful discrimination in higher education. Because an administrative agency has no greater powers than those conferred upon it by the legislative enactment creating it (Village of Lombard v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 503, 506, 363 N.E.2d 814, 815), I think the trial court properly granted the university a writ prohibiting the Department from further proceeding on the complaints of discrimination by the university in the context of its academic programs. I think it is important to mention that by my construction of the Act I do not wish to leave students such as the students here without a remedy. Discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap is as offensive in the classroom as in the workplace and should be as strongly condemned. However, I do not think the Act provides the appropriate remedy for the wrong. Although the Act is the exclusive remedy in those situations to which it applies (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 8 — 111(C)), because the academic programs of the university do not fall within the purview of the Act, students may seek redress elsewhere. (See Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 953, 527 N.E.2d 1281.) Thus, these students may find a remedy for unlawful discrimination in the classroom in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000d (1988)), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §§1681 through 1688 (1988)) and under other Federal statutory and Illinois constitutional and common law theories of discrimination. Finally, I note that with respect to functions of the university other than its academic programs, my decision as to whether the university is a place of public accommodation might be different.