Court Opinion

ID: 9353696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 16:17:28.763124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:02.378243
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tammy Meeker,                           :
         Appellant                      :
                                        :
         v.                             : No. 397 C.D. 2021
                                        : Submitted: September 16, 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
Department of Transportation,           :
Bureau of Driver Licensing              :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                       FILED: January 12, 2023

              Tammy Meeker (Licensee) appeals a decision of the Court of Common
Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) dismissing her statutory appeal of the decision
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing (PennDOT), to suspend her operating privilege for driving under
the influence (DUI). On appeal, Licensee argues that because PennDOT based its
12-month suspension on a prior DUI offense for which she had successfully
completed Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD), PennDOT lacked a basis
to suspend her operating privilege. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial
court.
              The facts in this matter are not in dispute. On August 2, 2018, Licensee
was accepted into ARD based on a January 27, 2018, charge of DUI, in violation of
Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3802(a)(1). Supplemental
Reproduced Record at 11b-12b, 14b (S.R.R. __). In accordance with Section
3807(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3807(d)(2) (relating to mandatory
suspension of operating privilege for ARD), PennDOT suspended Licensee’s
driver’s license for 30 days beginning August 1, 2018, and her license was restored
on August 31, 2018.
                 On July 24, 2020, Licensee was convicted of DUI for conduct that
occurred on November 4, 2018. On August 4, 2020, PennDOT notified Licensee
that it was suspending her operating privilege for 12 months, effective September 8,
2020. Licensee appealed.
                 A de novo hearing before the trial court was held on December 17,
    2020.   At the hearing, PennDOT submitted a certified packet of documents,
    including the DL-21 Form dated August 9, 2018, showing Licensee’s previous
    acceptance of ARD for the January 2018 DUI offense. The certified packet also
    included a DL-21 Form dated July 27, 2020, showing Licensee’s July 24, 2020,
    conviction for the November 2018 DUI offense. The exhibits were admitted into
    evidence. Licensee did not present any evidence and did not testify.
                 Before the trial court, PennDOT argued that Licensee’s acceptance of
ARD for a DUI offense constituted a prior offense under Section 3806 of the Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3806. Therefore, it properly imposed a 12-month suspension of
her operating privilege following her 2020 DUI conviction.
                 Licensee countered that her ARD for a DUI charge should not be
considered a prior offense for purposes of a license suspension. In Commonwealth
v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020),1 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code, which treats an ARD acceptance as a prior

1
    On October 4, 2022, the Superior Court overruled the decision in Chichkin. See infra at 7.
                                                  2
offense for purposes of sentencing, to be unconstitutional. Licensee argued that the
holding in Chichkin should be extended to license suspensions.
               On March 3, 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing
Licensee’s appeal. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a), PA. R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court explained that Chichkin, 232
A.3d 959, was irrelevant. In Chichkin, the defendant was convicted of two counts
of DUI and sentenced to 30 days to 6 months because of a 2013 DUI offense, for
which he had completed ARD. In Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the
United States Supreme Court held that an ARD acceptance is not a conviction
because a mandatory minimum sentence must be determined by a jury under a
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 964. Similarly, in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme Court
declared that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 965 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). Because
Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code treated an acceptance into ARD as a prior
conviction for purposes of subjecting a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence,
Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code was declared unconstitutional. Chichkin, 232
A.3d at 968.
               The trial court agreed that Licensee’s acceptance of ARD cannot be
considered a prior offense for the purpose of sentencing. However, Licensee’s
appeal concerned a license suspension, which is a civil matter. Because her prior
ARD imposed a civil consequence, as opposed to an enhanced criminal penalty, the
trial court concluded that Chichkin was not applicable.

                                         3
              On appeal,2 Licensee raises one issue. She argues that her due process
rights were violated when PennDOT suspended her driving privilege based on a
prior DUI offense, for which she accepted ARD. In making her argument, Licensee
relies on Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959.
              Section 3802(a) of the Vehicle Code establishes various offenses
related to driving under the influence of alcohol. It states:
              (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
              control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
              amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable
              of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of
              the movement of the vehicle.
              (2) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
              control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
              amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the
              individual's blood or breath is at least 0.08% but less than 0.10%
              within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been
              in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa. C.S. §3802(a). For violations of Section 3802, the Vehicle Code provides
both criminal and civil sanctions. Section 3804(e) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
              (1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an
                  individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified
                  record of the individual’s conviction of or an adjudication of
                  delinquency for:
                     (i)   an offense under section 3802;[]
                                                     ***

2
  This Court’s standard of review determines whether the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law, or whether
the trial court abused its discretion. Ferguson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 267 A.3d 628, 630 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
                                               4
            (2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with
            the following:
                   (i)   Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12
                         months for an ungraded misdemeanor or
                         misdemeanor of the second degree under this
                         chapter.
                                             ***
                   (iii) There shall be no suspension for an ungraded
                   misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the person is
                   subject to the penalties provided in subsection (a) and the
                   person has no prior offense.

75 Pa. C.S. §3804(e) (emphasis added). “Prior offense” is defined as follows:
            (a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term
            “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction
            for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication
            of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of
            Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of
            preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the present
            violation for any of the following:
                   (1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving
                   under influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
                   (2) an offense under former section 3731;
                   (3) an offense substantially similar to an offense under
                   paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or
                   (4) any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph
                   (1), (2) or (3).

75 Pa. C.S. §3806(a).
            Relying on Chichkin, Licensee argues that her acceptance into ARD
cannot be considered as a prior offense for a license suspension. This question was
recently decided by this Court in Ferguson, 267 A.3d at 628, petition for allowance

                                         5
of appeal granted, 280 A.3d 859 (Pa. 2022),3 petition for supersedeas and stay
granted (Pa., No. 73 MAP 2022, filed July 7, 2022).4 There, the licensee was
charged with DUI in violation of Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code and was
accepted into ARD, which he successfully completed. Eight years later, the licensee
pled guilty to a DUI in violation of Section 3802(a)(1). PennDOT suspended the
licensee’s operating privilege for 12 months in accordance with Section
3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code. Before this Court, relying on Chichkin, the
licensee argued that his acceptance and completion of ARD could not be considered
a prior offense under Section 3806(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code because the DUI charge
was dismissed. The licensee further argued that treating the acceptance of ARD as
a prior offense violated both procedural and substantive due process. We rejected
these arguments.
              We explained that Chichkin dealt with prior acceptance of ARD in a
DUI case “for purposes of subjecting a defendant to a mandatory minimum criminal
sentence” under the criminal sentencing provisions in Section 3804(a)-(d) of the
Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa. C.S. §3804(a)-(d). However, Section 3804(e) of the
Vehicle Code addresses the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege. Although

3
  On June 22, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal.
The issue on appeal is as follows:
        Did the Commonwealth Court err by ignoring the controlling decisions of this
        Court and the United States Supreme Court [by] holding that DUI statutes that
        penalize a defendant with a lengthy license suspension as a recidivist based on a
        prior acceptance of ARD disposition do not violate due process under the
        Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions even though the defendant who
        accepts ARD is presumed innocent and there is no proof of guilt?
Ferguson, 280 A.3d at 860.
4
  Licensee’s brief was filed on September 23, 2021, before this Court’s decision in Ferguson on
December 22, 2021. For this reason, Licensee does not address Ferguson or its progeny in her
brief to this Court.
                                               6
the ARD program is criminal in nature, a license suspension resulting from ARD is
civil in nature. This collateral consequence of the criminal proceeding did not
invalidate Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code. We reasoned that in a license
suspension, “the only issues are whether the licensee was in fact convicted, and
whether PennDOT has acted in accordance with applicable law.” Ferguson, 267
A.3d at 633 (quoting Spagnoletti v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 90 A.3d 759, 766 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
              More recently, in Hazlett v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1007 C.D. 2020, filed September 30, 2022)
(unreported), Owens v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1268 C.D. 2022, filed September 30, 2022) (unreported), and
Boals v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1266 C.D. 2020, filed October 20, 2022) (unreported), this Court again
confirmed that Chichkin is not applicable to license suspension cases, and the
licensee’s ARD is a prior offense as defined in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code.5
              Additionally, on October 4, 2022, the Superior Court overruled
Chichkin. See Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc);
see also Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). It
held that treating a prior acceptance into ARD as a prior conviction for purposes of
imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code
“passes constitutional muster.” Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233. The Superior Court
explained that Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code appropriately notifies an individual
that ARD will constitute a prior offense for purposes of sentencing on a second or

5
  Unreported panel decisions of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for
[their] persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
                                              7
subsequent DUI. “Moreover, a defendant voluntarily enters the ARD program to
avoid prosecution on a first DUI charge, and he is free to reject participation in the
program if he wishes to avail himself of his full panoply of constitutional rights.”
Id.
             Based on Ferguson and its progeny, we reject Licensee’s argument that
acceptance of ARD for a DUI offense cannot be treated as a prior offense for
purposes of a license suspension for a DUI conviction. Licensee’s previous ARD
constitutes a prior offense as defined by Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code and
supports PennDOT’s 12-month suspension of her driver’s license.
             Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                            ____________________________________________
                            MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                          8
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tammy Meeker,                      :
         Appellant                 :
                                   :
     v.                            : No. 397 C.D. 2021
                                   :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,      :
Department of Transportation,      :
Bureau of Driver Licensing         :

                                 ORDER

           AND NOW, this 12th day of January, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Monroe County dated March 3, 2021, in the above-captioned
matter, is AFFIRMED.
                        _________________________________________________________
                        MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita