Court Opinion

ID: 9959951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 21:04:55.615509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:01.310822
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U
                                           No. 2-24-0059
                                      Order filed April 12, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                               IN THE

                                APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kane County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 24-CF-109
                                       )
JEREMY L. BRANNON,                     ) Honorable
                                       ) Salvatore LoPiccolo Jr.
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1     Held: Clear and convincing evidence established that defendant’s charges were
             detainable, defendant’s release posed a threat to the community, and no conditions
             existed to mitigate such a threat if defendant were released.

¶2     Defendant, Jeremy L. Brannon, timely appeals the circuit court’s order of pretrial detention

pursuant to Public Acts 101-562 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial

Fairness Act (Act).1 For the reasons below, we affirm.

       1
           The Act has also been referred to as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today

(SAFE-T) Act or the Pretrial Fairness Act. However, none of these names appear within the Illinois
2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On January 19, 2024, the State charged defendant with four counts of aggravated fleeing a

police officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), (3), (4) (West 2022)), one count of possession of a

controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2022)), and two counts of resisting or

obstructing a police officer (720 ILCS 5/1.22 (West 2022)). On that same day, the State filed its

verified petition to detain pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the

Code that “defendant [was] charged with a forcible felony offense *** or any other felony which

involves the threat of an infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement

and [that] *** defendant’s pretrial release pose[d] a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons in the community.” Furthermore, as an alternative basis for detention, the State

argued that defendant had “a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.”

¶5     Also on January 19, 2024, the court held a hearing on the State’s petition. During the

hearing, the State submitted a police synopsis into evidence, which described defendant’s arrest.

The police synopsis described how, on January 17, 2024, defendant’s car was spotted by police

officers who noticed the vehicle “appeared to have an illegal amount of tint applied to the front

and rear windows.” The officers ran the car’s plates and quickly determined that it belonged to

defendant, who “had a revoked license at this time and felony traffic warrants out of DuPage

County and Kendall County.” As police activated their emergency lights to attempt to stop

defendant’s vehicle, defendant pulled into a gas station, drove through a red light, and sped away

from police officers at 60 miles per hour, despite the fact that the local speed limit was 30 miles

per hour. Defendant then drove past a stop sign without stopping, struck another vehicle, and drove

Compiled Statutes or public acts.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

through a church parking lot, where he struck a crossing guard booth, disabling his car. Defendant

exited the car and fled on foot before he was finally apprehended after a struggle. Defendant

admitted to officers that he “had ‘some drugs.’ ” Officers found 1.2 grams of cocaine on

defendant’s person. Meanwhile, the driver of the vehicle defendant struck “complained of shoulder

pain but declined medical attention.”

¶6     The State described defendant’s criminal history:

                 “MS. [BECHTOLD]2 [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Judge, in terms of

       proffer regarding *** defendant’s criminal history, it *** includes a 1994 burglary out of

       DuPage County in which the defendant received four years in the Illinois Department of

       Corrections; a 1994 case out of Kane County which *** defendant ultimately pled to an

       aggravated discharge, a Class I felony, and was sentenced to seven years in the Illinois

       Department of Corrections; a 1999 case out of Kane County of a felon in possession of a

       weapon, a Class 3 felony, [for] which he received 24 months, a Department of Corrections

       sentence; a 2000-CF-2291 Kane County case of a reckless homicide, a Class 2 felony, the

       defendant was sentenced to 13 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections; a 14-CF-

       1917, Kane County case, resisting a peace officer resulting in injury, a Class 4. He did

       receive 24 months of probation. And a 2016-CF-17 that was a Kendall County case which

       it was manufacturing and delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony which he

       received 24 months of probation in April of 2018.

                 His driver’s license has been revoked since January 21st of 2005 as a result of the

       conviction in that reckless homicide case from Kane County. He currently has pending 20-

       2
           The transcript from the January 19, 2024, hearing incorrectly lists defense counsel as

providing the proffer of defendant’s criminal history.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

       CF-315. It is a Class 4 driving on revoked, the basis being the reckless homicide revocation

       that is out of Kendall County. He also has a 20-TR-3217. But my review of their charging,

       it appears it was on one date. So I believe that’s just the offense.

               DuPage County case 21-CF-83, a Class 4 driving on revoked. Again, the basis

       being the revocation is a reckless homicide. The date of offense in that was September—

       I’m sorry—July 30th of 2020, and those have remained on warrant status.”

¶7     Following its proffer, the State argued that, given “the threat of or infliction of great bodily

harm or permanent disability or disfigurement,” defendant’s charged offenses—while not

“specifically listed in the statute”—were detainable under the Act. The State reiterated that, prior

to being arrested, defendant had fled from police “going at least 60 miles an hour in a 30 mile per

hour zone,” disobeyed both a red light and a stop sign, and “T-boned another vehicle,” all before

crashing into a crossing guard booth in a church parking lot. Although the driver defendant had

crashed into “declined *** medical assistance,” the State contended that defendant’s charges

constituted detainable offenses, because the relevant inquiry was not whether defendant’s actions

actually injured another, but whether his actions caused “a threat [of] infliction of great bodily

harm or permanent disability.” The State alternatively argued that defendant was a flight risk,

contending that his attempt to evade the police indicated he would similarly attempt to circumvent

prosecution unless he were detained.

¶8     Concerning whether any conditions could mitigate the real and present threat defendant’s

release may entail, the State argued that, given defendant’s “extensive criminal history,” he has

shown “his unwillingness to *** follow any rules.”

¶9     In return, defendant first argued that “a sworn synopsis by itself is—does not create a

presumption that [defendant] committed the alleged acts.” Defendant then pointed out numerous

injuries he was presently suffering from as a result of the chase, describing that “his right arm

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

[was] in a sling,” “he ha[d] gauze and tape around his left arm,” and “walked with a limp.”

Defendant also purportedly suffered a seizure after being arrested, requiring him to be “taken to

the hospital,” where he was diagnosed as having “exceedingly high blood pressure to the point

where the nurse did not want to discharge him.” Furthermore, defendant had “one or two broken

ribs,” a broken elbow, “screws in his left ankle,” a “reconstructed ACL in his right knee,” and

arthritis.

¶ 10    Defendant also described how he routinely cared for his 72-year-old mother, and that he

had many family members in the area, including his daughter and granddaughters. He was

currently employed as a sous chef in a local restaurant.

¶ 11    Defendant disputed that his charges involved “the use or threat of physical force or violence

against any individual.” As support, defendant called attention to the fact that the State had not

charged him with causing any type of bodily injury to any individual. Furthermore, pursuant to the

police synopsis, “there was no medical attention that was given to the *** driver of the vehicle

that was struck.” Given defendant’s injuries and numerous family members who lived in the

immediate area, defendant also argued that there was no threat that defendant would flee to avoid

prosecution if he were to be released. Indeed, according to defendant’s public safety assessment

report, he had “zero failures to appear within the past two years.”

¶ 12    Defendant next argued that several conditions existed that could “mitigate any threat to the

public” that his release may cause. “Those conditions,” according to defendant, “[could] include

things like not driving without a valid driver’s license” or electronic home monitoring. Specifically

pertaining to defendant’s drug charges, defendant also suggested that he be ordered “not to possess

or consume any intoxicating substances.”

¶ 13     Ultimately, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident

and the presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses. Citing People v.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, the court next found by clear and convincing evidence that

the presumption was great that defendant committed a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Similarly, the court found that “the State has proven by clear and

convincing evidence[] that the proof is evident and the presumption is great that *** defendant

pose[d] a real and present threat to the safety of the community,” and, given the fact that defendant

continued to drive despite his license being revoked many years earlier, that no conditions could

mitigate such a threat. For these reasons, the trial court granted the State’s petition “in regards to

[their first basis for relief,] dangerousness.” Concerning the State’s alternative basis for detention,

that defendant posed a great risk of willful flight if he were to be released, the court found by clear

and convincing evidence that “defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution

in this case,” based on his “driving away from *** officers instead of pulling over” and ultimately

fleeing on foot once his car was disabled.

¶ 14   Defendant timely appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023).

¶ 15                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16   The Code presumes that all criminal defendants are eligible for pretrial release prior to

conviction. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). In order to establish that a defendant should be

detained prior to a conviction, the State may prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the

defendant has committed a qualifying offense; (2) the defendant poses a “real and present threat

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of

the case;” and (3) that “no condition or combination of conditions *** may mitigate *** the real

and present threat[: (a)] to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the

specific articulable facts of the case[;” or (b)] “the defendant’s willful flight.” 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West 2022).

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

¶ 17   In reviewing whether a trial court erred in detaining a defendant under the Act, our standard

of review is two-fold. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. We review the trial

court’s factual findings under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, while reviewing the

court’s “ultimate determination regarding pretrial release” for an abuse of discretion. Id. Moreover,

questions concerning purely statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Rios, 2023 IL

App (5th) 230724, ¶ 8.

¶ 18   Here, defendant raises four arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding that defendant’s charges included a forcible felony under the Act, (2) that the

trial court erred in finding that defendant’s flight from police indicated that he would similarly flee

from prosecution if released, (3) that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that defendant’s pretrial release posed a threat, and (4) that the court erred in finding that no

conditions existed that could mitigate defendant’s threat to the public if he were to be released.

Because the State has seemingly abandoned its arguments as to willful flight, we only address

defendant’s first, third, and fourth arguments.

¶ 19   First, we disagree with defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion when

it found that defendant committed a forcible felony under the Act. Under section 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5)

of the Code, a court may deny a defendant pretrial release where:

       “the defendant's pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person

       or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and the

       defendant is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this Section, means treason,

       first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,

       aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, aggravated

       robbery, robbery, burglary where there is use of force against another person, residential

       burglary, home invasion, vehicular invasion, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

       kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent

       disability or disfigurement or any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of

       great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS

       5/110-6.5(a)(1.5) (West 2022).

¶ 20   For example, in Rodriguez, the appellate court found that the defendant’s charge of

resisting or obstructing a police officer qualified as a “forcible felony” under the Act. 2023 IL App

(3d) 230450, ¶ 10. There, relying on the language of section 5/110-6.5(a)(1.5), the court first noted

that the defendant’s charge was a felony under the Code. Id. Additionally, defendant’s felony

charge involved a threat of or infliction of great bodily harm, permanent disability, or

disfigurement, as the defendant had attempted to flee from police in his automobile while an

officer’s arm was lodged within his car window. Id. For those reasons, the court agreed with the

State that defendant’s felony charge involved a “threat of great bodily harm,” as the “defendant

contemplated the use of the force and was willing to use it,” despite the fact that the officer was

not seriously injured. Id.

¶ 21   Here, like the defendant in Rodriguez, defendant’s flight from police plainly involved the

threat of great bodily harm. Again, the record here shows that, as defendant fled from the police,

his car reached speeds of 60 miles per hour—over double the legal speed limit—as he disobeyed

various traffic control devices. It is only fortuity that defendant did not cause a serious injury, and,

indeed, he himself argues that his flight so injured him that he could not flee from jurisdiction.

Even if defendant were oblivious to the obvious threat he posed when driving over double the legal

speed limit and ignoring traffic devices, once he crashed into another vehicle, he surely must have

been aware of the inherent danger of his actions. Yet, when confronted with this obvious truth, he

continued to flee officers, driving through a church parking lot and crashing again into a crossing

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

guard booth. Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, we find that this conduct obviously

exemplifies his contemplation and willingness to use force while fleeing from the police. 3

¶ 22   Nonetheless, defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

concerning specific details of the police chase that were necessary to establish that defendant

contemplated and was willing to use force while fleeing. For example, defendant argues that the

State failed to show how fast defendant was traveling when he drove through the red light or when

he crashed into the other vehicle. For this reason, defendant asserts that the State failed to show

that defendant’s actions carried the threat of great bodily harm. Again, we disagree. While the

State did not present evidence of defendant’s speed during each and every second of the police

chase, defendant himself suggested that he suffered from serious injury as a result of the chase and

collisions. Clearly, given the fact that defendant was greatly injured in the collisions his flight from

       3
           Defendant cites People v. Mosley, 2023 IL App (1st) 200309, ¶¶ 35-36, to argue that a

forcible felony under the Act must involve an offense that inherently involves a specific intent to

carry out a violent act or where the particular facts of a case show that defendant had contemplated

and was willing to use force to carry out an offense. We note that the Mosley court was not

addressing any language in the Code regarding pretrial detention. Instead, the court analyzed

section 5/2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012, which contains language similar to, but not identical

with, the provisions of the Code concerning pretrial release for forcible felonies. 720 ILCS 5/2-8

(West 2012) (forcible felonies include “any other felony which involves the use or threat of

physical force or violence”); 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022) (a forcible felony includes

“any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent

disability or disfigurement”). Accordingly, we do not find Mosley to be instructive under these

circumstances.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

police caused, his speed was obviously sufficient to cause great injury. Furthermore, the car

defendant struck became disabled upon impact. Again, this suggests that defendant was driving at

a considerable speed when the crash occurred.

¶ 23   Defendant also argues that the State failed to show how busy the area was during

defendant’s police chase and suggests that his actions were less dangerous because he fled from

police at night rather than in the middle of the day. Once more, we disagree. We can infer that

other drivers were present during the police chase, as defendant did in fact collide with another

driver. While there is little doubt that more drivers or pedestrians may have been present had the

chase taken place earlier in the day, defendant’s actions were still obviously dangerous.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant’s offenses were detainable forcible

felonies under the Act.

¶ 24   Next, we disagree with defendant that the State failed to show by clear and convincing

evidence that defendant’s pretrial release posed a threat to any persons or the community. Again,

here, in order for defendant to have been properly detained prior to trial, the State must have shown,

among other things, that his release posed “a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). The State met this burden here. Defendant’s extensive criminal history

shows that he had previous convictions for reckless homicide—in which defendant crashed into a

corrections officer’s vehicle, killing him—and resisting a police officer resulting in injury. Taken

in conjunction with the facts underlying defendant’s instant charges, this history shows a pattern

of blatant disregard for others’ safety, especially while defendant is behind the wheel of an

automobile.

¶ 25   Defendant suggests that, given his injuries and the fact that he is now without a car, his

release is unlikely to result in any threat to the public. We disagree. First, despite his suggestions

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

to the contrary, the record suggests that defendant fled on foot after crashing his vehicle two times.

This fact alone downplays the severity of defendant’s injuries. Furthermore, the record shows that

defendant was able to continue driving after at least one of the crashes that presumably caused his

injuries. Furthermore, while defendant is now purportedly without a car, he has an extensive family

network which may provide him with easy access to a vehicle. Even if this were not the case, it is

not a speculative leap to infer that he will be able to borrow or obtain a vehicle through some

means, as his history strongly suggests a strong willingness to continue driving, no matter what

impediments he faced. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings as to the threat defendant’s release

posed were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26   Finally, we reject defendant’s arguments that the “court erroneously dismissed the

possibility of conditions and the impact of GPS or [electronic home monitoring].” In determining

which conditions of pretrial release, if any, would ensure the safety of any person or the

community, a court should consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offense,

(2) the weight of the incriminating evidence, (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics, and

(4) the seriousness of any threat the defendant poses to any person, persons, or the community.

725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). Once more, here, the record here affirmatively shows that, after

defendant’s license was revoked in 2005, defendant continued to drive for almost twenty years.

Since then, he has accumulated at least two more felony charges for driving while his license was

revoked, and he continued to drive while open warrants were out for his arrest. From these facts,

it is clear that defendant has a long history of repeatedly and flagrantly disregarding any court-

imposed restrictions on his driving. Given his problematic history, the court’s finding that no

conditions could mitigate the threat defendant’s release posed was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

¶ 27                                    III. CONCLUSION

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2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U

¶ 28   For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 29   Affirmed.

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