Court Opinion

ID: 9709507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:49:11.801606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.569132
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA delivered the opinion of the court: Northwestern has filed a petition for rehearing of this court’s determination. The only point raised in the petition which merits further comment urges the reconsideration of Northwestern’s contractual indemnity claim because it believes that we have inadvertently decided the common-law indemnity claim in count II of its third-party complaint. Northwestern’s contention is totally unfounded. We again emphasize that count II was never before this court, and we have neither considered nor do we intend to express any opinion as to the merits of that count. Northwestern suggests that the rule in Quilico v. Union Oil Co. (3d Dist. 1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 87, 374 N.E.2d 219, and Prater v. Luhr Brothers, Inc. (5th Dist. 1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 685, 366 N.E.2d 399, cited here for the first time, might necessitate that the common-law indemnity claim also be resolved against Northwestern because of their apparent holding that the mere existence of a contract with indemnification provisions precludes the consideration of a common-law indemnity claim. We believe that Northwestern’s reading of the two cases is incorrect. Both cases merely hold that recovery through indemnification may be had on only one theory and that the allowance of recovery according to contract obviates the need to consider the common-law claim.  While recovery may be had on only one theory, there is nothing to prevent a party from seeking recovery under both theories. As acknowledged in Prater, this is commonly done. (See also Nogacz v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. (1975), 37 Ill. App. 3d 636, 347 N.E.2d 112, and Valerio v. R. & R. Construction Co. (5th Dist. 1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 48, 312 NE.2d 713.) Furthermore, such practice is consistent with the well-established rule that a party has the right to plead and introduce proof on all possible theories of recovery, even if they are inconsistent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 43; Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 140,357 N.E.2d 500; Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624; Downs v. Exchange National Bank (1959), 24 Ill. App. 2d 24, 163 N.E.2d 858. Our decision in the instant case is that Northwestern is not indemnified against acts of its own negligence under the provisions of the purchase order issued to M & M. Nothing in our decision should be construed to affect Northwestern’s right to pursue a recovery under any other theory. For the reasons stated, we adhere to our prior disposition of this case. The petition for rehearing is denied. SULLIVAN, P. J., and WILSON, J., concur.