Court Opinion

ID: 9756960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:11:01.154645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:33.807742
License: Public Domain

Kelleher, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which deals with the authority granted the legislative bodies of our various cities and towns, and I reluctantly concur with their view as to the thrust of the proviso which requires the denying authority to purchase the subject property but restricts the amount it must pay to the value of the property “as a wetland.”
I cannot share the view that it is highly dubious, if not absurd, to read the pertinent provisions of §2-1-21 as giving a city or town council the absolute and unqualified right to give a “thumbs down” on any affirmative action taken by the Director of Natural Resources on a proposal which seeks to alter a wetland. My disagreement with my brothers is based upon the language of the statute and an examination of the travel of the wetlands legislation after it first made its appearance on the legislative scene during the General Assembly’s 1971 session.
While we are bound to construe a statute so that it is constitutional, the usual canons of statutory construction are not applicable where the statute is clear and unambiguous. In such instances, the statute declares itself, and *74its terms cannot be interpreted or extended; they must be applied literally. Andreozzi v. D’Antuono, 113 R. I. 155, 158, 319 A.2d 16, 18 (1974); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R. I. 565, 567, 225 A.2d 666, 667 (1967).
The original Wetlands Act was introduced on March 4, 1971.1 The bill was numbered “S-434” and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill passed the Senate on April 15.2 At that time it contained provisions several of which can still be found in §§2-1-21 and 2-1-22. These sections set forth the procedural and substantive rules which would govern the ultimate fate of one who might wish to change any property which fell within the statutory definition of what constituted a “fresh water wetland.”
When S-434 passed the Senate, the sole and exclusive power to grant or deny the application was vested in the director, whose guide would be the public interest. The bill required the director, once he had received an alteration application, to notify the abutting landowners as well as a variety of municipal agencies, including the council, the conservation commission, and the planning and zoning boards, of the application’s pendency. The director was also authorized to send a similar notice to such persons or agencies whose names are on a departmental mailing list because they have informed the director of their desire to be notified of the filing of all alteration applications. If any objection was received within 45 days of the mailing of the notice from any of those notified, the bill mandated a public hearing.
S-434 was transmitted to the House of Representatives on April 16 and referred to the Finance Committee.3 On June 30 the committee reported the bill on to the floor *75with recommendation that the House concur in its passage. The report was received and the bill placed on the calendar for July l.4 On that day, however, the bill was amended on the floor in two respects.5 The proposed §2-1-21 was modified so that the Water Resources Board was not required to seek the director’s approval, and the proposed §2-1-22 was revamped so that “* * * any person affecting inland wetlands or waters as described within §2-1-21 of this chapter” would file with the town council or the mayor of the municipality in which the wetlands were situated as well as the state Department of Natural Resources a written notice of his intention, together with the plans describing the proposed activity. The amendment retained the requirement of notice to the abutting owners and municipal agencies but specified that the requisite notice would be given and the public hearing would be conducted by the local authorities. The amendment provided that the council or the mayor could recommend such protective measures as may protect the public interest and transmit their recommendations to the director. Thereafter, the director had 6 weeks in which to make his decision.
The amended bill was then recommitted to the Finance Committee where the July 1 amendments were deleted and the original language proposed for §§2-1-21 and 2-1-22 was restored with one significant addition. The committee amended §2-1-21 by making an insertion between the provision mandating a denial by the director of an application if its grant would not be in the public interest and the stipulation providing for an appeal to the Superior Court from such a denial. The insertion specifically directed the withholding of a director’s approval unless the project had been approved by the governing body of the municipality within which the wetland was located. The House passed *76the committee’s amended version of S-434 on July 9, 1971,6 and 4 days later, on July 13, the Senate concurred in its passage.7 Thereafter, the Governor signed the bill, and S-434 became law.
I believe, from the explicit language found in §2-1-21 and the deletions and additions made in the House of Representatives, that the blank check given the local legislatures regarding proposed changes in the local wetlands was purposeful. The General Assembly, in its effort to preserve the wetlands’ “integrity and purity,” intended that the final say on any alteration to a local wetland would be vested with the council no matter what occurred on the state level and that the municipal officers would not be bound to the public-interest standard which is to be the director’s guideline.
Perhaps the General Assembly, when giving this unrestricted power to the local legislatures, believed that their actions were justified by a principle expressed by some courts: the Legislature, in delegating police power to the municipalities, need not fix guides and standards for its exercise. LaRoque v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. 329, 196 A.2d 902 (1964). Assuming the validity of such a proposition, its applicability depends upon the function being delegated. If it is a legislative function, it may pass muster. If it is judicial, it is a nullity.
The test for distinguishing legislative and judicial action was made by Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908). There he said:
“A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to *77the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.” Id. at 226, 29 S.Ct. at 69, 53 L.Ed. at 158.
In applying this test, it has been recognized that it is the nature of the act performed rather than the name of the officer, board, or agency doing the act which determines whether it is judicial or legislative. Gawith v. Gage’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 206 Kan. 169, 179, 476 P.2d 966, 973 (1970); Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N. J. 99, 104, 71 A.2d 624, 626 (1950). Here the power vested in the city and town councils is unquestionably judicial in nature. It follows that the proper exercise of this power is conditioned upon minimum requisites of due process being satisfied. Restriction on one’s property is valid only if the restriction is reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare. Town of Glocester v. Olivo’s Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R. I. 120, 124, 300 A.2d 465, 468 (1973). Here the Wetlands Act contains no standard which requires that there be a reasonable relationship between the council’s denial and the applicant’s proposed use of his land. Furthermore, due process demands that before the council can deny an application, the applicant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Carroll v. Zoning Board of Review, 104 R. I. 676, 248 A.2d 321 (1968). Consequently, the unfettered veto power given the city and town councils is unquestionably unconstitutional.
Turning to §2-1-21 (b), my agreement with the majority on the thrust of this section is clouded with concern. Section 2-1-21 (b) comes about as the result of an effort, begun in 1973, to make certain changes in the original Wetlands Act. The 1973 legislation, known as 73-H 6267, received rather expeditious treatment in the House of Representatives after being introduced there on April 5.8 It *78did not reach the Senate until the last legislative day of its 1973 session. When the Senate reached final adjournment on May 4, 73-H 6267 was placed on the president’s desk9 where it remained until the Senate returned for the 1974 session. On January 23, 1974,10 the fourteenth legislative day of the session, the bill was recommitted to the Joint Committee on Environment.
One of the proposed changes, awaiting Senate vote, would have amended §2-1-21 so that a municipal legislature would have to register its disapproval on an alteration plan within 45 days after the director had mailed notice of its pendency before him. This change was prompted by a recognition of the hardship that would be suffered by a landowner who had to wait until the council decided when and what it was going to do. Another change amended §2-1-22 by empowering a property owner to ask the director to determine whether the proposed alteration came within the ambit of the Wetlands Act. Once the director received such a request, he or his duly authorized agent was required to make an on-site inspection of the project area. If it appeared that the proposal contemplated a “significant alteration” to the wetland, an alteration application would have to be filed and the necessary notices of its pendency given.
When 73-H 6267 emerged from the committee on May 3, it was apparent that it not only contained all the changes that had been approved by the House, but it had been modified in committee by adding subsection b to §2-1-21. Attempts to recommit the bill were unsuccessful, and 73-H 6267, as amended, passed the Senate by a 28 to 22 roll-call vote. 1 The House concurred in the amend*79ment, and eventually the changes I have just discussed became part of the Wetlands Act.
It is obvious that §2-1-21 (b) is a manifestation of the General Assembly’s concern for a property owner whose interests must give way to the public interest in the preservation of the environment. However, the language used by the Legislature is by no means precise or clear. Apparently, the Legislature has afforded the landowner who does not want to continue his fight with those in the State House or the city and town halls a chance to obtain some compensation. If he wishes, the property owner can go to the Superior Court and seek the alternative relief delineated in §21 (b). If he takes this route, however, he must satisfy the three conditions set forth in this subsection. If he does, he will have convinced the trial justice that the denial of his application actually amounted to an invalid exercise of the police power. However, by invoking §21 (b), the property owner has waived his right to receive just compensation and will settle for a sum that represents the value of his wetland “as a wetland.”
While I agree with the majority that §21 (b) is a gratuitous offer, I can envision circumstances where a landowner who employs its provisions and gets paid for his wetland may discover that there has been a substantial diminution in the value of his property which adjoins the wetland. While the public interest in preserving flood plains and habitat for wildlife is commendable, it must not overshadow an awareness of the danger that the exercise of the police power can result in the “taking” of one’s real estate just as if a condemnation plat had been filed.12 If such an event occurs, the landowner should receive just compensation, which may not necessarily be the wetland value specified in §21 (b). If, in enacting §21 (b), the *80Legislature desired the state or municipality to pay just compensation when either disapproves an alteration plan, I would respectfully suggest that it give this subsection a second look.
Dominic F. Cresto, for plaintiffs.
Julius C. Michaelson, Attorney General, J. Peter Doh-erty, Special Asst. Attorney General, Tillinghast, Collins & Graham (on behalf of The Providence Audubon Society of Rhode Island as Amicus Curiae), for defendant.
Mr. Chief Justice Roberts was present at oral argument but retired prior to consideration or decision of this case.

Journal of the Senate, Vol. 83, No. 35 at 3.

Journal of the Senate, Vol. 83, No. 57 at 4.

Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 85, No. 58 at 7.

Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 85, No. 96 at 5.

Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 85, No. 97 at 9 and 10.

Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 85, No. 101 at 8.

Journal of the Senate, Vol. 83, No. 102 at 2.

Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 88, No. 50 at 4.

Journal of the Senate, Vol. 86, No. 65 at 46.

Journal of the Senate, Vol. 88, No. 14 at 5.

1Journal of the Senate, Vol. 88, No. 68 at 12 and 13.

See Aust v. Marcello, 112 R. I. 381, 310 A.2d 758 (1973) (dissenting opinion).