Court Opinion

ID: 2796721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-04-27 20:13:00.81523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:18.786260
License: Public Domain

. -J •-_• 11 I   145 Wash. 2d

674, 41 P3d 1175 (2002). It is true, as Darling argues, that Rivers and similar

cases decided in the context of discovery sanctions are not on point. However,

DeAtley's essential point remains correct. SCLMAR 7.2(b) does not impose an

obligation to enter judgment when the rule requiring confirmation of trial date two

weeks in advance is not complied with. It says that the opposing party "may"

move for judgment. It does not say that the court must grant the motion.

       Darling argues that deference must be accorded to the court

commissioner's interpretation and enforcement of the local mandatory arbitration

rule. This is incorrect. The application of court rules to a particular set of facts is

a question of law that we review de novo. Sorenson v. Dahlen, 136 Wash. App.

844, 849, 149 P.3d 394 (2006).

       The procedure for mandatory arbitration in superior court is governed by

the Mandatory Arbitration Rules (MAR). These generally applicable rules may be
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supplemented by local superior court rules not inconsistent with the Mandatory

Arbitration Rules. MAR 8.2; Sorenson, 136 Wash. App. at 852.

       One general rule pertinent to this particular set of facts is MAR 7.1,

"Request for Trial De Novo." When a trial de novo is properly requested, "the

case shall be transferred from the arbitration calendar in accordance with rule 8.2

in a manner established by local rule." MAR 7.1(d).

       Under MAR 7.1, a party is entitled to a trial de novo if (1) a request for a

trial de novo is timely filed and served and (2) proof of service is timely filed.

Nevers v. Fireside. Inc.. 133 Wash. 2d 804, 809, 947 P2d 721 (1997). The party

seeking trial de novo must strictly comply with these two requirements. A failure

to do so "is fatal to a request for trial de novo and the superior court's authority is

limited to entering a judgment upon the arbitrator's decision and award." Nevers,

133 Wash. 2d at 811. DeAtley strictly complied with these two requirements. As a

result, the superior court did not lack authority to hear and decide the claim on

the merits. See Sorenson, 136 Wash. App. at 854 n.4.

       The Snohomish County local rule here in question, SCLMAR 7.2(b),

establishes a local procedural requirement for transferring the case from the

arbitration calendar to the superior court. It does not impose a third requirement

of confirmation that must be timely satisfied in accordance with the local

confirmation rule before the superior court is authorized to conduct a trial de

novo. If it did, it would be in conflict with the Mandatory Arbitration Rules as

construed in Nevers. See Sorenson, 136 Wash. App. at 854. When a local
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procedural rule is violated, "sanctions other than dismissal may be imposed for

failure to observe the dictates of the rule." Nevers, 133 Wash. 2d at 811.

       Bad faith might justify entering judgment on the award for failure to comply

with a local procedural rule. See Sorensen, 136 Wash. App. at 857. But there is no

allegation or evidence of bad faith in this record.

       Under Nevers, the court could have imposed some lesser sanction upon

DeAtley without denying DeAtley's right to trial de novo. Under these

circumstances, denying DeAtley's right to a trial de novo was what Sorensen

refers to as "an unduly harsh result." Sorensen, 136 Wash. App. at 857. The trial

court erred in interpreting the rules as allowing no other option.

       The judgment on the award and the judgment for attorney fees are

reversed. DeAtley's right to a trial de novo is reinstated, and this matter is

remanded for further proceedings.

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WE CONCUR:

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