Court Opinion

ID: 9747087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:56:20.405624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.951092
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.:
I respectfully dissent.
The Opinion of the majority in this case theorizes that the action of a lower court in vacating a sentence is identical with that of suspending a sentence. I cannot agree with that position, especially in light of the factual and procedural history in the instant case.
The record shows that on June 29, 1972, following his conviction, the appellant was immediately sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment for one to five years. Shortly thereafter, on the same day, the Court entered the following Order: “Sentence vacated pending filing of motions within seven days. Sentence is deferred, same bail to stand;” By this action, and with the particular circumstances of the instant case I believe the lower court completely nullified its earlier pronouncement of sentence. Moreover, the appellant himself made the initial sentencing a nullity when he filed post-trial motions. This is so since a trial court may not enter a valid sentence until the time for post-trial motions have expired or until such motions have been argued and decided. See Commonwealth v. Young, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 447, 302 A. 2d 402 (1973) (footnote l).1
*153In United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F. 2d 808 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889, 88 S. Ct. 166, 19 L. Ed. 2d 189, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 997, 88 S. Ct. 488, 19 L. Ed. 2d 501, the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals passed on a somewhat analogous situation. There the Court held that it was not improper for a State court to increase punishment following a new trial where the first sentence imposed on the prisoner’s plea of guilt was vacated.2 Surely, this Court would not have found the cases of Commonwealth v. Silverman, 422 Pa. 211, 275 A. 2d 308 (1971), and Commonwealth v. Scheetz, 217 Pa. Superior Ct. 76, 268 A. 2d 193 (1970), to be controlling had the appellant pursued successful post-trial motions, only to he sentenced more harshly following a new trial. I think the loAver court’s action in vacating its initial sentence in the instant case should be accorded similar treatment.
In reaching my conclusion, I also find it interesting to note that in this case, unlike the cases cited by the majority, the court did not more harshly sentence the appellant following his withdrawal of post-trial motions. Rather, the lower court sentenced appellant to probation rather than imprisonment.3 I also deem it significant that the lower court had no psychiatric report at the time of its initial sentencing on June 29, 1972; such a report, however, was considered when the probationary sentence was imposed.4
Based upon all of the above, I would affirm.
Watkins, P. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 See also Commonwealth v. Souder, 376 Pa. 78, 101 A.2d 693 (1954).

 See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1969).

 In this regard, compare Commonwealth v. Jackson, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 357, 280 A.2d 422 (1971).

 See North Carolina v. Pearce, supra.