Court Opinion

ID: 9863900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 07:08:36.592519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:38.420927
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
      Second Appellate District of Texas
               at Fort Worth
            ___________________________
                 No. 02-23-00294-CV
            ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF D.J., S.H.-J., AND B.G., CHILDREN

         On Appeal from the 325th District Court
                 Tarrant County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 325-719439-22

         Before Bassel, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
         Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The mother of three children (Mother) and the father of two of those children

(Father) appeal from an interlocutory order terminating their parent–child

relationships with those children. Because a petition to terminate the parent–child

relationships between Mother’s third child, D.J., and that child’s presumed father and

an alleged father remains pending––and because no party has informed us that the

termination order as to Mother and Father has been severed from the claims in that

petition––we dismiss these appeals.

      In June 2022, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed an

original petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parent–child relationship with

three children. At what was supposed to be the final trial,1 Mother testified that

although she was married to another man, Father was D.J.’s biological father. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204(a) (defining presumed father). Although the trial court

issued a letter ruling in which it rendered judgment terminating Mother’s parent–child

relationship with all three children as well as Father’s parent–child relationship with

S.H.-G. and B.G., because Father had never admitted paternity of D.J., the trial court

ordered that genetic testing be done. The Department then filed––in the same cause

number––a petition seeking to terminate the parent–child relationship between D.J.

and his presumed father.

      The trial court extended the dismissal date by written order. See Tex. Fam.
      1

Code Ann. § 263.401. The current dismissal date is December 29, 2023.

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       Subsequent genetic testing showed that Father could not be D.J.’s biological

father. After the genetic testing was completed, the trial court signed an “Order of

Termination” as to Mother and Father only.            Although the order contains the

language required to be included in a final judgment by Family Code Section

263.405(b), see id. § 263.405(b), and contains the notation, “[A]ll relief requested in this

case and not expressly granted is denied,” it does not mention the claims related to

D.J.’s presumed father and also does not contain language indicating that it is a final

judgment that disposes of all claims and parties.

       After Mother’s and Father’s court-appointed attorneys filed notices of appeal

for them, the Department filed an amended petition to terminate the parent–child

relationship between D.J. and his presumed father; the petition named––and also

sought termination as to––a different man who could be an alleged father. See

id. § 101.0015 (defining alleged father). That petition remains pending in the trial

court; therefore, there has been no judgment rendered that disposes of all claims and

parties. No party has responded to this court’s jurisdictional inquiry.

       We have appellate jurisdiction of appeals from final judgments and from

interlocutory orders that the Texas Legislature has specified are appealable. Lehmann

v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 51.014. Texas Family Code Section 109.002 allows a party to appeal

only a final conservatorship or termination order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(a),

(b). To be final and appealable, a judgment must dispose of all parties and all issues.

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Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Although a presumption arises that a judgment rendered

after a conventional trial on the merits is final, that presumption can be rebutted by “a

contrary showing in the record.” N.E. ISD v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897–98 (Tex.

1966); In re M.G.F., No. 04-15-00591-CV, 2016 WL 519650, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Feb. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

       Despite the termination order’s inclusion of the Section 263.405(b) language

required to be contained in a final judgment, the entire record affirmatively shows that

the allegations to terminate the parent–child relationship between D.J. and his

presumed father––as well as between D.J. and an alleged father––remain pending;

therefore, the termination order as to Mother and Father is neither final nor

appealable. See, e.g., In re L.T., No. 02-19-00161-CV, 2019 WL 3334618, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

       Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction. See id.; see also

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

                                                      /s/ Brian Walker

                                                      Brian Walker
                                                      Justice

Delivered: September 21, 2023

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