Court Opinion

ID: 9407162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 21:02:07.650986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.639197
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10348     Document: 60-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-10348
                           ____________________

        MARK HENDERSON,
        as Administrator of the Estate of Christopher Henderson,
        deceased,
                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant-Cross Appellee,
        versus
        FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
        a corporation,

                                    Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                 22-10348

                           D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cv-00368-LCB
                                ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,∗ District
        Judge.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
               Chris Henderson, through his estate, sued Ford Motor Com-
        pany, inter alia, for wrongful death and products liability pursuant
        to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine
        (AEMLD). He alleged that a faulty seatbelt design in his 2003 Ford
        Mustang caused his fatal injury. At trial, the jury returned a verdict
        in favor of Ford. Henderson now appeals, arguing that the district
        court erroneously ruled on several evidentiary issues, a motion for
        judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and a motion for a new trial.
               Ford filed a cross-appeal in anticipation of a possible rever-
        sal, challenging the district court’s denial of its motion to exclude
        expert testimony at trial.
               For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the rulings
        challenged by Henderson. As for Ford’s cross-appeal, we DISMISS
        for lack of standing.
                                                I.
              In 2016, Henderson lost control of his 2003 Ford Mustang
        while driving. The car rolled and, because his seatbelt had at least

        ∗ Honorable Anne C. Conway, United States District Judge for the Middle Dis-

        trict of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10348               Opinion of the Court                        3

        fifteen inches of slack—“excess webbing”—between his right hip
        and left shoulder, his body partially ejected from the car, resulting
        in a fatal head injury. According to Henderson’s theory of the case,
        the excess webbing was the result of a defective seatbelt system.
                At trial, Ford introduced the actual seatbelt and retractor
        from Henderson’s car into evidence. The retractor worked
        properly, exhibiting no slow retraction, and the jury was able to
        examine it. Ford also introduced a seatbelt expert who testified
        that because the seatbelt retractor appeared to be working, there
        were only two scenarios to explain the excess webbing at the time
        of the crash: 1) Henderson was driving with full awareness of the
        excess webbing, or 2) Henderson improperly leaned forward in his
        seat with at least one pound of force, causing the excess webbing.
        This evidence was intended to show contributory negligence on
        the part of Henderson. Ford also introduced expert testimony
        from a biomechanics expert and a seatbelt expert who testified that
        even if the seatbelt did not have excess webbing, Henderson’s head
        still would have protruded through the window given the intensity
        of the accident.
                Henderson introduced seatbelt and design expert Steve
        Meyer, who testified that the extra webbing was due to the inabil-
        ity or failure of the seatbelt retractor to properly retract the web-
        bing. He also offered alternative designs that Ford could have used
        to prevent the problem. Ford moved to exclude Meyer’s expert
        testimony, arguing Meyer’s methodology was deficient and his
        opinions amounted to impermissible ipse dixit. The district court
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10348

        denied this motion, and the expert testimony was admitted. Hen-
        derson also introduced evidence to show that Ford had issued
        Technical Service Bulletins to address seatbelt retraction issues in
        2000–2004 Mustangs. The solution in the bulletin was to add Tef-
        lon tape to the seatbelt. One month after Henderson’s Mustang
        was manufactured, Ford began manufacturing Mustangs with the
        Teflon Tape.
               Henderson tried to introduce 50,829 warranty claims that
        purportedly showed thousands of reports filed with Ford regarding
        seatbelt issues in 2001–2004 Mustangs. The district court sup-
        pressed the warranty claims because they were not “substantially
        similar” to the claims at trial. Henderson alternatively tried to in-
        troduce these warranty claims during cross-examination to rebut
        Ford’s experts, but the court prevented the warranty evidence
        from coming in.
               Henderson also tried to offer testimony from Kathy Law-
        hon, who previously owned a Ford Mustang with seatbelt issues.
        The district court heard her testimony and ultimately excluded it
        because Henderson did not identify Lawhon as a potential witness
        until midnight on the day final trial witness lists were due and nine
        months after the close of discovery. The court would not alterna-
        tively allow Lawhon as a rebuttal witness because her experience
        with her Mustang was not “substantially similar” to the issues at
        trial.
              Henderson now appeals. First, he argues that the district
        court abused its discretion by excluding the warranty claims as
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        22-10348                Opinion of the Court                          5

        other incident evidence, by precluding the introduction of the war-
        ranties on cross-examination, by excluding Lawhorn’s testimony,
        and by excluding Lawhon as a rebuttal witness. Second, he argues
        that he is entitled to JMOL, and third, he argues that the district
        court erred by denying his motion for a new trial. Ford cross-ap-
        peals the admission of Henderson’s expert. Each issue will be ad-
        dressed in turn.
                                          II.
              First, we turn to Henderson’s claim that the district court
        abused its discretion when it excluded 1) testimony from Kathy
        Lawhon, who claimed she had similar seatbelt issues with her Ford
        Mustang, and 2) 50,829 warranty claims that purportedly showed
        thousands of issues with seatbelts in 2001–2004 Mustangs.
                We afford deference to the district court’s evidentiary deci-
        sions, and “[w]e will only reverse a district court[] . . . where the
        appellant can show that the judge abused his broad discretion and
        that the decision affected the substantial rights of the complaining
        party.” Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1395 (11th Cir.
        1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he abuse of discre-
        tion standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long
        as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment” or is
        based on the wrong legal standard. Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sher-
        iff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1104 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
              When a party seeks to admit prior accidents or occurrences
        involving the opposing party to show, for example, “notice,
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10348

        magnitude of the danger involved, the defendant’s ability to cor-
        rect a known defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, strength
        of a product, the standard of care, [or] causation,” the substantial
        similarity doctrine applies. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655,
        661–62 (11th Cir. 1988). The doctrine “does not require identical
        circumstances, and allows for some play in the joints depending on
        the scenario presented and the desired use of the evidence.” Sorrels
        v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1288, 1287 (11th Cir. 2015).
        That said, a prior incident sought to be introduced as evidence
        “must not have occurred too remote in time,” Jones, 861 F.2d at
        662, and must be similar enough to the present incident “to allow
        the jury to draw a reasonable inference” regarding the defendant’s
        knowledge or ability to foresee the incident at issue, Sorrels, 796
        F.3d at 1299 (quoting Borden, Inc. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 772 F.2d
        750, 755 (11th Cir. 1985)).
               Where evidence of a prior incident is found inadmissible, it
        may otherwise be used by an expert at trial as the basis to form her
        opinion if the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the
        opinion substantially outweighs [the evidence’s] prejudicial effect.”
        Fed. R. Evid. 703. This court has maintained that “Rule 703, how-
        ever, is not an open door to all inadmissible evidence disguised as
        expert opinion.” United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th
        Cir. 1987).
                We have also recognized that district courts have “‘unques-
        tionable’ authority to control their own dockets.” Smith v. Psychiat-
        ric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). When parties fail
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        22-10348                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

        to provide information or identify a witness as required by Federal
        Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) or (e), the district judge may exclude
        that witness unless the party’s failure was substantially justified or
        harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). When deciding if the late disclo-
        sure of a witness was justified, courts consider: “(1) the importance
        of the testimony; (2) the reason for the appellant’s failure to dis-
        close the witness earlier; and (3) the prejudice to the opposing party
        if the witness had been allowed to testify.” Bearint ex rel. Bearint v.
        Dorell Juv. Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004). The dis-
        trict court has considerable discretion in determining whether ex-
        clusion is proper. Murphy v. Magnolia Elec. Power Ass’n, 639 F.2d
        232, 234–35 (5th Cir. 1981). 1
               Here, the court acted within its wide discretion to exclude
        an untimely disclosed witness. The court heard Lawhon’s testi-
        mony and thereafter, in its discretion, appropriately weighed the
        importance of the testimony, the explanation for the delay, and the
        prejudice to the opposing party as the law directs. See Bearint, 389
        F.3d at 1353. The district court concluded that the testimony was
        not substantially similar enough to Henderson’s defect theory to
        warrant admission.
               The court also acted well within its discretion when it ex-
        cluded the warranty claims. The district court again appropriately
        applied the substantial similarity doctrine and, in its discretion,

        1 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are bind-
        ing on this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
        (en banc).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10348

        concluded the warranties were not sufficiently similar to the issue
        at trial. The district court then appropriately permitted the experts
        to review the inadmissible warranty evidence under Federal Rule
        of Evidence 703, but prevented the cross-examination from open-
        ing the door to “inadmissible evidence disguised as expert opin-
        ion.” Scrima, 819 F.2d at 1002.
               Since Henderson has not identified any misapplication of
        law or clear error of judgment, Cook, 402 F.3d at 1104, we AFFIRM
        these evidentiary rulings.
                                          III.
                Turning to the JMOL claim, Henderson alleges that he is en-
        titled to JMOL on Ford’s affirmative defense of contributory negli-
        gence. We review the district court’s denial of a party’s motion for
        JMOL de novo, “considering only the evidence that may properly
        be considered and the reasonable inferences drawn from it in the
        light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rossbach v. City of
        Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam). “Where
        ‘no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists for a reasonable jury to
        find for that party on that issue,’ judgment as a matter of law is
        proper.” Id. (quoting 12 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.50[5] (3d ed.
        1998)). “But if there is substantial conflict in the evidence, such that
        ‘reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
        judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion must be
        denied.’” Christopher v. Florida., 449 F.3d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 2006)
        (quoting Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th
        Cir. 1995)).
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        22-10348                Opinion of the Court                           9

               Here, the working seatbelt from the crash was admitted into
        evidence alongside expert testimony opining that the driver likely
        caused the excess webbing. A reasonable jury could have weighed
        this evidence against the evidence introduced by Henderson and
        “might reach different conclusions” about whether Henderson was
        contributorily negligent. Id. Therefore, JMOL is not proper, and
        we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Henderson’s motion.
                                          IV.
               Turning to Henderson’s claim that the district court erred
        when it denied his motion for a new trial. The decision to grant or
        deny a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
        Fondren v. Allstate Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 1533, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986). Trial
        courts should grant new trials on an evidentiary basis “only when
        the jury verdict is against the great—not merely the greater—
        weight of the evidence.” Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d
        1512, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        This difficult standard is “intended to preserve litigants’ right to a
        jury trial and to ensure that judges will not substitute their own
        judgment for that of the jury with respect to disputed issues of
        fact.” Id. at 1515. A party is owed a new trial where evidentiary
        issues affected the party’s “substantial rights.” See Ad-Vantage Tel.
        Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1465
        (11th Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
                Since we do not find any evidentiary issues that occurred at
        trial, a new trial is not appropriate. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
        district court’s denial of Henderson’s motion for a new trial.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10348

                                          V.
                Finally, Ford’s cross-appeal. It is a jurisdictional require-
        ment that litigants “establish their standing not only to bring
        claims, but also to appeal judgments.” Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351
        F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003). “Only a litigant who is aggrieved
        by the judgment or order may appeal.” Id. at 1354 (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted). A cross-appeal by a prevailing party is neither
        necessary nor appropriate where the prevailing party is merely
        seeking to expand the preclusive effect of the current judgment
        upon some future litigation. See Yunker v. Allianceone Receivables
        Mgmt., Inc., 701 F.3d 369, 374 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[E]ven
        if our decision on the merits could assist [the parties] in some future
        litigation, such a decision would be exactly the sort of advisory
        opinion prohibited by Article III.”); see also Elec. Fittings Corp. v.
        Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939).
               An appellee may not “attack [a] decree with a view either to
        enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his
        adversary.” United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435
        (1924). “Ordinarily, the prevailing party does not have standing to
        appeal because it is assumed that the judgment has caused that
        party no injury.” Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 195 F.3d 1225,
        1230 (11th Cir. 1999). We have recognized that “[a]n exception to
        this rule exists, however, when the prevailing party is prejudiced
        by the collateral estoppel effect of the district court’s order. In such
        a case, the litigant has been aggrieved by the judgment and has
        standing to appeal.” Id. However, a prevailing party cannot cross-
        appeal from an order that would not have a collateral estoppel
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        22-10348               Opinion of the Court                        11

        effect, or from dicta that is unnecessary to support the ruling. See
        Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334–335 (1980); Elec.
        Fittings Corp., 307 U.S. at 242 (“A party may not appeal from a judg-
        ment or decree in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review
        of findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to support
        the decree.”).
               Although Ford has identified cases where we have addressed
        a victorious plaintiff’s cross-appeal, this court is not bound by a
        prior decision’s sub silentio treatment of a jurisdictional question.
        King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1168 (11th Cir. 2007). We
        write today to clarify our precedent: prevailing parties lack stand-
        ing to appeal absent some prejudice by the collateral estoppel effect
        of the district court’s order.
              Since Ford is the prevailing party, its injury is merely antici-
        patory. Accordingly, we DISMISS the cross-appeal in its entirety.
              AFFIRMED and CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.