Court Opinion

ID: 9467822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:40.6356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:33.150725
License: Public Domain

MESKILL, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached in this case and with the reasoning Judge Mansfield uses in concluding that The Valley Hospital did not waive its power to object to the court’s personal jurisdiction over it. I also agree that Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980), should be applied retroactively. I reach this conclusion, however, not as a result of applying the three general criteria set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for deciding whether to apply a newly-announced rule retroactively, but rather by looking to the language of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981), that “by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only.” Id. at 676.
I hesitate to rely on Chevron because (1) the Chevron criteria are general whereas Firestone deals specifically with jurisdiction; (2) Chevron did not decide whether a jurisdictional ruling should be applied prospectively only, and (3) I have been unable to find an instance where any circuit court has relied on the criteria of Chevron in deciding whether to give retroactive effect to a jurisdictional ruling.
While the issue in Firestone was subject matter jurisdiction rather than personal jurisdiction, I find Justice Marshall’s phrasing instructive, if not controlling. The statement “by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only,” id. at 676, is hardly ambiguous. If it is dictum it is certainly strong dictum and the most recent word from the Supreme Court on this issue. I would rely on it. If, however, Chevron is the correct standard to apply in deciding the retroactivity issue, I would agree that Holzsager fails to meet the conditions necessary to prevail.