Court Opinion

ID: 9899454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:45.698066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.259824
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 P. v. Gonzalez CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165772
 v.
 DANIEL JOE GONZALEZ,                                                    (Napa County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 21CR000161)

         A jury convicted Daniel Joe Gonzalez of corporal injury to his girlfriend,
Jane Doe, and misdemeanor contempt for disobeying a protective order.
(Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 166, subd. (c)(1); undesignated statutory
references are to this code.) The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 10 years in
prison after it denied his motion to strike a prior felony conviction under the
“Three Strikes” law and imposed the upper term for his corporal injury
conviction based on aggravating circumstances. On appeal, Gonzalez argues
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) required the court to strike his
prior strike conviction. He also argues the court relied on improper
aggravating circumstances and was unaware of a presumptive lower term
during sentencing. We remand for sentencing on Gonzalez’s contempt
conviction, but otherwise affirm.

                                                               1
                               BACKGROUND
      Gonzalez has a history of domestic violence. In 2017, he was convicted
of corporal injury to a person with whom he had a dating relationship
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)) — the mother of his child — and sentenced to four years in
prison. In 2019, he began dating Doe; that November, he was convicted of
assaulting her. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) The conviction resulted in a sentence of
three years in prison and a protective order, prohibiting him from having
contact with Doe.
      Less than three months after his release from prison, and while on
post-release community supervision, Gonzalez again assaulted Doe in
January 2021. He ambushed her as she was returning home from visiting
family, demanded her car keys, grabbed her hair from behind, and started
hitting her. When she fell to the ground, he got on top of her, grabbed her
hair, and punched and kneed her in the face. She sustained several injuries,
including a swollen nose, chipped teeth, and bruises to her ribs and shoulder;
she had blood all over her face.
      Gonzalez was charged with corporal injury to a person with whom he
had a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count one) and contempt for
violating a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count two). In addition, the
information alleged he had prior convictions for domestic violence (§ 273.5,
subd. (f)), he inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd.
(e)), he had one prior strike (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and he had one prior
serious felony adjudication (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Five aggravating
circumstances were also alleged — the offense involved great violence, great
bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1); undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
                                        2
Court); he took advantage of his position of trust with the victim (rule
4.421(a)(11)); he engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and
his offense was committed while on post-release community supervision (rule
4.421(b)(4)).
      A jury convicted Gonzalez of both counts but was unable to reach a
verdict on the bodily injury enhancement allegation. Gonzalez admitted his
prior domestic violence conviction and a prior strike conviction from 2006 for
assault with a deadly weapon committed for the benefit of or at the direction
of a criminal street gang. (§§ 245, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The trial
court found the aggravating factors true.
      At his sentencing hearing, Gonzalez moved to strike his prior 2006
strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 4971 because he was 17 years old at the time and the offense was
less serious. The court denied the motion explaining that, despite the age of
the prior strike conviction, Gonzalez since had a demonstrated pattern of
violence as indicated by his three domestic violence convictions. On that
basis, the court concluded Gonzalez was not outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. In addition, the court found his conduct particularly egregious
and noted his criminal history involved violent behavior towards women.
After noting it previously found true the alleged aggravating factors, and
weighing them against a defense expert’s opinion that Gonzalez had a

      1 Under the Three Strikes law, sentencing requirements must be

“applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying”
prior serious or violent felony — a strike — unless the court finds the
defendant falls outside of the Three Strikes scheme. (People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337.) The court may strike a prior felony conviction.
(People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.)
                                        3
traumatic childhood, the court imposed the upper term of five years for the
domestic violence conviction, which was doubled to ten years based on the
prior strike conviction.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Gonzalez challenges his sentence on several grounds. We review a trial
court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) He is required to demonstrate the decision was
irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)
He has not done so.
      First, Gonzalez argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to strike his prior 2006 conviction due to Senate Bill No. 81.
Effective January 1, 2022, that bill amended section 1385, specifying “factors
that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.” (People
v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) As amended, section 1385 requires
the court to dismiss “an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to
do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) The court must consider and afford great
weight to the presence of mitigating factors — proof of one or more factors
“weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).) According to Gonzalez, this language also applies when a court
considers whether to strike a prior conviction.
      This argument is forfeited for failure to raise it at the sentencing
hearing. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) But contrary to
Gonzalez’s contention, the failure to raise it did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance, he must
demonstrate his attorney’s “representation fell below an objective standard of
                                        4
reasonableness” “under prevailing professional norms.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.) Specifically, he “must show both that
trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent
attorneys acting as diligent advocates, and that it is reasonably probable a
more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s
failings.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 623.)
      Critically, he fails to establish prejudice. The amendments to section
1385 apply only to sentencing enhancements. (People v. Burke (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242–243.) The term “enhancement” has a technical
meaning — “ ‘an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.’ ”
(People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101.) The “Three Strikes law is not
an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current
offense.” (Burke, at p. 243.) Accordingly, the amended provisions regarding
whether to strike sentencing enhancements do not apply when determining
whether to strike prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law.
(Burke, at p. 244.) As such, there is no reasonable probability of a different
outcome had the issue been preserved, and thus, no ineffective assistance of
counsel.2 (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 [ineffective assistance
claim fails if defendant makes an insufficient showing on either component].)
      Second, Gonzalez contends the trial court erred by imposing the upper
term of five years for his corporal injury conviction. Although we agree there
were some errors, remand is unnecessary. The record clearly indicates the

      2 For the same reasons, the argument that forfeiture rules do not apply

here because the trial court made its sentencing decision based on a
misunderstanding of the governing legal principles also fails. (People v. Leon
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023 [errors based on a misunderstanding of
governing legal principles are reviewable despite the lack of a timely
objection].)
                                       5
court would have imposed the upper term in any event. (People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 467.)
      Gonzalez initially argues the trial court improperly relied on
aggravating circumstances because they were also elements of his corporal
injury offense or the basis of sentencing enhancements — an improper dual
use of facts in sentencing him. The aggravating circumstances are that he
served a prior prison term; he committed the offense while on post-release
community supervision; he inflicted acts that disclose a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; the offense involved great violence; his
conduct, based on a prior strike conviction and prior corporal injury
conviction, indicated a serious danger to society; and he took advantage of his
position of trust with the victim. According to Gonzalez, it is reasonably
probable he would have had a more favorable result in the absence of these
errors, requiring remand for resentencing. We disagree.
      Under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), the middle term of
imprisonment for a particular offense is now the presumptive sentence.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The court may only impose
the upper term if it is justified by aggravating circumstances. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2); People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500.) The facts
underlying those circumstances must have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
A court, however, cannot use the facts for dual purposes. (People v. Avalos
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.) For example, it cannot use a fact constituting an
element of an underlying offense to aggravate a sentence. (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350; rule 4.420(h).) And courts are precluded from
“impos[ing] an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which
sentence is imposed under any provision of law.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5); rule
                                        6
4.420(g).) A court abuses its discretion by relying upon circumstances that
“otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.” (People v. Sandoval,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
      As a preliminary matter, we reject Gonzalez’s request to ignore the
findings the trial court made in support of the aggravating circumstances
because the court failed to state they were true beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed the court was
aware of and applied the proper burden of proof.” (People v. Abdelsalam
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 662.) That presumption applies here, and
Gonzalez’s brief assertion that it was more probable the court was relying on
an outdated lesser standard fails to rebut it.
      As to the merits, we reject Gonzalez’s assertion that his prior prison
term was an element of his corporal injury offense. (Rule 4.421(b)(3).)
A “sentencing factor is an element of the offense if the crime as defined by
statute cannot be accomplished without performance of the acts which
constitute such factor.” (People v. Clark (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 663, 666.)
Section 273.5 prohibits “willful[] inflict[ion of] corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition upon a victim” with a specified relationship to the
defendant, including a dating relationship. (Id., subds. (a), (b).) A defendant
convicted of such corporal injury within seven years of the previous conviction
shall be punished, as relevant here, by imprisonment for two, four, or five
years. (Id., subd. (f).) Under that statute, Gonzalez must have a previous
domestic violence conviction (ibid.); by contrast, the relied-upon aggravating
circumstance was for service of a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). No
improper dual use occurred in relying on this aggravating circumstance.
(Rule 4.420(h).)

                                         7
      Similarly, the aggravating finding that the offense involved acts of
great violence, great bodily harm, or a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness was proper. (Rule 4.421(a)(1).) As above, that circumstance was
not an element of the corporal injury offense. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) And
reliance on it was proper even though Gonzalez did not stipulate to the
underlying facts. As he waived his right to a jury trial on aggravating
circumstances, the court was authorized to — and did — make its finding
based on the evidence presented at trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2) [judge in a trial
court may impose upper term when finding facts underlying aggravating
circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt].)
      Moreover, that the jury failed to reach a verdict on the great bodily
injury enhancement did not preclude reliance on the circumstance. It applies
when the offense “involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” (Rule 4.421(a)(1), italics added.) Viciousness and callousness
are not synonymous with great bodily harm. (People v. Wilson (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 343, 357.) The “rule may be satisfied by cruel, vicious or
callous acts other than those involving great violence, great bodily harm, or
threat of great bodily harm.” (People v. Duran (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 987,
990.) Ample evidence of such acts exists here. Gonzalez attacked Doe by
repeatedly punching and kneeing her in the face in the street as she cried
and screamed. She sustained significant injuries to her face, teeth, ribs, and
shoulder. A witness testified Gonzalez “was going at her” and “attacking her”
as she screamed for help. Another witness testified Doe had blood all over
her face. We have no difficulty finding substantial evidence of acts disclosing
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.

                                        8
      There is similarly no merit to Gonzalez’s argument that the trial court
improperly used his prior 2019 corporal injury conviction to aggravate his
sentence. He admitted to having the prior conviction, which increased his
sentence for his instant corporal injury offense. (§ 273.5, subd. (f).) But he
also had additional prior corporal injury convictions upon which the court
could rely in assessing aggravating factors. Indeed, the court expressly relied
on the certified rap sheet admitted into evidence reflecting a 2016 domestic
violence conviction. After viewing the rap sheet as well as the evidence
presented at trial, the court found Gonzalez engaged in violent conduct
indicating a danger to society. Relying on a prior conviction to sentence
Gonzalez under section 273.5, subdivision (f) and other prior convictions to
impose the upper term was proper.
      Nor was there any impropriety in the trial court’s use of Gonzalez’s
prior strike conviction. The elements of the corporal injury offense did not
include a prior adjudication for a strike offense. (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (f).) And
as previously discussed, use of the strike conviction under the Three Strikes
law does not constitute an “enhancement.” Thus, relying on the prior strike
conviction was not an improper dual use of that fact to aggravate Gonzalez’s
sentence.
      The parties agree, however, that the trial court erroneously used
Gonzalez’s dating relationship with Doe to support its finding in aggravation
that he took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit this
offense. (Rule 4.421(a)(11).) We agree as well. Section 273.5 protects victims
with whom defendants are in dating relationships. It is intended to protect
persons in a special relationship “for which society demands, and the victim
may reasonably expect, stability and safety, and in which the victim, for

                                        9
these reasons among others, may be especially vulnerable.” (People v. Vega
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 710.) By relying on Gonzalez taking advantage
of a position of trust to commit the offense to impose an upper term, the court
improperly made dual use of the same facts. (People v. Avalos, supra,
37 Cal.3d at p. 233.)
      But remand is unnecessary because the error was harmless. “When a
trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice,
a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable
that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that
some of its reasons were improper.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,
492.) A reasonable probability of a more favorable result exists where the
improper factor was determinative for the sentencing court or where the
reviewing court cannot determine whether the improper factor was
determinative. (People v. Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 233.) Here the trial
court imposed the upper term for a variety of valid reasons — Gonzalez had
prior domestic violence convictions and a prior strike adjudication; he
violated post-release community supervision when committing his underlying
offense and served a prior prison term; the offense was of great violence and
demonstrated a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; and he
engaged in violent conduct demonstrating a danger to society. Given the
reliance on these aggravating factors, it “seems clear that the improper dual
use of facts was not determinative.” (Ibid.)
      Gonzalez next argues the trial court was not aware of section 1170’s
presumption that defendants may be entitled to a lower term if they have
childhood trauma that was a contributing factor to the commission of their
offenses. We agree. Remand, however, is unnecessary.

                                       10
      Courts must impose the lower term if certain identified
circumstances — including that the defendant experienced psychological
or childhood trauma — were a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Imposing this lower term is not required in
every case in which a defendant has experienced childhood trauma. (People
v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.) The presumption does not apply
if the court finds the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances and imposing the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The court is required to exercise its
discretion in determining whether to impose the presumptive low term.
(Flores, at p. 1039.) When reviewing a court’s failure to expressly apply this
lower term presumption, “the record must ‘affirmatively’ show” the court’s
compliance with the statutory mandate only if there has been an initial
showing defendants’ childhood trauma was a contributing factor to their
offenses. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991–992.)
      Gonzalez made such a showing here. (People v. Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 991–992.) Gonzalez’s sentencing brief noted he was
“marred by mental and physical abuse by his mother and stepfather.” An
expert’s report found he had significant psychosocial trauma from an early
age — such as his stepfather and mother hitting him often — and those
experiences influenced his subsequent behavior as an adolescent and adult.
According to the expert, Gonzalez experienced virtually all categories of
known adverse childhood experiences, supporting the conclusion that this
early trauma adversely and significantly affected his mental health and
behavior. Based on that opinion, Gonzalez argued this trauma was relevant
to the fact that the vast majority of his criminal record consists of physical
assaults. During the sentencing hearing, his counsel urged the court to
                                        11
impose the lower term given his childhood trauma. Accordingly, there was
an explicit indication that trauma contributed to the commission of the
offense. (Fredrickson, at pp. 989, 994.) Despite this showing, nothing in the
record indicates the court assessed whether the presumption applied or
whether imposing the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.
(Id. at p. 991.)
      Nevertheless, remand is not required. Where a court was apparently
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the remedy is to “remand for
resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, italics added.)
In making its sentencing decision — setting forth the facts and reasons for
choosing the sentence — the trial court explained Gonzalez had an extensive
record of antisocial and violent behavior, particularly towards women.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(5) [requiring court to identify on the record facts and
reasons for choosing sentence imposed].) And unlike other cases involving
young offenders, the court noted Gonzalez’s criminal conduct had not
diminished with age. The court weighed the aggravating factors that it
previously had found true — the offense involved great violence; he inflicted
acts that disclose a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; his
conduct indicated a serious danger to society; he served a prior prison term;
and his offense was committed while on post-release community
supervision — against the mitigating factor of Gonzalez’s childhood trauma.
Given this weighing, the record clearly indicates the court would have
imposed the upper term even if it had been aware of its discretion under
section 1170 because the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. (Gutierrez, at p. 1391.)
                                       12
      Finally, the parties agree — as do we — the case should be remanded
for sentencing on Gonzalez’s misdemeanor contempt conviction (§ 166,
subd. (c)(1).) The record does not reflect the trial court sentenced Gonzalez
on that count. (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469.) Due to
this omission, we remand for sentencing on the contempt conviction. (People
v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353.)
                               DISPOSITION
      We remand for the trial court to impose a sentence for Gonzalez’s
contempt conviction. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

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                                 _________________________
                                 Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

A165772

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