Court Opinion

ID: 9713702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:20:26.303577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.025399
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Justice
(dissenting).
The Commonwealth, while conceding that appellant had not been lawfully arrested at the time he was asked to submit to the breathalyzer test, nevertheless argues the term “arrest”, as used in Section 624.1(a), encompasses merely a factual determination that there has been a deprivation of a person’s liberty. A majority of this Court now accepts this position. I must disagree.
In ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, we must be guided by the rule of statutory construction which requires a reading of a statute that gives effect to all its *371provisions. 1 Pa. S. § 1921(a) (Supp.1974); Commonwealth v. Pope, 455 Pa. 384, 389, 317 A.2d 887 (1974); Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 114, 117 A.2d 899 (1955). It must also be presumed the Legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution through its enactment. 1 Pa. S. § 1922(3) (Supp.1974); Kurtz v. Erie, 389 Pa. 557, 565, 133 A.2d 172 (1957). To accept the interpretation advanced by the Commonwealth and accepted by the majority would violate these principles.
Although the Legislature, in Section 624.1(a), did use the word “arrest” rather than “lawful arrest”, it is apparent the latter was intended. In addition to providing the Secretary with the suspension power for failure to submit to the breathalyzer test, the Legislature also provided that such refusal could be admitted into evidence at the subsequent criminal proceeding against the accused. Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 624.1(h), as amended, 75 P.S. § 624.1(h) (Supp.1974). As such evidence could be properly introduced only as the product of a lawful arrest, any reading which would allow less than a lawful arrest would clearly be unconstitutional and be violative of the aforementioned rule of statutory construction. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to allow the Secretary’s suspension power to be triggered by an unlawful arrest, while requiring the presence of a lawful arrest before evidence of such refusal to submit to the test may be admitted at the criminal proceeding. As the Legislature cannot be considered to have intended an unreasonable or absurd result, 1 Pa. S. § 1922(1) (Supp. 1974); Kurtz v. Erie, supra, the Commonwealth’s view should be rejected.
This reading does not, as the majority holds, render superfluous the requirement that the test be administered “at the direction of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” This requirement only sets forth the procedural guidelines for *372administration of the breathalyzer test and is unrelated to the Secretary’s suspension power which takes effect when no test is given at all. Since the two provisions operate independently of each other, there is no inconsistency.
Today’s decision requires only that the motorist be physically placed under arrest before he can have his motor vehicle privileges suspended for failure to submit to a breathalyzer test. Apparently, in the future, similar suspensions will be sustained without regard to the police conduct which preceded the arrest. By sanctioning the instant suspension, despite the presence of an unlawful arrest, the majority has effectively granted the police unfettered discretion to stop any vehicle. As we said in Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 114, 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973), “this discretion could be used arbitrarily, or as a guise for seeking evidence of other crimes, or on mere ‘fishing expeditions.’ ” This impairment of the expectation of privacy which one has while driving in his automobile cannot be tolerated. It is imperative that there be an antecedent lawful arrest before a motorist can properly have his motor vehicle privileges suspended for failure to submit to a breathalyzer test.
I dissent.
O’BRIEN and MANDERINO, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.