Court Opinion

ID: 9784879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:56:47.813175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:00.676245
License: Public Domain

*784GLICKMAN, Associate Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
The supplemental instruction on reasonable doubt was problematic, but not, in my view, for the reason my colleagues identify. Evaluating a virtually identical instruction in Payne, this Court saw “no way in which [its] language conveyed a faulty legal principle, prejudiced [the defendant], or improperly bolstered the government’s case.”1 Here too, given the correctness, comprehensiveness, and clarity of the rein-struction, I see no reasonable likelihood that appellant’s jury was misled as to either the necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt or the substantive content of that standard. I appreciate my colleagues’ concern that the trial judge prefaced his supplemental instruction by stating that it would be “much like the reasonable doubt instruction originally given, but with some change that may be helpful.” But although the judge then introduced a distinction not included in his initial charge— between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond a shadow of a doubt — I think it notional at best to suggest that this rhetorical addition substantively confused the jury.
Nonetheless, considering the supplemental instruction (in conjunction with the judge’s prefatory comment) “ ‘in its context and under all the circumstances,’ ” 2 I do think it was problematic. After four days of inconclusive deliberations, the jury reported itself confused by the standard instruction on reasonable doubt and requested “additional guidance.” This was a momentous revelation. A jury that does not understand the central requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt cannot render a valid verdict in a criminal case. The trial judge cannot be faulted for endeavoring to clarify the standard of proof instead of leaving the jury in a state of confusion.3 But though I acknowledge the challenging nature of that endeavor, I am compelled to fault the supplemental instruction the judge proceeded to deliver. The sole material difference between his initial instruction on reasonable doubt and his supplemental instruction was that the latter instruction admonished the jury more forcefully that the prosecutor’s burden in a criminal case is not unrealistic— *785that the prosecution is not required to dispel fanciful or insubstantial doubts in order to convict a defendant. The judge focused the jury on this reinforced admonition by alerting them to the change in language. That the re-instruction remained substantively correct as a matter of law is beside the point. The highlighted new language could mean only one thing to the jurors who heard it — namely, that the judge thought some of them were holding the prosecution to an unduly rigorous standard of proof. And why would the judge have drawn that inference and delivered his warning, unless he believed the prosecution had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendants were guilty? I do not imagine the judge intended to communicate that belief to the jury, but that is the clear if implicit message of his supplemental instruction. I do not see how the jury could have missed it.4
It is well-established that a trial judge must not intrude on the jury’s independent deliberative process by communicating his opinion that “there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant.”5 Such a communication from the judge is improper not because it may mislead the jury as to the substance or necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but because it may influence the jury to agree with the judge that the evidence satisfies that standard of proof.6 In other words, the communication “create[s] the risk that the jury [will] abdicate its responsibility to evaluate the evidence in deference to the judge.”7 The error is of Constitutional dimension. “Inherent in the [Sixth Amendment] right to trial by jury is the assumption that the jury will be allowed to weigh the evidence and determine criminal guilt without undue judicial intervention^]”8
Unlike an instruction that materially misstates or relaxes the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an instruction that improperly conveys the *786judge’s opinion of the sufficiency of the government’s proof does not amount to structural error necessitating automatic reversal of a conviction regardless of demonstrable or likely prejudice.9 But as the error in communicating the judge’s belief to the jury is Constitutional, reversal is necessary unless we are persuaded it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.10 We cannot be persuaded of that here, where the jury — after deliberating four days without reaching agreement — returned its verdict against appellant only two hours after receiving the supplemental instruction. I therefore concur in the judgment reversing appellant’s convictions and remanding the case for a new trial.

. Payne v. United States, 932 A.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C.2007). As this statement encapsulated the rationale for Payne's holding that the instruction was not erroneous, I should think we are bound by it. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). It is immaterial that appellate review in Payne was for plain error; the Payne court held there was no error at all.

. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (per curiam)).

.The usual rule would seem to apply here: "when a jury sends a note indicating its confusion with the law governing its deliberations, the trial court must not allow that confusion to persist; it must respond appropriately” and dispel the jury’s difficulties with "concrete accuracy.” Cox v. United States, 999 A.2d 63, 70 (D.C.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The judge "is not, in responding, bound by the standard instruction,” United States v. Bolden, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 67, 514 F.2d 1301, 1308 (1975)—especially, one would think, when the jury declares itself confounded by that instruction. That said, I do not minimize the peculiar difficulty of elucidating the standard instruction on reasonable doubt — particularly where, as here, the nature of the jury’s difficulty with the instruction is unknown.

. My colleagues appear to agree with this conclusion. See ante at 782 (describing re-instruction as "virtually tantamount to an indication that the judge believes the defendant is guilty and that the government, therefore, has met its burden of proof”).

. United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc).

. The fundamental flaw in the majority opinion, in my view, is that it conflates those two conceptually different trial court errors.

. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d at 299. See generally Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 243-44 (D.C.2007) (explaining that the trial judge's common-law privilege to comment on the evidence "has inherent limitations and must be exercised cautiously, for a judge's influence on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his or her lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove to be controlling. Moreover, the judge may not exercise this privilege in a manner which intrudes upon functions which are within the sole province of the jury.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). See also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933) ("[Tjhe trial judge erred in stating the opinion that the respondent was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... He may advise the jury in respect of the facts, but the decision of issues of fact must be fairly left to the jury.”); Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 283, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (1950) ("A judge cannot impinge upon that right [to a trial by jury] any more than he can destroy it. He cannot press upon the jury the weight of his influence any more than he can eliminate the jury altogether. It is for this reason that courts have held time and again that a trial judge ... cannot urge his own view of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”).

. Wheeler, 930 A.2d at 248; see also Billeci, 87 U.S.App.D.C. at 283, 184 F.2d at 403 ("[T]here is a constitutional line across which [the trial judge] cannot go.”); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) (acknowledging constitutional rule against coercive jury instructions).

. See Wheeler, 930 A.2d at 249. The Supreme Court observed in Murdock that "[s]uch an expression of opinion was held not to warrant a reversal where upon the undisputed and admitted facts the defendant's voluntary conduct amounted to the commission of the crime defined by the statute." 290 U.S. at 394, 54 S.Ct. 223 (citing Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 53, 65 L.Ed. 185 (1920)). More recently, the Court has stated that "Homing's holding that it was harmless error, if error at all, for a trial judge effectively to order the jury to convict ... has been proved an unfortunate anomaly in light of subsequent cases.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (adding that Horning has been "repudiated”). Even so, the class of structural errors that never can be deemed harmless is too narrowly defined to encompass all judicial comments that trespass on the jury’s province. See Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663, 691 n. 122 (D.C.2009) (en banc); Wheeler, 930 A.2d at 246 n. 9.

. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).