Court Opinion

ID: 9568735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:07.619917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:32.669162
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion
MOON, J.
J.— Colonial Williamsburg Foundation was granted a rehearing en banc from a panel decision holding that Fay M. Jones’ injury arose out of and during the course of her employment. See Jones v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 8 Va. App. 432, 382 S.E.2d 300 (1989). The panel held that Mrs. Jones’ injury on the employer’s premises while going to work should be treated for compensability purposes as though it happened while she was engaged in her work at the place of its performance. Id. at 435, 382 S.E.2d at 302. The panel further held that while walking to her duty station, her action in taking a few steps out of a direct path of travel to that station in order to dispose of a small amount of personal trash in a receptacle provided by the employer, did not constitute a deviation which removed her from her employment.
On rehearing, Colonial Williamsbúrg argues that the panel decision applied the positional risk test, a test rejected by Virginia courts. City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 164, 335 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (1985). Under the positional risk test, simply being injured while at work is sufficient to establish compensability. As Colonial Williamsburg argues, Virginia applies the “actual risk” test, which, holds that the employee must prove that the accident arose both out of and in the course of employment. See County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183, 376 S.E.2d 73, 76 (1989). Colonial Williamsburg argues that Jones’ *523injury, even though it happened at work, is not compensable because it did not arise out of the conditions of her employment.
In Johnson, the employee was injured when his knee gave way because he suffered a torn meniscus as a result of the twist type injury when he turned around on a stairway at work. The Supreme Court held that he did not sustain an injury “arising out of’ his employment. The Supreme Court said the injury must be caused by “the condition of the workplace.” Id. at 185, 376 S.E. 2d at 716. In the present case, Mrs. Jones’ injury was sustained when she slipped and fell because of a wet step leading to the trash receptacle. Johnson’s injury was not attributable to a risk or hazard associated with the work environment. Mrs. Jones’ injury arose because of the wet and slippery condition on the employer’s premises. Accidents such as the one sustained by Jones during the course of her employment always have been considered compensable. The only question presented by her claim is whether the accident occurred at a place where she reasonably could be expected to be. See Norfolk & Washington Steamboat Co. v. Holladay, 174 Va. 152, 158, 5 S.E.2d 486, 489 (1939).
As was stated in the majority panel opinion, when an employee chooses to go to a dangerous place where his employment does not necessarily carry him and encounters dangers which are outside of any reasonable requirement of his normal working environment, the risk arising out of such action is not incident to and does not arise out of the employment. See 8 Va. App. at 438, 382 S.E.2d at 303-04; Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 209, 123 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1962); Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W.2d 102, 106 (1949); White Star Motor Coach Lines v. Industrial Comm’n, 336 Ill. 117, 168 N.E. 113, 115 (1929). Mrs. Jones was a pantry worker who described her duties as fixing gelatin salads, cutting pies, putting up waiters’ orders, dipping ice cream and making tea and coffee. Although this outside trash receptacle was not one that she would use in her normal work activities, the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that it was a receptacle for the disposal of trash by some persons working at, and possibly others patronizing, the restaurant. Mrs. Jones did not choose to go to a dangerous place where her employment did not necessarily carry her. She went to what was an appropriate place provided by the employer for some employees to dispose of trash. The mere fact that she stepped over to a trash receptacle for a *524personal need does not take the accident out of the course of her employment or cause the accident to become one not arising out of her employment.
As a matter of public policy, the General Assembly has decided that litigation involving accidents arising out of and in the course of employment should be handled before the Industrial Commission. The employer conceded in oral argument that if Mrs. Jones had already punched the clock and then walked from inside the restaurant to the trash receptacle to dispose of her personal trash, her claim would stand on better footing. In view of the accepted principle that all accidents otherwise compensable are to be considered the same once the employee reaches the premises, we find no logical support for the employer’s claim that Mrs. Jones cannot recover because she had not clocked in. If Mrs. Jones had met another employee on those steps who had punched the clock and both fell and were injured because the steps were slick, according to Colonial Williamsburg’s argument, one could sue the employer in a negligence action and the other would be limited to recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act. In both instances the employee’s injury arises out of the conditions of the workplace, the wet step. We do not believe the Act was intended to turn on the fine distinction urged by the employer. Accidents which arise out of the conditions of the workplace should be compensable if the activity which gave rise to the accident is of a nature reasonably to be expected by the employer and occurred at a place and time where an employee might reasonably be expected to be. See Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. at 208-09, 123 S.E.2d at 396-97.
Accordingly, the decision of the Industrial Commission is reversed and the case remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Barrow, J., Cole, J., Coleman, J., Keenan, J., and Willis, J., concurred.