Court Opinion

ID: 9942733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 20:04:14.905422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:23.473047
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 P. v. McGraw CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B330584
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. MA049580)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 CALVIN McGRAW,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Calvin McGraw appeals from the judgment following his
resentencing. He contends the trial court erred by staying a one-
year deadly weapon enhancement on a domestic violence
conviction rather than dismissing or striking it under Penal Code
section 1385, subdivision (a).1 Appellant also contends the court
erred when it denied his request to dismiss one of two five-year

         1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
terms for great bodily injury and serious felony enhancements
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B).
      We agree in part with the first contention and will remand
with directions to either impose or strike the deadly weapon
enhancement. We will otherwise affirm the judgment.
              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Appellant beat his longtime girlfriend with a chair during
an argument in 2010. A jury convicted him of corporal injury to a
cohabitant. (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Appellant received an aggregate
prison term of 22 years: a base term of four years, doubled, on
the corporal injury charge; three one-year prior prison term
enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b); a one-year deadly weapon
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); a five-year great bodily
injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); and a five-year serious
felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).2 He began serving his
sentence in 2011.
      In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recalling appellant’s
sentence and resentencing him pursuant to sections 1172.7,
subdivision (a) and 1172.75, subdivision (a). The trial court
struck the three one-year prior prison term enhancements as
legally invalid under section 1172.7.3 It denied appellant’s
request to strike the remaining enhancements under section
1385, subdivision (c), but agreed to stay the one-year deadly

      2 The jury also convicted appellant of assault with a deadly

weapon for the same incident. (§ 245.) The trial court stayed his
sentence on this pursuant to section 654.

      3 Section 1172.7 invalidated enhancements imposed in

connection with certain drug-related offenses.

                                2
weapon enhancement to commend him for “starting to make
some progress” with his conduct and education in prison. He
received a reduced aggregate term of 18 years.
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant raises two issues on appeal. He first contends
the trial court lacked authority to stay the one-year deadly
weapon enhancement and should have stricken it instead. He
then asserts the court erred by not striking one of his two five-
year enhancements pursuant to section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(B). We review both issues de novo as questions of statutory
interpretation. (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 395
(Walker).)
                    Deadly Weapon Enhancement
       “Ordinarily, an enhancement must be either imposed or
stricken ‘in furtherance of justice’ under . . . section 1385.”
(People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.) “The trial
court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than
strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its
own discretionary sense of justice.” (Ibid.) The parties agree the
trial court erred when it stayed appellant’s one-year deadly
weapon enhancement. The parties disagree, however, about how
to correct the error. Appellant argues we should strike the
enhancement because the trial court’s order “was the functional
equivalent” of doing so. (See People v. Santana (1986) 182
Cal.App.3d 185, 190 [section 1385 applies where purported stay
of sentence was “tantamount to a dismissal”].) The People argue
we should direct the court to exercise its statutory discretion to
either impose or strike the enhancement on remand.
       We agree with the People. The trial court expressly
declined to strike any enhancement other than those invalidated

                                 3
by section 1172.7. It stated: “I do believe the defendant should
be commended for making some progress. And so that is why I
was open to an indicated that I was going to strike – or excuse me
– I was going to stay the one-year weapon enhancement, because
I do see progress.” The court sentenced appellant to “an
additional one year [enhancement] pursuant to [section] 12022,
[subdivision] (b)(1)” and reiterated it would “be stayed.” We will
not speculate from this record whether it would have imposed or
stricken the enhancement had it not mistaken the scope of its
discretion under section 1385. We leave this task to the trial
court on remand.
       Serious Felony and Great Bodily Injury Enhancements
        A trial court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Evidence
proving one or more of the nine mitigating circumstances listed in
subdivision (c)(2) “erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates
a court to dismiss the enhancement unless the court finds that
dismissal of that enhancement—with the resultingly shorter
sentence—would endanger public safety.” (Walker, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 392.) “‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).)
        One of these mitigating circumstances is when “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(§ 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B).) Appellant argues this language
required the trial court to strike one of the two remaining five-
year enhancements, i.e., either the serious felony or great bodily
injury enhancement. This ignores the preceding language in

                                4
subdivision (c)(2): “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
present.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics added.) We decline to read
subdivision (c)(2)(B) as divesting the court of this discretion by
requiring it to strike an enhancement – even if doing so would
endanger public safety. (See People v. Anderson (2023) 88
CalApp.5th 233, 239 [“the dismissal of the enhancement [under
subdivision (c)(2)(B)] is conditioned on a court’s finding dismissal
is in the interest of justice”]; Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp.
397-398 [nothing in legislative history of section 1385,
subdivision (c) “indicates an intent to deprive trial courts of their
discretion altogether—either generally or more specifically in the
subset of cases where multiple enhancements are alleged”].)
                            DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed in part as to the trial court’s
order imposing, but staying, the one-year deadly weapon
enhancement on count one for corporal injury to a cohabitant.
The case is remanded with directions to either impose or strike
the enhancement pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c). The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.                  YEGAN, J.

                                  5
                 Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Julie A. Harris, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.