Court Opinion

ID: 9484336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:49:28.407783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:10.644061
License: Public Domain

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This panel previously ruled on West’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages under Montana law. West v. Northwest Airlines, 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.1991). In that opinion, we held that West’s claim for punitive damages was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), § 1305(a)(1) of the FAA, but that his claim for compensatory damages was not. 923 F.2d at 660. The Supreme Court vacated that opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992).
The majority now reaches the same result as in the original opinion which the Court vacated. Although I concur in the holding that West’s claim for punitive damages is preempted by the ADA, I cannot agree that
*153his claim for compensatory damages under state law is not also preempted in light of Morales.
The majority arrives at this result by seizing on the caveat at the end of the Morales opinion that despite the Court’s holding (that the fare advertising guidelines of the .National Association of Attorneys General are preempted by the ADA), there may still be some state actions which affect airline rates, routes, or services in so “tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner” that they need not be deemed preempted by the provisions of the ADA. Morales, 504 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2040, quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2901 n. 21, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). The majority classifies West’s, compensatory damages claim as one such “borderline” action, with sufficiently peripheral effect that we must look to the administrative rules for guidance on whether preemption is proper..
Our first resort must be to the language of the preemption statute itself. The ADA’s federal preemption section provides in relevant part:
[N]o state ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier' ...
49 U.S.CA.App. § 1305 (1992). The Morales Court made clear that the “relating to” language is to have a very broad scope, encompassing within its reach statutes or actions “having a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services.’” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2037.
We must reach the same result here as the Court reached in Morales itself — that the suit is preempted — unless we can say that West’s action to recover damages for his being bumped from the flight does not “relate to” airline services. I am unable to reach this conclusion.
An airline’s boarding practices certainly come within the ambit of the “airline services” which it provides to its customers. We expressly recognized this in our original opinion. 923 F.2d at 660. Aside from a state law explicitly barring the practice, one strains to conceive of an action which could relate to those services more directly than a lawsuit seeking damages for the inevitable result of those boarding practices — a passenger getting “bumped.”
The majority in effect concludes that West’s suit is not “related to” airline services. The opinion’s invocation of the “tenuous connection” language avoids having to make that statement, but it says the same thing. As I read the case, Morales’ “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” language is simply the other side of the “related to” coin. See 504 U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2040. If an action has too tenuous an effect on airline rates (or services), it is not ‘'related to” those services, and is not preempted by § 1305 of the ADA. I would find that West’s action does relate to airline services and is therefore preempted under the ADA.
As the majority points out, the FAA has promulgated a regulation directed to this precise circumstance. See 14 C.F.R. § 250.9 (1990). This regulation expressly provides for a “bumped” passenger to elect to seek damages “in a court of law or in some other manner.” 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b). The existence of this regulation, however, does not support a finding that such a suit in state court is not preempted by the ADA.
The fact that the FAA found it necessary to draft regulations addressing the situation of the bumped passenger lends further support to the conclusion that a passenger’s suit for damages from that practice “relates to” airline services. In addition, where the act itself sets forth a broad and effective statement of its preemptive effect, the FAA is powerless to create exceptions by way of administrative regulation. I believe that is the case here. Section 1305 of the ADA, in light of the teaching of Morales, preempts a state suit for damages for being bumped from a domestic flight. Any attempt-by the FAA to change that result by regulation is contrary to law.
To be sure, a finding that West’s claim for compensatory damages is preempted by the ADA would obviate 14; C.F.R. § 250.9(b)(3)’s effect, at least as it applies to most state actions. However, we can only look to the *154agency regulations for guidance if there remains some ambiguity after Morales.
I do not believe Morales leaves room to doubt whether West’s claim “relates to” airline services, and I respectfully dissent.