Court Opinion

ID: 9406753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 17:03:51.245289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:32.691474
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/3/23 P. v. Parker CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    2d Crim. No. B322913
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 21F-04907)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (San Luis Obispo County)

 v.

 SAMANTHA RAE PARKER,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Samantha Rae Parker appeals from a victim restitution
order entered after she was sentenced to state prison for
recklessly causing a fire. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 452, subd. (c), 1202.4.)
Appellant was ordered to pay $5,636.25 in restitution to the City
of Paso Robles Wastewater Treatment Plant (the Water
Treatment Plant) for the purported costs of compensating the
firefighters who responded to and extinguished the small fire
that appellant started in the riverbed near the Water Treatment

       All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
         1

otherwise stated.
Plant. We agree with appellant that this order is erroneous
because there is no evidence the Water Treatment Plant suffered
the claimed losses or any other economic losses as a result of
appellant’s conduct. Accordingly, we reverse.
                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In August 2021, appellant was charged in a complaint with
arson of a structure or forest (§ 451, subd. (c) (count 1)),
recklessly causing a fire (count 2), and possessing a drug
ingestion device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a) (count
3)). According to the police report, appellant was a transient who
set a small fire in the riverbed near 3200 Sulphur Springs Road
in the City of Paso Robles (the City). The City of Paso Robles
Fire Department (the Fire Department) responded to the fire and
quickly extinguished it; no structures were damaged. In
February 2022 appellant pleaded no contest to count 2, the
remaining counts were dismissed, and she was sentenced to two
years in state prison.
       On May 3, 2022, the probation department filed a
“restitution status determination memorandum” indicating that
the Water Treatment Plant, which is located at 3200 Sulphur
Springs Road, was submitting an attached request for $5,636.25
in victim restitution. The attached “restitution request form”
identifies the Water Treatment Plant as the “Victim/Business
Name.” The claimed “miscellaneous crime related losses” consist
of a handwritten notation of the “cost[s] of response” to the fire,
which were arrived at by obtaining the hourly rates of the
various Fire Department employees who purportedly responded
to the fire and multiplying those rates by an “incident time” of
3.75 hours. Although not otherwise identified, an individual
named Melissa R. Luma signed the form to “certify under penalty
of perjury . . . that the foregoing is a true and accurate statement

                                 2
concerning my losses in this matter.” A fee schedule for the
City’s emergency services was also attached.
      In her written opposition to the request for restitution,
appellant noted there was no evidence that the Water Treatment
Plant was a direct victim of the fire that suffered any resulting
economic losses. Appellant further asserted that Health and
Safety Code section 13009 provides the exclusive remedy for
government agencies seeking to recover fire suppression costs
under these circumstances.
      The People did not file a written response to appellant’s
opposition. At the restitution hearing, the People offered as
exhibits a map depicting the property where the Water
Treatment Plant is located and the location of the fire, a printout
from the City’s website regarding the Water Treatment Plant,
and a copy of the police report of the incident. The prosecutor
offered that “[n]o buildings were affected, only vegetation. The
request for restitution is for the time of the firefighters. . . . The
argument is essentially that the City of Paso Robles had to pay
for the firefighters’ response and their time and they are
requesting restitution for that cost.” (Italics added.) When asked
to respond to appellant’s argument that the Water Treatment
Plant was not a direct victim of the fire, the prosecutor reiterated
her position that “[t]he City of Paso Robles is the victim and they
are the ones who already paid the cost of the firefighters.” (Italics
added.)
      The trial court asked the prosecutor, “‘The City’ being the
[Water Treatment P]lant?” The prosecutor replied: “The City of
Paso Robles owns the [Water Treatment P]lant and also provides
the salaries for the [F]ire [D]epartment. . . . Therefore, they are
the ones who incurred the costs of the fire fighters’ time. And

                                  3
they also own the [Water Treatment P]lant, making them the
victim.”
       The court then asked the prosecutor to clarify if “[y]ou’re
saying that the [Water Treatment P]lant separately paid the
[F]ire [D]epartment.” The prosecutor reiterated her position that
the City “owns” the Water Treatment Plant and added “[t]hey are
[sic] the [Water Treatment P]lant, essentially. It’s a department
of the City . . . and the [F]ire [D]epartment is also a department
within the City.”
       Defense counsel replied that the prosecutor had merely
“pulled up a map and . . . talked to some people at the City and
they say that that portion of the riverbed is observed by the City.”
Counsel also asserted among other things that “if the People
cannot show that — and I don’t think they can show — that the
[W]ater [T]reatment [P]lant [paid] from their coffers the response
cost of the [F]ire [D]epartment, I don’t think they’re entitled to
any restitution.” In concluding his argument, counsel reiterated
that the People had not provided any proof that the Water
Treatment Plant expended any money or any costs for fire
suppression.
       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated: “All
right. I signed the order for restitution.” The court did not
address appellant’s arguments or otherwise offer any explanation
for its decision. The court’s signed order identifies the “Waste
Water Treatment Plant” as the victim and erroneously states
that appellant “stipulated to the amount of restitution to be
ordered” and that the restitution was awarded for the “value of
property stolen or damaged.”
                            DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the order requiring her to pay
$5,636.25 in victim restitution to the Water Treatment Plant

                                 4
pursuant to section 1202.4 must be reversed because the People
offered no evidence that the Water Treatment Plant was a direct
victim of the fire that suffered the claimed economic losses. We
agree.
       Victim restitution orders are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 44, 63.)
“‘“‘“Where there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of
restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will
be found by the reviewing court.”’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]
However, a restitution order “resting upon a ‘“demonstrable error
of law”’ constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion. [Citation.]”
[Citation.] “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to
support a factual finding], the ‘“power of the appellate court
begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support
the trial court’s findings.’ . . . We do not reweigh or reinterpret
the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.
[Citation.]” [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)
       Restitution is ordered under section 1202.4 for any direct
victim that has suffered economic losses as a result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct. (§ 1202.4, subds. (a), (f).) A
“‘victim’” includes a “government, governmental subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality . . . when that entity is a direct victim
of a crime.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(2).) Victims, however, are only
entitled to an amount of restitution that compensates them for
actual losses arising out of the defendant’s criminal behavior.
(People v. Busser (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1510.)
       Moreover, governmental agencies are not entitled to
restitution for the costs they incur in responding to crimes that
are not committed directly against them. (People v. Martinez

                                  5
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 384, 393-394 & fn. 1.) In so holding, our
Supreme Court disapproved another case “to the extent it holds
that a fire department that has incurred labor costs in fighting a
fire on a vacant lot not owned by the [fire] department is a direct
victim of the crime” as contemplated in section 1202.4. (Id. at
p. 394, fn. 2, disapproving In re Brian N. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
591.) Our Supreme Court has also more recently recognized that
Health and Safety Code section 13009 “provides the sole
mechanism by which a public agency may recover costs
associated with fire suppression.” (Presbyterian Camp &
Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493,
503, fn. 6 (Presbyterian).)2
       Even assuming there was a sufficient showing that the
Water Treatment Plant is a direct victim of appellant’s criminal
conduct, the record is insufficient to show that it actually suffered
any of the claimed economic losses, i.e., the costs of compensating
the Fire Department employees who responded to the fire
appellant started. Indeed, the People have acknowledged both
below and on appeal that the Water Treatment Plant did not
incur these costs and is not responsible for any portion of the
salaries paid to the Fire Department’s employees. In their

      2 Health and Safety Code section 13009 provides in
relevant part: “Any person . . . who negligently, or in violation of
the law, sets a fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows a fire kindled
or attended by [him or her] to escape onto any public or private
property, . . . is liable for the fire suppression costs incurred in
fighting the fire and for the cost of providing rescue or emergency
medical services, and those costs shall be a charge against that
person. The charge shall constitute a debt of that person, and is
collectible by the person, or by the federal, state, county, public,
or private agency, incurring those costs in the same manner as in
the case of an obligation under a contract, expressed or implied.”

                                   6
respondent’s brief, the People consistently and repeatedly assert
as they did below that the City is responsible for these costs, not
the Water Treatment Plant.
      But the court did not award restitution to the City, and
neither the City nor the People asked it to do so. The People offer
no support for their assertion that the City and the Water
Treatment Plant are essentially one and the same. Moreover, the
People’s position that section 1202.4 entitles the City (or the
Water Treatment Plant) to recover labor costs incurred by the
Fire Department in suppressing the fire is at odds with our
Supreme Court’s holdings in Martinez and Presbyterian.
Although the order awarding such costs as restitution under
section 1202.4 cannot stand, the City retains the right to pursue
its remedy, if any, under Health and Safety Code section 13009.
                          DISPOSITION
      The August 22, 2022 order requiring appellant to pay
$5,636.25 in victim restitution is reversed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      YEGAN, J.

                                7
                  Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge
           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
               ______________________________

      Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.