Court Opinion

ID: 9743752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:42:10.498069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.244182
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Robertson, P. J.
I concur with the majority opinion of my esteemed colleagues in all but one respect which deals with the alleged error of the trial court’s ruling on the motion for a change of judge. Even so, my contention is not directed to their application of the law as much as to the underlying philosophy that I view as an ever-widening departure from the language of Rule CR. 12, which says that the ruling on such a motion is subject to our review for the abuse of discretion only.
A combination of facts and factors in this case do not, in my opinion, place the trial court’s ruling in the category of discretion abused. To begin with, the case shows a history of being delayed for different reasons at different times. Standing alone this may not be important except to bolster an inference of delay upon the part of the moving party. Secondly; three days before the motion for a change of judge was filed the ■ State and the defendant stipulated that the *372questioned doctors’ reports were to be submitted to the court in lieu of a mental hearing. It would not be unwarranted to construe such an action as amounting to a waiver, if not actual invited error, on the defendant’s part. Additionally, the defendant was to be tried by a jury and not the judge. If prejudice in fact existed there is a high probability that it would be manifested by the court’s evidentiary rulings. This would give the reviewing court tangible questions to decide as opposed to a circumspection of an alleged subjective state of mind. In turn, this would enable the appellate court to serve the ends of justice with something more than speculation. Moreover, the record of this case is absolutely devoid of any indication of judicial hostility.
Finally, cases of the ilk of Beck v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 231, 171 N.E.2d 696, foreclose the possibility of giving a trial judge the benefit of being forthright in conducting the business of his court.
Were it within my power I would hold that under the facts of this case there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for a change of judge, thereby giving some efficacy to the meaning of a review for abuse of discretion as used in Rule CR. 12, if for no other reason than stemming the erosion of the rule into saying that one is entitled to a change of judge under any circumstances.
Note. — Reported at 300 N.E.2d 359.