Court Opinion

ID: 9743314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:30:41.286453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.505926
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: I agree with the holdings of my colleagues. I feel compelled to write, however, to emphasize that this court, the legislature and the executive are bound by the limitations of the constitution. No matter how politically or socially desirable a piece of legislation may be, if it is contrary to the provisions of our constitution, it cannot stand. Possibly, this court is more conscious of constitutional restrictions than are the other branches of our State government because we must constantly square our holdings with the constitution, whereas the legislative and executive branches must often measure their positions by social and political concerns. Nonetheless, the final product of those branches must stand the constitutional test. The opinion of this court in this case finds support for its conclusions in the constitutional debates, the presentations of the Judiciary Committee and in the historical background of article VI of our 1970 Constitution. I agree with the analysis contained in the opinion, but I wish to point out that the very language of article VI plainly indicates that appellate judges are to be elected from the appellate court district at large. The relevant constitutional provisions are set forth in the body of the opinion and I lift the following excerpts in support of my position. Section 2 of article VI provides: “ ‘The State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges. The First Judicial District consists of Cook County.’ ” (Emphasis added.) (136 Ill. 2d at 521, quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §2.) Section 5 of article VI provides: “ ‘The number of Appellate Judges to be selected from each Judicial District shall be provided by law.’ ” (Emphasis added.) (136 Ill. 2d at 522, quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §5.) Thus, the State is divided into judicial districts for the selection of supreme and appellate court judges, not judicial subdistricts, as the act in question attempts to do, and Cook County is designated as the First Judicial District, and no authority is granted by the constitution to divide the First Judicial District, or any judicial district, into subdistricts for the election of appellate judges. Also, section 5 plainly provides that the judges are to be selected from each district, not from subdistricts. Thus, it is my position that although the constitutional debates and history are helpful, one need look no further than the language of the constitution itself to see that appellate judges must be elected from the judicial district at large. The opinion of the court in this case clearly demonstrates that the provisions concerning the election of appellate judges and those relating to the election of circuit judges contained in the act in question were all part of one legislative package, and are so inextricably interwoven that they must stand or fall together. I need add nothing further in this regard. Also, I agree that the provisions for the election of two additional appellate judges in the Third Judicial District is entirely unrelated to the provision of the act relating to Cook County and the First Judicial District and is, therefore, severable.