Court Opinion

ID: 9929356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:55.524719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:12.929996
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13469

 JONI BABALETOS, personal representative,1 vs.      DEMOULAS SUPER
                    MARKETS, INC., & others.2

        Middlesex.    November 3, 2023. - February 2, 2024.

Present (Sitting at Lowell): Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker,
                    Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

Practice, Civil, Jury trial, Judicial discretion.    Evidence,
     Judicial discretion. Time.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
December 10, 2018.

    The case was tried before Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

     Andrew A. Rainer (Mark A. Gottlieb also present) for the
plaintiff.
     Scott A. Chesin (Christopher M. Morrison also present) for
the defendants.

    1   Of the estate of Thomas Babaletos.

    2   Philip Morris USA Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
                                                                     2

    LOWY, J.   The issue in this case involves whether the time

limits a trial judge set for the presentation of evidence in a

complex tobacco trial constituted an abuse of discretion.     This

appeal arises from a wrongful death action brought by the

plaintiff, Joni Babaletos, who served as a personal

representative of the estate of her late husband, Thomas

Babaletos, against the defendants, Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.;

Philip Morris USA Inc.; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.     The

plaintiff alleged that cigarettes produced and sold by the

defendants caused Thomas Babaletos's death from cancer.     The

plaintiff brought claims for breach of warranty in design,

negligence in design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and

unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of G. L.

c. 93A, § 9.   A jury found for the defendants on the four claims

presented to them, and the trial judge subsequently found no

liability with respect to the c. 93A claim.   The plaintiff

timely filed a notice of appeal, and we transferred the case

here on our own motion.

    On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial judge's

imposition of time limits forced her to forgo the presentation

of evidence essential to her case.   The plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate either an abuse of discretion on the part of the

trial judge in the face of general objections, or how the

plaintiff was prejudiced by the imposition of time limits.
                                                                    3

Given that the trial judge repeatedly offered to extend

scheduled half days to full days should the need arise during

trial, that the plaintiff made no such requests as the trial

progressed, and that the trial judge adopted the only two

specific requests the plaintiff made for more time, we conclude

that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in setting

reasonable time limits in this case.   Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court's judgment.

    In most instances trial judges will find that they are able

to manage the efficient presentation of evidence to the trier of

fact without the need to impose time limits.   Trusting in that,

we also take this opportunity to provide some guidance in an

Appendix to this opinion to trial judges who, in civil trials,

believe that setting time limits for the presentation of

evidence would be prudent in a particular case.

    Background.   We summarize the relevant facts as indicated

by the record, reserving certain details for our analysis of the

issues.   Before trial, the defendants moved to impose time

limits for the presentation of evidence, and the plaintiff

opposed that motion.   Prior to confirming time limits in the

case, the trial judge heard arguments from both parties,

discussed the matter at three separate pretrial conferences in

October 2021, and received the parties' joint pretrial

memorandum.   The trial judge ultimately confirmed time limits
                                                                     4

for the presentation of evidence and the length of trial on

October 15, 2021, having reiterated that the limits were subject

to change should a need to extend half days to full days3 or to

stay late on any given day arise.

     At the first pretrial conference on October 1, the trial

judge proposed an initial schedule of 1,575 minutes for the

plaintiff and 1,575 minutes for the defendants, or just over

twenty-six hours each, for all testimony and the presentation of

evidence.   The presentation of evidence was scheduled to

conclude by November 9, after which point closing arguments

would begin.   The trial judge also informed the parties that the

court would not be in session on November 12 because the judge

had a prior commitment that day.    In response to the proposed

time limits, the plaintiff specifically requested that October

29, which was set to be a half day, be extended to a full day to

accommodate a difficult-to-schedule witness.    The plaintiff also

     3 It is unclear from the transcript whether the trial
judge's offers to extend half days to full days were offers to
extend the minutes allotted to each party. Because the
extension of October 29 from a half day to a full day was
ultimately accompanied by an increase in the number of minutes
allotted to each party, it is possible the judge's offers to
extend days were also offers to increase minutes. However,
given that (1) the plaintiff clarified at the October 8 pretrial
hearing that her objection was to the allotted number of days,
not the allotted number of minutes; and (2) the plaintiff failed
to request either more days or more minutes during trial, the
question whether the trial judge's offers to extend half days to
full days were offers to increase the parties' allotted minutes
is immaterial.
                                                                    5

made a general objection, telling the court it would be

difficult to finish presenting the plaintiff's case before

November 9.   The trial judge agreed to the plaintiff's specific

request for the extension of a half day on October 29 to a full

day, affirmed a commitment to adjusting the schedule as needed

to ensure the parties' ability to present their cases, and

indicated a firmness as to the end date of November 9 for the

presentation of evidence:

    "So, as I sit here now, I'm sticking with my deadline. As
    to half day/full day, if there's a witness that needs to be
    on, I have no problem staying. If we have to stay till
    4:30 to finish somebody so they don't have to come back the
    next day, I'm fine with that. If we have to leave a little
    bit early one day because somebody isn't coming in till the
    next morning, I'm fine with that. So, I'll work with the
    parties so that they can get their case in, they can get
    their witnesses when they need them. As to Friday
    afternoon on the 29th, I have no problem doing it. I just
    laid out that staggered schedule as something for you to at
    least look at because we're trying to sort of clear the
    deck so that this case proceeds as efficiently as possible.
    I hear you . . . . As I said, I'll always listen and I'll
    consider it, but you've heard me."

    At the second pretrial conference on October 8, the

plaintiff again generally objected to the end date for the

presentation of evidence for both parties, stating after a

discussion of the plaintiff's intended witnesses:   "When we went

back and mapped out our case . . . the way that we see it is we

think there's a good chance that the plaintiff rests our case on

the 9th or maybe even the 10th, depending on how it goes."    To

which the trial judge responded, "I've got mapped out 1,635
                                                                      6

minutes per side.    How is that not . . . ," before being

interrupted by the plaintiff.   The plaintiff then clarified:

    "Let me -- if I could explain, your Honor? It's not the
    minutes. It's the days, and I'll explain to you what I
    mean by that. The way this is working is –- I know the
    Court has indicated . . . that if we're at side bar or
    something like that happens, that's not going to be counted
    against the person's minutes, but that is counted in the
    sense that if we're at side bar and we're having arguments
    and we're doing other things, the clock is ticking whether
    it's being held against us or not. In other words, I may
    not be able to finish a witness on a particular day. I may
    end up not even using all the minutes you've given me but
    exceed the day total, and that's our concern."

Having just asserted that the allotted number of days, not the

minutes, posed a problem, the plaintiff concluded by requesting

an additional week of time, acknowledging that the court would

not be in session on November 12 and seeking to move the end

date for the conclusion of evidence from November 9 to November

15 or 16.   The trial judge responded, "As I said at the

beginning, I'll listen to everybody, and I will consider

everything."

    At the third pretrial conference on October 14, the trial

judge asked all parties how much time they would need for their

closing arguments.   The plaintiff indicated about one hour.    The

trial judge also noted that it came to his attention that the

court would not be in session on November 11, due to the

Veteran's Day holiday.   Wanting to avoid a four-day break

between closing arguments and the start of deliberations, the
                                                                     7

trial judge indicated a likely shift of the end date for the

presentation of evidence from November 9 to November 10, with

closing arguments now likely to start on November 15:   "So,

likely, evidence would close no later than the 10th, Wednesday,

and if we have to go a full day Wednesday, I'll go."    Commenting

on his decision to move the end date for the presentation of

evidence to November 10 despite his earlier affirmance of

November 9, the trial judge stated, "As much as I wanted to

shrink the trial, I was not going to go back on my word of what

I had given as sort of an outlier of time and then move you back

a full day."   The trial judge then referenced receipt of the

plaintiff's objection to the timeline and promised that a

decision would be issued later that day, October 14, or on the

next day, October 15.   The trial judge also stated:

    "[L]isten, everyone here is extremely experienced at trying
    cases. There's a flow to a case and a cadence to a case,
    and you're not going to know what it is until it starts.
    So I think once it gets going, we're all going to have a
    much better idea of how it's going to flow. But my job is
    to make sure it flows efficiently and properly and lets
    everyone try their case at the same time."

    On October 15, the trial judge presented his pretrial time

limits for the presentation of evidence, increasing his

preliminary allotment of 1,575 minutes, or just over twenty-six

hours, for each party, to 1,680 minutes, or twenty-eight hours,

for each party.   The parties' cases were now set to conclude on

November 10, with closing arguments to begin on November 15.
                                                                      8

These adjustments had the effect of both extending the number of

days allotted for the presentation of evidence and increasing

the number of minutes the plaintiff had to present her case.

    The plaintiff made no specific requests during trial for

additional time for the presentation of evidence.   Despite the

trial judge's indications pretrial that he was willing to extend

days should the need arise, the plaintiff made no proffer to the

trial judge as to additional evidence she would have presented

with additional time, nor did the plaintiff request during trial

that additional half days be extended to full days or that the

court remain in session later than usual on any given day to

allow counsel to finish presenting evidence.   The plaintiff's

only request for additional time throughout the trial came at

closing arguments, where counsel expressed that the allotted one

hour was insufficient and requested ten additional minutes.     The

trial judge granted that request.   Neither the defendants nor

the plaintiff used all their allotted time at trial, with the

plaintiff forgoing just over twenty minutes.   The trial judge

never interrupted the plaintiff's presentation of evidence on

the basis of time during trial.

    Discussion.   We review a lower court's imposition of a time

limit for the presentation of evidence and the length of trial

for abuse of discretion.   See Van Liew v. Eliopoulos, 92 Mass.

App. Ct. 114, 118 (2017); Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737,
                                                                     9

746 (1999); Chandler v. FMC Corp., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 338

(1993).   A judge, "as the guiding spirit and controlling mind of

the trial," has broad discretion over setting a schedule for the

presentation of evidence, so long as exercise of that discretion

is reasonable and does not interfere with a party's right to

present his or her case.   Clark, supra.    See Guardianship of

Brandon, 424 Mass. 482, 494 (1997); Van Liew, supra; Chandler,

supra.

    In light of the scarcity of case law in the Commonwealth

specifically addressing the issue of time limits for the

presentation of evidence and length of trial, we also survey

general evidentiary principles and various other sources of

authority in an effort to gauge common practices.     "The judge

presiding over the trial of a case has the power to keep the

examination of witnesses within the limits of common decency and

fairness, and he has the duty to exercise that power promptly

and firmly when it becomes necessary to do so."     Commonwealth v.

Rooney, 365 Mass. 484, 496 (1974).   See generally Mass. G. Evid.

§ 611(a) (2023).   Furthermore, relevant evidence is "excludable

in the judge's discretion as an unduly time-consuming . . .

diversion" should the probative value of that evidence be

substantially outweighed by such a risk.     Commonwealth v. Cruz,

53 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 407-408 (2001).     See generally Mass. G.

Evid. § 403.   These evidentiary principles are at least one
                                                                   10

source of a judge's broad discretion to impose time limits as

necessary in the Commonwealth.   See generally Mass. G. Evid.

§§ 403, 611(a).

    Other jurisdictions have relied on a court's inherent

authority to control its docket as a source of a judge's broad

discretion in this area, shedding light on what litigants may

expect to be within a judge's power to implement.   See United

States v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12, 23 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2004)

(discussing courts' reliance on Fed. R. Evid. 403 versus courts'

inherent authority when considering propriety of imposition of

time limits); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66

F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.

Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Although

the procedural rules governing federal civil litigation do not

explicitly authorize a district court to set time limits for a

trial, a district court has inherent power 'to control cases

before it'"); United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1577

(E.D. Ky. 1986) ("the inherent power of the court to manage its

workload by placing reasonable time limits on trials is

theoretically unchallengeable").

    Further, local court rules and professional organizations

have offered guidance for judges.   Rule 43.1 of the Local Rules

of the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts (effective Oct. 1, 2023) (Local Rule 43.1) permits
                                                                     11

a judge to impose time limits in the absence of agreement among

the parties and to adjust any such limits upon a showing of good

cause.     In considering a request for an increased allotment of

time after the commencement of trial under Local Rule 43.1, a

judge may consider, among other relevant factors, whether the

moving party has used the time allotted reasonably so far,

complied with orders, and explained sufficiently why additional

time is needed and how it would be used.     Id. ("A request for

added time will be allowed only for good cause.     In determining

whether to grant a motion for an increased allotment of time,

the court will take into account . . . the moving party's

explanation as to the way in which the requested added time

would be used and why it is essential to assure a fair

trial . . ."); American Bar Association, Civil Trial Practice

Standards § 8(f), SN063 ALI-ABA 839, 865 (2007) ("The court

should reassess imposed limits in light of developments during

trial, and may grant an extension upon a showing of good

cause").

    The American Bar Association's Civil Trial Practice

Standards advise that, before imposing time limits, courts

should make an informed analysis of the parties' cases and plans

for trial, discuss the possibility of self-imposed time limits

with the parties, and afford the parties an opportunity to be

heard on the matter.     Civil Trial Practice Standards § 8(a),
                                                                   12

SN063 ALI-ABA at 865.   These sources provide insight into how a

judge can suitably exercise his or her broad discretion in

choosing whether and how to impose time limits for the

presentation of evidence and length of a trial.

    In light of our case law and the instructive sources

discussed supra, in determining whether to impose time limits,

and if so the length to impose, a trial judge should perform an

informed analysis of case-specific circumstances, including but

not limited to the complexity of a case and the parties'

representations of their needs.   This informed analysis may

involve reviewing written motions and affording the parties an

opportunity to be heard on the issue.   Upon request of a party,

a judge should reassess imposed time limits in light of evolving

circumstances at trial.   Flexibility is essential.   Importantly,

though, it is incumbent on the parties to reevaluate their

ability to present their case within the framework imposed by

the court and to make specific requests and objections

accordingly.   A trial judge cannot be expected to respond with

flexibility unless the parties alert the judge to a prospective

need for additional time.

    In the instant case, the trial judge did not abuse his

discretion in setting time limits.   The trial judge reviewed the

parties' motions for and against time limits, received the

parties' joint pretrial memorandum, and heard arguments from
                                                                     13

both parties on the matter on multiple occasions before setting

pretrial time limits:    "As I said at the beginning, I'll listen

to everybody, and I will consider everything."    Cf. Chandler, 35

Mass. App. Ct. at 338 (holding judge abused discretion where,

among other things, he arbitrarily limited redirect examination

of witness in middle of trial without parties having opportunity

to have been heard).    The trial judge also expressed a

commitment to reassessing his pretrial time limits by offering,

on multiple occasions, to extend half days to full days and stay

late as needed.

    The trial judge's offers of flexibility in this regard are

significant.   The schedule as set by the trial judge was subject

to change, driven by the parties' abilities to put on their

cases.   The judge, however, can only be expected to exercise his

discretion to extend time limits in response to developments at

trial if a party represents such a need to the court.      The

plaintiff in this case simply never provided the kind of input

the judge invited.   Specifically, not once after trial began did

the plaintiff ask for the extension of a half day to a full day,

nor did the plaintiff ever connect general pretrial objections

to an actualized need during trial to forgo specific evidence.

    The plaintiff asserts on appeal that she had to forgo

entirely the testimony of multiple of her witnesses.       Yet, we

cannot know on appeal whether the trial judge would have granted
                                                                     14

or denied the plaintiff's request for more time had the

plaintiff, for example, requested during trial that a half day

be extended to a full day to allow for such testimony, as the

trial judge specifically offered to do.     Had the plaintiff in

fact requested as much and had the trial judge elected to honor

the request -- which his earlier offer indicated was likely –-

the plaintiff would have had two more hours, in addition to the

twenty minutes she forwent at trial, to present additional

evidence.     Without any input of this kind from the plaintiff, it

cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion.

Given the plaintiff's failure in this regard, she cannot

demonstrate how she was prejudiced, or that the judge abused his

discretion.

       The trial judge's decision on October 15 as to the schedule

cannot be understood as final in light of his repeated offers to

adjust as needed.     The trial judge again offered to extend half

days after he had already granted the plaintiff's request for

one such half-day extension, indicating a continued willingness

to adjust:    "So, likely, evidence would close no later than the

10th, Wednesday, and if we have to go a full day Wednesday, I'll

go."   Moreover, in the two instances in which the plaintiff made

specific requests -- when the plaintiff sought the extension of

October 29 to a full day at the pretrial stage and when the

plaintiff sought ten extra minutes for her closing argument --
                                                                  15

the trial judge adjusted the schedule accordingly.    A trial

judge, having wide discretion over the management of a trial,

cannot be said to have abused his or her discretion if he or

she, having received no requests from parties to do otherwise,

proceeds according to a reasonable schedule set at the start of

trial.    Because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an abuse

of discretion or how she was prevented from presenting her

entire case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

    Conclusion.    In sum, we conclude that the judge's

imposition of a reasonable limit on the length of the trial in

this instance neither constituted an abuse of discretion nor

prevented the plaintiff from presenting her case to the fact

finder.

                                     Judgment affirmed.
                             Appendix.

     Surely, time limits are neither the only method nor usually
the best method by which to ensure the efficient presentation of
evidence to the trier of fact. Nonetheless, they may prove a
useful tool available to a trial judge in the context of complex
civil trials, and so we provide the following guidance for
judges for how best to approach the imposition of time limits.
With the recognition that every case is different and trial
judges have wide discretion over the management of a trial:

•   judges should avoid setting time limits for the various
    components of a trial before a thorough review of the case and
    the parties' plans with respect to the presentation of
    evidence;

•   judges should provide parties with an opportunity to be heard
    on the issue of time limits;

•   judges should pay particular attention to (1) the complexity
    of a given case and (2) the nature of the claims and defenses
    of the parties;

•   judges should generally allocate time equally to the
    plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) but may consider the possibility
    that a party with the burden of proof might, in a given case,
    require enhanced trial time;

•   judges should give the parties notice of any time limits
    before the start of trial, so that the parties may plan
    accordingly, and should likewise provide updates as to the
    accounting of time throughout trial;

•   judges should not be reticent to reevaluate their pretrial
    determinations based on developments during trial;

•   judges should reasonably accommodate a party's request during
    trial for a reasonable adjustment of the time limits if that
    party adequately explains why additional time is needed and
    how, if granted, that additional time would be used; and

•   judges should emphasize when informing a jury venire of the
    anticipated length of a trial that such estimates are not
    precise.