Court Opinion

ID: 9899556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:01:26.590386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.172657
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12729   Document: 36-1    Date Filed: 11/16/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-12729
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       NANCY B. MILLER,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       OMOTAYO B. ALLI,
       Executive Director of the Georgia Public Defender
       Council, in oﬃcial capacity,
       MOFFETT FLOURNOY,
       Chief Public Defender, Chattahoochee Judicial
       Circuit, Columbus, Georgia, in oﬃcial capacity,
       CHATTAHOOCHEE CIRCUIT PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
       GEORGIA PUBLIC DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL,
       as it governs, manages, and controls the
       Chattahoochee Circuit Public Defender’s Oﬃce,
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12729

                                                            Defendants-Appellees.

                               ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00129-CDL
                            ____________________

       Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Nancy Miller appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of
       her second amended complaint against Moffett Flournoy, the
       Circuit Public Defender for the Chattahoochee Circuit Public
       Defender’s Office, and others. 1 Miller’s Title VII and § 1983
       claims are time-barred, and her complaint failed to state a plausible
       claim of retaliation under § 1981. We therefore affirm the district
       court’s dismissal.
                                              I.
             Nancy Miller is an African-American attorney employed by
       the Chattahoochee Circuit Public Defender’s Oﬃce since 2006.

       1  Although Miller proceeds pro se on appeal, she is a licensed attorney, so
       liberal construction of her filings is not appropriate. See Hornsby-Culpepper v.
       Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).
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       22-12729              Opinion of the Court                        3

       According to her complaint, in March of 2017, Miller, concerned
       that several recent hires had all been white, asked Steve Craft, the
       Chief Assistant Public Defender who was involved in the hiring of
       new attorneys, if the oﬃce had received any applications from
       attorneys of color. Craft responded that the oﬃce did not want
       to lower its standards. Miller alleged that Craft also made other
       comments, but she did not state what those comments were.
       Miller believed this comment to be unlawful and reported it to
       Moﬀett Flournoy, head of the public defender’s oﬃce. Flournoy
       responded that he did not consider race and only wanted to hire
       other attorneys who could perform as well as Miller.
              Shortly after this exchange, Miller began a week-long
       murder trial. During the trial, Miller received notice that the
       Georgia Court of Appeals planned to dismiss one of her client’s
       pending cases because she had failed to sign her name to the appeal.
       After her trial concluded, she found that Flournoy had issued her a
       reprimand over this mistake. Miller objected, but the reprimand
       was not withdrawn.
              Miller believed that the reprimand was retaliation in
       response to her reporting Craft’s comment to Flournoy.
       Following the reprimand, Miller alleges that Flournoy and Craft
       excluded her from an oﬃce-wide raise, began more closely
       scrutinizing her work for deﬁciencies, and changed her schedule to
       be more rigorous than before. All events were alleged to have
       occurred within a “few months” of March of 2017.
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12729

               Based on these events, Miller ﬁled a charge with the Equal
       Employment Opportunity Commission in March of 2019. 2 The
       EEOC issued her a Notice of Right to Sue in May of 2021. She
       then ﬁled suit against Flournoy and a handful of other defendants
       in district court, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and a
       racially hostile work environment under Title VII; race
       discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, asserted
       through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
       The district court dismissed her complaint, reasoning that her Title
       VII and § 1983 claims were time-barred, that she was not entitled
       to equitable tolling of the deadlines, that she had failed to state a
       claim of § 1981 retaliation, and that Flournoy was entitled to
       qualiﬁed immunity. This appeal follows.
                                            II.
             We review a district court’s denial of equitable tolling de
       novo and its factual determinations for clear error. Cabello v.
       Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005).
             We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
       claim de novo. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir.
       2019). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true and
       construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. To

       2 Although the operative complaint alleges that Miller filed her charge in
       March of 2019, the actual EEOC charge attached as an exhibit by defendants
       to their motion to dismiss indicates that it was filed on September 16, 2019.
       This discrepancy does not matter for the outcome; either way, Miller’s charge
       was filed out-of-time.
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       22-12729               Opinion of the Court                          5

       survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that are
       “plausible on their face,” and “raise a right to relief above the
       speculative level.” Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1312 (11th
       Cir. 2022) (alterations adopted and quotation omitted). We must
       be able to draw from the plaintiﬀ’s facts “the reasonable inference
       that the defendants were liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
       (alterations adopted and quotation omitted).
                                        III.
               Before bringing suit under Title VII an aggrieved employee
       must ﬁrst ﬁle a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180
       days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C.
       § 2000e-5(e). Compliance with this deadline is not a jurisdictional
       prerequisite, and the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.
       Sturniolo v. Sheaﬀer, Eaton, Inc., 15 F.3d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir. 1994).
       But equitable tolling “is an extraordinary remedy.” Bost v. Fed.
       Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation
       omitted). The party seeking tolling must prove “(1) that he has
       been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
       circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely ﬁling.”
       Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir.
       2016) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
              In Georgia, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is
       two years. Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003). We
       look to state law for applicable tolling rules. Wallace v. Kato, 549
       U.S. 384, 394 (2007). In Georgia, the limitations period may be
       tolled where the defendant committed a fraud “by which the
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12729

       plaintiﬀ has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action,” in
       which case the limitation period runs “only from the time of the
       plaintiﬀ’s discovery of the fraud.” O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96. The
       plaintiﬀ must show that he “exercised reasonable diligence to
       discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the
       statute of limitation.” Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp.,
       289 Ga. 437, 445 (2011).
              Miller’s complaint alleges that all of the events supporting
       her Title VII and § 1983 claims occurred within a “few months” of
       March of 2017.          Therefore, under the most generous
       interpretation of her complaint, the period to ﬁle an EEOC charge
       for her Title VII claim ended sometime in 2018. And the
       limitations period for her to sue on her § 1983 claims expired in
       2019. Miller ﬁled her EEOC charge, at the earliest, in March of
       2019 and ﬁled suit in July of 2021. Both her Title VII and § 1983
       claims are thus untimely.
               Miller argues that she is entitled to equitable tolling because
       the defendants fraudulently concealed their discriminatory acts.
       Speciﬁcally, she contends that when she asked Craft about the 2017
       raises, he led her to believe that no one else had been given a raise
       either. But her own complaint indicates that she learned of the
       raises through a “Public Records Salary Information Site,” not via
       speaking with Craft. She does not explain why she could not have
       discovered this discrepancy from this same public website earlier.
       And she does not provide any reasons at all why equitable tolling is
       warranted for the other adverse actions taken against her—the
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       22-12729              Opinion of the Court                        7

       retaliatory reprimand, increased scrutiny, and change in her
       caseload—which she would have been aware of the instant they
       occurred. Because Miller’s delay is inconsistent with the exercise
       of reasonable diligence in the pursuit of her claims, she has not
       stated a plausible claim to equitable tolling.
                                       IV.
              To state a claim of retaliation under § 1981, a plaintiﬀ must
       show that (1) she “engaged in a statutorily protected activity;” (2)
       she “suﬀered an adverse employment action;” and (3) she
       “established a causal link between the protected activity and the
       adverse action.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08 (11th Cir.
       2009). Unlike Title VII claims where mixed-motivation causation
       sometimes applies, a retaliation claim under § 1981 requires proof
       that race was a but-for cause of the adverse action. Ossmann v.
       Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007, 1014 (11th Cir. 2023). In other
       words, to survive the motion to dismiss, Miller must plead facts
       supporting a reasonable inference that but for her race she would
       not have been disciplined. See id.
              Miller’s complaint does not meet this standard. She
       concedes that the stated ground for her reprimand was her
       endangering one of her client’s cases by failing to sign an appeal,
       an oﬀense which Flournoy told her was grounds for termination.
       Miller alleges no facts which tend to dispel the natural conclusion
       that the serious error she committed at her job was the but-for
       cause of her being subjected to discipline and increased scrutiny,
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       8                           Opinion of the Court                     22-12729

       whether or not she had earlier reported Craft’s allegedly
       discriminatory comment.
              Instead, she presents only conclusory allegations that
       “[s]imilarly situated white employees were not treated the same”
       and that “a lesser experienced white attorney” was appointed as her
       supervisor. These are threadbare assertions. She does not
       explain who these white employees were, how they were similarly
       situated to her, or whether they had committed similarly serious
       oﬀenses, nor does she explain how the promotion of a white
       colleague is relevant to her retaliation claim. Without more, the
       factual allegations in Miller’s complaint do not support a retaliation
       claim against Flournoy, as required to defeat the Rule 12(b)(6)
       motion to dismiss. 3
                                           *      *       *
               The district court correctly found that Miller was not
       entitled to equitable tolling of the statutes of limitations on her
       Title VII and § 1983 claims and that Miller had failed to state a claim
       of retaliation in violation of § 1981. We therefore AFFIRM the
       district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

       3   Miller has abandoned her § 1981 claims against all other defendants.