Court Opinion

ID: 9412062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 19:05:37.916474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.792254
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210217-U

                                   Order filed July 28, 2023.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-21-0217
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 20-CF-289
                                                      )
      ROBERT L. HARRIS,                               )       Honorable
                                                      )       Kevin W. Lyons,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
            Justice Brennan dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prejudicial other-crimes
                  evidence.

¶2          The defendant, Robert L. Harris, appeals his conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon

     by a felon (UPWF) and obstructing justice, arguing defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

     object to other-crimes evidence regarding the endangerment and subsequent death of a child.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND
¶4          The defendant was charged with endangering the health or life of a child (count I) (720

     ILCS 5/12C-5(a)(1) (West 2020)), UPWF (count II) (id. § 24-1.1(a)), and obstructing justice

     (count III) (id. § 31-4(a)(1)) as a result of an accidental shooting that occurred on May 20, 2020.

     On March 30, 2021, the defendant and the State agreed to sever count I and proceeded to trial on

     counts II and III. At a jury trial, the State introduced evidence of Bonita Harris’s 4:02 p.m. 911

     call, stating that a minor, Jo.W., had been wounded by a BB gun. On the call, Bonita stated that

     her grandchildren were playing outside, found a gun, and one of them pulled the trigger. Bonita

     was afraid of the gun and did not want to go near it, but believed it was a BB gun. She stated Jo.W.

     was bleeding from his chest and had trouble breathing.

¶5          Peoria police officers Danny Marx Jr. and Andrew Redpath were dispatched to Bonita’s

     house. Upon arrival, Marx discovered Jo.W. had a gunshot wound and not a wound inflicted by a

     BB gun as reported. Marx spoke with Ja.W., Jo.W.’s brother, who initially stated he was inside

     the house when he heard a loud bang outside. He ran outside and found Jo.W. lying on the

     sidewalk. Ja.W. stated that he threw the firearm into the neighbor’s yard and showed Marx where

     he threw the gun, but it was not found. Redpath searched the house and did not find anyone else

     present.

¶6          Peoria police officer David Buss discovered a 9-millimeter bullet casing underneath a coat

     rack behind the front door. Buss discovered that the bullet passed through a sweatshirt that was

     hanging on the wall and then struck the doorframe. Buss recovered the bullet from the doorframe.

     Officers searched the home after obtaining a search warrant and discovered a bag of .38-caliber

     ammunition in a coat. No firearm or BB gun was discovered in the residence during the search.

¶7          Bonita testified that she lived in the house with her son, O’Bryan, and her grandchildren,

     Ja.W. and Jo.W. The defendant was only Ja.W.’s biological father but both children called the

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     defendant “dad.” On the date of the incident, the defendant arrived at the house between 11 a.m.

     and 1 p.m. The defendant played with Ja.W. and Jo.W. Bonita went to take a nap and the defendant

     left. Bonita was later awoken when Ja.W. “slammed into” her bedroom door crying and stating

     Jo.W. was dead. Bonita exited her bedroom, saw the defendant, and told him to check on Jo.W.

     while she tried to calm down Ja.W. The defendant told Bonita to call 911, which she did.

¶8             Bonita testified that the defendant was still at the house when the ambulance arrived, but

     did not remember if he was there when police arrived. Bonita never saw a gun and denied

     mentioning a gun to the defendant at that time, but stated it was possible she told a detective that

     Ja.W. told her the defendant had left with a gun. Bonita did not know O’Bryan to own or have a

     gun or ammunition and believed the ammunition in the coat pocket could have belonged to her

     father who previously lived there. Bonita said the coat also could have been her father’s or

     O’Bryan’s since it was a smaller coat, and the defendant was much larger than O’Bryan or her

     father.

¶9             Ja.W. was 10 years old when he testified at trial and was granted immunity to compel him

     to testify. He testified that he and Jo.W. found the gun in the defendant’s coat pocket that was

     hanging on a coat rack behind the front door. They started playing with it near the front door when

     it went off and a bullet struck Jo.W. Ja.W. then ran to tell Bonita. Ja.W. and Bonita woke the

     defendant who was napping in another bedroom. The defendant then took the coat and left before

     the police and ambulance arrived. Ja.W. testified that before the defendant left with his coat and

     gun, Bonita asked the defendant “[w]hy would you have this gun in my house when you know I

     have these kids here.” Ja.W. also stated he initially lied to the police about how the incident

     occurred because the defendant told him to.

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¶ 10          Detective William Calbow Jr. conducted multiple recorded interviews as part of his

       investigation, which were played in court. Calbow first spoke with Bonita and Ja.W. on the date

       of the incident. During this interview, Bonita stated that she called the defendant and told him to

       come to the house immediately because Jo.W. shot himself. Phone records did not support this

       claim and Bonita denied calling the defendant at trial. Bonita was interviewed again two days later,

       during which she stated Ja.W. told her the defendant left the house when the ambulance arrived.

       During Calbow’s interview of Ja.W., he stated the defendant was not present during the shooting.

       Calbow stated Ja.W.’s statements in the video recording were “part of the initial story that [Ja.W.]

       gave before he told us the truth.” Ja.W. also stated he did not see Jo.W. find the gun.

¶ 11          Calbow interviewed the defendant a week after the incident after the defendant had

       surrendered himself to the police. During the interview, the defendant stated he did not know where

       he was the day of the incident. He further stated he was not at Bonita’s house that day but had been

       there the day before.

¶ 12          The parties stipulated the defendant was previously convicted of a felony. The parties also

       stipulated that Amanda Youmans would testify she was a forensic pathologist who performed

       Jo.W.’s autopsy. She found a gunshot wound on the left side of Jo.W.’s back and an exit wound

       on the left side of his chest. The bullet perforated Jo.W.’s left lung and heart, and Youmans opined

       that the cause of death was from the gunshot wound. The State rested, and the defendant’s motion

       for a directed verdict was denied. The defense rested without presenting any evidence.

¶ 13          The State referenced the death of Jo.W. multiple times in both their opening and closing

       arguments. Notably, the State began its closing argument stating:

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                      “[l]adies and gentlemen, on the afternoon of May 20th, 2020, [Ja.W.] was

                      standing in his house next to his dying brother, [Jo.W.]. [Ja.W.] had just fired [a]

                      gun, which hit [Jo.W.].

                              In that heartbreaking moment, when [Ja.W.] and [Jo.W.] need the

                      defendant more than anytime in their life, what does the defendant do? Flees out

                      of the house.”

       During their closing arguments, the State mentioned Jo.W.’s death or the fact that he had been shot

       more than 12 times.

¶ 14          The jury found the defendant guilty of both counts. The defendant filed a motion for a new

       trial arguing the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the court erred in

       granting Ja.W. immunity, and the court erred in denying the defendant’s motion in limine

       regarding prior convictions. The motion was denied. The court sentenced the defendant to

       concurrent prison terms of 10 years for UPWF and 3 years for obstructing justice. The defendant

       filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was denied. The defendant appealed.

¶ 15                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16          On appeal, the defendant argues, inter alia, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

       to the prejudicial other-crimes evidence describing how the defendant left a firearm in a place

       where children could reach it, one child shot another child, and a child died as a result. The United

       States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to the effective assistance of

       counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I § 8. Ineffective assistance of counsel

       claims are evaluated under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

       (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s

       performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient

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       performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s

       errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687; People v. Albanese, 104

       Ill. 2d 504, 525-26 (1984). Whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed

       question of law and fact subject to de novo review. People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (2008).

¶ 17          Evidence of offenses other than those at issue is generally inadmissible in order to “protect

       against the jury convicting a defendant because he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.”

       People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). But evidence of other crimes may be admissible

       “if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.”

       People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135 (2005). “For instance, other-crimes evidence is admissible

       to show modus operandi, intent, identity, motive or absence of mistake.” Id. at 135-36. “Evidence

       of other crimes [may also be] admissible if it is ‘part of the continuing narrative of the event giving

       rise to the offense [citation], is intertwined with the event charged [citation], or explains an aspect

       of the crime charged that would otherwise be implausible [citation].’ ” People v. Hale, 2012 IL

       App (1st) 103537, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Outlaw, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1086-87 (2009)).

       Continuing narrative acts are those “ ‘which concern the circumstances attending the entire

       transaction and they do not concern separate, distinct and disconnected crimes.’ ” People v. Adkins,

       239 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (2010) (quoting People v. Marose, 10 Ill. 2d 340, 343 (1957)). However, even if

       other-crimes evidence is relevant, it should be excluded “if the prejudicial effect substantially

       outweighs the probative value.” People v. Foreman, 2019 IL App (3d) 160334, ¶ 31.

¶ 18          We find that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of

       the other-crimes evidence. First, the other-crimes evidence was not admissible. Because of the

       stipulation that the defendant was a felon and the fact that the counts were severed, the State only

       needed to prove the defendant possessed a firearm, and he intended to obstruct his prosecution by

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       concealing the firearm. Nothing required the State to prove the firearm was left where a child could

       find it or that the firearm caused a child’s death. Evidence thereof served no legitimate purpose

       and instead was impermissibly used by the prosecution to “inflame the passions and prejudices of

       the jury.” People v. Porter, 372 Ill. App. 3d 973, 979 (2007). What little relevancy, if any, this

       evidence had in proving a firearm was present in the home on the date of the incident or to further

       support the State’s claim that the defendant intended to conceal the firearm is substantially

       outweighed by the unfair prejudice. Evidence of Jo.W.’s death was also not part of the continuing

       narrative in this matter. There were far less prejudicial ways to prove a firearm was present in the

       house on the date in question, and the defendant clearly had a motive to conceal the weapon given

       the stipulation that he was a felon and was alleged to be in possession of a weapon with police en

       route. For these reasons, the death was also not part of the continuing narrative which only required

       the State to prove the defendant possessed a firearm, police were called because a firearm was

       discharged, and the defendant removed the firearm before police arrived to conceal the fact he was

       a felon in possession of a firearm.

¶ 19          Second, even if we were to accept the State’s argument that Jo.W.’s death was relevant to

       prove the defendant’s intent to obstruct justice by concealing the firearm or permissible as part of

       the continuing narrative of events, “other-crimes evidence must not become a ‘focal point’ of the

       trial.” People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 747, 755 (2010) (quoting People v. Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d

       84, 94 (2006)). Courts have repeatedly warned against presenting unnecessarily detailed or

       repetitive evidence of other crimes. Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 94; People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App.

       3d 926, 940-41 (2001) (“The detail and repetition presented to the jury had nothing to do with the

       purported purpose of the evidence—proof of [the defendant’s] intent and the absence of

       accident.”).

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¶ 20          Here, the State impermissibly made Jo.W.’s death a focal point of the trial. The State began

       closing arguments by referring to the death of Jo.W. as a “heartbreaking moment, when [Ja.W.]

       and [Jo.W.] need[ed] the defendant more than anytime in their life.” The State then ended its

       closing argument again referring to Jo.W.’s death. The State also made repeated references to

       Jo.W.’s death throughout their opening and closing arguments and introduced the autopsy report,

       which unnecessarily detailed Jo.W.’s death. There was no strategic reason to allow the State to

       center the case around such prejudicial evidence of the untried offense of endangering the health

       or life of a child, and, therefore, counsel’s performance was deficient by failing to object.

¶ 21          In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s argument that evidence of Jo.W.’s death

       does not constitute other-crimes evidence even though the jury could infer from the evidence that

       the defendant endangered the health or life of a child because the State never explicitly stated the

       firearm was carelessly left where children could find it. “The fact that such evidence comes to the

       jury by way of inference does not alter its potentially prejudicial character.” People v. Lewis, 165

       Ill. 2d 305, 346 (1995). Evidence of Jo.W.’s death, allegedly caused by the firearm left in a place

       accessible by the children, was clearly evidence of a crime other than those at issue in this trial.

¶ 22          Turning to the second prong of the Strickland test, we must determine whether there is a

       reasonable probability the result of the proceedings would have been different had defense counsel

       objected to the impermissible other-crimes evidence. Here, the only witness who testified the

       firearm belonged to the defendant or that the defendant concealed the firearm from the police was

       Ja.W. who was 10 years old at the time of the trial and initially gave a contradictory statement to

       the authorities. Further, in her testimony, Bonita contradicted the information she provided in her

       video recorded interview several times. There was also ammunition found in a coat pocket that

       does not appear to have belonged to the defendant and did not match the caliber of firearm fired

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       inside the house. Moreover, as stated above, Jo. W.’s death became the focal point of trial, and the

       jury was not provided any limiting instruction for how to consider the other-crimes evidence.

       Given the lack of credible testimony or other evidence that the firearm belonged to the defendant,

       along with the highly prejudicial nature of the other-crimes evidence, we believe there was a

       reasonable probability the jury may have found the defendant not guilty of both counts absent the

       State’s attempt to inflame their passions. We, therefore, reverse the defendant’s convictions and

       remand for a new trial. We note that double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial as the evidence

       presented was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions. See People v. Belknap, 396 Ill.

       App. 3d 183, 213 (2009). Based this determination, we need not consider the defendant’s other

       contentions.

¶ 23                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and remanded.

¶ 25          Reversed and remanded.

¶ 26          JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting:

¶ 27          I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of defendant’s convictions due to

       ineffective assistance of counsel. First, I do not agree that most of the complained-of other crimes

       evidence was inadmissible. Moreover, trial counsel used this evidence for strategic purposes to

       discredit Bonita and Ja.W., which otherwise defeats the majority’s ineffective assistance analysis.

¶ 28          Initially, I take issue with the majority’s truncated characterization of the evidence

       surrounding Jo.W.’s death as “other crimes” evidence. Most of this evidence was course of

       conduct evidence necessary to prove the charged elements and explain an otherwise confusing set

       of circumstances. Hale, 2012 IL App (1st) 103537, ¶ 14. The State was required to prove that

       defendant possessed a gun inside Bonita’s apartment and that he fled the apartment with the gun

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       to obstruct his prosecution for possessing the gun as a felon. Here, however, law enforcement

       never saw defendant in the apartment, let alone in possession of a gun. Nor was a gun ever found.

       The only two witnesses to defendant possessing a gun in the apartment and fleeing with it both

       initially denied that defendant was present in the apartment when Jo.W. was shot. Further, it had

       been suggested in turn that Jo.W. had been shot with a BB gun, had shot himself outside the

       apartment with a gun found under a tree, and that it was Ja.W. who had secreted the gun somewhere

       outside the apartment. Adding to this confusion was unrelated ammunition found in a coat next to

       where defendant’s gun was purportedly located by Ja.W., and that defendant’s adult brother, and

       not defendant, lived in the apartment where the gun was found.

¶ 29          Under these circumstances, it would be all but impossible to prove that defendant had

       possessed a gun in the apartment and fled with it without getting into the circumstances leading

       up to Jo.W.’s death. Indeed, these facts “attend[ed] the entire transaction and they do not concern

       separate, distinct and disconnected crimes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d

       at 32. To prove that defendant fled with an actual (unrecovered) gun from the apartment, it was

       necessary to prove that there was a gun in the apartment in the first place. Given the inconsistent

       statements of the only two witnesses to this fact, the State was entitled to demonstrate that a gun

       was in the apartment by proof of the bullet casing on the floor and the bullet in the doorframe that

       presumably came from a single bullet fired through the body of Jo.W. The timing of Jo.W.’s

       gunshot wound and death was not elicited to inflame the passions of the jury, but to definitively

       prove the time an actual gun, and not a BB gun, was in the apartment.

¶ 30          That no gun was found at the scene of Jo.W.’s shooting when law enforcement arrived of

       course leads to the inference that someone secreted the gun from the scene. But who? Was it

       Ja.W., as he initially claimed, or defendant, as Ja.W. subsequently detailed? To prove beyond a

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       reasonable doubt that Ja.W.’s testimony was the truth, the State was entitled to argue that defendant

       fled the scene after Jo.W.’s death. The death of Jo.W., afterall, made it more likely that a thorough

       investigation as to the source of the gun would ensue. While I agree with the majority that the

       stipulated testimony of the forensic pathologist was unnecessary, I do not find it prejudicial under

       the circumstances. It was cumulative to evidence the State was otherwise entitled to and did

       introduce, i.e., Jo.W.’s death by gunshot wound, absent any pictures or graphic details to raise the

       specter of reversible prejudice.

¶ 31          Also problematic, the majority’s ineffective assistance analysis completely ignores the

       legitimate strategic reasons defense counsel did not object to the highlighted evidence. In

       assessing whether defense counsel’s performance was reasonable, we must afford great deference

       to strategic decisions and there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

       wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Given, as trial

       counsel emphasized, there was no physical evidence tying a gun to defendant, it was necessary to

       discredit the testimony of Bonita and Ja.W. that defendant possessed the gun and fled the scene

       after Jo.W.’s death. To discredit Bonita, the defense suggested that she framed defendant to deflect

       any blame she might have shared in Jo.W. obtaining a gun from her home and shooting himself

       and to reduce the likelihood of DCFS removing Ja.W. from her care. To discredit Ja.W., whom

       Bonita acknowledged on cross-examination “sometimes imagines things or sees things that aren’t

       there,” the defense attributed his claims that defendant was present to the shock of having shot and

       killed his half-brother. Evidence of Jo.W.’s death was necessary to each of these strategic attempts

       to discredit Bonita and Ja.W. Though defense counsel’s strategic use of this evidence was

       ultimately unsuccessful, success is not the lens through which we measure reasonable assistance.

¶ 32          I would affirm defendant’s convictions.

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