Court Opinion

ID: 9678249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:15:03.033108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.956603
License: Public Domain

John B. Robbins, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully disagree udge, which concludes that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Broth-erton’s injury was not sustained in the course of her employment with White River Area Agency on Aging. The majority cites Arkansas Methodist Hospital v. Hampton, 90 Ark. App. 288, 205 S.W.3d 848 (2005), as an example of when “performing employment services” may include an employee’s mere availability to act for the employer, if needed. That case is hardly relevant and is easily distinguished because it did not involve a second employer who was compensating the employee at the time of the injury, as the Commission found in the instant case. Furthermore, I take issue with the majority opinion’s statement that the Commission ignored the Agency’s acquiescence to a less-than-rigid work schedule. To the contrary, the Commission acknowledged that this was a unique work situation and offered an alternate scenario that might have proved compensable despite the timing of the injury. More to the point, the majority opinion has resorted to fact finding in order to reverse the decision of the Commission in this instance. A review of the evidence that supports the Commission’s decision, and the relevant facts found therein, include the following: (1) Brotherton worked for the Agency part time and for Mary Jane Foster part time at Foster’s residence where five elderly ladies resided and received assistance. (2) Brotherton began her day’s work at approximately 8:00 a.m. and worked until she and Foster were “caught up.” (3) The Agency paid Brotherton to provide three hours of personal care services each day to Maxine Raines, one of Foster’s residents. (4) The Agency also paid Brotherton to provide three hours of personal care services each day to Flora Shinaro, another of Foster’s residents. (5) Foster paid Brotherton $1100 per month to provide services for any of Foster’s five residents, and the pay was for any service rendered when Brotherton was not “on the clock” for the Agency. (6) Brotherton’s work schedule with the Agency reflected that her three hours of services for Maxine Raines were to be rendered from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (7) The record does not reflect when Brotherton was scheduled to render the three hours of services to Flora Shinaro. (8) Brotherton was injured while assisting Raines to the toilet at 9:00 a.m. on July 16,2002. (9) Maxine Raines routinely and often requested toileting assistance. (10) The bifling form Brotherton provided to the Agency set forth that on July 16,2002, she provided services to Maxine Raines from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (11) Many portions of Brotherton’s testimony at the hearing were deemed suspect. I submit that the foregoing evidence constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Commission’s finding that Brotherton failed to prove that she was performing employment services for the Agency at the time of her injury. To conclude otherwise requires fact finding, a function that is left to the Commission and not the appellate courts. The majority agrees that the employments are separable even though the tasks are the same, and it then finds that Brotherton’s Agency employment time was 8:00 a.m to 2:00 p.m. There is no such evidence of record. Our task is to review the evidence favorable to the Commission’s decision and decide if such evidence is substantial. In other words, could reasonable minds conclude that Brotherton failed to prove that she was “on the clock” for the Agency when she was hurt? Under proper application of the standard of review, the answer is yes. The majority opinion errs by holding otherwise.