Court Opinion

ID: 9578512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:55.479525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:12.575114
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, J.,
dissenting:
Respondent, a licensed real estate broker, brought suit against appellants, members of an investment group, for payment of a real estate commission allegedly earned during negotiations for the sale of real property. The district court awarded respondent $66,875 plus interest, and this appeal followed.
In October, 1972, Mr. Silverson, a real estate consultant working on behalf of appellants, sent respondent a 73-page document containing a detailed description of commercial property owned by appellants in Las Vegas, Nevada. Respondent subsequently showed the property to the Janitell brothers who were interested in investing in commercial property in the Las Vegas area.
The Janitells, respondent, some of the appellants, and Silverson met in early June, 1973, in Los Angeles, California to discuss the sale of appellants’ property. At that meeting some of the details of the proposed purchase were worked out.
*741On August 8, 1973, appellant Mayer Greenberg, to whom the other appellants had executed a power of attorney, called respondent to revoke the original offer, but gave the Janitells 10 days to accept another proposal. On August 11, 1973, respondent called Mayer Greenberg’s office, talked to appellant Staniek, and accepted the August 8, 1973 offer.
There was evidence presented at trial that an employee of Nevada Savings and Loan drafted escrow instructions in response to a call from appellant Staniek, in accordance with the agreement made on August 11, 1973. Subsequently, appellants accepted an offer from another party and the deal with the Janitells was never consummated.
Appellants contend (1) negotiations with one member of the investment group were insufficient to bind the remainder of the group; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that respondent earned his commission; and, (3) the pre-judgment interest award was improperly calculated.
1. Appellants argue that since Mayer Greenberg was attorney-in-fact for their investment group, he, and not Staniek, was the only one who had authority to negotiate on behalf of the group. Therefore, they conclude, since it was appellant Staniek, and not Mayer Greenberg, to whom respondent communicated on August 11, 1973, we must find that Staniek was acting as a sub-agent of Mayer Greenberg in order for there to be sufficient evidence of an agreement to purchase the property.
Such authority may be found from the facts adduced at trial. Cf. Nevada Nat’l Bank v. Gold Star Meat Co., 89 Nev. 427, 514 P.2d 651 (1973); Ellis v. Nelson, 68 Nev. 410, 233 P.2d 1072 (1951); Cleaveland v. Gabriel, 180 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1962). The evidence shows that Staniek frequently took Mayer Greenberg’s phone calls, and acted for Mayer Greenberg on behalf of the group in writing letters and transacting business. There is no evidence that any of his acts were subsequently repudiated by Mayer Greenberg, or any other member of the investment group. Further, it is undisputed that on August 11, 1973, respondent was calling Mayer Greenberg’s office when Staniek took the call and made representations on behalf of the Greenbergs.
The evidence of record is sufficient to find that Mayer Green-berg was holding out Staniek as his agent.
2. The general rule is well settled that, in the absence of some other agreement, a broker has earned his commission when he has produced a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase the property upon the terms prescribed by the seller. Bell *742v. Krupp, 86 Nev. 247, 467 P.2d 1013 (1970); Evans v. Dorman, 81 Nev. 319, 402 P.2d 652 (1965); Lukey v. Smith, 77 Nev. 402, 365 P.2d 487 (1961); Engel v. Wilcox, 75 Nev. 323, 340 P.2d 93 (1959). It is not necessary for the sale to be consummated. Engel v. Wilcox, id.
The district court found that respondent had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer. Appellants contend there is insufficient evidence to support this conclusion because, although Ralph Janitell testified that he was willing and able to buy the property, there had been no agreement as to material terms of the agreement.
The district court found that the August 11, 1973 phone conversation between appellant Staniek and respondent (acting on behalf of the Janitells) evidenced agreement as to material terms. This finding is substantiated by the fact that appellant Staniek asked Nevada Savings and Loan to prepare escrow instructions in accordance with that agreement.
“If the evidence, though conflicting, can be read to support [the findings of fact], this court must approve the trial court’s determinations.” Shell Oil Co. v. Ed Hoppe Realty Inc., 91 Nev. 576, 578, 540 P.2d 107, 108 (1975). See also Havas v. Carter, 89 Nev. 497, 515 P.2d 397 (1973). While there is certainly conflicting evidence here, there is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings.
3. The district court awarded respondent $66, 875, together with simple interest at 7 percent per annum. This sum was based upon the draft escrow instructions which provided for serial payments of premiums by the buyers to the sellers.
Respondent was to receive 5 percent of each of these serial payments, plus 7 percent interest from the date each payment was due to the date of judgment. The escrow instructions provided for payment of $250,000 on November 1, 1973; $125,000 on November 1, 1975; $125,000 on November 1, 1976; and $837,500 on November 1, 1977. Calculation of 5 percent of each of these figures results in commissions of $12,500; $6,250; $6,250; and, $41,875 respectively. Interest of 7 percent per annum'from the date each payment was due, to the date of judgment should have been based upon these figures.
Accordingly, that portion of the district court’s judgment awarding pre-judgment interest should be reversed and the case remanded for an award consistent with this opinion.
The remaining portions of the district court’s judgment should be affirmed.