Court Opinion

ID: 9400142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 16:06:08.982375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.480221
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 22-1294
                                 Filed June 7, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MADISON ELIZABETH MARY VIERS,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal    from     the   Iowa   District   Court   for   Black   Hawk   County,

David P. Odekirk, Judge.

      A defendant appeals the revocation of her deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.

      Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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BADDING, Judge.

       Madison Viers pled guilty to trafficking in stolen weapons. Honoring the

parties’ agreement, the court granted Viers a deferred judgment.           The order

deferring judgment placed Viers on probation for two years, required her to

“immediately report” to the judicial district department of correctional services for

probation supervision, and advised: “Upon violation of the terms of probation, the

court will enter judgment of guilty and sentence defendant.”

       Less than two months later, on May 17, 2022, the department filed a report

of probation violations, alleging Viers failed to comply with the requirement that

she “initiate and maintain specific contact with the probation officer.” The report

claimed the officer had been unable to contact Viers since receiving the file on

April 27, and Viers failed to appear or call in for scheduled appointments on May 2

and 9. A warrant was issued for Viers’s arrest, and she was taken into custody in

mid-June.

       At the revocation hearing in July, Viers stipulated to violating her probation

as alleged.    The State recommended revoking her deferred judgment and

imposing a suspended sentence, with residence at a treatment facility as a

condition of probation. Highlighting the “nature of the violations,” her acceptance

of “responsibility for what happened,” and her time in jail since arrest, Viers argued

for contempt with credit for time served and continued probation with the deferred

judgment remaining in place. The court elicited information about Viers’s family

and employment circumstances before questioning the probation officer about the

ongoing viability of probation. The officer agreed with the State’s recommendation,

explaining continued probation would not be “realistic” given Viers’s “stability
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issues.” The officer then pointed out that “she was on pretrial before she came to

me through intake, so she knows how the probation process works and made no

contact” and “this went on for nearly six weeks where I called, emailed, every time,

a number that I had and was not able to get in contact with her.”

       The court decided to revoke Viers’s deferred judgment. After hearing her

statement of allocution and the parties’ recommendations, the court imposed a

suspended sentence with placement in a residential treatment facility for one year

as a condition of probation. The court explained:

             In pronouncing judgment and sentence today, the court has
       considered the factors set forth in the Iowa Code. I’ve considered
       the Defendant’s age, nature of this offense, the recommendations of
       counsel, as well as the Defendant’s own allocution, her family
       circumstances, her employment history. And in pronouncing
       judgment and sentence, I think the sentence most likely to protect
       the community and deter future conduct of like nature would be to
       place the Defendant in the Residential Facility—suspend her
       sentence and place her in the Residential Facility for one year or
       maximum benefits.

In its written order, the court “conclude[d] the defendant’s deferred judgment

should be revoked and sentence imposed.”          The court separately stated its

“reasons for sentence,” which included some of the factors noted above.

       Viers now appeals, for which she has good cause.              See State v.

Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause to appeal following

guilty plea where defendant was challenging “the order revoking her deferred

judgment and entering a judgment of conviction and sentence”). She simply claims

her “deferred judgment should not have been revoked” because the court “did not

state a reason for the revocation.”
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       We will only overturn revocations upon an abuse of discretion, which

“occurs when the court exercises its discretion on grounds of for reasons that are

clearly untenable or unreasonable” or “based on an erroneous application of the

law.” Id. at 4 (quoting State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019)). The

supreme court has “observed that ‘revocation involves a serious loss of liberty’ and

‘due process requires written findings by the court showing the factual basis for the

revocation.’” Id. at 5 (quoting State v. Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 1994)).

But “[t]hose findings can be made orally on the record or in the written order.” Id.

       Despite this longstanding and clear authority allowing the court to state its

revocation rationale orally on the record, Viers argues a “written statement [is]

required in order to revoke probation.” Yet even the case she cites to support that

proposition, Christenson v. State, says otherwise. See 325 N.W.2d 922, 923 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1982) (“‘[A]n oral statement of such findings by the factfinder, made in

open court in the presence of the defendant and recorded by the reporter, is

substantially equivalent to the written statement’ required by Morrisey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471 (1972).” (quoting Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa

1976)). And Viers does not argue that the court’s oral statements about its reasons

for revocation were insufficient. Even if she did, such a challenge would be

meritless.

       A revocation decision is a two-step inquiry: (1) “whether the person has

acted in violation of one or more conditions of his or her probation” and (2) “whether

the person should be committed to prison or whether the court should take other

steps to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation.” Covel, 925 N.W.2d

at 187. Viers stipulated to violating probation, so the only question before the court
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was whether she should continue on probation or whether other steps should be

taken for rehabilitation. Id. at 188.

       On that question, the State recommended a different effort at

rehabilitation—imposition of a suspended sentence with one year at a residential

treatment facility as a condition of probation. Viers recommended staying the

course on probation, with a slight contempt detour. After questioning Viers about

her family and employment circumstances, the court received information about

why Viers’s stability issues would make staying the course an unrealistic option for

rehabilitation. Later, the court explained that its decision to enter judgment on the

conviction, and impose the sentence it did, was based in part on its consideration

of Viers’s age, family, and employment circumstances; the recommendations of

the parties; community protection; and deterrence.

       Finding the court provided a sufficient factual basis for revocation orally on

the record, which Viers does not dispute, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.