Court Opinion

ID: 9665236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:43:05.894475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.089590
License: Public Domain

Ward, J., (dissenting). The decisive issue in this case narrows itself to a very fine point. It calls for an answer to this question: Did Schuck believe, with good reasons, he was buying the car for $1,795. We say this because that is the only figure contended for by him. It is undisputed that the first price quoted was $1,795 and that this was a cash price, and it is further undisputed that they did not pay cash. Appellant and his wife say positively' no other price was ever discussed or mentioned. They do admit they first expected to pay cash and also admit they expected to pay some more if they bought under the terms later approved, but, they say, they did not expect to pay much more — possibly fifty or sixty dollars. Appellant says he signed somekind of a contract which stated the price was $1,795 but was unable to produce it. On behalf of the defendants we have the following testimony and exhibits: First. Garrett, the salesman, says he is a wholesaler of cars; that he has a cash price and a credit price; that after the cash price was quoted and not acted upon he told appellants that the terms price would be (after deducting down payments) 24 payments of $72 each. This amount ($1,728) of course bore no interest and included all carrying charges. It is not contended otherwise. Second. The Conditional Sales Contract was exhibited in evidence showing (a) the Total Time Price, (b) the deductions, and (c) the deferred balance. Appellants admit they understood they were to pay 24 payments of $72 each. Schuek admits he looked at his insurance policy a few days later and that it showed the encumbrance to be the same as the deferred balance on the Sales Contract. Third. The said Sales Contract bears appellant’s signature which he does not question. Fourth. Attached to the Sales Contract is a note for $1,728 payable in 24 monthly installments of $72 each and appellant’s signature (unquestioned) appears at the bottom. Appellant says said Sales Contract was not filled out when he signed it. Nothing is said about the note. Appellant is a civil engineer and presumably an educated man. It is my opinion there is ample evidence to show appellants knew or should have known they were not buying the car at the cash price mentioned above. Certainly there is sufficient evidence to sustain the chancellor’s finding in favor of appellees. That the burden of proving usry is on the person alleging it, is too well established by the decisions of our courts to require citations. Our court has gone further, in Briggs v. Steele, 91 Ark. 458 (p. 462), 121 S. W. 754, and said: “The wrongful acts of usury will never be imputed to the parties, and it will not be inferred when the opposite conclusion can be reasonably and fairly reached.” Citing a list of cases. Ordinarily a dissenting opinion on a question of facts can be productive of very little value but here the majority opinion, it seems to me, portends such deleterious effects to the usual and necessary transactions in commercial paper as to justify this warning. If the acceptance corporation is to lose money if paid for appellant’s note under the facts in this case, then it appears that hereafter such an agency must require from the purchasers of all cars an affidavit that they knew and understood the price they were to pay. Perhaps then they would not be safe, for it seems an affidavit would be no more effective than a signed note.