Court Opinion

ID: 9788402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:49:32.072311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.489623
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holding I that the claims of plaintiff Jose E. Cruz for restitution, disgorgement, and unjust enrichment are arbitrable. However, I dissent from the majority’s decision to follow and extend Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 988 P.2d 67] (Broughton), in holding that Cruz’s requests for injunctive relief under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and Business and Professions Code section 17500 are not arbitrable. Broughton's holding that CLRA claims for so-called public injunctive relief are not arbitrable is inconsistent and incompatible with the United States Supreme Court’s binding construction of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) in three post -Broughton decisions: Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105 [121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234] (Circuit City), EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 294-296 [122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755] (Waffle House), and Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79 [121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373] (Green Tree). Moreover, given the ease with which a plaintiff may allege a claim under the UCL, the majority’s extension of Broughton to UCL claims destroys the enforceability of arbitration agreements and eviscerates the public policy—expressly established by both the California Legislature and the United States Congress—that strongly favors enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. Finally, the *323majority sacrifices this public policy for no good reason; even if we hold an individual plaintiff to his or her agreement to arbitrate, under this court’s prior construction of the UCL, the Attorney General of California and any other California citizen who has not signed an arbitration agreement may bring a court action for injunctive relief to protect the public and vindicate the public interest in enforcement of the statutes here in question.
I. The FAA Preempts State Laws That Limit the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements.
In enacting the FAA, Congress “intended to ‘revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,’ [citation], by ‘placing] [them] “upon the same footing as other contracts.” ’ ” (Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon (1987) 482 U.S. 220, 225-226 [107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185].) Section 2 of the FAA provides: “A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) This provision “requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms” (Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478 [109 S.Ct. 1248, 1255, 103 L.Ed.2d 488] (Volt)), and “mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,” even if they include “statutory claims.” (Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 226 [107 S.Ct. atp. 2337].) “The ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ [citation], manifested by this provision and the [FAA] as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements: the [FAA] simply ‘creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.’ [Citation.]” (Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 625 [105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353, 87 L.Ed.2d 444], fn. omitted.)
The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated the primacy and scope of this duty by repeatedly invalidating, under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution, state laws that attempt to limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements.1 In invalidating these state laws, the high court has explained that section 2 of the FAA “ ‘is a congressional declaration of a *324liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.’ ” (Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 489 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2525], italics added.) According to the court, in enacting section 2 of the FAA, Congress “withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 10 [104 S.Ct. at p. 858]) in order “to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” (Id. at p. 16 [104 S.Ct. at p. 861], fn. omitted.) Thus, “the FAA ensures” that an agreement to arbitrate specified claims “will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.” (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 58 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1216], italics added.) “[A]ny . . . state policy” that purports to invalidate an arbitration clause in a contract that is otherwise enforceable under state law is “unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’ intent. [Citation.]” (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 281 [115 S.Ct. at p. 843], italics added.) In short, under the high court’s binding construction of federal law, “the FAA pre-empts state laws which ‘require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.’ [Citation.]” (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 478 [109 S.Ct. at p. 1255].) Accordingly, “state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements” to which the FAA applies.2 (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 272 [115 S.Ct. at p. 838].)
II. Broughton Manufactures an Exception to the Rule of FAA
Preemption.
In Broughton, the plaintiffs sued a defendant that had provided them with health care coverage. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) They alleged in part that the defendant had violated the CLRA by deceptively advertising the quality of medical services provided under its health plan. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) They requested actual damages, punitive damages, and an order enjoining the defendant’s deceptive conduct. (Ibid.) *325The defendant moved to compel arbitration, relying on a mandatory arbitration clause in its combined evidence of coverage and disclosure form. (Ibid.) The superior court denied the motion as to the CLRA claim. (Ibid)
In a closely divided decision, a four-justice majority of this court affirmed the superior court’s decision insofar as it declined to order arbitration of the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction under the CLRA. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1073-1084.) The majority opinion in Broughton concluded the California Legislature “did not intend” that requests under the CLRA for “this type of injunctive relief ... be arbitrated.” (Id. at p. 1080.) This conclusion rested on “two factors.” (Id. at p. 1082.) First, according to Broughton, “the evident purpose of the [CLRA’s] injunctive relief provision ... is ... to remedy a public wrong” and to protect “the general public” from “being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff suffered,” not to “compensat[e]” the plaintiff who brings and pursues the CLRA claim. (Id. at p. 1080.) “In other words,” Broughton continued, “the plaintiff in a CLRA damages action is playing the role of a bona fide private attorney general. [Citation.]” (Ibid) Second, Broughton found that private arbitration is “inherent[ly] unsuitable] . . . as a means of resolving” CLRA injunction requests. (Id. at p. 1088.) Broughton based this finding on the view that “private arbitration” has several “institutional shortcomings ... in the field of such public injunctions,” specifically: (1) arbitrators are not “accountable to the public”; (2) “continuing supervision of an injunction” is problematic because arbitrators “are not necessarily bound by earlier decisions of other arbitrators in the same case” and are “unconstrained by judicial review”; (3) “an arbitration award does not have collateral estoppel effect in favor of nonparties to an arbitration unless the arbitral parties so agree”; and (4) “modification or vacation of [arbitral] injunctions involves the cumbersome process of initiating a new arbitration proceeding.” (Id. at p. 1081.) According to Broughton, these “two factors taken in combination . . . make for an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and the underlying purpose of the CLRA’s injunctive relief remedy.” (Id. at p. 1082.) Based on this “inherent conflict,” Broughton “presume[dj . . . the Legislature did not intend that [CLRA] injunctive relief claims be arbitrated,” and found no “indications” of a contrary legislative intent to overcome this presumption. (Ibid) In reaching this conclusion, Broughton held that despite the express statutory declaration in Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract,” the Legislature “may express its intention to make a statutory right inarbitrable . . . implicitly in those rare circumstances in which the fulfillment of the statutory purpose inherently conflicts with arbitration.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1082, fn. 7.)
Broughton next found that this construction of the CLRA, although invalidating agreements to arbitrate CLRA injunction requests, did not violate the *326FAA. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1084.) Relying on Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20 [111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26] (Gilmer), Broughton concluded that despite the FAA, a court may invalidate an arbitration agreement if it finds, based on an “ ‘inherent conflict’ ” between arbitration and a state statutory right or remedy, that the state legislature intended to prohibit arbitration of claims involving that state right or remedy. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) Broughton acknowledged that the high court had “recognize[d] an ‘inherent conflict’ exception” to the FAA only with respect to “federal statutory claims,” and that Gilmer and the other high court cases discussing that exception “occurred in the context of an inquiry into whether Congress had intended federal statutory claims to be exempt from arbitration.” (Ibid., first italics added.) Citing Southland, Broughton also recognized that “the [high] court has stated generally that the capacity to withdraw statutory rights from the scope of arbitration agreements is the prerogative solely of Congress, not state courts or legislatures [citation] . . . .” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) Nevertheless, according to Broughton, the high court’s FAA preemption decisions “ha[d] never directly decided whether a legislature may restrict a private arbitration agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests.” (Ibid.) Broughton also reasoned that “it would be perverse to extend the policy [of the FAA] so far as to preclude states from passing legislation the purposes of which make it incompatible with arbitration . . . .” (Ibid) Finally, Broughton reasoned that the “inappropriateness” of arbitration as a means for resolving certain “private attorney general actions . . . does not turn on the happenstance of whether the rights and remedies being adjudicated are of state or federal derivation.” (Ibid.) Broughton thus concluded that notwithstanding the high court’s pronouncement that “the FAA pre-empts state laws which ‘require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration’ ” (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 478 [109 S.Ct. at p. 1255]), state legislatures and state courts may require a judicial forum for public injunction requests that contracting parties have agreed to resolve by arbitration.
Though invalidating agreements to arbitrate CLRA injunction requests, Broughton also held that agreements to arbitrate CLRA claims for damages are enforceable, “at least to the extent the FAA governs such claims.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) Broughton stated that the CLRA “might be interpreted” as requiring that CLRA damage claims “be resolved solely in a judicial forum.” (Ibid.) However, Broughton also explained: “[A]s [the high court’s decisions] make clear, statutory damages claims are fiilly arbitrable [under the FAA]. Such an action is primarily for the benefit of a party to the arbitration, even if the action incidentally vindicates important *327public interests. [Citation.] In the context of statutory damages claims, the [high court] has consistently rejected [the] arguments that abbreviated discovery, arbitration’s inability to establish binding precedent, and a plaintiffs right to a jury trial render the arbitral forum inadequate, or that submission of resolution of the claims to arbitration is in any sense a waiver of the substantive rights afforded by statute. [Citations.] ‘By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Thus,” in order to make the CLRA “consistent with the FAA,” Broughton “interpreted] the CLRA as permitting arbitration of damages claims, at least to the extent the FAA governs such claims.” (Ibid)
III. The High Court’s Post -Broughton Decisions Require That We Overrule Broughton.
Since we decided Broughton, the high court has issued three relevant arbitration decisions. The high court’s statements in these three decisions require us to overrule Broughton's holding that California may prohibit enforcement of agreements to arbitrate CLRA requests for public injunctions.
The first decision—Circuit City—directly refutes one of Broughton's critical premises: that Gilmer's “inherent conflict” exception to the FAA may apply based on the intent of a state legislature—as opposed to Congress— and that a state legislature therefore may, notwithstanding the FAA, prohibit enforcement of an arbitration agreement where the legislature concludes that arbitration inherently conflicts with a statutory right or remedy. In Circuit City, the high court construed the FAA to apply to “all contracts of employment” except those of “transportation workers.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 109 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1306].) Opposing this conclusion, “[v]arious amici, including the attorneys general of 21 States,” argued that this broad construction of the FAA would “intrude^ upon the policies of the separate States” by “effectively] pre-empting] . . . state employment laws [that] restrict or limit the ability of employees and employers to enter into arbitration agreements.” (Id. at pp. 121-122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) Amici curiae contended “that States should be permitted, pursuant to their traditional role in regulating employment relationships, to prohibit employees . . . from contracting away their right to pursue state-law discrimination claims in court.” (Id. at p. 122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) The high court responded that under Gilmer, arbitration agreements in employment contracts “can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 123 [121 S.Ct. at *328p. 1313], italics added.) As for the policies of state laws, the court found them irrelevant under Southland's holding “that Congress intended the FAA ... to pre-empt state antiarbitration laws to the contrary. [Citation.]” 0Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312]; see also id. at p. 112 [Southland held that the FAA is “pre-emptive of state laws hostile to arbitration”].) The court also declared that courts may “not chip away at Southland by indirection.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 122.) Thus, Circuit City holds that we may not, as Broughton did, chip away at Southland by applying Gilmer’s exemption analysis, including the “inherent conflict” exception, based on the intent or policies of a state legislature. Under Circuit City, only “the policies of congressional enactments” are relevant to this analysis; state policies are simply irrelevant unless, as the FAA provides, they establish grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 123 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1313], italics added.)
Circuit City also undermines Broughton’s analysis and conclusion in another important respect. As I have explained, amici curiae in Circuit City argued for a construction of the FAA that would leave states free to prohibit employees from contracting away their right to a judicial forum for resolving discrimination claims under state law. (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 121-122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) In rejecting this argument, the high court reasoned in part that amici curiae’s construction would enable states to deprive parties of the “real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions.” (Id. at pp. 122-123 [121 S.Ct. at pp. 1312-1313].) “Arbitration,” the court explained, “allow[s] parties to avoid the costs of litigation .... These litigation costs . . . would be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often presented in disputes arising from the employment relationship [citation], and the necessity of bifurcation of proceedings in those cases where state law precludes arbitration of certain types of employment claims but not others.” (Id. at p. 123 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1313].) The court also explained that amici curiae’s construction would produce “considerable complexity and uncertainty” regarding “the enforceability of arbitration agreements in employment contracts,” which “would call into doubt the efficacy of alternative dispute resolution procedures adopted by many of the Nation’s employers, in the process undermining the FAA’s proarbitration purposes and ‘breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As both Broughton and the case now before us amply demonstrate, Broughton’s holding produces precisely these effects; it deprives parties of the benefits of arbitration, necessitates bifurcated proceedings and compounds litigation costs, and creates both complexity and uncertainty regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements, thereby placing in doubt arbitration’s efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution *329procedure, “undermining the FAA’s proarbitration purposes and ‘breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it.’ [Citation.]” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 123 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1313].)
The majority here errs in asserting that because Circuit City “was principally concerned with” the construction of section 1 of the FAA, whereas Broughton involved “the preemptive scope of section 2,” Circuit City has “little if any bearing on” Broughton. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 314.) First and foremost, as I have explained, Circuit City expressly relied on “the preemptive scope of section 2” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 314) in rejecting the argument that the high court should construe the FAA so as to leave states free to implement their own “policies” regarding the nonarbitrability of discrimination claims under state law. (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 121-122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) Again, the high court found the argument foreclosed by Southland's holding—reaffirmed in Allied-Bruce—that section 2 of the FAA “pre-empt[s] state antiarbitration laws.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) Second, the high court based its construction of section 1 on the language and judicial construction of section 2. Regarding the former, the court contrasted the expansive language of section 2 with the narrower language of section 1. (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 115, 117-118 [121 S.Ct. at pp. 1309, 1310].) Regarding the latter, the court explained that the plaintiffs broad reading of section 1 was inconsistent with the court’s “expansive reading of § 2.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 119 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1311].) The court reasoned that the plaintiffs construction of section 1 would deprive parties of the arbitration benefits that section 2 confers and, by creating “considerable complexity and uncertainty” regarding “the enforceability of arbitration agreements,” would “underminfe]” section 2’s “proarbitration purposes.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 123 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1313].) The court also explained that “it would be incongruous to adopt” a reading of section 1 that would “undo” the broad “coverage in § 2” that “implement[s] proarbitration policies.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1313].) Third, the plaintiffs argument in Circuit City regarding section 1 was premised on the high court’s “construction of § 2’s coverage provision.” {Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 114 [121 S. Ct. at p. 1308.) Fourth, and finally, before even discussing the scope of section 1, the high court considered, and rejected, the plaintiffs argument regarding the “construction of § 2,” i.e., that section 2 of the FAA did not apply because “an employment contract is not a ‘contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce’ ” within the meaning of section 2. {Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 113 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1308].) Thus, the majority errs in asserting that section 2 of the FAA—and specifically its “preemptive scope” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 314)— were not critical components of the high court’s opinion in Circuit City.
*330The majority also errs in asserting that Circuit City does not “shed any further light on the ‘inherently incompatible’ exception to arbitrability.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 314.) In Circuit City, the attorneys general essentially argued that arbitration is inherently incompatible with state statutes that “prohibit employees . . . from contracting away their right to pursue state-law discrimination claims in court,” and that requiring arbitration of these claims would “intrude[] upon the policies of the separate States” reflected in these statutes. (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 121-122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) As I have explained, in rejecting this argument, the court held that whereas Gilmer—which sets forth the inherent conflict analysis Broughton adopted—“involved a federal statute” and thus governs enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under federal law (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 123-124 [121 S.Ct. at pp. 1313-1314]), enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under state law is both governed and required by Southland's holding that the FAA “pre-empt[s] state antiarbitration laws.” (Id. at p. 122 [121 S.Ct. at p. 1312].) Thus, Circuit City establishes that an exception to the FAA may not be based on a state’s view that arbitration is inherently incompatible with some state policy.
In this regard, Circuit City is consistent with another high court decision that Broughton completely ignored: Mastrobuono. There, the high court held that the FAA preempts a New York rule prohibiting an arbitrator from awarding punitive damages even where an arbitration agreement authorizes the award. (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 53-58 [115 S.Ct. at pp. 1214-1217].) New York established this rule based on its view that punitive damages are exemplary social remedies intended to punish and deter, not to compensate, and that as a matter of strong public policy, only the state—and not private arbitrators—may wield the power to punish. (Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. (1976) 40 N.Y.2d 354 [386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832-835, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794-797, 83 A.L.R.3d 1024] (Garrity).) According to the state’s highest court, New York’s public policy requires “ ‘rather close judicial supervision’ ” in the administration of this public penal sanction and, contrary to this public policy, “ ‘there [is] no effective judicial supervision over punitive awards in arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 834 [353 N.E.2d at pp. 796-797].) In finding that the FAA preempts the New York rule, the high court explained that under its prior decisions, “if contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.” (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 58 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1216], italics added.) Therefore, “in the absence of contractual intent to the contrary, the FAA would pre-empt the [New York] rule,” despite its basis in the state’s public policy. (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 59 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1217].) According to the *331high court, the question thus came “down to what the contract’—not New York law—“ha[d] to say about the arbitrability of [the] claim for punitive damages.” (Id. atp. 58 [115 S.Ct. atp. 1216], italics added.) The court found that “[a]t most,” one contractual provision “introduce[d] an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.” (Id. at p. 62 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1218].) Explaining that the FAA requires resolution of such ambiguities in favor of arbitration, the court read the arbitration agreement to permit arbitration of a punitive damages claim and it ordered enforcement of the arbitrator’s award of punitive damages notwithstanding New York’s law precluding such an award. (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 62-64 [115 S.Ct. atp. pp. 1218-1219].)
Mastrobuono, which Broughton did not consider or even cite, undermines Broughton’s analysis and conclusion in several critical respects. First, it directly contradicts Broughton’s statement that the high court “ha[d] never directly decided whether a legislature may restrict a private arbitration agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) Second, it directly refutes Broughton’s view that arbitration of CLRA injunction requests is impermissible because of the need for continuing judicial supervision of CLRA injunctions. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Mastrobuono directly refutes the fundamental premise of Broughton’s analysis: that the high court cases leave states free to prohibit arbitration of a state remedy if “the primary purpose and effect of’ that remedy is to protect the public, “not to compensate for an individual wrong.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1077.) In the high court’s view, “by definition,” the purpose of punitive damages is “not . . . to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor” (Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 266 [101 S.Ct. 2748, 2759, 69 L.Ed.2d 616]) and to “ ‘protect[] the public by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (1991) 499 U.S. 1, 19 [111 S.Ct. 1032, 1044, 113 L.Ed.2d 1].) Given the court’s view that the purpose of punitive damages is to protect the public and not to compensate the victim in any sense, Mastrobuono’s invalidation of New York’s rule against arbitration of punitive damages clearly established that the FAA preempts state laws prohibiting arbitration of such public, noncompensatory remedies.
The majority errs in suggesting that Broughton can be reconciled with Mastrobuono because punitive damages are different from public injunctions in some relevant sense. (Maj. opn., ante, at 312, fh. 1.) Consistent with the high court’s view, we have explained that the “purpose” of a punitive damages award “is a purely public one”—“to punish wrongdoing and *332thereby to protect [the public] from future misconduct, either by the same defendant or other potential wrongdoers. [Citation.]” (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 110 [284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 1348], fn. omitted (Adams).) Thus, under existing California law, punitive damages have the same “primary purpose and effect” that, according to Broughton, public injunctions have; “not to compensate for an individual wrong but to prohibit and enjoin conduct injurious to the general public.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1077.) As the preceding quote demonstrates, Broughton held that arbitrability depends not, as the majority suggests, on whether a remedy “conferfs] a direct benefit on the plaintiff[]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 313, fn. 1), but on whether “the primary purpose and effect of’ the remedy is “to compensate for an individual wrong” or “to prohibit and enjoin conduct injurious to the general public.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1077.) Applying this test, Broughton held that CLRA requests for public injunctions are inarbitrable because such relief is “designed for the protection of the general public.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) Broughton's analysis and conclusion are clearly irreconcilable with Mastrobuono, which held that requests for punitive damages are arbitrable even though their sole purpose is to protect the public and not to compensate the victim in any sense. Thus, that this case involves a request for injunctive relief rather than punitive damages is not a valid basis for distinguishing Mastrobuono. Indeed, as I later explain in more detail, the high court rejected this very distinction in its post -Broughton decision in Waffle House.3
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Mastrobuono fails for an additional reason. The majority suggests that regarding “ ‘judicial supervision’ ” in *333arbitration, the New York rule at issue in Mastrobuono was premised on the inadequacy of “judicial and appellate review,” whereas Broughton was premised on the “monitoring, enforcement, and modification that is required of public injunctions.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 313, fix. 1.) However, Broughton’s discussion of this subject stressed the fact that “[arbitrators” are “unconstrained by judicial review” and “are not necessarily bound by earlier decisions of other arbitrators in the same case.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) Thus, for several reasons, the majority’s attempt to distinguish Mastrobuono is unpersuasive.
In Circuit City and Mastrobuono, the high court simply applied the general constitutional rule regarding the supremacy of federal law specifically in the arbitration context. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2) “invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of Congress. [Citations.]” (Rose v. Arkansas State Police (1986) 479 U.S. 1, 3 [107 S.Ct. 334, 335, 93 L.Ed.2d 183], italics added.) According to the high court, this rule applies regardless of the magnitude or nature of the public policy the state law seeks to implement. “The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our [federal] Constitution provided [in the supremacy clause] that the federal law must prevail. [Citation.]” (Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 663, 666 [82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092, 8 L.Ed.2d 180].) Thus, the proper “inquiry” is “whether there is a conflict” between the state law and federal law, not the significance of the state public policy at issue. (Ibid.; see also Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 153 [102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664] [federal preemption under the supremacy clause applies even though “real property law is a matter of special concern to the States”].) Broughton’s reliance on the importance of the public interest at stake when a plaintiff seeks a CLRA injunction is inconsistent with these binding high court precedents and pronouncements. Regardless of the state’s interest, a “state statute [that] authorizes the precise conduct that Congress sought to prohibit ... is repugnant to the [supremacy [c]lause.” (Rose v. Arkansas State Police, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 4 [107 S.Ct. at p. 335].) Thus, under Broughton, the CLRA is repugnant to the supremacy clause—and is therefore invalid—insofar as it authorizes California courts to do precisely what the FAA prohibits: invalidate FAA-govemed agreements to arbitrate requests for CLRA injunctions on grounds other than those that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. In short, Mastrobuono and the high court’s post -Broughton decision in Circuit City, consistent with and following the high court’s supremacy clause jurisprudence, refute a foundational assumption of Broughton’s analysis: that states may create FAA exceptions for public policy reasons.
*334Indeed, Mastrobuono takes on increased importance with respect to this issue in light of the high court’s second relevant post -Broughton decision in Waffle House, which held that under the FAA, there is no difference in terms of arbitrability between requests for public injunctive relief and requests for compensatory or punitive damages. In Waffle House, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a discrimination action under the Americans With Disabilities Act “both in the public interest and on behalf of’ the specific victim of the discrimination, who had signed an arbitration agreement with the defendant. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 284 [122 S.Ct. at p. 759].) The complaint requested “injunctive relief to ‘eradicate the effects of [the defendant’s] past and present unlawful employment practices’ ” and “specific relief designed to make [the victim] whole, including backpay, . . . compensatory damages, and . . . punitive damages . . . .” (Id. at pp. 283-284 [122 S.Ct. at p. 759].) The court of appeals held that the victim’s arbitration agreement “precluded [the EEOC] from seeking victim-specific relief in court,” but not from seeking “ ‘large-scale injunctive relief.’ ” (Id. at p. 284 [122 S.Ct. at p. 759].) In so “distinguishing] between injunctive and victim-specific relief,” the court of appeals concluded that “the EEOC is barred from obtaining the latter because any public interest served when the EEOC pursues ‘make whole’ relief is outweighed by the policy goals favoring arbitration.” (Id. at p. 290 [122 S.Ct. at p. 762].) However, the court of appeals reasoned, “when the EEOC seeks broad injunctive relief, ... the public interest overcome [s] the goals underpinning the FAA.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
The high court in Waffle House held that under the FAA, a distinction in terms of arbitrability between requests for broad, large-scale injunctive relief to protect the public and requests for monetary relief, including punitive damages, is invalid. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 294-296 [122 S.Ct. at pp. 764-765].) The court explained that this distinction does not serve “its avowed purpose of preserving the EEOC’s public function while favoring arbitration. For that purpose, the category of victim-specific relief is both overinclusive and underinclusive. For example, it is overinclusive because . . . punitive damages . . . serve an obvious public function in deterring future violations. [Citations.] Punitive damages may often have a greater impact on the behavior of other employers than the threat of an injunction, yet the EEOC is precluded from seeking this form of relief under the Court of Appeals’ compromise scheme. And, it is underinclusive because injunctive relief, although seemingly not ‘victim-specific,’ can be seen as more closely tied to the employees’ injury than to any public interest.” (Id. at pp. 294-295 [122 S.Ct. at pp. 764-765].) “ ‘While injunctive relief may appear more “broad based,” it nonetheless is redress for individuals.’ ” (Id. at p. 295 [122 S.Ct. at p. 765].) Thus, the court held, “if the [FAA’s] policy *335favoring arbitration trumps the plain language of Title VII and the contract, the EEOC should be barred from pursuing any claim outside the arbitral forum. If not, then the statutory language is clear; the EEOC has the authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes.” (Ibid.) The high court ultimately held that because the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement, it could pursue an action in court for both injunctive relief and victim-specific, monetary relief. (Id. at p. 296 [122 S.Ct. p. 765].)
The high court’s post-Broughton decision in Waffle House requires that we overrule Broughton as being inconsistent with binding high court precedent. As I have explained, Broughton held that CERA requests for injunctive relief are not arbitrable because the “purpose” of such relief is “to remedy a public wrong” and to protect “the general public,” not to “compensat[e]” the plaintiff who pursues the CERA claim. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1080.) In Waffle House, the high court rejected this analysis, explaining that even large-scale requests for public “injunctive relief . . . can be seen as more closely tied to the [victim’s] injury than to any public interest” and “ ‘is redress for individuals.’ ” (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 295 [122 S.Ct. at p. 765].) The high court also explained that in terms of public protection, “[p]unitive damages may often have a greater impact on” a defendant’s “behavior . . . than the threat of an injunction . . . .” (Ibid.) This statement, in light of Mastrobuono's holding that the FAA requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate requests for punitive damages notwithstanding a state law precluding such arbitration (Mastrobuono, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 53-58 [115 S.Ct. at pp. 1214-1217]), contradicts Broughton's conclusion that we may base an FAA exception for CERA injunctive relief on the public nature of such relief. As I have also explained, Broughton held that although the FAA requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate requests for monetary relief, it does not require enforcement of agreements to arbitrate requests for injunctive relief designed to protect the public. The high court in Waffle House rejected this approach as well, holding that the precise distinction Broughton drew—between large-scale requests for injunctive relief to protect the public and requests for victim-specific, monetary relief—is invalid under the FAA, and that as a matter of federal law, the FAA requires courts to enforce an agreement to arbitrate requests for injunctive relief, even if that relief is designed principally to protect the public. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 294-296 [122 S.Ct. at pp. 764-765].) Thus, Waffle House requires that we overrule Broughton and hold that federal law requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate CERA requests for injunctive relief.
The majority’s discussion of Waffle House completely misses the point of that decision. In Waffle House, the high court did not, as the majority *336suggests, base its decision on the extent to which the EEOC “act[s] ... on behalf of the public.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 320, in. 6.) In fact, the high court found that the lower federal court had erred in focusing on precisely this factor. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 290-296 [122 S.Ct. at pp. 762-765].) Instead, the high court held that because the FAA “ ‘does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so,’ ” the determinative issue is simply whether the EEOC “is a party to the contract” containing the arbitration provision. (Waffle House, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 293-294 [122 S.Ct. at p. 764].) If not, then the EEOC has statutory authority to seek in court both large-scale injunctive relief to protect the public and damages. (Id. at p. 294 [122 S.Ct. at p. 764].) However, if the EEOC has agreed to arbitration, then it must arbitrate all of its claims—including any request for large-scale, public injunctive relief—and is “barred from pursuing any claim outside the arbitral forum.” (Id. at p. 295 [122 S.Ct. at p. 765], italics added.) In the latter situation, in terms of arbitrability, no “line [may be] drawn . . . between injunctive and victim-specific relief.” (Id. at p. 294 [122 S.Ct. at p. 764].) Thus, Waffle House establishes that contrary to Broughton, consumers, like Cruz, who have agreed to arbitration must arbitrate all of their claims, including requests for so-called public injunctions.
While the high court’s post -Broughton decisions in Circuit City and Waffle House undermine one of Broughton’s fundamental premises—that states may decide that injunctive relief is somehow different from monetary damages for purposes of applying the FAA—the high court’s third relevant post -Broughton decision in Green Tree undermines Broughton’s other fundamental premise: its assumption that “private arbitration” has several “institutional shortcomings” that render it inherently unsuitable for resolving requests for “public injunctions.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) In Green Tree, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement she signed left her “unable to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration”—and was therefore unenforceable—because its “silence with respect to [payment of] costs and fees create[d] a ‘risk’ that she [would] be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursue[d] her claims in an arbitral forum.” (Green Tree, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 90 [121 S.Ct. at p.-522].). The high court disagreed, finding that the agreement’s mere “silence on the subject” of fees was “alone . . . insufficient to render it unenforceable.” (Id. at p. 91 [121 S.Ct. at p. 522].) Instead, the court held, “a party seeking] to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive . . . bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” (Id. at p. 92 [121 S.Ct. at p. 522].) In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that “the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory *337rights in the arbitral forum.” (Id. at p. 90 [121 S.Ct. at p. 522].) However, the court held, absent evidence in “[t]he record’ on this question, “[t]he ‘risk’ that [a plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.” (Id. at p. 91 [121 S.Ct. at p. 522].) “To invalidate the agreement on that [speculative] basis,” the court explained, “would undermine the ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ [citation]” and would “conflict with” the court’s “prior holdings that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” (Ibid.) Thus, the court held, courts may not justify invalidating arbitration agreements with “generalized attacks on arbitration that rest,” not on evidence in the record, but “on ‘suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 89-90 [121 S.Ct. at p. 521].)
Broughton’s analysis is fundamentally inconsistent with the high court’s subsequent decision in Green Tree. As I have explained, in invalidating agreements to arbitrate CLRA requests for injunctive relief, Broughton asserted that several “institutional shortcomings” of arbitration render it inherently unsuitable for resolving requests for “public injunctions.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) However, Broughton cited no evidence—in the record or otherwise—or judicially noticeable facts to establish, or even support, this assertion. Nor does the majority here cite any such evidence. Nor did the plaintiff in Broughton or Cruz in this case offer any evidence on this question; under Green Tree, it was their burden, as the parties seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreements, to offer such evidence. Thus, “[t]he ‘risk’ ” that arbitration’s so-called institutional shortcomings render it less effective than court proceedings for dealing with public injunctions is completely “speculative” and insufficient “to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement” requiring arbitration of CLRA requests for injunctive relief. (Green Tree, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 91 [121 S.Ct. at p. 522].) Indeed, the very existence of those shortcomings is completely speculative. In short, Broughton’s holding regarding arbitration of CLRA injunction requests rests on the very “generalized” and unproven “ ‘suspicion of arbitration’ ” that Green Tree holds may not be a basis for invalidating an arbitration agreement. (Green Tree, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 89 [121 S.Ct. at p. 521].) As the high court stated in Green Tree, “[t]o invalidate [arbitration] agreements] on [such a speculative] basis . . . undermine[s] the ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ [Citation.]” (Green Tree, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 91 [121 S.Ct. at p. p. 522].) Thus, Green Tree and the high court’s other relevant post-Broughton decisions require that we overrule Broughton insofar as it invalidates agreements to arbitrate CLRA injunction requests, and that we hold that all of Cruz’s claims are arbitrable.
*338IV. Extending Broughton to UCL Claims Eviscerates the Strong Public Policy Favoring Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements.
As Broughton recognized, the FAA is a “federal statutory mandate” that establishes a “strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1073.) “Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . (Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24 [103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765].) It “create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [FAA].” (Ibid.) “[(Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for [this] federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” whatever the question at hand. (Id. at pp. 24-25 [103 S.Ct. at pp. 941-942].)
As Broughton also recognized, “California has a similar statute [citation] and a similar policy in favor of arbitration. [Citation.]” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1074.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 provides that written arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” This section establishes the “fundamental policy” of California’s arbitration scheme: “that arbitration agreements will be enforced in accordance with their terms.” (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 836, in. 10 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 982 P.2d 229].) Through the statute’s enactment, “the Legislature . . . expressed a ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ [Citations.]” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899].) As we explained more than 85 years ago, “[t]he policy of the law in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing by statute for their enforcement is to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing.” (Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 159 [162 P. 631].) Thus, California law, like federal law, establishes “a presumption in favor of arbitrability.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903].)
In extending Broughton to hold that UCL claims for injunctive relief are not arbitrable, the majority guts the strong federal and state public policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. As we have explained, the UCL’s “scope is broad” and “[i]ts coverage is ‘sweeping, embracing “ ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time *339is forbidden by law.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527].) In proscribing “any unlawful . . . business act or practice,” Business and Professions Code section 17200 “ ‘ “borrows” violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to a business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under [the UCL] and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder. ’ ” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 826 P.2d 730], italics added.) In other words, “[a]n unlawful act in the business context is, by definition, an action of unfair competition” that may support a UCL action. (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 579 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086] (cone. opn. of Baxter, L), italics added.) Of course, because arbitration clauses are contractual, every arbitrable dispute will, by definition, involve business activity and acts in the business context. Thus, under the majority’s holding, in every case where the parties have signed an arbitration agreement, the plaintiff can frustrate the defendant’s contractual right to the benefits of an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum—which both the high court and this court have recognized—simply by alleging a claim under the UCL and requesting injunctive relief. Thus, the majority’s statutory construction guts the strong public policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements that both the California Legislature and the United States Congress have established by statute. It also does precisely what the high court has held states may not do: “wholly eviscerate congressional intent [in passing the FAA] to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts,’ [citation], simply by passing statutes” that make certain arbitration agreements void as a matter of state public policy. (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 17, fn. 11 [104 S.Ct. at p. 861].)
More specifically, because a UCL action may be based on a violation of other laws, the majority’s holding will enable plaintiffs—through artful pleading—to obtain judicial determination of claims that they agreed to arbitrate and that the United States Supreme Court has expressly held to be arbitrable. In Southland, the high court held that where the FAA applies, claims under the California Franchise Investment Law are arbitrable notwithstanding a California statute prohibiting arbitration of such claims. (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. atp. 16 [104 S.Ct. atpp. 860-861].) Similarly, in Perry, the high court held that where the FAA applies, claims under California law for unpaid wages are arbitrable notwithstanding a California statute prohibiting arbitration of such claims. (Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 489-491 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 2525-2526].) Of course, a plaintiff may easily plead a violation of either our Franchise Investment Law or our wage payment statutes as a violation of the UCL. Under the majority’s conclusion, *340by doing so, a plaintiff can frustrate the defendant’s contractual right to an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum for claims under the Franchise Investment Law and our wage payment statutes, despite the high court’s binding and express holdings in Southland and Perry that the FAA requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate these claims.4 Indeed, the majority’s.conclusion vitiates numerous other high court holdings in precisely the same manner. The high court has held that the FAA requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Securities Act of 1933. (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 27-28 [111 S.Ct. at pp. 1652-1653].) However, contrary to these binding holdings, because a violation of any of these federal statutes is also a violation of the UCL, the majority’s conclusion enables a plaintiff to frustrate the defendant’s contractual right to the benefits of an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum for these arbitrable federal claims simply by alleging them as violations of the UCL and requesting injunctive relief.5
Finally, given the extremely broad standing provisions applicable to claims under the UCL and Business and Professions Code section 17500, the majority vitiates these binding high court precedents and sacrifices the strong public policy, favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements without justification. As the majority acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at p. 315), Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides in part that UCL *341actions for injunctive relief “shall be prosecuted” by the Attorney General of California, “any district attorney,” specified “county counsel,” “city prosecutor [s]” and “city attorney [s],” “or . . . any person acting for the interests of . . . the general public.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204, italics added.) Under our prior construction of this provision, “members of the public” other than a specific victim “also have standing to pursue unfair competition claims,” so “the policy underlying the unfair competition statute can be vindicated [in court] by multiple parties” even if the specific victim has signed an arbitration agreement and is required to honor that agreement. (Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1204 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044].) A similar standing provision applies to actions for injunctive relief under Business and Professions Code section 17500. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17535.) Given these broad standing provisions, and given that a violation of the CLRA also constitutes a violation of the UCL, we need not eviscerate the public policy strongly favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements in order to protect the public or to vindicate the public interest in enforcement of these statutes. Here, we need not let Cruz out of his arbitration agreement so he can proceed in court as a private attorney general, when the Attorney General himself, and any member of the general public who has not signed an arbitration agreement, can play that role. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Cruz’s requests for injunctive relief are not arbitrable.
Baxter, J., and Brown, J., concurred.

 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 58 [115 S.Ct. 1212, 1216, 131 L.Ed.2d 76] (Mastrobuono) (FAA preempts New York prohibition against arbitrating punitive damages); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 268-277 [115 S.Ct. 834, 836-841, 130 L.Ed.2d 753] (Allied-Bruce) (FAA preempts Alabama statute making predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable); Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 489 [107 S.Ct. 2520, 2525, 96 L.Ed.2d 426] (Perry) (FAA preempts California statute prohibiting arbitration of wage collection actions); Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 *324U.S. 1, 10 [104 S.Ct. 852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1] (Southland) (FAA preempts California statute prohibiting arbitration of claims under the California Franchise Investment Law).

 States “may,” however, “regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles,” and thus “may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ [Citation.]” (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 281 [115 S.Ct. at p. 843].) “Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of [the FAA], [Citations.]” (Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 493, fn. 9 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2527].)

 The majority also errs in asserting that punitive damages “are in principle little different from . . . treble damages antitrust awards.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 313, fn. 1.) According to the high court, the antitrust treble damages provision “is in essence a remedial provision.” (Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. (1977) 429 U.S. 477, 485 [97 S.Ct. 690, 695-696, 50 L.Ed.2d 701], italics added.) Congress “created” it “primarily as a remedy for the victims of antitrust violations.” (American Soc. of M. E. ’s v. Hydrolevel Corp. (1982) 456 U.S. 556, 575 [102 S.Ct. 1935, 1947, 72 L.Ed.2d 330], italics added.) Treble damages “ ‘make the remedy meaningful by counter-balancing “the difficulty of maintaining a private suit” ’ under the antitrust laws. [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics added.) Based on the fact that antitrust treble damages, unlike punitive damages, “serve as a means ... of compensating victims,” the high court has held that limitations on recovery of punitive damages do not apply to recovery of antitrust treble damages. (Id. at pp. 575-576 [102 S.Ct. at p. 1947, italics added.) Thus, the high court has rejected the majority’s view that punitive damages and antitrust treble damages are the same “in principle.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 313, fn. 1.) Our prior decisions also reject the majority’s view; they distinguish between punitive damages, which serve a “purely public“ function (Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 110), and antitrust treble damages, which principally provide “private compensation” and only “incidentally]” confer a “public benefit.” (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1080, fn. omitted, italics added.) New York decisions draw a similar distinction. (Garrity, supra, 386 N.Y.S.2d at p. 833 [353 N.E.2d at p. 795].)

 In reaching its conclusion in Southland, the high court expressly rejected the argument that the FAA allows states, in addition to Congress, to enact “public policy” limits on enforcing arbitration agreements subject to the FAA and to override agreements to arbitrate state-law disputes that “ ‘a state legislature . . . has decided should be left to judicial enforcement.’ ” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 21 [104 S.Ct. at p. 864] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Similarly, in reaching its conclusion in Perry, the high court expressly rejected the argument that the FAA allows “state legislatures,” like Congress, “to limit or preclude waiver of a judicial forum” for reasons of “ ‘public policy.’ ” (Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 495 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2528] (dis. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) In rejecting these arguments, the high court in both cases held that there are “only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the [FAA]: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract ‘evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ and such clauses may be revoked upon ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 10-11 [104 S.Ct. at p. 858], fh. omitted, italics added; see also Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 489 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2525].) According to the court, “ ‘nothing in the [FAA] indicates] that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations understate law.’ ” (Id. atpp. 489-490 [107 S.Ct. atp. 2525], italics added; see also Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 11 [104 S.Ct. at p. 858].)

 The majority’s statement that “a stay is generally in order” when a plaintiff pleads both arbitrable and inarbitrable claims (maj. opn., ante, at p. 320) offers little solace. Instead, it simply highlights the fact that the majority’s holding deprives defendants of their contractual • right to the benefits of an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. Under the majority’s holding, defendants may have to proceed in both fora.