Court Opinion

ID: 9467811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:15.462027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:32.528075
License: Public Domain

SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Plaintiff McCormick was discharged from his position as Program Director of the Capital District Law Enforcement Planning Council. The Governor of Louisiana, defendant Edwards, dismissed McCormick because of the latter’s active support of a mayoral candidate in the 1976 Baton Rouge election. The question in this case is whether McCormick’s local political activity, which is within the protection of the first amendment, was overridden by a sufficiently important state interest.
For the answer to this question, this Court was presented with two lines of cases. On the one hand, there are Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). These hold that government employees cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of political belief or party affiliation unless it is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. On the other hand, there are United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973), Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), and United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). These cases uphold statutory prohibitions of partisan political activities by government employees. The majority concludes that McCormick’s partisan political conduct falls within the Letter Carriers line of cases, and therefore hold that the discharge for political activism was permissible.
This case, however, does not involve the application of a statutory or other regulatory prohibition of political activities. Although an employee of the state government, McCormick was not within Louisiana’s prohibition of partisan political activities by state employees. See La.Const. art. 10, §§ 2, 9 (1974). Broadrick, the companion case to Letter Carriers, upheld similar state prohibitions of active political involvement by state and local government workers. But because there is no generic state prohibition applicable to McCormick in the case at bar, Broadrick is inapposite. Nonetheless, the majority relies on the Letter Carriers line of cases to hold that McCormick’s discharge was not for a constitutionally impermissible reason. In so doing, the majority assumes the existence of a fact the district court found not to be true. To see how this is so first requires a brief summary of the defendants’ argument below.
Defendants’ theory of defense was that adequate performance of McCormick’s job as liaison between the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice and various local law enforcement agencies required that McCormick remain politically neutral. De*180fendants claimed that McCormick’s political activities prevented him from maintaining cordial and harmonious relationships with the local officials. In other words, defendants assert that McCormick was in effect dismissed for cause, and not solely for the exercise of first amendment rights, because the exercise of those rights made McCormick’s job performance allegedly unsatisfactory.
Such a defense properly states the law. The first amendment protects political association — including partisan political activities by government employees—as well as political expression. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 9A-95, 67 S.Ct. at 566-567. Since involvement in partisan politics lies close to the core of the first amendment, the exercise of these rights can only be overridden on a showing of a sufficiently important governmental interest. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, 93 S.Ct. at 2889. In the Letter Carriers and Broadrick cases, the statutory prohibition against the exercise of these rights was justified on a proper showing of the interest in the efficient, fair, effective, and impartial administration of the executive branch of the government. One of the factors in the Court’s balancing of the government’s interest in efficient public service and the employee’s interest as a citizen was that the political activity restrictions there were not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but applied even-handedly to all covered partisan conduct, and did not seek to control political opinions or beliefs or interfere with the right to vote. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, 93 S.Ct. at 2889.
Since there was no generic prohibition of McCormick’s political activities, the analysis must proceed case-by-case in determining whether the dismissal was justified because these activities are demonstrably incompatible with the discharge of the employee’s public duties. Although the defendants alleged such an incompatibility, the district court found as a fact that McCormick was discharged solely for his political activities, and not because of any poor job performance. This finding of fact was based on the testimony of many witnesses, including local officials who did not find McCormick’s political activism to have affected his working relationship with them. This and other testimony overwhelmingly demonstrated that McCormick was doing not just a satisfactory job, but an exemplary job. Defendant White in fact testified that McCormick had been doing satisfactory work and was fired for solely political reasons. The only testimony to the contrary was that of some of the other defendants.
Findings of fact, of course, cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 52(a). Due regard is to be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Indeed, the appellate court must be especially reluctant to set aside a finding based on the trial judge’s evaluation of conflicting oral testimony. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2586, at 737 (1971); Matter of Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 723 (5th Cir. 1980). The majority recognizes the district court finding that McCormick’s discharge was motivated solely by political pressures, and holds that this finding is not clearly erroneous. The majority fails to recognize, however, the district court’s finding that McCormick’s political activities did not impair his ability to effectively and fairly discharge his public office. Before the majority can reach the legal issue of whether the governmental interest in effective public service outweighs McCormick’s right to engage in partisan political activities, it must first deal with the factual issue of whether such a governmental interest existed in this particular case. After reviewing the record, this writer is not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court erred in its conclusion. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). I accordingly dissent.