Court Opinion

ID: 9773822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:00:20.798245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:58.297098
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s resolution of point of error three.
In point of error three, Tuan Le contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for State Farm on his PIP claim. Tuan Le contends the Insurance Code does not limit PIP coverage to a “motor vehicle” accident.
The Insurance Code article 5.06-3(b) defines PIP coverage as:
“Personal injury protection” consists of provisions of a motor vehicle liability policy which provide for payment to the named insured in the motor vehicle liability policy and members of the insured’s household, any authorized operator or passenger of *326the named insured’s motor vehicle including a guest or occupant, up to an amount of $2,500 for each person for payment of all reasonable expenses arising from the accident....
State Farm’s PIP provision in its insurance policy reads:
We will pay Personal Injury Protection benefits because of bodily injury:
1. resulting from a motor vehicle accident; and
2. sustained by a covered person.
“Covered person” as used in the Part means:
1. You or any family member;
a. while occupying; or
b. when struck by a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public roads or a trailer of any type.
In Berry v. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, no writ), the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the term “the accident” in the Insurance Code is limited to a motor. vehicle accident. In Berry, the plaintiff snapped the cartilage in his knee as he twisted his leg to get out of his car. Id. at 429. No other cars were involved in the incident. Id. The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff could recover under the PIP provision. Id. at 430. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered the language of the Insurance Code that required only that the losses sought to be recovered must arise “from the accident” or “as the result of the accident.” Id. at 431; see Tex. Ins.Code art. 5.06-3(b) (1981).
The Fort Worth Court held that even though the policy stated there was coverage for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident, the Insurance Code did not require that the injuries result from a collision between two cars. Id. at 432-33. The court also noted the intention of the parties was that the named insured be afforded protection while they were occupying the insured automobile. Id. The Fort Worth Court reversed the trial court and held there was coverage under the PIP provision. Id. at 433-34.1
I agree with the Berry Court. The Insurance Code does not limit the PIP to an automobile accident. It uses the term “the accident” without any qualifying language, e.g., automobile accident or motor accident. By limiting PIP to injuries arising from an automobile accident and then interpreting that to require a collision between automobiles, the majority rewrites the Insurance Code instead of interpreting it.
I would apply the Berry analysis to the facts of this case and hold that Tuan Le’s injuries occurred while he was occupying the car.2 I would hold there is PIP coverage under the policy even though it did not involve a collision.
I would sustain point of error three.
I would reverse that part of State Farm’s summary judgment pertaining to its denial of PIP coverage and remand the cause in part.

. The majority relies on State Farm v. Peck, 900 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ), which was a liability case and not a PIP case. In Peck, the Amarillo Court considered the meaning of the term "auto accident” and held it refers to situations in which one or more vehicles are involved in some type of collision or near collision with another vehicle, object, or person. Id. at 913. The Amarillo Court decided an average person would not consider a dog-bite as an "auto accident.” Id. Because this is a PIP case, not a liability case, and the Insurance Code PIP provision does not refer to an "auto accident,” merely an “accident,” the majority is wrong in applying the reasoning of the Amarillo case. The majority should instead follow the reasoning of the Fort Worth Court in Berry.

. The majority takes issue with the Berry analysis and claims the Fort Worth Court unnecessarily narrowed the language of the Insurance Code. The Berry Court did not narrow anything. It merely read the term “the accident” to mean an accident and refused to read into it the word "automobile,” as does the majority. The legislature has met 10 times since the Berry opinion was issued. In none of those legislative sessions did the legislature amend the term "the accident” to include “automobile,” as does the majority.