Court Opinion

ID: 9686734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:04:17.512713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:37.488173
License: Public Domain

*684Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
My disagreement with the court in this case goes to three matters. The opinion does not discuss or decide the principal error assigned and argued by the plaintiff in this appeal. It decides a matter argued and in my opinion does so erroneously.
There were three questions tried and submitted to the jury in this case. (1) What was the contract between the parties? On conflicting evidence the jury decided that question in favor of the defendant. (2) How much did the plaintiff owe the defendant? The jury decided that question in favor of the defendant. The amount is not here questioned. (3) Was the defendant entitled to a lien on the horses for the amount found due? The jury decided that question in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff contends that the instruction upon which the finding is based was erroneous in that it included an element of debt for which defendant was hot entitled to a lien; i.e., it included lienable and nonlienable items.
The assignment goes to instruction No. 13 which the court quotes. It is in part: “If you find that the defendant was entitled to retain the possession of said horses and equipment until the plaintiff had fully paid him for training services, feeding and care of said horses, your verdict will be for the defendant for the amount, if any, you find is owing by the plaintiff to the defendant,” (Emphasis supplied to point out the specific error claimed.)
Defendant claimed a lien for training, care, and feeding of the horses. Plaintiff contends that under the provisions of section 54-201, R. R. S. 1943, the lien is limited to proper charges for feed and care and that the alleged contract charges of defendant included the nonlienable item of training, and that defendant’s charges not being apportioned between lienable and nonlienable items the claimed lien must fail.
Defendant claims that there was a common law lien *685for training race horses. He contends also that “care” of a race horse includes training under section 54-201, R. R. S. 1943. He also claims that section 52-601, R. R. S. 1943, is broad enough to cover this claim. I do not determine the two latter contentions.
It appears that at common law an agister as such did not have a lien but that the trainer of race horses had a lien for training services. 3 C. J. S., Animals, § 21, p. 1118; 2 Am. Jur., Animals, § 22, p. 710. The decisions sustain the text. Forth v. Simpson, 66 E. C. L. 681; Bevan v. Waters, 14 E. C. L. 693; Chase v. Robinson, 86 Vt. 240, 84 A. 867; Scott v. Mercer, 98 Iowa 258, 67 N. W. 108, 60 Am. S. R. 188; Harris v. Woodruff, 124 Mass. 205, 26 Am. R. 658; Jackson, Cook & Co. v. Holland, 31 Ga. 339; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Othoudt v. Addison Fur Corp., 262 Mich. 481, 247 N. W. 723.
One who keeps and trains another’s horse at the owner’s request has a statutory lien for the keep and a common law lien for the training. Towle v. Raymond, 58 N. H. 64. The common law lien and the statutory lien may exist together and operate in aid of each other. Hiltz v. Gould, 99 N. H. 85, 105 A. 2d 48.
Accordingly I would hold that the trial court did not err in submitting to the jury the question of the defendant having a lien for training, feed, and care.
The contention is here for determination as to the validity of the amount of the lien. It is directly presented. If this cause is to be remanded and retried, the issue here discussed will again be presented. The question should be decided — yet the court ignores it.
In this connection the court without discussion or citation of authority holds: “There was no evidence of any damages for withholding the property and the in;struction did not permit a finding as to the value of any right of possession appellee (defendant) had to the property.” This is a matter not involved in plaintiff’s argument here. The evidence was specific as to the *686amount of the lien which defendant claimed and which the jury found to be true. The jury was permitted to find the amount “owing by the plaintiff to the defendant.” The failure to determine the value of the right of possession and to allow a recovery for it cannot be detrimental to the plaintiff. It might be detrimental to the defendant who is not complaining. In my view the holding above quoted, if correct, will require a retrial— a material matter, as will appear later herein — and it is not a correct statement when tested by the rule of law repeatedly declared by this court.
We have held: Where the defendant in an action of replevin claims a special interest only in the property in controversy by virtue of a mortgage or other lien, his measure of damage, in case the property cannot be returned, is the amount of his lien with interest and costs, within the value of the property. (Emphasis supplied.) Creighton v. Haythorn, 49 Neb. 526, 68 N. W. 934.
This decision was followed in Jackson v. Arndt-Snyder Motor Co., 122 Neb. 276, 240 N. W. 279; in Hickman-Williams Agency v. Haney, 152 Neb. 219, 40 N. W. 2d 813; and in Underwriters Acceptance Corp. v. Dunkin, 152 Neb. 550, 41 N. W. 2d 855.
Here the parties made no particular effort to establish the value of the property. “No point” was made of it in the trial court.
In Landis Machine Co. v. Omaha Merchants Transfer Co., on rehearing, 142 Neb. 397, 9 N. W. 2d 198, we held: “In an action to replevin property claimed unlawfully distrained for personal taxes, if there is no evidence of the value of the property taken but no point is made thereof in the trial court, it will be presumed on appeal to this court that the case was tried on the theory that the property was worth more than the amount of the taxes, and judgment for defendant will not be reversed on the ground that it might have been less.”
We need only substitute “lien” for taxes to make the *687rule read: “* * * it will be presumed on appeal to this court that the case was tried on the theory that the property was worth more than the amount of the hen, and judgment for defendant will not be reversed on the ground that it might have been less.”
I now go to the other matter with which I disagree. It is not mentioned in the plaintiff’s assignments of error but is discussed in the argument.
The court holds that a verdict favorable to the defendant in a replevin action should conform to the requirements of section 25-10,103, R. R. S. 1943, becausé in the absence of the findings therein required there is no basis for the rendition of a judgment. The section provides: (1) “In all cases, when the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, * * That happened here. (2) “* * * where the jury shall find upon issue joined for the defendant, * * That happened here. (3) “* * * they shall also find whether the defendant had the right of property or the right of possession only, at the commencement of the suit; * * Here the jury was instructed that if it found that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant for training, feeding, and caring for the horses, the defendant had a lien on the horses and a right to legal possession until the claim was paid, and if it found that defendant was entitled to retain the possession of the horses until paid, then verdict would be for the defendant in the amount foxmd to be owing. No error is claimed in this instruction as to that feature. There was, then, inherent in the jury’s finding for the defendant, a finding that the defendant had the right of possession at the commencement of the suit — so that condition is met. (4) “* * * and if they find either in his favor, they shall assess such damages as they think right and proper for the defendant; * * which the jury did in this case. And (5) “* * * for which with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment for the defendant.” That was done in this case. So there was full compliance with section 25-10,103, R. R. S. 1943, *688in this case. The plaintiff by argument does not contend otherwise.
Section 25-10,102, R. R. S. 1943, is not directly applicable here. I mention it because it provides the same conditions as does section 25-10,103, R. R. S. 1943, if the jury “shall find that the defendant was entitled to the possession only * * * they shall assess such damages for the defendant as are right and proper; for which, with costs of suit, the court shall render judgment * *
Clearly the statutes require the verdict to determine the amount of the damages. There is no requirement that the verdict shall expressly find that the defendant was entitled to the possession.
I submit that the verdict is in full accord with the requirements of section 25-10,103, R. R. S. 1943. Whatever fault there may be in this matter relates to the judgment and not to the verdict under section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943. That is plaintiff’s contention. Section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “The judgment * * * shall be for a return of the property or the value thereof in case a return cannot be had, * * This clause clearly relates to the judgment in cases where the right of property has been found to be in the defendant. It does not apply here. The section further provides: “The judgment * * * shall be for a return of the property * * * or the value of the possession of the same, and for damages for withholding said property and costs of suit.”
The judgment here did not provide for an alternative “return of the property.”
Construing this provision the court lays down the rule that “the judgment must be in the alternative” and that the provision is “mandatory.” The court then, contradicting the “must” and “mandatory” rule, states that a failure to do so may be “error without prejudice” and would not require a reversal, limiting, however, the rule to where the evidence establishes that “a- return of the property cannot be had.”
*689I now cite those decisions of ours relied upon by the court here, where we have repeatedly held that failure to follow the letter of the statute was not reversible error unless the error was prejudicial to the complaining party. Jameson v. Kent, 42 Neb. 412, 60 N. W. 879; Scott v. Burrill, 44 Neb. 755, 62 N. W. 1093; Richardson Drug Co. v. Teasdall, 59 Neb. 150, 80 N. W. 488; Ulrich v. McConaughey, 63 Neb. 10, 88 N. W. 150. I quote only from Ulrich v. McConaughey, supra, written by Commissioner Pound. The case involved an instruction that directed the jury to find only a money judgment and where the verdict was for a money recovery only. “In the analogous case of the alternative judgment required by section 191a of the Code (now section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943), after first holding that such requirement must be complied with absolutely in all cases, this court has come to the view that a party who is in no way prejudiced by failure to enter the prescribed form of judgment can not complain thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The court then held that what is now section 25-10.103, R. R. S. 1943, did not require a different con- , struction and it refused to hold “that the one (section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943) may be departed from with impunity, if no prejudice results, while the other must be adhered to absolutely in every case under pain of reversal of the judgment.”
The court then held that what is now section 25-10.103, R. R. S. 1943, “or anything in the Code” did not require us “to reverse a judgment, otherwise right, at suit of one who is in no way prejudiced by the informality.” The court there held the instruction and the verdict, comparable to the ones here, to be free from reversible error. The instant decision of the court is directly contrary thereto. I would adhere to the reasoning and decision in Ulrich v. McConaughey, supra. In spite of the language above quoted, the court now ■holds that Ulrich v. McConaughey, supra, “does not *690conflict with what is here concluded.” I disagree.
Section 25-853, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “The court in every stage of an action must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I would follow the decisions of this court and the provision of the statute that before a reversal can be had in a case of this kind, error prejudicial to the plaintiff must be shown. It is not shown here. Prejudice to the defendant is shown. He is not complaining.
The court here states the “error without prejudice” rule but limits it to one situation. As the matter now stands defendant has a judgment against the plaintiff for the amount the jury found due and owing to him. That finding is not assailed. Defendant has lost possession of the horses upon which the jury found he had a lien and for which defendant was entitled to possession. Plaintiff has the horses. If he surrenders possession of them to the defendant he loses possession and gains nothing, for he will still be owing the debt to the defendant. The surrender of possession will not satisfy the judgment. It would merely place the defendant in a position to enforce his lien. I submit that plaintiff is in no wise prejudiced by the alleged error in the judgment. Under the “prejudice must be shown” rule this judgment should be affirmed.
Section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943, contains the only statutory provision with reference to the alternative of a return of the property. The right to return of the property, absolute or conditional, is a matter of law. The jury has nothing to decide with reference to it, and hence the Legislature properly did not include any reference to it in either section 25-10,102 or section 25-10,103, R. R. S. 1943, which relate to the jury’s verdict. The only requirement is in section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943, which specifically and directly relates to the *691“judgment.” For that reason throughout I have emphasized the word judgment.
Here the court takes language, regarding an alternative judgment, out of the section relating thereto and reads it into the section relating to the verdict. It cites no authority or reason for doing so.
If, however, this judgment is to be reversed because of failure to comply with the alternative requirement of section 25-10,104, R. R. S. 1943, it is not required that there be a retrial. The requirement would then be to remand the cause with directions to render a proper judgment.
We have so held in three cases cited and relied on by the court here.
Manker v. Sine, 35 Neb. 746, 53 N. W. 734, is one of the early “imperative” “mandatory” decisions. The judgment was reversed with instructions to render a judgment in the alternative. Roberson v. Reiter, 38 Neb. 198, 56 N. W. 877, followed Manker v. Sine, supra, and reversed and remanded with instructions to render judgment in the alternative.
In Landis Machine Co. v. Omaha Merchants Transfer Co., supra, again following Manker v. Sine, supra, we held: “If the judgment of the trial court in a replevin action is not in proper alternative form, a new trial will not be granted, but the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to render a proper judgment upon the verdict.”
Accordingly I would decide the question of lienable items as stated herein and follow Ulrich v. McConaughey, supra, and our decisions of like import. Ulrich v. McConaughey, supra, has never been modified, criticized, or overruled on the questions here involved. As to those it has been directly approved. See Ulrich v. McConaughey, 69 Neb. 773, 96 N. W. 645.
However as above stated, if the judgment is to be held to be erroneous, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions to render a proper *692alternative judgment, although to do so “in this particular would be but an idle ceremony.” Goodman v. Kennedy, 10 Neb. 270, 4 N. W. 987.