Court Opinion

ID: 9797745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:28:32.642027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:12.550872
License: Public Domain

Judge NIETO
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in Part IA. In all other respects, I concur.
In Part IA, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for tampering with a witness under § 18-8-707(l)(a), C.R.S.2002. In my view, the majority has interpreted § 18-8-707(l)(a) too narrowly and failed to give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might be drawn from the evidence.
The evidence here showed that the victim, defendant’s wife, reported to the police that defendant had assaulted her with a shotgun. Defendant was charged with second degree assault and other charges (the assault charges). Defendant then began an effort to get the assault charges dismissed. He prepared a letter for the victim that withdrew the accusations in her original report of the assault. The victim testified that she signed the letter and sent it to the prosecutor because she feared defendant. Defendant then prepared another similar letter and sent it to the victim with instructions to sign it and send it to the prosecutor. The victim testified that she destroyed the second letter. However, a letter with the victim’s purported *599signature, having content similar1 to the second letter, was sent to the prosecutor. Evidence was presented showing that defendant signed the victim’s name on the second letter received by the prosecutor.
The majority states, “there must be proof that there was an attempt to interfere with actual testimony” and goes on to note that the victim’s original statement to the police was not sworn and did not “otherwise consist!] of testimony.” This emphasis on the existence of “actual testimony” misperceives the harm the statute seeks to prevent. The statute seeks to prevent conduct that would interfere with a witness the defendant “believes is to be called to testify ... or who may be called to testify.” Section 18-8-707(1) (emphasis added). The very language of the statute indicates that the proscribed conduct would precede the witness’s actual testimony, and nothing in the language of the statute requires that the witness actually testify before the crime is complete. The majority, in effect, has added an element of “actual testimony” where none exists in the statute.
The statute applies to a person who attempts to interfere with a prospective witness. People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785 (Colo.1983). A division of this court, in People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207, 210 (Colo.App.2002), held that the crime of tampering with a witness was completed when the attempt to interfere with a witness was made. Therefore, once defendant engaged in conduct constituting an attempt to induce the victim to alter or withhold testimony he believed she would give at some time in the future, the crime was complete.
Accordingly, I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the absence of proof that the victim presented “actual testimony” in the assault case resulted in insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
The majority holds that because defendant did not consider the victim’s testimony and because his primary goal was to have the assault charges dismissed, his conduct did not constitute tampering with a witness. The majority bases its holding on the conclusion that the record shows only that the defendant asked the victim to persuade the prosecutor to dismiss the assault charges by the use of a false letter.
To the contrary, I conclude that that the jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that defendant was intentionally attempting to induce the victim to alter or withhold her testimony. Such intent is not inconsistent with the goal of having the charges dismissed because if the victim altered her testimony as suggested by defendant or refused to testify, the prosecutor may have dismissed the charges for that reason.
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the duty of the appellate court is to view the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and then determine whether, based on that evidence, a reasonable person could conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making that determination, we must give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be fairly drawn from the evidence. It is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence, including resolving conflicts in the evidence. Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colo.1988).
I conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s verdict for the following reasons.
First, defendant’s conduct was an attempt to destroy, or at least harm, the credibility of the victim’s original statement. Because the victim could not effect the dismissal of the charges, and therefore, she may have been required to testify in defendant’s trial, it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that defendant intended to induce her to alter or withhold her testimony.
Second, if the victim contradicted her original statement, it would be difficult for her to renounce her recantation and testify consistently with her original statement. Thus, defendant’s conduct could have had the effect of inducing the victim to alter or withhold her testimony. It did not have that effect because she testified consistently with her original statement. However, it is not necessary that defendant succeed in his attempt to tamper with a witness; it is sufficient that he *600made the attempt. See People v. Scialabba, supra.
Third, if the victim testified consistently with her original statement, under § 16-10-201, C.R.S.2002, the victim’s recantation, which defendant was attempting to induce, would be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement both for impeachment and as proof of the facts contained in the statement. Thus, the victim’s altered statement could be admitted as substantive evidence, and defendant’s conduct would have had the same effect as if the victim had testified falsely.
Fourth, defendant argues that he was trying to get the assault charges dismissed by getting the victim to tell the truth. While there was evidence challenging the credibility of the victim’s oi'iginal statement, it was the jury’s province to decide that question. The jury was free to reject defendant’s argument and conclude that he intended to induce the victim to alter or withhold her testimony. See Kogan v. People, supra, 756 P.2d at 950 (“An 'appellate court is not permitted to sit as a thirteenth juror and set aside a verdict because it might have drawn a different conclusion from the same evidence”).
Accordingly, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction for tampering with a witness. I reach this conclusion without considering defendant’s contention that certain evidentiary rulings constituted reversible error. In light of the majority’s decision, it is unnecessary to consider those issues here.