Court Opinion

ID: 9940186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:16:52.296989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:40.225589
License: Public Domain

I concur, of course, in the majority opinion that I authored for the court. I write briefly to respond to the dissenting opinion, which refers to my dissenting opinion in In re KennethH. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 [189 Cal.Rptr. 867, 659 P.2d 1156].
In Kenneth H. I expressed the view, as a matter of personal belief, that remand was unnecessary under the specific facts of that case, and that literal compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 represented "but one more step in a seemingly inexorable process . . . of converting juvenile proceedings into formal criminal trials." (In re Kenneth H.,supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 622 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
I have not succeeded, however, in persuading my colleagues of the soundness of that view. After reflection, I have decided not to beat a rataplan, but to join with the majority here as a matter of stare decisis. Moreover, in light of the increasingly serious consequences of a determination that a so-called "wobbler" would, in the case of an adult, be a felony, I do not share the view of the dissenting opinion that remand under these circumstances is merely a redundant exercise.
Even if one can perceive an inconsistency between a previous point of view and the court's conclusion in this case, I am reminded of the philosophy of Justice Frankfurter (Henslee v.Union Planters Bank (1949) *Page 1212 335 U.S. 595, 600 [69 S.Ct. 290, 292-293, 93 L.Ed. 259] (dis. opn. of Frankfurter, J.)) subsequently quoted by Justice Rutledge and Justice Jackson: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."