Court Opinion

ID: 9951681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 19:02:20.991098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:01.102090
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24
                    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                            DIVISION SIX

 F.K.,                                    2d Juv. No. B333788
                                      (Super. Ct. No. 23JV00092)
      Petitioner,                       (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,

      Respondent;

 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
 CHILD WELFARE SERVICES,

      Real Party in Interest.

      When a juvenile court removes a child from a parent’s
custody and orders reunification services, the purpose of those
services is to facilitate reunification of the family. The court
must evaluate the parent’s progress with the court-ordered
treatment plan during the reunification period. At the six-month
review hearing, the court has discretion to continue reunification
services even if it finds there is not a substantial probability the
child will be returned to the parent. The court errs when it does
not exercise that discretion.
      In this petition for extraordinary writ, F.K. (Mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her
reunification services and setting the matter for a selection and
implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3), 366.26, subd. (l) 1; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.452.) Mother contends the Santa Barbara County
Department of Child Welfare Services (department) did not
consider her grief for the death of A.R.’s twin sister and did not
provide reasonable reunification services. She also contends that
six months of services were not sufficient. She requests the
section 366.26 hearing, scheduled for March 26, 2024, be vacated,
and reunification services be reinstated.
      Mother filed the petition in propria persona. It is the
responsibility of trial counsel to file a petition challenging the
setting of a section 366.26 hearing unless the record is clear it
has no merit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(c); Cresse S. v.
Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 947, 956.) As we discuss
herein, Mother’s petition is meritorious. We grant the petition
and order the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21
hearing.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Mother had chronic untreated alcohol abuse and incidents
of domestic violence. Her criminal history included two
convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol and two
convictions of domestic violence causing injury.
      When Mother was intoxicated, she would often yell at, and

      1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                   2
be “rough toward,” A.R., age 18 months, and her half-sister, B.T.,
age 11. Several times a week, Mother was too intoxicated to care
for A.R. On several occasions when Mother was intoxicated, she
injured B.T. from “rough-housing” with her.
      Mother and A.R.’s father, T.R., repeatedly fought while
intoxicated in the presence of the children. B.T. reported to
police an incident in which Mother and T.R. were lying on the
kitchen floor arguing. Police found both were “clearly
intoxicated” and unable to care for the children. When police
spoke to Mother about the incident, she looked at B.T. and said,
“[T]his is all your fault.”
      In one incident after drinking, Mother slapped B.T., leaving
a red mark below her eye. B.T. ran to her father’s home and was
afraid to return to Mother’s home. Mother told police she did not
have an alcohol problem and said B.T. was “exaggerating.”
      The juvenile court found the dependency petition true
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)) and ordered A.R. removed from Mother’s
custody (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)). 2 The court ordered that Mother
receive reunification services. Her service objectives included
that she “[s]tay sober and show [her] ability to live free from
alcohol dependency,” “be able to articulate how her substance use
has impacted her ability to safely parent her child and the impact
her substance use has had on her child,” and “follow the
recommended treatment plan of the substance abuse treatment
program.” (Bold omitted.) It also required “individual therapy to
further assess her past traumas, loss of her child, grief, and the
potential impact they may have on her ability to parent,” and
that she “accept responsibility for her actions.”

      2 B.T. was placed with her father and the case was closed
as to her.

                                3
       The report prepared in mid-September 2023 for the
six-month review hearing stated that Mother was consistently
participating in supervised visitation. She was participating in
outpatient substance abuse treatment through Recovery Point,
which included three outside social support events per week and
two psychoeducational group sessions per week, focusing on
“relapse prevention, coping skills, and expressing accountability
for our own recovery.” Her counselor there stated that Mother
attended the program as required, was an “active participant,”
consistently tested negative for all substances in random tests,
and “has shown recent growth in the recovery process.”
       Mother also completed a six-week domestic violence
education program through Domestic Violence Solutions. She
participated during the classes and the counseling program
director believed Mother “was gaining insight and understanding
during the classes.” During monthly meetings with a child
welfare worker, Mother “show[ed] insight regarding domestic
violence.” She was attending weekly therapy with a licensed
clinical social worker, who stated Mother had never missed an
appointment, was “actively engaging in therapy and has made
progress toward her goals.” Mother developed a relapse
prevention plan as requested by the department.
       Before the six-month review, Mother had several negative
tests for alcohol use. But she had one positive alcohol test,
admitted drinking on another occasion, and provided one sample
considered to be a “dilute test” because she was “overly
hydrated.” She also had two unexcused missed tests, including
one when she forgot to schedule a test after she was released
from the emergency room; in both instances, she provided a
negative test the next day.

                                4
      The department stated that Mother repeatedly denied
having an alcohol problem and could not articulate how her
alcohol use affected her children. She said her children were
never harmed by her alcohol abuse. She refused to discuss with
the department a relapse prevention plan (which she later
provided) or whether she was using alcohol as a coping skill. She
blamed A.R.’s removal on “assumptions” and on B.T.’s “lie[s]”
about Mother’s substance abuse.
      The six-month review hearing was held December 4, 2023,
almost eight months after the petition was sustained. The
department did not supplement its September report and no
compliance issues were noted for the previous three months.
      Mother testified that A.R.’s twin sister died when she was
two months old, and she was discussing this with her therapist.
She said she drank to cope with her grief. She also acknowledged
that her children were removed because of her alcohol use. She
discussed her alcohol use with her therapist and her counselor.
During the previous four months, she spoke with her sponsor
every day. She was employed full time and had secured housing
for herself with a room for A.R.
      The court stated that Mother was in denial about her
alcohol problem, like “[a] lot of substance abusers.” The court
characterized Mother’s admission of an alcohol problem at the
review hearing as “somewhat of a hail Mary at this late stage.”
The court stated it did not have “unbridled discretion” and could
not grant more services unless Mother showed she had
“substantially complied with the case plan.” The court said that
was “not my rule,” but the Legislature “only gives parents six
months to make substantial progress on a plan,” and the court
was bound by that rule.

                                5
      The court found the department made reasonable efforts to
return the child by providing reasonable services. The court
found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to
participate regularly and make substantive progress in the
treatment plan and there was not a substantial probability of
returning custody to her within the time permitted. (§ 366.21,
subds. (e)(3), (g)(1)(B) & (C).) The court also found that return of
A.R. to Mother’s physical custody would create a substantial risk
of detriment to A.R.’s safety, protection, or physical and
emotional well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).) The court
terminated reunification services and set a selection and
implementation hearing (§ 366.26) for March 26, 2024.
                            DISCUSSION
                         Adequacy of services
      The record does not support Mother’s contention that the
department did not understand her grief. The department’s
reports acknowledged the trauma and grief Mother suffered. The
department ordered individual therapy to help Mother cope with
the impact of her grief on her ability to parent.
      In our view, the substance abuse program, domestic
violence education, and individual therapy ordered by the
department were reasonable and designed to remedy the
problems that led to Mother’s loss of custody. (In re Riva M.
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) But the department did not
provide information regarding any services it provided between
the preparation of its report in September 2023 and the
six-month review hearing in December. Accordingly, we cannot
assess whether such services were adequate.
                        Termination of services
      Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it

                                 6
terminated reunification services at the six-month review
hearing. We agree.
       We review the juvenile court’s ruling for substantial
evidence. (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 530,
535.) In applying that test, we “necessarily take account of the
‘standard of proof that applied before the trial court.’ ” (People v.
Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 970.)
       Because A.M. was removed from the home when she was
less than three years old, reunification services must be ordered
for six months from the dispositional hearing, but no longer than
12 months from the time the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(B).) Section 366.21, subdivision (e), provides that a
juvenile court shall not set a section 366.26 hearing if there is a
substantial probability the child may be returned to their parent
within six months or reasonable services have not been provided
to the parent. When there is noncompliance with a court-ordered
treatment plan, termination of reunification services at the
six-month review hearing is discretionary.
       Thus, if “the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent failed to participate regularly and make
substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court
may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120
days.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3), italics added.) “Section 366.21,
subdivision (e), places discretion in the hands of the trial court as
to whether to schedule a hearing to terminate parental rights.”
(M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 179 (M.V.).)
“At the six-month review, the court has discretion to continue the
case and forebear from scheduling a .26 hearing even if it does
not make the finding there is a substantial probability the child
may be returned to his or her parent.” (Ibid.; accord S.T. v.

                                  7
Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015 (S.T.).)
      On the other hand, when a child is not returned to their
parent at the 12-month permanency hearing, section 366.21,
subdivision (g)(1), provides that a juvenile court can extend
reunification services by an additional six months “only if it finds
that there is a substantial probability that the child will be
returned to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian
and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of
time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the
parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) A substantial
probability the child will be returned requires findings that the
parent (1) “consistently and regularly contacted and visited with
the child,” (2) “made significant progress in resolving problems
that led to the child’s removal from the home,” and (3)
“demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the
objectives of their treatment plan and to provide for the child’s
safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special
needs.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
      But section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1) did not preclude
extension of services at the six-month review hearing here. In
M.V., as in the present case, the juvenile court declined to extend
reunification services to 12 months for the parent of a child under
the age of three. The juvenile court there mistakenly “believed it
lacked the discretion to find a probability of return unless the
three factors in section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1) were satisfied.”
(M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) Instead, “[t]he court
was not required to find the existence of all three factors to
continue reunification services to a 12-month review.” (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the
juvenile court to vacate its order and hold a new section 366.21

                                 8
hearing. (M.V., at p. 184.)
       Here, as in M.V., the juvenile court did not exercise its
discretion to continue reunification services because it believed it
did not have the discretion to do so based on its finding that
Mother had not made substantial progress. But “applying
subdivision (g)(1) at a six-month review as if the court were
making findings on ‘substantial probability’ at a 12-month review
is legal error.” (M.V., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.) At the
six-month review, the juvenile court should weigh evidence
pertaining to the factors identified in section 366.21, subdivision
(g)(1), “along with any other relevant evidence (such as
extenuating circumstances excusing noncompliance with the
three factors) in considering whether is there substantial
evidence of a possible return to the mother by the 12-month
hearing.” (M.V., at p. 181.)
       The department’s September report may have contributed
to the juvenile court’s error by stating it need only apply the
factors in section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1), implying that the
court was required to terminate services and set a section 366.26
hearing.
       Writ relief is appropriate because the court apparently
believed it did not have discretion. It did, and the error was not
harmless. (S.T., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016-1017; M.V.,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) Mother did virtually
everything she was ordered to do and, in the opinion of the
domestic violence counseling director, child welfare worker,
substance abuse counselor, and her therapist, Mother was
making progress. Thus, “we cannot say that the court would
have abused its discretion by continuing the period for
reunification services or that it is not reasonably probable that

                                 9
the court would have exercised its discretion in [Mother’s] favor.”
(S.T., at p. 1016.)
       The juvenile court relied in part on the “recent” missed and
diluted alcohol tests. But those occurred in May through July,
four to seven months before the hearing. And the court’s concern
that Mother’s therapist did not testify did not justify termination
of services in light of the therapist’s positive written report and
the department’s burden of proof. (In re James Q. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 255, 261.)
       That Mother initially denied the role of alcohol abuse in the
case was an inadequate basis to terminate services here. As the
juvenile court recognized, denial is a frequent occurrence for
those with substance abuse problems, and it often acts as a
barrier to recovery. (Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the
Criminal Law (1988) 10 Cardozo L.Rev. 393, 407-408, 441-442,
467-469.) While we do not condone substance abuse violations by
parents in the dependency court system, Mother’s isolated
incidents of alcohol use and missed tests here, viewed in the
context of her overwhelming compliance with her treatment plan,
did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of lack of
progress supported by substantial evidence.
       Reunification services may be terminated at the six-month
review only when “ ‘parental unfitness is so well established that
there is no longer “reason to believe that positive, nurturing
parent-child relationships exist” [citation], and the parens
patriae interest of the state favoring preservation rather than
severance of natural familial bonds has been extinguished.’ ”
(Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 613.) As
noted in In re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932, 941, “relapse is a
normal part of recovery. In other words, a relapsed parent is far

                                10
from hopeless. It is decidedly not fruitless to offer services to a
parent who genuinely made an effort to achieve sobriety but
slipped up on the road to recovery.” 3 Mother here made
substantial efforts and progress that could warrant continuation
of reunification services.
                             DISPOSITION
       The petition for extraordinary writ is granted. Let a
peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the court to vacate its
order of December 4, 2023, vacate the setting of a section 366.26
hearing, and conduct a new hearing pursuant to section 366.21,
subdivision (e), in conformity with this opinion. In the interest of
justice, this decision is final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                      BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.           CODY, J.

      3 Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) was amended effective
January 1, 2022, to clarify that reunification services may not be
bypassed based on “passive resistance” to treatment as described
in In re B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 932.

                                 11
                 Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge

           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

               ______________________________

     F.K., in pro. per, for Petitioner.
     Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
     No appearance for Respondent.