Court Opinion

ID: 9792468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:48.698649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.027573
License: Public Domain

UNIS, J.,
dissenting.
I do not agree with the disposition of this case. We granted review to determine whether the common law rule that precludes damages for purely mental distress in an action for breach of contract should be modified, particularly “when emotional security is the very object of the promised confidentiality.”1 Yet, the majority declines to undertake reconsideration of that nonstatutory rule because of this court’s self-*511imposed methodology of judicial restraint, which substantially limits its authority to change, modify or formulate common law. The court’s self-imposed rule of judicial restraint rejects competing-policy methodology in judicial common law-making. For example, in G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 757 P2d 1347 (1988), the plaintiff argued that public policy justified imposing vicarious liability on a hospital for an employee’s criminal act upon a patient-plaintiff. Id. at 56. This court, citing Donaca v. Curry Co., 303 Or 30, 734 P2d 1339 (1987),2 responded by rejecting the use of “policy” as a rationale for formulating common law. 306 Or at 58-59. Similarly, Heino v. Harper, 306 Or 347, 759 P2d 253 (1988), rejected the assessment of competing policy considerations as a method for decision making.
The majority in this case states that the proper approach for reconsideration of a court-made rule or doctrine is the three-premise methodology articulated in G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., supra, 306 Or at 59:
“ ‘Ordinarily this court reconsiders a nonstatutory rule or doctrine upon one of three premises: (1) that an earlier case was inadequately considered or wrong when it was decided,
* * *; (2) that surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case, * * *; or (3) that the earlier rule was grounded in and tailored to specific factual conditions, and that some essential factual assumptions of the rule have changed. Without some such premise, the court has no grounds to reverse a well-established rule besides judicial fashion or personal policy preference, which are not sufficient grounds for such a change * * * i r>
310 Or at 505. Using that approach, the majority concludes that, because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate affirmatively that any of the three premises is present, it has “no grounds to reconsider the * * * [common law] rule that damages are not recoverable in contract for purely emotional distress” and, therefore, “decline[s] to do so.” Id.
*512This court has never explained the origin of this doctrine of judicial restraint that limits it in employing policy-premises that are not related to a legislative source, even if those policy-premises are sound, for justification for its decision. The effect of this court’s present approach is that the existing common law of this state, which was court created, becomes nearly “set in stone,” subject only to review under the three-premise methodology outlined in G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., supra. I believe that it is absolutely essential in the formulation of common law that relevant and crucial social data go into the calculus of decision making. The proper growth of the law demands it.
From the inception of common law, it has been the function of judges to make policy decisions. In United States F. & G. Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Or 261, 264-266, 217 P 332 (1923), this court observed that the Oregon Constitution expressly recognizes this court’s role in the preservation of the common law system. The people of this state did not adopt the civil law system of codifying the entire body of law; rather, they adopted the common law method in which the judiciary formulates nonstatutory law. Obviously, in the process of formulating common law rules or doctrine, judges must weigh competing policy considerations.
Former Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Kenneth O’Connell has stated that “[this] court’s rejection of judicial policy making could be the most significant, revolutionary, and startling pronouncement ever made by the Oregon Supreme Court throughout its history * * O’Connell, Ruminations on Oregon Negligence Law, 24 Willamette L Rev 385, 407 (1988).
I would jettison this court’s self-imposed rule that precludes it from justifying rules of common law or doctrine in terms of policy. Abandonment of the present decision-making methodology employed by this court, which I advocate, does not mean that this court should ignore the doctrines of judicial restraint and stare decisis, which recognize the need for stability and predictability in the development of the law. The self-imposed rule of judicial restraint earns this court the dubious distinction of being the only state in the union to limit *513its traditional judicial common law-making authority so substantially.3
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.4

 In Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or 706, 710, 696 P2d 527 (1985), this court stated in dictum that “perhaps there is no barrier [to contract damages for purely emotional injury] when emotional security is the very object of the promised confidentiality.”

 In Donaca v. Curry Co., 303 Or 30, 35-36, 734 P2d 1339 (1987), this court disapproved of courts “that in the absence of statutory sources of public policy, * * * articulate and justify rules of law in terms of policy * * *, in other words, adopt a legislative mode of making policy rather than a judicial search for policy made by others or for the implications of existing principles.”

 My research has failed to disclose any state that has similarly limited its traditional judicial common law-making authority.

 1 express no opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’ claim.