Court Opinion

ID: 9375898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 14:06:39.298399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.652499
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.B., 2023-Ohio-589.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: A.B.                               :      APPEAL NO. C-220577
                                                  TRIAL NO. F13-1249Z
                                           :

                                           :        O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 1, 2023

Jon R. Sinclair, for Appellant Father,

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas C. Varney,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job
and Family Services,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Masha Pupko, Assistant
Public Defender, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem.
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Presiding Judge.

           {¶1}    Appellant father appeals from the decision of the Hamilton County

Juvenile Court awarding permanent custody of his daughter, A.B., to appellee the

Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”). Father argues

that the court’s best-interest findings were not supported by sufficient evidence.1 For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

                             I. Factual and Procedural History

           {¶2}    A.B. was born in 2011 in Florida to mother and father. Mother brought

A.B. to Cincinnati, Ohio, in 2013. Father lost contact with mother and A.B. around the

same time and did not see A.B. again until 2020, after the commencement of this case.

           {¶3}    A.B. has a history of mental-health concerns and developmental delays.

In October 2019, A.B. was hospitalized due to physical aggression and threats of self-

harm. According to a psychological evaluation performed in October 2020, A.B. has

been diagnosed with mild-to-moderate intellectual disability, disruptive mood

dysregulation disorder, and other specified trauma-and-stressor related disorder. A.B.

is on a prescribed regimen of medication to help with managing her behavior.

           {¶4}    A.B. was in the temporary custody of HCJFS in 2013, 2017, and 2018

based on various factors related to mother’s chronic homelessness, mental-health

concerns, and domestic-violence issues. In April 2019, legal custody of A.B. was

remanded to her mother, and HCJFS ended its protective supervision of A.B. in July

2019.

           {¶5}    In August 2019, following a report from A.B.’s school and a home visit

by a caseworker, HCJFS was once again granted interim custody of A.B., who was

1   Mother, who had custody of A.B. prior to the instant proceedings, is not a party to this appeal.

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

placed in foster care. In November 2019, A.B.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed for

permanent custody to HCJFS on the basis that A.B. could not or should not be placed

with her parents (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)); had been abandoned by father (R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(b)); and had been adjudicated as an abused, neglected, or dependent

child on at least three separate occasions (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e)). Subsequent to the

GAL’s filing, father began participating in this case. The GAL requested, and the court

granted, a continuance so that a home study could be conducted for father, pursuant

to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”). In January 2020,

the juvenile court adjudicated A.B. neglected and dependent.

       {¶6}   Throughout 2020, HCJFS worked to provide services to mother and

father, with the goal of placing A.B. in the custody of one of her parents. In early 2020,

HCJFS reported receiving an approved ICPC home study for father, and the matter

was continued to evaluate the impact of the approved home study on the parties’

positions. In August 2020, the GAL withdrew the motion for permanent custody and

instead moved for temporary custody while attempting to make progress on A.B.’s case

plan for reunification. The court granted temporary custody of A.B. to HCJFS.

       {¶7}   The September 2020 case plan allowed A.B. to visit father monthly at

his home in Georgia and provided mother an opportunity to make improvements to

her living situation. The goal of this case plan was to reunite A.B. with one of her

parents by August 2021. This case plan included provisions requiring A.B. to

“participate in mental-health services and follow all recommendations” and to

“participate in med-somatic services and follow all recommendations.” The case plan

documented father’s need to “keep open and consistent contact between himself and

[A.B.] to develop an attachment” and “display an[] understanding that there is a need

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

for [A.B] [to] have mental-health and emotional interventions.” The case plan also

required father to “participate via phone/video to keep involved in the mental-health

treatment of [A.B.],” “engage with [A.B.]’s treatment providers to continue

understanding and being able to meet mental-health, cognitive and emotional needs,”

and “commit to continuing visitation between him and [A.B.].”

       {¶8}   In September 2020, A.B. went with her caseworker to Georgia to visit

father for a week. During that visit, father refused to give A.B. her medications because

he does not believe in the use of psychotropic medications. After this visit, HCJFS

suspended any further visits to Georgia, but offered father the opportunity to visit A.B.

in Ohio. Father never visited A.B. in Ohio, but father did visit A.B. in person at some

subsequent time when A.B.’s foster family vacationed in Tennessee. The two visits in

Georgia and Tennessee are the only times father and A.B. have seen each other in

person since 2013.

       {¶9}   In October 2020, after A.B.’s visit with father in Georgia, HCJFS

submitted a new case plan. The new case plan discontinued unsupervised visits

between father and A.B., noting that father had thrown out A.B.’s medication during

unsupervised visitation and refused to follow treatment plans recommended by A.B.’s

service providers. The case plan also documented that A.B. returned to her foster

family after the visit “with negative behaviors and unregulated temperament.” The

plan called for father to “commit to continuing visitation between him and [A.B.]”

       {¶10} In January 2021, the juvenile court held a remote hearing on HCJFS’s

motion to extend temporary custody. Mother and father both attended the hearing,

along with counsel. Father agreed with the motion and agreed to virtual visitation

facilitated through the Family Nurturing Center (“FNC”). The court also noted that

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

“Father’s ICPC Home Study has expired and [Georgia] wishes him to engage in

services and identify appropriate services for [A.B.] in [Georgia].” The court observed

that father “indicates a strong desire to engage in [A.B.]’s services so that he can better

understand her needs.” The court granted HCJFS’s motion to extend temporary

custody through February 2021, with the goal of reunifying A.B. with one of her

parents.

           {¶11} In February 2021, HCJFS filed an updated case plan. The updated case

plan required father and his wife “to complete parenting education centered around

children with special needs. And to complete a mental-health evaluation.” The case

plan shows that father participated by phone in developing the plan and had agreed

with it.

           {¶12} The court extended temporary custody in March 2021 at the request of

HCJFS. In July 2021, HCJFS filed a “Semiannual Administrative Review” (“SAR”) of

A.B.’s case plan. In the SAR, HCJFS reported that father was continuing with virtual

visits with A.B., mediated through the FNC. Despite having been provided with contact

information for A.B.’s service providers, father had not engaged with any of A.B.’s

providers. Father reported that he had not enrolled in parenting classes or pursued a

mental-health evaluation, citing cost and lack of local availability as barriers. HCJFS

reported that, although father has reported to the caseworker that he will “comply”

with HCJFS and the caseworker, he has not “shifted his thinking or behavior to reflect

truly understanding [A.B.] and what her mental-health and emotional and cognitive

needs are.” HCJFS summarized that father has displayed no understanding or

acknowledgement of A.B.’s diagnoses by licensed mental-health professionals, nor has

he displayed any willingness to keep A.B. in mental, emotional, and cognitive services

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

or to follow her medication prescriptions.

       {¶13} Following the July 2021 SAR, HCJFS filed its motion for permanent

custody. In its motion, HCJFS claimed that A.B. had been in the temporary custody of

the agency for at least 12 months of the preceding 22 months and that permanent

custody was in A.B.’s best interest.

       {¶14} In January 2022, A.B.’s GAL filed a permanent-custody report and

recommendation. In her report, the GAL noted that father had not completed any of

the steps outlined in the case plan, including the completion of a mental-health

assessment and a parenting class focused on special-needs children. Additionally, the

GAL emphasized father’s lack of commitment to meeting A.B.’s mental-health needs

that were documented in A.B.’s psychological evaluation. Further, the GAL reported

that father does not respond appropriately to A.B.’s mental-health needs and account

for her cognitive delays during their supervised phone calls. The GAL concluded that

granting permanent custody to HCJFS would be in A.B.’s best interest.

       {¶15} On July 6, 2022, the juvenile court held a trial on HCJFS’s motion for

permanent custody before a magistrate. Father did not appear, although father’s

attorney participated. The court heard testimony from A.B.’s caseworker, Tamyiah

Terrell. Terrell testified about A.B.’s history of mental-health concerns. Terrell stated

that father withheld A.B.’s medication during the visit in Georgia and that father does

not believe in the use of psychotropic medication because of his faith. Terrell testified

that father and his wife did not complete a mental-health assessment or engage in

parenting classes, as was required by the case plan. Terrell testified that father had

been given permission to visit A.B. in Ohio, under the supervision of the FNC, but that

father had refused to come. Terrell testified that it was her belief that there was no

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

bond between A.B. and father. She stated that A.B. would describe phone calls with

father as “okay” and simply state, “Yeah, I talked to him.”

       {¶16} The magistrate entered a decision finding that clear and convincing

evidence supported HCJFS’s motion for permanent custody and awarded permanent

custody to the agency. The magistrate’s decision addressed all of the statutory factors,

weighing each in favor of permanent custody.

       {¶17} Following the magistrate’s decision, father filed an objection, arguing

that the decision to terminate his parental rights was not based on sufficient evidence.

The court held a hearing on the objection in September 2022. Once again, father did

not appear, but he was represented by counsel. Father advanced no specific argument

as to why the magistrate’s decision was not based on sufficient evidence, other than

the conclusory allegation. Following the hearing, the court entered an order overruling

father’s objection to the magistrate’s decision. The juvenile court adopted the

magistrate’s decision and also found that each of the statutory factors favored

permanent custody.

       {¶18} Father timely appealed.

                                    II. Analysis

       {¶19} In his sole assignment of error, father argues that the juvenile court

erred when it granted permanent custody of A.B. to HCJFS. Specifically, father argues

that the court’s finding that permanent custody was in A.B.’s best interest was not

supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.

       {¶20} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides that the juvenile court may grant

permanent custody of a child to a public children services agency if the court finds by

clear and convincing evidence that (1) permanent custody is in the child’s best interest

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

and (2) that one of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. In re

P/W Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200103, 2020-Ohio-3513, ¶ 29. “To

determine the best interests of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors

within R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).” In re Z., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190026, 2019-Ohio-

1617, ¶ 18.

       {¶21} On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a permanent-custody

case, the reviewing court “tak[es] a fresh look at the evidence to see whether it clearly

and convincingly supports the court’s decision.” In re M/E, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

200349, 2021-Ohio-450, ¶ 8. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that

“ ‘produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts

sought to be established.’ ” In re L.H., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220161, 2022-Ohio-

2755, ¶ 38, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).

“[W]e accept the trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported by ‘some

competent and credible evidence.’ ” In re M/E at ¶ 8, quoting In re W.W., 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-110363 and C-110402, 2011-Ohio-4912, ¶ 46.

       {¶22} In evaluating the best interests of the child, the court must consider all

of the enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and “ ‘[t]here is not one element

that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.’ ” In re K.T.1, 1st

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170667, C-170687, C-170701, C-170702 and C-170707, 2018-

Ohio-1381, ¶ 13, quoting In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857

N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

       {¶23} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides that when making a best-interest

determination, “the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited

to, the following”:

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s

       parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers[, and others];

       (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through

       the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the

       child;

       (c) The custodial history of the child * * *;

       (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and

       whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of

       permanent custody to the agency;

       (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section

       apply in relation to the parents and child.

       {¶24} We first note that the record in this case shows that, while an ICPC home

study had been approved, it ultimately expired. A subsequent home study was denied.

       {¶25} The lack of an approved ICPC home study prevents a permanent

placement with father. Because father lives in Georgia, the ICPC is applicable to this

case. Under the ICPC, as codified in Ohio law at R.C. 5103.23 to 5103.237, “The child

shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until

the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending

agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be

contrary to the interests of the child.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 5103.23, Article III(D).

       {¶26} Because HCJFS did not have an active approval from the appropriate

agency in Georgia to place A.B. with father, the juvenile court could not place A.B. with

father. See In re E.H., 5th Dist. Licking Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109 and 2019

CA 00110, 2020-Ohio-2835, ¶ 38 (holding that the ICPC prevents an interstate

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

placement where the receiving state has not given approval to the placement); In re

Ranker, 11th Dist. Portage No. 99-P-0072, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4662, 33 (Oct. 6,

2000) (same).

       {¶27} Despite the lack of an approved ICPC home study, the juvenile court

analyzed the best-interest factors.

       {¶28} The juvenile court considered the relationships between A.B. and

mother, father, and the foster family. The court found that father had not had any

relationship with A.B. between 2013 and 2020. At the August 2020 dispositional

hearing, the parties agreed to a plan with the goal of reunification with one of A.B.’s

parents. Father was to regularly visit A.B. to develop a bond. However, father only had

two in-person visits with A.B., one at his home in Georgia and one while A.B.’s foster

family vacationed in Tennessee. Father refused to visit A.B. in Ohio because, he stated,

he couldn’t be away from his ministries. Father repeatedly told the caseworker that he

had not had a chance to look at A.B.’s psychological evaluation and did not participate

in any other services offered. Father had regular phone and video calls with A.B.

However, the uncontroverted testimony of A.B.’s caseworker was that A.B. had not

formed a bond with father.

       {¶29} In contrast, A.B. was bonded with her foster family. The foster family

supported A.B. through her challenging behaviors, and A.B. has made substantial

improvement in her behavior since living with the foster family.

       {¶30} The juvenile court also considered A.B.’s wishes, as relayed by her In re

Williams attorney. See In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805

N.E.2d 1110. A.B. wanted to reunify with mother, but was also happy in the foster

home. A.B. did not express an interest in being placed with father.

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} Next, the juvenile court considered A.B.’s custodial history. At the time

of the permanent-custody trial, A.B. had been in custody of HCJFS for 32 months and

one week, from the time she was eight years old until she was 11 years old.

       {¶32} The juvenile court placed significant emphasis on A.B.’s need for a

legally secure permanent placement. As we have previously stated, “A legally secure

placement refers to more than just a roof over one’s head, rather, a legally secure

placement, ‘ “encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with

one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.” ’ ” In re E.H.,

1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220424 and C-220428, 2022-Ohio-4701, ¶ 24, quoting In

re P. & H., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-190309 and C-190310, 2019-Ohio-3637, at ¶ 42,

quoting In re K.W., 2018-Ohio-1933, 111 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 87 (4th Dist.) (“Mother’s failure

to comply with her case plan, along with the presence of grandmother [who was

suspected of abusing drugs] at the home, provided clear and convincing evidence that

mother was unable to provide a legally secure permanent placement.”); see In re J.H.,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95 (record supported a finding that

parents were unable to provide a legally secure placement where parents were not

grasping parenting concepts and were not truthful in mental-health evaluations.).

       {¶33} The juvenile court found that father has stable housing and income

sufficient to meet A.B.’s needs. However, father does not have a close relationship with

A.B. Father does not believe that A.B. needs mental-health treatment, despite

discussion with A.B.’s caseworker, participation in A.B.’s psychological evaluation,

and being provided with A.B.’s psychological assessment. Father has stated that he can

address A.B.’s needs through structure and discipline. Father did not participate in

case-plan services, and despite multiple continuances, father did not appear at the

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

permanent-custody trial or the hearing on his objection to the magistrate’s decision.

Father did not attend a parenting class for parents of special-needs children, as

directed by the case plan. The juvenile court also found that father’s ICPC home study

was not approved. Thus, the juvenile court found that father cannot provide A.B. with

a permanent placement that would meet her unique needs.

       {¶34} Finally, the juvenile court determined that none of the factors under

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) were applicable to this case.

       {¶35} Upon review, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence

to support the juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody of A.B. to HCJFS.

The lack of an approved ICPC home study for father makes placement with father

impossible. The juvenile court also properly considered all of the best-interest factors

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Four of the five factors support permanent custody to

HCJFS, and none of the factors suggest that placement with father is in A.B.’s best

interest.

                                  III. Conclusion

       {¶36} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule father’s sole assignment of error.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS and BOCK, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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