Court Opinion

ID: 9736592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:00:33.739333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.466905
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring: I dissented from the majority opinion in First Chicago v. Industrial Comm’n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 685 (1998). In my view: “[Ujnless the bond is signed by an officer or director, i.e., someone who customarily has authority to bind the corporation in financial matters ***, then the authority of the party signing the bond must accompany the bond. Whether that person is an employee of the corporation, a nonemployee-agent, or an attorney is without significance.” First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 693-94 (Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.). In other words, regardless of who signs the bond, I would not allow evidence of their corporate authority to be submitted after the 20-day jurisdictional period. See First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 694-97 (Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.). In the instant case, attorney Sandy Echeveste signed the bond without providing any contemporary evidence that he was authorized to bind Unilever financially. The only contemporary evidence of such authority pertained to a different attorney — Mark E Slavin. Evidence of Echeveste’s authority was not submitted until after the 20-day jurisdictional period expired. For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s decision that Unilever failed to vest the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction.