Court Opinion

ID: 9704622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:41:25.757477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.659478
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). Frank J. Szopko was a crew member on a Kinsman Marine Transit Company ship. He was injured when he slipped and fell on the dock while returning to the ship from a personal shore leave. He commenced this action *674under the Jones Act.1 As set forth in the opinion of the Court, Szopko can recover for his injuries under the Jones Act only if he can establish both that he was acting "in the course of his employment” when injured, and that his injury was caused by the negligence of Kinsman. The majority holds that Szopko was unable to establish either element, and denies his claim.
I concur in the decision of the majority, but disagree on the "course of employment” issue.
A number of courts have held that a seaman on shore leave, at least when he is leaving from or returning to his ship by a standard route from a personal shore leave, is within the course of his employment under the Jones Act.2 The United *675States Supreme Court has said as much in dicta. See Braen v Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co, 361 US 129, 131-132; 80 S Ct 247; 4 L Ed 2d 191 (1959), where the Court said that the meaning of the term "in the course of his employment” under the Jones Act was equivalent to the meaning of the term "in service of the ship” in a maintenance and cure action.3 The Court had previously held that a *676seaman returning to his ship from a personal shore leave is in the service of his ship for purposes of maintenance and cure.4
There are also a number of decisions that contradict the majority’s construction of the "course of employment” requirement, although they stop short of affirming the view here stated. Those decisions declare that a seaman may be within the course of his employment under the Jones Act although he is not, at the time he is injured, carrying out his employer’s orders, or otherwise performing a job function.5
O’Donnell v Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co, 318 US 36; 63 S Ct 488; 87 L Ed 596 (1943), cited in the opinion of the Court, does not hold that a seaman is within the course of his employment under the Jones Act only when he is following orders or performing a job function. The Court held rather that a seaman can be within the course of his employment although he is injured on land rather than navigable waters. The plaintiff in O’Donnell was injured when a weight fell on him while he was working on shore. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had denied recovery under the Jones Act because the injury did not occur on navigable waters. The United States Supreme Court held that the words "in the course of his employment” are not restricted to injuries that occur at sea. It did not hold that a seaman returning from shore leave was not in the course of his employment._

 Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railroad employees shall apply .... [46 USC 688.]

 See Nowery v Smith, 69 F Supp 755 (ED Pa, 1946), aff'd 161 F2d 732 (CA 3, 1947); Walton v Continental S S Co, 66 F Supp 836, 841 (D Md, 1946); Williamson v Western-Pacific Dredging Corp, 304 F Supp 509 (D Or, 1969), aff'd 441 F2d 65 (CA 9, 1971), cert den 404 US 851 (1971); Dixon v Grace Lines, Inc, 27 Cal App 3d 278, 286, n 5; 103 Cal Rptr 595 (1972).
Numerous other cases have so stated in dicta. See, e.g., Wheeler v West India S S Co, 103 F Supp 631 (SD NY, 1951), aff'd 205 F2d 354 (CA 2, 1953), cert den 346 US 889 (1953); Broussard v Marine Transport Lines, Inc, 369 F Supp 103 (ED Tex, 1974); Dangovich v Isthmian Lines, Inc, 218 F Supp 235 (SD NY, 1963), aff'd 327 F2d 355 (CA 2, 1964); Ugarte v United States Lines, Inc, 64 NY2d 836; 486 NYS2d 934; 476 NE2d 333 (1985); Allan v Brown & Root, Inc, 491 F Supp 398 (SD Tex, 1980); Marceau v Great Lakes Transit Corp, 146 F2d 416 (CA 2, 1945). See also Anno: Jones Act — Course of Employment, 4 L Ed 2d 1777.
Kinsman relies on Petition of Atlass, 350 F2d 592, 597 (CA 7, 1965), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the claim of two seaman who drowned while returning to the ship from a personal shore leave because they were not in the course of their employment when the accident occurred. In so holding, however, the court stressed that the two seamen were extremely *675drunk when they fell into the water and said that they were responsible for their own deaths. The court also implied that the plaintiffs would have been in the course of their employment while returning from shore leave in ordinary circumstances, and that it was the excessive drinking that constituted a departure from their employment. Even if Atlass is not distinguishable, it is an anomaly among the numerous decisions supporting the rule that a seaman on shore leave, at least when he is leaving the ship or returning to it, is within the course of his employment under the Jones Act.
The majority would distinguish Central Gulf Steamship Corp v Sambula, 405 F2d 291 (CA 5, 1968), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a seaman who was assaulted while on shore leave was within the course of his employment. In so holding, the court cited at length from Nowery v Smith, supra, for the view that a seaman on shore leave is in the course of his employment.
In attempting to discredit the authority of Sambula, the majority relies on a footnote in Sambula that might appear to contradict the rule stated in Nowery:
The preceding language from Nowery v Smith does not mean that a seaman may recover under the Jones Act for all injuries sustained while he is on shore leave; it means only that recovery cannot be denied solely on the ground that a. seaman, while on shore leave, is not “in the course of his employment.” [Sambula, supra, p 298, n 4.]
The footnote notes that merely being in the course of one’s employment is not sufficient under the Jones Act for the plaintiff to recover. The plaintiffs injury must have been caused by the defendant’s negligence. Read this way, what otherwise might be seen as an incongruous footnote becomes understandable. The footnote reminds the reader that under the Jones Act — in contrast with a maintenance and cure action — the plaintiff must establish both that he was in the course of his employment and that the shipowner was negligent.

 While the holding in Braen goes no further than to state that since the plaintiff was doing the work of his employer when injured he was clearly in the course of his employment, the Court certainly did not suggest, as the majority implies, that a seaman is not in the course of his employment if he is not performing the work of his employer. The actual holding does not address the status of a seaman who is off duty or on shore leave.

 Aguilar v Standard Oil Co, 318 US 724; 63 S Ct 930; 84 L Ed 1107 (1943). Warren v United States, 340 US 523; 71 S Ct 432; 95 L Ed 503 (1951).

 See, e.g., Holm v Cities Service Transportation Co, 60 F2d 721, 722 (CA 2, 1932); Sundberg v Washington Fish & Oyster Co, 138 F2d 801 (CA 9, 1943); McCall v Inter-Harbor Navigation Co, 154 Or 252; 59 P2d 697 (1936).