Court Opinion

ID: 9398255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 17:08:04.130006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.126189
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                  CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          MAY 30, 2023
                                                                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 100

In the Interest of P.S.

State of North Dakota,                               Petitioner and Appellee
        v.
P.S.,                                             Respondent and Appellant

                                No. 20220298

Appeal from the District Court of McHenry County, Northeast Judicial
District, the Honorable Michael P. Hurly, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Joshua E. Frey, State’s Attorney, Towner, ND, for petitioner and appellee;
submitted on brief.

Jonathon F. Yunker, Devils Lake, ND, for respondent and appellant; submitted
on brief.
                               Interest of P.S.
                                No. 20220298

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] P.S. appeals from a district court’s judgment denying his petition to be
discharged from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. P.S.
argues the court erred in finding he has serious difficulty controlling his
behavior and that by concluding he must remain in a clinical setting, the court
exceeded its authority under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 by ordering a specific
treatment program—a role expressly assigned to the executive director of the
North Dakota Department of Human Services. We affirm in part and reverse
in part, concluding the court did not clearly err in determining P.S. has serious
difficulty controlling his behavior, but did exceed its authority as established
in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 by determining a specific treatment.

                                       I

[¶2] In 2004, at the age of seventeen, P.S. was convicted of gross sexual
imposition. In 2005, he was found to be a sexually dangerous individual and
committed for treatment. P.S. has petitioned for discharge and has been denied
on multiple occasions. In the current proceeding the State’s expert psychologist
testified that P.S. has been diagnosed with several mental and sexual
disorders, and that P.S. displayed signs of serious difficulty controlling his
behavior. The psychologist testified to several incidents spanning P.S.’s
institutionalization including exhibitionism against a female staffer and a
peer, rape threats, viewing of pornography, a stalking incident during
community placement, and displaying signs of anger and refusal to complete
treatment after community placement was revoked. The psychologist also
testified that P.S. “needs to have community outings where he’s seeing people
he finds attractive” and “if he’s having those opportunities and he’s succeeding,
I think that after six months that includes those features, he’s probably going
to be ready for a post-commitment placement.” The district court issued an
order denying P.S.’s petition for discharge, concluding he was to remain in a
clinical setting, and ordered him into the custody, care, and control of the
executive director of the Department of Human Services.

                                       1
                                       II

[¶3] The standard of review for the commitment of a sexually dangerous
individual is well-established:

            This Court reviews civil commitments of sexually dangerous
      individuals under a modified clearly erroneous standard. Matter of
      Knoke, 2021 ND 240, ¶ 13, 968 N.W.2d 178 (citing In re Nelson,
      2017 ND 28, ¶ 7, 889 N.W.2d 879). We will affirm a district court’s
      decision unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or we
      are firmly convinced the decision is not supported by clear and
      convincing evidence. Id. The court must specifically state the facts
      upon which its ultimate conclusion is based. In re Rubey, 2012 ND
      133, ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d 731; see also N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Interest of Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 7, 987 N.W.2d. 340 (quotation marks
omitted). “This Court defers to a district court’s determination that an
individual has serious difficulty controlling behavior when the determination
is supported by specific findings demonstrating the difficulty.” Id. at ¶ 13.

[¶4] The State must prove three statutory elements to show an individual
remains a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). First,
the individual must have engaged in sexually predatory conduct; second, the
individual must have a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by
a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction; and third, these two combined elements must make the individual
likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which endanger
the physical or mental health and safety of others. Additionally, substantive
due process requires the individual’s disorder results in that individual having
serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 8.

[¶5] There must be a “causal connection” between a sexually dangerous
individual’s disorder and the individual’s inability to control behavior such that
it “would likely result in future sexually predatory conduct.” Sternberg, 2023
ND 40, ¶ 9 (quoting Matter of Muscha, 2021 ND 164, ¶ 5, 964 N.W.2d 507). In
describing this nexus further, this Court has noted that a district court cannot
rely solely on prognostic factors, but must support its finding with

                                        2
contemporary evidence or specific instances of conduct to demonstrate serious
difficulty controlling behavior. Id. at ¶ 10.

[¶6] Specific instances should demonstrate that an individual has “present
serious difficulty” controlling behavior. Sternberg, 2023 ND 40, ¶ 13 (quoting
In re Nelson, 2017 ND 152, ¶ 9, 896 N.W.2d 923). The proximity of those
instances to the commitment hearing assists in establishing this present
difficulty. See Nelson, at ¶ 7 (finding two instances of sexual misconduct that
occurred 23 years prior to the commitment hearing were “far too remote”); see
also Matter of Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶¶ 14, 19, 777 N.W.2d 62 (finding two
inappropriate instances with female professionals occurring within three years
of a commitment hearing were sufficient); Matter of Vantreece, 2009 ND 152,
¶¶ 17, 19, 771 N.W.2d 585 (finding instances of uncontrolled anger and
compulsive masturbation within two years of a commitment hearing were
sufficient).

[¶7] Civil commitment should not be based solely on whether an individual
has sufficiently progressed in treatment. In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 11, 876
N.W.2d 25. Inadequate participation in treatment without more “reverses the
burden from the State to the committed individual.” Id. Additionally, an
individual’s past criminal history, alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate that
individual remains sexually dangerous. In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861
N.W.2d 484.

[¶8] Here, P.S. argues the district court erred in finding he presently has
serious difficulty controlling his behavior. P.S. contends the court ignored
evidence showing he had no negative incidents since 2020, he was well enough
to be placed in a community setting for a brief time, and he received positive
diagnostic scores on an assessment used in scoring recidivism. The court
determined the statutory elements of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) were satisfied
by finding the first element was met by stipulation; the second element was
met because P.S. currently suffered from disruptive, impulse-control, and
conduct disorder, voyeuristic disorder, specific paraphilic disorder, coprophilia,
urophilia, and attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder; and the third element
was met because P.S. engaged in several, recent instances of concerning

                                        3
behavior from 2012 to 2022 showing he was likely to engage in further acts of
sexually predatory conduct.

[¶9] The district court then found that P.S. has serious difficulty controlling
his behavior noting the “most recent manifestation” of this occurred “in Minot
on April 4, 2020.” The court found that while P.S. was in community placement
in Minot, he walked past a home of a woman he found attractive at least
twenty-two times over the span of a few days, and then violated curfew by
leaving his residence at midnight, and knocked on the woman’s door with the
intent to ask her to use the bathroom or for sex. The court also discussed
exhibitionism incidents that occurred in 2012, 2016, and 2019, angry outbursts
that occurred in 2016, and deception by P.S. when he initially lied about
stalking the Minot woman and watching pornography in community
placement in 2020. The court also noted P.S. was unwilling to participate in
treatment after his community placement was terminated.

[¶10] The district court identified at least six specific instances demonstrating
P.S. had “present serious difficulty” controlling his behavior. At least three of
these instances—the exhibitionism in 2019, the stalking incident in 2020, and
hot-headed, violent behaviors associated with his refusal to participate in work
assignments and treatment assignments after 2020—were recent and occurred
within three years of P.S. petitioning for discharge. The most recent stalking
incident occurred just two years prior, and is most demonstrative of P.S.’s
behavior while actually living among others at risk for harm. These recent
incidents support a finding that the requirement of proximity and “present
serious difficulty” as illustrated in Nelson, Hanenberg, and Vantreece exists in
this case. The court also coupled P.S.’s unwillingness to participate in
treatment with contemporaneous acts that were additional to his original
criminal convictions. These findings align with the requirements outlined in
Johnson, 2015 ND 71, and Johnson, 2016 ND 29. We hold the court’s findings
of fact and conclusion of law that P.S. has serious difficulty controlling his
behavior is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not clearly
erroneous.

                                       4
                                      III

[¶11] The executive director of the Department of Human Services is
responsible for making decisions regarding the appropriate course of treatment
for a sexually dangerous individual. Section 25-03.3-13, N.D.C.C., states:

      If the respondent is found to be a sexually dangerous individual,
      the court shall commit the respondent to the care, custody, and
      control of the executive director. The executive director shall place
      the respondent in an appropriate facility or program at which
      treatment is available. The appropriate treatment facility or
      program must be the least restrictive available treatment facility
      or program necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter. The
      executive director may not be required to create a less restrictive
      treatment facility or treatment program specifically for the
      respondent or committed individual.

The delineation of responsibility between a district court and executive director
has been discussed by this Court previously. In In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶
22, 27, 711 N.W.2d 587, we reiterated that the executive director has authority
to decide the least restrictive available treatment program or facility, and that
such authority does not violate due process or double jeopardy. In Whelan v.
A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7, 793 N.W.2d 471, we clarified that a district court may
exercise limited judicial review as to whether the decision of the executive
director was the least restrictive available treatment facility or program. We
further explained that the executive director’s authority to determine an
appropriate facility or program cannot be circumvented by a district court at
an initial commitment hearing. See In re B.V., 2006 ND 22, ¶¶ 13, 17, 708
N.W.2d 877 (“We agree with the district court’s determination that N.D.C.C. §
25-03.3-13 does not allow the district court to consider or determine treatment
options, but rather places that determination with the Department of Human
Services.”). We now find that N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not allow a district
court to determine treatment options at a discharge hearing.

[¶12] Here, P.S. argues the district court clearly erred by exceeding its scope of
authority when it ordered him to remain in a clinical setting despite the
psychologist’s recommendation that he may be ready for post-commitment

                                        5
community placement within six months if he abided by certain criteria. On
this issue, the court stated:

      The Court concludes [P.S.] has serious difficulty controlling his
      behavior. While [the psychologist] did recommend community
      placement within six months if [P.S.’s] risk triggers are tested and
      he submits to a polygraph test (likely due to his deception), this
      Court disagrees with the recommendation. Until [P.S.]
      demonstrates an actual ability to control his actions and improve
      his habit replacement, the Court concludes he should remain in a
      clinical setting.

It is the executive director of the Department of Human Services, and not a
district court, who determines the appropriate facility or program at which
treatment is available for a sexually dangerous individual. This authority
remains vested in the executive director both at an initial commitment hearing
and at a discharge hearing. By determining that a clinical setting was the only
appropriate treatment option for P.S. and concluding P.S. must remain there,
the court exceeded its authority, and encroached upon the executive director’s
statutory duty to make such a determination. The court erred by ordering P.S.
to remain in a clinical setting. To the extent the court made a determination
that fell within the authority of the executive director, that portion of the
judgment is reversed.

                                      IV

[¶13] We affirm the district court’s order denying P.S.’s petition to be
discharged from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. We find
the court did not clearly err when determining P.S. has serious difficulty
controlling his behavior. We reverse the court’s requirement that P.S. remain
in a clinical setting, but affirm the court’s order committing P.S. to the care,
custody, and control of the executive director of the Department of Human
Services until the executive director determines P.S. is safe to be at large and
has received the maximum benefit of treatment.

                                       6
[¶14] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                            7