Court Opinion

ID: 9897115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:07:20.801047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:01.311001
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                               DOYLE, P. J.,
                  GOBEIL, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                  November 13, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1236. BRADLEY v. WESTROCK CP, LLC et al.

      FULLER, Senior Judge.

      In this action for negligence, design defects, and several related claims,

plaintiff Philip Bradley appeals from the grant of summary judgment to defendants

WestRock CP, LLC, Nina Butler, Carole Hamner, and Chris Broome.1 Bradley raises

several challenges to the trial court’s ruling that his current claims are barred by res

judicata based on a prior federal lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, the trial court

erred when it ruled that Bradley’s claims for negligence and design defects are barred

but properly found that his remaining claims are precluded. We therefore affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

      1
        A fifth defendant, Pulp & Paper Safety Association, Inc., was dismissed from
the action in an earlier order and therefore is not a party to this appeal.
      “We review de novo a grant or denial of summary judgment, viewing the

evidence and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant.” Henry v. Griffin Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 362

Ga. App. 459, 460 (868 SE2d 827) (2022). So viewed, the record shows that, in

December 2017, a class action complaint was filed in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia against WestRock and West Point Chips, Inc.

Jurisdiction was premised on the parties’ diversity, under 28 USC § 1332 (d) (2). The

plaintiffs asserted claims for nuisance and trespass, seeking damages for fugitive

wood dust allegedly discharged from the defendants’ paper mill and wood chipper

onto the class members’ properties, as well as an injunction prohibiting the future

migration of dust onto their properties. Bradley was a member of the plaintiff class

in that action. In September 2019, the federal district court granted the defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to the nuisance and trespass claims on the ground

that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitation, but denied summary

judgment as to the claims for injunctive relief. The court subsequently dismissed the

claims for injunctive relief, entered a final judgment approving a settlement

agreement, and dismissed the non-injunctive claims for the reasons stated in its order

granting partial summary judgment.

                                          2
      The current action began in November 2021, when Bradley sued WestRock and

three of its employees (Butler, Hamner, and Broome) (collectively, the “appellees”)

in a state court in Georgia.2 Bradley asserted claims for breach of contract, design

defects, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentations, American Bar Association rule

violations, unauthorized practice of law, and conspiracy. These claims are all

premised on the allegation that the appellees’ paper mill and wood chipper discharged

wood dust onto Bradley’s property, causing him to develop cancer.

      The appellees moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by res judicata based

on the prior federal action. The trial court converted the motion to dismiss into a

motion for summary judgment and allowed Bradley to submit evidence in opposition.

See OCGA § 9-11-12 (b). Following a hearing, the court granted the appellees’

motion. Applying Georgia law, the court concluded that the current action is barred

by res judicata. Bradley appeals from that ruling.

              Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
      material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
      The burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by
      reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the
      record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

      2
          WestRock maintains a corporate office in Georgia.

                                         3
      party’s case. If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant cannot rest
      on his pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise
      to a triable issue.

Henry, 362 Ga. App. at 460-461 (citations and punctuation omitted); see OCGA

§ 9-11-56 (c), (e).

      1. In several related enumerations of error, Bradley contends that the trial court

erred when it applied Georgia law to find that the current action is barred by res

judicata. Bradley maintains that, under Virginia law, the prior federal action, which

asserted property damage claims, is not a bar to the current action, which is premised

on personal injury claims. While we agree that the trial court should have applied

Virginia law, as explained below, the result is the same for all but two of Bradley’s

causes of action.

             [T]he preclusive effect in state court of a federal court judgment
      is determined by federal common law. If, as here, the federal decision
      was rendered under diversity jurisdiction, . . . federal common law looks
      to the law of the state where the district court sits to determine the
      preclusive effect of the case, unless such state law is incompatible with
      federal interests in the case.

Falcone Global Solutions v. Forbo Flooring, 363 Ga. App. 815, 817 (872 SE2d 792)

(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,

                                          4
298 Ga. 732, 736 (2) (783 SE2d 614) (2016). Accordingly, because the federal court

in the prior action sat in Virginia, we look to Virginia law to determine whether res

judicata applies.3 Our review is de novo. See Kellogg v. Green, 295 Va. 39, 44 (809

SE2d 631) (2018).

      Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of certain

claims that have been — or could have been — adjudicated in a prior action.4 See

Levy v. Wegmans Food Markets, 68 Va. App. 575, 580 (II) (B) (811 SE2d 849)

(2018). The elements of claim preclusion under Virginia law are: “(1) a final

judgment on the merits, (2) the same parties (or their privies) in both proceedings,

also expressed as identity of the parties, and (3) both causes of action arising out of

the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, 297

Va. 645, 654 (831 SE2d 709) (2019). The doctrine is codified in Virginia Supreme

      3
        Neither party asserts that Virginia law on res judicata is incompatible with
federal interests. See Falcone Global Solutions, 363 Ga. App. at 817.
      4
         The terms “res judicata” and “claim preclusion” are interchangeable under
Georgia law. See Hinely v. Alliance Metals, 285 Ga. App. 230, 235 (2) (645 SE2d
584) (2007). While the term “res judicata” encompasses both claim preclusion and
issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) under Virginia law, see Funny Guy, LLC v.
Lecego, LLC, 293 Va. 135, 142 (II) (A) (795 SE2d 887) (2017), only claim preclusion
is at issue in this appeal.

                                          5
Court Rule 1:6. See Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC, 293 Va. 135, 150-152 (II) (B)-

(C) (1) (795 SE2d 887) (2017). The rule provides, in relevant part:

      (a) Definition of Cause of Action. — A party whose claim for relief
      arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, is
      decided on the merits by a final judgment, is forever barred from
      prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same
      opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from
      that same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal
      theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised
      in the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the legal elements or the evidence
      upon which any claims in the prior proceeding depended, or the
      particular remedies sought. . . .

                                          ...

      (c) Exceptions. — The provisions of this Rule do not bar a party or a
      party’s insurer from prosecuting separate personal injury and property
      damage suits arising out of the same conduct, transaction or
      occurrence . . . .

      (d) Privity. — The law of privity as heretofore articulated in case law
      in the Commonwealth of Virginia is unaffected by this Rule and remains
      intact. For purposes of this Rule, party or parties include all named
      parties and those in privity.

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6.

                                          6
      “Under this rule, a final judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very

same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the

earlier suit. Thus, parties may not relitigate the same cause of action, or any part

thereof which could have been litigated in the previous action.” D’Ambrosio v. Wolf,

295 Va. 48, 54 (II) (A) (809 SE2d 625) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted);

accord Levy, 68 Va. App. at 580 (II) (B) (“Claim preclusion extends beyond the

presented claim itself to include those claims incident to or essentially connected with

the subject matter of the litigation, whether the same, as a matter of fact, were or were

not considered.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Put another way, “if the

underlying dispute produces different legal claims that can be joined in a single suit[,]

they should be joined unless a judicially-recognized exception to res judicata exists.”

D’Ambrosio, 295 Va. at 54 (II) (A) (citation and punctuation omitted). With these

principles in mind, we consider whether the elements of res judicata have been met

and whether any exception applies.

      (a) Elements of Res Judicata.

      (i) Final judgment. Bradley does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that

the federal action resulted in a valid, final judgment. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6; Lane,

297 Va. at 654.

                                           7
      (ii) Same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Before examining identity of

parties, we address whether the two actions concern the same conduct, transaction,

or occurrence, which informs, in part, our ruling on identity of parties. See Va. Sup.

Ct. R. 1:6; Lane, 297 Va. at 654. As explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia,

      [f]or purposes of res judicata, deciding what constitutes a single
      transaction or occurrence under Rule 1:6 should be a practical analysis.
      The proper approach asks whether the facts are related in time, space,
      origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
      whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations
      or business understanding or usage. No single factor is indispensable or
      determinative. The factors should instead be considered pragmatically
      with a view toward uncovering the true underlying dispute between the
      parties. Under this approach, it does not matter that the claimant is
      prepared in the second action (1) to present evidence or grounds or
      theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) to seek
      remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.

Funny Guy, LLC, 293 Va. at 154-155 (II) (C) (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).

      Under that rubric, each of Bradley’s claims in the current action arises out of

the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as those in the federal action. As

discussed above, the plaintiffs in the federal action sought, in relevant part, damages

for fugitive wood dust allegedly discharged from the defendants’ paper mill and wood

                                          8
chipper onto the class members’ properties. Bradley’s claims in the current action are

premised — either directly or indirectly — on the very same alleged misconduct by

the appellees. Thus, as was the case in Funny Guy, LLC, “[t]he origin and motivation

for the claims are perfectly obvious”: Bradley seeks redress for various harms he

claims to have suffered due to the fugitive wood dust discharged by the appellees

onto his property. 293 Va. at 155 (II) (C) (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Similarly, “[e]valuating the time and space factors” shows the same connection

between the two actions — fugitive wood dust allegedly discharged from the same

facilities over the last two-to-three decades “that was ongoing and uninterrupted.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, the theories of recovery asserted in the

prior and current actions “all fit within a single factual narrative” — the appellees’

failure to adequately abate the dust problem — “that easily forms a convenient trial

unit” and “aris[es] out of a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.”

Id. at 155-156 (II) (C) (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).

      (iii) Identity of parties. We next address whether the two actions involve the

same opposing party or parties. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6; Lane, 297 Va. at 654. As

used in Rule 1:6 (a), the term “party or parties” includes “all named parties and those

in privity.” Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6 (d); see Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 248 (II) (A) (1)

                                          9
(b) (776 SE2d 798) (2015). Under Virginia law, “[p]rivity is a mutual or successive

relationship to the same rights of property, or such an identification in interest of one

person with another as to represent the same legal rights, and when applied to a

judgment or decree refers to one whose interest has been legally represented at the

trial.” Lane, 297 Va. at 655 (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). “The

touchstone of privity for purposes of res judicata is that a party’s interest is so

identical with another that representation by one party is representation of the other’s

legal right.” Lee, 290 Va. at 248 (II) (A) (1) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      “Privity centers on the closeness of the relationship in question” and, “as used

in the context of res judicata . . . , does not embrace relationships between persons or

entities, but rather it deals with a person’s relationship to the subject matter of the

litigation.” Lane, 297 Va. at 656 (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

“Whether privity exists is determined on a case by case examination of the

relationship and interests of the parties.” Id. (citation, punctuation, and emphasis

omitted).

      Here, while Butler, Hamner, and Broome were not named as defendants in the

federal action, they are in privity with WestRock, which was a defendant in that

action. That is because Bradley’s current claims against them concern actions they

                                           10
allegedly took together with WestRock — in their capacities as WestRock personnel

— all of which arise out of the same “nucleus of operative facts” as the federal action.

Funny Guy, LLC, 293 Va. at 155 (II) (C) (2). Those actions therefore are inextricably

intertwined with both Bradley’s and the prior class members’ claims against

WestRock. See id. Thus, each party’s interest is “identical” with respect to the subject

matter of both lawsuits. Lee, 290 Va. at 248 (II) (A) (1) (b) (citation and punctuation

omitted); see State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. 209, 212, 215-216

(II) (542 SE2d 766) (2001) (concluding that a state water board and the

Environmental Protection Agency were in privity for purposes of res judicata because

they “share[d] an identity of interest” in a water discharge permit issued to the

defendant that was the subject of separate proceedings by each government entity);

superseded in part on other grounds by Rule 1:6 as recognized in Ghayyada v. Rector

& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 3:11-cv-00037, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102279,

at *11 (III) (A), n. 5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2011). And as further evidence of their

privity with WestRock, the three individual defendants are represented by the same

counsel as WestRock.

                                          11
      (b) Exceptions to Res Judicata.

      (i) Bradley appears to argue that the trial court erred by failing to apply an

exception to the doctrine of res judicata that operates when the defendants have

engaged in fraud. But none of the authority he cites addresses any such exception, and

we therefore deem this argument abandoned. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1)

(“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority

or argument may be deemed abandoned.”); Brittain v. State, 329 Ga. App. 689, 704

(4) (a) (766 SE2d 106) (2014) (“[A]n appellant must support enumerations of error

with argument and citation of authority, and mere conclusory statements are not the

type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules.”) (citation and punctuation

omitted); Dixon v. MARTA, 242 Ga. App. 262, 266 (4) (529 SE2d 398) (2000) (legal

analysis, at a minimum, requires “a discussion of the appropriate law as applied to the

relevant facts”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      (ii) Bradley also claims that res judicata does not bar a claim for fraud that he

seeks to assert arising out of the appellees’ alleged refusal to provide a scientific

report in October 2022 because the claim did not accrue until then. But he fails to

explain how the refusal to provide information may support a claim for fraud, which

instead requires a false representation. See DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente,

                                          12
294 Ga. App. 38, 50 (3) (668 SE2d 737) (2008) (the elements of fraud include “a

false representation by a defendant”) (citation and punctuation omitted). This claim

therefore also does not entitle him to relief.

      (iii) As noted above, Rule 1:6 permits parties to “prosecut[e] separate personal

injury and property damage suits arising out of the same conduct, transaction or

occurrence.” Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6 (c). Under this exception to the application of res

judicata in Virginia, claim preclusion does not apply “to the unique contexts of”

related “property and personal injury damage suits.” Funny Guy, LLC, 293 Va. at 150

(II) (B), n. 15. The exception is implicated in this case because the federal action was

limited to trespass and nuisance claims that sought damages only for property damage

and not for personal injuries.

      Here, it is axiomatic that Bradley’s breach-of-contract claims sound in contract,

not tort, and therefore do not benefit from this exception. The same is true for

Bradley’s claims for fraud, ABA violations, and unauthorized practice of law, which

target wrongs that are distinct from his claims for personal injury. Cf. Isle v. Martin,

91 Va. Cir. 149, 152-153 (A) (1) (2015) (an action seeking damages for injuries

caused by ingesting contaminated well water was not barred by a prior action that

sought non-personal-injury damages arising from the use of the same well). His

                                          13
claims for design defects and negligence, however — which allege that the design

and operation of the mill and its associated “wood yard” exposed him to

“carcinogenic dust” and caused his cancer — appear to fall squarely within the

category of “personal injury” claims that qualify for the Rule 1:6 (c) exception to the

application of res judicata.5 See id.

      While the appellees cite various decisions from jurisdictions other than

Virginia in support of their claim that Bradley may not avail himself of the Rule 1:6

(c) exception, those decisions have no bearing here, given the plain meaning of the

Virginia rule. And the appellees’ claim that the Rule 1:6 (c) exception does not apply

here because Bradley’s personal injury claims accrued before the federal action also

is misplaced, as the plain language of the rule contains no such limitation. We

therefore conclude that Bradley’s design defect and negligence claims are not barred

by res judicata.

      2. The appellees alternatively contend that we may affirm the trial court’s

ruling under the “right for any reason” rule because Bradley’s personal injury claims

      5
        Bradley’s claims for “Damages” and “Punitive Damages” do not assert
independent causes of action, but rather seek different forms of relief premised on his
other substantive claims.

                                          14
are barred by the applicable statute of limitation. On the procedural posture of this

case, that issue should be addressed by the trial court in the first instance.

             This is a court for the review and correction of errors committed
      in the trial court, and an argument that was not made below will not be
      considered on appeal. Although, as a matter of judicial economy, we
      will affirm a grant of summary judgment under the “right for any
      reason” rule, we will generally only do so when the judgment may be
      sustained upon a legal basis apparent from the record and which was
      fairly presented in the court below.

Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail, 294 Ga. App. 147, 152 (3) (668 SE2d 732) (2008)

(emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted); accord Ga.-Pacific v. Fields,

293 Ga. 499, 503-504 (2) (748 SE2d 407) (2013) (explaining that, on summary

judgment, non-movants are “not required to produce any counter evidence or

materials in affirmative support of their side of the issue until the [movants] carried

the burden placed upon them” as the parties seeking summary judgment and that a

grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if it is right for any reason, “so long as

the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair

opportunity to respond”) (citations and punctuation omitted).

      The appellees did not raise a statute of limitation defense in their motion to

dismiss (which the trial court converted into a motion for summary judgment), and

                                          15
Bradley therefore did not address the issue in his opposition brief. The appellees

raised the issue for the first time in their summary judgment reply brief. Moreover,

the trial court expressly declined to address the matter during the summary judgment

hearing. Under these circumstances, the issue was not “fairly presented . . . below,”

and the trial court should address it in the first instance on remand after all parties

have had an adequate opportunity to be heard. Bullington, 294 Ga. App. at 152 (3)

(citation and punctuation omitted); accord Ga.-Pacific, 293 Ga. at 503-504.

      3. In sum, we reverse the trial court’s rulings that Bradley’s design defect and

negligence claims are barred by res judicata, affirm the rulings that his remaining

substantive claims are precluded, and remand the case to the trial court for further

proceedings.

      Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with

direction. Doyle, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.

                                          16