Court Opinion

ID: 9840303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 21:00:28.217467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:07.534495
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-6011

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        DEONE ANTONIO MELVIN, a/k/a D,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (8:03-cr-00321-DKC-1)

        Submitted: August 31, 2023                                  Decided: September 14, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: C. Justin Brown, BROWN LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
        Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Adam K. Ake, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Deone Antonio Melvin appeals from the denial of his motion for compassionate

        release. On appeal, he asserts that the district court failed to properly consider his

        arguments that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. We affirm.

               Melvin was found guilty after two jury trials of drug conspiracy, cocaine

        distribution, and two 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance

        of a drug trafficking crime. At sentencing, Melvin’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 360

        months to life in prison for the drug charges. The court granted a downward variance to

        180 months – 15 years – on the drug charge and sentenced Melvin to the mandatory

        minimum consecutive sentence of 360 months on the firearm charges (5 years on the first

        count, 25 years for the second count). Thus, Melvin’s total sentence was 540 months – 45

        years – in prison. In January 2017, President Barack Obama commuted Melvin’s sentence

        by 15 years, reducing the total term of imprisonment from 45 years to 30 years. In 2019,

        the First Step Act changed how § 924 sentences “stack.” Today, Melvin would face a

        mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison for his two firearm convictions.

               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on an 18 U.S.C.

        § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th

        826, 831 (4th Cir. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or

        irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of

        discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”

        United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

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                 When deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a

        district court generally proceeds in three steps. See United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181,

        185-86 (4th Cir. 2021). First, the district court considers whether “extraordinary and

        compelling reasons” support a sentence reduction. Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).    Second, the court considers whether granting such a reduction would be

        “consistent with applicable policy statements issue by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. at

        185-86 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is currently no Sentencing

        Commission policy statement “applicable” to defendant-filed motions for compassionate

        release, “district courts are empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling

        reason for release that a defendant might raise.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271,

        284 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Third, if the court determines that the defendant has

        demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons, it must also consider any applicable

        sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether a sentence reduction is

        warranted. United States v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2023).

                 The defendant seeking compassionate release bears the burden of showing that

        extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction. United States v.

        Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2021). A motion for compassionate release “precludes

        a court from simply taking facts that existed at sentencing and repackaging them as

        ‘extraordinary and compelling.’ The problem with such an approach is that it renders the

        general rule of finality and the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons requirement

        superfluous, void or insignificant.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 569 (6th Cir.

        2012).

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               A district court need not address every argument raised by a defendant in a

        compassionate-release motion. Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 170 (noting that “just how much of an

        explanation is required depends upon the narrow circumstances of the particular case”).

        Nevertheless, the court must provide an explanation sufficient “to allow for meaningful

        appellate review” in light of the particular circumstances of the case. High, 997 F.3d at

        190 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he touchstone in assessing the sufficiency of

        the district court’s explanation must be whether the district court set forth enough to satisfy

        [this] court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

        exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority[.]” United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th

        189, 199 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               On appeal, Melvin first argues that the district court improperly concluded that

        President Obama’s commutation of Melvin’s sentence did not entirely eliminate the effect

        of his stacked sentences. However, the district court did not so rule; instead, the court

        found that the original downward variance, together with the commutation, sufficiently

        addressed any unfairness arising from the stacking. Further, while the court did not

        explicitly address each of Melvin’s assertions regarding the sentence he would face today

        for the same charges, we find that the court’s analysis was sufficient.

               Melvin’s arguments that he would be sentenced to a lower sentence were he to be

        sentenced today rely on speculation regarding charging practices and average sentences,

        but such speculation involves numerous factors, assumptions, and considerations,

        rendering comparisons and predictions difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, Melvin does

        not argue that, if the court had properly considered his arguments, the denial of his motion

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        would be an abuse of discretion; instead, he contends that the court did not adequately

        explain its reasoning. However, we find that the district court sufficiently explained its

        conclusions that any disparity between Melvin’s current sentence and the one to which he

        would be sentenced today did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for

        release. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1113, 1116 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that

        “explicit and particular” explanation of the district court's “factual reasoning” provides an

        adequate basis for “meaningful appellate review”).

               Melvin also asserts that the district court erred in rejecting his argument that his

        sentence was too harsh when compared to his codefendants. Melvin contends that, while

        his criminal history, role in the offense, and late acceptance of responsibility can explain

        some disparity, the disparities here were too extreme. However, the factors Melvin points

        to can support a large disparity, and the sentencing court’s finding that Melvin was the

        driving force behind the conspiracy undermines Melvin’s contention that any disparity was

        compelling or extraordinary. See United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2005)

        (“A district court is not required to consider the sentences of codefendants, and it is well

        settled that codefendants and even coconspirators may be sentenced differently for the

        same offense[.]” (citations omitted)). Moreover, many of the cited disparities existed at

        the time of sentencing, thus further undermining a finding of extraordinary and compelling

        circumstances, as the issue could have been raised earlier.

               Turning to his rehabilitation, as Melvin observes, the district court only briefly

        addressed his post-sentencing mitigation evidence when considering whether Melvin had

        shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. While rehabilitation alone

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        cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, McCoy,

        981 F.3d at 286 n.9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)), successful rehabilitation efforts can be

        considered as “one among other factors.” Id. As such, even if the court provided a more

        robust analysis of Melvin’s rehabilitation and determined that it favored release, Melvin

        would have to provide other circumstances and factors that would constitute, in

        aggregation, extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.

               As discussed above, the district court provided appropriate reasoning in rejecting

        Melvin’s claims. In so doing, the court noted Melvin’s original downward variance and

        the commutation of his sentence.        Notably, the court did not simply find Melvin’s

        sentencing claims to fall short of an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

        Instead, the court found Melvin’s claims of unfairness regarding his sentence generally

        without merit and found that, even in combination with his rehabilitation, his arguments

        did not show an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Accordingly, given that

        the district court had rejected the remainder of Melvin’s arguments, there was no abuse of

        discretion in the analysis of Melvin’s rehabilitation.

               Because the district court adequately considered Melvin’s arguments and explained

        its rejection of them, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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