Court Opinion

ID: 9737989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:39:25.780868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.020589
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The petitioner-schoolteacher here came to court with a petition for change of name to assert her right to teach in the Milwaukee public schools under her maiden name, which was also her professional name as an artist. The sole reason she gave for such change of name being sought was the rule of the Milwaukee school board requiring that a married woman schoolteacher be listed by her married name on all school records. Since she did not comply with that rule, the petitioner had been denied inclusion in a family protection insurance program avail*155able to married women teachers in the Milwaukee school system.
This very rule from the same school board came before this court for review over fifty years ago.1 Then the Milwaukee school board had dismissed, for violation of the rule, a teacher who had insisted upon her right to teach under her maiden name. This court set aside such dismissal, and ordered the teacher reinstated, maiden name and all. As to the application of the rule to the teacher dismissed, this court found the record “. . . barren of anything indicating any harm or damage actually done in the administration of the school affairs, to school discipline, or control . ...” 2 As to the petitioner here, the rule as clearly did not warrant the exclusion of the petitioner from the insurance program for married school teachers, solely because she was listed under her maiden name. On its face, the rule has no relatedness to the proper administration of school affairs or classroom teaching, and is a rule beyond the authority of the school board to enact. Direct challenge to the rule would be by writ. At oral argument it was indicated that the rule has since been repealed on advice of the city attorney. Whether or not this has occurred, the rule being invalid, the right the petitioner sought to assert by change-of-name petition — to teach under her maiden name — was hers, without a change of name being required.
The rule aside, the right of a married woman schoolteacher to use her maiden name was assured in a far earlier holding of this court. Before the turn of the century, a married woman used her maiden name in signing a note and real estate mortgage. The holder of the real estate, who had acquired it without actual knowledge of the mortgagor, brought the consequences of *156such maiden name signature to this court for decision.3 He claimed that the mortgage was void “. . . because the name of Barbara M. Rhyner (which it is claimed is a fictitious name) is inserted therein as mortgagee. ...” 4 This court there held that it was no defense to the foreclosure action that the married woman had executed the note and mortgage, using her maiden name or baptismal name. This court then and there held:
“It is not true that a fictitious payee and mortgagee is named in the note and mortgage. Barbara M. Rhyner is not a fictitious person, but a person in esse. True, since her marriage she is entitled to the name of her husband, Zentner, but we are aware of no law that will invalidate obligations and conveyances executed' by and to her in her baptismal name, if she choose to give or take them in that form. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 5
The italicized portions of the Lane decision, in this writer’s opinion, make clear that three conclusions as to the rights of married women in this state cannot be escaped or avoided:
(1) That a married woman in this state, as “a person in esse,” does not lose her right to use her maiden name.
(2) That a married woman in this state “is entitled to the name of her husband,” the legal name of the family unit.
(3) That a married woman in this state has the option to use either her married name or her maiden name, “if she choose to give or take them in that form.”
The writer would follow and apply here the Lane holdings, quoted above, finding them to be wine that has mellowed, not soured, over the passing years. While some may disagree with the public policy and rights then established, with the decision standing without judicial or legislative modification since 1889, the writer *157would not abandon it now. The majority does, finding that “. . . the conditions that led to the practice of having women adopt their husbands’ surnames no longer have their foundation in existing law. . . For the options granted to married women in Lane, the majority substitutes a new rule, and that rule is stated in the majority opinion to be:
“. . .. a change of name results from marriage only if, in accordance with common law principles, the surname of a married woman’s husband is habitually used by her. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The new “habitual user” test replaces the options granted to married women under Lome. For now the majority opinion makes clear that a married woman in this state acquires her husband’s surname only if, as and when it is “. . . the result of usage and her holding out to the world that the surname is the same as the husband’s.” If she doesn’t use it, she doesn’t get it. If she blurs the situation by using both her maiden name and her married name, she will be hard put to qualify as an “habitual user” under the new test.
What does this new “habitual user” test do to the options granted to married women in this state by the Lane decision?
(1) It ends the right of a married woman in this state to me either her married name, or her maiden name, or both. For the “either-or” of Lane, it substitutes “one-or-the-other.” Since the petitioner here for a change of name never did “. . . in fact adopt the surname Kruzel [her husband’s name] by usage, . . her petition, the majority holds, was not really for change of name but “. . . a request for judicial recognition that she had been correct in using her maiden surname in the past.” The majority presumably excepts and excuses her signature on the change-of-name petition, stating her name, the one she wanted changed, to be Kathleen Rose Kruzel. She could have one name or the other, but not both. But *158in the Lane Case the lady involved signed her maiden name, Barbara M. Rhyner, to the mortgage document, but, at other times, on other occasions, used her married name, Mrs. Barbara Zentner. This court held that Barbara could use either name. In fact, she had used both names. The majority holds that if this petitioner is Kathleen Rose Harney in the art class at school, she cannot be Kathleen Rose Kruzel at home with her husband. Thus the right given to married women under Lane is narrowed by the majority’s new rule now.
(2) It finds unnecessary the existence of a legal name for the family unit, available to husband and wife, and prescribed for their children. Under the Lane holding the married woman’s use of her maiden name did not bar or affect her right to also use her married name, the court there holding that she could use her maiden name and that, nonetheless, “since her marriage she is entitled to the name of her husband, Zentner.” However, now, under the majority’s rule, if the wife is an “habitual user” of her maiden name, she does' not acquire her husband’s name. She is not entitled to use the name of her husband and their children. Folks may differ on what that family name ought be. By law and custom it certainly has been the surname of the husband.6 But the *159legislature could as well make it the maiden name of the wife, or some combination of the names of the husband and the wife. That there be such single name available to spouses, and identifying their children, is inherent in the concept of marriage as a partnership.7 The roles of the partners may vary, but the identity of the partnership as a viable and functioning unit or entity is not served by its having no name. That idea should appeal only to those who see our society as a numerical aggregate of atomized particles rather than as a plurality of groupings, the family the most basic and significant among them.8
In 1889, the year of the Lane decision, the Wisconsin legislature recognized the existence of a family name, created by the fact of marriage, in empowering courts in divorce judgments “. . . to change the name which the wife acquired by marriage to that by which she was known and called prior to entering into the contract of marriage.” (Emphasis supplied.) 9 That statute, renumbered, now provides that the court in such divorce judgment “. . . may allow the wife to resume her maiden name or the name of a former deceased husband, or the name of a husband of a former marriage of which there are children in her custody, unless there are children of the current marriage as to whom the parental rights of the wife have not been terminated.” (Emphasis supplied.) 10 The legislature thus recognizes the ex-*160istenee of a single family name, acquired by marriage. In fact the legislature continues the existence of such family name of a husband, wife and their children beyond the life of the marriage, where minor children are involved and affected. Other statutes clearly recognize the existence of a single legal name for the family unit as such. For example, registered electors are, by statute, required to transfer their registration “Whenever an elector’s name is legally changed, including by marriage or divorce . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 11 If this legislative support for a common family name for husband, wife and children is to be ended, it is the legislature that should do the ending.12
(3) It eliminates the married women’s prerogative to change her mind. Under the Lane option a married woman in this state could, at her option, use either her maiden name or her married name. The right to use what the court then called her baptismal name was hers to exercise whenever “she choose to give or take in that form.” Under the majority’s “habitual user” test, it is only through usage that a married woman secures the right to use the family name, that of her husband. If there is “habitual use” of her married name, and only *161if there is, has she “. . . effected a common law change in her name.” No such “habitual use,” and her name remains her maiden name. There is an element of choice remaining but only as to whether the family name is to be acquired or the maiden name retained. Circumstances may change, but the choice, once made, appears final. If the bride, after the wedding, elects to retain her maiden name by not getting into the habit of using her husband’s surname, she has made her decision. If, after the babies arrive, she would like to go to the PTA meeting as Mrs. So-and-So, that right has long ago been abandoned by her under the new test. For the free and continuing “either-or” alternatives of Lane, there has been substituted a “one-or-the-other” election, apparently irrevocable once exercised. Who gains by that?
The petitioner-schoolteacher here came to court seeking a change of name in order that she might teach her classes under her maiden name. The writer would affirm the trial court here and hold that the right she sought to secure was hers before she came to court. The majority vacates and remands, with directions to the trial court to enter an order that the petitioner never acquired her married name because she never was an “habitual user” of it. When she leaves the courtroom with that order she will have won only what was her right to do before she came to court. In the winning she will have lost for herself and others entitlement to the family name, the right to use either her maiden name or her married name or both, and the right to ever change her mind. The thought occurs that she might have been better off if she had never gone to that courthouse at all.
The writer is authorized to state that Mr. Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss and Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley join in this dissent.

 State ex rel. Thompson v. School Directors (1923), 179 Wis. 284, 191 N. W. 746.

 Id. at page 289.

 Lane v. Duchac (1889), 73 Wis. 646, 41 N. W. 962.

 Id. at page 663.

 Id. at page 654.

 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce & Separation, ch. 51, vol. 14, p. 617, sec. 1622, stating: “Name — The rule of law and custom is familiar, that marriage confers on the woman the husband’s surname. ... In some of our States, the statutes authorize the divorcing court to permit the woman to resume her maiden name.” See also: M. Spencer, A Woman’s Right to Her Name, 21 UCLA L. Rev. (1973), 665, the author stating: “According to the rule in the majority of common law jurisdictions, a woman automatically loses her maiden name upon marriage and, in its place, takes her husband’s surname as her legal name. . . .” See also: B. Brown, T. Emerson, G. Falk and A. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L. J. (1971), 871; M. Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 Hastings L. J. (1971), 233. See also: 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Name, p. 281, sec. 9.

 See: Lacey v. Lacey (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 378, 382, 173 N. W. 2d 142.

 See: Sec. 245.001 (2), Stats., providing: “. . . It is the intent of chs. 246 to 248 to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always. . . .”

 Sec. 2376a, Stats. 1889, predecessor of sec. 247.20, Stats.

 Sec. 247.20, Stats.

 As to such requirement of voter registration based on the family or married name, see: see. 6.40 (1) (c), Stats. See also: See. 296.36, Stats. 1971, the change-of-name statute here involved, providing: “. . . This prohibition against a change of name by a person engaged in the practice of any profession does not apply ... to a change of name resulting from marriage . . . .” See also: statutes requiring professionals under the surname under which they were originally licensed or registered but providing that such requirement does not apply “to a change of name resulting from marriage or divorce.” Sees. 266.30 (4) — attorneys; 443.01 (8) — architects; 447.06 (7) — dentists; 447.08 (7) — dental hygienists; 446.02 (6) — chiropractors; 448.02 (4) — medical doctors.

 Note: The legislature has rejected a proposal to amend sec. 247.20, Stats., that would have permitted a married woman to keep her maiden name as her legal surname. (Assembly Amendment No. 10 to 1973 Assembly Bill 23, striking sec. 144 of the bill, adopted on October 4, 1973. Journal of the Assembly, page 2661.)