Court Opinion

ID: 9703658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:03:41.227139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:12.589125
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority opinion that the rejection of the psychiatrist’s testimony was not reversible error. Additionally, I would hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. However, I dissent in the majority holding that it was error not to instruct the jury on a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. The majority, apparently, has chosen to follow the Ahlberg “miscarriage of justice” standard. (People v. Ahlberg (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 301 N.E.2d 608.) Carr, of course, simply followed the analysis oí Ahlberg (People v. Carr (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 512, 414 N.E.2d 1108, cert. denied (1981), 454 U.S. 848, 70 L. Ed. 2d 136, 102 S. Ct. 167), both of which were rejected by Harris (People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 463 N.E.2d 1030) as indicative of the adoption of a more liberal interpretation of what constitutes serious provocation in Illinois. “Serious provocation” is a legal standard. It is defined in People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331, 335, as including substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender’s spouse. I believe my disagreement with the majority centers upon whether the victim’s provocation obtains legal recognition under the latter “adultery” standard. Certainly, I do not disagree that, quantitatively, there is “some evidence” contained in defendant’s testimony concerning what the victim allegedly told him which many would consider provocative, but I disagree that the words attributed to the victim meet the “adultery” standard so as to be legally recognized as “serious provocation” as defined by our supreme court. It is my view that “words alone [even those that carry messages of adultery] are insufficient evidence of provocation.” People v. Arnold (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 309 N.E.2d 89, 92. I believe a distinction can be drawn between Ahlberg and Carr and the case at bar, as those cases were appeals from convictions for voluntary manslaughter which were affirmed. Here the question is whether it was error as a matter of law to refuse to give the jury the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. In Ahlberg the court applied a “miscarriage of justice” standard, and Carr simply followed Ahlberg. The Ahlberg court recognized the general rule while declining to apply it to the defendant, who dragged his wife from their home, beat, kicked, and stomped her, causing injuries from which she later died. The Ahlberg court said: “To follow unequivocally the rule that ‘mere words are insufficient to cause the provocation necessary to support a finding of guilt of voluntary manslaughter^] would be in keeping with precedent and an established rule) however, it would be a direct refutation of logic and a miscarriage of justice.” (Emphasis added.) 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1041, 301 N.E.2d 608. I agree with the Harris court that “these cases do not support the proposition that Illinois has adopted the more liberal approach concerning verbal communication of the fact of adultery as provocation.” People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 905, 493 N.E.2d 1030; see People v. Wax (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 163, 220 N.E.2d 600. It is my view that there are both qualitative and quantitative dimensions to the voluntary-manslaughter analysis. The qualitative analysis asks whether the nature of the victim’s conduct is legally recognized in Illinois as provocative. Our supreme court has concluded that a victim’s conduct which is legally recognized as provocative includes substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender’s spouse. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 9 — 2, Committee Comments, at 393 (Smith-Hurd 1979); People v. Fausz (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 535, 539, 449 N.E.2d 78; People v. Castiglione (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 459, 501 N.E.2d 923. In sum, I believe that Illinois case law teaches us that, with the exception of Ahlberg and Carr, if, quantitatively, there is some evidence satisfying the qualitative legal standard of provocation, then the instruction on voluntary manslaughter must be given. But, if the “some evidence,” from a quantitative analysis, is evidence of conduct that is not recognized in the vast majority of Hlinois cases as provocative, then the instruction should not be given. I conclude that the evidence here did not attain the qualitative threshold so as to authorize or mandate the giving of the voluntary manslaughter instruction. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.