Court Opinion

ID: 9764226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:15:28.075682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.932948
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the Court’s opinion and judgment. However, I write today solely to refute the petitioner’s argument that “Christianity” is not a religion and to respond to the dissent. The dissent ignores the facts to remake this case into a challenge of employment discrimination for all positions within the Presbyterian Children’s Home and Service Agency (“the Agency”). The dissent even interjects statements regarding race and sex discrimination, which have no application to this case. Additionally, without identifying a legal standard that is any different from the legal standard utilized by the lower courts, the dissent ignores the constitutional limits of our authority, disregards the extensive findings of fact made by the trial court, reweighs the evidence, and astonishingly concludes that this church-affiliated agency whose express purpose is to provide a variety of Christ-centered child care services is a secular agency.1
Facts
The Agency was chartered in 1904. The articles of incorporation state that its mission is to provide Christ-centered child care services which minister to the spiritual, physical, intellectual, emotional, and social needs of dependent, neglected, and disturbed children and their families. At the time Georgette Speer filed this suit, the Agency operated children’s homes in Itasca and San Antonio, a service agency in Dallas that offered adoptive and foster care services, and a service agency near Pharr that offered family life education services.
In April 1988, Ms. Speer applied for the position of senior adoption worker with the Agency’s Dallas office. She did not get the job because the Agency had a policy of hiring only Christians.2 Ms. Speer and the Texas Human Rights Commission filed suit against the Agency. The Agency asserted several affirmative defenses to this action, one of which was that it was a religious corporation exempt from the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987).
After a bench trial, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Facts

4. The Agency3 is a Texas non-profit corporation whose express purpose, as stated in its By-Laws, is to provide a variety of Christ-centered child care services which minister to the spiritual, physical, intellectual, emotional and social needs of dependent, neglected and disturbed children and youth, together *231with their families. These services shall be characterized by professional competence, as well as Christian concern, and reflect the flexibility and adaptability necessary to meet the needs of families in a rapidly changing world.
5. The Agency’s purpose is further reflected in a formal covenant between the Agency and the Synod of the Sun, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (hereinafter “Synod”), and its Restated Articles of Incorporation which state that the Agency is organized and shall be operated exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Synod is a regional governing body of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. which encompasses, serves and represents presbyteries and local Presbyterian churches in the geographical region of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.
6. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has issued numerous rulings affirming the Agency’s exempt non-profit, charitable, religious status, including a September 9, 1959, ruling that the Agency is exempt from federal income taxes because it is a religious and educational organization as described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; a November 30, 1987 letter ruling that the Agency is organized and operates exclusively to carry out the purposes of the Synod within the meaning of Section 509(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; and a March 19, 1987, National Office Ruling that the Agency is excused from filing annual Form 990 Information Returns because it is an “internally supported, church affiliated” organization within the meaning of Revenue Procedure 86-23, 1986-1 C.B. 564.
7. In furtherance of its expressed purpose, the Agency operates children’s homes in Itasca and San Antonio, Texas; a service agency in Dallas, Texas which offers adoptive and foster care service; and a service agency near Pharr, Texas which offers family life education services. The Agency has not wavered from its religious purpose since it was organized in 1904 (emphasis added). The Agency’s commitment to providing Christ-centered child care sets it apart from other secular agencies that provide similar services.
8. In 1989, the Agency’s total receipts amounted to $2,076,732. Money from governmental sources comprised 5.64% of that total amount.
9. The majority of the Agency’s funds are received from individual donors and from Presbyterian churches.
10. The children that the Agency serves in its various operations come from many sources, including private referrals and from the Department of Human Services.
11. All applicants for the position of Senior Adoption Worker complete an application for employment that requests information on religious background. The Agency does not hire persons for the position of Senior Adoption Worker who do not adhere to the Christian religion. Further, the Agency’s personnel policies include a statement of Christian commitment that the Agency requires of its employees, and each employee signs an acknowledgement of this information and has an opportunity to discuss the policies with his or her supervisor.
12. The Agency depends upon its adoption and foster workers to carry out its avowed charitable and religious purposes. According to the Agency, the primary link between the Agency and prospective adoptive parents, Senior Adoption Workers must be professed Christians, who possess a Christian commitment and concern for troubled youths and their families, in order to adequately fulfill the Agency’s purpose and goals. Senior Adoption Workers screen and evaluate prospective families to ensure their suitability to become adoptive families. One absolute criteria for suitability used by the Agency is that both husband and wife be church-oriented and active in the same Christian church. Although persons who are not Christians could assess a prospective foster or adoptive family’s appropriateness from a secular *232standpoint, they could not, according to the Agency, adequately evaluate the family’s Christian commitment. Senior Adoption Workers perform work connected with the religious activities of the Agency.
13. Prospective adoptive and foster parents must' sign an Agency Statement of Faith, which sets out the Agency’s mission statement and testifies to the prospective parents’ Christian faith. The staff member working with the family must also sign the Statement of Faith. Based upon the language set forth in the Statement, it is evident that only those persons who adhere to the Christian religion can truthfully sign the Statement of Faith.
14. Speer testified that she does not know what the Christian religion is and does not believe Christianity is a religion.
15. Speer also stated that she does not understand the concept of Christ-centered child care or the notion of distinctively Christian relationships.
16. Speer further testified that she does not believe in the statements contained in the Statement of Faith that the Agency requires all prospective parents to sign along with the Adoption Worker who is working with them.

Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 1.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp.1990).
2. The TCHRA specifically allows re-
ligious corporations to “limit employment ... to members of the same religion.” Id. Section 5.07(a)(2). The TCHRA further defines religion as “all aspects of religious observance and practice as well as belief_” Id. Section 2.01(14).
3. Defendant Agency is an “employer” within the meaning of the TCHRA. Id. Section 2.01(7).
4. Texas courts have had little opportunity to interpret the provisions of the TCHRA; thus, it is appropriate to seek guidance from cases decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F.Supp. 1328, 1345 (S.D.Tex.1987). Indeed the Texas Legislature stated that one of the general purposes of the TCHRA is “to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII_” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 1.02(1).
5.When determining whether an entity is a religious organization, both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the courts consider the character of the corporation, whether the corporation was created to serve a religious purpose, and whether its purpose has remained the same. EEOC v. Townley Eng’g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618-619 (9th Cir.1988); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972); EEOC Decision 75-192, CCH EEOC Dec. Section 6558 (Feb. 21, 1975). Federal courts have also recognized that religious activities of a religious organization do not lose this special status merely because the activity holds some interest for persons not members of the faith, or occupies a position of respect in the secular world at large. Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.Supp. 974, 977-78 (D.Mass.1983).
The Agency’s evidence established that it was organized and is exclusively operated for religious, charitable, and educational purposes; that this purpose has not changed over the years and that it receives the overwhelming majority of its funding from Presbyterian churches and individual church members. Further, the IRS has repeatedly recognized the Agency’s status as a religious charitable organization. Thus, the Agency is a “religious corporation” within the meaning of the TCHRA. Accordingly, the Agency did not unlawfully discriminate against Speer, because the TCHRA does not apply to the Agency in its employment of Senior Adoption Workers. TCHRA, Sections 5.06(1), 5.07(a)(2).
*233The dissent cannot ignore the findings of fact made by the trial court. We must give findings of fact by the trial court great deference. Under our rules of procedure, an appellate court cannot disregard findings of fact — the appellate court can only deviate from such findings if there is no evidence to support the findings.4 The dissent, however, does not even purport to engage in any type of “no evidence” analysis. Any attempt to state that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard is a mere pretext enabling the dissenting justice to improperly substitute his views of the evidence for that of the lower courts.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals looked to federal case law for guidance and concluded that the Agency’s “primary purpose and character are religious in nature.” 824 S.W.2d 589, 596. They held that as a matter of law, the Agency did not illegally discriminate against Ms. Speer. We accord the lower courts’ analysis and application of the appropriate law less deference than their pronouncements as to the facts. An erroneous conclusion of law by the lower courts is not binding on this Court. However, the “law” relied on the lower courts to conclude that the agency in question was a religious corporation is the same body of federal case law relied on by the dissent. The dissent disagrees with the lower courts’ conclusion that the Agency did not unlawfully discriminate against Ms. Speer but offers little in the way of explanation or analysis.
Question of Law or Question of Fact?
Is the status of an agency, whether it is religious or secular, a question of fact or a question of law? The dissent treats this as an issue of law. I believe that in the case before us, it is a question of fact. If the underlying facts are disputed, the question is usually a fact issue. When we addressed whether a church camp was a “place of religious worship,” and thus exempt from ad valorem taxation, we concluded, “What constitutes an actual place of religious worship as those words are used in the Constitution and statutes is a fact issue.” Davies v. Meyer, 541 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex.1976). See also Kerrville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southwest Tex. Encampment Ass’n, 673 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Determining whether an entity is a “religious corporation” is an inquiry that closely mirrors that for determining whether a property is a place of religious worship. Unless the facts conclusively establish the status of the entity in question, the question is one of “fact.” Because the trial court here acted in its capacity as factfinder in finding that the Agency is a religious corporation, this Court can only look to see whether there is some evidence to support this finding.
The lower courts did not make their decision in a vacuum. Based on the record before it, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the Agency is a religious corporation. They framed their answer to the inquiry of whether the Agency was a secular or a legal corporation as a legal conclusion. Whether this is a pure question of “fact” or of “law” or whether it is a mixed question of law and fact, under the facts of this case, the answer is the same. Either as a question of law or fact, balancing the eight relevant factors described in this opinion, giving due deference to the religious aspects of the organization, the evidence is overwhelming that the Agency is a religious corporation. Without any examination or inquiry, the dissent implies that as a matter of law, this Christ-centered Presbyterian Agency is a secular agency.
ANALYSIS
This is the first case to reach our court inquiring about the scope of the religious *234corporation exemption found in section 5.06(1) of the Act, which provides an exception for “the employment of an individual of a particular religion by a religious corporation, association, or society to perform work connected with the performance of religious activities by the corporation, association, or society.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 5.06(1) (Vernon 1987). The Agency had to meet three requirements to utilize the section 5.06(1) exemption. First, the Agency had to establish that it was a religious corporation. Second, the Agency had to demonstrate that a senior adoption worker was responsible for work connected with the performance of its religious activities. Finally, the Agency had to show that it denied employment to an individual of a particular religion. I will examine each of the requirements individually.5
The Status of the Agency as a Religious Corporation
The Agency first must establish its status as a religious corporation to be entitled to the section 5.06(1) exemption. Because of the similarity between section 5.06(1) and the federal exemption to Title VII,6 federal case law provides guidance in construing the meaning of the term “religious corporation.”7
Most federal courts use a balancing test to determine whether an entity is a religious corporation. “[E]ach case must turn on its own facts. All significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.” EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1527, 103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989) (emphasis added); see also EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch/Bishop Estate, 780 F.Supp. 1317, 1324 (D.Haw.1991) (“the court is required to use a balancing test to determine whether [the entity] is exempt”).
In making this determination, courts should give deference to the religious aspects of the organization. The United States Supreme Court clearly articulated the policy behind this deference in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. *2352862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987), where the Court upheld the firing of two non-Mormon employees from a gym that was open to the public but owned by the Church of Latter Day Saints. The Court noted that the exemption to Title VII has the “legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” Id. at 339, 107 S.Ct. at 2870. Furthermore, “the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two [church and state] and avoids ... intrusive inquiry into religious belief.” Id. The Court also determined that an inquiry into the religious nature of an organization should be avoided because “it is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.” Id. at 336, 107 S.Ct. at 2868. The legislative history of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act also evidences an intent to give due deference to the religious aspects of an organization. See House Study Group Daily Floor Report, Tex.H.B. 14, 68th Leg., 1st C.S. (June 25,1983) (“The bill would not apply to religious employ-ment_”); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5221k § 1.02(1) (Vernon Supp.1992-93) (purpose of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act is to provide for execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Balancing all significant religious and secular characteristics of the Agency, and giving due deference to the religious aspects of the organization, the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that the Agency is a religious corporation. In making this determination the court of appeals examined eight relevant factors that have been identified by various federal courts. The underlying inquiry is a balancing test, which examines whether the primary purpose and character of the entity are religious while maintaining the proper deference for the religious aspects of the entity.
The eight factors distilled by the court of appeals from several federal decisions are helpful in making this determination, but they are not necessarily dispositive or exclusive. Thus, an entity need not meet all these factors to be considered a religious corporation; instead, the entity must, on the balance, have a primary purpose and character that is religious.
The eight factors are as follows:
1) whether the entity operates for profit or as a nonprofit organization, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619;
2) whether an administrative agency has determined the entity’s status, Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.Supp. 974, 978 (D.Mass.1983);
3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619; Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977;
4) whether the entity represents itself to the church, the public, and the government as a secular or sectarian body, Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home, 547 F.Supp. 286, 289-290 (E.D.Va.1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.1983);
5) whether the church is intimately involved in the management, day-to-day operations, and the financial affairs of the entity, Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977;
6) whether the church supports or is affiliated with the entity, Townley, 859 F.2d at 619; Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 977;
7) whether the entity adheres to or deviates from an original religious purpose, Fike, 547 F.Supp. at 290; and
8) whether the entity conducts religious activities, services, or instruction, Fike, 547 F.Supp. at 289-90.
I will briefly discuss each of these factors in turn as they relate to the lower courts’ conclusion that the Agency is a religious corporation.
Profit v. Nonprofit
It is undisputed that the Agency operates as a non-profit organization.
Agency Determinations
The Internal Revenue Service has issued numerous rulings affirming the Agency’s exempt non-profit, charitable, and religious *236status, including a September 9, 1959 ruling that the Agency is exempt from federal income taxes because it is a religious and educational organization as described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”); a November 30, 1987 letter ruling that the Agency is organized and operates exclusively to carry out the purposes of the Synod of the Sun within the meaning of section 509(a)(3) of the I.R.C.; and a March 19, 1987 National Office ruling that the Agency is excused from filing annual Form 990 Information Returns because it is an “internally supported, church affiliated” organization within the meaning of Revenue Procedure 86-23, 1986-1 C.B. 564.
Statement of a Religious Purpose
The Agency’s articles of incorporation, as well as other documents, state that its purpose is to provide a variety of Christ-centered child care services characterized by professional competence and Christian concern. While such statements might be considered self-serving, the trial court, as previously noted, found that the Agency has not deviated from the purpose embodied in its articles of incorporation and this finding was not challenged on appeal.
Representations of its Nature
An organization must represent itself to its members, the public, and the state as a sectarian organization to avail itself of the status of religious corporation. That the Agency represents itself to all aspects of society as a religious organization is evidenced, if nothing else, by its name. Additionally, as the facts of this case demonstrate, the Agency makes clear to applicants that because of its religious mission it only hires Christian senior adoption workers.
The dissent argues that a problem arises here, though, because the Agency signed a contract with the Texas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) which provides that the Agency would not discriminate on the basis of religion in its hiring practices. However, as the court of appeals correctly pointed out,
The Agency was not inconsistent in its representations regarding its religious . nature. No direct evidence of any attempt by the Agency to hide its religious nature from DHS was before the court. DHS was aware of the Agency’s policy regarding employment.
824 S.W.2d at 594.
In signing the contract, the Agency merely agreed that it would not engage in any illegal discrimination, that is, in discrimination that was not exempt by the legislature. Furthermore, the parties presented no evidence that the Agency attempted to conceal its religious nature from DHS, nor that DHS was unaware of the Agency’s affiliation with the church. The name of the organization itself refutes any contrary conclusion.
Involvement of Church in Day-to-Day Operations
Although the Synod of the Sun does not exercise day-to-day control over the operations of the Agency, the Synod possesses the power to exercise such control if it wishes to do so. The Agency is a corporation affiliated with the regional governing body of the Presbyterian Church. The Restated Articles of Incorporation of the Agency provide that the Synod of the Sun shall determine the manner of election, term of office, number, and qualifications of the Board of Trustees, as well as the method and cause for removal of such trustees. The Synod of the Sun possesses the power to periodically evaluate the operations of the Agency and receives an annual report relating to the activities of the Agency. Upon dissolution of the Agency, all of its assets will be distributed to the Synod of the Sun. The Synod of the Sun possesses the power to periodically evaluate the operations of the Agency and receives an annual report relating to the activities of the Agency. Thus, the Synod is somewhat involved in the management of the Agency.
Church Affiliation
The Presbyterian Church both supports and affiliates itself with the Agency. The *237Agency uses the name of the Presbyterian Church. Furthermore, the Agency must demonstrate to the Synod of the Sun that it succeeds in its mission to provide Christ-centered child care in order to continue being classified as a Presbyterian organization. The Presbyterian approval implies the church’s recognition of the Agency as carrying out a primarily religious activity.
On the financial side of the ledger, it is undisputed that the Synod provides funding for the Agency. Additionally, the Agency is heavily funded by members of the Presbyterian Church. Just as a church receives the majority of its funding from individuals because they believe its religious underpinnings, so does the Agency receive the majority of its funds from individuals and churches supporting its religious mission.
No Deviation from Religious Purpose
To be a religious corporation, an entity must actually act to further its religious purpose. In Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 116 Wash.2d 659, 807 P.2d 880, 838 (1991), the Washington Supreme Court held that a nursing home owned by CRISTA was a religious corporation, based in part because the nursing home and CRISTA adhered to their religious mission statements. In a similar case, a court held that the Christian Science Monitor was a religious organization in part because its declared purpose is to further the tenets of the Christian Science faith. Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 978. The court so held despite the fact that the “Monitor holds itself out as an objective and unbiased reporter of world news and events.” Id. The court explained that an organization can still be a religious corporation even if its religious activities also entail secular activities:
[A] religious activity of a religious organization does not lose that special status merely because it holds some interest for persons not members of the faith, or occupies a position of respect in the secular world at large.

Id.

The court buttressed its holding by noting that this determination involves questions of separation of church and state; the court emphatically stated that the courts should stay out of these kinds of disputes because it is “unwilling to involve the federal court in what is ultimately an internal administrative matter of a religious activity,” namely, the hiring of employees. Id.
One of the earliest cases in this area granted the status of a religious corporation to the Salvation Army, in part because it fulfills its original mission statement. McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F.Supp. 1100 (N.D.Ga.1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972).
In contrast, the court in Fike declined to recognize the United Methodist Home as a religious corporation on the grounds that the United Methodist Children’s Home had deviated from its original purpose. “While the original mission of the Home was to provide a Christian home for orphans and other children, that mission has not remained unchanged.” Fike, 547 F.Supp. at 290.
The Agency’s articles of incorporation, and other documents, state that its purpose is to provide a variety of Christ-centered child care services characterized by professional competence and Christian concern. The undisputed fact that the workers at the Agency only place children in adoptive and foster homes where both parents are active Christians demonstrates that the Agency has not deviated from its original purpose. Furthermore, and most importantly, the trial court made a finding of fact that the Agency has not deviated from its original purpose, and this finding has not been challenged on appeal. Thus, this fact fundamentally distinguishes the present case from Fike.
Religious Activities
Both parties agree that the Agency does not provide religious instruction. However, the children are taken to Presbyterian churches as part of their life at the Agency. The lack of structured religious instruction does not diminish the fact that the Agency requires that adoptive and foster homes have two active Christian par*238ents who are committed to raising the children in a “Christian family environment.” Neither does it diminish the fact that all of the employees are Christians, and that all prospective adoptive parents, as well as employees, are required to sign a Statement of Faith. The Agency might wish to have Christian employees because it hopes that children at an impressionable age will follow the example set by Christian workers. Kamehameha, 780 F.Supp. at 1323. Employees in a religious institution “by their presence and daily contact with students serve as role models and instruct them in morals.... [Their] role is one of teaching by example and precept.” Id.
Summary
After balancing all the factors with proper deference being afforded to the religious aspects of the entity, I conclude that there is some evidence that the agency is a religious corporation. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment to this effect and the court of appeals decision is conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal. Tex.Const. art. V, § 6. Based on the record before us, the dissent’s insinuation that there is no evidence that the agency is a religious corporation is patently absurd.
I now turn to the second prong of the section 5.06(1) exemption — whether the position of senior adoption worker entails work connected with the religious activities of the corporation.
Religious Activities of the Senior Adoption Worker
Section 5.06(1) of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act exempts a religious corporation’s employment of an individual of a particular religion if the individual “perform[s] work connected with the performance of religious activities by the corporation.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 5.06(1) (emphasis added). The exemption in Title VII provides that religious entities can employ individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the entity’s activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l. Therefore, the federal statute does not require that the employee’s work be connected with the entity’s religious activities. Section 5.06(1) thus is more restrictive in this respect than the federal exemption. For this reason, federal case law does not aid us here.
To determine whether the work of a senior adoption worker is connected with the Agency’s religious activities, we should examine the relationship between the worker’s duties and the religious mission of the Synod of the Sun. Once again, we must engage in a balancing test, maintaining the proper deference to the religious aspects of the position.
Although senior adoption workers “performed no religious rituals,” 847 S.W.2d at 241 (Doggett, J., dissenting), they are the primary link between the Agency and prospective adoptive parents. According to the Agency, senior adoption workers must be professed Christians who possess a Christian commitment and concern for troubled youths and their families in order to adequately fulfill the Agency’s purpose and goals. Senior adoption workers screen and evaluate prospective families to ensure their suitability to become adoptive families. In turn, one absolute criteria for suitability utilized by the Agency is that both the husband and the wife be church-orientated and active in the same Christian church. The senior adoption worker must assess the couple’s commitment to the Christian religion.
As previously indicated, prospective adoptive and foster parents must sign a Statement of Faith that sets out the Agency’s mission statement and testifies to the prospective parents’ Christian faith. The staff member working with the family must also sign the Statement of Faith. The language set forth in the statement, shows that only those persons who adhere to the Christian religion can truthfully sign it.
The Agency’s mission is to provide a variety of Christ-centered child care services. Ms. Speer testified that she did not understand the concept of Christ-centered child care or the notion of distinctively Christian relationships. In fact, she also *239testified that she does not know what the Christian religion is and she does not believe Christianity is a religion. Based on her own admissions, she could not carry out the purpose of the Agency. Ms. Speer and the Commission urge that the senior adoption worker position does not entail religious activities. They argue that the application for the position does not discuss the necessity of being Christian. While this is true, the application devotes half a page to five questions inquiring into the religious background of the applicant. Such questions combined with the name of the organization should alert the reasonable applicant that the Agency possesses some type of religion-based requirement. Furthermore, the Adoption Worker Purpose of Position, Qualifications, and Responsibilities Statement requires an applicant to have a reference from a minister. This adequately serves notice on the applicant that religious belief is a consideration in the employment decision.
Ms. Speer and the Commission also argue that many of the Agency’s activities are also performed by secular organizations and entities. While this is true, “a religious activity of a religious organization does not lose that special status because it holds some interest for persons who are not members of the faith, or it occupies a position of respect in the secular world at large.” Feldstein, 555 F.Supp. at 978. Just because child care services can be rendered in a secular manner does not mean that they cannot be rendered in a religious manner.
I therefore conclude that there is some evidence that the Agency’s senior adoption worker position was connected with its religious activities.
Individuals of a Particular Religion
The final requirement of section 5.06(1) is whether the Agency limited employment to members of a particular religion. Ms. Speer and the Commission argue that the Agency cannot utilize the section 5.06(1) exemption because it did not limit its hiring to individuals of a particular religion. The Agency limited employment based on whether the applicant was a Christian. Ms. Speer and the Commission argue that the Agency cannot limit employment to Christians — rather, it must limit employment to only Presbyterians or it cannot limit employment at all.
I disagree. The statute requires only that the employment is denied to an individual of a particular religion. Since Presbyterians are a denomination of the Christian religion, the Agency was well within the dictates of section 5.06(1) by limiting employment to members of the Christian religion.
A holding that Presbyterians are a subgroup of the Christian religion comports with federal case law and the plain meaning of the terms. The United States Supreme Court recently recognized that the Christian religion includes various denominations, such as Presbyterians. Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 1517, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989). The EEOC reached a similar decision in a case under Title VII where it held that a religious corporation who hired only Christians did not hire from more than one religion when it hired persons of different Christian denominations. E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 75-186, EEOC Decisions (CCH) ¶ 6553 (Feb. 21, 1975). In Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950-51 (3d Cir.1991), the Third Circuit held that being of a particular religion encompassed more than just denominational affiliation.
These federal determinations are consistent with the plain meaning of the terms utilized in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Religion is defined by the Act as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief_” Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 2.01(14). The definition of “Christianity” is “the religion stemming from the life, teachings, and death of Jesus Christ....” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 400 (1961) (emphasis added). In contrast, the definition of “Presbyterian” is “a Protestant Christian church_” Id. at 1792 (emphasis added). Thus, there is substantial authority that Christianity is the religion of Presbyterians, and therefore the Agency *240complied with the requirement that it limit employment based on a particular religion.
Ms. Speer and the Commission also complain that the trial court and the court of appeals did not give the proper deference to the Commission’s interpretation of the Act as expressed at trial by its Executive Director. The Director testified that Christianity is not a religion.8 No deference need be given to such a patently erroneous opinion. The record does not show that the Commission nor its Director have special expertise or qualifications to determine what is or is not a religion. Whether something is a religion is probably a mixed question of law and fact that the trial court was entitled to decide.
Also, Ms. Speer and the Commission complain of the trial court’s failure to rule on the bona fide occupational defense asserted by the Agency. However, such a ruling was rendered moot by the trial court's disposition of the case.
Conclusion
The issue of relationships between Christians and Jews should be treated with tolerance, compassion, sensitivity, and care. Nonetheless, the legislature recognized that an adherent to a particular religion is likely to possess greater familiarity with its traditions and theology and thus exempted religious entities from the Texas Human Rights Act. The duly elected members of the body politic empowered to pass laws in this state, the legislature, and the dissenting justices recognize that “religious employers, to implement their purpose, must be able to select those employees who put into effect their religious tenets.” 847 S.W.2d at 242, n. 2 (Doggett, J., dissenting). The dissent ignores this legislative mandate and proceeds to construe “religion” so narrowly as to include little more than “spiritual leaders of an organization.” 847 S.W.2d at 242 n. 2 (Doggett, J., dissenting). Apparently, the dissent is of the view that the religious exemption means only that a Jewish congregation cannot be forced to hire a Baptist minister as their Rabbi, but that a secular court is going to decide whether an associate pastor, deacon, youth director, liturgist, etc., comes within the religious exception. This extreme and narrow interpretation guts the exemption and would have the disastrous effect of entangling government bureaucrats with the affairs of churches throughout the state. As previously noted, such interpretation of the religious exemption would facilitate and encourage significant governmental intrusion and interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions, and create significant burdens on religious organizations to predict, at the risk of substantial liability, which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.9 Apparently, the dissenting justices do not share this concern.
In my opinion, there is some evidence that the Agency is a religious corporation, that the position of senior adoption worker was connected with the religious activities of the corporation, and that the Agency limited employment to individuals of a particular religion.
*241Finally, the dissent disingenuously states that “the employer’s attorney announced to this court that it engaged in wide-ranging discrimination ...” This “announcement” came in response to a question by Justice Doggett from the bench during oral argument. The legal issues on appeal are framed by properly preserved points of error, not by questions from the bench. Nonetheless, the inquiry is irrelevant. The only position challenged in this appeal is that of a senior adoption worker. As to other employees of the Agency, the version of the Act in existence at the time of this incident exempted a religious corporation’s employment of an individual of a particular religion if the individual “performs work connected with the performance of religious activities by the corporation.” Tex. Rev.Stat.Ann. art 5221k § 5.06(1).

. The dissent states: "Mootness is a judicial roadblock used here to prevent Georgette Speer and the Texas Human Rights Commission from ever having an opportunity to hold an employer accountable for undisguised discrimination." 847 S.W.2d at 245 (Doggett, J., dissenting). This statement insinuates that the rejection of Speer’s and the Commission’s claim by both lower courts was erroneous. They did exercise their right to hold the Agency accountable and they lost in both lower courts.

. One of the defenses the Agency asserted at trial was that Ms. Speer was not the best qualified applicant for the position. The Agency had apparently decided that they had a particular need for an ethnic minority to fill this position. The Agency asserts that they hired a minority with credentials equal or superior to Ms. Speer’s. The trial court made no findings on this defense since it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case.

.The court of appeals and the trial court used the abbreviation "PCHSA” for Presbyterian Children’s Home and Service Agency. In order to be consistent with the majority opinion, everywhere they used "PCHSA,” we have used "the Agency.”

. Tex.R.Civ.P. 299 provides: "When findings of fact are filed by the trial court they shall form the basis of the judgment....” Thus, the trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to the same weight and consideration on appeal as a jury verdict. See Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.Civ.App.—

.The Agency also urged its entitlement to an exemption under section 5.07(a)(2) of the Act, which provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice "for a religious corporation, association, society, or educational institution ... to limit employment or give preference to members of the same religion." Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 5.07(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Therefore, an exemption under section 5.07(a)(2) would only require that the Agency establish that it is a religious corporation and that it limited employment to members of the same religion. The Agency would not be required to establish that the position of senior adoption worker is connected with its religious activities.
However, the Agency possessed a problem relying on section 5.07(a)(2) because prior to September 1, 1989 the exemption was only applicable to religious educational institutions. Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, 68th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 7, § 5.07, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 37, 48 (codified as amended at Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5221k § 5.07(a)(2)) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Thus, in 1988, when the Agency denied Ms. Speer employment, section 5.07(a)(2) would not have aided the Agency. On the other hand, by the time the case went to trial on June 26, 1990, section 5.07(a)(2) had been amended to apply to all religious corporations. The Agency urges that the amended version of section 5.07(a)(2) is applicable to this action since the trial judge relied upon the amended section and neither side objected. While I note that the Agency’s argument possesses some merit, it is unnecessary to determine the applicability of section 5.07(a)(2) in this case because section 5.06(1) provided an independent basis to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

. The federal exception to the Title VII prohibition against discrimination provides:
The subchapter shall not apply to ... a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l.

. In fact, the purpose of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act was to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 5221k § 1.02(1). Thus, federal jurisprudence provides guidance to the interpretation of all sections of the Texas Act unless the Texas Legislature deviated from the language of Title VII.

. The dissent states that "such theological questions, which hardly require a dictionary for an answer ... are in no way germane to today’s proceeding.” 847 S.W.2d at 245 (Doggett, J., dissenting). The Commission and Ms. Speer disagree. Ms. Speer and the Director of the Commission both testified that Christianity is not a religion. Also, Ms. Speer testified that she did not understand the concept of Christ-centered child care and did not believe in the Statement of Faith that the Agency required all prospective parents to sign along with the Adoption Worker who is working with them. Both the Commission and Ms. Speer alleged in points of error before this Court that the court of appeals committed error in concluding that Christianity is a religion. This is hardly an irrelevant inqui-

. The dissent states that in construing the contours of the statutory religious exception, that I would interpret it so broadly that my "test would tear a major loophole in our state discrimination laws." 847 S.W.2d at 242 (Doggett, J., dissenting). First of all, the "test” attributed to me is clearly not my test. What I would do is as I noted in footnote 7. Since the purpose of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act was to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, I would look to federal jurisprudence for guidance and utilizing the eight relevant factors listed on p. 235 of this opinion, I would use a balancing test to determine whether an entity is a religious corporation.