Court Opinion

ID: 8832004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 16:06:33.64132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:57.090218
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Taylor dissenting. Lidke having done certain work for and furnished certain materials to the defendant, they got into a controversy, the defendant claiming that some portions of the work were not properly done, Lidke claiming otherwise. There was due the latter at that time, according to his claim, about $1,100. To settle that controversy, amicably between them, they met, and on May 22, 1916, entered into the written contract which is in question in the instant case. By that contract Lidke makes a promise to do certain work and to waive payment for certain extra labor and material and the defendant promises to pay the plaintiff $671.80 and to each of four other parties a certain sum. Nothing was to' be paid Lidke, himself. It was a bilateral contract made up of their mutual promises, those promises being, according to the law of contract, sufficient consideration for each other. The contract, as soon as signed, created mutual obligations, one of which was to pay the plaintiff $671.80. That promise, according to the writing, was unconditional; it was not provided that it should be paid at some future time or dependent in any way upon Lidke’s future conduct. The consideration of the promise of the defendant to Bevell was not the doing of the work by Lidke, but Lidke’s promise to do that work. In the eyes of the law, a very different thing. The moment the binding written contract was made and the obligations of the defendant and Lidke fixed and specified, the defendant became bound, unconditionally, to pay Bevell, the plaintiff. He had so promised; that was unalterable either by him or Lidke. Though the consideration for it moved from Lidke, being Lidke’s promise to do certain things, it, nevertheless, was-as binding upon the defendant as though the plaintiff, himself, had furnished certain materials as a consideration for the defendant’s promise. Being a binding promise upon the defendant, the plaintiff had a right to sue to have it carried out. If it be admitted, as the opinion of the majority imports, that the contract was binding at the time it was executed and made and gave rise to the obligations it recites, it follows, as the writing mentions no condition, that the plaintiff was entitled at once to the sum promised him. If the promise to pay the plaintiff had been qualified, as, for example, to pay on a certain date, or when Lidke gets so far along in the fulfillment of his obligations, or when Lidke had done all he promised to do, then the plaintiff might not sue until the specified condition was fulfilled. But, the written promise is unqualified and the writing alone contains the contract. The expression, “In return you are to pay the balance of Eleven Hundred ($1,100) Dollars due me in full,” etc., which words were ratified by the defendant’s written acceptance, constitutes an unqualified admission by the defendant that he then owed, and also a promise at once to pay, the five amounts therein specified. The phrase “due me” is in the present tense. Lidke had claimed that his original undertaking had been completed and that the balance due him was $1,100. That was the situation when Lidke and the defendant started in to make the settlement-contract of May 22,1916. Then, in order to end their disagreement Lidke promised to do certain work and waive a claim for extras, and the defendant, in return for and in consideration of that promise, promised to pay ‘ ‘ To Alexander H. Bevell & Co., the sum of $671.80,” and also, four other smaller amounts, and admitted, by the same writing, that the total of those amounts, $1,100, was then due. His admission and his promise to pay are both unqualified. Of course, he ^stultifies himself when, in the face of the admission and promise, he claims that he ought not to pay the plaintiff. Having both admitted the amount and promised for a good consideration and without mention of time or condition, it is binding. When a written promise, to pay an express amount to a definite person, for a good consideration and without condition, is made, it ripens into an immediate legal obligation. The matter here, however, is purely one of fact. The defendant stated over his own signature, as Lidke has promised to do certain work and waive a certain claim, I promise to pay to the plaintiff, and four others, certain express amounts, which I admit are now in the aggregate due you. Such being the written contract, what ground is there for claiming that liability to Bevell, the plaintiff, must wait on what Lidke may or may not do in the future. To hold that the defendant’s promise to the plaintiff was dependent upon the future acts of Lidke is to make a brand new contract. The contract is in writing, but, whence the condition? It is admitted in the majority opinion that the promise of the defendant was binding, but, how, if he may attach an arbitrary unwritten condition? If he may do that, then it is not the law in this State that a promise made to a third person upon a good consideration is binding and may be sued upon. As not a single apt case has been cited—the facts here being different—I am of the opinion that the plain meaning of the written contract should control and that there should not be interjected some condition, which the parties cannot be said to have had in mind, and of which there is not a single syllable of evidence.