Court Opinion

ID: 9486573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:53:19.830567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:48.611848
License: Public Domain

McDADE, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the rather novel, but realistic, approach of the majority in resolving this issue of contract formation by finding that the parties agreed or had a “meeting of the minds” to execute a contract which contained an ambiguous term relating to a change in manning requirements for the four-color presses. A more traditional analysis would have required remandment to the district court for the admission of extrinsic evidence on the issue of contract formation once it was determined that the language of the summary setting forth the change in manning requirements was ambiguous.
The whole point of the lawsuit is the issue of whether a contract existed between the parties vel non, or as argued by Colfax, whether there was a “meeting of the minds” on an essential term, a requisite of contract formation. The majority finds that the requisite “meeting of the minds” exists because the parties “agree[d] to an obviously ambiguous term,” acknowledging that “the actual terms of the 1991 agreement were muddied in the summary that the Union gave Colfax and that Colfax signed, making it possible that the parties had different understandings.” Rather than finding that these “different understandings” resulted in an ambiguity necessitating the admission of extrinsic evidence on the issue of contract formation, the majority observes that “it is common for contracting parties to agree — that is, to signify agreement — to a term to which each party attaches a different meaning.” Since the language of the manning change is obviously ambiguous (or more preferably, “patently” ambiguous, in that the ambiguity arises from the language itself) and Colfax did nothing to clarify it before signifying his assent, a contract was formed despite the ambiguous term. To hold otherwise is found by the majority to be inconsistent with contract law principles awarding recision for “latent ambiguity” as distinct from the patent ambiguity involved in the case before us. I share the majority’s view that Colfax had to know its interpretation was not the only plausible interpretation of the language of the manning change and that Colfax accepted the risk of being wrong in the meaning it assigned to the term. Having taken the risk, Colfax must now face the consequences of a dispute with the Union on this issue. I also share the majority’s view that it was the explicit purpose of the arbitration clause to require arbitration of all such disputes “arising out of the application or interpretation” of the contract.
Having concluded that there was a contract which should be submitted to arbitration pursuant to its terms, I cannot agree *758with the majority that the arbitrator has the right or authority to consider anew the decision which this court has already made. The majority cannot have it both ways. There either was a “meeting of the minds” and a contract formed, or there was not a “meeting of the minds” and therefore no contract between the parties. This court having decided the former, it is beyond the purview of the arbitrator’s function to decide the existence of a contract — her function is to apply and interpret the contract. To hold otherwise would be to license the arbitrator to reverse the finding of this court as to contract formation, a duty belonging to the court and not the arbitrator.