Court Opinion

ID: 9713575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:18:01.849468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.372854
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I agree with the major thrust of the majority opinion, particularly with its crucial decision to regard compliance with Rule 604(d) as mandatory, I cannot also agree with several other aspects of the majority’s holding. As I understand it, the majority holds: (1) that compliance with Rule 604(d) (which requires the defendant who wishes to appeal after a guilty plea to first filé a motion to withdraw the plea) is a condition precedent for appeal after a plea of guilt, and (2) that counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but that (3) the appropriate remedy for such failure is a post-conviction proceeding, and (4) the standard for appellate ineffectiveness stemming from a simple procedural default is the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance at trial laid down in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. I would agree that compliance with Rule 604(d) is mandatory, and that the appellate court should neither routinely ignore the rule nor simply remand to the trial court so that the defendant can file the motion nunc pro tunc. I also agree that the failure to file may constitute ineffective assistance (whether it is ineffective depending, in crucial measure, upon whether the defendant communicated to counsel a desire to appeal). But if the defendant has actually been deprived of effective assistance, why wait for a post-conviction proceeding to resolve the merits of the appeal? It would seem to me that the better procedure would be for the appellate court to determine if assistance was ineffective, using a remand to the trial court if necessary while retaining jurisdiction. As the majority suggests, the attorney involved can be punished by “appropriate disciplinary measures”— there is no need to punish the defendant for his attorney’s incompetence. Nor is a post-conviction proceeding an adequate substitute for a direct appeal. (See, e.g., Bell v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 1986), 795 E2d 655.) Moreover, waiting for a post-conviction proceeding serves no useful purpose. The defendant has until 10 years after the date of the guilty plea to file a post-conviction petition. The possibility — indeed, the likelihood — of delay, conflicts with the basic purpose of Rule 604(d), which, as the majority correctly notes, is to provide for factfinding while witnesses are still available and memories are fresh. Secondly, the majority provides no support for its assumption that the Strickland standard applies in this instance. For the following reasons, I do not believe that it does. Defendants’ claims rest upon the sixth amendment right to counsel contained in the United States Constitution, as applied to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV.) Due process requires that State criminal defendants be afforded representation by counsel, both at trial (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792), and upon any direct appeal that is allowed as a matter of right (Douglas v. California (1963), 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814). In the case of trials, it has long been clear that due process requires not only that the defendant be afforded the formal presence of counsel, appointed or retained, but also counsel’s effective assistance. See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 685, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 344, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1715. The United States Supreme Court has now held that a defendant is also entitled to the effective assistance of counsel upon direct appeals which are allowed as a matter of right. (Evitts v. Lucey (1985), 469 U.S. 387, 396-97, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 830-31, 105 S. Ct. 830, 836-37.) In Evitts, the defendant’s retained attorney filed a timely notice of appeal on defendant’s behalf, but failed to submit a “statement of appeal” when he filed the record and defendant’s brief, as required by a nonjurisdictional State court rule of appellate procedure. An intermediate State appellate court dismissed the appeal on the motion of the prosecution. After the defendant exhausted State remedies, a Federal district court held that counsel’s failure to follow the State court appellate procedure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and granted a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release unless his appeal was reinstated or he was granted a new trial. 469 U.S. at 390-91, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 825-26, 105 S. Ct. at 832-33. On appeal, the prosecution did not challenge the district court’s finding that the defendant had received ineffective assistance, but instead claimed that ineffective assistance did not require the State court to reinstate his appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court was not required to “decide the content of appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” (469 U.S. at 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 827, 105 S. Ct. at 833.) The majority’s assumption that Strickland, applies is not, therefore, necessarily correct. The two different standards which might be applied are the standard used for judging claims of general ineffective trial assistance or the different standard used for judging claims that counsel was either totally absent from the proceedings, forcibly prevented from assisting the accused, or suffering from an actual conflict of interest. For general claims of ineffective assistance, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance fell below a standard of reasonable professional competence, as well as a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) In other words, the defendant must show that he suffered actual prejudice. For claims of total absence, forcible prevention, or actual conflict, on the other hand, prejudice is presumed. See, e.g., Geders v. United States (1976), 425 U.S. 80, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592, 96 S. Ct. 1330 (bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York (1975), 422 U.S. 853, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 95 S. Ct. 2550 (bar on summation at bench trial); Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 333, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (actual conflict of interest). I believe that it is the second standard which is the more appropriate in the case of a simple procedural default which results in the dismissal of the defendant’s appeal. An attorney who fails to obey a simple procedural rule is effectively “absent” from the appeal, notwithstanding the fact that he may be otherwise diligent in preparing it. Failure to follow such a rule means, as in the case of a bar upon summation, that an attorney cannot effectively prosecute the appeal at all, since no matter what he says, the court will not, need not, and, in this case, cannot, listen. Moreover, the reasons for the Strickland “actual prejudice” rule are not applicable here. In general, it is quite true, particularly at trial, that “[ajttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. *** Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.) The types of errors involved here and in Evitts, however, do not come in an infinite variety. The number of procedural defaults which will result in a complete dismissal of a criminal appeal are limited. They can be easily defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys what to avoid, and they are so defined in our rules. This particular phase of representation is no “art,” but simply a matter of common sense. Nor can it be said that the omission of something as simple as a notice of appeal could ever be characterized as “brilliant.” I am not alone in this view. (See, e.g., Jenkins v. Coombe (2d Cir. 1987), 821 F.2d 158 (merely nominal rep-reservation on appeal as of right not reasonably effective assistance; rejecting application of Strickland, standard); Gray v. Greer (7th Cir. 1985), 778 F.2d 350 (Strickland standard does not apply where counsel failed to raise claims which petitioner requested, and then was permitted to withdraw after filing nonadvocatory brief); Hollis v. United States (8th Cir. 1982), 687 F.2d 257, 259 (no showing of actual prejudice required where counsel failed to perfect appeal); Evans v. Clarke (D. Neb. 1988), 680 F. Supp. 1351 (Strickland standard inapplicable where appellate counsel negligently filed Anders brief arguing on behalf of prosecution); United States v. Gar-diner (D. Me. 1987), 666 F. Supp. 267 (no showing of prejudice required where counsel failed to perfect appeal).) Where the defendant communicates a desire to appeal, counsel’s failure to take the necessary procedural steps to file and perfect the appeal constitutes ineffective assistance, irrespective of whether the appeal would actually have succeeded. As the majority’s opinion indicates, some, if not all, of these defendants clearly indicated a desire to appeal. Since I believe that application of the Strickland standard to their claims would be error, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. JUSTICE STAMOS joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.