Court Opinion

ID: 9743521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:35:45.636972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.733697
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hoffman, C.J.
I see the issues in this case as two-fold. The first, not answered by the majority opinion, is whether a school board may bargain collectively with a teachers’ union. The second is whether a school board may enter into an agreement with the representatives of a group of teachers providing for binding arbitration of disputes.
The Indiana General School Powers Act, IC 1971, 20-5-1-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. §28-1701, et seq. (Burns 1970), is controlling in this appeal. The particularly pertinent sections of this Act are as follows;
*605“28-1710. Specific powers. — In carrying out the school purposes of each school corporation, its governing body acting on its behalf shall have the following specific powers:
“(2) To take charge of, manage and conduct the educational affairs of the school corporation and to establish, locate and provide the necessary schools, school libraries, other libraries where permitted by law, other buildings, facilities, property and equipment therefor.
“(7) To employ, contract for and discharge superintendents, supervisors, principals, teachers, * * *.
“The compensation, terms of employment and discharge of teachers shall, however, be subject to and governed by the laws relating to employment, contracting, compensation and discharge to teachers; * *
“28-1751. Construction of act. — This act [§§ 28-1701— 28-1761] shall be liberally construed to permit the governing body of school corporations to conduct its affairs in a manner consistent with sound business practice to the ends that the authority of the governing body shall be clarified and that it shall be permitted to operate with the maximum efficiency consistent with accountability.”
The above statutes can only be interpreted to say that the governing body [school board] of a school corporation is charged with the duty to manage and conduct the educational affairs of the school corporation. We are here dealing with one of the most basic, cherished and protected rights— the education of our children. The duty of the school board to manage the school corporation is an obligation conferred by law. Such obligation cannot be shared or delegated in any manner.
This legal duty imposed on the school board by the Indiana General School Powers Act must co-exist with the rights of public school teachers. I.C. 1971, 20-6-20-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. §28-4536 (Burns 1970), recognizes the right of public school teachers to join and belong to labor unions.
The first issue is whether a school board may bargain collectively with a teachers’ union.
*606It is well-setled that public employees do not have the same collective bargaining rights as do private employees. Anderson Fed. of Teach. v. School City of Anderson (1969), 252 Ind. 558, 251 N. E. 2d 15. Many jurisdictions have taken the position that absent express statutory provision, a public official may not engage in collective bargaining with public employees. International U. of Op. Eng., Loc. 321 v. Water Works Bd. (1964), 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619; International Bro. of Elec. Wkrs. v. City of Hastings (1965), 179 Neb. 455, 138 N. W. 2d 822; Fellows v. LaTronica (1962), 151 Col. 300, 377 P. 2d 547. See also: 31 A. L. R. 2d 1142, and eases there cited.
Other jurisdictions have taken a dissimilar but not wholly inconsistent view. In Norwalk Teachers’ Asso. v. Board of Education (1951), 138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1133, at 1140, the court stated:
“There is no objection to the organization of the plaintiff as a labor union, but if its organization is for the purpose of ‘demanding’ recognition and collective bargaining the demands must be kept within legal bounds. What we have said does not mean that the plaintiff has the right to organize for all of the purposes for which employees in private enterprise may unite, as those are defined in § 7391 of the General Statutes. Nor does it mean * * * that it shall be the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the unit. * * * [T]he plaintiff may organize and bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions which it may be in the power of the board of education to grant.
“The statutes and private acts give broad powers to the defendant with reference to educational matters and school management in Norwalk. If it chooses to negotiate with the plaintiff with regard to the employment, salaries, grievance procedure and working conditions of its members, there is no statute, public or private, which forbids such negotiations. It is a matter of common knowledge that this is the method pursued in most school systems large enough to support a teachers’ association in some form. It would seem to make no difference theoretically whether the negotiations are with a committee of the whole association or with individuals or small related groups, so long as any agree*607ment made with the committee is confined to members of the association. If the strike threat is absent and the defendant prefers to handle the matter through negotiation with the plaintiff, no reason exists why it should not do so. The claim of the defendant that this would be an Illegal delegation of authority is without merit. The authority is and remains in the board.”
The court went on to say that the school board and the teachers’ union could legally engage in limited arbitration.
In Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer (1966), 275 Minn. 347, 147 N. W. 2d 358, the court was asked to decide the constitutionality of the Pubilc Employees Labor Relations Act which excepted public school teachers from its operation. At 351 of 275 Minn., at 362 of 147 N. W. 2d, the Supreme Court of Minnesota commented on the Act as follows:
“It is unnecessary to go into the various provisions of c. 839 except to say that in substance it provides for a collective bargaining arrangement for meaningful negotiations subject to the limitation that it does not insure binding arbitration — a limitation inherent in the nature of governmental employment. The act reaffirms denial of the right to strike; affirms the right of public employees to form and join labor or employee organizations; and provides for the election of a representative who may bargain and treat with agency heads as the representative of all employees if the organization represents a majority of the employees.”
And, further, at 359-360 of 275 Minn., at 366-367 of 147 N. W. 2d:
“The next point raised is whether the school board has implied power to conduct an election and bargain with elected representatives of teacher organizations. The school board possesses only such powers as are granted by statute. Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N. W. 2d 689. There is no authority, either express or implied, by which the school board can hold an election for the purpose of designating an exclusive representative of the teachers.
*608“There is nothing to prevent the heads of governmental agencies from meeting with, or discussing wages, hours, and conditions of employment with, groups or individuals representing groups of the employee class.
“It would appear that even without express statutory authority, there is nothing to prevent collective bargaining when it is entered into voluntarily and no prohibitory state statute exists.”
In the instant case, we are required to interpret the Indiana General School Powers Act liberally. In managing the affairs of the school corporation a school board may lawfuly choose to discuss or negotiate with teachers singly or in a group. A representative of a group of teachers may negotiate in their behalf so long as such representative negotiates only for the particular teachers who have given authority to the representative. However, .there are no means by which a school board can choose to recognize an exclusive bargaining representative of all members of the bargaining unit. Therefore, a school board has no authority to bargain collectively, or collectively contract with a teachers’ union.
The second issue is whether a school board has authority to enter into an agreement for binding arbitration of disputes with the representative of a group of teachers.
As heretofore stated, the Indiana General School Powers Act imposes the legal obligation to conduct the affairs of the school corporation on the school board. Binding arbitration, although it may be a desirable facility in some instances, would remove the decision-making power from the school board and give it to a third party. Such result was not the intendment of the statute. I do not think the Uniform Arbitration Act can be applied here as the result would be to abrogate the Indiana General School Powers Act.
. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
NOTE — Reported in 284 N. E. 2d 108.