Court Opinion

ID: 9711096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:28.049778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.315856
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
{dissenting). In this appeal defendants claim the workmen’s compensation appeal board erred in answering “yes” to the following three questions:
“1.
“Was workmen’s compensation award for disability following coronary occlusion suffered by 66-year old semi-retired worker in advanced stages of coronary arteriosclerosis supported by evidence and in accordance with law?”
“2.
“Was employee’s notice of injury and claim for compensation timely where no notice was given or claim made for 11 months after alleged injury, the employer in the meantime having information only that employee suffered chest pains while at work- in-*677the afternoon and a heart attack in the evening of the same day after he had gone to bed?”
“3.
“Upon the death of Magnus Larson without dé-' pendents and before final award of the workmen’s compensation appeal board, did his pending claim, and any benefit rights thereunder pass to the administrator with will annexed of his estate?” . .
We agree with the defendants that the board erred in regard to the third question and, therefore, deem it unnecessary to consider questions one and two.
. The first paragraph of defendants’ brief concisely sets forth their contention in re question three as follows:
. “The legal profession has understood, from a line of decisions beginning with Stone v. Smith (1936), 275 Mich 344 and continuing through Benton Harbor Malleable Industries v. General Motors Corporation (1960), 358 Mich 684, that the death of a compensation claimant prior to final award by the appeal board terminated the proceedings and that further proceedings depended upon there being dependents of the deceased employee entitled to claim compensation. The other cases so holding were Holtz v. B. F. Keith Detroit Corp., 276 Mich 72; Nacey v. Utley, 295 Mich 266. The four cited cases were decided without dissent.
“The appeal board by its decision in this case of Larson has overruled all these previous cases and has done this retrospectively, together with the imposition of interest. We believe that if any changes in the law are to be made, such changes properly are for consideration and adoption by the legislature.”
Appellee’s answer and request for reconsideration by this Court of previous opinions is as follows;
*678“It is clear, if we look uncritically at the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court decided in the years 1931 through 1956, that the plaintiff-administrator’s claim for the workmen’s compensation benefits due Magnus Larson would not succeed, his death having occurred the day before the entry of the appeal board order affirming his right to compensation and medical expense. In order to appreciate the full import of these decisions as well as the rationale behind them, however, it appears to us to be worthwhile to examine them in detail.”
' After commenting on these cases,1 appellee states:
“In reviewing the cases from Schlichenmayer to Sebewaing we see that the Court has from time to time advanced three reasons for the doctrine of abatement:
“1. There is no specific provision in the act authorizing anyone to appear before the department and prosecute a claim other than the employee and his dependents. Munson.
“2. That the provision terminating liability for ‘the remainder of such payments which he would have received in case he had lived’ upon death prevent survival. Stone.
“3. That there is no specific provision in the workmen’s compensation act for the survival of the cause of action. Schlichenmayer.
“Reason No. 1, that an administrator may not be a claimant under the act is effectively laid to rest by Stetu, Houg, Brandner, Adams, in each of which the substitution of the administrator was allowed and he was allowed to continue the proceedings in his representative capacity.
*679“Reason No. 2, the statutory provision on the termination of liability was disposed of in Houg, wherein it was pointed out that the provision only refers to the remainder of the weekly benefits accruing after death.”
Stetu, Houg, Brandner and Adams present an entirely different problem than the appeal in this case because in each of those cases the administrator “was allowed to continue the proceedings in his representative capacity” because the referee’s award had not been appealed, or had been affirmed by the appeal hoard’s decision prior to the employee’s death. In this appeal we only have the referee’s award prior to Mr. Larson’s death.
Ten days must expire without appeal in order to make the hearing referee’s award a final award.2 An appeal from the referee’s award was taken in the present case. We made it clear in Fawley v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Co., 342 Mich 100, that appeal made it a de novo hearing when we said (pp 101, 102):
“We have heretofore indicated in Margenovitch v. Newport Mining Co., 213 Mich 272, and in Basner v. Defoe Shipbuilding Co., 319 Mich 67, as well as in Thompson v. Continental Motors Corp., 320 Mich 219, that the hearing before the commission on appeal from an award by the deputy is a de novo hearing. There have been many changes in the statute since the Margenovitch Case, but the 3- decisions quoted may be considered as indicating the nature of the hearing on appeal in workmen’s compensation cases.”
In regard to reason No. 3 “that there is no specific provision in the workmen’s compensation act for the survival of the cause of action,” appellee states that “there is presently a statute, RJA, which applies to *680the workmen’s compensation act which specifically allows survival of this action or claim, overruling reason No. 3.” Appellee refers to the revised judicature act of 1961, and particularly to section 2921 of chapter 293 and section 151 of chapter l4 thereof.
The revised judicature act does not apply to workmen’s compensation as is evidenced hy the title of the act, which reads in part:
“An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts; * * * the forms and attributes of civil claims and actions; the time within which civil actions and proceedings may be brought in said courts.”.
The words upon which appellee relies in regard to “judicial power,” which he claims include “any other agencies,” were eliminated by the 1963 legislature by the enactment of PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 18.5
Section 12 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act (CL 1948, § 412.12 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.162]) provided for payments to dependents after the employee’s death “if the injury so received *681by such employee was the proximate cause of his death.”
The 1965 legislature, by PA 1965, No 230, added a provision to the above section providing that the dependents shall receive the benefits even though “the claimant dies from a cause unrelated to his injury.”
It is presumed that the legislature was aware of our previous decisions6 when it added the 1965 provision. There is nothing in this 1965 amendment that in any way discloses displeasure with, or repudiation of our previous decisions, and we quote with approval defendants’ statement that:
“This [1965] amendment, we believe, may be considered a restatement by the legislature of its expressed intent that only dependents have a right to benefits following the death of an employee entitled to benefits. The amendment does not provide for the distribution of benefits to heirs, legatees or creditors, other than those creditors provided for in part 2, § 4, of the act (CL 1948, § 412.4, Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.154)  The amendment does not give the plaintiff in this proceeding what he seeks, for it does not give the administrator the right to collect benefits for the estate. The administrator, under the amendment, becomes only a substituted plaintiff for the purpose of continuing the proceeding. He does not collect the benefits which are paid only to the beneficiaries named in the act. He is given no right under the amendment to collect benefits or to channel such benefits to heirs or legatees.”
Appellee submits to this Court the question: “Is abatement of benefits sound public policy?”
*682On National and State levels the limitation of the courts’ right to pass upon matters of policy has heen established, and in this State our Court has spoken forcefully and clearly on that subject. I quote from two of our many decisions, namely: City of Lansing v. Township of Lansing (1959), 356 Mich 641:
“The fact that a plain, unambiguous statute may, in certain instances, work great hardship is an argument that should be addressed to the legislature rather than to the court.” (Syllabus 7.)
and Melia v. Employment Security Commission (1956), 346 Mich 544:
“It is the duty of a court to interpret a statute as found, the wisdom of the provision in question in the form enacted being a matter of legislative responsibility, since a court may not legislate.” (Syllabus 1.)
The August 16, 1965, order of the appeal board affirming with modification its order of August 18, 1964, should be reversed.
Dethmers, C. J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Schlickenmayer v. City of Highland Park (1931), 253 Mich 265; Munson v. Christie (1935), 270 Mich 94; Stone v. Smith (1936), 275 Mich 344; Holtz v. B. F. Keith Detroit Corp. (1936), 276 Mich 72; Stetu v. Ford Motor Co. (1936), 277 Mich 468; Houg v. Ford Motor Co. (1939), 288 Mich 478; Hoffman v. Parker Monument Co. (1939), 290 Mich 394; Nacey v. Utley (1940), 295 Mich 266; Brandner v. Myers Funeral Home (1951), 330 Mich 392; Adams v. Sebewaing Brewing Co. (1956), 347 Mich 265.

 CL 1948, § 413.8 (Stat Aim 1960 Rev § 17.182).

 Jeruzal v. Wayne County Drain Commissioner (1957), 350 Mich 527; Evans v. Ross (1944), 309 Mich 149; In re Chamberlain’s Estate (1941), 298 Mich 278; People v. Powell (1937), 280 Mich 699 (111 ALR 721).

 “All actions and claims survive death. Actions on claims for injuries which result in death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the injured person exeept pursuant to the next section. If an aetion is pending at the time of death the claims may be amended to bring it under the next section. A failure to so amend will amount to a waiver of the claim for additional damages resulting from death.” CLS 1961, § 600.2921 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2921).

; “The judicial power is vested in a single court system consisting of the supreme court, circuit courts, probate courts, justices of the peace, superior court, municix>al courts, eommon pleas courts, recorder’s eourts, circuit court commissioners, and any other agencies created by the legislature which .exercise judicial power.” CLS 1961, § 600.151 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.151).

 “The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in 1 court of justice whieh shall be divided into 1 supreme court, 1 court of appeals, 1 trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, 1 probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction' created by the legislature.” CLS 1961, § 600.151, as amended by PA 19C3 (2d Ex Sess), No 18 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 27A.151).