Court Opinion

ID: 9751958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:20:30.222225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:25.553386
License: Public Domain

*414O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
Termination of parental rights presents the legal system with an almost insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, we emphasize the inviolability of the family unit, noting that “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ * * * ‘basic civil rights of man,’ * * * and ‘[r]ights far more precious * * * than property rights’ * * Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972) (citations omitted). The interests of parents in this relationship have thus been deemed fundamental and are constitutionally protected. On the other hand, it has been recognized “that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 119 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 33 (1972)).
* * * *
“Termination of parental rights is essentially, of course, a statutory proceeding; but the statute does not say it all. Overlying constitutional considerations, constantly recurring statutory amendments, and the rapidly evolving nature of present-day social theory and public policy make judicial interpretation an inevit able and indispensable part of critical legal operation.” Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nevada State Dep’t of Human Resources, 100 Nev. 640, 663, 691 P.2d 849, 865 (1984). Indeed, were the sole criterion stated to be in terms of the best interests of the child, it would be suspect for vagueness because of the important constitutional interests involved.
[New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W. and R.W., Jr., 103 N.J. 591, 599, 601, 512 A.2d 438 (1986).]
N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 elaborates on the best interests standard by cataloguing the circumstances in which the Legislature has determined that a child’s health and welfare will be seriously impaired by continuing an existing parental relationship. The judicial inquiry should focus on the conduct specified by the Legislature as evidence of the type of harm that children should be spared. For example, a father who never sees his child or never makes efforts to be a part of a child’s life sufficient to cause the child to view the person as a parent, causes harm to the child. Children have a profound interest in permanency and knowing who their parents are. The problem is compounded here because the adopting party is a step-parent who has bonded with the two children. See In re Guardianship of J.C. and J.M.C., 129 N.J. 1, 25-26, 608 A.2d 1312 (1992) (requiring remand to determine whether children had *415“bonded with their foster parents and if so whether breaking such bonds would cause the children serious psychological or emotional harm.”).
Under N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a, in order to determine best interests, the court considers whether the parent has fulfilled financial obligations toward the child, whether the parent has demonstrated “continued interest in the child,” whether the parent has made “a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child,” and whether the parent has “a place of importance in the child’s life.”
The statute then sets forth time periods in a child’s life when the standards must be met, such as, for example, within the crucial first months of a child’s life. Under N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a(l) and (2), an adoption may be entered over the objection of a parent if the court finds that during the relevant time periods, either “the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so,” or the parent is unable to do so. The “regular and expected parental functions of care and support” include “the maintenance of a relationship with the child such that the child perceives the person as his parent ... communicating with the child ... unless prevented from so doing,” and “providing financial support ... unless prevented from doing so.” N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a(2)(a), (b) and (c).
The elements of these composite tests are intended to indicate whether a parent has failed and thereby harmed a child and whether that harm is likely to continue if the relationship is not ended.
N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 comports with the Court’s reasoning in In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988), also a contested adoption case. Although “[t]he statutory descriptions [in Title 30 guardianship actions and Title 9 adoption actions] of the conditions required to terminate parental rights differ; their interpretation in case law ... tends to equate them.” 109 N.J. at 444, 537 A.2d 1227. Our former Chief Justice Wilentz explained:
*416Although the question of best interests of the child is dispositive of the custody issue in a dispute between natural parents, it does not govern the question of termination. It has long been decided that the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent’s rights____ It must be noted, despite some language to the contrary, that the interests of the child are not the only interests involved when termination issues are raised. The parent’s rights, both constitutional and statutory, have their own independent vitality.
[Baby M., supra, 109 N.J. at 445, 537 A.2d 1227 (citations omitted).]
On remand, the Family Part must make the qualitative determination, using the analytical framework of the statute, of whether the physical or mental health of the children has been and will continue be jeopardized by their relationship with their father. Parham, supra, 442 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. at 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d at 119.
Justice STEIN joins this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed, — None.