Court Opinion

ID: 9781910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:37:12.126718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:14.750078
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
1 26 I respectfully dissent from the analysis and result reached by the majority opinion. The question before us is whether a party to an agency proceeding may seek relief from a final administrative order under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-46b-12(1)(a) (2004) (allowing a party to seek agency review, in accordance with statute or agency rules, by filing a written request for review within thirty days of the issuance of an agency order); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing courts to grant relief from a judgment or order on certain grounds and upon motion made within a reasonable time, not to exceed three months in certain cireum-stances). The Board concluded that rule 60(b) is not applicable to agency proceedings, a decision that I believe to be within the Board's authority and discretion. According ly, I would adopt the Board's reasoning and affirm the decision below.
I. Rule 60(a)
127 My first disagreement with the majority opinion is that it, in part, treats the award *674of temporary total disability compensation to Clausing as a clerical mistake addressable under rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) ("Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party ...." (emphasis added)). Frito-Lay concedes that it did not invoke rule 60(a) below, stating in its appellate brief that its "motion for relief, though designated as a 'Rule 60° motion, should likewise be considered according to its content. Its content makes it akin to a Rule 60(b) motion...."
128 Even if Frito-Lay had sought relief under rule 60(a), I do not believe that the alleged error in the September 2005 Order can be fairly characterized as a clerical mistake; if it is error, it is clearly a substantive misapplication of the law, i.e., judicial error. See Thomas A. Poulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 180 (Utah 1989) ("A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment."). The error appears to have been made in reaching the judgment, not in simply recording it. See generally Frost v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737, 739-40 (1938) (describing in great detail the type of tran-seription errors that will qualify as "clerical error"). Since there is no indication that the order does not reflect the ALJ's intent at the time the order was issued, rule 60(a) should not be applicable.
{29 I must also disagree with two other aspects of the majority's rule 60(a) analysis. First, the majority asserts that the error in the September 2005 Order is merely "(al belatedly discovered error in the amount of Clausing's award, which both parties conceded occurred," see supra 115. The error is not merely in the amount of Clausing's award, but in the rationale employed by the ALJ to reach that amount. And, to the extent that Clausing concedes error in the award, she characterizes it as "significant judicial error" rather than a "factual mistake well within the power of the ALJ to correct," see supra 115, as asserted by the majority. Second, I disagree with the majority's implication that agencies must use rule 60(a) as the appropriate avenue to correct clerical mistakes when they do occur. I believe the case law is quite clear that agencies have the authority to grant relief similar to that provided by rule 60(a) in appropriate cireum-stances but that such authority flows from an agency's inherent decision-making powers and is therefore not necessarily bound to rule 60(a) or its interpreting case law.
II. Rule 60(b)
30 Properly addressing Frito-Lay's motion as one invoking rule 60(b), I believe that the Board acted well within its discretion in determining that the motion was not cognizable before it. Agency determinations, including the workers' compensation proceeding below, are governed by UAPA.1 UAPA has expressly incorporated the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in just two areas, discovery and default. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-46b-7(1) (2004) ("If the agency does not enact rules under this section, the parties [to a formal adjudicative proceeding] may conduct discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."); id. § 68-46b-11(8)(a) (allowing parties to seek to set aside an agency default "by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure").
1 31 However, in other areas including the substantive review of agency orders, UAPA adopts procedures that are unique to the agency context and grants considerable discretion to agencies to implement those procedures. Under UAPA, a party may seek review of a workers' compensation order by filing a written request for ageney review, in a manner to be determined by the agency, within thirty days of the order's issuance. See id. § 68-46b-12(1)(a) (allowing agencies *675to develop a review procedure to be initiated by review request within thirty days after issuance of an order); see also id. § 34A-1-303(1) (2005) ("A decision entered by an [ALJ] under this title is the final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initiated ...."); id. § 84A-2-801(2) (Supp.2007) (rendering a workers' compensation ALJ's order final if agency review is not requested within thirty days). The statutes governing review of workers' compensation orders create, in the words of the Board, a "comprehensive and integrated system that allows the parties to obtain full review and, where appropriate, complete relief from any factual or legal error that may be contained in an ALJ's decision."
1 32 The Board determined that Frito-Lay could properly have raised the alleged error contained in the September 2005 Order by requesting review of that order within thirty days of its issuance. However, Frito-Lay did not do so and thus waived its right to substantive review. The Board concluded that Frito-Lay, having waived its right to a substantive review of the September 2005 Order, could not achieve that very review by resort to a rule of civil procedure that is not incorporated by UAPA, the Utah Labor Commission Act, or the Workers' Compensation Act. Frito-Lay raises multiple arguments in opposition to the Board's analysis, and the majority seems to accept each of Frito-Lay's arguments in reaching its conclusion. I am unconvinced by Frito-Lay's arguments.
183 First, Frito-Lay argues that Utah Code section 68-46b-18's allowanee for requests for reconsideration of orders otherwise unreviewable under section 638-46b-12 demonstrates that requests for agency review under section 63-46b-12 are not the only permissible post-order motions. See id. § 68-46b-18 (2004). However, sections 63-46b-12 and -18 address two different sets of orders. Section 63-46b-12 governs the review of orders where a statute or agency rule expressly permits the parties to seek review of that order, see id. § 68-46b-12, while seetion 68-46b-13 permits reconsideration of final orders for which there is no express statutory or rule authorization for review, see id. § 68-46b-18. Thus, together, the two sections cover all possible final ALJ orders, those that are expressly reviewable and those that are not, and as such constitute part of the "comprehensive and integrated system" described by the Board. I am unpersuaded that the statutory expression of either one or two avenues for revisiting an ALJ order necessarily implies the existence of other, unenumerated routes, and thus, I cannot join in the majority opinion's apparent reliance on section 63-46b-13 in this case. Further, Frito-Lay did not seek agency review under either section 68-46b-12 or -183 and should not now be permitted to invoke those sections to create a new avenue of review.
134 Frito-Lay next argues that the Board's decision runs contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997), that "[iInher-ent in the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a decision," id. at 945 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 559 P.2d 954, 956-57 (Utah 1977).2 In a related argument, Frito-Lay asserts that the Board, by statute, retains continuing jurisdiction over cases before it and "may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(1)(b) (2005). However, both the case law and section 34A-2-420 apply to situations where newly discovered facts warrant a change in an existing order. See Career Serv. Review Bd., 942 P.2d at 946 ("[The Board retained jurisdiction and had the inherent authority to reconsider and modify its 1998 Order in light of subsequently discovered facts." (emphasis added)); Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industri*676al Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah 1989) (applying the continuing jurisdiction statute in effect at the time and noting that the agency has "broad authority to make substantive changes in its orders when substantial changes in the ctirewmstances have occurred" (emphasis added)).
T35 Neither approach provides authority to demonstrate that rule 60(b) may be employed to seek modification of a final agency order in the absence of cireumstances that have changed since the time of the disputed order. Here, there are no changed cireum-stances, simply Frito-Lay's untimely discovery of an alleged error that was plain on the face of the September 2005 Order when it was issued. I believe that the majority opinion stretches the law too far when it applies an "inherent agency power" analysis to the cireamstances of this case.
T 36 Further, even if an agency's inherent ability to amend orders extends beyond situations where a change in factual cireum-stances has occurred, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that " 'express statutory provisions' " may " 'preseribe either indefinite or fixed periods of time'" in which such relief may be sought. See Bowen Trucking, Inc., 559 P.2d at 957. The time periods prescribed in Utah Code sections 68-46b-12 and -13 constitute such express limitations, and Frito-Lay did not comply with those limitations in this case. Thus, Frito-Lay waived whatever ability it may have had to invoke the agency's reconsideration powers when it failed to timely request a review of the September 2005 Order.
137 Frito-Lay next argues that agencies must be able to correct substantive errors consistent with rule 60(b) since they may in fact correct clerical errors in the manner permitted by rule 60(a). See Thomas A. Paulsen Co., 770 P.2d at 129-30 (concluding, under a prior but similar statute, that agency's authority "to correct clerical errors ... is comparable to that provided to trial courts by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a)"). This argument is unavailing for the same reason that Frito-Lay's motion should not simply be treated as one seeking relief under rule 60(a)-the alleged error in the September 2005 Order is substantive rather than clerical.
[38 As noted in Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989), there is a meaningful distinction between clerical errors, which may be corrected under rule 60(a), and substantive judicial errors, which may not. "[A] judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment." Id. at 180. The error asserted by Frito-Lay is substantive rather than clerical and as such could and should have been addressed as a matter of agency review. To provide otherwise would be to allow rule 60(b) to become a substitute for a timely appeal, a result that has been soundly rejected in the context of Utab's trial courts. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶¶21-25, 2 P.3d 451 (rejecting substantive legal error as a ground for relief under rule 60(b), lest rule 60(b) become a "back door" to the untimely direct appeal of the underlying judgment); see also Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶11, 104 P.3d 1198 (expressly approving of Franklin Covey's rule 60(b) analysis).
139 Finally, Frito-Lay argues that its 60(b) motion was essentially a motion to reconsider,3 timely filed within twenty days of the alleged discovery of the dispute over the proper interpretation of the September 2005 Order. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-46b-13(1)(a) (allowing requests for reconsideration in certain circumstances). This argument fails for several reasons.
[ 40 First, requests for reconsideration under section 63-46b-13(1)(a) are limited to situations where "review by the ageney ... is unavailable." Id. In this case, the September 2005 Order was subject to a timely-requested review by the agency and thus, was not *677subject to reconsideration upon motion under section 63-46b-18. Second, the plain language of section 68-46b-13(1)(a) precludes the application of the "discovery rule" as urged by Frito-Lay. See id. (allowing written requests for reconsideration to be filed "[wilithin 20 days after the date that an order is issued" (emphasis added)). Thus, as a motion to reconsider, Frito-Lay's motion was untimely. And finally, even if the discovery rule were applicable here, Frito-Lay's counsel's actions in failing to timely request review of the September 2005 Order do not, in my opinion, constitute the due diligence that application of the discovery rule requires. See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, 119, 156 P.3d 806 (stating that in order to invoke the discovery rule based on exceptional cireum-stances, " 'an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within {[the limitations period] " (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). For these reasons, I cannot join the majority in applying the discovery rule to allow reconsideration of the September 2005 Order.
[41 In sum, I agree with the Board that UAPA does not permit review of an ALJ's decision other than as provided for in Utah Code section 68-46b-12. While that review may presumably be sought on the same grounds contemplated in rule 60(b), and perhaps on other grounds as well, the request for review must be filed within thirty days of the challenged order. In this case, Frito-Lay did not file a request for review within thirty days of the September 2005 Order. Accordingly, Frito-Lay waived its right to agency review of the September 2005 Order that was otherwise available, and the Board properly rejected Frito-Lay's attempt to circumvent section 63-46b-12's requirements by resort to rule 60(b).
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the majority opinion's conclusions that the September 2005 Order's temporary total disability award represents clerical error correctable under rule 60(a); that rule 60(b) presents an available avenue for the untimely review of agency decisions; or that Frito, Lay's counsel's failure to timely review the September 2005 Order and seek appropriate ageney review warrants relief under the discovery rule. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. The Board noted that workers' compensation proceedings are also governed by both the Utah Labor Commission Act, see Utah Code Aun. §§ 34A-1-101 to -409 (2005 & Supp.2007), and the Workers' Compensation Act, see id. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 (2005 & Supp.2007)..

. The majority opinion also cites Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997), for the proposition that rule 60(b), as an exception to the rule against the reopening of judgments, "would apply to administrative agencies." See id. at 949 (Howe, J., dissenting). However, the cited language is found in a dissenting opinion that is not binding precedent and is also dicta as to the applicability of rule 60(b) in agency proceedings. Accordingly, it is not dispositive here.

. I am not as quick as the majority to simply accept Frito-Lay's recharacterization of its motion as one to reconsider the September 2005 Order, as I believe the Utah Supreme Court has significantly limited the previously approved practice of interpreting motions based on their substance rather than their title. See generally Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶8, 135 P.3d 861. However, as the supreme court has not yet expressly applied this change in policy to agency matters, I am content in this case to address and reject Frito-Lay's argument on its merits.