Court Opinion

ID: 9627542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:47:32.657428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:46.824355
License: Public Domain

BAKES, C.J.,
dissents.
III.
THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER WAS EFFECTIVE TO DISMISS THE FIRST CASE AS OF THE DATE THE TRIAL COURT INTENDED TO DISMISS IT.
Although neither party has addressed the issue, because we have concluded that the court minutes did not constitute an order dismissing the first information, we must consider whether the order issued by the trial court on April 21, 1988, dismissing the first case nunc pro tunc December 14, 1987, was effective. We conclude that it was effective.
In Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 720 P.2d 223 (Ct.App.1986) (review denied), our Court of Appeals explored in depth the effect of nunc pro tunc judgments in civil cases. In Westmont Tractor Co. v. Estate of Westfall, 112 Idaho 712, 735 P.2d 1023 (1987), this Court discussed and adopted the principles concerning nunc pro tunc judgments formulated in Ward. The crux of the analysis of the Court of Appeals in Ward as adopted by this Court in Westmont was whether the court issuing the nunc pro tunc judgment had intended to grant it on the earlier date but had failed to do so due to accident, excusable oversight or mistake. 112 Idaho at 714, 735 P.2d at 1025. In Westmont we noted that in Ward the Court of Appeals focused on the lack of unfair prejudice to the other parties in allowing the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc. Id.
While this is a criminal case and Ward and Westmont were civil cases, we see no reason not to apply the same principles concerning nunc pro tunc judgments developed there to this set of circumstances. Applying these principles here, we hold that the order of April 21, 1988, dismissing the first case nunc pro tunc December 14, 1987, was effective as of the earlier date. It is clear from the record that the trial court intended to dismiss the first case on December 14, 1987, stated its reasons and directed the prosecutor to prepare an order to do so. It is also clear from the record that the failure promptly to enter a formal order dismissing the first case was due to accident, excusable oversight or mistake. In fact, the prosecutor told the trial court at the hearing on Horsley’s motion to dismiss on April 18, 1988: “An order was prepared. I don’t have that file here with me. I have the current file. Why it has not made its way to the filing, I do not know.” The trial court asked the prosecutor to determine whether an order for dismissal was “floating around somewhere,” and if not to prepare one effective December 14, 1987.
*926The only evidence of prejudice that Horsley offered because of the delay in the dismissal of the first case was that his bond had not been exonerated. However, since his testimony was that he had furnished the bond through a bondsman for a premium of ten percent, we are unable to see what prejudice there was to Horsley. The premium is usually not refundable. No evidence was offered to show that Horsley would have been entitled to any refund upon exoneration of the bond. The attorney fees that Horsley testified he had incurred were in connection with the second case, not the first case.
AS TO PART III:
BAKES, C.J., JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.