Court Opinion

ID: 9860111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:10:58.235248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:01.408934
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), were not met with respect to the defendant’s written confession and that the defendant gave his written confession involuntarily. However, I do not agree that the admission of the written confession into evidence was harmless error under the authority of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), and People v. Henenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27 (1973). In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court said: “[Tjhere are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error ° ° (386 U.S. 18, 23, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824.) The eighth footnote to the opinion in Chapman indicates that the admission of an involuntary confession into evidence can never be harmless error. An identical holding is found in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68, 12 L. Ed. 2d 975, 980-81, 78 S. Ct. 844 (1958). Because the standard that must be applied in determining whether an error involving a Federal constitutional right is harmless is a Federal standard, supplied by Chapman, the admission into evidence of the defendant’s involuntary written confession must be regarded as prejudicial error, which necessitates a new trial for the defendant. The majority’s reliance upon People v. Henenberg is misplaced. The Illinois Supreme Court specifically said in that case that it was not “deciding whether the admission into evidence of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda can ever be harmless error.” 55 Ill. 2d 5, 12, 302 N.E.2d 27, 30. I also believe that the defendant’s oral confession should not have been admitted into evidence. The rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964), as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lagardo, 39 Ill. 2d 614, 237 N.E.2d 484, (1968), and People v. Halstrom, 34 Ill. 2d 20, 213 N.E.2d 498 (1966), is that police officers may not elicit incriminating statements from a defendant, after he has been indicted, in the absence of counsel, unless the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waives his right to the presence of counsel before giving the incriminating statements. The defendant in the present case did not make such a waiver before making his oral confession to the police investigator. Consider the following testimony of the police investigator on direct examination by the State’s attorney at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence: “Q. Did he [the defendant] have occasion to have a conversation with you prior to giving any statement, with reference to counsel? A. No, not before he had been given his rights. Q. I mean after he had been given his rights, prior to any questioning? A. Yes. Q. What did he say to you with reference to counsel? A. He asked me who his counsel would be. Q. And what did you say? A. I told him that if he couldn’t afford one, it would be our public defender. And he asked me who that was and I said Kenneth Hubler. Q. And then what did he say? A. Well, we went ahead and we talked about it and he gave me a statement.” I interpret this testimony to mean that after the defendant had been read the Miranda warning, but before he was questioned and before he made his oral confession, the defendant made some inquiry about having a lawyer. This renders it impossible for the State to carry its heavy burden of showing that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to the presence of counsel before giving his oral confession. Admitting the oral confession into evidence, therefore, was a violation of the rule of Massiah, Lagardo, and Halstrom. Moreover, since the defendant indicated before the questioning that led to his oral confession that he was interested in having a lawyer, the police investigator’s questioning him in the absence of counsel was in violation of the principles announced in Miranda. Thus, the circuit court’s failure to suppress the oral confession was error, and the defendant should be given a new trial.