Court Opinion

ID: 9756157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:10:21.262379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:15.059982
License: Public Domain

*521OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the well reasoned disposition of the majority except for the final issue dealing with the jury instruction and the Rescue Doctrine. As recited by the lower court and adopted by the majority, appellant’s injuries resulted from her attempt to aid appellee. Noticing his car stopped with the engine running and fearing the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning, appellant shut off the engine. Since the car was still in gear at this time, it began to roll, knocking her to the ground and inflicting injuries.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as early as 1900, realized the great regard for human life and the need to safeguard those who attempt to save the life of another. In Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900), it was determined that:
The law has so great a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, if the effort is made with a reasonable regard for the rescuer’s own safety ... It is not negligence per se for one to voluntarily risk his own safety or life in attempting to rescue another from impending danger.
Because of this great regard for human life, rescuers often act in the excitement of the moment in ways in which they would not act under calmer circumstances. This is precisely what happened to Mrs. Pachesky.
While I agree with the majority that there was no reversible error, I believe that the jury instruction and the special interrogatories could be shaped to give greater effect to the important policy of encouraging rescue and saving lives which underlies the Rescue Doctrine. I agree that the case to follow is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis.2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977), found on page 782 of the majority’s opinion. The Cord’s procedure is to first determine whether plaintiff’s actions were reasonable; only if they are unreasonable should the doctrine of comparative negligence come into play. Therefore, in submitting the special interrogatories to the jury, the initial question should be, “was the rescue unreasonable *522or unreasonably carried out?” The jury would then be instructed to continue with the remaining interrogatories only if the answer to this first question was “yes.”
McEWEN, J., joins.