Court Opinion

ID: 6425308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:03:24.504874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:57.606943
License: Public Domain

Field, C. J.
The court undertook to construe the contract declared on with reference to all the circumstances which the evidence tended to establish as existing when it was made, and merely left it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances assumed had been established by the evidence. This is not leaving the whole construction of a written contract to-the jury,- and the jury, by their verdict, have found that the circumstances were as they were assumed to be, and have construed the contract in the same manner as the court.
The principle of construing a writing most strongly against the party who wrote it, and proffered it, when it is reasonably capable of two constructions, and has been honestly understood and acted upon by the other party according to the construction which is most against the interest of the party proffering it, was announced in the charge of the presiding justice, not as an instruction to the jury, but as the rule adopted by the court. It is a rule which has been adopted in certain cases *77of real ambiguity, although we have some doubt whether, on the circumstances shown, there was any need of invoking it in the present case. Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46.
Assuming that the defendant knew that Webb, in behalf of the Economo Duplex Stove Company, had requested the plaintiff to make a new set of range patterns, of which there is no doubt, the letters of October 7 and October 8, 1890, become intelligible enough. The plaintiff in his letter to the defendant of October 7,1890, indicates that he wishes to have a note in writing from the defendant confirming what Webb had said, namely, that the defendant would' become responsible to the plaintiff for work on the new set of patterns ordered of the plaintiff to the amount of $500, although the plaintiff politely says that he has such confidence in Webb’s integrity that he regards a letter from the defendant as superfluous. The defendant, in his letter in reply, signifies in writing his present willingness and intention to become responsible to the plaintiff for work on such new set of patterns to the amount of $500. The whole letter of the defendant shows that he expected that the plaintiff would go on and make a new set of patterns as ordered by Webb, and the evidence shows that he knew that the plaintiff did go on and make the patterns. There was evidence that the defendant understood that the plaintiff in doing so was relying upon his agreement to become responsible to the amount of $500, and the jury must have so found. Upon such a finding no special notice of the acceptance of the guaranty or of the offer of guaranty was necessary. Knowledge was equivalent to notice. Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496.
In view of the facts which the court assumed in its hypothetical construction of the contract, which facts the jury must have found, the construction which the court gave to the clause, “ in the event of any such action on my part becoming necessary for any cause,” seems to be the only reasonable one. Itsmeant that if, for any cause, the company should be unable to pay for the new patterns, and it becomes necessary for the defendant to pay, he would pay for them up to the amount of $500.
The defendant contends that he is not bound, because it is said that he understood that the contract between the plaintiff and the company was, or was to be, for a set of patterns of wood *78and another set of iron, whereas the order actually given by .Webb was for a set of wooden patterns, and the plaintiff made only a set of wooden patterns, in conformity to the order.
Upon this point the instructions of the court were as follows: “ There is another matter to which I ought to refer, and that is the claim of the defendant that there was no guaranty of this contract, because he did not understand that the contract between the company and. the plaintiff was a contract to make wooden patterns alone, but that he understood that the contract was to make a complete set of patterns, wood and iron both; and that, inasmuch as he understood it that way, that was the contract, and not the contract to make a set of wooden patterns alone; and he agreed to guarantee a contract which, it appears upon the plaintiff’s own showing now, was not the contract which he understood he was guaranteeing, that therefore he is not bound. The claim is not correct. If a man undertakes to guarantee a contract which he may know the terms of upon inquiry, and he makes no effort to find out what the terms are, but guarantees it, says, ‘ I will guarantee that contract,’ and nobody misleads him about it, and he has an opportunity to know what it is if he sees fit, but does not take pains to find out, but guarantees it without knowing, he is bound: Now, whether that applies in this case you will determine upon the evidence.”
We think that the instructions were correct. The meaning of the letters, construed with reference to the circumstances which the jury must have found, is that the defendant is to become responsible to the amount of $500 for the work done by the plaintiff upon the new set of patterns, size No. 7, of the Economo Duplex Stove Company, which Webb, acting in behalf of the company, had ordered the plaintiff to make. There is nothing in the letters indicating whether the new patterns were to be of wood or of iron, or whether there were to be two sets of patterns, one of wood and the other of iron, and the defendant guarantees payment to the amount of $500 for the work to be done by the plaintiff on the patterns, size No. 7, of the Economo Duplex Stove Company which Webb had ordered. As Webb ordered only wooden patterns to be made, the defendant guaranteed payment for the patterns so ordered to the amount of $500.

Exceptions overruled.