Court Opinion

ID: 9957340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:07:43.623369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:16.824022
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3111-22

OMER JACKSON and
SHARONDA JACKSON,
per quod,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF HUDSON,
HUDSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE, and RENATO MAURE-
CASCARET,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

ORIENTAL HAMLET, ALBERT
A. AZIZ, GEICO INDEMNITY
COMPANY,

     Defendants.
_____________________________

                   Argued March 18, 2024 – Decided April 4, 2024

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.
           On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
           Division, Hudson County, Docket Nos. L-4100-19 and
           L-5038-19.

           Michael Scott Golner argued the cause for appellants
           (The Haddad Law Firm, PC, attorneys; Seamus Boyle
           and Nehal Modi, on the briefs).

           Christopher Kennedy Harriott argued the cause for
           respondents County of Hudson and Hudson County
           Sheriff's Office (Florio Kenny Raval, LLP, attorneys;
           Edward Joseph Florio, of counsel and on the brief;
           Christopher Kennedy Harriott, on the brief).

           Joseph Franck argued the cause for respondent Renato
           Maure-Cascaret (Inglesino Taylor, attorneys, join in the
           brief of respondents County of Hudson and Hudson
           County Sheriff's Office).

PER CURIAM

     Plaintiffs Omer Jackson and Sharonda Jackson sued defendants County of

Hudson, Hudson County Sheriff's Office, and Officer Renato Maure-Cascaret

under the Tort Claims Act ("TCA"), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, for injuries

suffered by Omer 1 when his car was hit by a motor vehicle that was being

pursued by Officer Maure-Cascaret. The trial court granted defendants' motion

for summary judgment dismissing the claims.             Plaintiffs appeal the

1
  We use Omer's first name when the discussion is applicable only to him
because he shares a surname with Sharonda. We intend no disrespect.
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                                      2
corresponding May 2, 2023 order. Having reviewed the record de novo, we

affirm.

                                       I.

      On January 23, 2018, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Officer Maure-Cascaret

of the Hudson County Sheriff's Department was conducting radar enforcement

in Jersey City. At that time, he observed a vehicle, driven by defendant Oriental

Hamlet,2 pass through three consecutive red lights on Kennedy Boulevard.

Officer Maure-Cascaret's radar captured Hamlet's vehicle traveling between

sixty-eight and seventy miles per hour. The posted speed limit on Kennedy

Boulevard is twenty-five miles per hour.

      Officer Maure-Cascaret followed Hamlet and attempted to "close the gap"

without turning on his patrol car's lights or sirens. Once he began following,

Officer Maure-Cascaret radioed the on-duty communications officers to inform

them he was following a vehicle traveling at a high speed.          The vehicle

subsequently slowed down, and Officer Maure-Cascaret initiated a traffic stop

of Hamlet near the intersection of Kennedy Boulevard and Fairmount Avenue.

2
  On November 13, 2020, default was entered against Hamlet. Stipulations of
dismissal with prejudice were filed as to defendants Albert A. Aziz and Geico
Indemnity Company.
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After both vehicles were stopped for several seconds, while Officer Maure-

Cascaret called in Hamlet's license plate, Hamlet suddenly sped away.

      Officer Maure-Cascaret again contacted the on-duty communications

officers to report that the vehicle sped away, and he was going to pursue. Shortly

thereafter, Hamlet sped through a red traffic signal at the intersection of

Kennedy Boulevard and Communipaw Avenue and collided with Omer's car,

which was traveling from Communipaw Avenue onto Kennedy Boulevard with

a green signal in its favor.

      The entire incident, from the time Officer Maure-Cascaret initially

observed Hamlet's speeding, to the attempt to pull him over, to the accident

terminating the pursuit, lasted approximately fifty seconds. The time period

from when Officer Maure-Cascaret initiated the traffic stop of Hamlet's vehicle

at Fairmount Avenue, to when Hamlet fled and then collided with Omer's car at

Communipaw Avenue, was approximately thirty seconds and spanned

approximately nine or ten blocks. At the time of the accident, Officer Maure-

Cascaret was approximately one block behind Hamlet at the intersection of

Kennedy Boulevard and Harrison Avenue, which the officer estimated was

between 500 and 1,000 feet away. After Officer Maure-Cascaret reported the

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collision, the communications officers informed him the vehicle Hamlet was

driving was stolen.

      On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in his application of

N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(2), which confers immunity on police officers for injuries

resulting from pursuits. Specifically, plaintiffs contend a jury should resolve

the question of whether Officer Maure-Cascaret's decision to initiate the pursuit

and his subsequent failure to terminate the pursuit violated the Attorney

General's Vehicular Pursuit Policy (hereinafter "Guidelines") and was thus

willful misconduct.

                                       II.

      We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk

v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). A motion for summary judgment must be

granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). "To decide whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists . . . [we] 'draw[] all legitimate inferences

from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242

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                                        5
N.J. 450, 472 (2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co.

v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016); see also Memuda v. Gonzalez, 475

N.J.(Super. 15, 18-19 (App. Div. 2023). "The court's function is not 'to weigh

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)

(quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). We

do not defer to the trial court's legal analysis. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire

Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018).

      The applicable law governing the issues on appeal is well established.

Tort claims made against public entities are governed by the conditions and

limitations of the TCA. As a general proposition, liability of public entities is

the exception, and immunity from liability is the rule under the TCA. Fluehr v.

City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532, 539 (1999); see also N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 (declaring

it "to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for

their negligence within the limitations of [the TCA] and in accordance with the

fair and uniform principles established [t]herein"); D.D. v. Univ. of Med. &

Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130, 133-34 (2013) (explaining that the overall

approach of the TCA is to broadly limit public entity liability). To that end, the

public policy adopted by the Legislature is to construe the immunity provisions

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of the TCA broadly and the liability provisions narrowly. Gerber v. Springfield

Bd. of Educ., 328 N.J. Super. 24, 34 (App. Div. 2000).

      Under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(2), neither a public entity nor a public employee

is liable for any injury caused by an escaping or escaped person. Further, a

public entity and public employee avoid liability for "any injury resulting from

or caused by a law enforcement officer's pursuit of a person."            N.J.S.A.

59:5-2(c).   Thus, barring a finding of willful misconduct, Officer Maure-

Cascaret cannot be found liable for plaintiffs' injuries sustained as a result of a

validly commenced pursuit. 3 N.J.S.A. 59:3-14(a).

      In Fielder v. Stonack, the Court defined "willful misconduct" in the

context of police pursuits. 141 N.J. 101, 125 (1995). The Court explained with

specificity the requirements for willful misconduct in the context of police

pursuits, finding two elements must be satisfied: "1) disobeying either a specific

lawful command of a superior or a specific lawful standing order and 2) knowing

3
  If a public employee is not liable for injuries arising from the employee's acts
or omissions, the public entity employer will not be liable either. N.J.S.A.
59:2-2(b). An additional provision of the TCA limits the entity's liability for
injuries caused by an employee's actions constituting willful misconduct.
N.J.S.A. 59:2-10. Read together, these provisions result in no liability for the
public entity defendants, whether the officer's acts constituted misconduct or
not.
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                                        7
of the command or standing order, knowing that it is being violated and,

intending to violate it." Ibid.

      Here, viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude

the trial court correctly determined there were no credible facts in the record to

establish Officer Maure-Cascaret engaged in willful misconduct during his

pursuit of Hamlet. The Guidelines state a police officer may only pursue a

suspect if they have committed a first- or second-degree offense or if the officer

reasonably believes the suspect poses an immediate threat to either the public or

the officer. Off. of the Att'y Gen., New Jersey Vehicular Pursuit Policy § I(A)(1)

(rev. 2009).

      During his deposition, Officer Maure-Cascaret explained his decision to

pursue Hamlet was based, in part, on Hamlet pulling away from the initiated

traffic stop. Officer Maure-Cascaret explained this was a second-degree offense

of eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), warranting police pursuit.         According to

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), any person "operating a motor vehicle . . . who knowingly

flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer . . . is guilty of

a crime of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of

death or injury to any person." Considering the Guidelines in conjunction with

the characterization of Hamlet's action as a second-degree offense under

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N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), Officer Maure-Cascaret's decision was authorized and did

not constitute willful misconduct.

      Plaintiffs next argue the trial court should permit a jury to determine

whether Officer Maure-Cascaret's failure to terminate the pursuit of Hamlet

constituted willful disobedience to the "standing orders" reflected in the

Guidelines. They posit the officer's failure to terminate the pursuit violated both

section I(C)(1)(f) of the Guidelines, which instructs a pursuing officer to

terminate a pursuit "if there is a clear and unreasonable danger to the police

officer or the public," and section I(C)(1)(d), which instructs officers to

terminate vehicle pursuits where the "distance [between an officer's vehicle and

the suspect's vehicle] becomes so great that further pursuit is futile." Plaintiffs

aver that given the officer's proximity to the location of the accident, as

evidenced by the surveillance footage submitted into evidence, and the time it

took the officer to arrive at the scene of the accident, the officer was likely to be

traveling more than twice the twenty-five mile per hour posted speed limit,

creating an unreasonable danger in violation of the Guidelines.

      As the trial court explained, the pursuit was of such a short duration that

the accident occurred "before [Officer Maure-Cascaret] could even have a

reasonable chance to terminate the pursuit." Moreover, the judge held in regard

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                                         9
to the use of excessive speed, "it's not just excessive speed that counts under

[section I(C)(1)(f)]. It's whether it was reasonable for the officer to move at that

excessive speed[.]" The judge concluded that finding Officer Maure-Cascaret

acted improperly in pursuing Hamlet at the speed he traveled would be an unfair

and illogical reading of the Guidelines.

      Denying defendants' summary judgment motion would have required a

factual dispute over whether Officer Maure-Cascaret demonstrated willful

misconduct in both his decision to pursue Hamlet and his failure to terminate

the pursuit prior to the collision. The undisputed facts reflect a pursuit on a

virtually empty street before 5:00 a.m., lasting thirty seconds, for only nine

blocks, with no order from a commanding officer to terminate the pursuit, and

no expert report opining that his speed was unreasonable. There are no factual

circumstances present in the record that could demonstrate willful misconduct

and, therefore, no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists.

      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions

raised by plaintiffs, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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