Court Opinion

ID: 9556589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 19:05:11.27214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:08.527196
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THIS AND THAT                     §
SERVICES CO. INC.,                §
                                  §      No. 441, 2022
     Employer Below,              §
     Appellant,                   §      Court Below: Superior Court
                                  §      of the State of Delaware
     v.                           §
                                  §      C.A. No. S21A-11-004
RAYMOND NIEVES,                   §
                                  §
     Claimant Below,              §
     Appellee.                    §

                       Submitted: June 28, 2023
                       Decided: August 17, 2023

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware: REVERSED.

John J. Ellis, Esquire, HECKLER & FRABIZZIO, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant This and That Services Co. Inc.

Walt F. Schmittinger, Esquire, SCHMITTINGER AND RODRIGUEZ, P.A., Dover,
Delaware, for Appellee Raymond Nieves.

LEGROW, Justice:
      An employer seeks review of a Superior Court Opinion1 reversing a decision

by the Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) regarding the

reasonableness of a prescribed course of treatment. This case has a protracted

procedural history despite the dispute’s limited scope. The IAB initially dismissed

this case as moot, but the Superior Court reversed and remanded that decision in

2019. On remand, the IAB held that the claimant employee’s ongoing narcotics

treatment after June 2017 was unreasonable, unnecessary, and therefore not

compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Superior Court then

reversed the IAB again, holding there was no justiciable issue before the Board

because the claimant employee had not submitted any medical claims to his

employer for ongoing treatment.

      The statute at issue in this appeal, 19 Del. C. § 2322F, provides a mechanism

for employers and their workers’ compensation carriers to challenge proposed or

provided health care services relating to compensable work injuries. On appeal, the

employer argues that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that

the IAB could not consider the compensability of an employee’s ongoing narcotics

treatment until the employee submitted invoices for payment to the employer and

the employer disputed those invoices in the statutory review process. Because the

1
 Nieves v. This & That Servs. Co., 2022 WL 3225283 (Del. Super. Aug. 10, 2022) [hereinafter
“Nieves II”].
Superior Court incorrectly interpreted 19 Del. C. § 2322F with respect to the

justiciability of the employer’s petition, we reverse the Superior Court’s decision,

vacate the attorneys’ fees award, and reinstate the IAB’s determination.

      I.      RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A.     The work injury and the utilization review

       On July 29, 2014, Raymond Nieves (“Mr. Nieves”), an employee of This and

That Services Co., Inc. (“This and That Services”), sustained a back injury while

working on a construction project.2 On December 17, 2015, Mr. Nieves sought pain

management treatment from Dr. Ganesh Balu (“Dr. Balu”), a board-certified

physician.3    Dr. Balu prescribed Mr. Nieves both opiate and non-opiate pain

medication, physical therapy, and two epidural injections.4 Dr. Balu also ordered a

discogram which showed a herniated disc and annular tear. As of June 13, 2017,

Mr. Nieves continued to complain of back pain and limited range of motion due to

pain and stiffness.5 To reduce the pain, Dr. Balu prescribed a mild opiate along with

Ibuprofen.6 After the June 13, 2017 visit, Mr. Nieves did not see Dr. Balu again until

2
  See App. to Opening Br. at A19 (2021 IAB Decision).
3
  See id. at A26.
4
  Id.
5
  Id. at A26–27.
6
  Id. at A27.
                                             2
April 10, 2018.7 Between those visits, Mr. Nieves underwent disc replacement

surgery on August 23, 2017.8

       This and That Services submitted Dr. Balu’s pain management treatment from

June 13, 2017 onward to utilization review in accordance with 19 Del. C. § 2322F.

Utilization review provides a mechanism for employers and their workers’

compensation carriers to challenge proposed and provided health care services

relating to compensable work injuries.9 On August 15, 2017, the utilization reviewer

certified Dr. Balu’s treatment as compliant with the Workers’ Compensation

Practice Guidelines and found all the treatment at issue was reasonable and

necessary.10

       B.      The IAB proceedings begin

       This and That Services disagreed with the utilization reviewer’s determination

and filed a petition (the “Petition”) with the IAB for de novo review of the utilization

reviewer’s conclusion that Dr. Balu’s pain management treatment was reasonable

and necessary.11       The parties filed a pre-hearing stipulation with the IAB in

7
  Id. at A28.
8
  Id. at A27.
9
  19 Del. C. § 2322F. Under Section 2322F(j), the “Workers’ Compensation Oversight Panel shall
approve, propose, and maintain a utilization review program for any health-care provider
providing services to injured workers. . .The intent is to provide reference for employers, insurance
carriers, and health-care providers for evaluation of health care and charges.” Id. § 2322F(j); A-
497 (Utilization Review Appeal).
10
   App. to Opening Br. at A502–07 (Utilization Review Determination).
11
   See id. at A497 (Utilization Review Appeal).
                                                 3
September 2018, narrowing the issues to whether Dr. Balu’s narcotic prescriptions

from June 13, 2017 forward were reasonable and necessary.12

       On September 14, 2018, Mr. Nieves filed a motion in limine with the IAB to

limit the Petition’s relevant time period to June 13, 2017 through August 23, 2017,

and to exclude all challenges to treatment after August 2017, when Mr. Nieves

underwent disc replacement surgery.13 Mr. Nieves argued that the circumstances of

his treatment changed as a result of the surgery.14 Mr. Nieves also moved to dismiss

the Petition, contending the remaining issues before the IAB were moot.15 The IAB

held a hearing to consider the Petition on September 20, 2018.16 At that hearing, the

IAB granted the motion in limine and limited the treatment period in dispute to June

13, 2017 through August 23, 2017, when Mr. Nieves had surgery.17 The IAB then

dismissed the Petition for mootness because This and That Services already had paid

for Mr. Nieves’ narcotics treatment from June 13, 2017 to August 23, 2017, and

nothing else remained in dispute (the “2018 IAB Decision”).18

12
   Id. at A5 (Stipulation of Facts).
13
   Id. at A524.
14
   Id.
15
   Id.
16
   Id. at A6 (2018 IAB Decision).
17
   Id. at A7.
18
   Id.; See also id. at A18 (2021 IAB Decision).
                                                   4
       C.     The first appeal to the Superior Court

       This and That Services then appealed the 2018 IAB Decision to the Superior

Court.19 The Superior Court issued a decision dated June 7, 2019 (“Nieves I”),

reversing and remanding the IAB’s decision.20 The Superior Court held that the IAB

erred in dismissing the Petition as moot because there was no evidence that This and

That Services had paid for the medication at issue, so there was still “a real, albeit

narrow, issue” for the IAB to decide.21 Mr. Nieves moved for reargument, seeking

to clarify whether the Superior Court was reversing the IAB’s holding that the

Petition was limited to the June to August 2017 period. The Superior Court denied

reargument, holding that “[a] full review of the evidence is needed. The Board

should make its decision after the review. My decision necessarily overrules the

limitations placed upon the parties by granting the motion in limine.”22

       D.     The IAB remand hearings
       The IAB conducted remand hearings on June 3, 2021, and October 8, 2021,

and issued a decision on October 18, 2021 (the “2021 IAB Decision”).23 During the

remand hearings, both parties presented evidence from their respective medical

19
   App. to Opening Br. at A18 (2021 IAB Decision).
20
   This & That Servs. Co. v. Nieves, 2019 WL 2406654 (Del. Super. June 7, 2019) [hereinafter
“Nieves I”].
21
   Nieves I, 2019 WL 2406654, at *4.
22
   This & That Servs. Co. v. Nieves, 2019 WL 2539268 (Del. Super. June 19, 2019) (emphasis
added).
23
   Answering Br. at 2. According to the parties, proceedings were delayed due to the COVID-19
pandemic.
                                             5
experts. This and That Services’ expert, Dr. Jason Brokaw (“Dr. Brokaw”), a board

certified physician, examined Mr. Nieves and reviewed his medical records.24 Dr.

Brokaw testified that Mr. Nieves’ use of narcotic medication was unreasonable,

unnecessary,25 and “outside the Delaware Practice Guidelines related to positive

functional outcomes and positive patient responses.”26 Dr. Brokaw testified that Dr.

Balu’s records contained many mistakes and boilerplate templated portions that did

not change from month to month. In his view, the templated portions of the records

indicated Dr. Balu was not appropriately assessing Mr. Nieves for functional

improvements.27

       In response to Dr. Brokaw’s testimony, Mr. Nieves relied on Dr. Balu’s

deposition testimony.28 Dr. Balu was deposed in 2018 and 2020 and testified on both

occasions that Mr. Nieves’ treatment was reasonable, necessary, and related to the

work injury.29 In his 2020 deposition, Dr. Balu stated during direct examination that

he had not prescribed narcotic medication to Mr. Nieves since September 10, 2018,

and that statements to the contrary in his medical records were erroneous.30

24
   App. to Opening Br. at A19 (2021 IAB Decision).
25
   Id. at A188 (Dr. Brokaw’s Tr. at 28:13–20).
26
   Id. at A98 (Dr. Brokaw’s Tr. at 16:10–16).
27
   Id. at A111 (Dr. Brokaw’s Tr. at 29:20–30:3).
28
   Opening Br. at 9.
29
   App. to Opening Br. at A243 (Dr. Balu’s Tr. at 23:8–11).
30
   Id. at A328 (Dr. Balu’s Tr. at 28:14–29:5, 35:19–24).
                                               6
       The IAB, “upon consideration of [Nieves I], as well as upon consideration of

all of the evidence presented during the hearing on the merits of this case,” concluded

the narcotic medication Dr. Balu prescribed was “unreasonable and unnecessary

since June 13, 2017.”31 The IAB accepted Dr. Brokaw’s expert testimony regarding

the appropriateness of narcotic medication32 and did not limit the time period under

review to the period before Mr. Nieves’ disc replacement surgery.33 The IAB also

found that Dr. Balu’s records were sloppy and internally inconsistent. 34 In its 2021

Decision, the IAB held that This and That Services met its burden of proof regarding

the non-compensability of the narcotic medication since June 13, 2017.35

       E.     The second appeal to the Superior Court

       Mr. Nieves appealed the 2021 IAB Decision to the Superior Court,36 which

issued an Order dated August 10, 2022, again reversing the IAB (“Nieves II”). After

concluding in Nieves I that the Petition was justiciable, the Superior Court reversed

course and held that the IAB did not have any justiciable issue before it for two

separate reasons.37 First, the Superior Court held that This and That Services could

31
   Id. at A34 (2021 IAB Decision).
32
   Id. at A36.
33
   Id. at A38.
34
   Id. at A36.
35
   Id. at A38.
36
   Answering Br. at 3.
37
   Nieves II, 2022 WL 3225283, at *3. “Utilization Review proceedings address a claim to certain
specific medical treatments. When new or subsequent claims are made, the Utilization Review
process can and should be used again. In cases where a medical invoice pertains to an
acknowledged compensable claim, it shall be referred to Utilization Review.” Id.
                                               7
not seek IAB review of Mr. Nieves’ ongoing narcotic prescriptions before first

submitting each prescription to utilization review.38 Second, the Superior Court held

that because Mr. Nieves had not made a claim to his employer for payment of

narcotics treatment, there was no justiciable issue for the Board to decide.39 Despite

previously holding that its decision in Nieves I “necessarily overrule[d]” the 2018

IAB Decision limiting the Petition to the June to August 2017 timeframe, the

Superior Court concluded that the sole issue before the IAB after the June 7, 2019

remand was the reasonableness of Dr. Balu’s June 2017 prescription for narcotic

medication, which the Superior Court now held was moot because This and That

Services previously paid that invoice.40

       F.     This and That Services appeals to this Court

       Before This and That Services filed its first notice of appeal in this Court, Mr.

Nieves filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, which the Superior Court granted on

November 21, 2022.41 While Mr. Nieves’ attorneys’ fees motion was pending, This

and That Services appealed Nieves II to this Court. We dismissed that appeal as

interlocutory.42 Additionally, during the period when Mr. Nieves’ attorneys’ fees

38
   Id.
39
   Id. at *2.
40
   Id. at *3.
41
   App. to Opening Br. at A47–50 (Superior Ct. Order).
42
   Id. at A51–54 (Supreme Ct. Dismissal Order).
                                              8
motion was pending before the Superior Court, the IAB issued an order dismissing

This and That Services’ Petition as instructed in Nieves II.43

       This and That Services sought reargument with the IAB, contesting the IAB’s

October 2022 remand decision and requesting that it rescind or stay that order.44 On

November 23, 2022, while This and That Services’ motion for reargument was

pending with the IAB, This and That Services filed a Notice of Appeal with this

Court, appealing the Superior Court’s August 10, 2022 and November 21, 2022

decisions.45 The IAB denied This and That Services’ motion for reargument on

January 19, 2023.46

                                 II.    ANALYSIS

       In an appeal from an IAB decision, this Court’s scope of review is limited to

examining the record for errors of law and determining whether the Board’s factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence.47 “Substantial evidence means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.”48 “It is ‘more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the

43
   Nieves II, 2022 WL 3225283, at *3 (“I reverse the Board’s decision and remand the case to be
dismissed.”).
44
   Answering Br. at 4.
45
   Id.
46
   App. to Answering Br. at B82.
47
   Roos Foods v. Guardado, 152 A.3d 114, 118 (Del. 2016).
48
   Christiana Care Health Servs. v. Davis, 127 A.3d 391, 394 (Del. 2015) (quoting Histed v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                               9
evidence.’”49 Alleged errors of law are reviewed de novo,50 but we accord significant

weight to the IAB’s application of legal principles within Delaware’s workers’

compensation scheme, which the IAB applies on a weekly, if not daily, basis.51

       This and That Services makes two primary arguments on appeal from Nieves

II. First, it contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law, abused its

discretion, and improperly overruled the IAB’s factual findings. Second, it asserts

that substantial evidence in the record supported the IAB’s decision that Mr. Nieves’

ongoing use of narcotic medication was unreasonable and unnecessary. Mr. Nieves

disputes the merits of these two arguments and additionally maintains that This and

That Services failed to appeal the IAB’s October 2022 decision to the Superior Court

and this appeal therefore should be dismissed as jurisdictionally improper.

       A.      This and That Services properly and timely appealed to this
               Court.
       Mr. Nieves argues this appeal should be dismissed with prejudice because

This and That Services did not perfect a timely appeal of the Superior Court’s

49
   Davis, 127 A.3d at 394 (quoting Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del.
1988)).
50
   State v. Gates, 213 A.3d 80, 85 (Del. 2019).
51
   Davis, 127 A.3d at 395 (citing Histed, 621 A.2d at 342 (“When factual determinations are at
issue, we must take due account of the experience and specialized competence of the Board and
of the purposes of our workers’ compensation law.”)); Spring Constr. Co. v. Mendez, 1992 WL
302072, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 15, 1992) (“Since one of the most compelling reasons for creating
administrative agencies is to allow the judicial system to make use of the knowledge and
experience of specialists, this Court would be wasting this resource if it lightly dismissed the fruits
of such expertise. It may not do so when the decision is based on substantial evidence and the
product of an orderly deductive process.”).
                                                  10
October 2022 remand decision.52 According to this argument, Nieves II was an

interlocutory decision, even after the Superior Court resolved the attorneys’ fees

motion, because the Superior Court remanded the case to the IAB.53 In Mr. Nieves’

view, because This and That Services failed to appeal the IAB’s January 19, 2023

decision, that decision and the IAB’s October 2022 dismissal order are final and

binding and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.54

       Mr. Nieves’ argument is flawed because the Superior Court’s remand to the

IAB was only for the Board to perform a ministerial function.55 A decision of the

Superior Court remanding a case to an administrative agency or board may be either

final or interlocutory, depending on the “nature of the functions directed to be

performed” on remand.56 If the functions are “purely ministerial,” such as a direction

to enter a specific award, the judgment is final; if the functions are quasi-judicial,

such as taking testimony and making findings, the judgment is not final.57 The

Superior Court’s decision in Nieves II left the IAB with no discretion as to how to

52
   Answering Br. at 23.
53
   Id. at 20–21.
54
   Id. at 22–23.
55
   DiFrancesco v. Mayor & Town Council of Elsmere, 2007 WL 1874761, at *2 (Del. Super. June
28, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Mayor & Town Council of Town of Elsmere v. DiFrancesco, 947 A.2d
1122 (Del. 2008). Although Mr. Nieves argues that the Board on remand awarded medical fees
and attorneys’ fees to Mr. Nieves, that issue was not actually before the Board. The Superior Court
remanded to the IAB for the case “to be dismissed.” The outstanding fee petition was pending
before, and ultimately decided by, the Superior Court.
56
   McClelland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 214 A.2d 847, 848 (Del. 1965).
57
   Id.
                                                11
rule. Rather, the Superior Court ordered the IAB to dismiss the petition and did not

direct the IAB to engage in any further inquiry.58 Accordingly, the Superior Court’s

order was final and appealable as a matter of right once it ruled on the fee petition,

and this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal on its merits.

       B.      The Superior Court erred as a matter of law in determining that
               the Petition did not raise any justiciable issues.

       Turning to the merits of the appeal, This and That Services first contends that

the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there was no justiciable

controversy before the IAB. The Superior Court reached that conclusion for two

reasons: (1) Mr. Nieves had not submitted an invoice to This and That Services

relating to the narcotic treatment; and (2) This and That Services had not submitted

any treatment after August 2017 to utilization review. But the relevant statutory

language does not support the Superior Court’s conclusion that “bills must be at

issue” before the parties may engage in the utilization review process.59

        An actual controversy exists when “one side makes a claim of a present

specific right, and the other side makes an equally definite claim to the contrary.”60

58
   Where the Board is directed to enter a specific different award, the judgment is final.
McClelland, 214 A.2d at 848. Mr. Nieves’ reliance on Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Barkley, 2004 WL
2239724 (Del. 2004) is misplaced. In Barkley, the Superior Court remanded the case to the IAB
so it could apply the correct causation standard and determine if benefits were owed. Id. at *1 n1.
Because the remand did not direct the IAB to enter a specific judgment, it was not a remand for a
purely ministerial function. Id. at *2.
59
   Nieves II, 2022 WL 3225283, at *3.
60
   Goldberg v. Rehoboth Beach, 565 A.2d 936, 939 (Del. Super. 1989).
                                                12
A justiciable controversy arises under Section 2322F(j) of the Workers’

Compensation Act when an employer or its insurance carrier disputes proposed or

provided healthcare services. The statute relevantly provides that “[a]n employer or

insurance carrier may engage in utilization review to evaluate the quality,

reasonableness and/or necessity of proposed or provided health-care services for

acknowledged compensable claims.”61

       The Superior Court did not address that statutory language but held that,

because Mr. Nieves did not submit invoices for payment of his narcotic medication

after June 2017, there was no issue in dispute, and therefore nothing was

justiciable.62   That conclusion misapplied the unambiguous statutory language

allowing utilization review for both proposed and provided treatment. The IAB

found that there was evidence that Dr. Balu prescribed narcotic medication to Mr.

Nieves because of his work-related low back injury until at least 2019,63 and This

and That Services was statutorily permitted to contest whether that treatment was

reasonable and necessary without regard to whether This and That Services first

received an invoice for the treatment.

61
   19 Del. C. § 2322F(j) (emphasis added).
62
   Nieves II, 2022 WL 3225283, at *2. The IAB and the Superior Court found This and That
Services had paid for the June 2017 prescription, thereby mooting that issue. We agree with this
conclusion legally and factually.
63
   App. to Opening Br. at A31, A33, A37–38 (2021 IAB Decision).
                                              13
       The Superior Court also erred in holding that the IAB lacked jurisdiction to

consider the Petition because This and That Services did not first submit each month

of Mr. Nieves’ ongoing narcotics treatment to utilization review. In the Superior

Court’s view, when new or subsequent claims are made, the employer must return

to utilization review,64 even when each claim relates to the ongoing treatment that

was originally sent to utilization review. That conclusion is inconsistent with this

case’s facts, the purpose of the utilization review process, and the Superior Court’s

previous holding in Nieves I.

       First, as a factual matter, the evidence the parties offered to the IAB indicates

that there was an actual controversy in dispute regarding the reasonableness of

narcotic medication after June 2017. In its Petition, This and That Services contested

the compensability of the narcotics from “June 13, 2017 and onwards.”65 The Board

heard conflicting evidence regarding Mr. Nieves’ treatment. Mr. Nieves testified on

two occasions that he continued to receive narcotic prescriptions after June 2017 and

into 2019, but he stated during the IAB hearing that he did not receive any narcotic

prescriptions from Dr. Balu after 2017.66 Further, all of Dr. Balu’s records after

September 10, 2018 indicated Mr. Nieves’ medication included narcotics.67 Dr.

64
   Nieves II, 2022 WL 3225283, at *2–3.
65
   App. to Opening Br. at A497 (Utilization Review Appeal).
66
   Id. at A31, A33, A36 (2021 IAB Decision).
67
   Id. at A38 (2021 IAB Decision).
                                             14
Balu, however, testified that he did not prescribe narcotic medication to Mr. Nieves

after 2017, dismissing the contrary medical records as inaccurate.68 Dr. Brokaw also

testified the records indicated Mr. Nieves continued to receive such medication.69

Acknowledging the conflicting evidentiary record, the IAB stated “if Dr. Balu kept

accurate records, . . . this matter may never have even required a hearing before the

Board.”70 The record reflects that This and That Services was disputing Dr. Balu’s

narcotic medication prescriptions after June 2017, and the parties presented evidence

to the Board regarding that medication’s use in 2017, 2018, and 2019.

       Second, the Superior Court’s holding lacks statutory support. The purpose of

utilization review is to permit “prompt resolution of issues related to treatment

and/or . . . practice guidelines for those claims which have been acknowledged to be

compensable.” 71 The Superior Court, however, held the IAB could not consider the

reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment until This and That Services first

submitted each invoice to utilization review. As previously explained, the Superior

Court’s focus on invoices misreads Section 2322F. The record shows This and That

Services consistently challenged Mr. Nieves’ narcotic prescriptions beginning June

13, 2017, without specifying an end date. The IAB had the authority to hear all the

68
   Id. at A37–38.
69
   Opening Br. at 16–17.
70
   App. to Opening Br. at A38 (2021 IAB Decision).
71
   Opening Br. at 21.
                                             15
issues before it, including the ongoing prescription of the challenged medication

after the utilization review determination.72

       Finally, the Superior Court’s reasoning contradicts its holding in Nieves I. In

its 2018 decision, the IAB granted Mr. Nieves’ motion in limine to limit its review

to the June to August 2017 time period, but the Superior Court expressly reversed

that holding in Nieves I, explaining its decision “overrule[d]” the limitations imposed

when the IAB granted the motion in limine.73 The compensability of narcotic

medication from June 2017 forward therefore was a justiciable issue before the IAB

on remand.

       C.     The IAB’s decision that Mr. Nieves’ ongoing use of narcotic
              medication was unreasonable and unnecessary is supported by
              substantial evidence in the record.

       Finally, This and That Services contends that this Court should reinstate the

IAB’s decision as to compensability because the ruling was supported by substantial

evidence. When the IAB concluded that Mr. Nieves’ continued prescriptions for

narcotics from June 2017 were unreasonable and unnecessary, it did so based on the

testimony of Mr. Nieves and the parties’ medical experts.74 In its evaluation of the

case, the IAB recognized the inconsistencies in Dr. Balu’s medical records. When

evidence or testimony conflicts, the Board must resolve credibility issues and weigh

72
   19 Del. C. § 2322F(j).
73
   This & That Servs. Co. v. Nieves, 2019 WL 2539268, at *1.
74
   App. to Opening Br. at A36–38 (2021 IAB Decision).
                                              16
the evidence.75 Provided there is substantial evidence to support its decision, the

Board may accept the testimony of one physician over another.76 The IAB held that

the evidence best supported Dr. Brokaw’s opinion that the narcotic medication was

“inappropriate, unreasonable, and unnecessary for [Mr. Nieves] since at least June

13, 2017.”77 The IAB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.

                                     III.    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Superior Court’s August 10, 2022

Memorandum Opinion and Order, vacate its November 21, 2022 attorneys’ fees

award, and reinstate the IAB’s October 18, 2021 decision.78

75
   Gen. Motors Corp. v. McNemar, 202 A.2d 803, 807 (Del. 1964).
76
   Standard Distributing Co. v. Nally, 630 A.2d 640, 646 (Del. 1993).
77
   App. to Opening Br. at A36 (2021 IAB Decision).
78
   See Davis, 127 A.3d at 395–96 (reversing the Superior Court’s decision and reinstating the IAB’s
decision); DiSabatino Bros., Inc., v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. 1982) (same).
                                                17