Court Opinion

ID: 9577333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:55.518317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:21.005491
License: Public Domain

*230Lovins, President,
dissenting in part:
In my opinion, the two points of the syllabus of the Court’s opinion are correct abstract statements of law. Furthermore, I agree that the first point of the syllabus is applicable to the case at bar. However, I do not believe that the proposition of law stated in the second point of the syllabus is applicable to the record presented us in the present appeal. Hence, this dissent.
Code, 23-4-6, after designating the percentage awards to be made for various specific losses occasioned by a com-pensable injury, none of which admittedly is applicable to the injury under consideration, provides: “In all other cases permanent disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts in the case * * Formerly, it was held that the determination of a percentage of disability in accordance with the above-quoted section of Code, 23-4-6, was an administrative act, and accordingly not reviewable by this Court. Vandall v. Comp. Com’r., 110 W. Va. 61, 158 S. E. 499; Scott v. Commissioner, 111 W. Va. 454, 162 S. E. 483; Saunders v. Comp. Com’r., 112 W. Va. 212, 164 S. E. 39; Jones v. Comp. Com’r., 112 W. Va. 473, 164 S. E. 661. This was true, notwithstanding the fact that the substantative right to an appeal from an order of the Compensation Commissioner, as provided by Code, 23-5-1, has always been the same, only procedural changes having been made therein.
However, by the enactment of Chapter 137, Acts of the Legislature, 1939, there was added to the above-quoted portion of the Code, 23-4-6, a proviso reading as follows: “Provided, That the claimant shall have the right of appeal from the decision of the commissioner as provided by article five of this chapter.” Chapter 137, idem, further amended the compensation law by adding to Code, 23-5, sections 1-a, 1-b, 1-c and 1-d, all of which relate to an adjustment or modification of a permanent partial disability award previously granted, where a showing of “progression or aggravation in the claimant’s condition, or some other fact or facts which were not theretofore *231considered by the commissioner in his former findings” can be made.
The opinion in the case of Blevins v. Comp. Com’r., 127 W. Va. 481, 501, 33 S. E. 2d 408, which was a case involving an adjustment of a compensation award previously made, contains the following comment: “We have not overlooked what may have been the practice in former days of treating only such matters as went to the claimant’s right to compensation as being final disposition of the case, from which an appeal could be taken. 1931 Code, 23-5. But such practice, if ever warranted by the statute, is now clearly foreclosed by the 1939 Act. Chapter 137, Article 4, [obviously meaning Article 5], Sections l-(a) and l-(b).” This comment, in so far as it might relate to the determination of an initial percentage award of permanent partial disability, was justified, at the time of the decision in the Blevins case, only by reason of the proviso added to Code, 23-4-6, by Chapter 137, idem, quoted above.
However, by the enactment of Chapter 131, Acts of the Legislature, 1945, the proviso of Code, 23-4-6, permitting an appeal from an initial percentage award of permanent partial disability, was deleted, although appeals from orders modifying or adjusting a permanent partial disability award continued to be specifically provided for. Accordingly, it is my opinion that, with respect to the right of an appeal from an initial percentage award of permanent partial disability, the doctrine announced in the Vandall, Scott, Saunders and Jones cases, should be clarified and applied to the instant case.
The cases cited in the Court’s opinion all deal with appeals from orders modifying or adjusting awards previously made, and none deals with the right to appeal from an initial percentage 'award of permanent partial disability. Therefore, the doctrine announced by the Court in the second point of the syllabus herein is applicable to cases: wherein an adjustment or modification of a permanent, partial disability award previously made is considered, but such doctrine does not and should not be applied in *232instances such as the present case, wherein only a determination of the amount of an initial permanent partial disability award has been made.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Code, 23-4-6, provides that the commissioner shall determine the percentage of an initial award for permanent partial disability “* * * in accordance with the facts in the case * * (Emphasis supplied.) It seems to me that the gist of the Court’s opinion, in reversing the percentage award, is based upon the fact that no physician recommended any specific percentage. For that reason, the opinion holds that the percentage awarded claimant herein is without basis. I am of the opinion that the Court in doing so, is attempting to substitute opinion evidence of a medical expert witness for “facts” required by the statute. Expert medical testimony may be a means of determining the “facts” of a case, but such testimony should not be determinative in and of itself. Such a result would substitute the opinion of a medical expert for the finding of the commissioner.
The “facts” disclosed by this record reveal a serious and painful injury to claimant. Unquestionably, claimant is now sexually impotent by reason of his injury. According to the report of Dr. W. T. Henshaw, the commissioner’s medical director, there is a strong inference that claimant will develop a psychological neurosis occasioned by his impotency. Such a result would seem to me to be natural, considering the nature of claimant’s injury. No doubt such a result is one of the “facts” to be considered by the commissioner in accordance with Code, 23-4-6. It is obvious to me that such fact was considered by the commissioner, and, in my opinion, is sufficient to support the percentage awarded.
Believing that the order of the State Compensation Commissioner, dated February 25,1949, fixing the percentage of an initial permanent partial disability award, is an administrative act, not subject to judicial review except upon a showing of fraud, arbitrariness or capriciousness, *233and that such percentage is amply supported by the record, I would affirm the orders of the said Commissioner and the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.