Court Opinion

ID: 9760250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:44:44.022883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.795638
License: Public Domain

DALIANIS, J.,
dissenting. The majority concludes that RSA 637:5, 11(b) (2007) is not overbroad as applied to the defendant, Daniel R Hynes, because it finds that his threatened lawsuit was “objectively baseless.” I disagree with this conclusion, and, therefore, respectfully, dissent.
The majority concludes that the threatened suit is objectively baseless because the defendant “could not have realistically expected success on the merits of the threatened suit where he had no standing to pursue it.” In my *206view, however, the defendant could have realistically believed that he had standing. We have never, before today, articulated that a person must have some definite or special interest in the outcome in order to be an aggrieved person under RSA chapter 354-A (1995 & Supp. 2008). Cf. State v. Panarello, 157 N.H. 204, 209-10 (2008) (in plain error context, when this court has never before decided issue, trial court’s error could not have been clear or obvious). Further, there is at least some suggestion in our jurisprudence, albeit in the context of employment discrimination, that to bring this type of claim, a person need not actually sustain an injury as a result of a discriminatory practice. See Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 710-11 (1980). While I agree with the majority that our employment discrimination cases can be distinguished from the instant case, the fact remains that, until today, we have not distinguished them.
Given these two factors, I would conclude that it was not objectively baseless for the defendant to believe he possessed standing to pursue a claim under RSA chapter 354-A. See also N.H. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.1. (lawyer may assert issue when there is good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law).