Court Opinion

ID: 9732712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:32:38.659341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:31.796331
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by my colleague. I do so, however, on the narrow basis that appellant has failed to make out a claim in quasi-contract that would entitle him to restitution from appellees.
Appellant has conceded that the facts in this case do not support a finding that a contract for legal services was reached between him and appellee Pucello. His only claim on *514appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his quantum meruit claim on the basis that there had been no meeting of the minds between the parties. In this appellant is correct, for
“[ujnlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons of justice.” Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 436 Pa. 279, 290, 259 A.2d 443, 449 (1969), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 5, comment b. at 24. “Quasi contracts may be found in the absence of any expression of assent by the party to be charged and may indeed be found in spite of the party’s contrary intention.” Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, supra at 290-91, 259 A.2d at 449.
Martin v. Little, Brown and Co., 304 Pa.Super. 424, 430-431, 450 A.2d 984, 988 (1981). However, this error by the trial court does not warrant reversal of its judgment because it is clear that the facts of this case cannot, as a matter of law, support a quantum meruit recovery by appellant.
A cause of action in quasi-contract for quantum meruit, a form of restitution, is made out where one person has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Martin v. Little, Brown and Co., supra (citing DeGasperi v. Valicenti, 198 Pa.Super. 455, 457, 181 A.2d 862, 864 (1962)).
The elements of unjust enrichment are “benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by defendant, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value.” Wolf v. Wolf, 356 Pa.Super. 365, 514 A.2d 901 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 527 Pa. 218, 590 A.2d 4 (1991); see also Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority v. Langeloth Townsite Co., 403 Pa.Super. 84, 588 A.2d 43 (1991).
Styer v. Hugo, 422 Pa.Super. 262, 267, 619 A.2d 347 (1993), affirmed 535 Pa. 610, 637 A.2d 276 (1994). The most significant element of the doctrine is whether the enrichment of the *515defendant is unjust. Id. Thus to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, it must be shown, “that a person wrongly secured or passively received a benefit that it would be unconscionable to retain” without making payment. Martin v. Little, Brown and Co., supra (citing Brereton’s Estate, 388 Pa. 206, 212, 130 A.2d 453, 457 (1957); Crossgates Realty, Inc. v. Moore, 279 Pa.Super. 247, 420 A.2d 1125, 1127-28 (1980); Roman Mosaic & Tile Co., Inc. v. Vollrath, 226 Pa.Super. 215, 218, 313 A.2d 305, 307 (1973).
The facts of this case simply cannot support a finding that Pucello was unjustly enriched by appellant Feingold’s services. By refusing to accept Feingold’s files containing his work product, Pucello affirmatively rejected any direct benefit from Feingold’s services. Thus it is clear that acceptance and retention of the benefits of Feingold’s services, a necessary element of the claim of unjust enrichment, has not been established.
Appellant argues that despite Pucello’s refusal to accept his work product, Pucello nevertheless passively received benefits from Feingold’s services. He points to two specific benefits which he contends were received by Pucello. First, he asserts that Pucello’s ability to obtain an appointment with a conveniently located physician on short notice was a result of Feingold’s established relationships with the physician. Second, Feingold asserts that settlement of Pucello’s case was facilitated because Feingold obtained a written admission of liability from the driver of the car which struck Pucello, and the driver was constrained from denying liability when he was later interviewed by Pucello’s counsel. I cannot agree that either of these alleged “benefits,” even if received by Pucello, was sufficient to establish that Pucello was unjustly enriched.
Feingold’s assistance in arranging an appointment with a physician is not the type of service for which one would normally expect to pay, nor is it a professional legal service which has a value because- of the professional expertise required to render it. Accordingly, these services did not confer upon Pucello a benefit which it would be unconscionable to retain without making restitution. Similarly, Feingold’s claim *516that settlement of Pucello’s case was facilitated by the admissions made by the alleged tortfeasor to Feingold is entirely speculative. Because Feingold introduced no competent evidence to support his assertion that his work on the case had the effect he alleges, the record cannot support his claim that his services conferred a benefit upon Pucello.
Appellant’s claim for quantum meruit cannot be sustained in the absence of a finding of unjust enrichment which, in equity, requires restitution. Because the record in this matter will not support such a finding, his quantum meruit claim was properly denied. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s order.