Court Opinion

ID: 9584886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:38.24136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:37.699852
License: Public Domain

Judge BECTON
concurring in the result.
For the reasons stated by the majority, I, too, believe the defendant is entitled to a new trial. However, I write this concurring opinion because prejudicial error was committed, in my opinion, when (a) the trial court admitted evidence that defendant made representations to other parties that he would assist them in obtaining housing and that these parties did not obtain houses; and (b) the trial court admitted evidence relating to civil judgments against the defendant.
I believe the evidence relating to defendant’s prior similar dealings with other parties should have been excluded. Generally, the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense even though the other offense is of the same nature as the crime charged. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954); *452State v. Jeffries, 117 N.C. 727, 23 S.E. 163 (1895). It is true that in certain cases evidence of prior offenses is competent to show knowledge or intent on the part of the defendant; however, the prior offenses must have been committed at or near the time of the offense charged. See State v. Gammons, 258 N.C. 522, 128 S.E. 2d 860 (1963), wherein our Supreme Court held, in a trial for assault with intent to commit rape, that evidence that the defendant had committed a similar offense two years earlier was inadmissible for any purpose. Some of the evidence admitted in this case dealt with defendant’s representations to other parties occurring two or more years prior to the representations made in the case at bar. On the basis of the rule enunciated in McClain and Gammons, I believe the evidence to which the defendant excepted in this case was inadmissible.
The State also presented evidence of seven civil judgments docketed against the defendant in the total principal amount of $9,357.80. Significantly, two of the civil judgments were in favor of Elsie B. Wade and William Henry Smith, both of whom testified that they had dealt with the defendant previously with regard to defendant assisting them in obtaining housing, but that they had not obtained houses as a result of their prior dealings with the defendant. “It is generally held that a ‘judgment in a civil action is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution although exactly the same questions are in dispute in both cases, for the reason that the parties are not the same, and different rules as to the weight of the evidence prevail.’ ” State v. Dula, 204 N.C. 535, 536, 168 S.E. 836, 836-37 (1933). The admission of a civil judgment in this case, especially those in favor of Elsie Wade and William Smith, violated this rule and constitute prejudicial error in my view.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe evidence of similar prior dealings with other parties and the evidence relating to civil judgments against the defendant should not be admitted at the retrial.