Court Opinion

ID: 9388193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 21:01:15.173054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:18.785290
License: Public Domain

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                                              PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1447

        SUMMER D. LASHLEY, Ph D

                    Plaintiff - Appellant

        v.

        SPARTANBURG METHODIST COLLEGE; W. SCOTT COCHRAN; MARK W.
        GIBBS, Ph D; TERESA D. FERGUSON; JONATHAN J. KEISLER, Ph D;
        ANGELIA A. TURNER; CLEVON A. BOYD, in his individual capacity

                    Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Spartanburg. Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (7:18−cv−02957−JD)

        Argued: March 7, 2023                                           Decided: April 18, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Niemeyer and Judge King joined.

        David Eliot Rothstein, ROTHSTEIN LAW FIRM, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
        Appellant. Todd Russell Flippin, HOLCOMBE BOMAR, P.A., Spartanburg, South
        Carolina, for Appellees.
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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

               In 2017, Summer Lashley signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice

        courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not

        to renew Lashley’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Lashley brought a mix

        of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract non-

        renewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in

        favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

        the state law claims. Lashley now appeals. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

        (ADA), Lashley accuses SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful

        health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she

        accuses SMC of retaliation. For the following reasons, we shall affirm the district court.

                                                     I.

                                                    A.

               In May 2017, Summer Lashley signed a contract to teach criminal justice courses at

        Spartanburg Methodist College and to serve as the Director of the Criminal Justice

        Program. Per the one-year contract, Lashley taught a full course load in the Fall 2017 and

        Spring 2018 semesters. During her time at SMC, Lashley was supervised by Mary Jane

        Farmer, the Chair of the Social Sciences Department, Mark W. Gibbs, the Dean of

        Instruction, and Anita Bowles, the Executive Vice President of Academic Affairs.

               The facts relevant to this appeal can be divided into three sections: (1) facts

        underlying Lashley’s Title IX and ADA claims, (2) facts pertaining to SMC’s decision not

        to renew her contract, and (3) facts surrounding her termination.

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                                                     1.

               Lashley’s Title IX retaliation claim stems from complaints she raised on behalf of

        students. Lashley informed SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator, Jenny

        Dunn, of several incidents between September and December 2017 in which she thought

        female students were being harassed by male students. These included reports of male

        athletes allegedly violating Title IX by sexually exploiting and bullying female athletes.

               According to Lashley, some of these incidents involved SMC employees covering

        up any misbehavior. So Lashley, assuming the posture of whistleblower, felt compelled to

        take her concerns to HR personnel. See Opening Br. at 8 (“Lashley had been very

        outspoken in raising numerous injustices that she became aware of at SMC.”). Lashley

        believed many students brought their issues to her because she was the Director of the

        Criminal Justice Program. She also claims not everyone at SMC was happy with her

        reports. Following one such complaint, Mark Gibbs allegedly confronted her and said he

        heard a rumor that Lashley told a female student to get an attorney. Gibbs denies this.

               Lashley’s ADA allegations originate from a series of incidents starting in January

        2018, when Lashley complained of ostensible mold or mildew in her office building.

        Lashley claimed the mold exacerbated her respiratory problems due to her asthma. SMC’s

        maintenance department brought these concerns to the attention of Gibbs and others. Gibbs

        met with Lashley at the end of January to discuss her health concerns.

               During this meeting, Lashley claims that Gibbs was “angry” and stated, “tell me

        about your health issues.” Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll., No. 7:18-CV-02957-

        KFM, 2022 WL 872604, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2022). In response, Lashley informed

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        Gibbs that she suffered from Lupus, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, and severe

        gastrointestinal issues. Id. at *3. Gibbs denies demanding that Lashley tell him about her

        medical issues, J.A. 912, but he testified that he did meet with her to “assess what could be

        done to accommodate her health,” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs offered to move

        Lashley’s office to a different building a short walk away to address her concerns, but

        Lashley rejected this option.

               On February 5, 2018, Lashley requested a reasonable accommodation form. HR

        Coordinator Dunn sent her the form, along with SMC’s faculty handbook. Lashley

        responded via email a few days later and informed the HR department that she had been

        diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, that she had informed her supervisor of this diagnosis,

        and that she wanted the information to remain confidential. Despite her response, Lashley

        never filled out or returned the reasonable accommodation form.

                                                     2.

               SMC eventually decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the following academic

        year. SMC claims this decision was the product of growing concerns regarding Lashley’s

        performance, professionalism, and conflicts with faculty and students. Mary Jane Farmer,

        Lashley’s direct supervisor, reported that though she was “pleased” with Lashley’s job

        performance after the Fall semester, she noted a variety of problems. Lashley, 2022 WL

        872604, at *2.

               Farmer reported that Lashley exhibited a proficiency with course material, but her

        classes lacked structure due to inadequate preparation. Lashley complained that she did not

        have enough time to get ready for class, so Farmer advised Lashley to use the ten hours of

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        weekly office time to prepare. Yet Farmer worried that Lashley was instead spending this

        time fraternizing with students, calling Lashley’s office a “student lounge”—a sentiment

        shared by other faculty. Id. Farmer further stated that Lashley maintained an

        unprofessionally close relationship with a work-study student. By late January 2018,

        Farmer described Lashley as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.” Id.

              This was not the only cause for concern. Throughout Lashley’s time at SMC, Gibbs

        received numerous complaints from Lashley about various students, faculty, and staff. The

        complaints were “quite regular” and suggested that Lashley was struggling to “settle[] into

        her position.” Id. at *3. According to Gibbs, Lashley informed him on “multiple occasions

        that SMC was not a good fit for her.” J.A. 575. Lashley’s inability to work with others was

        demonstrated by the numerous conflicts that arose around her. The district court

        highlighted a few examples.

               First, Lashley complained about her identity appearing in a SMC press release. She

        lodged this complaint even though she had consented to the use of her name. Next, Lashley

        appeared to have an ongoing conflict with Dale Hyder, an adjunct faculty member in the

        Criminal Justice Program. Gibbs observed that Lashley “had a personality conflict with

        Mr. Hyder” and “was allowing the conflict to disproportionately affect her job

        performance.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4. Farmer likewise described the conflict as

        a “petty thing between the two of them” that seemingly revealed a “professional rivalry.”

        J.A. 853–54. Further, echoing concerns from other SMC faculty, Gibbs noted that Lashley

        had an inappropriately close relationship with her work-study student. She was spending

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        too much time with the student, even once requesting that the student drive to Lashley’s

        home a good distance away to deliver teaching materials.

               Lashley’s multiple contentious interactions led Gibbs to worry that she was not

        forming constructive relationships with faculty and students and would have difficulty

        maintaining the professionalism required to perform as a SMC professor. In consultation

        with other SMC administrators, Gibbs decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the

        following year. On February 13, 2018, Gibbs informed Lashley that her contract was not

        being renewed, explaining that she “and SMC were not a good fit for each other.” Lashley,

        2022 WL 872604, at *4.

                                                    3.

               Lashley did not take kindly to this news. Various employees at SMC reported

        troubling behavior from Lashley in the following three days. On the same day Lashley was

        notified of the decision not to renew her contract, Gibbs claims he saw Lashley cleaning

        out her office and taking boxes to her car. When he asked her what she was doing, she

        angrily shouted at him for betraying her. The following day, a professor who shared an

        office with Lashley testified that she overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she

        felt like “blowing the school up.” Id. Then on February 15, another member of the faculty

        testified that Lashley spoke with him and said, “Bad stuff happens when people cross me.

        My dad says it’s true. They turn up dead.” Id. Lashley allegedly called certain individuals

        like Gibbs “evil people” who would “get theirs.” Id.

               Reports of these incidents made their way to SMC’s President, W. Scott Cochran.

        Even though Lashley denies ever making these alleged remarks, President Cochran came

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        to believe Lashley’s behavior revealed she was a threat to the safety of the SMC

        community. On February 16, 2018, Cochran made the decision to immediately terminate

        Lashley. He informed Lashley that her termination was due to “unprofessional,

        inappropriate interactions” with faculty. Id.

                                                        B.

               After receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity

        Commission, Lashley brought suit against SMC on November 1, 2018. Her verified

        complaint alleged a mixture of state and federal law violations centering on her contract

        non-renewal and her termination.

               On October 15, 2021, Lashley moved for sanctions against SMC, claiming it had

        failed to comply with her discovery requests. The same day, SMC moved for summary

        judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to grant summary

        judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims and to grant partial summary judgment

        on the state law claims. See Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll. (Lashley R&R), No.

        7:18-CV-2957-JD-KFM, 2021 WL 8014689, at *32 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2021).

               The district court adopted the report and recommendation, granting summary

        judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *10. The

        district court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

        claims, which were thus remanded to state court. Id.

               Lashley filed a timely notice of appeal, objecting to the district court’s findings on

        four federal law issues. She now presses claims of (1) discrimination in violation of the

        Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; (2) retaliation in

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        violation of the ADA; (3) unlawful health inquiry in violation of the ADA; and

        (4) retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

        §§ 1681 et seq. She withdrew all other federal claims on appeal. Opening Br. at 4 n.1.

               “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Equal Emp.

        Opportunity Comm’n v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary

        judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

        material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

        56(a). We of course construe the evidence and reasonable inferences at this stage “in the

        light most favorable to the non-moving party.” McLeod Health, 914 F.3d at 880; Halpern

        v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2012). The “nonmoving

        party must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists ‘by offering sufficient

        proof in the form of admissible evidence’ instead of ‘relying solely on the allegations of

        her pleadings.’” Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2022)

        (quoting Guessous v. Fairview Property Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).

                                                     II.

               We first address Lashley’s ADA and Title IX retaliation claims. The ADA’s

        retaliation provision prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any individual because such

        individual has” taken an action protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Title IX lacks

        an explicit cause of action for retaliation, but the Supreme Court has held that “the private

        right of action implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation.” Jackson v.

        Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). In the absence of a statutory backdrop

        for evaluating Title IX retaliation claims, our circuit has looked to Title VII to provide an

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        applicable legal framework. Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 694 (4th

        Cir. 2018).

               Under both the ADA and Title IX, the crux of a successful retaliation claim is that

        the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by law, and then, because of this, the defendant

        took an adverse employment action against him. See Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694 (explaining

        elements of Title IX retaliation); Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 577

        (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining elements of ADA retaliation).

               Lashley argues that she engaged in ADA-protected activity by requesting an

        accommodation for her disability. Opening Br. at 26. Lashley also asserts she engaged in

        Title IX-protected activity by helping female students raise complaints about SMC students

        and employees. Id. at 29. Because of these actions, Lashley argues, SMC retaliated against

        her by not renewing her contract and terminating her employment.

               To prevail on her retaliation claims, Lashley must either offer “sufficient direct and

        indirect evidence of retaliation, or proceed under a burden-shifting method.” Smith v.

        CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 416 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 577). Lashley

        concedes that the “burden-shifting framework[] is applicable to [her] retaliation claims

        under both the ADA and Title IX.” Opening Br. at 31–32. The “burden-shifting scheme set

        forth in McDonnell Douglas” proceeds in three steps. Hux v. City of Newport News, Va.,

        451 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

        792 (1973)).

               Lashley must first make a prima facie showing of retaliation—i.e., she engaged in

        a protected activity and was retaliated against because of it. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 578. The

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        “employer then has the burden to rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a

        legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “The burden then shifts back to [Lashley] to show that the proffered reason is pretext.” Id.

        Importantly, Lashley “always bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

        she was the victim of retaliation.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001).

               When we analyze the case through this well-settled framework, it becomes clear

        that Lashley’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not

        renewing Lashley’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to

        demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. We therefore need not decide whether

        Lashley established a prima facie case, for assuming arguendo that she satisfied the first

        step of the burden-shifting framework, her retaliation claims still fall short. See Hux, 451

        F.3d at 314 (assuming prima facie case when pretext was dispositive); see also Engler v.

        Harris Corp., 628 F. App’x 165, 168 (4th Cir. 2015) (same in retaliation context). We first

        discuss SMC’s proffered reasons before turning to pretext.

                                                    A.

               The record contains ample evidence of legitimate reasons not to renew Lashley’s

        contract and to terminate her employment. SMC offered evidence showing the reason

        behind Lashley’s contract non-renewal was that she was not a good fit for SMC.

        Additionally, SMC put forth evidence that the decision to terminate Lashley was based on

        reports of threatening and unprofessional behavior. We address each in turn.

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                                                     1.

               Regarding the decision not to renew Lashley’s contract, SMC proffered evidence

        that Lashley had a hard time performing to its expected level of professionalism and

        collegiality. As noted earlier, several sources reported that Lashley was often at the center

        of conflicts with students and faculty, revealing that she struggled to form healthy

        relationships at SMC.

               Multiple people at SMC complained of Lashley’s unprofessional relationships with

        students. Faculty members complained that Lashley’s office, which she shared with

        another professor, had become a “student lounge.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2.

        Students reported that Lashley was playing favorites with their classmates, requesting, for

        example, that a favored student drive to her house far from SMC. And Lashley’s direct

        supervisor observed that Lashley was excessively fraternizing with students in ways that

        went beyond constructive mentoring and educational guidance. While there is obviously

        nothing wrong, and much that is right, with faculty conversing with students outside of

        class, Lashley’s supervisor worried that the excessive familiarity inhibited Lashley’s

        ability to prepare and consequently made her classes disorganized.

               Lashley also clashed with multiple members of the faculty at SMC. For example,

        Gibbs observed that Lashley had difficulty working with her colleague Dale Hyder.

        Although she was Hyder’s direct supervisor, she declined to talk through their problems.

        While the issues apparently arose from a personality conflict, the personal spat negatively

        impacted Lashley’s job performance according to Gibbs. This and other repeated problems

        led Lashley’s supervisor to describe her as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.”

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        Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2. What’s more, the record shows that Lashley herself was

        dissatisfied during her time at SMC, often complaining to Gibbs about various people and

        incidents. J.A. 575, 884. She sent emails in January stating that she “just ha[d] to get out

        of SMC” and that she was applying for new jobs “everywhere and determined to get the

        f*** out of there.” Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5.

               Problems such as these are not unknown in institutional settings, and assessing fault

        and blame can become a complicated undertaking. At the same time, it was not wrong,

        much less unlawful, for a supervisor to conclude that Lashley’s conflicts with faculty

        demonstrated a lack of conflict-resolution skills needed in a professional setting where

        interactions with colleagues are frequent and essential. Lashley’s relationships with

        students similarly displayed a lack of professionalism and hurt her teaching abilities. An

        educational institution like SMC is justifiably sensitive to how its professors interact with

        students and faculty, relationships that often spell the difference between educational

        progress and its absence.

               By the time Gibbs and others decided whether to renew Lashley’s contract, the

        cumulative complaints from multiple sources had become “quite regular.” Lashley, 2022

        WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs ultimately concluded that Lashley “would have difficulty

        maintaining the professional relationships necessary to perform as a SMC professor.”

        Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *4. When Gibbs informed Lashley that her teaching

        contract would not be renewed, he explained it was because “she was not a good fit for

        SMC.” Id. at *5. For the reasons noted above, SMC produced sufficient evidence of

        legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Lashley’s teaching contract.

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                                                     2.

               We next consider SMC’s reasons for terminating Lashley’s employment. Lashley

        claims her termination was motivated by retaliatory animus. Here too, as we have

        recounted, SMC puts forth evidence to show legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing

        Lashley.

               The decision to fire Lashley was made by President Cochran on February 16, 2018.

        By that point in time, Cochran had received three independent reports of Lashley’s

        inappropriate and threatening behavior. First, Gibbs reported that on the day Lashley was

        informed her contract was not being renewed, she began to clear out her office and angrily

        confronted him. Second, a professor overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she felt

        like “blowing the school up.” Third, Lashley told a colleague that “[b]ad stuff happens

        when people cross me. . . . They turn up dead.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.

               Lashley denies ever making these comments. Her denial, however, does not negate

        the fact that these reports of unprofessional and dangerous behavior made their way to

        President Cochran, who naturally believed they revealed that Lashley was potentially

        violent and a threat to campus safety. Importantly, the burden at this stage of the analysis

        is “one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v.

        Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). So it does not suffice for Lashley to simply challenge the veracity of the evidence

        SMC puts forth. Despite Lashley’s protestations, SMC’s evidence shows that Cochran

        believed Lashley was dangerous—Cochran’s apparent motivation was not retaliation;

        it was safety.

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               In sum, SMC advanced legitimate reasons for not renewing Lashley’s contract and

        terminating her employment. SMC therefore carried its burden at this step of the

        McDonnell Douglas framework to “produc[e] evidence that” it acted “for a legitimate,

        non[retaliatory] reason.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

                                                     B.

               The burden then shifts back to Lashley to show that SMC’s proffered reasons were

        a pretext for unlawful retaliation. At this final stage, “the McDonnell Douglas

        framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappears,” and the “employee must

        prove” that the “legitimate reasons offered by the defendant[] were not its true reasons, but

        were a pretext.” Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 726 (4th Cir. 2019)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). The analysis “has long demanded proof at the pretext

        stage that retaliation was a but-for cause of a challenged adverse employment action.”

        Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015).

               Lashley faults the district court at this step for applying an invalid “pretext plus”

        standard. Opening Br. at 39. We disagree. A “pretext-plus” standard would require “that

        an employee introduce new evidence, separate from her prima facie case, that not only

        undercut the employer’s justification but also showed a specific and discriminatory [or

        retaliatory] motive.” Westmoreland, 924 F.3d at 726–27. That is not required here.

        Lashley’s claims fall short not only because she fails to provide evidence of retaliatory

        motive, but because she does not offer evidence beyond mere conjecture to undercut

        SMC’s justifications. Lashley’s claims therefore fail under the well-established pretext

        standard for multiple reasons. We examine each below.

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                                                      1.

               First, Lashley’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary

        decisionmakers at SMC were not aware of Lashley’s ADA or Title IX protected activity.

               Gibbs was the primary decisionmaker behind not renewing Lashley’s contract. Yet

        Lashley failed to produce any concrete evidence that Gibbs was even aware that Lashley

        helped students file Title IX complaints. Indeed, Gibbs’s decision was not influenced by

        previous Title IX complaints because Lashley raised Title IX complaints in September and

        December of 2017, yet in January of 2018, Gibbs extended her a separate contract to teach

        an additional Spring semester class. The record is also devoid of evidence that Gibbs was

        aware of Lashley’s request for an ADA reasonable accommodation form, which Lashley

        had in fact requested remain confidential.

               Similarly there is no evidence that President Cochran, who made the call to

        terminate Lashley, knew of Lashley’s ADA request or her Title IX complaints when he

        decided to fire her. To the contrary, the record shows Lashley’s ADA and Title IX

        complaints went to Jenny Dunn, SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator. See

        Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3 (describing that Lashley’s request for ADA

        accommodation went to Dunn); Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *2 (showing that

        Lashley’s Title IX complaints likewise went to Dunn). There is no evidence that Dunn was

        even consulted in the decisions regarding Lashley’s contract or termination. See Lashley

        R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *10, *13. Decisionmakers can hardly be accused of harboring

        a retaliatory animus when they were unaware of the actions that allegedly led to the

        retaliation. Without evidence on this score, the chain of causation is broken and Lashley

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        cannot show that retaliation was “a but-for cause” of the adverse action. Foster, 787 F.3d

        at 252; see also Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217.

               Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s

        explanations have been consistent throughout. Gibbs did not renew Lashley’s contract

        because she was not a good fit for SMC. Cochran fired Lashley because of her threatening

        interactions with colleagues. These were the very reasons communicated to Lashley back

        in February 2018. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5–6. The record lacks any

        sign of deviating from these explanations to make SMC’s story seem more plausible. See

        EEOC v. Sears Roebuck, 243 F.3d 846, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2001) (instructing that

        inconsistent explanations for an adverse employment action are “probative of pretext”). A

        straight and consistent line of explanation is more persuasive than one which wanders here,

        there, and yonder.

               Third, Lashley has not shown that Cochran did not honestly believe the reports of

        Lashley’s threatening comments. While Lashley denies making any threats, three different

        sources indicated that she did. We have previously explained that a plaintiff must rebut the

        fact that the “decisionmaker[] honestly believed” the threats, “regardless of whether [the

        plaintiff] did in fact issue the threats.” Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208,

        217 (4th Cir. 2007). If Cochran sincerely believed the threats, then his decision to fire

        Lashley was not a pretext for retaliation. An honest, nonretaliatory belief cannot by

        definition be the basis for the imposition of retaliatory liability. Rather than refuting

        Cochran’s sincere belief, the record supports the contention that he found the threats

        credible. The professor who informed Cochran of Lashley’s “evil people” comment

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        testified that he was “genuinely concerned that she might be angry enough to harm

        someone.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.

                                                       2.

               We come then to the main thrust of Lashley’s pretext argument, namely that SMC’s

        “good fit” justification is a thinly veiled disguise for retaliation. Lashley insists that

        “Gibbs’s conclusory statement that she was not a ‘good fit’ for SMC . . . is itself compelling

        evidence of retaliatory animus.” Opening Br. at 32.

               This is too broad an assertion. Describing an employee as not a “good fit” is an

        assessment that employers make all the time. Maybe someone’s skills do not match up with

        the institution’s mission. Maybe someone’s work ethic falls short of expectations. Maybe

        someone is just not a good team player. Though there may be circumstances where

        evidence reveals that “good fit” is a subterfuge for discrimination or retaliation, it is also a

        perfectly innocuous comment that an organization’s collaborative goals would not be

        furthered, and in fact might be retarded, by a particular employee. Institutional success is

        often a collective enterprise toward which an employer has entirely reasonable expectations

        that each employee should contribute.

               Any institution, especially a place of higher education whose “core . . . mission” is

        to foster a certain community and advance a unique pedagogical vision, is well within its

        rights to want people who can work well with others to achieve those goals. Our Lady of

        Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020). To wit, SMC has such

        a mission. SMC’s President explained that a good fit “for us is someone who is able and

        willing to effectively teach the demographics we teach with great success and academic

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        integrity,” who possesses the “[a]bility to be a good colleague with your faculty and staff,”

        as well as the ability to exhibit the “appropriate behavior with students and a level of

        professionalism with the appropriate boundaries between students and faculty.” J.A. 1041.

               This decidedly does not mean that every employee hold the same views or teach the

        same way or refrain from the kind of individual expression and opinions that make for

        genuine mutual respect. The record here indicates SMC was seeking cooperation, not

        conformity. Respect for individuality within a healthy institutional whole was a valid

        aspiration for the college to adopt.

               Lashley attempts to refute SMC’s “good fit” reasoning by portraying herself as the

        embodiment of the ideal whistleblower, intent on bringing to light misbehavior by students

        and employees. See Oral Arg. at 0:41. Whistleblowers certainly play a salutary role in our

        society. They can point out deficiencies and dishonesty within an organization that would

        otherwise go unnoticed and unrevealed. Their status is often protected under law, and for

        good reason. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 218c; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

        6(a)(6); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 436 (2014) (referencing “some 20 United

        States Code incorporated whistleblower protection provisions”). Plaintiff, however, cannot

        claim that mantle. We have accorded her the benefit of the reasonable inferences due her

        under the summary judgment standard. But at the end of the day, the record reveals

        unrelieved personality conflicts, unprofessional favoritisms, unwarranted threats, and

        contempt for what the defendant institution was attempting to accomplish. We cannot see

        how addressing those problems was a pretext for retaliatory or discriminatory animus.

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                                                     III.

               Lashley finally brings several claims under the ADA.

                                                      A.

               The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual

        on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

        employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination can include failing to make “reasonable

        accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

        individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

               We thus address Lashley’s claim that SMC discriminated against her by failing to

        accommodate her disability. To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, “a plaintiff

        must show (i) she was disabled, (ii) the employer had notice of her disability, (iii) she could

        perform the essential functions of her position with a reasonable accommodation, and (iv)

        the employer refused to make such accommodation.” Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.,

        41 F.4th 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2022). 1

               The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

        limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The

        district court found that Lashley’s gastrointestinal issues could arguably qualify as a

        disability as defined by the ADA. Lashley insists that she also suffered from PTSD and

               1
                 Lashley also claims she suffered an adverse employment action when SMC
        rescinded its promise to pay her salary and benefits through the end of her contract year.
        The record shows, however, that SMC paid the full salary and benefits owed to her. See
        J.A. 600.

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        Lupus. The record is devoid of evidence, however, that PTSD and Lupus “substantially

        limit[ed] one or more” of Lashley’s “major life activities.” Id. Though she claims she

        informed Gibbs of these ailments in a meeting, no evidence indicates that she informed

        Gibbs or anyone else at SMC how these medical issues were significantly impairing her

        life activities. Lashley’s claims of additional disabilities beyond gastrointestinal issues

        therefore do not survive the first step of the analysis.

               Regardless of the district court’s conclusion on the first prong of Lashley’s failure-

        to-accommodate claim, her argument falters on the subsequent prongs. The ADA’s

        implementing regulations instruct that to “determine the appropriate reasonable

        accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,

        interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation,”

        which “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential

        reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 16 C.F.R.

        § 1630.2(o)(3).

               Any failure here to engage in such an interactive process was not caused by SMC.

        Lashley contacted HR personnel to request an accommodation form and informed them

        that she had been diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, which was causing her gastrointestinal

        issues. From that point, however, the record reveals that Lashley failed to engage in the

        interactive process in several ways. She did not tell SMC how the diagnosis limited her

        ability to work. She neglected to inform SMC of the accommodation she would need to

        perform the essential duties of her job. See Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 378. She did not request

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        any measures that would mitigate the effects of her Crohn’s Disease. Worse still, Lashley

        never returned the accommodation form. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3.

               We cannot fault SMC for failing to accommodate plaintiff. Due to Lashley’s

        communication breakdown, SMC was left guessing what an accommodation for Lashley

        might entail. “Before an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations—or even

        to participate in the ‘interactive process’—is triggered under the ADA, the employee must

        make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen.

        Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d

        1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011)). Lashley cannot show that SMC refused to make an

        accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-

        to-accommodate claim fails for this reason.

                                                      B.

               Lashley’s last claim is that SMC violated the ADA by asking her unlawful health

        questions. The ADA provides that an employer “shall not make inquiries of an employee

        as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity

        of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and

        consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Lashley argues that Gibbs

        violated that ADA when he allegedly told Lashley—in an “angry” and “threatening”

        tone—“tell me about your health issues.” Opening Br. at 45–46. Gibbs denies ever

        demanding that Lashley tell him about her medical issues. J.A. 912.

               Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lashley, her bare testimony

        cannot form a successful claim for unlawful health inquiry. See Webster, 38 F.4th at 410.

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        To begin with, “[w]hether a medical inquiry is job-related and consistent with business

        necessity is an objective inquiry.” Coffey v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 23 F.4th 332, 339 (4th Cir.

        2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). So how Lashley subjectively perceived Gibbs’s

        tone is immaterial under that standard.

               Furthermore, we have noted that the objective “standard is met if the employer

        reasonably believes that an employee’s medical condition impairs [her] ability to perform

        the essential functions of the job” and the inquiry “is no broader or more intrusive than

        necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming Gibbs had Lashley tell

        him about her health, the inquiry satisfies this standard.

               Lashley had told faculty, staff, and students at SMC about her various health issues,

        usually in the context of missing or rescheduling classes. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL

        8014689, at *14 (cataloguing nearly a dozen examples of Lashley telling others about a

        variety of ailments). In particular, Lashley told a colleague that she had “been sick since

        she arrived and was going to see a pulmonary doctor to have her lungs swabbed” due to

        the “unhealthy conditions” in her office building, referring to the alleged mold in the

        ceiling. J.A. 585. These complaints came to Gibbs’s attention. 2

               Given these circumstances, Gibbs acted reasonably in meeting with Lashley to

        discuss her health issues. When a teacher tells others at the school that she is having

        medical problems, causing her to cancel classes, it is only reasonable that one of her

               2
                 We note that these generalized health complaints, as opposed to a more formal
        request for an ADA accommodation, do not rise to the level of ADA-protected activity,
        and indeed Lashley does not pursue them as such. See Opening Br. at 26.

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        superiors inquires about them. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th

        Cir. 2012) (holding summary judgment proper where health issues disclosed to others).

               Moreover, to determine whether Lashley’s claimed issues threatened her ability to

        perform the essential functions of the job, Coffey, 23 F.4th at 339, Gibbs needed to know

        how he could accommodate her so that she could continue working. Lashley had

        complained of unhealthy conditions in the building that housed her office and classes.

        Gibbs therefore had to assess whether these conditions would obstruct her ability to teach

        classes and hold meetings in that building. Gibbs offered Lashley an alternative office in

        another building to address her concerns about mold, but Lashley rejected this option.

               Last, Lashley fails to show that this inquiry was “broader or more intrusive than

        necessary.” Id. The sole evidence put forth is her testimony that Gibbs demanded she tell

        him about her health issues in an angry tone. There is no evidence of invasive follow-up

        questions or demands for confidential medical information. Lashley’s assertions are not

        enough to conclude that the query was unlawfully obtrusive, especially when viewed

        against the objective evidence that Gibbs needed some information in order to alleviate

        Lashley’s concerns. There is no indication that Gibbs crossed the line drawn by the ADA.

                                                     IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 3

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

               3
                Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we reject
        Lashley’s contention that the court abused its discretion in failing to award her sanctions.

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