Court Opinion

ID: 9948758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:19.815008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.631660
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-838.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                             No. 112800
                 v.                                 :

TORIANO WILLIAMS,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-656439-A

                                              Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, Kevin Filiatraut, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Walter H. Edwards, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, Toriano Williams (“appellant”), appeals his

convictions for aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, murder, felonious assault,
and having weapons while under disability. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm appellant’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

              In February 2021, appellant and Jannie Pace (“codefendant”) were

charged in a six-count indictment.1 Count 1 charged both of them with aggravated

murder; Count 2 charged both of them with aggravated burglary; Count 3 charged

both of them with murder; Count 4 charged both of them with felonious assault; and

Count 5 charged appellant with having weapons while under disability. Count 6 was

a weapons count that only applied to the codefendant. Each of Counts 1 through 4

carried both a one- and three-year firearm specification.

              In March 2023, appellant’s case proceeded to trial. Counts 1 through

4 were tried to a jury while Count 5 was tried before the bench. The following

evidence was adduced at trial.

              In the early morning hours of Wednesday, September 23, 2020,

Porsha Woods (“victim”), was found shot to death in her apartment in Cleveland,

Ohio. Immediately prior to her death, the victim made two 911 calls. The first call

came in at 5:16:23 a.m. In this call, the victim told the operator that the people

downstairs pulled a gun on her and were out in the hallway at that moment. She

requested police assistance. The victim explained that earlier that evening the girl

downstairs knocked on her door and said something about the victim’s brother, that

      1 Codefendant voluntarily dismissed her appeal in State v. Jannie Pace, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112790 (Sept. 8, 2023).
then she and that female fought, and that female’s boyfriend pulled a gun. The

operator, who testified at trial, attempted to get more information from the victim,

but the victim was not responding to the questions and just repeated “they are in the

hallway right now.” The victim did state that the male was light-skinned with a black

shirt. The operator told the victim she was sending police and then hung up the

phone, noting in the system that the caller stated, “The people downstairs pulled a

gun on her two hours ago. The suspects are in the hallway.” The call lasted 3 minutes

and 51 seconds.

              At 5:20:35 a.m., the victim made a second 911 call. In this call, the

victim does not say a word, but loud voices can be heard in the background, as well

as banging and popping noises. Then the phone disconnected. That operator tried

to call back two times but neither call was answered; each call went straight to

voicemail on the victim’s phone.

              Police arrived on scene at approximately 5:26 a.m. and found the

victim’s body behind her door, curled into a ball, still holding a baseball bat. The

victim had been shot in the head, chest, abdomen, and thigh. She also had a graze

wound to her left forearm. Police collected the spent shell casings found around her

body. The victim’s residence, Unit 4, showed signs of forced entry, as well as the

appellant’s residence, Unit 1. After investigating the scene, police also gathered a

knife, a hammer, and the baseball bat from Unit 4, as well as a tactical light for a

handgun from Unit 1 for evidence. In the stairway between Units 1 and 4, police

collected a red weave they believed to be connected to the incident.
               The victim’s brother, Chauncey Bizzell (“Bizzell”), testified that his

sister had only lived in Unit 4 for approximately three weeks before she was killed.

Bizzell met the codefendant one day when he was there helping his sister. The

codefendant was waiting for an Uber when Bizzell offered her a ride. The

codefendant accepted the ride. They drove around to run some errands and

eventually ended up at a hotel where they got high on PCP and other illicit drugs.

Shortly after arriving at the hotel, the codefendant called her boyfriend for a ride

home.

               Bizzell also testified that in the early morning hours of September 23,

2020, Bizzell received a voicemail from his sister, the victim, where she yelled at him

because a female, later identified as the codefendant, came to her apartment and

they fought and a man, later identified as appellant, pulled a gun on her. This

voicemail was the last time Bizzell ever heard from his sister.

               During the investigation, police learned that on September 23, 2020,

the victim had a prior physical altercation with the codefendant in the apartment

stairwell. This altercation took place around 1:00 a.m., while the victim was on the

phone with her cousin Janese Banks (“Banks”). Banks testified that she was on the

phone with the victim when the victim said, “[T]his B at my door, she’s mad that I

told [Bizzell] she has a boyfriend, and he has a gun.” While on the phone, Banks

heard the victim get into a fight, so she rushed over to the apartment. When Banks

arrived, she observed that the victim was visibly upset and disheveled like she had

just gotten in a fight. The victim was outside hitting the apartment building door
with a hammer. Banks took the victim across the street to her grandmother’s house

where the victim relayed to Banks that the boyfriend of the lady who lives downstairs

pointed a gun at her. When they went back to the apartment building, Banks saw

blood going up the stairs and a hair weave in the hallway. Banks left the victim at

her grandmother’s house where she thought the victim would stay for the night.

              Banks returned 45 minutes later after learning that gunshots were

heard from the victim’s building. When interviewed, Banks was unable to identify

the individuals involved in the fight but believed she had seen a light-skinned brown

female and a light-skinned male in the building when she helped the victim move

into her new apartment.

              Police learned that a black Chevy Malibu was captured on city

cameras at 5:21 a.m. leaving the area of the apartment building. This vehicle

continued in a direction away from the apartment building. Cleveland Police

Detective David Shapiro (“Det. Shapiro”) used Vigilant, a private camera system, to

continue tracking the vehicle seen on the real-time crime cameras and to identify

the license plate of the vehicle of interest. The black Chevy Malibu was registered to

Jennifer DeMoss (“DeMoss”).

              DeMoss testified that the appellant asked her to put the car in her

name in June 2020, which she did, but the car belonged to and was in the possession

of the appellant. The police tracked down and towed the black Chevy Malibu from

the appellant’s stepfather’s house on E. 140th Street on September 25, 2020. The
stepfather testified that appellant just sold him the vehicle that Thursday,

September 24, 2020.

              On January 24, 2021, the codefendant was arrested in connection

with the murder. She later entered into a plea agreement with the state wherein she

pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, with a three-year firearm specification, and

aggravated burglary, and agreed to testify truthfully against the appellant.

              The codefendant testified that she had been dating appellant at the

time of the incident. She explained that she met the victim’s brother previously and

received a ride from him. She described the encounter with Bizzell much the same

as Bizzell did adding that she left because she did not want to do drugs with him, so

she called appellant to pick her up. After appellant picked her up, Bizzell called her

phone and appellant informed him that whatever was going on was over.

              The codefendant further testified that the night before the murder,

she had gotten into an argument with the victim. She told the victim that Bizzell

tried to drug her while they were at a motel. The codefendant and the victim then

got into a physical altercation, and the victim pulled out her hair weave.

              After the fight, the codefendant went with appellant to a hotel. While

at the hotel, the appellant received a phone call that the victim had broken into his

apartment. The appellant then grabbed a large black gun off the dresser and headed

back to the apartment building with the codefendant. When they returned to the

apartment building, the codefendant testified that she observed the victim pacing
back and forth in her own apartment with a baseball bat. Appellant went past

codefendant, straight into the victim’s apartment, and shot her seven times.

               The codefendant testified that they left the apartment complex and

drove to appellant’s brother’s house in his black Chevy Malibu. The codefendant

claimed that she went with appellant instead of helping the victim because she did

not want to be shot as well. She testified that she heard the appellant tell his brother

he lost his temper and told his brother to get rid of the weapon. She never observed

the appellant with the black handgun again but did see him with a shotgun at some

point.

               During the trial, the codefendant admitted to being a drug user and

having mental health problems. She testified that although she had lied to the police

about her involvement before, she was telling the truth to the jury. She testified that

she lied because she was afraid for her life and potentially her family if appellant

found out she talked to the police. The codefendant testified repeatedly that she was

there and witnessed appellant shoot the victim seven times in the early morning

hours of September 23, 2020, and then left with him in the black Chevy Malibu.

               Appellant was found guilty on all five counts as charged in the

indictment, including the accompanying firearm specifications. On May 3, 2023,

appellant was sentenced to 36 years to life in prison.         Appellant appeals his

convictions, raising the following assignments of error for review:

         Assignment of Error I: The verdicts were against the manifest
         weight of the evidence.
      Assignment of Error II:          The verdicts were not supported by
      sufficient evidence.

      Assignment of Error III:          The trial court erred by admitting
      inadmissible hearsay.

      Assignment of Error IV: The trial court erred by disallowing
      admissible testimony about a prior firearm incident in the victim’s
      apartment.

              For ease of discussion, we will address these assignments of error out

of order and together where appropriate.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. No Abuse of Discretion — Testimony Admissibility

              In the third and fourth assignments of error, appellant challenges the

admissibility of the victim’s statements, as well as statements made by a lay witness

to Det. Shapiro.

              It is well-settled that the admission or exclusion of evidence rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180,

510 N.E.2d 343 (1987). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its

judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. As the gatekeeper of the evidence, the trial court “must

be cognizant of the evidence the state is attempting to admit into evidence. If the

state fails to comport with the basic requirements under the law, the trial court is

obligated to exclude such evidence, even if no objection is raised.” State v. Walker,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110741, 2022-Ohio-1238, ¶ 32.
      1. The Victim’s Statements were Admissible

               In appellant’s third assignment of error, the appellant asserts that the

trial court erred when it admitted hearsay statements the victim made to Banks

while on the phone hours before her murder. The state argues that the statements

were admissible under a hearsay exception pursuant to Evid.R. 803(1) and (2) or as

nonhearsay statements.

               “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Generally, hearsay testimony is inadmissible unless the

testimony falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Evid.R. 802.

               Present-sense impression is an exception to the hearsay rule.

Evid.R. 803(1) defines a present-sense impression as “[a] statement describing or

explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event

or condition, or immediately thereafter unless circumstances indicate lack of

trustworthiness.” Regarding Evid.R. 803(1), “[t]he key to the statement’s

trustworthiness is the spontaneity of the statement; it must be either

contemporaneous with the event or be made immediately thereafter.” State v. Essa,

194 Ohio App.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-2513, 955 N.E.2d 429 ¶ 126 (8th Dist.). “‘The

principle underlying this hearsay exception is the assumption that statements or

perceptions, describing the event and uttered in close temporal proximity to the

event, bear a high degree of trustworthiness.’” State v. Dixon, 152 Ohio App.3d 760,
2003-Ohio-2550, 790 N.E.2d 349, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Cox v. Oliver Machinery

Co., 41 Ohio App.3d 28, 35, 534 N.E.2d 855 (12th Dist.1987).

               In this case, the appellant takes issue with the following testimony by

Banks: (1) the victim “was cussing, she was, like, Well, this B is at my door. She’s

mad that I told [Bizzell] she has a boyfriend, and he has a gun. And I told her to call

the police or to leave and go across the street to my grandmother’s house”; (2) the

victim told her the boyfriend in question “was downstairs in the house and the

girlfriend was at her door arguing and they started the fight while I was on the

phone”; and (3) she “understood” the victim to mean that “the girl’s boyfriend” had

a gun when she had stated “he has a gun.”

               Appellant asserts that the altercation had already occurred when the

victim called Bank’s; therefore, it was not a present-sense impression. Appellant

further argues that being angry is not the “state of emotional shock” that allows a

statement’s admission under the excited-utterance exception.

               We find the appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. A review of the

record reveals that Banks testified that the victim called her and was upset and angry

because the codefendant was at her door yelling and that while she was on the

phone with the victim, she heard the victim getting into a fight. Banks further

testified that she went to the victim’s apartment because of what she heard over the

phone.    The statements at issue were made while the declarant-victim was

perceiving the events, which fits squarely under the exception for present-sense
impression under Evid.R. 803(1). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it admitted the victim’s statements.

               As a result, the third assignment of error is overruled.

      2. Hearsay Testimony was Properly Excluded

               In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

erred when it precluded defense counsel from questioning the detective regarding a

previous report of a person with a gun in the victim’s apartment, claiming that the

statements were nonhearsay because the detective learned it through his

investigation. The state argues that the information was inadmissible hearsay, as

well as irrelevant.

               As stated above, generally hearsay is inadmissible unless it fits a

hearsay exception, and “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Evid.R.

402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401.

               Appellant complains that counsel was not allowed to inquire if Det.

Shapiro had “come to know” that Evon Gocan (“Gocan”), the alleged owner of the

building, was present in the building during the shooting, whether he had “learned

about a prior incident” several days before in the victim’s apartment, or if he was

“aware of” or had “a description provided to him” of the incident wherein an

individual was in the victim’s apartment with a rifle. Appellant argues that “Ohio

courts have long held that out-of-court statements are admissible to explain the
actions of a police officer during an investigation and are not hearsay.” State v.

Johnson, 2018-Ohio-1389, 110 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Davis,

116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31.

               A review of the transcript and arguments of counsel do not shed light

on how these statements directed the actions of the detective for the statements to

be characterized as nonhearsay. In addition, it is unclear whether the statements

were made directly to the detective who was testifying at trial. Further, no exception

to the hearsay rule was offered to admit the statements of Gocan; it was only argued

that it was nonhearsay. Finally, the relevance of the statements is questionable

because the evidence at trial indicated that a .40-caliber handgun was used to kill

the victim, not a rifle. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it excluded Gocan’s statements.

               Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

      B. Appellant’s Convictions were Supported by Sufficient Evidence

               In appellant’s second assignment of error, he argues that the state

failed to present sufficient evidence of “force” to support a conviction for aggravated

burglary because the codefendant testified that the door was open and the appellant

brushed past her. The state argues that regardless of whether the jury believed

appellant broke into victim’s apartment or merely “entered through an open door,”

the force element was met, citing State v. Erker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107790,

2019-Ohio-3185, ¶ 69.
               The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function when

reviewing sufficiency is to determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

               With a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review

whether the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence

admitted at trial supported the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 91682, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument is not a factual

determination, but a question of law. Thompkins at 386.

               In State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d

1161, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned:

      But it is worth remembering what is not part of the court’s role when
      conducting a sufficiency review. It falls to the trier of fact to “‘resolve
      conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
      reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” [State v.
      McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316,
      ¶ 24], quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
      L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, an appellate court’s role is limited. It does
      not ask whether the evidence should be believed or assess the
      evidence’s “credibility or effect in inducing belief.” State v. Richardson,
      150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13,
      citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. Instead, it
       asks whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed, supports the
       conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

Id. at ¶ 16.

               Here, appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary in violation of

R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), which states:

       No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied
       structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of
       an occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice
       of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or
       in the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the
       structure any criminal offense, [and] the offender inflicts, or attempts
       or threatens to inflict physical harm on another[.]

“Force” is defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by

any means upon or against a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

               The codefendant’s attempts to minimize her involvement and the

appellant’s culpability are of no consequence; the evidence at trial was that the

victim’s door was forced open. The first 911 call from the victim clearly indicates

that immediately prior to her death she was requesting police assistance because she

was inside her apartment and the appellant and codefendant were outside her door.

In the second 911 call, loud banging and popping noises can be heard. Finally, state’s

exhibits Nos. 8 through 17 clearly depict the damage to the victim’s door, door frame,

and lock. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence that appellant

entered the victim’s apartment by force.

               Appellant also argues that the verdicts were based on insufficient

evidence “premised on the same arguments set forth” in the first assignment of
error, in which he argues the lack of physical evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses.

               When conducting a sufficiency review, assessing the credibility of the

witnesses and weighing the evidence is not appropriate and such arguments will be

addressed under the manifest weight standard of review. Therefore, we find that

after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier

of fact could find all the essential elements of aggravated murder, aggravated

burglary, murder, felonious assault, and having weapons while under disability

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

               Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

      C. Appellant’s Convictions are Not Against the Manifest Weight of
      the Evidence

               In appellant’s first assignment of error, appellant argues that his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no

physical evidence linking him to the crimes, the witnesses lacked credibility and

their testimony was inconsistent, and the police investigation was lacking.

               When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court,

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reversal on the basis that a verdict

is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “‘only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin at 175.

               As this court has previously stated:

      The criminal manifest weight-of-the-evidence standard addresses the
      evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382,
      2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio
      St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest weight-of-the-
      evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the following question:
      whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?
      Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient evidence to
      support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the manifest weight
      of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95,
      2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

      When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
      that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
      appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact
      finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id., quoting
      Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87.

               With respect to the investigation, any allegations of inadequate police

work has no bearing on whether appellant’s convictions are against the manifest

weight of the evidence. State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107929, 2019-

Ohio-5335, ¶ 11. A manifest weight challenge looks at the quality of the evidence

that the state presented at trial. Id. A consideration of evidence that was not

presented against appellant at trial, regardless of why it was not presented, is

irrelevant to our review of this assignment of error. Id.
               Appellant argues that there are no fingerprints or DNA linking him to

the actual crime scene. The state argues that due to the nature of the crime, it is not

unreasonable that appellant’s DNA was not found on scene.

               “A lack of physical evidence, standing alone, does not render a

defendant’s conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v.

Robertson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106279, 2018-Ohio-2934, ¶ 32; see also State v.

Flores-Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108458, 2020-Ohio-1274, ¶ 37, citing State

v. Rusnak, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 15 JE 0002, 2016-Ohio-7820, ¶ 30 (fact that no

physical evidence from the crime scene was presented at trial did not render verdict

against the manifest weight of the evidence); State v. Thomas, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 27362, 2018-Ohio-4345, ¶ 25 (fact that defendant’s conviction was based solely

on victim’s testimony and not any physical evidence did not render his conviction

against the manifest weight of the evidence).

               Although there were no fingerprints or DNA from the appellant on

scene, other evidence linked him to the crime. Therefore, the lack of fingerprints or

DNA at the crime scene does not render appellant’s convictions against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

               Appellant next complains that Bizzell is not a credible witness

because he is an admitted PCP user, claimed he was having a sexual relationship

with the victim, and was accused of attempting to drug the codefendant.

               In this case, Bizzell’s testimony explained how he knew the

codefendant and why the codefendant and the victim had a physical altercation the
night she was murdered. His testimony was corroborated by the codefendant’s

testimony, as well as the voicemail left by the victim the night she died, which lends

credibility to Bizzell’s testimony.

               Next, appellant asserts that Banks’s testimony is inconsistent with

other evidence admitted at trial. Specifically, Banks’s testimony regarding: (1) the

time the victim called her, approximately 1:00 a.m., describing the altercation with

the codefendant is inconsistent with the 911 call the victim made at 5:16 a.m.

wherein the victim tells the 911 operator that she had an altercation with the

appellant and codefendant two hours earlier; (2) what floor the altercation with the

codefendant occurred; and (3) her description of the downstairs neighbors that she

observed two weeks earlier.

               “A defendant is not entitled to reversal on manifest weight grounds

merely because certain aspects of a witness’ testimony are inconsistent or

contradictory.” Flores-Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108458, 2020-Ohio-1274,

¶ 40; see also State v. Wade, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90029, 2008-Ohio-4574, ¶ 38

(“‘A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence solely because the

[factfinder] heard inconsistent testimony.’”), quoting State v. Asberry, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 04AP-1113, 2005-Ohio-4547, ¶ 11; State v. Mann, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 10AP-1131, 2011-Ohio-5286, ¶ 37 (“‘While [a factfinder] may take note of the

inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies

do not render defendant’s conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of

the evidence.’”), quoting State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APA09-1236,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2245 (May 28, 1996). The jury may detect any number of

inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all, part, or none of a

witness’s testimony.” State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106667, 2019-Ohio-

313, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-

958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).

               Nearly all of Banks’s testimony is corroborated by the codefendant’s

testimony, the victim’s 911 call, her voicemail to her brother, and the hair weave

found in the hallway. Any inconsistency as to the exact time the altercation occurred

is of no consequence to this case. Therefore, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost

its way.

               Finally, appellant argues that the codefendant, who is the only

witness linking him to the shooting, is inconsistent, unreliable, and suffered from

serious mental health issues exacerbated by drug use. Specifically, appellant takes

issue with: (1) the codefendant accepting a plea agreement but testifying that she

had no role in the victim’s death; (2) the codefendant testifying that she does not

hallucinate but told the court psychiatric clinic that she hears voices; (3) the

codefendant testifying that the victim’s door was open and the appellant brushed

past her and shot the victim approximately seven times yet the evidence clearly

shows a forced entry; and (4) no one else in the apartment complex identified the

appellant.

               As this court has recognized, “‘[e]ven where discrepancies exist,

eyewitness identification testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction so
long as a reasonable juror could find the eyewitness testimony to be credible.’” State

v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111473, 2022-Ohio-4641, ¶ 17, citing State v.

Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100126, 2014-Ohio-1624, ¶ 12, quoting State v.

Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99822, 2014-Ohio-494, ¶ 52. Furthermore, as the

factfinder, the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. State

v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93593, 2010-Ohio-4006, ¶ 16.

               Much of the codefendant’s testimony was corroborated by other

witnesses’ testimony, 911 calls, DNA evidence, and traffic cameras. Again, the

codefendant’s attempt to minimize her own involvement in the victim’s murder does

not affect the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt. Therefore, after reviewing

the entire record, weighing the inferences, and examining the credibility of

witnesses, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. Appellant’s convictions are not against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

               The first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the

victim’s statements because they were admissible as a present-sense impression.

Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Gocan’s

statements as they were inadmissible hearsay and not relevant. In addition, there

was sufficient evidence of “force” to sustain a conviction for aggravated burglary.
Finally, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way, thus appellant’s convictions

are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE III, J., CONCUR