Court Opinion

ID: 9737072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:14:41.252194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.278618
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
STRUTZ, Judge.
The respondent has filed a petition for rehearing. First, it contends that the opinion of the majority in this case reverses the principle that the findings of a trial court, in a case tried to the court without a jury, will be given appreciable weight. It also inquires if the decision of the trial court was clearly against the evidence — as respondent contends it must be in order for this court to reverse — just where the evidence was contrary to the trial court’s decision.
We believe that respondent is laboring under a misapprehension of the scope of an appeal in a case tried to the court without a jury, in which a demand for a trial de novo is made. In North Dakota, when demand is made for trial de novo and properly included in the statement of the case, as was done in this case, this court is required to find the facts anew. We have held that, in finding the facts anew, we will give appreciable weight to the findings of the trial court. But the principle of giving appreciable weight to findings of the trial court will not relieve us of the *721duty and responsibility of finding the facts anew and of applying the law to those facts. Our statute specifically provides that on demand for trial de novo in a case tried without a jury “the supreme court shall try anew the questions of fact.” Sec. 28-27-32, N.D.C.C.
Thus it is the duty of this court on appeal, in any action tried by the court without a jury, to try anew the questions of fact if the appellant demands a retrial of the entire case. And, in applying the principle that in reviewing a case tried without a jury, appreciable weight will be given to the findings of the trial court, this court will not avoid its lawful duty of trying anew all questions of fact in the entire case. Spielman v. Weber (N.D.), 118 N.W.2d 727.
The cases cited by the respondent in support of its contention that if there is any evidence to support the findings of the trial court, this court must affirm, are cases from States that do not have a trial de novo statute similar to that of North Dakota. The rule it would have us apply is quite similar to the rule we apply in appeals from a judgment based upon a verdict of a jury. Under the so-called Newman law, Section 28-27-32, North Dakota Century Code, on an appeal from a judgment based upon the findings of a trial court we are prohibited from applying that rule. Instead, we must find the facts anew. This conclusion is supported by a long line of decisions.
The next point raised by the respondent relates to a statement in the dissenting opinion in this case that it is the duty of this court to determine “at what point the driver of the favored vehicle (the truck) if he had observed the approach of the inferior vehicle should take action to avoid collision in the intersection.”
Respondent concedes that the driver of the defendant’s vehicle was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, for it says: “For the purposes of this petition no exception to the court’s ruling that there was negligence on the part of the Cardinal Petroleum Company driver for failure to keep a proper lookout will be taken.” But respondent then asks just where a driver on a favored highway stands in relation to a vehicle on a servient highway, and at what point in his approach to the intersection he becomes negligent in proceeding without due care.
The highway upon which the defendant’s vehicle was being operated was not a controlled access highway. It was merely a county highway, as was the intersecting highway on which the Boeing vehicle was being driven. While the defendant’s equipment was being driven on a highway which was made the favored roadway by the placing of “yield” signs on highways which crossed it, that fact did not give to the operator of the defendant’s equipment the right to proceed down that highway without due care and without maintaining a proper lookout for other vehicles entering it from side roads. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that a sign placed on such favored highway 500 feet from the intersection notified drivers on the favored highway that there was a junction ahead. Thus the defendant did not have an absolute right of way over vehicles approaching from a side road. Under the rules of the road, the Boeing vehicle in which the plaintiff’s intestate was riding was required to yield, and the primary duty to avoid collision with a vehicle on the favored highway rested upon the Boeing driver. However, the driver on the favored highway also 'was required to exercise due care and to maintain a proper lookout for traffic approaching the intersection from inferior highways.
The defendant’s driver had the duty of exercising due care in approaching the intersection. We find that when he was warned by a sign 500 feet from the junction that he was approaching an intersection, it became his duty to determine whether there was any traffic approaching. As we said in Anderson v. Schreiner *722(N.D.), 94 N.W.2d 294, the negligence of a nonobserving driver is in not maintaining a lookout. Whether such negligence is remote or is a proximate cause of the collision which occurred in the intersection depends upon what he does as a result of not maintaining a lookout. Here, the defendant’s driver continued into the intersection without slowing his speed in the slightest. Had he looked, he would have seen that the driver of the Boeing car was negligently failing to yield. Thus the question is whether the conduct of the defendant’s driver was reasonable in the light of what he would have seen had he maintained a proper lookout. When he saw — or should have seen— the other driver negligently failing to yield, as a reasonable person he would have taken steps to avoid the collision. Under these circumstances, his negligence in failing to observe resulted in his failure to take steps to avoid the collision, as he reasonably would have done had he seen the Boeing vehicle.
The duty of the driver of the Boeing vehicle to yield the right of way did not give the defendant’s driver the right to drive without exercising due care. A motorist driving on a highway protected by “yield” signs cannot proceed on the assumption that he has the absolute right of way under all circumstances, and that every other driver who is about to epter the intersection from an inferior highway will, without question, yield the right of way to him. In other words, the driver of the defendant’s vehicle,, who had the right of way, could not exercise that right in an arbitrary manner and without paying some attention to whether there was any other vehicle approaching the intersection because an approaching vehicle might be operated in a negligent manner. The superior privilege of having the right of way did not give the driver of the defendant’s vehicle the right to wholly disregard the rules which required him to drive with due care and to keep a reasonable lookout for other traffic. The duty to avoid an accident rested upon both of the drivers, even though one of such drivers was required to exercise a greater degree of care in the exercise of due care than was the driver on the favored highway.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
ERICKSTAD and PAULSON, JJ., concur.