Court Opinion

ID: 9892920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 16:00:50.437345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:41.010295
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14132     Document: 69-1      Date Filed: 10/25/2023   Page: 1 of 34

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 21-14132
                            ____________________

        RICARDO SANCHEZ,
        as Personal Representative of the Estate of
        Teresa Sanchez Quetglas,
        ELIA BONFANTE,
        as Personal Representative of the Estate of
        Ana Gaitan Diaz,
        FRANCISCO CORTES,
        as Personal Representative of the Estate of
        Margarita Cortes-Pardo,
        JULIO LOPEZ-BERMEJO ROSSELLO,
        as Personal Representative of the Estate of
        Maria Lopez-Bermejo Rossello,
                                                       Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
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        2                       Opinion of the Court              21-14132

        DISCOUNT ROCK & SAND, INC.,
        a Florida Corporation,

                                                       Defendant-Appellant,

        CARLOS MANSO BLANCO,
        individually,

                                                                Defendant.

                               ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-10097-KMM
                           ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and MARCUS, Cir-
        cuit Judges.
        LUCK, Circuit Judge:
                This case stems from a tragic car accident that claimed the
        lives of four young women. The women’s estates sued Carlos
        Manso Blanco, the driver who rear-ended their car, for negligence.
        And the estates sued Blanco’s employer, Discount Rock & Sand,
        Inc., for negligently entrusting the company’s truck to Blanco and
        for vicarious liability for Blanco’s negligent driving. After the
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         3

        estates and Blanco settled, the district court ordered the estates to
        ﬁle a stipulation of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 41(a), which they did. Based on the stipulation, the district
        court ordered the dismissal of the claim against Blanco. The re-
        maining claims against Discount Rock went to trial, and the jury
        found the company liable and awarded nearly $12 million in dam-
        ages to the estates.
                Discount Rock appeals the judgment, arguing that: (1) it was
        entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrust-
        ment claim; (2) the district court erred by instructing the jury that
        it could presume a rear-ending driver was negligent; and (3) the dis-
        trict court abused its discretion by allowing the estates to show the
        jury a demonstrative aid depicting the crash. After we issued a ju-
        risdictional question, Discount Rock also moved to dismiss the ap-
        peal. Discount Rock argues that the stipulation was ineﬀective to
        dismiss the claim against Blanco because rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) re-
        quires all parties who appeared in the action to sign the stipulation,
        but Discount Rock didn’t sign it. Thus, the company argues, the
        claim against Blanco was not dismissed and the district court’s
        judgment was not ﬁnal.
               We ﬁrst conclude that we have jurisdiction. Although the
        stipulation did not comply with rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the district
        court’s order dismissing the claim against Blanco satisﬁed
        rule 41(a)(2)—which allows a district court to dismiss an action by
        court order at a plaintiﬀ’s request. And on the merits, we conclude
        that: (1) Discount Rock was not entitled to judgment as a matter
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

        of law on the negligent entrustment claim; (2) any error in instruct-
        ing the jury on the rear-end-collision presumption was harmless;
        and (3) there was no reversible error in publishing the demonstra-
        tive aid. We aﬃrm.
            FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               In March 2018, four Spanish citizens vacationing in the Flor-
        ida Keys were killed in an automobile accident. The four women
        were traveling northbound on U.S. Route 1 (the Overseas High-
        way) and stopped near mile marker 79 to turn left into a scenic
        viewing area. Two vehicles, driven by Cheyenne Del Okeyes and
        Eduardo Ponce, passed the women’s Nissan Rogue sport utility ve-
        hicle on the righthand shoulder. But a third vehicle—a truck out-
        fitted with a large tank holding water and sewage and hauling a
        port-a-potty—slammed into the Nissan. The truck, which was
        owned by Discount Rock and driven by its employee, Blanco, pro-
        pelled the Nissan into oncoming traffic, into the path of a recrea-
        tional vehicle driven by Daniel Pinkerton. All four women died at
        the scene.
               The women’s estates sued Blanco for negligence and Dis-
        count Rock for negligent entrustment and for vicarious liability for
        Blanco’s negligence. The estates sought compensatory and puni-
        tive damages.
                When Blanco and the estates settled, the district court “di-
        rected [them] to file a stipulation of dismissal of all claims signed by
        all [p]arties to the settlement pursuant to [r]ule 41(a).” So they filed
        a “Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal,” signed by both Blanco’s
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         5

        and the estates’ counsel, that stipulated, “pursuant to Federal Rule
        of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A), . . . to the voluntary dismissal of
        th[e] action only against [Blanco].” The district court then entered
        an order citing rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) before “adjudg[ing] that the [es-
        tates’] cause [be] hereby dismissed as to [Blanco].” Because the par-
        ties neither requested dismissal with prejudice nor indicated that
        the estates had previously dismissed their claim against Blanco, the
        district court ordered the dismissal to be without prejudice under
        rule 41(a)(1)(B). The district court also “retain[ed] jurisdiction to
        enforce the settlement agreement.”
                The remaining claims against Discount Rock went to trial.
        Discount Rock framed the accident as “unavoidable” and explained
        in its opening that it “d[id] not blame anyone in the Nissan for do-
        ing something wrong.” The estates, on the other hand, told the
        jury that Blanco was an inexperienced and checkered driver, was
        undertrained to safely handle a truck of that size and weight, and
        was speeding, following too closely, and distracted—looking away
        from the road—right before the accident.
               The jury heard from Discount Rock’s owner, who admitted
        he didn’t know about Blanco’s past driving violations—for speed-
        ing, running a stop sign, and driving with an expired tag—and
        wouldn’t have hired him had he known. The owner described hav-
        ing the dealership modify the truck to carry an aluminum tank with
        capacity for 300 gallons of water and 800 gallons of sewage (from
        cleaning port-a-potties)—for a combined 20,000-pound weight
        when full. But he didn’t test the truck’s braking or maneuverability
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-14132

        with the tank installed because he believed the dealer did—and be-
        cause, he said, the “heavy duty” truck was designed to handle the
        same with or without the added weight. Nor did the owner require
        Blanco to complete any safety training with the truck (other than
        shadowing another driver for a period). The day of the accident,
        the truck was nearly full and weighed 19,500 pounds.
               The jury also heard from Pinkerton, the recreational vehi-
        cle’s driver. Pinkerton said he saw the women’s Nissan slow to a
        stop with its turn signal on, at which point a black car swerved
        around it. Pinkerton then saw Blanco with his head down, “look-
        ing down with his hands down here,” as the Discount Rock truck
        approached the Nissan “at a pretty good rate of speed.” The jury
        saw a bodycam video in which Pinkerton informed a law enforce-
        ment officer at the scene that the “tanker truck” driver “wasn’t pay-
        ing attention.”
               Blanco testified too. He acknowledged his three prior traffic
        violations. He also confirmed he’d had neither a road test nor train-
        ing for driving the truck, other than riding with the outgoing driver
        for a week and a half. But Blanco agreed that the truck “felt differ-
        ent than [Discount Rock’s] old one,” which explained why he was
        speeding when the accident happened. And he testified that he did
        “everything in [his] power” to brake and maneuver to the right
        once he saw the Nissan stopped ahead—but he “was being
        dragged,” he said, and couldn’t stop “because maybe [he] had too
        much weight from the water, plus the [port-a-potty]” that he was
        hauling. The tank “sort of influenced in dragging [him]” and
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        21-14132                Opinion of the Court                          7

        preventing him from stopping, he testified, “because it’s very
        heavy, it weighs a lot.”
               Florida Highway Patrol Corporal Luis Perez likewise ex-
        plained that, “on the road, it look[ed] like [Blanco] actually tried to
        go to the right” but couldn’t avoid the collision “because [the truck]
        had too much . . . a lot of water, I believe it was a full tank of water
        in the back, all that inertia go[ing] forward when [Blanco] tried to
        go to the right.” Perez also saw evidence that, besides swerving,
        Blanco tried to brake “[j]ust right before” the collision. And Perez
        confirmed that the Nissan was stopped for a legal left turn at the
        time of the accident.
                The estates also presented the testimony of an accident re-
        construction expert, William Fischer. Before Fischer was called,
        Discount Rock objected to his planned use of a PowerPoint
        demonstrative aid on two grounds. First, although Discount Rock
        had asked for the demonstrative aid ten days before trial, the estates
        disclosed the eighty-four-slide PowerPoint deck at 11:45 p.m. after
        the first day of trial, “not pursuant to th[e district c]ourt’s dead-
        lines.” The estates’ untimely disclosure, Discount Rock contended,
        hampered its defense. Its cross-examination “outline would look
        very different,” it argued, had it seen the compilation—these slides,
        in this specific order—earlier, and perhaps it would’ve hired a com-
        peting expert. The district court initially described the estates’ con-
        duct as an “[eleven]th-hour ambush.” But after the district court
        directed the parties to confer and zero in on Discount Rock’s spe-
        cific objections, Discount Rock conceded that all but four slides had
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      21-14132

                                       1
        previously been disclosed. After pressing for specifics—and ob-
        serving that Discount Rock was simply “throw[ing] the whole
        bowl of spaghetti on the wall [to] see if any of it sticks”—the district
        court overruled Discount Rock’s timeliness objection.
               Second, Discount Rock objected to a “misleading” and “con-
        fusing” accident-reconstruction animation in the PowerPoint—“a
        gross mischaracterization of the facts” that omitted the two vehi-
        cles that passed the women’s Nissan before Blanco crashed into it.
        But the district court overruled this objection too, for three rea-
        sons. First, the district court noted that “there ha[d] been some
        different testimony with respect to the number of cars that may or
        may not have gone around.” Second, the district court offered to
        “remind the jury” that “these demonstrative aids are not evidence.”
        Third, Discount Rock could choose to address the omission during
        cross-examination. For these reasons, the district court concluded
        that the animation “would still be more helpful than not for the
        jury.”
               During Fischer’s testimony, the district court preemptively
        instructed the jury before publishing the demonstrative aid:

        1
           Discount Rock objected that, even if presenting previously disclosed mate-
        rial, “almost every single” slide had been changed since Fischer’s deposition.
        But after the estates pointed out that the bulk of the objected-to changes were
        benign—like an added directional arrow, a complaint the district court called
        “laughable”—Discount Rock conceded that it had no objection “to any of the
        slides where all they’ve done is add[] the directional.”
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        21-14132                Opinion of the Court                          9

               Folks, you’re going to see what is a demonstrative aid.
               It’s not evidence in the case. It’s presumably based on
               the witness’s testimony based on the evidence that he
               has reviewed in the case. So just be careful that if—
               this document, as I said, is not going to be admitted
               as evidence—but just be careful that if you see any-
               thing on the demonstrative aid that is diﬀerent than
               your recollection of what the evidence is in the case,
               it’s the evidence that controls. So, if you see anything
               diﬀerent—I mean, I’m not suggesting that there
               would be anything diﬀerent—but if you do, just be
               careful and just make sure you understand it’s not ev-
               idence in the case. It’s a demonstrative aid, they’re
               intended to help you, but if you see any diﬀerence, be
               guided by the evidence.

        Fischer opined: (1) that Blanco was speeding before the crash;
        (2) that he “only steered prior to impact and did not brake”; and
        (3) that the women’s Nissan—which had been stopped or moving
        slowly for “at least five seconds” before impact—would’ve been
        visible to “an attentive driver . . . for a sufficient amount of time to
        avoid actually impacting” it. Fischer also explained that the scenic
        viewing area into which the women were turning was paved, with
        no signs prohibiting a left turn—in fact, “all the pavement markings
        on the roadway were dashed and such that would allow a left
        turn”—and no signs prohibiting parking. On the day he inspected
        the area, Fischer said, several cars turned left into the area to stop,
        take photos, and enjoy the view.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

                Fischer then played the accident-reconstruction animation
        to “show the jurors the two impacts”: the animation depicted a
        stationary Nissan, angled slightly leftward in the direction of a
        paved turn-off, a recreational vehicle approaching from the oppo-
        site direction, and finally a tanker truck barreling into and pushing
        the Nissan into a collision with the recreational vehicle. Afterward,
        the estates asked him:
              Now, this animation that we’ve just seen, I take it,
              your focus is on the three vehicles that were involved
              in some sort of a collision in the crash scene . . . . You
              don’t show the vehicles, whether it was two, as some
              witnesses testiﬁed, or three vehicles, as the Florida
              Highway Patrolman testiﬁed, that passed without in-
              cident—passed the [women’s] vehicle without inci-
              dent; those aren’t shown there, are they?

        Fischer confirmed: “No, they’re not. This is, essentially, just to
        show—give someone an understanding of how all these vehicles
        came together.”
               Still, Fischer expressly addressed the two passing vehicles.
        Before playing the animation, he told the jury that “at least two
        cars also traveling north behind the [Nissan] maneuvered around
        and to the right of the stopped [Nissan].” He displayed and dis-
        cussed a slide with a still-image from the animation depicting the
        “[a]rea of other vehicles traveling around [the] stopped [Nissan]” (a
        superimposed dotted, “curved line that originates in the north-
        bound lane from behind the stopped vehicle, and then it curves
        around and then, ultimately, re-enters the northbound lane”). And
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         11

        he explained that he reviewed Del Okeyes’s and Ponce’s Florida
        Highway Patrol statements in preparing his expert report.
               On cross-examination, Fischer was again asked about the
        missing vehicles in the animation. He acknowledged that “[t]he
        animation that [he] created left out two of the cars that were part
        of the sequence of events leading up to th[e] accident.” But he dis-
        agreed with Discount Rock’s characterization that the omitted ve-
        hicles had “direct involvement” with the women’s Nissan and reit-
        erated that “th[e] animation was strictly to show the interaction
        between the [Discount Rock truck’s] impact into the rear of the
        Nissan and then the impact of the Nissan into the front of the [rec-
        reational vehicle].”
                Finally, the jury heard from the drivers of both vehicles that
        passed the women’s Nissan before the collision. Del Okeyes drove
        the first vehicle; she, like Pinkerton, testified that the Nissan grad-
        ually slowed to a stop with its blinker on. Del Okeyes told the jury
        that she slowed down and was “able to pass on the right without
        any issue” but also would’ve had enough time to stop behind the
        Nissan. After passing the Nissan, she saw a black car behind her
        pass too. She then saw “[a] big truck was coming up on the [Nissan]
        pretty fast, and it looked like he tried to avoid but didn’t have
        enough time to stop, which he slammed into the [Nissan], which
        pushed them into oncoming traffic” and into the recreational vehi-
        cle.
                Ponce—the driver of the black car that passed second—tes-
        tified that he didn’t see the stopped Nissan until Del Okeyes passed
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                21-14132

        it. He didn’t have time to brake or use his turn signal, he said; in-
        stead, he “almost crashed” into the Nissan before swerving around
        it. Ponce thought the Nissan had stopped quickly. But he admitted
        he didn’t know how long it’d been stopped—and Fischer testified
        that Ponce’s testimony that the Nissan stopped abruptly was incon-
        sistent both with data from the Nissan’s black box and with Pink-
        erton’s and Del Okeyes’s statements. After passing the Nissan,
        Ponce saw in his rearview mirror “a car that was coming behind
        [him]”—it was “really big, the truck”—crash into the Nissan “really
        bad.”
               After the estates rested, Discount Rock moved for judgment
        as a matter of law on the estates’ punitive damages claim, which
        the district court granted. Discount Rock then moved for judg-
        ment as a matter of law on the estates’ negligent entrustment
        claim. In doing so, Discount Rock stipulated that “Blanco was act-
        ing within the course and scope of his employment at the time of
        th[e] accident”—in which case, it argued, with the punitive dam-
        ages claim dismissed, the estates couldn’t hold Discount Rock both
        directly and vicariously liable. The district court, “satisfied that
        [there was] sufficient evidence . . . on both claims[] to allow them
        to go to the jury,” denied Discount Rock’s motion.
               At the charge conference, Discount Rock objected to a jury
        instruction on Florida’s presumption of negligence when a driver
        rear-ends another vehicle. Discount Rock asserted that it’s “a dis-
        solving presumption [and,] once evidence has been introduced that
        it was an unavoidable accident or that there is [an]other
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        21-14132                Opinion of the Court                         13

        explanation, the presumption dissolves and it becomes a jury ques-
        tion.” The district court overruled Discount Rock’s objection and
        instructed the jury: “In a rear-end collision[,] a rebuttable presump-
        tion of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle. The
        presumption can be rebutted if the rear-end driver puts forth evi-
        dence establishing the lead driver’s negligence contributed to the
        accident.” Discount Rock also proposed and agreed to a verdict
        form giving the jury three options for allocating liability for the col-
        lision: Discount Rock, Blanco, and Pinkerton.
               In closing, Discount Rock again asserted that the accident
        was unavoidable—the stretch of highway was unsafe, two cars had
        to swerve around the women’s Nissan because they didn’t have
        time to stop, and Blanco “was unable to avoid the collision” be-
        cause inertia caused by “the weight of the truck” prevented him
        from swerving—and that Discount Rock did nothing wrong in en-
        trusting the truck to Blanco in light of its safety policies. Discount
        Rock challenged Fischer’s credibility because the PowerPoint ani-
        mation omitted the cars that passed the women’s Nissan. And Dis-
        count Rock argued that Pinkerton, Del Okeyes, and Ponce were all
        partially responsible for the accident.
               The jury returned a verdict for the estates, awarding dam-
        ages totaling nearly $12 million. The jury found Discount Rock
        both vicariously liable for Blanco’s negligence (the jury appor-
        tioned seventy-five percent fault to him) and twenty-five percent
        responsible due to its own negligence. The district court entered
        judgment on the jury’s verdict against Discount Rock.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   21-14132

               Discount Rock then moved for judgment as a matter of law,
        for a new trial, or for remittitur. It argued that the district court
        should’ve entered judgment as a matter of law in its favor on the
        estates’ negligent entrustment claim, shouldn’t have instructed the
        jury on presuming negligence, and abused its discretion in allowing
        publication of Fischer’s demonstrative aid. The district court de-
        nied Discount Rock’s motion. This is Discount Rock’s appeal.
                                   JURISDICTION

               We begin, as we must, by assuring ourselves of our jurisdic-
        tion. Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A., 25 F.4th 843, 848 (11th Cir.
        2022) (“A federal court not only has the power but also the obliga-
        tion at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibil-
        ity that jurisdiction does not exist arises.” (citation omitted)). We
        issued a jurisdictional question asking the parties to address
        whether the rule 41 stipulation voluntarily dismissing Blanco “was
        effective, given that it appeared to be signed only by counsel for
        the [estates] and counsel for Blanco and did not appear to be signed
        by counsel for Discount Rock.”
                We asked that question because, if the stipulation was inef-
        fective to dismiss Blanco, then the estates’ claim against him re-
        mains pending. And if the estates’ claim against Blanco is still pend-
        ing, then the district court’s order entering judgment against Dis-
        count Rock isn’t final because it didn’t dispose of all claims against
        all parties. “Ordinarily, a final judgment resolves conclusively the
        substance of all claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties to an ac-
        tion.” Collar v. Abalux, Inc., 895 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2018)
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        21-14132                   Opinion of the Court                             15

        (emphasis added) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); see also 28 U.S.C.
        § 1291 (conferring “jurisdiction of appeals from all [district courts’]
        final decisions”).
                In response to our jurisdictional question, the estates urge
        us to follow the Fifth Circuit in National City Golf Finance v. Scott,
        899 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2018), and conclude that “only the dismissed
        defendant need sign the [rule 41] stipulation,” id. at 415 n.3. And if
        not, the estates argue, we should treat Blanco as having been vol-
        untarily dismissed by court order under rule 41(a)(2). Finally, the
        estates address a point we didn’t raise: whether the stipulation was
        effective despite not dismissing the estates’ entire action. On that
        issue, the estates argue that we should apply our holding in Plains
        Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glass-
        houses, Inc.—that a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice can dismiss one de-
        fendant while leaving “the action against another defendant” pend-
        ing, 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973)—to the rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
                            2
        stipulation here.
               Discount Rock, for its part, argues that a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
        stipulation “must be signed by all parties who have appeared in the
        action,” not just the parties that settled. Discount Rock also argues
        that we shouldn’t treat the district court’s order as a rule 41(a)(2)
        dismissal for three reasons: (1) because the estates never moved
        for an order of dismissal (as to which Discount Rock would’ve had

        2
         In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
        cuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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        16                           Opinion of the Court                         21-14132

        an “opportunity to be heard”); (2) because the order “[wa]s devoid
        of any analysis that Blanco was being dropped ‘on just terms’”; and
        (3) because Discount Rock was in fact prejudiced by Blanco’s dis-
        missal. Finally, Discount Rock asserts that Plains Growers “ex-
        pressly limited its ruling” to the rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice context.
        Extending Plains Growers’ holding to permit dismissal of a single
        defendant—rather than a plaintiff’s “entire action”—via rule 41’s
        other avenues, Discount Rock says, would conflict with the rule’s
        plain language, render Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 superflu-
        ous, and contradict the 1946 advisory committee note to rule 41
        “reflect[ing] an intention to ‘prevent[] unlimited dismissal.’”
               Rule 41(a) sets out three avenues for voluntary dismissal of
        “an action”: (1) a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice filed “before the oppos-
        ing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judg-
        ment”; (2) a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation “signed by all parties
        who have appeared”; or (3) a rule 41(a)(2) court order dismissing
        the action “at the plaintiff’s request” and “on terms that the court
        considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Although the estates’ stip-
        ulation was ineffective under rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) because Discount
                                 3
        Rock didn’t sign it, we agree with them that the district court’s
        order satisfied rule 41(a)(2)’s requirements and so was effective to
        dismiss Blanco. Here’s why.

        3
          After the parties briefed and argued this appeal, we held in City of Jacksonville
        v. Jacksonville Hospitality Holdings, L.P. that a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation re-
        quires the signatures of “all parties who have appeared in the lawsuit,” not just
        “all parties involved in the dismissal.” 82 F.4th 1031, 1034 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         17

                First, the stipulation—which alerted the district court that
        the estates sought to dismiss Blanco—sufficed as “the plaintiff[s’]
        request” for a court-ordered voluntary dismissal. Rule 41(a)(2), by
        its plain language, doesn’t require a motion. Cf. Pontenberg v. Bos.
        Sci. Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1256 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district
        court need not await a motion from a plaintiff to permit voluntary
        dismissal and may act sua sponte to dismiss under [r]ule 41(a)(2).”);
        see also Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (10th Cir.
        1994) (“Rule 41(a)(2) does not require that the plaintiff’s request for
        dismissal take any specific form; it requires only that the court ap-
        prove such a request for dismissal.”). And, several times, we’ve
        approved dismissal orders that treated rule 41(a)(1)(A) notices and
        stipulations as requests for a rule 41(a)(2) court order. See Ponten-
        berg, 252 F.3d at 1255–56 & n.1 (notice); Serendipity at Sea, LLC v.
        Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Pol’y No. 187581, 56
        F.4th 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2023) (stipulation); Druhan v. Am. Mut.
        Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1325 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (stipulation); see also
        Plains Growers, 474 F.2d at 253 (observing, in dicta, that “[w]here
        notice of dismissal under [r]ule 41(a)(1) fails, the notice may be con-
        sidered a motion under [r]ule 41(a)(2) and the court may order the
        dismissal”).
               Second, the district court’s order complied with the require-
        ment of rule 41(a)(2) in “adjudg[ing] that the [estates’] cause
        [wa]s . . . dismissed as to” Blanco because it set forth the terms of
        the dismissal. The district court ordered dismissal without preju-
        dice because the parties neither requested otherwise nor “informed
        the [c]ourt whether [the estates] previously dismissed any federal
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                    21-14132

        or state court action based on or including the same claim.” And
        the district court “retain[ed] jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
        agreement” between the estates and Blanco. Both of these are
        “terms that the [district] court consider[ed] proper,” which is all
        rule 41(a)(2) requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
                Discount Rock’s arguments to the contrary are unpersua-
        sive. First, it argues that the district court’s order was “devoid of
        any analysis” that the terms of Blanco’s dismissal were proper. But
        on its face, the order shows that the district court analyzed whether
        the dismissal’s terms were proper. The order expressly states the
        district court “consider[ed] . . . the [s]tipulation[ and] the pertinent
        portions of the record.” Then, only after “being . . . fully advised
        in the premises,” the district court ordered Blanco’s dismissal and
        specified the terms.
                Second, Discount Rock argues that even if we treat the dis-
        trict court’s order as a dismissal order under rule 41(a)(2), it still did
        not dismiss an “action” because it didn’t dismiss the entire case.
        But in Plains Growers, where we addressed a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) no-
        tice, we held that a plaintiff can dismiss one defendant under
        rule 41(a) “even though the action against another defendant
        would remain pending.” 474 F.2d at 253. That is what happened
        here—the district court’s order dismissed the action as to Blanco,
        “even though the action against [Discount Rock] remain[ed] pend-
        ing.” Id.
               Discount Rock is mistaken that Plains Growers “limited its
        ruling” to rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and thus “action” should mean the
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         19

        entire case for rule 41(a)(2) dismissal orders. Rules 41(a)(1)(A)(i),
        (a)(1)(A)(ii), and (a)(2) all use the term “action.” Although we de-
        cided Plains Growers in the context of a rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of
        dismissal, our holding hinged on interpreting the word “action” as
        used throughout rule 41(a)—not on any language in the dismissal-
        by-notice subrule, specifically. See id. at 254–55 (rejecting the argu-
        ment that “‘action’ in [rule 41(a)] . . . denotes the entire contro-
        versy” and adopting “the ‘better view’ . . . that a [r]ule 41(a) notice
        or motion can be effected against less than all of the defendants”).
        Indeed, we found
               little merit in an argument that the [district] court
               could not dismiss the action as to less than all defend-
               ants upon motion, and yet there is nothing in the
               [r]ule to indicate an intent to make the word “action”
               mean “all” in 41(a)(1) and mean less than “all” in
               41(a)(2).

        Id. at 254; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (setting out ways a
        “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order” (emphasis
        added)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (authorizing dismissal of “an ac-
        tion” by court order (emphasis added)). And in Oswalt v. Scripto,
        Inc., which involved a filing dismissing one of several defendants
        that we found “tantamount to a [rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)] stipulation,”
        we recognized that Plains Growers “rejected” the view “that ‘action’
        in [r]ule 41 means the entire controversy.” 616 F.2d 191, 194–95
        (5th Cir. 1980).
               We reject Discount Rock’s invitation to give “action” a dif-
        ferent meaning for rule 41(a)(2) than it has for rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                         21-14132

        (Plains Growers) or rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Oswalt). We generally “pre-
        sume that ‘words or phrases bear the same meaning throughout a
        text.’” Hylton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (cleaned up) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
        Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 25, at 170, 173 (2012)). “It
        would be odd if, in two consecutive subsections of [rule 41(a)], . . .
        the same words were read to mean one thing in the first subsection
        but another in the second.” Id. Discount Rock points us to nothing
        from rule 41(a)’s context rebutting the general presumption that
        the same word in the same rule means the same thing. See id. (“All
        else being equal, we prefer a reading of the second [subsection] that
                                                                    4
        coheres with binding precedent as to the first.”).
               The district court’s order dismissing Blanco but leaving the
        estates’ claims against Discount Rock pending satisfied
        rule 41(a)(2)’s requirements and so was effective to dismiss Blanco.
        And with Blanco dismissed, the judgment entered against Discount

        4
          Discount Rock directs our attention, by notice of supplemental authority, to
        Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141 (11th Cir. 2023), which it says “supports its
        position that Blanco’s ‘voluntary’ dismissal pursuant to [r]ule 41 was proce-
        durally ineffective.” We did dismiss the appeal in Rosell for lack of jurisdiction
        because “the parties . . . attempted to use [r]ule 41(a) to dismiss a single count
        and not an entire lawsuit.” Id. at 1143. But Discount Rock overlooks Rosell’s
        footnote two, which “recognized that [r]ule 41(a) allows a district court to dis-
        miss all claims against a particular defendant,” an “exception (if it can be called
        that) [that] is compatible with the rule’s text because[,] in a multi-defendant
        lawsuit, an ‘action’ can refer to all the claims against one party.” Id. at 1144
        n.2 (citations omitted).
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        21-14132                  Opinion of the Court                               21

        Rock resolved all claims against all remaining parties—making it
        final. We have jurisdiction.
                                      DISCUSSION

               Turning to the merits, Discount Rock raises three issues on
        appeal. First, Discount Rock asserts that the district court erred in
        denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law on the estates’
        negligent entrustment claim. Second, Discount Rock argues that
        the district court erred in instructing the jury on Florida’s rebutta-
        ble presumption that a rear-ending driver is negligent. Third, Dis-
        count Rock contends that the district court abused its discretion in
        allowing the estates to publish an untimely and misleading demon-
        strative aid.
                                 Negligent Entrustment

                Discount Rock argues, first, that the district court erred in
        denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law as to the es-
        tates’ negligent entrustment claim. It contends that, under long-
        standing Florida precedent, a plaintiff can’t pursue both vicarious
        liability and negligent entrustment claims against an employer
        once the employer has admitted that the allegedly negligent em-
                                                                                 5
        ployee was acting in the course and scope of his employment.

        5
         We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment as a
        matter of law. Mamani v. Sánchez Bustamante, 968 F.3d 1216, 1230 (11th Cir.
        2020). “Our sole consideration is whether the evidence sufficiently supports
        the verdict,” viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in
        the nonmovant’s favor. Id. (citations omitted).
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

               Under Florida law, an employer “may be held liable for in-
        jury to a third party caused by” its employee’s negligent conduct
        “while acting in the scope of his authority.” Mallory v. O’Neil, 69
        So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1954). Generally, where “a plaintiff alleges and
        a defendant admits that the alleged torts took place during the
        course and scope of employment, employer liability can only be
        pursued on the basis of [vicarious liability] and not on the basis that
        the employer was negligent.” Delaurentos v. Peguero, 47 So. 3d 879,
        882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mallory, 69 So. 2d at 315).
                But two exceptions to the general rule apply where a direct-
        liability theory “would impose additional liability” on the employer
        beyond vicarious liability for its employee’s negligence. Clooney v.
        Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). First, an
        employer can be separately liable—in addition to vicarious liabil-
        ity—where there’s a pending punitive damages claim. Id. Second,
        an employer may be separately liable where the alleged direct lia-
        bility takes the form of negligent entrustment. See id.
                The Clooney court gave the mine-run example of the second
        exception. An employer will be separately liable for negligent en-
        trustment if the “owner or authorized custodian of a motor vehicle
        . . . knows that the vehicle has defective brakes,” it allows an em-
        ployee “who is not aware of this dangerous condition to use [the
        vehicle], and because of the bad brakes an accident occurs.” Id. “If
        the driver were found not to be negligent”—because he didn’t
        know about the defective brakes—the employer “could not be held
        vicariously liable. So the means of imposing liability on the
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                        23

        [employer] would be through [its] own negligence of lending the
        car with bad brakes.” Id.
               Here, the district court granted Discount Rock’s motion for
        judgment as a matter of law as to the estates’ punitive damages
        claim so that claim couldn’t support sending both the estates’ direct
        and vicarious liability theories to the jury. But the estates also al-
        leged a negligent entrustment claim and provided evidence that
        Discount Rock knew of its truck’s dangerous condition.
               The jury heard evidence that Discount Rock’s owner had
        the truck Blanco was driving modified to carry an 1,100-gallon alu-
        minum tank. The owner testified that, with a full tank, the truck’s
        combined weight was 20,000 pounds—and Fischer testified that
        the truck was nearly full the day of the accident, weighing around
        19,500 pounds. The jury also heard evidence that Discount Rock’s
        owner never tested the truck’s brakes or maneuverability after the
        tank was installed—believing that the dealership tested it and that
        the “heavy duty” truck would handle the same as modified. And
        Discount Rock’s owner admitted that he didn’t train Blanco to op-
        erate the modified truck, instead only having Blanco shadow the
        outgoing driver for a week or two.
               At the same time, Blanco testified that the modified truck
        “felt different than [Discount Rock’s] old one.” He told the jury
        that he did “everything in [his] power” to brake and maneuver to
        the right but “was being dragged” and couldn’t stop “because
        maybe [he] had too much weight from the water, plus the [port-a-
        potty] that [he] was [hauling].” Blanco also testified that the
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14132

        aluminum tank “sort of influenced in dragging [him]” and prevent-
        ing him from stopping “because it’s very heavy, it weighs a lot.”
        Florida Highway Patrol Corporal Perez echoed this testimony, ex-
        plaining that the roadway evidence suggested that Blanco “actually
        tried to go to the right” to bypass the Nissan but couldn’t “because
        [the truck] had too much . . . a lot of water, I believe it was a full
        tank of water in the back, all that inertia go[ing] forward when
        [Blanco] tried to go to the right.”
               Discount Rock seized on this explanation in its closing argu-
        ment. It told the jury that the accident was “unavoidable” partly
        because Blanco “was unable to avoid the collision” when inertia
        caused by “the weight of the truck” prevented him from swerving
        around the Nissan. Indeed, Discount Rock specifically hearkened
        back to Blanco’s testimony about “being pulled,” and to Perez’s
        testimony that “inertia from the water in the tank dragged the
        truck away.” Discount Rock urged the jury not to hold it or Blanco
        responsible—pointing instead to Pinkerton’s, Del Okeyes’s, and
        Ponce’s responsibility for the accident.
                As Discount Rock’s closing argument demonstrates, this
        case is essentially the paradigm example of negligent entrustment.
        There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, as Clooney envi-
        sioned, that Discount Rock “kn[ew] that the vehicle ha[d]” a dan-
        gerous condition yet “allow[ed] one who [wa]s not aware of this
        dangerous condition to use it,” and an accident occurred because
        of that condition. See Clooney, 352 So. 2d at 1220. Because Discount
        Rock could be separately liable for entrusting the truck to Blanco
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        21-14132                  Opinion of the Court                               25

        in addition to being vicariously liable for Blanco’s negligence, the
        district court did not err in denying Discount Rock’s motion for
        judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrustment claim.
                         Rebuttable Presumption of Negligence

               Next, Discount Rock argues that the district court erred in
        instructing the jury on Florida’s presumption that a driver who
        rear-ends another vehicle was negligent. According to Discount
        Rock, the “presumption dissolves when there is evidence that fairly
        and reasonably tends to show that the presumption of negligence
        is misplaced”—which it says it presented here. And the district
        court’s error wasn’t harmless, Discount Rock argues, “because the
                                                                               6
        instruction essentially guaranteed a verdict for” the estates.
                In Florida, it’s well settled that a “rebuttable presumption of
        negligence . . . attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision.”
        Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales, 786 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 2001); accord,
        e.g., Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 1965); Birge v. Charron, 107
        So. 3d 350, 353 (Fla. 2012). The question here is whether it was
        error to instruct the jury on the presumption.

        6
          “We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they misstate
        the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party but give the
        district court wide discretion as to the style and wording employed.” Bhogaita
        v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (cleaned up). We will reverse “where we are left with a substantial and ine-
        radicable doubt as to whether the district court properly guided the jury.” Id.
        (cleaned up).
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14132

                Florida recognizes two types of rebuttable presumptions:
        those “affecting the burden of producing evidence” (often called
        vanishing presumptions) and those “affecting the burden of proof.”
        Fla. Stat. § 90.302 (emphases added); accord Universal Ins. Co. of
        N. Am. v. Warfel, 82 So. 3d 47, 53–54 (Fla. 2012). Vanishing pre-
        sumptions are “established primarily to facilitate the determination
        of the particular action in which the presumption is applied”; pre-
        sumptions affecting the burden of proof serve “to implement pub-
        lic policy.” Fla. Stat. §§ 90.303–.304. Under either type, “a directed
        verdict on a presumed fact” is appropriate “if such fact goes unre-
        butted.” Warfel, 82 So. 3d at 52.
               “The fundamental difference between the two” is what hap-
        pens “in the face of rebutting evidence: the former requires the
        presumption to vanish, whereas the latter still presents the pre-
        sumption to the trier of fact to decide if the contradicting evidence
        overcomes the presumption.” Id. So a jury never hears about a
        vanishing presumption: either the district court directs a verdict
        on the issue or, if rebutting evidence is produced, then the pre-
        sumption “drop[s] out of the case” and “the issue is determined on
        the evidence just as though no presumption had ever existed.” Id.
        at 51–52 (citations omitted); accord Pub. Health Tr. of Dade Cnty. v.
        Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 600 (Fla. 1987) (explaining that, once a van-
        ishing presumption is rebutted, issues are resolved “as in a typical
        case,” and “[t]he jury is never told of the presumption”).
               Florida’s presumption that a rear-ending driver was negli-
        gent is a vanishing presumption—meaning a jury shouldn’t hear
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                         27

        about it. Birge, 107 So. 3d at 359 n.16; Gulle, 174 So. 2d at 28–29.
        But the district court here instructed the jury: “In a rear-end colli-
        sion, a rebuttable presumption of negligence attaches to the driver
        of the rear vehicle. The presumption can be rebutted if the rear-
        end driver puts forth evidence establishing the lead driver’s negli-
        gence contributed to the accident.” Thus, we agree with Discount
        Rock that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the pre-
        sumption over Discount Rock’s objection. See, e.g., DiGregorio v.
        Indus. Supply Corp. of Orlando, 438 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1971)
        (“[T]his presumption is not the proper matter of a charge to the
        jury under any circumstances.”); Baker v. Deeks, 176 So. 2d 108, 109
        (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“[I]t is improper to instruct the jury on
        the presumption of negligence.”).
               Still, we conclude that the jury-instruction error was harm-
        less because the district court didn’t “misstate the law or mislead
        the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party” (Discount Rock). See
        Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
        That’s because Discount Rock never rebutted the presumption.
               Florida courts have recognized four kinds of rebutting evi-
        dence in rear-end-collision cases: “(1) a mechanical failure in the
        rear driver’s vehicle, (2) the lead driver’s sudden stop, (3) the lead
        driver’s sudden lane change, and (4) the lead driver’s illegal or im-
        proper stop.” Fonger v. Nall, 286 So. 3d 332, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
        2019) (citation omitted); see also Alford v. Cool Cargo Carriers, Inc.,
        936 So. 2d 646, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“In the[ latter three]
        instances, the purpose for the presumption is not served because
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

        the driver of the lead vehicle was a contributing cause of the colli-
        sion . . . .”). Discount Rock argues that it presented rebuttal evi-
        dence in two forms. First, it points to evidence that Del Okeyes
        and Ponce “illegally and unexpectedly took evasive action onto the
        shoulder” to avoid hitting the women’s Nissan, arguing that it was
        “an unavoidable accident precipitated by the sudden and unex-
        pected actions of the two vehicles immediately ahead of” Blanco’s
        truck. Second, Discount Rock relies on evidence that the women’s
        “unexpected stop on a busy two-lane highway”—not “at an inter-
        section or red light” but instead while “attempting to cross traffic
        into a scenic area”—caused Del Okeyes and Ponce “to take evasive
        action” in the first place.
                But Del Okeyes and Ponce’s evasive action is a non-starter.
        To rebut the presumption, Discount Rock had to show “the driver
        of the lead vehicle was a contributing cause of the collision.” Alford,
        936 So. 2d at 650 (emphasis added); see also Fonger, 286 So. 3d at 333
        (identifying “lead driver’s” conduct that can rebut presumption).
        Neither Del Okeyes nor Ponce was the “lead driver” in the colli-
        sion.
               As for evidence of the Nissan’s “unexpected stop,” “[i]t is
        well settled that a sudden stop, without more, is insufficient to
        overcome the presumption of negligence.” Clampitt, 786 So. 2d at
        575. Instead, what’s required is evidence of “a sudden stop by the
        [lead] driver at a time and place where it could not reasonably be
        expected by the following driver.” Id. at 574 (citation omitted)
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        21-14132               Opinion of the Court                       29

        (contrasting such evidence with “abrupt and arbitrary . . . ‘gotcha’
        stop” in Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 752 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2000)).
               So even if Discount Rock provided evidence that the
        women’s Nissan stopped suddenly—despite Fischer’s testimony
        that the Nissan was stopped or moving slowly for “at least five sec-
        onds” before impact, Pinkerton’s and Del Okeyes’s statements that
        the Nissan gradually slowed to a stop, and Ponce’s admission that
        he didn’t know how long the Nissan had been stopped—that’s not
        enough to rebut the presumption. The stop also had to be “at a
        time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by”
        Blanco. Id. (citation omitted).
                And that’s simply not the case here. The undisputed evi-
        dence showed that the turn into the scenic viewing area was both
        legal and expected. No signs prohibited drivers from turning into
        or parking at the scenic viewing area. In fact, Perez testified that
        Florida law didn’t prohibit the left turn the women were waiting
        to make, and his belief that the turn was unsafe didn’t transform it
        into illegal or unexpected conduct. Further, the roadway markings
        where the women were stopped—which “were dashed and such
        that would allow a left turn”—showed that turns could be expected
        into the scenic viewing area. There was thus no jury question
        about whether Blanco should have reasonably expected the
        women’s vehicle to stop. Cf. id. at 575 (concluding stop for turn
        was reasonably expected on two-lane road bordered by businesses
        and residential areas “all of which maintain[ed] entrances and exits
        on the roadway”); Wright v. Ring Power Corp., 834 So. 2d 329, 331
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

        (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t was reasonable for Datson to expect
        Wright’s car to stop suddenly when attempting to turn left onto
        the highway where there was no traffic signal requiring the high-
        way traffic to stop.”); Hunter v. Ward, 812 So. 2d 601, 602–04 (Fla.
        Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding stop for turn was reasonably ex-
        pected from inside lane of four-lane road at “a break in the grass
        median designed for turning”).
                In short, Discount Rock didn’t produce evidence rebutting
        the presumption that Blanco was negligent when he rear-ended the
        Nissan—meaning the district court, had it been asked, should’ve
        directed a verdict in the estates’ favor rather than giving the issue
        of Blanco’s negligence to the jury. See, e.g., Birge, 107 So. 3d at 353
        (“Unless this presumption is rebutted, the beneficiary of the pre-
        sumption is entitled to judgment thereon as a matter of law.”);
        Fonger, 286 So. 3d at 334 (“[I]f the stop occurs at a place where it
        was to be expected, the presumption of negligence is not rebutted,
        and the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict as to the rear
        driver’s negligence.” (citation omitted)). Thus, not only was the
        jury-instruction error harmless because the estates were entitled to
        a directed verdict, see Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285, but Discount Rock
        actually benefitted from that error by getting an unearned second
        bite at the negligence-issue apple. Any jury-instruction error was
        an “error without injury” and not reversible because “[t]he submis-
        sion to the jury, albeit under an erroneous standard, was more than
        the defendant was entitled to.” See Charleston Nat’l Bank v. Hen-
        nessy, 404 F.2d 539, 543–44 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The instruction did not
        correctly state the law, but the error was without injury” where the
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        21-14132                    Opinion of the Court                                 31

        rear-ending driver’s evidence to rebut the presumption of negli-
        gence “never rose above a scintilla at most, conjecture and specu-
        lation at least. The trial court should have instructed the jury that
        the presumption of negligence required a verdict for the plaintiff.”).
                                    Demonstrative Aid

                Finally, Discount Rock argues that the district court abused
        its discretion in permitting Fischer to publish an accident-recon-
        struction animation contained in his demonstrative aid Power-
               7
        Point. Discount Rock asserts that the district court abused its dis-
        cretion because the animation was untimely and “patently false
        and misleading.”
                As to timeliness, Discount Rock contends that the animation
        was created after Fischer’s deposition and only disclosed by the es-
        tates late on “the night before [Fischer] was to testify.” But even
        assuming that Discount Rock is right, it has not shown that any
        error substantially prejudiced its defense. Discount Rock conceded
        that all but four slides in Fischer’s PowerPoint had been previously
        disclosed in discovery, with only minor edits. And Discount Rock
        had ample opportunity to cross examine Fischer about the Power-
        Point, including that it omitted vehicles from the animation. Cf.

        7
          We review a district court’s decision to allow use of a demonstrative aid for
        abuse of discretion. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1290–91. We will reverse for a new
        trial based on an evidentiary error “only in cases where substantial prejudice
        exists.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (cita-
        tion omitted).
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14132

        Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 667 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even
        if district court should have excluded expert testimony, any error
        was harmless partly because the objecting parties “had ample op-
        portunity to cross-examine” the expert about his assumptions).
                Discount Rock also argues that the animation mischaracter-
        ized the facts because it “inexplicably . . . erased two of the vehi-
        cles” involved in the lead-up to the collision—thereby “impl[ying]
        that the Discount Rock truck had a wholly unobstructed view of
        [the] stopped Nissan, and was sufficiently behind [it] to avoid a col-
        lision, but nevertheless rear-ended it”—which was “purposefully
        misleading[] and highly prejudicial.” Discount Rock contends that
        the district court should’ve excluded the video under Federal Rule
        of Evidence 403 as “inherent[ly] confusing” and “misleading.”
               But Discount Rock hasn’t shown that the animation was “in-
        herent[ly] confusing” or “misleading.” First, Fischer repeatedly ref-
        erenced the missing vehicles during his testimony about the ani-
        mation. He mentioned them before he played the animation, in-
        forming the jury that “at least two cars” passed on the shoulder
        before the collision. He mentioned them after he played the ani-
        mation, when he displayed and discussed a PowerPoint slide de-
        picting the passing vehicles’ path around the Nissan. He also told
        the jury that he’d reviewed Del Okeyes’s and Ponce’s statements
        to the Florida Highway Patrol while preparing his expert report
        (and testified that Ponce’s statement conflicted with the black-box
        and other witnesses’ evidence). And Fischer acknowledged and ex-
        plained—on both direct and cross-examination—that the passing
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        21-14132                Opinion of the Court                          33

        vehicles didn’t appear because the animation “was strictly to show”
        the impacts between the Nissan, Discount Rock’s truck, and the
        recreational vehicle.
                And second, Del Okeyes and Ponce testified after Fischer tes-
        tified—meaning that, after seeing Fischer’s animation, the jury
        heard testimony directly addressing the roles the passing vehicles
        played in the events the day of the collision. In sum, the district
        court didn’t abuse its discretion in allowing the estates to publish
        Fischer’s accident-reconstruction animation because the animation
        wasn’t so “confusing” or “misleading” that rule 403 should’ve op-
        erated to exclude it. Cf. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1291 (emphasizing
        that district court’s “discretion is particularly broad with respect to
        [r]ule 403 determinations”); cf. also Wright v. CSX Transp., Inc., 375
        F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (clarifying that Seventh Circuit case
        upon which party relied to argue train-light demonstration
        should’ve been excluded “actually held . . . that when a demonstra-
        tion . . . differs from the actual conditions of the collision, the trial
        court has the discretion whether to admit it and allow the differing
        conditions to be highlighted on cross-examination,” which was
        “exactly what happened [t]here”).
                                   CONCLUSION

               We have jurisdiction over Discount Rock’s appeal because
        the district court’s order dismissing Blanco satisfied Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), and so the district court’s entry of judg-
        ment on the jury’s verdict was final.
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14132

                As to the merits, the district court didn’t err in denying judg-
        ment as a matter of law for Discount Rock on the estates’ negligent
        entrustment claim because there was sufficient evidence for the
        jury to find that Discount Rock negligently entrusted Blanco with
        the modified truck. And even though the district court erred in
        instructing the jury on Florida’s rebuttable presumption that a rear-
        ending driver was negligent, that error wasn’t “to the prejudice of”
        Discount Rock, see Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285, because Discount
        Rock failed to produce evidence rebutting the presumption. Fi-
        nally, any untimely disclosure of the demonstrative aid didn’t sub-
        stantially prejudice Discount Rock, and the district court didn’t
        abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstrative aid to be pub-
        lished because it wasn’t so “confusing” or “misleading” that it
        should’ve been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The
        district court’s entry of judgment on the jury verdict for the estates
        is therefore AFFIRMED.