Court Opinion

ID: 9683567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:31:36.329179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.815212
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Justice,
concurring.
My opinion dated June 26, 1992, is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefor.
*158I endorse the majority opinion, and respectfully disagree with the dissent.
The dissent is based primarily on the novel invoking of equity in a mandamus proceeding, the premise that Lee v. Daniels, 377 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.1964), should be either overruled or ignored by this court, and that article III, section 19, of the Texas Constitution should not apply to this relator for equitable reasons.
This court has no authority to overrule or disregard the Texas Supreme Court decision of Lee, especially in view of the fact that the same court recently cited the case without disapproval in Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.1992).
If equity dictates that article III, section 19, of the Texas Constitution should not apply to this relator, then who would it apply to? Further, how many other provisions of the Texas Constitution would equity likewise declare ineffective on this same basis?
Moreover, although we are undoubtedly sympathetic to the desires of the republican voters of this senatorial district, as well as the equitable arguments raised by the relator and the dissenting opinion, this is a mandamus proceeding which, in addition to being extremely restrictive, is not equitable in nature.
Generally, “[mjandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law” and “[t]he court of appeals, therefore, acts in excess of its writ power when it grants mandamus relief absent these circumstances.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985).
The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the respondent’s action. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-43 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986); Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1984). Rather, a respondent abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-43; Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 443; Bush v. Vela, 535 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1927, writ ref’d).
In ascertaining whether the respondent abused its discretion, the reviewing court must determine if the respondent aicted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1986). In a mandamus action, “[t]he relator who attacks the ruling of the [respondent] as an abuse of discretion labors under a heavy burden to establish under the circumstances of the case, that the fact and law permit the [respondent] to make but one decision.” Blasingame v. Krueger, 800 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ), citing Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917. This standard of review applies in mandamus proceedings involving election officer. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992); Oney v. Ammerman, 458 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.1970); Tex.Elec.Code Ann. §§ 161.009 and 273.061 (Vernon 1986).
Regardless of our own personal individual or collective feelings, mandamus cannot issue when the relator has failed to establish his burden.1 This respondent cannot be said to have abused his discretion in failing to perform his duty imposed by law when the record clearly reflects that the respondent followed the letter of the law as presently interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court.
Mandamus should be denied.

. The relator has the burden of presenting a record clearly showing the respondent’s abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law. Tex.R.App.P. 50(d).