Court Opinion

ID: 9460419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:49:42.514861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:36.659443
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Many of my own views coincide with those expressed in Judge Rosenn’s thoughtful opinion. However, in the circumstances of this case; I regard the failure to give an identification instruction, even though defense counsel did not request one, as prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to secure an adequately informed determination of his innocence or guilt. Further, such omission, in my estimation, requires reversal of the judgment of the district court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
It seems settled that the potential for erroneous eyewitness identification at or prior to trial is substantial. The Supreme Court, when dealing with possibly suggestive pretrial identification practices, has emphasized the demonstrably significant likelihood of misidentification in some situations and has sought to provide a degree of protection from attribution of wrongdoing to innocent parties, in part, by augmenting the procedural safeguards available to suspected malefactors.
In United States v. Wade,1 **the Supreme Court, in extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to post-indictment lineups, made the following observations :
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: ‘What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials. These instances are recent— not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.’ The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927) A commentator has observed that ‘[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor- — - perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.’ Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 26. Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the witness’ opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.2 (Footnotes omitted)
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet squarely faced the difficulties presented when a jury, undoubtedly unaware of the possible shortcomings of eyewitness identification testimony, is asked to render a decision of innocence or guilt when such testimony constitutes an important part of the evidence against the defendant. The Court of *737Appeals for the District of Columbia however, has abandoned the general rule that a trial judge need not submit a particular charge to the jury absent a request3 for an instruction relating to eyewitness identification testimony. In Macklin v. United States,4 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that:
After the Supreme Court has focused on identification problems in Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy, it is even more imperative that trial courts include, as a matter of routine, an identification instruction. In cases where identification is a major issue the judge should not rely on defense counsel to request so important a charge.5
It might be contended that the rule fashioned in Macklin by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to its supervisory power, required a new trial in every case where identification was a major issue and the trial court failed to give an identification instruction. However, United States v. Telfaire6 effectively eliminates any implication that Macklin leads automatically to such a result.
In Telfaire, the Court affirmed a conviction even though an identification instruction had not been given. It concluded, in effect, that the failure so to instruct the jury was harmless error because that case exhibited “none of the special difficulties often presented by identification testimony that would require additional information be given to the jury in order for us-to repose confidence in their ability to evaluate the reliability of the identification.”7 The Court added that the eyewitness had “an adequate opportunity to observe” and had made an earlier spontaneous identification. It did, however, set forth a model identification instruction and stated “[that] failure to use this model, with appropriate adaptations, would constitute a risk in future cases that should not be ignored unless there is strong reason in the particular case.” 8
Thus, it appears that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has concluded that in any case where identification is a major issue, the failure to instruct the jury with respect to the possible unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony must “be noticed although . . . not brought to the attention of the [trial] court” by way of a request for a specific instruction.9 The question left open .for review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is whether the error in failing so to instruct “affect [ed] substantial rights.” 10
This Court treated extensively the problems associated with eyewitness identification testimony in United States v. Barber.11 Although holding that there was no error in the identification charge given by the trial court in that case, this Court, exercising its supervisory power, sought to provide guidance for the district courts in cases where the identification of the defendant is at issue. It stated that:
where the circumstances surrounding the criminal act gave limited opportunity for observation or utilization of other sensory perception, or where uncertainty is expressed by the witness himself, or exposed by a past history of the witness’ statements or demonstrated by cross-examination, the statement of identity should be considered as only an expression of opinion and should be accompanied by *738appropriate instructions as to its sufficiency and weight.12
The Barber court required that instructions satisfy the guidelines followed by Pennsylvania state courts, which arguably establish reversible error if the trial court fails to instruct, even in the absence of a request, when any of the conditions of uncertainty just enumerated are present.13 However, the Barber panel stated that when none of those conditions are present the trial judge need not, at least absent a request, give an identification instruction.
A full appreciation of the uncertainties associated with eyewitness identification testimony and of the judiciary’s close attention to the impact of these uncertainties on the fact finding process should temper any decision to designate, or not to designate as plain error a failure to give identification instructions.
I agree with Judge Rosenn that Vaughn’s confusion as to the correct name of the defendant did not raise the type of doubts concerning the reliability of Vaughn’s eyewitness identification of the defendant that calls for a specific charge. I also agree that Barber, unlike Macklin, does not appear to preclude the applicability of the plain error rule in situations like this. I concede, however, that in light of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court and this Court, it is difficult, in the absence of Telfaire-type instructions, to contemplate cases in which identification is a major issue where a serious question whether the correct identification has been made. In such situations, plain error would, in all probability, exist.
Although Judge Rosenn’s characterization that the “central and crucial issue in the case” is the credibility of Vaughn, the informer, may not be inaccurate, such characterization should not blind us to the important role identification testimony may have played in Wilford’s conviction. Vaughn’s testimony placing Wilford at the location where the narcotics were sold and implicating Wilford as the seller is corroborated by Agent Malloy’s identification of Wilford as the person leaning from a second floor window. If the jury did credit Malloy’s testimony- — and there is no way that we can ascertain this — the government’s case was substantially strengthened. If the jury discounted Malloy’s testimony, the government’s case was immeasurably weakened. This seems particularly so because the testimony of informants is frequently suspect since they may well believe that convictions will result in better treatment for themselves.14 Because of these considerations, I would be inclined to view this case as one in which identification is a major issue.
Evidence was introduced by Wilford, chiefly by way of his own testimony, which indicated that Agent Malloy’s opportunity to observe may have been impaired by the dim lighting at the housing project. It would appear, therefore, that one of the conditions is present that, under Barber, transforms identification testimony from statements of fact into opinions.
Since this Court in Barber has recently and thoroughly grappled with the difficulties posed by eyewitness identification testimony, and in my view, such testimony may well have been a compelling factor in the jury’s decision in this case, I would not hold that Wilford’s failure to request an identification instruction prevents this Court from recognizing the trial court’s error in not so charging the jury after Wilford had produced evidence suggesting that Agent Malloy’s observations occurred in dim light.
In practice, it seems that a conclusion that plain error exists invariably leads *739to a conclusion that the error is not harmless; for quite frequently the considerations that prompt the former conclusion preclude a decision contrary to the latter.15 Contrasting this case with Telfaire strongly suggests that it is not an aberration. Judge Rosenn apparently acknowledges that the general instructions given here were not as likely to focus the jury’s attention on the identification issue as those in Telfaire.16 Further, the witness in Telfaire did have an adequate opportunity to observe, and a spontaneous pretrial identification in Telfaire buttressed the confidence of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the reliability of the identification testimony.17
The procedure followed in Telfaire, suggesting model identification instructions in this type of case, merits further attention. If the trial courts are constantly aware that certain instructions, varied to meet specific cases, are to be given whenever identification is an important issue, it is more likely that the defendant’s right to an informed consideration of his case will not be diluted and the number of appeals such as this may well be substantially reduced.18 On balance, it may be wiser to reverse the defendant’s conviction, based in large part on the informant’s possession, after allegedly meeting with the defendant, of four glassine packages of heroin, and, at the same time, take the opportunity to provide district courts with more definite guidance with respect to the necessity for and content of identification charges.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial.

. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) ; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

. Id. at 228-229, 87 S.Ct. at 1933.

. See United States v. Rickey, 457 F.2d 1027, 1031 (3d Cir. 1972).

. 133 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 409 F.2d 174 (1969).

. Id. at 178.

. 133 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 469 F.2d 552 (1972).

. Id. at 556.

. Id. at 557. The model instruction set forth in Telfaire was based, in part, on this Court’s suggestions in U. S. v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), discussed at greater length infra.

. Fed.R.Cr.P. 52(b).

. Fed.R.Cr.P. 52(a).

. 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971).

. Id. at 527.

. Id. at 528.

. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311-312, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966).

. See Wright, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure 349, 372-375 (1969).

. Majority Opinion at 734 n. 9.

. 469 F.2d at 556.

. Judge Bazelon has expressed the view that available data indicating that “members of one race have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race” demands the inclusion of a reference to this difficulty in any set of model identification instructions. Id. at 559-561. But see id. at 561-563 (Leventhal, J., concurring) .