Court Opinion

ID: 9852388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:36.870187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.056113
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P. J.
(dissenting). This case involves a claim and a counterclaim, and the well-intentioned efforts of the trial judge in suggesting a *124compromise that ultimately went far beyond what he or the parties had contemplated. It appears from this record that appellants themselves had doubts about entering into the settlement which they are now seeking to enforce.1
In general, public and judicial policies favor settlements. Steele v Wilson, 29 Mich App 388, 395; 185 NW2d 417, 420 (1971). However, a compromise and settlement is a contract, and is governed by the legal principles applicable to contracts generally. 15 Am Jur 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 20, p 954.
In order to constitute a valid contract, there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties upon all essential points. International Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236, 239; 236 NW 771, 772 (1931), Pangburn v Sifford, 216 Mich 153; 184 NW 512 (1921), W C Sterling & Son Co v Watson & Bennett Co, 193 Mich 11; 159 NW 381 (1916).
In this case, there was no such meeting of the minds and the trial judge committed no error in setting aside the settlement stipulation and refusing to enter judgment upon it.
The testimony at the evidentiary hearing tended to show that the appellee was misled by innocent misrepresentations on the part of appellant. Appellee’s accountant testified that, in a conversation between the adversaries held in the courtroom, "someone” among the appellant’s representatives said that 50 to 60 persons were involved and that $750 was a representative bonus. These statements *125were confirmed by two other witnesses for appellee.
Further, appellee’s accountant testified that, at the time of the settlement negotiations, he calculated that the cost of the bonuses and dinner money would range between $20,000 and a maximum of $37,500. Instead, after a three-week audit of appellant’s books, it was determined that the cost would be $123,914.19.
It should be kept in mind that, at the beginning of the negotiations, appellant had a claim of $47,369.19 and appellee a counterclaim of $105,366.83. When the $123,914.19 figure was added to appellant’s claim, and appellee’s counterclaim was subtracted, appellee’s liability to appellant became $65,916.55. The result of the purported settlement, then, was that appellee now owed appellant $18,547.36 more than appellant’s original claim.
The judge, as well as the defendant, was shocked by the results of the computation and stated:
"[W]hat I thought was fair is now turning out to be a disaster so far as the defendant is concerned, because we are obtaining a figure never contemplated by the defendant at all, and had they known about it, they certainly would never have entered into this agreement.”
And, after hearing the testimony of both parties, the judge stated in his bench opinion:
"I find, on the face of it, that the settlement agreement, although stated on the record in the language that appears in the record, is not one that was so thoroughly understood by the parties themselves and in their relationship to it that it would be unconscionable for the court to impose this judgment on the County.”
*126Furthermore, appellee was entitled to the relief given because of appellant’s innocent misrepresentations. In Converse v Blumrich, 14 Mich 109, 123 (1866), Mr. Justice Cooley stated:
"If one obtains the property of another, by means of untrue statements, though in ignorance of their falsity, he must be held responsible as for a legal fraud.” (Citations omitted.)
See also Aldrich v Scribner, 154 Mich 23; 117 NW 581 (1908), Rosenberg v Cyrowski, 227 Mich 508; 198 NW 905 (1924), Essenburg v Russell, 346 Mich 319; 78 NW2d 136 (1956), Kroninger v Anast, 367 Mich 478; 116 NW2d 863 (1962).
In summary, since there was no meeting of the minds, there was no contract, and the settlement should not be given effect.
Having reached this conclusion, it is now necessary to give some consideration to the judgment and opinion of the trial court on the substantive issue involved in the case. It should be noted that after the abortive attempt at a compromise, the first trial judge disqualified himself and a second judge was assigned to the case.
The issue is this: When a contract provides that architect-engineers be paid a fee computed as "actual payroll cost plus 100%”, are they entitled to compensation for hours allegedly worked by salaried employees in excess of the standard forty-hour week or eight-hour day, when such employees were not paid overtime?
The trial court found that the plaintiff-architect was not entitled to compensation for the overtime hours worked by salaried employees and entered judgment for defendant. The trial judge relied on the case of Montgomery v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 47 *127Mich App 269, 274; 209 NW2d 472, 475 (1973), which states:
"The role of the court in actions ex contractu, when as here the language is clear and unambiguous, is basically limited to determining what the intention of the parties was from the four corners of the contract and in accordance with normal usage of the English language.”
A review of the record below has revealed that there was no error in the judge’s determinations.
Judgment should be affirmed.

 Appellant’s counsel stated, at the opening of the evidentiary hearing: "The second day of the trial your Honor came up with a suggestion of a settlement. The settlement that was entered into was entirely your Honor’s suggestion. I personally was opposed to it. It was a gamble. I didn’t know how the thing was going to come out. It was purely a gamble.”