Court Opinion

ID: 9382901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 00:00:35.543773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.363662
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51208      Document: 00516692784         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/28/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                         March 28, 2023
                                   No. 21-51208
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Clarence Edward Roper,

                                                          Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 7:21-CR-65-1

   Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          Clarence Edward Roper was convicted after a bench trial of possession
   of a firearm by a felon. In this appeal, Roper contends that the district court
   erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We AFFIRM.
Case: 21-51208           Document: 00516692784               Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                             No. 21-51208

                                                   I.
           “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review
   questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.”1 “Factual
   findings are clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this Court
   with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”2
   Determining “[w]hether there is sufficient evidence to support reasonable
   suspicion[,]” at issue in this case, is a question of law reviewed de novo.3
           “Demonstrating reasonable suspicion is the Government’s burden.”4
   Where, as occurred here, “a district court’s denial of a suppression motion
   is based on live oral testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly
   strong because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
   witnesses.”5 Moreover, “[e]vidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
   the party that prevailed in the district court—in this case, the Government.”6
   Ultimately, “[a] district court’s ruling to deny a suppression motion should
   be upheld ‘if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.’”7

           1
             United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States
   v. Bolden, 508 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)).
           2
             United States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
           3
             McKinney, 980 F.3d at 491 (citing United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357
   (5th Cir. 2017)).
           4
               Id. (citing United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014)).
           5
            United States v. Nelson, 990 F.3d 947, 953 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v. Gibbs,
   421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021).
           6
               Id. at 952 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 2012)).
           7
               Id. (citing United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014)).

                                                   2
Case: 21-51208       Document: 00516692784             Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                        No. 21-51208

                                             II.
          At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 21, 2021, a Midland resident
   called the Midland Police Department (“MPD”) to report an individual en-
   tering her backyard.8 MPD Officer Kienan Goodnight responded to the call
   and took photos of the resident’s security camera footage that recorded the
   alleged prowler. Shortly after the call, MPD Sergeant William Welch was
   driving in the area and noticed a then-unidentified individual near the fence-
   line of a corner lot. The individual dipped his shoulders as if trying to hide
   from Welch.
          Welch stopped his police cruiser at the entrance to the alley and exited
   the vehicle, prompting the then-unidentified individual to begin walking
   towards Welch with his hands raised. The individual stated without
   prompting that “[t]wo Mexican dudes” “in a black truck [were] chasing
   [him].” Welch then directed the individual to place his hands on the police
   cruiser and to identify himself, which he did: Clarence Edward Roper. Welch
   told Roper that he was going to pat him down for weapons and did so while
   asking Roper additional questions.
          Approximately two minutes into this stop, as Welch continued to
   speak with Roper, Goodnight arrived and showed Welch the picture of the
   prowler he had obtained from the resident’s security footage. The
   photograph showed an individual who, like Roper, was a Black male with a
   mustache and earring stud; however, the photographed prowler appeared
   substantially younger and was wearing clothing nothing like what Roper
   donned. Welch nevertheless proceeded to ask why Roper was “in some
   lady’s back yard”; Roper did not deny the implied accusation but instead

          8
             This individual is referred to as a “prowler” in the Parties’ submissions. We
   adopt this here for consistency and clarity.

                                             3
Case: 21-51208      Document: 00516692784              Page: 4   Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                        No. 21-51208

   responded, “I was jumping fences, that’s why.” Welch speculated that the
   prowler’s jacket in the photograph was a different color because the image
   was taken from a security-camera in night vision mode and had been captured
   in black and white. Roper then stated that the man in the photograph was the
   one who was chasing him. After radioing in Roper’s identifying information,
   Welch walked along the fence line by which Roper was originally hiding and
   discovered a firearm on the ground. Upon this discovery, Welch promptly
   placed Roper in handcuffs, explained why he was doing so, and read Roper
   his rights. Roper protested that the gun was not his.
          Following a hearing to suppress the gun, the district court
   “conclude[d] that it was not reasonable to think that [Roper] was the prowler
   shown on the security footage.” Nonetheless, the district court denied
   Roper’s motion:
          [T]here was reasonable suspicion to continue Defendant’s
          detention after Officer Goodnight arrived with a photograph of
          the prowler. Sergeant Welch observed [Roper] hiding in the
          alley at approximately one o’clock in the morning, saw him
          come forward in a manner potentially consistent with hiding
          contraband, and [Roper] recited a story about being chased that
          was inconsistent with his physical appearance and demeanor.
          Additionally, [Roper] admitted to “jumping fences.” These
          are specific and articulable facts that support reasonable
          suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Shortly thereafter,
          Sergeant Welch discovered the pistol at the place in the alley
          where [Roper] was hiding.

          The district court subsequently held a brief bench trial wherein Judge
   Counts convicted Roper and later sentenced him to a 105-month term of im-
   prisonment and a subsequent three-year term of supervised release. Roper
   filed timely notice of his appeal.

                                             4
Case: 21-51208           Document: 00516692784               Page: 5      Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                             No. 21-51208

                                                 III.
           The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
   seizures.9 Pursuant thereto, “[w]arrantless searches and seizures are
   presumptively unreasonable, subject to certain exceptions.”10 The Supreme
   Court carved out such an exception in Terry v. Ohio, which held that “limited
   searches and seizures are not unreasonable when there is a reasonable and
   articulable suspicion that a person has committed a crime.”11 This Court
   “employ[s] a two-part test to determine whether there was ‘reasonable
   suspicion’”: first, “whether the officer’s action was justified at its
   inception,” and, second, “whether the officer’s subsequent actions were
   reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.’”12
           Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has “deliberately avoided
   reducing” the “somewhat abstract” concept of reasonable suspicion “to a
   neat set of legal rules.”13 Some principles nevertheless guide this inquiry. For
   example, reasonable suspicion need not be found solely on one fact: “factors
   which by themselves may appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the
   level of reasonable suspicion.”14 As the Supreme Court noted, “Terry itself

           9
                U.S. CONST. amend IV.
           10
                McKinney, 980 F.3d at 490 (citing Hill, 752 F.3d at 1033).
           11
             United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
   392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
           12
             United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
   v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
           13
              United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (internal quotation marks and
   citations omitted).
           14
                United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 1999).

                                                   5
Case: 21-51208              Document: 00516692784              Page: 6         Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                               No. 21-51208

   involved a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent if viewed separately,
   but which taken together warranted further investigation.”15 Accordingly,
              [courts] must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of
              each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
              “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal
              wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own
              experience and specialized training to make inferences from
              and deductions about the cumulative information available to
              them that “might well elude an untrained person.”16

              Additionally, while reasonable suspicion exists if the officer “can
   point to specific and articulable facts” supporting a reasonable belief “that a
   particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
   crime,”17 Terry does not require officers to have a “particularized suspicion
   of a particular, specific crime.”18 Finally, “[i]f the officer develops reasonable
   suspicion of additional criminal activity during his investigation of the
   circumstances that originally caused the stop, he may further detain its
   occupant[] for a reasonable time while appropriately attempting to dispel this
   reasonable suspicion.”19 “Detention, however, may last no longer than

              15
             United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
              16
                   Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18
   (1981)).
              17
             Monsivais, 848 F.3d at 357 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
   Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
              18
                   United States v. Pack, 622 F.3d 383, 383 (5th Cir. 2010).
              19
              United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on
   unrelated grounds on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383.

                                                      6
Case: 21-51208           Document: 00516692784              Page: 7       Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                            No. 21-51208

   required to effect the purpose of the stop.”20 Simply put, Welch had a
   reasonable suspicion that Roper was engaged in criminal activity in the alley.
           Three factors support this conclusion. First, Roper’s location and
   timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. While
   one’s “presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
   enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is
   committing a crime,” the “relevant characteristics of a location” can
   contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion,21 and the timing of one’s
   movements are a “permissible consideration” in reasonable suspicion
   analysis,22 including holding that a defendant’s “specific moves” gave rise to
   reasonable suspicion where they took place “at night, in a high crime area.”23
   That Roper was discovered hiding after midnight near the location of a crime
   supports a finding of reasonable suspicion.
           Second, Roper’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise
   to reasonable suspicion. As Welch approached, Roper emerged from a
   secreted location and offered information without being asked. Welch
   testified that Roper’s actions “walking out of the alley as [he] approached”
   contributed to his suspicion because “it was possible that [Roper] had

           20
              Jenson, 462 F.3d at 404 (citing United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430
   (5th Cir. 2005)).
           21
               Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 126 (2000) (emphasis added); see also
   United States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that, where the only
   facts to justify a stop of a red vehicle was that a red vehicle was involved in a crime fifteen
   minutes ago, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car); cf. Adams v.
   Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972) (noting, notwithstanding this rule, that where a
   Terry stop occurred—including in a “high crime area”—was a relevant contextual
   consideration).
           22
            See United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
   Lujan-Miranda, 535 F.2d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 1976).
           23
                United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

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Case: 21-51208             Document: 00516692784              Page: 8      Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                              No. 21-51208

   abandoned something – whether it be drugs, some type of contraband – in the
   alley and was distancing himself from that.” Although in another context,
   this Court has previously found reasonable suspicion from efforts to distance
   oneself from contraband.24 We apply the same consideration and credit here.
             Third, Roper’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to Welch’s
   questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. A detainee’s inconsistent and
   implausible explanations are pertinent to whether an officer has a reasonable
   suspicion to elongate a stop.25 Roper stated that two individuals were
   “chasing” him, but Roper “didn’t appear to be out of breath like he had been
   running,” nor did he “appear to be sweating or anything like” as if “he was
   running from someone.”26 And when Welch asked if Roper “kn[e]w these
   people that [we]re chasing you,” Roper responded affirmatively, but when
   Welch asked for their names, Roper said only “[t]hey are Mexican, man, but
   I[] can’t pronounce their names.” These statements, when viewed in concert
   with Roper’s timing and location, are themselves “specific and articulable
   facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
   reasonably warrant that intrusion.”27, 28

             24
              See United States v. Figueroa, No. 93-2664, 1994 WL 574186, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct.
   4, 1994) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding reasonable suspicion in part because the
   officer testified that the trafficker had checked his luggage in a fashion “typical of drug
   traffickers who wish to distance themselves from their contraband and begin traveling as
   soon as possible”).
             25
                  See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2008); Pack, 612 F.3d at
   360–61.
             26
                  The body camera footage confirms this perception.
             27
                  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
             28
             Two additional facts about the discussion, while not vital, are relevant. First,
   Roper said that he was trying to go to the police station, yet upon the police’s arrival, he
   expressed no appreciation for their aid, nor did he request protection or a ride to the station.

                                                    8
Case: 21-51208      Document: 00516692784            Page: 9    Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                      No. 21-51208

          Accepting the district court’s conclusion that it was unreasonable for
   Welch to believe Roper was the prowler based on the photograph does not
   end the inquiry. Even if Welch and Goodnight came to this realization in the
   moment, Roper’s furtive actions and inconsistent, implausible statements
   remained unresolved. When Welch effectively said to Roper that he was
   caught on camera trespassing, Roper did not contest the accusation, but
   responded in such a way that created additional suspicion for two reasons: 1)
   Roper admitted that he was engaging in suspicious activity by “jumping
   fences” after midnight; and, 2) Roper claimed the photographed man “was
   the person that was chasing [him]”—singular—despite initially claiming that
   two individuals—plural—were chasing him. In sum, even if Welch and
   Goodnight realized in the course of the seizure that Roper was not the
   individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and
   suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient
   to extend the seizure, namely Roper’s actions and statements before the
   photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to
   questions generated by the picture itself. The district court did not err in
   denying Roper’s motion.
                                         ****
          We AFFIRM.

   Second, Roper volunteered without prompting that he was on probation for aggravated
   assault.

                                           9