Court Opinion

ID: 9926319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:04:51.011292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:33.757449
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

             JONIDA GOGA, GENTIAN ZELKA, J.Z., a minor,
                        and A.Z., a minor,
                            Appellants,

                                     v.

                    PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC.,
                             Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-0011

                            [January 24, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Barbara Anne McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE20-
015950.

   Annabel C. Majewski of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, and
Morton Antman of Morton Antman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant
Jonida Goga.

   Edward George Guedes and Richard Bradlee Rosengarten of Weiss
Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, for appellee.

CONNER, J.

    The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her personal injury action filed
after she slipped and fell at the defendant’s store. Dismissal was granted
for fraud on the court. Because we determine the trial court did not
properly balance the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with
competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                Background

    The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging she slipped and fell at one of
its stores. She alleged her slip and fall was caused by another customer
dropping green dish soap on the floor. Her injuries resulted in seven
months of medical treatment to her spine.
    More than two years after her slip and fall, and more than a year after
her last medical treatment, the plaintiff answered interrogatories which
included a question asking her to specify the injured parts of her body and
the effects of injuries which she claimed were permanent. Her response
stated, among other things, that she: “Cannot lift anything heavy. Can’t
do any physical/sport activities can’t walk or stand for long periods. . . .
[C]an’t go places with both children alone. . . . Severe pain post-op. . . . Not
a mother I was. 34 years old will never be able to do activities I did pre
fall.”

   Less than a month later, the plaintiff was deposed, and the defendant’s
attorney asked questions about how injuries from her fall limited her
abilities. The plaintiff testified unequivocally that she could not lift her
young children and had not lifted them at all since her fall. She also
testified unequivocally that she could not bend at the waist. When asked
to describe “is there anything that you cannot do now that you used to do
before,” her response was “[T]here’s a lot of can’ts.” Specific deposition
answers painted a picture of severe limitations in terms of range of motion,
standing, walking, and lifting.

   Three months after her deposition, the plaintiff answered a
supplemental interrogatory regarding her claim for past and future income
and benefit losses and earning capacity. Her response again painted a
picture of severe limitations.

   During the three months preceding the plaintiff’s initial response to
interrogatories and her deposition, the defendant had hired a private
investigator to conduct video surveillance of the plaintiff’s activities. The
investigator conducted three different video surveillances during that
three-month period. Between the dates of the plaintiff’s deposition and
her supplemental interrogatory response, the investigator filmed another
video surveillance.    After the plaintiff’s supplemental interrogatory
response, the investigator filmed two more video surveillances.

    Based on the information gleaned from the video surveillances, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss for fraud on the court. The motion
contended the plaintiff’s sworn discovery responses and deposition
testimony demonstrated that the plaintiff “made a conscious choice to
repeatedly lie under oath about her injuries and limitations, in an attempt
to gain an unfair advantage in this litigation.” Citing Willie-Koonce v. Miami
Sunshine Transfer & Tours Corp., 233 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), as
“extremely analogous,” the motion contended the entire action should be
dismissed for fraud on the court.

                                       2
    The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
dismiss, viewing the several videos described in the motion to dismiss.
Multiple videos depicted the plaintiff picking up and carrying her children
across parking lots, loading and unloading her vehicle with multiple bags
of purchases, walking, and bending at the waist, all without any hesitancy
or movements indicating pain or limitations. The plaintiff testified at the
hearing and was given the opportunity to explain the apparent
discrepancies between her sworn discovery and deposition statements as
compared to what was depicted in the videos.

    The trial court entered a detailed order with extensive findings of fact,
granted the motion, and dismissed the entire action with prejudice. The
trial court specifically found by clear and convincing evidence that the
plaintiff intentionally lied on multiple occasions about her limitations, her
testimony at the evidentiary hearing was not credible, and the cumulative
effect of the plaintiff’s lies was evidence of “[t]he plaintiff’s gamesmanship
and disrespect for the judicial process.” The trial court found the plaintiff’s
lies permeated the entire proceeding and justified dismissal of the entire
action.

   After the trial court entered its judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff gave
notice of appeal.

                             Appellate Analysis

    “A trial court’s dismissal of a claim for fraud upon the court is reviewed
under a more stringent abuse of discretion standard, as the trial court’s
discretion is narrowed where dismissal is imposed as a sanction for
fraudulent conduct.” Beseler v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 291 So. 3d
137, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). Fraud on the court must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. Arzuman v. Saud, 843 So. 2d 950, 952
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Additionally, “[t]he standard of appellate review of a
‘clear and convincing finding’ is whether the finding is supported by
competent, substantial evidence.” Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Ctr.,
121 So. 3d 583, 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Wigley v. Hares, 82 So. 3d 932,
946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

   The plaintiff contends that the trial court’s dismissal of the action is
erroneous because it was not based upon clear and convincing evidence.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the defendant failed to prove the
plaintiff knowingly and intentionally prevented the defendant from
defending against her claim. The plaintiff also argues dismissal of the
entire action was an abuse of discretion where the defendant is not
prejudiced, and a lesser sanction will suffice.

                                      3
   The defendant responds that dismissal of an entire action is proper
where “plaintiffs [] are caught swearing to unequivocal falsehoods, as
opposed to debatable characteristics, and where the trial court finds
unbelievable the culpable plaintiff’s attempts to explain away their false
testimony.”

    “The trial court has the inherent authority, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated
a fraud on the court. . . .” Herman, 121 So. 3d at 588 (quoting Kornblum
v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).

   In Arzuman, we said:

      The requisite fraud on the court occurs where “it can be
      demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has
      sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
      calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability
      impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing
      the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the
      opposing party’s claim or defense.” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
      892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989). When reviewing a case
      for fraud, the court should “consider the proper mix of factors”
      and carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the
      merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the
      judicial system. Id. at 1117–18. Because “dismissal sounds
      the ‘death knell of the lawsuit,’ courts must reserve such
      strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party’s
      misconduct is correspondingly egregious.” Id. at 1118.

843 So. 2d at 952 (quoting Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998)). Notably, dismissal for fraud on the court is a severe remedy;
therefore, to sustain a dismissal, the fraud must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. (citation omitted); see also Gilbert v. Eckerd
Corp. of Fla., Inc., 34 So. 3d 773, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“It is the moving
party’s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the non-
moving party has engaged in fraudulent conduct warranting dismissal.”)
(citation omitted).

   Because this remedy is so severe, dismissal should be applied only in
the most extreme circumstances. Gilbert, 34 So. 3d at 776; see also
Kornblum, 609 So. 2d at 139 (“Because dismissal is the most severe of all
possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme
circumstances.”). “Courts act cautiously in dismissing on this basis

                                      4
because the Florida Constitution guarantees court availability to every
person to redress injury.” Perrine v. Henderson, 85 So. 3d 1210, 1211 (Fla.
5th DCA 2012) (citations omitted).

    “When imposing the sanction of dismissal for fraud upon the court, trial
courts should weigh the ‘policy favoring adjudication on the merits’ with
the need to ‘maintain the integrity of the judicial system.’” Herman, 121
So. 3d at 588 (quoting Arzuman, 843 So. 2d at 952). “The integrity of the
civil litigation process depends on truthful disclosure of facts. A system
that depends on an adversary’s ability to uncover falsehoods is doomed to
failure, which is why this kind of conduct must be discouraged in the
strongest possible way.” Cox, 706 So. 2d at 47. Thus, “[a] trial court has
the inherent authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s entire case when there is
clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has committed ‘a fraud on
the court which permeates the entire proceedings.’” Chacha v. Transp.
USA, Inc., 78 So. 3d 727, 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting McKnight v.
Evancheck, 907 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

    In balancing the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with
competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, trial
courts must keep in mind that “[m]isconduct that falls short of the rigors
of [the fraud on the court] test, including inconsistency, nondisclosure,
poor recollection, dissemblance and even lying, is insufficient to support a
dismissal for fraud, and, in many cases, may be well-managed and best
resolved by bringing the issue to the jury’s attention through cross-
examination.” Perrine, 85 So. 3d at 1212 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). “In other words, ‘allegations of inconsistency, nondisclosure,
and even falseness, are best resolved by allowing the parties to bring them
to the jury’s attention through cross examination or impeachment, rather
than by dismissal of the entire action.’” Wenwei Sun v. Aviles, 53 So. 3d
1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (quoting Granados v. Zehr, 979 So. 2d 1155,
1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)). However, “utterly deceitful behavior . . . most
certainly fits the standard for dismissal of the[] suit.” Id. at 1078. The
multiplicity of the deceit is also a factor to be considered in determining if
there is an “unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the
judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the
opposing party's claim or defense.” Aviles, 53 So. 3d at 1077 (citation
omitted); see also Perrine, 85 So. 3d at 1211 (citation omitted).

   The determination of whether clear and convincing evidence of an
unconscionable scheme exists “will almost always require an evidentiary
hearing.” Bologna v. Schlanger, 995 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008);
see also Gilbert, 34 So. 3d at 777 (“[W]e believe the better practice is for

                                      5
the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion and make
specific findings.”). The trial court in the instant case conducted an
evidentiary hearing, offering the plaintiff the opportunity to explain the
discrepancies between her sworn discovery and deposition statements and
the video evidence in support of the motion to dismiss.

   Our preliminary determination is whether the trial court’s findings are
supported by competent, substantial evidence. If that standard is met, we
then review the trial court’s legal conclusions for abuse of discretion.

      In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must
      fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and
      should apply the “reasonableness” test to determine whether
      the trial judge abused [their] discretion.         If reasonable
      [persons] could differ as to the propriety of the action taken
      by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and
      there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.

Bass v. City of Pembroke Pines, 991 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
(quoting Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002))
(other quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we have said in reviewing
an order granting dismissal that the appellate court should defer to the
“specific findings by the trial court” where the trial court has had the
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the plaintiff as to explanations for
the identified discrepancies in the plaintiff’s statements, even if the
reviewing court determines the evidence shows a “close call.” Herman, 121
So. 3d at 589.

   Our review of the record confirms competent, substantial evidence was
presented to support the trial court’s finding that, clearly and
convincingly, the plaintiff had intentionally lied about the extent of her
movement limitations and pain after medical treatment for her fall in the
defendant’s store. More importantly, the trial court specifically found the
plaintiff’s explanations for the discrepancies between her sworn discovery
and deposition statements and the surveillance videos were not credible.
The trial court further found the plaintiff’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing was not only “incredulous,” but demonstrated “the plaintiff’s
gamesmanship and disrespect for the judicial process.” The trial court
determined “[t]he record evidence demonstrates and supports the
plaintiff’s willingness under oath to withhold or distort the truth to achieve
her own objectives comprehensively infects the integrity of this action” and
the plaintiff “made a conscious choice to repeatedly lie under oath about
her injuries and limitations, in an attempt to gain an unfair advantage in
this litigation.”

                                      6
   However, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
the plaintiff’s entire action as a sanction. Instead, given the evidence that
the plaintiff underwent extensive medical treatment and procedures
arising from her injuries, the proper remedy was to (1) permit the plaintiff
to pursue her claim for her medical expenses occurring during her medical
treatment, which would rely on objective evidence, but (2) preclude the
plaintiff from pursuing her claims for pain and suffering damages and lost
wages, which would have relied on the plaintiff’s subjective testimony.

    Our analysis focuses on the specific facts of this case which establish
that the plaintiff intentionally lied under oath about the extent of her
movement limitations and pain. This case is not like the numerous cases
granting dismissal for fraud on the court where the plaintiff lied during
discovery about prior injuries and prior medical treatment for preexisting
conditions.    The distinction is important because in Kornblum, we
recognized that in cases “where the misconduct of a party or the party’s
counsel has permeated the entire proceeding, dismissal of the entire case
has been upheld, but in others where the fraud or other misconduct
pertained to only a part of the claim, dismissal of the unaffected legitimate
part of the claim has been held to be too severe.” 609 So. 2d at 139
(citations omitted).

   We agree “[i]t is well-settled law ‘that a party who has been guilty of
fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding
should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution [she]
has subverted to achieve [her] ends.’” Jimenez v. Ortega, 179 So. 3d 483,
489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). However, in reviewing whether the trial court in
the instant case properly balanced a policy favoring adjudication on the
merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system, we determine Jimenez to be instructive.

   In Jimenez, the contested issues were lost wages and pain and
suffering. Id. at 484. Liability, the costs of the plaintiff’s medical expenses,
and damage to the plaintiff’s truck were not contested. Id. However, the
plaintiff in Jimenez repeatedly lied under oath about the severity of his
injuries. Id. at 487. In other words, in Jimenez, the dispute did not revolve
around objective facts; instead, the dispute involved subjective facts.

    The Fifth District determined the appropriate punishment for the
severity of the plaintiff’s lies about the severity of his injuries was dismissal
of his claims for pain and suffering and lost wages because those damages
rely upon an individual’s subjective point of view and are difficult to defend
against. Id. at 488. However, the Fifth District also observed that

                                       7
“misconduct falling short of the test espoused in Cox, including
inconsistency, nondisclosure, poor recollection, dissemblance, and even
lying may be insufficient to support a dismissal for fraud.” Id. (emphasis
added). Additionally, the Fifth District noted that damages for medical
costs and property loss are easily measured, and for that reason,
concluded that under the Cox test, “dismissal of the entire action as a
sanction is unwarranted . . . where the damages for property loss and
medical expenses were undisputed.”

   Adopting the Fifth District’s reasoning, we determine that the trial court
did not appropriately balance the policy favoring adjudication on the
merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system. Thus, we conclude that dismissal of the entire action was
improper. 1

                                   Conclusion

   We agree the trial court properly dismissed the portion of the plaintiff’s
claim for damages regarding pain and suffering and lost wages. That is
because the plaintiff’s repeated pretrial lies about her limitations and pain
demonstrate her willingness to lie under oath at trial, which
“comprehensively infects the integrity of this action” seeking pain and
suffering damages and lost wages. Thus, we determine that the plaintiff
should not be allowed to pursue pain and suffering damages or lost wages
damages because such evidence is prone to rely on the plaintiff’s subjective
testimony. The plaintiff remains entitled to pursue claims for medical
expenses because such claims can be determined by objective evidence
without reliance on the plaintiff’s subjective testimony.

   Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
with instructions.

GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                              *         *          *

1We are not convinced that the Third District’s opinion in Willie-Koonce controls
the outcome of this case because the opinion does not provide much analysis on
the issue of balancing the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with
competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system or deference to
the trial court’s findings after an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss.

                                        8
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                               9