Court Opinion

ID: 9941029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:12:06.729272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.454751
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Flores, 2024-Ohio-571.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                            No. 112389
                 v.                               :

STEVEN FLORES,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-22-671414-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Nora Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Michael Gordillo, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                 Defendant-appellant, Steven Flores (“Flores”), appeals his conviction

for gross sexual imposition, a fourth-degree felony, raising the following four

assignments of error for review:
      Assignment of Error I: The trial court committed reversible error
      prejudicing [Flores] by permitting hearsay testimony into evidence.

      Assignment of Error II: The trial court erred in convicting [Flores]
      of Count 5, and only Count 5, where the alleged conduct occurred
      outside Cuyahoga County.

      Assignment of Error III: [Flores’s] conviction is not supported by
      sufficient evidence.

      Assignment of Error IV: [Flores’s] was convicted against the
      manifest weight of the evidence.

               For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

 I.   Facts and Procedural History

             Flores was indicted on the following six counts, in June 2022: Count

1— rape, Counts 2, 3, and 4 — gross sexual imposition for offenses occurring on or

about April 12, 2018, to April 11, 2019, and Counts 5 and 6 — gross sexual imposition

for offenses occurring on or about June 1, 2017, to September 1, 2017. Flores is

alleged to have committed these sex offenses against T.U.

             The matter proceeded to a jury trial in January 2023. The state called

five witnesses, the first being T.U. T.U. testified that she lives with her parents, two

older sisters, K.N. and C.U., and nephew, who is K.N. and Flores’s child. Prior to

moving to Florida in December 2019, T.U. and her family lived in a house in

Cleveland, Ohio. T.U. stated that she first met Flores when she was around 11 years

old, prior to the birth of her nephew. (Tr. 250.) T.U. explained that when they first

met, she and Flores were close and “[h]e was like a big brother.” (Tr. 250.) T.U.
then went on to describe certain incidents with Flores that made her uncomfortable

that are at the center of the charges against him.

             T.U. testified that the first incident occurred on an annual family

camping trip in July 2017, when she was 12 years old. T.U. testified that she and

more than 20 of her family members travelled to a campground in Akron, Ohio and

set up tents near each other. T.U. said that she and Flores went on a walk alone one

night and sat by a lake. T.U. stated that Flores laid his head on her lap while they

were talking and put her on his shoulder when they began to walk back. T.U.

commented that these behaviors were “normal to [her].” T.U. went on to explain

that at one point, he moved her from the back of his shoulders to the front, causing

her vaginal area to be in his face. T.U. noted that this made her uncomfortable, so

she quickly got down and started walking back to the campsite with Flores.

             T.U. testified that after her walk with Flores, she slept in the same tent

as Flores and her sister K.N. T.U. explained that K.N. was sleeping in the middle,

between her and Flores. T.U. stated, “We went to sleep, and then in the middle of

the night I felt sweaty, and I woke up, and [Flores] was rubbed up against me. He

was sleeping in the middle now, and he was rubbing up against me.” (Tr. 251.) T.U.

claimed that “[Flores] was directly behind me with his private area against my back”

and “[h]is penis was against my butt area.” (Tr. 256-257.) T.U. felt Flores’s penis

area “[g]ently rubbing up against [her butt], kind of like a grind” for “like five

minutes, not even.” (Tr. 257.) T.U. testified, “It was clear he was awake to me, but

he did not say anything.” (Tr. 257.) T.U. described the incident as “[u]ncomfortable.”
(Tr. 257.) T.U. noted that they were both clothed at the time and believed her sister

was still asleep. T.U. said that Flores did not realize she woke up, so she acted like

she was asleep, tried to move around to adjust her body away from him and “get him

off [her],” waited about five minutes, and left to sleep in different tent with her sister,

C.U.    (Tr.    251.)   T.U.   explained    that   she    left   “[b]ecause    [she]   felt

uncomfortable.” (Tr. 258.) T.U. testified that she did not say anything to anyone in

the other tent because they were sleeping. T.U. stated that while she felt

“uncomfortable” seeing Flores the next morning, “[n]othing was said between me

and him, and I didn’t say nothing to nobody.” (Tr. 258.)

               T.U. testified that a second incident occurred at her house in Cleveland

between April and September of 2018, when she was 13 years old. T.U. explained

that she shared a room with her sister C.U. and they were both sleeping in bed. T.U.

mentioned that K.N. was pregnant, and she and Flores were sleeping on an air

mattress in the same room. T.U. stated that once everyone was asleep, she felt

Flores’s arm over the bed “like rubbing up against me.” (Tr. 260.) T.U. testified:

       He ended up grabbing my arm and made me touch his penis. It was
       erected and out. He made me stroke it a couple of times, but then I
       ended up moving my hand away, and I was still playing as if I was
       asleep, so I moved it away, and he then waited a couple of minutes
       before he started to — reached his hand back over on my thigh. I had
       shorts on this night, and he slowly rubbed and inserted his fingers [into
       my vagina] * * * an[d] started fingering me. And that didn’t last long.

(Tr. 260.) T.U. explained that she felt “uncomfortable,” moved near C.U., and

switched places and cuddled with her until she knew Flores was sleeping

again. (Tr.    265.) T.U. testified that no one else was awake when the incident
occurred, Flores acted “normal” the next morning, which made her feel “weird,” but

she acted normally too and did not tell anyone because it “felt unreal.” (Tr. 267.)

             T.U. described a third incident that occurred between the first two in a

different house in Cleveland, where K.N. and Flores were living at the time. T.U.

explained that she, C.U., K.N., and Flores were all sharing a bed. T.U. testified,

“[W]e all went to sleep normally. This is like an every summer occurrence, and woke

up to the same thing, to him rubbing up against me.” (Tr. 268.) T.U. described that

“[Flores’s] penis area [was] rubbing up against my butt area again.” (Tr. 271.) T.U.

testified that they were both clothed but she knew it was different than somebody

moving around at night trying to get comfortable “[b]ecause it was very obvious, dry

humping. * * * He was holding me like forcefully putting himself against my body,

and it was ongoing. It wasn’t him moving around.” (Tr. 271.) T.U. said she was

“scared,” did not know how to react, and did not move or sleep

elsewhere. (Tr. 272.) T.U. testified that she should have told someone right then

and there, but did not say anything.

             T.U. stated that she first disclosed these incidents to her best friend,

K.R., sometime after she moved to Florida in December 2019. T.U. testified that the

information was kept between the two of them until October or September 2021,

when she disclosed that she had been sexually assaulted to a school counselor in

Florida, identified Flores, and told her that “he touched me.” (Tr. 279.) T.U.

explained that “[the school counselor] asked for details, and I continued giving her

briefly, telling her what happened.” (Tr. 279.) T.U. explained that she did not think
anything was going happen as a result of her disclosure, but later that day police

officers came to her home and told her mother what happened. T.U. testified that

after she told her mother everything, her mother took her to an interview with a

Florida social worker. T.U. said that she told the social worker what happened

during a recorded interview. T.U. explained that she did not disclose any

information about the incidents with Flores while she lived in Cleveland because she

was “uncomfortable” and “embarrassed.” (Tr. 283.)

                 On cross-examination, T.U. agreed that her family greatly

outnumbered Flores at the campsite and she chose to sleep in the tent with Flores

and K.N. despite having more than ten other tents to choose from. T.U. explained

that she did not say anything to police officers about the incident because they knew

all of the information from the school counselor. T.U. further acknowledged that

she did not tell the school counselor about what happened at the campsite and

explained that she did not “go into full detail” with the school counselor: “It was

very brief, me telling her that I was touched.” (Tr. 286.) T.U. confirmed that despite

being in a small tent and Flores moving on top of K.N., squeezing next to T.U., and

proceeding to “dry hump[ ]” her, K.N. never woke up; nor did K.N. and C.U. wake

up or notice either incident in Cleveland. T.U. could not recall if she saw a medical

doctor in Florida about anything related to the incidents and did not start any kind

of counseling.

                 T.U. further acknowledged that she had plenty of chances to tell her

family and did not say anything for roughly three years. T.U. confirmed that she was
embarrassed and testified that she “didn’t feel like getting involved in anything, any

drama, and * * * just dealt with it [her]self” because Flores was her nephew’s

father. (Tr. 300.) She later explained, “I knew if I did speak up, it would come to

something like this. If I brought it a while ago, and I thought I would want my

nephew to have a father in his life because I know my sister was big on family

because she never had a father.” (Tr. 303.)

               Next, the state called K.R., who testified that she and T.U. had been

best friends since the second grade. K.R. described their friendship as balancing

each other out and telling each other everything. K.R. stated that they talk almost

every day through text messages, phone calls, and Facetime. K.R. corroborated

T.U.’s testimony that they discussed Flores and T.U.’s “trauma” from sexual assault

around 2020, after T.U. moved to Florida. K.R. testified that she could tell T.U. was

“uncomfortable” during their conversation. (Tr. 311.) K.R. stated that she did

nothing with the information and kept it to herself “[b]ecause I knew [T.U.] trusted

me with [it].” (Tr. 312.) K.R. further corroborated T.U.’s testimony that she spoke

to a social worker in Florida.

               Testimony was then offered by T.U.’s mother, who identified Flores

in open-court. T.U.’s mother testified that Flores participated in family events, they

were all close with him, and she cared about him. T.U.’s mother confirmed that

Flores went on a family camping trip in July 2017, when T.U. was 12 or 13 years

old. T.U.’s mother testified that the campground was in North Lawrence,

Ohio. T.U.’s mother testified that everything seemed normal on the camping trip
and the family still had a good relationship with Flores afterwards. T.U.’s mother

further testified that T.U.’s demeanor did not change, nor did T.U. mention that she

was uncomfortable. T.U.’s mother advised that Flores and K.N. would occasionally

live together and Flores visited K.N. and the family at their home while K.N. was

pregnant. T.U.’s mother confirmed that Flores would spend the night and it was

typical for the family to sleep in one room. T.U.’s mother further confirmed that

police came to their house in Florida in September of 2021 and that’s when she

learned that “T.U. was being molested by Steven Flores.” (Tr. 332.) T.U.’s mother

testified that T.U. disclosed that Flores was the perpetrator and indicated what

happened to her during her time in Cleveland. T.U.’s mother confirmed that she

took T.U. for a follow-up interview with a social worker and explained that she was

in the waiting room when the interview took place. On cross-examination, T.U.’s

mother acknowledged that T.U. did not say anything to her previously and she did

not try to avoid him.

              Following this testimony and prior to proceedings being adjourned

for the day, the state requested a continuing course of conduct jury instruction for

the offense related to Count 5, which occurred at a campground outside of Cuyahoga

County, Ohio. The issue was briefed by the state prior to discussion the next

morning. During that discussion, defense counsel objected to this jury instruction,

arguing that “the Ohio Constitution clearly indicates that venue lies only in the

county where the crime is committed, or an element of the crime is committed. It

does not leave open any interpretation beyond the plain language of the
Constitutional article.” Defense counsel further argued against a three factor test for

application of a statute that will extend venue beyond county lines. (Tr. 344.) In

response, the state referenced State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107925, 2019-

Ohio-4672, and R.C. 2901.12(H)(1) and argued that because Counts 1 through 4

involved criminal conduct occurring in Cuyahoga County between the same persons,

Flores and T.U., and that although the alleged criminal conduct involved in Count 5

occurred outside of the Cuyahoga County it was part of the same course of

conduct. The trial court advised that it reviewed R.C. 2901.12(A), read the caselaw

presented by the state, noted defense counsel’s objection, and ruled that the

continuing course of conduct instruction would be presented to the jury.

               The trial court then addressed another issue: whether the state could

play a video recording of the interview that the Florida social worker had with

T.U. The trial court noted that the state provided Eighth District caselaw in support

of its argument and the trial court completed its own independent research. Defense

counsel objected, arguing the caselaw submitted by the state was “very

distinguishable from the case we have before us.” (Tr. 347.)         Defense counsel

further argued that the interview did not fall within hearsay exception for statements

made for the purpose of medical diagnoses and treatment because “[e]ssentially, it’s

a police interview * * * made at the detective’s request. There’s nothing medical,

whatsoever, about it. It’s testimonial and does not fit by any interpretation into a

statement made for diagnosis or treatment.” (Tr. 349.) In response, the state

argued that the exception was applicable, arguing regardless of the source of the
referral, the social worker’s primary purpose in conducting the interview was

“looking for safety, medical diagnosis, need for ongoing counseling, whether the

perpetrator has access to her or not.” (Tr. 350-351.) The trial court said that it

reviewed State v. Jeffries, taking special note of the concurring separate opinion

explaining that he was constrained to follow this court’s precedent regarding the

scope of testimony that may be elicited under the parameters of Evid.R. 803. Noting

defense counsel’s objection, the trial court determined that the video recording

interview of T.U. would be played for the jury.

              The state then called Kenyel Day (“Day”), the program director for the

Child Protection Team (“CPT”) in Florida. Day explained that CPT receives cases

from either the department of child and family (“DCF”) or law enforcement and

provides interviews and medical services for victims of abuse and neglect. Day

testified that when she received the assignment to follow up on a report pertaining

to T.U. in October 2021, she was CPT’s program supervisor and part of her role was

to conduct interviews with children. Throughout her career, Day estimated that she

conducted over 1,000 interviews relating to sexual abuse of children.

              Day explained that CPT conducted two types of interviews: forensic

and specialized. Day described forensic interviews as “more of a fact-finding

interview, which allows the child to — to elicit information in regards to abuse and

neglect” and specialized interviews as “focus[ing] more on the overall picture and

family dynamics.” (Tr. 358.) Day testified that specialized interviewing is learned

on the job while forensic interviewing requires a 40-hour training. Day advised that
she completed forensic interview training and the primary purpose of her role in

interviewing children is “to assess the allegations and their safety, and then we

provide our recommendations to DCF or law enforcement * * * on what we feel is

best to either reduce the risk or to ensure the child is safe at the

time.” (Tr. 359.) Day explained that during interviews, the child’s needs for

ongoing medical treatment and counseling are also assessed, although the child and

the parent have a right to decline those services. Day confirmed that these primary

purposes remain the same, regardless of whether the referral came from law

enforcement or DCF. Day advised that interviews are recorded, “[t]hat way if law

enforcement or DCF should ask to get the information or to know what was all said

in the interview, it gives them an opportunity to see it in real-time * * *.” (Tr. 361.)

               Day testified that she conducted a forensic interview and met with

T.U. in November 2021 after the matter was referred by a detective in Ohio. Day

explained that after receiving the referral, she contacted the detective to find out

what services were being requested and what was needed. Day testified that the

detective requested that T.U. be interviewed at CPT’s office regarding some

allegations of sexual abuse. Day authenticated the video recording of T.U.’s forensic

interview, which was played for the jury after the trial court noted defense counsel’s

objection. Day described the scene that was depicted, explained various aspects of

the interview, including “[T.U.] talking about a couple of incidents being touched

inappropriately[.]” (Tr. 369.) The video recording depicts T.U. describing the

incidents that occurred at the campground in Akron and in two homes in Cleveland,
similar to T.U.’s testimony. Day testified that during the interview, she assessed

whether Flores still had access to T.U. and noted that it was important to determine

whether T.U. was safe. Day believed that a victim’s advocate was assigned to T.U.

after the interview and a discussion was had about T.U. being referred to a sexual

assault treatment program.

                On cross-examination, Day acknowledged that she received a report

from the Florida police department prior to her interview with T.U. and noticed that

there was no mention of any incident at a campground. Day testified that she made

an offer for a medical evaluation to T.U. and her mother; however, she did not

believe they accepted it. Day explained further explained her role after an interview

is completed:

      So there’s only one referral that we would make at CPT, the Child
      Protection Team. That would be to the SAT Program. That’s Sexual
      Assault Treatment Program. Any other recommendations that we
      make, they would be for either DC[F] or the victim’s advocate that was
      working with the family to make the referral to whatever that is, so
      whatever that service is. Once we complete our interview, our
      connection and interaction with the family is complete after that.

(Tr. 377-378.) Day did not know whether T.U. took advantage of her referral to the

SAT Program.

                The state then called its last witness, Detective Darryl Turner

(“Detective Turner”) from the Cleveland Police Department’s Sex Crimes and Child

Abuse Unit. Detective Turner testified that he received an assignment to follow up

on a report pertaining to T.U. in October 2021. Detective Turner explained that

T.U.’s mother called his sergeant after making a report to the Florida police
department and receiving notification to contact the Cleveland Police Department

because the crime occurred there. Detective Turner testified that he made an initial

report, reached out to a child advocacy center in Florida, was linked to CPT, and

spoke to Day. Detective Turner stated that he asked Day to conduct a “courtesy

interview.” (Tr. 388.) Detective Turner testified that he reached out to T.U.’s

mother after T.U.’s forensic interview, received and reviewed a copy of it, learned

that Flores was the named perpetrator, and presented the facts of the case to a city

prosecutor.

               On cross-examination, Detective Turner acknowledged that there

was no reference to any incident at a campground in the Florida police report, which

described only one incident. Detective Turner conceded that he did not request

T.U.’s school or T.U. or Flores’s cell phone records; ask Day to refer T.U. for medical

evaluation; interview any witnesses, including T.U.; or follow-up with Day after

watching the recorded interview. Detective Turner further conceded that the name

of the campground was never disclosed prior to the testimony heard in the

courtroom that day.

               Following Detective Turner’s testimony, the state rested and moved

to dismiss Count 6. Flores also moved for dismissal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, arguing

that no testimony was offered about the conduct alleged in Counts 4 and 5 being

committed with the purpose of arousal or sexual gratification and venue was

improper. The state argued that the jury should be allowed to ascertain from the

surrounding circumstances whether the acts were committed with the purpose of
Flores’s sexual gratification. The trial court dismissed Count 6 and denied Flores’s

Crim.R. 29 motion. The defense did not present any witnesses, rested, and renewed

its Crim.R. 29 motion, standing by its prior argument. The trial court advised that

its ruling remained the same. The state then offered that the redacted video

recording of T.U.’s forensic interview as an exhibit and be admitted into

evidence. The trial court noted defense counsel’s objection and admitted this exhibit

into evidence. The trial court further noted that jury instructions were reviewed off-

the-record, and the parties agreed to the final version, which included instructions

on venue and course of conduct. The trial court then charged the jury, providing the

following instructions regarding venue and course of conduct:

      Venue. Before you can decide whether the State of Ohio has proved
      beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offenses
      with which the Defendant was charged, you must first decide whether
      this is the correct county in which the trial should be held. The State
      must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all or any part of the
      offenses involved in the Defendant’s course of conduct occurred in
      Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

      Course of conduct. In order for you to find that a course of conduct
      existed, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that, one, the
      offenses involve the same victim, or, two, the offenses were committed
      by the Defendant in his same capacity or relationship to another or,
      three, the offenses were committed as part of the same chain of events
      or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective or, four, the offense
      involved the same or similar modus operandi, scheme, plan, system or
      method. If you find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
      this is the correct county in which this trial should be held, then you
      must proceed to decide whether the Defendant is guilty of the offense
      charged. If you find the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
      that this is the correct county in which this trial should be held, you
      must notify the Court of this finding and should not proceed to decide
      whether the Defendant is guilty of the offense as charged.
(Tr. 425-426.) The parties presented their closing arguments, and the jury began

deliberations.

                 The jury returned verdicts of not guilty for Counts 1 through 4 and

guilty for Count 5. The trial court ordered a presentence-investigation report and

scheduled Flores’s sentencing hearing for a later date. At the sentencing hearing,

the trial court imposed a six-month prison sentence and determined that Flores was

a Tier I sex offender, requiring registration.

                 Flores now appeals his conviction for gross sexual imposition, Count

5.

II.   Law and Analysis

          A. Hearsay

                 In his first assignment of error, Flores argues that the trial court

committed reversible error when it admitted hearsay testimony into evidence.

Flores contends that the video recording of T.U.’s interview with Day that was played

for the jury is hearsay evidence and the trial court abused its discretion by not

excluding it. Flores claims that no exceptions to the hearsay rule exist because the

purpose of the Day’s interview with T.U. was investigative and the recording

contained prejudicial statements.

                 “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of

evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been

materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should be slow to interfere.” State

v. Davenport, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99328, 2013-Ohio-3731, ¶ 6, citing State v.
Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 122. Hearsay is

defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the

statement.” Evid.R. 801(C). Pursuant to Evid.R. 802, hearsay is inadmissible

unless an exception or exclusion applies. Evid.R. 803 enumerates 23 exceptions to

this rule, including “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or

treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or

sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source

thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The staff notes

to the rule provide in pertinent part:

      The circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness of this exception is
      derived from the assumption that a person will be truthful about his
      physical condition to a physician because of the risk of harmful
      treatment resulting from untruthful statements. * * * The exception is
      limited to those statements made by the patient which are reasonably
      pertinent to an accurate diagnosis and should not be a conduit through
      which matters of no medical significance would be admitted.

Staff Notes to Evid.R. 803(4).

               This court has explained the application of this exception in instances

where testimony is offered by a child advocacy social worker offers testimony in

sexual assault cases:

      In sexual assault cases involving young victims, there is often testimony
      from a child advocacy social worker. And courts have acknowledged
      the     “dual    role”    —     medical     diagnosis/treatment       and
      investigation/gathering of evidence — of social workers who interview
      a child who may be the victim of sexual abuse. See State v. Arnold, 126
      Ohio St. 3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, 933 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 33. Only those
      statements made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment are
      admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St. 3d 5,
      2007-Ohio-5267, 875 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 46 (regardless of whether a child
      less than ten years old has been determined to be competent to testify,
      the child’s statements may be admitted at trial as an exception to the
      hearsay rule if they were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
      treatment); State v. Goza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89032, 2007-Ohio-
      6837, ¶ 39. Social workers are oftentimes in the best position to help
      determine the proper treatment for the minor, which treatment
      includes determining which home was free of sexual abuse. State v.
      Durham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84132, 2005-Ohio-202, ¶ 33, citing
      Presley v. Presley, 71 Ohio App.3d 34, 39, 593 N.E.2d 17 (8th
      Dist.1990).

      To the extent a victim’s statement to a social worker is for investigative
      or prosecutorial purposes, the statement will not fall within the hearsay
      exception under Evid.R. 803(4). See State v. Rose, 12th Dist. Butler
      No. CA2011-11-214, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 42. The fact that the
      information initially gathered by the social workers was subsequently
      used by the state in its prosecution, however, does not change the fact
      that these statements were not made for investigative or prosecutorial
      purposes. Muttart at ¶ 62. Trial courts are entrusted with recognizing
      the point at which nontestimonial (admissible under Evid.R. 803(4))
      statements become testimonial (falling outside the hearsay
      exception). See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828, 126 S.Ct.
      2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).

State v. Fears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104868, 2017-Ohio-6978, ¶ 37-38.

               Flores does not dispute that case law from our court generally allows

testimony from child advocacy workers relating to forensic interviews they conduct

with allegedly sexually abused children when that testimony is for the purpose of

medical diagnosis and treatment in accordance with Evid.R. 803(4). However, in

this appeal, he argues that the testimony from Day and the video recording of Day’s

interview with T.U. was inadmissible hearsay since it was for investigative or

prosecutorial purposes and as such “will not fall within the hearsay exception under

Evid.R. 803(4). See Rose at ¶ 42.
              Flores points out that Day was contacted by the police for the purpose

of interviewing the sexual abuse allegations made by T.U. that was to be used against

the perpetrator for criminal prosecution. He compares Day’s interview to a police

interview. Flores does not specifically reference in his argument what testimony Day

gave or what in the video recording that the jury heard was hearsay and prejudicial.

The state maintains that when looking at Day’s testimony offered at trial, it clearly

shows that Day’s testimony is nontestimonial, that she provides her professional

background as a director of a child advocacy group who interviews children

suspected of having been sexually abused. Even though the state acknowledges that

Day received the request from Detective Turner to interview T.U., the interview was

not a police interview. Rather, it was for the purpose of her assessing the safety of

T.U. and determining if the alleged perpetrator was present in T.U.’s life and posed

a continuing threat of harm to her, for medical diagnosis and treatment. Our review

of the record, and testimony supports the state’s position that it follows Evid.R.

803(4) because it was for medical diagnosis, treatment, and evaluating the

safety/harm to T.U. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing Day’s testimony and the forensic interview recording to be played for the

jury.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

         B. Venue

              In his second assignment of error, Flores argues that the trial court

erred in convicting him of Count 5 — gross sexual imposition, and only Count 5,
where the alleged criminal offense did not occur in Cuyahoga County, the location

of where Flores was tried by jury. Flores contends that “the alleged course of

conduct never materialized” and as such the charge was improperly heard in

Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Flores states that “[R.C. 2901.12(H)] could be read to allow

conviction for the improperly venued count or counts to occur only upon conviction

of at least one offense that was properly venued” and thus asks us to overturn his

conviction.

              Venue is established under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution, which provides the accused with the right to “a speedy public trial by

an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been

committed.” R.C. 2901.12(A) further requires that “a criminal case in this state shall

be held * * * in the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was

committed.” This court explained:

      Venue is a fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
      criminal prosecutions unless it is waived by the defendant. State v.
      Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263,
      ¶ 149. When the evidence is insufficient for reasonable minds to find
      that venue is proper, a motion for judgment of acquittal must be
      granted. [State v. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983
      N.E.2d 324, ¶ 24]. “Venue is satisfied where there is a sufficient nexus
      between the defendant and the county of the trial.” State v.
      Chintalapalli, 88 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 2000-Ohio-266, 723 N.E.2d 111
      (2000).

State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107925, 2019-Ohio-4672, ¶ 27.

              However, R.C. 2901.12(H) allows offenses that are part of a course of

criminal conduct to be tried in other jurisdictions under certain circumstances:
      When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits
      offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of
      those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any
      element of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the
      evidence that may be used to establish the course of criminal conduct,
      any of the following is prima-facie evidence of a course of criminal
      conduct:

      (1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same type
      or from the same group.

      (2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender’s same
      employment, or capacity, or relationship to another.

      (3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or
      chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.

      (4) The offenses were committed in furtherance of the same conspiracy.

      (5) The offenses involved the same or a similar modus operandi.

      (6) The offenses were committed along the offender’s line of travel in
      this state, regardless of the offender’s point of origin or destination.

               The state concedes that T.U. testified that the offense relating to

Count 5, the only count which he was found guilty, occurred at a campground

located outside Cuyahoga County, Ohio in a contiguous county. However, the state

maintains that “R.C. 2901.12(H) allows offenses that are part of a course of criminal

conduct to be tried in other jurisdictions under certain circumstances” that apply

here. In the instant case, all six counts in the indictment pertained to the same

victim, T.U., and all six counts were allegedly committed by Flores, in his “brotherly”

relationship with T.U. Additionally, for Counts 1-4 T.U. testified that these offenses

occurred in Cuyahoga County and were similar in nature, sexual offenses, and in

furtherance of the same purpose or objective, same chain of events, and the offenses
were involving the same or similar modus operandi for sexual gratification. See, e.g.,

Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107925, 2019-Ohio-4672 (finding venue was proper

in Cuyahoga County because appellant committed the offenses charged in the

indictment as part of a criminal course of conduct despite Counts 1 and 2 occurring

in Summit County). Significantly, R.C. 2901.12(H) does not require the course of

criminal conduct to originate in the jurisdiction where the trial is held. See, e.g.,

State v. Workman, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2016-12-082, CA2016-12-083,

2017-Ohio-8638 (holding venue was appropriate in Clermont County for all offenses

where first offenses were committed Hamilton County).

              Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.

         C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

              In his third assignment of error, Flores argues that the state failed to

present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for gross sexual

imposition. Specifically, Flores claims that no evidence was presented that he

intended to sexually arouse or gratify himself or T.U. when he engaged in the alleged

conduct. Flores asserts that the jury had to infer that he was awake, consciously

rubbing his hips against T.U.’s buttocks, and intending to arouse or gratify despite

both parties remaining clothed and the absence of testimony “concerning overt

physical signs of arousal or verbal or non-verbal communication.”

              The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function when
reviewing sufficiency is to determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

               With a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review whether

the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted

at trial supported the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91682,

2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997). A sufficiency of the evidence argument is not a factual

determination, but a question of law. Thompkins at 386.

               In State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d

1161, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned:

       But it is worth remembering what is not part of the court’s role when
       conducting a sufficiency review. It falls to the trier of fact to “‘resolve
       conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
       reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” [State v.
       McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶
       24], quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
       L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, an appellate court’s role is limited. It does
       not ask whether the evidence should be believed or assess the
       evidence’s “credibility or effect in inducing belief.” State v.
       Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13,
       citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. Instead, it
       asks whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed, supports the
       conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

Id. at ¶ 16.
               Here, Flores was convicted of gross sexual imposition under

R.C. 2907.05 which provides in relevant part:

             (A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the
      spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender,
      to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other
      persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
              (1) The offender purposely compels the other person, or one of
                  the other persons, to submit by force or threat of force.
                  ***
              (4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than
      thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that
      person.
             (B) No person shall knowingly touch the genitalia of another,
      when the touching is not through clothing, the other person is less than
      twelve years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that
      person, and the touching is done with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
      harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
              (C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of gross sexual
      imposition. R.C. 2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching
      of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh,
      genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for
      the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”

               In determining whether sexual contact occurred, “the proper method

is to permit the trier of fact to infer from the evidence presented at trial whether the

purpose of the defendant was sexual arousal or gratification by his contact with

those areas of the body described in R.C. 2907.01.” Id. The purpose of the contact

may be inferred from the type, nature, and circumstances of the contact. Id. at ¶ 20.

While the phrase “sexually arousing or gratifying” is not defined by the Revised

Code, this court has held that “R.C. 2907.01(B) ‘“contemplate[s] any touching of the

described areas which a reasonable person would perceive as sexually stimulating

or gratifying.”’” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-3669, 199 N.E.3d 919, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.)
quoting State v. Tate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98221, 2013-Ohio-370, ¶ 18, quoting

State v. Astley, 36 Ohio App.3d 247, 250, 523 N.E.2d 322 (10th Dist.1987). This

court has further explained:

      In determining whether sexual contact occurred, the trier of fact may
      infer from the evidence presented at trial whether the defendant’s
      contact with the areas of the body outlined in R.C. 2907.01 was for the
      purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Tate; State v. Cobb, 81 Ohio
      App.3d 179, 185, 610 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist.1991). The purpose of the
      contact may be inferred from the type, nature, and circumstances of the
      contact. Tate at ¶ 20, citing [State v. Meredith, 12th Dist. Warren No.
      CA2004-06-062, 2005-Ohio-2664]; see also Ohio v. Coleman, 8th
      Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102291, 2015-Ohio-4491, ¶ 7 (finding that purpose
      may also be inferred from the defendant’s conduct as well as his or her
      personality). Accordingly, “[i]f the trier of fact determines that the
      defendant was motivated by desires of sexual arousal or gratification,
      and that the contact occurred, then the trier of fact may conclude that
      the object of the defendant’s motivation was achieved.” Cobb at 185.

Id., quoting Fears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104868, 2017-Ohio-6978, at ¶ 65.

               In this case, the state presented evidence through the testimony of

T.U. to satisfy its burden of production as to the elements of gross sexual imposition.

T.U. testified in July 2017 when she was 12 years old and at the family’s annual

camping trip, she slept in the same tent as Flores and her sister K.N. T.U. explained

that K.N. was sleeping in the middle, between her and Flores. T.U. testified that “We

went to sleep, and then in the middle of the night I felt sweaty, and I woke up, and

[Flores] was rubbed up against me. He was sleeping in the middle now, and he was

rubbing up against me.” (Tr. 251.) T.U. claimed that “[Flores] was directly behind

me with his private area against my back” and “[h]is penis was against my butt

area.” (Tr. 256-257.) T.U. felt Flores’s penis area “[g]ently rubbing up against [her
butt], kind of like a grind” for “like five minutes, not even.” (Tr. 257.) T.U. testified,

“It was clear he was awake to me, but he did not say anything.” (Tr. 257.) T.U.

described the incident as “[u]ncomfortable.” (Tr. 257.) T.U. noted that they were

both clothed at the time and believed her sister was still asleep. T.U. explained that

Flores did not realize she woke up, so she acted like she was asleep, tried to move

around to adjust her body away from him and “get him off [her],” waited about five

minutes, and left to sleep in different tent with C.U. (Tr. 251.) T.U. explained that

she left “[b]ecause [she] felt uncomfortable.” (Tr. 258.) T.U. testified that she did

not say anything to anyone in the other tent because they were sleeping. T.U. stated

that while she felt “uncomfortable” seeing Flores the next morning, “[n]othing was

said between me and him, and I didn’t say nothing to nobody.” (Tr. 258.) This

evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, can be inferred to

establish that Flores committed the offense with the purpose of sexual arousal or

gratification needed to support his conviction for gross sexual imposition.

Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

          D. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               In the fourth assignment of error, Flores argues that his conviction

for gross sexual imposition is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court,

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reversal on the basis that a verdict

is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “‘only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin at 175.

               As this court has previously stated:

      The criminal manifest weight-of-the-evidence standard addresses the
      evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382,
      2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio
      St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest weight-of-the-
      evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the following question:
      whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the
      defendant’s? Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient
      evidence to support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against
      the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v.
      Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

      When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
      that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
      appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact
      finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id.,
      quoting Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87.

               Flores argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence because: (1) it was not supported by sufficient evidence and (2) the

evidence failed to show he committed any offense in Cuyahoga County.               Flores

asserts that a conviction “predicated upon insufficient evidence is necessarily

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Flores further claims that the jury “was
set up for confusion by the venue and course of conduct issues” and clearly lost its

way in rendering a guilty verdict as to Count 5 only, which occurred at a park in

Summit County.

              Flores raises the same arguments in the fourth assignment of error as

he raised in his first three assignments of error. Since he adds nothing new other

than calling these errors as against the manifest weight of the evidence, we rely upon

our discussion above. After reviewing the entire record, weighing the inferences,

and examining the credibility of witnesses, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost

its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Flores’s conviction is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

              Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR