Court Opinion

ID: 9790134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:37.341991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.436257
License: Public Domain

*572BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I.
The majority opinion wholly declines to mention that the issue raised by the petition was the alleged validity of the Nebraska order — an issue which, insofar as the record discloses, was never decided. The majority mentions “the sanctity of the writ of habeas corpus” and “the discovery of a person sought by means of habeas corpus ... . ” The Great Writ, as it has been called, is recognized in our United States Constitution where it is referred to as “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus ... . ” Indeed, it is a constitutional right of the highest magnitude, and came to us from the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. The history of the Great Writ, however, and its attribute of sanctity stems from its origin “as the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, by which the legality of the detention of one in custody could be tested judicially.” McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934). As I mention, infra, the writ has been used as a substitute to try child custody; it is also used, as was intended in this case, to establish and enforce a final custody decree of a foreign state. The majority cites no cases holding that the writ may be used merely to discover from witnesses — not parties — the whereabouts of a child — nor did the instant petition for the writ purport to claim such relief. Habeas corpus petitions will ordinarily be dismissed where an alternative remedy is available, which is especially so where there is a statutory remedy. 39 Am. Jur.2d 140 §§ 18 and 19. Pettry v. McGinty, 60 Ohio St.2d 92, 397 N.E.2d 1190 (1979). Since the passage of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Title 10, Ch. 13, Idaho Code, in 1974, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Title 5, Ch. 10, in 1977, there is little, if any, justification for resorting to habeas corpus in the realm of child custody.
II.
This is an instance where it is possible to isolate and delineate the basic issue, an issue which is not today reached by the majority. As is well-stated in one of the leading texts:
“There is a public obligation to provide evidence and this obligation persists no matter how financially burdensome it may be.
“This rule is sometimes embodied in a statute declaring that a witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to the matter in issue, .... Under such provision a witness is not bound to answer questions irrelevant to the issue....
“Generally speaking, a witness possessing knowledge of facts material to the vindication of the rights of another may be compelled by judicial process to appear and give evidence in behalf of that other party----”
81 Am.Jur.2d 52 § 28 (emphasis added).
Recently this Court considered a case where a newspaper and its writers were punished for the refusal of the writers to testify. The punishment inflicted there was more severe than that in the confrontation which is before’ us today. In reversing the trial court we observed that “At no time during the hearing on the motion for sanctions, nor in its supporting memoranda, nor in its argument on appeal, has Sierra shown that its inability to discover the confidential sources obstructed its ability to prove the falsity of the publications. * * * Sierra has not pointed out how revelation of sources would have been instrumental in establishing that the articles were in fact false.” Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103 (1981). As that case points out, alleged falsity of certain statements published in the Twin Falls Times-News was a primary issue germane to the controversy. In a separate opinion, Bakes, J., declared that on remand, absent a demonstration “ ‘how revelation of [the] sources would have been instrumental in establishing that the articles were in fact false,’ summary judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants.” 101 Idaho at 801, 623 P.2d at 109.
Let us turn to the facts in the pending litigation which led to the punishment of *573Ellen Marks, who was not a party thereto, but whose knowledge as to the whereabouts of Alysia and her mother was wanted. The controversy had its genesis in a 1975 Arizona divorce decree wherein Alysia’s custody was awarded to her father, with the mother having rights of reasonable visitation. The parties migrated to Nebraska and submitted to the courts of that state minor disputes revolving around visitation.
In 1980, Alysia came to Idaho to visit her mother, who was by then living here. While Alysia was still in Idaho her mother filed papers in the district court of Ada County and at the same time filed papers in the district court of Douglas County, Nebraska — both proceedings aimed at obtaining temporary possession of Alysia. According to the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the Nebraska court ordered the mother to return the child to the father pending further investigation and evaluation, and authorized the father to pick up Alysia. Paragraph VI. (At the first hearing before Judge Vehlow, counsel for Alysia’s father asked Randy Gilmore if he had discussed with his wife “the pending action in Nebraska and the custody situation with Alysia.” Tr., Vol. I, p. 10.)
It is alleged that the 1980 Nebraska order is entitled to full faith and credit, and alleged further that the father does not know the whereabouts of Alysia and her mother. The petition prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue demanding that Alysia’s mother, and the mother’s husband, bring Alysia before the court so “that the court may make such orders concerning the custody of the said child as will best serve the interests of justice.” Prayer of Petition.
A writ was issued to Alysia’s mother and to the mother’s husband commanding them to bring Alysia before Judge Vehlow at a stated time on September 10, 1980, “to do and receive what shall then and there be considered concerning (Alysia).” A return of service shows that the named respondents were served by Louis W. Chase and Sgt. Gary Thurston by delivering copies of the process to Randall Gilmore (the husband of Alysia’s mother) on September 9,1980, at his place of employment, Hewlett-Packard. The return recites that Randall Gilmore resided at the same place as'Alysia’s mother. Judge Vehlow considered this as valid personal service1 upon Alysia’s mother and issued a bench warrant for her failure to appear. Accepting that service so made upon Alysia’s mother was sufficient enough to notify her of the issues which would be tried, the mother would be in default after the expiration of twenty days, entitling the court to enter its judgment on the issue presented.
WHAT WAS THE ISSUE?
The pleaded issue was simply that the 1980 Nebraska order was entitled to full faith and credit. No contention was made that the Arizona decree was entitled to full faith and credit, or that there was any final decree which had been entered by a Nebraska court. Rather and to the contrary there is an intimation that the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court. The contention advanced was only that the 1980 Nebraska order was entitled to full faith and credit. The resolution of the issue thus presented would appear to be a question of law, i.e., the finality of the Nebraska order entitling it to recognition by an Idaho court under the provision of the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, art. 4, § 1. We recently had before us such an issue in Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 577 P.2d 348 (1978). In that case a final decree of guardianship was entered in California and the enforcement of the decree sought in Idaho. The district court of Ada County reversed a decision of a magistrate of that court extending full faith and credit to the California decree. We in turn agreed with the magistrate and reversed the district court. Although the district court had approached the question as an issue of fact, i.e., the best interests of the child, we were obliged to and did as a matter of law give credence to the United States Constitution, *574once we ascertained the finality of the California decree under California law.
Here, in order to resolve the issue before us, it is not necessary to pass upon the finality of the Nebraska order of 1980. That issue is not before us, and will not be. It is required, however, that we isolate the issue so that we can pass upon the validity of Judge Vehlow’s order holding Ellen Marks in contempt of court, and thereafter incarcerating Marks in jail, and thereafter fining her a substantial amount of money. If the questions to which the judge demanded answers were not relevant to the issue before the judge, then the contempt order was invalid, and the fines collected should be returned. The answer is, of course, self-evident and hardly needful of saying. The answers sought were not by any stretch of the imagination germane to the sole issue of law presented. The jail incarceration and fines, undoubtedly aimed at punishing a violation of a direct order by the court to testify, cannot be said to be legally justified where the answers requested were not pertinent to the main issue raised by the petition for the writ. Hence, the order was in error. Had the habeas gone to judgment in favor of Alysia’s father, and had Judge Vehlow found the Nebraska order entitled to full faith and credit, and had Judge Vehlow ordered Alysia’s surrender by her mother, then there might have been some validity to an order directing Ellen Marks to answer the questions if propounded by the court in furtherance of supplemental proceedings enforcing its order — a question which need not be answered. A procedure is available which would appear to be far more appropriate, referring to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which had not been enacted at the time of Mitchell v. Pincock, and referring also to I.C. §§ 18-4501(2) and 18-205.
III.
The majority, while expressing its approval of the language which it quotes from Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.Cir.1981), nevertheless concocts “the sanctity-safety exception” — predicated upon the “safety” of a child not alleged nor shown to be in any way endangered and the “sanctity” of a writ which is being inappropriately utilized. Were the Court today required to decide the issue on wholly constitutional issues— which it clearly is not — while inclined to adopt the Zerilli language, I would not look so far afield for persuasive authority. Our neighboring sister state of Washington has considered the issue just this very year in Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash.2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (1983), wherein the issue before the Washington Supreme Court was that of a reporter’s privilege raised where the reporter, as here, refused to answer questions propounded to him. The case thus bears similarity to both our Sierra case and the case before us.
In Clampitt, a nine-member court dealt in depth with the issue. Its opinion is available and one would think should be persuasive with today’s majority, where the Clampitt court relies on the same Zerilli opinion which today’s majority approves. It is readily ascertainable that the Washington court is of the view that in civil cases, at least, reporters will be accorded a common law privilege against compelled disclosure. The privilege is not absolute and the Washington court holds that “The party seeking discovery may defeat the privilege by showing that (1) his or her claim is meritorious; (2) the information sought is critical to that claim; and (3) he or she has made a reasonable effort to obtain the information by other means.” 658 P.2d at 644. This holding, especially as to (1) and (2), bears a striking similarity to our holding in Sierra Life. As Clampitt makes evident, and as petitioners here claim, trial courts cannot simply declare, as did respondent in this case, “that no such claimed privilege existed.” This would seem especially true where, as petitioner correctly claims here, that issue had not been joined between the parties to the litigation, and hence there was nothing before the court. But, even if there was something before the court, petitioner was entitled to a proper hearing — which here was not accorded to her.
*575APPENDIX
Footnote 1
The bench warrant recites:
“Eugenia A. Clary Gilmore, having been served through her husband, Randall Gilmore, with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 9, 1980 requiring her to appear on September 10, 1980 at 4:00 p.m. at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, in person, and to produce Alysia Danielle Clary at said hearing, and said defendant-respondent, Eugenia A. Clary Gilmore, having failed to appear on September 10, 1980 at 4:00 p.m. before this Court in person and/or with the said child, Alysia Danielle Clary.”
The Court’s rule 4(d)(2) provides that service of process is “by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint ... personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” The Court long ago held that child custody habeas is a civil proceeding. Mabbett v. Mabbett, 34 Idaho 611, 202 P. 1057 (1921). There is little difference between the Court’s rule in civil proceedings and the provisions attendant to service of writs of habeas corpus. I.C. § 19-4206 provides:
“If the writ is directed to the sheriff or other ministerial officer of the court, out of which it issues, it must be delivered by the clerk to such officer without delay, as other writs are delivered for service. If it is directed to any other person, it must be delivered to the sheriff, and be by him served upon such person by delivering the same to him without delay. If the person to whom the writ is directed cannot be found, or refuses admittance to the officer or person serving or delivering such writ, it may be served or delivered by leaving it at the residence of the person to whom it is directed, or by affixing it to some conspicuous place on the outside, either of his dwelling-house or of the place where the party is confined or under restraint.”

. Footnote ! is appended.