Court Opinion

ID: 9955519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:14:18.710165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.555294
License: Public Domain

J-S42016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.T.M.-C., A    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1213 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered May 2, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000083-2023

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.M.-C., A    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1214 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered May 2, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000084-2023

 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.E.M.-C., A    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1215 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered May 2, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000085-2023

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.T.M.-S., A    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S42016-23

                                           :
                                           :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER                   :
                                           :
                                           :
                                           :
                                           :   No. 1216 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered May 2, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000086-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                            FILED MARCH 28, 2024

      C.M. (Mother) appeals the May 2, 2023 decrees involuntary terminating

her parental rights to her four biological children: T.T.M.-C. (DOB: 8/2009),

J.E.M.-C. (DOB: 4/2011), S.T.M.-C. (DOB: 8/2013), and E.T.M.-S. (DOB:

9/2017). After review, we affirm the termination decrees.

      We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of the above-

captioned matters from the certified record, particularly the trial court opinion,

the parenting capacity evaluation of Mother and the dependency dockets of

the children. On June 5, 2019, Philadelphia Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) received a general protective services (“GPS”) report concerning

Mother’s home. N.T., 5/2/23, at 21. The report contained several allegations:

(1) there were maggots, dirt and a lot of trash on the floors, and rats in the

home; (2) the home was infested with bedbugs and head lice; (3) one of the

children was sexually abused and refused to disclose because the person

threatened to kill them; (4) the children were physically abused; (5) the adults

smoked marijuana and used cocaine around the children; (6) approximately

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five children and five adults resided in the home; and (7) Mother and maternal

grandmother walked around the home naked.1               Id. at 21-22; Trial Court

Opinion, 8/14/23, at 2-3.         The same day, DHS met with Mother and the

children at the home, and Mother admitted the home was infested with

bedbugs. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 3. DHS also observed the home

was dirty and E.T.M.-S. did not have an appropriate sleeping area. Id.

       The next day, June 20, 2019, DHS received a child protective services

(“CPS”) report regarding physical abuse of the children that occurred on June

17, 2019. N.T., 5/2/23, at 22. Police were called to the home because of

alleged physical abuse of T.T.M.-C. and J.E.M.-C. by Mother and her paramour

(and father of E.T.M.-S.), R.S. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 4. It was

reported that due to the history of domestic violence, Mother was afraid of

R.S. and would not intervene to protect T.T.M.-C. Id. at 3-4. Mother was

being arrested when DHS arrived at the home. Id. at 4.

       The children were transported to the special victims unit wearing dirty

clothing and had an odor. Id. at 5. The children stated R.S. hit them with a

belt and a wooden stick with “staples.” Id. T.T.M.-C. had red marks and

bruising on the left side of his face, dark purple and red bruising on his left

arm, and red and purple bruising on his back and front of his right forearm.

Id. T.T.M.-C. also reported R.S. used his hand to choke him. Id. Afterward,

____________________________________________

1 This report was determined to be valid.        Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 3.

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T.T.M.-C. was forced to stay in his room for two days so no one would see his

injuries, and he was not fed during this time. Id. J.E.M.-C. reported R.S.

used a belt to choke her and had slight bruising on her left shoulder and right

arm and reported bruising on her back and buttocks. Id. Both T.T.M.-C. and

J.E.M.-C. reported: (1) R.S. and Mother hit them; (2) they suffered severe

pain; (3) they had gone long periods of time without food; and (4) the home

was infested with bedbugs and fleas. Id.

      DHS spoke with the maternal aunt, who had previously resided in

Mother’s home. Id. at 4. She and her daughter left because of the domestic

violence over the past several years and were afraid of R.S. Id. Maternal

aunt reported that on June 17, 2019, Mother found T.T.M.-C., J.E.M.-C., and

another child engaged in behavior they had seen on YouTube. Id. Mother

told maternal aunt to take E.T.M.-S. and S.T.M.-C. to the park while R.S.

disciplined T.T.M.-C. and J.E.M.-C. Id. at 4-5.

      On June 20, 2019, DHS was awarded protective custody of T.T.M.-C.,

J.E.M.-C., S.T.M.-C., E.T.M.-S. and, at a shelter care hearing the next day,

the court determined that the children should remain in the custody of DHS.

The children were adjudicated dependent in July 2019 and separately placed

in kinship care. Although each child lived in multiple kinship and foster homes,

they have remained in the custody of DHS during the pendency of these

proceedings.   On November 13, 2019, after an aggravated circumstances

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hearing, the court found T.T.M.-C. was a victim of child abuse, and Mother

and R.S. were found to be the perpetrators.

       On February 28, 2023, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b).2 The

trial court held a termination hearing on May 2, 2023, wherein DHS presented

testimony of the community umbrella agency (“CUA”) case manager, Destiny

Vargas, and Dr. William Russell, and introduced the following stipulated

exhibits: (1) proof of service on Mother; (2) curriculum vitae for Dr. Russell;

(3) parenting capacity evaluation of Mother; (4) dependency docket for

T.T.M.-C.; (5) dependency docket for S.T.M.-C.; (6) dependency docket for

J.E.M.-C.; and (7) dependency docket for E.T.M.-S. N.T., 5/2/23, at 16-20.

Mother testified on her own behalf. Id. at 78-97. The same day, the trial

court entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b).3

       On May 17, 2023, Mother filed a pro se notice of appeal and statement

of errors complained of on appeal. As she was represented by private counsel,

this Court directed private counsel to file an amended statement of errors

____________________________________________

2 Michael Graves, Jr., Esquire, was appointed as legal counsel for the children.

N.T., 5/2/23, at 5. Jo-Ann Braverman, Esquire, served as guardian ad litem
for J.E.M.-C., S.T.M.-C., and E.T.M.-S. Id. Lisa Visco, Esquire, served as
guardian ad litem for T.T.M.-C. Id.

3 The biological fathers voluntarily consented to terminating their parental
rights and those decrees were entered on a different day.

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complained of on appeal. Order, 6/9/23. On June 14, 2023, Mother’s counsel

filed a petition to withdraw representation. Thereafter, we directed the trial

court to address counsel’s petition to withdraw. Order, 6/20/23. On June 27,

2023, the trial court allowed private counsel to withdraw and appointed

counsel for Mother. Thereafter, Mother’s counsel filed an amended statement

of errors complained of on appeal. Mother raises five issues for our review:

      1. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law and abuse of
         discretion when it found that the Department of Human Services
         by clear and convincing evidence had met its burden to
         terminate [Mother’s] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
         2511(a)(2) and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

      2. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law and abuse of
         discretion when it found that termination of [Mother’s] parental
         rights was in the Child[ren]’s best interest and that the
         Department of Human Services had met its burden pursuant to
         23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

      3. Whether the Trial Court erred in evaluating [Mother’s] level of
         compliance with her Family Single Case Plan Objectives?

      4. Whether the Trial Court erred in its consideration of a stale
         Parenting Capacity Evaluation and in its reliance on any
         associated testimony?

      5. Whether the Trial Court erred in          its   consideration   of
         incompetent or inadmissible evidence?

Mother’s Brief at 4.

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an

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      appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
      has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
      must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
      concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
      the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
      support.    Termination of parental rights has significant and
      permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
      the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
      establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
      which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
      as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
      hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated

analysis:

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interest
      of the child.

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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

“We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent

evidence.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc),

appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004) (citing In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,

1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)).

      Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the trial court as

to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to

affirm. Id. at 384. We begin our analysis with Section 2511(a)(2), which

states:

      The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
      of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
      care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
      well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
      neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). “The grounds for termination are not limited to

affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021),

appeal denied, 258 A.3d 1144 (Pa. 2021). We emphasize that “[p]arents are

required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of

full parental duties.” Id. “A parent who is incapable of performing parental

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”

B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 387-88.

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       Mother contends that DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that her conduct warranted termination under Section 2511(a)(2).

Specifically, Mother asserts that she has “made tremendous strides at

achieving her identified family [single case plan] goals and court ordered

objectives.”    Mother’s Brief at 13.          Further, Mother argues that the record

demonstrates her capacity to parent the children successfully due to “her

achievement of full compliance and years of successful unsupervised

visitation.” Id. at 16. We disagree.

       The trial court identified Mother’s incapacity for the purposes of Section

2511(a)(2) as her lack of compliance with certain objectives, her failure to

take responsibility for why the children went into care and her lack of insight

as to how to manage the children’s behavior and engage in appropriate

discipline.4   Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 21-22. The trial court placed

great weight on Mother’s lack of compliance.                Mother’s permanency plan

objectives essentially remained the same for four years. N.T., 5/2/23, at 22-

23. Initially, her objectives were to (1) attend ARC for parenting classes and

follow all recommendations; (2) participate in supervised visits with the

children; (3) participate in a parenting capacity evaluation (“PCE”) when

scheduled and follow all recommendations; (4) report for random drug

screenings;     and     (5)   continue     to      attend   therapy   and   follow   all

____________________________________________

4 The trial court specifically noted that its decision was not based on Mother’s

housing and employment objectives. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 25.

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recommendations.        Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 7.    She was initially

scheduled to have two hours of supervised visitation at the agency.

       Between July 2019 and June 2021, Mother achieved full compliance with

her permanency plan objectives.                She completed domestic violence

counseling, parenting classes and the PCE, attended therapy, was consistent

with visitation, and obtained appropriate housing.         Mother progressed to

weekly unsupervised visits and alternating weekend overnights with two

children at a time (the two older and the two younger children together).

Following the June 1, 2021 permanency review hearing, the court directed

Mother to continue mental health treatment and provide the assigned CUA

copies of her progress reports.

       By May 2022, Mother’s progress with her objectives regressed to

minimal compliance and she made no progress toward alleviating the

circumstances that led to placement. Mother had unsupervised visitation from

December 2020 to May 20225. The visits reverted to supervised due to the

children’s behavior during the visits and Mother’s inability to control them.

N.T., 5/2/23, at 24. Additionally, the children would misbehave when they

returned to their foster homes. Id. at 24-25. Ms. Vargas supervised some

visits and described them as chaotic. Id. at 25.

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Vargas incorrectly testified that Mother’s unsupervised visits terminated

in June 2021. N.T., 5/2/23, at 41. The dependency docket reflects that
Mother was permitted unsupervised visitation until May 2022.

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      Though the record is unclear why, T.T.M.-C. did not visit Mother with his

siblings. T.T.M.-C.’s visits stopped in March 2023 after Mother bit him on the

cheek while play fighting during a supervised visit. Id. at 26. However, he

was already not attending visits regularly because he did not want to see

Mother. Id. at 26-27. During her testimony, Mother downplayed the incident:

      He likes to play fight like, you know, boys do. And I did... I like
      grabbed. Like I bit – not like hard, obviously, because we play
      like that.

      I like grabbed his cheek and I guess he said it was too hard. I
      said, “Sorry.” And I gave him a kiss. And everything was fine
      after that.

Id. at 79.

      The other three children – J.E.M.-C., S.T.M.-C. and E.T.M.-S. attended

visits with Mother together. Ms. Vargas testified that S.T.M.-C. and E.T.M.-S.

frequently misbehaved during the visits and Mother was unable to control their

behavior. Id. at 27. During visits, Mother was overly affectionate toward

S.T.M.-C. and E.T.M.-S., always kissing and hugging them, but would not

show the same affection toward J.E.M.-C. Id. at 27-28.

      Though Mother only missed one visit, there were several concerns. She

would get upset and yell at the children. Id. at 60-61. Mother explained: “I

try to get help. And they don’t help me. They don’t tell me what I can and

can’t do. They don’t like give me like references for anything. And I feel like

they’re just all – that no one wants to help me.” Id. at 92. Mother was asked

specifically what type of help she wanted, she answered “Anything. And they

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lie.” Id. Mother also told E.T.M.-S. to make allegations against his foster

parent. Id. at 61-62.

      Dr. William Russell conducted the PCE of Mother.            To complete his

evaluation, Dr. Russell reviewed the provided information, conducted a

structured interview of Mother in October 2020 and a clinical evaluation of

Mother in January 2021. Id. at 72. Dr. Russell concluded:

      [Mother] loves her children and can interact and play with them
      but cannot manage them. The records and [Mother’s] own
      statements reflect a young woman who minimizes negative or
      irresponsible behavior, externalizes blame for her children’s
      negative behavior and demonstrates no insight into her
      responsibility for the children’s current emotional and behavioral
      problems.

Parenting Capacity Evaluation, 1/19/21, at 12 (emphasis added).                 He

recommended Mother continue individual therapy, maintain contact with the

children’s   treatment   providers,   obtain   full-time     employment,     obtain

appropriate housing separate from maternal grandmother and maternal aunt,

and participate in family school with the children.        Id.   The goal of family

school was to increase Mother’s skill for managing the children’s behavior and

using appropriate discipline. Id. at 13.

      Mother attended family school with S.T.M.-C. and E.T.M.-S. from

November 1, 2022 through March 2, 2023. N.T., 5/2/23, at 33, 42. Family

school was concerned with Mother’s inability to discipline the children without

prompting by staff. Id. at 33. They were also concerned with the lack of age-

appropriate boundaries Mother had with the children and wanted her to be

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more of an authority figure.      Id.     Due to lack of progress, Ms. Vargas

requested family school to discharge Mother. Id. 33, 42.

      Though Mother attended individual therapy, her therapist reported that

she made no progress after 64 sessions. Id. at 29-30. Conversely, Mother

believed she had made progress and explained:

      Me and my therapist talk all the time about – I know what I’ve
      done wrong. And like I would never do it again. And I talk to her
      all the time about stuff like that, things that happened.

                                      ****

      -- and nobody has had a conversation with my therapist either to
      ask her if I know how I feel and how, you know, like about the
      kids’ feelings, and all of that. Nobody has ever said nothing.

Id. at 81-82. Mother did not have a report from her therapist stating that she

made progress and became defensive when the guardian ad litem asked about

it – “My therapist technically by law isn’t allowed to tell y’all what goes on in

detail in my sessions.” Id. at 91. Mother and T.T.M.-C. attended six sessions

of family therapy, which stopped due to T.T.M.-C.’s frustrations with Mother.

Id. at 34.

      Based on the foregoing, Ms. Vargas opined that Mother was not capable

of caring for the children because she failed to realize how the children feel

about the circumstances that led to placement and the trauma that they have

experienced. Id. at 35. Further, Mother has not remedied the issues that

brought the children into care. Id.

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         Dr. Russell testified as an expert6 in forensic psychology with a specialty

in PCEs, and explained:

         [T]here are significant problems with [Mother’s] insight into her
         responsibility and her role in terms of why the children went into
         care. There are significant problems with her insight into what
         her children’s needs were. And also the impact of her behavior
         and the domestic violence behavior on the development of these
         children.

         There was also a significant amount of blaming exhibited by
         [Mother]. That is blaming other people for the situation that they
         were in. It was – physical discipline by her was minimized. And
         blame was placed on her paramour.

         The issues related to the children’s behavior, she blamed her
         mother and the aunt for not helping her with the children. And
         that’s why they had so many problems. And [there] were also
         basic observations about the children where she simply said,
         “They’re all bad. They lie. They don’t listen.”

Id. at 74-75. Dr. Russell opined that there were no additional services that

would give Mother the capacity to safely parent the children. Id. at 76-77.

She already participated in therapy, visitation and family school with little to

no progress. Id. at 76. He elaborated:

         She has participated in some of [the recommendations].
         However, the testimony that I heard prior certainly indicates that
         while she’s participated in some of them, there has not been any
         significant progress in her development of further insight or into
         her responsibility and ability to handle the children.

         The behaviors that were described in terms of the inability to
         provide – to provide supervision and care for the children certainly
         raises questions as to whether there has been any change over
         the last three years in terms of her ability to do that.
____________________________________________

6 There was no objection to Dr. Russell testifying as an expert.      N.T., 5/2/23,
at 70.

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Id. Therefore, Dr. Russell opined that Mother does not possess the capacity

to provide safety for the children. Id.

      Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that Mother’s repeated

and continued incapacity to comply with her permanency objectives due to

her lack of insight, lack of responsibility and externalization of blame has

caused T.T.M.-C., J.E.M.-C., S.T.M.-C., and E.T.M.-C. to be without essential

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical and mental

well-being. There is a difference between participating in the objectives and

recommendations, and actual progress.        Here, there was no evidence that

Mother progressed despite the number of services she was provided. Thus,

the conditions and causes of Mother’s incapacity and refusal cannot or will not

be remedied.    Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

      We now turn to Section 2511(b), which states, in pertinent part:

      The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
      consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
      and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
      terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
      inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
      care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “Notably, courts should consider the matter from the

child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs

and welfare above concerns for the parent.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

1105 (Pa. 2023). This determination “should not be applied mechanically,”

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but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must

determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106.

      Our Supreme Court has mandated that a Section 2511(b) analysis must

include “consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.”

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Thus, the court must determine

whether the adverse impact of severing the parent-child bond “is outweighed

by the benefit of moving the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253.

      [B]y evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will
      impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts
      correctly refine their focus on the child’s development and mental
      and emotional health rather than considering only the child’s
      “feelings” or “affection” for the parent, which even badly abused
      and neglected children will retain.

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110. “The continued attachment to the natural parents,

despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to

correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the children

cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citing In re

K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

      However, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort,

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., 296

A.3d at 1111 (emphasis in the original; internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Thus, courts should also consider factors that naturally arise due to

the particular facts of a case, such as: (1) the child’s need for permanency

and time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and

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bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child’s

needs. Id. at 1113.

      Turning to the merits of Mother’s appeal, she argues that the evidence

was insufficient to terminate her parental rights because it is not clear that

adoption was adequately explained to the children by their legal interest

counsel.     Mother’s Brief at 42.   She also contends that the court did not

properly analyze the nature of the bond between Mother and the children. Id.

at 44. We disagree.

      Ms. Vargas testified that T.T.M.-C. and J.E.M.-C. do not have a bond

with Mother. N.T., 5/2/23, at 35-36, 48. Conversely, she testified that while

S.T.M.-C. and E.T.M.-S. do have a bond with Mother, it is an unhealthy one.

Id. at 37-38, 50. As to T.T.M.-C., Ms. Vargas testified that he wants to be

adopted and no longer wants a relationship with Mother. Id. at 36. T.T.M.-

C. has been in his pre-adoptive home since April 7, 2021, and sees his foster

parent as his mother. Id. He looks to his foster parent for love, protection

and support, and the foster parent meets all of T.T.M.-C.’s needs. Id. at 36-

37.   T.T.M.-C. would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were

terminated as he has expressed several times that he wants to be adopted.

Id. at 37.

      Likewise, J.E.M.-C. has expressed that she wants to be adopted. Id. at

48. She has been in her pre-adoptive home since May 17, 2021, and looks to

her foster parents for love, protection, and support, and the foster parents

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meet all of J.E.M.-C.’s needs. Id. She considers her foster parents as her

parents.   Id.   J.E.M.-C. does individual therapy and is on the waitlist for

trauma-based therapy because she still brings up the circumstances that

brought the children into care.      Id. at 55-56.     She also takes ADHD

medication. Id. at 55. J.E.M.-C. would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s

rights were terminated as she has expressed a desire to be adopted. Id. at

50.

      As to S.T.M.-C., Ms. Vargas testified that she has an unhealthy bond

with Mother. She explained that S.T.M.-C. is nine years old, she acts like a

baby when around Mother, and a mature nine-year-old in her foster home.

Id. at 38, 46. S.T.M.-C. has been in her pre-adoptive home since April 12,

2022. Id. at 46. She has been in five different foster homes and is most

stable in her current placement. Id. at 60. S.T.M.-C. has behavioral issues,

such as hitting other children in school, talking back and generally being

disrespectful. Id. at 54.   S.T.M.-C.’s behavior has improved since family

school with Mother stopped, and she would not suffer irreparable harm if

Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 47, 54.

      Similarly, Ms. Vargas testified that E.T.M.-S. has an unhealthy bond with

Mother. She explained that E.T.M.-S. acts completely different with Mother

than with his foster parent.    Id. at 51.    During visits, E.T.M.-S. would

misbehave the entire time and would not listen to Mother. Id. E.T.M.-S. has

been in his pre-adoptive home since October 16, 2020, and refers to his foster

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parent as mom. Id. at 51-52. Despite his age, E.T.M.-S. is not ready for

kindergarten because he cannot recognize his name nor identify the alphabet.

Id. at 60. He is currently enrolled in Head Start and attends occupational and

speech therapy.      Id. at 57.     E.T.M.-S. looks to his foster parent for love,

protection and support and his foster parent meets all his needs, and would

not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 52.

       The children’s legal interest counsel, Michael Graves, Esquire, provided

a report to the court. Id. at 97-103. He reported that E.T.M.-S. is too young

to have a substantive conversation about adoption.          Id. at 98.   E.T.M.-S.

reported that he liked where he was, but also wanted to be with Mother. Id.

As to the other three children, Attorney Graves reported that adoption was

explained to them and they very clearly understood what it meant. Id. All

three children expressed a desire to be adopted and did not want to be

reunified with Mother. Id. at 103.

       Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in

the trial court’s holding that termination was warranted pursuant to Section

2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental

rights.7

____________________________________________

7 We find Mother’s remaining issues to be waived.    “[W]here an appellate brief
fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or
fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review,
the claim is waived. It is not the obligation of this Court . . . to formulate
Appellant’s arguments for him.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915,
924 (Pa. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

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        Decrees affirmed.

        Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Date: 3/28/2024

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