Court Opinion

ID: 9427585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:15.806363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:08.221895
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the respondents have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process in the consideration of their release on parole. I do not believe, however, that, the applicability of the Due Process Clause to parole-release determinations depends upon the particular wording of the statute governing the deliberations of the parole board, or that the limited notice of the final hearing currently given by the State is consistent with the requirements of due process.
I
A substantial liberty from legal restraint is at stake when the State makes decisions regarding parole or probation. Although still subject to limitations not imposed on citizens never convicted of a crime, the parolee enjoys a liberty incomparably greater than whatever minimal freedom of action he may have retained within prison walls, a fact that the Court recognized in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972).
“The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. . . . Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id., at 482.
Liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673-674 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 *19U. S. 564, 572 (1972). Because this fundamental liberty “is valuable” and “its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss’ on the parolee,” the Court concluded in Morrissey that the decision to revoke parole must be made in conformity with due process standards. 408 U. S., at 482. Similarly in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a probationer must be accorded due process when a decision is to be made about the continuation of his probation. And the decision to rescind a prisoner’s “good-time credits,” which directly determine the time at which he will be eligible for parole, also must be reached in compliance with due process requirements. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974).
In principle, it seems to me that the Due Process Clause is no less applicable to the parole-release determination than to the decisions by state agencies at issue in the foregoing cases. Nothing in the Constitution requires a State to provide for probation or parole. But when a State adopts a parole system that applies general standards of eligibility, prisoners justifiably expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever those standards are met. This is so whether the governing statute states, as here, that parole “shall” be granted unless certain conditions exist, or provides some other standard for making the parole decision. Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, ante, at 9-11, I am convinced that the presence of a parole system is sufficient to create a liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in the parole-release decision.
The Court today, however, concludes that parole release and parole revocation “are quite different,” because “ 'there is a . . . difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants,’ ” ante, at 9, 10. I am unpersuaded that this difference, if indeed it exists at all, is as significant as the Court implies. Release on parole marks the first time when the severe restrictions imposed on a prisoner’s liberty by the prison regimen may be lifted, and his behavior in prison *20often is molded by his hope and expectation of securing parole at the earliest time permitted by law. Thus, the parole-release determination may be as important to the prisoner as some later, and generally unanticipated, parole-revocation decision. Moreover, whatever difference there may be in the subjective reactions of prisoners and parolees to release and revocation determinations is not dispositive. From the day that he is sentenced in a State with a parole system, a prisoner justifiably expects release on parole when he meets the standards of eligibility applicable within that system. This is true even if denial of release will be a less severe disappointment than revocation of parole once granted.
I am unconvinced also by the Court’s suggestion that the prisoner has due process rights in the context of parole revocation but not parole release because of the different “nature of the decision that must be made in each case.” Ante, at 9. It is true that the parole-revocation determination involves two inquiries: the parole board must ascertain the facts related to the prisoner’s behavior on parole, and must then make a judgment whether or not he should be returned to prison. But unless the parole board makes parole-release determinations in some arbitrary or random fashion, these subjective evaluations about future success on parole also must be based on retrospective factual findings. See ante, at 14 — 15. In addition, it seems to me that even if there were any systematic difference between the factual inquiries relevant to release and revocation determinations, this difference, under currently existing parole systems, would be too slight to bear on the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. It might be relevant, of course, in determining the process to be accorded in each setting.
II
The Court correctly concludes, in my view, that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering that a formal hearing be held for every inmate and that every adverse parole decision in-*21elude a statement of the evidence relied upon by the Board. Ante, at 14-16. The type of hearing afforded by Nebraska comports generously with the requirements of due process, and the report of the Board’s decision also seems adequate. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the case remanded.
I do not agree, however, with the Court’s decision that the present notice afforded to prisoners scheduled for final hearings (as opposed to initial review hearings) is constitutionally adequate. Ante, at 14 n. 6. Under present procedures, a prisoner is told in advance the month during which his final hearing will be held, but is not notified of the exact date of the hearing until the morning of the day that it will occur. Thus, although a prisoner is allowed to “present evidence, call witnesses and be represented by private counsel,” ante, at 5, at the final hearing, his ability to do so necessarily is reduced or nullified completely by the State’s refusal to give notice of the hearing more than a few hours in advance.
The Court’s opinion asserts that “[t]here is no claim that . . . the timing of the notice . . . seriously prejudices the inmate’s ability to prepare adequately for the hearing.” Ante, at 14 n. 6. But the original complaint in this case cited as an alleged denial of due process the State’s failure to “inform the [respondents] in advance of the date and time of their hearings before the Board of Parole.” The District Court ordered the petitioners to give prisoners notice of hearings at least 72 hours in advance of the hearings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that order. The respondents have supported that judgment in this Court by arguing that the courts below correctly determined that the current notice procedure undermines the prisoner’s ability to present his case adequately at the final review hearing. Brief for Respondents 65. This conclusion accords with common sense, despite the petitioners’ comment that prisoners “are seldom gone on vacation or have conflicting appointments on the day their parole hear*22ing is set.” Brief for Petitioners 30. It also imposes only a minimal burden on the State. I therefore agree with the decision of the courts below to require the State to give at least three days’ notice of final hearings, and I would not require the Court of Appeals to modify this portion of its judgment on remand.