Court Opinion

ID: 9941081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 20:03:14.147523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:12.503263
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 In re W.C. CA2/4
              NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 In re W.C.,                                                         B329733

 a Person Coming Under the Juvenile                                  (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                           Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00715)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                             AND DENYING REHEARING
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                               [CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 V.N. and W.C.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

THE COURT:
         It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 16, 2024, be
modified as follows:
         1.        The first paragraph of Section B shall be modified to remove the
sentence “We agree with DCFS.”
         2.        The first sentence of the second to last paragraph in Section B.2.
previously stated “We find DCFS’s inquiry as to father’s family satisfied the
ICWA requirements.” The opinion shall be modified so that this sentence
now reads “We find DCFS’s inquiry as to the paternal great-aunt Joyce
satisfied the ICWA requirements.”
      3.    The opinion shall be further modified to include a new paragraph
immediately preceding the Disposition stating:
      On November 13, 2023, father filed a motion to take additional
evidence on appeal which we granted. This additional evidence consists of a
declaration from father stating that he has learned of Indian ancestry in his
family through his maternal grandfather, Geronimo C. Father attests that
Geronimo C. was “full blooded Apache Chiricahua.” This information was not
known to DCFS until after the instant appeal had been filed and thus DCFS
could not have investigated this potential avenue of Native American
heritage below. However, we find that on remand, further inquiry as to the
paternal great-grandfather, Geronimo C., is warranted. On remand, DCFS
shall conduct a further inquiry of father’s extended family as to Geronimo C.,
as well as with the Apache Chiricahua tribe.
      4.    The Disposition previously read as follows:
      The order terminating parents’ parental rights and denying their
section 388 petitions is conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with
instructions to DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct any necessary ICWA
inquiry into mother’s family as soon as practicable. This inquiry shall
include compliance with ICWA’s notice requirements. If the inquiry and
notice do not reveal evidence of Native American heritage through mother’s
family, the order terminating parents’ parental rights shall stand.
      The opinion is to be modified so that the Disposition now reads as
follows:

                                      2
      The order terminating parents’ parental rights and denying their
section 388 petitions is conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with
instructions to DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct any necessary ICWA
inquiry as soon as practicable. This inquiry shall include compliance with
ICWA’s notice requirements. If the inquiry and notice do not reveal evidence
of Native American heritage, the order terminating parents’ parental rights
shall stand.
      This modification changes the judgment.
      The parties’ petitions for rehearing are DENIED.

COLLINS, Acting P. J.        MORI, J.           ZUKIN, J.

                                      3
Filed 1/16/24 In re W.C. CA2/4 (unmodified opinion)
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 In re W.C.,                                                         B329733

 a Person Coming Under the Juvenile                                  (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                           Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00715)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 V.N. and W.C.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
         Gino de Solenni, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant V.N.
         Seth F. Gorman, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant W.C.
       Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

                              INTRODUCTION
       Mother and father appeal the juvenile court’s orders denying their
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petitions and terminating their
parental rights under section 366.26. On appeal, both parents contend the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
failed to comply with the inquiry requirements under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes
(§ 224 et seq.). Mother also challenges the merits of the court’s denial of her
section 388 petition.
       We conditionally affirm the court’s order denying parents’ section 388
petitions and terminating their parental rights. We remand the case for the
limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA.
       As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.

                                DISCUSSION
    A. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
       The minor child, W.C., was born in February 2022. DCFS received a
referral shortly after he was born, alleging he was the victim of neglect by his

1    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
                                        2
mother, V.N. (mother). While in the hospital for prenatal care, mother had
twice tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines in the two
weeks leading up to W.C.’s birth. Each time, mother had left the hospital
against medical advice.
      Mother initially claimed she had previously used methamphetamines
but had been off drugs for over a year before W.C.’s birth. Mother, who was
31 years old at the time, later admitted she had been using
methamphetamines since she was 15 years old. Mother said she had
completed a substance abuse program in 2019 and remained sober until 2021
when she lost her job and began using methamphetamines again. Mother
also admitted to a history of criminal convictions related to drug use.
      The day after W.C. was discharged from the hospital, the juvenile court
granted a removal order and W.C. was detained and placed in the home of
paternal aunt Michele R. and her husband. W.C. has remained in their care
ever since.
      On February 25, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging,
among other things, that W.C. was at risk from parents’ drug use. On April
25, 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated the section 300 petition, sustaining
the counts concerning parents’ drug use. The court ordered W.C. removed
from parental custody and ordered DCFS to provide family reunification
services to mother and father, Walter C. (father). Mother and father failed to
comply with the case plan ordered by the court. Between March 2022 and
February 2023, parents’ contact and visits with the child were inconsistent.
The parents would often cancel or fail to appear for scheduled visits. When
they did appear, the parents arrived late or terminated visits early. On one
occasion in July 2022, mother and father were arrested by law enforcement
during a visit at a park. During the arrest, mother “was found in possession

                                       3
of drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine” and was booked and issued a
citation for possession of drug paraphernalia. For the remainder of 2022
following this arrest, mother only visited W.C. once. In a subsequent report,
DCFS noted “the parents’ inconsistency has affected the child in that he is no
longer familiar with the parents due to the lack of contact with them.”
      On October 24, 2022, the court terminated reunification services for the
parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing to select and
implement a permanent placement plan for the child.
      On May 16, 2023, the day before the section 366.26 hearing, mother
filed a section 388 petition. In her petition, mother requested “that her son
be returned to her care and custody, with family maintenance services, or in
the alternative, that reunification services be reinstated with orders for
unmonitored visits.” Mother claimed the requested change would be in the
best interest of W.C. because “Mother has changed her life. She is
participating in an aftercare program and complying with the previously
ordered case plan in the hopes that her son one day be returned to her. The
order would be better for [W.C.] because it would allow him to reunify with
his mother, strengthening their parent/child bond and reestablish their
family unit.”
      Attached to the petition were six unauthenticated exhibits. Exhibit 1
was an April 20, 2023, letter to mother’s attorney indicating mother had
entered treatment at La Casita Residential Treatment Program on February
15, 2023, and would be completing the residential portion of her treatment on
April 25, 2023. The letter also states mother was participating in individual
and group therapy sessions and had tested negative for illicit substances in
weekly tests while in the program.

                                       4
      Exhibit 2 was a September 15, 2022, letter to mother stating mother
began taking parenting classes on July 25, 2022, at Helpline Youth
Counseling. The letter states mother “participated in 5 out of the 10
parenting sessions” and “was an active participant in the classes she did
attend.”
      Exhibit 3 appears to be a screenshot of an undated email message
stating mother had enrolled for services at Rio Hondo Mental Health and had
an appointment with a case worker set for March 21, 2023, and an
appointment with a therapist set for April 6, 2023.
      Exhibit 4 is an undated and unsigned letter purporting to be from
mother’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor which states “I have known [mother]
for a couple months now and I am sponsoring her. She calls regularly and
has been doing the work. I see her willingness to change her life choices.”
      Exhibit 5 is a photograph of a portion of an undated letter stating on
May 9, 2023, mother had enrolled in the Intensive Outpatient Treatment
Program of the Los Angeles Centers for Alcohol and Drug Abuse (L.A. CADA)
program. The letter states mother was to attend six group therapy sessions
per week and submit to random testing once a week. It also states mother
was “working toward continued sobriety and has entered one of L.A. CADA
Recovery Bridge Housing called Grace’s Place.”
      Exhibit 6 consists of two photocopied pages and one photograph of a
piece of paper purporting to collectively be a log of mother’s visits and phone
calls with W.C. from March 11, 2023, to May 15, 2023.
      Mother’s petition was heard on May 17, 2023. At the hearing counsel
for DCFS objected to the admission of the exhibits attached to mother’s
petition on the basis that they had only been received the previous day and
had not been authenticated. The court admitted mother’s exhibits but stated

                                       5
they would be given their “due weight” considering they had not been
authenticated. Counsel for W.C. and counsel for DCFS both opposed
mother’s petition.
      The court denied the petition. The court explained that the letter
regarding mother’s parenting classes was dated before the termination of
reunification services and was thus not new information that could warrant a
change of the order terminating reunification. The court also noted that
while mother had enrolled in mental health services that were to start two
months prior, the court had “no further information as to whether or not that
actually did begin.” The court noted that while the letter from mother’s
sponsor was encouraging, it was not dated and there was “limited
information with regard to the authenticity.” While the visitation logs
showed mother had been spending time with W.C., the court noted “[T]his is
a very recent development” and the reports also indicated “there are months
without visits with the minor.”
      Ultimately the court found mother had not met the burden to set her
section 388 petition for a full hearing, holding “The circumstances
demonstrated are changing but not changed. Mother is making good
progress, but at this point in the case, it is not sufficient to demonstrate
changed circumstances. Given the minor’s age, the parents’ inconsistent
visits and periods of not visiting at all, I find it is not in the minor’s best
interest to set the mother’s 388 [petition] for a full evidentiary hearing and
the 388 [petition] is denied.”2

2      Father also filed a section 388 petition which was summarily denied by
the juvenile court. On appeal, father does not challenge the denial of his
petition on its merits and instead only attacks the sufficiency of DCFS’s
inquiry under ICWA.
                                          6
      The juvenile court then conducted the section 366.26 hearing,
ultimately terminating parental rights for mother and father. Mother and
father timely appealed.

      1.    Legal Standards
      Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify, or set aside
any previous juvenile court order. (§ 388, subd. (a).) “To obtain an
evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, a parent must make a prima
facie showing that circumstances have changed since the prior court order,
and that the proposed change will be in the best interests of the child.
[Citations.]” (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) The parent
petitioning under section 388 has the burden of establishing both prongs by a
preponderance of the evidence. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)
      “To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must be
substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) A petition
that only shows changing—not changed—circumstances is insufficient to
require an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The petition should also explain “‘the reason the
change was not made before.’” (In re D.R. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1494,
1512.) The fact that the parent “makes relatively last-minute (albeit genuine)
changes” does not automatically tip the scale in the parent’s favor. (In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530 (Kimberly F.).)
      “It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of
circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of
the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]”
(Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) “When custody continues over
a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an

                                        7
increasingly important role.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464
(Angel B).) “After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s
interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer
paramount. [Citation.] Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of
the child for permanency and stability.” (Ibid.) “While the bond to the
caretaker cannot be dispositive . . . , our Supreme Court made it very clear in
Jasmon O. that the disruption of an existing psychological bond between
dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor
bearing on any section 388 motion.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p.
531, citing In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 408, 414–422.) For a parent
“to revive the reunification issue,” the parent must prove that circumstances
have changed such that reunification is in the child’s best interest. (In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
      “In determining whether [a § 388] petition makes the required showing,
the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.”
(In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.) A section 388 petition may not be
based on a parent’s conclusory assertions. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)
      “We normally review the grant or denial of a section 388 petition for an
abuse of discretion.” (In re Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) “A
court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court
exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851,
citing In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)

                                         8
      2.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Summarily
            Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition

      Angel B. is squarely on point. In that case, mother admitted to using
cocaine and amphetamines while pregnant. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th
at p. 459.) The infant child, Angel, was detained while in the hospital and
promptly placed in foster care with a potential adoptive family. (Ibid.)
Mother had a long history of drug abuse dating back to the age of 13. (Ibid.)
Mother had previously attempted rehabilitation for her substance abuse
issues “without permanent success.” (Ibid.)
      The mother was granted monitored visitation with Angel, but only
appeared for some of the scheduled visits and missed several court hearings.
(Angel B., 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.) After the court determined mother was
not to receive any reunification services, mother began to do better. “She
enrolled in a residential drug treatment program, consistently tested clean
for four months, completed various classes, and even obtained employment.”
(Ibid.) She also had regular visits with Angel. (Ibid.) She then filed a
petition under section 388 seeking either supervised custody of Angel or
reunification services. (Ibid.) Her petition included a declaration and letter
from mother, a letter from a family friend who had supervised mother’s visits
with Angel, and a letter from the residential drug rehabilitation program in
which mother was enrolled. (Id. at p. 461.) The juvenile court summarily
denied her section 388 petition without holding a hearing. (Id at p. 459.) The
Court of Appeal affirmed.
      The appellate court noted mother “had consistently tested clean for
drugs and alcohol” while in the rehabilitation program and had completed
parenting classes. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 461.) Mother was
also successfully participating in individual counseling and had been

                                       9
consistently visiting and bonding with Angel. (Ibid.) However, the court
found that, while mother “had completed the drug program, the time she had
been sober was very brief compared to her many years of drug addiction.”
(Id. at p. 463.) Ultimately, the court determined mother had not shown
modification would have been in Angel’s best interest. The court noted
mother “never actually parented Angel before her removal, and Angel was
immediately placed with an adoptive family.” (Id. at p. 465.) Instead, the
adoptive family “provided Angel with all the day-to-day, hour-by-hour care
needed by a helpless infant and then growing toddler.” (Ibid.) By
comparison, mother’s visits “add[ed] up to only a tiny fraction of the time
Angel has spent with the foster parents.” (Ibid.)
      The court recognized that mother was “doing well, in the sense that she
has remained sober, completed various classes, obtained employment, and
visited regularly with Angel.” (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 464–
465.) However, it held “such facts are not legally sufficient to require a
hearing on her section 388 petition” even if the court were to assume “that
this time her resolve is different, and that she will, in fact, be able to remain
sober.” (Id. at p. 465.) Other courts are in accord with the holding in Angel
B. (See, e.g., In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446 [participation in a
recovery program and clean drug tests did not satisfy burden under § 388
where mother had very little contact with the child, who was doing well and
bonded to the guardian]; In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 252
[mother’s participation in drug counseling and parenting classes was
insufficient to show “it would be the children’s best interest to continue
reunification services, to remove them from their comfortable and secure
placement to live with mother who has a long history of drug addiction”]; In

                                        10
re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [seven months of sobriety since
relapse, while commendable, did not satisfy father’s burden under § 388].)
      The same result follows here. Mother’s recent interest in parenting
W.C. is laudable but falls short of requiring an evidentiary hearing on her
section 388 petition.
      Mother presented evidence that she had begun changing her
circumstances, not that they had fully changed. The unauthenticated
exhibits attached to her petition showed she had started a residential
treatment program and enrolled in mental health services. However, it did
not show that she completed the program or actually participated in any
mental health services. It also showed she only attended half of the
parenting classes offered by Helpline Youth Counseling. This evidence—even
when coupled with three months of clean drug testing and regular visits with
W.C.—shows she was at the early stages of her recovery. We note this is not
the first time mother has entered a treatment program. She previously
completed a drug treatment program in 2019, only to relapse and resume
using drugs in 2021. That mother remained sober in the three months
leading up to her petition is praiseworthy but does not establish that her long
history of drug addiction can now be considered fully resolved. As the trial
court found, her circumstances were in the process of changing but had not
yet changed. This alone establishes the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing.
      Mother also made no real showing that the proposed change would be
in W.C.’s best interest. She argues reunification would be in W.C.’s best
interest because it would reunify him with his mother. This is true of any
section 388 petition seeking reunification with a child. Mother cites no
authority that the reunification of a parent and child is automatically deemed

                                      11
to be in the child’s best interest. Indeed, this argument misapprehends the
focus of the court’s inquiry in determining the child’s best interest at this
stage of proceedings. As set forth above, after the termination of
reunification services, the child’s needs for stability and permanency take
center stage above the parent’s interest in reunification. As with the child in
Angel B., W.C. has been residing with the guardian effectively from birth.
Mother has not shown that the delay of W.C.’s placement in a permanent and
stable environment while mother continues to work on her self-improvement
would serve his best interests. (See In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
247, 260 [“The petition made no showing of how the minors’ best interests
would be served by depriving them of a permanent, stable home in exchange
for an uncertain future”].)
      On this record, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
summarily denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing.

    B. ICWA Compliance
      Mother and father contend DCFS and the juvenile court failed to
inquire of extended family members as to whether W.C. is an Indian3 child
under ICWA. DCFS concedes that it did not sufficiently inquire as to
mother’s family but argues its inquiry as to father’s family was sufficient.
We agree with DCFS.
      Congress enacted ICWA “to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian

3     “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for
consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native
American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                       12
children from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re
Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) “ICWA
recognizes that ‘“the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from
. . . the interest of the parents.”’” (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 247, 253.) Under state law, the juvenile court and DCFS have
“an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a
petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.”4 (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9,
11–12.) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child ‘can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the
duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.)
      The duty of initial inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse
or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b).) “Extended family members” include persons defined by law or custom of
the Indian child’s tribe, or in the absence of law or custom, adults who are the
child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-
in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd.
(c); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)

4      An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
                                        13
      1.    Maternal Family ICWA Inquiry
      Mother initially denied any Native American ancestry. In April 2022,
DCFS contacted two maternal great-aunts, both of whom indicated mother
did not have any Native American ancestry. Several months later, mother
told DCFS that she believed she had Cherokee ancestry through her
maternal grandfather. Mother said she did not know if anyone had
registered with a tribe. DCFS contacted both maternal great-aunts again to
attempt to corroborate mother’s claim of Cherokee ancestry. One great-aunt
again denied Native American ancestry, and the other, Yvonne C., claimed
ancestry through mother’s maternal grandfather, stating “We do [have
Native American ancestry] from New Mexico, but since dad passed, we can’t
remember [the] name.” Yvonne C. also stated she was not aware of anyone
else DCFS could contact for additional information.
      In January 2023, DCFS interviewed the maternal grandmother. She
indicated that her father—the maternal great-grandfather—had Native
American heritage with the Apache tribe. She indicated he had passed away
in 2020 and was not enrolled with the tribe and did not have an enrollment
number with any tribe. DCFS later attempted to contact maternal great-
grandmother again to obtain additional information as to the identity of her
father. DCFS left a voicemail for the maternal great-grandmother but did
not receive a response.
      Several months later, DCFS contacted maternal great-aunt Yvonne C.
again. At this time, Yvonne C. claimed the family had ancestry “with the
Apache and Mescal tribes from New Mexico,” though she said no family
members were registered with any tribe.5 In an April 2023 status report,

5    This reference to the “Mescal” tribe was presumably meant to refer to
the Mescalero Apache tribe.
                                     14
DCFS indicated it was in the process of sending questionnaires to the
maternal grandmother and great-aunt “to obtain a clearer picture of their
family background.”
      The record before us does not indicate whether these questionnaires
were ever sent, or whether DCFS made any further inquiry of potential
Native American ancestry through any Cherokee or Apache tribes, including
the Mescalero Apache tribe. DCFS concedes it erred in not making further
inquiry into potential Native American ancestry through mother’s family.
      We agree further inquiry of mother’s family was warranted here and
conclude that DCFS’s failure to adequately discharge its duty of initial
inquiry can be addressed by a conditional affirmance of the juvenile court’s
orders with directions to require DCFS to fulfill its duty. (See In re Baby Girl
M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 639, fn. 2 [“We see no need to order any ICWA
findings vacated because ICWA-related obligations are continuing duties;
that means earlier ICWA-related findings are subject to change and no order
vacating an earlier finding is necessary here”]; In re A.C. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1018 [same].)
      On remand, DCFS shall conduct a further inquiry of mother’s extended
family, as well as with the Cherokee and Apache tribes.

      2.    Paternal Family ICWA Inquiry
      Father initially denied any Native American ancestry. In April 2022,
DCFS contacted two paternal aunts who both indicated father did not have
any Native American ancestry. DCFS contacted both paternal aunts again in
September 2022 to conduct a further ICWA inquiry. Paternal aunt Michele
R. said she was unsure if father has any Native American ancestry. Paternal
aunt Jessica R. told DCFS that the father’s side of the family is of “mixed”

                                       15
heritage and stated she was “not 100% [sure] what we are.” Neither aunt
was aware of any family members registered to a tribe.
      DCFS also contacted a third paternal aunt, Peggy F., who indicated
there “may” be Native American ancestry in the family, saying Michele R. did
a DNA test and may have more information. When DCFS asked if there was
anyone they could contact for more details, Peggy F. identified “aunt Joyce.”
Peggy F. attempted to contact Joyce by text message on behalf of DCFS but
did not receive a response.
      In a subsequent interview in March 2023, Michele R. stated she had no
further updates and said the family did not have Native American heritage.
      Father argues DCFS failed to comply with ICWA inquiry requirements
in not making further efforts to contact paternal great-aunt Joyce. We
disagree. Father mischaracterizes the record, claiming it shows that Joyce
“was disclosed as likely having . . . information on [father’s Native American]
ancestry.” No such statement appears in the record. Instead, the record
indicates paternal aunt Peggy F. told DCFS that “maybe our aunt Joyce
would know” about potential ancestry. Peggy F. did not state she believed
there was ancestry in the family or that W.C. was likely to have Native
American heritage, rather she said only that she thought W.C. “may” have
such lineage.
      We find DCFS’s inquiry as to father’s family satisfied the ICWA
requirements. DCFS “must inquire as to possible Indian ancestry and act on
any information it receives, but it has no duty to conduct an extensive
independent investigation for information.” (In re C.Y. (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 34, 41; In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413
[“the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or
refute [Indian] ancestry”]; In re Levi U., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 199,

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superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re B.E. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 932, 940 [DCFS is not required to conduct an extensive
independent investigation or to “cast about” for investigative leads].) “While
we believe it reasonable in many cases to require DCFS to follow up on leads
provided by parents, we cannot ask the agency to intuit the names of
unidentified family members or to interview individuals for whom no contact
information has been provided.” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068,
1082.)
      Here, DCFS made efforts to contact the paternal great-aunt Joyce
regarding potential Native American ancestry and Joyce did not respond.
This effort was made through relative Peggy F. The record before us on
appeal does not suggest Peggy F., father, or any other family member ever
provided DCFS with contact information for Joyce to conduct a further
inquiry. DCFS was not required to make repeated attempts to contact the
paternal great-aunt after she failed to respond to the initial inquiry.
                                        //
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                               DISPOSITION
      The order terminating parents’ parental rights and denying their
section 388 petitions is conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with
instructions to DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct any necessary ICWA
inquiry into mother’s family as soon as practicable. This inquiry shall
include compliance with ICWA’s notice requirements. If the inquiry and
notice do not reveal evidence of Native American heritage through mother’s
family, the order terminating parents’ parental rights shall stand.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           ZUKIN, J.

      WE CONCUR:

      COLLINS, Acting P. J.

      MORI, J.

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