Court Opinion

ID: 9449439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:12:11.320172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:50.175036
License: Public Domain

MARSHALL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Disagreement with my brothers goes to the result reached. The remand ordered by the majority is for the purpose of determining “the authenticity of the questioned stenographic transcript.”1 The questioned transcript was introduced by the State, which rested its case upon it. If it is sufficient to support appellant’s claim, it justifies granting his prayer that he “be discharged from custody.” Certainly the State is not entitled to a new hearing as to the authenticity of a transcript which it itself introduced. Appellant’s challenge to the validity of the transcript was a plea for alternative relief, if the transcript was insufficient. Therefore, the controlling question is whether or not “the cold transcript” is sufficient to support appellant’s claim. In my view it clearly is.
The opinion of Judge KAUFMAN holds that the transcript of the proceedings in chambers does not provide grounds for invalidating the plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree because the trial judge did no more than explain to the defendant the realities of the situation in which he faced a choice between pleading guilty to the lesser offense or standing trial for robbery in the first degree. Of the cases cited in that opinion, only one involved any participation by the trial judge. The opinion in Futterman v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 202 F.2d 185, 186 (1952) mentions that appellants were advised by their attorneys “as well as by the court concerning the charges against them.” The other eases involved alleged bad advice by defense counsel, and/or promises or threats by prosecuting attorneys or government agents. None comes even close to this case. Here appellant’s attorney not only carefully advised him of all the possibilities but also urged him to take the lesser plea. Appellant consistently refused and insisted on going to trial. This was the situation when the case was called. Shortly thereafter, appellant agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense. What intervened in the meantime? The conference held in chambers at the request of the judge was the only intervening event.
We are not here concerned with allegations that the defendant was given bad advice by his own attorney or was made promises by the prosecuting attorney. The former are usually considered inadequate to raise a due process question because “[i]f that were sufficient to show that his plea was not intelligently made few, if any, convictions and sentences on pleas of guilty would be valid.” Monroe v. Huff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 145 F.2d 249 (1944). The latter are usually considered inadequate “for the defendant must be supposed to know, if he is experienced, or to be advised, if he has counsel, that such a promise is in no way binding upon the court and ought not to affect the prisoner’s judgment in pleading.” United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 712 (2 Cir., 1960). Cf. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5 Cir.), rev’d en banc, 246 F.2d 571 (1957), rev’d on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958). See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Our concept of due process must draw a distinct line between, on the one hand, advice from and “bargaining” between defense and prosecuting attorneys and, on the other hand, discussions by judges who are ultimately to determine the length of sentence to be imposed. This is especially true when, as here, the conference in chambers is or*320dered by the judge himself without any apparent request by either defendant or prosecutor.
The safeguard of procedural due process remains adequate only so long as it is “inexorable.” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73, 56 S.C. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). A plea of guilty in lieu of a full trial with all of the due process safeguards is itself protected by the Due Process Clause and by federal and state statutes. On the question of the ability of the defendant to enter a guilty plea without the assistance of counsel, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 729, 68 S.Ct. 316, 325-326, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948), clearly set forth the basic due process requirements:
“There must be both the capacity to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible. If the choice is beclouded, whether by duress or by misleading advice, however honestly offered by a member of the prosecution, a plea of guilty accepted without more than what this record discloses can hardly be called a refusal to put the inner feeling of innocence to the fair test of the law with intelligent awareness of consequences.”
In order to apply these principles to the present case, it is necessary to have .an understanding of the tone which the trial judge set at the proceedings which he held in his chambers:
“The Court: Let the record show there is no jury here. It is in chambers.
“They tell me that this boy was caught by an off-duty policeman. He has a long record.
“Mr. George [defendant’s attorney] : That’s right.
“The Court: Do you realize what is happening? Do you realize the .sentence you might have to face as a second offender in a first-degree robbery? That is one of the reasons I am talking to you now. I do not like to give long, long sentences.
“Mr. George: I have advised him, Judge.
“The Defendant: Yes, sir.
“Mr. George: 15 and 16 years as a first—
“The Court: I advise you to think it over. If you are convicted, I might have to send you away for the rest of your life.
“As I see it, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not too good. Of course, if you want a trial, you will certainly get a fair trial. But you must remember this: If you are convicted as a second offender of robbery in the first degree, you will be entitled to no consideration of any kind from me.”
The conclusion of the proceeding is equally illuminating:
“The Court: If there is a conviction of robbery in the first degree, then there can be no consideration.
“What do you want to do, son?
“The Defendant: I will take it.
“Mr. George: We will accept the plea.
“The Court: Son, if this is what you want to do, when we return to the courtroom and I question you concerning your plea, you must answer categorically. That means, when I ask you if you plead guilty, you must say yes.
“The Defendant: Yes.”
In a long line of cases from Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) to Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. p. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, the Supreme Court has expressly and repeatedly declared that the innocence or guilt of the accused is irrelevant to the determination of whether or not a conviction squares with the requirements of due process.
“Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due Proc*321ess Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 81 S.Ct. 735, 739-740, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961).
It is likewise clear that a conviction on a coerced plea of guilty is no more consistent with due process than a conviction supported by a coerced confession. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104, 62 S. Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942). For, the “aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 289-290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).2
In this case the trial judge qua judge told the appellant that he had “a long record.” “As I see it, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not too good.” 3 “The District Attorney has told me that, in his opinion, he has many witnesses who can prove his case.” “Considering your record and the case, only you can decide whether you wish to go to trial in the indictment of robbery in the first degree before a jury. As I said, if the District Attorney proves the case as he has outlined, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not good.”
Against this background of judicial pre-judgment, see United States v. Campbell, 316 F.2d 7, 9 (4 Cir., 1963), the trial judge made it clear that upon conviction of robbery in the first degree appellant would “be entitled to no consideration of any kind from me” and “[i]f I sentence you after a conviction of robbery in the first degree, you are going to be away until you are an old man.” At the same time the trial judge advised the appellant, “On the other hand, a very, very fair plea is being offered by the District Attorney” and promised, “I make no promises as to your sentence, but I will give you every consideration if you are truthful and there is an indication that you want to start a new life for yourself.” In order that the full purport of the proceedings in chambers may be grasped, the entire transcript of the proceedings is attached hereto as an appendix.
New York law requires that a plea of guilty “can only be put in by the defendant himself in open court.” N.Y.Code of Crim.Proc. § 335. At the conclusion of the proceedings in chambers the trial judge said, “Son, if this is what you want to do, when we return to the courtroom and I question you concerning your plea, you must answer categorically. That means, when I ask you if you plead guilty, you must say yes.” This direction foreclosed the usual open court investigation as to the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. The resulting formal answers which the defendant then gave to the questions which he was asked in open court thus provide little if any support to the argument that his plea was not coerced. See Haley, v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948) and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. p. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336.
Judge KAUFMAN’s opinion accurately states the basic rule that if a plea of guilty was the product of coercion, either mental or physical, or was unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence, the judgment which rests upon it is void and is subject to attack by habeas corpus. As one of the controlling cases states, “Fundamental *322standards of procedure in criminal cases require that a plea of guilty to the charge or charges contained in an indictment or information be entered freely, voluntarily, and without any semblance of coercion.” Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294-295 (10 Cir., 1957) (emphasis added). In Euziere a lower court order denying a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction was reversed because the trial judge accepted a plea of guilty by a defendant after he had threatened to give the defendant the maximum sentence if he did not plead guilty because he would have “put the government to the expense of a trial when [he was] guilty.” 249 F.2d at 294. The Court of Appeals concluded, “We think it is clear that the statements made by the trial court were reasonably calculated to influence the defendants to the point of coercion into entering their pleas of guilty.” Id. at 295.
In United States v. Tateo, 214 F.Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y.1963) a judgment of conviction based upon a guilty plea was vacated because the trial judge, during a trial for bank robbery and kidnapping, threatened to impose a life sentence and other sentences to run consecutively if the defendant insisted upon continuing the trial to conclusion and was found guilty. The opinion of Judge Weinfeld, 214 F.Supp. at 564, 566-567, accurately restates the applicable law:
“To further confine the issue, some preliminary observations are in order. The defendant’s guilt or innocence is not in issue on this motion. And neither the passage of time nor the absence of any showing that in the event of a new trial a different result is likely requires the denial of the defendant’s motion. Moreover, the fact that the defendant in open court at the time of the entry of the plea stated that it was not coerced, while evidential on the issue, does not foreclose inquiry as to its voluntariness.
******
“We are not here concerned with a situation much'debated among the Courts of Appeals, in which some statement, activity, promise or threat of the prosecution has allegedly vitiated the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. Nor is this a situation where a defendant and his lawyer accept the realities of fact as developed during the progress of a trial, recognize the force of the Government’s case, consult with one another and then the defendant makes a deliberate and measured choice. In such circumstances a defendant and his attorney act upon their appraisal of the evidence and the defendant makes his choice accordingly. Whatever his decision, whether to plead guilty or to continue with the trial, if found guilty the prospective sentence is an unknown quantity yet to be determined by the Trial Judge after an evaluation of all significant factors which normally are considered before sentence is imposed. In the instant case there is an added and distinguishing fact —the Court’s announcement during the trial and in advance of a verdict of what sentence he would impose in the event of conviction.”
In the instant case the trial judge by his statement in chambers added the element of compulsion which necessarily took from the defendant’s subsequent guilty plea the voluntariness which our concept of due process requires that he possess. Whether these statements were made with or without the gestures alleged by appellant is immaterial.
I would therefore reverse and order the writ to issue.
APPENDIX TO DISSENTING OPINION
Clerk of Court: People against Thomas McGrath; Salvatore M. George, counsel.
The Court: Good morning.
(The defendant was brought before the Court.)
*323Mr. Di Paola: People are ready.
Counsel is discussing the matter.
Mr. George: Defendant is ready, Judge.
The Court: Ready for trial. Do you realize what is happening ?
Mr. George: I just finished explaining it to him, Judge. I believe, Judge — -
The Court: You believe what? Come up here and tell me.
(Whereupon, there was an off-the-record discussion at the bench between the Court and Mr. George out of the hearing of the court reporter.)
The Court: Bring the defendant into chambers.
(Whereupon, the following ensued in chambers:)
The Court: Let the record show there is no jury here. It is in chambers.
They tell me that this boy was caught by an off-duty policeman. He has a long record.
Mr. George: That’s right.
The Court: Do you realize what is happening? Do you realize the sentence you might have to face as a second offender in a first-degree robbery? That is one of the reasons I am talking to you now. I do not like to give long, long sentences.
Mr. George: I have advised him, Judge.
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. George: 15 and 16 years as a first—
The Court: I advise you to think it over. If you are convicted, I might have to send you away for the rest of your life.
As I see it, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not too good. Of course, if you want a trial, you will certainly get a fair trial. But you must remember this: If you are convicted as a second offender of robbery in the first degree, you will be entitled to no consideration of any kind from me.
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: On the other hand, a very, very fair plea is being offered by the District Attorney. He is willing to give you that plea if you go downstairs and tell the whole truth.
I make you no promises as to your sentence, but I will give you every consideration if you are truthful and there is an indication that you want to start a new life for yourself. Do you understand me?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: You have to make up your mind, son, now. Once you are before the jury, you will be tried as indicted.
You have a very able counsel here, one of the best. I am not telling you what you should do or what you should not do. I am merely pointing out to you what you face.
The Defendant: Could you give me a chance to make up my mind ?
The Court: I certainly will give you a chance to make up your mind, but this case is ready today, son. Both the District Attorney and your own lawyer have answered ready, and we are ready to proceed to trial today.
First of all, you have to make up your mind, asking yourself, “Did I do what is alleged in the indictment?” You and God know the answer to that question. The District Attorney has told me that, in his opinion, he has many witnesses who can prove his case. You, yourself, know whether you did it or not.
We are in chambers. There is no jury here. I repeat that you will receive a fair trial.
The decision is yours. You know whether or not you did what is claimed you did do. Considering your record and the case, only you can decide whether you wish to go to trial on the indictment of robbery in the first degree before a jury.
As I said, if the District Attorney proves the case as he has outlined, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not good. Or do you want to take a plea to *324robbery in the second degree and have some opportunity of receiving a shorter sentence ? If I sentence you after a conviction of robbery in the first degree, you are going to be away until you are an old man. But I emphasize that I am not telling you what to do, son.
Are you married?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: After considering your case very carefully, I find this is your chance to serve a shorter term. If you choose the other course and are convicted, you are going to be away for a long time. You know you are a second offender. But I reiterate that I am not telling you what to do.
Mr. George, I do not like to see a boy who is offered a plea such as this—
Mr. George: Judge, I have worked before your Honor on many occasions. I have been out here and I know the fairness of the Court.
The Court: This boy has been a bad boy. There is no question about that. From what I have heard about this ease, this is a very serious crime. The defendant must consider that in relation to his chances which are—
Mr. George: I know he hasn’t any, Judge.
The Court: If he is convicted, I am faced with a mandatory first-degree robbery as a second offender.
Mr. George: Your hands are tied. Your hands are tied at 15.
The Court: If there is a conviction of robbery in the first degree, then there can be no consideration.
What do you want to do, son?
The Defendant: I will take it.
Mr. George: We will accept the plea.
The Court: Son, if this is what you want to do, when we return to the courtroom and I question you concerning your plea, you must answer categorically. That means, when I ask you if you plead guilty, you must say yes.
The Defendant: Yes.

. See the opinion of Judge IOrafman, supra, 319 F.2d at 311.

. See Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 671 (9 Cir., 1963).

. There is nothing in the record to show how or where the judge obtained this information before the trial. Regardless of this, the appellant was given the impression that the judge who was to try the case was already convinced that he would be convicted of first degree robbery.