Court Opinion

ID: 3271589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 16:40:06.138395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:33.425469
License: Public Domain

I think the majority opinion has impaired the authority of the cases which it cites and has left the Stock Law in unnecessary confusion. I therefore dissent.
Who can say, in view of the majority opinion, what the present status is of the stock districts organized under the amendments of the act of 1915 (321-332, Crawford Moses' Digest)? These are: Acts 1927, page 686; Acts 1929, pages 507 and 991; Acts 1931, pages 130 and 272.
What is the present status of districts organized under act 205 of the Acts of 1927, page 686? This act amends 321, Crawford  Moses' Digest, to read that "When ten per cent. of the qualified electors of any county in the State of Arkansas * * * shall petition the county court for the privilege to vote on the question of restraining horses, etc., * * * from running at large within any county, the county court in which such petition is duly filed shall make an order for such election to be held at any general or special election of the county or State officers." The statute which this act amended required the petition of 25 Per cent. of the electors.
The majority say the case of Gregory v. Cockrell,179 Ark. 719, 18 S.W.2d 362, has no application, because the effect of that case was to place Ashley County under the general Stock Law. What general law if not the act of 1915?
Two statutes appear in the Digest where general laws are found upon the subject of the organization of *Page 1079 
stock districts. The first is the act of 1883, which appears as 305-320, Crawford  Moses' Digest. Under this act districts are created by petition. The second act is that of 1915 (321-332, Crawford  Moses' Digest), under which such districts are created by election.
The act of 1883 is more local in its nature than the act of 1915. By its express terms it applies only to "* * * any county bordering upon a navigable stream and having territory in cultivation subject to overflow, or subdivision of a county consisting of not less than thirty-six square miles where said subdivision borders upon a navigable stream and contains territory in cultivation subject to overflow * * *."
In the case of Gregory v. Cockrell, supra, that portion of a local act (special act 42, Acts 1929, page 80) was held repealed which applied to Ashley County. Prior to the repeal of this act that portion of Ashley County affected by it was not governed by either the act of 1883 or the act of 1915. It was governed by the local act of which it was a part.
The act of 1915 was introduced in the General Assembly as a general law, but before its final passage it was amended so that its provisions did not apply to twenty-two counties, which were exempted from its operation. But for this exemption of certain counties, it would have been a general law. If the section exempting those counties were repealed, it would be a general law. Had this law, when it was passed, exempted only Monroe County, can it be doubted that the law could be made general by striking out that exempted county? It would thereafter apply to the whole State? And if it could be repealed as to one county, why not as to more than one?
Under the Constitutional Amendment of 1926, local laws cannot be passed, but they may be repealed, and, if they may be repealed altogether, why not in part? Uniformity is promoted, and this is one of the prime purposes of the amendment. If all the exempted counties were taken from the exemption clause, which makes the *Page 1080 
act local, we would then have a general law uniform throughout the State, and it appears to me that there is no question about the power of the Legislature to accomplish this result, under the Cockrell case, supra. The practical and correct construction of this amendment, as applied to the act of 1915, is just this: The Legislature is without power to add the name of any county to this exemption clause which makes the act local. It has the power to repeal or strike out the name of any county appearing in the exemption clause, because that action tends to make the act general, and if all counties were stricken from the exemption clause it would then be a general law applying to the entire State.
In the case of Gregory v. Cockrell, supra, an act was construed which originally applied to all of Chicot County and a portion of Ashley County. That act was, of course, local. It was amended by act 42, Acts 1929, by striking out the portion of Ashley County included in the original act. Special Act 42, which accomplished this purpose, was held valid as a repeal in part of a local law. It was held that the power to repeal wholly conferred the power to repeal in part, and I think that principle is applicable here.
It may be asked, what law now applies to that portion of Ashley County taken out of the operation of the special act 42, there repealed in part? It occurs to me that the answer to this question is that the act of 1915 applies, and that the act of 1883 would also apply to such of its territory as bordered a navigable stream and was subject to overflow, if there is such territory. If neither of those acts is applicable, I know of no legislation that does apply to the portion of Ashley County formerly included within the special act which the majority held in the Cockrell case had been repealed by a valid local act.
Ashley County was not included in the exemption section of the act of 1915, but that act did not apply to the whole of that county, because a portion of the county was included in the special act. Now, when this special *Page 1081 
act, applying only to a portion of Ashley County, was repealed, why does not the act of 1915 then apply to the whole of that county? In a sense this would be an amendment of that act, but it is an amendment which results from the repeal of the special act 42 in part, a thing which the Cockrell case held the General Assembly had the power to do.
The obvious and the expressed purpose of act 99 of the Acts of 1929 was to repeal that portion of the exemption section which made the act local in so far as it applied to Monroe County, thereby placing that county with the majority of the other counties under the provisions of that portion of the act of 1915 which would be a general law if there were no exemptions.
I think the General Assembly has the express power to repeal this exemption clause in whole or in part. Counties in the exemption clause may be taken out, but others cannot be added, and this is true because repeal to any extent is authorized by the amendment. Taking counties out of the exemption clause would be a partial repeal, and they may therefore be taken out. Adding counties would not be a repeal, and they may not therefore be added.
It is, therefore, my opinion, in which, Mr. Justice HUMPHREYS concurs, that Monroe County has been placed under the operation of the act of 1915, this result being accomplished by the repeal of that portion of the exemption clause which excluded that county from its operation. The judgment of the court below should therefore, in our opinion, be reversed, and we therefore dissent. *Page 1082