Court Opinion

ID: 9810052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:45.370239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:20.882536
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOBBS,
dissenting.
11 54 This case presents the first opportunity for this court to define the contours of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act's "natural condition of unimproved property" ex- - ception to the recreation area waiver. In light of our duty to narrowly construe grants of immunity and broadly construe waivers of immunity, I conclude that the natural condition of unimproved property exception in seetion 24-10-106(1)(e), C.R.S. (2014), does not apply in this ease. The plurality and coneur-rence, in my view, incorrectly invoke this exception. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
{55 The plain language of the CGIA shields the government from liability for injuries "caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property." $ 24-10-106(1)(e). If there had not been an improved campsite under the cottonwood tree branch that in-Jjured Burnett, the branch would have been a natural condition of unimproved property. But onee the State built the improved campsite in that location, that branch was no longer a natural condition of unimproved property, and thus the exception does not apply. Under these facts, the State's location of the campsite and, in particular, the tent pad under the cottonwood branches, gives rise to a claim of liability for a dangerous condition of a public facility that the natural condition of unimproved property exception does not excuse.
I.
A. Standard of Review
156 The plurality recites our mandate to narrowly construe the CGIA's immunity provisions in the interest of compensating vie-tims of governmental negligence but then proceeds to pay this rule of construction no heed. Because the legislature enacted the CGIA in derogation of common law, we narrowly construe its immunity provisions and, as a logical corollary, broadly construe its waiver provisions. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 13, 327 P.3d 891, 895; St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, ¶ 12, 325 P.3d 1014, 1019; Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist., 2014 CO 32, ¶ 13, 325 P.3d 571, 576. We must interpret section 24-10-106(1)(e)'s immunity waiver and natural condition exception according to these principles. >
B. Statutory Language
157 Contrary to the plurality opinion, which rests upon ambiguous and inconclusive legislative history, we should base our decision in this case on the plain language of the statute. Section 24-10-106(1)(e) contains both a waiver of immunity and an exception to that waiver: tos
Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in am action for injuries resulting from ... [a] dangerous condition of any public hospital, jail, public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. Nothing in this paragraph .. shall be construed to prevent a public entity from asserting sovereign immunity for an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property, whether or not such property is located in a park or recreation area ....
(Emphasis added.)
158 The exception the plurality and concurrence invoke to shield the State from liability in this case plainly applies to injuries "caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property." § 24-10-106(1)(e). Invocation of this exception ignores the stipulated facts before us. The parties agreed that Burnett's improved campsite was a "public facility" within the meaning of the CGIA's recreation area waiver. Among other improvements, the campsite contained electric, water, and sewer connections; a concrete parking pad; a level dirt tent pad; a picnic table; and a fire pit. If the State had not *1016built an improved campsite under the branch that crashed upon Burnett's tent, the branch would have been a natural condition of unimproved property. But onee. the State built the improved campsite, that branch was no longer a natural condition of «unimproved property; it became a natural condition of improved property, and thus the exception does not apply.
T59 Under these facts, the plurality and concurrence improperly truncate Burnett's opportunity to establish her claim. Burnett should be allowed to prove that the tree branches overhanging her campsite constituted a dangerous condition of a public facility. See, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561, 566 (Colo.2002) ("[Alreas immediately surrounding a facility often affect the overall condition of the facility."). By installing the campsite improvements, the State also assumed the responsibility of keeping those improvements safe from dangerous conditions. The State built the improved campsite for the purpose of overnight camping, and it must maintain the site to ensure it is suitable for that use.1
160 By determining that a "natural condition of any unimproved property" includes "native trees originating on unimproved property," plur. op. 36, the plurality and concurrence separate the trunk of a tree from its roots and branches, as they separate the General Assembly's intent from its moorings. Where a falling tree branch injures someone using a public facility, the location of that tree's trumk should not control the outcome. A tree originates from its roots. If the facts of a particular case show that a tree's root structure lies beneath an improved campsite, shouldn't that establish-under the plurality and concurring opinions' own reasoning-that the tree "originates" on improved property, and therefore take it out of the ambit of the natural condition exception?
{61 We should respect the balance the General Assembly struck between providing access to public land and protecting the public fise by finding a waiver of immunity in this case. See plur. op. 134; see also § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2014) ("Declaration of policy"). Exposing the State to liability here would not lead to excessive liability. Under the waiver of immunity, the government is only responsible for reasonable risk management of dangerous conditions of public facilities, whether or not those dangerous conditions arise from natural objects like trees. The natural condition exception shields the State from liability for injuries caused by the natural conditions of unimproved property, such as Colorado's numerous park and back-country trails and unimproved camping areas. But that exception does not operate where the State builds an improved public camping facility like the one Burnett was properly using when she was severely injured. Moreover, the statutory definition of "dangerous condition" sufficiently limits the government's role as a guarantor of public safety to those instances when it knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, that a physical condition of a public facility constituted an unreasonable risk to public safety. See § 24-10-108(1.3), C.R.S. (2014).
C. The Legislative Council Report Is Not Dispositive
T 62 The plurality's reliance on the Report is misplaced. See plur. op. 1120-86. We previously declined to use the Report to decipher legislative intent. See St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., ¶ 17, 325 P.3d at 1020 & n.7 (noting that there is no "pertinent legislative history" to illuminate the meaning of "public facility" as used in the CGIA because the Report contains no clear evidence of the legislature's intended meaning of that term). In any event, the plurality's use of the Re*1017port is not dispositive with regard to the interpretation of the natural condition exception.
€63 The plurality points to language in the Report suggesting that the application of the exception turns on (1) whether the injury was caused by a man-made or natural dangerous condition and (2) the mechanism, rather than the location, of the injury. See plur. op. 1125-27. Notably, however, the Report also explains that the policy underlying the natural condition exception was intended to shift the risk of injury to individuals only when they were actually using unimproved property. See Report at xxi-xxii. Because allowing people to enjoy public property in its natural state is desirable, "it is not unreasonable to expect persons who voluntarily use unimproved property in its natural condition to assume the risk of injuries arising therefrom." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the plurality seems to acknowledge this aspect in its statement that "[the General Assembly intended to encourage governmental entities to open primitive, government-owned property to the public by limiting the entities exposure to lability from individuals who choose to use the property." Plur. op. 185.
T64 In sum, the legislative history the plurality cites is inconclusive and not a reliable guide to this case. The plurality claims that this legislative history is "particularly instructive because it speaks to the specific cireumstances of this case." Id. at ¶ 23 n.4. But it is clear the legislature never envisioned the peculiar cireumstances the plurality and concurrence rely on here-where a tree's trunk is located outside an improved campsite but its branches overhang, the campsite. Certainly, recognizing a waiver of immunity in this case would not thwart the policy of encouraging the public to use unimproved recreational property at its own risk.
1 65 This is not a case where the plaintiff was injured while she was voluntarily using unimproved property in its natural condition. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to expect Burnett to assume the risk of the injury that occurred here, under the facts of the complaint. Campers who pay to use campsites in state parks like Cherry Creek State Park expect the sites to be improved with basic features and free of the risks inherent to unimproved property. Here, the State's decision to build an improved campsite at this location, amid a grove of trees, created the risk that a camper using the site could be struck by an overhanging tree branch-and that risk required management by the public entity in charge.2 Cf. Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258, 566 A.2d 515, 521 (1989) ("Public property is no longer 'unimproved' when there has been substantial physical modification of the property from its natural state, and when the physical change creates hazards that did not previously exist and that require management by the public entity."). The plurality and concurrence improperly shifted the risk of injury onto an individual using improved recreational property, contrary to the General Assembly's intent.
D. Other Authorities Distinguishable
" 66 The plurality and concurrence erroneously rely on cases from other jurisdictions that invert Colorado's well-established CGIA interpretation guidelines. See plur. op. TT 29-30; cone. op. 1 4. Unlike Colorado, California's governmental immunity statute "was designed to continue and extend the prior limited immunity, and therefore the Legislature did not intend a narrow construction" of its natural condition exception. See Meddock v. Cnty. of Yolo, 220 Cal.App.4h 170, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 796, 803 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Redinger v. Clapper's Tree Service Inc., 419 Pa.Super. 487, 615 A.2d 743, 747 (1992), involved a Pennsylvania recreational immunity statute that courts have interpreted to provide broad immunity to owners of "largely unimproved" land. However, because the General Assembly enacted the CGIA in derogation of common law, we must narrowly construe grants of immunity in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence. Therefore, although factually similar, the Meddock and Redinger decisions provide no authorita*1018tive guidance in interpreting Colorado's governmental immunity statute.3
T67 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the court of appeals and hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed Burnett's claim.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE RICE and JUSTICE MARQUEZ join in this dissent.

. Although the plurality suggests that section 24-10-106(1)(e) does not impose a maintenance duty, plur. op. 1 32 n.5, the statutory definition of "dangerous condition" explicitly establishes a duty to reasonably maintain a public facility:
"Dangerous condition" means ... a physical condition of a facility ... that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of a public entity ... taining such facility. in constructing or main-
§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. (2014) (emphasis added).

. For example, no facts suggest that an unforeseen lightning strike or extraordinary weather event caused the branch to crash onto the tent in which Burnett was sleeping.

. I do agree with the plurality that the Rosales test does not derive from the language of the statute, is contrary to this court's repeated instructions that the CGIA's immunity waivers are to be construed broadly in favor of compensating victims of governmental negligence, and must be overruled. See plur. op. T1 44-46.