Court Opinion

ID: 9605449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:36:51.218188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:27.893909
License: Public Domain

BLACKBURN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with Division 1 of the majority; however, I must respectfully dissent from Division 2 because there is a question of fact for jury determination as to whether Baxter was driving too fast for conditions and whether her conduct caused the accident.
The standard of review in this Court requires that if there is any evidence supporting the non-movant’s position or any question of fact concerning such evidence, the motion for directed verdict should be denied. “A motion for directed verdict should be granted only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands a particular verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50 (a). All evidence must be construed most favorably to the non-movant. Before the trial court can direct a verdict for the movant, he must find from the evidence that there is no evidence of any kind supporting the non-movant’s position.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) *669Quality Control Elec. v. Electronic Security Svcs. Co., 225 Ga. App. 671-672 (484 SE2d 696) (1997).
Decided September 16, 1998
Reconsideration denied October 7, 1998
Dozier & Sikes, Cheryl A. Sikes, for appellant.
Construing the evidence most favorably to Thomas, as the nonmovant, there was evidence presented which supported Thomas’ claims. Both Baxter and Horne testified that Baxter sped up prior to driving over a section of the road which contained several dips and irregularities. Baxter was driving more than 40 mph, but no more than 50 or 55 mph. Additionally, Baxter had driven over this section of road before and knew its condition. Baxter also testified that she thought the T-top came off when she hit one of the dips in the road. Horne testified that he and Baxter usually tried to avoid going over the dips in the road, but that on the night of the incident, Baxter sped up and went right over the dip, and that is when the T-top came off. Horne also testified that when the car went over the dip in the road, it bounced hard enough to jerk the car up and down. In his deposition, which was introduced for impeachment purposes, Horne testified that he had never gone over the dips in the road at that speed. Trooper Renew testified that based upon his conversation with Baxter and Horne, he determined that “the T-top [came] out of the vehicle and hit the windshield of the vehicle that was following them.” Baxter told Trooper Renew “[t]he T-top come out and hit the vehicle behind her.” Trooper Renew further testified that he believed Horne explained the accident by saying that the T-top was not fastened down properly. A jury could determine that Baxter was driving too fast for the condition of the road and that such conduct caused the T-top to come off.
“[Q]uestions of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury, and a court should not take the place of the jury in solving them, except in plain and indisputable cases. . . . [E]ven where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to say whether the conduct in question met the standard of the reasonable man.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cunningham v. Nat. Svc. Indus., 174 Ga. App. 832, 836 (331 SE2d 899) (1985). Whether Baxter drove too fast over the rough road, and whether the T-top came off as a result thereof and caused the incident is a jury question. The trial court erred in granting Baxter’s motion for directed verdict.
*670Newton, Smith, Durden, Kaufold & Rice, Wilson R. Smith, for appellee.