Court Opinion

ID: 9893346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 17:11:48.880542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:17.413150
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Campbell v. Campbell, 2023-Ohio-3896.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     SCIOTO COUNTY

MOLLIE CAMPBELL,                                  :

        Plaintiff-Appellant,                      :   CASE NO. 22CA3992

        v.                                        :

JOSHUA CAMPBELL,                                  :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellee.                       :

________________________________________________________________
                           APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant.

Joshua Campbell, pro se1.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:10-19-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas

Court, Domestic Relations Division, judgment that found Mollie

Campbell, plaintiff below and appellant herein, in contempt.

Appellant assigns three errors for review:

                FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                “THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND MOTHER IN
                CONTEMPT.”

                SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                “THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED THE

        1
      Appellee did not file a brief and did not participate in
this appeal.
                                                                     2
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           PARTIES’ PARENTING TIME SCHEDULE.”

           THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

           “THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ESTABLISHED CHILD
           SUPPORT AND FAILED TO FIND FATHER IN
           CONTEMPT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF SUPPORT.”

    {¶2}   This appeal arises from a contentious divorce

proceeding that the parties have litigated for over seven years.

The parties married in 2011 and are the parents of two children,

M.C. (DOB March 1, 2012) and K.C. (DOB September 21, 2013).     On

April 29, 2016, appellant filed a complaint for divorce against

appellee, Joshua Campbell.

    {¶3}   On May 11, 2016, pursuant to the parties’ agreement,

the trial court: (1) designated appellant the residential parent

for the minor children, (2) granted appellee parenting time on

alternating weekends and every Wednesday, (3) granted equal time

for holidays and two weeks for summer vacations, (4) designated

one child to each party as a dependent for tax purposes, (5)

ordered appellee to maintain medical insurance, and (6) ordered

appellee to pay appellant “pursuant to the agreement of the

parties and downward deviation in the amount of $800.00/month

plus 2% processing charges to the Scioto County Child Support

Enforcement Agency (CSEA) by wage withholding order effective

April 29, 2016.”   The trial court’s final decree incorporated,
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approved, and adopted the parties’ agreement.

    {¶4}   On February 10, 2017, appellee, through counsel, filed

a motion to modify the residential parent designation and a

motion for money judgment.   On April 19, 2017, appellee filed a

contempt motion for denial of visitation and another motion to

modify the residential parent designation.

    {¶5}   On June 27, 2017, the parties entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement that designated appellant the custodial

parent and established parenting time.   In addition, the

parties, inter alia, agreed to: (1) terminate child support on

September 1, 2017, (2) have appellee open a college savings

account and contribute $200 per month per child, and (3) have

appellee deposit $200 per month per child into a checking

account for the children’s benefit.   The trial court’s July 13,

2017 judgment recognized that the parties agreed to resolve all

matters and adopted the June 27, 2017 agreement.

    {¶6}   On March 26, 2020, appellant filed: (1) a motion to

modify the prior court order and alleged that appellee relocated

to Florida, failed to provide notice to her or to the court, and

visited the children sporadically, (2) a motion for contempt of

court and alleged that appellee failed to pay into the college

savings account and the checking account in violation of the
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July 13, 2017 order, and (3) a motion to modify child support.

      {¶7}   On May 1, 2020, appellee filed: (1) a pro se motion to

modify parental rights and responsibilities, (2) a proposed

shared parenting plan, (3) a motion for contempt for

interference with parenting time, (4) a motion to modify

parenting time, and (5) a motion to modify child support,

medical support, tax exemption and other child-related expenses.

On May 6, 2020, appellee filed another pro se motion for

contempt and alleged interference with parenting time.       On May

26, 2020, appellee filed another contempt motion and alleged

interference with parenting time.

      {¶8}   At the June 11, 2020 hearing, appellee appeared pro

se.   Because appellee failed to provide his witness list and

exhibits in a timely manner pursuant to both the Civil Rules and

Local Rules of Procedure, the court offered to either continue

the hearing to provide appellant and her counsel the opportunity

to review the exhibits, or to allow appellee to proceed without

referencing the exhibits.     Appellee chose to proceed.

      {¶9}   The trial court indicated that, because appellant’s

contempt motion jeopardized appellee’s liberty, appellee is

entitled to appointed counsel.     Consequently, the court

bifurcated the proceedings and only addressed appellant’s other
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March 26, 2020 motions to modify a prior court order, child

support, and appellee’s contempt motions.

    {¶10} Appellant testified that the July 13, 2017 order

established, inter alia, parenting time, and explained that in

the summers of 2017-2019 appellee exercised the week-on-week-off

summer schedule as per the agreement.     However, in January 2020

appellee relocated to Florida without notice.    Appellant argued

that the move necessitated a change in the parenting schedule

because appellee’s parenting time had been sporadic after his

relocation.    Appellant requested that appellee have the children

three non-consecutive weeks in the summer, follow local rules

for major holidays (but with 14-day notice appellee could visit

the children in Ohio), and appellee be responsible for travel

expenses.     Appellant further testified that appellee owes

$13,200 in the agreed payments and requested a conventional CSEA

child support order.

    {¶11} The trial court noted that none of appellee’s three

contempt motions (May 1, May 6, or May 26) listed specific

incidents or time frames.    Appellee attempted to cross-examine

appellant about the contempt motions, but did not reference the

specific motion or the specific dates that, he alleged,

appellant interfered with his visitation.    The court then issued
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a summer visitation schedule and continued other issues until

appellee retained counsel.

     {¶12} On July 9, 2020, the trial court entered an interim

order that states that at the June 11, 2020 hearing, appellant

presented her case-in-chief and rested.     When appellee requested

a continuance to seek counsel, the court granted the motion and

stated that the matter would begin at the point where the June

11, 2020 hearing ended.

     {¶13} At the September 3, 2020 hearing, the trial court

indicated that “when we adjourned the last time we were here

which was on the 6th of June of this year, Mollie Campbell had

just finished her case-in-chief * * * [and] we are at the point

for Mr. Campbell’s case to be presented.”    Appellee, now

represented, testified that he lived in Ohio at the time of the

divorce, but moved to Florida after a work-related injury and

because his new father-in-law offered appellee’s wife employment

in Florida.   Appellee earned $65,000 when he last worked in

2018, but had no income since then.   Because of his lack of

income, appellee explained he is in arrears in his payments.

However, appellee still provided insurance for the children

because his former employer granted a two-year grace period, to
                                                                     7
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expire on January 1, 2021.     Appellee requested appellant insure

the children after January 1, 2021, and, if not possible, the

parties equally divide health coverage costs.     Appellee

requested the court terminate the college account and the

checking account payments as requested in the previous order and

instead calculate traditional child support.     In addition,

appellee requested shared parenting.    Appellee also sought

additional time in the summer with the children and offered to

pay transportation costs.    Appellee testified that appellant

does not provide advance notice regarding medical situations and

does not permit him to exercise parenting time, when appellant

refuses to comply with the parenting time allocation, appellee

stated he filed contempt motions because he does not have shared

parenting.   In addition, appellee (1) explained he and his wife

plan to return to Ohio when he obtains “medical clearance,” and

(2) requested the court order the parties to communicate via the

Family Wizard app and offered to pay the fee.     On cross-

examination, appellee conceded he owed $4,600 as of June, and no

accounting of the college savings accounts had occurred.

    {¶14} On October 27, 2020, the trial court denied appellee’s

motion for shared parenting.     The court determined that none of

the best interest factors applied, or were properly before the
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court, because of “no change in circumstances of the residential

parent or the children, and this was not a shared parenting

case.”   The court retained appellant as the residential parent

and indicated that appellee could have parenting time one week

during the school year, as well as half of the Thanksgiving and

Christmas breaks from school and the entire spring break.

Further, the court ordered parenting time on Father’s Day, two

weeks in June, two weeks in July, one week in August, and

ordered that appellee could have weekend time in Ohio when he is

in Ohio “provided he has a safe place for them to visit, with 14

days advance notice.”   The court also ordered the parties to use

Family Wizard to communicate.   Because appellee is unemployed

due to an injury, the court terminated the previous support

order, did not find appellee in contempt for nonpayment due to

his inability to work, but did, however, find appellant in

contempt for her “willful and repeated denial of [appellee’s]

parenting time.”

    {¶15} November 6, 2020, appellee filed a motion for contempt

and alleged that appellant failed to share equally in the fees

for the Family Wizard program and failed to use the program for

communications as ordered.   Appellant filed a motion for

findings of fact and conclusions of law and a motion for stay of
                                                                    9
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final judgment.    The trial court granted the stay, ordered both

parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law, and stated that the court would hear the contempt motion at

a later date.

    {¶16} On April 14, 2021, appellee filed a pro se motion for

contempt and alleged that appellant denied visitation and

violated the trial court’s June 27, 2017 final divorce decree.

On April 20, 2021, appellee filed a pro se motion to show cause

why appellant should not be held in contempt for a violation of

the court’s June 27, 2017 final divorce decree.

    {¶17} On May 28, 2021, appellee, represented by counsel,

filed a motion for contempt and alleged that appellant willfully

denied parenting time from May 30, 2021 through June 6, 2021 in

violation of the court’s July 13, 2017 order.   On June 1, 2021,

appellee, represented by counsel, filed another motion for

contempt and alleged that appellant willfully denied parenting

time from May 30, 2021 through June 6, 2021, in violation of the

court’s July 13, 2017 order.

    {¶18} At the June 3, 2021 hearing, appellee testified that

since 2018, appellant denied him 61 days of parenting time.

Appellee explained that he paid for tickets to return to Florida

with both children after the hearing and requested $750 in
                                                                     10
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attorney fees, $50 in fuel, and $547.17 in airline tickets.

Appellee further testified that the parties did not divide all

holidays, appellee did not receive the children from 8:00 p.m.

Christmas Eve to 11:00 a.m. Christmas morning in odd-numbered

years, and appellee did not receive parenting time for

vacations, even though he provided appellant 30 days notice.

Appellee also requested the court lift the stay on the court’s

previous order for two weeks in June, two weeks in July, and one

week in August.

    {¶19} Appellant testified that she has been more than

accommodating and tried to minimize school absences.     Appellant

also acknowledged she failed to obtain passports for the

children as per the order four years prior.    The trial court’s

June 16, 2021 entry states that after the hearing, the parties

agreed to parenting time for June, July, and August 2021.

    {¶20} On June 30, 2021, the trial court (1) denied

appellant’s motion for contempt, and (2) found appellant in

contempt for her “blatant interference with [appellee’s]

parenting time but agrees with [appellant] that the court’s

order of 2017 must be modified.”   The court thus adopted

appellee’s conclusions of law, ordered appellant to continue as

the residential parent and set forth a parenting schedule.     The
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court terminated the child support order and stated it is

“particularly concerned about the poor communication between the

parties and considers the behavior between them not only

contemptuous but simply childish.”

    {¶21} On October 13, 2021, the trial court journalized a

memorandum of agreement.   On October 25, 2021, the court entered

an agreed judgment that: (1) appellee shall withdraw all pending

motions without prejudice, (2) the attached findings of fact and

conclusions of law shall be incorporated in the judgment entry

that adopts this memorandum of agreement, (3) scheduled

appellant’s sentencing for contempt on December 9, 2021, and (4)

equally divided court costs.

    {¶22} On April 7, 2022, appellee, through counsel, filed a

motion in limine and a motion to impose penalties.     At the April

8, 2022 hearing on the motion in limine and motion to impose

penalties, the parties discussed that appellant had been found

in contempt on October 27, 2020.     Appellee’s counsel, in fact,

argued that the court had found appellant in contempt three

times, but did not issue a sanction.    To purge the contempt,

appellee requested 33 days of parenting time (proposed in

December 2021), travel expenses of $99.47, and attorney fees.

Appellant argued, however, that the April 14, 2021 hearing did
                                                                    12
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not conclude and appellant had no opportunity to submit

testimony and evidence.

    {¶23} On April 18, 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant

to serve ten days in jail and pay a $250 fine.    Appellant could,

however, purge the contempt if she: (1) provides 33 days of

make-up parenting time to be exercised prior to September 1,

2022, (2) complies with the current parenting time schedule as

set forth in the October 25, 2021 entry, and (3) pays $1,034.47

for appellee’s transportation and transcript costs.    On May 5,

2022, appellant requested a stay of the July 6, 2021, October

25, 2021, and April 8, 2022 judgments pending appeal.    On May 9,

2022, appellee filed a motion contra and a request to schedule

dates of parenting time.

    {¶24} At this juncture, appellee’s counsel withdrew.   On

June 24, 2022, appellee filed a pro se motion for emergency ex

parte order for post-judgment temporary custody and parenting

time under R.C. 3127.18.    Appellee’s motion claimed that he and

the children “are in immediate danger.    I have received death

threats and I have been repeatedly stalked by Mollie Williams *

* * Mollie’s domestic violence towards me keeps progressing and

is not only dangerous to the children physically, but mentally

and emotionally as well.”    Appellee attached text messages to
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his motion.

    {¶25} On June 10, 2022, appellee filed for an injunction for

protection against cyber stalking/violence against appellant in

the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Florida.

The Florida court, however, denied the petition in view of

Ohio’s original jurisdiction.   In addition, on June 24, 2022

appellant filed an ex parte motion to modify parenting time.     On

June 29, 2022, appellee filed a motion for an emergency ex parte

order for summer parenting time.

    {¶26} On May 5, 2022, appellant filed a notice of appeal of

the judgments entered on April 18, 2022 (sentenced appellant on

contempt from October 27, 2020, June 30, 2021, and October 25,

2021), on October 25, 2021 (agreed entry indicated appellee to

withdraw all pending motions without prejudice, attached

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be incorporated into

the judgment, costs divided equally, and setting sentencing for

contempt), and on July 6, 2021 (found appellant in contempt “for

her blatant interference with [appellee’s] parenting time”).

                                I.

    {¶27} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts
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the trial court erred when it found her in contempt2.   In

particular, appellant contends that the court denied her due

process when it found her in contempt related to three pro se

motions that failed to state with particularity the grounds for

the motions.   See Civ.R. 7(B)(1).

     {¶28} “Contempt of court” is defined as the disobedience or

disregard of a court order or a command of judicial authority.

Montgomery v. Montgomery, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2923,

03CA2925, 2004-Ohio-6926, ¶ 11; R.C. 2705.02(A).   It involves

conduct that engenders disrespect for the administration of

justice or which tends to embarrass, impede or disturb a court

in the performance of its function.   Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty.

Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988).

Civil contempt exists when a party fails to do something ordered

by the court to benefit an opposing party.   Montgomery, supra.

Usually, contempt proceedings in domestic relations cases are

indirect and civil in nature because they aim to coerce or

encourage future compliance with the court’s orders and their

     2
      In the case at bar, appellee did not file a brief. Under
such circumstances, this Court may choose to accept appellant's
statement of facts and issues as correct and reverse the
judgment if appellant's brief reasonably appears to sustain such
action. App.R. 18(C). We, however, will review the merits of
this appeal.
                                                                     15
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concern centers on behavior that occurs outside the court’s

presence.   Flowers v. Flowers, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-

1176, 2011-Ohio-5972.   Interference with visitation is typically

punished by civil contempt, id.; Mascorro v. Mascorro, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 17945, 2000 WL 731751 (Jun.9, 2000), as is the

failure to pay child support.    Dressler v. Dressler, 12th Dist.

Warren Nos. CA2002-08-085 & CA2002-11-128, 2003-Ohio-5115, ¶ 14.

    {¶29} “A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the

moving party proves both the existence of a court order and the

nonmoving party’s noncompliance with the terms of the order.”

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2012-Ohio-4182, 975 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 12 (2d

Dist.), quoting Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587,

2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 13.   Clear and convincing evidence must

support a civil contempt finding.    See Brown v. Executive 200,

Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 253, 416 N.E.2d 610.     Clear and

convincing evidence is the level of proof that would “cause a

trier of fact to develop a firm belief or conviction as to the

facts sought to be proven.”     Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,

120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.       Once

the plaintiff establishes a violation, the defendant bears the

burden to prove an inability to comply, and absent that proof, a

contempt finding is appropriate.    Burks v. Burks, 2d Dist.
                                                                    16
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Montgomery No. 28349, 2019-Ohio-4292, ¶ 22.

    {¶30} Generally, a trial court possesses broad discretion

when it considers a contempt motion.   Burchett v. Burchett, 4th

Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3784, 2017-Ohio-8124, ¶ 19, Jones v. Jones,

4th Dist. Highland No. 20CA3, 2021-Ohio-1498, ¶ 28; State ex

rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 138 Ohio St.3d 51, 2013-

Ohio-5614, 3 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 29.   Thus, absent an abuse of

discretion, an appellate court will ordinarily uphold a trial

court’s contempt decision.   E.g., Burchett at ¶ 19; Welch v.

Muir, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA32, 2009-Ohio-3575, ¶ 10.       An

abuse of discretion is “‘an unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable use of discretion * * *.’”     State v. Kirkland,

140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67, quoting

State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d

671, ¶ 23.

    {¶31} In the case sub judice, appellant asserts that the

trial court denied her due process when it found her in contempt

that related to three pro se motions that did not provide her

with sufficient notice of her alleged transgressions.    In

particular, appellant argues that the motions failed to state

the grounds with sufficient particularity.    Civ.R. 7(B)(1).

Appellant points out that all three pro se motions (May 1, 2020,
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May 6, 2020, and May 26, 2020) used the Supreme Court of Ohio

Uniform Domestic Relations Form 21, but only state that

appellant should be held in contempt for “interference with

parenting time or other parenting time orders filed on June 27,

2017.”   The forms did not provide information regarding the

specific dates or times that appellant allegedly interfered with

appellee’s parenting time.   In fact, at the June 11, 2020

hearing on the contempt motions, the trial court stated, “the

Supreme Court forms that I personally very much dislike cause it

* * * doesn’t give you a reason to state for contempt.    It just

says the other person’s in contempt I think.”

    {¶32} Appellant also points out that, at the June 11, 2020

hearing, the trial court ruled that appellee could not submit

exhibits or call witnesses because he failed to provide

discovery in a timely manner.   Appellant points out that because

the trial court did not make a specific finding of the acts

appellant committed that formed the basis of the contempt

ruling, she requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The same day, November 6, 2020, appellee filed yet another

motion for contempt that the court did not hear.   Appellant,

however, alleges that the court simply adopted appellee’s

proposed conclusions of law that did not identify specific dates
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or acts.

      {¶33} Appellant further argues that, before the trial court

issued a final ruling regarding the 2020 motions, in 2021

appellee filed two additional contempt motions.   Appellant

contends that the trial court referenced the 2021 hearings in

its entry, but suggests that the court considered testimony from

the still-in-progress June 3, 2021 hearing.   Moreover, at the

October 2021 hearing, appellee withdrew his 2021 contempt

motions.   Thus, at the April 2022 hearing appellant’s counsel

argued, “there was nothing in the record to find her in contempt

on.   There were no dates permitted to be testified about.    The

motions were not permitted to be testified about.”   The court,

nonetheless, sentenced appellant to serve a suspended ten-day

jail sentence, pay a $250 fine, and pay appellee’s

transportation costs and transcript fees.

      {¶34} Appellant further asserts that, although the October

27, 2020 judgment states that appellant could avoid a sanction

if the court is satisfied that appellant provided appellee

“sufficient” make-up parenting time, appellant’s counsel points

out appellant was “without clear direction on how many days that

she needed to purge,” and “with the confusion of this case,

we’re really unclear as to what parenting time order exists.”
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The trial court determined that appellant could provide appellee

with 33 make-up days to purge the contempt finding, but

appellant argues that the court did not permit her to testify

regarding the dates that the court provided to appellee to

purge, then calculated the number of days to purge from

appellee’s withdrawn April 14, 2021 motion.   Consequently,

appellant argues that the court did not have the authority to

find appellant in contempt for acts alleged to have occurred in

2021.

    {¶35} We recognize that, although it does appear that both

parties have struggled to abide by court orders, after our

review we believe that the trial court’s finding of contempt on

this very confusing and ever changing record is unreasonable.

Although we greatly sympathize with the court’s unenviable task

of sorting through the multitude of motions, confusing testimony

and arguments, many of which appear to be repetitive and filed

for no specific purpose, courts must afford due process to

individuals accused of contempt.   McCall v. Cunard, 6th Dist.

Sandusky No. S-07-013, 2008-Ohio-378, ¶ 20.   Due process for

contempt proceedings includes providing the alleged contemnor

with notice of the allegations and an opportunity to be heard on

those allegations.   State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455,
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459, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996); R.C. 2705.03.     During a contempt

hearing, a court must consider the charge, hear the testimony,

the answer, and any explanation the accused offers, then

determine whether violations have occurred.     In re J.M., 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2008-01-004, 2008-Ohio-6763, ¶ 49.

    {¶36} Although R.C. 2705.02 does not specify the form of

notice an alleged contemnor must receive, “to comply with due

process requirements, [the notice] must be given sufficiently in

advance of scheduled court proceeding so that the [contemnor]

has reasonable opportunity to prepare for the specific issues

presented.”   Sassya v. Morgan, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2018-T-

0013, 2019-Ohio-1301, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).     See also State ex

rel. Johnson v. County Court of Perry County, 25 Ohio St.3d 53,

495 N.E.2d 16 (1986).   More significantly, for notice to comply

with due process requirements, it must “set forth the alleged

misconduct with particularity.”   Sassya at ¶ 28.

    {¶37} Turning to the case sub judice, we believe that

appellee’s May 1, 2020, May 6, 2020, and May 26, 2020 contempt

motions failed to provide sufficient notice so that appellant

could formulate a defense.   After our review, we also agree with

appellant’s assessment that the trial court may have permitted
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testimony concerning parenting time disputes for purposes other

than contempt, but used that testimony to support a contempt

finding, including, it appears, some allegations from a motion

that the court noted appeared to be still pending in 2021, then

later withdrawn.    Moreover, we agree with appellant that the

trial court did not permit appellant to be adequately heard

regarding her efforts to comply with the court’s prior orders.

However, we again sympathize with the trial court in this matter

having been placed in an unenviable position with multiple

motions and responses that tend to confuse the issues rather

than to provide clarity.

    Therefore, after our review we conclude that the trial

court acted unreasonably when it found appellant in contempt

related to appellee’s pro se motions.   Accordingly, we sustain

appellant’s first assignment of error and reverse the trial

court’s judgment.

                                 II.

    {¶38} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred when it modified the parties’

parenting time schedule.   In particular, appellant notes that
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the trial court did not refer to R.C. 3109.051, which governs

parenting time when there is no shared parenting decree, or the

R.C. 3109.051 best interest factors.

    {¶39} A post-decree motion to modify parenting time, when no

shared parenting plan exists, is governed by R.C. 3109.051.     As

appellant asserts, although a trial court is not required to

explicitly refer to all the best interest factors, it must be

apparent from the record that the court considered those

factors.   Todd v. Todd, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA26, 2019-Ohio-

1466, ¶ 14, quoting Sarchione-Tookey v. Tookey, 4th Dist. Athens

No. 17CA41, 2018-Ohio-2716, ¶ 32.   R.C. 3109.051(D) provides:

    (D) In determining whether to grant parenting time to a
    parent pursuant to this section or section 3109.12 of
    the Revised Code or companionship or visitation rights
    to a grandparent, relative, or other person pursuant to
    this section or section 3109.11 or 3109.12 of the Revised
    Code, in establishing a specific parenting time or
    visitation schedule, and in determining other parenting
    time matters under this section or section 3109.12 of
    the Revised Code or visitation matters under this
    section or section 3109.11 or 3109.12 of the Revised
    Code, the court shall consider all of the following
    factors:

    (1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the
    child with the child's parents, siblings, and other
    persons related by consanguinity or affinity, and with
    the person who requested companionship or visitation if
    that person is not a parent, sibling, or relative of the
    child;

    (2) The geographical location of the residence of each
    parent and the distance between those residences, and if
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    the person is not a parent, the geographical location of
    that person's residence and the distance between that
    person's residence and the child's residence;

    (3) The child's and parents' available time, including,
    but not limited to, each parent's employment schedule,
    the child's school schedule, and the child's and the
    parents' holiday and vacation schedule;

    (4) The age of the child;

    (5) The child's    adjustment   to   home,   school,   and
    community;

    (6) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers,
    pursuant to division (C) of this section, regarding the
    wishes and concerns of the child as to parenting time by
    the parent who is not the residential parent or
    companionship   or   visitation   by  the   grandparent,
    relative, or other person who requested companionship or
    visitation, as to a specific parenting time or
    visitation schedule, or as to other parenting time or
    visitation matters, the wishes and concerns of the
    child, as expressed to the court;

    (7) The health and safety of the child;

    (8) The amount of time that will be available for the
    child to spend with siblings;

    (9) The mental and physical health of all parties;

    (10) Each parent's willingness to reschedule missed
    parenting time and to facilitate the other parent's
    parenting time rights, and with respect to a person who
    requested companionship or visitation, the willingness
    of that person to reschedule missed visitation;

    (11) In relation to parenting time, whether either
    parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
    guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that
    resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected
    child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child
    has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected
                                                                24
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

    child, previously has been determined to be the
    perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the
    basis of the adjudication; and whether there is reason
    to believe that either parent has acted in a manner
    resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected
    child;

    (12) In relation to requested companionship or
    visitation by a person other than a parent, whether the
    person previously has been convicted of or pleaded
    guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that
    resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected
    child; whether the person, in a case in which a child
    has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected
    child, previously has been determined to be the
    perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the
    basis of the adjudication; whether either parent
    previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
    violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code
    involving a victim who at the time of the commission of
    the offense was a member of the family or household that
    is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either
    parent previously has been convicted of an offense
    involving a victim who at the time of the commission of
    the offense was a member of the family or household that
    is the subject of the current proceeding and caused
    physical harm to the victim in the commission of the
    offense; and whether there is reason to believe that the
    person has acted in a manner resulting in a child being
    an abused child or a neglected child;

    (13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents
    subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously
    and willfully denied the other parent's right to
    parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;

    (14) Whether either parent has established a residence
    or is planning to establish a residence outside this
    state;

    (15) In relation to requested companionship or
    visitation by a person other than a parent, the wishes
    and concerns of the child's parents, as expressed by
    them to the court;
                                                                    25
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

    (16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child.

    {¶40} In the case at bar, other than the trial court’s

reference to appellee moving far from his previous residence and

the parties’ contentious relationship, our review reveals that

the trial court may not have sufficiently considered the

appropriate statutory factors.    Once again, however, we

recognize that the trial court had an unenviable task to attempt

to navigate through this contentious proceeding.

    {¶41} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

sustain appellant’s second assignment of error.

                                 III.

    {¶42} In her final assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred when it established child support and

failed to find appellee in contempt for non-payment of support.

    {¶43} An appellate court must use the abuse of discretion

standard when reviewing matters related to child support.     Booth

v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989).    Once

again, the abuse of discretion standard implies that a court's

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983).   See, also, Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 85,
                                                                  26
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

630 N.E.2d 665 (1994).

    {¶44} “It is well established in the law of Ohio * * * that

a person charged with contempt for the violation of a court

order may defend by proving that it was not in his power to obey

the order.”   Stychno v. Stychno, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008-T-

0117, 2009-Ohio-6858, ¶ 38, citing Courtney v. Courtney, 16 Ohio

App.3d 329, 334, 475 N.E.2d 1284 (3d Dist.1984).   “Once a person

seeking contempt has demonstrated a defendant's failure to pay

child support, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to

prove his or her inability to pay.”   Smith v. Smith, 11th Dist.

Geauga No. 2013-G-3126, 2013-Ohio-4101, ¶ 41; see State ex rel.

Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N.E. 567 (1902), paragraph one

of the syllabus (“In a proceeding in contempt against a party

who has refused to comply with a money decree for alimony, it is

not essential that the complaint allege that the party is able

to pay the money.   The decree imports a finding of the court

that he is able to pay, and the burden is on him by allegation

and proof to establish his inability.”); Liming v. Damos, 133

Ohio St.3d 509,2012-Ohio-4783, 979 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 20.

    {¶45} In the case sub judice, appellant contends that

appellee did not provide documentation of his inability to pay,

testified at varying points during the hearing that he had no
                                                                  27
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

income and he could not afford counsel, but later stated he is

enrolled in online college classes and agreed to pay expenses

for the children to travel to and from his Florida home.

Appellant further argues that the court (1) did not make

findings about appellant’s future ability to work, and (2)

should have requested documentation before it imputed minimum

wage to him for child support purposes.

    {¶46} Initially, we recognize that the trial court ordered

child support, but the parties later agreed to a nonconventional

child support process.   In particular, the parties agreed that

appellee must: (1) open a 529 college savings account for each

child, (2) deposit $200 per month per child into that account,

and (3) contribute $200 per month per child into a checking

account for their benefit.   At the June 11, 2020 hearing,

appellee appeared pro se, testified that he was behind in these

payments, and asked the court to terminate their prior agreement

and calculate traditional CSEA child support.   Appellee also

testified that he could not work due to a work-related injury

and provided no income documentation.

    {¶47} We recognize that appellee provided somewhat

inconsistent testimony that he could not pay child support, but

could pay for college classes and transportation costs for the
                                                                  28
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

children.   Moreover, much of appellee’s testimony is not

supported by any documentation concerning financial status.

Consequently, we believe that the trial court acted unreasonably

and should have fully considered the parties’ financial

positions before it rendered judgment on this issue.

    {¶48} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                               JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE
                               REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
                               CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.
SCIOTO, 22CA3992

                                                                  29

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic
Relations Division, to carry these judgments into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                    For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.