Court Opinion

ID: 9698703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:58:02.665258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.917112
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). Defendant, Thomas Robert Tejeda, appeals as of right a jury conviction of possession of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(1) and (2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(1) and (2)(a)(iii). Defendant requests that his conviction be vacated and that he be released from custody on the grounds that the evidence obtained against him was the result of an illegal search and seizure. Although the defendant seeks to invoke an exclusionary rule as to the evidence, he does not articulate a constitutional basis for the suppression.
i
At the outset, I note that the cocaine is not to be excluded from evidence pursuant to the Michigan Constitution. In particular, the search and seizure provision of Const 1963, art 1, § 11 expressly prohibits exclusion in this instance:
The provisions of this section shall not be con*462strued to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.
The history of this provision and its predecessor was carefully traced by Justice Brickley in People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 208-215; 341 NW2d 439 (1983). As noted at 418 Mich 210, the citizens of our state added an antiexclusionary provision to our constitution in 1936 in response to People v Stein, 265 Mich 610; 251 NW 788 (1933), which had excluded from evidence an illegally seized weapon. Language prohibiting the exclusion from evidence of "any narcotic drug or drugs” was added in 1952.
Although the delegates to the constitutional convention of 1961-62 were fully aware of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 2d 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), the drafters of our constitution nevertheless continued with an antiexclusionary provision in the hope that the federal precedent would be overturned or limited to dwellings.
The language of the constitutional provision and its history "precludes a construction of the Michigan search and seizure clause imposing a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures of items named in the proviso than the United States Supreme Court has held applicable under the Fourth Amendment.” People v Moore, 391 Mich 426, 435; 216 NW2d 770 (1974). As stated more recently by the Supreme Court in People v Catania, 427 Mich 447, 466; 398 NW2d 343 (1986):
There is no basis in this case for holding that the Michigan Constitution, art 1, § 11, permits greater protection than the United States Constitution.
*463Accordingly, in the instant case, which involves a narcotic drug seized outside a dwelling house, we should look to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to determine whether exclusion of the evidence is constitutionally warranted.
n
In Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid two-pronged test of Aguilar1-Spinelli2 in favor of a less restrictive analysis which examines the "totality of the circumstances” to determine whether an affidavit establishes probable cause. For the reasons stated infra, I would hold that the affidavits at issue pass constitutional muster under Illinois v Gates.
Second, if we were to consider the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, I would hold that under the good-faith exception announced in People v Leon, 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984), suppression of the seized evidence is not warranted.
Suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 468 US 918. It should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. 468 US 918-919.
The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by a de*464tached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. 468 US 926. The test is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization, considering all the circumstances. 468 US 922, n 23.
In the present case, the search warrants at issue were authorized by a neutral, detached magistrate. Suppression of the evidence because of the alleged errors in the affidavits would not further the goals of the exclusionary rule. The alleged technical errors at issue are the type for which People v Leon established a good-faith exception.
m
Next, I address the argument that the Legislature intended an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of statutory requirements. First, I find no expressed provision in any statute which mandates the exclusion of such evidence. On the contrary, I note that the Legislature has codified a harmless-error rule which prohibits reversal unless the improper admission or rejection of evidence results in a miscarriage of justice:
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096.]
We should not construe statutes as conflicting if a reasonable and harmonizing construction is available.
*465Justice Boyle in her dissenting opinion in People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502, 513-516; 364 NW2d 658 (1984), wrote the following in regard to the argument that the former search-warrant statute contains an implied exclusionary rule:
I cannot conceive of a reason why we should apply the exclusionary rule to the supposed violation of a statute where the affidavit would pass constitutional muster under either Const 1983, art 1, § 11, or US Const, Am IV, see People v Nash, 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983). [421 Mich 516.]
Although the majority in Sherbine ruled that suppression was required, the Legislature has effectively overturned Sherbine by amending the statutory provision upon which it was based. In response to Sherbine, the Legislature enacted 1988 PA 80, which was ordered to take immediate effect. The new statutory provision provides:
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her. The affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed person if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
(a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from which the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the information.
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information is reliable. [MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3); emphasis added.]
The legislative history of the statute reveals that *466its purpose was to overrule Sherbine for reasons stated in Justice Boyle’s dissent. The legislative analysis of the bill prepared for the Michigan Senate articulates the following as "supporting arguments” for the legislation:
The bill would return Michigan to a more traditional approach toward determining whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant on the basis of an informant’s tip. By removing the statutory language relied upon by the Michigan Supreme Court in the Sherbine case to require both credibility of the witness and reliability of the information, the bill would reduce the burden imposed on courts and complaining officers when a warrant is sought. At the same time, the bill would not impinge on the constitutional protections of individuals.
While the original Aguilar-Spinelli test was considered impractical by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Michigan Supreme Court’s expansion of that test as dictated by People v Sherbine has made it virtually impossible to meet in some cases, especially in the event of an anonymous tip. And, as the dissent in Sherbine concluded, requiring proof of the informant’s credibility in each and every case could lead to the remarkable conclusion that, if one of the justices gave the police information that he or she had received a series of threatening phone calls and expected to receive another, a magistrate would not be justified in issuing a warrant unless the affiant officer also provided proof that the justice was credible and that the information was reliable. As the dissent continued, this construction of the statute also would prevent issuance of a search warrant when the affiant was communicating incriminating statements made to him or her by a third person. If the communication were, "I will have the drugs at my home tonight”, that would surely be reliable information, but it is doubtful that the speaker could be independently shown to be a credible person. Un*467der the approach proposed in the bill, however, it is likely that a warrant could properly be issued to either scenario. [Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 80, October 30, 1987.]
Although I recognize that such legislative bill analyses are not official statements of legislative policy, they nevertheless are of significant probative value in determining legislative intent. See, e.g., Sam v Balardo, 411 Mich 405, 421; 308 NW2d 142 (1981).
In the instant case, it is clear that the Legislature acted to correct what it perceived to be the overly stringent warrant requirements of Sherbine and to "return Michigan to a more traditional approach.” Since Sherbine is based upon statutory, not constitutional grounds, the people through their elected legislators are free to overturn it.
Although the warrants in the instant case were issued prior to its enactment, I view the statute to be remedial and procedural in nature and therefore would apply it retroactively. People v Bates, 175 Mich App 490, 492-493; 438 NW2d 298 (1989), and Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286 (1963).
The warrants in the instant case complied with the less stringent requirements of the new statute. The informant in both of the disputed affidavits was named. Therefore, the affidavits are sufficient if they contain information establishing probable cause and affirmative allegations from which the magistrate could conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the information. MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) as amended by 1988 PA 80. In the first affidavit, Douglas Raymond stated to the police that he was to deliver the cocaine to defendant. I would find the affidavit sufficient under the newly amended statute. The second affida*468vit in question contains information obtained by a named informant, Lieutenant Bertee of wemet, of a conversation between Raymond and defendant monitored directly by Lieutenant Bertee on a transmitter. This second affidavit also establishes probable cause and meets the requirements of the new statute.
Finally, the newly enacted statute does not contain an implied exclusionary rule. Implying an exclusionary rule from nonexisting language would not only construe the act as conflicting with the harmless-error statute, it would also be inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent to "return Michigan to a more traditional approach.” The purposes and objectives of the statute would not be served by excluding evidence which is not required to be suppressed by either the Michigan or United States Constitutions.
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm defendant’s conviction.3

 Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964).

 Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 895 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969).

 I have also considered the other issues raised on appeal and find them to be without merit.