Court Opinion

ID: 9632907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:27:58.741198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:24.295127
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
I cannot agree with the last portion of the majority opinion which premises the determination of no violation of the speedy trial requirement on the provisions of Rule 22 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming (hereinafter referred to as Rule 22).1 As stated in Robinson v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 168, 172 (1981):
"* * * Its adoption was accordingly admirable but the fixing of an absolute deadline by Rule 22(d), Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming was in conflict with, superseded and modified by Estrada." (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)2
The opinion in this case does not resolve the speedy trial issue on the basis of Estrada v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 850 (1980). The majority opinion refers to Estrada as a "pre-Rule 22" decision. It was not. As reflected in Robinson, Rule 22 was adopted September 14, 1979, over eight months before the decision in Estrada on May 28, 1980. Estrada was decided in full recognition of the existence of Rule 22, and it superseded any part of Rule 22 in conflict with it.
The conflict is obvious. A determination as to conformance with the speedy trial requirement cannot depend on a balancing test and have a specific time requirement at the same time. It must be one or the other. A criminal defendant is entitled to know which standard is to be applied.
In a given case, the Estrada standard may either shorten or lengthen the 120- or 90-day limit. For one in custody, as here, the Estrada standard may require the trial within 40 days. Rule 22 authorization to do so in 90 days would conflict therewith. Or for such a one, the Estrada standard may justify the trial in 200 days. Rule 22 mandating the trial in 90 days would also conflict therewith. Subsection (h) of Rule 22 provides that "[the time limits in (c) and (d) are maximum limits" (emphasis added). If the rules are to have any efficacy at all, they should mean what they say. Yet, they cannot do so if Estrada is to be followed.
I believe the holding in Estrada has completely replaced those portions of Rule 22 which mandate a standard other than the balancing test set forth in Estrada. I believe the test set forth in Estrada is the only standard by which it can be determined whether or not a defendant has received a speedy trial.
I specially concur with the majority opinion, rather than dissent therefrom, because I find that application of the Estrada standard to the facts of this case does not uphold appellant's claim. Under Estrada (and see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); and Cherniwchan v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 464 (1979)), four specific factors must be considered in making the determination: (1) *13the length of delay in getting to trial, (2) the reason for the delay, (8) the assertion of rights by the defendant during the delay, and (4) the prejudice suffered by defendant as a result.
Applying the factors to the facts of this case, I find:
(1) The length of time between the filing of the information (February 7, 1980) and the trial (June 16, 1980) was about a week more than four months. This was not unduly long. The time in Estrada was eleven months.
(2) The only record indication for the reason for delay is in the trial judge's comments that it concerned the "calendar with previous settings and with the change of Judge business." The parties have not otherwise set forth or argued the reason for delay. The record reflects ongoing activity in the case and that it was not subject to inattention.
(8) Appellant did not assert an objection to delay until May 21, 1980, at which time he filed a motion to dismiss for failure to be brought to trial within the 90 days provided by subsection (d) of Rule 22. At the same time he filed this motion, he filed a motion for suspension of trial pursuant to § 7-13-301, W.S.1977.3 The trial was held 26 days after appellant asserted his objection, and of the 26-day delay, 20 days were occasioned by appellant's request for a change of judge.
(4) Inasmuch as the delay was not unreasonable, there can be no prejudice from an undue delay. Beyond that, detriment or disadvantage to appellant is not indicated.
A complete analysis of the issue must be made in conjunction with a chronology of pertinent case activity:
February 7, 1980-Information was filed.
February 8, 1980-Case set for trial on May 19, 1980.
March 13, 1980-Appellant filed motions to suppress, for discovery and inspec-
tion and for obtaining preliminary hearing transcript in forma pauperis.
May 5, 1980-Appellant requested motion to suppress be set for hearing.
May 6, 1980-Hearing on motion to suppress was set for May 12, 1980.
May 15, 1980-Decision letter denied motion to suppress.
May 19, 1980-Come on for trial but continued because case "stacked" ahead of it was being tried.
May 21, 1980-Trial set for May 27, 1980.
May 21, 1980-Appellant filed motions for suspension of trial, in limine, and to dismiss for failure to afford trial within 90 days as specified in Rule 22.
May 22, 1980-Appellant filed motion for change in judge from Judge Spangler.
May 22, 1980-Case set for trial on June 16, 1980.
June 13, 1980-Order granting motion for change in judge.
June 16, 1980-Trial held.
Applying the standard set forth in Estrada, I conclude that the requirement for a speedy trial was met in this case.
I would affirm on that basis only.

. That portion of Rule 22 pertinent to this special concurrence provides:
"(c) Time limit.-A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or indictment in district court.
"(d) Defendant in custody.-A defendant unable to obtain pretrial release shall have priority and the charge shall be brought to trial within 90 days following the filing of the information or indictment in district court.
* % a u L *
"(h) The time limits in (c) and (d) are maximum limits.-Local court rules may shorten those periods."

. I did not specially concur with the opinion in Robinson v. State, supra, because of the quoted statement and because the case was decided through application of the balancing test set forth in Estrada v. State, infra. I considered other references to Rule 22 in Robinson to be superfluous in view of this statement and, thus, to be obiter dicta.

. Section 7-13-301, W.S.1977 provides in pertinent part:
"* * *~ With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation."