Court Opinion

ID: 9962060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:05:44.489067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:45.439049
License: Public Domain

Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia

                                        ATLANTA,____________________
                                                 April 22, 2024

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A1186. EAGLE RANCH, INC. et al. v. MICHAEL DOE, A MINOR, BY
    HIS NEXT FRIEND AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, B.H. et al.

      Plaintiffs Michael Doe, a minor, and his parents, filed an action against Eagle
Ranch, Inc. and Eagle Ranch Foundation, Inc., alleging that Doe was sexually abused
by an adult staff member while residing at Eagle Ranch’s facility, a residential program
for children with emotional or behavioral problems. Plaintiffs sought discovery from
Eagle Ranch and served subpoenas on seven state entities seeking information related
to any prior sexual abuse or sexual misconduct involving children at the facility. The
defendants moved for a protective order and to quash the subpoenas, and the trial
court entered a protective order to which the parties consented. Plaintiffs served its
subpoeonas, and defendants filed an emergency motion for protective order, after
which the parties agreed to additional limitations on the scope of the discovery sought
in the subpoenas. Defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order.
      In its “Order on Discovery Motions,” the trial court denied the defendants’
motions and ordered the production of the discovery sought in accordance with its
order, conditioned upon compliance with OCGA § 49-5-41 (a) (11).1 The defendants

      1
          OCGA § 49-5-41 (a) (11) provides, in pertinent part, that a court shall have
reasonable access to records concerning reports of child abuse, and “by subpoena that
is filed contemporaneously with a motion seeking records and requesting an in camera
inspection of such records, may make such records available to a party seeking such
filed the instant notice of appeal, asserting that the order at issue, although
interlocutory, is a collateral order and thereby entitles them to a direct appeal.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, challenging defendants’ position.2
We agree with plaintiffs and dismiss the appeal.
       The collateral order doctrine applies if the order to be appealed “(1) resolves
an issue that is ‘substantially separate’ from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2)
would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and
(3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the
underlying action can affect it.”3 Traditionally, the collateral order doctrine has not
applied to discovery orders because they may be reviewed upon final judgment, “or
a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against him, and
challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling.”4 In Hickey v. RREF BB
SBL Acquisitions,5 we held that the collateral order doctrine may apply to a discovery
order that is “directed at a disinterested third party[,]”6 but the defendants, however,
are not disinterested parties.
       The Supreme Court has limited the collateral order doctrine to
       a very small class of interlocutory rulings [that] are effectively final in
       that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral

records . . . [if] [a]fter an in camera inspection of such records, the court finds that
access to such records appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence[.]”
       2
        Defendants requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court
did not issue.
       3
           Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) (653 SE2d 713) (2007).
       4
       (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, 226 Ga.
App. 77, 82 (485 SE2d 525) (1997).
       5
           336 Ga. App. 411 (785 SE2d 72) (2016).
       6
           Id. at 413.
      to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
      too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration
      be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.7

This is not such a case. Accordingly, we hereby GRANT plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss,
and this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

                                        Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
                                          Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
                                                                      04/22/2024
                                                   I certify that the above is a true extract from
                                        the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
                                                  Witness my signature and the seal of said court
                                        hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

                                                                                          , Clerk.

      7
          (Citation omitted.) Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172-173 (1) (829 SE2d 348)
(2019).