Court Opinion

ID: 9495460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:03:32.318713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:02.063258
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority relies on Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.1977), and Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.1982), *1149which are cases involving cars. But this isn’t a car case; David paid the impound fees and recovered his car the day it was towed. David wanted a hearing to get back his cash. The question before us is whether the city must provide a hearing within 48 hours to contest a $134.50 fine. Looking to the familiar balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the clear answer is no.
Mathews explains that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). To make that determination, we look to the “governmental and private interests that are affected.” Id. Here, David’s interest is only in money. Unlike some deprivations, where the passage of even a day or two can cause substantial and irreparable harm, money is fungible; a loss of money can normally be made up with more money.1 And, being out $134.50 isn’t much of a burden if you can pay the money in the first place.2 If David hadn’t paid the money to get his car out of hock, he could have demanded a hearing within 48 hours. Had the city failed to provide him a hearing within that time, David probably would have had a solid claim. But David did pay the money, so the only thing he lost was use of the $134.50 for a few weeks — not such a big deal.
The government interest in delaying the hearing, on the other hand, is quite substantial. It takes time to organize hearings: there are only so many courtrooms and presiding officials;' the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his appearance; the city may have to find a substitute to cover that officer’s responsibilities while he attends the hearing. See Goichman, 682 F.2d at 1324-25. And, the city must do this for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of claimants each month. Given the minimal private interest, I can’t say that the city was required to drop everything and give David an immediate hearing for his $134.50.
The majority’s reliance on our post-deprivation cases is misplaced. Stypmann was careful to explain that its holding turned on the heavy weight it assigned “[t]he private interest in the uninterrupted use of an automobile.” 557 F.2d at 1342; see also id. at 1342-43 (“A person’s ability to make a living and his access to both the necessities and amenities of life may depend upon the availability of an automobile when needed.”); id. at 1344 (“A five-day delay in justifying detention of a private vehicle is too long. Days, even hours, of unnecessary delay may impose onerous burdens upon a person deprived of his vehicle.”). Goichman was no different. The focus of the inquiry, as in Stypmann, was a specific deprivation: the use of one’s automobile. See 682 F.2d at 1324. Stypmann and Goichman did not set the rule for cars, money and all other property alike.
Of course, had David been stuck without his car because he couldn’t pay the impound fees, the city’s untimely hearing may have violated his due process rights. See Stypmann, 557 F.2d at 1344-45.3 But *1150David did pay the fees and so he wasn’t deprived of his car. Simply because a system “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). David may not raise the claims of others against whom the city’s procedures might operate unconstitutionally. Unless David can show that the process he received — a hearing to challenge the tow within a month after paying a fine to spring his car — was constitutionally deficient, he can’t state a claim under section 1983.
The city’s failure to give David a prompt hearing may well have violated state law. See Cal. Veh.Code § 22852(c). David may have been able to challenge this violation in state court. Whether the delay violated David’s federal rights, however, is a different question, and one that requires “a sensitive inquiry into the competing governmental and private interests affected.” Goichman, 682 F.2d at 1324. The majority mistakenly applies our cases involving deprivation of an automobile to the deprivation of a small sum of cash. But money used to redeem a car does not thereby become a car; money is money, no matter what use it’s been put to. I see no authority for extending the car cases to this very different situation.

.The issue is different if the money is needed for living expenses. In such a case, a post-deprivation hearing — no matter how prompt — might not be adequate. Due process may require a pre-deprivation hearing. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).

. Whether David would have been entitled to interest had he prevailed before the hearing officer is a separate question.

. On the other hand, had David left the car at the impound lot, the city may have given him a hearing more promptly, and so he may have had nothing to complain about. We can only speculate.