Court Opinion

ID: 9539376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:03:21.086953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:47.295321
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
Problems created by the financially irresponsible motorist are both obvious and real and are a proper matter for legislative concern and action. Various state legislatures have dealt with this matter in a variety of ways. A very few states have by statute decreed that until a would-be motorist furnishes evidence of his financial responsibility he should not even be granted a license to drive on the public highways, and this type of legislation has been sustained by various state courts as being a constitutionally acceptable exercise of the police power. See Re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 129 A. 117, and 39 A.L.R. 1029. The Colorado legislature has not taken this drastic and controversial step, but has enacted a less stringent law (C.R.S. ’53, 13-7-1, et seq.) which is here subjected to attack on the grounds that even it *217offends the State and Federal Constitutions. The particular legislation enacted in Colorado has been sometimes referred to as of the “lock the barn door after the horse is stolen” type and operates in the following manner: A motorist is not required to show financial responsibility. before issuance of a license, but once evidence of his financial irresponsibility is brought to the attention of the licensing authorities following his involvement in an accident of specified proportion, then his license is suspended. One whose license is about to be suspended under this statute may avert the impending suspension by demonstrating his ability to respond to any judgment which might be entered against him as a result of the accident; or if his license be actually suspended, then the suspended licensee may regain his license if he, inter alia, posts sufficient security to demonstrate his ability to satisfy any judgment which may be entered against him as a result of such accident.
It may well be argued that this is an ineffective and illogical condition precedent to the averting, or the lifting, of a suspension order, but the wisdom of legislative action has theoretically never been a concern of the courts. If legislation requiring insurance or other security as a condition precedent to the right to operate a motor vehicle on the highway be valid, it would seem to follow that such compulsion may be limited to depend on contingencies, such as involvement in an accident. At the very least this type of legislation does have one salutory effect: if the statute be followed it makes certain that a motorist shall not become involved in two accidents and be financially irresponsible in both! In other words, having been involved in one accident, the motorist must demonstrate his ability to respond to possible judgments arising out of that accident before he is again licensed by a State to roam the highways in search of a second accident! In any event, whether this is the most effective legislation that could be enacted on the subject, is not our concern. Our problem is whether this *218statute is unconstitutional. I find nothing in either the State or Federal Constitution which outlaws this particular type of legislation.
It is to be noted that the statute under attack is a part of the so-called uniform Safety Responsibility Law and that identical statutes have been enacted in many of the 50 states. Moreover, similar statutes have been attacked on constitutional grounds identical to those urged in the instant case in at least 6 other states, namely California, Iowa, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Nebraska and Texas, and in every instance have been held to be constitutional. See Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W. (2d) 620; Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. (2d) 870, 222 P. (2d) 1; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W. (2d) 52; Ballow v. Reeves (Ky.), 238 S.W. (2d) 141; Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W. (2d) 177; and State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W. (2d) 514.
Also in 35 A.L.R. (2d) at page 1021 appears the following:
“Where a question has been raised as to the validity of statutes providing for suspension or revocation of the operator’s license and registration certificate of any person involved in a motor vehicle accident which resulted in personal injury or property damage usually of a certain specified amount, unless such person deposits or posts security in an amount sufficient to satisfy any judgment which might be obtained against him as a result of the accident, the courts have uniformly held such acts valid.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I, therefore, disassociate myself from the majority opinion and subscribe to the reasoning and result reached in each of the cases above cited and in so doing hold that C.R.S. ’53, 13-7-7, is a constitutional effort on the part of the People, acting through their legislature, to deal with a vexing and serious problem.
Mr. Justice Doyle concurs in this dissenting opinion.