Court Opinion

ID: 9390802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 17:06:31.66069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.773245
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                    No. 172PA22

                                 Filed 28 April 2023

IN THE MATTER OF: S.R.

      On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision

of the Court of Appeals, 283 N.C. App. 149 (2022), affirming an order entered on 8

June 2021 by Judge Caroline S. Burnette in District Court, Granville County. Heard

in the Supreme Court on 1 February 2023.

      Edward Eldred for petitioner-appellant.

      Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, and Jacky L. Brammer, Assistant Parent
      Defender, for respondent-appellee father.

      EARLS, Justice.

      This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights in a private setting

with no Department of Social Services involvement. Cases involving divorce and the

breakdown of marital relationships are often contentious, and each party may have

their own version of what has transpired. In cases involving children and the

termination of parental rights, both parents have a “fundamental liberty interest . . .

in the care, custody, and management of their child,” and this interest “does not

evaporate simply because they have not been model parents.” Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). To protect this vital interest and others, our legal system

operates under a set of procedures, one of which dictates that the trial court is the
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finder of fact. In re N.W., 381 N.C. 851, 857 (2022) (“[T]he trial court . . . [has the]

responsibility for evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, weighing the evidence,

and determining the relevant facts.” (citing In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 258 (2020))). In

contrast, this Court is not a fact-finding court. See id.

      In the context of termination of parental rights proceedings, the proper inquiry

is often fact-dependent and the trial court, as a fact-finding court, is in the best

position to determine the credibility of the witnesses before it and make findings of

fact. See id. With this in mind, this opinion underscores the importance of following

these procedures and the correct standard of review by applying the law only to those

findings of fact made by the trial court. In doing so, we affirm the Court of Appeals’

decision regarding the denial of the petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights

but modify its decision to clarify the correct standard of review at both the

adjudication and the dispositional stage.

                               I.    Factual Background

      The petitioner, Tiffany Roberto, and the respondent, Bruce Savard, were

previously married. On 23 April 2014, their only child, Sarah,1 was born. The day

before Sarah was born, Mr. Savard experienced a mental health related incident and

threatened to kill himself. Ms. Roberto contacted her current husband, Joe Roberto,

who successfully retrieved the gun from Mr. Savard. In June 2014, Ms. Roberto

sought and received an ex parte domestic violence protective order against Mr.

      1   This is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the minor child.

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Savard, in part based on this incident. The couple then separated, and Mr. Savard,

who was an active-duty member of the United States Marine Corps, continued living

on the military base. Ms. Roberto went to live with Mr. Roberto.

       Ms. Roberto and Mr. Savard’s divorce decree was entered on 8 June 2016.

Despite Ms. Roberto knowing Mr. Savard’s telephone number and home address, Mr.

Savard was served with notice of the complaint for divorce by publication and only

learned of the divorce eight days later, on 16 June 2016, through a text message from

Ms. Roberto. That same day, and in the same text message, Mr. Savard also learned

that as part of the divorce proceedings, Ms. Roberto was granted “the sole and

exclusive care, custody, and control” of Sarah.

      Ms. Roberto and Mr. Roberto were married on 22 November 2016. Mr. Savard

paid child support for Sarah, which was withheld from his paycheck and mailed to

North Carolina Centralized Collections. Ms. Roberto sought legal advice about

terminating Mr. Savard’s parental rights and was counseled to stop the garnishment

of his wages through North Carolina Centralized Collections, such that Mr. Savard

would be personally responsible for payment and nonpayment could be used as a

ground to terminate his parental rights.

      Toward the end of 2018, Ms. Roberto “closed [Mr. Savard’s] support case” but

“Mr. Savard was under the impression that he was no longer required to pay child

support as Ms. Roberto never informed him that he as [sic] not make payments

directly to her after his child support case was closed.” Thus, once child support

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payments were no longer collected through the garnishment of his wages, the child

support payments stopped. As a result, Mr. Savard accumulated past-due child

support obligations. Ms. Roberto asked Mr. Savard to relinquish his parental rights

to Sarah in exchange for her forgiving his child support debt, but he declined this

request.

       In its order denying the petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights,

the trial court found that Mr. Savard made an effort to have a relationship with

Sarah. It also found that he attempted to exercise his supervised visitation rights

with Sarah and sent Ms. Roberto text messages asking about Sarah. However, Ms.

Roberto ultimately blocked Mr. Savard’s telephone number, and he was no longer

able to contact her by phone. Ms. Roberto also blocked Mr. Savard from contacting

her on social media. This left Mr. Savard with no reliable way to contact Sarah or her

mother. The trial court further found that “Mr. Savard regularly checks Facebook for

pictures of [Sarah]. He prints them out and keeps them in an album. While he has

been blocked from Facebook by most of Ms. Roberto’s family, he still finds a way to

find those pictures.”

      The trial court also found that Mr. Savard had reached out to Ms. Roberto

about adding Sarah to his “insurance,” but Ms. Roberto never responded. Taking this

information together, the trial court concluded that Ms. Roberto knew how to contact

“Mr. Savard when it benefited [sic] her but ignored him at all other times” and this

“benefitted her agenda which was to terminate [Mr. Savard’s] parental rights.”

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      On 25 July 2019, Ms. Roberto had Sarah’s last name legally changed from

Savard to Roberto. No service was effectuated on Mr. Savard, and “[h]e had no clue

his child’s name had been changed and had absolutely no notice of the proceedings.”

At the time of the trial court’s 8 June 2021 order, Sarah was seven years old and had

“no clue that Mr. Savard [wa]s her father.” Ultimately, the trial court found that Mr.

Roberto and Ms. Roberto had planned to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights since

at least 2018 and Ms. Roberto had “actively hindered and . . . precluded Mr. Savard

from being part of [Sarah’s] life.”

      On 22 June 2020, Ms. Roberto filed a petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s

parental rights. She alleged that grounds for termination existed under N.C.G.S. §§

7B-1111(a)(1), (4), and (7) for neglect, failure to pay child support, and willful

abandonment of Sarah. On 10 September 2020, Mr. Savard filed his answer. The case

was heard in the trial court on 28 January 2021 and 18 March 2021. The trial court

entered its order on 8 June 2021, denying Ms. Roberto’s petition and concluding that

Ms. Roberto had failed to establish grounds to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental

rights. The trial court concluded that Sarah was not neglected, nor had Mr. Savard

“willfully failed without justification,” to pay child support for Sarah or “willfully”

abandoned Sarah. Ms. Roberto appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously

affirmed the trial court’s order. In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. 149 (2022). Now, we affirm

the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the denial of the petition to terminate Mr.

Savard’s parental rights but modify its decision to clarify the correct standard of

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review at both the adjudication and the dispositional stage.

                             II.   Standard of Review

      There are two stages involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding.

In re Q.P.W., 376 N.C. 738, 741 (2021). These are the adjudication stage and the

dispositional stage. Id. A different standard of review applies to each stage. Id. “At

the adjudication stage, the party petitioning for the termination must show by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental

rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247 (1997). If “[a] trial court’s finding of fact

. . . is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence[, it will be] deemed

conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary

finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019). We review whether the findings of

fact support the conclusions of law, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In

re K.N., 381 N.C. 823, 827 (2022) (citing In re S.C.L.R., 378 N.C. 484, 489 (2021)).

       At the dispositional stage, the trial court’s assessment of the best interests of

the child is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 560 (2020).

“[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by

reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)). “We review

the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are supported

by competent evidence.” Id. (quoting In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020)), mindful

that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 provides that at the disposition stage “[t]he court may

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consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801,

that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best

interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).

      Moreover, as is always true, a mistake of law is an abuse of discretion. State v.

Rhodes, 366 N.C. 532, 536 (2013) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996) (“[An abuse of discretion] standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond

appellate correction. A [trial] court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes

an error of law.” (citation omitted)). At the dispositional stage, as with the

adjudication stage, the trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on

appeal. In re Q.P.W., 376 N.C. at 741. Because the present case did not proceed past

the adjudication stage, the proper standard of review in this case first requires this

Court to assess whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence even if the record contains evidence that would

support a contrary finding. In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 379.

                       III.    The Child Support Order

      A trial court may terminate parental rights if

             [o]ne parent has been awarded custody of the juvenile by
             judicial decree or has custody by agreement of the parents,
             and the other parent whose parental rights are sought to
             be terminated has for a period of one year or more next
             preceding the filing of the petition or motion willfully failed
             without justification to pay for the care, support, and
             education of the juvenile, as required by the decree or
             custody agreement.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) (2021). In In re C.L.H., this Court explained that the party

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petitioning for termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) must

show “the existence of a support order that was enforceable during the year before

the termination petition was filed.” 376 N.C. 614, 620 (2021) (quoting In re I.R.L., 263

N.C. App. 481, 485 (2019)). There, this Court concluded that because the trial court

had not made any “findings of fact that a child support order existed in the year prior

to the filing of the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights,” those factual

findings could not support termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4). Id. at

621.

       Ms. Roberto argues that, although “not explicit, it is apparent” the trial court

and the Court of Appeals accepted that the child support order existed and was

enforceable. Ms. Roberto also argues that Mr. Savard also accepted this as true,

stating in his brief to the Court of Appeals that “[a]n [o]rder establishing Mr. Savard’s

child support obligation was entered on 24 November 2014.” Ms. Roberto states that

because of this admission and implicit acceptance of a child support order existing

and being enforceable, the trial court and Court of Appeals both erred in concluding

Mr. Savard’s parental rights could not be terminated.

       However, the Court of Appeals found that although there was evidence in the

record to support termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4),

the trial court did not make any findings of fact to this effect. In re S.R., 283 N.C.

App. at 159–60. In doing so, the Court of Appeals analogized the present case to In re

C.L.H., determining that a trial court must make findings of fact as to whether a

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support order exists. Id. at 159. In In re C.L.H., this Court concluded that when “the

trial court fails to make findings of fact indicating that a child support order existed

or that the parent failed to pay support as required by the child support order, its

findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that grounds for termination exist

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).” In re C.L.H., 376 N.C. at 620 (cleaned up).

Here, the trial court only made findings that Mr. Savard paid child support and that

his child support payments stopped after Ms. Roberto elected to stop garnishment of

his wages through North Carolina Centralized Collections. However, the trial court

did not make a finding that an order existed requiring Mr. Savard to pay child

support.

      Ms. Roberto urges this Court to apply In re Faircloth, which states that “by

failing to deny . . . certain allegations contained in the petition, [the respondent], in

fact, admitted” those allegations. 153 N.C. App. 565, 576 (2002). However, not only is

this case not binding on this Court, but here Ms. Roberto had the burden of proof and

cannot satisfy that burden simply by alleging unproven assertions that are not

directly denied. See In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626, 632 (2020) (“At the adjudicatory

stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-

1111(a) of the General Statutes.” (quoting In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019))).

Accordingly, the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that no grounds

to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) was

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correct. See In re C.L.H., 376 N.C. at 620.

      Furthermore, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) requires that “for a period of one year

or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion” a parent act “willfully”

and “without justification [in failing] to pay for the care, support, and education of

the juvenile, as required by the decree or custody agreement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(4). To this effect, the trial court found that in the “one year or more next

preceding the filing of the petition,” Mr. Savard had not “willfully failed without

justification to pay for [Sarah’s] care, support and education . . . as required by decree

or custody agreement.” Thus, the trial court properly concluded that Mr. Savard’s

parental rights should not be terminated pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).

      Because we find that the trial court made no findings of fact related to the

existence of a child support order or the willfulness of the respondent’s failure to pay

during the relevant period of time, we affirm that grounds were not established to

terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).

      Subsection 7B-1111(a) provides that “[t]he court may terminate the parental

rights” if it finds “one or more” of the grounds enumerated in the statute. N.C.G.S. §

7B-1111(a) (2021) (emphasis added). Here, while the trial court found that Mr.

Savard had stopped making child support payments once Ms. Roberto stopped the

wage garnishment through North Carolina Centralized Collections, it also found that

Ms. Roberto never informed Mr. Savard he was required to make child support

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payments directly to her.2 Moreover, according to the trial court’s findings, Ms.

Roberto tried to use Mr. Savard’s resulting child support debt as a bargaining chip,

promising to forgive the debt if he relinquished his parental rights to Sarah.

       The trial court also found that Ms. Roberto previously consulted an attorney

who counseled her to stop the wage garnishment so that if Mr. Savard failed to pay

child support, she could use that as a ground to seek termination of his parental

rights. Importantly, in weighing the evidence before it, the trial court determined

that Ms. Roberto “knew how to reach out to Mr. Savard when it benefitted her but

ignored him at all other times,” and this “benefit[t]ed [Ms. Roberto’s] agenda which

was to terminate [Mr. Savard’s] parental rights.” In the end, after weighing the

evidence, the trial court concluded the grounds necessary to terminate Mr. Savard’s

parental rights were not present.

       However, because this case involves the adjudication phase in a termination of

parental rights proceeding, the abuse of discretion standard is not applicable. Thus,

to the extent the Court of Appeals opinion could be read to be applying an abuse of

discretion standard at the adjudication stage, we modify that portion of the decision

and note the correct standard of appellate review at this stage is whether the findings

       2 Our decision should not be read as stating that a parent does not have a duty to “pay
a reasonable portion of the [financial] cost of care for [their] children.” See In re S.E., 373 N.C.
360, 366 (2020) (explaining that a parent “cannot hide behind a cloak of ignorance to assert
her failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children was not willful.”)
As we said in that case, “[t]he absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a requirement
to pay support is not a defense to a parent’s obligation to pay reasonable costs, because
parents have an inherent duty to support their children.” Id. (cleaned up).

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of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and whether the

findings support the conclusions of law. In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 379.

                       IV.    Neglect and Abandonment

   Although the Court of Appeals did not complete an analysis of these termination

grounds, it concluded that the record did not support termination on either ground.

In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. at 158. Our review of the record yields the same result.

Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) parental rights can be terminated if the “parent has

. . . neglected the juvenile . . . within the meaning of [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-101.” Under the

statute, a neglected juvenile is

             [a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age (i) who is found to
             be a minor victim of human trafficking under G.S. 14-43.15
             or (ii) whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does
             any of the following:

                 a. Does not provide proper care, supervision, or
                    discipline.

                 b. Has abandoned the juvenile.

                 c. Has not provided or arranged for the provision of
                    necessary medical or remedial care.

                 d. Or whose parent, guardian, or custodian has refused
                    to follow the recommendations of the Juvenile and
                    Family Team made pursuant to Article 27A of this
                    Chapter.

                 e. Creates or allows to be created a living environment
                    that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.

                 f. Has participated or attempted to participate in the
                    unlawful transfer of custody of the juvenile under
                    G.S. 14-321.2.

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                g. Has placed the juvenile for care or adoption in
                   violation of law.

             In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile,
             it is relevant whether that juvenile lives in a home where
             another juvenile has died as a result of suspected abuse or
             neglect or lives in a home where another juvenile has been
             subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly
             lives in the home.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2021). Grounds of abandonment are established where a

             parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six
             consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
             petition or motion, or the parent has voluntarily
             abandoned an infant pursuant to G.S. 7B-500 for at least
             60 consecutive days immediately preceding the filing of the
             petition or motion.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Because the Court of Appeals determined the record did not

support either of these grounds it necessarily concluded the trial court’s findings of

fact were supported by competent evidence. In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. at 158.

      First, regarding termination on the ground of neglect, Ms. Roberto asserts that

parental rights can be terminated for neglect if a parent neglects their child by

abandonment, citing In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020). The relevant period

for determining neglect by abandonment “is not limited to the six consecutive months

immediately preceding the filing of a termination petition.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71,

81 (2019). In some cases “a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights based on

neglect that is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing.” In re M.A.,

378 N.C. 462, 466 (2021). “However, for other forms of neglect, the fact that ‘a child

has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the

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termination hearing’ would make ‘requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to

show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . impossible.’ ” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80). In those cases, “evidence

of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child . . . is admissible in subsequent

proceedings to terminate parental rights,” but “[t]he trial court must also consider

any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the

probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re

Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984)). If after weighing the evidence the trial court finds

“a likelihood of future neglect by the parent,” then it can find a neglect ground to

terminate parental rights. Id. (quoting In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020)).

      Ms. Roberto claims that the trial court impermissibly limited its review to the

six months before Ms. Roberto filed the petition. However, this is incorrect as the trial

court explicitly noted “[t]he history of this case is extremely relevant in the analysis

of this matter,” and given that the trial court’s findings of fact go as far back as 2014,

there is no reason to conclude that the relevant history was limited to the six months

before Ms. Roberto filed her petition. Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated

that it reviewed Mr. Savard’s conduct outside of the six-month window to assess his

credibility. See In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 22 (2019) (“[T]he trial court may consider a

parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility

and intentions . . . .” (quoting In re D.M.O., 250 N.C. App. 570, 573 (2016))).

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      Ms. Roberto also argues that the trial court did not ask whether Mr. Savard

previously neglected Sarah or whether there was a likelihood of future neglect if

Sarah was placed in Mr. Savard’s care. Ms. Roberto points to Mr. Savard’s prior

suicidal behavior as proof that he “assaulted Ms. Roberto in Sarah’s presence” and

that there was a likelihood of future neglect because Mr. Savard has not adequately

addressed his mental health needs. See In re G.C., No. 241A22, 2023 WL 2799798, at

*5 (N.C. Apr. 6, 2023) (“[T]here must be some physical, mental, or emotional

impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence

of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.” (cleaned up)). But Ms.

Roberto’s characterization of Mr. Savard’s suicidal ideation as an assault is not

supported by the trial court’s findings of fact. Rather, the trial court found that

although Mr. Savard had threatened suicide in Ms. Roberto’s presence, he was “not

threatening or combative” towards her or their unborn child, Sarah. Accordingly, the

Court of Appeals was correct in holding that no grounds existed to terminate Mr.

Savard’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

      Second, regarding termination on the ground of willful abandonment, the

determinative period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive

months preceding the filing of the petition. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7); In re A.A.M.,

379 N.C. 167, 172 (2021). “Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent

which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish

all parental claims to the child.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19 (quoting In re Young,

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346 N.C. at 251). Willful “intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a

question of fact to be determined from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257

N.C. 486, 501 (1962)). “If a parent withholds that parent’s presence, . . . love, . . . care,

the opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend support and

maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.”

Id. (cleaned up).

       Ms. Roberto asserts that our holding in In re C.B.C. is instructive in analyzing

Mr. Savard’s actions during the relevant six-month period from 22 December 2019 to

22 June 2020. In In re C.B.C., this Court determined the parent had willfully

abandoned his daughter because he did not make an effort to pursue a relationship

with her. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 23. Specifically, the parent did not send cards or

letters or contact the petitioners to ask about the child’s well-being. Id. The parent

also did not take steps to modify the custody order, resume visitation, or provide

financial support for his daughter. Id. Although Ms. Roberto argues that Mr. Savard’s

actions are like that of the parent in In re C.B.C., the trial court saw the evidence

differently. Namely, the trial court found that “[w]hile Mr. Savard [had] not made

valiant efforts to forge a relationship with his daughter, he [had] made some efforts”

and these efforts were “often times . . . thwarted by Ms. Roberto.” Indeed, the trial

court found that “Ms. Roberto has actively hindered and essentially precluded Mr.

Savard from being part of [Sarah]’s life.” Perhaps most importantly, the trial court

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also found that Mr. Savard had “not shown an intention to give up all parental rights

to [Sarah].”

      While Ms. Roberto claims that In re C.B.C. is instructive, that case does not

contemplate a situation, such as here, where one parent actively thwarts the other

parent’s ability to have a relationship with their child. Furthermore, to the extent

that Ms. Roberto claims that her efforts to preclude Mr. Savard from being a part of

Sarah’s life were justified by Mr. Savard’s prior domestic violence towards her, the

trial court did not make any findings of fact to support that any abuse had occurred.

The trial court made no findings that Mr. Savard had sexually assaulted Ms. Roberto

or that he had threatened her with a gun. Furthermore, as noted above, and as it

relates to Mr. Savard’s suicidal behavior, the trial court found that when Mr. Savard

threatened suicide, he was not acting in a manner that was “threatening or

combative” towards Ms. Roberto or their unborn child. Thus, based on the record

before it, the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude that no grounds existed to

terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights for willful abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1111(a)(7).

      We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and hold that there are no grounds to

terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights to Sarah pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(1), (4), or (7). We modify the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent the

Court of Appeals’ decision could be read to be applying an abuse of discretion standard

of review at the adjudicatory stage of this proceeding to reiterate that our review at

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the adjudicatory stage is to determine whether there is clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact, and whether the

findings of fact support the conclusions of law.

      MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

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