Court Opinion

ID: 9353096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:04:36.066994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:32.790754
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                               FIRST CIRCUIT

                               NO. 2022 KA 0314

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                   VERSUS

                           DKERIAN THOMPSON

                               Judgment Rendered.   JAN 10 2023

                               Appealed from the
                          2 V Judicial District Court
                      In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa
                               State of Louisiana
                               Case No. 1701.099

                The Honorable Erika Sledge, Judge Presiding

Scott M. Perrilloux                  Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney                    State of Louisiana
Brett Sommer
Assistant District Attorney
Amite, LA

Katherine Franks                     Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Madisonville, LA                     Dkerian Thompson

             BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.

       The defendant, Dkerian Thompson, was charged by grand jury indictment

with one count of second degree murder, in violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)(2), to

which he pled not guilty.' Following a trial by jury,                 the defendant,     who     was

seventeen years old at the time of the offense, was found guilty of second degree

murder.     The trial court denied the defendant' s motion for new trial and motion for

post -verdict   judgment     of   acquittal,   and   sentenced         the   defendant     to    life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence.

       The defendant now appeals, designating five assignments of error: (                  1)   the

State improperly exercised peremptory challenges against prospective jurors on the

basis of race; ( 2) the introduction of a witness' s prior recorded statement through

the testimony of an investigating officer, rather than through the witness himself,

violated the defendant' s right to confront witnesses against him; ( 3) the statement

of a non -testifying witness, offered through the testimony of the investigating

officer, was inadmissible hearsay; ( 4) the admission of a non -testifying witness' s

identification of the defendant was improper;            and (   5)    the trial court erred in

sentencing the defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole,                probation,     or   suspension     of

sentence.

       For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, amend the sentence to

life imprisonment with the possibility of parole,              probation,     or   suspension     of

sentence,    pursuant to La. R. S.     15: 574. 4( G),   and   as     amended,     we   affirm   the

sentence, and remand with instructions.

                                           FACTS

1 Also indicted for second degree murder were co- defendants Tony Johnson, Jr., Jeremiah Ray,
and Shauna Broussard. The State tried the defendants separately.

                                               2
        On August 18, 2016, the victim, Christopher Franklin, returned home from

his place of work at the Fastlane Carwash in Hammond, Louisiana. Mr. Franklin

lived with his sister, Jeannette Scott, and her boyfriend, Don Tolbert, at 213

Methvien Drive in Ponchatoula, Louisiana. When Ms. Scott returned home from

work at approximately midnight on August 19, 2016, she noticed that the front

door and a window were both open, and the window screen was on the ground.

After calling the victim' s name and hearing no response,     Ms. Scott called her

stepfather and boyfriend to tell them that something was not right.     Ms. Scott' s

stepfather, Lyntrell Hemphill, told her to drive to the nearby Wal- Mart where he

met her a few minutes later.   They returned to 213 Methvien Drive, whereupon Mr.

Hemphill and Mr. Tolbert entered the residence.     Shortly thereafter, the victim' s

body was found on the floor of his bedroom with a fatal shotgun wound to his

head.

        The Ponchatoula Police Department' s investigation of the victim' s death

stalled, without generating a suspect.   However, in February of 2017, Ponchatoula

Police Detective R.J. Hill was contacted by the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab,

who notified him that some of the fingerprints collected at 213 Methvien Drive

were identified as a match to a man named Tony Johnson, Jr.,     who was currently

incarcerated in Livingston Parish. At that point, Special Agent Matt Vasquez with

the Louisiana Bureau of Investigation was brought in to assist in the investigation.

They began by interviewing Mario Tate, a neighbor who lived next door to the

victim and who witnessed some of the events that transpired the night of his death.

In a recorded statement, Mr. Tate informed the officers that he was sitting in his

vehicle on the night of the victim' s murder when he saw a pickup truck pass the

residence twice before stopping nearby. Mr. Tate stated he saw two males, a tall

one holding a shotgun and a shorter one holding a handgun,           get out   of the

passenger side of the vehicle.   He then saw them remove a screen, open the front

                                           3
window, and climb inside the house. A few minutes later, Mr. Tate observed them

running out the front door of the home.

      After interviewing Mr. Tate, the officers travelled to Livingston Parish to

interview Mr. Johnson, whose fingerprints were found on the window at 213

Methvien Drive. During the first interview, Mr. Johnson denied any involvement

in the victim' s death.     However, after he was informed that a witness saw two

people enter the house through the front window, and that his fingerprints were

found on that window, Mr.          Johnson requested his attorney and the interview

ceased. At that point, Mr. Johnson was arrested and booked for the murder of

Christopher Franklin. While there, the officers obtained Mr. Johnson' s DNA

sample.

      After departing the jail, the officers received a call that Mr. Johnson wished

to speak to them again. Once the officers            returned, Mr. Johnson revoked his

previous   request   for    his   attorney' s   presence   and   proceeded   to   detail   his

involvement in the victim' s murder. Mr. Johnson stated that he did not know the

name of the person who went into the home with him, referring to him only by his

nickname, "   Lah Juice."    Mr. Johnson stated that the other two people with them

that night were a female named Shauna and Lah Juice' s brother, " Lah Jay."                Mr.

Johnson pulled up the Facebook accounts of Lah Juice, Lah Jay, and Shauna, and

provided the officers with their pictures.

      The officers attempted to locate Lah Juice by looking through his social

media and photographs, wherein they discerned that Lah Juice attended Hammond

High School.    Using the photographs, administrators at Hammond High School

were able to identify Lah Juice as the defendant, Dkerian Thompson, and Lah Jay

as the defendant' s brother, Jeremiah Ray. The officers then returned to Livingston

Parish to speak with Mr.          Johnson about the information they gathered.             Mr.

Johnson confirmed that the defendant was the person who entered the home with

                                                4
him, and that Shauna Broussard and Jeremiah Ray were also in the vehicle that

night.

         Pursuant to the information provided by Mr. Johnson, the officers issued

arrest warrants for the defendant, Ms. Broussard, and Mr. Ray for the murder of

Christopher Franklin.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 1

         In   his     first assignment     of error, the   defendant argues that the             State

improperly exercised peremptory challenges against prospective jurors on the basis

of race.

         In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93- 98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721- 1724, 90

L.Ed.2d 69 ( 1986),        the United States Supreme Court adopted a three-step analysis

to determine whether the constitutional rights of a defendant or prospective jurors

have been infringed upon by impermissible discriminatory practices.                       First, the

defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised

peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has

been     made,      the burden     shifts to the prosecutor to articulate          a race -neutral

explanation for striking the jurors in question.                Finally,   the   trial   court   must

determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination.         State v. Handon, 2006- 0131 (       La. App. 1st Cir.      12/ 28/ 06), 952

So. 2d 53, 56, see also Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499, 136 S. Ct. 1737,

1747,    195 L.Ed.2d 1 (        2016).     The Constitution forbids striking even a single

prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.            Foster, 578 U.S. at 499.

         The race -neutral reasons for excusal need not present an explanation that is

persuasive,      or    even   plausible;   unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the

State' s explanation after review of the entire record, the reason offered will be

deemed race -neutral.           Handon, 952 So. 2d at 58.         For a Batson challenge to

succeed, it is not enough that a discriminatory result be evidenced; rather, the result

                                                   5
must ultimately be traced to a prohibited discriminatory purpose.                          Thus, the sole

focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the opposing party at the time he

exercised his peremptory strikes. See State v. Green, 94- 0887 ( La. 5/ 22/ 95),                        655

So. 2d    272,    287.       A reviewing       court       owes   the   trial   court' s   evaluation    of

discriminatory intent great deference, and should not reverse it unless it is clearly
erroneous.       Handon, 952 So. 2d at 58.            See also State v. Jackson, 2016- 1565 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 10/ 12/ 17), 232 So. 3d 628, 633, writ denied, 2017- 1944 ( La. 5/ 25/ 18),

243 So. 3d 566.

         The defendant raised a Batson challenge after the State exercised its third

peremptory challenge.           At that point, the State had exercised each of its three

peremptory challenges to excuse African American jurors; namely, Michelle

Jackson, Tidy Jones, and Datta Drake. The State proceeded to offer race -neutral

explanations for its use of peremptory strikes absent an affirmative finding from

the trial court that the defense had satisfied its prima facie burden.

         1,   Michelle Jackson

         With respect to Michelle Jackson, the State argued that according to Ms.

Jackson' s Facebook account, Ms. Jackson "                  has very unsavory posts concerning

police officers and their safety."           The State did not present any evidence of Ms.

Jackson' s Facebook posts, other than its own assertions.                       The defendant did not

object to those assertions,          but only re -urged his Batson challenge.2 The State

2 The defendant during voir dire also asked Ms. Jackson:
         Q: [     I] f there isn' t any scientific evidence, would you be able to return a
         verdict of guilty if you believe the State' s eyewitness?
         A;      No, sir.
         Q:      You would not. So you would require some type of scientific evidence?
         A;      Most definitely.

The defendant then attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Jackson by asking:
       Q.     But if the judge were to tell you in Louisiana, the State is not required to
              put on any form of DNA or fingerprints ... if you believe one witness and
                 you believe that that witness is credible ...     you can believe that witness
                 and return a verdict of guilty ...   is that something you can follow or not?
         A:      I cannot.

                                                       J
contended     that     Ms.   Jackson' s   Facebook      account     contradicted   her   previous

testimony regarding her attitude towards law enforcement, wherein she stated the

following in response to the State' s questioning:

       Q: . . .        How do you feel about police officers and me calling police
                  officers to the stand?
                                      Have you had a wonderful relationship with
                  police officers in the past?
       A:         I don' t bother them and they don' t bother me.
       Q:         Have you ever gotten any traffic tickets?
       A:         Yeah.

       Q:         And how were those experiences?
       A:         I said, give me my ticket and let me go.
       Q:         At this point, though, you will not hold any bad experiences
                  against these police officers?

       A:         No, ma' am.

       While Ms. Jackson stated that she would not hold any personal experiences

against the law enforcement officers testifying in this case, hostility towards law

enforcement is a valid race -neutral explanation for striking a prospective juror.

See State v. Wilson, 40, 767 (       La. App. 2d Cir. 8123106),         938 So. 2d 1111, 1135,

writ denied, 2006- 2323 ( La. 4120107), 954 So. 2d 159, cert. denied, 552 U. S. 917,

128 S. Ct, 275, 169 L.Ed. 2d 201 ( 2007) (           finding that striking a prospective juror

who expressed hostility toward the police was a race -neutral reason, particularly

where law enforcement witnesses were scheduled to testify).

       2. Tidy Jones

       As to Ms. Jones, the State argued that she " was completely confused every

time that I would ask her a question[,]"             and could not remember the questions

which were being asked to the panel. The record reflects that after being asked

more than once by the State if, after it were proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant was guilty, she could return a verdict of guilty, Ms. Jones appeared

We find this to be a race -neutral reason for excluding Ms. Jackson; however, the State
did not present this reason during the Batson challenge. Nevertheless, the trial court
would have known of this race -neutral basis for excusing Ms. Jackson. Since we must
give the trial court great deference in evaluating discriminatory intent, we do not find any
clear error on the part of the trial court for denying the Batson challenge with respect to
Ms. Jackson. See State v. Draughn, 2005- 1825 ( La. 1117107), 950 So. 2d 583, 600, cert.
denied, 522 U. S. 1012, 12.8 S. Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 ( 2007).

                                                 7
confused by the questions and gave conflicting responses.                    Ultimately,   it was

unclear whether Ms. Jones could render a verdict of either guilty or not guilty.

We find that weakness or hesitancy to render a verdict to be a valid race -neutral

explanation for striking Ms. Jones.     See Green, 655 So. 2d at 289 (              finding that

striking a prospective juror who expressed weakness in her willingness to apply the

death penalty was a race -neutral reason).

      3. Datia Drake

      Although the State did not address its peremptory challenge of Ms. Drake

following the defendant' s Batson challenge, the State previously attempted to

strike Ms. Drake for cause, citing that Ms. Drake " has too much going on in her

mind and she is all over the place."   Ms. Drake explained that she was working on

her master' s degree and had assignments due, and that she was preoccupied with

work being done on her home due to hurricane damage.             The record indeed reflects

that Ms. Drake previously testified that she was " mentally all over the place" due

to her ongoing school commitments and home repairs.

      In response to the State' s proffered race -neutral explanations, the defendant

argued only that the State' s reasons were "      generic"   in nature, and that other jurors

who had answered similarly to the stricken jurors were rehabilitated. He did not

offer any facts or circumstances to support an inference that the State exercised its

strikes against the three prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner.

      The trial court denied the defendant' s objection,             stating that Ms. Drake' s

concerns about her schoolwork and the work being done at her home were an

acceptable   race -neutral   explanation.    The     trial   court     did    not   address   the

explanations offered for Ms. Jackson or Ms. Jones.            Nonetheless, after reviewing

the record as a whole and considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that

the State' s race -neutral explanations were reasonable, and the proffered rationales

had some basis in accepted trial strategy.       See Handon, 952 So. 2d at 59.

                                             8
       Therefore, we find that the trial court' s acceptance of the State' s race -neutral

reasons for peremptorily striking Michelle Jackson, Tidy Jones, and Datia Drake

was not clearly erroneous.           As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court' s denial of the defendant' s Batson challenges regarding these prospective

jurors. This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 2

       1n his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court

erred in allowing Mario Tate' s recorded statement to be introduced through the

testimony of Special Agent Matt Vasquez even though Mr. Tate was an available

witness.      Specifically,   the defendant argues that introduction of the statement

through a witness other than Mr. Tate deprived the defendant of his opportunity to

confront Mr. Tate regarding his prior statement.

       Louisiana Code of Evidence article 607 permits the introduction of a prior

inconsistent statement,       even though it is inadmissible hearsay, for the limited

purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness. See State v, Harper, 2007- 0299

 La.   App.    1st Cir. 9/ 5107),    970 So. 2d 592, 601,          writ denied, 2007- 1921 ( La.

2115108), 976 So. 2d 173.           Louisiana Code of Evidence article 607 provides the

following, in pertinent part:

   A. Who may attack credibility. The credibility of a witness may be
      attacked by any party, including the party calling him.

   D. Attacking credibility extrinsically. Except as otherwise provided by
       legislation:

        2)      Other    extrinsic             including prior inconsistent
                                         evidence,

                statements and evidence contradicting the witness' testimony, is
                admissible when offered solely to attack the credibility of a
                witness unless the court determines that the probative value of
                the   evidence      on   the   issue     of   credibility   is   substantially
                outweighed     by     the   risks   of   undue     consumption      of   time,
                confusion of the issues, or unfair prejudice.

                                                    9
       When seeking to introduce evidence of a prior inconsistent statement,                        a

proper foundation must be established. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 613

provides:

       Except as the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence
       of bias, interest, corruption, or prior inconsistent statements,
       conviction          or defects of capacity is admissible after the
                       of crime,

       proponent has first fairly directed the witness' attention to the
       statement, act, or matter alleged, and the witness has been given the
       opportunity to admit the fact and has failed distinctly to do so.

       In State v. Harper, the defendant objected to the State' s introduction of two

witness statements where the defendant argued that the State failed to provide the

proper foundation for the statements, and that the statements were improperly used

for their substance rather than for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility

of the witnesses.       Harper, 970 So.2d at 600- 01.              At trial, two of the State' s

witnesses testified that the defendant, who was charged with simple kidnapping,

did not have a knife on the night in question.                However, both witnesses signed

prior written statements indicating that the defendant threatened the victim by

holding a knife to her throat.       Id.   After both witnesses acknowledged that they had

signed the written statements, the statements were introduced over the defendant' s

objection.   Id.

       This court found that a proper foundation was laid in accordance with La.

Code Evid.      art.   613,   and   that   the   statements    were    admissible    to   attack   the

credibility of the witnesses, pursuant to La. Code Evid. art. 607( D)( 2).                Moreover,

this court found that, under La. Code Evid. art. SO 1( D)( 1)(            a),   the statements were

not hearsay, and thus, were admissible not only to impeach the witnesses, but as

substantive proof of the offense.          Harper, 970 So. 2d at 601.

       Despite previously providing a recorded statement to Special Agent Vasquez

during the investigation, Mr. Tate was an evasive and reluctant trial witness.'                    Mr.

  The State requested that Mr, Tate be treated as a hostile witness.            However, the defense
objected to the State' s request and the trial court sustained the objection.

                                                  10
Tate was asked repeatedly about what he observed on the night the victim was

killed, to which Mr. Tate responded that he could not remember, and that he had

nothing to do with what went on that night. Specifically,                     Mr. Tate was asked

whether he saw two people going through the window. Despite having previously

described, in considerable detail, witnessing two individuals remove the screen and

enter the home through the front window, Mr. Tate testified that the only thing he

saw was somebody knocking on the front door with a gun, at which point he ran

inside. When questioned about his prior recorded statement, Mr.                         Tate initially

stated that he did not remember giving a statement.                    However, Mr. Tate later

acknowledged during his testimony that he gave a statement to the investigators,

although he was unsure whether it was recorded.

       The following exchange then occurred between Mr. Tate and the State:

       Q:      If I played that statement and it says that you described one as
               being 5' 11 and slim and the other subject was shorter, carrying
               a handgun, would that be what you recall as to the reason why
               you ran inside?

       A:      I don' t believe that that' s what happened, ma' am, but you can
               play the tape. I don' t remember nothing being recorded or no
               tape or nothing with me saying that.

       Immediately following this exchange and without introducing Mr. Tate' s

statement, the State tendered the witness.             Mr. Tate was excused following cross-

examination, but he was not released from his subpoena.                      Later in the trial, the

State called Special Agent Matt Vasquez to testify.                        Special Agent Vasquez

confirmed that he took Mr. Tate' s recorded statement during the course of his

investigation, at which point the State, over defense objection, offered Mr. Tate' s

                                                               4
statement into evidence and played it for the jury.

4 The following discussion took place regarding the defendant' s objection:
       Defense:       Your Honor, the Defense raises an objection to the statement being
                      played   without   the [   witness' s]   presence.     The [   witness]   is
                      available.   He is not unavailable pursuant to the rules of the

                                                  11
        A review of the record reflects that a proper foundation was established

prior to the introduction of Mr. Tate' s statement.                        Once the foundation was

properly established pursuant to La. Code Evid. art. 613, evidence of Mr. Tate' s

prior inconsistent statement was admissible to attack his credibility.                           La. Code

Evid. art. 607( D)( 2).       When a non- party witness' s credibility is attacked through

prior inconsistent statements,             the evidence is generally not admissible for its

assertive value as substantive evidence of guilt.                   State v. Owunta, 99- 1569 ( La.

5126100), 761 So. 2d 528, 529 (            per curiam).      An exception to this general rule is

codified in La. Code Evid. art. 801( D)( 1)(          a),
                                                            which provides the following:

       D. Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:

         1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
            hearing and is subject to cross- examination concerning the
            statement, and the statement is:

         a) In a criminal case, inconsistent with his testimony, provided that
            the proponent has first fairly directed the witness' attention to the
            statement and the witness has been given the opportunity to admit
            the   fact    and      where    there   exists    any    additional       evidence    to
            corroborate       the     matter    asserted       by    the    prior     inconsistent
            statement.]

                         hearsay exception; and, for those reasons, we would object to his
                         recorded statement being played.
                                   We would take notice that the [         witness]   was here and
                         testified,   although he   stated    on the record that he couldn' t
                         remember certain things.         He did testify, making him available;
                         and, for those reasons, we would object to the playing of this
                         record.

        The State:       Right.    But I couldn' t play it with him because he only stated the
                         fact that it was recorded and that he was there to do it, but 1 needed
                         the officer to say that it was recorded to finish laying my
                         foundation. He admitted to the statement being given and taken.

        The Court:       The statement has already been admitted into evidence.

        The State:       Right.

        The Court:       I' m going to overrule the objection.

Accordingly, the specific nature of the defendant' s objection is not apparent from the record, and
therefore, it is unclear whether the statements were admitted for impeachment only, or for their
assertive value as well. Having failed to specify the grounds for the objection, it is assumed that
the statement was admitted for both purposes. See State v. Rankin, 42, 412 ( La. App. 2d Cir.
9/ 19107), 965 So. 2d 946, 951, writ denied, 2007- 2067 ( La. 3/ 7/ 08), 977 So. 2d 897.

                                                     12
       Here, Mr. Tate testified at trial and was cross- examined regarding the prior
statement.    Moreover, Mr. Tate' s      prior statement was inconsistent with his

testimony. However, because Mr. Tate' s statement was not introduced while Mr.

Tate   was   testifying, but   rather   was   introduced   after   Mr.     Tate' s testimony

concluded,    through the testimony of Special Agent Vasquez, the defendant

contends that he was unable to cross- examine Mr. Tate regarding the contents of

the statement.

       In State v. Rankin, 42,412 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 9119/ 07),      965 So. 2d 946, 951,

writ denied, 2007- 2067 ( La. 317108), 977 So. 2d 897, the defendant was convicted

of the second degree battery of his girlfriend.       The girlfriend provided several

statements in which she told police that the defendant caused her injuries.

However, at trial, she recanted her prior accounts of the incident and denied giving

a statement to the police.      Id. at 947- 50.     She later acknowledged giving a

statement after being confronted with it by the State.     Id. at 949. Officers with the

Mansfield Police Department then testified as to the content of the victim' s

statements regarding the injuries inflicted upon her by the defendant.           Id. at 950.

The Rankin court found that where other facts elicited at trial supported the

victim' s earlier statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming

the statements admissible under La. Code Evid. an. 801( D)( 1)(      a).

       The facts in the instant case are similar to Rankin where, after the witness

acknowledged giving a statement, the contents of the prior inconsistent statement

were admitted through the officer to whom the statement was given.             Also, like in

Rankin,   additional evidence corroborated the facts offered by Mr.             Tate' s prior

inconsistent statement.    Mr. Franklin' s sister testified that when she arrived at

home after work, the front window screen was laying on the ground.                   Special

Agent Vasquez testified that Mr. Johnson confirmed that two individuals entered

the home.    And finally, the driver of the vehicle, Ms. Broussard, testified that Mr.

                                              13
Johnson and the defendant went to the victim' s house that night, armed with a

shotgun and a handgun, to rob him of marijuana.               Accordingly, Mr. Tate' s prior

inconsistent statement was admissible for its substantive value pursuant to La.

Code Evid. art. S01( D)( 1)(    a).

       The defendant contends that even if the prior inconsistent statement falls

within the exception set forth in La. Code Evid. art. 801( D)( 1)(            a),    it was still

inadmissible     because   it     violated    the   defendant' s    constitutional     right    of

confrontation.

       The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an

accused in a criminal prosecution the right to be confronted with the witnesses

against him. The confrontation clause of the Louisiana Constitution guarantees an

accused in a criminal prosecution the right " to confront and cross- examine the

witnesses against him[.]"       La. Const. art. I, §    16.   In accordance therewith, the

United States Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 68-

69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( 2004), that out -of court
                                                                 --    testimonial

statements are inadmissible,          regardless of whether they are deemed otherwise

reliable,   unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had the prior

opportunity to cross- examine them.          See also State v, Tsolainos, 2007- 2443 ( La.

App.   1st Cir. 10/ 10/ 08), 997 So. 2d 46, 48 (     per curiam),   writ denied, 2008- 2653

La. 10/ 09/ 09), 19 So. 3d 6.

       The defendant did in fact have the opportunity to confront and cross-

examine     Mr. Tate as    to     both his in -court and his out- of-court statements.

Moreover, as the defense concedes, Mr. Tate was an available witness,                          and

therefore, nothing precluded the defense from re -calling Mr. Tate to address the

contents of his prior inconsistent statement after it was played in full.       Accordingly,

the admission of Mr. Tate' s prior statement did not violate the defendant' s right to

confront his accusers.

                                               14
         Therefore, contrary to the defendant' s various assertions, the admission of

Mr. Tate' s prior statement was not error and this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Nos. 3 & 4

         In his third and fourth assignments of error, the defendant argues that the

trial court erred in allowing Special Agent Vasquez to testify as to the content of

Mr. Johnson' s statements, and specifically to his identification of the defendant.

         Special Agent Vasquez testified that Mr. Johnson told him that the

defendant, Mr. Ray, and. Ms. Broussard were all in the vehicle that went to the

victim' s apartment, and that the defendant was the person who accompanied him

into the home.    Special Agent Vasquez then testified that Mr. Johnson showed him

Facebook pictures of the defendant, Mr. Ray, and Ms. Broussard. Finally, Special

Agent Vasquez testified that when the officers returned to speak with Mr. Johnson

after visiting Hammond High School and identifying Lah Juice as the defendant,

Mr. Johnson confirmed the identification.

         Louisiana Code of Evidence article 501 defines hearsay as a statement, other

than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. The improper

introduction of hearsay evidence will be considered harmless error if it is

determined the hearsay evidence was cumulative and corroborative of other

properly admitted evidence and did not contribute to the verdict.       State v. Dantin,

2019- 0407 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 17! 1. 9), 291 So. 3d 1096, 1102 ( citation omitted).

         Initially, with the exception of a preemptive objection to ensure that the

State did not elicit testimony regarding the defendant' s incriminating social media

posts,   we note that the defendant failed to object to Special Agent Vasquez' s

testimony. The defense generally cannot avail itself of an error that was not

objected to at the time of the occurrence.    La. Code Crim P. art. 541; see also State

v. Arvie, 505 So. 2d 44, 48 ( La. 1957).

                                             15
      Moreover, a thorough review of the trial transcript reveals that the testimony

in question consisted of information relayed to Special Agent Vasquez during his

investigation.     Such testimonial evidence by a police officer is admissible to

explain the sequence of events leading to the defendant' s arrest when there is no

indication the evidence is presented to prejudice the defendant. Dantin, 291 So. 3d

at 1103, citing State v. Mitchell, 2016- 0834 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 9/ 21/ 17),   231 So. 3d

710, 726, writ denied, 2017- 1890 ( La. 8131/ 18), 251 So. 3d 410.

      Here,      the   testimony was   offered   to   explain   how   the   course   of   the

investigation led officers to the defendant, and there is no indication that it was

presented to prejudice him. In fact, the record reflects that both the State and the

witness were extremely careful not to elicit or include testimony regarding the

content of Mr. Johnson' s statement outside the permissible bounds of how that

information furthered the investigation.

      Furthermore, the testimony was cumulative.          Substantial physical evidence

tied Mr. Johnson to the crime scene, including his fingerprints, his DNA, and his

cell phone location data, all of which substantiated his ability to identify the other

individuals who were present that night. Mr. Tate' s statement corroborated Mr,

Johnson' s information that two individuals tried to enter the home. Finally, Ms.

Broussard, who was the defendant' s girlfriend at the time of the victim' s murder,

testified in detail regarding the defendant' s involvement in the crime.                  Ms.

Broussard testified that the reason that she, the defendant, Mr. Johnson, and Mr.

Ray went to the victim' s home was because the defendant heard the victim had

marijuana, and he wanted to " hit a lick[,]" or rob him of the drugs. She further

testified that she was the one who drove the defendant, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Ray

to the victim' s house, and that the defendant and Mr. Johnson both got out of the

vehicle and walked towards the house. Ms. Broussard testified that a few minutes

                                           16
later, Mr. Johnson and the defendant came back to the vehicle, at which point she

heard Mr. Johnson say " I     think I shot him."

        Accordingly, even if admission of the complained of testimony was in error,

such error was harmless.          See La. Code Crim. P. art. 921; Dantin, 291 So. 3d at

1104.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 5

        In his final assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court

erred in sentencing him to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence because he was a juvenile at the time

of the offense and the State withdrew its notice of intent to seek a life sentence

without parole prior to a hearing on the matter.

        A conviction for second degree murder in Louisiana mandates a sentence of

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence.     La. R.S.     14: 30. 1.    However, the United States Supreme Court in

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed. 2d 407 ( 2012) held

that a sentencing scheme that mandates life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against

cruel   and unusual punishment.            In accordance therewith, the Louisiana legislature

specifically amended La. Code Crim. P. art. 878. 1 and La. R.S. 15: 574. 4 to codify

Miller' s holding.

        Louisiana Revised Statutes 15: 574. 4( G) provides, in pertinent part:

         1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person
            serving a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of first
           degree    murder (     R. S.     14: 30)    or   second   degree    murder ( R.S.
           14: 30. 1) who was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the
           commission of the offense and whose indictment for the offense
           was   prior   to    August        1,   2017,     shall   be   eligible   for   parole
           consideration pursuant to the provisions of this Subsection if a
           judicial determination has been made that the person is entitled to
           parole eligibility pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article
           878. 1( B) and ... (    a) The offender has served twenty-five years of
           the sentence imposed[.]

                                                      17
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 878. 1( 13)( 1) reads, in pertinent part:

       If an offender was indicted prior to August 1, 2017, for the crime of
       first degree murder ( R. S.              14: 30)    or second degree murder ( R. S.
       14: 30. 1) where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the
       time of the commission of offense [ and] ...                     the district attorney fails
       to timely file the notice of intent [ to seek a sentence of life without the
       possibility of parole], the offender shall be eligible for parole pursuant
       to R.S. 15: 574. 4( E) without the need of a judicial determination
       pursuant to the provisions of this Article.

       Louisiana Revised Statutes 15: 574.4( E) mandates parole eligibility after

twenty- five years for any juvenile serving a life sentence for a conviction of first

degree murder, and whose indictment for the offense was on or after August 1,

2017, assuming several additional conditions are met.                          Louisiana Revised Statutes

15: 574. 4( F) provides the same mandatory parole eligibility for juveniles convicted

of second degree murder.

       Here, the defendant was indicted for second degree murder on May 9, 2017,

when he was seventeen years old.                 Although the State initially filed a notice of

intent to seek juvenile life without benefit of parole, the State ultimately withdrew

its intent prior to a hearing on the matter. Accordingly, under La. Code Crim. P.

art. 878. 1( B),   the defendant is entitled to parole eligibility without the need of a

judicial determination, and is not eligible for a life sentence imposed without the

possibility of probation, parole,          or     suspension        of sentence.       The defendant was

sentenced on November 15, 2021, pursuant to the following:

       THE COURT:             I denied the post -trial motions, and considering all
                              of the evidence that I also heard during trial, the
                              nature       of the         crime,    the factors enumerated in
                              Code         of     Criminal         Procedure       894. 1,    and     the

                              mandatory sentence listed in 14: 30. 1,                        I sentence
                              the defendant] to life imprisonment with hard
                              labor    without            benefit       of   probation,      parole    or

                              suspension of sentence.

                                       I    am        aware        of    the    mandatory        parole

                              eligibility after 25 years due to [                  the defendant' s]
                              age at the time of the offense.                   So I will order [ the
                              defendant]          to be remanded to the custody of the

                                                      18
                              Department of Corrections to begin serving his
                              sentence.

       THE STATE:             Also, Judge, with that being said, whenever you
                              said       the   sentencing      was    without     benefit    of

                              probation,       parole   or   suspension   of sentence,      you

                              said that you do know about that parole eligibility.
                              I would just ask that in the minutes that you make
                              it clear for the record that you are aware of it, that
                              it    is   without   benefit     of    probation,   parole     or

                              suspension of sentence subject to the 25 [                year]

                              parole eligibility.

       THE COURT:             Correct. That' s what I meant.            If I need to state it
                              again, I will. The sentence is life imprisonment at
                              hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole
                              or    suspension     of sentence;      however, I am aware
                              that there' s mandatory eligibility after 25 years due
                              to [ the defendant' s] age at the time of the offense.

       The minutes reflect the following sentence:

       The court sentenced the             defendant to be committed to the LA
       DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.                            The defendant to serve life.
       Court ordered sentence is to be served without benefit of probation,
       parole     or   suspension   of sentence.        Sentence to be served at Hard
       Labor.     Credit for any and all time served from the date of arrest up
       until today' s date for each and every day that the defendant has
       actually served.       Court informed counsel that she is aware of the
       defendant eligibility for parole after 25 years.

       The State of Louisiana Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order reads that

the defendant' s sentence is life, and the amount of time to be served without

benefit [ of probation, parole or suspension of sentence] is also life.

       It is apparent from a thorough review of the record that the trial court' s

intent was to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor with the

benefit of parole after serving at least twenty- five years.            Such a sentence would be

in compliance with. the mandates of Miller, La. R.S. 15: 574. 4, and La. Code Crim.

P. art. 878. 1.   However, regardless of the trial court' s intent, the record reflects that

                                                   19
the defendant was illegally sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of

parole.

       An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed

the sentence or by an appellate court on review.        La. Code Crim. P. art. 882; see

also State v.   Crosby, 54, 539 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 6/ 29/22), 342 So. 3d 458,        465

 declining to vacate and remand for resentencing and instead amending sentence to

life imprisonment with the benefit of parole where juvenile was illegally sentenced

to life imprisonment without benefit of parole after pleading guilty to second

degree murder);    State v. Clark, 2020- 167 ( La App. 5th Cir. 11/ 18/ 20),   306 So. 3d

619, 638- 40, writ denied, 2020- 01459 ( La. 2/ 17/ 21),       310 So. 3d 1150 ( amending

sentence to include parole eligibility after twenty- five years where defendant was a

juvenile at the time of the offense and was illegally sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole for thirty- five years). Because an appellate court may correct

an illegal sentence at any time, we find that the defendant is not entitled to have his

sentence vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.          See La. Code Crim. P.

art. 882.   Rather, we amend the defendant' s sentence to life imprisonment at hard

labor with the benefit of parole, pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 882 and La.

R.S. 15: 574. 4( G).

       For the foregoing reasons, Dkerian Thompson' s conviction of the second

degree murder of Christopher Franklin is affirmed, but the sentence is amended to

reflect life imprisonment with the benefit of parole consideration after serving

twenty- five years, pursuant to La. R.S.     15: 574. 4( G).   Further, the Department of

Corrections is ordered to revise the defendant' s master prison record to reflect that

his sentence is no longer without benefit of parole and, in accordance with the

criteria in La. R.S.   15: 574.4, to reflect an eligibility date for consideration by the

Board of Parole once the conditions contained therein are met.

                                            20
   CONVICTION     AFFIRMED;     SENTENCE     AMENDED      TO   LIFE
WITH   BENEFIT   OF    PAROLE   AND    AFFIRMED     AS   AMENDED;
REMANDED    FOR       CORRECTION      OF   MINUTE    ENTRY     AND
COMMITMENT ORDER.

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