Court Opinion

ID: 9456650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:59:33.575135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:03.906421
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
The Board, dissatisfied with certain language in our opinion, seeks the excise of the words “clear” and “dominant” from the sentence in the first paragraph which ends as follows,
“ * * * the Board has the burden of making a clear showing that the employer’s dominant motive was not a proper business one, but union animus.”
In addition, the Board points to our statement in footnote 1 that “we are aware of no substantial conflict” with the other circuits, and cites cases which it says indicate that this is erroneous. The prime difficulty appears to be that the Board considers the word “dominant” to impose an undue burden upon it.
To dominate means to control. The “dominant” motive is the controlling or effective motive. We use this particular word because of its insistent quality, to remind the Board that its burden is to find that the improper motive was the one that in fact brought about the result.
In support of its petition the Board cites some fifteen cases, listing them by circuit. While none states that the improper motive must be “dominant,” we consider the language of several to be indistinguishable. NLRB v. Milco, Inc., 2 Cir., 1968, 388 F.2d 133, 138 (“the true reason”); Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 3 Cir., 1969, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 943, 25 L.Ed.2d 115 (“the ‘real’ stimulus”); NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 3 Cir., 1962, 298 F.2d 169, 174 (“in fact motivated”); NLRB v. Central Power & Light Co., 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 1318, 1322 (“actually motivated”); NLRB v. Stemun Mfg. Co., 6 Cir., 1970, 423 F.2d 737, 741 (“the actual impelling motive”). It is true that the Board cites cases using general phrases indicating that a “partial” motive that is improper is enough. Some of these, however, proceed, in discussing the evidence, to apply a standard not significantly different from ours. E. g., NLRB v. Princeton Inn Co., 3 Cir., 1970, 424 F.2d 264; S. A. Healy Co. v. NLRB, 10 Cir., 1970, 435 F.2d 314. No case cited by the Board articulates a lesser requirement for finding a discharge to be an unfair labor practice. Even NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 5 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 576, on which the Board particularly relies, after saying that the “anti-union motive need not be dominant,” goes on to say that the Board must show “that the employee would not have been fired but for the anti-union animus of the employer.” 374 F.2d at 582. The only opinions not expressing that standard express none at all. We decline to delete the word “dominant.”
With regard to our use of the word “clear” we do not mean, as the Board fears, that its burden of proof on this issue is any greater than it is on any other. However, our experience has been that from time to time the Board not only forgets that “partially motivated” means effectively motivated, but forgets that an aura of even strong union animus is not sufficient in itself, once an adequate and proper business reason has been established. While of course an employer who has good cause to apply a particular sanction may in fact do so for an impermissible reason, in such circumstances the Board must have an affirmative basis for believing that the employer rejected the good reason and chose the bad. It is not enough, as in the case at bar, to ignore or denigrate the business reason, or to substitute speculation in its place.
The petition is denied.