Court Opinion

ID: 9942565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:04:47.097933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:15.013221
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-2868
                  _____________________________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellant,

    v.

STEVE LINCOLN,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Stephen S. Everett, Judge.

                        February 21, 2024

OSTERHAUS, C.J.

     The State appeals an order granting Appellee Steve Lincoln’s
motion in limine that excludes testimony from use at trial that
Appellee gave at a pretrial self-defense immunity hearing. The
trial court concluded that the court and counsel effectively
deprived Appellee of his constitutional right to stay silent at the
hearing by mistakenly placing the burden of proof on him. We
reverse because the burden-of-proof mistake did not render his
decision to testify involuntary or unintelligent in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights.

                                 I.

    In 2016, Appellee was charged with the first-degree murder of
his roommate, who died shortly after suffering three gunshot
wounds. Following his arrest, Appellee claimed the shooting was
in self-defense and filed a motion seeking immunity and dismissal
under § 776.032, Florida Statutes. At a subsequent hearing in
2018, counsel and the trial court agreed that Appellee had the
burden of proving his immunity by a preponderance of the
evidence. Appellee then testified in support of his immunity
argument, in part, by admitting that he shot the victim. The trial
court subsequently denied Appellee’s motion upon finding his
testimony not credible and his burden unsatisfied.

     More than a year later, after the Florida Supreme Court held
that the burden-of-proof amendment to the self-defense immunity
law applied to hearings held after the 2017 effective date of the
amendment, see chapter 2017-72, Laws of Florida, Appellee filed a
motion to reconsider his immunity. He sought to have his prior
immunity-hearing testimony stricken because the burden of proof
should have rested with the State to overcome his self-defense
immunity claim instead of on him. After the second hearing, the
trial court also denied relief.

     Appellee sought to keep his initial hearing testimony from
being used at trial by filing a motion in limine. Appellee’s motion
argued two grounds for not admitting that testimony as
substantive trial evidence: a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and a Fifth Amendment claim of
involuntariness. After more hearings, the trial court rejected
Appellee’s Sixth Amendment claim but granted his motion in
limine on Fifth Amendment grounds. The trial court found that
Appellee’s decision to testify was not voluntary or intelligent
because of the burden-of-proof error made at the first immunity
hearing. Thus, Appellee’s hearing testimony was excluded from
use as substantive evidence in any future trial. The trial court
entered a stay pending appeal, and the State timely appealed.

                                II.

      The State argues that Appellee’s hearing testimony at the
first self-defense immunity hearing shouldn’t have been excluded
on the basis of a burden-of-proof mistake. We review such
evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard, except
for pure questions of law, which are reviewed de novo. See State v.
Crofoot, 97 So. 3d 866, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

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     Generally speaking, a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial
hearing is admissible in evidence at later proceedings.
§ 90.803(18), Fla. Stat.; Barnes v. State, 970 So. 2d 332, 335–36
(Fla. 2007); see also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222
(1968) (noting that “a defendant’s testimony at a former trial is
admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings”); Tarver
v. State, 571 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding a defendant’s
prior statements from a bail hearing to be admissible in the state’s
case-in-chief and for impeachment purposes). Testimony from a
pretrial self-defense immunity hearing is no exception to this rule.
See, e.g., State v. Hester, 319 So. 3d 126, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021);
Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The trial court
departed from this rule in Appellee’s case, reasoning that the
burden of proof was placed on Appellee erroneously, which
prompted him to testify at his immunity hearing. At the time of
Appellee’s immunity hearing in 2018, it wasn’t clear that the
burden of proof should rest with the State to overcome a movant’s
prima facie claim with clear and convincing evidence in accordance
with a 2017-amended law because the amendment was effective
after the 2016 homicide for which Appellee had been criminally
charged. See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (2017). Following 2016-era
law, the court and counsel agreed that Appellee had the burden of
proving his entitlement to self-defense immunity at the pretrial
hearing. In turn, Appellee decided to testify at the hearing. Only
later did a Florida Supreme Court decision clarify that the State
bore the burden of proof to overcome a prima facie claim with clear
and convincing evidence in such pretrial self-defense immunity
hearings held after the effective date of the amendment, even
where the crime was allegedly committed before the effective date
of the law. Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177, 180 (Fla. 2019).

     Appellee argues that the burden-of-proof mistake made at his
pretrial self-defense immunity hearing deprived him of his Fifth
Amendment right to “listen to all of the State’s witnesses before
deciding whether or not he wanted to testify.” But we don’t agree
that a Fifth Amendment problem exists or prohibits the State’s use
of Appellee’s hearing testimony at trial. Although the court placed
the burden of proof on Appellee at his pretrial self-defense
immunity hearing, there isn’t a record of coercion or unintelligent
decision-making associated with Appellee’s decision to testify at
the hearing. Appellee made a strategy call to testify. Cf., Hester,

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319 So. 3d at 129 (discussing a defendant’s choice to forego a self-
defense immunity motion and hearing to eliminate the risk of the
State’s presenting the testimony to a jury). The upshot being that
Appellee took the stand voluntarily while represented by counsel
and testified without asserting his privilege against self-
incrimination. Although with hindsight the court and counsel’s
burden-of-proof mistake might have prompted Appellee to testify
earlier than he wanted, nothing indicates that it was coerced or
unintelligent as a constitutional matter. In fact, the record shows,
as the State’s brief suggests, that Appellee would have faced the
same decision in raising a prima facie case even if the State had
borne the ultimate burden of rebutting the case with clear and
convincing evidence at the hearing:

    The record demonstrates that Appellee, a six-foot one
    man shot an unarmed five-foot three woman who was
    standing at least ten feet away from him and on the other
    side of a counter at the time of the first shot. The victim
    then dropped behind the counter and Appellee fired two
    more shots over the counter without being able to see the
    victim. Appellee then fled the State while taking actions
    to conceal his identity.

See Freeman v. State, 373 So. 3d 1255, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)
(requiring that the defendant raise a prima facie claim of self-
defense immunity before the state bears the burden to overcome
the immunity claim). Because the evidence indicated that
Appellee’s use of deadly force wasn’t justified, Appellee had to
decide strategically whether to testify or lose at the hearing, which
is exactly what happened.

    This case also does not present an instance where Appellee
encountered a choice between constitutional rights forbidden by
Simmons. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393–34
(1968) (warning against requiring a defendant to surrender of one
constitutional right to assert another right). Simmons does not
extend to self-defense immunity decisions involving a defendant’s
pursuit of pretrial immunity. See Cruz, 189 So. 3d at 828 (noting
that self-defense immunity is entirely a creature of state statute
and not affected by Simmons); see also In re Fed. Grand Jury Proc.
(FGJ 91-9), Cohen, 975 F.2d 1488, 1493 (11th Cir. 1992) (declining

                                 4
to adopt a broad reading of Simmons in light of the Supreme
Court’s “considerabl[e] narrow[ing]” of the principle in a
subsequent case). As in the retrial context at issue in Cruz, the
defendant knew the risks inherent in testifying at the pretrial
hearing. And so,

    [t]his case does not present a reason to deviate from the
    general rule that a defendant’s testimony is admissible
    against him in later proceedings. Any time a defendant
    exercises the right to testify at a criminal trial, he risks
    that his testimony could be used against him at any
    subsequent retrial.

Cruz, 189 So. 3d at 828-29. We thus adhere to the general rule that
a defendant’s testimony is admissible in later proceedings.

     In reaching this result, we understand that when a decision
to testify essentially waives a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, it must be voluntary and
intelligent. Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 407 (Fla. 2010), as revised
on denial of reh’g (Sept. 8, 2010); see also Rolon v. State, 72 So. 3d
238, 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“Unless the defendant’s prior
testimony was involuntary or compelled in a constitutional sense,
the use of that testimony in a subsequent trial does not violate the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.”). Courts recognize, for
instance, that a defendant’s waiver can be involuntary if
ineffective assistance of counsel deprives the defendant of an
opportunity to choose intelligently whether to testify. See Beasley
v. State, 18 So. 3d 473, 495 (Fla. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992)) (“Where the
defendant claims a violation of his right to testify by defense
counsel, the essence of the claim is that the action or inaction of
the attorney deprived the defendant of the ability to choose
whether or not to testify in his own behalf.”). But here, the trial
court     rejected    Appellee’s     ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
argument. And the court and counsel’s reasonable self-defense-
immunity-law mistake also didn’t render Appellee’s testimony
constitutionally defective. Advice “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” does not render a plea
involuntary or unintelligent. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970) (holding that a defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary

                                  5
despite being motivated by counsel’s erroneous advice on the
admissibility of a prior confession); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 796–98 (1970) (same). And mistakes in calculating the
strength of the state’s case are likewise insufficient to render a
plea unintelligent or involuntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 757 (1970) (recognizing a guilty plea to be voluntary even
though it was induced by counsel’s overly pessimistic fear of a
death penalty statute that was subsequently ruled
unconstitutional); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 319 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding that a plea was “not rendered involuntary
merely because the defendant may have been motivated by a
statute or state conduct later found to be unconstitutional”). We
consider the burden-of-proof mistake here in the same light. Even
if the mistake prompted Appellee to testify in support of his self-
defense immunity claim, his Fifth Amendment rights were not
violated.

    REVERSED.

KELSEY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Adam B. Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

John D. Stevenson, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.

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