Court Opinion

ID: 9954558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:16.961098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:34.713466
License: Public Domain

J-S44024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LEROY WILSON                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 160 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 9, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007374-2015

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED MARCH 26, 2024

       Appellant Leroy Wilson appeals pro se from the order denying his timely

first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition.1 On appeal, Appellant raises

ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel, direct appeal counsel, and PCRA

counsel. We affirm.

       A previous panel of this Court set forth the following factual history:

       [Appellant] served as a handyman to various residents, including
       the victim, eighty-five-year-old Regina Brunner Holmes, living on
       or around the 300 block of Roumfort Road in Philadelphia. On
       June 27, 2015, [Appellant] was in the neighborhood, gardening
       and moving furniture for one of the victim’s neighbors. While he
       was working, he approached another neighbor, Darlene Adams,
       and inquired about a car of hers that she had listed for sale.
       [Appellant] told Ms. Adams that he believed the car was worth
       $2,500 and Ms. Adams agreed to sell the car to [Appellant] in
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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     exchange for $1,500 and [Appellant’s] services. [Appellant] told
     Ms. Adams that he would pay her the following week, after he
     collected his pay from the victim and another neighbor for services
     he had performed on their homes.

     Two days later, on June 29, 2015, Adam Brunner, the victim’s son,
     received a phone call from his mother’s employer, the Chestnut
     Hill Local, where she worked as a typist and editor. Mr. Brunner
     was told that his mother had not shown up for work, which was
     highly unusual because she had never been late. Mr. Brunner
     went to his mother’s home, at 307 Roumfort Road, but was unable
     to get into the home or get into contact with his mother, so he
     called the police.

     After arriving at the scene and gaining entry into the victim’s
     home, police located the victim lying on her bedroom floor, with
     multiple lacerations and strangulation marks on her body. In
     addition, police observed a large amount of blood on her bed and
     bedroom wall, and multiple emptied purses on the bed and floor.
     The victim was pronounced dead at the scene. An autopsy
     revealed that the victim died during the early morning hours of
     June 28, 2015, from a combination of multiple stab wounds,
     strangulation, and blunt trauma to her head.

     During the course of their investigation, Philadelphia Police
     Detectives discovered that the victim’s ATM card was used three
     times at a Wells Fargo Bank on Broad Street at approximately
     3:30 A.M. on June 28th, the same morning that the victim was
     killed. Detectives also discovered that one of the victim’s credit
     cards was used to make a large online purchase at Toys R Us. The
     I.P. address from where the purchase was made was traced to
     3137 North Stillman Street in Philadelphia, the home of Micshell
     Hoskins, [Appellant’s] ex-girlfriend, and where [Appellant]
     periodically resided.

     On the morning of the murder, at approximately 3:00 A.M.,
     [Appellant] arrived at Ms. Hoskins’s home and knocked on the
     front door for Hoskins to let him in.       Soon after arriving,
     [Appellant] left, only to come back a short time later. After
     Hoskins once again let him into her home, [Appellant] told her
     that he had “caught a body.” A few hours later, [Appellant] gave
     Hoskins a laptop that belonged to the victim and told Hoskins to
     buy whatever she wanted from Toys R Us.

     On June 30, 2015, the victim’s car, a 2007 Toyota Corolla, was
     found near Hoskins’s home on the 3100 block of North Stillman

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       Street. Video surveillance recovered from the morning of the
       murder showed the car travelling onto North Stillman Street at
       3:01 A.M. and leaving North Stillman at 3:22 A.M. At 3:28 A.M.,
       video surveillance captured the car entering the parking lot of the
       Wells Fargo Bank on Broad Street, where the victim’s ATM card
       was used only minutes later. Video surveillance also captured the
       individual using the victim’s card at the ATM machine, although
       his face was not visible. However, Micshell Hoskins identified the
       individual depicted in the video surveillance as [Appellant] by his
       walk, the manner in which he wore his pants, and because he was
       wearing the same sweatshirt that [Appellant] had been wearing
       the day before the murder.          Jessica Gaymon, [Appellant’s]
       girlfriend at the time of the murder, also identified [Appellant] as
       the individual using the victim’s card at the ATM machine from his
       clothes, his build, and the manner in which he pulled up his pants.

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 3250 EDA 2017, 2019 WL 2369585 at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. filed June 5, 2019) (unpublished mem.) (citation omitted).

       The PCRA court set forth the following procedural history:

       On May 5, 2017, following a jury trial . . . [Appellant] was
       convicted of one count each of murder [in] the first degree,
       robbery, burglary, and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC).[2]
       The [trial court] immediately imposed the mandatory sentence of
       life in prison [without parole] for the murder charge,[3] with two
       consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for robbery
       and burglary, and a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years’
       imprisonment for [PIC], for an aggregate sentence of life plus 22½
       to 45 years in prison.

       [Appellant] filed post-sentence motions, which the [trial court]
       denied on August 31, 2017. On June 5, 2019, the Superior Court
       affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence and on January 2,
       2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur. [See
       Commonwealth v. Wilson, 3250 EDA 2017, 2019 WL 2369585
       (Pa. Super. filed June 5, 2019) (unpublished mem.), appeal
       denied, 222 A.3d 1125 (Pa. 2020).] [Appellant] was represented
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), 3502(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1).

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     at trial and through direct appeal by Earl Kauffman, Esquire [(trial
     counsel)].

     On November 13, 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition under
     the PCRA. Dennis Turner, Esquire [(Attorney Turner)], entered
     his appearance as appointed counsel on January 11, 2021.
     [Attorney] Turner took no action on [Appellant’s] PCRA petition
     and repeatedly requested continuances until April 8, 2022, at
     which time he filed a motion for discovery. That day, the [PCRA
     court] relieved [Attorney] Turner as counsel and ordered
     [Appellant] be appointed new counsel. On April 14, 2022, Gina
     Amoriello, Esquire [(prior PCRA counsel)], entered her appearance
     as appointed counsel for [Appellant]. On September 18, 2022,
     pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
     1988), and] Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super.
     1988 [(en banc), prior PCRA counsel] filed a letter stating there
     was no merit to [Appellant’s] claims for collateral relief and
     requested to withdraw as counsel. On October 20, 2022, the
     [PCRA court] issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its
     intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without an
     evidentiary hearing. On December 9, 2022, the [PCRA court]
     dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition and granted [prior PCRA
     counsel’s] motion to withdraw.

     [Appellant] filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 4, 2023. The
     [PCRA court] issued an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
     directing [Appellant] to file a concise statement of errors
     complained of on appeal by January 27, 2023. On January 23,
     2023, [Appellant] filed an “application for extension of time in
     which to file Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement of errors
     complained of on appeal following receipt of complete record,” in
     which he requested documents from the record of his case as well
     as a twenty-one day extension from receipt of the requested
     documents to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
     appeal. At a status conference on January 31, 2023, the [PCRA
     court] directed prior PCRA counsel, [] to provide necessary
     documents to [Appellant] as soon as possible. That same day,
     the [PCRA court] issued an order granting [Appellant] until March
     2, 2023, to file his concise statement of errors complained of on
     appeal. On February 17, 2023, [Appellant] filed a “motion to
     amend the appellate record,” in which he requested certain
     exhibits from his trial be entered into the certified record for his
     appeal. The [PCRA court] held a status conference regarding
     [Appellant’s] motion to amend the appellate record on February
     24, 2023, at which time the [PCRA court] directed the

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       Commonwealth to send [Appellant] a redacted copy of his
       requested trial exhibits. On March 1, 2023, the [PCRA court]
       received [Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement].

PCRA Ct. Op., 3/16/23, at 1-3 (citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did Appellant suffer from ineffective assistance of [prior] PCRA
          counsel when [prior PCRA counsel] failed to locate and plead
          three issues of merit?

            A. Should [prior] PCRA counsel be found to have provided
            ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to locate and
            plead direct appeal counsel’s ineffectiveness for waiving an
            issue regarding photo number 43 being shown to the jury?

            B. Should [prior] PCRA counsel be found to have provided
            ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to plead an error
            on the part of trial counsel regarding permitting the viewing
            of photos numbered 403-413 to the jury without objection?

            C. Did [prior] PCRA counsel provide ineffective assistance
            [of] counsel in failing to locate and plead trial counsel’s
            failure to address prosecutorial misconduct committed by
            the Commonwealth during [its] closing statements to the
            jury?

Appellant’s Brief at 3A (formatting altered).

       In all three of his issues, Appellant raises            layered claims of

ineffectiveness against prior PCRA counsel, direct appeal counsel, and trial

counsel.4
____________________________________________

4 Our Supreme Court has adopted a rule permitting PCRA petitioners to “raise

claims of ineffective [assistance of] PCRA counsel at the first opportunity, even
if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review

       is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
       supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
       error.     The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
       supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
       apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
       conclusions.

       Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
       counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
       evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
       circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
       determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
       innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
       to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
       is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
       basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
       and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
       the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

                                       *       *   *

       Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis
       and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to
       prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy
       any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the
       claim of ineffectiveness.

____________________________________________

Instantly, we note that in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court concluded
that Appellant failed to raise his layered claims of ineffective assistance of
PCRA counsel in Appellant’s response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice of
intent to dismiss, therefore, Appellant has waived his issues on appeal. See
PCRA Ct. Op. at 5-7. This Court has held that Bradley permits us to review
an allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, even if it is raised for the first
time on appeal, rather than in a response to a Rule 907 notice. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 1654 MDA 2022, 2023 WL 5202414 at *3 (Pa.
Super. filed Aug. 14, 2023) (unpublished mem.); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)
(stating that unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for
persuasive value). Accordingly, we decline to find waiver and shall review
Appellant’s issues on their merits.

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Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, “[c]ounsel cannot be

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”

Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted).

       “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is

required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the

three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of representation.”

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1004 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation

omitted).

       Specifically, our Supreme Court has explained:

       To be eligible for relief on [layered claims of ineffective assistance
       of counsel, a petitioner] must plead and prove that: (1) trial
       counsel was ineffective for a certain action or failure to act; and
       (2) [subsequent] counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
       [previous] counsel’s ineffectiveness. As to each relevant layer of
       representation, [a petitioner] must meet all three prongs of the
       Pierce[5] test for ineffectiveness. A failure to satisfy any of the
       three prongs of the Pierce test requires rejection of a claim of
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which, in turn, requires
       rejection of a layered claim of ineffective assistance of
       [subsequent] counsel.

       Thus, if the petitioner cannot prove the underlying claim of trial
       counsel ineffectiveness, then petitioner’s derivative claim of
       [subsequent] counsel ineffectiveness of necessity must fail, and it
       is not necessary for the court to address the other two prongs of
       the Pierce test [i.e., the reasonable basis and prejudice prongs]
       as applied to [subsequent] counsel.

____________________________________________

5Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987); see also
Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043 (same).

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Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

       In his first two issues, Appellant claims that prior PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel and

direct appeal counsel in connection with photographs that were admitted into

evidence and published to the jury. Appellant’s Brief at 6-11.

       Specifically, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to other crime scene photographs being published to the jury.

Id. at 9. In support, Appellant argues that what he identifies as “Photograph

No. 43”, which depicted the victim’s entire head and neck, “inflamed the jury,

because of its gruesome nature, causing prejudice which should have excluded

[its] use as [outweighing] any probative value.” Id. at 7.6 Appellant further

argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission

of photographs numbered 403-416, which were from the victim’s autopsy.

Specifically, Appellant alleges that the photographs at issue were a “gruesome

depiction of the face and body of the victim.” Id. at 9. Appellant concludes

that the photographs’ “evidentiary value did not outweigh their prejudicial

effect.” Id. at 10.

       Our Supreme Court has addressed the admissibility of crime scene and

autopsy photographs in a murder case as follows:

____________________________________________

6 On direct appeal, this Court found the issue waived, as the photograph at

issue was never made part of the certified record. Wilson, 2019 WL 2369585
at *2.

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     The admissibility of photographs of a murder victim, like the
     admissibility of other evidence, is a matter resting within the
     sound discretion of the trial court. In determining the admissibility
     of such photographs, the trial court must engage in the following
     analysis:

     First a [trial] court must determine whether the photograph is
     inflammatory. If not, it may be admitted if it has relevance and
     can assist the jury’s understanding of the facts. If the photograph
     is inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or not the
     photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their
     need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and
     passions of the jurors.

     Photographic images of a homicide victim are often relevant to the
     intent element of first-degree murder. The mere fact that a
     medical examiner testified to the nature of the victim’s injuries
     and the cause of death does not render photographs of the victim
     duplicative. Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa.
     1994) (“[T]he condition of the victim’s body provides evidence of
     the assailant’s intent, and, even where the body’s condition can
     be described through testimony from a medical examiner, such
     testimony does not obviate the admissibility of photographs.”).
     While recognizing that photographs of a homicide victim can be
     unpleasant, disturbing, and brutal, we have held that there is no
     need to so overextend an attempt to sanitize the evidence of the
     condition of the body as to deprive the Commonwealth of
     opportunities of proof in support of the onerous burden of proof
     beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 724 (Pa. 2014) (some citations

omitted and some formatting altered).

     In the instant case, the PCRA court compared crime scene photograph

43 and a photograph from the victim’s autopsy, and reached the following

conclusion:

     Crime scene photograph 43 was one of two photographs that
     depicted the victim’s entire head and neck. The other was an
     autopsy photograph, which was marked as autopsy photograph
     A-A. Both showed the extensive injuries inflicted on the victim

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      including multiple stab wounds, strangulation marks, and gashes.
      Because there were no witnesses to the murder here at issue,
      these extensive injuries were essential and irreplaceable evidence
      of [Appellant’s] intent to kill the victim. Comparing the two
      photographs, the [trial court] found that the crime scene
      photograph was less likely to disturb the jurors because it was not
      a close-up photograph of the injuries, [the victim’s] eyes were
      closed, and much of the detail was obscured by blood.
      Accordingly, the [trial court] excluded the autopsy photograph,
      but admitted the crime scene photograph. Although the [trial
      court] did not believe the crime scene photograph to be
      inflammatory, even if it had been, it had essential evidentiary
      value that clearly outweighed any likelihood of inflaming the minds
      and passions of the jurors. Accordingly, it was properly admitted.

                                  *     *      *

      Photographs 403-416 are autopsy photos that show the multitude
      of injuries the victim sustained, including injuries to her hands,
      arms, neck, back, and head. . . . [The trial court] found none of
      these photographs to be inflammatory or “so gruesome it would
      tend to cloud the jury’s objective assessment of the guilt or
      innocence of the defendant.” . . . [A]ll of the photographs had
      essential evidentiary value to establish defendant’s intent to kill,
      which outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. . . .
      Therefore, trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing
      to object to their admission, and PCRA counsel could not been
      ineffective for failing to raise a claim based on these photographs.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 9-11 (citations omitted).

      The record further reflects that the trial court instructed the jury as

follows regarding the evidentiary value of the photographs that were published

during trial:

      Ladies and gentlemen, you folks saw photographs in this case that
      showed the body of the decedent at the crime scene and you also
      saw several autopsy photographs. These photographs were
      admitted into evidence for the purpose of showing the nature of
      the wounds received by the deceased; for showing the conditions
      at the scene of the alleged crime; and for helping you folks
      understand the testimony of the medical examiner. These, of

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      course, were not pleasant photographs to look at. You folks
      should not let them stir up your emotions to the prejudice of
      [Appellant]. Your verdict must be based on a rational and fair
      consideration of all of the evidence and not on passion or prejudice
      against [Appellant], against the Commonwealth or against
      anybody else connected with this case.

N.T. Trial, 5/5/17, at 108-09.      Indeed, the PCRA court found that the

photographs at issue had essential evidentiary value which outweighed any

potential unfair prejudice to Appellant. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 10-11.

      We first turn to crime scene photograph 43. Preliminarily, we note that

the Commonwealth, on March 28, 2023, filed a motion with this Court to

correct the record pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1926 to include, inter alia, “crime

scene photograph 43, depicting the victim’s head and neck” be included in the

certified record under seal. See generally Commonwealth’s Mot. to Correct

Record, 3/28/23. On April 13, 2023, this Court entered an order denying the

Commonwealth’s motion as moot, as the sealed exhibits at issue were

transmitted to this Court on March 29, 2023. The PCRA court’s March 28,

2023 order transmitting the sealed exhibits at issue to this Court also directed

the Commonwealth to “provide copies of the exhibits to the prison

superintendent, so that [Appellant] may view them, on request, as necessary

to litigate his appeal.” PCRA Ct. Order, 3/28/23, at 1. The record reflects that

Appellant was served a copy this order via first class mail.

      The supplemental record included Commonwealth’s Exhibit 43, which is

labeled as “24.     View of kitchen.”     Commonwealth’s Exhibit 43.         The

photograph does not contain any images of the victim.            See id.     The

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Prothonotary of this Court initiated a request to the Court of Common Pleas

of Philadelphia County to acquire the additional photographs that were

admitted into evidence at trial. However, crime scene photograph 43 was not

included in the photographs sent to this Court’s Prothonotary in response to

its request.

       We emphasize that in order to facilitate meaningful appellate review, it

is   Appellant’s   duty   to   provide   this     Court   with   a   complete   record.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d 512, 517 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022),

appeal denied, 282 A.3d 1124 (Pa. 2022). It is not the role of this Court to

scour the record for support for Appellant’s claims.             Commonwealth v.

Cannovo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2018).                  Without crime scene

photograph 43, we are constrained to find that Appellant’s ineffectiveness

claim relating to its admissibility is waived on appeal. See Commonwealth

v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1276-77 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc).

       Based on our review of the record, we agree with the remainder of PCRA

court’s conclusions, as they relate to the autopsy photographs.                   See

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44; see also PCRA Ct. Op. at 10-11. On this

record, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that his underlying claim has any

arguable merit. As noted, the photographs at issue had evidentiary value that

outweighed the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors in

the instant case.     See Watkins, 108 A.3d 724.             Further, the trial court

instructed the jury to consider the photographs “for the purpose of showing

the nature of the wounds received by the deceased; for showing the conditions

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at the scene of the alleged crime; and for helping [the jury] understand the

testimony of the medical examiner.” See N.T. Trial, 5/5/17, at 108-09; see

also Commonwealth v. Goods, 265 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(holding that a jury is presumed to follow a trial court’s instructions).

Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish that trial counsel or direct appeal

counsel were ineffective. See Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1004 n.11; Chmiel, 30

A.3d at 1128; see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596 (stating that counsel cannot

be considered ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim).

      In his remaining issue, Appellant contends that prior PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise a claim relating to alleged prosecutorial

misconduct during the Commonwealth’s closing arguments to the jury.

Appellant’s Brief at 11.       Appellant contends that the Commonwealth

improperly incorporated opinion and inflamed the jury with its rhetoric and

references to the crime scene and autopsy photographs admitted at trial

during closing arguments. Id. at 12-14.

      When addressing claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the context of

closing arguments, this Court has explained:

      [W]ith specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
      a closing statement, it is well settled that any challenged
      prosecutorial comment must not be viewed in isolation, but rather
      must be considered in the context in which it was offered. Our
      review of a prosecutor’s comment and an allegation of
      prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a
      defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Thus, it is well
      settled that statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during
      closing argument will not form the basis for granting a new trial
      unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to

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     prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
     toward the defendant so they could not weigh the evidence
     objectively and render a true verdict. The appellate courts have
     recognized that not every unwise remark by an attorney amounts
     to misconduct or warrants the grant of a new trial. Additionally,
     like the defense, the prosecution is accorded reasonable latitude,
     may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to
     the jury, and may advance arguments supported by the evidence
     or use inferences that can reasonably be derived therefrom.
     Moreover, the prosecutor is permitted to fairly respond to points
     made in the defense’s closing, and therefore, a proper
     examination of a prosecutor’s comments in closing requires review
     of the arguments advanced by the defense in summation.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 835-36 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

     Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

     During her closing argument, the prosecutor made comments
     such as, “Those photographs, the inquiry with the medical
     examiner was not to disturb you or to distress you but to show
     you just what kind of effort; what kind of effort it took to kill her.”
     The prosecutor then continued to describe in detail the injuries the
     victim received in this case in her effort to persuade the jury that
     the defendant acted with the intent to kill necessary for first
     degree murder.

     These arguments were entirely proper.         As there were no
     witnesses to the murder, the Commonwealth’s case necessarily
     relied on the injuries to the victim as proven through the crime
     scene and autopsy photographs in order to establish defendant’s
     intent to kill. Moreover, the prosecutor did not use any improper
     “name calling” language in her arguments nor base any
     arguments on facts not in evidence. Accordingly, neither trial
     counsel nor [prior] PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing raise a
     claim regarding the prosecutor’s comments.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 13-14.

     Based on this record, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that

the Commonwealth’s comments during its closing argument were permissible

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oratory and did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct that would

have resulted in the denial of Appellant’s right to a fair trial. See Jones, 191

A.3d at 835-36. As noted by the PCRA court, the Commonwealth did not base

any of its closing arguments on facts that were not in evidence, nor was there

improper      name-calling     language      as   alleged by Appellant.         See id.

Accordingly, Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that his

underlying claim has arguable merit.                    Therefore, Appellant’s layered

ineffectiveness claim fails because neither trial counsel nor PCRA counsel was

ineffective    for   failing   to   raise     a      meritless   claim   concerning   the

Commonwealth’s closing argument. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043; see

also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

For these reasons, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/26/2024

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