Court Opinion

ID: 9561216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:30.70371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.488739
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with my colleagues’ reversal of this case. First, I find the legal reasoning employed in order to support reversal to he dangerously flawed. Second, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order finding Healy in contempt of court.
1. (a) If the majority acknowledges that Healy’s knowing and intentional comment on the results of his client’s prior trial was improper and grounds for mistrial, then such would be an interference with the “administration of justice,” and this case would have to be affirmed. See OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1). Accordingly,. the majority must fashion a new rule to support reversal.2 To that end, the majority finds that Healy’s comment — standing alone — is not improper and thus “not sufficient to sustain contempt,” but concludes that “better practice dictates that the parties refrain from mentioning the previous trial.” (Emphasis supplied.)
To me, the majority does disservice to the bench and bar when it mischaracterizes Healy’s error as simply “mentioning the previous trial.” It is not the mentioning of the prior trial, but the result of the *271prior trial that comprised the improper conduct — which fact was recognized by the trial court and Healy.
It is a well established principle pronounced 110 years ago . . . that where a jury is apprized of a former verdict and such information might militate against the interest of a party to the case on trial, it is ground upon which a new trial may be granted the injured party.
(Citation omitted.) Hardwick v. Ga. Power Co., 100 Ga. App. 38, 46-47 (6) (110 SE2d 24) (1959).3
The purpose is to prevent a jury from being influenced by the decision of a prior jury on the same issues. Hardwick v. Ga. Power Co., supra; Waters v. State, 25 Ga. App. 577, 579 (103 SE 835) (1920).
Moreover, until this case, the State’s mentioning of the result of a previous trial would be improper and would warrant a mistrial — without right of appeal. To truly appreciate the magnitude of the majority’s new rule of law where it is not improper to “mention the prior trial” — including the results thereof — imagine the prosecutor asking Healy’s question, duly paraphrased, on retrial of a criminal conviction after appellate reversal, “And the last time you testified in this case ... to help in this search for the truth, defendant was convicted, wasn’t he?” Now, from the date of this majority opinion, the above statement — standing alone — is not improper when asked by the State or the defense, although the “better practice dictates that the parties refrain from mentioning the previous trial.” Under the majority’s analysis, this statement now provides no grounds for mistrial, and the intentional making of this statement provides no grounds to hold a prosecutor or a defense attorney in contempt.4
I believe, however, “the better practice” would be for this Court to adhere to long-standing principles of law when it comes to apprising the jury of the result of a prior proceeding. Under the law (as it stood before the majority’s holding), if either party mentions the results of a defendant’s prior trial, such comment is improper and warrants mistrial. As a consequence, the trial court’s finding that Healy both knew the comment was improper and intentionally made *272it provides a sufficient basis for mistrial and thus for contempt as an interference with the “administration of justice.” OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1).
(b) In addition, to support reversal, the majority uses the following flawed analyses which have the potential for long-range damage:
(i) There is no requirement in the statute that a trial court “warn” counsel or wait for counsel to “defy” an order of the court before the trial court may exercise control of misbehavior in the courtroom through contempt powers. OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1). The cases upon which the majority relies deal with OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (3) relating to disobedience of the court’s orders or directives. Here, we deal with OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1), intentional misbehavior in the presence of the court, in asking a question that could mistry the case; as such, Healy’s conduct interfered with the administration of justice and was subject to contempt.
For the majority to meld the two subsections together and graft onto OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1) a requirement that a trial court cannot correct intentional misbehavior which could result in mistrial unless it is in defiance of an order or warning is to endorse chaos in the courtroom — a chaos that this Court does not have to live with. This implicit holding in the majority opinion does immense damage to the judiciary, violates the statute, and should be a cause of deep concern.
(ii) The majority’s “harmless error” analysis is inappropriate in reviewing a contempt conviction. Such analysis is a hindsight evaluation of the effects of Healy’s deliberately improper comment but does not address the trial court’s statutory right to punish Healy for such intentional, impermissible conduct under OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1).
(iii) The fact that Healy’s intentional comment on the results of the prior trial used the term “not convicted” instead of “not guilty” in no way makes the comment proper. The prohibited result was the same. Healy deliberately apprised the instant jury that another jury — “searching for the truth” — did not convict his client in a previous trial. The purpose was to influence the current jury’s consideration of Sperry’s testimony, as Healy conceded at trial.5
The record shows that this is a straightforward case of contempt based on an improper, mistrial-worthy comment that Healy knowingly and intentionally made in violation of long-standing eviden-tiary principles, simply because Healy made the personal decision *273that it was necessary in order to give his client a “fair” trial.
The broad authority of a judge to preserve good order in the courtroom by the use of contempt power is well recognized and must be preserved if the courts are to perform their public duty. Therefore in-court statements and conduct are subject to reasonable control.
Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789, 791 (325 SE2d 131) (1985).
In my view, this Court should hesitate to second-guess a trial court’s use of judicial authority to maintain order during the course of a jury trial. Each time we reverse a trial court’s legitimate exercise of contempt powers, we chip away at the foundation upon which our legal structure is built, make trial judges more anxious about the exercise of their rightful authority, and thereby place more of that authority into the hands of advocates: a ruinous result. Trial experience and the facts of this case demonstrate that the flame of “zealous representation” which so concerns the majority burns bright enough without this Court pumping the bellows through unauthorized reversal.
2. There is more than sufficient evidence of record to support the trial court’s order finding Healy in contempt of court.
Healy was able to get a hung jury on his client’s first murder trial in a large part because pathologist James Dawson could testify only that the cause of the victim’s death was “undetermined.” Then Kris Sperry, Georgia’s Chief Medical Examiner, was called in at Dawson’s suggestion for the second trial. Using his expertise as a forensic pathologist, Sperry was able to conclude that the victim’s death was a homicide which could not have occurred in the manner presented by the defense in the first trial. Sperry testified, repeatedly, to that effect in the second trial. The record shows that Healy was clearly upset about this result and grew increasingly frustrated with Dr. Sperry’s testimony. It was into this climate that the State called Dr. Dawson to the stand. Healy immediately made the following objection to Dawson’s testimony, “I’m going to object to anything he went into with [Kris Sperry]. That’s hearsay. It’s an out-of-court statement, and my client wasn’t able to participate in this rank hearsay, and I’m objecting to it.” On the State’s direct, Dr. Dawson testified that if he had had the information he now possessed, he would not have made the same “undetermined” death diagnosis. Then, Healy cross-examined Dr. Dawson:
[Healy:] And you’ve testified in murder cases before without Dr. Sperry’s help, haven’t you. . . . And in fact, you have testified before in this case, haven’t you? . . . And Dr. Sperry *274wasn’t with you, was he? . . . Mr. McCollum here was using you as his expert in — in connection with that proceeding, wasn’t he. . . . Alright. And Sperry was nowhere to be found, was he? . . . And the prosecuting attorney depended on your expertise and your opinion in — in that particular proceeding, didn’t he? . . . Alright. And the last time you testified in this case without Dr. Sperry being around to help in this search for the truth my client was not convicted, was he?
The State objected. The jury was removed. The trial court permitted Healy to explain his conduct:
[Healy:] The District Attorney in this case has created an utterly false impression to this Jury. . . . This District Attorney tried this case in February with this expert without Dr. Sperry, and the result was a hung jury. There was no Dr. Sperry around. There was no reliance on Dr. Sperry. . . . And now throughout Dr. Dawson’s testimony Mr. McCollum has intentionally and purposefully created a false impression to this Jury. He now wants the Jury to ignore the expertise of this — this witness. He has in effect he has impeached his own witness by the way he’s presented this case. And I believe that the only legitimate way and the fairest way to bring that to the Jury’s attention is to show that Sperry wasn’t around when Mr. McCollum prosecuted this case the first time, that only this witness was. And Jay [(the assistant district attorney)] put all his basket — all his eggs in this one basket in February. And it’s just not fair to the Defense to create that kind of impression to this Jury, that Sperry’s right and he’s wrong.
[Trial court:] And what — under what theory of law are you entitled to bring in before this Jury the result of that first trial?
[Healy:] Fairness and justice, Judge.
[Trial court:] I’m going to give you ten minutes to go to that law library and get me a citation of authority that will change my mind from declaring mistrial and finding Counsel in contempt.
Thereafter, Healy failed to find legal support for his position that “fairness and justice” permitted him to improperly comment on the results of his client’s prior trial. The trial court acceded to the State’s desire to keep the jury, gave Healy opportunity to make further response, held Healy in contempt for his deliberately improper com*275ment, delayed punishment, and gave curative instructions to the jury.
Decided December 3, 1999.
Sean A. Black, for appellant.
Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, for appellee.
Here, the evidence of record shows Healy admitted that he intentionally asked the improper question because he felt it was only “fair” to the defense. Moreover, the trial court noted that Healy is an experienced attorney. Healy knew the comment was improper, but he personally felt that justice required the asking. It was not Healy’s call to make. By knowingly and intentionally making the improper comment on the results of his client’s prior trial, Healy deliberately usurped the trial court’s authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence and deliberately interfered with the “administration of justice.” OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1). The trial court had the authority to so find. Id. Viewing the evidence in a light to uphold the trial court’s order — as this Court must do in this case — any rational trier of fact could have found Healy’s conduct contumacious. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251 (328 SE2d 215) (1985).
The judgment below should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn and Judge Ellington join in this dissent.

 With respect, in my view, this is how “bad law” happens.

 Killen v. Sistrunk, 7 Ga. 281 (1849); Waters v. State, 25 Ga. App. 577, 579 (103 SE 835) (1920); Morris v. State, 49 Ga. App. 138 (174 SE 385) (1934); Brown v. State, 110 Ga. App. 401, 405 (138 SE2d 741) (1964); Allmond v. Johnson, 153 Ga. App. 59, 61 (264 SE2d 544) (1980); see also Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga. App. 279, 286 (329 SE2d 601) (1985) (Benham, J., concurring specially).

 Certainly there is no legal basis for the creation of a double standard for the defense and the State in this area: “ ‘The Constitution guarantees to every defendant a fair and impartial trial. Every litigant is entitled to the same right, and he does not get it where any influence except the law and the evidence [are] allowed to affect the minds of the jury.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Kornegay v. State, supra at 286.

 This Court should not endorse a process where creativity in informing a jury of the results of the prior trial is rewarded. The rule is no less violated when, for example, the State informs the jury, “And the last time you testified in this case ... to help in this search for the truth, defendant left in handcuffs, didn’t he?” Or the defense informs the jury, “And the last time you testified in this case ... to help in this search for the truth, defendant went free, didn’t he?” The prohibited result is the same, even without the majority’s talismanic “guilty” or “not guilty.”