Court Opinion

ID: 9410457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:05:51.786615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.996562
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

         Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals
                  NO. 2022-CA-0957-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                         APPELLANT

        APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, JUDGE
               ACTION NO. 19-CR-00120-002

PAULA CAMERON                                     APPELLEE

AND

                  NO. 2022-CA-0961-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                         APPELLANT

        APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, JUDGE
               ACTION NO. 19-CR-00120-001

STEVEN CAMERON                                    APPELLEE
                                        OPINION
                                       REVERSING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from orders of the

Rockcastle Circuit Court, entered July 21, 2022, granting the motions of Paula and

Steven Cameron to suppress evidence.1 After careful review of the

Commonwealth’s briefs, the record, and the law, we reverse.

         PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

              On May 17, 2019, two officers from the Mount Vernon Police

Department responded to a domestic violence (DV) call from Paula. When the

officers arrived at the Cameron residence, Paula identified her husband, Steven, as

the perpetrator and indicated that he was driving away from the scene. Officer

Messinger pursued Steven for approximately a half mile and initiated a traffic stop

with the sole intent of questioning him about the alleged DV. However, after

learning that Paula was reportedly struck by Steven, Officer Messinger arrested

Steven on charges of assault fourth degree.

1
  As these cases share a common nexus of facts, we have elected to address the appeals
simultaneously in this consolidated Opinion.

                                              -2-
                Without instructing Steven as to his Miranda2 rights, Officer

Messinger conducted a search incident to arrest and had Steven empty the contents

of his pockets, including a prescription bottle of Endocet,3 onto the back of his

vehicle. As Steven was being secured in a police cruiser, a second officer

suggested to Officer Messinger that a closer examination of the medication bottle

was merited. In response, Steven stated that he did not carry his entire prescription

on his person, that he had left some of the pills at his residence, and that he owed

someone seventeen pills. Upon further inspection, Officer Messinger observed

that though Steven’s prescription had been filled with a large quantity of pills that

same day, the bottle was missing 30 to 40 pills.

                Thereafter, Officer Messinger applied for a search warrant for the

Camerons’ residence. In addition to outlining his investigative efforts, he included

in his supporting affidavit the specific details of his search of the prescription

bottle, as well as Steven’s assertion that the remaining pills were at his residence.

A warrant was issued, and the ensuing search of the residence produced two cell

phones, 12 oxycodone pills, half a Suboxone pill, and $11,000 in cash. The

Camerons were then jointly indicted on charges of trafficking in a controlled

2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
    Endocet is a name brand for oxycodone and acetaminophen tablets.

                                               -3-
substance first degree (second offense for Steven) and possession of a controlled

substance first degree. KRS4 218A.1412; KRS 218A.1415.

                The Camerons, through counsel, moved to suppress the evidence

obtained via the traffic stop, the search incident to Steven’s arrest, and the search

of their residence. After hearing Officer Messinger’s testimony, the trial court

granted the motions, concluding the search exceeded the scope of a lawful search

incident to arrest and the evidence obtained from the residence was fruit of the

poisonous tree. On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed and remanded5 for

additional fact-finding and for the court to address whether Paula had standing.

                The trial court found, by order entered July 1, 2022, that while the

traffic stop and arrest of Steven were proper pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1986), and KRS 431.005(2)(a), the prescription

bottle, Steven’s statements, and the items recovered pursuant to the search warrant

should be suppressed due to various violations of their constitutional rights. This

interlocutory appeal followed. Additional facts will be introduced as they become

relevant.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

                When reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, an
                appellate court generally employs a two-step process.

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
5
    Commonwealth v. Cameron, No. 2020-CA-0594-MR.

                                            -4-
                First, findings of fact are reviewed and will not be set
                aside unless they are clearly erroneous. CR[6] 52.01;
                Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky.
                2015). Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they
                are supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v.
                Delaney, 20 S.W.3d 471, 473 (Ky. 2000). Substantial
                evidence is “evidence of substance and relevant
                consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in
                the minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning
                Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky.
                1998) (citation omitted). Also, due regard is given to the
                opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
                the testifying officer and to assess the reasonableness of
                the officer’s inferences. Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92
                S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002). Second, the circuit court’s
                application of the law to conclusive facts is reviewed de
                novo. Simpson, 474 S.W.3d at 547.

Commonwealth v. Perry, 630 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Ky. 2021).

                                    LEGAL ANALYSIS

                The Commonwealth argues on appeal that (1) the search of the

prescription bottle was authorized as a search incident to Steven’s arrest, (2)

Steven’s statements were voluntary, (3) the search warrant was valid, or the good-

faith exception applies, and (4) regardless, Paula did not have standing to seek

exclusion of the evidence. We will address each claim in turn.

6
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -5-
                                 The Prescription Bottle

              The court identified two bases to support the suppression of this

evidence. First, the court concluded Steven’s rights were violated when, without

being Mirandized, Officer Messinger inquired during the arrest if he had anything

on him and Steven produced the prescription bottle at issue. The Commonwealth

contends that Miranda warnings were not required because the question was one

normally attendant with arrest and refers this Court to United States v. Woods, 711

F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2013), in support. We, however, need not resolve this debate

because though Officer Messinger’s post-arrest complaint and his affidavit for a

search warrant reference the exchange, no corresponding testimony was elicited at

the suppression hearing; consequently, the court’s finding is not supported by

substantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Connor, 636 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Ky.

2021) (“we use the facts elicited during [the suppression hearing] as the basis for

our analysis”).

              In the alternative, the court concluded that Officer Messinger’s search

of the prescription bottle violated Steven’s Fourth Amendment rights. “The Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution7

7
  Kentucky courts have consistently interpreted Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution to be
consistent in both rights and remedies with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Ky. 2014) (citing Dunn v. Commonwealth, 360
S.W.3d 751, 758 (Ky. 2012); Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011)).

                                             -6-
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.”

Milam v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2015) (citing Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). “In the

absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific

exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134

S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (citation omitted); see also Cook v.

Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992). A search incident to lawful

arrest is a long-recognized exception that permits two distinct types of warrantless

searches: (1) a search of the area within the control of the arrestee, and (2) a

“search for and seiz[ure of] any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to

prevent its concealment or destruction.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 383, 134 S. Ct. at 2483

(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.

Ed. 2d 685 (1969)).

               Deciding the first category applied herein, the court asserted that a

vehicle search is only authorized “if there is a reasonable possibility of access to

the item”8 and reasoned that because Steven was secured at the time of the search,

Officer Messinger exceeded the scope of the exception. However, as the facts

clearly demonstrate the evidence was discovered during a search of Steven’s

8
  Though not cited by the court, this statement of the law echoes the limits imposed on the
search of a vehicle incident to arrest set by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).

                                               -7-
person and not a search of his vehicle, we conclude the court misapplied the law.9

Accordingly, as argued by the Commonwealth, the scope of the search is governed

by United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427

(1973).

              At issue in Robinson was whether the officer exceeded the scope of

the search incident to arrest exception when he opened a cigarette package found

on the defendant’s person during a pat-down. Id. at 220-23, 94 S. Ct. at 469-71.

Upholding the search, the Supreme Court explained that:

              The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
              custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and
              to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court
              may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
              situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
              upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a
              suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
              under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
              lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
              additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest
              which establishes the authority to search, and we hold
              that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of
              the person is not only an exception to the warrant
              requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
              ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.

              . . . Having in the course of a lawful search come upon
              the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was
              entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed

9
  The only facts presented during the suppression hearing from which the court could reach this
conclusion arose from the testimony that the contents of Steven’s pockets were placed on the
back of a truck during the search. We reject any inference that the mere placement of items
recovered from the person of the arrestee on a vehicle converts the very nature of the search.

                                              -8-
              heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as fruits,
              instrumentalities, or contraband probative of criminal
              conduct.

Id. at 235-36, 94 S. Ct. at 477 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).10

              As we agree with the Commonwealth that Robinson is instructive and

because the prescription bottle was discovered during a contemporaneous search of

Steven’s person incident to lawful arrest, we conclude that the court erred in

suppressing the evidence.

                                    Steven’s Statements

              The suppression of this evidence turns on the court’s determination

that Steven was required to be Mirandized prior to his statement. The Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” In protection

of this right, the Supreme Court in Miranda established a prophylactic rule that

generally bars the prosecution from introducing in its case-in-chief incriminating

statements obtained during custodial interrogations unless the individual was

10
   In Riley, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Robinson as applied to traditional
personal property recovered from the person of the arrestee, though it declined to extend the
doctrine to include data stored on an arrestee’s cellphone, and acknowledged that opinions of
lower courts have upheld such searches. 573 U.S. at 392-93, 134 S.Ct. at 2488. The cases cited
included: United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987) (billfold and address book);
United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (wallet); and United States v. Lee, 501
F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (wallet). Id.

                                              -9-
informed in advance of their constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at

1630.

             In the case herein, there is no dispute that Steven was in custody at the

time of his statements at issue, but the Commonwealth challenges the court’s

conclusion that Steven’s responses were the result of interrogation. “[T]he term

‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to

any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attend to

arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,

301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted). In

determining whether an interrogation has occurred, the primary focus is on the

“perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.” Id. Here, the

court found that the investigation of the prescription bottle, the opening of the

bottle, and the counting of the pills inside were the trigger for Steven’s responses,

and these actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. For

various reasons, we disagree.

             Again, we note that the court’s findings of fact are not supported by

substantial evidence. Officer Messinger never testified that he opened the bottle,

though a pill count was conducted at some unknown point, and there is no

evidence Steven was able to perceive these events. Rather, the uncontroverted

                                         -10-
evidence was that when Steven was being placed in the police cruiser, a fellow

officer made a statement that Officer Messinger “needed to check” the prescription

bottle when he returned. It was at this point that Steven made the challenged

statements. Accordingly, the question before us is whether Steven was subjected

to interrogation when he overheard a discussion between the officers regarding

necessary investigatory steps.

             In Wells v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed

similar conduct where one officer informed her fellows “that she would need

additional time to complete paperwork on an expected additional murder charge

and to inform the jail officials.” 892 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1995). Upon Wells’

demand for more information, the officer explained that the current charge of first-

degree assault would be elevated if the victim died, and Wells responded with an

incriminating statement. Id. Wells sought suppression citing the lack of Miranda

warnings, but the Court held that the officer’s statement to other officers could not

“be considered the functional equivalent of questioning.” Id. We are similarly

convinced that the police conduct in this matter does not constitute an

interrogation. Consequently, the court erred in granting suppression.

                                    The Warrant

             The court concluded the warrant was not based on probable cause

where the affidavit in support relied on illegally obtained information – the search

                                        -11-
of the prescription bottle and Steven’s statements – and an insufficient independent

investigation. Given our determination that the search and statements were

erroneously suppressed, the court’s analysis on this point is necessarily

undermined and must be reversed. Though we could remand for further

consideration of the sufficiency of the warrant, because we determine the claim to

be dispositive, we elect instead to consider the Commonwealth’s alternative

argument for denying suppression – that the Leon good-faith exception applied.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

             In Leon, the Supreme Court announced a good-faith exception to the

general rule that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible

against the accused, which was subsequently adopted by the Kentucky Supreme

Court in Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (1992). Under the Leon

exception, the exclusionary rule is not applied when officers execute a search in

“objectively reasonable reliance” upon a warrant issued by a neutral judge that is

later held invalid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420. The exception,

however, is unavailable if: (1) the affidavit contains information that the attesting

officer knew or should have known was false or misleading, (2) the issuing

magistrate wholly abandoned their judicial role, (3) no reasonably well-trained

officer should rely on the warrant, (4) the warrant is so lacking in indicia of

probable cause as to render reliance unreasonable, or (5) the warrant fails to

                                         -12-
identify the place to be searched or the thing to be seized. Id. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at

3421; Crayton, 846 S.W.2d at 687-88.

             Herein, the Commonwealth renews its claim that the exception should

apply where the Camerons have not alleged the existence of any disqualifying

factor and the affidavit did not include unlawfully obtained evidence. In the order

on appeal, after noting that Officer Messinger was both the affiant who applied for

the warrant and the officer who executed the search, the court concluded without

supporting citation that the Leon good-faith exception was not available. As this

Court is unaware of any such bar, we hold that the trial court erred. And because

we agree that the Camerons have failed to advance any facts or arguments

disputing the availability of the exception, we further hold that the evidence should

not have been suppressed.

                        Paula’s Standing to Seek Suppression

             Finally, given our conclusion that the evidence herein was erroneously

suppressed, we need not reach this issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Rockcastle Circuit Court is hereby REVERSED.

                                         -13-
           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:            NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                                 FILED.
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky

                               -14-