Court Opinion

ID: 9907675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 20:02:41.966864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:00.405412
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 In re S.M. CA4/1
                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re S.M., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 D082675
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J521226A)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 K.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
         John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION1
        In this dependency proceeding, the juvenile court placed then 16-year-
old S.M. with her noncustodial parent, K.M. (Father), subject to the
continued jurisdiction of the court and a postplacement home visit. (See
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.2, subd. (b)(2).)2 Father appeals, arguing the court
abused its discretion by relying on “speculative,” “amorphous,” and “stale
claims” to support its order. Father also contends the court did not have the
authority to order a postplacement home visit because a virtual,
preplacement visit had already been conducted. We conclude the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion and affirm its order.
        Section 361.2, subdivision (a) expresses a preference for placing a
removed child with her noncustodial parent, providing: “If that parent
requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it
finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Pursuant to
section 361.2, subdivision (b), once a court decides to place a child with the
noncustodial parent, it may do any of the following:
           “(1) Order that the parent become legal and physical
           custodian of the child. . . . The court shall then terminate
           its jurisdiction over the child. . . .

           “(2) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the
           jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require that a home
           visit be conducted within three months. In determining
           whether to take the action described in this paragraph, the
           court shall consider any concerns that have been raised by

1     We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “raise[s] no
substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)

2       All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
                                         2
         the child’s current caregiver regarding the parent. After
         the social worker conducts the home visit and files their
         report with the court, the court may then take the action
         described in paragraph (1), (3), or this paragraph.
         However, this paragraph does not imply that the court is
         required to take the action described in this paragraph as a
         prerequisite to the court taking the action described in
         either paragraph (1) or (3).

         “(3) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the
         supervision of the juvenile court. In that case the court
         may order that reunification services be provided to the
         parent or guardian from whom the child is being removed,
         or the court may order that services be provided solely to
         the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to
         allow that parent to retain later custody without court
         supervision, or that services be provided to both parents, in
         which case the court shall determine, at review hearings
         held pursuant to Section 366, which parent, if either, shall
         have custody of the child.”

      Here, the juvenile court ordered S.M., who had been removed from her
mother’s custody, to be placed with Father, her noncustodial parent.
Although the court found placing S.M. with Father would not “be detrimental
to [her] safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” for purposes of
section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court expressed concerns about allegations
by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) in its
reports. The court was concerned that, when S.M. and her sibling visited
Father in 2020, S.M. “was engaged in fighting[ and] cursing,” and S.M. and
siblings smoked marijuana with Father. The court was also concerned that,
on the same visit, someone came to Father’s house and pointed a gun at him
in S.M.’s and her sibling’s presence, observing that Father had “minimize[d]”
the incident. In light of these circumstances, the court exercised its
discretion to retain jurisdiction over S.M. until a home visit was conducted.

                                        3
         Father asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion by declining to
terminate jurisdiction. He points to his statements to the social worker in
which he denies “the kids smoked marijuana with him” and explains that
“the gun [was] pulled on him [by] the parents of . . . kids [S.M.] fought [with]
at the park.” He contends ordering a home investigation was unreasonable
because “a home investigation in 2023 was not going to unearth any
additional information concerning a visit in 2020.” We are not persuaded.
         As Father acknowledges, we review a juvenile court’s decision to
continue jurisdiction after placing a child with a noncustodial parent for
abuse of discretion. (See In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135.)
Under this deferential standard, we find no error. Although Father denied
smoking marijuana with the children, two of S.M.’s mentors told the Agency
“that the father reportedly smokes marijuana with [her] and [she is] allowed
to do whatever [she] want[s]” when she is with him. S.M.’s mother similarly
“stated there were reported concerns that [F]ather may have been smoking
marijuana with the children when they visited but that it was never
confirmed.” Even according to Father’s own statements, the 2020 visit “did
not go well,” and, at minimum, involved an angry person pointing a gun at
him in S.M.’s presence. According to the Agency, Father “minimiz[ed] the
severity of this incident” when he was asked about it. All of the court’s
concerns, thus, had support in the record. Contrary to Father’s suggestion,
the clear purpose of ongoing supervision was not to investigate what had
happened in 2020, but to ensure S.M. would be safe and healthy in her
placement with Father, in light of S.M.’s and Father’s reported behavior. The
juvenile court’s order has substantial support in the record, and we see no
abuse of discretion by the court continuing its jurisdiction subject to a home
visit.

                                          4
      Father also claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering a
home visit because the Agency has already conducted a virtual home visit.
But Father simply assumes this virtual visit was a sufficient substitute for
an in-person, postplacement visit. The juvenile court disagreed, expressly
ordering an in-person visit if at all possible, stating:
         “If the Agency needs to utilize services of a sister agency [in
         Father’s state] in order to complete that home visit, then
         the Agency is authorized to do so. If the Agency needs to
         conduct that home visit virtually after exploring the
         possibility of having its sister agency . . . conduct that visit,
         then the Agency may proceed with that virtual visit if that
         is the only available option to conduct that home visit.

         “The Court does, however, grant leave to counsel for
         [Child], as well as mother’s counsel, to set a special if they
         believe that a virtual visit with [Child] at [Father’s]
         residence is insufficient, and the Court will assess that
         issue if a special proceeding is set. The Court will at such a
         proceeding want to hear from the Agency about the
         possibility of conducting and [sic] in-person home visit of
         [Father’s] residence, either by utilizing a sister agency or
         by some other means, and whether or not an in-person
         home visit is practical.”

      Moreover, the preplacement home visit cannot have complied with
section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2), which requires the social worker to file a
postvisit “report with the court” to inform the court’s final placement
determination. There was no home-visit report filed with the court after the
(preplacement) virtual visit, only a single line in the August 2023 Addendum
Report: “This virtual home visit showed no safety concerns for the father’s
home.” The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a home
visit and report in accordance with section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2).
      Father relies on dicta in In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069 for his
assertion the court cannot order a postcustody home visit if there was a

                                         5
precustody home visit. (Id. at p. 1078 [“As the court here recognized,
[subdivision (b)] was not really available because a home visit had already
been conducted.”].) We are not bound by any court’s dicta. (Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301.) In any
event, the home visit in In re J.S. was not a virtual visit, and, though not
entirely clear from the factual background, it appears the inspecting social
worker prepared a report. (In re J.S., at p. 1073.) Accordingly, the single line
in In re J.S. is not persuasive authority for Father’s position.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

                                                           DO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

                                        6