Court Opinion

ID: 9670108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:14:46.778838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.599120
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion the court’s charge on the law governing speed, coupled with the misleading argument of plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to defendant’s duties to plaintiff, makes a new trial necessary. In a close case such as this, where liability is at best highly doubtful, the errors here present are clearly prejudicial.
Defendant has been found negligent in failing to avoid a collision with a small child, 3½ years old, who at the time of the accident was no more than 3 feet tall, and who ran into a busy city street between parked cars, in the middle of the block.
In response to counsel’s argument that defendant’s responsibilities as a driver had some limitations, counsel for plaintiffs over defendant’s objection was permitted to argue:
“* * * When you are driving a piece of danger like an automobile, your responsibilities and my responsibilities are endless; our responsibilities are one hundred per cent, not only one hundred per cent to small children, but one hundred per cent to everybody else because we have an instrument of danger, an instrument of danger that can be much greater than any pistol or bullet.”
This was an obvious misstatement of the law and invited the jury to impose absolute liability on defendant without regard to the limitations on the legal duties which he owed to pedestrians.
The error was compounded by instructions, to which timely objection was made, which in effect directed a verdict for plaintiffs if, regardless of defendant’s rate of speed, it resulted in a collision. The court charged as follows:
“It is the duty of drivers of automobiles * * * to maintain a speed that is reasonable and prudent and so restricted as may be necessary *48to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on the highway, having due regard to the conditions and to the situation under which the vehicle is proceeding.” (Italics supplied.)
There was no elaboration, qualification, or other reference to speed anywhere in the court’s charge.
It is not the law of Minnesota that motorists must drive at a speed which is “so restricted as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on the highway.” Although the court added, “having due regard to the conditions and to the situation under which the vehicle is proceeding,” the instructions failed to spell out what conditions and situations a driver is required to consider. Without the essential qualifying statutory limitations, this rule makes drivers the insurers of pedestrians’ safety. The court neglected to add that speed must be restricted so as to avoid colliding with any person “on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.” (Italics supplied.) Minn. St. 169.14, subd. 1.
While plaintiff Todd Capriotti was held as a matter of law not to be guilty of contributory negligence because of his age, that ruling did not in any way deprive defendant of his right to restrict his speed only to what is necessary to avoid colliding with persons lawfully entering the highway. The legal requirements governing a pedestrian’s right to enter the highway may be found in § 169.21, which provides in part as follows:
Subd. 2. “* * * no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.”
Subd. 3. “Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.”
It is only with these important qualifications in mind that a motorist’s conduct is to be judged in determining whether or not his speed is excessive.
*49If we are to hold that the instructions on speed here given fully and correctly state the Minnesota law, counsel’s argument that a motorist’s responsibilities are “endless” and “one hundred per cent” is entirely accurate. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.