Court Opinion

ID: 9860672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:29:02.142476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:20.013141
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, J., dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority opinion which decides this case on the basis of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which became effective in New York September 27, 1964, and if applicable, would govern this case. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is basically a reenactment, modification and expansion of the Uniform Sales Act in New York as the majority opinion states. Section 2-105 of that Code, defining “goods/’ and section 2-106, defining a “sale,” do not in their language include work or service on an article where the sale is incidental only to the service or work product. In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 NY 100, 123 NE2d 792 (1954), in construing the Uniform Sales Act, plainly held that “sale” and “transfer” are not synonymous and not every transfer of personal property constitutes a sale, citing Halsted v. Globe Indemnity Co., 258 NY 176, 179 NE 376, 377. That case pointed out that when service predominates and the transfer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not a sale within the Sales Act. This interpretation has been followed in the only cases thus far decided under these sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. In the case of Lovett v. Emory University, Inc., 116 Ga App 277, 156 SE2d 923 (1967), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the furnishing of blood by a hospital for transfusion to a patient is incidental to the service provided in the course of treatment and is not a sales transaction covered by the provisions of the Code as to breach of implied warranty. Likewise, in Newton v. Allen, 220 Ga 681, 141 SE2d 417 (1965), a lease of workable timber for turpentine was held not a sale of the turpentine itself so as to be the subject of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, but was a sale of real estate. If a contract to paint a picture is a contract for work, labor and services rather than a sale, even though the title to the canvas is transferred to the customer (Racklin-Fagin Const. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc 220, 281 NYS 426), the work done in the instant case on the plaintiff’s material could not have been a sale within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. For the reason that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are improperly applied to this case by the majority opinion, I am of the opinion that the majority is in error and that the cause should be reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the original complaint. The defendant cross-appealed but has not elected to pursue its appeal. There is thus no reason to discuss the apparent inconsistencies in the findings.