Court Opinion

ID: 9712861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:01:45.014861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.925796
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority of the court. I believe this case should be reversed and remanded for a hearing on the post-trial petition in order that the implications raised by the record in this case-can be-resolved. This case presents dual questions relating to newly discovered evidence and competency of counsel. While it is necessary as the majority has done to discuss these questions separately, they are mutually related and dependent. The majority of the court has recognized the mutual dependency of these questions to some extent, but has overlooked the logical consequences flowing from such mutual dependence. I am entirely in accord with the views of the majority holding- that newly discovered evidence will not justify the granting of a new trial where such evidence is merely impeaching evidence of- a cumulátive nature. However, when the nature of the evidence is combined with the nature of the circumstances preventing such evidence from coming to the attention of the defendant or his attorney, then I do not think that the issues can be resolved by describing such evidence as merely cumulatively impeaching. I think it can be fairly said from the pleadings and the arguments of the People on this appeal that the notes of the prosecuting witness do refer to exonerating statements which the witness made prior to trial and thát in fact exonerating statements of some kind were actually made. However, whether such exonerating statements- were written - or oral or both or were made to police officers or the State’s -attorney or both is not revealed by the record. The People’s failure to deny the existence of the exonerating statements and at the same time its attempt to minimize their effect without disclosing their nature prevents the evaluation of the nature and effect of such statements on this appeal. While it well may be that the prosecuting witness was telling the truth when at the trial he described defendant’s participation in the offense, such a conclusion assumes that any exonerating statements would have been false even though the nature and circumstances of such exonerating statements-are ■not presented by the record. If, as may be inferred from the notes, the statements were made to someone for whom the prosecution is responsible, then the question arises as to whether such statements could and should have been discovered and produced prior to trial. This, then, is the connection between the second main issue, namely, the claim of incompetency of counsel, because the record fails to disclose that defendant’s appointed counsel engaged in any pretrial discovery, made any effort to secure statements- of potential witnesses or ascertained the nature of the evidence or testimony which might be presented in court supporting the People’s charge. I must emphasize that this aspect of the case is based on the failure of the record to demonstrate any pretrial discovery activities on the part of defendant’s counsel. While it may be necessary at some time in the future to resolve the questions of whether counsel will be deemed incompetent as a matter of law where he fails to engage in pretrial discovery or what should be the consequences of the failure of the record to demonstrate counsel’s activity in this regard, I do not believe that these questions need be resolved in this case. Because the notes and the admissions of the People reveal there were pretrial statements exonerating the defendant which could and should have been discovered by pretrial discovery proceedings, and because the record fails to indicate whether such statements were in fact demanded or produced, it is my conclusion that a further hearing is required on the defendant’s post-trial petition. The majority opinion assumes from the absence of any findings to the contrary in the record that defendant’s counsel did not engage in pretrial discovery and then decides this action was not incompetent because there is some evidence in the record that counsel may have interviewed the prosecuting witness and was acquainted with his pretrial statements but that such witness did not intend to testify against the, defendant., If: in fact there was no pretrial discovery, such a circumstance would closely approximate incompetent representation as a matter of law, since I do not see how such failure can be justified on any tactical basis or excused as a matter of judgment. It is of course quite possible that any exonerating statements of the witness were made known by the People to defendant’s counsel although the circumstances relating to discovery were not made a part of the record. Since I believe a further hearing should be held, whatever deficiencies which may exist, in the record may be cured and the inferences which may be drawn from unknown exonerating statements may be refuted. Alternatively, if the exonerating statements had not .been requested or produced then I believe the combination of circumstances might well justEy granting the defendant a new trial. In summary, where the record fails to demonstrate that counsel engaged in reasonable pretrial discovery procedures, I do not believe the record is sufficient to support a conclusion defendant was represented by competent counsel, at least where it appears that we are approving his delinquenpies in this regard. Where a statement, confession or. other evidence could or should have been discovered by appropriate pretrial procedure, the failure to discover such evidence and the reasons therefore are appropriate in assessing a new trial motion and the relation of such acts to a .fair trial.