Court Opinion

ID: 9826424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:55:35.974856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:03.368375
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The plaintiff was notified by a telegram that his child was sick at home. The plaintiff was in Columbia in attendance upon the Legislature, and his child was sick at his home in Conway. In order to go from Columbia to Conway by rail, it is necessary to go to Chadbourn in North Carolina and change cars for Conway. When the train got to Florence, it was two hours late, and the plaintiff was uneasy about making connection at Chadbourn, and made inquiry at Florence. He could learn nothing in Florence about the matter. After leaving Florence, the plaintiff appealed to the conductor to find out for him if the train would be held at Chadbourn. The plaintiff says that at Marion he was informed that the train to Conway had left Chadbourn, and he would have to wait at Chadbourn for a later train, and be delayed several hours; that the conductor told him that, if he was obliged to be at home within a reasonable time’, it would be well to get off of the train and go across from Marion to Conway by automobile. The plaintiff got off of the train at Marion and engaged an automobile to take him *205across to Conway. The automobile broke down on the way. The day was exceedingly cold, and the roads were in a bad condition. The driver of the automobile refused to go any further. The plaintiff succeeded in getting another automobile. Automobile No. 2 broke down, and the plaintiff procured a third automobile to finish the journey. The plaintiff spent hours on the road, and suffered with the cold and was made sick by the exposure. He did not arrive at home until 8 o’clock at night. It seems that, while the train between Chadbourn and Conway did leave the station at Chadbourn, as reported, the engine was delayed in the yard just after it started, and it took so long to fix it that, after it was fixed, it waited for the train which the plaintiff had left at Marion, and enabled the other passengers for Conway to reach Conway at 3 o’clock, or five hours ahead of the plaintiff. This action is brought for the sickness of the plaintiff, produced by his exposure between Marion and Conway. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
I. The first assignment of error that needs consideration is the charge of his honor, the presiding Judge. The charge reads in part: .“Mr. Foreman, and Gentlemen of the Jury: In the trial of this case, in which Walter L. Mishoe seeks damages from the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, the Court finds itself surrounded by a mass of technical law which it has to pass upon, because in a case like this, where the journey is through another state, we are called upon and required to apply certain principles of the law of the United States, passed by Congress and construed by Federal Judges, and therefore the burden is thrown upon a State Judge of not only being familiar with and being able to expláin to the jury the law of one state, but the laws of the United States, as construed and intrepreted by the United States Courts to the different departments of the State Governments. Nevertheless the Courts have to pass upon these matters, *206and to do the best they can and try to lay the law before the jury.”
“The first idea to get into your mind, gentlemen, is that Mr. Mishoe- is coming in here and claiming damages, both actual and punitive, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, based upon certain charges, which he alleges to have been negligent conduct on the part of the railroad company, and that, as a proximate result of these alleged negligent acts, or any one of them, he was injured. And furthermore, on the basis that the charges made against the railroad company were not only negligent, but willful, wanton, and reckless, therefore he claims punitive as well as actual damage.”
“Now, we will dispose of the matter of punitive damage first under the Federal Law, in order that we may get clearly that point.”
“Under the state law, which was in force until recently, the idea was that, where an act was committed that was willful, wanton, and reckless, and as a proximate result of it there was an injury sustained, in that case a jury, under the state law, could find not only actual damages, but punitive damages, to punish the railroad for committing such willful, wanton, and reckless acts, and to prevent them from committing such like acts in the future.”
“Under the Act of Congress, the railroads having such a grasp upon Congress and being able to get through almost any legislation, under the law and decisions thereunder by Federal Judges, if the transit of a passenger is through another state, it does not matter how slightly it may be, the journey is denominated an interstate journey, involving more than one state, and the Federal Law says, and we are bound by that law, that in such a case as that the party injured, even though the cause of his injury was willful, wanton, and reckless conduct on the part of the railroad, bringing about as a proximate cause his injury, that he cannot recover more than his actual damages, unless it is shown *207on his behalf that the conduct of the railroad company in committing the willful, wanton, and reckless act resulting in the direct injury to the person was conduct authorized by the officers directing the railroad' — authorized directly by them As if one of the high officials were to come up to a conductor and say to him: T authorize you to throw this passenger off the train.’ There you have the direct authorization and direction to an official to perform the act by one authorized to do so. In such an event as that, the party could get punitive damages by reason of the fact that the act on the part of the official which brought about the injury by throwing the man off the train was done by the direct direction of one in control. Or it may be shown that, though such a person was not present, and did not directly authorize the act or wrong whereby the injury was incurred, yet if the higher authorities or parties in charge of the railroad, acquiesced in the conduct of that official subsequently, and of such acquiescence you are to judge from the testimony, whether, though the wrong conduct was not done by the official in control of the system, yet that there was ratification after it had been done.”
■ The jury might infer from this statement that the railroads and Congress are in collision to protect the railroad from the consequences of their unlawful invasions of the rights of the traveling public. The statement is not only unlawful, but. highly prejudicial to the appellant. Generally, a Judge charges a jury offhand, as it is called, and he does not say just what he means, and it is doubtless true that his Honor did not intend to reflect upon Congress, or the class to which the defendant belonged; but none the less it is true that it was calculated to prejudice the defendant, at least in the estimation of the jury, and was reversible error.
II. I think a verdict should have been directed for the defendant. The defendant undertook to carry the plaintiff by rail safely from Columbia to Conway, so far as hu*208man care and prudence could provide. The plaintiff, knowing the climatic conditions as well as the defendant’s agents and servants did, voluntarily left the train at Marion and undertook to go across country to Conway. The defendant did not produce the extreme cold from which the plaintiff suffered. 'It did not own the highway on which the plaintiff undertook to travel. The defendant could not repair any defects therein. No agent of the defendant selected the automobiles or their drivers. The whole injury complained of was incurred on the trip from Marion to Conway, after the plaintiff had severed his connection with the defendant, and due to causes over which the defendant had no control. A suitable automobile and competent driver did enable the plaintiff to complete his journey, which the other automobiles and their drivers could not, or would not, complete. No injury to the sick child was alleged or proven, but the injuries were due solely to the act of God, and the inefficiency of the means selected by the plaintiff. I see no ground upon which a liability of the defendant can be based. The plaintiff may have received injury, and yet the defendant not be liable. The wrong must be the proximate cause of the injury. The proximate cause here was the cold, the condition of the highway, the automobiles, and their drivers.
The judgment is reversed.
Messrs. Justices Coti-iran and Marion concur.
Mr. Ci-hee 'Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts dissent.