Court Opinion

ID: 9955912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:03:39.749029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:38.934046
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221324-U

                                                                                SECOND DIVISION
                                                                                    March 29, 2024

                                            No. 1-22-1324

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Cook County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 84 CO 1426804
                                                )
MARVIN BRYANT,                                  )     Honorable
                                                )     Thaddeus L. Wilson,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________

        JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
        Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1      Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for leave to file his fifth
              successive postconviction petition because his claim was previously raised and is
              barred by res judicata.

¶2      Defendant Marvin Bryant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file

his pro se successive postconviction petition. Specifically, he contends that his mandatory

natural life sentence imposed under a previous version of the Habitual Criminal Act (HCA) (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1 (recodified as amended at 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2022))

violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
No. 1-22-1324

§ 11) because his sentence was premised on a predicate offense committed when he was 19 years

old. Based on emerging authority regarding youthful offenders, defendant asserts that he satisfied

the requisite cause and prejudice for filing a successive postconviction petition and the trial court

erred in denying his motion.

¶3        Defendant, along with his four codefendants, William Glover, Marvin Barber, David

DuPree, and Markus Hunter1, were charged with multiple offenses stemming from an armed

robbery that occurred the night of December 7, 1984, at an illegal gambling club run by Eddie

Morris at 3735 South Ellis Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. During this incident, Morris, his family,

and patrons of his club were accosted and robbed at gunpoint, and following a joint jury trial, all

of the defendants were found guilty of armed robbery, home invasion, and aggravated battery.

Defendant was sentenced as an habitual criminal, pursuant to the HCA (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.

38, ¶ 33B-1(e)), to a term of natural life in prison for armed robbery and home invasion with a

concurrent term of 10 years for aggravated battery. We outline the evidence presented at

defendant’s jury trial as necessary for our disposition of this appeal. A full discussion of the

evidence presented at defendant’s trial was set forth in People v. Glover, 173 Ill. App. 3d 678

(1988).

¶4        On December 7, 1984, shortly before 1 a.m., Officer John Fason was directed via radio to

proceed to 3735 South Ellis Avenue in Chicago. Morris operated a club on the first floor and

basement of the building at that address and lived with his family on the second floor. Upon

arriving at that address, Officer Fason saw a woman on the second floor indicating that he should

1
    None of defendant’s codefendants are a party to this appeal.
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No. 1-22-1324

enter, so he kicked in the door and entered the building with two other officers. After speaking

with people at the scene, Officer Fason arrested Glover and another officer arrested Hunter.

¶5     When Officer Robert Andler arrived at the scene a few minutes later, he saw a man run

out of the building. Officer Andler observed other officers looking for that man with one of those

officers finding DuPree lying on the ground between the garbage cans and the shrubs of a nearby

house. That officer arrested DuPree and found $350 in small bills upon searching him. Another

officer found a carbine pistol in the shrubs next to the building. Other officers saw defendant and

Barber running down the street away from the club, and the officers chased the men for a couple

of blocks before placing the men under arrest. Officers found several pieces of jewelry on

defendant at the time of his arrest.

¶6     Multiple patrons of the club also testified about the armed robbery. Clarence Spears was

playing a video game on the first floor of the club when he saw DuPree and Barber enter the club

and noticed that Barber had a gun in his hand. Barber went to the bar, took money out of the cash

register, and took cigarettes from behind the bar. When DuPree blocked the front door, Spears

went to the back staircase, which led to the basement. In the basement, he saw people lined up

facing the wall with their hands on the wall. He saw Glover holding a small revolver and

defendant holding a larger gun which he identified as one of the guns which the police later

recovered.

¶7     Glover told people one at a time to step away from the wall, then he searched them and

took their valuables. Spears saw Glover take Alfred Johnson’s watch, then strike Johnson with

his gun, which discharged. When Glover finished taking money and jewelry from everyone in

the basement, he instructed them to remain in the room for ten minutes, he then broke the lights

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No. 1-22-1324

and went upstairs with defendant. Spears identified a gun which police recovered at the scene as

the gun carried by Barber, and he identified a gold cross which police found in defendant’s

pocket as the cross which Glover took from Spears.

¶8     Wade Curry was in the kitchen on the first floor when he saw Hunter with a gun pointed

at the head of a woman who worked in the club. Hunter told Curry to open the door to the

basement and go downstairs. The woman followed Curry and Hunter followed her, keeping the

gun pointed at her. Curry saw Glover and defendant in the basement. Hunter went upstairs after

asking someone where Morris was.

¶9     Curry recounted a similar account of the robbery by Glover and defendant as Spears.

Glover took Curry’s money and jewelry and then told him to stand against the opposite wall.

Curry saw Glover strike Johnson with his gun and saw the gun discharge. He also saw Glover

strike Norman Jeter with a gun because Jeter took too long to remove his jewelry. DuPree came

down to the basement, also carrying a gun, and he left with Glover and defendant when Glover

broke the lights. Curry identified guns which the police recovered as the guns which Hunter and

defendant carried that night.

¶ 10   Norman Jeter was in the basement of the club when he saw defendant enter and look

around the room. Defendant left and he returned shortly thereafter carrying a gun. He cocked the

gun and said, “You all know what this is.” Jeter testified that Glover came in carrying a pistol

and told everyone to get against the wall. Jeter’s description of the robbery mostly corroborated

Curry’s testimony. Alfred Johnson and Larry Niles further corroborated Curry’s description of

the robbery, and Johnson added that he fell to the floor and passed out when the gun Glover hit

                                                 4
No. 1-22-1324

him with discharged. He has lost all vision in one eye and part of the bullet remains lodged in his

head.

¶ 11    Rosalind Morris, Eddie Morris’s wife, testified that she was sitting in her kitchen after

midnight on December 7, 1984, when Hunter came into the kitchen carrying a pistol, ripped the

phone off the wall, and asked her where Morris was. She told him Morris was in the back.

Hunter pointed the gun at her head and walked next to her to the back of the house. Rosalind

knocked on the bathroom door. When Morris opened it, Hunter pushed his way into the

bathroom and then he took Rosalind and Morris back to their bedroom. Hunter asked, “where’s

the money?” Morris and Rosalind insisted that they did not have any money. Hunter took another

phone off the bedroom wall, then took a bank full of quarters, an answering machine, some

money, and jewelry, and put them in a pillowcase. He told Morris to go downstairs but left

Rosalind in the bedroom to get dressed. Hunter took the pillowcase and told Rosalind he would

come back in a minute to get her. Once he got downstairs, Rosalind picked up another telephone

in the bedroom, dialed 911, and told police an armed man was robbing her home. Shortly

thereafter, she saw a police car pull up and she went to the window and waved to the officers.

Barber came to her bedroom carrying a gun, cursed when he saw the police cars out front, then

began to run.

¶ 12    Morris’s testimony substantially corroborated Rosalind’s account. Morris added that

when Hunter took him downstairs, he saw defendant taking cigarettes and whiskey from the bar.

He acknowledged that police had raided his club more than 50 times, charging him with keeping

a disorderly house, keeping a gambling house, and selling liquor without a license.

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No. 1-22-1324

¶ 13   Defendant raised multiple claims on direct appeal, including challenging the

constitutionality of the HCA under the proportionate penalties clause. This court affirmed

defendant’s conviction and sentence. Glover, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 682-86.

¶ 14   Defendant has since filed several unsuccessful postconviction petitions. In June 2001,

defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous and

patently without merit in July 2001. Defendant did not appeal this dismissal. Defendant filed his

first successive pro se postconviction petition in August 2004, arguing that the HCA violated ex

post facto principles and this court affirmed the second-stage dismissal of that petition after

granting appellate counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley,

481 U.S. 551 (1987). People v. Bryant, No. 1-08-0754 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). In February 2012, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file his second

successive postconviction petition, asserting that his indictment was void and defective because

he was charged with multiple counts of home invasion for a single entry into a single dwelling,

his extended-term sentence for aggravated battery was void, and he was actually innocent. The

trial court denied defendant leave to file his petition in April 2012. This court vacated

defendant’s conviction and sentence for one count of home invasion, but affirmed the trial

court’s denial of leave to file the successive petition on all other grounds. People v. Bryant, 2014

IL App (1st) 121731-U, ¶ 33. In June 2014, defendant sought leave to file his third successive

pro se postconviction petition, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional for two reasons: (1)

his prior convictions were not submitted to the jury and therefore were not established by the

State beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) his mandatory life sentence violated Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012), because the trial court was prohibited from considering the scientific

                                                  6
No. 1-22-1324

mitigating factors applicable to defendant. The trial court denied defendant leave to file his

successive petition in September 2014 and this court affirmed the denial of leave to file that

petition after granting appellate counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Finley, 481

U.S. 551 (1987). People v. Bryant, No. 1-14-3379 (2016) (summary order filed pursuant

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2), (4) (eff. July 1, 2011)). In June 2019, defendant sought leave to

file his fourth successive pro se postconviction petition, arguing that his mandatory life sentence

violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because evolving science

regarding brain development applied to him because he was 29 years old at the time of the

offense. The trial court denied defendant leave to file in August 2019. Defendant did not appeal

the denial.

¶ 15   In November 2021, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file his fifth successive

petition, which is at issue in this appeal. In his motion, defendant argued that his mandatory life

sentence under the HCA violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution

(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) because he was 19 years old when his first predicate offense was

committed. Defendant relies on a recent amendment to the HCA that no longer classify any

offense committed before age 21 as a qualifying prior conviction. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

95(a)(4(E) (West 2022). While defendant conceded that the amendment was not retroactive, he

quoted People v. Aikens, 2016 IL App (1st) 133578, ¶ 38, to assert that the amendment is

“ ‘indicative of a changing moral compass in our society when it comes to trying and sentencing

juveniles as adults.’ ” He contended that he satisfied the requisite cause and prejudice test for

filing a successive petition because the law and science supporting his claim was unavailable in

his previous petitions and that prejudice resulted from the mandatorily imposed disproportionate

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No. 1-22-1324

life sentence. Defendant further argues that under today’s law, he would not be eligible to be

sentenced as an habitual offender, and the severity of his penalty was not in accordance with the

seriousness of his crimes. According to defendant, “the recently enacted Illinois law (see ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(a)(4)(E)), under which [defendant] would not be labeled ‘an habitual offender’

because of a reported mistake as a ‘youthful offender’ demonstrates the ‘mandatorily’ imposed

natural life sentence no longer reflects Illinois’s evolving standard of moral decency.”

¶ 16   In January 2022, the trial court entered a written order denying defendant leave to file his

successive petition. The court found that defendant’s claim fails because the amendment to

section 5-4.5-95 is not retroactive. The court, relying on People v. Lawson, 2015 IL App (1st)

120751, found that the penalty under the HCA results from the offender committing the third

qualifying offense as an adult. The court reasoned that defendant’s claim lacked merit because

defendant was an adult at the time of his third offense and, unlike the defendant in Lawson who

was a juvenile when he committed his first offense, defendant was a young adult at the time of

his first predicate offense. The court concluded that defendant failed to show that he is

prejudiced by his failure to raise the claim in his initial postconviction petition, and it need not

determine whether defendant demonstrated cause.

¶ 17   This appeal followed.

¶ 18   On appeal, defendant argues that he has satisfied the cause and prejudice test for filing a

successive postconviction petition because (1) he has shown cause since the statutory

amendment and legal authority relied on were issued after he filed his previous petitions and (2)

he has made a prima facie showing of prejudice since the new legislation and case law impacts

his mandatory life sentence.

                                                  8
No. 1-22-1324

¶ 19   The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) provides a

tool by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the

result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois

Constitution or both. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). Only one

postconviction proceeding is contemplated under the Act (People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711,

¶ 22), and a defendant seeking to file a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave

of court (People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 157 (2010)). The bar against successive

postconviction proceedings should not be relaxed unless (1) a defendant can establish “cause and

prejudice” for the failure to raise the claim earlier or (2) he can show actual innocence under the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23; People v.

Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30. Under the cause and prejudice test, a defendant must establish both

(1) cause for his or her failure to raise the claim earlier and (2) prejudice stemming from his or

her failure to do so. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d

444, 459 (2002)).

¶ 20   The cause and prejudice standard is higher than the normal first stage “frivolous or

patently without merit” standard applied to initial petitions. Id. ¶¶ 25-29; Smith, 2014 IL 115946,

¶ 35 (“the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition involves a higher standard than the

first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of

the Act”). “A defendant shows cause ‘by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her

ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.’ ” People v.

Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2010)). In other words, to

establish “cause” a defendant must articulate why he could not have discovered the claim earlier

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No. 1-22-1324

through the exercise of due diligence. People v. Wideman, 2016 IL App (1st) 123092, ¶ 72. A

defendant shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim so infected the trial that the resulting

conviction or sentence violated due process. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48. It is defendant’s

burden to establish a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice in order to be granted

leave before further proceedings on his claims can follow. See People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450,

¶ 24. We review the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition

de novo. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25.

¶ 21   The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll

penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the

objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “To

succeed on a proportionate penalties claim, a defendant must show either that the penalty

imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral

sense of the community ***.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009). Our supreme court

has never defined what kind of punishment constitutes “cruel,” “degrading,”,” or “so wholly

disproportioned to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community” because, “as our

society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the

‘moral sense’ of the community.” People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 339 (2002). It is under

this evolving societal standard that defendant contends that his mandatory life sentence shocks

the moral sense of community.

¶ 22   The State initially contends that defendant’s sentencing argument is barred by res

judicata because he previously argued that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties

clause in his direct appeal and his fourth successive postconviction petition.

                                                  10
No. 1-22-1324

¶ 23    On direct appeal, defendant argued that his mandatory life sentence violated the

proportionate penalties clause because the trial court had no discretion in imposing defendant’s

sentence under the HCA. Glover, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 683. The reviewing court held that

defendant’s sentence was constitutional and “the legislature properly exercised its authority

when it determined that in the public interest, any person who committed Class X felonies on

three separate occasions must be sentenced to natural life imprisonment.” Id. at 684.

¶ 24   In his 2019 postconviction petition, defendant raised an as-applied challenge that his

sentence was unconstitutional because the trial court lacked discretion to consider any mitigating

factors before imposing the mandatory life sentence. Defendant contended that he was “29 years

and 3 weeks” when the third armed robbery was committed on December 7, 1984, and “the

continued development of the human brain up to the age of 30 years old in areas of the brain that

governs impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, and foresight of consequences.” He

argued that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was imposed without an evidentiary

hearing considering his youth and its attendant circumstances. The trial court found that

defendant failed to establish the requisite prejudice and denied leave to file the petition.

Defendant did not appeal this dismissal.

¶ 25   In his reply brief, defendant maintains that his claim is not barred by res judicata because

the 2021 amendment to the HCA, which form “the central kernel” of his present claim did not

exist at the time of his previous sentencing challenges and his claim satisfied the requisite cause

prong for this reason.

¶ 26   “The doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of issues that were previously raised and

definitively settled by judicial decision.” People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 103. A

                                                  11
No. 1-22-1324

defendant cannot obtain relief under the Act simply by rephrasing previously addressed issues in

constitutional terms in his petition. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277 (1992). “Such claims

will be properly defeated by operation of waiver and res judicata.” Id. at 278.

¶ 27    An intervening change in the law can establish cause in considering whether to relax the

bar of res judicata when the intervening change in the law comes from the legislature or a higher

court. People v. Nichols, 2021 IL App (2d) 190659, ¶ 22. In proceedings under the Act,

fundamental fairness for relaxing the doctrine of res judicata is established by satisfying the

requirements of the cause and prejudice test. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 45. Since

defendant previously challenged his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause, his claim

is barred by res judicata unless he can overcome that bar by satisfying the cause and prejudice

test.

¶ 28    Defendant argues that he has satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test

because prior to the 2021 amendment, the HCA made no distinction between convictions for

offenses that occurred when a defendant was under 21 years old and those that occurred when a

defendant was over 21. He asserts that this intervening change in the law constitutes the requisite

change to file his successive petition because it was unavailable at the time he sought leave to

file his previous successive petition in 2019.

¶ 29    At the time of defendant’s sentencing in October 1985, the HCA stated:

                       “Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court

                of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in

                Illinois as a Class X felony or murder, and is thereafter convicted of a Class X

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No. 1-22-1324

                felony or murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an

                habitual criminal.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1(a). 2

Under this statute, “[e]xcept when the death penalty is imposed, anyone adjudged an habitual

criminal shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.” Id. ¶ 33B-1(e). No age

requirement was set forth in the statute at the time defendant was adjudged an habitual criminal

and sentenced to natural life in prison. See id. ¶ 33B-1.

¶ 30     Defendant argues that a recent amendment to the HCA demonstrates society’s evolving

consideration in sentencing of an offender’s age and related characteristics. Public Act 101-652

(eff. July 1, 2021) amended section 5-4.5-95(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) to

provide that the first qualifying offense for Class X sentencing must have been “committed when

the person was 21 years of age or older.” Pub. Act 101-652 (eff. July 1, 2021) (adding 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(a)(4)(E)).

¶ 31     Defendant concedes that the amended version of the HCA is not retroactive but contends

that based on recent case law and statutory changes regarding youthful offenders his natural life

sentence now “shocks the moral sense of the people.” Records attached to defendant’s motion

indicated that he was 19 years old at the time his first armed robbery was committed in

November 1974.

¶ 32     The sentencing of juvenile and youthful offenders has been evolving in the country over

the last several years. Beginning with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the United States

Supreme Court weighed in and set forth new constitutional parameters for the sentencing of

juvenile offenders. See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567

2
    Now codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a)(1) (West 2022).
                                                13
No. 1-22-1324

U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735-36 (2016). “[T]he

United States Supreme Court has advised that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults

for purposes of sentencing.’ ” People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 32 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.

at 471). “The Court outlawed capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder in Roper and

capital sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses in Graham. And in Miller, the

Court barred mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder.” Id. Miller has since

been held to apply retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735-36; see also People v. Holman,

2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38 (recognizing that Miller applied retroactively).

¶ 33   Since Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested similar sentencing challenges are

viable for youthful offenders, i.e., defendants who are young, but legal adults. See People v.

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (finding that a 19-year-old defendant was not necessarily

foreclosed from raising an as-applied challenge in the trial court and observing that the Act was

designed to resolve such constitutional claims); People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48

(concluding that the 18-year-old defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was

“more appropriately raised” in a postconviction proceeding rather than on direct appeal).

¶ 34   Defendant attempts to differentiate his claim based on the 2021 HCA amendment from a

general Miller-based claim. According to defendant, he is not contending that the HCA violates

the proportionate penalties clause because the sentencing court was precluded from considering

his youth and rehabilitative potential, but rather, that the 2021 amendment was part of a

sweeping criminal justice reform that reflects a shift in society’s evolving understanding of youth

and brain immaturity. He maintains that until the HCA was amended in 2021, his “claim was

legally and factually precluded by both the language of the [HCA] and precedent, and he had no

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No. 1-22-1324

basis upon which he could assert that his life sentence, based on a prior offense committed

before he was 21 years old, shocks the moral sense of the people.”

¶ 35    “ ‘[A] rule is “novel,” and therefore [is] cause for a procedural default, only if the

petitioner did not have the legal tools to construct the claim before the rule was issued.’ ”

Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 44 (quoting Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th

Cir. 1996)). “The lack of precedent for a position differs from ‘cause’ for failing to raise an issue,

and a defendant must raise the issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve it for

review.” People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 20.

¶ 36    The reason defendant seeks to avoid basing his claim on Miller and its progeny is

because Illinois courts have consistently held that Miller and other age-related claims do not

constitute cause because our courts have long recognized the differences between juvenile and

young adult offenders. See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123016, ¶74; People v. Clark, 2023 IL

127273, ¶¶ 92-94; People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42.

¶ 37    In Dorsey, a juvenile offender sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition,

challenging his 76-year aggregate prison sentence based on Miller. The Dorsey court held “that

Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment [did] not provide

cause for [the] defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021

Il 123016, ¶ 74. “Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature

age and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing. Thus, Miller’s unavailability prior to

2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state constitutional law claim,

which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ ” Id.

¶ 38    Following Dorsey, Illinois courts have continued to hold that sentencing claims based on

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youth are not novel and do not support a finding of cause. In Clark, the supreme court considered

the proportionate penalties claim of a 24-year-old defendant suffering from mental health issues.

Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 1. Applying the cause-and-prejudice test, the supreme court found that

the defendant could not establish cause because case law was clear that the new rule set forth in

Miller “ ‘does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties

clause’ in a successive postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 92 (quoting Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74).

In applying Dorsey to young adult offenders, the Clark court observed that “Illinois courts were

also aware that ‘less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted

that sentences take into account that reality of human development.’ ” Id. ¶ 93 (quoting Haines,

2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47). The court found that the defendant “ ‘had the essential legal

tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause’ when he filed

his previous postconviction petitions.” Id. (quoting Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 49).

The supreme court concluded that, “citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’

prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive

postconviction petition, as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain why defendant

neglected to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim in his prior postconviction

proceedings.” Id. ¶ 94; see Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law

applicable to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges

advanced in [the defendants’] proposed successive postconviction petitions.”).

¶ 39   By contending that his claim is premised on the 2021 amendment to the HCA and not

Miller, defendant aims to avoid the foreclosure of his claim by Dorsey and Clark. However, his

argument is a distinction without a difference. Defendant concedes that the amendment is not

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No. 1-22-1324

retroactive and therefore he is not seeking relief by being resentenced under these changes. But if

the 2021 amendment does not apply to him, then what is the basis of his proportionate penalties

claim. We find his claims fall under Miller because he is using its reasoning to demonstrate the

evolving standards of sentencing for young adult offenders. By suggesting his claims are not

based on Miller, defendant tries to get the benefit of the retroactive amendment which he

concedes does not apply to him.

¶ 40   We find the decisions in People v. Lawson, 2015 IL App (1st) 120751, People v.

Simmons, 2023 IL App (4th) 220693-U, and People v. Byrd, 2023 IL App (4th) 220957-U,

relevant to our analysis. In Lawson, the defendant argued on direct appeal, in part, that his

natural life sentence pursuant to the HCA was unconstitutional as applied to him because one of

the predicate convictions occurred when he was 17 years old. Lawson, 2015 IL App (1st)

120751, ¶ 44. The reviewing court observed that in enacting mandatory life sentences under the

HCA, the legislature considered the rehabilitative potential of offenders by limiting the

application of this statute to offenders who have a third serious felony conviction within a

prescribed period of time, and that offenders have the opportunity to present mitigating evidence

and demonstrate their rehabilitative potential when they are sentenced for their first two serious

felony offenses. The HCA is only imposed after defendant has twice shown that conviction and

imprisonment do not deter him from a life of crime. Id. ¶ 52. The Lawson court then concluded

that defendant was not a juvenile when he committed his third Class X felony and was being

punished for that offense. Id. ¶ 53.

¶ 41   In Simmons, the Fourth District recently considered the same issue before us. There, the

defendant was convicted of armed robbery in 1997. Simmons, 2023 IL App (4th) 220693-U, ¶ 4.

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Because the defendant had two prior Class X convictions, the State sought a natural life sentence

under the HCA. Id. ¶¶ 5- 6. In July 2022, the defendant sought leave to file a successive

postconviction petition and argued that his life sentence violated the proportionate penalties

clause because under current Illinois law, he could not be found to be an habitual criminal. He

noted that his first two convictions occurred when he was 16 and 20 years old. Id. ¶ 10. As

defendant in this case asserts, the defendant in Simmons alleged in his petition that “he could not

have raised his sentencing challenge in either of his previous postconviction proceedings as the

legislature did not amend the [HCA] to exclude crimes committed by persons under the age of 21

until many years after those proceedings were concluded.” Id. ¶ 11. The trial court found that the

defendant failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test and denied him leave to file his successive

petition. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 42    On appeal, the defendant argued that his life sentence under the HCA violated the

proportionate penalties clause “because (1) the current version of the [HCA] requires qualifying

felony offenses to have been committed when the defendant was 21 years of age or older and (2)

he was under the age of 21 when he committed his predicate felony offenses.” Id. ¶ 15. He

maintained that he satisfied the requisite cause because the 2021 amendment took effect after the

filing of his previous postconviction petition. Id. Specifically, he argued that the 2021

amendment reflected society’s evolving understanding of youth and brain immaturity as well as

its impact on rehabilitation. He further asserted that “this evolving understanding of youth

represents objective evidence that his life sentence—based in part upon offenses he committed

when he was under the age of 21—is shocking to the moral sense of the community” and prior to

the amendment, his claim was legally and factually precluded. Id. ¶ 24.

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¶ 43   The reviewing court disagreed and found that the “defendant had the essential legal tools

with which to construct his proportionate penalties claim prior to the 2021 amendment to the

[HCA], including at the time of his previous postconviction proceedings.” Id. ¶ 25. The Simmons

court relied on the decisions in Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, and People v. Kuehner, 2022

IL App (4th) 200325, for support.

¶ 44   In Haines, the defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition

challenging his 55 year sentence for a first degree murder he committed when he was 18 in

violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution based on Miller and Harris. Haines, 2021 IL App

(4th) 190612, ¶ 1. The Fourth District found that years prior to the defendant’s previous

postconviction petition, “Illinois courts recognized as-applied claims under the proportionate-

penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 46. Further, the Haines court observed that “decades before Harris,

Illinois case law held that the proportionate-penalties clause required the sentencing court to take

into account the defendant’s ‘youth’ and ‘mentality.’ ” Id. ¶ 47. The reviewing court concluded

that the defendant “had the essential legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the

proportionate-penalties clause” when he filed his prior postconviction petition and found that the

defendant had not satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test. Id. ¶ 49. The Haines

court further reasoned:

                “To be sure, Harris, issued some 10 years after the initial postconviction

                proceeding, would have made it easier for defendant to raise his claim. But, again,

                the question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made it easier to

                raise the claim. Rather, the question is whether, at the time of the initial

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                postconviction proceeding, Illinois law provided the tools with which to raise the

                claim. Despite the nonexistence of Harris, the legal basis of defendant’s present

                proposed claim was reasonably available at the time of the initial postconviction

                proceeding.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id.

¶ 45   In Kuehner, the defendant entered an open plea for attempted first degree murder and

home invasion, committed when he was 17 years old, and received a sentence of 35 years. He

sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging, in part, that his sentence

violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution. Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th) 200325, ¶¶ 1,4. The defendant

argued that he established cause because the authority on which he based his sentencing claim

was not previously available to him and pointed to legislative changes in Illinois in 2014, 2016,

and 2019 that he contended demonstrate a societal shift toward more lenient treatment of

juvenile offenders. Id. ¶ 100.

¶ 46   The Kuehner court followed the reasoning in Haines and found that the defendant could

not show cause because he was not prevented from challenging his sentence in a previous

postconviction petition.

                        “ Similarly, in this case, defendant had the necessary tools to construct an

                as-applied, proportionate penalties claim when he filed his (1) direct appeal in

                2005, (2) initial postconviction petition in 2009, and (3) amended postconviction

                petition in 2018. The statutory amendments in 2014, 2016, and 2019 would have

                made it easier for him to prove his claim, but he was not foreclosed from bringing

                that claim earlier.” Id. ¶ 106.

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¶ 47   Following Haines and Kuehner, the Simmons court likewise held that the defendant was

not prevented from raising a proportionate penalties claim in his prior postconviction petition.

Simmons, 2023 IL App (4th) 220693-U, ¶ 31. The defendant “had the ability to construct his

proportionate penalties claim at the time of his earlier postconviction proceedings. Neither the

unavailability of Miller nor the 2021 amendment to the [HCA] provides ‘cause’ for his failure to

previously raise that claim.” Id. The court found the defendant’s attempt to characterize his claim

based on the 2021 amendment as a novel issue “unconvincing.” Id. ¶¶ 32-33. “[T]he fact that

developmental differences exist between youthful offenders and offenders who are mature

adults, and that such differences are relevant to sentencing considerations, are not novel concepts

under Illinois law.” Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 48   Similarly, in Byrd, 2023 IL App (4th) 220957-U, ¶ 2, the defendant also sought leave to

file a successive postconviction petition, arguing that his natural life sentence imposed under the

HCA violated the proportionate penalties clause. The defendant asserted that one of his predicate

offenses occurred when he was under 21 years of age. On appeal, the defendant argued that the

reviewing court should revisit Simmons because its reliance on Kuehner was misplaced. Id. ¶ 21.

The Byrd court found Simmons persuasive and concluded that “[a]t best, the 2021 amendment

provides an example of the societal shift toward more lenient sentencing of youthful offenders

that would have made it easier to prove his claim. We agree with the analysis in Simmons—the

amendment is not novel.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 49   We find these cases persuasive and their analysis applicable in this case. While Lawson

did not involve, and predated, the 2021 amendment, we find its conclusion that the life sentence

imposed under the HCA is punishment for the third Class X felony offense is equally true in this

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case. Defendant was a 29-year-old when he committed his third armed robbery and that

conviction triggered the applicability of the HCA.

¶ 50   We further note that the legislature chose not to make the 2021 amendment retroactive

and we are bound by the statutory language. “It is the judiciary’s role to enforce clear,

unambiguous statutes as written, not to question the wisdom of the legislature.” People v. Wells,

2023 IL 127169, ¶ 31. “ ‘The legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined

offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences,

even if such sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.’ ” People v.

Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004)). “The

legislature’s determination of a particular punishment for a crime in and of itself is an expression

of the general moral ideas of the people.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 51   In Hilliard, the supreme court considered a similar argument involving the mandatory

firearm enhancement. There, the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and

received the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, for a total sentence of 40 years. Id. ¶ 9. In

a postconviction petition, the defendant contended that his sentence was unconstitutional because

he was 18 years old at the time of the offense and the mandatory nature of the firearm

enhancement deprived the trial court of the ability to consider his age and lack of criminal

history. Id. ¶ 11. The defendant argued that following a 2016 amendment, Illinois courts have the

statutory discretion to choose whether to impose the firearm enhancement on defendants who

were juveniles at the time of the offense. Id. ¶ 36 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2022)).

The supreme court concluded that the legislative changes did not support the defendant’s as-

applied challenge. “The legislature determined that courts should have the discretion to

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determine whether to impose the firearm enhancement on individuals who were juveniles when

they committed their crimes (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2022)), but the provision is not

retroactive.” Id. ¶ 38. The Hilliard court further observed that the legislature made the

“deliberate choice” not to extend the discretion to adult offenders. Id. “The legislature’s decision

not to broaden the statute’s reach to all defendants under 21 shows that it was implementing the

legislation as a policy change rather than a reflection that the previous statutory scheme was

abhorrent to the community’s moral sense.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 52   Similarly, here, the legislature decided in enacting the 2021 amendment to the HCA not

to broaden the scope for retroactive application. As the Hilliard court reasoned, this legislative

choice was “a policy change” rather than an indication that life sentences imposed under the

previous versions were against the “community’s moral sense.”

¶ 53   After reviewing all the relevant authority, we find that defendant has not shown the

requisite cause to overcome the bar of res judicata. As the Clark court observed, defendant had

“the essential legal tools” to raise his current sentencing claim when he filed his previous

postconviction petitions. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93. In fact, defendant previously raised a

proportionate penalties challenge of his sentence under a different argument based on Miller in

his fourth successive petition. Thus, defendant was aware of the evolving standards relating to

juvenile and young adult offenders and he cannot overcome the bar of res judicata.

¶ 54   Since our ruling on cause disposes of the case, we need not address the issue of whether

defendant adequately stated a prima facie showing of prejudice. People v. Moore, 2023 IL

126461, ¶ 42.

¶ 55   Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook

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County.

¶ 56   Affirmed.

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