Court Opinion

ID: 9550276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:23.777599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:19.426556
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority apparently was so offended by the outrageous conduct of appellant Ray K. Oukrop, D.D.S., that it suspended the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Civil Procedure for this one case. A large judgment against appellant is clearly justified, but should have been visited upon him without resort to outlawry.1
It seems to me most strange that Allen C. Collins, Ph.D., was allowed to testify as a medical expert. Throughout the trial Collins was referred to and addressed as “doctor,” and properly so. However, he is a pharmacologist with a doctorate in philosophy; he is not a medical doctor.2 Foundation testimony indicated that Collins had researched the effects of Belladonna Alkaloids, such as atropine, on the nervous system and brains of laboratory animals (mice), but had no clinical experience either treating or diagnosing physiological brain dysfunctions in human beings.
At trial, over appellant’s objection, Collins gave expert medical testimony, and testified that appellee had permanent brain damage.3 This is interesting because Collins never examined or treated appellee.
“ * * * Only an expert medical witness is competent to testify as to medical matters. * * *” Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747, 751 (1981).
*240Pharmacologists and toxicologists are not trained to diagnose mental injuries. Pharmacology is
“[t]he science concerned with drugs, their sources, appearances, chemistry, actions and uses.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 1065 (5th ed. 1982).
Pharmacologists and chemists are qualified to describe the general effects of a drug on the human body. Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 492-493 (3rd Cir.1963); and Stertz v. Briscoe, 184 Kan. 163, 334 P.2d 357, 361 (1959), 70 A.L.R.2d 1029 (1960). This type of testimony may be characterized as chemical opinion. State v. Bessette, 130 Vt. 438, 296 A.2d 179, 181 (1972). Therefore, an expert witness called upon to give an opinion on permanent brain damage logically should be a neurosurgeon, neurophysiologist or a clinical psychiatrist, not a doctor of philosophy or a pharmacologist with a Ph.D. in philosophy.
My main concern about this case, however, is the element of surprise, or stated another way, “trial by ambush.” There is no way appellant’s counsel could have known that appellee’s principal claim for damages was permanent brain damage. In the middle of the trial appellee revealed for the first time that he was claiming damages for permanent brain injury and that Collins would testify as an expert in support of that claim. Neither appellee’s complaint nor opening statement gives any hint that permanent brain damage is claimed as an element of damages, and says nothing to indicate that Collins would testify as though he were a medical doctor. Rather, the complaint and opening statement pleads a case of knee injury as a result of hallucinations. Also, the depositions of ap-pellee, his mother and family physician describe a case of knee injury. Three physicians (not doctors of philosophy, juris doctors or doctors of Divinity), testified at trial; they said nothing about brain damage.
Appellee gave notice of the substance of Collins' testimony when he filed his “Notice of Experts.” The notice incorporated by reference an opinion letter from Collins to appellee’s counsel dated November 6,1984. The letter was never modified nor supplemented, and represented the sum and substance of Collins’ proposed testimony. It partially states:
“ * * * As I mentioned above, there is no doubt in my mind that the symptoms described are due to the overdose of atropine. I should mention, however, that atropine toxicity is rarely fatal and long term toxic effects are rare. If the patient survives the first 24 hours the prognosis is usually excellent. This is also consistent with the records that I have seen for this case.”
The letter does not disclose that Collins had formed an opinion that appellee suffered from permanent and worsening brain damage, and counsel for appellant had no reason to suspect that Collins would give such testimony, i.e., testimony that should be elicited from a neurosurgeon, neuropsy-chologist or clinical psychologist.
On February 18, 1986, appellee filed a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Submissions,” which contained a section pertaining to the designation of witnesses. He listed Collins as a witness who would “ * * * testify as to the composition and effects of the drug Atropine by itself and taken in combination with the other drugs given to the Plaintiff, to-wit: Mephyton, demerol and Decadron.” Nowhere did ap-pellee give any indication that Collins would give a medical opinion that appel-lee suffered from permanent and worsening brain damage. Appellee specifically designated physicians as the persons who would provide testimony on the issue of causation and damages. The designation pertaining to Collins says nothing about damages suffered by appellee, and the absence of such a designation leads to the logical conclusion that appellee was not designating Collins as someone who would testify about damages. Therefore, counsel would not suspect that a pharmacologist or doctor of philosophy would be qualified to provide a medical diagnosis of brain damage, and the designations would not lead a reasonable person to suspect that Collins would attempt to do so.
*241On February 25, 1986, the court entered its “Pretrial Conference Report and Order.” There is no mention in either the order or the pretrial memoranda that appel-lee would seek to prove by Collins’ testimony that appellee was suffering from worsening brain damage. Rule 16, W.R.C.P., provides:
“The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.”
Absent amendment or modification, the parties were bound by the contents of the pretrial order. The order not only limited the issues, but it also limited the scope of the proposed testimony to that contained within the designation. Smith v. Ford Company, 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980). The majority does not challenge this point of law, but instead side-steps it by misapplying the standard of review. In Smith, the Tenth Circuit quoted from Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 817-818 (10th Cir.1979), where it had earlier held:
“ ‘ there exists a “properly drawn, detailed pretrial order, a trial court’s determination that certain facts or issues must [or should not] be excluded from trial on the basis of a pretrial order may be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” ***.’” Smith v. Ford Motor Company, supra, at 795.
The majority applies this rule by stating that “[t]he pre-trial submissions in this instance are ‘sufficiently equivocal ’ to justify the district court’s conclusion that Collins’ testimony had not been circumscribed in the manner argued by Dr. Oukrop [appellant] in either pre-trial submissions of Dennis [appellee] or in the pre-trial order. * * *” (Emphasis added.) Majority at 238. The pre-trial order in this case was “properly drawn” in terms of Collins testifying as a pharmacologist, and the trial court had discretion to allow expert testimony under that order. It could deviate from that order at trial only to prevent a manifest injustice. See McCabe v. Manning Construction Co., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699, 703-704 (1983). The basic purpose for having a pre-trial order is, in part, to try to put all of the parties on equal and fair notice about what evidence will be presented by the expert witnesses to be called in the trial. 6 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1527 at 604-615 (1971). In Clark v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 328 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 1006, 84 S.Ct. 1943, 12 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1964), the court stated:
“ * * * One of the prime objectives of this new, but now firmly established procedural device [Rule 16], is to do away with the old sporting theory of justice and substitute a more enlightened policy of putting the cards on the table, so to speak, and keeping surprise tactics down to a minimum. * * *”
See also Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 756 F.2d 1322, 1335 (8th Cir.1985); Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, 233 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir.1956); Fernandez v. United Fruit, 200 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir.1952); Fowler v. Crown-Zellerbach Corporation, 163 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir.1947).
Undisclosed testimony at variance with the pre-trial order should not be allowed if it causes surprise. Apparently, the trial court believed that appellant should have anticipated Collins’ testimony and taken his deposition.
Smith v. Ford Company, supra, was a case similar to this case. In Smith, plaintiff, who had incurred an injury to his pancreas, filed a pretrial memorandum designating a physician as one of his witnesses. The witness designation filed with the court made no mention of the fact that the physician would testify that the injury to the pancreas was due to the location of the seatbelt within the automobile. The designation said only that the physician would discuss the medical treatment of the plaintiff and his prognosis. Relying on this *242limited designation, counsel for defendant decided that a deposition of the physician would not be necessary. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals placed the burden upon plaintiff to apprise the defendant in advance of trial of the nature of the expert’s testimony. The burden was upon the plaintiff to articulate the subject matter of those areas about which his expert would be testifying. If this had been done, the defendant “could have taken his deposition,” if deemed essential.
I cannot subscribe to the majority’s view that any pre-trial order that is “sufficiently equivocal” or otherwise ambiguous concerning the substance of expert witness testimony can be used to affirm the trial court under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
I would reverse this case and remand for a new trial for the reason that appellant never received fair notice that a nonmedical witness was going to give a medical opinion on brain damage, and that Allen C. Collins, Ph.D., did not possess medical credentials to testify as a medical expert on brain damage to human beings.

. "* * * [0]utlawry is putting a man out of protection of the law so that he is incapable to bring an action for redress of injuries; and it is also attended with a forfeiture of all one’s goods and chattels. * * *" II W. Blackstone, Commentaries *283, 284 (1899). In the United States the concept of outlawry is unknown. Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. [1 Otto] 160, 23 L.Ed. 271 (1875).

. As a matter of fact there were several doctors floating around the courtroom the day of the trial. The trial judge, counsel for plaintiff, and counsel for defendant were all doctors — Juris Doctors, that is. Just because a person is addressed "doctor," it does not necessarily follow that he is enfused with medical expertise.

. If the trial court’s ruling was not so prejudicial to appellee, I might change my mind about Collins' so-called expert testimony under the doctrine of “Let it in for what it’s worth." In Wyoming, under this doctrine, a lot of irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent evidence gets into trials. The “Let it in for what it’s worth" rule of evidence is usually reserved for nonjury trials. The trial judge who invokes this doctrine does so as a sop to the proponent, knowing he is not going to consider it in any event. But, employing this doctrine is dangerous in jury trials. The jury may take the suspect evidence and run with it, as they apparently did here.