Court Opinion

ID: 9589917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:13.826969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:22.631852
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting in part.
In Division 8 (c), the majority finds the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments about defense counsel harmless in light of the scientific evidence produced at trial. Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the weight of the evidence precludes prejudice from these improper comments, I respectfully dissent.
There is no tyrant like the tyrant “Harmless Error!” While it is the nature of appellate judges to make concessions to the doctrine of harmless error, and rightfully so, such concessions should be made only after scrupulous analysis demands that we do so. The error in this case is an error that is infinitely more worthy of our consideration than the majority would have us believe. Furthermore, the error is so egregious that it exhorts us to examine, not evade it.
The standard for determining whether improper argument of counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice is whether “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 704, 705 (2) (285 SE2d 45) (1981). Although Georgia appellate courts have been reluctant to order new trials based upon improper argument in cases involving significant evidence of guilt, reversal is not without precedent. See, e.g., Houston v. Estelle, 569 F2d 372 (5th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor’s improper argument resulted in new trial for defendant convicted of heroin possession despite evidence that officer saw matchbook containing 92 foil wrappers of heroin fall from defendant’s body).
As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “overwhelming evidence of guilt” is not dispositive in considering whether a defendant has been afforded a fair trial. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F2d 1487, 1540-1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity resulted in new trial despite overwhelming evidence of guilt), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1164 (106 SC 2289, 90 LE2d 730) (1986). “To hold otherwise would mean an obviously guilty defendant would have no right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, a holding which would be contrary to the well established and fundamental constitutional right of every defendant to a fair trial. In Irvin v. Dowd, the Supreme Court noted that a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process’ and stated that ‘(t)his is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in *783life which he occupies.’ 366 U S. at 722, 81 S. Ct. at 1642.” Coleman, 778 F2d at 1541; see also Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F2d 1383, 1431, n. 2 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“[A] rule that where . . . evidence is strong, prejudice [from improper argument] is difficult or impossible to establish, is tantamount to an assertion that those procedural protections required by the Constitution apply only to those against whom the evidence is scant.”), vacated, 478 U. S. 1016 (106 SC 3325, 92 LE2d 732) (1986), opinion reinstated, 809 F2d 700 (11th Cir. 1987).
During closing argument in this case, the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel and his role at trial. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel had portrayed the State’s case in the worst possible light “just like he’s supposed to do so that you can let his guilty defendant off over here. That’s what he’s here for and that’s what he does.” The prosecutor then stated: “He’s not here to see justice. He’s not here to see that the right thing is done. He’s not here to see that the streets of Harris County are safe from drunk drivers crossing the center line at 2:00 o’clock coming from Columbus.” Although defense counsel objected following these statements, the trial judge remained silent, and the prosecutor continued: “He’s here to represent the interest of that man sitting over there. And if that man goes out on his usual drunken ride up in Columbus tonight and wipes out a school bus or three citizens or a family coming home from Atlanta late at night or for some reason whatever somebody might be doing, that ain’t his problem. . . . He can go and say, well, hey, I just did my job and hey, they found him not guilty.” Defense counsel again objected but then requested a ruling. In response, the trial court merely stated: ‘You may draw logical deductions and conclusions from the evidence that is presented.”
Despite the fact that a profusion of oral irrelevancies is not proof of that which is relevant, either directly or indirectly, defense counsel did not preserve his first objection to the prosecution’s argument when he failed to request a ruling from the trial judge, resulting in waiver of the error. Johnson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 433, 436 (5) (317 SE2d 213) (1984). But the second objection and request for a ruling was not waived. Although somewhat ambiguous, the trial court’s response appears to have overruled the objection and embraced the prosecutor’s comments as “logical deductions and conclusions from the evidence.” Accordingly, the issue of whether the trial court erred by failing to sustain this objection has been preserved for appeal. Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881, 882 (3) (350 SE2d 801) (1986). If the trial court improperly overruled the objection, this Court must consider whether “it is highly probable that the erroneous argument, unchecked by the trial court, did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. at 885.
*784During closing argument, the prosecution “is permitted to draw deductions from the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Clark v. State, 146 Ga. App. 697 (3) (247 SE2d 221) (1978). The comments about defense counsel, however, involved neither evidence nor deductions or conclusions therefrom. Rather, they were personal, denigrating, and improper remarks. As this Court has found previously, personal remarks about defense counsel have no place in the prosecution’s closing argument. Estep v. State, 129 Ga. App. 909, 915 (8) (201 SE2d 809) (1973) (physical precedent only). In Estep, the prosecuting attorney stated: “What [defense counsel] is trying to do — because he is a good lawyer and a good friend of mine — he knows he doesn’t have any merits on this case and he is just trying to confuse you.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 915 (8). Finding the remark improper, this Court noted that “[particularly objectionable was the personal reference to defense counsel. As it is improper for a district attorney to urge his personal belief as to a defendant’s guilt (cit.) it is similarly wrong for the prosecuting attorney representing the majesty of the state to comment that opposing counsel knows the defendant to be guilty or knows his client’s case is not meritorious.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 915-916.
Confronted with such improper and irrelevant remarks, a trial judge should act properly and promptly so that the integrity of the proceeding and the rights of the accused are protected. Id. at 916. “Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-8-75; see also Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 495 (422 SE2d 188) (1992) (OCGA § 17-8-75 requires the trial court to act when counsel makes a timely objection).
As recognized by the majority, the prosecutor’s remarks in this case were clearly improper. Despite defense counsel’s objection, and the trial judge’s duty consistent with OCGA § 17-8-75, the trial judge did nothing to remove the improper impressions from the jurors’ minds. Instead, the court simply stated that logical deductions and conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, thus implying that the prosecution’s comments might be supported by the evidence.
The trial court erred in overruling Geoffrion’s objection and giving the prosecution’s argument “ ‘the apparent sanction of the court.’ [Cits.]” Estep, supra at 916. Accordingly, I cannot find this error harmless. It is improbable that such denigrating remarks, received without rebuke from the trial court, “did not contribute to the judg*785ment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones, supra at 705 (2). Regardless of the weight of the evidence received, the trial court sanctioned before the jury improper attacks on defense counsel’s role at trial.
Decided February 21, 1997.
David J. Grindle, for appellant.
J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, E. Wayne Jernigan, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Harmless error is not a rule of systemic necessity, but a relic of judicial convenience. It has the noxious consequence of blunting our opportunity to scrutinize; hence, it should be used sparingly and only in the clearest instances. When used in questionable or dubious circumstances, it becomes the bigot of the law and compromises judicial integrity. Both our human fallibility and our institutional imperfections should cause us to subject the harmless error doctrine to our severest scrutiny.
Courts are primarily and ultimately duty bound to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (99 SC 2264, 60 LE2d 846) (1979); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (47 SC 248, 71 LE 520) (1927). Here, the trial court failed to take the necessary steps to protect Geoffrion’s right to a fair trial. Moreover, the approval of the trial court’s inaction encourages prosecutors to cross the line of proper argument. Such improper argument compromises convictions and ultimately wastes the significant judicial and economic resources of the State expended in obtaining those convictions. If this Court allows prosecutors armed with overwhelming evidence of guilt to present improper argument without fear of reprisal, we are equally culpable in encouraging such conduct. We should not approach this error with such undeserved delicacy. As judges we cannot pursue the empty glory of popularity. We must not be ambitious for the applause of audiences or the approval of editors. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson joins in this dissent.