Court Opinion

ID: 9796419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:57:09.219119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:13.446899
License: Public Domain

VOIGT, Justice,
dissenting,
in which BURKE, Justice, joins.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent. The alleged crimes in this case were improperly charged and the jury was improperly instructed. As a result, we do not know what alleged conduct, on what date, formed the basis for the conviction. This case is not like Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo.1999), relied upon by the majority, wherein we reiterated the rule that the State need not prove the exact date of an offense “so long as the action or occurrence relied upon for conviction is sufficiently identified.” Here, the exact dates of the four separate events were well-known to the State and became part of the proof.
[¶ 28] Neither is this case like Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966-68 (Wyo.1995), relied upon by the appellant, wherein we reversed Bush’s burglary conviction because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that Bush entered the particular building with both the intent to commit larceny and the intent to commit a felony. The elements instruction given to the jury in Bush alleged both statutory bases for burglary, and there was no special verdict form “particulariz[ing] the underlying crime that supports the burglary conviction.” Id. at 967. Bush involved a criminal statute that could be violated in multiple ways. This ease involves allegations of multiple violations of a single statute.
[¶ 29] The mischarged Information and the general verdict form in this case violated the doctrine of charging duplicity described in McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo.1991):
Secondly, the amended information im-permissibly combines several separate and independent offenses into one count. Even if there was no issue of improper amendment the information as amended would be void for duplicity on this basis. Edelhoff v. State, 5 Wyo. 19, 36 P. 627 (1894). This court has said that “[n]o man should be tried or convicted for several offenses when he is charged with but one.” Edelhoff, 5 Wyo. at 33, 36 P. at 632. That is precisely what happened to Mclnturff as the result of the amended information and its supplemental bill of particulars.
McInturff, charged with a single count in violation of W.S. 6-3-403(a)(i), was actually convicted for the aggregate of several separate and distinct violations of that statute, as is evident from the state’s bill of particulars and proof at trial.
[¶ 30] McInturff follows the general rule against duplicitous charging, which rule has been outlined as follows:
Duplicity is the charging of separate offenses in a single count. This practice is *170unacceptable because it prevents the jury from deciding guilt or innocence on each offense separately and may make it difficult to determine whether the conviction rested on only one of the offenses or both. Duplicity can result in prejudice to the defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in determining the sentence, and in limiting review on appeal. Also, where the jury is not able to reach a verdict or renders a guilty verdict that is later overturned, the defendant may be subjected to a second trial that exposes him to double jeopardy insofar as it includes an offense on which the original jury would have acquitted if required to render separate verdicts.
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 19.3(c), at 775 (2d ed.1999). See also 1 Nancy Hollander, Barbara E. Bergman, Melissa Stephenson, & Theresa M. Duncan, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure § 5.12, at 5-62 (14th ed. 2005) (“To determine if an indictment is duplicitous, the court must determine whether only one violation can be found in each count.”).
[¶ 31] The reason that duplicitous charging is forbidden is brought home by what happened in this case. Instruction No. 6 quoted the Information, including the allegation that the alleged escape from official detention took place “on or about the 11th day of November, 2002, through on or about the 25th day of November, 2002[.]” These dates were repeated as an element of the charged crime in Instruction No. 7. As noted by the majority, however, the State produced evidence of at least four separate incidents of escape.5 Apparently recognizing the problems caused by the charging duplicity, the jury sent the judge the following note:
Do we have to focus on the 11/22/03 [sic.]? or
Do we have to consider 10,11,15,17, 21, & 22?
The district court’s one-line response — “With regard to your question concerning the dates, you are directed to Instruction Nos. 6 and 7.” — did nothing to correct the problem. The result, as stated at the beginning of this dissent, is that we simply do not know what conduct formed the basis for the conviction. See Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001) (“the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.”).
[¶ 32] I would reverse the conviction.

. The dates of incidents for which proof was presented were November 10, 11, 15, 17, 21 and 22. November 10 was the last day the appellant actually worked at Parkway Plaza.