Court Opinion

ID: 9781420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:37:02.719856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.295717
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I join Division 3 of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s overturning of more than three decades of precedent and its decision to permit the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in probation revocation proceedings. As a matter of preserving judicial integrity, maintaining public confidence in the system of justice, and applying the clear legislative intent of the General Assembly to suppress illegally seized evidence as demonstrated by its codification of the exclusionary rule, I would continue to follow well-established precedent and hold that the exclusionary rule is applicable to probation revocation proceedings.
The majority has relied on cases such as United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (94 SC 613, 38 LE2d 561) (1974), and Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 362-364 (118 SC 2014, 141 LE2d 344) (1998), in reasoning that the purpose of utilizing the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officials from conducting unconstitutional searches and seizures, and any benefit the rule may have to this effect is essentially exhausted under the context of a criminal trial. While taking this reasoning into account, I urge the majority to consider whether *418deterrence is the only proper goal of precluding illegally obtained evidence in a probation revocation hearing.
The United States Supreme Court and the courts of this state have long acknowledged the Fourth Amendment rights of probationers. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (107 SC 3164, 97 LE2d 709) (1987) (“A probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’ ”); Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 425 (369 SE2d 909) (1988) (“[Appellant] argues that the Fourth Amendment applies to probationers as well as other citizens. He is correct.”); Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 678 (229 SE2d 505) (1976) (“The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers.”). Recognizing the rights of its citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, Georgia courts have upheld the exclusionary rule to protect its citizens from the use of evidence flowing from Fourth Amendment violations in probation revocation hearings for the past 36 years. In the seminal case of Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784 (219 SE2d 28) (1975), the Georgia Court of Appeals established the widely accepted view that motions to suppress such evidence are appropriate in probation revocation proceedings, finding the invasion of constitutional rights in these proceedings to be indistinguishable from the invasion of constitutional rights in criminal trials. Id. at 786. The Georgia appellate courts have adhered to this position steadfastly — until today. See Colvert v. State, 237 Ga. App. 670 (516 SE2d 377) (1999); Owens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 525 (2) (265 SE2d 856) (1980); Adams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41 (264 SE2d 532) (1980); Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263 (1) (254 SE2d 154) (1979); Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784 (1) (252 SE2d 696) (1979); Porter v. State, 142 Ga. App. 481 (236 SE2d 172) (1977). Without giving a reason for doing so, the majority’s holding that the exclusionary rule may no longer be asserted in probation revocation proceedings jettisons decades of precedent when nothing has materially changed. I find no reason to overturn this long-standing rule of law.
While the majority considers the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect in reaching its decision, it has completely disregarded the rule’s second and arguably more significant purpose — “the imperative of judicial integrity.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (80 SC 1437, 4 LE2d 1669) (1960). If we allow police and other law enforcement officials — those responsible for enforcing our rules of law — to break with impunity the very rules that serve as the foundation of our justice system, where do we draw the line? As Justice Brandéis of the United States Supreme Court has advocated, “In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . .. Against that *419pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (48 SC 564, 72 LE 944) (1928) (dissenting) (speaking out against the use of unlawfully seized evidence in criminal proceedings and emphasizing the importance of protecting liberty through constitutional rights). Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Amiss reasoned that permitting the use of such evidence in a probation revocation proceeding would “sanction ‘defiance of the ... Constitution’ ” and hinder judicial integrity. Amiss, supra, 135 Ga. App. at 785 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393 (34 SC 341, 58 LE 652) (1914)). See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 599, 611 (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416) (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). Public confidence in our system of justice is of utmost importance. The uniform application of established rules of law both within and outside the context of criminal trial proceedings engenders not only the public’s faith and trust in our system of justice, but also respect for and cooperation with the law. The idea that law enforcement officials may not disregard rules of law at the expense of constitutional rights is not a novel concept and has been promulgated throughout our federal and state court systems. To admit evidence resulting from these unlawful actions, whether in criminal trials or probation revocation proceedings, is an impermissible extension of this defiance.
The codification of the exclusionary rule in OCGA § 17-5-30 strengthens the argument for its use in probation revocation proceedings. Unlike federal courts, which do not permit motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence outside of the criminal trial context, the duly elected officials of this state have not demonstrated an intent to limit the exclusionary rule to criminal trials. To the contrary, the General Assembly has codified the exclusionary rule without distinguishing criminal trials from other types of proceedings. OCGA § 17-5-30 (a). The plain language of the statute, enacted in 1966, only requires that a motion to suppress be made “before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense.” OCGA § 17-5-30 (c) (specifying different fora where “a criminal accusation is filed or if an indictment or special presentment is returned by a grand jury”). Probation revocation proceedings, which are held before trial courts, plainly meet this statutory requirement. See Colvert, supra, 237 Ga. App. at 670 (vacating and remanding where the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing based on the defendant’s “properly filed” motion to suppress). The legislature has not chosen to amend the exclusionary rule in the lengthy span of time following the Amiss holding, and I do not see a reason to make a distinction where the legislature has not. “Where a ruling made by an able bench, after full argument by able counsel, has been followed and applied in divers[e] *420cases, and has been left unmolested by the General Assembly, it should not, unless for impelling reasons, thereafter be changed by the court.” Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 452 (200 SE 796) (1939). The majority has not given any reason, much less an impelling one, to change the well-settled law of this state, and therefore I must dissent.
Decided May 31, 2011
Reconsideration denied June 27, 2011.
David McDade, District Attorney, James A. Dooley, Thomas E. Kegley, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Steven A. Cook, for appellee.
Hogue & Hogue, Laura D. Hogue, Adam M. Hames, J. Scott Key, Cynthia W. Roseberry, amici curiae.