Court Opinion

ID: 9944497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 17:10:15.504887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:16.925177
License: Public Domain

J-A27019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  COREY A. HOLLINGER                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :    No. 581 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 17, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-38-CR-0000396-1987

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                         FILED: FEBRUARY 26, 2024

       Appellant Corey A. Hollinger appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after he was re-sentenced for one count of first-degree murder1 in

accordance with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery

v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).             Appellant frames his appeal as a

challenge to both the legality and the discretionary aspect of his sentence.

We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

       In May, 1987, [Appellant] absconded from the fourth juvenile
       placement facility in which he had been housed. He returned to
       his home, picked up his younger brother to accompany him and
       went on a crime spree; consisting of multiple burglaries, including
       the theft of two (2) firearms and ammunition. The last piece of
       [Appellant’s] plan was a getaway car. Albert Swalm lived next
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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     door to the second burglarized residence. [Appellant] and his
     brother had noticed Mr. Swalm and his car in the driveway.
     [Appellant] and his brother entered the Swalm home under the
     pretense of needing to use the phone. Ultimately, Mr. Swalm was
     shot twice with one of the stolen firearms. [Appellant] yanked the
     phone out of the wall so he couldn’t call for help, took the car keys
     from the kitchen table and left the victim to die. [Appellant] led
     police on a high speed chase in the stolen vehicle. The actions of
     [Appellant] that day culminated with the death of Albert Swalm
     []. [Appellant] was sixteen (16) years old at the time. Everything
     went according to his plan, with the exception of getting caught.

     On May 9, 1987 a criminal complaint was filed charging
     [Appellant] with criminal homicide. On May 12, 1987 a second
     criminal complaint was filed charging [Appellant] with burglary,
     robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit murder and theft by
     unlawful taking. Ultimately an amended criminal information was
     flied which included one (1) count of criminal homicide, one (1)
     count of conspiracy to commit criminal homicide, three (3) counts
     of burglary, one (1) count of robbery, one (1) count of theft by
     unlawful taking and one (1) count of criminal attempt to commit
     burglary.

     On October 12, 1987, [Appellant] entered a counseled guilty plea
     [to] all counts with the exception of criminal attempt to commit
     burglary. The plea agreement indicated all sentences on all other
     charges would be run concurrently with the sentence imposed on
     Count 1 – criminal homicide. On November 25, 1987, [Appellant]
     was sentenced . . .

                                 *    *    *

     Accordingly, [Appellant] was sentenced pursuant to the plea
     agreement. At the time of [Appellant’s] original sentencing,
     pursuant to the then-applicable mandatory sentence for first-
     degree murder, which also applied to juveniles[, Appellant] was
     sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

     Recently, the United States Supreme Court has addressed a
     number of Eighth Amendment cases applying the cruel and
     unusual punishment clause, specifically with regard to minors.
     The Supreme Court consistently has held that sentencing an
     offender who was under eighteen years old at the time of the
     crime raises special constitutional considerations. Specifically,
     Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), prohibited mandatory
     life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. Montgomery v.

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      Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), held Miller applied retroactively
      to cases on collateral appeal. As a result of Miller and its progeny,
      [Appellant] was entitled to resentencing on Count 1 of the 1987
      offense.

      On January 18, 2023 an evidentiary hearing was held at which
      time both the Commonwealth and [Appellant] presented
      testimony in support of their respective positions regarding an
      appropriate sentence for [Appellant]. In addition to the testimony
      presented, both the Commonwealth and [Appellant] submitted
      documentary evidence to be considered. On March 17, 2023,
      [Appellant] was sentenced [to fifty years to life imprisonment].
      The sentence was directed to run from May 6, 1987 and
      [Appellant] was awarded credit for 35 years, 10 months and 9
      days. In addition, it was indicated that [Appellant] was not RRRI
      eligible.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/7/23, at 1-4 (formatting altered).

      Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. On April 12, 2023,

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement.    The trial court subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion

addressing Appellant’s claims.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the sentencing court commit legal error by failing
         completely to consider [Appellant’s] age-related characteristics
         as required by the Constitution and in contravention of the
         intention, purpose, and direction of Miller v. Alabama, 567
         U.S. 460 (2012), and Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d
         1232 (Pa. 2022)?

      2. In the alternative, did the sentencing court abuse its discretion
         by not considering the constitutionally required age-related
         characteristics of [Appellant] in contravention of Miller,
         Felder[,] and 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 and misconstruing pertinent
         documents and evidence, and ignoring others, leading to a
         sentence unsupported by the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

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      In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it

failed to consider Appellant’s age at the time of the crime as a mitigating factor

when it imposed sentence. Id. at 22. Appellant further argues that this failure

resulted in the trial court imposing an illegal sentence pursuant to Miller and

Felder. Id. at 28. Specifically, Appellant alleges that the trial court “did not

merely abuse its discretion [], it imposed an illegal sentence by disregarding

the requirements of Miller and Felder and their command to consider the

mitigating qualities of youth.” Id. at 29 (some formatting altered).

      Initially, we must determine whether Appellant’s claims implicate the

legality or the discretionary aspects of his sentence. In Commonwealth v.

Schroat, 272 A.3d 523 (Pa. Super. 2022), the defendant appealed from a

judgment of sentence re-sentencing him to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for a first-degree murder that the defendant committed

while he was a juvenile. Schroat, 272 A.3d at 525. On appeal, the defendant

claimed that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because the trial court

did not adequately consider his age, diminished capacity, immaturity,

childhood trauma, or the evidence that the defendant had matured and

experienced rehabilitation during his incarceration. Id. at 526.

      In concluding that the defendant’s claim implicated the discretionary

aspects of his sentence, the Schroat Court explained:

      Recently in Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa.
      2022), our Supreme Court acknowledged that the [United States]
      Supreme Court has concluded that “a separate factual finding of
      permanent incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer
      imposes a life-without-parole sentence” on a juvenile offender

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      convicted of first-degree murder. [Felder, 269 A.3d at 1242]
      (quoting Jones v. Mississippi, [593 U.S. 98], 141 S.Ct. 1307,
      1318-19 (2021).       Thus, when reviewing the legality of a
      sentencing court’s imposition of [life without parole] on a juvenile
      offender, we focus on whether the statutory sentencing scheme
      provides the sentencing court with the “discretion to consider the
      mitigating qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.”
      Felder, [269 A.3d at 1243] (citing Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1314).
      Appellate review of the adequacy of a resentencing court’s
      consideration of factors attendant to the defendant’s youth, such
      as age, culpability, immaturity, childhood trauma, and whether
      the defendant is permanently incorrigible, involves the review
      of    the     discretionary      aspects       of    sentence.[fn2]
      Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 266 A.3d 49, 54 (Pa. Super. 2021)
      (en banc).
         [fn2] We note that when sentencing juveniles convicted of
         first- or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012, the
         court is required to consider several specifically enumerated
         sentencing     factors,    including    seven     “age-related
         characteristics[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(d). Since [the
         defendant] committed first-degree murder before June 24,
         2012, the court considers these factors as “guidance” which
         is “non-binding[.]” Felder, [269 A.3d at 1245] n.15.

Id. at 526 (emphasis added).

      In the instant case, Appellant committed the murder prior to June 24,

2012. Accordingly, the age-related characteristics set forth in Section 1102.1

of the Crimes Code served as non-binding guidance for the trial court. See

id. (citing Felder, 269 A.3d at 1245 n.15). Therefore, Appellant’s first issue

is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See id.

      “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted and formatting altered).         Before

reaching the merits of such claims, we must first determine:

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     (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
     his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
     2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
     allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
     sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
     substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
     sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

     “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);

Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 935 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(explaining that absent the filing a post-sentence motion, objections must be

raised at the sentencing hearing; otherwise, the issue is waived on appeal).

     Here, as noted previously, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

Further, the record reflects that although Appellant’s counsel made argument

before the trial court imposed his sentence, he did not raise an objection to

the trial court’s sentence after it was imposed. See N.T. Re-sentencing Hr’g,

3/17/23, at 21-26.    Accordingly, we are constrained to find Appellant’s

sentencing claim waived. See Watson, 228 A.3d at 935; Corley, 31 A.3d at

296; Malovich, 903 A.2d at 1251.

     In his remaining claim, Appellant contends that the trial court “abused

its discretion by misconstruing the evidence related to [Appellant’s] mental

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health programming and failing to adequately consider [Appellant’s] youth

characteristics.”   Appellant’s Brief at 30.       This claim implicates the

discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence.       See Commonwealth v.

Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2014) (recognizing that a

regarding the trial court’s consideration of mitigating factors is a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of sentence).     For the reasons set forth above,

Appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review and his claim

is therefore waived. Even if Appellant’s claims concerning the trial court’s lack

of consideration of age-related characteristics and mitigating factors were not

waived, we would affirm the judgment of sentence based on the trial court’s

opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/26/2024

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