Court Opinion

ID: 9840279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 19:05:38.218223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:01.587349
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/15/23 P. v. Perez CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B319874

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      TA087610-02)

 JULIO PEREZ,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.
      Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin, and Jeremy Cutcher for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Charles S. Lee and Viet H.
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       A jury convicted defendant and appellant Julio Perez
(defendant) of, among other things, two counts of first degree
murder for his participation in the fatal shooting of two gas
station convenience store employees in 2006. After intervening
changes in law defining murder, defendant petitioned for
resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95, now
codified at Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Relying on the evidence
presented at defendant’s murder trial, the trial court found
defendant was a major participant in the murders who acted with
reckless indifference to human life and denied the section 1172.6
petition. We are asked to decide whether the trial court should
have done more to specify the burden of proof it was applying
when it made its findings in connection with the section 1172.6
petition.2

                       I. BACKGROUND
     A.     The Offense Conduct3
     In July 2006, defendant was the driver in an attempted
robbery at an AM/PM gas station convenience store. Co-

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
       Defendant also hints at a claim that insufficient evidence
supports the trial court’s major participant and reckless
indifference findings, though he says the point is “in many
respects irrelevant” to the issue he asks us to decide. As we will
explain, hints described as irrelevant are insufficient to present a
question for resolution.
3
      Our description of the offense conduct draws on this court’s
unpublished opinion in defendant’s previous appeal. (People v.
Julio Perez and Eric Sanford (May 7, 2010, B211015) [nonpub.

                                 2
defendant Adam Loza (Loza) was also present, as were their
younger brothers. While defendant was waiting outside in a
vehicle, Loza’s younger brother brought a 12-pack of beer to the
mini mart’s register. When the clerk would not sell him the beer
because he looked too young, a fight broke out between the clerk
and the two brothers until other gas station employees were able
to break up the fight.
      Roughly six months later, in November 2006, defendant,
Loza, and co-defendant Eric Sanford (Sanford) attempted to rob a
Mobil gas station mini market. Two gas station clerks, Eduardo
Roco and Esther Arteaga, were killed in the process.
      On the evening of the attempted robbery and murders,
defendant, Loza, and others were driving around in an SUV and
drinking beer when defendant stopped to pick up Sanford. He
got into the front passenger seat of the vehicle while holding a
gun, said he had just shot someone in the head, and urged
defendant to drive away before the police arrived. Defendant
laughed off the comment, and Sanford then stowed the gun in a
compartment in the back of the SUV. After running out of beer,
defendant, Sanford, and Loza discussed doing a “beer run,” a
term used for when someone goes into a liquor store, grabs an 18
pack of beer, and runs out without paying.
      Around 4 a.m., the group pulled into a 24-hour Mobil gas
station that had a mini market on the premises. Defendant,
Loza, and Sanford got out of the vehicle and, as seen on later
obtained surveillance video footage, congregated at the back of

opn.] (“Perez I”).) The Attorney General asked us to take judicial
notice of the opinion and appellate record in that appeal and this
court granted the request.

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the SUV. Defendant opened the back of the vehicle, handed a
gun to Sanford, and gave Loza an article of clothing to use to
cover his face. Sanford and Loza then walked to the mini mart
while defendant got back in the driver’s seat of the vehicle and
kept the engine running.
      When Sanford and Loza returned to the vehicle about three
minutes later, Loza was crying and said, “‘He just shot him, he
just shot him.’” Sanford told defendant he killed the two market
clerks because they refused to give him money and he wanted to
prevent them from being witnesses against him. Defendant then
drove away with everyone in the vehicle and told Sanford to stash
the gun used in the killings in the vehicle’s back compartment.

       B.    Arrest, Trial, and Sentencing
       The police arrested defendant, Loza, and Sanford after the
Mobil gas station killings. The Los Angeles County District
Attorney charged them with two counts of murder and two counts
of attempted robbery. Multiple murder and robbery-murder
special circumstances were alleged in connection with the murder
charges. Defendant alone was also charged with a third count of
attempted robbery for the aborted beer incident earlier in July
2006.
       After trial, the jury convicted defendant on all charges.
The jury found the multiple murder special circumstance not true
and could not reach a verdict on the robbery-murder special
circumstance. The trial court sentenced defendant to two
consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for the murders,
imposed and stayed sentences for the corresponding attempted
robbery convictions, and imposed a concurrent determinate

                               4
sentence for the 2006 attempted robbery conviction. This court
affirmed the judgment, with modifications, on direct appeal.

       C.     Defendant’s Resentencing Petition
       In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied the petition.
Defendant appealed, and in November 2020, we reversed with
directions to appoint counsel and redetermine the matter.
(People v. Perez (Nov. 24, 2020, B300470) [nonpub. opn.].) On
remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause and
scheduled a hearing on the petition.
       Before the hearing, defendant filed a pre-hearing
memorandum urging the trial court to “require the People to
prove every element of liability for murder under the amended
statutes beyond a reasonable doubt.” Also before the hearing, the
Legislature amended section 1172.6 to place on the prosecution
the burden of showing that a petitioner is “guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019”
and to require a court deciding whether a defendant is entitled to
relief under the statute to make its determination using the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) The statutory amendments, which
became effective before the hearing on defendant’s petition,
further provide that “[a] finding that there is substantial
evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)

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       At the hearing on defendant’s petition in February 2022,
neither the prosecution nor defendant (who was represented by
counsel) presented new evidence. After defendant’s attorney
notified the court there were no additional witnesses, the
following exchange between the attorney and the court took
place:
              [Counsel:] “We’re just submitting on the
       pleading, your honor, which is the petition and the
       reply to the People. And we’re ready to proceed. [¶]
       I believe the OSC is the People’s burden to prove
       beyond a reasonable doubt the—under the
       circumstances—that defendant was a major
       participant or acted with reckless indifference in this
       case.
              The Court: That’s true. And on September
       18th, 2008, the court sentenced the petitioner to a
       total of 52 years to life for the murders, robberies,
       and the sex allegations. [¶] He appealed it. The case
       was affirmed. He—subsequently, it was directed
       back to the court for modification so that it was 50
       years to life.”
       After the hearing, the trial court issued a minute order
denying defendant’s 1172.6 petition. The court found defendant
was a major participant in the attempted robbery who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The court explained “all
factors were met with the evidence presented at trial, as fully
reflected in the notes of the official court reporter.”
       When making its finding on the record that defendant was
a major participant, the trial court expressly addressed each of
the five factors articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th

                                6
788 (Banks).4 Discussing what role the defendant played in
planning the attempted robbery, the trial court focused on the
difference between the events that occurred on the night of the
fatal shootings and the July 2006 attempted robbery. The court
also considered the presence of the gun and how defendant gave
Loza a shirt to use to cover his face. The court observed: “That
doesn’t sound like a beer run. That sounds like a robbery in
planning. . . . [¶] [H]e went out there, hid someone’s face,
handed a gun back to a guy who said he just shot someone in the
face. So he had a role in that.” The court also found that
defendant supplied the lethal weapon when he handed the gun to
Sanford.
       The trial court further determined that defendant was
aware of the particular danger posed by the nature of the crime
because he gave Sanford the gun after having been at the
previous attempted robbery where physical force was used.
Although the trial court found defendant was not at the scene of
the killings in the sense of being inside the convenience store, the
court did find defendant was in a position to facilitate the actual
murders because he handed the gun to Sanford. Additionally, the

4
       The factors in Banks include defendant’s role in “planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths”;
defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal weapons;
defendant’s awareness of “particular dangers posed by the nature
of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants”; defendant’s presence at the scene of the
killing and, if present, whether defendant was in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder and whether defendant’s
actions or inaction played a particular role in the death; and
defendant’s actions after lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at 803.)

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trial court found defendant played a particular role in the deaths
because he “hand[ed] the gun over to someone who goes and uses
it to kill someone” and then, after the use of lethal force, helped
the shooter escape.

                         II. DISCUSSION
       The record reveals the trial court applied the correct
burden of proof when making its finding that defendant was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. This conclusion flows not just from the customary
presumption that a trial court is aware of and applies governing
law, but also from the court’s consideration of the pre-hearing
submissions filed by the parties and the court’s “that’s true”
comment on the record when defense counsel said the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof applied.

       A.    The Trial Court Applied the Correct Burden of Proof
       As our summary of the factual and procedural background
has already revealed, by the time of the trial court’s ruling on
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition the law was established that
the court’s ruling must be based on the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof. The general rule in such circumstances
is equally well-established: “‘a trial court is presumed to have
been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]’”
(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Following this
general rule alone would justify affirmance because there is no
contrary evidence providing reason to suspect the trial court
applied the wrong burden of proof.
       In fact, there is more: the record affirmatively indicates the
trial court knew of and applied the beyond a reasonable doubt

                                  8
standard of proof when deciding defendant’s section 1172.6
petition. The defense’s pre-hearing memorandum submitted to
the court argued the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
applied and the prosecution did not contend otherwise. In
addition, defense counsel at the hearing reiterated the point, that
the prosecution must prove major participation and reckless
indifference beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court
agreed, stating, “That’s true.” It is accordingly obvious, even
without the customary presumption, that the trial court
committed no legal error in deciding defendant’s section 1172.6
petition.

      B.     Defendant Has Not Adequately Presented a Challenge
             to the Sufficiency of the Evidence
      To properly present a question for resolution on appeal,
certain basic things must be done. The rules of court require a
party’s brief to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority” as well as
“[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to
the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); see also
People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [rules of court
promote fairness to respondents and ‘“lighten the labors of the
appellate [courts] by requiring the litigants to present their cause
systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty
devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised,
as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of
being compelled to extricate it from the mass”’].) Case law
similarly requires arguments to be clearly presented and

                                 9
adequately developed for resolution; if not, they are forfeited.
(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Pizarro v. Reynoso
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [argument forfeited because it
was neither presented in a separate heading nor developed with
reasoned argument and citation to authority].)
       Here, defendant’s opening brief states—without any
heading indicating it is a separate ground raised for reversal—
that “[i]t must also be noted, though this is in many respects
irrelevant given the Superior Court’s failure to set forth the
burden of proof[,] that the prosecution fell far short of satisfying
its burden.” That does not suffice to properly raise an issue;
indeed, we take counsel at his word that the point is largely
irrelevant. Any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
accordingly forfeited.

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                             BAKER, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.                   MOOR, J.

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