Court Opinion

ID: 9825946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:48:53.527861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:59.230916
License: Public Domain

The complainants then filed a petition for a reargument.
Tillinghast, J.
The complainants move for a reargument of this case on the grounds, first, that the court has erred in its conclusions as to the facts relating thereto, and, second, that the complainants’ counsel did not have sufficient time at the former hearing properly to present their case to the court.
As to our conclusion of the facts in the case, it was arrived at after long and patient study and consideration of all the testimony submitted, (the same comprising 345 pages of type written matter), together with a consideration of the full and well arranged briefs of the respective counsel in the case. It is a case which depends entirely upon the testimony, much of which is more or less conflicting; and the very fact that the court itself was divided in opinion as to the effect thereof shows that it is one in which different minds may fairly reach different conclusions. A re-examination of the grounds upon which our decision was based, taken in connection with the criticism of plaintiffs’ counsel upon the decision, fails to satisfy us that we were wrong therein. We think that the evidence taken as a whole does show that an adequate moral consideration for the conveyance in question did exist, and also that it was recognized by Mary Crumby in connection with the making thereof. That such consideration existed is abundantly shown by the proof that practically all of the earnings of Hilton Crumby for seventeen years or more went *694into his mother’s hands, and were used by her as she saw fit, and by the further proof of the services rendered by him to his mother in improving and taking care of her property, he simply receiving from her during all of this time, his bare living in return therefor. Nor was the total amount earned by him during all of these years inconsiderable, as persistently claimed by complainants’ counsel. For, while there is but little direct proof of actual cash payments made to him by his employers, a fact upon which over-much stress is laid by counsel, there is most satisfactory proof that he worked as continuously and earned as much as ordinary men of his craft; and it is certainly fair to infer that he received the wages of his labor. That Mary Crumby recognized .the fact that she was morally indebted to her son Hilton, that he had fairly earned the property in question, and that the conveyance thereof to him was not made merely on account of love and affection and was not intended as an advancement, is fairly to be inferred from her conduct taken in connection with the various statements made by her to several of the witnesses called by the respondents. The deed itself from Mary to Hilton Crumby, shows prima facie that the conveyance was not made by way of advancement, but for a valuable consideration, and all of the testimony which has any bearing upon that branch of the case, tends to show the same thing. And although no money actually passed from Hilton to his mother at the time of the conveyance, yet it sufficiently appears that the property conveyed to him represented in her estimation the product of his labor and justly belonged to him.
But it is urged that to allow the conveyance to Hilton Crumby to operate as an ordinary deed for a valuable consideration will result in an unequal and hence inequitable distribution of the property of Mary Crumby amongst her children; and furthermore, that whatever moral consideration existed in favor of Hilton Crumby in connection with, and as the moving cause for, the making of the said conveyances to him, also existed in a stronger degree in favor of his sister Mrs. Beakhust. It is tme that in determining whether *695or not a certain transaction between a parent and child is an advancement, the maxim of equality and that each and every child has an equal moral claim on his property at his death, must always be borne in mind; that, as said by Thornton on Gifts & Advancements, 509, ‘c Inequality is not to be presumed, nor favoritism nor preference for one child to the injury of another.” But this doctrine in nowise militates against the right of the parent to recognize the fact that by reason of longer and more valuable services rendered by one child than by another, the former is morally entitled to be compensated therefor, and to render such an equivalent as he may see fit. Indeed, such a transaction is not only not in conflict with the rule above stated, but on the contrary directly tends to promote the same. As to the contention that Mrs. Crumby was under as strong and even stronger moral obligation to make the conveyance in question to Elizabeth as to Hilton, or in other words, that she earned as much of the property owned by the mother as he, we have only to say that the proof submitted does not sustain it. Elizabeth was married in 1872 when at the age of twenty-six, and of course ceased from that time to turn over her earnings to the mother, while Hilton continued to turn over his until 1888 at least, when he also got married. The deed from Mary to Hilton was not made until August, 1883, while that from the Omans to Mary and Hilton was not made until 1881, which was twelve years after Elizabeth had ceased to turn over her earnings to her mother. Hilton must therefore have contributed much more to the common fund, if such it may be called, at the time of said conveyances, than his sister, and a moral obligation was thereby created on the part of the mother to compensate him for this excess. That she recognized both the fact and the obligation arising therefrom and acted thereon, appears to us to be fairly shown in evidence.
The falling off in the savings bank deposits of Mrs. Crumby after the daughter left home is a fact upon which much stress is laid by complainants’ counsel as showing that it was largely by her earnings that said deposits were made. *696But the proof shows that another cause also existed for said falling off, namely, that soon after the daughter left home, the mother by reason of failing health was able to work only a small portion of the time, and then simply as a spare hand in taking the place of other operatives in the mill in case of sickness and the like. It also appears that quite a portion of Hilton’s time was required in repairing and taking care of his mother’s real estate which evidently prevented him also from contributing as much to said deposits as he otherwise would have done.
Darius Baker & Charles Acton Ives, for complainants.
William P. Sheffield, Jun., & Michael W. Callaghan, for respondents.
As to the second ground upon which a réargument is asked, namely, that sufficient time was not allowed by the court to the complainants’ counsel to present their case fully, we fail to see that there is any reason for such claim. The case occupied considerable time, (three hours or more as we recollect it), it was carefully and skilfully argued by counsel and the points were also well presented in their printed brief. It being a case which depends entirely upon the evidence as. reported, and this, as before stated, having been carefully considered by us after a full healing of the case, we do not think that the complainants are entitled to a reargument.

Motion for reargument denied.