Court Opinion

ID: 9522900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:33:32.903667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:16.081123
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CAMPBELL, dissenting: I agree with the well-reasoned opinion of Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners (N.D. Ill., 1984), 587 E Supp. 1136) and, therefore, would reverse the result reached by the circuit court and leave defendant’s name on the ballot.1  In an order issued March 8, 1984, Judge Marvin Aspen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the minimum signature requirements set forth in section 7 — 10(i) of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 46, par. 7 — 10(i)) are unconstitutional. (Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners (N.D. Ill., 1984), 587 F. Supp. 1136.) The board of election commissioners had determined that four named plaintiffs, candidates for the position of ward committeeman in the city of Chicago, will not appear on the ballot for the March 20, 1984, election because they failed to submit sufficient valid signatures on their nominating petitions to meet the 10% requirements of section 7 — 10(i). Section 7 — 10(i) specifies that a candidate for the position of ward committeeman must submit petitions for nomination signed by not less than 10% of the primary electors of his party in his ward. The number of primary electors is equal to the total votes cast for the candidate from the same political party who received the most votes in the last regular election in that district. In contrast, section 7 — 10(i) requires that candidates for the position of township committeeman need submit nominating petitions signed by only 5% of the primary electors in their district. Plaintiffs argued before the district court that this legislative classification based on geography violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district court recognized that minimum signature requirements on nominating petitions may injure a voter’s right to associate with the political party of their choice by excluding candidates from the ballot. (Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), 460 U.S. 780, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103 S. Ct. 1564.) The right of a party or an individual to be placed on the ballot is entitled to protection since it is intertwined with the associational rights of voters. Lubin v. Panish (1974), 415 U.S. 709, 716, 39 L. Ed. 2d 702, 708, 94 S. Ct. 1315,1320. In evaluating the constitutionality of ballot access restrictions the district court followed the analysis utilized in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which required that a court must: “first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” (Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), 460 U.S. 780, 789, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 558, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1570.) A court also must consider if there is a less burdensome alternative through which a State might reach its goals. 460 U.S. 780, 805, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 568, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1578-79. The district court found important the State’s interest in establishing a signature requirement to insure that ballots remain within manageable, understandable limits, to avoid voter confusion, to eliminate frivolous candidates and to require a modicum of support prior to placing a candidate’s name on the ballot. See Lubin; Bullock v. Carter (1972), 405 U.S. 134, 145, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 101, 92 S. Ct. 849, 857; Jenness v. Fortson (1971), 403 U.S. 431, 442, 29 L. Ed. 2d 554, 562, 91 S. Ct. 1970, 1976. The court found, however, that the evidence in the record indicated no significant differences between the offices of ward committeeman and township committeeman which would explain the disparate signature requirements and the more difficult burden placed on Chicago voters and candidates than upon township voters and candidates. The court was not convinced that gathering signatures in townships is more difficult than gathering signatures in the city. Nor was there any evidence that voter confusion, long ballots and frivolous candidates are a greater problem in the city than in the townships. Such an unjustified geographical classification, the court concluded, is contrary to the equality of citizens in the exercise of political rights. (Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), 394 U.S. 814, 818-19, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 1496.) The court determined that there are several less burdensome alternatives, including the elimination of the disparate signature requirements, by which the State could achieve its significant interests. Since the 5% rule presumably achieves the State’s interests in the townships, the court reasoned that to apply the 5% rule to the city wards would allow the State to realize its interests while reducing the unequal burden on Chicago candidates. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctive relief and ordered that certain plaintiff candidates’ names be placed on the ballot for the upcoming election. Counsel for defendant Patricia Dixon brought the Smith decision to the attention of this court and although defendant has not challenged the constitutionality of section 7 — 10(i), I am constrained to adopt the rationale employed by the Federal district court. The weight of the burden of the 10% signature requirement and the State’s inability to justify the disparate signature requirements between ward and township committeeman warrant sua sponte consideration of the constitutionality of section 7 — 10(i). I recognize that as a general rule decisions of the United States district and circuit courts are not binding upon Illinois courts. (City v. Chicago v. Groffman (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 112, 383 N.E.2d 891.) Nevertheless,2 this court should give attention to a ruling of the Federal district court which finds an Illinois statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant has informed this court that she has moved to intervene in the action before Judge Aspen. While the practice of pursuing identical relief in separate courts is frowned upon, I must note that if her intervention in the Federal district court is allowed, defendant’s name will appear on the ballot on March 20, 1984. During oral argument before this court, counsel for the defendant represented to this court that once the challenged signatures are removed, defendant’s petition will still have sufficient valid signatures to meet the 5% rule. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the circuit court and order that defendant’s name be placed on the ballot.  The case at bar was consolidated for the purpose of oral argument only with another case which raised issues concerning the sufficiency of nominating petitions submitted for ward committeeman, Watkins v. Bwrke (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 499. I would also apply the rationale of Smith to that case.   It is clear that a court may take judicial notice of other proceedings in other courts. People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164, 357 N.E.2d 792, 796.