Court Opinion

ID: 9844297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:30.166828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:31.949530
License: Public Domain

Plaintiff’s Motion To Strike
The defendant’s answer purports to set up three separate defenses. The first defense admits that the defendant constructed a dam across the Santee River for the purpose of diverting a part of the flow thereof into the Cooper River; and alleges that it has acted as an agency and part of the State primarily for the improvement of navigation on the Congaree, Waterec, Santee and Cooper Rivers, and for other public purposes, for the benefit of the State and its people; but it denies that it has injured or damaged the plaintiff in *525any manner whatsoever or that it has taken any of its property. The third defense sets up the defendant’s immunity from suit.
The plaintiff’s motion relates only to the second defense, from which it seeks to strike out certain paragraphs thereof, to wit, 2, 4 and 6. This defense is described by counsel for the appellant as the “navigation defense” ; that is to say, that since the primary duty which rested upon the defendant was the improvement of navigation, all property adjoining tidal navigable streams is impressed with an easement or servitude of navigation in favor of the State, its people and its agencies.
The allegations of these three paragraphs (with one exception) may be somewhat briefly stated as being to the effect that prior to the creation of the Authority by the General Assembly, the condition of the Santee River and its tributaries was such as to hamper and prevent the development thereof in the aid of commerce, industry, agriculture or in any other way for the benefit of the State and its people; and that the Authority in the performance of its duty and obligation constructed, and now maintains and operates, its project, consisting substantially of a dam across the Santee River and other works incident thereto; and that as a result thereof, among other things, the water distance from the coast to Columbia has been decreased by more than 100 miles, health conditions have been improved, and other public purposes for which the Authority was created have been subserved. And it is alleged in paragraph 6 that the Authority was charged with the duty to divert waters from the Santee River and to discharge the same into the Cooper River, and that all past and future development thereof has been, and will be, conducted in pursuance of its primary purpose of navigation, and in accordance with the obligations and duties with which the Authority is charged.
It thus appears that the allegations of these paragraphs are relevant to the alleged navigation defense; in other words, the Authority should have the right *526to allege and prove the performance of its duties under the law with respect to navigation, including the alleged improvement thereof and the resulting public benefits. As to how far such evidence should go in detail will be a matter for the trial Judge. Charles v. Texas Co., 192 S. C. 82, 5 S. E. (2d) 464. We conclude therefore that Judge Moss in the proper exercise of his discretion should have denied the motion of the plaintiff, save and except as to the last sentence in paragraph 4 which reads as follows: “The property described in the Complaint has been benefitted by said navigation works in that said works have provided a greatly improved water route with decreased sailing time from said property to Columbia and the interior of the State, in place of the narrow and tortuous channel previously existing.”
The quoted language from paragraph 4 we think was properly stricken out, because it does not constitute any defense to the complaint, as it stands after eliminating therefrom all causes of action or purported causes of action, save and except the cause of action to recover just compensation for the alleged taking of plaintiff’s property for a public purpose. As we have hereinbefore stated, the power of eminent domain was conferred upon the South Carolina Public Service Authority; and this was done in and by Code Section 8555-15, which provides that condemnation proceedings by the Authority “shall be instituted and prosecuted in the manner provided for and authorized in article 9 of chapter 160, providing for securing to railroads a right-of-way in this State.” Article 9 to which reference is thus made is included in Sections 8437-8450, both inclusive; and it is provided in Section 8440 that the value of the property is to be determined “irrespective of any benefit which the owner may derive” from the proposed construction. It follows therefore that even special benefits would not be available as an offset or defense to an action constituting the converse of a condemnation proceeding.
As we have already stated, our conclusion is that the three paragraphs, with the single exception of the last sentence in *527paragraph 4, should have been allowed to remain in the answer, in the proper exercise of the discretion of the Circuit Judge. But attention should also be directed to the fact that, as we read his order, in this particular his conclusion was manifestly influenced by what we deem to be an error of law. For he states that the fallacy of the defendant’s position is that it is not the United States, and has none of the powers, rights, privileges and duties of that sovereignty, other than such limited powers and privileges as were granted to it by the license under the Federal Power Act; and that the defendant is not the State of South Carolina.
We are of opinion, however, that the defendant is, for the purposes under consideration, the State of South Carolina, and that as such it has, in this connection, the powers, rights, privileges and duties of the State Government. While it is quite true that the rights and powers of the Federal Government with reference to navigation are paramount to those of the State, the latter remain in full force and effect, unless and until Congress acts upon the subject. Escanaba & Lake Michigan Transportation Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 S. Ct. 185, 27 L. Ed. 442. And we hold that the liability of the South Carolina Public Service Authority to a riparian owner for damages, if any, alleged to have been sustained by reason of the diversion of waters from the Santee River to the Cooper River, is substantially the same as that which would be applicable, if the United States were involved.
Perhaps the most important recent case on this subject is that of United States v. Commodore Park, decided in 1945, 324 U. S. 386, 65 S. Ct. 803, 805, 89 L. Ed. 1017, wherein the opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Black. In that case the United States dredged a tide water navigable bay and deposited the dredged materials in a navigable arm of the bay called Mason Creek, thereby destroying its navigability, and impairing certain benefits alleged to be inherent in the proximity of the land to a navigable tide water creek. *528The Court held, however, that a riparian owner is not entitled to compensation for the deprivation of his access to navigable waters. In other words, if was held in this case that the riparian owner was not entitled to recover, because the damages complained of did not result from “taking” by the government of its property for public use, since there had been no invasion of its “fast lands” (lands above high water mark), for its property was more than a mile from the fill made in Mason Creek. The following quotation from the opinion is quite illuminating: “Respondent’s property was always subject to a dominant servitude ; it did not have a vested right to have this navigable stream remain fixed and unaltered simply because of the consequent reflected additional market value to adjacent lands. Whatever market value of riparian lands may be attributable to their closeness to navigable waters, does not detract from the government’s ‘absolute’ power in the interests of commerce, to make necessary changes in a stream. In short, as against the demands of commerce, an owner of land adjacent to navigable waters, whose fast lands are left uninvaded, has no private riparian rights of access to the waters to do such things as ‘fishing and boating and the like’, for which rights the government must pay.” Emphasis added.
The Court also adverted to the fact that the State of Virginia, in which the premises were situated, recognized the landowners’ title to land between high and low water marks of a tidal creek, but held that this fact did not give to the landowner any right to compensation. We quote the following additional excerpt from the Court’s opinion: “United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592, 596-598, [313 U. S. 543], 61 S. Ct. 772, 775, 776, 85 L.Ed. 1064, 1069-1071, set at rest any remaining doubt concerning the dominant power of the government to control and regulate navigable waters in the interest of commerce, without payment of compensation to one who under state law may hold ‘technical’ legal title (as between himself and *529others than the government) to a part of the navigable stream’s bed.”
Counsel for the plaintiff in their elaborate brief argue at length that the State of South Carolina has no such easement or servitude as the United States has over land in the bed of a navigable stream. But we find nothing in our Constitution, statutes or decisions confirming this view. Rands lying between high and low water marks of a 'navigable stream are under the express decision of this Court held by the State in trust for public purposes, and obviously a public purpose with reference to such lands is that relating to navigation. Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434.
The general law with reference to the power of the State in connection with this matter is well stated in the following quotation from 18 Am. Jur. 800: “The waters of the ocean and its bays, and of public watercourses and lakes, so far as they lie within the jurisdiction of a state, are part of the public domain, and the state may authorize the diversion of such waters for any purpose it deems advantageous to the public, without providing compensation to riparian proprietors injuriously affected. Such diversion is not a taking of private property by eminent domain, but a disposition by the public of the public property.”
Our own case of McDaniel v. Greenville-Carolina Power Co., 95 S. C. 268, 78 S. E. 980, 981, 6 A. L. R. 1321, we think, conforms to the quoted excerpt. In that case the defendant, a private corporation, was given the right to build a dam across a navigable stream, and this action was brought by a riparian landowner for damages arising out of the construction and maintenance of the dam, and the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief under Article R Section 17, of the Constitution, not because of the diversion of the waters from one channel to another, but because of an invasion of plaintiff’s land above normal high water mark. *530For the cause of action is stated in the leading opinion by Mr. Justice Watts as follows: “The complainant in this case alleges that the water from this dam backed up on her lands, and overflowed them with water, mud, sand, and other deleterious deposits. The complaint states a good cause of action”.
And it will be particularly observed that this case is in harmony with the Commodore Park case; the factual distinction between the two cases being that in the Commodore Park case there had been no invasion of the landowner’s “fast lands”, while in the McDaniel case the complaint was based on the alleged overflow of the plaintiff’s land “lying above the dam”.
The briefs on both sides in the case before us contain much discussion on the subject of ownership of the land lying between normal high water mark and low water mark on tidal navigable streams, and as to the acquisition of title thereto by private owners. We adhere to our opinion in the case of Cape Domain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434, 438, supra, wherein it was said: “The title to land below high-water mark on tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is in the state, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for public purposes.” But we do not deem it necessary or proper upon this appeal to determine under what circumstances and by what method, if any, title might be acquired by private owners, because any such ownership would be, in our opinion, subject to the dominant power of the government (State and Federal) to control and regulate navigable waters.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Make Definite
Finally we come to the motion of the plaintiff to require certain allegations of the answer to be made more definite and certain. The first ground of- this motion relates to the parts of certain paragraphs alleging that in addition to the Santee River and Six Mile Creek *531there are numerous other navigable waterways which run through or border on the property described in the complaint. And Judge Moss held that the motion in this respect should be granted, and that the defendant should be required to state in its answer in clear and unambiguous language what waterways run through or border on the property of the plaintiff it contends to be navigable streams, either naming such streams or describing them with such certainty that they can be identified by the plaintiff. We are of opinion, however, that to this extent the order of the Circuit Court is in error, because there is no one presumed to have more knowledge of the property described in the complaint than the plaintiff itself, and the matter of navigable streams on or bordering on its property must be peculiarly within its knowledge. Hughes v. Orangeburg Mfg. Co., 81 S. C. 354, 62 S. E. 404; and Spurlin v. Colprovia Products Co., 185 S. C. 449, 194 S. E. 332, and other authorities therein cited.
The second ground of the motion to make more definite and certain, however, relates to an allegation in the answer, in paragraph 35, to the effect that numerous and extensive watercourses and engineering works in aid of navigation, in the vicinity of the property described in the complaint, have been constructed by the United States, or by parties other than defendant, and that these and other works, including the Intracoastal Waterway Canal, substantially changed tidal currents, stream flow, water level, salt content, and other water conditions, all of which caused or contributed to the damage claimed by the plaintiff, none of such damage being caused by the defendant. Judge Moss likewise held as to these allegations that the defendant should make the same more definite and certain by alleging what numerous and extensive watercourses and engineering works in aid of navigation, in addition to the Intracoastal Waterway Canal, have been constructed in the vicinity of the property described in the complaint, that have had the effect alleged, and that have caused or contributed to the damage claimed by the plaintiff, and that each of the same should be *532designated in such specific language that it can be recognized and identified by the plaintiff. Our conclusion is that this is a matter which might be deemed within the peculiar knowledge of the defendant, arising out of its construction of the Santee-Cooper Project; and that to this extent the order of the Circuit Judge should be affirmed.
The result is, of course, that the judgment of this Court is that the order of the Circuit Court should be reversed in part and affirmed in part, to wit, that the motion of the defendant to strike out certain allegations of the complaint should have been granted, save and except with reference to certain allegations contained in paragraphs 24 and 25 thereof, relating to hunting, fowling and fishing rights, as to which the motion was properly denied, and these allegations should remain in the complaint; and that the motion of the plaintiff to strike out certain allegations contained in the answer should have been denied as to paragraphs 2 and 6 of the second defense, and as to all of paragraph 4 thereof, save and except the last sentence therein contained, hereinbefore quoted, which should have been stricken out; and that the motion of the plaintiff to make certain parts of the answer more definite and certain should have been denied as to the first ground thereof, but was properly granted as to the second ground thereof, which should remain in full force and effect.
Let the complaint be amended in accordance with this opinion, and duly served upon counsel for the defendant within twenty days after the filing of the remitittur herein ; and let the answer be amended in accordance with this opinion, and duly served upon counsel for the plaintiff within twenty days after service of the amended complaint.
Accordingly, the order of the Circuit Court is
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
RishburnE, StukES, Taylor and OxxER, JJ., concur.
Baker, C. J., not participating.