Court Opinion

ID: 9961715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:05:30.510712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:24.385134
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Apr 19 2024, 9:07 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                   Brian Randy Van Auken,
                                         Appellant-Defendant

                                                     v.

                                          State of Indiana,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                             April 19, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-1573
                               Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court
                           The Honorable Kenton W. Kiracofe, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                          90C01-2202-F1-2

                               Opinion by Judge Bradford
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur.

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024                 Page 1 of 26
      Case Summary
[1]   Brian Van Auken appeals following his convictions for three counts of Level 1

      felony child molesting, Level 3 felony promotion of sexual trafficking of a

      younger child, six counts of Level 4 felony child solicitation, Level 4 felony

      sexual misconduct with a minor, and five counts of Level 5 felony child

      solicitation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

      certain evidence, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and his

      aggregate sixty-nine-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In December of 2020, forty-year-old Van Auken met thirteen-year-old D.M.1 on

      Grindr, an adult dating website. In an attempt to circumvent the age

      restrictions on Grindr, D.M. had indicated in his Grindr profile that he was

      nineteen years old. After communicating on Grindr, Van Auken and D.M.

      began communicating on Snapchat.2 Between December 20 and 26, 2020, Van

      Auken and D.M. engaged in sexually explicit conversations over Snapchat,

      during which Van Auken electronically solicited oral and anal sex from D.M.

      and offered to take D.M. to a friend’s house where D.M. could engage in oral

      1
          D.M. was born on February 25, 2007.
      2
       Snapchat is an internet-based instant messaging and social networking application commonly downloaded
      onto cellular telephones.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024                         Page 2 of 26
      sex with more than one person at a time. In exchange for sexual acts, Van

      Auken offered to supply D.M. with marijuana.

[3]   On December 26, 2020, Van Auken and D.M. met in person for the first time

      and engaged in either oral or anal sex. Afterwards, in a series of messages sent

      around 5:00 a.m. on December 31, 2020, the following Snapchat exchange

      occurred between Van Auken and D.M.:

                 [Van Auken]:        How old are you for real?? .. just put the
                 second digit, I wanna know just cause lol3
                 [Van Auken]:        Not gonna change anything lol
                 [Van Auken]:        5?
                 [D.M.]:             I am 17

      Ex. Vol. pp. 28–29. Van Auken and D.M. met in person “five to six times” and

      would engage in oral or anal sex while they were together. Tr. Vol. III p. 162.

[4]   While on patrol at approximately 1:30 a.m. on July 18, 2021, Bluffton Police

      Officer Bradley Carlson encountered a black BMW that was “weaving within

      its lane” of travel. Tr. Vol. III p. 23. Officer Carlson initiated a traffic stop after

      he had observed the vehicle cross the fog line, “leaving its lane of travel.” Tr.

      Vol. III p. 23. Officer Carlson approached the vehicle and made contact with

      the driver, who was later identified as D.M., and the front seat passenger, who

      was later identified as Van Auken. When he asked D.M. and Van Auken what

      they were doing, Van Auken told Officer Carlson that he was “letting [D.M.]

      3
          An emoji depicting a smiling face with its tongue sticking out is omitted after the “lol.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024                               Page 3 of 26
      drive” despite knowing that D.M. did not have a driver’s license. Tr. Vol. III p.

      26. While he was speaking with Officer Carlson, Van Auken appeared to be

      “extremely nervous” and Officer Carlson “noticed, immediately, that he was

      sweating profusely” and “was breathing heavily.” Tr. Vol. III p. 27. Given

      Van Auken’s demeanor and the fact that Van Auken had traveled from Fort

      Wayne to see D.M. in Bluffton, Officer Carlson became concerned that D.M.

      was a “child victim of some sort.” Tr. Vol. III p. 27. He then requested

      assistance and Officer Benjamin Griner arrived on scene a short time later.

[5]   Officer Carlson spoke privately with D.M. D.M. stated that he was “just

      learning how to drive” and that Van Auken, whom he knew as “Jax,” was

      “friends with his mom.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 28, 29. D.M. denied that anything

      sexual was “going on” and provided Officer Carlson with his parents’ names

      and a phone number, which turned out to be incorrect, for his mother. Tr. Vol.

      III p. 28. Officer Carlson observed that D.M. was “just a young kid” who did

      not “appear old for his age.” Tr. Vol. III p. 28. Likewise, Officer Griner

      observed that D.M. had appeared to be “a middle schooler” and “consistent

      with a [fourteen]-year-old.” Tr. Vol. III p. 63.

[6]   Officer Carlson then spoke with Van Auken. Van Auken told Officer Carlson

      that he had met D.M. online and that he had planned to let D.M. drive around

      “a little bit” before taking him home. Tr. Vol. III p. 29. Van Auken claimed

      that he “couldn’t remember” what website he had met D.M. on. Van Auken

      described the nature of his relationship with D.M. as “friends” and that they

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024      Page 4 of 26
      had “connected” and “morally support[ed] each other.” Tr. Vol. III p. 30. Van

      Auken also indicated that he did not know D.M.’s family.

[7]   Officer Carlson placed Van Auken under arrest for contributing to the

      delinquency of a minor.4 Officer Carlson searched the black BMW and seized

      Van Auken’s cellular telephone. During his search of the BMW, Officer

      Carlson located a box of condoms and “an open bottle of KY brand jelly”

      lubricant. Tr. Vol. III p. 34. Officer Carlson turned Van Auken’s cellular

      telephone over to Detective Clifford Thomas who, on July 19, 2021, applied

      for, and received, a warrant to search Van Auken’s cellular telephone.

[8]   The subsequent search of Van Auken’s cellular telephone revealed 939

      Snapchat messages between Van Auken and D.M. for the period between

      December 20, 2020, and the date of the traffic stop on July 18, 2021. The

      messages made it obvious that Van Auken and D.M. had been engaged in a

      sexual relationship and that they had met on numerous occasions to engage in

      sexual contact. After reviewing the Snapchat conversations, Detective Thomas

      spoke with D.M. and his parents. D.M. admitted that he had met with Van

      Auken on several occasions and that he had engaged in oral and anal sex with

      him.

      4
        D.M. was also detained and was transported to the Bluffton Police Department for driving without ever
      receiving a license.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024                            Page 5 of 26
[9]    On February 11, 2022, the State charged Van Auken with three counts of Level

       1 felony child molesting, Level 3 felony promotion of sexual trafficking of a

       younger child, six counts of Level 4 felony child solicitation, Level 4 felony

       sexual misconduct with a minor, and five counts of Level 5 felony child

       solicitation. On February 23, 2023, Van Auken moved to suppress the evidence

       recovered from his cellular telephone, i.e., the Snapchat messages. Following a

       hearing, the trial court denied Van Auken’s motion.

[10]   At trial, the deputy prosecutor and Van Auken’s counsel submitted a signed

       stipulation agreement, in which they stipulated as follows:

               COMES NOW, the State [of] Indiana, by its Deputy Prosecuting
               Attorney, and the Defendant by Counsel, and submits the
               following stipulated agreement:

               1.   The 115 pages of Snapchat communication between
               JAX_MEHOFF100 and TAIOOX13 was recovered from Brian
               VanAuken’s cellphone and is an accurate representation of the
               Snapchat communication between Defendant and [D.M.].

               2.       Agree that these communications are admissible at trial.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 210. After the parties had submitted their

       stipulation, Van Auken’s counsel indicated that she agreed that the messages

       were admissible and had “[n]o issues” with their publication. Tr. Vol. III p. 73.

       Moreover, when the messages were admitted into evidence at trial, Van

       Auken’s counsel explicitly stated that she had “[n]o objection.” Tr. Vol. III p.

       83.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024          Page 6 of 26
[11]   Van Auken testified in his own defense. Van Auken admitted that he had

       engaged in oral and anal sex with D.M. and had solicited such acts from him.

       Van Auken also presented evidence and argument which was aimed at proving

       his stated defense, i.e., that he had reasonably believed that D.M. was older

       than sixteen. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Van Auken guilty as

       charged. The trial court subsequently entered judgment of conviction and

       sentenced Van Auken to an aggregate sixty-nine-year sentence.

       Discussion and Decision
[12]   Van Auken contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

       certain data recovered from a search of his cellular telephone, that the evidence

       is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that his aggregate sixty-nine-year

       sentence is inappropriate.

           I.       The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
                    Admitting the Challenged Evidence
[13]   “The general admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to the discretion

       of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “Trial

       courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and our review is

       limited to whether the trial court abused that discretion.” Satterfield v. State, 33

       N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). “We consider all the facts and circumstances

       surrounding the trial court’s decision to determine whether it is clearly against

       the logic and effect of what those facts and circumstances dictate.” Id. (internal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024          Page 7 of 26
       quotation omitted). “And we may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any theory

       supported by the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[14]   Van Auken claims that the evidence recovered from his cellular telephone, i.e.,

       the Snapchat messages exchanged between himself and D.M., should have

       been excluded from the evidence at trial because the underlying warrant for the

       search of his cellular telephone was defective. Specifically, Van Auken claims

       that police lacked probable cause to search his cellular telephone because the

       affidavit filed in support of the warrant “simply did not present facts, along with

       any inferences, which demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the suspected

       criminal activity … and the specific thing to be searched,” i.e., Van Auken’s

       cellular telephone. Appellant’s Br. p. 21. “[T]he ultimate ruling on the

       constitutionality of a search is a legal conclusion that we review de novo.”

       McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original,

       internal quotation omitted).

[15]   Van Auken acknowledges that he did not object to the admission of the

       challenged evidence at trial, arguing on appeal that its admission resulted in

       fundamental error. “Fundamental error is an error that makes a fair trial

       impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary

       principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for

       harm.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009). However, even

       assuming the search warrant was in some way defective or insufficient or the

       admission of the challenged evidence amounted to fundamental error, Van

       Auken is not entitled to relief because he invited the error.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 8 of 26
[16]           The invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from
               obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were
               fundamental. A party invites an error if it was part of a deliberate,
               well-informed trial strategy. This means there must be evidence
               of counsel’s strategic maneuvering at trial to establish invited
               error. Mere neglect or the failure to object, standing alone, is
               simply not enough. And when there is no evidence of counsel’s
               strategic maneuvering, we are reluctant to find invited error.

       Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874–75 (Ind. 2022) (cleaned up, emphasis

       added). “[E]ven constitutional errors may be invited.” Brewington v. State, 7

       N.E.3d 946, 977 (Ind. 2014).

[17]   The record in this case clearly establishes that to the extent any error occurred,

       such error was invited by Van Auken. As is laid out above, at trial, the deputy

       prosecutor and Van Auken’s counsel submitted a signed stipulation agreement,

       in which they stipulated as follows:

               COMES NOW, the State [of] Indiana, by its Deputy Prosecuting
               Attorney, and the Defendant by Counsel, and submits the
               following stipulated agreement:

               1.   The 115 pages of Snapchat communication between
               JAX_MEHOFF100 and TAIOOX13 was recovered from Brian
               VanAuken’s cellphone and is an accurate representation of the
               Snapchat communication between Defendant and [D.M.].

               2.       Agree that these communications are admissible at trial.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 210. After the parties had submitted their

       stipulation, Van Auken’s counsel indicated that she agreed the messages were

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024             Page 9 of 26
       admissible and had “[n]o issues” with their publication. Tr. Vol. III p. 73.

       Moreover, when the messages were admitted into evidence at trial, Van

       Auken’s counsel explicitly stated that she had “[n]o objection.” Tr. Vol. III p.

       83.

[18]   In addition, Van Auken referred to the messages as part of a deliberate trial

       strategy. Van Auken’s defense at trial was that he had reasonably believed that

       D.M. had been seventeen years old. In support of his defense, Van Auken

       directed the jury to messages that he claimed supported his reasonable belief

       that D.M. had been of consenting age. Van Auken described the messages sent

       by D.M. as “very direct and vulgar,” and that nothing he said ever led him to

       believe that D.M. was younger than his claimed age of seventeen. Tr. Vol. III

       p. 227. In fact, when one witness failed to read some of the messages exactly as

       written, Van Auken objected, arguing that the witness needed to “be a little

       more thorough” and “has to read thoroughly because every sentence and every

       letter matters.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 93, 94. The trial court agreed that the witness

       needed to accurately describe the messages to the jury. In closing argument, the

       defense again pointed to some of D.M.’s messages, arguing “[w]hat person

       under the age of [sixteen] says that? That’s not a thing that any person would

       expect to hear a person under the age of [sixteen] say; let alone someone who’s

       [thirteen] or [fourteen] in middle school. It’s unbelievable.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 68.

       Van Auken described the language used by D.M. in their messages as

               the most foul language that no adult would expect a child of the
               age of [thirteen] or [fourteen] to use.… I invite you to look at the
               messages. Look at what D.[M]. said. The specific words that he
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 10 of 26
               used that no one would expect to hear out of the mouth of a
               [thirteen] or [fourteen]-year-old.

       Tr. Vol. IV. p. 69.

[19]   The record clearly establishes that Van Auken used the Snapchat messages to

       establish a defense by attempting to paint D.M. as a liar who had fooled him

       into believing that D.M. was of a consenting age. Van Auken, therefore,

       invited the alleged error as part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy. See

       Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 875. Given that constitutional errors can be invited, see

       Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 977, even assuming that the underlying search warrant

       was in some way insufficient or defective, Van Auken is precluded from

       obtaining appellate relief. See Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 874–75.

       II.     The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain Van Auken’s
               Convictions
[20]   Van Auken also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

       convictions, as the State failed to prove that he had knowingly committed the

       charged acts with an underage individual.

               When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
               conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
               evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
               the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
               witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
               it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
               when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
               they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
               Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024         Page 11 of 26
               finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
               reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
               overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
               evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
               from it to support the verdict.

       Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (cleaned up). Stated

       differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the

       evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither

       reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the

       judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.”

       Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[21]   Van Auken was convicted of three counts of Level 1 felony child molesting

       (Counts I, IV, and VII), Level 3 felony promotion of sexual trafficking of a

       younger child (Count III), six counts of Level 4 felony child solicitation (Counts

       II, VI, VIII, IX, XI, XII), Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor

       (Count X) and five counts of Level 5 felony child solicitation (Counts V, XIII,

       XIV, XV, XVI).

               A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age,
               knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual
               intercourse or other sexual conduct … commits child molesting,
               a Level 3 felony. However, the offense is a Level 1 felony if: (1)
               it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age.

       Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).

               A person who knowingly or intentionally recruits, entices,
               harbors, or transports a child less than eighteen (18) years of age
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 12 of 26
        with the intent of causing the child to engage in … a performance
        or incident that includes sexual conduct in violation of [child
        exploitation laws] … commits promotion of child sexual
        trafficking, a Level 3 felony.

Ind. Code § 35-42-3.5-1.2(a).

        A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly or
        intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other
        sexual conduct … with a child less than sixteen (16) years of age,
        commits sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 5 felony.
        However, the offense is: (1) a Level 4 felony if it is committed by
        a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a).

        (b) A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who knowingly
        or intentionally solicits a child under fourteen (14) years of age,
        or an individual the person believes to be a child under fourteen
        (14) years of age, to engage in sexual intercourse, other sexual
        conduct …, or any fondling or touching intended to arouse or
        satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person,
        commits child solicitation, a Level 5 felony. However, the
        offense is a Level 4 felony if the person solicits the child or
        individual the person believes to be a child under fourteen (14)
        years of age to engage in sexual intercourse or other sexual
        conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) and:
               (1) commits the offense by using a computer network
               (as defined in IC 35-43-2-3(a)) and travels to meet the
               child or individual the person believes to be a child;
               or
               (2) has a previous unrelated conviction for
               committing an offense under this section.
        (c) A person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who knowingly
        or intentionally solicits a child at least fourteen (14) years of age

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024         Page 13 of 26
               but less than sixteen (16) years of age, or an individual the person
               believes to be a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less
               than sixteen (16) years of age, to engage in sexual intercourse,
               other sexual conduct …, or any fondling or touching intended to
               arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older
               person, commits child solicitation, a Level 5 felony.

       Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he

       engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-

       41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the

       conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-

       41-2-2(b).

[22]   In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, Van

       Auken argues

               All [sixteen] counts for which Van Auken was convicted contain
               an element regarding the age of the victim either “under
               [fourteen]” (see Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XIII, XIV,
               XV); “at least [fourteen] but under [sixteen]” (see Counts IX, XI,
               XII, and XVI); and “less than [sixteen]” (see Counts III and X).
               Van Auken admitted that all of the acts occurred on the various
               dates. However, his defense for each count was that he
               reasonably believed that D.M. was [sixteen] years of age or older
               (i.e., [seventeen]).

       Appellant’s Br. p. 26.

[23]   Both Level 1 child molestation and Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a

       minor provide a defense to prosecution if the accused “reasonably believed the

       child was sixteen (16) years of age or older at the time of the conduct.” Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024         Page 14 of 26
       Code §§ 35-42-4-3(d), 35-42-4-9(c). “Such a defense admits all the elements of

       the crime but proves circumstances that excuse the defendant from culpability.”

       Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The

       “mistaken belief” defense “does not negate an element of the crime; rather, if

       believed, the defense reduces [the defendant’s] culpability for acts he

       committed.” Id. “Therefore, the burden to prove the defense may properly be

       placed on the defendant.” Id. Neither the promotion of sexual trafficking nor

       child solicitation statutes, however, provide such a defense. As such, even if

       Van Auken’s belief that D.M. had been over the age of sixteen was reasonable,

       such reasonable belief would not negate his culpability for his promotion of

       sexual trafficking or child solicitation convictions.

[24]   In support of his defense at trial and his argument on appeal, Van Auken points

       to evidence in the record which he claims proves that his belief that D.M. was

       over sixteen was reasonable. Van Auken asserts that D.M. had listed that he

       was nineteen in his Grindr profile, had later told Van Auken that he was

       seventeen, and used sexually explicit language in the messages that he had sent

       to Van Auken on Snapchat. Van Auken also asserts that the fact that Officer

       Carlson had asked D.M. for his driver’s license when he first encountered D.M.

       and Van Auken suggests “that it wasn’t obvious to [Officer] Carlson that D.M.

       was too young to have a license or permit.” Appellant’s Br. p. 29.

[25]   While the evidence cited by Van Auken may have suggested that he had

       reasonably believed that D.M. had been over the age of sixteen, the jury, acting

       as the trier-of-fact, was not required to credit Van Auken’s evidence and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 15 of 26
       assertions. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a

       general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness’s testimony even

       when it is uncontradicted.”). Moreover, other evidence in the record is

       sufficient to prove that Van Auken’s claimed belief was unreasonable as Van

       Auken knew, or, at the very least, should have known, that D.M. was under the

       age of sixteen.

[26]   D.M. testified that he was born on February 25, 2007. In December of 2020

       through February 24, 2021, he was therefore thirteen years old and turned

       fourteen on February 25, 2021. Officer Carlson observed that D.M. “was just a

       young kid” who did not appear old for his age. Tr. Vol. III p. 28. Likewise,

       Officer Griner testified that D.M. had appeared to be “a middle schooler” and

       “he appeared consistent with a [fourteen]-year-old.” Tr. Vol. III p. 63.

[27]   When Officer Carlson first encountered D.M. and Van Auken, Van Auken

       “appeared extremely nervous” and “was sweating profusely … and breathing

       heavily.” Tr. Vol. III p. 27. Consistent with Van Auken’s extremely nervous

       demeanor, Officer Carlson indicated that Van Auken had not acted surprised

       when he allegedly first learned that D.M. was only fourteen years old. When

       speaking to Officer Carlson, at one point, Van Auken referred to D.M. as “the

       kid.” Tr. Vol. III p. 31. He also “agreed” with Officer Carlson that he had

       known that the reason D.M. did not have a driver’s license was that D.M. was

       “too young to have one.” Tr. Vol. III p. 32. Prior to being arrested, Van

       Auken did not accuse D.M. of lying to him, but rather “didn’t say anything” to

       D.M. at all. Tr. Vol. III p. 192.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024      Page 16 of 26
[28]   D.M. and Van Auken each gave a different story to Officer Carlson regarding

       the nature of their relationship with the other, with Van Auken claiming that he

       and D.M. had met online but that “he couldn’t remember” what site. Tr. Vol.

       III p. 29. Van Auken claimed that he and D.M. “were friends and they

       emotionally connected,” and “morally supported each other” by giving the

       other “somebody to talk to.” Tr. Vol. III p. 30. D.M., on the other hand

       claimed that Van Auken was “friends with his mom” who was teaching him

       how to drive. Tr. Vol. III p. 28.

[29]   In addition, Van Auken’s Snapchat conversations with D.M. suggested that

       Van Auken knew, or at least suspected, that D.M. was younger than what he

       had originally claimed to be. In a series of messages sent around 5:00 a.m. on

       December 31, 2020, the following Snapchat exchange occurred between Van

       Auken and D.M.:

                [Van Auken]:        How old are you for real?? .. just put the
                second digit, I wanna know just cause lol5
                [Van Auken]:        Not gonna change anything lol
                [Van Auken]:        5?
                [D.M.]:             I am 17

       Ex. Vol. pp. 28–29. We agree with the State that this Snapchat exchange

       “make[s it] apparent” that Van Auken “believed that D.M. was a child and was

       at most [fifteen] years old.” Appellee’s Br. p. 38. We further agree with the

       5
         As was the case above, an emoji depicting a smiling face with its tongue sticking out is omitted after the
       “lol.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024                                Page 17 of 26
       State that “the jury had sufficient evidence before it from which to conclude

       that Van Auken did not reasonably believe that D.M. was [sixteen] years old or

       older when he engaged in other sexual conduct with him.” Appellee’s Br. p.

       38. Furthermore, Van Auken admits that each of his sexual encounters with

       D.M. occurred “in [his] car, at night, in a secluded area.” Appellant’s Br. p. 29.

       The record establishes that Van Auken was cautious about being seen with

       D.M. and, when stopped by police, lied about the nature of his relationship

       with D.M.

[30]   Again, Van Auken admits that the charged conduct occurred and only argues

       on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to prove the age component of the

       charged offenses because he had reasonably believed that D.M. was over the

       age of sixteen when the charged conduct occurred. Van Auken presented this

       defense at trial, but the jury did not credit Van Auken’s claim that he had

       reasonably believed that D.M. was over sixteen years old at all times when the

       charged conduct occurred. Likewise, the evidence establishes that D.M. was

       thirteen years old when Van Auken committed all of the charged offenses

       occurring before February 25, 2021, and was fourteen years old when Van

       Auken committed all of the charged offenses occurring after February 25, 2021.

       The evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain Van Auken’s convictions. Van

       Auken’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for

       this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d

       at 958.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024      Page 18 of 26
       III. Van Auken’s Sentence is Not Inappropriate
[31]   Van Auken last contends that his aggregate sixty-nine-year sentence is

       inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a

       sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s

       decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature

       of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we

       “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether

       real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity

       of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals

       about the defendant’s character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. “The defendant bears the

       burden of persuading us [that his] sentence is inappropriate.” Sanchez v. State,

       891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[32]   Again, Van Auken was convicted of three Level 1 felonies, one Level 3 felony,

       seven Level 4 felonies, and five Level 5 felonies. “[A] person who commits a

       Level 1 felony … shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20)

       and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Ind.

       Code § 35-50-2-4(b). “A person who commits a Level 3 felony … shall be

       imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the

       advisory sentence being nine (9) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). “A person

       who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between

       two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.”

       Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. “A person who commits a Level 5 felony … shall be

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 19 of 26
       imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the

       advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b).

[33]   The trial court sentenced Van Auken as follows:

               1.       Count Group 1, Count I as the main count:
                        a)      As to Count I, Child Molesting, a Level 1 Felony:
                        twenty (20) years.
                        b)      As to Count II, Child Solicitation, a Level 4 Felony:
                        six (6) years.
                        c)      As to Count III, Promotion of Sexual Trafficking of
                        a Younger Child, a Level 3 Felony: nine (9) years.
                        d)      Counts I, II, and III, shall be served concurrently
                        with each other.

               2.       Count Group 2, Count IV as the main count:
                        a)     As to Count IV, Child Molesting, a Level 1 Felony:
                        twenty (20) years.
                        b)     As to Count V, Child Solicitation, a Level 5 Felony:
                        three (3) years.
                        c)     As to Count XIII, Child Solicitation, a Level 5
                        Felony: three (3) years.
                        d)     Counts IV, V, and XIII, shall be served concurrently
                        with each other.

               3.       Count Group 3, Count VII as the main count:
                        a)    As to Count VII, Child Molesting, a Level 1 Felony:
                        twenty (20) years.
                        b)    As to Count VI, Child Solicitation, a Level 4
                        Felony: six (6) years.
                        c)    As to Count VIII, Child Solicitation, a Level 4
                        Felony: six (6) years.
                        d)    As to Count XIV, Child Solicitation, a Level 5
                        Felony: three (3) years[.]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024          Page 20 of 26
                 e)    Counts VII, VI, VIII and XIV, shall be served
                 concurrently with each other.

        4.       Count Group 4, Count X as the main count:
                 a)    As to Count X, Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, a
                 Level 4 Felony: six (6) years.
                 b)    As to Count IX, Child Solicitation, a Level 4
                 Felony: six (6) years.
                 c)    As to Count XI, Child Solicitation, a Level 4
                 Felony: six (6) years.
                 d)    As to Count XV, Child Solicitation, a Level 5
                 Felony: three (3) years.
                 e)    Counts X, IX, XI, and XV, shall be served
                 concurrently with each other.

        5.     Count XII, Child Solicitation, a Level 4 Felony: two (2)
        years.

        6.    Count XVI, Child Solicitation, a Level 5 Felony: one (1)
        year.

        7.    The sentences imposed in Count Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, Count
        XII, and Count XVI, shall be served consecutively, for an
        aggregate executed sentence of sixty-nine (69) years to the
        Indiana Department of Correction.

Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 125–26 (emphases in original). Thus, for each of

Van Auken’s Level 1 felony convictions, the trial court imposed a minimum

sentence; for the Level 3 felony conviction, an advisory sentence; an advisory

sentence for all but one of the Level 4 felony convictions and a minimum

sentence for the remaining Level 4 felony conviction; and an advisory sentence

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 21 of 26
       for all but one of the Level 5 felony convictions and a minimum sentence for

       the remaining Level 5 felony conviction.

[34]   We agree with Van Auken that “[t]he nature of the offenses are [sic] found in

       the details and circumstances of the commission of the offenses and a

       defendant’s participation.” Appellant’s Br. p. 33. In this case, the details and

       circumstances of Van Auken’s crimes are that he repeatedly electronically

       solicited sexual encounters with D.M. and engaged in repeated in-person sexual

       encounters with D.M. over the course of seven months. Although D.M. had

       claimed to be nineteen in his Grindr profile, Van Auken had doubts about

       D.M.’s age after their first in-person encounter. D.M. admitted that he was not

       nineteen but claimed to be seventeen. The evidence supports the inference,

       however, that Van Auken knew or at least suspected that D.M. was younger

       than seventeen, but nonetheless continued to electronically solicit D.M. to

       engage in sexual activities and met up with D.M. in-person to engage in sexual

       conduct. In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Van Auken asserts that

       “perhaps” he “was willingly ignorant and he should have better scrutinized the

       situation and ended the relationship at that point. Unfortunately, he did not.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 34.

[35]   Van Auken admits that he repeatedly solicited D.M. electronically, engaging in

       sexually explicit conversations over Snapchat and soliciting D.M. to perform

       oral sex on him and to submit to anal sex in exchange for marijuana. Van

       Auken also admits that he had solicited D.M. to engage in sexual conduct with

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024      Page 22 of 26
some of his friends. These solicitations occurred numerous times but are

evidenced by the following Snapchat conversation:

        [Van Auken]:        Was gonna see if you wanted to go to one of
        my friends [sic] houses in roanoake
        [Van Auken]:        They’re gay
        ****
        [D.M.]:             Dang why not?
        [Van Auken]:        You wanna go? Or you gotta be home
        ****
        [Van Auken]:        Don’t want you getting in trouble on your
        side tho
        [D.M.]:             How far is were [sic] they live
        [Van Auken]:        It’s too far so scratch that, I need my [c***]
        sucked really good you down?
        ****
        [D.M.]:             So are we going to your friends [sic] house?
        ****
        [Van Auken]:        Why you wanna suck two or three [c***s] at
        once?
        ****
        [D.M.]:             Yeah I want to
        [Van Auken]:        No not tonight but I’ll set that up for you …
        [D.M.]:             Yeah tell you [sic] friends to hit me up
        [Van Auken]:        So sup you want daddy’s [c***]
        [D.M.]:             Yeah
        [Van Auken]:        Mmm good I want that mouth
        [Van Auken]:        Got one spliff left

Ex. Vol. pp. 11–14. Van Auken and D.M. also had multiple in-person sexual

encounters, which Van Auken admits occurred “in [his] car, at night, in a

secluded area.” Appellant’s Br. p. 29.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024       Page 23 of 26
[36]   When stopped by police, Van Auken lied about the nature of his relationship

       with D.M. At trial, Van Auken attempted to shift the blame to D.M., claiming

       that D.M. had fooled him and that “it’s not his fault that some kid chose to lie.”

       Tr. Vol. IV p. 67. The nature of Van Auken’s offenses is undoubtedly serious

       and troubling as he repeatedly victimized a child, attempted to traffic him to

       other people, lied to police, and blamed the victim in an attempt to shield

       himself from responsibility.

[37]   As for Van Auken’s character, he claims that other than a few misdemeanor

       convictions, he “had led a law[-]abiding life, had a good home life growing up,

       and had a good work history. He is a high school graduate and completed

       some college classes at IPFW.” Appellant’s Br. p. 35. Van Auken asserts that

       “[t]here is nothing in [his] past that would suggest the kind of behavior for

       which he was convicted” and claims that his mother’s suicide in 2020 “set

       [him] into a tailspin. Everything fell apart and he increased his alcohol and

       marijuana use.” Appellant’s Br. p. 35 (internal record quotation omitted).

[38]   Van Auken has prior convictions for public intoxication, 6 Class B misdemeanor

       reckless driving, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. He has

       been arrested and charged with criminal activity on at least two other occasions

       and has violated the terms of probation on at least one occasion. While Van

       Auken’s criminal history may be classified as relatively minor, “[e]ven a minor

       6
           The class of misdemeanor for this offense is unclear from the record.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024          Page 24 of 26
       criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant’s character.” Prince v. State,

       148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[39]   Van Auken chose to continue his relationship with D.M. after he had become

       aware, or at the very least suspicious, that D.M. was an underage child. Van

       Auken admits that he was “perhaps … willingly ignorant” and “should have

       better scrutinized the situation.” Appellant’s Br. p. 34. However, Van Auken

       has attempted to shift the blame for his actions by claiming that D.M. had

       fooled him and it was not his fault that D.M. had lied about his age. We

       believe it reflects poorly on Van Auken’s character that he has attempted to shift

       the blame for his decisions and actions to D.M.

[40]   Furthermore, to the extent that Van Auken argues that he “did not force or

       threaten D.M. during the times they were together and that throughout their

       relationship D.M. was a willing participant,” Appellant’s Br. p. 34, the lack of

       force or threats does not mitigate Van Auken’s responsibility for his actions or

       justify a lesser sentence. See Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind. 2005)

       (“[A]bsence of physical harm is not an automatic mitigating circumstance such

       that it would require a lesser sentence than would otherwise be imposed.”).

       Van Auken has failed to convince us that his aggregate sixty-nine-year sentence

       is inappropriate.

[41]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024        Page 25 of 26
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Gregory L. Fumarolo
Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Courtney L. Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1573 | April 19, 2024   Page 26 of 26