Court Opinion

ID: 9693813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:01:21.952821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:18.523794
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 25 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTORIA CAROLINA RAMIREZ-                      No. 22-1122
RUANO,                                          Agency No.
                                                A099-581-936
             Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted August 23, 2023**
                              Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Victoria Ramirez-Ruano (“Ramirez-Ruano”) seeks review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“IJ”) decision on remand denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the

petition.

      This is the second time this case has been before our court. Ramirez-Ruano,

a citizen of Guatemala, suffered three acts of violence over a span of several years,

all at the hands of a single individual who appears to have been a member of the 18th

Street Gang. In each instance, she filed a police report but, to her knowledge, there

was no investigation or arrest. She originally alleged that she was a member of three

protected social groups: (1) Guatemalan women who are at risk of rape and murder,

(2) witnesses who testify against gang members, and (3) persons taking concrete

steps to oppose gang members. The agency denied her claims, concluding that she

had suffered an indiscriminate act of violence and then individual retribution for

reporting a crime.

      In 2017, we denied Ramirez-Ruano’s challenge relating to her proposed social

group of Guatemalan women, but remanded a portion of the petition for the BIA to

reconsider in light of our precedents in Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.

2014), and Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc),

noting that “witnesses who testify against gang members” and “persons taking

concrete steps to oppose gang members” may constitute cognizable social groups,

but that further fact-finding was required. Ramirez-Ruano v. Sessions, 683 F. App’x

                                        2                                  22-1122
646, 647‒48 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). The BIA further remanded these issues,

specifically instructing the IJ to address only these potential grounds for asylum and

withholding. Ramirez-Ruano submitted additional briefing and new documentary

evidence.

      The IJ again denied her claims, and the BIA affirmed.1 However, Ramirez-

Ruano’s brief to this court does not contain any arguments challenging the analysis

of the two proposed social groups that were the subject of the remand. Instead, it

argues for her membership in the social group Guatemalan women. But this issue

was previously raised and denied by our court; it was thus outside the scope of

remand, and the BIA properly refused to address it. See Mendez-Gutierrez v.

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the BIA is bound by

the scope of this court’s remand). Ramirez-Ruano has waived consideration of the

      1
         With respect to the proposed social group of witnesses who testify against
gang members, the BIA concluded that Ramirez-Ruano had not proffered evidence
that filing a police report was sufficiently similar to testifying in court against a gang
member. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242‒43 (9th Cir.
2020). With respect to the second proposed social group, the BIA concluded that
Ramirez-Ruano had failed to demonstrate sufficient particularity and distinction in
Guatemalan society, noting she has “not established that members of Guatemalan
society agree on what it means to ‘concretely oppose’ gangs or what degree of
opposition makes one a member of this group.” See Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016). The BIA declined to address her attempt to resurrect
her claim for membership in the social group of Guatemalan women, because the
denial had already been upheld by the Ninth Circuit and had not been part of the
remand order.

                                          3                                     22-1122
other two social groups by not presenting any argument regarding them in her

opening brief. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2011) (en banc). Accordingly, we deny the petition with respect to the asylum

and withholding claims.

       We also deny the petition regarding Ramirez-Ruano’s CAT claim on the

merits, as the record does not compel the conclusion that she is more likely than not

to be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. Garcia-

Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034‒35 (9th Cir. 2014). Although there is

widespread violence in Guatemala, Ramirez-Ruano has not shown a particularized

risk of torture in Guatemala with the acquiescence or willful blindness of a public

official, particularly where the IJ permissibly found that she could relocate within

the country to avoid the one individual she feared. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,

828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016); Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162‒64

(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

      The stay of removal remains in effect until the mandate issues.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        4                                  22-1122