Court Opinion

ID: 9642952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:13:45.868005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.269398
License: Public Domain

EAGER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I do not believe that authority was shown on the part of Mr. Crum to make the asserted oral contract of insurance. I further dissent from the statement to the effect that an agent with authority to execute a written binder necessarily has authority to make an oral contract of insurance unless notice of restriction is given. The opinion and that statement misconceive the whole theory and meaning of an insurance binder which, simply stated, ordinarily means that by the terms of a written binding receipt the insurance dates from a certain time if and when a written application is subsequently accepted by the insurer. Brancato v. National Reserve Life Insurance Co., C.A. 8, 35 F.2d 612; State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Robertson, Mo., 191 S.W. 989; Patterson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Mo.App., 23 S.W.2d 198. That question is wholly different from one involving the authority of a general agent or an issuing agent to make an oral contract, as in Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. R. E. Parsons Electric Co., C.A. 8, 61 F.2d 264, 92 A.L.R. 218 (cited in the opinion), where the agent was authorized to “issue” policies. And see also, Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 355 Mo. 127, 195 S.W.2d 441, for a *84specific definition. In my view, there was not in the present case any legitimate showing of Crum’s authority even to countersign policies, much less to “issue” policies, as is inferred in the foregoing opinion.
This opinion improperly shifts to the defendant the burden which should legitimately rest upon the plaintiff (Dickinson v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Mo.App., 283 S.W.2d 658, and cases there cited) and it misconceives the basic theories involved.