Court Opinion

ID: 9791728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:16:45.028516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.151149
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — In my view, the giving of additional instruction No. 1 constituted prejudicial error, and a new trial should be ordered.
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has approved such an instruction. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 41 L. Ed. 528, 17 S. Ct. 154 (1896). It also is true that this court has approved the giving of an “Allen” instruction. State v. Thomas, 63 Wn.2d 59, 385 P.2d 532 (1963). However, the practice of giving such instructions, obviously designed to “unhang” the jury, has not been free of criticism. In United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969), Judge Aldisert, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, delivered a *336thoughtful opinion pointing out the dangers involved in judicial interference with the jury’s deliberations.
As the writer of that opinion observed, a juror who is admonished that he must vote according to his own conscience and at the same time is told that if he disagrees with the majority he must doubt his own wisdom, is thrust upon the horns of a dilemma. In escaping that dilemma, he cannot ignore the fact that the judge has indicated that he considers the majority to be right. Furthermore, the juror’s attention, rather than being directed to the objective determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, is turned upon himself in an agonizing appraisal of his own motives. It should not be surprising if a juror concludes that the law prefers that he be agreeable rather than that he be intellectually honest.
The instruction discourages free and open discussion because of its emphasis upon the desirability of reaching a unanimous decision. Particularly when it is given, as here, after the jury has been deliberating for a period of time, it stresses the interest of the court in receiving an early verdict. I do not see how it can fail to inhibit the jury’s deliberations. It is not surprising that it has come to be characterized as a “dynamite charge,” designed as it obviously is to blast a hung jury into a verdict.
In my opinion, if the giving of such an instruction is to be regarded as harmless’error in any case, it should be only in a case where it was given as a part of the main charge. In that context it may go unnoticed and therefore do no harm. Frankly, though, I would prefer to see the practice of giving such instructions abolished. If the jury cannot agree, an agreement should not be forced by artificial means. Such a forced verdict is less than a fully deliberated verdict, and the seeds of injustice lie within it.
In this case,- the evidence against the appellant was all circumstantial evidence. His defense was not entirely implausible.' There is good reason to assume that the júry was beset by honest doubt when the additional instruction was given. It is not improbable that, acting in good faith upon *337the apparent message contained in the instruction, the jurors abandoned their deliberations and agreed to accept the decision of the majority. Such a verdict is not the unanimous verdict contemplated by the constitution.
I would overrule State v. Thomas, supra, and would hold that the giving of an “Allen” instruction is prejudicial error, resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Upon this ground, I would reverse.
Neill, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.