Court Opinion

ID: 9483975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:37:09.499164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:57.000448
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The nub of the court’s holding in this case is that “detention” includes the routine customs inspection, relying most particularly on Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 79 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984). Kosak, however, is not determinative. There the petitioner had conceded that the injuries to the property occurred after it had been lawfully detained by customs officers, and the court was explicit that it need not consider the meaning of the term “detention” in the statute. Id. at 853 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 1523 n. 8.
The district court based its decision on the undisputed facts that pier laborers, at the direction of the Customs Service, performed a routine inspection of the goods, causing extensive damage. The parties agreed that the goods were not detained pursuant to an executed search warrant. The district court and this court today equate inspection with detention. I differ.
The Customs Service is empowered to perform a number of functions, including inspections, utilization of search warrants, or the seizure and holding of property leading to forfeiture. Against this broad background of the operation of the Custom Service, Congress chose to use only the word “detention”. Had Congress desired to use a broader term, it knew how to do so. Detention has a more limited meaning in the context of the customs laws, and I believe it was error to hold that inspection equates with detention.
When the Third Circuit considered the controversy involved in Kosak, Judge Weis dissented and differentiated between inspection and detention. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 309-10 (3d Cir.1982). At the very least, in this case where the court’s decision was based on a motion to dismiss, the issue of detention was a fact question.
I would reverse.