Court Opinion

ID: 9740107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:10.266663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.345660
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: Since I would reverse the defendant’s convictions and sentences and remand the case for a new trial, I dissent. To evaluate the defendant’s claim that his attorney was incompetent, we must review the evidence. This was a close case. The State relied almost entirely on the testimony of Paula Gray, a witness whose credibility was— to put it mildly — subject to question. Even leaving aside the impeachment evidence available to defense counsel which he chose not to introduce, the jury was made aware of the following facts. Paula Gray was, by her own admission, an accomplice to the killings. She testified against the defendant in exchange for the State’s promise not to retry her for murder. At a prior proceeding she had sworn under oath that she knew nothing about the offenses. When confronted by defense counsel with her prior inconsistent statements, she failed to deny or explain them, claiming in essence that she could not recall the particular questions and answers that defense counsel put to her. Under these circumstances, her testimony must be viewed with great caution, both because she was an admitted accomplice to the murders (see People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225) and because she testified in exchange for the State’s promise not to retry her on the most serious charge she could possibly face. Indeed, we have held that “where a witness has hopes of reward from the prosecution, his testimony should not be accepted unless it carries within it an ‘absolute conviction of its truth.’ ” (People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493, quoting People v. Williams (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 258, 267.) Nor was the State’s case very much helped by its only other important witness, Charles McCraney. McCraney established — at best — the presence of Dennis Williams, Willie Rainge, and Kenneth Adams at the scene of the crime, but not the defendant. As for the blood type and hair sample evidence, I think that even the majority would agree that its probative value is extremely slight. The defendant testified in his own behalf and provided detailed evidence of an alibi. We are not required to reweigh this evidence and overturn the jury’s verdict for failure to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But given the weaknesses in the State’s case, the presentation of a credible alibi defense means that the evidence was closely balanced, and that therefore the asserted deficiencies in the trial, and in defense counsel’s performance, must be examined very carefully. Given the problems with Paula Gray’s credibility, is there really no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant if they had known: (1) that Paula Gray had testified under oath, exonerating the defendant, not just once, but in four separate hearings, over a period of eight months? (These were: a preliminary hearing in June 1978, a suppression hearing in October 1978, her trial in October 1978, and her sentencing hearing in January 1979.) (2) that Paula Gray was mentally retarded? (“The record contains a report on Paula from the Cook County Office of Special Education dated September 29, 1969. This gives her Wechsler Intelligence Quo: tient (IQ) as 65 verbal, 57 performance, 57 full. The report states that Paula has ‘limited intellectual capacities in really all spheres of function [and] continues to be in need of and to remain eligible for EMH classroom placement.’ (EMH is understood to be an abbreviation for ‘Educable Mentally Handicapped’.) A similar report in the record, dated June 12, 1974, shows an IQ of 69 verbal, 67 performance, and 64 full, with continued EMH classification. These figures classify Paula as mentally retarded. (Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1224 (5th unabr. law. ed. 1982).)” United States ex ret. Gray v. Director, Department of Corrections (7th Cir. 1983), 721 F.2d 586, 588.) (3) that they were entitled to consider her prior testimony not only as indicative of her credibility, but also as substantive evidence of the defendant’s innocence? Given the closeness of the case and the lack of a credible explanation for counsel’s failure to introduce this evidence, I would reverse because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. The majority’s contrary conclusion is based on reasoning which I find difficult to follow. What, for example, is the basis for the majority’s assertion that “Paula’s prior assertions *** would not have provided any greater benefit to the defendant as substantive evidence than as impeachment”? (127 Ill. 2d at 34.) Had counsel invoked the applicable provisions of section 115 — 10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 — 10.1) he would have been able to have her prior testimony read to the jury and to have the jury instructed that they could consider her prior testimony as substantive evidence of the defendant’s innocence. The majority’s assertion that the failure to invoke section 115 — 10.1 made no difference makes a mockery of section 115 — 10.1, since the majority apparently believes that a jury cannot distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence. Nor has the majority explained what possible strategic benefit counsel could have sought to achieve by failing to make use of section 115 — 10.1. In a siimlar situation, the appeEate court has held that counsel’s failure to recognize and use prior inconsistent testimonial statements as substantive evidence renders counsel’s representation constitutionaEy ineffective. People v. Wilson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 293. Were I to agree with the majority that counsel was not ineffective, I might also agree that the victim impact evidence introduced by the prosecution was not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. But given the weakness of the State’s case, and defense counsel’s failure to take fuE advantage of this weakness, I cannot agree that the introduction of the victim impact evidence was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the prosecution introduces the victim’s characteristics in his opening statement, deliberately elicits evidence of the same characteristics from witnesses, and again refers to the same characteristics in closing, I do not think we can say that the victim impact evidence was “incidental,” or “nonprejudiciai.” These murders were heinous, but they were not made more so by the good character of the victims. The law does not distinguish between the murder of the “hardworking” and the murder of the lazy. The prosecutor’s remarks could only have been intended to persuade the jury that it does. But even were I to agree that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed, I could not also agree to affirm the defendant’s death sentence. The defendant is a nontriggerman with no prior criminal record. The exact nature and degree of his participation in the murders is clouded by the infirmities in Paula Gray’s testimony. Moreover, given the fact that one of the triggermen has been sentenced to life, the defendant’s sentence of death is disproportionate and excessive. I would therefore have reversed the defendant’s death sentence and remanded for the imposition of a sentence of natural life.