Court Opinion

ID: 9830264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:02:24.019953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:17.042654
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant insists that the measure of damages for the conversion of property is the 'value of the property at the time of the conversion. We do not understand this to be the law where the property is of fluctuating value, and its conversion takes place, as it did in this case, under the circumstances stated in our opinion herein. Appellant cites in support of its contention, Moore v. Aldrich, 25 Tex. Supp. 276; Hatcher v. Pelham, 31 Tex. 202; Blum v. Merchant, 58 Tex. 400; Norwood v. Bank, 92 Tex. 268, 48 S. W. 3; Natl. Bnk. v. Mineóla State Bnk., 155 S. W. 603; Warehouse Co. v. Rice Co., 164 S. W. 396; Bayle v. Norris, 134 S. W. 767; Bank v. Butler, 92 Ark. 472, 123 S. W. 657; Masterson v. Goodlett, 46 Tex. 402; Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 170 S. W. 859; Ry. Co. v. Fruit Co., 200 S. W! 420; Dimock v. Bank, 55 N. J. Law,' 296, 25 Atl. 926, 39 Am. St. Rep. 643; Bank v. Boyce, 78 Ky. 42, 39 Am. Rep. 198; 3 Elliott on Contracts, §§ 729-731; Jones on Collateral Security (3d Ed.) § 574, p. 684; 22 Am. & Eng. Elne. of Law, 875; 31 Cyc. 845.
This is a formidable array of authorities, numerically considered; but an examination of them shows that they do not support appellant’s contention. It should be borne in mind that the linters converted in the instant case were of fluctuating value, and were pledged by appellee in order that he might, by borrowing money thereon, be able to hold them for a higher market; that they were sold by appellant on a low market, before the debt for which they were pledged was due; that thereafter appellee, having no knowledge of such sale, tendered payment of the debt and demanded return of the linters.
None of the cases cited by appellant deal with the question of the fluctuating value of the property pledged, or present the issue as to the value of such property subsequent to its conversion as against its value at the time of such conversion, except the cases of Mas-terson v. Goodlett and Bayle v. Norris. In the former ease the trial court instructed the jury that the measure of damages was the highest price from the time of the conversion to the time of the trial. The Supreme Court approved this as a general principle, but held that it was not applicable under the peculiar facts of that case. As to those facts, the court said that it might well be found that the defendant “was committing no wrong, but only doing what he might well have assumed the plaintiff wished him to do, as being for his best interest.”
In Bayle v. Norris, the court held that if the timber was taken in good faith, under a belief of ownership, without culpable negligence, the measure of damages was its value at the time of the taking, but, if not so taken, the plaintiff was entitled to the value of the timber after it had been converted into lumber by the defendant.
In Moore v. Aldrich, there is nothing said in the opinion about the measure of damages. The syllabus is misleading in this regard.
*228In Hatcher v. Pelham, the case was reversed. because the court Instructed the Jury that the measure of damages was the price at which the plaintiff instructed defendant to sell the cotton, without reference to its market value.
In Blum v. Merchant, the contention of appellant was that appellee should not be allowed the market value of the goods at the place where they were converted, which was all that plaintiff sued for, but only cost and carriage.
In Norwood v. Bank, the price of the lumber at the time of the trial was shown to be the same as when it was seized.
In Natl. Bank v. State Bank, the plaintiff asked only for the value at the time of the conversion.
In vVarehouse Go. v. Rice Co., no issue as to fluctuating value was presented. The error assigned was that the court submitted the reasonable value instead of the market value.
In Bank v. Butler, suit was for the price of the scrip at the time of the conversion. The error was that the court made the highest price at which the scrip could have been sold “at the time of conversion” the measure of damages, instead of its market value at that time.
In Ry. Co. v. Campbell, the suit was for the market value at the time of the conversion. Plaintiff contended that the retail value was the market value.
In Ry. Co. v. Fruit Co., it was held that proof of the market value on ■ August 22d would not support a judgment for conversion on August 24th; the fruit being of a perishable nature.
Bank v. Boyce deals only with the power of a factor to pledge goods.
' Thus it will be seen that none of the cases above referred to support appellant’s contention that the measure of damages, under the facts of the instant case, was the market value of the linters at the time of their conversion; it being shown that they were of fluctuating value.
The remaining case cited by appellant is Dimock v. Bank. In this ease the court said that the measure of damages for conversion of securities of fluctuating value is not their market value at the time of the conversion. The opinion in this case quotes with approval from Galigher v. Jones, 129 TJ. S. 200, 9 Sup. Ct. 337, 32 B. Ed. 660, which states as follows:
“To allow merely their value at the time of conversion would, in most cases, afford a very inadequate remedy; and in the case of a broker, holding the stocks of his principal, it would afford no remedy at all.”
The reference to Elliott on Contracts is an erroneous citation. The third volume does not contain sections 729-731, and sections 729-731, in volume 1, do not treat of the measure of damages.
Jones on Collateral Securities, § 514, does say that “the value of the property at the date of the conversion is the criterion of damage”; but it further says that the date of the demand for the return of the securities is the. date of the conversion.
We quote from 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 875, as follows:
“Where there is uncertainty or fluctuation attending the value, and the chattel rises in value after its conversion, the pledgor can be indemnified only by giving to him the amount of its value at the time he calls upon the pledgee to restore it.”
We quote from 31 Cyc. 845, as follows:
“In cases where it is held that the pledgor must tender repayment of his debt before he is entitled to demand a return of the property, or maintain a suit for its conversion, it is held the measure of damage is the value of the property at the time such tender and demand is made, and not its value at the time of the conversion.”
Thus it will be seen that neither the eases nor the text-books cited by appellant support its contention; but, on the contrary, in so far as they are in point, they are against such contention.
If we adopt the measure of damages adopted by the New Jersey court in Dimock v. Bank, supra, and also by the New York courts '(see Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 507; Id., 66 N. Y. 518, 23 Am. Rep. 80; Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Wright ,v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18 N. El. 79, 1 L. R. A. 289, 6 Am. St. Rep. 356), and also by the Supreme Court of the United States as to commercial securities (see Galigher v. Jones, supra), which is the highest market value between the time of the conversion and a reasonable time to replace the security after notice of sale; or if we adopt the test laid down in Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, supra, or in Cyc. supra — in either event, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment herein.
Appellee tendered payment and demanded the return of the linters on March 13, 1916, which was the day on which it discovered that they had been sold. ■ N. K. Smith, appellee’s manager, testified that the price of linters from March 12th to April 26, 1916, was 7½ cents per pound, which is the price upon which the judgment herein was based. The witness Claiborne testified that the price on March 20, 1916, was 7½ cents.
Appellant says that in some cases it has been held that the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion; in others, the highest value between the time of the conversion and the time of trial; but that we have announced a new standard, viz. the highest price between the date of conversion and the filing of the suit. Appellee did not ask for the highest price to the time of the trial, and hence that was not an issue in this case. Where the property is *229of fluctuating value, and has been taken without any claim of right, and the suit is seasonably brought, we thing 'that the standard which is announced herein is a just measure of damages.
Believing that our decision herein has correctly disposed of this case, the appellant’s motion for a rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.