Court Opinion

ID: 9624734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:15:24.707539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:53.824913
License: Public Domain

LA PRADE, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result reached by the majority but dissent as to the overruling of Sligh v. Watson, supra. First, I believe that the Sligh case followed the majority rule in this country. See Annotation Real Estate Brokers’ Commissions, 156 A.L.R. 1398. Second, the policy enunciated by the general rule recognizes the fiduciary relationship existing between the real estate broker and his client and, I believe, correctly places a duty on the real estate broker of not attempting to sell property subject to defects of which he is cognizant at the time of the listing. The majority opinion *94In this case will, in my opinion, permit realtors to persuade persons of little business ■acumen to sign listing contracts stating unequivocally that they are the owners of the property to be sold, when in actuality the broker is aware of defects, such as existed in Sligh v. Watson, supra, and Best v. Kelley, 1945, 22 Wash.2d 257, 155 P.2d 794, 156 A.L.R. 1387, to name but two, which •may make any sale impossible. As the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated in Hurt v. Sands Co., 1930, 236 Ky. 729, 33 S.W.2d 653, 654:
“* * * No broker has any right to negotiate a contract at the expense of his employer when he knows of facts or circumstances which will prevent the deal from being consummated. * * *»
The majority opinion relies on the parol ■evidence rule, but here again I must respectfully dissent for I do not believe it applicable. As was said in Dunn v. Kramer, 1948, 306 Ky. 377, 208 S.W.2d 41, 43, in answer to the contention that the parol ■evidence rule applied:
“* * * There are two answers to this contention: (1) the relationship of principal and agent requires good faith dealing between the parties, and evidence of the lack of it upon the part of the agent is always admissible, * *
In closing, I should merely like to point •out that the general rule as enunciated in 8 Am.Jur., Brokers, Section Í85, p. 1098, quoted with approval in the majority opinion in Sligh v. Watson, supra, requires the admission of parol testimony as to conversations between the parties leading up to the execution of the listing contract. As a result all jurisdictions which follow said rule must, of necessity, consider the parol evidence rule to be inapplicable, presumably for the same reason as stated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Dunn v. Kramer, supra.