Court Opinion

ID: 9912213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 20:02:24.592185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:58.728853
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/21/23 Larsen v. Sacor Financial CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 BRUCE E. LARSEN,                                                     D082248, D082249

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2104157)

 SACOR FINANCIAL, INC.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from an order and a judgment of the
Superior Court of Riverside, Godofredo Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
         Law Office of Brian C. Unitt, Brian C. Unitt; Law Offices of
Brian C. Pearcy and Brian C. Pearcy for Appellant.
         Carlson & Messer, LLP, J. Grace Felipe, and Calvin W. Davis for
Respondent.
         National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (NCA) filed a debt collection action
against Bruce E. Larsen and obtained a default judgment against him. NCA
then assigned the judgment to Sacor Financial, Inc. (Sacor). When Sacor
attempted to enforce the default judgment several years later, Larsen
successfully moved to vacate the judgment.
      Larsen then sued Sacor, NCA, and their attorneys for malicious

prosecution and unfair debt collection practices. (See Civ. Code,1 § 1788
et seq.). Sacor and its attorney, Joseph Scalia, filed motions to strike
Larsen’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation
(SLAPP) under section 425.16. The court granted the anti-SLAPP motions

and awarded Sacor attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c).2
      Larsen argues on appeal that the trial court should have found he
adequately showed Sacor (1) lacked probable cause to seek enforcement of the

default judgment, and (2) maintained the proceedings with malice.3 Larsen
also argues that the court erred in overruling his objections to a Sacor
executive’s declaration in support of Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion.
      We conclude that Larsen has failed to demonstrate a probability of
success on the merits because Sacor’s attempts to enforce and preserve the
default judgment against Larsen cannot form the basis of a malicious
prosecution claim. We further conclude that even if Larsen could bring a
malicious prosecution claim based on Sacor’s actions, Larsen’s evidence is
insufficient to show Sacor acted with malice. We need not, and do not, decide
whether the court erred in overruling Larsen’s evidentiary objections.

1    Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2     Section 425.16, subdivision (c), provides in relevant part that with
limited exceptions, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall
be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.”
3     Larsen only appeals the granting of Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion, not
Scalia’s, and only as to the malicious prosecution claim. Larsen also
separately appeals the court’s award of attorney fees to Sacor, and both
appeals are consolidated here.
                                        2
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Sacor’s anti-SLAPP
motion and the order awarding Sacor attorney fees.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   A. Underlying Litigation
      In October 2008, NCA purchased rights from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(Wells Fargo) to an approximately $30,000 debt owed by “Erick B Larsen.”
NCA filed a collection action against Larsen, listing “Erick B Larsen” as an
alleged alias and obtained a default judgment in March 2009.
      NCA assigned the judgment to Sacor in May 2013, and shortly
thereafter, Sacor began seeking writs of execution to enforce the judgment.
In the years following 2013, Sacor also sought to initiate debtor examinations
and renew the judgment. Larsen did not appear in the proceeding until
September 2020 after an abstract of judgment issued. Larsen moved to
vacate and set aside the judgment, asserting that he was never served in the
underlying collection action and that he never had a line of credit with Wells
Fargo. Sacor opposed Larsen’s motion, arguing that proper service was
accomplished via substitute service to Larsen’s UPS mailbox, and that
Larsen’s assertions regarding the alleged debt lacked credibility.
      In October 2020, the trial court granted Larsen’s motion to vacate and
set aside the default judgment based on ineffective service of the underlying
complaint. The court found no evidence that the UPS store where Larsen
received mail had a written agreement with Larsen for acceptance of service
as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (c),
which incorporates by reference Business and Professions Code section

17538.5, subdivision (d).4 The court further found no evidence that UPS

4     Business and Professions Code section 17538.5, subdivision (d)(1),
provides in relevant part that anyone using a private mailbox service is
                                       3
mailed the collection action complaint to Larsen’s last known home or
personal address, as it was required to do. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subds.
(b), (c); Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17538.5, subd. (d)(1).) For those reasons, the
court concluded that service in the underlying collection action was not
perfected, and the default judgment was therefore void. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, subd. (d).)
      Through new counsel, Sacor moved to vacate the order setting aside
judgment in November 2020, which the court denied in December 2020.
Three weeks later, Sacor voluntarily requested and obtained dismissal of the
underlying collection action without prejudice.
   B. Current Complaint
      Larsen filed a complaint against Sacor, NCA, and their attorneys in
September 2021, alleging malicious prosecution and unfair debt collection
practices. Larsen alleged in his malicious prosecution claim that NCA and its
attorneys “commenced and prosecuted” the collection action “without
probable cause,” and that Sacor and Scalia “continued the prosecution of the
action against [Larsen] without probable cause” by attempting to enforce the
default judgment. Specifically, Larsen alleged that Sacor and Scalia had no
probable cause to pursue enforcement because they did not investigate
whether Larsen was the actual debtor.

“required to sign an agreement” authorizing the mailbox service owner or
operator “to act as agent for service of process for the mail receiving service
customer.” That subdivision further provides that before service can be
deemed perfected, upon receiving process for any mailbox service customer,
the operator “shall (A) within 48 hours after receipt of any process, place a
copy of the documents or a notice that the documents were received into the
customer's mailbox or other place where the customer usually receives his or
her mail . . . and (B) within five days after receipt, send all documents by
first-class mail, to the last known home or personal address of the mail
receiving service customer.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17538.5, subd. (d)(1).)
                                        4
      Sacor and Scalia filed anti-SLAPP motions, arguing that Larsen’s
complaint arises from protected activity, and that he could not establish a
probability of prevailing in his malicious prosecution claim because: (1) the
alleged conduct could not give rise to a claim for malicious prosecution;
(2) their actions in enforcing the judgment were supported by probable cause;
(3) they did not act with malice; and (4) there was no termination in Larsen’s
favor on the merits.
      Larsen opposed their anti-SLAPP motions, conceding that the
complaint arose from protected activity, but contending that he had a
probability of succeeding on the merits of his malicious prosecution claim
because: (1) Sacor and Scalia can be liable for continuing to prosecute the
underlying collection action, (2) a voluntary dismissal generally constitutes a
favorable termination or at least raises a question of fact, (3) Sacor and Scalia
lacked probable cause to pursue a debt collection action against Larsen; and
(4) they acted with malice.
      After overruling Larsen’s objections to declarations provided by Scalia
and Sacor’s Vice President, the court granted the anti-SLAPP motions. In
ruling on Sacor’s motion, the court explained that even without the contested
supporting declarations, Larsen still failed to demonstrate a probability of
success on the merits of his malicious prosecution claim. The court first
found that Larsen adequately showed the underlying action terminated in his
favor. The court further found, however, that his evidence was insufficient to
prove a probability of success on the probable cause element because “Sacor
was not involved in prosecuting the underlying action” and was only involved
in enforcing the judgment, which it had no reason to believe was “not legally
tenable.” The court also found no evidence of malice, noting that Larsen’s
counsel first contacted Sacor 11 years after the judgment was entered, and

                                       5
then shortly after the court vacated the judgment and Larsen sent discovery
requests, Sacor voluntarily dismissed the underlying action.
      On these grounds, the court ruled that Larsen did not meet his burden
of showing a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his malicious
prosecution claim and granted Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court also
awarded Sacor attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c). Larsen
timely appealed the orders granting Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion and
awarding attorney fees.
                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I
      A. Statutory Framework
      The anti-SLAPP statute provides in relevant part that “[a] cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of
the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike [anti-SLAPP motion],
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process: first the
court must decide whether the defendant has shown the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and if so, the court
then must decide whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing
on the claim. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th
53, 67; Sugarman v. Brown (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 152, 159.) Only a claim
that both arises from protected activity and lacks merit is a SLAPP subject to
being stricken. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (Navellier);
Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 282 (Weeden).)

                                         6
      We review a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and engage in the
same two-step process as the trial court. (Park v. Board of Trustees of
Cal. State Univ. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067; Weeden, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 282.)
      B. Probability of Prevailing on Malicious Prosecution Claim
      It is undisputed that Larsen’s malicious prosecution claim meets the
first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because it arises from Sacor’s
protected speech or petitioning activity. (See Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 90, citing § 425.16, subd. (e)(1) [a claim for relief filed in court is
“indisputably . . . a ‘statement or writing made before a . . . judicial
proceeding[.]’ ”].) Accordingly, we conclude that the first prong of the anti-
SLAPP statute is met and focus on the second prong concerning Larsen’s
probability of prevailing.
      1.     Enforcing Judgment as a Basis for Malicious Prosecution
      Larsen argues that even though Sacor was not involved in initiating or
maintaining the underlying collection action prior to judgment, Sacor can
still be liable for malicious prosecution because it “took on the role of
collection plaintiff.” We disagree. Larson has failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability of success because Sacor’s actions here cannot form
the basis of a malicious prosecution action. (See Kim v. R Consulting &
Sales, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 263, 267 [reaching the same conclusion
regarding a malicious prosecution claim arising from a motion for an order to
show cause].) Sacor neither initiated nor prosecuted the underlying action
against Larsen to judgment; it merely attempted to enforce and preserve the
default judgment after it was assigned to Sacor.
      Merlet v. Rizzo (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 53 (Merlet) is instructive. Merlet
“involved application of the familiar rule that subsidiary procedural actions

                                          7
cannot be the basis for malicious prosecution claims.” (Zamos v. Stroud
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 969, fn. 8.) In Merlet, a judgment debtor’s husband
sued the judgment creditor for malicious prosecution after the trial court
denied the creditor’s application for a writ of sale and also denied the
creditor’s motion for reconsideration. (Merlet, at pp. 57–58.) The trial court
in Merlet sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim
without leave to amend, ruling that the creditor’s application for a writ of
sale could not support the claim. (Id. at p. 58.) The Court of Appeal affirmed,
reasoning that obtaining a writ of sale “occurs after liability and damages
have been determined, and it does not result in a separate and distinct
proceeding.” (Id. at p. 61.)
      The same reasoning applies here. As in Merlet, by requesting writs of
execution, debtor examinations, and other procedural mechanisms to enforce
a preexisting judgment, Sacor simply invoked remedial measures “which
could not exist absent the judgment.” (Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at
p. 61.) “ ‘A writ is an order in writing issued by a competent official in a
judicial proceeding and, as applied to execution in civil cases, is part of the
remedy to effectuate the action by the enforcement of the judgment.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 61–62.) Specifically, only after entry of judgment and
on application of a judgment creditor can the court clerk issue a writ of
execution directed to the levying officer and to any registered process server.
(§ 699.510, subd. (a); see Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065
(Rusheen).)
      Similarly, a debtor’s examination is incidental to the main lawsuit and
was originally established “as a substitute for the former creditor’s suit . . .
[which] was a cumbersome independent action . . . .” (8 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Enforcement of Judgment, § 277, pp. 302–303; see

                                         8
Code Civ. Proc., § 708.110 [providing that a judgment creditor may apply “for
an order requiring the judgment debtor to appear . . . to furnish information
to aid in enforcement of the money judgment[]”].) Thus, like a writ of sale or
execution, the application for an examination order “occurs after liability has
been determined and a judgment ordered,” and is “not a separate
proceeding[]” that can form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim.
(Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)
      Nor can Sacor’s opposition to Larsen’s motion to vacate judgment
expose Sacor to liability for malicious prosecution because this was a purely
defensive action to preserve a facially valid judgment. (See Merlet, supra, 64
Cal.App.4th at p. 59 [“Courts have concluded that subsidiary procedural
actions or purely defensive actions cannot be the basis for malicious
prosecution claims.”].) Sacor cannot be liable for opposing Larsen’s motion to
vacate because courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious
defense’[.] ” (Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 794, fn. 9,
quoting Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 (Bertero).)
And unlike in Bertero, Sacor did not go “beyond purely defensive measures
and file[] a cross-complaint,” thereby “ ‘seeking affirmative relief’ ” and taking
“ ‘the offensive in attempting to prosecute a cause of action of [its] own.’ ”
(Idell v. Goodman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 262, 272, citing Bertero, at p. 53.)
      Sacor also cannot be subject to a malicious prosecution suit for filing its
motion to set aside the order vacating the judgment. Much like the motion
for reconsideration in Merlet, there is no indication that Larsen’s hardship in
opposing Sacor’s motion “approach[ed] that suffered by litigants in a will
contest or a full-blown lawsuit.” (Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 63;
cf. Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 692 [a will contest can form the
basis of a malicious prosecution claim, even though it is dependent on the

                                         9
filing of the petition to probate the will, because a will contest is a separate
and distinct proceeding and “can dramatically transform the probate of a will
from a routine ex parte procedure . . . into sharply adversarial and hotly
contested litigation[]”].) Sacor’s motion to set aside the order, like a motion
for reconsideration, also had “no meaning apart from the original motion” to
vacate judgment, and therefore had “no separate existence and [was] not an
independent proceeding” subject to a malicious prosecution claim. (Merlet, at
p. 64.)
      Public policy reasons also support limiting Sacor’s exposure to
malicious prosecution for its actions in this case, especially given that Sacor’s
involvement began only after the trial court already entered judgment
against Larsen. In the judgment enforcement context, “modern public policy
seeks to encourage free access to the courts and finality of judgments by
limiting derivative tort claims arising out of litigation-related misconduct and
by favoring sanctions within the original lawsuit. [Citation.]” (Rusheen,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) As the Supreme Court noted when extending
the litigation privilege to abuse of process claims, “the process itself of
enforcing money judgments is subject to judicial supervision[]” and there are
“alternative remedies for improper service and [] procedural protections
against improper enforcement[,]” such as “successfully moving to set aside
the default judgment[]” as Larsen did here. (Id. at pp. 1064–1065.) Allowing
Sacor’s actions to form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim “would
permit a party to transform the statutory and summary procedure to enforce
a judgment into a full-blown lawsuit. The efficient administration of justice
in this situation is to permit the court to supervise the collection procedure; if
the procedure is abused, the appropriate remedy is to request sanctions.”
(Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61–62.)

                                        10
      Finally, we reject the fundamental premise of Larson’s malicious
prosecution claim—that Sacor was attempting to enforce an invalid debt that
Larsen did not owe. As a matter of law, the alleged Wells Fargo debt was
extinguished and superseded by the default judgment entered against Larsen
before Sacor even entered the picture. A money judgment based on a debt
supersedes the original debt and creates a new liability based on the
judgment. (Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior
Funding Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 290, 301–302.) Sacor’s efforts to
preserve and enforce a facially valid judgment against Larsen as an assignee
were not an attempt to enforce the original Wells Fargo debt; they were an
attempt to enforce the judgment. And Larsen does not dispute that the
default judgment was against him.
      Accordingly, because Sacor’s actions in seeking to enforce and preserve
the default judgment were not a valid basis for a malicious prosecution claim,
we conclude Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted.
      2.     Probability of Proving Malice
      Even if Sacor’s attempts to enforce the judgment could serve as a basis
for a malicious prosecution claim, we conclude that Larsen would still fall
short of satisfying the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute because his
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate a probability of prevailing against
Sacor on such a claim. (See Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San
Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.) To prevail in a
malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show the underlying action
was: “(i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and
pursued to a legal termination in favor of the . . . plaintiff; (ii) initiated or
maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with
malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775–776.)

                                         11
      We focus our analysis on malice because if Larsen’s evidence is
insufficient to show a probability of proving that element, his malicious
prosecution claim cannot succeed. In Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 260 (Soukup), the Supreme Court stated that the malice
element of a malicious prosecution cause of action “ ‘relates to the subjective
intent or purpose with which the defendant acted in initiating the prior
action. [Citation.] The motive of the defendant must have been something
other than . . . the satisfaction in a civil action of some personal or financial
purpose. [Citation.] The plaintiff must plead and prove actual ill will or
some improper ulterior motive.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 292.) Applying this
standard, our task is to determine whether Larsen has presented sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie showing of malice by a preponderance of
the evidence. (See Padres L.P. v. Henderson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 495, 522
(Padres) [at step two in anti-SLAPP analysis for malicious prosecution claim,
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that would permit a finding of
malice based on preponderance of evidence standard].)
      While lack of probable cause is one factor in determining the presence
of malice, it is insufficient to prove malice by itself. (See Jay v. Mahaffey
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1543.) “ ‘In other words, the presence of malice
must be established by other, additional evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Such
other evidence is not limited to actual hostility or ill will, but also includes
proceedings instituted primarily for an improper purpose, including when:
“ ‘(1) the person initiating them does not believe that his claim may be held
valid; (2) the proceedings are begun primarily because of hostility or ill will;
(3) the proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of depriving the person
against whom they are initiated of a beneficial use of his property; (4) the
proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has no

                                        12
relation to the merits of the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., internal quotation
marks omitted.)
      Larsen argues that Sacor acted with malice because it pursued
enforcement of the default judgment without investigating the “factual
tenability” of the underlying action and “stonewall[ed] any attempt to obtain
documentation.” But as the trial court noted, there is no evidence that Sacor
had any role in initiating the underlying action or obtaining the default
judgment. Sacor was merely an assignee of the judgment after the fact. As
an assignee of the judgment, Sacor had no obligation to investigate the merits
of the underlying claims against Larsen before attempting to enforce the
default judgment entered against him. A default judgment is not invalid just
because the underlying claims may have been lacking in merit. And there is
neither circumstantial nor direct evidence that Sacor acted with an improper
purpose in seeking to preserve the default judgment, or knowingly sought to

enforce a judgment it knew was invalid.5 (See Padres, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)
      Sacor’s conduct after the judgment was set aside further undercuts any
inference of malice. Less than two months after receiving discovery requests,

5      Although we need not decide whether Sacor or NCA had probable cause
to maintain or seek enforcement of the underlying action, we note Larsen
does not dispute that the credit report Sacor relied on lists two different
social security numbers, along with the names “Bruce E Larsen” and “Erick B
Larsen” as aliases. The credit report includes an address that matches
NCA’s documentation of the credit account at issue, and Larsen confirmed in
his declaration that he previously maintained a private post office box at that
address. The report also shows that someone with Larsen’s name was
associated with a business called “United Diamonds,” and Larsen stated in
his declaration that he used to work as a jewelry designer. That Sacor relied
on this report, which has some indicia of factual accuracy, undercuts Larsen’s
malice argument.
                                       13
and just three weeks after the denial of its motion to vacate the order setting
aside the judgment, Sacor voluntarily dismissed the underlying action.
Given the relatively short time period that elapsed between when Larsen
issued discovery requests and when Sacor requested dismissal, there is no
evidence that Sacor was “stonewalling” the discovery process to the extent
that would evidence malice. (Cf. Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 757,
815 [finding evidence of malice where a party withheld a key document “for
more than four years based on shifting positions, none of which had any
substance, and by treating document discovery as if it were a shell game”].)
The reality is that Sacor did nothing to prosecute the underlying action
against Larsen after its unsuccessful efforts to preserve the default judgment.
      Ultimately, it is Larsen’s burden to show a probability of success on
his malicious prosecution claim, and unlike in other cases where courts have
found a sufficient showing of malice, Larsen has produced no evidence that
Sacor had an improper purpose in seeking to preserve and enforce the default
judgment. (See, e.g., Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 296 [evidence of malice
included physical threats and intimidation]; Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 204, 225 [concluding the record “clearly supports an inference
that” defendant brought underlying case with malice because “his personal
relationship with and alleged threats to” plaintiff suggested his subjective
intent “may have been to exact revenge”]; HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title
Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 218 [malice “can exist, for example, where
the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which
has no relation to the merits of the claim”]; Padres, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at
p. 522 [plaintiff proved malice where defendant repeatedly filed actions in
order to interfere with a business project].)

                                       14
      Because Larsen has not met his burden of showing a probability of
proving that Sacor acted with malice, we need not reach the merits on the
remaining elements, nor do we need to decide whether the court erred in
overruling Larsen’s objections to declarations which are irrelevant here and
did not form the basis of the trial court’s ruling. We therefore conclude that
the trial court correctly granted Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion and did not err in
awarding attorney fees to Sacor as the prevailing party.
                                DISPOSITION
      The orders granting Sacor’s anti-SLAPP motion and awarding Sacor
attorney fees are affirmed. Sacor shall recover its costs on appeal.

                                                               BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

                                      15