Court Opinion

ID: 9499109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:38:07.772523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:09.077153
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately because I believe that the facts and posture of this case deserve careful distinction from those circumstances in which an arrestee or a third-party homeowner may assert valid Fourth Amendments interests against warrantless searches. In addition, I believe that the “reason to believe” standard under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), is the functional equivalent of “probable cause” and not some lesser standard.
I.
DISCUSSION
A. An Arrest Warrant Protects the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Subject of the Arrest Warrant, But a Premises Search Warrant Is Required to Protect the Fourth Amendment Interests of a Third-Party Homeowner
Defendant argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the Lorain Apprehension Search and Seizure Operation (“LASSO”) team arrested Defendant in his girlfriend’s home without a valid search warrant for the residence. In particular, Defendant argues that a combined reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), and Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) indicates that a suspect’s Fourth Amendment interests require the police to possess, at minimum, a valid search warrant to search a third-party’s residence in order to effectuate an arrest on those premises. Without such a search warrant, Defendant argues, Defendant has suffered a Fourth Amendment injury despite the existence of a valid warrant for Defendant’s arrest.
1. Under Payton, an Arrest Warrant Protects the Fourth Amendment Interests of the Subject of the Arrest Warrant
The Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment interests are personal. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). Defendant, therefore, can assert only his own Fourth Amendment rights, and not the Fourth Amendment rights of Louisa Serrano, the third-party homeowner in the instant case whose home the police entered without a valid search warrant in order to effectuate the arrest of Defendant. A review of the case law cited by Defendant with a particular emphasis on whose Fourth Amendment interests are implicated in each case is therefore warranted.
In Payton, the Supreme Court held that absent consent or exigent circumstances, police could not effect an arrest within a suspect’s home without a valid warrant. 445 U.S. at 602, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The Su*486preme Court rejected the contention, however, that only a premises search warrant sufficiently protected a suspect’s Fourth Amendment interests. Id. Instead, the Payton Court noted that a valid arrest warrant for the suspect, based on probable cause, would permit the police to enter a suspect’s home to effectuate an arrest. Id. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”). The Payton Court did not address the question (presumably because it was not before the Court) of whether entry with merely an arrest warrant would impinge on the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the arrest warrant.

2. A Premises Search Warrant Is Required to Protect the Fourth Amendment Interests of Persons Not Named in an Arrest Warrant

Just one year after Payton, the Supreme Court answered the question that it had left open in Payton concerning the rights of persons not named in an arrest warrant. The Steagald Court was presented with a Fourth Amendment claim by a third-party homeowner. In Steagald, the police possessed an arrest warrant for a suspect and had information that the suspect could be found at the home of the third party. 451 U.S. at 206-07, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The police entered the third party’s home unthout a premises search warrant (but with the arrest warrant) and failed to encounter their suspect, but saw, in plain view, incriminating evidence which they proceeded to use against the homeowner. Id. at 206, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court characterized the issue before it as a “narrow one .... [Wjhether an arrest warrant — as opposed to a search warrant — is adequate to protect the interests of persons not named in the [arrest] warrant, when their homes are searched without consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Id. at 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court concluded that only a valid premises search warrant could protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the arrest warrant. Id. at 217, 101 S.Ct. 1642. Therefore, a homeowner may experience a Fourth Amendment injury when the police enter his or her home without a valid premises search warrant (and in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances) in order to effectuate an arrest of a homeowner’s guest, even when the police possess a valid arrest warrant for the arrestee. Id.
A panel of this Court construed the combined holdings of Payton and Steagald in United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1983). The Buckner panel was presented with the precise question before the Court in the instant case: the police had a valid arrest warrant for a suspect, but no search warrant for the third party premises on which the suspect was actually found. Id. at 298-99. The suspect moved to suppress the evidence revealed during the officers’ protective sweep of the third-party premises following his arrest on the premises. Id. The Buckner panel concluded that the defendant in that case lacked standing to challenge the search because he did not reside in the home. The Buckner panel also found, however, that even were the defendant to possess Fourth Amendment standing, the rule of Payton would apply. Because the officers possessed a valid arrest warrant, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests were fully protected, because “[i]t would be illogical to afford the defendant any greater protection in the home of a third party than he was entitled to in his own home.” Id. at 300. The panel distinguished Steagald from the case before it because in Steagald the third-party homeowner challenged the search, whereas in *487Buckner only the arrestee (the subject of the valid arrest warrant) challenged the search. Id. Steagald, the panel concluded, protected the Fourth Amendment interests of those persons not named in any arrest warrant, whereas Payton protected the interests of the subject of an arrest warrant. Id. Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal, the arrestee did not have standing to assert the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment injury. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 88,119 S.Ct. 469.
3. Defendant Erroneously Argues That the Payton Arrest Warrant Requirement Has Been Superseded
Defendant argues to this Court that the Buckner analysis is merely dicta, and even if more than dicta, has been superseded by intervening Supreme Court precedent. Defendant argues that the 1990 Olson decision, in which the Supreme Court recognized that overnight guests may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the homes in which they stay, 459 U.S. at 100, 103 S.Ct. 416, somehow changed the Pay-ton and Steagald analyses as applied to cases such as Defendant’s case. This argument lacks merit. The Olson decision recognized the Fourth Amendment interests of overnight guests. Id. Yet the Olson decision did not purport to overrule Payton or Steagald; the Supreme Court continues to rely on both cases. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 636, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) (citing Payton for its rule requiring an arrest warrant for an arrest within the suspect’s home); Carter, 525 U.S. at 100, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998 decision) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Steagald rule as a rule protecting the interests of homeowners not otherwise subject to an arrest warrant).
Olson is entirely compatible with Payton and Steagald. Before Olson, someone else’s house was treated like public space insofar as a nonhomeowner’s Fourth Amendment interests were concerned. After Olson, however, the courts recognized that some guests have Fourth Amendment interests while staying in the home of another akin to the homeowner himself. After Olson, the overnight guest has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the validity of a premises search warrant, something a guest simply could not do before the Olson ruling. It does not follow, however, that the Olson decision grants greater Fourth Amendment protections to overnight guests than those granted to homeowners’ themselves. Under Payton, a valid arrest warrant is sufficient to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the person named in the arrest warrant, even if that arrest takes place in his or her home. It would be incongruous to say that the overnight guest has greater Fourth Amendment protections in the home of another than he or she would have in his or her own home. See Buckner, 717 F.2d at 300.
A Because Fourth Amendment Interests Are Personal, Defendant Lacks Standing to Assert the Homeowner’s Fourth Amendment Injury
There is an important distinction between the still controlling Supreme Court decision in Steagald and the instant case. We are dealing here with the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment interests as implicated by an arrest in a place where he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy; the Supreme Court has held that these interests are sufficiently protected through the procurement of a valid arrest warrant, so long as the attendant premises search is limited to a protective sweep. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“It is true that the area that may legally be searched is broader when executing a search warrant than when executing an arrest warrant within the home.”). The arrest warrant, however, sufficiently addresses only *488the Fourth Amendment rights of persons named in the warrant. For persons not named in the arrest warrant and who possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home entered, the Supreme Court’s decision in Steagald still controls, and the Constitution requires that the police possess a valid premises search warrant in order to enter the home without violating these persons’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217, 101 S.Ct. 1642; see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 100, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998 decision) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[Ajbsent exigent circumstances or consent, the police cannot search for the subject of an arrest warrant, in the home of a third party, without first obtaining a search warrant directing entry.”).
Were the police to áttempt to use any evidence discovered in the home against the homeowner, after entering the home without a search warrant to arrest a guest, the homeowner may have, under appropriate circumstances, a legitimate Fourth Amendment suppression argument. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217, 101 S.Ct. 1642. Alternatively, even without an attempted criminal prosecution against the homeowner, a homeowner subject to a police search without a premises search warrant for the subject of an arrest warrant may have a potential Fourth Amendment injury which may be vindicated through a § 1983 civil rights suit. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (upholding a § 1983 action against officers executing a search of a home without a valid search warrant).1 The Supreme. Court has held, however, that Fourth Amendment interests are personal, see Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S.Ct. 469; therefore, Defendant in this case may not assert the Fourth Amendment rights of Louisa Serrano, the renter of record at 2652 Meister Road, to this Court. Of course, to avoid any Fourth Amendment injury or suppression arguments, from any person involved, the police could procure and appropriately execute a valid premises search warrant. This is the standard procedure used by many police forces today, as evidenced by Lorain County’s attempt (ultimately unsuccessful) to procure a valid search warrant before entering the residence in the instant case.
This Circuit has employed the above analysis in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Watson, 983 F.2d 1070, 1993 WL 11873, at *2-3 (6th Cir.1993) (unpublished opinion). The Watson panel held that the Payton rule applied in a case in which the defendant argued that his arrest in his friend’s home, where the defendant had been staying, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in the absence of a valid search warrant. Id. The Watson panel disagreed with the defendant and found that the arrest warrant was sufficient to meet the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests. Id. Other circuit courts of appeals agree that only an arrest warrant, and not a search warrant, is required to protect the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment interests. See United States v. Agnew, 385 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir.2004); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663-64 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc).
Accordingly, a valid arrest warrant is sufficient to safeguard the Fourth Amendment interests of persons named in the arrest warrant. Of course, should officers wish to insure that everyone’s Fourth Amendment interests are protected, not *489just the interests of the potential arrestee, officers may seek and procure a premises search warrant or obtain the consent of the homeowner.2 In the instant case, however, Defendant was the named suspect in the arrest warrant, and he may not assert the Fourth Amendment interests of Louisa Serrano.
B. The Officers’ Reasonable Belief That Defendant Could Be Found at 2652 Meister Road Constituted Probable Cause
Defendant argues in the alternative that even under the Payton rule, the officers’ entry into the Meister Road residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant was present in the home. The government avers that reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, is the applicable standard, but argues that in this case that the higher standard has been met. Supreme Court case law indicates that “reason to believe” is equivalent to probable cause in the circumstances before this Court, see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003); furthermore, the evidence before the district court established that the officers had probable cause to believe Defendant was present at the residence when they entered 2652 Meister Road.

1. Reasonable Belief Echoes the Definition of Probable Cause

The Payton Court held that “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” 445 U.S. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The above analysis demonstrates that the Payton rule is sufficient to protect the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights even when the arrest warrant is executed in a third party’s home in which the suspect may have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the question devolves into whether the police, armed with an arrest warrant for Defendant, had “reason to believe” that Defendant was present at the 2652 Meister Road residence when they entered.
The parties differ over the quantum of proof required under the “reason to believe” standard articulated in the Payton decision. Defendant argues that “reason to believe” should entail the same protections and level of, knowledge inherent in probable cause. The Ninth Circuit has applied such a rule. See United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.2002). In contrast, the government argues that “reason to believe” is something less than probable cause and more akin to “reasonable suspicion.” The majority adopts this view, and seven circuit courts of appeal have refused to apply the “probable cause” moniker to the “reason to believe” ■ standard and instead have applied the “reason to believe” standard in a literal fashion. See United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C.Cir.2005); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Edmonds, *49052 F.3d 1236, 1248-49 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.1995). These courts have either simply asked whether there existed a reasonable basis for an officer’s belief that the suspect was in the residence, see, e.g., Edmonds, 52 F.3d at 1248, or held explicitly that “reason to believe” is something less than probable cause, see, e.g., Thomas, 429 F.3d at 286. The D.C. Circuit opined that “it [is] more likely ... that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other than ‘probable cause’ because it meant something other than ‘probable cause.’ ” Id.
Despite some courts’ attempt to distinguish between the two monikers, the “reason to believe” standard directly echoes the underlying definition of probable cause. The Supreme Court has recently expanded on the meaning of probable cause in the context of warrantless arrests in public places:
On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical conception” that deals with “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ... (1983) [internal quotation omitted] ---- “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — -turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances .... We have stated, however, that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” ... and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 ... (1979).
Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-371,124 S.Ct. 795.
The Supreme Court has therefore likened probable cause to a “reasonable ground for belief.” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 338. Because this is the grammatical analogue to “reason to believe,” the Court’s inquiry under the “probable cause” and “reason to believe” standards is the same: ultimately, this Court must ask whether the officers’ belief that Defendant was inside 2652 Meister Road was an objectively reasonable belief given the circumstances known to the officers at the time. See United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir.1985) (“The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”); Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir.1998) (“A determination of probable cause simply requires consideration of whether there were reasonable grounds to believe at the time of the affidavit that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched.”).
2. The Officers Possessed an Objectively Reasonable Belief That Defendant Was Present at 2652 Meister Road
When the LASSO task force entered the Meister Road residence, it possessed at least two, independent factual bases for believing that Defendant was present in the home. The initial telephone call to Defendant’s probation officer indicated that Defendant had been at the residence within the past two hours. Although Defendant argues that this was an anonymous tip upon which the officers unreasonably relied, there was sub*491stantial corroborating evidence to back up the tip. First, the call came to Fitzgerald, Defendant’s parole officer, indicating some level of knowledge about Defendant on the part of the caller. Second, the call relayed information consistent with the officers’ knowledge of Defendant, i.e., his involvement with drugs. The information conveyed by the caller was further corroborated by the LASSO surveillance team in the statement and identification obtained from Garcia. Garcia identified Defendant as being present in the home. Although Defendant argues that Garcia was merely telling the officers what they wanted to hear, and that the showing of a single picture to Garcia was impermissibly suggestive, the fact that Garcia identified Defendant by his known alias of “Meaty,” without prompting by the officers, belies Defendant’s objections. The officers thus had two bases for believing Defendant was inside 2652 Meister Road: the telephone call and Garcia’s identification. The officers therefore had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Defendant was present at 2652 Meister Road when the officers entered.
II.
CONCLUSION
I agree with the majority that Defendant in the instant case cannot assert the Fourth Amendment interests of the third-party homeowner. However, I differ with the majority in that the “reason to believe” standard of Payton v. New York is the functional equivalent of probable cause. Because the officers in the instant case had probable cause to believe Defendant was inside 2652 Meister Road when they entered, I would affirm the district court.

. A suit may be brought whether or not a homeowner suffers economic injury. The Supreme Court has recognized the availability of nominal damages for the deprivation of absolute rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

. The officers in the instant case attempted to procure a search warrant before entering the residence, but the warrant's facial invalidity for lack of particularity precluded the officers’ reliance on that warrant. Insofar as the record before this Court shows, police did not attempt to prosecute the homeowner for anything found on the premises. This is not to say, however, that Serrano's Fourth Amendment rights were not compromised when the officers entered her home without a valid search warrant when she was not the subject of any arrest warrant.