Court Opinion

ID: 9383668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:07:00.754088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.351406
License: Public Domain

03/30/2023

                                          DA 22-0146
                                                                                       Case Number: DA 22-0146

                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                         2023 MT 57N

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

TYLER FREDERICK ERICKSON,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DC-21-143
                       Honorable James A. Manley, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                       Michael Klinkhammer, Klinkhammer Law Offices, Kalispell, Montana

               For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
                       Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       James Lapotka, Lake County Attorney, Ben Anciaux, Deputy County
                       Attorney, Polson, Montana

                                                  Submitted on Briefs: February 8, 2023

                                                             Decided: March 30, 2023

Filed:

                                        if-6tA.-if
                       __________________________________________
                                        Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Tyler Erickson appeals his convictions for felony possession of dangerous drugs in

the Lake County District Court. We affirm.

¶3     In May 2021, a probation officer and law enforcement officers from Lake County

Sheriff’s Office and Polson Police Department conducted a probation search of Erickson’s

residence. The officers acted on a tip from a confidential informant who reported that

Erickson threatened to bring a weapon to his upcoming probation appointment and was

using heroin. During the search, the probation officer located two small plastic bags on

Erickson’s nightstand; subsequent testing at the Montana State Crime Lab confirmed that

the bags contained methamphetamine and heroin. Lake County prosecutors subsequently

charged Erickson with two counts of felony possession, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA.

The District Court denied Erickson’s motion to compel disclosure of the informant’s

identity and his final motion to continue the trial. The case went to trial in December 2021;

a Lake County jury found Erickson guilty of both charges. The District Court sentenced

Erickson to the Montana State Prison for eight years for each count, to be served

consecutively.

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¶4     We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s discovery rulings and rulings on

motions to continue. State v. Soto, 2020 MT 265, ¶ 8, 401 Mont. 545, 474 P.3d 815; State

v. Duncan, 2008 MT 148, ¶ 37, 343 Mont. 220, 183 P.3d 111.

Motion to Compel Disclosure of Confidential Informant’s Identity

¶5     Before trial, Erickson filed a motion to compel disclosure of the confidential

informant’s identity.1 He cited Montana Rule of Evidence 502(c)(2), which excepts an

informant’s identity from privilege if the informant may be able to testify to a relevant

issue in the case. Erickson argued that he needed the informant’s identity “to have a fair

trial, because without the testimony from the informant, there would not have been

probable cause to conduct a search of [his] residence with the level of force that was used.”

The District Court denied the motion, stating that the informant was not a State witness,

Erickson had not alleged reasons to doubt the informant’s credibility, and Erickson had not

alleged any specific information the informant could provide that would be relevant to his

defense or likely lead to exculpatory information. Erickson argues that this denial was an

abuse of the court’s discretion because Erickson needed the informant’s identity to

determine if probable cause for the search existed and because “the State’s entire case

rested on the credibility of the reasonable cause provided by its confidential informant.”

¶6     M. R. Evid. 502 allows the State to refuse to disclose “the identity of a person who

has furnished information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation

1
 The document Erickson filed is captioned as a subpoena. His appellate counsel acknowledges in
the opening brief that Erickson “essentially filed a motion for the identity of the confidential
informant.”
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of a law.” This privilege is waived if an informant appears as a State witness or if an

informant may be able to testify to a relevant issue in the case. M. R. Evid. 502(c)(1)-(2).

Further, § 46-15-324, MCA, does not require disclosure of a non-testifying informant’s

identity if: (a) disclosure would result in substantial risk to the informant or to the

informant’s operational effectiveness; and (b) the failure to disclose will not infringe the

constitutional rights of the accused. When determining if disclosure is appropriate under

M. R. Evid. 502 and § 46-15-324, MCA, courts look to evidence a defendant has provided

supporting the possible relevancy of the informant’s testimony to the defense.             A

defendant’s mere conjecture about relevancy is insufficient to warrant disclosure. Soto,

¶¶ 14-15.

¶7     Here, Erickson did not establish beyond conjecture that the informant’s testimony

would have been relevant to his defense. Erickson alleged that the ability to cross-examine

the informant may have demonstrated a lack of probable cause for the probation search.

He did not, however, file a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search.

Moreover, Erickson has not provided any evidence that such a motion would have had

merit. At trial, Erickson’s defense was that the State did not prove that he possessed the

drugs—there is no indication that the ability to cross-examine the informant would have

assisted his defense theory. Erickson claimed in a later motion to remove counsel that he

wanted to pursue a defense theory that the informant held a grudge against him and planted

drugs. But he filed this motion more than two months after the District Court denied his

motion to compel disclosure of the informant’s identity. The State did not call the

informant at trial or otherwise rely on the informant’s tip as evidence; rather, it relied on

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the discovery of the bags in Erickson’s residence and the subsequent testing of the

substances.        Given the discretionary nature of deciding discovery requests and no

indication that the informant’s identity would have been relevant to Erickson’s defense, we

conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel

disclosure.

¶8     Erickson briefly raises a second discovery-related issue on appeal, arguing that the

District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss based on untimely

disclosure of a second police report and additional body-camera and dash-camera footage.

Erickson timely received the probation officer’s report and Officer Kyle Cooper’s

body-camera footage showing the search of the bedroom where the drugs were discovered.

One month before trial, Erickson also received Deputy Clay Shoemaker’s report,

describing his search of Erickson’s kitchen and living room. Shoemaker was listed as a

State witness but did not testify at trial and did not participate in the search of Erickson’s

bedroom. Nevertheless, the State was required to provide Erickson a copy of Shoemaker’s

report because Shoemaker was on the State’s witness list. See § 46-15-322(1)(a), MCA.

Two weeks before trial, Erickson also received Deputy Michael Wharton’s body-camera

footage and Deputy Shoemaker’s dash-camera footage. Erickson has not demonstrated

that any of these later-disclosed discovery materials were either required to be turned over

to   him      as    tangible   items   presented       at   trial   or   as   exculpatory   material.

See § 46-15-322(1)(d)-(e), MCA.          Moreover, Erickson has not demonstrated that the

alleged delay prejudiced him because the later-disclosed materials did not contain evidence

relating to the discovery of drugs in Erickson’s bedroom. Regardless, Erickson had at least

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two weeks to review them. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion

when it refused to dismiss Erickson’s charges based on alleged untimely discovery from

the State.

Motion to Continue Trial

¶9     Erickson fired his public defender and represented himself in the proceedings

leading up to trial. The day before trial, Erickson filed a motion to continue, alleging that

his mother was retaining counsel for him. The District Court denied the motion because

no attorney had filed a notice of appearance and Erickson had had six months to retain

counsel. When Erickson’s retained attorney, Michael Klinkhammer, arrived on the day of

trial, the court said that Klinkhammer would be allowed to represent Erickson but the trial

would begin that day as scheduled. Klinkhammer, citing inadequate time to prepare, did

not represent Erickson at trial. Erickson instead represented himself with standby counsel

from the public defender’s office. Erickson argues that the denial of the continuance

deprived him of “the benefit of legal counsel retained on his behalf,” which would have

allowed him to complete retesting of the substances discovered in his bedroom.

¶10    A party seeking a continuance must demonstrate diligence in preparing for trial and

that a continuance is in the interests of justice. Duncan, ¶ 37. Two months before trial, the

District Court granted Erickson’s motion to retest the discovered substances. When

Erickson moved on the brink of trial to continue, he did not assert to the court that he

needed more time to retest the substances. It is unfair to fault a trial court for failing to rule

on an issue it never had the opportunity to consider. State v. Velasquez, 2016 MT 216,

¶ 24, 384 Mont. 447, 377 P.3d 1235. Further, the first time the District Court heard that

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Erickson was trying to retain counsel was the day before trial. The court reasoned that

Erickson had had six months to obtain counsel. Given the lack of diligence demonstrated

by Erickson, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his

last-minute motion to continue.

¶11    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent

or modify existing precedent. Erickson’s convictions are affirmed.

                                                  /S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE

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