Court Opinion

ID: 9412805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:19.563827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:30.840398
License: Public Domain

J-S24037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOHN PHILLIP WOLFE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1447 MDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-21-CR-0000290-2020

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED: AUGUST 1, 2023

       Appellant John Phillip Wolfe appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County following the

revocation of his probation and resentencing on his 2020 conviction for flight

to avoid apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a). After a careful review, we

find no error in the trial court revoking Appellant’s probation;1 however,

because the trial court imposed an illegal sentence upon resentencing

Appellant, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On August 13,

2020, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As discussed infra, Appellant does not dispute he violated his probation.
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sole charge of flight to avoid apprehension, which was graded as a second-

degree misdemeanor.2 At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor set forth the

facts underlying Appellant’s charge as follows:

              In [the instant case, at lower court docket number CP-21-
       CR-0000290-2020,] the police had a warrant for [Appellant’s]
       arrest based on the facts of [CP-21-CR-0000291-2020, which is
       related to Appellant’s assault of Jason Mellott]. The police spoke
       to family members looking for [Appellant] and talked to
       [Appellant] on the phone several times. [Appellant] knew he was
       wanted and refused to turn himself in. Furthermore, [Appellant]
       told the police that they would not catch him.
             [Appellant] was later found in Delaware. The involvement
       of the police and—at least the involvement of the police occurred
       in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.

N.T., 8/13/20, at 4.

       After accepting Appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court immediately

sentenced Appellant to two years of supervised probation for the instant

matter. The sentence was imposed consecutively to Appellant’s sentence for

simple assault at lower court docket number CP-21-CR-0000291-2020.3

Appellant did not file a direct appeal to this Court.

       Thereafter, on September 8, 2022, while Appellant was serving the

probation sentence for his flight to avoid apprehension conviction in the

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2 On the same date, Appellant also entered a guilty plea to a charge of simple

assault at lower court docket number CP-21-CR-0000291-2020.

3 For the simple assault charge docketed at CP-21-CR-0000291-2020, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to one year less one day to two years less one day
in prison. The trial court indicated that Appellant was eligible for the work
release program. It is undisputed Appellant completed this sentence.

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instant matter, Appellant’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke

Appellant’s probation on the following bases:

       1. [Appellant] failed to submit to testing for drug/alcohol as
          directed by the probation officer. [Appellant] may not use any
          synthetic, mood, or mind altering substances or any controlled
          substances without a valid prescription. To wit,
       •   On 8/16/22, [Appellant] refused to provide a sample.
       •   On 8/22/22, [Appellant] failed to provide an adequate sample.
       •   On 8/24/22, [Appellant] tested positive and admitted to the
           use of methamphetamine and amphetamine.
       2. [Appellant] failed to report as directed by the probation officer,
          to wit,
       •   On 9/22/22 and 9/6/22, [Appellant] failed to report to the
           office as directed and therefor[e] failed to report for drug
           testing.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/7/22, at 2 (footnote omitted) (citing Petition for

Revocation from Probation, filed 9/8/22).

       On September 13, 2022, Appellant, who was represented by counsel,

proceeded to a probation revocation hearing.          At the hearing, Appellant

admitted he tested positive for drugs. N.T., 9/13/22, at 4. Accordingly, the

trial court found Appellant committed a violation of his probation and revoked

his probation.4 Id.

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4 In Commonwealth v. Foster, 654 Pa. 266, 214 A.3d 1240 (2019), our
Supreme Court examined the statutory framework governing probation
revocations and concluded that “a court may find a defendant in violation of
probation only if the defendant has violated one of the specific conditions of
probation included in the probation order or has committed a new crime.” Id.
at 1250; see also Commonwealth v. Koger, 15 WAP 2022, 2023 WL
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Regarding resentencing Appellant for his flight to avoid apprehension

conviction, the probation officer recommended that Appellant be “resentenced

to a period of incarceration for three (3) to twelve (12) months.” Id. at 2-3.

Although the trial court indicated it was “honoring” the probation officer’s

recommendation, the trial court resentenced Appellant to three (3) months to

twenty-three (23) months in prison to be followed by one (1) year of

supervised probation for the flight to avoid apprehension conviction. Id. at 3-

4. This timely appeal followed on October 13, 2022, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been met.

       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of

the Questions Presented” (verbatim):

       I.     Whether the sentencing court erred in resentencing the
              Defendant to imprisonment for not less than three months
              nor more than twenty-three months, followed by a
              consecutive period of one year supervised probation on
              Count 2 flight to avoid apprehension graded as a
              misdemeanor of the second degree?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (bold, unnecessary capitalization, and suggested answer

omitted).

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4193028 (Pa. 2023). Here, Appellant does not dispute that, as a condition of
his probation, he “may not use any synthetic, mood, or mind altering
substances or any controlled substances without a valid prescription.” Trial
Court Opinion, filed 12/7/22, at 2. He also does not dispute he violated this
provision when, on August 24, 2022, he tested positive and admitted to the
use of methamphetamine and amphetamine. Id.

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     On appeal, Appellant specifically contends that, following the revocation

of his probation for flight to avoid apprehension, the trial court imposed a

sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, and thus, his sentence is

illegal. Accordingly, Appellant requests we vacate the judgment of sentence

and remand for resentencing.

     Initially, we note the following relevant legal precepts:

            Following probation violation proceedings, this Court’s scope
     of review is limited to verifying the validity of the proceeding and
     the legality of the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v.
     Heilman, 876 A.2d 1021 (Pa.Super. 2005). “The defendant or the
     Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the
     sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a). As long as the reviewing
     court has jurisdiction, a challenge to the legality of the sentence
     is non-waivable and the court can even raise and address it sua
     sponte. Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721, 723
     (Pa.Super. 2001). “Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are
     questions of law....” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 945 A.2d
     252, 256 (Pa.Super. 2008)[.] As with all questions of law on
     appeal, our “standard of review is de novo and our scope of review
     is plenary.” Id.
            “A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of
     the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge
     to the legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Catt, 994
     A.2d 1158, 1160 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc). “If no statutory
     authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is
     illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be
     vacated.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d
     174, 178–79 (Pa.Super. 2008)). Likewise, a sentence that
     exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. Commonwealth v.
     Bradley, 575 Pa. 141, 834 A.2d 1127 (2003). If a court “imposes
     a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the
     applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be remanded
     for correction.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 560 Pa. 381, 388,
     744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (2000).

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa.Super. 2013).

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       Once probation has been revoked, a sentence of total confinement may

be imposed if the defendant has been convicted of another crime, to vindicate

the authority of the court, or the conduct of the defendant indicates it is likely

he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned.5 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9771(c)(1)-(3). Moreover, as we discussed in Commonwealth v. Crump,

995 A.2d 1280 (Pa.Super. 2010), “while the language of [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9760

does not discuss an illegal sentence or the situation where a person receives

a new sentence as a result of a probation violation, our case law analyzing the

statute has outlined the necessary considerations we must make in

determining whether a sentence is illegal.” Id. at 1284.

       Our statutory and case law are clear. Subsequent to revocation of
       probation, the sentencing court has available to it all the options
       permissible at the time of initial sentencing, giving due
       consideration “to the time spent serving the order of probation.”
       42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).[6] As long as the new sentence imposed
       does not exceed the statutory maximum when factoring in the
       incarcerated time already served, the sentence is not illegal.
       Additionally, the sentencing court cannot give a new split sentence
       where the period of incarceration and period of probation exceed
       the statutory maximum.

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5 In the case sub judice, Appellant does not dispute the trial court had the
authority to impose a sentence of total confinement upon the revocation of
his probation.

6 To clarify, this Court has held that “the sentencing court at the time of re-

sentencing [upon a violation of probation] must give ‘due consideration’ to the
time the defendant spent serving probation, but need not credit the defendant
with any time spent on probation.” Crump, 995 A.2d at 1284 (determining
the defendant’s “original probationary sentence ha[d] no effect on
determining the legality of his subsequent revocation sentence”).

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Id. at 1285 (internal citations omitted) (footnote added).

       The statutory maximum period for flight to avoid apprehension-a

misdemeanor of the second degree-is two years’ imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1104(2). Accordingly, in sentencing Appellant after the revocation of his

probation, the trial court was limited by the statutory maximum of 2 years.

       Appellant was originally sentenced to two years of supervised probation

for the instant matter without any jail time. As indicated supra, while the trial

court was required to give “due consideration” to the two years of supervised

probation already served by Appellant, it was not required to credit Appellant

upon revocation for the time spent on probation. Crump, supra. Still, we

agree with Appellant that the trial court’s sentence imposed upon revocation

is illegal.7

       It is well-settled that a court may impose a split sentence, a sentence

that includes a period of incarceration as well as a period of probation.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001, 1004 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2009).

However, the sentencing court cannot give a new split sentence where the

period of incarceration and period of probation exceed the statutory

maximum. Crump, 995 A.2d at 1285 (internal citations omitted). For

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7 On appeal, the Commonwealth concurs with Appellant’s assessment, and
therefore, the Commonwealth requests that we vacate the judgment of
sentence and remand for Appellant to be resentenced. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 5-6. Furthermore, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) opinion, the trial court
suggests Appellant’s revocation sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/7/22, at 3.

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example, as we explained in Crump, “where the maximum is ten years, a

defendant cannot receive a term of incarceration of three to six years followed

by five years [of] probation.” Id. at 1284.

      Accordingly, in the case sub judice, where the statutory maximum is

two years, the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant upon the revocation of

his probation to three (3) months to twenty-three (23) months in prison to be

followed by one (1) year of supervised probation. Appellant faces the potential

of serving two years and eleven months punishment for his flight to avoid

apprehension offense, thereby exceeding the statutory maximum punishment

of two years for second-degree misdemeanors. Therefore, we conclude

Appellant’s sentence is illegal.

      Consequently, although we conclude the trial court properly revoked

Appellant’s probation, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for

resentencing.

      Order revoking probation affirmed; judgment of sentence vacated; case

remanded for resentencing; jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/01/2023

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