Court Opinion

ID: 9752436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:07:53.89712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:16.167489
License: Public Domain

*479SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I regret the majority’s reference to “active” and “passive” negligence for several reasons: Use of the terms has been discredited, and they are in any case irrelevant to the issues raised on this appeal; the majority does not make plain what it means by the terms; and finally, this case is better decided without resort to them.
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Offhand, one can think of three lines of cases where the terms “active” and “passive” have been employed to distinguish between types of negligent conduct. None of these lines, however, supports use of the terms here.
First, the terms “active” and “passive” are frequently found in older cases addressing the issue of whether an actor is relieved from the consequences of his negligent conduct by a superseding cause. See, e. g., Cotter v. Bell, 417 Pa. 560, 208 A.2d 216 (1965); DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. Inc., 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372 (1955). However, in Estate of Flickinger v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973), the Supreme Court disapproved the use of the terms “active” and “passive” negligence in this context. For cases following Estate of Flickinger, see Bacsick v. Barnes, 234 Pa.Super. 616, 341 A.2d 157 (1975); Noon v. Knavel, 234 Pa.Super. 198, 215, 339 A.2d 545, 554 (1975) (PRICE, J., concurring); Scheel v. Tremblay, 226 Pa.Super. 45, 312 A.2d 45 (1973). And see Grainy v. Campbell, 269 Pa.Super. 225, 242 n.12, 409 A.2d 860, 869 n. 12 (1979) (HOFFMAN, J., dissenting).
Second, as the majority notes, the terms “active” and “passive” negligence are used in several older cases to define the duty owed by a possessor of land to a “gratuitous licensee.” See, e. g., Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 242-43, 80 A.2d 76 (1951). However, the duty has been more clearly defined without reference to the terms. *480See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 333-350 (1965) (distinguishing between the duty of a possessor of land towards others for risks arising from dangerous conditions on the land and the duty owed for risks arising from dangerous activities conducted on the land).1
Third, the terms “active” and “passive” sometimes appear in cases involving common law indemnity. See, e. g., Bur-bage v. Boiler Eng. & Supp. Co., Inc., 433 Pa. 319, 326-27, 249 A.2d 563, 567 (1969); Eazor Express, Inc. v. Barkley, 441 Pa. 429, 272 A.2d 893 (1971).
If one overlooks the fact that the use of the terms “active” and “passive” negligence has been discredited in discussions of superseding cause and the duty owed by a possessor of land, and if one assumes that the use of the terms retains some validity in cases involving common law indemnity, but see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B, Comment C (1979), still, we should not resort to them here. Since the Redevelopment Authority does not contest that its negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the workman’s death, no question of superseding cause exists. In addition, Noralco’s workman was not a gratuitous licensee. Finally, this appeal does not involve common law indemnity. See footnote 1 of the Majority opinion. The Redevelopment Authority does not challenge the jury’s finding that Nor aleo was innocent of negligent conduct that contributed to the death of its workman. See the Authority’s Brief at 10. Further, it was established at a prior trial that the Authority was guilty of negligent conduct that caused the workman’s death, and the Authority has not attempted to refute these facts in the present proceedings. Since the Authority’s negligent conduct was the sole legal cause of the workman’s death, its liability was necessarily primary, not secondary, and the principles of common law indemnity are therefore irrelevant.
*481-2-
By failing to recognize the various definitions that have been given the terms “active” and “passive” in the several lines of cases mentioned above, the majority leaves one uncertain regarding what it means by the terms.
The majority first cites Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, for the proposition that “passive” negligence is “negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself.” Majority op. at 433 Pa. 326-327, 249 A.2d 567. Later, the majority cites cases from other jurisdictions that “have viewed as a relevant circumstance in determining the parties’ intent the fact that the indemnitee’s negligence was passive.” Majority op. at 433 Pa. 326-327, 249 A.2d 567. However, the Annotation cited on pages 568-569 of the majority opinion, which collects most of the cases discussed by the majority for this proposition, uses “passive negligence” as the synonym of “secondary negligence,” and “active negligence” as the synonym of “primary negligence.” See Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 663, §§ 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 (1969). Indeed, section 13 of the Annotation clearly distinguishes “passive negligence” in the sense of “secondary negligence” from a landowner’s negligent failure to provide a safe place to work for the employees of an independent contractor:
In some cases involving a contractor’s agreement to indemnify the owner with respect to injuries occurring in the course or prosecution of the work, or a similar contractual provision, the courts, without characterizing the negligence as active or passive or discussing that doctrine, have afforded the owner protection, regardless of whether the contractor was negligent, where an employee of the contractor, while engaged in the latter’s work, was injured by reason of a pre-existing condition of the owner’s premises which was defective or dangerous, or which became dangerous by reason of the nature or doing of the work, and liability attached to the owner on the ground *482that he negligently failed to furnish such workman with a safe place to work, or on a similar ground.
Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d § 13 at 734.
The majority’s inconsistent use of the terms is further demonstrated by its reliance on Bartlett v. Davis Corp., 219 Kan. 148, 156, 547 P.2d 800, 808 (1976), for the principle that “[w]here the indemnitor has possession and control of the work or premises and the owner does not maintain independent operations on the premises, a contract of indemnity is generally construed to cover passive negligence of the owner.” See Majority op. at 433 Pa. 327, 249 A.2d 569. In Bartlett, the deaths of two boys were caused by the negligent conduct of a landowner and the operator of a sand and gravel pit (who had exclusive possession and control of the work and premises). While the term “passive” was used by the court in Bartlett to denote the landowner’s negligent failure to comply- with a municipal ordinance requiring him to maintain a fence of specified type and dimensions around the pit, and thus may have been used in the same sense as in Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, it is equally possible that the court wished its use of “passive” to distinguish between the landowner’s secondary negligence in causing the boys’ deaths from the operator’s primary negligence, or indeed, that the court was using the term to convey both meanings simultaneously. A similar observation may be made regarding the majority’s citation of Harvey Machine Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal.2d 445, 353 P.2d 924, 6 Cal.Rptr. 284 (1960).
In the present case, while the Redevelopment Authority’s negligence was “passive” as that term is defined in Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, it was “active” in the sense that it was the primary legal cause of the death of Noralco’s workman.
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The issue raised in this appeal is simply this: When the parties contracted with each other, did they intend that *483Noralco should indemnify the Redevelopment Authority for the consequences of its negligent failure to provide Noralco’s workmen with a safe workplace? This issue may be decided without resort to the terms “active” and “passive” negligence, as the majority’s own opinion demonstrates. For in spite of its extended discussion of the concept of “passive” negligence, the majority does not grant the Redevelopment Authority indemnification because the Authority was merely “passively” negligent, but rather because the parties’ contract and the circumstances surrounding its formation, including, inter alia, the nature of the respective businesses of the Authority and Noralco, Noralco’s exclusive control and possession of the work and premises during its operations thereon, and the nature of the services to be rendered and the amount of the remuneration to be paid, established, clearly and convincingly, that the parties intended that Noralco would indemnify the Authority for injuries suffered by Noralco’s workmen because of the Authority’s failure to provide them with a safe place to work. Thus the majority’s discussions of “active” and “passive” negligence could have been easily avoided, since the parties did not themselves use those terms,2 and far more precise terminology exists to describe the intentions of the parties.
Today’s opinion by the majority can only serve to encourage continued reference to “active” and “passive” negligence in future cases, and thereby encourage unsound thinking, which, in turn may lead to unsound results.
We should have done better to repudiate the terms “active” and “passive,” and relegate them to the realm of legal history.

. The Restatement has also abandoned the term “gratuitous licensee.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 331.

. See Leidy v. Deseret Enterprises, Inc., 252 Pa.Super. 162, 167 n.2, 381 A.2d 164, 167 n.2 (1977), for an instance where the phrase “acts of active or passive negligence” appeared in the exculpatory clause of a written contract.