Court Opinion

ID: 9492984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:54:38.219905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:34.974510
License: Public Domain

*542NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This dissent is compelled by the majority’s validation of the unpardonable constitutional improprieties present in this record. The effect of this validation is an intolerable abandonment of substantive and procedural principles deeply rooted in Anglo Saxon and American constitutional jurisprudence. Stated in its most simple form, these principles are designed to protect individual rights from constitutional shortcuts. I dissent here because rather than upholding these principles, as courts are sworn to do, a grievous breakdown has occurred.
The ultimate penalty — death—hovers ominously over this case, and this reality leads me to set forth several postulates. Democracy defends itself from anarchy by the degree it exalts process over passion. The supremacy of due process over raw emotion is even more compelling when government contemplates assuming the power to kill. Jurists most often find themselves in the cross-hairs of popular rage when confronted with constitutional infirmity in capital cases. In no other arena of civic decision-making is it more imperative that public officials operate with detachment. Judge Cranch, with unsurpassed clarity, spoke to the necessity of judicial impartiality in charged circumstances when he declared during Aaron Burr’s 1807 treason trial: “The Constitution was made for times of commotion ... dangerous precedents occur in dangerous times. It then becomes the duty of the judiciary calmly to poise the scales of justice, ... undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude.”
Examining Petitioner John Byrd’s claims with the requisite judicial sobriety exposes serious and egregious instances of prejudicial error which, if uncorrected, will lead to his execution. It is beyond refutation that the State secured Byrd’s death sentence in contravention of fundamental constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, and effective assistance of counsel. These errors require an issuance of the writ or, at least, a remand for limited discovery. Anything less is a gross and irrevocable miscarriage of justice, as the stark and chilly choice here is between due process or death. Out of a deeply held belief that the option compelled by the Constitution is clear, I now set forth my dissenting views.
I.
A.
It is well settled that prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to an accused “violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). More specifically, due process prohibits the government from introducing testimony that it knew or should have known was false, see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, or failing to volunteer exculpatory evidence of which it was or should have been aware. See United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1088 (6th Cir.1993); Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354, 363 (5th Cir.1998); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 480-81 (9th Cir.1997) (finding due process violation when prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence relating to witness’ history of untruthfulness and violent behavior). Moreover, government suppression of any evidence that is favorable to a defendant is material, and such suppression constitutes constitutional error when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).
To establish constitutional error, a defendant need not show that “more likely *543than not [he would] have received a different verdict.” Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. It suffices to show that “the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In this vein, “[if] there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial ... [but] if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112— 13, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).
In this case, the prosecution did not disclose star witness Ronald Armstead’s parole records and pending charges. This evidence would have revealed that, at the time of Byrd’s trial, Armstead had a pending parole violation hearing where he faced the probability of three to fifteen years of imprisonment. The evidence would have further revealed that the Hamilton County prosecutor’s office, who so vehemently extolled Armstead’s virtues throughout Byrd’s trial, was adamantly opposed to any potential premature release for Armstead. Indeed, on multiple occasions prior to Armstead’s testimony against Byrd, the prosecutor informed the Ohio Adult Parole Authority that it was strongly opposed to any early release for Armstead. After Armstead’s testimony against Byrd, however, the prosecutor — who was involved in pursuing both Armstead’s and Byrd’s charges — committed an about-face, informing the parole board that Armstead would face physical harm in prison, and that he “sincerely hope[d]” that he would not be placed in such an environment. With a proverbial wink-and-nod, the prosecutor indicated that he “would not be opposed” to an early release for Armstead. J.A. at 1551-52.
While the jury was wholly unaware that, barring a fortuitous appearance at the parole hearing, Armstead was returning to prison, it did hear Armstead attest to the following: “I don’t have no time pending or nothing else pending.... I don’t have no more cases pending, and I come to testify against [Byrd] because he was wrong.” J.A. at 3864. At best, these statements were misleading and left the jury with a material mis-impression of fact. At worse, these statements were patently false, which the prosecution knew, or should have known.
The majority attempts to remove itself from this constitutional thicket by relying on our decision in United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.1991), which provided that “[n]o Brady violation exists where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information.” Id. at 738 (internal quotations and citation omitted). • Perhaps recognizing the dubiousness of Clark’s applicability to this case, the majority further maintains that Armstead’s statements are neither false nor material for Brady purposes.
First, the majority attempts to excuse the prosecution’s failure to correct Arm-stead’s false and misleading testimony by asserting — as' per Clark — that Byrd’s trial counsel should have known “that Armstead was on some form of parole when he was arrested in December 1982” since he had access to Armstead’s arrest records. See ante at 517. While, perhaps, one might expect an effective counsel to infer from Armstead’s arrest history that he was likely on some form of parole at the time of his 1982 arrest, this omission is not so egregious as to excuse ■ the prosecutor’s failure to correct known false testimony. In Clark, we held that defense counsel should have been aware of exculpatory evidence when such evidence “was disclosed at [an] earlier detention hearing in the presence of defendant and with the opportunity for inquiry by defense counsel.” 928 F.2d at 738. There was no such disclosure in this case. Brady most assuredly does not allow a prosecutor to stand idly by while key witnesses testify in materially false and misleading ways. In*544deed, the Supreme Court recently asserted: “[T]he prosecution’s responsibility for disclosing known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555.
Perhaps recognizing that the Clark exception to Brady is inapplicable to this case, the majority maintains that Arm-stead’s testimony was neither false nor material. The notion that Armstead’s testimony was not false is simply implausible. Byrd’s counsel asked Armstead, “Do you have any charges pending?” Armstead replied, “I don’t have no time pending or nothing else pending.” J.A. at 3863. On redirect, the prosecution asked Armstead why he came to testify against Byrd. Arm-stead responded, “I don’t have no more cases pending, and I come to testify against him because he was wrong.” J.A. at 3864. The majority attempts to explain the undeniable falsity of these statements by hypothesizing that Armstead must have thought that the questions referred to “criminal” charges, as opposed to his impending parole revocation hearings. See ante 517-18. First, Armstead was asked whether he had “any charges pending.” “Any” means “any.” Armstead was not asked whether he had any “criminal” charges pending, or any other kind of charges. He was simply asked whether he had “any” pending charges. Moreover, Armstead responded that he had “nothing else pending.” There is no qualification in this statement. By testifying that he had “nothing else pending,” Armstead left the jury with the impression that he had no specific reason to fabricate testimony, and that all of his jail time was behind him. This was patently untrue, and either the prosecution knew or should have known.
Additionally, the majority concludes that Armstead’s testimony on his pending charges is immaterial since any parole records evidence would merely serve as cumulative impeachment evidence, and that Armstead had been substantially impeached by other evidence. While Arm-stead’s overall credibility was certainly impugned by evidence that he was imprisoned at the Cincinnati Workhouse at the time of trial, and his admission that he had committed a prior crime carrying at least a one-year prison term, none of this testimony furnished the kind of specific motivation to fabricate testimony provided by his parole status. This evidence of a particular rationale to concoct testimony is not merely cumulative with respect to Armstead’s general credibility. Neither the district court nor the majority dispute that Armstead’s testimony was principally responsible for Byrd’s conviction. Indeed, Armstead’s testimony provided the only meaningful distinction between Byrd and co-defendant John Brewer, who was not charged with Tewksbury’s murder. Moreover, the State did not present any witnesses who corroborated Armstead’s testimony. In these ways, Armstead’s parole evidence certainly satisfies the Kyles definition of materiality as whether “the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotations and citation omitted). See also United States v. Scheer, 168 F.3d 445, 452-53 (11th Cir.1999) (finding a Brady violation when evidentiary suppression related to a key witness’ testimony); East v. Johnson, 123 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that “when the withheld evidence would seriously undermine the testimony of a key witness on an essential issue or there is no strong corroboration, the withheld evidence has been found to be material”).
The imperative that we have the utmost confidence in a jury verdict is paramount when the punishment is death. We must not tolerate any reasonable doubt in discharging this duty. Here, no one disputes that the State secured Byrd’s conviction as a direct result of Armstead’s testimony. We know that the jury was unaware that Armstead faced up to fifteen years imprisonment, depending on the reception he received at his parole hearing. This re*545ception would undoubtedly be warmer if he found a way to ingratiate himself with the Hamilton County prosecutor. None of these facts dictate that the jury would have necessarily reached a different verdict, but they certainly undermine confidence in its verdict. By failing to correct material testimony that it should have known was false, the State committed reversible constitutional error.
B.
The prosecution’s Brady violations were exacerbated by numerous other instances of misconduct — -notably improper prosecu-torial vouching for Armstead’s credibility and the importing of facts not in evidence into closing argument. This Court has unambiguously stated its disdain of prose-cutorial vouching for witness credibility. See United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1389 (6th Cir.1994) (“We cannot overstate the extent to which we disapprove of ... improper vouching by prosecutors.”). Our contempt for prosecutorial vouching stems from its tendency to place the imprimatur and legitimacy of the government behind witness testimony. See United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.1999). In this regard, the prohibition on government vouching is consistent with the prosecutor’s role as representative of a dispassionate sovereign, not a partisan interest. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
This Court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether prosecutorial vouching constitutes reversible constitutional error. First, we assess whether the statements were improper, and second, whether the impropriety was harmless. See Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1384-87 (6th Cir.1994). In determining whether improper conduct was harmless, we further inquire into the flagrancy of the conduct. This flagrancy inquiry requires that we assess the following factors: whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury; were isolated or extensive; were deliberately or accidently placed before the jury; and the strength of the evidence against the accused. See id. at 1385, 1389; see also Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 929 (6th Cir.1988) (applying flagrancy factors to determine scope of prosecutorial misconduct in habeas case).
In this case, there is no doubt that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Arm-stead’s credibility; the only issue is whether the vouching was harmless. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:
I’m not sure there is honor among thieves, but I- believe Armstead when he took the stand, and I believe you did, too.... I have heard no evidence direct or circumstantial to contradict what Armstead said. I believe him and submit that you should believe him.... Witnesses pay a price to testify. I never met Armstead before, but you know there’s something real genuine about our people....
J.A. at 3920. There is no more direct way to vouch for a witness’ credibility than to assert “I believe him.” In United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir.1979), we ordered a new trial in the face of prosecuto-rial vouching that is strikingly similar to what we see here. In that case, the prosecutor stated that he “believe[d] beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendant committed the charged crime. Id. at 753; see also United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1992) (finding improper vouching when prosecutor stated, “I think [the witness] was candid. I think he is honest.”). We characterized such direct prosecutorial vouching as “egregious,” “astonish[ing],” and “inexcusable.” Bess, 59$ F.2d at 753, 757. There is no other way to describe the prosecutor’s statements in this case. The essential question is whether this vouching constitutes reversible error.
In Carroll, we distilled the appropriate analysis for determining whether identified prosecutorial vouching rises to the level of reversible error. As noted above, we first determine whether the remarks at issue were flagrant. Here, the prosecutor’s comments were certainly misleading to the *546jury. The majority does not dispute that Armstead’s credibility was indispensable to Byrd’s conviction. Armstead was a jailhouse informant and convicted felon whose credibility was questionable at best. The State’s representations that it believed Armstead are certainly likely to mislead a citizen jury as to Armstead’s actual credibility. Additionally, the import of the remarks was exacerbated by the weakness of alternative evidence of Byrd’s guilt. Again, the majority does not dispute that this case turns on Armstead’s credibility, which was certainly bolstered by overt prosecutorial vouching. Though the statements .do not appear to be extensive, nor can we determine whether they were deliberately placed before the jury, their strategic potency is beyond dispute. Given the paucity of corroborating evidence of Byrd’s guilt, and the fact that these statements were the kind that would mislead a jury, the prosecutorial vouching in this case represents flagrant constitutional error.
C.
In addition to engaging in gross vouching during his closing argument, Byrd’s prosecutor also speculated as to facts not in evidence. As the majority acknowledges, it is highly improper for a prosecutor to inform the jury as to purported facts not in evidence during closing argument. See United States v. Wiedyk, 71 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir.1995) (“A prosecutor’s statement in a closing argument is improper if the statement brings to the jury’s attention purported facts that are not in evidence and are prejudicial.”); Bess, 593 F.2d at 753 (“An attorney’s job arguing a case before a jury is to persuade that body, based solely on the proof at trial and reasonable inferences that can be deduced therefrom.”); United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that “a prosecutor’s closing argument cannot roam beyond the evidence presented during trial”).
In this case, the prosecutor engaged in wild and inexcusable factual speculation during his closing argument. Without any evidentiary predicate whatsoever, the prosecutor concluded that since Byrd’s boyhood home was in the same area as the store where Tewksbury was killed, “on numerous occasions [Byrd] was face to face with Monte Tewksbury, saw him, and recognized him.” J.A. at 3912. In attempting to explain why Tewksbury’s blood was not found on the recovered knife, the prosecutor hypothesized — again without any evidentiary predicate — that Byrd had wiped the blood off the knife with a missing t-shirt sleeve and dumped the sleeve “out in Hamilton County in the northwest side with blood all over it.” J.A. at 3921-22. Given that this hypothesis was wholly unsupported by introduced evidence, the prosecutor, of course, could not identify the location of the sleeve. However, he decided to take a guess at the sleeve’s location anyway, speculating: “Maybe [it’s in] the same place Monte Tewksbury’s ring is. Maybe the same place the top of the cash register is. But that is the explanation of what happened to the other sleeve.” J.A. at 3921. The majority has not identified any evidentiary predicate from which the prosecutor could reasonably infer these purported facts. There is a good reason for this omission: there is no evidence to substantiate the prosecutor’s overzealous theorizing. Similar to prosecutorial vouching for witness credibility, such speculation places the government’s prestige behind uncorroborated putative facts that have not survived the rigor of substantiation. Morever, it transforms a trial from deliberate and sober fact-finding to visceral and capricious guesswork.
Finally, the prosecutor introduced substantial victim impact evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. While the Supreme Court has recently held that such evidence is permissible during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, it has not similarly approved of such evidence during the guilt phase. See Payne v. Tennessee, *547501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, (1991). Indeed, five of the six Justices in the Payne majority wrote or joined separate concurrences, reiterating that the Court’s holding applied only to the sentencing phase of capital trials. See id. at 880, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O’Connor, J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (“[A] state may legitimately determine that victim impact evidence is relevant to a capital sentencing proceeding.”); id. at 833, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (Scalia, J., joined by O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (“The Court correctly observes the injustice of requiring the exclusion of relevant aggravating evidence during capital sentencing .... ”); id. at 835, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To my knowledge, our legal tradition has never included a general rule that evidence of a crime’s effects on the victim and others is, standing alone, irrelevant to a sentencing determination of the defendant’s culpability.”). While it may be true that victim impact evidence related to the underlying crime will customarily be disclosed during the guilt phase, see id. at 840, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (Souter, J., concurring), such disclosure must be limited by its probative relevance respecting material facts. See, e.g., Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1348 (4th Cir.1996).
In Byrd’s ease, the prosecutor played a highly empathetic television news magazine videotape of Tewksbury and his family, during the testimony of Ronald Arm-stead. The videotape was played without audio so that all the jury observed were the highly-charged and undoubtedly heart-wrenching images of one who had been taken away from his family by a senseless crime. The majority asserts that the videotape was relevant to Armstead’s testimony since Byrd allegedly confessed to Armstead while watching the program from jail. This videotape had little, if any, probative value respecting Armstead’s testimony, and to the extent it did shed minimal light on the circumstances surrounding Byrd’s purported jailhouse confession, the State certainly could have presented alternative evidence that carried less potential to inflame and prejudice the jury. One can comprehend the relevance of this kind of material during the sentencing phase where the sentencer needs to respond to “the specific harm caused by the defendant,” see Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. But such a visceral appeal as this — with a highly attenuated connection to any material fact respecting Byrd’s guilt is inappropriate in the context of determining whether a defendant is guilty of a capital crime.
D.
While it may be that each specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct might not per se warrant a new trial, taken as a whole, the cumulative effects of these improprieties certainly denied Byrd a constitutionally fair trial. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (holding that a prosecutor’s conduct must be analyzed in context to determine if defendant denied a fair trial). In Francis, 170 F.3d at 552, we recently ordered a new trial despite our findings that the specific instances of pros-ecutorial vouching and improper factual speculation were not individually sufficient to warrant a new trial. We concluded: “[W]hen we review the numerous examples of impropriety in this ease together and in the context of the entire trial, a new trial is appropriate.” Id.; see also Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 790 (6th Cir.1996) (granting habeas petition given numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct).
For similar reasons, it is clear that the cumulative effect of the numerous prosecu-torial improprieties in this case denied Byrd a constitutionally fair trial. The only way the majority can reach a contrary conclusion is to focus myopically on each specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct as if it occurred in a vacuum. The prosecutor’s conduct, however, is symbiotic. The Brady violations create an environment in which the testimony of convict*548ed felon and jailhouse informant Armstead can be credited; the vouching results in the presentation of Arm stead as an upstanding member of the prosecutor’s “our people”; the factual speculation allows for the creation of an imaginary evidentiary predicate to undergird Armstead’s testimony; and the victim impact evidence predisposes the jury to grant Armstead every benefit of the doubt as it, understandably, seeks to make someone pay for the damage done to the Tewksbury family. In this context, confidence in the outcome of Byrd’s trial must be, and is, seriously undermined. One cannot, in good conscience, blink at such substantial constitutional impropriety with full comprehension of its deadly effects. In these circumstances, judicial neglect transforms the justice system into an accomplice to constitutional transgression.
II.
Byrd also claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Initially, I note that Byrd has not procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims, and therefore those claims are preserved for federal review.1 Turning to the merits of Byrd’s claims, it is apparent that the bulk of them lack merit. However, given the failure of *549Byrd’s trial counsel to object to widespread prosecutorial misconduct, see swpra Part I, and the failure of Byrd’s appellate counsel to raise issues pertaining to prose-cutorial misconduct and the credibility of Armstead’s testimony, it is clear that Byrd was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
A.
We apply a two-part test to determine whether a criminal defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. First, we ascertain whether counsel’s performance was professionally deficient; second, we determine whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant’s constitutional interests. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir.1997); Grav-ley, 87 F.3d at 785. In assessing counsel’s performance, we inquire whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Rickman, 131 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052). This objective reasonableness standard encompasses strategic litigation choices that simply fail to bear fruit. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In this ease, there is no objectively reasonable professional norm of capital defense practice that suggests counsel should remain mute while a prosecutor engages in egregious prosecutorial vouching and wild factual speculation. See Gravley, 87 F.3d at 785-86 (holding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct during trial and closing argument). In a case that turns on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, it is a gross dereliction of duty for a capital defense lawyer to sit silently while a prosecutor declares that the State of Ohio “believe[s]” the testimony. It is similarly deficient representation for capital defense counsel to fail to object to outrageous prosecutorial speculation as to a defendant’s purported motive in allegedly committing a murder, or the whereabouts of unrecovered key evidence. While the failure to object to apparent prejudicial error may often be predicated upon trial strategy, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, there is no acceptable tactical justification for silence on these issues. If this case did not so indispensably depend on the testimony of one individual, the substantial deference the Constitution affords criminal defense lawyers might encompass the inaction of Byrd’s counsel. However, in this case — on these facts — the failure even to challenge such serious and damaging prosecutorial misconduct falls far beyond the bounds of effective representation.
Likewise, Byrd’s appellate counsel must be deemed ineffective for not raising, on direct appeal, trial counsel’s failure to challenge the stated prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Barnard v. Lane, 819 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir.1987) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failure to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal). Certainly it is not within the bounds of objectively reasonable professional conduct, or constitutionally permissible appellate strategy, to fail to raise prejudicial violations of Sixth Amendment rights.
In addition, since the prejudice analysis is essentially identical to the Brady materiality determination, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Tucker v. Prelesnik, 181 F.3d 747, 754-55 (6th Cir.1999), for the reasons discussed previously, the failure of Byrd’s attorneys to challenge the discussed prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced Byrd’s right to a fair trial.
III.
If the majority is unwilling to acknowledge the constitutional errors that appear on the face of this record, Byrd should, at the very least, be granted discovery and an *550evidentiary hearing to explore his claims that: 1) Armstead testified falsely concerning Byrd’s role in the murder of Monte Tewksbury; 2) the prosecution intentionally failed to correct the false testimony; and 3) the prosecution actually suppressed evidence relevant to Armstead’s impeachment. Since Byrd has averred facts sufficient to support Brady violations because the prosecution should have known that Armstead testified falsely, he has certainly raised sufficient facts to justify an evidentiary hearing to further substantiate his claims.
The majority dismisses this request by concluding that since Byrd was unable to establish an exception to the presumption of correctness afforded state court factual findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (West 1995), the district court properly deferred to state findings of fact and, consequently, did not abuse its discretion in denying further discovery. The majority’s analysis is flawed, however, both in its discussion of the inapplicability of § 2254(d), and in its consolidation of the discovery determination with its resolution of the presumption of correctness issue.
In habeas proceedings initiated prior to the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts must presume the correctness of state court factual findings unless an exception under the former version of § 2254(d) applies.2 See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 991 (6th Cir.1999). When an exception does apply, and the habeas petitioner’s factual allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing. See McMillan v. Barksdale, 823 F.2d 981, 983-84 (6th Cir.1987); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 562-63 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A] federal habeas court must allow discovery and an eviden-tiary hearing only where a factual dispute, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would entitle him to relief and the state has not afforded the petitioner a full and fair evi-dentiary hearing.”) (quoting Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir.1994)); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1993) (“A federal evidentiary hearing is mandatory if (1) petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would establish the right to relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.”).
Moreover, even when an exception is inapplicable, federal courts are not thereby prevented from ordering discovery or conducting evidentiary hearings. The presumption of correctness is just that — a rebuttable presumption, not an inexorable command. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (providing that petitioner must “establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State was erroneous” when a § 2254(d) exception is inapplicable); Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (“To overcome the presumption of correctness, the petitioner must establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination in the state court was erroneous.”). Within the operation of “sound discretion,” district courts maintain significant authority to receive evidence pertaining to the legitimacy of federal claims. This discretion to order discovery or hold evidentiary hearings, however, becomes an obligation when “specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). In these circumstances, “it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry.” Id. (emphasis added); see Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (holding it is an abuse of discretion to deny discovery when specific factual allegations, if fully developed, would entitle petitioner to relief); see also *551Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228, 282 (6th Cir.1991); McDaniel v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir.1997)(per curiam).
At least three exceptions to the § 2264(d) presumption of correctness apply in this case: (i) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (ii) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; and (iii) the factual findings made by the state court were not supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (3) & (8). Even the district court acknowledges that Byrd’s discovery requests were consistently rebuffed by Ohio courts. Indeed, Byrd has never been afforded the opportunity to fully discover relevant documents, depose witnesses, or adequately develop his claims. Additionally, several of the “facts” found by the state court appear to be unsupported by the record — namely that the credibility of Ronald Armstead was subject to extensive cross-examination, that there is no credible evidence that Ronald Armstead lied in his testimony, and that Ronald Armstead was not given consideration by the State in return for his testimony.
The majority contends that the August 5, 1988 discovery order provided Byrd with sufficient opportunity to develop his claims. However, a close read of the record reveals that this order had little effect on Byrd’s ability to obtain the information he sought. For example, Byrd asserts that he filed a “Motion For Release of Records” in July 1988, and the trial court issued the August 5 order in response to that motion. According to Byrd, “[defense] counsel sought all available records through use of this motion.” J.A. at 279. Thus, despite the majority’s claim to the contrary, see ante at 513, Byrd did indeed attempt to utilize the August 5 order to obtain information, but was thwarted in his attempts. Byrd further asserts that he filed two additional motions, prior to the July 1988 motion, requesting discovery from the Hamilton County Sheriffs Office and the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office. Byrd contends that this information would have detailed contacts between inmates Ronald Armstead, Virgil Jordan, Marvin Randolph, Robert Jones and the prosecutor’s or sheriffs office. Byrd also requested discovery to determine why Armstead was chosen among four jailhouse informants who offered testimony against him. Byrd asserts that the documents establish that the prosecutor’s office knew Armstead was returning to prison, and shed light on any consideration Arm-stead received for his testimony. Without adequate discovery in these areas, Byrd has not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to factually develop his claims.
Even if Byrd has not established a § 2254(d) exception, he has nevertheless overcome the presumption of correctness by averring sufficient facts, which if fully developed, would entitle him to relief. It would be unjustifiably circular for this Court to hold that a state court’s findings were binding, without providing the petitioner an opportunity to fully and adequately develop evidence which may establish that the findings were actually erroneous. Such a ruling would defeat the entire purpose of the pre-AEDPA § 2254(d) — which, again, presumes, rather than requires, the correctness of state findings. Yet this appears to be exactly what the district court did in this case, seemingly determining that the state court findings were binding, rather than ascertaining whether Byrd had alleged sufficient facts to overcome the presumption.
The district court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery and an evidentia-ry hearing on Byrd’s claims of false testimony and suppression. Since the record already supports a number of Byrd’s claims of constitutional error, it is clear that he has, at least, alleged sufficient facts to require a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his claims. Moreover, the district court erred by determining that the pre*552sumption of correctness necessarily foreclosed an evidentiary hearing. The applicability of the presumption of correctness and the propriety of an evidentiary hearing are two interrelated, yet fundamentally distinct, issues. Byrd has yet to be afforded any meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery, and has consistently been denied an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, at minimum, Byrd should be granted discovery and an evidentiary hearing limited to the specific evidentiary requests he made previously before the district court, and to those requests pertinent to his false testimony and suppression claims. Given that there already exists significant evidence that Byrd’s conviction was secured in violation of bedrock constitutional guarantees of due process and fundamental fairness, discovery is the least that is required before this court pushes him further down the road toward execution.

. The majority primarily relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1982) for its conclusion that Byrd procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. It is settled that only state procedural bars that are deemed “adequate” to support the state’s judgment are given force by federal courts. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). This adequacy determination requires that a state procedural rule be actually enforced and "firmly established and regularly followed.” Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). On one hand, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded in Cole that a claim is barred by res judicata when a defendant, represented by new counsel, fails to raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be resolved Without reference to evidence outside the record. See 443 N.E.2d at 170. However, one year later in State v. Cooperrider, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
Appellant should have no fear that the doctrine of res judicata will prevent him from raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in a postconviction hearing. As long as no direct appeal was taken, or the claim of incompetent counsel was not raised and adjudicated on a direct appeal, res judicata does not bar the adjudication of this issue in postconviction proceedings.
448 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ohio 1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Shortly after Cooperrider, in an opinion seemingly applying the Cooperrider principle, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the merits of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, after it noted that the claim was not raised on direct appeal. See State v. Decker, 28 Ohio St.3d 137, 502 N.E.2d 647, 649 & n. 3 (Ohio 1986). All of the cases cited by the majority regarding the supposed consistency and clarity of the Cole rule are after 1990— well after Byrd had sought to vindicate his Sixth Amendment rights under state post-conviction proceedings. See Ante at ¶ 203-204. Given these ambiguous statements by the Ohio Supreme Court, we certainly cannot conclude that the Cole rule was sufficiently established and enforced to justify default of Byrd's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In any event, to the extent his trial counsel claim was defaulted, it is clear that the default was "cause[dj” by the ineffectiveness of Byrd’s appellate counsel. See, e.g., Gravley, 87 F.3d at 785. Further, given that this Court has itself recognized the murkiness of Ohio’s procedural framework for presenting claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, see Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 881-83 (6th Cir.1990), we cannot conclude that the Murna-han rule — not clearly articulated until 1992 — was sufficiently established and followed to bar our consideration of Byrd’s ineffective appellate counsel claims. Thus, irrespective of the Supreme Court’s resolution of Carpenter v. Mohr, 163 F.3d 938 (6th Cir.1998), cert. granted sub nom, Edwards v. Carpenter, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 444, 145 L.Ed.2d 362, (1999), Byrd’s appellate ineffectiveness claims are not barred by an "adequate” state procedural bar, and therefore can properly serve as "cause” for any purported default of his trial ineffectiveness claims. Finally, as should be apparent from the following discussion of the merits of Byrd’s claims, he was clearly prejudiced by the failure to receive effective assistance.

. See Ante at 510, n. 23 (listing statutory factors under former version of § 2254(d)).