Court Opinion

ID: 2964915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:55.015446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:26.206204
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2050

                                 VINCENT DeNOVELLIS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

              DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Jodie Grossman, with whom ALEF, Inc., was on brief for appellant.
            ______________            __________
            George B. Henderson, II, Assistant United States Attorney, with
            _______________________
        whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
             _______________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 2, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES,  Senior Circuit  Judge.   Plaintiff Vincent
                      BOWNES,  Senior Circuit  Judge.
                               _____________________

            DeNovellis   brought   this    action   alleging   employment

            discrimination  under Title  VII of the  Civil Rights  Act of

            1964,  42  U.S.C.     2000e   et  seq.,  and  under  the  Age
                                          ________

            Discrimination  in Employment Act (ADEA), 29  U.S.C.   621 et
                                                                       __

            seq.,  against  his  employer, the  Secretary  of  the United
            ____

            States  Department of Health  and Human  Services (HHS).   He

            alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of his

            race, national origin, and  age, in his work  assignments, in

            denials of promotions and awards, and in being subjected to a

            hostile work environment.  The district court granted summary

            judgment to the defendant.  We affirm.

                                          I.

                                       A. Facts
                                          _____

                      Viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

            party (DeNovellis) and  drawing all reasonable inferences  in

            his favor,  the following facts are treated as undisputed for

            purposes of the motion for summary judgment.  DeNovellis is a

            white male of Italian descent.  He was sixty-six years old at

            the time he filed this action in 1994.  

                      From  1979  to  1991 DeNovellis  served  as  Deputy

            Regional Administrator (DRA) of the Boston Regional Office of

            Human  Development Services  (HDS), which  was  part of  HHS.

            DeNovellis's   position   was   eliminated   in   an   agency

            reorganization  that occurred in  the spring of  1991.  After

                                         -2-
                                          2

            some  months "in limbo," in the form of temporary assignments

            to  "meaningless" positions,  DeNovellis  became the  program

            manager of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

            program  within   the  recently  formed   Administration  for

            Children  and  Families  (ACF).    His  civil  service  grade

            remained the same:  GS-14.  

                      Until the reorganization,  DeNovellis's supervisor,

            A.  Kenton Williams, was  the Regional Administrator  (RA) of

            HDS.  Williams was a black male of the age of fifty-five when

            this action  was filed.   There were  racial tensions  in the

            office.   Williams  often spoke  out  against the  "insidious

            racism  that  exists  in  our  society,"  and,  according  to

            DeNovellis,  "would try to justify the behavior and reactions

            of  black staff persons, who having  been subjected to racial

            discrimination  over  the  years,  reacted differently  under

            certain circumstances."  Williams also wrote a  letter to the

            editor  of the  Boston Globe  commenting  on the  "tremendous
                            ____________

            pressures" faced by  black executives.  These  comments about

            the  inequities  suffered  by  blacks  made  DeNovellis  feel

            uncomfortable. 

                      There were  also ethnic  and race-related  comments

            around the  office that  Williams condoned.   Members  of the

            staff would say things like  "Vinnie, why don't you have your

            people (Mafia) in  the North  End take care  of them."   (The

            North End is a largely Italian neighborhood of Boston.)  Both

                                         -3-
                                          3

            Williams and a black friend  of his, St. Clair Phillips, made

            negative comments about  DeNovellis's ethnicity.   And  staff

            members made general references to "you whites" in Williams's

            presence.

                      Williams  and  DeNovellis   also  had  work-related

            conflicts.   Part  of DeNovellis's  job  as DRA  was to  take

            charge  of the regional  activities during the  RA's absence.

            Williams   was  often  absent  from  the  office  and  became

            concerned that DeNovellis was signing  so much correspondence

            on Williams's behalf that it would highlight the frequency of

            his absences.   For this reason, Williams  ordered DeNovellis

            in 1989 to stop signing letters on his behalf.

                      In 1989 and  1990, other government administrators,

            including   Williams's  supervisor   in  Washington,   Pamela

            Coughlin,  who was white,  told Williams that  DeNovellis was

            spreading negative comments about Williams.  On more than one

            occasion, Williams also  had to intervene in  heated disputes

            that DeNovellis  had with  other people in  the office.   One

            such incident  pertained to  the distribution  of space,  and

            another concerned  whether a  minority student  (who did  not

            report to DeNovellis) had been absent from work.

                      In 1990,  certain federal employees were  given the

            opportunity  to  choose  early  retirement.   DeNovellis  was

            eligible  to retire but rejected  the offer.  Several people,

                                         -4-
                                          4

            including  Williams and  two  of  his  black  friends,  urged

            DeNovellis to take this opportunity and retire.

                      The   heart   of  DeNovellis's   complaint   is  an

            assignment  to  a  temporary  "detail"  to  an "unestablished

            position" in the Office of Fiscal Operations (OFO) in October

            1990.   Williams  claims  he was  instructed  to  order  this

            reassignment   by    Coughlin,   his    (white)   supervisor.

            Nevertheless,  Williams now  admits that  the  detail was  "a

            sham," and was  concocted in  part because  Williams did  not

            want  DeNovellis to  be  his  deputy.   On  October 9,  1990,

            Williams removed DeNovellis  from the order of  succession to

            act as RA.

                      DeNovellis suffered no diminution in grade, pay, or

            benefits during the detail.  He worked under  the supervision

            of  Williams's friend,  St. Clair  Phillips,  who was  black.

            Officially,   DeNovellis   was  responsible   for   financial

            activities, for which he had  no training or capability.  For

            the  first month  and a  half, he  "performed the  same (DRA)

            duties under  a new  supervisor."  In  mid-November, the  new

            supervisor,  Phillips,  asked  Williams  to  end  the  detail

            because DeNovellis did not have the background to perform the

            OFO work and he  was refusing to perform his old  DRA duties.

            Williams refused.   The detail was due to  expire in February

            1991 but, upon Williams's request, was extended through March

            31, 1991.  

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      On  March   8,  1991,   DeNovellis  filed   an  EEO

            complaint,  alleging   age,   race,   and   national   origin

            discrimination   in   assignment  of   duties,   awards,  and

            reassignment.  On April 11,  three days after the EEO officer

            interviewed Williams,  Williams filed  forms requesting  that

            DeNovellis's position be switched with that of Paul Kelley, a

            black  male who  was a  friend of  Williams's  and who  was a

            supervisory  accountant in  OFO.    According to  DeNovellis,

            Williams's purpose in making this request  was to protect the

            grades of Phillips and Kelley, both black and both friends of

            his, in  an impending  classification review.   However,  the

            classification  review and the proposed "job swap" were never

            carried out, overtaken  by the agency's restructuring  in the

            spring of 1991.

                      Around  the  same  time  that DeNovellis's  initial

            detail expired  at the  end of March  1991, HHS  underwent an

            internal  restructuring.   The former  HDS  and another  sub-

            agency of HHS, the Family Support Administration, were merged

            into  a new  entity,  the  Administration  for  Children  and

            Families (ACF).   The  restructuring took  several months  to

            effectuate.  During the transition, DeNovellis maintained his

            title of DRA of HDS and carried out some tasks of  the Deputy

            position, but he received no official assignments; as before,

            people came to him for information.  

                                         -6-
                                          6

                      In  April or May 1991, Hugh Galligan, a white male,

            was appointed Acting  Regional Administrator of the  new ACF;

            he appointed Williams as his Deputy.  By May, Williams was no

            longer in charge  of the Boston office.   The appointments of

            Galligan and Williams were finalized on August 23, 1991.  Two

            days  later,  DeNovellis's  position   was  "realigned";  his

            official title  remained  DRA of  HDS  (even though  HDS  was

            phasing out) but this was now within the new ACF.  The result

            was that Williams was DRA of ACF, and DeNovellis retained the

            job  title "DRA" but  remained unassigned in  the new agency.

            His grade remained unchanged throughout this period.

                      In   December  1991  Williams  left  Boston  for  a

            position  in Washington,  D.C.    Galligan  then  transferred

            Phillips, who had  been the head of OFO of the new agency, to

            the DRA position at  the new agency.  Because  Phillips was a

            GS-15 and  the new  DRA opening was  a GS-15,  Galligan could

            transfer  Phillips  laterally  into  the  position without  a

            competitive search.  Since  DeNovellis was a GS-14,  he could

            not have been promoted to Williams's former position unless a

            job  vacancy announcement  had been  made  and a  competitive

            search  performed.   There is no  evidence that  Galligan was

            precluded  from instituting  such  a  search and  considering

            DeNovellis for the position.

                      In May 1992  DeNovellis was reassigned from  DRA of

            the Office of Family Security  (OFS) in the new agency, to  a

                                         -7-
                                          7

            supervisory  position as  program manager  in  the same  OFS.

            This  was not part of the management  team of the new agency.

            DeNovellis  was  the  last person  appointed  to  a permanent

            position in the new agency.   Galligan has since detailed him

            twice  to the  OFO as  an assistant  goal leader  for ongoing

            restructuring.   (Thus, in  some respects, DeNovellis  claims

            his job assignments have been inappropriate because they were

            beneath  his DRA status  and in other  respects inappropriate

            because  the  positions  required   accounting  or  financial

            qualifications which he did not possess.)

                      According  to  DeNovellis,  at  least  part  of the

            reason for  the delay in  his reassignment in the  new agency

            was a "position  paper" he  wrote in early  1992.  The  paper

            pointed out the "convoluted interactions that were going on,"

            and  it accidently  was  mailed to  a  lot of  people  in the

            region, creating a furor.  Galligan was asked to find out who

            was   responsible  for  this  position  paper.    During  the

            investigation, DeNovellis's computer was confiscated.

                                         B.  

                              District Court Proceedings
                              __________________________

                      The district court granted  summary judgment to the

            Secretary as to all claims.  It dealt separately with each of

            the four types of adverse  action alleged by DeNovellis.  The

            court relied  on Landgraf  v. USI Film  Prods., 511  U.S. 244
                             ________     ________________

            (1994), to  reject  the Title  VII claim  for deprivation  of

                                         -8-
                                          8

            duties   that  occurred  prior  to  November  21,  1991,  the

            effective  date of the Civil Rights Act  of 1991, 42 U.S.C.  

            1981a ("the  Act" or "the  1991 Act").  The  court concluded,

            essentially,  that  even   if  DeNovellis  was  discriminated

            against,  he was  not entitled  to any  remedy for  it.   The

            equitable remedies  available under  Title VII  prior to  the

            1991 Act were not appropriate  because he suffered no loss in

            pay  or  loss   of  job  that  would  warrant   back  pay  or

            reinstatement (he did not  seek reinstatement).  And  the new

            remedies  made available under  the 1991 Act  (in particular,

            compensatory  damages) are only available for acts which took

            place after November 21, 1991, and therefore did not apply to

            DeNovellis's claims of pre-Act discrimination.1

                      The district  court rejected DeNovellis's  claim of

            post-Act  deprivation of  duties  based  on  his  failure  to

            present sufficient evidence  to enable a reasonable  trier of

            fact   to  conclude  that  the  employer's  motive  for  such

            deprivation was discriminatory.   Whereas DeNovellis provided

            indirect  evidence that Williams might have been motivated by

            improper reasons  in making pre-Act assignments, Williams was

            no longer in charge of the  Boston office after May 1991  and

            he left Boston  altogether in December 1991.   The court held

            that  DeNovellis could not bootstrap the pre-May 1991 alleged

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  court also  concluded that  such  remedies were  not
            available under the  ADEA as a matter of  law, and DeNovellis
            has not appealed that ruling.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            discrimination  by Williams  into sufficient  evidence for  a

            reasonable  trier of fact to conclude that post-November 1991

            decisions were animated by similar illegal bias. 

                      DeNovellis  also  made  a  claim  of  hostile  work

            environment based  on  negative  comments  about  his  ethnic

            background  coupled with  his "sham  detail."   The  district

            court rejected this claim for essentially the same reasons it

            rejected  the  deprivation  of duties  claims:    any pre-Act

            violation was a wrong without a remedy based on Landgraf, and
                                                            ________

            there   was   insufficient   evidence   that   any   post-Act

            discrimination  had  occurred.    The  court  stated  in  one

            sentence an alternative  ground for its  ruling:  failure  to

            exhaust administrative remedies.2

                      The district court also granted summary judgment to

            the Secretary  on DeNovellis's  claim that  his computer  was

            confiscated in retaliation for filing an EEO  complaint.  The

            court rejected this claim under  Title VII on the ground that

            DeNovellis  failed  to exhaust  his  administrative remedies,

            because  his EEO complaint alleged nothing about retaliation.

            The court  rejected the retaliation  claim under ADEA  on the

            merits (the  government had  waived exhaustion  as to  ADEA).

            The court  concluded that  DeNovellis failed  to present  any

                                
            ____________________

            2.  DeNovellis also presented  to the district court  a claim
            that he  was  denied the  opportunity  to be  considered  for
            promotion to the  DRA position in the new  agency (ACF) after
            Williams vacated  it in  December 1991.   He does  not pursue
            this claim on appeal. 

                                         -10-
                                          10

            evidence to establish  a causal connection between  his March

            1991 age discrimination  complaint against  Williams and  the

            February  1992  confiscation  of  his  computer by  Galligan.

            DeNovellis does not appeal this conclusion.

                      DeNovellis  pursues  three   arguments  on  appeal:

            (1) that he  is entitled  to the  remedies delineated in  the

            Civil  Rights Act of  1991 because  his pre-Act  and post-Act

            deprivation of duties  were part of one  continuing violation

            and the effects of his "employment purgatory" extended beyond

            the effective  date of the  Act; (2) that the  district court

            erred in requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies

            as to  post-detail deprivations  of duties  and hostile  work

            environment;  (3)  that  the district  court  was  obliged to

            provide him  with a declaratory  judgment and/or an  award of

            attorney's fees.

                                         II.

                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                      We  review  grants  of  summary  judgment  de novo.

            Dubois  v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273,
            ______     __________________________________

            1283 (1st Cir.  1996), cert. denied, 117 S.  Ct. 2510 (1997).
                                   ____________

            Summary  judgment   is  appropriate   when  "the   pleadings,

            depositions,  answers to  interrogatories, and  admissions on

            file,  together with the affidavits, if  any, show that there

            is no  genuine issue  as to  any material  fact and that  the

                                         -11-
                                          11

            moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of  law."3

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

                      "The very mission of the summary judgment procedure

            is to pierce the  pleadings and to assess the  proof in order

            to see whether there is a  genuine need for trial."  Fed.  R.

            Civ.  P. 56(e) advisory  committee's note to  1963 Amendment.

            The  moving  party  "bears   the  initial  responsibility  of

            informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

            identifying  those portions of [the record] which it believes

            demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

            Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Once the
            _____________    _______

            moving  party has properly  supported her motion  for summary

            judgment,  the burden  shifts to  the  nonmoving party,  with

            respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to

            demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his

            favor.   Id. at 322-25.   At this stage, the  nonmoving party
                     ___

            "may  not rest  upon  mere  allegation  or  denials  of  [the

            movant's] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing

            that there  is a genuine issue"  of material fact as  to each

            issue upon which  he would bear the ultimate  burden of proof

                                
            ____________________

            3.  A factual dispute is material if it has the potential to
            affect the outcome of the litigation under the applicable
            law; it is genuine if there is evidence sufficient to support
            rational resolution of the point in favor of the nonmoving
            party.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
                    ___ ________    ___________________
            248 (1986).

                                         -12-
                                          12

            at trial.   Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256;  see Celotex, 477 U.S.
                        ________                    ___ _______

            at 321-23.

                      Like the  district  court, in  deciding  a  summary

            judgment motion we are obliged to view the facts in the light

            most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable

            inferences in that party's favor.   Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1284.
                                                ______

            The test is  whether, as to each essential  element, there is

            "sufficient  evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury

            to return  a verdict  for  that party.   If  the evidence  is

            merely  colorable or is  not significantly probative, summary

            judgment  may be  granted."   Anderson,  477  U.S. at  249-50
                                          ________

            (citation omitted).  

                      Summary judgment is not "automatically preclude[d]"

            even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent

            are at issue.  Valles Velazquez v. Chardon, 736 F.2d 831, 833
                           ________________    _______

            (1st  Cir. 1984).   "[I]f the  non-moving party  rests merely

            upon  conclusory  allegations,   improbable  inferences,  and

            unsupported speculation," summary judgment may be appropriate

            even where  intent is an  issue.  Smith v.  Stratus Computer,
                                              _____     _________________

            Inc.,  40 F.3d  11, 12  (1st Cir.  1994) (internal  quotation
            ____

            marks  omitted).   Where, however,  the  nonmoving party  has

            produced more than  that, trial courts should  "use restraint

            in granting summary judgment" where  discriminatory animus is

            in  issue.     Valles  Velazquez,  736   F.2d  at  833;   see
                           _________________                          ___

            Stepanischen v.  Merchants Despatch Transp.  Corp., 722  F.2d
            ____________     _________________________________

                                         -13-
                                          13

            922,  928 (1st Cir. 1983) (courts are "particularly cautious"

            about granting summary judgment in such cases).

                                         III.

                     Landgraf and the Continuing Violation Issue
                     ___________________________________________

                      The  district court granted summary judgment to the

            government as to  pre-Act deprivation of  duties.  The  court

            correctly found that the  five-month assignment of DeNovellis

            to a  financial position for  which he had no  background and

            the concomitant deprivation of  meaningful duties constituted

            an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII.

            See  Blackie v.  Maine,  75  F.3d 716,  725  (1st Cir.  1996)
            ___  _________________

            (holding that  "tak[ing] something  of  consequence from  the

            employee,"   including   "divesting    her   of   significant

            responsibilities," constitutes an adverse employment action);

            see also  Collins v.  Illinois, 830 F.2d  692, 704  (7th Cir.
            ________  _______     ________

            1987).    The  court  also found  that  there  was sufficient

            evidence  in the  record to  create a  factual dispute  as to

            whether the sham  detail and the  deprivation of duties  were

            motivated  by illegal discrimination on Williams's part or by

            race-neutral  (and therefore  not  violative  of  Title  VII)

            personality  conflict  or  cronyism.   The  court  held that,

            although   DeNovellis  would  have  a  triable  issue  as  to

            liability for  pre-Act discrimination, he  had no right  to a

            remedy under the law as it existed prior to the 1991 Act.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

            plaintiffs  in  Title  VII cases  were  limited  to equitable

            remedies (including back  pay, reinstatement, and  injunctive

            relief).   Landgraf  v. USI  Film Prods.,  511 U.S.  244, 252
                       ________     ________________

            (1994).   The  Act,  which became  effective on  November 21,

            1991, amended Title VII, and "effect[ed] a major expansion in

            the    relief   available    to    victims   of    employment

            discrimination."  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 254-55.  The 1991 Act
                              ________

            created  a  right   on  the  part  of   individuals  alleging

            intentional unlawful  discrimination to  recover compensatory

            damages  "for   future  pecuniary  losses,   emotional  pain,

            suffering, inconvenience, mental  anguish, loss of  enjoyment

            of life, and other nonpecuniary  losses," as well as punitive

            damages.   42  U.S.C.     1981a(a)(1) &  (b)(3)  (1994);  see
                                                                      ___

            Morrison v. Carleton  Woolen Mills, Inc.,  108 F.3d 429,  437
            ________    ____________________________

            (1st Cir. 1997).  The Act  also gave Title VII plaintiffs the

            right to a  jury trial in cases where  they seek compensatory

            or  punitive damages.    42  U.S.C.    1981a(c).   These  new

            provisions,  however, do not  apply to conduct  that occurred

            before  the effective  date of  the Act,  November 21,  1991.

            Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 247, 286.
            ________

                      Applying Landgraf to the instant case, the district
                               ________

            court  concluded that, even  if DeNovellis were  to establish

            after trial that  his sham detail and  employment "purgatory"

            violated his rights under Title VII, he would not be entitled

                                         -15-
                                          15

            to any  remedy.   This is because  the sham  detail ended  in

            March  1991, prior  to the  effective date  of the  1991 Act.

            Therefore,  even if  liability were found  after trial  as to

            that detail, the only remedies that would have been available

            to DeNovellis  were equitable,  such  as reinstatement,  back

            pay, or  an injunction.   As the district court  analyzed the

            remedies for  pre-Act conduct:  because  DeNovellis "suffered

            no loss of pay, he may  not recover back pay; because he  did

            not quit  his job, he does not  seek reinstatement.  There is

            no possibility  of  enjoining Williams  from  future  details

            because he  is no longer  in the office, and  DeNovellis does

            not  seek  an injunction  against  details by  Galligan.   In

            short, the five-month detail ending in the spring of 1991, if

            based  upon illegal  discrimination, was  a  wrong without  a

            remedy."    As to  the  post-Act deprivation  of  duties, the

            district  court  found  insufficient  evidence  to  create  a

            triable issue as  to discriminatory intent.   DeNovellis does

            not directly appeal the latter determination.

                      Instead, DeNovellis takes  issue with both rulings,

            pre-Act  and  post-Act,  by essentially  conflating  the two.

            DeNovellis argues  that he  was  the victim  of a  continuing

            violation  that began before November 21, 1991, and continued

            thereafter, entitling him  to compensatory damages under  the

            1991  Act.  A related  continuing violation argument has been

            applied   to  other   time   requirements  imposed   by   the

                                         -16-
                                          16

            antidiscrimination laws,4 but the  theory on which DeNovellis

            bases his argument is not one that the courts have approved.

                      We  have   delineated  two   types  of   continuing

            violation cases:   systemic and serial.   Pilgrim v. Trustees
                                                      _______    ________

            of Tufts  College, 118 F.3d 864,  ___, 1997 WL 370286,  at *3
            _________________

            (1st  Cir.  1997);  see Barbara  Lindemann  &  Paul Grossman,
                                ___

            Employment  Discrimination  Law  1351-63 (3d  ed.  1996).   A
            _______________________________

            systemic violation usually "has its roots in a discriminatory

            policy or practice; so long  as the policy or practice itself

            continues into  the limitation  period, a  challenger may  be

            deemed to have filed a timely complaint," even if he fails to

            show  "an   identifiable  discrete   act  of   discrimination

            transpiring within  the period."   Jensen v. Frank,  912 F.2d
                                               ______    _____

            517, 523 (1st Cir. 1990).

                      DeNovellis does not argue that there was a systemic

            violation  here.    Rather,  he  argues  (A)  that  a  serial

            violation  occurred; (B) that  the continuing effects  of his

            pre-Act  deprivation  of  duties   constituted  a  continuing

            violation;  and (C)  that he  was  subjected to  a continuing

            hostile  work environment.   We  will address  each of  these

            arguments in turn.

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The issue usually  arises in the context of  a statute of
            limitations challenge.   See, e.g., United Airlines,  Inc. v.
                                     _________  _________________________
            Evans, 431  U.S.  553 (1977).    But a  continuing  violation
            _____
            theory could be  applied to any  time requirement imposed  by
            Title VII,  whether it be  the effective date of  an amending
            statute, as here, or a statute of limitations, as in Evans.
                                                                 _____

                                         -17-
                                          17

                                 A.  Serial Violation
                                     ________________

                      A  serial violation  "is composed  of  a number  of

            discriminatory acts  emanating from  the same  discriminatory

            animus,  each act  constituting  a separate  wrong actionable

            under Title  VII."  Jensen,  912 F.2d  at 522; Mack  v. Great
                                ______                     ____     _____

            Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,  871 F.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir.  1989).  To
            ___________________

            state  a claim  under  this  type  of  continuing  violation,

            DeNovellis would  have to show  that at least  one actionable

            violation  occurred  within the  relevant  time  period, even

            though the series  had begun prior to November 21, 1991.  See
                                                                      ___

            id.; Pilgrim,  118 F.3d at  ___, 1997 WL  370286, at *3.   He
            ___  _______

            could then be awarded the remedies made available in the 1991

            Act.  Cf. Sabree  v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 921
                  ___ ______     ___________________________________

            F.2d  396, 401  (1st  Cir. 1990)  (In a  continuing violation

            case, back  pay remedy  "may be based  on acts  that occurred

            prior  to the limitations  period when  a violation  has been

            established by an act within the period.").  We   must   ask,

            therefore,  whether  DeNovellis's   post-Act  deprivation  of

            duties constituted one  or more separate violations  of Title

            VII.  To show an  actionable violation, DeNovellis would have

            to  satisfy   the  familiar   three-step  McDonnell   Douglas
                                                      ___________________

            framework for analyzing discrimination claims.  See McDonnell
                                                            ___ _________

            Douglas   Corp.  v.  Green,  411  U.S.  792,  802-05  (1973);
            _______________      _____

            Lattimore  v.  Polaroid Corp.,  99  F.3d 456,  465  (1st Cir.
            _________      ______________

            1996).  Of  critical importance here, he would  have to offer

                                         -18-
                                          18

            facts,  at an  evidentiary level  sufficient  to withstand  a

            motion for summary judgment, showing that the alleged adverse

            employment action  was  motivated by  discrimination  on  the

            basis  of his  race, national  origin,  or age  (for an  ADEA

            violation).   See St.  Mary's Honor Ctr.  v. Hicks,  509 U.S.
                          ___ ______________________     _____

            502, 511 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
                             ________________________________    _______

            450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The ultimate  burden of persuading

            the   trier  of   fact  that   the  defendant   intentionally

            discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with

            the   plaintiff").      Of   course,   direct   evidence   of

            discriminatory  intent  is   often  hard  to  come   by,  and

            circumstantial  evidence is often  the only means  of proving

            such intent.  See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
                          ___ ___________________________________________

            v. Aikens,  460 U.S. 711,  716 (1983); Lindemann  & Grossman,
               ______

            supra,  at 11.  As  the Court noted  in Hicks, DeNovellis may
            _____                                   _____

            show  discriminatory  motive by  circumstantial means:   "The

            factfinder's  disbelief of  the reasons  put  forward by  the

            defendant  (particularly if  disbelief  is accompanied  by  a

            suspicion  of mendacity) may,  together with the  elements of

            the   prima   facie   case,  suffice   to   show  intentional

            discrimination.  Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered

            reasons will  permit [but not  require] the trier of  fact to
                          ______

            infer the ultimate  fact of intentional discrimination,  and,

            . . .  upon   such   rejection,  no   additional   proof   of

            discrimination   is  required."    Hicks,  509  U.S.  at  511
                                 ________      _____

                                         -19-
                                          19

            (footnote  and internal  quotation marks  omitted); see  also
                                                                _________

            Burdine,  450 U.S.  at  256  (plaintiff  may  succeed  either
            _______

            directly  or  "indirectly  by  showing  that  the  employer's

            proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."). 

                      "[A]t  the  summary  judgment  stage  the   judge's

            function is not  himself [or herself]  to weigh the  evidence

            and  determine  the  truth  of the  matter  but  to determine

            whether there is  a genuine issue for trial."   Anderson, 477
                                                            ________

            U.S. at 249.  The district court found that DeNovellis failed

            to  offer sufficient evidence,  direct or  circumstantial, to

            meet his  burden, even at  the summary judgment stage  of the

            litigation,   of   providing    substantive   evidence   that

            discrimination  was a factor  in his post-Act  deprivation of

            duties.  

                      DeNovellis does not seriously  contest that finding

            on appeal.   Nor could he:  the  record in this case presents

            qualitatively different  scenarios  for the  pre-Act and  the

            post-Act  periods.  The  district court correctly  found that

            there was enough  evidence of possible  discriminatory animus

            between Williams  and DeNovellis that  a jury could  find the

            pre-Act detail was  motivated by discrimination and  not mere

            personality  differences or cronyism.   But once  that detail

            ended and  Williams was no  longer in charge of  the Regional

            Office, the reasons for DeNovellis's assignments were neither

            analogous nor part of the  same pattern or series.  There  is

                                         -20-
                                          20

            precious little  evidence or inference  to get to a  trier of

            fact  on   discriminatory  motive  for   post-Act  employment

            decisions.  Of course, discrimination is not precluded merely

            because  Williams was no longer in charge.  Nor does the fact

            that  Galligan is white insulate the  defendant from a charge

            that  Galligan's actions were motivated  by race.  After all,

            for  the  first  eight  months of  Galligan's  tenure  as RA,

            Williams was  Galligan's deputy.  Galligan, as the new person

            in the  office, might  very well have  given great  weight to

            Williams's    allegedly    biased    recommendations    about

            reassignment    of   subordinate    personnel   during    the

            reorganization, transition, and realignments.  But DeNovellis

            presented no  evidence of  such discriminatory taint,  either

            directly or by inference.  

                      Indeed,  there   is  evidence   to  the   contrary.

            Bureaucratic  delays arising  from the  reorganization, which

            indisputably  had nothing  to  do  with  DeNovellis  or  with

            invidious  characteristics,  overtook  DeNovellis's  personal

            situation.   Further, at  his  deposition, DeNovellis  denied

            that  any of Galligan's  actions were motivated  by invidious

            discrimination   in  any   decision  affecting   DeNovellis's

            employment.  And DeNovellis  himself attributed a significant

            part of the delay in assigning him to a permanent position in

            the  new agency to his own error  in judgment:  the "position

            paper" that he wrote and  widely disseminated.  The  district

                                         -21-
                                          21

            court  correctly concluded  that  the  record  in  this  case

            contains  virtually  no  evidence  of  post-Act   violations.

            Therefore,  DeNovellis  cannot  rely  on  a serial  violation

            theory to defeat the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.

                                B.  Continuing Effects
                                    __________________

                      DeNovellis also argues another theory to circumvent

            Landgraf:   that the  pre-Act sham  assignment constituted  a
            ________

            continuing   violation   through  its   continuing   effects.

            Although the assignment itself was a discrete action that was

            over  and  done  with before  November  21,  1991, DeNovellis

            emphasizes  that  its  effects  continued  into  the post-Act
                                   _______

            period.  According to DeNovellis, these post-Act effects turn

            the pre-Act discrimination into  a continuing violation  that

            continued  post-Act,   thereby  triggering  the   1991  Act's

            remedies.   But continuing effects, without  additional post-

            Act  discriminatory actions, do  not turn a  discrete pre-Act

            decision into  a continuing violation.  See United Air Lines,
                                                    ___ _________________

            Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
            ____    _____

                      At one time,  it was thought that  this "continuing

            effects" theory described  a viable third type  of continuing

            violation   case,  in   addition  to   systemic  and   serial

            violations.  But the  Court has made it clear that  the focus

            of the  inquiry in continuing  violation cases  should be  on

            "whether any present violation exists," not whether there are

            residual  effects of past discriminatory conduct to which the

                                         -22-
                                          22

            statute does not  apply.  Id. (holding that  a discriminatory
                                      ___

            act, not  merely the  effects of  a past  discriminatory act,
                                  _______       ____

            must occur within the statute of limitations period of  Title

            VII); see Delaware State College  v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258
                  ___ ______________________     _____

            (1980); Sabree,  921 F.2d  at 400.   "[A] court  evaluating a
                    ______

            'continuing violation'  argument must  distinguish between  a

            continuing violation and  the continuing effects of  a prior,

            yet discrete  and no  longer existent,  discriminatory act."5

            Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce, 741 F.2d 464, 469 (1st Cir. 1984);
            _______    ______________

            see Pilgrim,  slip op. at  9; Kassaye v. Bryant  College, 999
            ___ _______                   _______    _______________

            F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1993). 

                      We  recently rejected a plaintiff's theory that the

            failure to restore her to her prior position formed part of a

            continuous  chain of  misconduct  extending  beyond the  time

            deadline.   Morrison, 108  F.3d at  443.   We  held that  the
                        ________

            employer's "inaction [was]  not enough."  Id.   We pointed to
                                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            5.  We  note that  this  is  a rule  governing  what kind  of
            conduct creates liability, not a rule of evidence.  Past acts
            of discrimination may constitute relevant background evidence
            and therefore  may be  admissible at trial.   See  Evans, 431
                                                          ___  _____
            U.S. at 558; Sabree, 921 F.2d at 400 n.9, 402. 
                         ______

                      Moreover,  although not  considered in  determining
            liability, the  continuing effects of  discriminatory conduct
            are  considered at  the relief stage  if liability  is found.
            "The objective of  fashioning an appropriate remedy  in Title
            VII cases is  to formulate the most  complete relief possible
            to eliminate  the effects  of discrimination."   Sabree,  921
                                                             ______
            F.2d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Albemarle
                                                            ___ _________
            Paper  Co. v.  Moody, 422  U.S.  405, 418-21  (1975) (To  the
            __________     _____
            extent  consistent   with  statutory   limitations,  once   a
            violation of  Title VII has  been found, it is  important for
            courts to fashion "make whole" relief.). 

                                         -23-
                                          23

            what we had said in a somewhat analogous situation:  "'it was

            incumbent  upon [the plaintiff]  to allege facts  giving some

            indication  that the later  refusals were themselves separate

            . . .  violations.'"   Valles  Velazquez,  736  F.2d  at  833
                                   _________________

            (quoting Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018
                     _______    ____________________

            (1st Cir. 1979)).  The  same reasoning applies to the instant

            case.   Even  though DeNovellis's  sham detail  had not  been

            remedied by the  time the Act became effective,  the focus at

            the liability stage  of our inquiry is the  date the employer

            made the  allegedly  discriminatory decision  to detail  him,

            even though the decision's effects still persisted after that

            effective date.  See De Leon Otero v. Rubero, 820 F.2d 18, 20
                             ___ _____________    ______

            (1st Cir. 1987) (Defendants'  refusal to reinstate  plaintiff

            "was  not a  separate  act of  discrimination,  but rather  a

            consequence of his initial demotion."); Valles Velasquez, 736
                                                    ________________

            F.2d  at  833  (demotion  followed  by  defendant's  repeated

            refusals   to  reinstate  plaintiff   did  not  constitute  a

            continuing violation);  Goldman, 607 F.2d  at 1018-19 (denial
                                    _______

            of requests to  be retransferred back to  original department

            after  allegedly  discriminatory  initial  transfer  did  not

            constitute  a  continuing  violation).     We  conclude  that

            DeNovellis's   continuing   effects   argument   is   legally

            insufficient.

                             C.  Hostile Work Environment
                                 ________________________

                                         -24-
                                          24

                      As his  final salvo  against the  Landgraf bulwark,
                                                        ________

            DeNovellis  argues a theory of hostile work environment which

            would constitute  a continuing violation of Title  VII.6  See
                                                                      ___

            Mills v.  Amoco Performance Prods.,  Inc., 872 F.  Supp. 975,
            _________________________________________

            986 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (A "hostile environment sexual harassment

            claim is  an archetypal  continuing violation  claim.").   He

            cites  cases involving  sexual harassment  where courts  have

            concluded  that  the  allegations   "were  not  discrete  and

            independent acts of  sexual harassment .  . . but  additional

            components of  one cause  of action for  an alleged  sexually

            hostile  environment."   Mills,  872 F.  Supp. at  985.    "A
                                     _____

            hostile environment claim is a single cause of action  rather

            than  a sum total of a number  of mutually distinct causes of

                                
            ____________________

            6.  The government  argues that DeNovellis cannot  raise this
            hostile work environment  argument here because he  failed to
            allege  it in  his  complaint.   That  view misconstrues  the
            purpose  of the complaint  in federal litigation.   Under the
            concept  of notice  pleading, a  complaint  need not  clearly
            articulate  the  precise  legal   theories  upon  which   the
            plaintiff bases  his right to  recovery.  The  complaint must
            simply  "'give  the   defendant  fair  notice  of   what  the
            plaintiff's  claim is and the grounds  upon which it rests.'"
            Baldwin County Welcome  Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.  147, 150 n.3
            _____________________________________
            (1984) (quoting Conley  v. Gibson, 355  U.S. 41, 47  (1957)).
                            _________________
            The plaintiff in the present case made clear in his complaint
            the  types of adverse  action he  was alleging  (sham detail,
            derogatory comments), and set forth the  discriminatory basis
            that he  claimed for  those actions  (race, national  origin,
            age), in  violation of Title VII and the  ADEA.  As for legal
            theories, he then put his continuing hostile work environment
            theory  before the district  court when the  court considered
            the  defendant's motion  for summary  judgment  (albeit in  a
            reply brief).  That is  sufficient to enable the plaintiff to
            argue that theory  on appeal.  Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce, 741
                                           _______    ______________
            F.2d 464, 468 n.12 (1st Cir. 1984).

                                         -25-
                                          25

            action to  be  judged each  on  its own  merits."   Vance  v.
                                                                _____

            Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir.
            _____________________________

            1989).  The  Mills court therefore  allowed the plaintiff  to
                         _____

            seek  recovery of compensatory  and punitive damages  for any

            post-Act conduct amounting  to sexual harassment  under Title

            VII.  Id.  
                  ___

                      Although  DeNovellis does  not discuss  them, other

            courts have  allowed Title  VII claims  for harassment  other

            than  sexual  harassment.   See  Lattimore, 99  F.3d  at 463;
                                        ___  _________

            Lindemann & Grossman, supra, at 749-54.  Indeed, until recent
                                  _____

            years, one of  the most common forms of  harassment claim was

            verbal  abuse,  such as  racial  epithets.   See  Lindemann &
                                                         ___

            Grossman,  supra, at 749-54.  Harassment may also  consist of
                       _____

            pranks and other forms of hazing, even without  racial slurs,

            although, in such  cases, "courts look especially  closely to

            see  whether the conduct  is in  fact racially  [or otherwise

            invidiously] motivated."  Id. at 753. 
                                      ___

                      Not  all   offensive  conduct   is  actionable   as

            harassment; trivial  offenses do  not suffice.   See  Meritor
                                                             ___  _______

            Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.  57, 67 (1986).  The Court  has
            _________    ______

            ruled  that, in  order to  establish  a Title  VII claim  for

            sexual  harassment under  a hostile  environment theory,  the

            conduct must be  "'sufficiently severe or pervasive  to alter

            the  conditions  of  the victim's  employment  and  create an

            abusive  [or  hostile]  working  environment.'"    Harris  v.
                                                               ______

                                         -26-
                                          26

            Forklift  Sys., Inc.,  510 U.S.  17,  21 (1993)  (quoting Los
            ____________________                                      ___

            Angeles Dep't of Water  & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
            _______________________________    _______

            n. 13  (1978)); see Vinson,  477 U.S. at 67;  Carleton Woolen
                            ___ ______                    _______________

            Mills, 108 F.3d at 439.
            _____

                      In determining  whether harassment  on  the job  is

            sufficiently severe  or pervasive to  rise to the level  of a

            Title VII  violation, courts look  to the gravity as  well as

            the frequency  of the offensive  conduct.  See,  e.g., Vance,
                                                       __________  _____

            863 F.2d at 1510-11  (noose hanging from light  fixture above

            employee's work  station  twice was  sufficient to  establish

            harassment  violation).   Guidelines  published by  the Equal

            Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)  require that sexual

            harassment be severe  enough to alter the  victim's workplace

            experience  (even  if  the  conduct  only  occurs  once),  or

            pervasive  enough to  become  a  defining  condition  of  the

            workplace.  EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual  Harassment, 8 FEP

            Man. at  405:6689; see Lindemann  & Grossman, supra,  at 794.
                               ___                        _____

            Sexual harassment can  be severe  enough to  be illegal  even

            without  tangible effects on job performance or psychological

            well-being.  Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
                         ______

                      DeNovellis's  reliance on  sexual harassment  cases

            such as  Mills is  misplaced because  the situations  are not
                     _____

            analogous.  Mills and other sexual harassment cases involve a
                        _____

            pervasive  and  continuing  hostile  work environment,  which

            constitutes  a  continuing  violation,  akin  to  a  systemic

                                         -27-
                                          27

            (continuing practice)  violation.  In  contrast, DeNovellis's

            allegations  of  "purgatory" job  assignments  set  forth, at

            best,  allegations as to  discrete and independent employment

            decisions,  however adverse.   Such claims are  not pervasive

            enough  to  be  considered as  one  continuous  imposition of

            hostile  work  environment, analogous  to  sexual harassment.

            Nor  is  a  "purgatory"  assignment  sufficiently  severe  to

            constitute,  by itself,  a  hostile  work  environment.    As

            previously noted, the fact that  DeNovellis remained assigned

            to  "purgatory" cannot constitute  a post-Act violation, even

            though the effects of that assignment decision were prolonged

            into the post-Act period by the bureaucratic delays emanating

            from the  agency's reorganization.   See  Evans, 431  U.S. at
                                                 ___  _____

            558; see Part III.A., supra.
                 ___              _____

                      DeNovellis correctly points out that the court must

            focus on the work atmosphere as a whole, and not separate out

            each  demeaning  work  assignment  or  derogatory remark  for

            individual   analysis.    See   Vance,  863  F.2d   at  1510.
                                      ___   _____

            Nevertheless,  the  question is  whether  he produced  enough

            evidence on  the entire summary  judgment record to  enable a

            reasonable  trier  of  fact  to  find  a  cognizable  hostile

            environment claim.  We agree  with the district court that he

            did not. 

                      Williams and  others  at HHS  apparently made  some

            scattered  comments  that  could  be  construed  as  evincing

                                         -28-
                                          28

            racial,  ethnic, or age-based hostility, although some of the

            comments   in  the  record  were  not  made  in  DeNovellis's

            presence.  DeNovellis does not argue that these comments were

            severe  or pervasive, nor does he claim that they rise to the

            level of sufficiency necessary to make out a prima facie case

            of harassment.  Rather, he appears to offer them as probative

            of discriminatory motive underlying his job assignments.

                      The  major  aspect  of his  work  environment  that

            DeNovellis  claims was  hostile or  "harassing"  was his  so-

            called "employment purgatory" of job assignments to positions

            he considered to be unfit for his level of qualification.  As

            already  noted, the  "hostile"  aspect  of  remaining  in  an

            undesirable  job  assignment  is  not  akin  to  a  pervasive

            environment  claim; it  is  a  discrete employment  decision,

            however adverse it may  be.  Even when this  is combined with

            the derogatory comments, we do not think a fact-finder, based

            on  this record, could  reasonably conclude that DeNovellis's

            work environment was so pervaded with  racial, ethnic, or age

            discrimination  so as to constitute a violation of Title VII.

                      That DeNovellis would  be left without a  remedy if

            we affirm  the district court's decision is  not a sufficient

            reason to  warrant reversal.   The Court in Landgraf  was not
                                                        ________

            moved  by petitioner's argument  there that, "if  she [could]

            not obtain damages pursuant to [the 1991 Act], she [would] be

            left  remediless despite an  adjudged violation of  her right

                                         -29-
                                          29

            under Title VII to be free of workplace discrimination."  511

            U.S. at 285  n.38.  As the  Court put it, Title  VII "did not

            create   a   'general   right   to   sue'    for   employment

            discrimination, but instead specified a set of 'circumscribed

            remedies,'"  and "[u]ntil the  1991 amendment, the  Title VII

            scheme did not allow for damages.  We are not free to fashion

            remedies  that  Congress  has   specifically  chosen  not  to

            extend."  Id. (quoting United  States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
                      ___          ______________    _____

            240 (1992)).   DeNovellis's lack  of a remedy (even  if there

            were a violation) is a result of the way Congress had drafted

            Title VII  prior to the  1991 Act; whatever  unfairness arose

            from that  limited remedial  scheme  affected all  plaintiffs

            suing under it.  

                                         IV.

                        Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
                        _____________________________________

                      DeNovellis argues that the district  court erred in

            dismissing his post-detail deprivation of duties  and hostile

            environment  claims   because  he  failed   to  exhaust   his

            administrative   remedies.     DeNovellis  misconstrues   the

            district court's decision.   The court did  not grant summary

            judgment   against  him  based  on  his  failure  to  exhaust

            administrative  remedies.    With  respect  to  the  post-Act

            deprivation  of  duties  the district  court  stated  that "a

            strong argument" could be made  that he has not exhausted his

            Title  VII claim,  but the  court did  not decide  the issue.

                                         -30-
                                          30

            Moreover, with respect to his claim under the ADEA, the court

            noted  that  the   government  had   waived  any   exhaustion

            argument.7     The  district   court  decided   the  post-Act

            deprivation  of duties  claim on  the  basis that  DeNovellis

            failed   to  produce   evidence  to   support   a  claim   of

            discrimination, sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

                      The  district court  rejected DeNovellis's  hostile

            work  environment claim  based on  the same reasoning  as the

            pre-Act deprivation of duties (a possible wrong but without a

            remedy).   The court  added one sentence  stating failure  to

            exhaust  as an alternative  ground for rejecting  this claim,

            but we need not address that here because we affirm based  on

            DeNovellis's failure to  demonstrate a genuine issue  as to a

            severe or pervasive hostile environment.   

                      Thus,  we  need not  reach  DeNovellis's exhaustion

            argument  because  we  uphold  the district  court's  summary

            judgment ruling  as to Title  VII and the  ADEA based  on its

            reasons other than exhaustion.  

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The  government takes the position that the ADEA does not
            require  a  federal employee  to  exhaust his  administrative
            remedies.  The  Supreme Court has held,  in the context of  a
            private   employer,   that   "filing  a   timely   charge  of
            discrimination   with  the  EEOC   is  not  a  jurisdictional
            prerequisite  to suit  in federal  court,  but a  requirement
            that, like  a statute of  limitations, is subject  to waiver,
            estoppel,  and  equitable  tolling."   Zipes  v.  Trans World
                                                   _____      ___________
            Airlines, Inc.,  455 U.S. 385,  393 (1982).   Quite  possibly
            ______________
            Zipes should  apply as  well when a  federal employee  sues a
            _____
            federal agency, see Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1059-60
                            ___ ______    _______
            (7th Cir.  1990) (citing cases);  but we need not  decide the
            point definitively in the present case.

                                         -31-
                                          31

                                         -32-
                                          32

                                          V.

                        Declaratory Relief and Attorney's Fees
                        ______________________________________

                      Finally, DeNovellis argues that  the district court

            should  have awarded  him  declaratory relief  and attorney's

            fees.  His  reasoning, however, is based on  a false premise.

            DeNovellis asserts that the district court 

                      ruled as a matter of law that DeNovellis'
                      "five-month  assignment  to  a  financial
                      position for  which he had  no background
                      was not  only a  set-up  for failure  but
                      also   an   adverse   employment  action"
                      motivated by illegal discrimination based
                      upon age, race or ethnicity.

            The  internal quotations  accurately  reproduce the  district

            court's conclusion as  to the legal  question of whether  the

            sham  assignment  constituted  an adverse  employment  action

            within the meaning  of Title VII and the  ADEA.  DeNovellis's

            assertion    after   the    internal   quotation,    however,

            misrepresents what the district court found.  

                      The  court  held  that  DeNovellis  had   presented

            sufficient evidence on the intent issue  to survive a summary

            judgment motion as to his pre-Act deprivation of duties.  The

            court  did  not  make  a conclusive  factual  finding  as  to

            discriminatory intent; that question would be resolved by the

            trier of fact if the matter went to trial.  The court granted

            the Secretary's motion for summary judgment because the court

            found that DeNovellis would not  be entitled to a remedy even

            if the case  went to trial and  he were able to  persuade the

                                         -33-
                                          33

            trier   of  fact  that  the  defendant  was  motivated  by  a

            discriminatory intent.

                      The difference between what the court actually held

            and what DeNovellis  claims it held is fatal  to his argument

            that  the court  was  obligated to  award  him a  declaratory

            judgment and attorney's fees.8  If DeNovellis were correct in

            his characterization of  the posture of the case  -- that the

            district   court  had  already  made  a  factual  finding  of

            discriminatory  intent --  then the  court  would still  have

            discretion  as to whether  to grant declaratory  relief after

            finding  discrimination  at   trial.    But  at   least  then

            DeNovellis  might be  able to persuade  us that  the district

            court abused its discretion in denying him declaratory relief

            and fees.  

                      The Declaratory  Judgment Act is "an  enabling Act,

            which confers  a  discretion on  the  courts rather  than  an

            absolute   right  upon  the   litigant";  courts  have  broad

            discretion  to  decline  to  enter  a  declaratory  judgment.

            Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,  515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (quoting
            ______    _______________

            Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.  237, 241
            ___________________________    __________

            (1952)).  "By  the Declaratory Judgment Act,  Congress sought

                                
            ____________________

            8.  Although  his  complaint  did   not  seek  a  declaratory
            judgment,  DeNovellis argues that the court had the authority
            to award such relief under his final prayer for relief, which
            sought  "such other  and further  relief as  may be  just and
            proper."   He  is correct  on this  point, but we  reject his
            declaratory judgment argument on other grounds.

                                         -34-
                                          34

            to place a remedial arrow  in the district court's quiver; it

            created an  opportunity, rather than  a duty, to grant  a new

            form of relief to qualifying litigants.  Consistent with  the

            nonobligatory  nature  of  the remedy,  a  district  court is

            authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, . . . to

            dismiss  an action  seeking  a  declaratory  judgment  before

            trial."  Wilton,  515 U.S. at 288.   Although "federal courts
                     ______

            have  a 'virtually  unflagging  obligation'  to exercise  the

            jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress," a district court

            may "nonetheless abstain from the assumption  of jurisdiction

            over a suit  in 'exceptional' circumstances" such  as where a

            declaratory judgment is  sought regarding an  issue currently

            pending in a  state court  action.  Wilton,  515 U.S. at  284
                                                ______

            (quoting Colorado  River Water  Conservation Dist.  v. United
                     _________________________________________     ______

            States, 424 U.S.  800, 813, 817-18, 818-20 (1976)).   "In the
            ______

            declaratory  judgment  context,  the  normal  principle  that

            federal  courts   should  adjudicate   claims  within   their

            jurisdiction  yields  to considerations  of  practicality and

            wise judicial administration."  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.  But
                                            ______                    ___

            see  Steffel v.  Thompson, 415  U.S. 452,  468 (1974)  ("'[A]
            ___  ____________________

            federal  district   court  has   the  duty   to  decide   the

            appropriateness  and the  merits of  the declaratory  request

            irrespective of  its conclusion as  to the  propriety of  the

            issuance of [a requested] injunction.'") (quoting Zwickler v.
                                                              ________

            Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254  (1967)); Frankfurter & Landis,  The
            _____                                                     ___

                                         -35-
                                          35

            Business of  the  Supreme  Court:  A  Study  of  the  Federal
            _____________________________________________________________

            Judicial System 65  (The federal courts are  "the primary and
            _______________

            powerful reliances for  vindicating every right given  by the

            Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.").

                      The standard of  appellate review of a  decision as

            to  declaratory relief is  whether the district  court abused

            its  discretion.   Wilton, 515  U.S. at  289.   Thus,  if the
                               ______

            district  court  actually  found  discriminatory  intent   in

            DeNovellis's deprivation  of duties,  we might  or might  not

            find that the denial of a  declaration to that effect was  an

            abuse  of  discretion.   Cf.  Metropolitan  Stevedore  Co. v.
                                     ___  ____________________________

            Rambo, 117  S. Ct. 1953 (1997) (nominal  damages permitted in
            _____

            Longshore  and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act case in order

            to preserve right to receive future benefits).

                      Because the district court  found that the question

            of  discriminatory  intent  was  a   triable  issue,  without

            reaching  any conclusion as  to whether such  intent actually

            existed, our review of its denial of declaratory relief is in

            a  different posture.   The  court  faced the  possibility of

            conducting  a trial  in this  case,  assessing arguments  and

            counter-arguments  as  to  what people  intended  by  certain

            statements  or  actions,  with no  opportunity  to  award any

            relief to DeNovellis that would remedy the harm  he allegedly

            suffered.   After trial,  the court  might possibly have  the

            authority  to enter  a declaration  that some  or all  of the

                                         -36-
                                          36

            defendant's    now-terminated    employment    actions   were

            discriminatory.    In  the circumstances  of  this  case, the

            district  court's decision  -- prior to  trial --  to refrain

            from such a  fruitless endeavor was within  its discretionary

            power.  See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.
                    ___ ______

                      Because  DeNovellis   has  no   entitlement  to   a

            declaratory  judgment and because we have affirmed the denial

            of other  relief, he has  not prevailed  on any issue  in the

            case and attorney's fees may not be awarded.  See 42 U.S.C.  
                                                          ___

            1988;  Texas  State  Teachers Ass'n  v.  Garland  Indep. Sch.
                   ____________________________      ____________________

            Dist.,  489  U.S.  782,  791-92   (1989)  (A  litigant  is  a
            _____

            prevailing party  if he  "has succeeded  on 'any  significant

            issue in litigation which achieve[d]  some of the benefit the

            parties sought in bringing  suit.'") (alteration in original)

            (quoting  Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581  F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
                      ______    ________

            1978)).

                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      Title  VII  and our  other  antidiscrimination laws

            serve essential societal goals.  See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
                                             ___ ______

            If America stands  for anything in the world,  it is fairness

            to all, without regard to race, sex, ethnicity, age, or other

            immutable characteristics that  a person does not  choose and

            cannot change.   We have  recently had occasion to  note that

            "Title VII is one  of the brightest stars in the firmament of

            this   nation's  antidiscrimination   laws."     Serapion  v.
                                                             ________

                                         -37-
                                          37

            Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 1997 WL 394605, at *2 (1st  Cir.
            ________

            July 18, 1997).  

                      The  standards  for  summary  judgment  are  highly

            favorable to the party opposing  such a motion, and issues of

            motive  often present fair factual disputes properly resolved

            by a factfinder  after trial.  Nevertheless, in this instance

            the  dearth  of  evidence  is simply  too  great  and summary

            judgment was properly granted.

                      The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.
                                                            Affirmed
                                                            ________

                                         -38-
                                          38