Court Opinion

ID: 9753122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:58:19.808856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:30.145362
License: Public Domain

Erancis, J.
(concurring). The Legislature adopted the Civil Service Acts in order to provide “a modern personnel system” for positions in the classified service of the State, counties and municipalities. R. 8. 11:4^1, 11:19-2, 11:21-4. The Civil Service Commission was created and given general authority to prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations in order to effectuate that statutory purpose. N. J. 8. A. 11:1-1, R- 8. 11:1 — 7. The Commission was empowered also to “secure compliance [with its rules] both within the service of the state, and a county, municipality, or school district operating under the provisions of subtitle 3 of this title (§ 11:19-1 et seq.).” R. 8. ll:l-7(d).
Pursuant to the authorization, the Commission adopted Rule 53, entitled “Transfers in state and local government services.” So far as pertinent it provides as follows:
“1. Transfers may te made as foliotes:
* 1¡C * $ * íj¡ :¡< , #
(e) The transfer of an employee for a temporary period not to exceed six months from one class in a department, institution or organization unit, to the same or another class in another department, institution or organization unit may be made in order to bring about a better distribution of persons in the service or to effect economies * * &."
*324In. the absence of any plainly restrictive statutory declaration, the broad language of that rule would authorize the Sheriff to make a temporary transfer or assignment of a court attendant to act as a jail keeper, when in his discretion circumstances (such as vacation periods, temporary shortage or inadequate numbers of jail keepers, etc.) warrant such action in the public interest. I find no such restriction. It is suggested that B. 8. 11:22-12 which provides
“No person shall be appointed or employed under any title not appropriate to the duties to be performed nor assigned to perform duties other than those properly pertaining to the position which he legally holds.”
stands in the way of the Sheriff’s action here. In the framework of the entire Civil Service legislation this section may be construed reasonably to refer to and forbid the permanent assignment of an employee to perform duties unrelated to the position he holds in the classified service. The same may reasonably be said of N. J. 8. A. 11:21-4 which provides:
“After the adoption of the civil service act of 1908 or this subtitle by any county, municipality or school district, no person shall be appointed, transferred, reinstated, promoted, reduced or dismissed as an officer, clerk, employee or laborer in the civil service of any such county, municipality or school district in any other manner or by any means other than those prescribed by this subtitle.”
It, too, must be read in the entire context of the statute which includes the specific grant of authority to the Commission to adopt rules and regulations so as to bring employment in the public service within the description of a "modern personnel system.”
B. 8. 11:11 — 3, relating to the State service, says that the "chief examiner and secretary shall provide ly rule, approved by the commission,” for the periodical or occasional transfer of employees for a period not to exceed six months "without regard to class or department, * * * in order to better the. distribution” of personnel or to effect economies. (Em*325phasis added) It does not follow from the fact that this section is part of the over-all legislation relating to the State service that the Legislature intended to limit the rule-making power to temporary transfers of Slate employees. Certainly there is no express statement to that effect. A fair implication is that the lawmakers desired to impose a mandate to adopt a broad and general type of rule dealing with the subject on the State scene but to leave regulation of the matter in the county and municipal service to the discretion of the Commission. Rule 53, section 1(e) quoted in part above, was promulgated at least twelve and a half years ago. At no time over that period has the Legislature overruled it, nor so far as I can ascertain, has anyone ever attacked its validity.
The respondents contend that the statute relating to the appointment of court attendants indicates a legislative design to preclude any temporary assignment under Buie 53 to act as jail keepers. In support they rely upon N. J. S. 2A :ll-32 stating that the Sheriff shall appoint as many court attendants “as may be necessary to attend upon the law division of the superior court and the county court in his county and to perform the duties required to be performed by constables of the respective counties summoned to attend such courts.” They argue that the statutory language limits the activities to which they can be assigned, even temporarily, to those duties which historically were performed by constables. And they say that since traditionally constables were distinguished from jail keepers in duties as well as in name, the Legislature must have intended to perpetuate the distinction and to such an extent as to deprive the Sheriff of any authority to employ their services except in accordance with the ancient rite. Adoption of such a determination would permit anachronism to subvert the legislative design for a modern efficient personnel system. It ought not to be accepted unless no reasonable basis for a contrary view is to be found in the statute. This is particularly so since everyone concedes that there are *326periods of markedly lessened demand in the trial courts for the services of court attendants in the limited sense contended for here.
As has been indicated above, no express mandate for or against temporary transfer of county employees generally is to be found in the subtitle 3, B. S. 11:19-1 et seq. Absence of such a bar coupled with the obvious purpose of the law to fashion a comprehensive plan for the productive use of employees in the public service, and the bestowal by the Legislature of broad rule-making power to effectuate the plan, reasonably supports the conclusion that implied power of occasional transfer under the supervision of the Commission is authorized. The conclusion of implied general authorization for temporary transfer of county employees on the basis suggested is not overcome or negated, as respondents contend, by the language of N. J. 8. 2A:ll-32 relating to the appointment of court attendants, when considered in the light of other relevant statutes concerning such attendants. True, it directs appointment of as many as may be necessary to attend the superior and county courts and to perform the duties required to be performed by constables summoned to attend such courts. But it does not say such attendants shall not be given any duties other than those described when their services as court attendants in the limited sense contended for are not needed. In fact, the language of the lawmakers viewed against the historical background narrated in the majority opinion is reasonably susceptible of the conclusion that the initiation of N. J. 8. 2A:ll-32 was simply to authorize appointment of a necessary number of persons to attend the courts who would not have to he constables.
The only enactment relating to appointment of court attendants is N. J. 8. 2A:ll-32. Acceptance of the definition of “court attendants” in the restricted sense claimed by respondents would create an obvious inconsistency in other pertinent statutes. Eor example, in all the statutes fixing their pay schedules, the Legislature spoke of the compensation of “court attendants attached or assigned to the *327superior court, the county courts, the juvenile and domestic relations court and to the grand jury and to the various bureaus and departments in the office of the sheriffs of said counties or to such executive or official as may be in charge of such duties, * * (Emphasis added) See N. J. 8. 2A:ll-33, 34, 36. Moreover, there can be no doubt of the Legislature’s awareness that court attendants’ duties may include custody and handling of prisoners. N. J. 8. A. 40 :ll-4 prohibits discrimination against persons over 40 years of age who apply for employment in the service of any county or municipality. The protection does not apply to persons of that age who would be engaged in certain hazardous employments including “court attendants in first and second class counties whose duties require the custody and handling of prisoners .” (Emphasis added) As originally adopted, the act did not mention court attendants. L. 1930, c. 104. Those employed in first class counties were added by amendment in 1938, L. 1938, c. 336, and in second class counties by 1951 amendment, L. 1951, c. 62.
It should not escape attention that these various statutes contain no description of the nature of, or of any time limitations on, the custody and handling of prisoners by court attendants. But, assuming that temporary periods were meant, such as while prisoners were being taken by court attendants to and from the county jail for purposes of trial and other court proceedings, during the court proceedings, and while transporting them to various other penal and mental institutions, such fact would aid rather than impair the Sheriff’s position in this case. He does not seek the permanent imposition of duties of jail keeper on the court attendants. His position is that these men are accustomed to the frequent, though temporary, custody and handling of prisoners at a time when there is a greater danger to personal safety than when they are confined in cells. Therefore, he contends, it is not unreleated to the court attendants’ existing duties to assign them to guard prisoners for little longer periods when necessary during *328vacations, sickness and the like of the regular jail keepers. In my opinion, the spirit of the Civil Service legislation and of the various acts relating to court attendants is reasonably compatible with the temporary dutjr assignment contemplated, and reasonably demonstrates the existence of adequate authority to do so.
It is plain from Rule 53(1) (e) that the power of temporary transfer or assignment cannot be exercised arbitrarily or discriminatorily. In addition to the language set forth above, it provides:
“* at * [N]o employee shall be transferred or assigned as a result of such transfer to a position involving duties for which he is not qualified as indicated by his experience, training and record of service. Any employee who is unwilling to accept a transfer under these provisions shall have reasonable opportunity to be heard in his own behalf.”
Thus, a court attendant who is unwilling to accept a temporary assignment to the duties of jail keeper is entitled to be heard by the Sheriff, and the reasons for the unwillingness given consideration compatible with the fair administration of Rule 53. If the objections advanced are not deemed adequate and are overruled, the affected employee, on proper application, should be granted a review of the transfer order by the Civil Service Commission.
Under all the circumstances, therefore, I concur in the view that the Sheriff has the general authority to make a temporary transfer or assignment of court attendants for the purpose contemplated. Whether a particular attendant, or those who are parties to this action, should or may be subjected to such an order over his or their objection, should not be passed upon at this time. Those persons who are unwilling to accept a transfer are entitled to present their objections administratively as prescribed by Rule 53 before the judiciary should intervene.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial *329court for the entry of a declaratory judgment in conformity herewith.
Justice Hall concurs in this opinion.