Court Opinion

ID: 9882526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:09.103571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:38.072214
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.D., 2023-Ohio-2442.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               SENECA COUNTY

IN RE:

        A.D.,                                               CASE NO. 13-22-12

ADJUDGED DEPENDENT CHILD.

[SAMANTHA B. - APPELLANT]                                   OPINION
[MASON D. - APPELLANT]

                  Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
                                 Juvenile Division
                             Trial Court No. 22250011

                                        Judgment Affirmed

                              Date of Decision: July 17, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Andrew R. Schuman for Appellant, Stephanie B.

        Olivia A. Myers for Appellant, Mason D.

        Victor H. Perez for Appellee, Seneca Co. DJFS
Case No. 13-22-12

ZIMMERMAN, J.

        {¶1} Mother-appellant, Samantha B. (“Samantha”), and father-appellant,

Mason D. (“Mason”) (collectively “parents”), appeal the September 6, 2022,

judgment entry of the Seneca County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division,

granting legal custody of their child, A.D., to Mandy B. (“Mandy”) and James B.

(“James”) (A.D.’s maternal grandparents). For the reasons that follow, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.1

        {¶2} On March 4, 2022, the Seneca County Department of Job and Family

Services (the “Agency”) filed a complaint alleging A.D., who was born in 2021, to

be an abused, neglected, and/or a dependent child. With the complaint, the Agency

filed a motion requesting that the trial court grant emergency-temporary custody of

A.D. to her maternal grandparents. The trial court granted the request ex parte.

        {¶3} Thereafter, the trial court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) for

A.D. on March 7, 2022.

        {¶4} At the March 8, 2022 shelter-care hearing, the parents consented to a

finding of probable cause. Thereafter, trial court determined that probable cause

existed that A.D. was an abused, neglected, and dependent child, and that it was in

1
 Notably, the record reveals that Samantha was married to “Austin” at the time that she conceived A.D., but
was divorced at the time that A.D. was born. Because the trial court’s record does not contain a divorce
decree or information related to whether the establishment of paternity was rebutted by Mason under R.C.
3111.03 prior to the trial court’s order for genetic testing, we cannot glean from the record whether Austin
should have been served as a party to this action.

                                                    -2-
Case No. 13-22-12

A.D.’s best interest to be placed in the temporary custody of her maternal

grandparents. The trial court further found that the Agency had made

         reasonable efforts as required by law to prevent the placement and
         removal of the child from the home and/or to make it possible for the
         child to remain in the home.

(Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 15).

         {¶5} At the adjudicatory hearing held on April 21, 2022, the Agency and the

parents entered into an agreement wherein the parents admitted that A.D. was a

dependent child in exchange for dismissal of the abuse and neglect allegations.

Thereafter, the trial court found A.D. to be a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C)

and dismissed the remaining allegations in the complaint.

         {¶6} Prior to the dispositional hearing, Samantha privately retained counsel

who filed an entry of appearance and a demand for discovery on April 29, 2022.2

Then, on May 13, 2022, Mason privately retained counsel who filed her notice of

appearance, a request for discovery, a motion for legal custody, and a motion to

continue disposition.3            That same day, Samantha filed a second request for

2
  That entry of appearance also included a statement demanding discovery. However, it did not contain a
certificate of service. (Id.). Notably, it did contain a statement identifying the names of the persons served
and the manner of service; nonetheless, it failed to identify a date of service or the mailing and email addresses
of the persons served. Moreover, the entry was not sent to Samantha’s existing counsel of record.
3
  Even though Mason’s new attorney’s notice of appearance did contain a certificate of service, it did not
serve his existing counsel of record who had not yet requested leave to withdraw or been permitted to
withdraw with the consent of the juvenile court. See Juv.R. 4(D), (F). See also Seneca Co. Loc.R. 3.01(A)
and 3.02(A) (regarding notices of appearance and substitution or withdrawal of counsel).

                                                       -3-
Case No. 13-22-12

discovery, a praecipe for service of a subpoena, a motion for legal custody, and a

motion to continue the dispositional hearing.

        {¶7} On May 16, 2022, the magistrate issued several magistrate’s orders

denying Samantha’s and Mason’s requests for a continuance and Samantha’s

praecipe requesting that the trial court issue a subpoena.4

        {¶8} Then, on May 17, 2022, Samantha filed a corrected praecipe with an

attached subpoena and a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order denying her

continuance. The trial court denied Samantha’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s

order, and issued her subpoena.

        {¶9} Mason filed a motion to compel discovery on May 18, 2022, which the

trial court denied.5 Additionally, Mason filed a motion for production of audio

recordings and/or transcripts of all prior and future proceedings held in the instant

case. The trial court denied his request.6

        {¶10} Following the dispositional hearing on May 19, 2022, the magistrate

issued his magistrate’s decision on June 2, 2022, recommending that A.D. be placed

in the legal custody of her maternal grandparents finding that the Agency had made

4
  All motions for continuance were denied because counsel failed to comply with the Local Rules of Court
for the Seneca County Juvenile Court and because those motions were not timely filed. In addition,
Samantha’s praecipe did not comport with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus no subpoena was issued.
5
  The record supports that discovery had already been provided to Mason’s existing attorney who had not
requested leave to withdraw.
6
  The motion was denied because of yet another failure to comply with the Local Rules of Court for the
Seneca County Juvenile Court. However, the trial court gave Mason’s counsel information regarding how
to make arrangements with the Clerk of Court to listen to the recorded hearings.

                                                  -4-
Case No. 13-22-12

reasonable efforts to eliminate A.D.’s continued removal from the home or make it

possible for her to return home safely. Moreover, the magistrate recommended the

establishment of child-support orders for both parents and the termination of the

case plan.

       {¶11} Samantha filed her objections to the magistrate’s decision on July 25,

2022, and Mason filed his objections on August 2, 2022.

       {¶12} On August 5, 2022, the Agency filed a motion for temporary child

support under R.C. 2151.33 and R.C. 3119 et seq. Samantha objected to the

Agency’s request for temporary support. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the

Agency’s request and issued interim-child-support orders for the parents with an

effective date of March 3, 2022. The support orders were based upon imputed

income to both parents.

       {¶13} Ultimately, the trial court overruled the parents’ objections to the

magistrate’s decision on September 6, 2022, granted legal custody of A.D. to her

maternal grandparents and found that the Agency had made reasonable efforts to

eliminate A.D.’s continued removal from the home or make it possible for her to

return home safely. The trial court also established child-support orders for the

parents consistent with the magistrate’s recommendation.

       {¶14} The parents jointly filed a notice of appeal and a joint merit brief with

the following nine assignments of error.

                                           -5-
Case No. 13-22-12

                    Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 1

      The juvenile court erred by denying procedural and substantive
      due process to appellants and awarding legal custody to the
      maternal grandparents.

      Reference: June 2, 2022 Judgment Entry, and Magistrate’s
      Decision, and Sept. 6, 2022 Judgment Entry. Note: all subsequent
      assignments of error have the same record references.

                    Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 2

      The magistrate erred by denying appellants’ motion to compel
      discovery when the Seneca County Department of Job and Family
      services willfully failed to provide discovery prior to the
      dispositional hearing.

                    Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 3

      The juvenile court violated the provisions of the United States and
      Ohio Constitution against self-incrimination by requiring the
      parents to admit criminal misconduct to retain custody of their
      own child.

                    Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 4

      The juvenile court erred by denying appellants’ motion to
      continue the dispositional hearing where counsel had recently
      been retained, discovery had not been completed, paternity had
      not been established, most others consented to the request, and
      their left adequate time to hold disposition within the statutory
      time limit.

                    Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 5

      The juvenile court erred by establishing an order of child support
      where there was no evidence presented as to the parent’s [sic]
      income and/or financial circumstances.

                                      -6-
Case No. 13-22-12

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 6

       The juvenile court erred by granting the motion to place the child
       in the legal custody of maternal grandparents where the evidence
       adduced at the hearing demonstrated that it was not in the child’s
       best interest and where the parents had not been given an
       opportunity to work the case plan, despite its goal of reunification.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 7

       The juvenile court erred by denying appellants’ motions to
       withdraw their admissions to dependency where the magistrate
       did not allow counsel to place on the record the reasons for the
       motions and where appellants received ineffective assistance of
       counsel at the time of the adjudication.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 8

       The report and investigation of the GAL were deficient and
       prejudicial to appellants.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 9

       Appellants were denied effective assistance of counsel at the
       adjudication hearing by appointed attorneys, who advised them
       to admit dependency, which newly retained counsel sought to
       remedy by moving to withdraw the previously made admissions.

       {¶15} For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of error out of order

starting with the second assignment of error.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 2

       The magistrate erred by denying appellants’ motion to compel
       discovery when the Seneca County Department of Job and Family
       services willfully failed to provide discovery prior to the
       dispositional hearing.

                                           -7-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶16} In their second assignment of error, the parents’ argue that the

magistrate erred by denying their motions to compel discovery. Specifically, the

parents’ assert that the Agency willfully failed to provide discovery to them, and

thus the magistrate should have compelled the Agency to comply.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶17} We review a juvenile court’s decision regarding discovery issues for

an abuse of discretion. In re Freed Children, 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-08-37, 5-

08-38, 5-08-39, and 5-08-40, 2009-Ohio-996, ¶ 46 (citations omitted). An abuse

of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

                                       Analysis

       {¶18} Juv.R. 24 is the mechanism by which a party may request discoverable

material provided that such material is not confidential, not privileged, or not in the

possession of a third party. However, Juv.R. 22 requires that motions for discovery

must be heard before the adjudicatory hearing. See Juv.R. 22(D)(4). Discovery

motions must be made seven days before the (adjudicatory) hearing or 10 days after

the appearance of counsel, whichever is later. See Juv.R. 22(E). Nevertheless, a

juvenile court may extend the time for filing such a motion “in the interest of

justice”. Id.

                                         -8-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶19} Importantly, Mason and Samantha had already received discovery

from the Agency (through their counsel of record) prior to the adjudicatory hearing.

However, when the parents privately retained new counsel on April 29 and May 13,

2022, new demands for discovery were made. Nevertheless, even if we assume

without deciding that that the parents were not outside of the time period

contemplated by Juv.R. 22(E) when they requested discovery anew, and if we

further assume without deciding that the parents were not at fault by delaying the

release of their original files to their new counsel, the record is clear that neither the

Agency nor the parents’ prior attorneys ever possessed the materials that the parents

new counsel was seeking (i.e., a copy of the search warrant requested by law

enforcement; photographs taken by law-enforcement officers during their execution

of the search warrant; any genetic-test results that may exist relative to law-

enforcement’s investigation, and written and recorded statements that may have

been made by the parents during law-enforcement interviews). (See May 19, 2022

Tr. at 15). Thus, based upon our review, we do not conclude that the magistrate

abused its discretion by denying a motion to compel discovery under the

circumstances presented in this appeal.

       {¶20} Accordingly, the parents’ second assignment of error is overruled.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 9

       Appellants were denied effective assistance of counsel at the
       adjudication hearing by appointed attorneys, who advised them

                                           -9-
Case No. 13-22-12

       to admit dependency, which newly retained counsel sought to
       remedy by moving to withdraw the previously made admissions.

       {¶21} In their ninth assignment of error, the parents’ argue that they were

denied the effective assistance of counsel at adjudication.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶22} The statutory right to counsel is guaranteed in juvenile-court

proceedings involving neglect, abuse, or dependency under R.C. 2151.352. See also

Juv.R. 4(A). Additionally, the right to counsel “‘also arises from the guarantees of

due process and equal protection contained within the’” Ohio Constitution and

Constitution of the United States. In re J.C., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 22AP-259

and 22AP-260, 2023-Ohio-778, ¶ 28 citing In re Brooks, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos.

04AP-164, 04AP-165, 04AP-201, and 04AP-202, 2004-Ohio-3887, ¶ 24, citing

State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus.

This right includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. In re I.R., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 11040, 2021-Ohio-3103, ¶ 83; In re D.L.S., 3d Dist. Hancock

Nos. 5-15-04 and 5-15-05, 2015-Ohio-2809, ¶ 34, citing In re Moore, 3d Dist.

Hardin No. 6-03-05, 2003-Ohio-4250, ¶ 28 and In re Brooks at ¶ 24. “[W]e apply

the same test as the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, [2064]

[] (1984), and adopted by the [] Supreme Court [of Ohio] in State v. Smith, 17 Ohio

St.3d 98, 100 [] (1985). In re D.L.S. at ¶ 34, citing Moore at ¶ 29.

                                        -10-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶23} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the represented party

must demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2)

that counsel’s errors prejudiced the party, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for

counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

669, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 2054-2056; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989),

paragraphs two and three of the syllabus; In re I.R. at ¶ 84.           “[R]easonable

probability” is “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Strickland at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

                                        Analysis

       {¶24} Here, the parents argue that their court-appointed attorneys were

deficient because they failed to review discovery provided by the parents before

advising the parents to admit to the dependency allegation in the complaint at

adjudication. (See Appellant’s Brief at 31).

       {¶25} As to the first prong of the analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the parents fail to identity (in their merit brief) what information was provided by

the parents that the attorneys failed to review. Further, the parents fail to assert how

that information would have resulted in a dismissal of all the allegations in the

Agency’s complaint. Moreover, the parents have failed to show how they were

prejudiced under the second prong.

                                          -11-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶26} Thus, the parents are unable to show how their attorneys were

deficient or how they were directly prejudiced failing to satisfy both prongs of

Strickland. See In re H.M., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-18-46, 8-18-47, 8-18-55, and 8-

18-56, 2019-Ohio-3721, ¶ 110.

       {¶27} Accordingly, the parents’ ninth assignment of error is overruled.

                      Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 7

       The juvenile court erred by denying appellants’ motions to
       withdraw their admissions to dependency where the magistrate
       did not allow counsel to place on the record the reasons for the
       motions and where appellants received ineffective assistance of
       counsel at the time of the adjudication.

       {¶28} In their seventh assignment of error, the parents’ argue that the

magistrate erred by denying their oral request to withdraw their admissions (to A.D.

being a dependent child) made at the dispositional hearing. Specifically, the parents

argue that their admissions were not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing in violation

of Juv.R. 29(D).

                                Standard of Review

       {¶29} We review a trial court’s substantial compliance with Juv.R. 29(D) as

to a parents’ admission to dependency at adjudication under a de novo standard of

review. In re Etter, et al., 134 Ohio App.3d 484 (1st Dist. 1998).

                                      Analysis

                                        -12-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶30} In juvenile-court proceedings involving a complaint filed under R.C.

2151.27, Juv.R. 29(C) requires that each party may either admit or deny the

allegations in the complaint. Juv.R. 29(D) sets forth how the juvenile court is to

proceed upon an admission. Under division (D), if an admission is made, the

juvenile court may refuse to accept that admission and must not accept the party’s

admission unless the juvenile court addresses each party entering an admission

personally and determines both of the following:

       (1) The party is making the admission voluntarily with
       understanding of the nature of the allegations and the consequences
       of the admission;

       (2) The party understands that by entering an admission the party is
       waiving the right to challenge the witnesses and evidence against the
       party, to remain silent, and to introduce evidence at the adjudicatory
       hearing.

       The court may hear testimony, review documents, or make further
       inquiry, as it considers appropriate, or it may proceed directly to the
       action required by division (F) of this rule.

Juv.R. 29(D).

       {¶31} Here, the appellants do not specify which portion of Juv.R. 29(D) the

magistrate failed to comply with (at adjudication) nor do they cite to the

adjudicatory-hearing transcript to support their contention. On the contrary, the

parents assert that they were prevented (at disposition) from placing their arguments

                                        -13-
Case No. 13-22-12

on the record by the magistrate.7 As such, appellant’s have presented no basis to

support this assignment of error. In our review of the record, we conclude that the

magistrate did not prevent the parents counsel from arguing that they should be

permitted to withdraw their admissions; rather the magistrate merely requested

counsel produce legal authority regarding why the admission could be withdrawn

in light of their written waiver made at the adjudicatory hearing. (May 19, 2022 Tr.

at 16-19).

        {¶32} Here, the record supports that the parents’ attorneys were not able to

present any legal authority (in support of withdrawing their admissions), and

requested additional time to brief the issue. (Id. at 17-18). Furthermore, the juvenile

court did not grant the attorneys’ request to brief the issue because it was under a

statutory-time constraint as to disposition. Thus, the parents’ argument that they

were prevented by the magistrate from creating a record is without merit.

        {¶33} Further, the parents predicated their argument upon a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it is unclear from our reading of their

merit brief, whether ineffective assistance is founded upon the discovery material

provided by the parents under their ninth assignment of error or the failure to receive

discovery from law-enforcement’s criminal investigation under their second

7
 The parents did not file a written motion to withdraw their admissions prior to the dispositional hearing,
and their attorneys orally raised their motions moments before the dispositional hearing was scheduled to
begin. See Juv.R. 19.

                                                  -14-
Case No. 13-22-12

assignment of error. Nevertheless, it is not our job to seek out and make appellants’

argument for them. Thus, given our prior determinations, the ineffective assistance

of counsel claim is wholly without merit under the argument presented.

       {¶34} Notwithstanding our determinations in this case, the record simply

does not establish an error in the acceptance of the parents’ admissions sufficient to

render those admissions and subsequent adjudication of dependency void.

       {¶35} Accordingly, the parents’ seventh assignment of error is overruled.

                       Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 4

       The juvenile court erred by denying appellants’ motion to
       continue the dispositional hearing where counsel had recently
       been retained, discovery had not been completed, paternity had
       not been established, most others consented to the request, and
       their left adequate time to hold disposition within the statutory
       time limit.

       {¶36} In their fourth assignment of error, the parents argue that the

magistrate erred by denying their motions to continue the dispositional hearing.

Specifically, the parents argue that they requested a continuance to allow their new

attorneys the opportunity to review discovery and prepare for disposition.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶37} We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for

continuance for an abuse of discretion. See In re G.R., 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-22-

03, 2022-Ohio-3779, ¶ 18. As we previously stated above, an abuse of discretion

refers to a decision of the trial court that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

                                        -15-
Case No. 13-22-12

unconscionable.    Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. See also In re J.E., 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9-17-07, 2017-Ohio-8272, ¶ 12.

                                       Analysis

       {¶38} Juv.R. 23 provides that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only when

imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.” In ruling on a motion for a

continuance, the juvenile court in an abuse, neglect, and dependency case should

balance several considerations including: 1) the length of the delay requested; 2)

prior continuances requested and granted; 3) inconvenience to other parties,

witnesses, counsel, and the court; 4) the reason the delay is requested; 5) whether

the party contributed to the reason for the request; and 6) any other relevant factors.

See In re J.D., 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458, ¶ 45, quoting In re

T.C., 140 Ohio App.3d 409, 417 (3d Dist. 2000), quoting State v. Unger, 67 Ohio

St.2d 65, 67-68 (1981). “Furthermore, the complaining party ‘must show how he

[or she] was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance before there can be a finding

of prejudicial error.’” In re M.B., 4th Dist. Pike No. 18CA888, 2018-Ohio-3778, ¶

21 quoting State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 288 (1988). Indeed, the Supreme

Court of Ohio has recognized that:

       [t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
       continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must
       be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the
       reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.

                                         -16-
Case No. 13-22-12

Unger at 67, quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 8 S.Ct. 841, 850 (1964).

“Weighed against any potential prejudice to [the parents] are concerns such as a

court’s right to control its own docket and the public’s interest in [effectuating the

purposes articulated by the General Assembly as set forth in R.C. 2151.01].” Id.

       {¶39} We begin by addressing the parties’ history of continuances, the length

of the requested delay, and inconvenience. Indeed, the parents had not previously

requested a continuance of the juvenile-court proceedings. However, the parents’

attorneys failed to advise the juvenile court how much time was needed for them to

come up to speed regarding dispositional issues.        To us, the lack of a prior

continuance weighs in favor of granting the motion. However, the failure of counsel

to specify the time needed weighs against the continuance.

       {¶40} Next, we turn to the rationale for the delay. The parents requested a

continuance because they had not received full discovery, and that they were not

prepared for the dispositional hearing. However, because we have concluded that

discovery had been completed (in the second assignment of error) we conclude a

continuance was not warranted under the discovery argument.

       {¶41} The parents further argue that they were awaiting genetic-test results

relative to paternity, and continuance was necessary. Specifically–the parents are

asserting that since paternity had not been established their continuance request

should have been granted. Notably, Mason never challenged paternity. At all times

                                        -17-
Case No. 13-22-12

relevant, Mason held himself out to be A.D.’s natural and biological father,

notwithstanding, that a presumption of paternity under R.C. 3111.03(A)(1) may

have existed as to a parent and child relationship between “Austin” and A.D.

       {¶42} Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, even if we assume without

deciding that the magistrate did err by recommending the establishment of a child-

support order for Mason prior to the establishment of a parent and child relationship

between he and A.D., the parents suffered no prejudice since the genetic-test results

led to the establishment of a parent and child relationship between Mason and A.D.

prior to the issuance of the juvenile court’s independent review reflected in the

judgment entry overruling their objections to the magistrate’s decision. See R.C.

2151.23 compare with R.C. 2151.231 and R.C. 3111.111. Indeed, “[a] magistrate’s

decision is not effective unless adopted by the court[]” and regardless of “[w]hether

or not objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision

in whole or in part, with or without modification. A court may hear a previously-

referred matter, take additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.”

(Emphasis added.) Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(a) and (b). Thus, the juvenile court was

permitted to consider the establishment of paternity after the fact. Hence, this factor

weighs in favor of denying the continuance and demonstrates that the parents have

suffered no prejudice.

                                         -18-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶43} Next, we consider whether the parents have contributed to the reason

for the continuance request. Samantha’s new attorney entered his appearance in

the record on April 29, 2022. However, he did not properly request discovery for

approximately two weeks and less than a week before the dispositional hearing (i.e.,

on May 12, 2022). Mason’s new attorney entered her appearance and requested

discovery on May 13, 2022. The record supports that none of the certificates of

service in the parents’ attorneys’ appearances or motions included all counsel of

record. Thus, the parents’ existing attorneys may not have been aware that they

hired new counsel until that counsel made direct contact on May 16, 2022.

Moreover, the parents tarried in hiring their chosen counsel and then sought material

in the hands of a third party (i.e., law enforcement) through their various motions

filed in juvenile court. Hence, any delay in the parents’ new attorneys obtaining

their original files (which included the discovery previously provided by the

Agency) from prior counsel is attributable to the parents and not the Agency, the

magistrate, or their existing attorneys. As such, this factor weighs in favor of

denying the continuance.

       {¶44} We also consider, as a unique factor relevant to this case, that the

juvenile court had a statutory-time constraint as to disposition. The Agency’s

complaint alleging that A.D. was neglected, abused, and dependent was filed on

March 4, 2022. Consequently, the 90-day-statutory deadline for disposition was

                                        -19-
Case No. 13-22-12

June 2, 2022. See Juv.R. 34(A). The juvenile court had approximately nine business

days (excluding weekends and holidays) to elect to permit post-adjudication

discovery and to reschedule a hearing involving potentially six different attorneys

where discovery had already been exchanged and the attorneys had not yet sought

leave to withdraw nor had the magistrate consented to permit withdrawal. See

Juv.R. 4(F). Here, we note that control of the juvenile court’s schedule is left within

the sound discretion of the juvenile court. See Wilson v. Wilson, 3d Dist. Union No.

14-03-16, 2003-Ohio-4474, ¶ 7. Moreover, the juvenile court must balance the

substitution of counsel and the continuance request against its authority to control

its own docket as well as its awareness that such a request may be utilized to delay

the proceedings or trifle with the court. See State v. Ames, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-

02, 2019-Ohio-2632, ¶ 22.8

         {¶45} We further consider, as another unique factor relevant to this case, that

a continuance would likely not have changed the outcome of the case based upon

the facts of this case. In re J.E., 3 Dist. Marion No. 9-17-07, 2017-Ohio-8272, ¶ 14.

Notwithstanding the parents’ desire to reunify with A.D. and their compliance with

8
  See also Seneca Co. Loc.R. 3.02(A) (“Unless otherwise ordered, the substitution or withdrawal of a trial
attorney shall be permitted only upon filing with the Juvenile Court, and service on all other parties, a Notice
of Substitution of Trial Attorney signed by the withdrawing attorney, the client, and a substitute trial attorney;
or upon written application for substitution or withdrawal served upon the client and showing of good cause
and upon such terms as the Juvenile Court shall impose. Unless otherwise ordered, a trial attorney shall not
be permitted to withdraw at any time later than twenty (20) days in advance of a trial or the setting of a
hearing on any motion. Unless otherwise ordered, the substitution of a trial attorney shall not serve as a basis
for postponement of a trial or any hearing.”)

                                                      -20-
Case No. 13-22-12

case-plan services, they simply were not able to remedy the conditions that led to

A.D.’s removal from their home since the “alleged perpetrator” of her severe and

questionable injuries was never identified and neither parent came forward to

explain the circumstances surrounding her injuries. See In re Hogan, 3d Dist. Allen

No. 1-01-141, 2002-Ohio-1770, *4 (“the fact that no one has come forward to

identify E[.H.]’s abuser makes it more likely that abuse will persist because there is

no evidence that the person who perpetrated this vicious attack will not again have

access to the child.”).

         {¶46} Upon our consideration of the factors above, we do not conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion by denying the parents’ continuance requests.

         {¶47} Accordingly, the parents’ fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                              Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 8

         The report and investigation of the GAL were deficient and
         prejudicial to appellants.

         {¶48} In their eighth assignment of error, the parents argue that the GAL’s

investigation and report were deficient resulting in prejudice to the parents.9

Specifically, the parents’ contend that the GAL failed to speak with either parent or

to observe their interactions with A.D. at their supervised visitations, prior to

recommending that the juvenile court grant legal custody to the maternal

9
  Although the parents include the GAL’s report in their assignment of error, they raise no argument related
to that report in their merit brief, and consequently we will not address any issue related to that report under
Sup. R. 48.06.

                                                     -21-
Case No. 13-22-12

grandparents. Thus, the parents argue that they were prejudiced because had the

GAL spoke with them or observed them with A.D., the GAL’s recommendation

may have changed.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶49} “Appellate courts will not reverse trial court decisions to admit a

guardian ad litem’s testimony and recommendation unless the trial court abused its

discretion.” In re T.C., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015-Ohio-3665, ¶ 20, citing

Corey v. Corey, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-73, 2014-Ohio-3258, ¶ 9. An abuse

of discretion connotes that the decision of the trial court is unreasonable, arbitrary,

or unconscionable. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219.

                                       Analysis

       {¶50} The parents support their position by directing us to Sup. R. 48(D)(13)

and Hunter-June v. Pitts, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-09-178, 2014-Ohio-2473.

However, the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio have been amended

several times since Hunter-June was released, and thus, Sup. R. 48(D)(13) does not

currently exist. Nonetheless, new Sup. R. 48.03 was adopted January 1, 2021, and

sets forth the general responsibilities of a GAL under division (A) and the duties of

GAL under division (D). Moreover, Sup. R. 48.03(D)(2) requires a GAL to

“[o]bserve the child with each parent * * *” and division (D)(6) requires that the

GAL “[i]nterview the parties”.

                                         -22-
Case No. 13-22-12

       {¶51} At the dispositional hearing, the GAL testified that the parents’ prior

attorneys instructed her not speak with their clients (i.e., the parents) since there was

an ongoing criminal investigation. Further, the GAL testified (at the dispositional

hearing) that she was never authorized to speak to the parents by their new attorneys.

Moreover, the GAL testified that she had been unable to observe the parents

supervised visitations with A.D. since they had only recently commenced

visitations, and that she had scheduling conflicts.

       {¶52} Irrespective of the foregoing, we recognize that a failure to comply

with Sup.R. 48.03 is not reversible error. See In re K.L., 11th Dist. Portage No.

2021-P-0022, 2021-Ohio-3080, ¶ 63 (“the failure to comply with the Rules of

Superintendence, even if a technical error, is not reversible”); In re E.W., J.W., and

J.W., 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, and 10CA20, 2011-Ohio-2123,

¶ 12 (superintendence rules are internal housekeeping rules that do not create any

substantive rights); Pettit v. Pettit, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-08-018, 2012-

Ohio-1801, ¶ 12 (superintendence rules are “administrative directives only, and are

not intended to function as rules of practice and procedure”); accord In re R.P. Jr.,

10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 20AP-538, 20AP-539, 20AP-540, 20AP-542, 20AP-543,

and 20AP-544, 2021-Ohio-4065, ¶ 31; State v. Clark, 9th Dist. Medina No.

20CA0020-M, 2021-Ohio-3397, ¶ 39; State v. Klayman, 4th Dist. Hocking No.

17CA13, 2018-Ohio-3580, ¶ 17; see State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd, 160 Ohio

                                          -23-
Case No. 13-22-12

St.3d 141, 2020-Ohio-2766, ¶ 41, quoting State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 110

(1977) (“‘[t]he Rules of Superintendence are not designed to alter basic substantive

rights’”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

       {¶53} Even if that were not the case, under the facts presented, the parents

cannot establish that they have suffered any prejudice. Significantly, the parents

cannot demonstrate that the juvenile court would have granted them legal custody

of A.D., and not the maternal grandparents, if the GAL had spoken with the parents

or observed their visitations with A.D., because they withdrew their legal custody

motions prior to the magistrate granting legal custody of A.D. to the maternal

grandparents.

       {¶54} Lastly, even though the GAL recommended legal custody of A.D. to

the maternal grandparents, the juvenile court was not bound by that

recommendation. The juvenile court’s focus in determining whether to grant legal

custody is the best interest of the child. Although the juvenile court is assisted in

making this determination by considering the information presented by the GAL,

which includes the GAL’s testimony and recommendation, that testimony and

recommendation is not dispositive as to the court’s custody determination. The

juvenile court is free to exercise its discretion to disregard any portion of the GAL’s

testimony and recommendation it in its credibility determination. See Sup.R.

48.03(D)(11) (stating that a GAL’s duties include providing the court with “any

                                         -24-
Case No. 13-22-12

necessary information * * * to make an informed recommendation regarding the

best interest of the child.”). Given the nature of the proceedings and the impact of

the juvenile court’s determination on the lives of the parties and the child, we accord

the juvenile court’s determinations the utmost respect as to its best-interest and

credibility determinations. See Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13-14.

         {¶55} For the reasons recited above, we do not say that the trial court abused

its discretion by considering the GAL’s testimony and recommendation under the

circumstances presented in this appeal.

         {¶56} Accordingly, the parents’ eighth assignment of error is overruled.

                             Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 6

         The juvenile court erred by granting the motion to place the child
         in the legal custody of maternal grandparents where the evidence
         adduced at the hearing demonstrated that it was not in the child’s
         best interest and where the parents had not been given an
         opportunity to work the case plan, despite its goal of reunification.

         {¶57} In the parents’ sixth assignment of error, the parents argue that the

juvenile court erred by awarding legal custody of A.D. to the maternal grandparents.

Specifically, the parents assert that they were not been given the opportunity to work

the case plan and that legal custody was not in A.D.’s best interest.10

                                         Standard of Review

10
   To the extent that the parents’ sixth assignment of error could be construed as a reasonable-efforts
challenge, we need not address such an argument since their assignment of error concerns the juvenile court’s
disposition of legal custody under 2151.353(A) and not the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency’s made
reasonable efforts under R.C. 2151.419. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); App.R. 16(A)(3).

                                                   -25-
Case No. 13-22-12

          {¶58} On appeal, we review the grant or denial of a motion for legal custody

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re B.P., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-15-07 and

8-15-08, 2015-Ohio-5445, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

at 219.

                                     Legal Custody

          {¶59} Ohio’s juvenile courts are statutory entities, and they are able to

exercise only those powers that the General Assembly confers on them. R.C.

Chapter 2151; In re Z.R., 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, ¶ 14. R.C. Chapter

2151 grants a juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction concerning a child

alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent. In re S.L., 3d Dist. Union No. 14-

15-07, 2016-Ohio-5000, ¶ 12. See also In re J.L.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 28867,

2018-Ohio-2175, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer

Cty. Common Pleas Court, Prob. Div., 150 Ohio St.3d 230, 2016-Ohio-7382, ¶ 21;

R.C. 2151.23(A)(1); R.C. 2151.27(A)(1); R.C. 2151.33(A); R.C. 2151.353(A)(2).

          {¶60} Following an adjudication of an abused, neglected, or dependent child,

R.C. 2151.353(A) provides the juvenile court with certain dispositional alternatives

for the child. “A juvenile court has broad discretion in [fashioning] the disposition

of an abused, neglected, or dependent child.” In re C.W., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-

09-26, 2010-Ohio-2157, ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2151.353(A) and Juv.R. 29(D). See also

                                          -26-
Case No. 13-22-12

In re L.P., 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-12-60 and 13-12-61, 2013-Ohio-2607, ¶ 20;

Juv.R. 34(D).

       {¶61} Among the juvenile court’s dispositional alternatives is granting legal

custody of the child to a person identified in the complaint or in a motion filed prior

to the dispositional hearing. See R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); see also Juv.R. 34(D). The

Revised Code defines “[l]egal custody” to mean

       a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care
       and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the
       child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline
       the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and
       medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and
       responsibilities. An individual granted legal custody shall exercise the
       rights and responsibilities personally unless otherwise authorized by
       any section of the Revised Code or by the court.

R.C. 2151.011(A)(21). “[T]he award of legal custody is ‘not as drastic a remedy as

permanent custody.’” In re J.B., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-79, 2016-Ohio-2670, ¶ 32,

quoting In re L.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-985, 2013-Ohio-3214, ¶ 7. Unlike

granting permanent custody, the award of legal custody does not divest parents of

their residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. In re C.R., 108 Ohio

St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, ¶ 17. Significantly, the parents can generally petition

the court for a custody modification in the future. In re L.D. at ¶ 7. Thus, “a parent’s

right to regain custody is not permanently foreclosed.” In re B.P., 2015-Ohio-5445,

at ¶ 19, citing In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 12.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a finding of parental unfitness is not a

                                         -27-
Case No. 13-22-12

prerequisite to a disposition of legal custody where a juvenile court is making a

custody determination under R.C. 2151.353 between a nonparent and parent. In re

C.R. at ¶ 21. See also In re M.H., 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-13-45 and 13-3-46, 2014-

Ohio-1485, ¶ 15 (“[A] trial court is not required to make a separate ‘unsuitability’

finding at disposition, because an adjudicatory finding that a child is abused,

neglected or dependent implicitly contains an unsuitability finding.”), citing In re

C.R. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, and In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio

St. 2d 100, 102 (1979).

       {¶62} The standard a juvenile court uses in making its determination in a

legal-custody proceeding (by “preponderance of the evidence”) is less onerous than

a permanent-custody proceeding (by “clear and convincing evidence”). See In re

B.P. at ¶ 19. “‘Preponderance of the evidence’ means evidence that is more

probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative value.” In re M.G., 3d Dist. Allen

No. 1-18-54, 2019-Ohio-906, ¶ 7, quoting In re J.B., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-79,

2016-Ohio-2670, ¶ 33, citing In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-

Ohio-5514, ¶ 7.

       {¶63} At a dispositional hearing involving a request for legal custody, the

focus is on the best interest of the child.      In re P.S., 5th Dist. Stark No.

2012CA00007, 2012-Ohio-3431, ¶ 31, citing In re C.R. at ¶ 10; In re B.P. at ¶ 19.

See also R.C. 2151.42(A). R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not list specific factors a court

                                        -28-
Case No. 13-22-12

should consider in deciding what is in the child’s best interest pursuant to the

requested disposition of legal custody. In re B.P. at ¶ 20, citing In re N.P., 9th Dist.

Summit No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110, ¶ 23, citing In re Fulton, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2002-09-236, 2003-Ohio-5984, ¶ 11.

       {¶64} Although, no specific factors must be followed in a case involving the

dispositional alternative of legal custody, we have previously concluded that

juvenile courts may be guided by the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (the

permanent-custody factors) or R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (factors employed in private-

custody disputes) since they are both purely instructive. See In re L.P., 3d Dist.

Seneca Nos. 13-12-60 and 13-12-61, 2013-Ohio-2607, ¶ 22. See also In re K.B. and

G.B., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-20-37 and 5-20-38, 2021-Ohio-3273, ¶ 50.

       {¶65} In addition to the foregoing factors, the juvenile court must also

liberally interpret and construe R.C. Chapter 2151 so as to effectuate the General

Assembly’s expressed purpose when considering which situation will best promote

the child’s “care, protection, and mental and physical development,” understanding

that the child should only be separated from his or her parents “when necessary for

the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety.” In re C.W., 2010-Ohio-2157,

at ¶ 11, citing R.C. 2151.01(A). See also In re L.P. at ¶ 21.

       {¶66} Because the parents’ argument involves the Agency’s case plan, we

also review R.C. 2151.412 since it statutorily mandates “[t]he procedures for the

                                         -29-
Case No. 13-22-12

creation and amendment of a case plan.” In re S.D-M., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27148

and 27149, 2014-Ohio-1501, ¶ 26. R.C. 2151.412 provides in its pertinent parts:

      (A) Each public children services agency and private child placing
      agency shall prepare and maintain a case plan for any child to whom
      the agency is providing services and to whom any of the following
      applies:

      (1) The agency filed a complaint pursuant to section 2151.27 of the
      Revised Code alleging that the child is an abused, neglected, or
      dependent child;

      ***

      (G)(1) All case plans for children in temporary custody shall have the
      following general goals:

      (a) Consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child,
      to achieve a safe out-of-home placement in the least restrictive, most
      family-like setting available and in close proximity to the home from
      which the child was removed or the home in which the child will be
      permanently placed;

      (b) To eliminate with all due speed the need for the out-of-home
      placement so that the child can safely return home.

      (2) The director of job and family services shall adopt rules pursuant
      to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code setting forth the general goals of
      case plans for children subject to dispositional orders for protective
      supervision, a planned permanent living arrangement, or permanent
      custody.

      (H) In the agency’s development of a case plan and the court’s
      review of the case plan, the child’s health and safety shall be the
      paramount concern. The agency and the court shall be guided by the
      following general priorities:

      (1) A child who is residing with or can be placed with the child’s
      parents within a reasonable time should remain in their legal custody

                                      -30-
Case No. 13-22-12

       even if an order of protective supervision is required for a reasonable
       period of time;

       (2) If both parents of the child have abandoned the child, have
       relinquished custody of the child, have become incapable of
       supporting or caring for the child even with reasonable assistance, or
       have a detrimental effect on the health, safety, and best interest of the
       child, the child should be placed in the legal custody of a suitable
       member of the child’s extended family;

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.412(A)(1), (G)(1)-(2), (H)(1)-(2).

                                       Analysis

       {¶67} Here, the parents argue that the juvenile court’s disposition of legal

custody to the maternal grandparents was not in A.D.’s best interest since

disposition was rushed and the parents were given little time to complete the case-

plan goals and objectives. In particular, the parents support their argument with

four assertions, and we will begin by addressing the parents’ first and third

assertions that the juvenile court presumptively awarded legal custody to the

maternal grandparents and that the maternal grandparents did not understand

reunification was the goal of the case plan.

       {¶68} Contrary to the parents’ assertions, the record does not support that the

juvenile court presumptively awarded the maternal grandparents legal custody of

A.D.   Indeed, both parents filed separate legal-custody motions, which were

withdrawn after the Agency rested its case at the dispositional hearing and before

the magistrate ruled on the merits of the Agency’s request. To us, the juvenile court

                                         -31-
Case No. 13-22-12

had no other legal-custody motion to consider. Thus, it is inconsequential whether

the maternal grandparents (as kinship caregivers) understood the goal of the case

plan was reunification since they both subsequently executed statements of

understanding pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(b), which provides as follows:

      (A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child,
      the court may make any of the following orders of disposition:

      ***

      (3) Award legal custody of the child to either parent or to any other
      person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion
      requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed
      legal custodian in a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional
      hearing by any party to the proceedings. A person identified in a
      complaint or motion filed by a party to the proceedings as a proposed
      legal custodian shall be awarded legal custody of the child only if the
      person identified signs a statement of understanding for legal custody
      that contains at least the following provisions:

      ***

      (b) That the person understands that legal custody of the child in
      question is intended to be permanent in nature and that the person will
      be responsible as the custodian for the child until the child reaches the
      age of majority. Responsibility as custodian for the child shall
      continue beyond the age of majority if, at the time the child reaches
      the age of majority, the child is pursuing a diploma granted by the
      board of education or other governing authority, successful
      completion of the curriculum of any high school, successful
      completion of an individualized education program developed for the
      student by any high school, or an age and schooling certificate.
      Responsibility beyond the age of majority shall terminate when the
      child ceases to continuously pursue such an education, completes such
      an education, or is excused from such an education under standards
      adopted by the state board of education, whichever occurs first.

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Case No. 13-22-12

Therefore, these portions of the parents’ argument are without merit.

       {¶69} Next, in the parents’ second assertion, they argue that the maternal

grandparents expressed reluctance in accepting legal custody of A.D. and were

stressed and overwhelmed caring for her. In our review of the record, the maternal

grandparents did not express reluctance to accept legal custody of A.D. evinced by

their statements of understanding and their testimony in open court. Indeed, any

grandparent (thrust into a position as a kinship caregiver) would be stressed and

overwhelmed by the level of care that A.D. requires. Moreover, the grandparents’

feelings are exacerbated by the inability to identify a perpetrator or to explain how

A.D.’s grisly injuries occurred. Each grandparent testified that they are coping with

the certainty that their child (Samantha) along with A.D.’s father (Mason) were the

primary caretakers of A.D. when the injuries occurred. Furthermore, they testified

that they are aware of the reality that they have become kinship caregivers (likely

for the next 18 years) and are experiencing a range of emotions related to changes

in their roles as parents and grandparents, their new expectations as caregivers, and

their concerns for ensuring A.D.’s continued health and safety. Accordingly, we

reject this portion of the parents’ argument.

       {¶70} Lastly, in the parents’ fourth assertion, they argue that the juvenile

court could not have considered the best interest factors under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a) since the GAL never spoke to the parents nor did she observe

                                        -33-
Case No. 13-22-12

them interacting with A.D. As we highlighted in our resolution of the parents’

eighth assignment of error, the supervised visitations between the parents and A.D.

had only recently commenced and were in conflict with the GAL’s schedule.

Furthermore, the GAL had been instructed not to speak with the parents by their

attorneys. Indeed, the record reflects that the juvenile court was guided by the

relevant factors listed in both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)

specifically determining in its independent review of the magistrate’s decision that

the “Magistrate properly considered the best-interest factors provided under R.C.

2151.414(D) and 3109.04(F)(1)”. (Emphasis added.) (Doc. No. 79).

       {¶71} Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by

granting legal custody to the maternal grandparents.

       {¶72} The parents’ sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                      Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 3

       The juvenile court violated the provisions of the United States and
       Ohio Constitution against self-incrimination by requiring the
       parents to admit criminal misconduct to retain custody of their
       own child.

       {¶73} In their third assignment of error, the parents’ argue that the juvenile

court violated their rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution by

requiring the parents to admit criminal conduct in order to regain custody of A.D.

at disposition.

                                        -34-
Case No. 13-22-12

                          Dispositional-Hearing Standard

       {¶74} In Ohio, the purpose of the adjudicatory hearing in an abuse, neglect,

or dependency case is to determine if the allegations as to the status of the child as

“abused, neglected, or dependent” are true thus bringing them under the jurisdiction

of the juvenile court. See Juv.R. 2(B). State v. Lowe, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-36,

2021-Ohio-4563, ¶ 19 (citations omitted). A finding of dependency, as is the case

here, places the child within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. See R.C. 2151.04;

2151.23. The purpose of the dispositional hearing is to determine what action shall

then be taken with respect to the child with a focus on the best interest of the child.

See Juv.R. 2(M); In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 233. The Supreme

Court of Ohio has recognized that “parents who are suitable persons have a

‘paramount’ right to the custody of their minor children.” In re Murray, 52 Ohio

St.3d 155, 157 (1990). However, parental rights are not absolute and the state has

a right to intervene when the exercise of the parent’s rights presents a health or

safety hazard to a child. See In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d at 106.

                 Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

       {¶75} “The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution declare that no person shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” State v. Arnold, 147 Ohio St.3d

                                         -35-
Case No. 13-22-12

138, 2016-Ohio-1595, ¶ 30. “[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is accorded

liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.” Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶76} To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, the communication

must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. See United States v. Hubbell,

530 U.S. 27, 34-38, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2042-2045 (2000). “[I]n order to be testimonial,

an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual

assertion or disclose information”. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 108

S.Ct. 2341, 2347 (1988). “A court may not compel a parent’s admission to a crime

in custody proceedings, if the admission could be used against the parent in a

subsequent criminal proceeding, under the threat of losing parental rights.” In the

Matter of A.W., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0026, 2022-Ohio-1553, ¶ 22,

citing Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 47 (Ind. 2019), In re A.D.L., 133 Nev. 561,

402 P.3d 1280, 1285 (2017), and Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97

S.Ct. 2132, 2135 (1977).

       {¶77} Here, as we determined in our resolution of the parents’ sixth

assignment of error, the juvenile court made its custody decision based upon the

evidence adduced at the dispositional hearing in furtherance of A.D.’s best interests.

Significantly, the parents did not testify at the dispositional hearing, and they did

not specifically invoke their rights against self-incrimination. Additionally, the

juvenile court did not draw an adverse inference about the parents’ guilt based upon

                                         -36-
Case No. 13-22-12

the parents’ decision to not to testify at the dispositional hearing. Thus, self-

incrimination was never implicated under the facts presented.

       {¶78} Accordingly, the parents’ third assignment of error is overruled.

                        Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 1

       The juvenile court erred by denying procedural and substantive
       due process to appellants and awarding legal custody to the
       maternal grandparents.

       Reference: June 2, 2022 Judgment Entry, and Magistrate’s
       Decision, and Sept. 6, 2022 Judgment Entry. Note: all subsequent
       assignments of error have the same record references.

       {¶79} In their first assignment of error, the parents’ contend that the juvenile

court erred by failing to provide them adequate notice and inform them of their right

to be present for an ex parte emergency hearing conducted on March 4, 2022.

Specifically, the parents argue that the juvenile court erred in failing to provide

adequate notice and inform them of their right to be present at the ex parte

emergency hearing.

                                  Standard of Review

       {¶80} Before adjudication of an abuse, neglect, and dependency complaint,

a juvenile court “may make any temporary disposition of any child that it considers

necessary to protect the best interest of the child and that can be made pursuant to

division (B) of this section.” R.C. 2151.33(A); Juv.R. 13(A). “The disposition that

is in the best interest of the child is within the sound discretion of the trial court and

                                          -37-
Case No. 13-22-12

will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Haywood, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-02-97, 2003-Ohio-3518, ¶ 4. An abuse of discretion implies that

the court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, 5

Ohio St.3d at 219.

       {¶81} Here, in reviewing the record, the parents failed to file a motion to set

aside the magistrate’s ex parte emergency orders. See Juv.R. 40(D)(2)(b). Thus,

they forfeited any challenge to this order on appeal. As a result, the parents have

failed to preserve this error for appeal. See Juv.R. 40(D)(2)(a)(iii)(F), (D)(2)(b).

       {¶82} “It is well established that if a party fails to object at the trial court

level, that party waives all but plain error”. In re L.L., J.L., and H.M., 3d Dist.

Logan Nos. 8-14-25, 8-14-26, 8-14-27, 2015-Ohio-2739, ¶ 51, quoting In re M.R.,

3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-18, 2013-Ohio-1302, ¶ 84. The plain-error doctrine is

applicable in civil cases only in the extremely rare case where the error “seriously

affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.”

Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123, 1997-Ohio-401.

                                      Analysis

       {¶83} Significant to us, the parents waived a probable-cause hearing

(following the magistrate’s issuance of the ex parte orders) and consented to a

finding of probable cause on March 8, 2022. Moreover, the parents did not contest

the temporary-custody orders placing A.D. with her maternal grandparents.

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Thereafter, the parents entered into an agreement (as to adjudication), admitting

A.D. was dependent, thus waiving and stipulating to the findings of the magistrate

(in a magistrate’s decision).

       {¶84} Since the parents waived their right to contest the magistrate’s

temporary-custody orders at shelter-care and adjudicatory hearings, they forfeited

the right to raise them now. Moreover, those issues are now rendered moot by the

juvenile court’s final dispositional order of legal custody and by our determination

of the parents’ sixth assignment of error concluding that the juvenile court did not

err in granting legal custody of A.D. to her maternal grandparents. See App.R.

12(A)(1)(c).

       {¶85} Accordingly, the parents’ first assignment of error is overruled.

                       Parents’ Assignment of Error No. 5

       The juvenile court erred by establishing an order of child support
       where there was no evidence presented as to the parent’s [sic]
       income and/or financial circumstances.

       {¶86} In the parents’ fifth assignment of error, the parents argue that the trial

court erred by establishing child-support orders. Specifically, they argue that that

the maternal grandparents waived the establishment of the child-support orders, and

even if that were not so, there was no income and financial information presented

at the dispositional hearing in conformity with the Rules of Court for Seneca County

Juvenile Court (i.e., Loc.R. 9).

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                                           Standard of Review

           {¶87} We review “matters concerning child support” under an abuse of

discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989); see also

Winkler v. Winkler, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-937, 2003-Ohio-2418, ¶ 54.                   An

“‘unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable’” action by the trial court amounts to

an abuse of discretion. Booth at 144, quoting Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219.

                                                   Jurisdiction

           {¶88} Juvenile courts in Ohio are created by statute. See In re D.R., ___Ohio

St.3d ____, 2022-Ohio-4493, ¶ 38, citing R.C. Chapter 2151 and In re Z.R., 144

Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, ¶ 14. Thus, “[j]uvenile courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction * * *.” In re S.M., 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2009-02-008,

2009-Ohio-4677, ¶ 14, citing Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-

7107, ¶ 25; see also In re D.R., 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27, 2014-Ohio-588, ¶ 10.

As statutory creatures with limited jurisdiction, juvenile courts have “little, if any,

inherent power.” In re A.A.C.W., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 13AP-618 and 13AP-

714, 2014-Ohio-2903, ¶ 1111.

           {¶89} Significantly, the statutory provisions establishing the jurisdiction of

the juvenile court similarly give the juvenile court the authority to issue child-

11
     Alternatively captioned as Welty v. Casper.

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support orders. Particularly, R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) grants the juvenile court exclusive

original jurisdiction concerning any child alleged to be an abused, neglected, or

dependent child. This exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be

abused, neglected, and/or dependent is exercised under R.C. 2151.27, R.C. 2151.31,

and R.C. 2151.33 and related sections.

         {¶90} Indeed, prior to the final disposition of cases involving an alleged or

adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent child, the juvenile court is mandated to

issue a temporary order (pursuant to Chapters 3119 to 3125 of the Revised Code)

requiring the “parents, guardian, or person charged with the child’s support to pay

support for the child.”12 R.C. 2151.33(B)(2)(a). See also R.C. 2151.36; Juv.R.

13(B)(2)(d). Importantly, the juvenile court “may issue an order * * * upon its own

motion or if a party files a written motion * * *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C.

2151.33(C)(1). Indeed, A.D. was taken into custody pursuant to section 2151.31

of the Revised Code and placed in the shelter care of the Agency. See R.C.

2151.33(C)(2). Thereafter, the Agency requested that the juvenile court issue a

temporary-child-support order for each parent on August 5, 2022. Thus, the juvenile

court’s issuance of court-child-support orders herein under R.C. 2151.33(B)(2)(a)

were ancillary to the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction over A.D. as a

12
  Even though we recognize that under R.C. 2151.33(B)(2)(b), the juvenile court is directed to issue an order
requiring the parents, guardian, or person charged with the child’s support to pay support for the child, and
also to issue an order requiring the appropriate person or persons to maintain or obtain health insurance
coverage, we will not address those provisions since they have not been raised on appeal.

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dependent child. See R.C. 3119.01(C)(3) (defining a “[c]ourt child support order”

to mean “any order issued by a court for the support of a child pursuant to * * *

2151.23, 2151.231, 2151.232, 2151.33 * * * of the Revised Code * * *.”). On

August 9, 2022 and before the trial court had ruled on the parents’ objection to the

magistrate’s decision, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry granting the

Agency’s request for a temporary order of child support imputing potential income

to both parents.

       {¶91} At the dispositional hearing held on May 19, 2022, there was minimal

testimony presented regarding the circumstances of the parents’ employment. Their

ongoing caseworker, Elizabeth Decker, testified that both parents were employed.

However, no evidence was introduced as to where they were employed and the

amounts of the parents’ hourly wages. Consequently, the magistrate (in its decision)

imputed potential income to both parents in the establishment of child-support

orders. Ultimately, the juvenile court overruled the parents’ objections to the

magistrate’s decision and issued its judgment entry consistent with the magistrate’s

recommendation for the establishment of child-support orders by imputing potential

income.

       {¶92} Here, the parents’ argument that the maternal grandparents were not

seeking the establishment of child-support orders is inconsequential since the

juvenile court is statutorily mandated to establish such orders when the child is

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placed in the custody of a third party. See R.C. 2151.33(B)(2)(a); 2151.231; R.C.

3119.07(C). Thus, this portion of their argument lacks merit.

      {¶93} Next, the parents assert that the magistrate failed to comply with

Seneca County Juvenile Court’s Loc.R. 9, which directs the juvenile court to review

documents listed in R.C. 3119.05(A) to establish income before calculating its

child-support orders. R.C. 3119.05(A) provides “[t]he parents’ current and past

income and personal earnings shall be verified by electronic means or with suitable

documents, including, but not limited to, paystubs, employer statements, receipts

and expense vouchers related to self-generated income, tax returns, and all

supporting documentation and schedules for the tax returns.”

      {¶94} While the record does not reflect that the parents submitted the

documentary evidence described in R.C. 3119.05(A) or Seneca Co. Loc.R. 9, we

note that the parties’ income is the starting point for calculating child-support

obligations under R.C. 3119 et seq. See R.C. 3119.01(C)(9). R.C. 3119.01 divides

income into two distinct categories: “gross income” of the parent and “potential

income”. R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(a) and (b). Both of those terms are statutorily defined

under R.C. 3119.01. See R.C. 3119.01(C)(12) and (17). R.C. 3119.01 then goes on

to define what does and does not constitute “[g]ross income”.                 R.C.

3119.01(C)(12)(a) through (g). Here, the trial court established its child-support

orders based upon its imputation of potential income to the parents and not their

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gross income. Thus, no verification of financial information was required under

R.C. 3119.05(A) and derivatively Seneca Co. Loc.R. 9.

       {¶95} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the juvenile court

did not abuse its discretion by not requiring verification of financial information

under R.C. 3119.05(A) (and derivatively Seneca Co. Loc.R. 9) since it imputed

potential income to the parents and because its determination was not based upon

the gross income of the parents.

       {¶96} Accordingly, the parents’ fifth assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶97} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the

particulars assigned and argued in their assignments of error, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                                               Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/jlr

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