Court Opinion

ID: 9959011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:05:50.088387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:23.529119
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-0690
                                 Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD CHAPLINE,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

         Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Chris Foy, Judge.

         A juvenile criminal defendant appeals his sentence for second-degree

sexual     abuse.        SENTENCE       VACATED         AND      REMANDED    FOR

RESENTENCING.

         Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

         Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

         Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Seventeen-year-old Chad Chapline pled guilty to second-degree sexual

abuse after he and a compatriot repeatedly sexually assaulted a teenage girl while

brandishing a knife. The district court sentenced Chapline to twenty-five years in

prison with a mandatory minimum of eight years and four months before parole

eligibility. Among other claims, Chapline contends the sentencing court failed to

address constitutionally required juvenile-sentencing factors. We agree, vacate

the sentence imposed, and remand for resentencing.

       I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Three teens—Chapline, N.O., and M.H.—ran away from a residential

treatment center near Waverly. While hiding out in a treehouse by a football field,

Chapline “started to touch” N.O., who struggled, screamed, and cried. Chapline

directed M.H. to “hold her down and cover her mouth” while Chapline sexually

assaulted her; the two then “switched roles” and M.H. assaulted N.O. During the

assaults, Chapline and M.H. brandished a pocketknife and screwdriver and—in

Chapline’s words—told N.O “we didn’t want to use them but would if we had to.”

Chapline emphasized the sharpness of the pocketknife by cutting the wooden

boards in the treehouse with it.

       Chapline and M.H. “took turns” sexually assaulting N.O. over two days.

They penetrated her anus and vagina with their penises and hands, forced her to

perform oral sex and a “handjob,” and they performed oral sex on her—all against

her will. Chapline and M.H. estimated they raped N.O. at least five times.
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       The three teens then went to Walmart to use the store’s public Wi-Fi. N.O.

managed to contact her mother and said Chapline and M.H. were holding her

against her will and threatening her with weapons.

       Police found the three teens in the jewelry department and arrested them.

They spoke with Chapline, M.H., and N.O. separately.           Chapline and M.H.

eventually confessed, and N.O. disclosed the multi-day assault. Chapline also

described how he had sexually assaulted other girls before N.O. and used threats

to keep them from reporting.

       The Bremer County Attorney charged Chapline with two counts of second-

degree sexual abuse, class “B” felonies in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1

and 709.3 (2022), and one count of false imprisonment, a serious misdemeanor in

violation of Iowa Code section 710.7. As part of a plea agreement, Chapline pled

guilty to one count of second-degree sexual abuse with open sentencing in

exchange for dismissing the remaining charges.

       Before sentencing, the Department of Correctional Services filed a

presentence investigation (PSI) report that documented communication from

Chapline’s adoptive parents and his time in treatment facilities, shelters, and

behavioral health units. The PSI also included a psychosexual evaluation that

noted Chapline “denied the offense” during the evaluation and “stated he did not

[sexually abuse N.O.] and indicated that she is lying.”

       At sentencing, Chapline asked the court to impose no mandatory minimum

on his term of incarceration before parole eligibility. The State sought a mandatory

minimum of seventeen-and-a-half years.       The district court sentenced him to
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twenty-five years in prison with a mandatory minimum of eight years and four

months. Chapline appeals.

       II.     Standard of Review

       Our review is for abuse of discretion, but “it is not forgiving of a deficiency

in the constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision based on a proper

hearing.” State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017). We are required to

reverse if the district court did not consider one of the five constitutionally-required

juvenile-sentencing factors before imposing a mandatory minimum.               State v.

Majors, 897 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 2017).

       III.    Discussion

       Chapline seeks relief alleging the district court failed to consider all the

required juvenile-sentencing factors, while also considering unproven conduct as

an aggravating factor. We find the juvenile-sentencing-factors issue dispositive.

       Under our supreme court’s precedent, a sentencing court must “expressly

consider the [juvenile-sentencing] factors before imposing any mandatory

minimum sentence on a juvenile offender.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 172

(Iowa 2018) (citing State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014)). The five

factors are:

              (1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful
       behavior, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
       risks and consequences;
              (2) the particular family and home environment that surround
       the youth;
              (3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all
       circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the
       commission of the crime;
              (4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through
       the criminal process; and
              (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
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State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 841 (Iowa 2018) (edited for readability).

      Chapline makes a few substantive challenges regarding the constitutional

factors, but we focus on his claim the sentencing court did not address the fourth

factor, concerning the challenges youthful offenders face in navigating the criminal

process. To give the full picture of the reasons given for sentencing, we reproduce

the court’s explanation verbatim:

             Mr. Chapline, this is a difficult case for the court. I mean, it’s
      clear your actions caused lots of harm. Lots of damage. Another
      thing that’s challenging for me is the fact that because—for various
      reasons you have been in a lot of different placements where the
      whole purpose of the placement was to try to get you help, address
      needs that you have, whether it’s for mental health purposes,
      emotional purposes or what have you, and it would not appear to the
      court that this treatment or these various programs have had much
      positive impact on you.
             You know, . . . the offense that you’ve pled guilty to, where . . .
      you engaged in un-consensual, nonconsensual, forcible sex with
      [N.O.], another person participated. Whether it was necessarily at
      your urging or guidance or not, you were both there, you both knew
      what was happening, you both participated. You used a knife.
             You know, my personal belief is that everyone can change,
      everybody’s got something positive to contribute to society. But your
      case challenges that belief, Mr. Chapline.
             I mean, I believe that there’s something positive you can
      contribute, but I don’t believe you’re in a position where we can
      safely—or we can leave—that I can leave the door open for you to
      be taken back into the community anytime soon.
             You know, the PSI, the psychosexual evaluation, talk about
      different factors that are concerning to me. You know, the fact that
      with the psychosexual evaluator, you were denying even committing
      the offense, that you’d done anything wrong. That causes the court
      concern that . . . a lot needs to happen before we can hope for your
      rehabilitation. And if you’re not acknowledging with the evaluator that
      you did these acts, the court doesn’t have much hope about your
      prospects for successfully going through sex offender treatment
      program.
             Because of my concerns of the treatment, the programming
      you’ve already received, and the fact that it doesn’t appear to have
      had much impact, I don’t sense any . . . I don’t sense any remorse
      from you, I don’t sense that you have an appreciation for . . . the
                                           6

       impact your actions have had on [N.O.], . . . and I am concerned
       about your likelihood to reoffend, I do think that that’s something
       that’s come through on the psychosexual evaluation.
                 You know, often with a young person who has committed a
       sex offense, looking at the circumstances, you can ascribe it to sort
       of somebody being impetuous, getting caught up in the heat of the
       moment and making poor choices that way. What you did here . . .
       doesn’t really have any of those what I would consider perhaps
       mitigating factors.
                 This looks to me like . . . there was a plan in place, you . . .
       enlisted or at least encouraged one other person to participate with
       you. You used a knife. . . . [T]his wasn’t a single act. It was, I
       believe, ongoing act over the course of at least a day. So there’s just
       different things that tell me you thought about this. You planned it.
       You were focused on some type of gratification for you without much
       concern for how it might impact your victim.
                 So it would be my belief that . . . some period of prison time is
       required before I feel you should even be considered for parole. I
       think the State’s recommendation is probably too harsh. What I’m
       wrestling with right now is the right balance. If you were [thirty] years
       old and committed this crime, I’d have no qualms about the sentence
       that the law requires.
                 You’re not [thirty] years old. You’re [seventeen], going to be
       [eighteen], and a five-year prison sentence is a, you know, more than
       a quarter of your life to this point. So, you know, my view is every
       year of prison I’m hoping will have more of an impact on you than it
       might have on somebody who is older, more hardened. But I have
       to say, Mr. Chapline, you’ve shown kind of . . . a cold disposition here
       . . . in the proceedings we’ve had. And it would be the court’s opinion
       that you should serve at least one-third of the indeterminate sentence
       before you can be considered for parole. So eight-and-one-third
       years.

       Chapline asserts the sentencing court “did not say a word about” the fourth

factor. The State contends the court implicitly considered this factor when it

discussed how Chapline was “placed in different programs with opportunities for

rehabilitation that did not work.” But Chapline’s past failures speak to the fifth factor

(prospects for rehabilitation), not the fourth factor (challenges navigating the justice

system). See, e.g., Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 647 (Iowa 2019)

(“This [fourth] factor recognizes that juveniles are typically less capable than adults
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at navigating the legal process.”); Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146 (describing the fourth

factor as “the legal incompetency associated with youth”).        We agree with

Chapline’s assessment; the fourth factor went unaddressed by the district court—

expressly or otherwise. See Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 171–72 (quoting Lyle, 854

N.W.2d at 404 n.10).

      We vacate the sentence imposed and remand with directions to re-sentence

Chapline after considering the required juvenile-sentencing factors. See, e.g., id.

at 173. We express no opinion on whether application of the constitutional factors

will yield the same or a different sentence on remand.

      SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.