Court Opinion

ID: 9790680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:57:20.515667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.902285
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I have concluded from a review of the record that there is no evidence to support the charge of extreme indifference murder, § 18-3-102(1)(d), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Yol. 8B), and thus, it was error to instruct the jury on that offense. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
On September 21, 1991, the defendant and a group of his high school friends attended a party. After the party the defendant, with others, gathered at the intersection of Nevada Avenue and Pikes Peak Boulevard in downtown Colorado Springs. The defendant and some of his friends were intoxicated, angry, and belligerent.
On at least one occasion, the defendant and his friends challenged and taunted a small group of persons who then retreated to a vehicle. The defendant attacked one of the members of this first group, continued to strike this person after he had gotten into the vehicle, and kicked the vehicle as it was leaving. Another member of the defendant’s group broke the rear window of the vehicle with his hand, suffered a cut hand, and bled profusely, as a result. While some fighting occurred with this first group, there is no evidence that anyone was seriously injured, and no evidence that any person’s life was threatened or endangered.
After this first group left, the defendant, among others, kicked some newspaper dispensing machines and continued to be noisy, unruly, and belligerent.
The victim and his companion were walking north on Nevada Avenue approaching Pikes Peak Boulevard when they encountered the defendant and his friends. The victim was immediately struck down by a blow to the back of his head. The defendant, and others, then began to kick the victim severely until well after the victim quit defending himself.
The defendant kicked the victim several times in the head and continued to do so after the others had stopped. The victim died of blunt trauma to the head.
This was a senseless killing of a person without any motive, or without any motive based on anything over which the victim had control. The defendant acted in a manner manifesting an extreme indifference to the life of the victim.
The defendant was charged with extreme indifference murder, § 18 — 3—102(1)(d), was convicted of manslaughter, § 18-3-104, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), and was sentenced to twelve years to the Department of Corrections. From this conviction and sentence he brings this appeal.
Here, inasmuch as the acts that constituted the fatal attack on the victim threatened or endangered only the victim, I conclude that extreme indifference murder cannot be applied to these facts without ignoring the rational distinction between it and second degree murder announced in People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo.1988).
In order to make my position clear, it is necessary to explore a portion of the history of extreme indifference murder in Colorado. I am aware that there have been numerous amendments to the statute, some of which are described, and that each case discussed must be read in light of the then existing statute.
In People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the then extreme indifference murder statute arguing that there was no rational distinction between it and second degree murder. The court held the extreme indifference murder statute was unconstitutional as violative of the guarantee of equal protection as it could not be reasonably distinguished from second degree murder.
At that time, the crime of first degree murder included the following:
A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:
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(d) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another.
*373Colo.Sess.Laws 1977, ch. 224, § 18-3-102(1)(d) at 960.
The crime of second degree murder was then, and is now, defined as:
A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if:
(a) He causes the death of a person knowingly, but not after deliberation.
Section 18-3-103(1)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B).
The possible penalty for extreme indifference murder has always been substantially higher than the penalty for murder in the second degree. Both offenses require the culpable mental state of “knowingly.”
In 1981, following Marcy, the General Assembly amended extreme indifference murder to provide as follows:
A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:
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(d) Under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another.
Section 18-3-102(1)(d) (emphasized language added by General Assembly in 1981).
In People v. Jefferson, supra, our supreme court held the amended statute constitutional as it could reasonably be distinguished from murder in the second degree even though both continued to require the mental state of “knowingly.” The distinction recognized in Jefferson arises from the added language.
In discussing the impact of this additional language, the court stated:
The 1981 addition of the words ‘universal malice’ and ‘generally’ to the language of the statute is an unmistakable indication of the legislative intent to retreat from the confusion sown by People v. Jones, and the 1977 amendments, and limit the application of extreme indifference murder to situations in which the actor demonstrates an indifference to human life generally, as distinguished from indifference to, or willingness to take, a particular human life. This interpretation is supported by the addition of the words ‘or persons’ following person in the statute.
These changes reinforce the element of cold-bloodedness. When a person creates a grave risk of death to a person or persons and kills for essentially no reason, or upon slight or insufficient provocation without knowing or caring who the victim may be, Longinotti, 46 Colo. at 181, 102 P. at 168, the state is justified in treating the crime as first-degree murder. The amended statute emphasizes those crucial factors which make extreme indifference murder a more serious crime than second-degree murder, even assuming an identical mens rea requirement for both crimes. •
People v. Jefferson, supra, at 1232.
The legislative retreat from People v. Jones, 193 Colo. 250, 565 P.2d 1333 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 498, 54 L.Ed.2d 447 (1977), and the court’s discussion of Longinotti v. People, 46 Colo. 173, 102 P. 165 (1909) are central to my position.
In Jones, the defendant met the victim by chance for the first time on the evening of the killing and the two went out for drinks. The defendant returned the victim to her apartment and stabbed her to death. The defendant’s conviction for extreme indifference murder was affirmed on appeal. Our supreme court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c). People v. Jones, 668 P.2d 937 (Colo.1983).
In Jefferson, the court stated that the “confusion sown by People v. Jones” was the application of extreme indifference murder to a situation in which the grave risk of death was confined to one identified person. The criticism of, or departure from, Jones in Jefferson was anticipated by the concurring opinion of Justice Lohr in People v. Ramos, 708 P.2d 1347 (Colo.1985) which arose under the current statute.
In Ramos, Justice Lohr stated:
In the 1981 amendment, among other changes, the legislature added the concept of ‘universal malice’ to the definition of the crime of extreme indifference murder. We *374have not analyzed the meaning of ‘universal malice’ in the context of this current version of the statute. We have stated before that “[u]niversal malice is evinced by acts which are ‘calculated to put the lives of many persons in jeopardy without being aimed at anyone in particular.’ ” People v. Jones, 193 Colo. 250, 254 n. 5, 565 P.2d 1333, 1336 n. 5 (1977), quoting from Longinotti v. People, 46 Colo. 173, 177, 102 P. 165, 167 (1909). In People v. Jones, which involved a review of a conviction for extreme indifference murder under a prior version of the present statute, we held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction even though the defendant’s conduct was directed towards a single person. We concluded that the extreme indifference murder statute as it was then constituted prohibited conduct that greatly endangered only a single person because the statute proscribed ‘conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person.’ 193 Colo. at 254, 565 P.2d at 1336 (emphasis in the original). We implicitly rejected an argument that universal malice was a required element of the crime. However, the statute has now been amended to incorporate explicitly a ‘universal malice’ requirement. This raises the obvious question whether a person still can be convicted of an offense under the statute if his conduct and intent are directed only towards a particular person.
People v. Ramos, 708 P.2d at 1353-54 (latter emphasis added).
I conclude that Justice Lohr’s question was answered in the negative in Jefferson, in which he concurred.
Finally, I note Longinotti v. People, supra, which is of interest because of its often quoted, but perhaps confusing, passage referring to the murderer as acting “without knowing or earing who may be the victim.” In this context, I believe, “knowing” does not mean “acquainted with,” but should be equated with “being aware of.”
In my view, extreme indifference murder under Jefferson is limited to those situations in which the fatal act endangers, or potentially endangers, more than one person. These situations would include, but would not be limited to, the random firing of a weapon into a crowd or occupied structure, driving a vehicle into a crowd, or introducing a virus or poison into an air, water, food, pharmaceutical, or illicit drug supply. Arson resulting in death, another indiscriminate act which includes the use of explosive devices, is first degree murder under the felony murder rule. Section 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (1993 Cum. Supp.). There is a valid public interest in making these indiscriminate and terroristic acts first degree murder when they result in the death of any person. In my view, however, there is no evidence of such conduct in this case.
Included in extreme indifference murder are those situations in which the defendant commits an act which can kill indiscriminately but which, in fact, endangers only the victim. For example, the defendant causes an explosion in a public place which would normally endanger many people but only the victim is endangered because the device malfunctions, the device is located in such a manner that its effect is limited, or some fortuitous circumstance causes the crowd to be dispersed so that only the victim is actually endangered. Another example would be when the defendant fees a weapon into an occupied structure at a time when only the victim is present. These scenarios give meaning to the use of “person” in the statute and added meaning to the phrase “without knowing [being aware of] or earing who the victim may be.” See Longinotti v. People, supra. Again, no such conduct occurred in this case.
I believe my view is in accord with People v. Atkins, 844 P.2d 1196 (Colo.App.1992) in which extreme indifference murder was distinguished from premeditated murder when a defendant was charged and convicted of both. In Atkins, a panel of this court held that the term “universal malice” describes those acts greatly dangerous to the lives of persons other than the one killed, revealing a depraved mind, and which do not include a killing from intentional, and I would add knowing, acts directed at the person slain. See also People v. Rodriguez, 888 P.2d 278 (Colo.App.1994); People v. Fernandez, 883 P.2d 491 (Colo.App.1994).
*375The People and the majority find evidence of “universal malice” in the conduct of the defendant and his companions prior to the encounter with the victim. While it is true that the defendant and his companions confronted, challenged, and even attacked persons indiscriminately, there is little indication in the evidence that any person’s life was endangered prior to the attack on the victim. More importantly, there is no evidence that the attack on the victim endangered, or could have endangered, anyone other than the victim.
I recognize that, in discussing the history of extreme indifference murder in Jefferson, our supreme court included examples of cases in which the fatal activity endangered only the victim. It is the inclusion of these examples that has led, in my opinion, to what confusion currently exists.
In my view, the jury’s verdict is amply supported by the evidence; and is the most appropriate verdict in light of all of the evidence. The verdict did not result from a compromise which could have been influenced by the fact that it was improvidently instructed to consider extreme indifference murder. I would, therefore, be inclined to hold that the error in instructing the jury on extreme indifference murder was harmless as it did not affect any substantial rights. Crim.P. 52(a).
I am not, however, permitted to speculate as to what, if any, impact the improvidently delivered instruction had on the deliberations and decision of the jury. It would appear that where, as here, juries are instructed with respect to an offense that is not supported by the evidence, a new trial is required. Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 360, 369 P.2d 54 (1962); Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952). In both Leonard and Tate, our supreme court reversed convictions of lesser offenses and remanded for new trials on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support an instruction on first degree murder.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.