Court Opinion

ID: 9962357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 16:00:44.586468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.323792
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 23 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA C. LUNA,                                  No.    22-15769

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:20-cv-08097-EMC

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION;
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                   Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted January 17, 2024
                            San Francisco, California

Before: COLLINS, FORREST, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Maria Luna appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) on her

Title VII hostile work environment claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we review de novo. Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 647

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
(9th Cir. 2021). For the reasons below, we affirm.

      Even assuming that the inmate’s conduct created a hostile work

environment, CDCR is not liable for the inmate’s conduct. An employer is liable

for harassment by a third party “where the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in

the harassment by not taking immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or

should have known of the conduct.” Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th

Cir.1997)). Conversely, “an employer’s prompt corrective response can insulate an

employer from liability for an employee’s hostile work environment claim.” Fried,

18 F.4th at 650.

      Here, after Luna experienced a single incident of indecent exposure by an

inmate, CDCR took immediate, corrective actions. Specifically, CDCR referred the

case for criminal prosecution; implemented multiple security measures pending

investigation; investigated the incident; and held a disciplinary hearing, all within

about a month of the incident. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“The most significant immediate measure an employer can take in

response to a sexual harassment complaint is to launch a prompt investigation to

determine whether the complaint is justified.”). After the inmate was found guilty

of indecent exposure, CDCR imposed sanctions that included revocation of the

inmate’s privileges, loss of good time credit, and a requirement that the inmate

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wear an exposure control jumpsuit. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“Employers should impose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace

free from sexual harassment.”). CDCR’s measures were at least effective in

preventing the inmate from exposing himself to Luna again. See Campbell v. Haw.

Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he issue of whether the

employer’s actions successfully ended the harassment [is] relevant to the question

of whether those actions were reasonable.”).

      Luna argues that CDCR’s response was unreasonable because it failed to

eliminate all contact between Luna and the inmate. However, “Title VII does not

require . . . that prisons prevent all manner of harassment at all cost and without

regard to important penological interests.” Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d

951, 959 (11th Cir. 2010). CDCR took steps “reasonably tailored to the incident at

hand,” Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1019, and its failure to implement the specific

measures that Luna identifies does not establish liability. First, Luna contends that

CDCR should have completely banned the inmate from the building in which Luna

worked. However, in addition to taking the security and disciplinary measures

discussed above, CDCR barred the inmate from taking any group classes that Luna

taught at the facility. In this context, CDCR reasonably declined to completely bar

the prisoner from Luna’s building because that was the only place where the

inmate could access mental health treatment, and ensuring an inmate’s access to

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treatment is an important penological interest.

      Second, Luna argues that CDCR was unreasonable because it did not

transfer the inmate to a different facility. However, CDCR responded to the

indecent exposure incident promptly and imposed multiple disciplinary actions and

restrictions on the inmate. Having responded with significant and strict measures

that took into account the unique context of a prison, CDCR was not required to go

even further and to impose the “most draconian” measures imaginable. Campbell,

892 F.3d at 1019 (“While [more severe and exacting] action may be appropriate in

some situations, this is not what the law requires in all circumstances.”); see also

Beckford, 605 F.3d at 959 (explaining prisons cannot “eject unruly inmates like

businesses can eject rude customers”).1

      Third, Luna contends that CDCR was unreasonable because it did not offer

1
  Insofar as Luna raises factual disputes about CDCR’s decision not to transfer the
inmate, she (1) mischaracterizes CDCR’s reliance on the Special Master report and
fails to demonstrate why CDCR could not take into account the “important
penological interests” and “constitutional limits” identified in the report in making
its decision, Beckford, 605 F.3d at 959; (2) does not offer evidentiary support for
disputing whether the inmate had mental health conditions that may have
contributed to his harassing conduct, see Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that a party
cannot “expect the [] court to draw inferences favorable to it when they are wholly
unsupported”); and (3) offers new evidence of CDCR policy requiring the inmate
be transferred that cannot be considered, see Krishner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842
F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Papers not filed with the district court or
admitted into evidence by that court are not part of the clerk's record and cannot be
part of the record on appeal.”).

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Luna a transfer to a position in a different facility. Where a harassment victim has

requested a job transfer in response to a hostile work environment, an employer

may be required to grant such a request, but an employer may not force a victim to

transfer. See Christian v. Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 814 (9th Cir. 2020)

(“[F]orced transfer is no remedy.”). Here, although Luna testified that she was

open to a transfer, she does not identify any evidence showing that she requested a

transfer. And she does not identify any evidence showing that CDCR should have

known that she was open to a transfer to avoid contact with the inmate. Because

transfer of a victim is a permissible remedy only if it is voluntary, CDCR’s failure

to transfer Luna under these circumstances was reasonable. See Campbell, 892

F.3d at 1018 (“We can evaluate the reasonableness of an employer’s corrective

measures only from the perspective of what the employer knew or should have

known at the time it acted.”).

      Finally, to the extent Luna asserts that CDCR acted unreasonably by failing

to follow its own policies in responding to the incident of harassment, Luna makes

these arguments for the first time on appeal, and they are forfeited. See Cornhusker

Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman, 553 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellate

court will not hear an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”) (quoting Broad v.

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Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir.1996)).2

      AFFIRMED.

2
 Luna has also forfeited any arguments related to the state law tort claims she
brought against CDCR because she does not contest the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment to CDCR on these claims. Claiborne v. Blauser, 934
F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2019).

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