Court Opinion

ID: 9626029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:59:40.061314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:19.855894
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. I am glad that the doctrine of charitable immunity is dead in this state. I deeply regret the manner of its demise. As in the Kelso2 case, I can say it is “good riddance,” but still insist that it was a legislative and not a judicial function.
The majority is entitled to all of the credit (and the blame, if any) for this achievement, and it is too generous in attributing the demise to the Pierce case. I would like to clear the record as to what the court held in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass’n (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 162, 260 P. (2d) 765, and Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church (1955), 47 Wn. (2d) 202, 287 P. (2d) 128. The majority implies that charitable immunity was exorcised from the law of this state by the Pierce opinion; and that, though the Lyon case refused to follow it, “No reason for this refusal was given.”
Any attempt to make the Pierce case stand for more than the court said it did is self delusion. There was no majority on the court then (1953) any more than there was when the Lyon opinion was filed (1955), favoring the abolition by the court of the doctrine of charitable immunity.
In the Pierce case, we said (p. 180):
“It is our opinion that a charitable, nonprofit hospital should no longer be held immune from liability for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital. Our previous decisions holding to the contrary are hereby overruled.” (Italics mine.)
The court placed its own emphasis on “for injuries to paying patients” in the Lyon case, where- we held that the doctrine of charitable immunity did apply where the plaintiff, a child, was injured while being transported to Sunday *183School on a bus operated by a church. It was argued, in that case, that the Pierce case had abolished charitable immunity in this state. We answered that by saying flatly:
“. . . That case did not reject the rule of charitable immunity, but merely modified it. There was only one question before us in the Pierce case, and it was stated in the first paragraph thereof: Where a paying patient of a charitable, nonprofit hospital sustains injuries by reason of the negligence of a nurse, may such patient recover damages from the hospital?’ We held that such an institution ‘should no longer be held immune from liability for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital.’ . . . ” (p. 204)
While the Lyon case was a departmental opinion, Judge Hamley (who wrote the Pierce opinion) signed it. Judge Weaver signed both opinions; Judge Schwellenbach, who signed the Pierce opinion, wrote the Lyon opinion. There can be no doubt that they understood what they were doing in both opinions. The opinions are completely consistent. The simple fact is that the viewpoint of the court has changed. Because of a justified impatience with the slow workings of the legislative process, the court substitutes its view of what the law should be.
Again, I can only say that I dissent—not because I believe charitable immunity is desirable, but because of my conviction that the court should adjudicate and not legislate, especially on public policy matters.

Kelso v. Tacoma (1963), 63 Wn. (2d) 913, 390 P. (2d) 2 (see dissent).