Court Opinion

ID: 9868335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:30:34.211849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:49.092051
License: Public Domain

Oh Petitioh to Rehear.
It is suggested in the Railway Company’s petition to rehear that we were mistaken when in our opinion heretofore rendered we stated that “these agents had actually been informed before they put the train in motion again that this child had not alighted from that train.” That allegation of the declaration upon which we based our above quoted statement is as follows:
“That upon arrival of the defendant’s said train in its terminal at Chattanooga, Tenn., a representative of the Travelers’ Aid Society in Chattanooga, Tenn., was pre*110sent to meet plaintiff and when plaintiff did not immediately alight from said train in its terminal, said representative of said Travelers’ Aid Society at Chattanooga, Tenn., informed said agents' and servants of the defendant in charge of said train as to plaintiff’s presence thereon and inquired as to why plaintiff had not alighted from the train.” (Emphasis ours.)
We think the above quoted allegation, when given a normal construction, states what we in our opinion said; Applicable to this construction is the following observation of this Court:
“It must be borne in mind that (1) we are dealing with a demurrer, which admits all allegations of the pleading, and is subject to the general rule that demurrers are not favored and will be overruled if, by any fair and reasonable intendment, the pleading challenged states, however, inartificially, a good case.” Byrd v. Pioneer-Jellico Coal Co. et al., 180 Tenn. 396, 399, 175 S. W. (2d) 542, 543.
We do not, however, think the allegation quoted is in-artificially stated.
Petitioner in seeking to bring this case within the ruling of Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Harrell, 21 Tenn. App. 353, 110 S. W. (2d) 1032, urges upon us the proposition that the rapid rate of speed with which the train was moving when young* Harrell attempted to alight was not a controlling factor in the conclusion reached in that case. The petition to rehear says that the Court “was merely describing the facts and conditions of that case when, it was stated that the train was moving at a rapid rate of speed . . . that . . . whether it he moving slow or fast . . . the passenger leaves the train at his own risk,” unless directed to do so by those in charge of the train. We are unable to so interpret that case, nor *111do we think that the Court in the Harrell case could have intended to hold as petitioner here insists, unless it had the further intention of overruling Tennessee R. R. Co. v. Kingsley, 10 Tenn. App. 637. The case indicates no such intention. Its necessary implication is, in our opinion, to the contrary.
In the Kingsley case the Court said: “The train was moving slowly and plaintiff was being carried by his nearest station to Huntsville, where he had been summoned to attend Court on that day. He was thus confronted with the alternative of a violation of the sub-, poena or further inconvenience, and we think was authorized under the circumstances to alight without being regarded as negligent, unless conditions were such, that an ordinarily prudent man would not have undertaken it.” (10 Tenn. App. at page 640) (Emphasis ours.) We are, of course, aware that in the Kingsley case the plaintiff was told by the conductor “that it would be all right” to get off this slowly moving train. The case, however, as will be observed from the above quotation therefrom, did not turn upon that point, since the Court stated that conditions were not such “that an ordinarily prudent man would not have undertaken it.
Turning now to Nashville, C. & St. L. v. Harrell, supra, it is to be observed that the Court emphasized the fact that the train was running’ fast when the young Harrell jumped off. The Court calls attention to the fact that the boy testified “that when he jumped off he Jmew the train ivas rimming fast”. (21 Tenn. App. at page 357, 110 S. W. (2d) at page 1035.) Then the Court held that if “he does get off while the train is moving at a vapid rate of speed, he does so at his own risk.” (21 Tenn. App. at page 362, 110 S. W. (2d) at page 1037) "(Emphasis ours.) In the light of this language we are un*112able to find any basis for tbe insistence tbat tbe rapid speed of tbe train was not one of tbe controlling factors in concluding tbat the railway company was not liable in tbat case. There would have been no point in calling attention to the testimony of tbe boy tbat “he knew tbe train was running fast” when be jumped off. Further, if tbe rule is tbat tbe passenger always steps off at bis own risk whether tbe train ‘ ‘ be moving slow or fast ’ ’ as insisted by petitioner, then there was no reason for tbe Court to have stated in tbe Harrell case, as it did, tbat the passenger steps off at bis own risk “while tbe train is moving at a rapid rate of speed.”
Tbe petition to rehear asserts tbat “there is no allegation in tbe declaration in this case indicating that plaintiff was induced or directed to leave tbe train by act or word of tbe defendant’s agent.” It was noted in our original opinion and in this opinion tbat those in charge of tbe train started it after being informed that this little girl bad not alighted. The starting of tbe train was an act of tbe defendant’s agent. Tbe declaration alleges tbat as a result of this act plaintiff “became . . . greatly fearful that she would be carried beyond her destination and proceeded to alight. ’ ’
It is also insisted tbat tbe act of tbe railroad inducing a passenger to undertake to alight will not render it liable unless tbat act is “simultaneous with tbe passenger’s departure from tbe train.” As to tbe principle applicable, it was held to tbe contrary in tbe Kingsley case. There tbe Court held: “Having-'admitted tbe reception of tbe cash fare from Norma to River Junction, it implied at least some obligation short of stopping, and it would have been error to have told tbe jury tbat if be got off at River Junction without compulsion from the defendant or its employees, then tbe plaintiff would not *113be entitled to recover.” (10 Tenn. App. at page 642.)
Finally, tlie petition to rehear asserts that it could not have reasonably been anticipated that the act of the defendant in starting its .train before this girl got off would induce her to undertake to alight therefrom while it was moving at from three to five miles per hour in order to avoid being carried beyond her destination. With sincere deference to counsel and to the strong petition which has been filed, we think this insistence is quite untenable in the light of the present day fact that there are many reported cases in many jurisdictions which resulted from the fact that a passenger undertook to do exactly what this little girl undertook to do in order to avoid the exact result which she was seeking to avoid. Probably counsel, in making this insistence, fails to draw the distinction between a rapidly moving train, on the one hand, as in the Harrell case, and one that is moving from three to five miles per hour, as in the Kingsley case, and in the case at bar. The passenger’s desire to avoid being carried beyond his or her destination is, we would say, a natural desire, common to all, and the temptation to alight from a train moving at from three to five miles per hour in order to avoid the result stated naturally follows, and this, we think, is a commonly known fact.
We cannot escape the conclusion that the particular facts of this case brings it within Tennessee R. R. Co. v. Kingsley, supra. So, the petition to rehear is denied.
All concur.