Court Opinion

ID: 9942397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 22:04:16.036866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:03.494972
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/20/24 P. v. Sherry CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050848
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. C1899674)

             v.

 ARTIEREY AGUILAR SHERRY,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) narrowed the scope of murder law and added former Penal Code section
1170.95,1 which provided resentencing relief to some convicted murderers. Three years
later, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) amended former
section 1170.95 to clarify that resentencing relief extends to some persons convicted of
manslaughter. In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether defendant Artierey Aguilar
Sherry, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the enactment of Senate Bill
1437 but before that of Senate Bill 775, can obtain relief from his sentence under former

         1
             Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).2 Based on the text of section 1172.6, we answer
that question in the negative.
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. The Offenses
       “On October 8, 2017, [Sherry] and a codefendant, who were both admitted gang
members, pulled up in a vehicle and fired multiple rounds at the victim, who died shortly
thereafter. On October 17, 2017, police located [Sherry] in the vehicle with his
girlfriend. After the vehicle was impounded, police searched the vehicle and found a
loaded pistol with [Sherry]’s fingerprints on it. [Sherry] and the codefendant were
arrested in August 2018.” (People v. Sherry (Nov. 19, 2021, H047497) [nonpub. opn.] at
p. 2, fn. omitted (Sherry).3)
       B. Underlying Prosecution
       In September 2018, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a complaint
charging Sherry and his codefendant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and Sherry
(alone) with carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2).4
       After Senate Bill 1437 took effect on January 1, 2019, Sherry entered into a plea
agreement with the district attorney. On September 9, 2019, pursuant to the plea
agreement, the trial court granted the district attorney’s oral motion to amend the
complaint to add a voluntary manslaughter charge (§ 192, subd. (a); count 3), along with
an enhancement for carrying a firearm during the commission of a street-gang-related

       2
         After enacting Senate Bill 775, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as
section 1172.6, with no change to the text of the statute (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff.
June 30, 2022). Unless otherwise necessary, we refer to the current version of any
relevant provisions now codified in section 1172.6.
       3
         We granted Sherry’s request for judicial notice of our decision in his direct
appeal, Sherry, supra, H047497. The only claim of error that Sherry raised in that appeal
related to the restitution fine and fees imposed at his sentencing. (See id. at pp. 4–5.)
       4
         Count 1 included an allegation that the codefendant personally discharged a
firearm causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
                                                 2
crime (§ 12021.5, subd. (a)). Sherry pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (count
3) and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (count 2). He also admitted the
enhancement allegation attached to count 3.
          On October 8, 2019, the trial court sentenced Sherry to 14 years and eight months
in prison. The court dismissed the murder charge (count 1) on the district attorney’s
motion.
          On November 19, 2021, this court affirmed the judgment, with a minor
amendment related to a fee imposed at Sherry’s sentencing. (Sherry, supra, H047497, at
p. 10.)
          C. Proceedings on Petition for Resentencing
          After Senate Bill 775 took effect, in April 2022, Sherry filed on his own behalf a
form petition seeking resentencing. Sherry declared, inter alia, that a complaint had been
filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, he had been convicted of manslaughter by plea in lieu of a trial at which he could
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder, and he could not presently be
convicted of murder because of the changes to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1,
2019. Upon Sherry’s request, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him.
          The district attorney filed an opposition to Sherry’s petition, arguing he was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
          On March 8, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Sherry’s petition. After
hearing oral argument from the parties’ counsel, the trial court denied Sherry’s petition
without issuing an order to show cause. The court stated that the record of conviction
“shows [Sherry] is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” The court also issued a
written order explaining its denial.

                                                    3
       In its written order, the trial court stated that at the time Sherry entered his plea in
September 2019, “the changes to sections 188 and 189 were already in effect” and Sherry
“already had the benefit of the changes.” The court reasoned that “there is nothing to
ameliorate” in Sherry’s voluntary manslaughter conviction and he “was never in jeopardy
of being convicted on a now-invalid theory of murder (or attempted murder).”
       Sherry appealed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Sherry contends the trial court erred and, in turn, violated his due process rights in
denying his petition for resentencing. He asserts that “in 2019, courts were routinely
finding voluntary manslaughter outside the change in the law. As such, [he] had no
ability to challenge that conviction. He accepted a plea to that crime rather than
something even lower, which would have been possible after [Senate Bill] 775 was
passed.” He further argues that he “met all the requirements under Penal Code section
1172.6, subdivision (c) for establishing a prima facie claim” and asks that this matter be
reversed and remanded with direction to “issue an order to show cause and allow [him] to
present evidence that he was not the actual killer or a major participant who acted in
reckless disregard of human life.”
       The Attorney General responds that because Sherry could not have properly been
convicted of murder based on an invalid theory at the time he pleaded no contest to
voluntary manslaughter, his plea “was not in lieu of a murder prosecution on a theory
eliminated by [Senate Bill] 1437, and he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of
law.” The Attorney General further asserts that Sherry cannot satisfy the requirements of
section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) and (3) because, as of January 1, 2019, the complaint
in this matter no longer allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory made invalid by
Senate Bill 1437 and, when Sherry pleaded no contest in September 2019, he was not
facing broader liability than that allowed by the changes made to our state’s murder law
by Senate Bill 1437.
                                                   4
       A. Legal Principles
       Senate Bill 1437 took effect on January 1, 2019. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 841.) The bill amended sections 188 and 189 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3)
and added former section 1170.95 (id. at § 4). “With the goal of ‘more equitably
sentenc[ing] offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides’ [citation],
Senate Bill 1437 significantly changed the scope of murder liability for defendants who
did not actually kill or intend to kill anyone, including those prosecuted on a felony-
murder theory.” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868; see § 188.) “The bill also
altered murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Wilson,
at p. 868, fn. 8; see § 188.5)
       In adding former section 1170.95, “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special
procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief
under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) The original
version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction for
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition
the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result of the
other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Flores
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
       By its express terms, Senate Bill 1437 did not authorize a petition to vacate a
conviction for any offense other than murder. After the enactment of Senate Bill 1437,

       5
         Section 188 provides in relevant part: “(a) For purposes of [s]ection 187, malice
may be express or implied. [¶] (1) Malice is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature. [¶] (2) Malice
is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. [¶] (3) Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.”
                                                 5
the California Courts of Appeal held that section 1170.95 did not apply to defendants
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. (See, e.g., People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
194, 201, 204.) In addition, the appellate courts were split on whether Senate Bill 1437
applied to attempted murder.
       “In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775, (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2), effective January 1, 2022.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544.)
Senate Bill 775 resolved the split of authority and amended former section 1170.95 in
several respects, “including (1) clarifying that, in some circumstances, the same relief
available to persons convicted of murder is also available to persons convicted of
attempted murder or manslaughter [citations]; and (2) addressing various aspects of the
petition procedure.” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865.) On June 30,
2022, the statute was renumbered as section 1172.6 without further substantive changes.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
       As amended by Senate Bill 775, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides: “A
person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all
of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
                                                  6
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3)
The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because
of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
       “An offender seeking resentencing must file a petition in the sentencing court and
serve it on statutorily enumerated persons. Among other requirements, the petition must
include a declaration from the petitioner that he is eligible for relief based on the three
conditions [stated] above.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 297 (Reyes).)
“If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. The prosecution then bears the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder (or its attempt)
under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Id. at p. 298.)
       “The trial court may consider the record of conviction to determine whether the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing only after the appointment of counsel and the
opportunity for briefing has occurred. [Citation.] At the prima facie hearing, the court
must take the petitioner’s factual allegations as true. However, if the record contains
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, the court may deny the petition without
issuing an order to show cause.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
       “Various courts have commented that the intent of this resentencing statute is to
provide relief to offenders who could not be convicted of murder under the current law.
[Citation.] In other words, section 1172.6 ‘provides a procedure whereby persons
convicted of murder under a now-invalid theory may petition to vacate their conviction.’
[Citation.] Our high court has stated that this procedure was designed to provide
retroactive relief to defendants who were, or who could have been, convicted of murder
(or its attempt) under the prior law.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 298–299.)
       “We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a petitioner has
made a prima facie showing.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) “In
analyzing section 1172.6, our goal is to effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] We must
                                                  7
avoid a statutory construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we
presume the Legislature did not intend.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 297.)
       B. Analysis
       Sherry contends “[t]he fact that [section] 1170.95 had been passed at the time [he]
pled does not preclude him establishing the prima facie case. . . . [A]t the time he pled,
the change in the law did not apply to manslaughter because [Senate Bill] 775 had not yet
been passed. Had it been passed, he would have challenged that crime as well,
specifically by not pleading to it, and instead pleading to some lesser offense as now set
forth in section 1172.6, subdivision (e).”
       Sherry has not persuaded us the trial court erred in denying his petition. Sherry is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law on two independent grounds. Section
1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) requires that the charging document filed against Sherry
“allowed the prosecution to proceed” under a theory in which malice is imputed to him
based solely on his participation in the crime. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) This requirement
is not met here. Although the district attorney originally filed a complaint that included a
murder charge before Senate Bill 1437, that complaint was superseded by amendment to
include a voluntary manslaughter charge after Senate Bill 1437 took effect. (See Muns v.
Superior Court (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 728, 732.) Thus, when the complaint was
amended in September 2019, Sherry’s prosecution could not have properly proceeded
under a theory of imputed malice abrogated by Senate Bill 1437.6 (§ 188, subd. (a)(3);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
       Sherry’s claim of error fails for a second reason. Under section 1172.6
subdivision (a)(3), “in order to be resentenced, a petitioner must allege that he could not

       6
         In reaching this conclusion we do not decide whether, regardless of the
amendment to the accusatory pleading, the requirement of section 1172.6, subdivision
(a)(1) was not met merely because Senate Bill 1437 was enacted prior to any plea or trial
in this matter, effectively preventing the prosecution from proceeding to a conviction in
reliance on a then-abrogated theory.
                                                 8
presently be convicted of murder (or its attempt) ‘because of changes’ brought by Senate
Bill No. 1437.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
       In Reyes, the Court of Appeal addressed a situation in which the defendant was
charged by information with murder in 2020, pleaded no contest to second degree murder
in 2021, and filed a petition for resentencing in 2022. (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 296.) The Reyes court found defendant ineligible for resentencing for two independent
reasons. The court concluded that the requirement of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1)
was not met because “when this criminal proceeding was initiated, the prosecution was
precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice.” (Reyes, at
p. 298.) The court also concluded that defendant could not satisfy subdivision (a)(3) of
section 1172.6 because, at the time of his no contest plea, he was not facing broader
liability for murder than that allowed following the passage of Senate Bill 1437. (Ibid.)
       We agree with the Reyes court that a defendant like Sherry, who was convicted
after Senate Bill 1437 changed our state’s murder law, “is not the type of defendant
[section 1172.6’s] retroactive procedure was intended to benefit, and any contrary
interpretation of this statute would lead to absurd results.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 299.) Sherry “was not convicted under the prior law, which permitted a theory of
murder based on imputed malice. . . . When [Sherry] entered his change of plea, the now
invalid theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. Consequently, [Sherry]
has already received the benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Id. at p. 298.)
       That after Sherry pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter, Senate Bill 775
“[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of . . . manslaughter under a theory of
felony murder and the natural probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same
relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories” (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 1) does not alter our conclusion that Sherry’s prosecution could not have
proceeded under the theories of liability that were abrogated by Senate Bill 1437.
Although Senate Bill 775 expanded former section 1170.95 by adding defendants with
                                                9
manslaughter convictions to the group of persons potentially eligible for resentencing
relief, it did not further amend the law of malice (§ 188) and left intact section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(3)’s original reference to a defendant’s inability to be convicted “because
of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 2.) The language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) provides that to be eligible
for relief, Sherry must have been facing liability beyond that allowed by Senate Bill 1437
at the time of his conviction. (See Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 298–299.) That
circumstance is not present in this case.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s March 8, 2023 order is affirmed.

                                                 10
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050848
People v. Sherry