Court Opinion

ID: 9528674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:00.870177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:12.631932
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, C. J.,
dissenting.
At the time relevant to this case, ORS 30.275(1) provided:
“Every person who claims damages from a public body * * * for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall cause to be presented * * * a written notice * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
The statute referred both to claims of damages for an injury and claims on account of an injury. The second phrase is not merely a synonym for the word “for.” That would make it surplusage. I would hold that a claim for contribution is “on account of’ an injury.
ORS 174.010 admonishes us not to omit words from a statute but to “give effect to all.” See 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 299 Or 344, 703 P2d 207 (1985); Blyth & Co., Inc., v. City of Portland, 204 Or 153, 159, 282 P2d 363, 366 (1955). There is precedent for interpreting the phrase “on *676account of’ to refer to a party who suffered a loss as a result of the injury to that person, for instance a husband whose wife was injured by the defendant. See Basler v. Sacramento Electric, Gas & Ry. Co., 166 Cal 33, 36-37, 134 P 993, 994 (1913); and Blackwell v. Memphis St. Ry. Co., 124 Tenn 516, 521, 137 SW 486, 487 (1911).
Oregon’s Tort Claims Act appears to have been based upon Minnesota’s act. Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary (April 3, 1967, Memorandum of William Juza); Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary (April 3, 1967, Memorandum of William Juza, Separate exhibit file under HB 1624); see also Lansing, The King Can Do No Wrong! The Oregon Tort Claims Act, 47 Or L Rev 357, 359 (1968). We have stated that “[t]he interpretation another state places upon its statute at the time our legislature incorporates that act into Oregon law is highly persuasive in the absence of a legislative directive that our statute is not to be similarly construed. Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or 545, 550, 495 P2d 273 (1972). See also Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, 233 Or 578, 585, 379 P2d 880, 883 (1963), which states:
“* * * [T]his would seem to be a clear case for application of the presumption that when the legislature adopts the statute of another state it intends to adopt also the construction theretofore placed upon the statute by the highest court of that state. ***”
Absent a legislative directive or indication that Oregon’s adopted statute is not to be similarly construed, we should follow the lead of the Minnesota court. See, e.g., Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or 531, 538 P2d 353 (1975); Joseph v. Lowery, supra. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s pronouncement in White v. Johnson, 272 Minn 363, 137 NW2d 674 (1965), see the majority opinion, 299 Or at 672, is strong authority for construing our statute in a similar manner and allowing contribution from the state.
The majority cites Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, 275 Or 35, 40, 549 P2d 657, 660 (1976), for the proposition that “[t]he pleading and proof of notice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ORS 30.275 [are] a mandatory requirement and a condition precedent to recovery under the Oregon Tort Claim Act.” 299 Or at 671. In Urban Renewal Agency, we held that the notice requirement was met. The quoted statement is dictum.
*677In Urban Renewal Agency we also stated that the Tort Claims Act notice requirements are “to give the public body timely notice of the tort and allow its officers an opportunity to investigate the matters promptly and ascertain all the necessary facts.” 275 Or at 41, 549 P2d at 660. This comment of the Minnesota court in White v. Johnson, supra, is relevant:
“* * * Although in Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 171 Minn. 57, 213 N.W. 557, 59 A.L.R. 404, we did state in passing that without notice there is no cause of action against a municipality, the language there used was perhaps too broad to express the simple point to be made that the notice requirements of a city charter should not be circumvented by special laws passed by the legislature. The more precise characterization of the notice requirement is that it is a condition precedent to bringing suit for the practical purpose of quickly informing a municipality of injuries for which it might be liable. Conceptually, the giving of notice is an essential element of the cause of action, but realistically, because of the preexisting right and duty, liability is created at the instant the tort is committed. The city is then subject to a liability, and it is no more unexpected that a city might settle a claim before the giving of notice than that private parties might settle before commencment of suit. We have held that a covenant not to sue secured by one wrongdoer does not destroy the common liability necessary for contribution. And the majority of the courts hold that running of the statute of limitations against one defendant on the plaintiffs claim does not bar a suit for contribution against him. The reasoning underlying these decisions is that joint liability arises the moment the tort is committed and these defenses come into being after the conduct which creates that liability. Moreover, since the right to recover contribution is based on equitable principles and has the objective of compelling joint wrongdoers to share responsibility for damages inflicted by their tortious acts, the conduct of the person from whom contribution is sought ought to control the right to maintain the action. The objective of contribution has equal validity where one of the tortfeasors is a municipal corporation. To permit a personal defense against the injured plaintiff to destroy the right to contribution from a municipality under the circumstances disclosed in this case would not only frustrate the basic aim of permitting recovery between participating tortfeasors but would deny third-party rights against a municipality where the statute creating it neither expressly nor by *678fair implication so intends.” 272 Minn at 370-71, 137 NW2d at 679. (Footnotes omitted.)
As stated above, even in the absence of any relationship between former ORS 30.275 and the Minnesota statute, the text of former ORS 30.275 lends itself to the result of the Minnesota court’s interpretation of its statute, even if not to its reasoning. I agree with the majority that a public body can be liable for contribution under ORS 18.440(1). I dissent, however, because the contribution claim in this case was a claim “on account of’ an injury of which the contribution claimant was entitled to give, and gave, the required notice.
Roberts and Jones, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.