Court Opinion

ID: 9674842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:36:21.73729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.746498
License: Public Domain

*717BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am uneasy with the suggestion in the principal opinion that the defendant has the burden of introducing evidence in support of the mitigating circumstance set out in § 565.012.3.(1), RSMo Cum.Supp. 1982, as follows:
The defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity.
There should be a rebuttable presumption that a defendant has no such significant history. It is established law, furthermore, that a juvenile record does not constitute “criminal activity.” Section 211.271, RSMo 1978. See State ex rel. R.L.W. v. Billings, 451 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. banc 1970); State ex rel. Whittaker v. Webber, 605 S.W.2d 179, 182-83 (Mo.App.1980); In re C _, 314 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Mo.App.1958).
Section 565.012.3.(1), however, refers to “criminal activity” and not to “convictions.” The state should be able to show criminal activity which has not ripened into conviction, subject to the trial court’s discretion to control the scope of the trial to keep it from getting too far out of bounds. There are indications in the record before us of other felonies committed by the defendant while an adult, but these may not have been offered into evidence during the trial. Because of the Court’s vote I have not further explored the possibility that a remand for the taking of further evidence might show that the trial court properly refused to instruct on absence of criminal conduct.
I adhere to the views expressed in State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo. banc 1983) as to the imposition of a death sentence on a very young offender, and cannot add to these views except to say that Battle’s offense was much more gruesome.
The principal opinion refers to deliberateness as demonstrated by “lying in wait.” The case is not so aggravated as State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1982), in which the defendant stalked the victim on two occasions and then shot him repeatedly, in order to collect a promised $1,000. I believe that this defendant’s extreme youth is a circumstance comparable to Mcllvoy’s demonstrated susceptibility to influence, as shown by expensive psychiatric testimony. I reiterate my observations in State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497, 518 (Mo. banc 1983), as to the reluctance of juries to impose death sentences when the sole statutory aggravating circumstance is robbery. State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. banc 1983) is not at all comparable to this case.
It appears that I am out of step with the majority of the Court in sentence review under § 565.014, RSMo 1978. I believe that, under that section, we are obliged to exercise independent judgment, rather than simply determining whether the jury’s recommendation is supported by the record. As in McDonald and Battle, I would set aside the death sentence in this case, but would affirm the conviction.