Court Opinion

ID: 9426180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:02.464883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.662342
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins, concurring in part.
I join the Court insofar as it holds that the per se rule adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court for determining the admissibility of petitioner’s two statements inadequately accommodates the diverse interests underlying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. I would, however, remand the case for reconsideration under the general standards articulated in the Court’s opinion and elaborated herein.
A
The issue presented in this case turns on proper application of the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, not on the Fifth Amendment or the prophylaxis added to that guarantee by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).1 The Court recognized in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to statements obtained following an illegal arrest just as it does to tangible evidence seized in a similar manner *607or obtained pursuant to an otherwise illegal search and seizure. Wong Sun squarely rejected, however, the suggestion that the admissibility of statements so obtained should be governed by a simple “but for” test that would render inadmissible all statements given subsequent to an illegal arrest. Id., at 487-488. In a similar manner, the Court today refrains from according dispositive weight to the single factor of Miranda warnings. I agree with each holding. Neither of the rejected extremes adequately recognizes the competing considerations involved in a determination to exclude evidence after finding that official possession of that evidence was to some degree caused by a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
On this record, I cannot conclude as readily as the Court that admission of the statements here at issue would constitute an effective overruling of Wong Sun. See ante, at 604-605. Although Wong Sun establishes the boundaries within which this case must be decided, the incompleteness of the record leaves me uncertain that it compels the exclusion of petitioner’s statements. The statements at issue in Wong Sun were on the temporal extremes in relation to the illegal arrest. Cf. Collins v. Beto, 348 F. 2d 823, 832, 834-836 (CA5 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring). Toy’s statement was obtained immediately after his pursuit and arrest by six agents. It appears to have been a spontaneous response to a question put to him in the frenzy of that event, and there is no indication that the agents made any attempt to inform him of his right to remain silent. Wong Sun’s statement, by contrast, was not given until after he was arraigned and released on his own recognizance. Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the station a few days after the arrest for questioning. His statement was preceded by an official warning of his right *608to remain silent and to have counsel if he desired.2 The Court rejected the Government’s assertion that Toy’s statement resulted from an independent act of free will sufficient to purge the consequences of the illegal arrest. Wong Sun’s statement, however, was deemed admissible. Given the circumstances in which Wong Sun’s statement was obtained, the Court concluded that “the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ ” 371 U. S., at 491.
Like most cases in which the admissibility of statements obtained subsequent to an illegal arrest is contested, this case concerns statements more removed than that of Toy from the time and circumstances of the illegal arrest. Petitioner made his first statement some two hours following his arrest, after he had been given Miranda warnings. The Court is correct in noting that no other significant intervening event altered the relationship established between petitioner and the officers by the illegal arrest. But the Court’s conclusion that admission of this statement could be allowed only by overruling Wong Sun rests either on an overly restrictive interpretation of the attenuation doctrine, to which I cannot subscribe, or on its view that the arrest was made for investigatory purposes, a factual determination that I think more appropriately should have been left for decision in the first instance by the state courts.
B
The Court’s rejection in Wong Sun of a “but for” test, reaffirmed today, ante, at 603-604, recognizes that in some *609circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes. The notion of the “dissipation of the taint” attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Application of the Wong Sun doctrine will generate fact-specific cases bearing distinct differences as well as similarities, and the question of attenuation inevitably is largely a matter of degree. The Court today identifies the general factors that the trial court must consider in making this determination. I think it appropriate, however, to attempt to articulate the possible relationships of those factors in particular, broad categories of cases.
All Fourth Amendment violations are, by constitutional definition, “unreasonable.” There are, however, significant practical differences that distinguish among violations, differences that measurably assist in identifying the kinds of cases in which disqualifying the evidence is likely to serve the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347-348 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). In my view, the point at which the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in the absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of that taint.
That police have not succeeded in coercing the accused’s confession through willful or negligent misuse of the power of arrest does not remove the fact that they may have tried. The impermissibility of the attempt, and the extent to which such attempts can be deterred by the use of the exclusionary rule, are of primary relevance in determining whether exclusion is an appropriate rem*610edy. The basic purpose of the rule, briefly stated, is to remove possible motivations for illegal arrests. Given this purpose the notion of voluntariness has practical value in deciding whether the rule should apply to statements removed from the immediate circumstances of the illegal arrest. If an illegal arrest merely provides the occasion of initial contact between the police and the accused, and because of time or other intervening factors the accused’s eventual statement is the product of his own reflection and free will, application of the exclusionary rule can serve little purpose: the police normally will not make an illegal arrest in the hope of eventually obtaining such a truly volunteered statement. In a similar manner, the role of the Miranda warnings in the Wong Sun inquiry is indirect. To the extent that they dissipate the psychological pressures of custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings serve to assure that the accused’s decision to make a statement has been relatively unaffected by the preceding illegal arrest. Correspondingly, to the extent that the police perceive Miranda warnings to have this equalizing potential, their motivation to abuse the power of arrest is diminished. Bearing these considerations in mind, and recognizing that the deterrent value of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is limited to certain kinds of police conduct, the following general categories can be identified.
Those most readily identifiable are on the extremes: the flagrantly abusive violation of Fourth Amendment rights, on the one hand, and "technical” Fourth Amendment violations, on the other. In my view, these extremes call for significantly different judicial responses.
I would require the clearest indication of attenuation in cases in which official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. If, for example, the fac*611tors relied on by the police in determining to make the arrest were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, or if the evidence clearly suggested that the arrest was effectuated as a pretext for collateral objectives, cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 237, 238 n. 2 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), or the physical circumstances of the arrest unnecessarily intrusive on personal privacy, I would consider the equalizing potential of Miranda warnings rarely sufficient to dissipate the taint. In such cases the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be effective, and the corresponding mandate to preserve judicial integrity, see United States v. Peltier, ante, p. 531; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450 n. 25 (1974), most clearly demands that the fruits of official misconduct be denied. I thus would require some demonstrably effective break in the chain of events leading from the illegal arrest to the statement, such as actual consultation with counsel or the accused’s presentation before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause, before the taint can be deemed removed, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975); cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 365 (1972); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 796 (1970).
At the opposite end of the spectrum lie “technical” violations of Fourth Amendment rights where, for example, officers in good faith arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later invalidated 3 or pursuant to a statute that subsequently is declared unconstitutional, see United States v. Kilgen, 445 F. 2d 287 (CA5 *6121971). As we noted in Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 447: “The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.” In cases in which this underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can see no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution of reliable and probative evidence. Thus, with the exception of statements given in the immediate circumstances of the illegal arrest' — a constraint I think is imposed by existing exclusionary-rule law — I would not require more than proof that effective Miranda warnings were given and that the ensuing statement was voluntary in the Fifth Amendment sense. Absent aggravating circumstances, I would consider a statement given at the station house after one has been advised of Miranda rights to be sufficiently removed from the immediate circumstances of the illegal arrest to justify its admission at trial.
Between these extremes lies a wide range of situations that defy ready categorization, and I will not attempt to embellish on the factors set forth in the Court’s opinion other than to emphasize that the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in focus. See ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Art. 150, p. 54 et seq. and Commentary thereon, p. 375 et seq. (Prop. Off. Draft 1975). And, in view of the inevitably fact-specific nature of the inquiry, we must place primary reliance on the “learning, good sense, fairness and courage” of judges who must make the determination in the first instance. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 342 (1939). See ante, at 604 n. 10.
*613c
On the facts of record as I view them, it is possible that the police may have believed reasonably that there was probable cause for petitioner’s arrest. Although the trial court conducted hearings on petitioner’s motion to suppress and received his testimony and that of the arresting officers, its inquiry focused on determining whether petitioner’s statements were preceded by adequate Miranda warnings and were made voluntarily. The court did not inquire into the possible justification, actual or perceived, for the arrest. Indeed, numerous questions addressed to the circumstances of the arrest elicited the State’s objection, which was sustained. App. 14-15. The Illinois Supreme Court’s consideration of the factual basis for its ruling similarly failed to focus on these relevant issues or to rest in any meaningful sense on the factors set forth in the Court’s opinion today. After determining that the officers lacked probable cause for petitioner’s arrest, the Illinois court concluded simply that examination of the record persuaded it that “the giving of Miranda warnings . . . served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements.” 56 Ill. 2d 312, 317, 307 N. E. 2d 356, 358 (1974).
I am not able to conclude on this record that the officers arrested petitioner solely for the purpose of questioning, ante, at 605; see also ante, at 606 (White, J., concurring in judgment). To be sure, there is evidence suggesting, as the Court notes, an investigatory arrest. The strongest evidence on that point is the inconclusive testimony by the arresting officers themselves. But the evidence is conflicting. Responding to questions as to what they told petitioner upon his arrest, the officers testified he was advised that the arrest was for investigation of murder. Responding to more pointed questions, *614however, one of the arresting officers stated that he informed petitioner that he was being arrested for murder. See App. 16.4
Moreover, other evidence of record indicates that the police may well have believed that probable cause existed to think that petitioner committed the crime of which he ultimately was convicted. As the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court reveals, petitioner had been identified as an acquaintance of the deceased, and the police had been told that petitioner was seen in the building where the deceased lived on the day of the murder. 56 Ill. 2d, at 315, 307 N. E. 2d, at 357. It is also plain that the investigation had begun to focus on petitioner. For example, the police had gone to the trouble of obtaining a bullet that petitioner had fired in an unrelated incident for the purpose of comparing it with the bullets that killed the victim. App. 20. The officers also obtained petitioner’s photograph prior to seeking him out, and the circumstances of petitioner’s arrest indicate that their suspicions of him were quite pronounced.
The trial court made no determination as to whether probable cause existed for petitioner’s arrest.5 The Illi*615nois Supreme Court resolved that issue, but did not consider whether the officers might reasonably, albeit erroneously, have thought that probable cause existed. Rather than decide those matters for the first time at this level, I think it preferable to allow the state courts to reconsider the case under the general guidelines expressed in today’s opinions.6 I therefore would remand for reconsideration 7 with directions to conduct such further fac*616tual inquiries as may be necessary to resolve the admissibility issue.

 Each of these guarantees provides an independent ground for suppression of statements and thus may make it unnecessary in many cases to conduct the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).

 Toy gave a second statement under circumstances similar to those in Wong Sun’s case. The Court did not, however, rule as to the admissibility of this statement, finding instead that it lacked corroboration and was therefore insufficient to support Toy’s conviction. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S., at 488-491.

 1 note that this resolution might have the added benefit of encouraging the police to seek a warrant whenever possible. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113 (1975), and sources cited therein.

 The majority of the statements cited by the Court are the officers’ responses to questions inquiring as to what the officers told petitioner upon arresting him and thus are only indirectly relevant to the issue whether the officers might reasonably have thought they then had sufficient evidence to support a probable-cause determination. Moreover, as noted above, that evidence is contradictory. In only two instances during the trial did the inquiry relate more directly to whether the officers arrested petitioner for questioning. App. 83, 94. The officers’ responses to those questions tend to support the Court’s conclusion. In view of the weight of the contrary evidence, however, I think that the matter should be considered in the first instance by the state courts.

 Petitioner’s motion to suppress alleged that the police lacked reasonable grounds for believing that he committed a crime. But *615the testimony at the hearing focused primarily on the issue of the adequacy of the Miranda warnings and the voluntariness of petitioner’s statements. At the close of the hearing the trial court ruled, without elaboration or findings of fact, that the statements were admissible. Id., at 65. Conceivably the trial court thought that probable cause existed to support the arrest. The State argued this point unsuccessfully on appeal. Equally possible, the trial court might have determined that the probable-cause issue was a close one and that, viewing the totality of the circumstances with that fact in mind, the statement should be admitted.

 The Solicitor General has filed a memorandum as amicus curiae in which he urges the Court to remand the case for further factual hearings, cf. Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969). I concur in the Court’s rejection of this suggestion, agreeing that the record is adequate to allow us to rule on the major issue — whether advice of Miranda rights constitutes a per se attenuation of the taint of an illegal arrest in all cases. I do not agree, however, that the record is adequate for the Court to rule, in addition, that there was insufficient attenuation of taint in this case.

 Petitioner’s second statement, corroborative of the first, was given more than six hours after his arrest and some five hours after the initial statement. During this time petitioner — cooperating with the police — had made two trips away from the police headquarters in search of Claggett, whom he had identified as his confederate in the murder. This second statement was given to an assistant state’s attorney who again had informed petitioner of his Miranda rights. The Court deems this statement to be the fruit of the first one and thus excludable along with it.
I also would leave the question of admissibility of this statement to the lower Illinois courts. Of course, if the first statement were ruled admissible under the general guidelines articulated in today’s *616opinion, it would follow that the second statement also would be admissible. In any event, the question whether there was sufficient attenuation between the first and second statements to render the second admissible in spite of the inadmissibility of the first presents a factual issue which, like the factual issue underlying the possible admissibility of the first statement, has not been passed on by the state courts.