Court Opinion

ID: 9641466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:32:41.83481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.628454
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority, in setting aside this Court’s original opinion on this appeal, have annonced a holding that is not only contrary to the prior rulings of this Court, but is an offense against reason as well.
Since the majority appear to advance two theories for affirmance, without expressly relying upon one or the other, I will discuss them both.
The majority first state that the record in this case reveals that appellant was in custody only' for the instant offenses. This is not correct. The record reveals that appellant was under arrest in Dallas for the instant offenses. But, it also re*875veals that he was transferred to the custody of Garland police officers’ for investigation of another offense. Unless the majority have hereby announced a criminal law doctrine of “relation-back” or of “constructive custody”, I cannot comprehend how they can seriously assert that appellant was still in the custody of Dallas police, at the same time he was in the custody of Garland police. Perhaps, by the magic of twisted reasoning, he was in two places at once ?
This simple fact — that custody of appellant had been transferred to the Garland police — seems to have escaped the majority in this case. For that reason, their attempts to distinguish away the ruling cases of this State must fail.
The majority argue that in this case, unlike Damron v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 255, 125 S.W. 396 (1910) and Torrence v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 310, 212 S.W. 957 (1919), the appellant was not on bond, was formally charged with only the instant offenses, and was in custody only for the instant offenses. Of course, the presence-or absence of bond is irrelevant, since we hold that forfeiture of bond may be used to show flight. See Guajardo v. State, 378 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Cr.App.1964). The presence or absence of formal charges on the offense in Garland means nothing, since we hold that flight need not be motivated by a formal charge. See Hicks v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 254, 199 S.W. 487 (1917) and Israel v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 574, 258 S.W.2d 82 (1953). As noted, the theory that there was but a single custody here is simply not shown by the record.
It is, however, the second theory of the majority which is the most important and the most dangerous. The majority recognize Hicks v. State, supra, as the ruling case in this area. The holding of the Hicks case, supra, is merely that evidence of flight must be relevant in order to be admissible. This is a simple and sensible rule which anyone, let alone the members of this Court, should be able to understand. But, the majority now hold that such evidence will be presumed to be relevant and that “ . . . the burden then shifts to the defendant to show affirmatively that the escape and flight is directly connected to some other transaction and further show that it is not connected with the offense on trial.” (Emphasis added)
I will not spend a great deal of time explaining the fact that Damron v. State, supra, cited as authority for this amazing proposition, contains nothing which a person reasonably familiar with the English language would conceive as advancing such an assertion. Unless it is the position of the majority that it is now an affirmative defense to challenge the relevancy of offered evidence, they cannot thus shift the burden from the offering party, the State, to the accused.1 It was my impression that under the law of this State as announced in Hicks v. State, supra, the prosecution must show that its evidence of flight was reasonably connected to the offense on trial. Obviously, this is no longer true.
Hereafter, we need no longer concern ourselves with the relevancy of extraneous offenses introduced at trial, since after today the burden shifts to the accused to show affirmatively their irrelevance. The potential application of this concept is unlimited and will no doubt considerably ease the burden which we have heretofore placed upon the State in a criminal prosetion.
ONION, P. J., joins in this dissent.

. I note that the majority has not set out the degree to which such irrelevancy must be shown. Does the accused have the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, or merely proof by preponderance? No doubt, this will be explained in later cases.