Court Opinion

ID: 9777922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:28:03.765128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.529717
License: Public Domain

GANT, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion herein, based upon my concurrence in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987). However, it is my opinion that the time has come to put an end to comity. As we stated in Reneer, supra:
The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth has the authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in the courts of this Commonwealth. Kentucky Constitution, Section 116. Because KRS 532.055 is a legislative attempt to invade the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court by legislatively prescribing rules of practice and procedure, it violates the separation of powers doctrine enunciated in Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution.
See also Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682 (1980), at page 688.
In this Commonwealth, authority to designate the sentencing authority lies with the Supreme Court of Kentucky. As we stated in Reneer, Section 28 of the Constitution provides for separation of powers among the three branches of government. Section 109 provides that judicial power shall vest in the Supreme Court, and Section 116 empowers the Supreme Court to make all rules of practice and procedure.
In its history, Kentucky has operated under four separate constitutions, none of *109which makes any reference to jury sentencing. Each of the four retains the right to “the ancient mode of trial by jury.” This phrase was adopted in Section 7 of our present Constitution, as follows: “The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred and the right thereof remains inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution.”
This was explained as early as Wilson v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 341, 348, 132 S.W. 557 (1910), in which the court stated:
What is here guaranteed is the right to trial by jury according to the ancient mode; that is as was the right of trial by jury at the common law. At the common law the jury either returned special verdicts, setting forth the facts supporting the prosecution and prayed the judgment of the court thereon, or a general verdict of guilty. Thereupon the punishment was fixed by the court and enforced by ministerial officers charged by the law with that duty. Citing 4th Blackstone Commentaries, page 361.
This question of comity has indeed been recognized by the General Assembly of Kentucky itself. When the Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1962, the legislature recognized that the previous statutory rules had “... governed general criminal proceedings only as a matter of comity on the part of the courts ...” It further declared that the policy of the legislature was “... that prescription of rules governing details of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Judicial Department after the effective date of this Act ...” Acts, 1962 C. 234, Preamble and § 61(2). The previous rule regarding the authority to sentence was not re-enacted, but became a Rule of the Supreme Court — i.e., Rule 9.84:
Rule 9.84. Penalty. — (1) When the jury returns a verdict of guilty it shall fix the degree of the offense and the penalty, except where the penalty is fixed by law, in which case it shall be fixed by the court.
(2) When the defendant enters a plea of guilty, the court may fix the penalty, except in cases involving offenses punishable by death.
Paragraph (2), above, calls to mind an interesting anomaly. Kentucky already has judicial sentencing under this section in all but about 10% of the cases in our judicial system. It is my impression that at the last count 9.85% of the cases in our criminal justice system were actually tried by jury.
The trend of modem criminal justice has been toward judicial sentencing. At present, only six states — viz., Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia — have jury sentencing, with Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas allowing the defendant to choose between jury and judicial sentencing.
Judicial sentencing has been endorsed by the American Bar Association, the President’s Crime Commission, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, the Model Sentencing Act (§ 12), and the Model Penal Code. The Circuit Judges Association of Kentucky has ardently endorsed judicial sentencing. These endorsements do not, per se, furnish grounds for a change of the rule, but are indicative of the thinking of the best minds which have studied the situation.
As indicated herein, we already have judicial sentencing in the vast majority of cases. Under KRS 532.050, which really should be adopted as a Rule of Procedure, no sentence may be imposed by a judge without considering a written report following a pre-sentence investigation, which report is made by a Probation Officer and includes “an analysis of the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and background, economic status, education, occupation, personal habits and any other matters the court directs to be included.” The defendant is ádvised of the contents of this investigation and report and given reasonable time and opportunity to controvert any facts and conclusions.
At the present time, with jury sentencing, this procedure is a tool for use in probation or conditional discharge. Under our present laws, which provide for a clum*110sy and time-consuming bifurcated trial, the jury is furnished with only a smattering of this information; but, in the main, the jury is conducting the sentencing phase of the trial in a dimly lit room.
I would immediately and prospectively change RCr 9.84 to provide that, when a jury returns a verdict of guilty which fixes the degree of the offense, the penalty shall be fixed by the court after the pre-sentence investigation and report, which also should be provided for by the Rules of this court.
STEPHENSON, J., joins in this concurring opinion.