Court Opinion

ID: 9763278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:56.756069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.322391
License: Public Domain

NYE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the covenant not to compete, signed by the employees of Diesel Injection, is reasonably necessary for the protection of the business and goodwill of Diesel Injection and, as such, the employees’ employment contract is valid and enforceable.
Diesel and Schwing are in the specialized business of diesel engine repair work and are in direct competition with each other in Nueces County. The record will reflect that Diesel and Schwing are the only two businesses in all of Nueces County to offer both an extensive line of diesel related repair products and services. Where the public interest is not directly involved, the test generally stated for determining the validity of the covenant as written is whether it imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of the employer. Weatherford Oil Tool Company v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).
The question, then, is whether the covenant not to compete, voluntarily signed by the appellees when they went to work for Diesel, imposes upon them any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of Diesel. There is no doubt that the covenant is reasonable. The record shows that it is necessary for the protection of the business and goodwill of Diesel. I am of the opinion that it should be enforced.
The majority would have us believe that the above-stated standard applies only where trade secrets exist or where the employee had direct contact with the customers of the party seeking to enforce the covenant. Although those cases are the more common, that does not exclude from consideration other fact situations which otherwise squarely meet the standard as pronounced in the Supreme Court case of Weatherford, supra.
Diesel went to considerable expense and trouble to educate and train its mechanics in a highly specialized field. Diesel’s reputation for repair and service has as its foundation the skilled mechanics who work un*575der their contract. The record reveals that the competition between Diesel and Schwing for diesel engine related repair business is direct, widespread and keen. The employees Renfro, Way, Gonzalez and Hudson were highly trained, skilled diesel engine mechanics employed by a reputable diesel engine repair firm which, by the very nature of its business, has a direct and incontrovertible interest in retaining competent, trained diesel mechanics. Because of the demand for trained diesel engine mechanics in the highly specialized field of diesel engine repair work and the direct effect that the loss of such mechanics will have on the business of Diesel, the covenant not to compete signed by the appellee employees was, in my opinion, reasonably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of Diesel. As such, the employment contract was valid and should be enforced.
The trial court filed a conclusion of law that an injunction against the appellees would create a substantial and unnecessary hardship for the affected employees. If this were true, the contract would be unenforceable. However, the only hardship that would be suffered by the appellees by the enforcement of the restrictive covenant would be that they be required to find other employment in a different type of business. This is true of all restrictive covenants. This type of hardship is insufficient to prevent enforcement of this covenant not to compete. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 501 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). The record before us discloses that appellee Renfro did not even look for employment anywhere else out of Nueces County. Appellee Hudson simply stated that he was not trained to do any other type of work outside the repair of diesel pumps. Appellee Gonzalez stated that he did not know what he would do if an injunction issued. This testimony is insufficient to prevent enforcement of a valid covenant not to compete.
The rule in breach of contract actions is that the mere proof of the making of a contract and breach is all that is necessary to make out a prima facie case for damages. The appellees, by leaving Diesel and working for Diesel’s competitor, did hurt the business and goodwill of Diesel. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover at least nominal damages, regardless of whether actual damages were proved. Houston Pipe Line Company v. Oxy Petroleum, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism’d); Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Construction Co., 472 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The trial court should determine the damages, whatever they may be, arising from the breach on remand.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it denies permanent injunctive relief.1 I would 1) remand the cause with instructions to issue a permanent injunction ordering appellees to comply with the terms of their employment contracts, and 2) determine the amount of damages that may be recoverable. Compare Premier Industrial Corp. v. Texas Industrial Fastener Company, 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.1971).

. I concur with the majority’s disposition of the intentional interference with contractual relationships and slander issues.