Court Opinion

ID: 9541031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:21:54.596661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:21.995206
License: Public Domain

Clifford, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the court that the amount of the attorney fees awarded under the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) are not dependent on the amount in controversy. Poussard v. Commercial Credit Plan, 479 A.2d 881, 886 n. 6 (Me.1984); 5 M.R.S.A. § 213(2) (1989). Because I conclude that the trial court’s failure to limit the award of attorney fees to efforts expended in pursuit of the UTPA claim is obvious error, however, I respectfully dissent.
This litigation was not limited to Beau-lieu’s claim under the ÚTPA, on which she prevailed. Beaulieu sought to recover punitive damages against Dorsey, and Dorsey prosecuted a counterclaim against Beaulieu for money due for the furniture. Beau-lieu’s entitlement to recover for her attorney fees is limited to the fees incurred in her successful prosecution of his claim under the UTPA. She may be entitled to attorney fees in defending the counterclaim, but she certainly has no right to recover for the unsuccessful efforts of her attorney in pursuing the claim for punitive damages. See Poussard, 479 A.2d at 883 (except in limited cases courts have no authority to award attorney fees in the absence of statute or contract); see also Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 238 (Me.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). It was Beaulieu’s burden to demonstrate that the fees for which she sought recovery were incurred in pursuit of the claim under the UTPA. The trial court did not hold Beaulieu to that burden and assessed Dorsey for Beaulieu’s attorney fees for the entire litigation, including the claim for punitive damages. The punitive damages claim was a major part of this litigation. It is apparent from this record that the effort expended in its pursuit was more than the one-half hour which this court disallows. I would conclude that the amount of attorney fees awarded is excessive and constitutes obvious error. I would vacate the judgment and remand to the Superior Court for its reconsideration of the attorney fee award.