Court Opinion

ID: 9636021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:12:48.520947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:40.589938
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant, Bichard Walley, was convicted of possession of dangerous drugs along with two co-defendants and now argues that there was insufficient evidence to support Ms conviction.
Pursuant to a search warrant, four police officers arrived at the Bartram Village Apartments on May 6, 1971, and began surveillance of Apartment 3B. On two separate occasions that day, police observed appellant and co-defendant Eonald Allen drive up to the apartment complex. On the first occasion, Walley entered Apartment 3B, using a key, while Allen waited in the car. The second time, Allen admitted himself to 3B with a key wMle Walley waited in the car. Two of the police officers then proceeded to the door and knocked. No one answered. The officers found the door unlocked and they entered the apartment. They found *471Allen talking on the telephone in the kitchen and co-defendant Brenda Stewart in the bedroom.
Appellant Walley soon walked up to the scene and the other two policemen brought him into the apartment.
The search of 3B uncovered 271 glassine bags containing heroin. The bags were found inside a lidless shoe box which had been sitting in the parlor closet behind some water pipes. There was a note in the box which read, “Pony, I counted all three packs. They are all okay.” Allen was repeatedly addressed by his friends as “Pony.”
All of the personal effects found in the apartment belonged to co-defendant Stewart, who leased the apartment. No men’s clothing was found there. Both appellant and Allen had a key to the apartment.
The question in this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that appellant possessed the drugs. The criteria to determine possession were outlined in Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A. 2d 119 (1971). The facts in the Davis case are as follows: The police discovered stolen goods in a locked cupboard in the apartment of Davis’ mistress. The apartment was owned by Davis’ former wife and two other persons, none of whom resided there. Davis “had clothing in the bedroom of her apartment and was observed spending the night there on several occasions.” His mistress had the only key found to open the cupboard. The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to convict Davis of receiving stolen goods. It ruled, “Absent literal possession, a defendant can be said to be in possession of stolen goods only when it is proved that he exercised conscious control or dominion over those goods.” Using the criteria established in Davis, the evidence was insufficient to prove appellant Walley’s possession of the heroin beyond a reasonable doubt.
*472The mere fact that appellant had a key to the apartment and was seen going in and out on occasion cannot support a finding that he had control or dominion over the contraband in the apartment. In Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 7, 296 A. 2d 854 (1972), a search of one Stephen Artjuch’s apartment disclosed, inter alia, nine marijuana cigarettes lying on the kitchen table. “Artjuch was the sole occupant of the apartment, but he permitted the appellant [Upde-grove] to enter and leave at will.” In addition, Upde-grove’s name was on the mailbox along with that of Artjuch. This Court declared that despite the fact that “appellant was one of only three people with access to the drugs . . . there is insufficient evidence to find that the marijuana was in the possession of the appellant.” The evidence was more persuasive in Updegrove than it is in the present case, yet this Court deemed it insufficient to convict.
In Commonwealth v. Schulhoff, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 209, 275 A. 2d 835 (1971), police raided an apartment and found drugs in the living room couch. At the time of the raid, four people were sleeping in the apartment (none were in the living room). Two of the people, Bernard Beck and the appellant, leased the apartment. Despite appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime and his interest in the premises, we held the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of possession of the drugs. See also Commonwealth v. Tirpak et al., 441 Pa. 534, 272 A. 2d 476 (1971), and Commonwealth v. Tine, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 318, 292 A. 2d 483 (1972).
In both Updegrove and Schulhoff, supra, this Court was presented with factual situations which gave a considerably greater suggestion of possession than is given in the instant case. In Updegrove, the appellant not only had access, through a key, to the apartment in question, but his name also appeared on the mailbox. *473Furthermore, the contraband was on a table in plain view. In Sehulhoff, the appellant was the actual lessee of the apartment. In the present case, the evidence ties Walley to the heroin only through his possession of the apartment’s key and his occasional visits to 311 Walley was not the lessee of the apartment. Neither was his name on the mailbox nor any of his clothing found there. Following the line of precedents just cited, one must conclude that appellant Walley’s mere possession of the door key and occasional visits to the apartment do not by themselves prove that appellant had either conscious control or dominion over the drugs or even that he had knowledge that contraband was present there.1
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Santiago, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 493, 305 A. 2d 378 (1973), as an example of a possession case where the evidence was deemed sufficient to convict. The overwhelming strength of the case against the Santiagos contrasts dramatically with the meager evidence presented in the instant case. We affirmed the Santiagos’ convictions because the heroin in that case was in plain view and within an “arm’s length” of each of the defendants when the police entered the room. Numerous other items of drug paraphernalia were also found in plain view within working reach of the appellants. Indeed, according to police testimony, “We were in the presence of a wholesale drug operation, and enterprise for the cutting and bagging of bulk heroin.” In the present case, the heroin was not in plain view, but was secreted in a closet behind some water pipes. In addition, appel*474lant Walley was not even in the apartment at tlie time of the initial raid, much less within an arm’s length of the drugs.2
Under these circumstances, the evidence was not sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for possession of drugs.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Spaulding and Spaeth, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

 If the evidence here is sufficient to convict appellant, countless innocent individuals will be placed In danger of drug possession convictions. It then follows that if a quantity of narcotics were found in a closet in the district attorney’s office, every district attorney with a key to the office would be found guilty of drug possession.

 In the recent case of U. S. v. Bonham, 477 F. 2d 1137 (3rd Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that evidence found secreted in a hidden recess above the doorway of a bedroom shared by defendant and his half-brother was insufficient to establish “possession” of heroin by the defendant. Judge Hastie, writing for the Majority, said, at p. 1138: “Where a person is the sole occupant of a room and has the right to exclude all others from it, it may logically be inferred that he has knowing dominion and control over objects so situated in his room that he is likely to be aware of their presence. United States v. Palmer, D. C. Cir. 1972, 467 F. 2d 371. But the situation is different where two persons share the occupancy of a room and the right to exclude others from it. Depending upon the circumstances, either or both may have knowing dominion and control over a particular chattel, and choice between these alternatives must be based on more than speculation.”