Court Opinion

ID: 9811838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:30:33.78248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:51.587991
License: Public Domain

*522YÁÑEZ, Justice, concurring.
I must concur in the result reached by the majority because appellant’s counsel consented to retrial.
“In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn.” Ex Parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim.App.1992). Once jeopardy attaches, “the defendant possesses a valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim.App. 1981). An exception to this rule is made if the defendant consents to retrial. Id. Here, the court informed the jury, in the presence of counsel, that the result of their deadlock and a mistrial would be a new trial before another jury. Nevertheless, appellant’s counsel moved for mistrial (a second time) after the jury’s third note and the trial court granted the motion. Therefore, appellant consented to retrial.
However, I am concerned by any system of laws that allows an accused to be subject to re-prosecution for the greater offense when a jury has (1) decided not guilty on the greater offense, (2) become hung on a lesser offense, (3) avoided announcing a complete verdict, (4) and been discharged on a motion for mistrial. If appellant had not consented to retrial by moving for mistrial once jury deliberations on the lesser became futile, his implied verdict theory would deserve more attention. That analysis would closely track the following examination.
Here, the jury charge provides, in relevant part:
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the Defendant of the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child as charged in the indictment and next consider whether he is guilty of the lesser included offense of Indecency with a Child.
(emphasis added). The jury’s notes to the trial judge indicate they were deadlocked at ten guilty against two not guilty on the lesser included offense. “We generally presume, although the presumption is re-buttable, that a jury follows the instructions given by the trial judge, in the manner presented.” Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (on rehearing). Based on such a presumption, the jury must have acquitted on the greater offense, because it had progressed to consideration of the lesser offense. Thus, presuming appellant’s acquittal on the greater offense, jeopardy would seem to bar any retrial on that offense.1
However, that is not the case. The court of criminal appeals has held, “[wjhen a jury is instructed on ... included offenses in addition to the charged offense, it cannot be said that the jury has decided the issue submitted to it until it declares the accused guilty of one of the offenses or not guilty of all of them.” State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Giblin, 589 S.W.2d 431, 432-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). In other words, an incomplete verdict is not a verdict at all. Furthermore, Giblin informs us that “a judgment cannot be entered in the absence of a verdict.” Id. at 432.
Giblin relies on the above propositions to conclude that a trial court may not “enter a judgment of acquittal in a case in which the jurors indicate they have voted unanimously to acquit the defendant on the charged offense but are undecided on a lesser included offense,” without a verdict2 *523or an informal verdict.3 Id. at 432-33. Yet, it is important to note that these propositions do not address pleas of jeopardy. There was no opportunity for a jeopardy plea in Giblin, as a second trial had yet to take place. So, on the facts before it, the Giblin court did not address the viability of a plea of jeopardy at a second trial.4
As for what should happen at a second trial, when a defendant did not move for mistrial based on the jury’s deadlock on a lesser included offense at the first, Pullin is instructive in a more practical and fair sense. See Pullin v. State, 827 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
In Pullin, the jury sent two notes to the trial judge. Id. at 2. The first, similar to the notes here, stated that the jury could not reach a decision on the lesser included offense. Id. The second note reiterated the jury’s indecision on the lesser but also stated its unanimous decision of “not guilty” on the greater offense. Id. After receiving the second note, the judge called the jury into the courtroom. Id. The following dialogue transpired between the judge and the jury foreman:
Court: [Mr. Foreman], as I understand the jury is hopelessly deadlocked, unable to reach a verdict.
Foreman: That’s correct.
Court: —as to either of the alternatives.
Foreman: No, we reached a verdict in terms of not guilty, in terms of the assault.
Court: All right, the aggravated? Foreman: The aggravated assault (greater offense).
Court: And then, on the attempt (lesser included offense), the jury is deadlocked?
Foreman: That’s correct.
Id. The judge then discharged the jury, without the jury returning a verdict on the form given to it with the charge. Id. at 2-3. After being re-indicted on all counts, appellant filed a special plea of double jeopardy. Id. at 3. The same judge from the earlier trial granted the jeopardy plea as to the aggravated assault. Id.
On appeal, this practice was implicitly upheld. Id. It appears that the trial court and the appellate court determined that jeopardy had attached once the jury “spoke clearly that appellant was not guilty ” of the greater offense, even though no written verdict was returned. See Monroe v. State, 871 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (emphasis in original).
It should be noted that the trial court in Pullin was simply and correctly following the instructions of the code of criminal procedure, which directs judges to order the jury to reduce informal verdicts to proper form. See Tex Code CRim. PROC. AnN. § 37.10 (Vernon Supp.2003). The *524code does not define “informal verdict,” but precedent regarding jury notes provides that such notes must be “plainly intended” as an acquittal before they can be considered an informal verdict. Antwine v. State, 572 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (panel op.). A complete, written verdict in “proper form” was not possible in Pullin, due to the jury’s deadlock on the lesser included offense. Pullin, 827 S.W.2d at 2. Nevertheless, when presented with an arguably informal verdict, the judge in that case prodded the jury with a few questions into the most practical and fair result. Pullin, 827 S.W.2d at 2-3. In sum, the judge called attention to the informal verdict,5 gave the jury the opportunity to speak clearly6 as to its decision, and allowed jeopardy to attach. Id.
Ignoring appellant’s consent to retrial, I cannot say that the habeas court here would have abused its discretion because the jury did not speak clearly or send notes plainly intended as an acquittal. Here, the jury was not given the chance to speak clearly and, thus, the appellant is not able to make a successful jeopardy plea. In the future, when an arguably informal verdict is submitted by the jury, the trial court is directed to call attention to it and order the jury to reduce it to proper form or at least speak clearly.

. After jeopardy attaches, any charge on which the jury returns an acquittal may not be retried. Ex Parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

. A verdict is a written declaration by a jury of its decision of the issue submitted to it in the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc Ann. § 37.01 (Vernon 1981).

. "If the verdict of the jury is informal, its attention shall be called to it, and with its consent the verdict may, under the direction of the court, be reduced to the proper form_” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.10(a) (Vernon Supp.2003). While the code of criminal procedure does not define an informal verdict, precedent has established that communications from the jury will not be considered an informal verdict unless "plainly intended” as such. State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Giblin, 589 S.W.2d 431, 432-33 (Tex.Crim. App.1979) (citing Antwine v. State, 572 S.W.2d 541, 542-43 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (panel op.); Robinson v. State, 23 Tex.App. 315, 4 S.W. 904 (1887)).

. I can speculate that the Giblin defendant would not have succeeded on a plea of jeopardy at a second trial because he moved for mistrial once it was determined that further deliberations by the juiy were futile, see Gib-lin, 589 S.W.2d at 432, therefore consenting to retrial.

. Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.10(a) (Vernon Supp.2003).

. See Monroe v. State, 871 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.).