Court Opinion

ID: 9665235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:43:05.890063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.088286
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice (concurring). Sparks v. Robinson, 66 Ark. 460, 51 S. W. 460, was a case involving usury; and parol evidence was permitted to show that the written instrument did not reflect the real transaction. The opinion was written by Justice Wood, and he there said: “The court was clearly justified in concluding that the instrument purporting to be a bill of sale, although absolute on its face, was intended by the parties as nothing more than a security for the money advanced.” ‘ ‘ The law shells the covering, and extracts the kernel. Names amount to nothing when they fail to designate, the facts. We are of the opinion that the court was justified in concluding that the papers called ‘bill of sale’ and ‘sale tickets’ were nothing more or less than a shift for a ■usurious loan of money.” When we “shell the covering” in the case at bar, it is clear to me that Garrett did. not act as a seller of commercial paper to Murdock, but acted as the agent of Murdock in making the loan to Schuck; that such loan was at a usurious rate of interest; and that the agency of Garrett for Murdock is the distinguishing point in this case. So I desire, first, to comment on the general principles of agency; then point out where agency was discussed in the briefs of the parties; and then to point to the evidence of agency in this case. In 2 Am. Jur. 13, agency is defined: “An agency may be defined as a contract either express or implied upon a consideration, or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in his name or on his account, and by which that other assumes to do the business and render an account of it. This is comparable with the definition of agency as adopted by the American Law Institute. That definition is as follows: ‘Agency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. ’ ’ ’ Garrett did not have to work exclusively for Murdock to be its agent. He could be the agent of Murdock to make loans at the same time he was engaged in selling ears. Neither did the agency have to be created by any special formality. In 2 Am. Jur. 25, in discussing the modes of creating an agency, this is stated: “As between principal and agent, the creation of the agency relationship arises from the consent of the parties. It is not essential that any actual contract should be expected by the agent; and while the relation, in its full sense, arises out of a contractual or gratuitous agreement between the parties, yet the agency and the assent of the parties thereto may be either express or implied. “An expressly created agency may be a product of the oral or written agreement of the parties. An implied agency is also an actual agency; it is a fact which is to be proved by deductions or inferences from other facts and circumstances. It is often established from the words and conduct of the 'parties and the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an agency may be implied from prior habits or from a course of dealings of a similar nature between the parties, especially where the agent has repeatedly been permitted to perform similar acts in the past. ’ ’ An interesting case on agency is Vaughan v. Hinkle, 131 Ark. 197, 198 S. W. 705. In that case, Crownover and Cole bought some cattle, as agents of Hinkle, and gave Vaughan a check for the cattle. Hinkle denied the agency. Judge Wood said that agency was a question of fact, and that a fact case was made for the jury. The Hinkle case supports the views I am here expressing. The question of Garrett being Murdock’s agent was presented in the original briefs in this case: (a) In Schuck’s (appellant’s) original brief, this appears: “Who was Garrett, the dealer, acting for? He was acting for Murdock and was Murdock’s agent because he used Murdock’s forms, rate charts, obtained the credit references of the buyer and phoned them to Murdock and he did not complete the sale until Murdock had agreed to handle same, and same met with Murdock’s approval, all this in advance. Murdock gave the dealer, Garrett, a bonus each year (Tr. 68, 69). Garrett got from Murdock the unpaid balance of the cash price plus $71.40 for handling the paper” (Tr. 67). (b) Likewise, in Murdock’s (appellee’s) original brief, this appears: “Appellant also suggests that Garrett was the agent of Murdock Acceptance Corporation, yet he can point to no fact indicating agency. The evidence affirmatively shows that Garrett did not act for Murdock; that Murdock purchased notes from Garrett only if it desired to do so; that Murdock would not purchase notes which it thought were inadequately secured (Tr. 69, 72, 73). Murdock had nothing whatever to do with the business conducted by Garrett (Tr. 73, 74). Garrett was a car dealer. He fixed the prices on the automobiles sold by him. In this Murdock had no interest whatever. It is true that Murdock informed Garrett of the rates of discount it would apply to notes purchased by it, but that is done by all banking institutions. The fact that these discount rates were furnished in advance does not affect the question of agency. This was done for the convenience of the parties in their mutual dealings.” Here is some of the evidence relating to the agency of Garrett for Murdock in the case at bar: (a) Garrett had all of Murdock’s forms and rate charts in his office. (b) Before filling out the forms, Garrett obtained from Schuck his credit references, and Garrett phoned Murdock to ascertain if Schuck’s credit was good and if Murdock would handle Schuck’s paper. (c) Murdock informed Garrett that Schuck’s credit was good, and that Murdock would handle the paper. (d) Only after Murdock’s consent was obtained did Garrett complete the transaction with Schuck, and in completing the transaction, Garrett used the forms and rate charts furnished him by Murdock. (e) Murdock gave Garrett a bonus each year for his services. (f) Furthermore, Garrett received from Murdock $71.40 for his services. I maintain that this evidence establishes Garrett’s agency for Murdock; and that the plea of “selling paper at a discount” is only a cloak to hide the usurious loan. So I conclude that the agency point differentiates the Murdock case from our other cases involving the sale of contracts and notes for automobiles; and the purpose of this concurring opinion is to call special attention to this differentiation.