Court Opinion

ID: 9399702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 12:05:53.03534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.270271
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                 No. COA22-831

                                Filed 06 June 2023

Orange County, No. 21 CVS 1017

RICHARD C. SEMELKA, M.D., Plaintiff,

            v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, a body politic and corporate institution
of the State of North Carolina; THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT
CHAPEL HILL, a constituent institution of the University of North Carolina; CAROL
L. FOLT, sued in her individual and official capacities; JAMES WARREN DEAN,
JR., sued in his individual and official capacities; WILLIAM L. ROPER, sued in his
individual and official capacities; ARVIL WESLEY BURKS, JR., sued in his official
and individual capacities; and MATTHEW A. MAURO, sued in his individual and
official capacities, Defendants.

      Appeal by defendants and cross-appeal by plaintiff from order entered

24 March 2022 by Judge Allen Baddour in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in

the Court of Appeals 12 April 2023.

      Law Office of Mark L. Hayes, by Mark L. Hayes; and Bailey & Dixon, LLP, by
      J. Heydt Philbeck, for plaintiff.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General
      Kimberly D. Potter, for defendants.

      Office of University Counsel, by Marla S. Bowman, for defendant-the University
      of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

      ARROWOOD, Judge.

      The University of North Carolina (“UNC”), the University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill (“UNC-CH”), Carol L. Folt (“Chancellor Folt”), James Warren Dean, Jr.
                                SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                        Opinion of the Court

(“Provost Dean”), William L. Roper (“Dr. Roper”), Arvil Wesley Burks, Jr. (“Dr.

Burks”), and Matthew A. Mauro (“Dr. Mauro”) (collectively, “defendants”) appeal

from the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss.1 Richard C. Semelka,

M.D. (“plaintiff”), cross-appeals. After careful review, we reverse the trial court’s

order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismiss plaintiff’s cross-appeal.

                                       I.      Background

       Litigation arising from plaintiff’s termination of employment from UNC-CH is

before this Court for the third time on appeal. Plaintiff exhausted the administrative

remedies available under the Administrative Procedures Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-

1 et seq., by petitioning for judicial review of the final termination decision made by

UNC-CH’s Board of Governors (“BOG”). This Court upheld the trial court’s order

affirming plaintiff’s discharge in Semelka v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 275 N.C. App. 662,

854 S.E.2d 34 (2020) (“Semelka I”), disc. review denied, 380 N.C. 289, 867 S.E.2d 678

(Mem), and disc. review dismissed, 867 S.E.2d 684 (Mem) (2022).                           The facts

underlying plaintiff’s termination, including facts discovered in the administrative

action, tend to establish the following.2

        1 Chancellor Folt, Provost Dean, Dr. Roper, Dr. Mauro, and Dr. Burks (collectively, “the

individual defendants”) were sued in both their official and individual capacities. Chancellor Folt,
Provost Dean, and Dr. Roper are no longer employed at UNC-CH. Presently, Dr. Burks serves as Dean
of the School of Medicine, Vice Chancellor for Medical Affairs, and CEO of the UNC Health Care
System; Dr. Mauro serves as the James H. Scatliff Distinguished Professor of Radiology and President
of UNC Faculty Physicians.
        2 Plaintiff challenges the use of outside materials as we are reviewing a motion to dismiss,

however, “[t]his Court has long recognized that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in

                                                -2-
                                 SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                         Opinion of the Court

        Plaintiff was formerly employed as a tenured professor within the Department

of Radiology at UNC-CH’s School of Medicine. On 8 January 2016, plaintiff sent a

letter to Chancellor Folt expressing various health and safety concerns within the

Department of Radiology and, as Chair of the Radiology Department, Dr. Mauro’s

“repeated failure to properly address[,]” “or otherwise protect patients and staff[,]”

from the harmful conditions created by certain colleagues within the School of

Medicine. Plaintiff’s letter, which was incorporated into his complaint, also alleged

Dr. Mauro “[r]etaliat[ed] against [him] . . . by not appointing [him] as the [D]ivision

[C]hief of Abdominal Imaging, but rather select[ing] the only outside candidate that

applied.”

        On 21 January 2016, on behalf of Chancellor Folt, Provost Dean responded to

plaintiff’s letter. Provost Dean informed plaintiff that his previously communicated

concerns were “ ‘thorough[ly] investigat[ed][,]’ ” but since they pertained to former

colleagues, further disciplinary action was unwarranted. With respect to plaintiff’s

concerns involving a current faculty member, Provost Dean stated that the matter

was also investigated, but found to be without merit.                        Regarding plaintiff’s

appointment as Division Chief, Provost Dean stated, “ ‘any personnel decision is open

to a number of interpretations’ ” and “ ‘based on a number of factors[,]’ ” but should

another interrelated proceeding where the parties are the same, the issues are the same and the
interrelated case is referred to in the case under consideration.” West v. G. D. Reddick, Inc., 302 N.C.
201, 202, 274 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981) (citations omitted). Plaintiff also referred to the administrative
action in his complaint.

                                                 -3-
                                SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                        Opinion of the Court

plaintiff wish to pursue further action, he may contact the University Faculty

Grievance Committee for assistance. Provost Dean also offered to meet with plaintiff

“ ‘to further discuss his concerns.’ ”

       Plaintiff “opted not to file a grievance or contact the Ombuds Office[,]” but

instead obtained legal counsel for the purported purpose “of assisting him in

presenting his health, safety, and work environment concerns directly to UNC-CH’s

Board of Trustees[.]” In February 2016, plaintiff retained the legal services of Mintz,

Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popeo, P.C. (“Mintz Levin”).

       On 13 July 2016, plaintiff submitted an expense reimbursement request to Bob

Collichio (“Mr. Collichio”), the Department of Radiology’s Associate Chair for

Administration, seeking reimbursement for approximately $30,000 in legal fees from

the Radiology Department’s Operating Fund.3                    In a series of follow-up emails,

plaintiff explained his stated reasons for requesting the reimbursement were due to

legal consultations he sought in reference to his professional work and were related

to his university duties. Plaintiff acknowledged that some prior consultations may

have appeared personal in nature, but he contended no more than one and a half

       3   The Radiology Department Operating Fund operates in accordance with the UNC School of
Medicine Faculty Affairs Code (“Faculty Affairs Code”) and the Policy on Clinical Department Faculty
Providing Expert Legal Services and Testimony (“Expert Legal Services Policy”). Under these policies,
clinical departments within the School of Medicine have an established Departmental Operating Fund
to hold income generated by faculty members for outside professional services. The Faculty Affairs
Code expressly provides that such funds belong to the Radiology Department and are designed to be
“used for professional purposes[.]” However, the Faculty Hearings Committee noted a “lack of clarity
. . . on how such funds can and should be used.”

                                                -4-
                           SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                 Opinion of the Court

hours were expended on personal matters.

      Mr. Collichio requested assistance from UNC-CH’s Office of University

Counsel (“OUC”) due to the “unusual” nature of plaintiff’s request. On 25 July 2016,

Mr. Collichio requested additional documentation and more detailed information

relating to plaintiff’s relationship with Mintz Levin to determine which legal

expenses were “strictly business-related” and potentially reimbursable. Plaintiff

provided Mr. Collichio with partially redacted invoices and a copy of the Mintz Levin

engagement letter dated 5 February 2016. On 5 August 2016, plaintiff informed Mr.

Collichio of his intention to terminate Mintz Levin and “expressed frustration that

his reimbursement request had still not been approved[.]”       Plaintiff learned on

23 August 2016 that he would not be reimbursed.

      Also in August 2016, at the request of OUC, UNC-CH’s Chief Audit Officer and

Director of the Internal Audit Department, Phyllis Petree (“Ms. Petree”) initiated an

investigation into plaintiff’s reimbursement request to determine whether plaintiff’s

stated reasons for retaining Mintz Levin were truly for university-related purposes.

In addition to investigating plaintiff’s relationship with Mintz Levin, Ms. Petree

conducted an audit into previous travel and business expenses paid to plaintiff

between July 2010 and September 2016.         The audit revealed that on multiple

occasions dating from 2010, plaintiff received reimbursements for nine trips which

were “ ‘primarily personal in nature and were not reimbursable as business travel.’ ”

It appeared that plaintiff had developed a pattern of planning personal vacations,

                                        -5-
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

and shortly before the trip was scheduled to begin, plaintiff would attempt to schedule

work meetings with colleagues abroad to justify multiple days of travel

reimbursement requests. Furthermore, the investigation into plaintiff’s relationship

with Mintz Levin ultimately revealed that plaintiff misrepresented the nature of his

reimbursement request in an improper attempt to have the university pay for

personal legal expenses. As a result of her findings, Ms. Petree concluded, “ ‘the

primary purpose of the law firm engagement giving rise to the legal fees in question

was for personal matters, though [plaintiff] initially represented that the fees were

for consultation related to cybersecurity and to his University duties.’ ”

      Ms. Petree’s final audit report was issued to Chancellor Folt on

5 January 2017. In a letter dated 11 January 2017, relying on the findings provided

by Ms. Petree, Provost Dean informed plaintiff of UNC-CH’s intent to discharge him

due to misconduct pursuant to Section 3 of the Trustee Policies and Regulations

Governing Academic Tenure in the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (the

“Tenure Policy”). The letter stated that plaintiff submitted a reimbursement request

for approximately $30,000 in legal fees, “knowingly misrepresenting that these

expenses were incurred for legal advice regarding” his professional work, “when,

instead, these legal services were obtained for primarily personal reasons, including

pursuing possible legal action against the University.” The letter further stated

plaintiff had established a “pattern of dishonesty and false representations” due to

his history of “seeking full reimbursement from the University” for primarily personal

                                          -6-
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

trips and “other costs that cannot be validated due to inadequate documentation[,]”

or were not applicable for reimbursement under “state and University policy.”

Provost Dean estimated that the total amount of “impermissible reimbursements”

were “in excess of $27,000.” Plaintiff’s behavior was described as “unethical conduct”

“sufficiently serious as to adversely reflect on [his] honesty, trustworthiness and

fitness to be a faculty member.”       Plaintiff responded on 17 January 2017, and

informed Provost Dean of his intent to appeal the discharge decision to the Faculty

Hearings Committee (or “the Committee”) pursuant to the Tenure Policy.

      A hearing regarding plaintiff’s appeal was conducted over the course of three

days beginning on 23 March 2017 and concluding on 12 April 2017. The stated issues

before the Committee included determining whether UNC-CH could prove by the

“clear and convincing standard” “whether permissible grounds for [plaintiff]’s

discharge exist[ed] under the Tenure Policy and whether those grounds were, in fact,

the basis of the University’s decision to discharge.” Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1) of the

Tenure Policy, misconduct justifying discharge may “be either (i) sufficiently related

to a faculty member’s academic responsibilities as to disqualify the individual from

effective performance of university duties, or (ii) sufficiently serious as to adversely

reflect on the individual’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to be a faculty

member[.]”

      The Faculty Hearings Committee heard testimony from thirteen witnesses,

including plaintiff, and examined other documentary evidence relating to plaintiff’s

                                          -7-
                             SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                    Opinion of the Court

termination.     Plaintiff’s “central defense . . . was that UNC-CH was retaliating

against him for raising prior safety concerns within the Department [of Radiology].”

Findings and recommendations of the Committee were issued to Chancellor Folt on

23 May 2017.      The Faculty Hearings Committee ultimately rejected plaintiff’s

retaliation claim finding “no evidence” of retaliation.         In pertinent part, the

Committee discovered: “[d]espite [plaintiff]’s broad statements in his communication

with Mr. Collichio, the specificity of his emails to Mintz Levin . . . make clear that

[plaintiff] originally consulted outside counsel because he was considering legal

action against the University.”

      Moreover, the Committee stated:

               We searched and asked specific questions looking for
               behavior that would indicate some sort of retaliation
               against [plaintiff] for bringing his safety concerns to the
               attention of those in the School of Medicine and University
               administration. We could find no evidence to indicate the
               University took employment action against [plaintiff]
               because of his complaints. We could find no evidence that
               Provost Dean relied on anything other than the grounds
               found in the Tenure Policy as the basis for his discharge of
               [plaintiff].

      Accordingly, the Committee concluded:

               [Plaintiff]’s choice to seek reimbursement for $30,000
               worth of legal fees and his description of the need for this
               outside legal consultation as being related to various
               activities such as writing books or considering new safety
               procedures was disingenuous and dishonest. Indeed, he
               eventually admitted to Ms. Petree that a significant
               portion (40%) of his conversations with Mintz Levin were
               related to taking legal action against the University . . . .

                                           -8-
                           SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                  Opinion of the Court

             Such conduct constitutes misconduct of such a nature as to
             adversely reflect on [plaintiff]’s honesty, trustworthiness
             and fitness to be a faculty member. Therefore, we find
             [plaintiff]’s conduct was of such a nature as to indicate that
             he is unfit to continue as a member of the faculty. We were
             not convinced that the travel improprieties noted by Ms.
             Petree by themselves rose to the level requiring discharge
             since those requests were clear, did reference at least some
             University-related meetings, and went through multiple
             levels of review before being granted.

      On 9 June 2017, Chancellor Folt notified plaintiff of her decision to accept the

findings and recommendations of the Faculty Hearings Committee. Chancellor Folt

agreed that plaintiff engaged in misconduct “sufficiently serious” “to render [him]

unfit to serve as a member of the faculty” and further concurred with the Committee’s

absence of findings evidencing retaliation. Pursuant to Section 8 of the Tenure Policy,

plaintiff appealed Chancellor Folt’s discharge decision to the Board of Trustees

(“BOT”) on 19 June 2017.

      In its decision rendered 1 August 2017, the BOT affirmed Chancellor Folt’s

decision. Plaintiff appealed the BOT’s decision to the BOG on 10 August 2017. The

BOG affirmed the dismissal decision on 12 September 2018, concluding “there [wa]s

sufficient evidence in the record to determine that [plaintiff] knowingly

misrepresented that multiple reimbursement requests for legal and travel expenses

were for university purposes when, in fact, substantial portions of the expenses were

for personal purposes, constituting misconduct under Section 603(1) of The Code [of

                                         -9-
                              SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                     Opinion of the Court

the Board of Governors of The University of North Carolina].”4 Similarly, the BOG

found no “evidence to support [plaintiff]’s claim that UNC-CH selected another

candidate for the Division Chief position or chose to discharge [plaintiff]” in an act of

retaliation “against him for reporting safety concerns about colleagues to UNC-CH

administrators.”

       Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43, plaintiff petitioned for judicial review

of the BOG’s final decision to Orange County Superior Court.                 The trial court

conducted a de novo review of the legal issues and a whole record review of the factual

evidence to determine whether plaintiff’s dismissal was supported by substantial

evidence in the record. The proposed issues before the trial court included:

              1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support
                 [plaintiff]’s dismissal from UNC-CH’s School of
                 Medicine based on misconduct.

              2. Whether the decision was properly made and consistent
                 with the requirements of Section 603 of [The Code]
                 where [plaintiff] claimed that UNC-CH administrators
                 engaged in unethical and illegal conduct related to
                 [plaintiff]’s discharge from employment, including
                 retaliating against him for his reports of safety concerns
                 related to colleagues; and

              3. Whether UNC-CH administrators erred by halting
                 [plaintiff]’s pay after the campus-based review process
                 ended with the decision of the [BOT] to uphold
                 [plaintiff]’s dismissal from employment from UNC-CH.

       4 The Code of the Board of Governors of The University of North Carolina (“The Code”) is
incorporated into the Tenure Policy.

                                            - 10 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Per order entered 25 April 2019, the trial court affirmed plaintiff’s termination

but found UNC-CH wrongfully discontinued his salary in August 2017, stating

“[plaintiff] should have been paid through the September 12, 2018 decision of the

BOG.” With respect to plaintiff’s termination, the trial court concluded:

             [T]he decision to discharge [plaintiff] based on misconduct
             is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is
             not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
             Specifically, substantial evidence in the record supports
             the conclusion that [plaintiff] submitted to UNC-CH for
             reimbursement legal fees of approximately $30,000,
             knowingly, misrepresenting that such expenses were for
             University business when in fact these legal services were
             obtained for primarily personal reasons. Substantial
             evidence in the record further supports that such conduct,
             as detailed above, constitutes misconduct warranting
             dismissal, as set forth in Section 603 of The Code and in
             Section 3 of UNC-CH’s Tenure Policy.

      Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order and UNC cross-appealed the trial

court’s conclusion of law relating to the discontinuation of plaintiff’s salary. Semelka

I, 275 N.C. App. at 670, 854 S.E.2d at 40. This Court affirmed the trial court’s order

and held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that plaintiff engaged in

misconduct justifying discharge, discharge was not an excessive discipline in

violation of The Code, and the BOG’s decision to terminate was not an “ ‘unjust and

arbitrary application of disciplinary penalties[.]’ ” Id. at 676-79, 854 S.E.2d at 43-45.

We also affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that “UNC violated its own policies when

it ceased [plaintiff]’s pay at the date of the BOT decision before the BOG issued its

ultimate decision.” Id. at 682, 854 S.E.2d at 47.

                                          - 11 -
                           SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Plaintiff commenced the instant action on 11 January 2018 by filing a

complaint in Orange County Superior Court (the “Orange County complaint”)

alleging defendants’ initiation of dismissal proceedings against him were retaliatory

in violation of the North Carolina Whistleblower Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-84 et seq.

(the “Whistleblower Act”). On 10 August 2018, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the

Orange County complaint pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) and filed a

fundamentally similar complaint in Wake County Superior Court (the “Wake County

complaint”) on 24 August 2018.

      Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Wake County complaint pursuant to

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6) on

28 September 2018, asserting, among other things, Wake County was an improper

venue. Ruling solely on the issue of venue, the trial court denied defendants’ motion

in an order entered 19 June 2019. In an opinion filed 31 December 2020, we vacated

and remanded the trial court’s order with instructions to transfer the action to

Orange County Superior Court. Semelka v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 275 N.C. App. 683,

689, 854 S.E.2d 47, 51 (2020) (“Semelka II”). Per order entered 18 August 2021, the

case was transferred to Orange County.

      Proceedings in the instant case resumed upon plaintiff’s scheduling of

defendants’ original motion to dismiss the Wake County complaint for a hearing on

14 February 2022. Due to uncertainty regarding whether the Wake County motion

to dismiss was properly before the trial court, defendants filed an amended motion to

                                         - 12 -
                             SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                    Opinion of the Court

dismiss on 9 February 2022.

       The day of the scheduled hearing, defendants filed a second amended motion

to dismiss in order to incorporate new legal arguments based on our Supreme Court’s

order denying plaintiff’s request for discretionary review rendered 9 February 2022.

Plaintiff challenged the validity of the second amended motion to dismiss arguing

defendants are prohibited from amending their motion. The trial court, considering

the denial of discretionary review a “significant development[,]” accepted defendants’

second amended motion to dismiss finding one month an adequate amount of time

for plaintiff to brief and oppose a new argument.           Accordingly, the trial court

acknowledged defendants’ original motion and amended motion to dismiss as

withdrawn and scheduled a hearing on the second amended motion to dismiss for the

following month.

       Defendants’ second amended motion to dismiss was heard at the

14 March 2022 session of Orange County Superior Court, Judge Baddour presiding.

Defendants argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s

whistleblower complaint as the question of plaintiff’s discharge being the result of

unlawful retaliation was addressed throughout the administrative process.

Defendants attached multiple exhibits to their motion, including: the BOG’s decision

affirming plaintiff’s discharge, plaintiff’s petition for judicial review, the trial court’s

order affirming the BOG’s decision to discharge, selected documents from the

administrative appeal, and Semelka I.

                                           - 13 -
                           SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Plaintiff’s counsel countered defendants’ arguments substantively, but

procedurally argued defendants’ second amended motion to dismiss ought to be

treated as invalid as the Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide an avenue for parties

to amend their motions prior to filing an answer. Plaintiff also attached various

documents in opposition to defendants’ second amended motion to dismiss, including:

UNC’s notice of intent to discharge dated 11 January 2017, plaintiff’s request for a

hearing before the Faculty Hearings Committee, the Tenure Policy, and the complete

transcript from the Committee hearing.

      The trial court entered an order on 24 March 2022 denying defendants’ motion

in part but granting dismissal of all claims against the individual defendants in their

individual capacities.   Defendants filed a notice of appeal on 20 April 2022 and

plaintiff cross-appealed on 22 April 2022.

                                   II.    Discussion

      At the outset, we must address the interlocutory nature of defendants’ appeal.

                              A.     Interlocutory Order

      An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it leaves the

matter for further action by the trial court. See Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C.

357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (citation omitted) (“An interlocutory order is one made

during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for

further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire

controversy.”), reh’g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). “Generally, there is

                                          - 14 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments.” Goldston v.

Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). However, “an

interlocutory order may be appealed immediately . . . if (i) the trial court certifies the

case for immediate appeal pursuant to N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), or (ii) the

order ‘affects a substantial right of the appellant that would be lost without

immediate review.’ ” McIntyre v. McIntyre, 175 N.C. App. 558, 562, 623 S.E.2d 828,

831 (2006) (citation omitted).

      Defendants concede this appeal as interlocutory, but contend a substantial

right is affected as they “ma[k]e a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel” and “are

facing a second trial on issues already resolved in [Semelka I][.]” Our case law

establishes that a trial court’s order rejecting the affirmative defense of collateral

estoppel can affect a substantial right, however, “incantation of the [doctrine of

collateral estoppel] does not . . . automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory

appeal[.]” Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162, 638 S.E.2d 526, 533-34 (citation

omitted), writ of supersedeas and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 567, 650 S.E.2d 602

(Mem) (2007). Thus, we must preliminarily determine whether defendants have

made a colorable argument that the doctrine applies in this context in order to allow

us to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.

      Although Semelka I consists of an administrative action, “it is axiomatic that

no one ought to be twice vexed for the same cause[,]” and “[t]his fundamental

principle of law applies to administrative decisions.” In re Mitchell, 88 N.C. App. 602,

                                          - 15 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

604, 364 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1988) (citations omitted).         Determining whether an

administrative decision enjoys the protections of “res judicata depends upon its

nature; decisions that are ‘judicial’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ can have that effect, decisions

that are simply ‘administrative’ or ‘legislative’ do not.” Id. at 605, 364 S.E.2d at 179

(citation omitted). The distinction between a quasi-judicial determination and an

administrative one “is not precisely defined,” but “courts have consistently found

decisions to be quasi-judicial when the administrative body adequately notifies and

hears before sanctioning, and when it adequately provides under legislative authority

for the proceeding’s finality and review.” Id. (citations omitted).

      Here, as illustrated by the facts set forth above, plaintiff appealed Provost

Dean’s discharge decision pursuant to “Section 3(b)(4) of the Tenure Policy.” The

appeal was held in accordance with the Tenure Policy, heard before a neutral panel

of five faculty members, and plaintiff was represented by counsel. The Code, as

incorporated into the Tenure Policy, allowed plaintiff to appeal the termination

decision to the BOG and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43 provided plaintiff the right to

petition for judicial review. Accordingly, collateral estoppel may apply in the present

case as the facts of Semelka I were established in a quasi-judicial forum as provided

under legislative authority.

      “The companion doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral

estoppel (issue preclusion) have been developed by the courts for the dual purposes

of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and

                                          - 16 -
                              SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                     Opinion of the Court

promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Bockweg v. Anderson,

333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993) (citation omitted).

              Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, parties and parties
              in privity with them are precluded from retrying fully
              litigated issues that were decided in any prior
              determination and were necessary to the prior
              determination.    The doctrine is designed to prevent
              repetitious lawsuits, and parties have a substantial right
              to avoid litigating issues that have already been
              determined by final judgment.

Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009)

(emphasis added) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “An

issue is actually litigated, for purposes of collateral estoppel . . . if it is properly raised

in the pleadings or otherwise submitted for determination and is in fact determined.”

Williams v. Peabody, 217 N.C. App. 1, 6, 719 S.E.2d 88, 93 (2011) (citation, brackets,

and internal quotation marks omitted). “A very close examination of matters actually

litigated must be made in order to determine if the underlying issues are in fact

identical[;] [i]f they are not identical, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not

apply.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       On the other hand, “the rules for determining whether the parties in question

are or were in privity with parties in the prior action are not as well defined.” State

v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 623, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000). Our case law describes

“privity” as “ somewhat elusive” because “no definition of the word . . . can be applied

in all cases.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Masters v.

                                            - 17 -
                             SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                    Opinion of the Court

Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 524, 124 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1962)). When considering whether

privity exists, we must “look beyond the nominal party whose name appears on the

record as plaintiff and consider the legal questions raised as they may affect the real

party or parties in interest.” Williams, 217 N.C. App. at 8, 719 S.E.2d at 94 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘In general, ‘privity involves a person so

identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right’ previously

represented at trial.’ ”   Summers, 351 N.C. at 623, 528 S.E.2d at 20 (citations

omitted).

      To determine whether collateral estoppel applies in the present case we must

first determine whether the individual defendants stand in privity with the

respondents of Semelka I, UNC and UNC-CH.                  Plaintiff argues the individual

defendants do not share privity as they “had no ability to direct the course of the

litigation” and cannot be bound by a judgment to which they were not named parties.

This application of privity is incorrect.

      Plaintiff’s recitation of privity derives from case law established prior to our

Supreme Court’s elimination of the mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel in

Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 434, 349 S.E.2d 552, 560

(1986). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, “[w]here a litigant seeks to assert collateral

estoppel defensively,” mutuality of estoppel is not required. Johnson v. Smith, 97

N.C. App. 450, 453, 388 S.E.2d 582, 584 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 326

N.C. 596, 393 S.E.2d 878 (Mem) (1990).           Thus, “the litigant invoking collateral

                                            - 18 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

estoppel need not have been a party to or in privity with a party to the first lawsuit

‘as long as the party to be collaterally estopped had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in the earlier action.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Here, it is apparent

that plaintiff received a full and fair opportunity to challenge his discharge as a three-

day hearing was held before the Faculty Hearings Committee.

      Likewise, plaintiff’s complaint in the instant case, along with a review of the

circumstances underlying plaintiff’s termination, lead us to conclude that Semelka I

involved identical issues previously litigated, actually determined, and necessary to

the overall disposition regarding plaintiff’s discharge. As indicated above, the issues

presented to the Faculty Hearings Committee included determining “whether

permissible grounds for [plaintiff]’s discharge existe[d] under the Tenure Policy and

whether those grounds were, in fact, the basis of the University’s decision to

discharge.” The Committee’s findings illustrate that a critical component of their

overall decision regarding plaintiff’s termination included examining potential

retaliation on behalf of the individual defendants due to plaintiff bringing his “long-

standing concerns about safety” in the Radiology Department to the attention of

university administration, a central feature of plaintiff’s complaint in the instant

case. In fact, the Committee noted that they were “struck by the seriousness” of

plaintiff’s allegations yet found “sufficient evidence . . . that the University ha[d] met

its burden in acknowledging and investigating [plaintiff]’s concerns.”

      In sum, Semelka I upheld plaintiff’s termination, was a final judgment on the

                                          - 19 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

merits, and facts relating to plaintiff’s termination being the result of retaliation were

actually litigated and necessary to the judgment. See City of Asheville v. State, 192

N.C. App. 1, 14, 665 S.E.2d 103, 115 (2008) (citation omitted) (“ ‘[A]ny right, fact, or

question in issue and directly adjudicated on or necessarily involved in the

determination of an action . . . on the merits is conclusively settled . . . and cannot

again be litigated between the parties and privies.’ ”), appeal dismissed and disc.

review denied, 672 S.E.2d 685 (Mem) (2009). We disagree with plaintiff’s assertion

that collateral estoppel may not apply to Semelka I because the administrative forum

hardly “provide[d] [him] with a full opportunity to litigate his case.” It is well-settled

that a party is not entitled to relitigate facts previously determined in a prior action,

even if that prior action was held in an administrative capacity. Swain v. Efland,

145 N.C. App. 383, 389, 550 S.E.2d 530, 535 (finding parties cannot maintain both an

administrative action and an action in superior court as “this would allow [parties]

two bites of the apple, could lead to the possibility that different forums would reach

opposite decisions, as well as engender needless litigation”), cert. denied, 354 N.C.

228, 554 S.E.2d 832 (Mem) (2001); See also Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,

797, 92 L. Ed. 2d 635, 645 (1986) (“[I]t is sound policy to apply principles of issue

preclusion to the fact-finding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity.”).

      Accordingly, we conclude that defendants’ motion to dismiss raises a colorable

assertion of collateral estoppel and defendants’ appeal is properly before this Court.

Having determined that findings from Semelka I may serve as a bar to plaintiff’s

                                          - 20 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

whistleblower action, we now turn to address the merits of defendants’ appeal.

                              B.     Standard of Review

      Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1),

(2), and (6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-

1, Rule 12(b)(1) (2022) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 12(b)(2) (2022) (lack of personal jurisdiction); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 Rule

12(b)(6) (2022) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). However,

defendants’ arguments on appeal focus exclusively on the doctrine of collateral

estoppel and plaintiff’s ability to state a claim under the Whistleblower Act. Thus,

we focus our analysis on Rule 12(b)(6). Hillsboro Partners, LLC v. City of Fayetteville,

226 N.C. App. 30, 32, 738 S.E.2d 819, 822 (“Because in this case the fact that

defendant argues plaintiff is collaterally estopped from contesting relates to

plaintiff’s ability to state a claim, rather than a jurisdictional issue, it is properly

analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6)[.]”), disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 236, 748 S.E.2d 544

(Mem) (2013).

      This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s order on a motion to

dismiss. Sykes v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.C., 372 N.C. 318, 324, 828 S.E.2d

489, 494 (citation omitted), reh’g denied, 372 N.C. 710, 830 S.E.2d 823 (Mem) (2019).

“In doing so, the Court must consider ‘whether the allegations of the complaint, if

treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under

some legal theory.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). However, dismissal is proper when: “(1)

                                          - 21 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the

complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or

(3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.”

Wood v. Guilford Cnty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002) (citation

omitted).

                       C.     Plaintiff’s Whistleblower Claims

      Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss as

plaintiff is precluded from establishing the elements of his whistleblower claims

because Semelka I determined that his discharge was (1) “proper” and (2) “not

retaliatory[.]” We agree.

      In order to assert a prima facie showing of retaliatory termination in violation

of the Whistleblower Act, “a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in

a protected activity, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff

in his or her employment, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse action taken[.]” Manickavasagar v. N.C. Dep’t of

Pub. Safety, 238 N.C. App. 418, 428, 767 S.E.2d 652, 658 (2014) (citation omitted).

“There are at least three distinct ways for a plaintiff to establish a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action under the

Whistleblower Act.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control and Pub. Safety, 359 N.C.

782, 790, 618 S.E.2d 201, 207 (2005).

                                          - 22 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      “First, a plaintiff may rely on the employer’s ‘admission that it took adverse

action against the plaintiff solely because of the plaintiff's protected activity.’ ” Id.

(citation and brackets omitted).     “Second, a plaintiff may seek to establish by

circumstantial evidence that the adverse employment action was retaliatory and that

the employer’s proffered explanation for the action was pretextual.” Id. (citation

omitted).

             [O]nce a plaintiff establishes a prime facie case of unlawful
             retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
             a lawful reason for the employment action at issue. If the
             defendant meets this burden of production, the burden
             shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
             defendant’s proffered explanation is pretextual. The
             ultimate burden of persuasion rests at all times with the
             plaintiff.

Id. at 791, 618 S.E.2d at 207-208 (citations omitted).

             Third, when the employer claims to have had a good reason
             for taking the adverse action but the employee has direct
             evidence of a retaliatory motive, a plaintiff may seek to
             prove that, even if a legitimate basis for discipline existed,
             unlawful retaliation was nonetheless a substantial
             causative factor for the adverse action taken. Cases in this
             category are commonly referred to as “mixed motive” cases.

Id. at 791, 618 S.E.2d at 208 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to the burden-shifting analysis of cases in the second category, “the ultimate

burden of persuasion in a ‘mixed motive’ case may be allocated to the defendant once

a plaintiff has established a prima facie case.” Id. at 792, 618 S.E.2d at 208. “In order

to shift the burden to the defendant, however, the plaintiff must first demonstrate ‘by

                                          - 23 -
                             SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                    Opinion of the Court

direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.’ ”

Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

      In the case sub judice, the question we are tasked with considering is plaintiff’s

ability to satisfy the third element of a whistleblower action: a causal connection

between his report of health and safety concerns to university administration and his

subsequent termination. See id. Plaintiff argues, primarily, that he is not collaterally

estopped from pursuing a whistleblower claim as Semelka I did not involve a cause

of action under the Whistleblower Act and only concerned questions of violation under

the Tenure Policy. Specifically, plaintiff contends retaliation was only mentioned in

context and due to its immateriality, plaintiff may still successfully prove his

discharge was an act of unlawful retaliation. We disagree.

      Plaintiff’s arguments rest on the third theory of causation established by our

Supreme Court in Newberne. Plaintiff argues that although he was terminated for

violating the Tenure Policy, he may still “seek to prove that, even if a legitimate basis

for discipline existed, unlawful retaliation was nonetheless a substantial causative

factor for the adverse action taken.” Newberne, 359 N.C. at 791, 618 S.E.2d at 208

(citation omitted). However, plaintiff’s contention is misplaced as cases under the

“mixed motive” theory of causation require plaintiffs to satisfy the initial burden that

the “protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor for the adverse

employment action” with “direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a

substantial factor in [the adverse action].” Id. at 792, 618 S.E.2d at 208 (emphasis in

                                           - 24 -
                             SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                    Opinion of the Court

original) (citations omitted). Only upon this initial showing does the burden shift to

defendant to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached

the same decision as to [the employment action at issue] even in the absence of the

protected conduct.” Id. at 791-92, 618 S.E.2d at 208 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, a review of the allegations contained in the complaint, in

addition to certain facts established in Semelka I, indicate plaintiff’s inability to prove

his report of health and safety concerns to Chancellor Folt played a substantial factor

in his termination.

      Plaintiff’s complaint states that he retained the legal services of Mintz Levin

“for purposes of assisting him in presenting” his concerns to the BOT “in an effort to

protect . . . patients and staff.” Plaintiff purportedly sought reimbursement of the

legal fees because “his primary purpose in retaining [legal services] was not for

personal benefit, but ultimately for the benefit of UNC-CH’s School of Medicine.” As

alleged by plaintiff, it was this retention of legal counsel which led defendants to

unlawfully retaliate against him. In fact, plaintiff contends,“[a]t no time did [he] ever

exhibit a ‘pattern of dishonesty’ related to” his legal reimbursement request, yet

defendants utilized this as a “pretext to retaliate against [him] for” reporting “health,

safety, and hostile work environment concerns to [Chancellor Folt]” and “seeking to

report the same to the [BOT] and potentially [the BOG].” Plaintiff argues that, in

essence, the audit and internal investigation was used to wrongly characterize his

request for reimbursement of legal fees as a violation of the Tenure Policy.

                                           - 25 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      We disagree with plaintiff’s interpretation of the facts underlying his

termination. Despite plaintiff’s assertion that the internal investigation was used as

a pretext for retaliation, the facts indicate that the audit was conducted due to the

“unusual” nature of plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of legal fees and the

ambiguity of his stated reasons for the reimbursement. Plaintiff reported to Mr.

Collichio that the legal services were retained for consultations “concerning a book he

might write, safety standards, drug development, staff burn-out and IRB issues.”

When plaintiff was asked for further explanation pertaining to his request, he

provided partially redacted invoices and vague emails. Only then did Ms. Petree

decide to conduct an audit to “ascertain whether his stated reasons for engaging

Mintz Levin were indeed true” and not “for personal purposes.” It was only upon a

review of plaintiff’s own communications with Mintz Levin did the audit reveal that

plaintiff was discussing the potential of “large monetary settlements and promotions

that he would like . . . in order for him to refrain from publicly disclosing his safety

concerns.” Consequently, the Faculty Hearings Committee concluded that despite

plaintiff’s ambiguity in his stated reasons for the reimbursement, “the specificity of

his emails . . . dated January 1 and 6, 2016, make clear that [plaintiff] originally

consulted with outside counsel because he was considering legal action against the

University.” Thus, the Committee ultimately concluded that plaintiff’s deliberate

obscurity of the need for outside legal consultation was “disingenuous and dishonest”

                                          - 26 -
                            SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                                   Opinion of the Court

and “constitute[d] misconduct of such a nature as to adversely reflect on [plaintiff]’s

honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to be a faculty member.”

      In conclusion, plaintiff cannot establish a prime facie case of whistleblower

retaliation as his discharge was the result of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons

related to his misrepresentations in seeking reimbursement for $30,000 in personal

legal fees. Newberne, 359 N.C. at 795, 618 S.E.2d at 210 (emphasis added) (citation

omitted) (“[A] trial court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a whistleblowing

claim should look at the face of the complaint to determine whether the factual

allegations, if true, would sustain a claim for relief under any viable theory of

causation.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are overruled.

                                  III.   Cross-Appeal

      On cross-appeal, plaintiff contends defendants’ second amended motion to

dismiss is a “nullity[,]” therefore the trial court’s order dismissing claims against the

individual defendants in their individual capacities is error. As indicated above,

plaintiff is collaterally estopped from pursuing a cause of action under the

Whistleblower Act, accordingly, remaining arguments pertaining to claims against

the individual defendants are moot.

                                   IV.    Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s cross-appeal is dismissed as moot.

      REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.

                                          - 27 -
                SEMELKA V. THE UNIV. OF N.C.

                      Opinion of the Court

Judges HAMPSON and GRIFFIN concur.

                             - 28 -