Court Opinion

ID: 9734736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:42.982755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.880276
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: In my opinion the General Assembly by the 1967 amendment to the injunction statute which added section 3—1 intended to create a system of injunctive relief in Illinois similar to that prevailing in the Federal courts. (See People ex rel. Pollution Control Board v. Frey Roofing Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 675.) By the amendment a three phase system of relief was established: (1) A temporary restraining order which could issue without notice and which would be of short duration and preserve the status quo until a preliminary injunction could be procured; (2) a preliminary injunction which would preserve the status quo until the determination of the merits of the controversy; (3) a permanent injunction which would issue only after the merits of the issue had been decided. The opinion of this court has abolished one of the accepted features of a temporary restraining order as it is known in Federal practice and in other jurisdictions; that is, it’s nonappealability. I fear that the effect of the opinion will be to obliterate the distinction between a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in Illinois. I can see no reason why appeals should lie from the issuance of temporary restraining orders in Illinois while it is generally accepted that appeals will not lie from such orders in the Federal courts or in other jurisdictions. Prior to 1967 in Illinois there was no provision in the injunction statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 69, par. 1 et seq.) for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order. Section 3 of the statute at that time referred only to injunctions without reference to whether the statute applied to permanent or preliminary injunctions. However, the practice developed of issuing a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of litigation until a determination of the merits of the controversy could be had. (21 I.L.P., Injunctions, secs. 4 and 12.) Although these writs were actually preliminary injunctions and served the function of such a writ, because of loose terminology they were variously referred to as preliminary injunctions, temporary injunctions, temporary restraining orders and other similar terms. The language used in the decrees was likewise not consistent and often “enjoined,” “stayed,” or “restrained” certain activities. The effect of the writ, however, was to preserve the status quo until a determination could be had on the merits of the case, the function of a preliminary injunction, and its issuance was appealable as to interlocutory order. In 1967 the General Assembly amended the injunction statute by making section 3 applicable only to preliminary injunctions and by adding a new section 3—1 which provides for temporary restraining orders. The language of the first two paragraphs of the new section 3—1 is identical to the language of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the amendment of that rule in 1966. Some confusion has been created by the fact that the General Assembly, in providing for a preliminary injunction in the 1967 amendment instead of adopting the language of Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which simply states “No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party”, attempted to keep most of the language of the old section 3 of our injunction statute. The net result is that our statute now authorizes both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to be issued without notice. However, the statute preserves the distinctive characteristics of the traditional temporary restraining order in section 3—1, which, as indicated later in this dissent, renders such an order nonappealable and distinguishes it from a preliminary injunction which is appealable. These characteristics are: it may issue ex parte; it is of short duration; and it is intended to remain in effect only until a hearing can be held on a motion to issue a preliminary injunction. The temporary restraining order under consideration fits into this traditional pattern. It was issued without notice and without a hearing. It provided that it would remain in effect until May 15 (within the 10-day period provided by statute) and it was continued in effect until May 19 (again within the allowable statutory extension period). Both the original expiration date and the extended date were correlated with the hearing and the continuance of the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. On May 19 there was no further extension of the temporary restraining order and on that date it expired. I agree that merely labelling an order “temporary restraining order” does not make it nonappealable under our Rule 307 if the order is in fact a preliminary injunction. The courts will look to the substance and effect of the order in determining its appealability. Although the general rule is held to be that a temporary restraining order is not appealable, the courts have held that the label will be disregarded and an order held to be appealable when it is not for a fixed duration prescribed by statute but is for an indefinite period (Parker v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (2d Cir. 1963), 320 F.2d 937) or where on expiration of the time prescribed in the statute the order is continued in effect for an extended period of time. (Connell v. Dulien Steel Products (5th Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 414; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers’ International Ass’n (2d Cir. 1962), 306 F.2d 840.) And generally the court will look “beyond teminology to the actual content, purport, and effect” of the order to determine whether it is a temporary restraining order and not appealable or a preliminary injunction and appealable. Smith v. Grady (5th Cir. 1969), 411 F.2d 181. Our Rule 307 provides for interlocutory appeals from orders “granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.” The statutory provisions governing interlocutory apppeals in Federal cases provides that appeals may be taken from interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions ***.” (28 U.S.C.Á. sec. 1292.) In view of the similarity between the Illinois and Federal provisions concerning interlocutory appeals and between the Illinois and Federal provisions concerning temporary restraining orders, previously discussed, there would appear to be no reason why we should reach a contrary result with regard to appealability from that universally followed by the Federal courts. It is well established in Federal cases that an appeal will not lie from an order granting the issuance of a temporary restraining order. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, sec. 2962. There is nothing about the temporary restraining order in this case which requires that it be considered to be a preliminary injunction. Under the Federal authority cited and the decisions of other jurisdictions (see cases collected in an annotation in 19 A.L.R. 3d 403), such orders are not appealable. The opinion of the court indicates that section 3 which provides for the issuance of a preliminary injunction without notice, and section 3 — 1 which provides for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice presents alternate methods of obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, thereby placing it within the power of the plaintiff to foreclose the defendant from the right to an interlocutory appeal if a temporary restraining order issued under section 3 — 1 is held to be nonappealable. This conclusion does not recognize the fact that a preliminary injunction issued under section 3 with or without notice remains in effect until the case is determined on its merits unless sooner dissolved. By contrast, the restraint imposed by a temporary restraining order issued without notice under section 3 — 1 is limited to a 10-day duration unless extended for a like period of time by order of the court. The relief obtainable under the two sections is not the same, and the plaintiff, therefore, does not have the option which the court’s opinion indicates. If an order issued under section 3 — 1, although labeled temporary restraining order, actually performs a function beyond the traditional scope of such an order, then it is in effect not a temporary restraining order but a preliminary injunction and is appealable. See 19 A.L.R. 3d 403 at 444; 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, sec. 14. Furthermore, if the temporary restraining order is issued following a notice and hearing I would conclude that the order would generally be appealable because in that case the court would have had an opportunity to consider the merits of the question before it. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, sec. 2962; see also 19 A.L.R. 3d 403, 444. If following a hearing on a motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order (referred to in the opinion of this court as an opportunity provided by our Rule 307(b) for the court to consider both sides of the controversy) the court denies the motion to dissolve and continues the order in effect so that it actually performs the function of a preliminary injunction, then we are not concerned with the propriety of the issuance of the original order but with the order extending it. The effect of such an extension may be to change the original temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction. Such an order would then be appealable. New York Telephone Co. v. Communication Workers of American (2d Cir.), 445 F.2d 39, at 46; see also 19 A.L.R. 3d 403, at 444, 445. Also if the hearing on the motion to dissolve the restraining order and the hearing on the motion to issue a preliminary injunction coincide or nearly coincide, as they often do, the court’s order which denies the dissolution of the restraining order and directs the issuance of a preliminary injunction is appealable. The right to appeal, however, • would stem from that part of the order directing the issuance of the preliminary injunction and not from the denial of the motion to dissolve the restraining order. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunction, sec. 14. These illustrations are not intended to be precise classifications because the variable factual situation of each case may alter the interpretation as to the nature of the order entered. However, in this case the lines of distinction are clear. We are concerned only with a temporary restraining order issued without notice, the life of which was not extended beyond the statutory limitation and which was not followed by the issuance of a preliminary injunction. We are not concerned with deciding whether the temporary restraining order may in fact be a preliminary injunction. Although the motion to dissolve the restraining order was denied it expired by its own terms at the conclusion of the hearing. Following its expiration the defendant was no longer under the restraint of a court order because no order was entered on the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction which was set for hearing at the same time. Thus, the defendant had in effect obtained the relief which he had sought. A temporary restraining order is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of the language of the Federal statutory provisions governing interlocutory appeals. (28 U.S.C.A. sec. 1292; see Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, sec. 2692.) The opinion of this court has not explained to my satisfaction why the practically identical language of our Rule 307(a) should include a temporary restraining order as an appealable interlocutory order. I can find nothing in the facts present in this case which requires that the general rule of nonappealability of temporary restraining orders be altered. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.