Court Opinion

ID: 9646915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:16:08.188526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:43.612047
License: Public Domain

John E. Jennings, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s view that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding of a causal connection between the claimant’s injury and her employment. I disagree, however, with the majority’s view that the administrative law judge exceeded his authority in reserving the issue of temporary disability for the period of time between February 1, 1989, and June 10,1989. The majority is of course right in saying that the Commission has a duty to make findings of fact and to decide the issues presented to it. It is also true that the claimant had the burden of proof. The duty to decide issues does not arise, however, until all the evidence is in. Until that point is reached the “burden of proof’ is irrelevant. The determination as to whether all the evidence is in, or stated another way, whether the record is fully developed, is one which must be made initially by the administrative law judge who hears the case. Arkansas statute law expressly authorizes the action taken by the administrative law judge in this case. “Further hearings for the purpose of introducing additional evidence will be granted only at the discretion of the hearing officer or commission.” Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-705(c)(l) (1987). So do the Commission’s own rules: “The Commission may, in its discretion, postpone or recess hearings at the instance of either party or on its own motion.” W.C.C. Rule 13(1988). Although an agency’s interpretation of its own rules is not binding upon the courts, it is highly persuasive. Sparks Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Serv., 290 Ark. 367, 719 S.W.2d 434 (1986). Arkansas Code Annotated Section 1 l-9-705(a)(1) provides that the Commission, in conducting a hearing, is not bound by technical rules of procedure, but may conduct the hearing “in a manner as will best ascertain the rights of the parties.” The Commission may even institute an investigation of a claim on its own. See Ark. Code Ann. § 1 l-9-205(b)(1) and (c) (1987). In the case at bar there is no inconvenience to appellant, nor for that matter to this court, associated with the administrative law judge’s decision. Necessarily, the question of when the claimant’s healing period ends remains to be decided. There is no apparent reason why the issue reserved cannot be decided at the same time. Even in a criminal case, where the court is undoubtedly “bound by technical rules of procedure,” after the state has rested and the defendant has moved for a directed verdict, a circuit judge has the discretionary authority to permit the state to reopen. See Cameron v. State, 278 Ark. 357, 645 S.W.2d 943 (1983). That authority is inherent, not statutory. Surely the ALJ likewise had the inherent authority to recess the hearing for the purpose of taking additional evidence, but that question need not be reached because the action taken was expressly authorized by statute and the Commission’s own rule. I would affirm the Commission’s decision. Mayfield, J., joins.