Court Opinion

ID: 9631657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:45:39.093936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:14.100577
License: Public Domain

OPINION DONNELLY, Judge.  Plaintiffs appeal from an order dismissing their claims against each of the Defendants, except as to C Tec, Inc., for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by Mary L. Branson when she collided with a ski lift tower at the Ski Apache Resort. We address Plaintiffs’ claims that the district court erred in determining that (1) the Ski Safety Act (Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 24-15-1 to -15-14 (Repl.Pamp.1991), constitutes Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy against Defendants; (2) Branson assumed the risk of injury under the Act and Defendants’ alleged negligence was not subject to apportionment under comparative negligence principles; and (3) the Act did not impose a duty on Defendants to warn Branson of the risk of collision with the tower or to cushion or install protective devices on the lift tower. Other issues listed in the docketing statement but not briefed are deemed abandoned. See State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.1985). For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse and remand. FACTS The parties stipulated, inter alia, that on February 26, 1986, Branson was skiing at Ski Apache Resort when she lost control, or fell, and collided with a lift tower located in the skiing area; the lift tower which Branson collided with was not surrounded by netting or protective padding; and the tower was plainly visible in the skiing area. The parties also agreed that the references in Plaintiffs’ complaint alleging violations of the Act by Defendants refer to “ ‘particular hazards or dangers,’ ” or “ ‘unusual obstacles or hazards,’ ” as used in the Act, and that use of the term “maintaining ski lifts in a ‘safe condition’ ” in Plaintiffs’ complaint refers only to the absence of protective devices on or around the lift tower with which Branson collided, the absence of markings at the top of the slope noting the presence of the lift tower, and to the absence of any warning concerning the potential danger to skiers presented by the unprotected lift tower. The stipulation of facts entered into by the parties further recited: 6. There is no allegation that any violation of the ski area operator, its employees, officers, or agents of their duties under the Ski Safety Act contributed to cause Branson’s fall or loss of control. 7. Any injuries or damages suffered by * * * Branson were as a result of her fall and/or collision with the lift tower. 8. Any injuries or damages suffered by * * * Branson were not a result of her being a passenger using a ski lift. The parties made no stipulation regarding whether the lack of padding or other protection on or around the lift tower was visible or known to Branson. STANDARD OF REVIEW  In examining the propriety of the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint, we first identify the standard of review applicable to the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis that it failed to set forth viable claims upon which relief could be granted and, alternatively, sought an award of summary judgment. See SCRA 1986, 1-012(B)(6) and -056. In its order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, the court stated: Based upon the Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the stipulations of counsel, it is undisputed that * * * (Ms. Branson) lost control or fell while skiing, losing control of her speed and course and colliding with a lift tower. * * * [S]he violated her duties under the New Mexico Ski Safety Act, and, as a matter of law, assumed the specific risks which caused her injury so that the * * * Act bars any recovery * * * for those injuries. The court’s decision to grant the motion was based on matters alleged in the pleadings, facts stipulated to by the parties, and the record containing affidavits submitted by the parties both in support and opposition to Defendants’ motions; thus, on appeal we review the court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims as a motion for summary judgment. See Peck v. Title USA Ins. Corp., 108 N.M. 30, 766 P.2d 290 (1988) (motion to dismiss for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted correctly treated as motion for summary judgment where matters outside pleadings were presented); Rivera v. King, 108 N.M. 5, 765 P.2d 1187 (Ct.App.1988) (where matters outside pleadings are presented in support of motion to dismiss, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment). SKI SAFETY ACT CLAIMS 1. Does the Act Provide the Exclusive Remedy? The district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint held in part that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy in any action between a skier and a ski area operator and excludes all common law claims other than the two expressly reserved in the Act, which are the common law principle of vicarious liability of the ski area operator for willful or negligent violations of the duties listed in Sections [24-15-7 and -15-8] of the Act by principals, agents, or employees of the ski area operator [Section 24-15-11] and the right to claim that a violation of the duties of Section [24-15-8] of the Act can be based upon a negligence standard of review [Section 24-15-14(A) ]. Based upon its construction of the Act, the court ruled that “all claims of the Plaintiffs against Defendants other than Defendant CTEC [sic], Inc., * * * which are outside the provisions of the * * * Act are * * * dismissed with prejudice.”  During the pendency of this appeal, Plaintiffs moved to amend their docketing statement to raise two additional issues. The first issue sought to be asserted involved the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing their claim against Defendants “for ordinary negligence, by holding that the * * * Act was their exclusive remedy against the Defendants.” At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for Plaintiffs conceded that the provisions of the Act were controlling as to their claims against the ski area operator, but not with respect to their claims against C Tec, Inc., alleging negligent design, manufacture and installation of the ski lift towers installed at Ski Apache Resort. We agree with the district court’s determination that the provisions of the Act were intended by the legislature to exclusively control each of Plaintiffs’ claims herein, except as to those claims directed against C Tec, Inc. See Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 704 P.2d 1092 (1985) (in discerning legislative intent, court looks not only to language of statute but also to purposes and objectives of legislature). 2. Applicability of Doctrine of Comparative Negligence and Defense of Assumption of Risk Plaintiffs argue that even if the Act is found to control certain of their claims, nevertheless, the district court misinterpreted its provisions and that disputed material factual issues existed concerning their allegations that Defendants also breached duties imposed upon them under the Act. Plaintiffs contend that the Act does not preclude fault and liability from being apportioned between the parties under comparative negligence principles where disputed factual issues exist as to whether both the ski area operator and a skier have negligently breached duties imposed upon them under the Act, and such negligence proximately results in injury to a skier. We agree. Review of the Act’s purposes and provisions indicates a legislative intent to promote ski safety practices, to detail the duties imposed upon both skiers and ski area operators, and to specify the consequences resulting from the violation of such duties. See Wood v. Angel Fire Ski Corp., 108 N.M. 453, 774 P.2d 447 (Ct.App.1989). Section 24-15-7 outlines the duties of ski area operators incident to the operation of the skiing areas, including the duty of marking ski trails or runs with symbols indicating their degree of difficulty, and the responsibility “to warn of or correct particular hazards or dangers known to the operator where feasible to do so.” § 24-15-7(1). Section 24-15-8 enumerates duties of the ski area operator in respect to the operation of the ski lifts. Correspondingly, the Act details the responsibilities of ski lift passengers under Section 24-15-9, and the duties imposed upon skiers under Section 24-15-10. The Act was adopted in 1969 and, although its original provisions prescribed responsibilities of both ski lift operators and individual skiers, the initial legislation sought to assure the safe operation of ski lifts and required that ski area operators obtain liability insurance prior to operating ski lifts or tramways. See 1969 N.M.Laws, ch. 218. In 1979 the Act was substantially amended, broadening its provisions and delineating in greater detail the duties and responsibilities of both the ski operators and skiers. See 1979 N.M.Laws, ch. 279; see also Wood v. Angel Fire Ski Corp. Section 24-15-2 of the Act states that the “primary responsibility for the safety of the individual skier * * * rests with the skier himself.” This same section also provides: It is recognized that there are inherent risks in the sport of skiing which should be understood by each skier and which are essentially impossible to eliminate by the ski area operator. It is the purpose of the Ski Safety Act to define those areas of responsibility and affirmative acts for which ski area operators shall be liable for loss, damage or injury and those risks which the skier expressly assumes and for which there can be no recovery. Section 24-15-10 further describes the duties imposed on skiers, as follows: A. It is recognized that skiing as a recreational sport is inherently hazardous to skiers, and it is the duty of each skier to conduct himself carefully. B. A'person who takes part in the sport of skiing accepts as a matter of law the dangers inherent in that sport insofar as they are obvious and necessary. Each skier expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to person or property which results from participation in the sport of skiing, in the skiing areas, including any injury caused by * * * lift towers and components thereof * * * which are plainly visible or are plainly marked in accordance with the provisions of Section 24-15-7 NMSA 1978; except for any injuries to persons or property resulting from any breach of duty imposed upon ski area operators under the provisions of Sections 24-15-7 and 24-15-8 NMSA 1978. Therefore, each skier shall have sole individual responsibility for knowing the range of his own ability to negotiate any slope or trail, and it shall be the duty of each skier to ski within the limits of the skier’s own ability, to maintain reasonable control of speed and course at all times while skiing, * * * and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of anyone. . The responsibility for collisions by any skier while actually skiing, with any person or object, shall be solely that of the individual or individuals involved in such collision, except where the ski area operator is involved in such collision or where such collision resulted from any breach of duty imposed upon the ski area operator under the provisions of Sections 24-15-7 and 24-15-8 NMSA 1978. [Emphasis added.] After enumerating the duties of ski area operators and skiers, the Act sets forth the parameters of liability of ski area operators and skiers resulting from a failure to comply with statutory provisions. §§ 24-15-11, -15-12. Section 24-15-11 provides: Any ski area operator shall be liable for loss or damages caused by the failure to follow the duties set forth in Sections 24-15-7 and 24-15-8 * * * where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered, and shall continue to be subject to liability in accordance with common-law principles of vicarious liability for the willful or negligent actions of its principals, agents or employees which cause injury to a passenger, skier or other person. The ski area operator shall not be liable to any passenger or skier acting in violation of his duties as set forth in Sections 24-15-9 and 24-15-10 * * * where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered. Section 24-15-13 states: Any skier shall be liable for loss or damages resulting from violations of the duties set forth in Section 24-15-10 * * * and shall not be able to recover from the ski area operator for any losses or damages where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered. Defendants assert that under the Act and Sections 24-15-2 and 24-15-10(A) and (B), Branson and other skiers expressly assumed the sole risk and legal responsibility for any injury resulting from a collision with a ski tower that is plainly visible in the skiing area. 'Defendants contend that in promulgating such legislation the legislature intended to codify the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, e.g., that where a party encounters a known and obvious danger inherent in the sport of skiing, he or she, as a matter of law, is held to have assumed any dangers resulting from such risk so as to preclude any recovery against the ski area operator. As observed in Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971), primary assumption of the risk is an alternative expression for the proposition that the defendant either owed no duty to the plaintiff or did not breach a duty. See also Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978) (if skier’s fall is not due to breach of duty by ski area operator, risk is assumed in primary sense and there can be no recovery). Defendants rely in part upon decisions from other jurisdictions barring claims by skiers against ski area operators arising from injuries sustained from colliding with hazards encountered in skiing areas, where such hazards were open and obvious and found to be risks inherent in the sport of skiing. Cf. Berniger v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.1991) (New Hampshire Ski Act held to preclude skier from maintaining action against ski area operator for injuries which result from risks intrinsic to skiing); Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 420 F.Supp. 781 (D.Vt.1976) (risk associated with skier’s loss of control and collision with unpadded lift tower held inherent risk of skiing); Wright v. Mount Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F.Supp. 786 (D.Vt.1951) (one who participates in activity of skiing held to accept inherent dangers insofar as they are obvious and necessary); Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990) (skier’s claim for damages arising from collision with unpadded sign post held risk inherent to sport of skiing). Plaintiffs argue that the decisions relied upon by Defendants from other jurisdictions are not dispositive here because of the basic differences in the language of our Act. We agree. Specifically, our Act, although containing language similar in part to ski legislation enacted in other jurisdictions limiting the liability of ski area operators against claims of skiers, nevertheless contains specific qualifying language. Section 24-15-10(B) of our Act specifies that the ski area operator is not exempted from negligence claims of skiers in situations where the ski area operator was “involved in such collision,” has breached a duty under Section 24-15-7 to warn against or correct a particular hazard located in the skiing area where feasible to do so, or has violated a duty imposed under Section 24-15-8 relating to the operation, repair or maintenance of ski lifts. Additionally, although interpretations by courts from other jurisdictions of similar legislation or common-law principles are not dispositive of the intent of the New Mexico Legislature or the appropriate interpretation of our Act, we note that other courts have held that ski resorts could be liable for injuries caused by their equipment or other hazards on the ski slopes. See Rimkus v. Northwest Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir.1983) (applying Colorado law, affirmed jury verdict holding ski area operator 80% negligent for failing to mark rocks that caused skier’s injuries); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir.1978) (applying Colorado law, court affirmed a judgment for a skier who hit a pole after being hit by another skier; court held that the skier did not assume the risk of hitting the pole because the hazard was not apparent until the other skier unexpectedly changed direction and that the location of the steel pole in an intersection with no padding and no warning were factors from which a jury could conclude the ski area operator was negligent); Marietta v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 385 Mich. 364, 189 N.W.2d 208 (1971) (ski resort liable for injuries caused when skier ran into maple sapling pole used as slalom marker; skier showed that bamboo poles or thinner poles would be safer); Sunday v. Stratton Corp. (Vermont Supreme Court questioned holding of Wright v. Mount Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F.Supp. 786 (D.Vt.1951), and affirmed judgment holding ski resort liable for injuries of skier who fell because of brush hidden by snow next to trail); Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 45 Wash.App. 393, 725 P.2d 1008 (1986) (ski area operator’s statutory duty to warn of latent hazards included warning of rocks in area between two runs).  In interpreting our Act and each of its provisions, we look to the purposes and intent of the legislature. See Board of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Jennings, 102 N.M. 762, 701 P.2d 361 (1985); Security Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1988); see also Wells v. County of Valencia, 98 N.M. 3, 644 P.2d 517 (1982) (legislation restricting a party’s common-law right to sue for negligence is strictly construed). Defendants argue that because the Act was enacted in 1969 and revised in 1979, prior to our supreme court’s recognition of the doctrine of comparative negligence in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981), Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case are not subject to adjudication under comparative negligence principles. Defendants contend that a plainly visible lift tower located in a skiing area does not constitute a “particular hazard or danger” within the meaning of Section 24-15-7(1), and, instead, is an inherent danger in the sport of skiing for which they have no liability. Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims resulting from Branson’s collision with the lift tower are precluded under the Act because the legislature, in adopting such legislation, intended to bar claims of this nature by codifying the defense of primary assumption of risk. See §§ 24-15-10; -15-13. Plaintiffs assert, however, that it is contrary to the basic purposes of the Act to bar a skier from prosecuting a negligence claim against Defendants where both the skier and ski area operator are alleged to have violated duties imposed under the Act. Looking to the language of our Act and its expressed purposes, we conclude that in situations where material factual issues exist as to whether both the skier and ski area operator have violated duties imposed upon them under the Act or factual issues exist as to whether such negligence has proximately resulted in injuries to a skier, Plaintiffs’ claims for damages alleged to have resulted from a ski area operator’s negligence are not barred under the Act. Cf. Jessup v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 101 Or. App. 670, 792 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1990) (“Plaintiff’s argument that an injury resulting from inherent risks of skiing * * * must be measured against the operator’s negligence is only correct in the context of multiple causation.”). Under such circumstances, the doctrine of comparative negligence, as recognized by our supreme court in Scott, is not incompatible with the objectives or provisions of the Act.  The language of Section 24-15-10(B), incorporating the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk so as to place the responsibility upon a skier for a collision with a lift tower, is expressly qualified in situations where a ski area operator is alleged to also have breached a duty under Sections 24-15-7 and -15-8. In such case, we conclude that the fact finder is entitled to determine the negligence, if any, of each of the parties, and in the event both parties are found to have negligently violated a duty under the Act contributing to the skier’s injuries, to apportion fault and damages between the parties under comparative negligence principles. Defendants’ reliance on the final sentence of Section 24-15-10(B), which imposes responsibility for collisions with any person or object on the parties involved, does not persuade us otherwise. It addresses only responsibility for collisions, and not liability for injuries or harm, as the earlier part of the section does. Additionally, we note that this portion of the section reaffirms the imposition of liability on the ski area operator when the ski area operator breaches a duty imposed by Sections 24-15-7 or -15-8, thus supporting our conclusion that comparative negligence principles are compatible with Section 24-15-10(B) when the section is read as a whole. We do not read the Act as disclosing a legislative intent to relieve ski area operators of responsibility for injuries suffered by a skier due, in part, to a breach of duties imposed upon operators under Sections 24-15-7 and -15-8, where such breach has causally contributed to the loss or damage complained of by a skier. See Kisella v. Dunn, 58 N.M. 695, 275 P.2d 181 (1954); McCasland v. Prather, 92 N.M. 192, 585 P.2d 336 (Ct.App.1978); cf. Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct.App.1983) (discussing enhanced injuries). As observed by our supreme court in Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M. 48, 51, 752 P.2d 240, 243 (1988), “[i]n adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence, we supplanted the all-or-nothing bar of contributory negligence and subjected the doctrine of assumption of risk and other concepts based on the claimant’s negligence to a comparative negligence analysis.” Thus, we conclude that the doctrine of comparative negligence is applicable to claims brought under the Act where both the skier and the ski area operator are alleged to have breached statutory duties. 3. Duty of Ski Area Operator to Warn and Protect Against Particular Hazards Plaintiffs’ final point raised on appeal argues that the district court erred in dismissing their claim alleging that Defendants negligently breached their duty to warn or place protective padding on ski lift towers in the skiing area, to safely maintain ski lifts under Section 24-15-8, or to install devices designed to protect Branson and other skiers from colliding with the metal ski lift tower in question. See § 24-15-7(C), (I). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendants breached both a duty to warn Bran-son of the existence of hazards or dangers located in the skiing area and a duty to correct specific hazards known by Defendants to pose a danger to skiers in the area, and that the violation of these duties causally contributed to Branson’s injuries. The stipulation of material facts entered into between the parties provided, in part: 5. All allegations of violations of the New Mexico Ski Safety Act found in the Plaintiff’s [sic] Complaint referring to “particular hazards or dangers,” “unusual obstacles or hazards,” and maintaining ski lifts in a “safe condition” refer only to the absence of manmade protective devices on the lift tower with which [Branson] collided, the absence of marking at the top of the slope of the presence of the lift tower, and the absence of a warning of the danger presented by the lift tower.  Defendants argue that they owed no duty to Branson. Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law for the court to determine. Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984). Plaintiff’s allege that Defendants breached duties found in three provisions: Sections 24-15-7(C) and (I), and -15-8. If these duties are owed to Branson as a skier and if the ski area operator is shown to have breached one or more of these duties and that the breach also contributed to or enhanced Branson’s injuries, then under Section 24-15-11, the ski area operator would be liable for those injuries caused by its negligence. Whether a duty has been breached is a question of fact. See Cross v. City of Clovis, 107 N.M. 251, 755 P.2d 589 (1988); Knapp v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 106 N.M. 11, 738 P.2d 129 (Ct.App.1987). Section 24-15-7(C) and (I) of the Act impose a duty upon Defendants to warn skiers of unusual hazards located in the skiing area. Section 24-15-7 specifies that every ski area operator has a duty C. to mark conspicuously the top or entrance to each slope, trail or area with the appropriate symbol for its relative degree of difficulty; and those slopes, * * * or portions of which present an unusual obstacle or hazard, shall be marked at the top or entrance with the appropriate symbols * * *. ****** I. [and the ski area operator has a duty] to warn of or correct particular hazards or dangers known to the operator where feasible to do so. [Emphasis added.]  The duty to provide a proper warning to skiers of the degree of difficulty of ski slopes or the existence of unusual obstacles or hazards located in skiing areas, imposed under Section 24-15-7(C) and (I), may assume additional significance as the difficulty of the skiing area becomes more pronounced, or the degree of danger posed by the risk of collision with an unprotected ski tower located in the designated skiing area increases. Cf. Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992) (holding where contributory negligence on the part of business visitor is foreseeable even in face of known or obvious hazard, landowner or occupier of premises has duty to use ordinary care to keep premises safe for use by business visitor); see also SCRA 1986, 13-910 (Repl.1991) (as danger which should be reasonably foreseen increases, amount of care required also increases). We note that the duty imposed on the ski area operator by Section 24-15-7(1) is limited to situations where the particular hazard is both known to the ski area operator and warning of or correcting the particular hazard is feasible. Thus, we do not believe our interpreting the Act as imposing this duty in relation to ski lift towers crossing the ski slope will lead to the absurd result foreseen by the dissent of requiring ski area operators to pad or otherwise protect trees, rocks, and any other object on the slope. Whether the hazard was known to the operator and whether taking any warning or corrective measures is feasible would be factual issues for the jury. See Knapp v. Fraternal Order of Eagles.  Defendants successfully argued to the court below that the duties of the Act relating to the operation, repair and maintenance of ski lifts do not impose a duty upon ski area operators to prevent injuries to skiers posed by the placement of unprotected lift towers in the skiing areas. In dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants, the district court held that lift towers and their components “are, by the terms of the Act, an inherent risk, which is obvious and necessary, which [Branson] assumed as a matter of law.” We agree with Plaintiffs that the district court erred in dismissing their claims alleging that Defendants proximately contributed to Branson’s injuries based on a failure to warn and to correct hazards or dangers known to the ski area operator where feasible to do so. See § 24-15-7. Under the record before us, although it was stipulated that Bran-son’s fall was not caused by Defendants, material disputed factual issues existed as to whether the ski tower with which she collided posed a “particular hazard known to the operator,” whether it was feasible to correct such hazard, and whether such hazard proximately contributed to or enhanced her injuries. In statutorily enumerating the duties required of ski area operators with respect to ski lifts, the legislature, in both the original Act and the 1979 amendments, emphasized the importance of the safe operation and maintenance of ski lifts and their components. In specifying the basic purposes of the Act, the legislature stated, in part, that “it is the policy of [this state] to protect its citizens and visitors from unnecessary hazards in the operation of ski lifts.” § 24-15-2. Whether in the instant ease the location or placement of the unprotected lift tower in the skiing area constituted an unreasonable hazard to Branson resulting in a breach of the duty imposed upon the ski area operator under Section 24-15-8, and proximately caused in whole or in part the injuries sustained by her, presents a material disputed question of fact for the fact finder. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp. (it is province of fact finder to determine issues of negligence and foreseeability); Knapp v. Fraternal Order of Eagles (issue of whether the defendant in a particular case breached duty of care constitutes question of fact). Reading Sections 24-15-2 and -15-10(B) in the manner urged by Defendants places the entire risk of injury upon Branson and ignores Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants also breached statutory duties which thereby proximately contributed to or enhanced Branson’s injuries. We will not read a statute in a manner that will reach an unjust result. See Wells v. County of Valencia. Under this posture, we determine that material disputed factual issues existed as to whether the alleged breach of duties imposed upon ski area operators to warn of an unprotected lift tower in the skiing area, or to correct such known hazard, causally contributed to Branson’s injuries and damages, and that Plaintiffs’ claims were subject to determination by the fact finder to ascertain and compare the alleged negligence of each of the parties. Cf. Elliott v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc. 83 N.M. 575, 494 P.2d 1392 (Ct.App.1972) (ski area operator held subject to negligence claim of skier injured prior to adoption of Ski Safety Act, where acts of employees were alleged to have aggravated skier’s initial injury); Duran v. General Motors Corp. (recognizing liability may exist where defendant's negligence proximately causes enhancement of injuries).  Similarly, we believe Section 24-15-8, requiring ski area operators to safely “maintain” ski lifts, includes a duty to use due care for the safety of skiers who may be injured by the operation or maintenance of such lifts or their components, whether or not the skiers are passengers. We interpret the duty to safely operate or maintain a ski lift imposed upon ski area operators under Section 24-15-8, to include the duty to correct where feasible, hazards which pose an unreasonable risk of injury to skiers who are non-passengers on such lifts. Section 24-15-8 does not, on its face, state that the ski area operator’s duty imposed by that section is limited only to passengers. Section 24-15-10, on the other hand, delineates the duties of and risks assumed by skiers. It also states that the risk assumed by skiers does not apply to “injuries * * * resulting from any breach of duty imposed upon ski area operators under * * * [Section] 24-15-8.” § 24-15-10(B). Thus, the duties imposed by Section 24-15-8 are explicitly applicable to skiers, and not restricted solely to passengers, as Defendants argue. The responsibility imposed upon ski area operators under the Act to safely operate or maintain ski lifts also imposes a duty to protect against unreasonable hazards created by lift towers situated in skiing areas. See § 24-15-7(1); cf. Miller v. New Mexico Dep’t of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987) (legislative purpose of excluding claims of individuals for damages arising by reason of negligently maintained roadways from defense of sovereign immunity is to ensure that highways are made and kept safe for the traveling public); see also Romero v. State, 112 N.M. 332, 815 P.2d 628 (1991) (evidence relating to the absence of plan or design of roadway held relevant to claim for damages alleging negligent maintenance of roadway); Rickerson v. State, 94 N.M. 473, 612 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1980) (concept of negligence where a duty to “maintain” exists may include duty to install necessary additional traffic control equipment; whether the defendant failed to properly maintain equipment at time of accident held to constitute jury question).  Some of the factors to be considered in determining whether an unprotected lift tower located in a skiing area constitutes a breach of duty imposed upon a ski area operator under Section 24-15-8, or breach of the duty to correct a hazard or danger within the contemplation of Section 24-15-7(1), include consideration of the nature and design of the lift or its components, the specific terrain where the lift tower is located, and the distance at which the lack of protection would reasonably become apparent to an approaching skier. Cf. Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp. (whether a dangerous condition on the premises involves an unreasonable risk of danger to business visitor and whether occupier should reasonably anticipate that visitor will not discover or realize the danger, generally constitute factual issues). Looking to the language of Plaintiffs’ complaint, together with the stipulations and matters contained in the record, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims alleging a breach of Defendants’ duty under the Act and that Plaintiffs were entitled to have these issues factually determined by the jury. CONCLUSION We reverse the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims alleging violations of statutory duties imposed upon Defendants under the Act, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. APODACA, J., concurs in part and specially concurs in part. BIVINS, J. dissenting.