Court Opinion

ID: 9590478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:55:15.602992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:12.508003
License: Public Domain

MOON, Chief Judge.
Timothy Lamont Clark appeals his conviction for statutory burglary. He contends that he could not be convicted of a violation of Code § 18.2-90 because he lawfully entered the store when it was open to the public. We hold that under Code § 18.2-90, a person who enters a store intending to commit robbery therein, enters the store unlawfully. Therefore, we affirm the conviction.
Clark was indicted on charges of robbery, statutory burglary, and use of a firearm in the commission of robbery. The statutory burglary indictment charged that Clark “unlawfully *675and feloniously, while armed with a deadly weapon, enter[ed] in the nighttime the storehouse of Kentuck Grocery, with the intent to commit robbery therein,” in violation of Code § 18.2-90. Clark pled guilty to robbery, not guilty to statutory burglary, and not guilty to use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery.
The parties stipulated that on February 21, 1994, at 8:00 p.m., Clark entered the Kentuck Grocery during regular business hours and asked an employee where the bathroom was located. When Clark returned to the counter, he pulled an object from his pocket that appeared to be the butt of a gun. Clark stated, “open it up and I mean now,” followed by, “let me have it all.” The employee gave Clark all the money in the cash drawer. Later, after the employee identified Clark from an array of photographs, Clark was interviewed by the police and confessed to the robbery. He denied that he had a gun.
In addition to this stipulated evidence, Clark testified that he did not possess a gun during the robbery. He testified that he put his hand under his sweater and intended to give the appearance of possessing a gun. The trial judge found Clark guilty of statutory burglary and not guilty of use of a firearm in the commission of robbery.
Clark contends that he cannot be found guilty of statutory burglary because he entered the store during its regular business hours pursuant to the owner’s general invitation to the public to enter the business establishment. He argues that Code § 18.2-90 has not eliminated the common law requirement that the Commonwealth must prove an unlawful entry in order to obtain a burglary conviction. He further argues that the legislature intended to eliminate the “force” aspect of breaking as required by the common law but did not intend to eliminate the defense of consent to enter or lack of trespassory conduct. We disagree.
Clark was indicted and convicted under the following statute:
*676If any person in the nighttime enters without breaking or in the daytime breaks and enters or enters and conceals himself in a dwelling house or an adjoining, occupied outhouse or in the nighttime enters without breaking or at any time breaks and enters or enters and conceals himself in any office, shop, manufactured home, storehouse, warehouse, banking house, or other house, or any ship, vessel or river craft or any railroad car, or any automobile, truck or trailer, if such automobile, truck or trailer is used as a dwelling or place of human habitation, with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery, he shall be deemed guilty of statutory burglary, which offense shall be a Class 3 felony. However, if such person was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony.
Code § 18.2-90. Our reading of the statute is governed by the following well established principles:
If [a statute’s] language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it. When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules for construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Therefore, when the language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts is not permitted because we take the words as written to determine their meaning.
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citations omitted).
“When the sufficiency of the evidence is attacked, the judgment of the trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed [on appeal] unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Evans v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975). Although breaking is an essential element of common law burglary, the statute’s language, “enter[ ] without breaking,” specifically excludes breaking as an element. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. at 321, 330 S.E.2d at 87 (1985) (courts must apply the plain meaning of a statute if its *677language is clear and unambiguous); see Johns v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 283, 289, 392 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1990) (under Code § 18.2-93, breaking during entry is not necessary to impose liability). Furthermore, because other offenses under the same statute require proof of breaking, the General Assembly must have intended to require only proof of entry into the building.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 295, 349 S.E.2d 414 (1986), we considered whether a burglary conviction under Code § 18.2-91 could be upheld where the defendant entered the store during normal business hours, concealed himself within the store and committed larceny once the store closed. In upholding the conviction, we stated:
Where a store owner invites the public to enter his premises he consents for the entrant to view his merchandise for the limited purpose of purchase, or to otherwise engage in a lawful activity thereon. It is not the will of the owner that entrance be made to defraud or steal from him.
Id. at 300, 349 S.E.2d at 417. See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 521, 524, 110 S.E. 356, 357 (1922) (citing with approval cases holding that if a person who is “fully authorized to enter for purposes within the scope of the employment or trust, actually enters ... to commit [robbery], he will be guilty of burglary”).
Although this Court reversed the burglary conviction in Johns, because Johns did not commit a breaking, “[w]e agree[d] ... that the bank ... did not authorize, invite or consent to Johns’ entry for the purpose of committing robbery.” 10 Va.App. at 287, 392 S.E.2d at 489. Indeed, the opinion intimated that we would have upheld the conviction if Johns had been prosecuted under Code § 18.2-93, which only requires proof of entering and not breaking. Id. at 285 n. 1, 392 S.E.2d at 488 n. 1. We reiterate our holding in Johns that “ ‘[i]t would be an impeachment of the common sense of mankind to say that ... a thief who enters the store with intent to steal does so with the owner’s consent and upon his invitation.’ ” Id. at 287, 392 S.E.2d at 489 (citation omitted).
*678The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark entered the store in the nighttime with the intent to commit robbery. The proof of those elements satisfied the provisions of Code § 18.2-90. Therefore, we affirm the conviction.

Affirmed.