Court Opinion

ID: 9395894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 19:03:52.777707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.577664
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/18/23 Stouffer v. Jones CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LAURENCE EUGENE STOUFFER,                                            D078980

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00010103-
                                                                     CU-PT-CTL)
TAMIKA JONES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed.
         Tamika Jones, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         Laurence Eugene Stouffer, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Tamika Jones appeals from an elder abuse restraining order (Order)
prohibiting her from contacting Laurence Eugene Stouffer. In a one-
paragraph argument lacking citations to the record, Jones contends the
Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Self-represented on appeal,
she also complains that her trial attorney ignored her request to disqualify
the judge, who she claims had a “personal relationship” with Stouffer.
      We affirm the Order. It is supported by substantial evidence, and any
disagreements between Jones and her trial lawyer are not grounds for
reversal.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

      Stouffer, who is about 76-years-old, met Jones (25 years his junior) at a
grocery store, and in late 2020 they lived together in his home. In March
2021, Stouffer filed a request for an elder abuse restraining order against
Jones. His accompanying declaration stated that Jones “has become abusive”
and was “intimidating” him to “leave [his] own home.” He maintained that
despite his repeated requests that she leave, Jones had taken a house key
without permission, and the stress was affecting his health. Stouffer stated
the situation was “horrible” and he was “concerned” for his safety. Stouffer’s
adult son also submitted a declaration. He observed Jones yell at his father
in a “mean and aggressive” manner. He believed she was attempting to
“oust” his father from his own home.
      As is not uncommon in these cases, Jones’s version was very different.
She maintained that Stouffer wanted her to stay as long as she wanted.
Jones claimed that she was the victim of Stouffer’s abuse, which began when
she rebuffed his crude and offensive sexual advances.

1     Both parties are self-represented on appeal and neither of their briefs
contain a statement of facts supported by citations to the record as required.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C).) Accordingly, the factual
and procedural background is drawn from our independent review of the
record, the settled statement, and documents from the superior court file,
which on our own motion we judicially notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459.) The facts are stated in the light most favorable to Stouffer, the
prevailing party. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137–
1138 (Bookout).)
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      After conducting an unreported hearing where both parties were
represented by counsel and testified, and after “careful review of the entire
record,” the court issued a five-year restraining order prohibiting Jones from,
among other things, having any contact with Stouffer.

                                 DISCUSSION

A.    The Order Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

      The court may issue a protective order for an elder who has suffered

“abuse” as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.07.2
(§ 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).) Under this broad definition, “abuse” includes
“treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering.”
(§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).) It can consist of “ ‘serious emotional distress that is
brought about by . . . intimidating behavior [or] harassment.’ ” (Darrin v.
Miller (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 450, 453–454.) The level of proof required is a
preponderance of the evidence. (Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
128, 137.)
      We review the findings necessary to support the protective order for
substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party
and indulging “all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding
the trial court’s findings.” (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137–
1138.) The trial court’s resolution of factual disputes between the parties will
not be disturbed on appeal. (Ibid.)
      Jones contends the Order was issued “[w]ithout any evidentiary
support . . . .” But the record contains ample substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s ruling. Under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil

2     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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Protection Act (§ 15600 et seq.), a protective order may be issued “if a
declaration shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse of the petitioning elder.” (§ 15657.03, subd. (c).)
      The declaration of a single witness, even a party, may constitute
substantial evidence. (See In re Marriage of Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d
677, 682.) Here, Stouffer’s declaration attests to past abuse by Jones. In
December 2020, Jones “grabbed” his chin and said, “ ‘You look at me when
I’m talking to you.’ ” She “flexed her muscles and stated that she is strong,
and nobody scares her.” Stouffer felt “intimidated” by Jones and was fearful
to leave his own home. He maintained that Jones had “huge mood swings”
causing him to fear that if he said something to upset her, she “could again
put her hands on [him] and abuse [him].” According to Stouffer’s physician,
“any undue stress may lead to further medical complications” including heart
attack or stroke.
      We acknowledge Jones’s claim that Stouffer is not being truthful and,
in her view, this proceeding is retaliation for her rebuffing his sexual
advances. The trial judge, however, was entitled to disbelieve Jones’s
testimony, and as a reviewing court we do not second-guess the trier of fact’s
firsthand determination of witness credibility. (See In re Marriage of Destiny
and Justin C. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 763, 770.)

B.    Disagreements Between Jones and Her Lawyer Are Not a Basis for
      Reversing the Order

      In a one-paragraph argument that is somewhat difficult to follow,
Jones complains although she informed her trial lawyer that the judge had a
“personal relationship” with Stouffer and his son, her attorney failed to seek
to disqualify the judge. This argument fails, not only because there is
nothing in the record showing any such relationship, but also because, as an

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intermediate appellate court, our role is to determine if the trial court
committed prejudicial error—not whether counsel in a civil case failed to
follow her client’s instructions or made wise tactical decisions. Even
assuming for the sake of discussion that Jones advised her attorney of facts
she claims showed judicial bias, her attorney’s failure to move to disqualify
the court would not be grounds for reversing the Order.

C.    Jones Forfeited Claims That the Court Erroneously Excluded Evidence

      In the concluding paragraph of her opening brief, Jones contends the
Order should be reversed because the trial court “erroneously refused to

admit relevant evidence.”3 We do not reach the merits on this point because
it is doubly forfeited.
      Evidence Code section 354, subdivision (a) provides that a “judgment or
decision” shall not be reversed based on the erroneous exclusion of evidence
unless it appears of record that: “The substance, purpose, and relevance of
the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked,
an offer of proof, or by any other means . . . .” Thus, to preserve her claim on
appeal that the trial court erred in excluding evidence, Jones was required to
first make an offer of proof in the trial court. An offer of proof gives the trial
court an opportunity to change or clarify its ruling, and in the event of appeal
provides the reviewing court with the means of determining error and
assessing prejudice. The offer of proof must be specific, setting forth the

3      In the table of contents of her opening brief, Jones’s first argument is
entitled, “There was no evidence to support Stouffer’s Claim” and “the trial
judge erroneously refused to admit relevant evidence thus prejudice the
appellant[’s] case.” But in the body of the brief, that argument heading is
different. It simply states, “There was no evidence to support Stouffer’s
Claim,” and the text under that heading says nothing about any evidentiary
ruling.
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actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed
and argued. (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124.) Here,
nothing in the record shows that the court excluded any evidence, nor that
any offer of proof was made. Accordingly, the point is forfeited.
      Moreover, to give the opposing party fair notice of issues that need to
be addressed, an appellate brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In this case, however, Jones’s argument in the
conclusion section does not give fair warning an additional legal argument is
being raised. The issue is forfeited on this ground as well. (See Tukes v.
Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 12, fn. 5.)

                                DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed. Stouffer is entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                        DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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