Court Opinion

ID: 9397072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:04:29.019943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.199380
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                             LARRY CLASE,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D21-2898

                              [May 24, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Okeechobee County; Michael C. Heisey, Judge; L.T. Case No.
472018CF000727A.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elijah Giuliano, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessica L.
Underwood, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

   We affirm the defendant’s conviction for violating section 790.23,
Florida Statutes (2018), including the defendant’s argument that he was
unconstitutionally convicted by a six-person jury, as opposed to a twelve-
person jury, on the authority of our decision in Guzman v. State, 350 So.
3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. pending, No. SC22-1597. However, we
accept the State’s concessions of error with respect to the improper scoring
of the defendant’s prior record on his Criminal Punishment Code (CPC)
scoresheet and the trial court’s imposition of $50 in investigative costs in
the absence of evidence supporting the requested amount. We therefore
reverse the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

   As conceded by the State, the defendant’s two prior record offenses for
violating the 1995 version of section 800.04, Florida Statutes, were
improperly scored as level 7 offenses on his CPC scoresheet. See Perdue
v. State, 333 So. 3d 207, 207-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (holding that
defendant’s prior conviction “for an offense involving lewd conduct” should
not have been “classified as a level 7 offense” on his CPC scoresheet, based
on the offense severity ranking applicable to the crime as defined by
existing statute, where the “version of the statute for which he was
convicted and the existing statute [did] not contain the same elements”).
We therefore reverse the defendant’s sentence because it cannot be
determined conclusively from the record that the trial court would have
imposed the same sentence without the error. See Zelaya v. State, 257 So.
3d 493, 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (scoresheet error cannot be considered
harmless unless “the record conclusively shows that the trial court would
have imposed the same sentence using a correct scoresheet” (quoting
Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 2007)).

   We also reverse the trial court’s assessment of $50 in investigative costs
because the State did not prove the requested amount by competent
substantial evidence, as conceded by the State. See Jenkins v. State, 332
So. 3d 1013, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (reversing investigative costs
assessment where State failed to prove amount requested).

    On remand, the trial court must resolve “[a]ny uncertainty” or
“disagreement” as to the propriety of scoring the disputed prior record
offenses. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(14)(D); Perdue, 333 So. 3d at 208
(remanding for trial court to resolve the parties’ dispute as to how the
defendant’s prior conviction should be scored). In addition, the trial court
shall either remove its assessment of investigative costs or reimpose those
costs to the extent proven by the State. See Jenkins, 332 So. 3d at 1019
(investigative costs may be reimposed on remand, if supported by
sufficient evidence demonstrating the amount, where reversal of the initial
assessment was based solely on a lack of evidentiary support).

   In all other respects, we affirm without further comment.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

CIKLIN, LEVINE and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                            *         *        *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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