Court Opinion

ID: 9391049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-29 05:09:31.927045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.275712
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 27, 2023

                                        In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                No. 11-22-00301-CV
                                    __________

              IN THE INTEREST OF L.C.C. JR., A CHILD

                      On Appeal from the 35th District Court
                              Brown County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CV2102037

                                    OPINION
       This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental
rights of the mother and the father of L.C.C. Jr. Both parents filed an appeal. On
appeal, each parent presents two issues. In their first issue, the parents assert that
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their request for an extension. In
their second issue, each parent challenges the trial court’s finding that the
termination of his or her parental rights is in the best interest of L.C.C. Jr. We affirm
the order of the trial court.
                         Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate parental
rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court found
that each parent had committed two of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—
those found in subsections (D) and (E). Neither parent challenges these findings on
appeal.
      The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination
of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the
child. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Each parent challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s respective best interest finding.
      To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case,
we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the
evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine
whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility
and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In
re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).
      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis.

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Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not
limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship
is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
                             Evidence Presented at Trial
      The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services
became involved with L.C.C. Jr. shortly after his birth. The reasons for the
Department’s initial involvement included the mother’s positive test for barbiturates,
which may have been attributable to a prescribed medication or medication
administered at the hospital, and the obstetrician’s concern about the mother’s
abilities as a parent. The obstetrician gave the following example of the mother’s
concerning conduct before the birth of L.C.C. Jr.: When instructed that she needed
to stay at the hospital because of her baby’s heart rate, the mother refused to stay and
said she would return “after the baby is delivered in the toilet.” The “[d]eplorable”
condition of the parents’ home was also a concern for the Department.
      L.C.C. Jr. was removed from his parents’ care before he left the hospital. The
trial court subsequently ordered the parents to comply with the requirements set forth
in their family service plan. The family service plan required that the parents

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complete a variety of services. The parents worked hard and completed their
services. Among other things, they obtained suitable housing, tested negative on all
drug screens, attended visitation, completed anger management and parenting
classes, and went to counseling. As a result of the parents’ progress, the trial court
ordered that L.C.C. Jr. be returned to his parents’ care in a monitored return.
      The monitored return did not last long—only about six weeks.                 The
Department removed L.C.C. Jr. from the monitored return after (1) a physical
altercation between the mother and another child that was in the home and (2) the
physical abuse of L.C.C. Jr. by the father. Both parents acknowledged that the
mother and the father’s teenaged daughter engaged in a physical altercation while
L.C.C. Jr. was present, but the parents denied that the father had physically abused
L.C.C. Jr. However, an MHMR worker, who was at the parents’ residence for a visit
with the older child, testified that she heard the father tell L.C.C. Jr., who was
standing in a play pen with his face and hands pressed against the mesh: “Get your
face off the mesh.” The father repeated this command a little louder, and when
L.C.C. Jr. did not comply, the father “walked over to the baby and grabbed him on
the outside of his arms and shoved him over to the other side of the play pen and
pressed him pretty firmly into the . . . mattress.”
      Additionally, a 2INgage worker who, for over a year, observed visits between
the parents and L.C.C. Jr. testified regarding the parents’ inappropriate conduct. She
testified that the mother would have to be told to interact with L.C.C. Jr. and that the
parents would get angry and argue with each other when L.C.C. Jr. cried. During
one such incident, the father kicked L.C.C. Jr.’s infant carrier “pretty hard” while
L.C.C. Jr. was in it—causing the carrier to move approximately two feet across the
floor and causing L.C.C. Jr. to scream. This same worker had seen the father “yank”
L.C.C. Jr. up by his arm when the father was angry.

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      When L.C.C. Jr. was removed from the monitored return, he had bruises
between his eyes, on his temple, and on one side of his back. L.C.C. Jr.’s pediatrician
was particularly concerned about the unusual bruise on the side of the back; that
bruise appeared to be consistent with someone hitting or throwing the child. The
pediatrician ordered “skeletal surveys”—which showed no fractures.                   The
pediatrician testified that he would be concerned for the safety of any child placed
in the parents’ care and that he did not believe it would be in L.C.C. Jr.’s best interest
to be returned to the care of his mother and father.
      Other testimony showed that L.C.C. Jr. regressed during the monitored return.
Upon being returned to the foster parents after the monitored return ended, L.C.C.
Jr. had quit talking, had become frightened of loud noises, had developed night
terrors, and had become very clingy. The foster mother described the night-terror
episodes as L.C.C. Jr. waking up screaming in the middle of the night and taking
about thirty or forty-five minutes to calm down—sometimes twice a night. He also
cried a lot more after the monitored return ended, especially when being picked up
at daycare for transport to, and upon the parents’ arrival at, the supervised visits.
And sudden movements caused him to flinch; he would put his hands up in a
defensive manner as if he thought someone was going to hit him. According to the
foster mother, it takes about two nights after each post-monitored-return visit with
the parents for the night terrors to cease.
      After the monitored return ended, the parents were again required to
participate in various services, including counseling and anger management. The
parents’ counselor indicated that, although the parents were ultimately discharged
from counseling, the counseling was not successful. According to the counselor, the
parents failed to accept any responsibility for their actions and continued to put the
child at risk—necessitating additional referrals. The parents’ counselor testified that

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a young toddler, such as L.C.C. Jr., would not be safe in the care of the mother and
the father.
       Both parents testified at trial. They disputed some of the testimony of other
witnesses. The father specifically testified that L.C.C. Jr. was not in the infant carrier
when the father kicked it and that the father was just moving it with his foot so that
he would have more leg room. Both parents denied that the play pen incident ever
occurred; the parents indicated that the father was outside the entire time that the
MHMR worker was inside their residence. The father also testified that he no longer
has a temper.
       The permanency goal for L.C.C. Jr. was “Unrelated Adoption.” At the time
of trial, L.C.C. Jr. remained in the care of the foster parents with whom he had been
placed since he was released from the hospital after his birth (with the exception of
the time spent in the monitored return). The foster parents, who had other adopted
children in their home, provided L.C.C. Jr. with a safe and stable home.
       Several witnesses testified either that it would not be in L.C.C. Jr.’s best
interest to return to the care of his mother and father or that it would be in L.C.C.
Jr.’s best interest for the parental rights of both parents to be terminated. These
witnesses included the child’s pediatrician, the mother’s obstetrician, the mother’s
case manager for her MHMR services, and a 2INgage case manager that had been
assigned to this case. The attorney and guardian ad litem for L.C.C. Jr., who had
previously advocated for the monitored return, informed the trial court that, in her
opinion, the parental rights of the mother and the father should be terminated.
                                        Analysis
       Best Interest of the Child
       In each parent’s second issue, they assert that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of

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that parent’s parental rights would be in the best interest of L.C.C. Jr. The trial court,
as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. A.B., 437 S.W.3d
at 503. We are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of fact as long
as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Giving
due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial
and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction that termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights would be
in the best interest of L.C.C. Jr. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      As set forth above, the Department presented testimony from multiple
witnesses regarding the bruised condition of L.C.C. Jr. at the time that the monitored
return ended, L.C.C. Jr.’s fear of the mother and the father during visits that occurred
after the monitored return, the physically and verbally aggressive behavior of the
father toward L.C.C. Jr., and the mother’s inappropriate behavior toward another
child in the parents’ home. There was no question that domestic violence occurred
in the home. L.C.C. Jr.’s attorney and guardian ad litem, who had previously
advocated for the monitored return, believed that the parents abused and “broke”
L.C.C. Jr. during the monitored return and that their parental rights should be
terminated. Upon considering the record as it relates to the actions of the mother
and the father, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future,
the apparent desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs of the child now
and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the domestic violence in
the parents’ home, and the plans for the child by the Department, we hold that the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support (1) the finding that termination
of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child and (2) the finding
that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See
id. We defer to the trial court’s findings as to the child’s best interest, see C.H., 89

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S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in this case that the trial court’s findings as to best
interest are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we
overrule each parent’s second issue.
      Denial of Motion for Extension
      In each parent’s first issue, they contend that the trial court abused its
discretion when, after determining that it had no authority to grant an extension after
the monitored return ended, it denied the parents’ requests for an extension under
Section 263.401 of the Family Code. See FAM. § 263.401 (West Supp. 2022).
Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an extension requested
under Section 263.401(b) for an abuse of discretion. In re M.G., 585 S.W.3d 51, 58
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.); In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). However, the issue presented in this case also requires
that we construe the applicable statutes. Statutory construction involves a legal
question, which we must review de novo. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d
621, 625 (Tex. 2008). In doing so, we must attempt to ascertain and give effect to
the legislature’s intent as expressed by the language of the statute. Id.; State v.
Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).
      Here, the applicable statutes are (1) Section 263.401, which provides for an
automatic dismissal date and one permissible extension of that date, and
(2) Section 263.403, which provides for a monitored return of a child to his parent.
The record shows that after the monitored return ended, the trial court set a new
dismissal date of November 1, 2022, in accordance with Section 263.403(c). On
October 3, 2022, one week prior to the commencement of the final hearing on
termination, the mother filed a motion for a second monitored return and/or an
extension of the dismissal date. The father joined this motion. The parents asserted
that a Section 263.401 extension remained “legally available” after the monitored

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return ended because the trial court had not previously extended the dismissal date
in this case under Section 263.401. The trial court did not agree, and it denied the
parents’ request for an extension, stating that “there is no ability to extend any
further” and recognizing that it was the legislature’s intent “not to exceed a case
more than two years, which would happen if [the trial court] continued to be able to
pile extensions on.”
      Section 263.401 provides for the automatic dismissal and the trial court’s loss
of jurisdiction over a parental termination suit filed by the Department—if trial on
the merits is not timely commenced. Id. § 263.401(a), (c). That same section,
however, also authorizes a trial court to retain a parental termination case on its
docket by granting one extension “for a period not to exceed 180 days after” the
original dismissal date provided for in Section 263.401(a). Id. § 263.401(b). The
original dismissal date is “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the
court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing
conservator.” Id. § 263.401(a) (emphasis added).
      Section 263.403 also permits a trial court to retain a parental termination case
on its docket beyond the original dismissal date. Section 263.403(a) provides:
“Notwithstanding Section 263.401, the court may retain jurisdiction and not dismiss
the suit or render a final order as required by that section if the court renders a
temporary order” for a monitored return of the child to a parent. Id. § 263.403(a).
Under a monitored return, the Department is “to continue to serve as temporary
managing conservator of the child.” Id. § 263.403(a)(3) (emphasis added). When a
trial court grants a monitored return under Section 263.403, it must schedule a new
dismissal date. Id. § 263.403(b)(2). If, before that dismissal date, the monitored
return fails and the child must be removed from the parent’s home by the
Department, the trial court shall again set a new dismissal date. Id. § 263.403(c).

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“The new dismissal date may not be later than the original dismissal date established
under Section 263.401 or the 180th day after the date the child is moved [from the
monitored return] . . . , whichever date is later.” Id.
      Section 263.401 does not authorize a trial court to extend the dismissal date
to a date beyond the 180th day after the original dismissal date. In this case, the
original dismissal date was February 7, 2022. The trial court did not thereafter
render another temporary order “appointing” the Department as temporary
managing conservator. See id. § 263.401(a). Thus, the trial court was not authorized
under Section 263.401 to extend the dismissal date to a date later than August 6,
2022—180 days after February 7. See id. § 263.401. The parents requested an
extension and a dismissal date that was well beyond the extension authorized by
Section 263.401. Furthermore, nothing in the monitored-return statute authorizes a
trial court to set a new dismissal date that is later than the 180th day after a child is
removed from a monitored return. See id. § 263.403(c). In this case, the trial court
calculated the post-monitored-return dismissal date as November 1, 2022.
      Additionally, as recognized by various courts in Texas, the legislative intent
behind Section 263.401 is to provide permanence and stability to children who have
been removed from their parents and to prevent those children from languishing
indefinitely in foster care. See In re B.W., 99 S.W.3d 757, 758–59 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); In re T.M., 33 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2000, no pet.); In re Neal, 4 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding); In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412, 416–17 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1999, orig. proceeding).
      Based on the language of the relevant statutes and also on the legislature’s
intent in enacting those statutes, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it
determined that a further extension of the dismissal date was not available under

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Section 263.401. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
parents’ request for an extension. We overrule each parent’s first issue on appeal.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
       We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                 JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                 CHIEF JUSTICE

April 27, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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