Court Opinion

ID: 9778702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:16:41.334844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.677518
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The testimony presented by Officer Baise revealed neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances.
While it is true that Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) adopted the totality of the circumstances test, it was only a rigid adherence to the two-pronged test of Aguilar1 that was abandoned; the elements of the Aguilar test remain highly relevant. 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2327-28, 76 L.Ed.2d at 543. The missing element in the probable cause equation is the basis of knowledge of the informant. Officer Baise gave no evidence concerning this. Did the informant see the drugs being sold or was the informant told this by a third person? If so, did that person see the transactions or was that person told of them? If so, what factors indicate the reliability of the third person or the fourth person? The “basis of knowledge” prong is there to determine if the information is based upon fact rather than mere rumor or suspicion. If the informant gave Officer Baise such information, it was not presented to the trial judge. The trial judge was correct in determining the state failed to show probable cause to search.
If Officer Baise was correct in his assumption that it would have taken in excess of two hours to secure a search warrant, then the exigent circumstances exception would be plausible. However, there is no evidence any effort was made to contact a magistrate. There is no evidence it would, in fact, have taken that long to secure the warrant. The trial judge was correct in determining the state failed to show exigent circumstances to excuse obtaining a search warrant.
No judge relishes suppressing evidence. That judge is subjected to the criticism of “letting a guilty criminal go free” because of a technicality. In fact, many more motions to suppress are overruled than are granted. When a judge grants a motion to suppress, we should treat that the same as a jury verdict and review it in the light most favorable to the judge’s ruling. I question whether that standard is being applied in these appeals.2 I would affirm the trial court.

. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).

. Since the advent of Tex.Code Crim.Proc Ann. art. 44.01, § a(5) (Vernon Supp.1994), we have reversed four times, State v. James, 848 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1993, no pet.); State v. Como, 821 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1992, pet. refd); State v. Hammitt, 825 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1992, pet. ref'd); State v. Vasquez, 842 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1992, pet. ref'd); and affirmed once, State v. Clouse, 839 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1992, no pet.).