Court Opinion

ID: 9727199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:24:55.126789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:34.748641
License: Public Domain

JEFFERSON (Bernard), P. J.—I dissent.
I consider that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to preclude disclosure before the jury of the fact that the defendant had *551been convicted of the felony offense of an assault with a deadly weapon even though that conviction was an essential element of the second offense charged against defendant—that the defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm. The error was of a prejudicial nature which mandates a reversal of defendant’s conviction.
The majority relies for its position that no error was committed in permitting disclosure to the jury of defendant’s conviction of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon on cases such as People v. Morrison (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 425 [136 Cal.Rptr. 650]; People v. Faulkner (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 384 [104 Cal.Rptr. 625]; and People v. Black (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 846 [158 Cal.Rptr. 449]. The majority approves of the statement found in Black as follows: “We followed People v. Faulkner, supra, in our recent opinion, People v. Morrison (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 425, 427-428 [136 Cal.Rptr. 650], and are not convinced by the arguments presented in appellant’s brief nor in the recent case of People v. Sherren (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 752 [152 Cal.Rptr. 828], to change our minds.” (Black, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 846, 854.)
It is my view that the Morrison, Faulkner and Black cases were clearly decided incorrectly. Their holdings are plainly untenable and indefensible. The Faulkner, Morrison and Black courts simply ignored the provisions of Evidence Code section 210. This section defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that has a “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact” in an action. If a fact is not disputed, evidence offered to prove such fact is irrelevant since Evidence Code section 350 provides unequivocably that “[n]o evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.”
It is significant that Evidence Code section 210 makes no exception for criminal actions. Its plain language makes evidence offered on an undisputed issue in any action—civil or criminal—irrelevant and hence inadmissible by the express provisions of Evidence Code section 350. In the case before us, the defendant expressly admitted that he had suffered the previous conviction of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon and by so doing removed from the action that one element of the offense defined by Penal Code section 12021. The Faulkner, Morrison and Black courts should have held, therefore, that Evidence Code sections 210 and 350 constituted a bar to the prosecution’s disclosure to the jury that defendant had been convicted of the felony offense of an assault with a deadly weapon once he had conceded the existence of that element of the offense charged against him.
*552The Faulkner, Black and Morrison cases are contrary to the views set forth by the California Supreme Court in Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 79 [137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022], in which the court observed that “[e]vidence which is relevant only as to an issue which is not before the jury should be excluded.”
People v. Sherren (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 752 [152 Cal.Rptr. 828], is correct in its rejection of the views of the Morrison court and in its holding that it is prejudicial error to admit evidence that defendant is a convicted felon when defendant is willing to admit that fact as being an essential element of the prosecution’s case.
Unfortunately, Sherren does not rely on Evidence Code section 210 for its correct holding. Instead, the Sherren court relies on cases holding that the element of knowledge of heroin may be removed from a criminal case by the defendant’s concession of knowledge (People v. Gonzales (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 286 [68 Cal.Rptr. 578]); and the petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction under Penal Code section 666 (People v. Gallinger (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 851 [28 Cal.Rptr. 472]); and assault by a life prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4500; People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205 [85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710]).
The Sherren court recognizes that our courts have said that a defendant will not be permitted to admit some element of the prosecution’s case and preclude the prosecutor from presenting evidence thereon if such a procedure constitutes an impairment of the effectiveness of the prosecution’s case against a defendant or if such procedure results in softening the impact of the prosecution’s evidence in its entirety.
I agree with the Sherren court in its disagreement with the Morrison court with respect to whether the removal of the issue of being a prior felon weakens the prosecutor’s case against the defendant. I see no such weakening of the prosecution’s case. On the contrary, what the prosecution seeks is the prejudicial effect and advantage of irrelevant evidence which the jury is apt to use against the defendant in an unwarranted and prejudicial manner to find that he was in possession of the firearm. In my view there exists the overriding factor that disclosure to the jury that defendant has suffered a prior felony conviction—in this case assault with a deadly weapon—represents an overwhelming prejudice to the defendant.
*553In addition, I disagree with the majority’s view that the defense counsel’s effort to keep the jury from knowing about the felony conviction of assault with a deadly weapon was based solely upon potential prejudice to defendant on count I, which was a charge of assault with a deadly weapon—an offense similar to the one involved in the prior conviction. I construe the record as also including an indication of prejudice on count II. I see no waiver involved in the right of defendant on this appeal to allege error with respect to the admissibility of this evidence as to count II.
The evidence as to defendant’s possession and ownership of the firearm involved in the instant case was conflicting. The prosecution’s case against defendant was far from overwhelming. Under these circumstances, the error of the trial court is magnified.
I would thus reverse defendant’s conviction because my examination of the entire record convinces me that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error discussed herein. (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 296 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 9, 1980, rule 27(e), California Rules of Court. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 2, 1980.