Court Opinion

ID: 9536857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:08:17.889061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:25.412737
License: Public Domain

KLEIN, Justice,
dissenting with whom MOON, Chief Justice, joins.
I agree with the majority that the certified question before us encompasses both the is*68sue whether the City and County of Honolulu (City) had the authority to enact Ordinance 91-95 and the issue whether Ordinance 91-95 is preempted by state law. For the reasons set forth below, however, I do not agree that the City had the authority to enact Ordinance 91-95. Because I believe that the certified question can be answered on this basis alone, I find it unnecessary to reach the preemption issue.
I.

The City’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is derived exclusively from statutory grants of that authority.

“Article VIII of the Hawai[‘]i State Constitution defines the relationship between the state and county governments. Article VIII, section 1, authorized the state legislature to create the counties and grant the counties such power as they [sic] deem necessary.” Marsland v. First Hawaiian Bank, 70 Haw. 126, 132, 764 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1988).1 Although Article VIII, section 2, establishes the counties’ “home rule” powers with respect to charter provisions concerning the structure and organization of county government, the constitutional protection afforded counties against legislative intrusion is limited. Id. at 132-33, 764 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted).2
The City does not appear to dispute that it has no inherent power of eminent domain, see 11 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 32.12 at 324 (3d ed. 1991) (McQuillin), or that it “may exercise only those powers which have been delegated to [the counties] by the State legislature.” In re Application of Anamizu, 52 Haw. 550, 553, 481 P.2d 116, 118 (1971). The City contends, however, that the legislature has granted eminent domain powers to the several counties pursuant to chapters 46 and 101 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS). Whether the City has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for a particular use, in this case condominium lease-to-fee conversion (i.e., condemnation of lessors’ leased fee interests in condominium developments, cooperative housing corporation developments and planned unit developments for transfer to their lessees), thus becomes purely a question of statutory interpretation.
“Our primary duty in interpreting and applying statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intention to the fullest degree.” Methven-Abreu v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd., 73 Haw. 385, 392, 834 P.2d 279, 284, recon. denied, 73 Haw. 625, 838 P.2d 860 (1992) (citation omitted). Although, “[t]he intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself,” Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d 414, 416 (1989),
we have rejected an approach to statutory construction which limits us to the words of a statute ... for when aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination.
Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 421, 653 P.2d 420, 424 (1982) (citations omitted). Thus, the plain language rule of statutory construction, see Sherman v. Sawyer, 63 Haw. 55, 59, 621 P.2d 346, 349 (1980),
does not preclude an examination of sources other than the language of the statute itself even when the language appears clear upon perfunctory review. *69Were this not the case, a court may be unable to adequately discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate and, thus, would be unable to determine if a literal construction would produce an absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the policies of the statute.
*68The legislature shall create counties, and may create other political subdivisions within the State, and provide for the government thereof. Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws.
*69Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land & Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 297, 660 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983) (citation omitted). With these principles in mind, I now turn to an examination of the relevant statutes.
II.

The power of eminent domain referred to in HRS § 46-1.5(6) is limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61.

The statutes relating to the scope of the City’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, HRS §§ 46-1.5 (Supp.1992), 46-61 (1985), and 101-2 (1985),3 must be read in pari materia. HRS § 1-16 (1985); Zator v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 Haw. 594, 597, 752 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1988). HRS § 46-1.5(6) provides:
Subject to general law, each county shall have the following powers and shall be subject to the following liabilities and limitations:
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(6) Each county shall have the power to exercise the power of condemnation by eminent domain when it is in the public interest to do so.
“On superficial examination” it might appear that this provision grants broad powers of eminent domain to the counties, limited only by the requirement that the powers be exercised “in the public interest.” Closer examination of the language of the statute, application of principles of statutory construction, and a review of the legislative history, however, all demonstrate that the power of eminent domain referred to in HRS § 46-1.5(6) is limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61.
HRS § 46-1.5 specifically provides that all powers set forth therein are “[s]ubject to general law.” “In its broadest sense, the term ‘general laws’ ... denotes laws which apply uniformly throughout all political subdivisions of the State.” Bulgo v. Maui County, 50 Haw. 51, 58, 430 P.2d 321, 326 (1967). HRS § 46-61 is one such general law as it appears in Subtitle 1 of Title 6 of the HRS entitled “Provisions common to all counties” and grants specific powers of eminent domain to “[e]ach county.” Thus, the broad authority apparently granted in HRS § 46-1.5(6) is subject to any limitations imposed by HRS § 46-61.
Furthermore, in addition to the “subject to general law” caveat, established principles of statutory construction tell us that “when the legislature expresses things through a list, the court assumes that what is not listed is excluded”.4 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 at 216, 217 (5th ed. 1992) (Sutherland) (“enumeration weakens [the force of the general law] as to things not *70expressed.”). Thus, the enumeration of specific uses in HRS § 46-61 limits the apparent grant of general powers in HRS § 46-1.5(6).
Finally, examination of the legislative history reveals that the apparent grant of broad authority in HRS § 46-1.5(6) has always been limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61. The predecessor to HRS § 46-61 was first enacted on April 17, 1907 and clearly limited the scope of the counties’ powers of eminent domain to “certain public purposes.” Act 67, § 1, 1907 Haw.Sess.Laws 85 (Act 67). Act 67 was entitled “an act to provide for the exercise by the counties of the power of eminent domain for certain public purposes.” It did not contain the “other public uses” clause presently in HRS § 46-61 but contained only an enumerated list of specific uses. Id. Later that month, on April 30, 1907, the City and County of Honolulu was incorporated. Act 118, 1907 Haw.Sess.Laws 200 (Act 118). Act 118 included the predecessor to HRS § 46-1.5(6)5 that gave the board of supervisors the power “to purchase or acquire by condemnation such property as may be needed for public use.” Id., § 23 at 207. A general rule of statutory construction states that “repeals by implication are not favored and that if effect can reasonably be given to two statutes, it is proper to presume that the earlier statute is to remain in force and that the later statute did not repeal it.” Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, 70 Haw. 93, 97, 762 P.2d 169, 172 (1988). Application of this rule leads to the conclusion that the limitation on the counties’ powers of eminent domain imposed by Act 67 remained in force upon the passage of Act 118. Thus, from the outset, the exercise of the City’s power of eminent domain was limited to certain enumerated public purposes. Although both statutes have been amended from time to time over the past eighty years, the relationship between the two statutes has not changed. Therefore, the power of eminent domain referred to in HRS § 46-1.5(6) continues to be limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61.6
III.

The “other public uses” clause in HRS § 46-61 was not intended to grant the counties the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for all unenumerated public uses.

The analysis next turns to the limits on the exercise of eminent domain powers imposed *71by HRS § 46-61. Condominium lease-to-fee conversion is clearly not among the specifically enumerated uses. Therefore, the City’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to Ordinance 91-95 can only be derived from the language in HRS § 46-61 that states that the counties may exercise the power of eminent domain for “other public uses within the purview of section 101-2.” Because HRS § 101-2 places no limits on the public uses for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised,7 under a literal reading of HRS § 46-61, the several counties would have the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for any constitutionally valid public use. Under this interpretation, the enumerated list of specific uses preceding the “other public uses” clause of HRS § 46-61 is entirely unnecessary. Such a result, however, is contrary to the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.
Methven-Abreu v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd., 73 Haw. 385, 392, 834 P.2d 279, 284, recon. denied, 73 Haw. 625, 838 P.2d 860 (1992) (citation omitted). Moreover, HRS §§ 101-13 (1985)8 and 101-14 (1985)9 make it clear that the counties do not. have the virtually unlimited authority to condemn property that a literal reading would indicate, but are limited to purposes that are within the scope of their governmental powers. Thus, HRS § 46-61 is ambiguous. See State v. Sylva, 61 Haw. 385, 388, 605 P.2d 496, 498 (1980) (“When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute an ambiguity exists.”). As a result, extrinsic aids to statutory construction, in particular the legislative history, must be examined in order to ascertain the legislature’s intent.
Prior to 1951, HRS § 46-6110 did not contain the troublesome “other public uses” clause. When initially enacted in 1907, the statute unambiguously limited the uses for which the counties could exercise eminent domain powers. Act 67, § 1, 1907 Haw.Sess. *72Laws 85 (Act 67).11 The list of permissible uses was amended from time to time, see Act 97, § 1, 1913 Haw.Sess.Laws 138 (adding “schools, hospitals, jails, court houses, police and fire stations, city halls, office and other public buildings, cemeteries, parks, playgrounds and ... land from which to obtain earth, gravel, stones and other material for the construction of roads and other public works”); Act 153, § 1, 1943 Haw.Sess.Laws 99 (adding “public off-street parking facilities and accommodations”), but was consistently treated as limiting the counties’ exercise of eminent domain powers to the uses specifically enumerated. In addition, when HRS § 46-61 was first enacted, HRS § 101-212 contained an enumerated list of uses for which eminent domain powers could be exercised by the state. Act 45, § 1, 1893-1896 Haw.Sess.Laws 104 (Act 45).13 The enumerated list in HRS § 101-2 was also amended on occasion. See Act 10, § 1,1909 Haw.Sess. Laws 9 (adding “schools and school recreation grounds”); Act 59, § 1, 1925 Haw.Sess. Laws 76 (adding “landing fields and hangars, and landing harbors for airships”); Act 149, § 1, 1941 Haw.Sess.Laws 2 (adding “sites for triangulation stations and for rights of way for access thereto”).
In 1951, however, significant changes were made to both HRS §§ 46-61 and 101-2. Act 12, §§ 1(b), 5(a), 1951 Haw.Sess.Laws 52, 52-53, 61 (Act 12). The amendments to HRS § 101-2 included removing the enumerated list of public uses and replacing it with the simple provision that “[p]rivate property may be taken for public use.” In section 6 of Act 12, the legislature indicated its intent that the amended provision encompass all valid public uses.14 The legislative history further reinforces the conclusion that HRS § 101-2 places no statutory limitation on the uses for which the state can exercise its power of eminent domain. See dissent at 1218 n. 7.
HRS § 46-61 was also amended by Act 12. The only amendment, however, was the addition of the “other public uses” clause. Significantly, the addition of the “other public uses” clause was not among the amendments proposed in the original bill, but was one of over a dozen changes made to the bill by the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC). Sen. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 177, in 1951 Senate Journal, at 541. The SJC made no specific comment regarding the intended effect of the addition of the “other public uses” clause but merely described all of the changes collec*73tively as “necessary to clarify the bill, more fully accomplish its purpose to achieve uniformity in procedure, and further improve its provisions.” Id. at 542. When the bill was later examined by the House Judiciary Committee, the changes were described as “definitions and some additional provisions as well as some minor changes of verbiage ... which serve to further improve the measure as to form and to better coordinate its provisions with other laws relating to the subject of the [sic] eminent domain.” Given the cursory comments made regarding the SJC’s changes as a whole and the absence of any particular comments regarding the addition of the “other public uses” clause, I cannot accept the contention that the legislature intended to drastically enlarge the scope of the counties’ authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.
In addition to failing to indicate its intent to enlarge the counties’ eminent domain authority, the legislature chose to retain the enumerated list of permissible uses in HRS § 46-61. The retention of the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61, in direct contrast to the elimination of the enumerated list in HRS § 101-2, must be deemed intentional and given special interpretative significance, particularly where the disparate treatment occurred in a single act. See Levy v. Kimball, 51 Haw. 540, 544-45, 465 P.2d 580, 583 (1970) (giving special interpretative significance to differences in words and phraseology between state statute and the federal statute that it followed). The legislature clearly understood that if it wished to remove statutory restrictions on eminent domain powers it could eliminate the enumerated list of permissible uses. See dissent at 1219 n. 14. The legislature, however, chose to retain the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61. The legislature’s failure to eliminate the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61 could “only be explained by an oversight on its part or by its intention to retain the [limitations]. I think the latter. As we stated long ago, courts will not presume an oversight on the part of the legislature where such presumption is avoidable.” Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, 70 Haw. 93, 98, 762 P.2d 169, 173 (1988). Thus, I believe that one must presume that by retaining the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61 the legislature intended to continue to limit the counties’ authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Further evidence of the legislative intent is found in subsequent acts of the legislature. See Gomes v. Campbell, 37 Haw. 252, 257 (1945) (quoting 50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 337) (“[I]n determining the meaning of a statute, [it is proper] to take into consideration subsequent action of the legislature^] ... Indeed, it has been held that if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia what meaning the legislaáture attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.”). In this regard, the act amending HRS § 46-61, Act 96, § 1, 1951 Haw.Sess.Laws 322 (Act 96), enacted a mere 17 days after the “other public uses” clause was added, has great probative force. See Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 326, 770 P.2d 414, 417 (1989) (“[T]he rule that statutes ‘in pari materia’ should be construed together has the greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter passed at the same session of the legislature[.]”). Act 96 added “for flood control” and “for reclamation of swamp lands” as uses for which the counties could exercise the power of eminent domain, and the legislative history indicates that the amendment was intended to “expand the purposes for which private property may be condemned.” Hse. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 637, in 1951 House Journal, at 562. Thus, the legislature clearly felt that the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61 continued to limit the counties’ authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. Moreover, if the “other public uses” clause already encompassed all constitutionally valid public uses, then the amendments of Act 96 were entirely unnecessary. We have stated, however, that “[w]e cannot presume that the legislature intended to enact an unnecessary amendment.” In re Taxes of Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Haw. 45, 60-61, 487 P.2d 1070, *741080 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 907, 92 S.Ct. 938, 30 L.Ed.2d 778, reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 1048, 92 S.Ct. 1308, 31 L.Ed.2d 591 (1972) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the enumerated list of HRS § 46-61 was again amended in 1965. Act 97, §§ 4, 8, 1965 Haw.Sess.Laws 116 (Act 97). In that amendment, “schools, hospitals, ... [and] courthouses” were removed from the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61. As with the addition of permissible uses in 1951, we must presume that the legislature intended the removal of uses from the enumerated list to have an effect on the scope of the counties’ authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.15
Based on the disparate manner in which HRS § 46-61 and 101-2 were amended by Act 12 in 1951, the lack of legislative comment concerning a substantial enlargement of the counties’ powers, and the fact that the legislature continued to both add and delete items from the enumerated list of HRS § 46-61 subsequent to the addition of the “other public uses” clause, I believe it is abundantly clear that the legislature did not intend to authorize the several counties to exercise the power of eminent domain for any and all unenumerated constitutionally valid public uses. Cf. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Haw. 208, 212, 490 P.2d 899, 902 (1971) (holding that “[t]he phrase ‘for any purpose’ in [RLH 1955 § 160—10(e) ] is not all-encompassing, but is restricted to a reasonable construction by [the] context of the entire statute and the purposes of the act”).
IV.

The “other public uses” clause of HRS § 46-61 was intended to account for grants to the counties of the power of eminent domain made in statutory provisions other than HRS § 46-61 itself.

Having concluded that HRS § 46-61 limits the counties’ authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, we must determine what the legislature intended when it amended HRS § 46-61 to include “other public uses within the purview of section 101-2.” It is conceivable that the amendment was inadvertently made and should be given no effect whatsoever. See majority at 22-23 (giving no effect to amendment that substituted “ordinance” for “statute” in the concluding proviso of HRS § 46-1.5(13) (Supp.1992)). If possible, however, we should not interpret a statute “where the result would be the emasculation or deletion of [a provision].” Hawaiian Airlines Inc. v. State Dept. of Taxation, 68 Haw. 391, 398, 716 P.2d 1138, 1143-44 (1986).
The rule of statutory construction of ejusdem generis often applies when a statute contains an enumerated list followed by a general term. “Under this established rule of statutory construction, where words of general description follow the enumeration of certain things, those words are restricted in their meaning to objects of like kind and character with those specified.” Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 64 Haw. 289, 294, 639 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1982). At first glance the rule would appear to be particularly applicable in the instant case as we struggle to give effect to both the enumerated list of uses and the “other public uses” clause, for we have stated that
[t]he purpose of the rule is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class, and the general words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named by the particular words.
State v. Yan, 44 Haw. 370, 376-77, 355 P.2d 25, 29 (1960). The rule only applies, however,
when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words[;] (2) the members of the enumer*75ation constitute a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general term follows the enumeration[;] and (5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.
Id. at 377, 355 P.2d at 29 (quoting 2 Sutherland § 4910 at 400 (3d ed. 1943)). Unfortunately, in the instant case, the uses on the enumerated list do not constitute a discernible class. The rule of ejusdem generis is, therefore, inapplicable. Compare Yan (not applying rule where enumerated list did not constitute a class as it contained only one item) with Jones (applying rule to enumerated list where items on list, “stocks and stock certificates, bonds, [and] notes,” constituted a class of items “usually issued as a means of raising funds” that “become part of the capital structure” of the issuer).
A construction of the statute that would give effect to the “other public uses” clause without rendering the enumerated list meaningless can be found, however, by examining the manner by which the legislature has granted eminent domain powers to the counties since the clause was added to HRS § 46-61 in 1951. As noted above, on some occasions, the legislature has directly amended the enumerated list of HRS § 46-61. See dissent at 1220-21. On other occasions, however, the legislature has granted eminent domain powers for specific uses that were not among the uses on the enumerated list. For example, the legislature gave the counties the power to condemn property “for the purpose of developing, constructing, and providing low and moderate income housing,” HRS § 46 — 15.1(a)(2) (1985 & Supp.1992),16 and for the purpose of providing mass transportation services. HRS § 51-1 (1985).17 In light of the two methods by which the state has granted eminent domain powers to the counties since the addition of the “other public uses” clause to HRS § 46-61, the clause should be interpreted as simply making clear that the several counties can exercise the power of eminent domain for public uses not on the enumerated list of HRS § 46-61 when authorized to do so by other statutes. This construction gives effect to all of the language of the statute, comports with the applicable rules of statutory construction, and, I believe, is the construction that the legislature intended.18
V.

Conclusion

The legislature has neither amended the enumerated list in HRS § 46-61 nor enacted *76any other statutes granting the City the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for condominium lease-to-fee conversions. Because the City’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is derived exclusively from statutory grants of that power, I would hold that the City was without authority to enact Ordinance 91-95. I would, therefore, answer the certified question in the affirmative.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. Article VIII, section 1, of the Hawaii Constitution (emphasis added) provides:

. Article VIII, section 2, of the Hawaii Constitution (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision's executive, legislative and administrative structure and organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and functions.

. I agree with the majority that HRS § 46-62 (1985) "simply incorporates the procedures prescribed by HRS ch. 101.” Majority at 1202 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the language or legislative history of HRS § 46-62 to indicate that it was intended to enlarge or limit the uses' for which the counties could exercise their powers of eminent domain.

. This rule of statutory construction, sometimes referred to as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is somewhat similar to the rule of construction relied on by the majority that "where there is a 'plainly irreconcilable’ conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific will be favored.” Majority at 1202 (quoting Mahiai v. Suwa, 69 Haw. 349, 356, 742 P.2d 359, 366 (1987)). The Mahiai rule, however, only applies when two statutes directly conflict. Compare State v. Spencer, 68 Haw. 622, 725 P.2d 799 (1986) (applying rule where one statute provided that any offense defined outside of the Hawai'i Penal Code (HPC) was a class C felony and another statute, although defining an offense outside of the HPC, specifically provided that the offense was a class B felony) with State v. Pacariem, 67 Haw. 46, 677 P.2d 463 (1984) (not applying rule where one statute provided for special indeterminate terms of imprisonment not to exceed eight years in lieu of other authorized sentences for young adults convicted of class A felonies other than murder and another statute provided for mandatory life sentences for persons convicted of attempted murder). The majority correctly concludes that the Mahiai rule does not apply in the instant case because HRS § 46-1.5(6) and HRS § 46-61 do not directly conflict. The conclusion that the *70Mahiai rule is inapplicable, however, does not mean that the statute with the enumerated list has no effect on the general statute. Such a result would be contrary to the direction in Mahiai that "where the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will he given to both if possible.” 69 Haw. at 356-57, 742 P.2d at 366 (emphasis added). The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies precisely in order to give effect to both statutes.

. When the legislature enacted HR.S § 46-1.5(6) in 1988, it was merely "codifying existing county condemnation powers.” Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 433-88, in 1988 House Journal, at 1006.

. The majority takes issue with the application of the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to determine the scope of the authority granted by HRS § 46-1.5(6). Majority at 1204. The majority’s position is that "[t]he principle of expressio unius est exclusion alterius is- inapplicable to HRS § 46-61 ... because the 'other public uses within the purview of HRS § 101-2' clause is an element of [HRS § 46 — 61]'s ‘list.’ " Id. This position is apparently based on the majority’s belief that HRS § 46-61 includes "any unenu-merated 'other public uses’ consonant with HRS § 101-2.” Id. at 1202. The interpretation of the "other public uses” clause, however, should not determine the applicability of the principle of expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The conclusion that HRS § 46-1.5(6) only grants the counties the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain as set forth in HRS § 46-61 does not in any way preclude the “other public uses" clause from being interpreted as allowing the counties to exercise the power of eminent domain for any constitutionally valid public use. On the other hand, if the apparent broad grant of authority in HRS § 46-1.5(6) were not limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61, the City could derive its authority to condemn for condominium lease-to-fee conversion .exclusively from HRS § 46-1.5(6), and we would never have to consider the proper interpretation of the "other public uses” clause.
In any case, the majority does not contest either that HRS § 46-1.5(6) is expressly "subject to general law” or that HRS § 46-61 is one such general law. Nor does the majority challenge the analysis of the legislative history indicating that the apparent broad grant of authority in HRS § 46-1.5(6) has always been bounded by HRS § 46-61. Therefore, I remain confident with the conclusion that the power of eminent domain referred to in HRS § 46-1.5(6) is limited by the provisions of HRS § 46-61.

.HRS § 101-2 states that “[p]rivate property may be taken for public use.” This provision essentially echoes the constitutional "public use” requirements of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 20 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Moreover, the legislative history clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to place any limits on the exercise of eminent domain powers beyond constitutional requirements:
[Uhis measure provides generally that the power of eminent domain may be exercised for any "public use” instead of, as at present, attempting to define minutely each public use or purpose. Your committee believes that the question as to whether any particular use is a public use so as to permit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the acquisition of property for such purpose, is a judicial one under the [United States] Constitution and the Hawaiian Organic Act (or State Constitution, when Hawai'i becomes a State), and that it is neither necessary nor desirable for the legislature to attempt to define each particular public use.
Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 177, in 1951 Senate Journal, at 541. See also Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 473, in 1951 House Journal, at 527 (committee report on "substantially identical” version of the bill originating in the House of Representatives); Act 12, § 6, 1951 Haw.Sess.Laws 52, 61.

. HRS § 101-13 (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any county deems it advisable or necessary to exercise the right of eminent domain in the furtherance of any governmental power, the proceedings may be instituted as provided in section 101—14[.]

. HRS § 101-14 (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Any county may institute proceedings ... for the condemnation of property within the county for any of the purposes provided in this part which are within the powers granted to the county.

. The essential provisions of HRS § 46-61 were first enacted during the 1907 legislative session. Act 67, § 1, 1907 Haw.Sess.Laws 85. They were subsequently codified in the Revised Laws of Hawai'i (RLH) § 1952 (1925), § 2300 (1935), § 6101 (1945), and § 141-1 (1955). For the sake of convenience, I will refer to all of these provisions as HRS § 46-61.

. Act 67 provided in pertinent part:
Each County shall have the following specific powers:
To take private property for the purpose of establishing, laying out, extending and widening streets, avenues, boulevards, alleys and other public highways and roads, for pumping stations, water works, reservoirs, wells and public squares, and for rights of way for drains, sewers, pipe lines, aqueducts and other conduits for distributing water to the public[.]

. The essential provisions of HRS § 101-2 were first enacted during the 1896 legislative session. Act 45, § 1, 1893-1896 Haw.Sess.Laws 104. They were subsequently codified in the RLH § 808 (1925), § 50 (1935), § 301 (1945), and § 8-2 (1955). For the sake of convenience, I will refer to all of these provisions as HRS § 101-2.

. Act 45 provided in pertinent part:
Private properly may be taken for the following purposes, which are declared to be public uses, to wit: sites for public buildings, fortifications, magazines, arsenals, navy-yards, navy and army stations, light houses, range and beacon lights, cemeteries, quarantine stations, pest-houses, hospitals, dumping places for garbage and refuse material, wharves, docks, piers, dams, reservoirs and bridges, also all necessary land over which to construct roads, canals, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, pipe lines and sewers; also all necessary land for growth and protection of forests, public squares and pleasure grounds; also all necessary land for improving any harbor, river or stream, removing obstructions therefrom, widening, deepening or straightening their channels; also all necessary land from which to obtain earth, gravel, stones, trees, timber, and all necessary material for the construction of any public work.

.Section 6 of Act 12 provided:
The amendment of [HRS § 101-2] by this Act shall not be interpreted as a legislative declaration that the purposes enumerated in said section before amendment are not public purposes, but said section [101-2], as so amended, shall be deemed to include all public purposes specifically mentioned therein before such amendment and any other additional public purposes.

. According to the majority, the amendments of Act 12 gave the counties "the unfettered power to take private property 'for public use.’ ” Majority at 1204. If this were true, the City could condemn property to build a school, hospital, or courthouse. Act 97, however, expressly fixed the responsibility for schools, hospitals, and courts in the state government and rescinded the counties' authority to condemn property for those purposes. Thus, it is clear that the counties do not have the unfettered power to take private property for every public use.

. HRS § 46-15.1(a)(2) (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, any county shall have and may exercise the same powers, subject to applicable limitations, as those granted the housing finance and development corporation pursuant to chapter 20IE insofar as such powers may be reasonably construed to be exercisable by a county for the purpose of developing, constructing, and providing low and moderate income housing.... The powers shall include the power, subject to applicable limitations, to:
* * * * * *
(2) Acquire necessary land by lease, purchase, exchange, or eminent domain [.]

. HRS § 51-1 (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part that "[e]very county of this State may acquire, condemn, purchase, lease, construct, extend, own, maintain, and operate mass transit systems[.]”

. The majority assails this analysis as "pure speculation,” arguing that the reason why the legislature acted in the way that it did is "ultimately unknowable.” Majority at 1204. The very concept of a single legislative intent, however, is a legal fiction that is inherently based on speculation. Whenever we endeavor to ascertain the legislature's intent, we are speculating as to the intentions of the individual legislators and, with the aid of established principles of statutory construction, attempting to adopt an interpretation that most closely approximates those intents. Thus, the fact that the legislature’s reasons for acting are "ultimately unknowable” is not a sound basis for disregarding relevant legislative actions and applicable rules of construction. In fact, it is precisely because the legislature's reasons are ultimately unknowable that rules of construction have developed. The majority's lengthy quotation of Judge Posner reinforces that very point. See majority at 1201 n. 14.
Even accepting that the legislative intent is ultimately unknowable and that the canons of statutory construction discussed in the text “pull[] in opposite directions,” id., there are additional canons particularly applicable to legislative grants of eminent domain powers to local governments which "establish presumptions, based on substantive policy, for resolving indeterminate statutory cases.” Id. First, statutes granting power to municipal corporations are interpreted strictly against the municipal corpo*76rations. 3 Sutherland § 64.02 at 260; 2 McQuillin § 10.18a at 1048 (3d ed. 1988). In addition, statutes granting the power of eminent domain are interpreted strictly against the grantee. 3 Sutherland § 64.06 at 284-85; 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.213[1] at 3-85 (3d ed. 1993); 11 McQuillin § 32.19 at 343. In conjunction, these principles reflect a strong policy against lightly allowing local governmental bodies to exercise the inherently sovereign power of eminent domain to divest individuals of their property. Moreover, if we cannot be certain whether the legislature intended to delegate eminent domain powers, we are well-advised to err against delegation: for if we erroneously allow the City to exercise powers it is not supposed to have, individuals will be wrongfully deprived of their property; whereas, if we erroneously prevent the City from exercising powers it is supposed to have, the result will merely be a delay until the legislature can enact a clearer statute. Therefore, where there is any doubt as to the scope of the delegation of eminent domain powers to the counties, we should adopt the narrowest interpretation that is reasonable.