Court Opinion

ID: 9852201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:35.346896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.227592
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. Under the particular facts of this case, the act of trying Hughes with Shaw, who was the victim of Hughes’s crime of pointing a firearm, as his co-defendant was inherently prejudicial.
While it is true criminal defendants who are jointly tried are not entitled to separate trials as a matter of right,10 a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial free from bias and confusion. As the majority states, a severance should be granted only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of a co-defendant or prevent the jury from, making a reliable judgment about a co-defendant’s guilt. State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 523 S.E.2d 173 (1999) (emphasis added). Allowing Hughes to be tried with his victim as his co-defendant seriously hampered the jury’s ability to make a *563reliable judgment about Hughes’s guilt for the charge of pointing a firearm. Accordingly, I would hold the PCR court erred by finding counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the charges against Hughes and for failing to make a motion to sever Hughes’s trial from his victim/co-defendant’s trial.
TOAL, C.J., concurs.

. State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 523 S.E.2d 173 (1999).