Court Opinion

ID: 9838906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 18:00:38.437076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:53.111064
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20163     Document: 00516888044        Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/08/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                               ____________                                     Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                No. 22-20163                          September 8, 2023
                               ____________                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                              Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Margil Reyna, Jr.,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:15-CR-564-2
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen Higginson, Circuit Judge:
         Reyna appeals the district court’s written judgment imposing the
   “standard” conditions of supervised release. Because the district court sat-
   isfied the oral pronouncement requirement and its written judgment did not
   conflict with its oral pronouncement, we AFFIRM.
                                        I.
         Margil Reyna, Jr., pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
   conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise. Reyna waived the
   preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined
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                                     No. 22-20163

   that a PSR was not necessary. The district court proceeded to sentencing
   directly after taking Reyna’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
   agreement, Reyna was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and 5 years
   of supervised release. As part of his supervised release term, the district court
   stated that Reyna was “subject to the standard conditions.” Reyna’s written
   judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision
   listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Reyna timely
   appealed.
                                          II.
          Reyna challenges solely the district court’s imposition of the standard
   conditions of supervised release. Reyna argues that the list of fifteen
   “standard” conditions of supervised release in his written judgment should
   be vacated because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing. The
   government contends that no such conflict exists between the oral
   pronouncement and the written judgment because the district court satisfied
   the pronouncement requirement by orally adopting the district’s standing
   order through its shorthand reference.
          As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the standard of review.
   In United States v. Martinez, our court explained that when “a defendant
   objects to a condition of supervised release for the first time on appeal, the
   standard of review depends on whether he had an opportunity to object
   before the district court.” 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Alexander
   Martinez”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The
   opportunity to object exists–and thus a district court satisfies the
   pronouncement requirement–when the court notifies the defendant at
   sentencing that conditions are being imposed.” Id. at 367 (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). If the defendant had the opportunity to object,
   we review for plain error; however, if the defendant did not, we review for

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   abuse of discretion. See id. at 366. Therefore, we cannot resolve the
   disagreement as to the appropriate standard of review until we determine
   whether the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement.
                                        III.
          Due process requires that the district court orally announce any
   conditions for supervised release that are not mandatory under 18 U.S.C. §
   3583(d), see United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en
   banc); however, “oral pronouncement does not mean that the sentencing
   court must recite the conditions word-for-word.” United States v. Grogan,
   977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). To satisfy the oral pronouncement
   requirement, the district court may, among other things, reference a list of
   recommended supervised release conditions from a court-wide or judge-
   specific standing order. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-63 & n.5.
          Since our court’s en banc decision in Diggles in 2020, we have
   elaborated on the notice required to comply with a defendant’s due process
   rights. For example, in United States v. Vargas, we affirmed a district court’s
   imposition of the standard conditions listed in a court-wide standing order
   where the court stated that “the Court’s mandatory, standard, and special
   conditions to be outlined momentarily” would be imposed. 23 F.4th 526, 527
   (5th Cir. 2022). We affirmed on the grounds that, “it should have been clear
   to defense counsel in this case that the ‘standard’ conditions of supervised
   release mentioned by the sentencing judge were the same standard
   conditions referenced in Vargas’s PSR and set forth in the Western District’s
   standing order.” Id.
          After briefing closed in this case, our court issued United States v.
   Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023). In Baez-Adriano, the district
   court orally imposed “[t]he standard and mandatory conditions of
   supervision” at the sentencing hearing, despite the PSR listing no conditions

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   of supervised release. Id. at 296. The written judgment contained the
   standard and mandatory conditions as set forth in the Western District of
   Texas’s standing order. Id. at 297. Baez-Adriano appealed and argued that
   the district court did not properly pronounce at sentencing the standard and
   mandatory conditions. Id.
          Our court held, “[I]f the conditions imposed in the written judgment
   match those in the standing order, a district court need only orally reference
   the standard conditions to satisfy the pronouncement requirement. In that
   instance, a simple reference to ‘standard conditions’ is sufficient.” Id. at 301.
   Our court elaborated, “[W]hen the [district] court imposes standard
   conditions of supervised release sourced from a standing order, the PSR’s
   inclusion or exclusion of said conditions is irrelevant.” Id. Accordingly, our
   court held that the district court satisfied the pronouncement requirement.
   Id. at 301, 304 (affirming the judgment, but urging that sentencing judges
   highlight standard conditions as a best practice).
          Here, like in Baez-Adriano, the district court made a shorthand
   reference to the “standard” conditions of supervised release when imposing
   its sentence. The written judgment in both cases mirrored the standard
   conditions as listed in that district’s standing order, but neither defendant
   had the benefit of a PSR containing the “standard” terms of supervised
   release.
          In supplemental letter briefing to this court, Reyna concedes some
   similarity between his case and Baez-Adriano; however, he argues that the
   expedited sentencing in his case and the absence of a PSR indicate that the
   oral pronouncement requirement was not met. The distinction put forth by
   Reyna—the absence of a PSR in Reyna’s case as compared to a PSR silent on
   the terms of supervised release in Baez-Adriano’s case—is irrelevant. As our
   court explained in Baez-Adriano, the district “court’s reference to and oral

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   imposition of the court-wide standard conditions . . . is dispositive.” 74 F.4th
   at 301. If whether a PSR includes the standard conditions is “irrelevant”
   where the district “court imposes standard conditions of supervised release
   sourced from a standing order,” id., it follows that the absence of a PSR is
   irrelevant in that same context. In fact, Reyna’s case may be simpler to
   resolve than Baez-Adriano’s as Reyna could not have been under the
   misimpression that the district’s “standard” conditions of supervised
   release would not be imposed because they were not contained in his PSR.
          Reyna    also   contends    that    the   expedited    sentencing—held
   immediately after re-arraignment—left “little opportunity to discuss” the
   implications of the various aspects of the sentencing hearing. The district
   court docket reflects that on March 9, 2023, the district court set the re-
   arraignment and sentencing hearing to be held simultaneously on March 14,
   2023. While this schedule was compressed, there is no indication in the
   record or in the briefing that trial counsel felt unprepared to handle the
   sentencing hearing or was unable to communicate with his client. Moreover,
   the docket reveals no objection by either party to this schedule.
          The Southern District of Texas’s standing order provided advance
   notice of the standard conditions of supervised release, which the district
   court then orally adopted via shorthand reference at the sentencing hearing.
   The written judgment listed the standard conditions of supervised release
   contained in the district’s standing order. Based on our precedent, the
   district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement. Baez-Adriano,
   74 F.4th at 301. Because Reyna did not object during the sentencing hearing,
   plain-error review applies. See Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 366.
          Reyna, who argues that our review is for abuse of discretion, did not
   brief the four plain-error prongs. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689

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   F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).
          We discern no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the
   standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing
   order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment.
   Furthermore, even if we assume the first three prongs of the plain-error test,
   Reyna has not met his burden in demonstrating that any claimed error
   affected “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
   See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th
   Cir. 2012).
          AFFIRMED.

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