Court Opinion

ID: 9402142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:05:02.552829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.858193
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 105
          SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                          No.   CV-23-358

                                    Opinion Delivered:   June 15, 2023

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION; JACOB OLIVA, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS       APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION;             COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
RANDY HENDERSON, JEFF WOOD,         FOURTH DIVISION
ADRIENNE WOODS, STEVE               [NO. 60CV-23-3267]
SUTTON, O. FITZGERALD HILL,
OUIDA NEWTON, SARAH MOORE,          HONORABLE HERBERT WRIGHT,
KATHY MCFETRIDGE, AND LISA          JUDGE
HUNTER, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE
ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION; FRIENDSHIP
EDUCATION FOUNDATION; AND
THE MARVELL-ELAINE SCHOOL
DISTRICT
                    APPELLANTS

V.

DORIS IVY JACKSON; LAVERNE
SIMS; JESSELIA MAPLES;
DIAMACIOUS SIMS; DARRYL
HARRIS; SYLVIA MOORE;
DANIELLE WRIGHT; DERASHAUN
MCGHEE; VIVIAN DAVIS; JAMES
CARRUTH; IOLA HOSKINS;
STEVEN GRAPPE; VERONICA
MCCLANE; AND CITIZENS FOR
ARKANSAS PUBLIC EDUCATION
AND STUDENTS (CAPES), A BALLOT
QUESTION COMMITTEE
                       APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED;
                                 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
                                 ORDER VACATED.

              COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice
       Appellants, the Arkansas Department of Education (“the Department”); Jacob Oliva, in

his official capacity as Arkansas Secretary of Education; Randy Henderson, Jeff Wood, Adrienne

Woods, Steve Sutton, O. Fitzgerald Hill, Ouida Newton, Sarah Moore, Kathy McFetridge,

and Lisa Hunter, in their official capacities as members of the Arkansas State Board of Education

(collectively, “the State appellants”); the Friendship Education Foundation; and the Marvell-

Elaine School District (“MESD”) appeal from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order

granting a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in favor of appellees Doris Ivy Jackson,

Laverne Sims, Jesselia Maples, Diamacious Sims, Darryl Harris, Sylvia Moore, Danielle Wright,

DeraShaun McGhee, Vivian Davis, James Carruth, Iola Hoskins, Steven Grappe, Veronica

McClane, and Citizens for Arkansas Public Education and Students (“CAPES”),1 a ballot-

question committee, in their lawsuit challenging the validity of the emergency clause in Act

237 of 2023 (“the LEARNS Act”). For reversal, appellants argue that the circuit court erred

in granting appellees’ motion for injunctive relief. We reverse the circuit court’s order, vacate

the TRO, and remand to the circuit court.

       On February 23, 2023, the Arkansas Senate voted to pass the LEARNS Act, which was

then Senate Bill 294. On March 2, 2023, the Arkansas House of Representatives voted to pass

the LEARNS Act with an amendment. The Senate voted to concur in the House amendment

to SB294 on March 7, 2023. The LEARNS Act was then sent to Governor Sarah Huckabee

Sanders, who signed it into law on March 8. Section 73 of the LEARNS Act contained an

emergency clause, which applied to specified parts of the omnibus act and caused certain

provisions to become effective as of the date of the Governor’s approval.

       1
       CAPES, which filed its statement of organization on April 10, 2023, was formed to repeal
the LEARNS Act through a citizen-initiated referendum petition.

                                               2
       During the 2020–2021 and 2021–2022 school years, the MESD was granted a waiver

by the Arkansas State Board of Education (“Board”) to avoid consolidation despite its

enrollment of less than the state-designated minimum of 350 students. In November 2022, the

Board voted to classify the MESD as in need of Level 5-Intensive support pursuant to Ark.

Code Ann. § 6-15-2915 (Repl. 2021). The Board then denied the MESD’s request for a

minimum-school-size waiver in December 2022. On April 13, 2023, the Board voted to take

over the MESD and directed Jacob Oliva, as the Secretary of Education, to act as the district’s

school board. The Board also voted to allow the MESD to remain open without consolidating

and instructed Oliva to explore the option of entering into a transformation contract with a

charter-school management company, as authorized under section 14 of the LEARNS Act.

Following a meeting on May 5, 2023, the Board voted to direct Oliva to execute a contract

with the Friendship Education Foundation to oversee management of the MESD.

       On May 8, 2023, appellees, who are parents, grandparents, or employees of the MESD,

residents of the Marvell area, and/or members of CAPES, filed a complaint against appellants

seeking a declaratory judgment ruling that the LEARNS Act’s emergency clause was invalid

and ineffective. Appellees also filed a motion for a TRO or, alternatively, a motion for

preliminary injunction. Appellees filed an amended complaint on May 16, 2023. Appellees

claimed that appellants had committed ultra vires, illegal, and unconstitutional acts by entering

into the transformation contract and expending funds under the LEARNS Act when it was not

yet in effect. The complaint included claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, Ark.

Code Ann. §§ 25-15-101 et seq. (Repl. 2014 & Supp. 2021), and the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-111-101 et seq. (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2021), as well as

for an illegal exaction under article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution. Appellees

alleged three defects with the LEARNS Act’s emergency clause. First, appellees asserted that

                                               3
the General Assembly failed to vote by separate roll call on the emergency clause as required by

article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. Second, appellees claimed that section 73(a) of

the LEARNS Act, which is the portion of the emergency clause that relates to the creation of

transformation contracts, is invalid and ineffective because it fails to state facts sufficient to

establish an emergency pursuant to article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. Third,

appellees alleged that the emergency clause is invalid and ineffective because it attempts to

declare an emergency as to only some provisions in the Act rather than the Act as a whole.

       Appellees also filed a first amended motion for TRO or, alternatively, for a preliminary

injunction on May 16, 2023. The motion alleged that appellees would suffer irreparable harm

if appellants continued to implement the LEARNS Act despite its invalid emergency clause

because (1) the MESD would be obligated to make two $25,000 payments in May and June

2023 to the Friendship Education Foundation under the transformation contract, which would

then diminish the funds available to the students; (2) the immediate execution of the

transformation contract would deprive appellees and other residents of the district the

opportunity to provide feedback regarding the contract; (3) based on statements by Oliva, the

district is also at risk of being involuntarily consolidated, dissolved, or divided in retaliation for

appellees bringing the lawsuit; and (4) CAPES and certain individual appellees are pursuing a

citizen-initiated repeal of the LEARNS Act via a referendum petition, and the validity or

invalidity of the emergency clause will impact their effort to gather signatures and determine

whether the measure would be in effect pending a vote if a timely referendum petition is filed.

Attached to the appellees’ motion were affidavits by two of the plaintiffs, in addition to the

transformation contract approved by the Board.

       On May 25, 2023, appellees filed a second motion for a TRO or, alternatively, a

preliminary injunction. This motion asserted that the MESD had recently issued letters to all

                                                  4
personnel under one-year contracts that their employment contracts were not being renewed

for the 2023–2024 school year due to the transformation contract. Two appellees, Iola Hoskins

and Danielle Wright, received this letter, and were informed that they could apply for a position

at the resulting transformation campus. Appellees claimed that the loss of a majority of high-

quality teachers and support staff constituted additional evidence of irreparable harm from the

premature and illegal application of the LEARNS Act. In the absence of the Act, appellees

argued that Arkansas law would have required compliance with certain notice and hearing

provisions before employment contracts were not renewed.

       The State appellants filed a response to appellees’ motion for a TRO or preliminary

injunction on May 26, 2023. They argued that appellees could not show a likelihood of success

on the merits because the LEARNS Act and its emergency clause were passed by separate roll

call as confirmed in the Senate and House Journals, which are the only official voting records.

Appellants also claimed that the emergency clause contained sufficient supporting facts and that

there was no requirement that the emergency clause apply to the entire Act. In addition,

appellants claimed that appellees had not demonstrated irreparable harm because the suit would

delay the implementation of the Act for only two months, at most. Appellants further argued

that loss of employment and money damages do not qualify as irreparable harm and that the

granting of injunctive relief would “sow chaos and impose irreparable harm on students, parents,

teachers, the MESD, and the State.” With regard to CAPES’s claim of irreparable harm,

appellants asserted that an injunction would have no effect on CAPES’s efforts to collect

signatures and file a proper referendum petition. The Friendship Education Foundation filed a

response arguing that appellees were not entitled to injunctive relief for the reasons stated by

the State appellants, and the MESD also filed a notice that it was adopting the State’s response

to appellees’ motion.

                                               5
       On May 26, 2023, the circuit court entered an order granting appellees’ motion for a

temporary restraining order until a scheduled hearing on June 20, 2023. The court found that

appellees had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their complaint for the reasons

argued in their motion. In addition, the court found that appellees had established that they

would be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction based on the potential illegal

exactions, the nonrenewal of the MESD’s employee contracts and the impact on their ability

to appeal the nonrenewal notices, the adverse effects related to the loss of employment on the

school employees and the community, the denial of an opportunity for appellees to participate

in shaping the transformation contract, and the denial of the CAPES appellees’ right to use the

referendum-petition process to delay or stop the LEARNS Act from going into effect.

Appellants filed timely notices of appeal from the order.

       On May 30, 2023, the State appellants filed an emergency motion to stay the circuit

court’s order pending their appeal. The MESD also requested expedited briefing on appeal. In

an order entered on June 2, 2023, we granted the request for expedited briefing but denied

appellants’ request for a stay. We also granted a motion by Americans for Prosperity Foundation

and yes.every.kid foundation to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants. Briefing is

complete, and the case is now before us for decision.

       On appeal, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion for

a TRO. The State appellants specifically contend that appellees cannot demonstrate a likelihood

of success because (1) this case presents a political question that this court may not decide, (2)

sovereign immunity requires dismissal of the suit, and (3) the emergency clause is valid. The

State appellants further argue that appellees have failed to establish irreparable harm and that the

restraining order causes, rather than prevents, such harm. Finally, the State appellants contend

that the TRO is facially invalid because it exceeds the time period permitted by Ark. R. Civ.

                                                 6
P. 65 and is too broad in scope. The MESD joins in the arguments made in the brief of the

State appellants, while the Friendship Education Foundation has filed a separate brief primarily

agreeing with the arguments made by the State appellants as to likelihood of success and

irreparable harm.

       We have held that an injunction is an extraordinary right reserved for extraordinary

circumstances. Muntiqim v. Hobbs, 2017 Ark. 97, 514 S.W.3d 464. In determining whether to

issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 65,

the circuit court must consider two things: (1) whether irreparable harm will result in the

absence of an injunction or restraining order and (2) whether the moving party has

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Thurston v. Safe Surgery Ark., 2021 Ark. 55,

619 S.W.3d 1; Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 226 S.W.3d 800 (2006). This court will

not reverse the circuit court’s decision on whether to grant a preliminary injunction unless it is

an abuse of discretion. Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763. We will

not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the circuit

court exceeded its discretion in granting the injunction. Baptist Health, supra.

       We have stated that preventing irreparable harm is “the touchstone of injunctive relief.”

Thurston v. Safe Surgery Ark., 2021 Ark. 55, at 19, 619 S.W.3d 1, 13. Thus, regardless of whether

the moving party has established a likelihood of success, irreparable harm must be shown before

the circuit court may grant injunctive relief. Wilson v. Pulaski Ass’n of Classroom Teachers, 330

Ark. 298, 954 S.W.2d 221 (1997). Because we agree with appellants that appellees have failed

to demonstrate irreparable harm and reverse on this basis, any discussion of the parties’

arguments regarding likelihood of success would be advisory. See Our Community, Our Dollars

v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (stating that in light of our decision to reverse and

remand on one point, any opinion on the remaining issues would be purely advisory). For the

                                                7
same reason, we also do not address appellants’ arguments regarding the facial validity of the

TRO.

       Appellees’ allegations of irreparable harm can be summarized as follows: (1) potential

illegal exactions from payments made by MESD to the Friendship Education Foundation

pursuant to the transformation contract that would diminish the district’s remaining funds; (2)

the nonrenewal of the MESD’s teacher and school-employee contracts, the impact on their

ability to appeal the nonrenewal notices, and the adverse effects flowing from the loss of

employment; (3) the risk of MESD being involuntarily consolidated, dissolved, or divided in

retaliation for appellees’ bringing the lawsuit; (4) the denial of an opportunity for appellees and

other MESD residents to participate in and provide feedback on the transformation contract;

and (5) the impairment of the CAPES appellees’ right to pursue a citizen-initiated repeal of the

LEARNS Act via a referendum petition.

       We have repeatedly held that harm is normally considered irreparable only when it

cannot be adequately compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law. E.g.,

Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, supra; Thurston v. Safe Surgery Ark., supra; Manila Sch. Dist. No.

15 v. Wagner, 356 Ark. 149, 148 S.W.3d 244 (2004). Appellees’ claims regarding the

expenditure of funds under the transformation contract are clearly monetary in nature and are

therefore not considered irreparable. The alleged harm from the nonrenewal of the employment

contracts and other adverse effects related to these nonrenewals can also be adequately

compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law. See Wagner, supra (holding that

the loss of a job and possible relocation are present in virtually every employment-termination

case and can be recouped in a court of law by a favorable judgment and an award of money

damages). In addition, appellees’ argument that MESD risks being consolidated, dissolved, or

divided in retaliation for this lawsuit is entirely speculative and thus does not support a finding

                                                 8
of irreparable harm. See AJ&K Operating Co. v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2004)

(stating the fear about potential future action did not constitute irreparable harm). With regard

to appellees’ claim that they were deprived of an opportunity to provide feedback on the

transformation contract due to its immediate execution, appellees have cited no authority that

gives them this right. Furthermore, the Board’s meeting wherein it approved the transformation

contract was open to the public. Finally, the CAPES appellees’ claim that their constitutional

right of referendum would be impaired is also without merit, as their ability to collect signatures

and otherwise pursue their referendum petition on the LEARNS Act is not affected by the

absence of a restraining order. Accordingly, because appellees failed to meet their burden of

proving irreparable harm, the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the motion for a

TRO. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order, vacate the TRO, and remand to the

circuit court.

       Reversed and remanded; temporary restraining order vacated.

       Mandate to issue immediately.

       BAKER, WOOD, WOMACK, and WEBB, JJ., concur.

       KEMP, C.J., and WYNNE, J., dissent.

       KAREN R. BAKER, Justice, concurring. While I concur in the decision to reverse

and remand, I write separately to address the claims that seek to control the actions of the State.

Until Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 535 S.W.3d 616, is

overruled, suit against the State is barred. As I explained in my dissent in Arkansas Oil & Gas

Commission v. Hurd, 2018 Ark. 397, at 18–19, 564 S.W.3d 248, 258–59,

       In Andrews, the court held that “never means never,” therefore . . . suit is barred
       based on the broad language in Andrews . . . because Andrews did not identify
       exceptions, exemptions or the like. Again, the State may never be sued.

       ....

                                                9
       Andrews held that the State may never be made a defendant in any of her own
       courts. Accordingly, despite the majority’s attempt to narrow Andrews, . . . State
       conduct is at issue, and Andrews bars suit.

Therefore, any claims that seek to control the actions of the State are barred pursuant to Andrews.

       With respect to any remaining claims that do not implicate sovereign immunity, I agree

with the majority’s holding that the appellees failed to demonstrate that irreparable harm will

result in the absence of the TRO. Accordingly, I agree that the circuit court abused its

discretion in granting the motion for TRO.

       For the reasons stated in my discussion above, I concur with the result reached by the

majority and would reverse and remand.

       RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, concurring. I join the majority opinion’s reversal

because I agree with its conclusion that appellees failed to establish irreparable harm. I write

separately because the appellees fail the second prong of our analysis in that they are unlikely to

succeed on the merits of each of their three claims. I would reverse the temporary restraining

order for this reason as well.

       First, appellees argue that the emergency clause is invalid because they allege there was

not a separate roll-call vote. This issue involves deciding whether the official legislative journal

conflicts with videos of the proceedings. The answer will depend on which is the official vote

and record. But we cannot resolve this issue without exceeding our judicial role by answering

a political question. The Arkansas Constitution gives each house authority to determine its own

rules and procedures.2 It specifically requires the houses to keep and publish journals of their

       2
        Ark. Const. art. 5, § 12.

                                                10
proceedings.3 Answering a political question about whether video has replaced the

constitutional journal entries and how the legislature conducts its vote proceedings would

violate separation of powers. We cannot usurp the legislative branch’s core functions or threaten

its independent institutional integrity.4 The only way to decide this issue would be to pass

judgment on the legislative branch’s internal procedural method of recording votes. This is not

our role.

        Like the eight other state courts that have considered challenges based on the legality of

internal legislative processes, we should conclude that this issue presents a nonjusticiable political

question.5 For example, New Hampshire has declined to weigh in on a constitutional challenge

to the validity of the method to enact a statute because “[t]he authority to adopt procedural

rules for passing legislation is demonstrably committed to the legislative branch.” 6 The

Washington Supreme Court has declined to interfere with the internal proceedings of a

legislative house on a point of order.7 The Alabama Supreme Court held the legislature could

rely on its own rules and procedures despite a constitutional challenge.8 The Maryland Supreme

        3
        Id.
        4
         Ark. Const. art. 4; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Ark. State Bd. of Elec. Comm’rs
v. Pulaski Cty. Elec. Comm’n, 2014 Ark. 236, 437 S.W.3d 80.
        5
        See, e.g., Sumner v. New Hampshire Sec’y of State, 136 A.3d 101, 106 (N.H. 2016); Brown v.
Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 722 (2009); Jefferson Cty. Comm’n v. Edwards, 32 So. 3d 572, 584 (Ala.
2009); Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (Md. 2009); Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 433 (Vt.
2001); Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Philpot v. Haviland, 880
S.W.2d 550, 552 (Ky. 1994); Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 705 (Pa. 1977).
        6
        New Hampshire Secretary of State, 136 A.3d at 106.
        7
        Brown, 165 Wash. 2d at 722.
        8
        Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 32 So. 3d at 584.

                                                   11
Court held that judicial intrusion into a legislative internal procedural issue would represent a

“fail[ure] to respect a coordinate branch of government” and found the claim nonjusticiable. 9

The Vermont Supreme Court decided that a challenge to a law whose passage involved approval

by legislators allegedly ineligible to vote on a bill was a nonjusticiable political question.10 The

Tennessee Court of Appeals refused to hear an issue that bills were allegedly products of

prohibited, secret legislative meetings because the question of when to close sessions was a

“purely political question.”11 Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to step into

legislative procedural matters; so too did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it held that “a

challenge to the Legislature’s exercise of power which the Constitution commits exclusively to

the Legislature presents a nonjusticiable ‘political question.’” 12 I thus find that Arkansas would

decline to answer a political question that violates separation of powers, and so the appellees

would be unlikely to succeed on the merits of this issue.13

       9
        Smigiel, 978 A.2d at 701.
       10
           Brady, 790 A.2d at 433.
       11
           Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d at 773.
       12
           Philpot, 880 S.W.2d at 552 (Ky. 1994); Sweeney, 375 A.2d at 705.
       13
         Additionally, appellees’ textualist argument relying on Board of Trustees v. Andrews, 2018
Ark. 12, was at their peril. From the onset of this case, plaintiffs argued Andrews to support their
argument under article 5, section 1. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of Andrews and the
avalanche of caselaw that ensued. Appellees argue Andrews for the proposition that this court will
ignore precedent when a careful reading of Andrews will show that it vacated intervening caselaw
and returned to prior precedent. But also, Andrews is substantively about the text of article 5, section
20 that the “state can never be made a defendant in her courts.” Plaintiffs bringing declaratory
judgment claims against the state and raising textualist arguments should use caution when citing
Andrews for their support without recognizing and addressing the inherent contradiction that they
are seeking to make the state a defendant.

                                                  12
       Next, the appellees challenge the emergency clause because, they contend, it fails to

state an emergency that is necessary for the “preservation of the public peace, health and safety.”

Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1. Our court has held that “if reasonable people might disagree about

whether the enunciated fact states an emergency, the clause will be upheld.” 14 The Act’s

emergency clause explained that educational services to children impacts the public peace,

health, and safety of Arkansas. Of that, no one can disagree. The legislature explained that the

Act’s extensive reforms would require schools and the Department of Education to implement

new rules, policies, and procedures before the 2023-2024 school year begins. Thus, the

emergency clause provides specific facts explaining the emergency and how it impacts the

“preservation of public peace, health and safety”—here, student learning.

       The Act’s emergency clause differs from the one in Safe Surgery, which stated an

emergency existed for implementation of a new set of rules for the ballot-initiative or

referendum process but didn’t explain why the prior rules couldn’t continue or how the rule

changes impacted public peace, health, or safety. 15 We should give substantial deference to the

legislature’s determination of whether an emergency exists when it gives some explanation

which was the original meaning behind the language in Amendment 7. 16 Applying that

deference here, I conclude the appellees are unlikely to succeed on the claim that the emergency

clause fails to sufficiently state an emergency.

       14
          Burroughs v. Ingram, 319 Ark. 530, 533, 893 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1995) (looking to the
original meaning for the adoption of Amendment 7, the court found that it was to prevent the
practice of attaching an emergency clause to almost every law, but to require the General Assembly
note facts constituting the emergency in the particular statute).
        15
          See Safe Surgery Ark. v. Thurston, 2019 Ark. 403, 591 S.W.3d 293 (Wood, J., concurring).
       16
         Id.; see also Burroughs, 319 Ark. at 530, 893 S.W.2d at 210.

                                                   13
       Last, appellees argue that either all of an act or none of an act must be declared an

emergency. Their interpretation of the constitution reads a requirement into the constitution

that does not exist. Therefore, I also find its argument unlikely to succeed on the merits.

       Accordingly, while I join the majority opinion, I would also reverse and vacate the

circuit court’s temporary restraining order because appellees are unlikely to succeed on the

merits of each of their claims.

       SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. I join the majority’s analysis of the issue

of irreparable harm. I write separately to address additional, relevant issues and to respond to

the dissent. The majority opinion is correct: the appellees will not suffer any irreparable harm

absent the temporary restraining order, and, therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion. 1

But in my opinion, the appellees have no chance of succeeding on the merits, which is the

strongest argument in favor of reversal.

                                      I. Sovereign Immunity

       First and foremost, sovereign immunity bars nearly the entirety of the appellees’ lawsuit.

Absent an express constitutional provision to the contrary, the State shall never be a defendant

in any of its courts.2 One of these express constitutional provisions, however, is the provision

authorizing illegal-exaction lawsuits against the State.3 Thus, except for the narrowly described

illegal-exaction claim about specific payments from the State to the Marvell-Elaine School

       1
        Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 7–8, 643 S.W.3d 763, 769.
       2
      Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327
(Womack, J. dissenting).
       3
      Ark. Const., art. 16, § 13; see also Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, at 10, 643 S.W.3d 5,
11 (Womack, J., concurring).

                                                14
District budget for the Friendship Education Foundation, sovereign immunity bars the

appellees’ claims against the State.4

                                        II. Success on the Merits

       Sovereign immunity notwithstanding, the appellees still fail to show any likelihood of

success on the merits. This court gives the “[l]anguage of a constitutional provision . . . its

obvious and common meaning.”5 To enact an emergency clause, the constitution requires that

“two-thirds of all the members elected to each house . . . shall vote upon separate roll call in

favor.”6 The constitution separately dictates the process by requiring that a vote on the passage

of a bill is conducted when “the vote be taken by yeas and nays; the names of the persons voting

for and against the same be entered on the journal; and a majority of each house be recorded

thereon as voting in its favor.”7 Thus, the journals of each chamber serve as the only official

record of the General Assembly’s votes.8

       The appellees, however, would have this court ignore this clear constitutional command.

Instead, they ask us to consider only the video recordings of each session, where the legislators

either announce their votes or enter them via computer. But as explained, this is not what

constitutes the official votes of legislators on a bill, and video recordings are not the official

record of the General Assembly.9 Absent a future amendment to the constitution, only the

       4
        But because I would hold that the LEARNS Act was constitutionally enacted, the illegal-
exaction claim fails.
       5
        Zook v. Martin, 2018 Ark. 293, at 4, 557 S.W.3d 880, 883.
       6
        Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1.
       7
        Id. § 22.
       8
       Id.; see also Niven v. Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 14 of Jefferson Cnty., 132 Ark. 240, 242, 200
S.W. 997, 997 (1918) (recognizing that “the journal entry [is] the sole evidence of the
proceedings”).
       9
        Ark. Const. art. 5, § 22.
                                                   15
official journal of each legislative body can prove or disprove the vote on a bill. 10 The journals

of both the House of Representatives and the Senate show the LEARNS Act received two

separate votes: one on the substance of the bill and one on the emergency clause. As a result,

the process by which the General Assembly passed the LEARNS Act was undoubtedly

constitutional, and it was effective upon the various effective dates contemplated therein. 11 Yet,

inexplicably, the dissent, which cites the Senate Journal signed by the Secretary of the Senate,

as well as affidavits by the Senate Chief Counsel and the House Parliamentarian, reaches the

conclusion that no separate vote occurred.

         It seems the dissent, the circuit court, and the appellees have all confused the issue of

separate votes with simultaneous votes. Both the House and the Senate have established internal

processes for voting on bills and their emergency clauses simultaneously, unless requested

otherwise by a member.12 They each then record those simultaneous but separate votes in their

respective journals.       Nothing in our constitution prohibits the House and Senate from

conducting simultaneous votes and adopting their own internal processes. To the contrary, the

constitution explicitly provides that “[e]ach house shall have the power to determine the rules

of its proceedings[,] . . . [and] [e]ach house shall keep a journal of its proceedings.” 13 Any

attempt by the circuit court or this court to dictate the internal procedures of the House and

         10
          Id.
         11
          Id. §§ 1 & 22.
         12
              Affidavits of House Parliamentarian, Finos B. Jonson, and Senate Chief Counsel, Phillip
Treat.
         13
          Ark. Const. art 5, § 12.

                                                   16
Senate would constitute an unconstitutional judicial encroachment on the legislative branch

and violate the principle of separation of powers.14

                                       III. Political Question

       Separate from the issues regarding the process of adopting the emergency clause is an

argument regarding its substance and content. The circuit court determined that the General

Assembly’s findings to support the emergency clause were insufficient. Such a determination,

however, is beyond the judicial branch’s competency.15 The constitution provides “that a

measure shall become effective without delay” “[i]f it shall be necessary for the preservation of

the public peace, health and safety[.]”16 When is a measure necessary for the preservation of

the public peace, health, and safety? That is a question of policy solely for the General Assembly

to decide—not this court or any other court.17

       Wresting power from the General Assembly to determine what constitutes an

emergency is not only unconstitutional,18 but also, it is essentially saying that courts alone possess

the capacity of reasonable interpretation—not the 78 duly elected men and women of the

Arkansas House of Representative who voted for the bill, not the 25 duly elected men and

women of the Arkansas Senate who voted for the bill.19

       14
         Ark. Const. art. 4, § 2.
       15
          Safe Surgery Ark. v. Thurston, 2019 Ark. 403, at 10–11, 591 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Womack,
J., dissenting).
       16
         Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1.
       17
         Safe Surgery Ark., 2019 Ark. 403, at 10–11, 591 S.W.3d at 299 (Womack, J., dissenting).
       18
         Ark. Const. art. 4, § 2.
       19
         Safe Surgery Ark., 2019 Ark. 403, at 11, 591 S.W.3d at 299 (Womack, J., dissenting).

                                                 17
A supermajority of the General Assembly determined

       that the provision of educational services to children in the State of Arkansas
       impacts the public peace, health, and safety through its effect upon student
       learning, which is critical for the future success of the state; that the act amends
       substantial portions of the Arkansas Code as it pertains to prekindergarten
       through grade twelve (preK-12) education in the State of Arkansas; that these
       amendments are extensive and will require new rules and procedures to be
       developed to implement the changes; that many of the changes to the Arkansas
       Code will require that certain procedures are put in place before the beginning
       of the 2023-2024 school year; that this act is immediately necessary in order to
       give local public school districts time to update school district policies to account
       for changes created by this act to provide necessary educational services; and that
       this act is immediately necessary in order to give the Department of Education
       time to promulgate rules necessary to implement this act to provide necessary
       educational services. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist[.][19]

And a finding is all the constitution requires the General Assembly to make.20 The power to

determine whether a measure is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and

safety—and, therefore, must be effective without delay—lies wholly with the General

Assembly.21

                                    IV. Varying Effective Dates

       The appellees argue that varying effective dates within the Act render it invalid.

Specifically, they contend that an emergency clause cannot attach to some subsections of the

bill and not others, i.e., it must apply to the entire Act or no part at all. Yet the appellees cite

nothing to support this proposition, and the circuit court merely adopted their baseless assertions

in its order. When considering the applicability of an emergency clause, the constitution only

contemplates its effect on a “measure[,]” which is defined as “any bill, law, resolution,

ordinance, charter, constitutional amendment or legislative proposal or enactment of any character.”22

       20
         Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1.
       21
         Id.
       22
         Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1 (emphasis added).

                                                 18
       The final phrase is broad enough to vest the General Assembly with the discretion to

include varying effective dates.23 Typically, courts will (and should) defer to legislatures about

their internal procedures and rules.24 For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama has rightly

recognized that the legislature defines the terms and scope of its internal procedure, so long as

they do not conflict with the state constitution. 25 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United

States has properly deferred to Congress when that Court confronts a challenge to certain

congressional procedures.26 In Nixon v. United States, an impeached federal judge argued that

the U.S. Constitution’s impeachment clause required the proceedings to be “in the nature of a

judicial trial.”27 Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that because the U.S.

Constitution vested the impeachment power solely in Congress, and the Senate’s procedures

were not obviously foreclosed, it was the Senate’s prerogative to “determine the meaning of

the word ‘try’ in the Impeachment Trial Clause.”28 These principles apply here.

       Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution does not prohibit the General Assembly

from attaching varying effective dates to subsections of a single act. Just as the General Assembly

cannot control which portions of an opinion the justices of this court join, this court cannot

control which effective dates the General Assembly chooses for portions of its enactments. So

long as the General Assembly follows the procedures set forth in article 5 of the Arkansas

       23
         See id.
       24
         See, e.g., Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 217
(Ala. 2005).
       25
         Id. at 218.
       26
         Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
       27
         Id. at 229.
       28
         Id. at 230–31, 237.

                                                19
Constitution, it is within the General Assembly’s discretion to choose the means by which to

employ them.

                                       V. Attorney Behavior

       Next, I would caution the primary attorneys in this case regarding their tone and tenor

and would remind them that the way they litigate a case, both publicly and before this court,

should reflect the professionalism that is expected of licensed attorneys. Specifically, it was

wholly inappropriate for the appellees’ attorney to engage in partisan rancor by including in her

brief to this court a tweet from a highly partisan blog discussing members of this court in relation

to the case pending before us.

                                            VI. Conclusion

       There is simply no irreparable harm to the appellees from the LEARNS Act, 29 and there

is no likelihood of success on the merits for the appellees’ claim that the LEARNS Act’s

       29
        In fact, the irreparable harm undoubtedly falls on the appellants and the people of Arkansas.
I would note just a few examples of the real-world consequences if the dissenters had prevailed:

       a. Sex offenders would no longer be required to register using their physical
          addresses, Act 37 of 2023;
       b. Rural hospitals would lose their licenses, Act 59 of 2023;
       c. Fentanyl traffickers would have reduced consequences for their action, The
          Fentanyl Enforcement and Accountability Act of 2023, Act 584 of 2023;
       d. Homeless shelters would be unable to save those they serve who are overdosing
          on opioids, Act 586 of 2023;
       e. A foster parent would lose her right to take maternity leave, Act 770 of 2023;
       f. Law enforcement agencies across the state would lose immediate access to grants
          aimed at combatting violent crime, Act 775 of 2023; and
       g. A terminally ill high school student who received his high school diploma this
          spring and was at risk of dying before his graduation would have his diploma
          posthumously revoked, Act 662 of 2023.

These are only a few of the hundreds of acts that the appellees and dissenters would have invalidated
had we not reversed the circuit court’s erroneous order. Not included here, but just as relevant,
are many appropriation bills that authorize the expenditures for the operations of state government
beginning July 1, 2023.
                                                 20
emergency clause was unconstitutionally passed. Therefore, I would reverse and vacate the

temporary restraining order.

        I respectfully concur.

        WEBB, J., joins.

        BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice, concurring. With the exception of Section I, I fully

join Justice Womack’s concurring opinion.

        JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice, dissenting. For the reasons set forth below, I would

hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees’ motion for

temporary restraining order (TRO).1 I must respectfully dissent.

                                                I. TRO

        Rule 65 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the issuance of TROs. In

determining whether to issue a TRO pursuant to Rule 65, a circuit court must consider two

issues: (1) whether irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction or restraining

order and (2) whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 7–8, 643 S.W.3d 763, 769.

        The issuance of a TRO is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the circuit court.

Id. at 8, 643 S.W.3d at 769. This court will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless there

has been an abuse of discretion. Id., 643 S.W.3d at 769. An abuse of discretion is a high

threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but requires that the

        1
         On appeal to this court, the parties briefed the issues of a nonjusticiable political question
and sovereign immunity. But the circuit court did not rule on these issues, and in my view, they
are not preserved for appellate review. See Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, at 4, 643 S.W.3d 5, 8
(stating that this court addresses only ruled-upon challenges, and “[a]ll other issues fall outside the
scope of [this court’s] review at this stage in the litigation”); Harris v. Hutchinson, 2020 Ark. 3, at 4,
591 S.W.3d 778, 781 (stating that “sovereign immunity . . . must be raised and ruled on at the
circuit court level in order to preserve the issue”).
                                                   21
circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Dollar Gen. Corp.

v. Elder, 2020 Ark. 208, at 12, 600 S.W.3d 597, 605. In reviewing the circuit court’s findings,

we give due deference to the circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of

the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.

Ledgerwood, 2017 Ark. 308, at 8, 530 S.W.3d 336, 342.

                                      A. Validity of the TRO

       Rule 65(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

               (2) Contents; Expiration. Every temporary restraining order issued
       without notice must state the date and hour it was issued; describe the injury and
       state why it is irreparable; state why the order was issued without notice; and be
       promptly filed in the clerk’s office and entered in the record. The order expires
       at the time after entry--not to exceed 14 days--that the court sets, unless before
       that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse
       party consents to a longer extension. The reasons for an extension must be
       entered in the record.

       Here, the circuit court ruled:

                A temporary restraining order, effective only until the court can hear this
       matter on June 20, 2023, and render its decision on Plaintiffs’ pending motions,
       is necessary to prevent the Defendants from continuing to violate the Arkansas
       Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the substantive rights of the
       plaintiffs. . . . This order shall expire on June 20, 2023, following the hearing
       scheduled on Plaintiffs’ pending motions, not to exceed fourteen days from the
       date of its issuance, unless terminated or extended by the Court.

       I interpret the circuit court’s order to mean there is good cause to extend its TRO

beyond the fourteen-day period to the June 20 hearing. For this reason, I would hold that the

TRO is valid, and I would reach the merits of the arguments concerning the TRO.

                              B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

       The first issue is whether appellees, as the moving parties, have demonstrated a likelihood

of success on the merits regarding the validity of the emergency clause. This court has held that

to justify a grant of TRO relief, a plaintiff must establish that it will likely prevail on the merits

                                                 22
at trial. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 9, 643 S.W.3d at 770. The test for determining the likelihood

of success is whether there is a reasonable probability of success in the litigation. Id. at 9, 643

S.W.3d at 770. This court will not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to

determine whether the circuit court exceeded its discretion in granting the injunction. Id. at 9,

643 S.W.3d at 770.

       Appellees’ complaint and amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-111-101 et seq. (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2021).

The gravamen of appellees’ amended complaint and underlying action seeking declaratory

judgment is that the emergency clause, section 73 of Act 237 of 2023, the Arkansas LEARNS

Act, is invalid and inoperable. In their amended complaint, appellees alleged, inter alia, that the

emergency clause is invalid because “Section 73 of Act 237, entitled ‘Emergency Clause,’ was

not passed by a separate roll-call vote garnering a two-thirds majority, as required by Article 5,

Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.”

       In support of this claim, appellees relied on article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas

Constitution, which provides in relevant part:

                Emergency. If it shall be necessary for the preservation of the public peace,
       health and safety that a measure shall become effective without delay, such
       necessity shall be stated in one section, and if upon a yea and nay vote two-thirds
       of all the members elected to each house, or two-thirds of all the members elected
       to city or town councils, shall vote upon separate roll call in favor of the measure
       going into immediate operation, such emergency measure shall become effective
       without delay. It shall be necessary, however, to state the fact which constitutes
       such emergency. Provided, however, that an emergency shall not be declared on
       any franchise or special privilege or act creating any vested right or interest or
       alienating any property of the State. If a referendum is filed against any
       emergency measure such measure shall be a law until it is voted upon by the
       people, and if it is then rejected by a majority of the electors voting thereon, it
       shall be thereby repealed. The provision of this sub-section shall apply to city or
       town councils.

                                                 23
Appellees made this claim in their original motion for TRO, and they included and adopted it

in both their first and second amended motions for TRO.

       On this issue, the circuit court specifically ruled:

               All of these claims hinge on the Plaintiff[s’] contention that the emergency
       clause in the Arkansas LEARNS Act, Act 237 of 2023, is invalid. The Court
       finds and concludes that . . . . Section 73 of Act 237, entitled “Emergency
       Clause,” was not passed by a separate roll-call vote garnering a two-thirds
       majority, as is required by Article 5, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of
       Arkansas. The Arkansas Supreme Court held in Board of Trustees of the University
       of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12 (2018), that the General Assembly cannot
       waive by law the State’s sovereign immunity granted in Arkansas Constitution,
       Article 5, Section 20. In doing so, the court overturned years of precedent and
       rejected the General Assembly’s claim that it could create policy that conflicts
       with the provisions of the Arkansas Constitution. Worries about upsetting the
       apple cart by upending precedent were not enough to override the Arkansas
       Supreme Court’s commitment to enforcing the plain language of Article 5. In
       fact, the court specifically noted that the language should be interpreted
       “precisely as it reads.” Id. Similarly, in Buonauito v. Gibson, 2020 Ark. 352, the
       Arkansas Supreme Court held that the phrase “four-lane highway” in
       Amendment 91 could not be interpreted to mean a six-lane highway because the
       Constitution’s language was plain and unambiguous.

               So too here. The word “separate” cannot mean “the same.” In order to
       pass a valid and enforceable emergency clause, the Arkansas General Assembly
       was required by Article 5, Section 1 to hold a separate roll-call vote, and they
       failed to do so.

       In making its ruling at this stage in the litigation, the circuit court considered the

numerous exhibits in the record. Among those exhibits were the following:

          (1) Exhibit 9—Draft Senate Journal indicating a separate vote on Senate Bill
       294 (26 yeas, 8 nays, and 34 total votes) and its emergency clause (26 yeas, 8
       nays, and 34 total votes), signed by Ann Cornwell, Secretary of Senate;

          (2) Exhibit 11—the affidavit of Finos B. Johnson, Jr., the Arkansas House of
       Representatives Parliamentarian, who swore that “[a] single Representative may
       make a motion that the electronic roll-call votes for the bill and for the
       emergency clause be taken separately[,]” but that “[n]o such motion occurred
       during the vote on SB294[;]”

           (3) Exhibit 12—the affidavit of Phillip Treat, Arkansas Senate Chief Counsel,
       who swore that “[t]he Arkansas Senate decides its own internal rules and
       parliamentary procedure,” and that “[a]s a matter of internal procedure, Senators

                                                24
       have decided to convey their separate roll call votes on emergency clauses in the same
       utterance as their votes on the underlying bill.”

(Emphasis added.)

       Based on our standard of review, I agree with the circuit court’s finding on this point.

Without delving into the underlying merits of appellees’ ongoing claims, it appears that they

have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits that, by failing to conduct a separate

roll-call vote on the emergency clause, the General Assembly did not substantially comply with

the requirements set forth in article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. Thus, I would

hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on appellees’ likelihood of

success on the merits.

                                       B. Irreparable Harm

       The second issue is whether irreparable harm will result in the absence of the TRO.

Irreparable harm is the touchstone of injunctive relief. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 13, 643 S.W.3d

at 772. This court has held that essential to the issuance of a temporary restraining order is a

finding that a failure to issue it will result in irreparable harm to the applicant. Ledgerwood, 2017

Ark. 308, at 9, 530 S.W.3d at 343. The prospect of irreparable harm or lack of an otherwise

adequate remedy is the foundation of the power to issue injunctive relief. Id., 530 S.W.3d at

343. Harm is normally considered irreparable only when it cannot be adequately compensated

by money damages or redressed in a court of law. Id., 530 S.W.3d at 343.

       The circuit court ruled that “the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits supporting their

assertion that, but for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Plaintiffs and many other

members of the Marvell-Elaine School District community will suffer immediate, substantial,

irreparable harm.” Among those affidavits was one from Jesselia Maples, a plaintiff in the lawsuit

and mother of four children who attend public schools in the Marvell-Elaine School District,

                                                 25
who swore that “[p]reventing the premature application of [the] Arkansas LEARNS Act will

spare my family immediate irreparable harm. . . . [It] would cause harm to my children’s

education by reducing the resources available to educate them and placing control of our district

in a charter-management company that does not have a strong academic track record.”

        This affidavit and appellees’ request for declaratory judgment in their amended

complaint,2 which was based, in part, on “Plaintiffs’ right to . . . educate their children[,]”

demonstrate that this plaintiff presently seeks to protect her children’s “right to equal educational

opportunity [that] is basic to our society.” DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford Cnty.,

279 Ark. 340, 346, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983). A violation of a constitutional right is deemed

irreparable harm for purposes of injunctive relief. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

        Moreover, this appeal hinges on this court’s well-established standard of review: whether

the circuit court abused its discretion. Giving due deference to the circuit court, I would hold

that the circuit court did not act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration in

its ruling. See Dollar Gen. Corp., 2020 Ark. 208, at 12, 600 S.W.3d at 605. Therefore, without

delving into the merits of appellees’ ongoing claims, I conclude that the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion in ruling that, absent a TRO, appellees would suffer irreparable harm at this

stage in the litigation.

                                           II. Conclusion

        I would hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellees’

motion for TRO. Accordingly, I would affirm.

        WYNNE, J., joins.

        2
      Appellees’ amended complaint was incorporated by reference in their first and second
amended motions for TRO.

                                                 26
        Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Nicholas J. Bronni, Solicitor Gen.; Dylan L. Jacobs, Dep.

Solicitor Gen.; and Hannah L. Templin and Michael A. Cantrell, Ass’t Solicitors Gen., for State

appellants.

        Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Devin R. Bates, for appellant

Friendship Education Foundation.

        Bequette, Billingsley & Kees, P.A., by: W. Cody Kees, for appellant Marvell-Elaine School

District.

        Noland Law Firm, PA, by: Ali Noland, for appellees.

        Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, counsel for amici curiae

yes. every kid. foundation and Americans for Prosperity Foundation – Arkansas in support of

appellants’ motion for stay.

                                               27