Court Opinion

ID: 9915299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 01:00:34.931423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:49.477389
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60647      Document: 00517021974         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/04/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                         January 4, 2024
                                  No. 23-60647                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   National Association for the Advancement of Colored
   People, NAACP; Mississippi State Conference of the
   National Association for the Advancement of Colored
   People, Mississippi NAACP; Jackson City Branch of the
   NAACP, Jackson NAACP; Derrick Johnson;
   Frank Figgers; Charles Taylor; Markyel Pittman;
   Charles Jones; Nsombi Lambright-Haynes,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Sean Tindell, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety;
   Bo Luckey, in his official capacity as Chief of the Mississippi Department of
   Public Safety Office of Capitol Police; Lynn Fitch, in her official capacity as
   Attorney General of the State of Mississippi,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                            USDC No. 3:23-CV-272
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
Case: 23-60647      Document: 00517021974          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/04/2024

                                    No. 23-60647

          The NAACP and other individuals and interest groups (collectively
   “plaintiffs”) sued several Mississippi public officials, seeking injunctive and
   declaratory relief. This appeal concerns plaintiffs’ emergency motions for an
   injunction pending appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary
   injunction. For the reasons that follow, both emergency motions are denied.
   Additionally, we vacate the temporary administrative stay issued by this
   administrative panel on December 31, 2023.

                                       I.
          On April 21, 2023, the Governor of Mississippi signed into law House
   Bill 1020 (“H.B. 1020”). See H.B. 1020, Reg. Sess., 2023 Miss. Laws
   ch. 546. This law, which became effective January 1, 2024, creates a new
   inferior court for Jackson’s Capitol Complex Improvement District
   (“CCID”). The CCID is an administrative area within the City of Jackson,
   covering roughly nine square miles surrounding the State Capitol. The area
   allegedly contains a disproportionate share of Jackson’s white residents.
          As relevant here, H.B. 1020 both expands the size of the CCID and
   creates a new “CCID court.” The judge of that new court has concurrent
   jurisdiction with Jackson’s municipal court and is authorized to hear misde-
   meanor violations and violations of city ordinances and to handle preliminary
   matters in felony cases. But, unlike other municipal courts in Mississippi—
   whose judges and prosecutors are appointed by locally elected officials—the
   Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court will appoint the CCID
   court’s judge, and the Mississippi Attorney General will appoint the court’s
   prosecutors.
          Feeling aggrieved by this scheme, plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983. Relevant here, they claim that the appointments of the judge and
   prosecutors by the Chief Justice and State Attorney General, respectively,
   violate their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the law.

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                                         No. 23-60647

   On November 13, 2023, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction,
   seeking to enjoin the appointments. A complicated procedural history
   followed.
           Plaintiffs wished to receive a ruling on their motion before H.B. 1020
   went into effect on January 1, 2024. Receiving no such ruling by Decem-
   ber 30, 2023, plaintiffs sought emergency relief from this court on Decem-
   ber 31, claiming—with precedent—that the district court’s inaction had the
   “practical effect” of denying a preliminary injunction. Several hours later,
   we granted plaintiffs’ motion, styling it as a temporary stay, ordered the
   motion for an injunction pending appeal to be carried with the case, and
   directed the district court to issue a final, appealable order by noon on
   Wednesday, January 3, 2024.
           Unbeknownst to this court and (apparently) plaintiffs, the district
   court did issue an order on December 31, 2023, denying plaintiffs’ motion.1
   Though the state defendants had raised several defenses to plaintiffs’
   motion,2 the district court found that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on
   the merits for want of standing. On January 3, 2024, plaintiffs filed an
   amended notice of appeal in light of the district court’s order. Plaintiffs again
   request an injunction pending appeal.3
           We now vacate that temporary administrative stay and deny both
   motions for an injunction pending appeal.

           _____________________
           1
            The district court entered its order at approximately 7:42 p.m., or about four
   hours before the statute took effect.
           2
              The Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court contended that he was
   entitled to judicial immunity. All state defendants contended that none of the preliminary-
   injunction factors was satisfied.
           3
            Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of a preliminary injunction. As we are just the
   motions panel, we do not rule on that request.

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                                     No. 23-60647

                                        II.
          We evaluate a request for an injunction pending appeal according to
   the standard for granting or denying a stay pending appeal. See Texas v. U.S.
   Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 23-50869, --- F.4th ---, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS
   34114, at *2, *9 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023). We consider four factors in deciding
   whether to grant a stay pending appeal: (1) whether the moving party has
   made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
   the moving party will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether the
   issuance of a stay will substantially injure the other interested parties; and (4)
   where the public interest lies. See id. at *9.
          We begin and end with the first factor: likelihood of success on the
   merits.

                                         III.
             “In the preliminary-injunction context, plaintiffs must make a clear
   showing of standing . . . .” Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 178
   (5th Cir. 2020). Article III limits us to deciding only actual “Cases” or
   “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Corollary to that, we require
   “that a litigant have standing to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated
   in the lawsuit.” Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
   Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
   Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
          The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
          three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury
          in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
          (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
          conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal con-
          nection between the injury and the conduct complained of—
          the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of
          the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
          some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely,

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                                          No. 23-60647

           as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be re-
           dressed by a favorable decision.
   Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up).
           The burden of establishing standing always rests with plaintiffs. See
   id. At this stage, “the plaintiffs must make a ‘clear showing’ that they have
   standing to maintain the preliminary injunction,”4 for “an injunction is
   always improper if the district court lack[s] jurisdiction.”5
           Plaintiffs press four theories to establish standing. All fail:
           First, plaintiffs theorize that H.B. 1020 causes them to lose “the ben-
   efits of their communities being served only by judges and prosecutors who
   are chosen locally.” Pl.’s First Mot. at 9. In other words, plaintiffs are com-
   plaining that Jackson’s local governing authority—which usually appoints
   judges and prosecutors to Jackson’s municipal courts—will not get to do the
   same for the new CCID court. That, plaintiffs assert, will make the CCID
   court less accountable to the local community, “affect[ing] all Jackson
   residents.” Id. at 10.
           Plaintiffs utterly fail to demonstrate that they, as members of the Jack-
   son community, have any legally protected interest in the CCID court’s
   accountability to the Jackson local governing authority (of which they are not
   even a part). The only binding caselaw they cite in support is LULAC v.
   Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). And for what proposition?
   That “[t]he state attempts to maintain the fact and appearance of judicial
           _____________________
           4
               Barber, 860 F.3d at 352.
           5
            All. for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, 78 F.4th 210, 227 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. granted
   sub nom. Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. All. Hippocratic Med., No. 23-236, 2023 WL 8605744
   (U.S. Dec. 13, 2023), and cert. granted sub nom. FDA v. All. Hippocratic Med., No. 23-235,
   2023 WL 8605746 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2023), and cert. denied, No. 23-395, 2023 WL 8605749
   (U.S. Dec. 13, 2023) (citation omitted).

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                                       No. 23-60647

   fairness that are central to the judicial task, in part, by insuring that judges
   remain accountable to the range of people within their jurisdiction.” Pl.’s
   First Mot. at 9 (quoting LULAC, 999 F.2d at 869).6
          As should be plain, LULAC is wholly inapposite. That case dealt with
   alleged vote dilution in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Infor-
   mation about “[t]he interests behind the existing court structure” might be
   relevant when determining, in the totality of the circumstances, whether a
   Section 2 violation has occurred. LULAC, 999 F.2d at 869. But it is of no
   relevance to the accountability of prosecutors and judges.
          Possibly recognizing that weakness, plaintiffs, in their second motion,
   attempt to analogize their claims to vote dilution. See Pl.’s Second Mot. at
   9–10. Claiming that they live within the district and therefore suffer from a
   “‘district specific’ dilution of voting rights,” they mistake the difference
   between being able to vote on equal footing—which is what the Equal
   Protection Clause protects—and the substantive impact of their vote—i.e.,
   what the politicians they vote for have the power to do. Pl.’s Second Mot.
   at 10 (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018)). As discussed
   below, plaintiffs have failed to show that Jackson’s local authorities have the
   power to appoint the CCID court’s judge or prosecutors. See infra discussion
   of dilution.
          Plaintiffs’ assertion that they hold a legally protected interest in the
   CCID court’s accountability to local officials arrives before us unsupported
   by law or reason. That the CCID court will (purportedly) be less account-
   able, relative to other municipal courts in Jackson, to the local governing
   authority does not “mean that plaintiffs have suffered a concrete and partic-

          _____________________
          6
             Never mind that this quotation comes not from any portion of that opinion’s
   analysis but from a recap of Texas’s argument.

                                            6
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                                     No. 23-60647

   ularized, actual[,] and imminent injury to interests protected by the Equal
   Protection Clause.” Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (finding Jackson voters lacked standing to sue over appointment of certain
   municipal airport commissioners).
          Plaintiffs’ first theory of standing still fails even assuming, arguendo,
   that they hold a legally protected interest in the CCID court’s accountability.
   That injury is not particularized—as their own briefing admits, the purported
   loss of benefits is one that “will affect all Jackson residents.” Pl.’s First Mot.
   at 10. Plaintiffs make only a weak attempt to demonstrate that the loss of
   benefits affects them in a “personal and individual way.” Spokeo Inc. v.
   Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
   ted); see Pl.’s Second Mot. at 12. The benefits of accountability are no more
   likely to accrue to “especially politically engaged” voters than to anyone else.
   Id. At most, the new prosecutors and court might, “conjecturally or hypo-
   thetically,” bring a meritless prosecution, making one of the plaintiffs a party
   to a proceeding in the CCID court. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned
   up). But plaintiffs have made no such showing. “Generalized and undiffer-
   entiated,” plaintiffs’ claimed injury “could occur to anyone who” lives in
   Jackson. Abbott v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (cleaned up).
          Second, plaintiffs theorize they will be harmed as voters in two ways.
   They first assert H.B. 1020 will “take[] away” appointment power from
   locally elected officials. Pl.’s First Mot. at 10. Additionally, they speculate
   that the challenged legislation will “dilute the local government’s control
   over the enforcement of its own laws within the CCID’s borders, a core
   government function.” Id.
          Plaintiffs’ second theory similarly fails to establish standing. They
   have not shown any injury to a legally protected interest they hold as voters.

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                                          No. 23-60647

           Their first assertion, that H.B. 1020 takes away power from local offi-
   cials, has no basis in fact. The challenged legislation creates a new CCID
   court, staffed with a newly appointed judge and newly appointed prosecutors.
   Plaintiffs have not shown that H.B. 1020 alters or affects—in any way—the
   method of appointment for any municipal court in Jackson. Nothing has been
   taken away from Jackson’s local governing authority.
           The second assertion, that H.B. 1020 “dilute[s] the local govern-
   ment’s control,” is similarly unfounded. Id. Plaintiffs cite no authority for
   the proposition that Jackson’s local governing authority has the exclusive
   power to appoint judges and prosecutors for the CCID court which, although
   “functional[ly] equivalent” to a municipal court, does not share “all features
   of municipal courts.” Saunders v. State, 371 So. 3d 604, 616 (Miss. 2023).7
   A mere political subdivision, Jackson is but “a subordinate unit of govern-
   ment created by the State to carry out delegated governmental functions,”
   with “no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may
   invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.” Ysura v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n,
   555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009) (cleaned up). The legislature decided against giving
   Jackson’s local officials a new grant of power over the new court. That is the
   right and prerogative of the legislature, not of Jackson’s voters.
           Thus, there is no support for plaintiffs’ theory that the city’s voters
   possess a legally protected interest in electing local officials with exclusive
   appointment power for the CCID court. Their second theory fails to estab-
   lish standing.
           Third, plaintiffs theorize that H.B. 1020 causes stigmatic harm. They
   take offense at the legislature’s decision to vest appointment power else-

           _____________________
           7
             See also id. at 617 (“[T]he CCID does not literally have to be a municipal court to
   function like one . . . .”).

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                                      No. 23-60647

   where, interpreting it as “infantilizing treatment” and an indication that
   black residents are “‘innately inferior and therefore . . . less worthy partici-
   pants in the political community.’” Pl.’s First Mot. at 10 (quoting Heckler v.
   Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984)). Establishing standing based on stig-
   matic harm requires plaintiffs to allege discriminatory treatment—no matter
   how strongly plaintiffs feel about H.B. 1020’s message. Barber, 860 F.3d
   at 357–58. But mere offense at the message is all that plaintiffs allege. There
   is no allegation that H.B. 1020 will alter any of plaintiffs’ planned conduct,
   and we are left to speculate as to the injuries they might suffer. See id. at 357.
   So stigmatic injury does not establish plaintiffs’ standing.
          Last, plaintiffs theorize that benefits from the CCID court will flow
   primarily to a “disproportionately white population.” Pl.’s First Mot. at 11.
   But, as the very authority plaintiffs cite mentions, that is an injury-in-fact only
   if “the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members
   of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group . . . .”
   Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
   Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). And plaintiffs’ briefing is silent as to what
   “barrier” H.B. 1020 erects beyond an ipse dixit claim that the claimed
   irregular borders are such a barrier.
                                           * * * * *
          In sum, plaintiffs fail to plead a cognizable injury-in-fact and thus lack
   standing to assert their claims. Without standing, they cannot obtain an
   injunction. Both motions for an injunction pending appeal are DENIED.
   The temporary administrative stay issued on December 31, 2023, is
   VACATED.

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