Court Opinion

ID: 9544788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:46.985999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.182729
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons, I dissent. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The analysis of the majority opinion utilizes the familiar technique of erecting a straw man, in this case, the abstract principle of law identified as Dillon’s Rule, and throttling it with the evocative shibboleth of local control. The majority then interprets Section 17-5-77 as a carte blanche delegation of the state police power to local government, unless there be a specific and direct conflict between state and local law. This interpretation is inconsistent with the multiple statutes, wherein the legislature confers specific powers and duties on local government, and distorts the nature of the police power.
The State is the sole and exclusive repository of the police power, neither the federal nor local government has any such inherent power. The police power is awesome, for it confers the right to declare an act a crime and to deprive an individual of his liberty or property in order to protect or advance the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. The decision of whether a problem should be deemed one of local concern and should be regulated under the police power should initially be decided by the legislature representing all the citizens of this state. The legislature may then elect to delegate the power to local government to deal with the specific area of concern. It is equally a legislative judgment to deny delegating this power to local government.
The palliative suggested by the majority opinion that local citizens can change the law by electing new officials provides no relief for the individual previously convicted and avoids the basic issue of whether the police power has, in fact, been delegated under the specific circumstance. All exercise of the police power by local government is derivative, none is inherent, and it is the exclusive prerogative of the State to establish the conditions under which it will be exercised. If local government discerns a condition which merits control through the police power, this matter should be submitted to the legislature so that representatives of the entire state may resolve whether the problem should be addressed on a local level.
It is within the context of the foregoing principles that the specific delegation of the police power in Section 17-5-77 should be interpreted in this case.
There are two basic issues posed in this case, whether the County had the authority to enact these ordinances, (Sections 1-10-4, 1-10-8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County) and whether the State had occupied the entire field of corrupt practices in elections, Chapter 14, Title 20 and Section 10-6-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Both issues were argued on appeal.
Either issue standing alone, on the operative facts here, would be resolved against the County. Consequently, we direct our attention to each.
The District Court in a memorandum decision stated the County relied on Section 17-5-35, and particularly on Section 17-5-77, as its statutory grant of authority to pass the ordinances. The District Court observed, although this Court had not been completely consistent in every case on the issue, the majority of the cases had indicated grants of power to cities or counties were to be strictly construed to the exclusion of implied powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the purposes of the expressed powers granted. The District Court expressed the opinion there was certainly no express authority enabling the enactment of the ordinances, and there was nothing implied from any express power that would justify the enactment of the ordinances.
*1129The District Court stated it had considered Salt Lake City v. Kusse1 and Salt Lake City v. Allred2 cases relied on by the County, and it acknowledged there was certain language in these cases, which suggested a county had a fairly broad power to enact ordinances under the general welfare clause of Section 17-5-77. The District Court explained after considering those cases, it discerned a substantial difference in the authority of a city or county to regulate driving under the influence and prostitution under the wording of the general welfare clause of Section 17-5-77, and in being able to regulate campaign financing in county elections. The District Court concluded:
“... Given its broadest meaning, the Court fails to see how this type of conduct can be regulated under language enabling ordinances ‘such as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof,
The ruling of the District Court was correct. The ordinances were ultra vires, and therefore void. There are no constitutional provisions conferring the police power concerning local matters on counties or non-chartered cities. These corporate political bodies have no inherent powers and none of the elements of sovereignty; they cannot go beyond the powers granted them and must exercise such powers in a reasonable manner.3 The exercise of the police power is an attribute of state sovereignty, a portion of which it may delegate, but not to relinquish, to municipalities, which have none of the elements of sovereignty.4 Section 17-4^1 provides the several counties of the state are bodies corporate and political, “and as such have the powers specified in this title and such other powers as are necessarily implied.”5
The County advocates the view that the general welfare clause of Section 17-5-77 constitutes a broad, general grant of the state’s police power to counties. This section is similar to Section 10-8-84, which grants the same powers to cities and has been interpreted by this court on a number of occasions. In Lark v. Whitehead6 the city urged, under the general welfare clause, a municipal legislative body had a broad grant of power in criminal matters. It was also alleged the city was better qualified to determine what would adversely affect the safety, peace and good order of its inhabitants than was the state legislature. This Court responded:
“In Nasfell v. Ogden City (122 Utah 344, 346, 249 P.2d 507 (1952)) this court stated that it was committed to the principle that cities have none of the elements of sovereignty and that any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (city) and the power denied; grants of power to cities are strictly construed to the exclusion of implied powers which are not reasonably necessary in carrying out the purposes of the express powers granted.”7
In 2 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1966 Rev.Vol.), Section 10.24, p. 801, it is stated:
“It has been said in some cases that municipal powers granted by a ‘general welfare’ clause in a charter or statute do *1130not extend or enlarge powers specifically granted, .. . ”8
The instant case is distinguishable from others, on which the County relies, insofar as in the others the municipal government did not rely solely and exclusively for its authority on the general welfare grant but cited and relied on other express statutory grants of authority which dealt generally with the subject matter of the challenged ordinances.
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse,9 the City relied on both its authority to regulate traffic and the general welfare clause, as the basis to sustain an ordinance which prohibited driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This Court stated there might be some question as to whether the authority to regulate traffic permitted enactment of the ordinance. However, the general welfare clause definitely permitted the city to pass such an ordinance. It further said the prohibition of such person’s propelling or driving a car was definitely and closely related to the safety of the inhabitants and the preservation of property. This Court distinguished the case of Salt Lake City v. Sutter,10 wherein there was no statutory authority for a city to prohibit possession of intoxicating liquors. It said:
“. .. There was power to pass an ordinance to prevent the sale, disposition, and manufacture of intoxicating liquors; but as there said the power to prohibit possession could not be inferred from the power to prohibit sale because it was not necessary to accomplish such prohibition nor was it fairly implied as an incident of such power.”
In Salt Lake City v. Allred11 the authority of the city to enact an ordinance making it a crime for one to direct any person to any place for the purpose of committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire was challenged. The city cited three statutory sources for its authority, the general welfare clause, the power to suppress houses of prostitution (Section 10-8-41) and to punish prostitutes (Section 10-8-51). This Court did not determine whether the authority conferred under the general welfare clause was sufficient, since it ruled the State, by enacting comprehensive and complete laws pertaining to sexual offenses had pre-empt-ed that field. Upon rehearing the case12 this Court completely reversed the prior decision. This Court accepted the contention of the city, viz., the general welfare clause conferred authority to enact the ordinance. The rationale of the case was, it is a proper exercise of the police power to protect the public morals, and the challenged ordinance appeared to bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation and protection of public morals.
In a thoughtful case note in the 1968 Utah Law Review 419, State Preemption and the Exercise of Municipal General Welfare Powers: A City’s Anti-Prostitution Ordinance, the author states apparently conflicting cases can be reconciled by a test suggested in some of the cases concerning the validity of an enactment under the general welfare clause:
“... Whether an ordinance is reasonably and substantially related to the protection of the public interest in health, safety, or morals.
The author explains this Court’s decisions appear compatible with a reasonable relationship standard, since only those ordinances immediately affecting general welfare interests have been upheld.
“... Driving under the influence of alcohol, for example, is a greater threat to public safety than merely possessing alcohol without authorization; maintaining rendezvous for prostitutes and their clients is more injurious to public morals than keeping pin ball machines or playing *1131pool. When the state legislature authorizes municipalities to prohibit the sale of alcohol, the maintenance of a place to sell alcohol is more clearly antagonistic to the state-sanctioned policy than unlawful possession of alcohol.”13
Section 17-6-77, provides:
“The board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this title, and such as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; ... ”
The issue is thus reduced to the question of whether the challenged ordinances are substantially and reasonably related to the promotion of the prosperity and improvement of the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and its inhabitants. The circumstances of this case compel a negative answer; there is neither a substantial nor reasonable relationship between the aforecited purposes and the campaign disclosures of elected county officials. This matter is best illustrated by three cases: Bohn v. Salt Lake City,14 Salt Lake City v. Revene,15 and Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc.16
In Bohn the issue concerned the authority of the city to include certain special provisions in a contract to construct storm sewers. These provisions were included solely for the purpose of alleviating the unemployment situation, which this Court described as a wholly collateral condition to the objects and purposes sought by the construction of storm sewers. This Court began its analysis by citing the principles that implied and incidental powers include those necessary to give effect to powers expressly granted, and the “General Welfare Clause” neither enlarges nor annuls the powers conferred upon the city by special grant.
This Court particularly concentrated on the provision in the contract concerning minimum wage. The power to fix a minimum wage and to prescribe the hours which constitute a day’s labor are generally regarded as an exercise of the police power. The Court explained the police power was inherent in the state, while a municipal corporation has no inherent power to enact police regulations. Such corporation derives its powers solely from the legislature and can exercise only such police power as is fairly included in the grant of its powers. The Court distinguished decisions from other jurisdictions where the charter powers of municipalities are far more comprehensive than is the case in this state.
“There is in this state no express or implied power conferred upon a municipality which directly or by implication authorizes a city to dictate to a contractor the wages that he shall pay his employees. ... In this jurisdiction, inasmuch as municipalities have none of the elements of sovereignty in exerting their given powers, we think the provision in the proposed contracts with respect to the minimum wage must be ruled out.”17
In the Revene case, the city urged, an ordinance, setting the closing hours of barbershops, was a valid exercise of the police power delegated by the Legislature to the city to regulate for the safety and preservation of health in the community. This Court characterized the issue as whether the fixing of the closing hours was a reasonable regulation within the scope of the delegated police power, i. e., did it have a *1132reasonable relationship to the protection of the health of the public.
The Court observed, if the purpose of the ordinance were to limit the working hours of the operators, the method was too indirect and accomplished far wider results than mere limitation of working hours. The Court further examined the cases from other jurisdictions and observed, in all of those cases concerning the fixing of hours of business of barbershops, all of the courts had held there was no reasonable relationship to the protection of the public.
The opinion then recited and relied on the principle that any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power denied. The ruling was:
“We find that the municipality was not delegated the authority to control the closing hours of barbershops, either under its general police power given by Section 15-8-84, and 15-8-61, or under the power to regulate certain named businesses. In the absence of a specific legislative enactment so providing for the municipality to act, we are of the opinion the ordinance requiring the closing of barbershops is an invalid exercise of the police power.”18
In the Nance case the challenged ordinance provided for civil rights concerning restaurants. The Court said cities had no inherent or original legislative power. The power to enact an ordinance is determined by the legislative grant of power and the Constitution of Utah. If there be a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular power, the doubt is resolved against the city, and the power is denied. The Court held:
“. .. The power to enact civil rights legislation is not granted in express words either by constitution or by statute, nor is it necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. Likewise it cannot be held to be essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, or as Dillon states, ‘indispensable’ to the accomplishment of the declared objects. We therefore hold that cities have no power to enact such civil rights legislation... . ”
In the matter at hand, there is no express grant conferring authority on Salt Lake County to enact a corrupt practices act concerning local elected officials. Such authority cannot be implied from the general welfare clause of Section 17-5-77 since it does not have a sufficiently direct, substantial, immediate effect on the specific general welfare interests set forth therein.
With regard to the issue of preemption, a critique in a 1968 Utah Law Review 419 (cited and discussed ante) is illuminating. With it we begin our analysis of that issue.
“The direct conflict standard, however, is not soundly grounded insofar as it was extrapolated from a jurisdiction in which the state constitution granted municipalities all residual powers to enact ordinances not in conflict with state law. In contrast to this jurisdiction, Utah’s un-chartered municipalities have no power independent of express grants made by the legislature. Therefore, a municipality could logically be prohibited from enacting an ordinance by a state statute evidencing an intent to restrict municipal legislation, although the statute’s language or plain meaning did not directly conflict with the ordinance. A more tenable approach for the court in the second opinion [Salt Lake City v. Allred, note 12, supra] would have been to expressly reject reliance on the direct conflict standard and expressly hold that preemption occurs when either direct conflict is apparent or the state legislature, through comprehensive statutory enactments, occupies the field.
“Preemption by occupation has been widely adopted in other jurisdictions and is consistent with the Utah court’s restricted view of municipal powers....”19
The author concluded:
*1133“In its treatment of preemption, the court should have expressly recognized the preemption-by-occupation doctrine and evaluated the state’s policy, statutory scheme, and interest in uniformity to resolve the preemption issue. Absent such an approach, only those ordinances directly in conflict with either the language or plain meaning of the statutes are clearly preempted.”20
In 6 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1969 Rev.Vol.), Section 21.34, pp. 268-270, it is stated:
“A matter may be of state concern to an extent that it calls for statewide treatment and is beyond the control of a municipality. In such a case, a state law may lawfully occupy a particular field of legislation so that there is no room for local regulation. Indeed, statutes supersede or prevail over even nonconflicting ordinances in some instances, as where the matter calls for exclusive regulation by virtue of legislative intention expressed or necessarily implied; and the implication may arise from the nature of the subject regulated. In other words, a municipal ordinance cannot prevail over or supersede a statute, and the ordinance is invalid, where the ordinance and statute relate to a matter that is fully, exclusively and validly covered by the statute. “. .. In all events, ‘whether the legislature has undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation is to be determined in every case upon an analysis of the statute, and of the facts and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate.’ Stated otherwise, in determining whether the legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation, the court may look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme and is not required to find such an intent solely in the language used in the statute.”21
In Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent Control Board,22 the Court explained preemption was a judicially created principle based on the proposition a municipality, which is an agent of the State, cannot act contrary to the State. In a preemption analysis there must be an initial determination as to whether the field or subject matter in which the ordinance operates, including its effects, is the same in which the State has acted. If the answer be in the affirmative, then the following questions are pertinent to the determination of the applicability of preemption:
1. Does the ordinance conflict with state law, either because of conflicting policies or operational effect (that is, does the ordinance forbid what the Legislature has permitted or does the ordinance permit what the Legislature has forbidden)? [Citations]
2. Was the law intended, expressly or impliedly, to be exclusive in the field? [Citations]
3. Does the subject matter reflect a need for uniformity? ...
4. Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation? [Citations]
5. Does the ordinance stand ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the Legislature? [Citation]
The principle of preemption by occupation is based on sound reasons. It is both logical and necessary that an ordinance may be found to conflict with a statute by reason that it is contrary to a state policy established by the Legislature.
The first enactment by the Legislature requiring a candidate to make a sworn statement of all his election and campaign *1134expenses and by whom such funds were contributed was in 1911, Laws of Utah, Chapter 125, Section 213. This requirement applied only to elective officers of cities of the first and second class. A substantially similar statute is in effect today in Section 10-6-18, U.C.A., 1953. In 1917, the Legislature passed an act for the prevention and punishment of corrupt practices in elections, Laws of Utah 1917, Chapter 92.
Under Section 1(2) of this act the term “candidate” meant and included every person for whom it was contemplated or desired that votes be cast at any political convention, primary or election, and who tacitly or expressly consented to be so considered, except candidates for president and vice-president of the United States. Under Section 9 of the act, every candidate was required to make a detailed disclosure of all receipts and disbursements.
In Sjostrom v. Bishop23 this Court ruled the apparent objective of both of the afore-cited enactments was to safeguard against corrupt practices in elections by requiring elected officials to disclose the sources and expenditures of funds.
In 1973, Laws of Utah, Chapter 31, the definition of a candidate and the reporting-requirements concerning contributions and expenditures were confined to the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general. [See Sections 20-14-1(2) and 20-14-7.] However, there remains a series of broad and comprehensive enactments in Section 20-14-24 through Section 20-14 — 47 to prohibit corrupt practices in elections and providing punishment for any violation. The legislation over a period of many years indicates a legislative intent to insure on a statewide basis the purity of the electives process by prohibiting corrupt practices. The means to accomplish this objective is subject to legislative discretion so long as it does not violate any constitutional provision. From 1917 until 1973, one of the means to accomplish the legislative objective was the requirement for all candidates to report their contributions and disbursements.
In 1973, the legislature appeared, in its wisdom, to determine either that reporting by all candidates was not a particularly efficacious means to prevent corruption or was an undue burden on candidates, other than those for the principal state offices, and the other enactments would still prohibit the egregious acts of corruption. From a review of the history of the nature of the comprehensive legislative enactments there emerges a clear legislative intent to occupy the entire field of corrupt practices in the elective process. This is, at once, more logical and consistent with the facts.
A reporting requirement concerning some local governments was retained (10-6-18), which inferentially supports the concept that reporting in other units of local government was rejected. Additionally, there was no legislation which expressly or impliedly authorized any units of local government to enact regulations concerning corrupt practices in the legislative process.
From the foregoing, the conclusion is compelling the Salt Lake County ordinances are in conflict with the state policy to control corrupt practices in the elective process, and to determine exclusively the means to accomplish this objective.
There is one other aspect which merits consideration, i. e., the total inconsistency in the position of the majority opinion concerning the authority of the County Attorney to prosecute this appeal and the action of this Court in State v. Loddy, Utah, 618 P.2d 60 (1980). Particularly in this case, where there is a serious issue of whether a complex statutory scheme regulating corrupt practices in elections has preempted local regulations, the Attorney General should have prosecuted this appeal. The County Attorney’s interest and approach are directed to sustaining the validity of the ordinance, a provincial position which may be completely antagonistic to the interests of the people of this state. The majority further attenuates the jealously-guarded legislative prerogative to delegate the police power to local government. The conse*1135quences of the opinion in this case are of such a magnitude that the people are entitled to have the issues briefed and argued by their statutory legal representative, the Attorney General.

. 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1939).

. 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968).

. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932).

. Salt Lake City v. International Association of Firelighters, Utah, 563 P.2d 786 (1977).

. See Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County, 28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972).

. 28 Utah 2d 343, 346, 502 P.2d 557 (1972).

. Also see Layton City v. Speth, Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978); Allgood v. Larsen, Utah, 545 P.2d 530 (1976); Parker v. Provo City Corporation, Utah, 543 P.2d 769 (1975); Johnson v. Sandy City Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 22, 497 P.2d 644 (1972); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957).

. Lark v. Whitehead, note 6, supra, is cited in the supplement as supporting this principle.

. Note 1 supra.

. 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923).

. 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (1967).

. 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968).

. at p. 422 of 1968 U.L.R.

. 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932).

. 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942).

. 108 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).

. at p. 131 of 79 Utah, 8 P.2d 591.

. p. 511 of 101 Utah, 124 P.2d 537.

. 1968 U.L.R. 424.

. 1968 U.L.R. 428.

. Lancaster v. Municipal Court for Beverly Hills, 6 Cal.3d 805, 100 Cal.Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681, 682 (1972); Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 851, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930, 935-940 (1969); In re Hubbard, 62 Cal.2d 119, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809, 812-815 (1964); In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897, 899-900 (1962); Lamb v. Mirin, 90 Nev. 329, 526 P.2d 80, 82 (1974); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761, 764-765 (1969).

. 71 N.J. 451, 366 A.2d 321, 326 (1976).

. 15 Utah 2d 373, 376, 393 P.2d 472 (1964).