Court Opinion

ID: 9859072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 18:38:30.658144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:58.413724
License: Public Domain

MoGehee, O. J.,
Dissenting.
I do not think that tbe judgment in this case should be affirmed for tbe reason that tbe verdict of tbe jury is in my opinion against tbe overwhelming weight of tbe evidence as to who was at fault in tbe accident.
ON MOTION TO STRIKE AND ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Lottekhos, J.
Appellant has filed a motion to strike from tbe record certain parts thereof purporting to disclose what occurred during tbe argument of this case to tbe jury, concerning statements in argument by counsel for both parties, and also to strike certain language from our original opinion as not supported by tbe record. Appellant has filed with tbe motion a suggestion of error seeking, in effect, tbe same relief, and asserting that tbe cause should be reversed. Exception is thereby taken to that part of our opinion declaring that appellant’s attorney told tbe jury in argument that any verdict rendered for appellee would have to be paid by appellant out of bis wages, and that *681part using this supposed statement as a basis for the affirmance of the judgment.
We have carefully reviewed the pertinent portion of the record in order to determine whether the exceptions are well taken. It appears that, immediately after the arguments to the jury had been completed and the jury had retired, counsel for appellant stated into the record his version of what had happened, and that after a brief colloquy the court said that a bill of exceptions would be allowed in accordance with the statements made by counsel. Appellant then made his motion for a mistrial, which was overruled. With reference to the bill of exceptions, the court stated that before signing it he would submit it to appellee’s attorney.
Thereafter on a subsequent day, appellee by her attorney submitted her proposed bill of exceptions, setting up her version of what took place during the argument, but the court declined to sign it. Appellee was permitted to make a record of the testimony in support of her version of what had happened. A statement by appellant’s attorney was also included in the transcript. The court signed the bill of exceptions tendered by appellant, with slight modifications.
There is an apparent conflict between appellee’s proposed ]nll of exceptions (not signed by the court) and appellant’s bill of exceptions (signed by the court), and between the statements of appellant’s counsel and of the witnesses as shown in the transcript, with respect to whether counsel for appellant made the statement in argument to which exception has been taken.
It is not for this Court to resolve disputes between parties or their attorneys as to what happened at the trial; that is a function of the trial court. We cannot properly consider what is set out in the unsigned bill of exceptions which appellee requested, nor weigh the testimony and statements which the trial judge heard in passing upon these matters. We must look only to *682the signed bill of exceptions in determining what was said in argument, for purposes of our decision. This conclusion is supported by the following cases: Pittman v. State, 155 Miss. 745, 124 So. 761; Geiselbreth v. Mississippi Power and Light Co., 166 Miss. 749, 147 So. 874; and Richardson v. State, Miss., 17 So. 2d 214.
October 5, 1953
37 Adv. S. 30
67 So. 2d 251
Upon reconsideration by the Court of the matters under discussion, a majority of the judges are of the opinion that the bill of exceptions in this record is properly construed as showing, for purposes of this decision, that counsel for appellant did use the argument in controversy. Although the bill of exceptions reflects the questioned language only in a quotation from ap-pellee’s argument, which purports to be in answer thereto, yet there is nothing in the bill of exceptions stating or implying that the comment so made by the attorney for appellee, to the effect that appellant’s attorney so stated, was false.
Accordingly, it is our decision that the motion and the suggestion of error should be overruled.
Motion to strike and suggestion of error overruled.
McGehee, C. J., and Roberds, J., dissent; all other Justices concur.
ON SECOND SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Lee, J.
A suggestion of error was overruled in this case on July 3, 1953, (Miss.), 65 So. 2d 839.
Appellant has now filed what he denominates as “Suggestion of Error, Motion to set aside Judgment, to Stay Mandate and for Other Relief.”
The Court deems that the contents of this complaint, except that part with reference to striking certain language from the opinion, in fact, constitutes a second sug-*683gestión of error, and, for that reason, can not be entertained. Section 3, Bule 14, Revised Rules 1953.
While adhering to the original decision, the Court did not then, and does not now, intend any reflection on the high personal and professional reputation of appellant’s counsel. Consequently, the words in the opinion, to-wit: “This was highly improper and unfair and was condemned in Avent v. Tucker, supra, ’ ’ are ordered stricken, and in lieu thereof are substituted the following: “It was proper for plaintiff’s counsel to reply to this.”
That part of the suggestion which has been deemed a second suggestion of error is dismissed, and that part which has been treated as a suggestion of error on a. motion, is sustained.
Suggestion of error generally dismissed, but applicable part sustained in part.
All Justices concur.