Court Opinion

ID: 2963514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:14.862703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.761216
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-2067

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  DONATO F. ANGIULO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

          No. 94-2068

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                FRANCESCO F. ANGIULO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                              _________________________

                                        Before

                        Selya, Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                               ______________
                              _________________________

               Anthony M. Cardinale for appellants.
               ____________________
               James  C. Rehnquist, Assistant  United States Attorney, with
               ___________________
          whom  Donald  K. Stern,  United  States Attorney,  and  Ernest S.
                ________________                                  _________
          Dinisco, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for the
          _______
          United States.

                              _________________________

                                    June 15, 1995

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.   This procedural motley requires
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          that  we explore  the  interstices  of sentence-related  criminal

          rules  that predate  the inauguration  of the  federal sentencing

          guidelines,  and are  in  that sense  relics  of a  bygone  era.1

          Having  completed the  judicial  equivalent of  an archaeological

          dig, we deny the requested relief.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    In 1983, a federal  grand jury indicted the appellants,

          Donato  and Francesco  Angiulo,  along with  several others,  for

          activities allegedly undertaken in  furtherance of the affairs of

          the  Patriarca family of La  Cosa Nostra.   Though the indictment

          charged certain members of the enterprise with predicate offenses

          that  included murder, it did not allege that Donato or Francesco

          Angiulo personally had committed any homicidal acts.  Following a

          lengthy trial, a jury  found the appellants guilty on  a plethora

          of counts,  including conspiracy to make  extortionate extensions

          of  credit, 18 U.S.C.    892(a), RICO conspiracy,  id.   1962(d),
                                                             ___

          racketeering  violations,  id.    1962(c),  and  operation of  an
                                     ___

          illegal gambling business, id.   1955.
                                     ___

                    On April 3,  1986, the  Hon. David S.  Nelson, who  had

          presided  at the  trial,  convened a  disposition  hearing.   The

          colloquy focused  on the  presentence investigative  reports (PSI

          Reports).   Among  other things,  both  PSI Reports  contained  a

          statement, under the heading "prosecution version," to the effect
                              
          ____________________

               1We set forth in an appendix hereto the text of the relevant
          procedural rules as they  stood on the date of  sentencing (April
          3, 1986).

                                          2

          that the  enterprise with which the appellants  were affiliated  

          the Patriarca family   engaged in "crimes, including murder, as a

          matter of duty," in  order to advance familial interests.   There

          followed a compendium of felonies, including four murders and two

          unconsummated murder  conspiracies,  allegedly committed  by  the

          enterprise.    Elliot  Weinstein,  Francesco Angiulo's  attorney,

          took umbrage at that account.  He stated in part:

                         In  support of my  objection and request
                    to  strike  . .  .  I  indicate that  nowhere
                    during the proceedings in  the case was there
                    any evidence or suggestion that my client was
                    involved in acts  of murder, conspiracies  to
                    murder or shared in any intent or desires for
                    the   murder  of  any   person  at  all.  The
                    specifically  named  victims   in  the   pre-
                    sentence   report    have   no   relationship
                    whatsoever to my client and indeed during the
                    course  of  the  proceedings  the  government
                    stated  to  the   Court  at  several  sidebar
                    discussions and the  Court indeed  instructed
                    the jury that evidence  as to murders was not
                    being admitted against  Francesco Angiulo . .
                    . .

          Robert  Sheketoff,  Donato   Angiulo's  lawyer,  joined   in  the

          objection.  He termed the recital "misleading" and added:

                         My  client  was  not  charged  with  any
                    predicate acts involving murder.  And I think
                    it is severely prejudicial  the way they have
                    drafted  this and  it is  not clear  from the
                    report I would suggest either  in the offense
                    section or  in any point in  the report that,
                    in fact, he was not charged, that there is an
                    affirmative statement that he was not charged
                    with any predicate acts of the verdict.

          Judge  Nelson  overruled these  objections  and  left intact  the

          references to  the multiple  murders.   He proceeded  to sentence

          both  Angiulos to  lengthy  terms of  immurement.   The  brothers

          appealed  their convictions  on other  grounds, but  eschewed any

                                          3

          further  challenge  to  the  PSI  Reports.    Their  appeals were

          unavailing.  See  United States  v. Angiulo, 897  F.2d 1169  (1st
                       ___  _____________     _______

          Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990).
                 _____ ______

                    On    December   18,   1990,   the   appellants   filed

          substantially  identical motions  for  sentence reduction  in the

          district court.  They served these motions within 120 days of the

          Supreme Court's  denial of certiorari (which  occurred on October

          1, 1990).   The motions  invoked former Criminal  Rule 35(b)  and

          spotlighted   a  purported   disparity   between  the   sentences

          appellants  received  and  the  sentences appellants  would  have

          received  under the newly  minted federal  sentencing guidelines.

          The government  filed objections to the  motions and subsequently

          served a detailed opposition.

                    Toward the end of 1991, the appellants,  acting pro se,
                                                                    ___ __

          each filed an undated  "Rule 35 Reply" that bemoaned  the adverse

          parole-related effects of  the references  to murder  in the  PSI

          Reports.   These pleadings raised, for the first time, the charge

          that  Judge Nelson had violated  Fed. R. Crim.  P. 32(c)(3)(D) in

          the  course of  imposing  sentence.   On  January 24,  1992,  the

          appellants, through new counsel, each filed in the district court

          a  pleading entitled "Appeal Pursuant to  28 C.F.R. 542.15 and/or

          Motion Pursuant to Rule  32(c)(3)(D)."  These pleadings described

          the  anticipated   adverse  effects  of  the   murder  references

          contained in the PSI Reports, and sought the expungement of those

          references.   In each instance,  the clerk of  court docketed the
                        ___________________________________________________

          pleading  as a separate motion.  The contents are consistent with
          ______________________________

                                          4

          that  characterization:    each pleading  clarified  that  "[t]he

          alternative and additional remedy [each appellant] seeks pursuant

          to  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) is simply another more expedient

          manner  of   effecting  the  relief  he   has  previously  sought

          administratively."2    These  pleadings  adopted  the defendants'

          earlier Rule  35(b) motions by  reference but cautioned  that the

          new initiatives should be viewed separate and apart therefrom "as

          an effort to implement the Rule 32 requests [that each] defendant

          made at the time of his sentencing."

                    Matters   remained  dormant  for  a  spell,  presumably

          because Judge Nelson assumed senior status.  Eventually, the Hon.

          William G. Young stepped into the void.  On April 25, 1994, Judge

          Young denied the appellants'  Rule 35(b) motions, concluding that

          the sentences  imposed by  Judge Nelson were  "entirely justified

          and  necessary" to  vindicate important  public policy  concerns.

          United States  v. Angiulo, 852 F.  Supp. 54, 62 (D.  Mass. 1994).
          _____________     _______

          The Angiulos did not  prosecute appeals from the denial  of their

          Rule 35(b) motions.

                    On May 31, 1994, the appellants filed a written request

          asking  Judge  Young  to  hold  a  "status  conference  regarding

          defendants' motions pursuant to  Rule 32(c)(3)(D)."  Although the

          record is tenebrous as to whether such a conference materialized,

          the  request sufficed  to  bring  the  Rule  32  motions  to  the

                              
          ____________________

               2The regulation cited in  the January 24 pleadings describes
          the  procedure for  administrative appeals  within the  Bureau of
          Prisons,  but makes no mention of judicial review.  See 28 C.F.R.
                                                              ___
            542.15 (1994).

                                          5

          forefront.  In an unpublished rescript dated September 12,  1994,

          Judge Young addressed  those motions.  He  discerned no violation

          of  Rule  32,  finding  that  the  objections  proffered  at  the

          disposition  hearing did not dispute  the factual accuracy of the

          murder  references.  In  the bargain,  the court  expressed doubt

          about the  intrinsic merit of the objections, indicating that the

          statements contained in the PSI Reports were not misleading, and,

          moreover, were directly relevant to the sentencing determination.

                    The appellants  filed these timely appeals  in the wake

          of the court's September 12 order.  They seek either resentencing

          or,  in the alternative, redaction  of the PSI  Reports to remove

          the  murder  references that  they  believe  are hindering  their

          chances to secure parole. 

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    We  start with  bedrock.   Although a  district court's

          denial of a motion for sentence reduction under former Rule 35(b)

          is  a final  order, and,  thus, an  appealable event,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1993); see
          _____________    _________                                    ___

          also United States  v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20, 24  (1st Cir. 1987)
          ____ _____________     ________

          (holding  the grant of a  sentence reduction to  be an appealable

          order),  the present  appeals are  not of  that persuasion.   The

          district  court denied  the Rule  35(b) motion  by  order entered

          April 25, 1994,  and no  action was taken  within the  applicable

          appeal period.   See Fed.  R. App. P.  4(b) (providing that  such
                           ___

          appeals must  be taken within 10  days from date of  entry of the

          order);  see also United States v. Morrillo, 8 F.3d 864, 867 (1st
                   ___ ____ _____________    ________

                                          6

          Cir. 1994) (explaining that the time limits for taking appeals in

          criminal cases  are "mandatory and jurisdictional").   Hence, the

          district court's Rule 35(b) determinations are not susceptible to

          review at this late date.3

                    Refined to  bare essence, the  defendants' appeals must

          stand or fall based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.   We think they fall.

          Criminal  Rule  32  provides  no  independent  foundation  for  a

          postsentence  motion  to correct  a  PSI  Report  and, under  the

          circumstances that  obtain here,  the appellants'  motions cannot

          properly  be recharacterized as timely motions under Rule 35.  We

          explain briefly.

                    We frequently have recognized the importance of Rule 32

          and  we have  emphasized its  requirement of  literal compliance.

          See,  e.g., United States  v. Hanono-Surujun, 914  F.2d 15, 18-20
          ___   ____  _____________     ______________

          (1st Cir. 1990); United  States v. Jimenez-Rivera, 842 F.2d  545,
                           ______________    ______________

          550-51 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  487 U.S. 1223  (1988).   These
                              _____ ______

          attributes,  however, do not  create jurisdiction for  a court to

          entertain  postsentence motions alleging  violations of  Rule 32.

          In the absence  of either an enabling statute or  language in the

                              
          ____________________

               3In  any   event,  former  Rule  35(b)  conferred  virtually
          unfettered discretion  on sentencing  courts.  See,  e.g., United
                                                         ___   ____  ______
          States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing
          ______    __________
          breadth of district  court's discretion).  Thus,  it seems highly
          unlikely that  Judge Young's  refusal to grant  relief thereunder
          could  successfully have  been  challenged,especially  given  the
          obvious  inadequacy  of the  motions'  linchpin  assertion.   See
                                                                        ___
          United States v. Twomey,  845 F.2d 1132, 1134-35 (1st  Cir. 1988)
          _____________    ______
          (upholding  denial  of  Rule  35(b) motion  and  explaining  that
          district  courts have  no obligation  to harmonize  sentences for
          pre-guidelines  offenses  with  sentencing  results  produced  by
          application of the guidelines).

                                          7

          rule's text that  could conceivably be  read as authorizing  such

          jurisdiction, we hold that  Rule 32, in and  of itself, does  not

          confer  district  court jurisdiction  to  conduct  a postsentence

          review.   Accord United States  v. Engs, 884  F.2d 894, 895  (5th
                    ______ _____________     ____

          Cir. 1989)  (agreeing that "no  postsentence jurisdiction  exists

          based solely  on Rule 32(c)(3)(D)"); United States v. Giaimo, 880
                                               _____________    ______

          F.2d 1561, 1563 (2d  Cir. 1989) (holding that "Rule  32, standing

          alone, does  not give  a district court  jurisdiction to  correct

          inaccuracies  in  a  PSI  report   after  a  defendant  has  been

          sentenced"); United States v. Sarduy, 838 F.2d 157, 158 (6th Cir.
                       _____________    ______

          1988);  United States  v. Peloso,  824 F.2d  914, 915  (11th Cir.
                  _____________     ______

          1987); United States v.  Williams, 618 F. Supp. 1419,  1420 (E.D.
                 _____________     ________

          Va. 1985), aff'd, 785  F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
                     _____                                 _____________

          Sheela,  667 F. Supp.  724, 726 (D.  Or. 1987);  United States v.
          ______                                           _____________

          Burkhead, 567 F. Supp. 1425, 1427-28 (W.D. Mo. 1983).4
          ________

                    Appellants  try to  locate  a  serviceable vehicle  for

          their  Rule  32  claims  by  characterizing  their  supplementary

          motions as ones  that were brought under Rule 35.   We, and other

          courts,  sometimes have  allowed  violations  of  Rule 32  to  be

          addressed in timely Rule 35 motions.  See, e.g., United States v.
                                                ___  ____  _____________

          Feigenbaum, 962 F.2d 230, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
          __________                                       _____________

          Smith, 844 F.2d  203, 207 (5th  Cir. 1988);  Sarduy, 838 F.2d  at
          _____                                        ______

          158;  United  States v.  Katzin, 824  F.2d  234, 237-38  (3d Cir.
                ______________     ______

                              
          ____________________

               4At least one court has reached an opposite conclusion.  See
                                                                        ___
          United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d  613, 615 (10th Cir. 1990).  With
          _____________    ____
          respect,  we regard  Hart as  wrongly decided  and we  decline to
                               ____
          follow it.

                                          8

          1987);  Peloso, 824 F.2d at 915; United States v. Santamaria, 788
                  ______                   _____________    __________

          F.2d  824,  828-29  (1st Cir.  1986).    This  avenue of  review,

          however,  is properly seen as  founded on former  Rule 35(a), and

          more particularly, on the prong of former Rule 35(a) that permits

          a district court  to "correct  a sentence imposed  in an  illegal

          manner."  Like motions arising under former Rule 35(b), such Rule

          35(a)  motions must be filed  within 120 days  next following the

          entry of final judgment.5

                    In view  of this  legal mise-en-scene,  the appellants'

          attempt  to anchor  jurisdiction on former  Rule 35  suffers from

          several infirmities  which, taken together, prove  fatal to their

          endeavor.   First, jurisdiction to review  the alleged violations

          of Rule 32 cannot be based on Rule 35(b) in  the circumstances of

          this case.    While the  district  court permissibly  could  have

          considered any  Rule 32 irregularities  when it decided  the Rule

          35(b) motions  for discretionary  sentence reduction in  April of

          1994, it  had no obligation  to do  so, and, in  all events,  the

          Angiulos did not  take timely  appeals from the  denial of  these

          motions.

                    Second,  the circumstances  do not  permit jurisdiction

          properly to be  premised on  former Rule 35(a).   The  appellants

                              
          ____________________

               5Although former Rule 35(a) also allowed a district court to
          correct  an "illegal sentence at  any time," that  remedy was not
          available  to  address  a  Rule  32  violation  because  "illegal
          sentences"  were  limited to  those  that  "`exceed the  relevant
          statutory  maximum  limits  or  violate double  jeopardy  or  are
          ambiguous or internally contradictory.'"  Katzin, 824 F.2d at 237
                                                    ______
          (quoting  8A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice   35.03[2],
                                       ________________________
          at 35-36 (2d ed. 1987)).

                                          9

          neither  cited that  rule to  Judge Young  nor attempted  to base

          jurisdiction  on it;  and,  as we  have  said, "absent  the  most

          extraordinary circumstances,  legal theories not  raised squarely

          in the  lower court  cannot be  broached  for the  first time  on

          appeal."   Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen  & Helpers  Union,
                     ______________________________________________________

          Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp.  Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.
          ____________    ______________________

          1992).  This  principle is  fully applicable  in criminal  cases.

          See, e.g.,  United States  v. Slade,  980 F.2d  27, 30  (1st Cir.
          ___  ____   _____________     _____

          1992).

                    Furthermore,  in order  to use former  Rule 35(a)  as a

          vehicle to review ostensible Rule 32 violations, appellants would

          have needed to file their motions within 120 days of the  Supreme

          Court's denial  of certiorari.   The  initial Rule 35(b)  motions

          were docketed within that time span, but the first pleadings that

          mentioned  Rule 32 were not  served until well  after the 120-day

          period expired.  Even if these  subsequent attempts somehow could

          be deemed to implicate Rule 35(a), the failure to comply with the

          120-day deadline  would defeat jurisdiction.6   See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Ames,  743 F.2d 46, 48  (1st Cir. 1984) (noting  that the time
             ____

          limitations  specified  in  former  Rule  35  are  mandatory  and
                              
          ____________________

               6It is often assumed  that inaccuracies in a PSI  Report may
          form the basis for a petition under 18 U.S.C.   2255.  See United
                                                                 ___ ______
          States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432, 1433-34 & n.4  (10th Cir. 1988);
          ______    ______
          United  States v.  Mosquera, 845  F.2d 1122,  1124 n.1  (1st Cir.
          ______________     ________
          1988).  In addition,  courts have suggested that such  relief may
          be obtainable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.   2241.  See Peloso, 824 F.2d
                                                       ___ ______
          at 915; United States v.  Daniels, 737 F. Supp. 111, 114  (D. Me.
                  _____________     _______
          1990).    The appellants  have  not  asserted jurisdiction  under
          either  of those  statutes,  and they  have expressly  disclaimed
          reliance on  section  2255.    Thus,  we  take  no  view  of  the
          appropriateness vel non of any such potential remedies.
                          ___ ___

                                          10

          jurisdictional), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985).
                           _____ ______

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    In this instance, all roads lead to Rome.  On one hand,

          the  appellants did not perfect  timely appeals from the district

          court's  denial of their  Rule 35(b)  motions, and,  hence, those

          motions are  dead letters.   On the  other hand,  insofar as  the

          appellants' postsentence  motions rest  on Rule 32,  simpliciter,

          the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider them.7

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               7Of course, the district court should simply have denied the
          Rule 32 motions  for lack of  jurisdiction, rather than  reaching
          the merits of the  alleged Rule 32 violations.   Accordingly, its
          comments, though insightful, should not be accorded binding force
          or effect if further proceedings eventuate.

                                          11

                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX

                    Former  Criminal  Rule 35,  which  applies to  offenses
          committed prior to November 1, 1987, provides in pertinent part:

                         (a) Correction of  Sentence.  The  court
                         (a) Correction of  Sentence.
                    may correct  an illegal sentence at  any time
                    and  may correct  a  sentence imposed  in  an
                    illegal  manner  within  the   time  provided
                    herein for the reduction of sentence.

                         (b) Reduction  of Sentence.  A motion to
                         (b) Reduction  of Sentence.
                    reduce a  sentence may be made,  or the court
                    may reduce a sentence without  motion, within
                    120  days after  the  sentence is  imposed or
                    probation  is  revoked,  or within  120  days
                    after receipt  by  the  court  of  a  mandate
                    issued  upon  affirmance of  the  judgment or
                    dismissal of the appeal,  or within 120  days
                    after entry  of any order or  judgment of the
                    Supreme  Court denying  review of,  or having
                    the  effect  of   upholding,  a  judgment  of
                    conviction or probation revocation. . . .

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.

                    Criminal  Rule 32(c)(3)(D),  as applicable  to offenses
          committed prior to November 1, 1987, provides that:

                         If the comments of the defendant and the
                    defendant's  counsel  or  testimony or  other
                    information  introduced  by  them allege  any
                    factual   inaccuracy   in   the   presentence
                    investigation  report or  the summary  of the
                    report or  part thereof, the court  shall, as
                    to  each  matter  controverted,  make  (i)  a
                    finding  as  to  the allegation,  or  (ii)  a
                    determination  that  no finding  is necessary
                    because the matter  controverted will not  be
                    taken into  account in sentencing.  A written
                    record  of  such findings  and determinations
                    shall be  appended to and accompany  any copy
                    of   the  presentence   investigation  report
                    thereafter  made available  to the  Bureau of
                    Prisons or the Parole Commission.

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D).

                                          12