Court Opinion

ID: 9671383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:35:26.897707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.625594
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, P. J.
(concurring in remanding for a new trial). The writer of this opinion is constrained to concur in the ordering of a remand for the purpose of granting a new trial to the defendant in this case. The defendant’s attorney, Mr. Kahn, of Chicago, Illinois, was not a practicing attorney in Michigan. It was necessary for Mr. Kahn to have Michigan counsel to be able to represent the defendant at the trial. Mr. Kahn was present and represented defendant at the preliminary examination. Evidently because he wasn’t paid additional money, he didn’t show up on the date of trial. Mr. Buer, a Michigan attorney, as an act of courtesy, was going to move for Mr. Kahn’s admission to the court to try the case, and sit in with him as of counsel for the defendant. Mr. Buer did not, nor was he hired to represent the defendant at the trial. He was not acquainted with the case other than his part to be with Mr. Kahn at the trial. Although the defendant consented to represent himself with possible aid from Mr. Buer, it is obvious from the affidavit of Mr. Buer, made after the trial, that the defendant was, under the circumstances, denied effective assistance of counsel. The affidavit is as follows:
“Leon B. Buer, being duly sworn, deposes and says that on the morning of the trial of Dirk Bruins-*188ma, without any preparation and without previously acquainting himself with the factual situation involved and upon request, he did, without being paid, act to advise the said Dirk Bruinsma in the conduct of the trial before the court and jury on a charge of sale of marijuana. That in order to acquaint himself with the facts, deponent hereto quickly read over the preliminary examination and then assisted the respondent in the voir dire examination of the jury.
“Deponent further states that it wasn’t until sometime later that he took an active role in the trial and cross-examined the prosecution’s main witness. Deponent hereto states that had he had time and a thorough-going acquaintance with the facts he could have represented the said Dirk Bruinsma in a more decisive fashion.
“Deponent further states that it is his opinion that time and preparation of the case might have uncovered facts leading to the impeachment of the prosecution’s key witness whereby the result of the trial would have been different.”
Now it is true that the courts of our state are heavily burdened and that it is imperative that cases move forward without undue delay. In order to do this, courts must at times make decisions to go forward when it might prove later to have been more advisable to postpone the trial. This case appears to this writer to fall into the latter category. It now appears that the trial judge should have granted the motion of the defendant for a continuance so that Mr. Buer could properly prepare for trial.
This ruling is made without criticism of anyone in the case except Mr. Kahn who should have been, and would have been, present at the trial representing defendant had he been a Michigan attorney. This writer declines to rule on the constitutionality *189of the criminal statute in question for the reason that constitutional questions are avoided if the case can be decided on other grounds. 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 113, p 301; Smith v. Curran (1934), 267 Mich 413.
O’Hara, J.
(for affirmance). After trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of having unlawfully sold a narcotic drug, marijuana, without a license. MCLA § 335.152 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev §18.1122). He appeals of right.
At his preliminary examination on September 15, 1969, defendant was represented by Alan Kahn, a member of the Illinois bar admitted to practice in Michigan for the purpose of this case. Based upon the evidence there adduced, the defendant was bound over to circuit court for trial.
On September 19, 1969, his arraignment was held in the Circuit Court for the County of Kent. Pursuant to the advice of his counsel, the defendant stood mute. A plea of not guilty was entered by order of the court. Mr. Kahn was not present in person on this occasion.
On October 13, 1969, a notice of the pretrial conference, set for November 20, and of the trial, set for December 9 at 9:30 a.m., had been sent to both Mr. Kahn, defendant’s counsel, and to Mr. Leon Buer, a member of the Michigan bar, as of counsel for defendant.
At the time set for trial, all of the participants were in attendance except Mr. Kahn.
Out of the presence of the jury and prior to commencement of the trial, defendant asked the court for a continuance because of the unavailability of his out-of-state counsel.
There followed a colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant concerning the reason for Mr. *190Kahn’s absence. In substance, the defendant contended that he had been under the impression that the proceedings that day were to be in the nature of a pretrial conference up until his telephone conversation with his Illinois attorney the night before. Mr. Kahn had stated that he was aware the case was set for trial the next day. Defendant then indicated that Mr. Kahn’s absence was due to defendant’s failure to pay Mr. Kahn’s required fee. The trial judge then said the case was ready for trial, that it was to go forward, and if the accused could not engage counsel the court would appoint one for him at public expense. The judge then addressed himself to the purpose for which the Michigan attorney had been engaged, and the reason for his presence in court. Defendant indicated that Mr. Buer was only to fulfill the requirement of resident counsel. The Michigan attorney advised the court that he was not familiar with the case as he had not expected to try it.
The defendant then asked if he could proceed in proper person with whatever assistance Mr. Buer could give him. We quote:
“Defendant: Could I ask the court’s permission to represent myself and just ask Mr. Buer to give me a little help now and then if he would like to ?
“The Court: Is that what you want to do?
“Defendant: Yes, I would like to do that because I feel I know the case and I, you know, I would like—
“The Court: You understand you have a right to an attorney?
“Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: And if you do not have enough money to hire an attorney, the court will appoint one for you without charge to you?
“Defendant: Uh huh.
*191“The Court: Knowing and understanding that, do you want to proceed on your own?
“Defendant: Uh huh.
“The Court: And just have Mr. Buer sit in and help you?
“Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: All right. We will proceed.
“Mr. Buer: May the record show, your Honor, that I will do everything that I can in this position. It was probably what I was employed for in the first place, only I hate to see Mr. Bruinsma representing himself, but he says he is familiar with the case. I certainly am not, so perhaps we can do the job. We will try.
“Defendant: Is there another copy of the transcript available?
“The Court: We will make one available to you. We will be in recess while a copy is made.
“Mr. Probert \assistant prosecutor]: Before the court takes a recess, I have discussed with Mr. Bruinsma and Mr. Buer one stipulation about the question of whether or not Mr. Bruinsma was licensed under the state law by the Department of Licensing Regulations [sic] to administer, prescribe, or dispense or sell narcotic drugs, and Mr. Buer has indicated that he would be willing to stipulate that Mr. Bruinsma was not so licensed, and I believe Mr. Bruinsma—
“Defendant: I can stipulate that myself.
“The Court: You are telling the court you are not so licensed?
“Defendant: I don’t have a license to sell any drugs, no.
“The Court: Allright.
“Mr. Probert: Thank you, your Honor.”
The only issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s first motion for a continuance on the day of trial because of the absence of his out-of-state *192counsel for the reasons and circumstances revealed by the quoted excerpts from the arraignment.
The public policy of this state, as expressed in both court rule1 and statute,2 discourages the granting of a continuance other than under the most compelling circumstances.
On his motion for adjourning the trial, defendant had the burden of demonstrating good cause and he further had to show that the grounds for continuance did not arise out of his own fault or neglect.
Defendant was first arraigned in September, 1969, but his trial did not take place until December of that year. During this period of approximately 2-1/2 months he was free on bond and could have arranged for other counsel of his own choice, or, alternatively, he could have petitioned the court for appointed counsel if he were indigent.
The record discloses that both Mr. Kahn and resident counsel received timely notice of the date of pretrial and of the trial. It was the defendant’s freely exercised choice to proceed as he did. The choice was not forced upon him.
But all this to the contrary notwithstanding. Were I convinced that prejudice to the defendant took place in the trial itself, or that errors inuring to his prejudice took place, I would not hesitate to reverse and remand for a new trial. I can find none. I reviewed the record with extreme care be*193cause of defendant’s age and the harshness of the mandatory minimum sentence involved. Mr. Buer rendered very able assistance to the defendant, particularly in the crucial cross-examination of the state’s principal witness.
Under the quoted examination of the defendant and the trial court’s offer to appoint counsel at public expense if defendant so chose, I can not see how abuse of discretion by the trial judge is an issue. The defendant was offered a choice. He chose to proceed.
I can find no error upon which reversal could he predicated. I would affirm.

 “It is the policy of this rule to encourage the diligent preparation and trial of eases. Continuance for any cause shall not be granted unless a showing is made and the court finds that the grounds for continuance do not arise out of the fault or negligence of the moving party and the court finds that substantial justice more nearly will be obtained.” GCR 1963, 503.

 MCLA § 768.2 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1025) provides in pertinent part that: “No adjournments, continuances or delays of criminal causes shall be granted by any court except for good cause shown in the manner provided by law for adjournments, continuances and delays in the trial of civil causes in courts of record