Court Opinion

ID: 9832180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:41:23.748585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:43.530692
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon consideration of appellee’s motion for a rehearing, we have concluded that we were in error in holding that appellant’s pleadings were sufficient to sustain a judgment for the statutory penalties sued for. In suits for penalties the rule adopted by the -Supreme Court is that such pleadings must be strictly construed against the pleader; and that a violation of the statute must be pleaded with the same degree of certainty and specification of facts relied upon as would be required in a bill of indictment. State v. Williams, 8 Tex. 255; Pool v. Chapman (Tex.Com.App.) 283 S. W. 762, 764; 32 Tex.Jur., Sec. 14, p. 764, and cases there cited. Without setting out appellant’s pleadings on that count here, which were general in nature, we have concluded that as to the penalties sought to be recovered, this strict requirement had not been met, and that so far as penalties are concerned, the trial court’s judgment should be sustained.
However, in addition to the pénalties sued for, the appellant sought to recover damages to his lands, independent of the statute, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellee. In this respect his suit was a common-law action, predicated, not upon a violation of the Johnson grass statute by the railroad company, but upon negligence in the construction and maintenance of its road. As to this count in his petition, the foregoing rule of strict construction pertinent to his penalty suit would not apply, but the general rule applicable to other suits for damages predicated upon negligence. In this regard, as held in our original opinion, we think the pleadings and proof were sufficient to submit such issue to the jury. The general demurrer as to the entire petition of appellant, though good as to his count for statutory penalties, was not good as against his suit for damages based upon common-law negligence. And the statute providing for penalties does not preclude a recovery of damages, if any, caused by the negligence of appellee. Dorrance & Co. v. International & G. N. R. Co., 53 Tex.Civ.App. 460, 126 S.W. 694; Vance v. Southern Kansas Ry. (Tex.Civ.App.) 152 S.W. 743, 745; 35 Tex.Jur., § 141, p. 212, and cases there cited. Conceding appellee’s contention as to the statutory penalties sought to be recovered against it, there still remained appellant’s cause of action for damages based upon alleged negligence, against which the general demurrer was not sufficient, and which should, have been submitted to the jury. This requires a reversal of the case in any event. With this modification of our original opinion herein, the motion for rehearing is in all other respects overruled.
Granted in part, and in part overruled.