Court Opinion

ID: 9377731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:00:42.462228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.033189
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1265     Document: 010110823277       Date Filed: 03/08/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 8, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1265
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00355-RM-1)
  ANTHONY EUGENE KELLER,                                       (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Anthony Eugene Keller appeals from his prison sentence despite the appeal

 waiver in his plea agreement. The government now moves to enforce that waiver, as

 permitted by United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

 Through counsel, Keller opposes the motion. We reject his arguments and grant the

 motion.

 I.    BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In January 2022, a grand jury in the District of Colorado indicted Keller on

 one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He chose to accept a plea deal

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1265    Document: 010110823277        Date Filed: 03/08/2023     Page: 2

 offered by the government. Through that deal, he agreed to plead guilty and to waive

 his right to appeal the conviction or sentence. The government, for its part, agreed

 that Keller deserved a three-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of

 responsibility. It also agreed to recommend a prison sentence at the low end of the

 guidelines range that the district court would eventually calculate. Following a

 hearing, the district court accepted Keller’s plea.

       About a week before Keller’s sentencing hearing, Keller’s retained

 attorney filed a motion to withdraw, informing the court that Keller wanted a new,

 court-appointed attorney. The district court addressed this motion in an ex parte

 hearing immediately before the sentencing hearing. There, Keller explained that, due

 to “lack of payment,” he believed his attorney had been “trying to rush through this,”

 including “the Plea Agreement . . . and everything that came after.” Suppl. R. at 6.1

       The district court told Keller that it would not reopen previous proceedings

 (such as his plea) and it would not allow Keller to delay the sentencing process by

 requesting a new attorney essentially on the eve of sentencing. The district court

 gave Keller the option of going forward pro se, or a hybrid option in which his

 attorney would continue to argue for him and then the court would allow Keller

 himself to raise any additional arguments. Keller elected the hybrid option and the

 sentencing hearing went forward, resulting in a 63-month prison sentence (the low

 end of the guidelines range, as calculated by the court). This appeal followed.

       1
         The supplemental record is sealed, but the parties quote this portion of it in
 their public filings.
                                             2
Appellate Case: 22-1265    Document: 010110823277        Date Filed: 03/08/2023     Page: 3

 II.   ANALYSIS

       The government’s motion to enforce would normally require us to ask three

 questions: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of

 appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

 appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage

 of justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. But we need not address a Hahn factor the

 defendant does not dispute. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143

 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, Keller explicitly concedes the first inquiry (scope of the

 waiver).

       As to the second inquiry (knowing and voluntary), Keller offers two

 paragraphs of general principles and one paragraph explaining why this case fits

 within those general principles. See Resp. at 8–9. But he then offers a fourth and

 final paragraph directing the court’s attention to the hearing on the motion to

 withdraw, and claiming, without elaboration, that he “raised doubt [about] the

 knowing and voluntary nature of the plea itself, and therefore, specific to [the

 government’s] motion, to the waiver of his appellate rights.” Id. at 9.

       “[P]erfunctory complaints fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to

 invoke appellate review,” Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir.

 1994), so we could deem this argument waived. Regardless, it is Keller’s burden to

 demonstrate involuntariness. See United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231, 1233

 (10th Cir. 2013). And “[a] properly conducted plea colloquy, particularly one

 containing express findings, will, in most cases, be conclusive on the waiver issue, in

                                            3
Appellate Case: 22-1265    Document: 010110823277        Date Filed: 03/08/2023      Page: 4

 spite of a defendant’s post hoc assertions to the contrary.” Id. Here, the district court

 conducted a painstakingly thorough plea colloquy. The district court confirmed,

 among many other things, that Keller “had enough time” to discuss the case with his

 attorney and was “fully satisfied with [his] counsel,” that he signed the plea

 agreement “freely and voluntarily,” that no one “pressured [him] or coerced [him], in

 any way, in order to get [him] to plead,” and that he understood the appellate waiver

 (including the possible exceptions). R. vol. III at 9–10, 12, 13, 14–16. At

 the conclusion of the colloquy, the district court found that Keller’s plea was

 “a knowing and voluntary one.” Id. at 34. Arrayed against this, Keller points to the

 motion-to-withdraw hearing in which he vaguely expressed the feeling of being

 “rush[ed].” Suppl. R. at 6. We hold this is not enough to overcome the district

 court’s findings at the change-of-plea hearing. We therefore find that Keller’s plea

 (and the appeal waiver within it) were knowing and voluntary.

       As to the third Hahn factor (miscarriage of justice), Keller asserts that his trial

 attorney was constitutionally ineffective. We held in Hahn that “ineffective

 assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver” could result in

 a miscarriage of justice. 359 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). But

 we also stated that our holding “[did] not disturb [the] longstanding rule” that,

 “[g]enerally, we only consider [such] claims on collateral review.” Id. n.13.

 Understanding this, Keller points us to rare cases in which we determined that an

 adequate record existed to adjudicate an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal.

 He then asserts that he tried to raise an ineffective-assistance claim during the

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-1265    Document: 010110823277        Date Filed: 03/08/2023    Page: 5

 hearing on his lawyer’s motion to withdraw, but the district court did not allow him

 to elaborate. Therefore, he says he did not have an opportunity to try and develop the

 sort of record that would allow this court to adjudicate an ineffective-assistance claim

 on direct appeal, so the court should remand to allow him to develop that record.

        Keller’s proposal is unprecedented and unnecessary. There is no right to

 develop an ineffective-assistance record before direct appeal, nor is there any need.

 A 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding is more than adequate to develop any claims a

 defendant may wish to bring against his or her attorney. We therefore reject this

 argument and find that enforcing the appeal waiver would not create a miscarriage of

 justice.

 III.   CONCLUSION

        For all these reasons, we reject Keller’s arguments, grant the government’s

 motion to enforce the appeal waiver, and dismiss this appeal.

                                             Entered for the Court
                                             Per Curiam

                                            5