Court Opinion

ID: 9915597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 21:01:05.757952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:57.733849
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39        Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 1 of 15

                                             PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4426

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JAHSIR JUSTIN CLAYBROOKS,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:21-cr-00119-NCT-2)

        Argued: September 22, 2023                                     Decided: January 4, 2024

        Before GREGORY and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and Patricia Tolliver GILES,
        United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson
        and Judge Giles joined.

        ARGUED: Aaron Bader Wellman, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, SIEGMUND, BRUMBAUGH
        & MCDONOUGH, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
        Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Mary Ann Courtney,
        Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 2 of 15

        GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

               Jahsir Claybrooks pleaded guilty to a single count of possession of a stolen firearm,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). In its presentence report (PSR), the

        probation office alleged that, at the time of the offense, Claybrooks was an unlawful user

        of controlled substances and was under indictment for a felony.             Under 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(g)(3) and § 922(n), respectively, this made him a “prohibited person” barred from

        possessing a firearm. The probation office accordingly calculated his sentence based on

        Claybrooks’s “prohibited person” status. Claybrooks objected to the finding that he was

        an unlawful user, but failed to object to the PSR’s statement that he was under indictment.

        One week before his sentencing, the Supreme Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol

        Association v. Bruen that the government must justify firearms prohibitions by showing

        that they are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations. See

        142 S. Ct. 2111, 2130 (2022). Without analyzing whether §§ 922(g)(3) and (n) are

        consistent with that historical tradition, the district court adopted both findings and

        sentenced Claybrooks to seventy months’ incarceration—seven months above the range

        recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

               Claybrooks now mounts both facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(3),

        claiming that he is not an unlawful drug user under the statute and that the statute itself is

        unconstitutionally vague. He also argues that the district court erred in its determination that

        he was under indictment at the time of his offense of conviction and abused its discretion by

        imposing an above-guidelines sentence. Finally, Claybrooks contends that the district court

                                                       2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 3 of 15

        erred by not conducting a Bruen analysis of the three firearms statutes at issue. Because we

        conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error, we affirm.

                                                      I.

               On June 24, 2020, around 2:24 a.m., a suspect broke into Sportsman Supply and

        Grocery in Liberty, North Carolina. The suspect used a torch to remove metal bars over a

        window before breaking the glass and entering. Once inside, he used an aluminum baseball

        bat to break several display cases and steal their contents. In total, he absconded with

        twenty-four handguns and three long guns, as well as several firearms accessories and

        lottery tickets.

               Four days later, in Findlay, Ohio, a local sheriff’s deputy conducted a traffic stop on

        Claybrooks and his brother Javier as Claybrooks was driving. The deputy initiated a search

        after smelling unburnt marijuana in the car. That search ultimately yielded eight grams of

        marijuana, plastic baggies, a digital scale, a “Port-a-Torch,” cell phones, and two

        handguns—a Glock 10mm and a Glock 9mm. The serial numbers on the two guns matched

        two of the handguns taken from the Sportsman Supply and Grocery. The deputy arrested

        Claybrooks and Javier for the Sportsman Supply robbery.

               The next day, investigators obtained and executed a search warrant for Claybrooks’s

        residence in Greensboro, North Carolina. J.A. 169. In a trashcan in the driveway, deputies

        found several price tags for guns, two black ski masks, an “Axis” glove, an empty “Port-

        a-Torch” box, an empty baton weapon box, and an empty extended magazine box. Id.

        Deputies also searched a 2006 Acura in the driveway and located walkie talkies, cell

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39        Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 4 of 15

        phones, a gun lock, six grams of methamphetamine, a driver’s license belonging to

        Claybrooks, and a receipt for the torch. Id. A search of Claybrooks’s bedroom revealed a

        9mm 50-round drum magazine in the closet and a speed loader on the dresser. Id.

              During a search of one of the cell phones located during the Ohio vehicle search,

        police found yet more evidence that Claybrooks and his brother committed the Sportsman

        Supply robbery. The search revealed photographs of handguns stolen from Sportsman

        Supply and a photograph of the store’s broken window. J.A. 170.

              Claybrooks was extradited from Ohio to North Carolina on July 28, 2020, and was

        released on bond on related state charges in September 2020. On March 29, 2021, a federal

        indictment was filed. While searching his home a month later, police again found a rifle

        and 32.13 grams of marijuana. Claybrooks remained in custody on North Carolina state

        matters through November 24, 2021, when he was served with a federal arrest warrant.

                                                   II.

              Claybrooks pleaded guilty to one count of possession of stolen firearms, in violation

        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). J.A. 3, 9–23. In the PSR, the probation office assigned a base

        offense level of 20 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). J.A. 128, 135–36. This base

        offense level was based upon an allegation that Claybrooks possessed a semiautomatic

        firearm capable of accepting a high-capacity magazine, as well as the probation officer’s

        assessment that Claybrooks was a “prohibited person” at the time of the offense. Id. After

        applying certain stipulations in the plea agreement, the PSR calculated a Total Offense

                                                    4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 5 of 15

        Level of 29 and a Criminal History Category of II, resulting in a guidelines range of 97 to

        120 months. J.A. 136, 147.

               Claybrooks objected to the draft PSR both based on his designation as a “prohibited

        person” and on the PSR’s assessment that conduct relevant to the offense involved a

        semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. J.A. 158, 160. At

        sentencing, the district court sustained Claybrooks’s objection to the related conduct

        enhancement but overruled his objection to his “prohibited person” designation, resulting

        in a new base offense level of 14. J.A. 80–83. * Following other adjustments not relevant

        to this appeal, the court found a Total Offense Level of 23 for a resulting guidelines range

        of 51 to 63 months.

               Prior to imposing a sentence, the court acknowledged Claybrooks’s difficult life

        circumstances, his history of substance abuse, and his engagement in classes during his

        incarceration. J.A. 97–98. But the court was nonetheless concerned with the number of

               *  In addition to being an unlawful drug user, the district court found that Claybrooks
        was a prohibited person because he was under indictment at the time of the offense. J.A.
        80–81. Claybrooks disputes this. During the sentencing hearing, the district judge twice
        referenced an indictment related to a 2019 case. Charges of “felony possession of stolen
        goods” and “felony obtain property by false pretense” are listed in the “Pending Charges”
        section of the presentence report. The description associated with the charges lists the date
        of the offenses but omits the date of indictment.

                There are questions as to whether the district court properly concluded that
        Claybrooks was under indictment at the time of his offense, but this Court need not reach
        them. To establish that a defendant is a prohibited person under § 2K2.1, the sentencing
        guidelines only require a finding that the defendant was either an unlawful user of a
        controlled substance or was under indictment at the time of the offense. See U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1 cmt. n.3. Because law and evidence support finding that Claybrooks was an
        unlawful user when he possessed the stolen firearm, any potential error concerning the
        district court’s § 922(n) finding was harmless.
                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 6 of 15

        guns, the danger of the AR-15, and the fact that Claybrooks was under pretrial supervision

        when he committed the offense of conviction. After considering these factors and the

        parties’ sentencing positions, the court determined that an upward variance to seventy

        months’ imprisonment was warranted. J.A. 98. The court’s judgment was entered on July

        14, 2021. J.A. 107–13. Claybrooks timely appealed.

                                                      III.

               Since the release of the first draft PSR, Claybrooks has insisted that he is not a

        prohibited person under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). The guidelines commentary defines a

        “prohibited person” as “any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n).” U.S.S.G.

        § 2K2.1 cmt. n.3. The statutes cited in the guidelines forbid possession of a firearm by an

        unlawful drug user and by any person under indictment for a felony, respectively.

               When determining whether the district court properly applied the advisory

        Sentencing Guidelines, this Court “review[s] the district court’s legal conclusions de novo

        and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th

        Cir. 2009). “Under the clear error standard, we will only reverse if left with the definite

        and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d

        212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). This standard of review applies to

        Claybrooks’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3).

               Admittedly, the legal contours of “unlawful user” of a controlled substance are not

        well defined within the statute. As an aid, this Circuit has used the test articulated in United

        States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2001), to determine whether a person can be thus

                                                       6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 7 of 15

        characterized under § 922(g)(3). To convict someone under the statute (or, as here,

        enhance a sentence), Purdy requires that the government prove “that the defendant took

        drugs with regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with his

        purchase or possession of a firearm.” Purdy, 264 F.3d at 813. See also United States v.

        Jackson, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding § 922(g)(3) conviction where

        defendant admitted to using marijuana from childhood until two months before the

        offense); United States v. Edwards, 38 F. App’x 134, 138 (4th Cir 2002) (unpublished)

        (stating that the drug use must be consistent, prolonged, and close in time to gun

        possession); United States v. Sperling, 400 F. App’x 765, 767 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010)

        (unpublished) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s “persuasive” decision in Purdy).

               Claybrooks does not pretend that he never used drugs. In fact, he admitted to drug

        use during his interview with a probation officer. According to the PSR, Claybrooks

        “admitted he was addicted to marijuana and had been smoking the substance on a daily

        basis. He noted he last used marijuana in 2021.” J.A. 171. Claybrooks “reported that he

        started smoking marijuana on a daily basis in high school . . . .[,] noted he became addicted

        to marijuana and it helped him be ‘mellow’ and numbed his feelings . . . . , [and] noted that

        marijuana is his drug of choice and he last smoked marijuana in 2021.” J.A. 181–82.

               Despite these admissions, Claybrooks insists that his drug use was not

        contemporaneous with his possession of the stolen firearms at issue. He says construing

        his statements as evidence that his marijuana use was contemporaneous with the offense

        would require assuming facts not in the record. According to Claybrooks, his admissions

        about addiction and daily use were about past, not current, activity. For example, the PSR

                                                     7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 8 of 15

        consistently refers to his drug use in past tense (i.e., “he was addicted”; “he had been

        smoking on a daily basis”; “it helped him be ‘mellow’”). J.A. 171, 181–82. While the

        start date of his drug use is well established, the end date is ambiguous, he argues.

               One can inject some ambiguity into Claybrooks’s statements in the presentence

        report, but any haziness is quickly clarified by the context of his statements. During his

        interview, Claybrooks relayed that marijuana was his drug of choice and admitted that he

        continued smoking it until 2021, which is well past the commission of his state and federal

        crimes. He described himself as “addicted” to marijuana, offered no evidence that he ever

        sought treatment for drug addiction or took efforts to cease using the controlled substance,

        and did not indicate that he had overcome the addiction.

               Taken together, these statements are enough to conclude that Claybrooks admitted

        to being an unlawful drug user contemporaneous with his arrest. This is particularly so

        under the preponderance of the evidence standard that applies to sentencing enhancements.

        Our sister circuits have upheld convictions for § 922(g)(3) based on similar circumstances.

        See United States v. Cowan, 469 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding a § 922(g)(3)

        conviction where defendant admitted to using marijuana from age thirteen to two months

        prior to offense); United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953–54 (11th Cir. 2003)

        (concluding defendant was unlawful drug user where he admitted to history of drug use,

        possessed marijuana when arrested, and tested positive for its use while on bond). As this

        Court explained in Jackson, § 922(g)(3) “does not forbid possession of a firearm while

        unlawfully using a controlled substance. Rather, the statute prohibits unlawful users of

                                                     8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 9 of 15

        controlled substances (and those addicted to such substances) from possessing firearms.”

        Jackson, 280 F.3d at 406.

               Citing an unpublished case of this circuit, Claybrooks asserts that any

        uncorroborated admission of drug use—like the admissions contained in the presentence

        report—must be supported by “substantial independent evidence” to support a conviction.

        See United States v. Sperling, 400 F. App’x 765, 767–68 (4th Cir. 2010). In Sperling, the

        defendant admitted use of drugs within a couple months of his arrest, but a police dog failed

        to locate drugs in his vehicle, and a federal agent could not find criminal or medical records

        of drug use by Sperling. Finding no substantial evidence outside of the defendant’s

        admission, this Court vacated his conviction.

               Claybrooks’s case is distinguishable. First, Sperling concerns a conviction under

        § 922(g)(3); this case is about guidelines calculations under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. While the

        government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction, the

        government need only establish the applicability of relevant conduct guidelines provisions

        by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir.

        2013). In light of this much lower threshold of proof, and given the record before us, we

        cannot conclude that the district court erred when it assessed that Claybrooks’s drug use

        occurred contemporaneous with his arrest.

               Second, Claybrooks’s statements to probation are better corroborated. Unlike in

        Sperling, police searches on the day of Claybrooks’s Ohio arrest produced marijuana and

        drug paraphernalia. In fact, the officer who initiated the traffic stop searched the vehicle

        only after he smelled a “strong odor” of unburnt marijuana. Thus, Claybrooks was at least

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 10 of 15

        in possession of marijuana at the time of the offense, adding color to his statements in the

        presentence report.    Moreover, Claybrooks completed his PSR interview while in a

        custodial setting where easy access to illicit drugs was limited or nonexistent. Considering

        this detention, the PSR’s use of the past tense is best understood as discussion of his

        engagement with drugs pre- and post-detention. When read through that lens, Claybrooks

        is not claiming that his addiction to drugs was distant or infrequent, but rather was

        continuous until 2021.

               Claybrooks was arrested with drugs, admitted to drug use prior to his arrest, and

        offered a timeline of use that immediately abuts that arrest. His own statements, and other

        evidence available to the court below, are sufficient to support the sentencing court’s

        conclusion that Claybrooks was an unlawful user of controlled substances as contemplated

        by the statute. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s finding and reject the as-applied

        challenge on appeal.

                                                     IV.

               Claybrooks next asserts that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague. Constitutional

        challenges and questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. United States v.

        Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 204 (4th Cir. 2013).

               This Circuit previously noted that “the exact reach of the statute is not easy to

        define” but declined to reach the question of whether the statute itself violates the void-for-

        vagueness doctrine. Jackson, 280 F.3d at 406. Because Claybrooks fails in his as-applied

        challenge, we again decline to reach that question.

                                                      10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 11 of 15

               The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal

        offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is

        prohibited, and defines it in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory

        enforcement. Hager, 721 F.3d at 183; United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).

        However, “a statute need not spell out every possible factual scenario with ‘celestial

        precision’ to avoid being struck down on vagueness grounds.” Hager, 721 F.3d at 183

        (quoting United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2008)).

               Providing clarity and notice to defendants remains a vital judicial value. But when

        a defendant’s conduct falls squarely within the confines of the disputed statute, he abandons

        the right to challenge that statute for vagueness. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project,

        561 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2010) (stating that a defendant who “engages in some conduct that is

        clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct

        of others”); United States v. Hasson, 26 F.4th 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2022) (declining to reach

        a facial vagueness challenge where defendant did not dispute that his actions fell within

        the statute); United States v. Hosford, 843 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2016) (same). As

        discussed supra, Claybrooks clearly falls within the statute’s definition of an unlawful drug

        user. He therefore cannot mount a facial challenge to the statute.

                                                     V.

               On June 23, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in New York State Rifle &

        Pistol Association v. Bruen, indicating that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text

        covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” 142

                                                     11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 12 of 15

        S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022). One week later, the district court sentenced Claybrooks without

        reference to the Supreme Court’s new standard. Claybrooks now asserts that the district

        court erred by not conducting a Bruen analysis of the three firearms statutes at issue, even

        though Claybrooks failed to object below.

               Prior to Bruen, courts evaluating the constitutionality of a gun regulation balanced

        the individual’s Second Amendment right to possess a gun with the state’s interest in

        promoting safety. See generally, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

        Bruen replaced this balancing test. Instead, Bruen clarifies that when the plain text of the

        Second Amendment covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively

        protects that conduct.       The government must then rebut that presumption “by

        demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm

        regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130.

               To reiterate, this case implicates three distinct criminal statutes restricting firearm

        possession. Claybrooks pleaded guilty to violating § 922(j), which prohibits possession of

        stolen firearms, and his sentence was enhanced based on findings that he was a prohibited

        person under both §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(n). If Claybrooks had raised Bruen below, this

        Court might have reached the question of whether the statutes survive Bruen’s renewed

        analysis. But he did not. Because Claybrooks raises issues relating to Bruen for the first

        time on appeal, the appropriate standard of review is plain error. See United States v. Allen,

        466 F.3d 522, 530 (4th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to the plain error test, the appellant may secure

        relief if he demonstrates that (1) the sentencing court erred, (2) such error was plain, and

        (3) the error affected substantial rights. Id. The appellate court should then correct the

                                                     12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426      Doc: 39          Filed: 01/04/2024     Pg: 13 of 15

        error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

        proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

               Claybrooks’s Bruen arguments cannot survive plain error review. This Circuit lacks

        precedent establishing that any of the relevant statutes violate the Second Amendment right

        to keep and bear arms. Nor have our sister circuits made much progress on the question.

        The contours of Bruen continue to solidify in district and appellate courts across the nation,

        and yet there is no consensus. See, e.g., United States v. Gore, No. 2:23-cr-04, 2023 WL

        2141032 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2023) (finding that § 922(j) is constitutional because of

        longstanding prohibitions on the receipt of stolen goods); United States v. Greer, No. 4:17-

        CR-94(1), 2023 WL 4747383 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2023) (citing Gore); United States v.

        Daniels, 77 F.4th 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2023) (concluding that § 922(g)(3) contradicts the plain

        text of the Second Amendment and is not aligned with the history and tradition of firearms

        regulation); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 22-10896, 2023 WL 4044409 (5th Cir. June

        16, 2023) (“There is no binding precedent holding § 922(n) unconstitutional, and it is not

        clear Bruen dictates such a result.”); United States v. Posey, No. 2:22-cr-83, 2023 WL

        1869095, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 9, 2023) (assuming without deciding that an unlawful user

        is part of “the people” and his possession of a firearm is protected by the Second

        Amendment); United States v. Alston, No. 5:23-CR-21-1, 2023 WL 4758734 (E.D.N.C.

        July 18, 2023) (magistrate recommending that § 922(g)(3) be found unconstitutional);

        United States v. Costianes, No. 1:21-cr-458, 2023 WL 3550972 (D. Md. May 18, 2023)

        (indicating agreement that the Second Amendment’s plain text does not cover prohibited

        persons under § 922(g)(3) but declining to “definitely resolve” that question).

                                                     13
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 14 of 15

               There can be no plain error where neither this nor other circuits have resolved the

        issues in dispute. United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 2012). As such, we

        cannot fault the district court for declining to submit the statutes to a Bruen analysis in the

        absence of a motion or request by the defendant.

                                                     VI.

               Finally, Claybrooks challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. The sentencing

        court imposed an upward variance to seventy months from the recommended range of fifty-

        one to sixty-three months’ imprisonment. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the

        district court commits a “significant procedural error,” such as: (1) imposing “a sentence

        based on clearly erroneous facts”; (2) failing to explain the sentence adequately; or (3)

        failing to address the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

        38, 51 (2007). A district court is required to provide “an individualized assessment” based

        on the facts before the court, and to explain adequately the sentence imposed “to allow for

        meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. at 50.

        “A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the court relies on an improper factor or

        rejects policies articulated by Congress or the Sentencing Commission.” United States v.

        Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006).

               “This Court reviews all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly

        outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United

        States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

                                                      14
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4426       Doc: 39         Filed: 01/04/2024      Pg: 15 of 15

               Claybrooks argues that the sentencing judge placed undue weight on the nature and

        circumstances of the offense and insufficient weight on the history and characteristics of

        the defendant. This argument is without support. Just before imposing the sentence, the

        judge discussed the number and type of guns stolen, specifically noting the danger posed

        by AR-15 assault rifles. J.A. 97. He then noted that Claybrooks was under indictment and

        pretrial supervision at the time of the offense. Id. Stating that these factors merited an

        upward variance, the judge cited Claybrooks’s difficult childhood, history of substance

        abuse, and recent steps toward self-improvement as factors that would help minimize the

        upward variance given. Id. 78. The judge also conducted an analysis of the § 3553(a)

        factors. This is the sort of individualized assessment required under the law. As such, the

        district court judge did not abuse his discretion by varying upwards by seven months.

                                                     VII.

               For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court did not err in applying

        U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6) and did not plainly err when it did not conduct a Bruen analysis of

        the relevant statutes. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

        by sentencing Claybrooks to seventy months’ imprisonment. Therefore, we affirm.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

                                                      15