Court Opinion

ID: 9751578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:37:34.581317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:45.774288
License: Public Domain

Justice McCAFFERY,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe the probable cause affidavit supporting the anticipatory search warrant in this matter was sufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to permit the magistrate judge to conclude that the triggering event, a controlled drug buy, would likely take place at 635 Morris Street in Philadelphia, and that following the controlled buy, evidence of criminal activity would likely be found in that residence. In Commonwealth v. Coleman, 574 Pa. 261, 830 A.2d 554, 563-564 (2003), this Court held that the conditional nature of an anticipatory search warrant is relevant to the question of whether probable cause exists at the time such a warrant is issued. In other words, the fact that a search will be accomplished if, and only if, a triggering event occurs, is a relevant consideration in determining whether probable cause for the search exists. Id.
Instantly, I believe the majority largely overlooks the relevant fact that the execution of the warrant was specifically conditioned upon the actual occurrence of the anticipated drug *421buy. Instead, the majority focuses on whether there was, prior to the controlled buy, sufficient police corroboration of the reliable confidential informant’s statement that he or she could purchase four ounces of cocaine from Appellant between the hours of 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. at 635 Morris Street on September 8, 2005. Indeed, the gravamen of the majority’s analysis is that probable cause was lacking because there was insufficient factual support to show the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. In reaching the determination that there were insufficient facts to conclude that the drug buy would occur as stated, the majority disregards as insignificant the fact that the police corroborated the information supplied by the informant regarding Appellant’s name, phone number, address, vehicle registration, and criminal history, as well as the fact that the informant would participate in the controlled buy of cocaine from Appellant, and that the informant had previously given information in another case that led to the seizure of a large amount of cocaine.
The majority’s approach here is contrary to this Court’s recent holding in Commonwealth v. Clark, 28 A.3d 1284 (Pa.2011).1 There, we stated that “an informant’s tip may constitute probable cause where police independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal activity.” Id. at 1288 (citing Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (1999) (emphasis in original)). In Clark, we rejected the conclusion of the lower courts that the affidavit was infirm because it contained no express statement quantifying the informant’s reliability or basis of knowledge, and stated that “[b]oth lower courts failed to look at the information as a whole, but examined and considered individual factors in a mechanical fashion, effectively nullifying the mandate to assess the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1289. Here, in *422my view, the majority similarly fails to properly consider the totality of the circumstances, which included corroboration by the police of Appellant’s address, phone number, name, and criminal history, as well as the informant’s demonstrated past reliability, and his participation in the anticipated drug buy. More importantly, the totality of the circumstances here included the fact the search would be accomplished if, and only if, the anticipated drug buy was successful.
This is simply not a case in which the affiant requested a search warrant in anticipation of approaching a home or homes at random, seeking to purchase illegal drugs, and then entering if the occupant had drugs for sale. The investigation of Appellant was grounded in the information provided by a demonstrably reliable informant, who was to take part in a controlled drug buy. Moreover, the amount of drugs and marked “buy money” was not insignificant here: four ounces of cocaine were to be purchased for $3800 in pre-recorded bills. As in Coleman, supra, to disapprove of an anticipatory search warrant under these circumstances would force the police to wait until the actual occurrence of an anticipated drug buy, then proceed to a station house to prepare a warrant application, find a magistrate at night and seek approval, all the while risking that the evidence would disappear.
Where probable cause to search exists, the law does not require such risk. See Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655, 660-662 (2000) (holding that anticipatory search warrants pose no threat to settled views of probable cause and ensure independent pre-search review by a neutral magistrate, while at the same time providing police with the ability to respond quickly to ongoing criminality). This Court has aptly observed that “the purpose of warrant protection is not to pointlessly hinder the conscientious efforts of law enforcement to discover and address criminal activity: it is to ensure that, before intrusions are made, neutral judicial officers pass upon the question of the basis for a belief that evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched.” Coleman, supra at 564. That determination is to be made in a common *423sense, non-technical fashion in consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921, 925 (1985). Indeed, “probable cause ... is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Glass, supra at 662.
In my view, the majority here applies a hyper-technical test that focuses on individual factors regarding the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge to conclude that there was no probable cause to believe the controlled buy of cocaine at Appellant’s residence would occur. Under the totality of the circumstances, I would conclude that probable cause did exist, and was sufficiently demonstrated in the supporting affidavit upon which the anticipatory search warrant was sought. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins the dissenting opinion.

. In Clark, we reversed the determination of the lower courts that a search warrant affidavit was infirm for failure to expound, expressly, on the informant’s reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge, where the affidavit recited the circumstances of a successful controlled drug buy that corroborated the informant’s averments.