Court Opinion

ID: 9943482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:06:09.630395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:05.952093
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA
                                      COURT OF APPEAL
                                       FIRST CIRCUIT

                                      DOCKET NUMBER
                                        2023 KA 0781

                                  STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                           VERSUS

                                      TYLER J. JACKSON

                                                        Judgment Rendered:
                                                                             FEB 2 3 2024

                                      ON APPEAL FROM THE
EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION C
U
                            IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF IBERVILLE
                                      STATE OF LOUISIANA
                                  DOCKET NUMBER 629- 18

                   HONORABLE ALVIN BATISTE, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

        Prentice L. White                        Attorney for Defendant -Appellant
        Baton Rouge, Louisiana                   Tyler J. Jackson

        Antonio M. " Tony" Clayton               Attorneys for Plaintiff -Appellee
        District Attorney                        State of Louisiana
        Terri Russo Lacy
        Assistant District Attorney
        Port Allen, Louisiana

                BEFORE:         THERIOT, PENZATO, AND GREENE, JJ.
GREENE, J.

         A grand jury indicted the defendant, Tyler Jackson, with one count of second degree

murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 30. 1.       He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, the

jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new

trial and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole,

probation,   or   suspension    of   sentence.    The defendant now appeals, challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's failure to remove a juror. For the following

reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

                                                 FACTS

         On the evening of April 7, 2018, the victim, Thailan Cutno, attended a party at the

White Castle Community Center ( WCCC) with his friends Christian Harding and Henry

Broden, III.   While the group was in the gymnasium, an individual ran up and hit Mr. Cutno

on the head with a gun and then shot him in the chest and back, killing him.

         A few hours after the shooting, detectives with the Iberville Parish Sheriff's Office

 IPSO)    interviewed Mr.      Harding and Mr.      Broden, who provided a description of the

perpetrator.      Upon receiving information that the defendant was responsible for the

shooting,    detectives   generated      a   photographic    lineup   containing   the   defendant's

photograph, which they presented to Mr. Broden.               Mr.   Broden positively identified the

defendant as the shooter, and officers ultimately arrested and charged the defendant with

Mr. Cutno's murder.

                                SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

         In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder.

         A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process.

See U. S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. I, § 2.          In reviewing claims challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity

proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the entirety of the evidence, when viewed in

the light most favorable to the prosecution. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 821( B); Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U. S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Southall, 2022-

                                                    N
0746 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 2/ 23), 369 So -3d 925, 930. When analyzing circumstantial evidence,

La. R. S. 15: 438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied that the overall evidence

excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Southall, 369 So. 3d at 930.

        The due process standard does not require the reviewing court to determine whether

it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698, 703 ( per curiatn).

Rather, appellate review is limited to determining whether the facts established by the direct

evidence, and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence, are sufficient

for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Livous, 2018- 0016 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

9/ 24/ 18), 259 So. 3d 1036, 1040, writ denied, 2018- 1788 ( La. 4/ 15/ 19), 267 So. 3d 1130.

The weight given evidence is not subject to appellate review; therefore, an appellate court

will not reweigh evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. Id.

         Second degree murder is pertinently defined as the killing of a human being when

the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R. S. 14: 30. l(A)( 1).

Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the

offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to

act.   La. R. S. 14: 10( 1).   The State bears the burden of proving these statutory elements, as

well as the burden of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.                 State v.

Draughn, 2005- 1825 ( La. 1/ 17/ 07), 950 So. 2d 583, 593, cert. denied, 552 U. S. 1012, 128

S. Ct. 537, 169 L. Ed. 2d 377 ( 2007).     When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the

perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate

any reasonable probability of misidentification.       State v. Weary, 2003-3067 ( La. 4/ 24/ 06).

931 So. 2d 297, 311, cert denied, 549 U. S. 1062, 127 S. Ct. 682, 166 L. Ed. 2d 531 ( 2006). A

positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction.         Id    In this

case, the defendant only challenges the evidence insofar it relates to his identity as the

perpetrator, not the elements of the offense.

         Mr. Harding testified that he arrived at the party with Mr. Cutno and Mr. Broden at

around 10 or 11 p. m. Upon entering the gymnasium, they headed towards the middle of

the floor.    A video from Mr. Harding's cell phone was introduced into evidence; the video

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depicted Mr. Broden and Mr. Cutno in the foreground, as well as the lighting conditions in

the gymnasium.       After approximately 10 to 15 minutes, they entered the lobby, where Mr.

Cutno spoke with his cousin, Tremecia Porter.              Mr. Harding testified that, after the group

went back into the gymnasium about 10 minutes later, an individual ran up and hit Mr.

Cutno on the head with a gun twice.             Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden punched the attacker,

who then aimed the gun at them, then directly at Mr. Cutno, and fired two shots.                            Mr.

Harding testified that, although part of the gymnasium was dark, the area where Mr. Cutno

was shot was near a door where light was coming in, which allowed him to see the shooter's

face.'    Mr.   Harding admitted that when interviewed by officers after the shooting, he

incorrectly identified himself as " Christopher Hardin" and stated it was too dark to see the

shooter's face. However, he told officers that the shooter's hairstyle was dreads and he was

shorter than 6T' tall, which matched the description of the defendant, who had dreads and

was 5' 11" tall. 2 At trial, Mr. Harding identified the defendant as the person who shot Mr.

Cutno.

         Mr. Broden testified that he attended the party with Mr. Cutno and Mr. Harding,

where he observed Mr. Cutno talking to Ms. Porter inside the lobby. Upon walking back into

the gymnasium, he observed someone hit Mr. Cutno with a gun, after which he and Mr.

Harding punched the attacker. As the attacker prepared to shoot Mr. Cutno, Mr. Broden

saw his face and realized it was the defendant.3 Mr. Broden testified that the defendant

then shot Mr. Cutno and fled. Mr. Broden testified that, in his initial interview with officers

shortly after the shooting, he told them he barely saw the shooter's face and had never seen

the shooter before.4          However, he stated that two days after the murder, he identified the

defendant as the shooter in a photographic lineup. Mr. Broden further testified that the

shooter was approximately his height, either 5' 10" or 5' 11" tall, and subsequently identified

 Mr. Harding testified that he did not know who the defendant was at the time.

Z According to Mr. Harding, he did not tell officers the full truth because he wanted revenge and wanted to
locate the shooter himself.

3 Mr. Broden and the defendant attended the same high school for a period of time.

4 Like Mr. Harding, Mr. Broden testified that he initially withheld the truth from officers, because the two men
wanted to locate the shooter themselves.

                                                       4
the defendant, sitting in the courtroom, as the shooter. Finally, Mr. Broden testified that

Mr. Cutno and the defendant had issues with each other prior to the shooting.

        Ms. Porter testified that when she arrived at the party, she spoke with the defendant,

whose nickname is " Sunny," in the lobby. Mr. Cutno approached and asked why she was

speaking to the defendant, and the defendant asked why she was speaking to Mr. Cutno.

She told them that Mr. Cutno was her cousin and the defendant was her friend. Mr. Cutno

then cursed at the defendant and walked back into the gymnasium. Ms. Porter testified that

the defendant followed Mr. Cutno, and seconds later, Ms. Porter heard two gunshots.

        Dr. Michael Defatta, Chief Pathologist at the St. Tammany Parish Coroner's Office and

an expert in the field of forensic pathology, reviewed the autopsy report and photographs

in this case. Dr. Defatta testified that Mr. Cutno died from two gunshot wounds to the chest

        IPSO Detective Jeremy Balcuns testified that he received a phone call from Tmeria

Graves, who informed him that "Sunny" admitted on Instagram that he shot Mr. Cutno.                       He

also received a tip through Crime Stoppers that the defendant's brother, Telly Jackson, was

the shooter. 5 Upon further investigation, Detective Balcuns learned that Telly Jackson was

63" tall with a darker complexion, and that the defendant, who was 5' 11" tall with a medium

complexion, more accurately matched the description given by Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden.

After Mr. Broden identified the defendant as the shooter, Detective Balcuns prepared an

arrest warrant for the defendant.

        Detective Balcuns further testified he reviewed the defendant's cell phone records

and, shortly after the shooting, the defendant sent a text message to Brendan Washington,

stating: " I Just Got Me a Soul." 6 At 12: 47 a. m. on April 8, 2018, the defendant sent a text

message to his brother, Telly, asking him to tell their mother he did not want to turn himself

in because the police did not know who " did it."7 At 12: 48 a. m., the defendant sent a similar

text message to his cousin, asking him to advise '"T.J." ( referring to Telly) to call their mother

for the same reason.       At 12: 40 p. m., the defendant texted Mr. Washington: " Don' t Tell Bro

5 At the time of the trial, Telly Jackson was deceased.

6 The defendant is identified by his nickname, Sunny, in the text message extractions.
7
 Telly is identified as " Marlyana" in the text message extractions. However, Detective Balcuns confirmed the
phone number belonged to Telly.
                                                          5
Nothin. [ I don't] Wone Spooke Em."     On April 10, 2018, the defendant sent a text message

to Telly, warning him to stay out of sight.

       The defendant testified at trial and stated that he and his brother, Telly, arrived at

the party at approximately 11 p. m. on April 7, 2018. Upon entering the building, he spoke

to Ms. Porter, after which Mr. Cutno approached and asked why Ms. Porter was speaking to

the defendant.    Mr. Cutno cursed at him and then returned to the gymnasium.            The

defendant talked to Ms. Porter for a few more minutes before going into the gymnasium

and informing Telly of what Mr. Cutno said, to which Telly replied that the defendant had

nothing to worry about. The defendant testified that they separated and, about five to eight

minutes later, he heard gunshots. The defendant then ran outside and found Telly, at which

point they walked towards Adams Drive, which was one street over from the party.

       The defendant further testified he was unarmed the entire night and not in the area

of the gymnasium where Mr. Cutno was shot.         He denied shooting Mr. Cutno and further

denied having any problems with Mr. Cutno prior to the shooting. Regarding his actions

following the    shooting,   the   defendant testified   he and Telly were together      until

approximately 1: 30 a. m. According to the defendant, Telly used the defendant's phone to

send text messages to Mr. Washington, including the text message that stated: " I Just Got

Me a Soul."

       Pete Edwards, the warden of the Iberville Parish Jail, testified as a rebuttal witness

for the State regarding a phone call the defendant made to his grandmother when he

returned to jail after court recessed the previous day. The defendant's grandmother told

the defendant that Telly was not at the party on the night of the murder, to which the

defendant responded that he was, because " I put him on the scene." When his grandmother

asked for clarification, the defendant again stated that he placed Telly at the scene.

       On appeal, the defendant asserts the evidence presented at trial did not establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense.        Specifically, the

defendant claims that Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden's testimony was not credible and should

have been rejected by the jury because they initially lied to police.

       After a thorough review of the record, we find that a rational trier of fact, viewing

the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, could find the

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evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of second degree murder and the defendant's

identity as the perpetrator. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient

support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Dorsey, 2010- 0216 (La. 9/ 7/ 11), 74 So. 3d

603, 634, cert. denied, 566 U. S. 930, 132 S. Ct. 1859, 182 L. Ed. 2d 658 ( 2012).         Further,

where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends

upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of

the evidence, not its sufficiency.      Accordingly, on appeal, this Court will not assess the

credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of

guilt.   Southall, 369 So. 3d at 933.

         Herein, both Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden testified they were standing near the lobby,

which was better lit than the rest of the gymnasium, when they saw the shooter's face, and

Mr. Broden immediately recognized the defendant from high school. Further, Mr. Harding

and Mr. Broden punched the shooter during the altercation, indicating they were physically

close to him.   Although Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden initially lied to officers about seeing the

shooter's face, they both provided a similar, accurate description of the incident, as well as

the shooter's complexion, height, hairstyle, and clothing, within hours of the shooting. When

Mr. Broden was brought in to identify the shooter in a photographic lineup two days after

the murder, he identified the defendant, who matched the initial description given to

officers.   Finally, at trial, both Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden positively identified the defendant

as the individual who shot Mr. Cutno. Accordingly, the jury could have rationally concluded

that Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden, who were in close proximity to the perpetrator in a lit

area, had a good view of the individual and properly identified the defendant as the shooter.

See State v. Cockerham, 2017- 0535 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 21/ 17), 231 So. 3d 698, 704-05, writ

denied, 2017- 1802 ( La.      6/ 15/ 18),   245   So. 3d   1035 (   rejecting defendant's theory of

misidentification where victim saw the defendant " pretty good" outside in the dark on night

of incident and identified defendant shortly after the incident and again at trial).

         Moreover, Mr. Broden acknowledged at trial that he originally lied to officers but

insisted he was telling the truth before the jury, and was 100% certain the defendant was

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the   shooter.    Mr.   Harding likewise admitted he was not forthcoming with officers

immediately after the shooting but stated he was truthful at trial and had no doubt the

defendant killed Mr. Cutno.   We note the fact that Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden initially lied

to officers does not render their testimony insufficient to support a conviction. Rather, any

discrepancy between their prior statements and the in -court testimony goes to the weight

of the evidence, not its sufficiency.      See State v. Coleman, 2017- 1045 ( La.   App. 1 Cir.

4/ 13/ 18), 249 So. 3d 872, 878- 83, writ denied, 2018- 0830 ( La. 2/ 18/ 19), 263 So. 3d 1155

 concluding sufficient evidence existed for second degree murder conviction, although two

eyewitnesses initially denied seeing anything immediately after shooting, but later identified

the defendant as the perpetrator).

        In addition to witness testimony, the State introduced the defendant's phone records

into evidence, which corroborated Mr. Broden and Mr.           Harding' s identification of the

defendant as the shooter.     Although the defendant claimed Telly used his phone to send

several text messages, including the message stating " I Just Got Me a Soul," he was unable

to explain why he was attempting to text Telly during the same time period he testified to

being with Telly. Thus, a jury could have rationally concluded the defendant was not with

Telly after the shooting as he claimed. Moreover, the jury could have further concluded

that, because he was not with Telly, the defendant was the person who sent the message

stating " I Just Got Me a Soul," which, according to Detective Balcuns, could mean that he

killed someone.

        Finally, mere hours after he testified, the defendant called his grandmother, who

repeatedly told him that Telly was not at the party that night. However, the defendant

insisted that Telly was there because " I put him on the scene." Accordingly, the jury could

have reasonably inferred that Telly was never at the party, as the defendant's own

grandmother suggested, and that the defendant, in implicating his then -deceased brother

in the crime, lied during his testimony.

        In finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, it is clear the jury rejected

the defendant's theory of innocence and that Telly was the shooter. The jury heard the

conflicting testimony and chose to believe Mr. Harding and Mr. Broden's testimony, rather

than the defendant's.    The eyewitnesses' detailed accounts, including their identification of

                                                 1.1
the defendant as the shooter, were corroborated by the defendant's phone records and the

phone call to his grandmother.     Accordingly, in reviewing the evidence presented at trial,

we cannot say the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty of the second degree

murder of Mr. Cutno was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State

v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So. 2d 654, 662.       An appellate court errs by

substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the

factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of

innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-

2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 ( per curiam). Thus, assignment of error number one

lacks merit.

                               FAILURE TO REMOVE JUROR

       In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court violated his

right to a fair trial by denying his motion to remove a juror who believed he was attacked

due to his presence on the jury.

       In all criminal prosecutions, a defendant has the right to a fair and impartial jury.

U. S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const. art. I, § 16; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149, 88

S. Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 ( 1968). It is essential that all facts considered by the jury

be presented in the courtroom with the full protection of the defendant's rights to

confrontation and due process. State v. Lebouef, 2018-0023 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 18), 2018

WL 2453674, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2018- 1070 ( La. 11/ 14/ 18), 256 So. 3d 286,

citing State v. Sinegal, 393 So. 2d 684, 686 ( La. 1981). If there is a reasonable possibility

that extraneous information considered by the jury affected its verdict, a new trial is

mandated.      Lebouef, 2018 WL 2453674 at * 3.

       When there is an allegation that a juror must be replaced, the trial court should hold

an evidentiary hearing with all parties to determine if the juror needs to be removed.        See

State v. Fuller, 454 So. 2d 119, 123 ( La. 1984); also see Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S.

227, 229- 30, 74 S. Ct. 450, 451- 52, 98 L. Ed. 654 ( 1954). After trial has commenced, a sworn

juror may be removed only if he is deemed " incompetent to serve" because of death, illness,

or any other cause that renders him unfit or disqualified to perform his duty as prescribed.

See La. C. Cr. P. art. 796; State v. Cass, 356 So. 2d 396, 397- 98 ( La. 1977).   The trial court

                                                E
has the discretion to remove and replace a juror when the court finds the juror is not

impartial. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 789( A);     State v. Colbert, 2007-0947 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 7/ 23/ 08),

990 So. 2d 76, 90, writ denied, 2008- 2098 ( La. 5/ 15/ 09), 8 So. 3d 579; see State v. Maillian,

464 So. 2d 1071, 1077- 78 ( La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 469 So. 2d 982 ( La. 1985).                   A trial

court may also remove and replace a juror when the juror has either the real or potential

for bias in the deliberations.       State v. Moran, 54, 281 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 5/ 25/ 22), 338 So. 3d

1229, 1240, writ denied, 2022- 00935 ( La. 10/ 12/ 22), 348 So. 3d 75, cert. denied,                       U. S.

      143 S. Ct. 815, 215 L. Ed. 2d 68 ( 2023).

        In this case, on the last day of trial, prior to the State's rebuttal witness and closing

arguments, defense counsel moved to strike a juror, Tim Guercio. During an off-the- record,

in -chambers meeting with the trial court and all counsel, and outside the presence of the

defendant, Mr.      Guercio stated that when he was driving home the previous evening,

something shattered his car window. Mr. Guercio was scared and shaken up, as he believed

someone fired a gun at his vehicle because he was sitting as a juror in the instant case.

When police arrived,        however, they showed him a surveillance video depicting a truck

passing by and assured him his vehicle had not been shot. After watching the video, Mr.

Guercio apparently stated he believed his window shattered because of a rock or some other

accident.   When questioned by the trial court, Mr. Guercio indicated he could " set all of that

aside" and still render a fair and impartial verdict. The trial court then instructed Mr. Guercio

not to discuss the incident with the other jurors.$

        Thereafter, the trial court held a sidebar discussion with all counsel, whereupon

defense counsel argued Mr. Guercio was unable to set aside his belief that the defendant

was capable of intimidating him and thus unable to render a fair and impartial verdict. The

trial court denied the defendant's motion to excuse Mr. Guercio, finding no reason to doubt

Mr. Guercio's competency to continue to serve as a juror.9 The trial court noted the incident

happened " momentarily" and stated it believed Mr. Guercio " set [ the incident] aside." While

the jury deliberated, the trial court brought Mr. Guercio into the courtroom for a sidebar

8 The discussion with Mr. Guercio is not contained in the record. After the in -chambers meeting, the trial court
summarized Mr. Guercio's statements regarding the incident, as well as his responses to the trial court's
questions, on the record.

9 We note the trial court relied on La. CUR art. 787, which governs the disqualification of prospective jurors.
Article 787 is inapplicable herein, as Mr. Guercio had already been sworn in by the trial court.
                                                       10
discussion with counsel.        The trial court asked whether Mr. Guercio discussed the incident

with the other jurors, and he said he had not.

         On appeal, the defendant asserts Mr. Guercio's belief that the defendant attempted

to intimidate or influence him potentially compromised the rest of the jury, and the trial

court's subsequent refusal to remove and replace Mr. Guercio violated the defendant's right

to a fair and impartial jury. The defendant further argues that the trial court failed to

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the record to allow both parties to question Mr. Guercio

under oath.

         In State v. Collins, 02- 546 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 11/ 26/ 02), 833 So. 2d 476, 477- 78, writ

denied, 2003- 0059 ( La. 10/ 3/ 03), 855 So. 2d 307, the defendant moved for a mistrial after

several jurors informed the trial court that they felt threatened and intimidated by menacing

gestures made by the defendant's brother. During a closed hearing, most jurors stated they

were not intimidated, and each juror indicated they could remain fair and impartial.            Id. at

479.     The trial court then denied the motion and implemented safety measures to protect

the jurors.       Id. at 479.   The Fifth Circuit found the defendant was not prejudiced by his

brother's actions and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court' s denial of the motion.

Id.

         The Second Circuit similarly found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of

a defendant's motion for mistrial after two jurors were threatened by the defendant's

brother.       State v. Williams, 45, 755 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 11/ 3/ 10), 54 So. 3d 1129, 1140- 41, writs

denied, 2010- 2682, 2010- 2706 ( La. 4/ 25/ 11), 62 So. 3d 85, 89.         When questioned by the

trial court, both jurors indicated they neither felt threatened nor targeted as jurors, nor did

they believe the incident would affect their ability to serve as a juror. Id. at 1140. The trial

court then excluded the defendant's brother from the courtroom for the remainder of the

trial.   Id.    Noting the trial court conducted a careful inquiry into the incident, the appellate

court found no error in the trial court's refusal to remove the jurors. Id. at 1140- 41.

          Herein, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to remove Mr. Guercio

as a juror. The trial court questioned Mr. Guercio and determined that he could set aside

the incident and remain fair and impartial. Mr. Guercio stated on the record that he did not

share the information with anyone. The trial court was able to hear Mr. Guercio' s responses,

                                                     11
as well as observe the manner in which his answers were given, the tone of his voice, and

his overall demeanor. Furthermore, we note the defendant did not object to the trial court's

recitation of what happened to Mr. Guercio or what Mr. Guercio said regarding his ability to

remain fair and impartial.   In fact, defense counsel acknowledged that Mr. Guercio stated

he could be fair. Thus, it appears the defendant acquiesced to the substance of Mr. Guercio's

statements but doubted his ability to remain impartial. Ultimately, the trial court was in the

best position to assess Mr. Guercio's credibility and believed that Mr. Guercio could remain

fair and impartial. See Williams, 54 So. 3d at 1140- 41; Collins, 833 So. 2d at 478- 79.

        Moreover, while the defendant contends he was not afforded a hearing on the

matter, the record clearly reflects otherwise. After the trial court placed the substance of

Mr. Guercio's in -chambers statements on the record, all parties had the opportunity to

respond.   Furthermore, the defendant did not request an opportunity to question Mr. Guercio

under oath on the record. See Lebouef,2018 WL 2453674 at * 3. Accordingly, the defendant

has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to remove Mr. Guercio

as a juror.

       Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

       CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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