Court Opinion

ID: 9445976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:42:57.720267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:28.686326
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
In Lyles v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. -, - F.2d -, the Court sitting en banc has held that, in a case where the defense of insanity is fairly raised and it does not appear that the defendant does not desire such an instruction, it is error for the trial judge not to inform the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
“means that the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent has certified, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or to others, in which event and at which time the court shall order his release either unconditionally or under such conditions as the court may see fit.” 1
In the present case the defense of insanity was 'fairly raised, and defense counsel in his argument to the jury sought'to advise the jury of the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by rea*369son of insanity. It follows that it cannot be said defendant did not wish the instruction. Upon the authority of Lyles, therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We point out, however, that the better practice is for the trial judge, rather than for counsel, to give the explanation to the jury.
Questions regarding the procedure for determining appellant’s mental competency to stand trial, which arose because of changes in the statute while the proceedings were under way,2 need not be decided since they are unlikely to arise again. In event of a new trial if appellant’s competency to stand trial need be determined the proceedings would necessarily fall within the present statute.
Appellant complains that the court’s charge on the defense of insanity did not include a requested instruction that if the jury should find that at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed Catlin was suffering from a mental disease to which the commission of the offense was attributable it should find him not guilty by reason of insanity even though the jury should further find that he was able to distinguish right from wrong and did not act under an irresistible impulse. There was no evidence with respect to appellant’s ability to distinguish right from wrong, or that he acted by reason of an irresistible impulse. There was accordingly no need for the trial judge to go into these matters.
Reversed and remanded.

. The proceedings were initiated and pursued in May, June, and the early days of August 1955, when 18 U.S.C. § 4244 was in effect, but were concluded on August 18, 1955, when said section had been, superseded by Pub.L. No. 313, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 9, 1955), 69 Stat. 610, D.C.Code § 24-301 (Supp. V, 1956).