Court Opinion

ID: 9725495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:50:13.312466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.907450
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The trial court should not have admitted testimony from the state psychologist concerning statements made by defendant during a 1991 court-ordered examination to determine her fitness to stand trial. The statements made by defendant during the fitness examination fell squarely within the terms of section 104 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 — 14 (West 1992)), and their admission was specifically prohibited. Although trial counsel failed to make the appropriate objections to the psychologist’s testimony, admission of that testimony denied defendant her right to a fair trial and constituted plain error. The majority invokes Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987), to avoid this conclusion, but nothing in Buchanan legitimizes the introduction at trial and sentencing of statements made by a defendant during a court-ordered fitness hearing where, as here, a statute expressly prohibits their use. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) prohibits the prosecution of a person who is unfit to stand trial. People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 455 (1994). The legislature has enacted a detailed statutory scheme to ensure that that prohibition is honored, and section 104 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of that scheme. In ruling as it has, the majority has rendered section 104 — 14 a nullity. By so doing, it has taken something that was intended to protect the integrity of the criminal process and subverted it into a trap for defendants who may be suffering from mental or psychological impairments. From this day forward, any defendant who cooperates with a court-ordered fitness hearing does so at his own peril. Under the majority’s analysis, trial courts will be free to disregard the terms of section 104 — 14 without risk of reversal, even where a timely objection is made, just as long as there is enough other evidence to support a conviction. For my colleagues, it is simply a question of the ends justifying the means. In my view, the concept of a fair trial involves considerably more than that. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.