Court Opinion

ID: 9778511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:10:29.512897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:21.764671
License: Public Domain

BENAVIDES, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because I disagree with certain majority findings relating to the eighth point of error. The majority finds that because appellants failed to present in the record on appeal certain depositions and documents, that they cannot show good cause, and that such matters (the depositions and documents) are critical to a determination of good cause. I would not determine the point of error on such grounds of waiver. However, I agree that the point of error should be overruled as I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion.
The majority determines that because the depositions and the supplementary answers to interrogatories are not in the record, they cannot properly review whether good cause was shown and implicitly finds the appellants’ point fails because the appellants did not present such documents in the record on appeal. In my view, the depositions and the supplementary answers to interrogatories are unnecessary to a review of the trial judge’s determination. In *708determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we review whether the trial court acted without reference to the guiding rules and principles regarding a determination of good cause. See Morrow v. H.E.B., 714 S.W.2d at 298. Whether the trial judge properly determined that good cause was not shown can be determined by examining the testimony of the attorneys at the hearing on good cause in light of the principles and rules determining good cause.
A showing of good cause is two-part. First, a showing of good cause to permit testimony must encompass a showing of good cause for the offering party’s failure to timely respond to proper discovery requests. Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 646; Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex.1985); Ramos v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 750 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). When a witness’s knowledge of relevant facts is first established through matters discovered and developed during trial, the failure to timely supplement answers to interrogatories is justified. See Tinkle v. Henderson, 777 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, no writ).
On the other hand, where a party is aware of the name of an individual and should have reason to believe that the person had knowledge of relevant facts, but does not contact that person until immediately before trial to determine whether they do have knowledge of relevant facts, there must be a showing of a good faith effort to locate the person or a showing of the party’s inability to anticipate the use of the witness’s testimony at trial in order to show good cause. Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 647; see also Yeldell, 701 S.W.2d at 246-47.
Second, good cause must be established for allowing the testimony. See Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex.1989); E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex.1987). When a witness is offered as a rebuttal witness, there is good cause to allow his testimony if the witness’s use as a rebuttal witness could not be anticipated prior to the testimony given at trial. (Emphasis added). Gannett Outdoor Co. of Texas v. Kubeczka, 710 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); see also Tinkle, 777 S.W.2d at 540.
At the hearing on good cause, which was held after the defense rested, appellant’s attorney stated that he designated Chamberlain as a witness to rebut the testimony that was given by Roland Garcia at trial and at deposition before trial. Appellant’s attorney took Garcia’s deposition during the week before trial despite knowing about him and his knowledge of relevant facts for two years. Although appellant’s attorney supplemented his answers to interrogatories immediately upon discovering Chamberlain’s apparent knowledge of relevant facts, he would have known of Chamberlain’s potential knowledge well in advance of trial had he made a good faith effort to locate Garcia. Hence, he could have supplemented the answers to the interrogatories in a timely manner. Further, according to appellant’s attorney, the need for Chamberlain’s testimony did not arise only from testimony given at trial; the need for Chamberlain to rebut testimony became apparent before trial, during Garcia’s deposition.
Here, the actual statements which Chamberlain was to rebut are irrelevant to his late designation as a witness or the pretrial realization of the need for his rebuttal testimony. The majority is incorrect that the deposition was “critical to appellants’ showing of good cause.... ” I am unwilling to agree that appellants needed to provide Garcia’s deposition as part of the record; the determination that appellants had failed to show good cause was properly made and is reviewable without the deposition.
During the week before trial, appellants’ attorney also designated Martinez and Alonzo as witnesses. According to appellants’ attorney, he knew about these two individuals, who were related to his clients by marriage, and their possible knowledge of relevant facts and the need for their rebuttal testimony before trial. Appel*709lants’ attorney knew of Martinez and Alonzo and did not designate them as individuals with knowledge of relevant facts until it was too late for his opponent to take their depositions. Counsel showed no good cause for his failure to timely designate Martinez and Alonzo as witnesses, nor did he show good cause to admit their testimony. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and therefore, properly excluded Alonzo and Martinez.
As with Chamberlain, appellants’ attorney referred to Rene Sosa’s deposition as the pre-trial source of the information requiring rebuttal. As before, the actual statements which Martinez and Alonzo were to rebut are irrelevant to their late designation as a witnesses or to the pre-trial realization of the need for the rebuttal testimony. Again, I cannot agree with the majority that the deposition was “critical to appellants’ showing of good cause....” I am unwilling to agree that Sosa’s deposition is necessary to our review of whether appellants established good cause.
Further, I fail to see why the supplementary answers to the interrogatories are “critical to appellants’ showing of good cause,” much less necessary at all. At the hearing on the issue of good cause, it was undisputed by the attorneys for each party that the designations of these additional witnesses were not made until during the week before trial.
Undisputed statements of the attorneys made during a hearing on good cause do not need to be corroborated with documentary evidence. To require corroborating evidence, either in the form of depositions or other discovery or documents would make the hearing on good cause unduly burdensome. Attorneys are officers of the court and the trial court can consider their testimony, as can this court, without corroborating evidence. As a practical matter, trial attorneys, because of their knowledge of the history of the case and the particular development of the facts of each case before trial, are ordinarily in the best position to relate the circumstances that would justify or fail to justify a failure to timely designate witnesses at a good cause hearing. To require supporting documentation of their unchallenged representations regarding good cause would serve no purpose and would burden and complicate the trial proceedings as well as create an unnecessary obstacle to appellate review. I therefore disagree with the majority holding that in this ease such documents are critical to a determination and the majority decision to overrule point of error eight because such are not included in the record before us. However, since I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion, I agree with the majority decision overruling the appellants’ eighth point of error and its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court.