Court Opinion

ID: 9547545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:48:40.760636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:50.773681
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the court did not err in ruling that evidence of defendant’s prior conviction was admissible. I also agree that the minimum sentence imposed *499was lawful. However, I disagree with the majority that separate sentences were lawfully imposed for each conviction. I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the judgment.
The analysis begins with certain settled principles. An indictment for burglary must include a specific allegation of the crime the accused intended to commit upon entry of the building. The accused may also be indicted for commission or attempted commission of the intended crime. The allegations of the burglary charge and the intended crime may be submitted to the jury, and the jury may properly find the accused guilty of both charges. State v. Cloutier, 286 Or 579, 596 P2d 1278 (1979). However, the court may not enter a judgment of conviction, nor sentence the accused, on both the burglary and the crime he intended to commit. State v. Cloutier, supra.
A problem of multiple sentences arises when the accused is convicted of more than one crime after the unlawful entry or a crime different from that originally intended. The problem becomes more intense because of the nature of burglary and the proof of the requisite intent element.
The crime of burglary is complete when the accused trespasses with the concurrent intent to commit a crime. If he does nothing else after the unlawful entry, he is subject to the maximum penalty for burglary. If he commits the intended crime, he is still subject only to the maximum penalty for burglary or the penalty for the crime committed if that penalty is greater than that for burglary.
The gravamen of burglary is not just the breaking and entering but the trespass coupled with the probability, based on the intent of the burglar, of a more serious crime than unlawful entry. As Cloutier holds, the legislature could not have intended that an accused be punished for burglary and the intended crime. The penalty for burglary was designed to punish the probability as well as the actual crime accomplished. The analysis must then include an appraisal of what the accused intended after the unlawful entry.
That intent element is rarely proven by evidence of the burglar’s thought process. In the ordinary case, it is established by the circumstances of the entry or what actually occurred following the trespass. If, after entry, the accused in *500fact steals property of the occupants, the jury may infer that that was the intent of the entry.
Because an indictment for burglary must include an allegation of a specific criminal act that was intended, there is of necessity some precision required in describing the accused’s intent. It, however, defies reality to suppose that a burglar’s thought process is as precise as the statutory elements of a particular crime. A burglar may enter with a purpose to take whatever he deems of value and to confront the occupants with force if necessary. An ingenious prosecutor can carve out a number of specific crimes from the post entry conduct of the accused and argue that these separate crimes are based on a different intent from that formed before the initial unlawful entry.
In this case, the indictment alleged that defendant unlawfully entered the dwelling with intent to commit the crime of theft. There was no separate charge of theft, but two separate counts alleged robbery of the two occupants. The majority dissects the defendant’s purpose into thin slices and microscopically examines each slice to conclude he formed additional purposes to rob after the unlawful entry with the single intent to steal property in the dwelling. After quoting extensively from Irby v. United States, 390 F2d 432 (DC Cir 1967), the majority says:
“* * * Defendant achieved a separate criminal objective when he committed the robberies and that he thereby subjected himself to cumulative sentences. * * *” 71 Or App at 498.
Defendant’s intent when entering the dwelling was simply to take some property. He was armed with a knife and a can of mace, and he wore a mask. That indicated he was prepared to use force, if necessary, and to prevent identification by the occupants of the dwelling. He was prepared to do those things which are described as robbery when he entered the dwelling. Describing the intent element of the burglary as simply intent to commit the crime of theft is not consistent with the reality of human thought and the facts of this case. The fact that he did the things which made the crime robbery, rather than simply theft, does not change the basic intent to take property by whatever means was necessary. In other words, he entered, armed and masked, to commit theft or *501robbery as might become necessary. Because the legislature could not have intended that a defendant be punished separately for burglary and the intended crime, State v. Cloutier, supra, I conclude that the separate sentence for burglary is improper.
My analysis raises an additional problem: whether defendant can properly be sentenced separately for each robbery he committed. Although my conclusion may defy the logic of that analysis, I conclude that separate sentences are proper. Although there was a single criminal objective, to enter and take property, by force if necessary, the immediate objective of forcibly taking property from the first victim was fully accomplished. The second robbery was an intermediate crime toward and the larger objective of the initial burglary. Under State v. Kessler, 297 Or 460, 686 P2d 345 (1984), as I understand it, the separate crimes are subject to cumulative punishment. This is different from the analysis of Cloutier regarding a burglary and the accomplishment of the purpose of the unlawful entry.
The judgment of conviction for burglary and the resultant sentence for that offense should be set aside and the convictions and sentences on the robberies affirmed.
I dissent. Joseph, C. J., and Warren and Newman, JJ., join in this dissent.