Court Opinion

ID: 9626452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:12:40.81717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:38.734121
License: Public Domain

Justice Webb
dissenting.
I dissent. I believe it was error to excuse prospective juror William E. Jackson for cause. Mr. Jackson was excused based on the following colloquy:
The Court: Please listen very carefully, Mr. Jackson, to the following questions. Consider your responses carefully before you respond. If you are selected to serve as a juror in this case, can and will you follow the law as it will be explained to you by the Court in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of first-degree murder or of any other lesser offense?
Juror: Yes, sir.
The Court: If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those things necessary to constitute first-degree murder, can and will you vote to return a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder even though you know that death is one of the possible penalties?
Juror: Yes, sir.
The Court: Considering your personal beliefs . . . about the death penalty, please state for me whether you would be able or unable to vote for a recommendation of the death penalty even though you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the three things required by law concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances previously mentioned.
Juror: I don’t know whether I could vote on the death penalty.
The Court: Is that response an able or unable response, sir?
Juror: Unable to respond to that.
*293The Court: Unable. Thank you.
Mr. Staten — Jackson, excuse me. If the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, can and will you follow the law of North Carolina as to the sentence recommendation to be made by the jury as the Court will explain it?
Juror: Yes, sir.
The majority, relying on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734-35, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 506 (1992), says “general ‘follow the law’ questions are not sufficient to ‘detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially impairing their duties in accordance with their instructions and oath.’ ” I submit that in the context of the colloquy in this case, the questions to Mr. Jackson were far more than general follow the law questions.
Mr. Jackson was asked questions concerning the death penalty. He said that he would return a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder if he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those things necessary to constitute first-degree murder although he knew death would be a possible penalty. He then said he was unable to respond to a question as to his ability to vote for the death penalty if he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those things which require the death penalty. The court then asked Mr. Jackson whether he could follow the law as to the sentence recommendation if the defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder. Mr. Jackson said, “Yes, sir.”
The last question asked Mr. Jackson was not a general “follow the law” question. It was a specific “follow the law” question directed at his ability to vote for the death penalty. Mr. Jackson had been told that there would be a trial to determine guilt and then a proceeding to determine whether the penalty would be death. He had to know when questioned about the sentencing proceeding that he was being asked whether he could vote for the death penalty, and he said that he could do so.
It appears to me that Mr. Jackson gave an ambiguous answer when he said he was unable to respond to the question about his ability to impose the death penalty. He then answered “Yes” with no ambiguity when he was asked a question which could only be interpreted as asking him whether he would vote for the death penalty if it was required by law. I believe it was error to excuse Mr. Jackson on this showing.
*294I vote for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Rannels, 333 N.C. 644, 655, 430 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1993).
Justice FRYE joins in this dissenting opinion.