Court Opinion

ID: 9765975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:27:17.526837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:17.676288
License: Public Domain

*675COLEMAN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of the Court. Appellant’s point of error that the court erred in concluding that any part of her claim was barred by limitation is sufficient to direct the attention of the Court to the fact that the statutes of limitation of the State of California applicable to appellant’s cause of action did not bar appellant’s claim contrary to the ruling of the trial court. Appellant has briefed this point, and therefore, has neither abandoned nor waived it. However the argument made in her brief has not persuaded us that the action of the trial court in applying a limitation period of five years requires reversal. It appears from the briefs, both of appellant and ap-pellee, that neither party was aware of the fact that the California statute under consideration was amended prior to the filing of this case to enlarge the period of limitation from five years to ten years. It is my feeling that where the attention of the appellate court is directed to an erroneous ruling of the trial court by a point in appellant’s brief, the fact that appellant has failed to advance in her argument the particular grounds upon which the point properly could be sustained cannot alter the judgment that this Court is required to enter.
While appellant’s point does not point out why the court erred, it did point out with some degree of certainty the nature of the complaint. It is the policy of the appellate courts to indulge a liberal construction in favor of the sufficiency of a point of error. Johnson-Sampson Construction Co. v. W. & W. Waterproofing Co., Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W.2d 926, err. ref., n. r. e.; Crawford v. Continental Panhandle Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 278 S.W.2d 566; Houston-American Finance Corp. v. Travis, Tex.Civ.App., 343 S.W.2d 323, err. ref., n. r. e.; Old Line Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tilger, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W.2d 557; Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Wichita Falls & Southern R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 629; Rule 431, T.R.C.P.
In this case, however, I would not reverse the judgment entered by the trial court by reason of the failure to properly apply the law of California. Rule 184a, T.R.C.P., provides:
“The judge upon the motion of either party shall take judicial notice of the common law, public statutes, and court decisions of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. Any party requesting, that judicial notice be taken of such matter shall furnish the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply with the request, and shall give each adverse party such notice, if any, as the judge may deem necessary, to enable the adverse party fairly to prepare to meet the request. The rulings of the judge on such matters shall be subject to review. Promulgated by order of June 16, 1943, effective December 31, 1943; amended by order of October 10, 1945, effective February 1, 1946.”
As has been pointed out in the opinion of the court, the trial court properly took notice of the Law of California. The rule places on the party requesting that the court take judicial notice of the law of another state the duty to furnish to the court sufficient information to properly comply with the request. It also gives to the opposing party the right to meet the request. This provision should be construed to mean that such party should have the right to contest the propriety of taking judicial notice of the law and also to point out any error in the information presented by the requesting party and to supplement such information to the end that the trial judge is in fact properly informed of the law. The ruling of the trial court on the question of what the law of another state is would be subject to review on appeal by the terms of Rule 184a, supra. Where the opposing party fails to present to the trial judge information indicating that the information presented by the moving party is incorrect or incomplete, he impliedly agrees *676that the law has been correctly presented and should not be permitted to question that fact on appeal. King v. Bruce, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 830, Rev. on other grounds 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, 171 A.L.R. 1328; Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., Tex.Com.App., 11 S.W.2d 778, rehearing den. 14 S.W.2d 819; Boatner v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., Tex.Com.App., 241 S.W. 136; Johnson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 131 Tex. 357, 112 S.W.2d 449; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Eyer, 96 Tex. 72, 70 S.W. 529; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shelton, 30 Tex.Civ.App. 72, 69 S.W. 653, aff’d 96 Tex. 301, 72 S.W. 165; Ward v. Wingate, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W.2d 938; Benritto v. Fransen, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W.2d 758.