Court Opinion

ID: 9766080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:20.190273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.293921
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, I do not believe that the record has been sufficiently developed in this case to allow this Court to make a definitive determination as to whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the wife. I therefore respectfully dissent from Division 3.
Although an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 (a) (1) is left to “the sound discretion of the trial court [after the court has] consider [ed] the financial circumstances of both parties” (id.), “[t]he purpose of allowing attorney fees is to ensure effective representation of both spouses so that all issues can be fully and fairly resolved.” (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Johnson, 260 Ga. 443, 444 (396 SE2d 234) (1990). Here, it is undisputed that the wife earned over three-and-a-half times husband’s imputed monthly income of $2,000.8 With such a large disparity in income between the parties, it is difficult to understand why the party who made significantly more income was the one who needed to be awarded attorney fees in order “to ensure [her] effective representation ... so that all issues [could] be fully and fairly resolved” at the divorce hearing. Id.
The trial court’s order does nothing to clarify the reason why an award of attorney fees to the party who earned over three-and-a-half times the income of the other was necessary to ensure her effective *504representation, as the order merely states:
Decided July 5, 2010.
Hait & Eichelzer, Elizabeth J. Kuhn, for appellant.
Bray & Johnson, Roger M. Johnson, for appellee.
The court considered both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees and considering the respective financial circumstances of the parties and the evidence presented at trial, the court awards attorney’s fees to the [wife] in the amount of Three Thousand Dollars and the court orders that the husband pay Three Thousand Dollars as attorney’s fees to the wife within twelve months from the date of this order.
This bare-boned recitation of the necessary evidentiary standard does not explain how an award of attorney fees to the wife may or may not have been justified in light of the significant income gap between the parties. Due to the lack of any reasoned explanation, this Court can only guess as to whether or not the trial court’s award amounted to an abuse of discretion. Such guesswork is inappropriate, and I would therefore vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees and remand this case to the trial court with the direction that the court explain why, in light of the income gap between the parties and their respective financial circumstances, an award of attorney fees to wife was necessary “to ensure [her] effective representation.” Johnson, supra, 260 Ga. at 444. See also, e.g., Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331 (2) (676 SE2d 212) (2009) (remanding issue of attorney fees to trial court where basis for portion of award to husband not entirely clear after order holding wife in contempt was reversed).9
I therefore respectfully dissent from Division 3.1 am authorized to state that Justice Nahmias joins in this opinion.

 Indeed, there is no evidence of record that the husband had an actual income of $2,000 per month at the time of the hearing.

 To the extent that the trial court may have been intending to base its award of attorney fees on the wife’s request for such fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 (“attorney’s fees assessed for frivolous actions and defenses”), the case would still have to be remanded to the trial court for clarification of its order. See Reese v. Grant, 277 Ga. 799 (596 SE2d 139) (2004) (where order was silent as to whether or not attorney fees were awarded pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 or OCGA § 19-6-2, and where order failed to set forth findings of fact to support an award under OCGA § 9-15-14, this Court vacated the award and remanded the case to the trial court “for further clarification of the trial court’s intent and the basis for its ruling”).