Court Opinion

ID: 9724426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:56:21.715748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:00.177750
License: Public Domain

AGLIANO, P. J.,
Dissenting. — I would affirm. The trial court correctly decided that once the determinate sentence has been served, the unused presentence credits are to be applied, in this case, to the ensuing period of imprisonment ordered upon revocation of petitioner’s parole. While Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (c) is not a model of clarity, it sufficiently dictates that the unused credits be applied to such period of imprisonment.
Subdivision (c) defines the “term of imprisonment” to which presentence credits are to be applied as including “any period of imprisonment prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole, prior to discharge, . . .” The Legislature thus identifies two periods of imprisonment to which presentence credits might apply — the prison term imposed by the court and any period of imprisonment ordered by the Board of Prison Terms upon parole revocation. The sentencing scheme, in the context of determinate sentencing, indeed contemplates that the defendant will, unless waived by the Board, be on parole for up to three years (Pen. Code, §§ 1170, subds. (c) and (e), 3000), and that he may be reconfined while on parole (Pen. Code, § 3057). As provided in Penal Code section 3056, *857“[p]risoners on parole shall remain under the legal custody of the department and shall be subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure of the prison.”
The majority restricts the application of presentence credits to the prison term imposed by the court and beyond that, to the period of parole only. This view gives no effect to the statute’s words that the credits also be applied to the period of “imprisonment and parole ” in addition to the period of imprisonment prior to release on parole. It also ignores the rule that “[i]n the construction of a statute . . . the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and . . . such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; Weber v. County of Santa Barbara (1940) 15 Cal.2d 82, 86 [98 P.2d 492].)
I further disagree with the majority’s resort to subdivision (b) of section 2900.5 as an aid to statutory construction. Subdivision (b) deals with the completely unrelated problem of credit allocation when multiple charges underlie presentence confinement. We do not, in the case before us, face an issue of multiple credits for a single period of confinement. (Cf. People v. Esparza (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 458 [229 Cal.Rptr. 739].) In fact, somewhat the converse is true.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 20, 1987, pursuant to rule 27(e), California Rules of Court. Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 29, 1987.