Court Opinion

ID: 2964804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:22.382426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.945531
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 95-2060
                                   NIMIA M. RAMOS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                              MANUEL LUJAN, II, ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                     [Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            Nimia M. Ramos Beauchamp on brief pro se.
            Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Fidel A. Sevillano Del
       Rio, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                    July 16, 1997
                                ____________________

                      Per Curiam.   Appellant  Ramos-Beauchamp  ("Ramos")
            brought this  suit against  various officials  of her  former
            employer, 
                     the 
                        Department 
                                   of the Interior, National Park Service
            (collectively "DOI"), alleging discrimination on the basis of
            her 
               gender 
                      and ethnicity (Hispanic).  Ramos claimed that while
            she was  employed as a  park ranger, she  was subjected to  a
            discriminator
                        ily hostile work environment, disparate treatment
            in 
              the 
                  assignment of equipment, training, responsibilities and
            discipline; and a retaliatory constructive discharge.   Ramos
            initially 
                     submitted 
                              her 
                                  complaints to the DOI's office of equal
            opportunity 
                       ("OEO").  The OEO found no support for most of the
            charges, but did find disparate treatment in (1) a thirty-day
            disciplinary 
                        suspension of Ramos's law enforcement commission,
            and 
               (2) 
                   the 
                       provision of certain equipment.  The DOI undertook
            remedial action; Ramos proceeded to district court. 
                      Following a five-day bench trial, which was held by
            consent 
                   of 
                      the parties before a magistrate judge, judgment was
            entered for the defendant on all claims.  The court's factual
            findings and  legal conclusions are  set forth  in a  26-page
            opinion.
                      Ramos 
                           timely 
                                  appealed, but failed to provide a trial
            transcript.  Unable  thus to review the issues, including  an
            evidentiary question which initially appeared substantial, we
            directed Ramos to provide  the transcript or face  dismissal.
            Citing  a  change   in  her   financial  circumstances,   she
                                         -2-

            successfully  sought  an  extension  of  time,  and  obtained
            permission 
                      from 
                          the 
                              district court to proceed in forma pauperis
            with 
                production 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 transcript at government expense.  After
            further delays, the transcript was transmitted to this court.
                      Ramos assigns as  error the court's exclusion  from
            evidence of an  "administrative deposition" given by  another
            Hispanic female  park  ranger, Mirta  Maltes.   The  excluded
            "deposition," or sworn statement,  was taken in a  one-on-one
            question 
                    and 
                       answer 
                              session conducted by the DOI's internal OEO
            investigator.  
                      Exclusion of  this  evidence, Ramos  contends,  was
            contrary to the parties' "binding" joint pretrial memorandum,
            as incorporated into the court's final case management order.
            The final order twice referenced Maltes's statement.   Maltes
            was listed, first,  as a witness for Ramos "by  deposition." 
            Maltes's "sworn statement"  also was listed as a DOI  exhibit
            which, by the terms of the order, was "received in evidence."
                      Nonetheless, at trial  the DOI objected when  Ramos
            proffered 
                     the 
                        Maltes 
                               statement during her case in chief.  After
            some  wrangling, the  statement  was excluded  from  evidence
            because, the magistrate held, it was hearsay and inadmissible
            under any exception to the hearsay rule, including the  open-
            ended exception in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
                      We need  not definitively  resolve the  evidentiary
            question, however, since a close reading of the record  shows
                                         -3-

            that  regardless  of  whether  the  statement  was   properly
            admissible 
                      or 
                        inadmissible, its exclusion did not prejudicially
            affect Ramos's  "substantial rights," or  the outcome of  the
            trial.  Lubanski v. Coleco Industries, Inc., 929 F.2d 42,  45
            (1st Cir. 1991); see  also United States v. Legarda, 17  F.3d
            496, 498 (1st  Cir.) (holding that an erroneous exclusion  of
            evidence requires reversal only if it has a "substantial  and
            injurious effect or influence" on the verdict), cert. denied,
            513 U.S. 820 (1994).  
                      The primary value of Maltes's statement was that it
            corroborated  Ramos's  allegations  of  disparities  in   the
            assignment of equipment, training, and responsibilities.  The
            very same facts, however, were placed in evidence by  Ramos's
            testimony. 
                       
                       Moreover, the disparities were not challenged, but
            were conceded by  the DOI's witnesses.   The DOI's  witnesses
            explained the uneven assignments as due to non-discriminatory
            factors.  Their explanations were accepted as credible by the
            magistrate. 
                        
                        Thus, 
                             the 
                                 outcome of the trial on these claims was
            not  affected  by   the  exclusion  of  Maltes's   statement,
            encompassing as it did little more than conceded facts. 
                      As to  Ramos's  other  claims,  Maltes's  statement
            contained no substantial supporting proof.  Maltes swore that
            she had no  personal knowledge of  the facts surrounding  the
            disciplinary 
                        suspension of Ramos's law enforcement commission.
            The statement offered only one marginal fact in corroboration
                                         -4-

            of Ramos's  retaliation  claim (that  Ramos had  presented  a
            doctor's 
                    note 
                         to 
                           excuse 
                                  an absence).1  And Maltes flatly denied
            knowledge  of  any disparities  in  overtime  pay  and  shift
            assignments.  Finally, while Maltes's statement  conclusorily
            characterized
                         the atmosphere at work as "male chauvinist," she
            also denied suffering any employment disadvantage due to  her
            gender, 
                   thus 
                        providing no factual support for Ramos's claim of
            a     discriminatorily     hostile     work     environment. 
                      Ramos's 
                             other assignments of error, as we understand
            them,2 fare no better.  We apprehend no error in the standard
            used by  the court  to assess the  claim of "abusive  working
            environment;" perceive no  prejudice in  the court's  alleged
            misstatement 
                        of 
                          Maltes's 
                                   employment title; find no abuse in the
            court's 
                   evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses; and no
            basis for  the argument that the  court denied a "release  of
            pertinent information in  agency files."  To the extent  that
            Ramos 
                 means 
                       to 
                         challenge 
                                   the weight of the evidence, we observe
               1The statement recites Maltes's "belief" that Ramos had
            encountered retaliation, but there is no recitation of a
            factual basis for the "belief."  And, although Maltes stated
            that she, too, feared retaliation, the only reason suggested
            for her fear is that on one occasion she felt threatened by a
            supervisor's "personal" animosity toward her. 
               2Although the transcript has been available for several
            months, Ramos has not moved to supplement her brief with
            record references.  
                                         -5-

            that this  was not  a "close" case.   There  is ample  record
            evidence to support the court's factual findings.
                      Affirmed.
                                         -6-