Court Opinion

ID: 9352826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 22:00:20.509676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:45.137943
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 21-1832

                          UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                           SHUREN QIN,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before
                       Barron, Chief Judge
               Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

     Michael R. Schneider, with whom Good Schneider Cormier & Fried
was on brief, for appellant.
     Karen L. Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.

                         January 9, 2023
            BARRON,     Chief       Judge.      In     this      appeal,      Shuren       Qin

challenges      his     federal      convictions            in    the        District       of

Massachusetts for conspiracy to commit export violations, visa

fraud,   making       false     statements           to    federal      agents,        money

laundering, and smuggling.             He does so on the ground that the

government     relied   on    the    fruits       of      what   he   contends       was   an

unconstitutional search of his laptop and cellular phone after

those devices were seized upon his re-entry to this country after

traveling      to   China.      Because         we     conclude       that    the    search

constituted a border search that was supported by reasonable

suspicion that Qin was engaged in the ongoing violation of export

laws, we affirm.

                                           I.

            Qin is a Chinese national who lives part of the year in

Massachusetts and part of the year in Qingdao, China.                                 He is

President of LinkOcean Technologies, Ltd. ("LinkOcean"), a company

based in Qingdao, China that imports and resells marine technology

from the United States, Canada, and Europe to customers in China,

including Chinese research institutes and the Chinese Navy.

            On November 24, 2017, Qin and his wife returned to the

United States from a trip to China.                  Soon after their arrival, two

Customs and Border Patrol ("CBP") agents, at the request of agents

from   other    agencies      who   had    been       investigating          Qin's   export

                                          - 2 -
activities for roughly seven months, conducted an interview of Qin

in the public baggage claim area in the airport.

           The CBP agents asked Qin during the interview about his

export activities and to see shipping documents related to his

exports.   According to one of the CBP agents, Qin answered that he

"only" exported items that "attach to buoys."

           After Qin indicated that the laptop and phone that he

carried with him were used for business, the CBP agents seized

those electronic devices for a further search and permitted Qin to

leave the airport.   Immediately after Qin's devices were seized,

the agents who had been conducting the investigation into Qin's

export activities brought the devices to the Homeland Security

Investigations ("HSI") forensic lab to be imaged and searched.

           The laptop contained 776 gigabytes of data, and the phone

contained approximately 55 gigabytes of data.     The "overwhelming

majority" of the content on the devices was in Mandarin, and the

language translation tool that the agents conducting the search

had downloaded did not provide adequate translations.      No local

agents could read, write, or translate Mandarin, and the agents

searching Qin's devices waited until an agent from New York could

travel to the area to assist them.      The agents searching Qin's

devices sought passwords from Qin to access the encrypted items on

his computer, but Qin did not provide them.

                               - 3 -
               During the Mandarin-speaking agent's second trip to

Boston, near the end of the 60-day period within which the search

took place, the agents searching Qin's devices came across emails

that provided evidence that Qin had illegally exported hydrophones

to   Northwestern     Polytechnical    University    ("NWPU"),   a   Chinese

university with military ties.        The agents completed the search of

the electronic devices after 60 days.               After the search was

completed, the agents did not return the electronic devices to

Qin.       Instead, the agents held the laptop for 11 more days and the

phone for 153 more days as the agents applied for and obtained a

search warrant, which they used to conduct an additional search.

               In October 2018,1 Qin was indicted based on the evidence

of illegal exports of hydrophones to NWPU found during the 60-day

warrantless search of his devices.          The indictment charged him

with conspiring to illegally export parts from the United States

to China, 50 U.S.C. § 1705; visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a);

conspiring to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371; making

false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §

1956; and smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 554.

               In September 2019, Qin moved to suppress the fruits of

the warrantless search conducted on his laptop and phone.                The

       Qin was initially served with a three-count indictment on
       1

June 26, 2018, before being served with a 14-count superseding
indictment on October 30, 2018.

                                   - 4 -
District    Court   issued   a   memorandum     and   order   denying   the

suppression motion.    The District Court ruled that the search was

a "non-routine border search" and that the search was lawful

because the agents who searched Qin's devices had reasonable

suspicion at the time of the search that Qin's devices contained

evidence of "export violations."2

            After the District Court's ruling, Qin entered into a

plea agreement with the government that "reserv[ed] [his] right to

appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained from

his laptop computer and Apple iPhone."          Qin timely appealed for

review of the District Court's decision to deny his motion to

suppress.     "In reviewing motions to suppress, we review [the

District Court's] legal determinations de novo" and its "factual

findings for clear error."       United States v. Bater, 594 F.3d 51,

55 (1st Cir. 2010).

                                   II.

            The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures."          U.S. Const. amend. IV.     It

     2The District Court stated that the agents who searched Qin's
devices had reasonable suspicion "that the electronic devices,
which Qin identified as devices he used for work, would contain
evidence of export violations, including but not limited to causing
the filing of false EEI, visa fraud . . . , and, after his
statements to CBP agents about the limits of his exports (which
the investigating agents reasonably believed to be false), false
statements to federal agents."

                                  - 5 -
further provides that "no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause,    supported     by   [o]ath   or   affirmation,      and     particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to

be seized."      Id.

            Border searches -- which the Supreme Court has described

as   searches      of    travelers     and     "belongings"         "crossing   an

international boundary" of the United States, Carroll v. United

States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) -- have long constituted an

exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.                        See

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977).                  The exception

derives from a recognition of the government's "inherent authority

to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial

integrity."      United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153

(2004).

            We   have    distinguished       between    "routine"      and   "non-

routine" border searches.             The former type of search may be

conducted not only without a warrant upon probable cause but also

without the government having any reasonable basis for suspecting

that it will turn up "contraband, evidence of contraband, or . . .

evidence    of   activity     in   violation    of     the   laws    enforced   or

administered by CBP or ICE."          Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 19-

21 (1st Cir. 2021).      The latter type of search, though it also may

be conducted without a warrant upon probable cause, must be

                                      - 6 -
supported by reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up

contraband or evidence of the sort just described.3   Id. at 18.

          The required reasonable suspicion must be "objective"

and based on "specific and articulable facts . . . taken together

with rational inferences from those facts."     Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 21 (1968).    The evidence needed to support reasonable

suspicion is less than that needed to support probable cause and

"considerably" less than that needed for "proof of wrongdoing by

a preponderance of the evidence."     United States v. Sokolow, 490

U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

                              III.

          We begin with Qin's contention that insofar as the

District Court was right to rule both that the search at issue was

a border search and that it was "non-routine,"4 the search still

violated the Fourth Amendment because the District Court erred in

     3 Whether a search is "'routine' or 'not routine' often
depends on the 'degree of invasiveness or intrusiveness associated
with' the search." United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19
(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509,
511-12 (1st Cir. 1988)). "[N]on-routine" border searches involve
a greater "degree of invasiveness or intrusiveness" than "routine"
searches. Id. In assessing whether searches of electronic devices
are routine or non-routine, this court has considered factors
including whether the searches were conducted manually so as to
limit the amount of content reviewed; whether the data reviewed
was "resident on the device;" and whether "deleted or encrypted
files" were viewed. See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18-19.
     4 The government does not dispute on appeal the District
Court's ruling that the type of border search that was conducted
here was a non-routine one.

                              - 7 -
finding that the government had demonstrated that the agents who

searched Qin's devices had the required reasonable suspicion.               Qin

understands the ruling to rest on the ground that the record

supportably shows that the agents who searched his electronic

devices had reasonable suspicion that the devices would contain

evidence of Qin's ongoing efforts to export controlled marine

instruments to China without proper licensure in violation of U.S.

export laws.      But, Qin contends, the record simply does not show

as much.      We disagree.

              Well before the CBP agents interviewed Qin at the airport

about his export activities concerning China, federal agents from

a number of agencies had been investigating those activities.               And

from   that    investigation,     those     agents   had    already   generated

evidence of the following kinds.

              First,   the   agents   who   had   been     investigating   Qin's

export activities had gathered evidence that reasonably led them

to conclude that Qin had shown a past interest in flouting U.S.

export laws while conducting his business with clients in China.

This evidence included Qin's expression of interest in using a

common practice to evade U.S. export laws, namely the establishment

of a front company based in the United States.              In Qin's case, the

front company that he expressed interest in creating would purchase

autonomous underwater vehicles ("AUVs") without a U.S. export

license and then unlawfully export the unlicensed AUVs to China.

                                      - 8 -
An AUV is a type of unmanned underwater vehicle ("UUV") that can

"operate   without     being    'tethered'      to    another     vehicle."     The

evidence of Qin's past interest in flouting U.S. export laws that

the agents investigating his export activities had gathered also

included his request to an undercover agent posing as a U.S. seller

of AUVs not to disclose to a U.S. manufacturer of AUVs -- who bears

responsibility for acquiring an export license when a product is

sold for export to China -- that the end users for the AUVs that

Qin was seeking were in China.

           Second, the agents investigating Qin's export activities

had gathered evidence that the clients of Qin's company, LinkOcean,

included   entities     to     which   the     United    States    restricted   or

prohibited certain kinds of exports.                    These clients included

Chinese research institutes5 and the PLA Navy, which is the naval

warfare branch of the Chinese Army that oversees the development

and   operation   of    surface    warships,         submarines,    and   unmanned

submersible vehicles.

           Third,      the   agents     investigating       Qin     had   gathered

evidence that Qin had expressed interest in exporting products to

      5Although the research institutes that the agents knew to be
clients of LinkOcean were not on the "Entity List," which
identifies entities that are believed to be involved in "activities
contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of
the United States" and requires additional licensing requirements,
see 15 C.F.R. § 744.16, certain products require a license if they
are shipped to any client in China, including the research
institutes that the agents were aware were Qin's clients.

                                       - 9 -
China through LinkOcean that require export licenses, including

AUVs.     And, relatedly, the agents knew at the time of the search

that Qin had expressed an interest in exporting to China products

that are on the U.S. Munitions List and cannot be exported from

the United States to China under the U.S. Arms Embargo against

China -- namely, sonobuoys, which are defense articles used in

anti-submarine warfare.

            Finally,    the    agents   investigating   Qin    had   gathered

evidence concerning Qin's willingness to conceal the nature of his

export    activities    from   authorities.     This    evidence     included

documents filed with the U.S. government concerning approximately

31   of   LinkOcean's   transactions     involving   exports    that   listed

LinkOcean as the "ultimate consignee," even though the company was

a reseller of the exported products and was often or always aware

of the identity of the end users of those exported products.             The

evidence also included Qin's having asked a U.S. seller not to

disclose the end user for a product when the seller filled out the

export documents to provide to the U.S. government.

            Thus, all that evidence had already been gathered in the

course of the investigation into Qin when the CBP agents questioned

him at the airport as he was returning from China about the nature

of his exports to China.        And so, after Qin answered during that

                                   - 10 -
questioning that he exported "only" items that "attach to buoys,"6

as the District Court found that he did, we conclude that at least

at that point, the agents who then conducted the search of Qin's

electronic devices had reasonable suspicion that Qin was engaging

in the kind of unlawful export activities that he contends the

record fails to show that the agents had reason to suspect.                For,

at least as of that point, the agents who conducted the search of

Qin's electronic devices not only had all the information gathered

throughout the investigation into his export activities that we

have described above.      Those agents as of that point also had been

informed of what the CBP agents had interpreted as Qin's lie to

them about the nature of his export activities to China.                       See

United States v. Favreau, 886 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding

that a "patent lie" to agents can, along with other evidence,

support   a   reasonable   suspicion     that   someone    is     "in   fear   of

revealing evidence of wrongdoing"); United States v. Wright, 582

F.3d 199, 213 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that "reasonable suspicion

arises not just from the combination of facts, but from their

progression"); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8-9 (finding that reasonable

suspicion requires reviewing the "totality of the circumstances");

United    States   v.   Ruidíaz,   529   F.3d   25,   30   (1st    Cir.   2008)

     6 The agents had evidence that Qin exported remotely operated
side scan sonar systems, UUVs, unmanned surface vehicles, and
hydrophones, which do not attach to buoys.

                                   - 11 -
(explaining that "individual facts, taken in the aggregate [may

be] sufficient to trigger a reasonable suspicion that some criminal

activity was afoot -- and that the defendant was involved").

          Moreover, Qin does not dispute that, if the agents who

conducted the search were armed with the requisite suspicion

concerning his ongoing violations, then they would have had reason

to suspect that evidence of the suspected export violations would

be contained on Qin's electronic devices. Accordingly, we conclude

that the record shows that the agents possessed the requisite

reasonable suspicion to search those devices.

          Qin challenges this conclusion in part by arguing that

the agents who searched his devices could not have reasonably

believed that he lied to CBP agents at the airport about whether

he exported "only" items that attach to buoys.   In particular, he

argues that the agents who searched his devices had evidence that

he was not very fluent in English and that he said that things

that "attach to buoys" are "the types of things" that he exported

to China rather than the "only" things.   But, given the evidence

in the record that Qin spoke "excellent" English and the CBP

agents' reports about Qin's responses to their questions, the

District Court did not clearly err in finding that the agents

reasonably believed that Qin lied to them about the types of

products that he exported.    See United States v. Espinoza, 490

F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]hen two or more legitimate

                              - 12 -
interpretations of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice

between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous.").7

            Qin    separately        argues    that     there    were   innocent

explanations      for   the   conduct     that    the    government     contends

supported the reasonable suspicion of the agents who searched Qin's

devices and that the agents who searched those devices were aware

of   such   explanations      when    they     conducted   the    search.    In

particular, Qin argues that the record shows that the agents who

searched his devices were aware that some of the technologies that

he sought were used for academic in addition to military purposes;

that he had financial incentives to conceal the end users of the

      7We note as well that our conclusion is not undermined even
if we accept Qin's contention that the diagrams Qin showed to the
CBP agents during the interview portrayed technologies that Qin
exported that do not necessarily attach to buoys, given that Qin
does not contend that the technologies depicted cannot attach to
buoys. We also note that there is no merit to Qin's contention
that the agents who searched Qin's devices could not have had
reasonable suspicion at the time of the search in November simply
because they conceded they did not have such suspicion in October
and nothing happened between October and November. In addition to
the fact that the agents who searched Qin's devices obtained
evidence that Qin had lied to CBP agents at the airport in
November, the agents' subjective experience is not the relevant
inquiry. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
Rather, the relevant inquiry is an objective one based on all "the
cumulative information available to [the agents]" at the time of
the search. Id. And, because the inquiry is an objective one, we
also reject Qin's contention that the agents who searched his
devices could not have relied on the lie as a predicate for
determining that they had reasonable suspicion because the agents
had decided to conduct the search weeks before the lie. See id.

                                      - 13 -
products he exported on some occasions; and that "some of the

components of the sonobuoys [that Qin was interested in] may have

been made in Canada" and may therefore not be barred for export by

U.S. export controls.     Qin relatedly argues that the evidence that

the export documents associated with his transactions did not

disclose who his end users were could not have reasonably generated

suspicion, because disclosure of end users is not legally required

under U.S. export regulations.       He further contends that even if

such disclosure was legally required, it was U.S. sellers -- rather

than buyers like Qin -- who were responsible for submitting the

information to the U.S. government and thus for any omissions in

the information submitted.

            But, in pressing these specific points, Qin does not

dispute that the agents had evidence of Qin's past expression of

a willingness to violate export laws, the nature of the clients of

his company in China, the products that he was interested in

exporting to China, and his misleading answer to the agents at the

airport about his export activities with China.              Nor does Qin

dispute   that   the   agents   possessed   evidence   that   the   export

documents    associated   with    approximately   31    of    his   export

transactions did not disclose the end users of the items exported

in those transactions or that Qin asked one seller not to disclose

the end user for a product when the seller filled out the export

documents to provide to the U.S. government.      Thus, Qin's focus on

                                  - 14 -
the favorable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence

that the agents who searched his devices had is ultimately a

contention that those agents knew from that evidence that there

existed "the possibility of innocent conduct."         Wright, 582 F.3d

at 205 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).       But, the agents

need not have ruled out that possibility to have reasonably

suspected that the conduct was not innocent, id., and, for the

reasons explained above, the unique "factual mosaic" that the

collection of evidence in this case created, see United States v.

Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2011), gave rise to the required

reasonable suspicion of ongoing export violations.

           Qin does also highlight evidence in the record that he

contends shows that the agents who searched his devices knew of

his past honesty and lawfulness in some contexts concerning his

export activities, as if that evidence suffices to establish that

the agents did not have reason to suspect his ongoing violation of

export laws.      For example, Qin notes that he listed the Chinese

Navy as one of LinkOcean's clients on the LinkOcean website; he

was "very open" with some prospective business partners about who

his clients were; he "repeatedly asked" a U.S. seller and an

undercover agent to submit the paperwork required to obtain export

licenses; and he decided not to purchase sonobuoys because he

believed   that    sonobuoys   "require[d]   an   exporting   license   or

permit."

                                 - 15 -
           But, this evidence at most shows that the agents who

searched Qin's devices knew that Qin sometimes revealed who his

clients were and sometimes chose to abide by the law.                   Such

evidence   does   not   show   --   indeed,   does   not   even   purport   to

show -- that the agents lacked all the evidence that the record

supportably shows they also had, which included evidence of his

past expression of interest in violating the export laws, the

nature of his clients, the products he was interested in exporting,

his lie to the agents at the airport, and the concealment of his

end users.

           Thus, here, too, Qin is necessarily equating evidence

that might support a conclusion that his conduct was innocent with

evidence that could refute other evidence that, based on a "broad-

based consideration of all the attendant circumstances," United

States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2007), including

"objective observations" coupled with "consideration of the modes

or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers," United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), supports a reasonable

suspicion that the conduct is not innocent.            But, evidence that

can support the possibility of innocent conduct is not evidence

that, on its own, suffices to show that there was no evidence of

the required reasonable suspicion.

           We thus find that, given the specific facts of this case,

taken all together, the agents conducting the search of Qin's

                                    - 16 -
devices had reasonable suspicion that Qin was exporting controlled

marine instruments to China without proper licensure, in violation

of U.S. export laws.     And, Qin does not dispute that, insofar as

the agents had such suspicion, they also had a reasonable basis to

suspect that evidence of this unlawful activity was contained on

the electronic devices searched by the agents.           Accordingly, we

reject Qin's contention that the record shows that the agents who

conducted the search of Qin's electronic devices did not possess

the requisite reasonable suspicion needed to justify a non-routine

border search of those devices.

                                  IV.

           Qin next argues that, even if we were to assume that the

agents who conducted the search of his electronic devices had the

reasonable suspicion required for a non-routine border search, the

search of those devices did not constitute a border search at all.

Qin is right that if the search at issue was not a border search

at all, then it would require both a warrant and probable cause,

rather   than   merely   reasonable   suspicion   that   the   electronic

devices would contain evidence of his ongoing export violations.

See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).          The District

Court rejected the arguments that Qin makes to us as to why the

search did not constitute a border search, however, and we do so

as well.

                                - 17 -
              Qin rests his argument that the search at issue did not

constitute a border search in part on its "duration," which he

contends was so long that the search became disconnected from

efforts to regulate the border and prevent border-related crime

and therefore no longer fell into the border search exception.

Qin notes that the search of his devices lasted 60 days and so

fell beyond the 22-day search of a laptop that was upheld in

Molina-Gómez as "not unreasonable" but that "seem[ed] lengthy."8

United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2015).

The search was also longer, Qin points out, than the 14-day search

that at least one other court found not to be a border search given

its length and scope, see United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d

32, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015), as well as the "presumptive" 30 days

allotted for a search under HSI policy.

              The search at issue in this case certainly pushes the

bounds   of    what   may   reasonably   fall   into   the   border   search

exception, and we by no means hold categorically that a search

that lasts sixty days and otherwise qualifies as a border search

falls within the border search exception.         The inquiry is context

     8 To the extent Qin did not waive the argument that, after
the 60-day search concluded, the government impermissibly detained
his computer for an additional eleven days and his phone for an
additional 153 days while seeking a warrant, we do not see how
that argument bears on the only issue before us in this appeal,
namely whether the District Court erred in denying Qin's motion to
suppress the evidence gathered during the preceding 60 days.

                                  - 18 -
specific and fact dependent.         We hold only that, on this record,

the duration of the search did not in and of itself render it so

disconnected from the purpose of the border search exception that

it falls outside the scope of that exception, given the District

Court's findings that the length of the search was justified by

the amount of data that the electronic devices contained, as well

as the language barriers and encrypted files that impeded access

to that data.

            The Supreme Court has "consistently rejected hard-and-

fast time limits" on border searches and has instructed that,

"[i]nstead,     'common    sense   and   ordinary   human    experience   must

govern   over   rigid     criteria.'"      United   States    v.   Montoya   de

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985) (quoting United States v.

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).            And, while the search did

exceed the 30 days that HSI policy identifies as presumptively

reasonable for a border search, it did not exceed the 60 days that

HSI policy itself has identified as permissible when, as in this

case, extensions beyond 30 days are merited by the fact-specific

challenges that the search being conducted poses.

           Qin contends in response that the justifications the

government puts forth for the length of the search do not in fact

justify the length.       On this score, he first contends that much of

the content on the laptop was in English and thus did not require

translation.     But, he does not contest that much of the content on

                                    - 19 -
the laptop was also in Chinese.               And, searching this content

required a Mandarin-speaking agent who could not assist with the

search for several weeks.

                Qin also argues that the agents' contention that they

needed to detain his devices while waiting for Qin to provide them

with       passwords   is   undermined   by   the   fact   that   the   advanced

encryption mechanisms that the agents were most concerned about,

including PGP, Keychain, and Bitlocker, were not used on the

laptop.       Qin does not suggest, however, that the laptop did not

contain any relevant encrypted items for which a password was

needed, so his argument does little to call into doubt the District

Court's finding that the encrypted items -- and the wait for the

passwords -- helped justify the length of the search.

               Qin separately argues that, independent of the length of

the search, it was sufficiently intrusive to be not a border search

but rather "a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence

of a crime might be found."          See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United

States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931). Qin argues in this connection

that the government used keyword searches to look for a broad array

of business records, financial documents, and technical documents

and schematics.9

       We note that Qin acknowledges that, under Alasaad, border
       9

searches can include searches not only for "contraband or evidence
of contraband," but also for evidence of border-related crime, see

                                     - 20 -
          But the fact that the agents used keywords to search for

such records, documents, and schematics does not, on its own, show

that the search fell outside the scope of a border search, given

the nature of the suspected criminal activities concerning the

conduct of Qin's business.     After all, such records, documents,

and   schematics   can   contain   "contraband,   evidence   of   such

contraband, or . . . evidence of activity in violation of the laws

enforced or administered by CBP or ICE," all of which can be

searched for during a border search.       Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 21.

Moreover, Qin does not point to any specific keywords that, he

says, were used for the purpose of a general exploration rather

than a search for information about the ongoing export violations

of which the agents were suspicious.    Thus, we do not see how Qin's

assertion about the keywords used by the agents turns this search

into a general exploratory search.

          Qin does also advance the related contention -- in

arguing that the search was too intrusive to constitute a border

search -- that, while searching his laptop, the government looked

"broadly for evidence of past and future crime," not "ongoing or

imminent" criminal conduct. To support this contention, Qin points

988 F.3d at 21, and that Alasaad governs our decision in this case.
And while Qin argues that we should revisit Alasaad en banc and
hold that border-related searches should not include evidence of
border-related crime, that contention has no bearing on how we
must rule as a panel.

                               - 21 -
out that the agents continued to search for evidence even after

they saw that the last email on the laptop was from May 2017.

               But,   the   record     shows     that      the   laptop   did    contain

evidence created after May 2017, and there is nothing in the record

to indicate that the agents were not searching this later evidence.

Moreover, old emails can shed light on future actions, so the

agents could have reasonably believed that the old emails were

relevant to their search for ongoing conduct.                    Thus, we do not see

how Qin's contention about the date of the last email on the laptop

supports a finding that the agents only searched for past criminal

conduct.

               Accordingly, we conclude that neither the length nor

scope of the search at issue placed it outside the scope of a

border search and thus that neither probable cause nor a warrant

was required for the search to be lawful under the challenges posed

and the Fourth Amendment.            And that is so in this case, even taking

into    consideration         both    how    long    the   search      lasted    and   how

comprehensive it was, given the suspicion that the agents who

searched Qin's electronic devices reasonably had that a search of

those       devices   would    turn    up     evidence     of    his   ongoing    export

violations.10

        Because we conclude that the agents in this case had
       10

reasonable suspicion to conduct the search at issue, we need not
address Qin's argument that, if the agents' search was not

                                            - 22 -
                               V.

          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed.

supported by reasonable suspicion, the fruits of their search
should be suppressed because the agents did not act in good faith.

                             - 23 -