Court Opinion

ID: 9478748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:13.43277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.148161
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
James Neavill threatened to kill the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). Nevertheless, this court reverses the judgment against Neavill because the district court refused to give an instruction that was not required under a long-standing precedent in this circuit. I dissent.
First, the district court did not commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury regarding Neavill’s disposition if he were found not guilty only by reason of insanity. This information was extraneous to the jury’s realm of concern. Ordinarily, in criminal matters, the jury determines only the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the district court determines a defendant’s disposition after the verdict. Thus, Neavill’s proposed instruction would have taken the jury into an area beyond its defined role. See Government of V.I. v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 935-36 (3d Cir.1978).
By requiring the proposed instruction, this court accepts Neavill’s rationale that in reaching its verdict the jury might consider the potential threat Neavill’s release could pose to the community. See id. at 935. This rationale ignores the traditional presumption that the jury follows its instructions closely, including those defining the jury’s role. See id. at 936; see also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); United States v. Cosby, 529 F.2d 143, 149 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 2647, 49 L.Ed.2d 386 (1976). Further, although unnoticed by the court, this rationale “could be prejudicial to * * * criminal defendants]. A juror who is convinced that a defendant is dangerous, but who believes [the defendant] did not * * * commit the [crime] charged, might be willing to compromise on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity rather than insist on an acquittal.” Government of V.I, 578 F.2d at 936.
Apart from well-established and sensible reasons for leaving this particular instructional decision to the sound discretion of the district court, no basis for reversal can be found in the record. Neavill has failed to show that in deliberating, the jury in this case considered extraneous information or held misconceptions that affected its verdict. Nor is the record before this court favored with studies demonstrating that in cases involving the insanity defense jurors are confused, ignore their instructions, or consider extraneous factors such as the defendant’s disposition after the verdict. Surely, this court does not hold the jury system in such low regard that it is willing to reject the presumption that the jury follows its instructions based on mere speculation. See United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065, 101 S.Ct. 793, 66 L.Ed.2d 609 (1980); see also United States v. Hoelker, 765 F.2d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024, 106 S.Ct. 1219, 89 L.Ed.2d 330 (1986).
Nor do I believe we must require the instruction because Congress enacted a new statutory confinement provision, 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (Supp. IV 1986). Indeed, the confinement provision is silent on the in*1008struction. The legislative history does favor the practice that a jury “may be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.” S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3422. That preference, however, is not a mandate. Thus, the statute and the legislative history provide no basis on which to reverse the district court.
Second, I question the panel’s authority to reach its result. Over twenty years ago, this court established that a district court does not commit reversible error by giving or refusing to give the type of instruction Neavill requested here. See Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 731-32 (8th Cir.1967), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 392 U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968). In then Judge Black-mun’s words, “justice does not require the specifics, questionable at best, [that] the defense demanded." Id. at 732. Although the Pope court acknowledged that no statutory confinement procedure then existed, I believe the court declared our rule based firmly on the traditional role of the jury in our system of justice. See id. at 731-32. The Fifth Circuit has also read Pope as based on the jury’s role in our system. See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 423 (5th Cir.1974) (“[M]any courts have explicitly based their approval of not instructing on the consequences of an [insanity] verdict on the applicability of [the] principle [that the instruction relays information outside the jury’s concern] * * (emphasis in original) (citing Pope, 372 F.2d at 731)).
The rule declared in Pope is stare decisis in this circuit. Consequently, this panel oversteps its bounds and invades the realm of the en banc court by overruling Pope. See Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 844 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 20, 101 L.Ed.2d 971 (1988).
Because I conclude the district court committed no reversible error, I would affirm.