Court Opinion

ID: 9860244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:15:52.234801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:38.316842
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, dissenting: "Residence,” as referred to by the framers of the 1970 Constitution, appears to be equivalent to the residence requirement for voters. The opinions of our supreme court dealing with the definition of "residence” have basically related to voters. (Kreitz, 125 Ill. at 195, 17 N.E. at 253; Park, 374 Ill. at 43, 27 N.E.2d at 842; Coffey v. Board of Election Commissioners (1940), 375 Ill. 385, 387-88, 31 N.E.2d 588, 589; Clark, 377 Ill. at 426-27, 36 N.E.2d at 565; Messman v. Newman Township High School District No. 150 (1942), 379 Ill. 32, 38-39, 39 N.E.2d 332, 336; Tuthill v. Rendelman (1944), 387 Ill. 321, 341, 56 N.E.2d 375, 386; Stein, 40 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 240 N.E.2d at 669.) There is no reason to believe a different interpretation was intended by the convention. Intent is a factor to consider. (Stein, 40 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 240 N.E.2d at 669.) However, the intent to be a resident is of importance, not the intent to be eligible for candidacy. Residency is required by the constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 2(c). Here, it is apparent that the rented apartment was intended to be temporary, while a more appropriate home could be found for the family. The family home, outside the 100th district, was still owned and occupied by the family. Curran continued his marital relationship and his family relationship. Little changed in the marital home, except that Curran spent some time in the temporary apartment (apparently only to qualify as a candidate for the 100th district). Would not this evidence result in a decision that Curran was a resident of, and could register and vote from, the family residence? Could not the same evidence sustain Curran’s right to run for election in the 99th district? I suggest the answer to each of these questions is yes. "A real and not an imaginary abode occupied as his home or dwelling, we have held, is essential to satisfy the residential qualifications prescribed by law.” (Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387, 31 N.E.2d at 589.) "[A] permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the contemplation of the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions.” (Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387, 31 N.E.2d at 589, citing Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners (1938), 370 Ill. 196, 199, 18 N.E.2d 214, 215.) A temporary removal from a residence does not result in a change of location for voter registration. See Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387, 31 N.E.2d at 589; Messman, 379 Ill. at 39, 39 N.E.2d at 336; Clark, 377 Ill. at 427, 36 N.E.2d at 565. The majority opinion is an incorrect interpretation of the constitutional provision. We should not interpret the restrictive provision of the constitution to mean that a person from one district can declare an intent to run for a representative or senate seat in another and be allowed on the ballot because of the part-time use of a rented apartment, while maintaining a family in another residence outside the district. I suggest the result of the majority’s incorrect interpretation invites problems in the future.