Court Opinion

ID: 9553450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:55.201212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:07.816515
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent.
Judicial immunity, with its absolute cloak of protection against liability for judicial acts, should be jealously guarded and sparingly extended. Three areas of concern are readily apparent from the grant of judicial immunity to such as Lavit in this case. First, a plaintiff allegedly injured by another is deprived absolutely of pursuing *102his case in court. As stated by our supreme court, “immunity deprives individuals of a remedy for wrongdoing and should be bestowed only when and at the level necessary.” Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1977). Secondly, the Grimm court also recognized the deterrent value of holding one responsible for shocking or outrageous conduct. Id. at 266, 564 P.2d at 1233; see also Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 729 P.2d 905, 909 (1986). Third, extension of judicial immunity into ever-widening circles presents, in my judgment, a very real threat to the protection given those who cannot decline to act judicially.
I believe judicial immunity to be inappropriate in this case. The essence of Okken’s complaint against Lavit is not that he made some erroneous judicial decision, for which he should be held accountable. Rather, Okken’s complaint is that Lavit made a decision to accept employment with the parties without disclosing to Okken his long-term association with Richter, Mrs. Okken’s attorney. The record reveals that association to include Richter representing Lavit in a prior child custody dispute, Richter and Lavit visiting each other’s homes for social events or case preparation, and Richter acting as a witness at Lavit’s wedding. Neither the decision to accept employment in this case nor the decision not to reveal the prior acquaintanceship between Richter and Lavit is judicial in nature. Those decisions predated any court appointment of Lavit and could not have been made under a cloak of judicial immunity.
Additionally, the stipulation entered into by the parties, and which, upon signing by the trial judge, became, by its terms, a “temporary order” of the court, provided only that
1. Lavit, ... shall conduct a psychological examination of both Petitioner and Respondent at the earliest opportunity—
2. Lavit, if called as a witness in these proceedings, ... may give testimony as an expert witness____
3. [Ujpon completion of his examination, Dr. Lavit shall prepare a written report and deliver a copy to counsel for each party____
I do not quarrel with those cases which hold that a professional whose services are sought by the court for the purpose of assisting the court in resolving difficult issues temporarily be deemed part of the judicial family and entitled to judicial immunity. However, I see nothing in Lavit’s performance which would set him apart as a judicial officer. The acts required of him were not judicial duties but rather duties imposed by a contract with the parties for his professional services and comparable with what is expected of any expert witness jointly selected by litigants. The seeking of the so-called “temporary order” of the court to enforce the contractual agreement between Lavit and the parties as set forth in the parties’ stipulation is merely an effort to bootstrap Lavit under the umbrella of judicial immunity.
Moreover, I do not read in the stipulation (and order) that Lavit would “serve as an expert for the court,” as found by the majority. The Court conducted no proceedings and made no findings relative to Lav-it’s qualifications as an expert. Rather, the parties simply stipulated that he may “give testimony as an expert witness.”
The majority finds that Lavit’s “activities are protected because ... at least to some extent, his evaluations and recommendations aided the trial court in determining child custody____” I believe this conclusion is flawed for several reasons. First, as previously stated, the activity complained of is Lavit’s failure to disclose the prior association between him and Richter at the time he entered into the agreement with the parties. Second, the assertion that Lavit’s evaluations and recommendations “aided” the court could be said of any expert called by a party in any case. Third, what Lavit’s involvement did accomplish was to assist the parties to resolve the child custody issues and to reach a stipulated agreement which was later approved by the court. I believe that such involvement can only minimally be deemed *103a part of the judicial process and is insufficient to support a rule eliminating the deterrent effect of liability and accountability for one’s conduct and the right of victims to receive compensation for their injuries. See Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. at 558, 729 P.2d at 912. The underlying concept dictating restraint in granting immunity was expressed by our supreme court as follows: “There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where [such wrongdoing] is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.” Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm’n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392, 381 P.2d 107, 112 (1963).
The fact that professionals, such as Lav-it, may become a “lightning rod for harassing litigation” following their involvement as an expert in litigation, seems to me to be no justification to grant judicial immunity unless their duties place them squarely within the judicial-making process. The risk and expense of defending one’s actions is inherent in the business of offering on the open market one’s professional services.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would deny relief.