Court Opinion

ID: 9851543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:14:40.695864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.429960
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion affirming the judgments in these consolidated appeals. I write separately to emphasize that in my view, the prosecutor’s warrantless arrest of defendant Cox’s alibi witness for perjury in the middle of trial, which resulted in her changing her testimony on the stand in a way favorable to the prosecution, violated Cox’s right to due process of law. Such egregious government intimidation of a testifying defense witness constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, regardless of the fact that it occurred outside the presence of the jury.13 However, as the Court explains, the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the perjury arrest and changed testimony did not contribute to Cox’s convictions.14 Accordingly, the Court is correct in affirming all three judgments.

 See Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95, 97-98 (93 SC 351, 34 LE2d 330) (1972); Burke v. State, 66 Ga. 157, 159 (1880). See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 10.66 (2nd ed.); Lisa A. Wenger, Admonitions Against Peijury or Threats to Prosecute Potential Defense Witness, Inducing Refusal to Testify, as Prejudicial Error, 88 ALR 4th 388 (1991).

 Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 21-24 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (“[W]e hold . . . that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).