Court Opinion

ID: 9447815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:45:17.591888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:12.105764
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Chief Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Being of the opinion that the trial judge was correct in directing a verdict in favor of Barber & Ross, I concur in the portion of the majority opinion which affirms that action. I dissent, however, from the reversal of the judgment n. o. v. awarded to Warfield & Sanford. Of course, the majority, having reversed that judgment, were bound to remand for a ruling on the motion for a new trial. But the remand would not have been necessary had the judgment n. o. v. been affirmed, as I think it should have been; for affirmance of that judgment would render immaterial the error of the trial judge in failing to rule on the motion for a new trial, as I shall show.
My opinion is that the judgment n. o. v. was properly granted because, as may be seen from the factual recital in the majority opinion, the evidence showed no negligence on the part of Warfield & Sanford but revealed, I think, that Casper’s injury was due to his sole negligence. Should it be thought, however, that some evidence tended to attribute negligence to Warfield & Sanford, there still can be no recovery against it, in my view, because Casper was clearly guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
*386It was technical error for the trial judge to fail to rule on the motion for a new trial, for the Supreme Court said in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311 U.S. 243, 253, 61 S.Ct. 189, 195, 85 L.Ed. 147:
“If alternative prayers or motions are presented, as here, we hold that the trial judge should rule on the motion for judgment. Whatever his ruling thereon he should also rule on-the motion for a new trial, indicating the grounds of his decision. * * *"
Our problem, then, in considering the Warfield & Sanford angle of this case has been to determine whether we should remand to the District Court to hear and rule upon the motion for a new trial, or whether we should say “that course would, in the circumstances, be neither fair nor practical.”1 Our choice depended entirely upon whether we affirmed or reversed the judgment n. o. v. As I would affirm that judgment, I think we should disregard the trial judge’s technical error in failing to pass on the motion for a new trial.
In view of the District Court’s grant of judgment n. o. v., it is unthinkable that the motion for a new trial would have been denied had it been passed on. But, if the District Court originally had granted not only the motion for judgment n. o. v. but also the motion for a new trial, it would have been necessary for its order to specify that the new trial was being granted only in the event of an appellate reversal of the judgment n. o. v.; because the unconditional grant of a new trial would have vacated that judgment. Allegheny County v. Maryland Casualty Co., 3 Cir., 132 F.2d 894, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 787, 1943, 63 S.Ct. 981, 87 L.Ed. 1154.
Therefore, if the judgment n. o. v. were being affirmed, as I think it should be, it would be an idle and useless act to remand the case for a ruling on the motion for a new trial, which inevitably would be conditioned as in the Allegheny County case. But, as I have said, the majority’s reversal of the judgment n. o. v. makes remand essential.

. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. at page 255, 61 S.Ct. at page 196.