Court Opinion

ID: 9792605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:31:42.767432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.873833
License: Public Domain

*194THORNTON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Contrary to the majority, it is my conclusion that petitioner was entitled to raise a defense or an exemption under the Equal Pay Act in the instant case. ORS 652.210(1). Further, in my view, the Equal Pay Act and the Fair Employment Practices Act are not inconsistent. They address different problems in different fashions. The Equal Pay Act was designed to remedy a problem in employment based on the now outmoded belief that a man, supposedly because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman, even though his duties are the same. It was not clear at the time the Equal Pay Act was adopted that courts would consider pay differentials between men and women to be discrimination based on sex. The Equal Pay Act removed this question from judicial scrutiny. Thus, that Act used particular language to meet a special problem. The Act also contains a number of defenses and a specific exemption. Public employers having a civil service system based on merit are exempted. The Act does not apply if the pay differential is a consequence of a seniority system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex and if the differential is based in good faith on factors other than sex.
The Fair Employment Practices Act was designed to prevent discrimination in employment based on race, religion, color, sex, national origin or age. It prohibits discrimination on these bases in barring from employment, hiring, firing, compensation and terms and conditions of employment. As the preamble to the Act indicates, it is based on a policy to prohibit employment practices based on arbitrary criteria.
These two acts are essentially independent of each other, although they should be read in pari materia. Nothing in the legislation prohibits an injured employe from seeking redress under both. If the conduct violates both, then remedies can be had under both — but not overlapping or double remedies for the same wrong. Reading the acts together, I conclude that a pay differential based on sex violates the Fair Employment Practices Act only if it violates the Equal Pay Act. Simply because a complaint brought under the Fair Employment Practices Act alleges *195discrimination in compensation on the basis of sex does not prevent the employer from raising a defense or an exemption provided under the Equal Pay Act.
Even assuming, arguendo, that an ambiguity arises by virtue of the failure of the legislature to mention the exemption of governmental bodies under the Equal Pay Act when amending the Fair Employment Practices Act in 1969 (Or Laws 1969, ch 618, § 3) to cover sex discrimination, this contention is answered by the well-established rule of construction embodied in ORS 174.020:
“In the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible; and when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent shall control a general one that is inconsistent with it.”
The same rule was stated in slightly different language in Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 274 Or 649, 549 P2d 510 (1976):
“* * * [A] specific or special act controls over a general act. This is the rule even if, as here, the general act was enacted later. * * * Absent a plain indication of intent to repeal the special act, the special act will continue to have effect and the general act will be modified by construction so the two can stand together; one as the general law of the state and the other as the law of the particular case or as an exception to the general rule.” 274 Or at 656. (Citations omitted.)
If we were to say, as the prevailing opinion concludes, that complainant’s claim is allowable under the Fair Employment Practices Act without reference to the exclusions provided under the Equal Pay Act, the latter would be a nullity. Contrary to the view expressed in that opinion, I am satisfied that, if the legislature had intended to eliminate from the Equal Pay Act the exclusion of municipal corporations having in force a civil service system based on merit, it would have done so. As this court observed in Corvallis Disposal v. Bureau of Labor, 49 Or App 245, 248 n 3, 619 P2d 663 (1980), rev den 290 Or 651 (1981), which also involved construction of a provision of the civil rights - anti-discrimination laws:
“ * * * [I]n the 1973 legislation the legislature demonstrated that it was able to call an unlawful employment *196practice an unlawful employment practice when it wanted to. ***”
Summarizing, I concur with the majority in affirming on complainant’s retaliation claim. I dissent, however, as to complainant’s claim under the Equal Pay Act.
Richardson, Warren and Young, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.