Court Opinion

ID: 9675589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:58:34.621332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.710235
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). On November 24, 1976, after a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, heroin, in contravention of MCL 335.341(l)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(a). Defendant was sentenced to a term of one year in prison and appeals as of right. This case arose out of an incident occurring on July 31, 1975, in which defendant allegedly sold heroin to a police informer at a pool hall. The transaction was recorded by a tape recorder which was hidden on the informer’s person. At trial, the informer testified that defendant delivered heroin to him. The tape recording of the transaction was also introduced into evidence.
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting this tape recording into evidence. He contends that the participant’s recording of the conversation was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by Const 1963, art 1, § 11, since there was no search warrant authorizing the recording or any exigent circumstances, see People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554; 227 NW2d 511 (1975). The prosecutor argues that no search warrant is required for a participant’s recording of a conversation, see United States v White, 401 US 745; 91 S Ct 1122; 28 L Ed 2d 453 (1971), People v Drielick, 400 Mich 559; 255 NW2d 619 (1977).
As a matter of Federal constitutional law, US Const, Ams IV, XIV, no search warrant is required for participant recording, Lopez v United States, 373 US 427; 83 S Ct 1381; 10 L Ed 2d 462 (1963), or participant monitoring, United States v White, 401 US 745; 91 S Ct 1122; 28 L Ed 2d 453 (1971). In Beavers, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court *333interpreted the Michigan constitutional provision governing searches and seizures, Const 1963, art 1, § 11, to apply the search warrant requirement to participant monitoring. Participant monitoring was defined to mean the use of an electronic device by a participant to transmit the exchange to a third party. The opinion did not address the constitutionality of participant recordings, Beavers, supra, at 562, fn 2. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether to extend the constitutional rule announced in Beavers to participant recordings.1 In Beavers, supra, the Court held that the Michigan constitution provided additional protections not offered by the Federal constitution. The Court was
"persuaded by the logic of Justice Harlan which recognizes a significant distinction between assuming the risk that communications directed to one party may subsequently be repeated to others and the simultaneous monitoring of a conversation by the uninvited ear of a third party functioning in cooperation with one of the participants yet unknown to the other.” Beavers, supra at 565.2
Applying this reasoning to the facts in this case, I conclude that participant recording is distinguishable from participant monitoring. Participant monitoring involves simultaneous transmissions of *334the conversation to third parties. The participant has no control, other than to turn off the monitor, over whether any disclosures should be made or over what should be disclosed. Everything and anything is automatically, simultaneously disclosed to the uninvited third ear. This is the feature of participant monitoring which makes it particularly offensive. Even if the participant can disengage the monitor, this does not give him effective control over the extent of simultaneous disclosures. Most participants will not know what is going to be said until it is said. However, because participant monitoring involves simultaneous transmissions, any decision to disengage a monitor to limit disclosures must be made before the statement, which the participant does not want disclosed, is made. Since the participant will not know what is going to be said before the other person says it, he does not have effective control over the disclosures.
Participant recording does not involve these same concerns. There is no simultaneous disclosure to third parties.3 Participant recording merely preserves the conversation in a more reliable form. If any disclosures are made, they will be because the participant decided, after hearing the conversation, to make them. The participant is in a position, after hearing the conversation, to decide if any disclosures are made and the extent of any disclosures. For these reasons, participant recording is more analogous to the concept of misplaced confidence than participant monitoring.
The misplaced confidence doctrine applied in *335Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293; 87 S Ct 408; 17 L Ed 2d 374 (1966), means that no matter how strongly one trusts an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the government. It is undisputed that the undercover officer who was a participant to these conversations due to defendant’s confidence in him could later disclose this transaction to the police or at trial. Neither the agent’s method of securing this information nor his later disclosures of it violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, Hoffa, supra. The only difference between Hoffa, supra, and the instant case is that evidence of this conversation was preserved by employing a tape recorder. Therefore, defendant must be claiming that this investigative procedure constituted an unreasonable search and seizure solely because this evidence, legitimately received, was preserved by means of a tape recorder. However, this same argument was rejected in Lopez, supra. Writing for the majority in Lopez, supra, Justice Harlan stated:
"Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.” Lopez, supra at 439.4
*336In terms of risk analysis, participant monitoring subjects people to greater risks than participant recording and the concept of misplaced confidence. Both participant monitoring and participant recording are variants of assuming the risk of misplaced confidence, but the risks of participant monitoring are greater. Allowing participant monitoring subjects one to the risk that his confidence may be betrayed even before the conversation occurs. It subjects him to the risk that the participant may have decided, a priori, to simultaneously disclose the conversation to third parties without effective means to control the extent of disclosure. For this reason, participant monitoring is distinguishable from the concept of misplaced confidence.
Participant recording does not subject one to these risks of simultaneous disclosure without effective means to control the extent of disclosure. The only difference between participant recording and the traditional concept of misplaced confidence is that evidence of the conversation is preserved. For this reason, the risks involved in participant recording are more analogous to the risks of misplaced confidence than the risks involved in participant monitoring. Although allowing participant recording, as contrasted with the traditional *337concept of misplaced confidence, exposes the speaker to the additional risk that his conversation may be accurately reproduced, this risk is not so substantial as to warrant constitutional significance.
This analysis which leads to the conclusion that participant recording is distinguishable from participant monitoring is consistent with Justice Harlan’s analysis. He also distinguishes participant recording from participant monitoring.5 He authored the majority opinion in Lopez, supra, which upheld participant recording. He dissented in White, supra, which approved of participant monitoring. In distinguishing these two cases, Justice Harlan noted that in Lopez, supra, the tape was only used to corroborate the agent’s testimony and that participant recording did not subject the speaker to any risks he had not fairly assumed, see White, supra, at 776. Justice Harlan also noted that there was no uninvited third ear in participant recording, White, supra, at 784.
Another factor which distinguishes this case from Beavers, supra, is that the monitoring in Beavers, supra was of a conversation which took place in the defendant’s home. This fact was emphasized twice in Beavers, supra, at 563, 565-6. Although the right to privacy protects people, not places, see Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), the right to privacy takes on special significance when one is in his own home. This is where a person’s justifiable expectation of privacy is the greatest. This signifi*338canee is recognized in our state constitution.6 The conversation in the instant case occurred in a pool hall open to the public. Defendant’s justifiable expectation of privacy was not as great in this situation as compared to conversations which are conducted in the privacy of one’s own home.
Recognizing that the participant recording in this case is distinguishable from the participant monitoring in Beavers, supra, in a number of respects, the issue remains as to whether this investigative technique violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures because there was no search warrant authorizing this recording. In Justice Harlan’s words:
"The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
"This question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.” White, supra, at 786.
The fact that participant recording has great utility as a technique of law enforcement is well recognized, see, Beavers, supra, at 566, 571. The recording of conversations which the police participate in can assist the police in many ways. This is especially true in investigations into the trafficking of narcotics, see Beavers, supra, at 571. The recording and preservation of constitutionally ac*339quired information not only helps the government prepare for trial but it can also ensure that ongoing investigations are not hindered by inaccurate perceptions or faulty memories.7 The recordings cannot only corroborate an officer’s testimony when a defendant denies the truth of that testimony but they can also be useful in rebutting charges of recent fabrication, entrapment or improper influence. The recordings might also protect officers from unjustifiable claims of harassment, brutality, taking bribes or other improper conduct.
The recognized utility of this investigative technique must be balanced against its impact on the security and privacy of the individuals in our society. I realize that allowing participant recording without a warrant subjects not only criminals and people contemplating criminal activities but all citizens to the possibility that a participant might be recording their conversation without imposing the protections offered by the search warrant requirement. However, it must be emphasized that the issue in this case involves only a participant’s recording of a conversation directed towards him. In regard to its impact on society, participant recording is distinguishable from the concept of misplaced confidence only by the fact that the conversation being disclosed is preserved on tape. Although the majority proceeds on the *340assumption that the preservation of conversations will chill spontaneous discussions, see, White, supra, at 762-763, and Lopez, supra, at 449, I conclude that any possible chilling of free expression is not unjustifiable. Since the officer received this information by engaging defendant in a conversation without violating any of his constitutional rights, I would hold that the officer’s preservation of this information by simultaneously recording it on a tape recorder did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, US Const, Ams IV, XVI; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The other issues raised by defendant do not warrant reversal or discussion. Defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.

 When the phrase "participant recording” appears, I am specifically referring to the use of an electronic device by a participant of a conversation which records the conversation. Although I recognize that the technological advances in electronic surveillance equipment raise many complex issues, this opinion addresses only the specific issues raised by the facts in this case.

 In Justice Harlan’s words, "it is one thing to subject the average citizen to the risk that participants in a conversation with him will subsequently divulge its contents to another, but quite a different matter to foist upon him the risk that unknown third parties may be simultaneously listening in.” United States v White, 401 US 745, 777; 91 S Ct 1122; 28 L Ed 2d 453 (1971).

 Although Justice Brennan perceived the tape recorder as the equivalent of the uninvited ear of a third party, see, Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 448; 83 S Ct 1381; 10 L Ed 2d 462 (1963), there are significant differences between recording a conversation and simultaneously transmitting it to a third party.

 In People v White, supra, 788, fn 24, Justice Harlan acknowledged *336that this reasoning might be open to question. He stated that the focus of the risk analysis should not be on whether the information is accurately reproduced but rather on the impact of the particular investigatory practice on the individual’s sense of security which is the major concern of the Fourth Amendment’s protection. I agree with Justice Harlan’s analysis of the issues and risks involved. To focus on the risk of accurate reproduction would validate even the warrantless monitoring condemned in Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), because the conversation seized in that case was accurately reproduced. The search and seizure clause is not directly concerned with whether the information is accurately reproduced at trial but rather it is concerned with the procedures employed in acquiring the information.

 "Distinctions do, however, exist between Lopez where a known Government agent uses a recording device, and in this case which involves third-party overhearing. However unlikely that the participant recorder will not play his tapes, the fact of the matter is that in a third-party situation the intrusion is instantaneous.” White, supra at 788, fn 24.

 Although not directly applicable to the facts in this case, Const 1963, art 1, § 11, recognizes the importance of privacy in one’s own home. It states, "[t]he provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.”

 One of the primary uses of participant recording by the police involves the recording of phone calls to the police. Numerous phone calls are made to the police each day reporting crimes and emergencies, relaying tips concerning ongoing investigations and other useful information. Many of these calls are made by people who are excited or under stress and, accordingly, speak quickly but not clearly. Some of these calls are recorded to guard against the possibility that vital information might be lost simply because the person answering the phone cannot transcribe the information as fast as the speaker talks. To require a warrant before the police could record this information would unjustifiably hamper a legitimate police practice.