Court Opinion

ID: 9742754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:19:43.789452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:36.349783
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Although the judgment of divorce provides that alimony payments terminate upon the occurrence of either the remarriage of the defendant or the demise of either the plaintiff or defendant, I do believe that defendant’s seven-year cohabitation with a male friend provides a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of the divorce judgment.
In my opinion, defendant’s relationship cannot be classified as a short-term casual romantic interlude. For the past seven years, defendant has maintained a continual live-in relationship which has far surpassed any casual status arrangement. Her relationship has graduated into a full-fledged quasi-marital situation. It appears that the continuous alimony has caused the decision not to marry.
Although common-law marriages are no longer recognized in Michigan and contracts made in consideration of meretricious relationships will not be enforced in Michigan, see Carnes v Sheldon, 109 Mich App 204, 211; 311 NW2d 747 (1981), the plaintiff is faced with a situation where his ex-wife has continued to enjoy the benefits of alimony payments while maintaining a long-term and continuous live-in relationship with a male friend.
*241At the least, I believe that a suspension in payments would be proper here. It is not my opinion however, that any cohabitation by an ex-spouse warrants a reduction, suspension or termination in alimony payments.
The defendant’s relationship appears in all essence to be a de facto marriage which needs only a ceremony in this state or in California to make it a legal marriage. I believe that under the circumstances, a suspension in alimony payments during this particular relationship would be equitable. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s decision not to modify the divorce judgment.