Court Opinion

ID: 9840182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:52.735771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:48.374625
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 22-0472 (Harrison County 15-F-222-1)

David J. Markley,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

         Petitioner David J. Markley appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Harrison County,
entered on May 19, 2022, resentencing him for the purpose of allowing him to directly appeal a
sentence entered several years earlier. 1 On appeal, Mr. Markley presents a single assignment of
error: that his sentence of “actual incarceration” is “unconstitutionally disproportionate.” Upon our
review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision is
appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In December 2015, Mr. Markley, then 65 years old, pled guilty to one count of first-degree
sexual abuse in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-3, and one count of sexual abuse by a
person in a position of trust, in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5. 2 When he entered his
plea, he affirmed that he understood that the entry of his plea exposed him to a potential prison
term of twenty to forty years, because each crime to which he pled was punishable by ten to twenty
years of imprisonment. When Mr. Markley appeared for sentencing, however, the circuit court
ordered that Mr. Markley’s sentences run concurrently. He, thus, was committed to the state
penitentiary for an effective term of ten to twenty years.

        Mr. Markley argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it is not proportionate to
his offenses. Unless a sentence “violates statutory or constitutional commands,” we review a

       1
         Mr. Markley appears by counsel Ryan C. Shreve. Respondent State of West Virginia
appears by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Goudy.
       2
         The parties failed to include the indictment in the appendix record on appeal. A copy of
the charging document should be included in the appendix for every criminal case. See Rule
7(c)(d)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. Even without the indictment,
however, it is apparent that Mr. Markley was charged with sexual crimes involving multiple minor
victims.
                                                 1
court’s imposition of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va.
271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997). Still, “[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits
and if not based on some unpermissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 4, State
v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982). That guideline is tempered, however, by
the Eighth Amendment's “‘proportionality principle: “Penalties shall be proportioned to the
character and degree of the offence.”’ Syllabus point 8, State v. Vance, 164 W.Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d
423 (1980).” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Booth, 224 W. Va. 307, 685 S.E.2d 701 (2009). We apply
two tests to evaluate the proportionality of a sentence. “The first is subjective and asks whether
the sentence for the particular crime shocks the conscience of the court and society. If a sentence
is so offensive that it cannot pass a societal and judicial sense of justice, the inquiry need not
proceed further.” State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266, 272, 304 S.E.2d 851, 857 (1983). The second
is an objective inquiry, requiring us to give consideration “to the nature of the offense, the
legislative purpose behind the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with what would be
inflicted in other jurisdictions, and a comparison with other offenses within the same jurisdiction.”
Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981)).
Having considered Mr. Markley’s sentence under each of these tests, we find that the circuit court
did not err in sentencing. 3

        Mr. Markley’s challenge to his sentence centers on his assertion that “one of [the crimes to
which he pled guilty] occurred in the distant past.” 4 He argues that he, “an elderly man in declining
health,” should have received alternative sentencing. Neither of these factors leads to the
conclusion that the statutory term of imprisonment shocks the conscience, not do they persuade us
that the penitentiary sentence is objectively unreasonable.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       3
         Mr. Markley correctly proposes that we apply these tests. He does not however, present
persuasive authority to assist in our consideration of the aspects of each test. Mr. Markley’s
argument is conclusory.
       4
         According to the circuit court’s recitation of the indictment at Mr. Markley’s plea hearing,
the basis of the charge of first-degree sexual assault was that Mr. Markley penetrated the mouth of
a four-year-old child.
                                                  2