Court Opinion

ID: 9411546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 23:03:34.580865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.418910
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 In re N.W. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re N.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
 Court Law.

 STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY                                                                 F085724
 SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                           (Super. Ct. No. JVDP-20-000027)
           Plaintiff and Appellant,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
 C.A. et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette
Rees, Judge.
         Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel and Lindy Giacopuzzirotz, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent E.W.
         Gregory M. Chappel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent C.A.
         Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
                                                        -ooOoo-
        This juvenile dependency appeal concerns the postpermanency stage of the
proceedings. At a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing held on behalf
of minor, N.W., a permanent plan of legal guardianship was selected, with the juvenile
court retaining dependency jurisdiction.
        The Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) subsequently filed a
section 388 petition requesting the court terminate the guardianship because the
guardians had indicated to the agency a desire for the guardianship to be terminated. The
record indicated N.W. had displayed difficult behaviors and gone AWOL from the
guardians’ home, and the guardians felt she needed a higher level of care.
        At a combined section 388/section 366.3 hearing, N.W.’s whereabouts were
unknown; N.W.’s counsel objected to the termination of the guardianship in N.W.’s
absence because she could not present the position of N.W., who was then 12 years old,
and took the position that while N.W. was AWOL, the only order the juvenile court could
make was to issue a protective custody warrant. The agency took the position that the
juvenile court could not properly issue a protective custody warrant without terminating
the guardianship.
        The juvenile court denied the agency’s section 388 petition and ordered the agency
to prepare a protective custody warrant specifying, at the agency’s request, that if
apprehended, N.W. was to return to the legal guardians’ home rather than the agency,
who could then turn N.W. over to the agency, with the agency filing a section 387
petition to remove N.W. from the guardians. The court reasoned it could not grant the
section 388 petition nor properly evaluate N.W.’s placement without hearing from N.W.
or gathering more information from the guardians, who were not present at the time of
the juvenile court’s ruling.

1       All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                             2.
       The agency appealed from the section 388 denial and the section 366.3 findings
and orders, contending that the juvenile court (1) abrogated its duties by declining to
evaluate N.W.’s placement and terminate the guardianship in light of the evidence before
it; (2) the court abused its discretion in denying the agency’s section 388 petition; and
(3) the court erred by ordering a protective custody warrant to be prepared without
terminating the guardianship. N.W., through counsel, and her parents—E.W. and C.A.—
all filed responsive briefs disputing the agency’s claims.2
       We agree in part with the agency’s contentions. We agree N.W.’s absence was
not a definitive barrier to considering and/or granting the section 388 petition, but we do
not agree with the agency’s proposed remedy of reversal with directions to grant the
petition and terminate the guardianship. Based on the record, we find the juvenile court
must decide in the first instance whether the agency met their burden to establish the
section 388 petition should be granted without the presumption it must not do so in
N.W.’s absence. Thus, we reverse the order denying the section 388 petition and remand
for a new hearing on the agency’s section 388 petition and appropriate further
proceedings. The protective custody warrant issued by the court shall remain in effect.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The underlying dependency proceedings were initiated in Santa Clara County.
Dependency jurisdiction was taken over then nine-year-old N.W. and her two siblings on
February 4, 2019, under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious
emotional damage). The children were removed from the physical custody of mother,
and she, as well as father who was incarcerated at the time, were ordered to participate in
family reunification services.

2      Each respondent joins in all arguments advanced by all other respondents. For the
sake of clarity, when we refer to a respondent’s specific argument, we attribute it to the
party that raised the argument in their brief.

                                             3.
       Upon initial removal, N.W. and her siblings were placed with their maternal uncle.
In February 2019, N.W. and one of her siblings, D.W. were placed in protective custody
due to the maternal uncle’s inability to meet the children’s challenging behaviors. In
March 2019, N.W. and D.W. were placed with paternal relatives. Due to N.W. and
D.W.’s challenging behaviors, they again needed new placement.
       In April 2019, N.W. and D.W. were placed with non-relative extended family
members S.E. and E.E., who the children referred to as their grandparents. S.E. and E.E.
were longtime licensed foster parents who cared for mother when she was a minor. In
December 2019, D.W. was moved to another placement, and N.W.’s other sibling, M.W.
was placed with her in the home of S.E. and E.E.
       On January 7, 2020, the Santa Clara County juvenile court ordered the matter
transferred to Stanislaus County. The Stanislaus County juvenile court accepted transfer
on February 4, 2020, and on March 10, 2020, ordered N.W. and her siblings continue as
dependents of the court and mother to continue receiving reunification services.
       On September 15, 2020, the juvenile court terminated mother’s services and found
there was a compelling reason for determining that a section 366.26 hearing would not be
in the best interest of N.W.
       In August 2021, N.W.’s care providers indicated they wanted to be legal guardians
of N.W., and the court set a section 366.26 hearing.
       At the section 366.26 hearing conducted on January 4, 2022, the court established
a guardianship of N.W. and appointed the care providers as her legal guardians and
retained dependency jurisdiction over N.W. The section 366.26 report recommended
dependency jurisdiction be retained because N.W. “continued to struggle with behavioral
issues, and has been reluctant to engage fully in therapy to work through her anger
outburst.” The report further stated, “The guardians would like to provide [N.W.] with
the same permanency, but would like the agency to stay on to continue to support [N.W.]
as she makes the progression towards full stability.” At the section 366.26 hearing, the

                                            4.
court also established guardianship of M.W., appointing the same care providers as
guardians, without dependency jurisdiction. The agency had recommended dependency
jurisdiction be dismissed as to M.W. because he was “stable.”
       A “CONSENT OF PROPOSED GUARDIAN” form signed by E.E. and S.E. and
Letters of Guardianship were filed on January 5, 2022.
       In the agency’s section 366.3 status review report dated June 15, 2022, the
recommendation was for N.W. to continue in her plan of legal guardianship with
dependency. N.W. was in good physical health but was reported to have a hard time
staying focused in school. In April 2022, she was caught vaping in the bathroom but had
not had any incidents since. She performed well academically with A’s and B’s. She
was participating in mental health services weekly and was reported to be doing well.
She was taking ADHD medication as well as melatonin for sleep, with no concerns
reported. She was visiting consistently with mother. The report further indicated N.W.
presented as “a very capable young lady who is able to perform independent living skills
appropriate for her age.” She was reported as having a strong relationship with her
guardians, “who she is typically able to talk to[] after calming down.” It was further
reported she played with friends in the neighborhood and “continues to work on
improving her behavior and when she feels overwhelmed, she tries to apply self-
regulation; however [N.W.] needs to continue to be mindful how her outburst behaviors
impact others.” It was recommended dependency jurisdiction be continued as N.W.
“continued to struggle with behavioral issues, and has been reluctant to engage fully in
therapy to work through her anger outburst.” It was reported the guardians were still
willing to provide N.W. with permanency but continued to want the agency’s support “as
[N.W.] makes the progression towards full stability.”
       At the section 366.3 and psychotropic medication review hearing conducted on
June 28, 2022, the juvenile court found N.W.’s prescribed medication was “working fine”
and was “appropriate at this time.” On behalf of N.W., her counsel stated she had spoken

                                            5.
with N.W. and the guardians, and “[t]he guardian, at some point in the future, would like
the dependency dismissed, but would like [N.W.] to participate in services and commit to
improving her behaviors. She’s still having some pretty alarming behaviors. She’s
AWOLing on a regular basis; coming back quickly but leaving the home, and cussing
and damaging property … at the caregiver’s home. And so the caregiver wants to see
some sort of improvement before agreeing to have the dependency dismissed, but she is
committed to being with [N.W.] until that happens.” The court noted N.W.’s behaviors,
particularly vaping at school were “concerning” but expressed hope that her behaviors
would improve. N.W.’s counsel further noted that it seemed N.W.’s behaviors might be
linked to visits with mother and that she was upset about not being able to live with
mother. The court confirmed that N.W. was participating in therapy to help her cope
with this issue. The court approved of the agency’s recommendations and ordered
N.W.’s permanent plan was to continue in the guardianship with her current guardians.
       On November 3, 2022, the agency filed a section 388 petition requesting the court
set aside N.W.’s current legal guardianship, establish a permanent plan of placement with
a fit and willing relative with continued dependency jurisdiction, dismiss the guardian
S.E. as a party from the proceedings, and order N.W. placed under the supervision of the
agency. In support of the petition, the agency alleged that “[o]n August 16, 2022, the
legal guardian indicated a desire for the guardianship to be terminated.” As to why the
request would be in the best interest of N.W., the petition alleged, “The minor would
have the opportunity to be in placement with a family that adequately meets the minor’s
needs since the minor expressed that she required a high level of care.” Attached to the
petition were e-mails representing the other parties’ positions. N.W.’s counsel wrote, “At
this time, I cannot state a position because my client is AWOL and I would need to
consult with her first due to her age. I do not believe that any order terminating a
guardianship should be made while the subject of the court’s jurisdiction ([N.W.]) is
AWOL.” Father’s counsel joined in minor’s counsel’s position.

                                             6.
       In the status review report the agency prepared for the next section 366.3 hearing
dated November 30, 2022, it was reported N.W. went AWOL from placement on October
16, 2022, and remained so as of date of the report.3 The agency’s recommendation was
for the legal guardianship to be vacated and for N.W. to continue in foster care with a
permanent plan of placement with a fit and willing relative. The report indicated the
guardian stated she no longer wanted to be N.W.’s legal guardian because “she feels that
[N.W.’s] behaviors continue to escalate and at this time she requires a higher level of
care.” The agency also requested the court to issue a protective custody warrant as the
legal guardianship would be terminated.
       On the date set for the section 366.3 hearing and an evidentiary hearing on the
agency’s section 388 petition, December 12, 2022, the court described an off-the-record
discussion regarding the case. The court noted N.W. remained AWOL and her
whereabouts were unknown. The court expressed concern there was no protective
custody warrant outstanding and “[t]here is nothing in the system for law enforcement to
be able to take her into custody and turn her over to CPS.” The court further explained
the agency’s “position is that they’re not able to ask for a protective custody warrant
while the guardianship exists,” and minor’s counsel “is objecting to the termination of the
guardianship.” The court indicated the matter would be trailed “as the Court wants to
know what the authority is for the Agency’s position that I cannot sign a protective
custody warrant for this child, who is under the jurisdiction of this court.”
       The court asked the guardians, who were present, if they were still requesting the
guardianship be terminated, to which S.E. responded, “Yes.” S.E. asked if they could
participate remotely at the trailed hearing, to which the court stated they could and
minor’s counsel represented she would e-mail the guardians the link.

3     In mother’s brief, mother’s appellate counsel indicated he was informed by
mother’s trial counsel that N.W. remained AWOL as of April 5, 2023.

                                              7.
       At the trailed hearing conducted on December 15, 2022, the parties argued their
positions on the issue of whether termination of the guardianship would be required
before the court could issue a protective custody warrant for N.W. while she was AWOL.
Counsel for the agency requested the court terminate the guardianship, arguing the court
could do so even though N.W. was AWOL, and issue a protective custody warrant
directing law enforcement to take N.W., if apprehended, to the agency. Counsel for
N.W. argued the court did not have authority to make any orders other than issuing a
protective custody warrant. She further argued that because N.W. was 12 years old, she
had the right to have her feelings about the guardianship being terminated put before the
court, and “without her here, without me being able to talk to her to get her position, I
can’t state that [N.W.] is in favor of the guardianship dissolving or not. She would also
have the right to set it for a contested hearing if those were her wishes.” Counsel for both
parents agreed with N.W.’s counsel.
       In ruling, the court noted the case In re Baby Boy M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588
(Baby Boy M.) was the “most dispositive” case of those cited. The court reasoned that it
did not see the present case “as being different from any of our other dependency youth
going AWOL, whether it is from an STRTP or a foster care placement, where the Court
does, as you cited, have the power to issue a protective custody warrant, and once
jurisdiction and disposition has been established on a case, has the duty to continue to act
in the youth’s best interests and in their supervision and their protection and safety.” The
court went on to say it “[could] not assess the current value of a placement or
appropriateness of a placement without knowing the circumstances, which we won’t
know until [N.W.] is apprehended on her protective custody warrant. And I don’t see a
guardianship being in place as being a barrier to law enforcement encountering [N.W.],
arresting her on the protective custody warrant, and immediately notifying CPS, who is
going to take custody of her and make an appropriate placement decision, at that point.”
The court continued, “I also don’t have the guardian[s] here. I understand their position

                                             8.
is laid out in the 388, but they are not present or providing a statement as to what their
feelings might be when [N.W.] is apprehended, when she’s apprehended and what their
situation is, and understanding their reasons in asking to terminate other than the AWOL,
which isn’t really set out in the 388.”
       The court then stated it intended to issue a protective custody warrant, set a
runaway review date and “then set a further post-permanency review date for [N.W.’s]
continued safety and in her best interests.” The court denied the section 388 petition and
ordered the agency to provide a protective custody warrant for it to sign.
       Counsel for the agency then asked the court if it was going to be making section
366.3 findings to which the court responded, “And how do I make those findings without
knowing anything about [N.W.] other than her status when she left?” Counsel for the
agency responded, “normally what we would have the Court do is make the orders the
Court can make for funding purposes. So, at this point, the placement is not going to be
funded anymore, and we are going to have some IV-E problems going forward now,
which is why we proceeded the way we have when asking the Court to make runaway
findings, which … involves specific language to meet the requirements of IV-E but also
kind of interlineated that we don’t have all the information.” In response, the court made
the following “runaway findings”: that N.W. had run away from the guardianship, an
out-of-home placement continues to be necessary and her placement was necessary and
appropriate, that the case plan was complied with and appropriate. The court noted “it
doesn’t sound like I’m making placement findings, but if you are saying that my finding
that the child’s placement was necessary and appropriate, therefore, triggers that, that is
something that we will have to address.”
       Counsel for the agency added that the minute order should state “should the youth
be located, the youth should be returned to the legal guardians.” Counsel went on to state
that once N.W. was returned to the legal guardians, they could relinquish her to the
agency, allowing them to file a section 387 petition. Counsel further stated she thought it

                                              9.
was “very convoluted to do it this way, but I’m really concerned for liability on my
client’s end if a kid is dropped off and we do not have custody orders for that child.” The
court stated it can be clarified on the minute order that “when the child is … picked up on
the protective custody warrant, she is to be taken to the legal guardians, who may
relinquish custody to [the agency] … I mean, at that point, I don’t know that when she’s
picked up and returned to the guardians, they may not have changed their mind.”
       Counsel for the agency stated once N.W. was to be apprehended and returned to
the legal guardians, the agency would “have to file the [section] 387 petition, because, at
that point, it’s almost a [section] 300(g) equivalent.” The court responded, “All right.
And the Agency would be ordered to file the [section] 387 petition forthwith.”
                                      DISCUSSION

I.     The Juvenile Court’s Denial of the Agency’s Request to Terminate the Legal
       Guardianship
       Recognizing the issues presented in this appeal are interrelated, we begin our
analysis by addressing whether the court erred by denying the section 388 petition
requesting the court terminate the guardianship. In addressing this issue, we consider the
agency’s separately briefed contention the court “abrogated” its duties in how it
conducted the combined hearing, as well as the issues raised by all parties regarding the
effect on the proceedings of N.W. being AWOL.
       For the reasons we will set forth, we conclude the juvenile court erred in part by
denying the section 388 petition. First, as we will explain, under the circumstances of the
present case, the court was not precluded from considering the merits of the petition just
because N.W. was AWOL, and we reject respondents’ arguments to the contrary. Thus,
we conclude it was an abuse of discretion to the extent the court relied on N.W.’s absence
to deny the petition. We do not, however, find reversal of the order with directions to the
juvenile court to grant the petition, as requested by the agency on appeal, to be an
appropriate remedy. As we will explain, on one hand, the juvenile court did not appear to

                                            10.
reach the merits of the agency’s petition; on the other, the juvenile court made comments
that signal to us, irrespective of N.W.’s absence, that could be construed as the court not
being convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency had met its burden
in establishing the section 388 petition should be granted. We conclude based on the
somewhat unclear record, the best remedy is to reverse the order denying the section 388
petition, and remand for a new hearing on the petition, with directions to the juvenile
court to consider the merits of the petition, without relying on the fact that N.W. is
AWOL as a sole basis for denial.
       Under section 388, subdivision (a), a party may petition the juvenile court to
change, modify or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden
of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a change of circumstances or
new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest. (In re
Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.)
       A section 388 petition is the proper means by which a party must request
termination of a legal guardianship established by the juvenile court. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.740(d).) Before the hearing on the petition, the agency shall prepare a
report that includes an evaluation of whether the child could safely remain in, or be
returned to, the legal guardian’s home without terminating the guardianship if services
were provided. (§ 366.3, subd. (b)(2).) If the petition is granted, the court may order that
a new plan be developed to provide stability for the minor. (§ 366.3, subd. (b)(2); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.740(d)(4).)
       Ruling on a section 388 petition is “ ‘committed to the sound discretion of the
juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an
abuse of discretion is clearly established.’ ” (In re A.R. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1102,
1116‒1117.) We look to whether the juvenile court “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason.
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing

                                             11.
court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318‒319.)
       Here, the juvenile court appeared to rely on two major factors in denying the
section 388 petition: (1) N.W. was AWOL and there was no further information about
her current circumstances or her position on termination of the guardianship, and (2) the
legal guardians were not present for the court to ascertain “as to what their feelings might
be when [N.W.] is apprehended, when she’s apprehended and what their situation is, and
understanding their reasons in asking to terminate other than the AWOL, which isn’t
really set out in the 388.” Notably, the court did not make express findings as to whether
the agency had established changed circumstances or that the requested order was in the
best interest of N.W., and it stated it intended not to consider terminating the
guardianship until N.W. was found.
       We first address the effect of N.W. being AWOL on the proceedings, particularly
the narrow issue of whether the court could consider and/or grant the section 388 petition
in light of the information the legal guardians had requested the guardianship be
terminated. We agree with the agency under the circumstances of the present case,
N.W.’s absence was not a definitive barrier to the court granting the petition. In light of
the specific reason for the request for termination—that the legal guardians were no
longer willing to have the guardianship in place—N.W.’s personal position was of low
probative value and not necessary for the court to make an order in her best interest with
regard to the narrow issue of the guardianship.
       We reject N.W.’s contention that granting the section 388 petition in her absence
would have violated her right to due process. Specifically, N.W. contends the record
does not demonstrate she had actual notice of the hearing and was not advised of her right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
       While we recognize N.W. had a right to be present at the hearing under the
circumstances of this case (§ 349), we do not find N.W. has persuaded us that the court

                                               12.
would have erred by proceeding in her absence. There is no evidence to suggest N.W.’s
absence from the guardians’ home was not voluntary as the record suggests N.W. had
been frequently going AWOL for shorter periods of time from the legal guardians’ home.
By absenting herself from the home and not making contact with them, her parents, her
attorney, or the agency, the only reasonable conclusion is that she had voluntarily chosen
not to be present at any hearings that may occur in her absence.
       N.W. provides no authority that actual notice was required to protect her rights.
N.W. was served by mail at her last known address (§ 295; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.740(d)(2)), the court found the agency had made reasonable efforts to locate N.W.,
N.W. was represented by counsel, and no party expressly raised the issue of service of
notice. Further, we do not find the fact that N.W. was not advised of her right to present
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses rises to the level of a due process violation, as
N.W. was represented by counsel at the hearing and had the opportunity to seek to
present evidence or cross-examine the social worker.
       Respondents cite a number of cases to support the argument that, without N.W.’s
presence and/or position, the court did not have sufficient information to grant the section
388 petition and therefore acted properly. First, the parents, as did the juvenile court, rely
on Baby Boy M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 588. In Baby Boy M., the mother of an infant
child appealed juvenile court orders declaring the minor, whose whereabouts were
unknown, a dependent child, denying the mother reunification services, identifying long-
term foster care as the minor’s permanent plan, and ordering permanent placement
services for the minor if he were to ever be found. (Id. at p. 591.) While the appellate
court found the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make custody
determinations regarding the minor, it also noted the court should not have conducted the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing until the minor was found and reversed all orders
remanding the matter for periodic review hearings as required by law. (Ibid.) It was
believed that the minor was out of state with his father. (Id. at p. 599.) The appellate

                                             13.
court reasoned that it “lack[ed] any meaningful information concerning [the minor]” and
therefore “prudential considerations independent of the jurisdictional analysis mandate
that the juvenile court should have deferred holding the jurisdictional and dispositional
hearings until [the minor was] located.” (Id. at pp. 600–601.) The court noted, “The
benefit of waiting until the child is present (or at least his location is known and his living
situation assessed) is that it avoids decisionmaking by the court that may ultimately prove
not in the child’s best interests.” (Id. at p. 601.) Finally, the appellate court found the
juvenile court properly issued a protective custody warrant, as “it had no reason to do
anything more.” (Ibid.)
       Mother also relies on Katheryn S. v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 958
(Katheryn S.) and In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236 (Claudia S.). In Katheryn
S., the juvenile court took jurisdiction over the minor and released her to her mother
under a conditional release to intensive supervision program (CRISP) agreement, and the
mother absconded with the minor. (Katheryn S., supra, at pp. 961–962.) The juvenile
court relieved mother’s counsel because mother was absent from the proceedings and
continued to hold hearings while the mother and minor’s whereabouts were unknown
including ordering reunification services provided and subsequently terminating services
and setting a section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 962.) After the mother and minor were
located out of state and the mother was in custody as a result of the juvenile court’s
warrant, the section 366.26 hearing was conducted, at which the social worker informed
the court they did not have time to assess the nature or quality of the parent-child
relationship, had not spoken to the minor about adoption, and thought it would be
inappropriate to do so since the child had been in the mother’s care for the prior three
years. (Id. at pp. 962–963.) The court proceeded with the hearing, ordering parental
rights terminated and adoption as the minor’s permanent plan. (Id. at p. 963.) The
appellate court held it was error to relieve the mother’s counsel and make the orders it did
in the mother’s absence. (Id. at pp. 963–964.) The appellate court noted that despite the

                                             14.
mother’s actions, the juvenile court did not act in the minor’s best interest as “orders were
eventually made by the court—orders that doubtless would affect [the minor] for the rest
of her life—at a time when the person [the minor] was most attached to and dependent
upon was absent outside the geographic jurisdiction of the court and unrepresented by
legal counsel. Not only was this unfair to [the mother], it put [the minor’s] welfare at
unnecessary risk.” (Id. at p. 974.) The appellate court concluded that under the “peculiar
circumstances” presented by the case before it, “the juvenile court’s decision to proceed
with a section 366.26 hearing in [the mother’s] absence or, at least, without [the mother]
being represented by counsel, was improvident—especially considering the social
worker’s and counsel’s request that the matter be continued so that a proper assessment
of the situation might be completed.” (Id. at p. 975.)
       In Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 236, the mother took the minors out of the
country knowing the child welfare agency intended to file dependency petitions. (Id. at
p. 241.) The juvenile court conducted detention, jurisdiction, disposition, 6- and 12-
month status review hearings in their absence, as well as the absence of the presumed
father, and without appointing counsel on behalf of the parents. (Ibid.) The appellate
court reversed all orders issued after the detention hearing and remanded the matter for a
new jurisdiction hearing “on the ground that the absence of the family and counsel under
the unique circumstances of this case rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.”
(Id. at p. 242.)
       These cases provide little by way of analogy to the present case. In Baby Boy M.,
it was believed the minor was out of state with his father; the minor’s living situation was
directly related to the issues of jurisdiction and disposition. That is, had the minor been
safe with his father and not at risk, jurisdictional and dispositional orders would not be in
the minor’s best interest because he would be safely with a parent. The issue before the
juvenile court in the present case presented much different considerations. Because the
reason for the request was that the guardians were representing they might be no longer

                                             15.
willing to care for the child, where N.W. was or whether she was currently safe or at risk
was not relevant to the narrow issue of whether the legal guardianship should be
terminated. Rather, depending on the situation, declining to terminate a legal
guardianship in a minor’s absence could be detrimental to the child. We note our
conclusion would without a doubt be different if the juvenile court was being asked to
make orders regarding the retention or dismissal of dependency jurisdiction, but that was
not the case here. Katheryn S. and Claudia S. are similarly inapposite. Both cases are
like Baby Boy M. in that the current circumstances of the children were directly related to
the orders being made, and as we have stated, a request to terminate a guardianship where
the guardians are no longer willing to care for the child is not analogous. Both cases are
further distinguishable because they had the additional aspect of the court making a series
of orders affecting parties without representation of counsel.
       We conclude that, to the extent the court denied the petition on the grounds that
N.W. was AWOL, it abused its discretion. We note our conclusion is limited to the
particular facts of this case. This does not end our analysis, however, as the court also
expressed it wanted to further ascertain the legal guardians’ positions, including the
reasons they were seeking to terminate the guardianship. Implicit in these comments was
the inference that the information the agency presented may not have satisfied the court
as to whether the section 388 petition should be granted. At the same time, it is not clear
to us the juvenile court considered the merits of the petition; as we have stated, it did not
make express findings and suggested it would not consider terminating the guardianship
until N.W. was found.
       We cannot ignore the court’s comments. It is within the juvenile court’s purview
to determine whether the agency met their burden as the petitioning party, and we must
not substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s if the juvenile court’s is not
unreasonable. As the agency points out, the evidence before the juvenile court was
(1) “the verified petition of the social worker stating the guardians requested that the

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guardianship be terminated”; (2) the section 366.3 report, “which stated that the legal
guardian ‘stated that she no longer wants to be [N.W.’s] legal guardian because she feels
that [N.W.]’s behaviors continue to escalate and at this time she requires a higher level of
care’ ”; and (3) “the, admittedly, unsworn statement of the guardians in response to the
Court’s own question, three days prior to the court ruling, that they continued to want the
guardianship terminated.” We cannot say this evidence was so overwhelming as to
compel the juvenile court to grant the petition thus rendering it an abuse of discretion not
to find the agency’s burden had been met. Had the juvenile court intended its comments
to be a ruling on the petition’s merits, we cannot say such a ruling was unreasonable.
Like the juvenile court pointed out, the reasons the legal guardians requested the
guardianship be terminated were not fleshed out in the section 388 petition or the section
366.3 report, nor were the legal guardians present for the juvenile court to make further
examination of them.
       We reject the agency’s contention that the court’s comments on the guardians’
position, particularly about whether the guardians would change their minds once N.W.
was returned, was speculation and therefore not a basis to deny the petition. We interpret
the court’s comments as it expressing it wanted a more complete picture as to the reasons
the guardians wanted the guardianship terminated, which was relevant to whether the
agency had met their burden in establishing the factors under section 388.
       In conclusion, though we do find the court abused its discretion by relying on the
fact that N.W. was AWOL in denying the petition, for the reasons we have stated, we are
reluctant to reverse the order denying the petition and direct the juvenile court to
terminate the guardianship as the agency requests. Based on the record before us, we
find the most appropriate remedy is to reverse the order denying the agency’s section 388
petition and remand for a new hearing. We find the determination of whether the agency
met its burden must be made in the first instance by the juvenile court, keeping in mind
that N.W.’s absence is not a definitive barrier to deciding.

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       We appreciate the agency’s position that in light of the guardians’ desire to have
the guardianship terminated, the only reasonable order to make to protect N.W.’s best
interests is to terminate the guardianship. We recognize placement with care providers
who are unable or unwilling to provide basic care is not in any child’s best interest. We
also recognize that maintaining the guardianship while N.W. was AWOL may have
prevented the agency from “engag[ing] in pre-planning and exploration of possible
appropriate placements for [N.W.] when she is located.” We also recognize the agency’s
concern that guardianship is a voluntary act, and it is a legal guardian’s prerogative to
withdraw consent. These are all considerations the juvenile court must weigh as it
considers the section 388 petition upon remand.
III.   The Court’s Issuance of the Protective Custody Warrant
       We turn to the agency’s contention the court may not properly issue a protective
custody warrant while the legal guardianship remains intact. While this issue may very
well become moot if the juvenile court, upon remand, grants the agency’s petition, we
will analyze the issue for guidance for the court and parties. Analysis of this issue
depends on interpretation of section 340.
       “We review questions of statutory construction de novo.” (In re B.H. (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 729, 736.) We first look to the words of the statute “to determine
legislative intent and to fulfill the purpose of the law.” (Ibid.) “ ‘If the statutory
language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the statute controls.’ ” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206,
1214.) We also “interpret the language in the context of the entire statute and the
overarching statutory scheme, and we give significance to every word, phrase, sentence
and part of an act in discerning the legislative purpose.” (In re B.H., supra, at p. 736.)
“We must also give the statute a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent
with the apparent purpose and intent of the lawmakers and resulting in wise policy rather
than mischief or absurdity.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the statutory language may reasonably be given

                                              18.
more than one interpretation, courts may employ various extrinsic aids, including a
consideration of the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative
history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.”
(Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, at p. 1214.)
       Section 340, subdivision (a) reads:

              “(a) Whenever a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging
       that a minor comes within Section 300 and praying for a hearing on that
       petition, or whenever any subsequent petition has been filed praying for a
       hearing in the matter of the minor and it appears to the court that the
       circumstances of his or her home environment may endanger the health,
       person, or welfare of the minor, or whenever a dependent minor has run
       away from his or her court-ordered placement, a protective custody
       warrant may be issued immediately for the minor.” (Italics added.)
       We find the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, contrary to the agency’s
suggestion. It appears clear to us the juvenile court was within its authority to issue a
protective custody warrant. Because the court had retained dependency jurisdiction over
N.W., she was “a dependent minor [who] ha[d] run away from … her court-ordered
placement,” and the statute clearly confers authority to issue a protective custody warrant
under that circumstance. We do not see any reason that this would not include a legal
guardianship over which the juvenile court still maintained dependency jurisdiction.
       The agency contends that this is an inappropriate reading because subdivision (c)
of section 340 provides, “Any child taken into protective custody pursuant to this section
shall immediately be delivered to the social worker who shall investigate, pursuant to
Section 309, the facts and circumstances of the child and the facts surrounding the child
being taken into custody and attempt to maintain the child with the child’s family through
the provision of services.” (Italics added.) The agency contends applying subdivision (a)
of section 340 to legal guardianships renders subdivision (c) superfluous. They reason,
as they did below, that the agency could not legally take custody over a minor in a legal
guardianship.

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       We disagree. If anything, section 340, subdivision (c) sets forth the proper
procedure for warrants, including those issued for runaway dependents. Here, based on
our reading of the plain language of the statute, the court could have properly directed
law enforcement to release N.W. to the agency. The court only directed N.W. to be
brought to the legal guardians at the agency’s request, and the agency does not appear to
be contending on appeal that this, specifically, was improper. We note that if, upon
remand, the juvenile court denies the request to terminate the guardianship, and N.W. is
subsequently taken to the legal guardians who in turn seek to relinquish N.W. to the
agency because they are unwilling to care for her, the agency could arguably take
temporary custody of N.W. pursuant to section 306 and file another request to terminate
the guardianship.
       The agency questions the propriety of a protective custody warrant being issued in
a hypothetical situation where M.W., who was placed in a legal guardianship with the
grandparents, were to run away. We note the circumstances between the children are
distinguishable in that the juvenile court retained dependency jurisdiction over N.W.,
while it dismissed it as to M.W., and the present appeal does not present the issue of
whether the court may issue a protective custody warrant on behalf of a nondependent
child in a legal guardianship established in a juvenile dependency case.
       We reject appellant’s contention the court erred by issuing a protective custody
warrant while the legal guardianship was in place.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The order denying the agency’s section 388 petition is reversed. The matter is
remanded for a new hearing on the agency’s section 388 petition requesting the court to
terminate the guardianship and for appropriate further proceedings in light of the views
expressed in this opinion and the then current circumstances of N.W. and the legal
guardians. The protective custody warrant shall remain in effect. If the court grants the

                                            20.
agency’s section 388 petition, it shall issue a new protective custody warrant directing
N.W. to be delivered to the agency, if necessary.

                                                                           DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

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