Court Opinion

ID: 9480530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:50:40.171303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:44.741454
License: Public Domain

BAUER, Chief Judge,
with whom CUDAHY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in the result but dissenting in part.
I have no problem with the affirmance of the conviction in this case; my only quarrel is with the decision not to include as part of the conspiracy instruction delivered to the jury, the language of Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 5.11, which reads:
In determining whether the defendant became a member of the conspiracy you may consider only the acts and doings of that particular defendant.1
It is very difficult to argue with the careful and logical opinion of Judge Easter-brook. Bourjaily does hold that the anti-boot strapping rule is abolished and, as this court did in Santiago, confirmed that the admissibility of a co-conspirator’s statement was solely a matter for the trial judge. That is not, it seems to me, the question.
The question is whether a finding of guilty of the crime of participating in a criminal conspiracy can be predicated entirely on the out-of-court statements of alleged co-conspirators. If so, then the confrontation clause of the Constitution has been fairly well dented.
*637The majority opinion says correctly that people are constantly convicted on the say-so of others. Short of a plea of guilty or an in-court confession, I believe that all convicted defendants are convicted on other people’s say-so. What the Seventh Circuit Pattern Instruction Committee sought was to face the confrontation clause of the Constitution and reconcile it with the rule 401.
At least this writer has no quarrel with the rule that says that statements of a co-conspirator are not hearsay. The rule is based on a logical series of thoughts: criminal conspiracies are business arrangements; the object of the “business” may be illegal, but its formation and growth is very like the formation and growth of a corporation (absent stock issuances) or a joint-venture or a multi-faceted partnership. And, as in a business arrangement, the partnership or corporation operates through agents. And these agents, acting within the scope of the agency agreement, have the power to bind the “company” or the partners of the agent. The acts and statements of the agent, made within its general terms, to further the business reason for the agency, are the acts and statements of the principal as well. And each partner in the business is the agent of all other partners with the same power to bind and make liable his co-partners (and fellow agents).
Having borrowed this much from the business law world, we must borrow it all; the agency cannot be proved only by the acts or declarations of the agents, but must be proved independently of the agent, either by written terms of the agency, the delivery of an indicia of agency by the principal to the agent, or by some affirmative act or statement (including ratification by accepting the benefits) of the principal which, in effect, acknowledges the agency relation. That is all the paragraph of the Pattern Instruction does: it calls the jury’s attention to the requirement that the principal-agent relationship must be demonstrated by some act or doing of the principal who is to be held accountable.
The majority opinion says just that: “Conspirators, like partners, are mutual agents. Declarations by others count against the accused only if the accused has joined the conspiracy personally. Linda Cabeza could not draft Martinez into a conspiracy; Martinez had to enlist. Unless her words and deeds place her among the conspirators, other persons’ statements are (substantively) irrelevant.” But this statement, unless conveyed to the jury in some form, means little. The reason for any instruction to the jury is to tell them what the law, applicable to the case at bar, is. And that, it seems to me, is what the paragraph being stricken does.
The quote from Bourjaily — "... There is little doubt that a co-conspirator’s statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant and the de-clarant in the conspiracy.” — is both accurate and frightening. It is precisely the problem: the participation of an alleged co-conspirator should not be provable only by the statements of a co-conspirator unless the speaker is a witness in court subject to confrontation and cross-examination.
Nor do I find much comfort in the statement of the majority opinion that says, “Declarations collectively may be sufficient to establish that the accused joined in the venture even though no snippet of hearsay may be enough, standing alone.” So that Linda’s taped statement about Martinez’s participatory role in the scheme here involved is given status as an admissible statement of a co-conspirator by Martinez who “shows up in Linda’s company talking about kilos.” Indeed it does, but it is the act and statement of the accused, not an out-of-court declaration by a third party.2 The participation of Martinez is shown by “her acts and statements” as the heretofore approved instruction required.
The opinion then proposes an instruction which “would suffice” (although “not re*638quired”). In plain language, the instruction tells the jury that they have “heard about statements made by persons who the prosecutor says are the defendant’s fellow conspirators. You may consider these statements when you decide whether the defendant joined the conspiracy. Please remember, however, that only the defendant’s own words and acts show whether he joined. You therefore should use statements by other persons to decide what the defendant did and said, or to help you understand the defendant’s acts and words.”
What it provides is that the judge can find the status of the accused as a co-conspirator by considering the out-of-court statements of an admitted co-conspirator. He then tells the jury that they may consider these statements “when you decide whether the defendant joined the conspiracy.” So if a live government witness testifies that he arranged with A to buy cocaine that A says he owns jointly with C and B, and the same government witness says that B delivered the cocaine and said he got it from C, A, B, and C can all be convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine although not one single witness has taken the stand to say he or she ever saw or talked with C. The opinion and instruction proposed as a model makes this result legal and proper. I cannot believe that this satisfies the confrontation clause of our Constitution or any concept of a fair trial.
Nor do I understand that out-of-court statements are made more persuasive or reliable because they are made by persons “who the prosecutor says are the defendant’s fellow conspirators.”
In short, by making the statements of co-conspirators the predicates for their own admissibility and then making them the basis for a conviction of someone not a party to the statements, the Constitution and my concept of a fair trial are grossly offended. Instruction 5.11 should be left intact.

. The entire instruction reads as follows:
5.11 CONSPIRACY
In order to establish the offense of conspiracy, the government must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. that the alleged conspiracy existed, and
[2. that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and]
3. that the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy.
A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose. A conspiracy may be established even if its purpose was not accomplished.
In determining whether the alleged conspiracy existed, you may consider the actions and statements of all the alleged participants. The agreement may be inferred from all the circumstances and the conduct of all the alleged participants.
(A conspiracy is not proved unless the evidence establishes that at least one overt act was committed by at least one conspirator to further the purpose of the conspiracy. It is not necessary that all the overt acts charged in the indictment be proved, and the overt act proved may itself be a lawful act.]
In determining whether the defendant became a member of the conspiracy you may consider only the acts and statements of that particular defendant.
To be a member of the conspiracy, the defendant need not join at the beginning or know all the other members or the means by which the purpose was to be accomplished. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, from the defendant’s own acts and statements, that he was aware of the common purpose and was a willing participant.

. Kathleen Jaeger, a government witness, testified that she was present with Ms. Cabeza and the defendant Martinez de Ortiz and that she, Jaeger, heard the defendant Martinez speak of "Lydia” and “kilos.”