Court Opinion

ID: 9899372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 17:09:51.40457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.695348
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Adoption of B.B., 2023-Ohio-4134.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

In re Adoption of B.B.                                  Court of Appeals No. L-23-1078

                                                        Trial Court No. 2022 ADP 000126

                                                        DECISION AND JUDGMENT

                                                        Decided: November 14, 2023

                                                    *****

        Stephen M. Szuch, for appellants

        Mark Davis, for appellee.

                                                    *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an expedited appeal from a judgment by the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas, Probate Division, which determined appellee’s written consent was

required to appellant-stepfather’s petition for adoption of the minor child, B.B., and

dismissed the petition. For the reasons set forth below, this court reverses and remands

the judgment of the probate court.
                                      I. Background

       {¶ 2} The following facts and timeline are relevant to this appeal. Appellant-

mother, N.B., and appellee-father, W.M., who never married each other, are the natural

parents of B.B., a minor. Appellant-petitioner, S.B., is married to N.B. and is the

stepfather of B.B.

       {¶ 3} Since June 18, 2018, the Lucas County Juvenile Court ordered appellee to

pay child support for B.B., and since May 24, 2019, the juvenile court designated

appellant-mother the residential parent and legal custodian of B.B. and awarded appellee

parenting time.

       {¶ 4} On July 18, 2020, appellant-petitioner married appellant-mother.

       {¶ 5} Effective on September 17, 2020, the Lucas County Juvenile Court issued a

no-contact order against appellee and in favor of B.B. The juvenile court’s journalized

order states, “Once father has engaged in [substance use and/or mental health] counseling

services and completed no less than 50% of the batterer’s intervention program, he may

petition the court to reinstate his parenting time to begin SUPERVISED at the CRC.”

(Emphasis sic.)

       {¶ 6} On September 26, 2022, appellee’s payroll deducted the first child support

payment for B.B. since May 18, 2021. Other child support payroll deductions during this

period were for another minor child with another mother, neither of whom are parties to

this appeal.

2.
         {¶ 7} On September 27, 2022, appellant-petitioner filed a petition to adopt B.B.

Appellant-mother filed her written consent to the adoption that day. Using the probate

court’s form for a petition for adoption of a minor pursuant to R.C. 3107.05, appellant-

petitioner checked-off the boxes that appellee’s consent was not required for two reasons:

(1) “The parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis

contact with the minor for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing

of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner”; and

(2) “The parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and

support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year

immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in

the home of the petitioner.” The petition also states B.B. “is living in the home of the

petitioner, and was placed therein for adoption on the 18th day of July, 2020, by

[appellant-mother] (married 7/18/20; cohabitated since Nov. 2016).”

         {¶ 8} Appellee, acting pro se,1 opposed the adoption petition on October 11, 2022.

         {¶ 9} On February 6, 2023, appellee filed a motion for Civ.R. 11 sanctions against

appellant-petitioner for filing the adoption petition in bad faith for two reasons. Appellee

argued appellee had justifiable cause for not contacting B.B. the year preceding the

adoption petition due to the juvenile court’s no-contact order against appellee. Appellee

1
    Appellee was subsequently represented by counsel for the remainder of the proceedings.

3.
further argued he made a child support payment for B.B. the day prior to the adoption

petition.

       {¶ 10} On February 7, 2023, the probate court held a contested-consent hearing on

the preliminary issue of the necessity for appellee’s written consent to the adoption

petition. The probate court heard testimony from four witnesses and admitted 11 exhibits

into evidence.

       {¶ 11} On March 6, 2023, the probate court dismissed appellant-petitioner’s

adoption petition because it found appellee’s written consent to the adoption of B.B. was

necessary pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). The probate court stated two reasons for its

determination that appellant-petitioner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence

that appellee’s consent was not required. First, citing In re Adoption of A.K., 168 Ohio

St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-350, 198 N.E.3d 47, the probate court determined that, “Lucas

County Juvenile Court’s no-contact order was clearly in effect during the entire one-year

period. Petitioner’s argument that the birth parent could have and should have taken

certain actions to request a removal of the court order is not persuasive. The fact is that

the order was in effect and the birth father complied with the order.” Second, citing In re

Adoption of Sunderhaus, 63 Ohio St.3d 127, 132, 585 N.E.2d 418 (1992), the probate

court determined that, “the evidence shows that the birth father provided support through

his employment prior to the expiration of the one-year period. The fact that this support

did not reach its destination prior to the statutory time period was beyond his control.

4.
Although a technical argument can be made that compliance with the statute requires the

support to arrive at its destination prior to the expiration of the statutory time limit, this

argument is not sufficient for a probate court to order a total termination of parental

rights.” The probate court also denied appellee’s motion for Civ.R. 11 sanctions.

       {¶ 12} Appellant-petitioner and appellant-mother timely appealed with two

assignments of error:

              1. The lower court erred in finding Father had justifiable cause for

       failing to maintain more than de minimis contact with B.B.

              2. The lower court erred in finding that Father provided for the

       maintenance and support of the minor child during the one year

       immediately preceding the filing of the adoption proceeding.

          II. Whether R.C. 3107.07(A) Requires Appellee’s Written Consent

       {¶ 13} Both assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decision that

appellee’s written consent was required pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). We will address

the assignments of error together.

       {¶ 14} R.C. 3107.06(B) requires appellee’s written consent to the adoption of B.B.

unless consent is not required under R.C. 3107.07. In re Adoption of H.P., Slip Opinion

No. 2022-Ohio-4369, ¶ 20. Where a party is invoking the parental-consent requirement

exception, that party carries the burden of establishing the exception by clear and

convincing evidence. Id. “The statute is not framed in terms of avoidance, but is drafted

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to require petitioner to establish each of his allegations[.]” In re Adoption of Holcomb,

18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). Clear and convincing evidence is proof

that produces in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts

sought to be established. Id. at 368, citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶ 15} In turn, R.C. 3107.07(A) states,

              Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following: (A) A

       parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court,

       after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing

       evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more

       than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance

       and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period

       of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption

       petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.

       {¶ 16} We find the language of R.C. 3107.07(A) is clear and unambiguous and

must be applied as written to give effect to its plain meaning. In re Crandall, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-060770, 2007-Ohio-855, ¶ 10; In re Adoption of A.C.B., 159 Ohio St.3d

256, 2020-Ohio-629, 150 N.E.3d 82, ¶ 7; In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186,

2012-Ohio-236, 963 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 19-20.

6.
       {¶ 17} There are separate, relevant one-year periods invoked by R.C. 3107.07(A):

(1) preceding the filing of the adoption petition or (2) preceding the placement of the

minor in the home of the petitioner. “Thus, a parent’s consent is not required when the

parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact or

maintenance and support during the relevant one-year period.” (Emphasis sic.) In re

Petition for Adoption of Z.H., 2022-Ohio-3926, 199 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.), citing

In re Adoption of A.K., 168 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-350, 198 N.E.3d 47, at ¶ 17.

       {¶ 18} The disjunctive relationship of the contact and support provisions, coupled

with the additional disjunctive relationship of the preceding one-year statutory periods

measured from the adoption petition or the child’s placement with the petitioner, mean

that a parent’s failure to meet any one of the four provisions is sufficient to nullify the

need to obtain that parent’s consent. Adoption of A.K. at ¶ 17 (“the General Assembly

intended to make the provisions of equal importance because each provision is subject to

the same evidentiary standard”).

              We recognize that this reading of the statute can lead to a harsh

       result. Once a parent has failed to provide communication or support during

       the first year-long period, no amount of support or communication during

       the year preceding the petition can ameliorate the effect of the statute. By

       statute, parental consent to adoption would not be required. But the harsh

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       result of the statute is for the legislature to address; we apply the law as it is

       written.

In re Crandall at ¶ 10 (construing former R.C. 3107.07(A)).

       {¶ 19} The issues regarding failure of de minimis contact, failure of support and

maintenance, the petition date, the year preceding the petition, the date the child was

placed with the petitioner, the year preceding the child’s placement with the petitioner,

and the existence of justifiable cause are questions of fact for the probate court. See In re

Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d at 368, 481 N.E.2d 613. We review for an abuse of

discretion the probate court’s determinations of these facts and decision regarding

whether a financial contribution from a parent constitutes maintenance and support for

purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A). In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 25. Abuse of discretion

“‘connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404

N.E.2d 144 (1980).

       {¶ 20} In this matter, the probate court determined as facts that appellee’s payroll

deduction for B.B.’s support was processed on September 26, 2022, and appellant-

petitioner filed the adoption petition on September 27, 2022. The probate court then

decided, “the evidence shows that the birth father provided support through his

employment prior to the expiration of the one-year period. The fact that this support did

8.
not reach its destination prior to the statutory time period was beyond his control.”

However, the probate court failed to analyze the separate one-year periods under R.C.

3107.07(A), which are recited in the probate court’s own petition form, with respect to

that September 26, 2022 child support payment. For example, there is unrefuted

testimony in the record that B.B. was placed in appellant-petitioner’s home as early as

November 2016, or as late as July 18, 2020. Given the foregoing, we find it unlikely the

probate court could determine that the September 26, 2022 support payment satisfied the

one-year period preceding the child’s placement with the petitioner under R.C.

3107.07(A).

       {¶ 21} The same abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a probate court

decision regarding the factual question of whether de minimis contact by a parent has

occurred for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A). In re Adoption of A.W., 6th Dist. Huron No.

H-22-007, 2022-Ohio-3360, ¶ 13. The probate court determined as facts that the juvenile

court’s no-contact order against appellee in favor of B.B. was in effect since

September 17, 2020, and was justifiable cause under R.C. 3107.07(A). Again, the

probate court failed to analyze the separate one-year periods under R.C. 3107.07(A),

which are recited in the probate court’s own petition form, when it stated, “Lucas County

Juvenile Court’s no-contact order was clearly in effect during the entire one-year period.”

Given the evidence in the record of the possible dates B.B. was placed in appellant-

petitioner’s home, we find it unlikely the probate court could determine that the juvenile

9.
court’s September 17, 2020 no-contact order was in effect during the preceding one-year

period of B.B.’s placement date.

       {¶ 22} Despite the foregoing failures, the probate court decided that by clear and

convincing evidence, appellee’s written consent to B.B.’s adoption by appellant-

petitioner was necessary pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). “Once the clear and convincing

standard has been met to the satisfaction of the probate court, the reviewing court must

examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to

satisfy this burden of proof. The determination of the probate court should not be

overturned unless it is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.” (Citations

omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d at 368, 481 N.E.2d 613.

       {¶ 23} We cannot say the evidence in the record supports the probate court’s

decision by clear and convincing evidence. We find the probate court abused its

discretion when it failed to address the contact and support factors under R.C. 3107.07(A)

measured from the placement of B.B. in the home of appellant-petitioner. “Since the

statute contemplates the calculation of the requisite year from either of two dates, the trial

court erred in considering only one.” In re Adoption of Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 576, 579,

591 N.E.2d 823 (9th Dist.1990).

       {¶ 24} The probate court’s decision is silent on the question of fact of B.B.’s date

of placement in appellant-petitioner’s home. “It is conceded that determination of

‘placement’ is crucial to an adoption proceeding pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A).” In the

10.
Matter Adoption of Kraft, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-84-442, 1985 WL 7138, *3 (May 31,

1985). “‘In making a determination as to whether a placement occurred, a court should

consider, among other factors, whether the child was placed in the home by a third-party

agency, the welfare department, or by court order; whether the child was placed in the

home by a private action; whether the marrying parent had legal custody of the child; and

the intent of the parties.’” Id., quoting In re Adoption of Kreyche, 15 Ohio St.3d 159,

162, 472 N.E.2d 1106 (1984).

       {¶ 25} Upon review, we find that appellant-petitioner’s and appellant-mother’s

first and second assignments of error are well-taken, and this matter is remanded to the

probate court to make additional findings of fact regarding all of the contact and support

factors under R.C. 3107.07(A), which are recited in the probate court’s own petition

form, prior to determining whether appellee’s written consent to B.B.’s adoption by

appellant-petitioner is necessary.

                            III. Cross-Motions for Sanctions

       {¶ 26} Appellee filed with the probate court a motion for Civ.R. 11 sanctions

against appellant-petitioner alleging the petitioner intentionally misled the court with the

reasons for not requiring his written consent to B.B’s adoption. Following the contested-

consent hearing, the probate court denied appellee’s motion. Appellee does not appeal

the probate court’s decision.

11.
       {¶ 27} Rather, on September 19, 2023, appellee filed in this court an original

motion for sanctions against appellant-petitioner alleging attempts “to taint the adoption

proceedings with allegations of domestic violence that he knew to be false.” Appellee

does not identify the legal basis for his motion. Nevertheless, where appellee’s motion

relies exclusively on appellant-petitioner’s conduct through references to the transcript of

proceedings in the probate court, we lack authority to address the motion for sanctions for

conduct solely occurring during probate court proceedings, and appellee’s motion is

denied. In re Guardianship of Wernick, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-263, 2006-Ohio-

5950, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Denlinger v. Douthwaite, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2003-

04-054, 2004-Ohio-2069, ¶ 31.

       {¶ 28} Further, even if appellee’s motion for sanctions was based upon this appeal

by appellant-petitioner, appellant-petitioner’s assignments of error on appeal presented

reasonable questions for review, and the appeal is not frivolous for purposes of App.R.

23. Kelley v. Kelley, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-010, 2020-Ohio-6778, ¶ 41. Appellee’s

motion for sanctions is denied. App.R. 23.

       {¶ 29} Appellant-petitioner opposed appellee’s motion and filed a cross-motion

for sanctions, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, for appellee’s motion for sanctions. Although

appellee’s motion for sanctions was unsuccessful, we decline to find it was “frivolous”

under R.C. 2323.51. State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d 571, 2015-Ohio-

12.
4915, 45 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 15 (frivolous conduct “must involve egregious conduct”).

Appellant-petitioner’s cross-motion for sanctions is hereby denied.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 30} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas, Probate Division, is reversed and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this decision: to make additional findings of fact regarding all of the

contact and support factors under R.C. 3107.07(A), which are recited in the probate

court’s own petition form, prior to determining whether appellee’s written consent to

B.B.’s adoption by appellant-petitioner is necessary. The cross-motions for sanctions by

appellee and appellant-petition are denied. Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment reversed,
                                                                             and remanded.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

13.
                                                                   In re Adoption of B.B.
                                                                               L-23-1078

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                          ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                              ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                 JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                              ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

14.