Court Opinion

ID: 9716490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:41:52.348592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.008463
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Buchanan, J.
— I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court of Marion County because in' reviewing the Commissioner’s suspension of Waller’s driver’s license, once it found in its Findings of Fact (One and Two) that Waller was twice convicted within a three-year period of operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, it was bound to affirm the Commissioner’s action under the mandate of IC 1971, 9-4-1-54 (b) (3), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2001 (b) (3) (Burns Supp. 1973) [also known as Senate Bill No. 299 of 1973, SECTION 1(b) (3)] (hereinafter (b) (3)). Therefore, Conclusions of Law No. 1 and No. 2, infra, by concluding that Senate Bill No. 299 is discretionary for “second offenders”, are erroneous because they ignore Findings of Fact No. 1 and No. 2, which mandate suspension of a driver’s license if the motorist has been twice convicted of driving under the influence within a three-year period.
The complete Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Superior Court of Marion County indicate Waller had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor twice within a three-year period:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
“The Petitioner, Richard L. Waller, was convicted of driving under the influence of liquor on August 10, 1970, and received a fine of $32.75 and costs, and his driving license was suspended for sixty (60) days.
' “2. The Petitioner, Richard L. Waller, was convicted of driving under the influence of liquor on May 4, 1973, in the Marion Municipal Court, Room No. 13, and received a $28.00 fine and costs of $32.00. He also received a ten (10) day suspended sentence and his driving license was restricted for-one (1) year and he was placed on probation for one (1) year.
“3. On June 25, 1973, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the Respondents herein, suspended Richard L. Waller’s *244driving license for a period of one (1) year from May 4, 1973 to May 4,1974.
“4. That the Petitioner, Richard L. Waller, received no administrative hearing, but only received a letter of suspension.
“5. That the Petitioner, Richard L. Waller, was convicted on May 4, 1973, under Burns Indiana Statutes, Annot. § 47-2001B2.
“6. That Senate Bill No. 299 which was enacted on April 10,1973 is the applicable statute in this case.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. Senate Bill No. 299 [Now IC 1971, 9-4-1-54] does not make it mandatory for a court to suspend a defendant’s driving license even if he was previously convicted of driving under the influence of liquor, prior to April 10, 1973.
“2. That Senate Bill No. 299 is discretionary with the trial court as to whether or not he suspends the driving license of a second offender or issues the defendant a restricted driving license.
“3. That Senate Bill No. 299 as enacted on April 10, 1973, is vague and ambiguous, and therefore every benefit of doubt must be given to the defendant who is charged with a violation of said statute.
“4. That the Respondents have no legal right under the provisions of Senate Bill No. 299 to overrule a trial court’s judgment.
“5. That the act of the Respondents on June 25, 1973, in suspending the Petitioner’s driving license is arbitrary and capricious and was without due process of law.”
The first and second Findings positively state that Waller was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating beverage twice within a three-year period and there is evidence in the record to support this finding. When faced with these Findings, the clarity of (b) (3) would seem to defy question. When a motorist has been convicted of “a second or any subsequent conviction within a three-year period” for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
“. . . the court shall recommend the suspension of the current driving license of the person so convicted for a determinate period of not less than one year , , . and the *245commissioner of motor vehicles shall thereupon comply with such recommendation, and should the court fail to make such mandatory recommendation, or should the court fail to make the appropriate mandatory recommendation, the commissioner shall proceed to act in the matter as if such recommendation had been made by the court.” (Emphasis added.)
The express language of the statute is neither vague nor ambiguous ... to the contrary. It expresses a clear and unequivocable legislative intent that when “any such person [driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, etc.] upon a second or any subsequent conviction within a three-year period from the date of the first such conviction” the court is bound to direct the suspension of the driver’s license and “should the court fail to make such mandatory recommendation . . . the commissioner shall proceed to act in the manner as if such recommendation had been made by the court.”
For over thirty years, the statutes regulating licensing of operators of motor vehicles have contained devices similar to subsection (b) (3), limiting judicial discretion as to suspension of licenses under certain conditions and mandating the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to suspend licenses whether or not direction is received by the court convicting the erring motorist.
An example is IndAnn.Stat. § 47-1052 (Burns 1952 Replacement) which, like subsection (b) (3), required the court to recommend suspension of the license for one-year upon a second or subsequent conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This statute was in effect in 1952 when State ex rel. Smith v. Delaware Circuit Court (1952), 231 Ind. 173, 108 N.E.2d 58, was decided, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied the right of the court to enter a restraining order preventing the Commissioner from acting in accordance with the provisions of § 47-1052 after the court had failed to follow the mandate of the statute.
The same principle was enunciated and followed in State ex rel. Root v. Circuit Court of Allen County (1972), 259 *246Ind. 500, 289 N.E.2d 503, the court recognizing" that the regulation of driving is within the police power of the státe and the inherent equity power of courts are thereby limited and accordingly quoted from Underhill v. Franz (1951), 230 Ind. 165, 101 N.E.2d 264:
“ ‘A court has no power to do anything which is not authorized by law and when its procedure is defined by a special statute, its judicial function is essentially controlled thereby, and the remedy is confined to the mode prescribed, and the procedure so provided excludes resort to another or different procedure.’ [Citations omitted] Id. at 173, 101 N.E.2d at 267.” 289 N.E.2d 503, at 507.
The thrust of both of these cases is that the courts have neither the inherent equity power nor the legal right to contravene the clearly expressed intent of the legislature and that the courts have no discretion to act under certain conditions.
So once it was determined that Waller was twice convicted within the three-year period (and Waller’s trial brief makes this admission), the only course open to the Superior Court of Marion County was to uphold the Commissioner’s suspension of Waller’s driver’s license. Failure to do so was reversible error.
The concern of the majority that Waller’s prior conviction was not properly established, is understandable but inapplicable.1
The net effect of their opinion is to assume that Waller’s prior conviction might have been improperly established . . . an assumption that has no basis in the record. Contrary to Trial Rule 52(A)2 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, the majority have changed the trial court’s Findings by *247ignoring Findings 1 and 2 arid embroidering'on Finding" 5 a factual conclusion that Waller’s prior conviction was not alleged in the affidavit or indictment and proved at trial. .
By so mutilating the Findings, the majority have partially emasculated (b) (3) and effectively trimmed the sails of clear legislative intent.
Underhill succinctly states the governing principle here:
“a court has no power to do anything which is not-authorized by law and when its procedure is- defined by a special statute its judicial function is essentially controlled thereby.”
Furthermore, the State, as Appellant, need only make a prima facie showing of reversible error inasmuch as Waller failed to file a brief. This it has done. DuFour v. DuFour (1971), 149 Ind. App. 404, 273 N.E.2d 102; Berry v. Town of Fowler (1960), 240 Ind. 443, 166 N.E.2d 333; Kuykendall v. Co. Comm’rs. of Marion County (1968), 142 Ind. App. 363, 234 N.E.2d 860; Nunemaker v. Glassburn (1965), 137 Ind. App. 655, 210 N.E.2d 668; Speedway Bd. of Zon. App. v. Standard Concrete Mat. (1971), 150 Ind. App. 363, 276 N.E. 2d 589.
As Waller was twice convicted within a three-year period of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor the Superior Court had no choice, and was bound to affirm the Commissioner’s action under the mandate of (b) (3), and its judgment ordering the Commissioner to remove the suspension of Waller’s driver’s license was reversible error.
Note. — Reported at 339 N.E.2d 61.

. Compare the majority opinion with Lewis v. State (1975), 166 Ind. App. 553, 337 N.E.2d 516.

. TR. 52(A) provides:
“On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an advisory jury, at law or in equity, a court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, . . (Emphasis supplied.)