Court Opinion

ID: 9532295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:20:04.058929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:43.598097
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Justice.
This workers’ compensation case was heard before the Workers’ Compensation Division. The compensation judge found for the employee on all issues and the rela-tors appealed. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, one judge dissenting. Relators then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which was granted by this court. We affirm.
Employee Kathleen M. Holliday was born in England in 1916. After graduating from high school she painted pottery in a factory for 9 years and then, during the war, worked as an electrician for an aircraft factory for five and one-half years. After the war she worked at a variety of jobs while awaiting transportation to the United States. In the United States she was married and did not immediately go out to work. She did, however, work for a year in 1951 or 1952 doing cooking and waitress work, but she was not employed again until 1967.
In August of 1967 she began working for Rush Products doing repetitious light assembly work. She had a variety of medical problems, including diabetes and hyperten*539sion, which caused her to miss over 8 months’ work during the period from 1971 thru 1972. Also during this time her doctors recommended that she lose weight,1 and she had problems with her knees. Her work attendance record improved markedly in 1973 and 1974, however.
In April of 1975 her job involved putting together a wiring assembly for Buick windshield wipers. The job involved no heavy lifting, only reaching and turning and some pushing of the wires into sockets. However, her back began to trouble her while she had this job. On Thursday, April 10, 1975, Mrs. Holliday’s lower back began to hurt her. The pain continued Friday, but it was not too bad on Monday when she worked at another type of job. Mid-morning Tuesday, April 15, she was returned to her original job. Shortly thereafter she felt “a little catch” low in her back and experienced much pain. After lunch she was unable to get up and was taken home. The next day Mrs. Holliday went to see a doctor. The pain continued, however, and she was admitted to a hospital from April 19 to April 23. She returned to work May 22 doing a light assembly job but again experienced much pain. She again saw a doctor and was admitted to a hospital on June 2 for a 2-week stay. She has not returned to work at Rush Products since that time.
In July of 1975, the Rush Products plant manager called Mrs. Holliday to ask her if she was going to return to work. He quoted her as replying: “I can never return. * * * I have to lie down from time to time throughout the day, and I don’t feel I can ever do justice to my work again.” In October of 1975 a nurse was sent to visit Mrs. Holliday by the compensation insurer. Mrs. Holliday told her: “I didn’t think I could go back and do that again. I had already hurt myself twice, I didn’t figure I should have to do it a third time.”
On appeal, relators contend that respondent has not proven (1) that her disability was continuous and total after October 21, 1975, (2) that there will be a need for medical care and treatment in the future, or (3) that one of her doctor bills was for care by a treating physician.
1. At oral argument counsel for the relators stated that Mrs. Holliday’s job was “the type job that if anybody could do any job at all, they could do this job.” Relators argue that she has not sustained her burden of proof on the claim for continuous and total disability since October 21,1975. This is essentially a factual question to be resolved by the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals.
“ * * * Findings of fact made by the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must be viewed in a light most favorable to such findings. In accordance with this general rule, this court has repeatedly held that we will not disturb a decision of the compensation court on questions of fact unless a consideration of all evidence and inferences permissible therefrom clearly require reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion. It is not our function as an appellate court * * * to determine whether its ultimate decision was preferable under the evidence, but rather to discern whether there was substantial credible evidence present in the record to support the award.” Briggs v. McKee, Inc. Minn., 259 N.W.2d 266 (1977). (Citations omitted.)
There was evidence in the record that Mrs. Holliday had a stable work record pri- or to her employment at Rush Products. Although she had suffered from major medical problems during her employment at Rush Products, she had returned to work and had maintained a high work performance level. Her testimony indicated that her injury was related to the job she was doing. Nevertheless, Mrs. Holliday had tried to return to work but had left because of pain. Dr. Meyer Z. Goldner, who examined and treated her, stated at deposition that Mrs. Holliday continues to present *540symptoms of a lumbar disc syndrome arising out of her work-related activities. He also stated that her condition was permanent and that while her weight did not do her condition any good, it did not make a difference, that both heavier and skinny people have the same complaints. As to her ability to work, Dr. Goldner remarked that he didn’t think she could do anything except get around.
Relators’ contention that Dr. Goldner’s opinion was based on an inadequate description of the job involved is without merit. It is apparent from Dr. Goldner’s testimony that he did not feel Mrs. Holliday could do any work on a sustained basis.2 Prodded by counsel, he did state: “[I]f there is anything they could offer that she can do, let her try it.” But Mrs. Holliday testified that her condition has remained about the same since she left Rush Products, and she is the best judge of what work she can and cannot do. Brening v. Roto-Rooter, Inc. 304 Minn. 562, 237 N.W.2d 383 (1975).
Substantial credible evidence exists in the record to support the decision below. Although Dr. Goldner’s testimony is often in conflict with that of another physician who described Mrs. Holliday as being able to return to work, this is not a situation which clearly requires a conclusion contrary to that reached below.
Relators also argue that Mrs. Holliday has not returned to work due to her nervous condition. This condition, however, is partially the result of her injury and the uncertain state of her work situation. The facts of Mrs. Holliday’s nervous condition and hesitancy to return to work were before the courts below and there is no indication that the facts were not considered in reaching their decisions.
Finally, relators argue that Mrs. Holliday has a degenerative disc disease which became symptomatic while on the job, that it was not a result of job-related activities, and thus she does not suffer from a personal injury which is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Although such an injury would not be compensable under the act,3 Fisher v. Red & White Taxi Co. 270 Minn. 317, 133 N.W.2d 543 (1965), the existence of such an injury is contrary to the factual findings of the courts below which were supported by substantial credible evidence.
2. Relators argue that no evidence has been presented to indicate that there will be any need for medical care and treatment in the future. Dr. Goldner, however, stated in his deposition that he felt there would be such a need. Although Mrs. Holli-day had received no medical treatment for her back from the time of her discharge from the hospital in June 1975, until her examination by Dr. Goldner, the prescription of the corset by Dr. Goldner constitutes medical treatment. Further, such a corset could require adjustment or replacement in the future. Also, Mrs. Holliday’s pain increases with increased activities so that her condition is not stable. Additional treatment or care may be necessary to alleviate pain.
3. Relators argue that Dr. Goldner was not a treating physician and his bill of $240 should be disallowed from coverage. At the request of her lawyer, Mrs. Holliday went to see Dr. Goldner on September 10, 1976, just prior to the commencement of litigation. Dr. Goldner not only examined her but also prescribed a lumbo-sacral corset to give support to her lumbar spine region and to reduce some of her pain. At his deposition Dr. Goldner indicated that Mrs. Holli-*541day was next examined by him on November 15, 1976. She reported to him on the use of the corset. On January 24,1977, she had her last appointment with Dr. Goldner and again indicated that the corset was of help to her. At the Workers’ Compensation hearing, Mrs. Holliday testified that she used the corset and that she thought it was some help to her. Dr. Goldner billed Mrs. Holliday $325, $85 of which was paid by her lawyer’s office for reports.
There is evidence in the record to support the findings of the Compensation Judge and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Goldner was a treating physician. This finding is both reasonable and practical. If relators’ argument is followed, it would result in an examining physician being only able to refer a patient to another doctor. As a result both bills would probably be higher because of the overlap of work involved in examining a patient.
Respondent is allowed $400 attorneys fees.
Affirmed.
SHERAN, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

. Her weight has varied between approximately 170 and 225 pounds during the past few years.

. Dr. Goldner’s description of her ability to work provided a reasonable basis for the decision below: “I don’t think she can do anything except get around. I don’t think she can do anything on a sustained basis. I don’t think she can lift, she can’t bend, she can’t reach, she can’t walk, she can’t sit, she can’t climb, she can’t kneel, she can’t squat. If you exclude all these things, 1 don’t think that leaves very much in the way of any type of gainful occupation.”

. Axi injury which is the result of the aggravation of a pre-existing physical infirmity is com-pensable under the act, however, if the aggravating circumstances are job related. Gillette v. Harold, Inc. 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960).