Court Opinion

ID: 9759583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:20:27.323834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.966183
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to recuse himself, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied a motion for a defense-oriented pathologist and arson expert.
The motion to recuse was filed on September 11, 1989, approximately 4 weeks before the scheduled trial. No affidavit was filed in support of the motion, but copies of ten newspaper articles were attached to the memorandum filed by Som-mers’ counsel. Seven of the articles mentioned Judge Graves. The newspaper articles indicated that Judge Graves made remarks to a reporter without checking the records first. The judge told a reporter that as a district judge he had signed papers granting Sommers’ guardianship over the two children who had died in the fire. Judge Graves later corrected his comments and spoke to reporters to clarify what had actually happened in district court. The mother had filed a petition to appoint Som-mers guardian of her two children and Judge Graves stated that he never ruled on the matter because Sommers did not appear in court on the morning it was scheduled for hearing. Consequently, Judge Graves never saw Sommers nor did he sign an order granting him guardianship of the two children. The school attended by the two girls treated the initial petition presented to them by the mother and Mrs. Som-mers as a court order and thus erroneously indicated a guardianship of Sommers on the school records.
In this situation the motion to recuse the trial judge was not timely filed as provided in Kohler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 492 S.W.2d 198 (1973) and Murray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 150 (1971). Promptness in asserting disqualification is necessary to prevent a party from awaiting the outcome before taking action. Crowders v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.1984).
The record shows that Sommers was indicted for the murders on December' 15, 1988. Six of the seven newspaper items which mention Judge Graves were published in December, 1988. Sommers or his counsel waited nine months before filing his motion to recuse on September 11,1989.
Originally, Sommers was represented by two lawyers who filed 27 motions prior to the date of filing of the motion to recuse. On March 22,1989, Sommers filed a motion for change of venue and the memorandum in support of the motion contained approximately 25 newspaper articles. Of these nine are reproduced in support of the motion to recuse which was filed six months later. Consequently at least two of the defense team were aware of Judge Graves’ statements to the press by March 22, 1989, when the motion for change of venue was made. If Sommers believed these statements provided a basis for a complaint about bias on the part of the trial judge, he should have moved to recuse him at that time. The September 11, 1989 motion was made four weeks before the October trial date. By that time, Judge Graves had ruled on approximately 19 defense motions and had already conducted numerous hearings related to the substance of the case. A review of the record demonstrates that Sommers waited until considerable work had been completed to file his motion to recuse. Recusal should not be used as a last resort when the outcome of motions and hearings do not please any counsel.
Although it is not entirely clear from the record, a third defense counsel entered the picture when one of the original team became ill. The motion to recuse was signed by the third counsel alone. A review of the record indicates that there was some irritation on the part of the trial judge directed to the new third counsel for a possible delay in bringing the motion to recuse. There is nothing to indicate that the brief irritation was directed to the defendant. *890The new counsel was later allowed to put in by avowal what his witness would have testified to regarding the television newscasts of December 15 and 16, 1988.
The motion to recuse was not timely and it was not reversible error for the trial judge to overrule it. If Sommers or his counsel believed that the trial judge was biased, recusal should have been sought at once; it was not.
A careful examination of the record reveals that Sommers received a fundamentally fair trial. A judge is not disqualified merely because of prior participation in the case in some judicial capacity. Poorman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 603 (1989); SCR 4.300; Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.
Although Judge Graves was a district judge when the petition for guardianship was filed, he never had an opportunity to rule on the question because Sommers did not appear for the hearing. Judge Graves never saw Sommers and did not make a determination as to the guardianship. In a trial for murder, the judge was not reviewing anything even remotely related to the guardianship issue. There was no testimony at the murder trial regarding this issue. Sommers and his wife testified that the girls were living with them because their parents had apparently abandoned them. No mention was made of a petition for guardianship. A review of the conduct of the trial judge during the trial reveals no evidence of bias or impartiality. See Marlowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 424 (1986).
The trial judge also did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sommers’ motion for funds for a defense-oriented pathologist and arson expert.
Sommers stated that he did not want to use state experts or facilities because such facilities were impractical and all the witnesses were for the Commonwealth. Clearly Sommers has waived any argument about the inaccessibility of state facilities. They were available to him but he did not choose to accept their assistance.
K.R.S. 31.185 provides that indigent defendants are entitled to use state facilities for the evaluation of evidence. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 585 S.W.2d 378 (1979). Here, defense counsel requested and received the use of state facilities for a psychiatric evaluation of Sommers. Obviously, defense counsel was satisfied that the state facility could give an objective independent evaluation of his client. However, defense counsel claims an implied bias for the prosecution among the state facilities relative to a pathologist and arson investigator. I find no merit in this contention. Trial judges are not required to provide funds for defense experts for mere fishing expeditions on the part of the defense. Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 837 (1984).
Pursuant to the standards set out in Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988) and Hicks, supra, Som-mers never made the required showing of reasonable necessity. The trial judge properly refused to expend public funds on the defense counsel’s request.
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.
REYNOLDS and SPAIN, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.