Court Opinion

ID: 9943912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:17:38.994972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:51:58.148224
License: Public Domain

This case is controlled by the opinions in the two cases of City of Waco v. Thralls, Tex.Civ.App., 128 S.W.2d 462 and 172 S.W.2d 142
and Cawthorn v. City of Houston, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 701. I cannot agree that the cases of Phillips v. City of Abilene, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 147, wr. ref., and Hallman v. City of Pampa, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 543, wr. ref., control the disposition of the present case.
The respondent filed his Fourth Amended Original Petition in which he plead both waiver and estoppel. The plea of estoppel is independent of the plea of waiver. The respondent alleged in substance that the City had notice of the injury (not the notice as required by City ordinance) within two days after the accident, and that he was examined by two or three doctors who were regularly employed by the City, and that such physical examinations were made at the instance of a Mr. Hord, superintendent of the Street and Bridge Department of the City of Houston, and that as a result of such examinations which were made within less than 90 days after the date of injury, the City kept respondent on the payroll for approximately one year thereafter, and that the payroll records contained the word 'injured' beside the name of 'Edward W. Hruska.' Respondent further alleged '* * * that by reason of the matters and things aforesaid, he was mislead and lulled into a sense of security, and the City of Houston is estopped to assert that plaintiff did not comply with such charter provisions; furthermore, and as additional facts in connection with such estoppel, a few days after his pay was stopped, on or about March 25, 1949, or in the alternative on or about February 25, 1949, plaintiff on April 1, 1949, served on the defendant, City of Houston, proper written notice of his claim as provided for (in) said Art. IX, Sec. 11, of said City's charter * * * without in any manner pointing out any defects in such notice or requesting additional information of any kind, the City Secretary of the defendant City of Houston, notified plaintiff's attorney that his claim had been denied, after the lapse of more than three months, and when nothing further could be done about it, on September 9, 1949. * * *'
The above pleadings, the evidence and jury answers to Special Issues Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 constitute sufficient basis for the judgment entered by the trial court to the effect that the City was estopped to deny liability because of the failure of respondent to file written notice of his claim within 90 days after the date he sustained his injuries.
In the first Thralls case the Court said (128 S.W.2d 465): 'The question as to whether plaintiff was lulled into sleep by the conduct of the city in continuing to pay him his salary, as it customarily did regardless of liability therefor, was not submitted to the jury.' The case was reversed and remanded and prior to the second trial the pleadings were amended. The issue of estoppel was submitted to the jury and upon favorable answer to the plaintiff, judgment was entered accordingly.
On the second appeal of the case, City of Waco v. Thralls,172 S.W.2d 142, 145, the Court of Civil Appeals said: 'Thereupon plaintiff amended his pleadings and alleged *Page 745 
in substance that he was lulled into a sense of security by the fact that the City of Waco continued to pay him his wages after he was injured, and that this caused him not to file his claim within the thirty day period.' The court passed upon this question of estoppel and affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Thralls. This Court refused the application for writ of error with the notation 'Refused for Want of Merit.' In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the Court said:
 "Independent of the question of waiver, the doctrine of estoppel was invoked by plaintiff's pleadings and, in our opinion, applies to the facts of this case. If the City, through its duly authorized agents, so conducted itself within the period of thirty days of plaintiff's injury as to lull the plaintiff into a sense of security, causing him to think that it was waiving the charter provisions, and if an ordinarily prudent person, under the same or similar circumstances, would have so concluded, then the City is estopped to demand strict compliance therewith, even though such city officials in authority had no intention of waiving the charter provisions. Cawthorn v. City of Houston, supra (Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 701); City of Waco v. Thralls, supra (Tex.Civ.App., 128 S.W.2d 462); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 986."
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish the above case from the one at bar. It seems to me that it amounts to a distinction without a difference. It is true that in the Thralls case, supra, evidence was introduced as to custom, but by no means did the Court base its holding upon such evidence alone. In my opinion, the same conclusion would have been reached if there had been no evidence in regard to the custom of the City to keep injured employees on the payroll.
Apparently respondent in the present case tracked the pleadings in the second Thralls case and had read the opinions of the Court of Civil Appeals in both cases. The effect of the majority opinion is to overrule the Thralls cases, supra, as well as the case of Cawthorn v. City of Houston, supra, so far as the pleading of estoppel independent of waiver is concerned. Admittedly, a written notice to a city of an injury required by a city ordinance is a condition precedent to an action for such injury; however, such requirement is in derogation of common right and should be construed with reasonable strictness and not extended so as to preclude allegations and proof of facts showing estoppel. See City of Dallas v. Shows, Tex.Com.App.,212 S.W. 633. The non-waiver ordinance adopted by the City did not deprive the respondent from establishing facts showing an estoppel independent of such ordinance. The Phillips and Hallman cases, in my opinion, involve different facts and pleadings and deal with the question of waiver and not estoppel independent of the issue of waiver.
On the only point discussed by the majority, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals.
WILSON, J., joins in this dissent.