Court Opinion

ID: 9634464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:13:56.579604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:12.159113
License: Public Domain

Handler, J.,
concurring and dissenting. This Court has concluded with ample justification that Sandra Castellano *417was properly found by the Director of the Division on Civil Rights to have been the victim of sex-discrimination contrary to the Law Against Discrimination, N. J. S. A. 10:5-l et seq. The Linden Board of Education discriminated against Mrs. Castellano, a tenured school teacher, by requiring her to take a mandatory leave of absence for one year without pay or sick leave credit because of the birth of her child. The full Court finds sufficient warrant for the Director’s award of compensatory damages to Mrs. Castellano. Yet, inexplicably, the majority of the Court would excise from that compensatory award damages — modestly set at $600 — for the anguish unquestionably suffered by Mrs. Castellano as a result of the Board’s conduct. I think the Court is wrong in this respect and I therefore dissent from that portion of its opinion and ruling.
There can be no disagreement with the basic, oft-repeated precept that the Division on Civil Rights has far-ranging and comprehensive jurisdiction in the field of civil rights. Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N. J. 113 (1969); Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N. J. 480 (1965); Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N. J. 384 (1962); Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Div. Against Discrimination, 31 N. J. 514, appeal dismissed 363 U. S. 418, 80 S. Ct. 1257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1515 (1960). Consistent with this embracive authority, the Division has broad and flexible powers to combat discrimination. E. g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N. J. 474 (1973); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N. J. 399 (1973); N. J. Builders, Owners & Managers Ass’n v. Blair, 60 N. J. 330 (1972); David v. Vesta Co., 45 N. J. 301 (1965).
Included in the Division’s arsenal of remedial weapons is the authority to affix damages for injury and loss consequent upon the discriminatory deprivation of civil rights. This encompasses compensatory damages for economic and special pecuniary loss. Jackson v. Concord Co., supra; see Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra; Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., 137 N. J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 1975) certif. granted 71 N. J. 493 (1976) (dismissed by stipulation). It *418has also been, recognized that damages as a remedial measure in the civil rights area can be awarded for the pain and suffering, in the nature of humiliation, embarrassment and loss of self-esteem, often endured by the victims of discrimination. See e. g., Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N. Y. 2d 143, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 25, 316 N. E. 2d 318 (Ct. App. 1974) ; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P. 2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 N. E. 2d 311 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970); 121-189 Broadway Realty, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 A. D. 2d 422, 376 N. Y. S. 2d 17 (App. Div. 1975) . See generally, Annot., “Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Discrimination Because of Sex or Marital Status, 61 A. L. R. 3d 944 (1975); Annot., “Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial, Ethnic or Religious Abuse or Discrimination”, 40 A. L. R. 3d 1290 (1971). Damages for this kind of injury have been vindicated by our courts. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra; Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., supra; Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N. J. Super. 297 (Ch. Div. 1970); see also, Blumrosen, “Anti-discrimination Laws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-Sociology Study”, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 189, 242-243 (1965).
The majority of the Court repudiates the award made by the Director to Mrs. Castellano for her mental and emotional anguish on evidential grounds. Ante at 410. I take it that the majority does not quarrel with, nor does it intend to compromise, the standard of appellate review generally applicable to the decisions of the Director. That standard imposes upon courts a conscientious duty to sustain the factual determinations of the civil rights tribunal “* * * if they could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record considering the proofs as a whole and with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility, as well as the *419agency’s expertise where this is a pertinent factor”. Gilchrist v. Bd. of Ed. of Haddonfield, 155 N. J. Super. 358, 367-368 (App. Div. 1978); see Jackson v. Concord Co., supra 54 N. J. at 117-118; also, Mayflower Securities Co. v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N. J. 85, 92-93 (1973). This rule of review is especially apt in the sensitive area of remedial relief. The administrative redress fashioned by the Director must be fine-tuned to the nuances of discrimination and the psychological as well as economic suffering it causes. The relief determined by the Director should not therefore be overturned by courts on review in the absence of a persuasive showing of illegality, arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra 62 N. J. at 409-410; see Mayflower Securities Co. v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N. J. supra at 93.
The evidence in the record of this ease, some of which is recounted in the opinion of the Court, Ante at 410-412, is virtually self-demonstrative of the reasonableness of the Director’s award of damages for mental and emotional suffering. There can be no retreat from the factual finding that Mrs. Castellano was upset and distraught as a result of the Board’s discrimination against her. Her mortification was undoubtedly intensified when her husband was personally berated by the superintendent who, in effect, stated “What kind of father are you or husband to have * * * [and] want your wife to go back so soon”, clearly implying that the Castellanos were not decent parents. The sting of this discriminatory affront was not drawn because the Board expressed “[b]est wishes for the coming blessed event”. Ante at 410.
The majority deprecates this evidence as “nebulous” and is “unable to find in the record a substantial basis for compensation for ^humiliation, pain and mental suffering’.” Ante at 411. It states that “[t]here was no basis for any feeling of humiliation on complainant’s part” because “[m]aternity leaves of absence of one kind or another are commonplace”. Id. It is of greater significance to me, however, that the *420Director did not think the evidence of Mrs. Castellano’s humiliation was light fiction. The majority’s contrary perceptions simply point up the fact that not everyone has a nose for discrimination, especially in its most subtle forms. We are coming to realize that people are products of cultural conditioning which frequently obscures recognition of social wrongs. The “commonplace”, to use the majority’s word, may constitute a Trojan horse of social inequities. Discrimination frequently goes uncorrected because it is undetected. This is why governmental responsibility in the civil rights field has been placed in an administrative body that is expected to have the keenness to see through these forms of cultural blindness and spot discrimination where it exists. Cf. Countiss v. Trenton State College, 77 N. J. 590, 595 (1978); Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of Ed., 77 N. J. 514 (1978). And, this is why it is important for courts to defer to the factual assessments of such administrative agencies.
I do not find adequate any of the other rationalizations put forward by the Court to justify rejection of the $600 award in favor of Mrs. Castellano. The good faith of the Board is not a factor since the award is not a punitive sanction; rather, it is a modicum of compensation for Mrs. Castellano’s personal chagrin and diminishment at the hands of the Board. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra. The status of the Board as a public body is not relevant; governmental agencies are subject to the full strictures of the Law Against Discrimination. Blair v. Mayer and Council of Bor. of Freehold, 117 N. J. Super. 415 (App. Div. 1971), certif. den. 60 N. J. 194 (1972); cf. Galloway Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Galloway Tp. Ass’n of Educational Secretaries, 78 N. J. 1 (1978). Indeed, the Board was under an affirmative and independent duty to eliminate and avoid discrimination within the school system. Cf. Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of Ed., supra. The inclusion in the negotiated teachers’ contract of the discriminatory provisions against expectant and new mothers assuredly was no legal excuse for the *421Board’s actions. These provisions were clearly invalid and unenforceable. Cf. Tp. of W. Windsor v. PFRC, 78 N. J. 98 (1978). It follows that they could not constitute grounds for an unfair labor practice reprisal, as suggested by the majority, Ante at 410, especially in view of the Board’s own decision to -turn from the contract and permit Mrs. Castellano to resume her teaching duties early in the school year.
In sum, the Board violated Mrs. Castellano’s civil rights. Regardless of the Board’s motives, its actions had a rude result for Mrs. Castellano. She was, in the reasonable judgment of the Director, entitled to modest remedial compensation for the understandable turmoil she experienced. I could not be in stronger accord with the Appellate Division, who with the same vantage and perspective of the record enjoyed by us, found that there was ample support for this award. 158 N. J. Super. 350, 363 (1978). I would affirm its determination sustaining these damages. To this extent, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Justices Pashman and Clieeord join in this opinion.
For affirmance of order — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Handler — 5.
For reversal or order in part — Justices Clieeord and Schreiber — 2.
For reversal of damages — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan and Schreiber — 4.
For affirmance of damages — Justices Pashman, Clieeord and Handler — 3.