Court Opinion

ID: 9742107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:50.874543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.590581
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: The majority finds an unconstitutional disproportionality in the imposition of a stricter penalty for a felon’s possession of a firearm without proper registration than for the offense of unlawful use of weapons by a felon. I disagree. The two crimes are distinct offenses with different elements, and the legislature is entitled to say that one is more serious than the other. It should be noted that the weapon required for the offense of unlawful use of weapons need not be a firearm, and to that extent the legislature could justifiably conclude that the possession of a firearm without proper registration is the more serious crime. In circumstances in which the conduct underlying the two offenses overlaps — that is, when a firearm is involved — I believe that the prosecutor should be free to decide whether to seek the greater penalty authorized by the more serious charge. I dissented in People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996), and People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172 (1990), cited by the majority, and I continue to believe that the earlier decisions are in error. In the present case, the majority acknowledges that the mandatory prison term for a felon who possesses a firearm without proper registration is not disproportionate to the offense. 177 Ill. 2d at 504. That should mark the end, not the beginning, of our inquiry under the proportionate penalties clause, found in article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). See People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 209-10 (1995). The propriety of the penalty for an offense should be assessed in relation to the conduct underlying that particular charge, and not in relation to the conduct prohibited by other offenses. The majority’s analysis, a wide-ranging comparative proportionality review, conflicts with the legislature’s power to define offenses and prescribe penalties {People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 379 (1989); People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1984)), and diminishes the prosecutor’s authority to decide which offenses to charge (see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 764, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204 (1979); People v. McCollough, 57 Ill. 2d 440, 444 (1974)). The court’s continuing effort to catalog and organize the entire body of our criminal law according to one grand scheme of comparative proportionality review exceeds the mandate of the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution and ultimately threatens to usurp the legislative and prosecutorial functions. JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.