Court Opinion

ID: 9665490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:49:39.649462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.057191
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This case involves the construction of a sewage lagoon. Its use resulted in the contamination of underground waters to the damage of a neighboring farmer who recovered from the city of Kimball. The city now seeks to recover from its insurer against property damage “caused by accident.”
Seismograph holes had been bored in the area covered by the lagoon and were not discovered until the difficulties mentioned had developed and the city undertook to seal the sides and bottom of the lagoon.
Construction of the lagoon was a deliberate, calculated, and willful act on the part of the city and it was clearly negligent in failing to seal the lagoon and in failing to discover the seismograph holes. Irrespective of the seismograph holes, the propensity of water, or water-bearing substances, to percolate through the ground is a well-known and elemental factor. Everyone is familiar with the way rain or other surface water is absorbed into the earth. It is commonplace in this day and age to find examples of underground water contamination resulting from the use of fertilizers and chemicals in farm operations. It is a matter of common knowledge that such items when used on the suriface of the ground will eventually percolate or seep into underground water-bearing strata. It is' therefore apparent that the city knew, or certainly should have known, that sooner or later its lagoon would bring about the very type of water contamination that resulted. This was neither a sudden' nor an unexpected occurrence, but on the contrary, something that should have been'. expected and foreseen. This is not'an instance *163of a break or leak developing unexpectedly in an -under-, ground pipe or tank.
The majority opinion is based entirely on the theory mentioned in case after case cited therein, that an accident is an undesigned, unexpected, and unforeseen event-I have no quarrel with that legal proposition or defini-: tion. Here the damage inflicted was the result of an intentional act of the city. It was almost certain to occur and certainly should have been anticipated. It was no accident.
The term “caused by accident” has been subject to multiple definitions. It is conceded that it' should be construed according to its “commonly accepted meaning.” It is generally deemed to refer to a fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens, an unforeseen or unlooked for event, an unusual or unexpected result, a sudden happening rather than one which continues, progresses or develops, or something extraordinary, out of the usual course of events. See, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.), pp. 30, 31; 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 1219, p. '64.
The only one of these definitions which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered applicable to the present case is the one referring to an event which is unusual and is unexpected by the person to whom it happens. That also is clearly inapplicable. Seepage through the ground, as mentioned, is a natural everyday phenomenon familiar to all. When it rains, the water seeps into the ground. With constant replenishment of this surface water, it seeps or sinks deeper and deeper into the ground. It winds up as “underground” water. This is the source of all underground water strata. We know that nitrogen fertilizer applied on a farmer’s field winds up .in, and contaminates, • under*164ground water strata. Canals, ponds, and lakes commonly raise underground water levels in adjacent areas and frequently result in “water boils” surfacing in adjoining lands. The use of an unsealed lagoon is similar and is certain to have similar results with or without seismographic holes. The only difference is that the holes let the raw sewage, completely unfiltered, enter directly into underground water strata.
In the case of Town of Tieton v. General Insurance Co. of America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380 P. 2d 127, an identical sewage lagoon was. constructed. The town officials were well aware of the natural phenomenon of seepage and fully expected it to occur just as the city officials of Kimball and the injured farmer should have, and possibly did, expect it in the present instance. This is not a fortuitous occurrence, nor is it an “unusual or unexpected” event from the standpoint of the damaged landowner. In the identical Tieton case, the court held that contamination of property owners’- well caused by seepage from sewage lagoon, which was located approximately 300 feet from well and which had been constructed by town with knowledge of potential hazard of pollution, was not caused by accident within town’s liability policy covering injury to property caused by accident. In the present case it is. not admitted that the parties involved anticipated contamination of the underlying water strata but they must be held to have recognized a natural law of nature and to have anticipated the result.
In the field of accident insurance, “The generally accepted rule is that death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury. In other words, an accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed, unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which pro*165duces or brings about the result of injury or death.” 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 1222, p. 70.
The case of Vappi & Co. Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 348 Mass. 427, 204 N. E. 2d 273, is not in point. In that case the insured had successfully defended the suit brought against him. The insurer had agreed to defend any suit against Vappi alleging an injury caused by accident even though the suit was. groundless. The insured sought recovery of attorney’s fees and engineering expense incurred in defending the suit when the insurer declined to defend it. Recovery was permitted under the guarantee to defend.
In Albuquerque Gravel Prod. Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 282 F. 2d 218 (10th Cir., 1960), recovery was sought for flooding. The court stated: “Although the rains were heavier and more frequent than usual during the summer of 1955, and the flooding was. more extensive, we cannot say as a matter of law that the floods were accidental rather than the normal consequence of heavy rains which were foreseeable by a prudent person. Consequently, assuming negligence in the construction of the ramp, the results of the floods were not accidental.”
The case of Gassaway v. Travelers Insurance Co., 222 Tenn. 649, 439 S. W. 2d 605, involved damage to a house due to seepage from a storm sewer. Negligence was involved. The court stated: “The point here is that while negligent acts can and in fact often do support a claim of accident as this word is used in insurance policies, yet it does not follow that all negligent acts so support such claim. Accident and negligence are not synonymous terms. * * *
“In regard to the legal definition of the word ‘accident’ as used in insurance policies we have conducted a rather extensive research. The courts have not found it possible to give the word so used a precise legal definition. In most all jurisdictions it is held this word so used has no technical meaning in law and should be in*166terpreted in its ordinary and popular sense. It does appear to us that the courts now either give this word a broader meaning or at least apply it to factual situations which the courts not many years ago would not have accepted. * * *
' “It is argued here, and we think correctly, that the damage occurring was not intended by any of the parties, and was, in fact, the result of ordinary negligence on the part of V & M Homes. Accepting this argument does not compel the conclusion the damage was caused by accident. The element of foreseeability cannot be ignored. The Circuit Court determined V & M Homes knew these drainage facilities created a risk and under these-facts we think V & M Homes could reasonably foresee that what did occur could occur. When a reasonably foreseeable event does occur, it cannot be said to be a result that was unforeseen and unexpected or fortuitous.”
In Harleysville Mutual Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 235 A. 2d 556 (1966), it was held that the fact that an injury is caused by an intentional act does not preclude it from being caused by accident within liability policy if in that act, something unforeseen, unusual and unexpected occurs which produces the result. Contractor who piled trees: and underbrush in 10 to 12-foot piles, added fuel oil and rubber tires, and permitted the fires to burn for 36 hours before they were extinguished was charged with responsibility of foreseeing that a pall of smoke and soot would result, which might damage adjacent properties, and hence resulting damage for which the contractor was held liable was not caused by accident within liability policy covering property damage liability caused by accident.
The case of Farmers Elevator Mutual Ins. Co. v. Burch, 38 Ill. App. 2d 249, 187 N. E. 2d 12 (1962), involved damage caused by dust, noise, and vibration from the operation of a grain elevator. Recovery from the insurer wás denied. The court stated: “ ‘Accident’ nor*167mally designates an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character, or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character * * *. The natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an ‘accident.’ ”
Hayden v. Insurance Co. of North America, 5 Wash. App. 710, 490 P. 2d 454 (1971), involved an accidental death policy and there was evidence the death resulted from the insured’s excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquors. The court held: “When death occurs as result of unusual, unexpected or unforeseen event or events following intentional act or acts, the death is ‘accident’ within the terms of accident policy but when death occurs as natural result of voluntary act or acts and there is nothing unusual, unexpected or unforeseen which occurs, except the death, the death is not ‘accident’ and an event or events is not unforeseen, unexpected or unusual if the event or events would normally result from the intentional act or acts. * * *
“ ‘Accident’ within terms of accident policy is never present when deliberate act is performed, unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the results of injury or death.” See, also, Wright v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.), 443 S. W. 2d 790 (1969).
The case of City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F. 2d 905 (10th Cir., 1964), held: “Damage caused by sewage backing up from insured city’s sewage system into residences as result' of heavy, but not unprecedented, rainfall and negligent operation of pump by city to prevent flooding of a lift station was not ‘caused by accident’ within coverage of comprehensive liability policy.”
In Clark v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N. W. 2d 29, 98 A. L. R. 2d 1037, it was held that an insurance policy for premises used in the operation of a gravel pit covering Ida*168bility of the insured for personal injury or property damage caused by accident does not extend to liability for the operation of the premises for a considerable period as a nuisance in permitting the gravel pit to be used for dumping purposes for the disposal of refuse, garbage, and other putrid and combustible material. See, also, American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Co., 270 F. 2d 686 (1959); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 239 P. 2d 754.
The principles enunciated herein have been followed in Nebraska. In Cutrell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 550, 17 N. W. 2d 465, it was held: “Death resulting from an accident is not effected by accidental means where insured brings the assault upon himself by his own wrongful acts, or voluntarily incurs an obvious hazard thereof under such circumstances that he would naturally be presumed to know that the injury is likely to be inflicted, or places himself in a position that may be reasonably expected to bring such an assault upon him.”
In Rapp v. Metropolitan Accident & Health Ins. Co., 143 Neb. 144, 8 N. W. 2d 692, it was held: “Where the insured voluntarily submitted to a major surgical operation, to determine the cause of an obstruction of the common bile duct and, as a result of his poor physical condition, died on the operating table during the progress of such operation from surgical shock incident to the operation, and the operating surgeon and his assistants- skilfully performed the operation, insured’s death was not the result of accident.”
When damage results from a willful and deliberate act and such damage is practically certain to occur under the immutable laws of nature, it must be considered to have been intended or recklessly disregarded and it certainly is not “caused by accident.”
We should not lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a contractual agreement, the terms of which *169we have no right or authority to alter or rewrite. Unquestionably the damaged landowner had a right of recovery against the city for its tortious act. It does not follow that the city can recover from its insurer unless the loss is covered under the policy. “In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the risks insured against under a policy of liability insurance are determined by the terms of the policy and not by the liability of the insured. And, if plainly expressed, insurers are entitled to have such limitations construed and enforced as expressed.” Marx v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N. W. 2d 870.
White, C. J., and Boslatjgh, J., join in this dissent.