Court Opinion

ID: 9551960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:02:41.895238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:14.586436
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
(dissenting) — One who attempts to obtain a default judgment based upon a technical violation of the civil rules should, in turn, be expected to follow those rules fully. Furthermore, this court should not only require compliance with its rules but should follow its own rules. If we find them unacceptable, we should face that fact and change them through the normal procedures. We should not, however, resort to creative ways to avoid them as the majority has done here.
*405In this case plaintiffs' motion for and granting of the default judgment were initiated "pursuant to CR 37(b)". The language of CR 37(b) is clear, however: the failure to obey a court order is a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions. See 2 L. Orland, Wash. Prac., Trial Practice § 175, at 72 (3d ed. 1979). In the instant case no court order compelled discovery. Absent that condition precedent, the court had no power to impose sanctions.
The majority holds that sanctions could be imposed under CR 37(d)(3). The plaintiffs did not ask for relief under CR 37(d), however. They specifically asked for CR 37(b) relief. In CR 37, section (d) specifically includes the sanctions authorized under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of subsection (b)(2). Thus a motion pursuant to CR 37(d) would, necessarily include CR 37(b) sanctions. The converse is not true, however. Nowhere in section (b) is there any reference, express or implied, to section (d). The greater relief (i.e., CR 37(d)) can include the lesser, but the lesser relief (i.e., CR 37(b)) does not include the greater.
Plaintiffs argue, and the majority holds, that by seeking the sanctions spelled out in CR 37(b) the motion necessarily included, even without expression, a basis for the court to reach CR 37(b) sanctions by reference to CR 37(d). They further argue that, since Washington is a notice pleading state, it was not necessary for them to specifically take defendants through the analysis of applying CR 37(d) to arrive at a CR 37(b) result.
This argument ignores two important factors, however. Civil rule 7(b)(1) requires that a motion "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Plaintiffs' motion stated the relief sought (i.e., sanctions under CR 37(b)) but did not "state with particularity the grounds therefor" if CR 37(d) was meant to apply. This defect in the motion could have been corrected at the hearing through an oral motion under CR 7(b)(1) if defendants had been present. This was not done, however, because a default judgment was taken. When a *406defendant does not appear to contest a motion, close compliance with the rules of civil procedure is particularly necessary. See State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950).
In a default situation the court is given the power to do only that which is requested in the motion or complaint. As was stated in State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 306, 207 P. 23 (1922), quoted in State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, supra at 872:
"It is elementary law that a default judgment cannot award any relief beyond that which the facts alleged in the complaint in the action show the plaintiff legally entitled to. This also means, of course, that if a complaint wholly fails to state facts legally entitling the plaintiff to any recovery, or states facts affirmatively showing that the plaintiff has no right of recovery, as those complaints did, a default judgment rendered thereon is void, just as such a default judgment would be void in so far as it awarded relief beyond that which the allegations of the complaint showed the plaintiff legally entitled to."
A defendant has a due process right to rely on this rule. He is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a judgment is rendered in excess of the relief requested. Watson v. Washington Preferred Life Ins. Co., 81 Wn.2d 403, 408, 502 P.2d 1016 (1972); Diedrick v. School Dist. 81, 87 Wn.2d 598, 555 P.2d 825 (1976). If a motion, on its face, does not justify the relief requested, the defendant has the right to not appear, secure in the knowledge that the relief cannot be granted, just as he has the right to allow a default to be taken against him secure in the knowledge that a judgment or decree will not exceed the demands of the complaint. State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, supra; Columbia Valley Credit Exch., Inc. v. Lampson, 12 Wn. App. 952, 533 P.2d 152 (1975).
In this case defendants should have had a right to assume the motion would be decided under CR 37(b), the section stated in the motion. Granting the motion pursuant to CR 37(d) was a violation of due process since there was *407no notice that CR 37(d) would be in issue. The sanctions actually imposed could not have been imposed under CR 37(b) since it was obvious on the face of the motion there had been no prerequisite court order. Plaintiffs had moved for such an order to produce records "if, but only if" the CR 37(b) motion was not granted.2
Consequently, I would hold the sanctions imposed by the trial court were void.
Where a judgment has been entered by a court which has not first secured jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, or which lacks the power to render the particular relief granted, such judgment is void and of no effect. Wiles v. Department of Labor & Indus., 34 Wn.2d 714, 209 P.2d 462 (1949). The court has a duty to absolutely annul such a judgment. Thus, I would hold the trial court erred by imposing conditions for the vacation of the judgment.
Brachtenbach, C.J., concurs with Stafford, J.

Furthermore, the striking of pleadings and the granting of a default judgment would not have been proper in this case even if properly presented. It is uncontested that there was not a complete failure to respond, and only upon a total failure to respond can sanctions (and especially default) be imposed. Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Rule 37(d) sanctions only apply where there is a total non-compliance with discovery"); see also the comments of the drafters, 48 F.R.D. 487, 542 (1970), and of commentators such as 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291 (1970). Also, there was not an explicit finding of wilfulness in failure to respond in this case. Although the rule does not explicitly require wilfulness, the (federal) drafter's comments make it clear wilfulness was eliminated because the 1972 revision provided a broader range of lesser sanctions and it was anticipated that if it was not a wilful failure to respond the court would impose a lesser sanction. 48 F.R.D. at 541-42. See also Associated Mortgage Investors v. G.P. Kent Constr. Co., 15 Wn. App. 223, 548 P.2d 558 (1976) (requiring wilfulness).