Court Opinion

ID: 9566697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:42:06.11376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:00.305254
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C. J.,
dissenting.
I must vigorously dissent from the majority in this case. I do so because the majority opinion is wrong both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The majority has now concluded that an employee who refuses to let his or her employer experiment with the employee’s health on a trial and error basis, albeit in good faith, is guilty of willful misconduct so as to deny the employee unemployment compensation benefits. It is, to me, significant that the majority is unable to cite any authority in support of that rule of law. I suspect that the majority’s inability to do so is due to the fact that there is no precedent for such a rule. An employer may be entitled to ask an employee to “give all” in the sense of supporting the employer’s work; it strikes me that it is too much to demand that the employee must likewise experiment with his or her health for the benefit of the employer.
This court has consistently held that the Employment Security Law is to be liberally construed in order that its beneficent purpose of paying benefits to involuntarily unemployed workers may be accomplished, see Sorensen v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 370 N.W.2d 173 (1985), and further that these beneficent purposes are not served by a strained construction of the statutes which will deny an unemployed worker the benefits of the act. See Hanlon v. Bodin, 209 Neb. 169, 306 N.W.2d 858 (1981). Notwithstanding that fact, the majority, while ignoring the recognized rules of law, now holds that an employee who is unwilling to permit his or her employer to experiment with the employee’s health is guilty of willful misconduct.
The question of what constitutes misconduct has been defined by this court. We have defined the term to include behavior which evidences
“ ‘(1) wanton and willful disregard of the employer’s interests, (2) deliberate violation of rules, (3) disregard of standards of behavior which the employer can rightfully expect from the employee, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or *26intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations.’...”
Smith v. Sorensen, 222 Neb. 599, 603, 386 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1986); McCorison v. City of Lincoln, 215 Neb. 474, 339 N.W.2d 294 (1983); Stuart v. Omaha Porkers, 213 Neb. 838, 331 N.W.2d 544 (1983). While absenteeism can constitute “misconduct” under the statutes if the absences are without notice or unexcused or are continued despite warnings from the employer, McCorison v. City of Lincoln, supra, it is not considered misconduct to follow the advice of a treating physician and remain absent from work. See Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. v. Employment Div., 37 Or. App. 843, 588 P.2d 654 (1978).
Unless it can be said that in some manner Ms. Turna deliberately violated some rule, I am unable to find any evidence to support a finding that her termination was due to misconduct.
O.P.P.D. concedes that Ms. Turna was being treated by a physician and had been ordered not to return to work for 4 weeks. Ms. Turna’s supervisor, Ms. Finnell, testified that she was fully aware of the nature of Ms. Tuma’s illness and the reason why she did not return to work. Ms. Finnell testified as follows:
Q. So, is it fair to say that, regardless of whether there was a doctor’s statement or not, you as her supervisor at the Omaha Public Power District were fully aware of the nature of her illness and the reason why she did not return to work; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had relayed that information on to your superiors at OPPD; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So there could be no question that your business knew exactly why she was not there?
A. Yes.
And while Ms. Turna did not send a medical statement to O.P.P.D., she did in fact write to it. Ms. Finnell testified in that regard as follows:
Q. All right. So, at least, as far as that conversation on *27the 17th goes, there is no question that she did tell you she was going to send a letter; and she did, in fact, send the letter, didn’t she?
A. Yes.
Q. You received the letter; is that correct?
A. I received that letter on the 22nd.
Q. The letter purports to be from Rita Tuma, does it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And the letter contains the information which she told you on the telephone, whether it be reading verbatim or told you, either way it contained that very information, didn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. You were aware when you received the letter, at least through her anyway, that she had seen the doctor and that she did have damage to her nasal tissue, and that he had advised her that there were unhealed, bleeding points because there had been no steps to remedy the pollution in the air, and that she should not return to work for four weeks?
You were at least — true or not, you were at least aware of that information from the letter; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Furthermore, while the majority makes a great deal out of the fact that Ms. Tuma failed to provide a letter from her physician, the evidence is clear that the company did not ask at any time for such a letter, nor did it have any rule requiring such a letter. Ms. Finnell testified as follows:
Q. Now, would I be correct in assuming that as a supervisor for her or any employee, part of your job would be to provide them instruction when they need a particular document or when they need something; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn’t it true, Miss Finnell, that you had never, at any time, told Ms. Tuma that “You need a statement from and signed by a physician in order to be excused from work”; isn’t that true?
*28A. That’s true.
Q. As a matter of fact, based upon your testimony at the prior hearing, one of your answers was: “Ms. Turna called me to tell me that she had seen her doctor and that he had suggested that she take another four weeks off because of her condition. I questioned the four weeks, and she explained her medical problem to me over the phone, and then she volunteered to give me a letter.”
A. Yes.
Q. That’s your testimony; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you did receive a letter from her?
A. Yes.
Q. You as her supervisor never, at any time, told her or asked her to send a doctor’s statement; isn’t that correct?
A. That’s correct. I assumed —
Q. You assumed?
A. Yes.
Q. You assumed; is that correct?
A. She had provided me with one earlier. When she mentioned getting a letter to that effect, I assumed that it would be j ust like the one I had already received.
Q. But as her supervisor you never told her, “Look, Rita, in order for you to be gone for a time like four weeks, we’re going to have to have some kind of medical substantiation”; you never told her that, did you?
A. No.
Q. And, to your knowledge, neither did anybody else from OPPD?
A. No.
This is supported by the testimony of Ms. Turna, who testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Now, with that what did you do with that information?
A. I contacted my attorney, and then I contacted Joyce Finnell. I read her a letter that I had composed and typed myself and told her that I would be sending her a copy of that letter in the mail.
*29I told her if she needed additional information she should contact my attorney or the doctor.
Q. Now, was this on the 17th of December?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell Miss Finnell — what did you tell her exactly?
A. The letter, which is in the Bill of Exceptions, I just read that to her.
Q. This Joyce Finnell is the same person you referred to earlier; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had talked to her extensively concerning the problems you had been having; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell her on that day what Dr. Duff had advised you to do?
A. Yes.
Q. What, if anything, did Miss Finnell ask you to do at that time?
A. Nothing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
While there may be some dispute about the conversation between Ms. Turna and her supervisor, there is no dispute that Ms. Turna was not aware that a physician’s statement was required or that if she did not provide such a statement she would be discharged. While the majority contends that Ms. Tuma’s behavior was detrimental to her employer’s interest and constituted misconduct, the evidence shows without dispute that Ms. Turna was following her doctor’s orders. The majority points out that Dr. Duff did not specifically recall the conversation, yet nowhere did Dr. Duff deny that he was treating Ms. Turna or that he had instructed her that she must remain in a smoke-free environment. Had O.P.P.D. wanted something more than Ms. Tuma’s letter, it should have made that request. To have expected Ms. Turna to know that she was to send a letter from a physician and that upon failure to do so she would be considered to have terminated her employment was not reasonable under the facts.
The majority attempts to create the impression that Dr. Duff *30did not recall treating Ms. Tuma; nevertheless, he testified by deposition with regard to these matters. His testimony is as follows: “When she came back and she still hadn’t totally healed up I said, ‘It seems to me if you continue to be exposed to whatever you are being exposed to, it might be detrimental and you might consider altering your environment.’ ” He further testified in his deposition that the trial and error suggested by O.P.P.D.’s physician could only be done after Ms. Tbma’s nose was normal again. It had not yet reached that point.
This is not a case in which the employer was uncertain as to the extent and the nature of the injury. O.P.P.D.’s own physician sent a letter to O.P.P.D. supporting Dr. Duff’s diagnosis of Ms. Tuma’s condition. The letter, as noted by the majority, said:
As long as she [Tuma] has symptoms from the exposure to cigarette smoke, she will probably not be able to work in surroundings in which there is a significant amount of exposure. The amount of exposure that she would tolerate could only be determined by trial and error. Certainly there is a pre-existing history of allergy and hypersensitivity which may be a predisposing factor in her current difficulties. It is my feeling that she could return to work immediately if she were in a smoke-free environment.
Yet, as noted by the majority, it is conceded by everyone that she was not going to be in a smoke-free environment. Nevertheless, the majority suggests that because she was not willing to continue bleeding, she was guilty of willful misconduct.
Furthermore, the facts do not support the position taken by the majority. The testimony is uncontroverted that by moving the desks the situation was not improved, but rather became worse. That was the reason O.P.P.D. considered the additional duct. The evidence is further clear that the additional duct was no real solution. Finally, the evidence is clear that she was never told that the change had been made. Ms. Finnell was asked:
Q- Did you ever advise Mrs. Thma that there was a — a change in the---
A- The air-flow?
Q- ---air — air-flow system?
*31A- Between the time when it was installed and the time she left. She was only in the office for three hours and I didn’t have a chance to do that.
Ms. Tuma was never made aware that any changes were made, and no one bothered to explain to her what the changes were or how they might improve the situation. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence to indicate that the changes would have made any difference. All that Ms. Tuma knew is that if she returned to work, she would continue to suffer from bleeding.
Lastly, action taken by O.P.P.D. did not comply with the requirements of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, as suggested in the letter from O.P.P.D. to Ms. Tuma or as suggested by the majority. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-5702 (Reissue 1986) specifically provides: “The purpose of sections 71-5701 to 71-5713 is to protect the public health, comfort, and environment by prohibiting smoking in public places and at public meetings except in designated smoking areas.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-5704 (Reissue 1986), this work area was clearly a public place within the meaning of the act. It was not appropriate for O.P.P.D. to designate the nonsmoking area; rather, it was necessary for O.P.P.D. to designate a limited smoking area. Even then, “Where smoking areas are designated, existing physical barriers and ventilation systems shall be used to minimize the toxic effect of smoke in adjacent nonsmoking areas.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-5708 (Reissue 1986). Finally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-5709 (Reissue 1986) provides:
The proprietor or other person in charge of a public place shall make reasonable efforts to prevent smoking in the public place by:
(1) Posting appropriate signs;
(2) Arranging seating to provide a smoke-free area;
(3) Asking smokers to refrain from smoking upon request of a client or employee suffering discomfort from the smoke; or
(4) Any other means which may be appropriate. (Emphasis supplied.)
The evidence is clear that no arrangements were made to *32provide a smoke-free area, nor were employees asked to refrain from smoking.
While O.P.P.D. may have been justified in discharging Ms. Tuma because of its inability to provide her with a safe place to work, its inability to do so did not justify its discharging her and claiming that the discharge was for misconduct on her part so as to deprive her of unemployment compensation benefits.
While Ms. Tuma obviously cannot obtain much comfort from our decision in this case, perhaps she can find solace in the haunting song from Jerome Kern:
They asked me how I knew
My true love was true?
I of course replied,
“Something here inside,
Cannot be denied.”
... Smoke gets in your eyes.