Court Opinion

ID: 9529137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:57.717966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:41.114606
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result of the majority opinion for the reason that the legislature, in 1949, changed its policy regarding the power of the superior court to award alimony in annulment cases. Prior to the enactment of RCW 26.08.110 in 1949, this court had held that under the prior statute the existence of a valid marriage was a condition precedent to the power of the court to grant alimony to the wife. State ex rel. Davis v. Superior Court, 200 Wash. 670, 94 P. (2d) 478.
In § 11 of chapter 215, Laws of 1949, p. 701 (RCW 26.08-.110), the legislature expressed its intention to change its policy by using the terms “divorce or annulment” therein five times without distinction, treating the two, types of proceedings in precisely the same manner with respect to the power of the court to award alimony.
We have recently held, in Loomis v. Loomis, 47 Wn. (2d) 468, 288 P. (2d) 235, that under RCW 26.08.110 the superior court has power to award alimony in a divorce action.
Since the legislature has, by enacting RCW 26.08.110, abolished the distinction theretofore existing between divorce actions and annulment proceedings with regard to awarding alimony (the two words being used interchangeably) , it follows that the trial court had power to enter its decree granting the wife alimony in the instant annulment proceeding.
I therefore concur with the majority in affirming the decree of the trial court.