Court Opinion

ID: 9854301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:04:45.046206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:00.429836
License: Public Domain

On Beheaking
Appeal from Circuit Court, Gilliam County.
E. H. Howell, Judge.
On respondent’s petition for rehearing.
Collier, Bernard, Bernard £ Edwards, of Portland, for the petition.
Raley, Kilkenny £ Raley, of Pendleton, and Wilber Henderson, of Portland, contra.
*299Before Latourette, Chief Justice, and Lusk, Brand and Tooze, Justices.
Petition denied.
TOOZE, J.
Plaintiff petitions for a rehearing, presenting numerous assignments of error directed to our original opinion, which was handed down May 20, 1953.
Plaintiff charges that we erred as follows:
“ (a) In holding that the plaintiff would not he allowed to show by evidence aliunde the deed that the granting of the option was a part of the consideration for the execution of the deed.
“(b) In holding that to permit the plaintiff to show that the granting of the option was a part of the consideration for the execution of the deed would vest in the grantee an estate inferior to that granted by the warranty deed itself.
“(c) In failing to hold that the agreement of August 31, 1948, including the granting of the option to the plaintiff, and the warranty deed dated October 26, 1948, were all part of the same transaction, and in giving unwarranted effect to the fact that the deed was dated subsequent to the agreement.
“(d) In holding that there was not evidence that the deed was executed by mutual mistake or mistake at all, and in not holding that the deed was executed by mutual mistake.”
It is unnecessary for us to again review the evidence in the case, because all the essential facts are set forth in our former opinion.
We have carefully re-examined the entire record in the case and are satisfied that our ultimate conclusions based thereon, and as expressed in our opinion, are correct.
*300We there said: ‘ ‘ There is not one iota of evidence that the deed was executed by mutual mistake or mistake at all.” (Italics ours.) We were correct in saying there was no evidence of mutual mistake of fact. However, the record does disclose that the mistake, if any, was a mistake as to the legal effect of the warranty deed which was executed.
Assuming, without deciding, that the option agreement was sufficiently definite and certain to be the basis of a decree for specific performance, we are met with the question whether under the record in this case reformation of the deed and specific performance thereof, as reformed, were permissible.
Plaintiff strongly urges that the effect of our holding is to deny relief in all cases for a mistake of law, as distinguished from a mutual mistake of fact. We did not intend to so hold. Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, the rule in this state is clearly stated in Richmond v. Ogden Street Ry. Co., 44 Or 48, 54, 74 P 333, where this court, speaking through Justice Robert S. Bean, said:
‘ ‘ 3. One of the well-recognized and firmly established jurisdictions of a court of equity is to reform written contracts when there has been an innocent omission or insertion of a material stipulation, contrary to the intention of both parties^ and under a mutual mistake. If, therefore, a promissory note or other written agreement omits or contains terms or stipulations contrary to the agreement and intention of the parties, a court of equity will, under a proper showing, reform it so as to make it conform to the actual contract. It is sometimes said that a mistake of law is no ground for equitable relief, but this rule only applies to cases where the contract, as entered into, speaks the true agreement *301of the parties. In such, a case equity mil not ordinarily reform the contract merely because one or both of the parties were mistaken as to its legal consequence, hut where, through a mistake of the parties or the draftsman, there is a failure to express the actual contract of the parties as contemplated, owing to the use of inapt words, or where the legal effect of the terms employed hy the parties in putting their contract in writing results in an agreement different from the one really entered into, a court of equity will reform the writing so as to effectuate the intention of the parties, even though the mistake was oné of law.” (Italics ours.)
Also see Smith et al. v. Cram et al., 113 Or 313, 323, 230 P 812.
"We agree with plaintiff that the execution of the deed was but a step in the entire transaction looking to the termination of the partnership and a winding up of its affairs. Plaintiff, in preparing the deeds and in handling the other matters incident to the winding up process, acted not only for himself but also as agent for his copartners, the defendant H. R. Weatherford included.
-It is clear from the record that the parties did not intend at any time to waive the provisions of the alleged option agreement. The mistake, therefore, that was made was in preparing and executing a warranty deed, with the legal consequences following the execution and delivery thereof, as outlined in our former opinion. It was a mistake of law rather than a mutual mistake of fact.
If that was all there was in this case, and such had been pleaded, under the rules of law above set forth reformation and specific performance might have been justified, but such is not the situation. Apart from all that was said in our former opinion, there is another *302legal obstacle to reformation and specific performance in this case that cannot be overcome.
The warranty deed conveying the Morrison place to the defendants H. R. Weatherford and Edith M. Weatherford, his wife, was duly executed by Frank M. Weatherford, the plaintiff Marion T. Weatherford, Barbara Athearn, and their respective spouses. The interest conveyed to the grantees is defined in the deed as follows:
“H. R. Weatherford and Edith M. Weatherford, husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety and not as tenants in community property.”
The deed contained the following warranty clause:
“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described and granted premises unto the said H. R. Weatherford and Edith M. Weatherford, husband and wife as tenants by the entirety and not as tenants in community property, and the grantors above named do covenant to and with the said grantees, their heirs and assigns, that they will, and their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and defend the above granted premises, and every part and parcel thereof, against the acts and deeds of said grantors, and all persons -claiming by, from, through or under the said grantors, unto the said grantees, their heirs and assigns forever.”
The defendant Edith M. Weatherford was not a party to the option agreement of August 31, 1948. She took no part whatever in the discussions between the parties relating thereto. In fact, the evidence discloses that she knew nothing about the agreement until the conveyance to her codefendants Edith M. Snell, D. L. Lemon, and Margaret S. Lemon. No estoppel was alleged against her in this case, nor was there the slightest bit of evidence in the record that would *303support an estoppel. It follows, therefore, that defendant Edith M. Weatherford was in no way bound by the agreement entered into between her husband, his brothers, and his sister. She gave a valuable consideration for the interest conveyed to her in the Morrison place, in that she surrendered her inchoate right of dower in and to the other parcels of land owned by the partners when she joined in the deeds conveying title to the respective brothers and sister of the several parcels of land allotted to each.
The law in this state is aptly state by Justice Rand in Woolsey v. Draper et al., 103 Or 103, 106, 201 P 730, 203 P 582, as follows:
“The rule is settled in this state that in suits for specific performance of contracts for the sale of land where the wife having a right of dower in the land is sued jointly with her husband upon a contract not binding upon her and the object of the suit is to divest her of her inchoate right of dower, the suit cannot be maintained against her nor against her husband, unless prior to the decree m the lower court the plaintiff elects to accept the deed of the husband alone because as to her the contract lacks mutuality. The court will not coerce the wife to perform a contract made by her husband alone, which she is not legally bound to perform: Kuratli v. Jackson, 60 Or. 203 (118 Pac. 192, 1013, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 203, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1195); Leo v. Deitz, 63 Or. 261 (127 Pac. 550).” (Italics ours.)
With much greater force is the rule applicable to a wife who owns the land with her husband as a tenant by entirety.
Land owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety was involved in the case of Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 154 P2d 547. The husband entered into an agreement for the sale of the land, and a suit *304for specific performance of such, agreement was instituted against both the husband and wife. Specific performance was decreed against the wife on the ground of an equitable estoppel. However, at page 517 of 175 Or, we said:
“In the absence of any showing of authority upon Mr. Wilson’s part to make such an agreement for his wife as well as for himself, or any ratification thereof by Mrs. Wilson, she would not be bound by the terms thereof; # *
Also see Hayward v. Morrison et ux., 194 Or 335, 241 P2d 888.
There is nothing whatever in the record of this case, either by way of pleading or evidence, that would bring this case within any exception indicated by our prior holdings.
Inasmuch as defendant Edith M. Weatherford was not a party to the option agreement, nor in any way bound thereby, specific performance did not lie against her nor against her husband, H. R. Weatherford; and for the same reasons, the warranty deed by which she obtained title to the real property in question was not subject to reformation.
We adhere to the result reached in our former opinion. The petition for rehearing is denied.