Court Opinion

ID: 9568121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:00:47.79633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:22.594750
License: Public Domain

Brickley, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the decision of the lead opinion to remand the case so that the trial courts may determine whether there were multiple conspiracies for purposes of the statute under the newly articulated burden of proof. Accordingly, I concur with parts I, n, IV and v of the lead opinion. However, I am unable to support the decision to overrule this Court’s opinion in People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450; 247 NW2d 866 (1976). I therefore dissent from part in of the lead opinion.
I concur with the decision to remand even though several factors appear to suggest that the defendants were not prosecuted twice for the same act. The alleged conspiracies were separate in time, although there was an overlap of some two years. The persons involved in each conspiracy were different, although again there was some overlap. The charged offenses were the same, consisting of the conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, although *287the amounts charged were different. The overt acts varied greatly between the indictments. The locales of the offenses also differed. Finally, the conspiracies differed in scope, with one aiming at large-scale national distribution and the other at local, street-level transactions. However, because this Court has not previously addressed the burden of proof, it is appropriate to remand to allow the trial court to apply the correct burden.
In Cooper, this Court held that the Michigan Constitution forbids a second prosecution for the same offense by the state unless the interests of the state and the initial prosecutor are “substantially different.” Id. at 462. Whether or not the members of this Court feel that the case was wrongly decided, principles of stare decisis require its continued vitality until and unless review is required for the resolution of the case before us. The instant cases may be decided on statutory grounds, making it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question of double jeopardy that invites review of Cooper. On remand, the trial court may conclude that MCL 333.7409; MSA 14.15(7409) bars the second prosecutions of the defendants. If so, there will be no need to perform double jeopardy analysis.
It is also unnecessary to reach Cooper because double jeopardy is not implicated by the facts before us. The lead opinion does conclude that, for double jeopardy purposes, the defendants established a prima facie claim that the prosecutions were for the same offense and that the government then failed to demonstrate that prosecution was not barred. I would conclude that the defendants did not make a prima facie showing and that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the offenses were distinct.
*288I dissent from the lead opinion’s reliance on the overlap in time and the similarity of the charges to conclude that the defendants made an unrefuted prima facie showing that they were prosecuted twice for the same offense. Ante at 277. I cannot assign the same weight to these similarities as the lead opinion does. Unfortunately, far more persons are charged with identical drug offenses than could ever be linked together in one conspiracy. Similarly, many drug offenses occur at the same time without being connected. The overlap in the time and charges is more symptomatic of the drug problems in our society than of any connection between the offenses charged. The preponderance of the evidence before the Court demonstrates that the conspiracies were separate.
The evidence is sufficient to overcome the defendants’ prima facie double jeopardy case — if, indeed, they made such a showing. Both lower courts should have held that the government met its burden of demonstrating that the conspiracies were separate. I would hold that there is no need for further double jeopardy analysis, so this Court need not address Cooper.