Court Opinion

ID: 9692888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:10:26.133358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:37.834039
License: Public Domain

KEAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
While I agree with the majority’s position upon the issues of waiver and the national standard of care for specialists, I respectfully dissent from the position that this case should be affirmed in all other respects. I do so because I perceive in the majority opinion a failure to distinguish between the requirements to be a qualified juror and juror misconduct during deliberations.
1.
JUROR CURTIS DID NOT NECESSARILY POSSESS THE QUALIFICATIONS TO BE SEATED AS A JUROR IN THIS CASE.
The qualifications of a petit juror are generally found at SDCL 16-13-10 wherein it is stated:
QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS. All citizens of this state, who are registered to vote, and of sound mind and who are able to read, write, and understand the English language, and not justices or clerks of the Supreme Court or a judge of the circuit court or any court of the United States, or a court of limited jurisdiction, or licensed attorneys, or clergymen as defined in § 19-13-16 when jury service conflicts with their religious beliefs and who have not been convicted of any felony unless restored to their civil rights and who are not subject to disability by the commission of any offense which by special provision of law does or shall disqualify them, are and shall be competent persons to serve on all grand and petit juries within their counties respectively. (Underlining added).
The language of this statute is broad enough to encompass an individual who has been convicted of a felony under either state or federal law as there is no limitation placed upon the wording. The phrase "... convicted of any felony ...” means convicted of a felony in South Dakota, Iowa, any other state or in federal court. And when the language of the statute is clear and no ambiguity exists, the courts should apply the clear meaning of the words used. In the Matter of the Petition of Famous Brands, 347 N.W.2d 882 (S.D.1984).
In the case of State v. Hermann, 283 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.1955), a person convicted of a felony under a federal law remained silent during voir dire when questioned about his criminal past. Subsequent to the conviction by the jury, it was learned that this man, who was a jury member, had been convicted of a federal felony. The state argued that a federal conviction was not a disqualification under Missouri law. In holding otherwise, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
The State further contends that a conviction in a federal court is not a disqualification. Sec. 496.100, applicable to St. Louis County, provides: “None of the following persons shall be permitted to serve as jurors: * * * (5) Any person who has been convicted of a felony”. In *308State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1287, 175 S.W.2d 787, 149 A.L.R. 1067 [1943], we held that such broad language without any stated limitation disqualified from voting one who had been convicted of a felony in a federal court. Certainly the reasons given therein are applicable here. There is even greater reason for such a conviction being a disqualification of a juror than a voter because Sec. 494.010 provides that every juror shall be “sober and intelligent, of good reputation * * * and otherwise qualified.” Certainly a conviction for a felony in a federal court has some bearing on these matters.
Id. at p. 619.
The plaintiffs claim that Curtis’s civil rights were restored to him when he was discharged from federal probation. As a basis for such claim they cite two statutes:
A sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term suspends the right of a person so sentenced to vote, to hold public office, to become a candidate for public office and to serve on a jury, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority or power during the term of such imprisonment. Any person who is serving a term in any penitentiary shall be a competent witness in any action now pending or hereafter commenced in the courts of this state, and his deposition may be taken in the same manner prescribed by statute or rule relating to taking of depositions. After a suspension of sentence pursuant to § 23A-27-18, upon the termination of the time of the original sentence or the time extended by order of the court, a defendant’s rights withheld by this section are restored. (Underlining added)
SDCL 23A-27-35.
Whenever any convict has been discharged under the provisions of § 24-5-1 he shall at the time of his discharge be considered as restored to the full rights of citizenship. At the time of the discharge of any convict under the provisions of this chapter, he shall receive from the warden a certificate and such certificate shall be due notice that he has been restored to the full rights of a citizen. If a convict is on parole at the time he becomes eligible for discharge, the warden shall issue a like certificate, which shall be due notice that such convict has been restored to the full rights of a citizen. Any convict discharged pri- or to July 1, 1965 shall as of the time of his discharge, be considered as restored to the full rights of citizenship. The warden is hereby authorized to issue a certificate to such ex-convicts.
The warden shall mail a copy of the certificate to the clerk of court for the county from which the convict was sentenced. (Underlining added)
SDCL 24-5-2
Neither of these statutory provisions are applicable to the facts presented by this appeal. The first statute and the whole of SDCL 23A-27 deal with convictions and sentences issued by courts of this state. It begins by this phrase: “A sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary ...” which must mean the South Dakota penitentiary. The same holds true for the second statute wherein it is the warden of South Dakota’s penitentiary who issues a certificate to an inmate restoring his civil rights upon discharge. It would be a bold legal proposition to hold that these two particularized statutes dealing with .inmates and felons sentenced and convicted under the criminal laws of South Dakota are applicable to restore civil rights to felons convicted under other legally distinct criminal systems, herein the federal government.
The plaintiffs argue that individuals who have been convicted under a criminal system other than South Dakota’s would have a more restricted right to serve on a jury. To answer this claim it should be noted that a classification restricting jury service, to non-felons is a constitutionally permitted classification. See, e.g., Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.3d 93, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595 (1979). But more importantly, South Dakota’s statutes do not absolutely forbid a felon from ever serving as a juror. The right to do so is restricted until the person’s civil rights are restored. It is a *309qualified limitation with the burden being upon the person challenged to demonstrate his restoration to this civil status.
Thus, a person who has been convicted of a felony under federal law is excludable as a juror under SDCL 16-13-10 unless that person can demonstrate he has been restored to his civil rights. Because there was no demonstration that Curtis’s civil rights had been restored under the federal system, he was potentially excludable as a juror.
2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON JURY MISCONDUCT.
Shortly after the Curtis letter surfaced, the defendant requested relief from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion and in doing so held (1) that there was no intrinsic or extrinsic influence by Curtis upon the jury; and, (2) there was no evidence to conclude that the jury was tampered with by Curtis.
I agree with the majority that Behren’s demonstration of juror misconduct during deliberations falls short of the standard required by SDCL 19-14-7. There has been no showing that extrinsic interferences have occurred during jury deliberations. But, this appeal does not center wholly around Curtis’s alleged influence upon the other jury members. The misconduct of the kind Curtis exhibited prior to trial and during jury selection is not reviewed by the standards of SDCL 19-14-7. This appeal not only involves juror misconduct during deliberation, but it also involves the issue of whether Curtis should have been allowed to participate in the decision. And it is this distinction which the majority fails to address.
The defendant’s request for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b) is well taken. In discussing this topic in State v. Hermann, supra at 619, the Missouri Supreme Court, after recognizing that the duty to question and preserve error on voir dire is usually the duty of counsel, noted in this exception:
An exception is made to this rule so that ‘where it is shown that matters which might establish prejudice or work a disqualification were actually gone into on voir dire, and false answers were given, or deception otherwise practiced, the court will be permitted to consider the question on the motion for a new trial, either upon oral testimony taken at a hearing on the motion, or by affidavits’; because ‘the situation is closely akin to that when a new trial is sought for newly discovered evidence; and the complaining party is not to be left without a remedy for the want of a prior objection and exception, when the disqualification of the juror was one which he by due diligence could not have learned sooner. (Citations omitted)
We find from the record herein there was such concealment and deception on the part of juror Michel as to make this exception applicable in this ease; and we must hold this was prejudicial to defendant for the reasons stated in the above-cited cases. (Underlining added)
In concluding the court stated the reason implicit in this ruling is required because:
... [Defendant was entitled to this information, in determining which jurors to strike in using his peremptory challenges, regardless of whether or not it amounted to an absolute disqualification. Therefore, the judgment herein must be reversed. (Underlining added)
In McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), prospective jurors were questioned on the topic of injuries specifically whether any members of their immediate family had ever sustained any severe injuries or had suffered for a prolonged period of time. One juror who remained silent to this question was seated as a jury member. After the verdict it was discovered that this particular juror had failed to appropriately respond and a new trial was ordered. In reversing the order for a new trial, the Supreme Court held that under Rule 61 (the same as SDCL 15-6-61) to *310obtain a new trial a party (1) must first demonstrate that a prospective juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire; and (2) then show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
The defendant’s motion for a new trial meets the criteria of Greenwood. First, Curtis failed to answer a material question. His prior conviction of mail fraud, a crime of dishonesty, had a direct bearing upon his qualifications as a juror. Under our state procedure it makes no difference whether the question was answered by questionnaire or by way of answer in voir dire. A dishonest answer to a material question under either circumstances is adequate. See, State v. Delfs, supra; State v. Wyss, 124 Wis.2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985). Was Curtis dishonest in his failure to fill out the jury form? The top of the form required him to read and fill out both sides. He did not fill out the reverse side. He failed to use his true name. He failed to mention other litigation in Pennington County. He failed to mention his conviction for mail fraud. He attempted to extort money from the prevailing attorney. Curtis’s honesty falls short of the benchmark.
Next, if the true state of affairs were known, the defendant would have had a challenge for cause. Under SDCL 15-14-6(1) a juror may be challenged for cause because he does not qualify. As Curtis was potentially not qualified because of his felony conviction under federal law, he could have been challenged. It is not required in Greenwood that the court be convinced that a challenge would have been exercised. It is only required that the challenge for cause exist.
I would reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the proceedings to the lower court for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that MILLER, J., joins in concurring in part and dissenting in part.