Court Opinion

ID: 9736160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:45:32.087404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.748608
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA delivered the opinion of the court:  Defendant seeks a rehearing in this matter contending that this court overlooked his two primary authorities, In re Pearson (D.C. 1970), 262 A.2d 337, and Jones v. United States (D.C. 1971), 273 A.2d 842, and also misapprehended the supreme court’s opinion in People v. Kellogg (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 524, 397 N.E.2d 835. Although not cited in the original opinion, Pearson and Jones were considered by this court but were not found to be controlling. Initially we note that the decisions of foreign jurisdictions are not binding upon Illinois courts (see City of Chicago v. Groffman (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118, 368 N.E.2d 891, 894; People v. Stansberry (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 541, 544, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 873, 30 L. Ed. 2d 116, 92 S. Ct. 121), and therefore we need not adopt the approach taken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Pearson stated that as soon as a poll of the jury reveals a dissenting juror, further polling is unnecessary and in the absence of a request by the defense is error. The court found that the proper response to a dissent is either to discharge the jury or to return it for more deliberation, since the continued poUing only ascertains the numerical division of a jury which was condemned in Brasfield v. United States (1926), 272 U.S. 448, 71 L. Ed. 345, 47 S. Ct. 135. As noted in our original opinion, Brasfield involved an inquiry by the trial court about the numerical division of a deliberating jury, which was considered to have coercive tendencies upon the jurors. The Pearson court found the reasoning in Brasfield to be equally applicable to the continuing jury poll and considered the coercive atmosphere created by the revelation of the juror’s division to be magnified when it occurs in open court rather than in the jury room. Because of the continuation of the jury poll and for several other reasons, the Pearson court was unable to conclude that the jury had freely arrived at an unanimous verdict and reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. The court subsequently followed Pearson in Jones. We cannot agree that the continuation of a jury poll after a dissenting juror is discovered brings coercive tendencies to bear merely because it reveals the numerical division of the jury. As noted in our original opinion, a jury poll by its nature separates any dissenting juror from the previously unanimous majority. If isolation of jurors produces the coercive tendency as feared in Pearson, then stopping the poll at the first dissent and isolating a single juror from the majority would bring more coercion to bear on that juror should further deliberations follow than if a continued poll had revealed further dissent as in the instant case. Another factor which distinguishes both Pearson and Jones from the instant case is the fact that the dissenting juror in each case changed her vote in court in response to direct questioning by the court. As noted in Kellogg, such interrogation may have coercive effects on a dissenting juror. Unlike those cases, here the jury was allowed to return to the jury room for further deliberations free from any coercion of the court. The two dissenting jurors then joined the majority in returning the unanimous verdict of guilty and the court was so informed. We fail to find any coercion on the dissenting jurors and cannot agree that the continued polling of the jury established a coercive effect in and of itself. We therefore reject the rule in Pearson that the continued polling is per se impermissible. Defendant also contends that we relied on overly broad dicta in People v. Kellogg (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 524, 397 N.E.2d 835, to support our conclusion and ignored other dicta which supports his position. We still find that Kellogg suggests that each member of the jury should be polled so that “an unequivocal expression from each juror” (Kellogg, at 528) is obtained and that the poll need not be stopped at the first dissent. In addition, although Kellogg limits the trial court’s remedies upon discovery of dissent to either directing the jury to retire for further deliberation or to discharging it, we do not feel that those remedies prohibit the continuation of the poll prior to the remedial action. This is apparent when the purpose of the poll, which is to make sure that each juror truly assents to the verdict, is considered. As noted in our original opinion, the question of unanimity of a verdict is for the trial court, and that determination will be upheld unless clearly unreasonable. The instant record does not show the trial court’s acceptance of the second verdict to be unreasonable. We did not overlook his primary authorities as defendant contends, nor do we find that Kellogg prohibits the continuation of the jury poll after a dissenting vote is discovered. Accordingly, defendant’s petition for rehearing is denied. SULLIVAN, P. J., and LORENZ, J., concur.