Court Opinion

ID: 9495937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:13:45.624828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:48.599557
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case because amendment 568 to the Sentencing Guidelines affords this panel the opportunity to reconsider United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902 (8th Cir.1996), and in light of the material change created by amendment 568, we should reject Hascall’s holding that burglary of a commercial building is always a crime of violence.
Amendment 568 to the commentary of § 4B1.2 calls into question the rationale of Hascall. The amended application note limits the scope of the “otherwise” provision of § 4B1.2(a)(2) by requiring sentencing courts to “focus” on “the offense of conviction (i.e., the conduct of which the defendant was convicted).” This restriction of the “otherwise” provision undermines Hascall’s categorical determination that all burglaries are crimes of violence.
The court in Hascall borrowed the generic definition of burglary provided by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-99, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), when it construed “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). This analysis does not survive amendment 568’s statement that the focus of inquiry for determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 4B1.1 is the offense of conviction. That an amendment was made in fact tends to uncouple the analysis of what constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 from the analysis of what constitutes a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The amendment to the commentary effectively amends the guidelines provision itself. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (stating that amendment to the commentary in the Guidelines Manual is one manner by which the Sentencing Commission may incorporate revisions in the Guidelines themselves).
Moreover, the amendment specifically explains that what courts are to weigh most heavily in determining whether a previous offense is a crime of violence is the “offense of conviction.” The appellants’ offenses of conviction here are various degrees of burglary, and what those offenses are is to be found in their elements and in the charging documents. Indeed, this court itself has stated that the district court is to “analyze the conduct set forth and/or expressly charged in the information and indictment” when considering whether a previous conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under §§ 4B1.1-2 of the guidelines. United States v. Fields, 167 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir.1998).
It should give us pause that since the Hascall decision, no other circuit has determined that burglary is always a crime of violence. See United States v. Hoults, 240 F.3d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir.2001) (listing the stances of the various circuits). Even the First Circuit, whose case United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1992), persuaded the Hascall court, appears to have retreated slightly from such a categorical holding. See United States v. Dueno, 171 F.3d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir.1999) (noting that not every crime that falls under the “otherwise” provision in the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act need be a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines). Amendment 568 is a change in the law, even if the change is minor, and that change now permits this court to decide these cases without being bound by Has-call.
District courts under the revised guideline ought consider a defendant’s specific conduct in committing a prior offense be*599fore determining that the offense is a crime of violence. Thus, I dissent.