Court Opinion

ID: 9556557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 18:00:36.115642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:58.340812
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LINDA BEEMAN,                                   No.    22-15696

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cv-01774-WBS-DB
 v.

JOHN B. CRUZ, individually and as               MEMORANDUM*
employee of the Amador County Sheriff's
Department; AMADOR COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE; COUNTY OF
AMADOR; J. CORDOZA,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of California
                   William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 15, 2023**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BADE, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District
Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
      Linda Beeman appeals the district court’s dismissal of her first amended

complaint (“FAC”), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective John

Cruz, Lieutenant Jim Cardoza, and the County of Amador (collectively,

“Defendants”). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the FAC failed to state a

claim for municipal liability, unreasonable execution of a warrant, malicious

prosecution, supervisory liability, or deprivation of due process.

      On appeal, Beeman challenges only the dismissal of her claims for malicious

prosecution and supervisory liability. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Ochoa v. Pub.

Consulting Grp., Inc., 48 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022). Reviewing the district

court’s dismissal order de novo, see Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2022), we affirm.

      To state a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Beeman

must allege “that the defendants prosecuted [her] with malice and without probable

cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [her a] specific constitutional

right.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). While the

Superior Court’s decision to hold Beeman to answer following a preliminary

hearing is not conclusive evidence of probable cause, see id. at 1067, Beeman

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failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut this prima facie showing of probable cause

by, for example, alleging facts demonstrating that the criminal prosecution was

“induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful

conduct undertaken in bad faith,” id. 1

      Rather, the facts alleged in the FAC, which we accept as true, Manzarek v.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), demonstrate

that the evidence allegedly withheld from the District Attorney at the time charges

were filed was before the Superior Court at the time of the preliminary hearing.

With that evidence in mind, the judge nevertheless concluded that there was

probable cause to support the complaint against Beeman. See Maxwell v. Cnty. of

San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Probable cause exists if the

arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts

and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee]

had committed or was committing a crime.’” (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.3d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1990))). Additionally,

Beeman alleged that the district attorney chose to file an information against her

following the preliminary hearing, this time with full knowledge of the allegedly

withheld evidence. Therefore, the FAC does not sufficiently allege the absence of

1
 Beeman provides no authority establishing that a subsequent dismissal of
criminal charges has any bearing on the Superior Court’s probable cause
determination here.

                                          3
probable cause necessary to state a claim for malicious prosecution.

      As for Beeman’s supervisory liability claim against Lieutenant Cardoza,

because Beeman failed to state a claim for a predicate constitutional violation, she

necessarily failed to state a claim of supervisory liability. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality nor a

supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional

violation has occurred.”).

      AFFIRMED.

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