Court Opinion

ID: 9891337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:03:30.444883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:02.123725
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 451
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION III
                                      No. CV-23-246

 STORMY RICHARDSON                             Opinion Delivered October 18, 2023

                               APPELLANT
                                               APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT
                                               COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                            [NO. 64JV-20-25]

 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF        HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN,
 HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR      JUDGE
 CHILDREN
                     APPELLEES AFFIRMED

                          RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

       Stormy Richardson (“Richardson”) appeals the Scott County Circuit Court’s order

terminating her parental rights to her children, Minor Child 1 (MC1, born in August 2020)

and Minor Child 2 (MC2, born in November 2021). On appeal, Richardson argues that the

circuit court erred by finding that any statutory ground pled supported termination or that

termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

       On December 28, 2020, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a

petition for ex parte emergency custody and dependency-neglect after it had placed a hold

on MC1, who was then four months old. DHS had received a report on December 20 that
MC1 was found alone in her car seat outside an apartment at 4:00 a.m. and that her parents1

were not located until 11:00 a.m., when they were found in a highly intoxicated state. The

temperature that night was in the thirties. The petition alleged that this was the third time

the child had been located alone and that a needle was found in a diaper bag near the child.

The petition also referenced three prior “unsubstantiated” DHS allegations, one being a

November 2020 referral in which Richardson “was reported to have seizures approximately

six to seven times a day.” The petition went on to state that “[a]lthough the abuse was

unsubstantiated, due to the concerns of the child being left alone with Stormy and due to

Stormy’s seizures being at six to seven times a day, a Protection Plan was put in place.” The

circuit court entered an ex parte order placing MC1 in DHS’s legal custody on December

28. The order further stated that the parents were found following the December 20

incident “after having attempted to hide the child from the Department, because they said,

the baby had been raped.”

       On January 5, 2021, the court found that probable cause existed such that MC1

should remain in the custody of DHS. The court entered the probable-cause order on

January 26 and an amended order on February 9. The order specified that Richardson was

to have visitation once a week for at least four hours and mandated that she receive services

to include parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, and random drug screens.

       1
        The proceedings also sought to terminate the parental rights of the putative father,
Zackery Richardson. The parties were divorced, and Zackery consented to the termination
of his parental rights in December 2022. He is not a party to this appeal.

                                             2
       An adjudication hearing was held on March 9, followed by an order entered May 17.

The court found MC1 dependent-neglected as the result of environmental neglect. The

order stated that, “[s]pecifically, the Court finds that the home has been inappropriate,

especially with the people that are in and out of the home, and the people staying in their

bed. The Court finds the testimony of the DHS investigator credible.”

       MC1 remained in the custody of DHS, and the goal of the case was set as

reunification. Visitation was as previously ordered, with DHS having the discretion to

increase visitation up to and including a trial home placement with the agreement of the

parties. Richardson was ordered to comply with the case plan; obtain and maintain safe,

stable, and appropriate housing, income, and transportation; submit to random drug

screens, hair-follicle tests, and alcohol swabs; complete a psychological evaluation and comply

with its recommendations; complete parenting classes and demonstrate the skills learned at

visitations; keep DHS aware of her contact information and notify DHS if there were any

changes; keep DHS aware of any significant life events; and attend visitation as scheduled.

       The court held review hearings on June 8, with an order entered June 16; and

September 28, with an order entered December 10. MC1 remained in DHS custody, and

the goal of the case continued to be reunification. The court found that Richardson was

“demonstrat[ing] some progress towards the goal of the case plan” in the June order.

       A permanency-planning hearing was held on December 14, with an order entered on

January 13, 2022. MC1 remained in DHS custody, and the goal of the case continued to be

reunification. Richardson was found to be in partial compliance at that time because she

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was without income and at risk of losing her housing. The January 13 order also found that

Richardson had given birth to MC1’s sibling, MC2; and the court ordered a seventy-two-

hour hold be placed on MC2, who was placed in the custody of DHS at that time.

       On December 17, 2021, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-

neglect with respect to MC2. The petition included an affidavit from a DHS family services

employee who stated that “due to the severity and frequency of the mother’s seizures [said to

occur six or seven times a day], that if the child is left alone with the mother, there is a risk

the child could be harmed.” The court entered an ex parte order granting the petition on

the same day. The order stated that with regard to Richardson, she had “no current income,

and [was] at a risk of losing her current housing. . . . [She] also has frequent and severe

seizures that pose a significant risk to the juvenile’s health and safety.” A probable-cause

hearing was held on December 20, with an order entered on January 7, 2022. The court

found that probable cause existed and continued to exist such that MC2 would remain in

the custody of DHS.

       The court entered a permanency-planning order on January 13, 2022, in which it

again stated the goal of the case as reunification and found the parents to be in partial

compliance with the case plan and orders of the court. With regard to Richardson, the court

noted that she did not “have income at this time, though she testified she may receive SSI

after one month. She is at risk of losing her current housing.”

       On February 22, the court held a fifteen-month review hearing with regard to MC1

and an adjudication hearing with regard to MC2. The court entered a resulting order on

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March 10. Both children were found to be dependent-neglected because the parents were

“unfit for custody.” Both children remained in the custody of DHS, and the court found

that it was in the best interest of the juveniles for the goal to remain reunification.

       Another permanency-planning hearing was held on June 28 with a resulting order

entered July 14. The children again remained in DHS custody with a continuing goal of

reunification. The order stated:

       The Department has not made reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency
       plan for the juveniles. Specifically, we are approximately 19 months into the
       case and are not making any progress. The parent, Zackery Richardson, has no
       water in the house he lives in, and does not appear to have any plan to get
       water soon. Neither parent has an appropriate home at this time, and the
       Court could not return the juveniles to either parent under the circumstances
       today. The direction in the case has pivoted and we are no closer to a
       resolution to permanency than previously. If the case were to go in the
       direction of permanency with placement with the grandmother, Zackery
       Richardson’s mother, there would need to be a specific, appropriate, visitation
       plan in place for the parent, Stormy Richardson.

       The order further stated that “[j]urisdiction of this case is continued with a

permanency planning hearing set for October 25, 2022.” The third permanency-planning

hearing was held on the set day, and the court’s findings were memorialized in an order

entered December 6. The order stated:

       After considering the evidence, the available permanency planning
       dispositions, and the juveniles’ best interest, health, safety, and welfare, the
       Court finds that the goal of the case shall be changed to adoption following
       termination of parental rights. The parents have both testified they do not
       want guardianship for the juveniles in this case. . . . The juveniles shall remain
       in the custody of the Department because the parents are unfit, and the
       juveniles’ health and safety cannot be protected by the parents if returned to
       the parents. Return to the custody of the parent is contrary to the welfare of
       the juveniles and the continuation of custody in the Department is in the best

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       interests of the juveniles, necessary to the protection of the juveniles’ health
       and safety, and the least restrictive alternative.

The order went on to rescind the “no reasonable effort finding from June 28, 2022” as it

related to DHS.

       With regard to Richardson, the order specifically stated, “The parent, Stormy

Richardson, has complied with the services. However, she is still not in a position to have

the children returned to her. The record is replete with issues regarding visitation and the

use of alarms. The juveniles could not be returned to her at this time.”

       DHS filed a termination-of-parental-rights petition on November 1. The petition

sought to terminate the parental rights of both parents as to both juveniles. The petition

pled failure to remedy, failure to provide significant material support and maintain

meaningful contact, subsequent factors, and aggravated circumstances. Zackery Richardson

consented to the termination of his parental rights in December 2022.

       The termination hearing for Stormy Richardson was held on January 10, 2023.

Following the presentation of DHS’s case, Richardson moved for a directed verdict—which

the court granted—on the ground of failure to provide significant material support and

maintain contact. Richardson then presented her case. The court granted the termination

petition on the grounds of failure to remedy, subsequent factors, and aggravated

circumstances. The court further held that termination was in the best interest of the

juveniles based on its findings that the juveniles are adoptable and that they would likely be

subjected to potential harm if parental rights were not terminated. This appeal followed.

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       Termination-of-parental-rights cases are given de novo review. E.g., L.W. v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 44, at 8, 380 S.W.3d 489, 494. Appellate courts will not

reverse a termination order unless the findings were clearly erroneous, meaning “although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 9, 380 S.W.3d at 495.

Further, appellate courts give due regard to the circuit court’s ability to assess a witness’s

credibility. Id., 380 S.W.3d at 494.

       In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing

evidence that at least one ground for termination exists and that termination is in the

juvenile’s best interest. Id. at 9–10, 380 S.W.3d at 494–95. “Clear and convincing evidence

is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the

allegation sought to be established.” Watkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 55,

at 4. Because DHS is required to prove only one ground for termination, an appellate court

need not consider whether each of the statutory grounds cited for termination was

independently appropriate. See Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. 115, 515

S.W.3d 599; see also Calloway v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 192, at 10, 644

S.W.3d 262, 267 (“We have repeatedly held that the Department need only prove one

ground for termination, so we must affirm if the evidence supports at least one of the

statutory grounds at issue in this case.”). Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy

in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Causer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 93 Ark.

                                               7
App. 483, 220 S.W.3d 270 (2005). Nevertheless, courts are not to enforce parental rights to

the detriment of a child’s health and well-being. Id.

       For her first argument on appeal, Richardson argues that DHS failed to prove any of

the statutory grounds pled in the termination petition. The court granted Richardson’s

motion for directed verdict on the ground of failure to provide significant material support

and maintain meaningful contact, leaving the grounds of failure to remedy, subsequent

factors, and aggravated circumstances. It was necessary, therefore, for the court to find that

only one of the remaining three statutory grounds existed in order to properly terminate

Richardson’s parental rights.

       Aggravated circumstances exist when a determination has been made by a court that

there is little likelihood that additional services to the family will result in successful

reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3) (Supp. 2023); see also Calloway,

2022 Ark. App. 192, at 10, 644 S.W.3d at 267. This court has held that a parent’s failure

to demonstrate “sufficient parenting skills to regain custody of the children or to be trusted

with a trial placement or unsupervised visitation” supports an aggravated-circumstances

finding. Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 299, at 8, 578 S.W.3d 312, 318

(holding that termination was appropriate where evidence “establishe[d] that DHS offered

services to Jones for almost a year and a half, and despite these services, Jones did not

demonstrate that she could consistently provide a stable, safe, and appropriate environment

for the children. A stable home is one of a child's most basic needs.”). This court has likewise

held that a finding of aggravated circumstances—though it requires more than a mere

                                               8
prediction or expectation that services will not result in successful reunification—may be

appropriate where doubts persist about a parent’s ability to be trusted with unsupervised

visitation and care of a child regardless of the parent’s compliance with a case plan and court

orders. See Helms v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 158, 662 S.W.285. Even full

compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has

become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 85, 512 S.W.3d 694. The provision of meaningful services by DHS is not

required for an aggravated-circumstances finding. See Love v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022

Ark. App. 377, at 7, 653 S.W.3d 539, 544.

        In support of her argument that the aggravated-circumstances ground was not proved

by clear and convincing evidence, Richardson primarily relies on her compliance with the

case plan and court orders. Richardson states, “The overarching concern expressed by the

court as to each of these grounds” was “parenting issues,” and she disputes specific testimony

that she alleges was in support of those concerns.

        Richardson further disputes that she had not shown that she could have unsupervised

visits, citing unsupervised visits in November 2021 (when the children’s father was also

present) as well as the fact that MC2 was in her care without incident for the first month of

her life.

        In response, DHS and minor children contend that Richardson

        demonstrated an incapacity or indifference to rehabilitate her circumstances,
        and the evidence demonstrated that services were not likely to result in
        reunification. More specifically, despite the longevity of the juveniles’ time in

                                                9
       foster care and Richardson’s completion of three separate parenting courses,
       she was unable to graduate to unsupervised visitation, and it was unclear
       whether this could even be accomplished in the future.

In support of their arguments, DHS and minor children contended that “Richardson is

autistic, developmentally behind, diagnosed with a seizure disorder, and requires 24/7

assistance from an aide to help her with basic tasks such as bathing, grooming, dressing,

laundry, housekeeping, meal preparation, and shopping.” At the termination hearing,

however, Richardson denied the need for further assistance from an aide.

       At the termination hearing, Melissa Dodson, a program assistant who participates in

the supervised visits with Richardson, and McKayla Whitley, the primary DHS caseworker

both testified about their concerns that the children could not be left otherwise unsupervised

in Richardson’s care due to safety concerns. The ad litem, Anna Noakes, further expressed

her preference that “termination be granted.” Evidence also established that Richardson

had declined both a home-health aide and a proposed guardianship arrangement.

Additionally, there was testimony that Richardson has frequent seizures, which could be

controlled by medication, but that she sometimes had trouble remembering to take her

medication without reminders from others. Richardson stated she had not had a seizure in

over a year but could not recall whether she had provided medical records to DHS.

       We have held repeatedly that the circuit court is in the best position to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and make factual determinations. L.W. v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2011 Ark. App. 44, at 8, 380 S.W.3d 489, 494. The January 19 order contained specific

factual findings in support of the court’s determination that aggravated circumstances were

                                              10
found due to “little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful

reunification.” Specifically, the order stated:

       As noted above, this case has been going on over two years. . . . During this
       hearing, the Court has not heard any testimony that can indicate a deadline
       for when the juveniles can be returned home safely to the parents. The Court
       does not find a way to achieve permanency for the juveniles without
       proceeding towards termination of parental rights. Stormy Richardson has
       worked services throughout this case, yet she has not progressed enough to be
       able to have the juveniles returned to her custody at this time. The parents’
       testimony today regarding her plans if the juveniles were returned to her clearly
       shows this Court there are still concerns with her ability to properly parent the
       juveniles. There are no known services identified that can help further the
       chances of a successful reunification. Under the circumstances, there is clearly
       a little likelihood that continued services to the parent, Stormy Richardson,
       will result in a successful reunification.

       There was sufficient testimony on which the circuit court could have reasonably

concluded that DHS proved aggravated circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.

Here, the evidence demonstrated—and the court found—that Richardson had attempted to

remedy and correct the issues through participating in services offered by DHS but seemed

to lack the capacity to independently exercise appropriate parenting judgment. There is also

evidence on which the court could have concluded that Richardson was not willing to

rehabilitate the circumstances that prevented the placement of the children in her custody,

such as her unwillingness to consent to a guardianship or a home-health aide. Accordingly,

we affirm the circuit court’s aggravated-circumstances finding. Because only one ground is

necessary to support termination, we do not address Richardson’s arguments concerning the

alternative grounds for termination. Helm v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 418,

501 S.W.3d 398.

                                              11
       Richardson next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that termination was in

the juveniles’ best interest. In considering the best-interest finding, the circuit court must

consider the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and the potential harm that could

be caused to the juvenile if returned to the parent. Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019

Ark. App. 389, at 7, 585 S.W.3d 725, 729–30. However, unlike statutory termination

grounds, potential harm and adoptability are only factors for the circuit court to consider

rather than essential elements of proof, and each factor need not be established by clear and

convincing evidence. L.W., 2011 Ark. App. 44, at 11, 380 S.W.3d at 496.

       Richardson does not challenge the adoptability factor with regard to either child;

therefore, this court is not required to address this issue on appeal. See, e.g., Easter v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, at 8, 587 S.W.3d 604, 608. In predicting potential

harm, a circuit court is not required to identify actual harm. See Gonzalez v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 425, at 12, 555 S.W.3d 915, 921.

       In support of her contention that termination was not in the children’s best interest,

Richardson cites Benedict v. Arkansas Department of Human Services for the proposition that

“disabilities are not conclusive on the termination issue.” 96 Ark. App. 395, 242 S.W.3d

305 (2006). In Benedict, this court reversed and remanded termination of a mother’s parental

rights based on the sole ground preserved on appeal: whether the decision was in the best

interest of the children. The court based its holding on the evidence, which revealed that

the mother was having a psychotic episode when DHS took the children into custody but

had since “made consistent efforts to improve her parenting skills and get to a point where

                                              12
she can raise her children despite her mental deficiencies.” Id. at 410, 242 S.W.3d at 317.

The court went on to find that Benedict had shown “marked progress in her ability to

provide a stable home . . . [,] benefited from the services provided by DHS, and shown

objective improvement to the benefit of the children.” Id. at 412, 242 S.W.3d at 319.

          Benedict was distinguished by Fowler v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2021

Ark. App. 307, 634 S.W.3d 535, where this court affirmed a termination of parental rights.

In Fowler, this court noted that although Fowler cited Benedict for the proposition that “it is

proper and appropriate to allow additional time and services when parents are striving to be

good parents, especially if the parent is hindered because of the parent’s intellectual or

psychological difficulties,” the true holding was that “where appellant has by all accounts

cooperated with the orders of the court, benefited from the services provided by DHS, and shown

objective improvement to the benefit of the children” a reversal was warranted. Id. at14–15 n.2,

634 S.W.3d at 544 n.2 (quoting Benedict, 96 Ark. App. at 412, 242 S.W.3d at 319) (emphasis

added). This court went on to note the unique factual circumstances in Benedict—that

appellant suffered from postpartum depression that was eliminated through treatment over

the course of the case—which remedied the underlying condition that caused removal. Id.

          There is no specific indication in the court’s order that Richardson’s mental health

or history of seizures was the basis for the best-interest finding. To the contrary, the order

stated:

          the circuit court considered all relevant factors, including the likelihood that
          the juveniles would be adopted if the parental rights were terminated, and the

                                                13
       potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of
       the juveniles, that could be caused by returning the juveniles to the parents.

However, as discussed above, there was sufficient evidence on which the court could

conclude that potential harm would be likely if the children were returned to the

unsupervised care of their mother. Unlike the facts in Benedict, Richardson unfortunately

had not made “marked progress in her ability to provide a stable home . . . [,] benefited from

the services provided by DHS, and shown objective improvement to the benefit of the

children.” Benedict, 96 Ark. App. at 412, 242 S.W.3d at 319. Under these facts, it was not

clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that Richardson’s past behavior and ongoing

behavior at supervised sessions demonstrated potential future harm to the children. See Cox

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 202, at 10, 462 S.W.3d 670, 676 (“This court

has held that past behavior is correctly viewed as a predictor of potential harm.”). We

therefore affirm the circuit court’s termination of Richardson’s parental rights.

       Affirmed.

       VIRDEN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

       Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

       Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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