Court Opinion

ID: 9789593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:38:50.130336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:23.406943
License: Public Domain

Andersen, J.
(dissenting)—Price tags were admitted into evidence. This was correct since they were stolen along with the merchandise to which they were affixed. The price tags were as relevant and properly admissible into evidence as was the stolen merchandise itself.
In this day and age, items bought at retail are customarily purchased at the price shown on the price tags attached to the merchandise. Although the price listed on the tags was not necessarily conclusive evidence of the market value of the merchandise in this case,1 it was at least substantial evidence on which a jury could reasonably rely in determining that the market value of the goods stolen was in fact that which was shown on the price tag. As we said in discussing what constitutes substantial evidence of the value of stolen property in State v. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 831, 470 P.2d 552 (1970):
It is not essential that there be direct evidence of value— a fact in issue—because reasonable inferences from substantial evidence may suffice. . . . Reasonable inferences from substantial evidence in a criminal case may be relied on to prove the crime. . . .
When substantial evidence is present, the drawing of reasonable inferences therefrom and the doing of some conjecturing on the basis of such evidence is permissible and acceptable.
*556(Citations omitted.) The defendant had every right to contend that in fact the price shown on the price tag was not the market value of the merchandise, but if evidence existed which refuted such a showing, it was incumbent on the defendant to present it so that the jury would have the assistance of such evidence in reaching its verdict.
In order to reach the decision that it did, the jury had to have concluded that the market value of the stolen merchandise exceeded $75. The theft therefore constituted grand larceny. Other courts have held that a jury could so conclude on the basis of price tags in evidence. Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610, 610-11 (1963); State v. Milano, 94 N.J. Super. 337, 228 A.2d 347, 347-48 (1967). I would also so conclude in this case and would affirm the conviction and sentence.
Petition for rehearing denied June 6, 1978.

Here the jury was instructed:
"You are instructed that price and value are not necessarily the same thing. Price may be evidence of value, but you may give it only such weight as the circumstances require." Instruction No. 8.
The jury was also instructed regarding the value of the stolen merchandise that it could take into consideration "any competent testimony as to its market value at the time of the offense." Instruction No. 9 (part).