Court Opinion

ID: 9735977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:38:21.953858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.168791
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Cooper, J.
This matter is now before us on the appellee’s petition for rehearing in which they con*219tend, in substance, that the decision of the court is erroneous in holding (1) that the Marion County Probate Court does not have jurisdiction over the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien when an Executor of an estate is made the party defendant to such action, under §4-2910 (Sixth clause) ; also, (2) that the opinion infers that the Marion County Probate Court is not a civil court of general jurisdiction when such court is a court of record and of general jurisdiction as provided in the statute creating such court, and, as such, has jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mechanic’s liens, and (3) that the decision of the court is erroneous in holding that an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien cannot be treated as a claim in an estate, when such could be treated as a claim and the judgment of the trial court corrected in this regard.
The appellee presents nothing for our consideration in item three, as above set forth, in his petition for rehearing, because our opinion does not infer, or hold, what the appellee attempts to contend.
In order that there be no misunderstanding and to clear up any ambiguity which might exist, we shall answer the first and second specifications.
It is apparent by the record before us that the appellee tried to circumvent the special statute relating to the foreclosure of mechanic’s liens wherein the legislature specifically stated that such matters must be brought in the Superior or Circuit Court by bringing-said proceedings against Michael P. Matracia, as Executor of the estate of Mary Demma, and James L. Johnson, who, the record reveals to be the contractor, in the Marion County Probate Court.
The statute relating to the foreclosure of mechanic’s liens creates new rights wholly unknown to the *220common law. In the recent case of State ex rel. Mar. C. Pl. Comm. v. Mar. S. C. et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 607, 609, 135 N. E. 2d 516, our Supreme Court, in discussing new rights and/or remedies wholly unknown to the common law, stated:
“The remedies therein prescribed are exclusive. In such case, the requirements of the statute as to the court where the remedy is to be had, and the time and manner asserting the rights, are mandatory and jurisdictional. Great Western Life, etc. Co. v. State ex rel. Honan (1913), 181 Ind. 28, 33, 102 N. E. 849, 103 N. E. 843; Slinkard v. Hunter (1936), 209 Ind. 475, 479, 199 N. E. 560; Gossard v. Vawter (1939), 215 Ind. 581, 585, 21 N. E. 2d 416; Ettinger v. Robbins (1945), 223 Ind. 168, 172, 59 N. E. 2d 118; State ex rel. Gary Taxpayers Assn. v. Lake Superior Court (1947), 225 Ind. 478, 493, 76 N. E. 2d 254; supra; State ex rel. Wever v. Reeves (1951), 229 Ind. 164, 169, 96 N. E. 2d 268; State ex rel. Mid-West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Marion County (1952), 231 Ind. 94, 100, 106 N. E. 2d 924; Ballman v. Duffecy (1952), 230 Ind. 220, 228, 102 N. E. 2d 646; Wedmore v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 545, 549, 122 N. E. 2d 1.”
The foregoing rule also applied to the foreclosure of mechanic’s liens.
In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, the owners of the property, either legal or equitable, and all others who acquire any right, title or interest in said real estate prior to the time suit is commenced, are necessary parties in, order for the court to have jurisdiction over the real parties in interest of the controversy. See Krotz v. A. R. Beck Lumber Co. (1905), 34 Ind. App. 577, 73 N. E. 273. As we have pointed out, for some reason unknown to us, and we are sure the same applied to the trial court, the only party defendant in this cause is the Executor *221of the last will and testament of the decedent and the contractor.
We find under the new Probate Code, §7-701, Burns’ 1953 Replacement, the personal representative takes only possession of the real property and not title. See also §7-123, Burns’ 1953 Replacement. Such personal representative may properly be made a defendant in order to determine his interest, if any, but would not be a necessary party in interest, unless it is averred and shown that it was necessary for said personal representative to sell said property, upon which said lien exists, to pay the debts of said decedent. See §7-816, Burns’ 1953 Replacement. The lien being enforceable in equity against the heirs of such decedent.
Under §7-123, Burns’, supra, and, also the decisions of our Supreme Court, it is the general rule that title to a decedent’s real estate vested immediately and absolutely in his heirs; the administrator had no power whatever over it; under the present law he takes possession of the real estate. If the personal estate was insufficient to pay debts, an unpaid claim was treated as a lien upon the land which the claimant could enforce in a suit of equity against the heirs. Coats v. Veedersburg State Bank (1941), 219 Ind. 675, 680, 38 N. E. 2d 243; see, also, Beach et al. v. Bell et al. (1894), 139 Ind. 167, 169, 38 N. E. 819. We also note that in the probate commission’s comments relating to the foregoing section of §7-701, Burns’, supra, that a personal representative “takes title to the personal property but not to the real estate, the same as under the present law”.
*222*221The Marion Probate Court being a creature of the legislature has only such jurisdiction as is granted *222it by the statute creating it and such powers as are necessarily implied to enable it to function as a probate court.
In reviewing the Acts creating the Marion County Probate Court, which the Legislature passed in 1907, we find that §16, the same being §4-2916, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, Part 2, reads as follows:
“Said court shall be a court of record and of general jurisdiction, and its judgments, decrees, orders and proceedings shall have the same force and effect as those of the circuit court, and shall be enforced in the same manner.”
By this provision it was not meant to confer upon the Marion Probate Court jurisdiction to try cases not enumerated in §10 of the Act, being §4-2910, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, Part 2, reading as follows:
“Said probate court, within and for the county for which it is organized, shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the probate of wills, the appointment of guardians, assignees, executors, administrators and trustees, and to the administration and settlement of estates of minors, persons of unsound mind, aged, infirm and improvident persons, habitual drunkards, insolvents and deceased persons, and of trusts, assignments, adoptions and surviving partnerships, and all other probate matters, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction in the following matters:
First. Proceedings in partition.
Second. Applications for the appointment of receivers and actions against corporations by either creditors or stockholders, or both.
Third. Applications for writs of habeas corpus.
Fourth. Proceedings to resist probate of wills and proceedings to contest wills.
Fifth. Complaints to contsrue wills and to dissolve trusts.
*223Sixth. All actions by and against executors, administrators, guardians, assignees and trustees.”
In the case of State ex rel. Bradshaw v. Probate Ct. (1947), 225 Ind. 268, at 278, 73 N. E. 2d 769, the late Judge Starr, in a dissenting opinion on a question not excepted to by the main opinion in construing the two foregoing sections relating to jurisdiction of the Marion Probate Court, stated:
“It is true that §4-2916, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, Part 2, provides that the probate court is a court of general jurisdiction. But by this provision it was not meant to confer upon this court jurisdiction to try cases not enumerated in said §4-2910. What was meant is that the probate court is vested with all the powers of any court of record when disposing of any matter of which the statute gives it jurisdiction. Doe on the Demise of Hain and Others v. Smith (1849), 1 Ind. 451.” (Our emphasis)
Our court, in discussing probate courts and their jurisdiction, in the case of Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. State ex rel. Anderson (1933), (T.D. 1934), 98 Ind. App. 485, at 497, 184 N. E. 916, stated:
“Probate courts have no common law jurisdiction. The nature, extent, and exercise of their jurisdiction depends upon the terms and breadth of the constitutional or statutory grant. They cannot exercise any powers other than those which have been expressly conferred or are necessarily implied from those expressly conferred. Their powers are not to be extended by construction or unnecessary implication.” (Our emphasis)
The Supreme Court, in discussing jurisdiction of the subject matter in trial courts and jurisdiction of probate courts in general, in the case of Wedmore v. *224State (1954), 233 Ind. 545, at 549, 122 N. E. 2d 1, stated:
“When there is a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter in the trial court, the jurisdictional question may be raised at any time before final decision and in any manner and if not raised by a party it is our duty saa sponte to raise and determine it. State ex rel. Ayers v. Ewing, Judge (1952), 231 Ind. 1, 10, 106 N. E. 2d 441, and cases there cited.
“Probate, in American law, is now a general name or term used to include all matters of which probate courts have jurisdiction. Black’s Law Dictionary, .p. 1428, Bouvier’s Law DictionaryRawles Third Revision, p. 2728; Johnson v. Harrison (1891), 47 Minn. 575, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382; see also Ingraham v. Baum (1918), 136 Ark. 101, 206 S. W. 67, 68.
“For many years it has been the law that:
‘Probate courts are creatures of the law whose basic jurisdiction is to administer justice in matters relating to decedents’ estates . . . The jurisdiction exercised by probate courts is commonly referred to as probate jurisdiction . . . Their jurisdiction is, of course, purely civil and in the settlement of estates it is primarily in rem. 21 C. J. S. — Courts, Secs. 298,300.’
“Being a creature of the legislature the St. Joseph Probate Court has such jurisdiction only as is granted by the statutes creating it, and such powers as are necessarily implied to enable it to function as a probate court. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Anderson (1933), 98 Ind. App. 485, 497, 184 N. E. 916, supra; State ex rel. Bradshaw v. Probate Court (1947), 225 Ind. 268, 272, 73 N. E. 2d 769.” (Our emphasis)
In the foregoing case, at p. 550, our Supreme Court also stated:
“To ascertain the legislative intent we must consider the entire statute and the object sought to be attained thereby. The intention of the lawmaker constitutes the law. State ex rel. Rogers *225v. Davis, Judge (1951), 230 Ind. 479, 482, 104 N. E. 2d 382; Haynes Automobile Co. v. City of Kokomo (1917), 186 Ind. 9, 12, 114 N. E. 758; Thorn v. Silver (1910), 174 Ind. 504, 515, 89 N. E. 943, 92 N. E. 161; City of Lebanon v. Dale (1943), 113 Ind. App. 173, 178, 46 N. E. 2d 269.”
The legislature by §43-705, Burns’ 1952 Replacement, Part 2, states in unequivocal terms that any person may bring his action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien by filing his complaint in a circuit or superior court in the county where said real estate, or propei'ty is situated.
This court in the case of Grimm et al. v. Rhoades et al. (1958), (T. D.), 129 Ind. App. 1, 7, 149 N. E. 2d 847, stated:
“. . . the mechanic’s lien law of this state creates new rights of purely statutory origin. The statutes providing for the lien and its enforcement are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed and anyone who seeks their benefit must bring himself within their provisions. Puritan Engineering Corp. v. Robinson, Tr. (1934), 207 Ind. 58, 191 N. E. 141; Watson v. Strohl (1943), 220 Ind. 672, 46 N. E. 2d 604; Shipman Exr. v. Shipman Gdn. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 445, 192 N. E. 849.”
We find the general rule of law well stated in the case of City of Ft. Wayne v. Bishop (1950), 228 Ind. 304, at 311, 92 N. E. 2d 544, as follows:
“Where the legislature creates a right and prescribes the method whereby the right may be enforced the statutory remedy so provided is exclusive. Lang v. Scott (1825), 1 Blckf. 405, 435, 12 Am. Dec. 257; Ryan et al. v. Ray et al. (1886), 105 Ind. 101, 106, 4 N. E. 214; Wilmont v. City of South Bend (1943), 221 Ind. 538, 543, 48 N. E. 2d 649; Ettinger v. Robbins (1945), 223 Ind. 168, 59 N. E. 2d 118; Hinkle v. Howard (1947), 225 Ind. 176, 178, 73 N. E. 2d 674, 675; New York, Chicago *226and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Zumbaugh (1895), 12 Ind. App. 272, 279, 39 N. E. 1058; Board of Comrs. v. Adler et al. (1922), 77 Ind. App. 296, 300, 301, 133 N. E. 602; City of Lebanon v. Dale (1943), 113 Ind. App. 173, 176, 177, 46 N. E. 2d 269.” See also State ex rel. Mar. C. Pl. Comm. v. Mar. S. C, et al., supra.
From the authorities we have heretofore cited, it is apparent, in our opinion, that the Marion Probate Court did not have jurisdiction in this particular cause and its proceedings in the matter are not merely erroneous, but were, in all respects, void.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Ax, J., Myers, J., Ryan, C. J., concur.
Note. — Reported in 1.78 N. E. 2d 455. Rehearing denied 181 N. E. 2d 253.