Court Opinion

ID: 9866330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 03:58:15.605744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:27.833546
License: Public Domain

*1162On Motion for Rehearing.
Respondents, defendants below, have filed a motion for rehearing, urging a consideration of a late opinion by the Supreme Court (People Bank of Butler v. Allen, 125 S. W. (2d) 829) wherein the well-accepted rule to the effect that one cannot enter into a contract with himself, or with himself and others, even though he acts in different capacities.
The point was raised by respondents in the hearing had at the April Call, 1929, of this court and was discussed by us in connection with the opinion in Robertson v. Bank of Vandalia, 66 S. W. (2d) 193..
The Butler v. Allen case, supra, is best distinguished from the opinion, l. c. 829 and 830 as follows, to-wit:
“The bank directors, in meeting assembled, in passing the resolution authorizing the bank’s bond made an order that the president and the cashier ‘assign, set apart and maintain as security to the sureties on the bond (all members of the board) bills receivable belonging to said bank in a sum not less than $40,000 nor more than double the amount of the penalty of said bond, for the purpose of securing said bondsmen against loss by reason of their obligation on said bond; said president and cashier are further authorized and empowered, from time to time, to take up any of the bills receivable so put up as security and to substitute other bills receivable in place of any so taken up; all security so put up to be returned to the bank when said bondsmen are released from liability on said bond. Alva Deerwater is named as trustee to receive and hold said collateral security for the benefit of the sureties on said bond. ’
“In the order of the county court designating the bank as depository it was further provided that the designated depository furnish a bond in proper form for the amount above stated, ‘to be signed by not less than five owners of unencumbered real estate of value equal in amount to the bond, or more.’
“Only two of all the directors could meet this requirement when the bond was presented. The county court approved and accepted the same.
“Said notes were all taken out of the possession of the bank before the assets of the bank were turned over to the Commissioner of Finance and copies of them substituted in the bank’s files. All the original notes so taken out were held and are now retained by the appellant.
“In all published statements of the condition of the affairs of said bank prior to the Commissioner of Finance’s taking over of the bank, said assets were includes as assets of the bank.”
It is fundamental that for a general rule of laiv to have application to any given case, the facts and circumstances of such case must come within the reason of the rule.
*1163The case now being reviewed by this court is-a suit oh a promissory note. The execution of the note is not denied and the note upon its face evidences a valid and valuable consideration. In its inception, the note in issue was a plain contract between the respondents and the Peoples Bank of Chamois of which P. J. Paulsmeyer was cashier. The note is duly endorsed by said Paulsmeyer and is in possession of the executrix of the Gaume estate, and said estate claims to be owner of said note under the following -state of facts, to-wit: After the death of P. J. Paulsmeyer, the note was found in the lock box of the Gaume estate in the defunct Peoples Bank. It is shown that the box was opened in the presence of Mr. Kiethly who was in charge of the assets of the bank for liquidation. Mr. Kiethly, after the box was opened, took charge of same and no other conclusion can be drawn but that .he turned the note in question to Mrs. Paulsmeyer, and that same was turned over by her to the representative of the Gaume estate. It is conclusively shown that the note is not even listed as an asset of the bank. A court of review cannot indulge in inferences based upon inferences to reach its conclusions, but must base its conclusions upon showing in the record before the court. It is conclusive from the showing of ■ the record in the case at bar that all parties, outside of the Gaume estate, that could possibly make claim of ownership of the note in question have made such disclaimer of ownership of the note as completely bars action by such parties.
The respondents herein either owe or do not owe the note in question. We cannot conceive of a situation of .payor without a payee. If respondents owe the note they certainly owe it to some payee. So far as the evidence before us reveals, all payees except the Gaume estate are eliminated.
The principle enunciated in the Peoples Bank v. Allen, supra, case we conclude has no application to the situation as presented in the case at bar.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
All concur.