Court Opinion

ID: 9667761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:54:37.172866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.659596
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is my sincere contention that the conclusion reached by the majority relative to petitioner’s first point of error springs from a misinterpretation by the Court of Civil Appeals in the case of Owl Taxi Service v. Saludis, 1938, Texas Civ. App., 122 S.W. 2d 225, writ dismissed, w.o.j., of the *594holding in the case of Stewart v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 34 Texas Civ. App., 370, 78 S.W. 979, writ refused. I shall hereafter refer to these causes as the “Saludis case” and the “Stewart case.”
In the Stewart case the defendant entered a general plea of contributory negligence. The trial court instructed the jury that if plaintiff failed to look and listen for the approach of cars, etc., and if such failure, if any, was negligence, without which the accident would not have occurred, to find for the defendant. Stewart, the plaintiff, excepted to this portion of the charge upon the ground that defendant had not alleged specifically any particular act of negligence on the part of plaintiff, and, therefore, it was improper to single out and charge upon specific acts of negligence and submit same to the jury. The Court of Civil Appeals overruled ¿¡plaintiff's assignment of error and held that “A general plea of contributory negligence, not excepted to, is undoubtedly sufficient to warrant its submission generally or in any and all forms in which the issue is made by the evidence.”
The Stewart case, supra, is cited as authority for the holding in the case of Owl Taxi Service v. Saludis, supra, wherein the Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing certain requested issues which had for their purpose the submission of specific acts of contributory negligence as raised by the evidence. The application for writ of error assigning error on this point filed by petitioner, Saludis, was dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction. The petitioner urged a conflict between the holding in the Stewart case and his case. This Court reached the conclusion that no conflict existed. In fact, there was no conflict. The trial court in the Stewart case chose to frame the issue on contributory negligence so as to inquire of the jury as to a specific act of negligence. This he had the right to do, if he so desired. In the Saludis case, the trial court submitted the issue generally, but refused to submit requested issues embracing specific acts of contributory negligence. The Court of Civil Appeals, in passing on this question, (122 S.W. 2d 227) stated: “The exact issue here presented is whether the general plea of contributory negligence, not excepted to, authorized the submission of specific groups of facts, raised by the evidence, which would constitute contributory negligence, after the court had submitted the issue of contributory negligence in general terms, without objection thereto by the defendants.” The Court of Civil Appeals held that “As submitted the general issue was sufficient to cover all groups of contributory negligence, raised by the evidence. The question arises, there*595fore, as to whether the defendants, by failure to object to the general issue as given, waived their rights to have the special issues, requested by them, submitted to the jury. * * * We have concluded that this was sufficient to call the matter to the trial court’s attention and that his refusal to give such special issues was error.” The Court further held that under the decisions the issues should have been submitted, and concluded that “The facts grouped in the special issues requested were clearly raised by the evidence. Though not specifically pleaded, the general plea of contributory negligence was not excepted to by the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, it now seems settled that defendants were entitled to have such grouping, as constituting a defense, submitted to the jury.” The Court proceeded to cite the Stewart case, supra, and quoted from that case the following: “A general plea of contributory negligence, not excepted to is undoubtedly sufficient to warrant its submission generally or in any and all forms in which the issue is made by the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) This is the only decision cited by the Court of Civil Appeals.
I am firmly of the opinion that the Court of Civil Appeals in the Stewart case did not have before it the question and it did not hold that the defendant was entitled to both the submission of a general issue on contributory negligence and the submission of specific acts of contributory negligence. It simply held that the trial court did not err in its method or manner of submitting the issue on contributory negligence. The respondent in the present case does not contend that it was entitled to both general and specific issues. At page 2 of its Supplemental Brief, filed in this Court, respondent says: “Under the above authorities (Owl Taxi Service v. Saludis, supra, etc.) we do not take the position that respondent in the trial of this case was entitled to the submission of both the specific issue and also the general issue of contributory negligence.” The respondent, in its Supplemental Brief, contends that (1) it did not secure the submission of its defense of contributory negligence and (2) if the trial court submitted its defense of contributory negligence, then the request for the submission of special issues on contributory negligence was sufficient to call the attention of the trial judge to “the proposition that respondent was not satisfied with the submission of its defense on the general issue.” (Emphasis added.) Both contentions are without merit. The respondent’s plea of contributory negligence was in general terms. The trial court submitted Special Issue No. 16 as follows: “Do you find * * * that plaintiff Agnew failed to exercise ordinary care in attempting to pass defendant’s truck at the place where he did attempt *596to pass it at the time and on the occasion in question?” The jury-answered : “He did not fail.”
I have examined the objections and exceptions to the court’s charge filed by the respondent and nowhere in such objections and exceptions does the respondent object to the form of the issue, neither does it object to the charge for failure to submit the defense of contributory negligence. Clearly the issue of contributory negligence was submitted as plead.
In support of its contention that the request for the submission of issues inquiring as to specific acts of contributory negligence was sufficient to call the trial court’s attention to its dissatisfaction with the general issue, respondent cites the Saludis case, supra. This case was cited with approval by the Commission of Appeals in Schumacher Co. v. Shooter, 132 Texas 560, 124 S.W. 2d 857 and in the case of Coleman v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., Texas Civ. App., 241 S.W. 2d 308, writ refused. It is obvious that due to a misinterpretation of the holding in the Stewart case the Court of Civil Appeals in the Saludis case held that the defendant was entitled to both forms of submission of the defense of contributory negligence. Apparently the respondent in the present case recognizes the weakness of the Saludis case — hence, counters with the proposition that the mere filing of the request for the submission of the issues was sufficient to apprise the trial court of its dissatisfaction with the issue submitted. Such contention comes too late. This position was not called to the attention of the trial court in any manner. I contend that the respondent was not entitled to both submissions and that the Stewart case does not so hold. The requested issues only informed the court that respondent desired the submission of the defense of contributory negligence in both forms; i.e., by way of a general issue and an issue inquiring as to specfic acts of contributory negligence.
How could the Court of Civil Appeals in the Saludis case hold that the general issue in the case was sufficient to “cover all groups of contributory negligence” and in the same opinion hold, as it did, that it was error for the trial court to refuse the requested issues? If the general charge in the present case covered all groups of specific acts of contributory negligence then the case should not have been reversed. It cannot be said that error was committed; neither can it be said that the action of the trial court in refusing the requested issues amounted to such a denial of the rights of respondent as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper *597judgment in this case. See Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case of Schumacher Co. v. Shooter, supra, (132 Texas, 560, 124 S.W. 2d 859), has no application to the question involved here. In that case the defendant requested the court to submit a group of issues inquiring as to whether a specific contributory-act of negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The plaintiff took the position that since the defendant had plead contributory negligence in general terms, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the group of special issues requested by defendant, which were designed to ascertain whether some one of the acts of the driver inquired about was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The trial court had not included the issue of sole proximate cause in its charge at the time defendant requested the issue. The issue of sole proximate cause was raised by the evidence. The trial court refused to submit the issue. The Commission of Appeals, in an opinion adopted by this Court, simply held as was held in the Stewart case that “It is settled that a general plea of contributory negligence not excepted to is sufficient to warrant submission of the issue either generally or in such respective groups of issues as may be made by the evidence * * (Emphasis added.) The Court went further to hold that “Although defendant did not plead specially that the contributory negligence of the driver was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries it pleaded a general denial to her petition, which was sufficient as a defensive plea to warrant submission of the issue,” citing Horton & Horton v. House, Texas Com. App., 29 S.W. 2d 172, 984; Wright v. Traders & General Ins. Co., Texas Com. App., 132 Texas 172, 123 S.W. 2d 314 and Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Wright, Texas Civ. App., 95 S.W. 2d 753 in support of this last mentioned holding.
So, in my opinion, it conclusively appears that the court in the Schumacher case, supra, was not considering the point of whether or not defendant was entitled to a submission of the defense of contributory negligence in both forms. The record shows in that case that the defendant pleaded several specific acts of contributory negligence, and special issues were submitted in the charge in line with the pleadings and the evidence. The defendant was not contending that it was entitled to both submissions.
The respondent relies very strongly on the case of Coleman v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., supra. The majority opinion here quotes at length from the opinion. Upon examination of the record, I *598find that the defendant was not contending for a submission of the defense of contributory negligence both generally and specifically. The defendant plead generally the defense of contributory negligence. The court chose to submit affirmatively the defense of contributory negligence by submitting issues embracing specific acts of negligence on the part of plaintiff. The plaintiff objected and excepted to the issues on the ground that it presented “to the jury over the objection of appellants affirmative defensive issues not plead and set up in the answer of the appellee to appellants’ petition.” The Court of Civil Appeals held that defendant’s general plea of contributory negligence, not excepted to, was a sufficient predicate for submission by the trial court of all issues of contributory negligence raised by the evidence. This was a correct holding on the point presented, but it is definitely no authority for a holding that the respondent in our case was entitled to both forms of submission merely because the plaintiff did not except to the general plea of the defense of contributory negligence. The Court of Civil Appeals then proceeds to hold that either form of submission was warranted under the general plea of contributory negligence.
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mangham, 95 Texas 413, 67 S.W. 765 is cited as authority in the majority opinion. It came to the Supreme Court by way of certified questions presented in 1902. The defendant filed a general plea of contributory negligence by alleging that “plaintiff’s injury was caused by the lack of care and contributory negligence, under the circumstances of the case, in getting upon, or attempting to get upon, the engine of defendant, which defendant pleads in bar of plaintiff’s cause of action.” The certificate states: “The court’s charge on contributory negligence was in general terms, but as full as defendant’s plea, and correct as far as it went.” (Emphasis added.) The question certified is: “Where the facts in evidence relied on by the defendant to constitute contributory negligence are not specifically pleaded, and the court fails to group the facts, but charges in general terms on contributory negligence, is the defendant entitled to have given a special charge, grouping the facts, and applying the law thereto?” It is apparent from the certificate that the Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that the general charge on contributory negligence given by the trial court did not cover all the acts of contributory negligence as shown by the evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court answered that under a general plea of contributory negligence, not excepted to, the pleader is authorized to introduce evidence and then have submitted to the jury all issues of contributory negligence raised by the pleadings and the evidence. *599An analysis of this case convinces me that it does not hold that defendant was entitled to have the same issues of contributory negligence submitted both generally and specifically.
It is my conclusion that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed on the point above discussed. I forego consideration of the petitioner’s second point for the reason that the Court of Civil Appeals and the majority opinion do not reverse the cause on the ground that the trial court should have sustained respondent’s objection to Special Issue No. 12.
Opinion delivered November 24, 1954.