Court Opinion

ID: 9829706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:32:54.293909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.632578
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellees complain very earnestly of our action in considering certain bills of exception alleged to be insufficient, in that they fail to negative supposible facts that will justify the rulings complained of, citing Vincent v. Bell (Tex. Civ. App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 753; Thompson v. Caldwell (Tex. Civ. App.) 22 S. W.(2d) 720; and Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Sherman (Tex. Civ. App.) 10 S.W.(2d) 243, 244. We think a close reading of these cases will disclose distinctions from the case we have before us. It is true that reference is made in one or more of them to rulings on the part of some of our courts of appeal, to the effect that a bill of exception must negative every fact or circumstance that would justify the ruling of the court complained of in the bill, but as to the complaints mentioned, we take occasion to say that in view of the nature of the subject and of the requirements of our statute relating thereto, this court is not inclined to apply in every case the presumption indulged by the decisions of other Courts of Civil Appeals, above cited in behalf of appellees.
In the case of Whitaker v. Gee, 61 Tex. 218, our Supreme Court held that: “To entitle a party to the revision of the ruling of a court below in regard to the admission or rejection of evidence, the matter must be so presented by bill of exceptions filed in proper time as to enable this court to fully understand and know all facts on which the correctness or incorrectness of the ruling depends.”
In Rogers v. Richards, 8 N. M. 658, 47 P. 719, it is said that a bill of exception should embrace, among other things, all the evidence necessary to an understanding of the exceptions and a review thereof.
Article 2237, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, relating to bills of exceptions, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:
“1. No particular form of words shall be required in a bill of exception; but the objection to the ruling or action of the court shall be stated with such circumstances, or so much of the evidence as may be necessary to explain, and no more, and the whole as briefly as possible. * * *
“5. The party taking a bill of exception shall reduce the same to writing and present it to the judge for his allowance and signature.
“6; The judge shall submit such bill to the adverse party or his counsel, if in attendance on the court, and if found to be correct, the judge shall sign it without delay and file it with the clerk.”
Let us suppose, for the purpose of an illustration only, that the transcript on appeal discloses error assigned and duly urged, to the effect that counsel for appellee during the trial before a jury made a statement or argument before the court that on its face is manifestly violative of some rule of law or established practice, and of a character presumptively prejudicial to the legal rights pleaded by appellant; and suppose it further appears from a bill of exception in due form that the objectional statement or argument was duly excepted to at the time upon proper grounds and that the objection was overruled, and that the bill has been duly signed and approved without change or explanation by both the trial court and offending counsel as contemplated by the statute.
Under such circumstances, should the reviewing court be required to presume ‘the existence of some possible fact or state of attending circumstances that would render the *798objectionable matter without prejudicial effect? As stated, we are not inclined to think so.
In Bell v. Blackwell, 283 S. W. 765, bisection B of our Commission of Appeals, it was held, in substance, that if error appears, harmful effect will be presumed and the judgment reversed unless it affirmatively appears otherwise. This ease has been expressly approved several times by our Supreme Court. See Parker v. Bailey (Tex. Com. App.) 15 S. W.(2d) 1033; Floyd v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 24 S.W.(2d) 363. In such eases the reviewing court is not required to search the record to rebut the presumption. The burden of doing this rests upon the ap-pellee. The offending counsel and the judge who made the ruling complained of must be held to have full knowledge of the circumstances, if any, that will justify the ruling or render it harmless. They also are naturally interested in supporting the ruling and have the final word in the preparation of the bill of exception. The statute specifically requires that .“the objection to the ruling or action of the court shall be stated with such circumstances, or so much of the evidence as may be necessary to explain” the ruling. If the complaining counsel fails to embody such circumstances, the offending counsel is given an opportunity by the statute to make or suggest the proper correction. In event of his failure to do so from any cause, the judge, as a condition of his approval, may require the inclusion of -the necessary matter or add it in an explanatory note to the bill. The bill thus brings the whole subject before the reviewing- court for determination without the necessity of resorting to mere presumptions that may or may not be well founded.
 It seems to us the statute contemplates this, and that such a preparation of a bill is best calculated to avoid miscarriages of justice. If it be argued that the complaining counsel is unwilling to accept his bill as amended by opposing counsel or court, the statute gives him the right to a bystander’s bill. But every lawyer of experience knows that this remedy is of very questionable benefit. It often is of impossible procurement and resort thereto rarely made with well-founded hope of success. If in any case it be permissible to entertain the inference that the opposing counsel and judge would be influenced to encourage, permit, or favor the omission of necessary explanatory matter to avoid criticism or a reversal of the judgment, no more effective course can be adopted to bring about such results than to approve the bill without explanation, if the court of review is required to adhere to -the rule of presumption now insisted upon in behalf of appellee and indicated by the decisions above cited by his counsel. It seems to us that in view of the requirements of our statute, the nature of the subject and of the duties of an appellate court, if a bill of exception, duly signed and approved by the trial judge and otherwise unobjectionable, is presented for review without explanation, the presumption should be indulged that the court did his duty in approving the bill and that there was no modifying or justifying explanation to be made. We are not unmindful of the rule of decision to the effect that all presumptions are in favor of the trial court’s action. But this rule we think is of proper application only where the matter objected to, as presented in the bill, is not plainly objectionable, and hence in need of explanation in order to make manifest the error and its prejudicial character. Where, however, as already indicated, the error and prejudicial character prima facie appears, the rule of decision referred to should be applied, not to the judge’s action in overruling the objection, but to his act in signing the bill without the necessary explanation.
However, in view of a press of other questions in other cases and because not thought to be of controlling importance in arriving at our final conclusion, we will not further discuss the question of -the proper application of the rule appellee now so insistently urges. We think it sufficient to further say that on original hearing we thought in some instances the bills in this case were distinguishable from those presented in -the cases cited in behalf of appellee, and in other instances that the rule as insisted upon was without application. We think it fairly apparent from a reading of our original opinion that many of ’the criticisms therein made of the proceedings below were more for the purpose of calling attention thereto on another trial than for the purpose of determining whether the error or apparent error pointed out was such as to require a reversal of the judgment.
On the whole, we continue to think that sufficient error was properly presented to require us in the interest of justice to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for another trial.
The motion for rehearing is accordingly overruled.