Court Opinion

ID: 9448774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:44:37.460834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:32.979792
License: Public Domain

On Petition For Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
In our opinion we stated that, “The findings of fact of the district court and its conclusions of law are embodied in an able opinion reported at 197 F.Supp. 348 (S.D.Tex.1961).” Perhaps we should have made express mention of the supplemental findings of fact, which we did not overlook, viz:
“On motion of plaintiffs I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law supplementing those contained in my Memorandum Opinion of July 21, 1961.
“FINDINGS OF FACT
“(1) In addition to the contracts referred to in the Memorandum Opinion of July 21,1961, in this case, there was also an amended Corpus Christi Terminal Association Agreement, a copy of which was attached to the application filed by the three plaintiffs and Nueces County Navigation District with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
“(2) Beginning at 12:01 A.M., November 18, 1960, when the track leading across the bascule bridge into Corpus Christi was cut by the City of Corpus Christi, the plaintiffs started railroad operations in accordance with the four contracts, copies of which were attached to the application with the Interstate Commerce Commission and in accordance with the authority granted by said Commission in its order of November 16, 1960. Operations in such manner have continued to date.
“(3) The strike which the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen called against the three plaintiffs to start on Monday, July 10, 1961, was for the purpose of compelling said plaintiffs to make agreements providing for operations different from those authorized by the said Commission in its Order of November 16, 1960, and particularly in the following respects :
“(a) To require Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company and The Texas Mexican Railway Company to conduct separate operations, including separate Corpus Christi Terminal Association (C.C.T.A.) operations, in the Corpus Christi Terminal instead of joint operations.
“(b) To require Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, as distinguished from C.C.T.A. to switch its former yards and industries in the Hughes Street-Tancahua Industrial Area. In order to reach said tracks, yards and industries as an individual railroad it would be necessary for Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company to operate over trackage owned by Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company is permitted to use said trackage for reaching the area in question when *163operating the C.C.T.A., but is not permitted to use Missouri Pacific track for the purpose of reaching the area in question as an individual railroad.
“(c) To require payment by the three plaintiffs to their respective employees of various time claims which have been filed by said employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen against the three plaintiffs because of the changes in operations which occurred on, and have continued since, November 18, 1960, at Corpus Christi, Texas. At the time of the trial said time claims against the three plaintiffs were in excess of $500,000.00. When properly processed by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, these time claims will be properly referable by the parties involved to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision.
“In addition, defendants’ counsel has requested the following findings of fact, which I make:
“Mediation Cases Nos. A-6265, 6266 and 6267 referred to in the stipulation which was made a part of the record in this case, were pending at the time plaintiffs filed the application with the Interstate Commerce Commission in October 1960, for approval of the changes in operation at Corpus Christi, Texas. Said cases were still pending at the time the Commission issued its Order on November 16, 1960, in response to said application and when the plaintiffs changed their methods and manner of operation on November 18, 1960.”
The time claims referred to in paragraph (c) of the supplemental findings are the ones to which we had inaccurately referred in our opinion, as follows: “The appellants have a secondary claim to the effect that one of the issues preventing settlement of the dispute concerns the time claims totalling more than $500,000, representing wages lost as the result of changes in working conditions instituted while the parties were in mediation, in violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 152 Fifth, 156. These claims are apparently calculated by taking the difference between actual wages under the changed working conditions and wages as they would have been under the old agreement.” The two sentences of our opinion just quoted are withdrawn.
In our opinion we said: “Prior to November 1960 the only rail access to Corpus Christi from the north was by the bascule bridge built in 1926 for the then current demands. Since that time the population of the area has increased some eight times and the bridge became a bottleneck to rail, auto, and marine traffic.” The word “rail” is stricken from the last sentence just quoted.
In our opinion we said: “This suit presents a three-way conflict between major pieces of federal legislation; surprisingly, it appears to be a case of first impression, although all three statutes have been on the books for some 30 years or more.” The figure “30” and the final words “or more” are stricken.
The foregoing changes are made in order to avoid any inaccuracy. None of these changes permits a change in the result.
Appellees, on their part, urge that “ * * * this Court’s mandate should dissolve the temporary restraining order pending the appeal previously issued by the District Court.” By its terms, the restraining order or injunction pending appeal issued by the district court was to continue in force “during the pendency of the appeal of this case and until a final order has been entered herein on appeal.” We agree with the construction implicit in appellees’ request just quoted, that is that when this Court’s mandate issues, the appeal will no longer be pending and a final order on appeal will have been entered. Hence, by its terms, the restraining order or injunction pending appeal will terminate upon the issuance of this Court’s mandate. It is nonetheless true that the mandate may *164be stayed under the terms of Fifth Circuit Court Rule 32, 28 U.S.C.A., or to enable the appellants to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2101(f).
The petition for rehearing is
Denied.