Court Opinion

ID: 9629905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:52:16.955398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:26.506494
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice
(dissenting).
The sentencing decision is the most complex and difficult function a jurist is called upon to perform.1 Because of the nature of the decision and the variables upon which it depends,2 we have long recognized the wisdom in vesting this responsibility within the discretion of the trial judge and we have been loath to interfere except where there has been a clearly demonstrated abuse of that discretion.3
Recognizing the trial judge’s unique position to perform this function4 we have deliberately curtailed the scope of appellate review in this area.
*137“The Court has said many times that the Commonwealth has no right to appeal from an adverse ruling in the trial court unless a pure question of law is involved, and that the Commonwealth may not appeal if the action complained of is based on an admixture of law and fact. See Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963); Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 168 A.2d 328 (1961); and Commonwealth v. Hartman, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A.2d 211 (1956).
Whether a trial judge imposed a proper sentence on a criminal defendant does not present a pure question of law, unless the sentence exceeds the statutorily prescribed limits or is such as to be constitutionally impermissible. In the usual case, the problem presents a mixture of law and fact. Hence, our Superior Court has correctly ruled that the sentence imposed on a person convicted of crime lies with one exception (where the conviction is for first degree murder following a trial by jury) within the sole discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed will not be reviewed by an appellate court, unless it exceeds the statutorily prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment. See Commonwealth v. Bilinski, 190 Pa.Superior Ct. 401, 154 A.2d 322 (1959).”
Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 206, 275 A.2d 78, 80-81 (1971).
See also Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152, 156, 299 A. 2d 640, 642 (1973).
In the instant appeals, it is conceded that the statutorily prescribed limits have not been exceeded nor were the *138sentences manifestly excessive as to constitute an unduly severe punishment. In my judgment the majority opinion introduces a concept of appellate review that would permit an appellate tribunal to superimpose its sentencing philosophy upon the sentencing court. I believe this intrusion upon the trial court’s sentencing discretion is unwarranted and therefore register my dissent.
The majority attempts to establish the legitimacy of its position and to deny its deviation from our former position by asserting “the record amply demonstrates that the three judges had agreed in advance” upon the sentence and failed to make a meaningful inquiry into “appellants' backgrounds, individual characteristics, relative culpability or prospects for rehabilitation.” I do not believe that the record established that the trial judges ignored those factors upon which the sentencing decision should be premised. Further, in my judgment, the majority’s real complaint is the weight to be attached to the germane variables in the sentencing decision.
This jurisdiction is committed to the principle of individualized sentences. However, as conceded by the majority, the most frequent and justifiable criticism of this policy is the unsupportable disparity which all too frequently results.5 Thus, judges should not be discouraged *139from achieving uniformity in sentences where there are no significant differences in the nature of the crime and the background of the offender to dictate a contrary result.
In appraising appellants’ contention, which was accepted by the majority, that the Judges of Lancaster County had agreed upon a formula for sentencing which ignored the peculiarities of the particular cases, we must turn to the factual setting in which these appeals arose. The Pennsylvania State Police, as a result of a special investigation, gathered evidence as to drug sales in the Lancaster County area which culminated in a large raid on July 19, 1972.6 Twenty-three persons were arrested and charged with drug sales. Eleven of these individuals were charged with sales of heroin. The majority supports its conclusion that the judges of the county reached a consensus as to the treatment of those convicted of sales of heroin 7 from an analysis of only six of these eleven cases.8
*140If we accept the validity of using these six cases as evidence of a consensus, it nevertheless overstates the case to argue that the resultant formula eliminated the sentencing judges’ exercise of discretion in the individual cases. As noted earlier (see footnote 1), the sentencing decision encompasses a number of judgments. At best, the record would arguably support that this consensus affected only one of these judgments, to wit, the length of the prison term to be imposed.
The first and most important judgment is the determination as to whether imprisonment or some other viable alternative is appropriate. The majority unjustifiably assumes that because in , these six cases, imprisonment was chosen as the appropriate punishment, that this fact necessarily suggests that the alleged agreement dictated the decision. I strenuously disagree because I know of no responsible jurist at this particular time in America who would not recognize the necessity of imprisonment where the record conclusively establishes sales of heroin for profit absent any significant mitigating or extenuating circumstance. In my judgment, the reason that prison sentences were imposed in the six cases was completely unrelated to any consensus, but rather because this judgment was dictated by the nature of the crime and a consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances including the background of the individual appellants.
My reading of the record satisfies me that this alleged agreement as to the term of imprisonment was not of such an iron-clad nature that it would exclude consideration of significant legitimate factors. The judges permitted the defense to fully develop all mitigating and extenuating information and considered this evidence in reaching its decision.9 The record also establishes that *141the judges distinguished between the sale of heroin and the sale of less dangerous drugs. The fact that the alleged agreed upon sentence was imposed in the six instances was, in my judgment, indicative of the fact that there was no basis for any significant differences in treatment between the offenders. In each instance, the record supports a finding that the offenders were engaged in the traffic of heroin for profit.
Where the nature of the criminal conduct is substantially the same and the background of the offenders are comparable, uniformity of treatment is to be desired. If, in fact, the judges of this county reached a consensus that provided uniformity in treatment and yet allowed for significant individual differences, I believe such a procedure would be in accord with the modern view of sentencing.10 One of the reasons for vesting in trial *142judges wide discretion in this area is to permit them to use their initiative in attempting to enhance the quality of sentencing. Nor do I perceive any reason why judicial initiative must await legislative fiat. Where the alleged agreed upon term of imprisonment was substantially below the maximum prescribed for the criminal conduct, there would be no occasion to alter this sentence for minor differences in the background of the individual offenders. The only significant difference reflected in this record was the number of counts for which the various appellants were convicted. The sentences imposed reflected this difference.
I also reject appellants’ argument that pre-sentence reports should have been obtained in these instances. None of these appellants specifically requested that a pre-sentence report be made. More importantly, there was nothing in the record of any of these cases which would suggest additional information, not already possessed by the court, would have been obtained if such a procedure had been followed. Our Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1403 places the decision as to whether a presentence investigation report should be prepared, within the discretion of the trial judge. Where, as here, there was ample evidence to determine that these crimes were inspired by greed and the defense had been given full opportunity to articulate any extenuating or mitigating circumstances, I do not believe that a decision that a pre-sentence report was unnecessary was an abuse of that discretion.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence in each case.
JONES, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The sentencing decision encompasses a number of judgments. A determination must be made as to whether imprisonment or some other alternative is appropriate. If imprisonment is to be imposed, the length of the confinement must be established. This judgment in turn requires a decision as to when parole eligibility should attach and also the maximum period that society must exercise control over the offender to minimize the possibility of future antisocial behavior. Further, where the options exist, the trial judge must select the institution best structured for the supportive help required by the particular offender.

. A balance must be struck among many factors that should influence the sentencing decision. The need for deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, a recognition of mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances, and the possibility for rehabilitation are but a few of the considerations that must enter this decision.

. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A. 2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941); Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932).

. “The consideration of the criminal himself is peculiarly within the sentencing judge’s domain. Only he can judge attitude and *137demeanor of the defendant. Only he can judge defendant’s repentance or lack of it. Only he can appraise defendant’s awareness of the seriousness of his offense and his understanding of the affront to society. ... No record, for example, could perpetrate a scowl of resentment or blind indifference.” United States ex rel. Huntt v. Russell, D.C., 285 F.Supp. 765, aff’d 406 F.2d 774 (3 Cir. 1968).

. See generally, ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences § 1.2 (Approved Draft April 1967); Frankel, Criminal Sentences — Law Without Order, 88 (1972); Glueck, Crime and Justice 115-129 (1936); Institute of Judicial Administration, Disparity in Sentencing of Convicted Defendants (1954); Mitford, Kind and Unusual Punishment (1973); Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, at 41-67 (1958) (Testimony of Mr. Bennett); Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and Punishment in America, Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee (1971); Dershovitz, Indeterminate Confinement; Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 297 (1974); The Honorable Edward J. Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Unjustified Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences? 41 F.R.D. 249 (1967); Honorable Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1 (1972); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 904 (1962); Palmer, A Model of Criminal Disposition, 62 Geo.L.J. 1 (1973); *139Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1966); Collective Sentencing Decision in Judicial and Administrative Contests, 11 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 695 (1973).

. The fact that state law enforcement officials, as opposed to local enforcement agents, conducted this investigation, is indicative of at least the suspected high incidence of drug traffic within this county at that particular time. These suspicions were obviously confirmed by the number of arrests that resulted.

. The majority concludes that there was an agreement among the members of the court to impose a sentence of three to ten years imprisonment plus a fine for a sale of heroin and that the sentences were to run consecutively for each count.

. Appellants set forth in their brief the disposition of the other five cases, four of which would seriously question the legitimacy of the conclusion that the judges had, in fact, agreed upon a formula. Commonwealth v. Ortego — two counts of selling heroin resulted in a sentence of three to ten years on one count and two years probation to run concurrently on the second. Commonwealth v. Amcro — two counts of selling heroin — two to five years on one count and a concurrent sentence of two to five years on the second count. Commonwealth v. Gonzales- — four counts of selling heroin — four to fifteen years of imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Cordova — 25 counts of selling heroin — -one to two years imprisonment.

. My reading of the record forces me to conclude that the majority’s charge that the judges “made virtually no inquiry into the circumstances of the crime or appellants’ background” is completely without foundation. Not only were the appellants given *141full opportunity to supply the sentencing judge with any information they might have deemed relevant to the question of the penalty to be imposed, in a number of instances the judges on their own initiative sought to ascertain whether appellants’ conduct was inspired by greed or as a result of addiction.
The following extract from the record in Commonwealth v. Martin, is illustrative:
“THE COURT: Mr. Shay, do I understand that he sold this for money, that is to say, that he didn’t use this to support his habit, this was a cynical, deliberate sale of heroin?
MR. SHAY: That’s in dispute to some extent. He did sell it for money to some degree, but he claims he also used it on some occasions.
THE COURT: He is not a drug addict?
MR. SHAY: I don’t know if he can make that claim or not.
MR. LUCARELLI: Your Honor, if I might speak to that point, Trooper Gills and Trooper Rogers, who were out on the streets at this time and say from the Defendant and from the people around him tell me that the Defendant isn’t an addict but he was in the business of selling heroin for profit.
He had a 1972 car, a 1972 Thunderbird and he had a job. There was attempts on the sale in the street for this Defendant and two other men to form a syndicate to control the heroin traffic in Lancaster and force the Puerto Ricans out of the business. This is not a case that we have some poor addict selling to support his habit, he’s trying to corrupt all of the rest of the people in the county.”

. Legal text writers have repeatedly approved of the multi-judge sentencing panels in the Eastern District of New York, the East*142ern District of Michigan, the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See, for example, Collective Sentencing Decision in Judicial and Administrative Contests, supra at n. 5 and Lawlessness in Sentencing, supra at n. 5. The formation of such panels for the discussion among judges of the appropriate sentence to be imposed for a particular crime when the defendant’s individual characteristics place him within a limited category, does not violate any ideal of individualized sentencing.