Court Opinion

ID: 9897229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:58.938577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:58.527913
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 13 2023, 8:52 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher C. Crawford                                  Theodore E. Rokita
Goshen, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
                                                         Robert M. Yoke
                                                         Deputy Attorney General
                                                         Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Herman O. Fritz,                                         November 13, 2023
Appellant-Defendant                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                         22A-CR-2340
        v.                                               Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
                                                         Court
State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable David C.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Bonfiglio, Judge
                                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                         20D06-2102-F6-147

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                             Judges Vaidik and Mathias concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023                           Page 1 of 22
      Statement of the Case
[1]   Herman O. Fritz (“Fritz”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for
                                                                    1
      Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor
                                        2
      resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana with
                                3                                                     4
      a prior conviction, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

      Fritz argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence

      seized from a patdown search and a subsequent search incident to Fritz’s arrest

      because the searches violated his constitutional rights; and (2) there was

      insufficient evidence to support Fritz’s possession of marijuana conviction.

      Concluding that the trial court properly admitted the evidence, but the State

      failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain Fritz’s possession of marijuana

      conviction, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

[2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

      Issues
                 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
                    evidence found during a patdown search of Fritz and a
                    subsequent search incident to Fritz’s arrest.

      1
          IND. CODE § 35-48-4-6.1.
      2
          I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1.
      3
          I.C. § 35-48-4-11.
      4
          I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023       Page 2 of 22
              2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Fritz’s
                 possession of marijuana conviction.

      Facts
[3]   On the afternoon of January 29, 2021, Elkhart Police Department Sergeant

      Seth Watkins (“Sergeant Watkins”) was dispatched to a local grocery store

      regarding a medical emergency. When Sergeant Watkins arrived, he saw a

      disheveled man, later identified as fifty-eight-year-old Fritz, lying on his back in

      the store’s parking lot. Concerned for Fritz’s well-being, Sergeant Watkins

      approached Fritz and asked him what had happened. Fritz told Sergeant

      Watkins that he “must have [fallen].” (Tr. at 98). When Sergeant Watkins

      asked Fritz if he had ingested any drugs, Fritz “slowly responded no.” (Tr. at

      98).

[4]   Paramedics arrived at the grocery store parking lot shortly after Sergeant

      Watkins’ arrival, and the medics and Sergeant Watkins helped Fritz to his feet

      so they could “start trying to figure out what [was] going on” with Fritz. (Tr. at

      99). At that point, Sergeant Watkins decided to perform a patdown search of

      Fritz for officer safety, to “make sure that [Fritz] was not armed[,]” and so that

      the medics would not be harmed when they administered treatment, in the

      event Fritz later suffered “some type of psychiatric issue[.]” (Tr. at 99).

      Because Sergeant Watkins recently had been stabbed with a drug needle while

      working a different case, the sergeant asked Fritz if he “had anything that was

      going to stick or poke” the sergeant, and Fritz answered in the negative. (Tr. at

      99).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023       Page 3 of 22
[5]   The jacket that Fritz was wearing was unzipped and open, and Sergeant

      Watkins could see the jacket’s interior pocket. Sergeant Watkins patted down

      the left side of Fritz’s jacket and the jacket’s outer pocket. Sergeant Watkins

      then patted down the interior pocket and felt a long cylindrical object with a

      bulbous end that Sergeant Watkins believed, based on his training and

      experience, to be a pipe used to ingest methamphetamine. Sergeant Watkins

      removed the “longer cylindrical object” and also found and removed a “smaller

      cylindrical object with a bulbous end” that Sergeant Watkins also believed to be

      a methamphetamine pipe. (Tr. at 101). Sergeant Watkins asked Fritz how he

      had used the pipes, and Fritz told Sergeant Watkins that he had used the pipes

      to smoke tobacco and synthetic drugs. Sergeant Watkins also patted down

      Fritz’s front pants pockets and felt objects inside the pockets, but Sergeant

      Watkins did not remove the objects.

[6]   To determine Fritz’s mental state, Sergeant Watkins asked Fritz if he knew who

      was President; the day of the week; and the current year. Fritz told Sergeant

      Watkins that Kennedy was the president and provided incorrect answers to the

      other two questions. One of the medics asked Fritz what drugs he had taken,

      and Fritz responded, “[a]nything and everything.” (Tr. at 106).

[7]   Sergeant Watkins already had determined that Fritz was under arrest for

      possession of paraphernalia based on finding what he believed to be

      methamphetamine pipes in Fritz’s pocket. However, because Sergeant Watkins

      was concerned that Fritz might have sustained a head injury and would need to

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 4 of 22
      be medically cleared before going to jail, Fritz was transported by ambulance to

      Elkhart General Hospital for evaluation.

[8]   After Fritz had arrived at the hospital and had been placed in a room, Sergeant

      Watkins continued his search of Fritz’s person, this time incident to Fritz’s

      arrest. Sergeant Watkins searched Fritz’s right front pants pocket and found a

      black mask that contained a plastic baggy with a white crystal-like substance
                                                                                                             5
      inside, later tested and determined to be 3.04 grams of methamphetamine.

      When Sergeant Watkins found the methamphetamine, Fritz became upset,

      began to yell obscenities, and tried to get out of the hospital bed. Fritz tried to

      resist the search and “pull[] away” from Sergeant Watkins. (Tr. at 112-113).

      Fritz threatened to kill Sergeant Watkins and attempted to kick the attending

      hospital personnel.

[9]   Sergeant Watkins physically restrained Fritz, handcuffed him to the hospital

      bed, and continued to search Fritz’s person and the pockets of his clothing.

      Sergeant Watkins eventually found in the left pocket of Fritz’s jacket two hand-

      rolled cigarettes that contained a green leafy substance that had the “smell of

      marijuana.” (Tr. at 115). Sergeant Watkins later field-tested the cigarettes and

      determined that the substance inside contained THC, the “active ingredient in

      marijuana.” (Tr. at 120).

      5
       Sergeant Watkins found a clear container in Fritz’s left front pants pocket containing a white crystal-like
      substance. For reasons not apparent from the record, that substance was not lab-tested.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023                               Page 5 of 22
[10]   Hospital personnel sedated Fritz, and Fritz eventually fell asleep. After Fritz

       awoke, Sergeant Watkins gave him a Miranda warning and asked Fritz if the

       cigarettes contained a synthetic substance or marijuana. Fritz answered,

       “[M]arijuana.” (Tr. at 116). Sergeant Watkins then asked Fritz if the crystal-

       like substance he had found was methamphetamine, and Fritz stated that it

       was. After Fritz had been medically cleared to leave the hospital, Sergeant

       Watkins transported Fritz to jail.

[11]   In February 2021, the State charged Fritz with Level 6 felony possession of

       methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class B

       misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of

       paraphernalia. In August 2021, Fritz filed a motion to suppress the evidence

       obtained during the patdown search. The trial court held a hearing on the

       motion to suppress on October 25, 2021. The following day, the trial court

       issued its order denying Fritz’s motion, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial

       held on August 15, 2022.

[12]   During Sergeant Watkins’ testimony at trial, Fritz objected to the admission of

       the evidence obtained during Sergeant Watkins’ patdown search of his person.

       The trial court overruled the objection. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
                                                 6
       found Fritz guilty on all counts.

       6
        Following the jury’s finding of guilt on the underlying offense of Class B misdemeanor possession of
       marijuana, Fritz pled guilty to the enhanced offense of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana with a
       prior conviction for a drug offense.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023                           Page 6 of 22
[13]   On September 15, 2022, the trial court sentenced Fritz as follows: 912 days for

       the Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine conviction; 365 days for the

       Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction; 180 days for the

       Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana conviction; and 60 days for the

       Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia conviction. The trial court

       ordered the sentences to run concurrently but suspended all of the time to

       probation.

[14]   Fritz now appeals.

       Decision
[15]   Fritz argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence

       seized from a patdown search and a subsequent search incident to Fritz’s arrest

       because the searches violated his constitutional rights; and (2) there was

       insufficient evidence to support Fritz’s possession of marijuana conviction. We

       will review each argument in turn.

       1. Admission of Evidence

[16]   Fritz argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       evidence obtained from the patdown search and the subsequent search incident

       to Fritz’s arrest because the searches were conducted in violation of his

       constitutional rights. We note that Fritz appeals following a completed trial.

       Thus, his appeal “is best framed as challenging the admission of evidence at

       trial[,]” rather than a denial of a motion to suppress. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d

       252, 259 (Ind. 2013). We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023        Page 7 of 22
       discretion, which occurs only when the admission is clearly against the logic

       and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s

       substantial rights. Id. at 260. “We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate

       the witnesses’ credibility; rather, we view the evidence in the light most

       favorable to the [judgment], and we will affirm that [judgment] unless we

       cannot find substantial evidence of probative value to support it.” Pierce v. State,

       29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). However, whether the facts establish a

       constitutional violation is a question of law that we review de novo. See, e.g.,

       Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 229 (Ind. 2017).

[17]   Fritz argues that Sergeant Watkins’ patdown of his person violated his right to

       be free from unreasonable searches under both the Fourth Amendment to the

       United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana

       Constitution. Although the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11,

       contain parallel language, each requires a separate, independent analysis.

       Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). The State asserts that

       Fritz waived his state constitutional challenge to the search of his person when

       he failed to include a separate Indiana constitutional analysis in his motion to

       suppress; failed to specifically argue at the suppression hearing that the search

       violated the Indiana Constitution; and failed to argue a violation of the Indiana

       Constitution when he objected to the admission of the challenged evidence

       during the jury trial. And we note that while Fritz references and cites to

       Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution in his appellate brief, he does

       not articulate a separate argument under the Indiana Constitution.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023         Page 8 of 22
       Accordingly, Fritz’s state constitutional claim is waived. See, e.g., Redfield v.

       State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the defendant waived

       an Article 1, Section 11, claim where his arguments in the trial court mentioned

       the state constitutional claim but did not provide any independent analysis for

       it) (citing Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied), trans.

       denied; see also Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (“Because Abel

       presents no authority or independent analysis supporting a separate standard

       under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived.”).

       Therefore, we address Fritz’s claim under the Fourth Amendment alone.

       Patdown Search

[18]   Fritz argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the patdown search, as

       well as the subsequent search incident to Fritz’s arrest, should have been

       suppressed and should not have been admitted at trial. According to Fritz, the

       patdown search was improper because there was “no indication that [police]

       officers arriving [at the grocery store parking lot] would be encountering an

       individual [who was] armed and dangerous[,]” thus, the patdown search was

       “unreasonable[.]” (Fritz’s Br. 17). The State argues that the patdown search

       was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because it was performed for the

       safety of the medical personnel tending to Fritz, who was found “disoriented

       and lying on the ground in the middle of a parking lot on a cold winter day.”

       (State’s Br. 10).

[19]   The Fourth Amendment states that:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023        Page 9 of 22
               The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
               papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
               shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
               probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
               particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
               or things to be seized.

       U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.

[20]   “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

       Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens

       possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Taylor v. State, 842

       N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been “extended to the states

       through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999

       (Ind. 2016). “As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this

       rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the

       unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception.” Clark,

       994 N.E.2d at 260. “When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State

       has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed

       at the time of the search.” Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (quotation marks and

       citations omitted).

[21]   One such exception relevant to the circumstances in this case is that the law

       enforcement officer had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that

       medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger[.]” Michigan v. Fisher,

       558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S. Ct. 546, 549, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009) (internal

       quotations omitted). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023        Page 10 of 22
       2408, 2413, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978) (“Numerous state and federal cases have

       recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from

       making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a

       person within is in need of immediate aid.”) (footnotes omitted). Our Courts

       have recognized this emergency aid exception, see M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329,

       332 (Ind. 2016), but have yet to apply the exception to a search of a person.

[22]   In M.O., the emergency aid exception was recognized under circumstances

       where an officer responded to a report that a woman was trapped under her car.

       That report raised a reasonable concern that emergency medical assistance was

       needed and prompted further investigation. However, the investigation did not

       objectively support that concern. M.O. was not under her vehicle or even at the

       gas station when the officers arrived. While it was not unreasonable for the

       officer to look for her, the officer noted that she operated her vehicle normally

       and was not observed committing any traffic infractions or criminal conduct.

[23]   Our supreme court in M.O. stated that the test for applying the emergency aid

       exception was objective and that the government must establish that the

       circumstances as they appeared at the moment would lead a reasonable,

       experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the vehicle

       required immediate assistance. 63 N.E.3d at 333. The Court concluded that

       the State had failed to carry its burden of showing that an exception to the

       warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment justified the stop. Accordingly,

       the Court reversed M.O.’s conviction. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023     Page 11 of 22
[24]   However, in Vauss v. United States, 370 F.2d 250, 251-252 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per

       curiam), a case we find instructive, the emergency aid exception was extended

       to the warrantless search of a person. In Vauss, police officers found a man

       lying unconscious on a public street. Unable to rouse him, the police called for

       an ambulance. As they waited for the ambulance to arrive, one of the officers

       searched the defendant’s pockets for identification but, instead, found narcotics.

       The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

       declined to suppress the evidence. The Court held that the narcotics were

       legally seized, finding that “[a] search of one found in an unconscious condition

       is both legally permissible and highly necessary.” Id. at 252.

[25]   In the instant case, the circumstances leading to the patdown of Fritz’s person

       and resulting in the seizure of the pipes, are similar to the circumstances in

       Vauss. On a cold day in January, Sergeant Watkins responded to a call

       regarding a medical emergency in a grocery store parking lot. Sergeant

       Watkins found Fritz lying on his back in the middle of the parking lot. Fritz

       told Sergeant Watkins that he “must have [fallen].” (Tr. at 98). When Sergeant

       Watkins asked Fritz if he had ingested any drugs, Fritz’s response of “no” was

       “slow[,] long, [and] drawn out.” (Tr. at 98). Sergeant Watkins testified that

       “[c]ommonly[,] with unknown [medical issues,] when we are dispatched to

       them, a common cause . . . [o]ften times . . . is a drug or alcohol related issue.”

       (Tr. at 98). Sergeant Watkins performed a patdown search of Fritz for his

       safety and the safety of the paramedics so that the medics would not be harmed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 12 of 22
       when they administered treatment, in the event Fritz later suffered “some type

       of psychiatric issue[.]” (Tr. at 99).

[26]   The protective patdown search that Sergeant Watkins performed before Fritz

       was transported to the hospital in the ambulance was limited to a search for

       weapons and/or items that might harm Sergeant Watkins or the paramedics as

       they administered treatment to Fritz. Under such circumstances, Sergeant

       Watkins had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Fritz might need

       medical assistance, and it was not unreasonable for the sergeant to be

       concerned about his safety and the safety of the attending paramedics when

       they rendered assistance to Fritz. Thus, we do not believe the patdown search

       of Fritz’s person performed by a concerned police officer violates Fritz’s Fourth
                                 7
       Amendment rights.

[27]   Therefore, we conclude that the State has carried its burden of showing an

       exception to the warrant requirement to justify the patdown search. We also

       conclude that the search was permissible under the emergency aid exception to

       the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable for Sergeant Watkins to

       7
         See, e.g., State v. Smith, 59 Kan. App. 2d 28, 476 P.3d 847 (2020), rev. denied. In Smith, officers were
       dispatched to check on Smith, who had apparently fallen asleep in her car parked in someone else’s
       driveway. After failing to rouse Smith, the officers removed her from the car, but she remained largely
       unresponsive and appeared to be suffering from an overdose. When emergency personnel arrived at the
       scene, an officer searched Smith’s purse, looking for her identification and any information about substances
       she may have ingested. Under these circumstances, the Court found that the officer’s belief that Smith’s life
       or safety was in immediate danger because of a potential overdose was objectively reasonable, satisfying the
       first prong of the emergency aid exception (that is, whether the officers reasonably believe the search was
       necessary to provide emergency assistance) and upholding the search of Smith’s purse. 59 Kan. App. 2d at
       36-38, 476 P.3d at 853-854.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023                            Page 13 of 22
                                                                    8
       believe that Fritz needed medical attention. Therefore, we hold that the trial

       court properly admitted into evidence the methamphetamine pipes found on

       Fritz’s person as a result of the patddown search.

[28]   Fritz also argues that, even if the patdown was proper, the removal of the

       methamphetamine pipes from his pocket was improper. We disagree. The

       United States Supreme Court recognized a plain-feel exception to the warrant

       requirement in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137,

       124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). The Supreme Court explained in Dickerson that

                [i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing
                and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
                immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s
                privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for
                weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure
                would be justified by the same practical considerations that
                inhere in the plain-view context.

       Id. at 375-76, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.

[29]   In determining the admissibility of contraband seized without a warrant under

       the “plain feel” doctrine, two issues are dispositive: (1) whether the contraband

       was detected during an initial patdown for weapons rather than during a further

       search; and (2) whether the identity of the contraband was immediately

       apparent to the officer. Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 487 (Ind. Ct. App.

       8
         As an appellate court, we will sustain the trial court if it can be done on any legal ground apparent in the
       record. Ratliff v. State, 770 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. 2002).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023                               Page 14 of 22
       2011) (quoting Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

       The phrase “immediately apparent” does not mean that an officer must be

       certain about the object’s identity; rather, an officer must “have probable cause

       to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it[.]” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at

       376, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.

[30]   Sergeant Watkins’ testimony demonstrates that it was immediately apparent to

       him that the object he felt in Fritz’s pocket was contraband. Sergeant Watkins

       testified that he had been involved in “well over 100” drug-related cases and

       affirmed that he had experience with “various types of paraphernalia, including

       pipes.” (Tr. at 96). He testified that when he patted down Fritz’s jacket and the

       jacket’s outer and inner pockets, he “felt a long, cylindrical object with a

       bulbous end which is essentially a meth[amphetamine] pipe.” (Tr. at 100).

       Sergeant Watkins further testified that “[t]hrough [his] training and

       experience,” he had realized that when he felt the object, it was a “hard object,”

       “a distinct object,” and was “used commonly to ingest illegal drugs into the

       body.” (Tr. at 100).

[31]   The methamphetamine pipe’s identity was immediately apparent to Sergeant

       Watkins based on its shape and consistency. Therefore, Sergeant Watkins’

       warrantless seizure of the pipe was permissible under the plain feel doctrine.

       Search Incident to Arrest

[32]   Fritz also challenges the search that Sergeant Watkins conducted at the hospital

       that resulted in the seizure of the methamphetamine and the marijuana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 15 of 22
       cigarettes. Another exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to

       a lawful arrest. Wilkinson v. State, 70 N.E.3d 392, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). An

       officer may conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s person and the area in

       the person’s immediate control if the officer has probable cause to make an

       arrest. Id. “Probable cause for an arrest exists if at the time of the arrest the

       officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which would warrant a man

       of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect has committed the criminal act

       in question.” Id. A suspect is considered under arrest when a police officer

       interrupts his freedom and restricts his liberty of movement. Fentress v. State,

       863 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The fact that a police officer does

       not inform a defendant he is under arrest prior to a search does not invalidate

       the search incident to arrest exception as long as there is probable cause to

       make an arrest. Id.

[33]   We have already determined that the removal of the pipes from Fritz’s pocket

       was permissible. Once Sergeant Watkins discovered the pipes that he believed

       were used to consume methamphetamine, he had probable cause to arrest Fritz

       for possession of paraphernalia. See IND. CODE § 35-48-4-8.3. Sergeant

       Watkins testified that, at that point, he had determined that Watkins was under

       arrest for possession of paraphernalia, but out of caution, had Fritz transported

       to the hospital for evaluation. The search Sergeant Watkins performed at the

       hospital incident to Fritz’s arrest resulted in Sergeant Watkins finding the

       methamphetamine in Fritz’s pants pocket and the marijuana cigarettes in

       Fritz’s jacket pocket. Sergeant Watkins’ discovery of the methamphetamine

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023       Page 16 of 22
       and the marijuana cigarettes in Fritz’s pockets did not violate the Fourth

       Amendment. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the evidence.

[34]   In sum, the patdown search, the removal of the methamphetamine pipes under

       the plain feel doctrine, and the search incident to Fritz’s arrest that resulted in

       the discovery of the methamphetamine and the marijuana cigarettes, are

       exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The

       evidence obtained was properly admitted at trial.

       2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[35]   Next, Fritz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his possession of

       marijuana conviction. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to

       support the conviction because the State failed to prove the percentage of the

       THC concentration in what the State alleged was marijuana in the cigarettes.

       He argues, essentially, that evidence of the THC concentration was essential so

       the factfinder could reasonably distinguish between marijuana, which is illegal

       to possess, and hemp, which is legal.

[36]   Our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well-settled. We do

       not assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in

       determining whether the evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144,

       146 (Ind. 2007). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable

       inferences supporting the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when no

       reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a

       reasonable doubt. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023       Page 17 of 22
[37]   In order to convict Fritz of possession of marijuana, the State was required to

       prove that he: (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) possessed; (3) marijuana, pure

       or adulterated. I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1). “Marijuana” is defined by statute as

       “any part of the plant genus Cannabis whether growing or not; the seeds

       thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant, including hashish and

       hash oil; any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation

       of the plant, its seeds or resin.” I.C. § 35-48-1-19(a). Importantly, however,

       “[t]he term [marijuana] does not include: . . . hemp (as defined by IC 15-15-13-

       6).” I.C. § 35-48-1-19(b)(6). “Hemp” is in turn defined as:

               the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including
               the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids,
               isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or
               not, with a delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not
               more than three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) on a dry weight
               basis, for any part of the Cannabis sativa L. plant.

       I.C. § 15-15-13-6 (emphasis added). “Accordingly, in Indiana, the difference

       between a legal substance, such as hemp, and illegal marijuana is determined by

       the concentration of delta-9-THC in a particular substance: to be illegal, the

       concentration of delta-9-THC must be more than 0.3%.” Rojo v. State, 202

       N.E.3d 1085, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. See also Fedij v. State, 186

       N.E.3d 696, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“[A]s a matter of Indiana law, the

       difference between legal hemp and illegal marijuana is determined by the

       percent concentration of THC in a particular substance: to be illegal, the

       percent concentration of THC must be more than 0.3%”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023     Page 18 of 22
[38]   In support of Fritz’s argument that his possession of marijuana conviction

       cannot stand because the State failed to prove the percentage of the THC

       concentration of the substance found in the cigarettes, Fritz cites both Fedij and

       Rojo. In Fedij, a panel of this court reversed Fedij’s conviction for possession of

       marijuana due to the State’s failure to prove that the seized substance was

       illegal marijuana, as opposed to legal hemp. At Fedij’s trial, the State’s

       witnesses “were unequivocal in their testimony that they had no way to

       distinguish any of the substances between hemp and marijuana absent a test for

       the percent concentration of THC.” Fedij, 186 N.E.3d at 708.

[39]   In Rojo, another panel of this court reversed Rojo’s conviction for possession of

       marijuana based on insufficient evidence to establish that the substance found

       on Rojo’s person was illegal marijuana with a THC concentration of 0.3% or

       more. At Rojo’s trial, the officer had testified that he knew the substance that

       was seized from Rojo was marijuana due to markers regarding sight and smell.

       However, applying the reasoning in Fedij, we held that “the State presented no

       evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the substance

       seized from Toledo Rojo was in fact marijuana and not a similar-smelling or -

       looking substance that is not illegal in Indiana.” Rojo, 202 N.E.3d at 1089.

[40]   In the case before us, the State introduced evidence indicating that based on a

       field test, the substance in the cigarettes tested positive for the presence of THC.

       Sergeant Watkins testified that based on his experience, the green leafy

       substance in the cigarettes had the “smell of marijuana.” (Tr. at 115).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 19 of 22
       However, the State did not present any evidence of the delta-9-THC

       concentration in the cigarettes.

[41]   Our General Assembly has established a clear distinction between legal hemp

       and illegal marijuana based on the THC concentration present in the plant
                      9
       material, the effect being to now require the State to prove beyond a reasonable

       doubt that a substance is marijuana by proving that the substance’s delta-9-THC

       concentration exceeds 0.3% on a dry weight basis. Here, the State failed to

       present any evidence of the delta-9 THC concentration of the substance in the

       cigarettes found on Fritz’s person. Consequently, and as we found in Fedij, the

       State has presented “no evidentiary basis from which a reasonable fact-finder

       could conclude that the [substance in the cigarettes was] in fact marijuana and

       not hemp.” Fedij, 186 N.E.3d at 709. Thus, the evidence presented at Fritz’s

       trial was insufficient for the jury to conclude that the cigarettes found on Fritz’s

       person contained marijuana and not a legal substance.

[42]   Regarding Fritz’s post-Miranda admission – that the substance in the cigarettes

       was marijuana – said admission does not alter our determination that the

       evidence was insufficient to sustain Fritz’s possession of marijuana conviction.

       Fritz’s admission was a nonjudicial confession, and it is well-settled that a

       person may not be convicted of a crime based solely on a nonjudicial confession

       of guilt. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017) (citing Green v. State,

       9
           See I.C. §§ 35-48-1-19(a), 15-15-13-6.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 20 of 22
       304 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)). Rather, there must be independent

       proof of the corpus delicti before the defendant may be convicted upon a

       nonjudicial confession. Id. “Proof of the corpus delicti means ‘proof that the

       specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone[.]’” Shinnock,

       76 N.E.3d at 843 (quoting Walker v. State, 249 Ind. 551, 559, 233 N.E.2d 483,

       488 (Ind. 1968)). We have determined that, in the instant case, the State failed

       to present sufficient evidence to show that Fritz possessed marijuana and not a

       legal substance. The only evidence presented to show that the substance was,

       in fact, marijuana was Sergeant Watkins’ opinion testimony, based on his

       experience, and the results of a field test showing that the substance contained

       THC. Therefore, we reverse Fritz’s Class A misdemeanor possession of

       marijuana conviction.

[43]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       when it admitted into evidence the methamphetamine pipes found during the

       patdown search and the marijuana cigarettes found during the search incident

       to Fritz’s arrest. We further hold that the State failed to present sufficient

       evidence to sustain Fritz’s conviction for possession of marijuana. Accordingly,

       we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial

       court to vacate Fritz’s conviction and sentence for the Class A misdemeanor

       possession of marijuana conviction.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023      Page 21 of 22
[44]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

       Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2340| November 13, 2023   Page 22 of 22