Court Opinion

ID: 9908852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 22:03:22.024757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:32.995148
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 231837B-U

                                                                                        FIRST DISTRICT,
                                                                                         FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                        December 11, 2023

                                                 No. 1-23-1837B

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Cook County
                                                )
      v.                                        )     No. 23400521301
                                                )
      ISRAEL FLORES-HIDALGO,                    )     Honorable
                                                )     John W. Wilson,
            Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge Presiding.
     ______________________________________________________________________________

               JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
               Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

                                                     ORDER

¶1             Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial release where the trial
                     court’s findings that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any
                     person or the community and that no less restrictive conditions would avoid the real
                     and present threat to the safety of any person or community were not against the
                     manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2             Defendant Israel Flores-Hidalgo appeals from the circuit court’s order denying pretrial

     release pursuant to the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act. See Pub.

     Acts 101-652, § 10-255; 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52

     (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). For the following reasons, we

     affirm.
     No. 1-23-1837B

¶3                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶4          On September 24, 2023, defendant was charged with the offenses of aggravated robbery

     (720 ILCS 5/18-1(b)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c)). The

     State filed a verified petition seeking to deny pretrial release pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-2, 110-

     6.1 (West 2022), alleging that defendant was the getaway driver in the commission of a forcible

     felony and his pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of persons or the

     community.

¶5          At the September 25, 2023, pretrial release hearing, the State argued that detention was

     appropriate under section 110-6.1(a)(3) of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022). In support,

     the State provided the following factual basis for denying defendant pretrial release: On September

     23rd, 2023, at approximately 11:13 a.m., at the Rue21 store located at 4783 West Cermak Road in

     Cicero, Illinois, officers responded to a report of a robbery in progress. The victim had made a 911

     call reporting that the offender (co-defendant) had entered the store with what appeared to be a

     firearm and taken approximately $352 in cash. Officers were advised that the co-defendant, who

     was wearing red pants, ski goggles, and a black sweater, was last seen exiting the store running

     eastbound. When officers arrived, they observed a suspect matching the co-defendant’s description

     entering the front passenger seat of defendant’s vehicle. Before defendant was able to pull off,

     officers “effectuated a felony investigation stop” and detained both offenders. When the officers

     approached, defendant initially refused to exit the vehicle. Witnesses identified co-defendant as

     the robber and police recovered a toy handgun from him. After defendant waived his Miranda

     rights, he admitted “to knowing that the co-offender was going to rob the store” and that “days

     before he drove the co-defendant to another store” where a pair of pants were stolen. Defendant

     was subsequently charged with aggravated robbery and possession of a controlled substance for

     having in his possession less than 30 grams of a substance containing cocaine. At the time of his

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     No. 1-23-1837B

     arrest for the instant offense, defendant was on pretrial release pending trial for a Class 1

     possession of a controlled substance charge.

¶6           In mitigation, defense counsel asserted that defendant was a married father of three, a

     mechanic in his own business, and the sole provider for his family. Defendant was born in Mexico

     and had lived in Chicago for ten years. Defense counsel argued that defendant did not pose “a risk

     of safety to any other individual just because he was in this car near this offense.”

¶7           At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied pretrial release, finding that the State

     had shown by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was charged with a detainable offense;

     that the proof was evident, and the presumption great that defendant committed the offense of

     aggravated robbery; and that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person

     or the community based on the specific facts in the case. The trial court observed that defendant

     was with someone “who went into the store and under the threat of a weapon, robbed the store”

     during regular store hours, and that “there are no conditions or combination of conditions set forth

     under 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) that can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person

     or persons or the community, based upon the specific articulable facts of this case.”

¶8                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶9           On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying pretrial release. In his

     notice of appeal, 1 the defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden to show by clear and

     convincing evidence that the defendant posed a threat to the safety of any person because his role

     in the aggravated robbery was “limited to a possible accomplice” and he did not “drive off when

     confronted by police.” Defendant further argues that the State failed to demonstrate by clear and

     convincing evidence that there were no conditions that would mitigate defendant’s threat to the

             1
               The Cook County Public Defender (PD) was appointed to represent the defendant and filed notice
     of appeal on October 4, 2023.

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       No. 1-23-1837B

       safety of others, ensure his appearance, and “prevent him from picking up new cases.”

¶ 10           In response, the State asserts that the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the

       defendant committed a qualifying offense under the SAFE-T Act; that he posed a real and present

       threat to the safety of any person, or the community, based upon the facts set forth in the proffer;

       and that there are no condition or conditions sufficient to mitigate this threat. Specifically, the State

       presented evidence that the crime involved the threat of force with a handgun, that “defendant

       admitted that the crime was planned, that he had been involved in a similar robbery just days prior,

       and that he was on pretrial release for a Class 1 felony pending trial” when the instant offense was

       committed.

¶ 11           Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

       (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022)), as amended by the SAFE-T Act. Under the Code, as

       amended, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations.

       725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). After filing a timely verified petition requesting denial

       of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

       proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense,

       that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

       the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and

       present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful

       flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).

¶ 12           The SAFE-T Act provides a nonexclusive list of factors that the trial court may consider

       when making a determination of “dangerousness,” i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present

       threat to any person or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022). In making this

       determination, the court may consider evidence or testimony as to factors that include, but are not

       limited to: (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense

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       No. 1-23-1837B

       is a crime of violence involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of

       the defendant; (3) the identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat

       and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together

       with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the

       defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether

       the defendant is known to possess or have access to a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current

       offense or any other offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or supervised release from

       custody; and (9) any other factors including those listed in section 110-5 of the SAFE-T Act. 725

       ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

¶ 13          In order to reverse a trial court’s finding denying pretrial release under the SAFE-T Act,

       the reviewing court must conclude that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight

       of the evidence. See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001) (setting a similar standard of review

       for requirement of clear and convincing evidence by the State in juvenile proceedings). A finding

       is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or

       the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v.

       Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). “Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to

       the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and

       demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Id.

¶ 14          Questions regarding whether the trial court properly considered one or more of the

       aforementioned factors in determining dangerousness are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See

       People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15 (in considering trial court’s decision to

       deny bail, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely

       because it would have balanced the appropriate factors differently). An abuse of discretion occurs

       when the decision of the circuit court is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable

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       No. 1-23-1837B

       person would agree with the position adopted by the court. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253,

       ¶ 9.

¶ 15           If the trial court finds that the State proved a valid threat to the safety of the person or the

       community and/or defendant’s likely willful flight to avoid prosecution, or defendant’s failure to

       abide by previously issued conditions of pretrial release, then the trial court must determine what

       pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as

       required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by

       the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). In

       reaching its determination, the trial court must consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the

       offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and

       characteristics of the defendant;2 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real and present

       threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and

       seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725

       ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). The statute lists no singular factor as dispositive. Id.

¶ 16           Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court’s finding that the defendant

       met the dangerousness standard and posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

       the community, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the trial court’s

       determination that there were no less restrictive conditions adequate to avoid the threat defendant

       posed to the safety of any person or the community and ensure defendant’s compliance with

       conditions of pretrial release was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, particularly in

               2
                 The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and
       mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
       community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning
       appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
       defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of
       sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A),
       (B) (West 2022).

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       No. 1-23-1837B

       view of the fact that defendant was on pretrial release for a pending felony offense when he was

       arrested on the instant charges.

¶ 17          Having reviewed the record on appeal, we find the trial court’s order denying pretrial

       release was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 18                                             CONCLUSION

¶ 19          For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 20          Affirmed.

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