Court Opinion

ID: 9602900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:01:29.27673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:04.234384
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds (1) that the 1964 Act relating to the State Court of Cobb County, which *345requires a written demand for trial by jury, is not on its face in conflict with the Civil Practice Act, and (2) that even though the demand was not made within the time required by the 1964 Act, the CPA, in Code Ann. § 81A-115 (a), gives a party the right to make the demand at any time before the entry of a pre-trial order. I agree that the demand for trial statute is not in conflict with that portion of the CPA embodied in Code Ann. §§ 81A-138 and 81A-139. However, I dissent to the application of Code Ann. § 81A-115 (a).
The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is its holding that an amendment can revive a right that has been waived. The 1964 Act, like Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that where the demand for jury trial is not made within the time specified it is waived. "Once effectively waived, the right to a jury trial is not revived by a reversal or a new trial... Neither is the right once waived revived by amendment of the pleadings.” 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2321, p. 104 (1971).
Using the logic of the majority opinion, matters waived under Code Ann. § 81A-112 could be revived under Code Ann. § 81A-115.
I would affirm the judgment based upon the ruling made by the Court of Appeals.