Court Opinion

ID: 9445195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:22:17.863007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:09.626183
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
In a memorandum filed in support of its petition for rehearing the appellant vehemently asserts that this court blun-, dered by failing to distinguish two words ■ in the contracts, “shipment” and “delivery.” Appellant contends that by1 “shipment” the parties meant shipment *847from the San Francisco ports by a vessel bound for Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, C.I.F. Mayaguez; by “delivery” they are said to have meant delivery of the rice at Sacramento, California, as expressly provided in the typewritten provision on the face of each contract. We need not pause to consider what conclusions would follow if that interpretation of both of those words were correct for it is apparent that the parties intended no such distinction.
As indicated by appellants the point of delivery typed on the face of the contracts was Sacramento. There is no mention whatever in the contracts of San Francisco ports or of any place other than Sacramento as a point of delivery. In this situation “Shipment to be made not later than September 30, 1951 at buyers option” clearly means shipment from the point of delivery, that is to say, Sacramento. This conclusion is further buttressed by the location of the typewritten time-of-shipment clause in the blank space provided after the printed title “Time of Delivery.” That is, the faces of the contracts read: in print “Time of Delivery” followed in typewriting by “Shipments to be made not later than September 30, 1951 at buyers option.” Thus, unless delivery has two meanings in the contracts the shipment clause must mean shipment from the point of delivery, Sacramento. Nor is there anything in the stipulated facts which indicates any intention of the parties other than that shipment must be made out of Sacramento no later than September 30, 1951.
Viewing the contracts in this light results in no inconsistency of their provisions nor impossibility of performance as asserted by appellant. In particular the printed provision requiring seven days notice may without inconsistency be incorporated as indicated in the opinion. Moreover, that length of time would have certainly been adequate for appellant to ship the rice from Sacramento consigned to the appellee in Mayaguez or to an independent warehouse. Its doing so after September 23 and no later than September 30 would have satisfied its obligations whether or not there were connecting ships sailing from San Francisco on or before September 30.
The petition for rehearing is denied.