Court Opinion

ID: 9844719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:07:21.320905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.831623
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
specially concurring:
The Colorado Libertarian Party (CLP) and Robin Heid appeal the district court’s ruling upholding the unaffiliation requirement of section 1 — 4—801(l)(i), IB C.R.S. (1980), against constitutional attack under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution. I agree with the court’s result in this case, but specially concur because my analysis is different. There is no violation of appellants’ right to equal protection of the laws because the CLP and the existing political parties are not similarly situated. Since *1009the dissimilar treatment occurs in the peculiar context of elections and access to the official ballot, it is unnecessary to engage in the extended analysis of the appellants’ First Amendment claim found in part II-A of the majority opinion. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), subsequently approved in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986), is disposi-tive.
I.
I begin by placing the contested statute in its proper context. Section 1 — 4—801(l)(i) is found in Part 8 of the Colorado election code under the heading, “NOMINATION OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES,” and provides in relevant part:
No person shall be placed in nomination by petition unless the person ... was registered as unaffiliated ... for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition.
Under Rule 16, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984), the term “unaffiliated” in the statute means unaffiliated with a political party. Although the CLP calls itself a party, it is not a political party under the election code. The CLP is a political organization, while the only political entities currently qualifying as political parties in Colorado are the democratic and republican parties. Heid, who was a registered republican within the twelve month period, was denied access to the ballot by the secretary of state even though he was the CLP nominee.
A political organization is defined by statute to mean “any group of registered electors who, by petition for nomination of an independent candidate as provided in section 1-4-801, places upon the official general election ballot nominees for public office.” § 1-1-104(17), IB C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). In contrast, a political party is defined to mean “any political organization which at the last preceding gubernatorial election was represented on the official ballot either by regular party candidates or by individual nominees only if it cast for its gubernatorial candidate at least ten percent of the total gubernatorial vote cast in the state at such election.” § 1-1-104(18), IB C.R.S. (1973). Thus, a political party is a political organization, but a political organization is not necessarily a political party.
The statutory scheme, however, allows a political organization to become a political party if that organization manifests a low minimum of support among the electorate. Under section l-4-801(l)(b), IB C.R.S. (1990), a political organization can field an independent candidate, for governor for example, by a petition signed by 1,000 registered electors statewide. Having secured that number of signatures or more, the independent candidate’s political organization would qualify as a political party for the next election if that candidate garnered at least ten percent of the votes cast for governor. “Any political entity that fails to receive at least ten percent of the total vote cast in the preceding gubernatorial election is a ‘political organization’ subject to section 1-4-801(1).” National Prohibition Party v. State, 752 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1988). See Clements v. People ex rel. Lee, 58 Colo. 105, 109-10,143 P. 834, 835 (1914).
The election code, therefore, enacts a structured yet fluid method for access to the general ballot. A distinction is made between political organizations and political parties, but that distinction does not prevent organizations from becoming parties. Indeed, political parties also could return to being political organizations should their fortunes wane. The election code does not maintain a static political picture; rather, it maintains a “revolving door” through which minority ideologies can enter the mainstream.
These points are important for the analysis of CLP’s equal protection challenge. Because political organizations and political parties are not similarly situated, political organizations and their prospective candidates can be accorded dissimilar treatment and, in fact, they are accorded different treatment under the election code. The two entities are treated differently because, under the statutes, political parties can override the twelve-month affiliation period by internal party rule, while political organizations enjoy no similar license to *1010override the twelve-month unaffiliation period by internal organization rule.
This disparate treatment, however, withstands the equal protection challenge because parties and organizations are not similarly situated, as I will show. That parties and organizations are not similarly situated in turn addresses the associational rights challenge under the First Amendment.
II.
Contrary to appellants’ argument, this case does involve the statutory requirements designed to ensure sound access to the ballot, and not just the right of a political organization to select the candidate of its choice. The issue as to whether it is permissible for the state to make the distinction between political organizations and political parties is at the heart of this case since that distinction is the essential mechanism by which the state regulates the electoral process and restricts access to the ballot. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the Court acknowledged that “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” More recently, in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, the Court held that although restrictions upon ballot access “impinge upon the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes, as well as the rights of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively,” these rights of association “are not absolute and are necessarily subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly and effectively.” 479 U.S. 189, 193, 107 S.Ct. 533, 536, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (citing Storer).
Acknowledging the element of a necessary restriction of associational rights is crucial. It means that certain practical regulations of the electoral process, including restrictions on access to the ballot, can be accomplished only by qualifying or impinging on the right of association.1 The requirement of having to demonstrate a modicum of public support before being allowed access to the ballot, for example, is at once a constitutionally valid restriction on the ballot and a permissible restriction or qualification of the right of association.
Addressing the validity of the distinction between political organizations and political parties is therefore necessary for any response to appellants’ allegation that the election code violates their associational rights under the First Amendment. The election code is again the point of departure, for it is there that the difference between organizations and parties is explicitly established. By their terms, the statutes set out the difference. A political organization is not a political party if or because its candidate has not received ten percent of the total gubernatorial vote in the preceding election. Consequently, a political organization must petition for access to the ballot with a certain number of qualified signatures, while its candidate must have been unaffiliated for twelve months prior to filing the petition. §§ 1-4-801(l)(b) and (i), IB C.R.S. (1973 & 1990 Supp.).
This court has already decided that the state has a “substantial interest” in assuring that candidates demonstrate significant support precedent to their placement on the ballot. National Prohibition Party, 752 P.2d at 85. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has made it “clear that States may condition access to the general election ballot by a minor-party or independent candidate upon a showing of a modicum of support among the potential voters for the office.” Munro, 479 U.S. at 193, 107 S.Ct. at 536. The signature and unaf-filiation requirements both serve the state’s substantial interest in conditioning access to the ballot upon a showing of support. The state’s “interest, if no other, [is] in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process *1011at the general election.” Jenness v. Forson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).
Appellants concede that gathering 1,000 qualified signatures is no problem for the CLP and/or Heid. Indeed, appellants state that the actual number of signatures required is completely irrelevant. The relative burden of petition signatures is therefore not at issue here. I turn then to the unaffiliation requirement. In Munro, the Court reaffirmed Storer, which
upheld California’s statutory provisions that denied ballot access to an independent candidate if the candidate had been affiliated with any political party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. [The Court] recognized that California had a “compelling” interest in maintaining the integrity of its political processes, and that the disaffiliation requirement furthered this interest and was therefore valid, even though it was an absolute bar to attaining a ballot position.
Munro, 479 U.S. at 195, 107 S.Ct. at 537.2 In fact, under Colorado law there is no absolute bar to Heid’s future CLP candidacy. Heid merely has to gather the requisite number of qualified signatures and remember to register to vote as anything but a republican or democrat (i.e., unaffiliated). This calls for nothing more than a “reasonably diligent independent candidate.” Storer, 415 U.S. at 742, 94 S.Ct. at 1285.
Furthermore, the Munro Court held that a state does not shoulder “the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective effects on political stability that were produced by the 1-year disaffiliation requirement.” 479 U.S. at 195, 107 S.Ct. at 537. Neither is the state required to “prove actual voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a predicate to the imposition of reasonable ballot access restrictions.” Id. Thus, appellants’ arguments that the secretary of state has failed to demonstrate the possibility of disarray and confusion are futile.
I again emphasize that the code affords ample opportunity both for political organizations to reach the status of political parties and for existing political parties to exit the political stage. The burden on the right of association, therefore, is not fixed, but may be shed or assumed depending on electoral success or failure. The danger of political monopoly by the major parties is thus avoided under Colorado’s election code. Storer, 415 U.S. at 729, 94 S.Ct. at 1278. That the two existing major parties have lately monopolized political life in Colorado may perhaps be due to their ability to adapt to the changing attitudes of their partisans and/or to adopt the promising platforms of rising political organizations. I note that here, Heid himself, by his dual candidacy, aspired to meld CLP ideology with that of the republican party. Thus, the election code’s “revolving door” is the means by which the state provides a feasible means of access to the general election ballot, pursuant to constitutional mandate. Storer, 415 U.S. at 728, 94 S.Ct. at 1278.
The election code’s different treatment of parties and organizations is permissible under the federal and state constitutions. Hence, I agree that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

. This relationship does not hold of course for other fundamental rights, such as free speech. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989).

. Storer thus retains its vigor, even after Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). In fact, the Celebrezze opinion, which invalidated Ohio's early filing deadlines for independent candidates, noted that a disaffiliation requirement is substantially different from an early filing requirement. 460 U.S. at 804, 103 S.Ct. at 1578. Storer also was reaffirmed in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. at 231, 109 S.Ct. at 1024.