Court Opinion

ID: 2963835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:54.177894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:45.006066
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          January 11, 1996  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                     ____________

          No. 95-1513

                                   JOSE D'ALMEIDA,

                                      Plaintiff,

                                          v.

                     STORK BRABANT B.V. AND STORK BRABANT, INC.,

                    Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                          v.

                          GERRITSE PROJECTEN, TEXMACH, B.V.,
                               AND ING. GERRITSE, B.V.,

                          Third Party Defendants-Appellees.

                                     ____________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of this court  issued on December  11, 1995, is

          amended as follows:

                    Page 7, line 2:  Change "Stork" to "Gerritse."

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1513

                                   JOSE D'ALMEIDA,

                                      Plaintiff,

                                          v.

                     STORK BRABANT B.V. AND STORK BRABANT, INC.,

                    Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants.

                                          v.

                          GERRITSE PROJECTEN, TEXMACH, B.V.,

                               AND ING. GERRITSE, B.V.,

                          Third Party Defendants-Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                 ____________________

            John  J. McGivney,  with whom  Burns & Levinson  was on  brief for
            _________________              ________________

        Stork Brabant,  B.V. and Stork Brabant,  Inc., defendants, third-party

        plaintiffs-appellants.

            John T.  Montgomery, with whom Jeffrey P. Trout, and Ropes & Gray,
            ___________________            ________________      ____________

        were on brief for Ing. Gerritse, B.V., third-party defendant-appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 11, 1995

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  Stork Brabant B.V.  and Stork Brabant, Inc.
                 __________

            ("Stork")  appeal  from  a  judgment of  the  district  court

            dismissing  a  third-party  action  for  indemnification  and

            contribution  against Ing.  Gerritse B.V. ("Gerritse").   The

            facts  are set out at length in the Report and Recommendation

            of the  magistrate judge; the  legal issues  are whether  the

            Massachusetts  long-arm statute,  Mass. Gen.  L. ch.  223A,  

            3(d), authorizes the assertion of  personal jurisdiction over

            Gerritse,  and,   if  so,   whether  such  an   assertion  of

            jurisdiction  is consistent  with due  process.   Although we

            would normally decide the  issue if possible on the  basis of

            the statute, in  this case there is real doubt  as to how the

            Massachusetts courts  would decide  the statutory  issue, and

            the resolution  of the constitutional issue  is, by contrast,

            reasonably clear.   We therefore  proceed to the  due process

            analysis.

                 The  third-party  complaint,  which  we  accept  at this

            stage,  reveals  that  Stork,  as a  distributor,  ordered  a

            machine from Gerritse; after  negligently and/or in breach of

            warranty producing  a defective machine, Gerritse  sent it to

            Massachusetts on Stork's instruction.  Whether this course of

            conduct gave Gerritse "minimum contacts" with the forum state

            as to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, see
                                                                      ___

            International  Shoe  Co. v.  Washington,  326  U.S. 310,  316
            ________________________     __________

            (1945), is  a very close call.   The arguments on  both sides

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            are ably set  forth in the  magistrate judge's report;  while

            she concluded that minimum contacts were not present, and the

            district court  agreed, we need  not decide the  issue, which

            would  be especially  difficult if  the injured  plaintiff in

            this case had brought suit against Gerritse.

                 But even if minimum  contacts were arguably present, due

            process further  imposes a requirement that  the assertion of

            jurisdiction be "consistent with traditional  notions of fair

            play and substantial justice" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
                                          __________________

            316, and this additional requirement controls here.  The sole

            cause  of action against Gerritse  is an action  by Stork for

            indemnification.  The parties  must reasonably have  expected

            that any  litigation between  them  would not  take place  in

            Massachusetts;  indeed,  their  contract  included   a  forum

            selection  clause  designating   Holland  as  the  locus   of

            litigation.   More important,  Massachusetts' interest in the

            indemnification   dispute   are   extremely    limited,   the

            compensation of its citizen not being at stake.

                 Extensive discussion  is unnecessary because in our view

            this  phase of the case  is directly governed  by Asahi Metal
                                                              ___________

            Industry Co. v. Superior Court,  480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).
            ____________    ______________

            There eight  justices applied the "fair  play and substantial

            justice" requirement to hold that jurisdiction was lacking in

            quite similar circumstances.   Thus, even if minimum contacts

            were barely  present, a  question we  decline to answer,  the

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            assertion   of   jurisdiction    over   Gerritse   in    this

            indemnification action would still be unconstitutional.  

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

                                                     Concurrence follows.
                                                     ____________________

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                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.   I agree
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
                              ____________________

            with  the result  reached  by the  court,  but I  have  grave

            reservations about the short cut taken  to get there.  On the

            basis of  a head count of the  Justices in Asahi Metal Indus.
                                                       __________________

            Co.,  480 U.S. 102, the  majority concludes that  it need not
            ___

            determine  whether the  defendant had  minimum contacts  with

            Massachusetts "such that the maintenance of the suit does not

            offend  'traditional  notions of  fair  play  and substantial

            justice.'"   International Shoe  Co. v. State  of Washington,
                         _______________________________________________

            326 U.S. 310, 316  (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311  U.S. 457,
                                        _________________

            463  (1940)).   In  Ashai there  was a  holding  albeit by  a
                                _____

            plurality:  the facts "do not establish minimum contacts such

            that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with

            fair play and substantial justice . . . ."   480 U.S. at 116.

            That is the  only jurisdictional holding  in the case.   I do

            not think we should, on the  basis of a head count,  jettison

            as  a  prerequisite  to  a  jurisdictional  determination   a

            "minimum contact"  analysis.  Up  until now such  an analysis

            has  been the  required starting  front for  a jurisdictional

            determination.

                      The analysis as applied here, would run as follows:

            The  question  is  whether  Gerritse has  sufficient  minimum

            contacts with  the forum  state, such  that the  assertion of

            jurisdiction  will not  offend  "traditional notions  of fair

            play and substantial justice."   International Shoe, 326 U.S.
                                             __________________

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            at  316.   The test  for the  assertion of  specific personal

            jurisdiction is tripartite.   First, the claim underlying the

            litigation must  arise out  of or  relate to  the defendant's

            contacts with  the forum state.   See Helicopteros Nacionales
                                              ___ _______________________

            de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).  Second,
            _________________________

            "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which

            the defendant purposefully avails  itself of the privilege of

            conducting activities within  the forum state, thus  invoking

            the  benefits and  protections  of  its  laws."    Hanson  v.
                                                               __________

            Denckla,  357 U.S. 235, 253  (1958).  Third,  the exercise of
            _______

            jurisdiction must be reasonable in light of the five criteria

            announced in  Burger King Corp.  v. Rudzewicz, 471  U.S. 462,
                          _______________________________

            477 (1985):  (1) the defendant's burden of appearing, (2) the

            forum state's  interest in adjudicating the  dispute, (3) the

            plaintiff's  interest in  obtaining convenient  and effective

            relief, (4)  the  interstate judicial  system's  interest  in

            obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and

            (5) the shared interest  of the several states in  furthering

            fundamental substantive policies.

                      I  do not agree with the majority that the "minimum

            contacts"  issue  "is  a  very  close  call"  and  "would  be

            especially  difficult  if the  injured  plaintiff .  .  . had

            brought    suit   against   Gerritse."       The   undisputed

            jurisdictional  facts are  as  follows.   Stork and  Gerritse

            signed  a contract  in the  Netherlands under  which Gerritse

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            would build  machines exclusively for Stork.   Both companies

            are headquartered  in  the Netherlands.    Stork is  a  large

            international  corporation that  does  business all  over the

            world.    Under the  contract  Stork agreed  to  purchase the

            machines  manufactured  by  Gerritse  and sell  them  on  the

            international  market.   When  the  machine  was finished  to

            Stork's satisfaction, Stork supplied  Gerritse with a mailing

            label  and arranged to  transport the  machine to  the buyer.

            Stork controlled all marketing, sales, and transporta-tion of

            the machines.

                      Gerritse  had no  contacts with Massachusetts.   It

            did  know from the order form  furnished it by Stork that the

            machine was  going to  Massachusetts.   It  was delivered  to

            Shawmut  Mills.    Subsequent  to  the  installation  of  the

            machine,  Roland Dekens,  an  engineer-employee of  Gerritse,

            while on  a trip to the  United States as an  agent of Stork,

            inspected the machine at Shawmut Mills and submitted a report

            to both Stork and Gerritse.

                      I  think it  is  clear that  under the  traditional

            "minimum  contacts"  analysis  there  could  be  no  personal

            jurisdiction over Gerritse.

                      But  even if  the  issue is  a  close one,  as  the

            majority  states, that is no excuse  for not deciding it.  To

            apply  the  "fair  play  and  substantial  justice"  doctrine

            without any "minimum  contacts" analysis ignores  established

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            law and flies in the teeth of binding precedent.

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