Court Opinion

ID: 9571076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:55.688808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:15.730687
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(concurring). This opinion is as much a respectful suggestion to the next Constitutional Convention as it is a legal holding. The reason for this is that historical factors require a process of legal interpretation of Const 1963, art 4, §9 that seems at variance with modern under*358standing of the plain language of that section. As it happens, the interpretative result in this case turns out the same but whether the common required result is one the people really want is impossible to say. Only a Constitutional Convention can get us clearly out of the mess we are in.
Const 1963, art 4, § 9 reads:
"No person elected to the legislature shall receive any civil appointment within this state from the governor, except notaries public, from the legislature, or from any other state authority, during the term for which he is elected.”
If we were reading art 4, §9 outside of any historical or precedential context, we would undoubtedly read "appointment” as just that, that is, designation by an appointing authority as opposed to "election” by the people. We would interpret "any civil appointment within this state” as any office within the geographical confines of the state, and thus include local as well as state offices.
However, historically, as my Brother Swainson clearly points out, "appointment” means "election” as well as "appointment”. Likewise historically (before the 1963 constitution which must be assumed to adopt it) "any” means any state as opposed to local appointment.
Applying a literal interpretation of art 4, § 9 to the instant case this Court would have to say a legislator can seek election to the office of Mayor of Detroit, because the constitution prohibits only appointments. Applying a legal, based on historical, interpretation, this Court is compelled to say a legislator can seek election to the office of Mayor of Detroit not because an election is not an appointment but because "any civil appointment within the state” means "any civil appointment *359within the state” except a local one. Obviously a mayor is a local officer. A literal common sense interpretation and a historical interpretation of art 4, §9 reach the same conclusion on almost diametrically opposite rationale.
For these reasons I concur with my Brother Swainson, there is no other legal choice. Whether this is really the will of the people is hard to say. If the people’s will is expressed by the contemporary understanding of the plain words of art 4, § 9, this Court has no difficulty. If the people’s will is expressed by the legal interpretations of history, there is also no difficulty. But if the people in approving the 1963 constitution relied in part on the plain language and in part on history,1 the Court can only speculate on what the people really had in mind. Recent referenda suggest what they have in mind today may be something different from either a correct plain language or historical interpretation. Howevér, this Court is perforce bound by history and the law. It is for these reasons I suggest that the next Constitutional Convention might well consider fresh language for this section reenforcéd by comprehensive and specific committee commentary to make clear Feyond per adventure whatever the people’s will actually is.

 See Justice Swainson’s. opinion, page 351, footnote 6.