Court Opinion

ID: 9402549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 00:01:06.172343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.652948
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30799     Document: 00516788903         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/15/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                                                          June 15, 2023
                                  No. 22-30799                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                              Clerk

   Louisiana State, by and through Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
   Fisheries,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration,
   Richard Spinrad, Administrator; Chris Oliver, in his
   official capacity as Assistant Administrator for Fisheries; Samuel D.
   Rauch, III, in his official capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator for
   Regulatory Programs; National Marine Fisheries Service;
   Department of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, Secretary,

                                                         Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:21-CV-1523

   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          Before us is the narrow question of whether the district court erred in
   holding that, based on the summary judgment record, the State of Louisiana
   failed to establish standing to challenge a National Marine Fisheries Service
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   (NMFS) rule that requires certain shrimping vessels in Louisiana waters to
   use turtle excluder devices (TEDs). We affirm.
                                          I.
                                          A.
          There have long been TED requirements for shrimping. In 1987,
   NMFS promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer
   operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install TEDs,
   subject to a few preconditions. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (June 29, 1987). Our
   circuit upheld that rule over Louisiana’s challenge. See State of La., ex rel.
   Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1988). But the 1987 rule exempted
   skimmer trawlers and inshore shrimpers from its requirements, so long as the
   exempted      vessels   followed     tow-time     restrictions.    50       C.F.R.
   § 223.206(d)(2)(ii)(A)(3).
          In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for
   skimmer trawlers, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,411 (May 10, 2012), but withdrew it in
   2013, 78 Fed. Reg. 9,024 (Feb. 7, 2013). In 2016, the agency proposed
   another rule, again largely requiring all skimmer trawlers to use TEDs
   regardless of length or whether they operated inshore. 81 Fed. Reg. 91,097
   (Dec. 16, 2016). NMFS justified this newest iteration in part based on a
   conclusion that tow-time restrictions were “inherently difficult to enforce.”
          NMFS promulgated a tailored version of its proposed 2016 rule in
   December 2019 (the Final Rule). The Final Rule required TEDs on all
   skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. See 84
   Fed. Reg. 70,048 (Dec. 20, 2019). The Final Rule’s environmental impact
   statement (EIS) estimates that:
          For the 1,047 vessels in the Gulf of Mexico that are expected to
          be affected by this regulatory action, the aggregate loss in gross
          revenue from shrimp loss is about $2.29 million, which
          represents about 2.9% of their gross revenue. Including the
          costs of purchasing TEDs, which are about $1.36 million, the

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          total adverse effect in the first year is about $3.65 million,
          which represents about 4.6% of their gross revenue in the
          aggregate.
   The EIS projects that 178 vessels will shut down throughout the Gulf of
   Mexico as a result of these costs. Further, the EIS predicts a shrimp loss per
   vessel of 6.21%, with a total adverse effect of $3,482 per vessel in the first year
   in the Gulf of Mexico. These losses would be less in subsequent years, once
   TEDs are initially purchased and installed. Cumulatively, the EIS forecasts
   that the “expected annual loss in food shrimp landings is approximately
   870,000 lbs under this regulatory action,” approximately 0.3% of all food
   shrimp processed in the Gulf.
          According to NMFS, changes incorporated in the Final Rule
   compared to the proposed 2016 version reduced the number of vessels
   impacted by more than 80% and the total economic effect by 73%. Neither
   NMFS nor Louisiana has offered data specific to Louisiana’s shrimping
   industry.
                                            B.
          The Final Rule was to go into effect on April 1, 2021, but on March
   31, 2021, NMFS delayed the effective date to August 1, 2021, citing the
   COVID-19 pandemic as justification for the delay. On August 11, 2021, ten
   days after the rule’s deferred effective date, Louisiana’s Department of
   Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS 1 under the Administrative
   Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. 2

          1
             Louisiana also sued the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
   Department of Commerce, and various administrators and secretaries in their official
   capacities. For ease of reference we focus, as the parties do, on NMFS as the principal
   defendant, as it promulgated the Final Rule.
          2
            While the State, through LDWF, has vigorously pursued this action, to date, no
   shrimpers, presumably most directly impacted by the Final Rule, have attempted to
   intervene in this action.

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          After denying Louisiana’s request for a temporary restraining order,
   the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Final Rule in
   Louisiana inshore waters until February 1, 2022. In its order the court stated,
   in a footnote, that “‘[t]he State of Louisiana ha[d] standing to sue in [its]
   quasi-sover[e]ign capacity because of its interest in and ownership of its
   marine resources.’” Louisiana v. Dep’t of Commerce, 559 F. Supp. 3d 543,
   548 n.19 (E.D. La. 2021) (quoting State of La. ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 681 F.
   Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. La. 1988), aff’d, 850 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1988)). The
   State did not seek an extension when the injunction expired.
          Instead, Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the
   merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary
   judgment. In its motion, NMFS defended the merits of the Final Rule but
   further asserted that Louisiana lacked standing to bring this action. In the
   State’s last summary judgment brief (it both supported its motion and
   opposed NMFS’s motion in the same filing), Louisiana devoted a mere two
   pages to standing.
          The State urged that it had standing on four bases. First, citing Verity,
   it asserted that it had standing based on its “interest in and ownership of its
   marine resources.”     Louisiana cited no record evidence to support its
   assertion. Second, the State contended that it “suffer[ed] direct injury from
   the enforcement resources it will have to expend to comply with the [Final
   Rule].” Relatedly, Louisiana asserted that the Final Rule “undermine[d] the
   State’s ability to enforce its existing laws by requiring the massive
   reallocation   of    resources   away       from    other    LDWF    activities[,
   which] . . . places substantial pressure on the State to change its policies and
   enforcement priorities.” For support, Louisiana relied on allegations in its
   complaint, referenced a declaration from Colonel Chad Hebert, with
   LDWF’s enforcement division, and cited caselaw. Specifically, the State
   cited Hebert’s statement that “[f]ull capacity for LDWF Enforcement staff
   and field agents is 234, however LDWF Enforcement is currently holding

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   206 positions due to ongoing funding constraints.” Finally, Louisiana
   asserted that it had parens patriae standing “to vindicate the economic
   interests . . . of the entire State.” Again, the State relied on its complaint and
   caselaw for support.
          The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana
   had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing. The
   court rejected Louisiana’s assertion that it had standing in its “quasi-
   sovereign” capacity because after the court entered the preliminary
   injunction, Louisiana had “made no attempt to show any injury to its marine
   resources resulting from the Final Rule.” The court acknowledged that it
   had previously accepted “an interest in and ownership of its marine
   resources,” see Verity, 681 F. Supp. at 1181, as a basis for standing at the
   preliminary injunction stage, but the court held that “at the summary
   judgment stage, more [was] required,” Louisiana v. Dep’t of Commerce, No.
   21-CV-1523, 2022 WL 17251152, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2022) (citing Lujan
   v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The district court faulted
   Louisiana for citing “only to the allegations of its [c]omplaint [and] ma[king]
   no attempt to show any injury to its marine resources resulting from the Final
   Rule,” id., by offering evidentiary support for the State’s alleged injury.
          The district court also rejected Louisiana’s arguments related to
   increased law enforcement costs and reallocation of resources. The court
   characterized Hebert’s declaration as “insufficiently vague, speculative, and
   conclusory[.]” Id. at *3 (citing Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.
   2015)).   Analogizing to Crane, the court found that, even considering
   Hebert’s statements, “[t]here [was] no evidence of how the Final Rule will
   burden the LDWF or even any proof that it will not receive federal funding
   to offset that burden.”      Id.   And the district court similarly rejected
   Louisiana’s parens patriae argument, faulting the State for relying only on its
   complaint allegations and failing to “provide any evidence of economic harm
   to the State’s economy caused by the Final Rule.” Id.

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           Louisiana timely appealed. We review only whether the district court
   erred in concluding that Louisiana lacked standing to challenge the Final
   Rule. It did not.
                                               II.
           On appeal, Louisiana asserts that it has standing because the Final
   Rule infringes on its sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and proprietary interests.
   See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
   In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, the Supreme Court differentiated those three types
   of interests based on how a State is injured. Id. at 600–08. Sovereign
   interests are “based on [the State’s] sovereign character.” Id. at 601. The
   Court identified two kinds of sovereign interests: “First, the exercise of
   sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant
   jurisdiction—this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both
   civil and criminal; second, the demand for recognition from other
   sovereigns—most frequently this involves the maintenance and recognition
   of borders.” Id. States have sovereign interests by virtue of their being co-
   sovereigns in our Nation’s federalism.
           Related, but distinct, quasi-sovereign interests “consist of a set of
   interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.” Id. at 602.
   “First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—
   both physical and economic—of its residents in general. Second, a State has
   a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful
   status within the federal system.” Id. at 607. Only the first is at play here. 3
   In either case, a plaintiff-State may sue as parens patriae, i.e., in a

           3
             The second type of quasi-sovereign interest centers on “ensuring that the State
   and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow from participation in
   the federal system.” Id. at 608. “Federal statutes” create these “benefits” “that a [S]tate
   will obviously wish to have accrue to its residents.” Id. Thus, there is a distinction between
   a State’s sovereign interest in enforcing its own law and a State’s quasi-sovereign interest
   in obtaining benefits under federal law on its residents’ behalf.

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   representative capacity, to vindicate an injury to a “sufficiently substantial
   segment of its population.” Id. at 607.
          Finally, a State may have proprietary interests sufficient to confer
   standing, much like a private litigant. After all, a State can enter into
   contracts, own land, and participate in business ventures. See id. at 601; see
   also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). “And like other such proprietors
   it may at times need to pursue those interests in court.” Alfred Snapp & Son,
   458 U.S. at 601–02. These proprietary interests have been extended, e.g., to
   a State’s collection of excise tax revenues, at least as against other States. See
   Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 447–50 (1992). And we have held that
   a State suffered injury to a proprietary interest when a change in federal law
   would have required the State to issue additional driver’s licenses at a loss.
   Tex. v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
   divided court, 579 U.S. 547 (2016).
          We examine the State’s proffered interests and concomitant injuries
   as follows.
                                         III.
          We review summary judgments de novo. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19
   F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). A party is entitled to summary judgment
   when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
   fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 56(a). “[F]acts that are subject to genuine dispute are viewed in the
   light most favorable to [the non-moving party].” Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct.
   52, 53 n.1 (2020) (per curiam).
          We likewise review whether a plaintiff has Article III standing de novo.
   Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir.
   2015). As plaintiff, Louisiana bears the burden of establishing standing. Tex.
   v. United States, 50 F.4th 498, 513 (5th Cir. 2022). To do so, a plaintiff must
   “have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the

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   challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by
   a favorable judicial decision.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of
   Treasury, 946 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted). Here, the major sticking point is whether Louisiana has presented
   evidence of an injury-in-fact that satisfies Article III.
           Louisiana contends its sovereign interests are injured by the Final
   Rule’s preemption of state laws, interference with Louisiana’s enforcement
   of its own wildlife laws, and interference with the marine resources in the
   State’s territorial waters (as well as with the State’s regulation of those
   resources). Louisiana next argues that its quasi-sovereign interests in the
   economic well-being of its populace suffer injury because the Final Rule
   inflicts adverse economic consequences upon its citizens. Lastly, Louisiana
   asserts that the Final Rule injures the State’s proprietary interests because of
   increased LDWF enforcement costs.
                                                 A.
           Casting a bit deeper into Louisiana’s asserted sovereign interests, the
   State urges on appeal that it has standing based on: (1) “the Final Rule’s
   preemption of state laws regulating the harvesting of shrimp in Louisiana
   waters”; (2) the rule’s “interference with Louisiana’s enforcement of its
   own wildlife laws”; (3) the State’s “sovereign interest in the shrimp in its
   waters,” cf. Verity, 681 F. Supp. at 1181; 4 and, relatedly, (4) Louisiana’s
   interest in regulating those marine resources. The first and last grounds
   readily escape the net because Louisiana failed to raise these arguments

           4
              Specifically, the Verity district court held that “Louisiana ha[d] standing to sue in
   the quasi-sover[e]ign capacity because of its interest in and ownership of its marine
   resources.” 681 F. Supp. at 1181. Louisiana adopted that characterization before the
   district court in this case but rebrands this species of interest as “sovereign” on appeal.

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   before the district court. The State’s other asserted sovereign interests
   likewise yield no catch, for the reasons discussed in turn.
                                       1. and 4.
            Generally, “arguments not raised before the district court . . . cannot
   be raised for the first time on appeal,” Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 720
   (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted), “absent
   extraordinary circumstances,” Chevron USA, Inc. v. Aker Mar. Inc., 689 F.3d
   497, 504 (5th Cir. 2012). However, “[a]n argument is not [forfeited] . . . if
   the argument on the issue before the district court was sufficient to permit
   the district court to rule on it.” Webster, 19 F.4th at 720 (quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
            Louisiana’s contentions based on the Final Rule’s preemption of state
   laws and its interference with the State’s regulation of marine resources
   nowhere appear in the State’s opposition to NMFS’s motion for summary
   judgment. Nevertheless, Louisiana asserts that it did not forfeit either basis
   for standing because the State alleged in its complaint that it “sue[d] to
   vindicate its sovereign, quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae
   interests.” But alleging grounds for standing in a complaint is not the same
   as asserting—and substantiating—those theories when resisting summary
   judgment, because the district court cannot “rule on” mere allegations at the
   summary judgment stage of litigation. Webster, 19 F.4th at 720; see also
   Chevron USA, Inc., 689 F.3d at 504. Louisiana therefore failed to preserve
   these grounds for standing by first adequately urging them in the district
   court.
            Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. We have limited
   discretion to reach an issue first raised on appeal when it presents “a purely
   legal matter and failure to consider the issue will result in a miscarriage of
   justice.” Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2021)

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   (quotation marks and citation omitted). Louisiana urges us to exercise our
   discretion in this instance. Presuming the State’s unpreserved bases for
   standing involve purely legal questions, we focus on whether extraordinary
   circumstances warrant doing so.
          Louisiana maintains that it “had no reason to press the relevant
   argument[s] more specifically” at summary judgment because the district
   court had already determined that the State had standing in granting the
   preliminary injunction. The State thus “simply had no reason” to litigate
   the “standing issue more vigorously and raise[] the argument[s] more
   specifically.”   While on the surface, Louisiana’s position resonates
   somewhat—the district court had previously held the State had standing,
   after all—we discern no extraordinary circumstance that justifies
   consideration of the forfeited arguments.
          Louisiana had the burden of establishing standing in the district court.
   See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.       When NMFS cross-moved for summary
   judgment, in response to Louisiana’s own dispositive motion, it argued that
   Louisiana lacked standing. Louisiana was therefore on notice that NMFS
   was contesting Louisiana’s standing—and seeking summary judgment on
   that basis. Cf. id. (The elements of standing are “an indispensable part of
   the plaintiff’s case, [such that] each element must be supported . . . with the
   manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
   litigation.”). In the State’s combined opposition to NMFS’s motion and
   reply in support of its own, Louisiana engaged, briefly, on the standing issue.
   That the State failed to conjure all its grounds for standing for the district
   court’s consideration is not itself an exceptional circumstance.          And
   Louisiana offers no reason for its omission that rises to such a circumstance.
   Therefore, we discern no “miscarriage of justice,” Rollins, 8 F.4th at 398, in
   declining to consider the Final Rule’s purported preemption of state laws or

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   its interference with the State’s regulation of its marine resources in
   evaluating Louisiana’s standing.
                                      2. and 3.
          We turn now to the merits of Louisiana’s preserved arguments: its
   Verity-based assertion that the State’s interests in its natural resources are
   harmed by the Final Rule, and its contention that increased enforcement
   costs caused by the rule will pressure Louisiana to change its enforcement
   priorities. In the end, neither of these arguments nets standing for the State.
          In Verity, the district court held that “the State of Louisiana ha[d]
   standing to sue in the quasi-sover[e]ign capacity because of its interest in and
   ownership of its marine resources.” See 681 F. Supp. at 1181. Because we
   did not address standing in the appeal of that case, this court’s decision “does
   not stand for the proposition that no [jurisdictional] defect existed.” Lefebure
   v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 657 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Regardless,
   assuming arguendo that Verity articulated a sovereign interest that could
   support standing, Louisiana’s argument fails for lack of evidentiary support.
          To resist summary judgment, Louisiana was required to present
   evidence of a “concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected
   interest.” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273
   (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Verity, Louisiana’s
   relevant interest is its ownership or trustee interest in its marine resources as
   “property” of the State. It follows that Louisiana must show an injury to
   those marine resources. But the State does not identify competent summary
   judgment evidence that substantiates any alleged injury that the Final Rule
   inflicts on Louisiana’s marine resources. On the contrary, under the Final
   Rule, less shrimp will be extracted from Louisiana waters and fewer turtles
   will ostensibly be caught inadvertently in shrimpers’ nets. Besides, while
   Louisiana directs us to the Final Rule’s EIS, which forecasts the impact on

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   shrimp harvests Gulf-wide, the State offers no evidence specific to its own
   shrimp harvests, in its own waters, much less an injury to its resources. We
   therefore agree with the district court that Louisiana “has made no attempt
   to show any injury to its marine resources resulting from the Final Rule,”
   such that this argument fails.
          Louisiana also urges that “the Final Rule interferes with Louisiana’s
   enforcement of its own wildlife and fisheries laws, and in so doing, places
   pressure on Louisiana to change those laws” thereby causing a separate
   injury to its sovereign interest. Louisiana tethers this argument to Colonel
   Hebert’s declaration testimony that the Final Rule places “additional strain”
   on the LDWF’s enforcement resources and relies on Texas v. EEOC, 933
   F.3d 433, 447 (5th Cir. 2019), to support the notion that the Final Rule
   “pressures [Louisiana] to abandon its laws and policies.”
          This argument is necessarily contingent on a finding that the Final
   Rule will increase LDWF enforcement costs.           Setting aside complaint
   allegations, the sum of Louisiana’s proof on that score is drawn from
   Hebert’s declaration. He states that additional enforcement duties triggered
   by the Final Rule “could substantially burden and interfere with LDWF
   Enforcement’s ability to effectively perform its various other enforcement
   duties.” He also avers that LDWF does not expect to receive “additional or
   commensurate” funding to defray the “additional LDWF Enforcement
   efforts.” But Hebert’s declaration does not explain the “pressure” this
   might bring to bear on Louisiana’s sovereign prerogatives; i.e., the
   declaration does not “connect the dots” so as to create a genuine issue of
   material fact as to the State’s ostensible sovereign injury. Instead, as further
   discussed in III.C. below, Hebert’s testimony is couched in speculative,
   general language (the rule “could” burden LDWF) that is flatly belied by the
   Final Rule, which by its terms does not require Louisiana to enforce it, and
   unrefuted evidence from NMFS that demonstrates that the agencies

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   annually coordinate enforcement efforts, including funding to cover federal
   priorities. See infra n.6. Louisiana’s lack of competent summary judgment
   evidence fatally undermines its assertion of standing on this basis.
                                         B.
          Next, we consider Louisiana’s parens patriae argument, i.e., that the
   Final Rule injures its quasi-sovereign interests. The State correctly asserts
   that it has a quasi-sovereign interest in the general economic well-being of its
   residents. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607. More specifically,
   Louisiana asserts that the Final Rule injures that interest because of the
   “significant adverse economic impact” the Final Rule will have on
   Louisiana’s shrimping industry, a significant component of the State’s
   economy.      Still, Louisiana must show that any such injury affects “a
   sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Id. Louisiana falters on
   this requirement, again for lack of evidence.
          In its opposition to NMFS’s motion for summary judgment,
   Louisiana pointed to its complaint to substantiate its assertion that the Final
   Rule will affect a sufficiently substantial segment of Louisiana residents. But
   complaint allegations are insufficient at summary judgment because
   “pleadings are not summary judgment evidence.” Wallace v. Tex. Tech
   Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Once a summary judgment
   motion is made and properly supported, the nonmovant must go beyond the
   pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing that there is a
   genuine issue for trial.”). Moreover, while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that
   the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of
   Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence particularly substantiating the
   rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial
   segment of its population.” See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607.

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           Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded
   States in the standing analysis, see Texas, 50 F.4th at 514, rescue this
   argument, or for that matter the State’s other arguments. Special solicitude
   merely changes “the normal standards for redressability and immediacy,” id.
   (citation omitted); it is not a standing shortcut when standing is otherwise
   lacking. In other words, it countenances some uncertainty as to both the
   efficacy of a judicial remedy and the timing of the injury alleged by a State.
   See id. But “special solicitude” does not absolve States from substantiating
   a cognizable injury, and neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held
   that it alters the requirements that the injury must be concrete and
   particularized. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–20 (2007); Texas,
   50 F.4th at 514. The district court did not err in holding that Louisiana failed
   to support its standing based on a parens patriae theory. 5

           5
              Additionally, it is dubious that Louisiana may maintain its parens patriae suit
   against the federal government at all. The D.C. Circuit has held that neither the APA nor
   Massachusetts v. EPA invalidates the “so-called Mellon bar, [under which] a State lacks
   standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the federal government.” Gov’t of
   Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon,
   262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (“While the state, under some circumstances, may sue as
   parens patriae for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce
   their rights in respect of their relations with the federal government.” (cleaned up)).
   Indeed, the Massachusetts v. EPA Court explained that “there is a critical difference
   between allowing a State to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes
   (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law
   (which it has standing to do).” 549 U.S. at 520 n.17 (quotation marks omitted). There,
   Massachusetts did not “dispute that the Clean Air Act applie[d] to its citizens; it rather
   [sought] to assert its rights under the Act.” Id. Here, Louisiana’s parens patriae argument
   appears to fall in the first category, and not the second. Regardless, because the parties do
   not brief the nuanced applicability of the Mellon bar with any granularity, and our decision
   does not turn on it, we decline to address this point further.

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                                     No. 22-30799

                                         C.
          To finish, we consider whether Louisiana’s alleged increased
   enforcement costs impinge on the State’s proprietary interests. The State’s
   argument is as follows: LDWF enforces laws relevant to the shrimping
   industry.     Per Hebert, the Final Rule “could result in significant
   noncompliance from the shrimping industry.” And while LDWF “will
   endeavor to enforce any and all regulations resulting from” the Final Rule,
   the additional enforcement duties imposed by the Final Rule “could
   substantially burden and interfere with LDWF Enforcement’s ability to
   effectively perform its various other enforcement duties.”           Moreover,
   Hebert averred that LDWF does not expect to receive “additional and
   commensurate” funding from NMFS “despite the additional LDWF
   Enforcement efforts imposed by implementation of [the Final Rule].” As a
   result, the Final Rule “will result in additional strain on LDWF Enforcement
   resources,” injuring Louisiana’s proprietary interests.
          NMFS counters that Hebert’s declaration does not contain sufficient
   detail to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Louisiana’s injury.
   Additionally, NMFS asserts that the Final Rule, by its terms, does not require
   Louisiana to enforce it, so any additional enforcement burden would be self-
   inflicted, especially because Louisiana could ask NMFS for additional
   funding to offset increased enforcement costs.
          Louisiana’s rejoinder is that, at summary judgment, the district court
   was required to consider Hebert’s declaration in the light most favorable to
   the State. And Louisiana asserts that in fact it is required to enforce the Final
   Rule, citing Louisiana Revised Statute § 56:493. That statute provides that
   “[t]he exclusive control of the shrimp fishery and the shrimp industry in
   Louisiana is vested in [LDWF], which shall enforce the laws regulating
   same.”

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                                    No. 22-30799

          The district court rejected Louisiana’s position, relying on Crane v.
   Johnson. We begin there.
          In Crane, we considered Mississippi’s challenge to the Deferred
   Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.               783 F.3d at 247.
   Mississippi urged that it had standing to challenge DACA as injurious to its
   proprietary interests. Id. at 252. In support, Mississippi relied on a 2006
   report that showed that illegal aliens had cost the state over $25 million
   annually in social benefits. Id. Mississippi contended that because DACA
   allowed a certain class of those illegal aliens to remain in the state, the
   program caused the state to incur further costs. Id. Problematically, the
   report was from 2006, while the suit was filed in 2012. Id.
          We affirmed the district court’s conclusion that “Mississippi’s
   alleged fiscal injury was purely speculative because there was no concrete
   evidence that Mississippi’s costs had increased or [would] increase as a result
   of DACA.” Id. We faulted Mississippi for failing to submit evidence that
   DACA-eligible immigrants resided in the state or would move to the state.
   Id. Noting that for Article III standing, Mississippi had to show a “concrete
   and particularized injury that [was] fairly traceable to DACA,” we held that
   “Mississippi was required to demonstrate that the state [would] incur costs
   because of the DACA program.” Id. (citation omitted). And we concluded
   Mississippi’s alleged injury was purely speculative because it was “not
   supported by any facts[.]” Id.
          While this case is not precisely on all fours with Crane, the same result
   obtains. Hebert’s declaration is speculative on the material points, merely
   describing what “could” happen, and is thus insufficient by itself to forestall
   summary judgment. And while Hebert asserts that additional federal funding
   is not expected, so that the Final Rule will cost the State enforcement
   resources, Louisiana fails to provide sufficient facts, either through Hebert’s

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                                       No. 22-30799

   testimony or otherwise, to support those assertions. See Ctr. for Biological
   Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 545 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Article III demands
   more than such conclusory assertions.”); see also, e.g., Clark v. Am.’s Favorite
   Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Unsupported allegations or
   affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts
   and conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
   judgment.”).
          By way of illustration, Hebert’s assertion that LDWF will incur
   increased law enforcement costs as a result of the Final Rule is dependent
   upon LDWF’s actually enforcing the Final Rule. Before the district court,
   Louisiana provided neither evidence nor argument in support of its assertion
   that it is required to enforce the Final Rule. If Louisiana’s enforcement of
   the rule is discretionary, any increased enforcement costs would be self-
   inflicted and therefore insufficient to confer standing. See Zimmerman v. City
   of Austin, Tex., 881 F.3d 378, 389 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[S]tanding cannot be
   conferred by a self-inflicted injury.”).
          Louisiana’s belated argument on appeal that it is required to enforce
   the Final Rule under § 56:493, such that any increased enforcement costs
   would not be self-inflicted, does not change the calculus, for three reasons.
   First, Louisiana did not raise that argument before the district court, and
   “[a]rguments not raised in the district court will not be considered [on
   appeal] absent extraordinary circumstances.” Chevron, 689 F.3d at 504
   (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, NMFS represented
   during oral argument that it would offset costs incurred by the State in
   enforcing the Final Rule, and unrebutted record evidence supports that
   contention. 6 Thus, even if Louisiana is required by state law to enforce the

          6
           Emanuel Antonaras, the Assistant Director of the Southeast Division of NMFS’s
   law enforcement arm, submitted a declaration describing the Joint Enforcement

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                                           No. 22-30799

   Final Rule, the record indicates that the State would suffer no cognizable
   injury because NMFS would provide commensurate funding to LDWF for
   its additional enforcement efforts. Third, Louisiana cannot manufacture
   injury with a novel interpretation of a general state statute. There is nothing
   in the record to suggest that Louisiana has previously interpreted § 56:493 to
   require the State to enforce federal regulations. 7 Doing so now, in the context
   of this litigation, gives rise to self-inflicted injury, if it gives rise to injury at
   all. Louisiana’s argument as to its proprietary injury therefore fails. 8
                                       *        *         *
           Based on the record and procedural history of this case, the district
   court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has
   standing to challenge the NMFS’s Final Rule. The district court’s summary
   judgment in favor of NMFS dismissing the State’s claims is therefore
                                                                          AFFIRMED.

   Agreements (JEA) NMFS enters with States. Per Antonaras, LDWF and NMFS negotiate
   a JEA once a year that delineates coordinated enforcement efforts and provides funding to
   LDWF for federal enforcement priorities. For example, the 2020 JEA provided
   $293,538.40 to LDWF for coordinated TED enforcement.
           7
             In fact, § 56:493 peacefully coexisted for years with now-repealed Louisiana
   Revised Statute § 56:57.2, which forbade LDWF from “enforc[ing] any federal law or
   regulation which requires any commercial or recreational fishermen to use TEDs in
   Louisiana waters until” several conditions had been satisfied.
           8
             Nor is the anti-commandeering doctrine applicable. The doctrine applies when a
   federal law “directly command[s] the executive or legislative branch of a state government
   to act or refrain from acting without commanding private parties to do the same[.]”
   Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 299 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The Final Rule, by its
   text, does not require Louisiana to “act or refrain from acting,” and § 56:493, as a state
   statute, does not support any anti-commandeering argument.

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