Court Opinion

ID: 9375359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 16:01:08.661066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.210045
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11409    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 02/27/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11409
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RAYMOND CHARLES LEE,
       a.k.a. Pete,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:93-cr-00209-SDM-AAS-1
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11409

                            ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Raymond Charles Lee, a federal prisoner serving life sen-
       tences for one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and
       two counts of distributing “50 grams or more” of crack cocaine,
       appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion for a sentence
       reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. See Pub. L.
       No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). Lee contends
       that the district court erred in denying his motion for a sentence
       reduction because it relied on a judge-made finding of drug quan-
       tity—rather than on the drug quantity charged in his indictment—
       to determine that he was ineligible for resentencing under the First
       Step Act. Our cases require us to affirm.
              “We review de novo . . . whether a district court had the
       authority to modify a term of imprisonment.” United States v.
       Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment
       vacated sub nom. Lavell Jackson v. United States, 214 L. Ed. 2d 121,
       143 S. Ct. 72 (2022), and opinion reinstated on reconsideration sub
       nom. United States v. Jackson, --- F.4th ---, 2023 WL 1501638 (11th
       Cir. Feb. 3, 2023).
             The First Step Act allows district courts to reduce a previ-
       ously imposed prison sentence, but only if the defendant was
       charged and sentenced for a “covered offense.” § 404(b), 132 Stat.
       5194, 5222. A “covered offense” is an offense that “triggered a
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       22-11409               Opinion of the Court                       3

       statutory penalty that has since been modified by the Fair Sentenc-
       ing Act.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301. For these covered offenses, the
       sentencing court may “reduce[] [the] sentence as if sections 2 and 3
       of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the
       covered offense was committed.” § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
       Relevant here, the Fair Sentencing Act bumped the quantity of
       crack cocaine required to trigger heightened penalties from 50
       grams to 280 grams. Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372,
       2372. But in deciding whether a sentence for a covered offense is
       eligible for reduction, “the district court is bound by a previous
       finding of drug quantity that could have been used to determine
       the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing.” Jones,
       962 F.3d at 1303.
              Lee was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute 654 grams of
       crack cocaine, far above the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act’s threshold
       of 280 grams. Having been previously convicted of two felonies,
       Lee was sentenced to life in prison. Under the 2010 Fair Sentencing
       Act, his original sentence wouldn’t change: Sections 2 and 3 still
       impose a mandatory life prison term on a defendant who distrib-
       utes more than 280 grams of crack cocaine and has two prior felo-
       nies. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). So
       long as the 654-gram figure is correct, Lee is ineligible for a sen-
       tence reduction under the First Step Act.
              While Lee seems to concede that the district court is bound
       by a previous finding of drug quantity, he claims that the district
       court’s reliance on the 654-gram figure was erroneous because a
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       4                      Opinion of the Court               22-11409

       judge—rather than a jury—found that amount. Lee contends that
       the district court instead should have relied on the 50-gram amount
       as charged in his indictment, an amount that would render him el-
       igible for a reduced sentence under the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.
              In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a
       drug-quantity finding that increases a defendant’s punishment
       must be made by a jury applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
       standard. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But whether a court is bound
       to a judge-made drug-quantity finding to determine a defendant’s
       Fair Sentencing Act statutory penalty range depends on whether
       the movant was sentenced before or after Apprendi. United States
       v. Russell, 994 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.7 (11th Cir. 2021).
              If a defendant was sentenced after Apprendi, the district
       court on resentencing “generally cannot look to a drug-quantity
       finding made at sentencing because that determination was made
       solely for the purpose of identifying the movant’s relevant conduct
       under the Sentencing Guidelines, not for setting his statutory pen-
       alty range.” Id. (citing Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301–02). But if the de-
       fendant was sentenced before Apprendi, then the district court may
       consider a previous judge-made drug-quantity finding that was
       necessary to trigger the statutory penalty. Id. “[J]ust as a movant
       [sentenced before Apprendi] may not use Apprendi to collaterally
       attack his sentence, he cannot rely on Apprendi to redefine his of-
       fense for purposes of a First Step Act motion.” Jones, 962 F.3d at
       1302 (internal citation omitted).
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       22-11409               Opinion of the Court                       5

              Lee was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute 654 grams of
       crack cocaine in 1994, six years before Apprendi. The district court
       was right to rely on that figure. Lee’s 654 grams is above 50 grams
       and was thus enough—together with his two prior felony drug
       convictions—to trigger the mandatory term of life imprisonment
       to which he was sentenced in 1994. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)
       (1994). Lee’s sentence would’ve been exactly the same had sec-
       tions 2 and 3 of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act applied at the time.
       Therefore, the district court properly concluded that it didn’t have
       authority to reduce Lee’s sentence under the First Step Act. Ac-
       cordingly, we affirm.

             AFFIRMED.