Court Opinion

ID: 9851774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:19:30.30552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:15.225396
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority opinion. The facts in this case graphically illustrate the need for counsel to be appointed to represent the indigent accused as soon as possible after the accused is deprived of his liberty. In the case sub judice, the alleged assault and the defendant’s arrest occurred on July 1,1974. Bond was set on July 4,1974, but on that date an "Open Court date” was filed, the effect of which was to deny the defendant a bond for up to another seveniy-two hours. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for July 8, 1974, but the state’s witnesses did not appear and the case was continued until July 23, 1974. The preliminary hearing was again continued and reset for August 8,1974. On this latter date, the state’s witness did not appear and the hearing was again continued until August 12, 1974. This last date came and went without the defendant’s being brought into court. The preliminary hearing was finally held on August 15,1974, at which the defendant was bound over to the grand jury and bond was set at $3,000. The defendant was indicted on September 17,1974. Counsel was finally appointed for the defendant on September 19,1974. A period of forty-six days elapsed from the defendant’s arrest to preliminary hearing. An *97additional thirty-five days passed before the defendant was appointed counsel — some eighty-one days following his arrest.
In view of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387) (1969) and United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300 (93 SC 2568, 37 LE2d 619), it is difficult to understand how the state can contend that the preliminary hearing is not a "critical stage” so as to entitle the accused to have counsel appointed.
It cannot be seriously disputed that the accused is entitled to counsel during any custodial interrogation. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (84 SC 1758, 12 LE2d 977) (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1965). Custodial interrogation has been defined as after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. If an individual is entitled to counsel prior to formal arrest when confronted with the adversary criminal process (interrogation) (see United States v. Ash, supra), it seems only fair and logical that the accused would be entitled to counsel after formal arrest, when again confronted with the adversary criminal process.