Court Opinion

ID: 9382723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:30.891843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.242108
License: Public Domain

J-S40019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RAFAEL SANTIAGO                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2257 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 6, 2021
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0711621-1998

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED MARCH 28, 2023

      Appellant Rafael Santiago pro se appeals from the October 6, 2021 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“PCRA court”), which

dismissed as untimely his second petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

      The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As fully

recounted by the PCRA court:

      On July 8, 1998, Appellant shot and killed Jose Navarro at Franklin
      and Pikes Street, Philadelphia, PA. Jose Navarro was shot two to
      three times, once in the back of the shoulder, once to the back of
      the right arm, and once in the right side of the abdomen. The
      cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of
      death was homicide. On July 13, 1998, Appellant was arrested
      for the shooting death of Jose Navarro. There were two civilian
      eyewitnesses that testified at trial for the Commonwealth, Ricardo
      Vasquez and Gladys Perez-Vasquez. Appellant was charged with
      murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502; carrying firearms/public street or
      place, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108; criminal conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
J-S40019-22

      § 903; carrying firearms without license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106; and
      possessing instruments of crime weapon, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907.

      On July 22, 1998, Appellant had a preliminary hearing before the
      Honorable Harvey W. Robbins and was held on all charges.
      Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable James L.
      Lineberger that began on March 29, 2001 and concluded April 6,
      2001. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the court sentenced
      him to [life imprisonment followed by two to six years’
      incarceration.]

      Appellant filed a timely appeal, but no brief was filed. On June 4,
      2003, a PCRA petition was filed for reinstatement of appellate
      rights which was granted nunc pro tunc. On June 11, 2003, a
      timely appeal to the Superior Court was filed (1824 EDA 2003).
      On November 8, 2004, the Superior Court affirmed judgment of
      sentence. No petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania
      Supreme Court was filed by the petitioner.

      On March 16, 2005, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition. On
      March 23, 2007, the PCRA court denied the amended petition
      without an evidentiary hearing. An Appeal to the Superior Court
      was filed (1062 EDA 2007). On July 16, 2007, [this Court]
      dismissed the appeal for failing to file a brief. On July 6, 2009,
      Appellant filed a PCRA petition for reinstatement of appellate
      rights. On January 29, 2010, the PCRA court reinstated appellate
      rights nunc pro tunc. On February 9, 2010, Appellant filed an
      appeal to [this Court] (444 EDA 2010). On February 7, 2012,
      [we] affirmed the denial by the PCRA court. On February 8, 2016,
      Appellant filed his [second] PCRA petition raising the issue of
      after-discovered evidence.     Counsel was court-appointed on
      August 6, 2020. On April 11, 2021, counsel filed a no-merit letter
      pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, [550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
      Super. 1988) (en banc)]. Appellant filed pro se responses.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalizations and footnote

omitted). Following the filing of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss

the petition without a hearing, the PCRA court dismissed the petition on

October 6, 2021. On that same day, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion

                                     -2-
J-S40019-22

to withdraw. Appellant pro se timely appealed. The PCRA court did not direct

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement of errors complained of on appeal.

        On appeal, 1 Appellant argues only that the PCRA court erred in denying

his petition without a hearing “where Appellant presented after-discovered

exculpatory evidence in the form of an affidavit from Lucy Gilbert and

sufficiently raised an issue of material fact in his filings[.]” Appellant’s Brief

at 6.

        It is settled that the PCRA contains the following restrictions governing

the timeliness of any PCRA petition.

        (b) Time for filing petition.--

        (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
        subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
        judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
        petitioner proves that:

              (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was      the
              result of interference by government officials with    the
              presentation of the claim in violation of              the
              Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or           the
              Constitution or laws of the United States;

              (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
              unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
              ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

              (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
              recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
              or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time

____________________________________________

1“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s
determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).

                                           -3-
J-S40019-22

              period provided in this section and has been held by
              that court to apply retroactively.

       (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
       shall be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have
       been presented.[2]

       (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
       the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
       the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
       review.

42   Pa.C.S.A.    §   9545(b).        Section    9545’s   timeliness   provisions   are

jurisdictional.    Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).

Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers no

authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA

time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations

omitted).

       Here, on November 8, 2004, a panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence.        Commonwealth v. Santiago, 867 A.2d 650 (Pa.

Super. 2004). As a result, his sentence became final on December 8, 2004,

more than 18 years ago. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

____________________________________________

2Section 9545(b)(2) was recently amended, effective December 24, 2018, to
extend the time for filing from sixty days of the date the claim could have
been presented to one year. The amendment applies only to claims arising
on or after December 24, 2017. Thus, this amendment does not apply to
Appellant’s PCRA petition because it was filed prior to the amendment’s
effective date.

                                           -4-
J-S40019-22

Accordingly, the instant petition is facially untimely because it was filed on

February 8, 2016.

        The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner

alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d

714, 719 (Pa. 2008). Here, Appellant has failed to prove at any stage of the

proceeding any exceptions to the one-year time bar. Although he appears to

invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, he does not tell us how he

satisfied the sixty-day period in subsection 9545(b)(2) for invoking the

exception.

        As the PCRA court aptly explained:

        Appellant attempted to satisfy the “previously unknown fact”
        exception, § 9545 (b )(1 )(ii) by claiming that the he had an alibi
        witness. Appellant included an affidavit from Lucy Gilbert dated
        January 22, 2016. In the affidavit Lucy Gilbert said she was on
        the phone with Appellant just prior to the shooting. She walked
        out of her house and saw three males, two African American and
        one Hispanic. Lucy Gilbert claims she then saw an African
        American male pull out a gun and shoot a Hispanic male. She
        then ran into her house due to fear. Appellant is unable to show
        that this is a new fact that he could not have presented early by
        exercising due diligence. Appellant knew this witness before he
        was arrested and tried for the murder.[3] Defense counsel
____________________________________________

3   As we frequently have explained:
        The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
        requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts
        upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those
        facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence
        demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-S40019-22

       presented Eliona Rodriquez as an alibi witness at trial and
       therefore there is no reason to believe counsel would not have
       presented Lucy Gilbert’s testimony as well. In a prose pleading,
       Appellant claims counsel refused to present Lucy Gilbert, or
       another woman named Dawn as alibi witnesses.[4] However, that
       further highlights that this information is not a new fact that could
       not have been presented in an earlier timely filing. This kind of
       presentation fell woefully short of Appellant’s obligation to explain
       how one of the statutory exceptions applied.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/5/22, at 4 (footnote omitted). We agree with the PCRA

court’s analysis. Appellant simply is unable to overcome the PCRA’s one-year

time-bar on the record before us. Consequently, the PCRA court did not err

in dismissing as untimely and without a hearing his second PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

       own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have
       learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
       This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of this
       exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly
       discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015).
4 Appellant at no point alleged counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to present
Lucy Gilbert’s testimony at trial. That issue now is waived, as Appellant failed
to raise it with the trial court or on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 984-85 (Pa. 2002); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544 (“For
purposes of [the PCRA], an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised
it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or
in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”).

                                           -6-
J-S40019-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

                          -7-