Court Opinion

ID: 9669619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:01:40.663251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:58.672177
License: Public Domain

OPINION
AMUNDSON, Judge.
Appellant J.A.J. challenges a disposition order on a juvenile delinquency adjudication of indecent exposure. The trial court ordered J.A.J. into a residential treatment program. J.A.J. argues that (1) the disposition order was an abuse of discretion, and (2) the trial court’s written findings were insufficient. We reverse.
FACTS
Appellant J.A.J. was charged by a delinquency petition with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, committed against his sister on October 29, 1993, at his mother’s home in Hennepin County. The petition was amended to add a count of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Later, the state amended the petition to charge indecent exposure, and on September 8, 1994, J.A.J. admitted to this charge in the petition.
The prosecutor explained that, as part of the agreement, the matter was to be referred to Anoka County, where J.A.J. lived with his father. The prosecutor also noted that
the parties anticipate that there be no out-of-home placement; however, we would anticipate that there be some further field study or some other kind of follow-up concerning this matter by Anoka County.
The Hennepin County court noted in its order: “No out of home placement contemplated.”
An initial disposition hearing was held in February 1995, at which the probation officer recommended that J.A.J. be placed on probation for six months and complete a sex offender assessment at the PHASE program. Over defense counsel’s objection to a sex offender program, the court ordered the PHASE assessment.
The PHASE report was completed in June 1995. The report noted J.A.J.’s family problems and his emotional and behavioral difficulties. The report recommended that J.A.J. take a polygraph examination in order to help him evaluate his offense behavior more honestly. The report also recommended that J.A.J. be placed in a residential treatment center with a sex-specific component.
The probation officer completed an adjustment report based in part on the PHASE evaluation. Although this report noted that J.A.J. had not committed any probation violations, it recommended that he be temporarily detained pending a review hearing and that he be given a polygraph test concerning the October 1993 incident. The probation officer later submitted a report addendum stating that J.A.J. had failed the polygraph test. He *414submitted a new recommendation that J.A.J. be placed at the Mille Lacs Academy Residential Treatment Program.
Another disposition hearing was held in August 1995. The probation officer testified that Mille Lacs Academy works with sex offenders, doing psychological evaluations and providing treatment with a sex-specific component. He also testified that inpatient treatment was in J.A.J.’s best interests because he lacked self-identity, and the best solution was to place him somewhere other than the home of either parent. He testified that an outpatient program was not intense enough for J.A.J.’s needs.
The trial court issued an order adopting the probation officer’s recommendation. The court found
that it is in the best interests of the child to be placed in a residential treatment center to address his present personality and psychological disorders. Further, the Court finds that an outpatient treatment environment shall not meet the needs of the child.
This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Is the trial court’s disposition order an abuse of discretion?
2. Are the trial court’s written findings sufficient?
ANALYSIS
I. Disposition
J.A.J. ai'gues that the trial court’s disposition, which sent him to Mille Lacs Academy for inpatient sex offender treatment, was not the least restrictive alternative available, was not in his best interests, and was imposed in violation of an agreement in Hennepin County that excluded any out-of-home placement.
The trial court has bi'oad discretion in choosing the appropriate juvenile delinquency disposition. In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Minn.App.1985). This court will affirm the disposition as long as it is not arbitrary. Id. Findings of fact in the dispositional order will be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Id. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial court’s disposition will not be disturbed. In re Welfare of M.A.C., 455 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Minn.App.1990).
We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to order a juvenile who was adjudicated for indecent exposure, and had no new offenses or probation violations in the nearly two years following the offense, into residential treatment.
At the disposition hearing, the state argued that there was no necessary link between the seriousness of the offense of adjudication and the severity of the disposition. But in L.K.W., this court stated:
To measure what [disposition] is necessary, a trial court must assess two factors, the severity of the child’s delinquency, and the severity of the proposed remedy. When the severity of intervention is disproportionate to the severity of the problem, the intervention is not necessary and cannot lawfully occur. The court must take the least drastic necessary step.
372 N.W.2d at 398.
At the initial disposition hearing, the trial court properly ordered a sex offender evaluation for J.A.J. See Minn.Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1(h) (1994) (court to order sex offender evaluation upon adjudication for indecent exposure, among other offenses). But the PHASE evaluation focuses primarily on J.A.J.’s family problems and his emotional problems due to family dysfunction. The evaluation does not identify any sexual problem requiring any treatment, let alone residential treatment. The Sexual Attitudes Questionnaire administered by PHASE showed no inappropriate responses (except one projecting blame on victims of sexual assault). Because J.A.J. blamed his sister for initiating the sexual incident, that response reflects nothing more than his denial of the original criminal sexual conduct charges.
In contrast to the minimal discussion of sexual issues in both the PHASE report and the probation officer’s report, there is extensive discussion of J.A.J.’s family problems. This court has criticized the use of a *415delinquency disposition “as a means to resolve the parents’ custody dispute.” See L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 398-99. Here, although there may be evidence of family dysfunction far deeper than a custody dispute, the trial court has no discretion to use a delinquency disposition to solve those problems.
The PHASE evaluation team expressed its concern about J.AJ.’s custody. The probation officer emphasized the need to pursue J.A.J.’s best interests rather than the interests of his parents. The probation officer suggested that after the Mille Lacs Academy program, the Anoka County Corrections Department might attempt to solve the custody problem.
Adults facing criminal sentencing for an offense similar to J.AJ.’s would not face a harsher sentence based on an assessment of their living arrangements. Neither would they be sanctioned for the faults of their parents or the parents’ noncooperation with the court system.
A delinquency disposition must serve the child’s best interests. Minn.Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1. But this court has held that the “best interests” standard does not supersede the requirement that the disposition be “necessary.” L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 399. In other words, this court explained:
The promise of benefits in a disposition, that the choice would be good or even best, does not permit an action which is not necessary.
Id. A disposition must be “necessary to the rehabilitation of the child,” and “necessary to restore law-abiding conduct in the juvenile.” Minn.Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1 (1994); In re Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn.App.1987). That a certain disposition may be desirable in a “holistic” sense, as the probation officer expressed in this case, does not make it “necessary” to restore a juvenile to law-abiding behavior.
Even on appeal, the state has failed to point to any evidence showing that J.A.J. has a sexual problem requiring treatment. The trial court’s order itself states that treatment is needed for “personality and psychological disorders.” Although the offense itself may suggest a possible need for sex offender treatment, the sex offender evaluation ordered for the specific purpose of deciding that question fails to substantiate it. Without such evidence, the disposition order is supported only by findings of family dysfunction more appropriately addressed in a child protection proceeding.
II. Findings
J.A.J. argues that the trial court’s written findings are inadequate because they do not show why less restrictive alternatives were rejected. See Minn.Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1 (court must make written findings on what alternative dispositions were considered and why they were not appropriate); M.A.C., 455 N.W.2d at 499 (failure to make statutorily required findings constitutes reversible error). We agree. The bare statement that the best interests of a child require the disposition is insufficient. See M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d at 151 (“best interests” finding with minimal elaboration was inadequate). Although the state urges this court to disregard any inadequacies in the findings in this case, those inadequacies point to a fundamental problem, the lack of any evidence that J.A.J. has a sexual problem, as opposed to a family problem, that requires residential treatment.
Given our reversal of the disposition order, we need not decide whether a remand for the statutorily-mandated findings is required. We do note that nothing stated in this opinion is intended to preclude the state from commencing a child protection proceeding at any time.
DECISION
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering residential sex offender treatment as a disposition for appellant’s juvenile delinquency adjudication. The trial court’s written findings are inadequate because they do not show why less restrictive alternatives were rejected.
Reversed.