Court Opinion

ID: 9870606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:03:29.730185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:50:08.931238
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/26/23 P. v. Sedillo CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B309401

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. NA085739)
           v.

 LISA SEDILLO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
      David Andreasen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Blythe J. Jeszkay, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ________________________________
      Lisa Sedillo appeals from an order denying her petition for
resentencing under the predecessor to Penal Code section 1172.6.1
We affirm.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In March 2013, a jury convicted Sedillo of one count of
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), five counts of attempted murder (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a)), and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246). We affirmed Sedillo’s murder conviction, reversed the
attempted murder convictions on statute of limitations grounds,
and reversed the shooting at an inhabited dwelling conviction with
directions to determine whether the statute of limitations had
expired on that count. (People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
1037, 1070 (Sedillo).) Sedillo was thereafter resentenced on the
murder count only to 15 years to life.
      In February 2019, Sedillo filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 in which she alleged that she was convicted
of “murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine” and she could not now be convicted
of murder because of changes made to the murder statutes as
of January 1, 2019.2 Sedillo also requested the appointment of
counsel.

      1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
       Sedillo filed her petition under the predecessor to
section 1172.6, which was originally codified as section 1170.95.
(See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, pp. 6675–6677; Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For the sake of consistency and to avoid confusion, we will
refer only to the current statutory designation.
      2 Sedillo filed her petition prior to an amendment to
section 1172.6 that permits resentencing if the petitioner was

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       The trial court appointed counsel for Sedillo and directed
the People to file a response to the petition.
       In their respective papers in the trial court, the People and
Sedillo agreed on the following facts concerning the crime. Sedillo
and Francisco Moreno were members of the Eastside Longo gang.
On December 1, 1992, Sedillo drove Moreno to a house where a
wake was being held for a former member of a rival of Eastside
Longo. Moreno got out of the car, fired at least 10 shots into
a group of people attending the wake, and returned to the car.
Sedillo then drove away. Moreno’s gunfire killed Jason Bandel
and wounded several others. Moreno was prosecuted and convicted
of Bandel’s murder in 1995. Sixteen years later, Sedillo was
charged with Bandel’s murder and other crimes after she made
incriminating statements in 2010. (Sedillo, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1042.)
       The People argued that Sedillo is ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law because she was prosecuted as a direct aider
and abettor, and the court did not instruct her jury as to the
felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
       In her response to the opposition, Sedillo conceded that
the jury that convicted her had not been instructed on either
the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, but argued that she was entitled to relief because the jury

convicted under a “theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person's participation in a crime,” as
well as under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, p. 6971.) For
purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the amendment
applies to Sedillo’s petition. (See People v. Langli (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972, 978, fn. 3 (Langli); People v. Montes (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006–1007.)

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made no finding that she acted with the intent to kill or that she
had actual knowledge of Moreno’s intent to kill.
      The court denied the petition without a hearing.3 The court
noted that Sedillo’s jury was not instructed on the felony-murder
rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
that “there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . that [Sedillo] aided and abetted Moreno in
the murder with implied malice.”
      Sedillo appealed. We appointed counsel for her, who filed
a brief that asserted no arguable issues and requested that we
review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende). Sedillo did not submit a supplemental brief or otherwise
inform us of any issues to be considered. We dismissed the appeal
as abandoned, citing People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496,
among other authorities.
      Our Supreme Court granted review and deferred action in the
matter pending its decision in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). (People v. Sedillo, S271292, Supreme Ct. Mins.,
Dec. 15, 2021.)
      On December 19, 2022, the Supreme Court decided
Delgadillo. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.) On March 29, 2023,
the Supreme Court transferred Sedillo’s case to this court with
directions to vacate our decision and reconsider whether to exercise
our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record or

      3 At the time the court ruled on Sedillo’s petition in October
2020, the court was not required to hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner made a prima facie showing for relief.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, pp. 6675–6677.) The Legislature
subsequently amended section 1172.6 to require “the court [to]
hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, p. 6972.)

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provide any other relief in light of Delgadillo. (People v. Sedillo,
S271292, Supreme Ct. Mins., Mar. 29, 2023.)
      On April 10, 2023, Sedillo’s counsel moved to strike his
“Wende / Delgadillo brief ” and set a briefing schedule. We granted
the motion on April 17, 2023 and directed counsel to file an opening
brief within 30 days. We also granted Sedillo’s request to augment
the record with the jury instructions given at Sedillo’s trial and
granted the Attorney General’s request to take judicial notice of
the appellate record in Sedillo’s direct appeal. Sedillo and the
People thereafter filed briefs and were given an opportunity for
oral argument.

                           DISCUSSION
       We review de novo the trial court’s determination
that a petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing under
section 1172.6. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251; People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
       Sedillo contends that the court engaged in “impermissible
factfinding” at the prima facie stage of her section 1172.6 petition,
improperly applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard of proof,
and did not consider whether the jury instructions permitted the
jury to convict Sedillo on a theory under which malice was imputed
to her based solely on her participation in a crime. We need not
decide the merits of these arguments if the record of conviction,
including the jury instructions, establishes as a matter of law that
Sedillo is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden); People v. Daniel
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677, review granted Feb. 24, 2021
& review dism. Dec. 1, 2021, S266336; People v. Garcia (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 956, 971; see Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 233 [further proceedings not required when reviewing court

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independently reviews the record and determines that petitioner is
not entitled to relief under section 1172.6].)
       A petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law when the jury that convicted the petitioner of murder
was not instructed on the felony-murder rule, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or another theory by which malice
could be imputed to the petitioner based solely on the petitioner’s
participation in a crime. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
198, 205; see Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52; People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599.)
       Here, Sedillo concedes that her jury was not instructed on
the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. She contends, however, that the jury instructions
permitted the jury to find her guilty on another theory under which
malice was imputed to her based solely on her participation in the
crime. We reject the contention.
       In instructing Sedillo’s jury on aiding and abetting murder,
the court stated that “the aider and abettor’s guilt is determined
by the combined acts of all of the participants as well as the
person[’]s own mental state.” The court further instructed that
“[a] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he
or she: [¶] (1) [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) [w]ith the intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶]
(3) [b]y act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the
commission of the crime.” (Brackets omitted.)
       Regarding “the crime” of murder, the court instructed the
jury that murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought, that malice may be express or implied, and
that malice is implied when “[(1)] [t]he killing resulted from an
intentional act; [¶] [(2)] [t]he natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life; and [¶] [(3)] [t]he act was deliberately

                                  6
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life.”
       Reading these instructions together, the jury was required to
determine Sedillo’s guilt for the crime of murder based in part on
her “own mental state,” which includes knowing the perpetrator’s
“unlawful purpose” and having the “intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime.” In
applying these instructions to the count of murder, the jury could
only have reasonably understood “the crime,” as used in this
instruction, to mean the crime of murder; no target or other crime
is indicated.
       In People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, our Supreme
Court explained that “one cannot knowingly and intentionally
help another commit an unlawful killing without acting with
malice” in the absence of “some circumstance negating malice.”
(Id. at p. 1123.) Sedillo points to no “circumstance” in this case
that could have negated malice. We can thus rephrase McCoy’s
statement to avoid its double negative to state: One who knowingly
and intentionally helps another commit an unlawful killing acts
with malice. This is substantively indistinguishable from the jury’s
finding that Sedillo knew of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and
acted with the intent and purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime of murder. Based on the
instructions, therefore, the jury’s finding necessarily implies that
she acted with malice. (See ibid.) Although such malice may be
implied, it was, as the jury was further instructed, based on her
“own mental state,” and not imputed to her based solely on her
participation in the crime.
       Sedillo relies on Langli, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972. In
Langli, our colleagues in the First District addressed similar
jury instructions and came to a different result. The Langli court
reasoned that the instruction that the aider and abettor must act

                                 7
with “ ‘the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime’ ” “does not state that
the aider and abettor must himself have known that the act he
aided was life-threatening, or that he must himself have acted
with indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 982.) If the “trial
court uses such an instruction without tailoring it to the specifics
of that crime,” the Langli court reasoned, “the instruction creates
an ambiguity under which the jury may find the defendant guilty
of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding
that he personally acted with malice.” (Ibid.; accord, People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1265.)
       We need not decide whether Langli is correct. It does not
appear from the decision in Langli that the court instructed the
jury in that case that the jury must determine the defendant’s
guilt based on his own mental state. In the absence of such an
instruction, the Court of Appeal could reasonably construe the
instructions as a whole as creating “an ambiguity under which
the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting
second degree murder without finding that he personally acted
with malice.” (Langli, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) Here,
by contrast, Sedillo’s jury was instructed that it must determine
Sedillo’s guilt as an aider and abettor based on her “own mental
state,” and that murder requires the mental state of “malice
aforethought.” The ambiguity in the Langli instructions, therefore,
is not present in this case. Rather, the instructions unambiguously
required the jury to find that Sedillo acted with the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the crime of
murder, which, in the absence of circumstances negating malice,
is “acting with malice.” (People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 1123.)

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       Because the record of conviction establishes that Sedillo is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, any
error in the proceeding below is harmless.4

                           DISPOSITION
      The order denying Sedillo’s resentencing petition is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  CHANEY, J.

                  BENDIX, J.

      4 Because we affirm the court’s ruling for the reasons stated,
we do not address the Attorney General’s further argument that
the jury’s determination that Sedillo was guilty of five counts of
attempted murder necessarily implies that she acted with express
malice or Sedillo’s argument that the attempted murder convictions
are irrelevant because we reversed such convictions on Sedillo’s
direct appeal.

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