Court Opinion

ID: 9382404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 17:02:31.647081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.215982
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/24/23 S.H. v. Superior Court CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    S.H.,
                                                                                             F085614
             Petitioner,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 20CEJ300241-5)
                    v.

    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO                                                          OPINION
    COUNTY,

             Respondent;

    FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
    SOCIAL SERVICES,

             Real Party in Interest.

                                                   THE COURT *
            ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Kimberly J.
Nystrom-Geist, Judge.
            Juvenile Law Center and Lusine M. Vardanova for Petitioner.
            No appearance for Respondent.
            Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Carlie Flaugher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*           Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
       Petitioner S.H. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders removing her now seven-month-old
daughter, E.H., from her custody, denying her family reunification services and setting a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.1 Mother contends there was
insufficient evidence she was using drugs to support the court’s rulings. She also
requests a stay of the section 366.26 hearing set for May 10, 2023. We deny the petition
and a stay.
                     PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
       These dependency proceedings were prompted by mother’s circumstances at the
time of E.H.’s birth in August 2022. Just two months before, her parental rights to her
minor children E.M., C.M., A.M. and L.H. (the siblings) were terminated after she failed
to reunify with them. Because the facts and circumstances in the siblings’ case are
germane to the juvenile court’s rulings in the instant case, we begin our summary of the
case there.
The Siblings’ Case
       In August 2020, then four-year-old E.M., 17-month-old C.M. and six-month-old
A.M. (the children) were found in an unsafe and unsanitary home with little to no food.
A.M. and C.M. were dirty and wearing soiled diapers. E.M. had on d irty and stained
clothes. E.M. said mother “ ‘smokes drugs.’ ” He also claimed C.M. got the drugs and
smoked them. The children were taken into protective custody and placed with their
maternal great aunt, L.R. In May 2021, the juvenile court ordered mother to complete
parenting classes, mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence assessments and
any recommended treatment, and submit to random drug testing. In June 2021, mother
gave birth to L.H. and both tested positive for amphetamine. L.H. was adjudged a
dependent of the court and mother was ordered to participate in family reunification

1      Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                            2.
services for her also. However, mother did not complete any of her court-ordered
services. She missed multiple appointments for a substance abuse assessment and
expressed interest in inpatient substance abuse treatment but denied having a substance
abuse problem. By the six-month review hearing, she had not completed substance abuse
treatment or enrolled in random drug testing. In December 2021, mother’s reunification
services were terminated and in June 2022 her parental rights were terminated. 2
The Referral
       In August 2022, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department)
received a crisis referral that mother had just given birth to E.H. and the medical staff
suspected she was under the influence of drugs. Her speech was rapid and she was
hostile and uncooperative. Despite her extensive history of substance abuse and child
welfare involvement, she denied having either. In a second referral received the same
day, the department was informed that mother was using methamphetamine and engaging
in domestic violence with Hector B., E.H.’s father. She was homeless and using Rescue
the Children as a shelter.
       Sarah Martinez, an investigating social worker, went to the hospital to meet with
mother. She knocked on the door and entered the room. A woman sitting in a chair
holding E.H. told Martinez mother was in the bathroom and she was mother’s friend.
Hector was asleep in a corner of the room behind the door. When mother exited the
bathroom and saw Martinez, she became upset and hostile and demanded to know why
she was allowed in her room. Mother declined to speak to Martinez and said she did not
have to answer any of her questions. Mother denied the siblings were adopted, accusing
Martinez of having inaccurate information and not being a “real CPS social worker.”
Mother continued yelling that it was none of the department’s business and that her
situation was different and she did not have to prove that. Martinez explained the

2      Mother did not appeal the termination order.

                                             3.
department needed to assess mother’s living situation and verify the changes. Mother
reluctantly stated that she lived at Rescue the Children. She refused to sign a release of
information to allow the department to communicate with the staff at Rescue the
Children. Mother said she was not enrolled in the substance abuse program at Rescue the
Children because she did not use drugs. When Hector spoke up, stating mother did not
use drugs, Martinez asked if Hector was E.H.’s father. Mother yelled, “ ‘Don’t answer
that! Don’t tell her anything!’ ” Martinez left mother’s room while mother continued to
yell at her.
       The following day, social worker Araceli Marquez arrived at the hospital, knocked
on mother’s door and entered. She observed a car seat and some clothing. Mother did
not want to disclose the name of E.H.’s father. She denied a history of domestic violence
and said her children were previously removed because she was using drugs. When
Marquez asked mother which drugs she used mother claimed not to know. She did not
think it was necessary for her to drug test for the department.
       On August 16, 2022, Margaret Castillo at Rescue the Children told Marquez
mother had been at the shelter since May 28, 2022. She drug tested upon entry with
negative results. She had not tested since. Mother was not in a program but could
remain in the shelter if she was working on herself, which she was doing as well as taking
a parenting class. Castillo said the facility had all the baby supplies and would allow
mother to get back on her feet. She was upset mother had not been honest with the social
workers. At a team decision making meeting later that day, mother said the siblings were
removed while she was living on a shared property and the yard was not suitable for the
siblings. L.H. was removed because mother relapsed and used methamphetamine just
before L.H. was born. She said it was a big mistake. One of the social workers pointed
out that reunification services were ordered in July 2021 and mother did not participate.
She said she did not complete services in that case because she lacked transportation but
had moved to Fresno to be closer to her service providers. Castillo said mother had met

                                             4.
the 90-day limit to stay in the shelter but they were not going to make her leave. She said
mother was allowed to leave during the day and her whereabouts were unknown for a
while. Mother also said there was a domestic violence incident in November 2021 from
which she received multiple contusions and a black eyes. Asked why Hector was in her
hospital room, she said he heard about E.H.’s birth through a friend. Mother began
deflecting and stated she could not make up for yesterday but could make up for
tomorrow. Marquez confirmed that a criminal protective order was issued in March 2022
protecting mother from Hector. The protective order expired in March 2025 and did not
include peaceful contact.
The Detention
       The department took E.H. into protective custody and filed a dependency petition
on her behalf, alleging under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that mother did not have any
baby supplies or stable housing when she gave birth to E.H. and exhibited aggressive and
paranoid behavior, including asking the same questions repeatedly, yelling and having
rapid speech patterns. It further alleged mother continued to use controlled substances
despite receiving family reunification services, including substance abuse treatment and
random drug testing. Under section 300, subdivision (j), the petition alleged mother
failed to provide the siblings adequate care, supervision and protection because of her
ongoing substance abuse problem, citing the circumstances of their dependency case, and
therefore placed E.H. at a substantial risk of suffering the same abuse and neglect.
Hector H. was identified as E.H.’s alleged father on the petition. E.H. was placed with
her siblings in L.R.’s home.
       On August 22, 2022, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the siblings’ case,
ordered E.H. detained, and offered mother substance abuse, mental health and domestic
violence assessments and any recommended treatment and random drug testing. The
court ordered twice weekly one-hour supervised visitation for mother and set the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing (combined hearing) for October 12, 2022. On August

                                             5.
29, 2022, the department received a copy of E.H.’s umbilical cord test, which revealed
negative results for all substances.
The Contested Combined Hearing
       The juvenile court continued the combined hearing and conducted it as a contested
hearing on January 12, 2023. Meanwhile, on August 31, 2022, mother completed a
substance use disorders orientation and was referred for a substance abuse assessment
with Delta Care. On September 6, she completed a substance abuse assessment with
counselor Mark Blanton at Delta Care and reported she was in the pretreatment phase
with Rescue the Children and had not used since November 2021 and had no desire or
urge to use. Blanton determined, based on mother’s assessment, that she did not require
treatment.
       In its report for the combined hearing, the department recommended the juvenile
court deny mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and
(11) because of her failure to treat her substance abuse. Although she participated in
random drug testing with negative results from August 29 to October 3, 2022, and was
living in Rescue the Children, a controlled sober living environment, she had not
demonstrated her ability to maintain her sobriety.
       Also in the months preceding the contested hearing, Hector underwent paternity
testing and the juvenile court deemed him to be E.H.’s biological father. The department
recommended the court deny Hector reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (a).
       Social worker Stefania Rodriguez testified mother participated in two of the
26 required classes for the domestic violence program and was participating in a 52-week
child abuse intervention program. According to her service providers, she engaged and
interacted in her sessions. Mother attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings when
she had the opportunity and regularly and consistently visited E.H. twice a week for one
hour. Mother was discharged from Rescue the Children in October 2022 because she

                                            6.
was involved in a verbal altercation with another client that became physical. According
to the case manager, mother was serving lunch and the client arrived late. The client
thought mother told her she could not eat because she was late. The client got upset and
the altercation ensued. Rodriguez did not know who attacked whom.
       Dr. Oliver Ezenwugo, director of the Phoenix Program, testified mother
participated in domestic violence, anger management, child abuse intervention and
victim’s mentality classes through his program. Mother regularly attended and was doing
well. She participated without having to be prompted and was not aggressive or
disruptive. He believed she was benefitting from her classes based on her progress
reports and the input from other service providers.
       Mother testified she had been clean and sober for over a year but did not know the
exact date of her sobriety. She began residing at Rescue the Children in March 2022.
She tested a couple of times there and the results were negative. She had more than
enough supplies for E.H. when she was born. She had a car seat and a diaper bag in her
hospital room. She moved from the shelter side of Rescue the Children in August 2022
to the treatment side. She was discharged from the program in October 2022 after the
incident with the late client. The woman had been warned twice that she could not come
late or she was not going to be served her meal. When she came in late again, mother
told her they would serve her and her children that time but would not serve them if they
were late the next day. The woman thought she and her children were not going to be fed
then and became angry. Mother repeated herself and the woman became aggressive,
threw her tray at mother and left. Mother was not physically aggressive but was loud and
used profanity. She regretted not walking away from the situation instead of arguing.
After leaving Rescue the Children, she went to Naomi’s House to avoid homelessness.
She participated in group therapy once a week, was enrolled in one-on-one therapy,
attended AA meetings from Friday to Tuesday, and was enrolled in Narcotics
Anonymous (NA) meetings. She was learning how her behavior affected her children.

                                            7.
Since she last participated in reunification services, she was more “clear minded” and
maintained her sobriety.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
       The juvenile court sustained the jurisdictional allegations and denied the parents
reunification services as recommended. In ruling, the court found sufficient evidence
mother had an ongoing substance abuse problem based on the totality of the
circumstances. Specifically, the court credited the medical staff’s suspicion mother was
using drugs based on her erratic behavior, rapid speech and denial of past drug use. The
court noted that mother had some drug tests after E.H.’s birth that were negative and that
her umbilical cord was negative. However, the court lacked any medical testimony that
would allow it to interpret what the negative umbilical cord meant, stating, “I have no
way of knowing if that means that the mother would not have used for the duration of the
pregnancy or if the mother would not have used for two days prior to birth, so there is no
perspective offered as to that meaning.” As to the clean drug tests, the court stated it had
no way of knowing what that meant other than that mother tested clean on those
particular days. The court did not find mother credible regarding her sobriety date. In
her assessment with Delta Care, she said she had not used since November 2021. At a
different point, she said she relapsed right before L.H. was born in June 2021 and did not
use any other time.
       Regarding disposition as to mother, the juvenile court ordered E.H. removed from
her custody and denied her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)
and (11) based on the outcome of the siblings’ case and mother’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to treat the problems necessitating their removal. The court stated
reasonable efforts would have included participating in substance abuse treatment and
some form of domestic violence services and utilizing the protection of the criminal
protective order, instead of allowing Hector to be present in her hospital room. The court
noted that mother completed seven sessions of a child abuse prevention program and

                                             8.
anger management program but found seven sessions minimal and less than a reasonable
effort in light of her significant problems.
                                       DISCUSSION
       On appeal, we review jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders under
the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237,
244.) Substantial evidence exists when the evidence is “reasonable in nature, credible,
and of solid value,” so that “a reasonable mind would accept [it] as adequate to support
[the] conclusion.” (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) Under this standard
of review, we consider the record as a whole, in a light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s findings and conclusions, and we defer to the juvenile court on any issues of
credibility of the evidence. (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733−734.) The
existence of evidence of some support for a contrary finding will not defeat the finding.
(In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 823.) Moreover, “[w]hen the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of
proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must
determine if there is any substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible and of solid value—to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” (In re Jasmine
C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) However, we bear in mind that the juvenile court was
required to make the findings on the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard
of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995−996.)
I.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings
       Mother contends there was insufficient evidence at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing to find that she had a substance abuse problem that negatively affected her ability
to provide E.H. adequate care, supervision and protection. On the contrary, she argues,
the evidence reflects she gave birth to a healthy baby whose umbilical cord tested
negative, she had been clean and sober since May 2022, consistently tested negative for

                                               9.
the six months between detention and jurisdiction and did not meet the medical necessity
for drug treatment. We disagree the evidence was insufficient.
       A juvenile court may exercise its dependency jurisdiction over a child if it finds,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the actions of a parent bring the child within one of
the statutory definitions set forth in section 300 and its subdivisions. (In re Joshua G.
(2005) 129 Cal.App,.4th 189, 202.) Here, the juvenile court adjudged E.H a minor
described under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). Subdivision (b)(1) applies, as
relevant here, where the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of …: [¶] [t]he failure or inability
of the child’s parent … to adequately supervise or protect the child[ or by] [¶] … [¶]
[t]he inability of the parent … to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s …
substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (j) applies when “[t]he child’s
sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i) and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in those
subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j).)
       With respect to substance abuse, the petition alleged under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) that mother continued to use controlled substances as evidenced by her
aggressive and paranoid behavior and rapid speech at the hospital on or around
August 14, 2022. The petition further alleged under subdivision (j) that mother was using
drugs and neglecting the siblings in August 2020, tested positive for amphetamine in
June 2021 while giving birth to L.H. and failed to complete court-ordered drug
treatment.3

3      Although we could affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding based on
substantial evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (b)(1) allegation alone, we
also address the subdivision (j) allegation regarding mother’s drug use and neglect of the
siblings as that evidence is pertinent to its true finding under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1).

                                              10.
       Mother contends her behavior alone at the time of E.H.’s birth was insufficient to
find jurisdiction in the absence of objective indicia of ongoing drug use such as positive
test results or the presence of drugs in the umbilical cord blood. What she fails to
acknowledge, however, is the probative value of her substance abuse history and denial
to the medical staff and the drug abuse counselor that she had a drug problem. “Although
‘the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing
subject the minor to the defined risk of harm’ [citation], the court may nevertheless
consider past events when determining whether a child presently needs the juvenile
court’s protection. [Citations.] A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior. [Citation.] ‘Facts supporting allegations that a child is one described
by section 300 are cumulative.’ [Citation.] Thus, the court ‘must consider all the
circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur.’ ” (In re T.V. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) Further, a parent’s denial of wrongdoing or failure to recognize
the negative impact of her conduct is also a relevant consideration in the court’s
determination of risk under section 300. (In re Tania S., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 735,
fn. 4; see also In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often
relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future
without court supervision.’ ”].)
       Here, mother’s history of drug use is sufficiently longstanding that it resulted in
the neglect of the siblings and ultimately the termination of her parental rights. Just
two months after that occurred, she gave birth to E.H. and was exhibiting behavior which
the medical staff deemed consistent with drug use. At that same time, mother flatly
denied having any drug problems even though her parental rights had just been
terminated in large part for that reason. Further, she could not pinpoint a sobriety date;
the best she could estimate was a month and year and even that was nebulous. For
example, she told the counselor at Delta Care during her assessment in September 2022
that she had been clean and sober since November 2021, yet testified in January 2023 that

                                             11.
she had been clean and sober for over a year but did not know the exact date or offer a
year and a month. What is clear from the record despite the lack of positive test results
are the facts that mother’s drug use was a significant factor in the loss of custody and
parental rights in the siblings’ case, she had 16 months in which to complete drug
treatment before her reunification services were terminated but did not, and just
two months after her parental rights were terminated, she exhibited behavior consistent
with drug use, yet denied ever using drugs. If mother was under the influence of drugs
around the time of E.H.’s birth, as was suspected, then she mispresented to the drug
counselor in September 2022 that she had been clean and sober for over a year and
thwarted her own chances of receiving drug treatment by not honestly reporting her drug
use. On that evidence, the juvenile court could find that mother’s untreated substance
abuse problem posed a substantial risk of harm to E.H. at the time of the combined
hearing. Consequently, we affirm its jurisdictional findings under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).
II.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Removal Order
       Mother next contends the department’s report was void of any meaningful
discussion of whether reasonable efforts were made to protect E.H. without removing her
from her custody, including following up on the services offered to her at the detention
hearing. For the reasons explained below, we conclude substantial evidence also
supports the juvenile court’s removal order.
       The juvenile court may not remove a child from the physical custody of a parent
with whom the child resided at the time a dependency petition was initiated unless, as
pertinent here, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the [child] if [the child] were returned home, and there are no reasonable
means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without removing the
[child] from [the parent’s physical custody.]” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The court must

                                            12.
“make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal of the [child] from his or her home” and “shall state the
facts on which the decision to remove the [child] is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) In
addition, the department’s report must include “[a] discussion of the reasonable efforts
made to prevent or eliminate removal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).)
       Mother does not contend the evidence was insufficient to support a finding E.H.
would be at a substantial risk of harm if placed in her custody. Instead, she contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the other required finding under the statute,
i.e., that there were no reasonable means to protect E.H. without removing her. To that
end, mother does not identify an alternative that she contends would have prevented
E.H.’s removal. She simply claims the department’s report is devoid of any evidence that
it considered any alternatives. We disagree. The department considered the option of
placing E.H. with mother at Rescue the Children. Its discussion of the matter is
contained in its detention report. On August 16, 2022, social worker Castillo and mother
met to discuss the department’s concerns mother was still using drugs and placing herself
at risk for domestic violence. Castillo stated mother was free to leave Rescue the
Children during the day and her whereabouts were unknown for a period of time. The
social workers pointed out she was still in a relationship with Hector and had not made
progress in any of the services ordered in the siblings’ case. Consequently, the social
workers decided it was unsafe and premature to place E.H. in mother’s custody, thus
eliminating Rescue the Children as a viable option.
       To the extent mother contends the department could have prevented E.H.’s
removal by following up on the services offered to her at the detention hearing, the record
reflects that the department did so. As documented in its report for the combined
hearing, the department mailed mother an individualized service letter on August 22,
2022, listing the services the department was ordered to offer her and the dates she was to
attend and the location and/or telephone number of the service provider. In the case of

                                            13.
mental health services, the letter informed mother that the service provider would contact
her. According to the same report, mother completed the assessments and enrolled in
random drug testing. We thus conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
removal order.
III.   Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Denial of Services Orders
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services
under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) because there is insufficient evidence to
support a finding, required under both subdivisions, that she failed to make reasonable
efforts to address the problems that led to the removal of E.H.’s siblings. 4 We disagree.
       “As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under
dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to ‘the
child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father.’ ” (Jennifer S. v. Superior
Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1120, quoting § 361.5, subd. (a).) However,
reunification services need not be provided under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) when
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]hat the court ordered termination of
reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent …
failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been
removed from that parent … and that parent … has not subsequently made reasonable
effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child
from that parent ….” Similarly, reunification services need not be provided under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11) when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
“[t]hat the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been

4       Although we may affirm the juvenile court’s denial of services order if substantial
evidence supports one of the subdivisions under section 361.5, section (b) (In re Brian M.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401), we review subdivision (b)(10) and (11) since the
issue is the same for each subpart, i.e., whether mother made reasonable efforts to address
her drug abuse subsequent to the removal of the siblings.

                                              14.
permanently severed, and … this parent has not subsequently made reasonable effort to
treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from the
parent ….”
       “The ‘no reasonable effort’ clause provides a means of mitigating a harsh rule that
would allow the court to deny services based only upon the parent’s prior failure to
reunify with the child’s sibling ‘when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked
toward correcting the underlying problems.’ ” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) The focus on whether the parent has “ ‘subsequently’ ” made
reasonable efforts to treat problems that led to the removal of the sibling “refers to
reasonable efforts made since the removal of the sibling,” and not to reasonable efforts
made since reunification services or parental rights were terminated as to the sibling. (Id.
at p. 98.)
       “Moreover, not every ‘effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the
problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these
provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the
duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating to
the quality and quantity of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness.
And while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress, or
lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears
on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court, supra, 15
Cal.App.5th at p. 1121, italics omitted.)
       Here, mother asserts she made reasonable efforts to treat the problems requiring
the siblings’ removal as evidenced by her negative drug test results, attendance at AA and
NA meetings, participation in mental health and child abuse programs and finding stable
housing albeit it in a shelter. The fact that she never completed drug treatment, she
contends, is immaterial since she was able to overcome her drug problem without it. The
record, however, does not support mother’s contention.

                                             15.
       The siblings were removed from mother’s custody in August 2020 because she
was using methamphetamine and neglecting them. Though she was provided services to
reunify with them, including drug treatment, she did not complete treatment and nearly a
year later, in June 2021, she gave birth to a fourth child who tested positive for
amphetamine. Again, she was provided drug treatment, which she did not complete. In
December 2021, her reunification services were terminated and in June 2022, nearly
two years after the siblings were removed, mother’s parental rights were terminated. At
no time up to that point had she completed drug treatment. Two months later, she gave
birth to E.H. and behaved in a way that caused the medical professionals to suspect she
was using drugs. At the same time, someone reported mother was homeless, using
methamphetamine and engaging in domestic violence with Hector. This was
approximately nine months after Hector assaulted her, leaving multiple contusions and
black eyes. Despite an order restraining him, mother allowed Hector in her hospital
room. By the hearing in January 2023, mother had participated in approximately
six weeks (August 29 to October 3, 2022) of random drug testing, attended group therapy
and some AA meetings, recently enrolled in NA meetings and one-on-one therapy and
completed seven sessions of child abuse and anger management. However, nearly
three years after the siblings’ removal, she had yet to complete drug treatment,
demonstrate that she was in a recovery program or that she was participating in domestic
violence services. On that evidence, the juvenile court could find that mother’s efforts
subsequent to the siblings’ removal to treat her drug abuse and domestic violence were
not reasonable.
       We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders denying
mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) and
setting a section 366.26 hearing.

                                             16.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The petition for extraordinary writ and request for a stay of the section 366.26
hearing are denied. This court’s opinion is final forthwith as to this court pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).

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