Court Opinion

ID: 9395810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 18:00:46.640978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.562122
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10233         Document: 00516754853             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                        No. 21-10233                                  FILED
                                                                                  May 18, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Christian Winchel,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                             Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:19-CV-2290

   Before Jolly, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
          Christian Winchel, a federal prisoner, was convicted on his plea of
   guilty to child pornography crimes. After sentencing, Winchel filed this 28
   U.S.C. § 2255 motion, challenging the validity of his guilty plea, on the basis
   that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). Therefore, he
   argues that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that his conviction should be
   vacated.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-10233     Document: 00516754853          Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/18/2023

                                   No. 21-10233

          The district court denied his motion. On appeal, Winchel contends
   that the district court erred in denying his IAC claims and abused its
   discretion in denying his requests for discovery and for an evidentiary
   hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
                                          I.
          We begin with an overview of the investigation that led to Winchel’s
   conviction. Between 2012 and 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
   (“FBI”) investigated “Website A.” Website A allowed users to post and
   access images and videos depicting child pornography. During their
   investigation, the FBI determined that one account on Website A bore
   Winchel’s IP address. The FBI used this information to support a search
   warrant of Winchel’s residence, and a search led to the discovery and seizure
   of computers, tapes, and other digital storage equipment that contained
   thousands of videos and images depicting sexually graphic and exploitative
   images of children. In an interview with the FBI, Winchel ultimately
   admitted that he was producing child pornography videos so that he could
   trade the videos online.
          A grand jury charged Winchel with (1) production of child
   pornography; (2) transporting and shipping child pornography; and (3) two
   counts of possession of prepubescent child pornography. Winchel later
   pleaded guilty to all charges except for one count of possession of
   prepubescent child pornography, which the Government dismissed pursuant
   to his plea agreement. Winchel’s plea agreement contained a waiver of his
   appellate and postconviction rights.
          At his rearraignment, Winchel stated that he was “glad it was over”
   and that there were no excuses for his “completely inappropriate and
   unacceptable behavior.” Winchel’s counsel advised the court that Winchel
   “chose on his own” to forgo trial, despite having “nothing to lose,” and that

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   he pleaded guilty, in part out of consideration for the families and victims.
   His counsel argued for mitigation because of his decision. Winchel also stated
   that he understood the nature of the charges against him, was satisfied with
   counsel’s advice and representation, and was pleading guilty voluntarily. The
   district court sentenced him to a total of 600 months of imprisonment and
   entered a restitution order.
          Later, Winchel had second thoughts. After his 600-month sentence
   began, he moved for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He
   attacked the validity of his plea based on two primary IAC claims, which in
   his mind rendered his plea involuntary. First, he alleged that counsel failed
   to retain an expert to investigate tactics used by law enforcement to obtain
   his IP address. Second, he alleged that counsel failed to move for suppression
   of the evidence based on the “international silver-platter doctrine.” 1
   Winchel claimed that but for these deficiencies, he would not have entered
   the plea and would have demanded a jury trial. Winchel also requested
   discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this motion.
          The magistrate judge rejected Winchel’s arguments. First, the
   magistrate judge determined that Winchel’s guilty plea was knowing and
   voluntary. The magistrate judge further found that Winchel’s plea
   agreement waived his pre-plea IAC claims because his claims were “not
   fundamentally related to the entry of his voluntary plea.”
          The magistrate judge then addressed Winchel’s requests for
   discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge concluded that
   because Winchel’s claims regarding the voluntary nature of his plea

          1
           The “international silver platter doctrine” is a term that the Second Circuit
   adopted with respect to potential exclusion of evidence obtained from foreign law
   enforcement sources. United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2013).

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   “lack[ed] merit for reasons wholly supported by the record,” an evidentiary
   hearing was unnecessary and discovery was moot.
          The district court adopted the findings, conclusions, and
   recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Winchel’s § 2255
   motion. This appeal followed.
                                          II.
          We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
   conclusions de novo. See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir.
   2008). “[W]e may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not
   relied on by the district court.” United States v. Gonzalez, 592 F.3d 675, 681
   (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
                                          III.
                                          A.
          We first address whether the district court erred when it adopted the
   magistrate judge’s finding that Winchel’s IAC claims were not related to the
   entry of his voluntary plea and were therefore barred by his plea agreement.
          It is true that “once a guilty plea has been entered, all nonjurisdictional
   defects in the proceedings against a defendant are waived.” Cavitt, 550 F.3d
   at 441 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983)). And this
   waiver “includes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States
   v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). But there is an exception to this
   rule that applies here: A guilty plea does not waive IAC claims when
   “[counsel’s] ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea
   involuntary.” Id.
          Here, Winchel alleged that his plea was involuntary because of
   counsel’s constitutionally-ineffective performance. Specifically, Winchel
   alleged that, but for counsel’s failure to investigate the Government’s tactics

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   used to obtain his IP address and move for suppression of that evidence, he
   would not have pleaded guilty, and instead, he would have proceeded to trial.
   Stated differently, in challenging the competency of counsel’s performance
   with regards to filing a motion to suppress, Winchel challenged the
   voluntariness of his guilty plea.
          The magistrate judge, however, did not see it that way. The magistrate
   judge instead concluded that Winchel’s claims were “not fundamentally
   related to the entry of his voluntary plea” and that therefore his plea
   agreement waived his IAC claims. But the magistrate judge was mistaken
   because this court treats allegations of counsel’s failure to investigate viable
   grounds for suppressing evidence, as challenges to the validity of a guilty plea.
   See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 741–46 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (finding counsel’s failure to investigate exculpatory evidence affected
   voluntariness of plea). Accordingly, the district court erred in adopting the
   magistrate judge’s finding that Winchel’s IAC claims were not related to the
   voluntariness of his plea and were therefore barred by his plea agreement.
                                           B.
          Thus, having held that the district court erred in concluding that
   Winchel’s plea agreement barred any consideration of his IAC claims, we
   must now ask whether to remand to allow the district court to first consider
   those claims. Here, we think that remand is unnecessary because other
   independent grounds in the record allow us to affirm the district court’s
   denial, see Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 537 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Scott
   v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2000)); that is, Winchel has failed to
   provide contemporaneous evidence showing that counsel’s alleged deficient
   performance caused him prejudice.
          To prevail on his IAC claims, Winchel must show that (1) counsel’s
   performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2)

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                                     No. 21-10233

   that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
   687–88 (1984). To demonstrate prejudice in the context of his guilty plea,
   Winchel must show that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
   guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
   59 (1985). But we must be cautious not to upset Winchel’s guilty plea solely
   because of his “post hoc assertions” that he would not have pleaded guilty
   but for counsel’s deficient performance. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958,
   1967 (2017). To address this concern, we look to “contemporaneous
   evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences” at the time of
   his pleading. Id.
          Here, Winchel argues that he would not have pleaded guilty if counsel
   (1) had hired an expert and investigated the Government’s IP evidence, and
   (2) had moved to suppress evidence, asserting the “international silver-
   platter doctrine.” The record, however, does not support these arguments.
          To the contrary, the record shows that counsel did investigate the
   Government’s IP evidence and that counsel did hire an expert to evaluate
   Winchel’s claims. The Government submitted an unchallenged affidavit
   from counsel indicating that (1) he was paid to hire a computer expert, and
   that (2) he hired and consulted with that expert. See also United States v.
   Newton, No. 19-11196, 2022 WL 4116914, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2022) (per
   curiam) (citing counsel’s affidavit as grounds for upholding the denial of
   relief on an IAC claim). Counsel’s affidavit also indicates that following the
   expert’s investigation, Winchel and counsel discussed options on how to
   proceed, including filing a motion to suppress. Ultimately, the record shows
   they jointly decided against filing such a motion.
          And even if counsel “erred” as Winchel alleges, Winchel has not
   provided contemporaneous evidence that but for those errors, he would have
   insisted on going to trial. Indeed, the record shows that Winchel rejected

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   filing a motion to suppress. He instead chose to plead guilty primarily to focus
   on mitigating his sentence. For example, at sentencing, Winchel’s counsel
   argued for a reduced sentence in the light of Winchel’s decision to forgo trial
   and spare his victims and their families. Moreover, it is relevant to Winchel’s
   state of mind that only after the judge sentenced him to 600 months in prison
   did he express dissatisfaction with his plea agreement and counsel’s
   performance. See Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting
   that defendant’s failure to seek to withdraw plea prior to sentencing weighs
   against a finding of prejudice).
           Accordingly, because Winchel cannot show that he was prejudiced by
   counsel’s performance, we affirm the district court’s denial of Winchel’s §
   2255 motion.
                                               IV.
           To sum up: We hold that the district court was incorrect to conclude
   that Winchel’s plea agreement barred his IAC claims. Nevertheless, the
   district court’s judgment denying Winchel’s § 2255 motion is affirmed
   because Winchel has failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
   purportedly deficient performance. Accordingly, the district court’s
   judgment denying Winchel’s § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED. 2
                                                                              AFFIRMED.

           2
             Because we have held that the record shows Winchel’s IAC claims are facially
   meritless, we also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   Winchel’s request for an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 374 (5th
   Cir. 2013) (citing Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 442) (“A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
   hearing on his § 2255 motion only if he presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of
   [his] allegations.’”). For the same reasons, the district court did not err in denying
   Winchel’s request for discovery because Winchel has failed to demonstrate good cause for
   additional discovery. United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 801 (5th Cir. 2004).

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