Court Opinion

ID: 9479269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:12:59.402255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:54.949388
License: Public Domain

*586DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge:
Linda Wood brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Washington State Trooper Steven Ostrander and his wife, and Neil Maloney, Chief Officer of the Washington State Patrol and his wife. Wood appeals the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of the case as to all defendants. We affirm the district court’s dismissal as to Maloney and his wife, but reverse the dismissal as to Ostrander and his wife.1
FACTS
At 2:30 a.m., on the morning of September 23, 1984, Trooper Ostrander pulled a car to the side of the road for driying with its high beams on. Ostrander determined that the driver, Robert Bell, was intoxicated and placed him under arrest. Ostrander called for a tow truck to have the car impounded, and returned to the car and removed the keys. Wood, who was sitting in the car, asked Ostrander how she would get home. Ostrander replied that he was sorry, but that Wood would have to get out of the car. These facts are not disputed. Wood claims that Ostrander simply returned to his patrol car and drove away. Ostrander claims that he offered to call a friend or family member who could give Wood a ride home, but that she declined the offer. Although Wood claims that she did not see any open business at the time Ostrander drove away, Ostrander claims that a Shell service station and a Seven-Eleven store were clearly visible and open for business. Ostrander further claims that Wood was picked up by an unknown driver before Ostrander drove away, although Bell and Wood dispute this.
Ostrander left Wood near a military reservation in the Parkland area of Pierce County, which has the highest aggravated crime rate in the county outside the City of Tacoma. The temperature was fifty degrees and Wood was wearing only a blouse and jeans. Wood alleges that after walking one-half block toward her home, which was five miles away, and having turned down rides offered by three or four strangers, she accepted a ride with an unknown man. The driver took Wood to a secluded area and raped her.
The district court denied defendants’ first summary judgment motion, ruling that Ostrander’s actions could not be characterized as merely negligent. Subsequently, the district court granted defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, on the ground that Ostrander was entitled to good faith qualified immunity, and that Ostrander owed no “affirmative constitutional duty of protection” to Wood.2
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). All facts in the record and inferences drawn from them must be viewed in the *587light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227, 103 S.Ct. 1234, 75 L.Ed.2d 468 (1983).
DISCUSSION
I. Viability of the Section 1983 Claim
To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)). It is not disputed that in arresting Bell and impounding the car, Ostrander was acting under color of state law. Ostrander argues, however, that Wood has failed to state a claim cognizable under section 1983 because, first, his conduct was at most negligent and, second, Wood has adequate state remedies to pursue her claim. These issues are considered in turn.
A. The “Mere Negligence” Bar
In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), the Supreme Court held that mere negligence or lack of due care by state officials does not trigger the protections of the fourteenth amendment and therefore does not state a claim under section 1983. In doing so, the Court overruled that part of Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37, 101 S.Ct. at 1913, which held that a negligent loss of property by state officials could be a “deprivation” under the due process clause. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31, 106 S.Ct. at 664-65. However, the Court expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or ‘gross negligence,’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3.
A number of circuits have held recklessness or gross negligence sufficient to state a section 1983 claim; none has held that only intentional misconduct will suffice. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc) (claim that state officials “were ‘grossly negligent’ or ‘deliberately indifferent’ ” is “sufficient to overcome either a Daniels or Davidson bar”); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir.1987) (gross negligence cognizable under section 1983); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir.1979) (gross negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others cognizable); see also Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3rd Cir.1984) (en banc), aff'd sub nom., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (gross negligence or reckless indifference sufficient) (plurality view).3
The law in this circuit is unclear. In Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.1988) we stated that “grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the due process clause is actionable under section 1983.” Id. at 640. We based this statement, however, on the first opinion in this case, Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1988). The first Wood opinion has been amended by this opinion. Moreover, the gross negligence standard which we articulated in our first Wood opinion was based on Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.1987). Ketchum involved a claim by a woman who was raped by an escaped inmate. The victim contended the county had been grossly negligent in maintaining security at the facility where the inmate had been confined. We affirmed summary *588judgment in favor of the state defendants on the ground that the victim, as a member of the public at large, did not have “a special relationship with the state or the criminal,” and hence “had no federal constitutional right to state protection from criminal attacks.” Id. at 1247. We did not decide the question of what culpability standard would have been applicable if such a relationship had existed. Id. at 1246 n. 3.
The Supreme Court has recently adopted the standard of deliberate indifference as the culpability standard necessary to establish section 1983 liability of a municipality based upon a claim that the municipality’s lack of training for police officers was a policy causing a violation of a constitutional right of a person subject to police action. City of Canton v. Hams, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). The Court in Canton expressly reserved the question whether the deliberate indifference standard would also apply to “an underlying claim of a constitutional violation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S.Ct. at 1204 n. 8. Despite this reservation, however, Canton calls into question our statements in Fargo and in our prior opinion in this case that, a showing of gross negligence will suffice to establish the requisite level of fault in a section 1983 action against an individual state actor such as Trooper Ostrander.
Here, however, Wood has raised a genuine issue of fact tending to show that Trooper Ostrander acted with deliberate indifference to Wood’s interest in personal security under the fourteenth amendment. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d at 793, 795-97 (deliberate indifference to victim’s well-being is more than negligence and supports section 1983 claim); Davidson v. O’Lone, supra, 752 F.2d at 828; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977) (prison officials’ deliberate disregard of prisoner’s serious illness or injury violates eighth amendment and is cognizable under section 1983). The rationale underlying Daniels’ bar of negligence-based section 1983 claims is that mere lack of due care, such as leaving a pillow on the prison stairs (Daniels) or mislaying an inmate’s property (Parratt) is “quite remote” from the fourteenth amendment’s purpose of redressing abuses of power by state officials. 474 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 665. In the present case, the facts put in issue by Wood — that Ostrander arrested the driver, impounded the car, and left Wood by the side of the road at night in a high-crime area — show an assertion of government power which, according to Wood’s version of the case, tends to show a disregard for Wood’s safety amounting to deliberate indifference.4
B. The “State Remedies” Bar
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 541-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1916-17, and its progeny hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under section 1983 when a state’s post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim’s procedural due process rights. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).5 However, “[t]he Parratt line of cases does not focus on the relevance of procedural protections to alleged violations of substantive constitutional rights.” Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1988). Accordingly, the existence of state remedies is irrelevant and the Parratt bar inapplicable where the plaintiff alleges a violation of a substantive right *589under either the Bill of Rights or the due process clause. Smith, 818 F.2d at 1415; accord Mann v. Tucson Dept. of Police, 782 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337-39, 106 S.Ct. at 677-79 (Stevens, J., concurring) (section 1983 claim alleging violation of substantive due process not barred by existence of state remedy); Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545, 101 S.Ct. at 1917 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (due process clause extends beyond procedural matters).
Ostrander argues that the existence of a state tort remedy for Wood precludes the section 1983 claim under Parratt. According to Ostrander, the only distinction between this case and the Parratt line is that Parratt and its progeny involve deprivations of property whereas this case involves an alleged deprivation of liberty. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-75, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1414, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (child had liberty interest in personal security and freedom from restraint and infliction of pain). Ostrander argues that we should anticipate a Supreme Court holding to the effect that Parratt extends to deprivations of liberty, because the Court cited certain section 1983 cases involving assaults to support its conclusion that Parratt extends to intentional deprivations of property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 531 n. 10, 533-34 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. at 3202 n. 10, 3204 n. 14. Ostrander also relies on this court’s decision in Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983), which held in part that a college football coach’s assault on a player was not cognizable under section 1983.
Ostrander’s argument is unpersuasive, because it follows the wrong axis of analysis. This circuit has analyzed Parratt and its progeny not by distinguishing liberty versus property deprivations, but rather by analyzing substantive versus procedural rights deprivations. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d at 1414-15. The relevant inquiry is whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious that “ ‘the constitutional line ha[s] been crossed’ so as to constitute a deprivation of substantive due process.” Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1986). Ingraham and Rutledge do not suggest otherwise. In Ingraham, the Court considered only a procedural due process challenge based on the lack of a hearing before corporal punishment was meted out. See 430 U.S. at 674, 680-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1417-19. In Rutledge, this court did not analyze the seriousness of the assault, deciding that Parratt was preclusive of such inquiry. 660 F.2d at 1352. To the extent that Rutledge found Parratt to bar section 1983 claims for substantive rights violated by official assaults, it does not survive this court’s en banc ruling in Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986). More generally, substantive due process violations comprise those acts by the state that are prohibited “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 665.
The seriousness of the official misconduct may determine whether “the constitutional line” between a procedural and a substantive due process violation “has been crossed,” so that the availability of state court relief will not bar a section 1983 claim. Clearly, the line is crossed in instances of serious police brutality. See, e.g., Rutherford, 780 F.2d at 1448. But Rutherford only “[p]artially answer[ed] the question left open in Haygood” as to whether “official assaults, batteries or other invasions of personal liberty” amount to substantive due process violations. Id. While brutality by police or prison guards is one paradigmatic example of a substantive due process violation, it does not exhaust the possibilities.
Although Ostrander did not himself assault Wood, he allegedly acted in callous disregard for Wood’s physical security, a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. See Ingraham v. Wright, supra.
Wood has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Ostrander’s conduct “affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of *590danger.” Ketchum, 811 F.2d at 1247; see Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d at 1204 (distinguishing situation where arrest creates the danger, actionable under section 1983, from situation where danger existed before defendant acted); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1006, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (distinguishing situation where state “played no part” in creating the dangers that minor child faced by remaining in his father’s custody “nor did [the state] do anything to render [the child] any more vulnerable to them.”). The fact that Ostrander arrested Bell, impounded his car, and apparently stranded Wood in a high-crime area at 2:30 a.m. distinguishes Wood from the general public and triggers a duty of the police to afford her some measure of peace and safety. See White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d at 384 & n. 6 (and authorities cited therein). See also Chambers-Castanes v. King Co., 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983); Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exhibits 1, 2(c) (policy of state police to respond to requests for assistance in courteous and judicious manner).
Wood also has raised at least a triable issue (if not an undisputed one) regarding Ostrander’s knowledge of the danger: official crime reports show that the area where Wood was stranded had the highest violent crime rate in the county outside the City of Tacoma. Ostrander, a state trooper stationed in that area since 1981, may well be chargeable with knowledge of these facts. Moreover, the inherent danger facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense. Cf. White v. Rockford, supra.
Most of the factual disputes in this case go to the issue of danger. Defendants contend, and the trial court found, that a 24-hour Shell station and a 24-hour Seven-Eleven store were located within two blocks of the location of the stop. Defendants further contend that there were paved sidewalks. Even if there is no genuine factual dispute as to these matters, their relevance is open to question by the trier of fact. The district court and the defendants too readily assume that Wood’s travail would have been over if she had only gone to the Shell station or the Seven-Eleven. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether a reasonable person should have regarded a gas station or convenience store, located in a high crime neighborhood, as some kind of safe haven where she would have been given assistance or permitted to stay until daybreak before walking five miles home. Nor is a telephone much help to a person who allegedly has no money to place a call and no one to call.6 These factual assumptions, either expressly or impliedly made, are particularly inappropriate for the district court to make on summary judgment.
There is a factual dispute as to whether Ostrander made any inquiry at all as to Wood’s ability to get safely home, or whether, instead, he ignored her request for help. Certain evidence suggests that Ostrander untruthfully told his superiors that he was told that Wood was being picked up by some “friends,” (Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition), and it is disputed whether Ostrander saw Wood picked up at all. Moreover, we cannot resolve on our review of summary judgment whether Wood acted unreasonably by accepting a ride with an unknown man. The resolution of these questions is for the trier of fact.
We are satisfied that Wood has presented genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether Ostrander deprived her of a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. See Ingraham v. Wright, supra; Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d at 1356.
*591II. Qualified, Immunity
State officials cannot be held liable for damages under section 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139, reh’g denied, 468 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 26, 82 L.Ed.2d 919 (1984). Officials are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct is objectively reasonable “ ‘as measured by reference to clearly established law.’ ” Id. at 191, 104 S.Ct. at 3017 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Ostrander is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if he can show that as a reasonable officer he could have believed his actions toward Wood were constitutional even if they were not. Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.1988). See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The district court concluded that Ostrander was shielded by qualified immunity. We review this conclusion de novo. “Assuming that [Wood] can prove the acts attributed to [Ostrander], we must decide the entirely legal issue of ‘whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly established law.’ ” Vaughan v. Ricketts, at 739 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 411).
The events on which Wood predicates her section 1983 claim occurred September 23, 1984. We have held above that Wood has raised genuine issues of material fact as to a number of these events. If the events occurred as Wood alleges, she has stated a violation of her constitutional right to personal security, a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, supra, We now consider, in light of Ostrander’s qualified immunity defense, whether a reasonable police officer in his position could have believed on September 23, 1984, that his treatment of Wood, as alleged by her, comported with the Constitution even though, assuming the trier of fact accepts Wood’s version of the case, it actually did not.7 To resolve this question, we must “survey the legal landscape” as it existed in September 1984 to determine whether it had been clearly established at that time that Ostran-der’s alleged conduct violated Wood’s liberty interest under the Constitution.8 Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020, 107 S.Ct. 3263, 97 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987).
A. The Law in 1984
In Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1985), this court held that “in the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to whatever decisional law is available to ascertain whether the law is clearly established under the Harlow test.” Accord, Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir.1984). The available decisional law includes cases from state courts, other circuits and district courts. Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d at 1332.
*592The case most like our case is White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.1979), which reversed the dismissal of a section 1983 complaint. In White, the defendant police officers arrested a driver for drag racing on the Chicago Skyway, a busy, limited-access highway. The complaint alleged that the driver, who was uncle to the three minor children riding with him in the car, pleaded with the officers to take the children to the police station or a phone booth so that they could contact their parents. The officers refused, and instead left the children in the abandoned car on the roadside, in inclement weather. The court held that the alleged conduct stated a claim under section 1983. The officers “could not avoid knowing that, absent their assistance, the three children would be subjected to exposure to cold weather and .danger from traffic. This indifference in the face of known dangers certainly must constitute gross negligence.” 592 F.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
In dealing with White, decided five years before the incident in this case, Ostrander frames the immunity issue thus:
In determining whether Ms. Wood was subjected to a constitutional deprivation it is the state of the law on September 23, 1984, which must be used to determine whether the violation occurred.... As of September 23, 1984, no court had ruled that a police officer owed a constitutional duty to make transportation arrangements for a non-intoxicated adult female who was left on the sidewalk of a major urban arterial within easy walking distance of at least two 24-hour businesses following the arrest of the person with whom she had previously been riding.
Appellees’ Brief at 9 (citation omitted). Ostrander seemingly suggests that this case can be disposed of if it does not bear a strict factual similarity to previous cases finding liability. However, this crabbed view of the good faith immunity principle cannot withstand analysis. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, it is not the case that “an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, ... but it is to say that in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 (citation omitted); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. at 2820 n. 12.
The first question is whether White is meaningfully distinguishable from the instant case. Both cases involve a police officer’s roadside abandonment of non-arrested third parties. Ostrander apparently would have the court decide that stranding three children on a busy eight-lane expressway is much worse than stranding a lone woman in a high-crime area at 2:30 a.m., indeed so much worse that the former is a constitutional violation while the latter is not. It would seem that the Supreme Court’s admonition in Anderson against looking for a repetition of “the very action in question” applies forcefully against making this type of comparison. Although the dangers facing the victims in the two cases may come from very different sources, the degree of danger is high in both, and the alleged police indifference to exposing the plaintiffs to the dangers is apparent in both instances. Ostrander’s suggestion that the children were in greater danger than Wood (“certain danger from the traffic and weather,” Appellees’ Brief at 10) is unpersuasive considering what actually occurred: none of the children was injured by a car (two suffered mental anguish, and a third suffered aggravation of his asthma condition from the weather), whereas Wood was raped.
Ostrander also argues that White was merely a “plurality” opinion and, further, adopted an “in loco parentist” rationale, finding that the officers owed a special duty to the children. This argument mis-characterizes White. The opinion of the court and the concurrence agree on the basic rationale of section 1983 liability: “indifference [of the officers] in the face of known dangers,” 592 F.2d at 385 (opinion of court); “[unnecessarily endangering the innocent parties in reckless disregard of their safety,” id. at 388 (concurrence) (emphasis added). The opinion of the court states that the officers could be liable un*593der section 1983 based on two theories: (1) for an “intrusion upon personal integrity” as a result of gross negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or (2) for conduct which “shockfs] the conscience.” White, 592 F.2d at 384-85 & n. 6. The “in loco parentis” concept was introduced only in the second half of a lengthy footnote to buttress the existence of the state’s duty as it arose in the case, and not as the sole basis for such duty. Id. at 384 n. 6.
The immunity standard considers whether a reasonable law enforcement officer should view the White case as controlling. Given this element of reasonableness, the qualified immunity regime of clearly established law should not be held to allow section 1983 defendants to interpose lawyerly distinctions that defy common sense in order to distinguish away clearly established law. White holds that a police officer may be liable under section 1983 when he abandons passengers of arrested drivers under circumstances which expose them to unreasonable danger. It defies common sense to find a meaningful legal distinction between the dangers facing children crossing a busy highway and a woman left alone to fend for herself at 2:30 a.m. in a high-crime area.
B. The Precedential Effect of White in This Circuit
The inquiry does not end here, however, because White did not necessarily establish law for this circuit. Where there are few cases on point, and none is binding, “an additional factor that may be considered in ascertaining whether the law is ‘clearly established’ is a determination of the likelihood that the Supreme Court or this circuit would have reached the same result” as the non-binding authorities at that time. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515; accord Ward, 791 F.2d at 1332.
There was no Supreme Court case, or case in this circuit, which was binding on this circuit when the events in this case occurred. Therefore, we begin with an analysis of whether it was likely, in September 1984, that our circuit would have come to the same result the Seventh Circuit did in White. In this analysis it is important to clarify the result in White. There were three opinions in the case. The lead opinion was written by Judge Sprecher. Judge Tone concurred in part. Judge Kilk-enny of our circuit was sitting by designation and he dissented. Judges Sprecher and Tone agreed that when the police officers arrested the children’s uncle and took him away, they left the children exposed to the “hazards” of “an immobilized car on a highspeed expressway and [the] cold”, and that this conduct violated the children’s “federally protected right to be free from unjustified intrusions on their personal security by the police.” White at 387 (Tone, J., concurring); compare id. at 384-85 (Sprecher, J., lead opinion)).
White was decided in 1979. Four years later the Seventh Circuit decided Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.1983). In Jackson, a car swerved off the road, crashed and burst into flames. Two minutes later a Joliet policeman arrived on the scene by chance. The car’s wheels were spinning, its lights were on, its motor was running, and it was burning. The officer, however, made no attempt to determine whether it was occupied and did not call an ambulance. He did call the fire department. He then returned to the road and directed traffic away from the scene of the accident. Firemen arrived eight minutes later. They made no attempt to remove or assist the occupants of the car who were observed slumped in the front seat. The occupants died. An action was filed under section 1983 alleging that the occupants of the car could have been saved if the officer had aided them, or called an ambulance, or at least not directed traffic in a way that prevented other potential rescuers from saving them, or if the firemen had tried to aid them. The district court denied motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court stated:
We hold that an attempt by state officers to assist at an accident is not a deprivation of life without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the attempt fails because of the negligence or even gross negligence of *594the officers or their superiors, and the accident victim dies.
Id. at 1206. The Jackson court distinguished its “officer-who-comes-upon-an-accident” case from White: “In White v. Rockford the arrest created the danger to the children; here the [occupants of the wrecked car] were in great danger before the [police and firemen] appeared.” Id. at 1204. The Jackson court amplified its distinction of White as a case “where the police arrested a driver and left his child passengers stranded in a driverless car, thus putting the children in a situation of peril for the consequences of which the police were held liable under section 1983”. Id.
Between White and Jackson, the Seventh Circuit decided Bowers v, DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.1982). Judge Posner wrote the opinions in Bowers and Jackson. In Jackson he noted that Jackson was closer to Bowers than to White. He stated that in Bowers “the state officers did not create but merely failed to avert danger, by negligently releasing from custody a dangerous lunatic who then killed the plaintiff’s decedent.” Jackson at 1204-05. In Bowers Judge Posner noted the difference which would exist if the state placed a person in danger. He stated:
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.
Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
Would we, in 1984, have followed the holding of White, and the logic of Judge Posner’s comments in Bowers and Jackson? We believe most certainly we would have. In Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.1986) we affirmed summary judgment in favor of police officers in a section 1983 action where the police had been involved in a shootout in a barroom and a bystander had been killed by a stray bullet fired by a suspect. We distinguished the Escamilla case from a case in which the officers “create or exacerbate the danger,” Escamilla at 269, and we cited Judge Posner’s language from Bowers, quoted above, as support for this distinction. Id.
We do not look to Escamilla, a post-incident decision, to determine whether the law was “clearly established” at the time of the incident in the present case. Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d at 1515. We don’t have to. By 1984, the law had been established by White and clearly articulated by Bowers and Jackson. We do consult Escamilla to note that it cited Bowers with approval and quoted Judge Posner’s comments in that case. Escamilla also cited Jackson. Having found Bowers and Jackson in 1986 when we wrote Escamilla, we have no doubt we would have found these cases in 1984. The question is, would we have followed their reasoning, and the White case which Jackson cited?
In Capoeman v. Reed, supra, we affirmed summary judgment in favor of prison officials who, in 1981, cut Capoeman’s hair over his objection that he wore it long for religious purposes, and in spite of his citation to supporting Eighth Circuit authority. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1513. We noted that in addition to the Eighth Circuit case cited by Capoeman, there were two other opinions from the Second Circuit, all of which were on the books at the time the officials cut Capoeman’s hair and all of which supported his position. We refused to follow these cases. We did not have a case in our circuit on point. We stated that “[t]o make the determination [of the likelihood the Supreme Court or this circuit would have reached the same result as the cases which supported Capoeman], we examine the legal analysis employed by ... courts [which had considered the issue] and compare it to the analysis being used at that time by the Ninth Circuit in related but factually different situations.” Id. at 1515. We then noted that various courts had “applied a number of different legal standards to prisoner claims of infringement of free exercise rights.” Id. We cited a law review article which identified “at least seven different standards for analyzing prisoner free exercise claims.” Id. Capoeman contended that instead of cutting his hair, the prison officials should *595have tied it back to take the picture they claimed they needed to identify him wearing short hair. He thus asserted a “least restrictive means” for the prison to accomplish its purpose of prisoner identification. We noted that outside of our circuit there was a “wide diversity” in standards which had been applied by various courts of appeals in considering how to deal with such prisoner claims. Id. Within our circuit we cited Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.1979), in which an inmate challenged the prison’s denial of the use of the prison chapel. We commented that in Jones our circuit had “concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in placing appropriate restrictions on chapel use that were reasonable to maintain order and security,” (emphasis added), and that we had given “no indication that ‘appropriate restrictions’ meant the least restrictive means” for which Capoeman contended. Id. at 1515-16. In view of what appeared to be conflicting authority from other circuits, as well as case law from our circuit which cut against Capoeman’s claim, we concluded that the law had not been so clearly established that the prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1516.
At the time of the incident in the present case, the Seventh Circuit cases previously noted had been decided. These cases support Wood’s position. At the time of the incident in this case, no other case had rejected a section 1983 claim such as Wood’s. There was no "wide diversity” of cases which had considered such claims and which had arrived at differing results. Cf. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515. And there was nothing in our circuit to indicate that we would have decided this case differently from White or that we would have rejected Judge Posner’s analysis in Bowers and Jackson. Cf. Capoeman at 1515-16 discussing Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294. We conclude that it was clearly established by September 1984 that Ostrander’s alleged treatment of Wood violated her liberty interest in personal security under the fourteenth amendment. We next consider the question whether Ostrander, as a reasonable police officer, should have known of this clearly established constitutional right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d at 739.
The answer to this question is compelled by Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d at 1332. There we stated:
... [Capoeman ] places the responsibility for keeping abreast of constitutional developments in criminal law squarely on the shoulders of law enforcement officials. Given the power of such officials over our liberty, and sometimes even over our lives, this placement of responsibility is entirely proper. Law enforcement officials must be cognizant not only of how far their authority extends, but also of the point at which their authority ends. At the same time, however, we do not read [Capoeman ] to require of most government officials the kind of legal scholarship normally associated with law professors and academicians. A reasonable person standard adheres at all times.
Id. Ward was decided in 1986. It considered a strip search at a San Diego County jail facility which had occurred in 1981. We noted in Ward that by 1984 we had decided Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053, 105 S.Ct. 2114, 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985) in which “we established that strip searches of arrestees for a minor offense are unconstitutional absent individualized suspicion that such arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband or is suffering from a communicable disease.” Ward, 791 F.2d at 1333. Obviously the jail officials in Ward were not aware of the 1984 Giles decision when they strip searched the plaintiff in 1981. But we stated in Ward that “[p]re-1981 strip search cases, including Tinetti, harb-inged our decision in Giles....” Ward at 1333, referring to Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.Supp. 486, 490-91 (E.D. Wis.1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980). The same is true here. Pre-1984 cases, including White, harbinged our decision in this case.
We conclude that if Wood establishes at trial the facts which she has stated in support of her section 1983 action, and which we must accept as true at this stage of the *596case, Ostrander will not be entitled to qualified immunity. A reasonable police officer who acted as Wood alleges Ostrander acted should have understood that what he was doing violated Wood’s constitutional right to be free from an unjustified intrusion into her personal security in violation of her liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d at 384-85 & 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
In sum, Wood has raised a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Ostrander deprived her of a liberty interest protected by the Constitution by affirmatively placing her in danger and then abandoning her. If Ostrander acted as Wood claims he did, Ostrander is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant Ostrander is reversed. We also reverse the summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Ostrander, for the reasons stated in footnote 1, supra. The summary judgment in favor of Neil Maloney and his wife is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. Wood has not presented any argument on appeal, or raised any issue, challenging the district court's dismissal of the case as to Maloney and his wife. It is well settled in this circuit that claims not addressed in an appellant’s brief are deemed abandoned, absent a showing that manifest injustice will result. United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.1987); Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir.1988). No such showing has been made in this case.
The claim against Mrs. Ostrander is different. Although no mention of her is made in the appellant’s brief, it appears she was named as a defendant in the case solely for the purpose of attempting to subject the marital community of the Ostranders to liability for any judgment which might be entered against Trooper Ostran-der. See Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash.2d 253, 396 P.2d 793, 795 (1964). We express no opinion on the merits of the claim against Mrs. Ostrander. However, given the limited purpose of this claim and its dependency on the claim against Trooper Ostrander, we do not deem it to have been abandoned at this time.

. The district court did not rule on defendants’ argument that the damages claim should be dismissed on proximate cause grounds. Although this court could presumably affirm on that basis if it had legal merit and factual support in the record, see, e.g., Lee v. United States, 809 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 772, 98 L.Ed.2d 859 (1988), defendants have not raised the proximate cause argument on appeal. We have not examined its merits.

. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049, 104 S.Ct. 1325, 79 L.Ed.2d 720 (1984), is not contra. There, the court found that a grossly negligent rescue attempt was not actionable under section 1983 where the plaintiffs decedents were already trapped in a burning car when the police arrived. The court expressly distinguished cases in which the state officials’ actions created the danger or created a special duty of protection toward the plaintiff. See id. at 1204-05. We discuss Jackson in more detail infra.

. A jury presented with these facts might find Ostrander’s conduct to have been "deliberately indifferent," "reckless,” "grossly negligent,” or merely "negligent." See Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.1988) ("When reasonable persons may disagree as to whether particular conduct constitutes negligence, gross negligence or recklessness, the question is one of fact to be decided by a jury.” (footnote omitted)). It is thus likely the district court will face the difficult task of defining for the jury the terms "negligence,” "gross negligence," "recklessness,” and "deliberate indifference.” See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334-35, 106 S.Ct. at 666-67; Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641-42.

. This aspect of Parratt was not overruled by Daniels.

. Wood alleged that she had little or no money on her person at the time Ostrander put her out of the car. Although she lived with her parents, she did not try to call them for help because, according to her allegations, they would have been unable to pick her up: her mother has night-blindness and her stepfather suffers from brain damage. How much of these circumstances Wood may have told Ostrander is not clear from the record. Ostrander denies knowledge of any of these allegations.

. Should the trier of fact find that Ostrander’s treatment of Wood was deliberately indifferent, this alone might deprive Ostrander of his qualified immunity defense. See Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 987 (9th Cir.1988) ("Despite [Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ], the [rule of Albers v. Whitley, 743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.1984), reversed on other grounds, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) ] that ‘a finding of deliberate indifference is inconsistent with ... qualified immunity’ remains the law of the circuit.’’). We do not reach this issue, however, because we hold infra that apart from the applicable culpability standard for Ostrander's conduct, he is not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts presented by Wood.

. Wood also argues that Ostrander’s treatment of her was so egregious that it "shocks the conscience” and violated her constitutional right to substantive due process. See Rutherford, 780 F.2d at 1446-47 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). We do not decide this question because we resolve this appeal on the ground that Wood has shown sufficient facts which, if proven at trial, establish a violation of her right to personal security, a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. This does not foreclose Wood from attempting to show at trial that Ostrander’s treatment of her was such that it "shocks the conscience."