Court Opinion

ID: 9910291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:00:40.516732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:03.390035
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10722    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 12/15/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10722
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MICHAEL PEGRAM,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00434-ELR-JFK-1
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10722

       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Michael Pegram appeals the district court’s order denying
       his 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of
       supervised release. On appeal, Pegram argues that the district
       court abused its discretion by failing to consider properly the
       relevant § 3553(a) factors and by impermissibly considering the
       seriousness of his offense. After review, we find no abuse of
       discretion and affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
              In 2009, Pegram pled guilty to receipt of child pornography,
       in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2)(A) and 2256(8)(A). Pegram
       was originally arrested on state charges of sexual battery and child
       exploitation based on allegations he inappropriately touched minor
       children while working at an afterschool program. After a search
       of Pegram’s computers turned up child pornography, the federal
       government charged Pegram with the instant federal child
       pornography offense.
               In 2015, after completing his 97-month sentence, Pegram
       began serving his supervised release term of ten years. At the time
       of his § 3583(e)(1) motion in 2023, Pregram had served over 7 years
       of his supervised release term. Pegram asked the district court to
       terminate his supervised release, stressing that he had never
       violated the terms of his supervised release, was employed, had
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       23-10722               Opinion of the Court                          3

       completed specialized sex offender treatment, and lived with and
       helped his parents.
              The district court denied Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The
       court reviewed the procedural history of Pegram’s case. In
       particular, the district court noted an earlier determination in the
       amended judgment and commitment order that Pegram required
       the most secure housing in prison and was “especially vulnerable”
       due to his slight physical stature, emotional immaturity, well-
       below-average IQ, learning disabilities, and treatment for
       depression and anxiety.
              The district court summarized the grounds for Pegram’s
       § 3583(e)(1) motion, including that he had “done well on
       supervision, is unlikely to recidivate, has been employed since
       2021, helps people in the community and his family.” Ultimately,
       the district court stated it denied the motion after conducting “a
       careful review of the record and the motion filed,” and explained
       that denial was appropriate “especially in light of the serious nature
       of the crime of which [Pegram] was convicted.”
                                II. DISCUSSION
       A.     General Principles
               “We review a district court’s denial of a motion for early ter-
       mination of supervised release for an abuse of discretion.” United
       States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). A court abuses
       its discretion when it fails to explain its sentencing decisions ade-
       quately enough for meaningful appellate review. Id.
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10722

              Under § 3583(e)(1), and after the expiration of one year of
       supervised release, a district court may terminate a defendant’s
       supervised release term if, “after considering the factors set forth in
       section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
       and (a)(7),” the court “is satisfied that such action is warranted by
       the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”
       18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); see Johnson, 877 F.3d at 996.
              The particular § 3553(a) factors referenced in § 3583(e)
       include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
       history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the
       sentence imposed (a) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
       conduct, (b) to protect the public from further crimes of the
       defendant, and (c) to provide the defendant with needed
       educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
       correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the need
       to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
       similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
       (4) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7).
              However, § 3583(e)’s list of factors does not expressly
       include the factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are “the need for the
       sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
       respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
       offense.” Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), 3583(e). Section 3583(e), however,
       does not explicitly forbid consideration of these factors, and
       § 3583(e) does expressly permit the district court to consider the
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       23-10722               Opinion of the Court                         5

       § 3553(a)(1) factors, which include the nature and circumstances of
       the offense.
             Further, this Court has concluded that it is not plain error
       for a district court to consider the same § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors,
       even though not listed in § 3583(e), when deciding a revocation of
       supervised release. See United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303,
       1308-09 (11th Cir. 2014). In Vandergrift, we emphasized that
       § 3583(e) did not “explicitly forbid a district court from considering
       § 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id. at 1308.
              In addition, a district court ruling on a § 3583(e)(1) motion
       “must indicate that [it] considered the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors
       enumerated in the provision,” but it “need not explain each factor’s
       applicability, nor always explicitly articulate that it considered the
       factors.” Johnson, 877 F.3d at 998. That said, the district court
       “must explain its sentencing decisions adequately enough to allow
       for meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 997-98 (addressing a
       paperless order stating only that the motion was denied).
       Meaningful appellate review “requires the reasons for the district
       court’s decision to be sufficiently apparent,” and thus, apart from
       the district court’s order, the record can also provide a sufficient
       basis for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 998 (stating that the
       “record must clearly imply that the relevant factors were
       considered”).
       B. Denial of Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) Motion
             Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
       denying Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The district court was not
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                23-10722

       required to explicitly consider or invoke the sentencing factors and
       it was sufficiently apparent from its written order that the court
       considered the relevant sentencing factors.
              The district court stated that it had carefully reviewed the
       record, including Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion. The court noted
       the reasons Pegram was “especially vulnerable” and Pegram’s
       arguments for why his supervised release should be terminated
       early—that he had “done well on supervision,” was “unlikely to
       recidivate,” had been employed for multiple years, and “helps
       people in the community.” These statements show the district
       court considered relevant factors, such as Pegram’s history and
       characteristics, protection of the public, and the need for
       educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
       correctional treatment. See Johnson, 877 F.3d at 997-98.
              The district court explicitly stated that early termination of
       Pegram’s supervised release was not warranted—despite Pegram’s
       assertion that certain factors weighed in his favor—“in light of the
       serious nature of the crime of which [Pegram] was convicted.”
       Although the district court’s reference to the serious nature of
       Pegram’s crime used language similar to that found in
       § 3553(a)(2)(A), Pegram fails to demonstrate that such
       consideration was not regarding “the nature . . . of the offense,”
       which is found in § 3553(a)(1), one of the enumerated factors. See
       18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Because the nature of the offense is a relevant
       factor, the district court did not improperly consider the serious
       nature of Pegram’s crime.
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       23-10722               Opinion of the Court                         7

               Additionally, the district court’s order provided a sufficient
       basis to afford meaningful appellate review because it explained the
       court’s determination that the serious nature of Pegram’s child
       pornography crime outweighed the other factors Pegram asserted
       in his motion. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and
       affirm the denial of Pegram’s § 3583(e)(1) motion to terminate
       early his supervised release term.
             AFFIRMED.