Court Opinion

ID: 9543805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:49:23.373052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:15.458912
License: Public Domain

*877HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The “cause and actual prejudice” standard of review recently applied in United States v. Frady (1982), - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816, is likewise applicable in the instant cause. Writing for the United States Supreme Court in Frady, Justice O’Connor stated that:
“[u]nder this standard, to obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.” 102 S.Ct. at 1594.
Though represented by counsel, at no time prior to trial on either the second felony charge or the habitual offender charge did appellant challenge the validity of the 1970 conviction. As noted by the trial court in denying Haynes’ motion to correct errors, appellant had the opportunity to request a continuance on the habitual offender charge until an appeal of his 1970 conviction could be adjudicated. Appellant chose instead to relinquish this right. Appellant has failed to show cause excusing such waiver. In Frady, supra, it was further held that:
“Once the defendant’s chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, however, we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal forum. Our trial and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation any binding effect beyond the next in a series of endless post-conviction collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment commands respect.” 102 S.Ct. at 1593.
Haynes was afforded similar opportunity to present his claims against the State of Indiana in a State forum.
Haynes’ pleadings themselves clearly establish that he failed to challenge the 1970 conviction for nearly ten years. It is therefore apparent from the record that appellant’s collateral attack was barred by the operation of laches. • Thus, it was proper for the trial court to deny the petition without evidentiary hearing. Ind. Rules of Procedures, Post-Conviction Rule 1, § 4(e).