Court Opinion

ID: 9686283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:39:02.841062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.221230
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring). I agree with the result reached by the lead opinion in this case. However, I am unable to agree with some of its analysis. I agree that the grievance procedures in this case were indeed mandatory and, therefore, the employees were required to exhaust those procedures before filing suit in circuit court for breach of their collective bargaining agreement. Ante, p 81. I also agree that such grievance procedures can be either binding or nonbinding. Id. However, I disagree with the lead opinion’s statement of the issue presented, that is, “regardless of whether the grievance procedure or arbitration is mandatory, if the process ends with something nonbinding, should the statute of limitations be tolled?” Id., p 83. I believe the issue presented is whether the grievance procedures are mandatory. If they are mandatory, then the aggrieved employees must exhaust them, and the statute of limitations should be tolled during pursuit of the mandatory grievance procedures.
Because I believe that exhaustion and tolling do not turn on whether the grievance procedure is final and binding, I do not agree with the lead opinion that this Court is “forced to resolve the apparent conflict” between the area of law requiring exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures and the body of law stating that an employee is not required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures that do not provide *93either complete relief or reactivation of the grievance before filing suit in court. Id., p 89; Clayton v Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 451 US 679, 692; 101 S Ct 2088; 69 L Ed 2d 538 (1981). The lead opinion acknowledges that the Supreme Court in Clayton specifically noted that, because of the distinction between collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures, which arise under the terms of a contract, and internal union procedures, which do not arise under the terms of a contract, the policy encouraging private resolution of grievances arising out of the collective bargaining process was not directly applicable in Clayton.1 Ante, pp 87-88; Clayton at 696.
I also agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the grievance procedure in this case was mandatory, as evidenced by use of the word “shall” preceding the description of the four-step grievance procedure to which the parties agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. I find a case from the federal Court of *94Appeals for the Third Circuit quite persuasive in its discussion of the difference between “mandatory” and “final and binding” relief. In Orlando v Interstate Container Corp, 100 F3d 296, 298 (CA 3, 1996), the collective bargaining agreement provided that “grievances shall be processed in the following manner” and laid out a four-step procedure. Step 4 provided that if the dispute had not been settled at that point, the union could give the company “notice of its intention to submit the grievance to arbitration” and request the American Arbitration Association to submit a list of arbitrators. Id. at 298.
In Orlando, the parties agreed that the grievance was arbitrable, that arbitration was mandatory, and that it had resulted in an award; the only issue was whether the award was “final” in the sense that the courts may not readjudicate the grievance. Id. at 300. The court stated:
It is important to distinguish between terms sometimes used interchangeably in this field. Arbitration may be mandatory in the sense that the parties are required to use that procedure. Although appellate rulings have used the word “exclusive,” they do not govern the issue of whether the arbitration awards are “final” in the sense that they preclude resort to a section 301 suit on the merits, but rather the opinions refer to the requirement that the grievance procedures be exhausted before filing suit. [Id. (citations omitted).]
The court disagreed with the employer’s argument that because the contract makes arbitration mandatory, it must necessarily be final as well. The lack of provision for finality does not overcome the presumption of access to the courts for review on the merits. Id. at 300. Finally,
*95[m\andatory arbitration prior to resort to a court is a different concept from mandatory arbitration precluding resort to a court. We do not discourage, but continue to endorse, the submission of grievances to arbitration. What we do decline to recognize is an expansive interpretation of the dispositive effect of arbitration when the collective bargaining agreement provides no basis for such a construction. [Id. at 300 (emphasis added).]
Whether referring to the grievance procedure or an arbitration provision, there is a distinct difference between “mandatory” and “final and binding.” In my view, exhaustion relates only to whether the process at issue is mandatory. The courts must enforce collective bargaining agreements as they are written. Whatever procedures are required according to the collective bargaining agreement must be exhausted before filing suit. Most important, this analysis comports with our decision in Grand Rapids v Grand Rapids Lodge No 97, Fraternal Order of Police, 415 Mich 628, 636; 330 NW2d 52 (1982), in which we held:
While most collective-bargaining agreements provide for arbitration as the final step in an agreed-upon grievance procedure, that is purely a matter of choice by the parties. Some collective-bargaining agreements set forth a procedure for resolving grievances arising in the administration of the contract that does not include arbitration. Others set forth a procedure which does not provide a means of deciding a grievance that parties cannot resolve by negotiation. Still others provide no procedure at all for resolving grievances.
If a collective-bargaining agreement contains a grievance resolution procedure, the courts generally require exhaustion of that procedure before the initiation of a lawsuit. If the grievance procedure includes arbitration, the courts normally defer to the arbitration decision. However, where arbitration is not the mandatory final step in a grievance *96procedure, a member of the union aggrieved by the asserted breach of the collective-bargaining agreement may resort to an action at law to obtain satisfaction.
We, too, have recognized the importance of the distinction between a mandatory grievance procedure and one that provides final and binding relief. Moreover, I believe that the important policies of collective bargaining agreement enforcement and resolution of labor disputes are best served by recognizing the effect of this distinction.
Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s analysis, whether the procedure is “final and binding” should be irrelevant to an exhaustion/tolling analysis because, if the procedure was indeed “final and binding,” the employee would be completely precluded from filing suit and the court would be precluded from addressing the merits of the claim, absent some type of fraud or other material defect in the grievance process. The dissent’s position that, because neither the arbitration provision nor the grievance procedure provided final and binding relief, the statute of limitations should not be tolled during the grievance process is untenable because that does not address the “mandatoiy” nature of the first four steps of the grievance procedure.2 Thus, regardless of the arbitration *97provision, which is arguably not “mandatory” as well as not “final and binding,” the first four steps were absolutely mandatory and, therefore, must have been exhausted before filing suit on the merits of the claims, regardless of whether they provided final and binding relief or whether the arbitration provision provided final and binding relief.
For the same reason that I am not in complete agreement with the analysis of the lead opinion, I disagree with the dissent. Tolling should not hinge on whether the grievance procedure provides final and binding relief because tolling should not be an issue, at least with regard to the primary claims, where final and binding relief is afforded under the collective bargaining agreement. This is so because where final and binding relief is afforded, the grievant would be precluded from seeking relief in court, absent a defect serious enough to warrant relief from the arbitration decision.
In my opinion, equity requires tolling the statute of limitations where collective bargaining grievance procedures are mandatory and are therefore required to be exhausted. Here, the statute of limitations was tolled for less than one year, and no evidence was presented that the employees sat on their claims. While they were not pursuing mandatory grievance procedures after 1985, they continued to negotiate *98with the school board and pursued arbitration in an attempt to resolve their disputes. Thus, I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the employees’ claims came within the six-year breach of contract statute of limitations.

 Clayton did not address tolling the statute of limitations in the context of internal union appeals. In fact, the federal courts are in conflict on this issue. The Sixth Circuit noted that some courts have extended the reasoning of Clayton and held that only where the process could provide complete relief to a grievant is the statute of limitations tolled. Robinson v Central Brass Mfg Co, 987 F2d 1235, 1241 (CA 6, 1993). Other courts have held that the statute of limitations is tolled even during the pursuit of internal union remedies, even where those remedies are later determined futile. Id. Even assuming that the first approach is correct, tolling in these circumstances is based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning regarding when exhaustion is required in the internal union appeals process. Here, we are holding that exhaustion of the grievance procedure is required because it is mandatory. While it is true that the basis of the Clayton decision is that exhaustion is only required where final and complete relief is afforded, that is not the basis of our holding in this case. The majority holds that the first four steps were mandatory and that is the basis of our holding requiring exhaustion. Therefore, in my opinion, it is on that basis alone that we should determine whether tolling is appropriate.

 The dissent also asserts that the body of labor law establishing the exhaustion requirement derives from 29 USC 173(d). Post, p 100. However, the instant case is governed by the public employee relations act, MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. It is true that the pera is patterned after the federal National Labor Relations Act. Demings v City of Ecorse, 423 Mich 49, 56; 377 NW2d 275 (1985). Moreover, in “ ‘construing our state labor statutes we look for guidance to “the construction placed on the analogous provides of the nlra by the [National Labor Relations Board] and the Federal Courts.” ’ ” Id. However, in relying on § 173(d), the dissent fails to refer to an analogous provision in the pera that would require us to look to federal interpretation of § 173(d). In Demings, the *97fair representation provisions in the pera were “replicas” of the federal provisions. Id. at 57. Moreover, we do not have the possible “disturbing consequence of departing from the federal model” that results in public employees being treated differently under the pera from private employees under the nlra. Id. at 67. The identical treatment required by the pera was based on the identical provisions regarding fair representation. Moreover, I do not believe that either the lead opinion’s or my own analysis is in conflict with federal precedent.