Court Opinion

ID: 9739377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:13:28.185154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.912217
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I join in the dissent of Judge DeBruler and must further point out the inconsistency of the position of the majority and of the trial judge. The witness Anderson first testified that he remembered the testimony of the defendant given before the Grand Jury, but nevertheless was not asked to relate it. Rather, at the insistence of the prosecutor, he ultimately testified that he could not relate such testimony word for word without, the transcript. The trial court, after having earlier suggested that the witness could use the transcript if necessary to refresh his memory, finally, over the objection of the defense counsel, ruled that the transcript could be used for “specific help.” Yet the witness did not use the transcript “to refresh his memory” or for “specific help,” but proceeded essentially to read the document. The evidence that went before the court, therefore, was. not the witness’ recollection but the transcript itself, which was inadmissible in this manner.
True, the transcript probably was correct and probably could have been properly authenticated and introduced. True, also, the witness probably could have testified .from his memory to substantially the same circumstances without reference to the transcript, or with reference to it only to refresh his memory, and the result of the trial probably would not have been altered. It is not beyond the realm of. reasomable probability, however, that the witness had no independent memory of the evidence as contained in the transcript, or that the transcript was not authentic. The prosecutor obviously was ill prepared to present the State’s case. The trial court apparently was, for the moment at least, conjecturing the transcript’s authenticity and accuracy; and, desiring to move the. proceedings along and get at the full facts, it gave the prosecutor, an unwarranted assist.
*662Our rules of evidence are too essential to the preservation of our basic doctrine of the presumption of innocence to be varied, in any given case, by such independent judgment, no matter how valid the belief or lofty the aim. For the trial court to relax the technical requirements of our procedures to compensate for counsel who is ill prepared, can only encourage indifference on the part of counsel until ultimately the trial judges will become advocates rather than impartial referees.
It was reversible error for the transcript to have been thus introduced into evidence.