Court Opinion

ID: 9396641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 14:06:35.565478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.593599
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-984

                                       N.M.

                                       vs.

                                       R.F.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        Following a hearing before a District Court judge on May

 20, 2022, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte abuse prevention

 order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A against the defendant, a former

 boyfriend.     After a second hearing by a different judge, the

 order was extended for one year.          The defendant appeals,

 claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding

 of abuse and that the parties' relationship, which had ended ten

 years prior to the issuance of the order, did not qualify as a

 "substantive dating relationship" as required by G. L. c. 209A,

 § 1.    Because the judge failed to consider one of the statutory

 criteria for determining whether a substantial dating

 relationship existed, we are constrained to vacate the order and

 remand the case.
      Background.   According to the record before us, the

plaintiff and the defendant were in a dating relationship

between 2007 and 2009.     The plaintiff alleged that the

relationship was abusive and outlined several instances of

abuse, including sexual assault, in her affidavit in support of

the ex parte order.    At the two-party hearing, she testified

that, on different occasions, the defendant dragged her down

three flights of stairs, sexually abused her, emotionally abused

her, and threatened her.    Specifically, she testified that, when

the relationship ended, he threatened to come find her, yank the

necklace that he gave her off of her neck, and choke her with

it.

      The most recent contact between the parties occurred in

January of 2020, when the defendant contacted the plaintiff

twice, once via text and once on Facebook asking if they could

talk.   The plaintiff testified that she believed this contact

was prompted by her filing a notarized witness statement against

the defendant one month earlier in connection with his divorce

proceedings.   As previously noted, about two years later, on May

20, 2022, the plaintiff sought a 209A order after she reported

to the police that during the course of her relationship with

the defendant, he had told her that he molested his siblings and

cousins.   The plaintiff testified that she was concerned that

the defendant would find out about the police report and contact

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her again, as he had two years prior when she provided the

notarized statement in the defendant's divorce proceedings.     She

further testified that she was afraid of the defendant based on

the abuse she had suffered during the course of their

relationship.

    Discussion.   On appeal, the defendant argues that the

plaintiff did not qualify for a 209A order because the

"substantive dating relationship" ended more than ten years

before the plaintiff sought the order and the plaintiff did not

allege any current or recent abuse by the defendant.     The

defendant further argues that the judge committed an error of

law by not considering all of the statutory factors in

determining whether a substantive dating relationship existed,

and that more specifically, the significant passage of time

between the end of the relationship and the plaintiff's

application for the order militated against finding that she

qualified for a 209A order.   The defendant also argues that the

plaintiff did not demonstrate a reasonable fear of imminent

physical harm based on the abuse she experienced between 2007

and 2009, even when taken in conjunction with the more recent

contact in the form of text and Facebook messages in January of

2020.

    "General Laws c. 209A, § 1, directs courts to adjudge the

existence of substantive dating relationships by considering

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four factors:   '(1) the length of time of the relationship; (2)

the type of relationship; (3) the frequency of interaction

between the parties; and (4) if the relationship has been

terminated by either person, the length of time elapsed since

the termination of the relationship.'"     E.C.O. v. Compton, 464

Mass. 558, 564 (2013).   Here, in concluding that an abuse

prevention order should issue, the judge properly considered the

first three factors, but appeared to not consider the fourth.

At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant's counsel argued

that the parties were not in a substantive dating relationship

because "the length of time elapsed since the termination of the

relationship is well beyond."   In response, the judge stated:

"Well, that's not relevant to whether she's a qualified person.

The length of time is a different argument."

    The plaintiff acknowledges that the judge erred by not

considering the passage of time between the end of the

relationship and her application for an abuse prevention order

but asserts that the error was harmless.    She argues that the

term "substantive dating relationship" should be construed

broadly to achieve the purposes of G. L. c. 209A, and that the

egregious nature of the abuse she suffered during the course of

the relationship (including sexual abuse), when viewed in

connection with the defendant's attempts to contact her

following the end of the relationship, undermined the

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defendant's argument that the passage of time disqualified her

from obtaining a 209A order.   This, she suggests, is

particularly true where the defendant's last contact with the

plaintiff seemed to have been precipitated by her filing a

statement in connection with legal proceedings, and the

application for the 209A order also immediately followed the

plaintiff reporting information to the police that she learned

during the course of her relationship with the defendant.

    Although the plaintiff has articulated a compelling

argument, under the circumstances presented, we conclude that

the judge's failure to adequately consider one of the four

statutory criteria -- "the length of time elapsed since the

termination of the relationship," G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (e) --

requires us to vacate the order and remand for a factual finding

on that issue.   In reaching our conclusion, we note that we are

not persuaded by the defendant's arguments that the judge abused

his discretion in determining that the plaintiff met her burden

to establish that she has a reasonable fear of imminent physical

harm based on instances of prior abuse.   "To the contrary, prior

abuse may 'serve as the necessary backdrop for reaching a proper

understanding of more recent words and behavior as well as for

assessing the reasonableness of an applicant's fear of imminent

serious physical harm.'"   Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App.

Ct. 549, 555 (2023), quoting Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App.

                                 5
Ct. 479, 487 (2005).   Cf. Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App.

Ct. 369, 374 (2014) (judge must appraise "the impact of the

violence already inflicted" where extension predicated on

attempted or actual physical abuse or involuntary sexual

relations).   We are likewise satisfied that the judge acted

within his discretion in extending the order on the alternative

basis that the plaintiff demonstrated her ongoing need for

"protect[ion] . . . from the impact of [the defendant's past

physical and sexual] abuse," Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass.

App. Ct. 315, 319 (2020), quoting Yahna Y. v. Sylvester S., 97

Mass. App. Ct. 184, 186-187 (2020), independent of any fear of

imminent physical harm.

     The order dated May 31, 2022, extending the abuse

prevention order is vacated, and the case is remand for further

proceedings consistent with this decision.1

                                     So ordered.

                                     By the Court (Vuono, Hand &
                                       Hodgens, JJ.2),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   May 23, 2023.

1 Both parties filed motions for appellate attorney's fees.    Both
motions are denied.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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