Court Opinion

ID: 7822904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:00:25.058835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:47.090842
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I think the majority is in error in stating that appellant Janes did not object to the consideration of a prior conviction for the purpose of enhancing his sentence. Appellants stated in a brief submitted to the trial court: “Defendants further contend that sections 1(b) and 4 of said Act render it constitutionally infirm in that such sections purport to permit imposition of enhanced sentences and imprisonment for prior convictions without regard to whether such convictions were counseled or uncounseled.” They cited and relied upon Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), a case we frequently cite as authority for exactly the same proposition as appellants were arguing. This argument was presented to the court in written form on the same day the judgment was entered, August 1, 1984. The argument was taken under consideration by the trial court prior to sentencing. In order to utter the exact words to comply with the majority opinion, an attorney would have to have clairvoyant powers to foresee what the judge would eventually enter into the record on appeal. Therefore, the objection was in rather broad language. Surely the trial court and members of this court fully understood the appellants were objecting to the use of prior convictions, whether counseled or uncounseled. The prior convictions in the case before us stand silent as to whether they were counseled or uncounseled. In argument before the trial court, counsel for appellants cited Baldasar for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions may not be used to enhance penalty statutes to felony status. We have spoken to the situation of a silent record before. In McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974) we stated: “It is well settled that ‘presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible’.” We have also held that the introduction of a previous conviction document, where that record concerning the level of the previous conviction is “silent,” amounts to prejudicial error. Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973). When the record of prior convictions does not show that the defendant was represented by counsel, or that he voluntarily waived counsel, the conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty. Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972). We have even held that when the record of a prior conviction was certified by the wrong person it could not be used for enhancement purposes. Richards v. State, 254 Ark. 760, 498 S.W.2d 1 (1973). When we first started considering appeals of convictions pursuant to the Omnibus DWI Act (Act 549 of 1983), we were confronted with this same issue. In Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318, 681 S.W.2d 395 (1984), we stated: “A prior conviction cannot be used collaterally to impose enhanced punishment unless the misdemeanant was represented by counsel or validly waived counsel. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); State v. Brown, 283 Ark. 304, 675 S.W.2d 822 (1984). Waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record.” No citation is needed to support the rule that the state has the duty to prove every essential element of a charge. Certainly it is essential to prove prior convictions to obtain a valid conviction under enhancement statutes. It is fundamental law that a record silent on whether prior convictions were counseled or uncounseled is inadmissible to enhance a penalty. The duty being on the state to prove a case, we surely should have held that the “silent” record will not support the conviction here. We should either reverse and remand or adjust the punishment here as we were used to doing.