Court Opinion

ID: 9749963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:07:57.269258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:00.633458
License: Public Domain

*519Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell:
I dissent — I very strongly dissent for each and all of the following reasons:
(1) Hospitals and public charities are, next to the Church, the greatest benefactors known to mankind. They are in reality a Trust for Humanity. The majority Opinion would bring so much harm to nonprofit hospitals and so greatly increase hospital expenses, and likewise the already colossal cost to patients, as to (a) harm all patients for the benefit of an injured few, and (b) jeopardize the existence of a number of hospitals, or (c) require them to reduce or greatly curtail or eliminate a number of their essential services and their functions, facilities, research and other activities and benevolences. Most hospitals in metropolitan areas operate in the red* when their costs and expenses include depreciation, amortization and interest. For the benefit of a few really injured and many imaginatively-injured people and their avaricious lawyers, the lame, the halt and the blind, the poor, the sick, the ill, the needy, and the general public will be deprived of the best services which a hospital can and should provide. Moreover, new buildings, modern equipment, more and better qualified personnel and increased wages will become more and more difficult if not impossible for most charities.
(2) By eliminating charitable immunity for nonprofit, charitable hospitals, the majority Opinion likewise abolishes it for Churches, schools and universities, homes for the blind, homes for the aged, homes for crippled or retarded or homeless children, Catholic *520Home Shelter and five other Catholic child-care institutions in Philadelphia, convents, religious organizations of many denominations, the Salvation Army, the Y.M.C.A., and in short for every other charity— small as well as large — and will undoubtedly jeopardize, especially in small communities, the very existence of many of them which today, in spite of State and City aid and large charitable gifts, are barely able to make both ends meet.
(3) The majority Opinion places the interests of a few individuals above the vital interests of the needy and ill public.
(4) The majority Opinion changes, without any legal or even social justification and with tremendous resulting harm to the public, the public policy of this Commonwealth which has existed for three-quarters of a century and which has been repeatedly and recently reiterated by our Courts: Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888); Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087; Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A. 2d 59; Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328: Knecht v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30; Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College, 404 Pa. 424, 172 A. 2d 769 (June 27, 1961) ; Betts v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Erie, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 545; Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 247 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1918).
Moreover, for approximately 70 years in nearly every Session of the Legislature, attempts have been made to abolish charitable immunity but the Legislature has always refused to make any change or modification in this wise and long established socially benevolent public policy.
(5) The majority Opinion usurps the province oí the Legislature which, because of its large numbers from all counties in the Commonwealth, its broad in*521vestigatory powers and ample means, is far better qualified than are four Judges of this Court to determine the wisdom of the existence or modification or abolition of this vitally important public policy. Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A. 2d 407. The majority Opinion substitutes its idea of wise public policy for the legislatively approved judicial policy in this broad public charitable field in which the Legislature is so much better qualified.
(6) Charities are and always have been favorites of the law in Pennsylvania, for the obvious reason that they render invaluable public service: Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 448, 138 A. 2d 844; Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College, 404 Pa., supra; Little Estate, 403 Pa. 247, 254,168 A. 2d 738; Voegtly Estate, 396 Pa. 90, 92, 151 A. 2d 593; Jordan’s Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 429, 197 Atl. 150; Daly’s Estate, 208 Pa. 58, 66, 57 Atl. 180. Moreover, where private interests and public interests conflict and no Constitutional problem is involved, the public interest should and, whenever reasonably possible, must prevail. Cf. Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 192, 82 A. 2d 34.
(7) Two principal reasons, both erroneous, are given to support the majority Opinion. The majority first assert that in good morals, in law and impliedly under the Constitution, there is and must be a remedy for every wrong. This is both factually and legally incorrect. For example, an injured person has no remedy and no recovery for damages is permitted when the injury resulted from the negligence of an agent or servant of a municipality while engaged in the performance of a governmental function. Moreover, a person injured by false and defamatory statements is not entitled to any recovery or any remedy if such statements were made or published by a high public official if such official was acting in the course of his official duties and within the scope of his authority or within *522his jurisdiction even if the statements were made with actual malice and for an improper motive and without reasonable or probable cause. Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A. 2d 100; Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892. Furthermore, it is well established that where a trial Judge in a criminal case makes a clearly erroneous, outrageous and unconstitutional ruling or decision against the Commonwealth— in such a case if the defendant is acquitted, the Commonwealth has no right of appeal and no remedy.
Moreover, the majority distort their contention that “for every wrong or injury there must be a remedy,” into meaning that there must be a remedy against those who are insured or in any event against an employer who is best able to pay. In order to support their theory, they rely upon and invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is neither ordained nor even mentioned in the Constitution.
The next reason given by the majority is that most hospitals have insurance and therefore can afford to adequately pay, where the actual wrongdoer cannot. Even if this were a fact, which it is not, there is no legal reason or justification for differentiation in legal liability between persons or charities which have insurance and those which have none. Moreover, what will happen to churches and to very small hospitals and small benevolent charitable homes, institutions and agencies, and to every little charity when they become liable for trespass injuries with their accompanying colossal verdicts? All of these eke out a bare existence while rendering many worthwhile and wonderful services to the public. Doesn’t their protection and preservation pro bono publico require a continuation of charitable immunity?
(8) The majority Opinion, subjecting all churches, charities and charitable organizations (small as well as large) to trespass claims, will greatly decrease — as soon *523as the colossal verdicts become known — charitable contributions which are the life blood of most hospitals, churches, and charities, and thereby jeopardize their very existence.
(9) If charitable immunity is abolished, it will aid the very few at the expense of the very many. Trespass litigation is already clogging and swamping our Courts (especially in large cities) and this Court load will undoubtedly be tremendously increased by suits against hospitals not only for real injuries but also for imaginary ailments, and for ailments and illnesses which were not cured by hospital care, and will be thought and alleged by the patient to be caused by negligence in the care or cure. Such suits will be limited only by the imagination of the discharged'patients and the ingenuity of astute lawyers specializing in the field of Tort, with the added result that Justice for thousands of injured persons who need speedier relief in their negligence suits, will be further unfairly postponed and jeopardized.
(10) If charitable immunity is to be abolished it should be abolished prospectively instead of retroactively. Retroactive application will raise difficult Constitutional questions and questions of statutory limitation, and will likely subject all charities to suits for injuries and real or imaginary ailments which allegedly occurred in the last two or more years and for which the charities are not and could not be prepared.
(11) The majority Opinion deals another mortal blow to the principle of Stare Decisis and the certainty and stability which is so absolutely necessary for the protection and preservation of the property and the rights of every individual, every hospital, and every other charity in Pennsylvania.
In Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa., supra, Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern, speaking for the Court, said *524(pages 407-408) : “Notwithstanding the violent criticisms that have been directed by academic legal writers against the doctrine of the immunity of charitable organizations from tort liability, and notwithstanding also the fact that there is considerable conflict in the judicial decisions on the subject among the several States, our own Commonwealth has, from the earliest times, stood firm in its adherence to the principle of immunity. For confirmation of that assertion it is only necessary to refer to such cases as Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 553; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087; Siidekum, Administrator, v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A. 2d 59; Betts v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Erie, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 545; Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass’n of Monongahela City, 247 Fed. 639 (3 C.C.). In the Gable case, supra, it was said (p. 258, A. p. 1088), ‘It is a doctrine too well established to be shaken, and as unequivocally declared in our own state as in any other, that a public charity cannot be made liable for the tort of its servants.’ Surely a doctrine so deeply embedded in the structure of our common law should not lightly be overturned in violation of the rule of stare decisis. Principles of the common law are not established or developed arbitrarily; they congeal during the course of the years from the fluidity of recurrent judicial decisions which presumably reflect the sentiments and social values of the community. Measured by that standard there is no class of institutions more favored and encouraged by our people as a whole than those devoted to religious or charitable causes. Public-minded benefactors are not likely to have their generous impulses encouraged if advised that some janitor, watchman or other employe of a charitable organization who carelessly fails to note the displacement of a brick or stone *525in a pavement* may thereby bring about the loss of all the property and funds which the donors had sought to devote to the common good. If and when there is to be any change in the doctrine of the immunity of charitable institutions from tort liability, it ought to be effected, not by the courts, but by the legislature, which is, of course, the ultimate tribunal to determine public policy. Incidentally, it will be remembered that this is not the only class of cases in which the victim of an accident may not recover damages from other than the individual who actually committed the tort; for instance, no such recovery is permitted where the accident results from the negligence of the agent or servant of a municipality while engaged in the performance of a governmental function.”
In Knecht v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30, Mr. Chief Justice Jones, speaking for the Court, quoted with approval and at great length from Bond v. Pittsburgh, supra, and said (pages 76, 77-78) : “The immunity of an eleemosynary institution from tort liability has long been the established rule in Pennsylvania: Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328; Siidekum, Admr. v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A. 2d 59; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087; Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 553; Betts v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Erie, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 545.
“. . . the law on this subject in Pennsylvania is clear. Charitable institutions are not subject to liability for tort. It is that rule which the appellant would have us now abandon by court decision.
*526“The rule was most recently reviewed in the case of Bond v. Pittsburgh, supra, in which the opinions for both the majority and the minority were agreed that the rule should remain as heretofore short of legislative change. Mr. Chief Justice Steen, speaking for the majority, said that ‘. . . our own Commonwealth has, from the earliest times, stood firm in its adherence to the principle of immunity.’ The majority opinion further pertinently stated that ‘If and when there is to be any change in the doctrine of the immunity of charitable institutions from tort liability, it ought to be effected, not by the courts, but by the legislature, which is, of course, the ultimate tribunal to determine public policy.’ The dissenter in the Bond case likewise recognized that ‘The doctrine of immunity of charities has in recent years been recurrently criticized as outmoded, unrealistic, illogical, inconsistent and not in public interest, but nevertheless . . . agree [d] with the majority that the principle is now too firmly imbedded in our law to be removed except by legislation. . . .’
“A rule of non-liability, even though judge-made, that has become as firmly fixed in the law of this State as has the charitable immunity from tort liability, should not be abrogated otherwise than by a statute made to operate prospectively. If the rule were to be abandoned by court decision, it would lay open to liability all charities for their torts of the past that were not barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the rendition of the rescinding decision. The injustice of such an imposition of liability upon charities that theretofore had a right to rely on the rule of immunity is readily apparent. . . .”
I am very greatly disturbed by the virtual extirpation of the principle of stare decisis, on which the House of Law was built. In the last six years the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has overruled cases *527in over 40 different areas of the law which had been, prior thereto, firmly established. Today no one knows from week to week, or Court session to Court session, whenever the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania meets, what the law will be tomorrow, or what are one’s rights, privileges, responsibilities and duties.
In a Constitutional republican form of Government such as ours, which is based upon law and order, Certainty and Stability are essential. Unless the Courts establish and maintain certainty and stability in the law, businessmen cannot safely and wisely make contracts with their employees or with each other; the meaning of wills, bonds, contracts, deeds and leases will fluctuate and change with each change in the personnel of a Court; property interests will be jeopardized and frequently lost or changed; Government cannot adequately protect law-abiding persons or communities against criminals; private citizens will not know their rights and obligations; and public officials will not know from week to week or month to month the powers and limitations of Government. This has been recognized for centuries by English-speaking peoples. Lord Coke, Chief Justice of England, thus wisely expressed (circa 1600) these truths: “The knowne certaintie of the law is the safetie of all.” This has been a beacon light for Anglo-American Courts, for text authorities, and for law-abiding Americans ever since the foundation of our Country. In the realm of the law it is usually expressed in the principle known as Stare Decisis. Stare Decisis is one of the bed-rocks upon which the House of Law has been erected and maintained.
In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), Mr; Justice Jackson (in a concurring opinion on the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus) aptly and pertinently said (page 535) : “Bightly or wrongly, the belief is widely *528held by the practicing profession that this Court no longer respects impersonal rules of law but is guided in these matters by personal impressions which from time to time may be shared by a majority of Justices. Whatever has been intended, this Court also has generated an impression in much of . the judiciary that regard for precedents and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have always meant to, the profession, that the law knows no■ fixed principles•”*
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192 (1958) said: “To be sure, it is never too late for this Court to correct a misconception in an occasional decision, even on a rare occasion to change a rule of law that may have long persisted but also have long. been, questioned and only fluctuatingly applied. To say that everybody on the Court has been wrong for 150 years [75 years] and that that which has been deemed part of the bone and sinew of the law should now be extirpated is quite another thing. . . . The admonition of Mr. Justice Brandéis that we are not a third branch of the Legislature should never be disregarded.”
Mr. Justice Douglas, who is generally regarded as the leading opponent of Stare' Decisis, in an article written for the Columbia Law Review of June 1949, Vol. 49, p. 735, said: “Uniformity and continuity in-law are necessary to many, activities. If they are nob present, the integrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and securities is impaired. And there Will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon. Stare decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious elements out-of law and' *529to give stability to a society. It is a strong tie which the future has to the past.”
It is obvious, if we are to progress, that there always will be exceptions to every general rule or principle, and that neither the law nor the principle of stare decisis can or should be as immutable as the laws of the Medes and the Persians. Nevertheless, it is obvious, at least to me, that the principle of stare decisis should not be ignored or extirpated, actually or effectually, because of changes in the personnel of a Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated the two exceptions which to him seem justifiable. I agree with him, and while I would express the same thoughts a little differently, I would go further. I would hold that the principle of Stare Decisis should always be applied, irrespective of the changing personnel of this (or any Supreme) Court, except in the two situations set forth by Justice Frankfurter and in the following situations: (1) Where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is convinced that prior decisions of the Court are irreconcilable, or (2) the application of a rule or principle has undoubtedly created great confusion; or (3) in those rare cases where the Supreme Court is' convinced that the reason for the law undoubtedly no longer exists, and modern circumstances and Justice combine to require or justify a change, and no one’s present personal rights or vested property interests will be injured by the change. Change of circumstances or modern circumstances does not mean, nor has it ever heretofore been considered as the equivalent of “change of personnel in the Court,” or the substitution of the social or political philosophy of a Judge for the language of the Constitution or of a written instrument, or for well settled principles of law.
Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, Pennsylvania’s most illustrious member of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a dissenting Opinion in Smith v. Allwright, *530321 U.S. 649, 669, thus aptly and strikingly expressed his views concerning the erosion or abolition of the principle of stare decisis: “The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current decisions, that the opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject.”
Mr. Justice Eagen well expressed the same concern for Stare Decisis in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 253, 164 A. 2d 98 (1960) : “. . . Unquestionably, in a republican form of government as we are privileged to enjoy, order, certainty and stability in the law are essential for the safety and protection of all. Stare Decisis should not be trifled with. If the law knows no fixed principles, 'chaos and confusion will certainly follow ... If it is clear that the reason for a law no longer exists and modern circumstances and justice require a change, and no vested rights will be violated, a change should be made.”
Chief Justice Black and Chief Justice Jones so aptly expressed the principles which should govern the Courts of Pennsylvania, irrespective of the social or political philosophy of the constantly changing members of the Court, that at the risk of piling Ossa upon Pelion we shall quote what they so wisely said.
In Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia, 404 Pa. 424, Chief Justice Jones, speaking for the Court as recently as June 27, 1961, said (pages 426-427 and 427-428) : “The rule of charitable immunity has long since been in force in Pennsylvania, see Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888). If the doctrine of charitable *531immunity is, as the appellants contend, no longer suited to the times and should be dispensed with, the proper way to accomplish that end is prospectively by legislation and not retroactively by judicial ukase. Under our democratic form of government, it is the legislature that can competently declare and promulgate public policy and not the courts. It is to be hoped, therefore, that, with this current decision, the appellants’ contention will assume a state of quiescence so far as further insistent court action is concerned. Perhaps that is too much to hope for. It is just three years since the identical contention was urged upon us and rejected in Knecht v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30. . . .
“What Chief Justice Black said for this court in McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa. 417, 423 (1853), concerning stare decisis, is presently most apposite, viz., ‘It is sometimes said that this adherence to precedent is slavish; that it fetters the mind of the judge, and compels him to decide without reference to principle. But let it be remembered that stare decisis is itself a principle of great magnitude and importance. It is absolutely necessary to the formation and permanence of any system of jurisprudence. Without it we may fairly be said to have no law; for law is a fixed and established rule, not depending in the slightest degree on the caprice of those who may happen to administer it. .
We once again repeat the words of Mr. Justice Jackson: “this Court has generated an impression in much of the judiciary [and of the Bar] that regard for ¡precedents and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have always meant to the profession, that the law knows no fixed principles.”
For years I have fought vigorously but vainly for the protection and preservation of Stare Decisis. After 40 or more major operations, it would appear that *532the principle is not dying, bnt dead. So I conclude by saying: Stare Decisis — don’t rest in a hospital, just rest in peace.

 In 1964, 61 hospitals in Metropolitan Philadelphia had an operating loss (not including depreciation, amortization and interest charges) of $26,801,260. Report of Delaware Valley Hospital Council. Nine of these were Catholic hospitals, one of which operated slightly in the black and the others had total operating losses exceeding $1,100,000.

 or if they learn that a hospital, which is the frequent object of their generosity, has just been compelled to pay a colossal verdict because, allegedly, some orderly, janitor, nurse, student or volunteer brought germs into a hospital, or left a patient in a drafty corridor or failed skillfully to perform either a menial or an important service.

 Italics throughout, ours.