Court Opinion

ID: 9757392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:38:33.817125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.960672
License: Public Domain

*226KELLY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
In this case, we are called upon to determine the conditions under which state law enforcement personnel in Pennsylvania may constitutionally conduct electronic participant monitoring.
I note initially that, as has frequently been the case in the past, this case arises as the result of a criminal’s invocation of the state and federal constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures in an effort to suppress undeniable proof of his guilt. Nonetheless, it is a historical fact that many of the safeguards and liberties which honest citizens cherish and hold dear were forged in cases such as this involving common criminals; thus, we must keep in mind that our decisions defining the scope and limits of constitutional rights apply equally to the vast majority of law-abiding citizens as well as to those justly suspected and accused of crimes.
On the other hand, it must also be remembered that what the constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. Our learned colleague Judge McEwen has recently explained:
Judicial examination of a challenge to a police search requires the court to balance the competing needs of society. On the one hand, the need of every society, including our free society, to provide for enforcement of its laws and thereby enable the preservation of the common weal is intrinsic to the existence of any society. That need in our society is, of course, described in constitutional parlance as the ‘police power.’ On the other hand, the quite decisive restrictions upon the ‘police power’ imposed by the founders and framers in the Bill of Rights bespeaks their keen awareness of the awesome nature of the ‘police power’. The specific role of the courts then is to balance the right of society to implement its police power against the right of a citizen to be free of police intrusion. This challenging task requires the courts to balance those competing rights and then to discern: what is ‘reasonable’ — a term which, with its kin *227‘fairness’ and ‘due process’, defies definition, but demands determination.
Commonwealth v. Martinson, 368 Pa.Super. 130, 140-141, 533 A.2d 750, 755 (1987) (per McEwen, J.; Cirillo, P.J., and Montemuro, J., join). (Emphasis added).
The eminent former Chief Justice Samuel Roberts explained the difficulty of this balancing approach as it applies to the right to privacy as follows:
A mere passing acquaintance with the daily newspaper suffices to substantiate the existence of a widely felt and insidious threat to individual privacy posed, not only by technological advances, but also by the evolution of contemporary social structures. A jealous regard for individual privacy is a judicial tradition of distinguished origin, buttressed in many area by the imperative mandate of constitutional guarantees. Protection of individual privacy, however, appears frequently to reduce the methods available to law enforcement agencies in the detection and prosecution of crime. New would deny that in this country today concern with the growth of criminal activity is of the same order of magnitude as the concern with the erosion of individual privacy.
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 442 Pa. 234, 240-41, 275 A.2d 28, 31 (1971). (Emphasis added).
I would add that the tension between “the right to be let alone” and the proper exercise of “police power” arises as a necessary incident of “civil liberty.” Society deprives the individual of the right to avenge himself by direct response and, in recompense for this loss, has instituted the “police power” to ensure a reasoned and just societal response. Chief Justice John Marshall explained, “[t]he very essence of civil liberty, is the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Judge William Blackstone explained that:
every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutu*228al commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws which the community has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power, and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. Hence, we may collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind.
I W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *125-26 (Sharswood ed. 1872). (Emphasis added). The instant dispute, then, involves not merely the rights of the police and the rights of the individual; rather, it involves the conflict between the right of the societal majority to enforce its laws, and the rights of each individual member of society as against the rule of that majority.
The crux of appellant’s appeal is that, notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s compliance with the requirements of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(ii), the state conducted an unreasonable search and seizure by using a police informant wired with a transmitter to allow the police to intercept and record a private conversation which occurred in appellant’s home. Appellant contends that the interception of his private conversation violates both state and federal proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures. The main thrust of appellant’s argument, however, is that this Court should adopt the minority view — adhered to in only Alaska, Montana, and Michigan (discussed infra) — that a warrant, issued by a judicial official and based upon proba*229ble cause, is constitutionally required under the state constitution prior to use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel. Appellant urges a more expansive construction of the Pennsylvania proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in this context than is currently given the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.
In addition to the primary issue presented for review, the parties have framed two subsidiary issues which must also be addressed. First, assuming, arguendo, that all evidence derived from the electronic participant monitoring must be suppressed, did the affidavit in support of the April 6, 1984 search warrant contain other facts sufficient to establish probable cause and thereby obviate the necessity of declaring the warrant invalid? Second, assuming that the search warrant is invalid, should the fruits of the execution of the warrant nonetheless be deemed to have been admissible at trial under a “good faith” exception to a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule? 1
The majority, per President Judge Cirillo, present an exhaustive analysis of the authorities which support the minority view that prior issuance by a judicial officer of a warrant based upon probable cause is constitutionally required under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 before law enforcement personnel may conduct electronic participant monitoring. The majority conclude that: evidence derived from warrantless electronic participant monitoring must be suppressed; the redacted affidavit contains insufficient averments to establish probable cause to support the search warrant; the search warrant is therefore invalid; and, a “good faith” exception to a state constitutionally mandated *230exclusionary rule cannot apply because it is per se unreasonable for the police to have believed that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 conferred upon them authority to conduct searches on less than probable cause. Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 221-222, 536 A.2d at 375. The majority reverse and remand for a new trial.
Judge Rowley, in his dissent, concludes that the electronic participant monitoring conducted in the instant case was constitutional under both the Pennsylvania and the' United States Constitutions. Judge Rowley relies upon the reasoning expressed in Commonwealth v. Harvey, 348 Pa.Super. 544, 502 A.2d 679 (1985), wherein this Court embraced the view of the United States Supreme Court and an overwhelming majority of our sister states — that warrantless electronic participant monitoring violates no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore, does not trigger the protections of either the Fourth Amendment or the analogous provisions of state constitutions.2 Judge Rowley *231opines further that the limitations of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5704 and 5714, “are sufficient to guard against the unlimited and indiscriminate use of such interceptions and the evidence obtained therefrom and act as an adequate deterrent to inappropriate police activity.” Dissenting Opinion, per Rowley, J., infra, 370 Pa.Super. at 271, 536 A.2d at 400. Although Judge Rowley finds the electronic participant monitoring to have been constitutional, he also indicates his agreement with Judges Olszewski and Beck that the affidavit contains sufficient facts to establish probable cause even with the averments based upon the affiant’s participation in the electronic participant monitoring redacted. He offers no opinion as to the admissibility of the fruits of the execution of the search warrant under a “good faith” exception to a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule.
I can agree fully with neither the majority nor the dissent. I agree with the majority that unbridled use of electronic participant monitoring involves a threat to the reasonable expectations of privacy of law-abiding citizens and therefore constitutes a search and seizure triggering the protections of Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. I also agree that 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5704 and 5714 are insufficient to safeguard the legitimate privacy interests threatened. While I share Judge Rowley’s confidence that those designated to authorize warrantless electronic participant monitoring will not countenance wholesale abuses of the procedure so as to bring into existence the Orwellian, apocalyptic vision so eloquently decried in the majority opinion, I must note the distinct possibility, even probability, that under the current standardless system and in the heat of passions arising in particular cases, zealousness for the perceived public good may overpower the judgment and objectivity of even the most faithful and conscientious members of the Commonwealth’s prosecuting team. The current safe*232guards leave virtually unrestricted discretion in the hands of the members of the prosecution team as to who will be subjected to such surveillance, for what reasons, under what conditions, and for how long. Consequently, I agree with the majority that additional safeguards are required.
However, while I share the majority’s grave concerns and cautious sentiments regarding the potential for abuse of electronic surveillance technology in general, and electronic participant monitoring in particular, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that prior issuance by a judicial officer of a warrant based upon probable cause is an irreducible prerequisite to the constitutional use of electronic participant monitoring by state law enforcement personnel in Pennsylvania. Nor do I agree that our constitution has already balanced “the needs of law enforcement against the rights of citizens.” See Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 205, 536 A.2d at 367. Rather, I believe that the Constitution requires us to conduct additional analysis in order to determine whether the seizure of appellant’s private conversation by use of electronic participant monitoring was unreasonable. Nonetheless, I agree that, because the safeguards were constitutionally inadequate, the seizure of appellant’s private communications was unreasonable. I outline, infra, the type of basic safeguards I believe to be minimally required in order to find the warrantless use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel to be reasonable.
Assuming, arguendo, that the tapes of the monitoring and the monitoring officer’s statements should have been suppressed pursuant to a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule (the existence and scope of which remains an open question), I would find the redacted affidavit of probable cause to contain insufficient averments to establish probable cause for the search of a home, and therefore, would find the search warrant to be invalid. In this I agree with the majority and not Judge Olszewski’s concurring and dissenting opinion with which Judges Rowley and Beck have indicated agreement. However, for a variety of rea*233sons, discussed infra, I find that suppression of the fruits of the execution of the search warrant in this case is neither required nor appropriate, and would decline to do so. Finally, I note that because neither the tapes of the prior warrantless electronic participant surveillance nor testimony of the monitoring officers were admitted into evidence during appellant’s bench trial, I find the failure to suppress that evidence, if error, was nonetheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and would affirm judgment of sentence. Because of the importance of the issues raised, I write separately to explain my reasoning and to express my concerns regarding the approaches taken by the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
I.
Under acts of Congress and state legislatures, it is unlawful to intercept a private oral or wire communication or to use or divulge the contents of an intercepted communication unless the interception, use, or divulgence is pursuant to prior judicial authorization, or unless a party to the conversation has consented to the interception by law enforcement personnel investigating suspected criminal activity.3 Appellant concedes that the electronic participant monitoring conducted in the instant case did not violate Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. (Appellant’s Brief at 11-13). Appellant contends, however, that to the *234extent that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 authorizes electronic participant monitoring without requiring prior issuance by a judicial official of a warrant based upon probable cause, the statute is unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief at 11).
I agree with the majority; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 does not authorize electronic participant monitoring. Rather, the statute merely exempts specified types of electronic participant monitoring from the statutory restrictions and limitations placed upon non-exempt wiretapping and electronic surveillance procedures. The statute provides in pertinent part, “[i]t shall not be unlawful under this chapter for — ” (Emphasis added). Thus, while 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2) clearly establishes the absence of a statutory bar to the electronic participant monitoring conducted in the instant case, the statute provides no authorization for such procedures and does not in any way insulate electronic participant monitoring conducted in compliance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2) from constitutional scrutiny.
II.
Under the current construction of the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court, warrantless electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel does not constitute a search or seizure because the monitoring is deemed not to have invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); United States v. Caceres, supra 440 U.S. at n. 3, 99 S.Ct. at n. 3; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (plurality); Kaufer v. United States, 394 U.S. 458, 89 S.Ct. 1223, 22 L.Ed.2d 414 (1969) (per curiam), aff'g 406 F.2d 550 (2nd Cir.1969).4 Based upon the foregoing authorities, I *235agree with the majority’s conclusion that, “the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to electronic eavesdropping conducted by the police without the consent of either party to the conversation, but does not apply where one of the parties to the conversation consents.” Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa. Super, at 188, 536 A.2d at 358. (Citations omitted).
III.
Appellant’s primary contention, though, is that the electronic participant monitoring violated the proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant argues that the search and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution must be construed so as to provide greater protections against electronic participant monitoring than the Fourth Amendment. The majority embrace this contention; Judge Rowley rejects it. My analysis leaves me between these two positions.
A.
As the majority notes, the Pennsylvania proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures antedates the federal provision. Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 194, 536 A.2d at 361. Indeed, each of the guarantees contained in the federal Bill of Rights had its antecedents in one or more of the state constitutions and colonial charters. See generally S. Fisher, The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia 1897). “Far from being the model for the states, the federal Bill of Rights was added to meet demands for the same guarantees against the new central government the people had secured against their own local officials.” Linde, First Things First, Redis*236covering the State’s Bill of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379, 381 (1980). Eight of the thirteen original states adopted a state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. See Cuddihy, “Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins),” in 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 762 (Levy ed. 1987); see also S. Fisher, supra at 199-201. Moreover, it is appropriate to note that from 1776 until 1949 when the Fourth Amendment was first applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Pennsylvania Constitution, and not the Fourth Amendment, protected Pennsylvanians from unreasonable searches and seizures by state law enforcement personnel. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 203 Pa.Super. 541, 201 A.2d 434 (1964); Commonwealth v. Rubin, 82 Pa.Super. 315, 319 (1923); accord Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law, at 116 (1985).
Clearly, Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 has identity and vitality separate and distinct from that of the Fourth Amendment; it remains therefore emphatically the province and duty of the Pennsylvania judiciary to declare its scope and limitations. See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra, 486 Pa. at 44, 403 A.2d at 1289; Beck, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review — 1982, 56 Temple Law Quarterly 705, 708-10 (1983); Roberts, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: Constitutional Government in Action, 54 Temple Law Quarterly 403, 411 (1981); see also Brennen, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 535 (1986); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L.Rev. 731 (1982).
However, even proponents of “new federalism” recognize that the case for an independent role for state courts “should not be read as a case for unthinking activism. No judge, state or federal, is a knight errant whose only concern is to do good. Hence, the state judge, when *237presented with the invitation to develop a body of state constitutional law, should pause to consider some of the dangers along the way.” Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger County, 62 Va.L.Rev. 873, 940-41 (1976) (also coining the phrase “new-federalism” to describe the use of state sovereignty to insulate state constitution protections broader than the federal constitutional protections from review in the federal courts); cf. Berger, New Theories of Interpretation: The Activists’ Flight from the Constitution, 47 Ohio St.L.J. 1 (Winter 1986) (analyzing and critizing the activist approaches).
As the majority recognizes, we are “expected to deal carefully with a Supreme Court opinion and to explain forthrightly why [we find ourselves] required to reason differently.” Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 190, 536 A.2d at 359, quoting Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra, 486 Pa. at 44, 403 A.2d at 1289. Moreover, it should be noted that the recognition of a higher standard for searches and seizures under state constitutional law than that required under federal constitutional law in one set of circumstances, does not require that a higher standard should be imposed in all other circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985), our Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants greater protections than the federal constitution does, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63-64, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1967) (collecting cases), there should be a compelling reason to do so.” 509 Pa. at 484-85, 503 A.2d at 926. (Emphasis added).
B.
Pennsylvanians undoubtedly have the right to adopt a state constitution which provides greater limitations on the warrantless use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel than the federal constitution provides. The question in the instant case, however, is not *238whether Pennsylvanians may, but whether we have already done so.
The mere fact that Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 antedates the Fourth Amendment does not provide a reason to construe it differently than the Fourth Amendment. Both were directed toward eliminating the same evils — general warrants and writs of assistance. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 317-18 (1814);5 Commonwealth v. Rubin, supra, 82 Pa.Super. at 319-20; see also V The Founder’s Constitution 219, 219-44 (1984) (tracing the origins of the Fourth Amendment); Galloway, Fourth Amendment Ban on General Searches and Seizures, 10 Search and Seizure L.Rep. 141, 141-48 (1983); Marke, “The Writs of Assistance Case and the Fourth Amendment,” in Essays in Legal History in Honor of Felix Frankfurter, at 351-72 (Forkosch ed. 1966); White, Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania, at 157-59 (Philadelphia 1907).
Moreover, there are no significant textual differences which would provide a reason for differing construction of the clauses. Commonwealth v. Gray, supra, 509 Pa. at 485-86, 503 A.2d at 926; see also Commonwealth v. John*239ston, 515 Pa. 454, 472, 530 A.2d 74, 83 (1987) (Hutchinson, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 266 n. 11, 312 A.2d 29, 34 n. 11 (1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); compare U.S. Const. Amend. 4 and Pa.Const. Art. I, sec. 8.6 Indeed, the revision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 in 1790 significantly reduced textual differences which might otherwise have supported a broader construction of the Pennsylvania provision than the federal provision.7 It is significant that these changes were made unanimously and contemporaneously with the ratification of the Fourth Amendment by Pennsylvania.8 The situation in Pennsylvania is, in this *240respect, quite different from the situation faced by the courts in Alaska, Montana, Louisiana, Florida, and Hawaii, to whose decisions the majority look for guidance and support. Majority Opinion, 370 Pa.Super. at 191, 536 A.2d at 360.
C.
State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), cited by the majority, did not involve the interpretation of a state constitutional provision analogous to the Fourth Amendment. 583 P.2d at 875. Rather, the Alaska Supreme Court expressly based its holding — that a warrant was required prior to the use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel — upon Alaska Const. Art. I, sec. 22 which provides: “[t]he right of the people to privacy is *241recognized and shall not be infringed.” 583 A.2d at 874.9 In rejecting the state’s arguments based upon United States v. White, supra, and earlier federal cases, the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “those authorities should not be regarded as determinative of the scope of Alaska’s right to privacy amendment, since no such express right is contained in the U.S. Constitution.” 583 A.2d at 875.
Likewise, State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978), also cited by the majority, expressly based its holding — that a warrant was required prior to the use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel — upon Mont. Const. Art. II, sec. 10, which provides, “[t]he right to privacy is essential to the well being of a free society and shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state interest.” 582 P.2d at 1220.10 Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court has stated that where state and federal constitutional provisions are identical or nearly iden*242tical, the state provisions will be construed consistently with United States Supreme Court decisions construing the federal provisions. See State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983); State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977). Thus, in absence of the express right to privacy in Mont.Const. Art. II, sec. 10, the provisions of MontConst. Art. II, sec. 11 (analogous to Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 and the Fourth Amendment) would provide no greater protection against electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel than the Fourth Amendment. See Collins, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: Reliance on State Constitutions — The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex.L.Rev. 1095 (1985) (analyzing and criticizing Jackson and Finley).
Similarly, the original 6-1 decision in State v. Reeves, 427 So.2d 403 (La. 1982), noted by the majority, was expressly based upon significant textual differences between La. Const. Art. I, sec. 5 and the Fourth Amendment.11 The original majority (which became the minority on rehearing) explained:
By its clear terms the constitution expressly protects every person’s ‘communications’ from unreasonable searches, seizures and ‘invasions of privacy,’ thereby affirmatively establishing a right to privacy including a person’s communications. The safeguard is unlimited and thus covers all of a person’s private communications. Because the constitution expressly elevates communication as a protected interest to a position of equal stature with other expressly protected interests, invasions or interceptions of them may not be conducted without a *243warrant issued upon probable cause, particularly describing the communication to be invaded, and the lawful purpose or reason for the interception.
427 So.2d at 404-05. The original majority rejected the rationale of United States v. White, supra, reasoning that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not contain these explicit guarantees and, as interpreted by the White plurality, simply does not address some types of invasions of privacy that concerned the delegates and the people of this State in adopting the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.” 427 So.2d at 409.
On rehearing, the new majority held that the defendants’ conversations were “communications” but that no “invasion of privacy” had occurred. While applying Justice Harlan’s actual and reasonable expectation of privacy test, the court expressly rejected Justice Harlan’s anecdotal argument that electronic participant monitoring will have a “chilling effect” on free speech, White, supra, 401 U.S. at 787-89; the rehearing majority responded to this argument:
Those who oppose warrantless consensual surveillance argue that it will have a chilling effect on free and open discourse among members of society. This claim is speculative at best. [...] The fact that this type of surveillance exists in the federal system or existed in our jurisdiction has not frustrated society’s willingness to trust others. Free and open discourse has not been inhibited.
427 So.2d at 418. (Footnote omitted). Louisiana has since reaffirmed the holding of the rehearing majority. See State v. Terracina, 430 So.2d 64 (La.1983) (per Lobrano, with two judges joining, three judges concurring and one dissenting); State v. Marks, 503 So.2d 32 (La.App.1986); State v. Taylor, 483 So.2d 232 (La.App.1986); see also Wise, State v. Reeves: Interpreting Louisiana’s Right to Privacy, 44 La.L.Rev. 183 (1983).
The majority also cites State v. Lee, 67 Hawaii 307, 686 P.2d 816 (1984), and State v. Lester, 64 Hawaii 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982); however, neither of these cases support the *244argument that a warrant based on probable cause is constitutionally required prior to use of electronic participant surveillance by law enforcement personnel. Indeed, despite an express constitutional proscription against “invasion[s] of privacy,” in Hawaii Const. Art. I, sec. 7, the Hawaii Supreme Court has consistently held that the Hawaii Constitution provides no greater protection against warrantless electronic participant monitoring than the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lee, supra, 686 P.2d at 817-18; State v. Okubo, 67 Hawaii 197, 682 P.2d 79, 81 (1984); State v. Pilago, 65 Hawaii 22, 24, 649 P.2d 363, 365 (1982); State v. Lester, supra, 649 P.2d at 352.
The majority also cites State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643 (Fla.1981), aff'g 371 So.2d 1047 (Fla.App.1979), wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that, in absence of exigent circumstances, warrantless electronic participant monitoring of private conversations in a target’s own home violated the express proscription against “unreasonable interceptions of private communications” in Florida Const. Art. I, sec. 12.12 Again, significant textual differences account for the difference in the construction of the state and federal provisions.
The fate of the Sarmiento rule, however, is particularly instructive as to the risks and limitations of the activist approach to “new federalism.” Following the Sarmiento decision, an active crusade was launched in the Florida Legislature which resulted in the passage of the following *245constitutional amendment in place of the provision construed in Sarmiento:
§ 12. Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Fla. Const. Art. 1, sec. 12 (as amended November 2, 1982) (emphasis indicates text added to the former provision). The new provision has been construed to have the effect of overruling Sarmiento prospectively, and to have brought Florida back into line with the majority view as to the constitutionality of warrantless electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel. Madsen v. State, 502 So.2d 948 (Fla.App.1987); State v. Hume, 463 So.2d 499 (Fla.App.1985); State v. Ridenour, 453 So.2d 193 (Fla.App.1984); see also Wilks, “The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: Death of the Phoenix?,” in Developments in State Constitutional Law at 166-193 (Nat’l Center for State Courts 1986) (discussing popular repeal of “new federalism” decisions by state constitutional amendments, including Sarmiento ).13
*246Based upon the foregoing, I find any reliance by the majority upon Glass, Brackmun, Reeves, Lester, Lee, and Sarmiento to be misplaced. Each of those cases involved the interpretation of a recently adopted state constitutional amendment expressly providing a constitutional right to privacy above and beyond that afforded by the state constitution’s provision analogous to the Fourth Amendment; Pennsylvania’s constitution contains no such amendment.14 *247Moreover, Reeves, Lester, and Lee rejected the proposition urged by the majority herein despite the presence of an additional express right to privacy in the state constitution being construed in those cases; and the people of Florida have altered their constitution so as to overrule Sarmiento. Finally, I note that I find the expansive view of privacy embraced by the appellate courts of Alaska and Montana to be inconsistent with Pennsylvania law and public policy.15
D.
Any reliance by the majority on Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 424 N.E.2d 250 (1981) is also misplaced. In Thorpe, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected statutory as well as state and federal constitutional claims that evidence derived from warrantless electronic *248participant monitoring of a uniformed police officer’s conversations with the accused should be suppressed. The court expressly declined to rule on the merits of the minority view urged herein, and instead based its decision on the narrow facts presented. 424 N.E.2d at 258-59. Read in context, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s dictum that, “the better future course, and the most secure course constitutionally, is for law enforcement officials to procure warrants in cases where probable cause for surveillance can be shown, and even in cases where it does not appear that the statute requires a case where it does not appear that the statutes require a warrant,” is no more than an application of the ancient dictum, vis consili expers mole ruit sua (literally, force without good sense falls by its own weight; colloquially, discretion is the better part of valor). 424 N.E.2d at 259; see also Kiehly, Warrantless Electronic Surveillance in Massachusetts, 71 Mass.L.R. 183, 183-93 (Winter 1986) (analyzing Thorpe). Undoubtedly, securing a warrant is the safest course, statutorily and constitutionally. However, the question here is not which is the safest course, but whether the course in question is constitutional. On this issue, Thorpe offers only stony silence.
The majority also cite People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 878, 96 S.Ct. 152, 46 L.Ed.2d 111 (1975), wherein the Michigan Supreme Court held that, in absence of exigent circumstances, warrantless electronic participant monitoring of a private conversation in the target’s own home constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Mich. Const. Art. I, sec. 11 (analogous to the Fourth Amendment, and Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8).16 Michigan’s constitution has no express “right to privacy” provision like those construed in Glass, Brackman, Reeves, Lester, Lee and Sarmiento; hence, the major*249ity’s reliance upon Beavers is more appropriate in that respect.
In Beavers, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that, “[participant monitoring is practiced extensively throughout the country and represents a vitally important investigative tool of law enforcement,” but found that the warrant requirement was necessary because:
The interests of both the society and the individual should not rest upon the exercise of unerring judgment and self-restraint of law enforcement officials. Our laws must ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may continue to engage in private discourse, free to speak with uninhibited spontaneity that is characteristic of our society.
393 Mich, at 566, 227 N.W.2d at 515. While I agree that the unrestricted discretion currently vested in law enforcement personnel in Pennsylvania jeopardizes legitimate privacy interests of law-abiding citizens protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution, I cannot agree that application of the fullblown warrant requirement is necessary or appropriate.
IV.
My primary disagreement with the majority relates to its conclusion that “any balancing of the needs of law enforcement against the rights of the citizen has already been done by the framers of the constitution who conditioned searches and seizures for the most part on the prior approval of a detached and neutral magistrate” and that “the constitutional standard is probable cause.” Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 205, 536 A.2d at 367. (Emphasis added).
A.
President Polk’s vice president, George M. Dallas, once opined that, “the Constitution in its words is plain and intelligible, and it is meant for the homebred, unsophis*250ticated understandings of our fellow citizens.” 17 To the contrary, however, by their very nature, there are great silences and ambiguities in any constitution, state or federal. Accord McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explained:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209, 48 S.Ct. 480, 485, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1927). (Emphasis added).
With regard to the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, Professor LaFave has observed:
The Fourth Amendment has the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity. It does not define the probable cause required for warrants or indicate whether a warrantless search or seizure is inevitably ‘unreasonable’ if made without probable cause, so that the factual basis required for a constitutional search or seizure is unclear. The amendment does not define the relationship of the word ‘unreasonable’ to the clause setting forth the conditions under which warrants may issue; it is thus unclear when a judicial officer’s approval must be obtained before an arrest or search is made. There is also uncertainty as to what official conduct is subject to the amendment’s restraints, that is, just what actions amount to ‘searches and seizures’ and threaten the ‘right of the people to be secure.’ Finally, there is ambiguity concerning how that right is to be enforced; unlike the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, no mention is made of barring from evidence the fruits of a violation of the amendment.
LaFave, “Search and Seizure” in 4 Encycl. of Am. Const. 1628 (1987). (Emphasis deleted). Professor LaFave’s observations apply with equal force to Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8.
*251B.
In light of the ambiguous terms in which Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 was drafted, I am unwilling to accept the majority’s dictum that the needs of law enforcement (and society in general) have already been balanced against the rights of the individual to be free from searches and seizures. To accept this black and white analysis, I would also have to be willing to impose the fullblown warrant requirement on other non-traditional intrusions such as: airport metal detector and x-ray security searches; canine drug searches; school locker searches; and systematic drunk driving or license registration check-point/roadblock traffic stops. Each of these examples undeniably involves a search and/or a seizure. If our state constitution has already struck the balance, then these too must fall under the “unreasonable per se” rule of the majority. To this line of analysis, I must dissent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa.Super. 49, 54-56, 519 A.2d 984, 987-88 (1986) (Kelly, J.).
I find that in rejecting the balancing approach, the majority impose upon Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 a rigidity which our Supreme Court has rejected. In Commonwealth v. Johnston, supra, our Supreme Court reasoned:
We believe that the present case lacks the exigencies which were so important in Terry, and for that reason, the determination of whether there was a search cannot be made by balancing the privacy interests of the individual against the law enforcement objectives of government, and in this we disagree with the majority’s analysis in Place. As Mr. Justice Brennan puts it, the balance has already been struck by the Fourth Amendment itself. The issue under Pennsylvania law, then, and contrary to Place, is not whether a search occurred, for it is our view that it did, but whether the search that occurred should implicate the usual warrant requirements characteristic of police searches of private areas. This question necessarily involves a balancing analysis. Thus, while we are unwilling to balance the privacy expectations of the individual against the law enforce*252ment interests of government for the purpose of determining whether there was a search, we find the balancing inquiry appropriate to determine whether this particular kind of search in these circumstances necessarily implicates the fullblown warrant requirements of most other police searches. Professor LaFave puts the question this way:
If the issue is framed in terms of whether a totally unrestrained use of such dogs in a dragnet fashion would be tolerable in a free society, one’s answer might likely be no. If so, then under the test earlier suggested as appropriate under Katz, such use of trained dogs to detect concealed contraband should be held to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Yet it is clear that this particular surveillance technique amounts to a relatively minor intrusion upon privacy, much less than is involved, say, in the physical entry and ransacking of a house in an effort to find a quantity of narcotics. Because this is so, and because the use of trained dogs is a valuable surveillance technique which would be considerably hampered if it could be utilized only upon full probable cause and with search warrant in hand, from this perspective the push is in the direction of a holding that the use of trained dogs to detect concealed contraband is not a search. This quite obviously leads to the question of whether there is some Fourth Amendment middle ground, that is, whether it is possible to subject this law enforcement practice to some restraints so as to ensure that it is not used in a dragnet fashion or in a random or unprincipled fashion, but yet not destroy its effectiveness by imposing all the limitations which are applicable to other, more traditional kinds of searches that are much more threatening to privacy and security.
I Search and Seizure (2d Ed.) § 2.1(e), p. 315.
We believe that there is a Fourth Amendment middle ground applicable to the investigations conducted by police handlers of narcotics detection dogs.
*253515 Pa. at 465, 530 A.2d at 79. (Emphasis added). Thus, while a balancing approach is deemed inappropriate to determine whether an activity constitutes a search, a balancing approach is nonetheless required in determining whether a search is reasonable or unreasonable.
V.
I believe that a Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, middle ground is, likewise, applicable here. I agree with the majority that the current safeguards are inadequate to protect legitimate privacy interests of the vast law-abiding majority of the public. Nonetheless, I believe that with additional safeguards to ensure that electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel is not used in a dragnet, arbitrary, or capricious fashion, the warrantless use of electronic participant monitoring could pass state as well as federal constitutional muster without imposing the fullblown warrant requirement. I set forth with specificity the type of additional safeguards I find to be minimally required first, and explain afterwards my reasons for adopting this view rather than that of the majority or that of Judge Rowley’s dissent.
A.
I find the following safeguards, or substantially similar safeguards, to be minimally required in order for warrant-less electronic participant monitoring to be found to be reasonable, and therefore constitutional, under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8:
1) a sworn affidavit by one of the investigative or law enforcement officers (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701) requesting authorization from the Attorney General, a District Attorney, or a Deputy Attorney General or Deputy District Attorney, properly authorized in writing (hereinafter authorizing attorney), to conduct electronic participant monitoring, setting forth:
*254a) a statement of the identity and qualifications of the investigative or law enforcement officers for whom authorization to participate in the monitoring is sought;
b) a statement of the identity of any person, not an investigative or law enforcement officer, for whom authorization to participate in the monitoring is sought, and any facts known relevant to a determination of the voluntariness of said person’s participation;
c) a statement of facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime listed in Pa.C.S.A. § 5708 has been, is being, or will be committed;
d) a statement of facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that the electronic participant monitoring proposed will secure material evidence of such criminal activity;
e) a statement of the facts known relevant to a determination of the reliability or credibility of the affiant’s sources; and,
f) a statement of the identity of the person or persons whose communications are to be monitored, and the times, dates, placed, and methods of the monitoring proposed; and,
2) a memorandum of authorization signed by an authorizing attorney, setting forth:
a) a statement of the identity of each investigative or law enforcement officer authorized to participate in the electronic participant monitoring;
b) a statement of the identity of each person, not an investigative or law enforcement officer authorized to participate, whom the authorizing attorney has interviewed personally and whom the authorizing attorney has determined to have consented to participate voluntarily, and setting forth any facts known by the authorizing attorney relevant to the determination that the consent was voluntary;
c) a statement that the affidavit of the requesting officer has been personally reviewed by the authorizing attorney and has been found to sufficiently establish *255reasonable suspicion that one of the offenses listed in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5708 has been, is being, or will be committed, and reasonable belief that the electronic participant monitoring authorized will secure material evidence of that criminal activity;
d) a statement of the person or persons whose communications are to be monitored, the times, dates, places, and methods of the monitoring, and any restrictions or minimization requirements imposed as a condition of the authorization, which shall include compliance with the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5714(a); and,
3) a final report in the form of a sworn affidavit or series of sworn affidavits, signed by each of the investigative or law enforcement officers who conducted the electronic participant monitoring, setting forth:
a) a statement containing the identity (if known) of the person or persons whose conversations were monitored, the times, dates, places, and methods of the monitoring and a brief summary of the contents of the communications; and
b) a statement of the occurrence or non-occurrence of any deviation from restrictions or conditions set forth in the memorandum of authorization and any relevant facts regarding the circumstances or reasons therefore; and,
4) the authorizing attorney would be required to secure and preserve, unaltered and intact, the affidavit of the requesting officer, the memorandum of authorization, the final report and the tapes of the monitoring, and be further required to produce the same when lawfully directed to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.
I note that I do not find each component of the above safeguards to be individually constitutionally mandated; rather, I find that adequate restriction of the present unfettered discretion vested in law enforcement personnel is constitutionally required, and that the above safeguards *256collectively meet that requirement without imposing the more restrictive probable cause/warrant requirement.18
B.
According to the majority view (which the majority herein reject), a criminal’s subjective expectation, that a confident-turned-informant will not be able to accurately or credibly establish the contents of incriminating statements made to the confidant, is neither legitimate nor reasonable. See Caceres, supra. Generally, I agree. The risk of disclosure of confidances by the parties to a private communication is inherent to all such communications; as Benjamin Franklin warned, “[i]f you would keep your secret from your enemy, *257tell it not to a friend.” Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanac (1751). It is well-settled, and undisputed by the majority herein, that in absence of a particular statutory prohibition (e.g.: marital privilege), a confidant may disclose the contents of private communications to the police, and the police may act upon such disclosures. See Jacobson, supra (citing cases).
I reject the notion that electronic participant monitoring must be considered significantly more invasive than unmonitored participant disclosure because it eliminates an accused’s ability to challenge the accuracy or credibility of an informant’s disclosures. I do not find that Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 was intended to aid the accused in the creation of false doubts in the minds of the jurors as to the accuracy or credibility of an informant’s disclosures. Rather, I find that Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, was intended to prevent oppression, and not to assist criminals in efforts to erect barriers to the discovery of the truth. Cf. White, supra, 401 U.S. at 753, 91 S.Ct. at 1126-27. Furthermore, I note that while the opportunity to create false doubts regarding credibility or accuracy is removed by the existence of tapes of the disclosed communication, so too is the opportunity for Commonwealth witnesses to remember and recount such communications through a filter of advocacy, interest, and bias. Tapes of such communications will dispassionately acquit the innocent and convict the guilty; in this respect, electronic participant monitoring protects the rights of the accused, as well as those of society.
The majority argue, though, that the general fear of electronic participant monitoring will have a “chilling effect” on the free speech rights of the law-abiding public. Like the Louisiana Supreme Court, I find this anecdotal argument to be highly speculative. See Reeves, supra, 427 So.2d at 418; see also Kiehly, supra at 191 (state “chilling effect” analysis is “muddled somewhat” by the effect of the less restrictive federal standard; an increase in state restrictions would not remove whatever general chilling effect is caused by the less restrictive federal standard). None*258theless, I agree that if electronic participant monitoring were used in a dragnet, arbitrary, or capricious manner, the intrusion upon legitimate privacy interests of lawabiding citizens would be intolerable. Thus, under the LaFave analysis adopted in Johnston, supra, indiscriminate electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel should be deemed to involve a search and seizure, albeit a non-traditional one.
Judge Rowley finds the restrictions in the statute to provide sufficient safeguards against abuse. Dissenting Opinion, per Rowley, J., infra, 370 Pa.Super. at 270-271, 536 A.2d at 400. I do not; rather, I find that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2) lacks adequate safeguards to prevent dragnet, arbitrary or capricious use of electronic participant monitoring. Under the statute such monitoring may be employed “to intercept a wire or oral communication involving suspected criminal activity.” (Emphasis added). There are no limitations expressed as to the level of suspicion required or the type of criminal activity which would warrant the use of electronic participant monitoring. Moreover, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(i), when the participant to be monitored is an investigative or law enforcement officer, no approval of an authorizing attorney is required. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 349 Pa.Super. 255, 502 A.2d 1375 (1985). Thus, under the current statutory safeguards the police could, with or without approval of an authorizing attorney, conduct extended electronic participant monitoring to target any citizen based upon mere suspicion of a minor misdemeanor or summary offense such as jaywalking; this absurd example demonstrates the virtually unfettered discretion currently vested in the officers in the field. I find the allowance of such discretion to be unreasonable. Cf. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 112, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (1973) (disapproving “absolute, unreviewable discretion and authority” in the hands of the officer in the field); Commonwealth v. Leninsky, supra (same); see generally Martens, The Fourth Amendment and Control of Police Discretion, 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 551 (1984).
*259I firmly believe, however, that the imposition of a probable cause/warrant requirement by the majority is excessively solicitous of the right to privacy and the possible chilling effect of the use of electronic participant monitoring on free speech. I do not believe that any appreciable chilling effect on the free speech rights of law-abiding citizens would result from the approval of warrantless electronic participant monitoring to be conducted consistently with the safeguards set forth supra at Part V, A.
The majority opines that, “[i]t is no great burden on the police to require that they restrict participant monitoring to cases where they can show probable cause for a warrant.” Majority Opinion, 370 Pa.Super. at 205, 536 A.2d at 367. I cannot agree. As the instant case demonstrates, the probable cause standard, even applying the totality of circumstances test, constitutes a formidable barrier. While I agree with the majority that two sales of a small amount of marijuana at a suspect’s home a week apart, with the last sale being five days prior to the request for a warrant to search the suspect’s home, does not meet the burden of establishing probable cause for issuance of a warrant authorizing a search of the home, I can see no reason why those same facts should not form a sufficient predicate to authorize properly limited electronic participant monitoring.
Because not all crimes are committed in the bright light of day before swarms of credible and respected citizens, it is often necessary for the police to resort to the use of informants of dubious character, reliability, and credibility. In organized crime, many directors and managers of criminal operations deal exclusively through such nefarious characters. Without tools such as electronic participant monitoring to corroborate the disclosures of such informants, reasonable suspicions might never be developed into probable cause, lawful arrest, and just conviction. I find that the risk of a chilling effect on free speech rights of the public in general, and the risk of unreasonable intrusions upon legitimate privacy interests of individuals are diminished and overcome by compelling countervailing societal inter*260ests in bringing criminals to justice when approval of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel is conducted consistently with the safeguards set forth supra at Part V, A. Nonetheless, because the monitoring conducted in the instant case was not conducted in accordance with such safeguards, I agree that the monitoring constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8.
VI.
We must then determine what the effect of the constitutional infirmity has upon the evidence derived from the electronic participant monitoring. The majority conclude that the tapes of the electronic participant monitoring, statements of the monitoring officer, and the fruits of the execution of the April 6, 1984 search warrant should have been suppressed. I find that even assuming, arguendo, that the tapes and the monitoring officer’s statements should have been suppressed, suppression of the fruits of the execution of the search warrant was neither necessary nor appropriate. Because I would find the fruits of the search admissible, and because neither the tapes nor the statements of the monitoring office were offered or admitted into evidence during appellant’s bench trial, I would affirm judgment of sentence. Although I find no need to decide the broader issue of whether a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule would have required suppression of the tapes and the monitoring officer’s statements, for the purposes of discussion, I will assume that suppression would be required.19
*261A.
The majority find that with the redaction of the monitoring officer’s statements from the affidavit in support of the April 6, 1984 search warrant, and with application of the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Burke, 235 Pa.Super. 36, 42, 340 A.2d 524, 527 (1975), the affidavit contains insufficient facts to establish probable cause to sustain the validity of the search warrant. See Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 217-221, 536 A.2d at 373-375. Applying the totality of circumstances test adopted in Commonwealth v. Gray, supra,20 I agree with the majority’s reasoning on this point. I note that the totality of circumstances test is to be applied to the redacted affidavit of probable cause and not the record as a whole. Upon review of the redacted affidavit, I find that there are simply insufficient facts averred to justify issuance of a warrant to search a home.
I also agree with the majority that in determining the validity of the warrant, we are limited to the four corners of the supporting affidavit. Pa.R.Crim.P. 2003(b). For this limited purpose, it is absolutely irrelevant whether the informant relayed additional information to the police or whether the police in turn relayed that information to the issuing authority. Commonwealth v. Morris, 368 Pa.Super. 237, 240 & n. 2, 533 A.2d 1042, 1044 & n. 2 (1987) (information not contained in probable cause affidavit but *262disclosed to issuing authority does not affect the validity of the warrant, but it is relevant to the issue of whether the police acted in good faith reliance on an invalid warrant). The warrant must, therefore, be deemed invalid.
B.
The fact remains, however, that the police took their affidavit of probable cause to a neutral and detached magistrate who examined it and issued a facially valid warrant based upon the information contained therein. Under federal law, the good faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule would apply so as to permit the admission of the fruits of the search which was based upon a facially valid warrant even though it was later determined to have been issued based upon an affidavit which failed to contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (Leon’s good faith exception applied where reliance on statute authorizing warrantless administrative search was objectively reasonable); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (Leon’s good faith exception applied where execution of warrant which was later discovered to have been overly broad was, nonetheless, objectively reasonable); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (Leon’s good faith exception applied where officer’s reliance upon technically, but facially, defective warrant was objectively reasonable); Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 405 n. 2, 490 A.2d 421, 426 n. 2 (1985) (summarizing the federal rule); Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Evidence Obtained by Law Enforcement Officer Allegedly Relying Reasonably and in Good Faith on Defective Warrant, 82 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1986 & 1987 Supp.) (collecting and analyzing cases); Kamisar, Introduction: Trends and Developments with Respect to that Amendment “Central to Enjoyment of Other Guarantees of The Bill of Rights,” 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 409, 409 n. 4 *263(1984) (collecting authorities analyzing, commending, or criticizing the Leon “good faith” exception).
The majority find, however, that a Leon type good faith exception to a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule cannot apply in this case because it was per se unreasonable for the police to believe that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 authorized them to conduct warrantless electronic participant monitoring, and therefore, it was unreasonable for them to believe that the warrant, based in part on evidence derived from the monitoring, was valid. The majority note that the warrant in the instant case was issued prior to the panel decision in Harvey, supra,21 and conclude that because express state appellate court authorization was lacking, reliance was therefore unreasonable. I cannot agree; while express state appellate court authorization was indeed lacking, I nonetheless find reliance on the warrant to be eminently reasonable under the circumstances.
C.
The majority note that prior to the effective date of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, warrantless electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel was a second degree misdemeanor. Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 184, 536 A.2d at 356. This fact, however, presents an incomplete picture of the history of the statutory right to privacy regarding oral and wire communications in Pennsylvania.22
*264Electronic participant monitoring of oral (non-wire) communications by law enforcement personnel was severely limited between February 21, 1975 and December 3, 1978; any failure to comply with the procedures then set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5705(c)(3) could have resulted in liability for a second degree misdemeanor. However, before February *26521, 1975, no statutory restrictions or prohibitions applied to electronic participant monitoring of oral (non-wire) communications; moreover, after December 3, 1978, electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement officials of either wire or oral communications was exempted from any statutory restrictions or prohibitions providing the monitoring was conducted in compliance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704. Thus, in the instant case, the police and the issuing authority reasonably and correctly believed that no statutory restriction applied to electronic participant monitoring conducted in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704.
D.
The majority correctly notes that in April of 1984, when the electronic participant monitoring involved in the instant case occurred, no Pennsylvania state appellate court had expressly held that electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel in accordance with Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 was constitutional under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. I do not believe, however, that the absence of such express appellate approval rendered the police’s or the issuing authority’s belief in the legality of the monitoring and the validity of the warrant unreasonable.
By April 6, 1984 (when the warrant in question was issued), the United States Supreme Court had already delivered its opinions in Jacobson, Caceres, White, and Kauffer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had cited United States v. White, supra, as authority in Commonwealth v. Glover, 446 Pa. 492, 498-99, 286 A.2d 349, 352 (1972), and this Court had applied White in rejecting a claim that electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel violated the target’s federal constitutional rights. Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396, 408-13, 336 A.2d 632, 638-41 (1975), allocatur refused 233 Pa.Super. xxxvi (Pa.1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 1477, 47 L.Ed.2d 744 (1976) . Although neither state appellate court decision involved a challenge to the constitutionality of warrantless electronic participant monitoring under Pa. Const. Art. I, *266sec. 8, it is significant that there is not the slightest hint in those decisions that a different result would obtain under state law. Indeed, the Supreme Courts of Louisiana, Michigan, and West Virginia construed Donnelly as bringing Pennsylvania in line with the federal rule. See State v. Reeves, supra, 427 So.2d at 416; People v. Drielick, 400 Mich. 559, 568 n. 11, 255 N.W.2d 619, 622 n. 11 (1977); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22, 32 (W.Va.1982). Moreover, while Pennsylvania state appellate courts had not yet addressed the issue, a federal district court sitting in Pittsburgh had published an opinion analyzing Pennsylvania caselaw and concluding that electronic participant monitoring in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704 did not violate Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. See United States v. Getter, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1314-17 (E.D.Pa.1983); aff'd sub nom. United States v. DeMaise, 745 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir.1984); cert. denied 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985).
I simply cannot agree that the belief of the police or the issuing authority — that the evidence derived from the electronic participant monitoring was constitutionally obtained and that the warrant issued in part on that evidence was valid — was unreasonable. After the search warrant was issued in this case, five separate panel decisions of this Court reached the same conclusion regarding the constitutionality of warrantless electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel. Commonwealth v. Frank, 357 Pa.Super. 442, 516 A.2d 64 (1986) (per Wieand, J.; Beck and Watkins, JJ., join); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 356 Pa. Super. 543, 515 A.2d 27 (1986) (per Wickersham, J.; Brosky and Watkins, JJ., join); Commonwealth v. Harvey, supra (per Wieand, J.; Johnson and Montgomery, JJ., join); Commonwealth v. Doty, 345 Pa.Super. 374, 498 A.2d 870 (1985) (per Wieand, J.; Del Sole and Popovich, JJ., join); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 490 A.2d 438 (1985) (per Montemuro, J.; Spaeth, P.J., and Popovich, J., join). While these decisions may have been erroneous, are we to find that they were also “unreasonable?” I certainly am unwilling to do so.
*267I find the police officer’s reliance upon the facially valid April 6, 1984 search warrant to have been objectively reasonable. There is no indication in the instant case of an intent to evade the law. Had the rules announced in the instant case (of the majority or of this author) been known or even suspected, I have no doubt the Commonwealth could have and would have obtained lawful authorization for the electronic participant monitoring, and a valid search warrant. Succinctly, this case involves precisely the kind of reasonable good faith (but erroneous) reliance on a facially valid search warrant to which the Leon good faith exception was intended to apply.
E.
In Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 513 Pa. 138, 518 A.2d 1197 (1986), our Supreme Court stated:
In Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 406 n. 2, 490 A.2d 421, 426 n. 2 (1985), we expressly reserved the question of ‘whether the Pennsylvania Constitution itself, Article I, Section 8, would compel the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation thereof, [or] whether a state constitutional exclusionary rule would be applied in a manner co-extensive with its federal counterpart.’ This case appeared at first blush to give us the opportunity to address these important exclusionary rule issues.
A careful review of the record, however, reveals that the Commonwealth did not properly preserve the exclusionary rule issue, therefore we are constrained from considering it herein.
513 Pa. at 142-43, 518 A.2d at 1199; see also Commonwealth v. Revtai, 516 Pa. 53, 61, 532 A.2d 1, 5 (1987). The existence and scope of a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania remains an open question.
In considering whether and to what extent an independent state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule should be recognized in Pennsylvania, it should be noted that prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), Pennsylvania steadfastly refused to *268adopt the federal exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. See Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404, 143 A.2d 652 (1958); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bruno, supra, 203 Pa.Super. at 557-59 n. 5, 201 A.2d at 441-448 n. 5 (1964) (collecting pre-Mapp cases). In Commonwealth v. Chaitt, supra, our Supreme Court stated:
We start with the fundamental principle of the common law that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained. That rule, which has persisted uninterruptedly in the several jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations and in an overwhelming number of the States which have had occasion to consider the question, has also been firmly entrenched in the decisions of the appellate courts of our own Commonwealth.
380 Pa. at 535, 112 A.2d at 381 (footnote collecting cases omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Ryan, supra at n. 3, at 459-60 (1934) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Street, supra at n. 3, at 794-98 (1923) (exhaustively collecting and analyzing early cases and authorities).
Even assuming, arguendo, that some form of state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule will eventually be adopted by our Supreme Court, I am unwilling to assume that the fruits of the execution of the April 6, 1984 search warrant would fall within the ambit of such a rule. It would be incongruous and ironic if under the banner of “new federalism” this Commonwealth were to recognize a state constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule broader than the federal rule which we resolutely resisted under the banner of “old federalism” (states’ rights) until we were forced to apply it by the compulsion of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.
Based upon the foregoing, I find that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the fruits of the execution of the April 6, 1984 search warrant was proper even though the prior electronic participant monitoring was unconstitu*269tional, and even if we assume that the tapes and the monitoring officer’s testimony must be suppressed and that the warrant itself was invalid. Succinctly, I find the police officer’s reliance upon the facially valid warrant to be objectively reasonable, and therefore, find suppression of the fruits of its execution to be unnecessary and inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
I agree with the majority that the electronic participant monitoring conducted in the instant case violated Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. The provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(i) and (ii) leave virtually unrestricted discretion in the hands of the law enforcement personnel (§ 5704(2)(i)) and prosecuting attorney’s designated to authorize electronic participant monitoring (§ 5704(2)(ii)), and thereby imperil legitimate privacy interests of law-abiding citizens which Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 is designed to protect. Therefore, I concur in part.
However, I do not agree with the majority that a warrant issued by a judicial officer based upon probable cause is an irreducible prerequisite to the constitutional use of electronic participant monitoring under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8; rather, I would find the safeguards set forth in Part V, A of this opinion sufficient. Nor do I agree that the unconstitutionality of the electronic participant monitoring renders the fruits of the execution of the April 6, 1984 search warrant inadmissible under Pennsylvania law. Rather, I find that the police acted in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on a facially valid (but defective) warrant; and therefore, exclusion of the fruits of the execution of the warrant is unnecessary and inappropriate. Finally, because neither the tapes of the monitoring nor any statements of the monitoring officer were admitted during appellant’s bench trial, I find any error in failing to suppress that evidence to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would affirm judgment of sentence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.

. Justice Louis Brandéis once opined that, "in frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action____” Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338, 41 S.Ct. 125, 129, 65 L.Ed. 287 (1920). That being so, I believe it incumbent upon this Court to acknowledge the significant contributions which the thorough and thoughtful analysis of counsel for appellant and counsel for the Commonwealth have made to our deliberations on these important matters. Both sides have presented eloquent and persuasive arguments for their particular points of view.

. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); Evers v. State, 434 So.2d 804 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); State v. Paul, 146 Ariz. 86, 703 P.2d 1235 (1985); Hoback v. State, 286 Ark. 153, 689 S.W.2d 569 (1985); People v. Phillips, 41 Cal.3d 29, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423 (1985); People v. Moreley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo.1986); State v. Del Vecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 464 A.2d 813 (1983); United States v. Sell, 487 A.2d 225 (D.C.App.1985); State v. Pulgini, 366 A.2d 1198 (Del.Super.1976); State v. Ridenour, 453 So.2d 193 (Fla.App.1984); Green v. State, 250 Ga. 610, 299 S.E.2d 544 (1983); State v. Lee, 67 Haw. 307, 686 P.2d 816 (1984); State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205, 646 P.2d 447 (1982); Lawhorn v. State, 452 N.E.2d 915 (Ind.1983); State v. Roudybush, 235 Kan. 834, 686 P.2d 100 (1984); State v. Reeves, 427 So.2d 403 (La.1982); State v. Thomas, 432 A.2d 757 (Me.1981); Buzbee v. State, 58 Md.App. 599, 473 A.2d 1315 (1984); Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 424 N.E.2d 250 (1981); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89 (Minn.1980); Everett v. State, 248 So.2d 439 (Miss.1971); State v. Engleman, 634 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.1982); State v. Manchester, 220 Neb. 41, 367 N.W.2d 733 (1985); State v. Kilgus, 128 N.H. 577, 519 A.2d 231 (1986); State v. Parisi, 181 N.J.Super. 117, 436 A.2d 948 (1981); State v. Hogervorst, 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828 (1977); People v. Lasher, 58 N.Y.2d 962, 460 N.Y.S.2d 522, 447 N.E.2d 70 (1983); State v. Better, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979); State v. Geraldo, 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 22 Ohio Op.3d 366, 429 N.E.2d 141 (1981); Ferguson v. State, 644 P.2d 121 (Okla.Crim.1982); State v. Underwood, 293 Or. 389, 648 P.2d 847 (1982); State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070 (R.I.1981); State v. Iverson, 364 N.W.2d 518 (S.D.1985); State v. Lee, 618 S.W.2d 320 (Tenn.Cr.App.1981); Kizziar v. State, 628 S.W.2d 243 *231(Tex.Crim.App.1982); State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986); Cogdill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 247 S.E.2d 392 (1978); State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 664 P.2d 466 (1983); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va.1982); Jackson v. State, 624 P.2d 751 (Wyo.1981).

. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701 et seq.; see also Carr, Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 3.5 “Surveillance with Consent of a Party to the Conversation,” at 3-55 to 3-76 (2nd Ed.1987) (collecting statutes and cases); Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, Ch. 2, § 8 at 56-74 (1978 & Cumm.Supp.1986) (same); Carr, Electronic Surveillance by Consent Under State Law, 11 Search & Seizure L.Rep. 77, 79-82 (1984) (same); Annotation, Permissible Warrantless Surveillance Under State Communications Statute, By Local Law Enforcement Officer or One Acting in Concert with Officer, 27 ALR 4th 449 (1984 & 1987 Supp.); Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Prosecution of Evidence Secured by Mechanical or Electronic Eavesdropping Device, 97 ALR2d 1283 (1964), 96-100 ALR2d Supp. 269 (1983 & 1987 Supp.); Search and Seizure § 31, 68 Am.Jur.2d 685 (1973 & 1987 Cum.Supp.) ("Informers Use of Concealed Listening Device”); Telecommunications § 217, 74 Am.Jur.2d 538 (1974 & 1987 Cum.Supp.) (“Consent of One Party to Communication that Another May Hear”).

. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952); United States v. Kelly, 708 *235F.2d 121 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 916, 104 S.Ct. 279, 78 L.Ed.2d 258 (1983); United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Buchert v. United States, 421 U.S. 968, 95 S.Ct. 1960, 44 L.Ed.2d 457 (1975); see also Annotation, Obtaining Evidence By Use Of Sound Recording or of Mechanical or Electronic Eavesdropping Device — (“Bugging") as Violation of Fourth Amendment — Federal Cases, 59 L.Ed.2d 959 (1979 & 1986 Supp.).

. In Wakley v. Hart, supra, Chief Justice Tilghman explained:
[T]he plaintiff insists, that by the constitution of this state, no arrest is lawful without a warrant, issued on probable cause supported by oath. [...] The provisions of Article IX, sec 7 [predecessor to Art. I, sec. 8], so far as concern warrants, only guard against their abuse by issuing them without good cause, or in so general or vague a form, as may put in the power of the officers who execute them to harass innocent persons under the pretense of suspicion; for if general warrants are allowed, it must be left to the officer, on what person or things they are to be executed. But it is nowhere said, that there should be no arrest without warrant. To have said so would have endangered the safety of society.
******
The whole section indeed was nothing more than an affirmance of the common law, for general warrants have been decided to be illegal; but as the practice of issuing them had been ancient, the abuses great and the decisions against them only of modern date, the agitation occasioned by the discussion of this important question had scarcely subsided, and it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto against this powerful engine of despotism.
6 Binn. at 317-18 (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Ryan, 21 Pa.D. & C. 457, 458 (1934); Commonwealth v. Street, 3 Pa.D. & C. 783, 787-88 (1923).

. U.S. Const.Amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Pa. Const. Article I, § 8
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or thing shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

. Pa. Const. (1776) Dec. of Rts., Cl. X
Tenth. That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.
Pa. Const. (1790), Article IX., sec. 8
Sec. 8. That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things shall issue, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

. James Madison included a provision which eventually became the Fourth Amendment in the proposed Bill of Rights he submitted to the United States Congress on June 8, 1789. The proposal was approved as amended on August 17, 1789. The Fourth Amendment was transmitted to the states for ratification by President Washington on September 25, 1789.
*240On December 10, 1789, the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention unanimously "Resolved, That, that part of the constitution of this commonwealth, called a declaration of the rights of the inhabitants of the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania, requires alterations and amendments, in such a manner as that the rights of the people, reserved, and excepted out of the general, powers of government, may be more accurately defined and secured, and that the same an such other alterations and amendments in said constitution as may be agreed on, be made to correspond with each other.” On December 11, 1789, a committee consisting of Delegates Findley, Hand, Miller, Wilson, Irvine, Lewis, Ross, Smith and Addison, were elected to report a draft of a proposed constitution to the Convention. On December 21, 1789 a draft was reported which contained Article IX, sec. 8 in the form finally adopted. This proposal was considered and approved unanimously on February 23, 1790. A semicolon was substituted for a comma between the words "seizure” and "and” on February 26, 1790.
The Fourth Amendment was ratified by Act of the Pennsylvania Legislature on March 10, 1790. See 2 Smith’s Laws 516 (1810). On August 17, 1790, Art. IX, sec. 8 was again considered by the Convention and approved without revision. On September 2, 1790, the new Pennsylvania Constitution was ratified as a whole and proclaimed. The Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was finally adopted on December 15, 1791. See Proceedings Relative to Calling the Conventions of 1776 and 1790, The Minutes of the Convention that Formed the Present Constitution of Pennsylvania, Together with the Charter to William Penn, the Constitutions of 1776 and 1790, and A View of the Proceedings of the Convention of 1776, and the Council of Censors, passim (Harrisburg 1825); Cuddihy, supra, at 762; W. Hickey, The Constitution of the United States of America, at 33-36 (Philadelphia 1854).

. In subsequent cases, the Alaska Courts have held that: the ruling in Glass is to be applied only to interceptions made after the date of the Glass decision, Mossberg v. State, 624 P.2d 796, 800-01 (Alaska 1981); a warrant authorizing interception need not specify the place where the interception is to occur, and service of the warrant need not occur until after the interception, Jones v. State, 646 P.2d 243, 247-49 (Alaska App.1982); the warrant requirement does not apply to discussions with a uniformed police officer, Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984), rev’g 664 P.2d 630 (Alaska App.1983); and, warrantless recordings are, despite Glass, admissible in perjury prosecutions, Wortham v. State, 666 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1983).

. In subsequent cases, Montana Courts have held: a warrant is only required for “face to face” electronic participant monitoring, consensual interception of telephone conversations does not violate Article II, sec. 10, State v. Coleman, 189 Mont. 492, 616 P.2d 1090 (1980) and State v. Cannon, 687 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1984); failure to obtain a warrant only invalidates the recordings and the monitoring officer’s testimony, the participant may still testify, State v. Jackson, 180 Mont. 195, 589 P.2d 1009 (1979); likewise, evidence acquired or derived as a result of the illegally monitored meeting is not tainted, State v. Hanley, 186 Mont. 410, 608 P.2d 104 (1980) and State v. Bassett, 189 Mont. 28, 614 P.2d 1054 (1980); and, a search warrant authorizing electronic participant monitoring may be issued based upon informant supplied information, may authorize monitoring of informant and target for ten days, and need not specify location where monitoring will occur (designation of informant, target, and duration of authorization sufficiently describes communications to be seized), State v. Coleman, supra.

. Article I, § 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
(Emphasis added).

. Sarmiento, supra, was applied to cases pending on appeal, but not to cases finally decided prior to the filing of the Sarmiento decision. See Williams v. State, 421 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1982); Hoberman v. State, 400 So.2d 758 (Fla.1981). The rule announced in Sarmiento was narrowly confined to "face to face" electronic participant monitoring in the target’s home. See State v. Williams, 443 So.2d 952, 955 (Fla.1983) (legality of monitoring of phone call to target’s home upheld, distinguishing Sarmiento ); State v. Chiarenza, 406 So.2d 66 (Fla.App.1981) (legality of monitoring in informant’s home upheld, distinguishing Sarmiento ); Morningstar v. State, 405 So.2d 778 (Fla.App.1981) (legality of monitoring at target’s place of business upheld, distinguishing Sarmiento); Padgett v. State, 404 So.2d 151 (Fla.App.1981) (same).

. Pennsylvania has had similar experience with popular repeal of unpopular state constitutional decisions by state constitutional amendment. See Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 9 (as amended November 6, 1984, in response to Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d *24662 (1975) (holding confession obtained as the result of a violation of Miranda rights could not be used to impeach an accused's denial of guilt at trial)); Commonwealth v. Baxter, 367 Pa.Super. 342, 532 A.2d 1177 (1987) (analyzing effects of the 1984 amendment to Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 9).

. Indeed, our most recent Constitutional Convention in 1968 was by design powerless to alter the provisions of our Declaration of Rights. See Act of March 15, 1967, No. 2, P.L. 2 (“Providing for a constitutional convention with limited powers”). See abo 2 Daily Journal 15 (December 5, 1967), reprinted in I Debates of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 (Harrisburg 1969) (remarks of former Governor John S. Fine, noting the prohibition against revision of our Declaration of Rights). Thus, while the conventions in Alaska, Montana, Louisiana, Hawaii and Florida had been authorized and encouraged to alter and expand their state’s Bills of Rights, our convention was purposefully denied the power to do so.
I note that the historical reluctance of Pennsylvanians to alter the provisions of the Declaration of Rights adopted in 1790 alluded to in Commonwealth v. Sell, supra, 504 Pa. at 62-63, 470 A.2d at 466, is eloquently explained by the following remarks of Delegate Daniel Kaine to the Constitutional Convention of 1872-73:
The Bill of Rights, as we have it, was framed in 1790. It passed through the Convention of 1837-38 without the alteration of a single word, without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i. We have had it as it came from the hands of the Convention in this city, signed as it was, and proclaimed here on the second day of September, 1790. It is our magna charter and every principle in it that is worth a farthing is taken from Magna Charter itself, as was the Declaration of Rights appended to the Constitution of 1776____ There is not a Constitution in this Union that has a Declaration of Rights appended thereto, perhaps with the exception of Massachusetts, that has not some article or some principle in it, taken from that Declaration of Rights of the State of Pennsylvania. It is one of the most perfect articles in any Constitution in the Union. It cannot be bettered; and therefore, upon principle, I am opposed to changing it.
******
I, for one, will stand by the integrity of the old ninth article of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, believing as I do that we have no right, in the first place, to alter or change it; and that, in the second *247place, even if we have the power, we ought not to do so. I would say, in the language of one of America’s sweetest poets— Woodman, spare that tree!
Touch not a single bough!
In youth it sheltered me,
And I’ll protect it now.
IV Debates of the Convention 659- 60 (Harrisburg 1873).

. See generally Eliason and NettikSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 Mont.L.Rev. 1, 1-52 (1987); Note, Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisdiction of Privacy, 2 Alaska L.Rev. 159, 159-83 (1985). I note the following for illustrative purposes. In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), the Alaska Supreme Court declared that the right to privacy in Alaska included the right of an adult to possess marijuana in the home for personal use. In analyzing Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972), which found unconstitutional public school hair length regulations, an Alaska Law Review article notes:
Two statements made by the Brease court have had significant influence on the development of the right to privacy in Alaska. First, the court noted that the state courts were not limited by federal precedent when construing similarly-worded Alaska constitutional provisions. States have a duty to ‘move forward’ and interpret state provisions more broadly than their federal counterparts. Moreover, the court recognized a judicial duty to develop additional rights not recognized under the federal Constitution. These two statements continue to provide a significant foundation for an extension of the Alaska constitutional right to privacy beyond the limits set by federal precedent.
Note, supra at 163 (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added). I find no such mandate in the Pennsylvania Constitution.

. The Michigan Supreme Court limited the Beavers holding in two important respects: the court held that the admissibility of the informant's testimony was in no way affected by the inadmissibility of the monitoring officer’s testimony; and the court held that the decision was to be applied prospectively. 227 N.W.2d at 516.

. Quoted in Hickey, supra at n. 8, at xxvii; also quoted in Lieberman, Milestones! Two Hundred Years of American Law, Ch. 2, at 48 (1976).

. I note that electronic participant monitoring by state law enforcement personnel under the conditions outlined would have none of the offensive characteristics of writs of assistance and general warrants which James Otis railed against with fiery oratory in Paxtons Case, Quincy 51 (Mass.1761) and which both the Fourth Amendment and Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 were intended to act as a "solemn veto against." Wakely, supra.
The authorization would be required to specify the person or persons whose communications were to be monitored; it would not be "universal,” or be directed against "all subjects." Only those specifically authorized to participate would be permitted to conduct the monitoring; the authorization would not be "negotiable from one officer to another.” The authority conferred is limited to the recordation of statements voluntarily disclosed to the informant, and it is restricted as to the time, place and method of the monitoring; it does not authorize the police or the informant to “break locks, bars, and anything else in his way" to enter the target's home or shop and conduct an unlimited search. A determination that any person, not an investigative or law enforcement officer, has voluntarily consented to participate would be required before such a person could be authorized to participate in the monitoring; no persons would be "compelled to assist in the search" against their will. A sworn affidavit establishing reasonable suspicion that a crime listed in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5708 had been, is being, or will be committed as well as a reasonable belief that material evidence of such an offense will be secured would be required; "bare suspicion without an oath” would not be sufficient. Lastly, the authorization would require a final report and delivery of the tapes to the authorizing attorney who would in turn be responsible for the production of the tapes upon lawful order of court; the authorization would not be “perpetual" and "without return." See 2 Works of John Adams, 523-25 (C. Adams ed. 1850) (setting forth Otis’s argument); I Orations of American Orator’s 20-24 (Starkweather ed. 1900) (same); see also Marke, supra (analyzing Otis's argument and its relation to the Fourth Amendment).

. I note, however, that in Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), our Supreme Court explained:
a prophylactic exclusionary rule is applied only in extreme cases where all other attempts to secure compliance have proven unsuccessful. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In this area there has been no showing of widespread flagrant disregard to justify formulation of such a rule at this time.
454 Pa. at 372, 312 A.2d at 600. The construction given Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 by the majority in this case imposes limitations on police powers heretofore unknown in this Commonwealth. Thus, while *261violations of these newly announced limitations may have been widespread, they could not reasonably be characterized as flagrant as until this day the overwhelming weight of authority held such conduct to be constitutional. Consequently, formulation of a prophylactic exclusionary rule for application in this case would not appear to be justified under our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Williams.

. Adoption of the totality of circumstances test has not diminished the standard for probable cause nor has it removed the necessity of establishing that the officer reasonably relied upon the hearsay statements of third parties; rather, it merely acknowledges that in some circumstances the police may possess information from third party sources which would not meet the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli test, but which nevertheless would warrant the reliance of a reasonably prudent man. See Gray, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 319 Pa.Super. 103, 112, 465 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1983).

. I note that it was also issued prior to the panel decision Commonwealth v. Beauford, 327 Pa.Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984), appeal dismissed 508 Pa. 319, 496 A.2d 1143 (1985) (holding unconstitutional non-participant monitoring of private communications via “pen register” devices).

. The first law regarding this subject was passed in Pennsylvania in 1851. Act of April 14, 1851, No. 331, § 7, P.L. 612. The 1851 act made it a crime for a telegraph employee to use or divulge the contents of a telegraph dispatch "without consent or direction of either the party sending or receiving,” unless the dispatch was sent "with a view to general publicity.” (Emphasis added). The penalties for violation of the 1851 act were increased in 1860. Act of March 31, 1860, No. 374, § 72, P.L. 382. In 1901, the proscriptions of the 1851 act were extended to persons connected with the provision of tele*264phone services; the exception for use or disclosure with "consent or direction of either the party sending or receiving" remained. Act of July 10, 1901, No. 330, §§ 1, 2, P.L. 651. The 1901 act was reenacted and codified with only minor changes to the penalty provisions in 1939. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 688, P.L. 872; 18 P.S. § 4688. (Such legislation was apparently necessary to foster acceptance of both the telegraph and the telephone as a secure means of private communication. I note that the limitations upon disclosure of private information by incidental/commercial conduit parties to communications recognized in DeJohn, supra, and Beauford, supra, involve analytically similar implicit economic necessity considerations).
In 1957, the legislature enacted a new statute which differed in material respects from its predecessors. Act of July 16, 1957, No. 411, §§ 5701-5704, P.L. 1482. The act, for the first time, required consent of all parties to the telegraph or telephone communication in order to authorize use or disclosure of the contents of the communication. Also for the first time, the act contained a statutory exclusionary rule applicable to information derived in violation of the act. In 1972, the 1957 act was codified at 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5704 and entitled "Invasion of Privacy.” Act of December 6, 1972, No. 334, §§ 5701-5704, P.L. 1482. No substantive changes were made to the provisions of the 1957 act.
In 1974, amendments were made to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701-5704, which, for the first time, brought use or divulgence of oral communications other than those transmitted by telephone or telegraph under statutory restrictions. Act of December 27, 1974, No. 327, §§ 5701, 5703-5705, P.L. 1007 (effective February 21, 1975). Under the 1974 amendments, it was a misdemeanor of the second degree for any person to use any electronic, mechanical or other device to intercept a private conversation without consent of all the parties. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5705. A narrow exception was included for electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel to ensure the personal safety of an undercover law enforcement officer. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5705(c)(3). The exception required authorization by a designated official and approval of a judicial official; monitoring but not recording was permitted under this exception.
In 1978, the legislature enacted the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act which substantially altered the law regarding use and divulgence of both oral and wire communications. Act of October 4, 1978, No. 1978-164, P.L. 831 (effective December 3, 1978). Significantly, the legislature adopted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2) which, under specified conditions, exempted electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel from the statutory restrictions and prohibitions which had been imposed by the 1974 and 1957 acts.