Court Opinion

ID: 9895722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 16:01:50.703774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:23.810992
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1099   Document: 51     Page: 1    Filed: 11/08/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  PATRICIA A. LILLY,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                       2023-1099
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CH-0353-16-0244-I-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: November 8, 2023
                 ______________________

    PATRICIA A. LILLY, Evanston, IL, pro se.

     ELIZABETH W. FLETCHER, Office of General Counsel,
 United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON JANE
 BOYLE, KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
                   ______________________

     Before LOURIE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 23-1099     Document: 51      Page: 2    Filed: 11/08/2023

 2                                                LILLY v. MSPB

     Patricia A. Lilly appeals from a final order of the
 United States Merit Systems Protection Board (“the
 Board”) dismissing her petition for review as untimely.
 Lilly v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CH-0353-16-0244-I-1, 2022
 WL 3693072 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 25, 2022) (“Final Order”). For
 the following reasons, we affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
      On December 1, 2006, Lilly sustained a workplace in-
 jury while employed by the United States Postal Service
 (“the USPS”). Resp’t Suppl. App. 11–12. In the following
 years, she filed two complaints in the United States Dis-
 trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that
 the USPS (1) failed to accommodate her disability as re-
 quired under the Rehabilitation Act and retaliated against
 her for engaging in a protected activity (“Discrimination
 Complaint”), and (2) violated her rights under the Family
 Medical Leave Act (“FMLA Complaint”). Id. at 12. The
 parties resolved the Discrimination Complaint through a
 settlement agreement and separately stipulated to the
 withdrawal of the FMLA Complaint with prejudice. Id.
      Years later, on February 19, 2016, Lilly filed an appeal
 at the Board alleging that the USPS failed to properly ac-
 commodate her injuries from the 2006 incident and seeking
 to be restored to her prior employment position. Id. An
 administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision on
 May 19, 2016, dismissing Lilly’s appeal for lack of jurisdic-
 tion. Id. at 11–14. The AJ made that determination be-
 cause the settlement agreement used to resolve the
 Discrimination Complaint included a provision requiring
 Lilly to waive her right to file any further litigation stem-
 ming from those facts. Id. at 13. That initial decision also
 included a “Notice to Appellant” stating that the initial de-
 cision would become final on June 23, 2016 and that “[t]his
 is an important date because it is usually the last day on
 which you can file a petition for review with the Board.” Id.
 at 14.
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 LILLY v. MSPB                                              3

      On July 20, 2016, over three weeks after the initial de-
 cision became final, Lilly filed a petition for review at the
 Board. Final Order at *1. Shortly thereafter, on July 28,
 2016, the Board (1) acknowledged receipt of Lilly’s petition
 for rehearing, (2) informed Lilly that the petition was un-
 timely filed, and (3) notified Lilly that she was also re-
 quired to file a motion to accept the filing as timely and/or
 to ask the Board to waive or set aside the time limit (“mo-
 tion to waive”). Resp’t Suppl. App. 31–33. Lilly filed the
 motion to waive on August 8, 2016, which explained that
 Lilly’s father and maternal aunt had passed away and that
 Lilly was experiencing emotional and financial hardships
 in the aftermath. Id. at 39. Lilly’s motion also included a
 printout from a funeral home’s website that identified the
 date of her father’s death as April 22, 2016. Final Order at
 *2; Resp’t Suppl. App. 41. Additionally, the motion alleged
 that Lilly called the Board on August 4, 2016 to inquire
 which documents “would be sufficient to submit” alongside
 her motion but was hung up on by Board staff. Resp’t
 Suppl. App. 39.
     On August 25, 2022, the Board issued a final order
 denying Lilly’s motion to waive and dismissing Lilly’s peti-
 tion for review as untimely. Final Order at *1–3. The
 Board stated that the final order was “the final decision of
 the [Board] regarding the timeliness of the petition for re-
 view,” while the “initial decision remain[ed] the final deci-
 sion of the Board regarding the dismissal of the appeal for
 lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at *3 (emphases added).
     Lilly appealed to this court on October 24, 2022. ECF
 No. 1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9)
 and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
                               I
    As a threshold issue, Lilly’s opening brief contains ar-
 guments regarding the AJ’s initial decision (which became
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 4                                                LILLY v. MSPB

 the Board’s final decision on June 23, 2016) dismissing
 Lilly’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as well as the Board’s
 final order dismissing Lilly’s petition for review as un-
 timely. The Board argues on appeal that the scope of our
 review is limited to the Board’s final order dismissing
 Lilly’s petition for review as untimely. We agree with the
 Board.
      As previously noted, we have jurisdiction to hear this
 appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1), which requires that
 “any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after
 the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the
 Board.” Furthermore, under Board regulations, “[t]he ini-
 tial decision of the judge will become the Board’s final de-
 cision 35 days after issuance,” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113, unless
 a party files a petition for review or requests vacatur for
 the purpose of accepting a settlement agreement into the
 record, id. § 1201.113(a). While “[t]he Board may extend
 the time limit for filing a petition for good cause shown,”
 id. § 1201.113(d), “[t]he untimely submission of a petition
 for review and motion for an extension of time to the
 [Board] does not prevent the initial decision of the admin-
 istrative judge from remaining the final decision of the
 [B]oard.” Olivares v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 17 F.3d 386, 388
 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e)(1) (emphasis in
 original)). “Thus, the untimely submission of a petition for
 review and motion for an extension of time to the [Board]
 does not stop the running of the [60]-day statutory time
 limit in which to file an appeal to this court.” Id.
      In this case, the initial decision of the AJ was issued on
 May 19, 2016 and became the final decision of the Board on
 June 23, 2016, given Lilly’s failure to timely file her peti-
 tion for review. Lilly first filed her appeal in this court on
 October 24, 2022, well past 60 days after the initial decision
 became final. Lilly thus did not timely appeal to this court
 the Board’s final decision dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.
 Accordingly, we may not review that decision. See Oliva-
 res, 17 F.3d at 388.
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 LILLY v. MSPB                                               5

     Lilly did, however, timely appeal the Board’s final or-
 der dismissing her petition for review as untimely that was
 issued on August 25, 2022, exactly 60 days before she filed
 her appeal in this court. The only issue properly presented
 on appeal, therefore, is whether or not the Board improp-
 erly dismissed Lilly’s untimely petition for review in its Au-
 gust 25, 2022 final order.
                               II
     Because the Board “has broad discretion to control its
 own docket and we will not substitute our judgment for
 that of the [B]oard in this regard,” we will “affirm the
 [B]oard’s decision to dismiss an untimely filed petition for
 review unless the decision is shown to have been arbitrary,
 an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
 law.” Id. at 388–89 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
 also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
      The Board will waive the 35-day time limit for filing a
 petition for review and allow an untimely filing only for
 good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.12, 1201.114(g). “The
 appellant bears the burden of establishing ‘good cause’ for
 the delay.” Kerr v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 908 F.3d 1307,
 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)). To
 establish good cause for an untimely petition for review,
 “[t]he appellant need not show an utter impossibility, but
 only that the delay was excusable in light of the particular
 facts and attending circumstances where diligence or ordi-
 nary prudence has been exercised.” Alonzo v. Dep’t of Air
 Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). In assessing good cause,
 the Board will examine (1) the length of the delay, (2) the
 reasonableness of appellant’s excuse and his or her show-
 ing of due diligence, (3) whether or not the appellant is pro-
 ceeding pro se, and (4) whether or not the appellant has
 presented evidence of the existence of circumstances be-
 yond the appellant’s control which affected his or her abil-
 ity to comply with time limits or of unavoidable casualty or
 misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to
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 6                                                LILLY v. MSPB

 his or her inability to file a timely petition. Moorman v.
 Dep’t of Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62–63 (1995) (citations omit-
 ted), aff’d sub nom. Moorman v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 79
 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
     In the Board’s final order, it determined that Lilly had
 not made the requisite showing of good cause. Final Order
 at *1. In examining the factors identified in Moorman, the
 Board found that Lilly’s delay of almost one month was
 “significant” and that her inability to secure counsel due to
 financial cost was not good cause for the delay. Id. The
 Board also found that Lilly failed to show that the deaths
 in her family created circumstances beyond her control
 that affected her ability to comply with the time limits for
 a petition for review and that Lilly had failed to demon-
 strate due diligence in filing her petition. Id. at *2. The
 Board acknowledged Lilly’s allegations of being hung up on
 by Board staff but found that they did not create good cause
 because these calls occurred while Lilly was preparing her
 motion to waive, long after the filing deadline for the peti-
 tion for review. Id.
      In arguing that the Board’s evaluation of the length of
 delay was arbitrary, Lilly relies on two of our decisions: An-
 derson v. Dep’t of Just., 999 F.2d 532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and
 Munson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 318 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
 2003). However, the factual differences between those
 cases and Lilly’s situation render that precedent of little
 value here. In Anderson, the appellant filed his appeal one
 day late, far less than the 27-day delay at issue in this case.
 Anderson, 999 F.2d at 533. Furthermore, in Munson, we
 found that the appellant had not received notice of his ap-
 peal rights, such that the time for filing an appeal had not
 begun to run in the first place. Munson, 318 F.3d at 1362–
 63. Conversely, Lilly has never contested receiving the in-
 itial decision, including its “Notice to Appellant” informing
 her of her appeal rights. Lilly has thus failed to show that
 the Board’s assessment of the length of delay was
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 LILLY v. MSPB                                               7

 arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
 cordance with law.
      Concerning the reasonableness of her excuse and her
 exercise of due diligence, Lilly argues that she informed the
 Board of the deaths in her family and provided sufficient
 information through documents and phone calls. Lilly ar-
 gues that she was unaware of the extent of evidence re-
 quired for a finding of good cause, in part, because the
 Board hung up on her when she called to inquire. However,
 as the Board correctly pointed out in its final order and
 again in its brief on appeal, the communications on record
 between Lilly and the Board occurred in connection with
 her motion to waive, weeks after the deadline for filing her
 petition for review had passed. Thus, while Lilly’s commu-
 nications with the Board may impact her showing of dili-
 gence in preparing her motion to waive, they have no
 bearing on Lilly’s diligence in meeting her petition for re-
 hearing’s filing deadline. See Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To establish good
 cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that the
 delay was excusable under the circumstances and that the
 appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to meet the
 filing deadline.” (emphasis added) (citing Phillips v. U.S.
 Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1982))). Lilly
 has thus failed to show that the Board’s treatment of that
 factor was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
 not in accordance with law.
     Regarding circumstances beyond her control or una-
 voidable casualty, Lilly argues that the financial and emo-
 tional tolls of her father’s and aunt’s deaths, in combination
 with the pre-existing hardships resulting from her loss of
 employment, resulted in circumstances that reasonably
 prevented her from timely filing her petition for review. In
 support, Lilly points to (1) a submission to the Board, dated
 February 19, 2016, alleging that she “has suffered severe
 depression and anxiety” and “accumulated nearly six fig-
 ures in psychiatric and psychologist’s visits,” Pet’r App. 16–
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 8                                              LILLY v. MSPB

 17, and (2) cashier’s checks showing partial payment to a
 psychologist, id. at 56. However, Lilly’s reliance on that
 evidence is misplaced. Lilly’s submission to the Board pro-
 vides almost no insight into the circumstances following
 her father’s and aunt’s deaths, as it was filed on February
 19, 2016, at least a month before her father or aunt died.
 Additionally, mere receipt of payment to a psychologist
 provides no detail regarding Lilly’s condition, including
 whether or not she would have been unavailable or pre-
 cluded from finding someone else to make appropriate ar-
 rangements. See Ford-Clifton v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 661
 F.3d 655, 659 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The Board has held that
 when petitioners allege delay for medical reasons, they
 must affirmatively identify medical evidence that ad-
 dresses the entire period of delay and explain how the ill-
 ness prevented a timely filing.”). We therefore agree with
 the Board that “[Lilly] has failed to show that her father’s
 death, while unfortunate, created any circumstances be-
 yond her control that affected her ability to comply with the
 time limits.” Final Order at *2.
     For the first time in this case, in a supplemental ap-
 pendix attached to her reply brief in this appeal, Lilly pro-
 vides a letter from her psychologist describing her
 conditions. Pet’r Reply Suppl. App. 19–20. In that same
 supplemental appendix, Lilly also provides receipts and
 other documents from the period shortly following her fa-
 ther’s death. We decline to consider that evidence because
 it was not presented to the Board in the underlying pro-
 ceedings. See Synan v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 765 F.2d 1099,
 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Petitioner cannot raise before this
 court an issue which could have been raised below but
 which was not.”); Lizut v. Dep’t of Army, 717 F.2d 1391,
 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Allowing a party to withhold im-
 portant issues from the [B]oard and later present them to
 this court would undermine the [B]oard’s authority.”).
    Finally, we acknowledge Lilly’s pro se status. However,
 we agree with the Board that “[Lilly’s] inability to secure
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 LILLY v. MSPB                                              9

 an attorney due to financial cost is not good cause for [her]
 untimely filing.” Final Order at *1. Accordingly, Lilly has
 failed to show that the Board’s analysis of the Moorman
 factors in denying her motion to waive and dismissing her
 petition for review as untimely was arbitrary, an abuse of
 discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
                              III
      Lilly’s arguments on appeal also include allegations of
 judicial bias by the Board, specifically Vice Chairman and
 current Acting Chairman, Cathy A. Harris. Those allega-
 tions seem to involve a law firm that Acting Chairman Har-
 ris was previously employed at, as well as an unrelated
 class action. Lilly fails to explain how that demonstrates
 bias, and even admits that “she has never been represented
 by [Acting Chairman Harris’s previous employer] regard-
 ing the [relevant litigation].” Pet’r Br. 20. Furthermore,
 Lilly failed to raise that issue to the Board. See 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.42(b) (requiring “a motion asking the judge to with-
 draw on the basis of personal bias or other disqualification”
 be filed “as soon as the party has reason to believe there is
 a basis for disqualification”). Lilly’s conclusory and under-
 developed allegations thus do not justify a finding of judi-
 cial bias.
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered Lilly’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.