Court Opinion

ID: 9907754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 21:01:23.465826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:22.751630
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10670    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 12/06/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10670
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       BAUTISTA TOLEDO-RAMIREZ,
       a.k.a. Kaka,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.
                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00233-SDG-LTW-2
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10670

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Bautista Toledo-Ramirez appeals his sentence of 276 months
       of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
       methamphetamine. He says his sentence is substantively unreason-
       able because the district court gave him a longer sentence than a
       similarly situated co-conspirator and improperly focused on his
       criminal history. We disagree. The district court reasonably ex-
       plained how its sentence did not create an unwarranted sentencing
       disparity and it appropriately considered Toledo-Ramirez’s history
       and characteristics. So we affirm.
                                      I.

               Toledo-Ramirez and Carmelo Reyes-Lozano, along with
       others, conspired to sell drugs while incarcerated in Georgia state
       prisons. Toledo-Ramirez was inside because he was convicted for
       felony murder after killing a police officer. His new operation sim-
       ilarly called for violence, or at least threats of such. On one occa-
       sion, Toledo-Ramirez texted someone a picture of him holding a
       shank, while on another he threatened to hurt someone’s relative.
              The co-conspirators were charged for conspiracy to possess
       with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Reyes-Lozano
       pleaded guilty early and received 210 months of imprisonment as
       part of a negotiated plea with the government, in which he gave
       up his appellate rights. Toledo-Ramirez did not plead guilty until
       days before his trial (specifically, he pleaded guilty on the
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       23-10670              Opinion of the Court                        3

       Wednesday before a Monday jury selection). He entered a guilty
       plea with no negotiated plea agreement, thereby keeping his appel-
       late rights. The Guidelines range was 360 months to life. The gov-
       ernment asked the district court to vary downward and sentence
       Toledo-Ramirez to 276 months. After considering the sentencing
       factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court agreed.
       This appeal followed.
                                     II.

             We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
       abuse of discretion. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188–89
       (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The party challenging the reasonable-
       ness of the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the
       sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Melgen, 967 F.3d 1250,
       1264–65 (11th Cir. 2020).
                                     III.

               A district court abuses its discretion in sentencing when it
       does not adequately consider relevant factors, overly considers im-
       proper factors, or clearly errs when weighing the proper factors.
       Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
              The relevant factors a court should consider when sentenc-
       ing include, among others, “the nature and circumstances of the
       offense,” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the
       need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,”
       and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
       defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10670

       similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Henry,
       1 F.4th 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 814 (2022)
       (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005)).
               The weight that the district court accords to each of the sec-
       tion 3553(a) factors is committed to its sound discretion. United
       States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). It can focus on any
       one or any combination of these factors. United States v. Overstreet,
       713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013).
              The district court can go beyond the section 3553(a) factors
       too and consider other information relevant to the defendant’s
       background, character, and conduct. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
       1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
              That’s not all. When a sentence falls well below the statu-
       tory maximum, that can indicate reasonableness. United States v.
       Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014). And when a sen-
       tence falls significantly below the Sentencing Guidelines recom-
       mendation, the defendant has a particularly onerous burden in es-
       tablishing its unreasonableness. United States v. Litzky, 18 F.4th
       1296, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2021).
               If that sounds like a wide berth, it’s supposed to be. District
       courts have great discretion in sentencing. And Toledo-Ramirez
       faces an even steeper than normal uphill climb because here the
       district judge sentenced him not only below the statutory maxi-
       mum, but well below the Guidelines recommendation as well. The
       statutory maximum was life imprisonment, the Guidelines range
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       23-10670               Opinion of the Court                        5

       was 360 months to life, and the judge sentenced him to 276
       months. That’s a seven-year downward variance.
              Still, Toledo-Ramirez says the district court abused its dis-
       cretion for two main reasons: it created an unwarranted sentencing
       disparity and improperly considered a prior conviction. Not so.
                                      A.

              Start with the first. Toledo-Ramirez argues that the district
       court should have sentenced him to less time than Reyes-Lozano
       to avoid creating unwarranted disparities.
              The district court explicitly acknowledged the need for
       avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. It explained why To-
       ledo-Ramirez received a heavier sentence than his co-conspirator
       Carmelo Reyes-Lozano, who received 210 months. Despite being
       responsible for a higher drug quantity, Reyes-Lozano had a slightly
       lower offense level. More importantly, Reyes Lozano negotiated
       an early plea agreement with the government, including an appel-
       late waiver, saving the government resources and the need to pre-
       pare for a trial or appeal. Meanwhile, Toledo-Ramirez pleaded
       guilty without a negotiated plea agreement, just days before his
       trial was set to begin.
              More than once, we have emphasized that a defendant who
       enters into a written plea agreement and assists the government is
       incomparable to one who does not. United States v. Docampo, 573
       F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d
       1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). Though Reyes-Lozano did not have a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10670

       formal cooperation agreement with the government, he had an
       early written plea agreement with it, assisting its prosecution of the
       case. Toledo-Ramirez, though, pleaded guilty five days (including
       a weekend) before jury selection. As a result, the government
       surely spent significantly more resources on Toledo-Ramirez than
       on Reyes-Lozano. Moreover, as the district court pointed out,
       Reyes-Lozano waived his appellate rights and Toledo-Ramirez did
       not. As this very proceeding demonstrates, the government also
       had to spend additional resources on appeal. By those metrics,
       Reyes-Lozano and Toledo-Ramirez are not similarly situated.
              Moreover, though Toledo-Ramirez formally got the three-
       point reduction to his offense level for accepting responsibility and
       timely pleading guilty, just as Reyes-Lozano did, he did not accept
       responsibility to the same degree or as quickly as Reyes-Lozano.
       That too is a distinguishing factor between the two, because some-
       one who accepts responsibility quickly and completely is likely to
       need deterrence less than someone who accepts responsibility
       grudgingly and late. Thus, the sentencing disparity between the
       two is entirely justifiable.
                                      B.

               We now turn to Toledo-Ramirez’s second argument. He ar-
       gues that his sentence was improperly based on his prior conduct
       (killing a police officer), rather than the offense here.
               The district court did emphasize that he lacked remorse
       about his previous conviction and demonstrated depravity towards
       life. But in the very same breath, the district court explained that
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       23-10670               Opinion of the Court                          7

       this fact signifies a high need for specific deterrence against Toledo-
       Ramirez. The district court exclaimed disgust with his bragging of
       killing a police officer while threatening victims in this case. But,
       again, the district court disclaimed that he was sentencing based on
       a past conviction, and instead said that it was concerned about To-
       ledo-Ramirez’s conduct here.
               Far from being an abuse of discretion, the district court was
       required to consider, among many factors, Toledo-Ramirez’s his-
       tory and characteristics. The district court had broad discretion in
       how it accords weight to each of the section 3553(a) factors individ-
       ually and in combination. Clay, 483 F.3d at 743; Overstreet, 713 F.3d
       at 638. As its explanation clearly shows, the district court was not
       looking to punish Toledo-Ramirez for his past offense. But his his-
       tory and characteristics are relevant to a sentencing determination,
       especially when they affect other factors like deterrence or the na-
       ture and circumstances of the crime. The district court found that
       Toledo-Ramirez’s past behavior suggested a high need to deter
       him. And it found that he relied on his past violent behavior to add
       muscle to his threats in this case, which is relevant to the consider-
       ation of the nature and circumstances of the offense. So, again, the
       district court did not abuse its discretion by examining how To-
       ledo-Ramirez’s past violent behavior affects the section 3553(a) fac-
       tors during sentencing.
                                      IV.

              For the above reasons, the district court is AFFIRMED.