Court Opinion

ID: 9796109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:49:01.214037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:01.338575
License: Public Domain

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
_ INTRODUCTION
123 The majority concludes that Cedar Mountain Environmental ("CME") has standing to bring its claims and that its claims as presented to the district court were not moot. Because I conclude that CME's claims are now moot, I would not reach the standing question and therefore I respectfully dissent.
BACKGROUND
24 The district court based its dismissal of CME's claims, in part, upon mootness grounds, determining that "the Court's action on this issue will have no effect on [CME's] use of [its] leased property." When this case was pending before the district court, CME was leasing property adjacent to property that is owned and occupied by En-ergySolutions and that is potentially the site of EnergySolutions' expanded hazardous waste activities. After the district court rendered its decision, and while the case was pending before this court, CME's lease of that property expired. Nothing in the record, the briefing, or the arguments before this court indicates that CME has entered into a new lease agreement. Further, the lease indicated that its terms "[in no event shall ... extend beyond [May 31, 2008] without the prior written consent of [EnergySolu-tions], which consent may be granted or withheld in [EnergySolutions'] sole disceretion." The record is void of any indication, written or otherwise, that EnergySolutions consented to continue the terms of the lease. Rather, all parties in their briefing refer only to the lease agreement that has since expired.
1 25 The expired lease agreement between CME and EnergySolutions specifically prohibited CME from competing with Energy-Solutions. The lease stated
4. Use of Premises Any use of the Premises by [CME] may not restrict or interfere with [EnergySolutions'] businesses, as determined by [EnergySolu-tions] in its sole discretion.... [CME] may also use the property for similar waste handling and transportation functions so long as such use does not compete or conflict with [EnergySolutions] businesses, as determined by [EnergySolutions] in its sole discretion.
Before the district court and in its brief to this court, EnergySolutions states that if CME were to store hazardous waste on the leased property, then CME would be competing with EnergySolutions and accordingly in violation of its lease.
ANALYSIS
126 Claims become moot when the "circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." 1 The mootness doctrine stems from the general principle that courts should not issue advisory opinions:
"The function of appellate courts, like that of courts generally, is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, *103but only to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some party to the litigation, and it has been held that questions or cases which have become moot or academic are not a proper subject to review.2
"An issue on appeal is considered moot when 'the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.'"3 Unlike standing, which must be determined by the facts that existed at the time the suit was filed,4 mootness can be determined by facts that change or develop as the suit is pending. Indeed, facts that change after a district court renders a judgment can make an appeal moot, such that the appellate court is not in a position to review the district court decision.5 Regardless of when mootness is determined, the test remains whether the requested judicial relief can affect the rights of the litigants. The burden of persuading the court that an issue is moot "lies with the party asserting mootness."6
27 CME requested that the district court find that Tooele County's decisions to reduce the size of the hazardous waste corridor and to grant EnergySolutions' application for an amendment to its conditional use permit were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Accordingly, CME sought to have the district court declare the county's two decisions unenforceable. Because, in my view, declaring these decisions unenforceable will not affect CME's rights, I conclude that CME's claims are moot.
1 28 CME has asserted a number of possible injuries resulting from the county's decisions that it claims could be remedied by declaring the decisions unenforceable. First, CME contends that the redrawing of the corridor effectively exeluded CME's parcel on Section 29, as well as any other land originally in the corridor not owned by Ener-gySolutions that CME could have potentially purchased. Second, as a tenant of a parcel on Section 29, CME contends that the land CME was leasing will be negatively affected due to radioactive drift from potential operations on EnergySolutions' newly acquired property. And finally, CME states that it has an interest in protecting the public's right to a fair administrative process. CME contends that this public interest has been harmed by Tooele County's decisions. I consider each of CME's alleged injuries in turn.
I. REDRAWING THE CORRIDOR DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF CME'S CURRENT RIGHTS
129 CME argues that successfully challenging Tooele County's changes to the corridor will affect CME's rights in two ways. First, a successful challenge will effectively restore CME's leased parcel on Section 29 to the corridor, thereby allowing CME to use the parcel for hazardous waste storage. Second, returning the corridor to its original size will allow CME to purchase additional land within the corridor to conduct waste storage activities.
30 I conclude that the requested relief will not affect CME's rights on either theory. With regard to CME's leased parcel, the lease expired on May 31, 2008.7 Further, the lease prohibited CME from competing with *104EnergySolutions. Therefore, even if the parcel that CME had leased from EnergySolu-tions was part of the corridor, CME could not use the parcel for waste storage because CME no longer has any interest in the parcel and any interest that CME had restricted CME from conducting waste storage on the parcel. Accordingly, the relief CME requests in this case would not affect CME's rights regarding use of the parcel on Section 29.
31 With regard to the potential purchase of other property that was excluded from the redrawn corridor, CME does not have any actual rights associated with that property. CME is not leasing, nor does CME own any parcel of that property. We do not recognize a protectable right to purchase property unless that right is conferred by contract. Because CME has no contractual rights pertaining to the other property that was excluded from the redrawn corridor, there is no way in which our overturning Tooele County's decisions will affect CME in relation to that property.
IIL THE ALLEGED INCREASES IN RADIOACTIVE DRIFT DO NOT AFFECT CME, WHICH NO LONGER HAS ANY INTEREST IN THE ADJOINING PROPERTY
132 CME contends that as a leasee of a parcel of land that is adjacent to EnergySo-lutions' newly acquired land, CME faces increased risks from EnergySolutions waste disposal activities. CME further contends that if we grant the relief CME requests CME would not face these increased risks. CME's arguments are unpersuasive. CME's lease for the parcel in question has expired. Accordingly, CME no longer faces the risks that it has alleged.
III, THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE PROHIBITS LAND USE CHALLENGES TO CONTINUE AFTER ALL OF THE LITIGANT§S RELEVANT PROPER TY RIGHTS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED
133 Finally, CME claims that the public has a right, which CME seeks to enforce, to a fair and impartial administrative process. The majority agrees with CME's argument and determines that CME has alternative standing based on its representation of this public interest. Although somewhat facially persuasive, CME's argument would create dire long-term consequences for the mootness doctrine. Under CME's argument, no matter how the cireumstances may change, a party could always argue that, at the very least, the requested relief would affect the integrity of the administrative process. Accordingly, the adoption of CME's position would effectively eviscerate the mootness doctrine as it pertains to land use challenges. For this reason, I decline to adopt CME's reasoning.
CONCLUSION
34 CME's claims are now moot because CME does not have a right that will be affected if the district court were to declare Tocele County's decisions unenforceable. CME does not have any potentially affected property rights because CME does not own, nor does CME at this time lease, any property in the vicinity of the corridor. Further, the mootness doctrine prohibits land use challenges from continuing after all of the litigant's relevant property rights have been transferred. For these reasons, I would dismiss this appeal.
4 35 Justice WILKINS concurs in Associate Chief Justice DURRANTS dissenting opinion.

. Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720 (Utah 1996) (holding that an appeal became moot when the party sold the real estate that formed the basis of the claims).

. McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 761).

. State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841. (Utah 1994) (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)).

. Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1099 (10th Cir.2006).

. Richards, 914 P.2d at 720; Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989) (dismissing an appeal of a trial court's decision to revoke a driver license because the one-year revocation period had expired); McRae, 526 P.2d at 1192 (dismissing an appeal of a trial court's declaration that a regulation prohibiting private driver's education to persons under the age of 17 was null and void because the plaintiffs already received their driver licenses).

. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

. After Tooele County argued in its brief that CME's lease was soon to expire, CME responded only with the statement that it was currently leasing a parcel on Section 29 and included as support the lease dated May 20, 2005, which expired on May 31, 2008. CME did 'not rebut the argument that its lease of the parcel was soon to expire.