Court Opinion

ID: 9688104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:04:48.094187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:43.156146
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/24/23 M.W. v. A.W. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

M.W.,                                                                D080452

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 21FL012404C)

A.W.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jose S. Castillo, Judge. Affirmed.
         Goldfaden Law and Erik Hoyle, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Law Office of Linda Cianciolo and Linda Cianciolo, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                               INTRODUCTION

         A.W.1 (Mother) appeals from a three-year domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO) issued against her for the protection of M.W. (Father) and their

1     Pursuant to rule 8.90 of the California Rules of Court, we refer to the
parties by first and last initials only.
two children. Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by
(1) allowing her ex-husband to offer testimony consisting of impermissible
character evidence, (2) failing to fully consider testimonial evidence from two
police officers, (3) excluding a text message Mother sent her father,
(4) relying upon Father’s testimony instead of making an adverse inference
based on his failure to produce photographs and journal entries supporting
his abuse claims, and (5) including the couple’s children as protected parties
under the DVRO. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
and we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Mother and Father married in June 2019 and separated in October
2021. They share two young children, V.W., and B.W., and Mother has an
older daughter from a previous marriage. Mother was a stay-at-home parent
and the primary caregiver prior to the October 2021 incident that
precipitated a temporary restraining order.
      According to Father, he and Mother had an argument about money in

mid-September 2021.2 Father sat down with B.W., who was six-months old
at the time, at which point Mother ran at him and began punching him. He
held up his legs to block her. After punching him 18 to 20 times, he claimed
she sunk her nails into both calves and broke off one of her nails in his leg in
the process. Father did not call the police following this incident. Mother
denies the incident occurred.
      On October 18, 2021, Mother asked to use Father’s credit card. Father
declined, and Mother went to his bag and started to unzip it to remove
Father’s wallet. Father said he tried to take the bag from her, but Mother

2     There was some dispute as to whether this incident occurred in August
or September.
                                        2
jerked away in what he described as a “knee-jerk reaction” and struck Father
in the right arm. In describing the incident, Mother said when she grabbed
the bag, Father grabbed her right bicep and pulled her off the bag.
      Once Father regained control of it, he stated that Mother started to
scream, “Don’t touch me, you’re going to pay for this, you can’t touch me, I’m
taking the kids.” Mother walked to the bedroom and Father followed her.
The baby remained where she was by a table, but V.W. followed Mother and
she carried him into the bedroom. After she set down V.W., Father said
Mother turned and slammed the door twice, telling Father to stop following
her. He claimed he had already put his arm and foot in the door and that
they became stuck as she continued pushing the door. Mother acknowledged
that she continued to push the door closed but said he was intentionally
using his body to keep her from doing it. In the process, she claimed he
berated her, saying “you can’t close doors in my house, this is my house, I’m
on the lease.”
      After Father freed himself, he returned to the living room and retrieved
the infant, who was crying. Mother then came out of the bedroom and Father
handed her the baby. Mother returned to the bedroom with the baby and
locked the door. Father called 911 and told the operator his wife had struck
him, had slammed the door on his arm, and was locked in a room with their
two children and threatening to leave with them.
      Three police officers arrived, separately interviewed Mother and
Father, and then gave Father the two children and arrested Mother.
According to the police report, Father appeared calm, while Mother was
crying and appeared fearful. Father told police there had been approximately
10 unreported incidents within the past six weeks and that Mother was
becoming more violent.

                                       3
      Father did not immediately sustain any visible injuries, but later that
day he said an injury became inflamed and he emailed a photograph of it to
Detective Janine Van Antwerp. He asserts he never received a return email
after doing so.
      The day of the incident, Father filed a request for a DVRO protecting
himself and the children from Mother. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) that required Mother to move out of the family
residence and stay at least 100 yards away from Father, the children, and
their home. It denied Mother custody or visitation. A hearing was set for
early November 2021.
      At the November 2021 hearing, the trial court continued the TRO and
granted custody to Father but authorized four days per week of supervised
visitation with Mother. The court left these orders in place after a February
2022 hearing.
      On April 5, 2022, the court convened a hearing on the DVRO petition.
At the outset of the hearing, counsel stipulated to admit the police report
from October 18, 2021, as evidence. Mother’s ex-husband then testified about
her behavior and use of physical violence during their relationship, which
spanned from 2007 to 2015. He indicated that they shared custody of their
daughter but that after Mother’s arrest in October 2021, he sought sole legal
and physical custody. A former roommate of the couple testified about his
interactions with the family, but he did not live with them after 2019 and
was not present during the October 2021 incident.
      Father then took the stand. He indicated that he had two photographs
of the leg injuries caused by Mother’s nails in September 2021, but he did not
submit them to the court because his face was not in the pictures. He also

                                       4
claimed to have written about the incident in a journal, but he did not offer
the journal entries during the hearing.
      According to Father, Mother’s outbursts became more violent and
escalated in the six weeks prior to the October 2021 incident. Father felt that
a restraining order protecting him as well as the children was warranted
until he was assured Mother was “actually going to make some changes.”
      Father’s father then testified that he routinely visited San Diego and
communicated with both Father and Mother in an effort to help reduce the
tension between them. He said Mother admitted to him that she struck
Father in September. His understanding from discussions with the couple
during the first couple weeks of October 2021 was that Mother had
threatened to leave Father.
      Next, Mother solicited testimony from the police officers who responded
to the October 2021 incident. Officer Sarafina Martinez indicated that
Mother was crying and upset that day. Detective Van Antwerp testified that
she never received photographs or any other information regarding the
incident from Father. She explained that she was the one who reviewed the
evidence and made the decision not to forward the case to the city attorney’s
office for criminal prosecution. According to Detective Van Antwerp, she
informed Father of her decision by telephone two days after the October
incident.
      Mother testified last. She said she had decided by the beginning of
October 2021 to leave Father. She listed his substance addictions, lies, and
mistreatment of her and her older daughter as reasons for wanting to leave.
In preparation, she stated she had reached out to her church for resources
regarding leaving, had made a safety plan with her therapist, and had been
looking for apartments.

                                       5
      Mother asserted that in the days leading up to the October 2021
incident, she and Father were having daily conversations about the
dissolution of their marriage, and that Father had expressed his fear that
Mother would take the children. She also confirmed that she had taken an
anger management class.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court noted that it had
considered the parties’ respective testimony and the exhibits that were
admitted into evidence. It made clear that it would focus on the September
and October 2021 incidents. It gave little to no weight to either party’s
witnesses because the primary incidents occurred in 2021, and the witnesses
were not present during the altercations. It further noted that the police
officers’ testimony was not particularly helpful because it was focused
primarily on the criminal aspects of the case. Although the court
acknowledged “a discussion or argument regarding missing evidence or
photos,” it stated that “an affidavit of testimony is enough to satisfy the
burden of proof.” The court credited Father’s testimony and found that he
was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.
      Under the totality of the circumstances, the court found that Father
met his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that abuse
occurred within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA). While it was not clear to the court why Father followed Mother to
the bedroom when she was trying to create space during the October incident,
it noted that she admitted that she closed the door on him. The court
suggested this incident alone may not have met the standard, but that it did
when coupled with the September dispute. During that exchange, the court
highlighted that it was Mother who followed Father this time when he tried
to walk away with the child, and that she then punched and scratched him.

                                        6
      The court issued a DVRO for a period of three years and included the
children as protected parties. It found good cause to do so because Father
was holding one of the children during the September incident and both
children were present during the October altercation. Because the court
found that Mother perpetrated domestic violence, it held that the Family
Code section 3044 presumption applied and that an award of custody to

Mother would be detrimental the children. (Fam. Code3, § 3044, subd. (a).)
The court set a further evidentiary hearing to address any potential changes
to the custody arrangement in light of the presumption.
                                 DISCUSSION

A.    Standard of Review

      We review the grant or denial of a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (In
re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226; Gonzalez v.
Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420-421.) “ ‘To the extent that we are
called upon to review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial
evidence standard of review.’ ” (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
773, 780.) This means “[w]e draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
court’s ruling and defer to the court’s express or implied findings when
supported by substantial evidence.” (J.M. & G.H. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
925, 935.) If substantial evidence exists, it does not matter if we would
believe other evidence, draw other reasonable inferences, or reach a different
conclusion. (In re Marriage of DeSouza (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 25, 33
(DeSouza).) “All conflicts in the evidence are drawn in favor of the
judgment,” and “[w]hen supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to
the trial court’s findings,” including findings regarding witness credibility.

3     Statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
                                        7
(Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364-365 (Niko).) Further, “[i]n
many domestic violence cases, . . . the sole evidence of abuse will be the
survivor’s own testimony which, standing alone, can be sufficient to establish
a fact: ‘The testimony of one witness, even that of a party, may constitute
substantial evidence.’ ” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 106, 119 (F.M. & M.M.).)

B.    Challenge to the Testimony of Mother’s Ex-Husband

      Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
testimony of her ex-husband. Specifically, she argues her ex-husband’s
testimony regarding disagreements he and Mother had during their
relationship consisted of impermissible and prejudicial character evidence.
      Father responds that Mother forfeited this argument by not objecting
during trial to the ex-husband’s testimony. Even if we were to consider the
argument, Father contends Mother has provided no evidence showing a
reasonable probability of a more favorable result had her ex-husband not
testified.
      We agree that Mother forfeited this argument. We generally do not
consider contentions raised for the first time on appeal. (In re Marriage of
Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1528.) If an objection could have
been made in the trial court, but was not, the reviewing court will not
ordinarily consider a challenge to the trial court’s ruling. (In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.); People v. Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 627
[timely and specific objection generally required]; Evid. Code, § 353,
subd. (a).)
      At the beginning of the ex-husband’s testimony, Father’s counsel asked,
“Do you recall any specific incidents that occurred while you were dating
[Mother] now, beginning in 2007?” He responded, “Yes. I recall numerous

                                        8
incidents over the time that we were together.” After Father’s counsel asked
him to describe those incidents, Mother’s counsel objected as to relevance.
The trial court overruled the objection, and then Mother’s counsel added,
“and probative.” The court did not respond to this last interjection and the
ex-husband went on to describe multiple instances when Mother engaged in
physical violence. Mother’s counsel did not raise any further objections to the
nature of the testimony, nor did she at any time object to him testifying
generally regarding Mother’s propensity for violence or other character
evidence.
      “[A] relevance objection does not, in itself, alert the trial court to the
claim that the testimony objected to is inadmissible character evidence.”
(People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 19-21 [concluding that defendant
forfeited his claim regarding admission of character evidence by failing to
object on this ground].) Mother made no other objections and did not
otherwise raise any concerns about character evidence. Therefore, we
conclude the failure to specify the character evidence claim now presented
before the trial court forfeited this argument on appeal. (S.B., supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 1293.)

C.    Alleged Failure to Consider Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers

      Mother next argues the court abused its discretion by not fully
considering the evidence presented by two officers from the San Diego Police
Department. Mother points specifically to Officer Martinez’s testimony that
Father appeared calm while Mother was crying and upset, and that Mother
told Officer Martinez Father “grabbed her arm to pull her back away from his
bag” and “grabbed her by the bicep and pulled her back.” She contends this
evidence was highly relevant because Officer Martinez was a percipient
witness of the events immediately following the October 2021 incident.

                                         9
Likewise, Mother asserts that Detective Van Antwerp’s testimony regarding
her investigation provided direct impeachment evidence against Father.
      We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the police officers’ testimony was not particularly helpful. Officer Martinez’s
observations of the couple and the statements Mother made to her were also
in Officer Martinez’s report. Thus, her testimony was cumulative. In fact,
the court would have acted within its discretion had it excluded Officer
Martinez’s testimony altogether as trial judges have broad discretion to curb
cumulative evidence. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Robinson (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1032 (Robinson).)

      To the extent Detective Van Antwerp’s testimony rebutted Father’s
claims and weighed against his credibility, it too was cumulative and of little
value. Mother submits that Detective Van Antwerp impeached Father by
refuting his claims that (1) he emailed photographs to her and (2) was
unaware that criminal charges would not be brought against Mother. But
Father himself provided grounds for the court to discount his credibility by
testifying at the hearing that he had the photographs supporting his abuse
allegations in his possession, yet still failing to produce them for the court’s
consideration. As to Father’s knowledge of the status of the criminal charges,
Mother does not clarify the probative value of this evidence. The implication
is that Detective Van Antwerp’s testimony showed Father was untruthful,
but Mother does not explain how this one small instance would have
overcome the totality of the evidence the court considered in weighing
Father’s credibility against Mother’s. Furthermore, the fact that the court
described the testimony as unhelpful suggests that it did consider the
evidence but did not find it persuasive. We will not disturb weight and

                                        10
credibility determinations on appeal. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 334 (Sav-On Drug Stores).)

D.    Exclusion of Text Message Evidence
      Mother contends the trial court erroneously excluded a September 2021
screenshot of a text message she sent her father based on lack of foundation.
She asserted the text message showed that Father had been emotionally
abusing her and had recently begun treatment for substance abuse. It also
supported her testimony that she had made plans to leave Father. She
argues the evidence would have bolstered her position that Father had clear
motive to lie because he was fearful Mother would be granted legal and
physical custody of their children.
      Even assuming the trial court erred by excluding the text message on
foundational grounds, the error was harmless. Under article VI, section 13,
of the California Constitution, “ ‘[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial
granted, in any cause, on the ground of . . . the improper admission or
rejection of evidence, . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” (See also Evid. Code,
§ 353, subd. (b) [“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous
admission of evidence unless: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the error or errors complained of
resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) “ ‘ “A miscarriage of
justice . . . occurs . . . when it appears reasonably probable that were it not for
the error a result more favorable to the appellant could have been obtained.”
[Citation.] “Prejudice is not presumed and the burden is on the appellant to
show its existence.” ’ ” (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 664, 674-675 (McIntyre).)

                                        11
      Here, the topics addressed were cumulative of other evidence in the
record. (See Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.) Father admitted
he enrolled in Narcotics Anonymous at the end of September 2021, and
Mother confirmed during her testimony that he began attending meetings
and addiction counseling at that time. She also testified that he mistreated
her, she had decided by the beginning of October to leave him, and she had
taken steps towards that goal. Mother indicated they had “daily
conversations about the dissol[ution] of [their] marriage” during which she
said Father frequently expressed his fear that Mother would take the

children.4 Thus, the record already included evidence supporting Father’s
purported motive to lie. And, given that the text message was written by
Mother and during roughly the same time frame addressed in other
testimony, it adds little to the existing evidence. Ultimately, while the text
message may have slightly bolstered the factual underpinnings for this
motive, Mother has not shown that it was reasonably probable the court
would not have issued the DVRO had it admitted the text message.
(McIntyre, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 674-675.)

E.    Consideration of Father’s Testimony Instead of Making an Adverse
      Inference Based on Father’s Failure to Produce the Photographs and
      Journal
      Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it relied upon
Father’s testimony regarding the September and October 2021 incidents.
Father had revealed that he had photographic evidence of the injuries he
allegedly sustained, as well as written journal entries regarding the

4     Again, although it is unclear how little weight the trial court afforded
the testimony of other witnesses, Father’s father also testified that he
participated in conversations with the couple during which Mother
threatened to leave Father.
                                       12
September 2021 incident. He claimed to have emailed the photographs to
Detective Van Antwerp, but she testified that she never received them.
Father did not otherwise offer the photographs or journal at the hearing.
Under these circumstances, Mother contends the court should have made an
adverse inference against Father pursuant to Evidence Code section 412,
which provides that, “[i]f weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered
when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more
satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.”
(Evid. Code, § 412.) Had it done so, Mother asserts it is more than
reasonably probable she would have obtained a more favorable result because
the court relied almost exclusively on Father’s testimony and claims of abuse.
      Father responds that he testified as to why he did not produce the
photographs and that, regardless, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to
support a finding.
      As an initial matter, contrary to Mother’s statement, the trial court did
not rely upon the existence of, and consider as evidence, Father’s photographs
and journal entries. It said only that “[t]here was a discussion or argument
regarding missing evidence or photos, and the court notes that in these types
of cases, an affidavit of testimony is enough to satisfy the burden of proof.”
This statement indicates that the court acknowledged the evidence was
missing but that this fact was immaterial because testimony alone would
suffice.
      The court was correct. A trial court may issue a DVRO “if an affidavit
or testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant
to Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based
solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining

                                       13
order.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The Evidence Code similarly provides that “the
direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for
proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411; see also Alperson v. Mirisch Co. (1967)
250 Cal.App.2d 84, 93 [“It is the rule . . . that the testimony of one witness, if
believed by the trier of fact and if not inherently improbable, is sufficient to
sustain a finding”].) Otherwise, “ ‘questions as to the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence, the construction to be put upon it, the inferences to be drawn
therefrom, the credibility of witnesses . . . and the determination of [any]
conflicts and inconsistencies in their testimony are matters for the trial court
to resolve.’ ” (Sav-On Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334.)
      Moreover, “ ‘[Evidence Code] [s]ection 412 only applies when it can be
shown that a party is in fact in possession of or has access to better and
stronger evidence than was presented’ ” (Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa
Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 362) and it is not clear that
is the case here. The testimony and argument regarding the photographs
and journal entries does not suggest they would have been dispositive of the
abuse determination. Father did not elaborate as to the content of the
journal entries, and the court may well have barred their admission as self-
serving hearsay. As for the photographs, Father explained that they did not
show his face, so there were issues with proving the pictures showed injuries
to his leg. Father also did not indicate anything in the photographs that tied
the injuries to Mother.
      Also, even if the court viewed Father’s testimony with “distrust,” it was
not required to discount it completely. When a factfinder applies the
Evidence Code section 412 inference, it discounts the weight of the evidence
or credibility of the witness. (See Largey v. Intrastate Radiotelephone, Inc.
(1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 660, 672 [“Evidence Code section 412 deals not with

                                        14
‘best’ evidence, but with ‘weaker and less satisfactory’ evidence”]; Vallbona v.
Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1537 [citing Evidence Code section 412
and explaining that a jury was free to “reasonably disbelieve” self-serving
portions of testimony].) The trial court here was well aware of Father’s
failure to produce what he claimed were readily available photographs and
journal entries. Mother cites no authority that the court was required to
expressly state that it was applying Evidence Code section 412 in the context
of a non-jury proceeding. Thus, we may presume the court factored Father’s
decision not to provide this additional evidence into its credibility
determination.
      On appellate review, we must defer to a trial court’s credibility
determination when they are supported by substantial evidence. (Niko,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 364-365.) Because in determining whether to
grant or deny a petition for a DVRO the court is directed to consider the
totality of the circumstances (§ 6301, subd. (c); F.M. & M.M., supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 117), we do the same here. The evidence shows that
Mother admitted striking Father in October. Although the DVPA does not
contain a corroboration requirement (F.M. & M.M., at p. 118), the record here
also contains some additional evidence of abuse. The police report reflects
that Father told an officer that there had been approximately 10 other
incidents within the preceding six weeks. And while the court afforded little
to no weight to the other witnesses, Father’s father testified that Mother
admitted to him that she struck Father in September. Thus, even if the court
viewed Father’s testimony with some “distrust” pursuant to Evidence Code
section 412 based on his failure to produce the photographs and journal,
substantial evidence in the record still supported its finding that abuse
occurred. Once we conclude substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s

                                       15
credibility determination exists, we may not reverse the judgment even if we
may have believed other evidence or reached a different conclusion.
(DeSouza, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 33.)

F.    Inclusion of the Children as Protected Parties

      Mother’s final contention is that the trial court improperly exercised its
discretion by including the children in the DVRO when there was no evidence
they were part of any violence between the parties.
      Father responds that after notice and a hearing, section 6340,
subdivision (a) affords the trial court the same discretion it has under section
6320 to include family members as protected parties. Moreover, the evidence
showed that Father was holding the infant during the September 2021
incident, and both children were present during the October 2021 incident.
      Based on a showing of good cause, the court may include minor
children residing in the household in a protective order. (§ 6320, subd. (a);
M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1144 (M.S.) [“By its plain language,
section 6320, subdivision (a), requires only a showing of ‘good cause’ for the
inclusion of family members or household members in a DVRO”].) When
determining whether to issue a DVRO after notice and a hearing, “the court
shall consider whether failure to make any of these orders may jeopardize the
safety of the petitioner and the children for whom the custody or visitation
orders are sought.” (§ 6340, subd. (a)(1).) But a finding of potential jeopardy
to the safety of the children is not a necessary predicate for including the
children as protected parties. (J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 642
(J.H.).) Instead, “the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.”
(Id. at p. 643; § 6301, subd. (c).)
      In this case, the trial court was well within its discretion in finding
good cause to include the minor children in the DVRO. Mother acknowledged

                                       16
that her son was in the bedroom when she pushed the bedroom door closed on
Father. She further stated that after she closed the door, she heard her
daughter scream from the other room. Thus, it is undisputed that both
children were not only present, but in close proximity to the dispute. Father
further testified that he was holding the younger child when Mother attacked
and scratched him in September. He said she punched him with “closed fists
and swinging side to side” and “[a]t any time she could have missed and
actually hit our daughter.” At the time of the October incident, their son was
two years old, and their daughter was six months old. Both were too young to
protect themselves from being even inadvertently harmed by the violence.
      Nonetheless, based on the reasons already addressed above, Mother
contends the court “ignored the majority of the evidence” and “failed to
consider the totality of the evidence.” We have already rejected Mother’s
other arguments. With regard to including the children as protected parties,
we conclude the trial court drew reasonable inferences from the evidence,
which supported a finding that the violence jeopardized their safety. (See
J.H., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at 643.) We may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court. (M.S., supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) Based on the totality of the circumstances appearing
in the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
including the children in the DVRO.

                                       17
                               DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed. Father is entitled to his costs on appeal.

                                                               HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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