Court Opinion

ID: 9551511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:54:36.913599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:03.225496
License: Public Domain

ME. JUSTICE HASWELL
(dissenting):
I would reverse the order granting defendants a new trial and reinstate the jury verdict. This result is based on two grounds: .(1) waiver; (2) harmless error.
After discovery and removal of the alternate juror from the jury room, defendants with full knowledge thereof did not move for a mistrial. Instead, defendants permitted the jury to continue its deliberations and return its verdict without objection. When the verdict was not to their liking, they moved for a new trial 22 days later. Defendants are not entitled to have their cake and eat it too.
The record is barren of any objection by defendants between the time of discovery of the presence of the alternate juror in the jury room and the time defendants moved for a new trial. They did not object when the jury returned its unanimous verdict in open court on August 23. They did not object prior to entry of judgment on the verdict on September 5. Defendants’ first objection was their motion for new trial on September 14.
Objections involving irregularities in jury proceedings known to a party at the time and not objected to are waived; they *245cannot be raised for the first time upon motion for a new trial following an adverse jury verdict. Seder v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Company, 156 Mont. 322, 479 P.2d 448.
Additionally, I believe the error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. No prejudice to defendants is indicated except an unfavorable verdict. The verdict was unanimous. The insignificance of the error is demonstrated more eloquently than a thousand words by defendants’ failure to object or move for a mistrial.
The majority hold that the presence of the alternate juror in the jury room in itself is reversible error. I disagree with this blanket holding.
A new trial can be granted only for an error “materially affecting the substantial rights” of the aggrieved party. Section 93-5603, R.C.M.1947. Prejudice is never presumed but must affirmatively appear. Martello v. Darlow et al., 151 Mont. 232, 441 P.2d 175; Conway v. Fabian, 108 Mont. 287, 89 P.2d 1022. The error must be of such character that refusal to grant a new trial “appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice”. Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P. In my view, none of these requirements for a new trial is present in this case.
A prima facie case of manifest abuse of discretion in awarding a new trial is made by discrediting the grounds specified for a new trial or showing that existing error did not materially affect the substantial rights of the moving party. Tigh v. College Park Realty, 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57. Such is the case here, in my opinion.
For these reasons, I would deny defendants a new trial and reinstate the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon.