Court Opinion

ID: 9854140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:01:49.523996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:56.894831
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(dissenting) :
’ I dissent, concluding the warrantless search of the appellant’s store and the warrantless seizure of a paper bag containing fifty-seven small packages of marijuana was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Unquestionably searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement is presented and the burden is upon the State to justify a warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. (2d) 564 (1971); State v. Peters, 271 S. C. 498, 248 S. E. (2d) 475 (1978).
A warrant is normally a prerequisite to a search unless exigent circumstances make compliance with this require*234ment impossible. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. (2d) 290 (1978).
The State sought to satisfy this requirement by proving probable cause and exigent circumstances. While the State probably has established probable cause, it has failed to establish exigent circumstances.
The State relies upon the police officer’s belief the drugs were about to be removed or destroyed as the exigent circumstance necessary to justify the warrantless seizure. The officer’s belief based solely upon information supplied by an informant that “. . the drugs were being sold fast and furious and we were afraid we were going to lose them . . .” There is no corroboration of this information in the record. There was no proof of increased activity in and around the premises, no showing of an increase in the number of customers and no proof that drugs were about to be removed or destroyed. This “exigency,” if it, in fact, existed, is refuted by the amount of marijuana seized.
The appellant’s interest in the contents of the bag on the shelf in the store is substantial. He had the same legitimate expectation of privacy in the closed bag, as was recognized in U. S. v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. (2d) 538 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. (2d) 235 (1979). Here there was no reason to believe that the paper sack presented any danger to the officer or others. At the time of the search, the paper sack could not be classified as evidence.
An analogous case is United States v. Rubin, 474 F. (2d) 262, 268 (3rd Cir. 1973), where it was held when officers have
“[Pjrobable cause to believe contraband is present and, in addition, based on the surrounding circumstances or the information at hand, they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant, a warrantless search is justified. . . Circum*235stances which have seemed relevant to courts include (1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant . .. (2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed. . . ”
Here the police had reliable information pursuant to a “buy” that drugs were present. The magistrate could not be located, but see Long v. State, 508 S. W. (2d) 47 (Ark. 1974), which held not to be sufficient that judge was out of town. Informer advised police “drugs were being sold fast and furious.” Police ryent into store and searched paper sacks on shelf of store.
Terms like “‘exigent circumstances” or “urgent need” are useful in underscoring the heavy burden on the police to show that there was a need that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant.
Officers’ failure to obtain a warrant to seize can be excused only if the circumstances at the time of the seizure were sufficiently exigent to make their course of action imperative.
I do not believe such circumstances existed here. The officers could have watched the paper sacks until a magistrate could issue a warrant.
If the warrant can be obtained, the officers must be free to preserve the situation intact while the required procedures are followed. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. (2d) 282 (1970).
Although the Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people to be secure in their “houses,” this protection is by no means limited to residential buildings. It has been consistently held that offices and stores and other businesses and commercial premises are likewise entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 1154 (1968).
A store open to the public, offers an “implied” invitation to enter. The officers here had the right to enter but not to seize *236items in a brown paper bag which were not in plain view. U. S. v. Berrett, 513 F. (2d) 154 (1st Cir. 1975).
I conclude the expectation of privacy in this paper sack outweighs the custodial interests making the opening of the sack unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In order to justify a warrantless search based upon exigent circumstances, this Court should adopt as a minimum the procedural safeguards required for a valid “stop” as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 889 (1968).
“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to' specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
The record is devoid of specific and articulable facts to support a determination that exigent circumstances were present at the time of the warrantless seizure. I would reverse and remand.