Court Opinion

ID: 9576979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:31.446248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:47.408516
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice.
Appellant appeals his conviction for first degree murder and the sentence of death imposed upon that conviction. Our review is in response to his appeal, and, in addition, we review this case pursuant to our duty to automatically review capital cases. I.C. § 19-2827.
In June of 1980, Scott Currier arrived in Spokane, Washington, with his fiancee. Sometime during that month they became acquainted with members of a Spokane motorcycle gang, including appellant, through a chance meeting in a Spokane park. Currier and the deceased, Kimberly Palmer, had known each other for five years and previously dated. On June 19, 1980, Palmer and Currier left Palmer’s Spokane residence to go to Idaho on a camping trip, driving a blue and white van owned by Currier’s fiancee.
*119The next evening, Friday, June 20, Currier and Palmer checked into a motel located around the corner from appellant’s Spokane residence. After checking in, they were observed looking for something in the rear of the van. Currier then went back to the motel clerk and asked for a return of his money, indicating several guns had been stolen, he knew who did it, and he was going to retrieve them. Currier and Palmer then left the motel.
On Saturday morning, June 21, at approximately 6:30 a.m., a blue and white van was observed driving up a steep, sparsely populated mountain road south of Post Falls, Idaho. In the van were two or three men, one wearing a gray cap. Thirty minutes later, three men were observed on foot, coming down the same steep mountain road. Witnesses later identified these three men as Donald Paradis, appellant here, Thomas Gibson and Larry Evans. Within the next thirty minutes, these same three men were seen at various locations in Post Falls. One was carrying what some observers believed to be a rifle rolled up in a blanket. Post Falls police received a report of a man with a gun, and upon investigation made contact with the three men outside a drive-in restaurant. From identification cards shown to police, the three were positively identified as appellant, Gibson and Evans.
On Sunday morning, June 22, Post Falls police received a report of a one-car rollover on the aforementioned mountain road. Upon investigation, they discovered the van, overturned, with various items scattered around it. Upon closer inspection an officer discovered Kimberly Palmer’s body lying face down in a creek 70 to 80 feet away from the van. Later, Scott Currier’s body was found near the van stuffed into a sleeping bag tied with a small piece of terry cloth. Currier’s belt was also in the bag, with a distinctive brass buckle missing, apparently cut off the belt. Lying under Palmer was a distinctive light blue Levi cap, identified as belonging to Larry Evans. Currier had been beaten severely around the head. Palmer had been manually strangled. There was evidence at trial suggesting that Palmer was still alive when she was placed in the stream bed.
Early Sunday morning, June 22, between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m., appellant’s residence in Spokane, Washington, was severely damaged by an arson fire. An investigator, who was on the scene to determine the cause of the fire, observed a rolled-up rug, in the basement of the house, surrounded by a reddish fluid. In the rug were Currier’s missing brass belt buckle, a blue colored lawn dart with traces of blood on the end, and a piece of blue terry cloth. The lawn dart closely matched puncture wounds in Currier’s back. The piece of blue terry cloth matched the piece of terry cloth used to tie up the sleeping bag where Currier’s body was found. Testimony placed appellant at the residence in the early morning hours before the fire began.
Appellant was arrested on Monday, June 23, at an abandoned gas station where he had been staying since the fire. Recovered from appellant’s vehicle was a blue blanket previously left in the van by Currier’s fiancee.
An autopsy was performed upon both victims. A major issue at trial concerned jurisdiction over the crime because, although strong physical evidence indicated that Currier was battered and probably killed at appellant’s house in Washington, other evidence indicated that Palmer was most likely killed in Idaho. A major part of the autopsy dealt with the differences that existed between the two bodies. Currier’s body had decomposed significantly by the time of the autopsy. Palmer’s body had not decomposed. This indicated to the medical examiner that Currier had been killed some hours before Palmer. Another difference between the two bodies was that Palmer’s lungs were half filled with water. The medical examiner hypothesized that this was because Palmer lay face down in the creek while still gasping for breath. Based on this evidence, the prosecution theorized that Palmer, a witness to Currier’s murder, was still alive when the van was driven to Idaho and was killed to prevent *120her from identifying the persons who killed Currier.
Appellant was charged in Washington with the murder of Scott Currier. After a trial, he was acquitted. He was then extradited to Idaho for trial in the murder of Kimberly Palmer.
Initially, appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning the death of Scott Currier. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the. evidence was admissible to portray a “rational and cohesive scenario.” Evidence of Currier’s death was introduced in the Idaho trial over the continuing objection of appellant.
I.
A.
First, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in not giving a certain instruction to the jury. Appellant alleges that under Idaho law, where a criminal case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the jury must be instructed to find the defendant guilty only if the facts are entirely consistent with his guilt. See State v. Davis, 69 Idaho 270, 206 P.2d 271 (1949); State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718 (1925); State v. Marcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80 (1920).
In State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979), we reversed a defendant’s conviction for failure to give the following requested instruction:
“You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant’s innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.” 100 Idaho at 132, 594 P.2d 639.
The trial judge in Holder had given an instruction which merely distinguished between circumstantial and direct evidence and did not explain the effect of a circumstantial case. Appellant here contends that the trial court erred in the same manner, in that he gave insufficient instructions on the effect of a circumstantial case. However, unlike in Holder, the trial judge here gave the following instruction at the beginning of appellant’s trial:
“To convict the defendant, the evidence must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. If after consideration of all the evidence in the case, you may reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the guilt of the defendant, you must acquit.”
This instruction, which was not objected to, sufficiently informed the jury that it could not convict the appellant unless all the facts were consistent with guilt, and excluded any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. This is in effect the same type of instruction we indicated should have been given in State v. Holder, supra. It informs the jury of its duty in a case involving only circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, there was no error in failing to give any further instructions on that issue.1
B.
Appellant also contends that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of the crime charged. He *121argues that only circumstantial evidence connects him to the scene, and that to be convicted of the principal offense it must be shown that an aider and abettor possessed the same intent as the principal. Appellant argues that the proof at trial failed in this respect, and that on the evidence presented no reasonable jury could have convicted appellant. He also argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in Kootenai County. Appellant’s reliance upon these arguments is misplaced since a defendant can be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Chapple, 98 Idaho 475, 567 P.2d 20 (1977); State v. Ponthier, 92 Idaho 704, 449 P.2d 364 (1969). The state presented a strong circumstantial case against appellant. He was placed at or near the scene where the victim’s body was found, in the company of a person, Larry Evans, who was almost certainly in or around the scene at the time of the murder (as indicated by the presence of his hat under Palmer’s body). The area was sparsely populated, and very few people used the road where the van was found; thus, the presence of strangers in the area was conspicuous. Witnesses observed a van Palmer and Currier had been driving on that road shortly before three men, whose identities were established, including appellant, were observed leaving the area on foot. The presence of these men on foot left little doubt that they had reached the area in the van. In addition, strong evidence of motive was presented in that appellant was strongly linked, by evidence discovered in his house, to the death of Scott Currier. Currier’s distinctive brass belt buckle, cut off his belt, was found at appellant’s house. The belt was found on Currier’s body. A lawn dart which was used to stab Currier in the back was found in appellant’s house. Pieces of terry cloth identical to those used to tie Currier into the sleeping bag were found in appellant’s house. There was evidence that an attempt was made to clean the house after Currier’s death, as evidenced by the bloody rug hidden in the basement, with rags having been washed in a washing machine. An arson caused fire had been set in appellant’s house in an apparent attempt to destroy all of this evidence. There was a strong inference that appellant attempted to leave the area after the killings. Also, a blue blanket that had been in Currier’s fiancee’s van was found in appellant’s car when he was arrested. The circumstantial evidence presented in this case was more than sufficient to support the conviction of appellant for aiding and abetting the murder of Kimberly Palmer.
C.
As previously noted, appellant was tried in Washington for the murder of Scott Currier, and acquitted. Evidence connecting appellant to Currier’s death was introduced in the Palmer trial over appellant’s objections. Appellant contends that the admission of this evidence was error; thus, his conviction is tainted and must be reversed.
Evidence connecting appellant to the death of Scott Currier constitutes evidence of another crime for which appellant was not on trial in the present case. Generally, evidence of other crimes of a defendant is not admissible at trial to show the defendant’s criminal propensity. State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978). Such evidence may be introduced, however, if the evidence falls within one of the generally recognized exceptions to the general rule.
“However, this jurisdiction will admit evidence of defendant’s past criminal activity to prove: (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, and (6) other similar issues.” State v. Needs, supra, 99 Idaho at 892-3, 591 P.2d at 139-40.
*122The evidence of the Currier death was presented not for the purpose of showing appellant’s criminal propensity, but for the purpose of showing motive and a common scheme and especially to indicate to the jury the entire factual situation presented in this case, as stated by the trial judge, a “rational and cohesive scenario,” also a use which is permissible. State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975); State v. Dayley, 96 Idaho 527, 531 P.2d 1172 (1975); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971).
However, the situation in this case is slightly different from previous Idaho cases in that the “other crime” of which evidence is being introduced was a crime for which the appellant has been acquitted. Nevertheless, evidence of a prior acquitted crime is generally allowed if it falls within one of the recognized exceptions already noted. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.1966); Buatte v. United States, 350 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 856, 87 S.Ct. 104, 17 L.Ed.2d 83 (1966); Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal.2d 406, 78 Cal.Rptr. 186, 455 P.2d 122 (1969); People v. Douglas, 246 Cal.App.2d 594, 54 Cal.Rptr. 777 (1966); Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 311 (Fla.App. 1973); Jenkins v. State, 147 Ga.App. 21, 248 S.E.2d 33 (1978); State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 836 (1966); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich.App. 452, 296 N.W.2d 613 (1980); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J.Super. 351, 323 A.2d 549 (1974); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 284 A.2d 549 (1971); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975); State v. Tarman, 27 Wash.App. 645, 621 P.2d 737 (1980). See also Annot., Admissibility of evidence as to other offense as affected by defendant’s acquittal of that offense, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962).
However, appellant raises another objection to admissibility. He contends that allowing admission of this “other crimes” evidence, where he has been acquitted, would violate his rights under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically the double jeopardy clause with its attendant collateral estoppel rule. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).2 After a careful examination of this argument, we conclude that, in the context of this case, admission of this evidence did not violate appellant’s fifth amendment rights.
The fifth amendment’s double jeopardy guarantee applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). In Ashe v. Swenson, supra, the defendant was charged with six counts of robbery, for robbing six participants in a poker game. After acquittal on one count, he was tried on a second count. The question before the court in Ashe was whether there exists an element of collateral estoppel in the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, as applicable to the states, that would preclude a state from retrying a defendant where the ultimate issue (in Ashe, identification of a perpetrator) had already been necessarily determined at a previous trial. The Supreme Court adopted the view that there is an element of collateral estoppel in the fifth amendment which would prevent the second trial.
One federal circuit has used the rationale in Ashe to forbid evidence of “other crimes,” where a defendant has been acquitted of that crime. Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.1972) (evidence that defendant robbed two establishments, where acquitted of those robberies, *123not admissible in trial on third separate robbery). However, Ashe and Wingate are distinguishable from this case, which can best be shown by comparing the facts of the present case to the facts in King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435 (8th Cir.1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1238, 59 L.Ed.2d 468 (1979).
In King, the appellant, a habeas petitioner, had been convicted in state court of the robbery of a particular store. This store had been robbed at 7:00 p.m.; another store was robbed at 4:30 a.m. the following morning. Appellant was arrested and charged with both robberies. He was tried for the morning robbery first and acquitted. At the subsequent trial for the evening robbery, testimony of appellant’s involvement in the morning robbery was presented. The King court first ruled that Ashe was not applicable.
“In the Ashe case the separate charges arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. The critical issue in the Ashe case was whether Ashe was a participant, with others, in the robbery of the six players. In acquitting Ashe in the first trial, the jury found that Ashe was not a participant in the robbery of the six players. In the second trial the jury found that he was a participant in the robbery of the six players. In contrast, in . this case appellant was charged with committing two separate and distinct robberies of two different stores, separated by distance, circumstances, and time of about nine and one-half hours. These facts distinguish this case from the Ashe case.” 577 F.2d at 440.
Similarly, the present case is distinguishable from Ashe. Appellant here was charged with committing two separate and distinct crimes, the murders of two separate persons, separated by time, distance and circumstances.3
The appellant here seeks to foreclose from consideration any alleged connection between himself and the death of Scott Currier. However, here, as in the King case, the evidence of Currier’s death and its connection to appellant was not introduced for the primary purpose of showing the guilt of appellant regarding the death of Currier, but rather to explain to the jury a possible motive the appellant may have had to participate in the murder of Kimberly Palmer and to connect him with that murder. The jury in the Washington case could very well have believed that appellant had a connection with Currier’s death, but that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the actual murderer of Currier. Additionally, the Washington jury might have had a reasonable doubt on the issue of whether Currier was killed in Washington or in Idaho, and thus acquitted because of that doubt. A verdict of acquittal in the previous case does not preclude all possibility of knowledge on the part of appellant of the circumstances of the death of Currier. It was this evidence of knowledge on the part of the defendant that the prosecution sought to use to indicate to the jury a possible motive and implication in Palmer’s death. The prosecution did not seek to prove once again that appellant was involved in Currier’s death, but only sought to show that appellant had a motive to aid in a cover-up of the Currier murder by helping to eliminate Kimberly Palmer as a witness. Regardless of his guilt or innocence in Currier’s death, the evidence of that death is still highly relevant in showing a possible motive for appellant’s involvement in Palmer’s murder. Because *124the verdict of acquittal did not necessarily preclude or decide finally the question of appellant’s knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Currier’s death or the tie-in between Currier’s death and Kimberly Palmer’s death, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude introduction of evidence of Currier’s death at the Palmer trial.
II.
Appellant next challenges the validity of the death penalty imposed on his conviction. He asserts that the penalty is disproportionate and excessive in this case for the following reasons: (1) there was a lack of jury participation in the capital sentencing process, which participation is constitutionally required; (2) one of the aggravating circumstances in Idaho’s death penalty law is unconstitutionally vague; (3) the death penalty cannot be imposed upon a defendant who is found guilty only of aiding and abetting in the murder; (4) the circumstances in this case do not provide a sufficient foundation for imposition of the death penalty. We will consider appellant’s assertions in the above order.
A.
Appellant’s first assertion is that involvement of the jury in the sentencing process in capital cases is constitutionally required. This assertion is disposed of by two recent cases in which we have considered this exact question and rejected the argument. In State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 463, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), we held “that there is no federal constitutional requirement of jury participation in the sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in the sentencing process, as contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the policy determination of the individual states.” We went on to hold that “the policy judgment of our legislature, which places capital sentencing discretion in the district judges of our state with mandatory appellate review vested in this Court of statewide jurisdiction, meets any test of constitutionality.” In State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), we again considered the question of whether the federal constitution prohibits a statutory scheme that does not provide for jury participation, and in addition, we considered the question of whether our own state constitution prohibits such a statutory scheme. We once again upheld our own statutes, rejecting the notion that the federal constitution requires jury sentencing, and also concluding that nothing in the state constitution prohibits a statute which does not provide for jury participation. Thus, this issue was thoroughly covered in both of these previous cases, and our decisions in those cases controls here.
B.
Appellant argues that the statutory aggravating circumstance found in I.C. § 19 — 2515(f)(6), that “the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life,” is unconstitutionally vague. The United States Supreme Court has previously required clear standards which guide the discretion of the sentencing body. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); See also, State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981). If the language of the statutory provision itself does not contain a sufficiently clear standard, it is the duty of the state courts to place limiting constructions upon the statutory aggravating circumstances “so as to avoid the possibility of their application in an unconstitutional manner.” State v. Osborn, supra at 418, 631 P.2d at 200. The aggravating circumstance challenged here has been considered in two previous Idaho cases and, with the aid of a limiting construction placed upon it, has been upheld as constitutional. In State v. Osborn, supra, we concluded that the phrase under consideration here “is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.” Id. at 419, 631 P.2d 187. In State v. Creech, supra, we once again upheld the constitutionality of this statutory aggravating cir*125cumstance. In light of our decisions in these two cases, further consideration of the identical argument presented here is not necessary.4
C.
Appellant argues that a death penalty cannot be imposed in this case because he was merely an aider and abettor, and no proof was presented that appellant was the actual killer of Kim Palmer. Appellant relies on the recent United States Supreme Court case of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). In Enmund, the court considered the question of whether a person convicted only of felony murder can be sentenced to death. Enmund was the driver of the getaway vehicle in a planned robbery during which the two principals killed the victims. There was no showing that Enmund intended the killings, only that he was a knowing participant in the robbery, during which the victims were killed. The court resolved the question in Enmund’s favor.
“[I]t is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. We have concluded, along with most legislatures and juries, that it does not.
"... The question before us is not the disproportionality of death as a penalty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund’s own conduct. The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on ‘individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.’ ” 458 U.S. at 797-98, 102 S.Ct. at 3376-77, (emphasis in original).
The court held that since Enmund’s criminal culpability extended only to the robbery, imposition of the death penalty for Enmund’s own culpability was excessive and disproportionate and thus a violation of the eighth amendment.
Enmund does not require a reversal of the sentence imposed in this case for several reasons. First, appellant was convicted of murder, not felony murder. Felony murder is defined as:
“Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem is murder of the first degree.” I.C. § 18-4003(d).
Under the felony murder rule, a defendant who participates in a robbery can be held liable for the death of any person killed during the commission of that robbery, regardless of the individual defendant’s intent that a death occur. Appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of a murder, an offense which necessarily involves an intent on the part of a defendant that a murder take place. We have already ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction on this charge. Although the United States Supreme Court ruled out imposition of the death penalty in a felony murder case, they did so because the felony murder offense involved in Enmund did not require, and the facts of the case itself did not warrant, a finding that the defendant entertained an intent that the victims of the robbery be killed. Such an intent to kill was required by the offense for which appellant was convicted.5
*126The trial judge instructed the jury that murder of the first degree requires a clear, deliberate intent to kill on the part of the defendant. He further instructed the jury that:
“You are instructed that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission, are principals in any crime so committed, and as principals are guilty of any crime so committed.
“You are instructed that to aid and abet means to knowingly assist, facilitate, promote, encourage, counsel, solicit or invite the commission of a crime.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the jury would necessarily have to find that the defendant intended that a life be taken before it could find him guilty of first degree murder. This type of moral culpability is all that the United States Supreme Court would require under Enmund. Because such a moral culpability necessarily exists in the present case, imposition of the death penalty is not disproportionate and unjust.
D.
Appellant also argues that the circumstances in the present case are not sufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty. In making this argument, appellant essentially reiterates some of the earlier arguments made, including that the death penalty is excessive in cases based on aiding and abetting, and that the circumstances did not reflect “utter disregard for human life.” We find that this argument, being basically a reiteration of defendant’s previous arguments does not merit consideration.
III.
Finally, we reach that point where we conduct our independent review of this case under I.C. § 19-2827. The purpose of our review is to examine the proceedings in the trial court to ensure that the sentence of death was imposed without resort to passion or prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of statutory aggravating circumstances; and that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate. I.C. § 19-2827.
In this case, all of the procedures mandated in potential death penalty cases, such as appellant’s attendance at the pronouncement of sentence, written findings of the trial judge on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, etc., were followed. The state gave appellant notice that it intended to ask for the death penalty and gave notice of its intent to rely on the aggravating circumstances in I.C. § 19 — 2515(f)(6), (8), and (10). Appellant was also allowed to submit a document, which was considered by the court, outlining what he felt were the mitigating circumstances that should be considered. An aggravation/mitigation hearing was held, evidence taken, and arguments heard. I.C. § 19-2515(d). The trial court then issued written findings indicating the mitigating factors considered and the aggravating factors found beyond a reasonable doubt.
In our independent review, we note that the trial court considered testimony given by Thomas Gibson during his separate trial for first degree murder of the same victim, Kimberly Palmer. This testimony was sworn testimony given in open court, although not in the trial of this particular cause. The trial court took judicial notice of the testimony because of its ruling that appellant had “agreed to consider*127ation of such testimony and to dispense with formal application of I.C. § 19-2516 ____” We find no error in the trial court’s ruling on this issue, considering the fact that the defendant did request that the trial court take notice of this testimony in mitigation of sentence, and the fact that the testimony itself was given under oath in an open courtroom. The testimony of Gibson, thus validly taken into consideration, further supported the notion that Kimberly Palmer was killed to cover up the murder of Scott Currier. Gibson testified that he aided in the murder of Palmer by knocking her to the ground at the Paradis house in an effort to prevent her from leaving the house after Currier’s murder, so that she could not inform the authorities of what she had witnessed.
The court, in its findings, found no mitigating circumstances, and it found one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that “there is nothing which outweighs the gravity of the aggravating circumstance.” This is not a case like State v. Osborn, supra, where the trial court failed to find any mitigating circumstances, but at the same time failed to set forth those mitigating circumstances which it considered. In this case, the trial court considered all of the possible mitigating circumstances urged by appellant, and also considered the possibility of the existence of six additional mitigating circumstances, but after consideration decided that none of the factors either suggested by appellant or considered by the court on its own constituted a mitigating circumstance. We find no error in the procedure followed by the trial court in making its findings.
We are also required under I.C. § 19-2827 to conduct a review of the sentence imposed, and the sentences imposed in similar cases, to assure that the sentence in this case was not excessive or disproportionate. We recently conducted an extensive review of Idaho murder cases and find that the sentence imposed in this case is not disproportionate to the sentence imposed in those cases where the death sentence was available as a form of punishment. We have also compared this case with our recent death penalty cases in State v. Creech, supra, and State v. Sivak, supra, and find that the sentence imposed in the present case is proportionate to the sentences imposed in those cases. In fact, the crime committed in the present case is the same type of crime as that committed in State v. Sivak, supra. In Sivak, the trial court found that one of the reasons the victim was killed was to prevent her from identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a robbery. In this case, the motive for the killing of Kimberly Palmer was identified by the trial court as a preventative measure, i.e., to prevent her from speaking to others about the circumstances surrounding the murder of Scott Currier. We find that the penalty imposed in this case is both proportionate and just.
The judgment of conviction and sentence imposed are affirmed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.

. Nor did the trial court err in giving this instruction at the beginning of the trial rather than at the end. The court reminded the jury at the beginning and end of trial that the instructions were to be considered as a whole, both those given at the beginning and those given at the end. He also indicated that all of the instructions were to be taken into the jury room in written form and considered there as a whole.

. There is a question whether collateral estoppel would even apply to a situation where the defendant is being prosecuted by two separate sovereigns. In the present case we are dealing with two separate offenses, one committed against one sovereign state, and another in a different sovereign state. Thus, collateral estoppel might not even apply here because the "same parties” requirement of collateral estoppel has not been met. However, for purposes of this discussion, we choose to show why, in the context of the facts presented here, collateral estoppel would not prevent a retrial of the defendant even if the same sovereign were prosecuting him.

. The court in King also considered the effect of the Fifth Circuit cases following Wingate. See Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.1975); Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiary Use of Prior Crimes of Which the Defendant has been Acquitted, 2 Fla. State Univ.L.Rev. 511 (1974). In Wingate and Blackburn, the two principal cases in the Fifth Circuit, the evidence of the prior crime was primarily being introduced to prove the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crimes, including those crimes of which he was acquitted. Thus, the King court noted that those cases were also factually distinguishable from their own case. The evidence in King was being introduced not to show guilt of the accused in the acquitted crime, but rather to impeach the defendant's testimony of alibi. Its primary purpose was not to establish the defendant’s guilt in the morning robbery.

. Since we have decided that appellant’s sentence was validly imposed because the trial court found these circumstances to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and the circumstances withstand constitutional scrutiny, it is unnecessary for us to consider the state’s argument that the sentence is also warranted under I.C. § 19-2515(f)(10), a circumstance that the trial court found existed, but ruled legally inapplicable to this case.

. In addition, note:
“19-2515. Inquiry into mitigating or aggravating circumstances — Sentence in capital cases— Statutory or aggravating circumstances — Judicial findings. — ...
*126"(f) The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed:
(7) The murder was one defined as murder of the first degree by section 18-4003, Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and it was accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death of a human being.” (Emphasis added.)
The felony murder rule is contained in I.C. § 18-4003(d); thus, it is included in the above aggravating circumstance.