Court Opinion

ID: 9884439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:57:18.183309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:45.883954
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Underwood, dissenting: A majority of the members of this court have concluded that the 21-day delay between defendants’ arrest and their appearance before a judicial officer, the admitted bleeding of defendant Holmes and the fact that the State did not call all of the witnesses to the confessions require a new hearing on the motion to suppress. With this conclusion I cannot agree. The opinion of the court dwells at some length upon the fact that defendants were not taken before a judicial officer for 21 days following their arrest. As stated in that opinion, the McNabb-Mallory rule of the Federal courts has not been followed in Illinois although prolonged detention is considered as a factor in evaluating the voluntariness of confessions. But it is clear to me that such detention in order to cause or contribute to a confession, must precede the confession. Here, defendants orally admitted the murder within an hour and a quarter of their arrest, repeated their confessions to an assistant State’s Attorney four hours later, signed written statements the following morning and voluntarily testified to the same effect at the coroner’s inquest that same morning even though previously advised they need say nothing and warned that anything they testified to could later be used against them. That they were not taken before a judicial officer until 20 days later, while concededly a violation of the statute requiring prompt presentment, could not have affected the voluntariness of the prior confessions, since any possible inference that appearance before a judicial officer was delayed in order to permit bruises or other evidence of mistreatment to disappear is completely eliminated by the fact that defendants were at the inquest the day following the confessions. The fact that the State did not call all of those who may be categorized as material witnesses poses the only question in the case which, to me, presents a serious problem, and it becomes so only because one of the defendants (Holmes) was admittedly spitting blood. The defendants both testified they were beaten in the abdomen and midsection, and Harper testified his head was banged against the wall and his face slapped. Both stated they complained of their mistreatment to the doctor at the county jail, and Holmes testified he told the lockup keeper at the nth and State station. Harper also testified he “went on sick call” as soon as he arrived at the county jail. The officers who testified denied any mistreatment and stated that Holmes explained the blood to them by saying he had a nervous stomach and a bad case of ulcers; Holmes in his testimony denied having ulcers and said that, while he often drank, he had no stomach trouble. Apparently no effort was made by the State to call the doctor who attended inmates at the county jail nor to produce such records, if any, as may have been kept regarding complaints of illness by such inmates. The State points out the fact that the assistant State’s Attorney testified he inquired of both defendants as to any complaints of mistreatment and that both said they had none. Holmes does not deny this, and Harper specifically admits saying he had been well treated but maintains he did so only because an officer was “giving him the eye”. The State urges that since it is admitted that no mention of ill-being or mistreatment was made to the assistant State’s Attorney or at the coroner’s inquest the following day, it is unrealistic to assume that the alleged mistreatment occurred or that the complaints testified to were actually made, and that, had they been, defendants would have had the doctor and any records in court. While there is some logic in this argument the answer, in my judgment, lies elsewhere. This trial occurred in 1964 subsequent to the effective date of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 38, par. 125 — 4). Section 114 — 11(d) specifically provides: “Objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession must be made in the trial court.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this sentence, as explained in the Committee Comments appended thereto (Smith-Hurd, Ill. Annot. Stat., chap. 38, par. 114 — 11) was to clarify “a problem of considerable uncertainty in the Illinois cases,” and it obviously was intended to permit subsequent complaint regarding a failure to call all material witnesses only if objection on this ground had been made in the trial court. The majority excuse defendants’ failure to object here on the ground that it would have been useless to do so because the trial judge had indicated he had heard enough. But this assumes that the judge would have arbitrarily overruled such objection and that the State would have acquiesced in such ruling. This seems 'most unlikely, since the State and the judge undoubtedly relied on the mandatory statutory requirement that defendant must state his objection for consideration by the court, and the absence thereof would indicate defendant was not concerned about additional witnesses. I do not believe the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was unwarranted, and it seems to me that this court’s refusal to enforce the clear command of the statute in this case restores to this area of the law the precise uncertainty which it was the intent of the statute to eliminate. The majority then proceeds to require a new trial in this case because of an erroneous instruction which told the jury that an attempted escape raised a presumption of guilt. I agree the instruction was improper and should not have been given, but the conclusion that a new trial must be granted is, I think, unwarranted. The evidence of an attempt to escape was clearly admissible and properly before the jury as the majority concedes. A new trial is required only if the faulty instruction can be said to have influenced the verdict. The defense presented no witnesses, and in this connection it is noteworthy that defendants were represented by separate appointed counsel, and had been given three different sets of attorneys largely because of their expressed dissatisfaction with the tactics and strategy of counsel. Their disagreement with trial counsel was no less. Illustrative of the situation is the fact that after the State rested defense counsel stated to the court that they had advised defendants it was advisable for them to testify, but defendants chose not to do so. Both defendants verified this, and stated they considered their counsel incompetent. Counsel then informed the court defendants had suggested the wallet found on Harper and identified as decedent’s actually belonged to Romeo Berni; that counsel had consulted Berni who said the wallet was not his. Defendant Holmes told the court he wanted his parole agent subpoenaed as his witness. Counsel stated to the court that he had conferred with the parole agent and that both defense counsel agreed the parole agent should not be called. The implications are obvious. It is particularly difficult in this case to believe that the verdict could have been other than guilty. Decedent’s body, with a fragmented .22 bullet in the brain, was found about 7:50 A.M. At 2:45 the same day defendants were arrested and searched. A .22 pistol and extra shells were found upon Holmes together with decedent’s watch and the keys to decedent’s car. The search of Harper produced a revolver and decedent’s wallet. Holmes showed the officers the car he had been driving — it was later identified as decedent’s. The defendants confessed after an unusually brief period of questioning, their statements indicating they killed decedent because he attempted to conceal some of his money during their robbery of him. The following morning they voluntarily testified at a corner’s inquest after being advised by that officer that they need not do so and that, if they did, their testimony might later be used against them. Their testimony was substantially the same as the confessions. The proof in this case is as conclusive of guilt as any coming before this court during my tenure, and I find no error of sufficient substance to require a new trial. I would affirm in both cases.