Court Opinion

ID: 9536442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:59:54.141691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:29.683947
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Judge (specially concurring). I concur in the result and concur in the majority’s discussion regarding the inadmissibility of the statement by Mr. Crislip accusing defendant of beating the child. Rather than basing reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel, however, I would reverse because of plain error. Perhaps as a practical matter every reversal predicated on plain error is a consequence of ineffective assistance of counsel. One could rely on either doctrine here. Nevertheless, ordinarily it is unwise to reverse a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel when, as in this case, there has been no adversary proceeding to explore what reasons there may have been for the action or inaction of defense counsel. Deciding nonfrivolous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without the record of such a hearing can be a quite inefficient process. Appellate courts can spend considerable time and effort attempting to determine why an attorney acted in a particular manner, when an adversary proceeding below could have resolved the question conclusively. Moreover, decisions made without a record of such a hearing are prone to error. Appellate courts must resort to speculation; they may hypothesize tactical reasons for conduct which in fact constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, or they may fail to consider a justification for conduct that might appear to constitute ineffective assistance. To avoid such inefficiency and error, when substantial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are raised on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, we should either remand for a hearing on the matter or require defendant to resort to post-conviction remedies under SCRA 1986, 5-802. The California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Bird, adopted essentially the same view in People v. Pope, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 590 P.2d 859, 867, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 740 (1979). She wrote: In some cases, ... the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged. In such circumstances, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, these cases are affirmed on appeal. Otherwise, appellate courts would become engaged “in the perilous process of second-guessing.” Reversals would be ordered unnecessarily in cases where there were, in fact, good reasons for the aspect of counsel’s representation under attack. Indeed, such reasons might lead a new defense counsel on retrial to do exactly what the original counsel did, making manifest the waste of judicial resources caused by reversal on an incomplete record. Where the record does not illuminate the basis for the challenged acts or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately made in a petition for habeas corpus. In habeas proceedings, there is an opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to have trial counsel fully describe his or her reasons for acting or failing to act in the manner complained of. For example, counsel may explain why certain defenses were or were not presented. Having afforded the trial attorney an opportunity to explain, courts are in a position to intelligently evaluate whether counsel’s acts or omissions were within the range of reasonable competence. [Citations and footnotes omitted.] Thus, I cannot join in the majority’s criticisms of those aspects of defense counsel’s performance which he has never been provided an opportunity to explain, and I am concerned about the precedent set in holding an ex parte hearing two weeks after trial at which trial counsel was asked to explain his representation of defendant without any prior notice of the specific conduct in question. Still, another doctrine — the plain-error rule — can be fairly invoked in this case and compels reversal. In general, a party cannot claim error predicated upon the admission of evidence unless the record shows a timely objection or motion to strike. SCRA 1986, 11-103(A)(1). The plain-error rule states, however, that “nothing in [Rule 11-103] precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the judge.” R. 11-103(D). As a result, evidentiary matters can be reviewed on appeal despite failure of trial counsel to bring them to the attention of the trial court. See State v. Wall, 94 N.M. 169, 608 P.2d 145 (1980); State v. Lara, 88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623 (Ct.App.1975); State v. Sanchez, 86 N.M. 713, 526 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1974); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 11103[07] (1989). Plain error can even be noticed by an appellate court on its own motion, see State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn.1984), although I would be very reluctant to decide the issue without full briefing of the parties. Defendant has not explicitly claimed plain error; but both parties have briefed and argued the admissibility of the evidence of Mr. Crislip’s statement and whether it caused prejudice to defendant. Therefore, there is no unfairness in deciding this case under the plain-error rule. Courts apply the rule to reverse convictions only when the evidentiary error is very damaging: “Plain error” has been characterized in various ways such as “grave errors which seriously affect substantial rights of the accused,” “errors that result, in a clear miscarriage of justice,” errors that “are obvious or * * * otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Campbell, 419 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir.1969). “It is settled law that the plain error rule should be applied with caution, and invoked only to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.1969). State v. Marquez, 87 N.M. 57, 61, 529 P.2d 283, 287 (Ct.App.1974). The error in admitting Mr. Crislip’s statement was such an error. At least five jurisdictions have ruled that admission of an accusation against a defendant by a non-testifying co-defendant can constitute plain error. United States v. Key, 725 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Longee, 603 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Morales, 477 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.1973); People v. Hopkins, 124 Ill.App.2d 415, 259 N.E.2d 577 (1970); State v. Ogle. Perhaps defense counsel’s failure to object would bar reversal if there had been a tactical reason not to object. But there could not have been such a reason in the circumstances presented here. Finally, it is worth noting that the trial court’s observations during the ex parte hearing conducted after trial support the conclusion that the error here deserves to be labelled plain error. First, the trial judge stated that he was surprised that Mr. Crislip’s statement came in without objection, because defense counsel had previously advised the court that he would be objecting to the statement. Defense counsel indicated that he did not believe that the statement in fact had come in. Something may have distracted counsel during the trial. In any case, the trial judge apparently thought that admissibility of the statement was plainly erroneous, but perhaps did not act on his own initiative because of surprise at defense counsel’s failure to act. Second, the trial judge referred to Mr. Crislip’s statement as “very damaging.” Thus, the trial judge apparently believed that the admission of the statement by Mr. Crislip was both plainly wrong and of critical importance.