Court Opinion

ID: 9472041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:47:39.060979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:09.819156
License: Public Domain

JAMESON, District Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The Fourth Amendment functions “to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). It is undisputed here that the initial strip search was not an unwarranted intrusion on de Hernandez’s privacy and dignity. The sole question is whether the subsequent detention, with the possibility that she would produce a monitored bowel movement, thereafter became an unwarranted or unreasonable intrusion on her privacy and dignity. This question requires us to strike a delicate balance. I would strike the balance in favor of the Government.
I recognize that a close question is presented, particularly under United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir.1983). In my opinion, however, Quintero-Castro and the other cases cited in the majority opinion may be distinguished.1 The opinion contains a fair summary of the facts. In addition, however, the following may be considered:
First, while the initial purpose of the detention was to “[have] a suspect produce a bowel movement,” in fact no such bodily function occurred. Instead, the customs agents merely observed and occasionally questioned Ms. de Hernandez for a period of 16 hours. From their observations, they gained further evidence that, in the magistrate’s view, gave a “clear indication” of alimentary canal smuggling. Consequently, the detention was minimally intrusive, and though de Hernandez may have suffered “many hours of humiliating discomfort”, she was herself solely responsible for a considerable part of it.
Even if de Hernandez had performed her peristaltic functions under the observation of a customs official, I would hold that the detention did not thereby become significantly more intrusive than a strip search. Certainly, performing such bodily functions while under observation imposes on an individual’s dignity, but such an imposition does not differ dramatically from a strip search.2 In both cases the “search” con*1374sists of passive visual inspection of the body’s surface and, in this case, of its waste products. On the other hand, we distinguish body cavity and X-ray searches precisely because they intrude “beyond the body's surface.” United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.1980). We have noted that body cavity searches are sometimes painful and always invade “the most intimate portions of [the suspect’s] anatomy,” United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir.1976). Additionally, X-rays pose the potential for physical harm to the suspect. See United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.1982). The detention in this case did not contemplate an invasion beyond the body’s surface nor did it require the same degree of humiliation attendant on such an invasion.
Second, this court recently recognized “that smuggling by ingestion into the alimentary canal does not leave the external signs that body cavity (e.g., rectum or vagina) smuggling does.” United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1983) (Citation omitted). As a result, many of our prior decisions are simply not analogous to the present facts, particularly cases where we relied on the suspect’s unnaturally stiff and erect gait, restricted body movements and possession of lubricants to demonstrate a clear indication of body cavity smuggling. See, e.g., United States v. Shreve, 697 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911.
It is clear that narcotics smugglers have become increasingly adept at concealing contraband. Consequently, the indicia used by customs officials to identify smugglers have in some cases become more general and circumstantial. Alimentary canal smugglers, for example, prepare their bodies by first taking laxatives to clear their digestive tracts; they then swallow their valuable cargo of narcotics often in capsules or “balloons”; finally they take certain drugs to inhibit digestion and prevent diarrhea during their usually brief flight to the United States. Once they reach their destination, they take another laxative to retrieve the narcotics. See United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir.1982). Beyond the usual “profile” of the narcotics smuggler, therefore, there are only a few consistently apparent and reliable indications that a person is smuggling narcotics in his alimentary canal. The two most common indications are the consistent refusal to eat or drink and the suspect’s often Herculean efforts to stifle his natural peristaltic functions.
It must be stressed that the foregoing indications of alimentary canal smuggling can only be observed over a period of time. Allowing a reasonable period of detention, based on a real suspicion, is the least intrusive and most reliable means of identifying alimentary canal smugglers.3
Third, it is well settled that we do not review evidence supporting a “real suspicion” or a “clear indication” of smuggling in light of our own experiences or those of a reasonable man:
On the contrary, the question is whether an experienced customs officer ... after assessing the totality of the evidentiary factors and circumstances in the light of his own training and experience, would conclude that there was a clear indication that the defendant was engaged in internal body smuggling.
United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at 1302-03 (Citation omitted). It is undisputed in this case that the facts initially known by the customs officials justified a “real suspicion” that de Hernandez was carrying narcotics. The first strip search was valid in light of their real suspicion. Similarly, in determining whether the subsequent detention was valid, we must give *1375due weight to the good faith, experienced assessment of the customs officials.
I would permit reasonable detentions at the border for the purpose of observing persons suspected of alimentary canal smuggling so long as the detention is based on a real suspicion sufficient to justify a strip search. In United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 603-04 (9th Cir.1982), we held that an extended detention is valid if it is reasonably related to a valid search. We also pointed to the well established rule that “[government agents are given considerably more leeway at the border.” Id. at 602. Since the strip search was valid in this case and given the elusive nature of the smuggling suspected here, I think the detention was reasonably related to the initial search. See also United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d at 382; United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir.1980). Although the detention was perhaps longer than absolutely necessary, I do not think it was unreasonable. The additional evidence obtained during the observation period demonstrated a clear indication of alimentary canal smuggling.
To deny the validity of reasonable detentions would reward the increasing ingenuity of narcotics smugglers and seriously hamstring the good faith efforts of customs officials to stem the flow of illegal narcotics across our borders. Eighteen years ago, this court declared that its review of border searches must “be governed by the practical knowledge of the extent to which smugglers are willing to degrade their bodies in order to obtain the drugs they crave or the money they desire.” Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir.1966). Nor can we ignore the generally improved treatment of smuggling suspects at the border,4 the regularity with which customs officials now seek court orders and warrants, and the ready availability of relatively unintrusive X-ray procedures as an alternative to body cavity searches. These are all factors which must be considered “in striking the delicate balance between human rights and the practical necessities of border security.” I would strike the balance here in favor of the Government.
I would affirm.

. Quintero-Castro involved an X-ray rather than detention, and we expressly recognized that "X-ray and body cavity searches are the most intrusive", requiring a "‘clear indication’ or ‘plain suggestion’ that the person is carrying contraband within his body.” A "real suspicion” is sufficient for a strip search. 705 F.2d at 1100.

. A valid strip search may involve “a visual search of the anal region.” United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 273 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945, 93 S.Ct. 1399, 35 L.Ed.2d 612. We have also upheld a strip search in which the female suspect was asked "to turn around and bend over." United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235, 1236-37 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 1615, 31 L.Ed.2d 821, cf. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.1967) (suspect made to "manually open her vagina for visual inspection” constituted body cavity search).

. As a practical matter, of course, a detention would not be necessary if customs officials could seek a court order for an X-ray on the basis of a "real suspicion". In United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.1982), however, we adopted the higher "clear indication" standard for X-ray searches. As the court recently observed, the wisdom of this decision may be questioned, but it is the law of the circuit. United States v. Shreve, 697 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1983).

. Cf. United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 256-57 (9th Cir.1976); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.1966); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. 672, 2 L.Ed.2d 586.