Court Opinion

ID: 9663053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:52.529953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.276300
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, but write separately from Judge Robertson, to express a partially different rationale. The contractual release of liability, as Judge Robertson so convincingly explains, is simply not ambiguous. It is comprehensive and all-inclusive. I suspect that similar provisions in the cases cited by the majority were deemed to be ambiguous in order to avoid harsh results.
Whether the contract is ambiguous, however, should not be the end of the inquiry, at least in the context of consumer sales contracts such as the one involved here. In my view, a release of liability for one’s own negligence is so abhorrent to public policy that it should be disallowed unless it is not only clear, but also prominent and conspicuous. In fact, several jurisdictions have taken the extreme step of disallowing these release provisions altogether. See e.g., Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 187 Wis.2d 596, 523 N.W.2d 429 (1994); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648 (N.D.1983); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 21 Conn.Sup. 38, 143 A.2d 466 (1958); Walker v. Self Serv. Storage & Miniwarehouses, Inc., 492 So.2d 210 (La.App.1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986) (by legislation). I would be tempted to follow the lead were it not for my deference to the notion of freedom of contract and *340my recognition of the possibility that the rewards of the contract might somehow exceed the risk of injury at the hands of the party to whom the release was given.
Although the majority states as I do that a release must be both clear and conspicuous, its holding depends solely on the conclusion that the language was ambiguous. To the contrary, the defect in the release was not that it was ambiguous, but rather that it was not conspicuous. The clarity of the words used hardly matters if the words go unnoticed.
The contract was lengthy, containing sixteen single-spaced paragraphs couched in print half the size of that used in the typical telephone directory. Furthermore, the release was not denominated as such, nor was it highlighted or set off from the other provisions. It was noticeable only by a close and thorough reading of the entire document, a rather daunting task for the simple privilege of joining a health club. When presented with a contract like this, even the most sophisticated of us are more properly counted among the hapless or unwary. With spectacles, see Exhibit A, a copy of the contract, attached hereto.
Had plaintiff merely signed the contract, I might have held it unenforceable, excusing him for the assumption that the contract would not contain such an extreme and unreasonable provision. Alas, plaintiff went to the trouble of a close and thorough reading, came across the release in question, and somehow determined that the words meant something different than what they stated. Despite the fact that the provision was not conspicuous, the plaintiff read it anyway. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot claim to be misled.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of defendant.
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