Court Opinion

ID: 9498669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:24:35.46635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:59.727295
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority today holds that the term “navigable waters,” as used in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., includes any nonnavigable waters that are “hydrologieally connected” to a navigable-in-fact water. This interpretation— which will vastly expand the federal government’s power to regulate private landowners such as the defendants in this case — goes well beyond the intention of Congress in enacting the CWA and expands the government’s powers beyond those authorized by the United States Constitution. Further, the government’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands conflicts with its own regulations. I therefore dissent.
I.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the government may assert jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters. Noting that Congress had defined “navigable waters” in the CWA as “waters of the United States,” the Court stated that “Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly” and “the term ‘navigable’ as used in the Act is of limited import.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133, 106 S.Ct. 455. It is thus settled that wetlands actually abutting a navigable-in-fact water are “waters of the United States” over which the government may assert jurisdiction.
However, Riverside Bayview — which did not address wetlands adjacent to a series of nonnavigable waters that eventually make their way into navigable-in-fact waters — must be read in light of the Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (“SWANCC”). While SWANCC — which involved “an abandoned sand and gravel pit” that had no hydrological connection to a navigable-in-fact water, id. at 162, 121 S.Ct. 675 — is not dispositive of the present case, the Court’s discussion in SWANCC is important.
The SWANCC Court stated that its holding in Riverside Bayview was based in large part on “the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ ” and the Court’s finding that Congress had “indicated its intent to regulate wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States.’ ” Id. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675 (quoting Riverside Bayview, *185474 U.S. at 134, 106 S.Ct. 455). The Court also noted that the CWA was enacted under Congress’s “traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.” Id. at 172, 106 S.Ct. 455. Perhaps most importantly, the Court stated that, while the term “navigable” is of limited import, “it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.” Id.
Unfortunately, the majority’s decision today does just that. Under the “any hydrological connection” test, any water that is hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact water is by definition “inseparably bound up with” waters of the United States and thus under the government’s control. This is the case regardless of how many nonnavigable waters separate the wetland from navigable-in-fact waters, or the distance between the wetland and navigable-in-fact waters. Under the majority’s test, a wetland that is separated from a navigable-in-fact water by hundreds of miles would fall under the government’s jurisdiction as long as it is hydrologically connected.
Further, although the majority is careful to state that “[njothing in the terms of the CWA or the regulation at issue here interpreting the CWA could be construed as extending jurisdiction to a body of ground water,” there is nothing in the “any hydrological connection” test that would theoretically prevent the EPA from asserting jurisdiction over ground water that is hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact water. In other words, the only reason the majority gives for its statement that the CWA does not cover ground water is that the CWA does not cover ground water. Aside from this tautology, there is nothing in the “any hydrological connection” test that would prevent the government from asserting jurisdiction over ground waters.24 Further, given the majority’s repeated emphasis on the broad purposes of the CWA, it would seem odd not to include in the government’s jurisdiction ground waters hydrologically connected to navigable-in-fact waters. After all, if the reason the majority is adopting the “any hydrological connection” test is that water moves in “hydrologic cycles” such that any waters hydrologically connected to navigable-in-fact waters are by definition inseparably bound up with those navigable-in-fact waters, then why should the fact that connections occur below, as opposed to above, the ground matter?
The obvious explanation for the majority’s insistence that the “any hydrological connection” test does not include ground waters is that the inclusion of ground waters would raise even more serious constitutional problems than the inclusion of surface waters does. But even assuming that the “any hydrological connection” test covers only surface waters, it still raises serious constitutional questions, and we therefore should construe the CWA “to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 675 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that the CWA does not “permit the federal government to impose regulations over ‘tributaries’ that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters”).
As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has articulated three categories of activities Congress may regulate under the *186Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). In SWANCC, the Court was dealing with an argument by the government that the “Migratory Bird Rule” fell “within Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.” 531 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 675. The Court found that such “substantial effects” justifications for the CWA raised serious constitutional issues and decided that, in the absence of a clear statement from Congress, it would construe the CWA to avoid such questions.
The majority, in order to avoid this problem, attempts to characterize the assertion of jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers over the “channels of commerce.” According to the majority, since Congress may validly regulate “channels of commerce” — which would include navigable-in-fact waters — it may validly regulate the Johnsons’ wetlands in order to protect the channel of commerce involved here. In making this point, the majority analogizes to Congress’s power to regulate interstate highways. However, Johnsons’ wetlands are not analogous to interstate highways. What would be analogous to a highway is the navigable-in-fact Weweantic River. The Johnsons’ wetlands are more akin to a dirt footpath on private property that connects to a private dirt road that connects to a small local road that connects to a state highway. I seriously doubt whether Congress could validly regulate such a dirt footpath under a “channels of commerce” rationale; in the same manner, Congress cannot regulate the Johnsons’ wetlands under a “channels of commerce” rationale.
The fact is that the wetlands at issue here are not channels of commerce. What the majority is concerned about are the aggregate affects that pollution of distant wetlands may have on navigable-in-fact waters. This falls under the third category of what Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit appears to have recently recognized as much, even though it reached a result with which I disagree. In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir.2005), the defendant had filled a 5.8 acre tract containing some wetlands that were hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact water. The court reasoned that, although the filling of the wetlands would probably not have a measurable effect on the navigable-in-fact water, “[the sum of many small interferences with commerce can be large, and so to protect commerce Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the class affects commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible effect.]” Id. at 806. In sum, although the majority attempts to characterize the regulation of these wetlands as part of Congress’ power to regulate channels of commerce, this type of regulation more properly falls under the substantial effects category articulated in Lopez. Just as in SWANCC, evaluating whether the activities here have a substantial effect on interstate commerce would raise serious constitutional questions. Because Congress has not provided a clear statement indicating that it intended the CWA to reach wetlands like the ones at issue here, the EPA’s interpretation should not be accorded deference. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d at 346 n. 8.
In concluding this section, I wish to emphasize that I understand Congress’s *187broad purpose in enacting the CWA, as well as the importance of wetlands to the quality of our nation’s waters. However, there are other interests that must be considered when dealing with these issues, including the livelihood of people in the Johnsons’ position and the federal-state framework involved in water conservation. Congress has recognized that the States have “the primary responsibilities and rights ... to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and to “to plan the development and use of ... water resources.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Today’s decision goes too far in recognizing the former interests at the expense of the latter. The federal government simply may not constitutionally regulate wetlands “that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters.” In re Needham, 354 F.3d at 345.25
II.
Even if I were inclined to agree with the majority’s conclusions under the “any hydrological connection” test, I would still dissent because the government’s attempt to assert jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands is inconsistent with its own regulations. Courts will not give an agency’s interpretation of its regulations deference when that interpretation is inconsistent with the regulations. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994). The applicable regulations state that “waters of the United States” include “[wjetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (s)(l) through (6) of this section.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7) (emphasis added). The government asserts jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands by claiming that they are adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of the Weweantic River. See id. § 230.3(s)(5) and (7). The government’s theory — with which the majority agrees' — is that “tributaries” as defined in Section 230.3(s)(5) means “tributary system.”26 However, it is undisputed that, for all of the wetlands at issue here, the “tributary system” to which they are adjacent includes other wetlands. The government is thus attempting to assert jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to other waters that are themselves wetlands, in contravention of its own regulations. We therefore should not accord deference to the government’s interpretation and should find that the government does not have jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands.
The majority’s attempt to circumvent this problem is unpersuasive. The majority states that
a wetland remains a “water of the United States” so long as it is also adjacent to a body of water that is a “water of the United States” that is not a wetland. Here, each target site *188is immediately adjacent to at least one (s)(5) tributary; and every wetland found in the chain of waters connecting the target sites to the Wewe-antic River is also adjacent to at least one (s)(5) tributary.
(emphasis added). However, it does not matter where in the chain of connections the other wetlands occur or what the John-sons’ wetlands are “immediately adjacent” to. Under the government’s theory, the Johnsons’ wetlands are adjacent to the entire “tributary system” between the wetlands and the Weweantic River because of the hydrological connection that exists. This tributary system includes other wetlands. Section 230.3(s)(7) plainly states that wetlands adjacent to waters that are themselves wetlands are not covered by the regulations. It says nothing about “immediate adjacency,” nor does it matter whether these other wetlands would themselves be considered “waters of the United States.”
In short, the majority cannot have it both ways. Either “tributaries” means only waters that flow directly into a navigable-in-fact water, in which ease the government could not assert jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands, or “tributaries” means “tributary system,” in which case the government cannot assert jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ wetlands because the tributary system they are adjacent to includes other wetlands. Because the government’s assertion of jurisdiction contradicts its own regulations, we should find in favor of the Johnsons.
III.
The majority’s opinion today greatly increases the power of the federal government to regulate the use of waters on private property. It allows the government to go far beyond what Congress intended in enacting the CWA and also raises serious constitutional issues regarding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Further, the majority ignores the fact that the government’s assertion of jurisdiction is inconsistent with its own regulations. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. In fact, several federal courts have already found that the CWA does include ground water that is hydrologically connected to a navigable-in-fact water. See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1179-80 (D.Idaho 2001) (collecting cases).

. Although. In re Needham was dealing with tributaries as opposed to wetlands, the principle for which it stands applies with full force to the Johnsons' wetlands.

. In its opinion, the majority acknowledge a dispute between the parties as to the definition of "tributaries.” The majority states that
the focus of the interpretive dispute is whether the term 'tributaries' ... refers only to nonnavigable waters that empty directly into a navigable-in-fact water; or does 'tributaries' include the waters that the target sites are adjacent to, and the bodies of open water that form part of the chain linking the target sites to the Weweantic River [i.e., the entire "tributary system” of the Weweantic River].
The majority chooses the latter definition, as it must, because under the former definition, the government could not assert jurisdiction over the Johnsons' wetlands since the streams to which they are immediately adjacent do not empty directly into the Weweantic River.