Court Opinion

ID: 9375310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 16:00:28.968004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:57.400037
License: Public Domain

21-3142-cv
    Ford v. Pension Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry Pension Trust Fund Plan, Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry

                                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                         FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                                       SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                  At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 27th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                ROBERT D. SACK,
                ALISON J. NATHAN,
                      Circuit Judges.
                GARY R. BROWN,
                      District Judge. ∗
    _____________________________________

    Bernard Ford,

                                          Plaintiff-Appellant,

                             v.                                                                                                      21-3142

    Pension Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of
    the Electrical Industry Pension Trust Fund
    Plan and Joint Industry Board of the
    Electrical Industry,

                      Defendants-Appellees.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                                                     STEWART LEE KARLIN, Stewart Lee Karlin
                                                                                                 Law Group, PC, New York, NY

    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                                                    PETER D. DECHIARA, Cohen, Weiss and
                                                                                                 Simon LLP, New York, NY

    ∗
     Judge Gary R. Brown, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by
    designation.
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York (Glasser, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

       Plaintiff-Appellant Bernard Ford worked in the electricity industry for 26 years and

participated in the Pension Trust Fund of the Pension, Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the

Electrical Industry (the “Plan”). The Plan is administrated by the Joint Industry Board of the

Electrical Industry (the “Joint Board”). In September 2002, Ford inquired with the Plan and the

Joint Board (collectively, “Defendants”) about his eligibility for a disability pension. However,

he continued to work intermittently for several employers in the electricity industry from

September 2004 through August 2006.

       Ford applied for a disability pension in 2009, and the Plan’s Pension Committee awarded

him benefits as of October 1, 2006. Three days after he was awarded his pension, Ford wrote to

the Defendants, asking why it was effective “10/1/2006 and not 12/1/2002 when [he] had first

applied?” Joint App’x at 134. After Ford hired an attorney who again inquired about the

pension’s effective date, the Joint Board informed Ford that “a pension cannot be granted with an

effective date of 2002” because he worked through 2006. Ford then appealed to the Plan’s

Board of Trustees, who affirmed the Joint Board on the ground that Ford was “actively engaged

in covered employment and/or was available for employment from 2003 through 2006 and

earned pension credits for that time period.” Joint App’x at 144.

       Ford subsequently filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

New York, and claimed entitlement to relief under the Employment Retirement Income Security

Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. He alleged that the Joint Board’s decision denying

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him pension benefits back to 2003 was arbitrary and capricious. After a brief period of

discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In a decision dated December 3,

2021, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion and denied Ford’s motion. Ford appeals

the district court’s ruling dismissing his claim.

       “In an ERISA action, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on

the administrative record de novo and apply the same legal standard as the district court.”

Hobson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2009). Where, as here, the

pension plan “grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility [for]

benefits . . . a court may not overturn the administrator’s denial of benefits unless its actions are

found to be arbitrary and capricious, meaning without reason, unsupported by substantial

evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126,

132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       We conclude that the administrator’s denial of benefits from December 2002 through

October 2006 was not arbitrary or capricious. Section 3.05(a) of the Plan states that a plan

participant must be “permanently incapacitated or disabled to such an extent that he can no

longer secure gainful employment in the electrical industry, or any other line of business” to be

eligible for disability benefits. Joint App’x at 54 (emphasis added). Ford argues that he was

unable to secure gainful employment because his disability prevented him from keeping a job

“for any significant period.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. However, he does not point to any Plan

language or past practice that supports this interpretation of Section 3.05(a). Additionally,

because the Plan does not define what it means to “secure gainful employment,” the Committee

had the discretionary authority to interpret this term. See Joint App’x at 76 (Plan Section 6.05

stating “[t]he Trustees shall have full discretionary authority . . . to construe the Plan’s terms and

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provisions”); accord Hobson, 574 F.3d at 79, 82–83.

       Ford admits he was employed by companies in the electrical industry from September

2004 through April 2005, October 2005 through January 2006, and for a period in July and

August 2006. Joint App’x at 31–32, 121–24, 151–52. His application for disability benefits also

listed his “last date of employment” as August 18, 2006. Id. at 130; see also id. at 72 (Plan

Section 5.15(a) stating that “a pension shall first be payable on the first of the month following

termination of employment or receipt of application, whichever is later, unless the Committee

finds that failure to make timely application was due to extenuating circumstances” (emphasis

added)). Based on this record, the Defendants’ determination that Ford was engaged in gainful

employment until 2006 was neither “without reason” nor “unsupported by substantial evidence.”

McCauley, 551 F.3d at 132 (citation omitted).

       Ford also argues that because the “plan administrator both evaluates and pays benefits

claims,” the administrator has a conflict of interest, and accordingly, “a heightened standard of

review should apply.” Appellant’s Br. at 9–10. We agree that if “a plan administrator both

evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims,” there is a “conflict of interest[.]” Metro.

Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). However,

this does not “impl[y] a change in the standard of review.” Id. at 115 (emphasis in original).

Instead, the presence of a conflict is “weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an

abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord McCauley, 52

F.3d at 128, 132–33. Additionally, we have not “assign[ed] any weight to a conflict of interest in

the absence of any evidence that the conflict actually affected the administrator’s decision.”

Roganti v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 786 F.3d 201, 218 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “Evidence that a conflict affected a decision may be categorical (such as a

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history of biased claims administration) or case specific (such as an administrator’s deceptive or

unreasonable conduct) . . . .” Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 140

(2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       Ford notes that the Plan administrator failed to take affirmative steps to reduce the risk of

bias in its decision-making, but he has not provided any categorical or case-specific evidence

that the administrator’s conflict of interest actually affected its decision with regard to his

disability pension. We therefore agree with the district court that the administrator’s conflict of

interest “need not be weighed as a factor in the analysis of their determinations concerning

[Ford].” Joint App’x at 10.

       We have considered all of Ford’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                               FOR THE COURT:
                                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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