Court Opinion

ID: 9943429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:04:55.577062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.018946
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2914
                 LT Case No. 2023-CT-000253-A
                 _____________________________

JESSICA SHAE STRICKLAND,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Lake County.
Emily Curlington, Judge.

William J McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marissa V.
Giles, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

                        February 23, 2024

                     ON MOTION TO DISMISS

MAKAR, J.

     Jessica Shae Strickland’s driving record is less than stellar,
resulting in the suspension of her driver’s license, jail time for
driving while her license was suspended, and—pertinent to this
case—her designation as a habitual traffic offender (HTO), which

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requires three or more convictions for specified offenses within a
five-year period. See § 322.264, Fla. Stat. (2023). A mechanism
exists for the removal of the HTO designation, which Strickland
invoked by pleading nolo contendere to the underlying charge in
this case arising in Lake County, Florida (driving while license
suspended) and attempting to prove compliance with statutory
criteria. See id. § 322.27(5)(b) (If a person whose license is revoked
“as a result of a third violation of driving a motor vehicle while his
or her license is suspended or revoked provides proof of compliance
for an offense listed in s. 318.14(10)(a) 1.-5., the clerk of court shall
submit an amended disposition to remove the habitual traffic
offender designation.”).

     After the entry of final judgment against her, Strickland filed
a motion requesting that the trial court—here, the county court for
Lake County—enter an order directing that the clerk of court
remove the HTO designation and forward the amended disposition
to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
for removal of the designation as to Strickland. The trial court,
however, ruled that Strickland must first comply with the
procedural requirements of section 318.14(10)(b), Florida Statutes,
which requires that a person cited for an applicable offense seeking
a withholding of adjudication “shall present proof of compliance
before the scheduled court appearance date.” Strickland contended
that this requirement would have applied to her plea hearing if she
had sought a withhold of adjudication (which she did not seek) but
is inapplicable to a proceeding seeking the removal of an HTO
designation under section 322.27(5)(b). The trial court disagreed
and entered an order denying relief. Strickland filed a timely
notice of appeal from that order.

     In this Court, the State now moves to dismiss this case for lack
of jurisdiction. It asserts that the trial court’s order is not
appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140 which
regards “Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases.” The State points
out that Strickland is not appealing her judgment or sentence,
both of which would be appealable under the rule. See Fla. R. App.
P. 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F). The State also argues that section
322.27(5)(b), the HTO removal provision, is an “administrative”
statute that is solely administered by the clerk of court and makes
no mention of judicial authority to “impose or order an amended
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disposition of the habitual traffic offender status.” As such, the
relief that Strickland seeks under section 322.27(5) is “solely
administrative and within the purview of the clerk of court, not the
trial court.”

     Strickland counters that rule 9.140(b)(1)(D) allows for her
appeal because it explicitly says a criminal defendant may appeal
“orders entered after final judgment or finding of guilt, including
orders revoking or modifying probation or community control, or
both, or orders denying relief” under specified rules of criminal
procedure not applicable here. (Emphasis added). Strickland first
points out that the order at issue was “entered after final
judgment” or a “finding of guilt” and thereby falls within the rule’s
textual language. She then notes that the word “including” is
commonly understood to mean that the various orders listed
thereafter are neither an exclusive nor exhaustive list. See, e.g.,
White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226
So. 3d 774, 781 (Fla. 2017) (The “conventional rule in Florida [is]
that the Legislature uses the word ‘including’ in a statute as a
word of expansion, not one of limitation.”). Thus, if an order is
entered after final judgment or a finding of guilt in the same
criminal case, the rule applies, and the order is appealable, even if
the order is not one listed after the word “including.”

     We agree that the textual phrase “orders entered after final
judgment or finding of guilt” in rule 9.140(b)(1)(D) includes the
type of post-judgment order at issue in this case. An order denying
relief to a movant/defendant in a criminal proceeding seeking to
remove an HTO designation imposed after a final judgment and
finding of guilt have been entered is precisely what the rule
envisions. The text is clear. Moreover, as Strickland urges, the
decision in McFadden v. State, 177 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2015), is
persuasive on this point. In that case, the criminal defendant,
McFadden, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
reduce or suspend his sentence under Florida’s “substantial
assistance” statute. § 921.186, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The judge
hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if the
judge finds that the defendant rendered such substantial
assistance.”). Our supreme court concluded that “an order denying
a motion filed under section 921.186 is an appealable final order
pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D).”

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McFadden, 177 So. 3d at 566. Likewise, in the context presented—
i.e., the removal of an HTO designation arising from the third
offense that triggered the HTO statute—we conclude that
Strickland’s motion is one that was “entered after final judgment”
or a “finding of guilt,” and was directly related to the underlying
proceedings. As such, jurisdiction is established.

     The view that the procedure in section 322.27(5)(b) is solely
administrative and exempt from judicial review is not persuasive.
The statute merely says that a clerk of court “shall submit an
amended disposition to remove the habitual traffic offender
designation” if proof of compliance is provided; the statute is silent,
however, as to who makes the determination of the adequacy of a
submission. In this regard, it is “well-established that the clerk of
courts is a ministerial officer of the court and, as such, is not
endowed with any discretion.” Coral Gables Imps., Inc. v. Suarez,
306 So. 3d 348, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Further, a clerk “lacks
‘authority to judicially determine the legal significance of a
document tendered for filing.’” Id. (citations omitted). Based upon
these principles, we agree with Strickland that a trial court, rather
than a clerk of court, “has the authority to determine the legal
significance of a document tendered and to direct the clerk of court
to act accordingly.”

     In conclusion, the denial of Strickland’s motion for an order
directing that the clerk of court remove the HTO designation is an
appealable order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(b)(1)(D). As such, this appeal shall proceed accordingly.

    The State’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

WALLIS and PRATT, JJ., concur.

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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________

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