Court Opinion

ID: 9307853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:18:35.633613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:59.939688
License: Public Domain

DALLAS, Circuit Judge.
Upon the trial of this case the presentation of evidence was not ‘concluded until about the hour of adjournment on the last day of the week assigned for jury trials; and, as there was no other case for trial, counsel, to relieve the jury from returning on the following Monday, waived discussion; but at the same time they submitted points for charge, to the number of five on behalf of the plaintiff, and ten on behalf of the defendant, which, together, covered six typewritten pages of foolscap paper. It was, under the circumstances, of course, not possible to answer the points with particularity, but I said:
“I will ask the stenographer to note that certain points have been presented on either side, which it has been impracticable for the court to separately consider in the haste of trial, and which, except as affirmed or denied in the general charge, may be marked as declined.”
To this action with respect to defendant’s points, his counsel asked and was allowed an exception; but inasmuch as, in my opinion, the law upon every matter material to the issue was correctly stated in the general charge, the omission to answer defendant’s points categorically cannot be said to have occasioned him any injury. In the brief now presented, his learned counsel states that the questions involved (apart from that relating to the damages) are:
“(1) Was the contract under which the plaintiff claimed a contract of "bailment, or was it a sale of property, with a reservation of title as security for the purchase money? (2) Even though it were a bailment, and therefore valid as between the. original parties, under the law of Pennsylvania is not the plaintiff estopped from asserting his title as against the mortgagee, or other purchaser for value without notice?”
The charge adequately, though hastily, dealt with the law applicable to both of these questions, and to the entire case. Therefore, I repeat, the declination of the court to answer the several points specifically was not error. Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161; Railroad Co. v. Friel, 23 C. C. A. 679, 77 Fed. 1007. The contract in question I held to be one of bailment, and instructed the jury accordingly. There was no evidence whatever to warrant a doubt as to its having been so intended, and that such was the effect of its terms, under the law, I believed was established by the authorities. The charge to the jury, therefore, was absolute and binding, that, except by way of bailment, no title to the refrigerating apparatus, which was the subject of contract, passed by virtue of its provisions, and of the delivery made in pursuance thereof. There was some testimony which, it was claimed, tended to show that the machine had been actually sold and delivered prior to the making of this contract; and, with reference to that evidence, the jury were told, in sub*585stance, that ii there had in fact been a previous absolute sale, and the written agreement was subsequently made for the purpose of giving a false color to the transaction, the writing would be fraudulent, and could not avail the plaintiff. The question of fact was distinctly left to the jury, though with the statement, emphatically made by the court, that in its opinion the evidence for plaintiff was entitled to the greaier weight. I still think that this opinion was amply warranted, and have no doubt that it was rightfully and competently expressed. Car Co. v. Harkins, 17 U. S. App. 22, 5 C. C. A. 326, 55 Fed. 932.
That the intent of the parties to the agreement was that the refrigerating plant should not be or become a part of the realty, plainly appears upon the face of the instrument itself. There was no testimony to the contrary, and, indeed, this fact was, at least tacitly, conceded. But it was and is insisted that the machinery was so annexed to the freehold as to make it, regardless of intent, a part thereof. I cannot, however, assent to this proposition, either as one of fact or of law. As matter of fact, it was conclusively shown tha t the machinery was not permanently attached, but in such manner only as was necessary to retain it in place, and by such means as admitted of its removal without substantial injury cither to it or to the building. As matter of law, I remain of the opinion which I expressed upon the trial, that upon this subject the controlling consideration in -this case is the intent of the parties, and not the character of the annexation.
The defendant having moved for a new trial, that motion has been ably argued at bar, and there have been submitted very thorough briefs upon both sides. These, and the authorities to which they refer, have been carefully examined; but I am not convinced that the view I took of the case upon the trial was incorrect, or that it was insufficiently presented to the jury.
The damages assessed are somewhat larger in amount than the court, if that matter had been for its determination, would have awarded; but there was substantial evidence to support the assessment made, and I do not think I would be justified in holding it to to be unreasonable, especially in view of the fact that I pointedly cautioned the jury against rendering an excessive verdict. It must be assumed that they regarded this caution, and rightly judged the evidence. It is proper to add, in this connection, that what was said in the charge as to the plaintiff being entitled to interest was said in pursuance of a suggestion of counsel for plaintiff which was acquiesced in by counsel for defendant, and not as accurately expressing the court’s understanding of the law. It was not excepted to, and is not now complained of. The defendant’s rule for a new trial is discharged.