Court Opinion

ID: 9898886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:05:15.640365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:42.436976
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                             MARK P. STOPA,

                         Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                     v.

          PETER R. McGRATH and PETER R. McGRATH, P.A.,

                                Appellees,

                                    and

                            KEVIN C. CANNON,

                         Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                              No. 2D22-4162

                            November 15, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Patricia A. Muscarella, Judge.

Mark P. Stopa, pro se.

Peter R. McGrath, pro se, and for Appellee Peter R. McGrath, P.A., and
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Kevin C. Cannon.

MORRIS, Judge.
     Mark Stopa appeals a portion of the trial court's order in his action
to reestablish a private paper and for damages for civil theft, breach of
contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and punitive damages as against
appellee Kevin C. Cannon, as well as damages for civil theft, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and punitive damages as against appellees Peter R.
McGrath (McGrath) and Peter R. McGrath, P.A. (McGrath P.A.). The
basis for the claims arose out of a real estate investment venture between
Cannon and Stopa. The portion of the order that he appeals transferred
venue of the action from the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas
County, Florida, to the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County,
Florida.
     Cannon cross-appeals the portion of the trial court's order deeming
service of process to be waived as to Cannon due to Cannon's failure to
challenge the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him prior
to him sending a letter to two circuit court judges below. The trial court
determined that because the letter contained a general denial of
allegations made in Stopa's complaint, it should be treated as a waiver of
service of process.
     Because the trial court sua sponte transferred venue of the action
based on forum non conveniens pursuant to section 47.122, Florida
Statutes (2020), without first providing the parties with notice and an
opportunity to be heard, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order
as explained herein. We affirm the portion of the trial court's order
determining service of process to be waived as to Cannon without further
comment.
                                  FACTS
     Only a brief recitation of relevant facts is necessary to this appeal.
Stopa and Cannon had a business relationship. Stopa alleged in his
complaint that (1) he gave money to Cannon to assist him in the
purchase of a parcel of property in Pinellas County; (2) the parties'
relationship became strained sometime thereafter, and Stopa asked for

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his money back; (3) Cannon refused to give the money back but assured
Stopa that he intended to sell the property and would repay Stopa out of
the sales proceeds; (4) Cannon acquired the property and subsequently
entered into a contract for its sale; (5) Stopa asked the closing agent to
pay him, out of the closing proceeds, the money that he had paid on
Cannon's behalf; (6) the closing agent told Stopa that the filing of a lien
was unnecessary because Stopa would be repaid out of the closing
proceeds; and (7) after the sale, the portion of the sales proceeds
belonging to Stopa were put into McGrath P.A.'s trust account and were
therefore under the exclusive control of McGrath.
     Stopa alleged that McGrath subsequently failed to pay Stopa the
money that he was due, instead telling Stopa that the money would
remain in McGrath P.A.'s trust account until the parties litigated their
dispute over the money. Stopa alleged that contrary to that
representation, McGrath disbursed the money to Cannon without
notifying Stopa. Stopa alleged that Cannon then hired McGrath to file
suit against Stopa wherein Cannon challenged the existence of a contract
between the parties related to the money that Stopa paid to Cannon.
Cannon also sought to recoup monies that Stopa allegedly had earned
when Stopa, who previously practiced law, represented Cannon and his
various businesses in lawsuits across the state.
     Stopa then filed his complaint against Cannon, McGrath, and
McGrath P.A., wherein he sought to reestablish a lost instrument, i.e., a
purported written fee agreement between Stopa and Cannon. Stopa also
sought damages for civil theft as to all of the defendants, for breach of
contract as to Cannon, for fraudulent misrepresentation as to all of the
defendants, and for punitive damages as to all of the defendants.

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     McGrath and McGrath P.A. filed a motion to transfer venue, citing
section 47.011, and arguing that venue was proper in Orange County
and not in Pinellas County because McGrath resided in Orange County,
the law firm was located there, and the causes of action accrued there.
No other statute was cited in the motion, nor did McGrath and McGrath
P.A. argue that venue should be transferred pursuant to forum non
conveniens as set forth in section 47.122. Stopa filed a response and
memorandum of law, arguing that venue was proper in Pinellas County.
     Eventually, a hearing was set for a case management conference on
December 15, 2022. There was nothing in the notice for that hearing
indicating that the trial court would be adjudicating the issue of a venue
change based on forum non conveniens.
     A week before the scheduled hearing, the trial court entered the
order on review. The trial court denied McGrath and McGrath P.A.'s
motion to transfer venue based on section 47.011, noting that venue was
proper in Pinellas County. However, the trial court then sua sponte
transferred venue from Pinellas County to Orange County based on
forum non conveniens, explaining that section 47.122 permits a change
of venue "for the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest
of justice." The court explained that all of the defendants resided in
Orange County, the defendants' two anticipated witnesses resided in
Orange County, and many of Stopa's claims involved actions which
occurred in Orange County.
                                 ANALYSIS
     Section 47.122 permits a trial court to transfer a civil action to any
other court wherein it could have been brought based on "the
convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice." "A
trial court may sua sponte raise the question of whether venue should be

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transferred to another county under section 47.122 for the convenience
of parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice." McDaniel Rsrv.
Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. Consultants, Inc., 39 So. 3d 504, 511 (Fla.
4th DCA 2010); see also Ground Improvement Techs., Inc. v. Merchs.
Bonding Co., 707 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Gov't Emps.
Ins. Co. v. Burns, 672 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). "However, the
'issue can be decided only after both parties receive appropriate notice
and an opportunity to be heard.' " McDaniel Rsrv. Realty Holdings, LLC,
39 So. 3d at 511 (quoting Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Joyner Elec., Inc., 616
So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)); see also Ground Improvement
Techs., Inc., 707 So. 2d at 1139 ("[A] lower court wishing to make a forum
non conveniens transfer must provide the parties with appropriate notice
and an opportunity to be heard."). "[O]rdering a change of venue without
notice is a denial of due process." Singer v. Singer, 278 So. 3d 79, 80-81
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also J.L.S. v. R.J.L., 708 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla.
2d DCA 1998) (holding that order transferring venue had to be reversed
because the appellant was deprived of due process when the trial court
entered the order without providing notice or an opportunity to be
heard). This is so even where a party seeks to challenge venue on some
other basis. See, e.g., Hall v. Animals.com, L.L.C., 171 So. 3d 216, 217-
18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that where appellee filed a motion to
transfer venue based on a substantial connection to one county but
failed to argue forum non conveniens in its motion, "the trial court erred
in entertaining this argument [made for the first time at the motion
hearing] without giving [the appellant] advance notice"); McDaniel Rsrv.
Realty Holdings, LLC, 39 So. 3d at 507, 511 (explaining that where the
defendant filed a motion to transfer venue based on improper venue
selection but failed to assert forum non conveniens pursuant to section

                                     5
47.122, "the trial court erred in entertaining such a claim on its own
motion without giving the plaintiff advance notice"); cf. Utilicore Corp. v.
Bednarsh, 730 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (explaining that
where the defendants had not filed a motion to transfer venue based on
forum non conveniens and where the trial court had not given advance
notice that it would entertain such a claim sua sponte, the trial court
erred in granting the defendants' motion to abate for improper venue).
      Notice and an opportunity to be heard are crucial to a venue
determination based on forum non conveniens because when that issue
is raised, "it is incumbent upon the parties to submit affidavits or other
evidence that will shed necessary light on the issue of the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice." Hall, 171 So. 3d at
218 (quoting Eggers v. Eggers, 776 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA
2011)). "In order to consider and weigh the convenience of the witnesses
under section 47.122, the court must know who the witnesses are and
the significance of their testimonies." Id. (citing Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)).
"The only exception would be where the complaint itself shows on its face
that a forum non conveniens transfer is warranted." Id. (quoting Ground
Improvement Techs., Inc., 707 So. 2d at 1139). There is no indication
from the face of the complaint here that the trial court could decide the
issue of forum non conveniens without considering affidavits or other
evidence relating to the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the
interest of justice. Consequently, the trial court erred by sua sponte
transferring venue based on forum non conveniens without providing the
parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue.
      Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

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KELLY and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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