Court Opinion

ID: 9792371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:24.379073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.380714
License: Public Domain

PERRY, C. J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction in evidence of the results of the breath test performed upon the defendant.
ORS 483.644 reads as follows:
“(1) Chemical analyses of the person’s breath, blood, urine or saliva, to be valid under ORS 483.642, shall be performed according to methods approved by the State Board of Health and by an *276individual possessing a valid permit to perform such analyses issued by the State Board of Health.
“(2) The State Board of Health shall:
“(a) Approve techniques or methods of performing chemical analyses that are satisfactory for determining alcoholic content of a person’s blood.
“(b) Prepare manuals and conduct courses throughout the state for the training of police officers in chemical analyses of a person’s breath, which courses shall include, but are not limited to, approved methods and techniques of chemical analyses, use of approved equipment and interpretation of test results together with a written examination on these subjects.
“(c) Test and certify the accuracy of equipment to be used by police officers for chemical analyses of a person’s breath before regular use of such equipment and periodically thereafter at intervals of not more than 60 days, such tests and certification to be conducted by trained technicians.
“(d) Ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses in accordance with one or more methods or techniques approved by the board.
“(e) Issue permits to individuals according to their qualifications. Permits shall be issued to police officers only upon satisfactory completion of the prescribed training course and written examination and the permit shall state the methods and equipment which the police officer is qualified to use. Permits shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the State Board of Health.”
It is to be noted that the first paragraph authorizes the use of generally accepted tests for the determination of the alcoholic content of the blood as evidence, providing the method used is one approved by *277the State Board of Health, and the test is made by an individual possessing a valid permit from the board to perform the analysis. Therefore, as a prerequisite to admission into evidence, the state must establish these two essential facts. It is admitted that these facts were established by the state in this case.
Paragraph (2) of the act and its subparagraphs are directives to the State Board of Health to perform certain duties that if performed will assure the reasonable accuracy of the breath tests taken. The majority confuse the legislature’s authorization of the use of such evidence with a trier of facts’ duty in evaluating such evidence.
I am unable to read into this latter section any thought that, if these directives are not performed, the result of a test by a method approved by the State Board of Health and analyzed by a person possessing a valid permit from the board may not be considered as evidence of intoxication.
It is quite clear that the legislature in providing in paragraph (1) of the act that to be valid the analyses shall be performed “according to methods approved by the State Board of Health and by an individual possessing a valid permit,” and not providing for periodical examinations of the equipment, was properly leaving the matter of the weight to be given to the tests to the jury. Thus the jury was properly left to evaluate all the facts surrounding the taking of the tests, which would include whether the directives given the State Board of Health to insure the accuracy of the tests had been performed.
Had the legislature intended to make the tests of the equipment a prerequisite to the introduction of breath tests, this requirement surely would have been *278included in paragraph. (1) the same as the requirement of proof of an approved method and an approved person to analyze the tests for use in civil or criminal proceedings.
It seems to me presumptuous of this court to assume that because the substance of the amendment contained in (2) (e) was not included in paragraph (1) of the act this was an oversight by the legislature. Rather it appears to me to be deliberate. When the legislature empowered the State Board of Health to approve methods by which the alcoholic content in the blood could be determined, it was not limiting the board to the then known methods, but such as would be developed in the future. Therefore, if new methods were developed, the question of the necessity of testing and at what intervals, if necessary, was also left to the board when the new method was approved.
ORS 161.050 provides:
“The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to the criminal and criminal procedure statutes of this state. Their provisions shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.”
The purpose of this statute is to permit ascertaining the intent of the legislature so as to make the statute workable and not create bizarre results.
It is clear that the purpose of ORS 483.644 (2) is to provide reasonably accurate tests for determining the alcoholic content of a suspect’s blood.
In using the language in ORS 483.644 (2)(c), “* * * before regular use * * * and periodi*279cully thereafter at intervals * * s,” (italics supplied) the legislature was referring to equipment having a degree of permanence so that adjustments therein could be made if necessary to keep the test reasonably accurate.
The Mobat test was not developed when OKS 483.644 was enacted. The Mobat test consists of a disposable unit not subject to a direct test. Once it is used it cannot be reused. The legislature, when (2) (c) of this act was passed, had in mind the “breathalizer” test, a permanent device which can be periodically tested and which is used whenever possible.
The evidence in this case discloses that the State Board of Health had approved the Mobat test. It, therefore, follows that, since the “Mobat kit” could not be directly tested every sixty days, the legislature certainly never intended that the Mobat test, once approved by the State Board of Health, should be included in the requirement for periodical testing for there is not even an inference in this case that once the kit is received from the manufacturer it ever deteriorates.
However, even if the majority is of the opinion that the legislature intended that the acts of the State Board of Health are to be considered as a prerequisite to the admission of the results of the tests in evidence, the state made a prima facie showing upon which the trial court would be required to admit the evidence.
There is a rebuttal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. OKS 41.360 (15). While such a presumption may be overcome by other evidence, unless so overcome “the jury is bound to find according to the presumption.” Presumptions of this Mnd are made a part of the substantive law of *280this state. State of Oregon v. Sengstacken, 61 Or 455, 468, 122 P 292; Barclay v. State Bd. of Education, 244 Or 294, 417 P2d 986; Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Linn Boundary Bd., 244 Or 207, 416 P2d 656; Lothstein v. Fitzpatrick, 171 Or 648, 138 P2d 919.
These statutory presumptions have probative value, that is, they are evidence. Wiebe v. Seely, Administrator, 215 Or 331, 335 P2d 379; Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Or 592, 147 P2d 227; Bunnell v. Parelius, 166 Or 174, 111 P2d 88. And they are as applicable in criminal cases as in civil. State v. Gilmore, 236 Or 349, 388 P2d 451; State v. Wendler, 83 Idaho 213, 360 P2d 697; State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P2d 284; State v. Miller, 71 Ariz 140, 224 P2d 205.
Since there is a total lack of evidence other than the presumption that official duty was duly and regularly performed, that presumption must prevail.
There is another reason why the trial court correctly ruled. This reason “rests upon the rule ‘that where an act is done which can be done legally only after the performance of some prior act, proof of the latter carries with it a presumption of due performance of the prior act.’ ” School District No. 17 v. Powell, 203 Or 168, 189, 279 P2d 492; Barclay v. State Board of Education, supra.
So in this case, the officer having been authorized to make the test with equipment authorized to be. used, there is a presumption that all other prior necessary acts to validate the test will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
For the above reasons I would affirm the judgment.
'Goodwin, J., joins in this dissent.