Court Opinion

ID: 9834270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:27:23.071176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:13.420340
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing appellee takes this court to task for “injecting into its opinion the issue of lack of authenticity as a ground against the admissibility in evidence of the notation on the bill of lading,” contending that the sole objection to its introduction was “that said notation is hearsay and not shown to have been made by appellant or any person acting for him.” The charge is wholly without ground or merit. The language of the objection, to the effect that the notation was “not shown to be the act of plaintiff or anyone authorized to act for him,” necessarily and clearly raises the issue of want of authenticity.
It is contended that the authenticity rule announced in the Lancaster-Adams Case, supra, is only the minority opinion of the court. Whether so or not, it is a salutary rule, and we hold it to be the law in this ease.
For the first time appellee now contends the notation was admissible “as a part of the res gestae of the transaction in issu■ing the bill of lading. This is contended for *112upon the grounds that we must indulge ap-pellee in the assumption that the notation was written on the bill of lading' by carrier’s agent contemporaneously with its issuance and delivery, because such is the custom, and that the language of the notation indicates that it was so written. But no such assumption is authorized, first, because the notation is not a part of the shipping contract, and it is not shown that "either the original or a copy of the bill with notation was delivered shipper’s agent at the time of issuance; and, second, because there is no proof whatsoever that these extraneous matters are customarily noted on bills of lading by carrier’s agent. In fact, appellant alleged that the original bills of lading were in appellee’s possession and gave notice to appellee to produce them on trial. The record does not show in whose possession the original bill introduced in evidence was, but merely shows that appellant introduced a bill of lading without introducing the notation thereon, and that later on in the trial appellee introduced the original bill with the notation thereon.
Appellee contends that the instruction requiring plaintiff to “establish the material allegations of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence” is distinguishable from the following instruction in the case of Wootton v. Jones, supra:
“The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts which will enable him to recover,”
—and that it is also distinguishable from the instructions given in the other cases cited, supra, to the effect that a “plaintiff” must establish the material allegations of his petition to entitle him to recover; it being contended that the vice in those charges was the fact that the jury’s attention was directed to the ultimate and final matter of “recovery,” while the jury was not so directed in this charge. There is no merit to the contention. Por what purpose would the court have the jury find that plaintiff had proved the material allegations of his petition unless it was to instruct the jury that if plaintiff had done so he would be entitled to recover? No other reasonable conclusion could be drawn by the jury. The “material allegations” relate to both allegations of fact and of law. So, in its last analysis the charge simply required the jury to find and determine what were the material allegations of plaintiff’s petition, so that the jury might know the effect same would have on the rights of the parties to an ultimate recovery in the case. Then, too, the charge certainly is valueless as a guide to the jury in answering the several issues submitted, none of which carried any instructions upon the burden of proof.
One of the prime purposes of the special issue statutes is to allow the trial court only to “submit such explanations and definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such [special] issues.” Rev. St. 1925, art. 2189. It is obvious that this charge, which instructed the jury to find what are the material allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition, is not a charge on the burden of proof, but is one which imposes a specific and definite duty upon the jury independent of who has the burden to prove the ultimate facts alleged.' Nor does such charge explain or define any term necessary to enable the jury to pass upon any issue submitted. It places upon them the duty of determining both questions of law and of fact, and is certainly not permissible under the statutes. And as is said by the Commission of Appeals in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. McLean, supra:
“Every party litigant has the right to have his ease tried in accordance with such statutory provisions. If this right be violated, over his objection, by the submission of instructions not authorized by statute, injury to the objecting party is presumed; and, unless it clearly, .appears that no injury or prejudice results to him, or his cause, he is entitled to a new trial. Texas & N. O. Railway v. Harrington (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 188, and authorities there cited.”
The criticisms urged against this court’s opinion are wholly without merit, and the motion for a rehearing is overruled in all things.
Overruled.