Court Opinion

ID: 2964841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:59.486618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.373059
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
          No. 96-2327
                       CAPE ANN CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
                              Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                                         v.
                             CITY OF GLOUCESTER, ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                       Bownes and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                _____________________
               Philip H. Cahalin for appellants.
               Madelyn  
                       Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental
          Protection Division, with whom George 
                                                B. 
                                                   Henderson 
                                                             II, Assistant
          United States Attorney, was on brief for appellees Commonwealth of
          Massachusetts and the United States.
               Linda Thomas Lowe
                               , General Counsel, Legal Department, City of
          Gloucester, for appellee City of Gloucester.
                                ____________________
                                   August 13, 1997
                                ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.  In 1979, the Commonwealth of
          Massachusetts ("the Commonwealth") sued the City of Gloucester
          ("the City") for violating the Massachusetts Clean Water Act, Mass.
          Gen. Laws ch. 21, SS 26-53. The City agreed to the entry of a
          final judgment that required it,     inter  
                                                      alia, to prepare a
          facilities plan to identify and remedy the pollution in North
          Gloucester.
                    In 1989, the United States brought an action in federal
          court, alleging that the City was in violation of the Clean Water
          Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1252 et seq. (CWA). The Commonwealth intervened
          as a party plaintiff and alleged that the City was violating both
          the state and federal clean water acts. The complaints in federal
          court alleged, 
                        inter alia
                                  , that the City was discharging pollutants
          into the waters of the United States and the Commonwealth, in
          violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
          ("NPDES") permit, issued by the Environmental Protection Agency
          pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
                    In 1991, the City agreed to the entry of a consent
          decree. The agreement included a schedule for the design and
          construction of an extension of the sewer system to North
          Gloucester. The decree was amended several times thereafter. In
          1993, it was amended to give the City discretion to use Septic Tank
          Effluent Pump ("STEP") sewers rather than a combination of
          conventional gravity sewers and pressure sewers.
                              
           A STEP sewer system includes STEP tanks located on the
          household's property. Household sewage flows into the STEP tank
                                         -2-

                    The City decided to use STEP sewers in the Annisquam and
          Lane's Cove areas in January 1994. The City initially intended to
          install all the STEP pumps, tanks, and ancillary equipment needed
          to connect individual properties to the collection system. The
          decree was amended in 1995 to reflect this decision. When some
          homeowners refused to grant the City the easements necessary to
          allow the City to install the septic tanks and pumps, the City
          offered them the option of doing the work themselves.
                    As of October 28, 1996, the City had completed the
          construction of the main and lateral lines of the STEP sewers in
          Annisquam and approximately seventy percent of the lines for Lane's
          Cove.
                    Plaintiffs-appellants, the Cape Ann Citizens Association,
          initiated suit in Massachusetts Superior Court in February 1996.
          After the suit was brought, the City amended its regulations to
          allow individual owners to install and maintain their own STEP
          tanks without conveying an easement to the City.
                    The City removed the action to federal district court.
          The Commonwealth and the United States intervened as defendants.
          Treating the matter as a case stated on the pleadings, the district
                              
          where it receives primary treatment, essentially consisting of the
          sludge's settling to the bottom of the tank and being digested by
          bacteria. The sludge-reduced liquid effluent then flows under
          pressure to the STEP sewer line and to the city treatment plant.
          The sewer lines serving STEP sewers are narrower than the lines
          serving conventional gravity sewers. Conventional gravity sewers
          convey wastewater, including both liquids and solids, to the
          treatment plant by means of gravity. Pressure sewers include pumps
          that grind the sewage before it is transported under pressure to
          the collection system.
                                         -3-

          court ruled for the City. The plaintiffs now appeal on a variety
          of grounds. We affirm. 
                           I. Validity of Consent Decree
                    Appellants present several theories in an attempt to have
          the 1991 consent decree declared void. None of their arguments are
          persuasive.
                    First, they claim that they have standing to challenge
          the consent decree under federal law. We need not decide the
          standing issue as the government agrees that appellant has
          standing. Assuming   arguendo that appellants have standing, we
          would normally turn to examine the substance of their claim
          regarding the consent decree. They have, however, failed to put
          forward a federal claim for relief. They argue only the standing
          issue, omitting any discussion of a substantive federal claim.
                    In the absence of a federal claim, we consider the state
          law claim advanced by appellants. The only state law claim
          presented is based on Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, S 53. In relevant
          part, the statute reads:
                      If a town . . . [is] about to raise or
                      expend money or incur obligations
                      purporting to bind said town for any
                      purpose or object or in any manner other
                      than that for and in which such town has
                      the legal and constitutional right and
                      power to raise or expend money or incur
                      obligations, the supreme judicial court
                      may, upon the petition of not less than
                              
           The district court also agreed that appellants had standing to
          challenge the consent decree on the grounds that the defense of
          lack of standing was waived when the case was removed to federal
          court.
                                         -4-

                      ten taxable inhabitants of the town,
                      determine the same in equity, and may,
                      before the final determination of the
                      cause, restrain the unlawful exercise or
                      abuse of such corporate power.
          Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, S 53.
                    Appellants' claim fails because it has been brought too
          late. It is well settled that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, S 53 is
          preventative. "The statute does not authorize the correction of
          wrongs wholly executed and completed. It is not retroactive."
          Fuller v. 
                   Trustees of Deerfield Academy & Dickinson High Sch.
                                                                      , 252
          Mass. 258, 259 (1925). Actions under the statute must be brought
          before obligations are incurred.  Kapinos v. Chicopee, 334 Mass.
          196, 198 (1956). In Kapinos, the court found that petitioners were
          not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, S 53 because
          "the construction companies had practically completed their work
          under the contract when this petition was brought."  Id. at 199.
                    The construction of the sewers required under the consent
          decree is similarly advanced. It is undisputed that of
          approximately 510 homes that must be connected, approximately 450
          had been connected as of September 1996. Of those that remain,
          some will not need to be connected because they have adequate on-
          site systems. Appellants do not dispute that the sewer system is
          almost completed. We find, therefore, that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40,
          S 53 does not offer appellants an avenue for relief.
                    Appellants next claim that the consent decree was void on
          the ground that it was entered into by the mayor 
                                                          ultra vires
                                                                     . The
          district court disagreed, stating that "under the city charter of
                                         -5-

          the City of Gloucester, the mayor of the city as the city's chief
          executive officer was empowered, at least on its face, to enter
          into the consent decree." Transcript of Hearing, October 28, 1996,
          at 56.
                    We need not decide the issue, however, because, although
          appellants discuss their standing to bring such a claim, they fail
          to argue the merits of their ultra vires claim.
                    It is well settled that this court will consider only
          those arguments that have been properly briefed and put before it. 
                      [I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory
                      manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
                      developed argumentation, are deemed waived
                      . . . . It is not enough merely to
                      mention a possible argument in the most
                      skeletal way, leaving the court to do
                      counsel's work . . . . Judges are not
                      expected to be mindreaders. Consequently,
                      a litigant has an obligation to spell out
                      its arguments squarely and distinctly, or
                      else forever hold its peace.
          Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 700 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations
          omitted); 
                   see also
                            
                            Ramos v. 
                                     Roche Prods.
                                                 , 936 F.2d 43, 51 (1st Cir.
          1991) (brief must contain full statement of issues presented and
          accompanying arguments). Appellants have failed to provide us with
          argument that supports their 
                                      ultra vires
                                                 claim and, accordingly, we
          consider that claim to have been waived.
                    II. Did the Consent Decree Violate the CWA?
                    The federal and state clean water acts are administered
          through a permitting system called the National Pollutant Discharge
          Elimination System ("NPDES"). Under this system, owners of point
                                         -6-

          sources must obtain an NPDES Permit. Pursuant to the Clean Water
          Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1251-1387, the EPA issued the City an NPDES
          permit.
                     Appellants claim that the consent decree is inconsistent
          with the Clean Water Act because the NPDES permit conditions
          governing the Gloucester storm drains were not developed in
          conformity with the Act's regulatory scheme. Because the effluent
          limitations in the NPDES permit were based upon water quality
          standards rather than the effluent limitations guidelines
          promulgated by the EPA, appellants argue that the limits in the
          permit are unenforceable.
                    Appellants' argument is that "reliance on water quality
          data alone to enforce the construction of a sewer was inconsistent
          with the enforcement scheme carefully developed under the Clean
          Water Act and deprived the district court of jurisdiction of the
          enforcement action." Appellants' Brief at 11. In other words,
          appellants argue that only specific effluent limitations stated in
                              
           A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete
          conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
          tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
          concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
          craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.
          S 1362(14).
           The permit was originally issued in 1975 and was reissued in
          1985.
           Effluent limitations refer to restrictions on the quantities,
          rates and concentrations of pollutants which are discharged from a
          point source. Water quality based standards limit discharges based
          on the desired conditions of a particular waterway.  See Arkansas
          v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
                                         -7-

          the NPDES permit, and not water quality data, can be enforced by
          courts. In support of this argument, appellants cite    Northwest
          Environmental 
                        Advocates v. City 
                                          of 
                                             Portland, 11 F.3d 900, 906-10
          (9th Cir. 1993). That case, however, was subsequently vacated by
          the Ninth Circuit in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of
          Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
                                                            denied, 116 S.
          Ct. 2550 (1996). In the latter opinion, the Ninth Circuit
          concluded, in light of 
                                PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County
                                                              v. 
                                                                 Washington
          Department of Ecology
                              , 511 U.S. 700 (1994), that "[b]y introducing
          effluent limitations into the CWA scheme, Congress intended to
          improve enforcement, not to supplant the old system."   Northwest
          Environmental Advocates
                                , 56 F.3d at 986. "[N]owhere does Congress
          evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality
          standards that have not been translated into effluent discharge
          limitations." Id. Furthermore, in  PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County
                                                                          ,
          the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act allows states to
          enforce broad water quality standards.  Id. at 713-21.
                    In an attempt to rescue their claim, appellants' seek to
          demonstrate that the CWA is intended to take into account the costs
          of eliminating the discharge of pollutants. Even assuming that
          appellants' view of the goals of the CWA is correct, they have
          nevertheless failed to demonstrate that the consent decree violated
          the Act. Appellants fail to show that it is impermissible for
          consent decrees to consider water quality standards. They have
          also failed to show that the goals of the CWA were ignored when the
          consent decree was established. We do not believe, as appellants'
                                         -8-

          position would require, that a consent decree must enumerate the
          objectives of the CWA and state that it has taken each into
          account. Thus, appellants offer little more than a vacated case,
          Northwest  
                    Environmental  
                                   Advocates, 11 F.3d at 906-10, and a
          generalized discussion of the goals of the CWA. We find this
          insufficient to establish that the consent decree violates the CWA.
                          III. Connection to Common Sewer
                    Appellants' next argument alleges that the City's Board
          of Health lacked the authority to order a landowner to connect to
          the STEP sewer unless and until the City had installed the STEP
          tank on the landowner's property.
                    The Board of Health is explicitly granted the authority
          to order connection to a common sewer:
                      The board of health of a town may require
                      the owner or occupant of any building upon
                      land abutting on a public or private way,
                      in which there is a common sewer, to
                      connect the same therewith by a sufficient
                      drain . . . .
          Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 83, S 11.
                    Appellants argue that the STEP sewer system is not a
          "common sewer" for the purpose of section 11 because the sewer
          system requires, in order to function, the pressure supplied by the
          individual STEP tanks and requires the pretreatment of sewage
          provided by these tanks. Accordingly, the argument goes, the STEP
          tanks are an integral part of the STEP sewer and must be installed
          before the board of health is empowered to order connection under
          section 11.
                                         -9-

                    In the absence of relevant Massachusetts case law, we
          find that this argument runs counter to the common sense reading of
          the term "common sewer." The requirement of pretreatment certainly
          cannot undermine the authority to order connection under section
          11. It is no less a "common sewer" merely because some treatment
          takes place in the STEP tank -- sewage is still sent through a set
          of shared pipes to a treatment plant. Similarly, the fact that
          pressure from the STEP tanks is required for the sewage system to
          operate does not render it something other than a "common sewer."
          No authority is cited by appellants for the proposition that the
          need for pressure from the STEP pumps implies that there is no
          "common sewer" prior to the STEP tank connection. A sound
          interpretation of "common sewer" would include the STEP sewer
          system at issue in which a set of common pipes transport sewage
          from individual properties to a common treatment facility.
                    Without any support for appellants' argument, we are
          unwilling to accept their creative interpretation of state law,
          which would add unprecedented nuances to the plain meaning of the
          statute.  See Doyle v. Hasbro, 103 F.3d 186, 192 (1st Cir. 1996)
          (stating that this court must exercise caution when considering a
          new application of state law, and that we will not do so without a
          strong argument in favor of the desired application).
                               IV. The Takings Claim
                    Appellants argue that the regulations requiring the grant
          of an easement to the City in exchange for the City's installation
                                        -10-

          of the STEP tanks on homeowners' properties violate the Takings
          Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
                    The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made
          applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,    see
          Chicago, 
                   B.  
                      & 
                         Q.R.  
                              Co. v.  Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897),
          provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
          without just compensation." One of the purposes of the Takings
          Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
          public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
          by the public as a whole."  Armstrong v. United 
                                                          States, 364 U.S.
          40, 49 (1960).
                    On the other hand, the authority of state and local
          governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained
          against constitutional challenge.  Euclid v. 
                                                      Ambler Realty Co.
                                                                      , 272
          U.S. 365 (1926). "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
          values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
          for every such change in the general law."  Pennsylvania Coal Co.
          v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
                    It is within the power of government to enact land-use
          regulation, and such regulation does not effect a taking if it
          "'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
          den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."  Nollan v.
          California Coastal Comm'n
                                  , 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting 
                                                                      Agins
          v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). "States have broad
          authority to regulate housing conditions." 
                                                    Loretto v. 
                                                               Teleprompter
          Manhattan 
                    CATV 
                         Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). It follows that
                                        -11-

          the state is entitled to regulate the disposal of sewage in order
          to protect the public health and to prevent conditions that amount
          to a nuisance.  See Town of Holden v. Holden Suburban Supply Co.,
          343 Mass. 187, 187 (1961). Every community must find some
          mechanism to dispose of its sewage. To do so effectively, a sewer
          system of some form is required, and connection to that system can
          be mandated without there being a taking.
                    In the instant case, the City's regulation governing the
          disposal of sewage can be satisfied in one of three ways. First,
          the homeowner can demonstrate that the sewage treatment on his or
          her property provides no point source pollution and is in
          compliance with municipal and state regulations governing sewage
          systems. Second, the homeowner can install a STEP system at his or
          her own expense. Third, the homeowner can allow the City to
          install and maintain the STEP system at its expense upon the
          granting of an easement allowing the City to come upon the land.
                    In Loretto, the Supreme Court found a taking where New
          York law required a landlord to allow the installation of cable
          facilities on his premises. The basic rule applied in  Loretto is
          that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is
          a taking." 458 U.S. at 426. The Court added that "[s]o long as
          the[] regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the
          physical invasion of a portion of his building by a third party,
          they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally
          applicable to nonpossessory government activity."   Loretto, 458
          U.S. at 440 (citing Penn 
                                   Central 
                                           Transp. 
                                                   Co., 438 U.S. 104). By
                                        -12-

          implication, where there is a permanent physical invasion by the
          government or a third party, there will normally be a taking.
                    The instant case, however, does not fall under the
          permanent physical invasion rule of    Loretto. The important
          distinction is explained in footnote 19 of Loretto, which states:
                      If S 828 required landlords to provide
                      cable installation if a tenant so desires,
                      the statute might present a different
                      question from the question before us,
                      since the landlord would own the
                      installation. Ownership would give the
                      landlord rights to the placement, manner,
                      use, and possibly the disposition of the
                      installation. The fact of ownership is,
                      contrary to the dissent, not simply
                      "incidental," it would give a landlord
                      (rather than a CATV company) full
                      authority over the installation except
                      only as government specifically limited
                      that authority. The landlord would decide
                      how to comply with applicable government
                      regulations concerning CATV and therefore
                      could minimize the physical, esthetic, and
                      other effects of the installation.
                      Moreover, if the landlord wished to
                      repair, demolish, or construct in the area
                      of the building where the installation is
                      located, he need not incur the burden of
                      obtaining the CATV company's cooperation
                      in moving the cable.
          Id. at 440 n.19.
                    In the instant case, the homeowner has the option of
          installing and owning the STEP tanks if the homeowner does not want
          the City to do so. This option distinguishes the case from
          Loretto. Because the City could simply order homeowners to connect
          to the sewer, which would not be a taking, giving them the
          additional option of having the City perform the installation does
          not render the regulation a taking.
                                        -13-

                    Appellants make much of their claim that even if the
          system is privately installed, "ownership" of the tanks remains
          with the City.  In fact, appellants appear to concede that there is
          no taking if the object placed on the homeowner's property is owned
          by the homeowner. "The critical distinction in 
                                                        Loretto between use
          regulations, which are ordinarily noncompensatory, and a 'permanent
          physical occupation of property,' which is always compensatory, is
          the ownership and control of the object placed on the homeowner's
          property." Appellants' Brief at 14.
                    Appellants' argument that the STEP tanks are not
          privately owned is as follows:
                      The only practical difference between STEP
                      tanks which are considered privately owned
                      . . . and maintained and those which are
                      not is in the identity of the installation
                      and maintenance people. It would seem
                      more would be required to distinguish
                      ownership and control. The tanks clearly
                      perform a public function. The tanks are
                      integral components in the city's sewer.
                      The city's sewer cannot perform its
                      function without the tanks.
          Appellants' Brief at 14.
                    Appellants have not, however, offered any practical
          method for distinguishing a privately owned installation and a
          publicly owned one. We are not convinced by appellants' claim that
          STEP sewers are different from other sewers because the STEP tanks
          are required for the system to operate. It is true that the STEP
          tanks perform the necessary function of allowing solids to settle
          out of the wastewater before the latter is discharged into the
          collection system. This function, however, is for the benefit of
                                        -14-

          the homeowner alone. The tank is simply a requirement imposed on
          the homeowner so that the homeowner's property can be connected to
          the sewer system. As such, it is not a taking. Rather, it is a
          reasonable requirement without which the property could not be
          connected to the sewer.
                    We believe that the option of installing and maintaining
          the STEP system oneself provides the homeowner ownership of the
          STEP tank. As discussed in footnote 19 of 
                                                   Loretto, the homeowner's
          ability to install the system himself or herself grants the
          homeowner "full authority over the installation except only as
          government specifically limited that authority." Id. at 440 n.19.
                    For this reason, and consistent with  Loretto, we find
          that the regulations do not work a taking.
                                  V. The Easement
                    Appellants claim that even if there is no taking, there
          is no need for the City to demand an easement in exchange for one
          dollar in order to install the STEP tanks. In support of this
          claim, they cite Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 83, S 1, which allows a city
          to take an easement by eminent domain if necessary for the
          construction and maintenance of common sewers. The STEP tanks,
          however, are not part of a "common sewer," as required by Mass.
          Gen. Laws ch. 83, S 1. Rather, they are part of a "particular
          sewer" which is governed by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 83, SS 3 and 24.
          See P 
                & 
                  D 
                    Service 
                            Co. v.  Zoning 
                                           Board 
                                                 of 
                                                    Appeals 
                                                            of 
                                                               Dedham, 359
          Mass. 96, 101 (1971) (stating that the line connecting a building
          to a municipal sewer system is a "particular sewer"). The sewer
                                        -15-

          system is, as discussed  supra, a common sewer. The STEP tank,
          however, is more accurately characterized as part of the line
          connecting a property to the municipal sewer. Sections 3 and 24 do
          not authorize municipalities to take an easement by eminent domain
          for the construction of particular sewers. Furthermore, appellants
          appear to admit that an easement is required. "Early on it became
          apparent that easements would be necessary for the installation and
          maintenance of city-owned utilities on private property."
          Appellants' Brief at xii.
                                    VI. Vagueness
                    Finally, appellants claim that the regulations are void
          for vagueness. Having reviewed the regulations, we find this
          argument to be without merit. In our view, a person "of ordinary
          intelligence" is able to understand the meaning of these
          regulations.  United 
                                States v.   Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 122
          (1979); 
                 Doe v. 
                        Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester
                                                           , 421 Mass. 117,
          134 (1995).
                               VII. State Law Issues
                    Two additional issues are raised by appellants: First,
          that the most the Board of Health can fine a landowner for failure
          to obey an order to connect to the sewer is $200 and, second, that
          the City must install the STEP tanks when requested to do so by the
          homeowner. These issues were not reached by the district court.
          In its ruling from the bench, the district court stated that "as to
          any aspects of the case not adjudicated by the declaration from the
          bench . . . the cause is remanded to the Massachusetts Superior
                                        -16-

          Court." Judgment of the District Court, October 28, 1996. Because
          appellants do not challenge the propriety of the remand order, we
          will not consider their arguments on the merits. Accordingly, we
          leave these issues to the Massachusetts Superior Court.
                                  VIII. Conclusion
                    For the reasons stated herein, we 
                                                     affirm 
                                                            the judgment of
          the district court. Costs to appellees.
                                        -17-