Court Opinion

ID: 9466945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:33:31.107211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:03.665282
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In light of our holding on the fair use question, the majority decides not to discuss the First Amendment issue. Had the District Court found fair use to be a valid defense, I wouid simply affirm and leave the First Amendment question to another day. However, since the District Court denied the motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions based on the First Amendment, and since, if allowed to stand, the District Court’s opinion could create confusion and uncertainty in the Fifth Circuit law of copyright, see Wisconsin Note, supra, at 264, I feel compelled to address the First Amendment issue.
Under the Constitution, Congress has the “Power ... to promote the Progress *1179of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. However, the First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” The possible tension between these two constitutional provisions has been repeatedly recognized by Courts and commentators.1
Under the law of copyright, “protection is given only to the expression of the idea— not the idea itself.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S.Ct. 460, 470, 98 L.Ed. 630, 642 (1954). In 1930, Judge Learned Hand attempted to give some guidance in drawing the line between an idea and an expression. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), Judge Hand recognized that under the copyright laws, “the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.” Id. at 121. The line between an idea and an expression of an idea “will seem arbitrary” no matter where it is drawn. Id. at 122. Yet, attempting to articulate the approach for discovering that line, Judge Hand stated in his “abstractions” test:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121.
This “idea-expression dichotomy” is carried forward in the 1976 Copyright Act. Thus § 102(b) makes clear that copyright protection does not extend to the idea itself. This notion is further articulated in the legislative history. For example, the House Report states: “Wide departures or variations from the copyrighted work would still be an infringement as long as the author’s ‘expression’ rather than merely the author’s ‘ideas’ are taken.” House Report, at 61; U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at 5675. The “idea-expression dichotomy” generally provides a workable balance between copyright and free speech interests. As the Ninth Circuit has stated:
[T]he idea-expression dichotomy . serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first amendment. The “marketplace of ideas” is not limited by copyright because copyright is limited to protection of expression. As one commentator has stated: “[T]he idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free speech interests. In some degree it encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to reproduce the ‘expression’ of others, but this is justified by the greater public good in the copyright encouragement of creative works. In some degree it encroaches upon the author’s right to control his work in that it renders his ‘ideas’ per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater public need for free access to ideas as part of the democratic dialogue.” Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 1180, 1192-93 (1970). Cf. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892-93, 92 S.Ct. 197 [200], 30 L.Ed.2d 169 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977).2
Prior to the District Court’s opinion in this case, no Court had ever held the First *1180Amendment to be a basis for preventing enforcement of a copyright infringement suit, although a number of Courts had been faced with the issue. For instance, in Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978), plaintiff, a limited partnership engaging in institutional research and brokerage business, prepared in-depth reports and analysis on nearly 300 corporations, examining major developments, growth prospects, profit expectations, weaknesses and strengths. These reports, which were as long as 40 pages each, were individually copyrighted. Defendant, a weekly financial newspaper, published abstracts of plaintiff’s research reports, appropriating plaintiff’s language almost verbatim. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction and defendant appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting both the fair use and First Amendment arguments. On the First Amendment issue, the Court reasoned that defendants did not merely use plaintiff’s news information but took plaintiff’s expression of that information.
This Court recently considered the application of the First Amendment to the law of copyright. In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979), the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders sued the Texas Cowgirls, Scoreboard Posters, Inc., and others, claiming among other things, copyright infringement. Five of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders had posed in their official uniforms for a copyrighted poster that was widely sold. Five members of the Texas Cowgirls, a group made up of former Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, posed for a poster in uniforms nearly identical to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders in the original poster. The only difference was that in the latter poster, the girls’ uniforms were partially unbuttoned, exposing their breasts. The District Court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. This Court affirmed, finding a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In so doing, it rejected the argument that the District Court failed to heed defendants’ rights to publish under the First Amendment. The Court observed that “[t]he first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property.” Id. at 1188. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., supra (rejecting defendants’ First Amendment arguments with respect to McDonald’s use of H. R. Pufnstuf characters in McDonaldland TV commercials; the Court reasoned that defendants appropriated not merely the idea but the expression of the idea as well).
The case law demonstrates that the “idea-expression dichotomy” generally provides a workable framework for separating First Amendment interests (ideas) from *1181copyright interests (expressions). However, what happens when the idea and the expression are one and the same? For example, with respect to graphic works, the expression is essential to convey the idea. Words may simply not suffice to describe the work. As Professor Nimmer points out, a work of art cannot be described but can only be experienced. He gives as examples the difficulty in trying to describe the “idea” of the Mona Lisa or Michelangelo’s Moses. 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.10[C][2], 1-81 (1978). He argues — and I agree — that in most such cases, the copyright interest should prevail. As he states, “The additional enlightenment contributed to the democratic dialogue by reason of the visual impact of most graphic work is relatively slight as compared with the intellectual impact of a literary work.” Id. These considerations seem relevant in this case since we are dealing here with graphic works — covers of TV Guide.
As stated, the District Court in this case held that Knight-Ridder’s use of TV Guide covers, although not fair use, was nonetheless protected under the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the copyright laws and the First Amendment created a tension in this case in light of recent Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), giving First Amendment protection to commercial speech. The Court pointed out that these commercial free speech cases demonstrate the importance of advertising. The Court did not rule the Copyright Act unconstitutional but simply held that under the facts of this case, § 106 should not be enforced because of the First Amendment. In the District Court’s view, whenever the First Amendment and the Copyright Act create a tension, “the primacy of the First Amendment mandates that the Copyright Act be deprived of effectuation.” 445 F.Supp. at 882.
The District Court’s conclusion is incorrect for a number of reasons. First, as we demonstrated above, the fair use doctrine provides protection for the Herald’s conduct. Thus, the asserted “tension” between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment simply does not exist in this case. The Copyright Act itself provides a safety valve — fair use — to minimize this potential tension. Indeed, the fair use doctrine has been recognized as “a substantial rule of copyright law that can on occasion reduce the inherent tension between free speech and property rights in expression.” Denicola, supra, at 299. See also id. at 303-04.
Second, even assuming fair use was not an appropriate defense, the Court was not compelled to reach the result it did on the basis of the Supreme Court’s commercial free speech cases. To begin with, the right of free speech is not absolute and must be analyzed in light of other legitimate interests. See, e. g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed. 965 (1977), discussed in note 2, supra. Moreover, the right of commercial free speech is afforded even less protection than non-commercial speech. As the Court stated in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918, 56 L.Ed.2d 444, 453 (1978): “[W]e have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-commercial expression.” See also Friedman, et al. v. Rogers, et al., 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979). And none of the Supreme Court’s commercial free speech cases involve a copyright question. Moreover, as one commentator points out, Bates, which the Court relied on so heavily, involved advertising that was totally banned. See Wisconsin Note, supra, at 257 n. 92. Here, Triangle conceded that the Herald could refer verbally to TV Guide and could even have used the facsimile of TV Guide’s cover so long as the Herald did not copy or simulate an actual cover of TV Guide. Thus the objective of comparative advertising would not have been completely thwarted.
*1182Finally, and most importantly, the District Court lost sight of the idea-expression dichotomy. The District Court did not consider whether the Herald was adopting only Triangle’s idea or its expression as well.
I believe that the Herald’s use of TV Guide covers is protected under fair use but reject the argument that the First Amendment confers a privilege on Knight-Ridder to infringe Triangle’s copyright. Since my conclusion stems in part from the idea-expression dichotomy, it is necessary to isolate the relevant idea involved here. Neither side really identifies the idea being communicated by TV Guide covers. Apparently, each cover presents a unique way of suggesting that TV Guide is a magazine containing TV schedules and articles about television. The new picture each week suggests that there are new listings and new articles. The Herald could have conveyed that idea by simply showing a facsimile of a TV Guide cover instead of reproducing the expression, namely, an actual cover of TV Guide. Hence, application of the idea-expression dichotomy principle suggests that the First Amendment is not a defense to Triangle’s infringement suit.
Alternatively, the idea may be similar to that expressed by any painting or work of art. If Triangle’s theory is that the covers of TV Guide are similar to great works of art,3 then I cannot understand why Triangle relies exclusively on the idea-expression dichotomy instead of analyzing the case as one in which the idea and expression are wedded. As I stated above, I believe that when the idea and the expression are one and the same, copyright interest should nearly always prevail over the generally incidental First Amendment concerns.4 Thus even if the Herald could convey the idea of the TV Guide covers only by showing the covers themselves, I believe that the copyright interests should prevail over the asserted First Amendment interests. Indeed, given my difficulty in trying to determine what the “idea” being communicated by the TV Guide covers is, I doubt that the First Amendment interests asserted here are in any way significant.
Accordingly, I believe that in this case the copyright interests clearly prevail over the alleged First Amendment interests. Even where, as here, the idea and the expression are wedded in graphic form, I believe that the First Amendment will rarely prevail over a copyright interest. In any event, if there is a situation where copyright protection must give way to the First Amendment, we certainly do not have such a case here.
In conclusion, I concur in the result reached by the majority and in their resolution of the “fair use” issue. But I would go further and hold that the District Court erroneously found a violation of the copyright laws and a valid First Amendment defense thereto. In a nutshell, I believe the District Court reached the right result for the wrong reason.
APPENDIX
Below is a small-scale, black and white version of the Herald’s full page colored ad of November 13, 1977.

*1183

kj

. See the cases and articles cited in note 1 of majority opinion, supra.

. The Supreme Court has never directly faced the possible tension between the First Amendment and the law of copyright. However, in an analogous case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard *1180Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2858 n.13, 53 L.Ed.2d 965, 977 n.13 (1977), the Court did allude to this tension. In Zacchini, petitioner performed an act in which he was shot from a cannon into a net about 200 feet away. He performed the act at a county fair in Ohio and his act was videotaped by a reporter for a broadcasting company and shown on a television news program. He sued for damages under a state theory of “right of publicity.” The Court held that the Company was not immunized under the First Amendment from damages for its alleged infringement. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court stated:
We note that Federal District Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law on the ground that “no restraint [has been] placed on the use of an idea or concept.” United States v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D.Okla.1974). See also Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F.Supp. 108, 115-116 (N.D.Cal.1972) (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA [L.]Rev. 1180 (1970), who argues that copyright law does not abridge the First Amendment because it does not restrain the communication of ideas or concepts); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 346 F.Supp. 376 (Conn. 1972) (also relying on Nimmer, supra).
433 U.S. at 577-78 n.13, 97 S.Ct. at 2858 n.13, 53 L.Ed.2d at 977 n.13. Without trying to read too much into this dictum, we think that the Supreme Court has given at least its most general approval to the “idea-expression dichotomy” principle.

. Triangle suggests that this may in fact be its theory. On page 5 of its Reply Brief, Triangle argues that the cover of TV Guide should be treated as though it were a masterpiece of graphic art. And at oral argument, Triangle’s counsel compared the TV Guide covers to Picasso and Rembrandt paintings.

. Professor Nimmer believes that in certain situations where the idea and the expression are wedded, the First Amendment should prevail over copyright concerns. He gives as an example exclusive photographs of the My Lai massacre. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.10[C][2], 1-82 (1978). While I express skepticism that even here the First Amendment would serve as a defense to a copyright suit, this problem is not before us and I therefore do not reach it.