Court Opinion

ID: 9729088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:26:20.0066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.351748
License: Public Domain

Concurring opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
We reverse the trial court, but not without empathy for its plight. The trial judge struggled gallantly with an almost impossible situation. It is doubtful that any of us here could have done better. That is because there is almost a dearth of guidance afforded by this tribunal or other authorities as to how to deal with such a situation. I think we should attempt to provide some light for this darkened trail.
The main obligation of a trial judge is to protect the integrity of the court proceedings over which he or she is the designated gate keeper. The law does not afford perjured testimony constitutional protection. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986).
However, I would disagree to some extent with the well written and thoroughly researched opinion of my sister jurist.
In this case there was too much “cryptic” dialogue between the judge and the attorney. In reviewing the record, we cannot clearly discern whether it was indeed perjured testimony hovering over the proceeding, or something less nefarious. The subtle message conveyed by the defense lawyer would cause us — as it obviously did the trial judge — to conclude that it was perjured testimony to which he was referring. But considering the dire consequences for the defendant which followed, it was not nailed down nearly well enough.
The explanation that the defendant’s expected testimony was “not consistent with my investigation” leaves too much room for interpretation. Frustration is a constant co-counsel to every trial lawyer. Clients may provide totally implausible and unbelievable stories for presentation to juries. Defense lawyers have to live with them. Defendants sometime even change their stories on the day of trial. *87Where does the truth he? Not only is it impossible to always know, but it isn’t even the defense lawyer’s duty to know. That is left to the rigorous exchange of cross examination, and ultimately the collective decision of the jurors. At one point in the discussion with the trial judge, the defense lawyer seemed to lament that he would have to change his opening statement. This hints, if faintly, that an unexpected change in trial strategy was the main burden being shouldered by counsel for the defendant.
Section 3.3(a)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer shall not knowingly “offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” Subsection (c) of that same provision states, “A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” This offers an inviting escape hatch for lawyers looking for a convenient exodus from difficult cases. Therefore, it should be closely guarded by trial judges to prevent abuse by lawyers looking for an exit from a case gone south. Judges should not be placed in a guessing game, but rather should hold candid conversations with defense attorneys.
The judge and the lawyer in this case danced ever so gently around the use of the brutally frank language that is needed in such cases. In an ex parte hearing with a sealed record, the lawyer should fully disclose to the judge the grounds of the request to withdraw. Such direct language as, “Judge, I have reason to know that my client intends to give false testimony under oath,” would remove any question about the dilemma of both the lawyer and the judge. The trial court would then be given the opportunity to explore the “reason to know.”
At that point, remedial steps should be within the discretion of the trial judge. A mistrial may be the deemed solution. However, this is always a drastic step because a mistrial comes at the expense of judicial economy, and also may just be passing the problem on to the next lawyer, the next judge, the next trial.
Contrary to the sentiment expressed in the majority opinion, I disagree with the holding in Commonwealth v. Mitchell that the “representation of counsel-of necessity would be cryptic.” Dealing with the possibility of perjured testimony is a very serious process and should not be reduced to a guessing game. Ambiguity is the last thing needed. In addition, logic is stretched to the breaking point. Arguably, a lawyer providing guarded hints to the trial judge about information acquired through confidential communication is just as much in breach of the canon as an attorney making a direct and unambiguous disclosure. Also, the effect upon the trial court’s ability to continue in a neutral role remains the same whether the point is made directly or through “cryptic” comments.
In cases such as this one, I would require the lawyer to stay on the case and even put his client on the stand if the latter chooses. There is always the possibility — remote as it may be — that the client will have a change of heart between counsel table and the witness stand. However, once the client proceeds to give the perjured testimony, then the lawyer becomes ethically bound to cease and desist further questioning of the witness. The fact that the client will be left to twist in the wind is of the client’s own making and the inescapable peril of an impossible situation — (“wings for angels; feet for men.”) Counsel would then be prohibited from commenting on the perjured testimony during the trial, including closing arguments. It is also important that counsel advise his or her client of the likely effects *88of giving perjured testimony before the defendant decides to testify at all.
This disclosure should not bring into jeopardy the objectivity and fairness of the trial judge in conducting the remainder of the trial. Judges regularly rise above such developments. It is constant fare for things to happen at trial which could prejudice the judge against the defendant. In most cases, judges have an experienced notion of the truthfulness of the defendant’s testimony. He or she must still remain fair and objective in ruling on issues that are raised during the remainder of the trial, as well as in sentencing if the trial concludes with a conviction.
Also, it is the opinion of this writer that the judicial requirement of this ex parte conversation between judge and lawyer cleanses the lawyer of all adverse ethical considerations which might come into play. In other words, as the canons already imply, Rule 3.3 trumps Rule 1.6.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of this imbroglio is how to proceed with the trial if the court denies a mistrial. The procedure used in this case was what the trial judge, under immense pressure, deemed proper. From the comfortable lounge of reflection and retrospect, it is obviously flawed. The defendant became counsel-less at a most critical stage of the trial. In addition, the jury returned to the courtroom to see that his lawyer had deserted him. The admonition given by the trial judge in an attempt to minimize the damage was not only inadequate but misleading. The defendant did not fire his lawyer. Rather, the lawyer chose to leave his client. The problem was then compounded once the lawyer reappeared at the sentencing stage, as if he had somehow had a change of heart or pocketbook.
For the above stated reasons, I concur in the result of the majority opinion herein but would vary somewhat as to its reasoning and direction.
LAMBERT, C.J.; MINTON and NOBLE, JJ., join.