Court Opinion

ID: 9955680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 22:12:38.387773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.696400
License: Public Domain

03/28/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                               February 14, 2024 Session

            ERIKA JEAN SCHANZENBACH v. ALETHEA SKEEN

           Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sullivan (Bristol) County
             No. 20-CB-27094         William K. Rogers, Chancellor
                     ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00457-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based
upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an
order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition
in this case.

      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
                            Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., joined. THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

W. Andrew Fox, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Martin A. Cannon (pro hac vice) and Michael
G. McHale (pro hac vice), Omaha, Nebraska, for the appellant, Erika Jean Schanzenbach.

Alexis Irene Tahinci, Kingsport, Tennessee; Devon Chase Muse, Johnson City, Tennessee;
and Laura Hecht-Felella (pro hac vice), Brooklyn, New York, for the appellee, Alethea
Skeen.

                                        OPINION

                                   I. BACKGROUND

       Erika Jean Schanzenbach (“Petitioner”) has frequented the Bristol Regional
Women’s Center (“the Clinic”) for seven years as a pro-life advocate, commonly referred
to as a sidewalk counselor. She holds signs, attempts to speak with women entering the
Clinic, and speaks through a “small amplifier” to share her beliefs. Petitioner, who is
employed elsewhere, stands outside the Clinic on the roadside on a weekly basis.
       Alethea Skeen (“Alethea1”), along with Cheryl Hanzlik, Denise Skeen, and Rowan
Skeen (collectively “Respondents”), also frequented the Clinic. Their purported purpose
was to counter Petitioner’s efforts and offer support for those entering the Clinic.

        Petitioner and Respondents had several encounters in late 2019 and in January 2020
that led Petitioner to file petitions for orders of protection that would prohibit Respondents
from contacting her, coming close to her, causing intentional damage to her property, and
interfering with her efforts to assist women at the Clinic. As pertinent to this appeal,
Petitioner alleged as follows:

       On April 8, 2020, Alethea ran up to me and got directly in my face after I
       crossed from the east to the west side of Slaughter Street toward [the Clinic].
       Alethea was wearing a black face mask depicting a shark-tooth grin, and she
       was blaring loud music through a bullhorn pointed upward toward my head.
       Even though a male friend of mine tried to get between Alethea and me in
       order to protect me, Alethea kicked and shoved his sign, which hit me. She
       then screamed “Get away from me!” at the top of her lungs and directly in
       my face multiple times, before pointing for me to return to the east side of
       Slaughter Street. Alethea, who was also joined for a time by her mother
       Denise Skeen, then continuously circled around me very closely while
       continuing to blare the bullhorn noise. Later that same day, Alethea changed
       her Facebook Profile Cover Photo to a custom-made graphic stating: “erika
       GO THE [expletive] HOME.” . . . That same day, Alethea also posted on
       her Facebook page that “if the city doesn’t start enforcing the stay at home
       [sic] with the antis things are going to uptick again. And it won’t be pretty.”

       On April 7, 2020, Alethea posted on her Facebook page an apparently
       custom-made graphic featuring a close up picture of my face next to an in-
       studio television reporter, with a banner underneath stating: “WCYB[,
       BREAKING NEWS[:] Erika Denied Her Day in Court.” This was in
       reference to the fact my hearing for protection orders against Alethea and
       three other respondents that had been postponed due to COVID-19. Alethea
       also posted a commentary to the graphic in which she noted the hearing had
       been delayed and stated: “good luck my stalker,” followed by a heart symbol.

       On January 22, 2020, Alethea followed me very closely as I walked back to
       my vehicle located hundreds of feet away from [the Clinic], despite my
       repeated requests that she get away from me. She walked a circle around me
       in very close proximity to my body. She high-fived my hand without my
       consent. She told me to engage in a sexual act and stay home in “Mendota,

       1
         We will refer to Respondent Alethea by her first name throughout the opinion solely for the
purpose of clarity given the involvement of her family members in the other actions.
                                               -2-
Virginia,” where I live. After I got in my vehicle and Alethea stood watching
me close by, she attempted to stick her hand in my window after I had slightly
rolled it down to tell her to get away. She then ran alongside and after my
vehicle as I drove out of the parking lot.

On January 17, 2020, Alethea picked up a coffee mug that belonged to my
friend and fellow pro-life sidewalk counselor with whom I was standing on
the right-of-way that day. My friend had earlier set the coffee mug down on
the edge of the road (on the east side of Slaughter Street) and walked some
feet away. Alethea eventually crossed to the east side of Slaughter Street,
and in spite of my warning her that it was private property and didn’t belong
to her, retrieved the mug, and walked with it back to the abortion facility.
Later, after my friend and I had crossed over to the west side of Slaughter
Street, Alethea approached within several feet of us and heaved the mug end-
over-end directly toward us. The mug flew directly by us and skidded into
the street.

On December 23, 2019, Alethea approached me as I stood on the east side of
Slaughter Street (the opposite side from [the Clinic]), crowded into my
personal space while holding a large, open umbrella, told me to engage in a
sexual act, high-fived my hand as I held it up in front of my face, and refused
to back off and stop touching me despite my repeated requests that she do so.
She then followed me well within my personal space as I walked up and
down the street, stepping on my feet, grabbing me along my sides from
behind, and dancing in a sexually suggestive manner right up against me
despite my personal requests that she back off. When her sister, Rowan,
grabbed the leaflets out of my pocket and threw them on the ground, Alethea
picked them up and crumpled and destroyed them with her hands. She
continued to crowd into my personal space and follow me wherever I walked
despite my requests that she back off and stop touching me and my attempts
to move away from her to a different area of the public right of way.
Eventually a police officer showed up and separated Alethea and Rowan
from me and advised that I file a police report of the incident.

On November 13, 2019, despite my many requests that she stop doing so,
Alethea repeatedly pushed her body up against mine as I attempted to counsel
people on the west side of Slaughter Street. She crowded so close to me that
she pushed me eastward out into the street. She also followed me at
extremely close range as I walked up and down the public right of way
outside the [C]linic. She did all this despite my repeated requests that she
back off.

On October 2, 2019, with no sign of rain, Alethea and her sister Rowan
                                -3-
crowded into my personal space on the east side of Slaughter Street while
holding their open umbrellas. Alethea licked my bare hand and forearm
multiple times as I held it up to try to create some personal space, despite my
protests for her to stop. She also positioned herself behind me multiple times
and grabbed/tickled my sides by my waist, despite my repeated instructions
to her to stop touching me. She also pushed up against the sign I was holding
despite my requests that she back off and stop touching me. She also
followed me at very close range as I walked up and down Slaughter Street
despite my requests that she back off. I tried many times to walk away from
her to a different area of the public right of way, but she continued to follow
me and refused to let me deescalate the situation. Alethea and Rowan
continued this behavior even after all patients had left the [C]linic, thus
confirming their intent to target and harass me rather than “protect” patients
from my attempts to reach out to them and offer help.

In two other incidents, on September 18 and August 14, 2019, respectively,
Alethea followed me as I walked back to my car a substantial distance from
the [C]linic. Alethea physically encroached into my personal space despite
me being nowhere close to the [C]linic and completely unable to
communicate with patients at the time. She did so despite my repeated
requests that she stop following me.

On September 4, 2019, Alethea pushed her body up against me while holding
her large, open umbrella as I attempted to counsel people on the west side of
Slaughter Street, despite my repeated requests that she not touch me. When
I crossed over to the east side of Slaughter Street to move away from her,
Alethea soon also crossed the street and, joined now by her mother Denise
continued encroaching into my personal space. Alethea shrieked at me to
“suck it up, you little bitch.”

On September 3, 2019, Alethea posted on her Facebook page about the fact
that day she stood “in front of [me] to obscure [my] sight.” She
acknowledged that she “snuggled” against my sign and then wrote: “if you
don’t want [to be] blocked stay home babydoll. you do not have a right to
an audience. you know who I’m standing in front of tomorrow?? sweet old
Erika.”

On August 28, 2019, Alethea approached me on the east side of Slaughter
Street and aggressively bumped into my sign. She continued to stand directly
against my sign and directly in my face, telling me she didn’t need to back
off because “you’re on a public road.” She also screamed: “Take me to court!
And end all this! Either take me to court or this is your [expletive] life now
Erika.”
                                     -4-
On August 14, 2019, Alethea aggressively approached me on the east side of
Slaughter Street and, while holding a large rainbow-colored umbrella,
continually pushed and leaned against my sign, saying the fact it’s on a public
road gives her a right to do so, despite my objections. She followed me when
I tried to move away from her to a different part of the street. She then
hooked her entire arm onto my sign and told me I was a “piece of shit” when
I told her she needs to stop. She continued to follow me when I tried to move
away, and then she rested her armpit on my hand as she again latched onto
and leaned against my sign. She also stood alongside me holding the
umbrella handle inches from my body while the open umbrella covered my
sign from public view.

On August 7, 2019, Alethea approached me near [the Clinic’s] south
driveway along West State Street, where she stood right in my face, stepped
on my feet, and pressed her face up against my arm and hand while I tried to
keep her away from my body. She did all this while holding a large, open
rainbow-colored umbrella and despite my requests that she back away. She
responded that “it’s a public sidewalk, I can stand wherever the [expletive] I
want.”

On July 31, 2019, Alethea approached me on the east side of Slaughter Street
and stood continuously and directly in my face. She then blared a bullhorn
directly in my face, repeatedly shouting at me to “Shut the [expletive] up”
and then repeatedly blaring the words “Stop Speaking [or Talking] to Me!”
directly in my face no less than 37 times.

On July 17, 2019, Alethea approached me on the east side of Slaughter Street
and followed me wherever I walked, even when I tried to move away from
her multiple times by walking up and down the eastern edge of the road. She
also bumped her chest directly and aggressively into my body and stepped
on my feet. When I told her to stop stepping on my feet, she said “then go
away,” acknowledging she was indeed stepping on feet. She engaged in lewd
dance moves directly near my body and scolded me to go home.

On July 3, 2019, as I tried to counsel people by speaking gently through my
hand-held amplification device (which I began using because of Alethea’s
and others’ efforts to disrupt and drown out my message) Alethea confronted
me with a much louder bullhorn, directed toward me, on the west side of
Slaughter Street. Alethea sang unintelligible noises into her bullhorn to
prevent me from communicating with anyone. As I tried to step away from
her, she followed me and continued singing into her bullhorn pointed directly
at me. She also repeatedly voiced police siren noises into her bullhorn. By
this point she was joined by her father, James Skeen, who used his own
                                      -5-
       bullhorn to play “feedback” noises from a handheld device and from his
       smart phone. Together their conduct harassed me and forced me to walk
       away.

       Alethea’s conduct is entirely illegitimate and prevents my legitimate and
       legal efforts at counseling women in need. Inasmuch as my counseling will
       continue, Alethea’s conduct will continue. She has assured me of that on
       several occasions, saying that if I don’t like what she does, “All you’ve got
       to do is go home,” and “shut the [expletive] up.” Alethea has taunted me for
       being afraid, and says “You can expect this [inaudible] every week, Erika.
       This is what you have to look forward to every week.” She also states: “Stop
       coming to the [C]linic and this all ends.”

       All of these incidents have caused me significant mental suffering and
       distress, and have caused me to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
       threatened, harassed, and molested. All of these incidents would cause a
       reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
       harassed, or molested.

In sum, Petitioner alleged that Alethea stalked her by physically and verbally harassing
her, blaring sirens in her face, and shadowing her along the sidewalk.

        The trial court did not issue temporary ex parte orders of protection and denied
Petitioner’s request to consolidate the four cases. The court consolidated the hearings in
the interest of judicial economy but maintained each petition as a separate action.

       The consolidated hearing occurred on August 4, 2020, at which time Petitioner
submitted lengthy video evidence of her interactions with Respondents for the court’s
consideration. As to Alethea, Petitioner alleged that Alethea engaged in at least 16 separate
acts of stalking between July 2019 and April 2020. She claimed that Alethea frequently
crowded her space, pushed a large umbrella in her face, blared music in her face, blew into
her face, followed her along the street while stepping on her feet, bumped her chest into
her body, issued verbal insults that were, at times, of a sexual nature, and pushed and leaned
into her signage. Alethea continued in her behavior, despite Petitioner’s requests for her
to stop. Alethea also posted to her social media account warnings to Petitioner and
described her interactions with Petitioner for those following her social media page. As to
each Respondent, Petitioner testified that she felt anxious prior to her self-designated day
at the Clinic and that she felt exhausted and, at times, “violated” following her encounters
with them. She claimed she had difficulty working on the days she spent time at the Clinic.
She agreed that she was able to sleep upon her return home after a glass of wine to settle
her anxiety.

       Respondents did not submit evidence for the court’s consideration.
                                         -6-
        The trial court denied the petition for the order of protection, stating that Petitioner
failed to establish her allegations of stalking within the meaning of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-17-315(a)(4).2 The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice,
utilizing a form order that did not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
of the decision. Upon appeal to this court, we vacated the ruling and remanded for the
issuance of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Schanzenbach v. Skeen, No.
E2020-01196-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 3696884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2022).

        During the pendency of the appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued its
ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), in which
it held that the federal constitution does not provide a right to abortion. The Clinic at issue
here was closed. A similar clinic opened nearby in Virginia.

       Upon remand, Petitioner requested a new hearing to update the record due to the
passage of time, the Court’s ruling in Dobbs, and related changes in Tennessee.
Respondents opposed Petitioner’s request. The court denied further hearing and entered a
new order with findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its original dismissal
of the petition. The court found that there was no medical proof of emotional distress and
that the videotaped evidence did not support a claim of significant mental distress. The
court explained that Petitioner was seen putting her hands on others and that her continued
interactions did not reflect someone who had been terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested. The court further noted that the police were often
present in the videos, along with many other people. The court provided that Petitioner
voluntarily continued to appear at the Clinic and that the presence of both parties at the
Clinic served a legitimate purpose. This second appeal followed.

                                           II. ISSUES

       We consolidate and restate the issues raised on appeal as follows:

       A.     Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish Petitioner’s
       allegations of stalking in the form of harassment at the Clinic.

       B.     Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish Petitioner’s
       allegations of stalking in the form of electronic communication.

       C.      Whether this action is now moot as a result of the Clinic’s closure.

       2
          ‘“Stalking” means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of
another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested[.]”
                                                -7-
       D.     Whether this appeal is frivolous.

                              III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The trial court may issue an order of protection if “the petitioner has proven the
allegation of domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-605(b). “Proving an allegation by a preponderance of
the evidence requires a litigant to convince the trier-of-fact that the allegation is more likely
true than not true.” McEwen v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 825 n.19 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2005) (citing Austin v. City of Memphis, 684 S.W.2d 624, 634–35 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1984)).

       We review this non-jury case de novo upon the record, with a presumption of
correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). This presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact
and not to conclusions of law. Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn.
1996). The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no
presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court’s
determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall
not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Morrison v. Allen,
338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

       To the extent that this case requires that we construe statutes, our review is also de
novo. Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co., 27 S.W.3d 909, 911–12 (Tenn. 2000) (“Issues of
statutory construction are questions of law and shall be reviewed de novo without a
presumption of correctness.”). In construing statutes, we keep the following guidance in
mind:

       Our resolution of this issue is guided by the familiar rules of statutory
       construction. Our role is to determine legislative intent and to effectuate
       legislative purpose. The text of the statute is of primary importance, and the
       words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in
       which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose. When the
       language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts look no farther to
       ascertain its meaning. When necessary to resolve a statutory ambiguity or
       conflict, courts may consider matters beyond the statutory text, including
       public policy, historical facts relevant to the enactment of the statute and the
       entire statutory scheme. However, these non-codified external sources
       “cannot provide a basis for departing from clear codified statutory
       provisions.”

                                              -8-
Dallas v. Shelby Cnty. BOE, 603 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Mills v.
Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012) (citations omitted)).

                                    IV. DISCUSSION

                                              A.

       Petitioner claims that the trial court’s denial of relief for Alethea’s behavior at the
Clinic was error when the statute provides that any victim of stalking can obtain relief.
Petitioner cites the history of the legislative provisions in support of her claim, noting that
the pertinent statutes were expanded beyond the bounds of domestic disputes to include
victims of stalking, who may or may not have any prior relationship with the perpetrator.

       Orders of protection are statutorily governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-3-601, et seq. Prior to 2005, orders of protection were available only to those in
domestic relationships, whether related by marriage or otherwise involved in a relationship
with the perpetrator. The stated purpose of the statutes was

       to recognize the seriousness of domestic abuse as a crime and to assure that
       the law provides a victim of domestic abuse with enhanced protection from
       domestic abuse. A further purpose of this chapter is to recognize that in the
       past law enforcement agencies have treated domestic abuse crimes
       differently than crimes resulting in the same harm but occurring between
       strangers. Thus, the General Assembly intends that the official response to
       domestic abuse shall stress enforcing the laws to protect the victim and
       prevent further harm to the victim and the official response shall
       communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-618. In 2005, the General Assembly amended the statutes to also
protect victims of sexual assault and stalking, regardless of the relationship between the
victim and perpetrator. 2005 Tennessee Laws Pub. Ch. 381 (S.B. 645). However, the
legislative purpose and intent of the statutes remained, despite numerous updates to the
statutes and the inclusion of sexual assault and stalking victims. See generally Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-3-618 (reflecting no substantive changes since 1995).

       Pursuant to Section 36-3-602(a), a stalking victim may seek relief from the courts
pursuant to Title 36 when such person “has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed
in fear of, domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault.” “‘Stalking victim’ means any
person, regardless of the relationship with the perpetrator, who has been subjected to,
threatened with, or placed in fear of the offense of stalking, as defined in [section] 39-17-
315.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(11). Section 39-17-315(a)(4) defines stalking as

                                             -9-
      a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of
      another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized,
      frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually
      causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
      harassed, or molested.

Similarly,

      “Harassment” means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is
      not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause
      a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the
      victim to suffer emotional distress.        Harassment does not include
      constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate
      purpose[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-315(a)(3). Emotional distress is defined as “significant mental
suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other
professional treatment or counseling.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315(a)(2). Lastly,

      (5) “Unconsented contact” means any contact with another person that is
      initiated or continued without that person’s consent, or in disregard of that
      person’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.
      Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:

      (A)    Following or appearing within the sight of that person;

      (B) Approaching or confronting that person in a public place or on private
      property;

      (C)    Appearing at that person’s workplace or residence;

      (D) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by
      that person;

      (E)    Contacting that person by telephone;

      (F)    Sending to that person mail or any electronic communications,
      including, but not limited to, electronic mail, text messages, or any other type
      of electronic message sent using the internet, websites, or a social media
      platform; or

      (G) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
      leased, or occupied by that person[.]
                                          - 10 -
       Citing PLT v. JBP, No. 346948, 2019 WL 7206134 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2019),
Petitioner claims that she was entitled to an order of protection under the circumstances
presented here. In PLT, the appellate court in Michigan upheld a trial court’s grant of an
order of protection against a pro-life advocate for his behavior toward an employee at an
abortion clinic. 2019 WL 7206134, at *7. The respondent argued that his protests were
constitutionally protected conduct serving a legitimate purpose, which cannot constitute
harassment within the meaning of the Michigan statutes. Id. at *3. In determining whether
to uphold the order, the court in PLT noted that an individual’s right to free speech must
be considered alongside the right for others “to be let alone.” Id. at *3–4 (citing Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000)). Acknowledging that while “[p]ublic protests
regarding abortion, whether in support or opposition, serve legitimate political purposes,”
the court held that respondent’s actions “exceeded the permissible scope of the activity”
and violated the petitioner’s right to be let alone. Id. at *4. The court noted that the
respondent went beyond his political message and targeted the petitioner, directing his
comments toward her when other workers were present. Id. The court continued,

      Respondent’s conduct violated petitioner’s right to be let alone. Petitioner
      repeatedly told respondent that he was scaring her and to get away from her.
      Respondent ignored these requests. Accordingly, respondent was aware that
      his conduct was having a negative impact on petitioner. Despite this
      knowledge, respondent continued to approach petitioner. Consequently, the
      trial court could reasonably find, as it did, that respondent was no longer
      simply seeking to share his political viewpoint with someone who might be
      receptive to his beliefs. Instead, respondent was antagonizing an individual
      who knew his views, did not share them, did not wish to hear them, and had
      repeatedly asked him to stop because he was scaring her. Such conduct was
      no longer constitutionally protected because respondent violated petitioner’s
      right to be let alone when he repeatedly attempted to press his ideas on an
      unwilling participant. Respondent’s conduct no longer served a legitimate
      purpose because it exceeded the scope of his general anti-abortion protest,
      having moved from advocacy to threatening conduct. Accordingly,
      respondent’s behavior instead became that of an individual continually
      accosting someone who repeatedly asked him to stop and told him that he
      was scaring her. Thus, because respondent’s conduct did not serve a
      legitimate purpose, it was not constitutionally protected.

Id.

       Here, Petitioner argues that the reverse scenario was present in this case, namely
Alethea’s conduct moved from legitimate advocacy protected by her right to free speech
to threatening conduct, despite Petitioner’s repeated requests to leave her alone. Alethea
responds that the court’s opinion in PLT is neither binding nor applicable. She
distinguishes her behavior by claiming that she complied with Petitioner’s request not to
                                           - 11 -
touch and that she and Petitioner engaged in conversation, namely she told Petitioner to go
home, albeit in colorful language, while Petitioner accused her of supporting a place of
murder and bloodshed.

        We must first note that the parties’ treatment of clinic patients is not at issue in this
case. Further, unlike the facts presented in PLT, neither party is employed by the Clinic.
The matter before this court concerns the behavior between protestors from opposing sides
that also involves a balancing act between the right to free speech and the right to be let
alone as presented in PLT. The parties each appear at the Clinic voluntarily and with an
entourage. They engage frequently enough to know each other on a first name basis.
Petitioner defends herself, shares her opinion of the competing side openly and freely, and
returns week after week.3 In return, Respondents attempt to prevent Petitioner from
interacting with patients at the Clinic. At times, the police are also present and operate to
separate the two opposing groups. Interactions between Petitioner and the Respondents
are limited to the issue of their opposing viewpoints on abortion.

        Additionally, the trial court found that there was no medical proof of emotional
distress and that the videotaped evidence did not support a claim of significant mental
distress. The court explained that Petitioner was seen putting her hands on others and that
her continued interactions did not reflect someone who had been terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. The record confirms that Petitioner was
able to calm herself from her time at the Clinic with a glass of wine before bed. We agree
with the trial court’s assessment that Petitioner established no proof of emotional distress
to support her claims. The court further noted that the police were often present in the
videos, along with many other people. The court provided that Petitioner voluntarily
continued to appear at the Clinic and that the presence of both parties at the Clinic served
a legitimate purpose. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings.
In consideration of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition as it
related to the claims of stalking in the form of harassment at the Clinic.

                                                 B.

      Next, Petitioner asserts that the trial court further failed to consider Alethea’s social
media posts as stalking in accordance with this court’s decision in Purifoy v. Mafa, 556
S.W.3d 170, 189–190 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). In Purifoy, the petitioner (“Ms. Purifoy”)
was an attorney who testified at a hearing concerning the respondent (“Dr. Mafa”), an
occupational therapist. 556 S.W.3d at 175. Ms. Purifoy testified on behalf of a student
who sought an order of protection against Dr. Mafa. Id. Her testimony was not favorable
toward Dr. Mafa; however, the proceeding was ultimately dismissed with no order of

       3
         We acknowledge that Petitioner ceased her protesting activities for approximately two months
following an alleged incident of assault on May 27, 2020, but she has since returned.
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protection issued. Id. Approximately eight months later, Ms. Purifoy was alerted to a
series of lengthy posts and videos about her on Facebook that were posted by Dr. Mafa.
Id. at 176.

       On December 14, 2013, Ms. Purifoy contacted Dr. Mafa through direct message on
Facebook and asked him to remove the posts. Id. at 176. He neither responded nor
removed the posts. Id. She then filed a complaint in circuit court against Dr. Mafa, alleging
defamation in the form of libel and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. She sought an immediate temporary restraining order and injunctive relief concerning
the postings. Id. He did not respond through the court system. Instead, he posted yet
another message on Facebook in the form of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 176–77. The
message provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

       Hey Yee Lord, Judge in the chamber wearing the black hood looking all
       important, comes he before yee this scholarly defendant named Steele Balz.
       He seek[s] to dismiss and throw away this docket into the trash where the
       pigs reside[.] [The Communication Decency Act] gives him his godly
       powers to [speak] as he pleases on the computer[.]

                                            ***

       Your judgement for her would change American law and warn you. [W]e
       are watching you judge.

Id. Dr. Mafa later posted a picture of the petitioner he obtained from a bulletin juxtaposed
with a picture of his ex-girlfriend. Id. at 177.

       On December 31, 2013, Ms. Purifoy had a brief encounter with Dr. Mafa at a bar,
the events of which were described by a panel of this court in the Purifoy case as follows:

       Ms. Purifoy had previously informed the bouncer that she was trying to
       obtain service of process on Dr. Mafa. When she arrived with a friend on
       New Year’s Eve, the bouncer told them that Dr. Mafa was inside. Ms.
       Purifoy called the private process server then proceeded inside. The private
       process server never came. Ms. Purifoy and Dr. Mafa had a brief encounter
       at the bar, but their versions of what occurred vary tremendously. According
       to Ms. Purifoy, she approached Dr. Mafa and said something along the lines
       of “Don’t you think you shouldn’t be here?”, but Dr. Mafa acted like he did
       not know Ms. Purifoy, so she turned and walked away.

Id. at 177. On January 1, 2014, Dr. Mafa posted another picture with a lengthy post on his
Facebook page in which he described the interaction at the bar. Id. He described her body
and appearance and said she “was turning me on” by making wild gestures. Id. The next
                                         - 13 -
day, he filed a complaint against Ms. Purifoy, alleging assault. Id.

       The trial court issued a permanent injunction against Dr. Mafa on January 13, 2014.
Id. On January 23, 2014, Dr. Mafa appeared at the Family Service Center, where Ms.
Purifoy maintained an office. Id. at 178. He was not permitted to enter the building. Id.
He later asserted that he was there to obtain an order of protection against her but that he
was unaware she maintained an office in the building. Id. On February 20, Dr. Mafa was
spotted again at the Family Service Center, shortly after 6 p.m. in the parking lot. Id.

        On February 26, Ms. Purifoy filed a petition for an order of protection, alleging
stalking. Id. The court issued an ex parte order of protection immediately, finding that
Ms. Purifoy was under an immediate and present danger of abuse. Id. Following a hearing,
the trial court granted Ms. Purifoy an order of protection against Dr. Mafa for one year. Id.
at 188.

        Upon appeal to this court, Dr. Mafa argued, inter alia, that his Facebook posts did
not constitute “contact” within the meaning of the statutory definition of stalking because
the posts were on his social media page, not Ms. Purifoy’s. Id. at 188–89. This court
disagreed, finding that electronic communications such as posts on Facebook qualified as
contact or communication. Id. at 190. The court further held that Ms. Purifoy viewed the
postings, that her requests to remove them were ignored, and that his repeated unconsented
contact through the postings and in person visits to her place of employment “caused Ms.
Purifoy to subjectively experience significant distress within the meaning of the statute.”
Id. at 191.

       Here, the record reflects that Alethea posted on her Facebook page in reference to
Petitioner on three separate dates. On September 3, 2019, Alethea wrote that she stood in
front of Petitioner to obscure her sight and that she “snuggled” her. She continued,

       If you don’t want blocked stay home babydoll. [Y]ou do not have the right
       to an audience. [Y]ou know who I’m standing in front of tomorrow. Sweet
       old Erika.

On April 7, 2020, Alethea posted a custom graphic on her Facebook page featuring a
picture of Petitioner’s face next to an in-studio reporter with a caption reading, “ERIKA
DENIED HER DAY IN COURT.” In the post itself, Alethea wrote,

       Erika was supposed to have her day in court today (getting an order of
       protection against someone she comes to stalk weekly) but it’s pushed back
       until at LEAST June.

       [G]ood luck my stalker[.]

                                           - 14 -
        (nobody even remembered it was supposed to be today including us)

The next day, on April 8, Alethea changed her Facebook cover photo to a custom graphic
stating, “ERIKA GO THE =UCK HOME.” She then posted the following comment on
her Facebook page:

        [I]f the city doesn’t start enforcing the stay at home order with the antis4
        things are going to uptick again. And it won’t be pretty.

        We agree with Petitioner that Alethea’s Facebook posts qualify as repeated
unconsented contact within the meaning of the statute. The question remains as to whether
these posts actually caused Petitioner to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315(a)(4) (requiring such a finding
to sustain an allegation of stalking necessitating the issuance of an order of protection).
The trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and found that Petitioner failed to
establish the requisite mental distress to establish her claims. Our review of the record
reflects that Petitioner did not offer testimony concerning her feelings of distress directly
related to the Facebook postings but offered her general sense of distress following the in-
person interactions with Respondents. Petitioner also did not establish that she requested
the removal of the posts as the petitioner did in Purifoy. With all of the above
considerations in mind, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition as it related to the
unconsented contact in the form of electronic communication.

                                                   C.

       We acknowledge that time has marched on since the filing of our initial decision in
which we remanded this matter to the trial court. Accordingly, in the event of further
appellate review, we will address Alethea’s assertion that this action is now moot because
the Clinic no longer exists. Alethea further explains that the parties have not interacted for
some time as a result of the closure of the Clinic. Petitioner acknowledges the closure of
the Clinic identified in her petitions but submits that an order of protection entered in
Tennessee would operate to bar further stalking in the form of harassment from
Respondents at the new clinic located in Virginia. She further asserts that any voluntary
cessation of illegal activity cannot support a finding a mootness when the Respondents will
be free to resume the same conduct once the action has been dismissed as moot.

       Courts limit their role to deciding “‘legal controversies.’” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch
Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam County, 301 S.W.3d 196, 203 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting White
v. Kelton, 232 S.W. 668, 670 (Tenn. 1921)). A proceeding is deemed a legal controversy

        4
          The record reflects that Alethea referred to the Petitioner and others as “antis,” seemingly in
reference to their views against abortion.
                                                 - 15 -
“when the disputed issue is real and existing, and not theoretical or abstract, and when the
dispute is between parties with real and adverse interests.” Id. (citations omitted). “A moot
case is one that has lost its justiciability either by court decision, acts of the parties, or some
other reason occurring after commencement of the case.” Id. at 204. “[W]hen the question
of mootness is raised, [courts] consider many factors, including the reason that the case is
alleged to be moot, the stage of the proceeding, the importance of the issue to the public,
and the probability that the issue will recur.” Id.

        Petitioner is correct in her assertion that a protection order issued in this state would
be afforded full faith and credit in Virginia.5 However, issuing such an order at this stage
of the proceedings would operate as an advisory or theoretical opinion when the disputed
issue between the parties is no longer real and existing in this state. Accordingly, we hold
that this action has been rendered moot by the closure of the Clinic.

                                                       D.

       Alethea asserts that this new appeal is frivolous and lacking of justiciable issues,
thereby entitling her to attorney’s fees on appeal. Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-
1-122, provides that:

        When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of
        record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon
        motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the
        appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on the
        judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.

        The decision whether to award damages for a frivolous appeal rests solely in our
discretion. Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Appellate
courts exercise their discretion to award fees under this statute “‘sparingly so as not to
discourage legitimate appeals.’” Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tenn.
2017) (quoting Whalum v. Marshall, 224 S.W.3d 169, 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).
“‘Successful litigants should not have to bear the expense and vexation of groundless
appeals.’” Whalum, 224 S.W.3d at 181 (quoting Davis v. Gulf Ins. Grp., 546 S.W.2d 583,
586 (Tenn. 1977)). “A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or one in which
there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.” Indus. Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d
382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Exercising our discretion in such matters, we respectfully

        5
            “Any protection order issued . . . by the court of one State [] shall be accorded full faith and credit
by the court of another State [] and enforced by the court and law enforcement personnel of the other State
[] as if it were the order of the enforcing State[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2265.
                                                     - 16 -
deny Alethea’s request for fees on appeal.

                                   V. CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The case is
remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed
to the appellant, Erika Jean Schanzenbach.

                                                      _________________________________
                                                      JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE

                                             - 17 -