Court Opinion

ID: 9747659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:26:24.475453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.320838
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.,
This appeal is taken from judgments of sentence rendered following non-jury trials and verdicts of guilty on various charges of operating a lottery.1 On October 18, 1974, trial was held before Judge John W. O’Brien, who adjudicated appellant guilty and, on January 14, 1975 suspended a sentence of imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 6%<f, and placed appellant on probation for three years and ordered a fine of $5,000.00 to be paid.
On October 24, 1974, another trial was held before Judge Loran L. Lewis, who adjudicated appellant guilty *110and, on January 14, 1975, imposed sentence of eight to twenty-three months imprisonment together with a fine of 6%$, sentence to be stayed pending appeal to this Court. We ordered the appeals consolidated. There is one issue pertaining to both cases, viz., whether or not the affidavits to the search warrants as executed on J.P. Criminal 74-R2006 Form promulgated by our Supreme Court of Pennsylvania were in substantial compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure No. 2006. As to each case, a search warrant was issued and search made of premises described therein, resulting in arrest of appellant and seizure of certain items of evidence which were the subject of suppression motions in each trial. Suppression motions were denied. Appellant now alleges that denial of these motions was error, arguing that the warrant forms’ failure to contain both a certification for the jurat and a separate one for the issuance of the warrant instead of one certification serving both purposes is a fatal defect. In each case, the contents of the warrants and information alleged in the affidavit are not otherwise challenged.
With respect to the appeal at our Number 342 April T., 1975, Trooper Drish of the Gambling Detail of the Pennsylvania State Police surveilled the appellant’s activities at and near No. 7134 Thomas Boulevard in the City of Pittsburgh, on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th of May, 1974. With the information he acquired from his observations together with other substantial information giving him probable cause he secured a search warrant on May 20, 1974, for the apartment above a garage at the rear of 7134 Thomas Boulevard and for the person of appellant. On that same day he executed the search warrant. In the apartment was the appellant, 18 brown paper bags containing “numbers” slips for past bets, a shoe box containing tapes for an adding machine, numbers slips and $300.00 in currency, a Victor adding machine, and a clip board containing current numbers bets. The post-dated and current numbers slips indicated a total play of $111,000.00.
*111With respect to the appeal at our Number 287 April Term, 1975, Trooper Drish on June 6, 1974 having information giving him probable cause secured a search warrant for Room 403 at the Sheraton Inn in the Monroeville Mall, together with warrants to search the persons of appellant and a co-defendant Alfred R. Schipani, Jr. On that same day, he and two other Troopers executed the warrants. In the lobby of the Inn, Mr. Schipani was found. He had a paper bag containing current numbers bets totaling approximately $3,051.00 and dated June 6, 1974. In the room (apartment) there were the appellant, another person, two adding machines, a suitcase containing bags of numbers slips and currency in the amount of $455.00. The plays indicated on the numbers slips found in the room were as follows:
$9,876.54 for May 31, 1974;
1,740.68 for June 1;
10,795.80 for June 3;
8,348.10 for June 4;
9,395.29 for June 5; and
5,526.05 for June 6, 1974.
With further respect to the appeal at Number 342 April Term, 1975, the record indicates no filing of any post-trial motions.2 The docket entries have no reference to them nor to any order refusing such motions. Ordinarily we would be foreclosed from considering any issues in this appeal under the ruling in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 324, 327 A.2d 77 (1974). However, the opinion of the court below states that “the defendant’s Motion for a New Trial and Arrest of Judgment was also denied” and the opinion considers the one issue of whether or not the affidavit accompanying the search warrants was in substantial compliance with Pa. R. *112Crim. P. 150. One basic reason for the foreclosure by the Appellate Courts from consideration of any issues not raised by post-trial motions is that failure to raise them below deprives the lower court of the opportunity to consider them. Here the court below took the opportunity to consider the one issue relating to the warrant affidavit. Furthermore the identical issue is raised in the appeal at Number 287 April Term, 1975. Hence we will consider that issue as if it were properly raised in both appeals.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article 1, §8 and the Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 2003 set forth the requirements for issuance of a search warrant. In pertinent part, Rule 2003, reflecting the Constitutional provision, provides as follows:
“(a) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority.”
The appellant attacks the affidavits of Trooper Ronald Drish claiming that because there is not one place for the issuing authority to sign and affix his seal to the jurat and another separate place for him to sign and affix his seal for his issuance of the search warrant the affidavit is in effect no affidavit.
There is no separate definition of an affidavit in the Pa. R. Crim. P. The word is defined in one of our statutes, November 25, 1970, P. L. 707, No. 230, added December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, §3, as amended December 10, 1974, P.L. 816, No. 271, §4, imd. effective, 1 Pa. C. S. §1991:
“ ‘Affidavit.’ A statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to or affirmed before an officer authorized by the laws of this Commonwealth to take acknowledgments of deeds, or authorized to administer oaths, or before the particular officer or individual designated by law as the one before whom it is to or may be taken, and officially certified to in the case of an officer under his seal of office.”
*113Case law defines an “affidavit” as a statement in writing under oath administered by a duly authorized person. In Re: Breidt, 84 N.J. Eq. 222, 94 A. 214 (1915); Youngker v. State of Florida, Fla. App. Ct., 215 S. 2d 318 (1968); Womack v. Allstate Insurance Company, Tex. Civ. App., 286 S.W. 2d 308 (1956).
The application for the search warrant in the instant case after the caption starts out as follows:
“Tpr. Ronald Drish Penna. State Police 565-5700 being duly sworn (or affirmed) before me according to law, deposes and says that there is probable cause to believe that certain property is evidence of or the fruit of a crime or is contraband or is unlawfully possessed or is otherwise subject to seizure, and is located at particular premises or in the possession of particular person as described below.”
Thereafter continues a recitation of the facts and circumstances supporting probable cause followed by the signature of “Ronald Drish.” Immediately thereafter continues the following language:
“TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: WHEREAS, facts have been sworn to or affirmed before me by written affidavit(s) attached hereto from which I have found probable cause, I do authorize you to search the above described premises or person, and to seize, secure, inventory, and make return according to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the above described items. This Warrant should be served as soon as practicable but in no event later than 1:50[ ]A.M.[X]P.M. June 8th, 1974 and shall be served only during daytime hours of 6 A.M. to 10 P.M.
Issued under my hand this 6th day of June, 1974, at 1:50 P.M. o’clock.
/s/ John H. Saltón
(SEAL)”
From the foregoing it is readily seen that the document *114in question is a statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer designated by law as the one before whom it is to be taken and officially certified to under the seal of his office. In other words it is an affidavit.
The appellant nevertheless claims that since the form J.P. Criminal 74-R2006 does not comply exactly with the sample required by Rule 2006 the affidavit must be struck down. He points out that the sample has one place for the magistrate to sign and seal a jurat and another place for him to sign and seal his issuance of the warrant. He claims that since the magistrate signed and sealed only in one place the affidavit is not signed and sealed by the magistrate and is invalid.
The appellant relies on Commonwealth v. McAfee, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 336, 326 A.2d 522 (1974). In McAfee, there was no complaint about the lack of a place for the magistrate to sign and seal. There was a jurat to be used but the magistrate had not signed or sealed the jurat. We held that the complete absence of any written record that the affiant was in fact sworn to his signed statement invalidated the search warrant and required suppression of the evidence seized. It should be noted that in McAfee the affidavit and the warrant were two separate papers. In the instant case both the affidavit and search warrant are one piece of paper. Appellant’s position would require us to hold that the form used for the affidavit and search warrant must be exactly the same as the form sample shown in the rule. The rule itself does not require such exactitude; it provides expressly that the affidavit and warrant shall be substantially in the form set forth in the rule. Substantially means “essentially” or to “an important degree.” A comparison of the form used in the instant case with that depicted in the rule discloses a variance to an unimportant degree and indicates that they are essentially the same. A jurat, when completed, is a certification that the signed statement made by the affiant was made under oath or affirmation.
*115Any realistic reading of the magistrate’s certification under his hand and seal leads to the conclusion that the signed written statement of the affiant was made under oath and that the certification substantially complies with Rule 2006. The form J.P. Criminal 74-R2006 was designed to combine the two certifications of the magistrate, the one for the jurat and the other for the issuance of the search warrant into one act to facilitate the work of the magistrate for the reason that the one would in the great majority of cases normally follow the other.
While in the appeal at Number 342 April Term, 1975, the magistrate executed the certification on the affidavit and warrant, in the appeal at Number 287 April Term, 1975, he neglected to sign and affix his seal to it. Appellant filed his motion to suppress in the case at 287 April Term, 1975, on the grounds not only that the affidavit was invalid because it wasn’t signed and sealed by the magistrate but also that there was no proper jurat for the magistrate to sign and seal and that the magistrate had not signed the issuance of the warrant. The Commonwealth then moved to amend the affidavit and warrant. The court below after a hearing allowed the amendment and permitted the magistrate to sign and seal the affidavit-warrant.
Under our ruling in Commonwealth v. McAfee, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 336, supra, had the Commonwealth in the instant case not amended, the appellant’s motion to suppress would prevail. The Commonwealth claims it had the right to amend, with leave of court, under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure particularly in the light of Rule 150. Rule 150 provides as follows:
“Rule 150. Defects in Complaint, Citation, Summons or Warrant
(a) Informal Defects:
No person arrested under a warrant or appearing in response to a summons or citation shall be *116discharged from custody nor shall any case be dismissed because of any informal defects in the complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, but the complaint, citation, summons or warrant, may be amended at any time so as to remedy any such informality.
(b) Substantive Defects:
If a complaint, citation, summons or warrant contains a substantive defect, the defendant shall be discharged unless he waives the defect. Nothing in this rule shall prevent the filing of a new complaint or citation and the issuance of process in which the defect is corrected in a proper manner.”
The rule expressly provides for the amendment of informal defects in the warrant of which the affidavit is a part. The comment to the rule says:
“Comment: ‘Informal defect’ refers to errors which do not prevent the substantive content of the document from being plainly understood.
Substantive defects would include those cases in which the defendant’s identity cannot be determined or in which the offense is not properly described.”
In the light of the comment did the defect prevent the substantive content of the document from being plainly understood? Gauged by one practical test no one did misunderstand the document. Looking to another test there was no reason not to understand the document. It contained a clear statement of facts showing probable cause for a search of Room 403 in the Sheraton Inn together with a warrant for such search. The appellant understood the warrant and so did the officers who executed it. Judged by another test there was no change in any of the substance of the document. There was no challenge to the warrant at the time it was executed. It was a de facto warrant and no prejudice resulted to the appellant because it wasn’t signed and sealed.
The facts and circumstances establishing probable cause were an integral part of the warrant. The absence *117of the magistrate’s signature and seal did not allow any enlargement or change in these facts and circumstances after the fact of execution of the warrant simply because it wasn’t signed by the magistrate. The trial court has discretion in the allowance of amendments under Rule 150 and we should not overrule the trial court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. We find no abuse of discretion in this case.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.

. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, 18 Pa. C.S. §5512.

. The transcript of the testimony indicates that counsel for appellant said he intended to file a motion for a new trial.