Court Opinion

ID: 9889774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 16:01:25.354922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:31.789613
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13831    Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 10/11/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13831
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ISAAC JACKIE SHARPE,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20200-RNS-1
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-13831

       Before WILSON, LUCK and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Appellant Isaac Sharpe appeals from the district court’s im-
       position of a 120 months’ sentence of imprisonment for his convic-
       tion for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
       Sharpe argues that the district court imposed a procedurally unrea-
       sonable sentence because it failed to consider adequately the 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors by, among other things, assigning insuffi-
       cient weight to mitigating evidence related to his upbringing and
       mental illness. Sharpe also argues that the district court imposed a
       substantively unreasonable sentence by imposing a significant up-
       ward variance based largely on his criminal history. Having read
       the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm Sharpe’s sen-
       tence.
                                        I.
              We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
       cretion, which includes both substantive and procedural reasona-
       bleness. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2020).
       The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of showing that
       the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d
       1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
              A sentence is procedurally reasonable when the district
       court properly calculates a defendant’s guideline range, treats the
       guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, duly considers the 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explains its chosen
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       22-13831               Opinion of the Court                         3

       sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597
       (2007). Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “shall im-
       pose a sentence suﬃcient, but not greater than necessary,” to re-
       ﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, promote respect for the law,
       and provide just punishment for the oﬀense; aﬀord adequate deter-
       rence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further crimes
       of the defendant; and provide the defendant with needed educa-
       tional or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
       treatment in the most eﬀective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-
       (D). In addition, the district court must consider the nature and cir-
       cumstances of the oﬀense and the history and characteristics of the
       defendant; the kinds of sentences available; the guideline sentenc-
       ing range; any pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid un-
       warranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
       records who have been convicted of similar conduct; and the need
       to provide restitution to any victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
              While a district court must consider all the § 3553(a) factors
       in determining a sentence, it is not required to state in its explana-
       tion that it has evaluated each factor individually. United States v.
       Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). The sentencing
       judge is under no duty to explain the sentence in “great detail.”
       United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
       However, a district court selecting a sentence outside the Guide-
       lines must have a justiﬁcation “suﬃciently compelling to support
       the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
       Ultimately, the district court “should set forth enough to satisfy the
       appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13831

       has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
       authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
       2468 (2007).
              As a preliminary matter, Sharpe’s argument that the district
       court procedurally erred by mislabeling a U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 depar-
       ture as a variance was raised for ﬁrst time in his reply brief. Because
       this argument was not included in Sharpe’s initial appellate brief,
       we do not address its merits. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d
       1284, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
               Further, Sharpe fails to meet his burden of proving that the
       district court abused its discretion and committed a procedural er-
       ror in imposing his sentence. The record shows that the district
       court explained its chosen sentence by identifying multiple
       § 3553(a) factors that justiﬁed its variance, including respect for the
       law, speciﬁc deterrence, and protection of the public. The district
       court considered Sharpe’s 1993 conviction for armed robbery and
       burglary with assault or battery while armed, which resulted in a
       12-year prison sentence; his conviction for aggravated battery on a
       law enforcement oﬃcer during an altercation while he was incar-
       cerated; and his numerous other arrests that did not result in con-
       victions. Moreover, the district court stated clearly that it had con-
       sidered the parties’ statements, and it speciﬁcally mentioned
       Sharpe’s mitigating evidence of his mental illness and diﬃcult
       childhood. We conclude that the district court’s assessment of the
       § 3553(a) factors, particularly Sharpe’s criminal history, provided a
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       22-13831               Opinion of the Court                          5

       “suﬃciently compelling” justiﬁcation for the court’s upward vari-
       ance. Accordingly, we aﬃrm as to this issue.
                                         II.
               A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substan-
       tively unreasonable sentence when it (1) fails to consider “relevant
       factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight
       to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
       judgment” by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. Irey, 612
       F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks omitted). The district court must
       impose a sentence that is “suﬃcient, but not greater than neces-
       sary,” to achieve the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Our
       review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence involves
       “examining the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Gon-
       zalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We will only vacate a
       sentence as unreasonable if we are left with a “deﬁnite and ﬁrm
       conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg-
       ment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
       lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts
       of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation marks omitted).
              District courts have “discretion to decide how much weight
       to give each § 3553(a) factor.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1323. And while
       the district court is required to consider all § 3553(a) factors, it is
       permitted to attach “great weight” to one factor over others.
       United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013). “Plac-
       ing substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely
       consistent with § 3553(a) because ﬁve of the factors it requires a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13831

       court to consider are related to criminal history.” United States v.
       Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). A sentence out-
       side of the guideline range is not presumed to be unreasonable, but
       we may consider the extent of a variance in our review of the rea-
       sonableness of a sentence. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230,
       1237-38 (11th Cir. 2009). “[A] district court has considerable discre-
       tion in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and
       the extent of one that is appropriate,” and we give that decision
       “due deference.” Id. at 1238 (quotation marks omitted).
               The record demonstrates that the district court did not
       abuse its discretion and imposed a substantively reasonable sen-
       tence. The district court’s assignment of signiﬁcant weight to
       Sharpe’s criminal history was not unreasonable, as district courts
       are permitted to attach more weight to some § 3553(a) factors over
       others, particularly when the factor given great weight is the de-
       fendant’s criminal history. See Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 638. Moreover,
       the district court did not abuse its discretion by assigning relatively
       little weight to the mitigation evidence related to Sharpe’s back-
       ground and mental illness, because district courts have discretion
       in deciding how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors. While the district
       court’s variance was signiﬁcant, it based its decision on multiple
       § 3553(a) factors, including Sharpe’s criminal history, promotion of
       respect for the law, deterrence, and protection of the public.
            Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
       ﬁrm Sharpe’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.