Court Opinion

ID: 9757381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:38:12.413516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.829727
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Associate Judge,
concurring, with whom Associate Judges MACK, FER-REN and TERRY, join as to Part VI:
I join the court’s conclusions that Georgetown University has violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act by denying the tangible benefits associated with “University Recognition” to the student groups Gay People of Georgetown University (GPGU) and Gay Rights Coalition (GRC) on the prohibited ground of their sexual orientation, and that the University’s free exercise defense is of no avail. I write separately to clarify the court’s holding as I understand it, and to differ with the approach of the lead opinion (authored by Judge Mack) to analyzing the free exercise claim.
I.
As I understand the court’s decision today, it affirms in part and reverses in part decisions of the trial court. It upholds Judge Braman’s finding of discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Act to the extent that that finding was based on the University’s withholding of material benefits from the gay student groups. To the extent that Judge Braman’s ruling had encompassed the denial of whatever intangible benefits are connected with “University Recognition,” the court’s opinion today reverses that holding as a matter of statutory construction. Finally, today’s decision reverses Judge Bacon’s determination that enforcement of the Human Rights Act in the circumstances of this case would work an unconstitutional infringement of the University’s rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
The Human Rights Act requires educational institutions to provide “facilities and services” on an equal basis without regard to various characteristics of the persons served, including their sexual orientation. That these “facilities and services” can include only tangible items should be apparent from the plain language of the statute, and, as the lead opinion notes, lead op. at 32, from our obligation to construe statutes in a manner as to avoid constitutional questions. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 297, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). Therefore, in analyzing the constitutional claim, we need concern ourselves only with those tangible benefits that accompany a student group’s elevation from one with “Student Body Endorsement” to one with “University Recognition.” We are told that these benefits consist of: officially approved use of a mailbox; use of the Computer Label Service; use of mailing services; and the opportunity to apply for funding. That these facilities and services were denied to the plaintiffs in this case on the impermissible basis of their *41sexual orientation cannot seriously be disputed on this record.
II.
As for Georgetown’s free exercise defense, I believe that the lead opinion wrestles unduly with the question of whether the District’s interest in enforcing its anti-discrimination statute is a “compelling” governmental interest, as required for it to withstand first amendment scrutiny. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. at 1413 (1981). The legislature of the District of Columbia has spoken with unmistakable clarity of the importance with which it regards the eradication of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and other inappropriate criteria. In enacting the legislation, the Council sought to “underscore [it’s] intent that the elimination of discrimination within the District of Columbia should have ‘the highest priority’” (citations omitted). Council of the District of Columbia, Committee Report on Bill 2-179, “The Human Rights Act of 1977,” at 3 (July 5, 1977). While the lead opinion recognizes this expressed interest of the District of Columbia Council, see lead op. at 67-71, it appears to give that legislative determination no deference whatsoever, instead engaging in its own de novo evaluation of the importance of the interest, id. at 71-82.
While the ultimate constitutional question is, of course, for the judiciary alone to decide, the kind of legislative-like weighing of interests revealed by the lead opinion is inappropriate here. For even in constitutional adjudication “a court cannot lightly dispute a determination by the political branches that the ... interests at stake are compelling....” Finzer v. Barry, 255 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 28, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (1986), cert. granted sub nom. Boos v. Barry, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1282, 94 L.Ed.2d 141 (1987) (free speech clause). While courts have not delineated the precise contours of this deference, they have recognized, sometimes implicitly, that some measure of deference is warranted. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 1313, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society”) (free exercise clause).
There may be sound reasons why courts have avoided defining explicitly a particular standard of deference to legislative findings when assessing a constitutional claim. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[announced degrees of ‘deference’ to legislative judgments, just as levels of ‘scrutiny’ which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-70, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2654, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981). My quarrel with the lead opinion is simply that it fails to recognize any measure of deference at all.
III.
There are two reasons why the courts do not sit as super-legislatures to divine the importance of governmental interests. The first is that the government bears the burden of proof in seeking to uphold the constitutionality of a statute; when a fundamental right is at stake, the burden is on the government to show the existence of a compelling interest. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Therefore, infringement of a free exercise interest can be justified “only by proof by the State of a compelling interest.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987). If a court could substitute completely its judgment for that of the state, it would render this burden of proof nugatory. See Thomas, supra, 450 U.S. at 719, 101 S.Ct. at 1432; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963) (refusing to credit state interests that were not supported by the record or not raised below).
The second reason why we owe some measure of deference to the government’s *42determination of the importance of its interest is a recognition of the expertise of the political branches in making such assessments. As this second reason suggests, our deference on the question of what is a “compelling” governmental interest is necessarily of a limited nature. “The deference we owe is not to the government’s legal judgment that the statute is constitutional, but to their factual discussion of the nature and depth of the ... interests that are involved.” Finzer, supra, 255 U.S.App.D.C. at 29, 798 F.2d at 1460 (emphasis in original).
Hence, this court in considering a constitutional claim for a religious exemption from the narcotics laws “cho[]se not to accept appellant’s suggestions that in balancing competing interests, we take into account evidence minimizing dangers from marijuana abuse,” and reasoned that “[t]his court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature....” Whyte v. United States, 471 A.2d 1018, 1021 (D.C.1984). Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court, while upholding a free exercise claim by Amish children and their parents for exemption from aspects of Wisconsin’s compulsory education requirements, cautioned that “courts must move with great circumspection” in creating religious exemptions from generally applicable requirements since “courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory education.” Id. at 235, 92 S.Ct. at 1543. If legislatures, as distinguished from courts, have expertise in the dangers of drug abuse and the educational needs of children, then certainly they have expertise warranting judicial deference on the social necessity of antidis-crimination legislation.
The District of Columbia Council was confident of both the “importance and noncontroversial character” of the Human Rights Act’s purposes. Council of the District of Columbia, Committee Report of Bill 2-179, supra, at 1 (noting that twelve of the thirteen Council Members had co-sponsored the bill). We owe that legislative assessment some degree of deference.
IV.
Whatever measure of deference courts may give to a legislative judgment, that deference is especially appropriate where, as here, there is evidence of record that the legislature was aware of competing claims of constitutional magnitude. See Rostker, supra, 453 U.S. at 72-74, 101 S.Ct. at 2655-56 (constitutionality of Congress’ exclusion of women from military draft supported by legislative record revealing that the exclusion was a considered legislative choice and not enacted “ ‘unthinkingly’ ” or as the “ ‘accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females’ ”) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court’s free exercise decisions suggest that the Court may give more deference to the legislative choice when a religious objector seeks exemption from a statutory scheme that already admits of some exception for religious adherents. For example, in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed. 2d 127 (1982), the Court refused to extend the social security tax’s exemption for self-employed Amish to other Amish employers and employees. In so doing, the Court noted that “Congress has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system.... Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs — Congress drew a line_” Id. at 260-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1057.1
*43In enacting the Human Rights Act, the District of Columbia Council included a section that permits religious institutions to discriminate in favor of co-religionists when doing so is designed to further the institution’s religious principles.2 Political organizations similarly are permitted to discriminate in favor of those of the same political persuasion.3 By incorporating these exceptions into the Human Rights Act, the District of Columbia Council signaled its awareness of the special role that religious and political belief plays in our constitutional order. At the same time, however, in prohibiting discrimination on grounds other than religion or political affiliation, or in any circumstances other than those embraced by the terms of these exceptions, the Council made plain that no further exception should be tolerated. In taking this view, our legislature implicitly determined that the importance of outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation outweighs competing religious claims. This least restrictive means determination, along with the Council’s assessment of the overall importance of the governmental interest, is entitled to at least a modicum of this court’s deference.4
V.
By failing to walk that “middle ground between a judicial House of Lords and the abandonment of any limitation on the other branches,” a court is likely to forget “what are surely the main qualities of law, its generality and its neutrality.” Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HaRV.L.Rev. 1, 16 (1959). By engaging in a legislative-like ab initio assessment of the importance of the asserted governmental interest, a court risks ignoring the more traditional judicial task of comparing like cases to determine the appropriate outcome in the instant one. In so doing, it would forget “the very essence of [the] judicial method to insist upon attending to such other cases.” Id. at 15. A brief review of the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence assures us that the government has met its burden of demonstrating that its interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act outweighs Georgetown University’s claim for religious exemption.
The Supreme Court has held a variety of governmental interests sufficient to sustain facially neutral laws or regulations challenged by religious objectors under the free exercise clause. In Goldman, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1314, the Court held that the military’s interest in “uniformity” permitted it to enforce its dress regulations to prohibit an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from wearing a yarmulke while on duty. In Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 260, 102 S.Ct. at 1057, the “broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system” prevented exemption from the Social Security tax for an Amish employer employing other Amish. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), the state’s interest in “improving the health, safety, morals and general well-being of ... citizens” permitted enforcement of Sunday closing laws against merchants who observed a Saturday Sabbath. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 441-42, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), the “interests of society to protect the welfare of children” permitted the state to *44apply its child labor law to bar a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious literature on the streets.
By contrast, in those cases in which the Court has upheld a free exercise challenge and required the government to make exception to its general scheme in order to accommodate a religious objector, it has made clear that the government presented only the weakest of interests to support its refusal to make such an accommodation. In Thomas, supra, 450 U.S. at 719, 101 S.Ct. at 1432, and Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. at 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1795, the Court found that the states' asserted interests were without support in the record or had not been raised below. These cases involved the denial of unemployment compensation to employees who had left their employment rather than comply with a job task, Thomas, or work schedule, Sherbert, that conflicted with religious beliefs. The states argued that granting compensation would lead to fraudulent claims and dilution of the fund. See 450 U.S. at 718-19, 101 S.Ct. at 1432; 374 U.S. at 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1795.
In Yoder, supra, the Court determined to uphold the free exercise claim because to reject it “would do little to serve those interests” that the state had advanced in favor of enforcement of its law. 406 U.S. at 222, 92 S.Ct. at 1536. Cf. Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S. at 787-88, 98 S.Ct. at 1422 (“However weighty [the state’s] interests may be ..., they either are not implicated in this case or are not served at all ... by the prohibition_”) (footnote omitted). Taking into consideration the Amish way of life and the fact that the Amish were willing to comply with the state’s requirements up through the eighth grade, the Court concluded that “Wisconsin’s interest in compelling the school attendance of Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance for children generally.” Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 228-29, 92 S.Ct. at 1540.
The Court in Yoder was also confident that no “harm ... to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare” would result from exempting the religious objectors from application of the law. Id. at 230, 92 S.Ct. at 1540. Cf. Whyte, supra, 471 A.2d at 1021 (refusing to grant religious exemption since “plainly enforcement of the CSA [Controlled Substances Act] directly operates to protect the public from the dangers of drug abuse and its repurcussions”). Moreover, the Court was mindful that it was dealing with a “way of life that ... interferes with no rights or interests of others,” Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 224, 92 S.Ct. at 1537. See also West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1181, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (“The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual”). By contrast, what is particularly compelling about the governmental interest asserted in this case is that it directly pits the civil rights of others against the claims of the religious objector.
While government cannot compel religious or other belief, Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), it can require persons and institutions to comport their behavior to secular moral norms. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (refusing to exempt Mormons from application of anti-polygamy statute). Nondiscrimination is such a secular norm. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257, 85 S.Ct. 348, 357, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (public accommodations laws are designed to combat the “moral and social wrong” of discrimination). In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has extinguished any doubt that the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws is a compelling governmental interest when poised against a first amendment objection. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the Court recognized that the government’s “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education” outweighed the free exercise claim of a private religious school that challenged the denial of tax-exempt status. In Roberts v. United States Jay*45cees, 468 U.S. 609, 626, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3254, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), the Court held that Minnesota’s law “[assuring women equal access to ... goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state interests.” Roberts permitted the state to enforce its public accommodations law to require a private organization to admit women members in the face of a freedom of association claim. Most recently, in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1948, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987), confronted by a similar challenge to the application of a California statute, the Court reaffirmed that “public accommodations laws ‘plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order,’ ” quoting Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 624, 104 S.Ct. at 3253.
Finally, the Supreme Court has indicated that the compass of the right to free exercise of religion is measured not only by the importance of the governmental interest but by the nature of the burden imposed on the religious objector. See, e.g., Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147 (cautioning against “strikpng] down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself”). I do not understand Georgetown to argue that discrimination against any persons or groups is a tenet of its faith. Rather, it claims that providing the disputed facilities and services to the gay student organizations infringes the University’s religious interest in embracing a particular doctrine of sexual ethics. Therefore, to require the University to make available its facilities and services in an even-handed manner works, at most,5 an indirect infringement of its religious interest. For just as enforcement of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of political affiliation does not signify endorsement of any particular political party, enforcement of the Human Rights Act’s ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation does not signify endorsement by the government or by the covered entity of any particular doctrine of sexual ethics. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (“State’s interest [wa]s to disseminate an ideology”); Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 631, 63 S.Ct. at 1182 (state action involved “compulsion ... to declare a belief”). Rather, it simply recognizes as irrelevant a person’s sexual orientation in the provision of facilities and services by an educational institution.
VI.
Finally, I note that Judge Belson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, has determined that there is a constitutional distinction between the Human Rights Act’s stricture against sexual orientation discrimination and its bar against racial discrimination. While expressly acknowledging that “[i]n evaluating the District of Columbia’s governmental interest in eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation, it is appropriate to give great weight to the judgment of the District of Columbia Council,” J. Belson’s op. at 160, he nonetheless chooses to ignore the legislative judgment. He finds — contrary to the law’s text and history — that it is “reasonable to postulate” that the Council did not intend the various grounds of discrimination to be regarded equally. Id. at 161. From this assumption he goes on to conclude that the District’s interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination is a less than compelling governmental interest. Judge Belson would therefore have the University prevail on its free exercise claim.
In Judge Belson’s view, “it cannot be said that the goal of eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation ... has attained the same high priority as public policy, in the District of Columbia or *46nationally, as has the goal of eliminating racial discrimination.” Id. The Council’s actions, however, baldly contradict this assessment as to the public policy of the District of Columbia. Whether or not his is an accurate observation about national policy has no relevance to our consideration of the question in this case; plainly, an interest need not be national in scope to be compelling. See lead op. at 82 note 25. Moreover, an interest need not be identical in weight to some other compelling interest to be compelling itself.
The legislature of the District of Columbia regarded as one of its first priorities after attaining home rule to enact an anti-discrimination statute that includes sexual orientation as a co-equal prohibited ground of discrimination. See id. at 69-70. Indeed, as Judge Belson himself observes, “neither he statutory language nor [the Act’s] legislative history indicates whether the Council intended to assign any hierarchy to the several proscribed bases for discrimination.” J. Belson’s op. at 160-61. It is precisely this fact, i.e., that the Council made no distinction among the various prohibited grounds while at the same time it emphasized that the elimination of discrimination was of the “highest priority,” see ante at 41, citing Council of the District of Columbia, Committee Report of Bill 2-179, that provides the basis for concluding that the governmental interest asserted here is a compelling one.
Our statute, like the Minnesota public accommodations act scrutinized by the Supreme Court in Roberts, “reflects th[is jurisdiction’s] strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services.” 468 U.S. at 624, 3253. The District of Columbia Human Rights Act and those of the various states “provide[] the primary means for protecting the civil rights of the historically disadvantaged” when the federal government fails to offer such protection, id. (noting the role of states in protecting civil rights in the period before 1957). The District of Columbia Council, determining to pioneer where the federal government, and indeed many state governments, have not, has chosen to include sexual orientation discrimination within the ambit of those forms of discrimination that it deems anathema in this jurisdiction. See generally id. (evolution of antidiscrimination legislation has involved progressive broadening of scope of facilities covered and groups protected). This provision, no less than the Act’s more traditional prohibitions, deserves the deference of this court.
VII.
Postscript
In light of Judge Ferren’s opinion, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part, I reemphasize that the only issues in this case are: first, what does the Human Rights Act require; and, second, does enforcement of the Act violate Georgetown’s first amendment rights? The answer to the first question is that the Human Rights Act compels educational institutions in the District of Columbia to provide “facilities and services” on an equal basis without regard to the sexual orientation of the persons served. Such facilities and services necessarily include only tangible items. The answer to the second question is that enforcement of the Act as thus construed does not unconstitutionally infringe the University’s rights under the first amendment. I reject Judge Ferren’s view that I ought to decide that which is not before us in this case, specifically, the use of the University’s name by the gay student groups.

.D.C.Code § l-2503(b) (1981) provides:
Nothing contained in the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to bar any religious or political organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious or political organization, from limiting employment, or sales, or rental of housing accommodations, or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or political persuasion as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious or political principles for which it is established or maintained.

. See note 2, supra.

. Some commentators suggest that the least restrictive means/compelling interest assessment is a single inquiry. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 Yale L.J. 350, 359 n. 55 (1980). Others caution against equating the state’s interest in denying an exemption to a religious objector with its generalized interest in maintaining the underlying rule or program, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-10, at 855 (1978).

. Arguably, given the court's construction of the Act, there has been no infringement of a religious interest in this case. 1 am willing to assume, however, with the lead opinion, see lead op. at 31-32, that the University has met the threshold requirements for bringing a free exercise claim. See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57, 102 S.Ct. at 1055.