Court Opinion

ID: 9770596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:11:25.178763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.684791
License: Public Domain

On Motions of Appellants and Appellees for .Rehearing.
We have concluded that on original hearing we erred in holding that the following special issues requested by appellants to be submitted were merely evidentiary and not ultimate issues, to-wit:
(1) whether deceased was operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time he sustained his injuries, and
(2) whether such act was a proximate cause of his injuries.
If the deceased were guilty of operating his automobile upon a public *268highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, such act would be in violation of P.C. Article 802 and would constitute negligence per se. And we held that there was evidence before the jury which would authorize the jury to have so concluded. — The deceased, like everyone else, was charged with the knowledge “that it is dangerous for an intoxicated driver to operate a motor vehicle upon the streets and highways, dangerous not only to pedestrians and occupants of other vehicles but as well to those who ride with the intoxicated driver.” Schiller v. Rice, Tex.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 607, 614.
In the cited case the Supreme Court held that the act of guests in voluntarily and knowingly riding in a motor vehicle under the indicated circumstances, was, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of injuries sustained by them by reason of the intoxication of the driver. It would necessarily follow that the act of a person in driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in violation of P.C. Article 802, would be the proximate cause of any injuries he received if “in the light of all of the attending circumstances the injury was such as ought reasonably to have been anticipated as a consequence of the act.” Galveston, H. & S. A..Ry. Co. v. Bell, 110 Tex. 104, 216 S.W. 390, 391; 30 Tex.Jur. 700, and cases there cited.
We based our holding on original hearing, that the issues in question were evidentiary and not ultimate issues, primarily upon the cases of Benoit v. Wilson, Tex.Sup., 239 S.W.2d 792, and Scott v. Gardner, 137 Tex. 628, 156 S.W.2d 513, 141 A.L.R. 50. In the Benoit case the evidence showed that the deceased met his death by reason of an explosion of gas in the room in which lie was staying and that he was intoxicated at the time, and the Supreme Court expressly pointed out that the condition of intoxication, standing alone, was insufficient to establish negligence or proximate cause but there must be evidence of other misconduct sufficient to establish by preponderance of evidence that he was guilty of performing some act or failing to perform some act which an ordinarily prudent person would have performed before he could be found guilty of contributory negligence which would have defeated a recovery. In other words, a reasonably prudent person could not have anticipated that the mere act of becoming and remaining intoxicated, standing alone, would result in an explosion of gas taking place in the room where the deceased was spending the night and result in his death. The mere act of being intoxicated, in and of itself, and standing alone, is not denounced by P.C. Article 802. But it is the act of driving an automobile upon the public highway, etc., while under the influence of intoxicating liquor that is so denounced and which is thereby made negligence per se. It was because such an act could be expected to be the proximate cause of injury that P.C. Article 802 was enacted. Proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate or nearest cause. And where intoxication results in the failure of a driver to keep a proper lookout, or proper control over his automobile, then the act of driving in an intoxicated condition would be the proximate cause.
 The deceased was an independent insurance adjuster, who lived in 'Corpus Christi. Mr. Mott was an insurance adjuster who lived in Houston. The deceased also did adjusting work in Houston. While on the witness stand Mr. Mott was asked to state his average net income for the year 1949. Appellants objected in substance that there was insufficient showing of comparative volume and similarity between the business of Mr. Mott and of deceased to make such evidence admissible, and same was not the best evidence of the earnings of the deceased. The admissibility of evidence is for the judge to determine, and the weight is the concern of the jury. However, we deem that there was insufficient showing of the similarity of conditions under which Mr. Mott and the deceased conducted their business for the earnings of Mr. Mott to cast any true light on the amount of the earnings of the deceased. See St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ball, 28 Tex.Civ.App. 287, 66 S.W. 879. The bare showing of what a doctor *269or lawyer makes from the practice of his profession in Houston would be too' remote to be admissible to establish what the earnings of one engaged in a similar activity in Corpus Christi. So, with respect to insurance adjusters.
Mr. Publicover was a witness for appellees. It was he that was driving an automobile behind the automobile -of de-; ceased. When he was testifying, appellants sought to impeach his testimony that the deceased was going at about the speed of 45 miles per hour by asking if he did not tell Lieutenant White at the scene of the accident that deceased had passed him going at a very high rate of speed shortly before the accident. The evidence showed that Mr. Publicover had given a written statement to the officers the next day. This statement, which is referred to as plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 12, was subsequently admitted, with the exception of paragraph 5 thereof,upon the ground that appellants sought to impeach the witness by showing prior inconsistent declarations and thereby opened the door to the admission of prior consistent statements. The written statement," so admitted, contained the declaration that the truck had come to a stop about thirty feet from Highway 59, which sharply conflicted with the testimony of appellant Mazzucco, the truck driver, whose testimony placed his stopped-position much nearer Highway 59. At the trial Mr. Publicover could not fix such distances. So much of said exhibit as contained his statement of the stopped-position of the truck was not admissible under the applicable exception to the hearsay evidence rule, as there had been no attempt to impeach that portion of Mr. Publicover’s testimony. We fail to find from the statement of facts that the objection specifically called this to the attention of the court.- The objection that the paragraph in which the declaration appears was hearsay, and prejudicial, was not, we think, sufficient.
Appellants’ motion for rehearing is granted to the extent hereinabove indicated. The judgment rendered on original hearing will remain unaffected.
Appellees’ motion for rehearing is refused.