Court Opinion

ID: 9676302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:20:59.108878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:47.411551
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Justice
(concurring).
I concur. The rule in question is clearly a constitutionally impermissible discrimination by the state against a particular class of its citizens. Similar rules have been held unconstitutional in the federal court cases of Hollon v. Mathis I.S.D. (U.S.D. Tex.1973), 358 F.Supp. 1269; Holt v. Shelton (U.S.D.C.1972), 341 F.Supp. 821; Davis v. Meek (U.S.D.C.1972), 344 F. Supp. 298; Moran v. School District (U.S.D.C.1972), 350 F.Supp. 1180; Romans v. Crenshaw (U.S.D.C.Tex.1972), 354 F.Supp. 868, and several others, as have other regulations or discrimination in many cases involving analogous classifications. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225; McErlain v. Taylor (S.Ct.Ind.1934), 207 Ind. 240, 192 N.E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation (S.Ct.Ind.1972), 289 N.E.2d 495; McLeod v. State, (S.Ct.Miss.1929), 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737, 63 A.L.R. 1161. See also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. (U.S.Ct.App.Seventh, 1971) 444 F.2d 1194, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30 L.Ed.2d 543. There are some earlier state cases which have upheld rules similar to the one in question here, but as said by the court in Holt v. Shelton, supra, “. they are either inapposite or they fail to apply the appropriate constitutional standard.”
The regulations of a public school district constitute “state action” in the constitutional sense. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation, supra. To be enforceable, therefore, they must square with the constitutional requirements of “equal protection of the laws.”
Not every state action which results in different treatment for different classes of citizens violates the United States Constitution. Reed v. Reed, supra; Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299. A state may validly impose special burdens upon certain classes of its citizens in order to achieve permissible ends, but the equal protection clause of the Constitution requires that in selecting and defining a class of citizens subject to such burdens, the distinctions which are drawn must have some rational relationship or relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577; Reed v. Reed, supra; McErlain v. Taylor, supra; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139, 81 L.Ed. 109; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 55 S.Ct. 538, 79 L.Ed. 1070; 16 Am.Jur.2d p. 875, Sec. 501. Stated another way, there must be a rational relation between the status of the classified citizens and the subject matter of the regulation. McErlain v. Taylor, supra; Kotch v. River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 67 S.Ct. 910, 91 L.Ed. 1093; Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, North Dakota, 326 U.S. 207, 66 S. Ct. 61, 90 L.Ed. 6. If the action affects a fundamental constitutional right of the classified citizens, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and there must not only be a rational relationship between the classification and the subject matter of the regulation, but the classification and the resulting *640regulation must also be “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra.
To say that the right to play football, or even the right to an education1 is not a constitutionally guaranteed right is to completely miss the issue involved here. That would be a pertinent question if we were attempting to decide if the state is obligated by the U. S. Constitution to provide an education or an athletic program for its citizens, but that is not the issue. Our question is whether the state, having voluntarily chosen to provide an athletic program for its school pupils, can discriminate in the furnishing of that program so as to exclude some of those students from an opportunity to participate in it. According to the long established constitutional principle noted earlier, the state cannot so discriminate unless the status or the characteristics of the excluded students have some rational relation to the activity from which they are excluded, which gives rise to a legitimate state interest that they not participate in the activity. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed. 620; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation, supra; McErlain v. Taylor, supra; Holt v. Shelton, supra.
Justice Ray correctly observes that a rule which excluded students from an opportunity to participate in school athletics on the basis of race, would be readily conceded by everyone to be unconstitutional. Not only is race an arbitrary classification per se, but there would be no rational relation between race and the subject matter of the regulation. As a further example more analogous to the issue before us, it may be conceded that a state has no federal constitutional obligation to provide paved highways for its citizens, but having voluntarily provided paved highways for its citizens through the use of public funds and state action, the state cannot then exclude married persons from using such highways merely because they are married. Marital status has no rational relation to the use of the highways.
The exclusion of students from the opportunity to participate in certain athletic programs provided by the state might be constitutionally justified as to classifications based upon the size, the physical health, the age, the scholastic standing, and even (as to contact sports)2 the sex of the students, because there is a reasonable relation between the classification and the activity, which gives rise to a legitimate state interest that the students falling into such classifications not participate in such programs. The health, the safety, the school work, or the moral welfare of such students might be adversely affected by such participation, and the state has a natural and rightful interest in protecting its school pupils from such adverse effects. There is no such rational relation between the status of being married and participation in athletics.
If the purpose of the rule is to discourage other students from marrying while in school, it is still constitutionally impermissible, even though the school district might commendably desire to discourage student marriages. Ordinarily, it is a legitimate exercise of state power to penalize certain conduct by withholding privileges from those who are guilty of such conduct, pro*641vided that such conduct is unlawful, or has a rational relationship to such privileges which justifies the withholding of them. But absent such “rational relationship,” the state cannot penalize conduct which it has expressly allowed and approved by statute. The appellant here contracted a marriage which was perfectly legal under the statutes of Texas. As his marriage was in full compliance with every aspect of state law, it has received the full sanction of the public policy of this state as expressed by its Legislature. The regulation of marriage is the sole province of the Legislature. The school district has no authority to repeal or modify those regulations, and it cannot penalize appellant for exercising his statutory right, unless the “rational relationship” explained above exists. Davis v. Meek, supra; Moran v. School District, supra.
Without regard to whether the right to participate in athletics, or even the right to secure an education, is a guaranteed right under the U. S. Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to marry, subject to reasonable regulation by the state, is not only a constitutionally guaranteed right, but is a “fundamental constitutional right.” See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010; Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655; Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur et al. 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). The case of Davis v. Meek, supra, and others have held that a rule such as that involved here puts an unlawful burden upon the student’s fundamental constitutional right to marry. It is elementary that state action which is designed “. . . .to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, • [is j patently unconstitutional.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. See also O’Neill v. Dent3 (U.S.D.C., N.Y.1974), 364 F.Supp. 565.
It may be conceded that the right to participate in an extracurricular program of athletics is a fragile one at best, as the applicant for such participation, by reason of lack of size, stamina, speed or other athletic prowess may not be able to make the team. However, these exclusionary criteria all have a rational relationship to the regulated activity. Exclusion from the team for such reasons is entirely different from the exclusion which is before us. Additionally, in those cases all students are afforded the opportunity to qualify, whereas, in our case married students are arbitrarily denied even the opportunity to qualify for the program regardless of their competitive ability. As said in Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation, supra, the fact that some students may not be able to qualify for the team has no bearing upon the student’s right to the opportunity to qualify.
It may be contended that there was disputed evidence presented to the trial court, and therefore his presumed fact findings in support of his judgment must be upheld on appeal. This is a correct statement of the rule, but it has no application here. Whether there is a “rational relationship giving rise to a legitimate state interest” is not a question of fact but is a question of law. People v. Sisk (Ill.S.Ct.1921), 297 Ill. 314, 130 N.E. 696; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, p. 344. Whether or not certain alleged facts exist is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. But whether the facts so found to exist constitute the rational relationship giving rise to a legitimate state interest is a question of law which this court must determine for itself, based upon well settled legal principles established through the years of our jurisprudence. Upon the record here, tested by the legal principles announced by the United States Supreme Court and other *642courts of this nation — even taking the facts alleged by the school district to be true— there is' a complete failure to show that the rule in question . .is even rationally related to, not to mention necessary to promote any legitimate state interest that married persons be arbitrarily excluded from an athletic program which the state, through its school district, has voluntarily chosen to provide for its school pupils.
Whatever one’s right may be to have a program of school athletics provided for him, it is recognized by the courts that once extra-curricular activities such as athletics are furnished as a part of the school program, they constitute an integral and complementary part of the total school program, and that a student’s right to participate in them is a valuable right which the courts will recognize and protect. See Tinker v. Des Moines I.S.D., supra; Williams v. Eaton (U.S.Ct. of App. Tenth Circuit, 1971), 443 F.2d 422. But the governing principle in a case such as the one before us was aptly stated by the United States Supreme Court when it said :4
“Whatever the rights of the individual . the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.” Ei-senstadt v. Baird, supra. Unless there is some ground of difference rationally explaining the different treatment of married and unmarried persons which is necessary to achieve a legitimate state interest, state action which provides “. . . dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, . . . violate [s] the Equal Protection Clause .” of the United States Constitution.
I therefore conclude that the rule which would deny appellant the opportunity to participate in the football program furnished by the School District solely on the ground that he is married constitutes state action in violation of the equal protection clause of United States Constitution. As the rule violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, it also violates Article I, Sec. 3 of the Texas Constitution. Consequently, appellant was entitled to the relief he sought.

. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. Rodriguez did not hold that the equal protection clause was inapplicable to rights related to education. It held that the question of whether education is a constitutionally guaranteed right determined whether the test of “strict judicial scrutiny” and compelling State interest, or only the traditional equal protection test of “rational relationship” was required in judging the validity of the state action.

. It has been held that the exclusion of female students from non-contact athletic programs solely on the basis of their sex violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corporation, supra.

. Holding that a rule excluding married men from the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy is unconstitutional.

. Concerning the right to purchase contraceptives.