Court Opinion

ID: 9573276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:51:30.618012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:23.554260
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
The majority concludes that the trial court did not err in prohibiting Farley’s proffered cross-examination of the State’s witness. Although I disagree with that conclusion, I nonetheless conclude that we should affirm the trial court. As we examine the record for error, we must be ever cognizant of the special relationship error has with harm. If there is little or none, the trial court should be affirmed.
I write separately to express my concerns with the majority’s proposed foundational requirement for the introduction of cross-examination testimony concerning racial bias and prejudice. That requirement appears to be as follows: that the “bias or prejudice [is] accompanied by a showing that there exists evidence of a specific intent to harm the accused such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer shading of evidence or deception or a personal self-interest or self-preservation motive by the witness, in such case, that could give rise to an inference of deception or shading the evidence against the accused.” Majority at 692.
I note initially that although the standard appears to allow a showing of either specific intent or self-interest/self-preservation, page 690 of the majority opinion provides that the bias or prejudice “must . . . [arise] from a self-interest or self-preservation motive. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The same language requiring a showing of self-interest or self-preservation is also stated repeatedly on pages 691 and 692 of the majority opinion. I am not sure whether an accused must make both showings to establish the proposed foundation.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with the required showing of a “specific intent to harm the accused.” “The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’. . . ‘Our cases construing the (confrontation) clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.’ [Cit.]” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 315 (94 SC 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Id. at 316. An *696accused is permitted to attack a witness’ credibility by “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 316. Moreover, while cross-examination does not guarantee truth, it will, hopefully, make untruth more difficult.
Although Davis requires that the possible bias relate directly to the personality at hand, this is not a requirement to produce evidence that the witness have a specific intent to harm the accused. Rather, evidence of a bias against African Americans generally, where the accused is also African American, could, by inference, relate directly to the accused. “[DJefense counsel [is] permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Id. at 318.
A jury could find that a witness’ testimony is shaded by a general intent to harm the particular class of people of which the accused is a member. One pitfall with the specific intent requirement is that it ignores the real problem concerning prejudices; that they are not limited to particular individuals, but are held against particular classes of individuals. “If the prejudice is to a class, generally, in all probability it extends to individual members of the class.” State v. Harling, 170 NW2d 720, 724 (Wis. 1969). See also 81 AmJur2d, Witnesses, § 892 (1992). Clearly, this portion of the proposed requirement is too narrowly stated to avoid violations of the Confrontation Clause. See Harris v. State, 216 Ga. App. 297 (454 SE2d 146) (1995) (Confrontation Clause not violated where trial court permitted defendant to question arresting officer “regarding any bias he had toward black males. . . .” Id. at 298).
I also disagree with the requirement for a showing that the witness is racially motivated to lie because of “self-interest” or “self-preservation.” An interested witness is generally defined as one who “has a stake in the outcome of the case.” 81 AmJur2d, Witnesses, § 876 (1992). However, the harms from racial prejudice do not always arise from self-interest or self-preservation. Indeed, life’s experiences show that many instances of prejudice arise from mere ignorance. The holder of such prejudice cannot explain why it is in his or her self-interest to harbor the prejudice, but it nevertheless can influence the person’s perceptions of those within that group and is relevant in determining the credibility of the person’s statements concerning persons within the group.
Our own statute provides that “[t]he state of a witness’s feelings toward the parties and his relationship to them may always be *697proved for the consideration of the jury.” OCGA § 24-9-68. (Emphasis supplied.) I am aware of no cases in which we have limited the application of this statute to restrict cross-examination in the manner proposed by the majority. Rather, we have consistently held that “it is better for cross-examination to be too free than too much restricted. Wherever the purpose is to impeach or discredit the witness, great latitude should be allowed by the court in cross-examinations.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Letlow v. State, 222 Ga. App. 339, 342 (2) (474 SE2d 211) (1996). If the goal is to allow great latitude in discrediting a witness, then testimony concerning racial bias or prejudice against the race of the accused should be admissible even without a showing of specific intent to harm the accused or that the witness is motivated by self-interest or self-preservation.
Although I agree with the majority that a defendant should not be permitted to go on a fishing expedition before the jury in an attempt to establish racial bias or prejudice, and that there must be some foundation established, the proposed requirement is too strict. It prohibits exploration concerning known biases and prejudices that by inference a witness may harbor against the accused. The fact that a witness is prejudiced or biased against the class of people of which the accused is a member, is relevant to the witness’ credibility and the accused has the right to confront the witness before the jury concerning such fact. See id.
Finally, I do not believe it matters when a witness forms his or her prejudice or bias, so long as it exists at the time the testimony is given. Although identification of the accused was an important fact in this case, it was not the only relevant fact. The witness also testified regarding the accused’s conduct and language during the robbery. Could not that testimony also have been influenced by racial bias or prejudice? Could not a witness in any case shade his or her testimony with the intent to enrage the jury? A witness’ bias or prejudice can subtly infect all of the witness’ testimony, not just his or her identification of the accused as the perpetrator.
Although I believe the trial court erred in limiting the defendant’s cross-examination concerning the witness’ prejudice and bias, based on the evidence of record, I do not believe it caused such harm as requires a new trial. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986) (constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to harmless error analysis). Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment.
*698Decided March 12,1997
Reconsideration denied March 25,1997
Richard D. Hobbs, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.