Court Opinion

ID: 9605908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:43:06.650524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:54.491887
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — I agree with all of the majority opinion except its conclusion that the defendant’s actions were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ damages. To be precise we should emphasize, as the majority correctly does, that we are not here speaking of proximate cause as cause in fact. The majority acknowledges that cause in fact did exist, linking the defendant’s actions to the plaintiffs’ damages.
Cause in fact does not lead automatically to legal responsibility. Again the majority is right in stating that there remains the question of whether the defendant should be legally responsible for the damages caused in fact. Proximate cause, in this sense, is an imprecise term. It really is a matter of policy of determining the extent of a defendant’s liability for its wrongdoing. W. Prosser, Torts § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971).
Surely we must have some recognized legal theory upon which to base a conclusion that there is no legal responsibility here. What are the policy considerations which free *254the defendant from responsibility for those damages which we acknowledge were in fact caused by defendant’s actions? The majority advances two such reasons. First, that the plaintiffs did not seek the necessary permit from the Corps of Engineers and second, that they did not attempt to sell the property.
What the majority in fact and in reality is holding, in my view, is that, as a matter of policy, we will deny damages because these plaintiffs did not mitigate their damages. I find no other legal theory in the majority opinion to justify its conclusion.
There are several reasons why the principle of mitigation should not be the foundation for such a policy determination that no damages are recoverable. First, it is the wrongdoer to which we are affording this protection and we should proceed with caution in creating such freedom from liability. That is the philosophy of this court. Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wn.2d 216, 221, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956).
Second, the defendant was guilty of an intentional tort against plaintiffs. That is, interference with prospective economic advantage. The majority correctly characterizes the defendant’s actions as an intentional tort. An intentional wrongdoer cannot place upon its victim the duty to mitigate. We have long so held. Desimone v. Mutual Materials Co., 23 Wn.2d 876, 884, 162 P.2d 808 (1945); Champa v. Washington Compressed Gas Co., 146 Wash. 190, 200, 262 P. 228 (1927). To apply mitigation principles in this case under the guise of a policy consideration in the context of determining proximate cause is unwarranted.
The majority rejects the plaintiffs’ explanation that they could not — for economic reasons — pursue their federal administrative procedures for a permit or keep up the contract payments while trying to sell the property. The majority contends that the trial court made no finding that plaintiffs were without economic resources to continue their efforts. In fact, the trial court did enter a finding that the plaintiffs were forced to abandon the property. Implicit in that find*255ing must be the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs were unable financially to pursue the project. The plaintiff wife testified that they did not have the money to proceed with the project and that they had no choice but to deed the property back to the contract vendor who had served notice of forfeiture. This is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that they were forced to abandon the premises.
I fail to understand why an intentional tort-feasor can or should escape liability because it happened to choose a plaintiff who did not have the financial resources to overcome the damages caused by the intentional tort.
In any event, contrary to the majority’s rejection of this economic decision by plaintiffs, it is entirely fitting to evaluate plaintiffs’ actions in light of their own financial condition. We have so held in Hoff v. Lester, 25 Wn.2d 86, 168 P.2d 409, 164 A.L.R. 751 (1946), and Adams v. Thibault, 49 Wn.2d 24, 297 P.2d 954, 57 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1956).
Returning to the two reasons assigned by the majority to its policy conclusion that no liability attaches, we find that these are tenuous grounds factually. The project could not go forward without a permit from the Corps of Engineers. The majority speculates that the plaintiffs could well have obtained such a permit. Yet the person in charge of issuance of such permits testified that in very similar circumstances it took almost 2 years to process such a permit. The defendant City chose to introduce no other evidence as to the likelihood of success or of the time which might be involved in securing the permit. Likewise, with regard to a possible sale of the property to recover the plaintiffs’ equity, the City did not present any evidence as to the market demand for this property or the time it might take to find a buyer; indeed it proved nothing more than the gross equity. Recovery of the equity would not have offset the $311,018.22 which the trial court found to be plaintiffs’ loss of profit on the contemplated building.
Under these circumstances I believe that justice requires *256us to resolve any doubts as to proximate cause or mitigation in favor of the plaintiffs and against the intentional tort-feasor. I would affirm.
Hunter and Hamilton, JJ., concur with Brachtenbach, J. Petition for rehearing denied December 17, 1974.