Court Opinion

ID: 9814967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:19:30.071112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:01.864630
License: Public Domain

Patton, J.
I must respectfully dissent from the position reached by the majority concerning its disposition of appellants’ first assigned error. It is my considered opinion, as will be discussed more fully below, that the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant drug store, as no evidence was presented to establish the defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the icy condition of the sidewalk.
The duty of ordinary care to insure the safety of invitees where the injury arises from a “slip and fall” due to a hazardous condition not created by the proprietor or his employees is well established. To permit an injured party recovery in such instances, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have had, notice of the hazard for a sufficient time to enable him, in the exercise of ordinary care, to remove such hazard, or warn patrons about it. Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 29 [65 O.O.2d 129], citing Anaple v. Standard Oil Co. (1955), 162 Ohio St. 537 [55 O.O. 424]; Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 [26 O.O. 161]; Keister v. Park Centre Lanes (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 19.
In reviewing the record subjudice, it clearly appears that the defendant had no notice of the icy condition of the sidewalk on the evening that Tyrrell sustained his fall. Further, though testimony exists to establish that the drug store employees knew about the dripping condition of the awning, the appellants failed to establish that on the date in question, the employees knew that the awning was dripping or that the temperature had dropped, thereby imputing the defendant with constructive notice of the slippery condition of the sidewalk.
The drug store’s duty toward its business invitees required its maintenance of a safe ingress and egress. Contrary to the long-established law requiring a finding of notice, either actual or constructive, of the hazard, prior to finding a breach of the storekeeper’s duty toward its patrons, the majority has chosen to modify this rule to now place an absolute liability upon a shopkeeper for any injuries which are remotely foreseeable, without first requiring a finding that the defendant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the actual hazard. I find this extension of liability to be in conflict with the law of Ohio on this subject, and further, to place an unfair burden upon the shopkeeper to protect against any and all remotely foreseeable injuries, regardless of whether or not he knows of an actual hazard. This extension of liability is untenable and I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.