Court Opinion

ID: 9566197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:56.111579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:29:34.905391
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, C. J.,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
Appellant Slobodian was convicted on two counts of statutory sexual seduction. See NRS 200.364(3); NRS 200.368. Slobodian was thirty-nine years old when he seduced a fifteen-year-old female to engage in various sexual activities with him. The appellant’s convictions should be affirmed.

COUNT V, SEXUAL SEDUCTION

First, the majority reasons that Slobodian’s conviction in Count V cannot stand because the digital penetration alleged in that count is not one of the specifically enumerated sexual acts in the statutory definition of “sexual seduction.” The provisions of NRS 200.364 state in relevant part:
As used in NRS 200.366 to 200.368, unless the context otherwise requires:
3. “Statutory sexual seduction” means ordinary sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio committed by a person 18 years of age or older with a consenting person under the age of 16 years.
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear that our statutory sexual seduction statutes were enacted to protect adolescents who, because of their immature minds and developing bodies, are susceptible to the sexual abuse and advances of sophisticated adults. See NRS 200.364; NRS 200.368. The introductory phrase in NRS 200.364, “unless the context otherwise requires,” literally invites this court to interpret these statutes in a manner that effectuates their intended purpose. The majority’s opinion, however, does not do this.
*149The purpose of NRS 200.364(3) is substantially negated, and the introduction to this statute is rendered absolutely meaningless unless “sexual seduction” is defined to include any carnal penetration of a victim’s vagina or anus. The simple logic of such a construction is enough to provide notice of the crime. Further, this is the only definition of “sexual seduction” that is legally and morally acceptable. Otherwise, individuals like Slobodian will be able to effectuate their designs upon a willing but immature adolescent, without fear of recourse or punishment, so long as their iniquitous behavior remains outside the confines of the narrow definitions of sexual seduction proposed by the majority opinion.
Therefore, I must object to a construction of statutory sexual seduction that makes it legally acceptable for a thirty-nine-year-old man to take advantage of a consenting fifteen-year-old girl by invading her vagina or anus with any number of body appendages, foreign objects, or mechanical devices, including a finger, a curling iron, or a dildo. This is not the result intended by our legislature.
Slobodian has demonstrated his propensity to exploit an immature and vulnerable female for his self-gratification. The facts, context, and circumstances surrounding Slobodian’s profane activities mandate a logical definition of “sexual seduction” consistent with the intended purpose and meaning of NRS 200.364(3). The appellant must be punished for his predatory crimes against adolescents.

COUNT VIII, SEXUAL SEDUCTION

Further, this court has repeatedly held that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility assigned to conflicting testimony. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 624 P.2d 20 (1981); see also Stewart v. State, 94 Nev. 378, 580 P.2d 473 (1978); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 576 P.2d 275 (1978); Hankins v. State, 91 Nev. 477, 538 P.2d 167 (1975). The jury in this case concluded that Slobodian was guilty of seducing a fifteen-year-old female to engage in sexual activities in violation of our criminal code. Now the majority elects to overturn Slobodian’s conviction under Count VIII because the victim asserted at trial that she did not consent to have sex with appellant. Respectfully, I disagree with the majority’s position on this issue as well.
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s conclusion that Slobodian and the victim engaged in sexual activities. The victim testified that while she was in Slobodian’s apartment, Slobodian told her to take off her clothes. Thereafter, the victim told the jury how Slobodian had penetrated her vagina *150with his finger, a dildo, and a curling iron. The victim also told the jury that Slobodian put his penis into her mouth.
Once the jury concluded that the appellant and the victim had sexual relations, the only remaining issue was consent: the victim either consented to have sex with the appellant or she did not. The jury evaluated conflicting evidence, weighed the testimony given at trial, and concluded that the victim was a willing participant in either all or some of the activities described. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt: the victim was a runaway who had been living with older men before she met Slobodian; she told the jury that Slobodian gave her $900.00 to engage in sex with him; she also testified that she had talked for ten minutes on the telephone with an unknown man during an interval between her sexual activities with appellant, yet she did not tell this unknown individual she was being sexually assaulted; her sexual encounters with the appellant took place in Slobodian’s apartment over a period of eight to nine hours, while the two drank alcohol and talked about the creation of a sexually explicit movie; the victim did not immediately report these sexual activities to law enforcement officials, and when she was picked up as a runaway, her allegation of forcible assault seemed to be an afterthought.
The jury watched the victim testify, heard her words and the inflections of her voice, and were able to draw inferences from her statements, actions, and all the evidence introduced by the State at trial. The jury weighed the victim’s credibility through her words and emotional responses, and they concluded that the victim had willingly engaged in sexual relations with the appellant.
Again, either the victim agreed to have sex with the appellant or she was forcibly assaulted. There is no middle ground, no other available alternatives. The jury was asked to decide between assault and consent. They did. Their decision should be affirmed by this court.
Accordingly, I must dissent.