Court Opinion

ID: 9751893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:15:07.52531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:04.444354
License: Public Domain

Thim, J.
(dissenting). This case is concerned with the problems encountered where the police, armed with the hearsay statement of an untested informer, attempted to obtain an arrest warrant from a magistrate who must decide whether the informant was credible or his information reliable so as to justify the warrant’s issuance. The trial court, relying on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, concluded that the implication of the defendant in the crimes charged was based solely on the uncorroboated statement of the informer, Ronald F. Strano, Jr., and that without a sworn statement showing underlying facts and circumstances attesting to Strano’s credibility or the reliability of his information concerning the defendant, there was no basis for the issuance of the warrant.
Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe that under the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, and which we are necessarily bound to follow, the lower court committed no error and the motion to dismiss the information was properly granted. While the majority opinion’s recitation of the applicable principles of law is correct, I take issue with the way in which these principles have been applied to this case.
The only affidavit offered in support of the appli*454cation for the bench warrant rests entirely on hearsay. While hearsay may be the basis for the issuance of a bench warrant, there must be a “substanial basis for crediting the hearsay.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684. Under the Aguilar rule, where, as in this case, the affiant, without any personal observation of the crime, relied entirely on the informer, a two-pronged test must be satisfied before a judge may issue a bench warrant. Under the test, the affidavit in question must contain: (1) some underlying facts and circumstances from which the informant could conclude that what he alleged was so; (2) some underlying facts and circumstances from which the affiant could conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 114; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637. As the majority opinion correctly concludes, the first test was met. If entitled to credit, the affidavit contains sufficient underlying facts and circumstances to establish probable cause. Having been duly sworn, there was reason for the judge to believe that the affiant was truthful and accurately relating the informant’s story.
The crux of the problem involves element (2) and the defendant’s contention that the affiant cited no underlying facts and circumstances from which the affiant could conclude that Strano was credible or his information reliable. With all due deference, the issuance of the warrant in the case at bar violated the spirit of the fourth amendment, there being no adequate indicia of trustworthiness within the four corners of the affidavit to satisfy constitutional standards.
*455An examination of the affidavit1 reveals, inter alia, that while he was in police custody, Strano *456made two statements which, differed in several respects, thereby raising the issue as to whether (1) *457the statements were inconsistent with one another and, therefore, inherently unreliable, or (2), as the majority holds, the second statement was merely an elaboration of the first. The June 30, 1970, statement indicated that the crimes were committed at about 10:30 p.m. and no reference concerning the defendant was made. By this statement, Strano, in effect, strongly implied that he alone committed the crime. In the August 6, 1970, statement, however, Strano stated that the crimes took place at about 11:55 p.m., that the defendant assisted him in their commission, and that a female employee of the nursing home supplied the combination to the safe. Both statements appear to be complete in themselves, yet they conflict as to the participants of the crime. As the defendant aptly states, the two conflicting statements lead to conjecture as to which statement of Strano was the truth so that the latter statement cannot be made the sole basis on which to issue a warrant. In State v. Saidel, 159 Conn. 96, 98, 267 A.2d 449, we held that an affidavit in an application for a warrant was not a sufficient basis for finding probable cause where it contained two conflicting statements. “Without more, the mere recitation of two conflicting statements cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding probable cause.” Id., 99.
The majority claims that there are several factors present within the affidavit which, at least in combination, elevate the reliability of Strano’s information to a degree sufficient to uphold the warrant’s validity.
As they correctly hold, declarations against one’s penal interest may be used to bolster an informant’s credibility or the reliability of his information. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723. In the Harris decision, the in*458former, fearing for Ms life, told how he had made purchases of illicit whiskey from the defendant. “People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their admission. Admissions of crime . . . carry their own indicia of credibility — sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause.” Id., 583. In the present case, while the August 6 statement of Strano would appear to be a declaration against interest, and the majority so holds, such is not the case. By the first statement of June 30, Strano had already implicated himself in the criminal activity involved, thereby subjecting himself to penal consequences. While the defendant concedes that the second statement would no doubt be admissible against him at trial, it made no further significant admission save a possible admission of conspiracy.
The majority further holds that the affiant’s own knowledge of some of the particulars of Strano’s statements reasonably supports an inference of corroboration. “[H]e [the affiant] may rely upon information received through an informant... so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697; see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327. In the present case, while the police did verify some of Strano’s statements, e.g., the actual occurrence of the incident, its location and the method of operation, it is convincingly clear that they did not, or were unable to, verify any of the crucial statements of Strano linking the defendant to the crime. Similarly, while corroborating information from “additional sources” as to the same facts is a substantial factor in satisfying the Aguilar standards, its appli*459cation is misapplied by the majority. Here, Mrs. Maloney’s statement is the only “additional source” of information concerning the crime and she could only corroborate the fact that the nursing home had been broken into and the safe stolen. Mrs. Maloney did not link the defendant to the crime, but merely informed the police that a crime had been committed.
The United States Supreme Court lends great weight to information which comes from informers who have supplied law enforcement officers with correct tips in the past. See Jones v. United States, supra. Some informers, as in Draper v. United States, supra, are considered “special employees” of the police who, for a fee, give tips to the police. Having a history of past veracity, there is good reason to believe that the current information is likewise reliable. In today’s opinion, the majority would erroneously attempt to apply this principle to the ease at bar, allowing Strano’s statement of June 30 to pass muster as a prior correct tip so as to elevate him to the status of a “past known informer” for the purpose of justifying a belief in his second statement. Such an application is improper and does an injustice to the concept as applied by the United States Supreme Court.
Nor does the fact that Strano confessed to the crimes while in custody make him any more trustworthy. Ming v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 206, 213, 91 Cal. Rptr. 477; Ovalle v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 760, 21 Cal. Rptr. 385. “To hold that the information here furnished by Oldrow [the arrestee] was sufficient to establish reasonable cause would be in effect to accord to a nonreliable informant who was in the toils of law a greater degree of reliability than is attributed to such an informant who is not thus encumbered.” People v. Amos, 181 *460Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 5 Cal. Rptr. 451; see Ovalle v. Superior Court, supra. Similarly, I do not believe that the presence of counsel is necessarily a deterrent to any fraud Strano may have decided to perpetrate by his statements.
In addition to there being no underlying facts or circumstances concerning Strano’s credibility or the reliability of his information within the affidavit, the affidavit does not even make the bald assertion that the affiant finds the informer reliable or credible. In contrast, the affidavit does state “the credibility of the complainant, Mrs. Ruth Maloney, to the best of your affiant’s knowledge is good.” Likewise, there is no averment that Strano was a known informer or that he had supplied reliable information in the past. While a magistrate may also rely on the affiant’s knowledge of a suspect’s past criminal reputation; United States v. Harris, supra; no averment as to any past criminal reputation was included in the affiant’s affidavit.
One final point warrants discussion. As the majority again correctly holds, whether the informant is credible or his information reliable is a determination to be made, not by the police, but rather, by a neutral and detached magistrate. “Otherwise, ‘the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint’ would be drawn not ‘by a neutral and detached magistrate,’ as the constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ ” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723; see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436. “[T]he court must still insist that the magistrate perform his ‘neutral and detached’ func*461tion and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 111. This duty is placed squarely on the magistrate, and it is not enough that the police find the tipster credible or his information reliable. In applying these principles to the present case, as the majority professes to do, it is convincingly clear that there are no underlying facts and circumstances in the affidavit from which a magistrate could make such an independent determination. To sustain this warrant would be to dilute “important safeguards that assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself between the police and the citizenry.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637.
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, it was stated that “the Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants . . . must be tested and interpreted ... in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting the evidence to a judicial officer before acting.” See United States v. Harris, supra. These sound principles have not been departed from in an analysis as to whether the affidavit was sufficient on its face. Here, unlike other cases where the affidavits have been held to be sufficient, the magistrate, as a matter of *462law, had nothing before him to show that the affiant was justified in believing Strano. Nothing whatsoever was within the affidavit to link the defendant to the crime except the uncorroborated and inconsistent statements made by an untested and inherently unreliable participant in the crime and who was in the toils of justice.
In their quest to reach a desired result, the majority has failed to look beyond the bounds of this ease to the future implications of such a decision. The fourth amendment directs that the citizenry of this country are to be secure against those who would make false accusations. To follow the majority today would mean that a statement by an informer, untested as to his credibility or the reliability of his information, without any independent corroboration or support to diminish the possibilities of a “prevaricating tale,” would be a sufficient basis on which to issue a warrant. I cannot abide by such a decision which would so erode one of the fundamental pillars of justice — the fourth amendment.

“I, John R. Marshall, after being duly sworn, depose and say that I am of legal age, am now and have been a member of the Vernon Police Department for about the past 7 years.
1. That on June 12, 1970, your affiant was assigned by an immediate supervisor to conduct a follow up investigation of Vernon Police Complaint, C-5223-70-I-J. That said complaint originated from a Mrs. Ruth Maloney, the administrator of a convalescent hospital known as the Roekville Memorial Nursing Home, located at 22 South St., in Rockville, Connecticut.
2. That your affiant has knowledge of, as indicated in said complaint, that the Rockville Memorial Nursing Home had been broken into, and that an office safe containing in excess of $1,000.00, and a quantity -of negotiable checks and jewelry had been reported stolen from the premises.
That Mrs. Maloney, in her capacity as administrator of said convalescent home, requested the person(s) responsible arrested and prosecuted.
3. That on June 30, 1970, following subsequent investigation, your affiant interviewed and obtained a written, signed, statement of one, Ronald F. Strano Jr., age 19 of 10 Allen Dr., Vernon, Connecticut. That said interview and statement was obtained following Strano being advised of, and signing a waiver of his rights. That in said statement Ronald Strano related of how on the night of June 11, 1970, at about 10:30 PM, he broke into the Rockville Memorial Nursing Home by prying open a screen and window at the office area to gain entry. That upon gaining entry Strano related of how he entered and removed the office safe which was loaded into his vehicle and driven to a wooded area to be opened. That on opening the safe, Strano removed $1,300.00 to $1,500.00 in IT. S. paper currency from it.
4. That on July 2, 1970, your affiant arrested Ronald F. Strano Jr. via a Circuit Court Warrant charging him with Breaking & Entering with Criminal Intent, and larceny (in excess of $2,000.00). That as the result of said arrest, Strano was later bound over to the jurisdiction of the Tolland County Superior Court for trial.
5. That on August 6, 1970, your affiant again interviewed Ronald F. Strano Jr. That said interview was conducted in the presence of Strano attorney, and that upon the advice of said attorney Ronald Strano volunteered to make an additional statement relative to the offenses committed against the Roekville Memorial Nursing Home.
6. That following Ronald F. Strano Jr., being advised of, and *456signing a waiver of his rights, your affiant obtained a second, written, signed statement in which Strano named his accomplice in the commission of his offenses against the Boekville Memorial Nursing Home on the night of June 11, 1970,
That Strano related in said statement of how he and one James Jackson, age about 26 of Vernon Garden Apartments, had in the past talked about pulling a job to get some money. That at about 9:30 PM of June 11, 1970, he, Strano, had phoned James Jackson, telling him of his plan to get the safe out of the Boekville Memorial Nursing Home. That Jackson was agreeable to this plan, as he needed money to pay outstanding debts.
That Jackson a short time later drove to Stranos home, picking him up at about 9:45 PM. That together, Strano and Jackson later drove to the Boekville Memorial Nursing Home in Jacksons vehicle.
6[A]. That at about 11:55 PM of June 11, 1970, Strano related of how he gained entry into the office of the Boekville Memorial Nursing Home by way of an office window. That on gaining entry Strano passed the office safe out of the window to James Jackson. That he and Jaekson after loading said safe into Jacksons car, drove to a wooded area where Strano opened the safe by use of the combination which had provided to him earlier by a girlfriend who was employed at the Boekville Memorial Nursing Home.
That on gaining entry into said safe, Strano and James Jackson removed its contents, taking only the U. S. paper currency. That said currency totaled to about $1,500,00 which they divided, each taking about $750.00.
7. That, based on and in view of the foregoing facts and information, your affiant believes that reasonable grounds and probable cause exists, and that the herein named accused, James Jackson, did, on June 11, 1970, in the Town of Vernon, Connecticut, commit the crime of Breaking and Entering With Criminal latent, in violation of section 53-76 of the Connecticut General Statutes: and that James Jackson did further, on June 11, 1970, commit, in the Town of Vernon, Connecticut, the crime of, Larceny (over $2,000.) in violation of section 53-63 of the Comn. General Statutes.
That the credibility of the complainant, Mrs. Buth Maloney, to the best of your affiants knowledge is good.
That no prior application has been made to the Superior Court in this case.
Application is hereby made for the issuance of a Bench Warrant for the aceused, James Jackson, for the crimes named herein.
Purther your affiant saith not.”