Court Opinion

ID: 9555524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-13 07:09:48.388484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:07.724797
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Majority Opinion and Concurring Opinion filed August 8, 2023

                                      In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-21-00461-CR

                       GORGE LUIS OLMOS, Appellant

                                         V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 239th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 84354-CR

                             MAJORITY OPINION

      Appellant, Gorge Olmos, appeals his conviction for aggravated assault that
resulted in his twenty-year prison sentence. In three issues, appellant complains
that the trial court reversibly erred when it precluded appellant from offering
evidence of alleged child pornography on complainant’s cellular phone, denied
appellant’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and refused
appellant’s request for a self-defense instruction. We affirm.

                  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A jury convicted appellant Gorge Olmos, of aggravated assault of the
complainant on February 4, 2018. The jury assessed punishment at imprisonment
for 20 years.

      Complainant, deceased, was Javier Lopez, Sr., father to Leonardo Lopez and
Javier Lopez Jr. Javier Sr. was the owner of the restaurant “Emily’s” where he was
found dead in the early morning hours of February 4, 2018.

      On February 3, Leonardo closed Emily’s around 9:00 p.m. and went home to
take a shower. He dropped Javier Sr. off at a party at Julia Gomez’s house and
returned home until he was picked up by his older brother, Javier Jr. After running
errands with Javier Jr. in Houston, around 2:00 a.m. (February 4), the brothers
went to check on their father at Julia Gomez’s house party. Javier Sr. was not
ready to leave, so Javier Jr. went back to his own home and Leonardo went back to
his home. At around 4:00 a.m. Leonardo picked up his father and Leonardo’s new
twenty-year-old friend, appellant. Leonardo offered appellant a ride to appellant’s
residence but appellant refused the offer and told Leonardo the plan was to return
to the residence where Javier Sr. and Leonardo resided. So Leonardo drove home.
After a short time there, Javier Sr. requested that they be taken to Emily’s (which
was only a short drive away). According to Leonardo, they arrived at Emily’s
around 5:00 a.m. and once there Javier Sr. told Leonardo he would call him in
about an hour. Leonardo when home and went to sleep.

      Leonardo woke up at 6:40 a.m. and realized Javier Sr. had not texted or
called him. Leonardo drove to Emily’s. As he pulled up in his truck, Leonardo saw
through the open French doors that a table had been flipped over. He ran inside and
observed appellant kicking a hole in the wall while angrily screaming. The scene
was chaotic—tables were flipped over, paintings had fallen off the wall, glass
bottles were smashed, and it appeared that there had been a struggle. Leonardo saw

                                        2
Javier Sr. lying face down on the ground in a pool of blood and flipped him over.
Javier Sr.’s face was purple, swollen, and covered in blood with small pieces of
glass. He had a large dent in his forehead.

      Leonardo recalled that while he was bent over his father, appellant ran into
the kitchen. Leonardo pursued appellant, who appeared to be looking for a way out
in a panicked state. Appellant pushed over a large silver rack, which Leonardo
avoided. Leonardo returned to his father and shook him, with no response.
Appellant then ran through the open French doors and into the passenger’s seat of
Leonardo’s running truck. Leonardo followed appellant, who told Leonardo “Let’s
go.” Leonardo turned off the vehicle and attempted to get appellant out. Appellant
exited, attempted to jump over a wooden fence, and ran off in the direction of some
nearby houses. Leonardo called 9-1-1, and provided law enforcement appellant’s
description.

      Around this time, Cheryl White saw appellant standing outside her living
room window and also called 9-1-1. Appellant went to the other side of her house
and began knocking on her front door. After her husband threatened to shoot him,
appellant turned around and walked up the dirt path back toward Emily’s. Officer
Adam Erlewein with the Alvin Police Department saw appellant, who matched the
description provided by Leonardo. Erlewein asked him to stop, and appellant stated
he was going to a friend’s house. Appellant was detained and positively identified
by Leonardo.

      After being transported to the Alvin Police Department, appellant waived his
Miranda rights and spoke to Detective Justin Kelly. Appellant confirmed he was
with Javier Sr. earlier that morning. Appellant claimed that he could remember
what occurred before and after his time at Emily’s, but had no memory of what had
happened when he was alone with Javier Sr. Though prompted by another

                                          3
detective regarding the possibility that he had defended himself, appellant did not
say that he had acted in self-defense.

      In his statement, appellant asked the detectives whether they were saying
Javier Sr. suffered “trauma” and that he hit Javier Sr. with a “blunt object.” The
medical examiner’s office later determined the cause of death to be blunt head
trauma from multiple blows, which could have been caused by punching, kicking,
or a blunt object.

      When the police found appellant he had bruising on his right shoulder and
right knuckle.       Javier Sr.’s DNA was found on appellant’s jeans and shoes.
Complainant is included “with caution” as a possible contributor to the DNA
profile on appellant’s hands.

      Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on July 7, 2021, and on July 15, 2021,
after trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The following day, the jury assessed
punishment, and the trial court entered judgment consistent with the verdict
sentencing appellant to 20 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice-Institutional Division.

      Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial based on a July 29, 2021 letter
appellant’s counsel received from the prosecutor’s office. Appellant attached his
counsel’s affidavit, his trial counsel’s prior discovery requests, and the letter he
had received from the prosecutor’s office. The letter reported that Josh Collins, an
investigator with the Alvin Police Department, who had been a witness at trial, had
received information from Leonardo “during trial”, that Leonardo and Javier Jr.
had been in an argument because “Leonardo felt that Javier Jr. was not helping the
family like he should be nor was Javier Jr. supporting his wife and kids like he
should be”. Leonardo had further reported that Javier Jr. was planning to leave his
wife and kids and move to Dallas and that Leonardo was no longer welcome at
                                         4
Javier Jr.’s house following a “physical altercation” between Leonardo and Javier
Jr.

       The visiting judge presiding over the motion for new trial acknowledged the
affidavit filed by appellant indicating her consideration of the evidence at the
hearing. At the hearing the judge expressed doubts about appellant’s right to relief
and concerns specifically regarding the third prong of the four-part test applied to
new trial requests based on newly discovered evidence.1 The motion was overruled
by operation of law.

                                 II. EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

       In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it refused to permit appellant to introduce evidence that child pornography
was found on the complainant’s phone.

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A
trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is so clearly wrong as to lie
outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree. Taylor v. State,
268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Romano v. State, 612 S.W.3d 151,
158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

       We first consider whether appellant preserved error on his first issue,
whether his complaint comports with his arguments for admissibility in the trial
court, because appellant only now contends this excluded evidence would have

1
  Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 40.001(“A new trial shall be granted an accused where material
evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial.”); see also see infra Part III,
citing State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (setting out four-part test
applied to motions under article 40.001, the third prong requires defendant to show “the new
evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching).

                                                5
aided his self-defense theory at trial.2 The record indicates admissibility of this
evidence was raised three times.

       First, during pretrial, when addressing the State’s motion in limine—seeking
the court’s approval on references at trial to child pornography found on the
complainant’s phone—appellant argued that two child pornographic videos found
on the complainant’s phone were admissible because they were relevant to the
motive of a potential alternative perpetrator and whether law enforcement
conducted a complete investigation. Appellant’s counsel described the evidence as
two videos: One is of a minor child receiving oral sex from an adult; the other is of
a minor child being made to penetrate and be raped by a chicken. The trial court
granted the motion in limine, precluding appellant from offering the evidence
without first approaching the bench.

       Later, during trial, on appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of Patrol
Lieutenant Gilcrease, appellant’s counsel approached the bench and requested
permission to ask a question regarding the general nature of child pornography.
The trial court denied appellant’s request during this exchange:

       Q. And one of the reasons why you preserve or pass this phone off to
       be preserved was to preserve any type of video that could be criminal.
       Right?
       A. Yes, sir.
       MR. BROWN: Judge, may we approach?
       THE COURT: Sure.
       (AT THE BENCH, ON THE RECORD.)
2
  We acknowledge that there are several potentially valid preservation concerns with respect to
appellant’s first complaint, including the extent to which appellant’s arguments during the
motion in limine could preserve the issue, whether appellant’s counsel made a sufficient offer of
proof, and whether a definitive adverse ruling was ever secured. We only need address the
question whether appellant’s complaint on appeal comports with the issue he sought to preserve
in the trial court.

                                               6
      MR. BROWN: I know there's a motion in limine about -- about child
      pornography. I want to ask him one question about -- about child
      pornography in a general nature.
      MR. HRACH: General nature about --
      MR. BROWN: I'm setting a foundation for later in this trial.
      THE COURT: Sustained.
      If it becomes relevant, you can ask the question at a later time.
      MR. BROWN: Okay.
      During the exchange, appellant’s counsel did not request admission of the
evidence on the basis that it was relevant to appellant’s self-defense or for any
other basis.

      Finally, during appellant’s counsel’s questioning of Detective Kelly, the trial
court instructed appellant’s counsel not to ask any questions regarding child
pornography during cross-examination. Appellant’s trial counsel approached and
argued, as he had at the motion in limine, that the alleged child pornography was
admissible on the basis that it was proof to support motive for a third-party
perpetrator and showed that the investigation was not thorough.

      To preserve a complaint of error, the record must demonstrate appellant
made a timely request with enough specificity to make the trial court aware of the
complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context. See Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1. Furthermore, the argument on appeal must comport with the specific
complaint that the appellant timely lodged in the trial court. Penton v. State, 489
S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d); see Pena v.
State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The appellant must have
conveyed to the trial court the particular argument raised on appeal, including the
precise and proper application of law as well as the underlying rationale. Penton,
489 S.W.3d at 580; Fish v. State, 609 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

                                          7
Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

       Because appellant failed to attempt to explain to the trial court (as he
attempts to explain on appeal) that the complainant’s possession of the child
pornography videos related in any way to an assertion of self-defense, the question
now presented was not preserved for our review. That is, appellant’s argument for
admissibility does comport with the specific complaint that the appellant timely
lodged in the trial court. See id. (holding appellant failed to preserve admissibility-
of-evidence complaint–offered to rebut false impression–despite preserving error
on other grounds of admissibility). Conversely, we need not consider whether the
trial court erred in excluding this evidence on the grounds appellant’s counsel
sought to have it admitted at trial – to support motive for a third-party perpetrator
and to show that the investigation was not thorough – because he has abandoned
those grounds on appeal.

       We therefore overrule appellant’s first issue.

                                        III. NEW TRIAL

       In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
grant him a new trial after the discovery of evidence that Javier Sr.’s two sons,
Leonardo and Javier Jr., had a falling out near the time of trial that resulted in a
physical altercation between the two brothers. 3

       3
         The State argues first that appellant failed to preserve his new-trial complaint by failing
to present evidence at the new-trial hearing. The State is correct: neither party tendered any
exhibit or presented any witness at the hearing. But attached to its verified motion for new trial,
appellant had included two affidavits of its counsel, and at the hearing, Judge Yates made it
unmistakably clear that the she was aware of the affidavits and had considered them in preparing
to preside over the hearing. The State never objected to her consideration of the affidavits at the
hearing as outside the record or otherwise. Upon this record we are reluctant to conclude that
appellant waived the issue. See Godoy v. State, 122 S.W.3d 315, 319–20 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d)(considering affidavits and medical records filed with new-trial
motion which were impliedly admitted into evidence as if formally admitted into evidence).

                                                 8
      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We
do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether
the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. An appellate court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, defers to
the trial court regarding credibility determinations, and presumes that all
reasonable fact findings in support of the ruling have been made. State v. Thomas,
428 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A trial court abuses its discretion in
denying a motion for a new trial when no reasonable view of the record could
support the trial court’s ruling. McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 150.

      Appellant filed a motion for new trial under the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure 40.001. Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 40.001. A defendant can obtain
relief under this provision if he shows the following:

      (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the
      defendant at the time of trial;

      (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not
      due to the defendant’s lack of due diligence;

      (3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative,
      corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and

      (4) the new evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a
      different result in a new trial.

Id.; State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Motions for
new trial predicated on newly discovered evidence are not favored by appellate
courts and are viewed with great caution. State v. Fury, 186 S.W.3d 67, 73 n.4
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); Soliz v. State, No. 14-14-00498-

                                          9
CR, 2015 WL 4141212, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 9, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       Much of the evidence presented in the new trial motion and discussed at the
hearing related to the first two prongs of the analysis.4            The record tends to show
that this newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant
at the time of trial, and the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the new
evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due diligence. We thus turn to the
third requirement under article 40.001.

    Is the new evidence admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative,
                          collateral, or impeaching?
        The “physical altercation” between Leonardo and Javier Jr. occurred three
years after the charged offense and did not involve Leonardo’s relationship with
Javier Sr. Appellant argues that the fight between Leonardo and Javier Jr. shows
Leonardo’s “animus” toward family members who neglect their familial
responsibilities. Specifically, appellant suggests this reported sibling conflict is
probative that appellant harbored a similar animus against his father. The trial court
could have reasonably rejected this view. First it is not clear from the proffered
letter whether Leonardo or Javier Jr. instigated the physical altercation. The recusal
court could have reasonably determined that this fight between brothers had no
direct bearing on the relationship between Leonardo and his father. There was no

       4
          Though appellant’s motion for new trial and his brief on appeal refer to the district
attorney’s duty under Brady to disclose evidence favorable to appellant, under his second issue,
he does not assert that the State’s failure to disclose such evidence (more rapidly than it did)
independently entitled appellant to a new trial or some other form of relief. Rather on appeal, he
argues that the trial court’s failure to grant a new trial on the basis of the newly discovered
evidence followed from errors in its analysis under article 40.001 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, we do not construe appellant’s discussion of the State’s duty under state and
federal law to disclose such evidence as setting out a separate ground for error, but as pertinent to
the issue raised, germane to the first two prongs of the analysis under article 40.001 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.

                                                 10
evidence Leonardo believed his father neglected his familial responsibilities and no
evidence that Leonardo and his father ever had disagreements or fights based on
his father’s behavior.

      With regard to a party’s ability to conduct cross-examination, a matter is
considered “collateral” when “the cross-examining party would not be entitled to
prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his plea.” Ramirez v. State, 802
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc). While appellant would be
entitled to prove facts that would show that Leonardo was the first aggressor, the
evidence of his fraternal altercation with Javier Jr. three years later could only
provide proof collateral to such facts. That is, even if the evidence illustrates
Leonardo’s sense of familial loyalty and obligation and his willingness to voice
disapproval to family members who do not share the same view, it does not
establish Leonardo as an instigator of violence. Nor does the evidence offered at
the motion for new trial establish Leonardo’s capacity to inflict the degree of
violence reflected by Javier Sr.’s injuries. Appellant’s counsel cross-examined
Leonardo over the course of two days, probing the details of his testimony on
direct examination. Whether Leonardo had a physical dispute with Javier, Jr. three
years after the events in question would not have undermined Leonardo’s
testimony.

      Even assuming without concluding that evidence regarding a fight between
Leonardo and Javier Jr. could have impeached Leonardo’s testimony, it was not
sufficiently “material and competent independent of its impeaching tendency” to
show that it would have probably brought about a different result. Id.

      Because the trial court could have reasonably concluded that appellant failed
to put forth sufficient proof in support of the third and fourth prongs of article
40.001, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion.

                                         11
      We therefore overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                   IV. JURY CHARGE

      In his third issue, appellant asserts that the trial court reversibly erred when
it refused to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge.

      In reviewing alleged jury charge error, appellate courts engage in a two-step
process. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Kirsch v.
State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, we determine whether
there was error in the charge; if not, our analysis ends. Cortez, 469 S.W.3d at 598;
Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649. If we find there was error in the charge, we must then
determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.
Cortez, 469 S.W.3d at 598; Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649. In the instant case, we
only reach the first part of this analysis.

      A defendant is entitled to a self-defense jury instruction when the issue is
raised by the evidence, “whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or
contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility
of the defense.” Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “A
trial court errs in denying a self-defense instruction if there is some evidence, from
any source, that will support the elements of self-defense.” Fury v. State, 607
S.W.3d 866, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing
Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510). “A person is justified in using deadly force against
another if ... he reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to
protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.”
Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Tex. Penal
Code § 9.32(a)).

      “Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance defense requiring the defendant

                                              12
to admit to his otherwise illegal conduct.” Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 343 (citing
Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); see Rogers v. State,
550 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “He cannot both invoke self-defense
and flatly deny the charged conduct.” Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 343 (citing Juarez,
308 S.W.3d at 406 (confession-and-avoidance requirements satisfied despite
Juarez’s inconsistent testimony alternatively admitting to the conduct and claiming
it was an accident)). Under this doctrine, “a defensive instruction is only
appropriate when the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every
element of the offense including the culpable mental state but interposes the
justification to excuse the otherwise criminal conduct.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d
647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis in original). A defendant who denies
committing the offense, on the other hand, is not entitled to such an instruction
because he contends “he has engaged in no conduct which needs justifying.”
Gilmore v. State, 44 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. App. — Beaumont 2001, pet. ref’d).

       A claim of self-defense must be supported by the record, and the defendant
bears the initial burden of producing evidence supporting submission of an issue
on this defense. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
In reviewing this issue, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant’s requested defensive instruction. Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510 & n.6
(citing Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

       Appellant did not testify at trial; he did not provide testimony in support of a
self-defense claim. See Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (en banc) (“While a non-testifying defendant may be
entitled to a charge on self-defense, it is rare for the defense to be raised when the
defendant fails to testify.”).

       In the unusual circumstance where a self-defense instruction is required in

                                          13
the absence of a defendant’s testimony, the court must find some evidence of the
defendant’s intent through the defendant’s conduct or statements made by the
defendant during or shortly after the offense. See, e.g., Durden v. State, 659
S.W.3d 26, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021) (though the defendant did
not testify, another witness had testified that the defendant reported to him that she
had killed the complainant and that the complainant had tried to rape her.). But on
the record before us, we find no such evidence.

      Leonardo was the first person to make contact with appellant after returning
to Emily’s where he found his father lying in a pool of his own blood and appellant
kicking a wall.   Leonardo did not report any statements or conduct by appellant
suggesting that appellant had been attacked by complainant. Rather Leonardo
reported that appellant had sought to flee.

      When appellant was apprehended and taken into custody he provided a
statement, but he told the investigator that he could not remember anything that
occurred when he was at Emily’s. At one point in the interview, one of the officers
specifically questioned appellant on the possibility of self-defense, which appellant
denied. Importantly, appellant’s testimony that he blacked out when he was at
Emily’s negates the element of intent associated with his self-defense argument.
See Uddley v. State, No. 07-06-0483-CR, 2008 WL 5334562, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Dec. 22, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding that the appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction where he
testified that he did not remember the events leading to the victim’s death and the
State’s evidence did not raise the issue); Spencer v. State, No. 14-99-00969-CR,
2000 WL 1752766, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 30, 2000, pet.
ref’d) (not designated for publication) (finding that the appellant was not entitled to
a self-defense charge where she did not testify, there was no other evidence

                                          14
showing she reasonably believed she was in danger, and there was no evidence that
any person had done anything to justify the appellant’s actions).

      The physical evidence and character evidence offered do not sufficiently
overcome this deficiency. The crux of appellant’s defense is based on the fact that
complainant was found with his zipper down, that Julia Gomez testified that
appellant had been known to kiss men when intoxicated, and Officer Jenny
Humbird’s theory that “the death occurred in defense of an unwanted sexual
advance.” With regard to his zipper, the law enforcement’s testimony was that
there was no evidence that complainant had pulled out his penis. Though the
zipper might provide some circumstantial evidence, without more, it is not
demonstrative of sexually aggressive conduct.

      Appellant conflates testimony that complainant had been known to kiss men
when intoxicated and speculation that complainant had made an unwanted sexual
advance toward appellant with evidence that complaintant was sexually violent
toward appellant. In the absence of any evidence of threatening behavior by
complainant, appellant relies on testimony that tends more to disprove his theory
than support it:

      Q. Even if -- even if the questions to Mr. Brown -- the questions by
      Mr. Brown about sexual advances, even if, whatever terminology you
      want to use, even if the victim had made a sexual advance toward the
      defendant, did you have anything to suggest that it was reasonable to
      believe he needed to beat the guy to death?
      A. No.
      We conclude from the evidence presented at trial that the trial court could
have reasonably found that appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction.

      We therefore overrule appellant’s third issue.

                                  V. CONCLUSION

                                         15
      Having overruled each of appellant’s complaints on appeal, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

                                    /s/    Randy Wilson
                                           Justice

Panel consists of Justice Spain, Justice Poissant and Justice Wilson (J. Spain,
concurring).
Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

                                      16