Court Opinion

ID: 9364453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:02:01.284367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.321817
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                             JOHNNY R., Appellant,

                                         v.

            DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.S., Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0056
                                FILED 1-19-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
                         No. L8015JD202107007
                The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, Flagstaff
By Sarah Snelling
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
                         JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1           Johnny R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his son (“Child”). For the following
reasons, we affirm.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2            Father and Samantha S. (“Mother”) are Child’s parents.
In March 2021, Mother was visiting Arizona from California when she went
into labor. She and Child tested positive for amphetamines after the birth.
Child had difficulty feeding, so he required a six-day stay at the hospital.

¶3            The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) met with Mother at
the hospital. She told DCS that Father was not there because he was “doing
something for work.” DCS then spoke with Father at his residence. He said
he had been in Arizona for months to prepare for the baby’s birth, but DCS
noted that “no baby items were observed” other than a crib that was still in
its box. After Child was discharged from the hospital, he was placed in
foster care.

¶4            DCS promptly filed a petition for dependency. As to Father,
DCS alleged (1) he was unwilling or unable to provide proper and effective
parental care by neglecting Child’s basic needs, (2) he had not been
involved with the Child since birth and did not visit him in the hospital, (3)
he had been advised to provide identification to facilitate a “rule out hair
follicle and urine test” but had not done so, and (4) he could not properly
care for Child due to suspected substance abuse “because common
symptoms of methamphetamine use include erratic and paranoid behavior
and impaired decision making.”

¶5           In its initial dependency report, DCS reported that despite
Father’s denial of any recent substance use, he appeared jittery, spoke fast,
did not answer the questions asked, and closed his eyes while being spoken
to. DCS expressed concern that Father was “not an appropriate support”
for Mother due to, among other things, his suspected substance use. DCS

                                      2
                          JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                            Decision of the Court

was also concerned that Mother and Father were not parenting Mother’s
other two children, who were living in California with their maternal
grandmother, the youngest of whom is also Father’s child (“J.S.”). Those
children were the subject of a 2019 dependency case in California, which
began when Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine,
and marijuana at J.S.’s birth.

¶6             After denying the allegations of the dependency petition,
Father failed to appear at a pretrial conference and placement hearing. DCS
requested that his non-appearance be deemed an admission to the
allegations in the petition, and the juvenile court found Child dependent as
to Father.

¶7             DCS offered both parents reunification services, including
substance-abuse testing and treatment, supervised visitation, and family
support services. The parents were both resistant to the services offered
and missed about 50 to 60 percent of their scheduled visits with Child,
which led to cutting the number of visits in half. The parents told DCS they
missed visits due to transportation issues, but when DCS set up
transportation, they declined to use it. Father participated in only one drug
test, which had not been randomly scheduled; the result was negative.
Father was unsuccessfully closed out of substance-abuse services twice due
to his inaction and resistance to services.

¶8           In October 2021, DCS filed a motion for termination of
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights based on chronic substance abuse and
six months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b). Following a
termination hearing held in January 2022, the juvenile court granted DCS’s
motion on both grounds and found that termination was in Child’s best
interests. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 8-235(A).1

1      In the termination order, the juvenile court stated that “[p]aternity
has not been established.” But Father is listed on the birth certificate, which
means he is the presumptive father. See A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(3). For reasons
that are not clear from the record, DCS moved to dismiss alleged father John
Doe without having served him by publication and the juvenile court
granted the motion. In this appeal, we address only the termination of
Father’s parental rights.

                                      3
                           JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                             Decision of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

¶9             To terminate parental rights, a court must find (1) by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)
has been proven, and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). We will affirm an order
terminating parental rights so long as reasonable evidence supports the
order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).
“The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). If the evidence
supports any one ground for terminating parental rights, we need not
address whether sufficient evidence supports the other grounds. Id. at ¶ 3.

       A.     Six Months’ Time-In-Care

¶10           To meet its burden of proving the time-in-care ground, DCS
was required to establish that (1) Child was in an out-of-home placement
for a “cumulative total period of six months or longer;” and (2) Father
“substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances
that caused the [Child] to be in the out-of-home placement, including
refusal to participate in reunification services offered by [DCS].” A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(8)(b). Father argues the only circumstance that caused Child to
remain out of his care was “DCS’s unsubstantiated belief” concerning his
substance abuse. He contends there is no evidence supporting DCS’s
allegations of substance abuse and the “dependency finding itself is
tenuous” because it was based on his non-appearance.

¶11            DCS explained its concerns about substance abuse at the
outset of the case and included specific allegations of those concerns in the
dependency petition. The significance of the court’s dependency finding is
not weakened by his failure to appear; instead, he is deemed to have
admitted all allegations in the petition, including his use of
methamphetamine. See A.R.S. § 8-844(F) (stating that if a parent does not
appear at a pretrial conference, a court may find that the parent “is deemed
to have admitted the allegations of the petition by the failure to appear”).
Father’s admission undercuts his contention that DCS’s decision to require
him to participate in substance-abuse testing was unsubstantiated. And he
does not dispute that he displayed behavior consistent with a person who
is under the influence of drugs.

                                        4
                          JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                            Decision of the Court

¶12             Moreover, the record supports the court’s finding that Father
refused to engage in substance-abuse services. Shortly after the birth of the
child, DCS informed both parents that they needed to provide a “rule out”
hair follicle and urinalysis test. Several weeks later, Father provided a urine
analysis that “wasn’t a random test, it was . . . “on a day that he agreed to
go.” He did not participate in any further testing, notwithstanding DCS’s
repeated requests. Concerning the hair follicle test, he initially suggested it
could not be done because he lacked hair on top of his head. However, the
DCS case manager later informed him the test could be done with facial or
body hair. Even though Father had many months before the termination
hearing to obtain a hair follicle test, he substantially neglected or willfully
refused to do so. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373,
379, ¶ 27 (App. 2010) (noting parent’s failure to submit to drug testing for
two months among evidence of ongoing substance abuse).

¶13           Further, we reject Father’s argument that the court
improperly placed the burden on him to prove he was not using drugs.
His reliance on Donald W. v. Department of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9 (App.
2019) is not persuasive. There, this court vacated a termination judgment
in part because the dependency petition allegations were not supported by
any evidence. Id. at 18, ¶¶ 27, 30. And the juvenile court in that case had
been unable to identify any “circumstance” causing the out-of-home
placement, which necessarily meant the court could not properly decide
whether diligent efforts had been made or whether the parent had been able
to remedy the circumstance. Id. at 17, ¶ 26. Given Father’s admission to the
allegations of the petition, coupled with evidence supporting DCS’s
concerns about his suspected substance abuse, the multiple problems
outlined in Donald W. are not present here.

       B.     Reunification Services

¶14            DCS also had to prove it made diligent efforts to provide
appropriate reunification services to Father. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), (D).
(court must consider the availability of reunification services to parents and
their participation in those services). DCS must provide services and give
the parent an opportunity to engage in the services, Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 37 (App. 1999), but it is not required
to wait an indefinite period before requesting termination of parental
rights, Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App.
1994). DCS has no obligation to provide services that would be futile or
ensure parents participate in the services offered, but it must give them the
time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help parents

                                       5
                           JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                             Decision of the Court

effectively parent. Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235,
¶¶ 14–15 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).

¶15           Father argues that DCS failed to make diligent efforts to
provide reunification services because it failed to provide sufficient
documentation supporting the case manager’s testimony about his lack of
compliance with services. He argues that his counsel subpoenaed records
from two agencies, both of which responded that they had no records for
Father. The case manager testified, however, that Father was given two
referrals and that both were closed out. The juvenile court was in the best
position to resolve that conflict in the evidence, and we will not reweigh it
on appeal. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018)
(noting that the juvenile court is entitled to resolve conflicting evidence
even when facts are sharply disputed). Moreover, Father did not testify
that he was never given referrals to those agencies, and he fails to
acknowledge that DCS records show he was not always referred to by the
same name, which could explain the discrepancy.

¶16           The DCS case manager testified that both parents were
offered referrals for several services, including substance abuse, but both
parents “were very resistant to the services.” She explained that although
there were issues with Father’s social security number, it did not prevent
him from drug testing. The record supports the court’s finding that DCS
“made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services” under
the unique circumstances present in this case, which included parents “who
were choosing not to engage, choosing not to call back, [and] choosing not
to show up to appointments.”

       C.     Best Interests

¶17            Termination is in a child’s best interests if either “(1) the child
will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is
denied.” Id. at 150, ¶ 13. The juvenile court may consider various factors
concerning the presence of a harm or benefit. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No.
JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6 (1990). The court’s primary concern is the “child’s
interest in stability and security.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12 (citation
omitted). The juvenile court considers the “totality of the circumstances
existing at the time of the severance,” id. at ¶ 13, including a parent’s
rehabilitation efforts, id. at 151, ¶ 15.

¶18          The juvenile court found that Child is in an adoptive
placement meeting all his needs and that “another adoptive placement
could be located should the current placement be unable to adopt.” The

                                        6
                           JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.
                             Decision of the Court

court also found that continuing Father’s parent-child relationship with
Child would be detrimental to him “because it would delay permanency,
leaving the child to linger in care for an indeterminate period since the child
does not have parents who are able to care for him.” The court explained
that Child does not have a strong bond with Father, and although severance
is traumatic, Child is almost a year old and Father had made no progress in
services, sobriety, or the ability to care for Child. The court thus concluded
that termination would serve the child’s best interests.

¶19            Father argues the court’s adoptability finding is speculative
but does not challenge the court’s findings that continuation of the parent-
child relationship would be detrimental. Because Father has waived any
challenge to those findings, we need not address his argument on the
adoptability finding. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578,
¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role
to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G., 227
Ariz. at 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (recognizing that the failure to develop an argument
on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver of the issue). The
evidence supports the court’s best-interests determination.

                                CONCLUSION

¶20           We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s
parental rights.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

                                          7