Court Opinion

ID: 9522807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:29.094213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:56.739118
License: Public Domain

Skoglund, J.
¶ 1. In this appeal, we consider the scope of Act 250 jurisdiction over utility line projects. Central Vermont Public Service Corporation (CVPS) sought an Act 250 permit to extend one of its electrical distribution lines. It appeals from the Environmental Court’s determination that it must not only obtain a permit pursuant to Act 250 Rule 70, 12 Code of Vt. Rules 004 060-18 to -20, which specifically applies to utility line projects, but it must also obtain an amendment to an existing Act 250 permit held by a third party and be named as a co-permittee on that permit.1 CVPS argues that the court erred in ordering it to be named as a co-permittee on the third-party permit because Rule 70 provided the sole basis for jurisdiction over its project. We agree that the Environmental Court erred, and we therefore reverse the court’s decision.
¶ 2. The record indicates the following. In October 2006, CVPS applied for an Act 250 permit to construct a 2500-foot extension of an electrical distribution line in Danville, Vermont, most of which would be located underground.2 CVPS obtained easements for its line corridor, one of which traversed land subject to an existing Act 250 permit held by a third party (“Barry permit”). The Barry permit approved the creation of three building sites, but it did not authorize further development of the subject property.
*292¶ 3. CVPS subsequently requested a jurisdictional opinion from the District 7 Environmental Coordinator on whether its line corridor would require an amendment to the Barry permit, in addition to the Act 250 permit required under Rule 70 for the line extension itself. The district coordinator issued an initial jurisdictional opinion, concluding that an amendment to the Barry permit was required because the project constituted a “material change” to the development approved under the Barry permit. See Rule 2(C)(6) (defining “material change” as any change to a permitted development or subdivision that has a significant impact on any finding, conclusion, term or condition of the project’s permit and which may result in an impact with respect to any of the criteria specified in 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(l)-(10)); see also Rule 34(A) (permit amendment required for any “material change” to a permitted development); Rule 34(C) (noting that, at discretion of district commission, a proposed amendment may instead be subject to new application process).
¶ 4. In December 2006, the district commission issued two permits — a new Act 250 permit to CVPS and an amended Barry permit that named CVPS as a co-permittee. Both permits stated that the utility line project was subject to Act 250 jurisdiction for two independent reasons: (1) the project met the criteria set forth in Rule 70, and (2) the project constituted a “material change” to the Barry permit under Rule 2(C)(6).
¶ 5. CVPS appealed both permits to the Environmental Court, and the appeals were consolidated. CVPS argued that the district commission erred by finding that a “material change” to an existing development could be an independent trigger for jurisdiction over its utility line project. CVPS also argued that the district commission erred in naming it as a co-permittee in the Barry permit. CVPS moved for summary judgment, and the Land Use Panel of the Natural Resources Board opposed its request. In an August 2007 decision, the court granted summary judgment to the land use panel.
¶ 6. The court first considered the terms of the Barry permit, which addressed the future residential development of a 289-acre parcel of land. The Barry permit had approved three future building sites as identified on a site development plan, but it had not approved the actual subdivision or the construction of these residences. Instead, the permit required an amendment before actual construction or subdivision of any parcels associated with the building sites.
*293¶ 7. The permit noted that the primary concern in developing the tract for residential purposes was the fact that the majority of the parcel was a mapped deer yard. For this reason, the permittee had agreed, as a condition of the permit, that no further development of the tract would be allowed unless it could be demonstrated that the development would not have any further impact on the tract’s ability to serve as a protected deer yard or unless the tract was no longer appropriate, necessary or functional as a deer yard. The permit also prohibited any further development of the parcel absent the concurrence of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Agency of Natural Resources, and the District Environmental Commission, and the written approval of the district commission or a written determination from the district coordinator that a permit was not required. In light of these provisions, the court concluded that the Barry permit plainly required an amendment before CYPS could construct and install its electrical distribution line.3
¶ 8. Even if the Barry permit had not expressly required an amendment, the court continued, a permit amendment would nonetheless be required under Rule 34(A), if the extension of the utility line constituted a material or substantial change to the previously-permitted project. In so concluding, the court rejected CVPS’s assertion that Rule 70 provided a separate regulatory framework for utility projects, to the exclusion of Rule 34(A). It reasoned that Rule 70 simply provided procedures for the processing of applications for new transmission lines, and if the Natural Resources Board had intended to exempt such projects from “amendment jurisdiction” under Rule 34(A), it could have done so. Nonetheless, the court found that it could not determine from the facts provided if the project constituted a material or substantial change to the Barry permit, and thus, summary judgment was not appropriate on this ground. Because the Barry permit itself required an amendment, however, the court found that this conclusion did not change the result.
*294¶ 9. Finally, the court addressed CVPS’s assertion that it should be removed as a co-permittee on the Barry permit for various policy reasons, including concerns about the operation of its line should another co-permittee violate the terms of the Barry permit. The court found insufficient “good cause” under Rule 10(A) to warrant a waiver of the co-applicant requirement, noting that CVPS had not identified any authority for the proposition that, as the owner of an easement in the property and the developer of the land within the line corridor, it should be removed as a co-permittee. The court clarified, however, that CVPS should be listed as a co-permittee only to the extent of its easement interest in the line corridor, and not as to the remainder of property subject to the Barry permit. The court thus denied CVPS’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the land use panel on the question of whether an amendment to the Barry permit was required. This appeal followed.
¶ 10. On appeal, CVPS argues that the court’s decision regarding amendment jurisdiction was both unnecessary and unsupported by the rules. We review the Environmental Court’s summary judgment ruling using the same standard as the Environmental Court. In re Hildebrand, 2007 VT 5, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 568, 917 A.2d 478 (mem.). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). As discussed below, we conclude that Rule 70 provided the sole basis for Act 250 jurisdiction over this utility project, and thus, the court erred in ordering CVPS to be named as a co-permittee on an amended Barry permit.4
*295I. Mootness
¶ 11. Before turning to the merits, we briefly respond to the issue raised by the dissent. The dissent concludes, sua sponte, that this appeal should be dismissed because CVPS no longer has a legal stake in the outcome of this case and there is no meaningful relief that can be afforded CVPS by this Court and, thus, CVPS is seeking an advisory opinion. The dissent misunderstands the issues presented on appeal.
¶ 12. As recounted above, the Environmental Court concluded that, based on the language of the Barry permit, CVPS was subject to the terms of the permit and, consequently, that it must obtain an amendment to the Barry permit before installing its line. It further found that CVPS would be required to seek a permit amendment pursuant to Rule 34 if the extension of the utility line constituted a material or substantial change to the Barry permitted project. These obligations were in addition to the requirement that CVPS obtain an Act 250 permit for its line under Rule 70. These are the decisions appealed to this Court. CVPS argues that Rule 70 provides the sole basis for Act 250 jurisdiction over utility line projects and that it should not be required to seek an amendment for a permit to which it was never a party and under rules that do not control here. CVPS retains a legal stake in the outcome of these proceedings, and this Court can offer it meaningful relief. See In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 529, 64 A.2d 169, 172 (1949) (Vermont Supreme Court is empowered “to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction” (quotation omitted)); see also J.L. v. Miller, 174 Vt. 288, 292, 817 A.2d 1, 4 (2002) (“The presence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely *296speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 13. Rather than resolve this controversy, the dissent suggests that we strike CVPS’s name from the Barry permit and vacate the entire Environmental Court decision as “unnecessary dicta.” Post, ¶¶ 33-34. It would seem obvious that striking CVPS’s name from the Barry permit alone is meaningful relief. Moreover, the Environmental Court’s entire decision below can hardly be characterized as dicta. Unlike the cases cited by the dissent, the question of whether CVPS was required to be named as a co-permittee on the Barry permit was clearly “in dispute” and it formed “a necessary part of the final disposition of the case to which it pertains.” Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121, 370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977).5 Indeed, it was the sole issue decided by the Environmental Court. The controversy is live and CVPS is entitled to have this Court decide if it must be named as a co-permittee on the Barry permit under the terms of that permit and whether Rule 34(A) applies to it.
II. Act 250 Jurisdiction Over Utility Line Projects
¶ 14. We thus turn to the merits. In reviewing the rules governing Act 250, we apply familiar principles of construction, including a presumption that the drafters of the rules intended “the plain ordinary meaning of the language used.” Comm. to *297Save the Bishop’s House, Inc. v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 137 Vt. 142, 153, 400 A.2d 1015, 1021 (1979); In re 1650 Cases of Seized Liquor, 168 Vt. 314, 319, 721 A.2d 100, 104 (1998) (“We apply the same rules of statutory construction to a regulation as we do to a statute.”); see also In re Vitale, 151 Vt. 580, 584, 563 A.2d 613, 616 (1989) (“The primary rule when reviewing [the] construction of an administrative rule is to give language its plain, ordinary meaning.”). We are also mindful, when considering Act 250’s jurisdictional threshold, that “legislation in derogation of common law property rights will be strictly construed.” Bishop’s House, 137 Vt. at 152, 400 A.2d at 1020. As discussed below, based on the history and the plain language of the rules, as well as the purposes served by Act 250, we conclude that Rule 70 exclusively governs Act 250 jurisdiction over utilities.
¶ 15. Generally speaking, Act 250 prohibits parties from subdividing land or commencing “development” without a permit. 10 V.S.A. § 6081(a). Utility companies are different from other developers in that they are statutorily obligated to provide electrical, communication, or other services to the public. See 30 V.S.A. § 219 (electric companies, and other corporations subject to regulation under chapter 5, Title 30, “shall be required to furnish reasonably adequate service, accommodation, and facilities to the public”), id. §2801 (describing general duties of companies engaged in the business of generating electric energy or transmitting it and distributing it for heating, lighting, or power purposes or for any other public use). In light of their special status, it is not surprising that utility line projects have been governed by a special set of permitting rules almost since the inception of Act 250.
¶ 16. Initially, those utility projects that did not require a certificate of public good were governed by “Appendix A,” titled “Power and Communication Lines and Facilities: Permit Requirements.” The stated purpose of Appendix A was to “establish rules and procedures for applications for a permit [under Act 250] by public and private utilities.” Pursuant to these rules, an Act 250 permit was required to
construct, relocate, reconstruct, or extend any transmission facility for any purpose whether above, below, or on ground if the construction of improvements for the right-of-way involves more than one acre ... if within a *298municipality not having permanent zoning and subdivision ordinances or more than ten acres ... if a municipally owned utility.
Appendix A, Rule A-3; see also Rule A-3(c) (identifying specific exemptions from permit requirement). These rules described the necessary components of a permit application, and set forth requirements concerning the installation of lines.
¶ 17. Effective January 2001, the Environmental Board promulgated a revised set of rules, which eliminated Appendix A, and instead expanded the definition of “development” to include the following:
The construction of improvements for electrical distribution or communication lines and related facilities that are located on rights-of-way, or easements, of more than one acre of land owned or controlled by a person or persons in a municipality without both permanent zoning and subdivisions bylaws. The phrase “construction of improvements” shall include construction, relocation, extension, and reconstruction. ... In a municipality with both permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws, this jurisdiction will apply if the rights-of-ways or easements involve more than ten acres of land. For the construction of improvements by a municipally-owned utility, regardless of the existence of zoning or subdivision bylaws in the area where improvements will be constructed, this jurisdiction will apply only if the rights-of-way[] or easements involve more than ten acres of land.
Rule 2(A)(12) (2001). The rule described how to calculate acreage for purposes of utility projects and also identified specific exemptions from this jurisdiction. See Rule 2(A)(12)(a), (b) (2001); see also Rule 2(F)(3) (defining “involved land” for purposes of electrical distribution or communication lines and related facilities to include only the acreage identified and calculated as set forth in Rule 2(A)(12)); 2(T) (2001) (defining term “electrical lines, communication lines, and related facilities”). Rule 70, titled “Utility Line Installations and Applications,” described the requirements for installation and the process for permit applications to construct, relocate, reconstruct, or extend any electrical distribution fine or related facility. Rule 70 (2001).
*299¶ 18. In May 2006, the rules were again revised. The utility-related rule provisions were consolidated into a revised Rule 70, titled “Utility Line Jurisdiction, Installations and Applications,” and this rule applies here.6 Rule 70(B) specifically provides:
(B) Utility Line Jurisdiction. The construction of improvements for electrical distribution, natural gas distribution, or communication lines and related facilities that are located on rights-of-way, or easements, of more than one acre of land owned or controlled by a person or persons in a municipality without both permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws. The phrase “construction of improvements” shall include construction, relocation, extension, and reconstruction. ... In a municipality with both permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws, this jurisdiction will apply if the rights-of-way[] or easements involve more than ten acres of land. For the construction of improvements by a municipally-owned utility, regardless of the existence of zoning or subdivision bylaws in the area where improvements will be constructed, this jurisdiction will apply only if the rights-of-way[] or easements involve more than ten acres of land.
As in prior rules, the acreage calculation methodology is set forth, and Rule 70(B)(1) states that jurisdiction will apply if a project exceeds the acreage thresholds set forth above. The rule also defines relevant terms and sets forth specific exemptions from jurisdiction under Rule 70, including cases where an electrical distribution line is within a development that has obtained a permit, provided that the line was included in the application for the permit. See Rule 70(B)(l)(a)-(c), 70(B)(2)(a). Additionally, the rule sets forth the necessary components of a permit application for the construction, relocation, reconstruction, or extension of any electrical distribution or communication line or related facility. Rule 70(D).
¶ 19. In addition to Rule 70, two recently enacted statutory provisions also touch on the scope of Act 250 jurisdiction over *300utility line projects. 10 V.S.A. § 6081(r) provides that the subsequent construction of improvements for a permitted utility project that were not identified or reasonably identifiable at the time the original permit was obtained will be considered new construction, and not a material or substantial change to the existing project.7 Section 6081(q) states that for the purpose of reviewing those utility projects that, standing alone, constitute a development for purposes of Act 250, the district commission shall not consider the actual or potential impacts of the construction of other improvements to be served by those lines and subsidiary facilities in evaluating the actual and potential impacts of the project under 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a).
¶ 20. In contrast to these utility-specific provisions is Rule 34, titled “New Permit Applications and Permit Amendments: Substantial and Material Change.”8 Rule 34(A) provides that an amendment is required for any “material change” to a permitted development or subdivision, or any administrative change in the terms and conditions of a land use permit.9 As noted above, a “material change” is defined as “any change to a permitted development or subdivision which has a significant impact on any finding, conclusion, term or condition of the project’s permit and *301which may result in an impact with respect to any of the criteria specified in 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(1) through (a)(10).” Rule 2(C)(6). Rule 34 also provides that proposed amendments may be subject to a new application process or to simplified review procedures set forth in the rule, at the discretion of the district coordinator. Rule 34(C). If a change to a preexisting development or subdivision involves a “substantial change,” thus implicating Act 250 jurisdiction, it is subject to a new application process. Rule 34(B). One can see a correlation between the requirements imposed by Rule 34 and those specifically imposed on electrical distribution or communication lines under 10 V.S.A. § 6081(r) requiring a new application process when a permitted utility project undertakes subsequent construction of improvements.
¶ 21. As set forth above, the Environmental Court concluded that Rule 70 did not provide the exclusive means of obtaining Act 250 jurisdiction over utility line projects. Instead, it found that CVPS must be added as a co-permittee to an existing Act 250 permit because the terms of the Barry permit required an amendment prior to any further development of the subject property. The court also stated that Act 250 jurisdiction would attach to the utility line project under Rule 34 if the project constituted a “material or substantial change” to the Barry permit. The court erred.
¶ 22. It is evident that Rule 70, in conjunction with the statutory provisions discussed above, was intended to define the scope of Act 250 jurisdiction over utility line projects. The rules are specific and comprehensive, and they plainly limit Act 250 jurisdiction to those utility line projects that meet certain threshold requirements, i.e., projects that involve the construction of improvements on easements or rights-of-way of more than one acre in municipalities without both permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws, or more than ten acres in municipalities with both permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws. The rule does not contemplate that, despite these specific jurisdictional thresholds, utilities would also be required to obtain amendments to any and all existing Act 250 permits held by third parties wherever their projects would constitute a “material change” to the terms of those permits. This approach would be inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of Rule 70, and it would vastly expand the scope of Act 250 jurisdiction over utilities. It would further expose utilities as co-permittees to liabilities and burdens that could arise, even if *302only to petition a court for relief from suit given the limited scope of their co-permittee status. It could also require legal action to impose upon other permit holders from whom the utility obtained an easement the inclusion of the utility on a land use permit. The mischief that could follow from the Environmental Court’s holding is unquantifiable.
¶23. This is not the regulatory approach set forth in the rules, and we reject the notion that the specific conditions contained in the Barry permit can serve to establish Act 250 jurisdiction over a utility in the first instance. While certain utility projects may not be subject to Act 250 review, despite the fact that they arguably constitute a “material change” to existing projects, this is precisely what Rule 70 requires.
¶ 24. We note, moreover, that the Legislature has declared that any unanticipated changes to permitted utility line projects will not be considered “material changes” to such projects but rather will be considered as “new construction.” 10 V.S.A. § 6081(r). It is difficult to see why, if CVPS is not subject to Rule 34(A) for its own permit, it would nonetheless be required to obtain amendments to Act 250 permits held by third parties. This approach would be irrational. See Kankakeeland Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Commerce & Cmty. Affairs, 557 N.E.2d 277, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“When courts interpret [administrative] rules in conjunction with a statute, they should construe the rules together with the statute to make, if possible, an effective piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason . . . .”) (citation and quotation omitted), quoted in In re Green Crow Corp., 2007 VT 137, ¶ 17.
¶ 25. There is no reason to require CVPS to obtain two Act 250 permits for the same project and conduct the same environmental evaluation twice. See Bishop’s House, 137 Vt. at 153, 400 A.2d at 1021 (explaining that the “obvious purpose” of the Act 250 permit requirement is “to subject all ‘development’ to scrutiny at the district environmental commission level to assure that any adverse impacts on the values described in 10 V.S.A. § 6086 will not be undue, when considered against the benefits of the development”). Nor is there any purpose to be served by requiring CVPS to be listed as a co-applicant on the Barry permit to the extent of its easement interest, when its activities on the easement are already subject to a separate permit. Requiring *303CVPS to amend permits held by others would accomplish nothing more than to impose potentially unrelated permit conditions upon CVPS and to place it and the operation of its utility line at the mercy of the behavior of others over whom it has no control. Act 250 does not contemplate this result.
¶ 26. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain language of Rule 70 and with a narrow construction of the jurisdictional reach of Act 250. As we have explained, Act 250 does “not purport to reach all land use changes within the state, nor to impose the substantial administrative and financial burdens of the Act”; instead, the Legislature intended to reach only those land use changes “where values of state concern are implicated through large scale changes in land utilization.” In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 76, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982) (citing Bishop’s House, 137 Vt. at 151, 400 A.2d at 1020)); see also In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 334, 566 A.2d 959, 962 (1989) (noting that “although the purposes of Act 250 are broad, its application is not without limitation”). Rule 70 identifies when that threshold is met for utility companies.10
¶ 27. We are not persuaded otherwise by In re Eustance Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion, 2009 VT 16, 185 Vt. 447, 970 A.2d 1285, cited by the dissent. The dissent misconstrues our holding in Eustance. In that case, we considered whether certain landowners were required to obtain an amendment to an Act 250 permit that governed their own property in order to make improvements to their property. The case did not involve the question of whether the Legislature intended utility companies to be bound by the terms of existing permits held by third parties.11
*304¶28. The real issue in this case is not the presence of potential environmental harm caused by the utility line project, but the triggering of pertinent jurisdictional standards. Rule 70 reflects a clear policy statement that Act 250 will apply to utility line projects only in certain defined circumstances. This rule plainly controls the analysis, to the exclusion of jurisdictional thresholds that may be set forth in other rules. The Environmental Court erred in its expansive construction of Act 250 jurisdiction in this case, and we therefore reverse its decision.

Reversed.

 The rules referenced herein are codified in their current form at 12 Code of Vt. Rules 004 060-1 to -2. Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the current rules.

 Verizon New England was also a party to the permit application, but because it is not a party to this appeal, we do not refer to it in our decision.

 The Barrys have never been a party to this action and despite the fact that their permit was at issue, the court did not order them to obtain an amendment. Instead, as discussed in additional detail below, the Environmental Court remanded the case involving the Barry permit to the district commission for the sole purpose of revising the permit to clarify and state that “CVPS is a co-permittee only to the extent of its easement interest in the line corridor and not as to the remainder of the project property.”

 In reaching our conclusion, we need not decide whether the Environmental Court’s jurisdictional analysis is entitled to the same level of deference previously afforded to jurisdictional rulings made by the Environmental Board. Even if we apply the standard previously afforded to Environmental Board rulings, we would reverse the court’s decision. See, e.g., In re Audet, 2004 VT 30, ¶ 9, 176 Vt. 617, 850 A.2d 1000 (mem.) (Supreme Court defers to Environmental Board’s interpretation of Act 250, and will sustain Board’s interpretations on appeal absent compelling indications of error); see also In re Green Crow Corp., 2007 VT 137, ¶¶ 12-13, 183 Vt. 33, 944 A.2d 244 (identifying similar standard, but noting that Court will not sustain decision by Board that purports to enlarge its own powers beyond those granted by the Legislature, and stating that with respect to agency decisions that are arguably jurisdictional, Supreme Court will generally afford less deference to purely legal determinations and more deference to fact-intensive determinations that rely on agency expertise); Huntington v. Dep’t of Soc. & *295Rehab. Servs., 139 Vt. 416, 419, 430 A2d 460, 462 (1981) (Supreme Court accords “great weight to interpretation by the promulgator of a regulation, but . . . only . . . where the interpretation is consistent with the purposes of the act under which the regulation is made”); and see also In re Albert, 2008 VT 30, ¶ 6, 183 Vt. 637, 954 A.2d 1281 (mem.) (explaining that because Environmental Court is part of judicial branch, there is no separation-of-powers imperative for this Court to deferentially review its decisions, and that whatever deference the Environmental Court is owed in the area of substantive environmental law does not apply to its construction of statutes governing general principles of law such as party standing).

 The cases cited by the dissent do not support its position. In In re Pilgrim Partnership, for example, we affirmed the Environmental Board’s holding that a landowner was required to include his neighbor as co-applicant on a revised Act 250 permit application to be submitted to the district commission. 153 Vt. 594, 598, 572 A.2d 909, 911 (1990). We noted, in response to an argument raised by the landowner, that the Environmental Board’s discussion of how the landowner might comply with a certain Act 250 criterion in the proceedings before the district commission was not necessary to the Board’s holding concerning the neighbor’s status and it was premature in light of the remand to the district commission. We simply recognized that the landowner was in no way bound by the Board’s dicta, but instead remained free on remand to propose alternative methods of complying with the Act 250 criterion at issue. Id. Unlike the extraneous statements discussed in Pilgrim Partnership, CVPS is challenging the Environmental Court’s express holding, not dicta. The dissent’s reliance on Chittenden South Education Ass’n v. Hinesburg School District, 147 Vt. 286, 294, 514 A.2d 1065, 1071 (1986), is equally misplaced. In that case, we declined to address an issue raised by a cross-appellant — the prevailing party — where our resolution of the issue would not entitle the cross-appellant to any further relief, nor change the relief afforded. The same cannot be said here.

 The new rules eliminated the specific definitions of the term “development.” Instead, revised Rule 2(A) states that “[t]he term ‘Development,’ relating to Act 250 jurisdiction, is defined at 10 V.S.A. Sections 6001(3)(A), 6001a, 6001b, and 6001c. Jurisdiction also attaches to any substantial change to a pre-existing development — 10 V.S.A. Section 6081(b).”

 Section 6081(r) specifically provides:
In situations in which the construction of improvements for any combination of electrical distribution and communications lines and subsidiary facilities, standing alone, constitutes a development subject to the jurisdiction of the board or district commission under this chapter, subsequent consteuction of improvements for any combination of electrical distribution and communications lines and subsidiary facilities not identified or reasonably identifiable at the time construction commences, standing alone, shall be considered new construction of improvements and shall not be considered a material or substantial change to that previously permitted development.

 The dissent believes any discussion of Rule 34 is completely advisory as the trial court, on the record before it, could not determine if compliance with the rule was triggered. However, it clearly considered the rule applicable to the regulation of utility projects, over and above the provisions of Rule 70, and specifically held that Rule 70 did not exempt such projects from “amendment jurisdiction” under Rule 34(A). This specifically is one of the issues on appeal. It does not arise from dicta.

 Rule 34(B) addresses “substantial changes” made to “pre-existing developments,” which are developments defined in part as those in existence before June 1, 1970. See Rule 2(C)(8). If a change to a pre-existing development or subdivision involves a “substantial change,” thus implicating Act 250 jurisdiction, it is subject to a new application process. Rule 34(B).

 The dissent expresses its fear that CVPS has now acquired the right to install line extensions less than 2200 feet long wherever it may want, regardless of the impact on wildlife habitat, wetlands, streams or agricultural soils. Post, ¶ 46. Of course, Rule 70, by its plain terms, has already conferred that so-called “right” on CVPS, expressly providing that no Act 250 jurisdiction attaches to utility line projects that fall below minimum acreage thresholds.

 In Eustance, the landowners’ property was subject to an existing Act 250 permit, and their lot had been created through the subdivision of a larger parcel without a proper permit. The district coordinator and the Environmental Court concluded that the landowners needed a permit to construct improvements on their property. On appeal, the landowners argued that Act 250 jurisdiction did not attach because they had constructed improvements for farming purposes, which did not constitute the commencement of development. See 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3)(D) (term “development” *304does not include construction of improvements for farming). We found this argument unpersuasive, concluding that even if landowners had not “commenced development,” they had nonetheless commenced “construction on a subdivision,” which triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Eustance, 2009 VT 16, ¶ 17. We noted that our decision was a narrow one. Id. ¶ 17 n.10.
We advanced a second reason why the landowners were required to obtain an Act 250 permit amendment: the existing Act 250 permit expressly stated that “[a]ny sale [or] further construction ... is specifically not approved without an amendment.” Id. ¶ 19 (brackets omitted). The Environmental Court had relied on this condition to conclude that an amendment was required, and the landowners did not argue otherwise on appeal. We thus concluded that the landowners had conceded that an amendment was required by the terms of the permit, although we noted in dicta that this was a reasonable construction of the permit that we would otherwise affirm. We did not expressly hold, as the dissent argues, that “a prior permit condition controlled . . . irrespective of whether the farming exemption applied.” Post, ¶ 43. Indeed, we engaged in no extended discussion of the farming exemption with respect to the applicability of the terms of the existing permit. Additionally, it was the landowners in Eustance who were responsible for obtaining a permit amendment. It is not apparent from this record that the holders of the Barry permit participated in the proceedings below. The Environmental Court did not order them to take any action, and they are not parties to this appeal. In any event, and more importantly, our decision in Eustance does not involve the same considerations as those at issue in the instant case, nor does its reasoning compel us to ignore the plain intent of the Legislature that Rule 70 provide the sole basis for Act 250 jurisdiction over utility line projects.