Court Opinion

ID: 9949727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 15:01:31.283379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:31.364946
License: Public Domain

Case: 24-1007    Document: 13     Page: 1   Filed: 03/12/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

   JAMES LA VELL HARRIS, AKA SMILEY JAMES
                   HARRIS,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2024-1007
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:23-cv-00510-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.
                   ______________________

                 Decided: March 12, 2024
                 ______________________

    JAMES LA VELL HARRIS, Clearlake, CA, pro se.

     BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, LISA LEFANTE DONAHUE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

    Before PROST, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 24-1007     Document: 13     Page: 2    Filed: 03/12/2024

 2                                                HARRIS v. US

 PER CURIAM.
      James La Vell Harris, a.k.a. Smiley James Harris, ap-
 peals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of
 his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We
 affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
      Mr. Harris filed a complaint in the Court of Federal
 Claims asserting subject-matter jurisdiction under the
 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The complaint alleged
 that, as a result of various cases in Lake County, Califor-
 nia, Mr. Harris was unjustly convicted and imprisoned for
 violating California law regarding driving without a license
 (or driving under a suspended one). It further alleged, cit-
 ing 8 U.S.C. § 1481, that these unjust convictions and im-
 prisonments resulted from a failure to train officers on how
 to protect the rights of expatriated persons, and it sought
 damages for these convictions and imprisonments under
 28 U.S.C. § 1495. The complaint also referenced Mr. Har-
 ris’s “claims of ‘copyright infringement’” under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1498(b) and sought related damages under 17 U.S.C.
 § 504(c). SApp’x 6. 1 And it referenced the alleged seizure
 of certain of his property by the police department of Clear-
 lake, California. SApp’x 13–15.
     The government moved to dismiss the complaint, argu-
 ing that it stated no claim within the Court of Federal
 Claims’ limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Before evalu-
 ating the complaint, the Court of Federal Claims recog-
 nized that, as a pro se plaintiff, Mr. Harris’s filings should
 be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards
 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Harris v. United
 States, No. 23-510, 2023 WL 4842350, at *2 (Fed. Cl.

     1  “SApp’x” refers to the supplemental appendix in-
 cluded with the government’s informal brief.
Case: 24-1007     Document: 13      Page: 3    Filed: 03/12/2024

 HARRIS v. US                                                 3

 July 28, 2023). But it also noted that this leniency does not
 relieve such plaintiffs of jurisdictional requirements. Id.
      After examining the complaint’s claims, the Court of
 Federal Claims concluded that none fell within its subject-
 matter jurisdiction. As to any claim for damages under
 28 U.S.C. § 1495, the court noted that this statute provides
 it jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim for dam-
 ages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against
 the United States and imprisoned.” Id. (emphasis added)
 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1495). It reasoned, however, that
 “[b]ecause Mr. Harris’s complaint challenge[d] only state
 convictions,” this statute did not provide it jurisdiction. Id.
 (emphasis added). The court also examined whether other
 possible claims might have fallen within its jurisdiction,
 but it found none. For example, although the complaint
 cited 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) and 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)—concern-
 ing copyright-infringement claims against the United
 States and related damages—and also attached what was
 described as a “Common Law Copyright notice,” the court
 concluded that the complaint “fail[ed] to state an infringe-
 ment claim against the United States.” Id. at *3 n.4. And,
 although the complaint had cited 8 U.S.C. § 1481—“a stat-
 ute that identifies various acts a [U.S.] national can take
 to relinquish his or her nationality”—the court concluded
 that, because this statute does not mandate compensation
 by the United States, it does not supply Tucker Act juris-
 diction. See id. at *3. Finally, although the complaint ap-
 peared to assert claims against private or state entities—
 possibly in relation to, among other things, the property-
 seizure allegations—the Court of Federal Claims con-
 cluded that it lacked jurisdiction over these claims against
 such nonfederal entities. See id. at *2. The court therefore
 granted the government’s motion and dismissed the com-
 plaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3.
     Mr. Harris timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
Case: 24-1007    Document: 13      Page: 4    Filed: 03/12/2024

 4                                               HARRIS v. US

                         DISCUSSION
     We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ dismis-
 sal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Waltner v.
 United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
     The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited juris-
 diction. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), gives it ju-
 risdiction over nontort “claims for money damages against
 the United States” founded upon “any Act of Congress.”
 See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir.
 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (cleaned up). To come
 within the court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction, however, “a
 plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law
 that creates the right to money damages”—in other words,
 a source that is “money-mandating.” Id.
     We see no error in the Court of Federal Claims’ conclu-
 sion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any
 claim in Mr. Harris’s complaint. For example, although the
 complaint sought damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1495 for al-
 legedly unjust convictions and imprisonments, that statute
 applies to convictions of federal crimes, not state crimes.
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (“The [U.S.] Court of Federal Claims
 shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
 for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense
 against the United States and imprisoned.” (emphasis
 added)); see also Machulas v. United States, 621 F. App’x
 629, 632 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential) (concluding
 that the Court of Federal Claims lacked 28 U.S.C. § 1495
 jurisdiction because the plaintiff “was convicted of a state
 crime, not a federal crime”). As the Court of Federal
 Claims noted here, the complaint “challenge[d] only state
 convictions,” Harris, 2023 WL 4842350, at *2 (emphasis
 added), and Mr. Harris does not dispute that any convic-
 tion or imprisonment identified in the complaint resulted
 from violations of state, as opposed to federal, law. We
 therefore affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of
 any claim that was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1495.
Case: 24-1007    Document: 13       Page: 5   Filed: 03/12/2024

 HARRIS v. US                                               5

     We also see no error in the Court of Federal Claims’
 dismissal of any claim that was based on 28 U.S.C.
 § 1498(b) or 8 U.S.C. § 1481. As to the former, the court
 correctly noted that, although the complaint mentioned
 this statutory provision (and another regarding related
 damages), it never alleged that the government infringed a
 copyright. And, as to the latter, Mr. Harris has not shown
 how this statute is money-mandating, and we see nothing
 suggesting that it is. We therefore affirm the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims’ dismissal of any claims that were based on
 these statutory provisions.
     Finally, to the extent the complaint included a claim
 against private or state entities (for example, regarding the
 alleged seizure of Mr. Harris’s property), the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims correctly dismissed any such claim under these
 circumstances. See Langan v. United States, 812 F. App’x
 982, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (affirming
 Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of any claims against
 private or state entities).
                        CONCLUSION
      We have considered Mr. Harris’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.