Court Opinion

ID: 9370976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 07:09:39.877635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.078164
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed February 13, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00758-CV

           IN THE INTEREST OF J.L.M., V, H.E.M., AND V.R.M.

               On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 366-53475-2018

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises in the context of a suit to modify

the parent–child relationship between the parties and their children. April S. Miller

(Mother) appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss appellee

James L. Miller’s (Father) claim for violations of the Texas Wiretap Act. We affirm.

Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum

opinion. See TEX. R. APP. 47.2(a), 47.4.

                                      BACKGROUND

      Mother and Father were married in 1997 and had three children before a final

decree of divorce was entered in 2012.
      In 2018, Father filed suit to modify the parent–child relationship, in particular

seeking appointment as the person who has the right to designate the primary

residence of the children, equal possession of the children, and a decrease in the

amount of his support obligations. The following year, Mother and Father agreed to

an order appointing a counselor Grace Chen Graham for the children. That same

year, Mother and Father agreed to an order modifying their possession rights and

support obligations to the children.

      In 2022, Father filed a counterpetition seeking further modification of

conservatorship, possession, and access to the children, as well as his support

obligations, and asserting claims against Mother and the court-appointed counselor

Graham for violations of the Texas Wiretap Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 123.002 (a)(2) (party to sue communication may sue a person who divulges

information that he knows was obtained by interception of communication). In his

counterpetition, Father alleged one of the children recorded Father without his

consent and that the child was not able to give consent to the recording as a minor

such that the recording was illegally obtained. See id. § 123.001 (2) (defining

“interception” to mean acquisition of communication through use of device without

consent of party to communication). Father further alleged that child “divulged” the

recordings to Graham who then “divulged” the records to Mother who then

“divulged” the recordings to her current husband and her attorneys.

                                         –2–
        Mother and Graham both filed motions to dismiss Father’s wiretap claims

under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. In her motion, Mother urged that while

she did “not plead the content of these recordings, they are believed to contain

Plaintiff’s outcry to her therapist concerning incidents of psychological and verbal

abuse at the hands of Plaintiff.”1 Mother further urged that the statements were made

to Graham and then relayed to Mother and to her lawyers “in furtherance of—and

as a result of—the instant judicial proceeding.” Mother concluded that Father’s suit

is thus based on or in response to her exercise of her right to petition. The trial court

conducted a hearing on both motions to dismiss and ultimately denied both.

Mother’s appeal followed. Graham’s appeal is a companion case and is addressed

in a separate opinion. See Graham v. Miller, No. 05-22-00766-CV.

                              THE TCPA AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is an “anti-SLAPP

statute,” meaning that the legislature enacted it to curb “strategic lawsuits against

public participation.” Locke Lord LLP v. Retractable Techs., Inc., No. 05-20-00884-

CV, 2021 WL 1540652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Its main feature is a motion-to-dismiss procedure that allows defendants at an

early stage to seek dismissal, attorney’s fees, and sanctions for the filing of a

meritless suit in response to a defendant’s proper exercise of a protected right. Id.

1
 We presume that Mother meant to allege that the recordings contained the child’s outcry regarding abuse
by Father.
                                                 –3–
      A Chapter 27 movant bears the initial burden of showing by a preponderance

of the evidence “that the legal action is based on or is in response to the party’s

exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association.”

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b); see also Brenner v. Centurion

Logistics LLC ex rel. Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC, No. 05-20-00308-CV, 2020

WL 7332847, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(holding amendments to TCPA do not change burden of “preponderance of the

evidence” established by Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017)). If the

movant carries his or her initial burden, the nonmovant must then establish “by clear

and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in

question.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c). Notwithstanding the nonmovant’s proof

of a prima facie case, however, the court shall dismiss a legal action against the

movant if the movant establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. § 27.005(d).

      We review de novo the trial court’s determinations that the parties met or

failed to meet their respective burdens under section 27.005. See id. § 27.005 (b),

(c); see also Brenner, 2020 WL 7332847, at *3 (holding amendments to TCPA do

not change de novo appellate standard of review). In conducting this review, we

consider, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings and any

supporting and opposing affidavits and other evidence stating the facts on which the

claim or defense is based. See Fishman v. C.O.D. Capital Corp., No. 05-16-00581-

                                          –4–
CV, 2017 WL 3033314, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a). However, the plaintiff’s pleadings are

generally “the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action.” Hersh,

526 S.W.3d at 467.

                                       DISCUSSION

      Mother argues Father’s claims against her are based on or in response to her

exercise of the right to petition. More particularly, she urges the communications

that made the basis of Father’s claims were made in and pertained to an ongoing suit

to modify the parent–child relationship.

      Under the TCPA, the exercise of the right to petition includes a

communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding, in connection with an issue

under consideration or review by a judicial body, or that is likely to encourage

consideration or review of an issue by a judicial body. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.

§ 27.001(4)(A)(i), (B), (C). This Court has interpreted “a judicial proceeding” to

mean “an actual, pending judicial proceeding.” See Levatino v. Apple Tree Café

Touring, Inc., 486 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).

      Here, the trial judge signed an agreed order for counseling appointing Graham

on March 21, 2019, and an agreed order in suit to modify parent–child relationship

on September 10, 2019. Subsequent to those orders, Father filed a second amended

counterclaim in which he asserted the instant wiretap claims against Mother, but that

pleading does not indicate when the recordings were made or later divulged.

                                           –5–
Likewise, nothing in or attached to Mother’s motion to dismiss establishes when the

instant communications were made.2 At the hearing on the motion, no evidence was

offered, only attorney arguments.3 See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a) (defining

scope of review as the pleadings, evidence, and supporting and opposing affidavits).

Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we conclude

Mother failed to offer any evidence that there was a pending “judicial proceeding”

at the time the recordings were made or later divulged. Thus, we conclude these

communications were not an exercise of the right to petition as set forth in section

27.001(4)(A) or (B). On these facts, we conclude that the discussions pertaining to

children’s mental health between the parents and their coordinators were not related

to or meant to encourage judicial review. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(C).

We conclude Mother failed to establish Father’s claims were based on or in response

to her exercise of the right to petition. Accordingly, we conclude Mother failed to

establish the TCPA applied to Father’s claims.4

    2
      Nor does any pleading or motion or any evidence establish the content of the recordings beyond
Mother’s statement in her motion that while she did “not plead the content of these recordings, they are
believed to contain [the child’s] outcry to her therapist concerning incidents of psychological and verbal
abuse at the hands of [Father].” See, e.g., White Nile Software, Inc. v. Carrington, Coleman, Sloman &
Blumenthal, LLP, No. 05-19-00780-CV, 2020 WL 5104966, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2020, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (“Without pleadings or evidence of Carrington Coleman’s alleged ‘communications’
and their contents, it is difficult to determine that those communications were protected by and subject to
the TCPA.”).
    3
      Even were we to consider the arguments made at the hearing, we would note Graham’s attorney stated
that “the factual basis for [the tort claims] was in mid-December of 2020 [when] . . . [d]uring one of the
therapy sessions one of the children revealed that she had recorded Plaintiff and her stepmother having
certain conversations.”
    4
     Because we conclude Mother failed to establish the TCPA applied to Father’s claims, we need not
address any argument regarding whether his claims are exempted under Section 27.010(a)(6) of the TCPA,

                                                   –6–
        We overrule Mother’s issue.

                                                   CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s order denying Mother’s motion to dismiss pursuant

to the TCPA.

                                                         /Nancy Kennedy/
                                                         NANCY KENNEDY
                                                         JUSTICE
220758F.P05

whether he established a prima facie case, or whether Mother established any affirmative defenses as a
matter of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(6) (exempting
legal action filed under Title 1, 2, 4, or 5 of the family code or an application for protective order); see also
Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, PLLC, No. 05-21-00367-CV, 2022 WL 1955755, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 3, 2022, no pet.) (concluding appellate courts may choose to consider movant’s step-one burden or
nonmovant’s exemption first).
                                                     –7–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF J.L.M., V,               On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
H.E.M., AND V.R.M.,                         District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                            Trial Court Cause No. 366-53475-
No. 05-22-00758-CV                          2018.
                                            Opinion delivered by Justice
                                            Kennedy. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                            and Nowell participating.

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial
court’s order denying Mother’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA.

      It is ORDERED that appellee James L. Miller recover his costs of this
appeal from appellant April S. Miller.

Judgment entered this 13th day of February 2023.

                                      –8–