Court Opinion

ID: 9940422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:07:31.159617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:50.961552
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                         COREY B. JOHNSON,
                             Appellant,

                                    v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-0876

                          [February 14, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Cheryl A. Caracuzzo, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502018CF002758AMB.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MAY, J.

    The constitutional parameters for sentencing a defendant, a juvenile
when he committed the crimes, is raised in this appeal. The defendant
appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of first-degree murder
and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The defendant raises
six arguments: three relate to evidence and three relate to sentencing. We
affirm on all issues and write to address only the defendant’s
constitutional argument regarding his consecutive life sentences.

   •   The Facts

    The defendant, who was seventeen when he committed the crimes, had
a best friend named Kyle. As they grew up together, the defendant spent
a lot of time at Kyle’s house and occasionally slept over.

   In 2017, the defendant converted to Islam. Kyle noticed an immediate
change in the defendant and witnessed his beliefs become more extreme
over time. The defendant confided in Kyle that he felt depressed. The
defendant also confided in Kyle that he was secretly messaging with a
woman named Hafsa. The defendant later shared Hafsa had ceased all
communications without warning, which left him feeling devastated.

   Unbeknownst to Kyle, the defendant’s relationship with Hafsa was
grounded in a mutual attraction to, appreciation for, and desire to commit
unspeakable violence. Hafsa routinely told the defendant she was sexually
attracted to killing, and the two frequently exchanged graphic videos.1
Also unbeknownst to Kyle, the defendant had been planning a “Qital”
(meaning “war”) with Hafsa for some time.

    On the day of the defendant’s premeditated attack, he purchased a six-
inch utility knife. The defendant then attended a birthday dinner
celebration with Kyle, Kyle’s mother, Kyle’s brother, and Kyle’s brother’s
friend Jovanni. After dinner, the defendant and Jovanni joined Kyle and
his family at their home for a sleepover. The boys “hung out” briefly, then
all prepared for bed and fell asleep.

   Once everyone was asleep, the defendant began his attack, starting
with Jovanni. The defendant viewed Jovanni as the “easiest” to kill given
his sleeping location. The defendant also thought he could kill Jovanni
quietly, but explained to the police he knew he had “messed up” when
Jovanni started screaming.

   Jovanni’s screaming woke up Kyle’s mother, who first came to check
on the noise. Upon so doing, Kyle’s mother saw the defendant standing
over Jovanni’s body, holding a knife, covered in blood.

   Kyle’s mother tried to grab the knife from the defendant, but he stabbed
her in the neck and chest. The defendant cut both of her wrists and sliced
her Achilles tendon. The mother also suffered multiple lacerations to her
forehead, chin, neck, chest, left wrist, and right elbow.

   Kyle’s brother next awoke. The defendant later admitted he attacked
Kyle’s brother to “prevent him from calling the police.” Kyle’s brother
sustained thirty stab wounds.

   The defendant last entered Kyle’s bedroom, still holding the bloody
knife, and explained he had killed Jovanni and Kyle’s brother. The

1 A litany of digital media later extracted from the defendant’s phone included

videos of beheadings, other acts of torture, and general ISIS propaganda.

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defendant assured Kyle he was “not kidding,” but that, because of their
friendship, Kyle would not be hurt.

   Kyle’s mother simultaneously ran next door, and a neighbor called 911.
Kyle’s brother escaped from the second floor. Jovanni succumbed to his
injuries and passed away before law enforcement arrived.

   Once on scene, police officers watched the defendant enter a closet
holding a knife. Eventually, a SWAT team used tear gas to force the
defendant out. The defendant surrendered to law enforcement while
repeating “Allah” and “Akbar.” 2

   When the officers took the defendant into custody, they found a letter
on his person. The letter was written in Arabic and intended for Hafsa.
The letter thanked Hafsa for caring about him and alerted her that he had
sent pictures of Kyle’s brother, Jovanni, and himself holding the knife to
her phone.

   The State charged the defendant with one count of first-degree murder
and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The defendant pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found the defendant guilty of all
charges.

   The defendant was seventeen when he committed the crimes and
twenty-one when he was convicted and sentenced. The trial court
considered each factor enumerated in section 921.1401, Florida Statutes
(2017), in sentencing the defendant.

     Ultimately, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment
for each charge, specifically ordering his two life sentences for attempted
murder (counts II and III) run concurrently with each other and
consecutively to the life sentence for murder (count I). The trial court
orally announced the defendant would be eligible for judicial review on two
occasions: after serving twenty-five years on count I and again after
twenty-five years served on his consecutive life sentences for counts II and
III.

   The defendant filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1)
motion, raising two challenges.       First, the defendant argued his
consecutive life sentences violated the Eighth Amendment because they
precluded release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation
(upon review of his murder sentence only). The trial court denied that

2 The correct phrase is “Allahu Akbar,” Arabic for “god is most great.”

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portion of the defendant’s motion, relying on Hegwood v. State, 308 So. 3d
647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), and Warthen v. State, 265 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2019).

    Second, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of his sentence
as an impermissible “pre-determination” in violation of due process. The
trial court denied that portion of the defendant’s motion “without
elaboration.” From his convictions and sentences, the defendant now
appeals.

   •   The Analysis

    The defendant argues his consecutive life sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment because they preclude his release from incarceration after his
first life sentence’s twenty-five-year judicial review. The State responds
the consecutive sentences are constitutional because the defendant
received individualized sentencing proceedings and will receive review for
each life sentence.

    We agree with the State and affirm. We hold a defendant sentenced to
life without parole for one homicide offense, consecutively followed by two
concurrent life-without-parole sentences for related nonhomicide offenses,
is constitutional because the defendant has an opportunity for
“meaningful review.”

    “Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue
of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Metellus v. State, 310 So. 3d
90, 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Brooks v. State, 199 So. 3d 974, 976
(Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).

    Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three terms of life
imprisonment, ordering his life sentences for the nonhomicide offenses
run concurrent to each other but consecutive to his first life sentence for
his homicide offense. Because each life sentence must be reviewed after
twenty-five years, the defendant’s sentences will first be reviewed twenty-
five years into his first life sentence. However, because the life sentences
on the nonhomicide offenses run consecutively, he will not be eligible for
release irrespective of his first review’s findings. Instead, he will only be
eligible for review in another twenty-five years. Thus, the defendant will
not be eligible for release until the expiration of fifty years.

   The defendant argues three points: (1) the trial court incorrectly relied
on Warthen; (2) Hegwood does not compel an affirmance; and (3) Purdy
intentionally left open the question which his appeal now presents. The

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State responds the Florida Legislature enacted sections 775.082,3
921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2017), “[i]n direct response to
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Graham,” and the cases cited
by the defendant are inapplicable. See Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393,
406 (Fla. 2015).

   A trial court’s discretion in sentencing is quite broad within applicable
statutory limits. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481–82
(2000); see also Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2007) (“Trial courts
are in the best position to observe the unique circumstances of a case and
have broad discretion . . . .”).

    The United States Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of
life sentences without parole for juveniles in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 75 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012). In
Graham, the Court reviewed a juvenile’s life sentence without parole for a
nonhomicide crime. 560 U.S. at 75. The Court reached the conclusion
the life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. Subsequently, in
Miller, the Court held “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison [for a homicide offense] without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. at 479.

   Graham and Miller, however, considered a single life sentence for a
single crime. The United States Supreme Court has yet to determine the
constitutionality of consecutive life sentences for a juvenile.

    Subsequently, in State v. Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723, 725 (Fla. 2018), our
supreme court had the opportunity to review a juvenile’s life sentence
without parole for a homicide offense and a consecutive sentence of ten
years for nonhomicide offenses (armed robbery and armed carjacking).
There, a juvenile defendant filed a Rule 3.800 motion concerning his life
sentence without parole but did not ask for review of his consecutive term
of years sentence. Id. at 727–28. The trial court reduced his life sentence
to forty years but did not modify the consecutive sentence. Id.

   At the defendant’s judicial review hearing on the life sentence, the trial
court reduced the forty-year sentence to twenty years, six months, and
thirteen days followed by ten years’ probation. Id. at 728. The trial court
did not review the consecutive ten-year sentence. Id. The Fifth District

3 Our supreme court, in Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147, 150 (Fla. 2018), held

section 775.082(10) unconstitutional.       Brown does not affect this Court’s
analysis.

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reversed and remanded the case with instruction to review the defendant’s
consecutive ten-year sentence. Id.

    Our supreme court ultimately held “[b]ecause the plain language of the
juvenile sentencing statutes does not provide for aggregation of sentences
at judicial sentence review,” the trial court was not required to review the
aggregate sentence at the same sentencing proceeding. Id. This left
unanswered whether consecutive life sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment when they run concurrent to another life sentence, as
presented in this case.

   In 2019, we held consecutive sentences of fifteen and twenty-five-year
terms for different nonhomicide offenses did not constitute an aggregate
sentence implicating a juvenile’s Eighth Amendment rights. Warthen, 265
So. 3d at 697.

    Then, in 2020, we held three consecutive life sentences for homicide
offenses—coupled with a concurrent life sentence for a nonhomicide
offense—did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Hegwood, 308 So. 3d at
648–49. We nonetheless remanded the case because judicial review of the
life sentence was required after twenty-five years (not seventy-five years)
under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes. Id. at 649.

   That same year, the Second District reached a different conclusion
under different facts. See Mack v. State, 313 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA
2020). There, the court held a life sentence for a homicide offense, followed
by a consecutive life sentence for a related nonhomicide offense, violated
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 695, 698. In reaching this holding the
Second District explained the statutorily required “opportunity for release”
after twenty-five years would be “wholly illusory” if the defendant’s
consecutive life sentence rendered him ineligible for release upon his first
judicial review. Id. at 696.

   Most recently, and specifically during the pendency of this appeal, the
Second District distinguished its decision in Mack and adopted our
decision in Hegwood. See Garner v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1841, 1841–
43 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 15, 2023). In Garner, a juvenile defendant had been
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without parole for two related
homicides occurring during one crime spree. Id. at D1841. Relying on
Hegwood, the Second District held the juvenile’s consecutive life sentences
for the homicide offenses did not violate the Eighth Amendment because
each sentence allowed for a judicial review after twenty-five years. Id. at
D1843.

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    This case does not involve more than one homicide offense and is thus
different from Hegwood. The instant facts are more akin to Mack, as here
the defendant was sentenced to life without parole for one homicide
offense, followed by two concurrent life-without-parole sentences for
related nonhomicide offenses. Nonetheless, we decline to follow Mack.

   As the United States Supreme Court has taught us:

          A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
      juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the
      State must do, however, is give defendants . . . some
      meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
      demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation . . . . [W]hile the
      Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life
      without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender,
      it does not require the State to release that offender during his
      natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as
      juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus
      deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.
      The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility
      that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed
      before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does
      prohibit States from making the judgment at the outset that
      those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). Thus, the prohibition is not
against the life sentence itself, but rather against “making the judgment
at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society” for
committing a nonhomicide offense. Id.

   The Constitution requires “some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and the
sentence serve a penological purpose. Id. Here, the trial court provided
the defendant with that meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The defendant will have a
meaningful review of his first life sentence after twenty-five years and a
second meaningful review of his consecutive life sentences twenty-five
years later. The defendant could thus be released after fifty years. His
sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

   Because our decision expressly and directly conflicts with the Second
District’s decision in Mack v. State, 313 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), we
certify conflict, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).

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   Affirmed.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                          *       *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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