Court Opinion

ID: 9417483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:18:55.056789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:43.643344
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Field,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court in this case, and in the greater part of the opinion upon which it is founded.
The opinion clearly shows, as I think, that the law of Iowa prohibiting the importation into that State of intoxicating liquors is an encroachment on the power of Congress over interstate commerce. That commerce is a subject of vast extent. It embraces intercourse between citizens of different States for purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities. The power to regulate it, which is vested in Congress in the same clause with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, is general in its terms. And to regulate this commerce is to prescribe the conditions under which it shall be conducted; that is, how far it shall be free, and how far subject to restrictions. The defendant is a common carrier engaged in the transportation of freight by railway, not only between places in the State of Illinois, but also between places in different States. In the latter business it is, therefore, engaged in interstate commerce. Whatever is an article of commerce it may carry, subject to such regulations as may be necessary for the convenience and safety of the community through whicji its cars pass, and to insure safety in the carriage of the freight. The law of Iowa prescribing the condi*501tions upon which certain liquors maybe imported into that State is, therefore, a regulation of interstate commerce. Such regulation, where the subject, like the transportation of goods, is national in its character, can be made only by Congress, the power which can act for the whole country. Action by the States upon such commerce is not, therefore, permissible. Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697.
"What is an article of commerce is determinable by the usages of. the. commercial world, and does- not depend upon the declaration of any State.' The State possesses the power to prescribe all such regulations with respect to the possession, use, and sale of property within its limits as may be necessary to protect the health, lives, and morals of its people; and that power may be applied to all kinds of property, even that which in its nature is harmless. But the power of regulation for that purpose is one thing, and the po-wer to exclude an article from commerce by a declaration that it shall not thenceforth be the subject of use and sale, is another and very different thing. If the State could thus take an article from commerce, its power over interstate commerce would be superior to that of Congress, where the Constitution has vested it. The language, of Mr. Justice Catron on this subject in The License Oases, quoted in the opinion of the court, is instructive. 5 How. 504, 600. Speaking of the assumption by the State of power to declare what shall and what shall not be deemed an article of commerce within its limits, and thus to permit the sale of one and prohibit the sale of the other, without inference to Congressional power of regulation, the learned justice said: “ The exclusive state power is made to rest, not on the fact of the state or condition of the article, nor that it is property usually passing by sale from hand to hand, but on the declaration found in the state laws, and asserted as the state policy, that it shall be excluded from commerce. And by this means the sovereign jurisdiction in the State is attempted to be created, in a case where it did not previously exist. If this be the true construction of the constitutional provision, then the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to a very material limitation ; for it takes *502from Congress, and leaves with the' States, the power to determine the commodities or articles of property which are the .subjects of lawful commerce. . Congress may regulate, but the States determine what shall or shall not be regulated. Upon this theory the power to regulate commerce, instea’d of being paramount over the subject, would become subordinate to the state police power; for it is obvious that the power to determine the articles which may be the subjects of commerce, and thus to circumscribe its scope and operation, is, in effect, the controlling one. The police power would not only be a formidable rival, but, in a struggle, must 'necessarily triumph over the commercial power, as the power to regulate is de-' pendent upon the power to fix and determine upon the subjects to be regulated.”
In Mugler v. Kansas, recently decided, (123 U. S. 623,) this court held a statute of that State to be valid which prohibited the ‘ manufacture and salé within its limits of intoxicating liquors except for medical, scientific, or mechanical purposes, and madé a violation of its provisions a' misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. I agreed to so much of the opinion of the court in that case as asserted that there was nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States which affected the validity of the statute prohibiting the sale of such liquors manufactured in the State, except under proper regulations for the protection of the health and morals of the people. But, at the same time, I stated, without expressing any opinion on the subject, that I was not prepared to say that the State could prohibit the sale of such liquors within its limits under like regulations, if Congress should authorize their importation; observing that the right to import an article of merchandise, recognized as such by the commercial world, Whether the right be given by act of Congress or by treaty with a foreign nation, would séem necessarily to carry the right to sell the article Avhen imported. "Where the importation is authorized from one State to another a similar right of sale of the article imported would seem,to follow. The question upon Avhich I Avas then umvilling to express an opinion is presented-in this case, not'in a direct way, it is true, *503but in such a form as, it seems'to me to require* consideration.
A statute of Iowa contains a prohibition, similar to that of the Kansas statute, upon the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within its limits, with the additional exception of permission to use them for pulinary purposes, and to sell foreign liquors imported under a law of Congress, in the original casks or packages In which they are imported. The law under consideration in this case, prohibiting the importa^ tion into Iowa of such liquors from other States, without a license for that purpose, was passed to carry out the policy of the State to suppress the sale of such liquors within its limits. And the argument is pressed with much force that if the State cannot prohibit the importation its policy to suppress the sale will be defeated, and if legislation establishing such policy is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, this additional measure to carry the legislation into successful operation must be permissible. The argument assumes that the right of importation carries with it the right to sell the article imported, a position hereafter considered.
The reserved powers of the States in the regulation of their internal affairs must be exercised consistently with'the exercise of the powers delegated to the United States. If there be a conflict, the powers 'delegated must prevail, being so much authority taken from the States by the express sanction of their people; for the Constitution itself declares that laws made in pursuance of it shall be the supreme law of the land. But those powers which -authorize legislation touching the health, morals, good order, and peace of their people were not delegated, and are so essential to the existence and prosperity of the States that it is not to be presumed that they will be encroached upon so as to impair their reasonable exercise.
How can these reserved powers be reconciled with the conceded power of Congress to.regulate interstate commerce ? As said above,-the State cannot exclude an article from commerce, and conséquently from importation, simply by declaring that its policy requires such ■ exclusion; and yet its regulations respecting the possession, use, and sale of any article of com*504merce may be as minute and strict as required by the nature of the article, and the liability of injury from it, for the safety, health and morals of its people.
' In the opinion of the court it is stated that the effect of the right of importation upon the asserted right, as á consequence thereof, to sell the article imported is not involved in this case, and therefore it is not necessary to express any opinion on the subject. The case, it is true, can be decided, and has been decided, without expressing an opinion on' that subject; but. with great deference to my associates, I must say that I think its consideration is presented, and to some extent required, to meet the argument that the right of importation, because carrying the right to sell the article imported, is inconsistent with the right of the State to prohibit the sale of the article absolutely, as held in the Kansas case. With respect to most subjects of commerce, regulations may be adopted touching- their use and sale when imported, which will afford all the protection and security desired, without going to the extent of absolute prohibition. It is not found difficult, even with the most, dangerous articles, to provide such minute and stringent regulations as will guard the public from all harm from them. Arsenic, dynamite powder, and nitro-glycerine are imported into every State under such restrictions, as' to their transportation and sale, as to render it safe to deal in them. There may be greater difficulty in regulating the use and sale of intoxicating liquors; and I admit that whénever the use of an article cannot be regulated and controlled so as to insure the health and safety of society, it may be prohibited and the article destroyed.
That the right of importa don carries with it the right to sell the article imported does not appear to me doubtful. Of course I am speaking of an article that is in a healthy condition, for when it has become putrescent or diseased it has ceased to be an article of commerce, and it may be destroyed or its use prohibited. To assert that, under the Constitution of the United States, the importation of an article of commerce cannot' be prohibited by the States, and yet to hold that when imported its use and sale can be prohibited, is to declare *505that the right which the Constitution gives is a barren one,' to be used only so- far as the burden of transportation is concerned, and to be denied so far as any benefits from such transportation are sought. The framers of the Constitution never intended that a right given should not be fully' enjoyed. In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, speaking of the-commercial power* of Congress, and after observing that it is co-extensive with the subject on which it acts, and cannot be stopped at the exterior boundary of a State, but must enter its interior, said: “ If this power reaches the interior of a State, and may be there exercised, it must be capable of authorizing the sale of those articles which it introduces. Commerce is intercourse; — one of its most ordinary ingredients is traffic. It is inconceivable that the power to authorize this traffic, when given in.-the most comprehensive terms, Avith the intent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the point when its continuance is indispensable to its value. To Avhat purpose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the poAver to authorize a sale of the thing imported ? Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse of Avhich importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell. . . . The power claimed by the State is, in its nature, in conflict Avith that given to Congress; and the greater or less extent in Avhich it may be exercised does not enter into the inquiry concerning its existence. We think, then, that if the poAver to authorize a sale exists in Congress, the conclusion that the right to sell is connected Avith the law permitting importation, as an inseparable incident, is inevitable.” And the Chief Justice added: “We suppose the principles laid doAvn in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State.” p. 449.
Assuming, therefore,, as correct doctrine that the right of importation carries the right to sell the article imported, the *506decision in the Kansas case may perhaps he reconciled with the one in this case by distinguishing the power of the State over property created within it, and its power over property imported- — -its power in one case extending, for the protection .of the health, morals, and safety of its people, to the absolute prohibition of the sale or u^e of the article, and in the other extending' only to such regulations as may be necessary for the safety of the community until it has been incorporated into and become a part of the general property of the State. However much this distinction may be open to criticism, it furnishes, as it seems to me, the only way in which the two decisions can be reconciled.
There is great difficulty in drawing the line precisely where the commercial power of Congress ends and the power of the State begins. The same difficulty was experienced in Brown v. Maryland, in drawing a line between the restriction on the States to lay a’ duty on imports and their acknowledged power to tax persons and property. In that case the court said that the two, the power and the restriction, though distinguishable when they did not approach each other, might, like the intervening colors between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the understanding as colors perplex the vision, in marking the distinction between them : but as the distinction existed, it must be marked as the cases arise. And after observing that it -might be premature to state any rule as being universal in its application, the court held as sufficient for that case that when the importer had so acted upon the thing imported, that it had become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it had lost its distinctive character as an import, and had become subject to the taxing power of the state ; but that while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it was plainly a duty on imports.
So in the present case it is perhaps impossible to state any rule which would determine in all cases where the right to sell an imported article under the commercial power of the Federal government ends and the power of the state to restrict *507further sale has commenced. Perhaps no safer rule can be adopted than the one laid down in Brown v. Maryland, that the commercial power continues until the articles imported have become mingled with and incorporated into the general property of the State, and not afterwards. And yet it is evident that the value of the importation will be materially affected, if the article imported ceases to be under the protection of the commercial power upon its sale by the importer. There will be little inducement for one to purchase from-the importer, if immediately afterwards he can himself be restrained from selling the article imported; and yet the power of the State must attach when the imported'article has become mingled with the general property within its limits, or its entire independence in the regulation of it's internal affairs must be abandoned. The difficulty and embarrassment which may follow must be met as each case arises.
In The License Oases, reported in 5 Howard, this court held that the States could not only regulate the sales of imported liquors, but could prohibit their sale. • The judges differed in their views in some particulars, but the majority were of opinion that the States had authority to legislate upon subjects of interstate commerce until Congress had acted upon them; and as Congress had not acted, the regulation of the States was valid. The doctrine thus declared has been modified since by repeated decisions. The doctrine now firmly established, is, that where the subject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or. sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide vessels in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers, and docks, and the like, which can be property regulated only by special provisions adapted to their localities, the State can act until Congress interferes and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the. *508needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter, shall be free. Thus the absence of regulations as to interstate commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of that article into the States shall.be unrestricted. It is only after the importation is completed, and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the State, that its regulations can act upon it, except so far. as may be necessary to insure safety in the disposition of the import until thus mingled. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 319; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 271; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 469; Mobile v Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 455; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489.
It is a matter of history that one of the great objects of the formation of the Constitution was to secure uniformity of commercial regulations, and thus put an end to restrictive and hostile discriminations by one State against the products of other States, and against their importation and sale. “ It may be doubted,” says Chief Justice Marshall, “ whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the Federal government contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present system than the deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce and all commerce among the States.- To construe the power so as to impair its efficacy would tend to defeat an object, in the attainment of which the American government took, and justly took, that strong interest which arose drom a full conviction .cf its necessity.” Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 446. To these views I may add, that if the States *509have the power asserted, to exclude from importation, within their limits any articles of commerce because in their judgment the articles may be injurious to their interests or policy, they may prescribe conditions upon which such importation will be admitted, and thus establish a system of duties as hostile to free commerce among the states as any that existed previous to the adoption of the Constitution.