Court Opinion

ID: 9395602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:05:50.677981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.720394
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128316

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                           OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 128316)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        SHAUN N. TAYLOR, Appellant.

                               Opinion filed May 18, 2023.

        JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
     Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                        OPINION

¶1       Defendant Shaun N. Taylor was convicted of attempted first degree murder of
     a peace officer and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, plus an additional 20
     years’ imprisonment for using a firearm during the commission of the offense. The
     Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.
     2022 IL App (3d) 190281. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to
     appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For the following reasons, we affirm
     the appellate court’s judgment.

¶2                                          FACTS

¶3       On October 15, 2017, Illinois State Trooper Andrew Scott stopped defendant
     on Interstate 80 due to an obstructed windshield. Scott approached defendant’s
     vehicle, identified himself as an Illinois State Trooper, and informed defendant that
     he was going to give him a warning. While Scott was preparing the warning,
     another officer arrived with a canine unit. That officer walked the canine around
     defendant’s vehicle, and the canine alerted. Scott and the other officer asked
     defendant to exit his car. Defendant refused and sped off.

¶4        Defendant exited the interstate at the first available exit and ultimately parked
     his vehicle on a country road. Defendant then grabbed two weapons that he was
     carrying in his vehicle, an AR-15, semiautomatic rifle and a .40-caliber handgun.
     Defendant took up a hidden position in a cornfield directly across from his vehicle.
     Scott found defendant’s vehicle shortly thereafter but did not approach the vehicle
     because he could see the vehicle was not occupied. Scott parked his squad car
     approximately 60 yards from defendant’s vehicle, with the front of his squad car
     facing the front of defendant’s vehicle. Scott exited his squad car and moved to a
     spot behind it. Defendant then fired 23 shots in Scott’s direction with the AR-15
     rifle. Scott was unharmed. Law enforcement officers then pursued defendant, who
     surrendered several hours later.

¶5       Defendant was charged with one count of attempted first degree murder of a
     peace officer in the course of performing his official duties (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-
     1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-
     1.2(a)(3)). Prior to defendant’s trial, the trial court appointed Dr. Kirk Witherspoon,
     a clinical psychologist, to examine defendant. Dr. Witherspoon examined
     defendant on two occasions to determine whether defendant could raise the defense
     of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant could raise the mitigation of guilty
     but mentally ill, and defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶6      Dr. Witherspoon’s diagnosis of defendant was that defendant suffered from
     posttraumatic stress disorder. Dr. Witherspoon found defendant to be fit to stand

                                              -2-
     trial and further found that defendant did not meet the criteria for a defense of not
     guilty by reason of insanity. However, Dr. Witherspoon opined that if defendant
     was convicted, the presumption of guilty but mentally ill seemed applicable. Dr.
     Witherspoon also filed an addendum to his psychological evaluations. The
     addendum was based upon Dr. Witherspoon’s review of records that defense
     counsel was able to obtain from a 2007 psychiatric hospitalization of defendant. Dr.
     Witherspoon’s addendum stated that the data associated with defendant’s 2007
     brief hospitalization did not appear significant or sufficient to alter Dr.
     Witherspoon’s recommendations that defendant was not eligible for a not guilty by
     reason of insanity plea but that the court could consider a guilty but mentally ill
     finding if defendant was found guilty.

¶7      Dr. Witherspoon also sent defense counsel a handwritten note stating:

        “Mr. Taylor’s is a borderline case. I do not think he meets the threshold of [not
        guilty by reason of insanity]. However, if his parents can afford it, you may
        wish to seek a second opinion. If so, I can give you the names of a couple of
        other good psychologists who can do this work.”

¶8       Defendant then filed a motion requesting the appointment of another expert, at
     the State’s expense, to render a second opinion concerning whether defendant could
     raise a not guilty by reason of insanity defense. In support of his request, defendant
     referenced Dr. Witherspoon’s handwritten note to defense counsel. The trial court
     denied defendant’s motion, noting that, in his report, Dr. Witherspoon did not limit
     or qualify his opinion in any way. The trial court also noted that he had seen Dr.
     Witherspoon make recommendations to the court on previous occasions
     recommending that the court appoint another expert. Further, the handwritten note
     did not recommend that the court appoint another expert. Rather, the note simply
     stated that, if defendant wanted to spend the money, he could talk to someone else.
     The trial court held that defendant did not show the need for the appointment of a
     second expert at public expense.

¶9       Defense counsel then asked the court if it would be willing to entertain a
     renewed motion if counsel could secure a firmer recommendation from Dr.
     Witherspoon. The trial court agreed that, if Dr. Witherspoon filed another
     addendum to his report, the court would consider that addendum. Further, in the
     event defense counsel was able to secure a firmer recommendation from Dr.

                                             -3-
       Witherspoon, the trial court told defense counsel that he could set the matter for
       hearing and call Dr. Witherspoon to testify. No further recommendations or
       evaluations from Dr. Witherspoon were filed.

¶ 10        Defendant’s case then proceeded to a jury trial, where defendant was found
       guilty of both charges. Because defendant was charged and convicted of attempted
       first degree murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties,
       defendant was subject to a sentence between 20 and 80 years’ imprisonment (id.
       § 8-4(c)(1)(A)), rather than the sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment for
       attempt to commit first degree murder (id. § 8-4(c)(1); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25 (West
       2016)).

¶ 11       At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court asked the parties whether the
       20-year firearm sentencing enhancement in section 8-4(c)(1)(C) of the Criminal
       Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2016)) applied to defendant’s
       case, given that defendant also was subject to the higher sentencing range for the
       attempted murder of a peace officer set forth in section 8-4(c)(1)(A). The State
       argued that the firearm sentencing enhancement applied, while defendant argued
       that the firearm sentencing enhancement would constitute an improper double
       enhancement.

¶ 12       Citing People v. Tolentino, 409 Ill. App. 3d 598 (2011), and People v. Jackson,
       2018 IL App (1st) 150487, the trial court found that the 20-year firearm
       enhancement did apply. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30
       years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of a peace officer in the course of
       performing his official duties, plus an additional 20 years for discharging a firearm
       in the attempted murder, for a total of 50 years’ imprisonment. The trial court then
       merged the aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction into the attempted murder
       conviction.

¶ 13       Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, again arguing that imposition
       of the firearm enhancement constituted an improper double enhancement. At a
       hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court noted a conflict in the appellate court
       over whether imposition of a firearm enhancement to a defendant subject to an
       enhanced status-based sentence under subsection (A) constituted an improper
       double enhancement. The trial court agreed with the cases finding the firearm
       enhancement addressed different policy concerns than the subsection (A) status-

                                                -4-
       based sentence, so that the firearm enhancement in this case did not constitute an
       improper double enhancement. The trial court therefore denied defendant’s motion
       to reconsider sentence.

¶ 14       Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
       his request for appointment of a second expert to determine whether defendant was
       eligible for a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant also argued that
       the trial court’s imposition of the 20-year firearm enhancement constituted an
       improper double enhancement, because the trial court also imposed a status-based
       sentence for the attempted murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his
       official duties.

¶ 15       The appellate court affirmed (2022 IL App (3d) 190281, ¶ 42) with one justice
       dissenting on the issue of double enhancement (id. ¶ 45 (Lytton, J., concurring in
       part and dissenting in part)). The appellate court first unanimously held that the trial
       court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a second expert
       to determine whether defendant was insane at the time of the offense. Id. ¶ 21
       (majority opinion); id. ¶ 45 (Lytton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
       The appellate court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma,
       470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985), established that,

          “ ‘when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of
          the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum,
          assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an
          appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation
          of the defense.’ ” 2022 IL App (3d) 190281, ¶ 42 (majority opinion) (quoting
          Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).

       The appellate court also stated that a defendant’s right to a psychiatric exam is
       protected by section 115-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
       5/115-6 (West 2016)).

¶ 16        The appellate court found that the requirements of Ake had been met in this
       case. Because defendant was indigent and his sanity was to be a significant issue at
       trial, the State was required to, and did, provide defendant with access to a
       psychiatric evaluation. The trial court appointed Dr. Witherspoon at the State’s
       expense to determine whether defendant was sane at the time he committed the

                                                -5-
       offense. Dr. Witherspoon conducted a thorough evaluation of defendant’s mental
       condition and determined that defendant was not insane when he fired on Officer
       Scott. The appellate court concluded that the appointment of Dr. Witherspoon and
       his evaluation of defendant fulfilled the requirements of Ake. 2022 IL App (3d)
       190281, ¶ 19.

¶ 17       The appellate court rejected defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a second
       evaluation based upon Dr. Witherspoon’s handwritten note to defense counsel,
       which described defendant’s case as “ ‘borderline.’ ” Id. ¶ 21. The appellate court
       stated that, given the information submitted by Dr. Witherspoon after examining
       defendant, there was no substantial value in ordering a second evaluation. Id. The
       appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to approve
       funds for a second psychiatric evaluation. Id.

¶ 18       The appellate court next addressed defendant’s claim that the trial court erred
       in applying both the status-based sentence under section 8-4(c)(1)(A) of the Code
       and the 20-year firearm enhancement under section 8-4(c)(1)(C) of the Code. Id.
       ¶ 23. Defendant argued that, once the trial court applied the status-based sentencing
       range in subsection (A), application of other subsections of the attempted first
       degree murder statute would constitute an improper double enhancement. Id.
       Defendant noted the split of authority on the issue and argued that the court should
       follow the case law finding that a court cannot impose a firearm enhancement once
       a status-based sentence is imposed. Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 19      The statute at issue provides:

              “§ 8-4. Attempt.

              (a) Elements of the offense.

              A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a
          specific offense, he or she does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward
          the commission of that offense.

                                              ***

              (c) Sentence

                                               -6-
    A person convicted of attempt may be fined or imprisoned or both not to
exceed the maximum provided for the offense attempted but, except for an
attempt to commit the offense defined in Section 33A-2 of this Code:

       (1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the
   sentence for a Class X felony, except that

           (A) an attempt to commit first degree murder when at least one of
       the aggravating factors specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (12) of
       subsection (b) of Section 9-1 is present is a Class X felony for which the
       sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and
       not more than 80 years;

           (B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while armed with a
       firearm is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term
       of imprisonment imposed by the court;

           (C) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the
       person personally discharged a firearm is a Class X felony for which 20
       years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

           (D) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the
       person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great
       bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to
       another person is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of
       natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
       court; and

           (E) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence at
       sentencing that, at the time of the attempted murder, he or she was acting
       under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
       by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to kill, or another,
       and, had the individual the defendant endeavored to kill died, the
       defendant would have negligently or accidentally caused that death,
       then the sentence for the attempted murder is the sentence for a Class 1
       felony[.]” 720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2016)).

                                   -7-
¶ 20       Defendant’s sentence falls under subsection (A) because the aggravating factor
       specified in section 9-1(b)(1) of the Code (id. § 9-1(b)(1)) was present. Section 9-
       1(b)(1) provides that an aggravating factor in the homicide statute is when

              “(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the
          course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his
          official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the
          defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace
          officer or fireman.” Id.

¶ 21       The appellate court noted the split of authority on the issue of double
       enhancement. 2022 IL App (3d) 190281, ¶ 24. One line of case law found that
       section 8-4(c) should be read disjunctively, precluding application of the firearm
       enhancement to a status-based sentence under subsection (A). Id. ¶ 29. The other
       line of cases found that the 20- to 80-year sentence set forth in subsection (A) was
       a baseline sentence, not an enhancement, so that application of the firearm
       enhancement to the status-based sentence was not an improper double
       enhancement. Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 22      The appellate court agreed with the cases holding that subsection (A) was a
       baseline sentence in cases involving status-based offenses, such as the attempted
       murder of Officer Scott in this case, so that subsections (B), (C), or (D) also applied
       when a firearm was used in that offense. Id. ¶ 39. The appellate court therefore
       found no error in the defendant’s sentence.

¶ 23       The partial dissent disagreed with this portion of the appellate court’s analysis.
       Id. ¶ 45 (Lytton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent believed
       that the semicolons between the subsections of section 8-4(c) indicated that each
       exception must be read disjunctively. Id. ¶ 50. The dissent found support for his
       analysis in the analysis of the courts in People v. Phagan, 2019 IL App (1st)
       153031, and People v. Holley, 2019 IL App (1st) 161326. 2022 IL App (3d)
       190281, ¶ 56. The dissent would vacate defendant’s 20-year firearm enhancement
       and would remand the cause for resentencing. Id. ¶ 60.

                                                -8-
¶ 24                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 25       In this court, defendant again challenges the trial court’s denial of his request
       for a second expert witness, as well as the imposition of the 20-year firearm
       sentencing enhancement.

¶ 26                                     A. Expert Witness

¶ 27      This court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for expert witness for an
       abuse of discretion. See People v. Page, 193 Ill. 2d 120, 153 (2000); People v.
       Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 230 (1994).

¶ 28       Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request
       for a second psychiatric evaluation to determine whether he was not guilty by
       reason of insanity. Defendant argues that a second evaluation was necessary based
       upon Dr. Witherspoon’s handwritten note to defense counsel stating that
       defendant’s case was borderline. Citing McWilliams v. Dunn, 582 U.S. 183 (2017),
       defendant argues that Ake requires not only an appropriate examination but also for
       the State to provide the defense with access to a competent psychiatrist who will
       also assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.

¶ 29      Defendant asserts that, even if Dr. Witherspoon conducted an appropriate
       examination, Dr. Witherspoon could not have helped the defense evaluate, prepare,
       and present a defense, because Dr. Witherspoon’s note that defendant’s case was a
       borderline case rendered Dr. Witherspoon’s opinion uncertain, necessitating the
       appointment of a second expert.

¶ 30       The State responds that defendant’s constitutional rights were satisfied by the
       appointment of Dr. Witherspoon. We agree with the State. Ake held that a defendant
       is entitled to access to a competent psychiatrist when the defendant’s sanity at the
       time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. Access
       to a competent psychiatrist means that the psychiatrist will conduct an appropriate
       examination and will assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
       defense. Id. Ake clarified that this did not mean an indigent defendant “has a
       constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds
       to hire his own.” Id.

                                                -9-
¶ 31       Defendant does not argue that Dr. Witherspoon did not conduct an appropriate
       examination. Dr. Witherspoon conducted two psychological evaluations of
       defendant, and both times he opined that defendant did not meet the criteria for a
       defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Witherspoon did believe that, if
       defendant was convicted, the guilty but mentally ill presumption could apply. Dr.
       Witherspoon also prepared an addendum to his psychological evaluation, after
       reviewing additional records obtained from a brief psychiatric hospitalization of
       defendant in 2007. The addendum stated that “[d]ata associated with [defendant’s]
       prior brief hospitalization did not appear significant or sufficient enough to alter
       those recommendations previously shared.”

¶ 32      Relying on McWilliams, defendant claims that he was entitled to the
       appointment of a second expert because Dr. Witherspoon did not assist in the
       evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.

¶ 33       Defendant’s reliance on McWilliams is misplaced. In McWilliams, the
       defendant was found competent to stand trial by a three-member panel of
       psychiatrists comprising the state of Alabama’s “Lunacy Commission.”
       McWilliams, 582 U.S. at 188. The defendant was convicted of capital murder, and
       the jury recommended the death penalty. Id. at 189. The case was then set for a
       judicial sentencing hearing. Id.

¶ 34       Five weeks before the sentencing hearing, defense counsel subpoenaed mental
       health records from the defendant’s prison and filed a motion for neurological and
       neuropsychological testing of the defendant. Id. at 190. Dr. Goff, a
       neuropsychologist, was retained to examine the defendant. Dr. Goff filed his report
       two days before the defendant’s sentencing hearing. Id. The day before the
       defendant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel received updated records from the
       state hospital, and on the morning of the hearing, defense counsel received
       subpoenaed records from the prison. Id. at 190-91.

¶ 35       At the defendant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel told the court that the
       late arrival of Dr. Goff’s report and the records left him unable to present evidence
       that day and that he needed to have someone review the documents and offer a
       second opinion. Id. at 191. Defense counsel noted his own lack of expertise to
       review the records or to determine whether and how to challenge the reports and
       tests run by the state hospital and Lunacy Commission. Id. at 192. The trial court

                                              - 10 -
       denied defense counsel’s motion, and the defendant ultimately was sentenced to
       death. Id. at 192-93. The Alabama reviewing courts rejected the defendant’s claim
       that the state of Alabama had failed to provide him with his constitutionally
       required expert mental health assistance. Id. at 193-94.

¶ 36       The United States Supreme Court found that the defendant had been denied the
       mental health assistance required by Ake. Id. at 199. The Court assumed that the
       defendant had received the examination portion of Ake’s requirements when Dr.
       Goff examined the defendant. Id. However, Ake’s requirement that the defendant
       receive access to an expert who will assist in the evaluation, preparation, and
       presentation of the defense was not met. No expert helped the defense evaluate Dr.
       Goff’s report, evaluate the defendant’s extensive medical records, or translate that
       data into a legal strategy. No expert helped the defense prepare and present
       arguments to explain the defendant’s alleged malingering or prepare for the direct
       or cross-examination of any witnesses. Id. The court concluded that the state of
       Alabama’s provision of mental health assistance fell dramatically short of Ake’s
       requirements and therefore remanded the matter to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
       Appeals. Id. at 200.

¶ 37       Defendant claims that in this case, as in McWilliams, the need for a second
       opinion arose because in both cases the indigent defendants were entitled to obtain
       additional experts. According to defendant, the issue of sanity remained a
       significant issue in both his case and McWilliams after the initial expert expressed
       an uncertain or inconclusive opinion that the defendant was sane. The inconclusive
       opinions left each expert unable to effectively assist in the preparation and
       presentation of a plausible insanity defense. Defendant argues that, even if Dr.
       Witherspoon conducted an appropriate examination, Dr. Witherspoon could not
       have helped defendant evaluate, prepare, and present a defense, given his
       uncertainty concerning whether defendant was insane at the time he committed the
       offense.

¶ 38       We disagree with defendant’s characterization of Dr. Witherspoon’s opinion.
       Dr. Witherspoon conducted two evaluations of defendant, reviewed additional
       medical records, and consistently opined that defendant was not eligible for a not
       guilty by reason of insanity defense. Neither of Dr. Witherspoon’s written
       evaluations indicated any equivocation concerning defendant’s sanity for purposes

                                              - 11 -
       of trial, nor did his addendum. Even Dr. Witherspoon’s note to defense counsel was
       unequivocal. Although the note stated that counsel might want to seek a second
       opinion if defendant’s parents could afford it, Dr. Witherspoon also wrote, “I do
       not think he meets the threshold of [not guilty by reason of insanity].” (Emphasis
       added.) Nowhere in the record is there evidence that Dr. Witherspoon was uncertain
       about his conclusion that defendant was sane.

¶ 39       This case is distinguishable from McWilliams. In McWilliams, defense counsel
       received Dr. Goff’s report and the defendant’s medical records just prior to the
       defendant’s sentencing hearing. Id. at 190-91. The trial court refused to continue
       the hearing to allow defense counsel additional time to review the materials for the
       hearing. Id. at 191-92. The sentencing hearing proceeded, and in response to the
       state of Alabama’s argument that there were no mitigating circumstances, defense
       counsel stated that he could not respond to that remark because he was not a doctor
       and could not go through the medical records on his own. Id. at 192-93. The trial
       court then sentenced the defendant to death, finding no mitigating circumstances.
       Id. at 193. Under those circumstances, the Court found that the defendant was
       denied access to a competent psychiatrist who would assist in evaluation,
       preparation, and presentation of a defense, as required under Ake. Id. at 199.

¶ 40       Those circumstances are not present in this case. Defendant does not and cannot
       claim that he did not have assistance in reviewing defendant’s medical records or
       in translating those records into a legal strategy. Dr. Witherspoon did help
       defendant evaluate, prepare, and present a defense. Dr. Witherspoon examined
       defendant on two occasions and reviewed defendant’s medical records. Although
       Dr. Witherspoon did not find that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity,
       Dr. Witherspoon suggested that defendant could be found guilty but mentally ill if
       he was convicted. This may not have been defendant’s preferred defense, but
       defendant cannot say that Dr. Witherspoon did not help him evaluate, prepare, and
       present a defense.

¶ 41       Defendant also claims the appellate court erred in relying on section 115-6 of
       the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-6 (West 2016)) to affirm
       the denial of defendant’s motion for the appointment of a second expert. We need
       not address this claim, as the basis for the appellate court’s ruling was its analysis
       of the requirements set forth in Ake. See 2022 IL App (3d) 190281, ¶¶ 17-20. The

                                               - 12 -
       appellate court simply noted that, in Illinois, a defendant’s right of access to a
       psychiatric examination is protected by statute as well, citing section 115-6. Id.
       ¶ 18.

¶ 42       Accordingly, we find that Dr. Witherspoon’s examinations and evaluations of
       defendant fulfilled the standards set forth in Ake. The trial court did not abuse its
       discretion in denying defendant’s request for a second expert to examine defendant.

¶ 43                                B. Firearm Enhancement

¶ 44       Defendant next argues that his sentence should be vacated and the cause
       remanded for resentencing because his sentence constituted an improper double
       enhancement. Defendant argues that the dissent in this case is better reasoned and
       that the split in the appellate court should be resolved in favor of the cases finding
       that the status-based sentence in subsection (A) is a sentencing enhancement and
       that all the sentencing enhancements in section (c)(1) apply disjunctively.

¶ 45       When reviewing issues of statutory construction, this court’s review is de novo.
       People v. Kastman, 2022 IL 127681, ¶ 29. A court’s fundamental objective in
       addressing issues of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
       legislature’s intent. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 14. In determining the
       legislature’s intent, a court “may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the
       evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.” People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.
       2d 36, 42 (2000). In addition, we presume that, in enacting the statute, the
       legislature did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. In re
       Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 560 (2010).

¶ 46        With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue. The first case to
       address the interplay of the status-based enhanced sentence in section 8-4(c)(1)(A)
       and the firearm enhancements in section 8-4(c)(1)(B), (C), and (D) was People v.
       Douglas, 371 Ill. App. 3d 21 (2007). In that case, the court considered whether the
       trial court was required to impose the 20-year firearm enhancement in addition to
       the defendant’s 35-year sentence for the attempted murder of a peace officer
       engaged in the course of performing his official duties. Id. at 23. In considering the
       sentencing issue, the Appellate Court, First District, first found that subsection (A)
       was not a sentencing enhancement but, rather, was a baseline sentence. Id. at 26.

                                               - 13 -
       The court stated that the sentencing enhancements were contained in subsections
       (B), (C), and (D) of the statute. The court declined to impose the 20-year sentencing
       enhancement, however, finding that in creating the subsection (A) Class X offense
       carrying a 20- to 80-year sentence, “the legislature well might have believed it was
       authorizing trial judges to impose severe sentences. That is, the sentence already is
       enhanced, without the need for further provision,” because Class X offenses
       ordinarily carry a sentence of 6 to 30 years. Id.

¶ 47       The Appellate Court, First District, next addressed the issue in People v.
       Tolentino, 409 Ill. App. 3d 598 (2011). The defendant in that case was sentenced
       to 20 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of a peace officer under
       subsection (A), along with a 20-year firearm enhancement under subsection (C).
       Id. at 599. Citing Douglas, the defendant argued on appeal that the plain,
       unambiguous statutory language prohibited application of the firearm enhancement
       to his attempted first degree murder of a peace officer conviction. Id. at 605.

¶ 48       The Tolentino court agreed with Douglas that subsection (A) contained no
       sentencing enhancements and that the sentencing enhancements were contained in
       subsections (B), (C), and (D). Id. at 606. The court, however, disagreed with the
       Douglas court’s statement that the legislature “ ‘might have believed’ ” subsection
       (A) presented a built-in enhancement without the need for further provision.
       Tolentino found that portion of the Douglas opinion to be speculative dicta and
       declined to follow it. Id. (quoting Douglas, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 26). The court found
       that the statute did not expressly prohibit use of the firearm enhancements when
       sentencing under subsection (A). Id. The court agreed with the State that the public
       policy concerns underlying subsection (A) differed from the concerns underlying
       the firearm enhancement provisions. Id. The court stated that

          “[a]llowing a trial court to add a firearm enhancement to a sentence given
          pursuant to subsection (A) would address the legislature’s desire both to deter
          intentional killings of peace officers and to discourage the use of firearms in the
          commission of felonies.” Id.

       Therefore, the trial court did not err in applying the firearm enhancement to the
       defendant’s sentence under subsection (A). Id.

                                              - 14 -
¶ 49       The Appellate Court, First District, reaffirmed this construction of the statute in
       People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 102354, and Jackson, 2018 IL App (1st)
       150487. Smith also found that the Douglas analysis was not persuasive, finding
       that, just as the firearm sentencing enhancements in subsections (B), (C), and (D)
       must be added to the 6- to 30-year sentencing range, they must also be added to the
       higher 20- to 80-year sentencing range. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 102354, ¶ 114.
       Smith noted that

          “a defendant may attempt to murder a police officer by many means other than
          a firearm, and where subsection (c)(1)(A) makes no reference to firearms, the
          court should not speculate that any concerns about the use of firearms in
          perpetrating this offense have already been considered by the legislature and
          are accounted for by the 20- to 80-year sentencing range.” Id.

¶ 50       The Jackson court also disagreed with the Douglas court’s reasoning. Jackson,
       2018 IL App (1st) 150487, ¶ 54. Jackson stated that the most natural reading of
       subsection (A) was that it set out an enhanced baseline sentence for the attempted
       murder of a peace officer and that subsections (B), (C), or (D) could apply based
       upon the facts of the case. Id. ¶ 52. The court acknowledged the legislature’s use of
       a semicolon to punctuate subsection (A) and noted that semicolons typically
       precede a related but separate concept. Id. ¶ 51. The semicolons suggested that the
       subsections in section (c)(1) must be read disjunctively. Id. Nonetheless, the
       Jackson court believed that the legislature did not use semicolons to signify a
       disjunctive intent. Id.

¶ 51       Jackson also noted that a 2010 amendment to the statute added subsection (E),
       changing the period at the end of subsection (D) into a semicolon and adding the
       word “and” before the text of subsection (E). Id. The court therefore concluded that
       the use of the word “and” at the end of the series of subsections, each ending in a
       semicolon, signaled that the legislature intended for the exceptions in subsection
       (c)(1) to apply conjunctively, not disjunctively. Id.

¶ 52       When faced with the issue again in 2019, the Appellate Court, First District,
       disagreed with Tolentino, Smith, and Jackson. Phagan, 2019 IL App (1st) 153031.
       Phagan noted that the courts in Douglas, Tolentino, and Smith addressed the
       version of the statute prior to the statute’s 2010 amendment. Id. ¶ 84. Further,
       although the Jackson court addressed the amended statute, containing subsection

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       (E), the Phagan court disagreed with Jackson’s analysis. Id. Phagan noted that
       subsections (A) and (E), the two exceptions to the base Class X sentencing range
       for attempted first degree murder, could not exist together. Id. ¶ 99. If a defendant
       attempted the aggravated form of first degree murder, he could not have attempted
       first degree murder plus a mitigating circumstance. Id. For that reason, the Jackson
       court erred in reading subsections (A) and (E) conjunctively. Id. ¶ 100.

¶ 53       Phagan also found an additional absurdity in reading the subsections of section
       (c)(1) conjunctively, stating that a conjunctive reading would allow trial courts to
       impose the 15-year, 20-year, and 25-year to natural life firearm enhancements on
       top of one another, thus sanctioning improper multiple enhancements. Id. ¶ 101.
       Phagan therefore held that the attempted first degree murder statute did not allow
       for the imposition of a 20-year firearm enhancement on top of the imposition of the
       extended sentencing range set forth in subsection (A). Id. ¶ 107.

¶ 54       Another panel of the Appellate Court, First District, similarly departed from the
       Tolentino, Smith, and Jackson decisions and held that the trial court had erred in
       applying the 25-year to natural life sentencing enhancement in subsection (D) to
       the defendant’s subsection (A) sentence for the attempted murders of two peace
       officers. Holley, 2019 IL App (1st) 161326. The court found that the statute set
       forth a sentence for attempted murder, a Class X offense, with a baseline sentence
       of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 32. That baseline sentence was subject to
       modification in one of the five ways set forth in subsections (A) through (E). Id.
       Holley stated that nothing in the structure of the statute or the statutory language
       suggested that the sentencing court was to apply more than one of those exceptions
       in a particular case. Id. Further, to the extent the statute was ambiguous, any
       ambiguity would be construed in favor of the defendant pursuant to the rule of
       lenity. Id.

¶ 55       The instant decision is the first case outside of the Appellate Court, First
       District, to address the issue of whether the firearm sentencing enhancements could
       be applied to a sentence imposed under subsection (A). As discussed, the appellate
       court in this case disagreed with the reasoning of the Phagan and Holley courts and
       found that subsection (A) was a base sentencing range for a status-based offense,
       rather than an enhancement, so that a trial court was not prohibited from also
       imposing a firearm enhancement to that sentence. We further note that, following

                                              - 16 -
       the appellate court’s decision in this case, the First District again addressed the issue
       and disagreed with the Phagan and Holley decisions. People v. Pledger, 2022 IL
       App (1st) 200094-U. The Pledger court analyzed the statute and reached the same
       conclusion as the appellate court in this case, that subsection (A) created a baseline
       sentence, which was subject to modification in one of four ways set forth in
       subsections (B) through (E). Id. ¶ 31.

¶ 56       Noting the conflict in the appellate court, defendant argues that this court should
       resolve that conflict in favor of the decisions finding that the sentence
       enhancements apply disjunctively rather than conjunctively, so that defendant’s
       sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing. Following the
       reasoning of those courts, defendant argues that the subsections in section 8-4(c)(1)
       apply disjunctively because (1) the plain language of the attempt statute shows that
       each sentence enhancement is an exception, with its own sentencing scheme, to the
       baseline Class X sentencing range of 6 to 30 years for attempted murder, (2) each
       sentence enhancement is a distinct and aggravated crime under the plain language
       of the statute and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
       Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and (3) the legislature’s use of semicolons to separate
       the subsections indicates the subsections are to be read disjunctively.

¶ 57        The State responds that the plain language and purpose of section 8-4 require
       application of the firearm enhancement to any attempted murder that constitutes a
       Class X felony, including the defendant’s attempted murder of a peace officer.
       Section (c)(1) provides that “the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder
       is the sentence for a Class X felony.” The statute then lists four exceptions where
       the attempt to commit first degree murder is still a Class X felony, but the
       sentencing range is not 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. The statute contains a final
       exception when the attempted murder is not a Class X felony.

¶ 58       We agree with the State and the decisions finding that the firearm enhancements
       in subsections (B) through (D) can apply to a sentence imposed under subsection
       (A). The appellate dissent in this case and the opinions in cases finding that the
       firearm sentencing enhancements do not apply to a sentence under subsection (A)
       place great emphasis on the use of semicolons in the statute. We decline to elevate
       form over substance, however, and instead look to the plain language of the statute

                                                - 17 -
       to determine whether the subsections of section 8-4(c)(1) are disjunctive or
       conjunctive.

¶ 59       In interpreting a statute, words and phrases in a statute should not be considered
       in isolation but should be interpreted in light of other relevant statutory provisions
       and the statute as a whole. People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12. Considering
       the statutory provisions and the statute as a whole, we first note that subsection
       (c)(1) provides that “the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the
       sentence for a Class X felony.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West
       2016). Subsection (A) provides that “an attempt to commit first degree murder
       when at least one of the aggravating factors *** of Section 9-1 is present is a Class
       X felony for which the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not less than 20
       years and not more than 80 years.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(A).

¶ 60       Subsections (B), (C), and (D) then set forth the firearm enhancements.
       Subsection (B) states that an attempt to commit first degree murder while armed
       with a firearm “is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of
       imprisonment imposed by the court.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(B).
       Similarly, subsection (C) provides that “20 years shall be added to the term of
       imprisonment imposed by the court” when the defendant “personally discharged a
       firearm.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(C). Subsection (D) provides that “25
       years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment
       imposed by the court” when the defendant “personally discharged a firearm that
       proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
       disfigurement, or death to another person.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(D).

¶ 61       It is clear from the preceding language, given its plain and ordinary meaning,
       that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (A) set forth baseline sentences for the offense
       of attempted first degree murder, i.e., the “term of imprisonment imposed by the
       court,” with subsection (A) imposing a longer baseline sentence based upon one of
       the aggravating factors specified in subsections (1), (2), and (12) of section 9-1(b).
       Subsections (B), (C), and (D) then provide that the firearm enhancements of 15, 20,
       or 25 years to natural life “shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
       the court.”

¶ 62      This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the reason for the law, the
       problems sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved. See Jackson,

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       2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12. As the appellate court noted, subsection (A)’s enhanced
       status-based sentence and the firearm enhancement subsections address separate
       evils. The appellate majority correctly observed:

          “The legislature has been explicit in its intent to punish attempted first degree
          murder of a peace officer more severely than the same attempt on an ordinary
          citizen. Moreover, the legislature has clearly expressed its intent to punish
          offenses perpetrated with firearms with sentencing enhancements.” 2022 IL
          App (3d) 190281, ¶ 34.

       That the subsections address separate evils is evident when considering that the
       subsections do not always overlap. For example, a defendant may attempt to
       commit the first degree murder of a peace officer or fireman with a weapon other
       than a firearm, so that only the legislature’s intent to punish the attempted murder
       of a peace officer more severely would apply.

¶ 63       Moreover, as the State points out, the statutory interpretation embraced by the
       dissent and the courts in Phagan and Holley would be contrary to the reasons for
       the law, the problems sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved.
       Under that interpretation, a defendant who personally discharges a firearm in an
       attempt to kill, for example, an accountant would be subject to a mandatory
       minimum term of 26 years: the 6-year mandatory minimum for attempted murder
       under subsection (c)(1), plus the 20-year firearm enhancement in subsection (C). If
       the defendant committed the exact same act against a peace officer or fireman in
       the course of performing his official duties, the defendant would be subject to a
       mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years under subsection (A). This result is
       contrary to the legislature’s express intent to punish the status-based offense in
       subsection (A) more severely.

¶ 64       We also disagree with the Phagan court’s analysis finding support for its
       holding in the fact that subsections (A) and (E) could not be read conjunctively,
       because a defendant who attempted the first degree murder of a peace officer could
       not also have attempted first degree murder plus a mitigating circumstance. 2019
       IL App (1st) 153031, ¶ 99. Phagan found such an “impossible reading of the
       statutory scheme as a whole” would lead to an absurd result. Id. ¶ 100. Phagan also
       believed that reading the statute conjunctively would allow the trial court to impose

                                              - 19 -
       the 15-year, 20-year, and 25-year to natural life subsections on top of one another.
       Id. ¶ 101.

¶ 65       We disagree. As the appellate court in this case found, subsection (E) is not an
       enhancement but rather sets forth a mitigating circumstance reducing the baseline
       sentence in subsection (c)(1). That the mitigating circumstance does not apply to
       subsection (A) is of no consequence. The plain language of the statute establishes
       that subsection (A) sets forth a basis to increase the sentence in subsection (c)(1),
       while subsection (E) sets forth a basis to decrease that sentence. Subsections (B)
       through (D) set forth a basis to increase the sentences in subsection (c)(1) and
       subsection (A) when a firearm is involved in the offense.

¶ 66       There also is no danger of an impermissible double enhancement in our
       interpretation of the statute. A trial court could not simultaneously impose the 15-
       year, 20-year, and 25-year to natural life subsections under our reading of the statute
       because double enhancements are prohibited unless the legislature has clearly
       intended such a penalty and has clearly expressed that intention in the statute.
       People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 530 (2005). The legislature has not clearly
       expressed that intention in section 8-4, so simultaneous imposition of the firearm
       enhancements would be prohibited multiple enhancements.

¶ 67       Defendant also argues that the decision in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, confirms
       that the four sentencing enhancements of the attempt statute are independent
       crimes, each with its own sentencing scheme, because each enhancement is based
       on a different Apprendi element.

¶ 68        As the State argues in response, the Apprendi decision is inapposite. Apprendi
       held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a
       crime beyond the prescribed statutory range must be proven by the factfinder
       beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 483-84. Defendant does not argue that the
       State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed attempted
       first degree murder, that the victim was a peace officer, or that defendant personally
       discharged a firearm during the commission of the attempted first degree murder.
       Defendant instead argues that, because each fact that alters the sentencing range in
       subsection (c)(1) is an element that must be proven to the factfinder beyond a
       reasonable doubt, then each of those provisions must constitute a distinct crime that
       cannot be combined to require a greater sentencing range. There is no merit to this

                                               - 20 -
       argument, as Apprendi does not prohibit combining multiple facts, proven beyond
       a reasonable doubt, to increase the sentencing range applied to the defendant’s
       conduct.

¶ 69       Finally, we find no merit to defendant’s argument that the legislative history of
       section 8-4 requires reversal of the appellate court’s opinion. In support of this
       argument, defendant points to the fact that the legislature added subsection (E) to
       section 8-4 following the appellate court’s Douglas decision. In doing so, the
       legislature did not amend the sentence enhancement provisions of the statute,
       suggesting that the legislature viewed the Douglas court’s interpretation of the
       statute as correct. As the State points out, however, the legislature inserted the word
       “and” to separate the subsections when it added subsection (E) to the statute. The
       State asserts this amendment also could be construed as correcting the Douglas
       court’s interpretation of the statute as disjunctive rather than conjunctive. We agree
       with the State that the legislature’s amendment of the statute to add subsection (E)
       does not indicate a clear legislative response to the Douglas decision. To the extent
       that the decisions in Douglas, Phagan, and Holley held that section 8-4(c)(1)’s
       subsections cannot be read conjunctively, they are hereby overruled.

¶ 70       In sum, we find the plain language of section 8-4 sets forth a baseline sentence
       for a Class X felony, as well as an increased baseline sentence for a Class X felony
       involving one of the aggravating factors specified in the statute. The statute also
       sets forth a mitigating circumstance that may apply to the baseline sentence in
       subsection (c)(1), along with firearm enhancements that may apply to the baseline
       sentences in subsections (c)(1) and (c)(1)(A). It follows that defendant was properly
       sentenced to a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment under subsection (A) of the
       statute, plus an additional 20 years’ imprisonment under subsection (C), for
       discharging a firearm in the attempted murder of Officer Scott.

¶ 71                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 72       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
       appointment of a second expert at the public’s expense. The defendant was not
       denied his right to the mental health assistance required by Ake. Dr. Witherspoon
       fulfilled Ake’s constitutional requirements in examining defendant and assisting in
       the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of defendant’s defense. The defendant

                                               - 21 -
       also was not subject to an improper double enhancement when he received a 20-
       year sentence under the firearm enhancement of subsection (C) of section 8-4(c)(1),
       in addition to his 30-year sentence under subsection (A) of the statute. We therefore
       affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 73      Judgments affirmed.

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