Court Opinion

ID: 9721885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:11:44.754573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:01.914003
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion has too narrowly construed the plain meaning of the statute, Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Supp.1977) in refusing to find that a professional degree is an intangible asset and therefore part of the marital property. The fact is that the law degree obtained by the husband in this case is something of value in which he had a present vested interest at the time of the dissolution and which was obtained as a result of the efforts and sacrifices of both parties. To flatly refuse to find any sort of protected property interest in the degree under the present circumstances would denigrate the very concept of equity.
It is true that a professional degree lacks many of the attributes of tangible property. It does not have an exchange value on the *374open market, and since it is personal to the holder, it cannot be inherited, assigned, sold, transferred, or conveyed. However, many courts.have found that intangible and nontransferable items should be treated as property for some purposes. As Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has said:
“The decisions of this Court have given constitutional recognition to the fact that in our complex modern society, wealth and property take many forms. We have said that property interests requiring constitutional protection ‘extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.’ ” Arnett v. Kennedy, (1974) 416 U.S. 134, 207-08, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1670-71, 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 64 [footnotes and citation omitted].
It was further noted:
“. . . today more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods. . A profession or job is frequently far more valuable than a house or bank account, . .” Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 416 U.S. at 207, n. 2, 94 S.Ct. at 1670, n. 2, 40 L.Ed.2d at 64, n. 2.
The United States Supreme Court has found that there is a property interest for constitutional purposes in such items as tenured federal employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; and possession of a driver’s license, Bell v. Burson, (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90. Other courts have divided such items as pension benefits, McGrew v. McGrew, (1977) 151 N.J.Super. 515, 377 A.2d 697; Hutchins v. Hutchins, (1976) 71 Mich.App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272, and goodwill, In re Marriage of Lopez, (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58. In our own state, it has been held that an interest in a profit-sharing pension plan which was held solely in the name of one spouse was an asset to be taken into consideration by the court in determining the amount of the award in a property settlement. Stigall v. Stigall, (1972) 151 Ind.App. 26, 277 N.E.2d 802.
The majority overly narrows the statute by concluding that a professional degree cannot be considered as “property.” It is clear that the statute speaks about the division of “marital property” without any attempt to define what property that includes. In fact, it has been expressly stated that “. .no guidance is given as to precisely what constitutes ‘property’ within the meaning of the statute.” Savage v. Savage, (1978) Ind.App., 374 N.E.2d 536, 538. The majority turns to cases dealing with future interests for guidance and concludes that there must be a vested present interest in an item before it can come within the ambit of “property of the parties.” Ind.Code § 31 — 1—11.5—11; Savage v. Savage, supra, Wilcox v. Wilcox, (1977) Ind.App., 365 N.E.2d 792. I feel it is clear that the holder of the degree has a present vested interest in the professional degree and only one party must have the present vested interest in the item before it is considered an asset. Stigall v. Stigall, supra.
This degree is an intangible asset which was in the nature of an equitable debt extended and expended by the wife to the husband during coverture and the trial court was correct in considering it as an asset in making the division of property.
It is not necessary to consider future earnings in order to determine the value of the degree as an asset. The economic reality is clear that the degree was acquired through the expenditure of time and money on the part of both parties. Had the money spent for the degree bought tangible goods there is no doubt that the trial court had power to divide those goods. There is no reason that the court cannot look to the amount of money expended in achieving the degree and use that as a basis for determining its present value as a marital asset.
In fact, it is very reasonable for courts of equity to have the power to find that since a professional degree is an asset it must be taken into consideration in fashioning a full and just relief for both parties. Nothing in the statute or our prior case law prevents this result in this case. There is no award of maintenance here since the monetary *375award is based entirely on a division of marital property.
The majority concludes that the monetary award here must be a distribution of the husband’s future income and that this is improper since there is no present vested interest in the future income. However, I feel the trial court correctly considered previously expended and dissipated assets in fashioning a division of present assets in this case, since the statute clearly provided that the conduct of the parties could be considered. If a tangible item had been purchased with the expended assets of one party, the court could order it to be sold in order to fairly divide its value between the parties. Since the degree could not be divided, the court fashioned equitable relief through a monetary award repaying the wife for her share in the acquisition of the asset. This is not an award of future income based upon a right of the wife in that income, or an enlargement of the marital estate beyond that property in which the parties maintain a present vested interest, but is a repayment of expended assets which is entirely proper for a court of equity to order.
In order to prevent an inequitable result under these circumstances, some monetary award must be made. To deny that the degree is part of the marital assets in this ease, is to give one spouse a windfall of contribution to his or her increased earning capacity while penalizing the other spouse for being a "breadwinner.” Courts in several states have found that some monetary award must be made to the working spouse under similar situations although these awards have been upheld on a variety of theories. In re Marriage of Horstmann, (Iowa 1978) 263 N.W.2d 885; Inman v. Inman, (Ky.Ct.App.1979) 578 S.W.2d 266; Moss v. Moss, (1978) 80 Mich.App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97; Daniels v. Daniels, (1961) Ohio App., 20 Ohio Op.2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773.
The trial court was correct in the instant case in determining that the degree was a marital asset and fashioned a just and equitable relief in the form of a monetary award to the party who was unjustly deprived of a present share in that asset. The intent of the legislature in this area has been made clear in the new code and this code expressly approves the relief granted by the trial court in this case.
I would deny transfer and affirm the trial court.