Court Opinion

ID: 9562062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:20:55.2605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:11.622295
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would hold that the lower court erred in failing to rule that Jean Tinsley abandoned her children within the meaning of Sections 31-51.1 through 31-51.4 of the South Carolina Code of Laws for 1962, and erred in failing to grant the adoption.
This action is in equity, and this court has authority on appeal to find the facts in accord with our views of the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. We may reverse a finding of fact by the lower court when the appellant satisfies us that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the lower court. See Simonds v. Simonds, 232 S. C. 185, 101 S. E. (2d) 494 (1957), and the cases cited therein.
In Goff v. Benedict, 252 S. C. 83, 165 S. E. (2d) 269 (1969), this court by inference recognized that misconduct on the part of a parent may serve as a basis for holding that parental ties should be severed. Though the respondent here asserts that she did not intend to abandon the children, her conduct constituted abandonment and warrants the conclusion that parental ties should be severed. Intention should be judged objectively by the conduct of the parent rather than solely by what is said. Respondent has voluntarily placed herself in a sphere of living totally incompatible with parental duties. The present and future life of the children should *359not be left to her arbitrary will, nor be controlled by her assertion that there was no intent to abandon. Intent involves a mental process and may be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as by utterances of the person whose intent is involved.
In my view the adoption should have been granted. In adoption proceedings there are four interested parties: (1) the minor children; (2) the parents or those standing in place of the parents; (3) the party seeking to adopt; (4) the State. Galloway v. Galloway, 249 S. C. 157, 153 S. E. (2d) 326 (1967).
The rights which the natural mother, Jean Tinsely, would assert must be considered; the welfare of the children must also be considered. It becomes the duty of this court to balance the equities and to determine whether the rights of the mother or the welfare of the children is paramount. Unfortunately, the rights claimed by the mother are inconsistent with the welfare of the children. Since 1961, when the natural mother went to Florida with Bill Tinsley, she has been to them a source of misery. The judge recognized that it was unsuitable for the children to visit with her at her home, or at the home of Joe and Mary Lee Bevis, and directed that visitations take place in his office under the supervision of one of his counselors until he ordered otherwise. There is nothing in the record before us to lead one to logically believe that her contacts with the children hereafter would contribute to their welfare. On the other hand, I am convinced that such would be detrimental. It is obvious that the children are now established in a good home. For nine years they have from time to time been afflicted with disturbance and anguish because of Jean Tinsley. They are now entitled to peace of mind, which can come only from a holding that the adoption should have been granted.