Court Opinion

ID: 9395546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:00:54.477093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.417853
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12163     Document: 30-1       Date Filed: 05/18/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-12163
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        WILLIE DEMPS,
        a.k.a. Willie Samuel Demps, Jr.,
        a.k.a. Willie S. Demps,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12163

                   D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00031-CDL-MSH-1
                           ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Willie Demps appeals his total sentence of 145 months’ im-
        prisonment, an upward variance from the guideline range of 97 to
        121 months, for one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and
        two counts of tax evasion. Demps argues that his sentence is pro-
        cedurally unreasonable because the District Court did not suﬃ-
        ciently explain its reasoning for imposing an upward variance or
        imposing partly consecutive sentences for tax fraud charges that
        are typically served concurrently. Demps also argues that his sen-
        tence is substantively unreasonable because it punished him exces-
        sively for his role in a conspiracy that was already the basis for an
        enhancement and was not grounded in facts from the presentence
        investigation report. Finally, Demps alleges that the Court focused
        solely on the seriousness of his oﬀense and did not suﬃciently con-
        sider other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
                                         I.
              A grand jury in the Middle District of Georgia returned a
        71-count indictment against Willie Demps and seven co-conspira-
        tors. The government later issued a superseding information
        against Demps, charging him with one count of conspiracy to
        commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(2) and 1349
        and two counts of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201.
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        22-12163               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Demps pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a plea agree-
        ment. As part of his plea agreement, Demps stipulated to a base
        oﬀense level of seven for Count One under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1),
        as well as the following enhancements to the Count One base of-
        fense level: a 16-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) for a loss
        between $1.5 and $3.5 million; a four-level increase under §3B1.1(a)
        because Demps was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity
        that involved ﬁve or more participants; and a two-level increase un-
        der § 3B1.3 for abusing a position of public trust.
               The presentence investigation report (the “PSR”) described
        Demps’s conduct as follows. Demps was a 30-year employee with
        the Muscogee County, Georgia Clerk’s Oﬃce and had risen to the
        level of Chief Deputy Clerk. As part of this job, Demps received
        funds and maintained deposits to various Clerk’s Oﬃce accounts;
        he was subject to no oversight regarding bank deposits or his man-
        agement of the accounts. Money from ﬁnes, forfeitures, and con-
        demnations were given to Demps for deposit.
               Upon her election as Clerk of Court in 2018, Danielle Forte
        observed money being handled incorrectly and requested an audit,
        which revealed missing funds totaling between $1.5 and $2.5 mil-
        lion. The audit also determined that dozens of checks were incor-
        rectly written from the Cash Bonds account and deposited into
        other accounts, some of which were supposed to have been closed.
        Demps wrote checks from the supposedly closed accounts to his
        family and friends. Demps did not timely produce requested infor-
        mation for the auditor.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-12163

               The auditor gave Demps a deadline of December 2, 2019, by
        which he was required to comply with the requests for production.
        On that date, he called in sick and submitted a notice of his retire-
        ment via email. He was also observed leaving his oﬃce after hours
        with boxes of unidentiﬁable objects; the auditor noticed that many
        of the documents previously in Demps’s oﬃce were no longer
        there.
               Based on the audit, Demps was responsible for taking ap-
        proximately $1.2 million in 2019 alone. Over $800,000 in checks
        had been written from Clerk’s Oﬃce accounts, and approximately
        half of those checks were written to the same six people. The in-
        vestigation uncovered that Demps used those individuals to cash
        the checks. Demps would write a check, meet with a “casher” in
        the parking lot of the Government Center or at a bank, give them
        the check, and then wait for the casher to return with the money.
        Many of the checks were cashed in Alabama, and a wire was sub-
        mitted to the bank of origin in Georgia to approve the transaction;
        in other instances, the checks were cashed in Georgia and the
        money then transported to Alabama. Demps gave the casher a
        small portion of the transaction and kept the rest for himself.
        Demps issued at least 330 checks totaling $1,323,045.21.
               With the money, Demps purchased expensive cars, sent his
        children to private school, and wired money to his wife’s family in
        Africa. The investigation revealed that Demps deposited $147,455
        and $327,787 in his personal bank accounts in 2018 and 2019,
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        22-12163              Opinion of the Court                        5

        respectively; in those same years he reported only $35,996 and
        $38,531, respectively, as his taxable income.
                The PSR indicated that the base oﬀense level was seven, and
        it assessed the above-mentioned enhancements. In addition to the
        enhancements Demps stipulated to, the PSR assessed Demps a
        two-level sophisticated means enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
        § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) and a two-level enhancement for deriving more
        than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more ﬁnancial insti-
        tutions under § 2B1.1(b)(17)(A). The total oﬀense level for the con-
        spiracy to commit bank fraud charge was 33. After a three-level
        reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, Demps’s
        ﬁnal oﬀense level was 30. Demps had a criminal history score of
        zero and a corresponding criminal history category of I. The PSR
        also explained that the maximum term of imprisonment for con-
        spiracy to commit bank fraud was 30 years, and that the maximum
        term of imprisonment for tax evasion was ﬁve years per count.
        The guideline imprisonment range was 97 to 121 months’ impris-
        onment. Neither the government nor Demps objected to the PSR.
              At the sentencing hearing, the Court announced that it had
        considered the advisory sentencing range, the sentencing factors
        found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the facts presented in the case.
        The Court sentenced Demps to the guideline maximum of 121
        months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit bank fraud.
        Demps was sentenced to 60 months for each of the two tax evasion
        counts. Twelve months of each tax evasion sentence was to be
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-12163

        served consecutive to the conspiracy sentence, for a total sentence
        of 145 months. The Court stated:
              To the extent that running Counts 2 and 3 partly con-
              secutive, or in addition to, Count 1, to the extent that
              is considered to be an upward variance from the
              guideline range, the Court ﬁnds that that variance is
              appropriate and necessary in this case in order to ac-
              complish the purposes of the sentencing factors
              found at 18 U.S.C., Section 3553(a).
        Sent’g Hr’g Tr., Doc. 252 at 20–21. The Court believed that this
        case was diﬀerent because in addition to victimizing the Muscogee
        County Clerk’s Oﬃce and the citizens of Muscogee County,
        Demps’s co-conspirators were also his victims because he took ad-
        vantage of them. The Court asked if there were any objections.
        Demps’s attorney objected to the consecutive nature of the tax eva-
        sion sentences as an upward variance that was not authorized by
        the sentencing factors.
               Demps timely appealed. On appeal, he argues that his total
        sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the Court did not
        adequately explain its chosen sentence. He argues that his sentence
        is substantively unreasonable because the Court focused on one of
        the § 3553(a) factors, seriousness of the oﬀense, and discounted the
        other statutory factors, like his advanced age. He also argues that
        it was improper for the Court to classify his co-conspirators as vic-
        tims because nothing in the record suggested that they were any-
        thing other than knowing participants, and that to the extent that
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        22-12163               Opinion of the Court                          7

        Demps recruited them, that conduct was already accounted for in
        the four-level § 3B1.1(a) enhancement.
                                          II.
                When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness,
        we consider legal issues de novo and review factual ﬁndings for clear
        error. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010).
        When a defendant challenges the procedural reasonableness of his
        sentence on the grounds that the district court did not state its rea-
        sons for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range as re-
        quired by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), we review the claim de novo even
        if the defendant did not object below. United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d
        990, 996 (11th Cir. 2016).
                A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court fails to
        adequately explain the chosen sentence, and additional explanation
        may be necessary if the court deviates from the guideline range.
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
        Although the district court is required to consider the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors, it is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly
        considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each one.
        United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Addi-
        tionally, a failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate
        tat the court ignored or failed to consider the evidence in error.
        United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
              When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,
        we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential
        abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12163

        The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establish-
        ing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the §
        3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
        2010). This Court will vacate a sentence only if it is “left with the
        deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court committed a
        clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv-
        ing at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences
        dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
                A district court abuses its discretion when it: “(1) fails to af-
        ford consideration to relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant
        weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
        tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
        proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
        2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The proper
        factors are set out in § 3553(a) and include the nature and circum-
        stances of the oﬀense, the personal history and characteristics of
        the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the promotion of re-
        spect for the law, just punishment, adequate deterrence, and the
        protection of the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court
        does not have to give all the factors equal weight and is given dis-
        cretion to attach great weight to one factor over another. United
        States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). How-
        ever, a sentence that “is grounded solely in one factor” may be un-
        reasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1194 (11th Cir.
        2008). Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court should
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        22-12163                Opinion of the Court                           9

        consider the particularized facts of the case and the guideline
        range. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1259–60.
               The sentencing court has wide discretion to conclude that
        the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance. United States v. Rodriguez,
        628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Van
        Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021). In imposing an upward
        variance, the court can rely on factors previously considered in im-
        posing an enhancement. Id. (holding that varying upward from the
        guideline range to account for multiple victims was not procedur-
        ally unreasonable, even when an enhancement was applied on the
        same grounds). A major variance must be supported by more sig-
        niﬁcant reasoning than a minor one, but the court need not discuss
        each factor in its justiﬁcation. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
        Even if an upward variance is imposed, a sentence that is well be-
        low the statutory maximum for the oﬀense is more likely to be rea-
        sonable. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir.
        2014). The court also has discretion to impose consecutive sen-
        tences in consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, including when
        charges arise from the same statutory provisions and are grouped
        in the guideline range calculation. See United States v. Bonilla, 579
        F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding consecutive sentencing
        for multiple counts of identity theft and because the court oﬀered
        a detailed explanation for its decision, expressing special concern
        for the seriousness of the oﬀense).
             Here, Demps’s 145-month total sentence, a 24-month up-
        ward variance, is procedurally reasonable because the District
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12163

        Court sufficiently explained its reasoning. According to the Court,
        the variance was necessary to provide just punishment for each of-
        fense, account for the number of victims of his conspiracy and
        fraud, and reflect the seriousness of the offense and need to pro-
        mote the rule of law. The record is clear that the Court imposed
        the partly consecutive sentences to ensure Demps was punished
        with imprisonment for each separate tax offense in addition to the
        conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The Court also emphasized that
        the number of victims in this case was actually higher than the PSR
        showed, because Demps took advantage of friends and family
        members by making them a part of the scheme.
                Likewise, Demps’s sentence is substantively reasonable be-
        cause the Court was permitted to vary upward based on factors
        accounted for in the guideline range and was not constrained by
        the PSR not indicating that a variance was warranted. The Court
        also properly weighed Demps’s personal characteristics, the nature
        of the offenses, the seriousness of the crime, the need to protect the
        public, and just punishment in determining that an upward vari-
        ance was warranted. The Court considered whether Demps acted
        out of greed or opportunism, as well as that he took advantage of
        his friends and family. The Court also considered the public trust
        that had been placed in Demps, and that his actions harmed the
        citizens of the entire county. It took into consideration the nature
        and seriousness of the crime and the need for public protection.
              While the District Court did not specifically mention that it
        had considered Demps’s age, it did not have to mention that
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        22-12163               Opinion of the Court                        11

        specifically. The Court stated that it had considered the guideline
        range, the § 3553(a) factors, and the particular facts of the case. It
        did not need to do more than that. We cannot say that we are left
        with a firm and definite belief that the District Court’s sentence was
        a clear error of judgment.
                Because Demps’s sentence is both procedurally and substan-
        tively reasonable, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.