Court Opinion

ID: 9630855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:22:48.34585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:45.159051
License: Public Domain

De MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
The majority and the concurrence hold ORS 167.065(l)(a) unconstitutional as a content-based restriction on speech that fits no historical exception to Article I, section 8.1 disagree with the majority and join in Judge Edmonds’ dissenting opinion. I write separately only to emphasize my view that a statute targeting the harmful effects of speech need not make that harm an element of the offense.
The majority holds that ORS 167.065(l)(a) fails expressly or by clear inference to identify the harmful effects it seeks to prevent. 138 Or App at 653-54. The concurrence, on the other hand, would hold that a statute targets the harmful effects of speech only when those effects are made express elements of the offense. 1 I disagree that making the specific harm an element of the offense is the only way a statute can identify that harm. Although I agree with the *684majority that ORS 167.065(l)(a) does not expressly mention what effects it targets, I believe it is possible to clearly infer that the statute is aimed at protecting children from the harmful effects of viewing hardcore pornography.
Over the past 15 or so years, the Supreme Court has sent various messages about the proper method to determine whether a statute focuses on expression or its harmful effects. In State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225, 611 P2d 1147 (1980), the court concluded that the disorderly conduct statute focused on expression, and not its effects, because the elements of that crime did not require that the words uttered actually cause “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” 289 Or at 229.2 However, in State v. Garcias, 296 Or 688, 679 P2d 1354 (1984), the court held that the menacing statute was aimed at the harmful effects of expression even though those effects were not elements of the offense. 296 Or at 697.3
In City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 759 P2d 242 (1988), upon which the concurrence primarily relies, the court apparently returned to its original Spencer analysis. The Tidyman court held that a zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult-oriented business was aimed at the content of expression, and not at its harmful effects, because “the operative text of the ordinance does not specify [the] adverse effects” that the ordinance sought to prevent. 306 Or at 185-86.4
*685According to the concurrence’s interpretation of Tidyman, a court cannot infer from the language of the statute what effects that statute was intended to prevent. However, more recently the Supreme Court appears to have rejected such a limited view, by inferring harmful effects that were neither elements nor expressly stated in the operative language of the laws at issue.
In State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992) , cert den __ US_, 113 S Ct 2967, 125 L Ed 2d 666 (1993) , the court held that ORS 166.165(l)(a)(A),5 a subsection of the intimidation statute, focused not on opinion or expression, but on the forbidden effects of “acting together to cause physical injury to a victim whom the assailants have targeted because of their perception that that victim belongs to a particular group.” 314 Or at 165. Although that harm was expressly identified in the elements of the offense, the court inferred that the legislature also sought to proscribe the “imitation, retaliation, and insecurity” that hate crimes foster. 314 Or at 166. These were neither listed as elements nor expressly mentioned in the text of the statute.
A year later, the court explicitly stated that a statute focuses on the effects of speech when it specifies “expressly or by clear inference what ‘serious and imminent’ effects it is designed to prevent.” Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372, 379, 845 P2d 1284 (1993), quoting Oregon State Police Assn. v. State of Oregon, 308 Or 531, 541, 783 P2d 7 (1989) (Linde J., concurring), cert den 498 US 810 (1990) (emphasis supplied). In Moser, the court held that a statute banning sales pitches via automatic telephone dialing and announcing machines focused on the content of speech, because it explicitly allowed noncommercial messages and apparently failed to identify any targeted or forbidden effects of commercial solicitation. 315 Or at 376, 379-80.6
*686Consistent with Moser and Plowman is City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 871 P2d 454 (1994). In Miller, the court held that a city ordinance7 regulating street vendors was aimed not at expression, but at a forbidden “effect” or “result” (street and sidewalk congestion, danger to public safety, promotion of business development, reduction of unfair competition and lessening of city liability). 318 Or at 489. Although causing “congestion” was an express “element” of the ordinance, the other effects were neither elements nor expressly included elsewhere in the text. 318 Or at 482, quoting Eugene City Code, section 4.860(d). Instead, the court apparently relied on the city’s assertions as to what effects the ordinance was intended to prevent. 318 Or at 483, 489.8
Because Miller and Plowman are the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements on this issue, I must conclude that we are permitted to look beyond the express language of the statute in determining what harmful effects lawmakers sought to prevent in enacting it. See also State v. Ray, 302 Or 595, 598, 733 P2d 28 (1987) (court considered both elements of offense as well as legislative history in holding that harassment statute was aimed at forbidden result of causing “alarm or annoyance” in another person).
ORS 167.065 provides, in part:
*687“(1) A person commits the crime of furnishing obscene materials to minors if, knowing or having good reason to know the character of the material furnished, the person furnishes to a minor:
“(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture, film or other visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement[.]”
ORS 167.060(10) defines “sexual conduct” as
“human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.”
ORS 167.060(11) defines “sexual excitement” as
“The condition of the human male or female genitals or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.”
ORS 167.065(l)(a) makes no explicit reference to what effects it seeks to prevent. However, the state contends that the statute is “aimed at protecting children from the harmful effects of viewing hardcore pornography.” I can conceive of no other purpose, and have no difficulty inferring that was the legislature’s purpose.
In summary, I would hold that ORS 167.065(l)(a) is aimed not at speech, but at preventing the harmful effects of exposing children to hardcore pornography. As such, the statute may constitutionally restrict certain types of expression to proscribe those effects. Because I agree with Judge Edmonds’ dissenting opinion that ORS 167.065(l)(a) does not reach constitutionally privileged expression in the process, I also respectfully dissent.

 The concurrence reasons that the legislature may only proscribe a harmful effect of speech by making that effect ‘ ‘part of the operative terms of the restriction. ’ ’ 138 Or App at 669. The state may then enforce that restriction, according to the concurrence, only by “establish[ing], as fact, that the targeted speech produced, or would produce, the harmful effects” the state seeks to prevent. 138 Or App at 658.

 See also State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 415, 649 P2d 569 (1982) (coercion statute focused on the forbidden effect of “overpowering another’s will” where offense required the element of compelling victim to act by instilling fear); State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691, 698-99, 705 P2d 740 (1985) (harassment statute targeted “[h]arm to another, in the form of alarm” where elements of crime required “actual and reasonable alarm” in victim); State v. Chakerian, 135 Or App 368, 371, 373, 900 P2d 511, rev allowed 322 Or 228 (1995) (riot statute focused on preventing specific harm of causing “grave risk of public alarm” where that effect was element of offense).

 In Garcias, the court concluded that the crime of menacing “appears to center on preventing harm to the victim in the form of tension, alarm and whatever injury may result from the confrontation.” 296 Or at 697. However, under former ORS 163.190(1), the statute then in effect, a person committed menacing merely by attempting to place another “in fear of imminent serious physical injury.” Because the victim need not actually fear injury, the identified harm was not an element of the offense, but was instead inferred from the express language of the statute.

 In State v. Stoneman, 132 Or App 137, 888 P2d 39 (1994), rev allowed 321 Or 94 (1995), amajority of this courtfollowed Tidyman in holding that ORS 163.680(1), the child pornography statute, focused on the content, and not the harmful effects, of child pornography.

 Former ORS 166.165, provided in part:
“(1) Two or more persons acting together commit the crime of intimidation in the first degree, if the persons:
“(a)(A) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another because of their perception of that person’s race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation[.l”

 The concurrence contends that Moser does not change the Tidyman analysis. 138 Or App at 667. The above-quoted statement in Moser, the concurrence correctly *686points out, was quoted from Oregon State Police Assn. v. State of Oregon, 308 Or 531, 541, 783 P2d 7 (1989), which in turn cited In re Laswell, 296 Or 121, 673 P2d 855 (1983). In Laswell, the court inferred the targeted effect of a disciplinary rule that restricted prosecutorial speech, but then interpreted that effect as a required element of the rule. 296 Or at 125-27. However, as argued above, in cases decided after Moser the court has inferred harmful effects that were neither elements nor expressly stated in the operative language of the laws at issue.

 Eugene Code, section 4.860, provided, in part:
“Unless otherwise authorized by this code, no person shall:
<<* * * * *
“(d) Set up or operate a vehicle, stand or place for the sale or display of merchandise, or sell, vend, or display for sale an article in the streets or on the sidewalks or in doorways or stairways of business houses, or in any other place where such activity causes congregation and congestion of people or vehicles on the streets or sidewalks.”

 Although determining that the ordinance was directed at “forbidden results,” the Miller court nonetheless held that it was unconstitutionally applied to the defendant. 318 Or at 492.