Court Opinion

ID: 9767636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:54.936134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.116670
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In holding that the trial court properly disregarded the jury verdict and substituted its own finding for post-taking value, the majority has violated the sanctity of the right of trial by jury and ignored longestablished precedent. I would uphold the jury verdict and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Since the rule was first pronounced in Carter v. Carter, 5 Tex. 93 (1849), this court has continuously stressed the inherent sanctity of the constitutionally mandated right of trial by jury. E.g., Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. McGuire, 744 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex.1988); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633-35 (Tex.1986). Recently, in Larson v. Cactus Utility Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1987), we stated that “no court is free to substitute its judgment for that of the jury,” and that any practice that “effectively allows jurists’ determinations to be substituted for those of the jury” should be condemned. Today, however, the majority endorses that precise practice.
At trial, twelve jurors heard testimony on the value of Callejo’s land. The testimony ranged from a high value of $729,265 to a low value of $0. After hearing the testimony and observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses and parties, the jurors concluded that the land was worth $456,161 prior to the condemnation and $364,928.80 after the condemnation. The trial judge, however, disagreed with the jury’s conclusion and entered his own figure for post-taking value in place of the jury’s answer. Although less than two *77months ago in Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (1988), this court expressly recognized “the sanctity to which a jury verdict is entitled” and observed that “courts are not free to substitute their judgment for that of the jury simply because they may disagree with the jury’s verdict,” the majority today holds that the trial judge properly disregarded the jury verdict and substituted his own finding.
The majority reasons that the trial judge acted properly because there was no evidence to support the jury’s findings. In conducting its no evidence review, however, the majority considers only a narrow portion of the testimony presented on the market value of Callejo’s land. “In reviewing a no evidence point, we consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury verdict and disregard all evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence of probative value to support the jury verdict, we must affirm.” International Armanent Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.1985) (emphasis added). All testimony must be viewed in a light most favorable to supporting the jury’s finding, and every reasonable meaning deductible from the evidence is to be indulged in the jury’s favor. Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex.1983).
As evidenced by the extensive list of authorities the majority is forced to disapprove, it is well-established in Texas that the jury in a condemnation case may select any figure within the general range of testimony when determining the post-taking value of the condemned land. E.g., Leiber v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 667 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); McConnico v. Texas Power & Light Co., 335 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Maddox v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co., 293 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex.Civ.App.—Port Worth 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.). To hold otherwise allows the testimony of a single class of witnesses to impermissibly control rather than aid the jury. Expert witnesses are present to assist in the court’s decision-making process, not to control it.
It has long been the rule of this state that the judgments and inferences of expert witnesses are not conclusive on the jury or trier of fact. E.g., McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.1986); Broussard v. Moon, 431 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex.1968). A jury may accept or reject such opinions, or the jury may find its own opinion from evidence and by utilizing its own experience in matters of common knowledge. Coxson v. Atlanta Life Insurance Co., 142 Tex. 544, 179 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1944). As this court observed in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hearks, 144 Tex. 317, 190 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1945):
Jurors in weighing the evidence before them have a right to use their common knowledge and experience in life. If the opinions of the experts as given in the evidence do not comport with the jurors’ ideas of sound logic, the jurors have a right to say so. Otherwise, there could not be a free discussion of evidence in the jury room.
See also Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 329 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (jurors may reject illogical opinions of experts). The majority’s reasoning places an inflexible mathematical constraint on the jury and leaves no room for the jury to consider and blend all of the evidence together in arriving at a verdict. Despite the majority’s claims to the contrary, such a constraint can only tarnish the sanctity of the right of trial by jury. As stated so amply by a current member of this court, “Talk is cheap. It is time for the court to show courage and restore the right of trial by jury to its proper constitutionally established role in the Texas legal system.” Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 147 (1988) (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
Because we must view all testimony in a light most favorable to supporting the jury verdict, I would hold that the jury finding of $364,928.80 is well within the range of testimony presented at trial. Thus, the jury verdict is supported by the evidence, and the trial court erred in disregarding *78the jury’s finding and rendering judgment notwithstanding the verdict. .
RAY and CULVER, JJ., join in this dissent.