Court Opinion

ID: 9625707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:48:39.133897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:13.954407
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from Division 1 of the majority opinion. I do not believe, as the majority holds, that the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court or the Georgia appellate courts create a constitutional requirement that a police supervisor must testify as to the purpose of a roadblock.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 46 (121 SC 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000), the U. S. Supreme Court directed that courts must “examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program” at issue. And while the Edmond opinion directs that the inquiry “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene,” id. at 48, nothing in that opinion, or any other Supreme Court opinion, dictates that only supervisory personnel may give evidence of the programmatic purpose of a roadblock. In fact, the Edmond opinion makes no mention of supervisors at all. Rather, we interpret the Edmond admonishment as directing that we look to the overall intended purpose of the roadblock, and not to the private motivations of the officers involved. And in doing so, the U. S. Supreme Court has directed us to “consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 *705U. S. 67, 81 (121 SC 1281, 149 LE2d 205) (2001).
In addition to the directives of the U. S. Supreme Court, we must also consider five factors established by our own Supreme Court for determining the propriety of a roadblock:
A roadblock is satisfactory where [(1)] the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field; [(2)] all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops; [(3)] the delay to motorists is minimal; [(4)] the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and [(5)] the “screening” officer’s training and experience [are] sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication.
LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3)(497 SE2d 367) (1998). The majority now relies upon the first requirement — that the decision to implement the roadblock must be made by a supervisor — to add as a sixth requirement that only the supervisor may testify as to the purpose of the roadblock.
While LaFontaine relies upon evidence that a supervisor called for the roadblock as one factor in ensuring that a roadblock is not used as a subterfuge for an improper purpose, it does nothing to elevate the role of the supervisor for evidentiary purposes. Instead, the law in this state has always been that we look to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the roadblock was legal. Wrigley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 387, 388 (1) (546 SE2d 794) (2001).
In applying this rule to the case before us, I would find that the evidence was sufficient to show that the primary purpose of the roadblock was to check for DUI violations. While the supervisor’s testimony as to its purpose is one piece of evidence, it is not irrefutable. And perhaps one of the best pieces of evidence would be the orders conveyed to the officers actually implementing the roadblock. Whatever purpose may have been chosen or discussed by supervisors, it is the orders communicated to the officers that truly determine the purpose of the roadblock. The stated purpose dictates the procedures followed and the actions taken by those officers, whatever the true motivations of the supervisors may be,
Here, Officer Wright testified in response to a series of questions directed to him:
Q. Thank you. Who called this roadblock?
A. My supervisor of the evening.
Q. And in which city and county was the roadblock held?
A. City of Atlanta, Fulton County.
*706Q. What was the purpose of the roadblock?
A. For DUI checks.
Officer Wright thus explained the who, where, and why of the roadblock. From the context of these questions, it can be inferred that he was testifying as to the official purpose communicated to him, and not as to his private motivations in participating in the roadblock. His testimony was therefore relevant evidence of the programmatic purpose of the roadblock.
It is immaterial that months later he could not recall which particular supervisor actually called the roadblock or that he was not present when the decision was made. While Officer Wright may not be able to testify as to what was discussed or decided by his supervisors, he can certainly testify as to what he was told as to the purpose for the roadblock. Thus, Officer Wright’s testimony is not hearsay, but rather is direct evidence of the purpose communicated to the officers involved:
Neither a hearsay nor a confrontation question would arise from use of testimony to prove merely that the statement had been made. The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. From the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only to what he has seen but also to what he has heard.
(Punctuation omitted.) Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 779 (1) (b) (301 SE2d 234) (1983). See McCormick on Evidence (5th ed. 1999), Vol. 2, Ch. 24, § 249, p. 101.
The majority suggests that this analysis is not applicable because it asserts that Officer Wright did not testify as to the words spoken by his supervisor. But if Officer Wright was not testifying as to what had been communicated to him, his testimony cannot be classified as hearsay. His evidence would simply reflect his understanding of the purpose based upon his own observations and would be admissible. “Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons.” OCGA § 24-3-1 (a). Whether Officer Wright was testifying as to the purpose communicated to him or as to the purpose he understood from his own observations, his testimony depended solely upon his own credibility.
Therefore, Officer Wright was competent to testify that the deci*707sion was made by a supervisor10 and that it was intended for a legal purpose. That testimony, along with the evidence of the procedures followed at the scene, is sufficient to establish that the roadblock had the legitimate purpose of checking for possible DUI violators.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 Indeed, Baker’s counsel conceded that the state had proven that the roadblock was established by supervisory personnel.