Court Opinion

ID: 9963596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:34:41.538523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.142173
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                  SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                         April 25, 2024
In re A.B. and M.B.                                                                         released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                                         C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                                                                                       SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
No. 23-58 (Putnam County CC-40-2021-JA-31 and CC-40-2021-JA-32)                              OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                     MEMORANDUM DECISION

                Petitioner Father B.B. was adjudicated as an abusive and neglectful parent to his
children A.B. and M.B. pursuant to a written stipulation in which petitioner admitted only that he
had pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition in Montgomery County, Ohio, four years
earlier, and that the victims had been his children. 1 At adjudication, he moved to dismiss the
petition as time barred under West Virginia Code § 52-2-12. But the Circuit Court of Putnam
County determined that the petition was not time-barred under that provision, because petitioner’s
then-recent attempt to resume contact with the children had rendered the petition timely.
Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order that was simply a copy of
petitioner’s written stipulation. At disposition, the court found that there was no reasonable
likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future
under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) and terminated petitioner’s parental rights to A.B. and
M.B. 2

                Upon review, we find termination of petitioner’s parental rights to be procedurally
infirm because the circuit court’s adjudicatory order rests on petitioner’s stipulation that does not
conform with the requirements of Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child
Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. The adjudicatory order also contains no findings that at the time
of the petition’s filing, the health and welfare of the children were threatened by petitioner’s sexual
assault conviction four years earlier. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court’s orders adjudicating
petitioner and terminating petitioner’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. This

         1
             We use initials to identify the parties in abuse and neglect cases. See W. Va. R. App. Proc.
40(e).
         2
          Petitioner appears by counsel Shawn D. Bayliss. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General Michael R. Williams, and Assistant Attorney General Heather L. Olcott. Lisa A. Estes
serves as the children’s guardian ad litem.

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5f-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).

                                                     1
case satisfies the “limited-circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure for disposition in a memorandum decision. 3

                 In July 2017, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition in
Montgomery County, Ohio after the mother discovered that petitioner sexually abused A.B. and
the child’s half-sibling. 4 As part of his plea, petitioner was barred from contacting A.B. and the
other child for five years. During that time, the mother moved with the children to Putnam County,
West Virginia, and the Family Court of Putnam County entered a divorce order that granted sole
parenting responsibility to the mother and precluded petitioner from having any contact with the
children.

                In April 2021, petitioner requested contact with A.B. and petitioner’s other
biological child M.B., in the Family Court of Putnam County, 5 asserting that the Ohio court had
changed the terms of this prohibition in March 2021 to allow contact with the children in a
therapeutic setting. 6 As a result, the mother filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Putnam County
alleging that petitioner is an abusive and neglectful parent based on petitioner’s sexual assault
conviction and abandonment, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-22-306. 7 Based on that petition, the
circuit court found an imminent danger to the physical well-being of the children and ordered DHS
to investigate the matter.

       3
           See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.
       4
           AB’s half sibling lives in the mother’s home with A.B. but is not at issue in this appeal.
       5
        In his brief, petitioner asserts that he requested contact with the children by filing a Motion
for Reunification Counseling in the Family Court of Putnam County.
       6
           Petitioner’s assertion is not necessarily reflected in the record before this Court. The
Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio entered an order on March 3, 2021 stating
that “[a]fter careful consideration, this Court will terminate [petitioner’s] community control
sanctions after he has been supervised for four years (in July 2021), provided that 1) [petitioner]
is still compliant with [his services] at that time and 2) his probation officer agrees with the
termination of [the sanctions].”

        Included in the record is a letter from petitioner’s psychologist recommending he have
contact with his biological children “through a gradual step process in which he works with a
therapist, trained and knowledgeable in family reunification after the occurrence of an incest
trauma.” Confusingly, the psychologist simultaneously recommended against petitioner’s contact
with other children less than eighteen years old.
       7
          To support her abandonment allegation the mother asserted that “[petitioner] has not had
any contact with either child in over four [4] years. [Petitioner] has provided no emotional, and or
fatherly support for the children. Further, other than mandated child support, [petitioner] has failed
to provide any financial support for the children, including but not limited to vacations, holidays,
Christmas, birthdays, etc.”

                                                   2
                At the June 2021 adjudicatory hearing, petitioner moved to dismiss the petition as
time barred by the two-year limitations period under West Virginia Code § 52-2-12. 8 He argued
that pursuant to § 52-2-12, the filing of a petition in 2021 based on conduct that had occurred more
than two years earlier was prohibited, and that the conduct here (petitioner’s sexual assault of the
children and the resulting convictions) had occurred in 2016 and 2017. The court denied
petitioner’s motion, reasoning that the relevant conduct was petitioner’s recent attempt to resume
contact with the children, and not petitioner’s criminal conduct in Ohio.

                 After that, petitioner entered a written stipulation admitting that he had pled guilty
to two counts of gross sexual imposition in Ohio, that his children were his victims, and that, as a
result, the children were abused and/or neglected children under West Virginia Code § 49-1-201. 9
Even though the circuit court had expressed its view that the relevant conduct was petitioner’s
recent attempt to resume contact with the children, the resulting adjudicatory order contained only
petitioner’s written stipulation. The court terminated petitioner’s parental rights to the children
following a dispositional hearing in May 2022. Before this Court, petitioner assigns as error the
circuit court’s failure to dismiss the action as time-barred under West Virginia Code
§ 55-2-12.

                On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews
the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. 10 As a
preliminary matter, we reject petitioner’s contention that because neither West Virginia Code
§ 49-4-601 nor the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings contain a specific
statute of limitations for the filing of an abuse and neglect petition, the applicable time frame is
two years as set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12.

               When addressing matters of statutory interpretation, “[w]e look first to the statute’s
language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive question, the language must

       8
           West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 sets forth the following statute of limitations for personal
actions:

                 Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise
                 prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right
                 to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property;
                 (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have
                 accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one
                 year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be
                 for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could
                 not have been brought at common law by or against his personal
                 representative.
       9
          The written stipulation did not include a “statement of respondent’s problems or
deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition” as required under Rule 26(a) of the Rules of
Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.
       10
            See Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).

                                                   3
prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” 11                   Applying the plain language of
§ 55-2-12, it is clear that it prescribes the statute of limitations for damage to property, 12 damages
for personal injuries, 13 and “for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could
not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.” 14 It does not
purport to apply to abuse and neglect civil actions.

                Still, petitioner relies on Merrill v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 15
to support his argument that the limitations period set forth in § 55-12-2 applies to abuse and
neglect proceedings. In Merrill, two individuals filed suit against DHHR after having reported
sexual abuse by their father to DHHR, which took no action for four years. 16 Although the children
were initially removed from the home, they were later returned to the parents and the father’s
sexual abuse of one of the children resumed. The DHHR case was closed. 17 Fifteen years later,
well after the children had reached the biological age of maturity, they filed a civil action against
DHHR for psychological and physical injuries they suffered as a result of DHHR’s failure to
protect them from their father’s repeated sexual abuse. The circuit court granted DHHR’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by the two year statute of
limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12. 18

                Petitioner’s reliance on Merrill, is misplaced. Merrill involved a personal injury
action to which West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 clearly applied. In contrast, this case—an abuse
and neglect matter—does not fall within the purview of West Virginia Code § 55-2-12, as it is
neither an action for “damage to property,” “damages for personal injuries,” nor “any other matter
of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against
his personal representative.” 19 So, the period of limitations provided in West Virginia Code § 55-
2-12 does not apply.

          11
               Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t, 195 W. Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438
(1995).
          12
               W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(a).
          13
               W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b).
          14
               W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c).
          15
               219 W. Va. 151, 632 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
          16
               Id. at 154, 632 S.E.2d at 310.
          17
               Id.
          18
               Id. at 161, 632 S.E.2d at 317.
          19
               W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.

                                                  4
                We now turn to requirements of the adjudicatory process as set forth in West
Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i). “In child abuse and neglect cases, the adjudicatory process is a
jurisdictional prerequisite.” 20 And at the adjudicatory stage, West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i)
directs the circuit court to make findings of abuse and neglect based on conditions existing at the
time the petition is filed:

                         Findings of the court. – Where relevant, the court shall
                 consider the efforts of the department to remedy the alleged
                 circumstances. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the
                 court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall
                 make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the child
                 is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is abusing,
                 neglecting, or, if applicable, a battered parent, all of which shall be
                 incorporated into the order of the court. The findings must be based
                 upon conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition and
                 proven by clear and convincing evidence.[21]

               We have held that “[f]or a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an abuse
and neglect case, the child must be an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ . . . based upon the
conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and neglect petition.” 22 [U]nder West
Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018), an abused child means,

                         (1) A child whose health or welfare is being harmed or
                 threatened by:

                         (A) A parent, guardian, or custodian who knowingly or
                 intentionally inflicts, attempts to inflict, or knowingly allows
                 another person to inflict, physical injury or mental or emotional
                 injury, upon the child or another child in the home. Physical injury
                 may include an injury to the child as a result of excessive corporal
                 punishment;

                        (B) Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation;

                        (C) The sale or attempted sale of a child by a parent,
                 guardian, or custodian in violation of § 61-2-14h of this code;

                        (D) Domestic violence as defined in § 48-27-202 of this
                 code; or

       20
            In re Z.S.-1 and Z.S.-2, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621, 627 (2023).
       21
            W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) (emphasis added).
       22
            Syl. Pt. 8, in part, In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022).

                                                   5
                         (E) Human trafficking or attempted human trafficking, in
                 violation of § 61-14-2 of this code.

                         (2) A child conceived as a result of sexual assault, as that
                 term is defined in this section, or as a result of the violation of a
                 criminal law of another jurisdiction which has the same essential
                 elements: Provided, That no victim of sexual assault may be
                 determined to be an abusive parent, as that term is defined in this
                 section, based upon being a victim of sexual assault.

                 ....

                 “Neglected child” means a child:

                         (A) Whose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened
                 by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child’s parent,
                 guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food,
                 clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or education, when that
                 refusal, failure, or inability is not due primarily to a lack of financial
                 means on the part of the parent, guardian, or custodian;

                         (B) Who is presently without necessary food, clothing,
                 shelter, medical care, education, or supervision because of the
                 disappearance or absence of the child's parent or custodian; or

                         (C) “Neglected child” does not mean a child whose
                 education is conducted within the provisions of § 18-8-1 et seq. of
                 this code.[23]

                Here, petitioner’s stipulated adjudication admitted that he had pled guilty to two
counts of gross sexual imposition in Ohio, and that, as a result, the children were abused and/or
neglected children under West Virginia Code § 49-1-201. At the time the mother filed the abuse
and neglect petition, the children had already been living with the mother in West Virginia and
had not had any contact with petitioner in at least four years. The circuit court’s order contains no
findings that at the time of the petition’s filing, the health and welfare of the children were
threatened in any way by petitioner’s sexual assault conviction four years earlier. Absent findings
that the subject children meet the statutory definitions of “abused” or “neglected” children, we
have held that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to disposition: “Stated even more
plainly, our statutes, cases, and rules instruct that a circuit court may not terminate parental rights
at a § 49-4-604 disposition hearing without first finding that the parent abused or neglected the
child in question at a § 49-4-601 adjudicatory hearing.” 24 Because petitioner’s stipulation to a

       23
            W. Va. Code § 49-4-201.
       24
            In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 693, 827 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2019).

                                                     6
conviction involving the subject children four years prior cannot, standing alone, meet those
statutory definitions, we find that the adjudicatory order is deficient and deprived the Circuit Court
of Putnam County of jurisdiction over petitioner’s disposition.

               Petitioner’s stipulated adjudication was also deficient under Rule 26(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, which directs that a
stipulation contain both “(1) [a]greed upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the
respondent[’s] problems, conduct, or condition” and “(2) [a] statement of respondent’s problems
or deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition.” 25 In In re Z.S.-1 and Z.S.-2, we vacated
and remanded an order terminating parental rights based, in part, on an inadequate stipulation to
adjudication. We held that both elements of Rule 26(a) must be satisfied for a circuit court to
properly adjudicate a parent pursuant to a stipulation. 26

                 Petitioner’s stipulated adjudication included only a stipulation to his 2017 guilty
plea to gross sexual imposition in Ohio. Although his stipulation acknowledges his abusive
history, it does not explain how that history relates to his status as a respondent parent in the present
case. The written stipulation further falls short of our requirements under Z.S-1 by omitting any
problems or deficiencies that would support termination of petitioner’s parental rights at
disposition, which, as we held in that case “helps to avoid discrepancies between adjudicatory and
dispositional rulings.” 27

                 Improper adjudication “deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed to the
dispositional phase of an abuse and neglect proceeding and is a clear violation of the established
procedures governing abuse and neglect proceedings.” 28 The circuit court’s adjudication of
petitioner was improper because of the jurisdictional requisite that the finding of abuse and neglect
be based on conditions exiting at the time of the petition’s filing and under the requirements for
written stipulations under Rule 26(a). Accordingly, it is clear that the circuit court’s adjudication
of petitioner was insufficient, and the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights to
the children. 29

        25
             W. Va. R.P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 26(a).
        26
             In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. at 14, 893 S.E.2d at 621.
        27
             Id.
        28
             Id. (referencing In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 693, 827 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2019)).
        29
           Although we hold that the Circuit Court of Putnam County lacked jurisdiction to
terminate petitioner’s parental rights in this case, we acknowledge the egregious conduct of which
petitioner was convicted in Ohio. Still, the written stipulation fell short of our statutory
requirements, and “[d]efects in adjudication implicate the due process protections provided to
parents subject to these sensitive proceedings.” In re C.L., 249 W. Va. 95, 894 S.E.2d 877, 885
(2023).

                                                   7
                For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the July 8, 2021, adjudicatory order and
remand this matter to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this decision, including but
not limited to the entry of an order setting out the requisite findings as to whether A.B. and M.B.
met the statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child under West Virginia Code § 49-4-201
and our holding in Z.S.-1. 30 The clerk is hereby directed to issue the mandate contemporaneously
with this decision.

                                                                           Vacated and Remanded.

ISSUED: April 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

CONCURRING IN PART; DISSENTING IN PART; AND WRITING SEPARATELY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

       30
            249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621.

                                                 8
Armstead, C.J., concurring, in part, dissenting, in part.

                While I agree with the majority that West Virginia Code § 52-2-12 does not extend
to abuse and neglect proceedings, I disagree with the conclusion that the circuit court erred when
it accepted petitioner’s stipulated adjudication and therefore lacked jurisdiction to terminate
petitioner’s parental rights. I take particular issue with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he circuit
court’s order contains no findings that at the time of the petition’s filing, the health and welfare of
the children were threatened in any way by petitioner’s sexual assault conviction four years
earlier.” This finding disregards the fact that the abuse for which Petitioner was convicted was
actually committed against his daughter A.B. It is difficult to imagine how exposing a child to a
parent who was convicted of sexually abusing her only four years earlier does not, by common-
sense definition, “threaten” the health and welfare of the abused child. The effects of sexual abuse
do not end for victims when the perpetrator pleads guilty. The record is fraught with examples of
the lasting psychological impact petitioner’s actions had on A.B. and M.B. Petitioner’s stipulation
to his prior conviction of sexual imposition against his daughter A.B. and his stepdaughter while
his son M.B. was in the home demonstrate his acknowledgement that his sexual abuse continued
to harm A.B. and M.B. despite the passage of time. His stipulation established abuse sufficient to
support adjudication for A.B. and M.B., and the children’s best interests support termination of
petitioner’s parental rights in this case. For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court order
terminating petitioner’s parental rights to A.B. and M.B.

                 The circuit court afforded petitioner all required due process in the proceedings
below. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(h) (“In any proceeding pursuant to [an abuse and neglect
petition], the party or parties having custodial or other parental rights or responsibilities to the child
shall be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to testify and to
present and cross-examine witnesses . . . .”). This due process must be balanced with the well-
established best-interest standard which guides these cases: “In a contest involving the custody of
an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be
guided.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2013) (citations
omitted). The court explained its consideration of this balance on the record when it conducted a
thorough colloquy regarding petitioner’s stipulation while also recognizing the impact petitioner’s
conduct could have on the children. The court stated, “We’re talking about a nine-year-old girl,
forcing her to be with the person that is convicted of sexually abusing her. And [her] best interest
is to follow through this action and follow through with adjudication today.”

               During the colloquy, petitioner stated that he freely, voluntarily, and in the presence
of counsel stipulated to the adjudication. He affirmed that he had read and considered all of the
information in the stipulation, and that he understood he could not be forced to enter into the
agreement. He stated that he understood that he had the right to an adjudicatory hearing, but he
chose to forgo the hearing and enter the stipulated agreement. Finally, petitioner affirmed his
understanding that his stipulation would result in his adjudication as an abusive and neglectful
parent to A.B. and M.B. During oral argument before this Court, petitioner’s counsel was asked
                                                    9
whether he deemed petitioner’s stipulation insufficient. He replied, “no I don’t . . . I think [the
stipulation] was made knowingly, intelligently, and that the waiver in terms of the adjudication
aspect of . . . the stipulation was proper.”

                Nevertheless, the majority sua sponte rejects the petitioner’s valid stipulation to
adjudication by inextricably concluding that abusive conditions did not exist at the time of the
petition filing and ignoring the lasting trauma the petitioner caused to his children. Given their
sensitive nature, abuse and neglect cases “must be recognized as being among the highest priority
for the [C]ourt’s attention. Unjustified procedural delays wreak havoc on a child’s development,
stability and security.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Carlita B., 185 W.Va. 613, 615, 408 S.E.2d 365,
367 (1991). Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings requires a stipulation to contain both facts justifying court involvement in the
respondent’s problems, conduct, or condition, and a statement of the respondent’s problems or
deficiencies to be addressed at final disposition. See W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse and Neglect Proc.
26(a). Petitioner agreed to stipulate to his prior conviction, indicating that he understood how his
conduct justified the court’s intervention. Similarly, his decision to stipulate to the prior conviction
acknowledged an ongoing deficiency, that he sexually abused A.B. Because M.B. resided in the
home where petitioner admitted to sexually abusing M.B.’s sisters, abuse can be imputed to him.
See Syl. Pt. 2, In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (“Where there is clear
and convincing evidence that a child has suffered physical and/or sexual abuse while in the custody
of his or her parent(s), guardian, or custodian, another child residing in the home when the abuse
took place who is not a direct victim of the physical and/or sexual abuse but is at risk of being
abused is an abused child under W. Va. Code, 49–1–3(a) (1994).”).

                Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621
(2023) is misguided. In Z.S.-1, we found that the circuit court incorrectly adjudicated the parents
as abusive based on a deficient stipulation under Rule 26(a). In that case, the parents stipulated
that their child sustained injuries, not that they caused the injuries. By contrast, petitioner here
admitted to his abusive conduct when he pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition
against two children, including his daughter A.B. Because of the devastating and lasting effects
petitioner’s conduct has had on A.B., his stipulation that he was convicted of sexual crimes against
A.B. and another child certainly meet the requirements of Rule 26(a).

                For these reasons, I respectfully dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to terminate petitioner’s parental rights and, thus, erred when it
accepted petitioner’s stipulated adjudication. Accordingly, I would affirm the termination of
petitioner’s parental rights to A.B. and M.B.

                                                  10