Court Opinion

ID: 9717980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:13:54.87176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.549755
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring: I would join fully in the majority opinion except that it finds statutory ambiguity where none exists. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 111 — 3, 1005 — 5—3(c)(8).) The majority’s resort to legislative history in reaching its ultimate decision is, thus, both unwarranted and unnecessary. Section 111 — 3 imposes no notice requirement unless a prior conviction raises the offense charged to a higher classification. Thus, section 5 — 5—3(c)(8) is not implicated here since it merely deals with the length of the sentence and does not change the classification. Where the language of a statute is clear, there is no justification for delving into the statute’s legislative history. The plain language of a statute must be taken at face value. In such cases, it is wholly immaterial what any Senator or Representative may have had to say about the legislation. (American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 230.) Fortuitously, the legislative history in this case supports the clear language of the statute. Thus, the majority reaches the correct result, albeit by a faulty method of analysis. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court, but not its rationale.