Court Opinion

ID: 9393312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 20:04:16.82519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.415085
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
           in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                      2023 IL App (3d) 220247-U

                                  Order filed May 9, 2023
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                IN THE

                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                          THIRD DISTRICT

                                                 2023

     In re MARRIAGE OF THOMAS L.            )    Appeal from the Circuit Court
     VALUS,                                 )    of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                            )    Du Page County, Illinois.
            Petitioner-Appellee,            )
                                            )    Appeal No. 3-22-0247
            and                             )    Circuit Nos. 16-D-81 and 16-OP-81
                                            )
      ELENA VALUS, n/k/a Elena Lyons,       )    The Honorable
                                            )    Louis B. Aranda,
            Respondent-Appellant.           )    Judge, Presiding.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

           JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                               ORDER

¶1         Held: In an appeal in a postdissolution of marriage case, the appellate court found that
                 the trial court did not err in: (1) granting the petitioner’s petition to modify the
                 trial court’s allocation judgment to provide that the parties’ minor children were
                 to receive school-required vaccinations; (2) denying the respondent’s motion for a
                 directed finding during the evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s petition to
                 modify at the conclusion of the petitioner’s case-in-chief; and (3) denying the
                 rehearing request portion of the respondent’s motion to reconsider, which claimed
                 that the trial court had improperly allowed certain testimony to be admitted into
                 evidence at the evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s petition to modify. The
                 appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
¶2          Petitioner, Thomas L. Valus, filed a petition to modify the trial court’s allocation

     judgment to provide that the parties’ minor children were to receive school-required

     vaccinations. Respondent, Elena Valus, n/k/a Elena Lyons, Thomas’s ex-wife, opposed the

     petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Thomas’s petition to modify. Elena

     filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court subsequently denied. Elena appeals, arguing

     that the trial court erred in: (1) granting Thomas’s petition to modify the trial court’s allocation

     judgment to provide that the parties’ minor children were to receive school-required

     vaccinations; (2) denying Elena’s motion for a directed finding during the evidentiary hearing on

     Thomas’s petition to modify at the conclusion of Thomas’s case-in-chief; and (3) denying the

     rehearing request portion of Elena’s motion to reconsider, which claimed that the trial court had

     improperly allowed certain testimony to be admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing on

     Thomas’s petition to modify. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          Elena and Thomas were married in January 2010 and had two children—V.V., born in

     August 2010, and T.V., born in August 2014. In January 2016, Thomas filed a petition for

     dissolution of marriage.

¶5          In December 2017, the parties entered into a parenting agreement, which the trial court

     approved and which became the trial court’s allocation judgment. Of relevance to this appeal, the

     allocation judgment provided that: (1) the children would be raised in the Christian faith; (2) it

     was in the children’s best interests for the parties to be jointly involved in the significant

     decision-making for the children; (3) to that end, the parties were required to consult with one

     another on all significant issues, including education, health, and religious issues, prior to a

     decision being made; (4) in the current best interests of the children, Thomas’s residence would

                                                        2
       be designated as the children’s residential address for school enrollment purposes and the

       children would be enrolled in Willow Creek Elementary School; (5) Thomas would be

       designated as the custodial parent for purposes of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West

       2016)); and (6) all prior understandings and agreements between the parties were superseded by

       the allocation judgment. Several months later, in April 2018, a judgment of dissolution of the

       parties’ marriage was entered.

¶6            In July 2021, Thomas filed a pro se motion, which the trial court characterized, in part, as

       a petition to modify the allocation judgment. In the petition, Thomas stated, among other things,

       that he wanted his minor children to receive school-required vaccinations.

¶7            In September 2021, Elena filed a petition to modify as well and sought to reduce or

       restrict Thomas’s parenting time for various reasons relating to Thomas’s and his new wife’s

       treatment of the children. The parties were sent to mediation but were unable to resolve either of

       the two petitions.

¶8            In November 2021, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate the

       pending matters and to file a written report with the court.

¶9            In February 2022, the case was called for a hearing on the two petitions to modify that

       had been filed. Prior to a hearing taking place, the parties participated in a pretrial conference

       with the trial court and were able to resolve most of the issues that had been raised in the two

       petitions, except for the vaccination issue. An evidentiary hearing was held on that issue with

       Thomas representing himself and Elena being represented by an attorney. The evidence

       presented at the hearing can be summarized as follows.

¶ 10          In his case-in-chief, Thomas called three witnesses to testify: himself, the GAL, and

       Elena. Thomas testified that his daughter, V.V., who was currently in sixth grade, had gotten all

                                                         3
       of her school-required vaccinations up until the present year. V.V. received her initial vaccines at

       the hospital when she was born and had been taken by Elena to get some of the other required

       vaccinations thereafter. Although Thomas was inconsistent, at times, in his testimony about

       when V.V. had been vaccinated, he stated that to the best of his memory, the last time that he had

       taken V.V. to receive vaccines was about two years ago, in 2020, when V.V. was in fourth grade,

       and he had taken her to get her booster shots.

¶ 11          Thomas’s son, T.V., however, who was currently seven years old, had not received any

       vaccinations, other than the two that he had received when he was born. When T.V. started

       kindergarten, an issue arose about T.V.’s lack of vaccinations. Prior to that time, Thomas and

       Elena had not discussed vaccines and Thomas had assumed that Elena was getting T.V. the

       required vaccinations. When the issue arose with T.V.’s school, Elena decided that she was

       going to try to get a religious exemption. According to Thomas, Elena had sent him an email (or

       emails) about vaccines and did not say anything in that email about religion or the Bible. Rather,

       Elena stated in her email that she did not believe in putting chemicals into one’s body, that doing

       so was illogical to her, and that vaccines were dangerous to everyone’s health.

¶ 12          During his testimony, Thomas denied that the reason for T.V.’s lack of vaccines was

       because he and Elena had agreed not to get any more vaccines for the children. Although

       Thomas had referred to V.V.’s vaccination form and to Elena’s email, he did not seek to admit

       either of those documents into evidence during the hearing.

¶ 13          The GAL, Sean McCumber, testified that he had a certificate in youth ministry from

       Northern Baptist Seminary in Lombard, Illinois, and had previously served as a youth pastor at

       St. Matthew United Church of Christ in Wheaton, Illinois. McCumber had interviewed Elena a

       few times during his entire involvement in the case and had one conversation and a few emails

                                                        4
       with Elena regarding Thomas’s current petition to modify. According to McCumber, Elena’s

       issue with the vaccines was that “Leviticus, a chapter in the Old Testament, advise[d] against

       putting [impure things] into [one’s] body, specifically the blood of another, and that was in

       reference to the fact that some vaccinations may or may not have come from stem cells from an

       aborted fetus from 1972.” Relative to Elena’s claim, McCumber had read the Bible, medical

       articles from the journals of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American

       Pediatric Association, and articles from countervailing viewpoints on vaccines. In McCumber’s

       opinion, the articles he had read from the AMA did not support a non-vaccination position.

       McCumber acknowledged, however, that he had no schooling in medicine, other than his college

       coursework in biochemistry and microbiology, and that he had never worked in the medical

       field.

¶ 14            Called as a witness by Thomas, Elena testified that she did not have any medical

       background or religious education, although she continued to take “[her] lessons in [her]

       church.” Elena had read Leviticus and the entire Bible. She sometimes ate pork, even though it

       said in Leviticus not to do so, and saw no connection between eating pork and the vaccination

       issue.

¶ 15            After Thomas presented the testimony of his witnesses, he rested his case-in-chief. Elena

       moved for a directed finding, arguing that Thomas had failed to prove or argue that vaccinations

       were in the children’s best interests. After taking a brief recess, the trial court denied Elena’s

       motion for a directed finding, stating that it had reviewed its notes regarding the GAL’s

       testimony and that it believed that, based upon that testimony, Thomas had established a

       prima facie case for the importance of school-related vaccinations.

                                                         5
¶ 16          Elena presented no additional evidence and proceeded, instead, to closing argument. In

       her argument, Elena asserted that the allocation judgment required the parties to agree on major

       decisions relating to the best interests of the minor children, including medical and vaccination

       decisions; that the parties had not agreed that the children should be vaccinated; and that Thomas

       had failed to show that it was in the children’s best interests to change what the parties had

       agreed to in the allocation judgment.

¶ 17          After Elena’s closing argument had concluded, the trial court called GAL McCumber to

       testify as the court’s witness. Upon being questioned by the trial court, McCumber stated that he

       had discussed the vaccination issue globally with Elena. McCumber’s understanding was that

       V.V. had her vaccinations current up until the sixth grade and that her last vaccination was two

       years ago when she was in the fourth grade. T.V., however, had not received all of the

       vaccinations that were required for school-age children during that same period of time. Elena

       had told McCumber that Thomas had gotten V.V.’s vaccinations a few years ago without Elena’s

       permission. Elena did not express a specific objection to McCumber about those vaccinations.

       McCumber had read the medical journals from the AMA and the Pediatrics Association and

       believed the vaccinations were needed.

¶ 18          According to McCumber, the children had been seeing a pediatrician since they were

       born. McCumber, however, had not spoken to the children’s pediatrician and did not know

       whether the children were still seeing the same pediatrician. The only reason that had been

       provided for T.V. not to receive vaccinations was Elena’s religious objection. McCumber

       thought that Elena had been a Biblical faith follower for the past several years. McCumber

       believed that Elena’s religious objection did not overcome the medical journals that McCumber

       had read and the importance of the vaccinations. McCumber was aware that Elena did not want

                                                        6
       vaccinations for the children and that Elena made a religious objection to those vaccinations.

       McCumber suspected that Elena was upset that Thomas had gotten V.V. vaccinated, but Elena

       was not screaming and ranting about it.

¶ 19          At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that it was in the best interests of

       the children to receive the school-required vaccinations and granted Thomas’s petition to modify

       the allocation judgment to that effect. In so doing, the trial court commented that: (1) V.V. had

       been vaccinated dating back to a period before the entry of the allocation judgment and before

       the divorce; (2) T.V. had been vaccinated at birth but not since; (3) the children had been seeing

       a pediatrician who had overseen the vaccinations that they had received; (4) there was nothing in

       the allocation judgment that stated that there was a prohibition to vaccinations; (5) the parties

       had been unable to resolve the vaccination issue on their own or through mediation; and (6) the

       trial court was taking “strong note” of the GAL’s testimony that vaccinations were in the

       children’s best interests. The trial court ruled, therefore, that the children were to receive the

       school-required vaccinations presently. In making that ruling, the trial court stated that it “[was]

       not making a decision to modify the parental responsibilities nor to modify the allocation

       judgment parenting agreement, but [was] simply stating that the children shall presently receive

       the school required vaccinations that [were] presently required.”

¶ 20          Elena filed a motion for clarification, reconsideration, and/or rehearing (referred to

       hereinafter as the motion to reconsider or the motion) of the trial court’s ruling and raised several

       issues. A hearing was held on the motion to reconsider in May 2022. At the conclusion of the

       hearing, the trial court denied the motion, noting, among other things, that: (1) the parties had

       agreed in the allocation judgment that it was in the best interests of the children to attend Willow

       Creek Elementary School and that Thomas would be the children’s custodial parent for the

                                                          7
       purposes of the School Code; (2) Thomas had argued at the hearing on the petition to modify that

       T.V. needed to get the school-required vaccinations in order to attend Willow Creek; (3) the

       allocation judgment was devoid of any prohibition to vaccines; (4) the children had previously

       received all school-required vaccinations for their age and grade, starting with when they were

       born; (5) the GAL believed that it was in the children’s best interests for the children to receive

       the present school-required vaccinations; (6) Elena’s decision not to obtain or agree to any more

       vaccinations for the children was a substantial change in circumstances; (7) Elena had chosen not

       to testify at the hearing on Thomas’s petition to modify and not to present any evidence as to

       why she had changed her position or why she now objected to the children receiving any

       additional vaccinations; (8) the importance of the GAL’s testimony was that it confirmed

       independently that the children had been under the care of the same pediatrician since birth who

       had administered the vaccines to the children until the issue arose with T.V. needing to be

       vaccinated for kindergarten; and (9) the trial court did not need to rely on the GAL for any

       opinion as to the medical aspect of the vaccines because Elena had chosen not to raise any

       argument at the hearing on Thomas’s petition to modify regarding any adverse effects of the

       vaccines. At Elena’s request, the trial court made a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

       Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) that there was no just reason to delay an appeal in this case and

       also stayed its underlying ruling pending an appeal. This appeal followed.

¶ 21                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22          On appeal, Elena argues that the trial court erred in: (1) granting Thomas’s petition to

       modify the trial court’s allocation judgment to provide that the parties’ minor children were to

       receive school-required vaccinations; (2) denying Elena’s motion for a directed finding during

       the evidentiary hearing on Thomas’s petition to modify at the conclusion of Thomas’s case-in-

                                                         8
       chief; and (3) denying the rehearing request portion of Elena’s motion to reconsider, which

       claimed that the trial court had improperly allowed certain testimony to be admitted into

       evidence at the evidentiary hearing on Thomas’s petition to modify. We will address each of

       those arguments in turn. Although Thomas has not filed an appellee’s brief in this case, we will,

       nevertheless, address the merits of this appeal, pursuant to the principles set forth in First Capitol

       Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (indicating that in the

       absence of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court should decide an appeal on the merits if the

       record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court may easily decide the issues raised

       by the appellant without the aid of an appellee’s brief).

¶ 23                                A. Grant of Thomas’s Petition to Modify

¶ 24          As noted above, as her first point of contention on appeal, Elena argues that the trial court

       erred in granting Thomas’s petition to modify the allocation judgment to provide that the

       children were to receive the school-required vaccinations. In support of that argument, Elena

       makes two primary assertions. First, Elena claims that the trial court’s order was a mandatory

       injunction and that it was erroneously entered because Thomas failed to satisfy the statutory and

       procedural requirements for such an injunction to issue. Elena reaches that conclusion, however,

       based largely upon a misinterpretation of the comments that the trial court made when it

       announced its ruling. By our view, when the trial court remarked that it was not making a

       decision to modify the parental responsibilities or the allocation judgment but was simply stating

       that the children were to presently receive the school-required vaccinations, the trial court was

       merely clarifying the extent of its ruling—that it was not changing the joint allocation of parental

       responsibility for significant decision-making or for health decisions as a whole but, rather, was

       only changing one narrow aspect of those categories of parental responsibility to require that the

                                                         9
       children receive the mandatory school vaccinations. We disagree with Elena’s contention that the

       trial court was expressly announcing that its ruling was not a modification of the allocation

       judgment, and we view the court’s order as a modification, albeit a very narrow one. We,

       therefore, reject Elena’s claim that the trial court’s ruling was an injunctive order. In so doing,

       we note that Thomas’s petition did not seek an injunction and that the parties did not argue this

       matter in the trial court as if an injunction had been sought. It comes as no surprise, therefore,

       that the record in this case does not show that Thomas satisfied the requirements for an

       injunction to be granted.

¶ 25          Second, and in the alternative, Elena claims that even if the trial court’s ruling was an

       order modifying the allocation judgment, and not a mandatory injunction as Elena initially

       claims, this court should still reverse the trial court’s ruling. She argues that Thomas failed to

       prove the two requirements necessary for a petition to modify to be granted—that there was a

       substantial change in circumstances and that modification was in the best interests of the

       children. According to Elena, the trial court reached the opposite conclusion because it

       erroneously considered facts that occurred prior to the allocation judgment, misapplied the law,

       and made a decision that was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For those reasons,

       Elena asks that we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 26          Section 610.5 of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) sets forth the

       requirements for the modification of orders allocating parental decision-making responsibilities

       and parenting time. 750 ILCS 5/610.5 (West 2020); see also id. § 600 (defining “allocation

       judgment,” “parenting plan,” and “parental responsibilities”). More specifically, section 610.5(c)

       provides:

                                                        10
                       “Except [in circumstances not relevant to this appeal], the court shall modify a

                       parenting plan or allocation judgment when necessary to serve the child’s best

                       interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that on the basis of

                       facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or allocation

                       judgment or were not anticipated therein, a substantial change has occurred in the

                       circumstances of the child or of either parent and that a modification is necessary

                       to serve the child’s best interests.” Id. § 610.5(c).

       Thus, to prevail on a petition to modify parental responsibilities, a petitioner must prove the

       following two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that a substantial change in the

       circumstances of the parents or the child has occurred; and (2) that modification is in the best

       interest of the child. See id.; In re Marriage of Burns & Lifferth, 2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 27.

       If the petitioner fails in his or her burden to prove those elements, the trial court must deny the

       petition to modify. See id.

¶ 27           A trial court’s ruling on whether to modify parental responsibilities will not be reversed

       on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Bates,

       212 Ill. 2d 489, 515 (2004) (addressing child custody issues). A ruling is against the manifest

       weight of the evidence only if it is clearly apparent from the record that the trial court should

       have reached the opposite conclusion or if the ruling itself is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not

       based upon the evidence presented. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). The appellate court

       gives great deference to a trial court’s determination on parental responsibilities because the trial

       court is in a far better position than the appellate court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to

       weigh the evidence, and to determine the best interest of the child. See Bates, 212 Ill. 2d at 515-

       16. Therefore, in determining whether a trial court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of

                                                          11
       the evidence, the appellate court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

       appellee and, when faced with multiple reasonable inferences, will accept those inferences that

       support the trial court’s ruling. See id. at 516.

¶ 28           In the present case, after thoroughly reviewing the record before us, we find that the trial

       court’s grant of Thomas’s petition to modify was well supported by the evidence. The evidence

       presented at the hearing on the modification petition established that up through the time of the

       allocation judgment, the parties had a practice of getting their children vaccinated, at least as far

       as Thomas’s knowledge was concerned. The allocation judgment provided that Thomas and

       Elena were to make jointly all significant decisions relating to the children, including health and

       religious decisions, but did not specifically address vaccinations. At some point after the

       allocation judgment was entered, however, Elena stopped getting the children vaccinated

       because she had developed certain religious objections or concerns with the vaccines. Elena did

       so without Thomas’s knowledge, without discussing the matter with Thomas, and did so despite

       the requirement in the allocation judgment that significant decisions for the children were to be

       made jointly by Thomas and Elena. Thomas only learned of the lack of vaccines because a

       problem arose when T.V. had reached school age but did not have the required vaccinations to

       attend the school in question. The parties had previously agreed in the allocation judgment that it

       was in the best interests of the children to attend that particular school, and the GAL, who had

       investigated the matter, was of the opinion that obtaining the school-required vaccinations was in

       the children’s best interests as well. By our view, the evidence presented at the hearing on the

       modification petition amply established both that a substantial change in circumstances had

       occurred and that a modification of the allocation judgment was in the best interests of the

                                                           12
       children. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight

       of the evidence. See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350.

¶ 29                             B. Denial of Elena’s Motion for Directed Finding

¶ 30           As her second point of contention on appeal, Elena argues that the trial court erred in

       denying the motion for a directed finding that Elena made during the evidentiary hearing on the

       modification petition at the conclusion of Thomas’s case-in-chief. Elena asserts that her motion

       should have been granted for either of the following two reasons: (1) because Thomas failed to

       establish a prima facie case for modification as a matter of law by failing to present at least some

       evidence on every essential element of a modification claim; or (2) because after a qualitative

       review of the evidence (not conducted in the light most favorable to Thomas), sufficient

       evidence did not remain to establish a prima facie case for modification. 1 Thus, for either of

       those two reasons, Elena asks that we reverse the trial court’s denial of her motion for directed

       finding and, we presume, that we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 31           In a bench trial, at the close of the plaintiff’s case (the petitioner here), the defendant (the

       respondent here) may move for a directed finding or judgment in his or her favor. 735 ILCS 5/2-

       1110 (West 2020); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 275 (2003). In ruling upon

       such a motion, the trial court must conduct a two-prong analysis. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 275. First,

       the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff has established a prima facia case as a matter

       of law. Id. To have done so, the plaintiff must have presented at least some evidence on every

       element essential to the plaintiff’s underlying cause of action. Id. If the plaintiff has failed in his

               1
                 In her argument on this issue, Elena again claims that the trial court’s order was an injunctive
       order. Because we have already rejected that argument in our analysis of the first issue, we will not
       address that argument further here.

                                                            13
       burden to establish a prima facie case, the trial court should grant the motion and should enter a

       directed finding or judgment in the defendant’s favor. Id.

¶ 32          If the trial court determines, however, that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,

       the trial court then moves on to the second prong of the analysis. Id. Under the second prong, the

       trial court, as the finder of fact, must consider the totality of the evidence presented in the

       plaintiff’s case-in-chief, including any evidence which is favorable to the defendant. Id. at 275-

       76. When conducting the second prong of the analysis, the trial court does not consider the

       evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as it would in a jury trial. See 735 ILCS 5/2-

       1110 (West 2020); Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 276. Instead, the trial court must weigh all of the

       evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.

       735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2020); Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 276. That weighing process may result in

       some of plaintiff’s evidence being negated. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 276. After weighing the quality

       of all of the evidence, the trial court should determine, applying the standard of proof required

       for the underlying cause, whether sufficient evidence remains to establish the plaintiff’s

       prima facie case. Id. If the trial court so finds, it should deny the defendant’s motion and proceed

       with the trial. Id. If the trial court reaches the opposite conclusion, however, it should grant the

       defendant’s motion and enter a directed finding or a judgment for defendant. Id.

¶ 33          The standard of review that applies on appeal differs depending on whether the appellate

       court is reviewing the trial court’s decision as to the first prong of the analysis or the second

       prong. See id. at 275-76. A trial court’s ruling under the first prong of the analysis, that the

       plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case, is a question of law that is subject to de novo

       review on appeal. Id. at 275. A trial court’s ruling under the second prong of the analysis,

                                                         14
       however, will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       Id. at 276.

¶ 34           In the present case, after reviewing the evidence presented in Thomas’s case-in-chief, we

       conclude that the trial court properly denied Elena’s motion for a directed finding. As to the first

       prong of the analysis set forth above, contrary to Elena’s assertion, the record before us shows

       that Thomas presented some evidence on each of the two essential elements of a modification

       claim. See id. Thomas’s testimony at the hearing established that the children had been

       vaccinated, to the best of Thomas’s knowledge, up through the time of the allocation judgment

       and that a problem arose thereafter because T.V. needed vaccinations to attend Willow Creek

       Elementary School, but Elena was opposing those vaccinations. The evidence also established

       that the parties had agreed in the allocation judgment that it was in the best interests of the

       parties’ children to attend Willow Creek and to have Thomas be the custodial parent for the

       purposes of the School Code. In addition, the GAL who had investigated the matter and had

       reviewed the Bible and medical journals about vaccines felt that the AMA journals that he had

       reviewed did not support a non-vaccination position. The evidence presented, therefore, was

       sufficient to establish a prima facie case for modification as a matter of law. Thus, the trial

       court’s implicit ruling on the first prong of the analysis was not erroneous. See id. at 275.

¶ 35           As to the second prong of the directed finding analysis, again, contrary to Elena’s

       assertion, a qualitative analysis of the evidence presented in Thomas’s case-in-chief does not

       negate any of the necessary elements of a modification claim. Although there were some minor

       problems with Thomas’s testimony—inconsistencies and possibly reading from notes—we find

       that the evidence presented in Thomas’s case-in-chief as a whole (Thomas’s testimony, as

       corroborated by the portion of the GAL’s testimony that was presented in Thomas’s case-in-

                                                         15
       chief) was sufficient to maintain a prima facie case for modification, even when that evidence is

       no longer viewed in the light most favorable to Thomas. See id. at 276. The trial court’s ruling

       on the second prong of the analysis, therefore, was not against the manifest weight of the

       evidence. See id. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly denied Elena’s motion for a

       directed finding. See id.

¶ 36                  C. Denial of Elena’s Request for Rehearing (Motion to Reconsider)

¶ 37          As her third and final point of contention on appeal, Elena argues that the trial court erred

       in denying the request for rehearing portion of Elena’s motion to reconsider. Elena asserts that

       her request should have been granted because in making its decision on the modification petition,

       the trial court erroneously relied on inadmissible testimony from the GAL that vaccination was

       in the children’s best interests, which was based, in part, upon the GAL’s review of medical

       journals that were not admitted into evidence. Elena acknowledges that she did not object when

       the GAL testified in that manner during the hearing but claims that the issue has not been

       forfeited on appeal because the real party in interest in this proceeding is the children (see Harris

       v. Spencer, 86 Ill. App. 2d 41, 46 (1967) (rejecting a claim in a custody modification proceeding

       that the defendant had waived any error in the admission of a probation officer’s report, even

       though the defendant had stipulated that the trial court could consider that report, because the

       real party in interest was the minor children and not the defendant)). Therefore, based upon the

       merits of her argument on this issue, Elena asks that we reverse the trial court’s ruling on the

       rehearing request portion of her motion to reconsider and that we remand this case for rehearing

       on Thomas’s petition to modify the allocation judgment.

¶ 38          A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed on appeal

       absent an abuse of discretion. In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008). The threshold for

                                                        16
       finding an abuse of discretion is a high one and will not be overcome unless it can be said that

       the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person

       would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36

       (2009); Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460. However, even if the trial court commits an abuse of

       discretion in the admission of evidence, a new trial should not be ordered unless the trial court’s

       erroneous ruling appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. See Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at

       460.

¶ 39          Under section 506(a)(2) of the Act, in any proceeding involving the allocation of parental

       responsibilities, the trial court may appoint a GAL to address the issues that the court delineates.

       750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2) (West 2020). Pursuant to that appointment, the GAL shall investigate the

       facts of the case and interview the child and the parties. See id. The statute also requires that the

       GAL testify or submit a written report to the trial court regarding his or her recommendations in

       accordance with the best interests of the minor child involved. Id. In addition, the GAL may be

       called as a witness for the purposes of cross-examination regarding his or her report or

       recommendations. Id.

¶ 40          In the present case, after reviewing the record, we find that the GAL’s testimony was

       properly admitted. Contrary to Elena’s assertion, we are not required to ignore Elena’s forfeiture

       of this issue. See In re Marriage of Saheb & Khazal, 377 Ill. App. 3d 615, 627 (2007) (noting

       that the father of the child had waived his arguments on appeal that the trial court had erred when

       it failed to obtain testimony or a written report from the court-appointed GAL as to the visitation

       issue before the court because the father had failed to object to those alleged errors). To the

       extent that the case law cited by Elena supports a different conclusion (see Harris, 86 Ill. App.

       2d at 46), we respectfully disagree.

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¶ 41          However, even if we were to ignore Elena’s forfeiture of this issue, we would still have to

       find that the GAL’s testimony regarding the best interests of the children was properly admitted.

       The Act specifically allows the GAL to provide testimony or a report regarding his or her

       recommendations in accordance with the best interests of the minor children involved. 750 ILCS

       5/506(a)(2) (West 2020). That is exactly what was done in the present case. The fact that the

       medical journals that the GAL reviewed on the vaccination issue were not admitted into evidence

       went to the weight to be given to the GAL’s testimony and not to its admissibility. See People ex

       rel Irby v. Dubois, 41 Ill. App. 3d 609, 616 (1976) (indicating that any weaknesses in social

       investigator’s custody report went to the weight to be given to the report). Nor does it appear

       from the record that Elena was prejudiced by the trial court’s implicit ruling. Although the trial

       court stated initially that it had taken “strong note” of the GAL’s testimony, it later clarified that

       comment at the hearing on Elena’s motion to reconsider, stating that it did not need to give any

       weight to the medical aspects of the GAL’s testimony because Elena had chosen not to raise any

       argument at the hearing on Thomas’s petition to modify regarding any adverse effects of the

       vaccines. We, therefore, find no error in the trial court’s admission of the GAL’s testimony.

¶ 42                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page

       County.

¶ 44          Affirmed.

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