Court Opinion

ID: 9470648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:12:12.737175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:02.054897
License: Public Domain

STERN, District Judge,
dissenting.
Had the current regulations governing filing in deferral states been in effect when plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC in October of 1980, the majority concedes that plaintiff’s federal remedy would not be time barred. See C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3) (1982); Maj. op. at 752 n. 4. In trying to understand why the majority reaches out to block plaintiff’s case from being heard on the merits, I can only conclude that its decision is based solely on the fact that filing regulations in effect on October 3, 1980 regarding deferral states did not require the EEOC to defer a charge filed with its office between 180 and 300 days from the last date of discrimination if the state or local filing period had expired. Because the filing regulations at the time plaintiff filed her charge were inconsistent with then-existing Supreme Court interpretations of § 706(c) and (e), and because the majority *756misconceives the relationship between state and federal enforcement of Title VII, I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes without further inquiry that since neither plaintiff nor the EEOC ever filed her charge with the Delaware Department of Labor, plaintiff’s remedy is barred by a 180 day statute of limitations, implicitly holding that the filing regulations existing in 1980, which did not obligate the EEOC to defer a charge where the state or local filing period had run, absolve the EEOC of responsibility for its failure to defer to Delaware’s 706 agency.1 Inspection of the 1980 regulations reveals that in deferral states the EEOC was compelled to defer charges initially filed with the federal agency between 180 and 300 days from the last date of discrimination only where the charge could also be filed “within the period of limitation of the appropriate 706 agency.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.-13(d) (iii) (1980). It is obvious that had Delaware’s statute of limitations been longer than 230 days, the EEOC would have been obligated to defer plaintiff’s charge and her federal cause of action would have been timely. Thus, the fortuity of the Delaware legislature’s decision to create a limitations period shorter than that devised by Congress in Title VII will operate in this case to foreclose plaintiff’s federal remedy. But this is precisely what the Supreme Court has held to be impermissible.
In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979), the Court unequivocally stated that federal remedies are not to be consigned to the “ ‘vagaries of diverse state limitations statutes.’ ” Id. at 763, 99 S.Ct. at 2075 (quoting Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 371, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2457, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977)). Speaking with specific reference to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a statute to be given parallel construction with Title VII, see maj. op. at 752 n. 3, the Court stated: “The structure of the ADEA [Title VII] reinforces the conclusion that ... state limitations periods cannot govern the efficacy of the federal remedy.” Id. 441 U.S. at 762, 99 S.Ct. at 2074. The 1980 filing regulations ignored this command by conditioning EEOC mandatory deferral on the length of a particular state’s filing period.
The EEOC recognized the defects in the 1980 regulations in light of Oscar Mayer and Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), and so corrected them. See 45 Fed.Reg. 81040 (1980); 46 Fed.Reg. 43037 (1981). Effective December 9, 1980, a plaintiff in a deferral state need only file with the EEOC within 240 days of the last violation to ensure preserving her federal remedy, for the EEOC is now obligated to defer in all cases, not simply where the 706 agency happens to operate on a filing schedule coextensive with Congress’ scheme. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.-13(a)(3) (1982); see Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 814 n. 16, 100 S.Ct. at 2491 n. 16. While the majority places unshakeable reliance on the fact that the new regulations were not in effect until December 9, 1980 — slightly over two months after plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC on October 3,1980— the significant events in this case are the Supreme Court decisions in Oscar Mayer and Mohasco Corp., which provided the reasons for the EEOC’s promulgation of new *757regulations, and which both predated October 3, 1980.
Plaintiff should not be deprived of a Title VII remedy merely because the EEOC at one time saw fit to be guided by the idiosyncracies of Delaware law. Courts have repeatedly prevented errors committed by the EEOC from operating to the detriment of Title VII grievants. E.g., Roberts v. Arizona Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir.1981); White v. Dallas Independent School District, 581 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir.1978). This court has recognized that Title VII establishes a remedial scheme whose jurisdictional requirements are to be construed liberally in favor of possible discrimination victims. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir.1977), appeal after remand, 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. G.C. Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935, 101 S.Ct. 2013, 68 L.Ed.2d 321 (1981). In this case, where the EEOC failed to defer, pursuant to regulations that were faulty in theory and in operation, I would not turn plaintiff away.2

. The majority suggests that the issue of plaintiffs failure to file her charge with the appropriate state agency is not before us as an independent ground for affirmance, since defendant did not raise this argument below. Maj. op. at 750 n. 1. Thus, the majority frames its analysis with the consideration of whether the “applicable” statute of limitations in this case is 180 or 300 days, concluding that the failure to defer precluded the triggering of the 120 day “extension” period available to those who initiate proceedings with the 706 agency. Sections 706(c) and (e), however, make clear that the statute of limitations for those in a deferral state is 300 days, and that commencement of proceedings with the state or local agency is a jurisdictional requirement, not an event by which grievants may define the relevant limitations period for themselves. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (e). The longer filing period in deferral states is a statutory entitlement not a benefit evoked or foreclosed depending on whether or not the grievant filed properly. The majority’s description of the operative statute of limitations in this case as 180 days obstructs a reasoned response to the question of whether the EEOC’s failure to defer here is an acceptable basis for denying plaintiff an opportunity to have her case heard on the merits.

. While it is true that plaintiff argued below that the EEOC complied with its own regulations, see maj. op. at 752 n. 5, the point is that those regulations were themselves defective. Plaintiff did raise this latter argument before the lower court. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 3, 5 (App. at 40a, 42a).