Court Opinion

ID: 9791833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:48.455461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.806609
License: Public Domain

*596O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
I concur in that part of the opinion which overrules Bush v. Shepherd, Adm’r., 186 Or 105, 205 P2d 842 (1949). I do not agree with the conclusion that there was an “abandonment” in this case.
ORS 23.240 expressly provides that the homestead exemption “shall not be .impaired * * * by the sale” of the homestead. The majority opinion construes this provision to mean that the exemption is preserved only when the sale is made by the owner while still in occupancy or when the owner has entered into a contract of sale intending, however, to return if the contract is not finally performed by the vendee. That is a very narrow construction of the statute. It must be remembered that the homestead exemption statute never comes into operation until the owner is pressed with a judgment and he asserts his claim to the exemption. The statute was intended to give the home owner, at that point, a means of protecting enough of his assets from the judgment lien to enable him to have a roof over his head. The legislature did not say that the roof had to be the one which the claimant had at the time he asserted his exemption. On the contrary, the statute permits him to sell without impairing the exemption.① But the majority opinion takes the position that the exemption is lost unless the claimant is either an actual or contingent occupant at the time of the sale.
*597Assuming that the owner wishes to make an outright sale of his property, that is, not under a land sale contract, what legislative policy relevant to the purposes of the homestead exemption would require the consummation of the sale before the owner leaves the premises'? The owner who sells while in occupancy has one year in which to invest the proceeds (up to the amount of the exemption) in another homestead unless the judgment creditor can prove that sometime within that period the claimant ceased to have the intention to procure another homestead with such proceeds. Since the legislature saw fit to let the claimant leave the premises after making the sale, it certainly cannot be said that occupancy by the owner was of any significance to the legislature in preserving the exemption to owners who wish to sell. To insist upon the occupancy of the owner at the time of the sale would, as the court in Vittengl v. Vittengl, 156 Iowa 41, 135 NW 63 (1912) described it, “reduce the law to somewhat of an absurdity at this point.” It is just as absurd to insist upon a contingent intent to return where the sale is made under the circumstances found in the Vittengl ease.
I would construe ORS 23.240 to mean that the exemption is not impaired where the owner leaves the homestead with the intent to sell it and invest the proceeds in another homestead. The exemption would continue to remain unimpaired until the owner evidences an intent to relinquish his homestead right through words or conduct. The burden of proving that the owner has relinquished his homestead right should rest upon the judgment creditor. That is the conclusion reached in DeHaven £ Son Hardware Co. v. Schultz, 122 Or 493, 496, 259 P 778 (1927) and a sub*598stantial number of eases in other states.② In the DeHaven case the court said:
“# # # ^.fter the existence of a homestead has 'been established, as has been done in the instant case, it is incumbent upon the judgment creditor, if it is sought to subject the property to execution, to establish by clear and convincing proof that there has been a relinquishment of the homestead . right. A condition once shown to exist is presumed to continue and he who would assert a change in the nature or character of the estate has the burden of proof: 29 C.J. 961. There are authorities to the contrary but the above rule meets with our approval: American State Bank v. LeForce, 95 Okl. 88 (218 Pac. 1073); 13 R.C.L. 694.”
The majority opinion rejects this view and adopts the “rule” that “cessation of occupancy raises a presumption of abandonment.” No explanation is offered for rejecting the rule in the DeHaven case and thus shifting the burden of proof from the judgment creditor to the claimant of the homestead right. I believe that the retention of the rule in the DeHaven ease permits a more reasonable construction of the sale provision of the homestead statute. If the burden of negating abandonment is placed upon the homestead claimant or purchaser, the statute is practically inoperative where the owner wishes to sell the homestead. Normally, the purchaser will deduct the full amount of the judgment because he will not wish to gamble on whether proof can be adduced negating an *599abandonment. Thus the owner is not substantially better off. under the rule adopted by the majority than he would .be under Bush v. Shepherd, supra.③
If the burden of proof is placed upon the judgment creditor to establish the relinquishment of the homestead right, the owner will usually have a better chance of inducing the purchaser to make the purchase on the basis of an existing exemption right. Neither solution is satisfactory but one of the two constructions of the statute must be adopted and I believe that the position I have taken is preferable. The sale provision of ORS 23.240 is in need of revision. If the legislature wishes to allow the exemption in those cases where the owner sells the homestead, it would seem that the only satisfactory solution is to preserve the exemption for a specified period irrespective of the owner’s intention upon ceasing to occupy the homestead. This is the solution attempted in at least one state.④
In the present case the intention to sell the property was evidenced by the fact that Mrs. Bilstad signed *600a listing agreement while occupying the premises. There was no evidence that defendants did not intend to use the proceeds of the sale for the purchase of another homestead. Therefore, plaintiff has not overcome the presumption of the continuance of the homestead exemption.
The judgment should be reversed and judgment entered for defendants.
Sloan and Goodwin, JJ., concur in this dissent.

 The inquiry in this type of case should not be whether the owner abandoned his homestead, but rather whether he relinquished his right. The statute permits a sale without impairing the exemption. This contemplates the “abandonment” of the homestead because, normally, one who sells property has no intent to return to it.

 E. G., Petition of Lehman v. Cottrell, 298 Ill App 434, 19 NE2d 111 (1939); First National Bank of Crowley v. Brooks, 164 La 297, 113 So 853 (1927); Gordon v. Emerson-Brantingham Imp. Co., 168 Minn 336, 210 NW 87 (1926); Jackson v. Coleman, 115 Miss 535, 76 So 545 (1917); American State Bank v. Leforce, 95 Okla 88, 218 P 1073 (1923); Bell v. Franklin, 230 SW 181 (Tex Civ App 1921); Jones v. Kepford, 17 Wyo 468, 100 P 923 (1909).

 Cf., Lacy, Homestead Exemption-Oregon Law: A Postscript, 34 Or L Rev 1 at p. 14 (1954).

 The Minnesota homestead exemption statute contains the following provision:
“The owner may sell and convey the homestead without subjecting it, or the proceeds of such sale for the period of one year after sale, to any judgment or debt from which it was exempt in his hands. He may remove therefrom without affecting such exemption, if he do not thereby abandon the same as his place of abode. If he shall cease to occupy such homestead for more than six consecutive months he shall be deemed to have abandoned the same unless, within such period, he shall file with the register of deeds of the county in which it is situated a notice, executed, witnessed, and acknowledged as in the case of a deed, describing the premises and claiming the same as his homestead. In no case shall the exemption continue more than five years after such filing, unless during some part of the term the premises shall have been occupied as the actual dwelling place of the debtor or his family.” 29 Minn Stat Ann, § 510.07 (1947).