Court Opinion

ID: 9744180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:56:00.532522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.111171
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE LEWIS, dissenting: I must dissent from the opinion of the majority. I do not believe the record supports the findings of fact made by the trial judge upon which the order of involuntary admission was based. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, there is no evidence in the record to support the assumption that the respondent here dangerously abused alcohol and drugs. There is no evidence of the amounts used. There is no scientific evidence that their use together constitutes a danger. Nor is this a matter that is properly the subject of judicial notice. Cook County Department of Environmental Control v. Tomar Industries (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 751, 331 N.E.2d 196. On January 1, 1979, a new Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 91M, par. 1 — 100 et seq.) went into effect. That code was designed to expand and make more secure the rights of the mentally and physically disabled of Illinois. As Judge Joseph Schneider, chairman of the Governor’s Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois, stated in his message to the Governor: “ ‘Persons under our Constitution mean all persons and not some persons, and this philosophy is an underpinning of our recommendations. The Commission’s goal is to insure that all mentally disabled persons are given the equal protection of the laws, that they are treated fairly and humanely, with the least possible restriction on their freedom.” Report of the Governor’s Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois, Preface vi (1976). The Code provides that the trial court must make findings of fact upon the record. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 91/2, par. 3 — 816(a).) Moreover, the standard of proof is one of clear and convincing evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 91M, par. 3 — 808.) I find neither the conclusory statements of the examining psychiatrist and respondent’s father, nor respondent’s garbled and confused testimony, sufficient to meet this standard. While I do not deny that respondent may well be in need of mental treatment, I do not believe the standards provided by the new Code have been met by the State. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new hearing.