Court Opinion

ID: 9957324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:06:12.185441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:16.498364
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23-P-294                                            Appeals Court

            ADOPTION OF FLAVIA (and a companion case1).

                             No. 23-P-294.

           Essex.      October 13, 2023. – April 4, 2024.

            Present:   Wolohojian, Desmond, & Sacks, JJ.

Adoption, Care and protection, Dispensing with parent's consent
     to adoption, Visitation rights. Minor, Adoption, Care and
     protection, Visitation rights. Parent and Child, Care and
     protection of minor, Adoption, Dispensing with parent's
     consent to adoption. Practice, Civil, Care and protection
     proceeding, Findings by judge. Statute, Construction.

     Petitions filed in the Essex County Division of the
Juvenile Court Department on September 16, 2019.

     The cases were heard by Karen E. Hennessy, J., and motions
for visitation and for reconsideration were considered by her.

     Laura E. Openshaw for the mother.
     Laura M. Chrismer for Flavia & another.
     Debra P. Dow for the father.
     Laura L. Bouliane, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for Mark.
     Carol Frisoli for Department of Children and Families.

    1   Adoption of Helen.   The children's names are pseudonyms.
                                                                    2

     DESMOND, J.   In this consolidated appeal, we affirm

Juvenile Court decrees terminating the mother's and the father's

parental rights to their twin daughters, Flavia and Helen, but

we vacate an order denying postdecree motions filed by the twins

and their older half-brother, Mark (a pseudonym).     The motions

cited G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), and requested an order for

sibling visitation.2    Because we conclude that an order should

have entered, we remand the matter for further proceedings.

     Background.   1.   Facts.   The Department of Children and

Families (department) became involved with the family in 2014,

after the mother committed an assault and battery on Mark, then

five years old.    Diagnosed with trauma and a variety of

behavioral and emotional disorders, Mark "require[d] a high

level of care and supervision" to manage behaviors such as fire

setting, self-harm, and aggressiveness toward animals; behaviors

that the judge found resulted from the way the parents cared for

Mark and increased after the twins' birth in 2015.3    In 2016,

Mark was placed in a residential treatment center (residential

center) due to his inability to be safe in a less restrictive

     2 Our use herein of the word "visitation" is not meant to
exclude virtual contact, which the children also sought.

     3 We refer to the father of Flavia and Helen as "the father"
throughout our decision. Although the father is not Mark's
biological father, he is the only father figure that Mark has
known. Mark's biological father stipulated to the termination
of his parental rights.
                                                                     3

setting, and the department filed a care and protection petition

on his behalf pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24.   At the

residential center, Mark continued to struggle with emotional

regulation, impulsivity, lack of personal boundaries, and

enuresis.   In 2017, Mark was committed to the department's

custody.    In February 2019, the department transitioned him home

to live with the parents and the twins.

    Seven reports in as many months were then filed with the

department pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report),

alleging neglect of all three children due to the parents'

substance use and failure to engage with services for Mark.     On

investigation pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51B, the department

learned that the parents had not followed recommendations for

managing Mark's behaviors at home, such as establishing rules

and consequences and implementing behavior charts.   Instead,

without consulting a doctor, the mother gave Mark a "vape pen"

containing cannabidiol oil and had Mark smoke it "to help with

his behaviors."   Then twenty-nine years old, the mother reported

poor liver function and regularly drank beer during meetings

with in-home support workers, but she denied alcohol use, while

the father, then thirty-one years old and addicted to Adderall

after being prescribed it in 2016 for a childhood diagnosis of

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), said in June

2019 that he bought Adderall "off the street and used it . . . ,
                                                                     4

as it helped with his ADHD," but in July, he "denied any

medications or diagnosis."

     In September 2019, the mother reported that the father

relapsed, and the department also learned that the parents had

failed to seek immediate medical attention for Mark's broken arm

after Mark hit a moving car while riding his scooter near a busy

road.     All three children were removed from the home, and the

department filed a second petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119,

§ 24, this one naming Flavia and Helen.     The petitions were

consolidated, and by the time of trial, eleven year old Mark was

living at the residential center where he had lived for periods

totaling over five years.     Flavia and Helen were six years old

and living in the same foster home where they had been for two

years, with a family that was prepared to adopt them.     Both

twins suffered from enuresis not caused by physical concerns,

were diagnosed with unspecified trauma and stressor-related

disorders, and received weekly therapy.     Helen was additionally

diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder with dissociative

features and had developmental delays and emotional disabilities

that "require[d] significant interventions."

     2.    Trial.   Trial took place on thirteen nonconsecutive

days between May of 2021 and 2022.     On the eighth day, before

the department introduced documentary evidence, the father moved

for a directed verdict as to the twins.     In response, the
                                                                     5

department reported that it had no more witnesses because the

foster mother was not available that day to testify about each

twin's functioning and needs.   A discussion ensued wherein the

judge questioned the sufficiency of the evidence as to Flavia

and Helen.   The judge made the following comments:   "I need more

than what I have to make a determination," and "I need to know

more about the girls' functioning.   That's what I'm telling

you."   She asked whether the department would introduce reports

for each twin that she knew had been, or were being, prepared,

and she said, "[T]here's a bunch of information in [the reports]

that I feel that I need in order to make a determination for

these girls."   The judge concluded that portion of the

discussion by stating, "I leave it to you to conference how the

evidence is going to get in. . . .   [P]erhaps, the [d]epartment

is going to call, like, the foster parent."

     Later, the judge suggested that counsel for the parents and

children "have a conversation" about their permanency plans --

all three children returning home -- in light of testimony that,

the judge said, "raised real concerns for me about the legal

viability" of that plan.   A social worker had testified that

Mark struggled at the residential center "with sexualized

behaviors, impulsivity, limit setting, following directions, and

respecting personal boundaries."   The judge commented, "[I]f I

credit that testimony . . . it creates a difficult situation
                                                                   6

wherein, if [Mark] goes home, the girls can't go home; or if the

girls go home, [Mark] can't go home."

    The evidence closed in March 2022, after the foster mother

testified and after Mark's twelfth birthday.   Two months later,

in court, the judge announced her decisions regarding the

parents' fitness and each child's best interests without

mentioning posttermination or postadoption visitation, for the

parents or for Mark, with the twins.    All three children were

adjudged in need of care and protection and committed to the

department's custody.   The parents were found unfit, but

termination of the mother's rights was not found to be in Mark's

best interests, "given his strong position against adoption" and

high level of need.   See G. L. c. 210, § 2 (child's written

consent to adoption required if child is "above the age of

twelve").

    As to Flavia and Helen, the judge expressed her view that

"[f]or [Mark] to have any future, it's going to mean that the

parents have to pour all of their attention towards

reunification with him" and give him "all of the family's

efforts," leaving an inadequate amount of time and attention for

what she described as each twin's "significant needs as a result

of the ongoing issues in regards to the parents' fitness."

Although she "recognize[d] that there ha[d] been some progress"

by the parents in addressing their "ongoing issues," the judge
                                                                    7

considered that "when [she] reviewed the record, it was replete

with instances of obfuscation and deception"; the father

relapsed during trial; and there was a risk that the parents had

not really changed    After "po[ring] over" the exhibits,

listening to the testimony, and reviewing her notes, the judge

made "a very, very difficult decision" that freeing Flavia and

Helen for adoption by their foster parents was in each twin's

best interests.    Decrees entered accordingly.   See G. L. c. 119,

§ 26 (b) (4); G. L. c. 210, § 3.   As to Mark, a judgment entered

committing him to the department's permanent custody, and his

placement in the residential center continued, see G. L. c. 119,

§ 26 (b) (2) (iii) -- a judgment from which neither he nor the

mother appealed.

    3.   Appeals and postdecree motions.    One week after the

decrees entered, the parents and the twins filed a joint notice

of appeal from the decrees.    On the same day, the parents and

the twins also filed a "joint motion for orders regarding post-

termination and post-adoption contact," seeking specific orders

for posttermination and postadoption visitation, for the parents

and for Mark, with the twins.    The judge did not expressly

discuss the joint motion for visitation in her September 2022

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rationale, wherein she

expanded on her reasoning after trial in 450 findings of fact

and forty conclusions of law.    The judge provided for parent-
                                                                   8

child visitation with the twins to be "held at the discretion of

the [d]epartment and then the adoptive parents, who will

determine the frequency, length, location, and manner of such

visitation," and sibling visitation between the twins and Mark

"as often as the adoptive resource is able to accommodate" until

after adoption, at which time "sibling visitation will be left

to the sound discretion of the adoptive parents."

    The following month, the judge allowed the mother's request

for a ruling on the joint motion for specific orders and entered

an order, nunc pro tunc to May 19, 2022, the date the motion was

filed, that posttermination and postadoption visitation with the

twins "will be addressed with the [t]rial evidence."   In other

words, the judge denied the joint motion for orders more

specific than the provisions contained in the findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and rationale.   No one appealed from this

decision.

    In November 2022 and January 2023, Mark, Flavia, and Helen

jointly filed a motion and a supplemental motion "to reconsider"

that identified the judge's decision, as specified in her

findings of fact and conclusions of law, to leave sibling

visitation to the discretion of the department and adoptive

parents (children's motions).   Supported by exhibits, the

children's motions (1) cited G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b); (2)

asserted that the department had reduced sibling visits to an
                                                                    9

insufficient level and requested an order mandating a specific

number of in-person visits plus weekly virtual contact; and (3)

requested an evidentiary hearing.    The department opposed the

motions and argued that reconsideration was neither timely nor

warranted.   At a hearing on February 1, 2023, the judge received

offers of proof that the department had reduced sibling

visitation by one-half, no sibling visits had been or were then

scheduled to occur, and the children wanted to see each other

every week if not more.    Reasoning that there was no new

evidence and that she had not made an error in her

"interpretation of the law . . . that [she could] leave it in

the sound discretion of the foster parent if [she] believe[s]

that, yes, it's in the best interest of the children," the judge

denied the children's motions from the bench.    All three

children appealed.

    Discussion.    1.   Parental rights.   "Parental unfitness must

be determined by taking into consideration a parent's character,

temperament, conduct, and capacity to provide for the child in

the same context with the child's particular needs, affections,

and age."    Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 711 (1993).    The

concepts of parental fitness and a child's best interests "are

not separate and distinct but, instead, are 'cognate and

connected steps' that 'reflect different degrees of emphasis on
                                                                  10

the same factors'" (citation omitted).   Adoption of Ulrich, 94

Mass. App. Ct. 668, 675 (2019).

     "Where there is clear and convincing evidence that the
     parent is unfit and likely to remain so, we give
     substantial deference to the trial judge's decision
     regarding the child's best interests and reverse only where
     the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there
     is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion. A finding
     is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support
     it, or when, although there is evidence to support it, the
     reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
     definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
     committed. An abuse of discretion exists where the
     decision amounts to a clear error of judgment [in weighing
     the relevant factors, such] that [the decision] falls
     outside the range of reasonable alternatives." (Quotations
     and citations omitted.)

Adoption of Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 615-616 (2021).

     The mother, the father, and the twins challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the decrees and join in

each other's arguments that the judge made several errors.    The

parties allege that the judge relied on stale evidence and

clearly erroneous findings about Mark's history, needs, and

"sexualized behaviors," the mother's alcohol use disorder, and

the twins' needs and each parent's ability to meet them;4 weighed

evidence relating to Mark too heavily and pitted his return home

     4 In particular, the parties maintain that the judge
overstated the needs of each twin and unreasonably inferred that
those needs were, at least in part, a result of the parents'
caregiving; erroneously found that removal from the foster home
would cause each twin "severe psychological and emotional harm";
and weighed the bond between each twin and the foster family too
heavily and manipulated the testimony of the bonding expert to
reach the conclusions she wanted.
                                                                   11

against that of the twins; did not make sufficiently

individualized findings about Flavia and Helen or support the

decision permanently to separate Mark from the twins with

findings that such action was in each child's best interests;

and deprived the parents of due process of law by her comments

on the eighth day of trial.

    Indeed, many of the parties' challenges "amount to no more

than a disagreement with the judge's weighing of the evidence

and credibility determinations regarding the witnesses,"

Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 166 (2001), but "our task is not

to decide whether we, presented with the same facts, would have

made the same decision," Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225

(1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S.

1034 (1999).   "We do not sit as a trial court to review de novo

the evidence presented by the parties."   Adoption of Paula, 420

Mass. 716, 730 (1995).   Our review is limited to determining (1)

whether the judge erred in concluding, based on subsidiary

findings proved by a preponderance of evidence, that there was

clear and convincing evidence that the parents were currently

unfit to parent each twin and likely to remain so, and (2)

whether the judge's conclusion that it was in each twin's best

interests to terminate the legal relation between the parents

and child was infected by clearly erroneous findings of fact or
                                                                      12

any clear error of law or abuse of discretion.      See Adoption of

Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 370 (2017), and cases cited.

     "A judge whose order will have the effect of irreversibly

terminating the legal parent-child relationship must focus on

the present circumstances of the parent and the child, taking

into account recent positive gains (if any), and, in appropriate

cases, the likelihood of future improvement, in a parent's

ability to care for the child who is the subject of the

petition."   Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. at 731.    Here, the

parents experienced housing instability that was relevant to

their fitness to care for the twins.5   See Adoption of Yvonne, 99

Mass. App. Ct. 574, 580-581 (2021), and cases cited.     Also

relevant was the parents' failure at every home where they lived

with the twins to supervise them properly, maintain a safe and

stable environment, or obtain consistent therapeutic services

required for the children to thrive.    See Adoption of Ulrich, 94

Mass. App. Ct. at 676 (judge may rely on patterns of past

conduct to assess parent's future performance and ability).

Although the parents engaged in services, their work did not

ameliorate the concerns that brought the twins into the

department's care, see id. at 677, as they were unable to keep a

     5 The parents moved seven times in the four years between
the twins' birth and their removal and again the week before
trial began.
                                                                   13

home clean for any significant period, see Care & Protection of

Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 706 (2016), and unable to supervise

the twins or Mark closely enough to prevent injuries, including

substantial ones,6 see Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579

(1980) (finding of unfitness "must be predicated upon parental

behavior which adversely affects the child").

     The parents also struggled with substance use that "was a

factor contributing to established neglect" of all three

children and therefore relevant.   Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass.

App. Ct. 667, 676 (2008).   The judge found that evidence of the

mother's alcohol use disorder was not stale based largely on the

parents' minimizations of the issue and lack of acknowledgment

at trial,7 but she also discussed what she called "substituted

     6 In 2017, the parents failed to notice Helen playing near
an industrial dryer at the mother's place of work. Helen's
shirt became lodged in the dryer's moving gears, pulling in her
arm and resulting in injuries requiring multiple surgeries to
reattach her thumb and repair damage to her skin. Throughout
2018, when Mark returned to the residential center after off-
site visits with the parents, he frequently had minor injuries.
In 2019, Mark collided with a car and broke his arm at a time
when the father claimed to have been watching him, and then the
parents failed to take him to the hospital until the next day.
See Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 676 (2008) ("Where
a parent is ineffective in obtaining medical care for a child,
causing neglect of the child, it is relevant to finding of
unfitness").

     7 For example, the judge found that the mother did not
testify credibly when she claimed to store her prescribed
Adderall elsewhere to prevent tempting the father, who by then
had relapsed, and that she failed to testify credibly or
                                                                     14

behaviors" by the mother, in findings the mother challenges as

clearly erroneous.    To the extent that we agree, erroneous

findings about drinking soda and gambling do not detract from

the judge's ultimate conclusions, because it is clear to us from

the larger picture painted by the findings that the judge's

concern was not that the mother struggled with addiction.      See

Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 32 (1997)

(addiction by itself does not necessarily translate into

unfitness).   It was that the mother's inability to recognize the

severity of the issue, combined with each twin's significant

needs requiring recognition and appreciation for the appropriate

response, created a risk to Flavia and Helen that the mother

would not promptly recognize if, when, or how the twins might

need support.8   This was not based on stale evidence or clearly

erroneous findings.

consistently about how much alcohol she consumed at various
times throughout the case. The judge likewise "did not credit
Father's testimony regarding his and Mother's use of alcohol."

     8 Flavia "requires supervision to ensure she is not
aggressive or overpowering in peer interactions," while Helen
"needs consistent redirection and supervision, as she has
hygiene, dissociation, and learning difficulties that require
skilled caregivers to monitor." Helen also becomes emotionally
dysregulated when correction is used, "even just verbal
correction or instruction. . . . Even when a correction was
given by the foster parents in a whisper, [Helen] would
sometimes appear to dissociate. . . . Any kind of physical
touch, even a gentle rub on the back, would trigger an
aggressive response, usually punching or kicking."
                                                                     15

    Even after three years of engagement in substance use

services that included monthly injections to curb cravings -- a

period equaling one-half of the twins' lives -- the mother's

sobriety was still "in its infancy."     Until July 2021, when the

mother "stated that after testifying [on two previous dates] she

realized that she is an alcoholic and had begun attending

Alcoholics Anonymous," the mother would only say that she had "a

problem with drinking."     While we commend the mother for her

acknowledgment, neither she nor the father demonstrated such

understanding or appreciation for "the complex emotional and

physical needs of" Flavia and Helen.     Adoption of Paula, 420

Mass. at 730.   The parents were not aware of either twin's

diagnoses or work in therapy; neither expressed what services or

supports they would want Flavia or Helen to engage in were they

returned home; and they "could articulate no realistic plan for

meeting" the needs of either twin or both twins together.     Id.

Thus, the supported findings "place this case within the line of

authority holding that, although a parent's shortcomings, viewed

in isolation, would not preclude his or her meeting the law's

somewhat undemanding standard of parental unfitness, they

nevertheless do so when viewed against the more complex and

attention-consuming needs of a child who has been impaired in

his development by early neglect."    Adoption of Oliver, 28 Mass.

App. Ct. 620, 625 (1990).
                                                                   16

     Similarly, the parents' significant history of domestic

violence was not stale even though the relationship had improved

by the time of trial, because in their testimony both parents

denied and minimized the abuse and its effects on all three

children.9    The judge found that the twins were clearly affected

by the violence because, on removal, Flavia was physically

assaultive and verbally dominating to Helen and showed her no

empathy, while Helen "was dysregulated, could dissociate, and

[also] exhibited some aggressive behaviors."    Solidly based in

the evidence, the judge's findings did not overstate Flavia's or

Helen's issues or needs, which the judge did not have to be an

expert to infer were, at least in part, a result of the parents'

caregiving.    "It is well established that exposure to domestic

violence works a 'distinctly grievous kind of harm' on children"

that can include imperiling their physical safety and

psychological development.    Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct.

at 374, quoting Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595 (1996).

See Adoption of Yvonne, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 578, and cases

cited.   This remains true even if the issues were also

attributable, in part, to the twins' removal from the home, as

the parents maintain.

     9 The father frequently perpetrated abuse on the mother
while some or all the children were present and was arrested
multiple times for assaulting the mother, who at one point
obtained an abuse prevention order against him.
                                                                  17

       The parents' pattern of minimizing responsibility for

incidents resulting in harm to all three children, their

inability to recognize the effects of the violence on the twins,

and their limited understanding of their roles in causing (1)

trauma in the family, or (2) all three children to be removed in

September 2019,10 were "compelling evidence for a finding of

parental unfitness."    Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at

374.    Against this evidence the judge weighed the recent

improvements.   She found that the parents' dishonesty "at

various junctures regarding issues of critical importance," such

as substance use, violence in the home, and significant mental

health concerns into which the parents also demonstrated minimal

insight and a lack of transparency,11 combined with their present

inability to articulate how they would deal with

intrarelationship strife differently or better if any or all the

       The mother testified that there was no reason for the
       10

removal.

       The mother denied and minimized diagnoses for which she
       11

was prescribed and took medication and made claims about storing
her Adderall that the judge did not credit; the father also lied
about medications, testifying that he was taking them as
prescribed when he had stopped taking them without consulting
his psychiatrist. In addition, while trial was ongoing, the
father slept through a scheduled parent-child visit before
presenting to a social worker as agitated, anxious, and
incoherent -- "conclusive evidence" for the judge that the
father had "not developed an appreciation for the severity of
his mental health conditions or an adequate understanding of how
to manage them or his sobriety effectively."
                                                                     18

children were returned to their care, "creates a likelihood that

old patterns of abusive and unhealthy behavior may recur" and

harm the twins.     See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 146 & n.17

(2020) (parent's mental illness relevant if there is nexus to

child's neglect).    This was not a risk to which the judge was

required to expose the twins.     See Adoption of Katharine, 42

Mass. App. Ct. at 32.     The "constellation of factors" at play

here amply supports the judge's assessment that the mother and

the father had not fully addressed their deficiencies to the

degree that they would not recur were the twins placed back with

them, such that neither parent was or soon would be able to

provide Flavia and Helen with a safe, stable home with

responsible caretakers dedicated to their safety and well-being.

Adoption of Yvonne, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 582, quoting Adoption

of Greta, 431 Mass. 577, 588 (2000).

    The foster parents provided their full attention to Flavia

and Helen, advocated for them, recognized when extra supports

were required, and provided an environment in which each twin's

specialized needs were met on a consistent basis.     Consequently,

after two years in the "stability and security" of that home,

Flavia and Helen "made great strides in overcoming their past

trauma, understanding their behaviors, and forming
                                                                   19

connections."12    Both twins had also formed a strong secondary

attachment to the foster family that, the bonding expert

testified, "allowed [Flavia and Helen] to stay resilient . . .

in the face of some really difficult situations."    It was the

judge's sole province to weigh the secondary bond and the twins'

"extraordinary progress" in foster care, and we see no error of

law or abuse of discretion in her choice to weigh that evidence

heavily.   Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 62 (2011).   See

Adoption of Daniel, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 202-203 (2003).

"Here we have a case where the [twins] are finally in [a] stable

situation[]."     Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 517 (2005).

The judge's finding that removing Flavia and Helen from the

foster home would cause severe psychological and emotional harm

did not require any manipulation of the expert's testimony; the

expert opined that each twin would experience such a removal as

a loss, and "it would be important for them to have the supports

to negotiate that loss."     Neither the mother nor the father,

however, demonstrated an understanding of the harm that either

twin would experience if the placement were disrupted, had the

initiative and insight to seek out services for Flavia or Helen,

     12Flavia's "aggression [wa]s minimal, and she no longer
ha[d] frequent enuretic episodes," while Helen was "able to
self-regulate and reengage more quickly after a dissociative
episode."
                                                                  20

or exhibited the ability to explain to providers why the twins

might need services.

     As there was clear and convincing evidence to support a

conclusion that termination of parental rights was in the best

interests of the twins together or as individuals, the judge's

findings on these issues were sufficient.   See Adoption of

Nancy, 443 Mass. at 516; Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass. App. Ct.

664, 675 n.20 (2018).   We do not agree that the findings reflect

a disproportionate focus on Mark or that the judge treated the

twins as a unit.   After making seventy-five findings

specifically about Mark, thirty-four findings about Flavia, and

fifty-two findings about Helen, the judge approved of the

department's permanency plans for the twins in part because the

"[f]oster parents have already demonstrated their commitment to

addressing each child's unique needs."   The judge also "ha[d] no

doubt" that the foster parents would "treat [Flavia] and [Helen]

as individuals despite the fact that they are twins."

     We do agree that the judge's focus on Mark's so-called

"sexualized behaviors" at the residential center was misplaced

due to a lack of a nexus to the twins,13 but once again we

     13None of the behaviors cited by the judge was directed at
the twins or any other young girl or demonstrated after August
or September of 2021. Although the judge found that Mark "needs
to be touching someone when speaking to them or will try to put
his hands on someone when he is talking to them" and that he
                                                                    21

conclude that reversal is not required, because the rest of the

"findings are amply specific and detailed to support the judge's

determination."   Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162,

168-169 (2012).   As demonstrated by their omission from our

discussion, the findings to which the parties cite are not

necessary to the judge's decision.    See Care & Protection of

Olga, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 825 (2003).    Taken as a whole, the

judge's analysis reflects appropriate consideration of Mark's

history and needs as factors among many bearing on the parents'

current and future fitness and the best interests of Flavia and

Helen.    See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 145.   For the judge,

it was the parents' patterns of behavior, not Mark's, that put

the twins "at serious risk of peril" if all three children were

returned, because she thought it unlikely that the parents would

be vigilant about accessing services on behalf of the twins

while also doing so for Mark.     Care & Protection of Bruce, 44

Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998).    Having carefully reviewed the

record, "[w]e see no basis for disturbing the judge's view of

the evidence."    Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 n.3

(1997).

"exhibited this behavior with the twins during visits as well,"
she did not find, and there was no suggestion, that the behavior
was sexual or negatively affected either twin. To the contrary,
the judge found that Mark tried to help Helen when she exhibited
dysregulated behavior during visits, and there was testimony
that "physical reassurance" helped Helen manage transitions.
                                                                     22

    Our decision is not changed by information that, in April

2023, while this appeal was pending, a motion by the department

to return custody of Mark to the mother was allowed after

hearing, and the care and protection petition naming Mark was

dismissed.   The judge praised the parents for their

"demonstrable progress toward being able to address [Mark's]

behavioral issues," and so do we.     Although we cannot ascertain

the reasons from the docket sheet, it is reasonable to think

that the department sought to return custody, because after

trial the parents had gained the enhanced understanding of

trauma and its impact on development that the judge thought

necessary to properly care for Mark.     When she was making the

decisions at issue in this appeal, however, the judge was

required "to focus on the present."    Adoption of Ramona, 61

Mass. App. Ct. 260, 264 (2004).     At that time, each parent

"demonstrated a current deficiency in this area."      Both

"acknowledged that they do not know what [Mark]'s diagnoses are"

and were not "prepared with the skills needed to be able to

supervise [Mark] were he to return home," despite eight years of

engaging with the department and Mark's providers.     They were

not entitled to an indefinite opportunity to reform.     See

Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 166.     See also

Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60 ("childhood is fleeting").

Considering the record "replete with instances in which the
                                                                  23

parents demonstrate progress and then regress at the expense of

the children," the judge decided on balance that the parents

were not then, and would not soon be, in a position if all three

children were returned home to ensure each attended appointments

and services on time, or to provide the heightened level of

supervision that is required to protect the children.   As to the

twins, Mark's reunification with the mother does not undermine

this analysis.

     We are not persuaded by the parties' claim that G. L.

c. 119, § 26B (b), creates a presumption that siblings should be

placed together, such that specific findings that it was in each

child's best interests were required before the twins could

permanently be separated from Mark.14   In pertinent part,

§ 26B (b) provides:

     "The court or the department shall, whenever reasonable and
     practical and based upon a determination of the best
     interests of the child, ensure that children placed in
     foster care shall have access to and visitation with
     siblings . . . if the children or their siblings are
     separated through adoption or . . . placements in foster
     care.

     "The court or the department shall determine, at the time
     of the initial placements wherein children and their
     siblings are separated through placements in foster, pre-

     14The parties also cite to 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.101
(2009), in support of this argument, but we do not address the
regulatory claim, because it was not raised below. The joint
motion for orders stated that "110 [Code Mass. Regs.] § 7.210
provides that [the department] will provide necessary services
to families post-adoption," but this contention is not pressed
on appeal.
                                                                  24

    adoptive or adoptive care, that sibling visitation rights
    be implemented through a schedule of visitations or
    supervised visitations . . . ."

    Rather than presume they are to be placed together, the

statute protects the rights of siblings who "are separated."

The rights protected by G. L. c. 119, § 29B (b), relate to

"visitation with siblings," not permanent placements, which are

governed by a statute that does not mention siblings.    As

required by G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), the judge considered the

factors enumerated in G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), and found factors

(ii), (iv), (vi), (vii), (viii), and (xii) applicable to Flavia

and Helen.   See Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 167.

Then she considered the applicable factors along with the

department's permanency plans for Flavia and Helen and found

that the plans represented the best ones for each twin's "future

stability and success."   This was not outside the range of

reasonable alternatives where, at the time of trial, Mark lived

in the residential home and was not "discharge ready."

Obviously, the twins could not permanently be placed with him

there.   There was no evidence that placing Mark with the twins

in their preadoptive home was an option, and the judge found it

was not in the twins' best interests to be placed with the

parents, for all the reasons we have discussed.

    The parties' final claim is that the parents were deprived

of impartial justice by the judge's comments on the eighth day
                                                                      25

of trial, because the comments tipped the scale in the

department's favor and reflected bias and prejudgment.      Again,

we are not persuaded.      The department had not yet rested when

the judge asked about further evidence, and her comments did not

reflect bias when taken in context.      In addition to the examples

we gave supra, the judge also remarked, "[I]t's not about the

[d]epartment not meeting its burden; it's about the cognate and

connected issue of what a child's needs are and the parental

capacities to meet those needs"; "[M]ind you, I haven't looked

at the documentary evidence"; and "I'm not pre-judging the

case."      The challenged remarks were "issue-spotting alerts," not

the sort of premature "weighted assessments of the evidence"

that are not permitted, and a close reading of the transcript

does not support that the parents were denied due process of

law.   Adoption of Tia, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 121 (2008).     See

Adoption of Norbert, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 547 (2013).

       2.   Posttermination and postadoption visitation with the

twins.      The parents and the twins challenge the judge's initial

decisions to leave postdecree visitation to the discretion of

the department and the adoptive parents.      All five parties fault

the judge for not entering an order on the postdecree sibling

visitation motions on February 1, 2023.      We review the judge's

initial decisions for an abuse of discretion.      See Adoption of

Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 623-624 (parent-child contact);
                                                                      26

Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 680-681 (sibling

contact).    The February 1, 2023 order was based on the judge's

interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), which we review de

novo.   See Adoption of Daphne, 484 Mass. 421, 424 (2020).

    a.      For the parents.   Before mandating posttermination and

postadoption visitation between a child and parent whose rights

have been terminated, a judge must find both that visitation

would be in the child's best interests and that those interests

will not be adequately served by the preadoptive or adoptive

parent's discretion.     See Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct.

at 168.     Absent (1) a reason to question the presumption that

preadoptive and adoptive parents will act in a child's interest

in evaluating whether such visitation is in the child's best

interests now and in the future, or (2) a compelling reason

requiring that an order be entered to protect the best interests

of a child, judges have discretion to leave decisions about

parent-child visitation to the sound judgment of the department

and preadoptive or adoptive parents.      See Adoption of Ilona, 459

Mass. at 66.

    Here, the judge considered whether posttermination and

postadoption visitation with the parents was in each twin's best

interests and concluded that it was, because Flavia and Helen

both had a primary attachment to the parents.      The judge then

considered the foster mother's testimony that her family "would
                                                                     27

have an open-door relationship with [the] [p]arents, allowing

them to see the twins and facilitating contact, including

visits, phone calls, and FaceTime, as long as this was in the

best interests of all parties involved."    "[C]onfident that the

foster parents will heed the advice of clinicians and other

professionals and be conscientious of the twins' trauma

histories and other behavioral and medical issues as they

continue to care for the girls," the judge concluded that a

specific order for parent-child visitation was not necessary to

protect either twin's best interests.    Her conclusion was not

outside the range of reasonable alternatives.

    b.     For Mark.   In support of her initial orders for sibling

visitation, the judge found that the foster parents "have

demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the twins'

connection to [Mark] and have consistently supported the

visitation," which prior to the COVID-19 pandemic consisted of

biweekly supervised visits by the twins with Mark and both

parents.   During and after the pandemic, Mark, Flavia, and Helen

had weekly virtual contact with just each other.     Mark looked

forward to visits with the twins, asked about them frequently,

and spoke about them affectionately.     He was described as "very,

very nurturing to his sisters."     Flavia and Helen would like to

visit with Mark more often, and their permanency plans

recommended "frequent and meaningful contact" with him.     The
                                                                   28

judge found that "it is in [Flavia] and [Helen]'s best interests

to continue to have sibling visitation with [Mark]."

    Explaining her decision to leave the form and frequency of

such visits in the discretion of the department and then the

twins' adoptive parents, the judge said, "I have . . . a

preadoptive [parent] that I have heard from who I feel confident

in her judgment in regarding being able to assess what is in the

best interest of the [twins], and that she respects the sibling

attachments and bond that they have . . . .   I've left it in her

sound discretion because I believe that, going forward, she will

be in the best position to evaluate what is . . . in the girls'

best interest."   On this record, we cannot say the judge made a

clear error in weighing the factors relevant to the decision

such that her initial sibling visitation order falls outside the

range of reasonable alternatives.   See Adoption of Garret, 92

Mass. App. Ct. at 680-681.

    The children's motions, filed in November 2022 and January

2023, stand on different footing.   While we appreciate that the

judge approached the children's motions as ones to reconsider

her initial decisions, because that is what the parties asked

her to do, substantively, they were "petition[s] for sibling

visitation" under G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), fourth par., and

should have been treated as such.   See Care & Protection of

Rashida, 488 Mass. 217, 233 (2021), S.C., 489 Mass. 128 (2022),
                                                                   29

and cases cited (label attached to motion not dispositive).       The

judge should have considered not whether there were grounds to

revisit her initial decisions, but whether sibling visitation

was currently reasonable and practical and in the best interests

of the petitioning child and "of the minor siblings with whom

visitation is sought."    Care & Protection of Jamison, 467 Mass.

269, 277 n.20 (2014).    See G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), first par.

If the judge concluded that it was, then she should have entered

an order.

    It is a general rule of statutory construction "that the

use of the term 'shall' imports a mandatory or imperative

obligation."   Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777,

785 (2008).    The rule "is at its strongest when the protection

of rights is involved."    Commonwealth v. Cook, 426 Mass. 174,

181 (1997).    Previously, sibling visitation was governed by a

provision of the general care and protection statute that read,

in part, "The court shall, whenever reasonable and practical,

and based upon a determination of the best interests of the

child, ensure that [State-separated siblings] have access to,

and visitation rights with, such siblings."    G. L. c. 119,

§ 26 (5), inserted by St. 1997, c. 43, § 99.    We said this

language meant that a judge must decide whether and if so how

sibling visitation is to occur, and then provide a schedule and

conditions of visitation, and on further appellate review, the
                                                                    30

Supreme Judicial Court "agree[d] that the judge should have

specified in an order or orders whether sibling visitation would

be in [the subject child]'s best interests; if so, visitation

with which siblings; and, if so, the form of visitation (in

person contact or otherwise), and the schedule of such

visitation."   Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 753 n.12 (2009),

citing Adoption of Rico, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 220-221 (2008).

       General Laws c. 119, § 26 (5), was replaced while further

appellate review in Adoption of Rico was pending, with a

separate section, c. 119, § 26B (b), first par., that twice

contains the word "shall" and includes mechanisms for

enforcement.   See St. 2008, c. 176, § 84.    Now, a child in

foster care (or the sibling of a child voluntarily placed in

foster care) who is "denied visitation rights by the department

. . . may appeal through the department's fair hearing process"

and then file a petition for review of any decision in the

Probate and Family Court, whereupon "[t]hat child or sibling

shall have the right to court review by trial de novo."     G. L.

c. 119, § 26B (b), third par.    "For children in the custody of

the department," the child or a sibling "may file a petition for

sibling visitation in the court committing the child to the

custody of the department."     G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), fourth

par.   If sibling visitation is "reasonable and practical" and in

"the best interests of the child," then the court "shall . . .
                                                                    31

ensure that [the child] shall have access to and visitation with

siblings."     G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), first par.

    These provisions reflect even more strongly a legislative

determination that, where siblings who have been permanently

separated through no fault of their own "are dissatisfied with

the state of visitation" and seek relief under G. L. c. 119,

§ 26B (b), Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 680 n.25,

the judge must "specif[y] in an order or orders whether sibling

visitation would be in" the best interests of the petitioning

child and each sibling with whom visitation is sought "and, if

so, the form of visitation (in person contact or otherwise), and

the schedule of such visitation."     Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass.

at 753 n.12.    See id. at 757 n.16; Adoption of Zander, 83 Mass.

App. Ct. 363, 367 (2013).     As the court stated in Adoption of

Rico, supra at 756-757, "The additional, but highly significant,

value of a court order" in this context is that it "provides

clarity and, perhaps more importantly, gives the child a present

sense of security about [their] ability to maintain contact and

a relationship with a person who has been shown to be critical

to [them]"; it provides "protection to the child that is absent

if the judge leaves all visitation matters up to the department

and future adoptive parents."     Although in that case the court

was discussing parent-child visitation, which differs from

sibling visitation in material respects, its reasoning also
                                                                    32

applies here.     Whereas the department has an independent

obligation under the statute to ensure sibling visitation,

adoptive parents are not so obligated.     See Adoption of Garret,

supra at 679-681; Adoption of Zander, supra.

    While the statute does not expressly state whether a de

novo trial may be had on a petition filed pursuant to G. L.

c. 119, § 26B (b), fourth par., it is clear to us as a result of

the change in circumstances, specifically Mark's reunification

with the parents, that further evidence will be required before

the judge can enter an appropriate order under G. L. c. 119,

§ 26B (b).     See Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass. at 758 ("current

context is critical" to assessing child's best interests).        For

these reasons, the children's motions, filed in November 2022

and January 2023, are remanded for evidentiary hearing and entry

of an order.    In the interim, the judge should consider whether

a temporary order for sibling visitation is reasonable,

practical, and in the current best interests of Mark, Flavia,

and Helen.     See G. L. c. 119, § 26B (b), first par.

    Conclusion.     The decrees terminating the mother's and

father's parental rights are affirmed.     The order entered

February 1, 2023, denying the children's motions, is vacated,

and the matter is remanded for consideration of those motions

consistent with this opinion.

                                      So ordered.