Court Opinion

ID: 9595039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:03.353384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:56:27.419374
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. I agree that section 16-7-120 is unconstitutional under R.A.V. supra. I also agree that the definition of incendiary as charged by the trial court and approved in Ramsey I is unconstitutionally overbroad. I disagree, however, with the definition of incendiary as espoused by the majority.
Incendiary is commonly defined as “relating to or involving a deliberate burning of property.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1141 (1976). Other courts have defined incendiary consistent with this definition. See State v. Bindyke, 25 N.C. App. 273, 212 S.E. (2d) 666 rev’d on other grounds 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E. (2d) 521 (1975). Alternative definitions include “tending to excite or inflame,” as well as the definition claimed by the majority: “fire bomb.” However, to hold that incendiary was intended to include something merely intending to excite or inflame would be overbroad. Contrarily, defining incendiary narrowly as a fire bomb would make the statute somewhat redundant. The use of the word incendiary in the statute was clearly intended to be an alternative to explosive, not merely a further explanation.
The majority relies on the fact that the legislature has in subsequent statutes narrowly defined incendiary devices as bombs to support a similar definition is applicable here. I disagree. The definition quoted by the majority found in section 16-11-550 is expressly limited to that section. Furthermore, *564the more narrow definitions provided in other statutes suggest that the legislature recognized a limiting definition was needed to prevent the term incendiary from being applied consistent with its ordinary and plain meaning as cited above and applicable to other statutes which do not include a more narrow definition. See e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 39-43-140 (Supp. 1992). If the legislature had intended to likewise limit the use of the term incendiary in § 16-11-550, it stands to reason they would have defined it narrowly within this statute as well.
Instead, the legislature has rightly determined that threats to intimidate which include the use of a burning object are particularly menacing and terrifying to the recipient. Therefore, they justify harsher penalties. Accordingly, S.C. Code § 16-11-550 is not unconstitutionally overbroad. R.A.V. supra.
I would further hold that the trial court’s charge which defined incendiary as “pertaining to or used to ignite fire or tending to excite” was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. Arnold v. State, — S.C. —, 420 S.E. (2d) 834 (1992) cert. denied — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1302, 122 L.Ed. (2d) 691 (1993). The jury found the defendant guilty of burning a cross pursuant to § 16-7-120. Therefore, the jury determined that beyond reasonable doubt, the cross was ignited. There was no evidence of any other acts which the jury could have found communicated a threat. Therefore, the jury could not have relied on the alternative definition of something tending to excite. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction under § 16-11-550 with the sentence modification pursuant to Ramsey I.
Finney, J., concurs.