Court Opinion

ID: 9408163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 18:05:57.594419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.251574
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/11/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                            STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                   D080917

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                    (Super. Ct. No. RIF1900604)

 MARILYN JOY ZEMEK,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

       Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

       A jury convicted Marilyn Joy Zemek of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); elder abuse (§ 366, subd. (b)(1); count 2); two counts
of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); counts 3 and 5); identity theft (§ 530.5,

1      Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
subd. (a); count 4); and perjury (§ 118; count 6). Regarding count 2, the jury
found true that Zemek caused the death of the victim who was then over 65
years and under 70 years of age within the meaning of section 368,
subdivision (b)(3)(A). Also, concerning counts 3 and 5, the jury found true
that Zemek committed two or more related felonies involving fraud with the
taking of more than $100,000 within the meaning of section 186.11,
subdivision (a)(1).
      The court sentenced Zemek to prison for an indeterminate term of 25
years to life on count 1, plus a total determinate term of five years, comprised
of eight-month terms (one-third the middle term) on each of counts 3, 4,
and 5, and the middle term of three years on count 6. Under section 654, the
court stayed the sentence on count 2 as well as the corresponding
enhancement.
      Zemek appeals, contending: (1) she was denied her right to a public
trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sufficiently investigate and then
dismiss a juror for misconduct; (3) insufficient evidence supports her murder
conviction; (4) the trial court erred in denying her request for a pinpoint jury
instruction; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting evidence of her prior
thefts. We conclude none of these arguments has merit. As such, we affirm
the judgment.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      For many years, Pam, who lived alone, suffered from seizures and
anxiety, for which she took phenobarbital and benzodiazepine (Valium).
Especially for the elderly, this drug combination may cause mental confusion,
and an overdose can be deadly.
      In late 2015, Zemek met Pam, and the two quickly became friends. A
few months later Pam was hospitalized after a phenobarbital overdose. In

                                         2
April 2016, she was again hospitalized after another overdose. Although still
“confused” and “delirious,” she was discharged to a skilled nursing facility
until she was able to return home.
      After that second hospitalization, Zemek contacted Dennis M., who at

the time held Pam’s durable power of attorney.2 She offered to take care of
Pam for $18 per hour to provide “meals, hygiene” and ensure Pam was
“properly taking her medication, getting exercise safely, and staying current
and up to date with bill paying and doctor’s appointments, et cetera.” (Italics
added.) Dennis told Zemek that his sister and father took phenobarbital for
epilepsy and “it was a very dangerous drug.”
      In early May 2016, Pam was “much more absentminded and forgetful.”
Zemek told Dennis she would work weekends too “to get [Pam] straightened

out” on her medications.3 But Pam’s health continued to decline, and about
two weeks later she could no longer feed herself. For example, after leaving
Pam alone for just 15 minutes, Zemek returned to find her on the floor in a
puddle of urine.
      In mid-May, Pam was again hospitalized following yet another
phenobarbital overdose. This time it caused respiratory failure and

2     Dennis owned a real estate company, and Pam was a former client. For
a time, they were good friends. Later, Pam suspected that Dennis had
swindled her out of her home.

3     In a police interrogation, Zemek claimed that a home health care
provider, Visiting Angels, was hired to “come and organize” Pam’s
medications. But Visiting Angels does not manage or administer medications
and, in any event, Pam was never one of its clients. A similar entity,
Guardian Angels, was referred to Pam during this time period, but it was
never engaged to provide her services.
                                       3
hallucinations.4 She was once more discharged to a skilled nursing facility
because it was “ ‘[u]nsafe [for her] to return home alone.’ ” Pam was
“extremely restless,” “confused,” and “severely impaired [in] making
decisions.”
      On May 27, Zemek took Pam out of the nursing facility—purportedly
for a day trip. With Pam wearing nothing but a hospital gown, they went to
her bank. Pam told the manager that she did not trust Dennis and wanted to
make sure he was not a beneficiary on her accounts.
      Zemek did not return Pam to the nursing facility until nearly midnight,
and did so only after staff threatened to call the police. Even then, she

pressured Pam to leave with her.5 Pam signed herself out that night—
against doctors’ orders.
      The next day, Zemek took Pam to see John Gallegos, an attorney who
had defended Zemek in three prior criminal cases. According to Gallegos,
Pam thought Dennis had swindled her out of her home, and she wanted him
off the power of attorney and out of her will. Gallegos drafted a new durable
power of attorney naming Zemek. He also wrote a new estate plan for Pam,
making Zemek the sole beneficiary of her will, executor, and trustee.
      On June 1, Zemek took Pam to an urgent care facility for a hand injury.
The intake form identifies Zemek as Pam’s “best friend and caregiver.” Nine
days later, Pam signed the new will leaving everything to Zemek.

4     Pam reported seeing Zemek in the adjacent hospital bed and ants
crawling on the walls.

5      Nursing staff claimed that Zemek “brainwashed” Pam into leaving. In
contrast, Zemek claimed the facility was “an absolute nuthouse dive,” with
“crazy people walking the halls . . . screaming and yelling.” She said Pam
“[n]ever once got bathed” and was fed “slop.” According to Zemek, Pam told
her, “I’m not going back there. There’s no way in hell . . . .”
                                       4
        Zemek last spent time with Pam on June 13. Despite making several
unanswered phone calls between June 14 and 17, Zemek did not return to
check on Pam’s welfare until about 11:30 a.m. on June 17—when she found
Pam dead in a chair, the victim of an apparent drug overdose.
        Zemek called 911. When the police arrived, she identified herself as
Pam’s “friend and caretaker.” Zemek explained that Pam told her to take
some time off to be with her husband, and she had not seen Pam for several
days.
        Hundreds of phenobarbital pills were found in Pam’s home, along with
a large quantity of Valium. In an ashtray next to her body were white pills
and a bowl of partially eaten Jell-O. A white powdery substance and gelatin
was around her mouth. Although Pam died from a phenobarbital overdose,
the pathologist could not determine whether it was an accident, a suicide, or
a homicide. She died between eight and 48 hours before Zemek found her
body.
        Zemek began clearing out Pam’s bank account the same day. Within
about a year, she had taken over $200,000 and used Pam’s credit cards more
than 100 times. On two separate occasions during recorded telephone calls to
Pam’s banks (played for the jury), Zemek impersonated Pam to request an
extension of credit.
        The jury heard that this was not the first time Zemek used a position of
trust to facilitate theft. In 1998 while working in a surgeon’s office, she stole
jewelry from a patient’s purse during an outpatient procedure. Then two
years later, Zemek made a house call on a woman who had undergone in-
office surgery, purportedly to give her a shot for postoperative pain. The shot
rendered the patient unconscious. Just before losing consciousness, the

                                        5
patient heard her son say, “ ‘What are you doing in mom’s closet?’ ” Inside a
bank safe deposit box rented to Zemek the police found both victims’ jewelry.

                                   DISCUSSION
                                       I
                         PUBLIC RIGHT TO TRIAL
                         A.    Zemek’s Contentions
      Zemek contends her public right to trial was violated because her
husband and sister were not permitted to watch her trial from within the
courtroom. Instead, the trial court closed the physical courtroom to the
public but permitted the public to follow the trial via livestream. Zemek’s
husband and sister, as part of the public, enjoyed the same access to the trial.
As we explain post, we conclude that Zemek’s Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial was not violated under the facts of the instant matter.
                              B.    Background
      On October 1, 2020, before voir dire, the trial court explained:
         “At this time, as of October 1st, there’s been 59,405
         confirmed cases and 1,226 confirmed deaths, and 130
         people are currently hospitalized in the County of Riverside
         due to coronavirus. At this time, there's less than ten
         people in the courtroom. Due to the emergency orders in
         place and because of the public health directive from Dr.
         Kaiser, his recommendation is that there should be no more
         than ten people in the courtroom. He's reviewed certain
         procedures that we sent him back in November—back in
         June. He inspected the courthouse and accepted the
         procedures. At this time, Court finds good cause to close
         the courtroom to the public; however, we are livestreaming
         on the Internet as we speak, and the public and the press
         or anyone else could listen to the stream. The Court at this
         time will admonish both the witnesses for the People and
         the defense not to listen to the livestream prior to
         testifying. Both parties are ordered to inform their
         witnesses of that fact.”

                                       6
      Six days later, during jury selection, defense counsel asked the trial
court to allow Zemek’s spouse and sister to sit in the courtroom. That request
led to the following exchange:
         “[Defense Counsel]: I’m asking the Court to allow Ms.
         Zemek’s husband, David Zemek, and his sister to attend
         this trial.

         “THE COURT: They will be allowed to attend via
         livestream.

         “[Defense Counsel]: I’m asking for them to be allowed to
         attend in person.

         “THE COURT: If there was a request that the victim’s
         family be allowed, they will be allowed also via livestream.
         So the request is they can hear these proceedings via
         livestream. I cannot have more than 18 prospective
         individuals, 18 plus the numbers that we have here, I
         cannot do that. The Court already made a finding at the
         beginning of the trial, good cause, and I think you object. If
         you don’t, we’ll make your objection. Court found good
         cause that these proceedings are closed to the public, and
         we’ll note your objection. But that was at the very
         beginning.

         “[Defense Counsel]: They are not the public. They are
         family.

         “THE COURT: They are the public.

         “[Defense Counsel]: Family and friends of the defendant.

         “THE COURT: Sir, once again, we’re playing antics. They
         are the public, they are. And the public, under the good old
         days, this is an open court. Anyone from the public could
         come in, anyone in any hearing. The Court made good
         cause findings to close the proceedings to the public, and
         the alternate is to allow them to listen on livestream.

         “[Defense Counsel]: I understand that, but I think it’s
         important for the defendant to have the support of close

                                       7
         friends and family. I think it’s recognized under the United
         States Constitution and the California Constitution. It's not
         like they're newspaper reporters, it’s not like they are just
         free-floating members of the public, they are close to this
         defendant. And I think under the Constitution, one or two
         more seats is not going to interfere with the number of
         jurors that we have impaneled, including the alternates, to
         allow them to be here. They can be socially distanced. They
         could spread out. It’s not going to interfere with any of the
         COVID protocols, and it’s going to provide the essential
         moral support to my client. And it also will allow the jury
         to see that she’s not an orphan, that there are people here
         who care for her and are concerned about these
         proceedings.

         “THE COURT: I thank you for your request, but my ruling
         remains. And if the victim’s family wants to be present, and
         I know there's a statute on point, right on point, Marsy’s
         Law, the Court ruling is still that unfortunately we cannot
         accommodate. The Court already found good cause. But
         they can be more than happy to listen via livestream.”6

      In the presence of the jury, on October 13, 2020, before the trial began,
the trial court again illustrated its position on having the public in the
courtroom during trial:
         “As of today, October 13th, there’s been 61,824 confirmed
         cases of COVID-19 and 1,056 confirmed deaths, and there
         are currently 145 people in the County of Riverside in the
         hospital. [¶] At this time, there’s about 29, 30 individuals
         in the courtroom. Dr. Kaiser is recommending—or has
         ordered the Riverside County Public Health Department
         and the courts to social distance. We are livestreaming on
         the Internet. Court finds good cause to close the

6     Marsy’s Law, also colloquially known as the Victims’ Bill of Rights,
provides that a victim is entitled to be present at “all public
proceedings . . . at which the defendant and the prosecutor are entitled to be
present . . . .” (Cal. Const., art I, § 28, subd. (b)(7).)
                                        8
         proceedings to the public, but we are livestreaming.
         Everyone has access to the courts via the Web.”

      The morning after the first day of trial, defense counsel informed the
trial court that Zemek’s “husband and family were unable to hear great
portions of yesterday’s proceedings due to some snafu with the livestream.”
The courtroom clerk confirmed the livestream stopped working around
10:30 a.m. but worked after lunch. It appeared to have been out for about

two hours.7 Again, defense counsel asked for Zemek’s husband and close
family to be allowed into the courtroom to watch the trial:
         “My concern is again that under the First Amendment, my
         client’s entitled to a public trial, and that applies with more
         force to her husband and close family relations. And to the
         extent that they’re unable to hear the proceedings or
         portions of them, I think her First Amendment right to a
         public trial is being bridged. And I would reiterate our
         request to have her husband be allowed to attend these
         proceedings in person as well as her sister. [¶] And I
         would note for the record that there appears to be two seats
         in the back row that are unoccupied by anybody and they
         could be socially distanced, six feet apart, if the Court
         would permit them to attend.”

The court responded:

         “All right. I’ll note your recommendation and your request.

         “The Court at the beginning of the trial made certain
         findings and that continues on. As a matter of fact,
         hospitalizations have been up the last two days in
         Riverside County. I don’t have the latest stats today. Let
         me look it up, it shouldn’t take more than 30 seconds.

         “Once again, the Court is following the presiding judge’s
         orders and the public health director’s recommendations,

7     The record is not clear regarding how much of the two hours consisted
of actual trial time.
                                        9
         Dr. Kaiser. And as of October 14, 2020, there have been
         62,553 confirmed cases, 1,258 confirmed deaths. So we
         went up, I think five since yesterday. And hospitalizations
         have been up. Last time we spoke, it was 138. Now we’re
         up to 146 people currently hospitalized from coronavirus.

         “So the Court continues to find good cause. The jurors are
         spread out as much as we can. I’m not even allowing the
         victim’s family under Marsy’s Law because the Court’s
         making a good finding under good cause to close these
         proceedings.”

      Defense counsel then pointed out that the victim had no family. The
court indicated that it was not aware of that fact. The court then thanked
defense counsel, noted they were running about seven minutes behind
schedule, and asked if defense counsel had anything else to add. Defense
counsel did not, and the court called in the jury.
      On the morning of October 29, with about two-thirds of the trial
completed, the court was informed that “some people are trying to listen in on
livestream, and are not able to hear anything.” The court asked, “someone
from IT” to “look into it as soon as possible.” Just before the noon recess, the
court noted the livestream was working. But in the afternoon “the entire
livestream system just shut down.”
      Two court days later, defense counsel again noted “there is room in the
back row” for Zemek’s husband and sister “to be socially distanced,”
observing that he had previously requested they be allowed to attend trial,
but the court denied the request. The court acknowledged the previous
request and denial and added, “the victim advocate sits in the back. Also
your investigator has been in the back row.” Counsel replied, “There’s still
room for at least her husband and her sister” and “[b]eyond that,” the
livestream had not been working “at least three or four days.” The court
admitted to receiving complaints about the livestream but noted that every

                                       10
time it received a complaint, it, “in good faith, put in . . . requests to have
someone in IT come.” The clerk then noted that the livestream was not
picking up the microphones in the courtroom and that the “IT person” said it
was not going to be “an easy fix.” The judge directed the clerk to determine if
there was an empty courtroom with livestream service. Meanwhile, the jury
returned to the courtroom and testimony resumed. Later that morning, the
trial was moved to a different courtroom with livestream service.
                             C.    Applicable Law
      A criminal defendant has a right to a public trial that is guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
by article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution. (Waller v. Georgia
(1984) 467 U.S. 39, 46 (Waller); People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 382
(Woodward).) “Every person charged with a criminal offense has a
constitutional right to a public trial, that is, a trial which is open to the
general public at all times. [Citations.]” (Woodward, at p. 382.)
      “The right to a public trial serves two important interests. It protects
those who are accused of a crime by helping to ensure that the innocent are
not unjustly convicted and that the guilty are given a fair trial. [Citation.]
Second, there is a ‘strong societal interest in public trials’; they provide an
opportunity for spectators to observe the judicial system, improve the quality
of testimony, encourage witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony,
and prompt judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors to perform their duties
conscientiously. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 524, 530
(Scott).)
      Even so, the right to a public trial “is not absolute” and must be
“balanced against other interests essential to the administration of justice.”
(United States v. Osborne (5th Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 94, 98, citing Waller, supra,

                                        11
467 U.S. at p. 45). Such interests include “the size of the courtroom, the
conveniences of the court, the right to exclude objectionable characters and
youth of tender years, and to do other things which may facilitate the proper
conduct of the trial.” (Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th 376, at p. 388 (conc. opn.
of Mosk, J.), citing People v. Hartman (1894) 103 Cal. 242, 245.)
      We consider de novo a defendant’s claim that he was denied his
constitutional right to a public trial, but review the trial court’s underlying
factual determinations for substantial evidence. (Scott, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th 524, 531.) Where a defendant has been deprived of this right,
“no showing of prejudice is required ‘[b]ecause the right to a public trial
protects the defendant from very subtle but very real injustices,’ and
‘[re]quiring such a defendant to prove actual prejudice would deprive most
defendants of the right to a public trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 532.)
                                 D.    Analysis
      The trial here occurred under difficult circumstances, a time when
COVID-19, a global pandemic, continued to terrorize the community, and
when the federal government provided recommendations and suggestions
that, at times, seemed to change on a consistent basis. This was a time, too,
when COVID-19 vaccines were not yet available. (See Stepien v. Murphy
(D.N.J. 2021) 574 F.Supp. 3d 229, 234 [noting that “vaccines became widely
available in the Spring of 2021”].) In other words, at the time of the trial in
the instant matter (October through November 2020), the world looked much
different than it does today, especially considering that the federal emergency
declaration regarding the COVID-19 pandemic expired on May 11, 2023, and
its California counterpart expired February 28, 2023. This context is
important in viewing the trial court’s actions.

                                         12
      Certainly, the trial court understood the gravity of the public health
emergency the residents of Riverside County were facing. In explaining that
no member of the public would be able to observe the trial from within the
courtroom, the trial court specifically recited, no fewer than three times, the
infection, hospitalization, and death rates caused by the COVID-19 virus in
Riverside County. The court noted that the rates continued to increase
throughout the trial. The trial court explained that pursuant to a local public
health directive, no more than 10 people were to be present in the courtroom.
Therefore, the court allowed the trial to be livestreamed to the public but did
not permit the public to watch the trial from within the courtroom.
      As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[s]temming
the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.” (Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo (2020) ___ U.S. ___, [141
S.Ct. 63, 67, 208 L.Ed.2d 206].) Given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
on Riverside County at the time of Zemek’s trial, we agree that the goal of
limiting the transmission of COVID-19 while holding a trial was an
overriding interest. The parties here do not dispute this. Indeed, Zemek
admits “that initially by livestreaming the proceedings the court instituted
an adequate alternative to allow the public at large to watch and listen to the

                                       13
trial court proceedings.”8 Yet, Zemek faults the court for not allowing her
husband and sister to sit in the back of the courtroom, socially distanced, and
observe the trial. To this end, she argues, “by denying [her] request to allow
two of her close family members to attend the proceedings, the court failed to
narrowly tailor the interest it sought to protect, and the jury was never aware
that [Zemek] had family members who were supporting her in the course of
the trial.” Alternatively stated, Zemek seems to suggest that the
livestreaming of the trial was sufficient to make her trial public (as long as
the livestream functioned properly), but the trial court’s refusal to allow her
spouse and sister into the courtroom to watch the trial in person violated her
right to a public trial, nonetheless.

8      In her opening brief, Zemek suggests the livestream allowed the public
to “watch and listen” to the trial. The record is less clear regarding the
livestream output. For example, the trial court stated, “the public and the
press or anyone else could listen to the stream” and directed counsel to
admonish their witnesses “not to listen to the livestream prior to testifying.”
Later, the court stated that Zemek’s family “can hear these proceedings via
livestream” and the public could “listen on livestream.” Neither party
discusses this issue, so we do not consider whether the ability to hear but not
see proceedings has Sixth Amendment significance. (See United States v.
Allen (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th 789, 796 (Allen) [a trial transcript is not an
adequate substitute for access to the courtroom and “an audio stream is not
substantially different than a public transcript.”].) Despite not reaching this
issue, we do not mean to imply that we agree with Allen on this point.
“[T]ranscripts of testimonial evidence” fail to “fully reflect what was
communicated by the testifying witness” because they “cannot capture the
sweaty brow, the shifty eye, the quavering voice.” (In re Schoenfield (2d Cir.
1979) 608 F.2d 930, 935.) Livestreaming oral testimony, however, allows the
listener to hear the witness’s voice, any pauses or sobs, and to evaluate the
volume and confidence with which she testifies. Thus, we disagree with the
dissent’s conclusion that the court closure here “was effectively ‘total’ ” when
all testimony was contemporaneously livestreamed to the public.
                                        14
      Ostensibly, Zemek’s argument seems to suggest the public right to trial
requires a special preference to be given to a defendant’s close family
members. Thus, according to Zemek, it was not a violation to prohibit the
general public from personally watching the trial, but her rights were
infringed when Zemek’s spouse and sister also were precluded. In response,
the People rely on Martin v. Bissonette (1st Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 871 (Martin)
for the proposition that, in considering a defendant’s right to public trial, “the

same standard applies to family members as to the general public.”9
However, Zemek claims the People have misrepresented her position. She
maintains she is not arguing that a different standard for exclusion applies to
her husband or sister than does the general public. She clarifies that she is
simply asserting that the court, by excluding her spouse and sister along with
the rest of the public, did not “narrowly tailor the interest it sought to
protect.” Yet, in making this argument, she notes “ ‘the Supreme Court has
specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family
members of the accused.’ ” (Vidal v. Williams (1994) 31 F.3d 67, 69.)
Moreover, Zemek contends, “[h]ere the trial court disregarded this important
concern.” Thus, Zemek appears to be implying that, under the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant’s close family members are just different.
Alternatively stated, a defendant’s right to a public trial includes a right to

9     We observe that Martin, supra, 118 F.3d 871 is not necessarily on all
fours with the instant matter. There, the defendant’s family had been
intimidating certain witnesses to testify falsely. (Id. at p. 873.) The trial
court ordered the courtroom closed until the witness was excused and made
no exception for the defendant’s mother. (Ibid.) The appellate court found no
Sixth Amendment violation. (Id. at p. 875.) That said, we note that the court
did not consider additional rights or apply a different standard to the
preclusion of the defendant’s family from the courtroom in that case.
                                        15
have her close family observe the trial beyond the access provided to the
public in general.
      In the instant matter, the record indicates that the trial court
specifically considered that Zemek was requesting for her family members to
observe the trial in person. For example, in response to one of defense
counsel’s requests to allow Zemek’s spouse and sister to attend the trial, the
trial court noted its previous findings about the impact of COVID-19 on
Riverside County, the presiding judge’s orders, and the health director’s
recommendations while noting that it was not allowing the victim’s family to
observe the trial in person either. In this way, the court was informing
defense counsel that it was not unfairly prohibiting Zemek’s family from
attending the trial but instead, was applying the prohibition equally to all

members of the public.10
      In another exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, the
trial court clearly understood that counsel was asking for Zemek’s spouse and
sister to attend the trial in person, but the court noted that Zemek’s family
was part of the public and the court found good cause to close the courtroom
to the public. Zemek’s trial counsel insisted Zemek’s spouse and sister were
“not the public” but were “family,” arguing that the Constitution recognizes
the importance of “the defendant to have the support of close friends and

10     The record indicates that defense counsel pointed out to the court that
the victim had no family. Yet, the absence of any family for the victim does
not change our analysis here. The court was not justifying its order to
prohibit the public from observing the trial in person on the basis that it was
not allowing the victim’s family to attend. Instead, it was merely pointing
out that no member of the public was allowed to attend the trial regardless of
their relationship to the defendant or victim. Additionally, as the court
stated on the record no fewer than three times, it was closing the courtroom
to the public to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus and to combat the
rising infection, hospitalization, and death rates from the deadly coronavirus.
                                      16
families.” The court, however, disagreed, pointing out that Zemek’s family
could follow the trial via livestream like the rest of the public.
      Thus, as these exchanges between the court and defense counsel
illustrate, the court did consider the presence of Zemek’s family at the trial,
noted that her family was part of the public, and reiterated that it found good
cause to limit the public to following the trial on livestream. And although
Zemek’s trial counsel argued that the Constitution provided for Zemek to
have the support of her close family personally present at trial, Zemek has
not developed that argument in her briefs on appeal. Rather, she merely
refers to the Supreme Court’s “special concern” of this issue. This concern
was alluded to in In re Oliver (1948) 333 U.S. 257 (Oliver).
      In Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. 257, the Supreme Court reversed a contempt
conviction imposed by a judge in a proceeding closed to everyone except

perhaps a prosecutor and a court reporter.11 (Id. at p. 259.) The court found
that this practice violated the defendant's right to a public trial. (Id. at
pp. 272–273.) The court made its finding after noting, in dicta, that “without
exception all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to
have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense
he may be charged.” (Id. at pp. 271–272.) However, in reaching its
conclusion, the court neither sketched a test for courtroom closures nor
provided the contours for the constitutional right. Further, the court’s
holding did not rest on the failure to admit a family member. Rather, the

11     Oliver involved a Michigan state judge acting as a “ ‘one-man grand
jury’ ” who disbelieved an individual's testimony based, in part, on the
testimony of another witness. (See Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. at p. 258.) The
state judge “immediately charged [the witness] with contempt, immediately
convicted him, and immediately sentenced him to sixty days in jail.” (Id. at
p. 259.)
                                        17
Court held that a trial in total secrecy, in the highly unusual circumstances
presented there, was unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 272–273.)
      Thirty-six years later, the Supreme Court considered closure during a
suppression hearing, held that the right to a public trial is not absolute
(Waller, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 45), and established the four-part test
applicable to a complete courtroom closure: the prosecution must show an
overriding interest likely to be prejudiced by an open courtroom; the closure
must be no broader than necessary; the court must consider alternatives to a
complete closure; and the court’s findings must be adequate to support the

closure.12 (Id. at p. 48.) Neither Oliver nor Waller specifically addressed the
exclusion of a defendant’s family members. Further, those two cases do not
stand for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment should be read to
provide greater rights to observe a trial to a defendant’s close family
members than what is provided to the public. And we observe that neither
the United States Supreme Court nor the California Supreme Court has
addressed this issue. That said, we need not answer this question today.

12     We acknowledge that “[t]he test for determining whether a particular
closure order violates a defendant’s right to public trial changes depending on
whether the courtroom closure is total or partial.” (Allen, supra, 34 F.4th at
p. 797.) Here, Zemek seems to suggest that the closure was partial as she
admits that the court provided an adequate alternative to allow the public to
follow the trial via livestream. Yet, she still claims her right to public trial
was violated because the trial court did not allow her husband and sister to
observe the trial from the courtroom. For their part, the People argue that
the closure was partial, but in the alternative maintain that, even if we were
to conclude the closure was total, the trial court satisfied Waller’s four part
test. In any event, whether the closure was partial or total is not dispositive
here. The parties agree that the trial court had an overriding interest to
prohibit the spread of the COVID-19 virus. And even when a closure is
partial, it still must be narrowly tailored to ensure the governmental interest.
In the instant matter, Zemek says it was not so narrowly tailored while the
People say it was. That is the crux of the dispute here.
                                       18
Rather, the salient issue before us is whether the trial court’s order was
narrowly tailored to achieve its interest of prohibiting the spread of the
deadly COVID-19 virus.
      As Zemek acknowledges in her reply brief, the trial court articulated
that it had been advised that there should be no more than 10 people in the
courtroom. However, Zemek points out that when the jury and the five
alternates were present then there was up to an additional 17 people in the
courtroom, surpassing the recommended 10-person limit. Thus, Zemek
appears to suggest that because the trial court had already exceeded that 10-
person limit that it had no choice but to allow Zemek’s spouse and sister to sit
in the back row of the courtroom if they could be socially distanced from each
other and the other individuals in the courtroom. We disagree.
      In viewing Zemek’s request through the lens of May 2023, it may not
seem unreasonable. Now, COVID-19 vaccinations and booster shots are
abundantly available to the public. The stay-at-home orders and social-
distancing guidelines were lifted long ago. There no longer exist any federal,
state, or county COVID-19 restrictions. But that was not the landscape in
October 2020. In a time with no vaccinations, stay-at-home orders, and
rising infection, hospitalization, and death rates in Riverside County, we
think it unfair, from our pristine perch in May 2023, to declare that the trial
court did not narrowly tailor its order to address the crisis because it simply
did not allow Zemek’s spouse and sister to sit in the back of the courtroom
during the trial. We reach this conclusion despite acknowledging that in late
2020 one of the recognized tools to reduce exposure was to physically distance
people six feet apart. (See Tarpey v. State (Wy. 2023) 523 P.3d 916, 922
(Tarpey).) Although social distancing could lessen possible virus exposure, it
was no guarantee. In the face of the increasing threat of COVID-19, we

                                       19
cannot fault the trial court here for limiting the individuals physically in the
courtroom to those necessary for the trial: the parties, attorneys, courtroom
personnel, jurors, and testifying witnesses. Nor will we say the order closing
the courtroom to the public was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest. Each additional person permitted inside the courtroom (a confined
space) is an additional person who may have COVID-19 and increases the
risk of infection to courtroom staff, jurors, and trial participants. In short,
the restriction on public access to the courtroom was essential to a higher
value, protecting the health and immediate safety of litigants, trial
participants, and court employees from exposure to people who may be
contagious for COVID-19 and limiting the spread of COVID-19 to the broader
public. Moreover, the exclusion of the public was narrowly tailored and not
broader than necessary to protect the public health. And the fact the trial
was available to the public via livestream helped to further assure the
integrity of the judicial process. (See Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. at p. 270 [“The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power”].) Under these circumstances, we determine that Zemek’s
right to public trial was not violated. Our conclusion is buttressed by the
several courts that have found similar restrictions passed constitutional
muster. (See e.g., Tarpey, supra, 523 P.3d at pp. 929–930 [finding no Sixth
Amendment violation where courtroom was physically closed to the public
but the trial was broadcast so the public and the press could listen to the
trial]; United States v. Rosenschein (D.N.M. 2020) 474 F. Supp.3d 1203, 1210
[concluding that “provid[ing] the public with appropriate electronic access to
the hearing” through Zoom satisfied defendant’s public trial rights during the
pandemic]; Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth (2021) 487 Mass. 336, 167 N.E.3d

                                        20
822, 838–841 [holding a sentencing hearing was not closed to the public
where it was conducted entirely via Zoom made accessible to the public
“either through a Zoom link where nonparticipants’ video displays are turned
off and sound is muted, or through an audio-only telephone line,” reasoning
“there [was] no limit on who or how many individuals [could] virtually or
telephonically attend the hearing”]; Peters v. State (Nev. 2022, No. 82437) 521
P.3d 417 LEXIS 847, at *2 (concluding public trial rights were preserved
where district court “provided the live stream alternative to ensure the right
to a public trial was afforded”); Williams v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2022, No.
PD-0504-20) 664 S.W.3d 266 LEXIS 647 at *1, *29 [rejecting public trial
challenge to exclusion of defendant’s brother during testimony of one witness
where the brother was still allowed to view the testimony via a livestream in
an adjacent courtroom and describing the livestreaming accommodation as
“the defining feature of this case”]; State v. Williams (Wash.Ct.App. 2022, No.
55269-8-11) 2022 Wash.App. LEXIS 1595 at *1 [concluding trial was not
truly “closed” where public was provided access through Zoom, YouTube, and
local television broadcast even though YouTube channel went down during a
portion of the trial]; Lappin v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) 171 N.E.3d 702, 704–
707) [affirming trial court’s decision to limit public observation of voir dire to
an audio-only livestream broadcast to the courthouse lobby].)
      Zemek also maintains that the trial court violated her right to a public
trial when the livestream of the trial experienced technical difficulties
because the court did not either suspend the trial until the technical issues
were resolved or allow spectators to attend the trial in person until the
livestream problems were solved. We reject these contentions.
      As a threshold matter, as noted by the People, Zemek did not ask the
court to suspend the trial when livestream was not working and did not ask

                                        21
for spectators to temporarily watch the trial in person until the livestream
problems were fixed. As such, she has forfeited those claims on appeal. (See
Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670.) Anticipating
forfeiture, Zemek asserts her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by
failing to sufficiently address the livestream technical difficulties.
      A defendant seeking reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel must
prove both deficient performance and prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) To demonstrate prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have received a
more favorable result had counsel’s performance not been deficient. (Id. at
pp. 694–695.) “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.) “The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” (Harrington v.
Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 112.)
      “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Where counsel’s trial tactics “for challenged decisions
do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or
omissions.” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)
      Here, on the record before us, we cannot say that defense counsel did
not have a tactical reason for not requesting that the trial court suspend the
trial whenever the livestream was not working properly. Perhaps, counsel

                                        22
did not make such a request because he believed delaying the proceeding
would have harmed his client. Or maybe a delay would have caused defense
counsel scheduling problems with his witnesses.
      In addition, Zemek has not shown that she was prejudiced by her trial
counsel’s failure to specifically ask for her spouse and sister to sit in the
courtroom while the livestream was not functioning properly. As we
discussed ante, the court’s decision to physically close the courtroom to the
public and provide a livestream feed of the trial was justified. Thus, it
appears unlikely that the court would have been moved by the additional
consideration of a livestream that malfunctioned on occasion. Moreover, the
few times the livestream had problems, Zemek’s trial counsel used those
occasions to renew his request for the court to allow Zemek’s spouse and
sister to observe the trial from within the courtroom. Thus, the court was
aware of both defense counsel’s continued requests as well as the
malfunctioning of the livestream. The fact that defense counsel did not
explicitly make the connection between the livestream issues and the
requests for Zemek’s spouse and sister to attend the trial in person would not
have made a difference on the record before us.
      Additionally, to the extent that Zemek is arguing that her right to a
public trial was violated the few times the livestream malfunctioned, we are
not persuaded. Zemek’s trial was a lengthy, seven-week trial. It appears
that the livestream did not work a few times, for hours at a time. That said,
the fact that the public could not follow the testimony of a few witnesses does
not otherwise erode the trial court’s efforts to maintain the public nature of
the trial. Indeed, when notified of a problem with livestream, the trial court
asked for assistance and was mindful of the issue. When it appeared that the
livestream would take a while to fix, the trial court arranged to move to

                                        23
another courtroom where livestream was working. There is no indication in
the record that the trial court ignored other technology that was available to
the Riverside Superior Court to stream the trial. And Zemek does not point
to any other steps the trial court could have taken to address the problem
(short of allowing the public to watch the trial from the courtroom).
      For these reasons, we conclude Zemek’s right to a public trial was not
violated.
                                              II
                           ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT
                                A. Zemek’s Contentions
      Zemek claims that after a juror was overheard commenting about the
defense’s lengthy closing argument, the trial court erred by failing to conduct
an inquiry into the statement as well as failing to discharge the juror. We
disagree.
                                     B. Background
      On the 20th day of trial, defense counsel’s closing argument began at
about 11:30 a.m. and, even after resuming after the noon recess, was not
finished by the end of the day. As court adjourned that afternoon, the
defense investigator heard Juror No. 11 say, “This trial’s never going to end.
That’s his strategy.” The prosecutor corroborated the report, also hearing the
end of the comment about “that’s his strategy.”
      The next morning before the jury was brought in, Zemek’s trial counsel
asked the court “to investigate” the matter, stating:
            “[The statement] indicates that the juror’s already made up
            his own mind in violation of the court’s instruction to keep
            an open mind. And he’s discussing his view of the case
            with another juror or other jurors before the case has been
            given to him to deliberate.

                                         24
         “And I’m very concerned that this sort of behavior is
         prejudicial to the defense, and I’d like the court to
         investigate it.”

      The prosecutor agreed “that the statement happened,” but asserted
there was no misconduct because the juror was not discussing “the evidence
or the law.” Noting “it has been a very long trial” and “a very long closing
argument session,” he asked the court to simply admonish the juror “just to
be patient with the process and not to factor in the duration of the process
into the deliberations.”
      The court then commented:
         “All right. I’m going to bring in all the jurors and admonish
         them. Had I heard something to the effect like I’ve already
         made up my mind, this is BS, what are we doing here,
         those are the things that would concern the Court.

         “It doesn’t look like the juror is expressing any views of the
         evidence, maybe his frustration that closing argument
         lasted the entire day, but it is what it is. I’m not going to
         shut down the People or the defense in their closing
         arguments. If you want to go on for three days, it’s fine
         with me. If you want to go on for ten days, it’s fine with
         me. It doesn't bother me. I have other trials lined up. They
         just have to wait their turn. I preside over one trial at a
         time.

         “All right. I’ll bring all the jurors in and I’ll generally tell
         them what happened on Tuesday and admonish the jurors
         not to discuss the case or express their opinion one way or
         another.”

      Also, the court asked defense counsel if he was moving for a mistrial.
Counsel responded in the negative but asked the court to bring in Juror
No. 11, ask him if he admits to what he said, and, if so, excuse him. Counsel
then emphasized that the juror was not supposed to be discussing the case
and argued:

                                        25
         “We’ve put all the evidence. He’s not supposed to be
         discussing the case with any other jurors before being given
         the case to deliberate. He’s committed misconduct. He
         needs to be excused.”

      The court noted that it agreed with defense counsel “that there was
some misconduct,” but the court made clear that it did not believe what was
said required that the juror be excused.
      The judge then addressed the jury, stating:
         “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, on November 10th
         toward the end of the afternoon, I believe, right before we
         adjourned or right after we adjourned, one of the jurors
         made a statement as he was, or she was walking out. It is
         very important that you do not, do not express any opinion
         about this case until you are in the jury deliberation room.
         It was a long day. It was a long day, so be it. But you’re
         not to express your opinion to any jurors or to anyone else
         regarding the case.

         “Are we on the same page?

         “(Jurors collectively respond in the affirmative.)”

                                      C. Analysis
      “The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to a trial by an impartial and unbiased jury. [Citations.] A
deprivation of that right can occur even if only one juror is biased. [Citation.]”
(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 98.) An impartial jury is one in which no
member has been improperly influenced and each member is capable of
deciding and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it. (In re
Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293–294.) Upon a showing of good cause,
section 1089 authorizes a court to discharge a juror who is “found to be
unable to perform his or her duty . . . .”

                                        26
      Jurors are prohibited from forming or expressing any opinion on the
case “until the cause is finally submitted to them.” (§ 1122, subd. (b).) A
juror who violates this duty, such as by prejudging a case, has committed
misconduct. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194.)
      The trial court “must hold a hearing when it learns of allegations
which, if true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s discharge.” (People v.
Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60, 69–70; see People v. Bradford (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1229, 1348 [“A hearing is required only where the court possesses
information which, if proved to be true, would constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt
a juror's ability to perform his or her duties and would justify his or her
removal from the case.”].) However, “[c]ourts should exercise caution when
undertaking inquiries that threaten to trench on the sanctity of jury
deliberations, for the preservation of secrecy during deliberations fosters an
atmosphere conducive to a frank and open discussion of the issues among
jurors. Ensuring such secrecy also insulates the jury from improper influence
that could be brought to bear by outside forces and supports the stability of
jury verdicts.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 829 (Wilson).)
      “The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror misconduct
as well as the ultimate decision whether to retain or discharge a juror is
subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] This discretion
is, however, ‘ “at most . . . limited.” ’ [Citations.] The trial court's discretion
under this section is ‘bridled to the extent’ the juror's inability to perform his
or her functions must appear in the record as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ and
‘court[s] must not presume the worst’ of a juror. [Citations.]” (People v.
Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 729, italics added; see People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 53 [“ ‘a hearing is required only where the
court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute

                                         27
“good cause” to doubt a juror's ability to perform his [or her] duties and would
justify his [or her] removal from the case’ ”]; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th
313, 342–344 [trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not make a
further inquiry after receiving note that juror knew daughter of victim from
school because note indicated that juror did not talk with the daughter about
the case]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 694 [no hearing required
when juror made derogatory remark directed toward defense counsel absent
inference that remark was result of improper or external influences].)
      Although we review the court’s decision here for abuse of discretion
(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124–125), we will not find error in
the court’s decision unless the record shows as a demonstrable reality the
juror was unable to perform his duty (§ 1089; People v. Martinez (2010) 47
Cal.4th 911, 943).
      Here, our inquiry focuses not on whether “there is uncertainty in the
record concerning what occurred because the trial court did not conduct an
inquiry,” but “whether the information the trial court was aware of when it
made its decision warranted further inquiry.” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53
Cal.4th 622, 703.) On the record before us, we determine it was not
unreasonable for the trial court to have declined to further investigate.
Further, “ ‘ “ ‘[a] hearing is required only where the court possesses
information which, if proven to be true, would constitute “good cause” to
doubt a juror’s ability to perform his duties . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010)
50 Cal.4th 401, 506.) Below, there was no dispute as to what Juror No. 11
said. The juror did not comment on the evidence. The juror did not say that
he had already made up his mind. Rather, he expressed his frustration
regarding the length of defense counsel’s closing argument. In light of this
record, we see little purpose in the court questioning Juror No. 11 about his

                                         28
statement. Accordingly, we do not find the juror’s statement rises to the level
of good cause to excuse him. (See People v. Allen and Johnson, supra, 53
Cal.4th at pp. 69–70.)
      Moreover, the trial court did not fail to address Juror No. 11’s
comment. Instead, it took appropriate action by admonishing the jurors to
not “express any opinion about this case until [they were] in the jury
deliberation room.” Although a more thorough admonishment would have
included the phrases “not to discuss the case” and “not to form any opinion”
until the cause is submitted to them, the jurors were so instructed (per

CALCRIM No. 3550)13 before and after closing arguments and before the
matter was submitted to them.
      In short, Juror No. 11’s comments did not indicate that the juror had
made up his mind or was considering extrinsic matters to reach a verdict.
The comments do not reveal a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 11 was
incapable of performing his duties. Alternatively stated, we find that Zemek
was not prejudiced by the comments. “Trivial violations that do not prejudice
the parties do not require removal of a sitting juror.” (Wilson, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 839; see People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 27
[juror’s comment to spouse that she would be done late, a verdict had been
reached, and possibly what the verdict was did not evidence prejudice or
cause juror to be incapable of serving during the jury phase]; Wilson, at

13    CALCRIM No. 3550 provides, in pertinent part: “As I told you at the
beginning of trial, do no talk about the case or about any of the people or any
subject involved in it with anyone, including, but not limited to, your spouse
or other family, or friends, spiritual leaders or advisors, or therapists. You
must discuss the case only in the jury room and only when all jurors are
present. Do not discuss your deliberations with anyone. Do not communicate
using social media or other similar applications during your deliberations.”
                                      29
pp. 839–840 [finding juror’s comment, “The whole thing is a problem with
authority, and this is what happens when you have no authority figure”
during the guilt phase of the trial was a “trivial” violation evidencing no
prejudice]; People v. Steward (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 510 [juror comment to
the defendant’s girlfriend that she was attractive deemed “trifling” with no
reasonable probability of prejudice]; People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694,
698 [concluding that a juror’s question to the deputy public defendant
whether the prosecutor was “available” was trivial and did not require
removal of the juror].)
                                            III
                            SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
                              A. Zemek’s Contentions
      Zemek argues that substantial evidence does not support her conviction
for murder in the first degree. Specifically, she claims the evidence failed to
establish that she acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. We
disagree.
                                     B. Analysis
      The prosecution’s murder theory was that as a paid caregiver, Zemek
had a legal duty to care for Pam. Violating that duty, she deliberately left
Pam alone for several days, intending that she self-administer a fatal
overdose of phenobarbital (as Pam had done three times before), leaving
Zemek as her sole beneficiary.
      Murder by omission is an unusual way to intentionally kill, but not
unheard of. “ ‘The omission of a duty is in law the equivalent of an act and
when death results, the standard for determination of the degree of homicide
is identical.’ ” (Zemek v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 535, 551
(Zemek I).)

                                       30
      Here, Zemek concedes that her “failure to carry out the duty of care she
owed to [Pam] ultimately resulted in [her] death.” She further concedes that
“an omission—a failure to act—constitutes an affirmative act for purposes of
the commission of a crime in California as long as there is a legal duty to act.”
      She maintains, however, that in defining first degree murder, the trial
court gave CALCRIM No. 521, which made no reference to any failure to act,
and instead stated that “the defendant acted with premeditation if she
decided to kill before completing the acts that caused death.” (Italics added.)
Zemek does not complain that this instruction was an erroneous statement of

law.14 Rather, she claims that because the prosecution failed to prove that
she “completed an affirmative act that caused [Pam’s] death,” there was no
substantial evidence that she committed first degree murder as defined in the

instructions given to the jury.15
      The analysis begins with the jury instructions on murder because, as
Zemek correctly asserts, the issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence
supports the jury’s conclusion under the instructions as given, and not
whether the evidence might prove guilt on some other legal theory that was
not presented. (See People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251.) Here, the
jury was instructed that murder may be based on an omission where the
defendant has a legal duty to act:

14    Both sides asked that it be given.

15    By asking the trial court to give CALCRIM No. 521, defense counsel
implicitly conceded there was substantial evidence to support it.
Nevertheless, we address the point without regard to any forfeiture under the
invited-error doctrine.
                                       31
         “To prove the defendant is guilty of [murder], the People
         must prove that:

         “One, the defendant had a legal duty to care for [Pam] and
         the defendant failed to perform that duty and the failure
         caused the death of another person.

         “And two, when the defendant acted or failed to act, she
         had a state of mind called malice aforethought. [¶] There
         are two kinds of malice aforethought: Express malice and
         implied malice. . . . The defendant acted with express
         malice if she unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The
         defendant acted with implied malice if she, one,
         intentionally committed the act or failed to act. [¶] Two,
         the natural and probable consequences of the act or failure
         to act were dangerous to human life. [¶] And three, at the
         time she acted, or failed to act, she knew her act or failure
         to act was dangerous to human life. [¶] And four, she
         deliberately acted or failed to act with conscious disregard
         for human life.”

         “[¶] . . . [¶]

         “An act or failure to act causes the death if the direct—if
         the death is direct, natural and probable consequence of the
         act or failure to act and the death would not have happened
         without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one
         that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if
         nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether
         consequence [sic] is natural and probable, consider all the
         circumstances established by the evidence.

         “There may be more than one cause of death. An act or
         failure to act causes death only if it is a substantial factor
         in causing the death. A substantial factor is more than a
         trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the
         only factor that causes death.” (Italics added.)

      In defining first degree murder, CALCRIM No. 521 was not modified to
include similar “failure to act” language. The court instructed:

                                      32
         “If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it is
         murder of the second degree, unless the People have proved
         beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder in the first
         degree as defined in the jury instruction CALCRIM number
         521.

         “CALCRIM 521: The defendant is guilty of first-degree
         murder if the People have proved that she acted willfully,
         deliberately, and with premeditation. A defendant acted
         willfully if she intended to kill; the defendant acted
         deliberately if she carefully weighed the considerations for
         and against her choice, and knowing the consequences
         decided to kill; the defendant acted with premeditation if
         she decided to kill before completing the acts that caused
         death.”16 (Italics added.)

      Zemek’s argument might carry some weight if CALCRIM No. 521 was
the only murder instruction given. But it was not, and “[w]e evaluate the
jury instructions as a whole, ‘not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14
Cal.5th 327, 369.) Reading the instructions as a whole in the context of a
case in which the prosecution put on no evidence that Zemek committed
affirmative-act murder, the jury could convict only on a failure to act theory.
      Indeed, in closing argument defense counsel urged the jury to read
CALCRIM No. 521 precisely this way—telling the jury that “act” should be
understood to mean a failure to act:
         “When you get all of these instructions to when the
         defendant acted or failed to act, well, we know the act is out.
         So we cross that out because it’s a failure to act at this point.
         It’s the only viable theory he’s got left.

         “And then further down express malice, defendant acted
         with express malice. Well, actually that should be failed to
         act, comma, with express malice. Defendant acted with

16    Both parties requested CALCRIM No. 521 as given.
                                        33
         implied malice if she intentionally committed the act again
         is out. It should be if she intentionally failed to act. The
         natural and probable consequences of the failure to act[,]
         because we’re not talking about an act. We’re not talking
         about the poisoning. That’s gone. It’s done. It’s finished.
         It’s kaput. At the time she failed to act, not at the time she
         acted, she knew her failure to act, not her act, was
         dangerous to health and life.

         “And, four, she deliberately failed to act with conscious
         disregard for human life.

         “And then down below, an act or failure to act. Well, again,
         we’re not talking about an act anymore, so it’s failure to act,
         consequence of the act or failure should be just the failure to
         act, and the death would not have happened without the
         failure to act.” (Italics added.)

      The prosecutor echoed these remarks, stating:
         “Some people kill people with guns. Some people kill
         people with knives. All the defendant had to do was walk
         away to kill this victim, abandon her duty of care that she
         had assumed upon herself to care for this person. And that
         was what caused the death of [Pam]. [¶] And that is why
         the defendant is guilty of murder in this case.”

      We further conclude there was substantial evidence to support the first
degree murder conviction on a failure to act theory. Zemek removed Pam
from a skilled nursing facility that managed her phenobarbital and placed
her in an apartment where she would be isolated and alone for days, with
ready access to hundreds of pills. She knew (1) Pam was incapable of taking
care of herself; (2) phenobarbital was a potentially deadly drug; (3) Pam had
recently self-overdosed on it three times, once causing respiratory arrest; and
(4) there were hundreds of phenobarbital pills in the home. Despite all this,
Zemek left Pam alone there for several days, failing to check on her even
after repeated telephone calls went unanswered. The jury could reasonably

                                       34
conclude that Zemek waited it out to make sure Pam was dead and not
merely unconscious. That is premeditated murder. The motive was simple:
Greed. Just days after making Zemek her sole beneficiary, Pam was left
alone to predictably self-inflict a fourth overdose of phenobarbital.
      Shifting the discussion away from the evidence, in a related argument
Zemek further contends that as a matter of law, first degree premeditated
murder cannot be based solely on a failure to act. We disagree.
      Murder requires a killing, and we acknowledge that most involve an act
designed to kill. The trigger is pulled; the knife is thrust. But nothing in the
definition of murder—“the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought”—suggests that it cannot be accomplished by means of an
omission. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Indeed, in common experience an omission often
can make the difference between life and death. Ask any farmer in the
Imperial Valley what will happen if there is a failure to irrigate crops.
      In California, “the omission of a duty is in law the equivalent of an act,”
even in a homicide. (People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 616
(Burden).) In Zemek I, Division Two of this court considered this issue when
Zemek challenged a magistrate’s order holding her to answer for murder.
(Zemek I, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 538.) Because the magistrate found
implied but not express malice, Zemek maintained the prosecution was
precluded from trying her for first degree murder. (Id. at p. 549, fn. 8.) The
Court of Appeal rejected that assertion, stating there was sufficient evidence
of express malice and “the People still have the option of prosecuting [Zemek]
for first degree murder.” (Ibid.)
      “ ‘ “The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal,
an appellate court ‘states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to
the decision, that principle or rule . . . must be adhered to throughout its

                                       35
subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent
appeal.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 (Kocontes).)
The doctrine applies to pretrial writ proceedings—such as Zemek I—where
the matter is fully briefed, there is an opportunity for oral argument, and the
cause is decided by a written opinion. (Kocontes, at p. 819.) Accordingly, we
conclude that not only is Zemek’s argument inconsistent with Burden, supra,
72 Cal.App.3d 603, it is in any event foreclosed here by the law of the case
effect of Zemek I.
      In urging us to redecide the point, Zemek contends the prior writ
decision “did not state as a principle of law that first degree premeditated
murder can be based on the failure to act where there is a duty to do so.”
Although it might not have been expressly stated, that conclusion was
implied. The court would not have specified that “the People still have the
option of prosecuting [Zemek] for first degree murder” unless the theory was
legally permissible.
      Zemek further asserts that the writ petition was wrongly decided
because it is inconsistent with People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174
(Whisenhunt). She reads Whisenhunt to require “an affirmative act in order
to constitute the requisite malice for murder.” We interpret Whisenhunt

differently.17 In any event, the law of the case doctrine applies even where

17    In Whisenhunt, a child died of injuries inflicted where she lived with
her mother and the defendant. (Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 181.)
The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. On appeal, he
argued that a second degree murder instruction should have been given on a
theory that he failed to provide the child medical care. Addressing that point,
the Supreme Court stated the “defendant provide[d] no authority that a
failure to act can, on its own, constitute an ‘intentional act’ for implied malice
murder.” (Id. at p. 217.) Zemek construes this to mean that a failure to act
cannot be the basis for murder. An equally plausible reading is that this was
a comment on the adequacy of briefing in that case.
                                       36
“ ‘in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that
the former decision is erroneous.’ ” (Kocontes, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 819.)
                                             IV
                                JURY INSTRUCTIONS
                                A. Zemek’s Contentions
      Zemek contends the trial court prejudicially erred in declining to
provide her request for a pinpoint instruction. We reject this contention.
                                     B. Background
      During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel requested a
special, pinpoint instruction on causation. The requested instruction read as
follows:
           “A cause of death is an act or omission that sets in motion a
           chain of events that produces death as a direct, natural and
           probable consequence of the act or omission, and without
           which the death would not occur.

           “In general, proximate cause is clearly established where
           the act is directly connected with the resulting death, with
           no intervening force operating. While the defendant may
           also be criminally liable for a result directly caused by his
           or her act, or failure to act, even though there is another
           contributing cause, in general an independent intervening
           cause will absolve a defendant of criminal liability.

           “In order to be independent, the intervening cause must be
           unforeseeable, an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence
           which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding
           cause.

           “You must decide whether the defendant’s failure to visit
           the decedent between June 13 and June 17, 2016 set in
           motion a chain of events the direct, natural and probable
           consequence of which was the death of Pamelia P[.] If you
           decide that it did, you must then decide whether:

                                        37
         “a) the decedent accidentally overdosed; or

         “b) the decedent committed suicide,

         “and, if so, whether that is an independent intervening
         cause.”

      The prosecutor objected to the request, arguing that the issue of
causation was properly addressed in the standard CALCRIM instructions
and that portions of the requested pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the
law. Defense counsel insisted the requested instruction “pinpoints facts in
the case that have been introduced and can be considered. And it goes
further than the standard instruction in defining for them what an
independent intervening cause is, which is nowhere described in any of the
[prosecution’s] instructions.” Counsel further asserted that the pinpoint
instruction points to the two only realistic ways Pam could have died
(accidental overdose or suicide) and directs the jury to consider whether
either or both could be considered an independent intervening cause of Pam’s
death. In response, the prosecutor emphasized that he did not want to
explore the issue of suicide with the jury because “[e]ven a suicide would be
[Zemek’s] responsibility because of her failure to perform her duty.”
      The trial court ultimately declined to give the instruction. It explained
that it “learned very early on not to deviate too far from the CALCRIM jury
instructions. The Court of Appeals frowns about that. . . . So in an
abundance of caution, the court will give CALCRIM 520, not the Special
Instruction No. 1, failure to act.”
      The jury was given four instructions that discussed causation:
CALCRIM No. 520 (murder), CALCRIM No. 580 (lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter); a special instruction on elder abuse enhancement;
and CALCRIM No. 620 (special issues regarding causation).

                                      38
      CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 580 as well as the special instruction on the
elder abuse enhancement were similar, and provided, in relevant part:
         “An act or failure to act causes death if the death is the
         direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act or
         failure to act and the death would not have happened
         without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one
         that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if
         nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a
         consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the
         circumstances established by the evidence.

         “There may be more than one cause of death. An act or
         failure to act causes death only if it is a substantial factor
         in causing the death. A substantial factor is more than a
         trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the
         only factor that causes the death.”18

      CALCRIM No. 620 repeated the same language from CALCRIM
No. 520 regarding multiple causes of death. It also contained several
paragraphs explaining the impact of any negligence by the victim or her
doctors. Specifically, the jury was instructed that while the victim’s or her
doctors’ actions may have contributed to the victim’s death, Zemek could still
be found liable so long as her act [or failure to act] was a substantial factor in
the victim’s death. The instruction went on to explain that if Zemek’s act or
failure to act was not a substantial factor causing the death, and the death
was caused by grossly improper treatment by the doctors, then Zemek was

18     CALCRIM No. 580 was substantially similar to CALCRIM No. 520, but
it omitted the phrase “or failure to act” throughout most of the instruction
until the last paragraph wherein the instruction informed the jury what the
prosecution had to prove. The special instruction on the elder abuse
enhancement was nearly identical except that it included the word
“proximately” as follows: “An act or failure to act proximately causes death if
the death is a direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act or failure
to act and the death would not have happened without the act or failure to
act.”
                                        39
not legally responsible. (See CALCRIM No. 620.) Lastly, the instruction
explained that even if the victim’s vulnerability meant that she may have
died of other causes in a short time, so long as Zemek’s act [or failure to act]
was a substantial factor in causing the victim’s death, Zemek was legally
responsible for the death. (See ibid.)
                                   C. Analysis
      Pinpoint instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue or pinpoint
the crux of a defendant's case. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789,
824.) “Parties are entitled to legally correct and factually warranted pinpoint
instructions, should they request such additional instruction.” (People v.
Lyon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 237, 252.) But a trial court may “refuse an
instruction offered by the defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is
argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing [citation], or if it is not
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30.)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (Lyon, at p. 253.)
      The trial court properly declined to give Zemek’s pinpoint instruction.
First, the requested instruction was largely a restatement of the requirement
that the victim’s death must have been the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of Zemek’s failure to act—something that the above-mentioned
portions of CALCRIM Nos. 520, 580, 620, and the special instruction on the
elder abuse enhancement already explained to the jury. The given
instructions properly described to the jury that the defendant’s failure to act
caused the victim’s death if the death was the direct, natural, and probable
consequence (defined as something a reasonable person would know is likely
to happen if nothing unusual intervenes) of the failure to act. As such, while
the given instructions did not explicitly include or define the phrase
“independent intervening cause,” the instructions nevertheless conveyed that

                                         40
if something “unusual” intervened, a death might not be the direct, natural,
and probable consequence of the defendant’s failure to act.
      The given instructions also properly told the jury that although
Zemek’s failure to act need not be the only factor that caused the victim’s
death, it needed to be a “substantial” factor—meaning more than a trivial or
remote factor—in causing the death. Further, Zemek does not argue that any
of the jury instructions provided misstated the law or were otherwise
incorrect. Because the given instructions were correct statements of the law,
to the extent that the proposed pinpoint instruction echoed the given
instructions, the proposed pinpoint instruction was duplicative and properly
declined on that basis.
      Moreover, the proposed pinpoint instruction was improperly
argumentative and potentially confusing for the jury. An instruction that
directs the jury to “consider” certain evidence is properly refused as
argumentative. (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135 [in a proper
instruction, what is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but the theory
of the defendant’s case].) Here, Zemek’s proposed instruction pinpointed
specific evidence (the accidental overdose or alleged suicide) and told the jury
that it “must” decide which of those events occurred and whether they
constituted an independent intervening cause. Yet, there was no such
requirement to prove either occurrence to establish murder or elder abuse.
Rather, the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Zemek’s failure to act (leaving the victim alone for three days) was a
substantial factor in causing the victim’s death. (See CALCRIM Nos. 520,
620.) Accordingly, because the given instructions accurately explained
causation and the proposed pinpoint instruction was duplicative,

                                       41
argumentative, and confusing, the trial court properly declined to give
Zemek’s proposed pinpoint instruction.
      However, even if the trial court erred in failing to give the pinpoint
instruction, we would conclude it to be harmless error. The failure to instruct
the jury on an appropriate pinpoint instruction on the defense's theory of the
case is reviewed for harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836. (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886–887; People v. Sandoval
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 421–422 [“failure to give a pinpoint instruction . . . is
judged as state law error that is prejudicial only where there is reasonable
probability of a more favorable result”].) The denial of a pinpoint instruction
is harmless under Watson where the instructions that were given do not
preclude findings consistent with the proposed pinpoint instruction's theory
and where the defense counsel fully argued the point to the jury. (People v.

Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144.)19
      Here, any error was harmless because, as set forth above, the standard
causation instructions sufficiently addressed the principles stated in Zemek’s
proposed pinpoint instruction. Further, defense counsel specifically
addressed the issue in his closing argument. The crux of that closing
argument was that the victim’s death was unforeseeable and that the victim’s

19     Zemek argues the proper test for determining whether a jury
instruction error violated a defendant’s due process rights as well as the right
to present a complete defense is the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. We disagree. An
instructional error that “relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the charged offense, or
that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense” requires the
Chapman harmless error review. (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
810, 829.) Because pinpoint instructions merely relate particular facts to
legal issues in the case, the failure to give a pinpoint instruction is reviewed
for prejudice under the Watson harmless error standard. (Id. at p. 830.)
                                       42
accidental overdose or suicide was an intervening act. At the beginning of his
closing argument, defense counsel asserted that Zemek would have to be
“Nostradamus” to have predicted that the victim would die if left alone for a
few days. To this end, counsel argued, “Was she really supposed to know that
this woman would overdose in a three-day window? Or that worse yet, the
woman would take her own life in a three-day window?”
       Defense counsel continued, “What I want you to consider when you’re
talking about causation . . . and that’s where we are now, and there’s a
general causation instruction, and there are causation instructions as part of
several of these individual counts, including the elder abuse, including the
involuntary manslaughter, including the murder charges. [¶] And this is the
first hint that we have that there’s something called an independent
intervening cause.” He also argued that if the victim committed suicide, that
would serve as an independent intervening cause that would relieve Zemek of
liability.
       Later during the closing argument, defense counsel reiterated the
point, using language that was nearly identical to that in his proposed
pinpoint instruction. After explaining that proximate cause was a required
element of each offense, counsel urged the jury to consider “whether there is
any independent intervening cause of this woman’s death, like she decided to
commit suicide, like she accidentally overdosed.” He asserted to the jury,
“You’ve got to consider this. You’ve got to look at this. That’s a big leap.
Three days and you’re going to impute that knowledge to this woman who
regularly spent more than three days away from the woman from beginning
to end?”
       Additionally, we conclude any error here was harmless because,
regardless of the instructions given, the jury would not have found that the

                                       43
victim’s actions constituted an unforeseeable intervening cause based on the
circumstances in this case. Only “an unforeseeable intervening cause, an
extraordinary and abnormal occurrence,” rises to the level of “an exonerating,
superseding cause.” (People v. Armitage (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 405, 420–421;
see People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 52 [to constitute a
superseding cause, the victim’s conduct must have been “so unusual,
abnormal, or extraordinary that it could not have been foreseen”].) Absent
such conduct, evidence the victim “may have shared responsibility or fault for
the accident does nothing to exonerate [a] defendant for [her] role and is not
relevant.” (Schmies, at p. 51.)
      The victim’s act of overdosing on her seizure medication was not such
an unusual, abnormal, or extraordinary event that it could not have been
foreseen by Zemek. To the contrary, the record shows that Zemek knew that
the victim had overdosed on the same medication on two prior occasions in
the past two months. Further, even if, in spite of the dearth of evidence on
this point, the jury believed the victim committed suicide, that too was
foreseeable. As pointed out in the prior opinion, Zemek knew that the victim
had a history of depression. (Zemek I, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 549.)
Accordingly, any assumed error in declining to give Zemek’s pinpoint
instruction on causation was harmless.
                                       V
                       EVIDENCE OF PRIOR THEFTS
                             A. Zemek’s Contentions
      Zemek argues the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the
prosecution to introduce evidence that on two prior occasions, Zemek stole
money and jewelry from women for whom she was a quasi-caregiver. She

                                      44
contends these prior acts were too dissimilar to the charged theft offenses in
the instant action. We disagree.
                                   B. Background
      Before trial, the prosecutor sought permission to introduce two prior
thefts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to show, among

other things,20 intent to defraud as well as to establish a common plan or
scheme. In his offer of proof, the prosecutor explained that in 1998, prior
victim 1 went to a doctor for a medical procedure involving “sun spots.”
Although she was not a doctor, Zemek performed the procedure. Afterwards,
the victim went to the restroom and Zemek stole several items of jewelry
from the victim’s purse. When she was later questioned about the missing
jewelry, Zemek denied taking it and ultimately filed a defamation lawsuit
against the victim, from whom she received a $10,000 settlement. Years
later, the victim’s jewelry was found in Zemek’s safety deposit box.
      As to the second prior act, the prosecutor explained that in 2000,
Zemek was working as a receptionist and surgical coordinator at a surgical
office. Prior victim 2 contacted Zemek after a procedure and complained of
being in pain. Zemek offered to come to the victim’s house to give her pain
medication. At the victim’s house, Zemek injected the victim with medication
and waited for the victim to fall asleep. Once the victim was asleep, Zemek
stole her credit cards, cash, checks, and jewelry. Zemek denied taking any of
these items; however, police later found several of the victim’s stolen jewelry
pieces in Zemek’s safety deposit box.

20   The prosecution also sought to use the prior act evidence to prove
Zemek’s knowledge and willingness to undertake a duty of care as to the
murder and elder abuse counts. However, the trial court denied this request.
                                        45
      The prosecutor argued that these prior acts were admissible because
they (along with the charged theft offenses) involved thefts related to a duty
of care. He argued that Zemek had “a signature mode of operation that
involves victimizing women who are medically reliant on her to not do so.”
      At the hearing on the in limine motions, the court and parties engaged
in a lengthy and detailed discussion concerning the facts of the prior offenses,
the prosecutor’s theories of admissibility, and defense counsel’s opposition.
After that discussion, the trial court indicated that it had conducted an
Evidence Code section 352 analysis and ruled that the prior uncharged acts
were admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove
intent and common plan or scheme.
      The prior act victims testified at trial consistent with the prosecutor’s
offer of proof.
      At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM
No. 303 that certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose and that it
could consider that evidence for the limited purpose only. The jury was
further instructed with CALCRIM No. 375 as to the limited purpose of the
prior act evidence. In pertinent part, that instruction told the jury that if it
found that Zemek committed the two prior thefts, it could (but was not
required to) “consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding
whether the defendant acted with the intent to defraud or the defendant had
a plan or scheme to commit the theft offenses alleged in this case.”
(CALCRIM NO. 375.) The instruction explicitly told the jury to consider any
similarity (or lack thereof) between the charged and uncharged offenses, not
to use the evidence for any other purpose, and not to conclude from the
evidence that Zemek had a bad character or was disposed to commit crime.
Additionally, the instruction told the jury that the prior act evidence was not

                                       46
sufficient by itself to prove guilt and that the prosecution still had to prove
each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. (See ibid.)
                                    C. Analysis
      Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits the
admission of evidence of a prior criminal act against a criminal defendant
“ ‘when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.’ ” (People
v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 22; Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However,
subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 1101 provides that such evidence is
admissible when relevant to prove some fact in issue, such as motive, intent,
knowledge, identity, or the existence of a common design or plan. (Evid.
Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) A significant factor in determining the admissibility
of a prior uncharged act under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) is
the degree of similarity between the uncharged act and the charged crime.
(See, e.g. People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1145.) To be
admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently
similar to support the inference that the defendant “probably harbor[ed] the
same intent in each instance.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402
(Ewoldt).)
      To be admissible to prove a common plan or scheme, the uncharged act
evidence must demonstrate “ ‘a concurrence of common features that the
various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of
which they are the individual manifestations.’ ” (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
pp. 402–403.) Also, although the uncharged crimes must be very similar to
the charged offenses if offered to prove identity, a “lesser degree” of similarity
is required to establish relevance on the issue of common design or plan, and
the “least degree” of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue
of intent. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 636–637.)

                                        47
      Here, the two uncharged thefts were sufficiently similar to the charged
theft offenses to be relevant and probative regarding the issues of intent and
common plan or scheme. Zemek met all three victims through quasi-medical
procedures: she met the prior act victims through her jobs as a medical
technician and surgical scheduler, and she met the current victim at a Botox
party. Further, Zemek undertook a caregiving function as to all three
victims. She performed the “sun spot” removal procedure on prior act victim
1; she administered pain medication to prior act victim 2; and she was Pam’s
paid caregiver.
      Additionally, Zemek used her caregiver role to steal from each victim.
She stole from prior act victim 1 while she was using the restroom following
her procedure. She stole from prior act victim 2 after she fell asleep from the
pain medication Zemek administered. And she stole from Pam’s estate after
she died due to Zemek’s failure to provide care.
      Against this backdrop, the evidence was properly admitted under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to show that when Zemek took
money from the victim’s estate, she did so with the intent to steal and not, as
she claimed, because she believed she was entitled to the money under the
victim’s will. (See People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 27 (Chhoun) [“if a
person acts similarly in similar situations, [she] probably harbors the same
intent in each instance”].) Also, by showing that Zemek acted pursuant to a
common pattern in two similar prior thefts, the prior act evidence helped
prove that Zemek committed the theft offenses in this case and, thus, was
relevant and admissible to show a common plan or scheme. (See People v.
Myers (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1224 [the purpose of common plan
evidence is to prove the defendant engaged in a specific act, by showing that

                                      48
she acted pursuant to a common pattern or planned course of conduct in
similar prior instances].)
      Moreover, the prior acts were not unduly prejudicial such that
exclusion was required under Evidence Code section 352. “Even if evidence of
the uncharged conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to be
relevant for a nonpropensity purpose, the trial court must next determine
whether the evidence’s probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 26.) The prejudice that Evidence Code section 352 is
designed to avoid “is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally
flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.” (People v. Baker (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1044, 1089.) Rather, it generally refers to evidence “that prompts an
emotional reaction against the defendant and tends to cause the trier of fact
to decide the case on an improper basis.” (People v. Walker (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 782, 806.)
      We conclude there was no such prejudice here. The testimony from the
prior act victims was succinct. Further, testimony that Zemek stole money
and jewelry from two (living) victims was far less likely to inflame the
passions of the jury than the charged evidence, which involved Zemek’s
deliberate plan to gain the victim’s trust and promise to care for her then,
after becoming the sole beneficiary in her will, to leave her alone to overdose
and die.
      In asserting that the prior acts should have been excluded, Zemek’s
primary contention is that the prior acts were too dissimilar from the charged
offenses. Yet, in making this argument, Zemek points only to insignificant
factual differences, such as the fact that jewelry was stolen from the prior act

                                       49
victims but not from Pam. This argument does not help Zemek because there
is no requirement that the prior acts be identical to the charged offenses.
      Zemek’s claim that the jury may have used the prior act evidence for an
impermissible purpose, such as to conclude that Zemek intentionally killed
the victim to inherit from her estate, is speculative. The jury was properly
instructed as to the limited purpose of the prior act evidence, and juries are
presumed to follow the court’s instructions. (People v. Orloff (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 947, 957.) Moreover, defense counsel explicitly reminded the
jury during closing argument that the prior acts had “nothing to do with the
homicide counts.”
      Accordingly, because the prior thefts were sufficiently similar to the
charged theft counts, they were relevant to prove both intent and common
plan or scheme and were thus properly admitted under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (b) and Evidence Code section 352. As such, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
prior acts evidence.

                                DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:

DO, J.

                                       50
Dato, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

      I concur in the majority opinion to the extent it holds that substantial
evidence supports defendant Marilyn Joy Zemek’s conviction for first degree
murder and related counts. I respectfully dissent, however, from its
conclusions that there was no violation of Zemek’s right to a public trial and
that no juror misconduct occurred in this case. Either of these errors
requires reversal for a new trial.

                       Defendant’s Right to a Public Trial

      The trial in this case occurred during the fall of 2020, a concededly
challenging time. COVID-19 infections were increasing, sometimes with
fatal results. Lawyers wore face masks; jurors were kept six feet from trial
participants and each other. Plexiglass shielded the witnesses, jurors, court
personnel, and sometimes the judge. But although it was not business as
usual in the courthouse, “even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put
away and forgotten.” (Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo (2020) ___ U.S. ___,
___ [141 S.Ct. 63, 68] (Catholic Diocese).)

                                        A

      The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, made applicable to the
states in In re Oliver (1948) 333 U.S. 257 (Oliver), is “for the benefit of the
accused” so “the public may see [s]he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned.” (Id. at p. 270, fn. 25.) It has the salutary effect of “keeping
h[er] triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions.” (Ibid.) Like many constitutional rights, the
right to public trial is not absolute and may “give way in certain cases to
other rights or interests.” (Waller v. Georgia (1984) 467 U.S. 39, 45 (Waller).)
These interests must be sufficiently substantial1 and, more importantly for
our purposes, the trial closure must be “essential” and “narrowly tailored” to
serve that interest. (Waller, at p. 45.) Thus, “the party seeking to close the
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced,
the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding,
and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” (Id. at p. 48.)
      Of particular importance here, not all members of the public are
identically situated when it comes to enforcing a defendant’s right to a

“public” trial.2 Reflective of our common humanity, we recognize that the
defendant’s relatives and friends occupy a special position. They provide both

1      In determining whether closing a trial is permissible, the Ninth Circuit
has distinguished between “whether the courtroom closure is total or partial.
A total closure of the courtroom means that ‘all persons other than witnesses,
court personnel, the parties and their lawyers are excluded for the duration
of the hearing’ [Citation.]. A partial closure means the court has excluded
only a limited number of persons from the courtroom, either for the duration
of the proceeding or for a limited period of time (such as during one witness’s
testimony).” (United States v. Allen (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th 789, 797.) Here,
the closure was effectively “total.” Although the trial court referred to a
defense investigator and “victim advocate” being present, there was no
explanation as to their exact functions and no one without a role in the trial
was permitted to observe. In any event, the government’s public health
concern with protecting persons from the COVID-19 virus “is unquestionably
a compelling interest.” (Catholic Diocese, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 67.) The real
question in this case is whether the exclusion of Zemek’s family was essential
and narrowly tailored to achieve this interest.
2      Thus, the fundamental issue is not whether the Sixth Amendment
provides greater rights to a defendant’s family. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)
The right to a public trial belongs to the defendant. The question is whether
that constitutional right requires a court to treat the defendant’s family
differently than the public at large in crafting a closure order that is narrowly
tailored to achieve the particular overriding interest.
                                       2
psychological encouragement for the defendant and a tangible reminder to
the jury that she is not a social outcast bereft of family and community
support. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “[W]ithout
exception, all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to
have [their] friends, relatives, and counsel present.” (Oliver, supra, 333 U.S.
at pp. 271–272; see also State v. Brimmer (Iowa 2022) 983 N.W.2d 247, 265
(Brimmer) [“Striking a proper balance means allowing at least the
defendant’s family to attend if possible within the parameters of the
overriding interest [citation], as was done by other courts during COVID.”];
Tinsley v. United States (D.C. 2005) 868 A.2d 867, 873 [“Of all members of the
public, a criminal defendant’s family and friends are the people most likely to
be interested in, and concerned about, the defendant’s treatment and fate, so
it is precisely their attendance at trial that may best serve the purposes of
the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee.”].) So just because there is
good reason not to allow every member of the public to attend a trial does not
absolve the court of the obligation to determine whether at least some family
members can be accommodated. (English v. Artuz (2d Cir. 1998) 164 F.3d
105, 108 [applying the Waller factors, extent of the court closure must take
account of “the relationship of those excluded to the complaining
defendant”].)
      Before and during her trial, Zemek repeatedly invoked these public
trial rights by asking the judge to allow two people—her husband and
sister—to attend court proceedings in person. During jury selection, the
court denied defense counsel’s first such request by explaining that the
proceedings were “closed to the public” and Zemek’s family members, like
everyone else, would be limited to viewing a livestream video of the trial from
a different room in the courthouse. When counsel pointed out, “They are not

                                        3
the public. They are family,” the judge rebuked him for “playing antics.” The
court saw no difference between members of the defendant’s family and
anyone else who wanted to observe the trial. According to the judge, “They
are the public, they are [and] [t]he Court made good cause findings to close
the proceedings to the public.” Counsel persisted, explaining that the family
members should be given special consideration because Zemek was entitled
to their physical presence and support:

         “I think it’s recognized under the United States
         Constitution and the California Constitution. It’s not like
         they’re newspaper reporters, it’s not like they are just free-
         floating members of the public, they are close to this
         defendant. And I think under the Constitution, one or two
         more seats is not going to interfere with the number of
         jurors that we have impaneled, including the alternates, to
         allow them to be here. They can be socially distanced.
         They could spread out. It’s not going to interfere with any of
         the COVID protocols, and it’s going to provide the essential
         moral support to my client. And it also will allow the jury
         to see that she’s not an orphan, that there are people here
         who care for her and are concerned about these
         proceedings.” (Italics added.)

Unpersuaded, the court remarked, “[M]y ruling remains. . . . The Court
already found good cause [to close the proceedings].”
      Zemek’s counsel continued to raise the issue in response to repeated
problems with the livestream video throughout trial. Each time, the trial
judge refused to recognize any obligation to separately evaluate the need to
exclude one or two family members, focusing instead on a nonspecific finding
of good cause to close the proceedings to the public in general.
      For example, on the second day of testimony defense counsel informed
the court that Zemek’s “husband and family were unable to hear great
portions of yesterday’s proceedings due to some snafu with the livestream.”

                                       4
The clerk confirmed that the livestream was down for about two hours.
Counsel again asked the court to permit the two family members to attend in
person, reiterating that Zemek’s public trial right “applies with more force to
her husband and close family relations.” He specifically noted that there
were “two seats in the back row that are unoccupied by anybody and they
could be socially distanced, six feet apart, if the court would permit them to
attend.” Denying the request, the trial judge cited infection statistics and
commented that he was “not even allowing the victim’s family under Marsy’s

Law.”3 Defense counsel replied, “The victim has no family”; the court
responded, “Well, I didn’t know that.” Again, Zemek’s lawyer emphasized,
“My client does have family.” Unmoved, the court stated, “We’re about seven
minutes behind schedule. Anything else?”
      Several days before testimony concluded, during another discussion
about livestream issues, defense counsel noted for the third time that “there
is room in the back row” for Zemek’s husband and sister “to be socially
distanced.” The court appeared to agree, but then deflected the issue by

stating that two other people sometimes sat in the back row.4 Counsel
replied, “There’s still room for at least her husband and her sister” and

3     Marsy’s Law, also colloquially known as the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act
of 2008, provides that a victim is entitled to be present at “all public
proceedings . . . at which the defendant and the prosecutor are entitled to be
present . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(7).)
4     The exchange was as follows:
         “[Defense Counsel:] I think the record should reflect that
         there is room in the back row for both of them to be socially
         distanced.
         “THE COURT: Right. But also let the record reflect that
         the victim advocate sits in the back. Also your investigator
         has been in the back row.”
                                       5
“[b]eyond that,” the livestream had not been working for “at least three or
four days.” The court acknowledged receiving complaints about the
livestream and, according to the clerk, the “IT person” said it was not going to
be “an easy fix.” The judge directed the clerk to determine if there was an
empty courtroom with livestream capability. Meanwhile, the jury returned
and testimony resumed. Later that morning, the trial was moved to a
different courtroom.

                                        B

      As citizens of this nation, we take justifiable pride in the protection for
individual rights provided by our Constitution, especially the first ten
amendments we call the Bill of Rights as well as the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Unfortunately, our record of
honoring and protecting these rights in times of crisis is checkered at best.
(See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak (2020) ___ U.S. ___, ___
[140 S.Ct. 2603, 2615] (dis. opn. of Kavanaugh, J. [dissenting from denial of
injunctive relief]) [“history is littered with unfortunate examples of overly
broad judicial deference” where the government invokes an emergency or
crisis to abrogate fundamental rights].) In the heat of the moment, it may
appear tempting to “suspend” protection for constitutional rights that
inconveniently interfere with our efforts to deal with an emergency. But
“[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency,
when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” (Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives’ Ass’n (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 635 (dis. opn. of Marshall, J.).)
In hindsight, the apparent value of expedience generally fades in the
clarifying light of historical perspective. Or, more bluntly in Justice
Marshall’s words, “[W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in

                                        6
the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.”
(Ibid.)
      Examples, lamentably, abound. The ink on the Bill of Rights was
hardly dry when, as an outgrowth of the Quasi-War with France in 1798,
Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. These “infamous statutes” that
criminalized core political speech are now remembered as a blatant violation
of fundamental First Amendment principles. (Ellis, Founding Brothers
(2001) p. 190; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 276
[although the legislation was never tested in court, “the attack upon its
validity has carried the day in the court of history”].)
      The American Civil War was arguably the most dire emergency ever
confronted by the nation. The Lincoln Administration’s suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus and creation of military tribunals to try civilians for
sedition was not addressed by the United States Supreme Court until after
the war’s end. But in Ex parte Milligan (1866) 71 U.S. 2 (Milligan), a
unanimous court—including five Lincoln appointees—found the President’s

emergency actions unconstitutional.5 Evaluating the claimed exigency with
the perspective of hindsight, the majority opinion forcefully rejected the
government’s argument that civil war justified suspending the judicial power
of civilian courts in states that remained loyal to the Union: “No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man

5     Chief Justice Chase, as well as Justices Swayne, Miller, Davis and
Field, were all appointed by President Lincoln. Referring to the timing of the
decision, Justice Davis’s majority opinion candidly acknowledged that while
the war was being waged, “the temper of the times did not allow that
calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion
of a purely judicial question.” (Milligan, supra, 71 U.S. 2, 109.)
                                        7
than that any . . . provisions [of the Constitution] can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government.” (Milligan, at p. 121.)
      No more damning example exists than Korematsu v. U.S. (1944) 323
U.S. 214 (Korematsu), in which a majority of the United States Supreme
Court approved the internment of United States citizens of Japanese
ancestry during World War II. Even in the midst of the bloodiest conflict in
world history, Justice Jackson’s dissent recognized why resort to military
“necessity” as justification for the internment order was inconsistent with
fundamental constitutional principles: “[A] judicial construction of the due
process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty
than the promulgation of the order itself. . . . [O]nce a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or
rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure . . . . The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.” (Id. at pp. 245–246 (dis. opn. of Jackson,
J.).) It took more than 50 years, but the Court has now expressly
acknowledged that “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided,
has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in
law under the Constitution.’ ” (Trump v. Hawaii (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [138
S.Ct. 2392, 2423].)
                                        C

      With each of these examples, and others we could add, the
“inconvenient” constitutional right is a different one—the First Amendment
right of free expression, the right to judicial review protected by the Due
Process Clause, the prohibition on racial discrimination afforded by the Equal

                                        8
Protection Clause. Likewise, the nature of the emergency varies from case to
case. It could be a foreign war, a domestic civil war, the War on Terror or the
War on Drugs. In this case we deal with a different kind of battle—a fight
against a global pandemic—and a different constitutional right—the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial.
      We draw from different examples throughout history not to suggest any
equivalency regarding the constitutional deprivations at stake, but rather to
underscore the critical role of judicial oversight in safeguarding individual
rights in times of emergency. Whenever the protection of established
constitutional rights is claimed to conflict with the government’s effective
response to an emergency, it is not enough for the judicial branch, as
guardians of the individual rights protected by the Constitution, to await the
judgment of the “court of history” at some undetermined future point in time.
Rather, we have the responsibility to closely examine claims of exigent
“necessity,” with the benefit of whatever perspective the passage of time
allows, against the applicable constitutional standard. Indeed, it is only
“ ‘[b]y subjecting government incursions on civil liberties to meaningful
judicial review [that] courts force the government to do its homework—to
communicate not only the purposes of its actions, but also how the imposed
restrictions actually relate to and further those purposes.’ ” (Wiley &
Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against
“Suspending” Judicial Review (2020) 133 Harvard L.Rev. Forum 179, 195.)
      For the trial court in this case, the issue seemed simple. It decided that
the danger of infection justified closing the courtroom to the public. Although
social distancing had been accepted as the standard basis for deciding how
many people could occupy a particular space, the court did not concern itself
with that level of detail. Zemek’s husband and sister were members of the

                                       9
public. They were entitled to no special consideration, and were excluded just
like members of the victim’s family. The fact that the victim had no family
was beside the point.
      This reasoning cannot be squared with the established constitutional
requirements that a court narrowly tailor court closure orders and consider
alternatives to complete exclusion. (Waller, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 45, 48.)
Applying the Waller test, courts have routinely found violations of a
defendant’s public trial right where circumstances justified restricting
courtroom attendance but the court failed to consider whether a limited
number of the defendant’s family members could be present. (See, e.g.,
Brimmer, supra, 983 N.W.2d at p. 265 [order closing courtroom to all
spectators during COVID-19 pandemic was not “narrowly tailored” in failing
to “allow[ ] at least the defendant’s family to attend if possible within the
parameters of the overriding interest”]; Vidal v. Williams (2d Cir. 1994) 31
F.3d 67, 68 [although excluding the general public was justified, there was
insufficient reason to prohibit defendant’s parents from being present]; State
v. Tucker (Ariz. Ct.App. 2012) 290 P.3d 1248, 1257 [exclusion of defendants’
families along with the rest of the general public was broader than necessary
to achieve the state interest]; Watters v. State (1992) 328 Md. 38, 45 [sheriff’s
order uniformly excluding members of the defendant’s family as well as the
press and the public was not “narrowly tailored” to address space limitations
in the courtroom].) Similarly here, the record reflects that Zemek’s two
family members could have been accommodated, consistent with existing
COVID-19 protocols, without undue risk to the trial participants.
      The majority opinion suggests there is something “unfair” about
evaluating the necessity for and breadth of the trial court’s closure order in
light of what three years’ experience with the COVID-19 pandemic has

                                       10
taught us. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) To the contrary, however, a certain
temporal distance “allows that calmness in deliberation and discussion so
necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.” (Milligan,
supra, 71 U.S. at p. 109.) I submit, moreover, that our experience has merely
highlighted what was missing from the justifications proffered by the court
for excluding two of Zemek’s family members, purported justifications we are

constitutionally bound to dispassionately scrutinize.6 (See Catholic Diocese,
supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 68.)
      We all remember what it was like in the fall of 2020 when we were
trying to reclaim some level of normalcy based on limited and evolving
information about pandemic risks. But it is precisely when courts need to act
on less-than-perfect information that we must demand their rigorous
adherence to the well-established standards for proper decision making.
When we require that a court closure order be no broader than necessary,
justified by specific findings, and that the court consider any and all
reasonable alternatives that would narrow the order, we guard against
unnecessary infringements on constitutional rights that merely serve the
government’s convenience or, worse yet, rest on unsubstantiated fear instead
of evidence.
      It is suggested that “[e]ach additional person permitted inside the
courtroom (a confined space) is an additional person who may have COVID-
19 and increases the risk of infection . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) True

6      “[C]ourts should not just police the Constitution’s boundaries and set
‘firm and unequivocal’ lines during periods of calm. They should also stand
watch during periods of emergency, applying standard doctrines of judicial
review and calling out unconstitutional action where they see it.” (Tyler,
Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the Founding Through the
COVID-19 Pandemic (2023) 109 Va. L.Rev. 489, 581–582.)
                                        11
enough, “but the fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify
its being drawn anywhere.” (Pearce v. Commissioner (1942) 315 U.S. 543,
558, dis. opn. of Frankfurter, J.) The line must be drawn in a reasonable
place, based on reasonable standards that account for the important
constitutional interests at stake. Here, personal attendance by at least some
members of the defendant’s family is the constitutional interest that must be
accommodated if reasonably possible.
      If the choice were an all-or-nothing one—limiting attendance to actual
trial participants (judge, jurors, attorneys, court personnel, witnesses and the
defendant) or accepting a crowded courtroom full of spectators—the line
drawn by the trial court here might be defensible. But those weren’t the only
options. Defense counsel repeatedly informed the court that accepted social
distancing criteria would permit two members of Zemek’s family to be
present. If that wasn’t factually accurate, the court or the prosecutor seeking
to justify the closure order had an obligation to say so. They did not. Nor did
the court offer any other reason why it was necessary to exclude the two
family members, apart from its mistaken reference to the victim’s
nonexistent family. Our collective experience over the last several years only
confirms that the court’s order—well-intentioned, perhaps—was arbitrary,
unnecessarily restrictive, and ultimately unconstitutional. And as the
majority opinion concedes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12), if this was error it was a
structural one requiring reversal.

                               Juror Misconduct

      What happened in the middle of defense counsel’s closing argument is
undisputed. Counsel had hoped to finish by the end of the day on Tuesday,
November 10 in advance of the court holiday on November 11, leaving only
the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. But as proceedings were about to

                                       12
conclude, defense counsel apologized and indicated he still had some matters
to discuss. In other words, closing argument was always going to continue on
Thursday, November 12; the only question was which attorney would be
speaking when proceedings resumed?
      The judge adjourned court for the day and left the courtroom. As the
jury was preparing to leave, one of the jurors expressed his frustration with
defense counsel: “ ‘This trial’s never going to end. That’s his strategy.’ ”
(Italics added.) The prosecutor confirmed hearing the substance of the
statement.
      I submit that the frustrated juror’s meaning is obvious. He had
personally concluded the defendant was guilty, and nothing else defense
counsel could say was going to change that. In this juror’s view, defense
counsel knew his client was guilty and had adopted a strategy to delay the
day of reckoning for as long as possible by offering an interminable closing

argument. Perhaps one might conjure other more benign interpretations,7
but the most reasonable one is far from benign.
      For a juror to form or express any opinion about the defendant’s guilt
before the case is submitted to the jury for decision is “ ‘serious misconduct,’ ”
pure and simple. (People v. Weatherton (2014) 59 Cal.4th 589, 598
(Weatherton); Pen. Code, § 1122, subd. (b); see also People v. Linton (2013)
56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194.) Where a juror is shown to have engaged in
misconduct—and in particular by prematurely forming or expressing an
opinion on guilt—“the defendant is afforded the benefit of a rebuttable

7     The majority opinion suggests that the juror “did not say that he had
already made up his mind,” but merely “expressed his frustration regarding
the length of defense counsel’s closing argument.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)
That might be a fair reading if the juror had simply said, “ ‘This argument is
never going to end.’ ”
                                        13
presumption of prejudice.” (People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105,
1116–1117; see In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 118.) Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine how a juror prematurely forming an opinion on guilt
could not be prejudicial, even if that opinion was communicated to no one
else. A defendant is entitled to a unanimous verdict following the thoughtful
deliberation of 12 impartial jurors, not 11. (See People v. Holloway (1990) 50
Cal.3d 1098, 1112.)
      Here, the trial court accepted that the juror made the statement as
alleged (“I agree that the statement happened”) and that it constituted
misconduct (“I agree with you that there was some misconduct”). In the
court’s mind, however, the defendant didn’t satisfy her “burden” of
demonstrating that the misconduct “[rose] to the level” of requiring that the
juror be excused.
      The trial court seems to have relied on a principle of de minimis juror
misconduct in refusing to take any action beyond repeating the desultory
admonition not to “express any opinion about this case until you are in the
jury deliberation room.” This was the same admonition the juror in question
had already ignored. It is true, of course, that not every minor transgression
mandates removal of the offending juror, nor does every allegation of
misconduct require an evidentiary hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Bell (2019)
7 Cal.5th 70, 120.) “ ‘Where the misconduct is of such trifling nature that it
could not in the nature of things have prevented either party from having a
fair trial, the verdict should not be set aside.’ ” (People v. Calles (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1200, 1211, quoting Enyart v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 499, 507.)
      But the misconduct in this case was far from trifling. It went to the
heart of the defendant’s right to jury deliberations by 12 jurors, each of whom

                                        14
had not yet formed or expressed an opinion on her guilt. If, despite its
statement that “there was some misconduct,” the trial court believed there
was a legitimate question what the juror meant by his statement, it should
have conducted a hearing and examined the juror, as defense counsel urged.
(See People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60, 70 [trial court “must
hold a hearing when it learns of allegations which, if true, would constitute
good cause for a juror’s discharge”].) The court was not permitted to assume
the most benign interpretation without any facts to support it, and then use
that assumption as the justification for conducting no further inquiry.
      The trial court’s analysis here is functionally identical to the reasoning
employed by the trial judge in Weatherton, who found misconduct but
concluded that it “ ‘[did] not rise to the level that there is a substantial
likelihood [of bias].’ ” (59 Cal.4th at p. 600.) As the California Supreme
Court explained, however, “This formulation has it backward.” (Ibid.) A
finding of juror misconduct creates a presumption of prejudice. After that,
there is no “burden” on the defendant. The burden is on the prosecution to
demonstrate a lack of prejudice. Even assuming that a further investigation
might have developed evidence to support such a claim, here the court chose
not to conduct one. As a result, the prosecutor never made the showing
necessary to rebut the presumption of prejudice, compelling reversal on this
independent ground.

                                                                         DATO, J.

                                        15