Court Opinion

ID: 9765842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:21:42.686269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.151324
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice. Appellant, Rodney Williams, having several felony convictions, was convicted of the aggravated robbery and first degree murder of Hoyt Green and sentenced on each charge to life imprisonment, the robbery sentence merging with the murder sentence. For reversal, Williams argues that it was error to admit evidence of an unrelated crime and to admit two custodial statements given by him, the first on May 8,1982 and a later one on May 14. The arguments are without merit and, accordingly, we affirm the trial court. At about 8 o’clock on the evening of May 7, 1982, Mrs. Patricia Nobles was accosted by a gunman at the rear of her home at 4400 W. 29th Street, Little Rock, as she returned from shopping. She was robbed of her purse, containing credit cards and cash, and she watched the robber get into a light colored Buick. After Williams was arrested she recognized him in a line up and she firmly identified him at trial as the man who robbed her. About thirty minutes later, Hoyt Green was approached by two men as he worked in his yard at 3705 W. 11th Street in Little Rock. At gunpoint, the men demanded money and when Green resisted, one of them shot and killed him. The two men drove away in a vehicle matching the description of the one used in the robbery of Mrs. Nobles. Coins were found near the body of Hoyt Green and some were scattered as the man ran to the waiting car. Williams was arrested around 11 o’clock the following morning. There is no argument that the Miranda warnings were not given; they were fully explained to him. At 9 o’clock that evening Williams gave a statement denying any connection with the Hoyt Green murder, but admitting that he and two companions had robbed Mrs. Nobles. On May 14 Williams called Officer Ivan Jones to discuss the charges. Jones attempted to reach Williams’ lawyer, who was unavailable, and Williams said he wanted to go ahead and asked that a prosecuting attorney be present. Lloyd Haynes, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, accompanied Jones to the county jail, where Williams offered to give a statement concerning Hoyt Green if he would not be charged with capital felony murder. He then gave a statement that he and two companions had seen Hoyt Green in the yard as they drove around. Williams said he and another passenger got out of the car to rob Green and when Green resisted, the other man shot him. Other shots were fired as they ran to the car. The May 8 and the May 14 statements were admitted in evidence over defense objections. The May 14 statement is challenged on the grounds: a) that Williams’ lawyer was not present and b) the statement was given in reward for a promise to bring a lesser charge. The May 8 statement is attacked because of Williams’ age, limited intellect, and apprehension over being interrogated. The argument points out that Williams was arrested at 10:30 a.m. and did not give a statement until 9:05 that evening. The arguments are not sufficient. As required by our case law [Degler v. State, 257 Ark. 388, 517 S.W.2d 515 (1974); Freeman v. State, 258 Ark. 617, 527 S.W.2d 909 (1975)], we have reviewed the circumstances developed by the omnibus hearing relative to the two statements and are satisfied the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that they were given voluntarily. Williams was twenty-two years old and had obtained the equivalent of a high-school education. He could not have been unfamiliar with police procedures, having previous felony convictions. The Miranda warnings were repeatedly given to him, which he confirms. He was not subjected to lengthy interrogation, in fact the testimony was that he was not questioned until 9:00 p.m. on the 8th, and promptly gave the statement admitting the robbery of Mrs. Nobles. There is a passing reference to his having wanted his lawyer at the May 8 interrogation (which the appellee does not address) but it is clear this issue, if it has merit, was not first presented to the trial court and, hence, will not support reversal. Meyers v. State, 271 Ark. 886, 611 S.W.2d 514 (1981); Williams v. State, 257 Ark. 8, 513 S.W.2d 793 (1974). With respect to the statement given on May 14, there was proof at the omnibus hearing which supported a finding by the trial court that Williams waived the right to have counsel present by initiating the interrogation and insisting on a meeting even though his lawyer was not then available. Williams did not refute the testimony on this issue and we agree with the findings of the trial judge. Under such circumstances, it was not wrong for Haynes and Jones to meet with Williams in the absence of his lawyer. The proof was undisputed that Williams instigated the meeting, knowing his lawyer was not available. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court reviewed the waiver of the warnings established by the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), stating: . . . [Ajlthough we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 372-376, the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. (Our italics.) Nor can the argument that the statement was given in return for a reward or promise be sustained. The applicable law is summarized in Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S. W.2d 1 (1982): The second prong of appellant’s suppression argumain components, first, the statement of the officer on a case-by-case basis by looking at the totality of the circumstances. The applicable law is simple. If a police official makes a false promise which misleads a prisoner, and the prisoner gives a confession because of that false promise, then the confession has not been voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. In determining whether there has been a misleading promise of reward we look at the totality of the circumstances. The totality is subdivided into two main compopnents, first, the statement of the officer and second, the vulnerability of the defendant. Here the promise was neither false nor an inducement of Williams’ May 14 confession. He was not enticed by “the flattery of hope”, or excited by prospects of reward from those in authority. He conceived the idea and initiated the meeting where he proposed to give a statement in return for an assurance that he would be charged with first degree murder. Nothing suggests the statement was extorted from Williams by false promises. See Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914). Williams makes no claim his statement was false, or that he was misled by Haynes and Jones. In fact, the state delivered exactly what he asked for, in contrast to the circumstances in Tatum v. State, 266 Ark. 506, 585 S.W.2d 957 (1979), where an officer who had promised to do all he could to help the accused, did nothing; or Freeman v. State, 258 Ark. 617, 527 S.W.2d 909 (1975), where the accused got life after being told that twenty-one years was the most he would receive; or Hardin v. State, 66 Ark. 53 (1898), where Hardin received the death penalty after being told that second-degree murder would follow. Finally, appellant cites Hickey v. State, 263 Ark. 809, 569 S.W.2d 64 (1978) and Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954) for the argument that proof of the “unrelated” robbery of Mrs. Mattie Nobles should not have been permitted. We cannot say the finding of the trial court on this issue was so clearly wrong as to require its exclusion under Unif. R. Evid. 403. The two men who accosted Mr. Green fled the scene in a light colored Buick which exactly matched the automobile Mrs. Nobles saw Williams get into after she was robbed. Moreover, the two crimes were closely related in time, in location and, especially, in method of operation, i.e., both crimes occurred as Williams and others simply drove around aimlessly in an area generally adjacent to Wright Avenue, until they spotted what they deemed to be likely subj ects for robbery. We think there is probative value in the evidence which brings it within the scope of Unif. R. Evid. 404. See Clines, et al v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684(1983). The judgment on the sentences is affirmed. Purtle, J., dissents.