Court Opinion

ID: 9388728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:01:52.110865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.209927
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 21, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0721
                                _________________________

                                     Daniel Flickinger

                                                  v.

   Lawrence Tracy King and King Simmons Ford & Spree P.C.

                      Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                                 (CV-21-226)

COOK, Justice.

       In 2020, Daniel Flickinger, an attorney in Birmingham, posted a

message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he
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appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while

Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along

with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared

with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy

King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford

& Spree, P.C. ("the King law firm"). Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was

forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a

"private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments

about him both personally and professionally.

     Flickinger sued King and the King law firm ("the King

defendants"), asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and

tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants

filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

Ala. R. Civ. P., and that motion was granted by the Jefferson Circuit

Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment

and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                     Facts and Procedural History

     At the time of the events underlying the present lawsuit, Flickinger

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had been employed as a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope &

McMeekin, P.C. ("WPM"), for approximately 11 years. According to

Flickinger, during the course of his career with WPM, he had been active

on various social-media platforms and had often posted "conservative

political and cultural commentary" on those platforms. Flickinger

maintained that, when he posted such commentary, he always did so in

his "personal capacity" and that he never "listed his place of employment

on his personal social media profiles or in conjunction with his personal

social media posts."

     It is undisputed that, in June 2020, Flickinger posted the following

message on his personal Facebook page, apparently regarding the death

of George Floyd:

     "Things I think about: If I were a seven-time felon, with my
     most recent prison stint stemming from robbing and holding
     a pregnant woman at gunpoint in her home, would I choose to
     die in a fentanyl and methamphetamine numbed
     strangulation if it meant being worshipped in a nationwide
     funeral and my family receiving millions of dollars? Purely
     hypothetical."

     On June 9, 2020, Flickinger received a telephone call from his

supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, during which Wainwright

revealed that King had contacted him regarding Flickinger's social-media

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post. Wainwright asked that Flickinger meet with him the following day.

According to Flickinger, shortly after speaking with Wainwright, he

received a "cryptic tweet" from the King law firm's Twitter social-media

account -- @KingSimmonsPC -- that contained a "large eyes emoji" along

with one of Flickinger's posts from several days earlier on his personal

Facebook page. 1

      The next day, June 10, 2020, Flickinger met with the partners of

WPM. Although, according to Flickinger, the WPM partners at the

meeting admitted that they "did not understand social media" and were

"not on social media," they expressed that they were very concerned

about the public connection between his social-media post and their law

firm, and, according to Flickinger, one partner asked: "How could you do

this to us?"

      After Flickinger asked the WPM partners numerous times for a

copy of the actual images sent to them by the King defendants, Flickinger

says, "the managing partner … permitted [Flickinger] to view his phone,

      1This was the first and only correspondence that Flickinger alleges
that he received from the King defendants, and he contends that at no
point did the King defendants inform him that they had contacted WPM.

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which depicted an image that was generated, manufactured, sent,

published, and/or distributed by Lawrence T. King and King Simmons

Ford Spree, P.C. containing a counterfeit social media profile using

[Flickinger's] professional credentials that [Flickinger] had never used in

conjunction with personal social media posts." (Emphasis added.)

According to Flickinger, the allegedly "counterfeit" social-media profile

contained a professional photograph "appropriated" from WPM's Web

site that, he said, he had never used on any of his personal social-media

platforms as well as the name of Flickinger's employer, which, he

maintains, he had "never advertised or shared in conjunction with any of

his personal social media posts."

     According to Flickinger, digitally merged with this "counterfeit"

social-media profile were additional social-media posts appropriated

from his personal social-media platforms that were critical of the mass

nationwide violence that had been going on in the wake of George Floyd's

death. Additionally, offensive comments about his initial social-media

post about George Floyd's death had been added to that "counterfeit"

profile to make it appear that third persons were commenting directly on

the social-media post. Those comments included statements that

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Flickinger was a "racist" and that WPM was "a business that supports

racism."

     Flickinger was then told that the WPM partners had had

discussions with King about the King defendants' "ability and

willingness to control the distribution of the false and defamatory images

favorably for WPM." At the conclusion of the meeting, Flickinger was

informed that either he must resign or WPM would pursue "other [more

punitive] options." Flickinger resigned.

     After Flickinger resigned, the WPM partners informed him that

they had spoken on the phone with King a second time and that King had

told them again about the King defendants' "ability and willingness to

control the distribution of the false and defamatory images favorably for

WPM." The very next day, the following "tweet" appeared on the

@KingSimmonsPC Twitter page:

     "We represent a lot of hurt workers across Alabama, & spar
     w/lots of great defense lawyers. Those @ [WPM] (2 of whom
     I've know for well over 34 years) are as diligent, fair, upright,
     honest, & ethical as are found anywhere. Felt like saying it.
     #RESPECT."

Additionally, a Facebook page belonging to an individual who Flickinger

alleges is a "co-conspirator" with the King defendants contained the

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following message:

     "Now that [Daniel Flickinger] has been erased, I want to say
     that the firm he worked for has a great reputation in town and
     they are honest, professional, kind people. Good for them for
     such a fast and definitive response."

     Flickinger subsequently discovered that the King law firm's Twitter

page contained "tweets" allegedly authored by the King defendants

"gloating over the employment termination of private citizens solely on

the basis of citizens expressing thoughts and opinions with which [the

King defendants] disagreed." For example, Flickinger noticed that, before

the events underlying the present action occurred, the following post

appeared on the @KingSimmonsPC Twitter page regarding the

employment termination of a different person:

     "5/12/2020: Here's a white guy that got fired by his law firm
     employer. He wouldn't wear a mask in a 'ghetto store' and
     bragged about his guns and ammo. What a turd…"

     In addition, Flickinger alleges that he later discovered that

members of a 1,500-plus member "private" Facebook group named

"CALLING OUT ALABAMA BUSINESSES THAT SUPPORT RACISM"

had been posting the following statements accusing him of being a

"racist" and accusing WPM of being a "business that supports racism":

        • "Calling Out Alabama Businesses That Support Racism… So
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           [Daniel Flickinger] is a lawyer! Who knows what kinda
           ethical damage he's done?! He works at Wainwright, Pope,
           McMeekin, P.C."

        • "I went to school for years with this asshole… Racist condones
          running over protestors a few posts down…"

        • "….DEFINITELY email [Daniel Flickinger's] firm. Firms are
          firing people left and right for being racist scumbags (and
          rightfully so)"

        • "Ugly inside and out"

        • "What a f***ing piece of s**t"

According to Flickinger, King was a member of this "private" Facebook

group, something that King now denies.

     As a result of this conduct, Flickinger filed suit against the King

defendants. In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged claims

of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a

business relationship. It does not appear that Flickinger averred that the

content of his social-media post itself was doctored; instead, he averred

that the image sent to his employer is actionable because it was falsely

made to appear as if he was posting from an account linked to his place

of employment. He also alleged that the false and defamatory statements

added to the image (that is, the comments by others) were actionable. As

a "direct result of false and defamatory materials generated,

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manufactured, sent, published and/or distributed by Defendants among

the partners of WPM," Flickinger alleged that he was constructively

discharged.

     The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss in which they alleged

that Flickinger's "claims do not contain the necessary elements for any of

those causes of action and thus the Complaint, on its face, must be

dismissed," asserting that attributing Flickinger's own statements from

his personal Facebook page to him was not defamatory. They also argued

that Flickinger's tortious-interference claim was due to be dismissed

because, they said, they never intended for his employment with WPM to

be terminated and there was nothing wrongful about their decision to

truthfully share the content of Flickinger's Facebook post with WPM.

Finally, the King defendants argued that Flickinger's invasion-of-privacy

claim was due to be dismissed because, they said, the social-media

statements attributed to him were not "false" and were not "publicized."

     In his response to their motion, Flickinger disputed that he had

failed to satisfy the elements of his claims. Specifically, Flickinger

disputed the King defendants' assertion that they did not intend to bring

about the termination of his employment by sharing his Facebook post

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with WPM. In support of his response, Flickinger argued that various

tweets from the @KingSimmonsPC Twitter page "gloatingly revel in the

employment termination of American citizens, who … expressed personal

opinions that ran afoul of [the King defendants'] self-described

'progressive,' political orthodoxy."

     The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. 2 Following that

hearing, the trial court entered a judgment in which it stated:

     "In his Complaint, [Flickinger] asserts claims for defamation,
     invasion of privacy/false light, [and] tortious interference .…
     All of these claims have their genesis in the fact that
     [Flickinger] was terminated from his at-will employment as
     an associate attorney at a law firm for making a social [media]
     post on his personal social media account. … The Complaint
     makes clear that [Flickinger] knowingly and purposefully
     made the social media post. The Complaint also makes clear
     that [Flickinger] was an associate attorney at the law firm at
     the time he made the social media post. Finally, the
     Complaint makes clear that [Flickinger] was terminated from
     his employment with the law firm for making the social media
     post while he was an associate attorney at the law firm.

     "This lawsuit states no claims against [Flickinger's] former
     law firm; i.e., there is no allegation that the law firm illegally
     terminated [Flickinger] from his employment. Rather, this
     suit seeks to advance tort claims against third-parties who are
     alleged to have linked the fact that [Flickinger] made the
     social media post to the fact that [Flickinger] was an
     associate attorney with the law firm, which resulted in the

     2A   transcript of the hearing was not included in the record on
appeal.
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     termination of [Flickinger's] employment at the firm.

     "Because [Flickinger's] Complaint acknowledges that all of
     the above facts are true, none of the counts in the Complaint
     states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
     Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So.
     2d 200, 203 (Ala. 2001) ('It is well established that truth is an
     absolute defense against a defamation claim. Because
     Mooneyham's defamation claim alleges a truthful
     communication, he cannot prevail even if we accept his
     allegations as true. Therefore, the trial court properly
     dismissed this claim against the defendants.') (internal
     citations omitted); Borden v. Malone, 327 So. 3d 1105, 1112
     (Ala. 2020) ('a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to
     state a claim based on an affirmative defense when the
     allegations of the complaint, on their face, show that the
     defense bars recovery'); Regions Bank v. Plott, 879 So. 2d 239,
     24 (Ala. 2004) ('unlike defamation, truth is not an affirmative
     defense to a false-light [invasion-of-privacy] claim; rather,
     "falsity" is an element of the plaintiff's claim, on which the
     plaintiff bears the burden of proof'); Bosarge v. Bankers Life
     Co., 541 So. 2d 499, 501 (Ala. 1989) ('Bosarge cannot complain
     because Bankers Life notified his clients that he was no longer
     a full-time associate of Bankers Life. That was obviously a
     truthful notification, because Bosarge had been terminated as
     an agent for Bankers Life.') …."

Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted the King defendants'

motion and dismissed Flickinger's claims with prejudice. Shortly

thereafter, Flickinger filed a postjudgment motion that was denied. He

now appeals.

                           Standard of Review

                "'On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a
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           presumption of correctness. The appropriate
           standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R.
           Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the
           complaint are viewed most strongly in the
           pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could
           prove any set of circumstances that would entitle
           her to relief. In making this determination, this
           Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will
           ultimately prevail, but only whether she may
           possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6)
           dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond
           doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
           support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff
           to relief.'

     "Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations
     omitted)."

Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Healthsouth Corp., 979 So. 2d 784, 791 (Ala.

2007) (emphasis added).

                               Discussion

     On appeal, Flickinger argues that the trial court erred by

dismissing his case at the pleading stage and resolving what he says were

"highly disputed factual contentions injected by [the King defendants]

purporting to defend their motives and the reason behind [his]

employment termination." Flickinger's brief at 26. As explained in more

detail below, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed

Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims but should not

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have dismissed his tortious-interference claim.

                             I. Defamation

     First, Flickinger contends that he has pleaded actionable

defamation in the present case. According to Flickinger, the images

"curated and distributed" by the King defendants contained "false and

defamatory statements" that, "when considered in the societal context of

the unhinged Summer 2020 cultural climate," indicate "that [he]

conducted his legal profession in a racist manner." Flickinger's brief at

28. The King defendants contend, however, that the trial court properly

dismissed this claim because, they say, linking Flickinger's publicly

viewable photograph from WPM's Web site as a means of identifying him

as the one who posted the social-media post at issue is not defamatory.

     In Alabama, the elements of a cause of action for defamation are:

     "'"1) [A] false and defamatory statement concerning the
     plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement
     to a third party; 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on
     the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of the
     statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
     special harm caused by the publication of the statement."'"

Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So. 3d 173, 186 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 840 (Ala. 2003), quoting

in turn McCaig v. Talladega Publ'g Co., 544 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1989)).
                                  13
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     The trial court cited Mooneyham v. State Board of Chiropractic

Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200, 201-04 (Ala. 2001), in dismissing Flickinger's

defamation claim on the basis that he had not satisfied the first element

(falsity). In Mooneyham, a licensed chiropractor was investigated by the

State Board of Chiropractic Examiners for violations of various laws,

rules, or regulations applicable to the chiropractic profession. Following

the investigation, the Board revoked the chiropractor's license and

ordered him to pay a fine. It then shared the results of its investigation

with certain third parties, including the State of Florida and the

Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards.

     Almost two years later, the chiropractor obtained a reversal of the

Board's determination. He then filed suit against the Board and some of

its members in which he alleged, among other things, that the Board's

decision to publish the findings of its investigation to third parties

constituted defamation. The Board and the other individual defendants

moved to dismiss the chiropractor's complaint, and the trial court granted

their motion.

     On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the chiropractor's

defamation claim. In support of its holding, this Court stated:

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     "We are particularly interested in [the chiropractor's]
     allegations that the Board found him guilty of four violations
     of Alabama's professional code of conduct for chiropractors.
     We note that [the chiropractor] alleged as a fact that the
     Board's adjudication of his disciplinary matter occurred
     before the time when he alleges certain members of the Board
     authorized communications to third parties notifying those
     third persons of the conclusion and result of the Board's
     proceedings against him.

           "[The chiropractor's] complaint indicates that he has
     essentially pleaded that the Board communicated accurate
     and true information -- at the time the alleged
     communications were authorized and at the time they were
     made, the Board had made its ruling and that ruling had not
     yet been reversed by the Montgomery Circuit Court. It is well
     established that truth is an absolute defense against a
     defamation claim. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619
     So. 2d 1280, 1289 (Ala. 1993); Foley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
     Ins. Co., 491 So. 2d 934, 937 (Ala. 1986); and Liberty Loan
     Corp. of Gadsden v. Mizell, 410 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1982).
     Because [the chiropractor's] defamation claim alleges a
     truthful communication, he cannot prevail even if we accept
     his allegations as true. Therefore, the trial court properly
     dismissed this claim against the defendants."

802 So. 2d at 203 (emphasis added).

     Unlike in Mooneyham, here, Flickinger alleged in his complaint

that the King defendants had shared a "counterfeit" social-media profile

that appeared to show that Flickinger was making a controversial

political statement on behalf of WPM. Although Flickinger does not

dispute that the statement in the post that was shared was his and was,

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therefore, truthful, he pleaded that the remainder of the post -- coupled

with the "counterfeit" social-media profile -- falsely associated his

political views with WPM.

     The affirmative association of a potentially incendiary social-media

post with the employer of the writer of the post could be relevant to a

reader and would certainly be relevant to the employer. In fact, one of

WPM's partners admitted to Flickinger that he "did not understand

social media" and was not "on social media." It would be reasonable to

conclude that he believed that readers of the post might make this false

association. Thus, under these circumstances, we agree with Flickinger

that the nature of this social-media post was in fact "false."

      However, our caselaw makes clear that it is not enough for a

statement to be "false," it must also be "defamatory." This Court has

previously stated that "'[t]he test to be applied [by the court] in

determining the defamatory nature of an imputation is that meaning

which "would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of

ordinary or average intelligence, or by a 'common mind.'"'" Finebaum v.

Coulter, 854 So. 2d 1120, 1128 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted). Writings

-- or, in this case, screenshots depicting images of writings -- can be

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"defamatory" if they "'"tend[] to harm the reputation of another so as to

lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons

from associating or dealing with him."'" Blevins v. WF Barnes Corp., 768

So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

      Additionally, "'"any false and malicious publication, when

expressed in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, is a libel [if it] …

tends to bring an individual into public hatred, contempt or ridicule …."'"

Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 19 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted).

Finally, if the depictions "employed in the allegedly libelous publication

are understood to impute dishonesty or corruption to an individual, they

are actionable." Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 927 (Ala. 1992).

      Here, Flickinger does not dispute that the social-media post at the

heart of this lawsuit was in fact written by him. He also does not allege

that the content of that post was manipulated in any way before it was

shared with the partners at WPM.

      In order to adequately allege a claim of defamation, Flickinger must

allege that the false association -- i.e., that in making that post he was

doing so as a representative of his law firm -- is what brought him "into

public hatred, contempt or ridicule" or "imput[ed] dishonesty or

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corruption" to him. Nowhere in his second amended complaint, however,

does Flickinger allege that the "counterfeit" social-media profile

associated with the post generated such outrage and hatred. Instead, it

was the content of his post that he alleges generated such outrage and

hatred. Thus, under these circumstances, Flickinger has failed to

demonstrate that the "counterfeit" social-media profile associated with

the post at issue amounted to defamation.

     However, in his complaint Flickinger also points to other

statements about him that were posted by members of the "private"

Facebook group that he alleges were defamatory, including a statement

that he was a racist. Although Flickinger appears to concede that the

King defendants did not author any of these statements, he nevertheless

alleges that the King defendants conspired with the creators of the

"private" Facebook group to make such statements and then transmitted

them to WPM.

     Flickinger argues that, given the intense social unrest in June

2020, there is even greater reason to construe these allegations as raising

valid defamation and conspiracy claims. In support of his contention,

Flickinger cites Gibson Bros. v. Oberlin College, 187 N.E.3d 629 (Ohio

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Ct. App. 2022), in which the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a defamation

judgment in favor of a plaintiff bakery against Oberlin College based on

the fact that college employees had distributed flyers created by nonparty

students that labeled the bakery as a "RACIST establishment with a

LONG ACCOUNT OF RACIAL PROFILING AND DISCRIMINATION"

at a 200-300 person protest held shortly after an incident involving the

arrest of a black Oberlin student who was subdued by a bakery employee

after the employee had witnessed the student shoplifting. Id. at 639. In

support of its holding, the Ohio Court of Appeals emphasized the

importance of the broader societal context of the ongoing campus tension

over "racial injustice" that served to amplify the reputational harm to the

bakery and the force of the false accusations of racial profiling against

the bakery. Id. at 645.

     In response, the King defendants contend that accusing someone of

being a racist is nothing more than an opinion and is, therefore, not

actionable. Specifically, they argue that a false and defamatory

statement must be a statement of fact and that, therefore, the expression

of an opinion cannot be deemed "'actionable defamation.'" Williams v.

Marcum, 519 So. 2d 473, 477 (Ala. 1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting the

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trial court's order). Although the King defendants acknowledge that our

appellate courts have not squarely addressed the question whether

accusing someone of being "racist" can be defamatory, they note that, in

Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985), this Court

held that a reference to a gay man as being "queer as a three-dollar bill"

did not amount to defamation.

     Further, the King defendants provide many pages of citations to

decisions from other jurisdictions that hold that a statement regarding

whether someone is "racist" or "supports racism" is a statement of opinion

and is thus not actionable as defamation. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman,

855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that calling someone a racist "is

not actionable unless it implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory

facts"); Cummings v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-7723(CM)(OTW), Feb.

4, 2020 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding

that reference to plaintiff as racist does not have a "precise meaning

capable of sustaining a defamation action"); Jorjani v. New Jersey Inst.

of Tech., No. 18-cv-11693, Mar. 12, 2019 (D.N.J. 2019) (not reported in

Federal Supplement) (recognizing that an allegation of racism alone is

not actionable but that, if a statement falsely implies that someone is

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engaging in specific acts, such as making racist statements or refusing to

employ a person of a certain race, it may be defamatory); and Squitieri v.

Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17CV441, Feb. 16, 2018 (W.D.N.C. 2018)

(not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding that statements indicating

that the plaintiff is racist are "clearly expressions of opinion that cannot

be proven as verifiably true or false"); see also 3 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The

Law of Torts § 572 (2d ed. 2011) ("'[R]acist' is sometimes said to be mere

name-calling and not actionable in some contexts[; however,] the term

can be actionable where it plainly imputes acts based on racial

discrimination."); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 200 (2017).

     In the present case, third parties calling Flickinger a racist in

response to his statement amounts to nothing more than the expression

of their opinions. The third-party statements identified in Flickinger's

complaint and quoted earlier in this opinion do not indicate or imply that

Flickinger committed racially discriminatory acts, which, as the caselaw

above indicates, could change the analysis of the issue.3 Although we

     3We  note briefly that, although other alleged posts by members of
the "private" Facebook group alleging that Flickinger had a history of
committing professional-ethics violations might well be actionable, see
Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856, 857-68 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (affirming
defamation judgment in favor of plaintiff tattoo artist when defendants
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should not be understood as condoning the casual use of such a powerful

label, in the present case, the third parties' use of the term "racist" is not

actionable as Flickinger's claims are currently pleaded. The language in

some of the other posts about Flickinger made by members of the

"private" Facebook group, while ill-considered, are likewise not

actionable defamatory statements. In Logan, this Court stated:

     "'Our manners, and with them our law, have not yet
     progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy
     in the form of tort damages for all intended mental
     disturbance. Liability of course cannot be extended to every
     trivial indignity. There is no occasion for the law to intervene
     with balm for wounded feelings in every case where a flood of
     billingsgate is loosed in an argument over a back fence. The
     plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be
     hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts
     that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is still, in
     this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express an
     unflattering opinion of another, however wounding it may be
     to his feeling; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech
     but also of avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is
     still very desirable that some safety valve be left through
     which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless
     steam.'"

466 So. 2d at 124 (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 54-55 (4th ed. 1971)).

displayed false statements suggesting the plaintiff's methodology
violated best health and safety practices), the statements pleaded in
Flickinger's complaint and quoted above speculate about whether
Flickinger's behavior was ethical but do not actually state that he has
committed any professional-ethics violations.
                                  22
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     Because Flickinger has failed to demonstrate that the posts at issue

constitute defamatory statements, he has failed to meet the first element

for a defamation cause of action. We, therefore, need not address the

remaining elements of such a claim and conclude that the trial court

properly dismissed this claim.

                        II. Tortious Interference

     Next, Flickinger contends that the trial court erred in dismissing

his tortious-interference claim. The elements of a prima facie tortious-

interference claim include: "(1) the existence of a protectible business

relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to which the defendant

was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally interfered;

and (5) damage." White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5,

14 (Ala. 2009).

     Historically, Alabama has recognized the employer-employee

relationship as a type of "protectible business relationship" underlying a

tortious-interference claim. See generally Gross v. Lowder Realty Better

Homes & Gardens, 494 So. 2d 590, 593 (Ala. 1986) (noting that

interference with an employer-employee relationship can form the

underlying basis for a tortious-interference cause of action); and James

                                   23
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S. Kemper & Co. Se. v. Cox & Assocs., Inc., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1386 (Ala.

1983) (same).

     Here, it is undisputed that Flickinger was employed by WPM and,

thus, that a protectible employer-employee relationship existed. It is also

undisputed that the King defendants were aware of this relationship

because they were the ones who reached out to Flickinger's supervising

attorney and shared the Facebook post at issue with him. They were also

strangers to that relationship because neither King nor the King law firm

have any affiliation with WPM. Finally, it is undisputed that Flickinger

has suffered damage because he has lost his job.

     What is disputed, however, is whether Flickinger adequately

alleged that the King defendants "intentionally interfered" with his

employer-employee relationship with WPM. Flickinger points to two

"tweets" that the King defendants allegedly made, gloating about the

firing of other private citizens and about his discharge from WPM, along

with a direct message that was sent to him from the King law firm

Twitter account the night before his employment was terminated in

support of his contention that the King defendants "intentionally

interfered" with that relationship.      Flickinger asserts that these

                                    24
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allegations alone sufficiently plead a claim that the King defendants

intentionally interfered with his employer-employee relationship with

WPM.

     Relying on this Court's decision in S.B. v. Saint James School, 959

So. 2d 72 (Ala. 2006), the King defendants argue, however, that to

sufficiently plead an allegation of intentional interference a plaintiff

must allege that the defendant "coerced" a third party into acting against

the plaintiff. According to the King defendants, like in Saint James

School, there is nothing in this case indicating that they "coerced" WPM

into terminating Flickinger's employment. Instead, they contend that

they merely "alerted" WPM to Flickinger's Facebook post that had been

shared on the "private" Facebook page and that they were acting with

the best interests of WPM in mind. They also emphasize that at no point

did they suggest that WPM confront Flickinger about his post or take any

disciplinary action against him in light of that post. According to the King

defendants, their only motivation in sharing this information was to

protect WPM from being falsely labeled as a racist business. In support

of these contentions, the King defendants point to affidavits filed by WPM

partners that the King defendants submitted in support of a motion to

                                    25
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change venue in which those WPM partners state that the King

defendants did not ask that Flickinger's employment be terminated. 4

     The King defendants' reliance on Saint James School in support of

its contention here is misplaced. In White Sands Group, supra, this

Court specifically overruled older opinions, including Saint James

School, that required a party asserting a tortious-interference claim to

make "a showing of fraud, force, or coercion." 32 So. 3d at 14.

Additionally, contrary to the King defendants' contentions, Flickinger

has asserted allegations in his complaint that would support an inference

of intent to interfere with his employer-employee relationship with WPM,

at least at the pleading stage. We also cannot ignore the fact that the

termination of Flickinger's employment occurred almost immediately

     4The  affidavits cited by the King defendants are not properly before
this Court. The trial court did not convert the motion to dismiss into a
summary-judgment motion -- something that would have required notice
and compliance with the requirements of Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. In fact,
the trial court did not even indicate that it considered the affidavits.
Thus, we do not consider the affidavits. The King defendants argue that
we can consider them because they were appended to the mandamus
petition previously filed in this action (concerning venue), and they cite
Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 280 Ala. 586, 196 So. 2d 702 (1967), in
support of their position. However, Alabama Power was decided before
the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and concerned a
unique procedural posture (presuit discovery). It is of no precedential
value in this case and is contrary to current Alabama law.
                                     26
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after WPM was contacted by King. See, e.g., Thomas v. Williams, 21 So.

3d 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (reversing judgment dismissing

intentional-interference claim when firing of employee occurred soon

after phone call from defendant to employer). Based on the foregoing, we

conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Flickinger's tortious-

interference claim.

                         III. Invasion of Privacy

     Flickinger next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his

invasion-of-privacy claim. This Court has defined the tort of invasion of

privacy as the "'intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private

activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,

shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.'" Rosen v.

Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So. 2d 735, 737 (Ala. 2001) (quoting

Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995)). The

tort of invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct wrongs:

     "'(1) intruding into the plaintiff's physical solitude or
     seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the
     plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the
     plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in
     the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the
     plaintiff's personality for a commercial use.'"

Saint James School, 959 So. 2d at 90 (quoting Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.
                                    27
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2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997)). Each of these categories has distinct elements,

and each category "'establishes a separate privacy interest that may be

invaded.'" Regions Bank v. Plott, 897 So. 2d 239, 243 (Ala. 2004) (quoting

Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998)).

     Flickinger argues that the King defendants invaded his privacy (1)

by putting him in a false position or "false light" in the public eye and (2)

by appropriating some element of his personality for a commercial use.

We will address each argument in turn.

     First, a party may be subjected to liability under a false-light

invasion-of-privacy claim when that party

     "'"gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
     the other before the public in a false light … if

                "'"'(a) the false light in which the other was
           placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
           person, and

                 "'"'(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
           reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
           matter and the false light in which the other would
           be placed.'"'"

Regions Bank, 897 So. 2d at 244 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

This Court has explained that a party "gives publicity" to a matter by

showing that false and highly offensive material has been communicated
                                     28
SC-2022-0721

"'to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially

certain to become one of public knowledge.'" Butler, 871 So. 2d at 13

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977))

(emphasis added).

     In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged that the King

defendants and their coconspirators in the "private" Facebook group

     "deliberately created, manufactured, and published, shared,
     and/or distributed images falsely and maliciously describing
     the Plaintiff in his professional capacity and/or as a corporate
     representative of his former employer as a 'racist,' 'a business
     that supports racism,' a person who has advocated for running
     over protestors, and as a lawyer who has committed ethics
     violations among a group of at least 1,500 people for the stated
     purpose of 'eras[ing]' the Plaintiff or to pressure Plaintiff's
     former employer into terminating the Plaintiff's employment
     relationship."

However, we cannot say that publication of statements to this "private"

group would make those statements essentially "public knowledge." In

fact, as the King defendants point out, 1,500 is a tiny fraction of the

population of Jefferson County. They further note that, since being fired

from WPM, Flickinger himself has publicized this dispute on other social-

media platforms. Moreover, with regard to the statements made by

members of the "private" Facebook group that Flickinger was a "racist,"

we cannot say that those statements, in these circumstances, are "highly
                                   29
SC-2022-0721

offensive." Under these circumstances, Flickinger failed to allege a claim

of invasion of privacy based on "false light." 5

      With regard to commercial appropriation, this Court has previously

stated:

      "Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C, states that liability
      for this wrong arises when one's name or likeness is
      'appropriated' by another to the other's 'use or benefit.'
      Comment d to this section states, in part:

            "'No one has the right to object merely because his
            name or his appearance is brought before the
            public, since neither is in any way a private matter
            and both are open to public observation. It is only
            when the publicity is given for the purpose of
            appropriating to the defendant's benefit the
            commercial or other values associated with the
            name or the likeness that the right of privacy is
            invaded.'"

Schifano v. Greene Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala.

1993). To illustrate, in Schifano, patrons of a dog-racing park were

photographed as they sat in a section of the park that could be reserved

      5We   should not be understood as holding that publicizing a matter
to only 1,500 persons is never sufficient to support a false-light invasion-
of-privacy claim. Compare Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 13 (Ala.
2013) (noting that distributing a handbill to a "large" number of people
might satisfy the publicity requirement). However, at least in this
context, publishing matters to this "private" Facebook group regarding a
plaintiff living in the metro Birmingham area did not make those matters
essentially "public knowledge."
                                     30
SC-2022-0721

by interested groups. The park printed the photograph in an advertising

brochure. The patrons in the photograph were not identified by name.

The photograph was taken by a camera mounted on a tripod in full view

of, and only a few feet from, the patrons being photographed.

     The patrons sued the park, alleging invasion of privacy based on

commercial appropriation of their likenesses. The trial court entered a

judgment for the park.

     As the quote above indicates, this Court, quoting the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d, noted that "'[i]t is only when the publicity

is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the

commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that

the right of privacy is invaded.'" Schifano, 624 So. 2d at 181. Because

there was "no unique quality or value in the [patrons'] likenesses that

would result in commercial profit to the [p]ark simply from using a

photograph that included them," id., this Court concluded that the

patrons could not prevail.

     In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged:

     "[T]he Defendants maliciously appropriated misleadingly
     manipulated elements of the Plaintiff's personal likeness for
     the commercial purpose of pressuring Plaintiff's former
     employer into terminating its business relationship with the
                                     31
SC-2022-0721

     Plaintiff. Defendants further maliciously appropriated and
     misleadingly manipulated elements of the Plaintiff's personal
     likeness for the commercial purpose of flexing their power and
     influence within the Alabama workers' compensation bar to
     serve as the political and ideological gatekeepers of those who
     may earn a living practicing workers' compensation defense
     law while also practicing fundamental First Amendment
     freedoms of speech and thought."

Other than accusing the King defendants of "maliciously" and

"misleadingly" appropriating his "personal likeness for the commercial

purpose of pressuring [his] former employer into terminating its business

relationship" with him and "for the commercial purpose of flexing their

power and influence within the Alabama workers' compensation bar,"

Flickinger does not otherwise allege any "unique quality or value in [his

social-media presence] that would result in commercial profit to" the

King defendants. Id. at 181. Thus, under these circumstances, Flickinger

has failed to allege that his privacy was invaded in this way.

     Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly dismissed

Flickinger's invasion-of-privacy claim.

                               Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment

insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy

claims. However, we reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it
                                   32
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dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and we remand the

cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

                                   33