Court Opinion

ID: 9559825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:36:04.731939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.433226
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
It is true, as the majority opinion holds, that the confidence game statute covers a crime different from that of obtaining money by false pretenses under section 94-1805, supra. On at least that point a majority of the justices agreed in the case of State v. Moran, 56 Mont. 94, 182 Pac. 110.
The distinction between the two crimes is shadowy and I shall not attempt to point out where one ends and the other begins.
The gist of the crime denounced by R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-1806, is the obtaining of property through or by means of obtaining the confidence of the victim through false representation or device.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated certain distinguishing features between the two crimes as established by prior decisions, many of which are relied on in the Moran ease, supra, in the late case of People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 2 N. E. (2d) 324, 326, as follows: “There is a difference between the crime of confidence game and that of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. On account of the multitude and diversity of means employed to fraudulently obtain the confidence of a victim, the term ‘confidence game’ can hardly be defined in a manner that will cover and segregate all cases of that nature from those constituting the offense of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Obviously, false pretenses of some sort are employed in a confidence game. The crimes are separate and distinct and are differentiated by the facts and circumstances of the transactions. The difference between the two offenses may be found in the many expressions of this court where the question has been at issue. By those cases it is well established that any designed misrepresentation of an existing fact or condition by which a party obtains the money or goods of another is a false pretense under the statute (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 38, sec. 253), making it a crime to obtain money or property by *320false pretenses. People v. Peers, 307 Ill. 539, 139 N. E. 13; Jackson v. People, 126 Ill. 139, 18 N. E. 286. The confidence game statute (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 38, sec. 256) was designed to reach that class of offenders known as confidence men, who practice upon unwary victims swindling schemes as various as the mind of man is suggestive. As the name of the crime implies, the gist of it is the obtaining of the confidence of the victim by some false representation or device. People v. Snyder, 327 Ill. 402, 158 N. E. 677, 56 A. L. R. 722; People v. Parker, 356 Ill. 138, 190 N. E. 318; People v. Heinsius, 319 Ill. 168, 149 N. E. 783; People v. Harrington, 310 Ill. 613, 142 N. E. 246; People v. Peers, supra; People v. Santow, 293 Ill. 430, 127 N. E. 671, 9 A. L. R. 1524. A swindling operation which is not connected with the element of confidence fraudulently obtained for the purpose of the swindle does not constitute the crime of confidence game. People v. Peers, supra; People v. Rallo, 293 Ill. 304, 127 N. E. 715; People v. Santow, supra. It is not enough to show that money or property was obtained by false pretenses. People v. Peers, supra; People v. Koelling, 284 Ill. 118, 119 N. E. 993. It is well settled that, in order to constitute the crime of confidence game, it is necessary that there be more than confidence reposed in the swindler. Where the confidence of the injured party is honestly obtained through a course of regular business dealings and the one in whom the confidence is reposed breaches that confidence to the injury of the one reposing it, the statute defining and punishing the confidence game is not violated. People v. Snyder, supra; People v. Benton, 324 Ill. 331, 155 N. E. 308, 56 A. L. R. 725; People v. Perlmutter, 306 Ill. 495, 138 N. E. 152. Where the property is obtained by unlawful means other than by fraudulently obtaining the confidence of the victim and abusing the confidence so obtained, a conviction for the crime of confidence game cannot stand. People v. Snyder, supra; People v. Benton, supra; People v. Perlmutter, supra. Where the property is obtained by unlawful means other than by fraudulently obtaining the confidence of the victim and abusing the confidence so obtained, a conviction for the crime of confidence *321game is not warranted. People v. Snyder, supra; People v. Ingravallo, 309 Ill. 498, 141 N. E. 176; People v. Koelling, supra; People v. Gallowich, 283 Ill. 360, 119 N. E. 283. Expressions may be found in some opinions of this court indicating that the crime of confidence game is established by proving, merely, the obtaining of money or property by a swindling scheme, but, whenever the issue as to the difference between the two crimes has been clearly presented, we have adhered to the principles announced here.” To the same effect is People v. Martin, 372 Ill. 484, 24 N. E. (2d) 380.
Chief Justice Stone dissented in the Gould case. He took the view that the confidence game statute is violated even though the confidence was honestly obtained through a course of regular business dealing. It is unnecessary here to choose between these two views because in this case there had not been a course of regular business dealing between defendant and the victim of the alleged swindle.
That the confidence game statute may be violated when the confidence of the victim is obtained through false representation, as well as other token, device or trick, is the general rule elsewhere. Clark v. State, 53 Ariz. 416, 89 Pac. (2d) 1077; State v. Wilson, 223 Mo. 156, 122 S. W. 701. 22 Am. Jur., False Pretenses, sec. 74, p. 483; and compare Elliott v. People, 56 Colo. 236, 138 Pac. 39, although there is authority to the contrary, Wheeler v. People, 49 Colo. 402, 113 Pac. 312.
The evidence introduced by the state shows in substance the following: Mrs. Dibble, a widow 68 years of age, who lives in Great Falls, Montana, with two grandchildren, answered a newspaper advertisement in the latter part of May 1953 by letter. The advertisement sought the services of a woman to do house telephoning. Mrs. Dibble was seeking the employment for her elder granddaughter. In response to her letter defendant came to her house to interview her. He told her the employment consisted of telephoning and “that it was for an encyclopedia and child welfare.” Mrs. Dibble explained that it was her granddaughter who was to do the work and he stated that was “per*322fectly all right.” After the granddaughter started work, defendant would return to the home about every two weeks to ‘ ‘ pick up these cards that she was filling in with the names that she got from phoning.” The cards would contain information which was elicited from those called over the telephone. Defendant advised that the telephoning should start from the back of the telephone directory. The only thing said about pay was that defendant said, “We pay good.”
Asked if defendant on those visits represented himself as being engaged in any other type of occupation, Mrs. Dibble replied, “Yes, he said he had Louisiana oil; he had wells producing in Louisiana.” This was around the 20th of June. He said his Louisiana oil was “very good, very productive, and that he was getting $800 a month from it, and he said he would only be too glad to let me have two hundred. ’ ’ Mrs. Dibble then testified:
“Q. Did he tell you why he would let you have $200.00? A. Well, because it made him too big an income tax; it would cut down his income tax.
“Q. Did he ask you if you had any money to give in exchange? A. And then he asked me if I had any money, and I said, ‘No, I didn’t but,’ I said, ‘I do have a diamond ring,’ and I said, ‘You could use that, that would be all right with me. ’
“Q. And what did he say then? A. Well, he said that was all right. He was happy enough to do that.
“Q. And you say he said he would take the diamond ring, and in exchange for the diamond ring you would receive $200.00 a month for the rest of your life? A. That’s right, the 15th of each month, $200 a month, the 15th of each month. It was $500 and then a twenty dollar filing fee. ’ ’
She testified that he claimed, and she paid $20 as a filing fee although there were no papers or anything given. She received no receipt for the $20 or for the ring. Defendant requested that she tell no one about it, that it was all confidential. She believed his story about the Louisiana oil because “he *323dressed nice and he had a good car and I kind of supposed he probably did have that much.”
No one else was present when this discussion took place. The first payment which she was to receive was to be paid on July 15th. Defendant did not present her with the $200 on July 15th and in fact ceased to make his usual call at the Dibble home, and Mrs. Dibble began to feel uneasy about the situation and about July 20th reported the matter to the police station.
Asked whether anything was said about other property which she had when they had the conversation about the oil, Mrs. Dibble said, “Yes, I spoke about a home which I have in Washington near Tacoma, and he suggested I sell that and put it into oil with him, because it was productive; it was so valuable.”
Defendant never contacted Mrs. Dibble after she gave him the ring until September when she saw him in jail.
On cross-examination Mrs. Dibble said she told the defendant the ring was valued at $450, “but he was going to be good to me and be a good fellow and he said I could have five hundred in oil rights.” She further testified on cross-examination:
“Q. Now, after Mr. Allen took the ring from you, did he come back to your place again! A. I think he was at the house about two times, checking up or picking up the things, the cards that Claudia [the granddaughter] had gotten ready.
“Q. After he took the ring? A. That’s right.
“Q. Now, your testimony is that right after you gave him the ring you walked out in the yard and you were pretty ‘leery’ about it, A. I was very much so.
“Q. And those two times that Mr. Allen returned did you ask him anything — A. No, I just kept still. It was supposed to be confidential.”
On redirect examination she said the first time she became “leery” of Mr. Allen was after he got the ring and had left her place. Mrs. Dibble did not receive the $200 per month promised to her.
This evidence was sufficient to justify submission of the case to the jury on the issues involved, viz., on whether defendant *324thus gained the confidence of Mrs. Dibble by the use of false pretenses and representations and by this means obtained from her the diamond ring and $20 in cash, contrary to R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-1806.
Defendant contends that the evidence shows that Mrs. Dibble did not rely upon the representations made by defendant and hence was not misled by them since she testified that she was “leery” of defendant after she gave him the ring and the $20.
The record shows that she did not become suspicious of defendant or mistrust him until after she had parted with her property and after defendant had left with her property.
Defendant relies on R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-7219, which requires two witnesses — or one witness and corroborating circumstances— to warrant a conviction for obtaining property with intent to cheat or defraud by false pretenses. That section applies to prosecutions under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-1805, and not to prosecutions under the confidence game statute, sec. 94-1806. But were the court to hold that it did apply to the latter, there are in this ca.se corroborating circumstances in addition to the testimony of Mrs. Dibble to make out a case for the jury.
Complaint is made of the giving of certain instructions offered by the state and objected to by defendant. In general the instructions complained of were to the effect that a false pretense under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-1806, may be made by representation or statement or by the mere use of words and that a confidence game is any swindling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence reposed by the victim in the swindler. These instructions are in line with the principles of law applicable as above pointed out. The instructions offered by defendant and which were refused were to the effect that no conviction could be had where the false pretense consisted of language unaccompanied by a false token or writing or unless proven by two witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances. As above noted, those were not correct statements of the law applicable; hence were properly refused.
*325Finding' no reversible error in the record, I think the judgment should be affirmed.