Court Opinion

ID: 9793424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:47:21.423626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:54.400271
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I
Although I am of the opinion that the particular zoning ordinance, in question has in some particulars gone beyond the permissible limits of propriety and cannot meet certain constitutional requirements, I cannot agree with the majority opinion when it would deny to zoning authorities the right and power to adopt reasonable zoning laws which will properly regulate land and its use so that we city dwellers can live in a less frenetic and more orderly society.
It requires no citation of authority to establish that zoning is constitutionally possible only under the police powers of a state. In other words, all such ordinances or statutes must have a reasonable relation to the public health, safety or morals.
Let us examine the first question posed by the majority opinion and its answer relating to whether a municipality can require any type of off-street parking.
Admittedly off-street parking requirements for new construction or new uses of existing property dilute the bundle of an owner’s rights, which in theory permits him to do whatever he chooses with his property. But such rights of ownership have never been absolute. Originally in England, from whence comes our common law, all property belonged to the Crown and ownership could revert to the King on failure of its possessor to perform certain conditions. Later the Crown lost these rights of reversion but the owner was required to pay taxqs to the state for the privilege of ownership. Failure *150to pay resulted then as now in the loss of the property to the government.
In other words, though we recognize and firmly believe in the right to acquire and own private property, property rights are not absolute and property bears its share of responsibility for the orderly functioning of government by carrying part of the tax burden with the corollary restrictions that it cannot be used to the detriment of the public, and is always subject to the police power. Thus, for example, the law for centuries has prohibited a man from creating or permitting nuisances on his land which annoy or harm the public or a member thereof; and, in the event of public disaster the state under its police powers can even destroy private property without liability for compensation to its owners.
Zoning and planning laws have evolved in modern civilizations to permit huge masses of people to dwell together in restricted areas with the least possible friction commensurate with the widest and freest use of the land used in such areas.
The determination of municipal officials in zoning matters should not be approached by the courts with a general feeling of suspicion (Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes (1958), 28 N.J. 258, 146 A. (2d) 111). When zoning ordinances are reasonable and applied uniformly they do not violate due process of law (see McMahon v. City of Dubuque, Iowa (C.A. 8th Cir. 1958), 255 F. (2d) 154). Under general rules of construction courts have an obligation in construing the validity of city ordinances to apply such construction, if possible, as will avoid an unconstitutional result. (City of New Orleans v. Leeco (1954), 226 La. 335, 76 So. (2d) 387.) This is subject, however, to the exception that when the subject matter sought to be regulated is something which was permitted at common law, then the restriction is strictly construed in favor of the person against whom its provisions are sought to be applied. Denver v. Thrailkill (1952), 125 Colo. 488, 500, 244 P. (2d) 1074. *151The latter does not mean, however, that the police powers can never be used to meet new situations which arise, for example, due to the growth of cities and vehicular traffic, and which need new but constitutional solutions. The exception is but one more test to properly protect freedoms against unwarranted governmental encroachment on private rights; it is not a bar to make government powerless to act for the general welfare under its police powers.
We live in a dynamic, growing society and what may have been unreasonable or arbitrary governmental interference or regulation in one period of our national history has often been recognized and accepted in later years as both necessary and constitutional when applied reasonably and equally to all people or property within a certain uniform class.
I firmly agree with the basic constitutional concepts set out by the majority opinion. It is in their application to some of the facts of this case that I respectfully dissent. In other words, the issue here is: what is a reasonable and necessary exercise of the police power? This degree of use “ * * * cannot be disposed of by general propositions * * * ” as the majority opinion so succinctly quotes Mr. Justice Holmes as saying in Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), 260 U. S. 393, 43 S. C. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322.
This ordinance could not, contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, “ * * * prohibit the use of that property for any purpose until its owners devote a substantial portion thereof to parking; * * In this regard I point out that the owners obviously can continue their present uses without interference and possibly change to others which do not require more parking area than may now exist.
It is not amiss to ask what is off-street parking attempting to do in this ordinance. Without determining whether this particular regulation is reasonable, it is obvious to all that traffic congestion and the need for *152adequate parking is a public problem of paramount importance in Denver. The public welfare, if nothing more, would require public officials to seek reasonable and legal solutions thereto. Such officials recognize a duty not to let the public stew in its own juice, so to speak, of traffic confusion and parking. This ordinance seeks to help correct the problem by requiring owners to provide certain off-street parking if and when they build new buildings or make structural alterations or change their uses in zoning districts where the problem exists. The majority opinion states this can only be done by condemnation and payment of compensation from public funds, whereas I believe it is properly the subject of reasonable zoning regulations. Apparently many others concur, for by 1953, according to Yokley on Zoning Law and Practice, Vol. 2, 2nd Ed. §208', p. 76, “ * * * 265 known localities in thirty-three different states have enacted (zoning) ordinances or amendments thereto requiring off-street parking accommodations for designated property uses.” We can presume that in the interval the list has grown considerably larger.
In McMahon, supra, the federal circuit court not only upheld the constitutionality of an Iowa zoning ordinance but went on to point out that all regulations impose limitations upon the full use and enjoyment of property and in a sense take away property rights. McMahon, supra, cites Anderson v. Jester (1928), 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354, 357, which held: “That full use and enjoyment of a plot of ground is prohibited, that the excluded use is the most profitable to which the land can be put, or that the prohibition deprives the owner of profit that would otherwise be derived from such use, or that esthetic considerations incidentally enter into the determination does not invalidate the regulation.”
The McMahon opinion further pointed out that though the zoning authorities had refused to rezone two corners of a wide intersection as commercial just because the other two were so zoned, was not illegal or arbitrary *153saying it was a reasonable legislative determination that the district line should stop there; and it emphasized that lower market value and highest use of the land are not necessarily determinative factors to be considered in determining the validity of zoning regulations.
In Colby v. Board (1927), 81 Colo. 344, 225 Pac. 443, in discussing the constitutionality of a Denver zoning ordinance, this court pointed out that such laws are for the promotion of the public welfare and that “A full perspective (of community growth and development), however, in a case like this, requires not merely that the present be depicted, but that the future be envisaged.”
In addition to Yokley’s comments supra it appears that many jurisdictions recently have either by implication or express holding upheld the principle of reasonable off-street parking. Among those so holding by implication are: Fleishon v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adj. (1956), 385 Pa. 295, 122 A. (2d) 673 (permits revoked as not being valid because no access provided to parking space; however, required off-street parking was not ruled upon); Hill v. Kesselring (1949), 310 Ky. 483, 220 S.W. (2d) 858 (remanded for further hearing on adequacy of off-street parking, traffic hazards on deadend street, etc., for a proposed church); Roselle v. Wright (1955), 37 N.J. Super. Ct. 507 (ordinance required off-street public parking, petitioner desired permit for private storage of a few trucks and was denied it; reversed as to denial of off-street parking permit); Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton (1953), 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E. (2d) 310 (off-street parking requirements only for apartment houses and not for other multiple use buildings in same zone, held discriminatory).
I find the following decisions upholding off-street parking in direct fashion: Allendale Congr. of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Grosman (1959), 30 N.J. 273, 152 A. (2d) 569; City of New Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., supra (where one of several points decided was that defendant Leeco, *154Inc., had complied with the off-street parking requirements for a theatre); State v. City of East Cleveland (1958 Ohio), 153 N.E. (2d) 177 (owner sought permit to build supermarket; one question involved was off-street parking. Headnote 7 summarizes this point by saying: “Zoning ordinance of city being within the exercise of the police power, provisions thereof regulating off-street parking are constitutional.”).
The true test as to whether off-street parking is constitutional seems to be whether the requirement is applied uniformly in a district and whether the amount of space required bears a reasonable relation to the use proposed. See 58 Columbia Law Review 666-667 (1958) for a discussion of various lines of demarcation laid down by the courts in various zoning controversies.
In Allensdale, supra, a church had been denied a building permit because it did not propose to provide the required off-street parking space required by the zoning ordinance. The supreme court of New Jersey unanimously upheld the denial saying that the requirement was not invalid on its face and did not violate either the state or federal constitutions. I quote some pertinent parts of the court’s language:
“The plaintiff’s real contention is that the off-street parking requirements of the amendatory ordinance are invalid on their face and as applied because they abridge ‘freedom of assembly and worship contrary to the state and federal constitutions.’ We consider this contention to be without merit. The off-street parking requirements are made indiscriminately applicable to all buildings where substantial numbers of people are likely to gather via private motor vehicles and are well designed to promote the public safety and general welfare by lessening ‘congestion in the streets.’ See R.S. 40:55-32, N.J.S.A.; James v. Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Montclair, 40 N.J. Super. 206, 212, 122 A. 2d 660 (Law Div. 1956); 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (3rd ed. 1956), 397. They do not restrict the plaintiff’s freedom *155of worship and assembly at its present quarters or at any suitable quarters in the AA residential zone or .in any of the other zones in the borough or even at the plaintiff’s relatively small lot on Hillside Avenue, if its plans are altered to reduce its proposed seating capacity and increase its proposed off-street parking facilities so as to comply with the terms of the amendatory ordinance. On the record before us we are not at all at liberty to say that the requirements have not been imposed in good faith and for the public interest or that they are unnecessary or excessive or that they are not substantially related to the promotion of the public safety and general welfare; they appear to come well within the principles expressed in cases which have heretofore held that property used for church purposes, along with property used for other purposes, may be lawfully subjected to reasonable zoning restrictions. (Citing numerous authorities.)
“In Appeal of Trustees of Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Bethel Unit, 183 Pa. Super. 219, 130 A. 2d 240, 243 (Super. Ct. 1957), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question 355 U.S. 40, 79 S.Ct. 120, 2 L.Ed. 2d 71 (1957), the Borough of Bethel had adopted an ordinance which contained an off-street parking requirement applicable to churches, schools, auditoriums, stadiums and similar places of assembly; it also provided that no such places shall be permitted within % mile of each other. In a decision adverse to the appellant Jehovah’s Witnesses, the board of adjustment found that its proposed church premises violated the off-street parking requirement and the % mile requirement. The Pennsylvania court, in sustaining the board’s decision, first noted that each of the requirements bore a reasonable-relation to the safety of the public and then made these comments which are fully applicable here:
“ ‘Certainly freedom of worship does not mean that churches are exempt from reasonable police power regulations. Our Supreme Court in Kurman v. Zoning Board *156of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 247, 40 A. 2d 381, determined that setback requirements are applicable to properties used for church purposes. The concepts of religious freedom, freedom of speech and the press which are embodied in the First Amendment have never been construed as absolute rights and beyond the power of reasonable regulation under the police power. Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E. 2d 115, 123. The language used at page 123 of 117 N.E. 2d [dissenting opinion] is applicable to the present case: ‘It is quite evident that the members of the appellee could be killed just as dead going to and from church as going to and from a theater or a basketball game. It is a proper exercise of the police power to protect appellee’s members from their own negligence as well as from the negligence of the traveling public. There would be just as much logic in holding that the members of appellee when going to church were not required to comply with the traffic regulations as in holding that the appellee is not required to make reasonable provisions for a lessening of the traffic hazards by off-street parking.
“ Tf it was a proper exercise of the police power for the city by its zoning ordinance to require the appellee to comply with the average setback line of the residences, which only has a very remote bearing on traffic hazards, a fortiori it was a reasonable exercise of the police power to require appellee to provide space for 25 cars to park off the streets. The right of appellee to exercise its religious freedom is not violated in either case.’ ” (Citing numerous authorities.)
As I see it, times have changed, and the constitutional police power of the states is now being recognized in this country as the only reasonable and practical way to cope with this ever growing Frankenstein called “Traffic congestion.” It is my firm belief that such regulations, *157when reasonable and applied equally, are not only constitutional but necessary to urban survival.
In Brodhead v. Denver (1952), 126 Colo. 119, 247 P. (2d) 140, this court recognized the validity of Denver’s attempt to solve this problem in some measure by creating publicly owned off-street parking facilities. But as in most communities where this has been done it has not been enough. Yokley in Vol. 2 at page 78 says about this problem:
“It must be beyond debate that the private parking lot and the private parking garage have failed to meet the crisis and solve the problem in most large cities. This failure has brought into being a two-fold muncipal activity — the public parking of automobiles and the inclusion of off-street parking provisions in municipal zoning ordinances.”
And on page 82 in Vol. 2 Yokley says:
“The question that has occurred to many thoughtful communities, as the passing of time has aggravated the problem of traffic congestion, is this: We have building codes and master plans and their policing partner, the zoning law; why then, can they not be put to good use by requiring, at least in the case of new construction, that reasonable off-street parking facilities be furnished for the employees and patrons of the building so constructed and used?
“Thus, in the areas immediately outside the central business district, the theatre, the department store, the medical center, the commercial business, the industrial plant, the super-markets, the streamlined drug store — all would be required to have some care and responsibility for the parking problems of their employees and patrons without requiring the public agency to step in and take a hand in clearing the streets of vehicular traffic.
“It is beyond debate that some businesses, by their very nature, attract vehicular traffic and create congestion in the public thoroughfares. What have the mu*158nicipalities done to solve this problem from the standpoint of zoning?”
Another well known authority (“Municipal Law” (1957) by Charles S. Rhyne, page 967) has commented on this as follows:
“Off-street parking requirements for dwellings, apartments, businesses, theatres, churches and other uses are common in zoning ordinances today. A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a Chicago zoning ordinance requiring apartment houses to provide private garages or automobile compounds for its tenants was invalid as discriminatory since boarding houses, rooming houses and similar uses which create traffic and other problems were not required to comply with this requirement. (Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E. 2d 310, 312-13 (1953)). But similar provisions in other zoning ordinances have been sustained. Thus zoning ordinances have been held valid which required theatres to provide one parking space for each eight seats; (New Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., 226 La. 335, 76 So. 2d 387, 390 (1954)) and lunch counters, (Mirschel v. Weissenberger, 277 App Div 1039, 100 NYS 2d 452 (1950), no confiscation or discrimination shown.) and churches (Hill v. Kesselring, 310 Ky. 483, 220 SW 2d 858, 861-63 (1949).) to furnish suitable parking facilities. However, the latter case was remanded to the lower court for additional evidence on the adequacy of the off-street parking facilities to be furnished by the church. But a zoning ordinance requiring ‘all places of assembly’ to provide 100 square feet of off-street parking space for every person in attendance was held not a valid reason for denial of a building permit for a church which had more off-street parking space than the seating capacity of the church. (State v. Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1945), mandamus granted to compel issuance of building permit because there had been substantial compliance and because there was no showing of a connection between the ordinance and public health, safety, *159and morals.) Likewise, a zoning ordinance requiring one off-street parking space for every six seats in a church was held unconstitutional as a restraint upon the right of freedom of worship and assembly, and unreasonable'in view of the fact that services would be held during minimum traffic hours and sufficient parking space for all vehicles was available for all ordinary services. (Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses 233 Ind. 83, 117 NE 2d 115, 119-21 (1954).).” (Cases cited are inserted from footnotes.)
One of the public purposes of zoning and planning is “to lessen congestion in the streets” and the 1923 Denver Charter Amendment (Sec. 219A, §3) expressly so provides. Heretofore some traffic congestion has been solved by public parking garages, by prohibiting all parking on certain thoroughfares and by restricting the period of time one may park in other areas. Some cities have even found it necessary to prohibit all stopping of vehicles on certain highways. All this is done in the exercise of the police powers of the state or city.
The reasoning of the majority opinion is that it is a taking of private property for a public use without condemnation and just compensation to require even reasonably computed off-street parking. I fail to see how that is so if an ordinance only requires an owner to provide parking on his own property for his own vehicles, or a reasonable amount of parking space for himself and those who use his property. In reality it is an application to zoning of the accepted but distinct nuisance principle that one shall not so use his property so as to interfere with either his neighbors or the public. When parking is an incident of a new land use, why should it not be required on the land itself just as the type of business or residential use can itself be lawfully regulated?
The specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frantz goes further than the majority opinion and urges that if the off-street parking is only for persons going to the building in question “ * * * then it is a taking for pri*160vate use, a taking of more doubtful validity.” For the reasons herein set forth I cannot agree that this principle results in a taking of property or that it is of doubtful validity. It is primarily for the public welfare and to lessen congestion in the streets. The fact that incidentally it is also for the use and benefit of those who use the property in question does not suffice to void it.
Clearly the law could not require an owner to permit the general public to use his property for parking purposes, but that is not the case here. It is only the reasonableness of this requirement that we should concern ourselves with since I consider the principle itself to be a proper constitutional exercise of legislative power. And, if necessary I would remand this action to the trial court for the taking of testimony on the need and reasonableness of the regulation and for a determination thereof.
The majority opinion labels this requirement “ * * * a price tax or tribute for the exercise of the constitutional right to do business * * *,” which in my opinion ignores the widely recognized right and power of governments, local, state and national, to not only tax businesses but also the right to regulate them when deemed reasonably necessary for police purposes or to prevent nuisances.
I need not describe here the various types of provisions which exist elsewhere in other zoning ordinances detailing how off-street parking should be computed. Suffice it to say that representative samples appear in Yokley, supra, and in Rathkopf, 3rd ed. on “The Law of Zoning and Planning
Thus contrary to my learned colleagues, I conclude that reasonable off-street parking requirements, when equally applied, do not “unreasonably and unnecessarily fasten upon him (the citizen) new restraints upon freedom of action in the use and enjoyment” of his property as the majority opinion states. I urge that we declare this part of the ordinance invalid only if we are convinced after a thorough study that these particular pro*161visions are unreasonable and, as pointed out above, before we can determine that question evidence should be taken upon a retrial of the action. This would allow the city to correct its error by amendment if it in fact has erred. I also concur with Mr. Justice Doyle in his dissenting opinion filed in this case as to the views he expresses and authorities he cites on the need for and validity of reasonable off-street parking requirements.
II
As to the second question posed by the majority opinion and its answer thereto I am in general agreement that this particular non-conforming use proviso is unconstitutional but only for the reasons hereafter given.
It seems to me that this provision of the ordinance by imposing so many restrictions on non-conforming uses, passed into the constitutional danger zone and made a fetish out of excessive regulation of property and uses to the point where property owners are unduly, unreasonably and unconstitutionally restricted as to non-conforming uses. Though those who designed the specifications, and chose the terms used, are no doubt sincere and competent planning engineers, they neglected to consider the constitutional rights of those who own property affected by non-conforming uses. In other words, professional planners sometimes see only a vision of the ideal city or metropolitan area in which all businesses and industries are restricted to planned areas. While this may be a “consummation devoutly to be wished,” planners are confronted with the fact that they are not starting with vacant unoccupied land, hence they, as well as the courts, are restrained by those limitations which the constitutions set up as barriers to an invasion of personal and property rights. These protect each of us in our property rights, subject to such reasonable restraints as suggested above in discussing off-street parking requirements. In my view it is the task of this court to evaluate the facts to determine if a valid end to which the legislation is related has actually been demon*162strated (see Uphause v. Wyman (1959), 360 U.S. 172), having in mind at all times that public necessity in the protection of the health, morals or safety of the public is the keystone upon which regulations by use of the police powers depends. It is one thing to say that traffic and parking must be regulated, directed and restrained in the public interest, or we will have a complete morass of danger and confusion, and on the other hand to say we should have an esthetically beautiful city, which can be accomplished only if all non-conforming uses are eliminated. The elimination of such uses, though possibly a desirable ideal, cannot be attained by either prohibition without just compensation, or by so fettering the citizen that he cannot use his property in a reasonable manner.
The majority opinion calls attention to some of the shackles which this ordinance would, I believe, unconstitutionally lock upon the rights of the owners of nonconforming uses. I add some additional comments: For example, a non-conforming use, being a use protected as a constitutional property right, like all other property is subject to the police power of the state to reasonably regulate to promote the public health, safety or morals. I cannot say that it appears unreasonable or unconstitutional to require that if a building is so completely destroyed as to require razing or rebuilding, it should not be rebuilt contrary to the building code or zoning ordinance of the district where it was located. This is because the non-conforming features have been eliminated through happenstance or Act of God, giving the legislative body the opportunity to take a step forward in its comprehensive plan. Also, if reasonable, the courts should uphold a percentage destruction figure that will help to accomplish uniform zones over a period of time when destruction of a use has occurred.
As to the abandonment of a non-conforming use we should also uphold reasonable legislative acts relating thereto when they are made prima facie evidence of intent to abandon. In this regard the one year period *163provided here seems highly unreasonable. I am persuaded that compulsory registration, obsolescence, or doing prohibited acts under the zoning ordinance, under penalty of forfeiting a lawful property right, are all illegal and improper methods to attain the desirable objective of a well planned city and the majority opinion properly rejects them. This is not to say, however, that some reasonable type of registration or the reasonable consideration of deterioration of buildings may not be inserted in a zoning ordinance relating to non-conforming uses.
Probably America’s first zoning authority in point of time is Bassett on “Zoning” (1940) where at page 105 it is stated: “Nonconforming buildings and uses existing when an ordinance goes into effect are allowed to continue. * * * Zoning seeks to stabilize and protect and not to destroy.” Bassett then points out that such uses should not be allowed to enlarge or increase where harmful or improper in a district.
The development and refinement of zoning ordinances since 1940 have, as I view it, done the following to the concept of non-conforming uses: (1) Allowed variances within districts, but this right is being abused in some municipalities so that the over-all purpose of the zoning laws to restrict new non-conformities is being defeated. This is usually the fault of the Boards of Adjustment who permit legally unnecessary exceptions. (2) The principle of “Amortization” has developed, which recognizes that if a use is both non-conforming and small in monetary value that then it need be allowed to exist only for a period of time which is adequate to allow the owner to recover his reasonable investment therein. (See Vol. 44, No. 3, Cornell Law Quarterly, Spring 1959, page 450 et seq. and cases cited therein.) (3) The erroneous concept has arisen, as stated supra in this dissent, that the purpose of limiting non-conforming uses is to destroy them. The reason why the latter is objec*164tionable is because it fails to recognize that these uses are a matter of right, not of privilege.
III
The majority opinion, like the trial court, finds that this ordinance unlawfully and unconstitutionally places so-called down town Denver in one business zone and arbitrarily denies the same type of zoning to plaintiffs’ lands which for many years have been used for similar business purposes. I believe this to be a matter of legislative discretion. Though the uses may be similar in great part in both zones, the types of structure obviously are not the same in many particulars, nor is the nature or character of the business carried on generally the same. I would also remand this phase of the proceedings to the trial court to take and hear evidence thereon to determine the reasonableness thereof. And, if reasonable, as well it might be, for differences are apparent to all who view the Denver skyline, I would uphold such a classification.
IV
The majority opinion holds that all the permits sought herein should issue because this ordinance cannot be held to be retroactive, Article II, Section 11, of the Colorado Constitution being cited in support thereof. I agree that any of these plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, who had applied for permits under the prior ordinance and before the adoption of this one, must now, and from the beginning should have been given their building permits, subject to the terms of the former ordinance. I so concur, fully aware that in Colby, supra, at page 352 this court had held that no one can secure vested rights against the operation of the police power.
Heretofore the attitude of this court, as well as those in many other jurisdictions, has been as expressed in Colby (see 8 McQuillian “Municipal Corporation,” 3rd ed. 471, §25.181; and Allendale, supra). However, Colby neglected to consider the Colorado constitutional provision cited by the majority herein and we are of course *165bound by the latter and I would expressly overrule Colby on that point. Even if we were not so bound it seems to me that only in the rarest of instances could a zoning authority be justified under the police power in denying a permit under existing law while a new ordinance or an amendment to an existing ordinance is being drafted and adopted. Each of such cases would have to rest on its own facts and a real emergency be shown before I could support such reasoning. This is so because it is palpably unjust, for example, to say that an owner who has spent large sums on plans and specifications, in reliance on the law as it is, should forfeit his rights and what he has spent on architects’ fees for the public good without just compensation. It seems to me that in all cases, except in case of an actual crisis in public health, morals or safety, builders should have the right to rely upon the law as it is, not what some public official thinks it should or will be at some time in the future.
To summarize, I would hold the concept of off-street parking valid; hold this particular non-conforming use section invalid; hold the zoning district classifications in question valid; and order certain permits issued as indicated. If we deem it necessary to have more evidence to reject or sustain this particular off-street parking section or the zoning classification in question, I would remand the case to the trial court to determine these matters after hearing further evidence thereon.