Court Opinion

ID: 9553468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:09.010965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:11.570393
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the prohibition against hiring professional strikebreakers does not apply to school districts, because they are not “employers” under ORS 662.205(2). It concludes that plaintiffs complaint, based on an alleged violation of ORS 662.215, fails to state a claim. In order to arrive at that result, the majority ignores the plain meaning of the statute and creates a new rule of statutory construction that contravenes the holding in Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 632 P2d 782 (1981). The majority says:

“No matter how broad the apparent meaning of a statute may be, if we cannot tell whether the legislature intended a statute to apply in a particular context, we must resort to extrinsic aids to construction.

“ORS 662.205(2) provides:
“ ‘Employer’ means any person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or other entity, or any agent thereof, that employs an individual to perform services for a wage or salary.’
“That statute does not unambiguously include school districts and public officials within the definition of ‘employer.’ ” 115 Or App at 210. (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the majority concedes that the definition of “entity” is broad enough to include school districts, it resorts to the rule of ejusdem generis as a basis to exclude them from the statute. It rewrites the definition of “employer” under ORS 662.205(2) to give effect to what it perceives to be *215legislative intent. The majority ignores the mandate of ORS 174.010.1 We do not resort to legislative history or rules of statutory construction when the language of a statute is clear and expresses the intent of the legislature. Whipple v. Hawser, supra, 291 Or at 481. In construing a statute, words of common usage are to be given their natural, plain and obvious meaning. Perez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 299, 613 P2d 32 (1980). The term “any * * * other entity” means what it says: it encompasses the whole definition of the word “entity” and plainly includes school districts.
Defendants also argue that ORS 662.215 does not apply, because defendants are not “employers” under ORS 662.205(2). They point out that plaintiff failed to allege any ultimate facts showing that defendants, as individuals, hired the substitute teachers or paid their salaries. According to defendants, because District did the. hiring and paid the salaries, it is the “employer” under ORS 662.215. Their argument misses the mark because of ORS 294.100(2). If District violated ORS 662.215 and that violation was authorized by defendants, then they, as public officials, may have expended money for a “different purpose than authorized by law.” Violation of ORS 662.215 makes the expenditure unlawful, and ORS 294.100 imposes liability on the public officials who authorized the unlawful expenditure.
Defendants also contend that ORS 662.215 does not apply to school districts, because of public policy. They argue that the legislature would not have required school districts to hire certified teachers from a limited pool of replacements and also intend that they could incur civil liability for discharging their statutory obligation during a labor dispute. As the majority points out, the legislature did not act on a proposed amendment that would have exempted school districts and employees of school districts from the bill. This court is not authorized to insert into the statute what the *216legislature left out. Lane County v. Heintz Const. Co. et al, 228 Or 152, 157, 364 P2d 627 (1961).
Another argument for affirmance of the trial court is that the complaint purportedly does not allege an economic injury to taxpayers. The proposition that there can be no liability under ORS 294.100 unless an expenditure injures taxpayers economically is inconsistent with the measure of damages available under ORS 294.100(2). That statute says that public officials who expend public money for a purpose other than that authorized by law are liable for the return of that money. Nothing in ORS 294.100 requires that taxpayers personally be injured economically. See also Burt v. Blumenauer, 299 Or 55, 699 P2d 168 (1985). Second, paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges a misapplication of public tax money “for which defendants are liable under ORS 294.100,” thereby incorporating by reference the statutory requirement for injury. When that allegation is read with the other factual allegations in the complaint, the complaint states a claim under ORS 294.100.
ORS 662.205(2) is not ambiguous. It encompasses every “entity” that employs an individual to perform services for a wage or salary. Plaintiffs complaint alleges a claim that defendants have misapplied public tax money and are liable for the return of those funds under ORS 294.100, because they caused District to employ professional strikebreakers. Those allegations state a cognizable claim, and plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that follow from them. The function of this court is to interpret the law, not to make it. See Foster v. Goss et al, 180 Or 405, 408, 168 P2d 589, 175 P2d 794 (1946). The majority, by judicial fiat, creates a statutory exemption for school districts. If the legislature had intended that result, it would have said so.
I dissent.
Riggs and De Muniz, JJ., join in this dissent.

 ORS 174.010 provides:
“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”