Court Opinion

ID: 9664611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:22:33.306211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:07.562117
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff has filed a motion for rehearing contending that she is entitled to a full half of the retirement benefits under the “inception of title” rule. She argues that since the parties were married when the employee’s interest vested, that interest was community property, just as if it were a tract of land then acquired, and contributions either after the divorce or before the marriage would not affect the parties’ equal ownership, although she concedes that on proper pleading and proof her former husband would have the right to reimbursement for enhancement resulting from contributions after the divorce.
We recognize that the inception-of-title rule is applied to determine the existence of a community-property interest in retirement benefits. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1970); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1973, writ dism’d). The logic of this rule, however, has not been pushed to a rigorous conclusion in determining the extent of the community interest. In cases involving military retirement pay, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals has apportioned the benefits by awarding a community-property interest based on the number of months the parties were married during the qualifying period. Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1969, no writ); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1968, writ dism’d); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1960, no writ). These opinions do not explain the rationale of recognizing a separate-property interest based on service before marriage and before vesting of any property interest. The assumption seems to be that retirement benefits should be treated as separate property to the extent that they represent deferred compensation for services rendered before marriage, and apparently the San Antonio court has considered it inequitable to award a full community interest in retirement benefits attributable to services rendered over a long period of time, a substantial part of which may have elapsed before the marriage. The apportionment theory has been discussed favorably by legal writers. Dutton, the Wife’s Community Interest in Her Husband’s Qualified Pension or Profit-Sharing Plan, 50 Texas L.Rev. 334, 341 (1972); Comment, Military Retirement Benefits as Community Property, 25 SW.L.J. 340, 343 (1971). In Busby the Supreme Court comments with approval on the opinions in Mora and Kirkham, but does not discuss the apportionment point and does not follow them in that respect. Although the law on this point cannot be regarded as settled, we conclude that the apportionment theory does substantial justice in determining the extent of a community-property interest which has vested during the marriage. Accordingly, we adhere to the instructions in our original opinion.
The former husband contends in his motion for rehearing that we erred in holding that the parties are bound by the 1968 order of the domestic relations court refusing to correct the divorce decree nunc pro tunc. He argues that since the court’s jurisdiction in that proceeding was limited to determination of whether the written decree as entered conformed to the decree as originally pronounced, the court had no power to make a fact finding as to what was adjudicated in the 1963 divorce suit. We do not agree. In order to correct a judgment nunc pro tunc, the court *682must find as a fact that the judgment as entered did not conform to the judgment originally pronounced and that the variance was the result of a clerical mistake. Kostura v. Kostura, 469 S.W.2d 196 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1971, writ dismissed). Here the court found as a fact that ownership of the retirement plan “was not adjudicated by the Court in the trial of this cause, nor- was any division thereof between plaintiff and defendant made by the Court.” The judge could make that finding on the basis of the available evidence (docket sheet, letters, etc.) even though he was not the judge who pronounced the original decree. Having so found, the court was required to examine the written decree to determine whether it conformed to his finding concerning the original pronouncement. This determination necessarily involved interpretation of the decree. Apparently the judge interpreted it as conforming to the original pronouncement, since he denied the motion to correct it nunc pro tunc. His construction of the decree for that purpose was within the court’s jurisdiction to determine whether its records spoke the truth. Accordingly, it was a binding determination which the parties cannot now attack.
The former husband also urges in his motion that we erred in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff’s claim was not barred by limitations or laches. Our opinion should not be construed as preventing defendants from offering proof on these issues in another trial. We hold only that neither limitation nor laches has been established in the present record as a matter of law, and, consequently, that the instructed verdict for defendant cannot be sustained on these grounds.
We have considered the other points urged in the motion and find no merit in them. All motions for rehearing are overruled.