Court Opinion

ID: 9661012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:26:19.642334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:24.212487
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). Because PA 1967 [Ex Sess], No 12 fails to provide any standards or guidelines for adjudicatory action by the highway location arbitration board, it is my belief that the act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 'jfower and consequently invalid. I am unable to agree with the majority of the Court that the act can be saved as a reference statute which adopts within its1 scope provisions of Federal- law to implement its own operation. Since the result which I reach would render the act invalid, it is unnecessary for me to give further consideration to the other questions raised on this appeal.

The Background of the Cases.

The legislature in 1967, while in extra session,.undertook to provide a solution to a long-standing dispute over the route location of a portion of interstate highway 696. As planned by the State highway department, 1-696 will be a freeway running across southern Oakland and Macomb counties from a western terminus at 1-96 in Novi to an eastern terminus at 1-94 in Roseville and St. Clair Shores, a distance *260of approximately 28 miles. A'10-mile portion running from the western terminus easterly to Lahser road in Southfield has already been constructed. As of 1967, the route of the eastern portion extending from a point in Royal Oak near 1-75, approximately 11 miles to 1-94, had been agreed upon by the highway department and by the affected communities and construction' was under way. The location of the route for the remaining 7.4 miles became a matter of dispute, culminating in this appeal.
Historically, the need for an east-west freeway through southern Oakland and Macomb counties was first documented as a result of the Detroit area traffic study which was initiated in 1953. The purpose of the study was to provide Federal, State, and local agencies with planning data as a guide in establishing highway service for the metropolitan area. Interstate highway 696 was conceived to serve that purpose as an integral part of the freeway network for- the State and the Detroit area. In addition, such a highway would be eligible for inclusion in the national system of interstate and defense highways and the recommendation of the State highway department for such inclusion was approved by the Federal bureau of public roads in 1955. Location studies for 1-696 were begun in 1958 and completed for the section from 1-96 to Lahser road in 1959. Studies for the remainder of the route, from Lahser road to 1-94, were completed in 1963. Local governmental officials were told that a decision on a cbmmon alignment was necessary by January of 19’64 in order to maintain the then current Federal program schédule for completion of the interstate system. "When agreement was not forthcoming, Commissioner John C. Mackie1 selected the so-called *26110-Mile-E-F-ll-Mile alternative and announced his decision in J anuary of 1964.
From that date on, the department of State highways or its predecessor has endeavored to secure the necessary approval. When all else failed, resort was had to the legislature. In his message to the extra session of 1967, the governor made reference to the existing stalemate over route selection of the remaining portion of 1-696 and said:
“Because of the importance of the project and because of the continued misuse of the veto power over its construction by certain communities, I urge this legislature to take one of two actions:
“1. Establish a reasonable form of binding arbitration for the resolution by the State of local dif-' ferences over freeway routes; or,
“2. Remove the existing veto power over freeway route locations from communities of 30,000 population or less, which do not contribute to the cost of. freeway construction.”2
Act 12 resulted.

An Analysis of Act 12.

What is the purpose of Act 12 of the 1967 extra session?- Its title describes it as “An act to provide for arbitration of disputes involving the determination of routes for interstate highways through mu*262nicipalities and to authorize the acquisition of property therefor.” The key function of the act is to provide a means for “the determination of routes” for interstate highways within Michigan where the route proposed by the highway department lies wholly or partially within the boundaries of a city or village and such proposal has met with protest and objections from municipal authorities, property owners, and others, resulting in a dispute over route location. In view of the universal rule that the right of eminent domain is inherent in State sovereignty,3 it. would appear as a first impression that the State could proceed to establish the routes for public highways with a free hand. However, although the right exists, its exercise is subject to any restrictions or limitations found in the State Constitution.4 That there are claims by municipalities of constitutional restrictions concerning the authority of the State over streets, highways, and route locations within municipal boundaries is amply demonstrated by this appeal and by the recitals in the majority opinion. (That any claims by such municipalities pursuant to Michigan’s Constitution would be subordinate to the Federal government’s power of eminent domain in condemnation proceedings by Federal agencies to acquire land for the establishment of the route of an interstate highway, see part 2 of the majority opinion in this appeal.)
Act 12 proposes to. resolve disputes when they relate to route locations of interstate highways by requiring “arbitration.” Arbitration is an inept description of what occurs whenever the provisions *263of the act are invoked. Customarily, arbitration is the determination of a dispute between parties by a person or persons chosen or agreed upon by them. If an affected municipality is willing to agree “to voluntary binding arbitration on the issue of route location (section 2), it is required under the act (section 3) to select, either alone or in conjunction with other similarly affected municipalities, 3 members from a list of members of the national panel of arbitrators as submitted by the governor and furnished to him by the American Arbitration Association. The 3 members so selected then constitute the arbitration board. If an affected municipality or municipalities do not agree on arbitrators within the 30-day period prescribed by the act, the governor shall choose the arbitrators. Under the statute, the arbitration board “shall function in the ■ executive office and by majority vote shall make the determinations authorized by this act.” (Section 3.) “The board shall convene at the time and place set by the governor and shall consider the submitted maps and information and shall hear representatives of the department and the affected municipalities and shall hear such other persons as are1 parties in interest. * * * Within 60 days of the date if convenes, the board shall approve 1 of the locations. The approval is final and binding qpon the departmént and the affected municipalities.” (Section'd.) “Approval by the board is deemed to be consent to designating the route as . ah interstate highway., and,' notwithstanding any provision to the contrary "in' any law, the department may forthwith proceed to acquire property, by condemnation or otherwise, deemed’by •the department to be necessary to provide for,the completion and successful operation of the interstate highway and appurtenant facilities.” (Section 7.)
*264From the foregoing extracts, it is obvious that the highway location arbitration board, whether constituted by agreement or by executive appointment, does perform the function of effectuating the State’s policy regarding the establishment and location of the route of an interstate highway through a city or village where a dispute exists over the desirability of a proposed location. The performance by the arbitration board is adjudicatory action. “The proceeding is not one of ordinary administration, conformable to the standards governing duties of a purely executive character.” (p 479.) “A. proceeding of this sort requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, determinations of fact based upon the consideration of the evidence, and the making' of an order supported by such findings, has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding. Hence it is frequently described as a proceeding of a quasi-judicial character.” (p 480.) Morgan v. United States (1936), 298 US 468, 479, 480 (56 S Ct 90680 L Ed 1288).

No Standards or Guidelines in Act 12.

■ The majority opinion states: “Act 12, standing by itself, admittedly contains no standards within our . constitutional rule.” I agree with the majority that ,.Act 12 contains no enumeration of standards or . guidelines to be applied by the arbitration board in arriving at its determination. The need for such direction has a practical side in this particular legislation as well as the legal requirement. The highway location arbitration board provided by Act 12 is not a continuing board or body with a fixed term '•'of' office for its members.’ It is constituted for an ad hoc determination. A new board is created as éach dispute over an interstate highway route location arises in an affected municipality. As conceived *265in Act 12, the arbitration board lacks any semblance of continuity.

No Standards or Guidelines in Act 12 by Reference.

I agree with the majority opinion as to the rule which permits adoption by reference of all or a portion of the provisions of another statute to make them applicable to a current legislative enactment. This method, when properly done, has received the approval of this Court over many years, as is shown by the quotations from Michigan cases appearing in the majority opinion. I disagree with the majority holding that adequate standards and guidelines have been established from which the extent of the powers of the arbitration board can be ascertained and the manner of performance determined. The only source for such direction is a reference in Act 12 to'“Title 23 of the United States Code” in connection with defining the words “interstate highway.” The reference appears only once, and then in section 1 of Act 12, as follows:
“Sec. 1. As used in this act:
“(a) ‘Board’ means * * *
“(b) ‘Department’ means * * *
“(c) ‘Commission’ means * * *
“(d) ‘Interstate highway’ means a highway route on the interstate system as defined in and designated pursuant to Title 23 of the United States Code, prior to the effective date of this act.
“(e) ‘Affected municipality’ means * *
I regard the above reference to Title 23 as wholly inadequate to incorporate any standards or guidelines contained in Title 23 into Act 12 for the guidance of the arbiters in the performance of their duties. Nowhere in Act 12 is there the least statement or instruction to the arbiters that they .shall follow *266Title 23’guidelines. Quite the contrary, the hoard is given carte Manche authority to “approve 1 of the locations” as proposed by the highway commission or by the affected municipalities;

’"No Standard’s or Guidelines in Title 23.

, While I do not agree that Act 12 contains a usable reference to Title 23 of the US Code, if such an assumption is made, then January 16, 1968 became the cut-off date for usable reference to the provisions of Title 23 because Act 12 went into effect on that •date. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that Reference cannot be made to any other title of the US/Code since none is contained in Act 12. Title .23 contains no definition, as such, of “interstate highway.” However, the following does appear in section 101(a),:
“The term ‘interstate system’ means the national system of interstate and defense highways described in subsection (d) of section 103 of this title.”
Section 101(b) contains these words:
“It is hereby declared that the prompt and early completion of the national system of interstate and defense highways, so named because of its primary importance to the national defense and hereafter referred to as the ‘interstate system’, is essential to •the national interest and is one of the most important objectives of this act. * * * Insofar as possible in consonance with this objective, existing highways located on an interstate route shall be used to the extent that such use is practicable, suitable, and feasible, it being the intent that local needs, to the extent practicable, suitable, and feasible, shall be given equal consideration with the needs of interstate commerce.” •
That the foregoing statement of national policy and objectives and the application thereof to be made *267furnishes no adequate guidelines to the Michigan highway location arbitration board in determining interstate routes seems self-evident.
Proceeding as directed in section 101(a) to section 103(d), I quote the language in full,' except for unimportant territorial description:
“(d) The interstate system shall be designated within the United States * * * and it shall iiot exceed forty-one thousand miles in total extent. It shall be so located as to connect by routes, as direct as practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to serve the national defense and, to the greatest extent possible, to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance in the Dominion of Canada'; and the Republic of Mexico. The routes of this system, to the greatest extent possible,-shall-be selected by joint action of the State highway departments of each State and the adjoining States, subject to the approval by the secretary5 as provided in subsection (e) of this section. All highways or routes included in the interstate system as finally, approved, if not already coincident with the primary system, shall be added to said system without regard to the mileagé limitation set forth in subsection (b) of this section. This system may be located both in rural and urban areas.” . ' . ■
Section 109 of Title 23, captioned “Standards,” contains nothing in the way of guidelines which could be applied in the determination of a route location by the Michigan arbitration board. The most nearly *268relevant provisions appear as subsections (a) and (b) which are as follows:
“(a) The secretary shall not approve plans and specifications for proposed projects on any Federal-aid system if they fail to provide for a facility (1) that will adequately meet the existing and probable future traffic needs and conditions in a manner conducive to safety, durability, and economy of maintenance; (2) that will be designed and constructed in accordance with standards best suited to accomplish the foregoing objectives and to conform to the particular needs of each locality.
“(b) The geometric and construction standards to be adopted for the interstate system shall be those approved by the secretary in cooperation with the State highway departments. Such standards, as applied to each actual construction project, shall be adequate to enable such project to accommodate the types and volumes of traffic anticipated for such project for the twenty-year period commencing on the date of approval by the secretary, under section 106 of this title, of the plans, specifications, and estimates for actual construction of such project. Such standards shall in all cases provide for at least four lanes of traffic. The right-of-way width of the interstate system shall be adequate to permit construction of projects on the interstate system to such standards. The secretary shall apply such standards uniformly throughout all the States.”
The underscored sentence was added by Public Law 89-574, effective September 13, 1966. 80 Stat 767.
It must be constantly borne in mind that the standards or guidelines we are in search of in Title 23 are those pertaining to the selection of the route for an interstate highway. The standards I have quoted from Title 23 do not provide standards or guidelines for the selection of a route but rather pertain to plans, design, and specifications for con*269struction of the highway once a route has been selected.6 The limited function of the highway location arbitration board does not involve these. Nor are we able to turn to the standards which might well be considered to be adequate and which are contained in the provisions quoted from sections 1651 and 1653 of the department of transportation act, Title 49 USC, since the only reference in Act 12 is to Title 23 and these provisions do not appear under that title.
One of the cases cited in the majority opinion in support of the conclusion that Act 12 is a “reference statute” is Senior Citizens League, Inc., v. Department of Social Security (1951), 38 Wash 2d 142 (228 P2d 478). In Senior Citizens, 10 individuals had been recipients of various types of public assistance under the provisions of an existing law, identified as initiative measure No 172 (chapter 6, Laws of 1949). In 1950, the people voted favorably on initiative *270measure No 178  which, was a comprehensive act relating to the statewide public assistance program amending in substantial respects the prior 'law as it appeared in chapter 6, Laws of 1949. Plaintiff-appellants brought suit claiming No 178 was unconstitutional on several grounds, among which was the claim of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The Washington initiatory measure is substantially different from Michigan’s Act 12. The majority opinion of the Washington court states (pp 158, 159) :
“The objectives of the legislation are rather clearly revealed when the entire act is read and considered together. Those objectives are also expressly stated, in summary form, in the declaration of legislative policy which is set forth in section 2 of No 178. That declaration reads as follows:
“ ‘It is the purpose and intent of this act to provide for the public welfare by making available, in conjunction with Federal matching funds, such public assistance as is necessary to insure the recipients thereof a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health. This act recognizes that there are possibilities of serious abuses of such a program whereby those least deserving of public aid will benefit at the expense of the deserving, and of the State and its political subdivisions, and it is intended hereby to make possible sufficient administrative control of the program of assistance to curb or at least minimize such abuses without at the same time depriving qualified applicants and recipients of the assistance to which they are rightfully entitled.’
“It will be observed that the quoted declaration of policy lays down the following standards or guides:
“(1) The purpose is to provide for the public welfare.
*271“(2) Public assistance is to be made available in conjunction with Federal matching funds.
“(3) Such public assistance is to be provided as is necessary to insure a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.
“(4) The act is to be administered in such way as to avoid abuses whereby those least deserving of Dublic aid will benefit at the expense of the deserving, and of the State and its political subdivisions.
“(5) Such abuses are to be curbed without depriving qualified applicants and recipients of the assistance to which they are rightfully entitled.
“One of the most important of these guides or standards is (2), which provides that the public assistance be made available ‘in conjunction with’ Federal matching funds. This direction is not as broad as that contained in section 2 of chapter 6, Laws of 1949, where the intention was expressed to take ‘the fullest possible advantage’ of the provisions of the Federal social security act. To the extent that the two are in conflict, the provision in No 178 governs, under the theory of implied repeal. At the very least, however, the declaration in No 178 requires that the State public assistance program be so administered as to qualify the State to receive, in so far as the State’s contribution permits, the fullest available measure of Federal matching funds. This intent is further borne out by the provision of section 17, chapter 6, Laws of 1929 (not repealed by No 178) declaring chapter 6 inoperative to the extent that it fails to conform to the Federal social security act.”
The extracted quotation precedes the precise paragraph quoted from the Washington case in the majority opinion of this Court.
The AVashington majority opinion stated that Court’s conclusion on the issue of adequate standards in these words (p 161):
*272“Giving effect to these declarations of policy, we are of the opinion that the power conferred upon the department to fix ‘máximums’ and ‘ceilings’ is subject to sufficiently definite legislative standards to guide the department and to permit of judicial review of individual determinations. To be specific, the pertinent legislative standards assure, among other things, that the ‘máximums’ and ‘ceilings’ (1) shall not be so high or so low as to result in withdrawal of Federal matching funds; (2) shall not be so low that the resulting hardships and burdens in effect compel applicants and recipients to forego the public assistance they should have to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health; and (3) shall not be so high as to benefit those least deserving of public aid at the expense of those most deserving.
“We accordingly hold that the provisions in question do not unlawfully delegate legislative authority to the department.”
Since neither Act 12 nor Title 23 contains standards or guidelines at all comparable to the considerable State and Federal guidelines involved in Senior Citizens, as detailed in the Court’s opinion above quoted, I fail to see how Senior Citizens is applicable here.

The Second Part of the Majority Opinion.

Except for the statements dealing with Act 12 contained in the second part of the majority opinion, I agree that part 2 of the opinion states acceptable principles of law. It may be further noted that the Federal supremacy in the whole matter of interstate highways is highlighted by the case of Road Review League, Town of Redford v. Boyd (SD NY, 1967), 270 F Supp 650. That case was an action against Allan S. Boyd, individually and as secretary of transportation of the United States, and Alexander *273D. Trowbridge, individually and as acting secretary of commerce of the United States, challenging a determination of the Federal highway administrator, approved by the secretary of commerce, made under Title 23 USC § 101 et seq., regarding an approved route for a portion of an interstate highway. Over objections by local authorities and conservation groups; the district judge upheld the final determination of the Federal highway administrator and the acting secretary of commerce of the route for a highway as being neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law.-
I would reverse, holding PA 1967 (Ex Sess), No 12, to be unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Kelly, J., did not sit.

 The-present department of State highways originated with the State highway department organization act of 1964, PA 1964, No 286. That act abolished the office of State highway commissioner, *261transferring all tlie powers and duties of tbe office to a State highway commission, consisting of 4 members appointed by the governor as required by the Constitution of 1963, art 5, § 28. By the 1964 aet, administrative control over the State highway department and jurisdiction and control over all State trunkline highways was vested in the commission. The executive organization aet of 1965 (PA 1965, No 380) created a department of State highways as one of the principal departments of State government, named the State highway commission as head of the department,- and transferred all the powers, duties and functions vested in the State highway department to the department of State highways.

 Journal of the House, 74th Legislature, Pirst Extra Session of 1967, No. 1, Oct. 10, 1967,

 Cf. Hendershott v. Rogers (1927), 237 Mich 338; Fitzsimons & Galvin, Inc., v. Rogers (1928), 243 Mich 649.

 The exercise of the power of eminent domain is a matter entirely under the control of the legislature, subject to such restrictions as are found in the Constitution. Loomis v. Hartz (1911), 165 Mich 662, 665; Bendershott v. Rogers, supra

 At the time of the effective date of Act 12 (January 16, 1968), the Federal department of transportation had been created, with-'the secretary of transportation as its head, by the passage of the -department of transportation‘act (49 USC §1651 et seq.) made effective April 1, 1967, by executive order No. 11340. See, 32 Fed Reg 5453 (1967). The functions, powers, and duties theretofore vested in the secretary of commerce under Title 23 of the US Code were transferred to and vested in the secretary of transportation by section 1655 of the department of transportation act.

 Compare the following language of section 1651(b) (2) of the department of transportation act, Title 49 US Code (see footnote 5, supra):
“(2) It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.”
The national policy in this regard is further expanded by section 1653 (f) of Title 49 USC, which reads:
“(f) It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The secretary of transportation shall cooperate and consult with the secretaries of the interior, housing and urban development, and agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After August 23, 1968, the secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or loeal officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by sueh officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to sueh park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site re suiting from sueh use.”