Court Opinion

ID: 9543082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:52.970323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:38.258264
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
I dissent to that part' of the majority opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court allowing attorney’s fees to plaintiff.
Here the plaintiff has again married. The defendant likewise has married. The decree of divorce had long before this action arose- becpme final. All actions for divorce are strictly statutory.
“Where allowances for expenses of suit and counsel fees of the wife are, by statute, specifically provided for it is usually held that her right to such allowances is purely statutory and cannot be extended by the court; hence such allowances can be made only in accordance with the terms of the statute; * * *.
‘ ‘ The' right of the wife to counsel fees is not an absolute right, especially in the absence of statute specifically authorizing an allowance, in which case she must make a prima facie showing on a proper hearing.” 27 C. J. S., Divorce, sec. 216, pp. 910-911, and cases cited.
In State ex rel. Wooten v. District Court, 57 Mont. 517, 522, 189 Pac. 233, 9 A. L. R. 1212, the action was for annulment. In that case the court said: ‘ ‘ That the courts of this state have no inherent power, either as courts of law or equity, to dissolve marriage, and that the power to decree a divorce is purely statutory, has been determined by this court. Rumping v. Rumping, 36 Mont. 39, 91 Pac. 1057, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 1197, 12 Ann. Cas. 1090. This is so because of the fact that, at the time our forefathers brought with them the common law of England, neither courts of law or equity had jurisdiction in such matters; they being handled exclusively by the ecclesiastical courts. 2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, 431. The first legislative assembly of the territory, therefore, provided for actions for divorce, * * * and provided for the granting of alimony, both permanent and temporary, in all such actions. ’ ’ Emphasis supplied. The court then reviewed the history of the legislation relative to the subject of divorce, support and maintenance and annulment, and *35found that the statute did not provide or authorize the allowance of an attorney’s fee in actions for annulment, stating.
“It is therefore evident that whatever statutory authority the court now has in awarding alimony must be found in said section 3677 R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-137, Revised Codes. * * *.
“Section 3677 authorizes the court to grant temporary alimony in but two classes of cases, to wit: ‘While an action for divorce is pending,’ and ‘during the pendency of’ actions for support and maintenance. We are impelled, therefore, to the conclusion that there is no statutory authority in this state for the making of such an award as that complained of. ’ ’
In State ex rel. La Point v. District Court, 69 Mont. 29, 220 Pac. 88, 91, which was an action for separate maintenance, in interpreting this part of the section, this court said, ‘ ‘ * * * that the right to grant maintenance without a decree of divorce is recognized by section 5768, supra (Rev. Codes of 1921, now R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-136), and that the statute expressly imposes upon a husband the duty to support his wife, we conclude that the court is possessed of power to grant a decree for separate maintenance, together with alimony, attorney’s fees, and suit money, during the pendency of an action instituted for that purpose * * Emphasis supplied.
Thus did this court hold in the La Point case, supra, that during the pendency of an action for separate maintenance the court has jurisdiction on proper showing to allow an attorney’s fee to the husband’s wife. However such holding does not empower the trial court to allow an attorney’s fee under the facts herein, long after the decree granting an absolute divorce has become final.
In Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 201 Pac. 314, 315, 25 A. L. R. 351, Chief Justice Brantly, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
“We shall not stop to inquire what power the courts in this jurisdiction would have had at common law in divorce cases to require the husband to pay the fees of counsel employed by the *36wife. The statute declares the extent of the power and, in our opinion, is exclusive; for ‘in this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Code or the statute ’ (section 8060, Rev. Codes [1907]), and ‘the Code establishes the law of this state respecting the subjects to which it relates’ (Section 8061). It requires but a casual reading of section 3677, supra (Rev. Codes 1907), to ascertain that the object of the Legislature in enacting it was to give the courts discretionary power, to be exercised fairing the pendency of the action upon proper showing by the wife in an application for that purpose, to compel the husband to provide the means necessary to enable her to prosecute or defend the action. * * *
“Upon examination of the decided cases in other states which have the same or similar statutory provisions, we find that their courts generally agree that counsel fees may be allowed only while the divorce action is pending. (Citing cases.) * * * The rule was impliedly recognized by this court in the case of Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 29 Mont. 478, 75 Pac. 359; s. e., on rehearing, 32 Mont. 159, 80 Pac. 6. In that case it was held that a district court has no power under the statute to allow counsel fees for past services, even during the pendency of the divorce proceedings; the only possible exception to this being, perhaps, where the allowance for such past services would be necessary to enable the wife to continue the future prosecution of the action or to make her defense. ’ ’ Emphasis supplied.
Since the statutes do not empower the trial court to allow counsel fees for past services, even during the pendency of the divorce action, it necessarily follows that, after the divorce action is terminated, the trial court may not entertain an independent action by counsel against the husband for services rendered for the wife during the pendency of such independent action. See Albrecht v. Albrecht, 83 Mont. 37, 269 Pac. 158.
In Rumping v. Rumping, 36 Mont. 39, 91 Pac. 1057, 1058, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 1197, 12 Ann. Cas. 1090,. this court said, “It is elementary, of course, that neither courts of law or equity have *37any inherent power to dissolve marriage. The power to decree a divorce is purely statutory.”
In Sell v. Sell, 58 Mont. 329, 193 Pac. 561, 562, this court said, “In this jurisdiction the power to decree a divorce is purely statutory. Rumping v. Rumping, 36 Mont. 39, 91 Pac. 1057, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 1197, 12 Ann. Cas. 1090.
“A court of equity has no inherent jurisdiction of a suit for divorce, the authority to hear and determine the same being derived from statute.” Nield v. Nield, 126 W. Va. 430, 28 S. E. (2d) 825, 826; McCotter v. Carle, 149 Va. 584, 140 S. E. 670; Schoulder on Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations, 6th Ed., Yol. 2, see. 1468. Our Constitution by section 1 of Article III, declares, “All Political power is vested in and derived from the people. ’ ’
The only statutory authority for allowing suit money or attorney fees is that contained in R. C. M. 1947, section 21-137, which as far as pertinent here, provides that while an action for divorce is pending the judge may, in his discretion, require the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary.to enable the wife to support herself or her children, or to prosecute or defend the action in divorce.
R. C. M. 1947, section 93-8706, provides: “An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.” (Emphasis supplied.) McCormick v. Shields, 63 Mont. 9, 12, 205 Pac. 831; Peterson v. City of Butte, 44 Mont. 129, 120 Pac. 231; Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 26 Mont. 533, 534, 69 Pac. 103, Id., 29 Mont. 478. 482, 483, 75 Pac. 359; 1 C. J. S., Actions, sec. 142, p. 1421.
“The power of the trial court in an action for divorce to make an allowance to the wife for her support or to enable her to defend or prosecute the action exists as long as the action is pending, which is from the time of the commencement thereof ‘until its final determination on appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless judgment is sooner satisfied’.” (Em*38phasis supplied.) 1 Cal. Jur., “Alimony and Separate Maintenance,” sec. 25, p. 972. See also: Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 87, 118 Pac. 445, and cases cited; Loveren v. Loveren, 100 Cal. 493, 494, 35 Pac. 87.
The proceedings for divorce are purely statutory, and the powers which the court exercises are only those conferred upon it by statute. The court merely exercises the special power with which it is invested by statute, and not according to the course of common law. See state ex rel. Tolls v. Tolls, 160 Or. 317, 85 Pac. (2d) 366, 119 A. L. R. 1370.
The trial court, in an action for divorce and alimony, derives its power solely from statutes and has no general equity jurisdiction inherent in courts of chancery. See Owens v. Owens, 85 Ohio App. 414, 88 N. E. (2d) 922.
Divorce jurisdiction of district courts is purely statutory and such courts have only those powers delegated to them by statute. See State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, Minn., 1950, 40 N. W. (2d) 881.
Jurisdiction of a court of equity in a suit for divorce is restricted to powers conferred by statute, and courts of equity have no inherent power in cases of divorce. See Pressney v. Pressney, 339 Ill. App. 371, 90 N. E. (2d) 119.
The divorce statute must be accorded a strict construction. The statute is the sole source from which jurisdiction in divorce actions' must be sought. See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 4 Terry 245, 43 Del. 245, 45 A. (2d) 536.
Jurisdiction relative to divorce and alimony is given by statute, and every power exercised by a court with reference thereto must find its source in the statute or it does not exist. See Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N. W. (2d) 731.
Trial courts have only such jurisdiction in divorce matters as the legislature confers on them. See Swenson v. Swenson, 245 Wis. 124, 13 N. W. (2d) 531.
Courts of New York have no common law jurisdiction over the subject of divorce and must act within the limits of power con*39ferred by statute. See Haas v. Haas, 183 Misc. 870, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 931.
Strictly speaking, a proceeding in divorce, with its incidentals of suit money, attorney’s fees and maintenance is sui generis wherein the extent of the court’s authority is prescribed and limited wholly by statute. In Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 208 Pac. (2d) 514, 525, this court said, “The power of courts in divorce actions is to be determined entirely upon the terms of the statutes conferring jurisdiction.”
In Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 Pac. (2d) 251, 264, this court said: “ It is well established that the powers of courts in matrimonial matters are to be determined entirely upon the terms of the statutes conferring the jurisdiction. ’ ’
The trial judge was correct where in his finding No. XI, he stated, in considering the allowance of the attorney’s fee, that “However, as the statute [R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-137] is not complete enough to authorize the same,” but was in error in finishing the paragraph with, “it seems that under the equity jurisdiction of this court, this is a proper case for such allowance.”
Not only is the last above quoted part of the finding- incorporated in the judgment erroneous for want of statutory authority but the order and judgment erroneously directs the fee not to be paid to the plaintiff who is, under any theory the only person to whom it could be adjudged, but it further erroneously orders the defendant to pay the fee direct to plaintiff’s attorney.
This court may not read into the above quoted section 21-137 any such authority. The legislature did not provide for the exaction of such fees. A statute so clear and unambiguous should need no interpretation. Not only is there no authority in law for the allowance of attorney’s fees under the facts in this case, but the record further shows herein that there was no adequate showing whatever of plaintiff’s need or necessity therefor. On the contrary the record discloses that plaintiff received from defendant some $585 but a few days prior to the hearing. In *40Albrecht v. Albrecht, supra, this court said, “We have searched the record in vain to find any evidence whatever, offered on the part of the defendant, showing the necessity for the allowance of attorney f ees as made by the court, and we hold that such allowance was an abuse of discretion and was error.” [83 Mont. 37, 269 Pac. 161.] Emphasis supplied.
In the ease of Crooks v. Crooks, Mo. App., 197 S. W. (2d) 686, it should be kept in mind that there the Missouri court had under consideration and interpretation the Missouri statute dealing with alimony and maintenance which is not similar to the Montana statute, section 21-137, supra. Further it should be noted that Missouri has no statute similar to our section 93-8706, supra.
A divorce action under our statutes is not an action in equity. Although the procedure employed therein closely follows that provided for the trial of suits in equity, yet a divorce suit is strictly a statutory action, separate and distinct from both actions at law and suits in equity; as before stated, the proceeding is sui generis.
The duty of the husband under the statute grows out of the obligations imposed by the marital relation while it exists and not out of any duty or obligation to provide attorney fees for his former wife’s future actions as a single woman or as the present wife of another man.
Here the action for divorce was not pending. The absolute decree of divorce had been entered and had become final long before the instant proceeding was commenced or heard. The parties were no longer husband and wife. Each had become married to a different spouse. The status of each had changed. There was and is no authority under the statutes for the court to assess or allow attorney fees. And the record further shows that at the hearing plaintiff testified in substance that she had never asked defendant for any money and that he could keep his money.
For these reasons, the allowance of attorney’s fees by the judge was wholly without authority, contrary to law and error. The *41portion of the order and decree allowing attorney’s fees should be stricken, set aside and vacated.