Court Opinion

ID: 9601303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:41:26.784614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:31.314624
License: Public Domain

*159CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree that the instruction quoted in the majority-opinion is ground for reversal for two reasons: (1) The instruction was not erroneous; at the most it was incomplete and not sufficiently specific and hence defendant cannot complain because she did not offer a more explicit one. (2) The error, if any, in the instruction was cured by other instructions.
Let us examine the instruction quoted in the majority opinion. The opinion concedes that the first sentence correctly states the law. The only apparent criticism is that the word ‘‘ control ’’ is not sufficiently defined. That is nothing more than a statement that it is incomplete—not sufficiently explicit. As defendant offered no more precise instruction he cannot now complain. The rule is stated in Tabata v. Murane, 24 Cal.2d 221, 228 [148 P.2d 605], cited by the majority: “If the law applicable to the facts of a case is stated correctly in a general charge to the jury, a party may not, in the absence of a request for a more specific or elaborate instruction, complain .that a more specific or elaborate instruction should have been given.” (Emphasis added.) And generally, “it is unquestionably the law that where a general instruction is given which is correct as far as it goes, being deficient merely by reason of its generality, the injured party may complain upon appeal only in ease he requests that the charge be made more specific, or asks for other qualifying instructions, and his request is denied.” (24 Cal.Jur. 796.) Particularly it has been held that a party cannot complain of the failure of an instruction to define terms used unless he requests a definition. (Mecham v. Crump, 137 Cal.App. 200 [30 P.2d 568]; Neudeck v. Vestal, 117 Cal.App. 266 [3 P.2d 595] ; Hamm v. San Joaquin etc. Canal Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 47 [111 P.2d 940] ; Los Angeles City H. S. Dist. v. Schumann, 78 Cal.App. 353 [248 P. 737]; Ramos v. Service Bros., 118 Cal.App. 432 [5 P.2d 623]; Bezera v. Associated Oil Co., 117 Cal.App. 139 [3 P.2d 622]; Bruce v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 177 Cal. 25 [169 P. 660] ; 24 Cal.Jur. 797.) No complaint may be made, therefore, of the first sentence.
It is clear that the second sentence of the instruction is modified by the first sentence thus requiring “control” by the defendant in the circumstances there mentioned. Moreover, the majority opinion overlooks that part of the second sentence reading “if you believe from the evidence that there *160was a danger inherent" upon a particular approach to the building owned by defendant” certain results follow. Clearly the word “owned” refers to and modifies approach rather than “building.” Hence the jury were told that if they found that the approach was owned by defendant and it was dangerous, there was liability. That is no doubt the law because if it is owned by the defendant it is' controlled by him, and the ownership harmonizes with the first sentence which speaks of control of the property involved.
Even assuming there is some uncertainty in the instruction it was adequately clarified by other instructions which specifically required that defendant be the owner and have control of the defective place where plaintiff fell before there could be liability. The jury was instructed: “It is the duty of a landlord, such as the defendant in this case, to exercise reasonable care in making safe, and in the maintenance and repair of, any part of a building or other property over which he retains control and which is reserved from the exclusive use of any one tenant so that it may be used in common by all tenants and all others who may lawfully enter the premises.” (Emphasis added.) “Whenever a person is a guest or an invitee of a tenant and as such enters upon a part of the premises so reserved for common use, and which is under the landlord’s control, he is deemed by law to be an invitee of the landlord, and the duty of the'landlord, as I have stated it, applies in such invitee’s favor as to those parts of the premises under the landlord’s control and upon or into which said invitee would reasonably be likely to go under the circumstances of the invitation, or would be induced or allured to go by the express or implied invitation arising from those circumstances. ... It is the duty of a landlord to maintain and keep in a reasonably safe condition for use by guests or invitees of tenants any part of a building over which he retains control and which is reserved from the exclusive use of one tenant so that it may be used in common by the tenants and all others who may lawfully enter the premises.” (Emphasis added.) “. . . [Defendants were under no duty to keep the public sidewalk in front of their premises safe or in repair, or to reconstruct or alter it in any way, and they cannot be held liable for a structural defect, if any, causing plaintiff’s accident.” (Emphasis added.) The last instruction specifically told the jury that there could be no liability if the accident occurred on the public sidewalk thus eliminating any possibility that liability *161could be imposed for conditions on property not owned by or under defendant’s control.
In view of the foregoing it cannot fairly be said that the error, if any, in giving the instruction complained of, was prejudicial, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 24, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.