Court Opinion

ID: 9792712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:34:59.265126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.759174
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s characterization of respondent’s misconduct, I do not agree that a 3-year suspension from the practice of law is an adequate sanction. Rather, I find that the egregiousness of respondent’s misconduct, coupled with this court’s decision in In re Fresquez, mandates disbarment.
The misconduct at issue in Fresquez was strikingly similar to respondent’s misconduct in this case. See In re Fresquez, 162 Ariz. 328, 783 P.2d 774 (1989). In response to a bar complaint, respondent Fresquez sought and obtained his secretary’s signature on an affidavit that contained false representations. Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 330, 783 P.2d at 776. Knowing that these representations were false, Fresquez submitted the affidavit along with his answer to the State Bar. Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 333, 783 P.2d at 779. Additionally, while under oath, Fresquez repeatedly lied to the State Bar hearing committee. Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 335, 783 P.2d at 781. Upon disbarring Fresquez, this court found that notwithstanding any other misconduct, Fresquez’s misconduct relating to the false affidavit “standing alone, [was] sufficient to warrant [Fresquez’s] disbarment.” Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 335, 783 P.2d at 781. Moreover, with regard to Fresquez’s lies under oath, we commented that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of an ethical violation more serious than a lawyer lying under oath.” Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 335, 783 P.2d at 781.
I find no reason to depart from our position in Fresquez. Respondent’s misconduct in manufacturing evidence, lying under oath at his deposition, and suborning perjury by means of false affidavits falls within the bounds of the Fresquez decision. Respondent’s misconduct warrants disbarment under the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See Standards 5.11(b) and 6.11 (1991). Indeed, the majority concedes as much, acknowledging that “respondent’s conduct, standing alone, is sufficiently grievous to merit disbarment.” Neverthe*190less, it finds that respondent’s permanent disbarment would be an inappropriate and unnecessarily harsh sanction. In weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors of this case, the majority apparently finds that the mitigating factors of respondent’s good reputation in the Tucson community and absence of a prior disciplinary record provide a sufficiently compelling case against respondent’s disbarment. Considering the egregiousness of respondent’s misconduct, I do not agree.