Court Opinion

ID: 9396268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-20 00:00:30.105896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.107204
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-61019      Document: 00516757458         Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/19/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                           May 19, 2023
                                   No. 20-61019                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk

   Charles Ray Crawford,

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections;
   Earnest Lee, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary,

                                                         Respondents—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Mississippi
                            USDC No. 3:17-CV-105

   Before Smith, Duncan, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
          The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no member of
   the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled
   on rehearing en banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR. R. 35), the
   petition for    rehearing   en banc      is   DENIED. The opinion is
   WITHDRAWN, and the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED:
Case: 20-61019      Document: 00516757458           Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/19/2023

                                     No. 20-61019

          Charles Crawford petitions for habeas relief. As a prisoner held under
   a state court judgment, Crawford must overcome the strictures of the Anti-
   Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). He also must
   prove that “law and justice require” relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Crawford does
   neither. We affirm.
                                          I.
                                         A.
          Crawford was convicted of raping a 17-year-old girl (Kelly Roberts),
   assaulting a 16-year-old girl (Nicole Cutberth) with a hammer, and raping and
   murdering a 20-year-old woman (Kristy Ray). The series of gruesome crimes
   began on April 13, 1991.
          On that fateful day, Roberts and Cutberth were riding around Walnut,
   Mississippi. The girls went to a store to purchase fluid for the car. When they
   left, they saw Crawford—who at that time was Roberts’s brother-in-law—
   and asked him to help put the fluid in the car. Crawford agreed.
          Crawford then began his scheme to lure the girls to his house. He told
   Roberts that he needed to talk to her about something important but refused
   to say what. Roberts insisted he tell her. Eventually, Crawford agreed to tell
   her if she met him at a cemetery outside the city. Roberts reluctantly agreed.
          Later that evening, the girls met Crawford at the cemetery. There,
   Crawford told Roberts that her boyfriend had pictures of her that were
   “pretty bad,” that Crawford had gotten the pictures from her boyfriend, and
   that Crawford planned to get rid of them. Roberts told Crawford she wanted
   the pictures. Crawford replied that the pictures were at his house and that he
   would take her there. Roberts and Cutberth then got into Crawford’s truck,
   and he drove them to his house.

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                                     No. 20-61019

            Crawford drove the girls to an abandoned house near his and parked.
   He told Cutberth to stay in the car while he and Roberts got the photos. Once
   Crawford and Roberts entered the house, Crawford told Roberts to stay by
   the door so he could make sure nobody was home. When Crawford returned,
   he pulled a gun and put it to Roberts’s head. Crawford told her to do what he
   said and no one would get hurt.
            He ordered Roberts to get onto the floor. Roberts obeyed. Crawford
   taped her mouth shut. He then commanded her to put her hands behind her
   back. Roberts again obeyed. Crawford taped her hands together. Crawford
   then forced Roberts into a bedroom and onto a bed. He undressed her. And
   then he raped her.
            Afterwards, Roberts begged Crawford not to hurt her friend. But
   Crawford didn’t listen. He went outside and bludgeoned Cutberth on the
   back of the head with a hammer. Roberts heard the assault happen. Crawford
   then went back inside the house, grabbed Roberts, and forced her into his
   truck.
            Eventually, Crawford let Roberts go and turned himself in to the
   police. The police found Cutberth alive, recovered the gun, and found
   Roberts’s and Crawford’s hair on used pieces of duct tape in Crawford’s
   house. Crawford was charged with the rape and kidnapping of Roberts and
   the aggravated assault of Cutberth.
            But this was not the end of Crawford’s crimes. Crawford was let out
   on bond. While out on bond, Crawford kidnapped 20-year-old Kristy Ray. He
   took Ray to a secluded barn in the woods, where he raped and murdered her.
   The police quickly arrested Crawford. And Crawford admitted to raping and
   murdering Ray and led the police to Ray’s body. He was charged with capital
   murder, kidnapping, burglary of an occupied dwelling, rape, and sexual
   battery.

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                                    No. 20-61019

          Crawford received three separate trials, which occurred in the
   following order: (1) the aggravated assault of Cutberth, (2) the rape and
   kidnapping of Roberts, and (3) the murder of Ray. For each, Crawford
   pressed an insanity defense. At the aggravated-assault trial (1) and the
   murder trial (3), Crawford had an expert testify that he was insane at the time
   of the incidents. At the rape trial (2), Crawford pressed a substantively
   identical insanity defense but only had lay witnesses testify. He also
   challenged the kidnapping charge on the facts and the rape charge on the
   theories that Roberts consented, or alternatively, that Roberts and Crawford
   never had sex. Crawford was convicted of raping Roberts (but acquitted of
   kidnapping) and was sentenced to 46 years of imprisonment. Crawford was
   convicted of assaulting Cutberth and was sentenced to 20 years of
   imprisonment. Crawford was convicted of murdering Ray and was sentenced
   to death.
                                         B.
          The present appeal involves only Crawford’s conviction for raping
   Roberts. Crawford directly appealed his rape conviction in state court and
   almost succeeded in getting a new trial: The Mississippi Supreme Court
   affirmed his conviction by a 5–4 vote. See Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905
   (Miss. 2015).
          Crawford next tried his luck at state postconviction relief. Again, he
   failed. Crawford argued for the first time that the trial court violated his
   procedural due process right to expert assistance in his insanity defense
   under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), along with many other claims.
   The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Crawford procedurally
   defaulted his Ake claim because it “could have been raised in the direct
   appeal.” The court also denied Crawford’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
   claims and found the rest of Crawford’s claims to be “without merit.”

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                                         No. 20-61019

           Crawford next filed a habeas petition in federal district court, raising
   thirteen claims. The district court denied Crawford’s petition but granted
   Crawford a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on all thirteen claims.
   Crawford timely appealed.
                                               II.
           Crawford raises only three claims on appeal. 1 First, Crawford claims
   that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise an Ake claim
   on direct appeal. Second, Crawford raises an Ake claim and argues that the
   claim is not procedurally barred because his appellate counsel’s
   ineffectiveness establishes cause and prejudice. Third, Crawford claims that
   his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
           All fail. We first (A) provide some background on (1) AEDPA and
   (2) ineffectiveness claims. We then (B) conclude that Crawford failed to
   establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We last (C) determine
   that Crawford has not established ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
                                               A.
                                               1.
           AEDPA first. Everyone agrees AEDPA’s strictures—including its
   relitigation bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—apply to each of Crawford’s
   ineffectiveness arguments. See Lucio v. Lumpkin, 987 F.3d 451, 465 (5th Cir.
   2021) (en banc) (plurality op.). Section 2254(d) “restores the res judicata

           1
              Although Crawford obtained a COA on thirteen claims, Crawford provides
   arguments on only three claims and tries to incorporate by reference his application before
   the district court for the rest. He has thus abandoned the ten unbriefed claims. See, e.g.,
   Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 295 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (arguments incorporated by
   reference from prior briefing are “not adequately briefed” and forfeited); McGowen v.
   Thaler, 675 F.3d 482, 497 (5th Cir. 2012).

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                                     No. 20-61019

   rule” that long underpinned habeas “and then modifies it” by providing
   “narrow exceptions.” Langley v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 2019) (en
   banc). As relevant here, Crawford must show the state court’s adjudication
   of the claim “resulted in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable
   application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
   Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
          To meet the unreasonable-application exception to the relitigation
   bar, “a prisoner must show far more than that the state court’s decision was
   merely wrong or even clear error.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020)
   (per curiam) (quotation omitted). “Rather, the relitigation bar forecloses
   relief unless the prisoner can show the state court was so wrong that the error
   was ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
   possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Langley, 926 F.3d at 156 (quoting
   Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam)). “In other words, the
   unreasonable-application exception asks whether it is ‘beyond the realm of
   possibility that a fairminded jurist could’ agree with the state court.” Ibid.
   (quoting Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 118 (2016) (per curiam)).
          To apply the relitigation bar, we first “must identify the relevant state-
   court ‘decision.’” Lucio, 987 F.3d at 465. Here, the relevant decision is the
   sole state court opinion involving ineffectiveness: the Mississippi Supreme
   Court’s order denying Crawford’s application for leave to file a motion to
   vacate his conviction and sentence. ROA.3167–68. All agree that the court’s
   denial of leave is a decision “adjudicat[ing] . . . the merits” of Crawford’s
   ineffectiveness claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). And for good reason. The
   Mississippi Supreme Court plainly rejected those claims on the merits: “The
   Court further finds that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail to
   meet the Strickland v. Washington standard.” ROA.3167; cf. Harrington v.
   Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011) (“This Court now holds and reconfirms that

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                                        No. 20-61019

   § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision
   can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’”).
          But the Mississippi Supreme Court did not explain why it rejected
   Crawford’s Strickland claim. This is significant. When “a state court’s
   decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden
   still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court
   to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. We “must determine what arguments
   or theories . . . could have supported[] the state court’s decision; and then [we]
   must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those
   arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of
   this Court.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added); see also Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S.
   Ct. 2555, 2558 (2018) (per curiam) (same); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
   188 (2011) (same). That is, we imagine the reasons that Story, Brandeis, and
   Frankfurter could’ve dreamt up to support the state court’s decision, and
   then we ask whether every reasonable jurist would conclude that all those
   hypothetical reasons violate the relitigation bar. That makes § 2254(d) very
   close to a res judicata provision.
                                             2.
          Next, ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment
   generally obliges the State to provide an indigent defendant with counsel. See
   U.S. Const. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But
   not just any counsel. According to the Supreme Court, States must provide
   effective counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That’s
   because “a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation
   is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.” Evitts v. Lucey,
   469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
          To establish ineffectiveness, Crawford must show that counsel’s
   failure was both (1) objectively deficient and (2) prejudicial. Strickland, 466

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                                       No. 20-61019

   U.S. at 687. “Strickland’s first prong sets a high bar.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S.
   Ct. 759, 775 (2017). “To establish deficient performance, a person
   challenging a conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below
   an objective standard of reasonableness.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (quotation
   omitted). There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was
   within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Ibid. (quotation
   omitted). And to show deficient performance, the defendant must show that
   his lawyer was so bad as to be “no counsel at all.” Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396. 2
          AEDPA makes it even more difficult to win an ineffectiveness claim.
   The “more general the rule, the more leeway state courts have.” Kayer, 141
   S. Ct. at 523 (quotation omitted). And “because the Strickland standard is a
   general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably
   determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v.
   Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). “The standards created by Strickland
   and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem,
   review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation omitted); see also
   Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2021) (per curiam) (“doubly
   deferential”); Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123 (“doubly deferential”).
                                             B.
          We now address the first two claims, each turning on whether
   Crawford’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Ake on direct
   appeal. “Declining to raise a claim on appeal . . . is not deficient performance
   unless that claim was plainly stronger than those actually presented to the
   appellate court.” Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2067 (2017). “In most
   cases, an unpreserved trial error will not be a plainly stronger ground for

          2
            Because Crawford’s lone preserved Strickland claim fails at prong one, we need
   not discuss the prejudice prong in this case. See infra 10–13.

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                                    No. 20-61019

   appeal than preserved errors.” Ibid. “Thus, in most instances in which the
   trial court did not rule on the alleged trial error (because it was not
   preserved), the prisoner could not make out a substantial claim of ineffective
   assistance of appellate counsel.” Ibid.
          Here, the district court held the state court could’ve reasonably found
   the Ake claim unpreserved. We agree. Crawford’s trial counsel withdrew his
   Ake motion, so the trial court never ruled on it. Crawford must thus show
   that every fairminded jurist would conclude that this is the extraordinary
   instance where an unpreserved claim was stronger than the preserved claims,
   and that appellate counsel’s failure to press the unpreserved Ake claim was
   tantamount to providing no appellate counsel at all.
          Crawford cannot come close to that showing. His appellate counsel
   raised numerous issues on direct appeal and nearly won a new trial from the
   State’s highest court. See Crawford, 192 So. 3d at 905 (vote of 5–4). It thus
   borders on absurd to contend that appellate counsel was deficient for failing
   to raise an unpreserved claim, or that the state court transgressed the every-
   reasonable-jurist standard.
          But even if the Ake claim were preserved, the ineffectiveness claim
   still fails. Even though Crawford has the burden to show ineffectiveness
   under AEDPA’s strictures, he merely argues that he meets Ake. See Burt v.
   Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22–23 (2013) (“[T]he burden to show that counsel’s
   performance was deficient rests squarely on the defendant.” (quotation
   omitted)). That’s not close to enough. He has not shown that his Ake
   argument is so strong that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise it was
   tantamount to providing no counsel at all. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396. And even
   if he could make that showing, which he doesn’t even try to make, Crawford
   would still fail because he hasn’t tried to show that his Ake-Strickland claim
   would satisfy AEDPA’s relitigation bar.

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                                     No. 20-61019

                                          C.
          Crawford’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim fares no
   better. We (1) provide two independent reasons that doom Crawford’s claim.
   Then we (2) reject Crawford’s remaining counterarguments.
                                          1.
          A fairminded jurist could conclude that the trial counsel’s
   performance was not deficient and prejudicial. That’s for two independent
   reasons.
          First, the jury found Crawford not guilty of the kidnapping charge.
   Crawford does not dispute that his counsel’s performance contributed to this
   result. It’s thus difficult to say that the State failed to provide Crawford with
   counsel that was effective to some extent and that Crawford was “in no better
   position than one who has no counsel at all.” Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396.
          Second, before the rape trial began, the same trial counsel tried an
   insanity defense in the related assault trial, and the jury rejected it—even
   though counsel presented an expert who testified that Crawford was insane.
   In the subsequent rape trial, counsel tried something different: He presented
   a substantively identical insanity defense but with lay testimony instead of
   the prior expert whose testimony was already rejected, and he tried to raise
   reasonable doubt as to the rape charge based on a theory of consent and a
   theory that Crawford and Roberts never had sex. A fairminded jurist could
   conclude that counsel made an adequate strategic choice not to do the same
   thing over again and expect a different result.
                                          2.
          Crawford’s remaining counterarguments are unpersuasive.
          Crawford argues that we can’t evaluate trial counsel’s overall
   conduct; instead, we must dissect the trial counsel’s insanity-defense

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   performance in a vacuum. Not so. Strickland’s prejudice prong requires that
   a court consider whether the challenged act or omission changed the result
   of the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (holding an “error by counsel”
   doesn’t “warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding” where
   in the context of the whole proceeding the identified error “had no effect on
   the judgment”). That means looking at trial counsel’s overall conduct in the
   context of the whole proceeding and determining whether the identified error
   would have changed the outcome.
          But even if we focused on the insanity defense alone, Crawford still
   cannot surmount AEDPA’s relitigation bar. Contrary to Crawford’s
   suggestion, every fairminded jurist would not think that the absence of an
   expert for an insanity defense is per se error. The Supreme Court has “often
   explained that strategic decisions—including whether to hire an expert—are
   entitled to a strong presumption of reasonableness.” Reeves, 141 S. Ct. at
   2410 (quotation omitted). That’s why “Strickland does not . . . require[] for
   every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense. . . .
   When defense counsel does not have a solid case, the best strategy can be to
   say that there is too much doubt about the State’s theory for a jury to
   convict.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. And Crawford’s first jury heard his
   insanity defense, replete with expert testimony, and rejected it—thus
   showing counsel the defense was weak. Cf. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 124
   (“Rather, his counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he
   reasonably believed was a claim doomed to fail. The jury had already rejected
   medical testimony about Mirzayance’s mental state in the guilt phase, during
   which the State carried its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
   doubt.”). Thus, a fairminded jurist could find the strategic choice to cross-
   examine the State’s experts and present lay testimony to be adequate
   performance.

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          Crawford offers a hodgepodge of cases, but none helps him. In fact,
   only one of his cases (Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014) (per curiam))
   could even potentially help him because Hinton is his only case that found
   deficient performance. Id. at 274. And we’ve held that only a case finding
   deficient performance can clearly establish the law for an ineffectiveness
   claim under § 2254(d). See Lucio, 987 F.3d at 485 (“We are aware of no
   authority for turning the Supreme Court’s rejection of one prisoner’s claim
   into clearly established law that supports a second prisoner’s claim.”).
          Hinton, however, doesn’t help either. If a state court “must extend a
   rationale” from Hinton before “it can apply to the facts at hand, then by
   definition the rationale was not clearly established at the time of the state-
   court decision” and thus was not sufficient to pass the relitigation bar. White
   v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014). This follows from the statutory text:
   “Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court
   unreasonably applies [the Supreme] Court’s precedent; it does not require
   state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the
   failure to do so as error.” Ibid.
          At the very least, a state court would’ve had to extend Hinton to grant
   relief here. In Hinton, the Court concluded that trial counsel’s “failure to
   request additional funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be
   inadequate because he mistakenly believed that he had received all he could
   get under [state] law constituted deficient performance.” 571 U.S. at 274.
   The Court found two features significant. First was that “the core of the
   prosecution’s case was the state experts’ conclusion . . . and effectively
   rebutting that case required a competent expert on the defense side.” Id. at
   273. Second was that counsel’s failure “was based not on any strategic choice
   but on a mistaken belief that available funding was capped.” Ibid.

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          Neither of the two features the Supreme Court found significant in
   Hinton is present here. See, e.g., Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 317–18 (2015)
   (per curiam) (“Because none of our cases confront the specific question
   presented by this case, the state court’s decision could not be ‘contrary to’
   any holding from this Court,” nor an “unreasonable application” thereof.
   (quotation omitted)); Langley, 926 F.3d at 160 (collecting cases). Given
   defense counsel’s hybrid strategy, the “core” of the prosecution’s case was
   proving that the rape occurred, not that Crawford was sane. And Crawford
   points to no mistake in law that led to counsel’s choice. On top of that, Hinton
   did not involve a situation where a jury previously rejected the substantively
   identical defense with expert assistance for a contemporaneous crime. These
   differences are fatal.
                                         III.

          Moreover, the Supreme Court recently released two landmark habeas
   decisions—Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510 (2022), and Shinn v. Ramirez,
   142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022)—that direct us to refocus our attention in AEDPA
   cases. In Davenport, the Supreme Court made clear that “Congress invested
   federal courts with discretion when it comes to supplying habeas relief—
   providing that they ‘may’ (not must) grant writs of habeas corpus, and that
   they should do so only as ‘law and justice require.’” 142 S. Ct. at 1523
   (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243). This meant that AEDPA “did not
   guarantee relief upon . . . satisfaction” of its conditions; instead, “even a
   petitioner who prevails under AEDPA must still today persuade a federal
   habeas court that ‘law and justice require’ relief.” Id. at 1524 (quoting 28
   U.S.C. § 2243); see also Pacheco v. El Habti, 48 F.4th 1179, 1187–88 (10th Cir.
   2022) (noting, even after AEDPA, federal courts retain “traditional
   equitable authority” (citing Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1524)).

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           About a month later, the Supreme Court in Ramirez doubled down on
   the proposition that passing AEDPA’s strictures and the preexisting
   equitable doctrines are necessary but not sufficient to get habeas relief:
           To ensure that federal habeas corpus retains its narrow role,
           AEDPA imposes several limits on habeas relief, and we have
           prescribed several more. And even if a prisoner overcomes all
           of these limits, he is never entitled to habeas relief. He must
           still persuade a federal habeas court that law and justice require
           it.
   142 S. Ct. at 1731 (quotation omitted).
           Davenport and Ramirez thus indicate that courts should apply a two-
   prong framework to adjudicate habeas petitions from state prisoners. 3 The
   first prong is business as usual: whether the state prisoner satisfies AEDPA
   and the usual equitable and prudential doctrines (e.g., procedural default and
   prejudicial error). See Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. at 1731 (“AEDPA imposes several

           3
             Crawford is a state prisoner, so we need not determine whether federal courts
   may employ the two-prong framework in adjudicating § 2255 motions. See United States v.
   Cardenas, 13 F.4th 380, 384 n.* (5th Cir. 2021) (“Section 2255 is, of course, a statutory
   substitute for habeas corpus.”); Beras v. Johnson, 978 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (explaining that while state prisoners file “applications,” federal prisoners file “motions”).
   But there is good reason to think that federal courts can and should. The Supreme Court
   has made clear that “the ‘sole purpose’ of § 2255 was to change the venue for challenges to
   a sentence.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.) (emphasis
   added) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952)). The Supreme Court
   has repeatedly emphasized that there is “no basis for affording federal prisoners a preferred
   status when they seek postconviction relief.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166
   (1982); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 723 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
   and dissenting in part) (“A federal court entertaining collateral attack against a state
   criminal conviction should accord the same measure of respect and finality as it would to a
   federal criminal conviction. As it exercises equitable discretion to determine whether the
   merits of constitutional claims will be reached in the one, it should exercise a similar
   discretion for the other.”). For this reason, we generally apply the same equitable and
   prudential doctrines to federal and state prisoners. See United States v. Vargas-Soto, 35
   F.4th 979, 996 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2022).

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                                           No. 20-61019

   limits on habeas relief, and we have prescribed several more.” (emphasis added)
   (quotation omitted)). The second prong is whether law and justice require
   granting habeas relief. See ibid. (“And even if a prisoner overcomes all of these
   limits, he is never entitled to habeas relief. He must still persuade a federal
   habeas court that law and justice require it.” (emphasis added) (quotation
   omitted)). Much like qualified immunity after Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
   223 (2009), both prongs are necessary to get relief and a court may analyze
   either one first. 4 Id. at 236.
           We next (1) explain that law and justice do not compel issuance of the
   writ in the absence of factual innocence. Then we (2) conclude that Crawford
   can’t make the required showing.
                                                 1.
           As the Supreme Court recently reminded us, habeas is and always has
   been a discretionary remedy. See Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1520–24; Ramirez,
   142 S. Ct. at 1731. In England, the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus ad
   subjiciendum gave common-law courts the discretionary power to investigate
   the Crown’s basis for detaining its subjects. See Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1,
   ch.1, ¶¶ 5, 8 (1628). The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave our new federal courts
   that same power. See § 14, 1 Stat. 81–82. And modern federal courts retain
   it—though it remains, as always, a discretionary power and not a mandatory
   obligation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted . . .
   (emphasis added)); id. § 2243 (“as law and justice require”).

           4
             Jurisdiction is the only exception. That’s because “[i]n habeas proceedings, as in
   every other kind, federal courts must do jurisdiction first. And where jurisdiction is lacking,
   federal courts also must do jurisdiction last.” Davis v. Sumlin, 999 F.3d 278, 279 (5th Cir.
   2021) (quotation omitted). But whenever the court is assured of its jurisdiction, Davenport
   and Ramirez suggest that courts can perform either step first.

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          Law and justice do not require habeas relief—and hence a federal
   court can exercise its discretion not to grant it—when the prisoner is factually
   guilty. See Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1523 (concluding “guilt[]” is the primary
   consideration in evaluating whether “law and justice” require the writ
   (quotation omitted)); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
   Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142 (1970)
   (“[W]ith a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to
   collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea
   with a colorable claim of innocence.”). Again, this comports with the
   historical office of the writ. For the first 500 or so years of the writ’s
   existence, it generally could not be used to challenge a judgment of guilt. See
   Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to
   Empire 16–18 (2010) (comparing habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to various
   medieval writs that courts used after Magna Carta); id. at 18 (dating the
   writ’s emergence to the latter half of the fifteenth century). That’s because
   the historical purpose of the writ was to ensure that the prisoner’s detention
   comported with due process, and “a trial was generally considered proof he
   had received just that.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1521 (citing Bushell’s Case,
   124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–10 (C. P. 1670)).
          Requiring prisoners to show factual innocence also comports with the
   federalism principles undergirding AEDPA. The Supreme Court
   emphasized that courts must “adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with
   equitable and prudential considerations.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1523
   (quotation omitted). “Foremost among those considerations is the States’
   powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.” Ibid. (quotation
   omitted); see also Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. at 1731 (“To unsettle these expectations
   is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in
   punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and the victims of crime
   alike.” (quotation omitted)); ibid. (describing the States’ interests and the

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   significant costs of granting federal habeas relief). The States’ preeminent
   interest is at its apex where, as here, the conviction occurred long before the
   federal postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct.
   1547, 1554 (2021) (“When previously convicted perpetrators of violent
   crimes go free merely because the evidence needed to conduct a retrial has
   become stale or is no longer available, the public suffers, as do the victims.”);
   Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403, 417 (1993) (worrying that “the passage
   of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications” and
   worrying about “the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on
   often stale evidence would place on the States”). Requiring a state prisoner
   to show factual innocence in his federal habeas petition thus promotes
   federalism interests.
          Requiring federal habeas petitioners to show factual innocence also
   protects other parties not before the court. When the Supreme Court erased
   “[t]he traditional distinction between jurisdictional defects and mere errors
   in adjudication,” “[f]ederal courts struggled with an exploding caseload of
   habeas petitions from state prisoners.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1522; see also
   Langley, 926 F.3d at 154 (“It was not until 1953 that state prisoners could use
   federal habeas proceedings to relitigate free-standing constitutional claims
   after pressing and losing them in state court.”). Federal courts desperately
   needed “new rules aimed at separating the meritorious needles from the
   growing haystack.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1523. After all, “[i]t must
   prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
   worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end
   up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.” Brown v. Allen,
   344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). As Judge Friendly
   explained long ago:
          It defies good sense to say that after government has afforded a
          defendant every means to avoid conviction, not only on the

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           merits but by preventing the prosecution from utilizing
           probative evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional
           rights, he is entitled to repeat engagements directed to issues
           of the latter type even though his guilt is patent. A rule
           [requiring prisoners to show innocence] would go a long way
           toward halting the inundation; it would permit the speedy
           elimination of most of the petitions that are hopeless on the
           facts and the law, themselves a great preponderance of the
           total, and of others where, because of previous opportunity to
           litigate the point, release of a guilty man is not required in the
           interest of justice even though he might have escaped deserved
           punishment in the first instance with a brighter lawyer or a
           different judge.
   Friendly, supra, at 157 (quotation omitted).
           Factual innocence is an assertion by the defendant that he did not
   commit the conduct underlying his conviction. By contrast, affirmative
   defenses do not implicate factual innocence; they implicate legal innocence.
   Cf. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“It is important to note
   in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal
   insufficiency.”). Although law and justice can require habeas relief for
   certain legal errors that are deeply rooted in the writ’s history, “mere legal
   insufficiency” or “legal innocence” are not among them. Ibid. 5

           5
             As Judge Friendly observed: “the original sphere for collateral attack on a
   conviction was where the tribunal lacked jurisdiction either in the usual sense or because
   the statute under which the defendant had been prosecuted was unconstitutional or
   because the sentence was one the court could not lawfully impose.” Friendly, supra, at 151
   (citing Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); Ex parte Siebold, 100 US. 371 (1879);
   Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)). Only such legal errors, deeply rooted in the
   Great Writ’s history, will satisfy the law and justice requirement when a prisoner
   challenges his guilty conviction in a habeas proceeding. We have no occasion to consider,
   however, what law and justice might require when a prisoner challenges only his sentence
   and not his underlying conviction. Cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 85 (2005) (Scalia,
   J., concurring) (noting the phrase “law and justice” has been interpreted to allow prisoners

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           The colorable-claim-of-factual-innocence requirement critically
   differs from the prejudicial-error requirement under Brecht v. Abrahamson,
   507 U.S. 619 (1993). While the prejudicial-error requirement forecloses
   “relief against constitutional claims on immaterial points, the test on
   collateral attack generally should be not whether the error could have affected
   the result but whether it could have caused the punishment of an innocent
   man.” Friendly, supra, at 157 n.81. In other words, prejudicial error does not
   focus on factual innocence but on the significance of the error.
                                              2.
           Crawford has not made a colorable claim of factual innocence.
   Crawford does not deny that he committed the elements of the offense. He
   raped Roberts. Instead, he at most asserts that he wasn’t legally culpable
   under Mississippi law because of the affirmative defense of insanity. Cf.
   ROA.963 (“Crawford has not provided this Court with any new evidence
   that, as a factual matter, would show that he did not commit the crime of
   conviction. Indeed, Crawford does not make the argument at all.”). But
   affirmative defenses go to legal innocence—not factual innocence.
           Even if insanity implicated factual innocence, Crawford’s innocence
   claim is not colorable, so law and justice would still require denying his
   petition. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243. Crawford presented substantively
   identical insanity defenses at all three of his trials. At two of his trials,
   Crawford presented an expert witness to support his defense. Both juries
   flatly rejected that Crawford was insane. And one of the trials involved an
   incident contemporaneous with the rape of Roberts, and the same expert

   to separately challenge their convictions and their sentences); Jennings v. Stephens, 574
   U.S. 271, 278–79 (2015) (entertaining habeas challenge to capital sentence where prisoner
   did not contest his guilt for underlying crime).

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   Crawford wanted for the rape trial (Dr. Hutt) testified at the assault trial. See
   Crawford, 787 So. 2d at 1240, 1243. The State also presented at all three trials
   two experts who opined that Crawford was sane. There is thus no colorable
   reason to think that Crawford is insane, much less that he is factually
   innocent.
                                   *        *         *
          Crawford unquestionably raped a 17-year-old girl. AEDPA and “law
   and justice” both require denying his request for federal habeas relief.
          AFFIRMED.

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