Court Opinion

ID: 9957368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:01:10.194209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:17.613541
License: Public Domain

22-6209
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Palmer, IJ
                                                                           A206 443 303

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 4   four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                      DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                            Chief Judge,
 9                      ROBERT D. SACK,
10                      BETH ROBINSON,
11                    Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   KULWINDER SINGH,
15           Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                       22-6209
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
1    FOR PETITIONER:                    Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of Jaspreet Singh,
2                                       Richmond Hill, NY.
3
4    FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
5                                       Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting,
6                                       Assistant Director; Sanya Sarich Kerksiek,
7                                       Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
8                                       Litigation, United States Department of
9                                       Justice, Washington, DC.

10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Kulwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

14   March 30, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming a May 24, 2019, decision of an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

16   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re

17   Kulwinder Singh , No. A 206 443 303 (B.I.A. Mar. 30, 2022), aff’g No. A 206 443 303

18   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 24, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

19   underlying facts and procedural history.

20         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final

21   agency determination. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008).

22   We review an adverse credibility determination “under the substantial evidence

                                             2
1    standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the

2    administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

3    would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

4          “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 5   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of

 6   the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or

 7   witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under

 8   oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made),

 9   the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

10   with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on

11   country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,

12   without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the

13   heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”                8 U.S.C.

14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

15   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

16   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

17   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

                                                3
1          Singh alleged that he feared persecution as a member of the Shiromani Akali

 2   Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) Party because he was assaulted once by the police, and

3    his father and brother had previously fled India after facing similar persecution.

4    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

 5         First, the IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s statements

6    and his corroborating evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh wrote in

 7   his application that he was beaten by the police once on February 14, 2014, and he

8    explicitly confirmed at his hearing that he was only assaulted once. However, the

9    supporting letters he provided from a religious leader and two people in his

10   community aver that he was beaten by the police more than once, and that he was

11   physically attacked, rather than threatened, in March 2014. This inconsistency is

12   substantial because it goes to the harm Singh allegedly suffered and calls the

13   reliability of his documentary evidence into question. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of

14   Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “a material

15   inconsistency in an aspect of [an applicant]’s story that served as an example of

16   the very persecution from which he sought asylum . . . afforded substantial

17   evidence to support the adverse credibility finding” (quotation marks and citation

18   omitted)). The IJ was not required to accept Singh’s explanation that these were

                                             4
1    typographical errors because the letters explicitly stated that there were two

2    physical attacks. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner

3    must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

4    secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

 5   to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).

 6         Second, having questioned Singh’s credibility, the IJ reasonably relied on

 7   his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroboration.            “An

 8   applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

 9   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

10   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.

11   Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ was not required to credit the

12   letters from the SADA representative and Singh’s mother over his other,

13   inconsistent evidence; neither letter was a contemporaneous account, the party

14   representative made only a general statement that “Singh was tortured, arrested

15   and beaten during police custody due to his father’s association with our party,”

16   his mother was an interested witness, and neither declarant was available for

17   cross-examination.    See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We

18   generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

                                               5
 1   applicant’s documentary evidence.”); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d

 2   Cir. 2020) (concluding that “IJ acted within her discretion in according . . . little

 3   weight to letters from applicant’s wife and friend “because the declarants

 4   (particularly [the applicant’s] wife) were interested parties and neither was

 5   available for cross-examination”).

 6         Moreover, the IJ reasonably relied on Singh’s failure to present evidence

 7   from his father and brother confirming their own persecution.               Contrary to

 8   Singh’s position, because Singh’s credibility was already in question and the IJ was

 9   not denying relief solely for lack of corroboration, the IJ was not required to

10   determine that letters were reasonably available. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273;

11   see also Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing

12   between corroboration and credibility). Regardless, Singh did not allege that he

13   made any attempt to obtain statements from his father (in Greece) or brother (in

14   the United States).     See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“No court shall reverse a

15   determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of

16   corroborating evidence, . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact

17   is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”). The

18   IJ also reasonably noted that Singh failed to produce contemporaneous medical

                                                 6
 1   records related to the alleged February 2014 attack because the record Singh

 2   provided from 2018 references hospital records from 2014.

 3            Finally, the IJ reasonably found it implausible that the police were

 4   threatening and assaulting Singh because of his father’s political activities from 20

 5   years earlier. “It is well settled that, in assessing the credibility of an asylum

 6   applicant’s testimony, an IJ is entitled to consider whether the applicant’s story is

 7   inherently implausible.” Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007).

 8   The IJ’s conclusion was reasonable because Singh alleged that his father left India

 9   in 1995, had not been engaged in Indian politics since that time, and, although he

10   stated his father was a “strong” member of the party, he had few details of his

11   father’s activities and did not testify that his father had any significant role in the

12   party.    Given the absence of major political activism and the lack of country

13   conditions evidence to establish that Indian authorities harass or persecute the

14   families of activists decades later, the IJ did not err in finding the claim

15   implausible. Id. at 67 (upholding an implausibility finding that was “tethered to

16   record evidence, and there is nothing else in the record from which a firm

17   conviction of error could properly be derived”).

                                               7
 1         Taken together, the inconsistencies, the lack of reliable corroboration, and

 2   the implausibility of Singh’s account provide substantial evidence for the adverse

 3   credibility determination.    See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 (“[E]ven a single

 4   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to

 5   find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more

 6   forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse

 7   credibility determination is dispositive because asylum, withholding of removal,

 8   and CAT relief were all based on the same factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao,

 9   891 F.3d at 76 (“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims

10   for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, an adverse

11   credibility determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

12         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

13   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

14                                           FOR THE COURT:
15                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
16                                           Clerk of Court

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