Court Opinion

ID: 9645994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 00:00:30.955829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:52.522937
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30143   Document: 00516867632   Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/22/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                           ____________                                 FILED
                                                                  August 22, 2023
                             No. 22-30143                          Lyle W. Cayce
                           ____________                                 Clerk

   Nyron Harrison; Et al.,

                                                              Plaintiffs,

   Louisiana State,

                                         Intervenor Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                versus

   Jefferson Parish School Board, Dr. James Gray;

                            Defendants-Intervenor Defendants—Appellees,

   _______________________________

   Timothy Brown,

                                                               Plaintiff,

   Louisiana State,

                                         Intervenor Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                versus

   Jefferson Parish School Board; Dr. James Gray,

                            Defendants-Intervenor Defendants—Appellees.
Case: 22-30143        Document: 00516867632         Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/22/2023

                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                       USDC Nos. 2:20-CV-2916, 2:21-CV-40
                     ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
          Treating the petitions for rehearing en banc as petitions for panel
   rehearing, the petitions for panel rehearing are DENIED. Because no panel
   member or judge in regular active service requested an en banc poll,1 the
   petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED. We withdraw our previous
   opinion, reported at 74 F.4th 712, and substitute the following:
          The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two
   students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each
   student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the
   school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional.
   Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of
   JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as
   ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana
   wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its
   laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so.
          This case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States
   undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to
   federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign
   interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The two are distinctly dissimilar.
   Louisiana fails to point to “any precedent, history, or tradition” establishing
   that its interest in compliance with its laws is the equivalent of an Article III

          _____________________
          1
              Fed. R. App. P. 35; 5th Cir. R. 35.

                                               2
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   sovereign interest in maintaining its right to govern in the face of competing
   authority. 2 The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established
   quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing.
   Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short.
           As we conclude that Louisiana does not have Article III standing, we
   follow our statutory directive and REMAND the case to the district court
   to send back to the capable Louisiana state courts.
                                                 I
           Because of COVID, Ka’Mauri Harrison and T.B. were relegated to
   attending fourth grade and sixth grade, respectively, virtually. On different
   virtual school days, Ka’Mauri and T.B. individually had a BB gun on camera.
   Ka’Mauri was trying to move one out of the way. T.B. held one in the
   background during a break. Each student’s principal referred the student to
   JPSB for expulsion for violating the school’s weapon policy. Each student
   had a hearing before the JPSB. After the hearings, the JPSB converted the
   expulsions to suspensions. The students’ parents tried to appeal the
   suspensions, but JPSB denied the appeals, stating that appeals were only
   available to students who were expelled.
           The Louisiana Legislature subsequently passed H.B. 83 (“Ka’Mauri
   Harrison Act”) to address the rights of students that “have been expelled or
   suspended for doing what would be considered normal at home.” The Act
   provides for the right of review, first to the school board and then to the
   district court for the parish in which the school is located, when a student is
   recommended for expulsion, regardless of whether the student is ultimately

           _____________________
           2
             United States v. Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1970 (2023); see also id. (noting that “the
   Court has examined ‘history and tradition,’ among other things, as ‘a meaningful guide to
   the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider’”).

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   expelled. It also requires school boards to adopt specific disciplinary policies
   for virtual learning that are “narrowly tailored to address compelling
   government interests” and “the students’ and their families’ rights to
   privacy and other constitutional rights while at home or in a location that is
   not school property.” The Act applies retroactively to “recommendation[s]
   for expulsion [that were] reduced to a suspension, for behavior displayed
   while participating in virtual instruction . . . between March 13, 2020, and
   December 31, 2020.
          Before the Governor signed the act into law, JPSB approved an
   Interim Virtual Discipline Policy, which subjected virtual students to the
   same laws and policies as they would encounter in a physical classroom. Still,
   after the Governor signed the Act into law, JPSB reviewed Ka’Mauri’s and
   T.B.’s suspensions, ultimately affirming them.
          Each family sued JPSB in state court, Ka’Mauri’s in October 2020
   and T.B.’s in December 2020. The complaints raised state and federal
   constitutional and several tort claims and requested a declaration that
   JPSB’s policies and the state school discipline statute 3 are unconstitutional.
   JPSB removed both suits to federal court.
          Louisiana moved to intervene. The district court granted Louisiana
   leave to intervene as a matter of right because the suit challenged the
   constitutionality of a state statute. In its intervenor complaint, Louisiana
   alleged that JPSB is violating state and federal law in several ways, mainly
   by: (1) “acting ultra vires” in its disciplinary policies and actions; (2)
   violating several Louisiana statutes and (3) violating students’ and their
   parents’ due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. JPSB
   counterclaimed, alleging that the Ka’Mauri Harrison Act violates its due
          _____________________
          3
              La. Rev. Stat. § 17:416.

                                              4
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   process rights under Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana constitution and the
   Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.
          JPSB ultimately settled with the families and entered into a
   stipulation of dismissal of all the families’ claims. JPSB maintained its
   counterclaim under the stipulation but later voluntarily dismissed the claim.
   With only Louisiana’s claims remaining, JPSB moved for judgment on the
   pleadings.
          The district court granted JPSB’s motion, holding that Louisiana
   lacked standing. The court read Louisiana’s briefing as only asserting
   standing in its parens patriae capacity. It concluded that Louisiana failed to
   satisfy the doctrine’s requirements because the state failed to show a quasi-
   sovereign interest in protecting students from JPSB’s alleged discrimination
   and that its alleged injury affects a substantial portion of its population.4
   Summing up, the court stated, “Absent any concrete Article III injury that is
   sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court cannot wade into this
   dispute between the State and its political subdivision over the administration
   of Louisiana schools.” 5
          Louisiana filed this timely appeal. In the state’s view, it has Article III
   standing to sue to protect its citizens against JPSB’s alleged discriminatory
   disciplinary policies in a direct and a parens patriae capacity. Alternatively,
   Louisiana asks that, if we hold that it does not have standing, we remand the
   case to the district court with instructions for the district court to remand the
   case to state court.

          _____________________
          4
              See 2022 WL 539277, at *10–13 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2022).
          5
              Id. at *13.

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                                                  II
           Article III of the Federal Constitution confines our authority to
   “Cases” and “Controversies.” 6 To establish that a suit falls within this limit,
   a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the
   conduct complained of and (3) redressable by a favorable judicial decision. 7
   “States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
   jurisdiction.” 8 But they, too, are bound by Article III’s standing
   requirements.
           The Supreme Court has explained that states have at least four types
   of interests that, if injured, satisfy standing’s first requirement: sovereign,
   quasi-sovereign, proprietary, or private. 9 Plus, states can sue in multiple
   capacities. They may sue on behalf of themselves or in the interest of their
   residents in a parens patriae capacity. The capacity in which the state is suing
   changes the standing calculus. 10
           For direct suits, a state “need meet only the ordinary demands of
   Article III—that is, establish injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.”11
   In these suits, states can vindicate their sovereign, proprietary, or private
   interests. For parens patriae suits, however, states, “must do more than meet

           _____________________
           6
                U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
           7
               See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
           8
                Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
           9
                See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 (1982).
           10
              Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting
   Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 121 (7th ed. 2016) (“[A]
   distinction must be drawn between a government entity suing to remedy injuries that it has
   suffered and suing in a representative capacity on behalf of its citizens.”)).
           11
                Id.

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   Article III’s irreducible minimum; [they] must assert a quasi-sovereign
   interest ‘apart from the interests of particular private parties.’” 12
           Louisiana asserts that it has standing to sue in both capacities to
   vindicate three of those interests. First, Louisiana argues that it has a
   sovereign interest in its subordinates obeying state and federal law. Second,
   if that direct-standing theory fails, Louisiana asserts it has proprietary
   standing to ensure that JPSB follows the law and doesn’t risk losing any
   school funding. Third, Louisiana argues that it has parens patriae standing to
   vindicate its quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from
   discrimination.
           History and tradition guide our analysis today because “[a] ‘telling
   indication of the severe constitutional problem’ with [a state’s] assertion of
   standing to bring this lawsuit ‘is the lack of historical precedent’ supporting
   it.” 13 So we start there in addressing each of Louisiana’s standing theories.
   Ultimately, each of Louisiana’s bases for standing comes up short in
   establishing an injury-in-fact.
                                                  A
           We start with Louisiana’s claim that JPSB’s actions injured a
   sovereign interest. For much of the Supreme Court’s history, states could
   not sue to vindicate a sovereign interest. “From the Founding through the
   end of the nineteenth century, States could sue in federal court only to
   vindicate their ‘common-law interests,’ their property or contract rights.” 14
           _____________________
           12
                Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
           13
             Texas, 143 S. Ct. at 1970 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
   561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).
           14
             Saginaw County v. STAT Emergency Med. Servs, Inc., 946 F.3d 951, 956 (6th Cir.
   2020) (Sutton, J.) (quoting Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va.
   L. Rev. 387, 392–93 (1995)); see also, e.g., Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412 (1799)

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   Put differently, the federal courts were only available for states for
   “common-law or equity actions similar to those of ordinary litigants.” 15
              Post-Lochner, the Supreme Court “loosened some of these standing
   limitations, permitting states ‘to depart from the common-law menu of
   litigable claims’ and to pursue their interests as sovereigns directly.” 16 But
   what has traditionally counted as an injury to a sovereign interest does not
   include every act of disobedience to a state’s edicts.
              The Supreme Court has identified two clear sovereign interests:
   “First, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within
   the relevant jurisdiction—this involves the power to create and enforce a
   legal code, both civil and criminal; second, the demand for recognition from
   other sovereigns—most frequently this involves the maintenance and
   recognition of borders.” 17 We have given several examples of the first type of
   injury: “(1) federal assertions of authority to regulate matters they believe
   they control, (2) federal preemption of state law, and (3) federal interference
   with the enforcement of state law, at least where the state statute at issue
   regulates behavior or provides for the administration of a state program and
   does not simply purport to immunize state citizens from federal law.” 18 And
   we recently explained that “States have sovereign interests by virtue of their
              _____________________
   (declining to exercise jurisdiction because the state’s “right of jurisdiction” was an issue
   of sovereignty); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 76 (1867) (declining jurisdiction
   because “merely political rights . . . do not belong to the jurisdiction of a[n Article III]
   court, either in law or equity.”).
              15
            Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Standing, 94 Notre
   Dame L. Rev. 2015, 2015 (2019).
              16
                   Saginaw County, 946 F.3d at 957 (quoting Woolhandler & Collins, 81 Va. L. Rev.
   at 393).
              17
                   Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
              18
                   Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 153 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

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   being co-sovereigns in our Nation’s federalism.” 19 Given that the roots of
   these interests are found in federalism, for a sovereign interest to serve as a
   cognizable injury for federal standing, “‘the acts of the defendant . . . [must]
   invade the [government’s] sovereign right,’ resulting in some tangible
   interference with its authority to regulate or to enforce its laws.” 20 This is
   where Louisiana’s theory goes wrong.
              Louisiana          contends     that       “[w]hen   JPSB       officials    adopt
   unconstitutional policies and practices, . . . they risk undermining public
   confidence in the State . . . [and] interfere with the performance of the
   obligation of executive officers of the State to uphold and enforce those
   rights.” Louisiana’s assertion that it has a sovereign interest in its
   subordinates following the law facially has merit. But Louisiana is not
   hindered from enforcing its laws against JPSB. The state may use its full
   arsenal of enforcement mechanisms to force JPSB to comply with state law.
              The Sixth Circuit recently faced a similar assertion of sovereign injury
   in Saginaw County v. STAT Emergency Medical Services, Inc. There Saginaw
   County sought to preempt suit by an ambulatory service by seeking a
   declaration that its contract with its existing, competing service was valid.21
   The Sixth Circuit dismissed the suit, holding that the County failed to assert
   any Article III injury. The court first noted that injuries to the state
   “conventionally arise” when the state “has enacted a law, enforced it against
   a resident, and the resident has refused to comply. Then and only then, it
   would seem, does the sovereign sustain a cognizable injury—at least when it
              _____________________
              19
                   Louisiana v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 70 F.4th 872, 877 (5th Cir.
   2023).
              20
                   Saginaw County, 946 F.3d at 957 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431
   (1920)).
              21
                   Id. at 954.

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   comes to enforcing public rights.” 22 So “someone violat[ing] a law . . . does
   not by itself injure the government in an Article III way. Only ‘actual or
   threatened interference with [its] authority’ does.” 23
           The Seventh Circuit similarly held that Illinois did not have standing
   to sue Chicago over Chicago’s agreement with Gary, Indiana, to create an
   airport authority under a state statute because Illinois’s assertion that the fact
   that its “laws have been preempted is injury to a sovereign” failed to create
   a cognizable injury. 24 The court emphasized that “the city exists at the
   state’s sufferance” so Illinois could use its full quiver of powers to force
   Chicago into compliance. 25
           Likewise here, Louisiana’s purported sovereign injury is that JPSB is
   allegedly violating state and federal law. Such a violation does not become an
   injury until Louisiana brings an enforcement action against JPSB to bring
   JPSB into compliance with the law, and JPSB or another entity hinders the
   state from doing so. Only then would there exist a controversy for us to
   resolve within the limits of federalism. 26 The state attempts to invoke federal

           _____________________
           22
                Id. at 956.
           23
                Id. (quoting United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 473 (1935)).
           24
                Illinois v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1998).
           25
              Id. at 476; see also id. (“Illinois could reclaim the powers Chicago now exercises,
   and the fact that the balance of political power in Illinois may render this impossible at the
   moment is a poor reason for a federal court to readjust the allocation of functions between
   the city and the state.”).
           26
              See Saginaw County, 946 F.3d at 958 (citation omitted) (“The conventional route
   for resolving state enforcement actions is to let the state counties or agencies clarify how
   the law works in state court before a federal constitutional challenge ripens for resolution.
   That won’t happen if either side can sue first in federal court before the contours of the
   local enforcement action take shape.”).

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                                          No. 22-30143

   jurisdiction to enforce mostly state law against a subordinate. Neither history
   nor tradition supports the use of our Article III judicial power in this way.
           We are unpersuaded by Louisiana’s arguments and citations to the
   contrary. Most of the cited cases are federal enforcement actions brought in
   federal court and are thus inapposite. 27 And in Texas Office of Public Utility
   Counsel v. F.C.C., the state agencies claimed in part that the federal
   government’s actions infringed on their ability to regulate intrastate
   telecommunications. 28 Louisiana does not face any such infringement here.
   JPSB has allegedly violated the law. Violating the law is different from
   hindering its enforcement. We would not say a criminal defendant’s mere
   disobedience of state or federal law hindered the respective government’s
   enforcement of it. More to the point, when speaking about the sovereign’s
   interest in enforcing its laws, the Supreme Court has spoken about the state’s
   interest in the enforceability of its laws. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
   Rico, the Court noted that “the power to create and enforce a legal code” is
   “regularly at issue in constitutional litigation.” 29 No such challenge to the

           _____________________
           27
              See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)
   (qui-tam action against state agency) (“It is beyond doubt that the complaint asserts an
   injury to the United States—[]the injury to its sovereignty arising from violation of its laws
   (which suffices to support a criminal lawsuit by the Government).”); EEOC v. Bd. of
   Supervisors for Univ. of La. Sys., 559 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding federal
   government had an interest in ensuring that the state complied with federal law); see also,
   e.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 14 (5th Cir. 1963) (“When a State, not by
   some sporadic act against a particular individual but by a law or pattern of conduct, takes
   action motivated by a policy which collides with national policy as embodied in the
   Constitution, the interest of the United States ‘to promote the interest of all’ gives it
   standing to challenge the State in the courts.”).
           28
               Texas Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 408, 449 (5th Cir. 1999)
   (challenging an FCC’s assertion of authority to refer telecommunications carriers to the
   states to seek recovery of certain intrastate contributions).
           29
            Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601; see also Saginaw County, 946 F.3d at 956 (“A
   government’s interest in the resolution of contested legal questions before an Article III

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   enforceability of Louisiana’s law is present here. So like the Sixth and
   Seventh Circuits, we also hold that JPSB’s alleged failure to follow state and
   federal law is not currently injuring Louisiana’s sovereign interest.
                                                B
           Louisiana next asserts that, even if it lacks direct standing, it has parens
   patriae standing because it has a “quasi-sovereign interest in preventing its
   political subdivisions from violating the constitutional rights of 52,000 public
   schoolchildren.” In Snapp, the Supreme Court stated two hard-and-fast
   limits on the parens patriae doctrine. To invoke the doctrine a state must show
   that it has “[a] quasi-sovereign interest” that is “sufficiently concrete to
   create an actual controversy between the State and the defendant” and (2)
   the injury to that interest affects a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the
   state’s] population.” 30 Louisiana’s allegations fail at the first prong.
           The definition of quasi-sovereign interest is not “simple or exact.” 31
   The Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining
   whether an alleged injury . . . suffices to give the State standing to sue as
   parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would
   likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” 32 And
   “the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular
   private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party.” 33 The
   classic example of suits vindicating sovereign interests are those involving

           _____________________
   tribunal, including those concerning the limits of its own power, thus extends only as far as
   the actual or threatened invasion of its sovereign right to enforce the law.”).
           30
                458 U.S. at 602, 07.
           31
                Id. at 601.
           32
                Id. at 607.
           33
                Id.

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   public nuisances 34 and economic interests. 35 In those cases, the state is not
   suing simply to protect the interests of a private citizen, but the interest of
   the state to be free from the invasion of out-of-state nuisances or
   discriminatory policies that threaten the state’s economy. 36
            Louisiana’s asserted interest here is wholly derivative of the interests
   of JPSB’s students. Louisiana is not asserting a separate injury such as being
   denied its full participation in the federal system, nor does it allege injury to
   its citizens health or economic well-being in a way that also implicates its own
   interests. And, again, individual students can sue to get relief from JPSB’s
   alleged discrimination. 37
           Snapp, Louisiana argues, establishes that its interest is a quasi-
   sovereign interest under the parens patriae doctrine. In Snapp, Puerto Rico
   sued Virginia apple growers for discriminating against its workers by

           _____________________
           34
             See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); Wyoming v.
   Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversion of state waters); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
   296 (1921) (discharging sewage); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of state
   waters); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (noxious gas).
           35
              See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (giving certain states
   preferential right of purchase of gas); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir.
   2022) (“The classic cases involve public nuisances, in which a state sues to prevent
   pollution that not only injures its citizens but also invades the state’s prerogative to
   superintend the public health.”).
           36
             See, e.g., Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236–37 (noting Georgia’s allegation that
   Tennessee’s pollution inflicted “a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops”
   and holding that, even though Georgia did not own most of the affected property, it had a
   quasi-sovereign interest in the “earth and air within its domain”); Georgia v. Penn. R.R.
   Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (“If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy
   of Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as the result of this alleged
   conspiracy” to fix railroad freight rates).
           37
              See Missouri v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that courts have
   held that “parens patriae standing is inappropriate where an aggrieved party could seek
   private relief”).

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   discriminatorily hiring, treating harshly, and firing workers from Puerto
   Rico. 38 The Court held that Puerto Rico had parens patriae standing in part
   because it had an “interest in securing residents from the harmful effects of
   discrimination.” 39
           Present in Snapp but missing here is an injury that emanates outside
   the state’s sovereign authority. As the First Circuit explained, the
   discrimination in Snapp implicated Puerto Rico’s interest in “full and equal
   participation” in the federal system. 40 Otherwise, Puerto Rico would have
   simply been asserting the interests of the citizens and thus its interest would
   not have satisfied the requirement that the state assert “interest[s] apart from
   the interests of particular private parties.” 41 This vindication of Puerto
   Rico’s interest in protecting its citizens against discrimination from a state
   could only occur in federal court. No such federalism concern is present here.
   Louisiana has the power to right JPSB’s violations without the help of the
   federal courts. 42 Indeed, Louisiana has already corrected JPSB’s allegedly
   discriminatory policies through legislation.

           _____________________
           38
                Snapp, 458 U.S. at 592–94.
           39
                Id. at 609.
           40
               Id.; see also Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir.
   2000) (“Although the Court recognized Puerto Rico’s interest in avoiding discrimination
   against its citizens as a quasi-sovereign interest, it did so in the context of describing Puerto
   Rico’s role in the federal system.”); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 482 (4th Cir.
   1997) (noting that Puerto Rico had standing in Snapp because the discrimination “impaired
   [Puerto Rico’s] participation in federal employment programs.).
           41
                Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
           42
            Cf. id. at 603–04 (citing cases recognizing a quasi-sovereign interest standing
   where the state could not resolve the dispute due to restraints from not being a fully
   independent sovereign).

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           Louisiana asks this court to adopt the Third Circuit’s pre-Snapp
   decision in Pennsylvania v. Porter, which allowed Pennsylvania to sue one of
   its villages for unconstitutional police conduct. 43 This suit is on all fours with
   Porter, but Porter is not on all fours with Snapp. Lacking the benefit of Snapp,
   the Porter court failed to explain how Pennsylvania suffered an injury separate
   from the citizens subjected to the alleged police misconduct or an injury that
   could not have been corrected by legislation. And we can divine no such
   separate injury. For this and other reasons, 44 Porter does not change our view
   that Louisiana fails to show a quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to create
   parens patriae standing.
                                                    C
           Louisiana finally tries to satisfy the injury requirement by pointing to
   its allegations that it has a proprietary interest in JPSB keeping its
   governmental funding, which turns on its obedience to state and federal law.
   Only one sentence of Louisiana’s Intervenor Complaint alleges that
   “JPSB’s conduct . . . places the State Treasury at risk of irreparable
   harm.” 45 And Louisiana devoted one lone paragraph to its proprietary-
           _____________________
           43
                659 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1981).
           44
              The Third Circuit relied on civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
   and 1983 relating to Pennsylvania’s ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
   at 317 (citing Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1966), vacated and
   remanded on other grounds, 373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (en banc); Commonwealth v.
   Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974)). The Supreme Court has questioned Porter’s
   conclusion that Pennsylvania had parens patriae standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
   See Inyo County. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S.
   701, 709–10 & n.5 (2003). The Third Circuit alternatively relied on a Pennsylvania law that
   the court concluded “recognizes the availability of parens patriae relief even when
   individual relief might also be available.” See id. at 318. Louisiana does not point to any such
   state law here.
           45
           The district court acknowledged this argument but did not address it. See 2022
   WL 539277, at *6.

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   standing argument below, reiterating that it could be exposed to recoupment
   if JPSB violates state or federal law. Before us, Louisiana argues that its
   coffers are at risk because, “The State is . . . directly exposed to recoupment
   for unconstitutional actions by JPSB, as well as down-stream risks from its
   guarantees of some of JPSB’s obligations.”
             The state’s asserted proprietary “alleged harms ‘rel[y] on a highly
   attenuated chain of possibilities.’” 46 Without more, Louisiana’s possible
   exposure to recoupment is uncertain. 47 Louisiana cites no law here or below
   bolstering its standing in this capacity. Thus the state has failed to offer a
   sufficient basis for Article III standing, and so we lack jurisdiction over this
   action.
                                                 III
             Louisiana alternatively asks us to remand the case if it holds that
   Louisiana does not have Article III standing. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides,
   “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
   subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 48 We and other
   circuits have recognized that this statutory provision requires us to vacate the
   district court’s dismissal and instruct the district court to remand the case to

             _____________________
             46
            Louisiana v. Biden, 64 F.4th 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty
   Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)).
             47
               Louisiana’s citation to Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551
   (2019), is not the layup that Louisiana thinks it is. There the Supreme Court affirmed the
   district court’s post-trial finding that reinstatement of a citizenship census question would
   lower census participation. Id. at 2565. But the plaintiffs proved at trial that they suffered
   an injury from the potential low census participation. Id. So that decision says nothing about
   what constitutes an adequate pleading for proprietary interest purposes.
             48
                  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added).

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                                             No. 22-30143

   state court if we hold there is no Article III jurisdiction. 49 Because that
   condition is met here, we remand the case for the district court to send it back
   to state court.
                                                  IV
           Louisiana essentially seeks to bring an enforcement action in federal
   court against a subordinate largely for violating state law. This case is the
   same “(non) controversy” that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held falls
   outside of our Article III power. 50 “The federal courts do not sit to resolve
   intramural disputes among state officials over the bounds of their authority
   under state law.” 51 Why? Because it is not the role of the federal courts to
   govern the states. Louisiana stands fully capable and ready to enforce its laws,
   and it can do so in its courts, which “are not bound to adhere” to Article III’s
   requirements. 52

           _____________________
           49
              See Atkins v. CB&I, L.L.C., 991 F.3d 667, 672 & 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021); Mack v.
   USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2021). JPSB points to Samuels v. Twin
   City, 602 F. App’x 209 (5th Cir. 2015), and Griffin v. Lee, 621 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2010), for
   the proposition that § 1447(c) does not apply in the unique situation presented here: when
   the intervenor joined the case after removal but before dismissal of the original parties’
   claims. Both Samuels and Griffin involved post-dismissal interventions. Moreover, the
   putative intervenor’s claim would have destroyed diversity and was below the $75,000
   jurisdictional threshold, such that jurisdiction was affirmatively barred by 28 U.S.C.
   § 1367(b). Thus, in those cases, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
   intervenors’ claims in the first place. Here, by contrast, Louisiana’s joinder as an intervenor
   was appropriate at the time it occurred, and Louisiana is thus “treated as if [it] were an
   original party and has equal standing with the original parties.” Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792
   F.2d 478, 480–81 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
           50
                See City of Chicago, 137 F.3d at 477.
           51
                Cronson v. Clark, 810 F.2d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 1987).
           52
                ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).

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          We thus AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Louisiana
   lacks standing and REMAND the case to the district court with the
   instruction to remand this case to the state court.

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