Court Opinion

ID: 9640564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:08:32.6346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.708809
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur that the judgment in this appeal should be affirmed. However, I state my reasons separately.
Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court inspite of the erroneous instruction, we must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury instruction made no contribution to the punishment. However, we are charged to look to the record to determine whether there is reasonable doubt, not just any doubt, that the parol and good time charge made no contribution to the punishment received by Payne, life imprisonment.
This “harmless error” rule “promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Satterwhite v. State, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436-37, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).
Whether the jurors in this case actually did discuss and consider parole law and good conduct time, and to what extent and effect that had, can never be properly discovered and adequately determined. In this light, Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), commands, “To gain any insight into the basis and rationale of a verdict one must resort to evidence admitted, the charge on punishment, argument of the parties and other relevant indicia of record, if any.”
No purpose would be served in setting forth the evidence again, I would merely recite verbatim from Justice Baker’s opinion. Suffice it to say, I agree that this killing of a mentally and physically impaired, sleeping victim was “cold-blooded.”
I start my analysis with the point that the mere giving of the erroneous instruction does not require reversal. The dissent presumes harm from the giving of the instruction, which would require reversal without more. However, under Rose, to give the instruction is error, but harm, resulting in reversal, is not present in the absence of other factors that create reasonable doubt that the charge had no impact on the sentence imposed. I, therefore, look at the other factors.1
It is true, the jury assessed Payne a life sentence, but that fact, standing alone, cannot be a turning factor. See TEX.R.APP. P. 81(b)(2). Murder is a first-degree felony. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN § 19.02(b) (Vernon 1974). The punishment for a first-degree felony is confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life or for any term of not more than ninety-nine years or less than five years. TEX.PENAL CODE. ANN. § 12.32(a) (Vernon 1974). In addition to imprisonment, a fine not to exceed $10,000 is permissible. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(b) (Vernon 1974). No doubt, the legislature foresaw that under certain facts a murderer may not deserve a life sentence and, therefore, the sentencer was allowed a range of punishments to assess. In no event, however, could this punishment be less than five years’ confinement. In this case, because the charge was enhanced by a prior conviction, the legislature provided that the range of punishment would not permit a minimum sentence of less than fifteen years. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c) (Vernon 1974). It is significant that there is no evidence in this record that *588militates against the full sentence authorized by law. See Zimmerman v. State, 754 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.). The punishment under the facts of this case casts no doubt in my mind, nor even the specter of a doubt that is reasonable, that the impermissible charge did contribute to the sentence.
The only other relevant factor to be considered is that the jury, during deliberations inquired, “What is the earliest possible parole on a life sentence?” In response, the trial judge replied, “You are instructed to consider only the evidence you have received from the witness stand along with the exhibits admitted into evidence and the law applicable to this case which is contained in the Court’s Charge.” The charge as given told the jurors not to consider parole and good time as it applied to Payne. The general presumption is that a jury follows the instructions given by the trial judge in the manner presented. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 324 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
The other opinions in this appeal note that the charge in this case contained no additional mitigating instruction on good time and parole. I do not ascribe to the view that this omission is critical, it just happened to be a circumstance that existed in Rose. See Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554. It is inescapable to my way of thinking that unless the circumstances of the crime itself contain elements militating against a maximum sentence, the defendant receives no solace from the fact that the court did not charge a second time that the jury should not consider parole and good time. In this case, the jury was instructed:
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
(emphasis added). I recognize there is the view that because Rose ruled the parole instruction erroneous that no part of the instruction should be accorded weight. However, it defies logic to conclude that error existed because the jury was presented an improper instruction, but in assessing the harm caused by the error, this court cannot consider what that instruction said.
Considering the other factors appearing in the record, the jury instruction given in this case did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to Payne’s sentence. I, therefore, concur that the Judgment be AFFIRMED.

. I do not disagree with the dissent that the State has the burden on appeal to show in the record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, I have little concern for this issue because Rose still mandates that we, the appellate courts, review the whole record. Consequently, we are not free simply to say that, since the State has failed to affirmatively demonstrate the negative, we need not go further before concluding there is doubt as to harmlessness.