Court Opinion

ID: 9776292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:29:43.93111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.657035
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the holding of the principal opinion affirming the jury’s finding of the defendant’s guilt and the sentences for the other crimes. I do not join the Court’s decision reversing the sentence of death and remanding the case for new penalty phase proceedings.
First, I applaud the majority’s refusal to exercise plain error review of closing argument in this ease. “[P]lain error will seldom be found in unobjected closing argument.” State v. Kempker, 824 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. banc 1992). This is because “alleged errors committed in closing argument do not justify relief under the plain error rule unless they are determined to have a decisive effect on the jury.” State v. Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975, 109 S.Ct. 515, 102 L.Ed.2d 550 (1988). Second, the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (1995), counsels against a state appellate court ever conducting plain error review except in the most egregious circumstances. “ ‘If the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal court review that might otherwise be available.’ ” Id. at 1361 (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2593, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)). I do not believe justice would be served by plain error review of closing argument in this case.
Refusal to conduct plain error review does not end the discussion, however, as the majority’s conclusion demonstrates. Rule 29.15 permits a convicted murderer to argue that his trial counsel failed to represent him effectively, claiming a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Rule 29.15, post-conviction counsel is armed with carte blanche authority to second guess trial counsel’s performance and search the record for, among other things, every instance that seems to support a claim that trial counsel’s silence should have turned to an objection. Relief follows if the reviewing court makes two findings: First, that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable competence and second, that counsel’s ineffective performance created a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s ineffective performance, the jury would have (not could have) concluded that the convicted murderer deserved life in prison and not death. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 695, 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 2068-69, 2071, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Walter Timothy Storey — by his own words — entered Jill Frey’s apartment through an unlocked patio door after climbing up her balcony, armed with a butcher knife he had taken from his mother’s kitchen. He did not confess to killing Jill Frey, but the physical evidence revealed that she had six or seven broken ribs, that she had been struck in the face at least a dozen times and that she died as a result of two deep, six-inch gashes across her throat. She struggled. Storey had scratch wounds on his chest. Jill’s body was found on the floor, her nightgown raised above her waist, foreign pubic hairs on her body.
On the basis of these facts, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Storey murdered Jill Frey and did so in a manner that was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.” § 565.032.2(7), RSMo 1994.
*904The penalty phase of a death sentence case is unlike any other criminal proceeding in terms of both gravity and purpose. The members of the jury, as the representatives and symbols of society as a whole, must determine whether society would decide that a defendant’s acts warrant the death sentence. The law erects channels to make sure that the deliberations of the jury are narrowed to assure that only persons whose crimes contain aggravating circumstances are eligible for the death sentence. Moreover, the jury’s decision must be channelled to require “ ‘an individualized determination [of the appropriate penalty] on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.’ ” Tuilaepa v. California, U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2635, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)) (emphasis original). Thus, even after the legal prerequisites for imposition of the death penalty are met, another purpose of the penalty phase is to make certain that the penalty fits this criminal. This is the “individualized determination” of which Zant speaks. This individualized determination requires the jury to consider fully the brutality of the murder involved and the state’s interest in the death penalty it seeks. Throughout, “[t]he State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision.” Tuilaepa, - U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2635.
In my view, the “state” to which Tuilaepa refers is not the state as a party in a criminal case, but the laws passed by the legislature, approved by the executive, and applied and interpreted by the judiciary. Once the “state” adopts procedures that narrow the eligibility for the death penalty and require the jury to hear evidence of mitigation, the process is neutral and principled and will guard against the bias and caprice the constitution condemns. Counsel in the case remain advocates for the positions they represent, subject to correction by the trial court on objection of opposing counsel if either strays outside the record. It is not the obligation of counsel for the plaintiff in the case — the state — to abandon the role of advocate in favor of a position of neutrality.
The jury could not impose the death penalty in this case unless the jury first found that Storey killed Jill Frey and that the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.” § 565.032.2(7), RSMo 1994. The law requires the state to prove that aggravating circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt.” § 565.032.1(2), RSMo 1994. Depravity of mind exists where the defendant’s murder of the victim was brutal, involving “serious physical abuse.” State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3175, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1989). “For example, evidence that the murder victim ... [was] beaten or evidence that numerous wounds were inflicted upon [the] victim will support the aggravating circumstance.” Id.
The Court finds Storey’s counsel ineffective in failing to object to four portions of the state’s closing argument during the penalty phase. I disagree. I do not believe Storey has met his burden under Strickland or under Rule 29.15. He offered no evidence at the Rule 29.15 .hearing of prejudice other than a copy of the penalty phase transcript. Nor can the majority show where the prejudice is. Instead, the majority appears to create an irrebuttable presumption that prejudice exists whenever these words are said, no matter how heinous the crime nor how sure the evidence. Under Strickland, that prejudice is present only where there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended (not could have recommended) a life sentence rather than death.
Under Strickland, or any other standard for that matter, I do not believe one can consider the closing argument in a vacuum in a search for outcome-determinative error. The closing argument is part of a total process that subjects the jury to presentations of evidence, the reading of instructions and the argument of counsel. At a minimum, a determination of prejudice requires that the closing argument be considered in the context of the entire penalty phase, not alone.
In this case, the brutality of the crime spoke for itself. I have a difficult time believing that a death sentence based on the *905reality of at least a dozen blows to the face, six broken ribs, and two deep slashes across the throat could be rendered unconstitutional by the words the principal opinion condemns as so erroneous counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
The state is entitled to argue that the brutality of the murder supports its submission to the jury. I do not believe the statement “[t]his case is about the most brutal slaying in the history of this county” [emphasis added] argues facts outside the record. The word “about” indicates approximation, not certainty. It invites the jury to consider the level of brutality of the murder. The other statements to which the majority refers are not so powerful as to sway the minds of the jurors and change their view of the appropriate penalty. I do not believe that jurors are so ignorant that they forget that the prosecutor is advocating a position or that they are so easily swayed by rhetoric that they abandoned their duty to weigh the evidence carefully in a manner consistent with the instruction, in reaching their sentencing recommendation. Trials begin with lengthy examinations of potential jurors to remove those who harbor prejudice or who will permit their emotions to overcome the court’s instructions. I do not believe that winnowing process suddenly loses its effect once the jury enters the sentence-deliberating phase.
Second, the principal opinion relies on State v. Raspberry, 452 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Mo.1970), for the proposition that personalization of the argument taints the jury’s consideration of the evidence and appeals to their emotion. First, Raspberry condemns the argument when a jury is considering guilt, not punishment. On that basis alone, I do not think Raspberry applies. Second, it is virtually impossible for a person to consider the appropriate punishment for a murder this brutal without the mind reacting with some feeling. Emotion, as that word means “[t]he affective aspect of consciousness: FEELING,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 742 (1976), necessarily plays a role in the deliberative process. “[C]hoice is either intelligence motivated by desire or desire operating through thought.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 149 (1962). And, “decisions are made by emotions on an unconscious level, but they are validated with logic.” L. Smith & L. Malandro, Courtroom Communications Strategies § 4.06 (1985).
In this case the jury was asked to consider whether Jill Frey’s murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, and involved torture or depravity of mind. This Court has defined that aggravating circumstance to permit the jury to consider the infliction of physical torture on the victim. State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 10-11 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984). Torture — to “subject to severe pain,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2414 (1976)— is a word that persons instinctively feel. So are vile, horrible, inhuman, brutal and physical abuse.
I see no outcome-determinative trespass in counsel’s failure to object to a statement that invites the jury to consider the amount of pain and anguish Jill Frey suffered as it considered whether her death subjected her to severe pain, brutality or the severe physical abuse that, it seems to me, obviously accompanies six broken ribs, at least twelve blows to the face, and two throat slashings. The instructions the constitution demands channel the jury’s consideration required such considerations. Judicial musings that a decision must not contain emotion deny what philosophers and scientists tell us makes for a good decisional process. The proper caveat would be that the decision not be based solely on emotion and that it be made in the presence of reason supplied by instructions.
Third, the prosecutor’s statement that someone who happened on to the murder would have been justified in killing Storey to stop it is not about the presence of the victim’s brother, but about the seriousness of the crime and a response to it that society recognizes as appropriate. I do not think the argument appeals to emotion to a degree that supports the result reached in the principal opinion, nor do I think the argument equates the jury’s function with self-defense. The argument is, as the majority says, irrelevant. But irrelevance alone does not require a finding that counsel’s failure to object ere-*906ated a reasonable probability that the jury would have decided a different penalty if counsel had objected.
Finally, the argument styled “weighing the value of lives” seems to me little more than an inartful deterrence argument. I cannot find the infirmity the principal opinion finds and even if it exists, it is not prejudicial.
For these reasons, I do not believe that counsel’s failure to object was outcome-determinative or that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the prosecutor’s comments, the jury would have recommended life in prison without parole instead of death. That being the case, Strickland does not require reversal.
Having said all of that, the dilemma for me is whether to dissent or concur in the result the majority reaches. Death penalty jurisprudence in this country has responded more to judicial viscera than to constitutional principle. While the majority correctly asserts that we are not bound by the decisions of the Eighth Circuit, the judgments that we review ultimately find their way to that forum for an independent federal scrutiny. That federal scrutiny sometimes appears to harbor antipathy for the judgments of state courts in death cases. Worse, even decisions that I believe are profoundly incorrect — like Ant-wine — cast a corrupting shadow over our decisions if we choose to attempt to predict the outcome of federal review.
Yet that is what the principal opinion seems to do — to predict that federal habeas review of the death sentence in this case will result in a new penalty phase hearing. That prediction is exceedingly difficult and ultimately futile. The Eighth Circuit’s recent Antwine standard is at loggerheads with Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825, 112 S.Ct. 89, 116 L.Ed.2d 62 (1991). Until that court adopts an en banc standard or the United States Supreme Court speaks, the composition of the judicial panel, not predictable standards, will determine the outcome.
Like the majority, if a rehearing is the ultimate result in this case, I would much prefer that this Court order it than countenance a delay of another seven or eight years.1 However, I am willing to found my vote in this case on the belief that Antwine is an aberration. The majority guesses otherwise. Having decided to guess, it is difficult to fault the majority for guessing differently than I do.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the death sentence in this case and remand for a new penalty phase hearing.

. This Court decided State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. banc) in 1987. The Supreme Court of the United States considered Antwine's petition for certiorari and found no reason to review the case in 1988. Antwine v. Missouri, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217. The Eighth Circuit set aside the death sentence and ordered a new penalty phase hearing for Antwine on May 12, 1995. Antwine v. Delo, supra.