Court Opinion

ID: 9914036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:09:01.78355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:54.059932
License: Public Domain

J-A08003-23

                                   2023 PA Super 275

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                   :
                v.                                 :
                                                   :
                                                   :
  JERMAINE BELGRAVE                                :
                                                   :
                       Appellant                   :   No. 1480 WDA 2021

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-25-CR-0001015-2019

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED: December 28, 2023

       Appellant, Jermaine Belgrave, appeals from his judgment of sentence of

7½-15 years’ imprisonment for possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance (“PWID”), reckless endangerment, and carrying firearms without a

license.1     We affirm Appellant’s convictions, but remand for further

proceedings to correct Appellant’s sentence.

       The charges against Appellant arise from a sale of drugs at a hotel in

Erie, Pennsylvania on February 9, 2019, that ended in a gunfight.             The

Commonwealth presented its evidence at trial through the testimony of Erie

police officials and evidence gathered during their investigation. The evidence

demonstrates that on February 7, 2019, four males, including Appellant, drove

from Chicago, Illinois to Erie, Pennsylvania. On the same date, one of the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705 and 6106, respectively.

                                               1
J-A08003-23

four men, Sheldon Morales, rented a room at a Marriott Hotel in Erie with a

checkout date of February 9, 2019.       The four men, including Appellant,

Morales, Baizar, and another man, stayed together in this room.

      The hotel’s videotape demonstrates that at approximately 5:15 p.m. on

February 9, 2019, the four men were parked in a Chevrolet Impala in front of

the hotel. Appellant was in the front passenger seat; Baizar was in the

backseat.     A dark-colored SUV arrived in the parking lot and parked

nearby. Baizar and another man exited the Impala and walked toward the

SUV. When Baizar attempted to enter the SUV, the SUV’s driver exited the

vehicle and began shooting at Baizar.      Baizar ran away and dropped a

package. Appellant reacted to the gunshots by exiting the Impala and firing

two shots in the direction of the SUV. Moments later, Appellant was shot and

seriously injured.

      Appellant and Baizar re-entered the Impala, which then drove

away. Subsequently, police stopped the Impala when it was exiting from a

parking garage located across from the Marriott. At that time, Baizar was

driving     the   Chevy   Impala   and   Appellant   was   the    front   seat

passenger. Appellant received treatment for his injuries at a local hospital.

The package that Baizar dropped during the gunfight was found to contain

239 grams of heroin.

      Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit PWID and other

charges. Baizar was charged with conspiracy to commit PWID. At Appellant’s

                                    -2-
J-A08003-23

preliminary hearing, defense counsel contended that the evidence merely

showed that Appellant was present at the scene, and that his mere presence

did not demonstrate any conspiracy between him and the other occupants of

the Impala to commit PWID. N.T., 4/8/19, at 74-75. Appellant was held for

court on all charges; Baizar was held for court on the conspiracy charge. In

December 2019, Baizar pled guilty to conspiracy and was sentenced to a term

of imprisonment.

     On the first morning of Appellant’s trial, the Commonwealth moved to

amend the information to charge Appellant with PWID in lieu of conspiracy to

commit PWID. N.T., 6/9/21, at 5. The Commonwealth contended it could

prosecute Appellant for PWID under a theory of accomplice liability. Id. It

asserted that the amendment in charges would not prejudice Appellant

because the Commonwealth intended to present the “exact same facts” but

simply claim that these facts made Appellant an accomplice rather than a

conspirator. Id. (“we’re saying, instead of saying he’s a conspirator, we’re

saying he’s an accomplice”).      The charges of accomplice liability and

conspiracy were “completely identical,” the prosecutor continued, because

there was no “functional change” in the charges. Id. at 5-6. The prosecutor

added that “[o]ftentimes we heard jurors express confusion about the

distinction [between these charges] and I have expressed confusion about the

actual distinction.” Id. at 6. Following argument, the court verbally granted

                                    -3-
J-A08003-23

the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the charge of conspiracy to commit

PWID to PWID.2

        During trial, the Commonwealth called Baizar as a witness. Prior to

Baizar’s testimony, outside the presence of the jury, Baizar’s counsel indicated

that Baizar intended to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination if called

to testify. N.T., 6/9/21, at 177-78. The Commonwealth sought and obtained

an order granting Baizar immunity.3 The court informed Baizar, again outside

the presence of the jury, that “no testimony, information or other evidence

directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of [Baizar during] trial may

be used against [him], including on cross-examination . . . The Commonwealth

explicitly includes the crime of perjury in this cloak of immunity.” Id. at 180.

____________________________________________

2 The record does not include an amended information.       The Commonwealth
advised that it “doesn’t even believe we have to file an amended information
because the change is so minor.” Id. at 7. Although this Court frequently
refers to possession with intent to deliver as “PWID,” in this case, we will refer
to the amended charge as “PWID-accomplice liability” in accordance with the
theory of criminal liability advanced by the Commonwealth during trial.

3 The Judiciary Code provides that when “a witness has refused or is likely to

refuse to testify . . . on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,”
the district attorney “may request an immunity order from [the trial] judge,
and that judge shall issue such an order.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(b). Following
an order of immunity, if the witness refuses to testify on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, and the trial court “communicates to the
witness [the] immunity order, that witness may not refuse to testify based on
his privilege against self-incrimination.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(c). If the
witness fails to comply with the immunity order, he “is guilty of criminal
contempt,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(e), and may also be adjudged in civil
contempt . . . until such time as he purges himself of contempt by complying
with the order.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5937(d).

                                           -4-
J-A08003-23

The court instructed Baizar that he no longer had a Fifth Amendment right not

to testify because the court had signed an order of immunity. Id. at 178. The

court advised Baizar that he could be held in contempt if he failed to comply

with the order of immunity. Id. at 180. Nevertheless, Baizar continued to

state that he was not going to provide testimony. Id. at 183-84.

        When the jury returned to the courtroom, Baizar was called to the

stand by the prosecution. After he stated his name, the prosecutor asked

eighteen questions.       In response, Baizar either stated that he refused to

answer questions or remained silent in response to all eighteen questions by

the prosecutor. N.T., 6/9/21, at 185-91. For example, the prosecutor stated:

       Q. You are citizen of Belize? He does not answer. Is it fair to say
       you are cousins with Mr. Belgrave? No answer. Fair to say that
       you came to the City of Erie to sell heroin with Mr. Belgrave? Fair
       to say that that’s what you told police during your interview...

Id. at 187. At another point, the prosecutor stated:

       Fair to say you gave four separate statements back on February
       7th, Mr. Baizar? No answer. Fair to say you answered questions
       during those statements about what happened on February 7th
       during this incident. And I’ll note no answer. Fair to say that
       officers attempted to have you perform a lineup of the individuals
       that robbed you and you didn’t want to participate in that because
       you believe in criminals getting away with crimes? No answer.

Id. at 191. The court then asked Baizar whether “[it is] your intent not to

answer any questions today?”4            Id. at 185.   Baizar answered, “It’s my

intention not to answer no questions at all.” Id. At the conclusion of the

____________________________________________

4 The court did not inform the jury that Baizar had been granted immunity.

                                           -5-
J-A08003-23

prosecutor’s questioning, defense counsel stated that he had no questions for

Baizar.   The court excused Baizar from the stand without holding him in

contempt.    The jury did not learn that Baizar was standing on his self-

incrimination privilege and that he had been granted immunity.

      At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements

of PWID-accomplice liability. N.T., 6/11/21, at 6-7. The jury found Appellant

guilty of PWID-accomplice liability, reckless endangerment, and carrying

firearms without a license. The jury did not reach a verdict on three charges

of aggravated assault and simple assault. On November 19, 2021, the court

sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit PWID

and concurrent sentences of imprisonment for reckless endangerment and

carrying firearms without a license. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this

Court, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:

      I. Whether or not the trial court erred resulting in prejudice to the
      Appellant by allowing the Commonwealth to continue questioning
      the Appellant’s co-defendant, Charles Baizar, over objection of the
      Appellant, when both Mr. Baizar and his attorney made it clear
      [that] Mr. Baizar would not be answering any questions,
      notwithstanding the fact that the trial court gave a cautionary
      instruction to the jury once Mr. Baizar was excused from the
      witness stand, since the questions posed to Mr. Baizar clearly
      implicated the Appellant regarding the charge of unlawful delivery
      of a controlled substance?
      II. Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the
      Commonwealth to amend the charge of criminal conspiracy to
      unlawfully deliver a controlled substance to the charge of unlawful
      delivery of a controlled substance, on the day trial was to
      commence, thus resulting in prejudice to the Appellant, since the

                                      -6-
J-A08003-23

      elements or defenses to the amended charge, unlawful delivery of
      a controlled substance, are materially different [from] the
      elements or defenses to the charge of criminal conspiracy to
      unlawfully deliver a controlled substance?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      In his first argument, Appellant contends that the court erred by

permitting the Commonwealth to question Baizar after Baizar and his attorney

indicated prior to trial and on the first day of trial that Baizar would invoke his

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Baizar maintained that

his position remained unchanged even after the grant of immunity. Relying

principally on Commonwealth v. Duval, 307 A.2d 229 (Pa. 1973), Appellant

insists that Baizar’s refusal to testify prejudiced Appellant and caused the jury

to convict him based on guilt by association.

      In Duval, our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for

voluntary manslaughter and ordered a new trial because the prosecutor

summoned two witnesses to the stand with foreknowledge that they intended

to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination.     The same events took

place with regard to each witness. Each witness gave her name and address

when called to the stand and then asserted her Fifth amendment privilege in

response to all other questions. Out of the jury’s presence, the trial court held

that each witness waived her privilege by testifying during prior proceedings

in the case (a grand jury proceeding and a habeas corpus hearing). The jury

returned, and the court ordered the witness to testify, but each witness

continued to refuse to testify. The court held each witness in contempt, and

                                       -7-
J-A08003-23

each was led off in the custody of the sheriff. Citing its then recent case of

Commonwealth v. Terenda, 301 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1973), the Court concluded

that calling these witnesses to testify was prejudicial error due to “the risk

that the jury would draw adverse inferences against the defendant.” Duval,

307 A.2d at 232.     The court held that when the prosecutor attempts to

capitalize on a witness’s refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination,

      there is a special vice: the inference to be drawn from the refusal
      to testify of the defendant’s co-defendant, accomplice or
      associate, has [n]o probative value whatsoever in establishing the
      guilt of the defendant. It is rather an effort to use the jury to
      think guilt by association.

Id. at 232-33.

      The Commonwealth argued that it acted in good faith because it

honestly believed that the claim of privilege of which it had been forewarned

would not be legally sustainable on the ground that the witnesses had waived

their privilege by testifying on prior occasions.      The Court rejected this

argument because, inter alia, the Commonwealth’s position was contrary to

Snyder’s Appeal, 157 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1960), which held that a witness could

invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege on the stand during trial even though

she had testified concerning the same subject in preliminary proceedings. Id.

at 233 & n.5. The Court further stated that a good-faith belief was irrelevant.

The Court explained:

      The witness’ known intent to invoke the privilege coupled with the
      prosecutor’s opinion that the testimony sought can be
      nevertheless compelled presents the risk that, as actually
      occurred twice in the case at bar, the witness might prove not only

                                      -8-
J-A08003-23

      reluctant to testify but contumacious as well. If the fact of
      invocation of the privilege is, as we believe, irrelevant to the
      issues and prejudicial to the defendant, it is that much more
      prejudicial to permit the jury to observe that the recalcitrant
      witness (a person likely to be associated in the juror’s minds with
      the defendant) elects to remain silent notwithstanding the order
      of the court that he testify.

      In the case at bar it would have been a simple matter indeed, with
      the jury already removed from the courtroom, to determine
      whether the witnesses . . . would continue to assert a privilege
      despite the contrary ruling by the court. Permitting the jury to
      return to the courtroom and then to observe [each witness] being
      cited for contempt and marched out in the custody of the sheriff
      was prejudicial to the defendant.

      We therefore hold that the prosecution, once informed that
      a witness intends to claim a privilege against self-
      incrimination, commits error in calling that witness to the
      stand before the jury where the witness is a person (co-
      defendant, accomplice, associate, etc.) likely to be thought
      by the jury to be associated with the defendant in the
      incident or transaction out of which the criminal charges
      arose. Whether or not the prosecution has a good faith
      belief that the assertion of privilege is legally invalid is
      irrelevant; that matter can be settled outside the hearing of the
      jury.

Id. at 234-35 (emphasis added).

      Appellant is correct that under Duval, it is prejudicial error for a

prosecutor to call a witness to the stand knowing that the witness will invoke

their privilege against self-incrimination under circumstances where the

witness is likely to be considered as associated with the defendant with respect

to the criminal charges being tried. Nonetheless, we find Duval not applicable

here because Baizar never invoked his privilege against self-incrimination in

front of the jury.

                                     -9-
J-A08003-23

       The prejudice to be avoided by prohibiting a prosecutor from calling an

alleged accomplice to the stand, knowing the witness will assert their privilege

against self-incrimination in the presence of a jury, is the human tendency to

treat the claim of privilege as a confession of a crime or guilt, thereby creating

an adverse inference that the defendant is unable to confront through cross-

examination.     Id.; see also State v. Allen, 224 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa

1974). There is a distinct danger that jurors will misconstrue a known co-

actor’s refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds as evidence of the

defendant’s guilt by association. Commonwealth v. Todaro, 569 A.2d 333,

335 (Pa. 1990).5

       Our Supreme Court’s decision in Todaro is sufficiently analogous to

control the outcome on this issue of privilege. In Todaro, the Commonwealth

accused the defendant of committing multiple burglaries with a co-actor

named Kinsey. During trial,

       Kinsey was called to the stand by the Commonwealth. After being
       sworn, he quietly turned to the trial judge and requested to plead
       the Fifth, stating that he did not want to testify. The request was
       deemed proper since he had not yet been sentenced on his guilty
       plea.

       The trial judge called counsel to side bar and informed them of
       Kinsey’s request, which neither of them had heard. He granted a
       recess and, out of the presence and hearing of the jury, he heard
____________________________________________

5 In our view, this prejudice would be exacerbated if a jury, in addition to
being informed that the witness is invoking the Fifth Amendment, also is told
the witness is doing so despite a grant of immunity, because this latter fact
would reinforce the adverse inference against the defendant of guilt by
association.

                                          - 10 -
J-A08003-23

      the prosecuting attorney explain that the witness, the day before,
      had indicated he would have no problem in testifying. Defense
      counsel complained that he had told the prosecuting attorney two
      months before that the witness would invoke his Fifth amendment
      privilege and refuse to testify. He argued, therefore, that a
      mistrial must be granted in accordance with the rule we have laid
      down in DuVal….

Id. at 334.    Counsel argued that Kinsey’s appearance and excusal from

testifying for no apparent reason prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the

jury. Counsel maintained that since the jury knew Kinsey had certain stolen

items in his possession from the various burglaries, the jury imputed Kinsey’s

guilt to the defendant.

      Our Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider whether a mistrial

must be declared where a co-actor is called as a witness by the

Commonwealth, is sworn, takes the witness stand, but then leaves the stand

without explanation to the jury.     The Court granted review to determine

whether such conduct was consistent with its decisions in Duval and

Commonwealth v. Virtu, 432 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1981) (mistrial declared and

subsequent retrial barred by double jeopardy where prosecutor’s misconduct

in calling a witness to the stand knowing the witness would invoke his Fifth

Amendment privilege was found to be intentional to prejudice the defendant).

Todaro, 569 A.2d at 334. The Court found that the facts in Todaro compelled

a different result than that in Duval and Virtu, because the witness did not

invoke his self-incrimination privilege in front of the jury. The Court dismissed

the argument that Kinsey’s appearance and unexplained departure from the

                                     - 11 -
J-A08003-23

stand prejudiced the defendant as the “sheerest speculation! The jury was

just as likely to conclude that [] Kinsey had decided at the last minute to

testify against the Commonwealth and was dismissed for that reason . . .

[T]here was nothing that occurred that would be likely to cause the jury to

infer anything, one way or the other.” Id. at 336 (emphasis in original). “It

is the expressed, highlighted reference to the Fifth Amendment privilege that

may prejudice or influence a jury, not mere silence itself.” Todaro, 569 A.2d

at 336. This adverse inference does not arise when the witness refuses to

testify or remains silent and does not invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of

the jury. Id.

      Like the witness in Todaro, but unlike the witnesses in Duval, Baizar

did not expressly invoke his self-incrimination privilege in front of the jury; he

simply refused to answer questions and then remained silent. Nothing about

Baizar’s refusal to answer or his remaining silent suggested that the reason

for his conduct was his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. A witness

“does not expressly invoke the privilege by standing mute.”           Salinas v.

Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 187 (2013) (plurality). If he desires the protection of

the privilege, he “must claim it at the time he relies on it.” Id. Just as the

jury had nothing to infer from Kinsey’s departure from the stand in Todaro,

so too there was nothing to infer from Baizar’s refusal to answer or remain

silent.   Nothing in Baizar’s silence or refusal to answer gave the jury any

                                     - 12 -
J-A08003-23

reason to suspect that he was invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege.

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

        In his second argument, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by

allowing the Commonwealth to amend the original information in violation of

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 by changing the charge of conspiracy to commit PWID to

PWID-accomplice liability. We find no error.

        On the first morning of trial, immediately before opening statements,

the Commonwealth sought leave to amend the information to charge PWID-

accomplice liability instead of conspiracy to commit PWID. Appellant objected

on the grounds that (1) the amendment was not minor because conspiracy to

commit PWID is distinct substantively from PWID-accomplice liability, (2) the

defense strategy would have to change as a result of this amendment, and

(3) the timing of the Commonwealth’s request did not give defense counsel

adequate time to prepare.        N.T., 6/9/21, at 8-10.      Counsel requested a

continuance if the court intended to grant the amendment. Id. at 10. The

court    ruled   that   a   continuance     was    unnecessary   and   granted   the

Commonwealth’s motion to amend. Id. at 14. The court charged the jury

that Appellant could be found guilty of PWID based on accomplice liability, and

the jury returned a verdict of guilty on this count.

        We review decisions to allow an amendment to the information for abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 681 (Pa. 1999).

        Prior to December 21, 2017, the version of Rule 564 in effect provided:

                                          - 13 -
J-A08003-23

     The court may allow an information to be amended when there is
     a defect in form, the description of the offense(s), the description
     of any person or any property, or the date charged, provided the
     information as amended does not charge an additional or different
     offense.      Upon amendment, the court may grant such
     postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in the
     interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 (former version).      Effective December 21, 2017, our

Supreme Court amended Rule 564 to provide:

     The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that
     the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from
     a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so
     materially different from the original charge that the defendant
     would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may
     grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in
     the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 (effective Dec. 21, 2017). The Comment to amended Rule

564 states:

     The rule was amended in 2016 to more accurately reflect the
     interpretation of this rule that has developed since it first was
     adopted in 1974. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d 541
     (Pa. 1999). See also Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656
     (Pa. Super 2013); Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212 (Pa.
     Super. 2009); Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218 (Pa.
     Super. 2006).

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 (“Comment”).

     Rule 564’s purpose is to “ensure that a defendant is fully apprised of the

charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the last-minute addition of

alleged criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.” Sinclair, 897

A.2d at 1221.   The three Superior Court decisions cited in the Comment

(Beck, Page, and Sinclair) list six factors that the court must weigh in

determining whether an amendment is prejudicial:

                                    - 14 -
J-A08003-23

       (1) Whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
       supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new
       facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
       factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4)
       whether the description of the charges changed with the
       amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was
       necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of
       the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
       notice and preparation.

Beck, 78 A.3d at 660; Page, 965 A.2d at 1224; Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1221.6

Because new Rule 564 reflects the standards articulated in these decisions,

we will apply them to review whether prejudice resulted in the present case.7

       Decisions from this Court provide many examples of amendments that

do not prejudice the defendant.                For example, in Commonwealth v.

Whitmayer, 144 A.3d 939 (Pa. Super. 2016), a case involving sexual abuse

of a lone victim, we concluded that adding sexual misconduct charges from

Chester County “did not add any new facts or charges of which [the defendant]

was previously unaware. Both the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable

cause detailed acts of abuse occurring in both Chester County and

Montgomery County.” Id., 144 A.3d at 947. Therefore, the missing phrase,

____________________________________________

6 The fourth case, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, did not include this

list, presumably because the first three factors in the list were not implicated
in that case.

7 This Court also has applied the six-factor test in cases that went to trial after

new Rule 564’s effective date of December 21, 2017.       See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 979 (Pa. Super. 2019);
Commonwealth v. Ricci, 2023 WL 5013697, *4 (Pa. Super., Aug. 7, 2023)
(non-precedential decision).

                                          - 15 -
J-A08003-23

“County of Chester,” was “merely a defect in form,” id. at 948, and the

amendment did not violate Rule 564. Similarly, in Sinclair, a prosecution for

driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), an amendment to charge the

defendant with a lower range of blood alcohol content was permitted, because

he could not demonstrate any prejudice by being charged in a lower range.

“Where the crimes specified in the original information involved the same basic

elements and arose out of the same factual situation as the crime added by

the amendment, the appellant is deemed to have been placed on notice

regarding his alleged criminal conduct and no prejudice to defendant results.”

Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1222; see also Beck, 78 A.3d at 661 (defendant was

not prejudiced by amendment to information adding DUI-high rate of alcohol,

because he: (1) was on notice, due to prior filings, that the additional charge

would    be   included;   (2)   cross-examined   Commonwealth’s   witness   on

information relevant to defense on this charge; (3) did not assert any specific

prejudice suffered as result of amendment; and (4) did not request

postponement to retain expert witness); Page, 965 A.2d at 1224 (defendant

was not prejudiced by amendment to information for aggravated indecent

assault charge, from a child under 18 to a child under 13, because amendment

did not require change in defense strategy, child victim was known to

defendant before trial, and defendant was aware age was element of offense).

        In contrast, in Brown, our Supreme Court did find prejudice when,

immediately before trial, the Commonwealth added charges alleging rape and

                                      - 16 -
J-A08003-23

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with an unconscious person,

and the defendant was subsequently convicted of these charges as well as

indecent assault, indecent exposure, and aggravated indecent assault. The

Court explained:

     The original information included the charges of Rape and IDSI by
     forcible compulsion. In order to prove the “forcible compulsion”
     component of these charges, the Commonwealth was required to
     establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used either
     physical force, a threat of physical force, or psychological
     coercion, since the mere showing of a lack of consent does not
     support a conviction for Rape and/or IDSI by forcible compulsion.
     The amendment introduced the charges of Rape and IDSI with a
     person who is unconscious. These latter charges did not require
     proof by the Commonwealth that force of any sort was employed
     by the accused. Consequently, the amendment to the information
     violated Rule [564] by introducing new offenses.

Id., 727 A.2d at 544. After determining that the amendment at issue violated

the rule by introducing new offenses, the Court held that the amendment

prejudiced the appellant:

     [B]ased on the original charges, appellant had every reason to
     expect that the Commonwealth would be attempting to establish
     that the victim was conscious during the sexual encounter. It
     would be virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to meet its
     burden of establishing that appellant used physical force, a threat
     of physical force, or psychological coercion against the victim if
     the Commonwealth did not first establish that the victim was
     conscious. Assuming the Commonwealth could establish that the
     victim was conscious, appellant’s primary line of defense would
     have been that she consented to the encounter. When the
     Commonwealth shifted the focus of its case to proving that the
     victim was unconscious, the Commonwealth vitiated appellant’s
     primary line of defense, since consent is not a defense to the
     charges of Rape and/or IDSI with an unconscious person.
     Therefore, by varying the information at the eleventh hour, the
     Commonwealth rendered appellant’s primary defense a nullity.

                                   - 17 -
J-A08003-23

Id. (emphasis in original). The Court reversed the defendant’s rape and IDSI

convictions, and because the other charges were lesser-included offenses

relative to rape and IDSI, the Court granted a new trial as to all charges.

      More recently, in Commonwealth v. Quinones, 200 A.3d 1004 (Pa.

Super. 2018), the Commonwealth originally charged the defendant with abuse

of corpse, conspiracy to abuse corpse, and firearms charges. The defendant

and his cohort used a Honda Odyssey van to transport handguns as well as

the corpse of an individual whom the cohort had shot and killed. Months after

the defendant’s arrest on these charges and his preliminary hearing, the police

searched   the   Odyssey   and   found    drugs   and   paraphernalia.        The

Commonwealth moved to amend the information to add charges of PWID and

possession of drug paraphernalia. The court granted the motion. The jury

found the defendant guilty of one firearms charge, abuse of corpse, conspiracy

to abuse corpse, PWID, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

      Applying the six-factor test described above, this Court vacated the

defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial on all charges. We held

that the amendment to the information added new facts relating to drug

activity that were not in the original information. Moreover,

      The description of the charges changed drastically with the
      amendment, taking the case from one of guns and abuse of corpse
      to one involving drug dealing and drug possession. As a result, a
      change in defense strategy was necessitated in order to defend
      against the new charges, which were unrelated to the original
      charges and painted a different picture of the events[.]

                                    - 18 -
J-A08003-23

Quinones, 200 A.3d at 1012-13. We also cited with approval the argument

in the defendant’s appellate brief that the effect of the amendments to the

information was to tarnish the defendant’s character as a drug dealer. Id. at

1013-14. Consequently, we vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence

and remanded with instructions to sever the drug charges from the charges

in the original information. Id. at 1014.

      With these precedents as backdrop, we turn to the present case.

Appellant does not satisfy the first three factors in the six-part test, because

the amendment to the information did not change the factual scenario

supporting the charges or add new facts previously unknown to Appellant, and

the entire factual scenario was developed during the preliminary hearing.

      Appellant contends that he satisfies the fourth and fifth factors of the

test, arguing:

      [With regard to factor 4,] there is absolutely no question the
      description of the charges changed with the amendment. The
      Commonwealth went from having to prove an agreement,
      whether direct or implied, between the Appellant and the co-
      defendant, Charles Baizar, to merely showing that the Appellant
      was an accomplice who aided and abetted in the commission of
      the said crime. Looking at factor 5, clearly there was a change in
      strategy at the time of trial. At all times relevant hereto, the
      Appellant was prepared to argue that there was no evidence of a
      conspiracy between him and Mr. Baizar other than their mere
      association. Clearly, under conspiracy, the Appellant could not be
      convicted because he or she was merely present with others, or
      even because he or she knew what the others had planned or were
      doing. There had to be actual proof of an agreement between the
      Appellant and another person or persons to form or continue a
      conspiracy.

Appellant’s Brief at 25.

                                     - 19 -
J-A08003-23

      As stated above, courts have identified the fourth factor as “whether the

description of the charges changed with the amendment.” Beck, 78 A.3d at

660. We think it important to examine this factor in conjunction with the text

of Rule 564, i.e., relief is unavailable unless “the amended charges are . . . so

materially different from the original charge that the defendant would be

unfairly prejudiced.”   Id.    Since the Commonwealth did not file a written

amended information charging PWID-accomplice liability, we will analyze the

fourth factor by comparing the original information’s description of the

conspiracy charge with the court’s jury instructions on PWID-accomplice

liability. For two reasons, the description of the charges did not change with

the amendment to the information.

      First, the original charge of conspiracy to commit PWID and the jury

instruction on accomplice liability both required the Commonwealth to prove

that Appellant had the “intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of

the crime of [PWID].”         Information, Count 1 (conspiracy charge); N.T.,

6/11/21, at 6-7 (jury instruction on accomplice liability).

      Second, both the original charge of conspiracy to commit PWID and the

jury instructions on accomplice liability contain the element of an “agreement”

between Appellant and others.       The original information charged Appellant

with conspiracy by alleging that Appellant, did agree with [Baizar, Morales]

and others, known or unknown, and agreed with them to engage in conduct

which constitutes [PWID].”        Information, Count 1.       Count 1 alleged an

                                      - 20 -
J-A08003-23

“agreement” because an agreement is an element of conspiracy.             See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person

or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its

commission he: . . . agrees with such other person or persons that they or

one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or

an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime”).8 The jury instructions on

PWID-accomplice liability also include the element of an agreement. The court

instructed:

       To be an accomplice, a person does not have to agree to help
       someone else. A person is an accomplice if he, on his own, acts
       to help the other person commit a crime. More specifically, you
       may find that the defendant is an accomplice of another, in this
       case, if the following two elements are proven beyond a
       reasonable doubt:

       First, that the defendant had the intent of promoting or facilitating
       the commission of the offense . . . and the defendant aids, agrees
       to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or
       committing the crime. It is important to understand that a person
       is not an accomplice merely because he is present when a crime
       is committed or knows that a crime is committed. To be an
       accomplice, the defendant must specifically intend to bring about
       the crime by assisting another in its commission.

N.T., 6/11/21, at 7, 24 (emphasis added).9

____________________________________________

8 Another subsection of the conspiracy statute provides that the defendant is

guilty of conspiracy if he “agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(2). The Commonwealth,
however, did not charge Appellant with violating this subsection.

9 The “agrees to aid” element also is included in the Crimes Code’s definition

of an accomplice. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c).

                                          - 21 -
J-A08003-23

      We turn to the fifth factor, “whether a change in defense strategy was

necessitated by the amendment.”       Beck, 78 A.3d at 660.       No change in

strategy was necessary. As discussed above, the original charge of conspiracy

included the element of an agreement. So, too, did the amended charge of

PWID-accomplice liability, because the trial court instructed that this charge

includes the element of an agreement.         N.T., 6/11/21, at 7, 24. Thus, the

change in charges from conspiracy to PWID-accomplice liability did not

preclude defense counsel from making the same argument he intended to

make in opposition to the conspiracy charge: no agreement existed between

Appellant and the other males.

      Nor did the amended charge necessitate any other change in Appellant’s

trial strategy. We acknowledge that the charge of PWID-accomplice liability

added one element that was not present in the conspiracy charge: the element

that Appellant “aided” others in possessing heroin with intent to deliver it. In

the context of this case, however, we do not consider “aiding” the other males

materially different from the conspiracy element of “agreeing” with others to

“engage in conduct which constitutes [the] crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1).

The evidence that Appellant aided others in committing PWID was precisely

the same as the evidence that the Commonwealth would have proffered to

prove Appellant’s agreement with others to commit PWID—specifically,

Appellant’s trip together with the others from Chicago to Erie, their occupancy

of the same hotel room, their presence together in the car in the parking lot,

                                     - 22 -
J-A08003-23

Appellant’s possession of a gun while two of his companions approached the

SUV with a package of heroin, Appellant’s firing of the gun toward the SUV

after the SUV’s occupants fired at his companions, and Appellant’s flight from

the parking lot with Baizar. We see no difference between the strategy that

Appellant used in defending against this evidence in a PWID-accomplice

liability prosecution to the strategy that he would have used in defending

against the same evidence in a conspiracy prosecution.

      The absence of any need to devise a new strategy distinguishes this

case from decisions in which amendment of the charges necessitated a new

trial. See Brown, Quinones, supra. In Brown, the amendment in charges

from rape by forcible compulsion to rape of an unconscious person changed

the charge from one requiring proof of force to one requiring entirely different

evidence, i.e., proof that the victim was unconscious. Id., 727 A.2d at 544.

In Quinones, the addition of PWID and drug paraphernalia charges to the

original charges of abuse of corpse and gun possession “changed [the

charges] drastically . . . from one of guns and abuse of corpse to one involving

drug dealing and drug possession.” Id., 200 A.3d at 1012-13. The defendants

in these cases had to create new strategies unrelated to the original charges

to defend against new evidence. No such change in strategy was necessary

in the present case.

      Finally, as to the sixth factor, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s

request for amendment on the first morning of trial did not allow for ample

                                     - 23 -
J-A08003-23

notice and preparation.    While an earlier request might have been more

courteous, we agree with the trial court that Appellant suffered no prejudice,

and therefore no continuance was necessary. As discussed above, Appellant

was able to make the same argument against the PWID-accomplice liability

charge as he intended to make against the conspiracy charge, and the change

in charges did not force him to make any other change in strategy.

      In short, we conclude that Appellant fails to meet any of the six factors

used to analyze claims of error under Rule 564.

      Because neither of Appellant’s arguments has merit, we affirm his

convictions.   However, we are obliged to remand for consideration of a

sentencing issue that we raise sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Watson,

228 A.3d 928, 941 (Pa. Super. 2020) (issues relating to legality of sentence

may be raised sua sponte by appellate court). In its sentencing order, the

court sentenced Appellant to 7½-15 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to

commit PWID, instead of PWID itself. On remand, we direct the trial court to

determine whether the reference to conspiracy to commit PWID in its

sentencing order was merely a clerical error, or if in fact Appellant was

sentenced to conspiracy to commit PWID.           If the court determines the

reference to conspiracy in its sentencing order was merely a clerical error, the

court may correct this error without conducting further proceedings.       See

Commonwealth v. Black, 531 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. Super. 1986) (where

defendant pled guilty to false imprisonment but was sentenced for unlawful

                                     - 24 -
J-A08003-23

restraint, “this error should be corrected”); see also Commonwealth v.

Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 606-07 (Pa. Super. 2021) (trial court may correct its

clear clerical error or patent and obvious mistake in sentencing order; court

was authorized to correct sentencing order to reflect that defendant was

sentenced on one, not three, conspiracy charges, where sentencing transcript

clearly supported conviction and correction did not affect aggregate sentence).

If on the other hand, the court incorrectly sentenced Appellant on conspiracy

to commit PWID, rather than PWID, then the court shall vacate Appellant’s

current sentence and resentence Appellant for those crimes upon which he

was convicted. It has been settled for over a century that a defendant can

only be sentenced for crimes that they have been charged with and have been

found guilty of committing. See Conway v. Commonwealth, 4 Walker 106,

1881 WL 14631 (Pa. 1881) (where defendant was convicted of larceny and

acquitted of burglary, it was error to count larceny as a second offense).

      Appellant’s   convictions   affirmed.    Case   remanded    for   further

proceedings relating to Appellant’s sentence. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge Sullivan joins the Opinion.

      Judge Pellegrini files a Dissenting Opinion.

                                     - 25 -
J-A08003-23

 12/28/2023

              - 26 -