Court Opinion

ID: 9749881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:01:57.409847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:59.197965
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring. I concur that the family court, acting through an assistant judge, improperly reopened the divorce judgment between plaintiff and her former husband after the expiration of the nisi period, and that res judicata does not prevent a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Indeed, as I expressed in a dissent in Godin v. Godin, 168 Vt. 514, 533, 725 A.2d 904, 916 (1998), it is far preferable that the biological father bear the financial responsibility for the support of his child rather than the husband of the mother, who mistakenly believing he is the biological father, fails to protect his interest in the divorce proceeding.
We need, however, to step back and recognize the situation that Godin and this decision have created. The mother of the child now has the virtually unfettered choice whether to obtain child support from *92the biological father or her former husband, and there is no requirement that this decision be based on the best interest of the child. If, for example, the mother decides that her former husband’s demands for visitation are unacceptable, she can disclose that he is not the biological father and bring a paternity action against the biological father. The paternity action will create the exact conflict that warrants relief from judgment in this case. I suspect that a stipulated relief from the divorce judgment will be granted as a matter or course if there is an outstanding parentage order against the biological father. Alternatively, the mother can conceal that there is a different biological father and pursue only her former husband for support. These are, of course, the facts of Godin.
I recognize that in the last few paragraphs of the majority decision is a suggestion that Godin applies only in limited circumstances, “where the presumptive father had held himself out as the child’s parent over a number of years,” 172 Vt. at 90, 772 A.2d at 505, and that the limitation makes it more fair. In fact, the attempt to limit Godin is a fiction. The only relevant period is that between the time of the divorce and the “presumptive” father’s realization that he is not the biological father. If he brings a motion for relief from judgment within a year, see V.R.C.P. 60(b); V.R.F.P. 4(a)(1) (Rules of Civil Procedure apply to divorce actions except as otherwise provided), he has some chance of reopening the divorce judgment. Otherwise he does not, at least if the 60(b) motion is opposed.
In this case the marriage was short; the divorce filing came only a year after the birth of the child. That fact is, however, irrelevant to this decision. Even if the child were ten years old at the time of the divorce, the mother could bring this parentage action and require the biological father to support the child. Nothing in Godin limits its holding to short marriages or very young children.
The majority’s choice of words magnifies the fiction. According to the majority’s decision, the problem Godin addresses is that “the presumptive father had held himself out as the child’s parent.” 172 Vt. at 90, 772 A.2d at 505. The implication is that the presumptive father, knowing he is not actually the biological father, acts as the father anyway, creating some sort of estoppel. In fact, in each of the cases the majority cites, the presumptive father is misled into believing he is the biological father, and acts accordingly until he realizes the true facts. I reiterate my view, expressed in the Godin dissent, that the majority has built a policy around blaming the victim. Godin, 168 Vt. at 526, 725 A.2d at 912.
*93As we continue to explain the meaning and consequences of Godin, I hope the Legislature will recognize that the policy judgment underlying it is wrong and needs substantial modification. In all cases, biological fathers should have the obligation to support their children unless all parties involved knowingly and intentionally agree to a different financial arrangement. Creating a choice in the mother to seek support either from her ex-husband or from the biological father is neither fair to the ex-husband nor in the best interest of the child.