Court Opinion

ID: 9714020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:55.619852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.728759
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Martinson to apply the surplus to the first mortgage indebtedness. Where discretion has been vested in the trial court, only a clear abuse of that discretion or the application of impermissible legal criteria justifies reversal. Boatmen’s National Bank v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305 (1993). Abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person could find as the trial court did. McKenzie Dredging Co. v. Deneen River Co., 249 Ill. App. 3d 694 (1993). I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that no reasonable person could find as the trial court did in awarding the surplusage to the senior lienholder, even though that lienholder had not been made a party to the foreclosure proceeding. In Kankakee Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Mueller, 134 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1985), this court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award the surplus proceeds of a foreclosure sale to a junior lienholder. Although, as the majority points out, the junior lienholder had been named as a party defendant, it had not entered an appearance and was therefore in default. In spite of its failure to appear in the proceeding, the trial court nonetheless awarded it the surplus proceeds. The mortgagor maintained on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding the surplus to a party that had failed to appear and protect its rights in the property. This court affirmed the decision of the trial court, reasoning that the distribution of surplus proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure is a matter in equity and the trial court, in its discretion, may distribute the surplus to any party shown to have an interest in the property. In the instant matter, the majority makes a strong case for awarding the surplus to the mortgagors. However, it is well settled that under the abuse of discretion standard, the role of the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court or even to determine whether the trial court acted wisely. Schoon v. Hill, 207 Ill. App. 3d 601 (1990). Rather, the reviewing court must limit its task to determining whether the trial court’s decision is one with which no reasonable person could agree. The record here indicates that there was no dispute that Members Equity had a lienhold interest in the property subject to the foreclose action. As between Members Equity and the Duefels, a reasonable person could conclude that equity would favor paying the excess proceeds to the lienholder with an interest in the property rather than to the mortgagors whose interest had been extinguished in the foreclosure. I would therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court and I dissent on that basis.