Court Opinion

ID: 9390464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 17:02:58.684045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.679660
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 Green v. Green CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 IRWIN L. GREEN AND DOROTHY                                       B316576
 L. GREEN REVOCABLE 1998
 TRUST                                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No.
                                                                   16STPB01322)
 MATTHEW GREEN et al.,

          Plaintiffs and Respondents,

          v.

 PAULA R. GREEN,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Juarez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Paula R. Green, in pro. per.; Caldwell Law Firm and Larry
J. Caldwell for Defendant and Appellant.
      Matthew Green, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Robert Green, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire, and Ani Grigoryan for
Court-Appointed Trustee Michael Augustine.
       Dorothy Green (Dorothy) and Irwin Green (Irwin)
established the Irwin L. Green and Dorothy L. Green Revocable
1998 Trust (the Trust). This is the second appeal arising from
litigation involving Dorothy and her three adult children: Paula
Green (Paula), Matthew Green (Matthew), and Robert Green
(Robert). In the previous appeal, Green v. Cohen (Feb. 11, 2021,
B289909) [nonpub. opn.] (Green I), we held Dorothy’s purported
revocation of the Trust and transfers of Trust property were
invalid and we ordered Dorothy and Paula to return Trust
property. We also reversed in part and remanded for the trial
court to recalculate the amount owed by Paula. In this appeal
from the judgment amended to reflect this recalculated amount,
Paula asks us to decide whether the trial court should have
revisited its original findings regarding the validity of purported
transfers of Trust property.

                         I. BACKGROUND1
       A.     Dorothy and Paula’s Actions Before and After Irwin’s
              Death
       At the time of Irwin’s death in March 2016, the Trust’s
largest assets were a $440,000 life insurance policy insuring
Irwin’s life, a home on Mandeville Canyon Road in Los Angeles
(the Mandeville property), and a home on South Glenroy Avenue,
also in Los Angeles (the Glenroy property).
       The Trust provides that, upon the death of either Irwin or
Dorothy, the estate is to be divided into two separate trusts, the
survivor’s trust and the decedent’s trust. The surviving spouse is

1
      In reciting the pertinent background facts, we draw on our
prior opinion in Green I.

                                 2
entitled to receive the net income from the survivor’s trust and, if
insufficient, any portion of the principal necessary for his or her
health, education, support, and maintenance. Upon the death of
the surviving spouse, the entire Trust estate is to be divided into
equal shares for each child then living or any deceased child with
issue then living.
       Shortly before Irwin died, while he was in the hospital,
Dorothy executed a document purporting to revoke the Trust; she
and Irwin also executed trust transfer deeds purporting to
transfer the Mandeville and Glenroy properties from the Trust to
themselves as community property with right of survivorship.
After Irwin died, Dorothy obtained the life insurance proceeds
based on her purported revocation of the Trust. She then
refinanced the Mandeville property and deposited the net
proceeds of the loan, $502,025.25, into a checking account opened
in Paula’s name. Dorothy later sold the Glenroy property for
$2.641 million. She deposited the net proceeds from the sale,
$1,778,864.67, into a personal banking account.

       B.    Green I
       Litigation ensued in the form of two probate court petitions:
one filed by Matthew and Robert against Dorothy and Paula, and
another filed by Dorothy against Matthew and Robert.2 Matthew
and Robert’s petition sought to remove Dorothy as trustee of the
Trust because she breached her fiduciary duty as trustee and

2
      Dorothy died while the first appeal was pending. The trial
court appointed Randall Cohen as the special administrator of
her estate, and he continued the litigation in a representative
capacity.

                                 3
Paula aided and abetted that breach. Matthew and Robert
further alleged Paula engaged in wrongful taking of Trust
property and financial elder abuse. Dorothy’s action sought to
confirm the validity of her revocation of the Trust and alleged
Matthew and Robert engaged in financial elder abuse.
       After presentation of evidence, the trial court found
Dorothy’s purported revocation of the Trust was invalid and
ineffective because Dorothy did not deliver the revocation
document to Irwin as the Trust required. The trial court further
found that Dorothy could not have revoked the Trust when she
purported to do so because the delivery requirement presumed
the receiving spouse would have the capacity to respond (which
Irwin did not while hospitalized). Finally, even if the delivery
condition had been satisfied, the court found the revocation was
the direct result of Paula’s undue influence over Dorothy.
       As to the trust transfer deeds, the court found they were
invalid because Irwin lacked capacity to execute them, because
the trust transfer deeds misidentified the Trust (as the “1988
Trust” rather than the “1998 Trust”), and because they were the
product of Paula’s undue influence over Dorothy. Alternatively—
and most pertinent to this appeal—the trial court determined
Dorothy did not rebut the presumption of undue influence that
arises when one spouse gains an advantage from a transaction.
       The trial court further found Dorothy wrongfully obtained
the proceeds of Irwin’s life insurance policy because the Trust
remained in effect and, even if Dorothy’s revocation had been
successful, Irwin’s estate—not Dorothy—would have been
entitled to the proceeds.
       The trial court ordered Dorothy removed as trustee of the
Trust and replaced her with Michael R. Augustine (Augustine),

                               4
an independent fiduciary. The trial court ordered Dorothy and
Paula to return Trust assets with interest, including the net
proceeds of the August 2016 loan secured by the Mandeville
property, the net proceeds of the January 2017 sale of the
Glenroy property, and the life insurance proceeds. The trial court
additionally determined that Paula engaged in a “relentless,
continuous and repetitive campaign of false statements and
misrepresentation to Dorothy about Matthew and Robert so that
she could unduly influence Dorothy” and ordered her to return
$292,086.95 obtained by undue influence and to pay double
damages.3
       We reversed the judgment as to $80,430.40 of this amount
that Paula was ordered to return to the Trust. The details of the
trial court’s “relatively minor calculation error” are not relevant
to this appeal. We directed the trial court to “recalculate the
amount to be returned [by Paula] and any damages assessed
thereon in a manner consistent with [our] opinion” and affirmed
the judgment “in all other respects.” As pertinent to this appeal,
we held substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
conclusion that Dorothy did not revoke the Trust. We further
explained that although “Dorothy and Paula [did] not challenge
the trial court’s substantive reasons for setting aside the trust
transfer deeds,” our affirmance of the trial court’s conclusion that
Dorothy did not validly revoke the Trust foreclosed their
argument that the trial court’s ruling setting aside the trust
transfer deeds was an idle act.

3
       The trial court found Matthew and Robert did not engage
in financial elder abuse.

                                 5
      C.     Proceedings on Remand
      On remand, Augustine, the Trustee, filed a proposed
amended judgment accompanied by a declaration in which he
“withdr[e]w, waive[d], and relinquish[ed]” the right to recover the
funds we directed the trial court to recalculate on remand. The
proposed amended judgment incorporated this concession. Paula
objected to the proposed amended judgment as improperly
noticed and contended it did not reflect funds the Trust received
in partial satisfaction of the original judgment against her. She
asked the trial court to refrain from entering the amended
judgment until it ruled on her previously-filed petition for
Augustine to provide information and an accounting.
      The trial court determined Paula’s objections lacked merit
and the proposed amended judgment “excising the disputed
amount raised by the Court of Appeal” resolved its task on
remand. The trial court entered the amended judgment.

                         II. DISCUSSION
       Paula’s appeal does not address any of the grounds on
which she objected to the amended judgment in the trial court.
Rather, she asks us to revisit the trial court’s determination that
the trust transfer deeds were invalid based in part on the
presumption of undue influence that arises when one spouse
gains an advantage from a transaction. She contends legislation
that took effect while the appeal in Green I was pending
eliminated the presumption that Dorothy exercised undue
influence over Irwin in executing the trust transfer deeds. As we
shall briefly explain, Paula forfeited this argument by failing to
raise it at any time prior to this appeal.

                                 6
       Family Code section 721 (Section 721) provides, in
pertinent part, “in transactions between themselves, spouses are
subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that
control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations
with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of
the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and
neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” (§ 721,
subd. (b).) Section 721 has been construed to create a rebuttable
presumption that a spouse who secures an advantage over their
partner in a transaction has exercised undue influence. (Lintz v.
Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353.)
       Section 721 is subject to certain statutory exceptions.
Effective January 1, 2020, Assembly Bill No. 327 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) (AB 327) added Probate Code section 21385, which
provides that “[a]n at-death transfer . . . between spouses by will,
revocable trust, beneficiary form, or other instrument is not
subject to Section 721 . . . or any presumptions of undue influence
created by that section.” (Prob. Code, § 21385, subd. (a).)
       Although Paula and Dorothy filed their opening brief in
Green I before AB 327 took effect, they did not mention AB 327 in
their reply brief filed in May 2020, at oral argument in December
2020, nor via a supplemental letter that the California Rules of
Court authorize.4 Paula also did not raise the issue on remand.
Thus, even if AB 327 applied retroactively, covered the
transactions at issue here, was within the scope of our remand

4
      California Rules of Court, rule 8.254(a) provides, “If a party
learns of significant new authority, including new legislation,
that was not available in time to be included in the last brief that
the party filed or could have filed, the party may inform the
Court of Appeal of this authority by letter.”

                                 7
instructions after Green I, and somehow obviated the several
alternative and unchallenged grounds for the trial court’s original
ruling invalidating the trust transfer deeds, the issue has still
been forfeited twice over. (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60
Cal.4th 909, 920, fn. 3 [argument forfeited for failure to raise it in
the trial court]; Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517,
538 [failure to brief issue constitutes a waiver or abandonment of
the issue on appeal].)
       We have discretion to excuse the forfeiture, but we exercise
that discretion “most frequently . . . when ‘important issues of
public policy are at issue.’ [Citations.]” (Sea & Sage Audubon
Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.) That is
not the case here, and we accordingly decline to consider Paula’s
AB 327 argument.

                                  8
                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Matthew, Robert, and Trustee
Augustine shall recover their costs on appeal.

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                     BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     MOOR, J.

     KIM, J.

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