Court Opinion

ID: 9709710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:22.648158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.220215
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, concurring in part, dissenting in part: Although agreeing with the rest of the majority opinion, I must dissent from that portion which holds that the disputed art objects are nonmarital property. The majority claims that because the art objects were acquired prior to the marriage, they were nonmarital property at the time of purchase and remained that way after marriage despite the fact that marital property was used to pay part of the purchase price. I agree that, having been purchased prior to marriage, the art objects were originally nonmarital property of Mr. Crouch. However, I believe that when marital funds were used to pay part of the purchase price this constituted a commingling of nonmarital and marital property which transmuted the nonmarital property into marital property. Such an approach is mandated by the objective of the legislature in passing the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.) The objective of the legislature in categorizing property as marital and nonmarital was to allow for an equitable distribution of property upon termination of the marriage. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382. To hold as the majority does — that nonmarital property stays non-marital despite the contribution of marital funds — will all too often lead to an inequitable result. An example is easily envisioned. Suppose a man buys a $100,000 house prior to marrying and has paid $10,000 at the time he marries. Over the next 20 years the remaining $90,000 is paid off by the married couple. If there is a subsequent dissolution, the holding of the majority would require a finding that the house is clearly traceable and identifiable and therefore, despite a commingling of marital and nonmarital funds, it would remain nonmarital property. The husband would receive the house and the wife would receive nothing, notwithstanding her contribution over 20 years to paying off the $90,000 mortgage. Such a result is manifestly inequitable. To insure an equitable division of property it is necessary to regard nonmarital property that has been commingled with marital property as having been transmuted into marital property. The rationale for this was set forth in Klingberg v. Klingberg (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517. In Klingberg the court noted that a spouse may by agreement, express or implied, or by gift, transmute an item of nonmarital property into marital property. “Thus, the failure to properly segregate nonmarital property by commingling it with marital property evinces an intent to have the former property treated as part of the marital estate. [Citation.] Absent evidence to the contrary, as here, treating nonmarital property in this manner will result in its transmutation to marital property.” Klingberg, 68 Ill. App. 3d 513, 516-17, 386 N.E.2d 517, 520. Treating property in this manner will not result in inequitable distributions of property. In the previously mentioned example regarding the house, the property would be divided between the parties taking into account their respective contributions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c).) The husband’s original $10,000 would be taken into account as well as both parties’ contribution to the remaining $90,000 so as to insure an equitable distribution. In attempting to distinguish Klingberg from the present case, the majority both misinterprets its holding and misapplies it to the facts of this case. The majority states thatKlingberg differs from the instant case in that the commingled property in Klingberg was money in a joint bank account which was not traceable, while the property in the instant case is art objects which are clearly identifiable. However, the holding in Klingberg does not rest on whether or not the property in question is identifiable. It rests on the idea that by commingling nonmarital and marital property, there is an intent to have it considered marital property. It is irrelevant whether the property being commingled is fungible. Further, the question in applying Klingberg to the instant case is not whether art objects bought prior to marriage were commingled with objects bought after marriage but whether the art objects bought before the marriage were paid for with marital funds. It is undisputed that marital funds were used to pay for the Pearlstein painting, the Perlis painting and the Casa Grande Serpent vessel. With regard to those pieces there has been a commingling of nonmarital and marital funds to purchase them. This evinces an intent to have them treated as marital property. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, they must be considered marital property. The majority emphasizes that these objects were business inventory and therefore must be considered nonmarital property. Such an analysis leads to inconsistent results in this case. The trial court found that the business inventory purchased after the marriage was marital property, and the majority does not disturb that part of the decision. With regard to that property, the majority apparently feels that whether or not the property is business inventory is not determinative of its status as marital or nonmarital property. Yet when dealing with property purchased before marriage, the majority says that because it is business inventory, the property must be considered nonmarital. Such an approach cannot be justified by any reading of the statute or case law. I believe the fact that the property is business inventory is irrelevant in determining its status as nonmarital or marital property. Thus, simply because the disputed objects were business inventory is not evidence that the respondent intended to keep the property nonmarital. The majority’s emphasis on the art objects being business inventory is similarly misplaced in dealing with the problem of when the property is acquired. The majority holds that a different rule as to time of acquisition might be utilized to prevent inequitable distributions if property were not business inventory. However, if the property is going to be considered nonmarital because it is business inventory, then the time of acquisition is irrelevant. Conversely, if the time of acquisition is determinative, then the fact that the property is business inventory is irrelevant. There is one other problem with the majority’s holding. Adopting the majority’s analysis regarding commingling would lead to the anomalous result of transforming marital property into nonmarital property. In this situation, marital funds would be used to increase equity in nonmarital property and one spouse would end up with nothing to show for her contribution. I do not believe the legislature intended to create a loophole from which such manifestly inequitable results could occur. Therefore I believe that where marital funds are used to pay for property obtained prior to marriage, the property is transmuted into marital property. This will ensure an equitable distribution of property. In the instant case, the art objects should have been considered marital property and divided according to the relative contributions of each spouse.