Court Opinion

ID: 9760910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:22:48.616387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.379021
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I join the Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Stephens.
Further, I dissent from the conclusion stated in the Majority Opinion that the hearsay testimony provided by Ms. Barlow-Elliott, the clinical psychologist, was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule stated in Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) and Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990). It was not.
The Majority Opinion suggests only that a “hardened cynic” would attribute police investigation as the reason Det. Carr took this child to Ms. Barlow-Elliott for an examination. On the contrary, I suggest only a cynic could read this record and conclude this child was taken to Ms. Barlow-Elliott for any other reason but to strengthen the case. Certainly a fair reading of the record suggests that was the sole reason for the initial consultation. Ms. Barlow-Elliott testified the child was referred to her in the hope that by “seeing a therapist who is trained to interview children who had been traumatized that perhaps he would be able to explain what happened to him.” Her comment that she would also be able to evaluate what his treatment needed to be does not alter the hearsay characteristic of this evidence.
The misuse of Drumm v. Commonwealth, supra, to justify admitting this evidence sets a bad precedent for future cases.