Court Opinion

ID: 9469211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:35:16.837303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:49.485994
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
We sit on a court of limited jurisdiction. The Constitution and laws have not empowered us to right every wrong we might perceive or imagine. That function is occasionally left in the hands of coordinate branches of our government. Such is the case here. As the majority correctly states, *815judicial review is only appropriate when the NLRB has ignored a legal standard. The Board, however, has not done so in this case. Therefore, I dissent.
It is undeniable that the purpose of the 1974 amendment of section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), is to limit the number of bargaining units in nonprofit hospitals so that unnecessary disruption of health facilities can be prevented. Yet, as the legislative history of the 1974 amendment of section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), makes clear:
Congress did not within this framework intend to preclude the Board acting in the public interest from exercising its specialized experience and expert knowledge in determining appropriate bargaining units.
120 Cong.Rec. 22575 (1974).
Thus, the amendment was not meant to interfere with the deference courts have traditionally paid to the Board’s unit determination. Moreover, the amendment does not provide specific criteria the Board must follow in all circumstances. The majority argues that even if the amendment itself does not provide such criteria, NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d 404 (9th. Cir. 1979), has interpreted the amendment as creating a specific rule — “disparity of interests” — -that the Board must always follow when determining the appropriate bargaining unit in a public health facility. However, the holding of St. Francis Hospital is simply that the Board may not rely on a presumption in favor of an RN unit without on a previous occasion articulating the bases for the assumption. No such presumption was employed in this case. The Board gave due consideration to the need to prevent a proliferation of bargaining units in a nonprofit hospital. See Decision of Regional Director, HMO International, Inc., n.4, Cases Nos. 31-RC-3645, 31-RM-523 (Nov. 10,1976), reproduced in appendix to majority opinion. Such consideration is all that is required by the Board.
In dicta, St. Francis Hospital discusses the guidelines to be used by the Board in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for a public health facility. “While the community of interest standard may be decisive in other industries, it is not entirely controlling for the health care industry in the present context.” St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d at 418. The court suggests that “by focusing on the disparity of interests between employee groups which would prohibit or inhibit fair representation of employee interests, a balance can be made between the congressional directive and the employees’ right to representation.” St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d at 419. Community of interest is itself only a guideline to be used by the Board; it is not a firm and fast rule that the Board must explicitly show was accurately applied. St. Francis Hospital suggests that disparity of interest might be a more appropriate guideline for the Board to use in a public health facility. However, nothing in the decision undermines the overall thrust of the amendment, which is to advise the Board that it must give due consideration to limit the proliferation of units in a public health facility.
Even if one were to adopt the more specific “disparity of interest” test, a remand to the Board would be inappropriate here. That test is plainly met, since the LVN’s are already in another unit. One need not make a complicated comparative analysis of what kind of work the RN’s and the LVN’s are engaged in, what kind of pay they receive, etc. In this case, the “disparity of interests” is established by the simple reality that the LVN’s are already represented by a union. See Decision of the Regional Director, supra (“I find that the LVNs are currently represented by the Intervenor and the current collective bargaining agreement constitutes a bar to an election among the LVNs.”). On this fact alone this case can be distinguished from St. Francis Hospital. None of the cases cited by St. Francis Hospital or by the majority’s opinion involve a fact situation where the LVN’s are already represented by a union at the time the RN’s filed for an election.
The “community of interest” standard has always served as one part of an overall balancing test. The Board has traditionally *816been given great flexibility in balancing all the competing interests. Even if it were the case that the most appropriate unit, in light of the 1974 amendments, is a LVN-RN unit with a proviso of a Sonotone election, it is not necessary for the Board to arrive at the most appropriate unit, only an appropriate unit. Even if one were to adopt the disparity of interest test advocated, such a test should not be used to subvert the role of the Board as an expert body in the field of labor law. See Rayner v. NLRB, 665 F.2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1982).
This court is not in a position to make the careful evaluation of the facts necessary to determine the appropriate unit in a particular case. There is no need to undermine a long established judicial posture of deference to the Board simply because the majority would like us to do so. The enforcement order should be granted.