Court Opinion

ID: 9951075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 16:01:31.434787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:05.684395
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                        KISOR, DALY, and MIZER
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                     Albert J. WILLIAMS
             Gunnery Sergeant (E-7), U.S. Marine Corps
                            Appellant

                             No. 202300217

                        _________________________

                          Decided: 15 March 2024

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                              Military Judge:
                              Derek A. Poteet

 Sentence adjudged 18 April 2023 by a special court-martial convened at
 Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a military
 judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to
 E-4, confinement for 30 days, and a bad-conduct discharge.

                              For Appellant:
                       Major Joshua P. Keefe, USMC

                              For Appellee:
                Lieutenant Michael A. Tuosto, JAGC, USN
                     Major Allison V. Acosta, USMC
               United States v. Williams, NMCCA No. 202300217
                              Opinion of the Court

   Senior Judge KISOR delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
   DALY and Judge MIZER joined.

                          _________________________

        This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
        may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule
                     of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                          _________________________

KISOR, Senior Judge:
    A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted Appellant, con-
sistent with his guilty plea, of one specification of wrongfully receiving stolen
ammunition of a value more than $1,000, in violation of Article 122a, Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 1
   Appellant asserts one assignment of error: whether the bad-conduct dis-
charge portion of Appellant’s sentence is inappropriately severe. Because it is
not, we find no prejudicial error and affirm.

                               I. BACKGROUND

   Appellant, a Gunnery Sergeant with a generally excellent service record,
was an explosive ordinance disposal technician at Camp Pendleton, California,
assigned to Expeditionary Operations Training Group, I Marine Expeditionary
Force. In March 2022, Appellant and a civilian contractor who also worked at
the range were discussing whether disposing of unused ammunition was a
waste. Sometime thereafter, the civilian contractor visited Appellant off base
and gifted him over ten thousand rounds of pistol and rifle ammunition that
the contractor had stolen from the Camp Pendleton range. The ammunition
was clearly military property and was in readily identifiable containers. The
monetary value of this ammunition approximated $4,200.00. Appellant at-
tempted to have this ammunition included as part of his household goods ship-
ment while he was changing duty stations, wherein it was discovered. 2
    After an Article 32, UCMJ, preliminary hearing, Appellant’s case was re-
ferred to a general court-martial; but as a part of the plea bargaining process,
the convening authority referred a single charge of receiving stolen military

   1 10 U.S.C. § 922a.

   2 Pros. Ex. 1.

                                       2
               United States v. Williams, NMCCA No. 202300217
                              Opinion of the Court

property of a value exceeding $1000 to this special court-martial. Although the
jurisdictional maximum of a special court-martial includes up to a year of con-
finement, Appellant and the convening authority agreed to a confinement
range of 0-45 days, to be determined by the military judge at sentencing. The
parties also agreed that “a Bad Conduct Discharge shall be adjudged.” 3

                                  II. DISCUSSION

    Raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 4 Appellant contends that
the bad-conduct discharge adjudged in this case is inappropriately severe for
this offense and this offender.

A. Standards of Review and the Law:
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. 5 The Courts of Criminal Ap-
peals have broad power to “affirm only such findings of guilty and the sentence
or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” 6 Put differ-
ently, “a CCA may not affirm any portion of a sentence that it finds excessive.” 7
This analysis requires an “individualized consideration of the particular ac-
cused on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense and the charac-
ter of the offender.” 8 In exercising this function, we seek to ensure that “justice
is done and that the accused gets the punishment he deserves.” 9 And in making
this assessment, we analyze the record as a whole. 10
   Appellate courts, of course, do not have clemency powers per se, that being

   3 App. Ex. 1 at para. 10, “[S]entencing limitations.”

   4 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).

   5 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   6 United States v. Wheelus, 49 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 1998); See United States v. Bell,

60 M.J. 682 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
   7 United States v. Flores, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2024) (citing United States v. Jesse,

79 M.J. 437, 440 (C.A.A.F. 2020)); see also United States v. Kerr, No. 202200140, 2023
CCA LEXIS 434 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2023)).
   8 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   9 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

   10 Id. at 395-97. If the sentence were segmented (which this one is not), we would

likewise analyze each part. See United States v. Flores, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2024).

                                           3
                United States v. Williams, NMCCA No. 202300217
                               Opinion of the Court

an executive function of the convening authority. 11 Clemency involves bestow-
ing mercy and is the prerogative of the convening authority and the Secretary
of the military service rather than the military appellate courts. 12

B. The sentence in this case is not inappropriately severe.
    Despite negotiating a favorable plea agreement that reduced the forum
from a general court-martial to a special court-martial and protected Appellant
from confinement in excess of 45 days, Appellant now contends that the sen-
tence that includes the (bargained for) bad-conduct discharge is inappropri-
ately severe. 13 The Government, for its part, points out that the military judge
discussed the specific terms of the plea agreement, including the bad-conduct
discharge provision, with Appellant at length, and Appellant repeatedly ex-
pressed his desire to enter into the plea agreement. 14
    Appellant’s contention is based upon two factors that were both baked into
the plea bargaining process and the plea agreement itself: that Appellant had
an “unblemished” prior record and that he accepted responsibility for his ac-
tions. 15 Appellant cites this Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Kerr as
analogous. 16
    Our superior Court’s precedents do not require this Court to explain its
reasoning when assessing the reasonableness of a sentence. 17 Additionally,
this case is unrelated to Kerr and we do not generally engage in sentence com-
parison in unrelated cases, and we will not do so here. 18 Nonetheless, we ob-
serve that an important facet of this case is readily distinguishable from Kerr.
In Kerr, the military judge expressed profound reservations about accepting
that plea agreement for that offender because of the severity of the sentence,

    11 Wheelus, 49 M.J. at 283 (citing Healy, 26 M.J. at 395).

    12 See generally Healy, 26 M.J. at 395.

    13 Appellant’s Br. at 8.

    14 Appellee’s Br. at 13; R. at 56-92.

    15 Appellant’s Br. at 8.

    16 Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Kerr, No. 202200140, 2023 CCA LEXIS 434 (N-

M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2023)).
    17 United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 16 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (“The Court of

Criminal Appeals did not detail its analysis in this case; nor was it obligated to do so.”).
    18 See United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Behunin,

83 M.J. 158 (C.A.A.F. 2023). See generally United States v. Ballard, 20 M.J. 282, 283
(C.M.A. 1985); United States v. Wacha, 55 M.J. 266, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2001). Appellant
does not argue that these cases are related.

                                              4
                United States v. Williams, NMCCA No. 202300217
                               Opinion of the Court

which included a punitive discharge and 8 months of confinement. 19 Reviewing
that sentence de novo, this Court agreed that the punitive discharge in that
case—even though bargained for—was inappropriately severe and we set it
aside. 20 In stark contrast, the military judge in this case accepted the plea
agreement without expressing any reservation, and he did not recommend that
the convening authority exercise any clemency or suspend the bad-conduct dis-
charge. 21
    Although not dispositive, when an accused who is represented by compe-
tent counsel bargains for a punitive discharge in return for other provisions,
that is strong evidence that the punitive discharge is not inappropriately se-
vere. This is particularly so where the plea agreement is accepted by the mili-
tary judge without express reservation. But this does not mean we surrender
to the parties or military judge our duty to determine sentence appropriate-
ness. At the same time, while we have considerable power to adjust sentences
we deem to be inappropriately severe, we do not have equitable power to grant
clemency. 22
   In sum, in reviewing this sentence de novo, we do not believe that this sen-
tence, including the unsuspended bad-conduct discharge, is inappropriately se-
vere under the circumstances of this case. We will not disturb it on appeal.

   19 Kerr, 2023 CCA LEXIS 434.

   20 See id.

   21 R. at 243. Of course, a military judge’s clemency recommendation is non-binding

on the convening authority. See R.C.M. 1009(f) and (g).
   22 See United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

                                          5
             United States v. Williams, NMCCA No. 202300217
                            Opinion of the Court

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 23
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   23 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

                                       6