Court Opinion

ID: 9776311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:34.539653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.021786
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Before the court pends the motion of Roberts Paper Company (Roberts) for rehearing. Same is denied for the reasons which follow.
Roberts initially contends that the “court ignore[d] the fact that the trial court made no express findings of fact, nor were any requested.” Furthermore, by not issuing such findings, “the trial court could have entered the temporary injunction against unfair competition because Appellants’ use of the Roberts’ ... customer relationships and goodwill constituted unfair competition even in the absence of a written agreement.” It is mistaken.
Given the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the temporary injunction may indeed be affirmed “on any legal theory supported by the record.” Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978); accord, Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex.1986). This we did not ignore. Instead, we recognized that findings of fact and conclusions of law serve to inform the litigants, and reviewing court, of the grounds underlying the trial court’s decision. The “Order for Issuance of Temporary Injunction” did just that.
On the second page of the document, the trial court found as fact that the appellants Klotz, Burk, Clark, Lile, Reams, and Schri-ber
intend to solicit or accept, or already have solicited or accepted, business from former customers of Roberts ... who were such within two (2) years prior to the Defendants’ termination of employment from Roberts ... and who were solicited directly by said Defendants or where said Defendants supervised, directly or indirectly, in whole or part, the solicitation activities related to such former customer.
Then it concluded, as a matter of law, that the aforementioned individuals should be “restrained and enjoined from engaging in any activity prohibited by paragraph 3 of ... [their] employment agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto....” (Emphasis added). Reading these provisions together, as we must, reveals that the court sought to enforce the covenant not to compete included in the “Salesmen’s Contracts” executed by Klotz, Reams, Burk, Clark, Lile and Schri-ber. If this were not true, and if the court were actually enforcing some common law precept of unfair competition, then it had no reason to tract the language of the contract in explaining the misconduct allegedly committed or to expressly refer to paragraph three, and then attach the agreements containing the paragraph, when specifying the prohibited acts. Because the trial court clearly disclosed, in writing, that it sought to enforce the contract in enjoining Klotz and the five others under paragraphs “b,” “c,” “d,” “e,” “f,” and “g” of pages three and four of the Order, Davis and Allen are inapplicable.
Next, and assuming the cause of action of unfair competition were available to support the injunction entered, the outcome remains the same. The cases cited by Roberts decry, as unfair competition, use of confidential information belonging to a prior employer. Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1993, no writ); Johnston v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1975, no writ. Neither they nor the cause of action prohibit fair competition. Furthermore, the latter includes the ability to solicit customers of the ex-employer, absent an enforceable non-compete agreement or use of confidential information. Crouch v. Swing Machinery Co. Inc., 468 S.W.2d 604, 606-607 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1971, no writ). This is especially so when the identity of the customer is not confidential, such as when they can be obtained from a phone book or comparable avenue of public access. Id. at 605-606. That appears to be the situation at bar, at least according to the great weight of the evidence.
Yet, should the customer’s identity be combined with other data, such as that found in Roberts’ “book,” then the resulting compilation, assuming it itself is not publically available, carries indicia of confidentiality worthy of injunctive protection. Id. at 607-607; *604Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that while a customer list simply containing the names and addresses of a customer may not be a “trade secret” it may be made so if extraneous information is incorporated therein at “considerable expense”); see footnote three infra. Thus, to the extent that Roberts demanded a preliminary injunction, via the doctrine of unfair competition, forbidding the solicitation of its customers whose identity is publically available, the request exceeded the trial court’s authority. To the extent that it demanded injunction halting the use of confidential information, such as its customer list, in soliciting those customers, it received, and still enjoys, the desired relief.
Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is denied.