Court Opinion

ID: 9406365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 18:05:48.785792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:29.332418
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210988-U
                                               1-21-0988
                                             June 30, 2023
                                                                               SECOND DIVISION

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                                 )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 14 CR 15458
                                                                )
 TONY MARSHALL,                                                 )   Honorable
                                                                )   James B. Linn,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge Presiding.

           JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s supplemental postconviction
                petition when defendant failed to make a substantial showing that he was denied
                the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

¶2        Defendant Tony Marshall appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal, on the State’s motion,

of his supplemental petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725

ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). On appeal, he contends the supplemental petition made a

substantial showing that he was denied effective assistance by (1) trial counsel’s failure to
1-21-0988

investigate and present a witness at trial, and (2) appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. We affirm.

¶3      Defendant was charged with armed habitual criminal (AHC), unlawful use or possession

of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) following a

July 29, 2014, incident. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, where defendant was represented

by private counsel.

¶4      Chicago police officer Zinchuk testified that on July 29, 2014, he was part of a team

executing a search warrant at a basement apartment in the 4300 block of South Michigan Avenue. 1

The officers descended stairs to a doorway, where the officers knocked and announced their office.

From behind the door, someone asked “who *** is it” and “what do you want.” Officers again

announced their office, and after a “short period” a sergeant authorized forced entry.

¶5      Zinchuk breached the door, which led to an outdoor breezeway that ran along the side of

the building. 2 In the breezeway, Zinchuk observed defendant, whom he identified in court,

Defendant fled, tossing what appeared to be a firearm into a bucket. No other civilians were

present. Zinchuk immediately detained defendant and asked another officer to hold him. Then

Zinchuk went to the bucket, where he “discovered” a revolver. Zinchuk called an evidence officer

who recovered the firearm. A juvenile then exited the basement apartment. Zinchuk first stated

that he did not remember the juvenile’s identity, but when the State asked whether the juvenile

was Lezereke Jarmon, Zinchuk answered, “Yes, I believe that was it.” Zinchuk did not know

        1
          The transcript does not contain Zinchuk’s first name.
        2
          Zinchuk described the area as a “little side gangway, like a breezeway that goes from the front of
the building to the back of the building” and “like an underpass almost.” For clarity, this court will refer to
the area in question as a breezeway.

                                                     -2-
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whether the juvenile was arrested, as he was “dealing” with defendant. During the course of his

testimony, Zinchuk identified a photograph of the door to the breezeway and a photograph of the

breezeway, which depicted the bucket.

¶6     During cross-examination, Zinchuk testified that when he entered the breezeway,

defendant was five to six feet away, running toward the back of the building and the apartment

door, but did not enter the apartment. The firearm was not photographed inside the bucket and was

not tested for fingerprints or DNA evidence. From the breezeway door to the bucket was five to

six feet, and the distance from the bucket to the apartment door was “maybe” eight feet. Zinchuk

believed that the juvenile who exited the apartment was Jarmon, but was not sure. The juvenile

exited the basement apartment rather than the exterior door through which the officers entered.

¶7     Chicago police officer Troutman testified that Zinchuk directed him to a bucket from which

he recovered a .357-caliber magnum revolver containing six live rounds. 3 He did not see Jarmon

or other civilians in the breezeway when he recovered the firearm.

¶8     During cross-examination, Troutman acknowledged that he did not see defendant in

possession of the firearm. Jarmon, who was an adult, was arrested, but a different individual, an

unidentified juvenile, was not. When the juvenile exited the apartment, defendant was already in

custody. The bucket was “just a couple feet, maybe not even that much” from the breezeway door.

¶9     The State entered into evidence (1) certified copies of defendant’s convictions for armed

robbery in case number 09 CR 07765 and arson in case number 02 CR 163, and (2) a certification

from the Illinois State Police that defendant did not possess a Firearm Owners Identification

(FOID) card or “concealed/carry” permit on the date of the incident.

       3
           The report of proceedings does not contain Troutman’s first name.

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¶ 10    The defense presented Jarmon, who testified that he was 54 years old, a veteran, and

currently on probation for possession of “some drugs.” On the afternoon of July 29, 2014, Jarmon

and defendant were in Jarmon’s living room. Jarmon’s mother and a young man from the

neighborhood were also present. The young man brought Jarmon a firearm that he found and asked

Jarmon to give it to the police. Officers then “busted” into the apartment and searched everyone.

Defendant never left the apartment, and Jarmon did not see defendant “handling” a firearm.

Although Jarmon and defendant were arrested “right there in the hallway,” the young man was

not. Jarmon did not know that the young man put the firearm in the bucket.

¶ 11    During cross-examination, Jarmon testified that he was exiting the bathroom as the officers

entered the apartment. While in the bathroom, he did not see whether the young man left the

apartment or defendant’s location. Although Jarmon did not see the young man place the firearm

in the bucket, he believed that was what happened.

¶ 12    The trial court found defendant guilty of AHC, UUWF, and AUUW, concluding that

defendant ran down the breezeway and threw a firearm into a bucket. The court stated that it

disbelieved Jarmon’s story that a juvenile entered the apartment with a firearm “minutes” before

the execution of a search warrant and then placed the firearm in the bucket.

¶ 13    Posttrial, defendant fired trial counsel and an assistant public defender was appointed to

represent defendant. Posttrial counsel sought a new trial alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel never

visited defendant prior to trial to discuss the case and failed to impeach the State’s witnesses with

physical and testimonial evidence, and that defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. After argument, the trial court denied the motion. At sentencing, the trial court merged the

UUWF and AUUW counts into the AHC count, and sentenced defendant to nine years in prison.

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¶ 14    On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant’s conviction over his contentions that the AHC

statute was unconstitutional and his sentence was excessive. See People v. Marshall, 2018 IL App

(1st) 152895-U.

¶ 15    In 2017, while defendant’s direct appeal was pending, he filed an unsuccessful pro se

petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). See People v. Marshall, No. 1-17-1424 (2019) (unpublished

summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 16    On March 30, 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that he was

actually innocent because the unidentified juvenile mentioned at trial, Jordan Fonder, brought the

firearm to Jarmon’s home and hid it. 4 The petition further alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant

was denied effective assistance by trial counsel’s failure to (1) investigate and interview Fonder

and Jarmon, (2) subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, (3) impeach the State’s

witnesses, and (4) argue that defendant was actually innocent. Specifically, the petition alleged

that prior to trial, counsel received an affidavit from Jarmon stating that a “juvenile” brought a

firearm to Jarmon’s home, but counsel failed to investigate this issue or “contact this person or his

family.” The petition also alleged that defendant was denied effective assistance by appellate

counsel’s failure to raise these issues on direct appeal. Attached to the petition were, relevant here,

the affidavits of Fonder, Jarmon, and defendant. 5

        4
           The record on appeal contains a scanned copy of defendant’s handwritten petition, which omits
portions of the top and last lines of several pages. This does not impede our understanding of the petition.
         5
           The record on appeal contains a scanned copy of Fonder’s handwritten affidavit, which is scanned
in such a way that the bottom line of the first page is illegible. This does not impede our understanding of
the affidavit.

                                                   -5-
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¶ 17   In his affidavit, notarized on July 24, 2017, Fonder averred that on July 29, 2014, he took

a firearm he discovered to Jarmon, and they decided to give it to the police. During the discussion,

another man, whom Fonder later learned was defendant, arrived. Jarmon did not want anyone to

know about the firearm and told Fonder to hide it. Fonder hid the firearm under a bucket in the

hallway. When Fonder returned, Jarmon was in the bathroom and defendant was on the phone.

Then, police entered and Fonder and defendant were searched. An officer kicked over the bucket

and asked who owned the firearm. When both defendant and Fonder denied owning it, the sergeant

said that one of them was going to jail, and asked their ages and whether either was on parole.

When defendant stated that he was on parole, the sergeant said that the firearm belonged to

defendant and Fonder was told to “take a walk.”

¶ 18   Jarmon’s 2015 affidavit stated that a friend’s nephew brought a firearm to Jarmon’s home

and asked Jarmon to give it to the police. Police arrived 10 to 15 minutes later, and arrested

everyone except the friend’s nephew.

¶ 19   Defendant averred that when he entered Jarmon’s home on July 29, 2014, Jarmon and

Fonder were present. The police then kicked in the door and took everyone into the hallway.

During a search, a bucket was kicked over, and a firearm was discovered. Although everyone

denied owning the firearm, the officers asked who was previously arrested or on parole. After

learning that defendant was on parole, the officers “gave” the firearm to him.

¶ 20   The circuit court docketed the petition and appointed postconviction counsel.

¶ 21   At a hearing on December 17, 2019, postconviction counsel stated that defendant provided

the name of a witness whom she was attempting to “track down.” On February 21, 2020,

postconviction counsel told the court that she spoke to one witness and was trying to contact a

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1-21-0988

second. On July 16, 2020, postconviction counsel told the court she obtained a witness affidavit,

and needed to incorporate the witness’s statement into a supplemental petition.

¶ 22   On September 10, 2020, postconviction counsel filed a supplemental petition,

incorporating the claims raised in the pro se petition, and alleging that defendant was denied

effective assistance when trial counsel failed to investigate, interview, and present Fonder at trial

to corroborate defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Attached was Fonder’s September 8, 2020,

affidavit in which he averred that on July 29, 2014, he was 16 years old, and took a firearm he

found to Jarmon’s home because Jarmon was previously in the military and “would know what to

do with it.” When Jarmon told him to remove the firearm from the apartment, Fonder put it in a

bucket several feet from the apartment door. Defendant then arrived, followed by police officers

several minutes later. Fonder did not tell the police that he put the firearm in the bucket because

he did not want to get into trouble. He was not contacted about testifying, and although he did not

want to be involved, he would have testified had he been subpoenaed.

¶ 23   The State filed a motion to dismiss alleging, in pertinent part, that defendant did not allege

that trial counsel was aware of Fonder’s name, location, or affidavit prior to trial, and that Jarmon

did not identify the juvenile as Fonder at trial. The State concluded that defendant’s ineffective

assistance claim failed because he did not establish that trial counsel was aware of Fonder’s

identifying information or the content of his proposed testimony. Moreover, under the

circumstances, Fonder may have had a constitutional right against self-incrimination.

¶ 24   On July 7, 2021, the court heard argument on the State’s motion. Postconviction counsel

argued that trial counsel failed to call Fonder, who actually possessed the firearm. Counsel stated

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that trial counsel was told about Fonder, who “really wasn’t interested in testifying at the time

because he was *** concerned about his culpability.”

¶ 25    The court responded that Fonder was “not cooperative” because he had a fifth amendment

claim. The court further noted that while defendant’s postconviction claim was that Fonder would

have testified that the firearm belonged to him rather than to defendant, the court heard evidence

at trial that defendant possessed the firearm and disposed of it as he fled. The court concluded that

the “problem” with Fonder testifying was that he would have to be admonished, and that trial

counsel “knew that and [did not get] any cooperation” because Fonder “knew he might have

criminal liability.” The court therefore declined to find trial counsel ineffective, as trial counsel

had “no control” over Fonder.

¶ 26    Postconviction counsel then asked that the matter proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the

other claims contained in the pro se petition. However, based on the “totality of the record,” the

circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 27     On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion

to dismiss when the supplemental petition made a substantial showing that he was denied the

effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 6

¶ 28    The Act “provides a tool for criminal defendants to assert that their convictions were the

result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois

Constitution or both.” People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 15. There are three stages of

postconviction proceedings. At the first stage, the circuit court reviews the petition independently

        6
           On appeal, defendant does not raise any of the remaining claims from his pro se petition. See Ill.
S. Ct. R 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply
brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

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to “determine whether it is ‘frivolous or *** patently without merit.’ ” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting 725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)). If the court does not summarily dismiss the petition, the matter

proceeds to the second stage, where the court may appoint counsel for the defendant and the State

may file a responsive pleading. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. If the defendant does not make a substantial showing

of a constitutional violation at the second stage, the court dismisses the petition. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 29   When considering a motion to dismiss at the second stage, the court must determine

whether the defendant has made a substantial showing, based on the allegations in the petition

supported by “affidavits, records, or other evidence,” that his constitutional rights were violated.

725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018); People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. A “ ‘substantial

showing’ ” is the “measure of the legal sufficiency of the petition’s well-pled allegations of a

constitutional violation, which if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle [the defendant] to

relief.” (emphasis in original). People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. At this stage, a

reviewing court must take as true all well-pleaded facts in the petition, unless such allegations are

“affirmatively refuted by the record.” Id. We review de novo an order dismissing a petition at the

second stage. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31. Further, we may affirm the second-stage

dismissal of a petition on any basis supported by the record. People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st)

122940, ¶ 54.

¶ 30   A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the standard set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance, a defendant must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 19.

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¶ 31   During second stage postconviction proceedings, the defendant must make “(1) a

substantial showing that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing

professional norms and (2) a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v.

White, 2021 IL App (1st) 170903, ¶ 35. The failure to establish deficient performance or prejudice

will defeat an ineffective assistance claim. People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53.

¶ 32   Defendant first contends that the petition made a substantial showing that he was denied

effective assistance when trial counsel failed to investigate and present Fonder at trial. Defendant

notes that Fonder averred that he would have testified had he been subpoenaed, and that Fonder’s

testimony would have corroborated Jarmon’s testimony that defendant did not possess a firearm.

¶ 33   Generally, matters of trial strategy are immune from ineffective assistance claims. People

v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999). Even a mistake in trial strategy will not, alone, render

representation constitutionally defective unless counsel’s strategy was so unsound that counsel

entirely failed to conduct meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case. People v. Peterson,

2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80. Therefore, a reviewing court is highly deferential to trial strategy decisions

and evaluates counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time and not in hindsight.

People v. Perry, 224 Ill 2d 312, 344 (2007). A defendant has the burden to overcome the “strong

presumption” that counsel’s action or inaction reflected sound strategy. Id. at 341-42.

¶ 34   Whether to call a witness is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after

consultation with the defendant, and such decisions will not ordinarily support an ineffective

assistance claim. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80. However, trial counsel has a duty to conduct

reasonable investigations. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 38. Failing to interview a witness

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indicates deficient representation when the witness is known to counsel and the anticipated

testimony may be exonerating. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 398 (1998); see also People v.

Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 74-75 (1988) (the failure to call a witness will not support an

ineffectiveness claim unless it is unreasonable for counsel to believe that the anticipated testimony

would be harmful or have no probative value for guilt or innocence).

¶ 35   Here, accepting as true the facts set forth in the petition, supplemental petition, and

accompanying affidavits, defendant has not made a substantial showing that trial counsel was

deficient for failing to investigate and present Fonder because the materials do not contain well-

pled facts establishing that trial counsel knew Fonder’s identity prior to trial.

¶ 36   In the pro se petition, defendant states that prior to trial, counsel received an affidavit from

Jarmon stating that a juvenile brought a firearm to Jarmon’s home, but counsel failed to investigate

this issue or “contact this person or his family.” However, neither the petition nor the

accompanying affidavits include facts establishing that defendant gave trial counsel Fonder’s

contact information or that trial counsel could otherwise identify the juvenile present at Jarmon’s

apartment prior to trial. Jarmon’s 2015 affidavit did not identify Fonder by name; rather, Jarmon

refers to a “friend’s nephew.” Moreover, the defense theory at trial, as detailed in Jarmon’s

testimony, was that a young man from the neighborhood brought the firearm to Jarmon’s home

and placed it in the bucket.

¶ 37    These facts, taken as true at this stage of proceedings under the Act, establish that trial

counsel knew prior to trial that, according to Jarmon, an unidentified juvenile brought a firearm to

Jarmon’s home. However, no facts establish that trial counsel knew the juvenile’s identity or

contact information. Absent facts establishing that the juvenile was identified to trial counsel prior

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to trial, defendant cannot establish that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present that

juvenile at trial was deficient. See People v. Makiel, 358 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106 (2005) (“Failure to

subpoena witnesses known to defense counsel who contradict the State’s case or provide

exonerating testimony demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 38   We are unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st)

170650. In that case, the defendant raised a postconviction claim alleging, relevant here, that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call the defendant’s brother as a witness at

trial. Id. ¶ 24. According to the defendant, his brother witnessed the offense, gave a statement to

the police, and would have testified that someone else was the offender. Id. The defendant’s

postconviction filings were supported by his brother’s affidavits that described the offender and

stated that he was willing to testify, but was never contacted. Id. ¶ 25. The defendant’s

supplemental postconviction petition alleged that his brother should have been known to trial

counsel because the brother was identified by name in police reports as a “ ‘potential eyewitness’ ”

and was interviewed by a codefendant’s attorney. Id. ¶ 26.

¶ 39   On appeal from the grant of the State’s motion to dismiss at the second stage, we found

that the defendant made a substantial showing that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to

contact the defendant’s brother as a potential exculpatory witness. Id. ¶ 43. We noted that the

defendant’s brother stated in his affidavit that the person he saw fleeing while shooting was not

the defendant, that he told this information to the police and to a codefendant’s counsel, and that

he would have testified at the defendant’s trial but was never contacted. Id. The record also

contained police reports identifying the defendant’s brother as a potential eyewitness. Id. We found

no strategic reason that trial counsel may have decided not to interview the defendant’s brother.

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Id. We therefore determined, taking the facts in the affidavits as true, that the defendant made a

substantial showing that trial counsel was deficient. Id.

¶ 40   Unlike Simmons, in the case at bar, no facts establish that trial counsel knew Fonder’s

identity prior to trial. Moreover, unlike Simmons, where the witness spoke to police and was

identified in police reports as a potential eyewitness, here, Fonder averred that he did not speak to

police officers and at trial police officers described Fonder as an “unidentified” juvenile. While

trial counsel’s “failure to interview known witnesses can indicate incompetence” (id. ¶ 42), here,

the relevant witness was unidentified.

¶ 41   Accordingly, defendant cannot overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s

decision to present evidence that the firearm was brought to Jarmon’s apartment by an unidentified

juvenile, rather than Fonder specifically, was sound strategy. Perry, 224 Ill 2d at 341-42.

Accordingly, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails. Johnson, 2021 IL

126291, ¶ 53. As defendant failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional right to

effective assistance was violated (Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33), the circuit court properly

denied him postconviction relief on this claim.

¶ 42   Defendant next contends that the petition made a substantial showing that he was denied

effective assistance on direct appeal when appellate counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence.

¶ 43   The Strickland standard applies equally to claims concerning trial and appellate counsel.

White, 2021 IL App (1st) 170903, ¶ 38. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, a defendant must establish the objective unreasonableness of counsel’s performance and

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a reasonable probability that the appeal would have been successful but for the complained-of

error. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 33.

¶ 44   Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every conceivable contention of error on appeal

but may exercise professional judgment to determine which claims to raise. Id. Generally,

counsel’s decision not to raise an issue on appeal is given substantial deference. People v. Harris,

206 Ill. 2d 293, 326 (2002). It is not incompetent to refrain from raising issues which in counsel’s

judgment are without merit, unless counsel’s appraisal is patently wrong. People v. Simms, 192 Ill.

2d 348, 362 (2000); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 243 (2004) (rather than raise

“every conceivable issue on appeal,” appellate counsel “exercise[s] professional judgment to select

from the many potential claims of error that might be asserted”). Thus, unless the underlying issue

is meritorious, a defendant is not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise it on appeal.

Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 326.

¶ 45   Here, defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance by appellate counsel’s

failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal when the State’s case,

consisting “entirely” of Zinchuk’s “dubious” testimony, was refuted by Jarmon’s testimony that a

juvenile placed the firearm in the bucket. Defendant argues that it makes “little sense” that he

would dispose of contraband in the presence of police officers, and it was “suspicious” that

photographs of the crime scene did not depict the firearm.

¶ 46   When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine

whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could

have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cline, 2022 IL

126383, ¶ 25. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine witness

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credibility. Id. ¶ 39. A reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact

on issues involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, or retry the

defendant. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64. The positive and credible testimony of a

single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction even if the defendant contradicts it. People v.

Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 27. The trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences that flow

normally from the evidence, nor to seek all possible explanations consistent with innocence and

elevate them to reasonable doubt. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 41. A conviction will be reversed only

if the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt remains. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 47    Defendant was convicted of AHC in that he possessed a firearm after having been

convicted of two qualifying offenses (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2014)). On appeal, defendant

challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence proving his possession of a firearm.

¶ 48    To prove the possession element, the State can show either actual or constructive

possession of a firearm. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 27. Actual possession is

shown by testimony that a defendant had some form of control over the firearm, “such as he had

it on his person, tried to conceal it, or was seen to discard it.” Id.

¶ 49    Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence from which

the trial court could have found defendant possessed a firearm. Here, Zinchuk testified that upon

breaching the door, he saw defendant, who was running away, toss what appeared to be a firearm

into a bucket. Zinchuk did not see any other civilians in the breezeway and did not see defendant

enter the basement apartment. After defendant was taken into custody, Zinchuk went to the bucket,

wherein he observed a revolver. This testimony supports a finding that defendant actually

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possessed a firearm. See id. ¶ 28 (finding the credible testimony of a police officer that showed

defendant had actual possession of a firearm was sufficient to prove possession).

¶ 50   Although defendant argues that it was “suspicious” that officers did not photograph the

firearm and the State did not present physical evidence linking defendant to the firearm, such

evidence was unnecessary for the State to prove possession. See People v. Moore, 2016 IL App

(1st) 133814, ¶ 56 (because a single credible witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, the State

need not present corroborating physical evidence under those circumstances); People v. Bennett,

154 Ill. App. 3d 469, 475 (1987) (lack of fingerprint evidence does not necessarily raise a

reasonable doubt of guilt; rather, it is “unnecessary and cumulative” when there is eyewitness

testimony).

¶ 51   Defendant further contends that Zinchuk’s testimony that defendant threw a firearm

away—essentially in the direction of a police officer—as he fled made “no sense.” He likens

Zinchuk’s account to so-called “dropsy” testimony, where an officer is alleged to have fabricated

evidence that a defendant dropped contraband in plain view in order to avoid the exclusion of

improperly obtained evidence. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640, ¶ 20. He

further notes that Zinchuk’s version of events was refuted by Jarmon’s testimony that a young man

from the neighborhood brought the firearm to Jarmon’s home, and that defendant, who never left

the apartment, did not have a firearm.

¶ 52   As discussed, the positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain

a conviction even if the defendant contradicts it. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 27. Contradictory

evidence, or minor or collateral discrepancies in testimony, does not automatically render the

totality of a witness’s testimony incredible. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 47; People v.

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Peoples, 2015 IL App (1st) 121717, ¶ 67. That is true whether the factfinder is considering

contradictions or discrepancies within the testimony of a single witness (Gray, 2017 IL 120958,

¶ 47), or, as here, comparing one person’s account to that of another (Peoples, 2015 IL App (1st)

121717, ¶ 67).

¶ 53   Here, Zinchuk observed defendant toss an object that appeared to be a firearm into a bucket

while running in the breezeway and then observed a revolver in that bucket. Although Jarmon

testified that defendant did not have a firearm and never left the apartment, the trial court found

Zinchuk’s testimony credible. The court was not “required to accept the defendant’s version of the

facts.” See People v. Jacobs, 2016 IL App (1st) 133881, ¶ 53.

¶ 54   A rational trier of fact could have found Zinchuk’s testimony was neither improbable nor

contrary to human experience. Defendant’s allegation that police officers frequently fabricate

“dropsy” testimony does not show that the evidence in this case, i.e., that defendant threw a firearm

away as he fled police, was so improbable or incredible that it created a reasonable doubt of his

guilt. See Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640, ¶ 34 (noting that “we do not always see logical

responses to police presence from criminal suspects”); see also People v. Henderson, 33 Ill. 2d

225, 229 (1965) (“Far from being contrary to human experience, cases which have come to this

court show it to be a common behavior pattern for individuals [possessing contraband] to attempt

to dispose of [it] when suddenly confronted by authorities.”).

¶ 55   Considering the two versions of events presented, the trial court did not find defendant’s

version credible. See People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12 (“It is the responsibility of the trier

of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences

from the facts.”). Here, the trial court found the testimony that defendant possessed a firearm to be

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credible and rejected the testimony to the contrary. This court will not retry a defendant and

overturn the trial court’s credibility determinations simply because a defendant claims his version

of events is more credible. See Peoples, 2015 IL App (1st) 121717, ¶ 67 (the mere existence of

conflicting evidence at trial does not require a reviewing court to reverse a conviction).

¶ 56   Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we would

have been required to do on direct appeal, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have

concluded that defendant possessed a firearm. See Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. Because the

underlying issue was not meritorious, defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by

appellate counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal (Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 326), and his claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must fail (English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 33). Therefore,

the circuit court properly denied defendant postconviction relief on this claim. Domagala, 2013 IL

113688, ¶ 35.

¶ 57   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 58   Affirmed.

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