Court Opinion

ID: 9697134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:07:02.489303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:51.125295
License: Public Domain

TODD, Justice
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority because I am unable, as a practical matter, to reconcile the present case with the decision of this court in Riley v. Lake, 295 Minn. 43, 203 N.W.2d 331 (1972).
The facts of the Riley case are strikingly similar. The plaintiff was traveling north toward an uncontrolled intersection. Defendant was driving west on the intersecting street. According to her testimony, plaintiff looked to her right as she approached the intersection, had an unobstructed view for a distance roughly equal to a city block, and saw nothing. She therefore did not brake for the intersection, although her foot was off the accelerator. In any event, when plaintiff’s car was nearly through the intersection, it was struck on the rear, right-hand side by defendant’s car. Defendant likewise testified that he had not seen plaintiff’s car and “just wasn’t paying any attention.” 295 Minn. 48, 203 N.W.2d 335. The jury compared the parties’ negligence and found the defendant 100-percent negligent.
On appeal, this court overturned the jury’s findings and held plaintiff to have been negligent as a matter of law. The reasoning underlying the Riley decision is of particular importance here. Based on the physical fact that a collision had occurred, the court reached the rather obvious conclusion that the two vehicles must have entered the intersection at almost exactly the same moment. The statute governing right-of-way in uncontrolled intersections, Minn.St. 169.20, subd. 1, required that when two vehicles approach an uncontrolled intersection at approximately the same time, the driver on the left must yield the right-of-way to the driver on the right.1 The .court reasoned that since the subject vehicles must have entered the intersection at approximately the same time, and since plaintiff’s vehicle was on the left, the plaintiff should have yielded the right-of-way to defendant. The court concluded (295 Minn. 53, 203 N.W.2d 338):
*407“Under Minn.St. 169.96, failure to yield the right-of-way is prima facie evidence of negligence. Where there is no evidence to excuse a violation of a right-of-way statute, the court should hold the violator negligent as a matter of law.” (Italics supplied.)
The only material fact which differentiates the present case from Riley v. Lake, supra, is the type of intersection in which the collision occurred. In the Riley case, the intersection was uncontrolled; here, entry into the intersection from the east and west was controlled by stop signs. However, the difference in the nature of the intersections involved does not in practice justify the opposing right-of-way/negligence rules the court has established for the two situations.
To be sure, the right-of-way question in the instant case is controlled by a different statutory provision. Minn.St. 169.20, subd. 3, states in part:
“The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from the through highway or which are approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but the driver having so yielded may proceed, and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on the through highway shall yield the right of way to the vehicles so proceeding into or across the through highway.”
The majority opinion correctly notes that this provision has been construed to require only that a driver exercise reasonable care in looking both directions before proceeding from a stop sign into an intersection. A motorist who has complied with this requirement gains the right-of-way while moving across the intersecting highway.
I cannot disagree with this general construction of § 169.20, subd. 3, but its application in this case has produced a result which is both unnecessary and counterintui-tive. The majority reasons as follows: The jury could have concluded that while he was stopped at the intersection, defendant, in the exercise of due care, failed to see any oncoming traffic which he reasonably perceived as an “immediate hazard.” Having made such an observation, the right-of-way shifted from any oncoming vehicles to defendant as he entered the intersection. The plaintiff motorcyclist was therefore under a duty to yield the right-of-way and his failure to do so constituted prima facie negligence.
While this reasoning is certainly internally coherent, it overlooks the simple truth that the motorcycle was in fact an “immediate hazard” when defendant started into the intersection. The fact that an accident occurred is conclusive proof that the motorcycle must have been so close to the intersection as to constitute an “immediate hazard.” The majority opinion is thus supportable only if one finds agreeable the proposition that a driver who looks and fails to see another approaching vehicle with which he ultimately collides can fairly be considered not negligent. I find any such proposition unacceptable. Absent obstructions to a driver’s view — and there were none in this case — the failure to see a vehicle which is close enough to collide with can be characterized only as negligence,2 unless we are willing to countenance dangerously low standards of driving technique.
To bring the result in this case into accord with both the operative facts of the accident and our decision in Riley v. Lake, supra, I would allow the fact of the collision to support a mandatory inference that the two vehicles were inside the “danger zone” with respect to one another.3 Under such *408circumstances, I would hold that defendant could not, as a matter of law, have exercised reasonable care before proceeding into the intersection. That being so, defendant could not gain the right-of-way under § 169.20, subd. 3. Having entered the intersection without the right-of-way, defendant would be held prima facie negligent. In the absence of any excuse,4 defendant would be adjudged negligent as a matter of law.
This analysis, I submit, would be functionally identical to that which we employed in Riley v. Lake, supra, and would do no violence to the right-of-way mechanism contained in § 169.20, subd. 8. Once defendant’s negligence was established, the jury would be free to weigh any of plaintiff’s contributory negligence5 in the comparative negligence balance. The results under the rule I have outlined seem much more likely to jibe with our intuitive sense of fault in intersection collisions.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case with the instruction that defendant Horsley be found negligent as a matter of law, leaving to the jury the calculation of the parties’ comparative negligence.

. This provision remains in effect at the present time.

. At very least, a driver who fails to see what is obviously present cannot be zero-percent negligent.

. Requiring this inference as a matter of law would, of course, necessitate the abandonment of certain of this court’s language in Peterson v. Rodekuhr, 274 Minn. 204, 209, 143 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1966), where it was stated: “Plaintiff places some reliance upon the statement appearing in some of our cases to the effect that *408the fact ‘[t]hat plaintiff’s automobile was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard is established by the event of the accident.’ It is clear from a reading of those cases that the statement does not mean that the event of the accident establishes the immediacy of the hazard as a matter of law.”

. For example, evidence of obstructions to view could under proper circumstances constitute a legitimate excuse.

. Evidence of plaintiffs contributory negligence could include such things as excessive speed or failure to maintain a proper lookout.