Court Opinion

ID: 9820335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:07:30.573755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:59.468936
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE,
concurring in the judgment.
T40 I agree with the majority that a defendant may be held gccountable as a compli-citor when the underlying criminal offense is one of strict lability. However, unlike the majority, I would simply hold that People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989), resolves the question we are faced with today. I am concerned by the majority's purported abrogation, via obiter dicta, of Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001). See maj. op. 1125-35. For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.
*1671 41 The majority posits a conflict between Bogdanov and Wheeler and then resolves the conflict by selecting the Wheeler rationale as the winner. Maj. op. ¶¶ 28-29. Although at first blush certain broad language in these two cases might appear to be in conflict, once the cases are distinguished and. contextualized, the tension disappears.
142 To the extent that the majority concludes that the reasoning in Wheeler applies in this case, I agree. However, instead of broadening Wheeler to subsume Bogdanoy, I would apply Wheeler's rationale in a more limited way-simply to include strict Hability crimes such as the one at issue here. This would avoid unnecessarily overruling Bogda-mov. - It is axiomatic that controlling precedent should be abrogated only very relue-tantly. See Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo, 429, 366 P.2d 384, 386 (1961). This approach also has the benefit of avoiding a great deal of dicta concerning the complicity standard for crimes other than the crime at issue here, which is vehictlar assault. See maj. op. ¶¶28-29, 31-32; see also City & Cnty. of Denver ex rel. Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. Consol. Ditches Co., 807 P.2d 23, 38 (Colo. 1991) (noting that a court "should avoid an advisory opinion on, an abstract proposition of law"). -
483 Moreover, I am not convmced that Bogdanov should be overruled, even if the opportunity were properly presented. I am troubled by the majority's assertion that the "difference" between the new standard it creates and the standard in Bogdanov "is largely academic." Maj. op. 132. "In any event; the instant case does not present us with an opportunity to retreat from our holding in Bogdanov, because Bogdanov concerned complicity in an intentional erime and thus does not bear on the narrow question before us today. 941 P.2d at 249.
~44 In Wheeler, the court was faced with the question of whether the defendant could be found complicit in a criminally negligent homicide. 772 P.2d at 103. The court explained that its specific task was to reconcile the statutory language requiring that a com-plicitor " ‘1nten[d] to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense' with the definition of eriminally negligent homicide." Id. (alteration in original) (citing § 18-1-608, C.R.S. (1986)). To complicate this task, the court had. to confront language from prior cases that had characterized the statutory phrase "intent to promote ... the commission of the offense," § 18-1-603, as a "requirement" that a complicitor have knowledge "that the principal intended to commit- the crime." Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 103 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Thompson, 655 - P.2d 416, 418 (Colo. 1982)).
T45 In other words, the Wheeler court was tasked with defining complicity in a crime of negligence~a question of first impression-but the ease law up until that point had only defined complicity from the vantage of intentional crimes. See Thompson, 655 P.2d at 417 (complicitor charged with assault, robbery, and criminal mischief); see also People v. Larson, 194 Colo. 338, 572 P.2d 815, 817 (1977) (underlying crime of aggravated robbery); People v. Martin, 192 Colo. 491, 561 P2d 776, 777 (1977) (underlying crime of aggravated robbery); People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113, 118 (1974) (underlying crime of theft). Though these cases had defined the complicity statute as requiring that the complicitor know "that the principal intended to commit the crime," the Wheeler court distinguished them. 772 P.2d at 103, 105; see also Marques, 520 P.2d at 118. It reasoned that "[when doing the act which 'amount([s] to criminal negligence, " a principal "need not intend to cause" the "specific result, death." Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 105 (second alteration in original) (quoting § 18-3-105, C.R.S. (1986)). "Therefore," the court reasoned, a complicitor "need not know. that death will result from the principal's conduct because the principal need not know that." Id. In other words, the court held that a complicitor in negligent homicide need not "intend" to cause death, because by definition the underlying crime involves an unintentional death.
46 Thus, the Wheeler court held that a complicitor to eriminally negligent homicide must only "be aware that the principal is engaging in conduct that grossly deviates from the standard of reasonable care and poses 'a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another. In addition, he must aid or *168abet the principal in that conduct and, finally, death must result from that conduct."1 Id. This holding is a product of the differences between complicity in an intentional crime and complicity in a crime of negligence. The Wheeler court's unique task places in context that court's seemingly more general comments concerning the meaning of the complicity statute. 772 P.2d at 103-04. As explained in Bogdanoy, the expansive language in Wheeler must be seen through the lens of the court's objective there, and limited to that context, Bogdanov, 941 P.2d at 251. Thus, I disagree with the majority that our rationale in Wheeler "can only be understood as an answer to the broader question con- . cerning the meaning of the [complicity stat-utel-not an answer limited to erimes of negligence." Maj. op. ¶ 25.
T47 A person is legally accountable as a complicitor if "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense." § 18-11-6038, C.R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). Bogdanov and Wheeler are not in conflict if one accepts that the answer to the question of whether a complicitor has aided a principal "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense" varies depending on the underlying crime. Id. Thus, the test for whether a complicitor has provided aid to a principal with the intent "to promote or facilitate" that offense is related to the elements that comprise the "commission" of the offense. Id.
{48 A complicitor's conduct must have a connection to the "commission of the crime committed by the principal"-namely, the complicitor must interd that such commission occur. Bogdanov, 941 P.2d at 250-51. The complexity arises because crimes differ significantly: in the nature of their commission. For example, a principal commits a crime of negligence when he engages in conduct that is a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise" and a certain result-for example death-occurs. Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 105. Negligent homicide, thus, can be understood as a crime that consists of negligent behavior followed by the unintended cireumstance that a person is thereby killed. On the other hand, a principal commits an intentional crime, such as murder, when "with the intent to ecause the death of a person ... he causes the death of that person." § 18-8-102, C.R.S. (2015). Because the "commission" of these two crimes is so different, so too are the requirements for guilt under a complicity theory. This is why, to be guilty of negligent homicide, a complicitor need only (1) know that the. principal intends to engage in the negligent conduct; (2) have the intent that the principal actually engage in the conduct; and (8) aid, abet, advise, or encourage the principal to undertake that conduct, See Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 105. But to be guilty under a complicity theory for murder, the complicitor must aid or abet the principal with the intent that the principal cause the death of that person-which is the same intent that the principal must have. § 18-3-102; Bogdanov; 941 P.2d at 250-51.
1 49 Both Bogdanov and Wheeler seem to go too far in places. Bogdanov suggests that a complicitor must always have "the culpable mental state required for the underlying crime" without noting that some crimes have no culpable mental state-namely, strict liability crimes. Id. And Wheeler's broad statement that the complicity statute "only requires knowledge by the complicitor that the principal is engaging in, or about to engage in, criminal conduct," arguably goes outside the bounds of the statute and risks sweeping up actors who would not properly be viewed as complicitors; for example, a taxi driver who wants a fare despite hearing the murderous plans of his passengers, a pawn shop owner who sells a gun to a known gang member, or a landlord who leases a building to a madam. 772 P.2d at 104. But if these cases are limited to the context in *169which they arose-Wheeler for complicity to negligent homicide and Bogdanov for complicity to assault-their differences become reconcilable,
{50 I would hold that Bogdanow's language that a complicitor must "share the culpable mental state required for the underlying crime committed by the principal" does not preclude liability under a complicity theory for a strict lability crime. 941 P.2d at 250-51. A strict liability crime does not require a culpable mental state.2 Thus, Bog-damov's statement simply does not apply, and should be understood in the context of that case: as a statement of the standard for complicity in intentional erimes.
{[ 51 Wheeler imposes lability for unintentional crimes, and thus provides an apt analogy in the instant case. 772 P.2d at 103. I would simply apply Wheeler's rationale to strict liability crimes. Accordingly, I would hold that, to be guilty of complicity for vehicular assault under section 18-8-205, C.R.S. (2015), (1) the complicitor must be aware that the principal is engaging in or will engage in conduct that comprises the actus reus of vehicular assault: namely, that the principal is or will operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; 3 (2) the complicitor must aid, abet, advise, or encourage the principal in that conduct; (3) with the intent that the principal engage in that conduct; and (4) the conduct is ultimately "the proximate cause of a serious bodily injury to another." § 18-8-205.
152 I do not agree with the majority's unsupported assertion that its new construction of the complicity statute "imposes a comparable, if not more onerous, standard for establishing complicitor lability, in virtually every possible seenario." Maj. op. €830. ' As the majority itself acknowledges, its new rule "arguably require[s] a less culpable state 'of mind on the part of the complicitor than of the principal" when it comes to crimes of specific intent. Id. at 182. But the majority sweeps this concern away by asserting that "it could hardly be said" that a complicitor who aids, abets, advises, or encourages another with both the required awareness of the person's intent and "a design" that the person cause the prohibited result, "is any less culpable than having that conscious objective himself." Id. Even if this issue were properly before the court-which it is not-I remain skeptical of this assertion. In my view, the court's prior interpretation of seetion 18-1-603 in Bogdanov is sound. 941 P.2d at 251. This court is bound by stare decisis-and accordingly, I disapprove of freewheeling dicta in the majority opinion which purports to abrogate Bogdanov. Maj. op. ¶¶ 35-36; see also People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo. 1999) ("[Sltare decisis 'should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it'") (quoting Smith v. Dist. Ct., 907 P.2d 611, 612 (Colo. 1995)).
153 Because the majority does not limit itself to applying the Wheeler rule within the boundaries of the case before us, I cannot join in its analysis. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the judgment.

. The majority restates this test and adds the requirement that the complicitor also "be cognizant"' that the principal "failfs] to perceive" the substantial and unjustifiable risk. Maj. op. 130. But Wheeler requires only that the complicifor know of the risk and know that the principal plans to conduct himself in a way that shows a disregard for that risk. 772 P.2d at 105. I would not phrase the standard for complicity in a crime of negligence to require that the compli-citor know what the principal perceives or does not perceive. ,

. While strict liability crimes do not require a "culpable mental state" as defined by statute, they do at a minimum require "proof that the proscribed conduct was performed voluntarily." People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126, 129 (Colo. 1983),

. As defined by section 18-3-205(2).