Court Opinion

ID: 9588551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:36.70156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:59.518056
License: Public Domain

Justice MITCHELL
dissenting.
Mindful as I am of the rules of construction which require in sum that insurance policies be construed against the companies issuing them, I nevertheless feel compelled by law and the clear terms of the insurance policies involved in this case to conclude that neither policy provided coverage under these facts. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
The motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company in the present case included as a matter of law language insuring the named insured against loss from liability “for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle. . . .” N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1985). The majority states that the test for determining whether the motor vehicle liability policy provides coverage “is whether there is a causal connection between the use of the automobile and the accident.” The majority then “finds” such a causal connection to exist in the present case. I do not agree.
It is clear in the present case that Anderson returned to his parked pickup truck to get his rifle after seeing a deer. As he unloaded the rifle from the truck, it discharged wounding McKinnon who was standing on the opposite side of the truck. The majority’s finding that McKinnon’s injury was causally connected to the use of the truck in this case, would seem to require a similar “finding” had the truck been on blocks and inoperable in Anderson’s yard at the time the accident occurred. I fail to see any principled way of distinguishing the “use” of the vehicle in the hypothetical situation from the “use” actually involved here. I *549would not allow recovery in either situation under the terms made a part of the liability policy by the statute.
The simple fact of the matter is that in this case the accident arose out of the ownership and use of the rifle and was in no way causally connected to the use of the truck. I do not believe that the cases relied upon by the majority support its determination that a causal connection existed between the use of the truck in the present case and the injuries to McKinnon. Most of those cases involved situations in which the vehicle was in motion or being placed in motion by the driver at the time of the accident. E.g. Insurance Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E. 2d 206, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 159, 236 S.E. 2d 704 (1977) (rifle discharged as driver prepared to drive away and reached to insert key in ignition); Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co., 16 N.C. App. 194, 192 S.E. 2d 113, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 425, 192 S.E. 2d 840 (1972) (key in ignition switch negligently turned causing truck to move forward); State Farm v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P. 2d 123 (1973) (insured shooting a “hair trigger” pistol at jack rabbits while driving his vehicle after them). In each of those cases the actual driving or operation of the motor vehicle properly could have been found to be at least concurring negligence and one proximate cause of the resulting injury. The result should be different, however, when as in the present case the accident and resulting injury arose solely from the removal of a gun from a motor vehicle which was parked and not itself being driven or otherwise “used” at the time of the accident. Raines v. Insurance Co., 9 N.C. App. 27, 175 S.E. 2d 299 (1970) (no coverage for accidental discharge of gun killing other occupant in parked automobile).
The majority next holds that the injury resulting from the accidental shooting of McKinnon was covered by the homeowner’s policy issued by State Capital Insurance Company. That policy specifically excluded coverage, inter alia, for damages arising out of the “unloading” of a motor vehicle. In removing the rifle from the truck, Anderson clearly was “unloading” a motor vehicle. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1378 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The accident and resulting injury in this case arose from the unloading. In my view, the term “unloading” as used in the exclusionary section of the homeowner’s policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for the accident in the present case. Contra Travelers In*550surance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 491 S.W. 2d 363 (Tenn. 1973).
Although my heart might go to the insured in a case such as this, I simply can find no way in good conscience that my mind can follow. I dissent.
Justice MEYER joins in this dissenting opinion.