Court Opinion

ID: 9400230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 19:05:33.038168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:43.099928
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/7/23 In re D.A. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re D.A., a Person Coming                                       B321748
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                            Super. Ct. No. DK15837A
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 K.S. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
      Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.S.
      Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant De.A.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   ____________________________
       A mother, K.S., and a father, De.A., appeal termination of
their parental rights as to their son, D.A. The parents’ lone
contention on appeal is that the court erred in finding the Indian
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224 et seq., the Act) does not apply because the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services failed to
interview three specified extended family members. We affirm.
       These proceedings began in 2016 when D.A. was three and
a half years old. D.A. was then staying at his maternal
grandmother’s house, where the mother came and went. The
father was not part of these living arrangements—he lived
elsewhere with the paternal great-grandmother and a female
cousin. The father’s cousin is D.A.’s cousin once removed. We
refer to her as “paternal cousin once removed.”
       D.A. was placed in foster care, and later returned to the
maternal grandmother’s home, where he had been living when
the case began. The court ordered legal guardianship by the
maternal grandmother as D.A.’s permanent plan. The maternal
grandmother, then D.A.’s legal guardian, filed to adopt D.A. The
court terminated the parents’ rights, and ordered adoption as
D.A.’s permanent plan. The mother and the father appealed.
       The father identifies three relatives he contends were
available to the Department but as to whom no inquiry was
conducted under the Act. (The father initially said the
Department made no inquiry of the maternal grandmother. In
his reply brief, he concedes the Department made this inquiry.)
The mother concurs with the father’s inquiry argument.
       The first two relatives at issue are the paternal great-
grandmother and the paternal cousin once removed, with whom

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the father lived in May 2016. The parties agree the first two are
not extended family members under the statute. Specifically, the
father says the Act’s “plain terms” do not include these relatives
and asking them “is not mandated.” Given this agreement, this
issue is not in contention. We need not and do not tackle the
question of whether the Legislature intended these relatives to
fall within the definition of “extended family members.”
       There is insufficient evidence either the paternal great-
grandmother or the cousin once removed has an interest in the
child. Neither has been involved in D.A.’s life. As a separate and
independent ground, the father acknowledges he did not raise the
issue of these relatives’ interest in the child in his opening brief,
and he indeed forfeited this argument.
       The third relative is a maternal aunt. The Department
interviewed the maternal grandmother on the issue of Indian
ancestry. We presume the maternal grandmother had as much
knowledge of family heritage as the maternal aunt. Any error in
the Department’s failure to interview this aunt was harmless.
                           DISPOSITION
       The court’s orders terminating the mother’s and the
father’s parental rights are affirmed.

                                            WILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:

      GRIMES, Acting P. J.                  VIRAMONTES, J.

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