Court Opinion

ID: 1002690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:14:45.122618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:58.815691
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD D. CROSLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                No. 00-1325
LOUIS CALDERA, Secretary of the
Army,
Defendant-Appellee.

AYAAD ASSAAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                No. 00-1536
LOUIS CALDERA, Secretary of the
Army,
Defendant-Appellee.

KULTHOUM A. MEREISH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                No. 00-1551
LOUIS CALDERA, Secretary of the
Army,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Benson E. Legg, District Judge.
(CA-99-2280-L, CA-98-3828-L, CA-98-1696-L)

Submitted: September 29, 2000

Decided: October 13, 2000
Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Rosemary A. McDermott, Thurmont, Maryland, for Appellants.
Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Allen F. Loucks, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Drs. Richard D. Crosland, Ayaad Assaad, and Kulthoum A. Mere-
ish were terminated from their employment with the United States
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
("USAMRIID") as part of a 1997 reduction in force. In separate suits,
Dr. Crosland alleged that he was terminated from his employment on
the basis of age, Dr. Assaad alleged that he was terminated because
of his age, race, and national origin, and Dr. Mereish alleged that she
was terminated because of age and national origin. In a series of
orders, the district court granted summary judgment to the Army on
these claims made under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On
appeal, these actions were consolidated. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.

                    2
With respect to the district court's order dismissing Dr. Assaad's
claims of race and national origin discrimination, we affirm on the
reasoning of the district court. See Assaad v. Caldera, No. L-98-3828
(D. Md. Oct. 1, 1999).1 Likewise, we affirm the district court's order
dismissing Dr. Mereish's claims of employment discrimination
because of her national origin. Mereish v. Caldera, No. L-98-1696
(D. Md. Oct. 1, 1999).2

However, with respect to the district court's orders dismissing each
Appellants' claim that they were terminated because of their age, see
Crosland v. Caldera, No. L-99-2280 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2000);3 Assaad
v. Caldera, No. L-98-3828 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2000);4 Mereish v. Cal-
dera, No. L-98-1696 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2000),5 we vacate and remand.
We vacate and remand because the district court relied upon this Cir-
cuit's "pretext-plus" case law, which has since been rejected by the
Supreme Court. Under this theory, where a plaintiff has already estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination and the employer has
advanced an alleged legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
action, a plaintiff, in order to prevail, must show both that the
employer's nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual and that the real
_________________________________________________________________
1 Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on September
29, 1999, the district court's records show that it was entered on the
docket sheet on October 1, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was physi-
cally entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the
district court's decision. See Wilson v. Murray , 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35
(4th Cir. 1986).
2 Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on September
29, 1999, the district court's records show that it was entered on the
docket sheet on October 1, 1999. See note 1.

3 Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on February
14, 2000, the district court's records show that it was entered on the
docket sheet on February 15, 2000. See note 1.
4 Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on April 12,
2000, the district court's records show that it was entered on the docket
sheet on April 13, 2000. See note 1.
5 Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on April 12,
2000, the district court's records show that it was entered on the docket
sheet on April 13, 2000. See note 1.

                    3
reason that for the employment action was illegal discrimination. See
Vaughan v. MetraHealth Cos. Inc., 145 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 1998);
Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 1995). That is, the plain-
tiff must show that the employer's reason was pretextual, plus some-
thing additional. In the case of each of these Appellants, the district
court relied upon this "pretext-plus" case law to grant summary judg-
ment to the Army on their age discrimination claims. See Crosland
v. Caldera, No. L-99-2280 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2000); Assaad v. Cal-
dera, No. L-98-3828 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2000); Mereish v. Caldera, No.
L-98-1696 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2000).

Following the district court's orders granting summary judgment in
favor of the employer, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
"pretext-plus" approach. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000). Under Reeves a
plaintiff may prevail by only showing that the employer's proffered
reason for its action was pretextual because such a showing "is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination." Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108. "Thus, a plaintiff's prima
facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employ-
er's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to con-
clude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 2109.

Although we express no opinion on the merits of the Appellants'
age claims, we vacate and remand for the district court to reconsider
its orders in light of Reeves. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

                     4