Court Opinion

ID: 9807736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:14:28.072437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:44.915142
License: Public Domain

BeowN, J.,
concurring: I concur in the opinion of the Court rendered by the Chief Justice upon the matters of law presented upon the record, and am clearly of opinion that no error was committed upon the trial in the Superior Court that justifies us in directing another trial.
*741With entire deference for the opinion of others, I do not think that the record discloses that there has been any unjustifiable delay in docketing the appeal in this Court or that the learned judge of the Superior Court who presided at this trial, or the diligent and able solicitor for the State have been guilty of any negligence or dereliction of duty whatever.
As the.case was tried last October, under our statute the appeal was properly taken to the succeeding term of the Supreme Court, which is the present term. By consent of counsel for the prisoner, it was advanced and argued five weeks in advance of the regular call of the Seventh District.
The solicitor could not compel the prisoner’s counsel to docket the appeal until the present term, and this Court could not properly issue a writ to compel such docketing in advance of the date fixed by law.
If, however, the appeal had been docketed here at last term, it could have been then heard, but there is no law compelling such advanced docketing that I am aware of.
I am further of opinion that the solicitor has the right to consent to the enlargement of time within which to serve a case on appeal. I do not understand that Trull's case decides to the contrary. It holds that the solicitor has no right to consent to a postponement of the docketing of an appeal in the Supreme Court beyond the time fixed by law.
Formerly the statement of the case on appeal in criminal actions was prepared by the judge (S. v. Randall, 88 N. C., 611), but it is now provided by statute (Revisal, see. 3271) that “the appeal shall be perfected and the case for the Supreme Court settled as provided in civil actions.”
This change in the law makes it necessary to serve the case on appeal on the solicitor personally, as “the solicitor represents the State in criminal prosecutions and the statement of cases on appeal in such cases should be submitted to him for acceptance or objection.” S. v. Cameron, 121 N. C., 572.
The solicitor may agree to a case on appeal detrimental to the cause of the State, and the judge cannot correct it, as held in S. v. Chaffin, 125 N. C., 664, in which Glarlc, J., says: “The ease on appeal was agreed upon by the solicitor and the counsel for the defendant. Such being the case, there is no ground for action by the judge (S. v. Cameron, 121 N. C., 572; The Code, see. 1234), nor for a certiorari to correct the case by the judge’s notes of the evidence on file; nor to permit the judge to correct the ease.”
With such absolute control over the statement of the case on appeal, it would be very remarkable if the law denied to the solicitor the right *742to agree to an enlargement of tbe time when necessary to properly make up sucb case. He bas tbe same power as counsel in civil cases, and tbeir right to agree to sucb extension of time bas never been questioned. Pell’s Rev., sec. 591, and cases cited.
Why then question tbe right of tbe solicitor? It is derived from tbe same statute.
Tbe existence of tbe power is necessary to protect tbe interests of society and of tbe State, as tbe solicitor cannot expect an extension of time if be cannot grant it, and if tbe solicitor is always held to ten days within which to serve bis counter-case, tbe case of tbe defendant may be served on him at tbe beginning of a busy term when be could not give it attention during tbe ten days without neglecting other duties.
Again, there bas been no delay. Tbe appeal is here as soon as it would have been if no provision of tbe statute bad been waived, and no extension of time granted. Tbe prisoner was sentenced to death on 13 October, 1917; tbe papers for settlement of case on appeal reached tbe judge on 8 December, 1917, and tbe case was settled on 18 December, 1917, showing a period of 67 days from tbe time tbe appeal was taken until tbe case was settled.
Under Revisal, sec. 591, tbe defendant bad 15 days within which to serve bis case; tbe solicitor 10 days to serve counter-case; tbe defendant 15 days to send tbe papers to tbe judge; tbe judge 20 days within which to fix its time for settling a case. Tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court is allowed 20 days within which to transmit tbe transcript to this Court (Revisal, 592), making a total of 80 days given by tbe State within which to docket case here. This would have brought tbe record to this Court on 2 January, 1918, some 10 days after its adjournment at Fall Term, 1917.
It cannot be justly charged that public officials are derelict in tbeir duty when tbeir acts are well within tbe statute enacted for tbeir direction.
I know from long experience on tbe Superior Court bench something of tbe exacting nature of tbe duties of that office and bow little time judges and solicitors have to make up cases on appeal, a very difficult and tedious character of work. In this case I think tbe judge and tbe solicitor acted well within tbe ■ authority conferred on them by law, and I know they acted conscientiously and with a desire to serve tbe best interests of tbe State.
They, too, have been elected by tbe people, to whom they are responsible, not to this Court, and our supervisory jurisdiction over other courts is restricted by tbe Constitution (Art 4, sec. 8) to tbe issuing of remedial writs for which no application bas been made, and does *743not extend to tbe right to condemn public officers without notice and when they have not been heard and cannot defend themselves.
That our' Superior Court judges and solicitors do their full duty is shown by the records of our courts and the manner in which business is dispatched in them. There is no unreasonable delay in the trial of criminal cases in North Carolina. On the contrary, there are few, if any, States in the Union where they are more rapidly disposed of.
I am authorized to state that Justices "Walkee, Hoee, and AlleN concur in this opinion.