Court Opinion

ID: 9474776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:08:27.347971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:19.640505
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Appellants, members of the Detroit community engaged in the gathering and presentation of information to the public, appeal from orders of the district court denying both contemporaneous and post-trial access to (1) videotapes introduced as evidence in the criminal trial of former Detroit city officials, (2) transcripts of the videotapes given to the jury during the in-court playing of the tapes but not introduced into evidence, and (3) documentary exhibits not *416introduced into evidence.1 The defendants filed no brief in this appeal, and the government sought dismissal of the appeal on the ground of mootness. While concurring in the majority’s conclusion that the case is not moot2 and that the district court erred in denying access to documentary evidence, I conclude that the First Amendment and the public’s common law right of access to public and judicial records requires the district court to grant the public access to the transcripts and tapes sought in this case.
I.
This appeal is a consolidation of the appellants’ appeals of several orders of the district court denying public access to the records at issue in this case. The district court asserted several grounds for denying the public’s multiple applications, and, prior to review of the law in this area, I will review those orders. The district court also filed a memorandum opposing the press’ application for a writ of mandamus. The district court cited the following:
(1) The applications for access were made after the jury had been impaneled, and, therefore, it was impossible to sequester a jury since the jury had not been questioned with regard to sequestration at the voir dire.
(2) No First Amendment issues were implicated by the application.
(3) The transcripts were not evidence and could not be corrected by a cautionary instruction when communicated to the public by the appellants.
(4) A cautionary instruction to the jury, while adequate to protect against jury exposure to reports of the trial, would not protect against exposure to the tapes.
(5) Allowing access to the tapes “would transform this already highly publicized trial into an entertaining carnival.”
(6) In light of charges by the Mayor that media coverage of the prosecution was racially motivated, “the present community climate will become fragile if the tapes are made available to the press prior to the jury reaching a verdict.” If race becomes an issue in the public’s mind, “the court cannot protect the jury from its fallout,” and defendants would not receive a fair trial.
(7) Appellants would be more likely to misinform the public in reporting from the tapes than from their own observations of the trial. The district court reasoned:
There is a difference between accurately reporting an event that occurs in the courtroom, and taking a tape, subject to the media’s editorial prerogatives, and playing it on the television. There is a misleading aura of accuracy *417to a tape recording, and a good faith edit on the part of the media can present a completely different picture to the public than what it would have seen if it had been in court that day. On the other hand, a competent reporter can easily convey to the public the information that it needs to know concerning the trial.
On October 17, 1983, the district court issued an order denying applicants’ application for contemporaneous access to the tapes. Applicants moved for clarification on the ground that the order did not deal with their request for transcripts and copies of exhibits. A hearing was held on October 19 at which the court denied access to transcripts on the ground that “I think it is going to telegraph to that jury that this Court is taking steps to give the media what it is not giving to the person sitting in the last row ... ”, and that “[w]hat is being published is the Government’s view of what these tapes say, and I have just noted too many errors to permit that.” On October 21, 1983, the court issued an order allowing appellants to inspect and examine the exhibits at the end of each trial day, but did not rule on whether the appellants could copy the exhibits.
On about December 13, 1983, the first jury was dismissed after reaching a verdict of guilty as to three defendants and failing to reach a conclusion with respect to the others. On January 6 and 13, 1984, appellants again sought access to the tapes on retrial of the defendants who had not been convicted. On June 7, 1984, the district court issued an order denying access on the following grounds:
(1) No common law right of access to the transcripts existed.
(2) Granting access to the tapes would create such a tense community environment that sequestration would be required. So few jurors are available for sequestration that defendant’s right to a jury representative of the community would be jeopardized.
(3) Access to the transcripts would implicate innocent third parties.
(4) “[Rjegardless of the media’s motivations, selective publication of these tapes necessitated by media limitations of time and space would assure that the second trial would be conducted in a carnival atmosphere that would permeate the actual proceedings despite the best intentions of all involved.”
The court granted the media the right to examine exhibits at the close of each day.
II.
Appellants’ right of access to the materials in the case is found in both the First Amendment and the common law. While neither right is absolute, similar standards govern the evaluation of the appellants’ right of access regardless of its foundation. Accordingly, I review below the sources of appellants’ right of access and the factors that I believe require a grant of access in this case.
A.
The First Amendment expressly limits government regulation of the free flow of information and ideas. The Amendment in no way expressly qualifies this limitation with reference to the source or type of information, and, in fact, the Amendment “encompass[es] those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2618, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). The Amendment assures “freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2826, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. at 2618; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). “By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. at 2618. See Press Enterprise Co. v. Su*418perior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 516-18, 104 S.Ct. 819, 827-28, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). While this right of information about government has most often arisen in the context of access to criminal trials, the Court has never expressly limited the right of communication about governmental matters to that context. Nor has the Court held that this right of communication is limited to presence at trial and does not extend to the inspection and copying of the information in question. Perhaps the ultimate inquiry is whether the access sought by the public “makes a positive contribution to this process of self-governance.” Id. at 518, 104 S.Ct. at 828.
I am convinced that this case implicates the public right to information about the functioning of its government and the process of self-governance. The prosecution involves a city official charged with illegal conduct in the course of conducting public business. The mayor of Detroit has, according to the district court, commented extensively on the prosecution. The prosecution reveals the work of law enforcement officials, and, like any criminal trial, facilitates public examination of the judicial branch of government. New cases exist where the public interest in information about government is more strongly and directly implicated. See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.1984).3 See also Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, Case No. 85-6073 (E.D.Pa., November 5, 1985) [Available on WESTLAW, DCTV database].
Further, the fact that the public may have an alternative avenue of access to the information has never been deemed sufficient to automatically justify denial of information. In Globe Newspapers, the public sought access to a criminal sex-offense trial during the testimony of minor victims. Neither the majority nor the dissent concluded that the First Amendment did not apply to the restriction on public information simply because the public had access to the public record of the witness’ identification and transcript of testimony. The majority concluded that where the government, as in this case, “attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. at 2619-20. “Such circumstances will be rare.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). See also Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F.Supp. 569, 577-78 (D.Utah 1985) (“Even if there is no purposeful tampering with the transcript, the full flavor of the hearing cannot be sensed from the sterile sheets of the transcript. Emotions, gestures, facial expressions, and pregnant pauses do not appear on the reported transcript____ Much of what makes good news is lost in the difference between a one-dimensional transcript and an opportunity to see and hear testimony as it unfolds.”). The Court held that where the public had access to the transcript of the proceeding, the state’s interest in denying access to the proceeding itself was diminished. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610, 102 S.Ct. at 2622. The dissent recognized that such restrictions do affect First Amendment rights, but would review such restrictions for reasonableness only. Id. at 616, 102 S.Ct. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
That the public had access to the courtroom is not, of course, irrelevant to our consideration of the governmental interest in this case and the means to vindicate such interest. However, it must be recognized that, as in Globe Newspaper, there has been a denial of public access to information essential to public communication regarding the functioning of government. Access to a copy of the tapes in question, like the difference between a transcript and live testimony, is qualitatively different *419from news reports of members of the public present in court when the tapes were presented. Accordingly, the restriction on public access to information essential to the process of self-governance may be upheld against a First Amendment challenge only upon a showing that the restrictions applied are the least burdensome manner of vindicating a compelling governmental interest.4
B.
Public access to public records is guaranteed not only by the First Amendment, but by common law as well. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978), the Court recognized “a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1311 (footnotes omitted). Such right is not absolute, and records cannot be “ ‘used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal,’ ” nor “serve as reservoirs of libelous statements,” or “as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Id. at 598, 98 S.Ct. at 1311. Further, “the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 599, 98 S.Ct. at 1312 (footnote omitted).
The courts have recognized that “there is a strong presumption that material introduced into evidence at trial should be made reasonably accessible in a manner suitable for copying and broader dissemination,” and that “generally the right to copy has been considered correlative to the right to inspect.” United States v. Criden (Criden I), 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir.1981); United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir.1985). See United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir.1985); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir.1982); In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609, 612-13 (D.C.Cir.1981); In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. (Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 949-50 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C.Cir.1976), rev’d sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); In re Application of WFMJ Broadcasting Co., 566 F.Supp. 1036, 1041 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See also United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.1985); United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.1985). “When physical evidence is in a form that permits inspection and copying without any significant risk of impairing the integrity of the evidence or interfering with the orderly conduct of the trial, only the most compelling circumstances should prevent contemporaneous public access to it.” Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 (footnotes omitted); Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 615 (“restricting the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is rarely the proper protection”); United States v. Mouzin, 559 F.Supp. 463, 465 (C.D.Cal.1983) (“the potential harm must not be capable of resolution by a means less drastic than denial of access”). Further, “the presumption of access normally involves a right of contemporaneous access.” In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1310 (7th Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 506, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (“The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”) (footnote omitted); *420Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. Denial of contemporaneous access “would result in denial of the right to copy at a time when the issues remained a matter of public interest. Thus the educational and informational value of public observation of the evidence would never be available at a meaningful time.” Criden I, 648 F.2d at 827; Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1262 n. 42 (“A portion of the news value of such materials may be irrevocably lost by even a temporary delay.”). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]s a practical matter ... the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the public promptly.” Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. at 2803.
Given the strong common law presumption in favor of public access to judicial records, the burden of rebutting or overcoming the presumption falls on the party opposing access, in this case, the government. United States v. Miller, 579 F.Supp. 862, 866 (S.D.Fla.1984); WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1043; Mouzin, 559 F.Supp. at 466; In re Application of CBS, Inc., 540 F.Supp. 769, 771 (N.D.Ill.1982).
A district court which denies access in the face of the strong common law presumption favoring access must articulate its reasons for such denial with specificity. In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir.1984); Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294; Criden I, 648 F.2d at 829. While we review the decision of the district court for abuse of discretion, it is clear that “[t]he mere statement that a decision lies within the discretion of the trial court does little to shed light on its reviewability. It means merely that the decision is uncontrolled by fixed principles or rules of law.” Criden I, 648 F.2d at 817. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177; Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir.1981); Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 613; WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1040. In In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir.1983), we noted that “the district court’s decision is not accorded the traditional scope of ‘narrow review reserved for discretionary decisions based on first-hand observation.’ ” Rather, we adopted the following view of the abuse of discretion standard to govern our review of right-to-access cases.
“To say that discretion exists, however, is not to say, as appellee contends, that what, is involved here ‘is simply a policy determination.’ Appellants seek to vindicate a precious common law right, one that predates the Constitution itself. While the courts have sanctioned incursions on this right, they have done so only when they have concluded that justice so requires. To demand any less would demean the common law right.”
Id. at 476 (quoting Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260).
C.
Four factors gleaned from the recently developed case law in this area convince me that the district court’s restriction of public access to judicial records constituted an abuse of discretion and that no compelling state interest necessitated the restriction on access pursuant to both the First Amendment and common law. First among these is the fact that the prosecution in this case involved public officials, the monitoring of which both the First Amendment and common law right of access are intended to facilitate. Second, the right of public access is heightened in criminal judicial proceedings. Third, the parties in the district court failed to convincingly establish that the defendants’ right to a fair trial could be protected only by denying access to the records. Fourth, the district court failed to specifically articulate how release of the tapes would injure innocent third parties. These four factors are considered below.
1.
Our history of public access to government informs our analysis of this case. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-70, 100 S.Ct. at 2820-23. The public's interest in the functioning of its government certainly ranks among the highest when communication of information is con*421cerned, and a quest for knowledge should not be blocked, especially when the public seeks “access to places traditionally open to the public.” Id. at 577, 100 S.Ct. at 2827. See id. at 575, 100 S.Ct. at 2826 (“These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”). See Press Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 518, 104 S.Ct. at 828 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Other circuits have agreed that where corruption in government is the focus of the proceeding in issue, this factor weighs against limitations on the traditional right of public access. United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir.1984); Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 614; Criden 1, 648 F.2d at 822; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 (“The presumption is especially strong in a case like this [AB-SCAM] where the evidence shows the actions of public officials....”). See WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1041; In re CBS, 540 F.Supp. at 771-72. Accordingly, this factor strengthens the strong presumption in favor of public access to public records, and highlights the applicability of the First Amendment when the records in question expose the conduct of government officials.
2.
History and case law highlight the heightened public interest in access to criminal proceedings. The interest in access applies equally to records of criminal proceedings. “[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573, 100 S.Ct. at 2825. “Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted.” Id. at 575, 100 S.Ct. at 2826. The review of the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings in Richmond Newspapers is just as applicable to the problem of access to public records. The Court reasoned:
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even without such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and its results. When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows____ Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion____
... The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is “done in a corner [or] in any covert manner.” Supra at 567 [100 S.Ct. at 2822]. It is not enough to say that results alone will satiate the natural community desire for “satisfaction.” A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society’s criminal process “satisfy the appearance of justice,” ... and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.
Id. at 570-72, 100 S.Ct. at 2823-24.
Accordingly, a grant of access in this case would promote the necessary community cartharsis and allow an open airing, in light of all the evidence and charges of racism, and a complete examination of the judicial process by the public.
3.
While the most troubling aspect of this case is the contention that public access will necessarily deprive a defendant of the right to a fair trial, “speculative threats to that right have never been sufficient to overcome either first amendment rights to attend and report on trials ... or the common law right of access to trial materials.” *422Martin, 746 F.2d at 972; Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294 (cannot deny access on basis of “unsupported hypothesis or conjecture”); Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 616; Myers, 635 F.2d at 953; Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1261 (“the ‘risk of causing possible prejudice’ at a hypothetical second trial does not justify” denial of access); Mouzin, 559 F.Supp. at 467. But see Belo, 654 F.2d at 431. Denials of access often involve resort to colorful language, raising the specter of a trial turned into a “carnival,” a la Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). However, Sheppard does not stand for the proposition that excess publicity alone threatens a fair trial. The Court in Sheppard emphasized that the publicity surrounding the case to which the jurors were exposed was dominated by material (1) not presented in court, and (2) inadmissible as evidence. Id. at 351, 360, 86 S.Ct. at 1516,1521. Accordingly, the courts have concluded that the admission of a videotape into evidence is a substantial safeguard to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 614; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 (“Once the evidence has become known to the members of the public ... through their attendance at a public session of court, it would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically in attendance____”); Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1262 n. 43; WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1042 (“The public need not be shielded from information which has been deemed to be reliable enough to be presented to the jury.”). Accordingly, the fact that the tapes were admitted as evidence minimizes the threat of deprivation of the defendants’ right to a fair trial.
One of the district court’s principal objections to allowing the public to see the tapes was that such would inevitably require sequestration of the jury. The district court’s theory requires that we assume that the jury could follow the court’s admonition with respect to reported descriptions of the tapes, but could not follow that admonition if the tapes themselves were available to the media. This theory has been soundly rejected by courts which are unwilling to lightly conclude that jurors will disregard the court’s admonition. Arguments such as that accepted by the district court “rest on a speculative assumption that the jury, which already has been empaneled will not abide by this court’s admonition to avoid all publicity about this case.... Confidence that jurors will obey instructions of the court is an underpinning of our criminal justice system.... There is no reason to believe that the jury will disobey this Court’s instruction to avoid publicity....” Mouzin, 559 F.Supp. at 461; Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 n. 8; WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1042 (“this Court cannot find that release of the tapes will increase the likelihood that the jury will disregard its instructions”).
With respect to future retrials, it is clear that “pretrial publicity — even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 554, 96 S.Ct. at 2800; Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575, 101 S.Ct. 802, 810, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981). “Recent highly publicized cases indicate that even when exposed to heavy and widespread publicity many, if not most, potential jurors are untainted by press coverage.” CBS, Inc. v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir.1984). “[I]t is not enough that publicity might prejudice one directly exposed to it. If it is to be restrained, the publicity must threaten to prejudice the entire community so that twelve unbiased jurors cannot be found.” Id. at 1180; Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 (“Even the intensive publicity surrounding the events of Watergate, very likely the most widely reported crime of the past decade, did not prevent the selection of jurors without such knowledge of the events as would prevent them from serving impartially.”).
Further, there are numerous tools available to a trial court to guard against prejudice in the pending proceeding and in potential retrials after appeals. These tools, including change of venue, continuances, and voir dire, are less restrictive alternatives than banning public access to traditionally and presumptively open records. *423Martin, 746 F.2d at 973. See CBS, Inc., 729 F.2d at 1179-80 (use instructions, voir dire); Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1295-96 (cautionary instructions); Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 616, 617 n. 45; Criden I, 648 F.2d at 828 (voir dire); Myers, 635 F.2d at 953. But see In re Gannett News Service, Inc., 772 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1985).5
I would not hold that a trial court could never restrict public access to public records. However, the orders of the district court simply lack the articulable specifics indicating that release of the tapes would deprive defendants of a fair trial and that no less restrictive means of dealing with the attendant publicity was viable.6
4.
The district court also alleged in conclu-sory terms that granting access to the tapes would affect the rights of innocent third parties. While this factor is one that the district court may properly consider, Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 619-20; In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F.Supp. 360, 363-64 (D.Minn.1980), the district court’s conclusions in this regard are so devoid of specificity that review of this argument is practically precluded. Further, the proper remedy when innocent third parties are involved and may be legitimately protected, is not to suppress the tapes, but rather to excise those portions of the tape implicating innocent third parties. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the district court to either release the tapes or to excise those portions implicating innocent third parties.
III.
In light of the aforementioned factors, I conclude that the district court erred in denying the public access to the audio and video tapes and transcripts.
Initially, it is clear that the right of access applies to both electronic and paper records. Belo, 654 F.2d at 429; Myers, 635 F.2d at 950; Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258 n. 21; WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1040; Shannon, 540 F.Supp. at 771 n. 3. Although several district courts have granted the public access to transcripts, the courts have rejected the argument that transcripts obviate the need for access to the tape where the tape is the actual record introduced into evidence.7 “The public is entitled to access to evidence introduced at trial in the form in which that evidence has already been seen and heard by persons attending the trial.” WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1042. See Criden I, 648 F.2d at 824 (“There can be no question that actual observation of testimony or exhibits contributes a dimension which cannot be fully provided by second-hand reports .... However, such publicity, rather than favoring rejection of the application, may in fact support its grant, absent compelling reasons to the contrary.”); Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 (“Though the transcripts of the videotapes have already provided the public with an opportunity to know what words were spoken, there remains a legitimate and important interest in affording members of the public their own opportunity to see and hear evidence that records the *424activities of a member of Congress and local elected officials, as well as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”); WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1043 (“The broadcasters have suggested that members of the public should have their own opportunity to evaluate these elements themselves by listening to the inflection in the voices of those recorded, as well as their tone of voice, their delivery and the timing of their remarks. In these areas, the Court agrees, the actual recordings are certainly more accurate than a transcript.”). See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597 n. 22, 100 S.Ct. at 2838 n. 22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced appellate judge can attest, the ‘cold’ record is a very imperfect reproduction of events that transpire in the courtroom.”). Accordingly, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the public access to the electronic records.
More problematic is the issue of transcripts of the tapes, which were not admitted as evidence. Some courts have denied access to transcripts since they are not evidence, although granting access to the tapes, WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1042, while other courts have released transcripts and used this, often unsuccessfully, as a justification for denying access to the tapes. See Belo, 654 F.2d at 432. The district judge’s concern that the fact that the tapes were prepared by the government and were not exactly correct is entitled to consideration. One court has analyzed this issue as follows:
Although representatives of the media were present at the trial and were able to take notes on the recorded conversations as they were played to the jury, this procedure has obvious limitations. The public interest can best be vindicated by the release of complete and accurate transcriptions, at the expense of the media applicants. We therefore hold that the strong presumption in favor of public access applies to these transcripts.
In so holding we do not suggest that the fact that requested materials are not in evidence can never be a relevant consideration, we hold only that the district court erred in treating it as a dispositive consideration. Cf. In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C.Cir.1981). Where proffered evidence is found inadmissible because it is unreliable, or because it is more prejudicial than probative, the dangers of broad dissemination may substantially outweigh any benefits. This is not such a case — the requested transcripts were deemed sufficiently reliable and helpful to be given to the jury. In these circumstances the fact that the transcripts are not in evidence carries little weight.
Martin, 746 F.2d at 968-69.
The possibility that the transcripts are inaccurate is best resolved by granting the public full access to both the tapes and the government’s transcribed version of such. This facilitates the public's role of monitoring the courts in dispensing justice and allows the public to consider first-hand any government misconduct in preparing such transcripts. Public confidence in the meting out of justice is hardly bolstered when transcripts deemed too unreliable for public release, are handed to the jury as an aid in determining innocence or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where consequences involve the deprivation of the defendant’s property, liberty, and in some instances, life. Since the transcripts were deemed reliable enough to give to the jury as an aid in following the tapes, and since the district court failed to specifically cite instances of incorrect transcriptions of the tapes, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the public access to the transcripts.8
*425IV.
In accordance with the above analysis, I conclude that the absolute denial of access in this case violates both the First Amendment and the common law right of access to judicial records. The government, while proffering several interests entitled to consideration — those of the defendant and innocent third parties — fails to proffer an interest in the context of this case which is both compelling and which could not be furthered in a less restrictive manner than an absolute denial of access. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of access constitutes a violation of the First Amendment and a gross abuse of discretion with respect to the abridgment of appellants’ common law right of access. I do not suggest, of course, that copying need occur simultaneously or that copying, like the broadcast of a trial, is not subject to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions.9 Likewise, the public’s responsibility in handling the material is not dispositive. “Confidence in the responsibility of the media must prevail until reason is given to find likewise. Admittedly, the media has been known to behave irresponsibly at times; however, barring them access for that reason is not only personally repugnant to this court, but is also inimicably hostile to our way of life.” WFMJ, 566 F.Supp. at 1043. See Guzzino, 766 F.2d at 304.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court should be REVERSED.

. Appellants’ status as members of the news media in no way diminishes their rights as members of the community, but instead casts them as representatives of the public. “Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2824-25, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). See also id. at 577 n. 12, 100 S.Ct. at 2827 n. 12.

. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1414, 55 L.Ed.2d 765 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2796-97, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 758 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 618 n. 1 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 747 F.2d 111, 112 (2d Cir.1984); In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir.1984); United States v. City of Detroit, 720 F.2d 443, 449 (6th Cir.1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1292 (7th Cir.1982); In re Application of National Broadcasting Company (Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 949 n. 1 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 1606, 56 L.Ed.2d 59 (1978); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 690, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974).

. Regarding civil cases, see In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C.Cir.1985).

. While recognizing the principles set forth in footnote one of the majority opinion, I believe that the compelling facts of this case involving corruption in government and the fact that much of the affected public will, due to practical limitations, inevitably receive "less than the original, first-hand genuine article” require a grant of access to the transcripts and tapes in order to avoid rendering the public’s First Amendment rights meaningless.

. The district court found that the tense climate of racism arose out of the Mayor’s charges that the coverage of the case was racially motivated. The district court’s orders in this case are, therefore, plainly predicated on the Mayor’s criticism of the public’s reaction to prosecution of a city official. The district court, unwittingly, perhaps, proceeded through its orders to mute open public debate by severely limiting the number of citizens with primary access to the evidence. It is plain that the increasingly second-hand nature of the information supplied to the public would foster misinformation, rumor, and confusion, rather than the unfettered discussion engendered by tossing the tapes, transcripts, and other circumstances of trial into the public arena.

. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that our review is limited to deciding whether “the lower court weighed the proper factors ... and reached a reasonable decision.” Opinion at n. 3. The district court clearly failed to consider alternative means of protecting the fairness of the trial in a manner less burdensome to the First Amendment rights of the Detroit community.

. One court has concluded that the provision of transcripts to the public is a factor to be considered in deciding the access issue with respect to the tapes. Belo, 654 F.2d at 432. However, in this case, the court provided neither transcripts nor tapes.

. The majority notes that the safeguards (cautionary instructions, contemporaneous viewing/reading of tapes and transcripts) used to regulate jury consideration of evidence are not available when material is presented to the pub-lie. To require the application of such procedural devices when evidence is reported to the public would, in my view, constitute an extraordinarily strained and unbalanced resolution of *425the interplay between the First and Sixth Amendment rights at issue here.

. Globe Newspapers Co., 457 U.S. at 607 n. 17, 102 S.Ct. at 2620 n. 17; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 2830 n. 18; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 n. 7.