Court Opinion

ID: 9900928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 19:03:35.553725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.665953
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 P. v. Otten CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D081644

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. SCD237822)

 TROY PHILLIP VAN OTTEN,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Desiree A. Bruce-Lyle, Judge. Affirmed.
          Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Katherine Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

          In 2013, Troy Phillip Van Otten pleaded guilty to robbery with a
personal discharge of a firearm enhancement, assault with a firearm,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Van
Otten also admitted a strike prior, a serious felony prior, and a prison prior.
The trial court sentenced Van Otten to a total of 27 years in prison, including
20 years for the firearm enhancement and five years for the serious felony
prior conviction. Since then, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitations (CDCR) has twice recommended resentencing for Van Otten.
Both times, the trial court considered the request and declined to resentence
him.
       Van Otten now appeals from the second denial, arguing the court’s
determination that he poses a danger to public safety is unsupported by the
evidence and that the court failed to consider mitigating factors, specifically
his rehabilitation in prison. As we shall explain, we reject these arguments
and affirm the trial court’s order.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
       On June 29, 2011, Van Otten and an accomplice entered a barbecue
restaurant wearing masks over their faces. Van Otten approached the store
clerk, who was counting money at the register. He then pointed a gun at the
clerk and demanded the money. When the clerk did not comply, Van Otten
fired the gun at the wall next to the clerk and repeated his demand. Van
Otten then grabbed the cash while his accomplice went behind the counter to
look for more money. Both men then ran out of the store and fled in a car.
       Van Otten’s home was searched the following month after a probation
violation, and law enforcement officers found a revolver hidden in a storage
shed and a pipe for methamphetamine in Van Otten’s bedroom.

1     The facts are taken from the probation report, which was drawn from
the transcripts from the preliminary hearing (the factual basis for Van
Otten’s guilty plea and the police reports.
                                       2
      On February 28, 2013, Van Otten pleaded guilty to robbery (Pen. Code,

§ 2112; count 1); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2);
possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)(now § 29800,
subd. (a)(1)); count 3); and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11364; count 4). With respect to count 1, Van Otten admitted he
personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). He also admitted a
strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)), a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)),
and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), which were based on convictions in
1990, including a guilty plea for assault with a firearm, and 2003.
      On April 10, 2013, the superior court struck the strike prior and prison
prior, and sentenced Van Otten to a total term of 27 years in prison,
consisting of the low term of two years on count 1, a consecutive 20-year term
for the personal discharge of a firearm allegation, a consecutive five-year
term for the serious felony prior allegation, and a concurrent 16-month term
on count 3. The court stayed the sentence on count 2 under section 654, and
dismissed count 4.
      In 2018, the CDCR wrote a letter to the superior court recommending
that Van Otten be resentenced under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
After a hearing, the court declined to resentence Van Otten. He appealed,
and this court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the resentencing
request. (People v. Van Otten (July 29, 2020, D076725) [nonpub. opn.].)
      Subsequently, the CDCR again recommended Van Otten for
resentencing, this time under the authority of section 1172.1. The trial court
appointed counsel for Van Otten and, on January 26, 2023, conducted
another resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court stated it had
reviewed the relevant evidence, including the brief and exhibits submitted on

2     Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                          3
Van Otten’s behalf by his appointed counsel and an opposition brief filed by
the district attorney, who argued that Van Otten’s sentence should not be
reduced. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Van Otten
continued to pose a risk of danger to public safety and declined to resentence
him. Van Otten filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Van Otten argues that the trial court’s decision not to resentence him
was an abuse of its discretion because its finding that he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is not sufficiently supported by
the evidence. In addition, Van Otten asserts the court erred by failing to
consider his rehabilitation efforts in prison and his plans for continued
rehabilitation after release. Finally, Van Otten argues that the trial court
erred by failing to consider section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
                                        I
      Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a court to “recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced” on the
court’s own motion within 120 days after sentencing or at any time upon a
recommendation from the Secretary of the CDCR or other specified persons.
      The goal of such resentencing is to “eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) Section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(4) provides: “In recalling and resentencing pursuant
to this provision, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that

                                        4
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. The court shall consider if
the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence,
... and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.”
      Under the statute, when the Secretary of the CDCR recommends
resentencing there is a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the
defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of
Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c)
states that “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within
the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of
subdivision (e) of Section 667.” That provision, in turn, includes “ ‘eight types

                                        5
of particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as “super

strikes.” ’ ”3 (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818.)
      We review the trial court’s resentencing determination for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.) “ ‘In reviewing
for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First,
“ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to
impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” [Citations.]
Second, a “ ‘decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted
in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ”
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does
not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no

3      The eight super strikes are: “(I) A ‘sexually violent offense’ as defined
in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [¶]
(II) Oral copulation with a child who is under 14 years of age and more than
10 years younger than the defendant as defined by Section 288a, sodomy with
another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger
than the defendant as defined by Section 286, or sexual penetration with
another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger
than the defendant, as defined by Section 289. [¶] (III) A lewd or lascivious
act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation of Section 288. [¶]
(IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined
in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive. [¶] (V) Solicitation to commit murder as
defined in Section 653f. [¶] (VI) Assault with a machinegun on a peace officer
or firefighter, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245.
[¶] (VII) Possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph
(1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11418. [¶] (VIII) Any serious or violent felony
offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I–VIII).)
                                        6
reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. Strother (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 563, 571 (Strother).)
      However, “ ‘[a]ll discretionary authority is contextual.’ [Citation.]
Thus, we cannot determine whether a trial court has acted irrationally or
arbitrarily without considering the legal principles and policies that should
have guided the court’s actions. [Citation.] Further, ‘ “[t]he facts upon which
the court’s finding of unreasonable risk is based must be proven by the People
by a preponderance of the evidence ... and are themselves subject to
[appellate] review for substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Strother, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
                                        II
      At the resentencing hearing, the court stated that it had both initially
sentenced Van Otten and also presided over the prior denial of recall and
resentencing. The court then explicitly recognized the applicable standard
under section 1172.1, which created a presumption in favor or recalling and
resentencing him. The court then found Van Otten presented an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. To support its unreasonable
risk finding, the court pointed to the district attorney’s brief in opposition to
resentencing. The court specifically referenced the pages in the brief
discussing the court’s prior finding that while Van Otten had taken
advantage of rehabilitative resources while incarcerated, the court was
concerned that outside of the highly structured setting of prison, Van Otten
would still be unable to abide by the norms of society.
      The pages referenced by the court also discussed Van Otten’s criminal
record, including the extremely serious admitted present offense of firing a
gun during a robbery and, with respect to Van Otten’s earlier convictions,
“firing an assault rifle in the air several times and holding a gun to a man’s

                                        7
face, breaking his nose, and shooting the victim in the back.” The pages also
contained reference to the record showing that Van Otten had a “documented
history of drug abuse, gang affiliation, and mental health struggles.” The
probation report before the court confirmed the information discussed in the
prosecutor’s brief.
      Before declining to recall the sentence, the court stated it had
considered all the exhibits and arguments presented by the parties, but found
that the presumption in favor of resentencing was overcome by the facts
identified by the prosecutor, and that Van Otten continued to pose a serious
risk to the community. The court recognized Van Otten’s rehabilitation
efforts and explicitly stated that it was not “ignoring everything [he had]
done to rehab himself while in custody,” and it had balanced those efforts
against his violent past.
      While Van Otten argues there was no evidence to support the court’s
findings, we agree with the People that the court’s recitation of the
undisputed facts of Van Otten’s criminal record are sufficient to support its
decision. The trial court was reasonably concerned about the violence in the
underlying offense and prior convictions, and the possibility of a recurrence of
such violence, or worse, in the future. While a generalized reference to past
crimes may be insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of
resentencing in some cases, here, the court appropriately looked to the highly
violent and serious nature of the specific criminal background of Van Otten,
which included a conviction for assault with a firearm and shooting a person
in the back. The considerations that Van Otten points to on appeal—the
recommendation of the CDCR, his significant efforts at rehabilitation, and
the presumption in favor or resentencing—do not show the court abused its
discretion by relying on the severity of his prior crimes. Although Van

                                       8
Otten’s record during confinement was admirable, we do not agree that the
trial court abused its discretion by concluding those facts did not negate the
risk of future violence.
      Next, Van Otten correctly argues that section 1172.1 allowed the court
to consider postconviction factors for purposes of its decision, including his
“disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation ... while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and
evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)
      However, we disagree with Van Otten’s assertion that because the
court did not explicitly reference the particular evidence he submitted
concerning his rehabilitation efforts at the hearing, the court did not consider
that evidence. The court stated it had considered all of Van Otten’s
submissions and, as discussed, explained its rationale for denying the request
to recall the sentence based on the violent nature of Van Otten’s criminal
history. This was sufficient to comply with section 1172.1’s directive to
consider evidence of rehabilitation, and the requirement that the court “state
on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and
resentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(6).)
      While a different court may have reached another result in this case, it
cannot be said that the trial court’s conclusion was “arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd,” or completely unsupported by the record, such that it

                                           9
amounted to a reversible abuse of discretion.4 (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376.)
      Finally, Van Otten argues the court erred by not considering the
mitigating circumstance contained in section 1385, subdivision (c), which was
referred to in the CDCR’s recommendation letter to the trial court. This
argument lacks merit. “For all criminal sentencings after January 1, 2022,
our Legislature in Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,

4      The two primary cases Van Otten relies on in support of his argument,
Nijmeddin v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, and People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138 (Whitmill), do not lead us to conclude
otherwise. In Nijmeddin, the Court of Appeal issued a preemptory writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate its decision denying the defendant
compassionate release under section 1172.2. The defendant suffered from
end-stage pancreatic cancer, had just months to live, and was wheelchair
bound. (Nijmeddin, at p. 81.) The trial court denied the motion for release
based on the severity of the defendant’s criminal record, but the
compassionate release statute required the court to base its decision
concerning the dangerousness of the incarcerated person on that “person’s
current physical and mental condition”—qualifying language not included in
section 1172.1. (Id. at pp. 82‒83.)
       Whitmill reversed the trial court’s decision to deny pretrial mental
health diversion under section 1001.36 based on a finding that the defendant
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1150‒1152.) Like section 1172.1, the diversion statute
required the court to assess the risk to public safety posed by the defendant.
The crimes the defendant had been charged with involved firing a gun into
the air, but the crime was directly attributable to the defendant’s mental
illness and the defendant’s only prior convictions were theft and the sale and
use of drugs. (Id. at p. 1151.) No other facts supported the trial court’s
decision and several mitigating factors supported the opposite conclusion,
including the fact that he “peacefully compl[ied] with law enforcement’s
request that he come forward and (presumably) be arrested” and the
evaluating psychologist’s report he was a strong candidate for treatment and
rehabilitation. (Ibid.) Unlike this case, in Whitmill there was no evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding the defendant was likely to commit a
super strike offense in the future.
                                      10
ch. 721, § 1) has provided direction on how trial courts are to exercise their
discretion in deciding whether to dismiss sentencing enhancements.” (People
v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391.) Specifically, section 1385,
subdivision (c)(1) provides that at sentencing, “the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,” and
subdivision (c)(2) states that “[i]n exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence” of
nine listed “mitigating circumstances,” any one of which “weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
      The nine listed “mitigating circumstances” include factors such as
mental illness, prior victimization, childhood trauma, use of an inoperable or
unloaded firearm, the defendant’s status as a juvenile, and the use of a prior
conviction that is over five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I).) This

statute, as Van Otten recognized in the trial court,5 would be applicable if
the court had decided to recall and resentence Van Otten. Because the court
exercised its discretion to deny Van Otten’s request to recall and resentence,
the case was not reopened for a new sentence and the trial court was not
obligated to apply section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)
[the court may “recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously
been sentenced”]; Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 456, italics
omitted [“Once the sentence and commitment have validly been recalled,

5    Van Otten’s trial court brief stated, “if the court opts to resentence,
changes to the law since the original sentencing date [including section 1385]
support a reduction in sentence.” (Italics added.)
                                        11
[former] section 1170(d) authorizes the court to ‘resentence ... in the same
manner as if [the defendant] had not previously been sentenced’ ”].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

                                                           McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

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