Court Opinion

ID: 9965059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:00:49.876666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.115997
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BARBARA KINNARD,                                DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          AT-0752-20-0449-I-2

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 30, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Shaun C. Southworth and Georgia A. Lawrence , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia,
        for the appellant.

      Kathleen Pohlid , Nashville, Tennessee, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her involuntary retirement appeal for lack of jurisdiction.         For the
reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
REVERSE the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant (1) did not make

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

nonfrivolous allegations that the agency coerced her retirement based on its
decisions to deny her requested accommodation and propose her removal when it
knew or should have known that it could not sustain the action, and (2) did not
show good cause for the delay in refiling the appeal, and AFFIRM the remainder
of the initial decision. As such, we REMAND the case to the Atlanta Regional
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant was an Advanced Medical Support Assistant at the agency’s
Nashville, Tennessee office. Kinnard v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
Docket No. AT-0752-20-0449-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7.           On
September 13, 2018, the agency proposed to remove her based on charges of
inappropriate conduct, absence without leave, and failure to follow leave
requesting procedures. Id. at 7-9. The appellant retired, effective September 27,
2018, before the agency issued a decision on the proposed removal. IAF, Tab 5
at 41. She subsequently filed a formal complaint of employment discrimination
alleging reprisal for whistleblowing activity and prior equal employment
opportunity (EEO) activity, and stating that her retirement was involuntary. Id.
at 38. The agency issued a final agency decision (FAD), finding that she did not
prove retaliation for prior EEO activity or that she was constructively discharged.
IAF, Tab 1 at 10-16.
      Following the agency’s FAD, the appellant filed a Board appeal
challenging her retirement as involuntary. Id. at 3, 5. The appeal was dismissed
without prejudice because the appellant sought representation, and the
administrative judge advised her to refile her appeal by August 21, 2020. IAF,
Tab 15 at 1-2. The appellant refiled her appeal on August 22, 2020. Kinnard v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-20-0449-I-2,
Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 1. The administrative judge issued orders
informing the parties that the refiled appeal appeared to be untimely filed and that
                                                                                        3

it was unclear whether the appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction.             RAF,
Tabs 8-9. After the parties responded on the issues of jurisdiction and timeliness,
RAF, Tabs 16-18, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, RAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. He
found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her retirement was
involuntary based on the agency’s failure to grant her requested accommodation
of an ergonomic chair, the proposal removal, or union advice. ID at 6-10. In the
alternative, the administrative judge also found that the appellant’s refiled appeal
was untimely filed without good cause shown for the delay. 2 ID at 10 n.10.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has responded.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      An employee-initiated action, such as a resignation or retirement, is
presumed to be voluntary, and thus, outside the Board’s jurisdiction. Searcy v.
Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12 (2010).                     However, an
employee may establish Board jurisdiction over an involuntary resignation or

2
   Although the appellant does not challenge on review the administrative judge’s
alternative finding that the refiled appeal was untimely filed without a showing of good
cause for the delay, a dismissal without prejudice should not become a trap that would
deny the unwary pro se appellant the opportunity to have her case decided on the
merits. Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 86 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2000). The
Board will find good cause for the untimeliness when a refiled appeal is untimely by
only a few days, there is some indication of confusion by the appellant, the decision
dismissing the original appeal without prejudice set a relatively arbitrary refiling
deadline, and there was no showing that the agency would be prejudiced by the delay.
Id. At the time of refiling, the appellant was pro se. RAF, Tab 1. The delay in filing
here was just 1 day. IAF, Tab 15 at 2; RAF, Tab 1 at 1. According to the appellant’s
declaration, made under penalty of perjury, she attempted to refile the appeal on the
date identified by the administrative judge, August 21, 2020, but was “unsuccessful”
due to “technological errors” and confusion about the Board’s error messages.
RAF, Tab 17 at 11. Moreover, the deadline of 60 days to refile the appeal is arbitrary,
and there is no indication that the agency was prejudiced in any way by the 1 -day delay.
Accordingly, we find that the appellant has established good cause for the de minimis
delay in refiling her appeal, and we waive the time limit for the refiled appeal. Slate v.
U.S. Postal Service, 92 M.S.P.R. 85, ¶ 7 (2002).
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retirement by proving that she lacked a meaningful choice in the matter and the
agency’s wrongful actions deprived her of that choice. Bean v. U.S. Postal
Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 8, 11 (2013). Among the ways that an employee
can establish involuntariness is by proving that the agency obtained the action
through duress or coercion. Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12. Alternatively, an
appellant may establish that her retirement was involuntary by showing that the
agency made misleading statements upon which she reasonably relied to her
detriment.     Paige v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 9 (2007).
The touchstone of a voluntariness analysis is whether, considering the totality of
the circumstances, factors operated on the employee’s decision-making process
that deprived her of freedom of choice. Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12. If the
appellant presents a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction in this regard, 3
she is entitled to a hearing at which she must prove jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.          Carey v. Department of Health & Human
Services, 112 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 6 (2009).

The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency coerced her retirement based
on its decisions to deny her requested accommodation and propose her removal
when it knew or should have known that it could not sustain the action.
       In her declaration made under penalty of perjury, the appellant made the
following assertions: (1) she had 32 years of service with the agency; (2) she
worked approximately 20 years in the Advanced Medical Support Assistant
position or a similarly titled position; (3) she had “31 years of exceptional service
with no write ups or disciplinary actions”; (4) “the vast majority of [her]
performance appraisal[s] throughout [her] tenure [were] outstanding”; and (5) in
the last 12-18 months of her employment, she was admonished 4 and the agency
3
  A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation will generally be considered nonfrivolous
when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that is more
than conclusory, plausible on its face, and material to the legal issues in the appeal. Id.
4
  Although unclear, the appellant’s declaration made under penalty of perjury appears to
state that the admonishment occurred on or around June 2017, and it was “based on
                                                                                      5

proposed her removal, and such actions “were all a part of the intimidating and
retaliatory behavior” by the agency.       RAF, Tab 16 at 16.       Significantly, the
appellant alleged that in 2017 she was transferred to a different agency location
and was forced to work with a non-ergonomic office chair despite previously
having access to such equipment for a back-related disability from 2005.            Id.
at 17; IAF, Tab 5 at 64. After the transfer, she requested an ergonomic chair as a
reasonable accommodation.       RAF, Tab 16 at 17.       According to the appellant,
despite numerous requests for an ergonomic chair to various agency personnel,
starting in June 2017, she could “no longer take the physical pain” of working
without an ergonomic chair, and was forced to retire. Id. She also alleged that
the agency’s proposed removal was unfounded and retaliatory. Id. at 16-20. In
particular, the appellant declared under penalty of perjury that specification 1 of
charge 1 and charges 2 and 3 were “factually false,” specification 2 of charge 1
was based on her protected activity (opposing discriminatory treatment), and the
proposed removal was based on retaliation for protected activity. Id. at 18-19.
       In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the length of
time   between   the   denial   of   the   appellant’s   request   for   a   reasonable
accommodation and her subsequent retirement—approximately 1 year and
3 months—rendered the denial immaterial to the jurisdictional issue and whether
she lacked a meaningful choice regarding her retirement. ID at 6-7. Regarding
the proposed removal, the administrative judge determined that the appellant
failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that it was the agency’s wrongful actions
that deprived her of the choice to retire. ID at 8. In particular, he noted that the
appellant did not dispute that the agency had a basis for its most serious charge,
and she did not allege that the agency acted without evidence; he also interpreted
and rejected her contention that the agency relied upon evidence falsified by a
union official. Id.
unfounded allegations of [the appellant] yelling in a threatening manner.” RAF, Tab 16
at 16-17. The appellant also stated that the supervisor who admonished her harbored
“retaliatory animus” against her. Id. at 18.
                                                                                   6

      On review, the appellant argues that the agency’s denial of her request for
an accommodation of her disability coerced her retirement. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
She further asserts that the proposed removal was based on unfounded allegations
and was a “retaliatory tool” used by the agency. Id. She asserts that she retired
due to the agency’s “intimidating and hostile actions.” Id. at 7.
      The proper approach here is to view the appellant’s allegations collectively,
rather than individually. Trinkl v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 727 F. App’x
1007, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 5 By doing so, we conclude that the appellant has
made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency coerced her retirement by
engaging   in   discrimination   and    retaliation   by   denying   her   requested
accommodation, issuing her an admonishment, and proposing her removal based
on largely unfounded allegations. In Trinkl, 727 F. App’x at 1010, our reviewing
court held that, at the nonfrivolous allegation stage, the Board may not consider
the relative probative value of an appellant’s allegations over time; rather,
weighing allegations as more or less probative is appropriate only following a
jurisdictional hearing. Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge erred in
weighing the evidence and discounting the denied request for accommodation due
to its lack of temporal proximity to the appellant’s retirement. Moreover, the
Board has found that an appellant’s allegation that her retirement was involuntary
because the agency denied her request for an accommodation that would have
permitted her to continue working sufficed as a nonfrivolous allegation of the
Board’s jurisdiction. Carey, 112 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 7; see Hernandez v. U.S. Postal
Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 412, 416-18 (1997) (finding the appellant’s claim that the
agency denied his request for an orthopedic chair to accommodate his disability
was a nonfrivolous allegation that his resignation was involuntary).
      Although the fact that an employee is faced with the unpleasant choice of
retiring or opposing an adverse action does not rebut the presumption of
5
 The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit when, as here, it finds its reasoning persuasive.       LeMaster v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 11 n.5 (2016).
                                                                                     7

voluntariness, Green v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 59, ¶ 8
(2009), an appellant can establish that her retirement was involuntary by showing
that the agency knew or should have known that the threatened adverse action
could not be substantiated, Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 10. Indeed, the choice
between resigning and contesting an unfounded adverse action is not a
meaningful one because it is a choice between false alternatives. Id. We find
that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that the agency knew or should have
known that it could not substantiate the charged misconduct and it was therefore
coercive. We therefore find that through the series of events, starting with the
agency’s denial of the requested accommodation and culminating in the proposed
removal, the appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that she lacked a
meaningful choice in the decision to retire based on the agency’s wrongful
actions.   Therefore, the appellant has made nonfrivolous allegations of the
Board’s jurisdiction sufficient for a jurisdictional hearing. Accordingly, we must
remand this case for the appellant’s requested hearing.         At the hearing, the
appellant must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).

The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that her retirement was caused by the agency’s misleading
statements.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to identify any
misleading statements attributable to the agency which led to her retirement. ID
at 7-10. On review, the appellant alleges that she was incorrectly advised by her
union representative to retire, rather than oppose the proposed removal, in order
to preserve her retirement benefits. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. We are not persuaded
by this argument.    The appellant may feel that she was misled by the union
representative; however, that union representative was not a representative of the

6
  Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                           8

agency, and thus, the union representative’s misleading statements cannot be
attributed to the agency. See Green, 112 M.S.P.R. 59, ¶ 9. Thus, the appellant
has failed to nonfrivolously allege that her retirement was involuntary as a result
of the union representative’s statements. 7         See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8
(noting that it must be the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the appellant
of meaningful choice).

                                         ORDER
       For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the Atlanta
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                             ______________________________
                                           Gina K. Grippando
                                           Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

7
  In the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that the appellant alleged that the
evidence relied upon in the proposed removal was falsified by a different union official,
and he concluded that the appellant has not explained how the union official’s actions
could be imputed to the agency. ID at 8. The appellant does not appear to challenge
this finding on review, and we do not address it further.