Court Opinion

ID: 9494994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:51:56.472825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:45.208104
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the district court correctly determined that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Wagoner and that the firearm seized from Martin should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search.
Before evaluating the totality of the circumstances, I note two points regarding the majority’s characterization of the facts underlying the stop. The majority relies on four factors in reaching its decision-(l) Wagoner’s “dress and attire were typical of prostitutes; (2) she was in an area known for prostitution activity; (3) [the police officers] recognized her as a woman *401who had been convicted of prostitution crimes in the past; and (4) she waved in a manner that [the police officers] identified as being characteristic of a prostitute’s means of soliciting customers.” Maj. Op. at 399. Initially, I note that there is no indication in the district court’s factual findings or in the arresting officers’ suppression hearing testimony that Wagoner’s “dress” was “typical of prostitutes.” The district court simply noted that Wagoner was wearing jeans and a short-sleeved t-shirt on a cool night. District Court Op. at 1. While the government characterizes jeans and a short-sleeved t-shirt as “scantily clothed,” there is no record evidence supporting the government’s assertion or otherwise indicating such an outfit was more typical of a prostitute than any other Covington resident.1
The majority opinion also airbrushes the police officers’ knowledge regarding Wagoner’s prior purported prostitution activity. It asserts “the officers recognized [Wagoner] as a woman who been convicted of prostitution crimes in the past.” Maj. Op. at 399. But the district court’s findings reflected that the officers “believed that Wagoner had been arrested on prostitution charges in the past.” District Ct. Op. at 1. Moreover, the officers’ suppression hearing testimony reveals that one of the officers based his belief on department photographs and that the other officer could not specify the source of his belief. J.A. 42, 68.
In United States v. Byrd, No. 94-5301, 1995 WL 72299 (6th Cir. Feb.21,1995), our only prior opinion addressing reasonable suspicion in the prostitution context, we held that the police could constitutionally stop a woman on suspicion of prostitution. The officers observed the suspect, a known prostitute whom they had told earlier to get off the streets, lean into the passenger window of a car stopped in the middle of the street at 3:30 a.m. Id. at *3.
Our state court counterparts, who ordinarily handle prostitution cases, have relied on similar combinations of particularized facts in approving investigatory stops. In State v. Goldstein, for example, the court ruled that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop a car where (1) the police observed the car driving aimlessly (2) the car stopped and the driver engaged in a brief conversation with a known prostitute; (3) the known prostitute stepped into the car; (4) the car made a series of furtive movements when it spotted the police officers. State v. Goldstein, No. 12130, 1991 WL 1674, at *1 (Ohio App. 2 Dist., Jan.11, 1991); see also City of Cleveland v. Harmon, No. 91-TRC-54308A-C, 1993 WL 489752, at *2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., Nov.24, 1993) (relying on time of day [3:19 a.m.], the reputation of the area, the gender of the vehicle’s occupants [male and female] and the fact that the vehicle was illegally parked).
Considering the totality of the circumstances in light of Byrd and its state court analogs, I do not believe that the police officers had the particularized, reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. While I credit the officers’ experience and expertise, I do not believe that their interpretation of the wave, combined with the nature of the neighborhood, their belief about Wagoner’s prior arrest and Wagoner’s failure to cany a purse, justified their stop of Wagoner. The underlying facts simply leave too much to speculation about whether Wagoner was engaged in loitering for prostitution purposes in this particular instance. *402Perhaps if the police officers had continued to observe Wagoner, they might have witnessed additional factors that would have supplied the necessary suspicion, but under the present circumstances, I do not believe the police officers could permissibly stop Wagoner. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s decision.2

. Because I do not believe the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Wagoner, I would not reach the probable cause issue addressed by the majority opinion.