Court Opinion

ID: 9774314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:15:11.52778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:05.789305
License: Public Domain

HYDE, Judge
(concurring).
I fully concur in the opinion of EAGER, J., herein and consider the views expressed in his opinion to be supported by the history of Sec. 82.090 on which appellant relies. The enactment out of which this section came (Laws 1887, pp. 42, 49) was Sec. 41 of the act of March 10, 1887, applying to cities *289authorized to frame their own charters (then applying only to cities of more than 100,000, Sec. 16, Art. 9, 1875 Const.) and authorized extension of limits by ordinance. This became Sec. 1880, RS 1889, but was broadened then to include certain special charter cities, the first sentence then reading as follows: “Any such city, or any other city of ten thousand inhabitants or less and having a special charter, after the taking effect of such charter, may at any time or times extend its limits by ordinance, specifying with accuracy the new line or lines to which it is proposed to extend such limits.” (Italicized words were added.)
However, this statute was amended in 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 54) by adding at the end of the section the following proviso: “Provided, that if the city, the limits of which are to be extended, is organized under section 16 of article 9 of the constitution of this state, then the ordinance extending the limits shall, in all cases where the corporate limits are defined in the charter of such city, be in the form of a proposed amendment to the charter of such city, and before the same shall be of any force or effect, it shall be submitted to and accepted by three-fifths of the qualified voters of such city voting at a general or special election, in all respects and in compliance with all the requirements provided for amendments to the charter of such city.” Why was it so amended? Undoubtedly because this court in 1890 in City of Westport v. City of Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141, 151, 15 S.W. 68, 70, held: “[S]ection 41 of the act of the legislature of March 10, 1887, is void, in so far as it attempts to give cities adopting charters for their own government the power to extend their corporate limits without submitting the proposition to the voters of such cities.”
Surely the effect of this 1895 amendment was to leave this statute as only authorizing a city of ten thousand or less, having a special charter, to extend its boundaries by ordinance; and to repeal the authorization, which this court had declared void, for cities organized under Sec. 16 of Art. 9 of the Constitution to extend their boundaries by ordinance. This statute containing the 1895 proviso in exactly the same form appears in the following subsequent revisions, 1899, Sec. 6399; 1909, Sec. 9743; 1919, Sec. 8894; 1929, Sec. 7483; 1939, Sec. 7626; and during all that period there was no constitutional charter city except Kansas City. However, in the 1949 revision, the words “[pjrovided, that if the city, the limits of which are to be extended, is organized under section 16 of article IX of the Constitution of this state, then the ordinance extending the limits shall” were omitted. Thereafter, in the 1949 and 1959 revisions, this former proviso appears as a complete separate sentence beginning: “In all cases where the corporate limits are defined in the charter of such city, the ordinance extending the limits shall be in the form of a proposed amendment [etc.].” (The italicized words being moved from the place they previously were in the proviso and all reference to any constitutional provision omitted.) Also in the 1949 revision, the words “or any other city of ten thousand inhabitants or less, and having a special charter,” in the first sentence of the section, were omitted. Thus special charter cities were eliminated and this statute seemed intended to again apply to constitutional charter cities as it was originally enacted in 1887. If, as this court held in the City of Westport case, the Legislature could not authorize a city framing its charter, under authority of Sec. 16, Art. 9, of the Constitution, to extend its limits by ordinance, this could not be done by the Legislature in 1949 and certainly not in a mere revision of the statutes (for authority of revisors see Laws 1949, p. 545, especially Sec. 3.06, p. 547) the present constitutional provisions (Secs. 19-20, Art. VI, 1945 Const.) being substantially the same in this respect. In 1959, by Senate Bill 75, this section was repealed and reenacted in its present form, the principal change being the elimination of the requirement of a three-fifths vote and substituting a majority vote for annexation, no doubt because of our decision in 1950 in State ex *290inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762.
Although the Legislature cannot change the method by which the charter of a constitutional charter city may be amended, because the Constitution provides the only way it may be done, I recognize that the Legislature may provide the scope of annexation that could be accomplished by an amendment and add requirements therefor as it did in Sec. 82.090 for annexing other cities, towns or villages; and has since done by Secs. 71.860-71.920, Laws 1963, p. 126 as to certain first class counties. However, if there is no law imposing any restrictions on annexation of unincorporated territory, it is my view that a constitutional charter city may do what other cities may do by annexation because it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this state to do so. (See discussion of this authority in McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, Mo.Sup., 367 S.W.2d 498, 500-503.) The provisions of Secs. 19-20, Art. VI, 1945 Constitution, grant to cities, organized under it, a part of the legislative power of the state. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195, 202; see also Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943, in which this court held to be without merit the contention that a constitutional charter city could not have the power of eminent domain without an enabling act of the legislature. This constitutional grant of legislative power to such cities by the Constitution is the reason why such cities may annex unincorporated territory by charter amendment.
The view expressed-in the dissenting opinion herein that constitutional charter cities cannot annex any territory without an enabling act of the legislature would amount to striking out of Sec. 19, Art. VI, the words “consistent with and subject to the * * * laws of the state” and substituting therefor the words “specifically authorized by the laws of this state.” The main purpose of providing for constitutional charter cities was to make it unnecessary for the larger cities to go to the legislature for laws to authorize every act their interests seemed to require. If this constitutional provision is to be so narrowly construed as to prevent enactments for local needs which are not in conflict with any state laws, then constitutional charter cities could have no real purpose and might as well be abolished. Of course, constitutional charter cities would not be authorized to so annex other cities already organized under authority of the legislature (which would be inconsistent with laws of this state); and that is why it was necessary for the legislature to provide a method by which this could be done, which it did by enacting Sec. 82.090. Legislative authority is required to authorize any annexation by cities organized under general statutes and these statutes have the effect of charter provisions for cities so organized. However, the Constitution, by granting legislative power to constitutional charter cities, makes a charter amendment the proper method of annexation. This must be true because, as the principal opinion shows, defining corporate limits in its charter in some manner is an essential part of a valid charter. Therefore, a change in corporate limits must be a charter amendment.
I also agree with the suggestion expressed in the principal opinion that the council of a charter city intending to proceed with annexation by ordinance on its own initiative could first adopt a resolution of intent and obtain a declaratory judgment under the Sawyers Act (Sec. 71.015) procedure and thus obtain a determination of reasonableness and necessity before adopting a charter amendment ordinance for annexation, which would prevent litigation on that issue after the charter amendment election. However, such a course would be completely optional. In fact, there is nothing in the Sawyers Act that requires such a resolution for any city. All the Act says is: “Whenever the governing body of any city has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land, such city shall, before proceeding as otherwise authorized by law or charter for annexation of unincorporated areas, file an *291action in the circuit court of the county in which such unincorporated area is situated, under the provisions of Chapter 527 RSMo 1949, praying for a declaratory judgment authorizing such annexation.” (Emphasis mine.)
“A resolution is ordinarily ministerial in character and relates to the administrative business of the municipality, whereas an ordinance is distinctively a legislative act.” 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 52 Sec. 15.02. Nowhere in Sec. 71.015 is there any requirement that there be a resolution to begin annexation proceedings and there is no reason why there must be a resolution in the annexation process. There can be no doubt that annexation is the exercise of legislative power so that an ordinance which is a legislative act is required. Thus only if the term “resolution” is construed to include “ordinance,” as suggested in the McConnell case (282 S.W.2d 518), would the provisions of Sec. 71.015 be mandatory as to any city. This is true because a city can annex without a resolution but cannot annex without an ordinance. Literally, by its terms, Sec. 71.015 only requires a declaratory judgment “whenever” a resolution has been adopted and it does not anywhere require the adoption of a resolution. In any event, Sec. 71.015 cannot be construed as a mandatory requirement for annexation by a charter city as the principal opinion so clearly shows. Therefore, I concur in the judgment ordered to be entered.