Court Opinion

ID: 9452656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:48:02.038264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:18.616947
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR FURTHER REHEARING
The appellant calls attention that in addition to the grounds of objection1 to the instruction2 made following the charge, a further ground had been assigned earlier in a conference on proposed charges,3 which should be considered.4
We agree, but hold that the instruction was not objectionable upon that ground. In our original opinion we quoted the provisions of the policies which preclude coverage after the insured or an officer of the insured not in collusion with the employee discovers or has knowledge or information “that such Employee has committed any fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether such act be committed before or after the date of the employment by the Insured,” or again, “of any fraudulent or dishonest act on the part of such Employee.” (Emphasis added.) Those provisions are much broader than somewhat similar provisions which have been construed to limit the exclusion to fraudulent or dishonest acts which would give rise to a claim under the policy.5 The exclusion of coverage after knowledge that the employee has committed any fraudulent or dishonest act is a reasonable and valid provision.6 The present policies clearly and unambiguously so provide. The petition for further rehearing is
Denied.

. Such grounds of objection are quoted in footnote 1 to our opinion on rehearing.

. The instruction is quoted in our original ppinion.

. “MR. DITMAR [Plaintiff’s counsel]:
“If I may add to that, the cases establish that the only sort of fraudulent and dishonest acts, knowledge or information of which can terminate the coverage of the policy, is a fraudulent or dishonest act that would itself have given rise to a claim under the policy. That is why this Anchor Hocking thing is irrelevant, we believe.”

. Under our holding in Williams v. Hen-nessey, 5th Cir. 1964, 328 F.2d 490, 491.

. For example, see provisions referred to in Bank of Erie Trust Co. v. Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp., 1936, 322 Pa. 132, 185 A. 224, 225, 104 A.L.R. 1170; Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 1932, 174 La. 1014, 142 So. 156, 157; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. People’s Bank, 4th Cir. 1934, 72 F.2d 932, 936-937; 45 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 666, 801, pp. 604, 849.

. J. S. Fraering, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 5th Cir. 1957, 242 F.2d 609.