Court Opinion

ID: 9672555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:57:04.254983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.124435
License: Public Domain

Hendry, C.J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it addresses Neb. Const. art. III, § 18.
Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, prohibits the Legislature from passing local or special laws that grant “to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatever.”
We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean:
When the Legislature confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in question has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by the Nebraska Constitution. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991). A legislative act can violate article III, § 18, in one of two ways: by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or by creating a permanently closed class.
Swanson v. State, 249 Neb. 466, 479, 544 N.W.2d 333, 341-42 (1996).
Further, in Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 773, 123 N.W.2d 844, 849 (1963), we said, “The very purpose of Article III, section 18, of the Constitution, is to prevent legislative action which *862grants benefits or immunities to persons or property within the general class that is made the subject of legislation.”
In this appeal, Haven asserts that the medical lien statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 52-401 (Reissue 1998), is unconstitutional special legislation. In analyzing a special legislation claim, we must determine (1) the privilege created by the statute, (2) the particular class which is singled out to receive the privilege, (3) the persons within the general class that is made the subject of the legislation who stand in the same relation to the privilege as the particular class, and finally (4) whether the statute violates Neb. Const, art. III, § 18, either because the particular class which receives the privilege is a permanently closed class, or because the particular class has no reasonable distinction or substantial difference from the general class. See, Swanson, supra', Stanton, supra.
The privilege granted by § 52-401 is the lien which attaches against any recovery obtained by the injured person. This lien is a special privilege which exists by operation of the statute. The particular class privileged by the legislative grant is composed of physicians, nurses, and hospitals. The general class of persons “standing in the same relation to the privileges,” Swanson, 249 Neb. at 479, 544 N.W.2d at 341, would be all professional service providers who likewise perform services of any nature in the treatment of, or in connection with, an injury. § 52-401.
Haven instead argues that the act creates two classes consisting of those injured by tort-feasors and those not injured by tortfeasors. Neither of these two purported classes, however, is granted the privilege of the lien which the statute creates. Notwithstanding, Haven contends there is in effect a privilege granted to people not injured by tort-feasors. The privilege for people in this “class” is that there is no lien which attaches due to the rendering of professional services to that person.
What Haven is asserting is the act, in its application, discriminates against people such as Haven, who are injured by tortfeasors, in the form of a lien. This, in my view, is an equal protection claim and does not address the issue of whether § 52-401 has conferred an unconstitutional privilege upon physicians, nurses, and hospitals.
*863The majority opinion, and Justice McCormack’s dissent, analyze the classification of physicians, nurses, and hospitals in great detail. However, I respectfully suggest that such analyses are unnecessary at this time because Haven lacks standing to assert that the classification of physicians, nurses, and hospitals created by § 52-401 is unconstitutional as special legislation under Neb. Const. art. III, § 18.
To establish standing to bring a special legislation claim, the plaintiff must show that the statute is depriving him or her of a constitutionally protected right. State v. Cushman, 256 Neb. 335, 589 N.W.2d 533 (1999); Kalisek v. Abramson, 257 Neb. 517, 599 N.W.2d 834 (1999); Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Twin Platte NRD, 250 Neb. 442, 550 N.W.2d 907 (1996); State ex rel. Dept. of Health v. Jeffrey, 247 Neb. 100, 525 N.W.2d 193 (1994). In order to establish standing, Haven must show that his constitutional rights are being violated because the privilege granted under § 52-401 to physicians, nurses, and hospitals is being arbitrarily denied to him. This Haven cannot do.
As Justice Shanahan stated in his concurrence in School Dist. No. 46 v. City of Bellevue, 224 Neb. 543, 556, 400 N.W.2d 229, 238 (1987):
Ordinarily, a challenge to constitutionality of a statute on the ground that the assailed statute denies equal rights and privileges by discriminating between persons or classes may not be made by one not belonging to the class alleged to be discriminated against. See Griffin v. Gass, 133 Neb. 56, 274 N.W. 193 (1937). See, also, Ritums v. Howell, 190 Neb. 503, 209 N.W.2d 160 (1973) (one who is not harmfully affected by a particular feature of a statute, alleged to be unconstitutional, may not urge the unconstitutionality of the statute in question).
In my view, the only persons who would have standing to assert that § 52-401 is unconstitutional special legislation are the general class of persons who stand “in the same relation to the privilege” as the particular class. Under § 52-401, the general class would include those persons who are not physicians, nurses, or hospitals, but nevertheless “perform professional services or services of any nature, in the treatment of or in connection with an injury.” Only members of this general class would *864have standing to claim that their constitutional rights are being violated because the privilege of a lien is given to physicians, nurses, and hospitals, but denied to them.
Accordingly, because I believe Haven lacks standing, I would withhold any opinion regarding whether § 52-401 violates Neb. Const. art III, § 18.