Court Opinion

ID: 9710507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:57.297348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.254710
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In affirming the trial court’s granting of the motion for preliminary injunction, the majority concludes that Dr. Cole violated the Debt Collection Regulations, specifically 37 Pa.Code §§ 303.3(3) and (18), by filing complaints against former patients in common pleas court.1 The violation of these regulations is based solely on Dr. Cole’s alleged *998prosecution of eight actions barred by the four-year statute of limitations for contract actions. Dr. Cole commenced the legal proceedings in an attempt to collect bills which the trial court found to be meritorious. Trial court opinion at 11. I am perplexed as to how the filing of a lawsuit for recovery of legitimate debts beyond the statute of limitations can be construed as being either a false representation of the extent, amount, or status of a debt in a legal proceeding or the use of deceptive means in attempting to collect a debt. Moreover, this conclusion is particularly disturbing because there is no evidence in the record to support it.
In a strange twist of irony, the Attorney General did not include the eight allegedly deceptive complaints in its motion for preliminary injunction or any other documents of record. Instead, the Attorney General submitted “representative copies” of civil complaints filed by Dr. Cole in other cases. I am not sure how we can affirm the granting of the motion for preliminary injunction when the documents, which are a supposed violation of the Debt Collection Regulations, are not available for review by this court.
Next, I turn my attention to the actions of the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s power to file a motion for preliminary injunction is granted in section 4 of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Specifically, section 4 permits the Attorney General to bring an action to restrain activity deemed to be unlawful under the Debt Collection Regulations when such proceedings would be in the public interest.
I am not convinced that this statute gives the Attorney General standing to file a motion for preliminary injunction on behalf of eight individuals involved in a private cause of action.2 What legally protectible and tangible public interest is at stake for the Attorney General in this case? Second, how is the Attorney General acting in the public interest by filing a motion for preliminary injunction on behalf of eight individuals who legitimately owe Dr. Cole for services rendered? If anything, the Attorney General’s action is antithetical to the public interest and is certainly not what the legislature intended when it enacted the statute.
In addition, the defendants in Dr. Cole’s actions have available to them an adequate remedy at law: the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Rule 1030 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states that all affirmative defenses including statute of limitations shall be pleaded in new matter. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1030. The purpose of this rule is to compel a plaintiff to answer a defendant’s affirmative defenses diming the pleading stage to avoid an unnecessary trial. See Ruhe v. Kroger Company, 425 Pa. 213, 228 A.2d 750 (1967). Apparently, this procedural device is not sufficient enough for the Attorney General, who decided to stop a legitimate cause of action before it began.
The Attorney General’s actions are further undermined by the existence of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1032. Rule 1032 provides that a party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by preliminary objection or reply.3 By deciding which debt collection actions Dr. Cole can bring, the Attorney General is interfering with the defendants’ right to waive the statute of limitations defense and pay Dr. Cole for services rendered.
Additionally, the Attorney General’s expression of authority in this ease is in direct contradiction to Article 1, Section 11, of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. Article 1, Section 11, provides in relevant part:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, *999person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
It is the constitutional right of every person who finds it necessary or desirable to repair to the courts for the protection of legally cognizable interests to have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244 (1943). Article I, Section 11 can only be invoked with respect to a legal injury. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919), aff'd, 260 U.S. 22, 43 S.Ct. 9, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922).
Here, Dr. Cole has a legally cognizable interest in the recovery of debts legitimately owed to him. The Attorney General, by denying the prosecution of these actions, has clearly interfered with a right guaranteed to Dr. Cole by the Constitution of this Commonwealth.
Accordingly, I must voice my earnest dissent against the affirmation of actions taken by the Attorney General, which are incongruous with my basic understanding of our time-tested tripartite governmental system. The Attorney General is not the gatekeeper of debt collection actions. I would reverse the order of the trial court and allow Dr. Cole the opportunity to prosecute the actions against the eight people who owe Dr. Cole for “meritorious” bills.

. The complaints assert a cause of action based on the common law theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

. Assuming the Attorney General does have standing to file a motion for preliminary injunction in this case, I also have to ask how the Attorney General can intervene on behalf of eight individuals involved in a pending private action without filing a petition to intervene in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. lío. 2327.
Rule 2327 provides that
At any time during the pendency of an action, a person not a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene therein, subject to these rules if ... (4) the determination of such action may affect any legally enforceable interest of such person whether or not he may be bound by a judgment in the action.

. Pa. R.C.P. 1032 does set forth exceptions to the rule, but they are not applicable to this case.