Court Opinion

ID: 9559409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:28:46.817543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:53.874029
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
The Superior Court of Oklahoma County is not allowed to continue in operation because the majority concludes that part (b)* of Sec. 161 must be “restricted” in its scope hy the county population classification prescribed in part (I). My disagreement with the course which the Court has taken in the present case is based on two considerations —First, it is my view that the use of interpretative devices to construe Sec. 161 is unwarranted by the remote and purely .anticipatory nature of the “Incongruity” which the Court finds in the statutory language and which it seeks to avoid; Second, the restriction placed upon plain and unambiguous statutory language is based on most obscure and unconvincing extrinsic aids.
If, for the sake of argument, I should be willing to assume, only as a matter of mere speculative possibility, that literal interpretation of the word “every” in part (b) might cause the two alternative county categories to overlap some day in the future, I view such remote, hypothetical eventuality (of having “double courts” in one county) as being without a legally valid basis for presently declaring the statute “incongruous.” This view seems especially cogent here, because Oklahoma County will never qualify for more than one superior court since it cannot possibly fall within any class other than that created in part (b). My independent research has led me to no legal precedent which authorizes a court, in considering a statute, to assume a remote hypothetical “incongruity” as a basis for finding the language uncertain as to its meaning and for employment of extrinsic aids in order to change what clearly appears to be plain and unambiguous wording.
Neither am I convinced that the Legislature intended by this enactment that in no future case should one county be allowed to fall within both of the alternative and independent classes created by Sec. 161. If such intent should be apparent and the statute contemplates but one superior, court in any single county, the sweeping restriction of part (b) need not be imposed. The word “every” could still be construed here to mean what it says and the “incongruity” avoided when a proper case for its consideration is presented. The Oklahoma County case, I reiterate, does not and cannot produce the inconsistency which the Court seeks to avoid. As applied to Oklahoma County, the incongruous consequence is apparent only by assumption of a future hypothetical attempt at an extension of Sec. *270161 to allow establishment of “double” courts in one county.
It is, therefore, my view that in so far as Oklahoma County is affected, there exists no incongruity, present or future, and the statute must be taken as plain and unambiguous.
From our past decisions I find these quotations applicable:
In re Martin’s Estate, 183 Okl. 177, 80 P.2d 561, 563, 564:
“If we are to examine into the history of the legislation and contemporaneous circumstances, we are compelled to admit that the act is ambiguous. * * * If such statutes are clear and unmistakable in the language employed therein, they must generally be accorded their literal meaning. Whether the results accord with right, and justice, and logic, in the eyes of the court, is a question of no judicial concern.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“In view of the fact that there is nothing contained in the present act that would cast a cloud upon the intent of Congress therein expressed, we will not go outside the same for information in aid of its interpretation. * * * ”
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Okl. 240, 192 P.2d 668:
“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.
“The rule that statutes should be construed so as to avoid absurd consequences applies only where the statute is subject to interpretation, not where the legislative intent is clearly expressed.”
Whittier v. Murrell, Okl., 362 P.2d 694, 696:
“ * * * • It is not this Court’s prerogative to distort plain language in order that a more plausible or workable result might be obtained.”
To me, there is no cogent indication in the history of Sec. 161 that part (b) was intended to be restricted by the county population class of part (I). In this respect, any view is at most a matter of pure conjecture — since the extrinsic aids are largely obscure. If I had been convinced that a present “incongruity” does exist and judicial interpretation would be in order, I might have concluded, with equal force of logic and support, that in part (b) the Legislature intended to authorize the establishment of a superior court in every comity of the state, with the urban characteristics specified therein, where the county seat city was second in importance and size to some other municipal community in the county. In other words, I would construe part (b) to mean “and in every (other) county having a city other (and larger) than the county seat city * * * This construction clearly demonstrates that there is no indication of legislative intent to place part (b) in the county population class of part (I).
Since I am of the opinion that there exists no incongruity in so far as Oklahoma County is affected by Sec. 161, and since there is no persuasive proof outside of the language of the statute that the Legislature intended to restrict part (b) by the provisions of part (I), I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision as to Oklahoma County. I concur with the majority in the present disposition as to Kay County because, in my view, Sec. 182 does operate to prospectively inhibit the establishment of superior courts in all counties of the State having a population of less than 52,000 people.
I am authorized to state that WILLIAMS, J., concurs with me in this dissenting opinion.
Rehearing denied.
WILLIAMS and BERRY, JJ., dissent.

(* The marks (b) and (I) are used in the same manner and identify the same portions of Sec. 161 as in the majority opinion.)