Court Opinion

ID: 9895807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 18:04:14.98426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:38.293806
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 P. v. Cordero CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085025
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                          (Fresno Super. Ct. No. F21904232)
                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
 EDDIE LEON CORDERO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Arlan L.
Harrell, Judge.
         Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, and Sally
Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Defendant shot and killed two people, and wounded a third, after an argument at a
bar. The jury convicted him of assault with a firearm and two counts of murder, while
finding true two multiple-murder special circumstances attached to the two murder
counts. Defendant contends the court committed prejudicial instructional error and that
his second multiple-murder special circumstance must be stricken.
       We conclude the court gave an erroneous but harmless instruction overly
restricting the jury’s consideration of voluntary intoxication evidence. We also accept
the Attorney General’s concession that, under current Supreme Court precedent, the
second multiple-murder special circumstance must be stricken. We affirm the judgment
as modified.
                                    BACKGROUND
       In an information filed November 15, 2021, the Fresno County District Attorney
charged defendant Eddie Leon Cordero with two counts of murder (counts 1-2; Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and assault with a firearm (count 3; § 245, subd. (a)(2).) As to
counts 1 and 2, the information alleged a multiple-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(3)) and a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As to
count 3, the information alleged a great bodily injury enhancement. (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a).)
       A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder on counts 1 and 2, and assault
with a deadly weapon on count 3, and found true all enhancements/special circumstances.
The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of
parole on counts 1 and 2, plus two 25-year-to-life terms for the firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subd. (g)) to those counts. On count 3, the court imposed a prison term of
three years, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a).)

       1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                             2.
                                         FACTS
       On May 21, 2021, Angel Mejia, Santiago Garcia and Carlos Hernandez met up
with defendant in Old Town Clovis at around 9:00 p.m. The group had drinks at a bar
called The Palace. They drank, danced, and generally “had a good time.”
       At some point, a man in a jacket approached Mejia and they exchanged names.
From there, “things started … escalating,” though Mejia did not know “necessarily what
started it.” A few seconds later, a person with long hair and a polo shirt approached and
told defendant, “This ain’t Hollywood.” Defendant became angry, raised his voice, and
engaged in a verbal altercation. In Mejia’s opinion, defendant did not seem intoxicated,
and nothing about his demeanor suggested he was feeling the effects of alcohol.
       Mejia tried to deescalate the situation, but things only became more heated. The
person in the jacket also tried to calm the person in the polo shirt. Within a few minutes
defendant began pounding his fist several times. The person in the jacket told Mejia,
“Get your boy.” Eventually, Mejia told Garcia that defendant was getting hotheaded.
Mejia and Garcia decided to “call it a night.”
       Mejia, Garcia, and defendant left at around 12:30 a.m. and walked to Mejia’s
vehicle in front of a restaurant next door. Defendant was acting aggressively and
sounded mad. Mejia drove, defendant sat behind him, Garcia was in the front passenger
seat and Hernandez was in the rear passenger seat. Mejia drove about 15 minutes to drop
off defendant at home. During the drive, defendant “kept mouthing off.” Mejia heard a
“clicking noise” coming from the backseat where defendant was seated. At trial, Mejia
said he was not sure what the noise was, and that it could have been a seat belt or
“anything.” At the preliminary hearing, however, Mejia testified that it sounded like
defendant had cocked a gun.
       Meanwhile, Robert R. was working as a disc jockey (D.J.) for The Palace that
night. Robert announced “last call” at around 1:40 a.m. He then said goodbye to the
crowd and packed up his D.J. equipment. At around 2:00 a.m., Robert heard three

                                             3.
gunshots and took cover. He eventually heard a total of 12 to 13 gunshots. Robert felt
pain and observed that he had been shot in the leg. Robert was transported to Clovis
Community Hospital and underwent surgery.
       The shooting was captured on surveillance cameras from multiple angles. The
footage shows Andres Sanchez and Merehildo Luna fall to the floor. Luna died at the
scene, and Sanchez was pronounced deceased at a hospital. They both died from gunshot
wounds.
       Law enforcement determined defendant was the shooter captured on camera and
contacted him in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendant had a handgun in his possession, but it
was not the one used in the subject shooting.
       Law enforcement officers interrogated defendant. Defendant initially claimed he
did not remember anything from the night in question and was “drunk as f[**]k.”
Defendant said he had begun drinking at “[m]aybe about like five or six,” but “it wasn’t
like, like a lot, a lot .…” Defendant said he did not go to the bar to start problems, “but it
seems like that’s what happened sometimes … guys … had to get up in my face and
instead of lookin’ at girls they wanna look at you.” One of the people at the bar said
something like “let’s go to the back.” Defendant did not know what he meant.
       Defendant claimed he did not remember anything after he and his group left the
bar. He suggested he did not remember because he was doing drugs or alcohol.
       Defendant cut his hair and travelled to Arizona because he was scared, knowing he
had done something wrong. Defendant later said, “I made a mistake.” When asked if he
meant to kill defendant replied, “Not two people.” Defendant said, “I don’t really
remember what, what I wanted to do, but I know I didn’t want to kill no – like a bunch of
people, like shot and … hit a bunch of people.”
       Detectives asked if defendant’s intended target was the “skinny” guy with long
hair, to which defendant answered, “I don’t know to be honest. I think so.”

                                              4.
       At one point, when defendant said he did not remember how many shots he took,
he made a shooting motion with his hand. Additionally, just before defendant was shown
the video of him walking into the bar, he stood up and made a “shooting” gesture.
Jail Call
       Defendant called his sister from jail on November 9, 2021. A recording of the call
was played for the jury. In the call, defendant said, “Angel hella snitched on me.”2
Defendant later claimed Mejia was lying. Defendant said Mejia “better hope I never get
out [of] this mother[**]ker or something. [He] better move out of Fresno or something.
Because I’m going to be right back in this motherf[**]ker with the same shit … if I ever
see that motherf[**]ker again, bro.”
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Voluntary Intoxication Instruction was Erroneous, but Harmless
       Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury regarding intoxication
evidence.
       Law
       “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or
not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with
murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice
aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).)
       Additional Background
       Here, the defendant was charged with murder and the court instructed the jury as
follows:

       2 Context strongly indicates defendant’s reference to Angel was to Angel Mejia,
so we will refer to this individual as “Mejia” going forward.

                                            5.
             “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary
      intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in
      deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill.[3]

               “A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated
      by willingly using an intoxicating drug, drink or other substance knowing
      that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk
      of that effect.

             “You may not consider evidence of the defendant’s voluntary
      intoxication for any other purpose.” (Italics added.)
      In addition to CALCRIM No. 625, the court also instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 626 as follows:

             “Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to be unconscious of his
      or her actions. A very intoxicated person may still be capable of physical
      movement but may not be aware of his or her actions or the nature of those
      actions.

             “A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated
      by using any intoxicating drug, drink or other substance – a person is
      voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using
      any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could
      produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.

             “When a person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the
      point of unconsciousness, the person assumes the risk that while
      unconscious he or she will commit acts inherently dangerous to human life.

      3 CALCRIM No. 625, on which these instructions were based, has bracketed
language, which the court excluded here:
             “You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the
      defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the defendant acted with
      deliberation and premeditation[,]] [[or] the defendant was unconscious
      when (he/she) acted[,]] [or the defendant <insert other specific intent
      required in a homicide charge or other charged offense>.]” (Italics added.)
        The bench notes to this instruction state, “If the defendant is charged with a
homicide crime that has as an element an additional specific intent requirement other than
intent to kill, include the required intent in the last bracketed portion of the second
sentence.” Here, defendant was charged with premeditated murder. For the reasons
explained herein, the court should have given the bracketed, italicized language here.

                                            6.
      If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was unconscious
      due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter.

            “Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if you find beyond a
      reasonable doubt that:

             “One, the defendant killed without legal justification or excuse;

             “Two, the defendant did not act with the intent to kill;

           “Three, the defendant did not act with a conscious disregard for
      human life;

             “And four, as a result of voluntary intoxication the defendant was
      not conscious of his actions or the nature of those actions.

              “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
      that the defendant was not unconscious. If the People have not met this
      burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder or manslaughter.”
      In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that because of the surveillance video
and confession, the issue for the jury was not whether defendant committed the killings
but rather: “[W]hat was his mental state.”
      Later, the prosecutor made the following argument:

              “Now, you’re going to hear some argument about whether the
      defendant knew what he was doing, whether he was unconscious at the
      time. And I want you to go back and I want you to watch this video and I
      want you to tell me if it looks like [defendant] doesn’t know what he’s
      doing. He absolutely knows what he’s doing. And so while he is shooting
      the gun, he not only shoots Mr. Luna four times – and again if somebody is
      so intoxicated, are they going to be able to shoot an individual … their
      intended target four times, as well as the other individual that was nearby
      five times, if they’re so intoxicated? No. Absolutely not.”
      Later still, the prosecutor argued:

      “There is also the verdict form for the lesser [included offense] of second
      degree. And then if you cannot all agree as to first or second, that’s when
      you would only go to involuntary manslaughter. And that is only if you
      believe that the defendant was not able to form the intent to kill. And I’m
      not sure what evidence, if any, there is of that. Except for the defendant’s
      own self-serving statement that he was, quote, unquote, ‘hella drunk.’

                                             7.
Okay. But we have no other evidence to show that he didn’t know exactly
what he was doing.”
Defense counsel argued:

       “We’re also going to talk a little bit about the law of intoxication.
And these both come out of the instructions that the judge read to you. You
can consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication
only in a limited way. You can consider that evidence only in deciding
whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill. In other words, did his
intoxication affect his ability to form the mental state necessary for first
degree murder, that intent to kill. Okay? Voluntary intoxication may cause
a person to be unconscious of his or her actions. A very intoxicated person
may still be capable of physical movement but they may not be aware of his
or her actions or the nature of those actions.

        “So Ms. Smith [prosecutor] is telling you, oh, it doesn’t look like
Eddie [defendant] is stumbling around in the bar, it doesn’t look like he is
falling, tripping over himself when he is running back to the car.
Unconsciousness has nothing to do with physical coordination. It has to do
with whether your brain is functioning normally or whether your brain has
been sort of shut off, that your higher reasoning has been cut off from your
ability of your brain to operate your body.

       “It’s all about the mental state. Which is what I told you at the very
beginning of my opening statement. Taking into account his consumption
of alcohol and possibly drugs. Has Ms. Smith proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Eddie had malice aforethought? Has she proven that he killed
with deliberation and premeditation? Has she proven that he was not
unconscious at the time of this act and that his intoxication did not prevent
him from forming that intent to kill? That burden is on Ms. Smith. So she
briefly stated in her opening, well, if you don’t believe Mr. Richter’s
contention that Eddie was unconscious – you don’t have to believe that
Eddie was unconscious. You have to believe that he was not unconscious
beyond a reasonable doubt. I don’t have a burden here. And I’m going to
come back to that.

        “What has Ms. Smith proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt was
going through Eddie’s mind at the time when he walked into The Palace at
2 o’clock in the morning or 2:05 abouts as we saw on the video. The
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first
degree murder, and then, again, assuming you still believe there’s malice,

                                      8.
       that the murder is second degree. And, again, the burden is on Ms. Smith
       to prove to you that Eddie had the necessary mental state. It is not my
       burden to prove to you that he did not have it.

              “So did Eddie intend to kill when he walked up to the bar at 2:05, in
       which case this would be first degree murder, or did he just intend to shoot
       the place up and he wasn’t really thinking about what the consequence of
       shooting the place up might be? In which case it might be second degree
       murder. Or was he even conscious of his actions at all? In which case
       we’re looking at a case of voluntary manslaughter.”
       Analysis
       The instructional error here is plain. Because defendant was charged with murder,
the evidence of voluntary intoxication was admissible on the following issues: “whether
or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or … whether the
defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (§ 29.4,
subd. (b).) However, the instructions told the jury the evidence was “admissible” on only
one issue: intent to kill. The instructions expressly forbade the jury from considering the
evidence on any other issue. Yet, as section 29.4, subdivision (b) makes clear, the jury
clearly should have been able to consider that evidence on the issues of premeditation and
deliberation as well. (See § 29.4, subd. (b).)
       The Attorney General cites People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 and People v.
Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, cases where the Supreme Court rejected claims the
voluntary intoxication instructions were misleading. However, in those cases the trial
courts instructed the jury it could consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on the
issues of specific intent or mental state. (Hughes, at p. 340; Castillo, at p. 1014.) In both
cases, the Supreme Court held that the jury would have understood that deliberation and
premeditation are “mental states,” and therefore the instructions did not preclude them
from considering the evidence as to that issue. (Hughes at p. 342; Castillo at p. 1016.) In
the present case, however, the instructions only permitted the jury to consider the
voluntary intoxication evidence on the issue of “intent to kill” – they did not broadly

                                             9.
permit consideration for “mental state[s]” as the instructions did in Hughes and Castillo.
Consequently, there was no analogous basis for the jury here to believe it could consider
the evidence of voluntary intoxication for an issue other than intent to kill, such as
premeditation/deliberation.
       The Attorney General also observes that defense counsel argued in closing that the
jury should consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on issues other than intent to kill.
However, this fact does not solve the problem presented by the erroneous jury
instruction. Even if the jury inferred from closing argument that defense counsel
believed the jury could consider the evidence of voluntary intoxication on issues other
than intent to kill, it would not change the fact that the court’s instructions said otherwise.
Moreover, the court had previously instructed the jury, “If you believe that the attorneys’
comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.”
       Having concluded the instructions are erroneous, we turn to the issue of prejudice.
       Prejudice
       Defendant contends the error violated his rights under the federal constitution and
therefore should be evaluated under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, and not
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. However, the error here was functionally
equivalent to excluding defense evidence and “is thus subject to the usual standard for
state law error: ‘the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the
error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18
Cal.4th 1114, 1134–1135.)
       Premeditation/Deliberation
       We conclude there is no reasonable probability the error affected the verdict here.
We begin with the observation that the jury was permitted to consider the evidence of
voluntary intoxication on the issue of intent to kill and yet still convicted defendant of
first degree murders. Consequently, it is clear the jury concluded the evidence of
voluntary intoxication did not raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant actually

                                             10.
formed intent to kill. We find it highly unlikely that, having reached such a conclusion
on the present evidence, the jury would have also determined the same evidence of
voluntary intoxication did raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant premeditated
and deliberated the murder. While intent to kill and premeditation/deliberation are
obviously not synonymous, there is no reason to think the jury would have found
defendant’s claims of intoxication to police were insufficient to negate the inference he
formed intent to kill but sufficient to negate the inference he premeditated/deliberated.
       There was little to no basis to conclude the defendant could have harbored intent
to kill but did not premeditate/deliberate. The argument between defendant and the
victim preceding the shooting by more than an hour. And the surveillance video shows
that when defendant arrived back at the bar around 2:00 a.m., he walked straight up to the
entrance and fired at victim Luna within seconds. Had there been a lengthier gap of time,
during which some other or additional motive to kill could have arisen (such as additional
arguing), then perhaps a factfinder might entertain some doubt as to whether defendant
had premeditated the killing before approaching the establishment. However, since
defendant walked up to the door and quickly began shooting at Luna, the inference that
defendant had been premeditating the killing of Luna for some appreciable time before
pulling the trigger is overwhelmingly strong.
       Involuntary Manslaughter
       Defendant observes the instructional error also had the effect of “precluding the
jury from also considering this evidence in determining whether [he] was unconscious
and hence was only guilty of involuntary manslaughter.…” We agree.4 However, we
find the error harmless in this respect as well.

       4 It is true, as the Attorney General points out, that CALCRIM No. 626 included
as an element: defendant’s unconsciousness of his actions or the nature of those actions
due to voluntary intoxication. However, that does not change the erroneous nature of the
other instruction expressly restricting consideration of voluntary intoxication evidence to
the issue of intent to kill. While a jury may have figured out that evaluating the

                                             11.
       Because it convicted defendant of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found
he acted with malice. That is, he either intended to kill (express malice) or intentionally
pulled the trigger knowing his act was dangerous to human life and deliberately acting
with conscious disregard for human life (implied malice). The jury made these
determinations under instructions permitting it to consider voluntary intoxication
evidence in evaluating “whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill .…”
       The finding of malice – for which the voluntary intoxication evidence was in play
– precludes any possibility the jury would have found defendant was unconscious of his
actions and therefore liable only for involuntary manslaughter. A person cannot intend to
kill nor deliberately act with conscious disregard for human life while also being
unconscious as to those actions or the nature of the actions. Consequently, the jury’s
verdict establishing malice demonstrates the harmlessness of the error as to involuntary
manslaughter.
II.    The Court did not Err in Omitting Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction
       Law
       “ ‘ “[A] trial court must give ‘ “ ‘instructions on lesser included offenses when the
evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were
present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that
charged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 109.) This standard is not met by
pointing to any evidence, no matter how weak. (Ibid.) Instead, the evidence must be
substantial enough to merit consideration by a jury; meaning evidence from which a
reasonably jury could actually conclude only the lesser offense was committed. (Ibid.)

consciousness element under CALCRIM No. 626 would require ignoring the express
restrictions given by the court in its giving of CALCRIM No. 625, the fact is the jury
should not have had to navigate the confusing and contradictory instructions. The court
should have given the bracketed portion of CALCRIM No. 625 that expanded
consideration of the evidence beyond intent to kill to include unconsciousness (and
premeditation/deliberation).

                                            12.
       Here, defendant contends the court should have instructed on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense because there was evidence from which the
jury could conclude “heat of passion” applied.
       “ ‘The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a
subjective component. [Citation.] The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under
the heat of passion. [Citation.] But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion
are also viewed objectively.… “[T]his heat of passion must be such a passion as would
naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts
and circumstances.…” ’ ” (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 855.)
       Analysis
       Here, there was not sufficient evidence as to the objective requirement so as to
merit consideration by a jury. Defendant observes that his friend testified one of the
men5 arguing with defendant told him, “ ‘This ain’t Hollywood.’ ” Defendant speculates
this might have been a taunt or derogatory comment about his clothing or appearance. 6
But this is quite simply not a circumstance that would arouse the passion of an
“ordinarily reasonable person.” No reasonable jury could conclude the objective element
of ‘heat of passion’ was met here.
       The court did not err in omitting instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
III.   No Cumulative Prejudice
       Defendant contends the court’s errors in this case had a cumulative effect that was
prejudicial. However, for the reasons explained above, we conclude defendant has only
identified a single error in this case: the instruction that erroneously limited the jury’s

       5 Context indicates the man was Luna.
       6 Defendant also points to evidence he contends supports the subjective
component. However, because we have found the evidence insufficient as to a different
necessary component (the objective component), we do not address these points. Nor do
we address contentions concerning invited error or harmlessness.

                                              13.
consideration of voluntary intoxication evidence to the sole issue of intent to kill. We
have found that error harmless and there are no additional errors to consider.
IV.    One of the Multiple Murder Special Circumstances Must be Stricken
       Defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the jury should not
have been permitted to find two multiple-murder special circumstances, one for each
murder. In light of controlling Supreme Court precedent (see, e.g., People v. McWhorter
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 378) we accept the concession and strike the multiple-murder
special circumstance to count 2.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The multiple-murder special circumstance attached to count 2 is stricken. The
trial court shall prepare and forward to all appropriate parties a certified copy of an
amended abstract of judgment. So modified, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                             14.