Court Opinion

ID: 9897199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:30.463984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:03.801518
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                  Nov 02 2023, 9:50 am

                                                      CLERK
                                                  Indiana Supreme Court
                                                     Court of Appeals
                                                       and Tax Court

                  IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
    Supreme Court Case No. 23S-DI-258

            In the Matter of
          Theodore E. Rokita,
                   Respondent.

          Decided: November 2, 2023

           Attorney Discipline Action

              Per Curiam Opinion
  Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
   Chief Justice Rush and Justice Goff dissent.
Per curiam.

   Respondent Theodore Rokita is, and at relevant times was, the
Attorney General of Indiana. On July 13, 2022, Respondent appeared on a
national television program to discuss an Indiana physician who had
performed an abortion on a ten-year-old rape victim from Ohio. During
that appearance Respondent described the physician as an “abortion
activist acting as a doctor—with a history of failing to report.”

   Respondent admits, and we find, that he engaged in attorney
misconduct by making this statement. This matter is before us on a
disciplinary complaint the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary
Commission filed and a conditional agreement the parties submitted to
this Court pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23(12.1)(b).
Respondent’s 1995 admission to this state’s bar subjects him to this
Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction. We approve the parties’ conditional
agreement and their proposed discipline of a public reprimand.

Procedural Background and Stipulated Facts
   On July 1, 2022, a local news outlet published an article titled “Patients
Head to Indiana for Abortion Services as Other States Restrict Care.” The
article referenced an Indiana physician who had performed an abortion on
a ten-year-old Ohio child who was six weeks and three days pregnant.

   On July 2, the physician submitted reports required by state law to the
Indiana Department of Health (IDOH) and the Indiana Department of
Child Services (IDCS). In the ensuing days, the Attorney General’s office
received seven complaints regarding the physician’s termination of the
Ohio child’s pregnancy. None of the complainants were patients of the
physician.

   On July 11 and 12, staff members of the Attorney General’s office
requested records from IDOH and IDCS; and on July 12, the Attorney
General’s office notified the physician it was opening an investigation into
six of the complaints. On July 13, Respondent appeared on a national
television program to discuss the matter. After the program’s host stated

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-DI-258 | November 2, 2023      Page 2 of 6
that “from what we can find out so far, this Indiana abortion doctor has
covered this up” and the doctor “has a history of failing to report child
abuse cases,” Respondent said:

      [T]hanks for having me on. But, I shouldn’t be here, right.

                                               ***

      Then we have the rape. And then we have this, uh, abortion activist
      acting as a doctor—with a history of failing to report. So, we’re
      gathering the information. We’re gathering the evidence as we speak,
      and we’re going to fight this to the end, uh, including looking at her
      licensure if she failed to report. In Indiana, it’s a crime, uh, for, uh, to
      not report—uh, to intentionally not report.

(Emphasis added).

  The parties agree that, through his use of the phrase emphasized above,
Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules
prohibiting the following misconduct:

      3.6(a): Making an extrajudicial statement that a lawyer participating
      in the litigation or investigation of a matter knows or reasonably
      should know will be publicly disseminated and will have a
      substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
      proceeding in the matter.

      4.4(a): Using means in representing a client that have no substantial
      purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.

In exchange for Respondent’s admission to these two violations, the
Commission has agreed to dismiss a third charged violation.

Discussion and Discipline
   The parties propose that Respondent receive a public reprimand for his
misconduct. In assessing whether the proposed sanction is appropriate,
we consider, among other things, the nature of the misconduct, the duties
Respondent violated, any resulting or potential harm, Respondent’s state
of mind, our duty to preserve the integrity of the profession, and matters

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-DI-258 | November 2, 2023           Page 3 of 6
in mitigation and aggravation. Matter of Philpot, 31 N.E.3d 468, 469 (Ind.
2015).

   We issued public reprimands for misconduct of a similar nature in
Matter of Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. 2012), and Matter of Litz, 721 N.E.2d
258 (Ind. 1999). In Brizzi, a county prosecutor issued a press release after
two suspects were charged with the murders of seven people. The press
release stated, among other things, that the prosecutor “would not trade
all the money and drugs in the world for the life of one person, let alone
seven,” the evidence was overwhelming, one defendant deserved the
death penalty, and it would be a travesty not to seek the death penalty. In
Litz, a criminal defense attorney representing a client facing a retrial for
neglect of a dependent submitted letters to the editors of three local
newspapers stating his client was innocent and had passed a lie detector
test, and characterizing the State’s decision to retry his client as
“abominable.”

   Like the extrajudicial statements at issue in Brizzi and Litz,
Respondent’s statement was of a type rebuttably presumed to have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding 1 and did not fall within any of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6’s
“safe harbors.” Respondent’s statement additionally violated Professional
Conduct Rule 4.4(a) because the statement had no substantial purpose, in
connection with Respondent’s legal representation of the State, other than
to embarrass or burden the physician. See Matter of Kyres, 183 N.E.3d 299
(Ind. 2022) (approving an agreed public reprimand for a Rule 4.4(a)
violation).

  In a sworn affidavit attached to the conditional agreement, made under
penalty of perjury, Respondent admits these two rule violations and
acknowledges that he could not successfully defend himself on these two

1 Although not specified in the conditional agreement, we note the Attorney General’s office
filed an administrative complaint with the Indiana Medical Licensing Board against the
physician in November 2022, which was heard by the Board in May 2023. (Complaint at 6-7;
Answer at 17, 21).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-DI-258 | November 2, 2023                      Page 4 of 6
charges if this matter were tried. Respondent’s acceptance of
responsibility is a mitigating factor, as are his cooperation with the
disciplinary process and his lack of prior discipline over a lengthy career.
But that same length of experience also “counsels that he should have
known better” than to conduct himself in the manner he did. See Matter of
Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 196 (Ind. 2020). And Respondent’s misconduct, which
occurred on a national television program, had far greater reach than the
statements made in a press release and to local newspapers in Brizzi and
Litz, respectively.

  “Whether extrajudicial statements of this sort warrant reprimand or
suspension is fact sensitive.” Litz, 721 N.E.2d at 260. Balancing the factors
relevant to sanction in their entirety, a majority of the Court agrees with
the parties that a public reprimand is appropriate in this case.

Conclusion
  The Court concludes that Respondent violated Indiana Professional
Conduct Rules 3.6(a) and 4.4(a) by making an extrajudicial statement that
had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding and had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or
burden the physician. For Respondent’s professional misconduct, he is
hereby publicly reprimanded.

   The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. Pursuant
to the parties’ stipulation in their conditional agreement, the Court orders
Respondent to pay $250.00 by check made payable and transmitted to the
Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court. The Clerk shall retain those funds in
their entirety upon receipt. The parties further stipulate that the
Commission’s investigation costs under Admission and Discipline Rule
23(21)(a)(1) remain to be determined.

All Justices concur, except Rush, C.J., and Goff, J., who would reject
the conditional agreement, believing the discipline to be too lenient
based on the Respondent’s position as Attorney General and the
scope and breadth of the admitted misconduct.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-DI-258 | November 2, 2023        Page 5 of 6
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
H. Christopher Bartolomucci
Schaerr | Jaffe LLP
Washington, DC

James J. Ammeen
Ammeen Valenzuela Associates LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
Adrienne L. Meiring, Executive Director
Stephanie K. Bibbs, Deputy Director of Litigation
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-DI-258 | November 2, 2023   Page 6 of 6