Court Opinion

ID: 9426439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:57.603228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:00.847236
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The decisive question in this case is whether, in judging the sufficiency of respondent’s motion, we should assume that his allegations are true.
He has alleged that there was insufficient evidence to *335support his conviction, but that he did not appeal. If he had appealed, respondent would have obtained the transcript of the trial at Government expense.1 He has also alleged that his lawyer did not provide him with the effective representation at trial that the Sixth Amendment requires, and that this conclusion would be supported by an examination of the trial transcript. Respondent has neither the training nor the memory to allege the factual basis for that conclusion. If, however, that conclusion is accurate, he is entitled not only to a transcript but to a new trial.
As the plurality points out, there are legitimate reasons for holding that respondent’s allegations are not specific enough. In most cases the pleader should be able to set forth more factual details to support his ultimate conclusion. If respondent’s pleading is adequate, almost any general statement claiming ineffective assistance of counsel would entitle a prisoner to a transcript in a proceeding under § 2255. In short, the right to a transcript at that stage would be almost as automatic as when a direct appeal is taken. Thus, in a sense, this case presents the question whether the defendant’s right to a transcript at Government expense should survive if he fails to take a direct appeal.
There are two reasons why I would answer that question in the affirmative and accept respondent’s allegations at face value for purposes of determining whether his motion is frivolous and whether a transcript is necessary to decide the claims he asserts.
First, § 753 (f) should be interpreted to establish a standard of nonfrivolousness and need that may be fairly administered. The statute itself does not address the standard that judges are to use in determining “that the suit or appeal is not frivolous and that the transcript is *336needed to decide the issue presented by the suit or appeal,” and the legislative history is also silent on the question.2 The plurality reads the statute to impose upon the § 2255 movant the burden of putting forward “some factual allegations” indicating a denial of constitutional rights, ante, at S26, but this reading creates the risk that district judges will exercise the discretion conferred by the statute on a haphazard rather than a principled basis. In many cases, the judge can have no rational basis for determining whether or not the movant could ultimately succeed on the merits without first *337ordering a transcript.3 Unquestionably some judges routinely order a transcript in a case like this while others do not. Given the uncertainty of the standard adopted by the plurality,4 the indigent’s right to protection against the risk that his appointed counsel was in fact ineffective depends on the happenstance of what district judge has been assigned to his case. Such an important protection should not depend on such a fortuitous circumstance. In short, the administration of justice in the federal courts would be more evenhanded if the indigent’s right to a transcript were not dependent either upon the advice he receives from counsel at the time when he may still file a direct appeal,5 or upon his *338later ability to persuade a trial judge that if the transcript were available, it would show that counsel’s advice was actually unsound. The indigent is at least entitled to a transcript of sufficient completeness to permit a determination of frivolousness. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U. S. 438, 445-446.6
Second, in my judgment a ruling in respondent’s favor would tend to improve the administration of justice in the federal system. If, as seems probable, such a ruling would make transcripts available almost automatically in § 2255 proceedings, it would make good sense for federal prosecutors to adopt the practice of routinely ordering the transcript at the conclusion of every criminal trial resulting in conviction. Such a practice would eliminate a serious cause of delay in the processing of criminal appeals.7 Even assuming *339an increase in monetary costs,8 we should take into account the costs associated with unnecessary delay in the appellate process and the saving in judges' time that would result from the elimination of the need to decide questions such as this. One of our Nation’s scarcest resources is the time of our judges; if spending a few dollars9 for automatic disposition of preliminary issues will enable them to devote extra time to adjudicating disputes on the merits, the money will be well spent. See Coppedge, supra, at 450-452; id., at 458 (Stewart, J., concurring); J. Frank, American Law: The Case for *340Radical Reform 85-110 (1969). More importantly, routine availability of transcripts would minimize the danger — which is not so insignificant that it can be safely ignored — that the rights of an indigent defendant may be lost because of the ineptitude of his appointed counsel.
I recognize that my view does not reflect a necessary reading of the statute as applied to respondent's § 2255 motion, but it certainly is permissible to rule as a matter of law that his allegations are sufficient to plead a non-frivolous claim that cannot be resolved without a transcript.10 Such a ruling would have the added virtue of avoiding the constitutional issue discussed in Part III of the plurality’s opinion. Cf. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 17. S. 394, 401. On balance, I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

 28 U. S. C. §753 (f); 18 U. S. C. §§3006A (a), .(c), (d)(6).

 The provision for free transcripts in § 2255 cases was added in 1965 by Pub. L. 89-167, 79 Stat. 647, which followed verbatim a proposal of the Judicial Conference in 1961. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proceedings 100-101 (1961). The primary purpose of the amendment was to make transcripts as available to indigent federal prisoners on § 2255 motions as on habeas corpus. See H. R. Rep. No. 133, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. Rep. No. 617, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 Cong. Rec. 5000 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 20828-20829. The legislative sources do not discuss what standards should be applied in determining nonfrivolousness and need.
Specifically, the legislative history does not address the question whether federal prisoners are required to make a stronger showing of nonfrivolousness and need on § 2255 motions than on habeas corpus. Although § 753 (f) expressly requires certification of nonfrivo-lousness and need only in § 2255 cases, it requires prior leave to proceed in forma pauperis in both habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings. This requirement, in turn, imports the requirement of nonfrivolousness contained in 28 U. S. C. §1915 (d). The legislative history contains no indication that the standard of nonfrivo-lousness for § 2255 cases was to be any stronger than that imposed by § 1915 (d). See Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F. R. D. 343, 356-357 (1967). Indeed, §1915 is nowhere mentioned. Nor does the requirement of need impose any additional burden upon § 2255 movants, since §§ 753 (f) and 1915 (d) could not reasonably be interpreted to grant a right to a transcript to habeas corpus petitioners who assert nonfrivolous claims that can be resolved without a transcript.

 Since our most gifted trial lawyers usually need daily copy to be sure of exactly what happened in the courtroom the preceding day, and since the passage of time is bound to cause any trial to be blended with many others in the judge’s memory, it is almost inconceivable that the judge can determine whether a motion has arguable merit without the benefit of a transcript.

 Would the plurality regard respondent’s pleadings as sufficient if he had alleged that his lawyer failed to object to inadmissible evidence, failed to argue effectively to the jury, failed to advise him properly about his appeal rights, or failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of key prosecution witnesses? Such allegations are just as easily made as the general claim of ineffectiveness of counsel and just as difficult to support by factual details without the assistance of a transcript. Rather than' requiring the district judge to take the time to evaluate all the permutations of such allegations as these, is it not more sensible to make the record available promptly and automatically?

 Indeed, the failure of respondent’s attorney to file a notice of appeal itself supports his claim of denial of effective assistance of counsel. Because notice of appeal from a criminal conviction must be filed within the 10-day period specified in Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4 (b), most defense counsel routinely file such notice in order to protect their clients’ right to appeal and to obtain a transcript. Furthermore, in the present case, respondent represented in this Court, although not in the District Court, that he did not appeal from his conviction because he was advised by his lawyer that “‘it would *338interfere with a motion to modify sentence.’” Brief for Respondent 3.

 Although I have described that right as “almost” the equivalent of the absolute right to a full transcript on direct appeal, the difference between the two is significant. Before Congress amended § 753 (f) to provide for automatic availability of transcripts, Pub. L. 91-545, 84 Stat. 1412, the statute already authorized transcripts for appellants proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U. S. C. § 753 (f) (1964 ed., Supp. V), but, under Coppedge, 369 U. S., at 446, it only entitled the appellant to a transcript sufficient to determine nonfrivo-lousness. The fact that Congress amended the statute to give the appellant the right to a complete transcript demonstrates (a) that Congress was aware of this difference, and (b) that recognition of a right in a § 2255 context which is only “almost” as valuable as the right on direct appeal is consistent with the intent of Congress.

 As Judge Craven noted in Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 460 F. 2d 150, 153 n. 4 (CA4 1972), rehearing denied, 465 F. 2d 1091, cert. denied, 410 U. S. 944 (1973): “It has been noted time and again that the delay in deciding appeals is often attributable to delay in getting a transcript.” Since the allowance of bail pending appeal is almost routine in the federal system (a routine, incidentally, which might well be restudied), defendants may postpone their incarceration by delaying their appeals as long *339as possible, and, thus, they have a practical motivation for not ordering transcripts any sooner than necessary.

 Appeals are now filed in approximately 75% of criminal cases in which a defendant is convicted after trial. The rate has increased steadily from approximately 46% in Fiscal Year 1966 to approximately 75% in Fiscal Year 1973, where it has remained. See Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables Bl, D4 (1966-1969, 1971-1975) (compare total criminal appeals commenced with total convictions after trial). Since appeals are taken from such a high percentage of convictions after trial, since experience teaches us that the appeal rate is more apt to increase than decrease, and since an appreciable number of transcripts are no doubt prepared in § 2255 proceedings already, a rule requiring the automatic preparation of a transcript would have a minimal impact on the budget. Even if the total number of transcripts would increase significantly, it is doubtful that there would be a parallel increase in cost because there would surely be a substantial saving in substituting a routine practice for the present practice of ordering transcripts individually, often at a time when the court reporter is faced with an appellate deadline.

 1 use the words “few dollars” advisedly because the entire cost of subsidizing the defense of indigents, including the fees and expenses of appointed counsel, has amounted to between 5% and 9% of the expenditures for the lower federal courts in recent years, which in turn have been less than Mo of 1% of the national budget. Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts VI-3 (1975), IV-2 (1974), III-3 (1973), III-3 (1972); Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1977, p. 153 (1976).

 Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U. S. 738, 746-747; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520-521; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46.