Court Opinion

ID: 9591659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:06:20.943567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:54.376171
License: Public Domain

*473RUSSELL, J.,
concurring.
I agree that the “missing witness” instruction was properly refused in this case for both of the reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion. I would, however, go further.
The “missing witness” instruction is a survivor from the era of trial by ambush. Before the advent of discovery, it was difficult or impossible for a litigant to ascertain the nature of his opponent’s evidence in advance of trial. During the trial itself, he often learned for the first time the identities of his opponent’s witnesses and their connection with the case. If the opponent’s evidence disclosed that a certain person might have knowledge of the facts, it would logically be expected that the opponent would bring that person with him to court to testify, and the opponent’s failure to do so would arouse suspicion. Judicial statements to that effect, dating from before Lord Mansfield’s time, gave rise to the presumption, perhaps more accurately called an inference, expressed in the “missing witness” instruction. See generally 2 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 285-291 (3d ed. 1940).
Little need remains for the instruction today. The advent of liberal discovery in civil cases has given litigants the means of ascertaining the identities of all persons known by all other parties to have knowledge of the facts. Those persons may then be interviewed, deposed, and subpoenaed to testify at trial. Witnesses do not “belong” to any party. Except in rare instances, they are equally available to each party. If they have a special relationship with a party which might give rise to bias, that fact may be adduced in evidence to affect their credibility.
As we pointed out in Neeley v. Johnson, 215 Va. 565, 574, 211 S.E.2d 100, 107 (1975), where a witness is equally available to both parties, “the failure to produce is open to an inference against both parties.” It is manifestly unfair, in such circumstances, for the court to suggest to the jury that an inference should be drawn against one party alone. Yet the instruction is frequently sought in order to obtain such an unfair advantage, as it was in Neeley, where the plaintiff had been treated by fifteen physicians, but brought only four to court. We held that it was error to grant the “missing witness” instruction in Neeley. In addition to the cogent reasons stated there for denying the instruction, another equally compelling reason might have existed. The plaintiff simply might have lacked the financial resources required to bring fifteen expert medical witnesses to court. In my view, *474such witnesses would be equally available to both parties because of the discovery rules.*
In Felice v. Long Island Railroad Company, 426 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1970), Judge Friendly observed that where the witness would be as likely to favor one party as another, either party should be permitted to argue the inference against his adversary, but the judge should not instruct the jury to draw the inference against one party and refuse an equal instruction against the other: “If . . . the judge . . . decides to charge on the subject at all, [he] must do so in an even-handed manner, explaining to the jury why it would have been reasonable for either party to call the witness and what inference can logically be drawn from failure to do so.” Id. at 195.
I would dispense with the “missing witness” instruction for a further reason, equally applicable to civil and criminal cases. Counsel are always free to argue to the jury the inferences to be drawn, on the basis of reason and human experience, from the evidence. The unexplained failure of a party to produce available and material evidence may often give rise to such an inference, and is thus a proper subject for fair comment in the argument of counsel. McCormick on Evidence § 272, at 659 (2d ed. 1972). There is no reason for the trial judge to reinforce this comment on the evidence by a statement from the bench. It does nothing to enhance the jury’s perception of the court’s impartiality. The modern trend is increasingly to restrict such comment. McCormick, id., at 657. Even in those jurisdictions in which the judge may properly comment on the evidence when instructing the jury, comments concerning a missing witness are not favored. See U.S. v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689,.692 (2d Cir. 1932, L. Hand, J.). In Virginia the judge does not ordinarily comment on the evidence, but instead leaves the inferences to be drawn therefrom to the arguments of counsel and to the jury’s reasoning. I would so treat the “missing witness” inference and, saluting the “missing witness” instruction for its notable service in past ages, now accord it a decent burial.

 I do not agree with the observation in Neeley that a treating physician is more “available” to his patient than to his patient’s opponent because of the physician-patient privilege. No privilege exists where the physical or mental condition of the patient is in issue. Code § 8.01-399.