Court Opinion

ID: 9856143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:39:07.981868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:08.587823
License: Public Domain

HARSHBARGER, Justice,
concurring:
This Court has not, nor should it have, decided that Spencer Hospital should or should not be closed. That is a decision to be made by the legislature that created it. See DeVault v. Nicholson, 170 W.Va. 719, 296 S.E.2d 682 (1982). And therefore, Justice Neely’s dissent, in which he condemns the majority position as putting some sort of approving imprimatur upon Spencer Hospital’s continued existence, missed the point.
First: this Court’s opinion was simply that when a governor vetoes funds for a legislatively-created institution, whether the veto is for a little bit of the funds, or a lot, or all, he must do so for particular and specific reasons that he must reveal. The West Virginia Constitution states that the governor, when vetoing, must file his objections that explain that drastic act that nullifies legislation.
This Governor's veto note stated that his action was predicated upon “the severe economic condition of our state, and the obvious need to provide jobs for our people.” Well, of course, that would be a reason for cutting any budget item. It has not, however, an iota of particular relationship to the budget items dealing with this legislatively-created institution.
Second: after the Governor noted that he had reduced personal services, current expenses, repairs and alterations, and equipment, in Account 4160, State Health Department — Mental Hospitals, he explained that there was left 1.5 million dollars for Spencer Hospital as a sixty-bed geriatric hospital, allowing 1 million to improve personnel at Weston and Huntington Hospitals; and he added that duplication of administrative costs in operating twelve state hospitals should be eliminated as far as possible to provide the highest degree of patient care at the lowest cost.
But where does this hone in on Spencer? Why Spencer? Why not Weston Hospital or Huntington Hospital or one or more of the others?
The final irony in Justice Neely’s dissent is that he has reversed his position 180 degrees since the days when another governor was contravening legislative will.
In the first State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W.Va. 100, 207 S.E.2d 421, 437 (1973), he wrote, in dissent:
The provision that “... The Governor may veto the bill, or he may disapprove or reduce items or parts of items contained therein....” was not intended to eliminate the Legislature’s absolute power over the appropriation of funds. Three hundred years of British and American constitutional history accord the Legislature the preeminent weapon of the purse to insure conformity to its will by other branches of government.
And, of course, he overlooked, regarding the Spencer reduction to allow improvement in Huntington and Weston Hospitals’ personnel, the Virginia Court’s language that he applauded in State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, supra 157 W.Va. at 128, 207 S.E.2d, at 437: “Plainly, money devoted to one purpose can not be used for another, and it is equally plain that power *47to impose conditions before it can become available is legislation.”
And in State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, supra 157 W.Va. 129, 207 S.E.2d, at 438, he concluded with magnificent grandness nearly equal to his eloquence on the other side in this case:
The history of liberty is the history of legislatures. When once the Legislature has been divested of its traditional power of the purse it will stand like Stonehenge as a useless and incomprehensible monument to a past era. Sic transit gloria mundi.
What we have said is that broad statements about the state of the economy or that things are bad all over and we have to cut somewhere, are not sufficient as the constitutionally required objections to be set out by a governor when he vetoes a budget item for a legislatively-created institution, anymore than no statement of objections is sufficient. Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 154 W.Va. 253, 175 S.E.2d 172 (1970).
Justice Neely promises dissent in every case where he perceives the Court, when it does its constitutionally required work * that often involves refereeing legislative and executive bouts, to be simply judging the wisdom of legislative or governmental activities. He can call our work whatever he wants. And he can posture however he wants — on one side, the other side, or on both sides as he has done in this area. His twitting certainly saves him hard decisions, and permits him to often be the only one of us who is “in step”.

In State ex rel Brotherton v. Blankenship, 158 W.Va. 390, 214 S.E.2d 467, 473-474 (1975), Chief Justice Haden wrote:
"As was true in two former cases decided by this Court, State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 154 W.Va. 253, 175 S.E.2d 172 (1970) and State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, [157 W.Va. 100], 207 S.E.2d 421 (1973), resolving matters of dispute between the legislative and executive branches of government arising from the interplay of those branches pursuant to the Modern Budget Amendment, West Virginia Constitution, Article VI, Section 51, the primary issue presented is whether the several actions of the Governor in the exercise of his veto powers in relation to the Budget Act ... are valid.”