Court Opinion

ID: 9625646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:46:39.730737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:12.631510
License: Public Domain

MlKELL, Judge,
dissenting.
While I concur in the majority’s opinion in Case No. A01A1480,1 must respectfully dissent in Case No. A01A1481 as I believe that no jury issue exists as to Mr. Johnston’s liability under OCGA § 51-2-7.
1. It is undisputed that when Mr. Johnston left for work, his dog was secure inside his home. Additionally, Mr. Johnston deposed that he had no knowledge of the dogs rushing through the door in the past. Therefore, the Warendhs cannot establish “careless management” or “allowing the animal to go at liberty” on the part of Mr. Johnston, and he is entitled to summary judgment on the OCGA § 51-2-7 claim.
2. Furthermore, contrary to the Warendhs’ argument and the majority’s opinion, I do not believe that an agency relationship existed between Mr. Johnston and his sister that would result in his liability for the incident. OCGA § 10-6-1 provides: “The relation of principal and agent arises whenever one person, expressly or by implication, authorizes another to act for him or subsequently ratifies the acts of another in his behalf.” There is no evidence that Mr. Johnston authorized his sister to act for him or that he somehow ratified any such actions. She may have been a bailee, but there is nothing in the record to show a relationship which would impart vicarious liability to the brother. The record shows that Ms. Johnston attempted to confine the dogs with gates within the home in an effort to protect her furniture; however, such action was taken for her own benefit and did not render her Mr. Johnston’s agent. Ms. Johnston deposed that she was very rarely alone with the dogs and that she never fed or walked them. The evidence is thus significantly different from that in Sanders v. Bowen, 196 Ga. App. 644-645 (2) (396 SE2d 908) (1990), in which the defendant’s sons had been designated to “take care of” their father’s pit bulldog, Bad Eye. I reject the *681Warendhs’ contention that Ms. Johnston acted as her brother’s agent by providing water to the dogs on occasion when their owners were not home. Accordingly, I would reverse the partial denial of summary judgment to Robert Johnston.
Decided November 30, 2001.
Gray, Hedrick & Edenfield, Lloyd B. Hedrick, Jr., for appellants.
Gibson, Deal & Fletcher, John W. Gibson, for appellees.