Court Opinion

ID: 9865180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:26:18.037509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:48.195209
License: Public Domain

*54Mr. Justice Gabbert,
dissenting:
The- two important questions presented are: (■1) Did Mrs. Alexander acquire an interest in the premises superior to the lien of Judge Hallett’s mortgage? — and (2), If she did, should Judge Hallett be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sale -of the property for the moneys which he advanced to discharge taxes and tax sales against it?
By the majority opinion it is determined that by virtue of the provisions of sec. 446, 1 Mills’ Stats, (sec. 694, Rev. Stats.), Mrs. Alexander obtained title to an undivided one-half interest in the property in controversy unincumbered by the Hallett mortgage, because neither the deed from Mrs. Reithman to Mrs. Wagner, nor the mortgage of the latter to Judge Hallett, were of record at the time Mrs. Alexander levied her execution, she having at that time no knowledge of their existence.
The general propositions of law announced -in reaching- this conclusion, and in discussing our recording statute, are correct, but they are not applicable to the facts of this case. The statute upon which- the rights of Mrs. Alexander are predicated and those of Judge- Hallett denied, was intended to protect innocent parties, and-not as an instrument to deprive others of- rights except in those instances where the party invoking its provisions was clearly of the class entitled to invoke the protection which it is- intended to afford.
■ ■ It has--been frequently decided by this court that an unrecorded deed-does not operate to defeat the right of a judgment creditor of the grantor who has ■secured a lien unless he had notice of the existence of such-deed- at the time his lien attached; but in- none of these cases was the applicability of the statute considered or presented where the judgment creditor, as in the case at bar, claimed the benefit of its provisions *55under a levy on the alleged of apparent interest of an heir who, as a matter of fact, because of an unrecorded deed of his ancestor, had no interest in the property levied upon. This presents an entirely new question, in this jurisdiction, and must be determined from the facts of the case in which it is presented.
An unrecorded deed binds the'grantor, his heirs and devisees to the same extent, so far as they are concerned, as it would do if recorded — Ralls v. Graham, 4 Monroe (Ky.) 120; consequently, John J. Reithman as the heir of his deceased wife took no interest whatever in the property in controversy,- for the reason that prior to his death she had conveyed it to Mrs. Wagner; but, notwithstanding this conclusion, the question with which we are confronted, under our recording statute is, Can the creditor of an heir of a deceased person in whose name the title to real estate stands at the time of his death, as disclosed by the records in the office of the recorder of deeds, acquire by levy and sale under execution on a judgment against the heir of deceased a lien superior to one to whom the property has been conveyed by deceased by an unrecorded deed, the • creditor not having actual notice of such conveyance, and the levy having been made in less than seventy days after'the death of the ancestor of the heir1? ' This court has determined, as a general proposition that a judgment creditor who purchases property at sheriff’s sale under his own judgment, and who pays no new consideration, but whose bid is merely credited upon the execution, is a bona fide purchaser within the meaning of the recording statute under consideration. In each case, however, in which this declaration has been made, the judgment creditor was the créditor ‘of the person who had executed and delivered the unrecorded conveyance ; but this proposition, in the circumstances of this case, does not in any manner af*56feet or control the rights of a judgment creditor who seeks to enforce his judgment against an heir who, as a matter of fact, has no interest whatever in the property levied upon. By the common law the priority of liens upon real estate was governed by the date of their acquisition, the first in order of time standing-first in order of rank. — Westervelt v. Voorhis, 42 N. J. Eq. 179. The statute under consideration has changed the common law in this respect, but it should not be given a construction beyond its plain scope, and should be limited to the purposes for which it was enacted. Its object was to prevent the creation of secret liens and trusts, and to protect subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers against previous unrecorded conveyances by, in effect, providing that such purchasers without notice of prior conveyances could rely upon the title to real estate as disclosed by the records in the office of the recorder of deeds.— Earle v. Fiske, 103 Mass. 491; Voorhis v. Westervelt, 43 N. J. Eq. 642.
But its provisions must be limited to- those who have the right to- rely upon such records. The statute does not deal with titles by descent or devise. It only requires that deeds, conveyances and agreements in writing affecting the title to real estate shall be placed of record in order that the title thus acquired shall be protected as against others subsequently acquiring- an interest in the same premises. So that its manifest purpose is, that the apparent owner of record shall be deemed the true owner so far as subsequent purchasers without notice are concerned, notwithstanding any unrecorded previous alienation, provided such purchasers have the right to invoke its protection. A title which results from means other than those designated by the statute, and not required thereby to- be disclosed in the office of the recorder of deeds, is not a title which can be *57said to be apparent from snob records, and is, therefore, not within the operation of the recording act. The title of an heir to property standing in the name of his ancestor is not apparent from the records required by the act, unless, from, lapse of time, or the adjudication of the affairs of the estate of the deceased from whom title descends, it becomes so, or the grantor of the heir, after the exercise of due diligence, is justified in treating it as such. An heir or a devisee of a deceased person in whose name the title to real estate may appear as evidenced by the records in the recorder’s office is' not, from this fact alone, an apparent owner of such real estate. His interest therein depends upon a variety of circumstances. He takes title to the real estate of his. ancestor either by devise or descent, subject to the payment of the debts of the former. If the ancestor dies testate, the ownership of the devisee depends .upon the provisions of the will. If there is an outstanding unrecorded deed of the ancestor, the grantee will hold the real estate so conveyed as against the heir, whether he asserts a right thereto by descent or devise.
Mrs. Alexander did not learn of Mrs. Beithman’s death from the records in the recorder’s office. That information was obtained aliunde. Mrs. Alexander had no .right to assume in the circumstances of this case, merely because the real estate in question stood of record in the name of Mrs. Beithman at the time of her death, that John J. Beithman, as the husband of deceased, became the owner of an undivided one-half interest therein as the heir of deceased, when at the time she made her levy the affairs of the estate were not adjusted and could not have been, by administration proceedings, and but a short time had elapsed since Mrs. Beithman’s death. Suppose, as a fact, Mrs. Beithman had not conveyed *58this property to Mrs. Wagner; that the latter had not mortgaged it to Judge Hallett, and that Mrs. Reithman was, in fact, the' owner when she died. One-half- would have descended to Reithman, subject to the payment of his wife’s debts. If these debts absorbed the property, Reithman would take nothing; or if Mrs. Reithman had died testate, and had devised this property to some one other than her husband, he would have taken nothing. But as she had conveyed it to- her daughter, he acquired no interest therein-by descent, so what his interest in the real estate might be depended entirely upon not what the records, in the office of the recorder disclosed, but upon facts aliunde; consequently, Mrs. Alexander was not-misled by anything she learned from the office of the.recorder of deeds; nor did she act upon information which was there disclosed which she had a right to rely upon, but assumed that because the record's in the office, of the recorder showed Mrs. Reithman. to be- the owner of real estate at the time of her. death, that, therefore, ipso, facto she had the right to further .assume, ihat her judgment debtor acquired an undivided one-half interest therein by descent, when his interest depended altogether upon other facts and circumstances .which the statute does not require shall appear of record in the office of the recorder, and which could not appear there, but which Mrs. Alexander could have learned had she sought for information, as she was bound to do> at the proper source. Had she made inquiry she would have ascer-. tained that her judgment debtor had no interest in the property whatever, ..because it had already been conveyed by Mrs. Reithman to her daughter. The statute does not protect those who have notice of an unrecorded conveyance, but k party cannot blindly assume that facts do.not exist which it is his duty to make inquiry about. When Mrs. Alexander made her *59levy, she was bound to take notice that the' interest of her judgment debtor in the subject of the levy was entirely contingent, and it was, therefore, her duty to ascertain what that interest was. 'Whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts to notice, provided1 that the inquiry becomes a duty, and would lead to tlie knowledge of a requisite fact by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. — Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 167. Hence, in the circumstances of this case, Mrs. Alexander acquired no interest in the subject-matter of controversy by virtue of her execution sale. In reaching this conclusion, however, it must be understood that it is limited strictly to the facts of this case, and that what has been said is limited accordingly.’ A state of facts might be presented where the grantee of an unrecorded deed would not be permitted to hold title to real estate as against the grantee of the heir of a deceased person, either by voluntary conveyance or proceedings in invito.
Cases decided by this court are cited by counsel for Mrs. Alexander wherein it was held’that an execution creditor who purchased at the sale, the amount of Ms bid being endorsed upon his execution, is a purchaser for value, and acquired rights superior to those of a grantee in an outstanding deed by the .execution debtor of which the execution creditor did not have notice.' That proposition is unquestionably sound as applied to the facts of those cases, namely, Jerome v. Carbonate National Bank, 22 Colo. 37, and McMurtrie v. Riddell, 9 Colo. 197; but those in the case at bar render it inapplicable: From an examination of these cases it will be found that the records' in the office of the county clerk and recorder disclosed of themselves that the judgment debtor was the owner of the premises purchased at the execution sale, and the facts were such that the judgment creditor was not required to look elsewhere; and hence, *60it was held that by virtue of our recording statute the unrecorded deeds did not take effect as against the judgment creditor who had no notice of their existence. These cases would be applicable if Mrs. Alexander had obtained a judgment against Mrs. Reithman and during her lifetime had levied upon the lots she had conveyed to Mrs. Wagner without notice of such conveyance; but they have no application to the case at bar, for the reason that Mrs. Alexander was not justified in assuming that Reithman owned an interest in the lots because the record showed that his wife owned them at the time of her death. Their ownership thereafter depended upon extraneous facts which Mrs. Alexander could have ascertained, and which it was her duty under the circumstances to ascertain, and which were of such a nature, when she learned them, that she would not have been an innocent purchaser. An analysis of the cases cited in the majority opinion and by counsel for Mrs. Alexander, based upon recording* statutes similar to our own, will disclose that the facts are so radically different from the case at bar that the conclusions announced in these cases could not have been otherwise.
The Memphis Land & Timber Co. v. Ford, 58 Fed. 452, involved a construction of the recording act of the state of Arkansas which, in many respects, is similar to our own. It was there held that the protection of the statute was not limited to bona fide purchasers from the same person who executed the unrecorded conveyances, but extends to innocent purchasers from any one who appears from the record to be the owner of the title and interest which such grantor had when he made the unrecorded deeds. This conclusion was based upon these facts: Swamp land certificates had been issued to one Atkinson. Thereafter he and his wife conveyed the land de*61scribed in these certificates to W. Gr. Ford. Later, Atkinson endorsed these certificates to Mary S. Ford. Thereafter W. G-. Ford-conveyed the land in question to Mary S. Ford. None of these deeds or assignments were filed for record until the year 1887. Atkinson died in 1864, and the receiver of his estate, duly appointed by the proper court and fully empowered to sell and convey all the interest of the estate, sold the property described in the swamp land certificates to The Memphis Land & Timber Company, in 1883, by a deed which was duly recorded May 20, 1884. The question presented was, which grantee was entitled to hold the land? On the findings of fact Judge Sanborn, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:
“The grantor who has conveyed away his land by an unrecorded deed, it is true, has no title or interest remaining in himself, and yet his deed to an innocent purchaser for value avoids, by virtue of the registry statute, the prior conveyance and vests the title in the subsequent purchaser. If Atkinson, before his death, had conveyed his apparent equitable estate in these lands to such a purchaser, the unrecorded deeds and assignments held by the appellee would have been void as against the subsequent conveyance, because that would have carried the apparent title. After he died and the receiver of his estate was empowered to convey the equitable estate in these lands which Atkinson appeared to have had at his death, the receiver’s deeds or assignments appear from an examination of the records to convey as perfect a title as the deed of Atkinson would have conveyed before he died. A purchaser from such a vendor seems to be clearly within the reason and policy of the statute. ’ ’
This conclusion is based upon the ground that the policy of the recording act is to make the appar*62exit title of -tlie grantor of record upon which tlie grantee lias the right to rely superior in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value to the real title that is not of record. There can be no doubt regarding the soundness of this decision upon the facts stated, but for the reasons already given, to' the effect that Mrs. Alexander had no right to- rely entirely upon what the records in the recorder’s office disclosed, it has no application.
Illinois has a recording statute very similar to our own, which was considered in Kennedy v. Northrup, 15 Ill. 148, and Bowen v. Prout, 52 Ill. 354. In the first case it was held that the words “subsequent purchasers” in the recording act means subsequent purchasers from the heirs as well as from the original grantor.
In the Bowen case it was held that a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration from an heir without notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance from the ancestor will be protected in his title as against such prior conveyance. These holdings are sound when the facts justify their application, but the decision in each case, so far as material to the case at bar, was based substantially upon the proposition that tlie purpose of the recording statute was to make potent the titles to real estate so1 that purchasers might know what title they were acquiring; that where a deed is not recorded, the title is apparently still in the grantor, and the law authorizes purchasers who are ignorant of the conveyances to1 deal with him as the real owner-, and in case of his death, the heir beconres the apparent owner of the legal title, and it is, therefore, equally important and equally as just that the public may be led to1 deal with him as with the original grantor, if living. The soundness of this doctrine cannot be questioned, but it does not meet the proposition that tlie circumstances must be such *63that the purchaser from the heir is justified in relying upon the title of the heir. Nothing is said on this subject in either of the cases, hut the facts are such that it is apparent the purchasers from the heirs were fully justified in assuming that the respective heirs did have the title to the property which the records in the recorder’s office disclosed stood in the name of their respective ancestors.
In the Kennedy case it appears that in 1818 one Weiant was the owner of certain premises. On the 19th day of June, of that year, he conveyed to Stewart by deed, which was not recorded until Décember 26, 1850. In 1820 Stewart conveyed to Kennedy, which deed was recorded May .23, 1821. Kennedy died intestate in 1839. What date Weiant died is not stated, but it .appears-that after he executed his deed to Stewart, and -before that instrument was recorded, the.heirs of Weiant executed a deed which was recorded before the Stewart deed, and the question was, which deed should prevail, the contest over the premises being between the heirs of Kennedy and the grantees of the heirs of Weiant. It was determined that the. deed from the Weiant heirs was superior to the one which their ancestor had executed to Stewart, which was the-one under which the Kennedy heirs claimed title. -This discloses that such a length of time had elapsed between the date of the deed, from Weiant to Stewart, and also between the date of Weiant’s .death and the execution of the deed by.his heirs,, that the grantees of the latter were justified in assuming that their grantors owned the' premises in controversy.
In the Bowen case, one William Prout executed a deed- in 1817, which was not recorded until August, 1862. In 1831 it appears that the heir's of Prout had partitioned between themselves the premises con*64veyed' by the deed to Warren, and at once caused deeds to be executed and filed for record accordingly. Subsequently one of the heirs had purchased1 some of the interests of the others and the question was, whether the unrecorded deed was paramount to the title which he obtained from his co-heirs. It was held that it was not, and on facts, from which it appears that the party who had acquired title from the heirs was justified in assuming that they were the actual owners of the premises in controversy.
In Earle v. Fiske, 103 Mass. 491, it was determined that an unrecorded deed is not valid after the death of the grantor as against one holding by a recorded deed from the grantor’s heir without notice of the former deed. This holding was based upon these facts: Nancy A. Fiske conveyed certain premises by deed dated April 22, 1864, but not recorded until 1867. She died in 1865. Her son Benjamin was her sole heir, and in 1866 he1 executed and delivered a deed of the premises which was recorded in the same year. It was held that this deed was good as against the deed executed by Mrs. Fiske in 1864. But there, it will be observed, something like a year had elapsed after the death of the ancestor before her heir made any disposition of the premises.
In Youngblood v. Vastine, 46 Mo. 239, it was held that the heirs of a grantor in an unrecorded deed of land on his death become the apparent owners of the legal title, and a duly recorded conveyance by them of the same estate to an innocent purchaser will carry the title as against the first grantee, in like manner as if made by the ancestor. The facts in that case were, that Sarah G. Wright executed a deed of trust in July, 1859, which was not recorded until October, 1866. Mrs. Wright died in 1860, and on the first day of October, 1865, the property described in the *65Wright deed was purchased from her heirs. The grantee received a warranty deed, which was recorded April 28, 1866. It was held that the latter deed was superior to the first; hut, again, this conveyance was obtained under circumstances which would justify the grantee in assuming that the heirs of Mrs. Wright were the real owners of the property.
It is scarcely necessary to enter upon an analysis of the remaining cases cited by counsel for Mrs. Alexander or in the majority opinion. They, generally, announce that an unrecorded deed of land is valid against the grantor and against his heir, but if the grantor or his heir afterwards, for a valuable consideration, convey the land to another purchaser who has no notice of the unrecorded deed, the last conveyance will perva.il against the first. This proposition is sound, .when the facts are such that the purchaser is justified in assuming that the heir was the owner. This, each of the eases shows, was. the situation.
In the circumstances of this case, Mrs. Alexander was not entitled to- the protection of the statute which she invokes. Her levy was made a little more than sixty days after the death of Mrs. Keithman. The affairs of the estate could not have been closed by administration proceedings. No such length of time elapsed between the death of Mrs. Keithman and the date of the levy as would justify Mrs. Alexander in assuming that her judgment debtor was an heir to an undivided one-half interest in the premises in dispute. She had no right at the time she made the levy to rely alone upon what the records might disclose with respect to- what real estate Mrs. Keithman owned when she died. That depended entirely upon facts independent of the record in the office of the recorder of deeds. It was her duty to have made inquiries. If she had, it appears she would have *66learned the trae facts; and not having done so, she purchased at her execution sale at her peril. It appears that Reithman had no- interest in the premises'; consequently none was acquired by the sheriff’s deed.
Assuming, for the sake of the argument,"that the majority opinion is right in holding that the lien of the Hallett mortgage is not superior to- the rights of Mrs. Alexander, then the judgment denying Judge Hallett reimbursement out of the proceeds- of the sale of tire property for money advanced to pay taxes and redeem from tax sales, is at least.erroneous, in so far as it relates to the sum advanced by him in November, 1906, about $264.00, to redeem the property from sale for the taxes of 1904 and to- pay the taxes for 1905. In matters- of partition, a court of equity will adjudicate all rights and equities growing immediately out of the common tenancy and adjust its decree to the full exigencies of the case. — Packard v. King, 3 Colo. 211. Where one in good faith, believing himself to be the owner of land, pays the taxes upo»n it or redeems it from a tax sale, and afterwards the land is adjudged to belong to another, the latter must reimburse the other to the extent of the money thus advanced. At the time Judge Hallett advanced the mo-ne-y for the purposes under conside»ration, Mrs. Alexander had received a sheriff’s deed upon which her right to» the judgment which this court has affirmed was predicated. There can be no doubt regarding Judge Hallett’s good faith in asserting that his rights in the premises were superior to tho»se of Mrs. Alexander. She has had the benefit of the money thus advanced. The statutes cited in the opinion which permit a party claiming an interest in an undivided estate in lands to pay the.taxes on, o»r redeem his interest from, a tax sale, by paying his pro*67portionate part of the taxes dne, or of the sum required to redeem the whole, do not estop Judge Hallett from recovering from- Mrs. Alexander the proportionate share which she should have paid, and of which she has had the benefit, but were merely intended to permit a party to pay the taxes on or redeem from a tax sale his proportionate part of the whole, if he so elected. They do not change the rule that a co-tenant may, if he so elects, pay the taxes on or redeem from a tax sale of the whole and hold his co-tenant for his share of the moneys thus expended. That Judge Hallett should be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the premises the $264.00 advanced is so clear, and to deny him this relief is so manifestly unjust, that argument or citation of authority is unnecessary to demonstrate that the judgment of the court on this proposition is not the law.
Counsel for Mrs. Alexander concedes the record discloses that Judge Hallett was a creditor of Mrs. Reithman at the time of her death. An heir always takes property of his ancestor subject to the payment of the debts of the latter, and in the circumstances of this case, it must be conceded there is much force in the contention of counsel that, independent of our recording act, in equity and good conscience Mrs. Alexander’s rights in the premises are subject to the debt due from the estate to Judge Hallett.
It is unnecessary, however, to discuss'this question, in view of the fact, that in my judgment Mrs. Alexander acquired no interest whatever in the premises superior to those of Judge Hallett.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Campbell agrees with my conclusion, that Judge Hallett should be reimbursed for the $264.00 advanced to redeem from tax sale and for taxes.