Court Opinion

ID: 9952639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:12:51.243557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.545373
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                   :
                                               :
                 v.                            : No. 613 C.D. 2023
                                               : Submitted: February 6, 2024
Anthony D. Heath,                              :
                                               :
                               Appellant       :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                            FILED: March 20, 2024

               Anthony D. Heath (Licensee) appeals pro se from an order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court and County, respectively),
which denied his “Ex Parte Pro Se Motion to the President Judge Seeking Leave of
Court to Reinstate Pennsylvania Driver’s License 29554408” (Motion) as moot. See
Original Record Docket Entry (OR Dkt. #) 12. The trial court found that Licensee
appears to be ineligible for reinstatement of his operating privileges because he is
currently serving a lifetime sentence for an unrelated crime. We affirm.
               The Pennsylvania Superior Court has summarized the relevant facts of
this case1 as follows:

       1
         It is appropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of the docket entries that are filed
and entered into our docket and the dockets of other courts in Licensee’s related cases. See, e.g.,
Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of facts that may be “determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Moss v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1137 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (taking judicial notice of
docket entries that were not part of the original record); Miller v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 131 A.3d 110, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (taking judicial notice of the entries on a
claimant’s criminal docket and the records contained therein).
                    On January 26, 2012, [Licensee] entered a
            negotiated guilty plea to driving under the influence of a
            controlled substance (“DUI”). [Licensee] acknowledged
            at the time of his plea that his driver’s license would be
            suspended for 12 months as a result of the guilty plea. The
            [trial] court sentenced [Licensee] that day to 3 days to 6
            months’ imprisonment, and to pay fines and costs. While
            on parole, [Licensee] failed to report as required. On
            September 14, 2012, following a revocation hearing, the
            [trial] court revoked parole and resentenced [Licensee] to
            serve the balance of his sentence, which was
            approximately 4½ months.

                   On February 8, 2022, [Licensee] filed the current
            [Motion]. In his [Motion], Licensee alleged that he turned
            in his driver’s license on or around the time of his guilty
            plea in 2012. [Licensee] claimed that he completed his
            sentence for the DUI case on February 18, 2013.
            [Licensee] conceded that he still owed costs and fines in
            the amount of $2,468.75. [Licensee] further admitted that
            he was currently incarcerated for other crimes, but
            [Licensee] stated that he planned to find employment upon
            his release. [Licensee] indicated that he received a letter
            from [the Department of Transportation (DOT)] listing the
            requirements for restoration of [Licensee]’s license. One
            of the requirements is that the court notify [DOT] that
            [Licensee] had completed serving his sentence. Thus,
            [Licensee] asked the court to: (1) forward [DOT]
            notification that [Licensee] completed his prison term; (2)
            order that [Licensee]’s driver’s license be reinstated; (3)
            order the clerk to set up a payment plan once [Licensee]
            obtains employment; and (4) suspend the court costs and
            fines.

                   On February 22, 2022, the court denied [Licensee’s
            [Motion] as moot. Specifically, the court stated that
            [Licensee] is ineligible for the restoration of his driving
            privileges based on [Licensee]’s conviction in another
            matter . . . for which [Licensee] is serving a life sentence.
Commonwealth v. Heath (Pa. Super., No. 801 EDA 2022, filed April 19, 2023), slip
op. at 1-3. The Superior Court also explained that Licensee is currently serving a

                                         2
life sentence because “a jury convicted Licensee of first-degree murder, receiving
stolen property, access device fraud, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with or
fabricating evidence.” Id. at 3, n.3. He was serving this sentence when he filed the
Motion. Id.2
                On appeal,3 Licensee argues that the trial court had a ministerial duty to
notify DOT that he had completed his prison term for the underlying DUI offense
giving rise to the suspension of his driving privileges. Licensee’s Brief at 6. In
support of his position, Licensee directs our attention to “ACT 151” and the
restoration requirements letter sent to him by DOT. Id. Licensee also contends that
he is currently in compliance with Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S.
§1541, but that the trial court has “unfairly [] obstructed in that process simply
because the [trial] court makes mention of a[n] unrelated sentence deeming [his]
request as moot, all of which . . . plays no legal or [c]onstitutional difference in the

        2
          The Northampton County District Attorney’s Office determined that it does not involve
itself in matters related to the reinstatement of driving privileges and opted not to file a brief in the
Superior Court. See Heath, slip op. at 4. Further, because Licensee’s motion also sought to
reinstate his driving privileges, the Superior Court found that the best resolution in this case would
be to transfer this appeal to our Court. Id. (citing Section 762(a)(3) of the Judicial Code, 42
Pa. C.S. §762(a)(3) (the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final
orders of the courts of common pleas where the courts of common pleas initially had jurisdiction
over the review of a government agency’s decision); see also Section 933(a)(1)(ii), 42 Pa. C.S.
§933(a)(1)(ii) (the courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction over appeals from the final order
of a government agency, including DOT); and Section 1550(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S.
§1550(a) (vesting any person who has had their license suspended by DOT with a right to appeal
in a court with proper jurisdiction). Finally, the Superior Court ordered that “[Licensee] shall file
an amended notice of appeal listing [DOT] as the appellee, so that [DOT] may have an opportunity
to respond to [Licensee]’s reinstatement request.” Id. at 5. Our review of the record in this matter
demonstrates that an amended notice of appeal has not been filed in this case, and DOT has never
been made a party in this matter.

        3
         Our “review of a grant or denial of mandamus is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion or committed legal error.” Worth v. Smeal, 701 A.2d 997, 998 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1997) (citation omitted).
                                                   3
restoration process . . . .” Licensee’s Brief at 6-7. To that end, Licensee posits that
his attempt to reinstate his driving privileges should not be prevented by an unrelated
lifetime sentence, because he has matters pending in federal court which will result
in his release from custody on that separate judgment of sentence. Id. at 5.
             However, Licensee’s Motion sought to compel, inter alia, the
reinstatement of his driver’s license.         Thus, “irrespective of [Licensee’s]
nomenclature, [the instant matter] is a mandamus action, because it seeks court
intervention to compel the performance of certain acts by government officials.”
Campbell v. Rosenberger, 632 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Moreover,
this mandamus action is peculiar because Licensee initiated this matter by filing the
Motion under the former criminal docket number for his DUI prosecution, rather
than by filing a civil action against either the County’s Clerk of Courts or DOT
directly seeking the reinstatement of his license.
             Indeed, as this Court has explained:

             Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is designed
             to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act or
             mandatory duty on the part of a public officer. In order to
             prevail in an action for mandamus, [Licensee] must
             establish that he has a clear legal right to the relief he
             requested, that respondents have a corresponding duty to
             perform a ministerial act or mandatory duty, and that no
             other adequate remedy is available at law.
Campbell, 632 A.2d at 1096; see also Nason v. Commonwealth, 494 A.2d 499, 502
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which is granted only
where there is a clear and specific legal right of [a] plaintiff, a correspondingly clear
legal duty of [a] defendant and a want of any other adequate remedy. It is never
granted in anticipation of an omission of duty.”) (citations omitted and emphasis in
original); Sewell v. Solomon, 465 A.2d 130, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (“The

                                           4
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure also state that in order for a [c]omplaint in
mandamus to be sufficient it must allege, among other things, the want of any other
adequate remedy at law.”) (footnote omitted).
              Here, Licensee failed to demonstrate that the trial court has a mandatory
or ministerial duty to notify DOT of the completion of his DUI sentence or that he
is entitled to the reinstatement of his license by DOT. For his contention that the
trial court did in fact have such a duty, Licensee vaguely cites to “ACT 151.” Brief
for Appellant at 6. Similarly, in its December 29, 2020 restoration requirements
letter sent to Licensee, DOT referred to a “PRISON RELEASE REQUIREMENT
(Act 151).” OR Dkt. #12, Ex. A at 2.4 In relevant part, the letter states that “[t]he
[trial c]ourt has sentenced you to serve a prison term. . . . The [trial c]ourt must
certify to [DOT] that your prison term is completed. [DOT] recommends that you
CONTACT YOUR PROBATION OFFICER and/or the [trial c]ourt to ensure that
[DOT] is properly notified.” Id. However, the Motion is unclear regarding what
Act 151 specifically refers to and whether it actually charges the trial court or the
County Clerk of Courts with a duty to notify DOT of the completion of Licensee’s
term of imprisonment for his DUI conviction.
              Section 16 of the Act of December 28, 1998, P.L. 1126, No. 151 (Act
151), amended Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code by adding subsection (a.1), 75
Pa. C.S. §1541(a.1). In relevant part, Section 1541(a.1) now states that “[c]redit
toward serving the period of suspension or revocation imposed for [S]ection[] . . .
3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) . . .
shall not commence until the date of the person’s release from prison.” In addition,

       4
         We note that DOT’s restoration requirements letter was sent to Licensee at a residential
address in Allentown, while the Motion was filed by Licensee with a return address at the State
Correctional Institution at Frackville. Compare OR Dkt. #12 at 1 with OR Dkt. #12, Ex. A at 1.
                                               5
Section 56 of Act 151 amended Section 6323(5) of the Vehicle Code, which now
provides that “the record of judgment required to be sent to [DOT] by paragraphs
(1) and (2) shall indicate if the court ordered the defendant to a term of prison.” 75
Pa. C.S. §6323(5).
              However, Section 6323 (1)(i) and (2) of the Vehicle Code states:

               Subject to any inconsistent procedures and standards
              relating to reports and transmission of funds prescribed
              pursuant to [the Judicial Code]:

               (1) The following shall apply:

                    (i) The clerks of any court of this Commonwealth,
              within 10 days after final judgment of conviction or
              acquittal or other disposition of charges under any of the
              provision of this title or under Section 13 of the [A]ct of
              April 14, 1972[, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §780-113],
              known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
              Cosmetic Act [(Drug Act)], including an adjudication of
              delinquency or the granting of a consent decree, shall send
              to [DOT] a record of conviction, acquittal or other
              disposition.

                                             ***

               (2) A record of the judgment shall also be forwarded to
              [DOT] upon conviction or acquittal of a person of a felony,
              a misdemeanor of the first degree or a misdemeanor of the
              second degree in the commission of which the judge
              determines that a motor vehicle was essentially involved.
75 Pa. C.S. §6323(1)(i), (2).5

       5
          Act 151 also amended Section 1584 and added Section 1586 to the Vehicle Code, 75
Pa. C.S. §§1584 and 1586, which relate to the Commonwealth’s participation in the interstate
Driver’s License Compact (Compact). See, e.g., Golden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Driver Licensing, 766 A.2d 361, 363-65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (rejecting constitutional claims to
the validity of these amendments to the Vehicle Code). Nevertheless, these changes are not
relevant as the Compact is not implicated herein.
                                               6
              None of the above provisions create a purported “prison release
requirement” to be sent by the trial court to DOT upon the completion of a DUI-
related prison term. Rather, as indicated, the law relates to the report that must be
sent within 10 days of a conviction, acquittal or disposition by a clerk of courts to
DOT. See Section 81.4 of DOT’s regulations, 37 Pa. Code §81.4 (describing the
content that the clerk of courts must include in a report to be sent to DOT under
Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code, within 10 days of a conviction, acquittal or
disposition); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 771 (“The clerk of courts shall report to [DOT]
all dispositions of charges required by [Section] 6323 (relating to reports by courts).
The report shall be sent by electronic transmission.”).
              In any event, Licensee did not file an appropriate civil action against
either DOT or the County Clerk of Courts in his efforts to obtain a restoration of his
driving privileges. Moreover, it is well settled that mandamus may not be used as a
substitute for Licensee’s statutory remedies to contest either the validity of the
license suspension or issues regarding credit to the suspension. See, e.g., Section
1516(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1516(d) (“Drivers wishing to have their
record reviewed by [DOT] may make such a request in order that the record be
brought up to date.”); Section 1541(a.1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1541(a.1)
(“Credit toward serving the period of suspension . . . for [violations of S]ection[] . . .
3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) . . . shall
not commence until the date of the person’s release from prison.”);6 Section 1550(a)

       6
         See also Section 1541(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1541(d), which states, in
relevant part:

              Successful completion of a treatment program includes the
              payment of all court-imposed fines and costs, as well as fees to be
              paid to the treatment program by the defendant. For the purposes of
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                              7
of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1550(a) (“Any person . . . whose operating
privilege has been . . . suspended, . . . by [DOT] shall have the right to appeal to the
court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to [the Judicial Code].
The appellant shall serve a copy of the petition for appeal, together with a copy of
the notice of the action from which the appeal has been taken, upon [DOT’s] legal
office.”);    Section      491.4(d)(1)(iii)       of    DOT’s       regulations,      67     Pa. Code
§491.4(d)(1)(iii) (“Correspondence, pleadings, briefs, orders or other papers relating
to the case shall be filed with the appropriate docket clerk at the following address:
. . . Secretary of Transportation, Driver Licensing Docket Clerk, 1101 South Front
[St.], 3rd [Fl.], Harrisburg, [PA] 17104-2516 . . . for matters involving: . . . Requests
for record review under 75 Pa. C.S. §1516 (relating to [DOT] records).”);
Department of Transportation v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 1155, 1163 (Pa. 2000) (“If
appellees wish to challenge the accuracy of their driving records . . . they may do so
under [Section] 1516(d) (licensees may request that driving records be updated).
Should they choose to do so, however, any amendment to the accuracy of the record
will not result in the reinstatement of their driving privileges. Such an amendment

                restoring a suspended license, being current on a payment plan shall
                be considered as a part of a successfully completed program. If a
                defendant fails to successfully complete the requirements of a
                treatment program, the suspension shall remain in effect until the
                defendant completes the program and is otherwise eligible for
                restoration of his operating privilege.

(Emphasis added.) The Motion alleges, in pertinent part, that “there is still an outstanding balance
we wish to pay to the [C]lerk of this court to cover court cost and fines in the amount of $2,468.75,”
and that “[w]e seek further leave of court to be able once we have secured employment to make a
payment plan with the court[’]s [C]lerk[’]s [O]ffice to pay off the required fee and court costs . . . .”
OR Dkt. #12 at 1, 2. Thus, the trial court could have denied the Motion on this basis as well. See
Washington v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 301 A.3d 982, 985
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s order on any basis appearing in the
record.”).
                                                   8
to the driver’s license record would simply clarify the record as to the specific nature
of the suspension.”); Smires v. O’Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
(“This de novo appeal before a court of law [under Section 1550(a)] is an appropriate
and adequate remedy that can be used to raise any defense, whether constitutional
or statutory. That precedent does not favor [the l]icensees does not mean that they
may seek a writ of mandamus.”); Boyer v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 513 M.D. 2020, filed July 26, 2022), slip op. at
6 n.7 (“Likewise, ‘[o]ne who allows his statutory appeal rights to expire cannot at a
later date successfully assert those appeal rights under the guise of a petition for writ
of mandamus.’ Luke v. Cataldi, 883 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).”).7
              Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.8

       7
         See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to an
unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of . . . th[is] Court filed after January 15,
2008. Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).

       8
         See, e.g., Washington, 301 A.3d at 985 (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s order on
any basis appearing in the record.”).
                                               9
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania       :
                                   :
            v.                     : No. 613 C.D. 2023
                                   :
Anthony D. Heath,                  :
                                   :
                      Appellant    :

PER CURIAM

                                  ORDER

           AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2024, the order of the
Northampton County Court of Common Pleas dated February 22, 2022, is
AFFIRMED.