Court Opinion

ID: 9686309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:41:02.719379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.527774
License: Public Domain

Taylor, J.
(dissenting). This Whistleblowers’ Protection Act case presents the issue what constitutes the “occurrence of the alleged violation of this act” that triggers the ninety-day period of limitation, MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1), in the context of a constructive discharge claim. The majority concludes that it is the employee’s tender of resignation that triggers the limitation period. I dissent because I believe that *331it is the employer’s adverse action that triggers the limitation period. Because plaintiff alleges no adverse actions by defendant that occurred within ninety days of the filing of her complaint, subsection 3(1) bars plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1972. On February 28, 1989, after consulting with her attorney, plaintiff contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation because she believed that defendant had filed an unsubstantiated and therefore improper bond claim with its insurer. Plaintiff claimed that the credit union board members’ attitude toward her changed dramatically after they learned of this action.
At the time this took place, the president and CEO of defendant was retiring. Plaintiff thought she was generally perceived as his successor. However, an acting interim CEO was named. Plaintiff was among five candidates interviewed for the president and CEO position. After the position had been offered to and rejected by another candidate, the board voted on June 27, 1989, to appoint plaintiff to the position. Plaintiff testified that she did not learn of the appointment until July 25, 1989. On the following day, July 26, 1989, the board rescinded her promotion. Defendant’s alleged basis for the rescission was that the National Credit Union Agency opposed plaintiffs appointment due to her lack of a background in finance and accounting. On July 27, 1989, plaintiff contacted her attorney for advice about what action to take with regard to the rescission of her promotion.
On August 16, 1989, plaintiff learned that another person, Katie Stone, had been appointed interim president and CEO. Simultaneous with Stone’s appoint*332ment, plaintiff was relieved of her job duties, and her staff was instructed to report to Stone. She claimed that from that time on she was ignored and ostracized.
On Saturday, October 21, 1989, plaintiff typed out a letter of resignation, mailed it to the board members, and placed a copy on Stone’s desk. Plaintiff acknowledged that her decision to resign was precipitated by defendant’s conduct before the preparation of the letter and that she had had no contact with credit union management or board members on either October 21 or 22, 1989.
After receiving plaintiff’s letter of resignation on October 23, 1989, Stone asked her to clean out her desk and leave immediately, which she did.
On January 19, 1990, plaintiff filed suit against defendant and some of its board members, alleging, inter alia, that she had been constructively discharged in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.) MSA 17.428(1) et seq. After the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff’s claim under the act was barred because she had not filed her claim within the statutory ninety-day period of limitation. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that plaintiff was constructively discharged on October 23, 1989.
The majority affirms the result of the Court of Appeals, concluding that plaintiff’s October 21, 1989, resignation triggered the ninety-day period of limitation and that her claim, accordingly, was timely. I disagree. I am convinced that the limitation period was triggered by defendant’s alleged discriminatory actions, none of which occurred after August 1989. *333Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the judgment of the trial court because plaintiffs claim was filed outside the limitation period.
The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act’s limitation provision, MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1), states that a civil action must be brought “within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.” As is apparent from the quoted language, the Legislature has chosen the time of the alleged discriminatory act as the beginning of the limitation period. Because plaintiff filed suit on January 19, 1990, all incidents of alleged discriminatory retaliation that occurred before October 21, 1989, are barred.
Here, plaintiff alleges no incidents of discriminatory retaliation after August 1989, when Stone was named CEO and plaintiff was relieved of her duties. Therefore, in order to fit within the ninety-day limitation period, plaintiff was required to file a Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim by November 1989, at the latest. Because plaintiff failed to do so and did not file her claim until January 19, 1990, subsection 3(1) bars her claim.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid this result by contending that, in the context of a constructive discharge claim, the ninety-day limitation period is not triggered until the employee actually resigns. The majority adopts this position.
“[A] constructive discharge occurs only where an employer or its agent’s conduct is so severe that a reasonable person in the employee’s place would feel compelled to resign.” Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 710; 545 NW2d 596 (1996). Where an employee establishes that he was *334constructively discharged, he is treated the same as if the employer had actually discharged him. Id. However, this does not necessarily mean that the discharge imputed to the employer occurred on the date the employee resigned.
Constructive discharge is not in itself a cause of action, but rather is a defense against the employer’s argument that the employee is precluded from bringing suit because he voluntarily terminated his employment.1 Because constructive discharge is merely a defense to a claim of nonsuit, an underlying cause of action is necessary to support maintenance of the employee’s suit. Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc, 204 Mich App 481, 487; 516 NW2d 102 (1994). This Court has indicated that it is the time of the employer’s alleged discriminatory act giving rise to the underlying cause of action that signals the start of the statutory limitation period, not the date the employee eventually resigns. Champion, supra at 711; Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 543-544; 398 NW2d 368 (1986). Further, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the relevant inquiry is “ ‘the time of the discriminatory acts,’ rather than . . . ‘the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.’ ” Delaware State College v Ricks, 449 US 250, 258; 101 S Ct 498; 66 L Ed 2d 431 *335(1980); see also Chardon v Fernandez, 454 US 6, 8; 102 S Ct 28; 70 L Ed 2d 6 (1981).
In other words, it is the adverse employment action leading to the employee’s decision to leave that constitutes the “discharge” giving rise to the cause of action. Champion, supra at 711. Thus, here, plaintiff’s discharge occurred when Stone was named to the CEO position and plaintiff was relieved of all her duties in August 1989. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged no further discriminatory acts after this point, even though her employment continued until her resignation two months later. “Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Ricks, supra at 257; see also Chardon, supra at 8; Sumner, supra at 530. Plaintiff’s decision to resign in October was simply the “delayed, but inevitable consequence” of the board’s actions in July and August 1989. Ricks, supra at 257-258 (holding that the plaintiff’s separation from his employment was not the event that triggered the running of the period of limitation because it was merely the delayed effect of his employer’s decision to deny him tenure); see also Chardon, supra. Accordingly, Michigan and United States Supreme Court authority regarding constructive discharge, as well as the plain language of subsection 3(1), indicate that the relevant event for purposes of the limitation period was defendant’s alleged discriminatory action in August 1989.
The majority nonetheless concludes that a constructive discharge generally occurs at the time of *336resignation.2 It cites Champion, supra, for the definition of constructive discharge, but does not follow Champion’s holding regarding when a constructive discharge occurs. In Champion, a civil rights action in which the plaintiff was raped by her supervisor, this Court held that the constructive discharge occurred at the time of the rape, not following the rape. Champion, supra at 711. The majority apparently views Champion as an exceptional case, as indicated by its conclusion that the focus “in these far more common situations must be on the moment of resignation.” Ante at 328. I agree that Champion involved particularly egregious employer conduct. However, by definition, a constructive discharge involves employer conduct that is “so severe that a reasonable person in the employee’s place would feel compelled to resign.” Id. at 710. Employer conduct that is sufficiently severe to cause a reasonable person to feel compelled to resign, even if less extreme than that involved in Champion, is the “occurrence of the alleged violation” that triggers the statute of limitations under subsection 3(1). I see no justification, and the majority does not offer one, for creating a different rule for an instance of employer conduct that *337constitutes constructive discharge but is less egregious than the rape at issue in Champion.
The majority also indicates that there is something improper about focusing on the employer’s action to determine the time of a constructive discharge because this results in setting a date of occurrence in retrospect. Ante at 327. However, subsection 3(1) compels this result by explicitly requiring that the period of limitation run from the “occurrence of the alleged violation.” In the context of a constructive discharge, the “occurrence of the alleged violation” is clearly the employer’s action that causes an employee to feel compelled to resign. The employee’s decision to resign is a response to an alleged violation. The resignation itself cannot reasonably be considered the “occurrence of the alleged violation.”3 Thus, the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff’s resignation triggered the statute of limitations is inconsistent with the language of subsection 3(1), which places the focus on the time of the alleged discriminatory act.
In support of its conclusion that the date of a constructive discharge is the date a plaintiff resigns, the majority cites cases from other jurisdictions indicating that the resignation date “provides the most clearly determinable indication of when a constructive discharge occurred.” Id. at 328, n 21. There may be cases in which it is difficult to pinpoint the spe*338cific discriminatory act by the employer that caused the employee to reasonably feel compelled to resign. But the difficulty of such factual determinations in some cases is no excuse for departing from established law that focuses on the discriminatory act of the employer. Factfinders are frequently called upon to resolve factual disputes regarding when a party reasonably knew some matter. In any event, the present case raises no such factual disputes; plaintiff does not even allege any discriminatory conduct by defendant occurring after August 1989. Moreover, in the context of Whistleblowers’ Protection Act cases, the Legislature has clearly stated that the ninety-day limitation period is triggered by the “occurrence of the alleged violation.” Subsection 3(1). The majority fails to demonstrate how an employee’s tender of resignation could be the “occurrence of the alleged violation.”
Finally, the majority implicitly acknowledges that its rule places control over accrual of a cause of action in the hands of the employee. Ante at 328, n 22. It cites a case from another jurisdiction, Mullins v Rockwell Int’l Corp, 15 Cal 4th 731, 740; 63 Cal Rptr 2d 636; 936 P2d 1246 (1997), which rationalizes such a rule. Mullins basically concludes that, because constructive discharge cases by definition involve an employer who engages in conduct that causes the employee to resign, the employer remains in control. I agree that in a constructive discharge claim, the employer has a measure of control over the merits of the claim in the sense that it must have done something to cause the employee to feel compelled to resign. But if the statute of limitations in constructive discharge cases is not triggered until the employee *339actually resigns, the employer cannot reasonably be viewed as having any control over when the action accrues and, accordingly, has no protection from stale claims. Mullins also contends that a delay by an employee in resigning will only make it more difficult for the employee to prove constructive discharge.4 These assertions lose track of the primary purposes of statutes of limitations: “1) to encourage plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently, and 2) to protect defendants from having to defend against stale and fraudulent claims.” Lemmerman v Fealk, 449 Mich 56, 65; 534 NW2d 695 (1995). A rule that allows plaintiffs to determine when a statute of limitations begins to run, e.g., by deciding when to resign, undermines these primary purposes of statutes of limitation. The rule adopted by the majority — that a constructive discharge does not occur until the employee actually resigns — neither encourages plaintiffs to promptly pursue their claims nor protects defendants from stale claims. Accordingly, the majority does not provide a satisfactory response to the criticism that it is improper for a statute of limitation to be triggered by an occurrence that is solely in the control of a plaintiff.
In conclusion, all the elements of plaintiffs claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act accrued before October 21, 1989. Plaintiff alleged no discriminatory act by defendant occurring after August 1989. Subsection 3(1) states that the “occurrence of the *340alleged violation” triggers the limitation period. This Court’s prior decisions mandate that the focus in constructive discharge cases be on the date of the discriminatory act, not on the date the plaintiff eventually resigns. Accordingly, subsection 3(l)’s ninety-day limitation period bars plaintiff’s claim here. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the trial court’s judgment for defendant.
Brickley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.

 Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc, 204 Mich App 481, 487; 516 NW2d 102 (1994); Wolff v Automobile Club of Michigan, 194 Mich App 6, 15; 486 NW2d 75 (1992); anno: Circumstances which warrant finding of constructive discharge in cases under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC 621 et seq.), 93 ALR Fed 10, 16; anno: Circumstances in title VII employment discrimination cases (42 USC 2000e et seq.) which warrant finding of “constructive discharge” of discriminatee who resigns employment, 55 ALR Fed 418, 420-421.

 At n 20, the majority suggests that there may be instances where a constructive discharge occurs before the date that the employee resigns because the employee “has received definite notice of the termination.” However, it chooses not to discuss this possibility at length, summarily concluding that plaintiff had no such definite notice here. I believe that the actions plaintiff alleges in her complaint as constituting the constructive discharge provided her with sufficiently “definite notice of the termination” when they occurred, i.e., in August 1989. Because plaintiff alleges no conduct by defendant after August 1989, I do not understand how plaintiff had more definite notice of her termination on October 21, 1989, than she did in August 1989.

 The majority asserts that defendant invites this Court “to depart from our longstanding rule that a discharge occurs when a reasonable person in the employee’s place would feel compelled to resign.” Id. at 328. However, there is no dispute with this definition of constructive discharge. The only dispute here is when the constructive discharge occurs: 1) when the employer’s action occurs that causes the employee to reasonably feel compelled to resign or 2) when the employee actually resigns in response to such an action.

 It is not necessarily true that delay will harm an employee’s case in the context of an alleged constructive discharge. The additional information an employee may gain through continuing at a workplace after the employer’s alleged discriminatory conduct may assist in proving the employee’s claim.