Court Opinion

ID: 9845231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:17:05.487197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:55.065512
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority concludes that a person given jail time as a condition of probation is eligible for good-time credits under sections 17-26-109 and 17-26-115, 8A C.R.S. (1986). I disagree.1
The sentencing statute evinces two separate and distinct legislative schemes: one for sentences of probation and another for sentences of imprisonment. See § 16-11-201,-213, 8A C.R.S. (1986), and § 16-11-301,-310, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Probation is purely a statutory creation. § 16-11-201,-213; People v. Ray, 192 Colo. 391, 393, 560 P.2d 74, 75 (1977); People v. Ledford, 173 Colo. 194, 196, 477 P.2d 374, 375 (1970). Section 16-11-202 provides:
Probationary power of court. When it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best *1281interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be served thereby, the court may grant the defendant probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it deems best. In addition to imposing other conditions, the court has the power to commit the defendant to any jail operated by the county or city and county in which the offense was committed during such time or for such intervals within the period of probation as the court determines. ... That the defendant submit to commitment imposed under this section shall be deemed a condition of probation.
(Emphasis added.)
The terms and conditions of probation must be derived from the statute. § 16-11-203, 8A C.R.S. (1986) (“The court, subject to the provisions in this title, in its discretion may grant probation to a defendant[.]” (Emphasis added.)); Ledford, 173 Colo, at 196, 477 P.2d at 375. Under this statutory scheme, the sentence of probation and the imposition of any conditions of probation are entirely within the trial judge’s discretion. § 16-11-202,-204(4), 8A C.R.S. (1986); Ledford, 173 Colo, at 196, 477 P.2d at 375. Moreover, the trial judge is the only person given statutory authority in the probation sentencing scheme to “reduce or increase the term of probation or alter the conditions or impose new conditions.” § 16-11-204(4) (emphasis added).
There is no statutory provision for good-time credit in the probation sentencing scheme. In concluding that a condition of probation is subject to the good-time credit in sections 17-26-109 and 17-26-115, the majority writes a good-time credit provision into the probation scheme by including within this scheme mandatory credits that do not exist under a plain reading of the statute. See § 16-11-201, -213. This clearly was not the General Assembly’s intent because the statute does not provide good-time credits as one of the terms and conditions of probation. In my opinion, conditions of probation should not be treated differently than the actual sentence of probation. Any enhancement or reduction in the probation sentence, or any condition of probation, is vested only in the trial judge. This court should not disrupt this statutory scheme and read sections 17-26-109 and 17-26-115 into the probation statute.
The majority concludes that sections 17-26-109 and 17-26-115 apply to incarceration when imposed as a condition of probation. The effect of these sections, however, is to reduce the overall sentence imposed by the court. Section 17-26-109 provides that a person who faithfully performs his or her duties in jail “is entitled to a deduction from the time of his [or her] sentence of two days in each month.” (Emphasis added.) Under the probation sentencing scheme, a defendant is sentenced to probation and incarcerated as a condition of probation. The clear language of sections 17-26-109 and 17-26-115 applies to misdemeanor sentences to the county jail, and does not include incarceration as a condition of probation.
Finally, section 16-11-202, which provides for jail time as a condition of probation, does not include a good-time credit provision or any reference to sections 17-26-109 or 17-26-115. Likewise, neither section 17-26-109 nor section 17-26-115 refers back to section 16-11-202. The General Assembly is presumed to have acted with full knowledge of already existing laws. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Colo.1985) (presumption that General Assembly was mindful of prior good-time credit statutes when it enacted sentencing scheme for offenders). If the General Assembly intended a good-time credit to be a term or condition of probation, they would have included such language in section 16-11-202.
I respectfully dissent.

. While I disagree with the general rule adopted by the majority, I do agree that the rule of lenity should be applied to the facts in this case and that the defendant should not be returned to jail because the original mittimus committing the defendant did not advise the sheriff that the confinement was a condition of probation.