Court Opinion

ID: 9771812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:54:06.604139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:37.007487
License: Public Domain

LAGARDE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It should first be noted that appellant has not challenged the constitutionality of TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. section 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987). However, the majority effectively renders invalid and meaningless the follow*426ing portion of section 6.01 of the Texas Penal Code:
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a statute provides that the omission is an offense or ...
and further impliedly declares unconstitutional as applied the following portion of section 22.04(a)(1) of the code:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes.... to an individual who is 66 years of age or older:
(1) serious bodily injury;
(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;
(3) disfigurement or deformity; or
(4) bodily injury.
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.1987) (emphasis supplied).
The effective date of the last amendment to Section 6.01 was September 1, 1975. Act of Sept. 1, 1975, ch. 342, § 3, 1975 Tex.Gen.Laws, 912, 913. In 1977, section 22.04 was amended to add the words “by act or omission.” Act of Aug. 29, 1977, ch. 819, § 1,1977 Tex.Gen.Laws 2067. The cases primarily relied on by the majority were decided pre-1977. The effective date of the amendment to section 22.04 creating the offense of injury to an elderly individual was September 1, 1981. Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 604, § 2204, 1981 Tex.Gen.Laws 2397. The offense is defined in clear and precise language with no reference to any required duty.
The majority relies on Anderson v. State, 27 Tex.Crim.App. 177, 11 S.W. 33 (1889), as the leading authority for the rule that in Texas criminal liability cannot be imposed if no statutory duty to act exists.
The Anderson court, at page 34, concluded:
As we understand both the common law and the statute, there can be no criminal negligence or carelessness by omission to act, unless it was the especial duty of the party to perform the act omitted. Negligence or carelessness by omission presupposes duty to perform the act omitted, and cannot, in law, be imputed except upon the predicate of duty.
(Emphasis supplied.)
A careful reading of Anderson reveals that only a legal duty is required, not a statutory duty. See Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 BAYLOR L.REV. 589, 595 (1983). Further, unlike the current version of section 22.04, the statute considered by the Anderson court did not specifically refer to conduct by omission. Anderson, 11 S.W. at 33.
At the time of the amendment of the statute creating the offense, by act or omission, of injury to an elderly individual, the legislature is presumed to have known that no statutory duty existed. By implication, the legislature must have intended that the common law duties be considered as a basis for such legal duty, thereby repudiating the state judicial hardline approach of requiring a statutory duty.1 At common law a legal duty, from which a criminally punishable omission could be drawn, arose by virtue of a status relationship between individuals, as well as by contract. See Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 599-600 (1958).
In light of the fact that the constitutionality of section 22.04 has not been challenged, I conclude that because section 22.-04 says that an omission can constitute an offense, and the indictment alleges facts from which a legal duty clearly and naturally flows, to-wit: “that Hazel Billingslea was the natural mother of the defendant, who lived in the same house as defendant, and the said Hazel Billingslea was at said time physically unable to secure medical care for herself” that section 22.04 does make an omission an offense within the meaning of section 6.01(c), and is constitutionally applied to the facts of this case.
Since 1889 the holding in Anderson v. State has been misinterpreted and cited for the rule that a statutory duty is required. It is time to re-read the case and correctly *427apply it for its true holding — that a legal duty is required, not necessarily a statutory duty. Consequently, I would overrule appellant’s first point of error.
In point of error number two Billingslea challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction. He primarily claims that the evidence fails to show he had a duty to care for his mother.
The majority opinion adequately sets out the evidence herein. Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979): “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dickey v. State, 693 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Reconciliation of any conflicts and contradictions in the evidence is within the province of the jury, and such conflicts will not call for reversal if there is enough credible evidence to support the conviction. Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Applying that standard, I would hold that the evidence herein is sufficient to show that Billingslea had a legal duty to his Mother and to support his conviction herein. I would, therefore, overrule appellant’s sufficiency point.
Appellant’s points of error three, four and five complain of the submission of jury instructions pursuant to TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1987). These points have been decided adversely to appellant in this court’s opinions in Rose v. State, 724 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, pet. filed); Joslin v. State, 722 S.W.2d 725, 730-36 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, pet. filed). I would, therefore, overrule his remaining points of error and affirm the conviction.

. Apparently, Texas stands alone in this requirement. See Goodall, 35 BAYLOR L.REV. at 605.