Court Opinion

ID: 9951676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 18:03:03.612825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.677325
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 Maldonado v. County of Riverside CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JOEY MALDONADO,                                                      D082761

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2104513)

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,

         Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside,
Eric A. Keen, Judge. Affirmed.
         Stone Busailah, Michael P. Stone, Muna Busailah, and Robert Rabe for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Liberty Cassidy Whitmore, Jennifer M. Rosner, and Brian R. Dierzé for
Defendant and Respondent.

         Joey Maldonado, a correctional officer employed by the Riverside
County Sheriff’s Department (Department), appeals the trial court’s denial of
his petition for a writ of mandate challenging his 317-day suspension without
pay. Maldonado contends the court erred both procedurally and
substantively by: (1) finding there was sufficient evidence that he violated
Department policy; (2) relying on evidence of misconduct that was not
specifically alleged in the Department’s Letter of Intent (see Gov. Code,

§ 3304, subd. (d)(1)1); and (3) finding that his suspension was not an abuse of
discretion. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. The Cell Search
      On June 22, 2019, Maldonado was working for the Department as a
senior correctional deputy at Smith Correctional Facility. Around 8:30 p.m.,
Deputy Nigel Hinson and Maldonado searched a cell occupied by inmates
Rickey McDonald and Ronald Coleman on a second-floor top tier above a
communal dayroom below. In the hours leading up to the search, McDonald
and Hinson exchanged words on more than one occasion, and McDonald
thought Hinson was antagonizing him. An officer escorted McDonald and
Coleman out of the cell while it was being searched.
      Choppy video footage of the dayroom area shows that Hinson and
Maldonado searched the cell for several minutes. The dayroom floor was
empty before the search started, but at some point during the search, items
appeared on the floor underneath McDonald’s cell. Maldonado put some
items from McDonald’s cell into a trash bag. After the search, Hinson walked
to a bottom tier cell occupied by James Goodwin, an inmate “rep” who helped
keep order among inmates, and spoke with him for a moment before exiting
the dayroom.

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1), provides in relevant part that when a public
agency determines that discipline may be taken against a public safety
officer, “it shall complete its investigation and notify the public safety officer
of its proposed discipline by a Letter of Intent or Notice of Adverse Action
articulating the discipline . . . .”
                                         2
      According to McDonald, his cell was left in disarray and some of his
food items were opened, but his cellmate’s belongings were untouched.
During the search, McDonald saw the deputies throwing things over the top
tier railing onto the floor of the dayroom. Goodwin also saw items falling
from the top tier during the search. Around 8:43 p.m., video footage shows
Coleman retrieving items from the dayroom floor. Hinson and Maldonado
did not document the items removed during the search or complete a cell
search log.
      B. The Fight
      After the search, Hinson made an announcement on the public address
system that dayroom time was suspended “thanks to McDonald.” Dayroom
time allows inmates to watch television, take a shower, use telephones, and
take advantage of other benefits. According to Deputy Oliver Cepeida, a new
officer on duty at the time, Hinson also spoke to some inmates over cell
intercoms and told them McDonald was responsible for the suspension.
      Shortly thereafter, Hinson or Maldonado opened only the bottom tier
cells, which was unusual because typically both the top and bottom tiers are
opened at the same time. Video footage shows Goodwin walking over to the
intercom connecting the dayroom with the “pod office” where Hinson and
Maldonado were working. Goodwin told a Department investigator that
Hinson informed him they were going to lock down the bottom tier again and
suspend dayroom because of McDonald’s misconduct. Around this time,
Cepeida believed he heard Hinson say “take care of it” or something along
those lines. Cepeida left the pod office to go to the restroom, in part because
he felt “uneasy” and “uncomfortable.”
      Goodwin then walked to McDonald’s cell to speak to him. The deputies
would have been able to hear the conversation between Goodwin and

                                        3
McDonald from inside the pod office, as well as incoming inmate calls
through the intercom. Goodwin told McDonald he would face “discipline,”
and then Goodwin went to talk to another inmate, Davion Owens. Goodwin
told an investigator that after he returned to his cell for lock down, Hinson
used the intercom system to tell him to “take care of” disciplining McDonald
“now.”
      Soon afterwards the deputies opened both tiers—to the surprise of
some inmates given the announced dayroom suspension—and Goodwin
emerged from his cell without a shirt on because he planned to fight
McDonald to discipline him. At first, Goodwin went upstairs to McDonald’s
cell and told him to come down to the bottom tier for discipline. When
McDonald refused to come down, Goodwin, his cellmate David Moore, and
Owens walked up the stairs to McDonald’s cell and began punching
McDonald. About one minute later, the deputies told the inmates to lock
down and Goodwin, Moore, and Owens returned to their cells. Hinson did
not instruct the inmates to stop fighting or lock down until after the fight was
already over. None of the officers on duty left the pod office to get
PepperBalls or spray, ordered the inmates to stand down, or attempted to
break up the fight, despite being trained to do so in those situations.
      After McDonald walked down to the dayroom floor to seek medical
attention, two deputies handcuffed him, and Maldonado and Hinson went to
Goodwin’s cell. Goodwin, Moore, and Owens were led to holding cells without
being handcuffed. According to deputies’ testimony, leaving suspects
unhandcuffed is inconsistent with what deputies are trained to do in those
circumstances. And although deputies are supposed to advise suspects of

their Miranda2 rights and interview them, the inmate suspects said that was

2     See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
                                        4
not done here, and they were returned to their cells about 20 minutes later.
Goodwin told a Department investigator that while Hinson was escorting him
to a holding cell, Hinson commended or thanked him.
      Immediately after the fight, McDonald spent two days in the facility’s
intake area before being transferred to another facility. He also was not
interviewed or Mirandized. Hinson radioed dispatch afterwards and
indicated he would not be writing a report about the incident, and that a
report should not be tracked in internal systems. Goodwin received no
discipline in connection with the fight.
      C. The Investigation
      McDonald filed a grievance a week later, and the Department initiated
an investigation. The Department’s investigators reviewed logs, video
footage, audio recordings, and other documentation, and also interviewed
deputies and inmates. The lead investigator said that the facility’s video
system only records when the camera detects motion and “maybe a couple of
frames a second[,]” which made the footage “not very smooth . . . .”
      The audio recordings collected by Department investigators included an
outgoing phone call Goodwin made to his girlfriend the morning after the
incident. In the call, Goodwin said that deputies told him to take care of the
discipline “now” instead of later. Goodwin also said that afterwards, Hinson
told him “good looking,” which he interpreted to mean that Hinson condoned
what happened.
      D. Disciplinary Action
      Chief Edward Delgado, a correctional officer with 21 years of
experience, reviewed the investigation results and supporting documentation.
Based on his review, Delgado concluded that Hinson and Maldonado
performed the search of McDonald’s cell in an unprofessional manner as

                                           5
retaliation for McDonald’s disrespectful behavior. Delgado found it
significant that the deputies did not touch Coleman’s belongings during the
search, but “ruin[ed]” McDonald’s property. According to Delgado, there was
only “one way” for McDonald’s belongings to end up on the floor of the
dayroom, which was for the items to be “pushed off into the tier outside of the
cell door[.]” Delgado first said he saw the deputies “kick the stuff over the top
tier onto the ground into the dayroom.” He later said that while the video
does not show the deputies kicking the items, it was “obvious that based on
their movements” and objects “falling and on the ground on the floor of the
dayroom” that the “only way they got there was” by the deputies kicking
them. Citing his “training and experience at every level[,]” Delgado believed
the search was a “fuck-you cell search” which was “a catalyst” for the fight
that followed.
      Delgado also credited witnesses’ statements that Hinson made a
loudspeaker announcement identifying McDonald as the reason for the
dayroom suspension, and that Hinson later communicated to Goodwin via
intercom that Goodwin should take care of disciplining McDonald “now.”
When Delgado saw from video footage that the deputies only opened the
bottom tier at first, he said “it was very obvious what was going on” because
the tier remained open just long enough for Goodwin to go upstairs and talk
to McDonald, confer with Owens, and then return to his cell. As for what
happened after the fight, Delgado observed that in this particular dayroom—
which housed repeat offenders with a higher “propensity for violence”—it was
unusual that McDonald was handcuffed, but not the suspected aggressors.
Delgado also found it unusual that the deputies took no statements, did not
Mirandize the suspects, and did little to document the incident.

                                       6
      Delgado concluded that for a senior deputy with 12 years of experience
with the Department, Maldonado displayed incompetence by failing to
complete a cell search log as required and destroying McDonald’s property
during the search. Delgado noted that Maldonado could have suspended
dayroom time for McDonald alone instead of for everyone in the unit, or he
could have given McDonald a disciplinary marker for being disrespectful,
which was “very, very common.” Delgado also concluded Maldonado was
negligent when he failed to intervene in Hinson’s retaliatory actions and then
failed to report what happened.
      On June 30, 2020, Delgado sent Letters of Intent to Hinson and
Maldonado pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194,
a case addressing due process considerations in the context of civil service
employee dismissals. The letter to Maldonado informed him that Delgado
had made a preliminary determination that Maldonado’s employment should
be terminated because he violated the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the Riverside Sheriff’s Association and County of Riverside
due to “a. Incompetence [¶] c. Inefficiency or negligence in performances of
duties. [¶] f. Willful violation of an employee regulation . . . . [¶] m. Conduct
either during or outside of duty hours which adversely affects the employee’s
job performance or operation of the department in which they are employed.”
      The letter further specified that the proposed discipline was based on
violations of the Department’s General Orders under sections 105.09 and
203.07, which require Maldonado to properly execute “all assigned duties”
and “report violations of any laws, policies, procedures, rules or regulations of
the Department when committed by another member to a supervisor as soon
as possible.” Under the heading of “Facts In Support of Proposed Discipline,”
the letter stated that in connection with the cell search and McDonald’s

                                         7
assault, Maldonado either “failed to recognize, condoned and was complicit
to” Hinson’s actions, or he “lacked the leadership and fortitude necessary to
correct and report” Hinson’s misconduct, which “caused injury to McDonald
and exposed the Department” to civil liability. The letter noted that
Maldonado had been suspended on a prior occasion for 160 hours in 2017,
which other documentation showed was for hitting and kicking a female
deputy while he was intoxicated.
      After an August 2020 pre-disciplinary meeting in which Hinson and
Maldonado were both represented by counsel and each had the opportunity to
make statements, Delgado sent a final notice of termination to both deputies.
      E. Arbitration
      Maldonado and Hinson appealed their terminations and entered
arbitration pursuant to the MOU. During the arbitration proceeding,
Goodwin recanted some of his prior statements to the Department
investigator and testified that he had lied about Hinson asking him to
discipline McDonald “now,” about hearing a loudspeaker announcement
identifying McDonald, and about Hinson commending him for the fight.
Goodwin said he fabricated those parts of his interview because he was
“angry.” When asked about the call recording in which he told the previous
version of events to his girlfriend, Goodwin testified that he only said those
things so she would not “get mad” at him for “get[ting] in trouble.”
      Nonetheless, Goodwin testified that he knew McDonald was the reason
for the dayroom suspension, and that he used the intercom system to call the
pod office and tell Hinson that he would “deal with” McDonald later. When
the bottom tier opened, he used that opportunity to confront McDonald
instead of waiting until the next day. He only heard a loudspeaker
announcement instructing him to “lock it down” and return to his cell after

                                       8
the fight already ended. He also testified that he was not Mirandized or
interviewed after the incident.
      Maldonado testified that he would never allow or condone an inmate
imposing discipline on another inmate. While he was uncertain about why he
searched McDonald’s cell that night, he said that none of McDonald’s
property was destroyed in the process, and that not all searches are entered
into the cell search log. Maldonado did not recall Hinson identifying
McDonald as the reason for the dayroom suspension, telling Goodwin to
discipline McDonald, or thanking Goodwin afterwards. He also did not recall
why the tiers were opened separately after dayroom time was suspended.
Maldonado acknowledged that assault suspects are typically handcuffed, but
he made a “judgment call” not to handcuff the suspects after the fight. He
noted that an activity log from the date of the incident did not reflect that a
cell search occurred, even though it should have, and that he did not create a
report for the incident. Maldonado said “we might have made some mistakes
as far as paperwork and . . . entries on the log, but nothing intentionally[.]”
      Hinson testified that he did not tell Goodwin to discipline McDonald,
did not single McDonald out in any announcement or communication, and did
not thank Goodwin for assaulting McDonald. He also did not recall why only
the bottom tier was opened initially. Hinson confirmed that by the time he
“called it out” on his radio, the fight was over. He acknowledged that he was
assigned to write the incident report, but said he forgot to do so and
mistakenly conveyed to dispatch that there was no need to track the report.
Hinson said he Mirandized Owens and Moore and interviewed McDonald,
Owens, and Moore, but he had no notes from any interviews.
      Several deputies testified as character witnesses in support of
Maldonado and Hinson.

                                        9
      F. Arbitrator’s Decision
      The arbitrator issued a written decision, finding first that although

Maldonado’s3 Letter of Intent cited the Penal Code, California Title 15, and
Corrections Division Policy, “no corresponding factual basis” supported
alleged violations of those particular rules. The arbitrator therefore
“confine[d] his decision . . . to the provisions of the MOU, General Orders and
policies specifically noticed and analyzed in the disciplinary notices.”
      Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the arbitrator
concluded that the search of McDonald’s cell was not properly or
professionally done and was prompted by McDonald’s disrespectful behavior.
He credited McDonald’s testimony that only his belongings were targeted by
the search, and that some of his items were destroyed or thrown from the top
tier. The arbitrator noted that the deputies could have used other ways of
responding to McDonald’s disrespectful behavior, such as by issuing a
disciplinary marker. The arbitrator also determined that while cell search
logs and activity reports are not always prepared, Hinson or Maldonado
should have ensured they were done in this instance.
      The arbitrator further found that Maldonado was negligent in failing to
handcuff the assault suspects considering evidence that doing so was the
preferred practice. The arbitrator concluded that both the cell search and the
failure to handcuff violated the MOU’s provisions related to “incompetence,
inefficiency/negligence and conduct unbecoming an officer[,]” as well as
General Order section 105.09 relating to “Proper Execution of Duties.”
      The arbitrator found there was insufficient evidence, however, that
Hinson orchestrated the attack on McDonald, given Goodwin’s testimony

3      Although both Maldonado and Hinson appealed their terminations
initially, the arbitrator’s decision only addresses Maldonado’s appeal.
                                       10
recanting his prior statements. The arbitrator determined that the assault
was caused by Goodwin deducing that McDonald was the reason for the
dayroom suspension, and by McDonald’s disrespectful attitude towards
Goodwin. The arbitrator believed Maldonado did not intentionally destroy
McDonald’s property, and he credited Maldonado’s testimony that mistakes
were made during the incident. Accordingly, the arbitrator found that
Maldonado did not condone, and was not complicit in, any orchestrated
attack on McDonald. He did find though that Maldonado was “negligent in
failing to recognize that Inmate Goodwin was not locking-down, and was
proceeding up the stairs to confront Inmate McDonald.” He further observed
that it was “obvious that [Maldonado] should have addressed Goodwin’s
actions and/or recognized that an assault could occur.”
      The arbitrator ultimately decided that Maldonado should be reinstated
because termination was excessive given the circumstances, but that the
period between his last date of employment and reinstatement should still
constitute a suspension.
      G. Writ Petition
      Maldonado petitioned the Riverside Superior Court for a peremptory
writ of mandate setting aside the arbitrator’s decision. Applying an
independent judgment standard, the trial court found that the weight of the
evidence supported the arbitrator’s decision in four respects. First, the court
noted that the arbitrator found the “ ‘manner’ in which McDonald’s cell was
searched was at issue,” and that testimonial and video evidence supported
the conclusion that McDonald’s items were “impacted, destroyed and/or were
thrown off the top tier[.]” Although the court said it had “not seen” the video
footage, the court cited Delgado’s testimony that the search was done to “send
a message,” and pointed to other testimony showing that the search

                                      11
demonstrated “incompetence, inefficiency/negligence and conduct
unbecoming an officer” in violation of Department policy.
      Second, the court found sufficient evidence supported the arbitrator’s
conclusion that Maldonado violated Department policy by failing to ensure
the assault suspects were handcuffed after the incident. Although “not
necessarily required[,]” the court noted testimony that handcuffing the
suspects would have been the preferred practice, and that handcuffing the
victim of the assault in this instance “demonstrated varied treatment[.]”
      Third, the court determined that the evidence showed Maldonado
violated policy by failing to recognize the impending assault. The court found
that Maldonado’s position and rank made him responsible for exercising
“proper supervision and observation of his surroundings.” Yet Goodwin
walked to the top tier with Moore and Owens to fight McDonald without
Maldonado recognizing that Goodwin was not locking down as instructed.
      Lastly, the court found sufficient evidence that the deputies did not
prepare a cell search log or activity report, and that the arbitrator properly
relied on those omissions in upholding discipline. The court observed that
despite “inconsistencies in the logging practices among the deputies,”
Maldonado himself “acknowledged that a cell search log should have been
completed in this instance.”
      Having decided that a preponderance of the evidence supported the
arbitrator’s misconduct findings, the court concluded the arbitrator did not
abuse his discretion in imposing a suspension and denied Maldonado’s writ.
Maldonado timely appealed.

                                       12
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
      Maldonado first contends the trial court erred when it found
substantial evidence that the way he conducted the cell search violated
Department policy. We disagree.
   A. Governing Law
      “When a fundamental vested right is involved, such as the right of a
city employee to continued employment [citation], the trial court exercises its
independent judgment to determine whether due process requirements were
met and whether the agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the
evidence. [Citations.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service
Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 (Flippin).) “An appellate
court must sustain the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence
supports them, resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and
giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference in support of the
judgment. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
   B. Analysis
      Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that
McDonald’s items were “impacted, destroyed and/or were thrown off the top
tier,” and that the search was done to “send a message.” Video footage shows
that the dayroom floor was empty before the search started, and that at some
point during the search, items appeared on the floor underneath McDonald’s
cell. McDonald testified that his cell was left in disarray and some of his food
packages were opened. During the search, McDonald saw Hinson and
Maldonado throwing things over the top tier railing onto the floor of the
dayroom. Goodwin also saw items falling from the top tier during the search,
and around 8:43 p.m., video footage shows Coleman retrieving items from the

                                       13
dayroom floor. While the footage is choppy and it is unclear whether
McDonald’s items were kicked or thrown off the tier, the trial court
reasonably inferred based on Delgado’s testimony that there was only “one
way” for McDonald’s belongings to end up on the floor of the dayroom, which
was for the items to be “pushed off into the tier outside of the cell door[.]”
      Maldonado argues that the court erred by not reviewing the video
footage and relying instead on witness testimony about what the footage
shows. But we see no prejudicial error under these circumstances. While the
parties dispute whether McDonald’s items were thrown, kicked, or otherwise
pushed off the tier, Maldonado does not dispute that items from McDonald’s
cell somehow ended up on the dayroom floor below, and the video footage
does not show definitively how this occurred. McDonald and Goodwin both
testified to seeing items falling from the top tier. Although Maldonado
attempts to cast doubt on the inmates’ credibility, their testimony is
corroborated by Delgado’s and the Department investigator’s testimony, and
at any rate “ ‘[w]e do not . . . assess the credibility of witnesses on review for
substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Schmidt
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1292.) Therefore, even if the court did not
directly view the footage, other evidence in the record is sufficient to support
a reasonable inference that Maldonado and Hinson caused McDonald’s items
to fall off the top tier and onto the dayroom floor during the search. (See
Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 66 (Kazensky) [trial
court did not commit reversible error in not viewing videotapes because
witnesses testified to video’s contents and there was no significant dispute
about what it showed].) Having reviewed the footage ourselves, we conclude
that there is no reasonable probability of a different result if the trial court
had done so.

                                        14
      As for the search being used to “send a message,” Maldonado contends
that because a supervisor approved the search, inmates are known to hide
contraband inside commissary items, and property boxes are easily
replaceable, any alleged damage to McDonald’s items did not constitute a
violation of Department policy. There is substantial evidence, however, that
this was unlike other customary searches. McDonald testified that he and
Hinson exchanged words leading up to the search, and McDonald believed
Hinson was antagonizing him. No other cell was searched, McDonald’s cell
was left in disarray, and some of his food items were opened, but his
cellmate’s belongings were untouched. Goodwin testified that when Hinson
approached his cell after the search, Hinson told him that the search was
conducted because “[o]ne of your guys was being disrespectful.” Delgado,
citing his extensive “training and experience at every level[,]” believed the
search was a “fuck-you cell search” which was “a catalyst” for the fight that
followed. Furthermore, the record contains no definitive evidence that
deputies found any contraband in McDonald’s cell, and Maldonado confirmed
there was no indication after the search that McDonald was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, which could have justified the search.
      To the extent that Maldonado presents alternative reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the record, we must nonetheless resolve
conflicting evidence in favor of the Department as the prevailing party. (See
Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) And even if a trier of fact could
have concluded that the search was initiated for valid reasons or conducted in
a manner which minimized damage to McDonald’s items, the question here is
not whether there would have been substantial evidence to support a finding
in Maldonado’s favor. Based on the evidence, the court reasonably found that
the manner of the search demonstrated “incompetence,

                                       15
inefficiency/negligence and conduct unbecoming an officer” in violation of
Department policy. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports
the court’s findings regarding the impropriety of the cell search.
                                        II
      Maldonado also contends the trial court erred when it found he violated
Department policy by failing to handcuff McDonald’s suspected attackers.
We conclude the court did not err in this respect either.
      Maldonado first makes a procedural argument that because the Letter
of Intent did not expressly specify his failure to handcuff as a basis for
discipline, he cannot be punished for that omission. He cites no authority,
however, that requires the Department to provide that level of detail in the
Letter of Intent. (See Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th
921, 933 (Hinrichs).) Maldonado relies on Hinrichs, but that case does little
to support his position because the Court of Appeal did not “necessarily
disagree with the [agency’s] contention that it was not obligated to give [the
appellant] more than a general description of the allegations against her.”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal went on to note that “[s]ection 3303 provides only
that [the appellant] is entitled to be ‘informed of the nature of the
investigation prior to any interrogation.’ [Citation.] Under that standard, it
would be difficult to argue [the appellant] was entitled to a detailed
specification of the exact charges leveled.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, Hinrichs is
distinguishable because although the agency in that case specified a
particular regulation it alleged the officer violated, the agency provided no
other description of the alleged wrongful conduct, and then subsequently
imposed discipline based on a different regulation. (Ibid.)
      Here, the Department’s Letter of Intent cited the specific MOU
provisions it alleged Maldonado violated, along with the Department’s

                                       16
General Orders under sections 105.09 and 203.07. The letter also stated that
the violations were committed in connection with the cell search and
McDonald’s assault, alleging that he failed to recognize or correct Hinson’s
actions, causing injury to McDonald and the Department. Maldonado was
ultimately disciplined for acts falling within that general description, and
only under those specific provisions and orders—not the Penal Code,
California Title 15, or Corrections Division Policy, for which “no
corresponding factual basis” was given.
      Even if the trial court’s reliance on Maldonado’s failure to handcuff
constituted a procedural due process violation, any such error would be
subject to a harmless error analysis. (Hinrichs, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 928.) In this case, like the appellant in Hinrichs, Maldonado does not
argue that the Department’s failure to expressly inform him about the failure
to handcuff prejudiced him in any way. (Ibid.) He does not assert that he
had inadequate notice of, or opportunity to rebut, the allegation that his
omission violated Department policy. In fact, the failure to handcuff the
assault suspects was discussed at length in the Department’s investigation
report, which according to the Letter of Intent, was provided to Maldonado
several months in advance of the arbitration hearing. And during the
arbitration hearing, Maldonado’s counsel raised the topic of handcuffing
practices with multiple witnesses, with the apparent aim of rebutting the
allegation. She cross-examined Cepeida about whether “it was policy” or just
“preferrable” that inmates “had to be handcuffed during transport[.]” She
asked four of Maldonado’s deputy witnesses whether policy requires
handcuffing assault suspects, and three responded in the negative while one
did not know. During Maldonado’s own testimony about the video footage, he
brought up that “the suspects weren’t handcuffed” and spoke at length about

                                       17
his understanding of when inmates should be handcuffed. Even the
arbitrator asked witnesses questions about handcuffing practices.
Accordingly, even if the court committed error because the Letter of Intent
did not expressly identify Maldonado’s failure to handcuff as a basis for
discipline, any error would be harmless. (Id. at pp. 927–928 [finding any
procedural due process violation in failing to provide proper notice to be
harmless].)
      We turn next to whether there is substantial evidence to support the
finding that Maldonado violated Department policy by failing to ensure the
suspects were handcuffed along with McDonald. We conclude that there is.
As the court noted, although “not necessarily required[,]” witnesses testified
that handcuffing the suspects would have been the preferred practice, and
that handcuffing the victim of the assault in this instance “demonstrated
varied treatment[.]” Multiple deputies testified that they are trained to
handcuff assault suspects, they train others to do so, or they would have done
so here. Even Maldonado testified that he tells trainees to handcuff both
suspects and victims because it is “the safest way[,]” and he acknowledged
that assault suspects are typically handcuffed. Delgado testified that in this
particular dayroom, it was unusual that only McDonald was handcuffed, but
not the suspected aggressors. Considered in its totality, the evidence is
sufficient to support a finding that the decision to handcuff McDonald but not
the inmates who assaulted him violated Department policy.
      Even if Maldonado had plausible reasons for deciding against
handcuffing the suspects—such as his own discretion or to maintain inmate
rapport—we must resolve conflicts in favor of the Department, and
reasonable inferences support the court’s finding that Maldonado was
negligent in these circumstances. (See Flippin, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at

                                      18
p. 279.) Accordingly, we conclude the court did not err in finding Maldonado’s
failure to handcuff the assault suspects was a valid basis for discipline.
                                        III
      Maldonado next argues that the trial court erred when it determined
that substantial evidence supports the finding that Maldonado violated
Department policy when he failed to recognize the impending assault. We
again disagree.
      Maldonado first claims that the Department waived this ground for
discipline by failing to provide supporting record cites in its trial court brief.
Maldonado also argues that neither the arbitrator nor the court “identified
any portions of the record supporting” the finding that Maldonado failed to
realize that Goodwin was going to assault McDonald. But the Department’s
trial court brief does cite testimony describing video footage of Goodwin
proceeding up the stairs towards McDonald after the search. The brief also
cites the arbitration decision’s reference to Goodwin’s testimony in which he
told deputies he would “deal with” McDonald later, and how when the bottom
tier opened, Goodwin was not locking down and “was proceeding up the
stairs” to confront McDonald. Accordingly, we conclude the Department did
not waive the issue.
      Maldonado’s primary contention is that there was insufficient evidence
to support finding he was negligent in failing to anticipate the fight. The
trial court, however, cited multiple reasonable bases with support in the
record for its finding. The court noted that Maldonado could have observed,
based on Goodwin’s movements both alone and with Moore and Owens, that
Goodwin “was preparing to engage in an altercation with McDonald.”
Goodwin testified that he told the deputies he planned to “deal with” or
discipline McDonald for getting dayroom time suspended. Maldonado

                                        19
observed in his own narrative of the video footage that Goodwin and other
inmates were refusing instructions to lock down when Goodwin went up to
McDonald’s cell to talk to him. The Department investigator testified that
when Goodwin emerged from his cell right before the fight, he did not have a
shirt on because he was “ready to assault [McDonald], and it’s easier to
assault someone with . . . a shirt off than it is on.” Although Maldonado said
that an inmate being shirtless “doesn’t necessarily mean that a fight is going
to occur” because the inmate “could be going to the showers[,]” he also
acknowledged that “[i]nmates typically fight with their shirts off.” Moreover,
Maldonado could not explain why the bottom tier, and then both tiers, were
opened in the first place, which allowed the fight to happen.
      The court found that Maldonado’s position and rank made him
responsible for exercising “proper supervision and observation of his
surroundings.” It was thus reasonable for the court to infer—given the
selective search of McDonald’s cell, the dayroom suspension that followed,
Goodwin’s expressed intention to “discipline” McDonald, and footage of
Goodwin approaching McDonald’s cell without a shirt on and with two other
inmates following alongside—that Maldonado was negligent when he failed
to appreciate that a fight was imminent. And contrary to what Maldonado
argues, this conclusion is not inconsistent with finding that Hinson did not
orchestrate the attack, nor is it at odds with Maldonado’s testimony that he
believed Goodwin was going to the showers. Even if Hinson did not direct
Goodwin to assault McDonald, and even if Maldonado genuinely believed
Goodwin could be going upstairs to shower, a reasonable trier of fact could
still deem Maldonado negligent for failing to act in light of multiple warning
signs that conflict was brewing. “Where the evidence supports more than one
reasonable inference, we are not at liberty to substitute our deductions for

                                      20
those of the trial court.” (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los
Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868.) We therefore
conclude the court did not err in finding that Maldonado violated Department
policy when he failed to recognize the impending assault.
                                         IV
      Maldonado further contends that the trial court erred when it ruled
that substantial evidence supports the finding that he violated Department
policy by failing to log the cell search. We are not persuaded.
      Maldonado begins with the same procedural argument he made
regarding the failure to handcuff: that because the Letter of Intent did not
expressly mention the failure to complete a cell search log form as a basis for
discipline, he cannot be punished for that omission. We find this argument
unpersuasive for the same reasons we discuss above, including that
Maldonado fails to cite authority requiring the Department to provide that
level of specificity in its notice letter. The letter clearly states that the
alleged policy violations were committed in connection with “a cell search
[Maldonado] conducted” during which McDonald’s property “was destroyed[.]”
Maldonado again does not explain how he was prejudiced by the letter’s lack
of specificity, or how he had insufficient opportunity to rebut the allegation.
The Department’s investigation report stated that “the cell search log did not
indicate” that McDonald’s cell was searched, and that a cell search log
“should have” been completed. Moreover, during the arbitration hearing,
Maldonado’s counsel raised the issue of documenting cell searches with
multiple witnesses. Accordingly, even if the court had erred because the
Letter of Intent did not expressly identify Maldonado’s failure to document
the cell search as a basis for discipline, any error would be harmless.

                                         21
      We further conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that
Maldonado’s failure on this front violated Department policy. To rebut
testimony that the cell search should have been documented and that
deputies are trained to log searches, Maldonado relies on testimony that in
practice, not every cell search is logged. He also asserts that Cepeida was
responsible for completing the cell search log. But even Maldonado said he
“might have made some mistakes as far as paperwork and . . . entries on the
log, but nothing intentionally[.]” The record also shows that Maldonado was
the senior deputy on duty that night, with responsibility for “directing the
work” of junior deputies like Cepeida, and that Cepeida was brand new to the
job. Furthermore, as we already noted, even if Maldonado had plausible
reasons for foregoing documentation here, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts
and draw all legitimate reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s
decision. (See Flippin, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.) Given the evidence
that Maldonado’s responsibilities included ensuring that a cell search log
form was completed, we conclude the court did not err in finding Maldonado’s
failure to log the cell search was a valid basis for discipline.
                                         V
      Lastly, Maldonado argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
upholding his 317-day suspension. (See Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at
p. 48 [“ ‘[T]he penalty imposed by an administrative body will not be
disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless an abuse of discretion is
demonstrated[.]’ ”].) More specifically, he contends that the suspension was
based cumulatively on the four instances of misconduct already discussed,
and that the reversal “of any one of these findings would necessitate vacating
the disciplinary sanction.” Because we conclude that all four grounds for

                                        22
discipline are supported by substantial evidence, Maldonado’s argument is
unpersuasive.
      Furthermore, Delgado testified based on his extensive experience that
Maldonado’s negligence was unprofessional, incompetent, and unsafe in that
it ultimately “set[] inmates up for assault[,]” exposing the Department to
liability. Both the arbitrator and the trial court noted this was not
Maldonado’s first time facing discipline, and the record shows he was
suspended in 2017 for conduct unbecoming of a Department member after he
assaulted a female deputy. (See Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified
School Dist. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 169, 192 [past discipline is one “relevant
factor[] to consider in determining whether” misconduct warranted the
penalty imposed].)
      “If reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty
imposed, there has been no abuse of discretion. [Citation.] It is only in the
exceptional case, when it is shown that reasonable minds cannot differ on the
propriety of the penalty, that an abuse of discretion is shown. [Citations.]”
(Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46–47.) The trial
court’s findings in this case indicate that, intentional or not, Maldonado’s
actions and omissions led to an inmate being assaulted for nearly a full
minute by three other inmates. We conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in upholding the 317-day suspension.

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                               DISPOSITION
     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The Department is
awarded its costs on appeal.

                                                           BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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