Court Opinion

ID: 9740602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:38:15.559685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.102379
License: Public Domain

TEIGEN, Chief Justice.
I dissent. The majority grant a new trial to the plaintiff on the theory that the *34plaintiff did not have a fóir and impartial trial because of errors in the instructions which they say are prejudicial.
I cannot agree. I feel that the instructions taken as a whole outline the issues in the case fairly and correctly, and that the inadvertent mistake of the trial judge in substituting the word “plaintiff” for “decedent” in one part of the charge, when considered in connection with the rest of the charge and the theory on which the case was tried, is so evident that a jury of reasonable men would not be confused thereby. Furthermore, I cannot agree that we should “give meaningful effect” of our disapproval of the instruction in Spalding v. Loyland, N.D., 132 N.W.2d 914, to a case which was tried before our opinion in Spalding v. Loyland was released. It was not the intent of this Court to give retrospective effect to the decision in Spalding. This is evidenced by the fact this Court in that case merely disapproved of the instruction, but did not find it constituted prejudicial error as a ground for granting new trial. New trial, in that case, was granted on other grounds. The case in issue was tried before Spalding was released. I feel the trial court was entitled to rely on the law that existed under our decisions at the time the instant case was tried.
The majority also find it was error for the court not to have given another instruction based on Section 39-10-30, N.D.C.C., which is quoted in the majority opinion. I find the court did instruct as to the applicable elements of this statute as applied to the facts in this case. There was no request for an instruction based on this statute, and the omission, if any, certainly does not constitute misdirection. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain because she feels the instructions were not sufficiently specific unless the omissions in the instructions were such that they amounted to a misdirection. Reineke v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 52 N.D. 324, 202 N.W. 657; DeMoss v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 412, 272 N.W. 506; State v. Van Horne, 71 N.D. 455, 2 N.W.2d 1; Froh v. Hein, 76 N.D. 701, 39 N.W.2d 11; Umphrey v. Deery, 78 N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897; Lund v. Knoff, N.D., 85 N.W.2d 676, 67 A.L.R.2d 1110; Teegarden v. Dahl, N.D., 138 N.W. 2d 668.
However, a further examination of the instructions as a whole discloses the court did, in my opinion, fully instruct the jury. It read to the jury Subsection 1, of Section 39-10-28, N.D.C.C., which immediately precedes Subsection 2, quoted in the majority opinion. It provides:
1. When traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger; * * *
It also instructed the jury as to the standard of care required of a seven-year-old child; admonished them that a motorist must exercise a higher degree of care toward children than adults; and instructed that a motorist has the duty, in areas where children may be expected, not to confine his lookout to the narrow lane immediately in front of his vehicle, but to watch the sides of the street as well. It also instructed the jury relative to the rules of the road, advising that a motorist must drive his vehicle in a careful, prudent manner, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway, and any other conditions then existing; that no motorist shall drive a vehicle in a manner to endanger the life, limb or property of any person. The court also informed the jury that it is the duty of the driver of a vehicle to be vigilant at all times, keeping a reasonable lookout for possible danger to himself or others, and that he must keep his vehicle under control so that not to injure another he can stop as quickly as might be required of him by eventualities that would be anticipated by *35an ordinarily prudent person in a like position. It instructed that a motorist has a duty to obey the rules of the road, and that if he is careless or negligent, even though he did not violate any of the legal statutory requirements, he may nevertheless be held responsible for damages.
An examination of these instructions discloses to me that the court did instruct on all of the elements of Section 39-10-30, except the provision which states he “shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary.” There is no contention made in the arguments that this part of the statute applied to the facts in this case. The undisputed evidence establishes the accident occurred when the decedent-child ran from between two standing automobiles in the opposite lane of traffic to the one in which the defendant was driving. There was a continuous line of standing automobiles more than a block in length waiting for a traffic light to change. The decedent ran between two of them and into the path of the defendant’s oncoming car. In other words, the standing automobiles were facing north, and the line was more than a block in length. It extended through the intersection a block south of the traffic light. The decedent, at the southerly crosswalk, ran between two of them and directly into the path of defendant’s automobile proceeding south. The events immediately leading up to the collision occurred with such speed that there was no time to give warning by sounding the horn. Thus on the basis of the facts in the case, instruction on that portion of the statute was neither necessary nor proper.
A review of the instructions in this case discloses that the trial judge first advised the jury of the issues involved in the action as based on the pleadings and the evidence. In doing this he advised that the defendant by his answer alleged that “the accident resulted from the failure of the decedent * * * to take due care and caution for her own safety, and that her own negligence proximately caused or contributed to the cause of the accident and her resultant death.” The court then summarized from the plaintiff’s reply, which in part stated that “ * * * she denied that her daughter * * * was negligent, * * The court instructed the jury that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense that must be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and that if a fair preponderance thereof shows “that the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence which contributed directly and proximately, as the term ‘proximate cause’ shall be hereinafter defined, to the injury of which the plaintiff complains, the defense has sustained its burden of proof and plaintiff cannot recover.” It instructed on the wrongful death statute, and informed the jury that the action may be brought by the surviving mother of the deceased. The court also instructed that to charge a child with contributory negligence, it must have had the capacity not only to know the danger ordinarily involved in the conduct alleged to be negligent, but to realize and appreciate the risk and to exercise judgment and discretion necessary to avoid it; that “the test of whether the child has been guilty of negligence contributing to injuries sustained by collision with a motor vehicle depends on whether it has used that degree or extent of care which ordinarily prudent children of its age, capacity, and experience are accustomed to use under like circumstance.” I feel these instructions, in addition to the one singled out by the majority, in which the trial court inadvertently substituted the word “plaintiff” for “decedent,” make the error of substitution so patent that reasonable men would not be confused as a result thereof.
Rule 51(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., provides that the court shall instruct the jury, after the arguments of counsel are concluded, only as to the law of the case. The purpose of an instruction is to furnish guidance .to the jury in their deliberations and to aid them in arriving at a proper verdict so far as it is competent for the court to assist them. The chief object is to explain the law of the case, to point out the essentials to be *36proved on the one side or the other, and to bring into view the relations of the particular evidence adduced to the particular parties involved.
I would affirm the judgment and the ordei* denying a new trial.
STRUTZ, J., concurs.