Court Opinion

ID: 9852644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:34:13.088184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:31.658989
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
“When the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an occupant, this constitutes a ‘seizure’ of the person for Fourth Amendment purposes, even though the function of the stop is limited and the detention brief.” Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988) (citations omitted). The events that led to the conviction of Jimmie Hugene Woodson, Jr., began as a result of an unlawful seizure.
It is well-established that, an investigatory stop may be initiated only when an officer has “a reasonable suspicion, based *797on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” When examining the officer’s articulable reasons for stopping a person, we examine the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior rather than the officer’s subjective belief that the conduct indicates criminal activity.
Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 496-97, 412 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1992) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). The record proves that “[t]he detaining officer [did not] ‘have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 612, 363 S.E.2d at 710 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
The evidence proved that eight police officers battered down the door of a residence in the City of Richmond to gain entry to search for drugs. Sergeant D.R. Carter was guarding the entrance to the residence and “took a position where the front door used to be [because] the door was knocked down.” While Carter was standing watch, he observed a vehicle as it passed the residence. The majority observes that Carter noticed that the head of the man “in the rear [of the vehicle] was . . . turned toward” the residence being searched. Carter did not testify that the man’s conduct was indicative of criminal conduct. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that it would be abnormal for a passerby to look at an armed man standing in a doorway. Carter did not testify that either the driver or the front passenger looked in the direction of the residence.
The majority gleans some undisclosed significance from Carter’s testimony that the vehicle was moving at a “slow pace.” However, the evidence provides a rational explanation for the vehicle’s speed. The vehicle was twenty-five feet away from Carter when he first noticed it. After the vehicle passed Carter, it stopped. Carter described the distance the car travelled past the residence:
I was at [the residence being searched]. There is a house there and I believe there are two more units within that row of houses and it is the corner. Then on the opposite side of the corner of the street is 30 feet wide, I would say, 65 or 70 feet, maybe. Maybe further.
*798These added facts prove that when Carter first saw the vehicle it was about to stop. That the vehicle was travelling at a “slow pace” in a residential neighborhood immediately prior to the stop is not unusual, significant, or suspicious.
When the vehicle stopped, the man in the rear exited the vehicle and walked on the sidewalk. When he was in front of the residence, he turned and looked at the residence. Carter realized that he knew the man and called his name. The man “rapidly turned away and continued to walk” in the direction he originally was walking — away from the vehicle. Although Carter testified that he knew the man to be a drug user, Carter did not find his conduct suspicious enough to warrant following him. Rather, Carter went in the other direction. Carter chose to approach a vehicle containing individuals who Carter could not identify and who had engaged in no behavior giving rise to an articulable suspicion of illegal activity.
Carter, with his weapon in his hand, ordered the occupants of the vehicle to remain in place. The Commonwealth asks this Court to uphold the lawfulness of the seizure of the occupants because the vehicle was traveling slowly when Carter first saw it. Nothing in Carter’s testimony suggests that he had “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [the occupants of the vehicle] of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary is not supported by the facts. An objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances requires more than a recitation of the minutia of the factual setting. Unless the objective facts are shown to give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, the seizure is unlawful. The record proves only that Carter had a subjective hunch that caused him to decide to investigate the vehicle and detain the occupants. A “hunch” is “too slender a reed” to satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
Every citizen has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to be stopped at the unfettered discretion of police. That right is protected even though the police may consider the intrusion to be a mere inconvenience. “Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’ ” Davis v. Missis*799sippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969). One of the most fundamental fourth amendment principles requires that, “in justifying a particular intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 209, 308 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). “In the absence of any basis for suspecting [Woodson] of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and [Woodson’s] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
We all recognize that the police face difficult tasks when working at night. However, the majority allows the hazards of the police work to confuse the issue. A citizen’s right to be free of arbitrary police interference cannot be overcome by reciting slogans. Woodson’s interest in being free from arbitrary interference by police agents existed when Carter made the subjective decision to seize him — long before his struggle with Carter. We also would do well to recall that it is not just police officers who are at risk on the roads of this country at night. Citizens are also equally at risk of being victimized by persons who approach vehicles at night under the guise of offering assistance, see Titcomb v. Wyant, 1 Va. App. 31, 33, 333 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1985); or under the pretext of being an un-uniformed police officer. See Hill City Trucking v. Christian, 238 Va. 735, 737, 385 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1989); State v. Gagnon, 18 Conn. App. 694, 713, 561 A.2d 129, 132 (1989); Commonwealth v. Garafolo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906, 499 N.E.2d 839, 840 (1986).
Carter testified that he went to the vehicle and ordered the occupants to remain in place because the vehicle was traveling slowly when he first saw it. He gave no other reason for his decision to approach the vehicle. Carter was not in uniform and was carrying an automatic weapon in his hand. Although Carter testified that he had a badge around his neck on a chain, he also testified that this incident occurred in the dark of night. I would hold that, apart from the constitutional violation that occurred when Carter ordered the occupants to remain in place, the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Woodson had the requisite criminal intent necessary to prove a violation of Code § 18.2-*800460(B) (“knowingly attempts to intimidate or impede . . . any law enforcement officer, lawfully engaged in his duties”). The record proved no observable indicia of authority that would have put Woodson on notice that Carter was in fact a law enforcement officer. Cf. Gagnon, 18 Conn. App. at 713, 561 A.2d at 132 (criminal defendant in plain clothes introduced himself as a police officer before assaulting victim); Garafolo, 23 Mass. App. at 906, 499 N.E.2d at 840 (criminal defendant in plain clothes introduced himself as a narcotic officer before abducting victim). Proof that Woodson resisted an unknown man in the dark, carrying an automatic weapon, dressed in street clothes, who announced himself to be a police officer, is insufficient to prove the specific intent required by Code § 18.2-460(B).
For the reasons here stated and because the only evidence supporting Woodson’s conviction for possession of cocaine was the product of the unlawful stop and detention of Woodson, I would hold that the evidence should have been suppressed and that the conviction must be reversed. I dissent.