Court Opinion

ID: 9465333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:43:34.356297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:07.510019
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The record quite clearly reveals that repeated requests for possibly exculpatory evidence were essentially and inexcusably disregarded by the Government prosecutors to whom the requests were properly directed. Not until the eve of trial did the prosecution suddenly produce more than 500 pages of material that, as I see it, should have been delivered to the defense long before. Moreover, the prosecution followed the same unsavory pattern during the trial and thereafter, not delivering additional material until there had been continued requests by the defense and, also, prodding by the trial judge. In these circumstances, and in the light of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the judgment of conviction should be reversed.
The Government’s case rested heavily upon the testimony of one Prohaska, a former employee of the Union. Without his testimony, the evidence would have been insufficient to support Shelton’s conviction. The voluminous material withheld by the Government, especially the records containing the denials by Shelton’s accountant of a coverup meeting, impeached Prohaska and Prohaska’s incriminating testimony. My Brothers hold that because these materials were merely cumulative, consisting largely of testimony duplicated by two witnesses for the defense, Shelton was not harmed by the late disclosure. I simply cannot agree.
It is true, of course, that our Circuit’s rule, a rule that I dislike (See, United States v. Andrews, 455 F.2d 632, 633, n.1 (9th Cir. 1972)), is that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, standing alone, will support a conviction. United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1978); Moody v. United States, 376 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1967). Nevertheless, an enhanced impeachment by the accused, armed with material amassed by the Government during its investigation, could have well been pivotal as the jury weighed the evidence relating to Shelton’s guilt or innocence. Thus, I submit that it cannot be said that the Brady error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).
I take no pleasure in reprimanding government prosecutors or any other attorneys, and I emphasize that, most assuredly, there is no indication here that exculpatory material was intentionally suppressed. What is all too apparent, however, is a demonstrated laxity and failure seriously to undertake the prosecutorial duty to examine government files for requested material that may show that a case against an accused is unfounded. In our land, the attainment of a conviction must never become the sole goal of the prosecution. “(T)he interest of the prosecution is not that it shall win the case, but that it shall bring forth the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime so that justice shall be *1253done . . ..”1 I thoroughly share the opinion of Judge Hufstedler, written in a cogent dissent about two years ago:
“We should not be hesitant in rigorously applying Brady and enforcing that rule even though reversals of criminal convictions may thereby result. The Brady rule does not result in the suppression of relevant evidence, but in its disclosure, thereby shoring up the integrity of the fact-finding process.”
United States v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1976).
I would vacate the convicting judgment and permit Shelton, rightly prepared, to defend himself again.

. Introduction to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, at 3 (Approved Draft 1972) cited in United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J., concurring).