Court Opinion

ID: 9404380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 21:03:20.954063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.468084
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4120

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        CURTIS WATSON, a/k/a LOW,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00279-1)

        Submitted: October 17, 2022                                       Decided: June 21, 2023

        Before HARRIS, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: L. Thompson Price, TOM PRICE LAW, Charleston, West Virginia; Shawn
        A. Morgan, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for Appellant.
        Lisa G. Johnston, Acting United States Attorney, Nowles H. Heinrich, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Curtis Watson of conspiracy to distribute heroin, possession of

        firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and witness tampering. The district

        court sentenced Watson to 295 months’ imprisonment, consistent with his advisory

        Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Watson challenges both his conviction and his

        sentence. For the reasons given below, we affirm.

                                                    I.

               Curtis Watson, known as “Low,” led a large-scale drug trafficking operation in

        Hernshaw, West Virginia. Watson provided heroin and prescription pills to multiple

        associates and then supervised their distribution of the drugs. During a roughly six-month

        period in 2017, the trial testimony established, the home of one of Watson’s associates

        became a virtual “fast food restaurant” for drug sales, J.A. 29, with drugs sold for ten to

        twelve hours a day. Watson’s operation brought in thousands of dollars each day, and at

        sentencing, Watson was found responsible for 1,650 grams of heroin, 1,000 oxycodone

        pills, and 14 grams of fentanyl.

               The charged conspiracy ended on November 17, 2017, after a man purchased and

        used drugs at the home in question and soon died from a drug overdose. Police searched

        the premises and found baggies of heroin, pills, and fentanyl, along with a loaded 9-

        millimeter handgun. Watson was not at the house, but the police arrested two of his

        associates, who testified that Watson supplied them with the drugs and the gun.

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               Watson initially was indicted for conspiring to distribute heroin and distributing

        heroin. But while awaiting trial, Watson confronted and yelled at a potential prosecution

        witness at the courthouse, placing the witness in fear. A superseding indictment then

        charged Watson with conspiracy to distribute heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; use and carry of

        a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A);

        and tampering with a witness, see 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(1).

               At trial, fifteen witnesses testified for the government, including seven who had

        worked with Watson or purchased drugs from him during the period of the charged

        conspiracy. The witnesses testified that a man named “Low” ran the drug trafficking

        operation at the Hernshaw residence, and all identified Watson as “Low.” Watson testified

        on his own behalf, denying that he was “Low” and raising what was in effect a mistaken-

        identity defense. The jury rejected that defense and convicted Watson on all counts.

               At sentencing, the district court adopted an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range

        of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment on the drug and witness-tampering charges, followed

        by a mandatory 60-month consecutive sentence for the firearm offense. The court rejected

        the government’s request for an upward departure based on the overdose death on

        November 17, 2017, finding that the relevant offense level already took into account the

        risk of injury to others. The court also rejected the defendant’s request for a downward

        variance. Ultimately, the court sentenced Watson to a cumulative sentence of 295 months’

        imprisonment: a bottom-of-the-Guidelines 235 months for the drug and witness-tampering

        counts, with a required 60-month consecutive sentence on the firearm offense.

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                                                     II.

                 On appeal, Watson challenges his convictions on multiple grounds.           Having

        reviewed the record and finding no reversible error, we affirm Watson’s convictions.

                                                     A.

                 Watson raises four alleged errors and constitutional violations associated with his

        trial, each of which, he contends, entitles him to a new trial on all counts against him. For

        the reasons given below, we find no merit to those arguments and no ground for a new

        trial.

                 First, Watson raises what appears to be an evidentiary contention, arguing that the

        government improperly displayed for the jury a three-page exhibit – Exhibit 16D – that

        transcribed text messages between Watson and an associate and included on one page a

        reference to an “OD,” or overdose. According to Watson, that reference could have unduly

        prejudiced the jury and influenced its verdict, requiring that we set aside his convictions.

                 Because Watson did not object to the display of Exhibit 16D or request a limiting

        instruction, we review his claim for plain error only. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

        725, 732–34 (1993) (setting out standard for plain-error review). It is not clear there was

        any error here, plain or otherwise, as the record does not conclusively show that the page

        of Exhibit 16D containing the “OD” reference actually was displayed at trial. And if it was

        displayed, it would have been only briefly, as the entire exhibit was “quickly” removed

        from the screen on which it had appeared. J.A. 131. Under the circumstances, there is no

        reason to think any hypothetical error could have “affected the outcome” of Watson’s trial,

        as would be required for reversal on plain-error review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Given

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        the overwhelming evidence of dangerous drug trafficking in this case, a momentary

        showing of the term “OD” – without any indication of a fatality – could not have

        appreciably affected the jury’s thinking.

               Second, Watson claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury was not

        provided with a special verdict form requiring a finding that his drug charge involved the

        distribution of 100 grams or more of heroin. That drug quantity, Watson argues, is an

        element necessary for conviction because it increased the range of statutory penalties to

        which he was exposed, see Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013), and so he

        was entitled to a specific jury finding on the issue.

               As Watson concedes, because he did not seek a special verdict form or object to its

        absence at trial, our review is for plain error only. We find no such error here. In this case

        – unlike Alleyne – the relevant drug weight was treated as an element of Watson’s drug

        offense, with the jury instructed that to convict, it would have to find beyond a reasonable

        doubt that the “object of the conspiracy involved distribution of 100 grams or more of

        heroin.” J.A. 212. The government reiterated the point in its summation, explaining that

        “one of the elements we have to prove is that there was 100 or more grams of heroin

        distributed as part of this conspiracy.” J.A. 225. And the defendant has cited no authority

        for the proposition that the verdict of a jury properly instructed on the drug-weight element

        of a crime is insufficient under Alleyne if not accompanied by a special verdict form.

               Moreover, Watson cannot establish the prejudice required to set aside a conviction

        under the plain-error standard of review. Consistent trial testimony in this case described

        a large-scale drug-distribution operation, with drug quantities far exceeding the 100-gram

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        benchmark at issue. One witness, for instance, testified that 200 to 250 grams of heroin

        were sold in November 2017 alone. And Watson never disputed this at trial; as noted

        above, his defense turned not on the quantity of drugs involved, but on his claim that he

        had been misidentified as the “Low” who ran the drug trafficking operation. Because any

        error regarding the 100-gram drug quantity could not have “affected [Watson’s] substantial

        rights,” see Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–34, he cannot prevail on this claim. See United States

        v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 161 (4th Cir. 2001) (declining to correct error on plain-error

        review because of “overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence” that defendant

        was a major participant in conspiracy to distribute drugs).

               Next, Watson argues that the government’s closing argument constituted

        prosecutorial misconduct that violated his due process rights and requires reversal.

        Specifically, Watson objects to the government saying, at one point in its closing, that

        Watson “took advantage of a drug crisis in [West Virginia]” and that his “sole purpose in

        coming to West Virginia was to develop a drug trafficking network.” J.A. 221. Watson

        argues that by virtue of this language, the government improperly appealed to the jury as a

        community to “make a general statement” against narcotics crimes. Appellant’s Suppl.

        Opening Br. at 25.

               Again, because Watson failed to object to this comment before the district court,

        our review is for plain error only. In determining whether a defendant’s due process rights

        were violated by a prosecutor’s closing argument, we ask whether the proceeding at issue

        was rendered “fundamentally unfair” by improper argument, considering such factors as

        “the nature of the comments,” whether they were “isolated or repeated,” and the “quantum

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        of the evidence before the jury.” Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 1998). The

        comments here, we note, are unlike those at issue in United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235,

        1240 (4th Cir. 1988), on which Watson relies, and in which the prosecutor expressly urged

        the jury to “make [a] statement” to “address these types of conspiracies that are taking

        place in [the] community.” There is no similar invitation to this jury to make a statement

        or send a message, and as the government argues, its language could be read as nothing

        more than a fair comment on the evidence. Moreover, the commentary at issue was

        isolated, occurring only once in the government’s closing, in a case in which the evidence

        against the defendant was overwhelming.          See Boyd, 147 F.3d at 329.       Under the

        circumstances, it cannot be said that the government’s statement affected Watson’s

        substantial rights by depriving him of a fundamentally fair trial. See Pupo, 841 F.2d at

        1240 (holding that improper “make a statement” remarks did not rise to level of due process

        violation because they were isolated and the evidence of guilt, though not overwhelming,

        was adequate).

               Finally, Watson claims that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel at

        trial, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

        668 (1984). We decline to reach that claim. Ineffective assistance claims generally are not

        addressed on direct appeal, and they may be resolved in that posture only if it “conclusively

        appears from the record that counsel did not provide effective assistance.” United States

        v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 2014) (alteration omitted); see United States v

        Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Watson cannot meet this “demanding”

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        standard. Galloway, 749 F.3d at 241. Accordingly, his claims should be raised, if at all,

        in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to permit sufficient development of the record.

                                                          B.

               Watson also raises a separate challenge to his conviction on his firearm charge,

        arguing that the district court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on

        that count. According to Watson, the government presented insufficient evidence to

        establish he used the gun recovered at his accomplice’s home to further or advance his drug

        trafficking crimes, as required to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). See

        United States v. Moore, 769 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing required “nexus

        between the firearms and the drugs”). We disagree.

               While a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is

        reviewed de novo, the defendant bears “a heavy burden.” See United States v. Wolf, 860

        F.3d 175, 194 (4th Cir. 2017). We “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to

        the government, assuming its credibility, and drawing all favorable inferences from it, and

        will sustain the jury’s verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

        elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Penniegraft,

        641 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 2011). And as we have noted, “[d]etermining whether an

        adequate connection has been made between a firearm and an underlying drug offense is a

        classic jury question.” United States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir. 1994).

               Here, substantial trial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Watson insists that there

        is no evidence that the gun was used to further or advance his drug trafficking offenses; at

        most, he argues, “the firearm and the drugs were possessed simultaneously.” Br. of

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        Appellant at 9. But “the fact finder is free to consider the numerous ways in which a

        firearm might further or advance drug trafficking.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701,

        705 (4th Cir. 2002). And here, one of Watson’s associates testified to just such a use:

        Watson provided him with the gun, he explained, to protect the drug operation at the

        Hernshaw residence. See Moore, 769 F.3d at 270 (explaining that firearm may further or

        advance drug trafficking crime by “defending the dealer’s drugs” or “drug profits”).

        Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the trial evidence is sufficient to

        support Watson’s § 924(c) conviction, and the district court properly denied his motion for

        a judgment of acquittal on that charge.

                                                    III.

               Watson also challenges his sentence, arguing that his 235-month sentence on his

        drug and witness-tampering charges is substantively unreasonable because it is an “outlier”

        when compared to nationwide data on sentences for opioid-related crimes. Br. of Appellant

        at 13. We cannot agree.

               This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-

        discretion standard, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the

        extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

        (2007). Here, critically, there is no variance: Watson’s sentence is within – and at the

        lowest end – of the advisory Guidelines range. For that reason, it is “presumptively

        reasonable.”   United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).           That

        presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when

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        measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. And “district courts have extremely

        broad discretion when determining the weight to be given [to] each of the 18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011).

               Here, prior to imposing its within-Guidelines sentence, the district court properly

        calculated the Sentencing Guidelines and considered the § 3553(a) factors as well as the

        arguments of the government and the defendant. * When analyzing the § 3553(a) factors,

        the court noted the substantial quantity of drugs involved; Watson’s exploitation of the

        drug addiction of one of his associates; Watson’s various obstructive acts, including

        threatening a witness and committing perjury at trial; his supervisory role in the trafficking

        operation; his possession of firearms; his criminal record and particular risk of recidivism;

        and other relevant facts. Nothing about the district court’s consideration of these factors

        leads us to believe that its within-Guidelines sentence was an abuse of discretion and

        substantively unreasonable.

               Indeed, Watson’s argument focuses not on his individual offenses, characteristics,

        and circumstances, but on nationwide sentencing data that purportedly shows a disparity

        between his 235-month sentence and the “median” sentences imposed for allegedly similar

        drug trafficking crimes. Watson describes this data at a high enough level of generality

        that it is impossible to tell whether it controls for defendants with similar criminal histories

               *
                 Whenever we review a sentence, “we must first ensure that the district court
        committed no significant procedural error[.]” See United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668
        F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2012). The defendant does not in any way dispute the procedural
        reasonableness of his sentence, and we agree that there is no procedural error here.

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        or equivalent aggravating factors. But in any event, as we have cautioned, “comparisons

        of sentences may be treacherous because each sentencing proceeding is inescapably

        individualized.” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012). Even

        if it could be shown that Watson’s sentence is “more severe than average,” in other words,

        that would “not mean that it was unwarranted.” Id. at 106. Given the constellation of

        individualized factors appropriately considered by the district court, we find no abuse of

        discretion in its imposition of a 235-month within-Guidelines sentence.

                                                   IV.

               For the reasons given above, we affirm Watson’s convictions and sentence. We

        dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

        presented in the materials before the court and would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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