Court Opinion

ID: 9678710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:29:35.934783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:56.267738
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The trial judge should have sustained Carrie Baker’s Batson challenge to Lexington Place’s peremptory strike. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We should reverse and remand for a new trial.
The venire consisted of 36 people. Lexington Place used a peremptory strike on venire member three, Rhonda West, an African-American who worked for the United States Post Office.
West’s only participation in voir dire consisted of the following statements:
Baker’s attorney: Who else thinks it’s important for employees to put their best effort forward? Juror No. 3?
West: I do.
Baker’s attorney: What do you think? You agree that it’s important for employees to put forth their employees to be loyal to their employer?
Another venire member: Yes.
Baker’s attorney: How about you, ma'am?
West: Uh-huh.
Baker challenged Lexington Place’s strike against West as racially motivated. As an explanation, the attorney for Lexington Place said he based the decision to strike West
on the fact that she’s a postal worker and a union worker, and postal workers as known to be militant and more pro-employee then [sic] pro-employer, and that’s what was the basis for striking that juror.
The venire panel included another postal worker, Michael Lee Brown, an Anglo male. Lexington Place did not strike Brown. Lexington Place described its decision as “the lesser of evils.” Other than that, Lexington Place could not explain its decision. When asked to explain why Lexington Place did not strike Brown, its lawyer said
I’m trying to think why we kept him. We had a big question mark on him and ended up keeping him because it was either that or somebody else. But I absolutely didn’t want a postal worker on the jury.
The majority opinion correctly identifies the three steps process for resolving a Bat-son objection to a peremptory challenge. It is the third of those steps that is at issue in this case, the facial validity of the explanation for the peremptory challenge.1
During the second step of the process, the party who exercised the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation, showing the challenge was based on something other than the potential juror’s race. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex.1997). Whether the explanation is persuasive or even plausible is not important at this stage; the issue is the facial validity of the explanation. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. In evaluating whether the explanation is race-*758neutral, we must determine whether the peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law, assuming the reasons for the challenge are true. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, it will be deemed race-neutral for purposes of the analysis at step two. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67. It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the explanation becomes relevant.
At the third step of the process, the trial court must determine if the party challenging the strike proved purposeful racial discrimination. The trial court may believe or not believe the explanation offered by the party who exercised the peremptory challenge. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the “abuse of discretion” standard to review Bat-son challenges. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles. Id. We are not bound by a finding of no discrimination under the abuse of discretion standard if the justification offered for striking a potential juror is “simply too incredible to be accepted.” Id.
Whether the explanations offered for exercising peremptory challenges are credible is a fact question to be resolved by the trial court. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 447. We will disturb that factual determination only upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 447. I believe the explanation offered by Lexington was too incredible to be accepted, and in accepting it, the trial court abused its discretion.
In this case, one of the reasons offered for striking West — that she was a member of a union — was simply wrong. Nothing in the record showed she was a member of a union. Further, postal workers (or their views) had nothing to do with the question whether Lexington Place illegally retaliated against Baker in violation of the Texas Workers Compensation Act.
When West, who was virtually silent through most of voir dire, responded to questions, she responded in ways that tended to reveal pro-employer views, not the anti-employer views that Lexington Place ascribed to her. Lexington Place directed no questions to her, nor did she respond to any random questions posed by Lexington Place. To the extent that she did speak, West revealed only her feelings that employees should be loyal to their employers, put forth their best efforts, take pride in their job, and attend work regularly. These are not the views of a “militant,” anti-employer venire-member. These support the conclusion that Lexington Place’s explanation of its strike was pretextural.
Nothing in West’s oral statements reflected anything about her employment by the Post Office or the characteristics of persons employed by the Post Office. And, if Lexington Place “absolutely didn’t want a postal worker on the jury,” as it claims, it would have exercised a strike against Brown. Lexington Place’s statement stands in marked contrast to its actual conduct. Its lawyer could not explain why it struck the black postal worker but not the white postal worker.
Lexington Place’s strike of West was, under the Batson standard, a pretextural strike of a African-American member of the venire. Because the exclusion of even one member of the venire for prohibited reasons invalidates the entire jury selection, a new trial should be ordered in this case. Dominguez v. State Farm Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, writ dism’d).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The majority’s opinion contains a potentially misleading statement, that Baker's attorney agreed that the explanation offered by Lexington was race neutral. Op. p. 755. The majority is referring to Golub's statement quoted in the majority opinion, that begins "There is a racially neutral reason, but ...” Op. p. 756. Baker's entire argument is that the explanation for the peremptory strike of West was facially neutral and was pretextural reason for striking an African-American from the panel.