Court Opinion

ID: 9373796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:28.303988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.669339
License: Public Domain

1

                           UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     WILLIAM B. JOLLEY,                              DOCKET NUMBERS
                   Appellant,                        AT-4324-18-0576-I-2
                                                     AT-4324-19-0041-I-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
       URBAN DEVELOPMENT,                            DATE: March 31, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           William B. Jolley, Brunswick, Georgia, pro se.

           Magda Lovinsky Chevron and Robert Andrew Zayac, Jr., Atlanta, Georgia,
            for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                           ORDER

¶1         These appeals are before us on the administrative judge’s April 23, 2019
     orders certifying for interlocutory review his orders addressing the appellant’s
     claims under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. For the reasons

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     discussed below, we JOIN the two appeals, 2 VACATE the administrative judge’s
     ruling and RETURN this case to the regional office for further adjudication
     before a different administrative judge consistent with this decision.

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2           In each of these appeals, the appellant alleged that the agency discriminated
     against him on the basis of his military service in violation of the Uniformed
     Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as
     amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA) by failing to select him for
     positions.      In his first appeal, Jolley v. Department of Housing & Urban
     Development, MSPB Docket No. AT-4324-18-0576-I-1, the appellant argued in
     part that the Board’s administrative judges 3 were not properly appointed under
     Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), and that the
     statutory requirement that Federal employees bring USERRA clai ms before the
     Board is unconstitutional. In July 2018, the administrative judge dismissed that
     appeal without prejudice to refiling within 90 days pending clarification from the
     Board regarding the appointment issue. 4            Jolley v. Department of Housing
     & Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. AT-4324-18-0576-I-1, Initial Appeal
     File, Tab 4, Initial Decision.        The Board automatically refiled that appeal in

     2
       Joinder of two or more appeals filed by the same appellant is appropriate when doing
     so would expedite case processing and will not adversely affect the parties’ interests.
     Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 1 n.1 (2015), clarified by
     Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647 (2016); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.36(a)-(b). We find that these criteria are satisfied here. After the case is
     returned to the regional office, the administrative judge should determine whether it is
     appropriate to continue adjudicating the appeals together.
     3
         The appellant actually referred to the Board’s administrative law judges.
     4
       In October 2018, the appellant sought review of the Board’s decision before the
     U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, the Federal Circuit dismissed
     that appeal on the Board’s motion, finding that the dismissal of an appeal without
     prejudice to refiling is not a final decision for purposes of judicial review. Jolley v.
     Department of Housing & Urban Development, No. 2019-1022, Order (Fed. Cir.
     Dec. 28, 2018).
                                                                                            3

     October 2018. Jolley v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, MSPB
     Docket No. AT-4324-18-0576-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (0576 RAF), Tab 1. The
     refiled appeal was reassigned to a different administrative judge.          0576 RAF,
     Tab 2.
¶3         The appellant filed his other appeal, Jolley v. Department of Housing
     & Urban     Development,      MSPB       Docket     No.    AT-4324-19-0041-I-1,        in
     October 2018. The appellant raised the same arguments he had raised in his prior
     appeal. Jolley v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, MSPB Docket
     No. AT-4324-19-0041-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0041 IAF), Tab 1. That appeal
     was reassigned to the same administrative judge as his refiled appeal. 0041 IAF,
     Tab 3.    The administrative judge issued an order in both of the appellant’s
     pending appeals in which he gave the parties an opportunity to submit briefs
     addressing the effect of Lucia on the Board and its administrative judges.
     0041 IAF, Tab 20; 0576 RAF, Tab 7. On April 23, 2019, the administrative judge
     issued an Order and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal in the appella nt’s two
     appeals. 0041 IAF, Tab 22; 0576 RAF, Tab 9. Applying the Supreme Court’s
     decision in Lucia, he determined that the Board’s administrative judges are
     inferior officers of the United States who must be appointed in accordance with
     the Appointments Clause 5 and that the appellant was entitled to a hearing before
     an official who had been properly appointed. 0041 IAF, Tab 22 at 7; 0576 RAF,
     Tab 9 at 7.     He certified his ruling for interlocutory appeal and stayed all
     proceedings in the appeals pending the Board’s resolution of the interlocutory
     appeal. 0041 IAF, Tab 22 at 8; 0576 RAF, Tab 9 at 8.

     5
       Under the Appointments Clause, the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
     Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . .
     but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
     think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
     Departments.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
                                                                                          4

                                          ANALYSIS
¶4         An administrative judge will certify a ruling for interlocutory review if the
     ruling involves an important question of law or policy about which there is
     substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate ru ling will
     materially advance the completing of the proceeding, or the denial of an
     immediate ruling will cause undue harm to a party or the public.            Cooper v.
     Department of the Navy, 98 M.S.P.R. 683, ¶ 5 (2005), review dismissed sub nom.
     Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 197 F. App’x 936 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.92. In light of the lack of guidance regarding the impact of the Lucia
     decision on the Board, we find that certification was proper.

     The appellant’s Appointments Clause claim is now moot.
¶5         In Lucia, the Supreme Court held that Securities & Exchange Commission
     (SEC) administrative law judges qualify as Officers of the United States subject
     to the Appointments Clause, rather than as mere employees. Lucia, 138 S. Ct.
     at 2049, 2052-55. Because SEC’s administrative law judges were appointed by
     SEC staff members rather than the Commission itself, the Court held that the
     appointment of those administrative law judges violated the Appointments
     Clause. Id. at 2050-51. 6
¶6         The Court in Lucia held that the remedy for an Appointments Clause
     violation “is a new ‘hearing before a properly appointed’ official.”            Lucia,
     138 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182-83 (1995)).
     Here, all of the Board’s administrative judges have now received appointments
     ratified by the head of the agency, thereby satisfying the requirements of the
     Appointments Clause.        See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Ratification
     Order (Mar. 4, 2022), https://www.mspb.gov/foia/files/AJ_Ratification_Order

     6
       The holding in Lucia applied only to SEC administrative law judges and ther efore did
     not directly address whether the Board’s method of appointing administrative judges
     violated the Appointments Clause. For the reasons set forth herein, we need not resolve
     that question here.
                                                                                              5

     _3-4-2022.pdf. 7 The Ratification Order is a public document, of which we take
     administrative notice.      Id.; see Azdell v. Office of Personnel Management,
     88 M.S.P.R. 319, 323 (2001). That document is also now a part of the record
     before the Board. 0041 IAF, Tab 23; 0576 RAF, Tab 10. Therefore, the decision
     on the merits of these appeals will be issued in the first instance by a properly
     appointed official.
¶7         In order to avoid any additional Appointments Clause issues, we direct the
     regional office to assign the appeals to a properly appointed official other than
     either the administrative judge who issued the first initial decision or the
     administrative judge who certified the interlocutory appeal. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct
     at 2055. 8 Thus, the appellant has received all the relief the Board can provide as
     to his Appointments Clause claim and that issue is now moot. See Milner v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 4 (2012) (holding that an issue is moot when
     there is no effective relief that the Board can provide).

     7
       The Appointments Clause permits the appointment of inferior officers by the head of a
     department; principal officers must be appointed by the President with the advice and
     consent of the Senate. We see no basis to conclude that the Board’s administrative
     judges are principal officers. See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
     501 U.S. 868, 880-82 (1991) (holding that special trial judges of the Tax Court, who
     exercise significant discretion in adjudicating matters before them, are inferior
     officers). Thus, the appointment of administrative judges by the Board satisfies the
     requirements of the Appointments Clause even if Board administrative judges are
     officers, rather than mere employees.
     8
       Arguably, either of those administrative judges could properly adjudicate the appeal
     now that they have received proper appointments. The Court in Lucia held that the
     official who heard the case after remand could not be the same one who already heard
     the case and issued an initial decision on the merits, even if he were to receive a proper
     appointment, because “[h]e cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had
     not adjudicated it before.” Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055. This logic would not apply to
     either the administrative judge who certified the interlocutory appeal or the
     administrative judge who dismissed the appellant’s first appeal without prejudice
     because neither judge has expressed a view on the merits of the appeal. Nevertheless,
     we find it appropriate to assign the appeal to a different administrative judge for further
     adjudication in order to avoid any further claim under the Appointments Clause.
                                                                                     6

                                          ORDER
¶8        Accordingly, we vacate the stay orders issued in these proceedings and
     return the appeals to the regional office for further processing and adjudication
     before a different administrative judge consistent with this Order.

     FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
     Washington, D.C.