Court Opinion

ID: 9877923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:32:42.051057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:29.708976
License: Public Domain

BRUNNER, J.
  

   {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel R. Gibson, appeals a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas issued on February 17, 2017 denying his motion for recalculation of jail-time credit. Because Gibson's motion did state facts, amounting to an assertion that he had not previously raised in his claim regarding jail-time credit, the trial court erred in deciding that Gibson's motion was not filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). For this reason, we reverse.
  

    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   

   {¶ 2} On November 3, 2015, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Gibson for two counts of robbery, one count of kidnapping, one count of attempted rape, and one count of gross sexual imposition. (Nov. 3, 2015 Indictment.) Gibson initially pled not guilty to all charges. (Nov. 6, 2015 Plea Form.) But approximately six months later, he agreed to plead guilty to one count of fourth-degree felony aggravated assault in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. (May 17, 2016 Entry of Guilty Plea.)
  

   {¶ 3} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on October 25, 2016. (Oct. 25, 2016 Sentencing Sheet.) However, a transcript of that hearing was not ordered and is not in the record. Following that hearing, on October 31, 2016, the trial court entered judgment sentencing Gibson to 16 months in prison and awarding him 49 days of jail credit. (Oct. 31, 2016 Jgmt. Entry at 1-2.) Gibson did not file a direct appeal.
  

   {¶ 4} Approximately one and one-half month later, Gibson filed a pro se motion for jail-time credit using a fill-in-the-blank form. (Dec. 15, 2016 Mot. for Jail Time Credit.) The form indicated the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to "correct any error in its determination of jail-time credit
   
    not previously raised at sentencing
   
   ," and using the form, Gibson alleged that only after he was "delivered into state custody" (i.e., post sentencing) on November 4, 2016 did he learn that he received what he believed to be an incorrect determination of jail-time credit. (Emphasis added.)
   
    Id.
   
   at 1-2. The motion set forth specific dates during which Gibson was allegedly held in connection with the offense for which he pled guilty.
   
    Id.
   
   at 1. Gibson ultimately sought a total of 294 days of jail-time credit.
   
    Id.
   
   at 2.
  

   {¶ 5} On February 17, 2017 the trial court declined to consider Gibson's motion. (Feb. 17, 2017 Jgmt. Entry at 1-2.) It found that Gibson's motion was barred by res judicata and that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), which can remove such motions from the reach of res judicata, was inapplicable because that provision only applies to "error[s] not previously raised at sentencing" and that Gibson had not "alleged that any such error failed to be raised at sentencing."
   
    Id.
   

   {¶ 6} Gibson now appeals.
  

    II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
   

   {¶ 7} Gibson asserts a single assignment of error for review:
  

   The trial court abused its discretion and denied Daniel Gibson Due Process and Equal Protection of the law when it failed to consider the merits of his motion for jail-time credit, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii).
  

    III. DISCUSSION
   

   {¶ 8} In criminal cases, res judicata generally bars a defendant from litigating claims in a proceeding subsequent to the direct appeal "if he or she raised or could have raised the issue at the trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that judgment."
   
    State v. Jackson
   
   ,
   
    141 Ohio St.3d 171
   
   ,
   
    2014-Ohio-3707
   
   ,
   
    23 N.E.3d 1023
   
   , ¶ 92. "Stated differently, in criminal cases
   
    res judicata
   
   may preclude issues, arguments, or positions that could have been (even if they were not actually) litigated." (Emphasis sic.)
   
    State v. Breeze
   
   , 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1027,
   
    2016-Ohio-1457
   
   ,
   
    2016 WL 1378208
   
   , ¶ 9. This is distinct from civil cases in which "[i]ssue preclusion does not apply to other matters that might have been litigated but were not."
   
    State ex rel. Davis v. Public Emps. Retirement Bd.
   
   ,
   
    174 Ohio App.3d 135
   
   ,
   
    2007-Ohio-6594
   
   ,
   
    881 N.E.2d 294
   
   , ¶ 31 (10th Dist.). There are, however, exceptions to the reach of res judicata in criminal cases.
  

   {¶ 9} One such exception exists in state statute:
  

   The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making a determination [regarding jail-time credit]. The offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the sentencing court to correct any error made in making a determination [regarding jail-time credit], and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion. * * * Sections [governing petitions for postconviction relief and motions for new trials] do not apply to a motion made under this section.
  

   R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) ;
   
    see
   

    State v. Thompson
   
   ,
   
    147 Ohio St.3d 29
   
   ,
   
    2016-Ohio-2769
   
   ,
   
    59 N.E.3d 1264
   
   , ¶ 11-12 (recognizing that prior to the enactment of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), a motion to correct jail-time credit would be bared by res judicata if the issue were not raised on direct appeal and that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) changed that by creating a new right). Thus, if R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) applies to Gibson's motion, the trial court should not have refused to hear it on res judicata grounds.
  

   {¶ 10} The State argues that Gibson's motion is not addressed by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) because it does not assert that he seeks to correct a jail-time credit "error not previously raised at sentencing" and no transcript was ordered to allow the trial court to determine whether the issue was previously raised or not. (State Brief at 3.) Essentially, the State argues that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) requires Gibson not only to raise the error, but to prove it by supplying a transcript with his motion.
   
    1
   
   We find no basis for this in the language of the statute. The State would have us interpret the statute so as to create a presumption that such error
   
    had
   
   been raised at sentencing unless a defendant can produce a transcript that proves otherwise, or else res judicata bars relief. This is not what the statute requires. According to the statute, the operative action Gibson was required to take was to "file a motion." R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). And while the statute also includes language that the purpose of the motion is "to correct any error made in making a determination" of jail-time credit, it is the trial court that makes the determination on a criminal defendant's allegation made by motion.
   

     Id.
    

   {¶ 11} Nor does Crim.R. 47 require a transcript to be filed. Instead, Crim.R. 47 requires that Gibson's motion be stated with particularity and that such motion
   
    may
   
   be supported by affidavit. To review, Gibson, by written motion, alleged that it was only after Gibson was "delivered into state custody" on November 4, 2016 that he learned he had received an incorrect computation of jail-time credit. (Dec. 15, 2016 Mot. for Jail Time Credit at 1.) Gibson's sentencing hearing took place on October 25, 2016, and the trial court on October 31, 2016 entered judgment in the record that contained a written recitation of Gibson's sentence and a calculation and award of 49 days of jail credit. (Oct. 25, 2016 Sentencing Sheet; Oct. 31, 2016 Jgmt. Entry at 1-2.) November 4 is after both of those dates. Gibson has stated plainly on the face of the motion that he was unaware of the potential problem in his jail-time credit until November 4, 2016 and that it was not raised "at sentencing," which had occurred on October 25. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii).
  

   {¶ 12} The trial court denied Gibson's motion, stating that he had not alleged in his motion that the problem with his jail-time credit was not raised at sentencing. Yet, Gibson had stated very plainly in his motion that the problem with his jail-time credit had not been raised at sentencing. No transcript was needed to discern this.
  

   {¶ 13} We have previously concluded that only when the issue is raised at sentencing does res judicata apply.
   
    State v. Smith
   
   , 10th Dist. No. 15AP-209,
   
    2015-Ohio-4465
   
   ,
   
    2015 WL 6459961
   
   , ¶ 9. Gibson alleges that the issue was not raised at sentencing. In
   
    Smith
   
   , we differentiated between whether the error was characterized in the motion as "mathematical or clerical error" or based on "a legal entitlement," supplying additional analysis beyond the plain language of the statute. But Gibson's case differs from that of
   
    Smith.
   
   He simply sought to avail himself of the court's continuing jurisdiction to "correct any error in its determination of jail-time credit not previously raised at sentencing." R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). And the statute does not differentiate between types of alleged errors as addressed in
   
    Smith.
   

   {¶ 14} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) applies based on the face of the motion. The trial court erred in finding that Gibson had failed to allege that the claimed error in his jail-time credit was not raised at sentencing. We further hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in rejecting on res judicata grounds the merits of Gibson's motion for additional jail-time credit. Gibson's assignment of error is sustained.
  

    IV. CONCLUSION
   

   {¶ 15} Because the face of Gibson's motion for jail-time credit contains the assertion that he did not learn of the alleged error in jail-time credit until after sentencing, and no material in the record contradicts that assertion, it was error for the trial court to have concluded that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) was inapplicable. Hence, it was also error for the trial court to have dismissed Gibson's motion on res judicata grounds. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.
  

    Judgment reversed and remanded.
   

   TYACK, P.J., concurs
  

   SADLER, J., dissents.
  

    It is conceivable that the State could have provided a transcript or portion thereof with its memorandum opposing Gibson's motion for jail-time credit. It did not do so and instead argues that Gibson should have.