Court Opinion

ID: 9520626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:45:45.995502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:33.507209
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.10 At first glance, the majority's analysis, which hinges on the identity of the property owner, is compelling. Upon taking a closer look, however, I must disagree. Of course "the Defendants' argument ... assurnes that the Plaintiffs own the real estate at issue"that is what the complaint alleged. Op. p. 102 (emphasis in original). The Plaintiffs crafted their lawsuit around a central theory-that they are the rightful owners of the property. I believe that it is the nature of the complaint that frames the case, not the nature of the response. Thus, that the Defendants claim in their answer that they also own the property does not change the fact that all of the Plaintiffs' theories are premised on the opposite contention. I think that the result reached by the majority will effectively preclude most, if not all, inverse condemnation actions in the future, and I cannot countenance such a result.
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs allege that they own the property, I believe that Dible forecloses them from any recovery aside from inverse condemnation. 713 N.E.2d at 274 (holding that "[elquitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the government entity subsequent to the taking"). Initially, I can only conclude that the allegedly unlawful possession and use of the Disputed Property would be a taking for a public purpose. In Indiana, the State directly benefits from the profits of the gaming industry. See, eg., Ind.Code § 4-33-12-6 (2002 & Supp.2008) (setting admission taxes on riverboat casinos); ILC. § 4 33-13-1 (2002 & Supp.2008) (setting 22.5% tax on adjusted gross receipts of riverboat casinos). Thus, the taking of the Disputed Property for use as a riverboat casino docking site was not a taking for a purely private purpose and amounted to a taking for a public purpose. Therefore, the Plaintiffs may not seek equitable relief. See Dible, 713 N.E.2d at 274.
Count I seeks to quiet title of the Disputed Property in the Plaintiffs' favor. Although a statutory action to quiet title is triable to a jury, an action to quiet title is governed by equitable principles. See Terpstra v. Farmers & Merch. Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (noting that quiet title actions are an equitable as well as a statutory remedy). Here, the Plaintiffs seek non-monetary relief-a declaration that they are the owners of the Disputed Property. Thus, I can only conclude that, notwithstanding the fact that a quiet title action may be statutory and triable to a jury, the nature of the relief sought in a quiet title action is equitable. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have no right to seek this relief.
As the majority noted, the relief sought in Counts II and III is clearly equitable. As to Count IV, the majority aptly notes that it is "multifaceted," listing seven different claims for relief. Op. p. 106. I *109agree with the majority that the facets of this claim seeking restoration of the Disputed Property and an easement by necessity are equitable in nature. I also agree that the claims for monetary damages based on lost rents and profits are legal actions but note that they are time-barred by a six-year statute of limitations. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7 (listing among actions that must be commenced within six years after accrual, "[aletions for use, rents, and profits of real property").
As for the portion of Count IV seeking ejectment, I simply cannot agree that the Plaintiffs can make an end run around a time-barred inverse condemnation claim by pursuing an alternate claim for ejectment. I believe that the General Assembly had to have intended that a party seeking redress for a dispute over governmental infringement on the individual's property rights is required to pursue an inverse condemnation claim within six years. To permit this ejectment claim to survive is to elevate form over substance to a degree that I cannot support. Therefore, I believe we should affirm the trial court's decision to refuse to hold a jury trial on this claim.
Count V is a negligence claim, seeking relief for the Plaintiffs' alleged economic loss stemming from their exclusion from the lease negotiations and agreements concerning the use and rent of their land. Appellants' App. p. 54. As stated above, actions for use, rents, and profits of real property must be commenced within six years after accrual of the cause of action. I.C. § 34-11-2-7. Therefore, this claim is untimely.
Count VI seeks relief under a theory of unjust enrichment. Whether framed as an equitable or legal claim, it is time-barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. [Id. Thus, this claim is untimely and may not proceed to a jury.
The availability of an action for inverse condemnation precludes the Plaintiffs from obtaining the equitable relief sought in their complaint. An action for inverse condemnation, however, is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Similarly, all but one of the Plaintiffs' remaining legal claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. And as explained above, I can only conclude that the availability of an inverse condemnation claim bars the Plaintiffs from seeking ejectment as an alternate remedy. Therefore, I believe that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial on any of their claims and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

. As an aside, I agree with the majority's decision to address the Defendants' cross-appeal.