Court Opinion

ID: 9651449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:19:38.346367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:26.728029
License: Public Domain

Levine, J.,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. On the key issue in this case, whether the amendment to Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.) Art. 67, § 4 (a) is to be given retroactive application, the majority holds:
“. . . the rule quoted above from Janda [v. General Motors, 237 Md. 161, 168-69, 205 A. 2d 228 (1964)] is applicable to require that prospective application of the amended version of Art. 67, § 4 (a) be made, unless the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent that the provision be retroactive in application. Certainly, the Legislature did not *546clearly express an intention that Ch. 781+ be made retroactive to causes of action accruing after July 1, 1968.” (emphasis added).
While agreeing with the general rule from Janda relied on by the majority, I would hold that here the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent that the provision be retroactive in application. If the words “shall be applied prospectively and retrospectively” are deemed insufficient for this purpose, I am at a loss to understand what the majority would regard as a clear expression of intent.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 555, 325 A. 2d 748 (1974); Radio Com., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 271 Md. 82, 93, 314 A. 2d 118 (1974); Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393, 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1, 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); and if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Rockville, supra, 272 Md. at 556; Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, supra, 269 Md. at 393-94.
Where, as here, however, a literal reading of the statute leads to totally absurd consequences which could never have been intended by the Legislature, this Court must determine the real legislative intent, Fairchild v. Maritime Air Serv., 274 Md. 181, 186, 333 A. 2d 313 (1975); Blocker v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571, 584, 303 A. 2d 395 (1973); Farber’s, Inc. v. Comptroller, 266 Md. 44, 51, 291 A. 2d 658 (1972); Pan Am. Sulphur v. State Dep’t, 251 Md. 620, 627, 248 A. 2d 354 (1968). Furthermore, wherever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 275 Md. 130, 339 A. 2d 291; A. H. Smith Sand & Gravel v. Dep’t, 270 Md. 652, 659, 313 A. 2d 820 (1974); Baltimore City v. United Stores, 250 Md. 361, 368-69, 243 A. 2d 521 (1968); Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A. 2d 625 (1956).
*547Chapter 784 of the Laws of 1971, effective July 1, 1971, amended Art. 67, § 4 (a) so as to enlarge the limitations period in wrongful death cases from two to three years. Section 2 of Ch. 784 provides:
“And be it further enacted, That the provisions of this Act shall be applied prospectively and retrospectively to have effect upon or application to any cause of action arising prior to July 1, 1968.” (emphasis added).
Read literally, this section would apply to all wrongful death cases arising prior to July 1, 1968, and +o such cases arising after July 1, 1971; however, it would not apply to those cases arising between July 1, 1868, and July 1, 1871. For all cases arising prior to July 1, 1868, therefore, the new three-year limitations period would have elapsed prior to the effective date of the very amendment enlarging the limitations period. In short, under this interpretation, § 2 of Ch. 784 expired before it even applied, except for the remote possibility of a wrongful death suit being filed prior to the effective date of the amendment, but between two and three years after the cause of action accrued.1
Such an absurd reading of the amendment, which renders an entire section virtually superfluous and meaningless, cannot be what the Legislature contemplated. Since it is to be assumed that the Legislature intended a rational result in enacting § 2, one can only conclude that it meant to apply the amendment retroactively to all cases arising after July 1, 1868, that is, to all cases which would not have been barred under the enlarged limitations period as of the effective date of the amendment. In my view, the words “prior to” can only be deemed an error of draftsmanship and, in light of the true legislative intent, should be replaced with the words “subsequent to.”
Having thus concluded that the Legislature has clearly *548expressed its intent to apply Ch. 784 retroactively, I would reach the constitutional issues not decided by the majority.
In Smith v. Westinghouse Electric, 266 Md. 52, 291 A. 2d 452 (1972), this Court declared § 2 of Ch. 784 unconstitutional as literally written, when applied to a case which arose prior to July 1, 1968. We there held that the provision violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Federal Constitution, as well as Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Equal Protection violation is readily obviated by a construction of § 2 which avoids the arbitrary distinction between cases arising prior to July 1, 1968, and those arising subsequent thereto. Also, Due Process was held to be violated on the ground that the plaintiff’s substantive right to bring a wrongful death action had terminated prior to the effective date of the amendment, and that the attempt in § 2 to revive this expired substantive right deprived the defendant of a vested property interest.
Thus, Smith v. Westinghouse Electric, supra, stands for the principle that due process is violated by a retroactive application of Ch. 784 to causes of action which had expired under the old limitations provision as of the effective date of the amendment, i.e., to causes of action accruing prior to July 1, 1969.
In the present cases, which arose subsequent to July 1, 1969, the plaintiffs’ rights had not yet expired when the amendment took effect on July 1, 1971. Consequently, no vested property interests of the defendants were infringed, and due process was not violated. See Pratt v. Hayes, 20 Ill.App.2d 457, 156 N.E.2d 290, 296, 79 A.L.R.2d 1071 (1959); Nichols v. Wilbur, 256 Ore. 418, 473 P. 2d 1022, 1023 (1970). The fact that the amendment has been declared unconstitutional as to some circumstances, as the majority noted in footnote 2 of its opinion, does not mean it is unconstitutional in toto, Compensation Board v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 96, 36 A. 2d 666 (1944).
It is my opinion, therefore, that the Legislature clearly intended the amendment to apply retroactively to cases *549arising subsequent to July 1, 1968, but that such application is unconstitutional under Smith v. Westinghouse Electric, supra, in regard to those cases arising prior to July 1, 1969. The amendment, therefore, would apply retroactively to all wrongful death cases arising after July 1, 1969. Since the two cases before us arose subsequent to that date, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. Chief Judge Murphy authorizes me to state that he concurs in this opinion.

. This is the fact situation which, on constitutional grounds, was held not to support recovery in Smith v. Westinghouse Electric, infra.