Court Opinion

ID: 9790555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:54:52.909386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.185329
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the defendant’s dilatory conduct, gamesmanship, and refusal to retain private counsel or comply with the procedures necessary for appointment of counsel cannot form the basis for a reversal of the defendant’s conviction. The right to counsel is a “fundamental [principle] which lie[s] at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)). However, a defendant may not manipulate that right in a manner that will impede the efficient and effective administration of justice. See United States ex rel. Carey v. Bundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir.1969). In Allen v. People, 157 Colo. 582, 404 P.2d 266 (1965), we held that a defendant, who was advised three times of his right to appointed or retained counsel, waived his right to counsel when he appeared at trial unrepresented. We rejected Allen’s contention that the trial court should have inquired into his indigency and should not have tried him without counsel, and said:
The rule does not require the trial court to maintain a continuing vigilance over the financial affairs of one accused of crime in order to ferret out his poverty potential_ [T]he trial court fully advised the defendant of his right to be represented by an attorney, and ... determined that he was able to secure the services of an attorney. Ample time was given to prepare for trial. Thereafter, the burden rested upon the defendant to apprise the court of any change in circumstances resulting in indigency.
Id. at 591, 404 P.2d at 271.
In People v. Litsey, 192 Colo. 19, 555 P.2d 974 (1976), the defendant refused appointed counsel, and advised the trial court that he intended to retain a private attorney. The defendant failed to retain counsel, and appeared at trial unrepresented. In affirming his conviction, we said: “the defendant made no effort to retain counsel after being told of all his options by the trial court.... [T]he trial court properly construed the defendant’s actions in this regard as a waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 23, 555 P.2d at 977. In United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.1980), the court of appeals “refused to permit [a] game to be played with the courts,” and held that the defendant waived his right to counsel when he failed to engage an attorney after repeated admonitions by the trial court. The court of appeals noted that the defendant had ample *1271time before trial to retain counsel, and that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s request for a four-month continuance.
In the present case, the defendants, who had previous encounters with the criminal justice system, first appeared before the court on January 4, 1982, at which time Milano advised the court that he and King had retained private counsel. Because their counsel could not attend, the court continued the case to January 18, 1982, for their appearance with counsel. On January 18, 1982, King and Milano again appeared unrepresented, and requested a preliminary hearing. The trial court set a preliminary hearing for February 5, 1982, and advised the defendants that they were entitled to appointed counsel upon proof of indigency, and that self-representation was dangerous. At the preliminary hearing, the trial court again warned the defendants against self-representation, and advised them of the procedures to obtain appointed counsel. The defendants declined appointed counsel, and the trial court advised them to see the eligibility investigator in the event a last-minute appointment became necessary.
On March 8, 1982, despite the court’s careful admonitions and detailed directions, King and Milano appeared at trial without counsel. The court denied King’s request for a continuance, and advised the defendants that they would have to proceed to trial unrepresented. The court was later forced to reschedule the trial for March 15, 1982, when the defendants temporarily left the courthouse during a recess. The defendants did not seek representation during their week’s respite, and were eventually convicted on March 15.
I believe that the defendant’s refusal in this case either to appear pro se or to take the steps necessary to retain private or appointed counsel resulted in a waiver of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel. The defendant could not bypass the eligibility procedure for appointment of counsel for indigent defendants and obtain a continuance by appearing at trial unrepresented. The trial court fully apprised the defendant of his alternatives two months before trial, and the defendant chose to ignore his options. The trial court committed no error by requiring the defendant to proceed with his case as it was docketed. The majority view, in my opinion, improperly permits a defendant to place the trial judge in a position where a failure to grant a further continuance after repeated directions as to the procedure for obtaining counsel constitutes a deprivation of the right to counsel. See Kates v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (9th Cir.1970).
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.1
I am authorized to say that Justice VOL-LACK joins me in this dissent.

. I would also affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript.