Court Opinion

ID: 9490619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:49:24.231275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:12.845460
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
with whom SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, joins.
I concur with the court that the willfulness inquiry under I.R.C. § 6672 and Treas. Reg. § 301.6672-1 requires consideration of relevant evidence pertaining to intent, including whether a responsible person fails to investigate or correct mismanagement after learning of nonpayment of trust fund taxes. In my view, this case turns on whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Mr. Johnson did not act willfully when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to him. See Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir.1992). Because a jury is entitled to consider the nature, extent and timing of a responsible person’s nonpayment in deciding willfulness, I would hold that sufficient evidence supports the-jury’s verdict and would remand the case to the district court to vacate its judgment, reinstate the jury verdict, and enter judgment in favor of Mr. Johnson. I would not reach the issue of whether a “reasonable cause” exception applies, nor would I define its parameters.
The principles in our prior cases must be read in conjunction with the procedural posture of the case, specifically, application of the law to undisputed facts on summary judgment, Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1993) or affirming a judge or jury’s finding of willfulness while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the result, Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (10th Cir.1993) (jury verdict); Burden v. United States, 486 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir.1973) (district court finding), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904, 94 S.Ct. 1608, 40 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974). Where we have reversed a district court’s finding of a lack of willfulness in the § 6672 context, the responsible person knew the taxes were unpaid, yet continued to operate and liquidate the business over a substantial period of time. Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175, 1186 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 296, 136 L.Ed.2d 215 (1996). In Bradshaw, we rejected a contention that allowing a bank authority over disbursements vitiated willfulness. Id. at 1183-86.
Whether Mr. Johnson acted “willfully” under § 6672 is a factual matter. Id. at 1182-83; Taylor v. I.R.S., 69 F.3d 411, 417 (10th Cir.1995). One way to prove willfulness is to show that a responsible person acted with reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk that trust funds may not be paid over to the government. Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1183; Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033. Under this theory, we have held that “[a] responsible person’s failure to investigate or to correct mismanagement after being notified that withholding taxes have not been paid satisfies the section 6672 willfulness requirement.” Bradshaw, 83 F.3d at 1183. At the same time, negligence is insufficient to result in § 6672 liability. Id. Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033.
The evidence in this case does not compel a finding of willfulness, i.e., that Mr. Johnson knowingly preferred other creditors to the government with unencumbered funds totaling $95,000. Mr. Johnson learned of the delinquent trust fund taxes in late October 1988 from Mr. Finley, discussed sources of funds, and then directed that they be paid. Other than the fact of the unpaid taxes, Mr. Johnson had no reason to view Mr. Finley as unreliable; he was unaware of Mr. Finley’s scheme to conceal unpaid trust fund taxes. See Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 969 (10th Cir.1996). Even assuming that the unpaid taxes were evidence of mismanagement, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Johnson took appropriate steps to correct it under the circumstances by discussing available sources of funds and directing that the taxes be paid.
Notuntil November 8, 1988, did Mr. Johnson learn of the failure to correct the problem. At this point, however, the company’s arrangement with the bank underwent substantial change. The government does not argue that subsequent cash receipts delivered to the bank pursuant to this arrange*1351ment (including $105,000 that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Finley requested be applied to trust fund taxes) constitute unencumbered funds that should have been applied to payment of trust fund taxes. See United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1358-61 (7th Cir.1997); Honey v. United States, 963 F.2d 1083, 1089-90 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028, 113 S.Ct. 676, 121 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992). Thus, at issue in this case are Mr. Johnson’s actions from late October 1988 until November 8, 1988.
According to the government,
once a responsible officer becomes aware that trust fund taxes due the United States have not been paid, it is incumbent upon such person to take appropriate steps to ensure that the taxes are paid and that, if he fails to do so, e.g., fails to investigate the matter or correct mismanagement, his failure to act constitutes, as a matter of law, a reckless disregard of the known risk that the taxes owed the Government might not be paid.
Aplee. Supp. Br. On Reh’g En Banc at 8. I agree that investigating the matter or correcting mismanagement are exemplary but not exclusive and that the focus must be on taking appropriate steps given the situation. Here, Mr. Johnson did act. Whether a responsible person has taken appropriate steps, and consequently not acted with scien-ter, cannot be dependent solely upon whether the investigation or correction of mismanagement ensured that the taxes were paid; otherwise, there would be strict liability in every nonpayment case. A much more reasonable construction of the statute allows the jury to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the nonpayment, including (1) Mr. Johnson’s lack of sophistication, (2) that Mr. Finley hid from him the company’s financial problems and led him to believe the company was doing better than it actually was, (3) that Mr. Johnson wanted the taxes paid and took steps to accomplish that goal, including (a) delivery of $105,000 to the bank for that purpose, and (b) actual payment of unencumbered funds, and (4) that the time period in which the government claims Mr. Johnson’s conduct amounted to recklessness was no more than a couple of weeks and possibly as short as one week. Though the statute is harsh, surely it was not intended to replace a subjective evaluation of willfulness with a formulaic objective standard. While any one of these factors might not be sufficient to avoid a willfulness determination, the trier of fact should be allowed to consider them and determine whether the nonpayment conduct was willful.