Court Opinion

ID: 9526306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:30.260792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:26.515875
License: Public Domain

Marilyn Kelly, J.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
Defendants appeal as of right from an order of the Ingham Circuit Court which granted summary disposition to plaintiffs and enjoined defendants *380from implementing Executive Order 1991-31. They argue on appeal that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims are nonjusticiable political questions. They assert that the Governor is absolutely immune from suit and that his executive order was a valid exercise of authority granted him by the Michigan Constitution. Plaintiffs Michigan Environmental Protection Foundation et al. (mepf) cross appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in denying them attorney fees and costs and in failing to find a second executive order, EO 1991-33, unconstitutional.
EO 1991-31 alters the state’s role with respect to its natural resources by expressly abolishing the existing Department of Natural Resources (dnr) and creating a new one. The trial court characterized the order as an attempt to accomplish the most comprehensive reorganization of state government since the implementation of the 1963 constitution. A second order, EO 1991-33, creates an Environmental Science Board to advise the Governor on environmental issues.
The circuit court ruled that all the plaintiffs had standing. It then found that EO 1991-31 violated the separation of powers clause of the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. In addition, it determined that, in issuing EO 1991-31, the Governor exceeded his authority under both the Michigan Constitution and the Executive Organization Act, MCL 16.101 et seq.; MSA 3.29(1) et seq. It found the Governor lacked authority to appoint the head of the Natural Resources Commission (nrc). It ruled he was not empowered to abolish commissions and boards whose functions include the holding of public hearings. The court concluded by ruling that EO 1991-31 was not violative of the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq.; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq., Freedom of Information *381Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq., Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq.; MSA 27A.101 et seq., or substantive due process. The court refused to award attorney fees on the basis that a public question was involved.1
We affirm the actions of the circuit court.
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING
Defendants argue initially that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action. The requirement of standing ensures that only those who have a substantial interest in a dispute will be allowed to come into court to be heard. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 190 Mich App 260, 265; 475 NW2d 440 (1991), lv gtd 439 Mich 1013 (1992), citing Highland Recreation Defense Foundation v Natural Resources Comm, 180 Mich App 324, 328; 446 NW2d 895 (1989). Plaintiffs must show both a substantial interest in the dispute and that they will be detrimentally affected by the litigation in a manner different than the citizenry at large. House Speaker, 266, citing Muskegon Building & Construction Trades v Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist, 130 Mich App 420, 423-424; 343 NW2d 579 (1983).
In House Speaker, certain legislators brought suit claiming that the state administrative board’s transfer of funds within various state departments exceeded the board’s statutory authority and violated the state constitution. They asserted that the intertransfers could be accomplished only by the state budget director, subject to review by legislative appropriations committees. Alternatively, they argued that, if the Management and Budget Act, *382MCL 18.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.516(101) et seq., authorized the transfers, the act was unconstitutional, as it delegated legislative power to the executive branch of state government. This Court determined that, under either theory, the legislators, members of the appropriations committees or their appointors, clearly asserted substantial interests different in kind from those of the citizenry at large. Id., 266-267.
As in House Speaker, the legislator plaintiffs here argue that the Governor violated the separation of powers clause by exceeding the scope of legislative power which Michigan’s constitution grants him. Const 1963, art 5, § 2. The legislator plaintiffs are: Lewis Dodak, Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives; Thomas Alley, Chair of the House Committee on Conservation, Recreation and the Environment; Tracey Yokich, member of the House Committee on Conservation, Recreation and the Environment; John D. Cherry, the Senate Minority Floor Leader; and Arthur Miller, the Senate Minority Leader.
The Michigan Legislature is constitutionally mandated to protect the natural resources of this state from pollution, impairment and destruction. The executive order challenged eliminates a substantial number of boards and commissions which the Legislature created for the purpose of protecting the environment. See Const 1963, art 4, § 52. We agree with the trial court that the legislator plaintiffs clearly have asserted substantial interests as legislators different in kind from those of the citizenry at large. House Speaker, 267.
Plaintiffs Michigan United Conservation Clubs et al. (mucc) and mepf also unquestionably had standing to bring this action and to obtain the relief sought and granted. The trial court ruled that their standing was based on their status as *383taxpayers. MCR 2.201(B)(4). Mucc and mepf are nonprofit corporations, organized for civic, protective or improvement purposes. They and five or more of their members, who own property assessed for direct taxation by the county in which they reside, filed this action. MCR 2.201(B)(4)(a) and (b). In concert with the legislator plaintiffs, these plaintiffs alleged that the executive order exceeded the Governor’s authority and that any expenditure of funds by a new dnr would be illegal. MCR 2.201(B)(4).
The standing of mucc and mepf may be based, also, on their status as nonprofit corporations which were incorporated to establish and protect the rights and interests of their members. See Muskegon Building Trades, 428. Individual plaintiffs are members of mucc or mepf and either are also members of, or regularly attend and speak at meetings of, boards and commissions to be abolished under EO 1991-31. These plaintiffs clearly have a substantial interest different in kind from the citizenry at large. See Muskegon Building Trades, supra.
nonjusticiable political questions are not INVOLVED
Defendants next assert that the trial court should have used its "equitable discretion” and dismissed this case, because the matters at issue are nonjusticiable political questions. They point out that the doctrine of equitable discretion should be applied, since the Legislature may: 1) elect to reject the two contested executive orders by mustering a majority vote of both the House and Senate; 2) overturn the orders through subsequent legislation; and 3) reduce the orders’ effectiveness through the appropriations process.
*384The federal doctrine of equitable discretion has been applied "where a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute.” House Speaker, 270, citing Dornan v United States Secretary of Defense, 271 US App DC 195, 196; 851 F2d 450 (1988). Here, the legislator plaintiffs seek a judicial determination that the Governor unlawfully usurped authority which the constitution granted to the Legislature. They argue that they could not obtain "substantial relief’ if the Legislature rejected, overturned or reduced the effectiveness of EO 1991-31 and EO 1991-33; no legislative action could prevent the Governor from once again exceeding his authority in the guise of yet another executive reorganization. We agree and decline to apply the federal doctrine of equitable discretion to this case.
The trial court was correct in determining that this case does not present nonjusticiable political questions. The decision whether the constitution committed a matter to another branch of government, or whether the actions of a branch exceeded the authority committed, is a matter of constitutional interpretation. As such, the decision is the responsibility of the courts as the ultimate interpreter of the constitution. See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211; 82 S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962).
THE GOVERNOR IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT
Defendants argue that the Governor is absolutely immune from suit in his exercise of legislative authority. They point out that state legislators and the Legislature itself enjoy a broad-based immunity. They are immune from suit for their enactment of legislation and other acts committed within their sphere of legislative activity. 77th *385Dist Judge v Michigan, 175 Mich App 681, 697; 438 NW2d 333 (1989), citing Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of the United States, 446 US 719, 731-734; 100 S Ct 1967; 64 L Ed 2d 641 (1980); Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367; 71 S Ct 783; 95 L Ed 1019 (1951).
In reviewing the complaint in this case, we see that plaintiffs asserted that the Governor acted outside the authority granted to him by the constitution to reorganize the executive branch. In essence, they alleged that the Governor acted outside his sphere of legislative authority. See 77th Dist Judge, supra. Even legislators are not immune from suit when acting outside their "sphere” of authority. Id.
Plaintiffs have sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction, equitable relief, not money damages. Actions seeking only equitable relief do not normally fall within the purview of governmental immunity. Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 152, n 5; 422 NW2d 205 (1988). We conclude, based on the allegations in the complaint and the type of relief requested, that the Governor is not immune from liability. See 77th Dist Judge, supra; Hadfield, supra.
THE GOVERNOR LACKED AUTHORITY TO CREATE A NEW DNR
The heart of defendants’ appeal is that EO 1991-31 represents a valid exercise of authority granted to the Governor by the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 5, § 2. Defendants argue that the Governor had the authority to: reorganize the dnr; transfer functions to the director of the new dnr; appoint the chairperson of the Natural Resources Commission; and abolish commissions whose function it is to hold public hearings.
*386The Governor derives authority to reorganize the dnr from Const 1963, art 5, § 2, which provides:
All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and duties, except for the- office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to major purposes.
Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the governor.
Under the first paragraph of § 2, the Legislature had two years to complete its allocation of functions, powers and duties to the principal departments. Const 1963, Schedule and Temporary Provisions, § 12. Had it failed to complete it within that period, the Governor had specific authority to act in its stead. Id. The Legislature did in fact make the allocation in a timely fashion by passing the Executive Organization Act (eoa). The act created nineteen principal departments of state govern*387ment, one of them being the dnr. MCL 16.104; MSA 3.29(4).
In ruling that the Governor exceeded his authority in creating a new Department of Natural Resources, the circuit court found he violated the separation of powers doctrine. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. This doctrine provides that no person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly permitted.
The Supreme Court has laid down two rules of construction which we follow when interpreting the state constitution:
First, the interpretation given the constitution should be "the sense most obvious to the common understanding”; the one which "reasonable minds, the great mass of people themselves, would give it.” Secondly, the "circumstances surrounding the adoption of the constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.” [Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 745; 330 NW2d 346 (1982); citations omitted.]
Legislative implementations of constitutional provisions are entitled to weight but do not control our rulings. Durant v Dep’t of Education (On Remand), 129 Mich App 517, 522; 342 NW2d 591 (1983), modified 424 Mich 364; 381 NW2d 662 (1985).
Former Michigan Governor George Romney argues in his brief amicus curiae that the second paragraph of § 2 is self-executing. As a result, he concludes, the Executive Organization Act should not be considered in our interpretation of this constitutional provision.
The Michigan Supreme Court has specifically found that the provisions of § 2 are not self-execut*388ing. McDonald v Schnipke, 380 Mich 14, 26; 155 NW2d 169 (1968). In Soap & Detergent, the Court made distinctions between the first and second paragraphs of §2, but did not differentiate with respect to the question of self-execution. Therefore, we find that the Executive Organization Act is the enabling act of both paragraphs of § 2. See Soap & Detergent, 748.
Defendants argue that the holding in Soap & Detergent should control the outcome of this case. We disagree. In Soap & Detergent, the Governor had transferred the rulemaking power of the Water Resources Commission by executive order to the dnr and its department head, the nrc. The plaintiffs challenged the nrc’s authority to promulgate a rule limiting phosphate content in detergents.
In interpreting §2, the Court recognized that the intent of the constitutional convention was to grant the Governor full legislative power to promote the most efficient possible executive department. Id., 747. The Court indicated that an executive order transferring rulemaking power from one executive agency to another is a change in the organization of the executive branch of government. It ruled that the executive order was within the Governor’s power to reorganize the executive branch under the Michigan Constitution.
Soap & Detergent is clearly distinguishable from this case. There, the Governor was merely transferring functions. Here, the Governor was eliminating functions and creating an entirely new dnr. Furthermore, the Court in Soap & Detergent recognized that § 2 does not vest unlimited legislative power in the executive branch. Id., 752. In fact, the area of executive exercise of legislative power is limited and specific. Id. Although the constitution granted the Governor authority to *389allocate functions of new principal departments, that authority took effect only if the Legislature failed to make its allocation within two years. Const 1963, Schedule and Temporary Provisions, §12.
Any legislative power that the Governor possesses must be expressly granted to him by the constitution. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Although the Governor has the express power to reallocate functions and reorganize executive departments, no provision of the Michigan Constitution expressly authorizes him to create a new principal department. Our interpretion of art 5, § 2 is supported by the Executive Organization Act, constitutional debates and the "common understanding” of the provision. We agree with the trial court that, in creating a new dnr, the Governor violated the separation of powers doctrine and exceeded his authority under Const 1963, art 5, § 2. Therefore, we find EO 1991-31 unconstitutional.
THE GOVERNOR MAY NOT ABOLISH THE FUNCTION OF COMMISSIONS TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARINGS
Defendants allege that the trial court erred in concluding that the Governor could not abolish eighteen boards and commissions which provide citizens the opportunity for public hearings.
The Governor, in exercising his reorganization powers under the constitution, uses the transfer mechanisms established under the Executive Organization Act. See Soap & Detergent, 748-750. One mechanism, called a Type hi transfer, allows the Governor to abolish existing boards or commissions and to assign their functions to the principal departments. MCL 16.103(c); MSA 3.29(3)(c). However, although he is empowered to transfer, nowhere is the Governor granted authority to abolish *390functions of the boards and commissions or of a principal department.
The boards and commissions which EO 1991-31 would abolish allow citizens to voice their opinions through public hearings. After public input, some of the boards and commissions are statutorily mandated to make recommendations and reports to the Legislature, the Governor, the dnk or a combination of them. See MCL 323.2; MSA 3.522; MCL 320.504(a); MSA 13.244(a). Some commissions have the authority to make substantial decisions or issue permits. MCL 336.15; MSA 14.58(5).2
Defendants argue that the executive order merely transfers the functions of these boards and commissions to the head of the new dnr. However, defendants have failed to set forth any credible evidence establishing that the functions would be preserved under the new dnr. They ask, as a leap of faith, that we believe the new dnr director and staff would have time and resources to perform the functions of eighteen boards and commissions. We cannot but believe, instead, that the Governor’s actions have eliminated the hearing function. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the Governor was without authority to abolish the boards and commissions as he did.
TRANSFERS MUST BE SUPERVISED BY THE PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENT HEAD
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that governmental functions transferred must be supervised by the head of the department receiving them.
Powers granted under Const 1963, art 5, § 2 must be exercised pursuant to the Executive Orga*391nization Act, since the constitutional provision is not self-executing. McDonald, supra. Although statutes cannot supersede the constitution, constitutional provisions should not be read in isolation. See generally Soap & Detergent, supra.
The Executive Organization Act . provides that, in Type n and m transfers, the head of a principal department must direct and supervise the administration of the transferred department’s functions. MCL 16.107(b); MSA 3.29(7)(b). The Governor’s EO 1991-31 retains the nrc as the head of the new dnr. ilowever, it calls for the director of the new dnr, not the nrc, to supervise and direct the functions transferred to the new dnr.
In ruling on this question, the circuit court provided this apt analysis:
The Order purports to continue the Natural Resources Commission as the head of the New Department. However, the Order eviscerates the Natural Resources Commission by placing the New Department under the executive direction of the Director, and the New Department and the Natural Resources Commission under the supervision of the Governor. This changes the entire nature of the Commission.
We agree with the trial court that the Governor exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority by delegating to the director of the new dnr the authority to supervise and administer the transferred functions.
THE GOVERNOR HAS NO AUTHORITY TO APPOINT THE CHAIR OF THE NRC
Defendants assert that, contrary to the circuit court’s ruling, the Governor does have authority to appoint the chair of the Natural Resources Com*392mission. Statutory authority provides that the chair of the nrc is selected by the commission’s own members. MCL 16.354; MSA 3.29(254). Nothing in either Const 1963, art 5, § 2 or the eoa gives the Governor power to transfer from the commission’s members to himself the selection of the chair. Moreover, the eoa mandates that any statutory authority transferred under it must be transferred to the head of a principal department, which in this case is the nrc. MCL 16.103(b); MSA 3.29(3)(b). Therefore, the Governor lacks authority to appoint the chair of the nrc.
EO 1991-33 CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED
Cross appellant mepf argues that the trial court erred in failing to determine whether EO 1991-33 is illegal and unconstitutional. The order creates the Michigan Environmental Science Board, an independent entity within the Department of Management and Budget. It authorizes the board to advise the Governor, the nrc, the new dnr and other agencies regarding the protection and management of the natural resources in the state.
In deciding whether EO 1991-33 is unconstitutional, we must first determine whether the order can be implemented without EO 1991-31. The Michigan Supreme Court has declared that the same rules of construction are used for executive orders as for statutes. Soap & Detergent, 757. The Court drew the analogy, because executive orders are quasi-legislative in nature. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the statutory doctrine of in pari materia may be applied to executive orders.
The doctrine of in pari materia may be applied when statutes have a common purpose or relate to the same person, thing, or class of persons or things. People v Rogers, 438 Mich 602, 608; 475 *393NW2d 717 (1991), citing Palmer v State Land Office Bd, 304 Mich 628, 636-637; 8 NW2d 664 (1943). All statutes which have the same subject or general purpose should be read together as one law. Rogers, supra.
In this case, EO 1991-31 and EO 1991-33 have a common purpose: to make major changes in the existing structure of the dnr. The executive orders propose to eliminate the current dnr and to replace it with an agency and an advisory board controlled by the Governor. Based on the similar purpose of these orders, we conclude that it is appropriate to read them in pari materia.
EO 1991-33 provides that the board is to report its findings to the new dnr and to advise it on issues affecting the management of the state’s natural resources. Without EO 1991-31, there is no new dnr to which to report. The plain language of EO 1991-33 permits no other conclusion than that it contemplated and assumed the implementation of EO 1991-31. We have declared EO 1991-31 unconstitutional. Therefore, we make the specific finding that EO 1991-33 cannot be implemented.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
The mepf argues also that the trial court erred in failing to award it attorney fees and costs. This plaintiff sought attorney fees under the Open Meetings Act, Freedom of Information Act and the Civil Rights Act. MCL 15.271(4); MSA 4.1800(21) (4); MCL 15.240(4); MSA 4.1801(10X4); 42 USC 1988. The trial court found that EO 1991-31 did not violate the Open Meetings Act (oma) or the Freedom of Information Act (foia). Plaintiff mepf does not appeal these rulings. The court did not decide whether the order violated the Civil Rights *394Act. It denied attorney fees and costs on the basis that a public question was involved.
Attorney fees are generally not recoverable as an element of costs unless expressly allowed by statute or court rule. DeWald v Isola (After Remand), 188 Mich App 697, 699; 470 NW2d 505 (1991), citing Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 695; 385 NW2d 586 (1986). If a court finds violations of either the oma or the foia, it must award attorney fees. See MCL 15.271(4); MSA 4.1800(21)(4); MCL 15.240(4); MSA 4.1801(10X4). A court has discretion whether to award attorney fees under the Civil Rights Act. 42 USC 1988.
In this case, the court did not decide whether EO 1991-31 violates the Civil Rights Act. However, it is clear that the civil rights claim was not instrumental in obtaining the permanent injunction against the implementation of EO 1991-31. See Dorfman v Dep’t of Transportation, 155 Mich App 57, 62-63; 399 NW2d 437 (1986). Therefore, mepf was not entitled to attorney fees under that claim. Id. Further, the court specifically found that EO 1991-31 did not violate the oma or the foia. Since mepf did not appeal these rulings, we must conclude that it is not entitled to attorney fees; it did not prevail on the claims under which it sought them.
Mepf claimed in its complaint that EO 1991-33 also violated the oma and the foia. There is no need for us to review this issue in light of our disposition of EO 1991-31 and the relationship between the two executive orders. However, review of it is necessary in order for us to determine whether mepf was entitled to attorney fees.
The foia allows for the recovery of attorney fees when the person filing the complaint asserts a right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record. MCL 15.240(4); MSA 4.1801(10X4). From *395the plain language of this section, it is clear that the action filed by mepf is not the type that the Legislature contemplated to be appropriate for attorney fees. Therefore, we conclude that mepf is not entitled to attorney fees under this act.
Mepf also asserts a right to attorney fees under the oma. MCL 15.271(4); MSA 4.1800(21X4) provides:
If a public body is not complying with this act, and a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action.
The purpose of the oma is to promote openness and accountability in government. It is to be interpreted broadly to accomplish this goal. Booth Newspapers, Inc v University of Michigan Bd of Regents, 192 Mich App 574, 580; 481 NW2d 778 (1992), citing Booth Newspapers, Inc v Wyoming City Council, 168 Mich App 459, 466; 425 NW2d 695 (1988); Detroit News, Inc v Detroit, 185 Mich App 296, 300; 460 NW2d 312 (1990). The oma provides that all decisions and meetings of a public body must be open to the public. MCL 15.263; MSA 4.1800(13).
Mepf claims that EO 1991-33 was enacted to avoid the oma and the foia. It argues that the Science Board is "probably not a public body” as defined under the statute. MCL 15.262(a); MSA 4.1800(12)(a). However, neither the oma nor case law supports a ruling that the mere formation of an advisory board through an executive order would violate the oma. Therefore, we decline to award attorney fees to mepf under this act.
Although mepf is not entitled to attorney fees, it *396may be entitled to costs. Mepf was not a prevailing party on its claims under which it sought attorney fees. However, it was a prevailing party on its permanent injunction claim. See MCR 2.625(B)(2).
The decision whether to award costs was a discretionary one and was in the hands of the trial judge. See MCR 2.625(A)(1) and (B)(2). Michigan courts frequently refuse to award costs when cases involve public questions. American Aggregates Corp v Highland Twp, 151 Mich App 37, 54; 390 Mich 192 (1986), citing Ettinger v Avon Twp, 64 Mich App 529; 236 NW2d 129 (1975); Turkish v City of Warren, 61 Mich App 435; 232 NW2d 732 (1975), modified on other grounds 406 Mich 137; 277 NW2d 475 (1979). That was the basis for refusal of costs in this case. We are unwilling to reverse the judge’s exercise of discretion on this issue.
Affirmed.
Wahls, P.J., concurred.

 Defendants are not appealing from the trial court’s ruling that the Governor may not delegate power to persons not authorized by statute to exercise it. They are also not appealing from the ruling that the Governor may not create new levels of adjudicatory hearings.

 We found mucc’s brief, which contained an outline of the abolished boards and commissions, particularly helpful.