Court Opinion

ID: 9732349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:17:13.494987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:19.606843
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, J.
{dissenting). The defendant, an inmate of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, was tried by jury in Jackson county for the murder of Prank Clark, a fellow inmate, and was found guilty of murder in the second degree. (CL 1948, § 750.317 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549].)
Prom this conviction defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming irregularities at the trial even though he was represented by court-appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals, upon grounds which shall be herein discussed, reversed and remanded for a new trial. 13 Mich App 69. Prom this decision the prosecutor filed delayed application for leave to appeal, and this Court granted his application. 381 Mich 803.
The crucial and composite issue raised in this appeal is whether reversible error was committed by the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant *652as to his good character and in regard to separate, distinct, and unrelated offenses.
On this point, the record discloses the following cross-examination of the defendant at trial:
“Q. [By Mr. Barton, assistant prosecutor] Mr. Johnson, you are left-handed, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. You took the oath with your left hand, is that right?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. How tall are you?
“A. Six one and a half.
“Q. Would you characterize yourself as a calm man or an excitable one?
“A. I characterize myself as being calm.
“Q. I see. At any time while you have been in prison have you lost that calm attitude on occasion ?
“Q. On occasions I have had tension on me, what make me irritable.
“Q. What sort of tension would make you irritable?
“A. My mother is most sick all the time.
“Q. Would any sort of incident inside the prison make you irritable?
“A. Possibly.
“Q. Possibly. What sort of incident would that be, please?
“A. A number of things. It might be every week or a month or so.
“Q. What sort of things would build up on you, please? People bothering you, would that build up on you?
“A. I didn’t have too much trouble about anybody bothering me, because I didn’t bother anybody.
“Q. You haven’t had much trouble inside the prison about people bothering you?
“A. Not exactly.
*653“Q. What do you mean by ‘not exactly’? Have yon had trouble with guards or other inmates bothering you inside the prison?
“A. I have had a few troubles with guards.
“Q. What sort of troubles?
“A. With who are you—
“Q. (Interrupting) With guards.
“A. With guards? In the way they would address me.
“Q. In the way they would address you. You don’t like the way they address you, is that right?
“A. No, I don’t.
“Q. How do they address you? What bothers you about that ?
“A. In a boiley [sic] fashion, like I am a child.
“Q. When guards or other inmates have used that kind of approach to you, you become irritable, is that right?
“A. No, that isn’t what I mean.
“Q. Well, tell me what you mean then, please.
“A. What I mean, that this one incident wouldn’t make me irritable. It would make me — I am a convict, but I am a convict second and I am a man first.
Q. You are going to make sure everyone knows you are a man, is that right?
“A. No. It is not in that fashion you are implying.
“Q. Let’s get back to the original question.
“Have you become irritable and been involved in any disturbance at the prison because you felt people were harassing you or getting after you?
“A. I became involved with officers and convicts, but it wasn’t because I felt irritable.
“Q. Why was it, please?
“A. In this institution, if you are familiar with it—
“Q. (Interrupting) Just tell me what it was, please. Go ahead.
“A. I can’t answer yes or no.
“The Court: You do not have to, He asked you to tell him why.
*654“The Witness: What — I proceeded to tell him why.
“The Court: Go ahead.
“A. In this institution, you — they want you to do whatever they say for you to do as the command, whether they are wrong or right. You are supposed to do it.
“If they say, ‘shine my shoes,’ shine your shoes, or you get a ticket wrote up on you.
“Q. [By Mr. Barton] You sometimes objected to that, is that right, and had tickets written up on you?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you would become irritated about that?
“A. No, I didn’t.
“Tickets were wrote, as you may observe in the records of the incident, but because I would tell him — I say, ‘If you wish for me to do something, tell me in a way so that I can understand. Don’t shout at me anything like you did, and normal. Just explain. Just tell me you want me to go to the hall office or whatever you want me to do.’
“Q. Mr. Johnson, to find out what sort of situation would make you react, let’s take something that happened less than a month ago.
“Were you involved at that time in a quarrel with Officer Grinnell and Officer Bailey in the prison?
“Mr. Goler [defendant’s attorney] : If the Court please, barring any argument with the deceased, I do not see that this is relevant or material.
“Mr. Barton: Your Honor, only that his disposition in this case, in this particular crime especially, since he has characterized himself as a calm person, is very much relevant and material.
“The Court: We are talking about something that happened some time after the incident in question here, aren’t we?
“Mr. Barton: Yes, your Honor, but about half a year afterwards; but, nevertheless, the same person is involved and under the same circumstances, the prison conditions,
*655“The Court: We have a lot of unknown factors involved here, I think, without a proper foundation. We can’t go into that. That is too far beyond the incident in question here.
“Q. [By Mr. Barton] Did you have a ticket written on you, then, on October 25, 1965, about 11 days — I am sorry — the day after this incident?
“A. No, I didn’t.
“Q. I am sorry. September. On September 25, 1965, a month before the incident?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. That was for refusing a direct order in a manner extremely insolent, is that correct?
“A. No, it wasn’t.
“Mr. Coler [defendant’s attorney] : If the Court please, again I do not think that this is relevant, and I do not think that it is material here to this case at all.
“I think that perhaps the prosecutor might bring up any number of little, petty things here, but they don’t have anything to do with this case.
“Mr. Barton: May it please the Court, this man is on the witness stand. Both his credibility and, in this particular case, his disposition toward violations and his entire mannerism are issues in the case.
“Mr. Goler: If the prosecutor has some criminal record of this man that he wants to put into evidence, any convictions of felonies, arrests, to go to his credibility, I think it is material; but for infractions of the rules at Southern Michigan Prison, I don’t think it would be material or relevant in this case.
“The Court: The only purpose for which they are being offered is on this question of the disposition of the defendant, which is already in issue now. It is in the record.
“I assume that is the only purpose it is being offered. Is that correct?
“Mr. Barton: Yes, Yoar Honor.
“The Court: The jury will so understand that is the only purpose they are being offered for. They are not substantive proof and shall not be considered *656so by the jury as to the commission of the offense on October 24, 1965, the stabbing, an alleged stabbing, I am referring to.
“Gro ahead, Mr. Barton.”
It is the people’s position that defense counsel had put defendant’s character in issue by stating in his opening remarks that defendant would take the stand to show “what kind of man he is” and that upon taking the stand both defendant’s character and credibility were in issue. Refuting this position as untenable and prejudicial to a fair trial, the Court of Appeals stated (pp 71, 72):
“The argument offered on appeal must fail. The character of a defendant cannot be attacked unless he first puts it in issue by offering evidence of his good character. Defendant’s response on cross-examination can in no way be treated as having put his character in issue and, consequently, no rebuttal of good charatcter was in order. See People v. Boske (1922), 221 Mich 129. Furthermore, had defendant put his character in issue, it is still error to introduce specific acts of misconduct to prove a bad character. People v. Hill (1932), 258 Mich 79. The prosecutor cannot use a statement of self-characterization, cleverly elicited on cross-examination of defendant, as a springboard to reach every prior incident of misconduct, under the guise of testing credibility. On this theory, the evidence was inadmissible.”
We agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It is a well-settled rule, adopted by this Court in People v. Minney (1909), 155 Mich 534, 540, that:
“‘(l)It is not permitted to the prosecution to attack the character of the prisoner, unless he first puts that in issue by offering evidence of his good character; (2) it is not permitted to show the defendant’s bad character by showing particular acts; (3) *657it is not permitted to show in the prisoner a tendency or disposition to commit the crime with which he is charged; (4) it is not permitted to give in evidence other crimes of the prisoner, unless they are so connected by circumstances with the particular crime in issue as that the proof of one fact with its circumstances has some bearing upon the issue on trial other than such as is expressed in the foregoing three propositions.’ ”
"We cannot find a single instance in the entire record where defendant offered “evidence of his good character.” The bulk of the testimony relating to “character” was given by defense witnesses and dealt exclusively with the character of the deceased, depicting him as argumentative and bellicose. This was permissible (People v. Dunn [1925], 233 Mich 185) and neither works adversely nor introduces defendant’s good character. See 1 Jones, Evidence (5th Ed), § 172, p 305; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (12th Ed), § 228. The only testimony relating to defendant’s good character, other than the objected to cross-examination of defendant, came from a witness for defendant, but this also was elicited upon cross-examination by the prosecutor.
The only justification for the attack upon defendant’s character is readily acknowledged by the people in its brief:
“In the instant case when the defendant took the witness stand his credibility was in issue. In addition, he took the stand, according to his attorney’s opening statement, for the express purpose of showing ‘what hind of man he is’. In view of this, the prosecuting attorney asked the defendant whether he was a calm person; the defendant so .characterized himself. The prosecutor then by a series of questions concerning defendant’s infraction of prison rules sought to discredit the defendant by showing that the defendant had falsely characterised himself. *658Tlie .purpose of the prosecutor’s examination enumerated above went to the defendant’s credibility.”
We feel, however, that a man’s reputation, especially where he. is also the criminal defendant-witness, is too valuable an asset to be lightly ensnared by such insidious adversary tactics and tenuous reasoning.
Opening statements of counsel are not accorded the stature and weight of evidence and a prosecutor’s reliance upon a single casual opening remark is unwarranted. GCR 1963, 507.1; Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Company (1968), 380 Mich 445; People v. Koharski (1913), 177 Mich 194. It is only after defendant has directly introduced testimony or proofs as to his good character that the prosecutor may test the credibility of the testimony or discredit those proofs as they relate to defendant’s character. See People v. Neal (1939), 290 Mich 123; People v. Dunn, supra; People v. Boske (1922) 221 Mich 129.
The failure to make this initial distinction quite naturally and inevitably leads to a precipitous compounding of errors. Once we allow the prosecutor to predicate cleverly elicited statements of self-characterization upon inadvertent and casual opening remarks, we must permit him to test the credibility of such testimony. But neither the initial error nor its cumulative effect can be sanctioned.
We would adhere to the rule stated in People v. Gotshall (1900), 123 Mich 474, 483:
“While it is the well-settled rule that the previous life and character of a witness may be inquired into to elicit facts which may aid the jury in determining what credence they will attach to his testimony, yet it is the duty of the courts to keep such examinations within reasonable bounds. When it is manifest that the design or effect of the questions is not to elicit facts, but to cast suspicion upon the character and *659credibility of the witness, courts must intervene, or trials will result in a miscarriage of justice.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A review of the record convinces us thát the sole purpose of the prosecutor’s line of cross-examination was to characterize defendant as a fractious and intractable prison inmate. His success in this respect deprived defendant of a fair trial.
"We..agree with the Court of Appeals that prejudicial and reversible error was committed and would affirm their decision of reversal and remand for a new trial.
T. Gr. Kavanagh,-J., did not sit.