Court Opinion

ID: 9632903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:27:57.171704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:24.256046
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully disagree with the majority that the 30-day recommended suspension by the Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Association be upheld. Even though the 30-day suspension for failure to file an income tax return "borders on inadequate discipline" (majority, at 937) what is the sanction imposed for neglecting the client's interest to the extent that a cause of action was lost through the running of the statute of limitations?
Respondent, for a second time, is before the bar for failure to take action on behalf of a client. As noted by the majority, he was censured for such failure in 1975. Now, again, he comes before the bar in a much more serious neglect of clients' affairs.
While I can understand the theory that the hearing panel officer is in a better position to enter findings and conclusions than is an appellate court, we do not have that problem here. Respondent has filed no objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations. They are not in dispute. The Disciplinary Board adopted those findings as well as the 30-day suspension recommendation of the hearing panel officer. The issue this court has to determine is whether the sanction is appropriate. I maintain it is not. While our court must give serious consideration to the recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, the ultimate responsibility remains with this court. In re Espedal, 82 Wn.2d 834, 514 P.2d 518 (1973). Our purpose is to protect the public and preserve confidence in the legal profession and the judicial system. We aim to assure that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional *940conduct. Our goal is also to avoid repetition of that conduct and deter other lawyers from similar misdeeds. In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 532 P.2d 274 (1975); In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974).
This court, in recent years, has disbarred attorneys for commingling clients' funds, In re Gibson, 90 Wn.2d 440, 583 P.2d 633 (1978); In re Deschane, 84 Wn.2d 514, 527 P.2d 683 (1974), has imposed lengthy suspensions for neglect and procrastination, In re Johnson, 94 Wn.2d 659, 618 P.2d 1322 (1980) (60 days); In re Yates, 78 Wn.2d 243, 473 P.2d 402 (1970) (45 days), yet is satisfied with a 30-day suspension when a client's cause of action is lost. If we are to uphold the integrity of the profession, we must impose discipline that holds significant consequences. Disregarding the respondent's tax problems, the fact that this is his second offense for failure to take appropriate action on behalf of a client warrants a minimum suspension from the practice of law for a period of 90 days. Therefore, I dissent.
Hicks and Dore, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.