Court Opinion

ID: 9839919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 17:05:25.785595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:06.764114
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/14/23 Lindholm v. Apollo Equine Transport CA2/7
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

                                                               B308356
 ROBERT LINDHOLM et al.,
                                                               (Los Angeles County
          Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants                         Super. Ct. No. YC073049)
          and Appellants.

          v.

 APOLLO EQUINE TRANSPORT,
 INC., et al.

           Defendants, Cross-
           Complainants and
           Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Affirmed.
     Robert Lindholm, in pro per., for Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant
and Appellant Robert Lindholm.
     Carolyn Lindholm, in pro per., for Plaintiff, Cross-
Defendant and Appellant Carolyn Lindholm.
     Hersh and Hersh, Nancy Hersh and Joseph Boyle for
Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Respondents.
                         INTRODUCTION

      Robert Lindholm hired Apollo Equine Transport, Inc.
(Apollo) and European Horse Services (USA), Inc. (EHS) to
transport five foals from Europe to Los Angeles.1 Robert and his
wife Carolyn, an attorney with 40 years of litigation experience,
received the foals but refused to pay for the horses’
transportation. Instead, the Lindholms sued Apollo and EHS;
Apollo in turn sued the Lindholms. Eventually the parties
agreed to a settlement requiring the Lindholms to pay Apollo and
EHS $20,000. But the Lindholms—apparently unhappy with the
settlement—again refused to pay, which prompted Apollo and
EHS to file a motion to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6.2 The trial court granted the motion and
entered judgment enforcing the settlement. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.   Robert Hires Apollo and EHS To Transport Foals
           from Europe to the United States; Lawsuits Follow
     After Carolyn purchased five foals located in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Belgium, Robert hired Apollo, EHS, and BVBA

1     “A ‘foal’ is a baby horse of either sex.” (Giles v. C.I.R.
(2006) 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 684, fn. 5.)
2    Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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European Horse Services (BVBA)3 to transport the foals to
Los Angeles. EHS and BVBA agreed to arrange the foals’
transportation to Los Angeles International Airport, and Apollo
agreed to handle the “customs and immigration process,” a two-
to three-day process that included transporting the foals for
quarantine upon their arrival at the airport, completing all
required import forms, and ensuring the foals received all
necessary medical tests.
       Robert initially wanted the foals to be transported from
Amsterdam to Los Angeles on a flight operated by KLM—an
airline that, according to the Lindholms, “specialized and was
experienced in flying foals . . . .” When EHS and BVBA told
Robert there were no available KLM flights for several weeks,
however, Robert “reluctantly accepted” that the foals could be
transported from Luxembourg on a flight operated by the airline
Cargolux. Ultimately, the Lindholms received the foals in Los
Angeles. Apollo sent the Lindholms an invoice for $15,250 for its
services, and EHS and BVBA sent the Lindholms a separate
invoice for $20,115.81.
       The Lindholms refused to pay anything to anyone. When
Apollo, EHS, and BVBA demanded payment, the Lindholms filed
this action against Apollo and EHS. The Lindholms alleged that
“[t]he flight from Luxemburg [sic] airport to Los Angeles was not
a direct flight . . . as was contracted for,” that “the cost of utilizing
Cargolux to transport the Horses . . . was not for a price similar

3     BVBA is a Belgian Company whose principal, Filip Vande
Capelle, is also the chief executive officer of EHS. EHS contends
it was BVBA—not EHS—that entered into the relevant
agreements with Robert to transport the foals. Because for
purposes of this appeal it does not matter which company
contracted with Robert, we assume it was both EHS and BVBA.

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to that charged by KLM for similar services,” and that the total
cost of transporting the horses “should not have exceeded”
$10,000. The Lindholms sought $25,365.81 in damages—the
difference between the total amount Apollo and EHS collectively
charged and the amount the Lindholms claimed the defendants
“should” have charged. Apollo filed a cross-complaint against the
Lindholms to recover the $15,250 they owed for Apollo’s services.
BVBA filed a separate lawsuit in Belgium against the Lindholms
to recover the money owed for its services (the Belgium lawsuit).

     B.      The Parties Reach a Global Settlement, and the Trial
             Court Grants a Motion by Apollo and EHS
             To Enforce It
       The Lindholms, Apollo, EHS, and BVBA ultimately reached
a settlement resolving all their claims. Under the terms of the
written settlement agreement, the Lindholms agreed they would
make a “lump sum payment” of $20,000 to Apollo, EHS, and
BVBA, and the parties to this action agreed they would file
requests for dismissal with prejudice of the complaint and cross-
complaint. BVBA similarly agreed it would “dismiss the Belgium
Lawsuit with prejudice at the earliest opportunity possible which
[counsel for BVBA] has advised is September 29, 2020 at the first
pleading date in the Belgium Lawsuit.” Robert, Carolyn, and
representatives of Apollo, EHS, and BVBA signed the settlement
agreement.
       And yet, the Lindholms again refused to pay Apollo, EHS,
and BVBA, which prompted Apollo and EHS to file a motion to
enforce the settlement under section 664.6. The Lindholms
opposed the motion, arguing the settlement agreement failed to
“state material terms” because the agreement, while specifying
the Lindholms had to pay a total of $20,000, did not specify how

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much Robert, individually, and Carolyn, individually, had to pay,
nor did the agreement specify how much Apollo, EHS, and BVBA
were each to receive. The Lindholms also complained that they
had asked counsel for Apollo, EHS, and BVBA to translate
certain documents the Lindholms received about the Belgium
lawsuit and to explain why BVBA could not dismiss the Belgium
lawsuit before September 29, 2020, but that they received no
response. The Lindholms contended opposing counsel’s conduct
demonstrated BVBA had “something to hide” or did not intend to
dismiss the Belgium lawsuit. The Lindholms also asserted
various theories for not enforcing the settlement, including “no
meeting of the minds,” mistake, anticipatory breach, and fraud.
         The trial court granted the motion to enforce the
settlement. The court ruled that the terms of the settlement
were sufficiently clear because they “require[d] a payment by the
Lindholms to [Apollo and EHS] in exchange for a dismissal of the
Cross-Complaint” and that “[t]he fact that the Agreement does
not specifically delineate how much of the payment would be
apportioned between the . . . parties” was immaterial. The court
also rejected the Lindholms’ theories based on the conduct of
counsel for Apollo, EHS, and BVBA relating to the Belgium
lawsuit. The court ruled there was a meeting of the minds
because the settlement agreement “specifically took into account
and did attempt to incorporate the Belgium lawsuit” and
“specifically calls for the Belgium lawsuit to be dismissed
. . . .” The court explained that, to the extent the Lindholms were
complaining about other conduct “occurring in the Belgium
lawsuit,” the Lindholms’ “recourse would be to pursue their
rights” elsewhere. The court entered a judgment that
incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement, and the
Lindholms timely appealed.

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                          DISCUSSION

       A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Section 664.6, subdivision (a), states: “If parties to pending
litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of
the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement
of the case, . . . the court, upon motion, may enter judgment
pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” “It is for the trial court
to determine in the first instance whether the parties have
entered into an enforceable settlement. [Citation.] In making
that determination, ‘the trial court acts as the trier of fact,
determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding
settlement. [Citation.] Trial judges may consider oral testimony
or may determine the motion upon declarations alone.’” (Osumi
v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360; see Terry v. Conlan
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1454; Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc.
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.)
       “A trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a
settlement pursuant to section 664.6 are subject to limited
appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
779, 790; see J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984; Chan v. Lund (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1159, 1165.) “Consistent with the venerable substantial evidence
standard of review, and with our policy favoring settlements, we
resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable
inferences to support the trial court’s finding that these parties
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement and its order
enforcing that agreement.” (J.B.B. Investment Partners, at
p. 984; accord, Osumi v. Sutton, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at

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p. 1360; see Steinman v. Malamed (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1550,
1556 [in reviewing the trial court’s findings on a motion to
enforce a settlement under section 664.6, we “view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the
benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in
its favor”].) “In instances involving questions of law,” however,
“the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference and will be
subject to independent review.” (Chan, at p. 1166; see Critzer v.
Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.)

      B.     The Settlement Agreement Did Not Lack Material
             Terms
       The Lindholms first contend, as they did in the trial court,
the settlement agreement “fails to state . . . material terms”
because it does not specify how much Robert, individually, or
Carolyn, individually, had to pay and because it did not specify
how much each of Apollo, EHS, and BVBA was to receive. The
trial court correctly ruled the settlement agreement contained the
necessary material terms.
       Before the court may enter judgment under section 664.6,
“two key prerequisites must be satisfied. First, there must be
contract formation. The litigants must first agree to the material
terms of a settlement contract before a judgment can be entered
‘pursuant to the terms of the settlement.’ If no meeting of the
minds has occurred on the material terms of a contract, basic
contract law provides that no contract formation has occurred.”
(Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793,
797; see Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199,
215 [“‘failure to reach a meeting of the minds on all material
points prevents the formation of a contract’”].) Second, there
must be a “writing signed by the parties” [or oral stipulation in

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court] that contains the material terms.” (Weddington, at p. 797.)
Here, the settlement agreement contained the material terms
required to form a contract. The Lindholms agreed to pay Apollo,
EHS, and BVBA $20,000; the parties agreed to dismiss the
complaint and the cross-complaint in this action; and BVBA
agreed to dismiss the Belgium lawsuit by September 29, 2020.
(See Rohrbacher v. Aitken (1904) 145 Cal. 485, 488 [dismissal of
an action constitutes consideration for a settlement agreement];
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 951, 957 [“forbearance from exercising a legal
right constitutes legal consideration”]; Westwood Temple v.
Emanuel Center (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 755, 759 [dismissal of an
action is “valid consideration for” a settlement agreement].) The
settlement agreement also specified how the Lindholms were
supposed to tender the payment: to “counsel for Apollo & EHS
USA, Hersh & Hersh . . . no later than ten (10) business days
after counsel for Lindholm . . . receive[d] a fully executed copy of
th[e] settlement agreement . . . .”
       That the settlement agreement did not specify how much
each of the Lindholms was supposed to pay, or how Apollo, EHS,
and BVBA would divvy up the settlement amount, was, as the
trial court ruled, immaterial. “An obligation imposed upon
several persons, or a right created in favor of several persons,
may be: [¶] 1. Joint; 2. [¶] Several; or, [¶] 3. Joint and several.”
(Civ. Code, § 1430.) “Where all the parties who unite in a
promise receive some benefit from the consideration ”—as the
Lindholms did—“their promise is presumed to be joint and
several.” (Id., § 1659; see Civ. Code, § 1660 [“A promise, made in
the singular number, but executed by several persons, is
presumed to be joint and several.”]; DKN Holdings LLC v.
Vaerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 820.) And “a right created in favor

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of several persons”—like the right of Apollo, EHS, and BVBA to
receive payment from the Lindholms under the settlement
agreement—“is presumed to be joint” absent “express words to
the contrary.” (Civ. Code, § 1431; see Cober v. Connoly (1942)
20 Cal.2d 741, 744 [promissory note containing an “unqualified
general promise” by a husband and wife to pay three individuals
“create[ed] a joint right in favor of the three payees”]; Rest.2d
Contracts § 297, subd. (2) [“Except to the extent that a different
intention is manifested or that the interests of the obligees in the
performance . . . are distinct, the rights of obligees of the same
performance are joint.”].) The settlement agreement stated who
was to pay (the Lindholms), how much ($20,000), and to whom
(Apollo, EHS, BVBA, through their attorneys). That was enough.
(See Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344, 349 [“‘“[t]he law
does not favor but leans against the destruction of contracts
because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, so construe
agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the
parties if [they] can be ascertained”’”].) A settlement agreement
is not unenforceable simply because it includes joint obligors and
joint payees.

      C.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
            Rulings Rejecting the Lindholms’ Other Reasons for
            Trying To Avoid the Settlement Agreement
       The Lindholms’ remaining arguments are all premised on
their theory that BVBA does not intend to dismiss the Belgium
lawsuit or that Apollo, EHS, and BVBA otherwise have
“something to hide with regard to the Belgium lawsuit.” As
discussed, the Lindholms contend counsel for Apollo, EHS, and
BVBA did not translate certain documents the Lindholms
received or explain why BVBA could not dismiss the Belgium

                                 9
lawsuit before September 29, 2020. According to the Lindholms,
these purported facts show BVBA does not intend to abide by the
terms of the settlement agreement. As they did in the trial court,
the Lindholms assert that “there was no meeting of the minds”
and that legal doctrines such as mistake, anticipatory breach,
and fraud preclude enforcing the agreement.
       Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s rulings
that there was a meeting of the minds and that there was no
mistake, anticipatory breach, or fraud. (See J.B.B. Investment
Partners, Ltd. v. Fair, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 984 [“whether
the parties had a meeting of the minds regarding settlement . . .
is a factual question” that “will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence”]; Central Valley General Hospital v. Smith
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 501, 519, fn. 10 [“whether the conduct of”
a party to a contract “was an implied repudiation is a question for
the trier of fact”];4 Miller v. St. Andre (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 259,
262 [in action to set aside contract, “[b]oth fraud and mutual
mistake are questions of fact”].) Most importantly, the
settlement agreement required BVBA to dismiss the Belgium
lawsuit “at the earliest opportunity possible which [counsel for
BVBA] has advised is September 29, 2020 at the first pleading
date” in the lawsuit. That BVBA signed a written promise to
dismiss the lawsuit is pretty good evidence it intended to do so.
(See Zhang v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 167, 180 [the “‘best indicator of the parties’ intent

4      “Breach by repudiation is referred to in the case law as an
‘anticipatory breach.’” (Central Valley General Hospital v. Smith,
supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 514; see Romano v. Rockwell
Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 489.)

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in a written contract is the words they chose for the agreement’”];
Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 643, 654 [same].)
       In addition, Belgium counsel for BVBA sent a letter (in
English) to counsel for the Lindholms5 explaining why BVBA
could not dismiss the lawsuit until September 29, 2020. He
explained that the court in Belgium had already set a date “for
the exchange of written submissions,” and that “[b]oth parties
([BVBA] and the Lindholm[s]) must write a letter to the Belgian
court informing the Belgian court of their settlement and their
joint decision to dismiss and discontinue the Belgian
proceedings.” Counsel for BVBA explained that, “because the
pleading date for the Belgian Court to deal with this matter is
only scheduled on 29 September 2020, the dismissal of the
proceedings will only be enacted by the court at that date.” Even
if the trial court could have inferred BVBA did not intend to
dismiss the Belgian lawsuit based on the Lindholms’ failure-to-
translate and failure-to-provide-additional-information theories—
a dubious proposition given the written settlement agreement
and counsel for BVBA’s written explanation (see Roddenberry v.
Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 657 [“undisclosed

5      The Lindholms were represented by counsel during the
settlement negotiations. Their attorney, however, filed a motion
to be relieved as counsel shortly before Apollo and EHS filed their
motion to enforce the settlement agreement, stating in his
supporting declaration: “There is a break down in the attorney-
client relationship” because a “settlement agreement has been
signed in this matter by all parties and all counsel, however, the
clients and present counsel have a fundamental disagreement
concerning same which cannot be resolved.” The Lindholms also
refused to pay their attorney.

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contractual intent . . . is not substantial evidence”]; see also
Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30 [“something
more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendant’s
intent not to perform his promise”])—we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the court’s order enforcing the
settlement and the judgment. (See J.B.B. Investment Partners,
Ltd. v. Fair, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) There was
substantial evidence BVBA intended to dismiss the Belgium
lawsuit once the Lindholms made the payment required by the
settlement agreement. That opposing counsel did not provide the
Lindholms additional information or translation services is not a
reason to reverse the order enforcing the settlement or the
resulting judgment.

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                        DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. Apollo and EHS are to recover
their costs on appeal.

                                        SEGAL, J.

     We concur:

                  PERLUSS, P. J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

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