Court Opinion

ID: 9773126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:37:59.071421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.269929
License: Public Domain

*942Dissenting opinion by
HOWELL, J.
HOWELL, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The majority opinion would badly cripple the statutory privilege:
(1) The fact that hospital personnel reviewed the committee proceedings before responding to the plaintiffs’ requests for information did not bar Relator from assertion of its privilege.
(2) As properly defined, there has been no disclosure, voluntary or otherwise, to a third party.
The word “waiver” is one of the most fluid and shifting terms in the legal lexicon. Examples abound where the term has been applied to express consent, implied consent, fraud, estoppel, abandonment, election, ratification, forfeiture, and even as a component of a vaguely-defined policy against overreaching.
What can be better established than the proposition that, during the presentation of evidence at trial, the failure to present a timely and proper objection constitutes a “waiver?” See, e.g., Adams v. Petrade Int’l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 711 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); see also Tex.R.App.P. 52(a). However, on analysis, it is clear that the term as used in this context has no relation to consent. Rather, the courts are employing the term “waiver” as a euphemism for the harsh and unpalatable, but extremely accurate and descriptive term, “forfeiture.” The concept of an orderly trial requires that a party who is offended must make a prompt and specific objection. Unless such an objection is properly lodged, the objection is in reality forfeit rather than “waived.”
The majority relies on rule 511 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence to support its finding of waiver. That rule provides that a privilege holder waives his privilege if he “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter.” Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 511 (emphasis added). Yet, our majority has paused not a moment to discuss any facts that might indicate any consensual activity. Further, a commonly identified principle underlying the doctrine of waiver by partial disclosure is the principle of fairness. In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102 (5th Cir.1987). The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent prejudice to the opposing party and distortion of the judicial truth finding process that may result from the privilege holder’s selective disclosure of privileged material during litigation. Id. But the majority has not explored how the alleged partial disclosure might result in misrepresentation of the information or prejudice to the plaintiff. By process of elimination, it follows that the majority has centered entirely upon forfeiture-based waiver. The facts presented reflect no grounds for exacting a forfeiture. Cf. id. at 102 (extrajudicial disclosure of a privileged communication not subsequently used in a judicial proceeding to the adversary’s prejudice did not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication).
Implicitly, our majority has held that the privilege of hospital committee records is forfeit if they are consulted in any manner in connection with actual, or even potential, litigation based upon the transaction that was the subject of the committee proceedings. They must be sealed away and never consulted, or the privilege is lost.
Even further, it appears that, in this case, the hospital superintendent had no direct knowledge of the incident in question. However, he attended the committee proceedings and presumably heard and saw all that transpired. If he had written the letter on the basis of memory alone, he would still, to the same extent, have been disclosing hospital committee proceedings. The fact that he refreshed his memory, either in the interest of accuracy or for some less commendable purpose, does not obscure the fact that, by necessity, he would have been employing committee proceedings for the purpose of answering the letter, regardless of whether he consulted the written record. If the majority reasoning prevails, any answer to the plaintiff’s letter by an official whose knowledge of the incident was through the committee *943proceedings would have destroyed the privilege accorded to those proceedings and to the record thereof.
“Waiver” should turn upon the question whether the witness or responding party has expressly identified the committee proceedings as his source of information. Certainly, if someone who has attended hospital committee proceedings responds to an inquiry by spontaneously declaring that the committee proceedings reflect such-and-such, he has placed those proceedings in issue; he has opened the door. Such did not occur in this case. Without voluntary disclosure1 that the source of the information is the committee proceedings, there has been no forfeiture of the privilege.
Forfeitures may only be exacted in pursuance of substantial public considerations. The situation in hand is not at all comparable to the absence of a timely and proper trial objection. The mere fact that a witness, possessed with the legitimated right of access to committee proceedings, may have reviewed those proceedings before testifying does not, of itself, operate to the prejudice of the other party. The privilege need not be terminated thereby, even if in-court testimony is involved. See Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 541 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting argument that trial court was required to order disclosure of material reviewed by witness prior to testifying), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1200, 89 L.Ed.2d 313 (1986). Particularly where, as here, the declarant is simply responding to a non-judicial inquiry, there is no logical basis for application of a harsher rule. The law seeks to encourage voluntary disclosure of information pertaining to a disputed matter. Plorin v. Bedrock Foundation and House Leveling Co., 755 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied). The writ must issue to protect the privilege granted by statute. See Texarkana Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex.1977) (conditionally granting writ where trial court ordered discovery of material protected by hospital committee privilege).
Furthermore, the disclosure at issue here was not to a third party to the litigation; in the absence of disclosure to a third party, there has been no waiver (i.e., conduct justifying forfeiture). Our majority has not fully read Jordan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.1985): “If the matter for which a privilege has been sought has been disclosed to a third party, ... the party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving that no waiver has occurred.” Id. at 649 (emphasis added). Here, there has been no third party disclosure; the senator was “acting on behalf of” the decedent’s mother, now the plaintiff. She is asserting a bootstrap argument. She is claiming that, inasmuch as the defendant has, in response to her request, arguably given her part of the information contained in the committee report, it is obligated to give her all of it. The claim is a non sequitur.
There is a substantial policy argument to be invoked in favor of forfeiting the privilege if the information has been disclosed to others. Otherwise, the possessor is free to pick and choose those to whom he may make disclosures. No comparable argument may be invoked when the person asserting the waiver is the person to whom the partial disclosure was made. No prejudice to this plaintiff can be hypothesized from the fact that she has arguably received a partial disclosure. There is no basis in law for the claim of “waiver.” The writ must issue.
I therefore dissent. Relator is entitled to relief by mandamus from this order which *944has no basis in law upon the admitted facts presented to us. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986); see also Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985) (to establish abuse of discretion relator must show that facts and law permit trial court to make only one decision).

. Disclosure in response to adverse party examination while serving as a witness is not voluntary disclosure. See Fuentes v. State, 775 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (wife’s prior testimony, over her objection and without being informed of privilege, did not waive her privilege not to testify against her husband); see also Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 512 (privilege is not defeated by disclosure which is compelled erroneously or made without opportunity to claim privilege).