Court Opinion

ID: 9819092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:26.098657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:28.040809
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: The majority’s opinion represents a departure from a previously unbroken line of this court’s precedent. We have long held that a school district has an affirmative duty to provide safety equipment to protect students from serious injury during school athletic activities. See Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 52 (1978); Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education, 77 Ill. 2d 165, 170 (1979); Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 434 (1980); Palmer v. Mt. Vernon Township High School District 201, 169 Ill. 2d 551, 557 (1996). We have likewise held that a school district does not enjoy immunity from liability for injuries allegedly arising from a breach of this duty to provide safety equipment. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d at 52; Thomas, 77 Ill. 2d at 170; Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d at 558. Through its decision in this case, the majority has (1) departed from the plain language of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/2—201, 3—108(a) (West 2000)); (2) overlooked the parameters of the individual policymaking requirement of section 2—201 of the Act; and (3) effectively abrogated a school district’s duty to provide safety equipment for its students. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. PLAIN LANGUAGE Section 2—201 provides: “Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2—201 (West 2000). The phrase “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by Statute” indicates that the legislature contemplated the existence of conflicting statutory mandates that may obviate application of section 2—201. In this case, such statutory authority exists in sections 24—24 and 34—84a of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24—24, 34—84a (West 2000)). As indicated by the majority, we addressed the scope of immunity under sections 24—24 and 34 — 84a of the School Code in Gerrity and determined that those sections did not affect a school district’s obligation to supply safety equipment. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d at 52-53. As we stated in Palmer, “ ‘[t]o hold school districts to the duty of ordinary care in such matters [is] not *** unduly burdensome.’ ” Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d at 558, quoting Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d at 52-53. More importantly, contrary to the majority’s assertion (198 Ill. 2d at 487), the appellate court decision in this case does not elevate a common law duty over an applicable statutory immunity. Immunity pursuant to the applicable statutory authority (i.e., the School Code) simply does not exist in this particular factual situation. Moreover, the majority has also departed from the plain language of the Act by allowing the school district to raise section 2—201 immunity when such immunity is specifically afforded to “public employee[s],” immunizing each individual policy-making decision. The majority has overlooked this language in the Act and has allowed the school district to enjoy blanket immunity, regardless of the acts or omissions of the district’s individual employees. While it is true that a public entity may not be held liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable (745 ILCS 10/2—109 (West 1998)), as we stated in Palmer in relation to the School Code, a school district cannot vicariously claim the immunity of its employee where it is alleged that the school district’s liability is premised upon the district’s independent duty to provide adequate safety equipment. Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d at 558. Although the majority is correct that the School Code and the Act provide separate immunities to public employees, I can discern no reason to treat the immunity afforded under the Act differently than that afforded by the School Code in this context, and neither has the majority provided such a basis. POLICYMAKING By allowing the school district to raise directly the immunity defense afforded to its employees under the Act, the majority has also circumvented a bedrock principle of section 2—201 immunity. In order to be immune under section 2—201, the policymaking decisions must be decisions that require the employee “ ‘to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.’ ” Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342 (1998), quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). Under the majority’s decision, it will never be necessary for a public entity to present evidence that such reasoned deliberation was undertaken. In fact, it will not be necessary for the public entity to show that it even considered the issue at all. Any decision made by a municipal employee whose responsibilities include the determination of policy will be automatically immune from liability. Such blanket immunity is certainly not contemplated by the Act. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 355 (Harrison, J., dissenting). I acknowledge that it would be unduly burdensome for a public entity to support every one of its policymaking decisions with evidence of an involved deliberative process. Nonetheless, the importance of the particular issue at hand simply necessitates that the school district somehow demonstrate that there was an affirmative decision not to provide safety equipment for a school-related athletic activity. Otherwise, by conferring blanket immunity to public entities, we will be encouraging school districts and other public entities to take no action concerning a whole host of important safety issues. DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFETY EQUIPMENT The majority acknowledges the disastrous consequences of its decision, remarking that under its “view of the Act, a school district would enjoy immunity if, for example, it provided its football players with leather helmets or, worse yet, no helmets at all.” 198 Ill. 2d at 487. The majority then attempts to justify that conclusion as “inescapable” under the existing state of the law. 198 Ill. 2d at 488. While I agree with the majority’s assessment that legislative attention to the scope of discretionary immunity is desperately needed, I take no solace in the fact that the legislature may remedy the situation. The outcome of this particular case was controlled by a line of precedent implicitly overturned by the majority. By its decision, the majority has effectively abrogated a school district’s duty to provide safety equipment to protect students from serious injury during school athletic activities. For this reason and for the reasons expressed above, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.