Court Opinion

ID: 2964314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:53.303355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:53.753517
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          October 4, 1996
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                   _______________

        No.  96-1339

                                   JUAN M. COFIELD,
                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                             JOHN O. DESMOND, TRUSTEE AND
                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
                                      Appellees.

                                _____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

                                            

            The opinion of this Court issued  on September 26, 1996 is amended
        as follows:

            On page 2, 3rd line from the bottom, change "11" to "7"

                   

        October 1, 1996         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1339

                                   JUAN M. COFIELD,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                             JOHN O. DESMOND, TRUSTEE AND
                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

                                      Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Juan M. Cofield on brief pro se.
            _______________
            John O. Desmond on brief pro se.
            _______________
            Kathryn R. Norcross, Ann S. Duross and  Thomas L. Hindes on  brief
            ___________________  _____________      ________________
        for appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.  Appellant Juan M. Cofield appeals from
                      __________

            the district  court's affirmance of a  bankruptcy court order

            which permitted appellant to convert his chapter 7 bankruptcy

            case  to  a  case  under  chapter  11,  but  then immediately

            reconverted  the case  back to  chapter 7.   After  carefully

            reviewing  the briefs and the record,  we affirm the district

            court's judgment  for essentially  the reasons stated  in its

            Memorandum  and Order, dated January  26, 1996.   We add only

            the following comments.

                      1.  A  notice of conversion,  filed pursuant to  11

            U.S.C.   706(a), is not effective on filing.  Bankruptcy Rule

            1017(d) provides that conversion under    706(a) "shall be on

            motion  filed and  served as  required by  Rule 9013."   Rule

            9013, in  turn, states that "[a]  request for an order  . . .

            shall  be  by written  motion."    Thus, "[t]hese  provisions

            indicate that a motion to convert pursuant to   706(a) is not
                            ______

            effective in and  of itself, but  rather is  a request for  a

            court order of conversion."  In re Calder, 973 F.2d 862,  867
                  _____                  ____________

            (10th  Cir. 1992).   As  a result,  the bankruptcy  court was

            correct  in treating appellant's "notice" as a motion and the

            conversion was not effective on January 13, 1995, when it was

            filed.

                      2.   Even assuming that "cause" for reconversion to

            chapter 7 must exist at the  time a   706(a) motion is filed,

            such  "cause" existed  here.   The  bankruptcy court's  cause

                                         -2-

            determination   rested   primarily   on   the   futility   of

            reorganization.   The court based the futility finding on the

            speculative nature of  the Fannie Mae lawsuit.   Although the

            court entered  these findings  three  months after  appellant
                  _______

            filed his    706(a) notice,  it plainly was  determining that

            futility had existed  as long  as the Fannie  Mae action  had
                         _______

            been pending.   That  is, if  funding for reorganization  was

            dependent on the success  of the lawsuit and the  lawsuit had

            little  chance of succeeding,  the reorganization  was futile

            when appellant filed the conversion notice.

                      3.   Appellant's  procedural due  process arguments

            also fail.  He first maintains that the bankruptcy court made

            a determination  prior to holding the hearings  that it would
                             ________

            deny  conversion.  There is  simply no support  in the record

            for  this  description of  what  happened.  Second, appellant

            asserts that  although the  bankruptcy court noticed  the two

            hearings  as non-evidentiary, it  took evidence  at them.   A

            reading  of  the   transcripts  from  these   hearings  shows

            otherwise.    The court  only  ordered  appellant to  produce

            certain documents at a future time.
                                   ______

                      4.    Appellant's  arguments  that  the  bankruptcy

            court's actions  constituted a  "taking" in violation  of the

            Constitution  and  that  the  bankruptcy  court violated  the

            substantive due  process clause were  not raised  below.   As

                                         -3-

            such, they are waived.   See McCoy v. Massachusetts  Inst. of
                                     ___ _____    _______________________

            Technology, 950
            __________

                                         -4-

            F.2d  13,  22 (1st  Cir. 1991),  cert.  denied, 504  U.S. 910
                                             _____________

            (1992).        Affirmed.
                           ________

                                         -5-