Court Opinion

ID: 9559036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:21:08.100148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:43.689938
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting) .
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion on the ground that claimant, under the circumstances of this case, and in my opinion, has been denied due process of law.
Claimant’s Form 3 was filed on September 24, 1956. Eight months later, May 28, 1957, a hearing was held. Claimant’s medical reports were filed on June 11 and August 8, 1957. Eight months after this *568hearing, on January 13, 1958, depositions, of witnesses for both parties were taken. These depositions were filed on January 30, 1958. Thirteen days later the order complained of was made by, the trial commissioner. Title 85 O.S.1951 § 26 provides as follows:
“Any time after the expiration of the first five days of disability on the part of the injured employee, a claim for compensation may be presented to the Commission * * * The Commission shall have full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to payment of claims for compensation under the provisions of this Act. The Commission shall make, or cause to be made, such investigation as it deems necessary, and upon application of either party shall order a hearing, and as soon as practicable, after a claim for compensation is submitted under this Section, or such hearing closed, shall make or deny an award determining such claim for compensation, * * * ” (Emphasis ours).
Due process of law is discussed in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Wilson & Co., 146 Okl. 272, 288 P. 316, 324, in which we quoted Daniel Webster’s definition contained in'the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward case, 4 Wheat 518, 4 L. Ed. 629:
“The essential elements of due process of law are: (1) Notice. (2) An opportunity to be heard. (3) An opportunity to defend. (4) An orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case.”
“Order” is defined as “customary mode of procedure”. Where a tribunal, having jurisdiction to determine rights of parties before it, deviates from its customary mode of expeditiously handling a cause within its jurisdiction and permits the parties thereto to be dilatory in its prosecution, the sudden’ expediting of such cause by entry of award or judgment without notice to the parties is, in my view, denial of due process of law.
As above indicated, I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that BLACKBIRD, J., concurs with the views herein expressed.