Court Opinion

ID: 9659755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:54:11.834955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.397444
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
concurring and dissenting on Motion for Rehearing.
My dissenting opinion of February 21, 1990 is withdrawn and the following is substituted.
While I agree with the court that the cause should be remanded for a new trial, I find it odd that all parties to this dispute, the trial court, the court of appeals, and this court agree that the contract in question is clear as a bell and yet disagree as to its meaning. I would hold that the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for a trier of fact to determine the true intent of the parties.
Ginsberg and the partnership take the position that Criswell’s engineering services were necessary only to create a condominium regime. According to the agreement, they contend Criswell was entitled to payment if and only if the center was sold on a condominium basis; since it was not, the partnership was not liable and did not pay Criswell.
Criswell contends that his services assisted the sale of the center and that under the agreement, it does not matter on what basis the center was sold. He brought this breach of contract suit, alleging that he was entitled to 1% of the sales price for services rendered and attorneys’ fees.
The pertinent rules of construction are well settled and were set out in Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393-394 (Tex.1983):
In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. To achieve this objective, courts should examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. No single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument_ Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by looking at the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered, (citations omitted).
AMBIGUITY
A contract is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex.1979). The construction of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact. See Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex.1987); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394; Harris, 593 S.W.2d at 306. In the instant case, the agreement is ambiguous because it is just as fairly susceptible to the construction given by Crossroads as it is to that given it by Criswell.
The sentence in dispute reads: “I will compile and prepare all information necessary for real estate agents to show and sell the above property on a condominium basis; i.e., to be able to sell each individual building (Building # 1 through Building # 9) as a separate item with necessary information to form an association to accommodate maintenance, taxes, necessary exterior utilities and any other community expenses; or as a whole project.” (emphasis added).
*951Criswell’s reading of the contract, adopted by the court today, is reasonable. The agreement can fairly be read to mean that Criswell was to be paid whether the shopping complex was transferred as a number of separate units of a condominium project, or undivided “as a whole project.” This reading of the contract is not, however, the only certain and definite interpretation available; therefore, the contract is ambiguous and rendition of judgment for Criswell is improper. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; R & P Enter, v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1980).
Crossroads’ reading of the contract, adopted by both the trial court and the court of appeals, is also reasonable. The agreement can be read to mean that a sale of the shopping center on a condominium basis, either as individual buildings or as an entire condominium project, was required in order for Criswell to be entitled to payment.
The court relies upon the significance of the semicolons in the disputed sentence and upon the Chicago Manual of Style but overlooks pertinent law. A semicolon is a mark or point of grammatical punctuation, used for marking off a series of sentences or clauses of coordinate value, “or for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, and never for introducing a new idea.” Empire Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 138 S.W.2d 159, 163-164 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1940, writ dism’d) (emphasis added). Criswell wrote that the shopping center was to be sold “on a condominium basis; .... ” Arguably, language following the semicolon — “as a whole project” — cannot introduce a new idea, but can only continue the expression that the project be sold on a condominium basis.
Arguments advanced by both parties are rational and both interpretations are reasonable. Thus, I am surprised that the court concludes that the contract is certain and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning.
I acknowledge that neither party has pleaded ambiguity. However, we have previously found ambiguity in agreements where it had not been pleaded. In Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, we were called upon to interpret the terms of a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. As in this case, both parties contended that the agreement was unambiguous. Nevertheless, we held that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded the cause to the trial court so that the intent of the parties could be determined as a question of fact. In White v. Moore, 760 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.1988), we considered a provision in a will. Both parties agreed that the provision was unambiguous but attached conflicting interpretations to it. We concluded that the will was ambiguous and remanded the case for trial.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
The court hinges its decision upon a discussion of conditions precedent and implicitly finds that there is no condition precedent but that there is a covenant. Not only is this incorrect, but the whole discussion is inconsequential to the resolution of this case. The letter agreement, according to any interpretation, contains a condition precedent. That is, the property had to be sold before Crossroads was obligated to pay Criswell.
Conditions precedent are those acts which must occur before there is a right to performance or before there is a breach of a contractual duty. Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.1976). Criswell was to be paid a fee of “one percent (1%) of the total sales price.” So long as no sale occurred, Cris-well had no right to demand payment from Crossroads. The dispute between Criswell and Crossroads centers not on the existence of the condition precedent — the sale— but rather on its terms — whether the sale had to be on a condominium basis.
The rules utilized by the court are inapplicable. For example, the court writes that “when a condition would impose an absurd or impossible result or result in forfeiture, an agreement will be interpreted as creating a covenant rather than a condition.” (emphasis added). These rules and the others cited by the court are used *952only to determine whether contractual provisions will be construed as conditions or covenants. They lose their force once it is established, as it is here, that a condition exists. The court’s discussion of conditions precedent is therefore irrelevant.1
The contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Thus, in my opinion, the trial court committed error in refusing to let the jury decide the true intent of the parties.
DOGGETT, J., joins this opinion.

. The court also writes: "[A] term such as 'if, ‘provided that’, 'on condition that’, or some other phrase of conditional language” must be included that makes performance specifically conditional. These or similar provisions, however, are not necessary and whether a contractual provision is a condition rather than a promise is determined from the whole instrument. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc. v. Delisle Constr. Co., 569 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1978) (citations omitted). No magic terms were needed in this case; payment to Criswell was conditioned on a sale.