Court Opinion

ID: 9540550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:17:22.941704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:58.222217
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell :
Three 15 year old boys, Green, Walker and Crowson, held up Jacob Wallfield, a 75 year old man, in his drug store on Germantown Avenue. Two of the boys were unarmed. Defendant Green was armed with a double barreled .12 gauge shotgun, which he had cut off and concealed. When Wallfield ordered Green to get away from the fountain, Green, without provocation or mitigation, deliberately, ruthlessly, and wantonly shot and killed Wallfield. Two days later the boys were arrested and orally and in writing confessed. Walker and Crowson pleaded guilty. Green pleaded not guilty but subsequently changed his plea to guilty. Walker and Crowson were found guilty of murder of the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Green was found guilty of murder of the first degree and sentenced to death. The majority of this Court have commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.
I strongly disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority and particularly with the reasons given to support its decision.
From time immemorial, a person who shot and killed his victim during a robbery was guilty of murder, and, if there were no strong mitigating circumstances, he was sentenced to death.*
*152There are three basic errors in the majority’s opinion, due probably to the truism that heart-touching cases make bad law.
The first basic error of the majority is that they change the law of Pennsylvania — without any prior authority and without any justification — with respect to the test for the imposition of the penalty of death. The second error is that they have failed to carefully examine and realistically analyze the record in this case. The third and most important basic error is that they have usurped the discretion which the Legislature vested in the trial Court to fix the penalty, after a plea of guilty and a conviction of murder.
For the first time in the history of this Commonwealth, a majority of this Court has today taken the illogical', unjustifiable and I believe illegal position that “the imposition of the death penalty by a judicial tribunal should be made only when it is the sole penalty justified by the criminal act and the criminal himself . . .” This new and novel' principle of law — the majority opinion does not mention or even indicate that it is a change — is unsupported by any prior decision of this Court; it is contrary to a host of prior decisions of this Court; and it is contrary to the statutory law of Pennsylvania.
The majority opinion then says “both the criminal act and the criminal himself must be thoroughly, completely and exhaustively examined* before the Court *153can exercise a sound discretion in determining the appropriate penalty.*
“On the record there is no evidence of the background of this boy; his home environment, the economic circumstances under which he was reared, his scholastic record; in short, what was this boy, now a convicted murderer, really like* prior to the commission of this crime? Of these things the Court below was without knowledge . . .” As that famous American, A1 Smith, was wont to say, “Let’s look at the record.”
A trial Court, after a plea of guilty to a charge of murder, hears evidence, and then determines the crime and its degree. After determining the crime, it then takes evidence to aid it in imposing the penalty. Counsel for defendant then presents not only all mitigating circumstances and all other evidence favorable to the defendant, but also all the evidence he can conceive of, which, by any possible chance, might influence the Court to give defendant the lightest possible sentence.
Green, who was represented by experienced counsel, testified in his own behalf and gave his reasons to explain his thoughts and actions and to justify a sentence of life imprisonment. Green and his companion bought 50 shells to “settle some misunderstanding with the Tenderloin Gang, which had just begun.” He had lived in Philadelphia for 13 years with his mother and father and (18 year old) brother. For the last year he did not have his mother to look after him (she was in Mt. Alto Tuberculosis Sanitorium). Green went to the Daniel Boone School, a disciplinary school for the most serious disciplinary cases; then was sent to Glen Mills School, “A House of Refuge” in Philadelphia for minors under the age of 21 years. It is a reformatory training school for incorrigibles or minors of vicious *154conduct, and minors committed as vagrants, or upon any criminal charge, or convicted of criminal offenses where the Judge of the proper Court deems such commitment proper. After Green got out of Glen Mills, he went to Penn Treaty School until the end of Grade 9B.
Green’s counsel then read to the Court what he considered to be favorable excerpts from a psychological report, and a psychiatric report of Green. The psychological report Avas made at the end of 1955 and read as follows: “I.Q. 80. described as dull-normal intelligence, emotionally insecure in his relations with others. He is ambitious and extrovertous. Comprehension and judgment are Aveak points in his adjustments, and social mores were not taught by his family.”
The psychiatric report of the Juvenile Court which was made on January 11, 1955, by Dr. D. G. Davidson, read: “Boy is essentially normal. He is mentally clear and alert. No unusual traits. Boy is friendly and cooperative, but is not sufficiently impressed. Diagnosis-normal.”
Does that record show “Green’s background and what he was really like”? Even more important, what, may I ask, does this Court know about this ruthless crime, or about Green that the lower Court did not know. This Court never saw or heard Green or any of the witnesses — all it knows is that Green deliberately shot and killed in cold blood an old man without the slightest provocation or mitigation; and that he was in a disciplinary School and then in Glen Mills; and that an impartial psychologist believed him to be of a dull-normal intelligence and emotionally insecure; and the impartial psychiatrist of the Juvenile Court found him to be normal.
If the three judges who saw and heard all the Avitnesses in this deliberate cold blooded murder, as Avell as Green’s above mentioned home environment reports *155and record, are not in a position to impose a “sound” sentence, how is this Court — which did not see or hear Green or any of the witnesses, and obviously and unquestionably has less knowledge concerning Green than the lower Court possessed — in a position to impose a “sound” sentence? Is it not clear that the most the majority could do, even under their analysis of the record and their novel theory of the law, would be to remand the case for further investigation and possible resentencing by the lower Court? It is not difficult to perceive how devoid of logic, and of justice to the public, the majority’s reasoning and conclusions are, or where lies the manifest abuse of discretion?
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is not a super Legislative body, nor is it a sentencing Court, nor is it a super Executive, or even a Board of Pardons, although at times it would be equitable and would promote justice if this Court possessed one or all of those powers.
Three conscientious Judges on two different occasions unanimously sentenced Green to death. This was not a light or hasty action on their part — it' is a real ordeal to have to sentence a criminal to death, and it obviously must be a terrible ordeal for trial Judges (or juries) to sentence a 15 year old boy to death. The Legislature confided to the trial Court and not to us the duty and the discretion to determine the punishment to be inflicted upon Green. The province and the duty of the Supreme Court, under our American System of Government, is neither legislative nor executive. Our province is to interpret and support the Constitution and the Constitutional statutory laws as they are written, and it is not within our province to ignore or change or rewrite them even though sometimes, I repeat, it would do equity or promote Justice.
In Commonwealth v. Gossard, 383 Pa. 239, 117 A. 2d 902, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice *156Stern, said (pages 242-243) : “The Penal Code, §701, provides that ‘In cases of pleas of guilty, the court, where it determines the crime to be murder of the first degree, shall, at its discretion, impose sentence of death or imprisonment for life.’ While the court’s determination of the penalty is subject to appellate review the question is not whether the appellate court would have imposed the same penalty as did the court below but whether that court manifestly abused the discretion confided to it by the statute: Commonwealth v. Howell, 338 Pa. 577, 580, 13 A. 2d 521, 522; Commonwealth v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 344, 59 A. 2d 53, 54; Commonwealth v. Givens, 363 Pa. 141, 69 A. 2d 142, 144; Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 76, 77, 89 A. 2d 782, 785; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 372 Pa. 223, 228, 93 A. 2d 455, 457.”
Green’s age (15) is the only possible justification for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment by the trial Judges, but there is no justification for its imposition by this Court! Children over 14 years of age are and for centuries have been held liable for murder; and they have been executed for murder.* The conviction of a boy, William C. Cavalier, 14 years and 5 months old, of murder of the first degree with sentence of death was sustained in a learned opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Schaffer in Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 284 Pa. 311, 323 et seq., 131 A. 229.** See to the same effect Commonwealth v. Zeitz, 364 Pa. 294, 300, 301, 72 A. 2d 282; Blackstone’s Commentaries, *157Book 3, §§22-24; Bishop on Criminal Law, 9th Ed., Vol. 1, §368, pages 260, 261.
Green is not without an adequate remedy, although the majority have overlooked the fact that his remedy is not in this Court. The Constitution — Art. IV, §9— gives to the Governor of Pennsylvania, upon the written recommendation of the three members of the Board of Pardons, the power of clemency.* This Court does not possess under the Constitution, or under statutory or decisional law, or inherently, any power of clemency; and in my judgment we have no right to usurp either the discretion which the Legislature vested in the trial Court, or the power of clemency which is given by the Constitution to the Governor of Pennsylvania.
I would affirm the Judgment and the Sentence.

 Moreover, in order to protect society and to deter murder — ■ tlie two factors which are forgotten or ignored by many Judges and social reformers — the law is well settled that when a killing occurs in the perpetration of a felony, even a look-out, or a driver of a get-away car, or a person who was not armed and did not fire the fatal shot, is also guilty of first degree murder and is subject to the death penalty; and this is true even if the victim was killed by a confederate during his escape: Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 251, 2 A. 191; Commonwealth v. Biddle, 200 Pa. 640, 50 A. 262: *152Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211; Commonwealth v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99, 130 A. 302; Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 A. 313; Commonwealth v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247, 56 A. 2d 84; Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A. 2d 733; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 513-514, 113 A. 2d 464.

 One wonders what charge the trial Judge must hereafter make to a jury in a case when death occurs in a robbery. In such cases everyone knows that the defendant is not and under the law cannot be “thoroughly, completely and exhaustively examined.”

 What happens to a jury’s verdict of death when they never hear or know what the majority say the trial Court must know?

 I believe the majority’s opinion would have been clearer and stronger if it had said something like this: “We are opposed to the death penalty, especially for young persons. Notwithstanding all authorities to the contrary, henceforth it shall be unlawful for a trial Court to impose the death penalty on any murderer who is under — years of age.”

 Cavalier’s sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment, not by this Court, but by the Governor.

 As against the natural reluctance of every one to impose the death penalty on a boy under 16 years of age, it is high time that Courts, Governors and Pardon Boards, in the imposition or commutation of sentence, should take into consideration, as President Judge Oliver of the Court below did, the appalling crime wave which has been sweeping our Country, and the almost unbelievable percentage of major crimes which are committed by boys 18 years and under. In the opinion of many experienced persons the death penalty is both wise and necessary for the protection of society and as a deterrent to the crime of murder. It is a fact which is frequently ignored in dealing with dangerous young criminals that 46 out of every 100 arrests for major crimes in Philadelphia in 1957 were of young persons between 13 and 18 years of age (Civic Affairs, May 1958). Moreover, according to the information supplied by the District Attorney of Philadelphia, 55% of all major Grimes committed in Philadelphia in 1957 — murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary and assault with intent to kill — were committed by persons under 18 years of age. It must be apparent that youthful dangerous criminals can no longer be treated as juveniles.