Court Opinion

ID: 9369965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:04:27.573278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.313161
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-1027-MR

THOMAS JOHN ALGEO                                                 APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-00447

THE ESTATE OF JOHN THOMAS ALGEO,
BY AND THROUGH ITS EXECUTRIX,
CATHERINE MARIE ALGEO; and
CATHERINE MARIE ALGEO,
INDIVIDUALLY                                                       APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, EASTON, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Thomas John Algeo appeals an order of the Warren Circuit

Court granting summary judgment in a will contest he filed against the above-

referenced appellees. Upon review, we affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             This case is a will dispute between the children of John Thomas Algeo

(“John”). The appellant, Thomas John Algeo (“Thomas”), is the brother of the

appellee Catherine Marie Algeo (“Catherine”) who serves as the executrix of their

father’s estate. The specific will at issue was executed in April of 2012. In this

will, John gave his entire estate, less taxes and costs, to Catherine. The will’s exact

wording regarding the disinheritance of Thomas is as follows:

             After thoughtful consideration, I have elected not to
             include my dear son, Thomas John Algeo, as a residuary
             beneficiary of this estate. This decision in no way
             reflects a lack of love, pride, and true friendship with my
             son. It however reflects my belief that my son, Thomas
             John Algeo, has been financially successful in life and
             has sufficient financial resources and family support to
             provide for his needs. My daughter, Catherine Marie
             Algeo, does not have the same source of financial and
             family support and is, in my belief, in greater need. I do
             leave to my two children, in equal shares, both my love
             and admiration.

             John previously executed a will in 2010 which split his estate equally

between his two children. John eventually passed away on October 13, 2019, at

the age of 88. Afterward, Catherine offered the 2012 will for probate, and the

Warren District Court admitted it for that purpose. In March of 2020, Thomas

filed suit in Warren Circuit Court contesting the 2012 will, claiming it was the

product of Catherine’s undue influence. Thomas made some initial suggestion

about John’s incapacity separate from undue influence. Thomas abandoned that

                                          -2-
claim and for good reason. Overwhelming evidence submitted in this record

removes any genuine question of capacity in 2012.

             After written discovery, Catherine moved for summary judgment,

arguing no evidence supported Thomas’ claims. After an oral argument on August

2, 2021, the circuit court granted Catherine’s motion on August 11, 2021. This

appeal followed. Additional facts will be discussed, as necessary, in the context of

our analysis below.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

             As discussed, all of Thomas’ allegations of error emanate from the

summary dismissal of his claims. In weighing the foregoing allegations of error:

                    “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary
             judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that
             there were no issues as to any material fact and that the
             moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of
             law.” Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems,
             Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002). Summary judgment
             is only proper when “it would be impossible for the
             respondent to produce any evidence at the trial
             warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.
             Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
             1991). In Steelvest, the word “‘impossible’ is used in a
             practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v.
             Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). In ruling
             on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required
             to construe the record “in a light most favorable to the
             party opposing the motion . . . and all doubts are to be
             resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. A
             party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely
             on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the
             movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present

                                        -3-
             affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly
             supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 481.

Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 789-90 (Ky. App. 2012).

                    “Appellate review of a summary judgment
             involves only legal questions and a determination of
             whether a disputed material issue of fact exists. So, we
             operate under a de novo standard of review . . . .” Adams
             v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017) (quoting
             Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901,
             905 (Ky. 2013)).

Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospitality Mgt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Ky. 2021).

                                    ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Thomas presents two overarching arguments as to why, in

his view, summary judgment was improper: (1) it was premature because

discovery had yet to be completed; and (2) evidence of record demonstrated

genuine issues of material fact relative to the issue of undue influence.

             Regarding Thomas’ first argument, it is unpreserved. Contrary to

what Thomas represents in his appellate brief, he did not argue below in his

“Response to Motion for Summary Judgment” that summary judgment was

premature. His response also did not contest Catherine’s representation, set forth

in the introduction of her motion for summary judgment, that “[t]he parties have

completed written discovery[.]” Nor did Thomas move for a continuance or bring

                                         -4-
this issue to the circuit court’s attention in a CR1 59.05 motion. Additionally,

Thomas makes no request for palpable error review.2 Because we must review the

discovery to assess the propriety of summary judgment in this case, we choose to

address the opportunity to complete discovery.

                We note “[t]here is no requirement that discovery be completed, only

that the non-moving party have ‘had an opportunity to do so.’” Carberry v.

Golden Hawk Transp. Co., 402 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation

omitted). Six months has been deemed an adequate opportunity to complete

discovery. Hartford Ins. Group v. Citizen’s Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579

S.W.2d 628 (Ky. App. 1979).

                Here, almost a year had elapsed before Catherine filed her summary

judgment motion: Thomas filed suit on March 25, 2020, and Catherine moved for

summary judgment on March 1, 2021. An additional six months elapsed before

the circuit court considered the summary judgment motion. Even if we consider

the argument, Thomas clearly had the required “opportunity” to present some

evidence through discovery of a genuinely disputed fact.

1
    Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
2
 Absent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate
court will not engage in palpable error review “unless such a request is made and briefed by the
appellant.” Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d 601, 613 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Shepherd v.
Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008)).

                                               -5-
             Regarding his second overarching argument (i.e., that evidence of

record demonstrated genuine issues of material fact relative to the issue of undue

influence), we begin our analysis with a review of the operative law. To invalidate

a will based upon undue influence, it must be demonstrated that undue influence

was at “a level of persuasion which destroys the testator’s free will and replaces it

with the desires of the influencer.” Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Ky.

1998) (citations omitted). The Kentucky Supreme Court recently set forth the legal

framework to determine when a will is to be invalidated based upon undue

influence:

             In discerning whether influence on a given testator is
             “undue,” courts must examine both the nature and the
             extent of the influence. First, the influence must be of a
             type which is inappropriate. Influence from acts of
             kindness, appeals to feeling, or arguments addressed to
             the understanding of the testator are permissible.
             Influence from threats, coercion and the like are improper
             and not permitted by the law. Second, the influence must
             be of a level that vitiates the testator’s own free will so
             that the testator is disposing of her property in a manner
             that she would otherwise refuse to do. The essence of
             this inquiry is whether the testator is exercising her own
             judgment.

                    In addition to demonstrating that undue influence
             was exercised upon the testator, a contestant must also
             show influence prior to or during the execution of the
             will. Undue influence exercised after the execution of
             the will has no bearing whatsoever upon whether the
             testator disposed of her property according to her own
             wishes.

                                         -6-
                    The influence must operate upon the testator at the
            execution of the will. If the influence did not affect the
            testator, then such conduct is irrelevant. However, even
            if the influence occurred many years prior to the
            execution of the will, but operates upon the testator at the
            time of execution, it is improper and will render the will
            null and void.

                   To determine whether a will reflects the wishes of
            the testator, the court must examine the indicia or badges
            of undue influence. Such badges include a physically
            weak and mentally impaired testator, a will which is
            unnatural in its provisions, a recently developed and
            comparatively short period of close relationship between
            the testator and principal beneficiary, participation by the
            principal beneficiary in the preparation of the will,
            possession of the will by the principal beneficiary after it
            was reduced to writing, efforts by the principal
            beneficiary to restrict contacts between the testator and
            the natural objects of his bounty, and absolute control of
            testator’s business affairs.

            ....

                   When a contestant seeks to claim that undue
            influence was employed upon a testator, the burden is
            upon the contestant to demonstrate the existence and
            effect of the influence. Merely demonstrating that the
            opportunity to exert such influence [existed] is not
            sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. When undue
            influence and a mentally impaired testator are both
            alleged and the mental impairment of the testator is
            proven, the level of undue influence which must be
            shown is less than would normally be required since the
            testator is in a weakened state.

Getty v. Getty, 581 S.W.3d 548, 555-56 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Bye, 975 S.W.2d at

457).

                                        -7-
              Before discussing what this record discloses regarding “badges of

undue influence,” we turn to what Thomas asserts is direct proof of Catherine’s

undue influence upon their father, John. Citing the offending provision of John’s

will, Thomas argued below that “Catherine had apparently been telling her father

that her brother was far more financially secure that [sic] she, and that she needed

the estate more than her brother.”

              “Apparently” is emphasized because no evidence of record

demonstrates Catherine told John anything about her brother’s financial situation,

and this is nothing more than Thomas’ unsubstantiated belief, which “is not

evidence and does not create an issue of material fact.” Sparks v. Trustguard Ins.

Co., 389 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Ky. App. 2012) (citations omitted). Suppositions are

not evidence. More to the point, the circuit court correctly observed in its

dispositive order that Thomas adduced no evidence that contradicted John’s belief,

as set forth in the 2012 will, that:

              Thomas John Algeo, has been financially successful in
              life and has sufficient financial resources and family
              support to provide for his needs. My daughter, Catherine
              Marie Algeo, does not have the same source of financial
              and family support and is, in my belief, in greater need.

              To the extent Thomas took any issue with John’s above-stated

“belief” at the trial court level, his evidence only took issue with where he thought

                                         -8-
it came from. In the affidavit he submitted in support of his summary judgment

response, all that Thomas stated about his father’s belief was the following:

             4. In the will that has now been admitted to probate,
             which I am contesting, my father observes that, after
             “thoughtful consideration” I am not to be included as a
             beneficiary of his estate. He explains his reasoning by
             stating that I have been “financially successful in life”
             and that his daughter (my sister) “does not have the same
             source of financial and family support” and is in “greater
             need.”

             The fact of the matter is that John Algeo, the decedent,
             absolutely could not have considered the relative
             financial positions of his son and daughter, because he
             had absolutely no financial information whatsoever
             regarding his son’s condition. Therefore, the only
             information that he would have had in this regard would
             be information that Catherine had given to him in order
             to influence the making of his will.

             Undue influence in the area of wills is a species of fraud. Marcum v.

Gallup, 237 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. 1951). Fraud is not to be presumed and must be

established by clear and convincing evidence. See United Parcel Service Co. v.

Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1999). Here, nothing of record demonstrates

Catherine made any representation to John about Thomas’ financial need;

accordingly, it would be pure speculation to conclude that John’s belief about

Thomas’ financial need was born of any influence from Catherine. Furthermore,

nothing of record demonstrates John’s “belief” about Thomas’ financial need, as

set forth in the 2012 will, was incorrect or misinformed at that time. Accordingly,

                                         -9-
even if Catherine did make some representation to John that influenced his opinion

about Thomas’ financial need, it would also be pure speculation to conclude that

John’s resulting belief about Thomas’ financial need was born of undue influence

from Catherine, as opposed to non-actionable influence consisting of “modest

persuasion and arguments addressed to the understanding, or by mere appeals to

the affections[.]” Cecil’s Ex’rs v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198, 195 S.W. 837 (1917).

             As an aside, Thomas also argues on appeal that John’s “belief” about

his financial need, as set forth in the 2012 will, was incorrect and misinformed.

Whether Thomas effectively preserved this argument is questionable because his

counsel only stated in passing and without further elaboration during the August 2,

2021, summary judgment hearing that John’s belief about his children’s relative

finances was “not true.” In any event, arguments and representations by Thomas’

counsel are not evidence. Mason v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 610, 624-25 (Ky.

2011). And no evidence of record otherwise supports this argument. Accordingly,

we will not address this point further.

             We now turn to the circumstantial evidence of undue influence, i.e.,

the “badges.” Initially, Thomas argues undue influence from Catherine is evident

because the 2012 will reflects an “unnatural disposition” of John’s estate. In that

vein, he points out that John’s 2012 will: (1) disinherited him; and (2) differed

from a prior will John executed in 2010, which did not disinherit him.

                                          -10-
             The issue of whether a will is sufficiently unnatural on its face to raise

an issue of fact requires examination of what is and is not unnatural in each

situation. It is “perfectly normal for a person to change his mind or even to do at a

later date something contrary to his earlier expressed intention.” New v. Creamer,

275 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ky. 1955). There are a variety of reasons why one child

might be preferred over another, or a friend may be preferred over a child. “It

might be said generally that to exclude one’s children might be considered

unnatural, but merely because one happens to be the offspring of a testator does not

entitle one to be included in an estate. Moreover, there is nothing requiring a

parent to make such a provision.” Wallace v. Scott, 844 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky.

App. 1992). Additionally, “[t]he power to disinherit may be the only means an old

person has of assuring his needs.” Middleton v. Middleton’s Ex’r, 302 S.W.2d

588, 591 (Ky. 1956) (citation omitted). It is not unnatural for a testator to favor

one heir over another because of the comparative financial needs of the heirs.

Race v. Stevens, 276 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Ky. 1954).

             Here, the undisputed evidence shows Catherine regularly helped take

care of John after his wife (the parties’ mother) passed away; and in 2010, John

moved to the city where Catherine lived – Bowling Green, Kentucky – to make it

easier for her to do so. Thomas, on the other hand, resided in Cincinnati, and was

unable to care for John or regularly visit him because, unlike Catherine, Thomas

                                         -11-
had a spouse and children of his own to care for. John’s apparent need for a

caretaker and Catherine’s proximity to him simultaneously demonstrates John’s

vulnerability to undue coercion, but also provides a rational explanation for the

unequal treatment. However, viewing the circumstance most favorably to Thomas

raises merely a suspicion that the will could have been the product of undue

influence.

             No single badge of undue influence is conclusive. Indeed, “an

unequal or unnatural disposition by itself is not enough to show undue

influence[.]” Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1967). Instead, their

cumulative effect must be considered. And, regarding those additional “badges,”

there is no evidence – and Thomas makes no argument – that Catherine restricted

contact between John and anyone else; or that the relationship between John and

Catherine was recently developed and comparatively short. Getty, 581 S.W.3d at

555.

             Thomas asserted that “[a]t the time of the making of the will in issue,

[John] was elderly and physically weakened.” John was eighty-one years old when

he executed his will. John required the assistance of a walker to ambulate and no

longer drove a vehicle at that time. However, old age alone does not give rise to a

presumption of undue influence. Parks v. Moore’s Ex’r, 265 Ky. 678, 97 S.W.2d

579, 581 (1936). Moreover, age and evidence of physical weakness and

                                        -12-
enfeeblement are merely “corroborative evidence of undue influence where there is

other probative evidence of undue influence[.]” Id. These factors are relevant

insofar as they demonstrate the testator was susceptible to undue influence. See

Hines v. Price, 310 Ky. 758, 221 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1949) (emphasis added)

(explaining, “in determining the issue of undue influence the jury may take into

consideration the testator’s age and evidence of physical weakness and

enfeeblement likely to impair his mind and powers of resistance”).

             Here, Thomas no longer makes any argument that John lacked

testamentary capacity. It is undisputed that at all relevant times John resided by

himself in an apartment at Village Manor in Bowling Green Kentucky – an

independent living facility, not a nursing home – and that he was largely self-

sufficient. Thomas also adduced no evidence that John’s physical health affected

his mental health or otherwise impaired John’s powers of resistance at any relevant

time before or at the time John executed the 2012 will. Thus, John’s age and

physical condition presented no material issue for purposes of withstanding

summary judgment.

             We now proceed to another badge, i.e., “absolute control.” Getty, 581

S.W.3d at 555. Again, John did not reside with Catherine. Furthermore, there has

been no showing that Catherine exploited John to financially gain from him.

Notwithstanding, Thomas argues “[t]he only circumstances that had changed

                                        -13-
between January 2010 and April 2012 was that Catherine had assumed complete

control over all of his [Testator’s] financial, medical, and personal affairs.” In

support, he represents that John gave Catherine “power of attorney” “during this

time”; that Catherine ignored “an existing commitment from their father to

financially contribute to Thomas’ three minor children’s 529 education accounts”;

and that one of John’s medical records from May 13, 2011, recites that Catherine

accompanied John to an appointment with his neurologist and “helped supply

portions” of his medical history.

             However, the parameters and extent of the aforementioned “power of

attorney” are unknown, as it is not of record. Thomas also altered his “during this

time” statement by explaining elsewhere in his brief – consistently with an

interrogatory answer he provided during discovery – that John granted Catherine

“power of attorney” in “April 2012.” Recall, John executed his will at issue in this

matter on April 25, 2012. If Thomas is insinuating that the existence of a power of

attorney evinced Catherine’s requisite “control” over John’s affairs, he has

adduced nothing indicating this control existed before, as opposed to after, John

executed his will. See Getty, 581 S.W.3d at 555 (citation omitted) (“Undue

influence exercised after the execution of the will has no bearing whatsoever upon

whether the testator disposed of her property according to her own wishes.”).

                                         -14-
             There is a similar problem with Thomas’ contention that Catherine

ignored “an existing commitment from their father to financially contribute to

Thomas’ three minor children’s 529 education accounts.” In the interrogatory

answers he provided during discovery below, Thomas acknowledged that his

“three minor children” are triplets born in 2014 – two years after John executed his

will. As they did not yet exist when John executed his will in 2012, Catherine

could not have controlled or influenced John’s decision to exclude Thomas or his

children from the 2012 will.

             Lastly, one of John’s medical records from May 13, 2011, does indeed

recite that Catherine accompanied John to an appointment with his neurologist and

“helped supply portions” of his medical history. In and of itself, this does not

demonstrate Catherine controlled John, much less exercised the requisite “absolute

control” over him. Getty, 581 S.W.3d at 555.

             Proceeding to another “badge,” Thomas asserts Catherine participated

in the preparation of John’s 2012 will. He presents no direct evidence of this; and

Catherine denied doing so in an affidavit she submitted of record. Catherine also

averred that she was unaware of the terms of John’s 2012 will before he executed

it. However, Thomas asserts that the following is circumstantial evidence in

support of his assertion: (1) Catherine recommended to John the attorney he

selected to draft the 2012 will – the same law firm that represented Catherine

                                        -15-
below and continues to do so in this appeal; (2) Catherine drove John to the law

firm on the date he executed the will; and (3) Catherine was aware of “notes” John

made regarding what he wanted in the 2012 will, and email correspondence John

submitted to his attorney to that effect.

             We disagree that this evidence was sufficient. Regarding his first

point, Catherine also retained the attorney John had selected to draft his 2012 will

(Frank Hampton Moore, Jr.); but she did so, as reflected by the answer she filed

below, no later than April 13, 2020. Nothing indicates Catherine and Moore were

more than strangers to one another or had any interaction prior to and when John

executed the 2012 will. The only evidence of record relevant to this point is found

in Catherine’s summary judgment affidavit, in which she averred:

             8. With regard to [John’s] decision to draft a new will,
             he specifically indicated to me that he asked persons at
             Village Manor and he asked me with regard to a
             recommendation for an attorney. I indicated that I did
             not know anyone but would ask persons at W.K.U. and
             after polling some persons about any recommendations
             as to someone who would be suitable for drafting a will
             and estate documents, I was provided the name of Frank
             Hampton Moore, Jr. I provided Mr. Moore’s name and
             contact information to my father and he initiated the
             contact with the law firm of Cole & Moore to make an
             appointment. My father later changed the appointment
             time on his own and then indicated this new date and
             time to me so I would be available to drive him to the
             office. I only drove my father to the appointment and did
             not participate or provide input in the drafting of the will.

                                            -16-
             Regarding Thomas’ second point, a beneficiary does not actively

participate in the execution of a will, for purposes of this “badge,” by merely

driving the testator to and from the lawyer’s offices. Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 459.

             As for Thomas’ third point, it derives from inferences he makes from

the following paragraph of Catherine’s affidavit, in which she stated:

             9. I recall that my father did indicate that he had made
             some changes to the will, and he made notes regarding
             what he wanted modified. He emailed those changes to
             Mr. Moore and they were incorporated into the Last Will
             and Testament.

             That said, Thomas’ assertion this demonstrates Catherine actively

participated in the drafting and execution of John’s 2012 will is speculation and

conjecture, rather than reasonable inference. From the foregoing averment, it is

unclear whether Catherine was personally aware of notes and emails John made

relating to his 2012 will, or whether John simply indicated to Catherine that he had

made notes and had emailed his attorney about it. Moreover, this averment does

not specify when John indicated to Catherine – or when Catherine became aware –

that John had done those things. Absent more, this is insufficient.

             Next, Thomas asserts a pair of arguments founded upon an affidavit

he submitted below, in which he recounted details of a visit he paid to John in

“December 2017.” The relevant substance of his affidavit is as follows:

             2. In December 2017, I visited my father, John Thomas
             Algeo, and recorded our conversation about his Last Will

                                        -17-
and Testament. With my father’s permission I looked in
his home office for his will and found the Last Will and
Testament of 2010. I did not find the Last Will and
Testament of 2012.

3. My father, John Thomas Algeo read through his 2010
Last Will and Testament which stated that Catherine
Marie Algeo and Thomas John Algeo received equal
shares of his estate. My father commented: “. . . that all
seems perfectly satisfactory me [sic]. Does it seem
satisfactory to you?” In this recording, my father can be
clearly heard to say that his wishes are a 50/50 split of his
estate.

....

5. During this 2017 visit, my father did not have his
2012 will in his possession. Catherine’s statement that
my father always had his 2012 will in his possession is
false. It is my belief that Catherine had my father’s 2012
will in her possession.

6. I requested a copy of my father’s 2012 Last Will and
Testament, and he called Catherine Marie Algeo to
request a copy. He told me: “. . . she [Catherine] doesn’t
want you to have a copy of my will.” Thomas: “Why is
that?” John: “Because she thinks that you might use it to
have me declared mentally incompetent.” My father
went on to say that he himself did not have a copy of his
2012 will and that he thought that I should have a copy
and he would “do my best to see that Katie sends you a
copy of my will . . . .”

7. I tried to contact Catherine on multiple occasions,
mostly via email, to request that she provide a copy of
my father’s will to me. My father had given me his
verbal approval that Catherine provide me such a copy.
Despite my multiple requests, no copy was provided to
me by her. In fact, she ignored all of these requests and
never responded to them.

                            -18-
             There is no indication John gave Thomas permission to record him or

that John was even made aware of this alleged recording. Most significant is the

fact Thomas did not produce this recording as evidence. The recording would

have been the best evidence of the interaction. The absence of this recording

further damages the weak foundation of any actual evidence to support Thomas’

claims of undue influence.

             If we accept the reported contents of the missing recording as true,

Thomas’ first argument is that what is set forth above from that recording

demonstrates that in “December 2017,” John’s stated intent was “a 50/50 split of

his estate.” Thomas assumes John’s intent in 2017 is a material element of the

dispute over whether his 2012 will was signed under undue influence, and

therefore, that a declaration John made in 2017 indicating his testamentary intent

was relevant.

             Thomas is incorrect. John’s intent in December 2017 is not a material

element of a disputed fact in the case before us. Once a will has been duly

admitted to probate, as it has here, it presumptively reflects the true intentions of

the testator, since in such circumstances the testator is presumed competent and of

sound mind. “If the rule were otherwise, a will would amount to nothing, since it

could be overthrown and a new and different will established by parol testimony.”

White v. Ponder, 180 Ky. 386, 202 S.W. 867, 869 (1918). For purposes of this

                                         -19-
case, the dispositive facts Thomas was required to prove were those that would

demonstrate specific acts of undue influence from Catherine. John’s intentions in

December 2017 do not tend to prove or disprove any elements of undue influence

in 2012.

             Thomas’ second argument is that what is set forth above demonstrates

Catherine had exclusive possession of John’s 2012 will in December 2017; and

that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate undue influence for purposes of

summary judgment. We disagree. First, Catherine insists the will was in

possession of John’s attorney. To be sure, “possession of the will by the principal

beneficiary after it was reduced to writing” is considered one of the “badges of

undue influence.” Getty, 581 S.W.3d at 555. But Thomas is describing a situation

that arose five years after John executed the 2012 will. See id. (citation omitted)

(“Undue influence exercised after the execution of the will has no bearing

whatsoever upon whether the testator disposed of her property according to her

own wishes.”).

             Taken as true, there is also no indication that Catherine prevented

John from accessing his 2012 will – only Thomas. What is set forth above

demonstrates that after John executed his 2012 will, Thomas could not find it in

John’s office, John believed he did not have possession of his 2012 will, and

Catherine could supply a copy of it to Thomas, which she refused to do. For her

                                        -20-
part, Catherine averred she never possessed John’s 2012 will. Perhaps, if

Catherine was John’s power of attorney, she may have had access to John’s 2012

will sufficient to enable her to make a copy of it for Thomas. But nothing

demonstrates she had exclusive possession of John’s will at any point in time.

             Contrary to what Thomas represents about the substance of

Catherine’s affidavit, Catherine averred that John only had possession of a copy of

his 2012 will, and that his original 2012 will was, to the best of her understanding,

in the possession of John’s attorney, Moore, who kept it on John’s behalf in a safe

deposit box maintained by his firm. Moore, for his part, also submitted a reply

memorandum during the underlying litigation verifying that his firm had indeed

kept John’s original 2012 will in a safe deposit box maintained by his firm at all

relevant times – a point that Thomas does not refute or address. Thomas’ belief

that Catherine had exclusive possession of John’s 2012 will is not evidence that

she had exclusive possession of John’s 2012 will. Sparks, 389 S.W.3d at 124

(citations omitted).

                                  CONCLUSION

             We have addressed the breadth of what Thomas presents on appeal

about his claim of undue influence. The totality of the circumstances here, viewed

most favorably toward his case, establishes nothing of substance illustrating a

genuine issue of material fact. From the whole of this record, it is practically

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impossible for Thomas to have presented clear and convincing evidence to a

factfinder to establish undue influence thus warranting submission of this matter to

a jury. The Warren Circuit Court did not err in granting summary judgment

judgment in this case. We therefore AFFIRM.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Joseph P. Bowman                          Frank Hampton Moore, Jr.
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Bowling Green, Kentucky

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