Court Opinion

ID: 9899458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:46.866315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.493158
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 In re Phoenix D. CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 In re Phoenix D. et al.,                                              B324357

 Persons Coming Under the Juvenile                                     (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01546A-D)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 D.P. and G.D.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Pete R. Navarro, Referee. Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
         Patricia K. Saucier, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant D.P.
         Paul A. Swiller, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant G.D.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                              INTRODUCTION
      Father and mother appeal from the juvenile court’s orders asserting
dependency jurisdiction over four children. They allege the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply
with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) because
it did not ask extended family members whether they had Native American
ancestry. They ask us to remand the matter for compliance with ICWA’s
inquiry mandates. DCFS does not oppose remand for that purpose.
      Father also challenges the jurisdictional findings that the children
were at risk due to his history of substance abuse and mental health issues.
      We conditionally affirm the court’s orders asserting dependency
jurisdiction and remand the case for the limited purpose of ensuring
compliance with ICWA.
      As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.

                                   DISCUSSION
      A.    Jurisdictional Findings
            1.    Justiciability
      G.D. (father) challenges the jurisdictional findings made by the juvenile
court as to the four children who are the subject of this action. No one has

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challenged the jurisdictional findings against D.P. (mother). Father
acknowledges the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over the children
regardless of the outcome of father’s appeal of the jurisdictional findings
against him. Father requests that we exercise our discretion to consider his
appeal on its merits as his status as an “offending” parent could have
consequences in future proceedings concerning his custody of the children.
DCFS does not address this issue in its briefing and instead addresses the
merits of father’s arguments concerning the jurisdictional findings against
him.
       “An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of
‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.) In dependency cases, our Supreme Court has set
forth several factors that may be considered in deciding whether to review
jurisdictional findings in an otherwise moot appeal. (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 283, 285–286 (D.P.).) These factors include whether the finding
“‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current
or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or . . . “could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 283; see
also In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431–1432 [holding the Court of
Appeal has discretion to consider an appeal of jurisdictional findings where
they could impact future proceedings].) Other factors include whether the
jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct and the reason why the appeal became moot. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 285–286.) “The factors above are not exhaustive, and no single
factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)

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      As we find the jurisdictional findings against father are stigmatizing
and may play a role in future dependency proceedings, we will exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of his appeal of the jurisdictional findings.

            2.    Governing Principles and Standard of Review
      Under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
the juvenile court has jurisdiction over a child where there is a substantial
risk the child will be harmed by certain enumerated conduct of a parent or
guardian. This conduct includes “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child” and “[t]he
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to
the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.” (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A), (D).) “A jurisdictional finding
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires DCFS to demonstrate the
following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful
conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious
physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.)
      “Although section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child [citation]. The court
may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the
court’s protection. [Citation.] A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will

1    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
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continue.’” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383–1384; see In
re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“[t]he focus of section 300 is on
averting harm to the child”].) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the
adjudication hearing, “[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation
to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
      We review jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re
Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) “Substantial evidence must be of
ponderable legal significance. It is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence.
[Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) “[W]e view the
record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations,
drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s findings and orders.” (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p.
992.) The test is whether it was reasonable for the trier of fact to make the
ruling in question in light of the whole record. (Ibid.)
      “We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at
p. 228.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” (Ibid.)

            3.    Counts b-3 and b-4
      Mother and father have four children. This action arose when twins
Phr. D. and Pha. D. were born in April 2022 exhibiting symptoms of drug
withdrawal. The section 300 petition included two counts asserted against
father. Count b-3 alleged father has a history of substance abuse, including
alcohol, which renders him incapable of providing regular care for the

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children. Count b-4 alleged father has a history of mental and emotional
problems, including a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, which
render him incapable of providing regular care for the children. As these
allegations are interrelated, we will discuss them together.
      The record indicates father has had a long, ongoing history of anger
and domestic abuse toward mother that has interfered with his ability to care
for the children. In 2013, father physically assaulted mother in front of the
eldest child. Father repeatedly struck her, threw her phone when she tried to
call for help, and slammed her against a bedroom wall causing her to bleed
from the head. This incident led to the initiation of a dependency action
which removed the eldest child from father’s physical custody. It was also
followed a few months later by another incident of domestic violence against
mother which resulted in father’s arrest, conviction, and imprisonment.
      While the record indicates father had taken some steps toward
rehabilitation beginning in 2020, his mental and emotional issues continue to
impact his ability to care for the children. Shortly after the twins were born,
the hospital revoked his visiting privileges because of repeated angry and
threatening outbursts directed at mother while she was trying to feed one of
the children in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).2 In July 2022, he
told a social worker that he did not want to have anything to do with the case
or any of the four children anymore because mother told him the twins were
not his children.3

2     Father attempts to minimize the significance of these issues. In an
April 19, 2022, interview with DCFS, father claimed “that he and mother now
successfully co-parent and there are no conflicts between them.” This
statement was made less than ten days after the hospital revoked his access
to the NICU where the twins were being treated.

3     Subsequent genetic testing indicated the twins are father’s children.
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      Father himself traces the root of these problems to his mental health
issues and history of substance abuse. The record indicates he now attends
monthly individual therapy and has participated in two substance abuse
programs. However, we note he also indicated he had stopped attending
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and did not currently have a sobriety
sponsor. He also has been reluctant to take medication prescribed to him and
chooses instead to self-medicate with marijuana. He claims the marijuana
helps him sleep and “calms me down because I do have a temper.” As set
forth above, this reliance on marijuana to address his emotional issues has
proven unsuccessful.
      We find there is substantial evidence in the record that father’s
substance abuse is intertwined with his well-documented history of emotional
and mental issues. These issues continue to manifest in ways that affect his
ability to co-parent with mother and reliably care for the children. We
therefore affirm the court’s sustaining of counts b-3 and b-4 as to father.

      B.    ICWA Compliance
      Mother and father contend DCFS and the juvenile court failed to
inquire of extended family members as to whether the children are or may be
Indian4 children under ICWA. We agree.
      Congress enacted ICWA “to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian
children from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re

4     “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for
consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native
American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
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Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) “ICWA
recognizes that ‘“the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from
. . . the interest of the parents.”’” (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 247, 253.) Under state law, the juvenile court and DCFS have
“an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a
petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.”5 (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9,
11–12.) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child ‘can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the
duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.)
      The duty of initial inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse
or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b).) “Extended family members” include persons defined by law or custom of
the Indian child’s tribe, or in the absence of law or custom, adults who are the
child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-
in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd.
(c); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
      DCFS does not dispute that it failed to fully discharge its duty of initial
inquiry.
      Mother and father denied any Native American ancestry. In May 2022,
maternal grandmother indicated her family did not have Native American

5      An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
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ancestry. However, in June 2022, maternal grandmother informed DCFS
that the maternal side of the family may have Native American ancestry.
Specifically, she identified two relatives who she believed could have
Cherokee or Choctaw ancestry. One of these individuals was the maternal
great-grandmother who sometimes assisted the maternal grandmother in
caring for the children. It is undisputed that DCFS did not make an ICWA
inquiry of the maternal great-grandmother or the other extended family
members it was aware of.
      DCFS mailed ICWA notices to the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and
the Cherokee Nation. Each responded that the children were not in its
records and therefore were not an “Indian child” under ICWA. The juvenile
court reviewed the tribes’ responses and found ICWA did not apply. DCFS
did not send notices or make further inquiries of two other Choctaw tribes or
two other Cherokee tribes.
      We conclude that because the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over
the children and continues to have an ongoing duty to ensure ICWA
compliance, the failure by DCFS to adequately discharge its duty of initial
inquiry can be addressed by a conditional affirmance of the juvenile court’s
orders with directions to require DCFS to fulfill its duty. (See In re Baby Girl
M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 639, fn. 2 [“We see no need to order any ICWA
findings vacated because ICWA-related obligations are continuing duties;
that means earlier ICWA-related findings are subject to change and no order
vacating an earlier finding is necessary here”]; In re A.C. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1018 [same].)
      The parties identified several extended family members who have not
been asked about possible Native American heritage, including the maternal
great-grandmother, the maternal grandfather, the paternal grandfather, and

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the maternal and paternal uncles. On remand, DCFS shall attempt to
inquire of any extended family members known to DCFS.

                               DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s orders asserting dependency jurisdiction over the
four children are conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with
instructions to DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct any necessary ICWA
inquiry as to available relatives as soon as practicable. DCFS and the court
shall comply with additional ICWA requirements, including the notice
requirements for all Cherokee and Choctaw tribes. If the inquiry and notice
do not reveal evidence of Native American heritage, the orders shall stand.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           ZUKIN, J.

      WE CONCUR:

      CURREY, P. J.

      MORI, J.

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