Court Opinion

ID: 9733016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:49:37.540525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:37.465508
License: Public Domain

LAVORATO, Justice
(dissenting).
For reasons that follow I dissent to division II.
A possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. This duty requires the possessor to use reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises. This duty also requires the possessor to make the premises reasonably safe or to give warning of the actual condition and risk involved. Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 comment d [hereinafter Restatement].
However, the possessor of land is not liable if the invitee’s injuries are caused by a known or obvious condition. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618; Restatement § 343A. There are, however, circumstances in which the possessor can and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee even though the dangerous condition is known or obvious. In these circumstances the possessor still has a duty to warn or protect the invitee against the dangerous condition. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618; Restatement § 343A comment f.
One such circumstance in which the possessor should expect harm to the invitee from known or obvious dangers may arise
where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantage of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.
Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618 (quoting Restatement § 343A comment f). I think this determination is peculiarly a fact question for the jury to decide. In this circumstance, the fact that the danger is known or obvious goes to the question of what percentage of fault should be assigned to the invitee. But the fact that the danger is known or obvious is not conclusive in determining the possessor’s duty or whether the possessor has acted reasonably under the circumstances. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618; Restatement § 343A comment f.
On a motion for directed verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. In doing that here, I think the plaintiffs generated a jury question on whether the defendant Deitchler should have anticipated Bernard D. Schnoor’s approach to the auger. I say this for several reasons.
First, Schnoor and Deitchler were friends. It is inconceivable to me — as I am sure it would be to a jury — that Deitchler would not anticipate that Schnoor would stand around the auger and visit with Deitchler during the loading process. Deitchler’s own testimony suggests this:
Q. Mr. Deitchler, on the diagram that’s up on the board there, and maybe you still have your pointer there, during the time that the first wagon was being unloaded, in what area was Mr. Schnoor standing? Would you show us? A. (Witness complied.)
*919Q. So he would have been to the west of where the actual auger was running? A. Yes.
Q. Now, that wasn’t unusual, was it, that he would be in the area of where the augering was being done? A. No, it was not.
Q. Not only not unusual for him, but I assume if you had other people around when augering was being done, they might stand in the area where it was being done? A. Yes, they would.
Second, Schnoor testified that one of his duties was to make sure the auger did not overload his truck. This task would necessarily place Schnoor close to the wagon. This was not the first time that Schnoor had been on the premises for the same reason he was there this time. So the jury could — I think — reasonably find that Deitchler would have been aware of this necessary task and should have anticipated Schnoor’s approach to the auger.
Last, according to Schnoor, Deitchler had left the auger to move a grain wagon to the auger for loading. That left only Schnoor to make sure the loading was proceeding properly. When Deitchler left the auger, Schnoor was standing ten to fifteen feet from the auger, watching the loading process. At this point, Schnoor walked up to the auger to see how full the auger was running. This is when the accident happened. Again, I think a jury could reasonably find that Deitchler should have anticipated Schnoor’s approach to the auger.
Schnoor testified that he did not think he was at risk in approaching to the point he did before slipping into the auger. To a reasonable person in Schnoor’s position, the advantages in doing so would appear to outweigh the apparent risk. The jury could reasonably find that Deitchler should have anticipated this. The majority’s error is in deciding this issue as a matter of law.
I would affirm as to the defendant Deitchler.
LARSON, J., joins this dissent.