Court Opinion

ID: 9899257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:10:49.865568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:12.707813
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Plozay, 2023-Ohio-4128.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 112599
                 v.                                :

ANTHONY PLOZAY,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: DISMISSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 16, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-22-670917-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

I.    Introduction

                   On February 1, 2023, defendant-appellant Anthony Plozay (“Plozay”)

entered a plea of guilty to failure to comply with order, signal of a police officer

(“failure to comply”), R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony, as charged in Count 1

of the indictment, and attempted obstructing official business, R.C. 2923.02 and
2921.31(A), a first-degree misdemeanor, as amended in Count 2 of the indictment.

On March 8, 2023, after receipt of the presentence-investigation report, Plozay was

sentenced on Count 1 failure to comply to a 36-month prison term, a Class One

lifetime driver’s license suspension, and a $10,000 fine. On Count 2, attempted

obstructing official business, Plozay was sentenced to time served. He was also

ordered to pay costs. Plozay received jail-time credit for 84 days.

              Counsel appointed to represent Plozay in the instant appeal has filed

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493

(1967), and requested leave to withdraw as counsel. Anders held that where, after a

conscientious examination of the case, appellate counsel is unable to find any

meritorious issues for review, counsel may inform the court and request permission

to withdraw from the case. Id. at 744. In addition, the request must be

      accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might
      arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be
      furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he
      chooses; the court — not counsel — then proceeds, after a full
      examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly
      frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and
      dismiss the appeal.

Id. If this court determines that one or more legal points have merit, the defendant

will be afforded counsel to argue the appeal. Id.

II. Discussion of Potential Assignments of Error

              Counsel identifies four potential assignments of error but explains

that the errors are not prejudicial and meritorious of review. After a thorough
independent review of the record, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and

dismiss this appeal.

               The four potential errors are:

       Potential Issue 1:      Whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11.

       Potential Issue 2:      Whether the sentence imposed is contrary to law.

       Potential Issue 3:      Whether the trial court erred by imposing a
                               lifetime license suspension.

       Potential Issue 4:      Whether the trial court erred by imposing a
                               maximum fine.

       A. Crim.R. 11 compliance

               A defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional

rights. State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10,

citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State

v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25; see State v.

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Enforcement of the plea is

unconstitutional where the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily. Id., citing id.

               Crim.R. 11

       “outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting
       pleas” and “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial
       court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the
       consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly
       and voluntarily made.’” [Dangler] at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43
       Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975).

State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112017, 2023-Ohio-1673, ¶ 11.
               In Dangler, the court determined that the former strict or substantial

compliance standard for a Crim.R. 11(C) analysis “unduly complicated what should

be a fairly straightforward inquiry.” Id. at ¶ 17. “[T]he questions to be answered are

simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if

the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that

excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a

showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Id.

               At the plea hearing, counsel for the parties confirmed that Plozay’s

plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The record reflects the trial

court failed to advise Plozay that he was also waiving his right to a bench trial. “The

right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States, and it is one of the five constitutional trial rights a criminal

defendant must be advised of.” State v. Lewis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107552,

2019-Ohio-1994, ¶ 12, citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479, 423 N.E.2d

115 (1981). However, “[a] defendant’s option to be tried without a jury, although

provided in R.C. 2945.05, is not a constitutional right, neither is it mentioned

anywhere in Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. “Crim.R. 11 does not require [the advisement] for

the plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Id. at ¶ 14.

               A failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 has not been demonstrated. The

first potential assignment of error lacks merit.
      B. Sentence contrary to law

              The trial court sentenced Plozay to a 36-month term of incarceration

on Count 1 and time served on Count 2. A sentence is contrary to law if the sentence

falls outside of the statutory range for the particular degree of offense or the trial

court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in

R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hinton, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 10, citing State v. Smith, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 100206, 2014-Ohio-1520, ¶ 13.

              Failure to comply under R.C. 2921.331(B) is a third-degree felony

subject to a prison term of 9 to 36 months pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Plozay

was sentenced to 36 months which is within the statutory range.

              A trial court must consider the purposes and principles of sentencing

under R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 when imposing a

felony sentence. State v. Wagner, 2023-Ohio-1215, 212 N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 28 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68,

¶ 20. A trial court is not required under those statutes to make any specific factual

findings on the record. Id., citing id., citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214,

2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215,

724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). Both R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 call on the sentencing court

to consider what sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime by the

defendant, with R.C. 2929.12(E)(3) focusing specifically on whether the offender
had led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years prior to the offense at

issue.

                The trial court recounted Plozay’s involvement in “at least six very

dangerous” activities related to vehicular incidents over the past few years and other

concerns supporting that Plozay had not been living a law-abiding life. Thus, the

record supports that the trial court considered the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 when sentencing Plozay. “While trial courts must carefully consider the

statutes that apply to every felony case, it is not necessary for the trial court to

articulate its consideration of each individual factor as long as it is evident from the

record that the principles of sentencing were considered.” State v. Roberts, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 89236, 2008-Ohio-1942, ¶ 10. We add that the trial court stated in

its journal entry that it considered all required factors of law, and that prison was

consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11. Therefore, we find that the trial court

fulfilled its statutory requirements. State v. Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700,

2014-Ohio-112, ¶ 9.

                The second potential assignment of error lacks merit.

         C. Lifetime license suspension

               Plozay received a lifetime driver’s license conviction for failure to

comply under R.C. 2921.331(B).        This was Plozay’s second failure to comply

conviction. R.C. 2921.331(E) and 4510.02(A)(1) provide that a Class One lifetime

driver’s license suspension is mandatory where the second failure to comply is a

felony.
                The third potential assignment of error lacks merit.

      D. Imposition of maximum fine

                The trial court imposed a $10,000 maximum fine for the third-

degree failure to comply felony under R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(c) without considering

Plozay’s ability to pay it. The trial court stated that if Plozay paid off the court costs

“which aren’t going to be all that much * * * by not later than April 1, 2024, I will

[reduce] that fine down to $3,000, okay? But I want [you] to work it off while you’re

in prison.” (Tr. 42.) This statement by the court indicates that the trial court gave

consideration to Plozay’s ability to pay.

               The record reflects that Plozay was represented by appointed counsel

who did not object to the fine and appellate counsel was appointed for appeal.

However, as this court has acknowledged, “‘a determination that a criminal

defendant is indigent for the purpose of receiving counsel does not prohibit the trial

court from imposing a fine.’” State v. Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99806,

2014-Ohio-1422, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Mock, 187 Ohio App.3d 599, 2010-Ohio-

2747, 933 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.). “Ohio law does not prohibit a court from

imposing a fine on an indigent defendant.” State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92419, 2009-Ohio-5964, ¶ 8, citing State v. Ramos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92357, 2009-Ohio-3064; and State v. Roark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84992,

2005-Ohio-1980.

               The fourth potential assignment of error lacks merit.
III. Conclusion

              As required by Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493,

this court has conducted a thorough review of the proceedings below and considered

the arguments identified in counsel’s Anders brief. We conclude that there are no

arguable legal points on the merits of this matter. Counsel’s request to withdraw is

granted, and we dismiss this appeal.

              We remand the matter to the trial court, however, for two nunc pro

tunc entries. “‘The function of a nunc pro tunc entry is not to change, modify, or

correct erroneous judgments, but merely to have the record speak the truth.’”

State v. Kimmie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98979, 2013-Ohio-2906, ¶ 20, quoting

Ruby v. Wolf, 39 Ohio App. 144, 147, 177 N.E. 240 (8th Dist.1931).

              Though properly stated on the record, the judgment entries for the

plea and sentencing provide that Plozay pleaded guilty to obstructing official

business instead of attempted obstructing official business under R.C. 2923.02 and

2921.31(A), a first-degree misdemeanor, as amended in Count 2 of the indictment.

The trial court shall enter nunc pro entries for the plea and sentencing to accurately

reflect the offense of attempted obstructing official business under R.C. 2923.02 and

2921.31(A).

               Case dismissed and remanded.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                                      ___
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR