Court Opinion

ID: 9393531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 16:00:58.182362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.867264
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: UNITED STATES OF                 No. 21-56358
AMERICA V. 6.03 ACRES OF
LAND IN THE COUNTY OF                      D.C. No.
SANTA BARBARA, STATE OF                 2:20-cv-10647-
CALIFORNIA, ET AL,                         AB-AFM
______________________________

KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P.,                   OPINION

              Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

BRENDA BURMAN, in her official
capacity as the Commissioner of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation;
SCOTT MCGOLPIN, in his official
capacity as the Head of the County of
Santa Barbara Public Works
Department and Director of the
County Water Agency; DAS
WILLIAMS, Santa Barbara County
Board of Supervisor, individually in
his official capacity as policy maker
for the Santa Barbara County Water
Agency and as Purchaser of
Emergency Road Access Easement;
2              KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

GREGG HART, Santa Barbara
County Board of Supervisor,
individually in his official capacity as
policy maker for the Santa Barbara
County Water Agency and as
Purchaser of Emergency Road Access
Easement; BOB NELSON, Santa
Barbara County Board of Supervisor,
individually in his official capacity as
policy maker for the Santa Barbara
County Water Agency and as
Purchaser of Emergency Road Access
Easement; JOAN HARTMANN,
Santa Barbara County Board of
Supervisor, individually in her official
capacity as policy maker for the Santa
Barbara County Water Agency and as
Purchaser of Emergency Road Access
Easement; STEVE LAVAGNINO,
Santa Barbara County Board of
Supervisor, individually in his official
capacity as policy maker for the Santa
Barbara County Water Agency and as
Purchaser of Emergency Road Access
Easement; CACHUMA OPERATION
AND MAINTENANCE BOARD;
ERNEST CONANT, in his official
capacity as the Regional Supervisor
for the BOR Region 10,

               Defendants-Appellees.
                KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN                   3

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Central District of California
         Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted December 7, 2022
          Submission Withdrawn January 18, 2023
                 Resubmitted May 4, 2023
                   Pasadena, California

                       Filed May 10, 2023

    Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., DANIEL P. COLLINS,
            and KENNETH K. LEE, Circuit Judges.

            Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

                          SUMMARY *

                           Easements

   The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Kimball-Griffith, L.P.’s action against federal and local
government defendants asserting easement rights over a
maintenance road on federal land in Montecito, California.
    In 1952, the United States initiated an eminent domain
action to acquire land in Montecito, California, to build the
Ortega Reservoir. Kimball-Griffith’s property is located
directly north of the Ortega Reservoir, and the maintenance

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4              KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

road at issue (the Access Road) runs along the southern edge
of Kimball-Griffith’s property, just within the boundaries of
the federal reservoir land. In 1989, the federal Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) granted an easement over the Access
Road to the County of Santa Barbara, and the County
installed locked gates across the road, blocking public
entry. In 2020, Kimball-Griffith filed this lawsuit, asserting
the right to use the Access Road based on its purported
ownership of “an equitable servitude and covenant running
with the land.”
    The district court held that Kimball-Griffith’s claim
against the BOR and its officials must be construed pursuant
to the Quiet Title Act (QTA). Because the QTA’s statute of
limitations had elapsed, the court dismissed the claims
against the BOR. The district court dismissed the remaining
claims as time-barred and because Kimball-Griffith failed to
allege a property interest in the Access Road.
    The parties disputed whether Kimball-Griffith’s claim
against the BOR and its officials must proceed pursuant to
the QTA and, as a result, comply with its statute of
limitations. In a case decided after argument in this case, the
Supreme Court held in Wilkins v. United States, 143 S. Ct.
870 (2023), that the QTA’s limitations period was a mere
claims-processing       rule,     not     a     jurisdictional
requirement. The panel held that in light of Wilkins, it need
not decide whether the statute of limitations applied in this
case. With jurisdiction no longer in question, the panel held
that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record.
    The panel affirmed the dismissal of Kimball-Griffith’s
claims because Kimball-Griffith failed to plead a property
interest in the Access Road. To succeed on any of its
claims, Kimball-Griffith must establish a property interest in
               KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN             5

an easement over the Access Road. Kimball-Griffith argued
that the 1952 Decree of Taking and 1955 Judgment
preserved an easement for Kimball-Griffith’s predecessors,
the Cunniffs, and that this easement passed to Kimball-
Griffith. First, Kimball-Griffith asserted that the Cunniffs
had an easement over the Access Road as owners of property
abutting the road. The panel held, however, that Kimball-
Griffith did not allege that, at the time of condemnation, the
Access Road existed as a “public street.” As a result,
Kimball-Griffith cannot rely on the theory that the Cunniffs,
as     adjacent     landowners,        acquired   a    private
easement. Second, the panel held that Kimball-Griffith had
not alleged facts suggesting that the Cunniffs acquired an
easement over the Access Road as a third party by any other
means or operation of law. Indeed, prior to the eminent
domain action, the Cunniffs owned all the land underlying
the relevant portion of the current Access Road, as well as
the land on both sides of the current road. Accordingly, they
could not have acquired a private easement over the road
against themselves. The panel concluded that without
allegations supporting a property interest in an easement
over the Access Road, all of Kimball-Griffith’s claims
failed.

                        COUNSEL

Michael M. Berger (argued), Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP,
Los Angeles, California; John K. Dorwin, Buellton,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew J. Barragan (argued) and Kevin B. Finn, Assistant
United States Attorneys; David M. Harris, Assistant United
States Attorney, Civil Division Chief; E. Martin Estrada,
6             KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney;
Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee Brenda
Burman.

Callie Patton Kim (argued), Deputy Assistant General
Counsel; Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel; Office of
the Santa Barbara County Counsel; Santa Barbara,
California; for Defendants-Appellees Scott McGolpin, Das
Williams, Gregg Hart, Bob Nelson, Joan Hartmann, and
Steve Lavagnino.

William W. Carter (argued), Musick Peeler & Garrett LLP,
Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee Cachuma
Operation and Maintenance Board.

                        OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    This case arises from a dispute concerning access to a
maintenance road on federal land. In the 1950s, the United
States condemned a tract of land adjacent to what is now
Appellant Kimball-Griffith’s property, including land
underlying a maintenance road, which was later closed to the
public. In 2020, Kimball-Griffith sued various federal and
local government defendants, asserting easement rights over
the road. The district court dismissed Kimball-Griffith’s
claims against all defendants. Because Kimball-Griffith has
not plausibly alleged a property interest in an easement over
the maintenance road, we affirm.
               KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN                7

                      BACKGROUND
    In 1952, the United States initiated an eminent domain
action to acquire land in Montecito, California to build the
Ortega Reservoir. At the time the action was filed, part of
the condemned land was owned by Kimball-Griffith’s
predecessors-in-interest, Phillip and Ethyl Cunniff. In 1955,
the district court entered a final judgment documenting the
taking of the Cunniffs’ land (the 1955 Judgment) and
specified that the government took the property “subject . . .
to existing rights of way in favor of the public or third parties
for highways [and] roads . . . on, over, and across said land.”
The 1952 Decree of Taking related to the condemnation
contained the same “subject to” language.
    In 1958, the Cunniffs sold forty-five acres of their
remaining land to Loma Griffith, née Kimball, who later
transferred the property to Kimball-Griffith, L.P. Kimball-
Griffith’s property is located directly north of the Ortega
Reservoir, and the maintenance road at issue in this case (the
Access Road) runs along the southern edge of Kimball-
Griffith’s property, just within the boundaries of the federal
reservoir land. In 1989, the federal Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR) granted an easement over the Access Road to the
County of Santa Barbara, and the County installed locked
gates across the road, blocking public entry.
     Over thirty years later, in November 2020, Kimball-
Griffith filed this lawsuit, asserting the right to use the
Access Road based on its purported ownership of “an
equitable servitude and covenant running with the land.” In
its amended complaint—styled as a “Petition to Reopen” the
1955 Judgment—Kimball-Griffith asserted ejectment and
injunctive relief claims against the BOR and its officials,
demanding removal of the gates blocking the Access Road;
8              KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

taking and conspiracy-to-commit-a-taking claims against the
County, reservoir authority, and other local government
entities and contractors pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and a
judicial taking claim against the district court.
     The district court dismissed the case in its entirety. The
court held that Kimball-Griffith’s claim against the BOR and
its officials must be construed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act
(QTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), the federal statute that waives
the United States’s sovereign immunity with respect to
claims challenging federal title to land. Because the QTA’s
statute of limitations had elapsed, the court dismissed
Kimball-Griffith’s claim against the BOR. The court
dismissed the remaining claims as time-barred and because
Kimball-Griffith failed to allege a property interest in the
Access Road. This appeal followed.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true
and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2021).
                         ANALYSIS
                               I
    At the outset, the parties dispute whether Kimball-
Griffith’s claim against the BOR and its officials (BOR
defendants) must proceed pursuant to the QTA and, as a
result, comply with its statute of limitations. The QTA
waives federal sovereign immunity with respect to claims
challenging federal title to land. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). It
generally provides “the exclusive means by which adverse
claimants c[an] challenge the United States’ title to real
               KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN             9

property,” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch.
Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983), including challenges
related to easements, Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d
683, 686 (9th Cir. 2009). QTA claims are subject to a
twelve-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).
    The BOR defendants argue that, because Kimball-
Griffith’s claim asserts an easement over federal land, it can
be brought only pursuant to the QTA and is thus long barred
by its statute of limitations. Kimball-Griffith contends that
this case does not implicate the QTA at all. Rather, it argues
that its claim against the BOR is a “Petition to Reopen” the
1955 Judgment, which, according to Kimball-Griffith,
provides an alternative ground for jurisdiction. The 1955
Judgment purported to reserve jurisdiction for the court “to
make further orders and decrees” related to the
condemnation. So, Kimball-Griffith argues, the federal
government waived immunity by stipulating to the
Judgment, and Kimball-Griffith is not required to invoke the
QTA in this case.
    At the time this case was argued, our court’s case law
had interpreted the QTA’s statute of limitations to be a
jurisdictional requirement. See Adams v. United States, 255
F.3d 787, 796 (9th Cir. 2001). Under that precedent, we may
have been obligated to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding
the applicability of the QTA’s statute of limitations before
considering the merits. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay.
Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (“[A]
federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case
without first determining that it has jurisdiction . . . .”).
    However, in light of a Supreme Court decision decided
after argument in this case, we now need not do so. In
Wilkins v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 870 (2023), the Court
10            KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

held that the QTA’s limitations period is a mere claims-
processing rule—not a jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 877,
881. The Court explained that it “will treat a procedural
requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states
that it is.” Id. at 876 (cleaned up). Reversing our court’s
decision below in that case, the Supreme Court held that the
QTA lacks such a clear statement creating a jurisdictional
requirement. Id. at 877, 881.
    Now that the Supreme Court has overruled our precedent
and held that the QTA’s statute of limitations is merely a
claims-processing rule, we need not decide whether the
statute of limitations applies in this case. With our
jurisdiction no longer in question, we may “affirm on any
ground supported by the record.” Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998). As
explained below, we affirm the dismissal of Kimball-
Griffith’s claims because Kimball-Griffith failed to plead a
property interest in the Access Road.
                             II
    To succeed on any of its claims, Kimball-Griffith must
establish a property interest in an easement over the Access
Road. Its ejectment claim against the BOR for removal of
the gates is premised on Kimball-Griffith’s purported right
to use the Access Road. Likewise, establishing an easement
interest in the road is a prerequisite to Kimball-Griffith’s
taking, conspiracy-to-commit-a-taking, and judicial taking
claims. See Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]o state a claim under the Takings Clause, a
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he possesses a property
interest that is constitutionally protected.” (cleaned up));
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Env’t
Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 728 (2010) (plurality) (“What counts
                KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN               11

[for judicial taking claims] is . . . whether the property right
allegedly taken was established.”).
    Kimball-Griffith argues that the 1952 Decree of Taking
and 1955 Judgment preserved an easement for Kimball-
Griffith’s predecessors, the Cunniffs, and that this easement
passed to Kimball-Griffith. The relevant documents specify
that the United States took title to the reservoir land subject
to “existing rights of way in favor of the public or third
parties for . . . roads . . . over and across [the] land.” So, if
the Cunniffs had an easement over the road at the time of the
eminent domain action, it would have been preserved and
potentially passed to Kimball-Griffith.
      Kimball-Griffith asserts that the Cunniffs had an
easement over the Access Road as owners of property
abutting the road. In support, it cites two California Supreme
Court cases—Bacich v. Bd. of Control of California, 144
P.2d 818 (Cal. 1943), and Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co.,
394 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1964). Under Bacich, “an owner of
property abutting upon a public street has a property right in
the nature of an easement in the street . . . which is his private
right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the
public.” 144 P.2d at 823. Breidert clarifies that an
“interference with the property owner’s access to the street
upon which his property abuts” will “constitute[] a taking”
if it causes “a substantial impairment of his right of access to
the general system of public streets.” 394 P.2d at 722.
    However, Kimball-Griffith has not alleged that, at the
time of condemnation, the Access Road existed as a “public
street.” Kimball-Griffith alleges that the Access Road
existed before the condemnation and makes general
references to “historic access” to the road until it was gated
off but does not allege that the public had a right-of-way over
12                KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN

the road. And the 1890 subdivision map cited by Kimball-
Griffith shows—at most—only that some form of the Access
Road (or plans to build the road) existed in 1890. It does
not show that it was a public street. See Gardner v. County
of Sonoma, 62 P.3d 103, 110 nn.7, 9 (Cal. 2003) (“[P]rior to
California’s adoption of statutory methods of dedication [in
1893], the mere filing and recordation of a subdivision map
did not create a dedication to public use of property so
depicted on the map, e.g., streets, highways, and parks, until
there was action upon the dedication.”). Likewise, the 1944
topographical map shows, at most, only the existence of the
Access Road at that time. As a result, Kimball-Griffith
cannot rely on the theory that the Cunniffs, as adjacent
landowners, acquired a private easement in a “public street”
under Bacich and Breidert.
        Nor has Kimball-Griffith alleged facts suggesting
that the Cunniffs acquired an easement over the Access Road
as a third party by any other means or operation of law. 1
Indeed, it appears that, prior to the eminent domain action,
the Cunniffs owned all the land underlying the relevant
portion of the current Access Road, as well as the land on
both sides of the current road. Accordingly, they could not
have acquired a private easement over the road against
themselves. See Canyon Vineyard Ests. I, LLC v. DeJoria,
294 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 210 (Ct. App. 2022) (“Because an

1
  Despite Kimball-Griffith’s argument, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021), did not reject traditional requirements for
easement creation. Cedar Point Nursery held only that the government
could effect a taking of private property even if it did not assert a formal
easement over that property. See id. at 2076. The case did not address
the manner in which a private party could create an easement and
otherwise has no bearing on this case.
               KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. V. BURMAN            13

easement is the right to use or prevent the use of the land of
another, a person cannot have an easement on his or her own
land.”); Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of
Easements & Licenses in Land § 3:11 (2023) (“[I]t is
axiomatic that a landowner cannot obtain an easement in the
landowner’s own property.”).
       Since Kimball-Griffith has not plausibly alleged that
the Cunniffs had an easement over the Access Road, no
easement could have been preserved as an “existing right[]
of way” in the eminent domain action. Without allegations
supporting a property interest in an easement over the
Access Road, all of Kimball-Griffith’s claims fail.
                      CONCLUSION
         For the reasons described, we AFFIRM the district
court.