Court Opinion

ID: 9844646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:06:01.070729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.574759
License: Public Domain

*233BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue on appeal is not whether the City was justified in discharging the claimant,1 but rather whether the claimant’s work performance amounted to the type of “misconduct,” which constitutes a bar to unemployment compensation benefits. Such being the case, I am unable to understand why the Court in its opinion dwells at length on the constitutional standards of appellate review of findings of fact. Nor can I understand the relevance of its conclusion that, “The court therefore declines to independently adopt findings of fact at variance with those of the Industrial Commission where such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Nowhere in claimant’s brief is there any argument that this Court should not abide by findings of the Commission which are supported by substantial competent evidence.
In announcing its dictum on the constitutional question, the Court’s opinion painstakingly sets forth the findings of fact made by the Commission, which are, I concede, accurately copied from the appeal transcript. These findings from the Commission are the same findings which were made by the appeal examiner, numbered and rearranged in order. The opinion then incorrectly declares:
The Industrial Commission concluded that appellant was discharged for actions that violated known rules of employment and that showed an intentional disregard for the employer’s interests. (Emphasis added.)
The misstatement is repeated in the final paragraph of the Court’s opinion:
Based upon a careful review of the entire record before the Industrial Commission it is the conclusion of the Court that its findings of fact are supported by competent and substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. Having found that appellant intentionally disregarded his employer’s rules and best interests no error was committed in the Industrial Commission’s conclusions of law and order denying appellant’s claim for benefits. (Emphasis added.)
My concern is not so much with the misstatement,2 as it is with the failure to recognize that the only question before us is one of law. We are not asked to change the facts; we are asked to reach a legal conclusion different from that arrived at by the Commission.
Simply put, the issue before us is whether or not the facts as found justified the Commission’s conclusion of law that claimant was guilty of the type of “misconduct” for which unemployment benefits may properly be denied under the language of I.C. § 72 — 1366(e):
The personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant are that—
(e) His unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily without good cause, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment.
*234In Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556 P.2d 859 (1976), this Court made it clear that not every “violation of any rule of an employer will, per se, constitute misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compensation benefits upon discharge.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 902, 556 P.2d at 861. “Misconduct” within the meaning of I.C. § 72-1366(e) must amount to
“wilful, intentional disregard of the employer’s interests; a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules ; or a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.” (Emphasis added in Wroble.)
Id. (quoting from Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., 91 Idaho 312, 317, 420 P.2d 795, 800 (1966).
Appeals Examiner G. H. Oram concluded that the conduct of Booth did not amount to intentional disregard of his employer’s interests or rules or reasonable standards of behavior. After dismissing several of the issues complained of as being completely without merit, the Appeals Examiner concluded that the remaining items were “in the nature of good faith errors”:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck, [237 Wis. 249] 296 N.W. 636 states “ * * * good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.” While it may be seen that the actions of the claimant were not acceptable to the Police Committee and the City Council responsible for his employment, the facts as they have been presented to the examiner reveal nothing to indicate more than perhaps some inefficiency or inadvertencies or ordinary negligence on his part to indicate that he was not doing the best he could under the circumstances. As a result, the Examiner is constrained to rule that there was no misconduct, per se, on the part of the claimant. (Emphasis added.)
I find the conclusions of law of the appeals examiner supported both in logic and in law, and I see nothing in the Court’s opinion suggesting to the contrary.3

. Claimant, writing his own brief, states that he “does not question the City’s right to terminate, only the manner in which it was done.”

. The Commission’s only conclusions were:
I
A claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is ineligible if it is found that his unemployment is due to having been discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment. Misconduct is defined as an act in willful disregard of the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, or an intentional disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee.
II
The Commission finds that the claimant was discharged for actions which were in disregard of the employer’s interests and of the instructions that had been given him at the time of his employment. The Commission concludes that the claimant’s discharge was for misconduct in connection with his employment.
Conspicuously absent is any acknowledgment by the Commission of the distinction between misconduct serious enough to justify discharge and misconduct serious enough to result in denial of unemployment benefits. Equally absent is any explicit finding by the Commission that Booth’s misconduct was intentional.

. The majority offers no explanation as to why the Commission’s conclusions of law are correct and those of the appeals examiner are not. This issue should be the crux of the appeal, not the proper appellate standard on findings of fact — which, in my opinion, is dictum.