Court Opinion

ID: 9535082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:45:21.37647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:10.087243
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the referee’s findings on the claimant’s worsened condition were not contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the commission erred in reversing these findings and in dismissing the claimant’s petition to reopen. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I.
A review of the evidence and procedural history of this case will place in focus the issue before us. The claimant, Lenzie A. Jones, sustained an industrial accident on November 20, 1975, while employed by As-arco, Inc. The pain and disability associated with this accident required a lumbar laminectomy in 1977, and the claimant was awarded permanent partial disability benefits of six percent in June 1977. Upon recovering from surgery the claimant experienced a relief in his symptoms and was able to return to employment. He entered a trade school and worked as a welder for General Iron Works from 1978 to 1981.
On August 14, 1981, the claimant filed a petition to reopen his compensation claim due to a worsening of his physical condition. The claimant, who was the only witness testifying before the referee, denied sustaining any industrial accident while employed at General Iron Works. He testified that he was basically asymptomatic until January 1981, when he began to experience pain in his back and legs. These symptoms became so severe that he was unable to engage in such routine physical activities as standing or sitting for any length of time, washing a car, or riding a bicycle. He had to sleep on the floor to relieve his pain, and due to his worsened condition he left employment with General Iron Works on July 20, 1981.
A report of Dr. Steve A. Levalley, dated August 11, 1981, was considered by the referee. Dr. Levalley stated in his report that the claimant, during the preceding two or three months, had undergone treatment for left lumbar pain with occasional radiation to the lateral aspect of the left leg. Dr. Levalley’s examination showed spasm of the left lumbar muscle group and diminished tendon reflexes in the left knee. A report of another treating physician, Dr. Stephen P. Goff, was also considered by the referee. This report indicated that since July 20, 1981, the claimant had been examined on several occasions for lower back pain, and on November 23, 1981, the date of Dr. Goff’s last examination, he was still experiencing low back symptoms. It was Dr. Goff's recommendation that the claimant return to work about December 9, 1981, on a light duty basis involving “no lifting over ten to fifteen pounds, no bending or squatting, and preferably a sedentary duty.” The other medical report considered by the referee was prepared by Dr. Martin E. Anderson, who examined the claimant on October 6, 1981, at the request of the compensation carrier. It was Dr. Anderson’s opinion that, although the claimant was experiencing mild symptoms from the 1977 surgery, there had been no aggravation of any preexisting disability.
*1121It was on the basis of all of the above evidence that the referee found that the claimant’s condition had worsened and that the worsened condition was not related to the claimant’s employment at the General Iron Works, but to his industrial injury of November 20, 1975. The referee accordingly concluded that the claimant had been totally disabled since July 20, 1981, and granted the petition to reopen, awarding temporary disability benefits and continuing the case on the issue of permanent partial disability. The commission, concluding that the referee’s findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence, reversed the referee’s decision and dismissed the petitioner’s claim to reopen. The court of appeals reversed the commission, holding that the referee’s findings were evidentiary in character, were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and were therefore binding on the commission under section 8-53-106(2)(b), 3 C.R.S. (1982 Supp.), ch. 86, sec. 2, 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, 476-77.1
II.
Section 8-53-119, 3 C.R.S. (1973), authorizes the director of the division of labor, within six years from the date of an accident, to review and reopen a workmen’s compensation award for a change in condition. Section 8-53-106(2)(b), 3 C.R.S. (1982 Supp.), which is controlling on these proceedings, states that “[t]he findings of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, made by the director or referee shall not be set aside by the commission on review of the director’s or referee’s decision unless the findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”
I agree with the majority’s assumption that the findings of the referee with respect to worsened condition are matters of evidentiary fact. Findings of evidentiary fact involve the raw, historical data underlying the controversy. deKoevend v. Board of Education, 688 P.2d 219, 225 (Colo.1984); Lee v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 654 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1982); Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1118 (Colo.1981); Blair v. Lovett, 196 Colo. 118, 124 n. 13, 582 P.2d 668, 672 n. 13 (1976). Findings of ultimate fact, in contrast, involve a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact, requiring as they do the application of legal standards in resolving the rights and liabilities of the parties. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 225; Lee, 645 P.2d at 844; Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118; Blair, 196 Colo. at 124 n. 13, 582 P.2d at 672 n. 13; R. & R. Well Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 658 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Colo.App.1983). The question whether the claimant suffered a worsening of his physical condition as a result of the industrial injury in 1975 is a question of eviden-tiary fact because its determination centers solely on the claimant’s physical condition on or about July 20, 1981, and the physical or actual cause of that condition. Resolution of this question does not require a normative judgment based on statutory or jurisprudential policy considerations, such as those relating to proximate and intervening cause. See Baca v. Helm, 682 P.2d 474 (Colo.1984). The only issue properly before us, therefore, is whether the referee’s findings with respect to the claimant’s worsened condition were “contrary to the weight of the evidence” within the meaning of section 8-53-106(2)(b).
III.
The term “contrary to the weight of the evidence” is a broad and general term that proves difficult of application. See generally Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 58, 5 L.Ed.2d 60 (1960). It is clear that the term contemplates a different standard of review from the traditional *1122standard for a directed verdict, which requires a court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, disregard all conflicting evidence, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence so considered. E.g., Lind, 278 F.2d 79. The term “contrary to the weight of the evidence,” in my view, should be interpreted in light of the broad factfinding authority granted by the General Assembly to referees in workmen’s compensation cases.
Section 8-53-106(2)(b) is predicated on the assumption that the referee is in the best position to resolve factual issues. This assumption is a reasonable one because these factual issues often require an assessment of credibility. In an analogous context, it has been stated that a trial judge, in determining whether a motion for a new trial should be granted as “contrary to the weight of the evidence,” should focus on whether there has been a miscarriage of justice; and unless so satisfied, the judge should let the verdict stand. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 930, 93 S.Ct. 1371, 35 L.Ed.2d 592 (1973); Lind, 278 F.2d 79; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir.1941); Morgan v. Bucks Associates, 428 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.Pa.1977); see 6A J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.08[5] at 59-140-154.
I would apply this same “miscarriage of justice” standard in determining the commission’s authority to reverse a referee’s factual findings under section 8-53-106(2)(b). The commission should not be permitted to reverse factual findings merely because it might have accorded lesser or greater weight to the evidence and have reached a different result. The commission’s power to reverse factual findings as “contrary to the weight of the evidence” should be confined to those situations where the commission concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings, the evidence so preponderates against the findings that a serious miscarriage of justice will occur if the findings are not reversed.
IV.
Viewing this case in light of the above standard, I conclude that the referee’s findings were not contrary to the weight of the evidence. A claimant in a workmen’s compensation case has the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of evidence. E.g., Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo.1983). A preponderance of evidence means that evidence which is the most convincing and satisfying in the controversy, regardless of which party may have produced it. See Swaim v. Swanson, 118 Colo. 509, 197 P.2d 624 (1948); CJI-Civ. 2d 3.1. All that is necessary to sustain a referee’s decision to grant a petition to reopen under section 8-53-119, 3 C.R.S. (1973), is evidence showing to a reasonable probability that the claimant’s worsened condition resulted from or was precipitated by an industrial accident. Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 189 Colo. 153, 538 P.2d 430 (1975); Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P.2d 293 (1951). There is no requirement that a claimant’s burden on causal connection must be established by medical evidence. E.g., Industrial Commission v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957); Industrial Commission v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937). Thus, in resolving the issue of causation, the referee was entitled to consider all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, including the claimant’s testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from this evidence. E.g., Havens, 136 Colo. at 120, 314 P.2d at 703; Industrial Commission v. CF&I, 135 Colo. 307, 312, 310 P.2d 717, 720 (1957).
To be sure, the factual issues underlying the claimant’s petition to reopen are close, and the referee could have resolved these matters either way. The mere fact that the referee could have reached a contrary conclusion, however, is no reason to conclude that the referee’s findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence. Although the medical reports were somewhat ambivalent, the claimant’s testimony provided a rational foundation for the inference that his physical condition had sub*1123stantially deteriorated in 1981 and that his worsened condition was causally related to his industrial injury on November 20, 1975. I see no miscarriage of justice resulting from the referee’s factual finding on such closely disputed questions. On the contrary, considering the beneficent purpose of workmen’s compensation legislation in allaying “the adverse economic effects upon a workman which flow from a disabling industrial accident,” City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 350, 426 P.2d 194, 197 (1967) (emphasis in original), any miscarriage of justice in this case is more likely to result from the commission’s dismissal of the claimant’s petition to reopen than from the factual findings of the referee. I would affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to say that Justice KIRSHBAUM joins me in this dissent.
NEIGHBORS, J., joins in part III of the dissent.

. Article 53 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was repealed and reenacted in 1983. §§ 8-53-101-129, 3 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.). Citations in this dissent are to the statutory provisions which were in effect during the proceedings relating to the claimant’s petition to reopen.