Court Opinion

ID: 9834006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:12:55.809226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:10.551548
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[9] Upon further consideration, we have reached the conclusion that there was no error in the exclusion by the trial court of the proffered testimony of one of defendant’s witnesses, to the effect that during the difficulty a woman who was present ran to the plaintiff and begged him to stop fighting Dooms, and telling him that it was a shame for him to fight a man so much under his size. That testimony did not tend to show whether the fight was begun by Dooms or by the plaintiff, which was the material issue. Hence the contrary conclusion expressed in the opinion on original hearing is withdrawn.
The only other assignment of error which we sustained was the one addressed to that portion of the charge which is copied in the original opinion, wherein the jury was told that the defendant would be liable for the assault made by another person if, such other person aided and assisted Dooms in the assault at the instigation of Dooms. We held that the evidence was insufficient to show that such other person was instigated by Dooms to aid him in the fight, and we adhere to that conclusion. The evidence showed that the principal injury done to the plaintiff was inflicted by the bystander, Graham, who was a friend of Dooms, and in the argument upon the motion for rehearing appellee conceded that the jury allowed damages for the injury done by Graham. Hence it cannot be said that the error in the charge was harmless, but appellee earnestly insists that the error, if any, in giving the charge was invited by the appellant, and therefore he is in no position to complain of it. That contention is predicated upon an instruction requested by appellant, reading as follows:
*604“If any other person, of his volition, took [ part in the fight between the plaintiff and ¡ Dooms, then Ered Harvey is in no manner responsible for the acts or doing of such other person.” [ !
It will be noted that in a portion of the charge copied in the original opinion substantially that instruction was given in connection with the further converse instruction, to the effect that the defendant would be liable for the assault by such other person if such other person acted at the instigation of Dooms. The instruction so requested by the defendant was special instruction No. 7, while special instruction No. 1, requested by the defendant, reads as follows:
“There is no proof that any other employee of the defendant participated in the fight between plaintiff, E. E. Comegys, and O. D. Dooms, and you will disregard the allegations in the petition, claiming that any one -besides said Dooms took part in said fight.”
The proof showed that Dooms was the manager in charge of the defendant’s eating house where the controversy between plaintiff and Dooms originated, and presumably had general authority to employ others to1 assist in the conduct of the defendant’s business. Evidently the testimony offered by the plaintiff to show that during the fight Graham struck him on the back of his head and inflicted a serious injury upon him was offered upon the theory that Graham was, in law, a servant or agent of the defendant, in accordance with allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition that the injury of which he complained was inflicted by “two of the agents and servants of the defendant, acting within the apparent scope off their authority.”
Defendant’s requested instruction No. 1 clearly presented the contention, in effect, that there was no sufficient evidence to show that Graham, the bystander,.in striking the plaintiff did so at the instigation of Dooms, or any one else authorized by the defendant to employ him to do so. That instruction having been requested and refused, and apparently having been presented before the requested instruction No. 7 was presented, we hardly perceive how it can be said that the defendant is deprived of the right to complain of the erroneous instruction upon the theory that the error in giving it was invited by the defendant, especially when it is conceded by the appellee and shown by the evidence that the injury inflicted by Graham, the bystander, was one of the injuries for which damages were allowed.
Appellee urgently insists that there were sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a finding by the jury that Dooms did request Graham to aid him in the event of a probable difficulty with the plaintiff. It is true that the evidence showed conclusively that Gra- [ ¡ [ ham and Dooms were close friends, and that ! he (Graham), was present during the quarrel which occurred between the two men before the fight began. There were oiher circum--stances tending to show that possibly Dooms may have said to Graham that he (Dooms) desired his assistance in the event a fight started, but all of those circumstances taken together go no further than to arouse a suspicion that the participation in the fight by Graham was possibly at the instigation of Dooms. In order to conclude that that amounted to proof of that fact, it would be necessary to build one inference upon another, which cannot be done. In the ease of Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S. W. 1059, circumstances even more cogent than those recited above were shown to prove that an arrest of the plaintiff was made by the direction of defendant, against whom damages were sought for the arrest, but it was held that they amounted to no more than a mere scintilla of evidence, which was insufficient to sustain a verdict and judgment against the defendant.
With the correction above made, the motion for rehearing is overruled.