Court Opinion

ID: 9843777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:15.175736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:55.226580
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 25] I concur with Part II of the majority decision that the district court did not err allowing Minot to assert the recreational use immunity defense. I respectfully dissent from Part III regarding summary judgment because the majority erroneously concludes the Leets’ claim is not barred by N.D.C.C. chapter 53-08. I also write separately to highlight this issue so that the Legislature might consider whether statutory clarification is warranted.
[¶ 26] This case requires us to apply the recreational use immunity statute to a situation most likely not contemplated by the Legislature: whether a landowner’s immunity from liability extends to claims by a paid employee of a vendor preparing to participate in a public educational event. I part company with the majority because I believe they misread the statutes, misapply legislative intent, and reach a result antithetical to the Legislature’s goal leading to adoption of recreational use immunity laws.
[¶ 27] The Legislature enacted the original statutes to encourage landowners to open their land for free recreational use by others. Majority opinion at ¶ 14 and Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 6, 642 N.W.2d 864. The legislation was titled an Act “Limiting Liability of Landowners.” 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 337. The Act was “[t]o encourage landowners to make available to the public, land and water areas and other property for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward users.” Id. The scope of immunity was expanded in 1995 when the recreational use statutes were modified to cover public and private property, and to ensure the recreational purpose definition covered all recreational activities. Olson, ¶ 8. Subsequently, “[t]his Court has recognized that recreational use immunity statutes advance the important legislative goal of opening property to the public for recreational use in a manner that closely corresponds to the achievement of that goal.” Majority opinion at ¶ 14 (citing Olson, ¶ 6). Importantly, the Legislature has never retreated from that goal by narrowing the scope of the recreational use immunity statutes.
[¶ 28] Despite the original expression of legislative intent, and despite later legislative changes and expanded expressions of intent to maintain open access to both private and public property, the majority focuses on the user’s use of the property rather than the owner’s purpose in making the property available. This is evident by that portion of the opinion stating, “Although the landowner’s intent is not irrelevant, we conclude the district court erred in holding the landowner’s intent controlled in determining whether the recreational use immunity statutes applied.” Majority opinion at ¶ 19. Their conclusion builds on an earlier statement that “[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.” Id. ¶ 20. By so ruling, the majority strays from the Legislature’s expressly stated goal of gaining access to property by protecting owners *408from liability. See 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 387.
[¶ 29] I do acknowledge that N.D.C.C. § 53-08-02 contains language about land available “for entry or use by others for recreational purposes” and the lack of a duty “to persons entering for such purposes.” However, this section does not call for invention of a balancing test that looks to the entrant’s use or intent, as is done by the majority. Instead, the Legislature has directed us to focus on the landowner when section 53-08-02 is read in the context of the other sections of chapter 53-08. When that is done, the rational interpretation is that the landowner has immunity from liability arising from recreational use that he, she, or it intended be conducted on the property. At the same time, section 53-08-02 should be read to say the owner has no immunity from claims arising out of injury to users who are on the property, by grant of authority from the owner, for other than recreational purposes.
[¶ 30] Under my interpretation, premises liability in the latter circumstance would be decided under the long-standing rule announced in O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D.1977) (adopting ordinary negligence principles for licensees and invitees). However, premises liability would not occur, absent willful and malicious failure to guard or warn, for injury to a recreational user or injury to a third party using the property in connection with activities reasonably related to the recreational use. Set to facts, this means a landowner has no liability to an injured recreational snowmobiler. See Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Co-op., 373 N.W.2d 911 (N.D.1985). Nor should that landowner incur liability if an uninjured snowmobiler has mechanical problems, calls for repairs without involvement of the landowner, and the repairman is injured on the property open for recreational use. Yet the majority’s opinion reaches just the opposite result.
[¶ 31] The majority’s result is obtained by dramatically changing focus to each user’s purpose for being present on the property and away from the owner’s act of opening the property for recreational use. This shift strips the owner of any ability to control liability and hands that control to each user — or in this case — a user’s employee. I do not believe this is the result directed by plain words of the recreational use immunity statutes. I do not believe this result is supported by a fair assessment of the Legislature’s express and implied intent. To the contrary, the majority’s analysis and conclusion thwart, rather than carry out, the Legislature’s goal by reducing, rather than maintaining or expanding, land available for recreational use. I would therefore affirm the district court judgment granting Minot summary judgment. Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent from that part of its opinion.
[¶ 32] Daniel J. Crothers