Court Opinion

ID: 9908443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 19:00:59.152223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:11.977549
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 8 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA GUADALUPE ROSALES                         No. 22-1980
MARTINEZ; GUADALUPE VICTORIA                    Agency Nos.
SALAZAR ROSALES; MANUEL                         A202-177-973
ALEJANDRO SALAZAR ROSALES,                      A202-177-974
                                                A202-177-975
             Petitioners,
                                                MEMORANDUM*
 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted December 6, 2023**
                                Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Petitioners Maria Guadalupe Rosales Martinez (Rosales) and her minor

children, natives of Mexico, seek review of the decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ)

denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1

      We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de

novo and the agency’s factual findings, including credibility determinations, for

substantial evidence. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651–52 (9th Cir. 2022). “To

prevail under the substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must show that the

evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that these findings and

decisions are erroneous.” Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, the BIA adopts

an IJ’s findings as its own and “expresses no disagreement with the IJ’s decision,

we review the IJ’s order as if it were the BIA’s.” See Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder,

671 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2011).

1
 Rosales’s minor children were listed as derivatives on her application pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). The children also filed separate, independent
applications. However, their applications were based on the same facts and
experiences set forth in Rosales’s petition. Because Rosales’s minor children rely
on the same evidence for their applications, our analysis is the same for all
Petitioners.

                                        2                                  22-1980
      We deny the petition as to Rosales’s asylum and withholding-of-removal

claims, because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.

See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016). The IJ

reasonably concluded that there were material inconsistencies between Rosales’s

written declaration and her testimony regarding (1) the sources and forms of

threatening communications Rosales received; (2) why competing cartels allegedly

made the same threats from the same phone number; (3) whether Rosales reported

the threats to the police; and (4) the circumstances of her reunification with the

father of her children in a small Washington state town. Rosales was evasive or

unresponsive when confronted about these inconsistencies. This record does not

“compel” a conclusion that Rosales was credible. See Silva-Pereira, 827 F.3d at

1185–86 (emphasis added); see also Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th

Cir. 2011).

      Rosales’s argument that the IJ improperly failed to explain its reasoning in

denying the withholding-of-removal claim is unpersuasive, because the IJ stated on

the record that his adverse credibility finding was the basis for his decision. See

Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the agency

because “the IJ established a legitimate, articulable basis to question Farah’s

credibility and offered specific, cogent reasons for disbelief as required under our

law”). Accordingly, we also affirm the BIA’s determination on Rosales’s

                                         3                                   22-1980
withholding of removal claim. See id. (“Because we affirm the BIA’s

determination that Farah failed to establish eligibility for asylum, we also affirm

the denial of Farah’s application for withholding of removal.”).

      Though the adverse credibility determination did not “necessarily defeat

[her] CAT claim,” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014), Rosales

does not identify independent record evidence that “meet[s] the high threshold of

establishing that it is more likely than not that [she] will be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of a public official,” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924,

927 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th

Cir. 2017). She therefore has not “establish[ed] entitlement to protection under

CAT.” Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 834.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                          4                                    22-1980