Court Opinion

ID: 9845374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:20:31.152098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:04.830184
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In qualifying the jury, the trial court asked the jury panel whether anyone was associated with the Interstate National Corporation or Interstate Fife & Casualty Company. When one panel member indicated that he sold insurance as an independent agent for one of the companies, the appellees’ counsel attempted to ask if his “relationship with one of the defendant companies in this case” would bias him, but the appellant’s counsel objected. The trial court told the appellees’ counsel to repeat the question so that he could consider the *275objection, and counsel more specifically asked the panel member whether his “business relationship with one of the defendant insurance companies” would bias him. In response to the appellant’s renewed objection that neither insurance company was a party to this action, the appellees’ counsel denied making that statement, and on appeal professes that his interjection of insurance was inadvertent. The trial court instructed the jurors that they should disregard the statement, that the insurance companies were not parties in this case, and that any impression created in the jurors’ minds by the statement should be dispelled. The appellant moved for a new panel of jurors, but the trial court denied that motion.
Decided September 6, 1989
Rehearing denied October 24, 1989
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, Brian J. O’Shea, Robert C. Lamar, for appellant.
“It is proper to qualify the jury relative to the possible interest which the members may have in an insurance carrier having a financial interest in the outcome of the suit.” Weatherbee v. Hutcheson, 114 Ga. App. 761, 764 (152 SE2d 715) (1966). However, precaution should be taken to avoid specifically informing the jury that a plaintiff or defendant has insurance coverage, as “[t]hat knowledge on the part of the jury can be, and often is, prejudicial and harmful.” Id. at 765. By requesting the jury to be qualified relative to any possible interest in Interstate, which it had every right to do, the appellant most certainly did not invite the appellees’ improper injection of the appellant’s insurance coverage. Although the interjection of insurance into a case does not automatically result in reversible error, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Bridges, 168 Ga. App. 874 (3) (311 SE2d 193) (1983), this court has recently noted that “the general rule against admitting evidence of insurance or unnecessarily referring to it. . . has not relaxed but has strengthened.” Collins v. Davis, 186 Ga. App. 192, 195 (366 SE2d 769) (1988).
In the instant case, regardless of whether the appellee’s interjection of the defendant’s insurance was deliberate or not, the fact remains that the jurors were put on notice that the defendant in this case had insurance. After the jury had been so poisoned, the trial court’s instruction to disregard that poisoning was an inadequate cure. Accordingly, new trial should be granted, and I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
*276Robert J. Reed, McCurdy & Candler, Michael C. McGoff, for appellees.