Court Opinion

ID: 9952751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 17:09:33.503331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:10.871811
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mork, 2024-Ohio-1033.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.     30605

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
ROBERT MORK                                           COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   CR 21 03 0964

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 20, 2024

        HENSAL, Judge.

        {¶1}     Robert Mork appeals his conviction for sexual battery by the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     According to A.M., when she was sixteen, Mr. Mork contacted her one morning to

ask her to come over to do some yard work for him. The Morks lived only two houses over from

A.M. and had children around the same age as A.M.’s younger brother, so the two families had

become close over the years. A.M. testified that it was normal for her to go over to the Mork

residence and do tasks for them. Although it was a weekday, A.M. was attending an online high

school, so her day was flexible.

        {¶3}     Although the Morks lived nearby, A.M. drove to the house because she was feeling

lazy. When she arrived, Mr. Mork invited her in, and they sat talking for 15 to 20 minutes. Mr.

Mork then offered her hard seltzer beverages and, subsequently, a cup of liquor, which she
                                                2

accepted. After a little while, A.M. sent a text message to one of her work colleagues, reporting

that she was drunk.

       {¶4}   According to A.M., when she got up, Mr. Mork began touching her, including on

her chest and buttocks. He proceeded to pull off her pants and underwear and penetrated her

mouth, vagina, and anus with his penis. Because of her smaller size and intoxicated state, A.M.

believed resisting would be futile. When A.M.’s father called her cell phone, however, Mr. Mork

stopped. He drove A.M. home so she could take measurements that her father requested but ended

up taking them for her because of her condition. A.M., meanwhile, texted her coworker again and

asked him to pick her up. When the coworker arrived, he could tell A.M. was drunk from her gait

as she walked to his car. After telling him what had happened, he took her back to his apartment,

where his girlfriend and friends took care of her. They eventually drove A.M. to the emergency

room to be evaluated for sexual assault. DNA evidence collected during the examination was

consistent with Mr. Mork’s DNA.

       {¶5}   The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Mork on one count of sexual battery under Revised

Code Section 2907.03(A)(2). A jury found him guilty of the offense, and the trial court sentenced

him to four years imprisonment. Mr. Mork has appealed, assigning three errors.

                                               II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE
       FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
       SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR. MORK.

       {¶6}   In his first assignment of error, Mr. Mork argues that there is insufficient evidence

to support his conviction. Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question

of law, which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying
                                                 3

out this review, our “function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine

whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

       {¶7}    Section 2907.03(A)(2) provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct

with another, not the spouse of the offender, [if] * * * [t]he offender knows that the other person’s

ability to appraise the nature of or control the other person’s own conduct is substantially

impaired.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the

person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A

person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably

exist” R.C. 2901.22(B). “[If] knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an

offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high

probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid

learning the fact.” Id.

       {¶8}    Because the term “substantially impaired” is not defined by statute, the Ohio

Supreme Court has given it “the meaning generally understood in common usage.” State v. Zeh,

31 Ohio St.3d 99, 103 (1987). “[S]ubstantial impairment must be established by demonstrating a

present reduction, diminution or decrease in the victim’s ability, either to appraise the nature of

[her] conduct or to control [her] conduct.” Id. at 103-104. “This is distinguishable from a general

deficit in ability to cope, which condition might be inferred from or evidenced by a general

intelligence or I.Q. report.” Id. at 104. “Expert testimony is not required to establish substantial
                                                4

impairment, and the existence of a substantial impairment may be proven by the victim’s

testimony.” State v. Carnegie, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29844, 2021-Ohio-4597, ¶ 15.

       {¶9}     “[V]oluntary intoxication is recognized as ‘a mental or physical condition that

could cause substantial impairment.’”     Id., quoting State v. Hansing, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

16CA011053, 2019-Ohio-739, ¶ 14. Every alcohol consumption, however, “does not lead to a

substantial impairment.” State v. Oliver, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29535, 2021-Ohio-4153, ¶ 24,

quoting Hansing at ¶ 24. “Depending on the circumstances, it can be even more challenging to

determine whether the defendant knew, or should have known, that someone else was impaired as

opposed to merely intoxicated.” Id.

       {¶10} According to A.M., Mr. Mork gave her hard seltzer beverages followed by a liquor

that she thought was rum. The glass with the liquor was bigger than a shot glass and was filled

very high. Mr. Mork told her the liquor was so strong that it had knocked her father out when he

drank it. A.M. had never been drunk before, but as she drank the beverages, she began to feel like

she was not herself anymore. Although she could move, she felt immobilized and, overall, not

right. Her mind was relaxed but spinning a little. This was around the time when she texted her

coworker that she was drunk. She knows she had a conversation with Mr. Mork but could not

remember what it was about. A.M. also testified that, after her father called, Mr. Mork drove her

back to her house because he thought she was too drunk to drive. He also took the measurements

her father had asked for because she immediately went to the bathroom to throw up when they got

to the house.

       {¶11} A.M.’s coworker testified that he did not want to pick A.M. up, but eventually

agreed because he thought there might be something wrong. When A.M. came out of her house,

she looked disheveled. Her hair was messy, her clothes did not match, and, overall, it looked like
                                                 5

she had not taken care of herself. Although she was not falling over herself as she walked to the

car, she was wobbly, and he could tell she was drunk. When she got in the car, she just sat, staring

at the front console. Once he pulled out of the driveway, however, she completely broke down,

yelling, wailing, and crying.

       {¶12} Upon review of the record, we conclude there is sufficient evidence from which the

jury could infer Mr. Mork knew that A.M. was substantially impaired at the time of the sexual

activity. In fact, it appears to have been Mr. Mork’s intention. He gave a 5’4” 16-year-old girl

multiple alcohol drinks over a short period of time, including a hard liquor that he knew had caused

a grown adult to pass out. Immediately after the sexual activity, he did not allow A.M. to drive

her vehicle a mere two houses over because of her level of intoxication. He also performed the

task A.M.’s father requested because she was incapable of doing it herself. Although A.M. did

not pass out from the drinks, she began vomiting as soon as she arrived home and continued having

spells of vomiting after she was picked up by her coworker. All these circumstances support a

finding that A.M. was substantially impaired “as opposed to merely intoxicated.” Oliver at ¶ 24.

Mr. Mork’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       MR. MORK’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
       OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
       THE CONSTITUTION.

       {¶13} Mr. Mork’s second assignment of error is that his conviction was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Although Mr. Mork’s brief includes the standard for a manifest-

weight challenge, it does not develop an argument for why his conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. It is not clear whether Mr. Mork decided to abandon this assignment of

error, whether he filed the wrong version of his brief, whether he ran out of time to complete his
                                                  6

brief, or whether he simply forgot to develop an argument. Regardless, under Appellate Rule

16(A)(7), a brief must contain “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with

respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant

relies.” Mr. Mork’s brief does not comply with that rule. “[If] an appellant fails to develop an

argument in support of his assignment of error, this Court will not create one for him.” State v.

Franks, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28533, 2017-Ohio-7045, ¶ 16. Mr. Mork’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN AND PREJUDICED MR. MORK’S
       RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY FAILURE TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL.

       {¶14} Mr. Mork’s third assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly failed to

declare a mistrial. Similar to his second assignment of error, Mr. Mork’s brief includes the

standard for when a trial court should declare a mistrial and this Court’s standard of review on

appeal. It also includes an explanation that multiple errors might have the cumulative effect of

depriving a defendant of a fair trial even if none of the errors, by itself, meets that standard. What

Mr. Mork’s brief fails to include, however, is any argument concerning his case. App.R. 16(A)(7).

Mr. Mork’s brief does not even identify any place in the record where the trial court should have

declared a mistrial. As previously noted, this Court will not create arguments to support Mr.

Mork’s assignments of error. Franks at ¶ 16. Mr. Mork’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶15} Mr. Mork’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
                                                 7

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     JENNIFER HENSAL
                                                     FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.