Court Opinion

ID: 6007817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-13 10:31:41.139852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:24.895949
License: Public Domain

White, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ryan, Jr., J.), entered January 23,1996 in Franklin County, which, inter alia, denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted a cross motion by defendants for summary judgment against third-party defendant on the issue of indemnification.
Plaintiffs, in this personal injury action arising out of a construction site accident, moved for summary judgment on their cause of action predicated upon Labor Law § 240 (1). Defendants responded by cross-moving for the same relief dismissing plaintiffs’ Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action or, alternatively, summary judgment against third-party defendant on their cause of action for common-law and contractual indemnification. Because the movants did not support their motions with copies of their pleadings, they were not entitled to summary judgment (see, Dupuy v Carrier Corp., 204 AD2d 977; Mathiesen v Mead, 168 AD2d 736, 737; Lawlor v County of Nassau, 166 AD2d 692; Somers Realty Corp. v Big "V” Props., 149 AD2d 581; see also, CPLR 3212 [b]).
Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Peters and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendants’ cross motion; cross motion denied; and, as so modified, affirmed.