Court Opinion

ID: 9451210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:10:13.240099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:37.070225
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
Following his acquittal, by reason of insanity in 1960, petitioner was committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital for treatment. He initiated this habeas corpus proceeding to obtain his release on the grounds that he has regained his sanity. The District Court dismissed his petition but granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis and referred petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel to this court. I would grant that motion.
Petitioner requested a copy of the transcript in order to “personally” present certain issues. By this request, say the majority, petitioner “affirmatively” rejected the assistance of counsel. I cannot agree. Petitioner’s letter of request is at least ambiguous. A waiver of assistance of counsel must be neither ambiguous nor lightly implied. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). All that appears here is that petitioner, as a result of past difficulties with counsel, simply wanted to bring certain matters to the court’s attention. With reference to his past dissatisfaction with counsel, petitioner expressly stated: “This is not to say that any member of the bar who is appointed to me will be the same.”
As the majority point out, we normally appoint counsel in these cases. A party is denied assistance only if the issues are plainly frivolous or the appeal is taken for delay. By allowing an appeal in this case, the District Court has determined that neither ground for denial is present here. I see no reason to disturb this finding. On the contrary, the issues presented are such as to require the assistance of counsel for the benefit of the court as well as petitioner.
Petitioner claims before us that the issue of sanity was improperly presented below by appointed counsel. Based upon the limited amount of evidence produced, the manner in which it was presented, and counsel’s failure to present certain evidence, a difficult question is presented. See Rollerson v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 343 F.2d 269 (1964); and Jackson v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 343, 336 F.2d 579, 581 (1964) (separate opinion).
Also, according to petitioner’s uncontradicted claim at the hearing below, he has received virtually no treatment during his confinement. Whether this would entitle petitioner to release raises another difficult question which requires the aid of counsel on appeal. See Darnell v. Cameron, 121 U.S.App.D.C. -, 348 F.2d 64 (1965); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 315, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (1960) (concurring opinion); Birnbaum, Some Comments on “The Right to Treatment”, 13 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 34 (1965) .
The Government’s insistence that petitioner is presently insane hardly reassures us that he will be able to present these issues properly. Thus, petitioner’s poverty and mental condition will effectively shackle a fair presentation and consideration of this appeal from the District Court unless, acting pro se, he can persuade the Supreme Court to direct the appointment of counsel. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-447, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962).