Court Opinion

ID: 9715863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:17:34.463439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:38.889290
License: Public Domain

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURMAN delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action commenced by plaintiff, Fay Lubin, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her when she fell in defendant’s premises. After a trial before the court without a jury, judgment was entered for plaintiff in the amount of $40,000 and defendant appeals. Defendant contends the finding of negligence against it is contrary to the law and to the evidence and that plaintiff failed to prove she exercised reasonable care for her own safety. Alternatively, defendant contends that if the verdict is affirmed, the amount of damages should be reduced as grossly excessive. From the testimony it appears that on July 11,1960, the plaintiff, then about seventy years of age, was about to leave defendant’s store when she slipped and fell in the foyer between some sales counters and the revolving exit door. The accident occurred between 12:30 and 2:00 o’clock p. m., a short time after the store was opened for business. Plaintiff testified she was familiar with the store and said this was her customary place of going in and out. She stated that the slippery condition of the floor was the cause, of her fall. There were no eyewitnesses to the occurrence. Ronald Kerman, employed by defendant, heard someone cry out and was the first person to reach the scene. He found plaintiff on the floor in the foyer inside the. Broadway entrance directly in front of the revolving door. When plaintiff told him she could not get up he called Mrs. Jean Ross in Personnel and the latter called Charles W. Baker, the store supervisor. The plaintiff complained of an injury to her leg. After a phone call, the fire department personnel and two policemen arrived. Plaintiff was placed in a wheel chair and then taken to Weiss Memorial Hospital. With respect to the condition of the floor in the area where plaintiff fell, the evidence showed that the floor was composed of asphalt tile, was clean except for buffing marks, and there was no dirt, debris, or foreign material present. It had been swept the night before with an oil cloth mop and buffed with a fiber pad on the morning of the occurrence. The standing maintenance care consisted of waxing the floor about every two months. The porter in charge of waxing the floor could not recall the last time it had been waxed prior to the accident. At the point where plaintiff fell, the floor sloped from a distance of one foot from the nearest counter, which was less than six feet from the revolving door, and extended to the center of the revolving door. The slope measured %ths of an inch per foot. This converts to a three, degree slope. The amended complaint charged the defendant with the following acts of negligence: (1) Permitting the floor of the store to be waxed and polished and in a slippery condition; (2) Failing to warn the plaintiff that the floor was in a slippery and dangerous condition; (3) Applying wax to the floor at a point where there was a substantial grade in the level of the floor as a result of which the floor at the point where the grade was located became extremely slippery; and (4) Permitting the floor to be in a dangerous and slippery condition at a point where there was a substantial grade or change in level of the floor which grade or change in level was unexpected and not readily visible. The answer denied all charges of negligence and affirmatively alleged that the floor was surfaced with the type of flooring customarily used in department stores and that the flooring was cleaned and dressed in the customary manner. The plaintiff’s reply was a general denial of the affirmative allegations. The case was tried without a jury and the trial judge found in favor of the defendant, Broadland Building Corporation, the owner of the building, and against the defendant, Goldblatt Bros., Inc., the lessee. The damages were assessed at $40,000.  Defendant maintains there is no evidence whatsoever of any negligence by the defendant in its floor and maintenance procedures. A court of review will consider the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff inasmuch as a reviewing court is not authorized to disturb the findings of the trial judge unless the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence and an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Vasic v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill App2d 11, 180 NE2d 347.  We agree with defendant that a storekeeper who conducts a business to which the public is invited is not the insurer of his customer’s safety. Liability must be founded on fault. Olinger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 21 Ill2d 469, 173 NE2d 443. Also, a storekeeper may wax his floors in the customary manner without incurring liability unless he is shown to have been negligent in the materials he uses or in the manner of applying them. Smith v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank, 13 Ill App2d 424, 142 NE2d 181 (Abstr); Dixon v. Hart, 344 Ill App 432, 101 NE2d 282. Defendant contends that evidence to the effect that the floor was “slick,” “slippery,” “buffed,” and “shiny” does not establish that the defendant was negligent or that a dangerous condition existed. Many decisions supporting this contention have been called to our attention, including the following: Turner v. Chicago Housing Authority, 11 Ill App2d 160, 136 NE 2d 543; Dixon v. Hart, 344 Ill App 432, 101 NE2d 282; Scoville v. Smith Bldg. Co., 334 Ill App 262, 78 NE2d 858; Stephens v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 212 F2d 260 and Elias v. Hiller, 201 NYS2d 382. But in none of these cases are the facts or surrounding circumstances similar to those found in the case at bar. In Turner the construction and maintenance of a stairway were involved. There the plaintiff testified that the “metal nosing on the stairs was worn and they were smooth, shiny, slippery . . .” The Appellate Court, in holding that it was error to deny a directed verdict, stated that “the testimony to the effect that the one-half inch metal stair nosing was ‘shiny’ and ‘slippery’ clearly did not establish that the stairway, if properly used, was in an unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition,” and pointed out that there was no evidence that the metal nosing itself, or any part of the stairs had been noticeably worn. In Dixon and Scoville the alleged negligence consisted solely of the plaintiff’s testimony that the floor was slick. The Court said, in Dixon, that “in Illinois ... as a general proposition the mere treating of a floor with a substance that gives it a polished surface is not negligence per se.” 344 Ill App at p 435. In Stephens recovery was sought for a fall allegedly caused when plaintiff hit a greasy or slick spot. The Circuit Court of Appeals held plaintiff failed to establish a dangerous condition since there was no description by her or anyone else as to the appearance of the alleged spot. In Elias, the New York Court said “[t]he fact that a floor is slippery by reason of its smoothness or being ‘highly polished’ does not give rise to a cause of action, absent competent proof of negligent application of the wax or polish.” 201 NYS2d at p 383. None of the above cited cases involved a floor that sloped 3 degrees and upon which an oil cloth mop was used to clean it on the morning of the occurrence. In Dixon v. Hart, 344 Ill App 432, 101 NE2d 282, the court enumerated some of the positive acts of negligence which would justify recovery. Among those mentioned was the application of wax to a floor with a substantial incline. 344 Ill App at p 435. In the instant case, a lieutenant of the fire department testified that he came to the store in response to a call and found plaintiff in a wheel chair and that in examining the floor where he was told the fall occurred, he testified, “I ran my foot over it. I noticed that it was slippery due to recent cleaning.” Another fireman testified he examined the flooring in the aisles in addition to the floor on the slope where Mrs. Lubin fell. He found the entire area to be uniformly highly buffed and slippery. Further, a police patrolman who arrived at the scene made an examination of the floor and found it to be smooth and slippery. In a well reasoned opinion, which we think involved the same factual question before this court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Burg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 256 F2d 613 (CA 7, 1958), reversed an order of the District Court directing a verdict for defendant. The court said: Admittedly, the waxing of floors is too common a practice to constitute negligence in the absence of evidence tending to show some positive negligent act or omission. In the instant case the wax was applied to asphalt tile on an incline. The trial court discounted the incline as being too slight, admitting that if the slope had been steeper it might have constituted actionable negligence to wax its surface. Such a determination, that is, whether a three-degree incline is so substantial that an application of wax on its surface evidences a lack of reasonable care on the part of the store owner, is, however, a factual determination which should be left to the jury. 256 F2d at p 615. Thus the Burg case does not hold that applying wax to an incline was negligence per se, but does hold as we do here, that this was a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. The facts here support a finding of negligence. The incline was immediately in front of the revolving exit door, an area where a customer would normally be looking at the door rather than watching her feet. The flooring on the incline was the same color as the flooring elsewhere. It was treated in the same manner as the flooring elsewhere, waxed, mopped and buffed. The trial court’s opinion was to the effect that the evidence showed that defendant’s negligent manner in the maintenance and care of the sloping floor was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall. It is true, as defendant argues, that since the testimony of plaintiff was produced by evidence deposition, the trial judge was in no better position than we are to pass on her credibility. However, the determining testimony regarding the condition of the floor where plaintiff fell, as indicated by defendant’s employees, was given by other witnesses. The trial judge was therefore in a better position to observe the conduct of those witnesses and to weigh the evidence and determine the preponderance thereof. Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill App2d 311, 146 NE2d 205.  On the question of whether the plaintiff was exercising reasonable care for her own safety, it is our conclusion, after considering the evidence that the trial court properly held that plaintiff was walking in a reasonable manner toward the exit door. No precise law can be laid down on this subject, but each case must be determined upon its own facts. Schiff v. Oak Park Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 9 Ill App2d 1, 132 NE2d 416; Stack v. East St. Louis & S. R. Co., 245 Ill 308, 92 NE 241; Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 4 Ill2d 60.  The evidence shows that plaintiff could not have known by any observation on her part that the sloping floor was slippery and dangerous. She had a right to assume that the floor was reasonably safe. There was nothing to give her any warning to the contrary. As we indicated before, the normal behavior of a person approaching the revolving door would be to keep one’s eyes on the door. Under the circumstances, in the case at bar, the plaintiff did not have to exercise the same or an equal degree of care as would be required of a pedestrian upon the street.  There remains the contention that the award of $40,000 was grossly excessive. Defendant concedes that as a result of the fall the plaintiff sustained a fractured hip and while in the hospital, after surgery, complications occurred consisting of congestive heart failure plus kidney failure which caused uremic poisoning. The plaintiff was then seventy years of age and as defendant points out, “whether these complications would have arisen if the fall had not occurred cannot, of course, be definitely determined.” However, Dr. Handelman, her treating physician, testified that the development of these infections might have been causally related to the trauma. Her hospital bill was $3,640.05 and the total doctor bills were $3,500. After leaving the hospital she was confined to a wheel chair and was placed in the Rest Haven home where the charges were $20 a day. At the time of the trial she was unable to walk, was confined to a wheel chair, her mind was clouded and she developed an amnesia. Dr. Handelman further testified that her condition was permanent and would require medical supervision until the end of her life. Defendant argnes, that in view of the fact that plaintiff was seventy years of age, had been hospitalized a year prior to the occurrence when she admitted her complaints were confusion, dizziness, backaches, high blood pressure and pain in the right shoulder and ribs radiating in the right hip, it could not be established that the damages were reasonably certain to have resulted from the injuries sustained in the instant claim. Also defendant argues that an award of $40,000 for a woman seventy years of age, in failing health, with a nine and one-half years life expectancy, was grossly excessive.  In reviewing the record we must assume that the trial judge considered all of the evidence before making the award. The reviewing courts are reluctant to disturb a finding by a trial judge on the issue of damages, and in the absence of some error of law will not do so unless the amount is so excessive as to show prejudice or passion. Mueth v. Jaska, 302 Ill App 289, 23 NE2d 805. In Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill App2d 1, 165 NE2d 733, the Appellate Court held that an award of $38,000 was not excessive for a seventy year old man where as a result of his injuries, he became mentally incompetent and physically helpless. We cannot say, from the record, that the award in the instant case was excessive and motivated by passion or prejudice. For the reasons indicated the judgment entered by the court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MURPHY, J., concurs.