Court Opinion

ID: 9725173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:39.282774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:03.699189
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J..
I respectfully dissent.
If the facts in this case were as stated by the majority I would join in voting to reverse the judgment. The majority opinion leads one to believe this is a case about a bicycle racer, with “dreams” of going to the Olympics, who fell off her bicycle and was injured in the course of a race. The majority opinion misstates the facts in this case by omitting any mention of the cause of plaintiff’s accident and the federation’s responsibility for it; by glossing over plaintiff’s standing in the world of amateur bicycle racing; and by ignoring the domination over amateur bicycle racing exercised by the United States Cycling Federation (Federation). These facts, set forth more fully below, distinguish this case from the Okura line of cases relied on by the majority 1 and support the trial court’s ruling that the releases signed by plaintiff are unenforceable by the Federation.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Ms. Buchan suffered severe head injuries as the result of a crash during a bicycle race in Malibu conducted by the Federation. The evidence relevant to the issues on appeal is as follows:
A. Ms. Buchan’s Athletic Career
Ms. Buchan had been a top-level athlete all her life. In high school she was one of the state’s premier track and cross-country runners and she received a full athletic scholarship to attend Boise State. In college, she competed against the best long-distance runners in the country and *156qualified for the national championships in both the 3,000- and 5,000-meter races.
She started competitive cycling and obtained her first Federation racing license in 1975, at the age of 18. Toward the latter part of 1979 she decided to devote full time to amateur cycling.
Ms. Buchan testified she was an assistant coach at University of California San Diego for a short time after graduating from college. But, as she progressed in the sport of cycling, the travel and training requirements required her to give up this job and become a full-time athlete. In her view, bicycle racing was her career. Her typical day began at 7 a.m. with stretching exercises, then breakfast, then a minimum two-hour bicycle ride. Three nights a week she attended weight training classes and three nights a week she attended gymnastics classes.
Ms. Buchan’s goals, at the time of her injury, were to represent the United States in the Cycling World Championship in 1982 and in the Summer Olympics in 1984. The evidence shows these goals were objectively realistic, not simply “dreams” as the majority characterizes them. In 1981, the Federation placed Ms. Buchan in the highest category in women’s racing. In races that year she consistently placed high among the country’s best cyclists and was invited to join the top 30 women cyclists in training at the United States Olympic Training Center in Boulder Springs, Colorado. The purpose of the training center was to develop top amateur athletes for Olympic competition. It clearly took more than “dreams” to be invited to train at the Olympic Training Center.
B. The Federation's Control Over National and World-level Cycling
The Federation is the governing body in the United States for the Olympic sport of cycling. The Federation is a member of the United States Olympic Committee. The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (36 U.S.C. § 371 et seq.) regulates amateur competitive cycling. The act imposes duties upon the Federation as the sole national governing body of Olympic amateur cycling including the duty of ensuring safety precautions are taken to protect the athletes. (36 U.S.C. § 392(b)(l)(B)(vi).)
The Federation has total control over the conduct of national-level events such as the 1982 world trials in which plaintiff was injured. Other groups are allowed to conduct local or regional races, but all national, international and Olympic-level races are conducted solely by the Federation. A United *157States cyclist wishing to compete in world-class cycling events must have a Federation license.
The Federation divided women cyclists into three categories: A-2 was limited to the best, most experienced world-class racers, followed by A-3 and A-4 riders. Ms. Buchan was classified as an A-2 rider. These categories were created because putting world-class A-2 cyclists and beginning A-4 cyclists together in the same race greatly enhanced the risk of injury due to the great variance in the skill levels between the two categories. Accordingly, in national-level events, A-4 riders who were first-year riders were not allowed to compete. In the unusual case where, because of a small entering field, A-4 riders were mixed in with A-2 racers, the field was staggered so that A-2 racers started a few minutes before the A-4 cyclists to avoid racing alongside each other.
The Federation required every applicant for a license to sign an application form containing an “Agreement and Release of Liability” which provided, in relevant part: “I acknowledge that cycling is an inherently dangerous sport in which I participate at my own risk .... In consideration of the agreement of the United States Cycling Federation, Inc. to issue an amateur license to me hereby on behalf of myself, my heirs, assigns and personal representatives, I waive, release and forever discharge the United States Cycling Federation, Inc., its employees, agents, members, sponsors, promoters and affiliates whosoever from any and all liability, claim, loss cost or expense arising from or attributable in any legal way to any action or omission to act of any such person or organization in connection with sponsorship, organization or execution of any bicycle racing or sporting event, including travel to and from such event, in which I may participate as a rider, team member or spectator.”
Ms. Buchan signed this agreement when she applied for her 1982 license. She testified she was given no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the release. The evidence at trial showed the Federation had no procedure whereby a racer could, for an additional fee, purchase insurance against the Federation’s negligence.
C. The Federation’s Conduct of the 1982 World Trials
In the summer of 1982, the Federation conducted a series of four races referred to by the competitors as the “World Trials.” The World Trials were the top competitive events of 1982 in the United States. The top finishers in the World Trials would be automatically selected to represent the United States in 1982 at the world championships in England. In turn, *158the members of the world team would be favored to make the United States team in the 1984 Summer Olympics. In sum, the 1982 World Trials were a major stepping stone to the 1984 Olympics.
Racers entering each World Trials event were required to sign a release of liability which provided, in relevant part:
“I hereby waive, release and discharge any and all claims of damages for death, personal injury or property damage which I have, or which may hereafter accrue to me, as a result of my participation in the Event. This release is intended to discharge in advance Self Magazine, the Conde Nast Publications Inc., and other sponsors, [the Federation], the promoting clubs, the officials and any other individuals, their respective agents, their directors, and employees, and any involved municipalities or other public entities, from and against any and all liability arising out of or connected in any way with my participation in the Event, even though that liability may arise out of negligence or carelessness on the part of the persons or entities mentioned above. I further understand that serious accidents occasionally occur during bicycle racing, and that participants in bicycle racing occasionally sustain mortal or serious personal injuries as a consequence thereof.”
Prior to the World Trials, the Federation’s policy was to segregate the racers according to their classification; novices raced against novices; elite riders, such as Ms. Buchan, raced against other elite racers. The purpose of this segregation was safety. Although the risk of a crash in a cycling event is ever present, allowing a novice rider to race in a pack of elite world-class racers substantially increases the risk. In an Olympic-level race, the elite racers know each other, rely upon each other’s experience and know what to do and what not to do in tight, pressure situations.
In the 1982 World Trials, the Federation decided to admit novice racers into the event on a case-by-case basis. Thus, unknown to the elite racers before the World Trials began, the Federation determined a novice rider, Mary Pieper, possessed sufficient skills to be admitted into the field of elite racers. Ms. Pieper had received her first Federation license in 1982 and was a category A-4 rider, i.e., a novice. At the time Ms. Buchan signed the application for entry into the 1982 World Trials, no national-level event had ever been conducted in which novice riders were allowed to race alongside the national-level racers.
D. The Plaintiff’s Injury
The World Trials commenced with a 40.5-mile race in Laguna Beach. As the tight pack of racers sped downhill reaching a speed of 30 miles per hour, *159Mary Pieper weaved in and out of the pack, trying to get past the group. Pieper was not accustomed to and was scared of large packs of riders. Pieper’s front wheel hit the rider in front of her, and she went down, causing a chain reaction of fallen riders.
Although that day there were no serious injuries, a number of the cyclists, Ms. Buchan among them, approached the president and other officials of the Federation present at the race site and complained vigorously that Pieper did not belong in the World Trials and was a danger to the competitors. The Federation’s chief referee had the authority to reverse the prior decision allowing a first-year rider to race if it was demonstrated that the rider was so inexperienced as to be unsafe and a danger to the world-class cyclists. Despite the complaints and the Federation’s knowledge that Pieper presented a danger to the world-class cyclists, the Federation allowed Pieper to continue racing.
Six days after the Laguna Beach race, the World Trials resumed in Malibu. On the morning of the Malibu race, the complaints about Mary Pieper’s presence in the race were renewed and again ignored. After five miles of the race, the pack of riders descended downhill, reaching a speed of fifty miles per hour. Once again, Mary Pieper began weaving in and out of the pack and lost control of her bicycle. Her front wheel struck a racer’s back wheel and Pieper fell, causing an immediate chain reaction of numerous riders to spill, this time with tragic consequences. Ms. Buchan landed squarely on her head and sustained a catastrophic injury to her brain.
Ms. Buchan was tended to on the scene by Paul Pearson, an emergency medical technician, who had been covering cycling races since 1972. He testified hers was the most severe head injury he had ever seen in a bicycle race. There was evidence a helmet meeting the standards in existence in 1982 would have prevented any brain injury whatsoever. Ms. Buchan was not wearing such a helmet.
At the hospital, Ms. Buchan was admitted in an extreme comatose state and immediately underwent emergency brain surgery to save her life. She remained in a coma for four weeks and when she left the hospital she could not walk or talk.
At the scene of the accident, the cyclists blamed Mary Pieper for the crash. Federation officials immediately disqualified Pieper from competing in further World Trials races.
*160E. Trial Court Proceedings
Ms. Buchan filed a complaint for personal injuries against the Federation and Conde Nast Publications which sponsored the Malibu race in which she was injured. The gravamen of her complaint was that defendants negligently failed to supervise and monitor the race. Defendants denied they acted negligently and alleged Ms. Buchan expressly and impliedly assumed all risks related to the race.
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment by defendant Conde Nast Publications based on the releases Ms. Buchan signed upon applying for her racing license and upon entering the Malibu race. Ms. Buchan did not appeal this judgment. The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment by the Federation based on these same releases.
Ms. Buchan’s personal injury action was tried before a jury. After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, the two written releases Ms. Buchan signed were unenforceable under Civil Code section 1668 and Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693]. The case was submitted to the jury on the issues of negligence, contributory negligence and reasonable implied assumption of the risk. The jury returned special verdicts in favor of plaintiff. The jury found the Federation was negligent, Ms. Buchan was contributorily negligent, but Ms. Buchan did not reasonably assume the risk of the Federation’s negligence. In conformity with the jury’s special verdict, the court entered judgment for Ms. Buchan in the sum of $1,151,176.
Discussion
Civil Code section 1668 provides “[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for . . . violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” In Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, supra, 60 Cal.2d at page 96, the court, without resolving conflicting interpretations of Civil Code section 1668, noted, “[t]he cases have consistently held that the exculpatory provision may stand only if it does not involve ‘the public interest.’ ” Accepting the premise “the exculpatory clause which affects the public interest cannot stand” the court proceeded to ascertain “those factors or characteristics which constitute the public interest.” (Id. at p. 98.) The court concluded, after a review of previous decisions, an “invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics.[:] [1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in perform*161ing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed unde r the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (Id. at pp. 98-101, citations omitted.) The court characterized this list of factors as a “rough outline of that type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid.” (Id. at p. 98.)
Although subsequent cases have invalidated exculpatory clauses upon finding all six Tunkl factors were present,2 a score of 100 percent on the Tunkl test is not required to invalidate an exculpatory clause on public policy grounds. “To meet that test, the agreement need only fulfill some of the characteristics above outlined; . . .” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 101.) As we have previously observed, the Supreme Court has not told us how many characteristics have to be satisfied—or which ones—before exculpatory clauses become unenforceable. (Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 717.) Nor did the court indicate whether certain factors should be given greater weight than others. Nevertheless, we do not believe the court intended a mechanical application of the factors mentioned in Tunkl. Instead, the focus should be on the two principal concerns reflected in the court’s opinion: (1) Is the party seeking exculpation engaged in a service of great importance to the public? (2) Does providing this service give the provider a decisive advantage in bargaining strength over a person using this service? (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 101-102.)
The present case represents a situation in which public interest and publicly conferred power provide the Federation an insurmountable advantage in bargaining strength against any athlete seeking to participate in amateur bicycle racing at the world-class level.
*1621. The Public Interest in World-class Amateur Sports.
Few would argue with the proposition amateur athletics are important to the health, well-being and enjoyment of most Americans. But that is not a basis for denying enforcement of the exculpatory clauses in this case. As the court correctly pointed out in Okura v. United States Cycling Federation, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at page 1467, “There is no compelling public interest in facilitating sponsorship and organization of the leisure activity of bicycle racing for public participation.” (Italics added.) Thus, in Okura, the court upheld the enforcement of an exculpatory clause, similar to the one signed by plaintiff Buchan, in a negligence action brought by a cycling hobbyist injured in a race conducted by the Federation. The plaintiff in Okura was riding in an “ ‘open’ public event” in which “anyone with a bicycle and the entrance fee who desires to enter the event can do so under standards established by the organizers.” {Ibid.)
The race in which Ms. Buchan was injured was not a “leisure activity” open to anyone “with a bicycle and the entrance fee.” Hers was a race between the top cyclists in the country competing for a place on the team which would represent the United States in the world championships later that year which in turn was a step toward a place on the United States Olympic team.
Although at one time amateur sports at the international level was of significance only to individuals with a particular interest in a certain sport, that era has passed. Today, international amateur athletics involve the power and prestige of the United States. Indeed, it was the shortcomings in the nation’s performance in such events that led to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (36 U.S.C. § 373 et seq.) (See discussion below.) In its final report, the President’s Commission on Olympic Sports concluded, “[t]he fact is that we are competing less well and other nations competing more successfully because other nations have established excellence in international athletics as a national priority.” (1 Final Rep. of the President’s Comm, on Olympic Sports 1975-1977 (1977), p. ix, italics added.) In support of the act’s overhaul of the administration of amateur athletics, Representative Robert Michel observed, “it would be good for our nation and for the athletes who represent us if the cooperation, spirit of individuality, and personal freedom that are the great virtues of our system are allowed to exert their full influence in the [Olympic] games.” (124 Cong. Record 31662 (1978), italics added.) The nationalistic aspect of amateur athletics was recognized in San Fran. Arts & Athletics v. U.S.O.C. (1987) 483 U.S. 522, 537 [97 L.Ed.2d 427, 449, 107 S.Ct. 2971], which concluded “Congress has *163a [broad] public interest in promoting . . . the participation of amateur athletes from the United States in [the Olympic Games].”
The public interest in international competition by United States amateur athletes is reflected in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, supra. Among other things, the act created the United States Olympic Committee (U.S.O.C.) (36 U.S.C. § 371) whose “objects and purposes [should] be to [Ƣ[] (1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encourage the attainment of those goals; [ƣ] (2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related organizations; [fl] (3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constituent members or committees, over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United States in the Olympic Games and in the Pan-American Games, including the representation of the United States in such games, and over the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when held in the United States; [U] (4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur representation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and of the Pan-American Games; ftj] (5) promote and support amateur athletics activities involving the United States and foreign nations; . . .” (36 U.S.C. § 374.)
The U.S.O.C. is authorized to recognize a national governing body for any Olympic sport. “The [U.S.O.C.] shall recognize only one national governing body for each sport . . . .” (36 U.S.C. § 391(a).) (Italics added.) A national governing body recognized by the U.S.O.C. “is under a duty to (1) develop interest and participation throughout the United States and be responsible to the persons and amateur sports organizations it represents; • • • [10 (4) promptly review every request submitted by an amateur sports organization or person for a sanction (A) to hold an international amateur athletic competition in the United States; or (B) to sponsor United States amateur athletes to compete in international amateur athletic competition held outside the United States, and determine whether to grant such sanction, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section; . . .” (36 U.S.C. § 392(a).)
The Amateur Sports Act amply demonstrates amateur sports at the international level—the level at which Ms. Buchan was competing—are a matter of great importance to the public.
Furthermore, as evidenced by the Amateur Sports Act, the Federation, as the governing body for amateur cycling in the United States, is engaged in a service Congress thought suitable for public regulation.
*164The evidence in this case shows the Federation’s races are open to racers “coming within certain established standards.” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 99.) Also, the Federation is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, color, age, sex or national origin, (36 U.S.C. § 391(b)(6)), and is under a duty to “provide equitable support and encouragement for participation by women . . . .” (36 U.S.C. § 392(a)(6).)
Therefore, the first, second and third Tunki factors are met.
2. As a Result of Its Monopoly Over World-class Amateur Cycling, the Federation Possesses a Decisive Advantage in Bargaining Strength Over World-class Cyclists.
The Federation is the national governing body for amateur cycling recognized by the U.S.O.C. under the Amateur Sports Act. (36 U.S.C. § 391(a).) As a result, the Federation enjoys a total monopoly over world-class amateur cycling in the United States. A cyclist who wants to participate in Olympic or other international competition can only do so through the Federation.
The Federation has total control over the races it conducts, including the qualifications of the racers. Once a racer like Ms. Buchan entered the World Trials she came under the control of the Federation, subject to the risk of its carelessness. She had no choice over whom she would race against. The decision on who would be allowed to race was in the complete discretion of the Federation.
Ms. Buchan had less bargaining power than the plaintiff in Gardner who took his automobile to defendant for repairs. (Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 719.) There was more than one garage that could have repaired Gardner’s Porsche, but there is only one governing body for amateur bicycle racing. If Ms. Buchan was going to compete at the world-class level, the only way to do it was through the Federation.
Therefore, the fourth and sixth Tunki factors are met.
3. The Federation Used Standardized Adhesion Contracts of Exculpation.
The remaining factor under Tunki is whether, in exercising its superior bargaining power, the party confronts the user of its service with “a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby *165a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protections against negligence.” (60 Cal.2d at pp. 100-101, fns. omitted.)
Both of the exculpatory clauses in this case were printed on standardized forms and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Ms. Buchan was given no opportunity to negotiate or even discuss the terms of the agreements. Furthermore, the Federation has no procedure whereby a racer can pay an extra fee and be protected against the Federation’s negligence.
Therefore, the fifth and final Tunkl factor is met, and the exculpatory clauses are unenforceable.
By ignoring the unique facts in this case, the majority lumps this case in the same class as cases involving white water rafting (Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 758 [276 Cal.Rptr. 672]); dirt bike riding (Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 606 [246 Cal.Rptr. 310]); and sky diving (Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 333 [214 Cal.Rptr. 194]). Thus, the majority dismisses this case as one involving mere “sport and recreation” and holds as a matter of law the concept of “ ‘public interest’ has no applicability to sports activities.” (Maj. op., ante, at p. 149.) The majority opinion is contradicted by the factual record in this case developed after a lengthy trial. This factual record was before the trial court when it ruled the exculpatory clauses were unenforceable. The trial court’s ruling is fully supported by the record and should be affirmed on this appeal.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 2, 1991.

 Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462 [231 Cal.Rptr. 429].

See, e.g., Vilner v. Crocker National Bank (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 732, 735-736 [152 Cal.Rptr. 850]; Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d 713, 717; Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1556 [230 Cal.Rptr. 253].