Court Opinion

ID: 9565397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:20:08.716499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.541813
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
The effect of the majority’s holding that “whether or not the order of the magistrate was an ‘order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint,’ the State may not appeal from that order ...” is to repeal I.C.R. 54(a)(3), at least as it relates to dismissals after a preliminary hearing based upon the magistrate’s evaluation of the evidence relating to probable cause. It seems to me the clear wording of Rule 54 authorizes such an appeal.
I agree with the majority opinion that “the State could have simply filed another complaint with another magistrate, in effect having its assertion of error resolved in a new preliminary hearing. See Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116 (1977); and Rufener v. Shaud, 98 Idaho 823, 573 P.2d 142 (1977) ....” Ordinarily, that avenue would take care of the problem. However, there are times when it is important to have determined as a matter of law whether or not adequate evidence has been produced at a preliminary hearing in order to justify a finding of probable cause. It may well be that the magistrate’s determination was based not so much upon the evidence as the magistrate’s interpretation of the law relating to that evidence.
*339If a prosecutor feels he can present a better evidentiary case, he should certainly choose that alternative and refile, rather than appeal. However, if the dismissal results from a magistrate’s legal determination that may be at odds with other magistrates in the district, it may well be that judicial economy in the long run will be served by having that determination reviewed by the district court in order to obtain a uniform ruling in that district, and perhaps ultimately by this Court in order to get a uniform interpretation of the law throughout the state. In my view, I.C.R. 54(a)(3) was adopted for just that reason.
The fact that a prosecutor may choose to appeal when his best remedy would have been to refile does not detract from the fact that I.C.R. 54(a)(3), and our decisions in Rufener v. Shaud, supra, and Stockwell v. State, supra, give him either option. Our decision today erroneously and unnecessarily restricts I.C.R. 54(a)(3), and forces prosecutors into the sole remedy of refiling. Today’s opinion will no doubt be viewed by some as encouraging “judge shopping.”