Court Opinion

ID: 9908953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 04:07:59.987381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:37.905580
License: Public Domain

12/11/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

                  STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DARIOUS GORY

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                   No. 20-02078, C2003558 Chris Craft, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00062-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child for which he received a
sentence of 60 years’ confinement as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant claims
the trial court erred in allowing the State, over the defendant’s objection, to dismiss the
second count of the indictment, aggravated sexual battery, at the close of its proof.
Additionally, the defendant asserts that the demonstrative aid used by the prosecutor during
jury voir dire constituted misconduct. The State insists that “it is within the State’s
prerogative” to dismiss count two and that by failing to object, the defendant has waived
his claim relating to the State’s voir dire. Upon our review of the record, the applicable
law, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN,
P.J., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, Jr., J., joined.

Claiborne H. Ferguson and Matthew Blissitt, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant,
Darious Gory.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine K. Decker, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Jose F. Leon and Dru
Carpenter, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                              Facts and Procedural History
      The defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery, arising out of an incident against his nine-year-old second cousin
in March 2020.

I.     Jury Voir Dire

       During the State’s voir dire of the potential jurors, the State asked a prospective
juror what came to mind when he heard the word “rape.” In response, the juror stated,
“Force.” The State then followed-up by asking, “Do you expect to see injuries? Do you
expect to see a lot of blood? . . . Some people think of rape in one way and some people
think of rape in a different way and those are a few misconceptions and things that I want
to get out in front of you, okay?” In response to the State’s questions and comments, a
second potential jury responded, “Aggression,” to which the the prosecutor asked if he
would expect to see bruises and, for anal rape, tears of the anus. In response, a third
prospective juror answered yes to both.

       The prosecutor then asked, “If it was vaginal rape, would you expect to see vaginal
tears and vaginal injuries and all of that? . . . [C]an someone be raped and not present all
of those injuries or all of that force?” When a prospective juror suggested that “[s]ome of
them just give in,” the prosecutor asked, “What if it’s opposed to . . . . What if the
penetration was done with something small as opposed to something big?” The prosecutor
then used a cup and pen as a demonstrative aid while explaining:

       Here’s where I’m going—and this is graphic but I’m going to show you. So
       imagine that this [cup] is the—this [cup] is the–the body part, right? If you
       go with my fist, I’m probably going to tear the [cup], right? We all agree on
       that? Really, it’s just physics, right? I’m going to tear this cup but if I put
       my pen in, am I going to tear the cup?

       In response to the State’s illustration and statements, one prospective juror answered
no and another said he understood what the prosecutor was saying. The State further
explained that in order to find the defendant guilty, the law does not require the victim
suffer an injury. More specifically, the State noted,

       It has to be unlawful penetration . . . and the cup, I guess that’s the best way
       of explaining it. I mean, if I put my hand through this cup, I’ll tear it. Just,
       that easy, right, because [my hand] is bigger than this [cup]. But if I put my
       pen, it’s still going in the cup, right? And the . . . pen is in this cup but there’s
       no tear, there’s no damage, there’s no nothing. I want you to start thinking
       about those—some of those things that Judge Craft is going to talk to you
       about, okay? And that’s why I brought that example up.
                                               -2-
        As the State continued to voir dire prospective jurors, the State again referenced the
earlier juror who had an expectation that there would be injuries or tears associated with a
rape, and the following exchange then occurred:

       [State]: What if I told you there was no injuries? Would that affect [you] one
       way or another?
       Prospective Juror: No.
       [State]: What if I told you there was or there was not semen?
       Prospective Juror: No.
       [State]: Would it affect you if I told you there was or there wasn’t any
       injuries?
       Prospective Juror: No.

The State then reminded the additional prospective jurors of its earlier demonstration and
asked if the pen could be inserted into the cup without it being torn:

       [State]: Remember the example I used last time?
       Prospective Juror: The cup and the pen.
       [State]: About the cup and the pen. How if I push my fist through this [cup] I’ll
       break it but if I put a pen, I mean, it’s still inside the cup, right?
       Prospective Juror: Uh-huh.
       [State]: And I’m not tearing the cup. I guess the question I’m asking is sort of like
       what I told you in the instructions, it’s the unlawful sexual penetration of the alleged
       victim for purposes of, like, it’s not even touching. But is this not inserted in this
       cup?

II.    Proof at Trial

       The State’s proof at trial showed that the victim, who was nine years old at the time,
went to her great-grandmother’s house on the night of March 27, 2020, to spend the night.
The victim’s younger sister, two younger cousins, and several adult family members and
family friends were also there that night. Among the adults present were Jeremy Childs
and Christopher “Bull” McGee, as well as the defendant, who was thirty-one years old and
the victim’s second cousin.

       The victim and other children were hanging out in “Uncle Marlon’s” bedroom. At
some point, “Uncle Marlon” came into the room to go to sleep, and he and the other
children fell asleep in his bed. The victim moved to the foot of the bed and played a game
on her tablet until the battery died. Around 3:00 a.m., the defendant came into the room
and asked the victim if she wanted to play on his phone. The victim said “yes,” and the
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defendant gave the victim his phone and got into the bed with her. The defendant asked
the victim questions while she played a game on his phone and then pulled her underwear
down and “started to touch [her].” The defendant “put his finger in [the victim’s] vagina
and kissed [her] on the lips.” The victim felt “[u]ncomfortable” when the defendant put
his finger in her vagina, and she started to cry. The victim tried to fight the defendant’s
hand, “but his hand won.” The victim, however, did not scream because she was scared.
The defendant stopped when an adult the victim knew as “Bull” came into the room to get
tissues. When “Bull” entered the room, the defendant “jumped back out [of] the bed and
he pretended not to know what happened.”

        The victim told “Bull” and Mr. Childs that the defendant kissed her and touched
her, but she did not use the words penetrate or vagina. “Bull” was deceased at the time of
trial, but Mr. Childs testified that he was alerted that something had happened in the back
bedroom and went to investigate. Mr. Childs found the victim “tragically crying” and
“hysterical.” After the incident was reported to the police, the victim identified the
defendant from a photographic array and on which she wrote: “He kissed me on my lips
and pulled my underwear down and he put his hand in my private part.” Mr. Childs also
identified the defendant from a photographic array and noted on the array that “[The victim]
told me he molested her while everyone was [a]sleep.”

       The victim’s mother learned of the incident when someone called her around 6:00
a.m. saying the victim was crying and hysterical. The victim’s mother went to the home,
and the victim told her that the defendant touched her on and inside her vagina. The
victim’s mother had never seen the victim so upset before. The victim’s mother noted that
the victim had become timid and scared “of everything and everyone” since the rape. The
victim’s mother also recounted that the victim was wearing a dress when she was raped
and has refused to wear a dress again since that night.

        Later that morning, the victim was taken to the rape crisis center where she reported
to a nurse examiner at the rape crisis center that “something bad happened” to her. The
victim elaborated that the defendant came into the room, asked if she wanted to see his
phone, and started kissing her on the lips and hugging her. The defendant pulled down the
victim’s underwear and touched her between the legs and “put his fingers inside.” The
victim reported that she was crying, and the defendant apologized and asked what he could
do to make her forgive him. The victim told the examiner “it hurt down there after he did
it.” Although a physical examination did not reveal evidence of genital injury, the
examiner said such finding was not unusual for the type of penetration alleged. The victim
similarly recounted the incident to the officer who responded to the scene, the officer who
met with her at the rape crisis center, and a forensic interviewer at the child advocacy
center.

                                            -4-
       Forensic analysis of vulvar swabs taken from the victim’s sexual assault kit revealed
the presence of male DNA, consistent with the victim’s report of digital touching and
penetration of her vagina by a male. In addition, a Y-STR DNA profile from a swab of the
victim’s lips was consistent with buccal swabs taken from the defendant, supporting the
victim’s account that the defendant kissed her on the lips.

       At the conclusion of the State’s proof, the prosecutor announced that, “based on the
way the proof came out and how the indictment was written,” it planned to dismiss count
two. The defendant objected to the State’s taking such action in the middle of trial,
asserting the case should go to the jury as indicted. The trial court responded that it could
not disallow the State from doing so and offered that it would explain to the jury that count
two was a lesser-included offense of count one which would implicate double jeopardy if
the defendant were convicted on both counts.

       Later, when charging the jury with the applicable law, the trial court explained:

               Now count two charges aggravated sexual battery but it’s also one of
       the lesser[-]included offenses in count one. And there’s only one incident of
       any sexual contact or anything mentioned in the proof so for that reason, the
       State has dismissed count two so all we’re going to be considering is count
       one as far as the proof in the case.

       The jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child, and, following a sentencing
hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 60 years’ confinement as a career offender.
This timely appeal followed.

                                         Analysis

I.     Indictment

       The defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to dismiss the
second count of the indictment over his objection. The defendant asserts that the dismissal
was an amendment to the indictment that did not comply with the procedural requirements
of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b)(2) and that the timing of which “became a
source of steep prejudice” against him and deprived him of an impartial jury and fair trial.
Alternatively, the defendant contends that the dismissal of count two was essentially a
severance of mandatorily joined offenses that did not follow the proper procedure found in
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(2)(B) because he did not consent. The State
responds that “it was within the State’s prerogative to dismiss Count 2,” that neither of the
rules relied on by the defendant apply to dismissing a count of an indictment, and the

                                            -5-
defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated and his trial was not unfair. We
agree with the State.

      Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) governs the amendment of indictments.
An indictment can be amended pursuant to Rule 7(b)(1) if the defendant consents to the
amendment. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 7(b)(1); State v. Stokes, 24 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Tenn. 2000).
Pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2), a trial court may allow an indictment to be amended without the
defendant’s consent, before jeopardy attaches, “if no additional or different offense is
charged and no substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 7(b)(2).

        Clearly, the defendant did not consent to any amendment and jeopardy had attached.
However, Rule 7 does not apply to the dismissal of count two because the removal was just
a narrowing of the indictment and “removal of one of the charged offenses from the jury
does not operate as an impermissible amendment to the indictment.” State v. Lindsey, 208
S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (citing United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130,
145 (1985). As the Supreme Court noted in Miller, “where an indictment charges several
offenses, or the commission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from the jury’s
consideration of one offense or one alleged method of committing it does not constitute a
forbidden amendment of the indictment.” See Miller, 471 U.S. at 145. See also Salinger
v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548-49 (1926) (Removal of all counts but one from the jury
did not add anything to the indictment that was not charged and “was not even remotely an
infraction” of the constitutional guarantee of indictment by the grand jury.)

       The defendant acknowledges this precedent but asserts his case is different because
he is not claiming that the dismissal resulted in the deprivation of his right “to be tried only
on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury” but instead that the
dismissal “materially impacted the impartiality of the jury and the fairness of his trial.” In
the defendant’s view, the “last-minute . . . altering [of] the indictment at the conclusion of
the proof, curtailed any hope of an impartial jury[.]” The defendant expounds that “the
altered indictment forced the jury to infer that they could either convict [him] of Rape of a
Child or convict him of nothing at all.”

        A defendant’s right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the United States and
the Tennessee Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. “‘The
impartial jury guaranteed by constitutional provisions is one which is of impartial frame of
mind at the beginning of trial, is influenced only by legal and competent evidence produced
during trial, and bases its verdict upon evidence connecting defendant with the commission
of the crime charged.’” State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W. 3d 356, 377-78 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting
State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). There is simply no proof,
only speculation, that the jury was somehow made impartial by the State’s dismissal of
count two.
                                             -6-
        Likewise, there is no evidence that the fairness of the defendant’s trial was affected
by the dismissal of count two. The trial court explicitly instructed the jury that the reason
for the dismissal was because the evidence only established one incident of sexual contact
and that it could consider the offense of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included
offense if it found the defendant not guilty of rape of a child. We presume the jury followed
the trial court’s instructions. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tenn. 2001); State v.
Starner, No. M2014-01690-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1620778, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 20, 2016) (citing State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 111 (Tenn. 2006)). The dismissal
of count two did not render the defendant’s trial unfair.

       We turn now to the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to
comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(2)(B) regarding severance of
offenses that have been joined mandatorily when it dismissed count two without his
consent. The applicable rule provides that the trial court shall grant a severance of such
offenses “[d]uring trial, with consent of the defendant, when the court finds a severance is
necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each
offense.” Id. However, this rule is not applicable because count two was dismissed, not
severed for separate determination.

       As to the defendant’s suggestion that “[t]here was nothing to gain from Count 2’s
dismissal” because the merger doctrine would have precluded any potential double
jeopardy issues had he been convicted on both counts, even if true, it was still within the
State’s prerogative to dismiss the count.

II.    Prosecutorial Misconduct

       The defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s use of a cup and pen as a
demonstrative aid during jury voir dire constituted misconduct. He posits that the
prosecutor’s “lewd gestures” were irrelevant to the facts of the case and “led to prejudice
before the jury was even selected.” The defendant acknowledges that he did not make a
contemporaneous objection but asks this Court to review the issue for plain error.

       We may consider an issue to be plain error when all five of the following factors are
met: (a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and
unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused
must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical
reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.” State v.
Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (footnotes omitted); see
also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 283 (Tenn. 2000) (adopting the Adkisson test for
determining plain error). “[A]ll five factors must be established by the record before this
                                            -7-
Court will recognize the existence of plain error, and complete consideration of all the
factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one of the factors
cannot be established.” Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283. “Moreover, the error must have been of
‘sufficient magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Vance,
596 S.W.3d 229, 254 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 119 (Tenn.
2008)). We conclude that the complained-of conduct does not rise to the level
of plain error, as there was no breach of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, no substantial
right of the defendant was affected, and consideration of the alleged error is not necessary
to do substantial justice.

     At the motion for new trial, the prosecutor explained the reason for his
demonstration, stating:

       The State of Tennessee was merely attempting to get jurors to start thinking
       that just because there was no injury, it doesn’t mean that it didn’t happen.
       The correlation between force and the small genital area of a female. That’s
       why that explanation was used, to show that [injury] wasn’t required. To
       show that it wasn’t unnecessarily what’s expected to happen physically.

               And as a matter of fact, to back that up, the nurse practitioner, who
       examined [the victim], explained that in cases like the one we had, we don’t
       necessarily see injury. So, it was the explanation that the State did to show
       to the jury that they don’t -- it doesn’t have to be that when they imagined
       rapes, they imagined a violent act. And the ripping of the cup was what . . .
       some of them had that conception that there had to be some kind of . . . tear
       or damage to the genital parts of the victim. And the State of Tennessee
       merely tried to demonstrate that. That was not the testimony at trial. There
       was merely a -- the State of Tennessee seeking to explain to the jury kind of
       what the case in front of them was going to be.

        As noted supra, in order to conduct plain error review all five factors must be
established, including that the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court.
Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42. Here, despite the defendant’s description and argument,
it is not abundantly clear what happened during voir dire. While the defendant claims the
prosecutor physically tore the cup with his fist, a reading of the transcript neither
establishes or disproves that fact. During his questioning of the jury and discussion of his
cup, fist, and pen analogy, the prosecutor used the following language:

       If you go with my fist, I’m probably going to tear the [cup], right? We all
       agree on that? Really, it’s just physics, right? I’m going to tear this cup but
       if I put my pen in, am I going to tear the cup?
                                             -8-
         ....
         I mean, if I put my hand through this cup, I’ll tear it. Just, that easy, right,
         because [my hand] is bigger than this [cup]. But if I put my pen, it’s still
         going in the cup, right? And the . . . pen is in this cup but there’s no tear,
         there’s no damage, there’s no nothing.

Our reading of the language used by the prosecutor is language of supposition and a
conditional clause. The transcript does not support the defendant’s claim that the
prosecutor did, in fact, place his fist in the cup and tear the cup. Accordingly, it is unclear
from the record before us as to what took place during voir dire. To be clear, we are not
concluding that the act complained of did or did not happen and would note that if it were
clear that the act did occur the analysis might be different; however, based on the record
before us, we cannot with any level of reasonable certainty determine what occurred at the
trial level. Therefore, the defendant has not established the first requirement for plain error
review.

        Regardless of the clarity, or lack thereof, of the record, the defendant has failed to
establish that the State’s demonstration affected the outcome of his trial. “A voir dire
examination is for the purpose of advising counsel of the juror’s qualification, interest, or
bias . . . [and] [t]he subjacent purpose is to enable the exercise of one’s peremptory
challenges.” Smith v. State, 327 S.W.2d 308, 318 (1959). A juror’s belief that the victim
would have sustained physical injuries if raped was a bias or misconception that the
prosecutor’s demonstration aimed to dispel and could have led to the exercise of a
peremptory challenge to any juror who did not appear to accept such distinction.
Moreover, there was abundant proof that the defendant committed rape of a child by
inserting his finger into the victim’s vagina, and it was that proof that led to his conviction,
not the prosecutor’s demonstration during voir dire. Also, as noted above, while the record
reveals that the prosecutor talked about what would happen if he put his hand in the cup,
there is no proof in the record that the prosecutor actually placed his hand in the cup and
caused the “damage” discussed. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim that the demonstration
somehow created a visual that was violent and prejudicial is not supported by the record.
The defendant has failed to establish that the State’s demonstration probably affected the
outcome of the trial. Furthermore, while the defendant argues he is entitled to relief under
the five factors considered when measuring the prejudicial impact of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, he fails to address how he is entitled to relief under the factors of plain error
review. The defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                          Conclusion

         Based on the forgoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
                                              -9-
   ____________________________________
   J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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