Court Opinion

ID: 9427948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:20.220314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.725964
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
It is not clear to me that the award of attorney’s fees in this case was in error because “respondents have of course not prevailed on the merits of any of their claims.” Ante, at 758. The Court concedes that Congress in passing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 contemplated the award of attorney’s fees pendente lite in certain instances, and that a litigant may be a “prevailing party” for purposes of the Act without obtaining final judgment on the merits following a full trial. It is sufficient if there has been a determination of “ ‘substantial rights of the parties,’ ” ante, at 757, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94 — 1558, p. 8 (1976).
In the instant case, respondents have been successful in obtaining reversal on appeal of a directed verdict entered against them. While this “only” means that respondents are entitled to a trial of their cause, ante, at 758, that is a major accomplishment which determines “substantial rights of the parties.” Had petitioners been successful in defending their directed verdict on appeal, there is no doubt that they would be considered to have prevailed on the merits; the lawsuit would have been finished. Obtaining an appellate order requiring that a new trial be held after an action to enforce civil rights has been prematurely terminated similarly is an achievement reflecting on the merits of the case. The decision of the Court of Appeals, establishing that respondents produced sufficient evidence to warrant sending their case to the jury, breathes new life into an otherwise dead lawsuit. Without full briefing and oral argument, I am unable to *767say that this does not fall within the category of legal victories which determine “substantial rights of the parties” for purposes of the Act.
In my view, the attorney’s fees issue is sufficiently difficult to warrant the plenary attention of this Court rather than summary reversal. Accordingly, I dissent.