Court Opinion

ID: 9858744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:35:59.22342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:41.950030
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
By their motion for rehearing General and Continental have called our attention to a Supplemental Transcript which was, with the court’s permission, filed after submission, and which contains their exception to the judgment because it did not provide for pre-judgment interest. There is also a notice of appeal by appellees on the question only of pre-judgment interest. We sustain the crosspoint of General and Continental.
It has been held in Texas in many cases that interest is allowed as compensation for the detention of money where the recovery or damages are fixed by the conditions existing at the time the injury is inflicted. Watkins v. Junker, 90 Tex. 584, 40 S.W. 11 (1897); Davidson v. Clearman, 391 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.1965); Womack Machine Supply Co. v. Fannin Bank, 504 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1974). See Art. 5069-1.01 et seq., Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St. To be more specific as to the instant case, where an insurer denies liability, and the insured establishes the insurer’s liability, interest will begin from the date of the denial of liability. Fort Worth Lloyds v. Hale, 405 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo, 1966, ref’d, n. r. e.); Standard Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bayless, 338 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont, 1960, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Alamo Casualty Co. v. Laird, 229 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston, 1950, writ ref’d, n. r. e.).
We hold that interest at the rate of six per cent would begin to run from Novem*799ber 30, 1968, the date on which General and Continental paid the judgment in Montague County. Such judgment and payment by General and Continental were the result of the compromise settlement agreement made with the claimants in the Montague County suit, and Liberty agreed such settlement was reasonable but refused to contribute to it and thus denied liability. Liberty’s liability was liquidated and fixed as of that date.
Liberty points out that the pleadings and prayer of General and Continental did not ask for interest from November 30, 1968, or from any date, and that under such circumstances they would be entitled to interest only from the date of judgment. The petition upon which General and Continental went to trial contained the following prayer;
“WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that upon final hearing hereof plaintiffs do have and recover of and from defendant the sum of $167,607, together with their costs in this behalf expended and that plaintiffs have such other and further relief to which they may appear entitled.”
The judgment of the trial court rendered judgment for $40,611 for General and $100,000 for Continental. According to the record the judgment was correct for the principal amounts due. However, the prayer, as shown above, was for a total of $167,607, approximately $27,000 in excess of the principal amount. The pleadings and prayer do not indicate what the excess over the principal amount represents.
A general prayer for relief will ordinarily be sufficient to permit recovery for pre-judgment interest. Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Kennedy, 495 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland, 1973, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Tennessee Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 459 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston, 14th, 1970, no writ); Dunnam v. Dillingham, 345 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin, 1961, no writ).
We have examined Liberty’s motion for rehearing and have reconsidered our opinion on the points presented. We overrule Liberty’s motion for rehearing.
The judgment of the trial court is reformed to include interest at 6% from November 30, 1968, to the date of the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment of the trial court is reformed, and as reformed is affirmed.