Court Opinion

ID: 9737323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:21:53.82298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.086508
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting: A reading of Miller’s deposition convinces me that he did not have, nor could he reasonably have, an expert opinion, based on any known facts, of the cause of the blowout. Any opinion Miller may have expressed was necessarily based on speculation or conjecture. He testified he relied on no other lay witness in arriving at his opinion. In fact he listed seven possible causes of the blowout, including user-caused defects, such as running into or over objects or operating in underinflated condition. This tire was original equipment on a 1979 Mercury automobile. It had been driven 33,600 miles at the time of the occurrence. Plaintiff testified in her discovery deposition that she had recently experienced a “shimmying” problem with the car and actually did not know what caused her to lose control of the automobile. Miller examined the spare tire and found no defect. It is just as likely that the tire that failed was manufactured to the same standards as the spare. Shramek v. General Motors Corp. (1966), 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244, cited by the majority, actually supports the defendant. There the court sustained the entry of summary judgment for defendant, stating: “Blowouts can be attributed to myriad causes, including not only the care with which the tires are maintained, but the conditions of the roads over which they are driven and the happenstance striking of damaging objects.” 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 78, 216 N.E.2d 244, 247. It is true that no expert testimony was present in Shramek. But the addition of Miller’s testimony here simply adds a superficial gloss of authority that cannot supply the total absence of facts. Bare conclusions, unsupported by any facts, are not sanctioned under the rule of Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322.