Court Opinion

ID: 9781424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:37:23.709113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:03.164224
License: Public Domain

Justice BURDICK
Specially Concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion and write only to address defendant’s assertion of prosecutorial misconduct. I believe that the issue was correctly addressed by Judge Lansing in State v. Robinett, Docket No. 28564, 2004 WL 32949:
Robinett contends that there was misconduct in several components of the prosecutor’s closing argument. We find it necessary to address only one of these for guidance on remand.
While discussing the proof required to establish Robinett’s guilt of aggravated DUI, the prosecutor said: “What they do, because this is essentially a DUI statute, is they make it strict liability. If you are intoxicated and you’re driving, [and] an injury occurs, then you are guilty of this.” This comment misstated to the jury the causation element of aggravated DUI. The offense is defined in I.C. § 18-8006 as follows:
Any person causing great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself in committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(l)(a) or (l)(e), Idaho Code, is guilty of a felony....
(Emphasis added.) Although this statute does not require that the State prove any negligent act while driving under the influence, it does require that there be “some causal connection between the defendant’s driving while under the influence and the victim’s injuries.” State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 895, 894 P.2d 125, 128 (1995).1 See also State v. Frank, 51 Idaho 21, 28, 1 P.2d 181, 184 (1931) (holding that, under an analogous statute establishing the offense of involuntary manslaughter, the State was required to prove not only that the defendant was driving under the influence but also that his unlawful driving was the proximate cause of the victim’s death).
The prosecutor’s argument here was improper because it suggested to the jury that the State need not prove any causal relationship between Robinett’s driving under the influence and the accident that caused Patricia’s injuries. Indeed, it indicated that even if the wreck occurred in the manner asserted by Robinett, solely as a result of Lawrence suddenly grabbing Robinett from behind, Robinett would be criminally liable. This assertion in the prosecutor’s argument that a defendant is “strictly liable” for any injury that occurs while he is driving under the influence eliminated the causation element and misled the jury regarding the State’s burden of proof.

. In holding that I.C. § 18-8006 does not require a negligent act, Johnson overruled, sub silentio, the court of Appeals decision in State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446-47, 807 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Ct.App., 1991), where we held that the statute required proof that the driver, while intoxicated, committed a negligent act or omission.