Court Opinion

ID: 9731639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:53:09.626236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.151687
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority opinion, and write separately only to point out that this appeal demonstrates the efficacy of the trial colloquy procedure described in Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C.1991). In the absence of a trial colloquy regarding Hunter’s right to testify, the trial judge was required to hold two separate post-trial hearings on Hunter’s collateral attack motion. Thereafter the judge had to reconstruct exactly what transpired between Hunter and his counsel at a trial that took place over four years earlier. The trial judge’s action here predated our decision in Boyd, and I imply no criticism of the trial judge. But if the judge had questioned Hunter on the record before the defense had rested to ensure that he was knowingly waiving his right to testify, “[t]he record [would have been] made in a timely manner, eliminating ... controversies on appeal and in collateral proceedings long after the trial [was] concluded....” Boyd, supra, at 679. Thus, the colloquy at trial would have protected Hunter’s right to testify, most likely eliminated the attack on defense counsel’s assistance and expedited the finality of Hunter’s conviction, while at the same time sparing both the trial and appellate courts of a difficult collateral attack issue.1 In sum, this case is testament to our recognition in Boyd that “the colloquy procedure would best serve all of the interests of all parties in the administration of justice.” Id., at 680.

. "Post-conviction challenges in Colorado [in which trial judges routinely question non-testifying defendants] have, to all appearances, been relatively easy to adjudicate” both at the trial and the appellate level. Boyd, supra, at 679 n. 16 (citing cases).