Court Opinion

ID: 9628218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:13:10.224208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:00.650520
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
specially concurs:
My special concurrence herein is based upon the premise adopted by the majority that intent is not an ingredient of felony murder involving robbery. If intent is an essential element of robbery, it would have to be proved in order to establish beyond a doubt that murder was committed incident to a robbery.
I must confess that I have not fully researched this question. However, I have always assumed that intent is a necessary element of robbery, and without looking at the hornbooks or the cyclopedias, I am confident that they hold this to be true whether the crime be simple robbery or aggravated robbery. The case of Wechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, 124 Pac. 183, inferentially holds this. It clearly recognizes that one who seeks to obtain his own property by force is not guilty of robbery. The principle clearly appears in People v. Gallegos, 130 Colo. 232, 274 P. (2d) 608. There defendant used force to obtain money from the prosecuting witness and asserted that it was under a claim of right to the money. The Court explains that robbery is merely an aggravated form of larceny and that it requires intent to steal. The issue was carefully considered and explained in Gallegos and it appears to me sufficient to merely quote from the well reasoned opinion of Mr.' Justice Alter which stated:
“Counsel for defendant does not contend that in thus securing the payment of his wages no crime was committed, nor did the trial court so determine. The only question presented on this review is whether, under the facts, defendant was guilty of aggravated robbery as to which the trial court held him guiltless.
“Gallegos, in his defense in the trial court, relied upon, and the basis of his motion was, our opinion in Analytis v. People, 68 Colo. 74, 188 Pac. 1113. We have read and *59carefully considered the record in that case and have concluded that the decision there is determinative of the matter presented in the instant proceeding, and amply supported the trial court’s disposition of this case.
“We are aware of the fact that there is a divergence of opinion in robbery cases, and in Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846, there is a nicety of distinctions which we are disinclined to adopt in this jurisdiction. However, it is to be noted that in that case is the statement, ‘If the animus furandi is lacking in the taking, there can be no robbery. So our courts have held the taking of property under a fair claim of right of possession does not constitute robbery.’ Also it should be observed that in the Georgia case the word ‘fraudulent’ is used in the definition of robbery, and its absence in our jurisdiction is to be noted.
“ ‘Animus furandi’ is a latin phrase which generally may be translated as intent to steal, that is, a criminal intent or an intent to feloniously deprive an owner of his property.
“In the Analytis case, supra, we cited the court’s opinion in State v. Hollyway, 41 Ia. 200, and therein is to be found the following: ‘If it be not robbery to forcibly take property from another as security for that to which the defendant in good faith lays claim as the owner thereof, we do not see how it can be said to be robbery where the defendant by putting in fear compels his debtor to pay that which the defendant in good faith believes to be a just and honest debt then due. The felonious intent is wanting in the latter as well as the former case. There is no fraud or injury intended in either case. The intent in both is to obtain that which he believes to be his and nothing more. This rebuts the inference of a felonious intent that would arise from the forcible and unlawful taking.’
“Under the Analytis case, supra, it is settled law in Colorado — and we believe it to be the law in all but a few other jurisdictions — -that when a creditor takes *60money from his debtor in satisfaction of an obligation, even though in so doing he uses force or intimidation, it cannot be regarded as robbery for it is the generally accepted doctrine that where property is taken under a bona fide claim of right the requisite animus furandi is lacking.
“It may generally be said that the offense of robbery is but an aggravated form of larceny, and, therefore, the intent to deprive an owner of his property and to convert it to the use and benefit of the accused is an essential element of the offense and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence. In the present case it is undisputed that the intent to steal is absent, and this being a substantive element in the commission of the crime of robbery, its absence precludes a successful prosecution therefor. * * *”
See also Stewart v. U. S., 214 Fed. 2d 879.
I am satisfied that intent is part of robbery, either simple or aggravated, and that it does not get lost in the shuffle, so to speak, when the robbery becomes merged in a homicide. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution need not prove express malice as part of the murder prosecution in a robbery-murder case. This does not mean that the prosecution need not prove the robbery. If at least prior intent to rob or to steal by force must be proven, it would follow that a defendant who is incapable of entertaining a prior criminal intent to rob or to steal by force could not be successfully prosecuted as a felony murderer. Therefore, these are the considerations which persuade me that the trial court was correct in ruling evidence as to intent to be germane to the issue before the court.
I concur in the result for the reasons stated. It is my view that ordinary fairness demanded that the accused be given an opportunity to present his testimony. He was deprived of that opportunity and on this account the case should be reversed and remanded.