Court Opinion

ID: 9744290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:59:24.540147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.249163
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
Seruggs' appeal from his convictions is based upon the assertion that insofar as 1.C. § 35-834-1-1 permits a prosecution to be brought by information rather than by a grand jury indictment, it is unconstitutional. I do not necessarily disagree with the grounds upon which the majority affirms the trial court's dismissal of the Seruggs complaint. However, I believe there are two more clear eut reasons to do so.
First and foremost, our Supreme Court has specifically held that I.C. § 85-84-1-1 allowing prosecution by information is constitutional. Beverly v. State, 548 N.E.2d 1111 (Ind.1989).
Secondly, I.C. § 35-34-1-4 provides for dismissal of an information upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by a defendant. It appears that prior to the various convictions being attacked in the civil complaint under review here, none of the defendants challenged the constitutionality of I.C. § 35-34-1-1 by Motion to Dismiss the informa-tions or in any other procedural manner. Such failure constitutes a waiver of the claim of unconstitutionality of a prosecution by information. See Allen v. State, 798 N.E.2d 490 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Cosby v. State, 738 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); Driver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 465 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
Subject to these observations, I concur.