Court Opinion

ID: 9567264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:19.330219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:28.837028
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. I am of the opinion that the statute attacked in this case, Code Ann. § 26-2610 (b),is vague and overbroad and is susceptible to the constitutional attacks leveled against it.
*510This statute was enacted in 1968 as a part of the Criminal Code of Georgia, effective July 1, 1969. It provides that a person who, without provocation, "uses obscene and vulgar or profane language in the presence of a female . . .” is guilty of a misdemeanor.
First, this statute does not prohibit conduct. It prohibits speech, speech that is obscene and vulgar or profane in the presence of a female. Speech is protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment is made applicable to Georgia by the Fourteenth Amendment which means that Georgia, through its legislature, shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech.”
There are certain well-defined and narrow limited classes of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment. However, a statute prohibiting such classes of speech must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only such classes of speech as are unprotected by the First Amendment.
What is "obscene and vulgar or profane language” used in the presence of a female? These words, to me, are inherently subjective. They do not in and of themselves provide a definitive standard by which an average person can determine whether the speech he utters is prohibited. The statute itself does not make any attempt to limit or define the words "obscene and vulgar or profane.”
I am therefore of the opinion that the statute, on its face, is too vague and too broad to be enforced as a legitimate abridgment of freedom of speech. This statute permits a jury to create its own standard in each case. The statute does not prescribe a reasonably ascertainable standard or definition of speech or language that is prohibited.
Likewise, the construction placed on the statute by the majority opinion does not establish a more meaningful standard or definition of the prohibited language than does the statute itself. That construction is as follows: "Language is obscene, vulgar or profane when, under the *511circumstances and the manner in which such utterance was made, it would clearly offend a reasonable person’s sense of decency.”
It seems to me that this construction of the statute still leaves the definition of what is prohibited in the inherently subjective realm. The fault with the statute and with this construction of the statute is that it "leaves wide open the standard of responsibility, so that it is easily susceptible to improper application.” See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 528 (92 SC 1103, 31 LE2d 408) (1972), quoting from 303 FSupp. 952, 955.
I conclude that this statute as written and as construed by the majority is too vague and too broad to be constitutionally enforceable.
I respectfully dissent.