Court Opinion

ID: 9848935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:30:26.574096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:54.696642
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. In my opinion the majority simply heaps error upon error by “recasting” an untimely petition for interlocutory certiorari into an application for extraordinary relief and then answering the underlying question which is inappropriate for interlocutory review. This proceeding is “laden with postural and jurisdictional infirmities” and should be dismissed. Lawson v. Boston Chrysler, Plymouth and Dodge, Inc., 625 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Okla.1981). See also *4Salyer v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 727 P.2d 1361 (Okla.1986).
After sustaining the mother’s objections to the psychologist’s testimony, the trial judge signed an order on November 16, 1995, explaining the basis of his ruling and certifying the question for review by this Court. The father’s appeal of that order was not timely, however. His petition for certiorari was tendered for filing on December 18, 1995, but it was not accompanied by the required filing fee. A sufficient filing fee was not deposited until December 20,1995, and the petition was filed that date which was too late.
Under our rules, a petition for certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order is treated as a petition in error in terms of the requirements for perfecting an appeal. A proceeding for review of a certified interlocutory order is commenced when the petition for certiorari is filed within thirty (30) days of the date the order is certified and all costs are deposited. Rule 1.51 and Rule 1.14 of the Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 15, App. 2.
Timely commencement of an appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. The appellant’s failure to file his petition within 30 days is a jurisdictional defect which places this matter beyond our power to consider it. This is true regardless of the way in which the majority now characterizes the pleadings before us.
In addition to the absence of appellate jurisdiction, the case is also afflicted with a procedural infirmity which should cause this Court to deny certiorari. As the majority admits, the underlying question does not concern issues which are proper for certification and review by interlocutory order. It is merely an evidentiary ruling; a discretionary call by a trial judge disallowing proffered testimony.
Our power to review certified orders is limited to those involving prejudgment issues which affect a substantial part of the merits of a controversy. 12 O.S.1991, § 952(b)(3); Pierson v. Canupp, 754 P.2d 548 (1988). Issues outside the merits of a controversy are not certifiable for review of an interlocutory order, and evidentiary rulings are outside the merits. See Pierson, supra, and cases cited therein.
The majority, however, is doggedly determined to address the question raised and therefore “recasts” this tardy petition for interlocutory certiorari into an application to assume original jurisdiction and grant extraordinary relief.
I will not belabor this dissent with my negative thoughts about the court’s emerging tendency to practice law for our litigants by changing their actions filed as one thing into another. By “recasting” the pleadings, characterizing them as something never intended by the attorneys or parties, the Court simply changes sows’ ears into silk purses — or as in this case, sows’ ears into sows’ tails. I only offer my view that the practice is ill-advised and short-sighted.
A question of the correctness of the trial court’s prejudgment rulings on questions of proffered testimony is no better suited for consideration as an application for assumption of original jurisdiction and exercise of extraordinary relief than as an interlocutory appeal. The majority acknowledges that prohibition should not lie where an appeal is the proper remedy and affords complete relief, as it does here, but concludes that the “circumstances” of this dispute weigh in favor of extraordinary relief. I disagree. There are no circumstances which justify this extraordinary treatment by this Court. The majority is simply using this “recast” proceeding as a vehicle to issue an advisory opinion on the new Child Abuse Report and Prevention Act. The trial court may have been incorrect in refusing to allow the testimony, but review of that decision should come to this Court by regular appeal following judgment in the matter.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice WILSON and Justice OPALA join with me in the views expressed herein.