Court Opinion

ID: 9470073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:56:39.686362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:43.222373
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant Fiore pleaded guilty, on behalf of both himself and the corporation he owned and controlled as president and sole shareholder, to charges arising out of his scheme to defraud the Food and Drug Administration (the FDA). The issue before us is whether the experienced sentencing judge in this case abused his considerable discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3851 by including one particular condition among those that were to govern Fiore’s probation. That condition is the requirement that appellant pay the fine imposed on the corporation. The language of the probation statute provides no explicit check on the judge’s power to impose “such terms and conditions as the court deems best.” 18 U.S.C. § 3651. It does not, as appellant contends, limit those terms or conditions to the examples enumerated in the paragraphs that follow the quoted language. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir.1976). Thus, we may overturn the condition imposed in this case only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the majority notes, the controlling test is set out in Pastore, supra: “[J]udicial discretion on conditions of probation is limited by the requirement that they bear ‘a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.’ ” Id. at 681.
The condition at issue here reflects Judge Ward’s concern for the protection of the public and the rehabilitation of Fiore. At *212the sentencing hearing, the judge expressed his concern that Fiore’s crime was a serious one, presenting a threat to the public health and to the public trust in FDA-approved drugs. The judge felt that the offense warranted a term of imprisonment, especially for the purpose of general deterrence. But because the originator of the kickback scheme, whom the government considered more culpable than Fiore, had been sentenced by another judge to probation only, Judge Ward felt constrained to place Fiore on probation as well. In imposing a sentence that was lighter than he would have given absent the need for uniformity, Judge Ward must have been concerned about the effect this would have on Fiore’s rehabilitation. According to information presented to the judge, in the two years prior to the indictment Fiore had received almost $18,-000 in income from the corporation, but by the time of sentence the corporation was hopelessly insolvent and had almost no assets. Thus, it appears that after using his company to defraud the FDA, Fiore depleted its assets to the point where it was unable to pay the $10,000 fine to which his scheme had exposed it. If Fiore could get away with this, suffering only the relatively light sentence of a $1,000 fine and a three-year term of probation on the condition that he not be involved with a medical testing laboratory, he would surely be inclined to view his offense as a minor one. Furthermore, the public trust in the protection afforded by FDA testing of drugs would certainly be eroded if a man who abused that trust were permitted to escape with a sentence that Judge Ward considered inadequate for general deterrence.
In view of these considerations, it seems to me that it was perfectly reasonable for the sentencing judge to require that Fiore ensure payment of the fine imposed on the corporation. When the judge denied the § 2255 petition that is the basis of this appeal, he endorsed the following on the papers:
In the Court’s view, the special condition of probation that petitioner pay in full the fine imposed upon Bucks County Research Institute, Inc., a corporation of which he was the sole stockholder and only full-time employee, is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Moreover, under the facts of this case, the special condition was appropriate and well within the discretion of the Court.
It is significant that the judge noted that Fiore was the “sole stockholder and only full-time employee” of the corporation, which had been fined $10,000. The emphasis on the unusual “facts of this case” and the reference to payment of “the fine imposed upon” the corporation that Fiore controlled indicate to me that the judge viewed the condition as a guarantee — if the corporation had had the assets to pay the $10,000, Fiore would not have been required to do so.
Viewed in this manner, this condition is far less “unusual and severe,” Pastore, supra, 537 F.2d at 681, than many others that have been upheld, including those cited by the majority. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir.1974) (defendant convicted of illegal export of firearms to Republic of Ireland forbidden as condition of probation to belong to Irish organizations or Irish Catholic organizations, to accept employment by any Irish organization and to visit Irish pubs). See also United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.1973) (defendant pleading guilty to mailing obscene matter given probation on condition, inter alia, that he not associate with any known homosexuals). I do not suggest that these sentences are models to be followed, and I recognize that the judge’s discretion is not unlimited; that is why we laid down the rule quoted above in Pastore. But unlike the condition struck down in that case and in the others cited by the majority, the condition at issue here is clearly related to the offense, as well as to the protection of the public and the rehabilitation of defendant.
In short, the condition that Fiore pay his corporation’s fine is a far cry from the sort of flagrant abuse of discretion that required reversal in other cases. It is instead a sensible attempt by a seasoned trial judge to make the conditions of probation serve *213the purposes of the probation statute as applied to this not inconsiderable white collar crime. Because I find that the challenged condition meets the requirements of Pastore, I would affirm.