Court Opinion

ID: 9942693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 18:13:17.144791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:26.465766
License: Public Domain

02/21/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                         January 11, 2024 Session

              BEN SMITH ET AL. V. WILLIAM A. WHITE ET AL.

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County
                   No. 2022-CV-14     Michael Wayne Collins, Judge

                              No. M2023-00030-COA-R3-CV

The appellees sold a portion of their property to the appellants. The appellees sued the
appellants seeking an easement by necessity. The appellants maintained that Tenn. Code
Ann § 54-14-102 and its associated statutes prohibited such an easement. The trial court
granted a common law easement by necessity. We agree with the trial court’s determination
that the 2020 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann § 54-14-102 and its associated statutes did
not change the common law regarding easements by necessity. However, due to the lack
of a hearing and the corresponding lack of evidence, the improper use of the trial judge’s
visit to the property as a fact-finding mission, and the uncertain procedures used to decide
the case, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.

        Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
                              Vacated and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER
and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Rocklan W. King, III, and Stacia Marie Burns, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants,
William A. White and Kassidy White.

Robert Luke Chaffin and Seth Bryan Pinson, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Ben
Smith and Daniel Smith.

                                          OPINION

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The facts regarding the land transaction between the parties are mostly
uncontroverted. On September 23, 2021, Ben and Daniel Smith (“the Smiths” or
“Appellees”) purchased approximately 93.74 acres of land from the Ruth Ida Radke
Ludwig 2018 Revocable Trust. The property included a home, outbuildings, and an asphalt
driveway known as “Ludwig Lane” that was used to access the property from a public
roadway, Dyer Cemetery Lane.

       On January 28, 2022, the Smiths sold a portion of the property (approximately 70
acres) to Kassidy and William White (“the Whites” or “Appellants”), including the home,
outbuildings, and Ludwig Lane (collectively “the White Property). The warranty deed
conveying the property to the Whites included a ten-foot utility easement along the east
side of Ludwig Lane. There were no other easements conveyed by the warranty deed. The
Smiths retained ownership of the remaining, approximately 23-acre tract (“the Smith
Property”). The Smith Property is unimproved and abuts Dyer Cemetery Lane; however,
the portion of the Smith Property abutting Dyer Cemetery Lane is allegedly “a very steep
ridge rising hundreds of feet.”

       The Smiths filed a Petition for Easement by Necessity and/or for Declaratory
Judgment on May 27, 2022. The Smiths averred that Ludwig Lane was “the only access
they have for ingress and egress to their property” and that, otherwise, the property was
“landlocked.” The Whites opposed the petition on the basis that the Smith Property was
not “cut off or obstructed entirely from a public road or highway.” Tenn. Code Ann § 54-
14-102(a)(1).

       The Smiths filed a motion requesting the court to inspect the property and driveway
in person, arguing that an in-person inspection would help the court “ascertain whether [the
Smiths’] property is actually landlocked.” The trial court granted the motion for inspection,
and the judge and counsel for both parties viewed the property in person. After briefing
and without a hearing, by an order dated December 7, 2022, the trial court held that the
Smiths were entitled to an easement, reasoning as follows:

       2. That the easement should only exist by necessity because it will likely cost
       many more times the total value of the property itself to begin to build a road
       around the side of the bluff, as required by the layout of the property and
       orientation of the Petitioners’ property to any public access.

       3. That the property of the Petitioners is obstructed by topography as the only
       part of their property to have access to a public road is on the side of
       hill/mountain/bluff.

       4. That an easement should exist because of open, obvious, and continued
       prior use of the current private road which is used by the immediate neighbor
       of the Petitioners to access their property.

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      5. That the cost of the easement for the benefit of the Petitioners property
      would incur nearly no cost of the Respondents.

      6. That the situation of these adjoining lots was created at equal fault by both
      the Petitioners and Respondents.

      7. That the Respondents should likewise be granted a utility easement for
      their benefit across the Respondents’ property as the Respondents property
      is completely cut off from an[y] potential source of city water.

      The Whites appeal, raising two issues:

      1.     Tennessee law prevents property owners from obtaining an easement
             by necessity when the property at issue abuts a public right of way.
             Plaintiffs’ property abuts a public right of way. Did the Circuit Court
             err by granting Plaintiffs an easement by necessity?

      2.     Did the Circuit Court err by concluding that Petitioners/Appellees are
             entitled to an easement implied by prior use based solely on the prior
             use of the easement area by a different, entirely landlocked property
             owner?

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes, are reviewed de novo.
First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 489 S.W.3d 369, 382 (Tenn. 2015).
Findings of fact receive a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates
otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d).

                                    ANALYSIS

        The Smiths maintain, on one hand, that their easement suit proceeded under the
common law. The Whites, on the other hand, argue that the Smiths invoked the statutory
process found in Tennessee Code Annotated, title 54, chapter 14, part 1 for condemning an
easement by necessity and that the 2020 amendments to those code sections alter the
common law regarding easements by necessity. The only reference to title 54, chapter 14,
part 1 in the Smiths’ complaint is in paragraph 6, which states, “Pursuant to T.C.A. 54-14-
102, Tennessee land owners cannot be landlocked.” The parties’ filings before the trial
court talk past each other with the Smiths addressing common law easement by necessity
while the Whites address statutory easement by necessity. The trial court’s order appears
to be based on common law necessity, but it is not specific on this point. On remand, there
would be benefit in clarifying the basis upon which relief is being sought.

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        The Whites’ other argument requires more consideration. They contend that the
2020 amendments to title 54, chapter 14, part 1 change the common law to make it more
restrictive.1 The legislature has the ability to change or eradicate the common law by
statute, but “the existence of a statute in and of itself will not repeal a common law right
absent a clear legislative statement expressing an intent to do so.” Cellco P’ship v. Shelby
Cnty., 172 S.W.3d 574, 591 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

        The elements of a common law easement by necessity are:

        1) the titles to the two tracts in question must have been held by one person;

        2) the unity of title must have been severed by a conveyance of one of the
        tracts;

        3) the easement must be necessary in order for the owner of the dominant
        tenement to use his land with the necessity existing both at the time of the
        severance of title and the time of exercise of the easement.

Cello P’ship, 172 S.W.3d at 592(quoting Powell v. Miller, 785 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1990)). In this case, the existence of the first two elements is not disputed. “The third
element, regarding necessity, arises when the conveyance results in the dominant parcel
becoming landlocked.” Id.

       Tennessee courts view Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-102 and its
associated statutes as distinct from the common law easement by necessity because these
statutes and the common law have different requirements and procedures. Id. at 591 n.7.
While these statutes have been referred to as “a statutory easement by necessity,” id., they
have also been described as “the condemnation of a right-of-way” across another’s
property. Boone v. Frazor, No. 87-177-II, 1988 WL 77542, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27,
1988); see also Bingham v Knipp, Nos. 11281, 02A01-9803-CH-00083, 1999 WL 86985,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb 23, 1999) (Highers and Lillard, JJ., concurring) (“[W]e note that
a property owner whose land is cut off from a public road by the intervening land of another
has a statutory right to condemn an easement across his neighbor’s land.”). “Tennessee
Code Annotated section 54-14-102 relaxed the common law’s requirement that the parties
trace their titles to a common grantor.” Boone, 1888 WL 77542, at *5; see also Page v.
Fuchs, No. W1999-00702-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 791812, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6,
2000) (“A statutory easement by necessity does not require unity of title.”). Its associated
statutes require joinder of all parties with an interest in the land, a full description of the
    1
      Among other things, 2020 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 703 amends Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-102(a) by
limiting the easement to cases where the is no outlet, rather than where there is no outlet that is “adequate
and convenient,” and by adding language constituting Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-119 that prohibits the
granting of the easement or right of way if it resulted from “the intentional and knowing action of the owner
of the surrounded or enclosed land.”
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property sought and a bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-103. If the court’s ruling is for the
petitioner, the court issues a writ of inquiry of damages and a jury of view is created hear
testimony and to set the bounds and assess damages for the land taken. Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 54-14-104(a),-105, -107, -108. Thus, the statutory method set forth in title 54, chapter
14, part 1 differed from the common law before the 2020 amendments. Creating further
differences does not change the common law of easements by necessity in the absence of
a clear expression of intent. See Cellco P’ship, 172 S.W.3d at 591 n.7. There being no such
expression, we find that the 2020 amendments did not affect or change the common law of
easements by necessity.

       There is no transcript of the evidence or statement of the facts in the record. In such
instances, appellate courts often invoke the presumption that the judge’s findings would be
supported by the transcript if there was one. See Outdoor Mgmt., LLC v. Thomas, 249
S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). However, in this case, there was no hearing from
which the judge could make findings of fact. There is an order requiring the parties to file
briefs with the court on the issue of easement by necessity. The Whites’ brief discusses the
standard for summary judgment, but the record contains no summary judgment motions.
The Smiths’ brief does not mention summary judgment, but does state that the trial court
ordered the briefing on agreement of the parties. The agreement is not found in the record.
There is no statement of material facts as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 in the record.
The trial court’s order does not mention summary judgment and does not state the legal
grounds upon which it ruled as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

         The trial court’s order granting the easement by necessity states that the court made
its ruling “after submission of briefs and case law by the parties, inspection of the property
by the Judge with the parties’ attorneys, and the record as a whole.” Again, there was no
hearing and no testimony. Attached to the Whites’ brief is the 2020 act amending portions
of title 54, chapter 14, part 1 and a legislative bill summary that states, “This bill also limits
the right to the easement to cases where there is no outlet, instead of no outlet that is
“adequate or convenient.”2 We have already determined that the 2020 amendments do not
apply to the common law easement of necessity. Attached to the Smiths’ brief are the
relevant deeds, and surveys, and the Smiths’ responses to the Whites’ first set of
interrogatories and request for production of documents. They emphasize the interrogatory
responses that state that both parties knew that the Smiths intended to keep an easement
over Ludwig Lane (Interrogatory 5 and 6), that leaving the easement out of the deed was a
mutual mistake (Interrogatory 7), that no road could be built across the ridge because it
was too steep (Interrogatory 8), and that one agreement to sell the Smith property had
already fallen through because the property was not accessible (Interrogatory 7).

   2
      Legislative history may be considered where statutory language is ambiguous. Thurmond v. Mid-
Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC., 433 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tenn. 2014). We do not consider
the statutes at issue to be ambiguous.
                                                -5-
       Statements of fact made in briefs are not evidence. Reid v. Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292,
295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). The procedures for summary judgment were not followed in
this case, and the trial court’s order does not meet the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P.
56.04. Furthermore, it is apparent that the trial court used its observations of the property
as evidence. This is not permitted:

       [A] trial judge has the inherent discretion to take a view of the site of a
       property dispute, a crime, an accident, or any other location, where such a
       view will enable the judge to assess the credibility of witnesses, to resolve
       conflicting evidence, or to obtain a clearer understanding of the issues.
       However, the view cannot be made to obtain additional evidence or to replace
       the requirement that evidence be produced at trial with the judge’s personal
       observations of the site. Thus, the proper purpose of a view is to enable the
       judge to better understand the evidence that has been presented in court, not
       as a substitute for such evidence.

Tarpley v. Hornyak, 174 S.W.3d 736, 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

       The trial court also found an easement implied by prior use. The Whites argue that
the court’s ruling is void because no such claim was made by the Smiths in their petition.
The Smiths’ appellate brief does not address an easement implied by prior use.
Furthermore, the same procedural issues that plague the trial court’s determination that
there should be an easement by necessity are present as to the determination of an easement
implied by prior use.

       In light of all of the above, trial court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                       CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded. Costs of this appeal are
assessed equally against the Whites and the Smiths, for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                   /s/ Andy D. Bennett________________
                                                   ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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