Court Opinion

ID: 9440281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 15:00:39.823189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.034359
License: Public Domain

20-3514
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                BIA
                                                                         Schoppert, IJ
                                                                        A202 067 255

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 3rd day of August, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 9            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   RISPUDAMAN SINGH,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                    20-3514
18                                                            NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond
25                                     Hill, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                     Attorney General; John W.
29                                     Blakeley, Assistant Director;
 1                                 Elizabeth K. Fitzgerald-Sambou,
 2                                 Trial Attorney, Office of
 3                                 Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                 States Department of Justice,
 5                                 Washington, DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is DENIED.

10       Petitioner Rispudaman Singh, a native and citizen of

11   India, seeks review of a September 17, 2020 decision of the

12   BIA affirming a May 16, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

13   (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

14   under   the    Convention   Against      Torture    (“CAT”).     In   re

15   Rispudaman Singh, No. A202 067 255 (B.I.A. Sept. 17, 2020),

16   aff’g No. A202 067 255 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 16, 2018).

17   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

18   and procedural history.

19       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for

20   the sake of completeness.”          Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland

21   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                   We review the

22   agency’s      legal   conclusions       de   novo   and    its   factual

23   determinations for substantial evidence.            Y.C. v. Holder, 741

24   F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013).
                                         2
1        When, as here, the agency concludes           that an asylum

2    applicant    suffered   past   persecution,    the    applicant     is

3    presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution on

4    the same basis.   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).      “That presumption

5    may be rebutted” where an IJ finds that “[t]he applicant could

6    avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the

7    applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all the

8    circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant

 9   to do so.”    Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 1     The Government may

10   rebut the presumption if a preponderance of the evidence

11   establishes that the applicant can safely relocate within his

12   own country. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii).         The agency considers

13   the reasonableness of relocation, including “whether the

14   applicant would face other serious harm in the place of

15   suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the

16   country;      administrative,      economic,         or     judicial

17   infrastructure;   geographical    limitations;    and     social   and

18   cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social

19   and familial ties.”     Id. § 1208.13(b)(3).

     1 Citations are to the version of the regulations in effect
     at the time of Singh’s proceedings before the agency.
                                   3
 1        As an initial matter the IJ did not abuse his discretion

 2   in   accepting    and    considering      a    memorandum      on    internal

 3   relocation from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

 4   filed   five   days     before    the    hearing     because    an    IJ   has

 5   discretion to accept an           untimely filing.          See 8 C.F.R.

 6   § 1003.31(c); 2 Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191—92 (2d Cir.

 7   2008); see also Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chap.

 8   3.1(d)(ii).

 9        Singh was assaulted by members of the Akali Dal Badal

10   party   (“Badal      Party”)   because    of   his    membership      in   the

11   Shiromani Akali Dal Mann Amritsar party (“SADA”) party, and

12   the police in his home state of Punjab beat and detained him

13   when he reported the attack.            Substantial evidence supports

14   the agency’s conclusion that he could relocate.                       The IJ

15   identified     the    following    grounds      supporting      relocation:

16   Singh’s past harm was limited to his home state of Punjab; he

17   had a low position within SADA; the record suggested that

18   only local police, and not federal authorities, were involved

19   in his past harm, and the police are entities of state

     2 The current provision is the same, but is found at §
     1003.31(h).
                                4
 1   governments,      not   the    national   government;    there      are    no

 2   significant barriers to internal migration in India; Singh is

 3   relatively young; despite Punjabi being his primary language,

 4   Singh was able to support himself in the United States; and

 5   nothing in the record suggested he would be unable to support

 6   himself in another part of India, where English is also

 7   spoken.

 8       Singh’s challenges to this determination fail.                        The

 9   agency was not required to identify a specific location in

10   India     where    Singh      could     relocate.       See     8   C.F.R.

11   §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B),          (3),     1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B),        (3);

12   Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33–34 & n.5 (B.I.A.

13   2012) (explaining that DHS can meet its burden by showing

14   that conditions outside of the home region “were not such

15   that the applicant would have a well-founded fear”); see also

16   Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Singh v.

17   Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2021).                 The country-

18   conditions    evidence        discusses   mistreatment    of     Sikhs     in

19   Punjab, but not persecution of Sikhs in other states, and the

20   evidence states that the Badal Party’s influence is generally

21   limited to Punjab.      See Certified Admin. R. at 186–87.           Singh

                                           5
 1   argues that the Badal Party can persecute him outside of

 2   Punjab because it is affiliated with the Bharatiya Janata

 3   Party that controls the national government; however, the

 4   country-conditions      evidence    does    not   reflect   nation-wide

 5   persecution of SADA supporters, but only prosecution of some

 6   high-level SADA members on terrorism and sedition charges.

 7         In   sum,    substantial   evidence    supports    the    agency’s

 8   relocation finding given evidence that Sikhs can live in other

 9   areas of India and the Badal Party’s influence is limited,

10   and the fact that there is no evidence the national government

11   is targeting members of SADA.

12         Singh contends that the BIA erred by deeming his CAT

13   claim waived; even assuming error in that waiver finding,

14   Singh’s withholding of removal and CAT claims fail on the

15   same grounds as his asylum claim, so the relocation finding

16   is dispositive of all forms of relief.            See Lecaj v. Holder,

17   616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that an applicant

18   who   fails   to    establish    requisite   probability       of   future

19   persecution for asylum claim “necessarily” fails to meet

20   higher standard for withholding of removal and CAT relief);

21   see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (c)(3).

                                         6
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  7