Court Opinion

ID: 9402498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 21:01:15.727024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.324842
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4548

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        BRANDON BEVERLY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:21-cr-00260-1)

        Submitted: May 18, 2023                                           Decided: June 14, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Rada Herrald, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Charleston, West Virginia, Kathleen Elizabeth Robeson, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Brandon Beverly of aiding and abetting the destruction of an

        energy facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1366(b). The district court sentenced

        Beverly to 24 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

        On appeal, Beverly’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

        738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning

        whether Beverly’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. Beverly has not filed a pro se

        supplemental brief. Upon our review, we conclude that a discrepancy in the written

        judgment requires a resentencing hearing. Thus, while we affirm Beverly’s conviction, we

        vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

               We review de novo whether the sentence imposed in the written judgment matches

        the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d

        291, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2020). In Rogers, we vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded

        to the district court based on the court’s failure to orally announce the standard, but

        discretionary, conditions of supervision included in the written judgment. Id. at 296-301.

        We explained that “the requirement that a district court expressly adopt a written list of

        proposed conditions is not a meaningless formality: It is a critical part of the defendant’s

        right to be present at sentencing.” Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]

        district court may satisfy [this] obligation . . . through incorporation—by incorporating, for

        instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release

        sentence, and then detailing those conditions in the written judgment.” Id. at 299.

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               When reviewing the conditions of supervised release at Beverly’s sentencing

        hearing, the district court referred to the presentence report (PSR) and summarized the

        standard conditions listed in the PSR and required by a local rule. The court then reviewed

        the proposed special conditions of supervision recommended by the probation officer. One

        condition proposed by the probation officer prohibited Beverly from using or possessing

        alcohol. At the sentencing hearing, the district clarified that this prohibition was limited to

        using or possessing alcohol to excess. However, the written judgment matched the

        conditions in the PSR and did not clarify that Beverly was only prohibited from possessing

        or using alcohol to excess.

               We have recognized that the lack of a “match” between written and orally

        articulated discretionary conditions of supervision “is reversible Rogers error.” United

        States v. Jenkins, No. 21-4003, 2022 WL 112069, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 2022). And “t[h]e

        remedy for a Rogers error ‘is to vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to

        resentence’ the defendant anew.” Id. (quoting United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341,

        346 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2021)). Because the Rogers error alone requires us to vacate Beverly’s

        sentence, we do not address counsel’s argument that the term of imprisonment imposed by

        the district court was substantively unreasonable. See Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case, and

        have found no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Beverly’s

        conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. This court requires that

        counsel inform Beverly, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United

        States for further review. If Beverly requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes

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        that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to

        withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served

        on Beverly. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                   AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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