Court Opinion

ID: 9777587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:16:01.182474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:56.739188
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
By virtue of the majority opinion in this case, I fear the distinction between wanton murder and reckless homicide will be lost. Under this decision, whenever there is evidence of misconduct in the operation of a motor vehicle exceeding ordinary negligence, the Commonwealth will be entitled to go to the jury on wanton murder.
The culpable mental state for wanton murder is wantonly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person. KRS 507.020(l)(b). For reckless homicide, the culpable mental state is recklessness. KRS 507.050. KRS 501.020 defines these mental states as follows:
(8) “Wantonly”—A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto. (4) “Recklessly”—a person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
In this case, the accident occurred in the morning while appellant was en route to a doctor’s appointment. At an excessive rate of speed, and on a double yellow line, she passed another vehicle and upon rounding a curve, hit the victims head-on in their lane. Of the three occupants of the other vehicle, one person died, one was seriously injured, and the other was essentially unharmed.
There was some evidence of erratic behavior by appellant at the accident scene but none which was particularly probative in view of the horrific collision which had just occurred. At the hospital appellant was found to have in her system five different prescription drugs, Xanax, Elavil, Soma, Valium and Hydrocodone. Three of the drugs found to be present were within proper therapeutic levels and the other two were at levels less than therapeutic quantities.
The Commonwealth’s theory was that appellant engaged in wanton conduct by ingesting drugs and in such a condition, driving an automobile. While Dr. Hunsaker opined that the presence of such drugs and in the quantities found would cause impairment of one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, there was *195no evidence that appellant knew of the effects of such drug combinations. As to such drug combination effects, even Dr. Hunsaker was uncertain in his opinion, “She appeared to be under the influence of something.” He acknowledged that physicians and pharmacists have a duty to inform the public of the risks associated with drug interaction. Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove wantonness as defined in KRS 501.020 which requires that she be “aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur....”
Our most recent encounter with this area of law was in Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 951 (1994), a case arising out of an accident in which a coal truck struck a vehicle entering the highway and killed the occupant. We reversed the wanton murder conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evidence and remanded for a new trial upon lesser included offenses. Both parties here contend that the Johnson case supports their position. We affirmed a wanton murder conviction in Walden v. Commonwealth, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 102 (1991), where appellant’s blood alcohol sample tested at .297. From the evidence, Walden operated his van on a two-lane country road in Madison County at a high rate of speed in this profoundly intoxicated condition. In a thorough discussion, the Court distinguished between the wanton state of mind applicable to wanton murder and the state of mind applicable to manslaughter in the second degree. “The difference between wanton murder and involuntary murder (manslaughter 2) continues to be, as the penal code originally intended, where there is evidence from which the jury could find ‘circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.’ Depending on the situation, drunk driving may be such a circumstance.” Id. at 105. Indicative of its view of what the law requires for wanton murder, the Walden Court concluded its analysis of this issue as follows: “Applying this rule to present circumstances, we hold that here the extreme nature of appellant’s intoxication was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer wantonness so extreme as to manifest extreme indifference to human life.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
Despite appellant’s serious driving misconduct and the evidence from which the jury could have believed that she was impaired, I cannot conclude that her conduct satisfies the high standard required for wanton murder. At a minimum, there had to be evidence that she knew of and disregarded the risk of taking the combination of drugs found in her system. The law presumes that persons know the significance of ingestion of alcohol and treats each such person as if he had actual knowledge (KRS 501.020(3)). The same cannot be said with respect to the ingestion of prescription drugs within therapeutic levels.
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.