Court Opinion

ID: 9955055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 16:05:01.570536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.355749
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                                                            FILED
                                          Justin R. Hogg,              Mar 27 2024, 8:39 am

                                        Appellant-Defendant                 CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

                                                    v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 27, 2024
                                  Court of Appeals Case No.
                                         23A-CR-525
                   Interlocutory Appeal from the Cass Superior Court
                        The Honorable James Muehlhausen, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        09D01-2005-F6-130

                                 Opinion by Judge May
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024      Page 1 of 19
[1]   Justin R. Hogg appeals the trial court’s denial of Hogg’s motion to dismiss the

      “five additional criminal charges” filed by the State after Hogg’s conviction of

      Level 6 felony theft 1 was reversed on appeal due a material variance between

      the charging information and the evidence presented at trial. (Appellant’s Br. at

      4) (emphasis in original). Hogg argues the five new charges represent

      impermissible prosecutorial vindictiveness, and we agree. We reverse the trial

      court’s denial of Hogg’s motion to dismiss the five additional charges and

      remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   The underlying facts are these:

                 Sometime prior to March 5, 2020, Hogg, Chad Myer (Hogg’s
                 romantic partner), and Gail Slavens (their mutual acquaintance)
                 created false payroll checks that purported to be from a business
                 identified as Last Call, LLC, which business did not in fact exist.
                 The trio made at least six checks: one payable to “Robert Shane
                 Madewell,” one payable to Hogg, two payable to Myer, and two
                 payable to Slavens. Each check appeared to be payable in an
                 amount of about $1000.

                 On March 5, the three entered the Dutch Mill bar in Logansport.
                 Slavens and Myer each cashed one of the false checks that had
                 been made payable to them. Hogg cashed the false check made
                 payable to Madewell, which was in the amount of $989.19. In

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024            Page 2 of 19
                 endorsing that check, Hogg appears to have initially written a
                 large letter J, but he then wrote “Robert Madewell” over it.

                 In the early morning hours of March 7, the three entered the
                 Dutch Mill bar to cash the other false checks. Slavens and Myer
                 again each cashed one of the false checks that had been made
                 payable to them. Hogg cashed the check appearing to bear his
                 name. That check was in the amount of $984.79. In his later
                 testimony, Alex Maloy, an owner of the Dutch Mill bar, stated
                 that, while the second-round of false checks were cashed on
                 March 7, the Dutch Mill bar’s practice was to record those
                 transactions as having occurred on March 6 because the bar had
                 not yet closed down for that evening.

      Hogg v. State, 187 N.E.3d 950, Case No. 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *1 (Ind.

      Ct. App. April 25, 2022) (internal record citations omitted).

[3]   On May 13, 2020, the State charged Hogg with Level 6 felony check deception 2

      and Level 6 felony theft in a charging information that alleged, respectively:

                                            Count 1 [check deception]:

                 [O]n or about March 6, 2020, in Cass County . . . Hogg did
                 knowingly issue or deliver a check to acquire money or other
                 property, having a value of at least $750, but less than $50,000[,]
                 knowing that said check would not be paid or honored by the
                 credit institution[ ] upon presentment in the usual course of
                 business . . . .

      2
          Ind. Code § 35-43-5-5(a)(1) (repealed effective July 1, 2021, by P.L. 174-2021).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024                      Page 3 of 19
                                                Count 2 [theft]:

                 [O]n or about March 6, 2020, in Cass County . . . Hogg did
                 knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the
                 property of Dutch Mill, with the intent to deprive Dutch Mill of
                 any part of the use or value of the property, said property having
                 a value of at least [$750] and less than the value of [$50,000], to
                 wit: $984.7[9] . . . .

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 31.) Then, on September 25, 2020, the State

      amended the information by adding a count of Level 6 felony counterfeiting3 in

      an information that provided:

                 [O]n or about March 6, 2020, in Cass County . . . Hogg[ ] did
                 knowingly or intentionally make or utter a written instrument, in
                 such a manner that it purports to have been made by another
                 person . . .

      (Id. at 86.) The State also alleged Hogg was a habitual offender.

[4]   The State then moved to join Myer and Slavens with Hogg as co-defendants.

      Hogg objected, but the trial court granted the State’s motion. Myer pled guilty

      and Slavens absconded, so the State proceeded against Hogg individually.

[5]   At Hogg’s trial, the State offered into evidence all six of the false checks cashed

      at Dutch Mill. Hogg objected on the basis that the check deception and

      counterfeiting charges against him alleged “a check” and “a written

      3
          Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a)(1)(A).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024                Page 4 of 19
      instrument” while the theft charge alleged the specified amount of “$984.7[9,]”

      which was the value of the check that Hogg cashed at Dutch Mill in the early

      morning hours of March 7. Hogg, 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *2. Hogg also

      requested the court grant a mistrial. The State argued mistrial was improper

      and admission was appropriate because all six of the checks were proof of the

      charged acts that occurred “on or about March 6[.]” Id. at *3. The trial court

      overruled Hogg’s objection and denied Hogg’s motion for mistrial. The jury

      found Hogg guilty of all three charges. At sentencing, the State conceded the

      evidence for all three charges was the same, so the trial court “merged Hogg’s

      convictions” 4 of check deception and counterfeiting into the conviction of theft.

      Id. at *5. The court imposed a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony theft and

      enhanced it by five years for Hogg being a habitual offender.

[6]   Hogg appealed and argued the evidence presented by the State at trial varied

      materially from the charges that had been filed against him, such that he had

      been prejudiced in the preparation of his defense. On April 25, 2022, we

      handed down an opinion that explained:

               We agree with Hogg that the allegations in the charging
               instrument against him and the evidence used at his trial were
               not consistent. The State alleged, albeit across three counts, a

      4
        We note, as did our colleagues in the prior opinion of this court, that merger of convictions is inadequate to
      remedy a double jeopardy violation. See Hogg, 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *5 n.1. Instead, the trial court
      should note the multiple guilty findings in the record but then enter a single conviction. Green v. State, 856
      N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006) (double jeopardy occurs when court enters multiple judgments of conviction for
      the same crime, but multiple jury verdicts are unproblematic for double jeopardy purposes, so courts should
      merge (but not vacate) the guilty findings and enter a single conviction).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024                                   Page 5 of 19
        single criminal act: that on or about March 6, 2020, Hogg
        tendered one false check. Each of the three charges refers to a
        single check or written instrument. Count 1 identified “a check”
        and referred to the range of value of “said check.” Count 2
        specifically identified the amount of the check at issue, $984.79,
        which was the check that had been made payable to Hogg. And
        Count 3 accused Hogg of having made or uttered “a written
        instrument”—not multiple instruments.

        Further, the “on or about March 6, 2020” language used in each
        of the State’s charges was at best confusing. Without question, as
        the prosecutor emphasized at trial, time was not of the essence to
        the State’s charges here, and, thus, it was not necessary for the
        State to prove that Hogg’s act occurred on the date alleged. See
        Barger v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Ind. 1992). Still, coupled
        with the singular references to “a check” and “a written
        instrument” and the specific identification in Count 2 to the
        check payable to Hogg, the most natural reading of the “on or
        about March 6, 2020” language is that that date referred to the
        check Hogg cashed at the Dutch Mill bar in the early morning
        hours of March 7, which the Dutch Mill bar had recorded as a
        March 6 transaction.

        Thus, the charging instrument put Hogg on notice only that he
        had been accused of committing a single criminal act, which act
        could have resulted in a conviction for one, but only one, count
        of check deception, theft, or counterfeiting.

        Nonetheless, at trial the State’s evidence was far more expansive
        than the charging instrument suggested. The State presented
        evidence that Hogg had presented two false checks to the Dutch
        Mill bar on two different days; that Hogg had forged a third-
        party’s signature on the March 5 check payable to Robert
        Madewell; and that Hogg, Myer, and Slavens had acted as
        accomplices in repeatedly deceiving the Dutch Mill bar. On this
        latter point, the prosecutor was explicit that the false checks
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024           Page 6 of 19
        made payable to Myer and Slavens on both March 5 and March
        7 were also independent factual bases on which the jury could
        find Hogg guilty.

        Thus, the State’s evidence at trial was not that Hogg had
        committed a single criminal act. Rather, the State’s evidence was
        that Hogg, Myer, and Slavens had engaged in a criminal
        conspiracy and, individually and collectively, had engaged in at
        least six criminal acts.

        The variance between the State’s charges and evidence here is far
        more expansive than the misidentification of the necessary law-
        enforcement officer’s identity in Whaley [v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1
        (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied]. Further, the “means used” in
        the State’s charges against Hogg – the singular, March 7 check
        payable to him – was far different from the “means used” in the
        State’s evidence against Hogg – the apparent criminal conspiracy
        and each of the six checks made payable to Madewell, Myer,
        Slavens, and Hogg across two days. Moreover, the authority
        cited by the State in its brief discusses variances in nonessential
        details, not variances in what the underlying offenses even are or
        the factual bases for them. We therefore are not persuaded by
        the State’s cited authorities.

        The State’s notice to Hogg of its charges against him and the
        actual evidence presented at his trial was inconsistent. The
        State’s charging instrument did not put Hogg on notice of a
        criminal conspiracy or that he would be tried for any of the five
        false checks that did not bear his name.

        We also agree with Hogg that this variance misled him in his
        preparation of his defense. At trial, Hogg argued that he lacked
        knowledge that the checks were false, and that Myer had
        deceptively created the checks and presented the checks to Hogg
        as legitimate. The State’s more expansive evidence at trial, of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024           Page 7 of 19
         course, undermined that defense. Further, as Hogg’s counsel
         made clear at trial, the State’s charging information misled Hogg
         in the scope of his requested pretrial motions in limine, in which
         Hogg sought to properly discern and limit the scope of other acts
         that would and would not be available against him at trial.

         We thus turn to whether the variance resulted in prejudice
         against Hogg. Here, we emphasize both that Hogg’s defense was
         misled as explained above, and, further, that the prosecutor
         informed the jurors that it could find Hogg guilty on a variety of
         the acts that were not alleged in the charging information.
         Because of this, we have no way to discern if the jurors
         unanimously found Hogg guilty for presenting the false March 7
         check payable to him, or if instead the jurors relied unanimously
         or in part on the Madewell check, either of the Myer checks,
         either of the Slavens checks, or on a theory of accomplice
         liability. In short, we cannot say with confidence what the
         factual basis for the jury’s verdict was. Therefore, we agree with
         Hogg that the variance resulted in prejudice against him and
         denied his due process rights.

Hogg, 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *6-*7 (footnote omitted) (record citations

omitted) (italics in original). We accordingly reversed Hogg’s conviction of

theft. 5 Id. at *7 (“We reverse his conviction for Level 6 felony theft.”).

5
  The other two convictions were also reversed by implication. See Hogg, 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *5 n.1
(“in light of our resolution of this appeal, we need not remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate
the judgment of conviction entered on Counts 1 and 3”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024                                  Page 8 of 19
[7]   On June 13, 2022, the State filed a new charging information (hereinafter “2022

      Information”) that deleted the counterfeiting count and added five new counts

      against Hogg:

               Count 1 [Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit check deception]:

              [B]etween March 5, 2020 and March 7, 2020 in Cass County . . .
              Hogg, with the intent to commit the felony of check deception,
              did agree with another person or persons, to wit: Gail Slavens or
              Chad Myer, to commit the felony of check deception, to wit: to
              knowingly issue or deliver a check to acquire money or other
              property having a value of at least $750, but less than $50,000
              knowing that said check would not be paid or honored upon
              presentment in the usual course of business[.]

                       Count 2 [Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit theft]:

              [B]etween March 5, 2020 and March 7, 2020 in Cass County . . .
              Hogg, with the intent to commit the felony of theft, did agree
              with another person or persons, to wit: Gail Slavens or Chad
              Myer, to commit the felony of theft, to wit: to knowingly or
              intentionally exert unauthorized control over the property of
              Dutch Mill, with the intent to deprive Dutch Mill of any part of
              the use or value of the property, said property having a value of
              at least [$750] and less than the value of [$50,000.]

                 Count 3 [Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit counterfeiting]:

              [B]etween March 5, 2020 and March 7, 2020 in Cass County . . .
              Hogg, with the intent to commit the felony of counterfeiting, did
              agree with another person or persons, to wit: Gail Slavens or
              Chad Myer, to commit the felony of counterfeiting, to with [sic]:
              to knowingly or intentionally make or utter a written instrument,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024          Page 9 of 19
        in such a manner that it purports to have been made by another
        person[.]

                        Count 4 [Level 6 felony check deception]:

        [O]n or about March 5, 2020 in Cass County . . . Hogg did
        knowingly deliver a check, in the amount of $989.19 to acquire
        money, having a value of at least $750, but less than $50,000
        knowing that said check would not be paid or honored upon
        presentment in the usual course of business[.]

                                Count 5 [Level 6 felony theft]:

        [O]n or about March 5, 2020 in Cass County . . . Hogg did
        knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the
        property of Dutch Mill, to-wit: cash, with the intent to deprive
        Dutch Mill of any part of the use or value of the property, said
        property having a value of at least [$750] and less than the value
        of [$50,000], to-wit: $989.19[.]

                        Count 6 [Level 6 felony check deception]:

        [O]n or about March 7, 2020 in Cass County . . . Hogg did
        knowingly deliver a check, in the amount of $984.79 to acquire
        money, having a value of at least $750, but less than $50,000
        knowing that said check would not be paid or honored upon
        presentment in the usual course of business[.]

                                Count 7 [Level 6 felony theft]:

        [O]n or about March 7, 2020 in Cass County . . . Hogg did
        knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the
        property of Dutch Mill, to-wit: cash, with the intent to deprive
        Dutch Mill of any part of the use or value of the property, said
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024          Page 10 of 19
              property having a value of at least [$750] and less than the value
              of [$50,000], to-wit: 984.79[.]

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 236-38.)

[8]   On July 21, 2022, Hogg filed a motion to dismiss and a memorandum in

      support thereof. Hogg argued the State’s filing of five additional charges after

      Hogg’s successful appeal constituted impermissible prosecutorial vindictiveness

      and impermissible successive prosecution because the State had all the same

      evidence and could have filed the additional charges before Hogg’s first trial.

      The trial court held a hearing on Hogg’s motion on July 28, 2022. Hogg’s

      counsel argued:

              There’s no Motion that’s been presented as to why they’re asking
              for the charges to be amended or to add the charges two years
              after the original charges have been made and after a trial has
              already been done and the same evidence that was used at that
              trial, they’re going to want to use at another trial after they’ve
              amended these charges. . . . [T]hey already had the opportunity
              to do that, and the discretion was up to the prosecutor to amend
              those charges prior to us having the trial.

      (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34-35.) In response the State asserted:

              We’re not filing new charges. We’re filing the exact same thing
              in conformity with the instructions given by the Court of
              Appeals. The issue raised here addressed very clearly by the
              Court of Appeals was, was due process by way of notice, which
              we’ve amended. We’ve given plenty of notice here. So, there,
              there’s no additional charges being brought here. If I was
              vindictive, I’ll file a level 5. There’s a level 5 to be had here.
              Right? This is corrupt business influence to a T. This is an

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024            Page 11 of 19
              enterprise, which is a group of two or more people or a business,
              whether, you know, incorporated in fact engaging in a pattern,
              which is two or more acts of racketeering and activity, which
              includes things like forgery and fraud and theft. So, a level 5 is
              out there. Sadly, I can’t, I can’t file that. That would be deemed
              vindictive on its face. Not doing that. These were all level 6’s
              before, they’re level 6’s now and the charges that were merged
              before into two will be merged in this case. We just broadened
              the theory in conformity with the instructions given by the, by
              the Opinion, the written Opinion.

      (Id. at 37-38.) The trial court denied Hogg’s motion to dismiss, and Hogg asked

      the trial court to certify the order denying his motion to dismiss for

      interlocutory appeal. The trial court so certified, and we accepted jurisdiction

      over his appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[9]   A trial court’s decision whether to dismiss a charging information should be

      reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind.

      2008). An abuse of discretion has occurred if the trial court’s decision is

      “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the

      trial court,” or if the trial court “misinterpreted or misapplied the law.” State v.

      Smith, 179 N.E.3d 516, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. To the extent

      the parties’ arguments raise questions of law, we review those issues de novo.

      See Easler v. State, 131 N.E.3d 584, 588 (Ind. 2019) (“This Court reviews pure

      questions of law de novo.”).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024         Page 12 of 19
[10]   “[C]ourts have the inherent authority to dismiss criminal charges where the

       prosecution of such charges would violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.”

       Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 285. Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4 (2004) also provides

       a “non-exclusive list of reasons allowing dismissal of an indictment or

       information.” Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 285. The provision in that statute barring

       prosecution “by reason of a previous prosecution[,]” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-

       4(a)(7), is based in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of double jeopardy.

       Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 285. “Whether a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy

       is a question of law.” Smith v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2013) (quoting Swenson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), reh’g

       denied, trans. denied.

[11]   As the State notes in its brief, a defendant generally may be retried after a

       conviction is reversed on appeal, (Appellee’s Br. at 11) (citing Dexter v. State,

       959 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 2012)), unless the “conviction is reversed due to

       insufficient evidence because such a reversal is tantamount to an acquittal.”

       Dexter, 959 N.E.2d at 240. Herein, though, Hogg’s convictions were not

       reversed because the State presented insufficient evidence. Instead, his

       convictions were reversed because the trial court permitted the State to present

       too much evidence regarding criminal acts for which the charging information

       had not given Hogg notice that he would be on trial. See Hogg, 21A-CR-2251,

       memo. op. at *6-*7 (“[T]he charging instrument put Hogg on notice only that

       he had been accused of committing a single criminal act . . . . [T]he State’s

       evidence was that Hogg, Myer, and Slavens had engaged in a criminal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024         Page 13 of 19
       conspiracy and, individually and collectively, had engaged in at least six

       criminal acts.”).

[12]   When convictions are reversed due to improper admission of evidence, double

       jeopardy concerns usually do not apply. Walters v. State, 120 N.E.2d 1145, 1156

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 237 (Ind. 1997)).

       Rather, “if all the evidence, even that erroneously admitted, is sufficient to

       support the jury verdict, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial on the same

       charge.” Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 705 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Stahl v.

       State, 686 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind. 1997)). In light of all the evidence admitted at

       Hogg’s prior trial, we have no trouble determining the record contained

       sufficient evidence to prove that, in the early morning hours of March 7, 2020,

       Hogg presented a fake check to the Dutch Mill bar to obtain $984.79 from

       Dutch Mill while knowing Dutch Mill would be unable to collect that money

       from a credit institution upon presentment of the check in the usual course of

       business. See, e.g., Neese v. State, 994 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

       (evidence sufficient to support conviction of check deception when defendant

       traded her check for acquaintance’s cash knowing acquaintance could not

       obtain cash from bank because defendant had closed the checking account).

       Accordingly, double jeopardy does not prohibit Hogg’s retrial. See, e.g.,

       Carpenter, 786 N.E.2d at 705 (holding Carpenter could be retried following

       reversal of his convictions for improper admission of evidence because the

       evidence presented at his first trial was sufficient to support his convictions).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024         Page 14 of 19
[13]   Nevertheless, the parties disagree about the charges for which Hogg may be

       tried at a second trial. We begin by pointing back to language from Carpenter:

       “double jeopardy does not bar a retrial on the same charge.” 786 N.E.2d at 705

       (emphasis added). As our prior opinion made clear, the original charging

       instrument charged Hogg with “a single criminal act, which act could have

       resulted in a conviction for one, but only one, count of check deception, theft,

       or counterfeiting.” Hogg, 21A-CR-2251, memo. op. at *6. Because we held

       those are the charges for which Hogg stood trial in his first trial, see id., the State

       was entitled to try Hogg a second time for check deception, theft, and

       counterfeiting based on Hogg’s passing of a fake check for $984.79 at Dutch

       Mill in the early morning hours of March 7, 2020. See, e.g., Carpenter, 786

       N.E.2d at 705 (holding Carpenter could be retried following reversal of his

       convictions for improper admission of evidence because the evidence presented

       at his first trial was sufficient to support his convictions).

[14]   Rather than retry Hogg based on the original charging information, on June 13,

       2022, the State filed a new seven-count charging information that included five

       new Level 6 felony charges based on criminal behavior that occurred on March

       5, 2020, and/or in cooperation with Myer or Slavens. Hogg argues this filing of

       new charges after his successful appeal demonstrates prosecutorial

       vindictiveness that violates his right to due process. As our Indiana Supreme

       Court made clear more than forty years ago,

               when the prosecution has occasion to file more numerous or
               more severe charges for the same basic criminal conduct against

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024           Page 15 of 19
               an accused after the accused has successfully exercised his
               statutory or constitutional rights to an appeal, the prosecution
               bears a heavy burden of proving that any increase in the number
               or severity of the charges was not motivated by a vindictive
               purpose.

       Cherry v. State, 275 Ind. 14, 20, 414 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1981). “[U]nless there is

       new evidence or information discovered to warrant additional charges, the

       potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness is too great for courts to allow the

       State to bring additional charges against a defendant” after that defendant

       exercises his right to a fair trial by moving for a mistrial. Warner v. State, 773

       N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ind. 2002). Moreover, the rationale for protecting the right to

       a fair trial, which supports the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, “is

       even more compelling in the case of a successful appeal than in the case of a

       successful motion for a mistrial” because, in Indiana, convicted persons have a

       constitutional right to an appeal. Owens v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2005).

[15]   The State argues it is permitted to bring the five additional charges because “the

       State is not alleging any new criminal acts nor seeking more severe penalties.”

       (Appellee’s Br. at 14.) We find the State’s argument disingenuous.

[16]   First, our prior opinion made clear that Hogg had been charged for only one

       criminal act – the one alleged to have occurred when he cashed a check for

       $984.79 at Dutch Mill in the early morning hours of March 7, 2020.

       Accordingly, a charge based on any other alleged criminal act – whether a

       conspiracy with Myer or Slaven or a check cashed by Hogg on March 5, 2020 –

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024          Page 16 of 19
       is, in fact, an allegation of a criminal act that had not been charged prior to

       Hogg’s first trial and appeal. Thus, the five additional counts are “new”

       criminal allegations. See Webster’s New English Dictionary, “new” (Third Ed.,

       1976) (“having existed or having been made but a short time: having originated

       or occurred lately: not early or long in being: RECENT, FRESH, MODERN –

       opposed to old”) (formatting in original).

[17]   Second, in circumstances such as this, due process prohibits the State from

       seeking not just “more severe penalties[,]” (Appellee’s Br. at 14), but also from

       seeking a greater number of convictions. See Cherry, 275 Ind. at 20, 414 N.E.2d

       at 305 (“more numerous or more severe charges”). The State claims it seeks

       only one conviction. (Appellee’s Br. at 17) (“only one conviction will survive

       (along with the habitual enhancement)”). However, the additional criminal

       charges filed by the State allege wholly separate criminal behavior that, while

       part of a single plan or scheme, could result in multiple convictions that would

       not merge under our State’s double jeopardy jurisprudence. See, e.g., Littlefield v.

       State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (simultaneous convictions of

       murder and conspiracy to commit that murder did not violate Indiana

       Constitution’s prohibition of double jeopardy), trans. denied.

[18]   The State may not obtain the one conviction it seeks by charging additional

       crimes that the State could have charged prior to the first trial. See Warner v.

       State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Ind. 2002) (“Having known of the attempted

       robbery evidence it used at the second trial all along, notions of fundamental

       fairness dictate that it was improper for the State to add the new counts [of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024         Page 17 of 19
       felony murder and attempted robbery] after Warner exercised his right to a fair

       trial [on a charge of murder].”). The trial court abused its discretion when it

       denied Hogg’s motion to dismiss the five new charges filed against Hogg after

       he exercised his constitutional right to an appeal. See, e.g., id. at 244 (holding

       trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the charges to allege two

       additional crimes after defendant exercised his right to a fair trial).

       Conclusion
[19]   Following reversal for improper admission of evidence, Hogg may be retried for

       the same charges, but the State may not add any additional charges based on

       the same evidence. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by denying

       Hogg’s motion to dismiss the five new charges the State filed on June 13, 2022.

       We reverse the trial court’s denial of that motion and remand for further

       proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

[20]   Reversed and remanded.

       Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Mark K. Leeman
       Leeman Law Office
       Logansport, Indiana
       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Indiana Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024         Page 18 of 19
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-525 | March 27, 2024   Page 19 of 19