Court Opinion

ID: 9635390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:49:39.610701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:26.422879
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion would make the equitable principle of de minimis applicable to cases in *244trespass quare clausum fregit. This is, in my view, contrary to the established law in Pennsylvania. Further, it violates several critical policy considerations. I would reverse the order of the court below and order the wall removed from appellant’s land within a specified period of time.
The law in Pennsylvania on this subject dates back to the last century. In Pile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296, 31 A. 646 (1895), the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth had before it a case legally identical to the one before us. There a wall was erected which encroached 1% inches 1 onto the property of the adjoining landowner. In relevant part the opinion of the court states:
For one inch and three eighths the ends of the stones in the wall are said to project beyond the division line. The defendants have no right at law or in equity to occupy land that does not belong to them and we do not see how the court below could have done otherwise than recognize and act upon this principle. They must remove their wall so that it shall be upon their land.
Id., 167 Pa. at 300-1, 31 A. at 647.
In Pile there is no suggestion of any doubt as to the result. Nor should there have been. This was in the face of an argument made by appellant that the wall should have been left as it was — for its removal would work a greater injury than damages at law.
While I believe that Pile governs the case before us, thus removing from this court’s appraisal of its wisdom — I will briefly explore some of the other authority for this result and its underlying rationale.
Dean Prosser, perhaps the foremost authority on torts in twentieth century America, quoted in his hornbook the following statement. “... the common law, in considering liability for intrusions upon realty could not undertake to discriminate between the much and the little.” Prosser, LAW OF TORTS, 4th ed., (1971) at p. 63.
*245As in Pile this has been found to be the rule even where little or no damage was suffered. The paucity of damage was held to be an insufficient reason to deny a mandatory injunction. Blood v. Cohen, 330 Mass. 385, 113 N.E.2d 448 (1953). This rule was also not voided by the fact that the expense to defendant in removing the trespassing object would be disproportionate to the damage to the plaintiff. Lizzo v. Drukas, 333 Mass. 242, 129 N.E.2d 892 (1955). See also Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 193 N.E. 726 (1935).
In another case directly on point, the Supreme Court of our sister state, Arkansas, has held that the de minimis principle has no application to an encroachment caused by a brick wall leaning over a property line. Fulks v. Fredeman, 224 Ark. 413, 273 S.W.2d 528 (1954).
Five distinct and independently adequate policy considerations support this line of thinking.
First, it has a preventive function. Acting against such unauthorized, (albeit spatially minimal), trespasses deters their future occurrence elsewhere. An unenforceable right soon ceases to be a right in any real-world sense. See generally, Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173 (1931).
Second, it promotes the lawful resolution of disputes by providing for appropriate economic reparations to the injured party — and, where economic reparation is insufficient, it affords the plaintiff the emotionally vital sense of vindication.
Third, it can be used to settle boundary disputes. See Pfeiffer v. Grossman, 15 Ill. 53 (1853) and Bragg v. Laraway, 65 Vt. 673, 27 A. 492 (1893).
Fourth, it prevents the defendant from unjustly benefiting at the expense of plaintiff. Justice requires no less, for the illegal appropriation of realty cannot be rewarded in a society that operates under the rule of law. J.H. Leavenworth & Sons v. Hunter, 150 Miss. 245, 116 So. 593 (1928). *246Thus, the plaintiff is left in at least as good a position as he was before the trespass.
Fifth, this rule provides an avenue through which an easement by prescription can be terminated. Pagenstecher v. Biasiolli, 267 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Civ.App., 1954).
I reject the majority’s disposition of this case for these policy reasons. Case law in other jurisdictions supports this result. More importantly, governing case law in this jurisdiction compels this result.
I dissent.

. I note that the encroachment in the instant case was two inches.