Court Opinion

ID: 9881073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:03:55.470057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.902716
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Uriquidez CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     (Tehama)
                                        ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096228

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. 21CR900005)

           v.

 ALEJANDRO LEON URIQUIDEZ,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Alejandro Leon Uriquidez guilty of sex offenses
committed against three child victims, I.C., A.C., and C.V. On appeal, defendant raises
three arguments: 1) the trial court did not make a reasonable inquiry into a juror’s
impartiality; 2) there is insufficient evidence to support one of defendant’s aggravated
lewd conduct convictions; and 3) the fines and fees imposed by the trial court were
incorrect. We agree as to the amount of the fines and fees and order they be modified but
otherwise affirm the judgment.

                                                             1
                                     BACKGROUND
       Maria C., who is I.C. and A.C.’s mother and C.V.’s grandmother, was in a
relationship with defendant. During the relationship, defendant lived with Maria C. and
the three victims (I.C., A.C., and C.V.) and sexually abused them. The prosecution
charged defendant with 10 counts of forcible lewd conduct (Pen. Code, § 288, subd.
(b)(1)1; counts 1 through 8, 10, & 14), four counts of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd.
(c)(2); counts 9, 13, 16, & 18), four counts of rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 11, 12, 15,
& 17), and one count of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5, subd. (a); count 19). The
prosecution also alleged multiple victim aggravating circumstances as to all counts.
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5).)2
       We will provide a brief summary of the evidence for context; more detailed facts
are provided below, as relevant to the issues on appeal. I.C. testified about several
incidents in which defendant sexually abused her. Defendant would come into her
bedroom and abuse I.C. “mostly every night.” He also pretended to wrestle with her and
groped her while doing so. In addition, defendant abused I.C. when he was driving her to
school and to the store, beginning when she was in first grade and continuing through
sixth grade. I.C. also testified about an incident where defendant raped her.
       To keep her in line, defendant would threaten to harm I.C.’s mother and baby
sister if I.C. did not do what she was told. In one specific incident, I.C. refused to have
sex with defendant so he raped A.C., her deaf sister. I.C. recounted other specific
incidents of abuse. Altogether, defendant continuously abused I.C. from the time she was

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Defendant correctly points out that the information’s allegations relating to section
667.61, subdivision (e)(5) are incorrect and, instead, the correct reference should be to
section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4), as each allegation states defendant committed his
misconduct on more than one victim.

                                              2
5 or 6 years old until she was 13 years old, and only abstained from abusing her for about
one month during that period.
       C.V. testified defendant sexually abused her and then threatened her afterwards.
More detail about the circumstances will be provided post. A.C. testified defendant raped
and abused her on a regular basis from the time she was 10 years old until she was 15
years old.
       Following a five-day jury trial, the jury found defendant guilty of all counts and
found true the aggravating circumstance allegations.
       At sentencing, the trial court vacated counts 11 through 14 under People v.
Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240. The court imposed a sentence of 225 years to life. The
court also imposed fines and fees as listed in the probation report, which included a $760
court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), a $570 criminal conviction assessment (Gov.
Code, § 70373), and a $500 sex offender fine (§ 290.3), plus applicable penalty
assessments adding an additional $1,300.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                          Juror Bias
       We begin with defendant’s first claim alleging that the trial court did not complete
a reasonable inquiry into a juror’s impartiality which was first brought to the court’s
attention after the jury had been sworn and during the presentation of evidence. More
specifically, defendant contends that, after Juror No. 6 raised a question about his own
impartiality, the trial court did not adequately inquire into the juror’s state of mind.
       A.     Background
       During jury selection, the trial court read the charges against defendant and asked
the jurors, including Juror No. 6, whether they would have any difficulty being fair and

                                               3
impartial in the case, based on those charges. Juror No. 6 did not indicate he would have
any difficulties. He stated he had two children, ages six and four.
       On the morning after I.C. and her mother testified, the juror asked to speak with
the court. Juror No. 6 explained, “I believe highly in our justice system and how things
are conducted, and I want to give the defendant the fair opportunity, and I no longer
believe that in myself to be able to give him that.” The juror said he was not trying to say
something that he had failed to say before the trial started. The court asked whether Juror
No. 6 had started to form opinions about the case after the trial started, and the juror
responded, “It was more when I got home and looked at my daughters, and there’s just no
way that I would–you know, it’s one thing to make accusations towards somebody, and
it’s completely wrong to make false ones and I agree with that. But I don’t believe that I
can hold myself to that standard. I don’t want to be unfair to our justice system.”
       The trial court asked whether the juror would be able to follow an instruction
saying he should decide the case “only on the evidence that you hear and only after you
decided if the witness is credible,” and Juror No. 6 replied, “I will, but . . . .” Before
Juror No. 6 could complete his comment, the court confirmed Juror No. 6 was not saying,
“No matter what the evidence is, I am going to vote a certain way.” Based on further
questioning by the court, Juror No. 6 confirmed he would listen to all the evidence before
making a final decision about the verdict.
       Counsel then had a discussion off the record with the trial court. The court then
confirmed Juror No. 6 could “be fair and listen to all of the evidence before” making up
his mind about the verdict, would wait until the evidence was in and argument was done
before forming an opinion as to the verdict, and had not already made up his mind about
how to vote. The court explained that further evidence could inform the juror’s opinions
and that argument from counsel could help explain how the evidence fit into the law, and
the juror assured the court he would wait until he had heard “all of the witnesses, all the
evidence and all the arguments” before reaching a conclusion.

                                               4
       The trial court asked Juror No. 6 two final questions:
       “THE COURT: Okay. Anything else that you want to tell us?
       “JUROR NUMBER SIX: No.
       “THE COURT: All right. Do you think I asked the right questions to get what
you’re thinking?
       “JUROR NUMBER SIX: No.”
       Juror No. 6 apologized to the trial court for “wasting your time” after which the
court thanked the juror for his candor and assured him “it’s not a waste of time.” After
the juror left, the court provided counsel a further opportunity to pose questions, and both
declined. Defense counsel then asked to remove Juror No. 6, arguing defendant could
not receive a fair trial, despite the juror’s “technically” correct answers. The trial court
denied the request, explaining:
       “First of all, the juror articulated his desire to be fair, and he actually said he does–
he–well, when he articulated his concern, he said that the defendant–something to the
effect that the defendant needs a fair trial, and he was concerned that he couldn’t be fair;
and it was because–and then he started talking about he knows that people can make false
accusations, he also mentioned the fact that he looked at his daughters.
       “So, we can make inference from that that he’s–he’s maybe leaning one way or
the other, but the truth is we don’t know what the evidence yesterday and–or how that
affected him and how look[ing] at his daughter[s] affected him. It could [be] that that
[e]ffect was such that he was leaning towards the prosecution, but, frankly, it–it could
have meant that–with his mention of false accusations and listening to the testimony
yesterday, that he didn’t believe the–the witness.
       “I–I thought it was important not–not to get him to tell his ultimate bias, but I
think the only way to do that is ask him questions; and he appeared to be credible when
he was asked whether he still could be fair, which he said he could. Whether he had

                                               5
made up his mind and he said he had not. Will he wait to hear all the evidence and the
argument until he decides, he said he could.
       “I think we have a very conscientious juror who was worried, after he started
forming opinions, after listening to the case, which is very normal, I would think. Just
because he has that extra sense or urging to speak with us about his concern. Really his
concern was to have a fair jury, and I still think he presents as a fair juror, because he is
willing to follow the law. He is willing to continue to be fair. He’s willing to still have
an open mind, and I didn’t think this discussion was any different than we have with
jurors during–during the jury selection. The only difference was that we had a discussion
during the trial instead of before–before the trial.
       “With that said, because he appeared very credible when he said he still could be
fair in his desire to be a fair juror, I think that it would be inappropriate to dismiss him, so
he will remain on the jury.”
       B.     Analysis
       “ ‘An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. [Citations.]
An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations]
and every member is “ ‘capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence
before it’ ” [citations].’ ” (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 824.)
       A trial court may discharge a juror for good cause at any time if it finds the juror is
unable to perform their duties. (§ 1089; People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th
60, 69 (Allen); People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 588 (Lomax).) When a court is
apprised of information which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s
removal, it must conduct whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine whether
the juror should be discharged. (Allen, at p. 69; Lomax, at p. 588.) Whether and how to
hold such a hearing is a matter within the court’s discretion, as is the ultimate decision
whether to discharge or retain a sitting juror. (Allen, at p. 70; People v. Holloway (2004)
33 Cal.4th 96, 124-125 (Holloway); Lomax, at p. 589.)

                                               6
        However, to support a decision to discharge a juror, a “ ‘somewhat stronger
showing’ than is typical for abuse of discretion review must be made to support such
decisions on appeal. [Citations.] . . . [T]he basis for a juror’s disqualification must appear
on the record as a ‘demonstrable reality.’ This standard involves ‘a more comprehensive
and less deferential review’ than simply determining whether any substantial evidence in
the record supports the trial court’s decision. [Citation.] It must appear ‘that the court as
trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion
that bias was established.’ [Citation.]” (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 589.)
Conversely, where substantial evidence supports a trial court’s conclusion that a juror is
able to serve impartially, and no inability to do so appears as a demonstrable reality in the
record, the court’s failure to discharge the juror is not an abuse of discretion. (Holloway,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 126.)
        The fact that Juror No. 6 initially expressed concerns to the trial court does not
mean he could not be an impartial juror or needed to be immediately discharged. During
trial, jurors are required to “maintain an open mind, consider all the evidence, and subject
any preliminary opinion to rational and collegial scrutiny before coming to a final
determination.” (Allen, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 75.) Thus, the trial court’s inquiry
appropriately focused on Juror No. 6’s ability to do these things, even if he may have
formed an initial opinion in the case based on the first day of testimony. The court
questioned Juror No. 6 about whether he could consider all the evidence, keep an open
mind, and carefully take into consideration the evidence and arguments before reaching a
final verdict. And, the court asked Juror No. 6 the open-ended question about whether he
had anything else he wanted to share; significantly, he replied that he did not. Following
this discussion, the court found Juror No. 6 to be “credible” and “conscientious,” noting
his willingness to keep an open mind, despite forming some initial opinions about the
case.

                                               7
       Following our review of the trial court’s questions and the juror’s responses to
those questions, we believe the trial court could have “reasonably conclude[d] the juror
was trying to be honest” about his opinion of the testimony up to that point “but was also
sincerely willing and able to listen to the evidence and instructions and render an
impartial verdict based on that evidence and those instructions.” (People v. Hillhouse
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488.) “A reviewing court must allow the trial court to make this
sort of determination. The trial court is present and able to observe the juror itself. It can
judge the person’s sincerity and actual state of mind far more reliably than an appellate
court reviewing only a cold transcript.” (Id., at pp. 488-489.)
       Defendant argues Juror No. 6’s final statement that the trial court had not asked
the “right questions” makes this case similar to People v. McNeal (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d
830, 836, which found error in a trial court’s decision not to inquire into the factual basis
of a juror’s bias after the juror sent an ambiguous note indicating she had “information
outside the evidence” that could affect her impartiality. Here, however, the trial court did
inquire as to the source of the information that Juror No. 6 was concerned about, and
determined the juror’s fears of bias were based on the testimony he heard, rather than
something that occurred before trial or outside the courtroom. Thus, unlike McNeal, the
trial court eliminated the possibility of “improper influences” into Juror No. 6’s
deliberations. (Id. at p. 838.) Juror No. 6’s statement came after hearing difficult
testimony in a case concerning child sexual abuse, which likely evoked strong emotional
reactions. In this context, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude the juror may
have formed a preliminary opinion necessitating an inquiry into whether he could keep an
open mind and consider the remaining evidence before making a final decision. Once the
court had confirmed this was the case, and in the absence of any further communications
from the juror or evidence he refused to deliberate or consider the evidence, no further
inquiry was required. (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 592.) We see no abuse of
discretion in the court’s inquiry.

                                              8
                                             II
                                   Insufficient Evidence
       Relying on People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999 and People v. Senior
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, defendant argues insufficient evidence supports count 10
because there was no evidence he used force or duress against C.V. when he abused her.
We disagree.
       A.      Background
       C.V., who was 23 years old at the time of trial, testified for the prosecution. Once,
when C.V. was in elementary school, defendant asked her if she wanted to play a game,
then lifted her in the air from behind. Defendant threw her in the air, then slipped his
hands under her clothes and held her in the air with his hands on her chest. C.V.
described his conduct as “weird,” saying she felt scared and could still feel his hands on
her. She knew “what was going on was not okay,” but did not say anything to defendant
at the time because he was so much taller than she was. She froze when he held her and
ran away as soon as he put her down. She was upset and crying. A few days later,
defendant took her to a bedroom, grabbed her arms, and asked her if she enjoyed what he
had done. He tried to pull her closer and she pushed him away; he said that if she said
anything to anyone, he would do the same to her sisters.
       B.      Analysis
       “ ‘ “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] We determine “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment the

                                             9
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (People
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626.) “[O]ur task is not to resolve credibility
issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might ‘ “ ‘be
reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s innocence.’ ” ’ [Citations.] The relevant
inquiry is whether, in light of all the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th
243, 278.)
       Section 288, subdivision (a), prohibits any person from committing a lewd or
lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” Section 288,
subdivision (b)(1), further prohibits the commission of such a lewd or lascivious act “by
use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
on the victim or another person.” “ ‘Force, in this context, means physical force that is
“ ‘substantially different from or substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish
the lewd act itself.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 373, 391.)
       “ ‘A defendant uses “force” if the prohibited act is facilitated by the defendant’s
use of physical violence, compulsion or constraint against the victim other than, or in
addition to, the physical contact which is inherent in the prohibited act.’ [Citation.] ‘The
evidentiary key to whether an act was forcible is not whether the distinction between the
“force” used to accomplish the prohibited act and the physical contact inherent in that act
can be termed “substantial.” Instead, an act is forcible if force facilitated the act rather
than being merely incidental to the act.’ ” (People v. Morales (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th
471, 480.) “[A]cts of grabbing, holding and restraining that occur in conjunction with the
lewd acts themselves” are sufficient to support a finding that the lewd act was committed
by means of force. (People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005.)
       Citing People v. Schulz, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 999 and People v. Senior, supra,
3 Cal.App.4th 765, defendant argues there was no evidence of “any sort of struggle,” and

                                              10
that any force was “so minimal that it fails to reach the level . . . necessary to sustain the
judgment.” Both Schulz and Senior have been roundly rejected by multiple courts,
including this court, however, and we do not find them persuasive. (See, e.g., People v.
Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Soto
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 229; People v. Aguilar (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1027; People v.
Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383, 387-388.)
       Here, defendant lifted the victim, who was a child in elementary school, up in the
air and threw her in the air while fondling her. Even at the time, the conduct disturbed
her, to the extent that when she testified, more than ten years later, she said she could
“still feel his fucking hands on me.” She described being “frozen” and said she could not
do or say anything at the time because she was “a kid and he was an adult,” and “he was
a lot taller.” After he put her down, she ran away and cried. The disparity in age and size
between the victim and defendant, as well as the fact defendant was holding the victim
and throwing her up in the air, is enough to find defendant used force. Defendant
restrained the victim in a way that was more than merely incidental to the lewd act, and
we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant on this count.
                                              III
                                       Fines and Fees
       Defendant argues the trial court imposed excessive court operations and criminal
conviction assessments, as well as an excessive sex offender fine and associated penalty
assessments. The People concede the errors. We agree with the parties and will modify
the judgment accordingly.
       Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) required a $40 per count assessment to fund
court operations, and Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1) requires a $30
per felony count assessment to fund court facilities. Here, the probation report calculated
each of these assessments assuming defendant had 19 convictions. At the sentencing
hearing, however, the trial court vacated the convictions on four of the counts, consistent

                                              11
with People v. Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 240. Thus, the court should have imposed
these assessments based on the final 15 convictions, rather than the initial 19 convictions.
We will modify the judgment and direct the court to update its records. (See People v.
Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 349.)
       Similarly, section 290.3, subdivision (a) provides “[e]very person who is
convicted of any offense specified in subdivision (c) of Section 290 shall, in addition to
any imprisonment or fine, or both, imposed for commission of the underlying offense, be
punished by a fine of three hundred dollars ($300) upon the first conviction or a fine of
five hundred dollars ($500) upon the second and each subsequent conviction, unless the
court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the fine.” Here, the
probation report recommends a single $500 fine, plus applicable penalty assessments, but
a $500 fine is only available for the second and subsequent convictions, and the trial
court did not impose a $300 fine for the first conviction. We agree with the parties that
the trial court’s imposition of a single fine implies a finding defendant did not have the
ability to pay fines for his second and subsequent convictions, and that it was improper
for the court to impose a $500 fine, rather than a $300 fine. (People v. Burnett (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 257, 261.) We will modify the judgment to reduce the fine and the
accompanying penalty assessments.

                                             12
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to reduce the court operations assessment (§ 1465.8) to
$600 and the criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) to $450. The sex
offender fine (§ 290.3) is reduced to $300, which, in addition to applicable penalty
assessments listed in the probation report, totals $1,080. The trial court is directed to
amend the abstract of judgment and send a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/                         ,
                                                  WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

 /s/                        ,
MAURO, Acting P. J.

 /s/                        ,
MESIWALA, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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