Court Opinion

ID: 9930516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 01:00:37.256662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:14.749632
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40072          Document: 00517058045              Page: 1       Date Filed: 02/06/2024

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit
                                       ____________                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                        No. 23-40072                          FILED
                                       ____________                     February 6, 2024
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                   Clerk

                                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                               versus

   Jonathan Rolando Ortiz-De Leon,

                                                Defendant—Appellant.
                       ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:22-CR-716-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, Stewart, Circuit Judge, and Hanks,
   District Judge. *
   Per Curiam: **
          On September 14, 2022, Jonathan Rolando Ortiz-De Leon pleaded
   guilty to hostage taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203.                        His charge
   originated in his kidnapping a four-year-old child and demanding a ransom
   from the child’s father, as part of a larger business to smuggle persons over
   the United States-Mexico border. The district court sentenced Ortiz-De
         _____________________
          *
              District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
          **
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40072      Document: 00517058045            Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/06/2024

                                      No. 23-40072

   Leon to 174 months of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the district
   court plainly erred by imposing a three-level sentencing enhancement under
   U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(6), which applies if “the victim is a minor and, in
   exchange for money or other consideration, was placed in the care or custody
   of another person who had no legal right to such care or custody of the
   victim.” We affirm the district court’s judgment.
                                           I
                                           A
          Nayelie Fabiola Mejia-Lopez paid approximately $7,000 for her and
   her four-year-old son, L.Z.R.M., to be smuggled into the United States from
   Mexico. Mejia-Lopez and her son were housed in a stash house in the United
   States for eleven days with minimal food and no electricity or running water.
   The smugglers forcibly removed L.Z.R.M. from his mother at the request of
   the boy’s father (Sabdi Minyamin Roblero-Bravo) who separately paid
   $2,500 to have his son transported to him. Approximately one week later, an
   individual involved with the smuggling enterprise told Roblero-Bravo that he
   would not release L.Z.R.M. until an additional $6,000 was paid, an amount
   that was later raised to $6,500.
          Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in Houston received
   information about L.Z.R.M. The same day, an undercover HSI agent posed
   as the boy’s uncle and contacted the smuggler at the phone number Roblero-
   Bravo provided. The smuggler demanded a ransom payment of $6,500 and
   implied that if the money was not paid, L.Z.R.M. would be harmed.
          The undercover HSI agent contacted the suspects and proposed to
   meet at an IKEA parking lot to exchange the ransom money for L.Z.R.M.
   The suspects agreed on the condition that they would first receive the cash,
   and L.Z.R.M. would be delivered later. Agents also tracked a phone, that
   proved to be Ortiz-De Leon’s, to locate L.Z.R.M.

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                                   No. 23-40072

          On the same day that agents tracked that phone, Ortiz-De Leon was
   seen driving a blue Nissan SUV with paper tags. Agents surveilled the
   vehicle, leading them to an apartment complex in Stafford, Texas. At the
   complex, the agents witnessed Ortiz-De Leon interacting with children, one
   of whom matched the description of L.Z.R.M. Agents then stopped Ortiz-
   De Leon’s vehicle (in which Ortiz-De Leon and Carlos Oyervides were
   riding) in the apartment parking lot. The agents called the number they had
   been using to communicate with the suspects and heard a phone ring inside
   the vehicle. Subsequently, the agents arrested Ortiz-De Leon and Oyervides.
          Following the arrest, officers from the Houston Police Department
   conducted a “knock and talk” at the apartment complex. While there, the
   officers spoke with Ortiz-De Leon’s wife, Evelyn Serna, who consented to a
   search of the apartment. The officers found L.Z.R.M. in the apartment.
          Ortiz-De Leon waived his Miranda rights and confessed, claiming this
   was the first time he was involved in taking a minor hostage. He admitted
   that he kept L.Z.R.M. in his home and that he was to be paid $1,000 for doing
   so. Ortiz-De Leon also admitted that he requested Roblero-Bravo pay $6,500
   for the return of L.Z.R.M. However, he denied contacting the child’s uncle
   (the undercover agent) on the day of his arrest and instead placed the blame
   on Oyervides.
          Ortiz-De Leon outlined the events leading up to his arrest. He related
   that Oyervides and Gilbert Montez contacted him and requested that he pick
   up a child at a Houston Kroger. Ortiz-De Leon picked up L.Z.R.M. and was
   supposed to contact the child’s father but could not reach him.
   Consequently, Ortiz-De Leon brought L.Z.R.M. home and placed him in the
   care of his wife. His wife was angry at him and informed him that he was
   committing a crime.

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                                   No. 23-40072

         Ortiz-De Leon said that on the day of his arrest, Montez contacted
   him. In this conversation, Montez instructed Ortiz-De Leon not to deliver
   L.Z.R.M. because “law enforcement had disrupted his operations down
   south.” Instead, Oyervides came to Ortiz-De Leon’s home and said they
   would send someone else to deliver L.Z.R.M. Text messages from Ortiz-De
   Leon’s phone indicate that he offered Carlos Catalan $200 to deliver
   L.Z.R.M.
                                        B
         A three-count indictment was filed against Ortiz-De Leon in the
   Southern District of Texas. For this appeal, the relevant count is Count 3:
   hostage taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203. Ortiz-De Leon entered into
   a plea agreement.     In exchange for pleading guilty to Count 3, the
   Government agreed to (a) not oppose his request for full credit for his
   acceptance of responsibility and to (b) dismiss any remaining counts.
         Subsequently, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence
   Investigation Report (PSR) for Ortiz-De Leon’s sentencing.         Ortiz-De
   Leon’s base offense level was 32, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a). Several
   upward adjustments were assessed. First, a six-level increase pursuant to
   U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(1) was proposed because Ortiz-De Leon demanded a
   ransom. Second, a one-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(4)(B)
   was proposed because Ortiz-De Leon did not release L.Z.R.M. before seven
   days had elapsed.    Third, a three-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.
   § 2A4.1(b)(6) was proposed because “the victim is a minor and, in exchange
   for money or other consideration, was placed in the care or custody of
   another person who had no legal right to such care or custody of the victim.”
   Fourth, a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) was
   proposed because Ortiz-De Leon knew or should have known that a victim of
   the offense was a vulnerable victim. The total adjusted offense level was 44.

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                                      No. 23-40072

   The probation officer recommended a one-level reduction, pursuant to
   U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Commentary to Sentencing Table, cmt. n.2. The
   resulting total offense level was 43, and Ortiz-De Leon’s criminal history
   category was I based on his prior conviction in 2015 for assault of a family
   member.
           The district court did not fully adopt the PSR’s recommendations. As
   Ortiz-De Leon accepted responsibility, the district court applied a three-level
   reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). While that reduction
   should have brought the total to level 40, the district court incorrectly
   reported the number as 41. Next, the district court rejected the two-level
   vulnerable victim enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), resulting
   in the total offense level 39. The district court overruled Ortiz-De Leon’s
   objection to the one-level increase pursuant to § 2A4.1(b)(4)(B) because
   L.Z.R.M. was held longer than seven days.
           At this point, the total offense level calculated by the district court was
   39, and Ortiz-De Leon’s criminal history category was I. The corresponding
   sentencing guidelines range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. The
   district court granted the Government’s motion for downward departure but
   refused to “do more than what they recommend” because of the “very
   serious offense.” The district court sentenced Ortiz-De Leon to 174 months
   of imprisonment. Ortiz-De Leon timely appealed.
                                           II
           Ortiz-De Leon argues that the district court committed reversible
   error   by   applying     the   sentencing    enhancement       under    U.S.S.G.
   § 2A4.1(b)(6). He contends that the enhancement does not apply and relies
   on the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 2A4.1(b)(6) in United States v.

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                                               No. 23-40072

   Alvarez-Cuevas, 1 which held that the enhancement is inapplicable “when a
   fellow conspirator in the hostage taking has retained the taken child in his or
   her custody and the consideration received is no more than the conspirator’s
   expected share of the ransom.” 2
           The Government argues that neither our circuit nor other circuits
   have adopted the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 2A4.1(b)(6) in Alvarez-
   Cuevas. Second, the Government contends that the facts of this case “are
   easily distinguished from those of Alvarez-Cuevas.” Third, the Government
   stresses that Ortiz-De Leon did not satisfy the fourth prong of plain error
   review.
           Although Ortiz-De Leon filed several objections to the PSR, he did
   not object to the three-level enhancement pursuant to § 2A4.1(b)(6).
   Consequently, Ortiz-De Leon concedes that he failed to preserve a
   sentencing error and that plain error review applies.
           Ortiz-De Leon must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and
   (3) that affected substantial rights. 3 A sentencing error affects a defendant’s
   substantial rights if “he can show a reasonable probability that, but for the
   district court’s misapplication of the Guidelines, he would have received a
   lesser sentence.” 4 Even if the defendant makes such a showing, this court
   has discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
   integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 5 Ortiz-De Leon has

           _____________________
           1
               415 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2005).
           2
               Id. at 122.
           3
               United States v. Brown, 437 F.3d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 2006).
           4
               United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
           5
            Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano,
   507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)); see also United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 425 (5th

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                                              No. 23-40072

   the burden to demonstrate that all four prongs are met, 6 and the Supreme
   Court has instructed that “[m]eeting all four prongs is difficult, ‘as it should
   be.’” 7
             We agree with the Government that Ortiz-De Leon’s reliance on the
   First Circuit’s interpretation of § 2A4.1(b)(6) in Alvarez-Cuevas is
   insufficient. First, a single out-of-circuit case does not establish plain error.
   Ortiz-De Leon has not shown that any error on the part of the district court
   was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” 8
   Moreover, in United States v. Cedillo-Narvaez, 9 our court declined to adopt
   the First Circuit’s interpretation due to distinguishable facts. The “lack of
   binding authority is often dispositive in the plain-error context.” 10 Although
   a defendant “need not show that the specific factual and legal scenario has
   been addressed,” he “must at least show error in the ‘straightforward
   applications of case law.’” 11 Ortiz-De Leon appears to request an extension

             _____________________
   Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Additionally, we do not view the fourth prong as automatic if the
   other three prongs are met.”).
             6
            United States v. Lavalais, 960 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The defendant has
   the burden to demonstrate that all four prongs of plain error review are met.”).
             7
             Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74,
   83 n. 9 (2004)).
             8
                  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
             9
              761 F.3d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the case was factually
   distinguishable from Alvarez-Cuevas).
             10
              United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2015); see also United States
   v. Acuna-Ramirez, 673 F. App’x 463, 464 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“In
   the absence of binding precedent, or even clear analogous precedent, this court will not find
   plain error in this case.”).
             11
              United States v. Vargas-Soto, 700 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United
   States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2009)).

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                                            No. 23-40072

   of our case law, but “an error is not plain if it requires the extension of
   precedent.” 12
           Second, the facts of the First Circuit’s decision in Alvarez-Cuevas are
   distinguishable from the present case. In Alvarez-Cuevas, the defendant and
   his co-conspirators kidnapped a man and his six-year-old step-daughter, left
   the child with two other (indicted) co-conspirators, and demanded a
   $500,000 ransom for the safe return of the child. 13 Ultimately, the First
   Circuit held that the enhancement under § 2A4.1(b)(6) is inapplicable
   “when a fellow conspirator in the hostage taking has retained the taken child
   in his or her custody and the consideration received is no more than the
   conspirator’s expected share of the ransom.” 14
           Unlike Alvarez-Cuevas wherein the only compensation to the
   defendant was a share of the ransom money, 15 Ortiz-De Leon was supposed
   to receive $1,000 for keeping L.Z.R.M. in his home. This situation resembles
   Cedillo-Narvaez wherein the caretaker was not compensated with an
   expected share of the ransom but rather was paid a flat fee ($500) for her
   services. 16 Additionally, the minor in the present case was left in the custody
   of not only Ortiz-De Leon but also his wife. Ortiz-De Leon’s case is factually
   distinguishable from Alvarez-Cuevas, and here as in Cedillo-Narvaez, the

           _____________________
           12
              Id.; see also Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., 660 F.3d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
   (“Indeed, we have previously held that even where an argument merely requires extending
   existing precedent, the district court’s failure to do so cannot be plain error.”).
           13
                United States v. Alvarez-Cuevas, 415 F.3d 121, 122 (1st Cir. 2005).
           14
                Id.
           15
                Id. at 124.
           16
                United States v. Cedillo-Narvaez, 761 F.3d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 2014).

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                                            No. 23-40072

   district court did not plainly err by applying the enhancement under
   § 2A4.1(b)(6).
                                                III
           Lastly, Ortiz-De Leon’s appeal fails because he has not made a
   showing for the fourth prong of plain error, namely that the purported error
   “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” 17 As previously mentioned, the defendant bears the burden of
   demonstrating that all four prongs are satisfied. 18 Although Ortiz-De Leon
   mentions the fourth prong in passing, he does not explain how it applies to
   the facts of his case.
                                        *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           17
             Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano,
   507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
           18
             United States v. Lavalais, 960 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The defendant has
   the burden to demonstrate that all four prongs of plain error review are met.”); see also
   United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Importantly, the
   burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the error affects the fairness, integrity, or
   public reputation of judicial proceedings.”).

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