Court Opinion

ID: 9702760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:22:49.407319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.368459
License: Public Domain

*588Johnson, J.,
concurring. I agree that VR.C.B 59 incorporates the majority rule that remittitur, once accepted, cannot be appealed. I write separately because I believe that this rule is flawed, and that a change should be considered by the rules committee.
The rule that a plaintiff cannot appeal remittitur without first enduring the time and expense of a new trial is both widespread and longstanding. See, e.g., Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (“A line of decisions stretching back to 1889 has firmly established that a plaintiff cannot appeal the propriety of a remittitur order to which he has agreed.”); Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 544 A.2d 158, 160 (Conn. 1988) (majority of state courts have held that at common law plaintiff who accepts remittitur in lieu of new trial is bound by that election and cannot appeal from judgment ordering remittitur); Deans v. Eastern Me. Medical Ctr., 454 A.2d 835, 837 (Me. 1983) (almost without exception, courts have held that plaintiff may not appeal reduced judgment entered after plaintiff accepted remittitur rather than suffer entry of new trial order). Unfortunately, the long history of the rule appears to be the only justification for it. For example, the United States Supreme Court, instead of providing an explanation, merely emphasized that the rule was “settled,” “longstanding,” “consistent,” “firmly established,” and based on “unbroken precedents” that “stretch[] back to 1889.” Donovan, 429 U.S. at 649-50.
Some courts attempt to justify the practice with circular reasoning. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court put it this way: “[B]y stipulating to a remittitur, plaintiff has agreed to the amended judgment entered thereafter.” Deans, 454 A.2d at 836; see also Donovan v. Penn. Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 536 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Having chosen ... to accede to the remittitur . . . [plaintiff] is bound by his decision just as if he had reached a settlement with his adversary.”), aff’d, 429 U.S. 648 (1977). This approach, however, begs the question; the issue cannot be decided merely by reciting the usual consequences of accepting remittitur. The rules governing remittitur could be changed to permit a plaintiff to accept remittitur under protest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-10-102 (1994).
Where a substantive explanation is offered, courts typically fall back on the unsupported claim that the traditional rule conserves judicial resources by reducing the number of appeals. See, e.g., Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Colo. 1983) (rationale for rule is that plaintiff should not be allowed to perfect no-risk appeal; traditional rule requiring party to seek retrial before appealing conserves judicial resources); Civiello, 544 A.2d at 160 (result of permitting plaintiffs to accept remittitur under protest would be proliferation of appeals; plaintiff would be guaranteed minimum verdict and have nothing to lose by appealing). Plaintiff correctly points out, however, that withholding the right to review pending a second trial may increase the strain on judicial resources. If a plaintiff is willing to accept remittitur, but wants the decision reviewed, a new trial wastes time and money. Allowing an appeal of accepted remittitur permits the parties to bypass the new trial and go straight to the appeal. At least in some situations, an immediate appeal that permits this Court to review the remittitur decision, which is the heart of the parties’ dispute, would be a better procedure.
Aside from judicial efficiency, there is also concern that most plaintiffs, daunted by the expense of a second trial, are effectively coerced into giving up the right to challenge the trial court’s “invasion of the jury’s prerogative.” Donovan, 536 F.2d at 539 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). With a new trial as the price of gaining an appeal, many plaintiffs effectively lose the *589right to appeal the remittitur decision. Permitting a plaintiff to accept remittitur under protest resolves this problem. See Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 321 (1976) (traditional rules of remittitur procedure coerce plaintiffs into accepting reduced verdicts; remittitur under protest is effective antidote to coercion).
Justice Holmes once wrote that “[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV” 0.1V Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,469 (1897). Indeed, the rule that a plaintiff may not appeal remittitur without first undergoing the trouble and expense of a second trial appears to be grounded more in tradition than in reason. See Donovan, 536 F.2d at 539, 541 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (weight of precedent and tradition support rule, but persuasive justification for rule is lacking). Although I believe that a change in the rules is warranted, I concur in the judgment because any change is better accomplished through the rules committee than by court decision. I am authorized to state that Justice Morse joins in this concurrence.
Motion for reargument denied November 18, 1996.