Court Opinion

ID: 9568890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:22.26209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:12:21.919671
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
I cannot agree with the main opinion, the effect of which is to deprive the plaintiff of compensation for services rendered to the defendant at the latter’s request. One of the most elementary principles of justice is that where one contracts for goods or services from another he must keep his contract and pay for them.1 It is appreciated that there are some exceptions where the law does not so require. But it is so squarely contrary to basic concepts of justice to deny compensation to one who has rendered service, and to give an unearned benefit to the recipient of the service, that this is done only when cogent and persuasive considerations of public policy render the result necessary. This is usually where there is involved the commission of a crime or the doing of something wherein there is such a hazard to health, safety or morals, that it is deemed that the harm to result from enforcement of such a contract outweighs the injustice of not enforcing it.2 In my opinion there is nothing shown in this case from which it can reasonably he concluded that the drilling of a well without a permit has any such vital relationship or hazard to public health, welfare or morals, as to impose the penalty of denying plaintiff pay for his work and to unjustly enrich the undeserving defendant. It is significant that the statute in question, Sec. 73-3-26, U.C.A. 1953, is in the chapter dealing with the appropriation of waters and its purpose relates to control of rights in underground waters.
*354Where the resolution of such a. question is based upon a statute, it is to that statute that we should look to determine whatever penalty and/or sanction was intended for its violation.3 In this instance the statute simply provides that a person drilling a well without a permit is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine or imprisonment, but provides no other sanction or disability. It is important to keep in mind that where our legislature has intended that there be sanctions or limitations for the failure to comply with a statute it has expressly so provided. Some examples are: (1) the disability of. a foreign corporation to sue unless certain requirements are met;4 (2) disabilities placed on insurance companies under certain circumstances;5 (3) forfeiture of interest when usurious rates have been charged.6 Inasmuch as there is no express provision in the statute of concern here prohibiting the collection for services rendered the reasonable inference is that the legislature intended the fine or imprisonment to be the only penalty for violation. Insofar as this statute and its enforcement are ■ concerned, that. is something strictly between the plaintiff, the State Engineer, and the other- appropriate law enforcement authorities. Whether the plaintiff had a permit or not has no causative relationship whatsoever to the rights and obligations which exist between him and defendant; and the defendant has suffered no harm or disadvantage on that account.
It is appreciated that the case of Olsen v. Reese referred to in the main-opinion must be taken cognizance of. I take up no quarrel with it upon-the particular facts of that case. But if. its rule is made too broad and applied beyond those facts, it obviously is a harsh one and works injustice. This has been given recognition in- subsequent cases by this court in different fact situations. In the case of Platt v. Locke,7 it was held that the plaintiff who had not obtained a required license nor complied with the statute requiring the filing of an affidavit DBA, doing business under an assumed name, was not precluded from recovering for the cost of constructing a swimming pool for the defendant. In ¡pointing out the justice so required Justice Wade wrote for the court: * no fraud' or other detriment was inflicted on the defendant, and therefore the contract entered into * * * was enforceable.” He further observed that the statutes prescribed appropriate penalties for their violation and that failure to comply with them had no relationship to the rights between the parties.
*355Similar recognition of what justice requires in such situation is indicated in the case of Butterfield v. Cheney.8 There the defense was that plaintiff had not obtained a required building permit for construction work for defendant where the amount exceeded $1000. The view was taken that the work done in the construction of a retaining wall, a patio and putting in the lawn, should be regarded as three separate jobs and thus each below the $1000; and thus recovery was allowed to the plaintiff.
There is a good treatment of the principle here involved in Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen.9 The court recognizes the rule of unenforceability of • illegal contracts generally but states:
* * * Where contracts which violate statutory provisions are merely malum prohibitum, the general rule- does not always apply. If the statute does not| provide expressly that its violation will deprive the parties of their right to sue on the contract, and the denial of relief is wholly out .of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate individual punishment, the right to recover will not he denied.
The cases just referred to-are consistent with the view which is reflected generally by the authorities on the subj ect: , that courts are reluctant to apply a rule which, prevents recovery by a plaintiff who. has. rendered service.. The recognized authority, Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., Vol. 5, § Í630, at p. 4561, states:
* .* * but the rule of public policy that forbids an action for damages for breach of such.an agreement is not based on the impropriety of compelling the defendant to pay the damages; in itself that would generally be a desirable thing. When relief is denied it is either because the plaintiff is a wrongdoer, and such a person the law does not aid, or, in exceptional cases, because the transaction is declared absolutely void by the law.
In reference to this rule, Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 6A, Sec. 1512, observes that the rule which precludes recovery by one unlicensed to perform a particular service should not be arbitrarily applied and that:
* * * even in these cases enforcement of the wrongdoer’s bargains is not always denied him. The statute may be clearly for protection against fraud and 'incompetence; but in very many cases the statute breaker is neither fraudulent nor incompetent. He may have rendered excellent service or delivered goods of the highest quality, his non-compliance with the statute seems nearly harmless, and the real defrauder seems to be the defendant who is enriching himself at the plaintiff’s expense. Although many courts yearn for a mechanically, app.lica-*356ble rule, they have not made one in the present instance. Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and justice and sound policy do not always require the enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures going not to the state but to repudiating defendants.
In the present situation allowing the defendant to invoke the technical defense of failure to have a drilling permit and thus escape payment for services he requested and received the benefit of runs particularly counter to one’s sense of justice. The law charges him with knowing about the requirement of a permit and it is to be assumed that he knew as much about it as did the plaintiff. Yet he engaged the plaintiff to drill the well. Our law provides that every person who aids, abets or encourages the commission of an unlawful act is guilty as a principal.10 If plaintiff was guilty of wrongdoing, the defendant was in pari delicto with him and should not be permitted to use his own wrong to avoid the obligation of his contract and to thus unjustly enrich himself.
On the basis of what I have said above it is my belief that under the circumstances here shown, it is inequitable and unjust to rule as a matter of law on summary judgment that the defendant can take the benefit of the plaintiff’s labor and refuse to pay for it. I would remand the case for trial on all issues. (All emphasis added.)

. See 5 Williston, Contracts, § 1630 (Rev. Ed.).

. E. g., see Lyon v. Leet, 199 Iowa 1034, 202 N.W. 881 (chiropractor posing as physician denied recovery), 42 A.L.R. 1226, 118 A.L.R. 646, and Corbin on Contracts, § 1513.

. See Ross v. Producers Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339.

. See Sec. 16-10-120, U.C.A.1953.

. See Sees. 31-15-17 and 31-35-1, U.C.A. 1953.

. See See. 15-1-7, U.C.A.1953.

. 11 Utah 2d 273, 358 P.2d 95.

. 12 Utah 2d 347, 366 P.2d 607.

. 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L. R. 641.

. Sec. 76-1-44, U.C.A.1953.