Court Opinion

ID: 9555452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-12 06:11:45.3648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:22.601721
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed August 10, 2023

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                                No. 11-22-00044-CV
                                    __________

                          BRIAN SPORN, Appellant
                                         V.
                   MARCANTONIO, ET AL., Appellees

                     On Appeal from the 106th District Court
                             Dawson County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 21-09-20830

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, Brian Sporn, is an inmate confined in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). He appeals the trial court’s
dismissal of his complaint against Appellees, Captain Richard Aynes, Lieutenant
Olivia Caudillo, and Corrections Officer Marcantonio, all of whom are employees
of TDCJ. Appellant filed his petition as “a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 civil rights action
lawsuit.”   In his “complaint,” Appellant alleged that Appellees violated his
constitutional due process rights and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV. Following Appellees’
motion to dismiss pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, the trial court dismissed the case based on Appellant’s failure to comply with
the procedural requirements of that chapter. This appeal followed. We modify and
affirm.
                                  Factual and Procedural History
        In his “complaint,” Appellant alleged that a violation of his rights occurred
when prison disciplinary action was assessed against him. On the day of the relevant
incident, Appellant had “requested for heat reprieve” but the request was refused by
Marcantonio, who ordered him to return to his cell. Appellant refused. According
to Appellant, afterwards, Caudillo “came in the wing yelling and threatening to write
everyone [disciplinary] cases for not ‘racking up.’” Then, a “major” told Caudillo
that she “cannot do that” and told the inmates to go to the day room and that no
disciplinary violations cases would be written up. Appellant claims that some three
weeks later, Aynes served him with the disciplinary action that Marcantonio had
written for refusing to return to his cell. Appellant alleges that Aynes “ran the case
and found [him] guilty” without giving Appellant sufficient time to prepare for the
hearing or obtain witnesses, which violated his due process rights.
        Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s suit based on multiple
grounds, including Appellant’s failure to follow the procedural requirements for
inmate litigation under Chapter 14.1 The next day, the trial court signed an order

        1
         The motion noted that, “at this time there is no record that Marcantonio has been served in this
lawsuit” and therefore named only Appellees Caudillo and Aynes as the respondents in Appellant’s suit.
We note that, while the trial court had the discretion to dismiss Appellant’s claims on the basis that the
claims asserted had no arguable basis in law or in fact either before or after service of process, it could not
render a judgment against Marcantonio unless he was served. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.003(a) (West 2017); TEX. R. CIV. P. 124.
                                                      2
dismissing the case due to Appellants failure to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 14. Shortly after the trial court’s order was signed, Appellant filed a
“motion to grant immunity” to Caudillo and Aynes; Appellant stated in his motion
that he was “granting immunity to Defendants Richard Aynes and Olivia Caudillo
and exonerate all and any wrong doing [sic] on theyre [sic] behalf in above cause no.
in above Honorable Court. Both defendants were not at all responsible for CO IV
Marcantonio and his actions at the time of said actions that brought this lawsuit to
bare [sic].” In the motion, Appellant also requested that the trial court “grant this
motion in its entirety to release both [Appellees] from this lawsuit[,]” citing a case
that referenced official immunity. The trial court denied the motion based on its
previous disposition of the case.
      Appellant argues three issues on appeal. First, Appellant contends that the
trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to state a cause of action. Second,
Appellant states that the trial court abused its discretion dismissing his case for
failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Third, Appellant argues that the trial court’s dismissal of his case violated his due
process rights.
                                  Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s dismissal of inmate litigation under Chapter 14 for
an abuse of discretion. Sullivan v. Owens, 418 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2011, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner without reference to guiding rules or principles. Garcia v.
Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex.1999). When reviewing matters committed to
the trial court’s discretion, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the
trial court. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992).

                                            3
                                         Analysis
         Enacted in response to the amount of inmate litigation found to be frivolous
and without merit, Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
applies to inmate suits brought where an “affidavit or unsworn declaration of
inability to pay costs is filed by the inmate.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.002(a). As noted by the court in Hickson:
         Prisoners have everything to gain and little to lose by filing frivolous
         suits. It costs them almost nothing; time is of no consequence to a
         prisoner; threats of sanctions are virtually meaningless; and the prisoner
         can look forward to a day trip to the courthouse. Thus, the temptation
         to file a frivolous suit is strong. Such suits, however, waste valuable
         judicial resources and subject the state and its prison officials to the
         burden of unwarranted litigation, preventing claims with merit from
         being heard expeditiously.
Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1991, no writ)). To preserve judicial resources, under Chapter 14, a trial court
may dismiss an inmate’s lawsuit for failing to comply with the chapter’s procedural
requirements; it may also dismiss a lawsuit that is malicious or frivolous. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 14.003(a); Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Because Appellant is an inmate proceeding pro se
who filed a statement of inability to pay costs, this suit is governed by Chapter 14.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 14.002(a).
         Appellant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s suit based on
his failure to comply with the procedural requisites of Chapter 14. In his first issue,
Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his case
for failure to state a cause of action. Appellant misreads the trial court’s order which
reads:

                                             4
        Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Chapter
        14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. After considering
        the motion, the Court is of the opinion that, for the reasons stated
        therein, this motion should be GRANTED.

        It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
        Pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
        is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed in its
        entirety for its failure to comply with the Chapter 14 procedural
        requirements.
Nowhere in the order does it state that Appellant failed to state a cause of action.2
The trial court’s order dismisses Appellant’s suit solely based on his failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14. Because it addresses a
matter that is not germane to the trial court’s disposition, we overrule Appellant’s
first issue.
        We address Appellant’s second and third issues together. Appellant’s second
issue is overbroad and claims that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
his case for failure to comply with the requirements of Chapter 14. Upon review,
Appellant’s suit failed to comply with several mandatory requisites of Chapter 14.
On the issue of claimed indigency, Appellant failed to attach a certified copy of his
trust account statement. “The affidavit or unsworn declaration must be accompanied
by the certified copy of the [inmate’s] trust account statement.” CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 14.004(c). The legislature’s use of the word “must” indicates that this is a
mandatory requirement to proceed under Chapter 14 where, as here, the inmate has

        2
         We note that the first paragraph of the trial court’s order granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss “for
the reasons stated therein.” In their motion, Appellees stated the following reasons for dismissal:
(1) Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14, (2) Appellant’s lawsuit is
“frivolous and/or malicious,” (3) Appellant failed to state a claim, and (4) Appellees are entitled to
immunity. It is apparent from the trial court’s order that it based its decision to dismiss Appellant’s lawsuit
solely on his failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14. Appellees confirm this
understanding of the basis of the trial court’s order in their brief.
                                                      5
filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration of an inability to pay costs. See Williams v.
Brown, 33 S.W.3d 410, 411–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
      Further, Appellant did not file an affidavit or declaration related to previous
litigation brought by him. See id. § 14.004(a). This failure permitted the trial court
to assume Appellant’s current suit was substantially similar to any previous filings.
Hall v. Treon, 39 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.). In
addition, Appellant did not attach proof that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. Pursuant to Chapter 14, an inmate shall file an affidavit stating the date
that his grievance was administratively filed and the date the written decision of his
administrative appeal was issued. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 14.005. The inmate must
also attach a copy of the written decision from the grievance system. Id. None was
filed with Appellant’s petition.
      When reviewing the discretion of the trial court in dismissing an inmate’s suit,
we should consider whether the suit was dismissed with prejudice. See Hickman v.
Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). If it
was dismissed with prejudice, we should determine whether the inmate’s error could
be remedied. Id. Appellant’s pleadings contained multiple defects that failed to
comply with the provisions of Chapter 14, but nothing indicates that these failures
could not be cured with an amended pleading. Therefore, dismissal with prejudice
is improper. Pena v. McDowell, 201 S.W.3d 665, 666 (Tex. 2006).
      Here, the dismissal order does not state whether the trial court’s dismissal was
with or without prejudice. However, when “a judgment of dismissal in a Chapter 14
case does not state whether the case was dismissed with or without prejudice, it is
presumed [that] it was dismissed without prejudice.” Estes v. Richerson, No. 02-17-
00391-CV, 2018 WL 3968784, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 16, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases). “Dismissal with prejudice constitutes an
adjudication on the merits and operates as if the case has been fully tried and
                                          6
decided.” Thomas v. Skinner, 54 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2001, pet. denied) (citing Ritchey v. Vasquez, 986 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex.
1999)). A failure to comply with procedural requirements under Chapter 14 is not
an adjudication on the merits; therefore, the proper disposition in the present case
was a dismissal without prejudice. See id. Although the trial court’s order does not
so specify, we presume that the trial court properly ordered that Appellant’s suit be
dismissed without prejudice. Estes, 2018 WL 3968784, at *4.
      As part of his due process claim, Appellant contends that he was entitled to
an opportunity to amend his pleading to comply with Chapter 14. He relies on
McLean v. Livingston to support his argument; 3 however, his reliance on McLean is
misplaced. In McLean, the Texas Supreme Court held that an inmate must be
afforded the same opportunity to amend his appellate filings to cure Chapter 14 filing
defects prior to the dismissal of the appeal; McLean is readily distinguishable. In
McLean, the Plaintiff-Appellee filed an amended notice of appeal, which included
his Chapter 14 declaration and a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement,
thereby correcting his defective filings. To the contrary, Appellant did not cure any
of his Chapter 14 procedural defects discussed above after (1) he filed his petition in
September 2021, (2) Appellees’ filed their answer in January 2022, which alleged,
among other things, that they “assert their claim to all exclusions, limitations,
exceptions, and reservations contained in [Chapter 14]” and that Appellant had failed
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the suit, and
(3) Appellees’ filed their motion to dismiss in February 2022 that stated in part that
the trial court should dismiss Appellant’s claims based on his failure to comply with
the procedural requirements of Chapter 14. Instead, Appellant filed a “motion to

      3
       486 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2016).

                                          7
grant immunity” to the only defendants-Appellees that had been served with his
lawsuit.
        We hold that an order dismissing Appellant’s lawsuit without prejudice for
failing to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14 does not violate
Appellant’s right to due process. See McDowell, 201 S.W.3d at 666.4 Accordingly,
we overrule Appellant’s second and third issues. However, we modify the trial
court’s order to clarify that the trial court’s dismissal is without prejudice as to
Appellant’s claims. See Estes, 2018 WL 3968784, at *5.
                                         This Court’s Ruling
        We modify the trial court’s order to reflect that the cause is dismissed “without
prejudice.” As modified, the order is affirmed.

                                                          W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                          JUSTICE

August 10, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

        4
         While the trial court dismissed Peña’s suit with prejudice as “frivolous or malicious,” the supreme
court noted with approval that the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal but reformed the trial court’s
judgment to read “without prejudice.”
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