Court Opinion

ID: 9748205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:55:03.290623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:32.709367
License: Public Domain

VOGEL (MIRIAM A.), J.
I concur but write separately for several reasons.
First, most of the facts recited by the majority are irrelevant. What matters is that Dr. O’Byrne applied for staff privileges, acknowledged receipt of a copy of the medical staff bylaws that were adopted to conform to statewide regulations, failed to provide further information requested by the Medical Center, then sued when some of his medical staff privileges were terminated and his application was denied. Dr. O’Byme’s complaint alleged three causes of action—breach of contract (the bylaws), breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional interference with the practice of a profession. These facts are undisputed and I see no reason to recite the four pages of minutia included in the majority opinion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 800-803.) As Justice Cardozo put it, a proper statement of facts is one that is “rigidly pared down” to those facts “that are truly essential as opposed to those that are decorative and adventitious.” (See Gailor, Opinions Among Other Things (1946) 32 A.B.A. J. 443, 497.)
Second, I agree with my colleagues that Dr. O’Byrne failed to establish the existence of a contract, but I would decide the issue on a narrow ground—that medical staff bylaws adopted pursuant to one regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 70703, subd. (b)) and approved by the hospital pursuant to another (id., § 70701, subd. (a)(8)) do not, without more, create a contract between an attending physician and the hospital. The cases that conclude otherwise are based on different facts—bylaws that go far beyond the bare statutory requirements or a contractual relationship that exists outside the bylaws. (E.g., Janda v. Madera Community Hosp. (E.D.Cal. 1998) 16 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1185-1186 [bylaws do not create a contract per se but may become part of an existing contractual relationship]; Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp. (1989) 211 Conn. 51 [557 A.2d 1249, 1253] [bylaws by themselves do not constitute a contract between doctor and hospital]; Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services (1997) 127 N.C.App. 71 [488 S.E.2d 284, 288] [bylaws were an “integral part” of existing contract].)
*815Third, since attending physicians are not employees of the hospital, and since the hospital is not bound to consider the physician’s interests before its own (and would probably subject itself to liability if it did so at the risk of a patient’s health or well-being), I necessarily agree that there is no fiduciary relationship between a hospital and an attending physician. (Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels etc. Medical Center (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1143 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 695].)
Fourth, I agree that Dr. O’Byme hasn’t come close to showing an intentional interference with his right to practice his profession. (Willis v. Santa Ana etc. Hospital Assn. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 806, 810 [26 Cal.Rptr. 640, 376 P.2d 568], overruled on another point in Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 921, 925 [221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375].)
For these reasons, I agree with the affirmance.