Court Opinion

ID: 9926993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 22:35:07.236164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:30.668350
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                                January 25, 2024
                                                                                  C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
State of West Virginia,                                                         SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                          OF WEST VIRGINIA

vs.) No. 22-691 (Roane County CC-44-2013-F-93)

Marlow P.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Marlow P.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Roane County’s August 23, 2022, order
that revoked his supervised release after petitioner waived his right to contest the allegations and
admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release.2 On appeal, he argues that the court
abused its discretion by sentencing him to fifty years of incarceration upon the revocation of his
supervised release, and he argues that this sentence violates the proportionality clause of the West
Virginia Constitution. Upon our review, finding no substantial question of law and no prejudicial
error, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming
the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

        Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury of the felony offenses of sexual abuse by a parent,
guardian, or custodian and first-degree sexual abuse stemming from contact with his six-year-old
cousin. He ultimately pled guilty to first-degree sexual abuse.3 Petitioner was sentenced to not less
than five years and not more than twenty-five years imprisonment and a term of fifty years of
supervised release pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26. Pursuant to the terms of his
supervised release, petitioner was required to obtain sex offender treatment and to abstain from

       1
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
       2
         Petitioner appears by counsel Andrew Mendelson. Respondent appears by Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Goudy.
       3
          Petitioner ultimately admitted to the allegations but initially blamed the victim, claiming
that she “dressed sexy,” was hitting on him by jumping into his lap, and also put the phone between
her legs at the end of phone conversations in a suggestive manner.

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drugs and alcohol, among other conditions. He did not appeal the sentence for his underlying
conviction.

        Petitioner’s supervised release began on November 15, 2021, and on June 13, 2022,
petitioner’s supervising officer filed a motion to revoke his supervised release. The motion
provided that petitioner had tested positive for marijuana and was involuntarily terminated from
his mandated sex offender treatment program.4 Petitioner waived his right to contest the allegations
and admitted to the violations contained in the motion to revoke. Ultimately, the court revoked
petitioner’s supervised release and sentenced him to prison for fifty years in lieu of supervised
release. On appeal, petitioner maintains that this sentence violates Article III, Section 5 of the West
Virginia Constitution.

              When reviewing an order modifying or revoking a defendant’s supervised
       release under West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(h), we apply a three-pronged
       standard of review. We review the circuit court’s final order and decision to modify
       or revoke a defendant’s supervised release under an abuse of discretion standard;
       we review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; and we
       review questions of law and interpretations of statutes de novo.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. White, --- W. Va. --- , --- S.E.2d --- , No. 22-0197 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2023).

        Although this appeal stems from an order revoking petitioner’s supervised release, his
argument focuses on the sentence that the court imposed upon the revocation. We review
“sentencing orders . . . under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates
statutory or constitutional commands.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496
S.E.2d 221 (1997). Further, “[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and
if not based on some impermissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v.
Tyler, 211 W. Va. 246, 565 S.E.2d 368 (2002) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va.
366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982)).

         West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 gives the circuit court discretion to impose the sentence
that it imposed in this matter.5 Specifically, West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(h)(3) authorizes the
court to

       4
          Correspondence from petitioner’s treatment program noted that petitioner was discharged
from the program due to his “level of sexual deviancy coupled with a disregard for his rules.” This
letter also detailed petitioner’s “extensive history of sexual offending [ten victims and multiple
family pets], though he only has [one] conviction.”
       5
          Despite the fact that petitioner did not contest the allegations and confirmed that his
sentence was within the discretion of the court, he argues that the sentence was not proportionate
to his minor supervised release infractions. While petitioner characterizes his violations as minor
violations, they are violations nonetheless, a fact that he does not contest. He asks this Court to
direct the lower courts to limit a term of incarceration upon a first revocation of a criminal
defendant’s supervised release to no more than one year. Petitioner’s requested relief, however, is

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       [r]evoke a term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison
       all or part of the term of supervised release without credit for time previously served
       on supervised release if the court, pursuant to the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
       Procedure applicable to revocation of probation, finds by clear and convincing
       evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that
       a defendant whose term is revoked under this subdivision may not be required to
       serve more than the period of supervised release[.]

        We have held that the “post-revocation sanction [provided for in West Virginia Code § 62-
12-26(h)(3)] simply is a continuation of the legal consequences of a defendant’s original crime. In
other words, it is part of a single sentencing scheme arising from the defendant’s original
conviction.” State v. Hargus, 232 W. Va. 735, 743, 753 S.E.2d 893, 901 (2013). With the post-
revocation sentence, petitioner asks this Court to focus only on his supervised release infractions,
which he characterizes as minor, and ignore the fact that his post-revocation incarceration was part
of the initial sentence, not a punishment for violating the terms of supervised release. Based upon
our existing jurisprudence, however, we do not view his post-revocation sanction in isolation.
Instead, we find that petitioner’s post-revocation sentence is a continuation of the legal
consequences of his first-degree sexual abuse conviction.

       “Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, which contains the cruel and
unusual punishment counterpart to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, has
an express statement of the proportionality principle: ‘Penalties shall be proportioned to the
character and degree of the offence.’” Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423
(1980). We ordinarily limit proportionality reviews to sentences “where there is either no fixed
maximum set by statute or where there is a life recidivist sentence.” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Wanstreet
v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981). Further, we have established that

       [t]here are two tests to determine whether a sentence is so disproportionate to a
       crime that it violates the West Virginia Constitution. The subjective test is found in
       syllabus point 5 of State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266, 304 S.E.2d 851 (1983), which
       provides:

                   Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible, although not
           cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for
           which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
           notions of human dignity, thereby violating West Virginia Constitution,
           Article III, Section 5 that prohibits a penalty that is not proportionate to the
           character and degree of an offense.

       When it cannot be found that a sentence shocks the conscience, a disproportionality
       challenge is guided by the objective test which states:

not consistent with West Virginia Code § 62-12-26, and the broad discretion that the Legislature
has conferred upon the sentencing court. Accordingly, we decline petitioner’s invitation to invade
the province of the Legislature.
                                                  3
                    In determining whether a given sentence violates the proportionality
            principle found in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution,
            consideration is given to the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose
            behind the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with what would
            be inflicted in other jurisdictions, and a comparison with other offenses
            within the same jurisdiction.

        Syl. pt. 5, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981).

Hargus, 232 W. Va. at 743-744, 753 S.E.2d at 901-902.

        Initially, applying a subjective proportionality test, petitioner pled guilty to the first-degree
sexual abuse of one of our most vulnerable members of society, a minor child. Petitioner’s
counselor also detailed disturbing revelations about other victims, a fact not disputed by petitioner.
Based upon these facts, we find that petitioner’s sentence is not constitutionally impermissible
pursuant to the subjective test because it is not so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.
Additionally, applying the objective test, petitioner acknowledges that sex crimes are serious and
that the Legislature has determined that periods of supervised release must be imposed to address
the seriousness of the crimes over and above incarceration. Petitioner also recognizes that most
jurisdictions provide for some supervised release, the terms of which vary significantly, from a
few years up to a lifetime term of supervised release. He further acknowledges that his underlying
sentence, including the term of supervised release, is “standard” when comparing similar offenses
in West Virginia. Additionally, he concedes that the court is free to subtract, add and/or modify
the time, terms and conditions as the court deems necessary to the criminal defendant’s supervised
release, a practice that petitioner agrees “makes sense and is just in practice and application.”
Accordingly, based upon these facts, petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing that the
sentence violates either the subjective or objective proportionality principles. Therefore, his
proportionality challenge fails.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton

DISSENTING:

                                                   4
Justice C. Haley Bunn

Bunn, Justice, dissenting:
       I dissent to the majority’s resolution of this case. I would have set this case for oral
argument to thoroughly address the error alleged in this appeal. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs
and the issues raised therein, I believe a formal opinion of this Court was warranted, not a
memorandum decision. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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