Court Opinion

ID: 9544737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:14.211198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:33.883857
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
concurring in part; dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority when it concludes the plaintiff properly preserved his objection to instructions given by the trial court.
It is apparent the spirit of the statute, to inform the trial judge of possible errors in the instructions, was carried out in this instance, even though the means used by the appellant was not within the exact technical letter of the law.
This conclusion is strengthened when the wording of 12 O.S.1971 § 578 is examined. It should be noted that the statute provides that it shall be sufficient to preserve objections by dictating the number of the questionable instruction into the record. This Court will not punish plaintiff for taking steps beyond the minimum procedure required by the statute.
REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS
I cannot support the majority conclusion that the given instruction of the trial court adequately presented the issues to the jury.
Jury instructions are directions as to the law of the case, enabling the jury to better understand its duty and to prevent it from arriving at wrong conclusions.1 The Court could choose the language and form of the instruction which correctly states the law in such terms so that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand the full meaning of the law.2 No particular instruction need contain all the law of the case, and the instructions are sufficient when, considered as a whole, they present the law applicable to the issues.3 The Court must give instructions applicable to the issues as found by the pleadings and supported by the evidence.4
Plaintiff claims error because the trial court refused to give his requested instructions six and seven.5 Instead, the court *1060gave its instructions three and six (a different instruction six than that requested by plaintiff.)6
I would adopt for Oklahoma the rationale of other jurisdictions7 which have held that an instruction containing the meaning of term aggravation of preexisting conditions should be given in a11 cases.
I would not give prospective application to the announced change and requirement set out aforesaid because the only issue in the instant case was the question of damages. Plaintiff alleged preexisting condition, and its subsequent aggravation, was the focal point of that damage question. No general explanation of the legal meaning of the term “preexisting condition” was included in the instructions which were given. We cannot expect a jury of average citizens to know or understand the significance of the tenet that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. This was the central issue in plaintiff’s case, and it seems more than likely that the appellant was prejudiced by the complete omission of any instruction explaining the effect of a preexisting condition on appellant’s recovery. Advising the jury that plaintiff could recover for aggravation of this preexisting condition, if aggravation was proved by appellant, was simply not enough.8
The instructions given did not fairly present the crux of plaintiff’s case which was raised by his pleadings and amply supported by evidence. Where instructions fail to present the theory of a party on which the case was tried and on which evidence was introduced, and the theory goes to the right to recover, the failure to so instruct constitutes fundamental and prejudicial error.9
I would hold it was error to not include an instruction on aggravation of a preexisting condition for I find the Court’s given instructions Nos. 3 and 6 were inadequate on that point.
I cannot approve of plaintiff’s suggested instruction No. 6 for I believe it is argumentative and overemphasizes the plaintiff’s rights to recovery. I would approve of an instruction such as was given in Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184, 1187 (Alaska 1976), for it fairly presents a plaintiff’s theory of recovery, yet preserves the defendant’s rights.10
Plaintiff also contends the trial court’s refusal to give instruction No. 7 was error.
When the trial court gave its instruction No. 6, providing plaintiff could recover for aggravation of a preexisting condition *1061proximately caused by defendant’s action, the jury, in effect, was instructed it was to apportion the pain and disability between the two causes. The portion of the requested instruction No. 7 dealing with the duty of the jury to apportion the damages between those solely attributable to the preexisting condition and those attributable to the aggravation of the condition caused by defendant’s negligence is a correct statement of the law. The defendant should not be held liable for an injury which is not a proximate result of his negligence.11
However, I believe that the portion of the instruction (requested 7) requiring the defendant to assume the burden of proof that his negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury is erroneous. In a case of negligence, plaintiff must prove the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant failed to perform that duty, and that such failure was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.12 By giving this portion of the requested instruction No. 7, the court would have permitted the plaintiff to recover damages even though he has not proved one of the elements of his cause of action, specific causation of the aggravation.13
The further instruction that if no apportionment can be made the defendant is liable for the entire injury is also error. This Court stated in Midco Oil Corporation v. Hull, 182 Okl. 21, 22, 75 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1938): “No recovery can be had for the effect of any disease contracted before an accident resulting from defendant’s negligence, unless the disease was aggravated or increased by defendant’s negligent act, when a recovery may be had only to the extent of the aggravation.”
A jury cannot ordinarily be instructed to return an award as to amount or quantity in the face of conflicting evidence.
I would hold a general instruction, similar to plaintiff’s requested instruction No. 6, explaining the legal concept of preexisting condition and its aggravation, should be given. The jury should also be instructed to award plaintiff damages for injuries resulting only from defendant’s negligence. However, any instruction placing the burden upon defendant to show which of plaintiff’s injuries he is not responsible for is incorrect, as is any instruction providing that defendant is liable for all of the damages if no apportionment can be shown by the defendant.
I am authorized to state that Justice LAVENDER concurs in the views herein expressed.

. Hanson v. Kent & Purdy Paint Co., 36 Okl. 583, 129 P. 7 (1912).

. Campbell v. Breece, 134 Okl. 266, 274 P. 1085 (1928).

. Loftis v. LaSalle, 434 P.2d 221 (Okl.1967).

. Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. McAnally, 208 Okl. 497, 257 P.2d 271 (1952).

. Appellant’s requested instruction No. 6 read as follows:
“You are instructed that if you find under a preponderance of the evidence under these rules in favor of the plaintiff, Kenneth Cantrell, then plaintiff is entitled to his damages, even if a pre-existing condition of the plaintiff has more readily pre-disposed him to injury, and even though the acts of the defendant would have not caused such injury to a person who did not have the pre-existing condition such as the plaintiff had.”
Appellant’s requested instruction No. 7 read as follows:
“Where a pre-existing condition exists which has been aggravated by the accident, it is your duty, if possible, to apportion the amount of disability and pain between that caused by the pre-existing condition and that caused by the accident. The burden of proof of this issue is upon the defendant to establish that portion of plaintiffs present condition for which the defendant is not responsible, and if you find that the evidence does not permit such an apportionment, then the defendant is liable for the entire disability.”

. Given instruction No. 3 read as follows:
“... In this connection, (the matter of damages), you are instructed that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the material allegations of the petition; pain and suffering, medical expenses, loss of earnings, earning capacity reduced, aggravation of a preexisting condition, ...”
Given instruction No. 6 read as follows:
“Should you find from a preponderance of the evidence, under these instructions, in favor of the plaintiff, then you may assess the amount of recovery for such damages, if any, which you find from a preponderance of the evidence were sustained by plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of the accident . . . In this regard you may take into consideration ... aggravation of a pre-existing condition ...”

. Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1976); Jacob v. Key System Transit Lines, 140 Cal.App.2d 357, 295 P.2d 569 (1956); Holt v. McCann, 58 Tenn.App. 248, 429 S.W.2d 441 (1968).

. Balestri v. Terminal Freight Co-op Assn., 76 Ill.2d 451, 31 Ill.Dec. 189, 394 N.E.2d 391 (1979).

. Bradley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Goodson, 450 P.2d 500 (Okl.1969).

. “A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to recover damages therefor. However, he is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such preexisting condition or disability proximately resulting from the injury.
“This is true even if the person’s condition or disability made him more susceptible to the possibility of ill effects that [sic] a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial injury.
“Where a preexisting condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation.”

. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Robertson, 207 Okl. 80, 247 P.2d 501 (1952); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Nail, 156 Okl. 294, 10 P.2d 668 (1932).

. Sheridan v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 201 Okl. 312, 205 P.2d 276 (1947); Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. Swink, 186 Okl. 292, 97 P.2d 72 (1939).

.St.Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Ford, 139 Okl. 64, 281 P. 248 (1929).