Court Opinion

ID: 9759233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:09:40.875171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.579433
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Arth’s license was suspended under § 302.505.1, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984, (hereinafter § 302.505.1) following his arrest for drunk driving under § 577.010, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1984. Section 302.505.1 authorizes suspension of an individual’s license when he is arrested upon probable cause to believe he is driving with a blood alcohol level of .13 or more. Following suspension of his license under § 302.505.1 a licensee can, upon timely request under § 302.530.1 RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984, obtain administrative review of that decision. After review by a hearing examiner, an aggrieved licensee may then seek a “trial de novo” in circuit court under § 302.535.1, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984 (hereinafter § 302.535.1). That trial de novo is to be conducted “pursuant to the Missouri rules of civil proce-dure_” (Emphasis added.) This provision grants a licensee access to the entire panoply of discovery devices — interrogatories, depositions, and production of documents.
The Department of Revenue complains that the trial judge abused his discretion when he struck its petition for failing to respond to Arth’s interrogatories because answering the interrogatories would have allegedly required research and investigation of sources not within its control. As *608noted in the per curiam opinion, the interrogatories sought information about the background of the arresting officer, the circumstances surrounding Arth’s arrest, and details about the functioning of the instrument used to measure Arth’s blood alcohol content.
The general rule of this Court has been that an interrogated party is only required to respond as to matters of fact within his knowledge and is not to be required to express opinions or engage in research and compilation of data or information not readily known to him. State ex rel. Gamble Construction Co. v. Carroll, 408 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo. banc 1966). The Gamble case was an original proceeding in prohibition and the facts there closely parallel those of the case at bar. There, the trial judge had indicated that unless Gamble obtained a writ of prohibition or answered the interrogatories propounded he would strike its pleadings.
In Gamble, we acknowledged that interrogatories which require a party to engage in investigations, research, or compilation of data are frequently improper. A party generally should not be subjected to the burden of conducting independent research in order to acquire the information needed to respond to interrogatories. However, in Gamble, we also indicated
... the objection that preparing an answer would require research by the interrogated party is not enough to bar the interrogatories in every case. In order to justify sustaining of an objection to such an interrogatory, it must be shown that the research is unduly burdensome and oppressive. The party seeking to avoid answering the interrogatories carries the burden of showing that the information sought is not readily available to him and where there is conflict the court will make its own determination as to the cost and inconvenience of answering the interrogatories, rather than relying on bare assertions as to this by the party.
Gamble, 408 S.W.2d at 38 (quoting 2A Barron and Holtzoff 321 § 768) (emphasis added). Additionally, we concluded that it is the trial court which has jurisdiction to decide whether requiring a party to answer certain interrogatories will subject him “to annoyance, undue expense, embarrassment or oppression.” Gamble, 408 S.W.2d at 38. Our decision in Gamble clearly commits to the discretion of trial judges the weighing of all relevant factors bearing upon whether a party should be compelled to answer relevant interrogatories.
Here, the trial judge exercised the discretion authorized by our decision in Gamble and nothing in the record indicates an abuse of that discretion. Moreover, it is not clear that answering Arth’s interrogatories would require extraordinary labor or expense, or that the information is unavailable from a not unfriendly source. Because the Department of Revenue processes so many license suspensions and revocations for drunk driving it should be able to reasonably anticipate interrogatories such as those submitted by Arth as well as provide for the necessary administrative framework to expeditiously provide the required responses. Additionally, there is no support in the record that any of the interrogatories asked and ordered answered could not be answered, or would not be developed by the Department in preparation for and conduct of the trial provided by § 302.535.1.
Undoubtedly, the legislative purpose of the Suspension and Revocation Administrative Procedure Statute, Chapter 302.500-302.540 is to provide an efficient procedure to combat the problem of drunk driving. Our role is to construe the statute (§ 302.-535.1) as enacted by the legislature and not to alter its clear meaning. As aptly stated in United Airlines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 377 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Mo. banc 1964) “We are guided by what the legislature says, and not by what we may think it meant to say.” Section 302.535.1 explicitly provides that the rules of civil procedure apply in a trial de novo. The trial judge exercised the discretion he was granted by our decision in Gamble to enforce those *609rules no abuse of discretion has been shown and therefore I respectfully dissent.