Court Opinion

ID: 9367937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 16:03:53.804482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.570650
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127678

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                           OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 127678)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                      MATTISON J. GALARZA, Appellant.

                              Opinion filed February 2, 2023.

        JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville and Overstreet concurred in the
     judgment and opinion.

        Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                        OPINION

¶1       Following a March 2018 stipulated bench trial, the Will County circuit court
     found defendant, Mattison J. Galarza, guilty of driving under the influence of
     alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)), failure to reduce speed to
     avoid an accident (id. § 11-601(a)), and operating an uninsured motor vehicle (id.
     § 3-707). Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the State failed to prove him guilty
     beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident and
     operating an uninsured motor vehicle and (2) his stipulated bench trial was
     tantamount to a guilty plea, such that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him
     pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). The appellate
     court affirmed defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an
     accident, finding the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove
     carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with the tree. 2021 IL App
     (3d) 190129-U, ¶¶ 19-20. As to the conviction for operating an uninsured motor
     vehicle, the State conceded error, and the court accepted the State’s confession of
     error and reversed the operating an uninsured motor vehicle conviction. Id. ¶ 24.
     The court further determined the trial court was not required to admonish defendant
     pursuant to Rule 402(a), as defendant’s stipulated bench trial was not tantamount
     to a guilty plea. Id. ¶ 27.

¶2        In this appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of failure
     to reduce speed to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) his
     stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea, thus the trial court erred when
     it failed to admonish him pursuant to Rule 402(a). For the following reasons, we
     affirm.

¶3                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶4        In August 2016, defendant was charged with two counts of DUI (625 ILCS
     5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)), one count of failure to reduce speed to avoid an
     accident (id. § 11-601(a)), and one count of operating an uninsured motor vehicle
     (id. § 3-707). The charges stemmed from a single-vehicle accident that occurred on
     August 27, 2016, at approximately 5 a.m.

¶5                                A. Trial Court Proceedings

¶6       In March 2018, the matter proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. At the stipulated
     bench trial, the trial court considered the following evidence: (1) a case report
     written by responding officer Ryan Albin from the Will County Sheriff’s Office,
     (2) patient care reports from the Wilmington Fire Protection District describing the

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       care and treatment paramedics provided to defendant and Jordan Taylor, a
       passenger in the vehicle when the accident occurred, and (3) the vehicle’s
       registration information.

¶7         Reports from the Wilmington Fire Protection District showed paramedics
       responded to the scene of the accident on August 27, 2016, at approximately 5 a.m.
       Upon arrival, paramedics observed a single vehicle crashed “into a tree head on
       with airbag deployment.” Paramedics found Taylor alert and sitting in the vehicle’s
       driver’s seat. Taylor told paramedics “her boyfriend was driving and jerked the
       wheel hitting the tree.” Paramedics detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage on
       Taylor’s breath.

¶8         Paramedics found defendant sitting on the ground outside of the vehicle.
       Defendant told paramedics he injured his knee in a prior accident and aggravated
       the injury “when he went to step out of the vehicle and slipped in the grass.” While
       defendant told paramedics he was fine, he was unable to stand on his own because
       of his injured knee. Both Taylor and defendant refused medical treatment.

¶9         Officer Albin’s case report further provided that he and another officer arrived
       on the scene shortly after the paramedics and observed a gray Chevrolet Cruze with
       “heavy front end damage against a tree.” Officer Albin found an empty bottle of
       vodka on the floor in front of the vehicle’s passenger seat and discovered
       defendant’s cell phone wedged in the driver’s seat.

¶ 10       When Officer Albin spoke with defendant, he noted that defendant’s eyes were
       bloodshot and glassy, he smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on
       defendant’s breath, and defendant slurred his speech when he spoke. Defendant told
       Officer Albin that he and Taylor consumed mixed alcoholic beverages at a bar
       earlier that night but stated “he or Taylor did not have any alcohol in his vehicle.”
       Defendant also admitted to Officer Albin that “he was the driver.” The vehicle’s
       registration information showed the Chevrolet Cruze was registered to defendant.

¶ 11      Officer Albin noted he attempted to conduct standardized field sobriety testing
       on defendant but that defendant could not complete the walking portion of the test
       due to the “knee pain [he] sustained from the accident.” Officer Albin further
       provided that defendant failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Defendant took a

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       portable breath test that showed his blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.203.
       Subsequently, Officer Albin placed defendant under arrest for DUI.

¶ 12      Following the presentation of the stipulated evidence, defense counsel argued,
       “our main position is that [defendant] was not the driver of the vehicle.” Rather,
       counsel argued Taylor was the driver when the accident occurred. Specifically,
       counsel stated,

              “I think what’s pretty clear from an unbiased perspective are the paramedics
          who are the first to arrive on scene and actually saw the repercussions of an
          accident. And when they arrived, they saw Jordan Taylor in the driver’s seat
          with the air bags deployed, Judge, and they saw [defendant] as the passenger
          kind of on the floor.

              While the vehicle was registered to [defendant], there is plenty of situations
          where other people let someone else drive. That’s his car so the cell phone could
          be anywhere, Judge. It’s really the paramedics [that] saw someone else as the
          driver, Jordan Taylor. There should be no weight according to any other
          testimony or statements, just that’s clear, unbiased eyewitnesses, Judge.”

       Subsequently, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

¶ 13       In May 2018, the trial judge found defendant guilty of DUI, failure to reduce
       speed to avoid an accident, and operating an uninsured motor vehicle. As to the
       failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident charge, the judge stated, “I guess it’s
       an appropriate charge for a one car accident in that fashion. The Court finds him
       guilty on that.”

¶ 14       In June 2018, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the finding of guilty or, in
       the alternative, a motion for a new trial. In the motion to reconsider, defendant
       asked the trial court to reconsider its finding of guilty where evidence showed
       Taylor was the driver, not defendant. In the alternative, defendant asked the court
       to reopen proofs to allow defendant and the paramedics to testify or grant him a
       new trial. Following a February 2019 hearing on the motion to reconsider, the court
       denied the motion.

¶ 15       In March 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ conditional
       discharge, 17 days in jail, and 240 hours of community service and ordered him to

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       pay several fines and fees.

¶ 16                              B. Appellate Court Proceedings

¶ 17       On appeal, defendant argued (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
       reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident and operating an
       uninsured motor vehicle and (2) his stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty
       plea, such that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him pursuant to Illinois
       Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). 2021 IL App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 2.

¶ 18       The Third District affirmed defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed
       to avoid an accident and reversed his conviction for operating an uninsured motor
       vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24. As to defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed to
       avoid an accident, the appellate court found the State proved beyond a reasonable
       doubt that defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding
       with the tree. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. The court determined “the combination of defendant’s
       act of jerking the wheel and a high BAC readily established the careless driving
       element.” Id. ¶ 19. The court found the record also established defendant failed to
       reduce speed to avoid colliding with the tree. Id. ¶ 20. Specifically, the court stated,
       “[t]he very fact that defendant hit the tree establishes that he failed to reduce speed
       to avoid this accident.” Id. The court acknowledged that People v. Brant, 82 Ill.
       App. 3d 847, 852 (1980), and People v. Sampson, 130 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444 (1985),
       had reached the opposite conclusion, finding the “failure to reduce speed cannot be
       inferred from the fact that a defendant was involved in an accident because any
       individual involved in an accident would then be guilty of the offense.” 2021 IL
       App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 21. However, the court was unpersuaded by the rationale in
       Brant and Sampson. Id.

¶ 19       The appellate court further concluded defendant’s bench trial was not
       tantamount to a guilty plea. Id. ¶ 27. The court acknowledged that there are two
       circumstances under which a stipulated bench trial is considered tantamount to a
       guilty plea but found neither circumstance existed in this case (see People v.
       Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 322 (2010)). 2021 IL App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 26.
       Specifically, the court found defendant failed to functionally admit his guilt when
       he preserved a defense by maintaining that Taylor was the driver of the vehicle. Id.
       ¶ 27. The court also determined neither defendant nor defense counsel stated on the

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       record that the stipulated evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. Id.
       Accordingly, the appellate court held that the trial court was not required to
       admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 402(a), as defendant’s stipulated bench trial
       was not tantamount to a guilty plea. Id.

¶ 20       This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)
       (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 21                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22        In this appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of failure
       to reduce speed to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) his
       stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea, thus the trial court erred when
       it failed to admonish him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July
       1, 2012). We review each issue in turn.

¶ 23                              A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 24       Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty of failure to reduce speed
       to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt where the stipulated evidence only
       showed he was driving while intoxicated and jerked the steering wheel for an
       unknown reason. The State disagrees and argues the lower courts correctly found
       the stipulated evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for failure
       to reduce speed to avoid an accident. We agree with the State.

¶ 25       When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, after
       viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of
       fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
       doubt. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. “It is the responsibility of the trier
       of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw
       reasonable inferences from the facts.” Id. “[T]he trier of fact is not required to
       disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all
       possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of
       reasonable doubt.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 332 (2000). “[I]n a bench trial it
       is the province of the trial court to determine the credibility and weight of the

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       testimony, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts therein, and to render its
       decision accordingly.” People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 305-06 (1978).

¶ 26       “[A] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the fact finder on
       questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.”
       Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. “All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
       a finding of guilt.” People v. Swenson, 2020 IL 124688, ¶ 35. “A conviction will
       be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or
       unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People
       v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.

¶ 27       “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided
       that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the
       crime charged.” Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330. “The trier of fact need not, however, be
       satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. It
       is sufficient if all of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a
       reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. (citing People v. Jones, 105 Ill. 2d
       342, 350 (1985)).

¶ 28      Section 11-601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West
       2016)) provides:

          “No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is
          greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the
          use of the highway, or endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact
          that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit
          does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching
          and crossing an intersection, approaching and going around a curve, when
          approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway,
          or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by
          reason of weather or highway conditions. Speed must be decreased as may be
          necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the
          highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to
          use due care.”

¶ 29       To prove defendant guilty of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, the
       State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove carelessly

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       and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with the tree. See id. § 11-601(a); In re
       Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 238 (1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 447
       U.S. 410 (1980).

¶ 30       Defendant first argues the State failed to prove he drove carelessly under the
       circumstances. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Schumann,
       120 Ill. App. 3d 518 (1983). In Schumann, the appellate court found the trier of fact
       could infer that the defendant was driving carelessly and failed to reduce speed
       based on the facts surrounding the accident. Id. at 526. The evidence showed the
       victim was driving at night with her headlights and taillights illuminated, in the
       center lane of the roadway, traveling “45 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour
       zone.” Id. at 525. The victim saw no vehicles ahead of her or behind her on the road
       when she was suddenly struck from behind by the defendant’s vehicle, which was
       subsequently found in the ditch. Id.

¶ 31       Here, defendant argues the State failed to provide any evidence of the
       circumstances surrounding the accident where the stipulated evidence did not
       reveal any information about a potential obstruction in the road, where the tree was
       located in relation to the road, the conditions of the road, or the relative speed at
       which the vehicle was traveling. Thus, defendant asserts the stipulated evidence
       that he drove while intoxicated and jerked the steering wheel for an unknown reason
       causing the vehicle to collide with a tree was insufficient to prove the careless
       driving element.

¶ 32        While defendant admits he was intoxicated, he notes that evidence of
       intoxication, without more, does not prove he was driving carelessly. See Brant, 82
       Ill. App. 3d at 851-52 (stating evidence of intoxication without more cannot support
       an inference of carelessness sufficient to satisfy the requirements of proof of failure
       to reduce speed to avoid an accident); Sampson, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 443-44. Rather,
       defendant contends the State needed to prove he drove carelessly in addition to
       being intoxicated. Defendant argues the State failed to do so.

¶ 33       Section 11-601(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2016))
       imposes a duty upon all motorists to exercise “due care.” This court defines “due
       care” as “ ‘that degree of care which ordinarily prudent persons are accustomed to
       exercise under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” People v. Wawczak, 109 Ill.

                                                -8-
       2d 244, 250 (1985) (quoting Roberts v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 262 Ill. 228, 233
       (1914)).

¶ 34       When we view the stipulated evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
       we find the State provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude
       defendant drove carelessly. The stipulated evidence showed defendant drove while
       intoxicated where he registered a BAC of 0.203. Officer Albin also found
       defendant’s cell phone wedged in the driver’s seat. Further, Taylor told paramedics
       defendant was driving when he jerked the wheel, resulting in the vehicle hitting a
       tree.

¶ 35       Given that all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of a finding of guilt
       (Swenson, 2020 IL 124688, ¶ 35), we agree with the appellate court and find a
       combination of defendant’s act of jerking the wheel and driving with a high BAC
       allowed the fact finder to draw a reasonable inference that defendant drove
       carelessly where he failed to act as an ordinarily prudent person under the
       circumstances. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s assertion that the State failed to
       prove he drove carelessly.

¶ 36       Defendant also argues the State could not establish that he failed to reduce his
       speed to avoid colliding with the tree. Specifically, defendant asserts a conviction
       for failure to reduce speed cannot rest only on the fact that there was a collision. In
       support of his argument, defendant cites Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 852, and Sampson,
       130 Ill. App. 3d at 443-44. In Brant, the State argued the doctrine of res ipsa
       loquitur applied and asserted, “because defendant hit the car[,] he therefore must
       not have reduced his speed to avoid the accident.” 82 Ill. App. 3d at 852. However,
       the appellate court rejected the State’s argument, stating, “Based on the logic of
       that argument, anyone involved in an accident could properly be convicted for
       failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.” Id. Thus, the appellate court found
       the State failed to prove the failure to reduce speed element, where the failure to
       reduce speed “cannot be inferred merely from the fact of the collision.” Id.

¶ 37       The appellate court in Sampson relied on the above analysis in Brant to reject
       the State’s argument “that the law presumes where a vehicle runs into a parked
       vehicle or object at the side of the road, the accident would not have occurred had
       due care been used.” Sampson, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 443. In Sampson, the stipulated
       facts showed that the defendant was intoxicated and lost control of the car, hitting

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       a telephone pole. Id. at 440, 444. The appellate court found the evidence presented
       was insufficient to find the defendant guilty of driving too fast for conditions where,
       apart from the defendant’s intoxication, the State did not prove the essential
       elements of the offense. Id. at 444.

¶ 38       Here, the appellate court acknowledged its holding was in direct conflict with
       Brant and Sampson (2021 IL App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 21), where it found “[t]he very
       fact that defendant hit the tree establishes that he failed to reduce speed to avoid
       this accident” (id. ¶ 20). Given that, in order to sustain a conviction for failure to
       reduce speed to avoid an accident, the State is required to prove careless driving
       and the failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, the physical act of hitting the
       tree alone is not sufficient to meet the State’s burden. Even so, we affirm the
       appellate court because, in this instance, the evidence went beyond only
       establishing the physical act of hitting the tree. This court is not bound by the
       appellate court’s reasoning and may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
       See People v. Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 33.

¶ 39       Section 11-601(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2016))
       does not require proof that defendant was exceeding the applicable speed limit to
       find failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision because the offense can be
       committed regardless of the speed of defendant’s vehicle or the relevant speed limit.
       See also People v. Sturgess, 364 Ill. App. 3d 107, 116 (2006) (citing People v. Luka,
       184 Ill. App. 3d 84, 86 (1989)). Rather, the State needed to prove defendant failed
       to decrease his speed as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or
       vehicle. See 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2016).

¶ 40       As stated above, the stipulated evidence showed defendant drove while
       intoxicated and jerked the steering wheel, resulting in his vehicle colliding with the
       tree. The State further argues circumstantial evidence suggests the collision
       occurred at a high rate of speed, where defendant’s car sustained “heavy front end
       damage,” defendant injured his knee, and the airbags deployed. We note it is not
       clear from the record whether defendant injured his knee in the accident or
       aggravated a prior knee injury when he stepped out of the vehicle after the accident.
       Officer Albin’s report states defendant could not complete the walking portion of
       the test due to the “knee pain [defendant] sustained from the accident.” However,
       the Wilmington Fire Protection District care report provided that defendant told

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       paramedics he injured his knee in a prior accident and aggravated the injury “when
       he went to step out of the vehicle and slipped in the grass.”

¶ 41       While the State did not present physical evidence as to whether defendant
       reduced his speed before hitting the tree, such as the presence or lack of skid mark
       evidence on the pavement (Watkins v. Schmitt, 172 Ill. 2d 193, 208 (1996) (stating
       evidence of skid marks “ ‘tends to establish excessive speed’ ” (quoting Young v.
       Patrick, 323 Ill. 200, 202 (1926)))), we find the trier of fact could draw reasonable
       inferences from the circumstantial evidence—heavy front end damage to vehicle
       and airbag deployment—that defendant failed to reduce his speed before hitting the
       tree. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330 (stating “[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to
       sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a
       reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged”). The trier of fact is not
       required to disregard inferences that logically flow from the evidence. Id. at 332.
       Thus, when looking at the stipulated evidence in its entirety, we find the State
       presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant failed to reduce his speed to avoid
       colliding with the tree.

¶ 42       Accordingly, when viewing the stipulated evidence in the light most favorable
       to the State, we find a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond
       a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. We next turn to
       whether defendant’s stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea, such
       that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him pursuant to Rule 402(a).

¶ 43                                 B. Stipulated Bench Trial

¶ 44       Defendant argues his stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea such
       that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him pursuant to Illinois Supreme
       Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). The State argues defendant forfeited this issue
       and the trial court did not commit plain error by omitting Rule 402(a)
       admonishments because defendant’s stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a
       guilty plea.

¶ 45       To preserve an error for consideration on appeal, a defendant must object to the
       error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL
       119445, ¶ 48. Failure to do so constitutes forfeiture. Id. However, this court may

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       consider a forfeited claim where the defendant demonstrates a plain error occurred.
       Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). To prevail under the plain error doctrine, the
       defendant must first demonstrate a clear and obvious error occurred. People v.
       Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). If an error occurred, this court will only
       reverse where (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
       threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
       seriousness of the error” or (2) the “error is so serious that it affected the fairness
       of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process,
       regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Id.

¶ 46       Based on the record, we find defendant failed to raise this issue—that his
       stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea such that the trial court erred
       in failing to admonish him pursuant to Rule 402(a)—at the stipulated bench trial or
       in his posttrial motion. Thus, defendant forfeited this issue on appeal. See Sebby,
       2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Accordingly, we first turn to whether a clear or obvious error
       occurred.

¶ 47        A stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea under two circumstances:
       “(1) the State’s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does
       not present or preserve a defense; or (2) the stipulation includes a statement that the
       evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.” (Emphases in original.) Clendenin,
       238 Ill. 2d at 322. If a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea, the trial
       court must give the defendant guilty plea admonishments pursuant to Rule 402(a).
       People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 21 (1991). Whether a defendant’s stipulated bench
       trial is tantamount to a guilty plea is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.
       People v. Foote, 389 Ill. App. 3d 888, 893 (2009).

¶ 48       In determining whether defendant’s stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a
       guilty plea, we look to the two categories specified in Clendenin. Initially, we note
       defendant concedes the stipulation did not include an express statement that the
       evidence was sufficient to convict. In looking at the record, we agree with defendant
       that neither defendant nor defense counsel stated that the stipulated evidence was
       sufficient to convict defendant.

¶ 49       According to defendant, his stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty
       plea because defense counsel did not present or preserve a defense at his stipulated
       bench trial. Defendant notes that counsel stipulated to all of the facts in the State’s

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       case-in-chief and only attempted to deny one of the stipulated facts—that defendant
       was the driver of the vehicle. Defendant argues that, because his defense was only
       the denial of the very facts to which he stipulated, his bench trial was tantamount
       to a guilty plea. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Russ, 31 Ill.
       App. 3d 385 (1975). In Russ, the appellate court explained that merely denying
       stipulated facts, without more, cannot constitute a meaningful defense in the context
       of a stipulated bench trial. Id. at 389, 392.

¶ 50       Defendant recognizes that courts, including the court below, have held that a
       defendant presents and preserves a defense by generally arguing against the
       sufficiency of the evidence and therefore the stipulated bench trial is not the
       fundamental equivalent of a guilty plea. See Foote, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 894-95; 2021
       IL App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Taylor, 2018 IL App (2d) 150995,
       ¶ 12). However, defendant argues these cases should be overruled insofar as they
       hold that a defendant presents or preserves a defense by generally offering any
       argument against the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of how frivolous and
       unsupported by the evidence the “defense” may be. We disagree with defendant
       and decline his suggestion that we overrule these cases.

¶ 51       Following the presentation of the stipulated evidence, defendant did more than
       deny stipulated facts, he presented a defense. Defendant challenged the sufficiency
       of the evidence. Specifically, defense counsel argued, “our main position is that
       [defendant] was not the driver of the vehicle.” Counsel asserted the evidence
       showed Taylor was the driver of the vehicle when the accident occurred, as
       paramedics found Taylor in the driver’s seat “with the air bags deployed, Judge,
       and they saw [defendant] as the passenger kind of on the floor.” While the stipulated
       evidence showed defendant admitted to Officer Albin that “he was the driver,”
       defendant’s defense to the contrary presented a genuine question of fact for the trial
       court to decide.

¶ 52       Accordingly, we find defendant’s stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to
       a guilty plea, and the trial court was not required to provide Rule 402(a)
       admonishments. See Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 21. Given the trial court committed no
       clear or obvious error, further plain error review is unwarranted.

¶ 53                                   III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 54       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which
       affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence for failure to reduce speed to avoid
       an accident.

¶ 55      Affirmed.

¶ 56      JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the
       consideration or decision of this case.

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