Court Opinion

ID: 9694651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:49:57.244533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:03.734820
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision finding that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the decisions of local governments to grant tax increment financing for property that they deem to be deteriorated or blighted.
A.
This case involves the grant of tax-increment financing (TIF) under the Tax Increment Financing Act (Act)1 to be used for a 211-acre of vacant land in Washington County to be used for commercial development.2 The land had been previously zoned as agricultural but was recently rezoned as commercial. The proposed project would require a private investment of $400,000,000 and a local TIF portion of $14,000,000 with a state contribution of $15,000,000. Trinity Area School District et al; Washington County et al; and South Strabane Township et al, each had the creation of a TIF district and participation in a TIF proposal approved by their respective Boards: Trinity Area School’s Board by a vote of 6 to 3 on August 4, 2005; Washington County’s Board by a vote of 2 to 0 on August 5, 2005; and the South Strabane Township’s Board by a vote of 3 to 2 on October 25, 2005.
On September 6, 2005, Citizens filed two complaints requesting equitable relief alleging that the area of the proposed development, among other things, was not “blighted.”3 On that same date, Citizens *1272filed with the trial court two local agency law appeals from the decisions of the Trinity Area School Board’s decision and the Washington County Board of Commissioner’s decision adopting the TIF proposal. On November 4, 2005, Citizens filed an appeal from the decision of the South Stra-bane Township Board of Supervisors as well as a complaint requesting equitable relief making the same allegations as in the previous complaints. In each complaint, Citizens contended that by granting a TIF for property not blighted, each individual taxing body abused its discretion, was contrary to statute and otherwise improper. The Taxing Bodies each filed preliminary objections and motions to strike for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court first addressed the preliminary objections on subject matter jurisdiction and held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on legislative enactments, citing Mercurio v. Allegheny County Redevelopment Authority, 889 A.2d 1196 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003),4 and Ondek v. Allegheny County Council, 860 A.2d 644 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).5 Regarding the question of blight, the trial court found that the TIF district could be designated as blighted by acts of the taxing units, and certifying an area as blighted was not subject to judicial review where there had been no showing that the determination of the blight was made with fraud or bad faith. Agreeing with the trial court’s reasoning, the majority affirms. I disagree with the majority because I believe the certification of blight necessary to grant a TIF is chal-lengeable in equity no matter how that action is characterized.
The cornerstone of the majority opinion is that because a condemnation based on a certification of blight made under the Urban Redevelopment Law6 is not challenge-able in equity or under the local agency law appeal, then a certification of blight used in granting a TIF is similarly not challengeable in equity. However, a certification of blight in a condemnation case is not challengeable in equity or under the *1273local agency law because the General Assembly created an adequate and exclusive remedy at law under the Eminent Domain Code. That Code provides that a con-demnee who desires to challenge the certification must do so by filing “preliminary objections” to the declaration of taking. This was explained in Faranda Appeal, 420 Pa. 295, 300-302, 216 A.2d 769, 772-774 (1966):
Faranda’s final objection raises a more difficult and novel question. By his preliminary objections, Faranda has challenged the Authority’s power and right to condemn the property in question by his assertion that the said property is not, in fact, blighted. Since the condemnation of property is limited by our Constitution, supra, to a taking for a public use and since the only basis for the Authority’s present taking is that the elimination of a blighted area is such a public use (Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277, 172 A.L.R. 953), Faranda seeks to show that the area is not blighted thereby negativing the power or right of the Authority to condemn. The Authority counters by saying that an action in equity rather than a preliminary objection is the proper procedural method to follow in challenging the Authority’s taking. In the Authority’s view, a preliminary objection should be limited to attacking the wisdom, rather than the lawfulness, of the condemnation.
An examination of the language of Section 406(a) of the Eminent Domain Code, supra, clearly substantiates the soundness of the view urged upon this court by Faranda. That section provides: ‘ * * * Preliminary objections shall be limited to and shall be the exclusive method of challenging (1) the power or right of the condemnor to appropriate the condemned property unless the same has been previously adjudicated * * * ’ (Emphasis supplied). See also: Snitzer, Pennsylvania Eminent Domain, Section 406.1 wherein the author says: ‘Section 406 specifically provides that the filing of preliminary objections shall be the sole and exclusive remedy available to condemnees to challenge the condemnation. As the comment notes indicate, the intent of this section is to provide the exclusive method of challenging the power to condemn, the sufficiency of the security, the declaration of taking and procedure. * * * ’ Thus it is clear that the new Eminent Domain Code sets forth a complete and exclusive method of challenging the taking. The Authority’s argument suffers from the inherent fallacy of urging that Faranda is questioning not the power of the Authority to condemn but rather the wisdom of the action it has taken. As we have said, supra, the taking is constitutional only if it is for a public use; if the purpose is not for a public use, the taking is unconstitutional. Herein, the Authority bottoms its public use in declaring the area involved to be blighted, a determination challenged by Faranda, thereby making the thrust of Faranda’s attack directly to the Authority’s power, not to its wisdom. McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A.2d 142; Belovsky, supra; Ormsby Land Co. v. Pittsburgh, 276 Pa. 68, 119 A. 730.
The Authority urges that Faranda’s remedy is by a suit in equity. However, we have recently held that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to determine whether a municipal authority has the right of eminent domain or whether it has properly exercised any right of eminent domain; Cunfer v. Carbon Airport Authority, 414 Pa. 408, 200 A.2d 768. See also Balazick v. Dunkard-Bobtown Municipal Authority, 414 Pa. 182, 199 A.2d 430. Similarly, the many cases cited by the Authority in its brief for the proposition that equity is the *1274proper forum are not controlling in that such cases were decided prior to the passage of the present Eminent Domain Code.
By the clear language of the statute, the legislature has mandated that preliminary objections constitute the exclusive method of challenging the power of the condemnor to take private property. Faranda has challenged the Authority’s right to condemn and has raised this challenge properly through the medium of preliminary objections. ‘It is commonplace that where the legislature has provided a remedy or procedure, that remedy or procedure is exclusive and alone must be pursued.’ Schwab v. Pottstown Borough, 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921, 923; Cunfer v. Carbon Airport Authority, supra; Jacobs v. Fetzer, 381 Pa. 262, 112 A.2d 356. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial review of a certification of blight in a condemnation case then is not precluded — it is only precluded in equity or local agency law because the General Assembly has provided an exclusive remedy to challenge the taking through preliminary objections to the declaration of taking. In consideration of those preliminary objections, the property is given a full evidentiary hearing to establish that the certification was improper. Moreover, the property owner challenging the certification of blight does not have to, as the majority suggests, establish that the certification was done through fraud or bad faith, only that, the certification of blight by the governmental entity was arbitrary or capricious. Simco Stores v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 455 Pa. 438, 317 A.2d 610 (1974); Cass Plumbing & Heating Company, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 600, 416 A.2d 1142 (1980).7
As can be seen, absent the statutory remedy set forth in the Eminent Domain Code, equity would have jurisdiction to hear whether the property was, in fact, blighted.
*1275B.
While the Tax Increment Financing Act has a similar procedure to the procedure in the Redevelopment Law, in that an authority can certify to the governing body that the area is “blighted” based on the same standards contained in the Redevelopment Law, the challenge here has a completely different constitutional and legal framework. Tax increment financing is authorized by Art. 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution entitled “Taxation and Finance.” Section 2 of that Article, entitled “Exemptions and special provisions,” provides in subsection (b)(iii) for Tax Increment Financing, stating that the General Assembly may, by law:
(iii) Establish standards and qualifications by which local taxing authorities may make uniform special tax provisions applicable to a taxpayer for a limited period of time to encourage improvement of deteriorating property or areas by an individual, association or corporation, or to encourage industrial development by a non-profit corporation.
The General Assembly implemented established standards and qualifications in the Tax Increment Financing Act.8
Like other tax cases where there is not an adequate remedy at law, Citizens have alleged that the Taxing Bodies have committed an illegal act by granting a TIF for property that does not meet the statutory requirements for being blighted, equity has jurisdiction. Where there is no legal remedy or even where the legal remedy cannot afford “full, perfect and complete” relief, “equity extends its jurisdiction in the furtherance of justice.” Pentlong Corp. v. GLS Capital, Inc., 573 Pa. 34, 820 A.2d 1240, 1245 (2003), quoting from Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, 386 Pa. 306, 125 A.2d 755, 766 (1956). Just as equity had jurisdiction to hear certification of blight in a condemnation case, equity has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a certification of blight to grant a TIF.
TIFs are not granted so that a developer can develop a project more profitably— they are granted so that the public purpose of the elimination of blight can be accomplished. If a TIF is granted for property that is not blighted, the public is not receiving the “bargain” to which it is entitled. In this case, because Citizens as taxpayers have standing to maintain this action, Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (1986), and equity has jurisdiction, I would reverse the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Judges McGINLEY and SMITH-RIB NER join in this dissent.

. Act of July 11, 1990, P.L. 465, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 6930.1-6930.13.

. Tax-increment financing generally commits a community to devote new property tax revenue generated by a development to pay for the development’s infrastructure that a developer would normally have to assume. If a TIF is not granted, the increase in tax revenues would go into the local government general fund to carry out their municipal, educational or social welfare responsibilities.

.They also argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their appeals; if the trial court had jurisdiction, then the trial court erred by sustaining the taxing districts’ demurrers because their complaints averred facts sufficient to establish bad faith in the designation of the property as blighted; they were entitled to challenge the actions of the individual public officials in approving the TIF proposal; and there was a violation of the Sunshine Act when the tie-breaking vote was cast by Supervisor Bill Bell by telephone from his home.

.Mercurio involved whether a challenge to a TIF ordinance could be brought more than 30 days after its enactment. While acknowledging that their action had not been filed within 30 days, those challengers contended that the action was still timely because the required hearing had not been held. We rejected that argument because Section 5571(c)(5) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5), provided a 30-day time limitation for challenging defects in the enactment of ordinances and resolutions. However, our Supreme Court effectively overruled that portion of Mercurio in Glen-Gery Corporation v. Zoning Hearing Board of Dover Township, 589 Pa. 135, 907 A.2d 1033 (2006). Glen-Gery involved a challenge to an enactment of a subdivision ordinance enacted four years earlier because, as in Mercurio, a required hearing had not been held. We held that 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5) barred the claim because it was brought well beyond 30 days after the ordinance had been enacted. Our Supreme Court reversed, holding “that a defect in the enactment renders any time bar null and void as the statute is, in its entirety, void ab initio." 907 A.2d at 1043. Rather than automatically dismiss the claim as time barred when an action was not filed within 30 days, our Supreme Court held that it must be determined whether the procedural defects were such that it "implicate[d] notice, due process, or other constitutional rights of a party ... if proven, could render the statute void ab ini-tio.” 907 A.2d at 1037, footnote 5.
I recognize that in Mercurio, we went on in dicta to state that the certification of blight could only be challenged if fraud or bad faith were made out, but for reasons set forth later in the opinion, I believe that statement is not in accord with later case law.

. Ondek held that the granting of a TIF was not an adjudication subject to appeal under the Local Agency Law. 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 551-555, 751-754. Based on that opinion, I agree that Citizens’ Local Agency Law appeals cannot be maintained.

. Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, as amended, 35 P.S. 1701-1747.

. Judge Blatt dissented in Cass stating: "Our Supreme Court, in Simco Stores v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 455 Pa. 438, 442, 317 A.2d 610, 612-613 (1974), restricted lower courts’ scope of review over planning commissions' certifications of blight, stating that: ‘On review a condemnee should be given an opportunity to prove that a certification of blight is arbitrary or capricious.... It does not require the lower court to substitute its discretion for that of the legislatively-granted discretion of the Commission.’ ” As Justice Roberts noted in his dissent, this procedure "impermissibly limits the property owner to only a faint shadow of his right to judicial review.” Simco, supra, 455 Pa. at 447, 317 A.2d at 615; Cass, 416 A.2d at 1150.
Justice Roberts would have allowed a de novo review of a certification of blight stating: "Simco’s challenge ... 'seeks to show that the area is not blighted thereby negativing the Power or right of the Authority to condemn.’ Contrary to the assertions of the majority, appellants do not ask the court to substitute its conception of blight for that of the Authority. What appellants seek is a judicial determination whether the Authority exceeded the power granted it by the Legislature. The court in ruling on preliminary objections to a declaration of taking must make an initial determination that the area condemned is in fact blighted as defined by the Legislature. This determination, fully within the competence of a judicial tribunal, decides the threshold question of the Authority’s 'power or right’ to condemn. Only if it is concluded that the Authority is acting within its legislatively-granted power, will a court confront the question whether the Authority's action was arbitrary or capricious. While a court’s function is not to assess the wisdom of an administrative declaration of blight, a court must nevertheless fulfill its affirmative duty in condemnation cases to review the challenged exercise of the Authority’s power.” Simco, 455 Pa. at 445-446, 317 A.2d at 614-615. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)

. Section 2 of the Urban Redevelopment Law provides that: "It is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legislative flnding-(a) That there exist in urban communities in this Commonwealth areas which have become blighted because of the unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate or over-crowded condition of the dwellings therein, or because of inadequate planning of the area, or excessive land coverage by the buildings thereon, or the lack of proper light and air and open space, or because of the defective design and arrangement of the buildings thereon, or faulty street or lot layout, or economically or socially undesirable land uses.” 35 P.S. § 1702(a).