Court Opinion

ID: 9965660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 05:08:39.422596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:24.496060
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re PETERS/BRINTON/MATHEWS, Minors.                                May 2, 2024

                                                                     No. 367069
                                                                     Berrien Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2023-000019-NA

In re N. BRINTON, Minor.

                                                                     No. 367070
                                                                     Berrien Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2023-000019-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right
the trial court’s order of disposition. Shortly before this order was entered, the trial court,
following an adjudication, found statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over the three minor
children, KP, NB, and EJM, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper care and custody
due to neglect or abandonment) and (2) (unfit home environment due to neglect). Respondent-
mother is a biological parent to all three children, while respondent-father is only NB’s biological
parent. In Docket No. 367069, respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by taking
jurisdiction over the three children. In Docket No. 367070, respondent-father argues that (1) the
trial court’s findings were insufficient to support NB’s placement in foster care and (2) NB’s
guardian ad litem (LGAL) rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       The children were taken into protective custody by an order entered on February 28, 2023.
The order stated that respondent-father had previously struck KP, giving her a black eye. He was

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charged with domestic violence and a no-contact order was issued. On February 28, 2023,
however, respondent-father was found hiding in the family home with respondent-mother’s
“knowledge and acquiescence.” The order removed the children from respondents’ home and
placed them under the care and supervision of the DHHS.

       The DHHS filed a lengthy petition the following day, March 1, 2023. A preliminary
hearing took place that same day, but it had to be adjourned and was not concluded until March
13, 2023. On that date, the trial court authorized the petition.

         The case eventually proceeded to an adjudication trial that took place over three days,
concluding on June 22, 2023. The trial court signed an order of adjudication the following day in
which it took jurisdiction over KP, NB, and EJM under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). During the
adjudication trial, the court heard testimony from caseworkers with Children’s Protective Services
(CPS), respondent-mother, and KP. The trial court found KP to be a highly credible witness. KP
testified that she was hit in the face and given a black eye by respondent-father, and that it was not
the first time that he had hit her. She also testified to having gone several years without being in
school and being placed in charge of her siblings’ educational needs. KP estimated that the family
had moved 72 times in the last nine years, and said that respondents would pack up and leave any
time they had a run in with CPS or police. She also said that she and her siblings did not receive
proper medical care.

         At the end of the hearing, the trial court concluded that respondents had neglected the
physical, emotional, mental, and educational needs of the children. The court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that respondents engaged in “educational neglect” based on
evidence that the children’s schooling was left to KP; that respondents created an unfit home
environment because of criminality or depravity because (1) KP was physically abused by
respondent-father and (2) respondent-mother was aware of the abuse but did not do anything about
it; and that respondents engaged in neglect by leaving KP to essentially parent the other children
while knowing she suffered from mental health issues and did nothing about it. Relying on this
same evidence, the court found that respondents failed to provide proper care or support to assure
that the children’s health and safety needs were being met. Based on testimony that the children
had not been receiving consistent medical care, the court found that respondents had neglected the
children’s medical well-being. The trial court further found that returning the children to
respondents’ custody would present a substantial risk of harm to the children’s health and well-
being, and that no other services or arrangement would adequately safeguard the children from
that risk of harm.

       This appeal followed.

                                     II. DOCKET NO. 367069

       In Docket No. 367069, respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by
finding statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over the children because there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that either MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2) was satisfied. We disagree.

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                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction. In re BZ,
264 Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. at 296-297.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

        To acquire jurisdiction, a trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
child comes within the requirements of MCL 712A.2. In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 295. That statute
provides in relevant part:

              (b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age
       found within the county:

               (1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
       maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
       proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
       for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or
       her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
       custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . .

                                               * * *

               (2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
       drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent
       adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in. [MCL
       712A.2(b)(1) and (2).]

       Respondent-mother argues that these statutory grounds were not satisfied because there
was no evidence that she failed to provide food, education, housing, or clothes for her children.
Respondent-mother alternatively argues that the trial court did not consider that KP’s black eye
was a one-time incident, and that “there was no other abuse of any of the children.”

         Addressing the latter point first, the trial court heard testimony from KP that she was
physically abused numerous times by respondent-father and that respondent-mother had told KP
to lie to investigators about how she received her black eye. KP also testified that respondent-
father abused EJM by punishing him harder than the other children because he was not respondent-
father’s biological child. This testimony effectively refutes respondent-mother’s arguments that
respondent-father only hit KP once and that there was no evidence that the other children were
abused.

       KP further testified that she had not attended school in several years, was tasked with
educating her brothers, and occasionally had to ration food with her brothers whenever respondent-
mother left town for multiple weeks and left the children in the care of respondent-father. There
was additional evidence that respondent-mother put KP in danger by allowing respondent-father

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to violate his no-contact order and return to the home shortly after he was charged with domestic
violence for striking KP and giving her a black eye. The court also heard testimony about the
children’s vagabond lifestyle—according to KP, respondent-mother packed up the children and
moved at least 72 times over the past nine years of KP’s life. KP additionally testified that she
had mental health problems and needed to see a therapist, but respondent-mother brushed it aside.
KP elaborated that it was not just KP that respondent-mother medically neglected; KP said that
respondent-mother had not been taking NB and EJM to regular doctor and dental appointments.
KP guessed that NB had only seen a doctor once, and EJM might have never seen a doctor at all.
KP further testified that her schooling was inadequate, and that she was also responsible for her
siblings’ education. This testimony refutes respondent-mother’s contention that there was no
evidence that she neglected the educational and medical needs of all three children. It further
supports that there were even times when respondent-mother failed to provide sufficient food to
meet the children’s needs.

         Not only does the evidence discussed above rebut respondent-mother’s assertions that such
evidence was not before the trial court, but the evidence provided a more-than-sufficient basis for
the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the three minor children under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2). The court accordingly did not clearly err by taking jurisdiction over KP, NB, and EJM.

                                    III. DOCKET NO. 367070

        In Docket No. 367070, respondent-father raises two arguments. First, he contends that the
trial court did not make sufficient factual findings to place NB into foster care. Second, he argues
that NB’s LGAL did not provide NB effective assistance of counsel. We take each argument in
turn.

                                          A. REMOVAL

        Respondent-father argues that, in its order following the preliminary hearing, the trial court
did not make sufficient findings under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2) to justify placing
NB in foster care. We disagree.

       Under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2), which are nearly identical, a trial court
can order that a child be placed in foster care if the following conditions are met:

               (a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm
       to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.

               (b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child
       is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from risk as described in
       subdivision (a).

              (c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s
       welfare.

              (d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to
       prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.

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              (e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to
       safeguard the child’s health and welfare. [MCL 712A.13a(9).]

       Respondent-father argues that the trial court did not make any findings under Subsection
(a) because it supposedly “focused its factual determinations solely on [KP]”; did not make
adequate findings under Subsection (b) because it did not consider whether options besides
removal were available to protect NB; did not “consider whether any efforts had been made to
keep [NB] in the home”; and did not make adequate findings under Subsection (e), particularly
because the court failed to consider the potential negative effects of removing NB from his care.
Respondent-father is wrong on all counts.

        At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court placed a number of factual
findings on the record that respondent-father does not contest on appeal. The trial court found that
respondent-father struck KP and was charged with domestic violence for that conduct. The court
found that KP was “primarily responsible for the care and upkeep of” NB and EJM. It found that
NB had not attended school in several years, that his schooling was left to KP, and that the
combination of these facts amounted to “educational neglect.” The court found that respondents
were constantly moving from place to place, subjecting the children to a “transient . . . lifestyle,”
which in turn contributed to the children’s educational deficiencies. The court recognized a request
by respondents to place the children with respondent-mother “with certain conditions” but rejected
that request because respondent-father “was already subject to those conditions” and violated
them. Respondent-father was previously subject to a no-contact order, the court explained, which
respondent-father violated “with the permission of [respondent-mother].” The court also found
that reasonable efforts were made, which included an investigation by the DHHS, “police
investigation, attempted interview of the children, and safety planning.” The court opined that it
would be contrary to the welfare of all the children to remain in a placement with either respondent
due to respondent-father’s “ongoing criminality” and the accompanying acquiescence of
respondent-mother. In a written order following the hearing, the trial court opined that additional
efforts made by the DHHS to prevent removal included CPS interviews with respondents and the
maternal grandmother, as well as “[c]riminal history checks.” That same order required the DHHS
to provide any services to the foster parents that may be necessary to provide for the children’s
care, as well as to provide any service to the children that may be “necessary and appropriate.”

         The trial court’s findings on the record and in its order following the preliminary hearing
plainly satisfy the requirements of MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). Contrary to
respondent-father’s argument with respect to Subsection (a), the court did not focus its factual
findings solely on KP but discussed how all three children were subjected to “educational neglect.”
The court also noted that NB was neglected because respondents left KP primarily responsible for
NB’s “care and upkeep.” Under Subsection (b), the court plainly considered alternative
placements, again contrary to respondent-father’s argument. The court specifically acknowledged
respondents’ request to place NB with respondent-mother “with certain conditions,” but it rejected
this option, reasoning that respondents had already proven unwilling or unable to adhere to such
restrictions. Respondent-father’s contention that the trial court failed to consider whether
reasonable efforts had been made to prevent NB’s removal is likewise contradicted by the record.
In both its findings on the record at the hearing and in its written order following the hearing, the
court described the reasonable efforts that had been made to prevent removal. Finally, with respect
to Subsection (e), the court in its written order ensured that NB’s placement away from respondent

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would adequately safeguard his health and welfare by requiring the DHHS to provide any “services
to the foster parent(s) that are necessary and appropriate” for NB’s care, as well as any services to
NB that may be “necessary and appropriate.” These findings were more than sufficient to facilitate
appellate review of the factors enumerated in MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). See In re
Williams, 333 Mich App 172, 183; 958 NW2d 629 (2020). Having reviewed the properly-created
record, we discern no error in the trial court’s decision to place NB in foster care.

                        B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Respondent-father next argues that this Court should abandon precedent and rule that
respondent-parents have standing to challenge the effectiveness of a child’s attorney. We decline
respondent-father’s request.

        Respondent-father wishes to argue that NB’s court-appointed LGAL provided ineffective
assistance. This Court addressed a similar argument in In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781
NW2d 105 (2009), explaining that a respondent-parent does not have standing to challenge the
effectiveness of a child’s counsel. This Court reasoned as follows:

               It is true that children have a right to appointed counsel in child protective
       proceedings, MCL 712A.17c(7), and that a child’s attorney appointed under the
       juvenile code “has the same duties that any other client’s attorney would fulfill
       when necessary.” In re AMB, 248 Mich App 144, 224; 640 NW2d 262 (2001). In
       addition, although child protective proceedings are not criminal in nature, where
       the right to effective counsel arises from the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process
       Clause indirectly guarantees effective assistance of counsel in the context of child
       protective proceedings. In re C.R., 250 Mich App 185, 197-198; 646 N.W.2d 506
       (2002).

               Respondents’ argument, however, wrongly assumes that they have standing
       to challenge the alleged violation of [the child’s] constitutional rights. Generally,
       persons do not have standing to assert constitutional or statutory rights on behalf of
       another person. People v Wood, 447 Mich 80, 89; 523 NW2d 477 (1994). And,
       this Court has held that a respondent in a child protective proceeding lacks standing
       to challenge the effectiveness of the child’s attorney. As this Court stated in In re
       E.P., 234 Mich App 582, 598; 595 N.W.2d 167 (1999), overruled on other grounds
       462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000):

               [C]onstitutional protections are generally personal and cannot be
               asserted vicariously, but rather only “ ‘at the instance of one whose
               own protection was infringed.’ ” A plaintiff must assert his own
               legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
               legal rights or interests of third parties. Because the right to effective
               assistance of counsel is a constitutional one, it is personal to the child
               and respondent may not assert it on behalf of the child. [Citations
               omitted.]

                                                  -6-
               Accordingly, because respondents do not have standing to challenge the
       effectiveness of [the child’s] counsel, we decline to address the merits of this
       argument.

Like the respondent in In re HRC, respondent-father lacks standing to challenge the effectiveness
of NB’s counsel, so we decline to address the merits of this argument.1

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

1
  We also briefly note that, even if we could consider the merits of respondent-father’s claim, he
would still be responsible for establishing the factual predicate of his ineffective-assistance claim,
see People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999), which he plainly has not done.
Respondent-father contends that, had the LGAL performed certain duties, then a different outcome
was probable. But respondent-father concedes that “[i]t is unclear” whether the LGAL performed
those duties, thus failing to establish the factual predicate of his claim.

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