Court Opinion

ID: 9620445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:42:25.087814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.984928
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
I.
Over Eletmeyer’s objection, the trial judge allowed the Commonwealth to introduce testimony that a police dog detected the odor of a narcotic emanating from a roll of money that included some of Hetmeyer’s money. The majority concludes that the probative value of that identification outweighed its prejudicial value. I disagree with that conclusion.
Evidence is not admissible if it is irrelevant or its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial value. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 478, 486, 100 S.E.2d 766, 772 (1957); Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 254, 259, 443 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1994). The Commonwealth has failed to establish that the testimony of a police dog’s “alert” to the odor of a narcotic or its derivative on the roll of currency had any tendency to prove the fact for which it was offered.
The evidence proved that during Detective Thompson’s search of the room, he opened the radio’s battery compartment, where he discovered the bags of crack cocaine and heroin. After he closed the battery compartment, he continued to search and found a bundle of money in a suitcase. When the police were preparing to leave the room, Detective Thompson was assigned the task of delivering the radio and the money to police headquarters. For rea*113sons that are unexplained on the record, he placed the money in his coat pocket. No evidence proved that Detective Thompson enclosed the money in a wrapper before inserting it in his pocket.
The evidence proved that a police dog later “alerted” to the money Detective Thompson seized from the room and placed in his pocket. The evidence did not prove whether the dog “alerted” to cocaine, heroin, marijuana, or one of the other “derivative” odors which the dog was trained to identify. No evidence suggested that the dog alerted in a unique manner for each narcotic or that residue of a particular narcotic was discovered on the money.
In attempting to establish that Hetmeyer possessed the narcotics, Detective Thompson “speculate [d] [that] somebody handled the money after handling the drugs.” However, Thompson’s testimony established that he could have been the source of the transfer of a narcotic to the money. His search progressed from the narcotics to the money. Moreover, Thompson did not place the money in a bag or other container before he placed it in his pocket.
The evidence also failed to prove that the money which the dog identified as having the odor of narcotics was in fact Hetmeyer’s money. Hetmeyer claimed only $1500 of the $2900 discovered in the suitcase and later exposed to the dog. One of the other men claimed some of the money. Although the third man did not claim that any of the money belonged to him, he, as did Hetmeyer and the second man, claimed ownership of some of the clothing in the suitcase where the money was found. Simply put, no evidence proved that Hetmeyer was the only person who touched the money and was the source of the contamination.
Significantly, no testimony proved what quantity of narcotic was required in order to be detectable by the dog or whether the presence of detectable quantities of narcotic on currency was a common or uncommon occurrence. The dog’s handler acknowledged, however, that in order to train the dog to distinguish between “clean” and drug-tainted currency, he taught the dog to distinguish between uncirculated currency obtained from a bank and currency known to have been near narcotics. Because of the widespread exposure of much of U.S. currency to narcotics, a dog’s successful identification of “tainted” currency is of little, if *114any, evidentiary significance. See United States v. Fifty-three Thousand Eighty-two Dollars in United States Currency, 985 F.2d 245, 250 n.5 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that evidentiary value of drug detecting dog’s alert has been called into question in light of large amount of currency tainted with drugs); Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 819 F. Supp. 698, 720 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting that DEA chemist found that one-third of bills in randomly selected sample were contaminated with detectable cocaine and that Federal Reserve Bank money sorting belts were also contaminated).
In order for the dog’s alert to the money to have been probative of any fact in this case, the jury must necessarily have speculated that the odor detected by the dog was either cocaine or heroin, that the odor was not marijuana, that money with such an odor is uncommon, that Hetmeyer’s money was the money that contained the odor of narcotic, and that Hetmeyer’s money came to have such an odor by virtue of Hetmeyer’s possession of narcotics. That speculation is unwarranted by the evidence and is too attenuated to be of any probative value. Furthermore, these circumstances manifestly establish that the prejudice that flows from allowing proof of the dog’s identification of the odor of narcotics on the money outweighs its probative value.
In relying on Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882 (1982), for the proposition that the dog’s identification was properly admitted, the majority misinterprets the import of that case. In Epperly, a dog was used to follow the scent of a human.
We hold that dog-tracking evidence is admissible in a criminal case after a proper foundation has been laid to show that the handler was qualified to work with the dog and to interpret its responses, that the dog was a sufficiently trained and proven tracker of human scent, that the dog was placed on the trail where circumstances indicated that the guilty party had been, and that the trail had not become so stale or contaminated as to be beyond the dog’s tracking capabilities.
224 Va. at 233, 294 S.E.2d at 893 (emphasis added).
*115In Epperly, the dog followed a scent it had first detected from an article of clothing known to belong to Epperly. Id. at 227, 294 S.E.2d at 889. In this case, although there was proof that Hetmeyer had been standing near the suitcase that contained his currency, no evidence proved that the narcotic scent the dog detected was related to Hetmeyer and not someone else. Given the nature of the scent that the dog in this case was tracking (i.e., marijuana, heroin, cocaine, or a derivative odor), it cannot be said as was the case in Epperly, that “[i]n the actual event [] the dog unerringly followed the trail ... to the defendant’s front door.” Id. at 233, 294 S.E.2d at 893.
For all of these reasons, evidence of the dog’s identification of Hetmeyer’s currency should have been suppressed.
II.
The majority also concludes that the circumstances of Hetmeyer’s presence in a hotel room were sufficient to prove that he exercised dominion and control over narcotics found in the hotel room. I also disagree that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Hetmeyer possessed either the heroin or cocaine.
Because no evidence proved that Hetmeyer was ever in actual possession of either drug, the sole question is whether Hetmeyer constructively possessed heroin or cocaine. His proximity to those items, even in a hotel room that he rented, is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed them. See Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619, 623, 238 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1977). In order to prove that Hetmeyer constructively possessed contraband, the Commonwealth was required to prove facts and circumstances that indicated that Hetmeyer was aware of its presence and exercised dominion and control over the contraband. Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986). Moreover, in order for circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be wholly consistent with guilt and wholly inconsistent with innocence. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984).
The police found bags of heroin and cocaine in the battery compartment of a radio on a bed in the hotel room which Hetmeyer rented. Two other men were also present in the hotel room. No evidence proved that Hetmeyer was aware of the drugs in the *116radio. Although the police dog may have “alerted” to a roll of money, some of which Hetmeyer admitted was his, no evidence proved that Hetmeyer’s money was connected with the contraband found in the radio or that the odor the dog detected was in fact that of heroin or cocaine.
The majority also states that Hetmeyer delayed in admitting the investigating police officers into the hotel room. The detective who initially approached Hetmeyer’s hotel room testified, however, that after he knocked at the hotel room door Hetmeyer came to the door and “[sjtarted to go from the dead bolt to the handle like this [indicated]; . . . and . . . was going up and down as if he was having a problem with the locks. . . . [H]e kept doing this [indicating] for a while just back and forth, back and forth up to the dead bolt and down, and finally he opened the door.” Nothing in the detective’s testimony proved that Hetmeyer was not having trouble with the locks. The detective also testified that the delay was “[o]ne or two minutes. Wasn’t very long.”
Moreover, Hetmeyer was under no obligation to admit the detective who came to the door without a warrant and who admitted that during his hour-long surveillance of the room from the outside he saw nothing suspicious. Neither the Commonwealth nor the majority cite any authority for the proposition that such a delay as was present here is evidence of consciousness of guilt or any other inculpatory circumstance. Cf. Clodfelter, 218 Va. at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822 (reversing conviction notwithstanding fact that defendant gave false identity to police who searched hotel room with valid search warrant).
Although the radio containing the narcotics was found near a suitcase that contained some personal property of Hetmeyer’s, no evidence proved that Hetmeyer owned the radio. Indeed, Hetmeyer told the police that he did not own the radio and that the radio was owned by a fourth person. Even if the jury believed that Hetmeyer lied to the police, a finding the jury could not have made based on Hetmeyer’s lack of credibility since he did not testify, Hetmeyer’s lying about ownership of the radio does not permit the attenuated inference that Hetmeyer knew of the drugs in the radio and intended to possess them. Hetmeyer, for example, may have lied to protect his two companions or because he believed the radio to be stolen or because he suspected that it might, in some way, implicate one of his companions. Any inference that *117Hetmeyer lied to conceal his guilt, as opposed to some other inference consistent with innocence, is necessarily speculative. See, e.g., Bishop, 227 Va. at 170, 313 S.E.2d at 393 (characterizing defendant’s deceit as “suspicious conduct which does not constitute evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 618, 624, 283 S.E.2d 194, 196-97 (1981) (defendant’s possible perjury regarding a suspicious circumstance was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Hyde v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 950, 955, 234 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1977) (“suspicious inferences” may be drawn from defendant’s deceptive conduct, but these are insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Of course, Hetmeyer’s silence at trial is not a factor upon which the jury could choose to credit a particular inference. See Durant v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 454, 458, 375 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1988).
Similarly, evidence that a scale, razor knife, and an AC adaptor for the radio were found in the suitcase does not prove that Hetmeyer possessed drugs. Each of those items was lawfully possessed. No evidence established that narcotics or narcotics residue were found on those items. Furthermore, the items were in a suitcase which contained property claimed by Hetmeyer and one of the other men. None of those items was in plain view inside the room. Hetmeyer told Detective Thompson that the suitcase “was a community type suitcase, that everybody had some property that was in the suitcase.” Indeed, when Detective Thompson spoke to the other occupants of the room, they all claimed some property in the suitcase.
Detective Thompson stated that the knife found in Hetmeyer’s suitcase was the sort used to cut crack cocaine. No evidence proved that the knife contained cocaine or its residue or that a person might not have such a knife for an alternative reason.
The presence of digital pagers in the room as well as Hetmeyer’s possession of a large sum of cash do not prove that Hetmeyer possessed the narcotics. The detective testified that the manner in which Hetmeyer carried his money was consistent with the method used by drug dealers. The money was not found on Hetmeyer’s person, however. Although the manner in which the money was rolled may be consistent with the method of drug dealers, no evidence proved that only drug dealers are known to carry their money tightly rolled.
*118Because the evidence in this case was wholly circumstantial and because it did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, the evidence was insufficient to prove Hetmeyer’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.