Court Opinion

ID: 9905514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:02.571402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.809024
License: Public Domain

J-S30028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 REGINALD CARR                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 58 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 22, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0011216-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                      FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2023

      Reginald Carr appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we

affirm.

      The Honorable Rose Marie DeFino-Nastasi summarized the pertinent

facts as follows:

      On June 9, 2009, the decedent, Kyree Young, was shot and killed
      during the commission of a robbery by [Carr] and co-defendant,
      Omar Roane. Tyreese Gibson was shot in the shoulder and
      survived.

      Tyreese Gibson testified that[,] at approximately 1:11 a.m., he
      was walking on 56th and Greenway Street[s], in the city and
      county of Philadelphia, when he observed the decedent. Gibson
      did not know the decedent but asked him for a cigarette. The
      decedent gave him a cigarette and the two were walking toward
      Woodland Avenue when two (2) males riding bikes asked the
      decedent if he had any weed. The decedent said he only had pills.
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     As the males pulled over to speak to the decedent, Gibson walked
     off. Gibson heard someone say, “don’t run[,]”[] followed by
     gunshots. Gibson heard approximately nine (9) gunshots as he
     was running. He looked back and saw one of the males on the
     bike holding a gun. Gibson was struck by a bullet in his shoulder.

     Gibson gave a description of the two males on the bikes to police
     later that morning. He described the male with the gun as
     approximately 5’10”, dark-skinned, wearing a blue sweat suit with
     a white stripe down the side. The other male was approximately
     5’7”, light-skinned, short hair, slanted eyes, tattoo on his face,
     and beard. Both males were riding BMX bikes. The gun was a
     semi-automatic weapon.

     On July 22, 2010, Gibson was shown a photo array by homicide
     detectives. He identified [Carr] and co-defendant, Omar Roane,
     as the males on the bikes. He identified [Carr] as the male that
     was holding the gun.

     At trial, Gibson testified that he could not identify [Carr] and that
     the detectives had forced him to pick [Carr] out of the photo array.
     Gibson was impeached with his prior statement and prior
     identification of [Carr].

     Jessica McNeil testified that she was in her house watching
     television at approximately 1:10 [a.m.] when she heard
     approximately five (5) gunshots and looked out of the window.
     She observed a young black male, wearing a white cap and a blue
     sweat suit with a light blue stripe down the side, running from
     56th and Yocum Street[s] to 55th and Yocum Street[s], holding a
     gun in his right hand. A few minutes later, McNeil went outside
     and saw a bike laying in the middle of the street and police near
     the decedent’s body.

     The co-defendant, [] Roane, testified that he knew [Carr] for eight
     (8) years. The two hung out together. In the early morning hours
     of June 9, 2009, an associate by the name of Jermaine Graham
     called Roane and gave him the name of someone Roane and
     [Carr] could rob. Graham said the person would have drugs on
     him. Roane and [Carr] [rode] to 56th and Paschall Street[s], on
     their bikes, to meet up with Graham. Graham described the
     individual they could rob and told [Carr] and Roane that the
     individual was walking on 56th Street between Woodland and
     Greenway. [Carr] and Roane went to the area and observed the

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     decedent, who fit the description, in the company of another
     person. Roane asked the decedent if he had weed. The decedent
     said he did not have weed but he had some pills. At that point,
     Roane rode up the street to look out for police and [Carr] pulled
     out a gun. Roane heard [Carr] tell someone not to move and then
     heard gunshots. Roane [rode] back toward [Carr], to see if he
     was okay, and then [rode] off. Initially, [Carr] was following
     behind him on his bike, but then dropped the bike, and began
     running on foot. Roane further testified that [Carr] had a tattoo
     of a teardrop on his cheek in the courtroom that he did not have
     on the night of the incident. On the night of the incident, Roane
     was wearing a black Adidas sweat suit with a white stripe down
     the side and a white hat. [Carr] was wearing a blue (turquoise)
     sweat suit with a dark stripe down the side and a grey hat.

     Cory Williams testified that he knew [Carr] from the
     neighborhood. On the night of June 9, 2009, he was sitting on
     the steps at 54th and Belmar Street with Tymeer Workman and
     some other friends when he heard a couple of gunshots.
     Approximately one (1) hour later, [Carr] came around and said
     that it was “hot” on Woodland Ave. When Williams asked [Carr]
     why it was “hot,” he responded that he and “O” went on a
     “mission.” [Carr] went on to describe that he and “O” attempted
     to rob a guy, but the guy ran and they fired shots at him. Williams
     testified that “O” is Omar, but that he did not know his last name.
     Williams gave his statement to homicide detectives after he was
     arrested in February, 2011.

     [Doctor Edwin] Lieberman from the medical examiner’s office
     testified that the decedent suffered six (6) gunshot wounds.

     The defense presented testimony from Ishon Coleman who
     testified that [Carr] was at home with him the entire night on the
     night of the incident.

     Rashod Carr[, Carr’s brother,] testified that Roane made a
     statement to him that he was framing [Carr] for this murder
     because [Carr] was “messing” with his girlfriend.

     Annette Rodriquez, Roane’s girlfriend, testified that Roane made
     a statement to her that he was blaming [Carr] for the homicide
     because he heard that [Carr] was “messing” with her.

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       Michele Coleman testified that she is [Carr]’s aunt and that he
       lived with her at the time of the incident. She testified that she
       remembers the date of the incident because she was celebrating
       the fourth anniversary of a relationship she was in, and was
       supposed to go out to dinner, but was too tired. She recalled
       looking in on [Carr] after midnight and he was asleep in his
       bedroom.

       Tymeer Workman testified that he was not with Cory Williams on
       June 9, 2009, and never overheard [Carr] admit to Williams that
       [Carr] robbed and shot the decedent.

       Sharmella Lewis testified that she knew the decedent from the
       neighborhood. On June 9, 2009, she was sitting on her front porch
       at approximately 12:30 a.m. when she saw two males ride by on
       bikes asking people if they had weed. She could only describe
       one (1) of the males. She described the male as wearing a black
       Adidas sweat suit with a white stripe down the side. She stated
       that she observed a gun on that male’s waist. Approximately ten
       (10) minutes after seeing the males, she heard gunshots.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/18, at 4-7 (citations to the record omitted).

       On February 10, 2014, after a jury trial, Carr was found guilty of second-

degree murder,1 robbery,2 and conspiracy to commit robbery.3 On April 27,

2015, Carr was sentenced to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment for second-degree

murder and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery;

the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

       On May 26, 2015, Carr filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. On

March 1, 2016, we dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. On January

17, 2017, Carr filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Carr’s court-appointed
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

2 Id. at § 3701.

3 Id. at § 903.

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counsel filed an amended petition on August 3, 2017. On January 10, 2018,

the PCRA court reinstated Carr’s direct appeal rights, nunc pro tunc.

       On January 17, 2018, Carr filed a pro se nunc pro tunc direct appeal to

this Court.     On April 17, 2019, we affirmed the judgment of sentence,

concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Carr’s convictions and

that Carr had waived his claim that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 216 A.3d 399 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(Table). On May 17, 2019, Carr filed an unsuccessful petition for allowance

of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

       On February 6, 2020, Carr filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court

appointed counsel.       On October 25, 2021, PCRA counsel filed an amended

petition, raising a single claim of after-discovered evidence. This evidence

was a letter purportedly written by Roane, indicating that Roane had killed

Young and was planning to implicate Carr to avoid additional prison time. 4
____________________________________________

4 The letter is discussed further below, as it applies to the instant appeal, but

allegedly stated the following:

       Yo bro[,] this is Lil O[.] Listen[,] rite [,] I got to do w[hat] I got to
       do[.] I dont care who feel some kind of way about what Im
       doing[;] Im looking at 95 year[s] minimum[.] I done [sic] miss
       all little Nana[’s] birthdays. I got to make it back home to her so
       Im gone [sic] say whatever to get home. Listen[,] I cant go down
       for a body[,] and the law think[s] Lil Reg did it[,] so Im gone [sic]
       put it on him[.] [Redacted] It[’]s him or me[;] I just need one
       more reason to say what Im gone [sic] to say[;] they believe it.
       P.S. This the Feds[,] [redacted] they can make anything
       happen[.] Write me back the same way it came[;] if you dont[,]
       I know where you stand.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Carr argued that the letter would have strengthened Carr’s defense and was

a confession that Roane killed Young. Carr further argued that the letter, in

conjunction with testimony from Romel Moten, the recipient of the letter,

would entitle him to a new trial.

       On May 17, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of its

Intent to Dismiss, stating that the petition was untimely filed.         See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).5        On June 28, 2022, Carr filed another pro se PCRA

petition, which the PCRA court treated as a response to the Rule 907 Notice.

The PCRA court formally dismissed Carr’s PCRA petition, without an

evidentiary hearing, on November 22, 2022. On December 23, 2022, Carr

timely filed the instant notice of appeal.6      Carr subsequently filed a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

____________________________________________

Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 5/17/22, at 5.

5 Though the notice states the petition was untimely filed, the PCRA court’s

analysis states that Roane’s letter did not meet the standard for after-
discovered evidence, did not require an evidentiary hearing, and was the basis
for dismissal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 5/17/22. In addition, a review of
the record reveals that Carr’s judgment of sentence became final on February
5, 2020, 90 days after the Supreme Court denied Carr’s petition for allowance
of appeal on November 6, 2019. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 219 A.3d 601
(Pa. 2019) (No. 242 EAL 2019). Carr’s pro se PCRA petition was filed on
February 6, 2020, well within the one-year PCRA timing requirement. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

6 Though the   date the notice of appeal was filed appears to be beyond the
thirty-day appeal period pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 903, we are to exclude the first
and include the last day of such a period. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. The date
of Carr’s notice of appeal was on the thirtieth day, and, therefore, is timely.

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      Carr sets forth the following issues on appeal:

      [1.] Whether [Carr] has after-discovered evidence that a letter
      written by Omar Roane showed that Roane had committed the
      murder and had planned to fabricate a story to pin the murder on
      [Carr.]

      [2.] Whether the PCRA court abused its discretion by failing to
      hold an evidentiary hearing even though [Carr] presented a
      genuine issue of material fact[.]

      [3.] Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and
      abused its discretion when it denied [Carr]’s sought-after PCRA
      relief for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing based upon
      Detective Howard Peterman’s pattern and practice of police
      misconduct[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at viii.

      The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether

that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal

error. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for

the findings in the certified record. Id.

      Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, the PCRA court may

dismiss a PCRA petition without a hearing where “the judge is satisfied from

this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact and

that the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no

purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. To

this end, a court may decline to hold a hearing on the PCRA if the petitioner’s

claim is “patently frivolous and is without a trace of support either in the record

or from other evidence.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 905 A.2d 507, 509

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(Pa. Super. 2006); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (Comment).           In short, there is no

absolute right to an evidentiary PCRA hearing if the court can determine from

the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Commonwealth v.

Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      Carr’s first claim is that he is entitled to relief on the basis of after-

discovered evidence.    It is well-settled that a new trial based upon after-

discovered evidence will only be granted if: (1) the exculpatory evidence has

been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial

through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not

being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a

different verdict.   Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa.

2004). See also Commonwealth v. Buehl, 508 A.2d 1167, 1182-83 (Pa.

1986); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined cumulative evidence as

evidence that “supports a fact established by the existing evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018) (quotation

omitted). Furthermore, the Court stated that “after-discovered evidence is

merely corroborative or cumulative—and thus not sufficient to support the

grant of a new trial—if it is of the same character and to the same material

point as evidence already adduced at trial.” Id. at 973-74. If, instead, the

after-discovered evidence is of a “different and ‘higher’ grade or character,

though upon the same point, or of the same grade or character on a different

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point, it is not ‘merely’ corroborative or cumulative, and may support the grant

of a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.” Id. at 974.

       Carr argues that, applying the four-pronged after-discovered evidence

test to the letter Roane sent to Moten, he is entitled to relief where: (1) he

was made aware of the letter on the fifth day of his trial, and that it could not

have been obtained any earlier through due diligence because Moten was in

federal custody and unable to testify or provide the letter at the time of trial;7

(2) the letter is not cumulative evidence and is of a higher grade than that of

testimony presented at trial; (3) the letter is not solely used to impeach Roane

as a witness, but is also evidence of Roane’s plan to frame Carr and is a

confession that he committed the murder; and (4) if the letter had been

presented at trial, the trial would have had a different outcome.             See

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8.

       The PCRA court, in its analysis, found that Carr’s claim of after-

discovered evidence failed to satisfy the after-discovered evidence test,

concluding that the letter was cumulative evidence, not of a higher grade than

the evidence presented at trial, that it could have been obtained prior to or

during trial with reasonable diligence, that the letter’s integrity is dubious, and

that admission of the letter would not have resulted in a different outcome in

____________________________________________

7 On the record at trial, Carr’s counsel stated that Moten was in federal custody

at the time and, therefore, unavailable to testify as to the letter. PCRA Court
Opinion, 2/21/23, at 5. Moreover, Carr did not in fact receive the letter until
the trial concluded. Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

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the case. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 5/17/22. We agree with the PCRA

court’s analysis.

      A review of the trial transcript reveals that Carr’s trial counsel was in

touch with Moton’s attorney and, with reasonable diligence, could have

obtained the letter at or before trial as part of his attempt to impeach Roane

at trial. See N.T. Trial, 2/7/14, at 95-100. Even if the letter could not have

been obtained prior to or at trial, the letter is cumulative of evidence presented

at trial. Specifically, Carr presented evidence from two witnesses, his brother,

Rashod Carr, and Roane’s girlfriend, Annette Rodriguez, both of whom stated

that Roane was attempting to direct law enforcement to Carr as revenge for

Carr having a relationship with Roane’s girlfriend. See id. at 113-27; id.,

2/10/14, at 12-17.     Both testified that Roane only implicated Carr in the

instant case as revenge. Id. It follows that the letter, if authenticated, would

only serve to impeach Roane and the potential veracity of his testimony,

evidence already presented at Carr’s trial. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/14, at 130-35,

151-52, 164-65, 198-204.

      We will not disturb the PCRA court’s denial of a PCRA petition absent

clear legal error. See Johnston, supra. As such, we conclude that the court

did not err in denying Carr’s PCRA petition with respect to after-discovered

evidence where the record contains sufficient evidence for the court’s finding

that the letter could have been discovered before or during trial, with

reasonable diligence, and if not, that the letter was cumulative evidence. Id.

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      Carr’s second claim is that the PCRA court abused its discretion by failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing where Carr presented a genuine issue of

material fact, specifically the letter discussed above. It is well-settled that

evidentiary hearings are not required in post-conviction proceedings when

“there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the

defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose

would be served by any further proceedings.”       Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 852 A.2d 1168, 1180 (Pa. 2004).

Furthermore, a court’s decision to deny a PCRA claim without a hearing “may

only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth

v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1094 (Pa. 2012).

      Carr argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to authenticate

the letter Roane sent to Moten. If deemed authentic, Carr argues, the letter

would have “profoundly bolstered [his] defense at trial.” Appellant’s Brief, at

10.   Carr further argues that the PCRA court could not have assessed the

authenticity of the letter from the pleadings alone, and so a hearing, during

which Moten would testify as to the veracity of the letter, was necessary. Id.

      Having determined earlier that the letter failed to satisfy the after-

discovered evidence test, it is clear that such a claim had no merit and,

therefore, no hearing was necessary. See Harris, supra.

      Carr’s third claim is that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it

denied Carr PCRA relief for a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing, based upon

alleged misconduct by Detective Howard Peterman.

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      As we stated above, our scope and standard of review of the denial of a

PCRA petition is limited to “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. McCready, 295 A.3d 292, 297 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(internal citation omitted).

      Carr includes this claim in his statement of the questions involved with

the following footnote: “For more on this claim, see the Appellant’s Pro Se

June 28, 2022, Petition included in the certified record from pages 312-402.”

Appellant’s Brief, at viii (emphasis original and added). As such, Carr’s PCRA

counsel attempted to preserve the issue raised in Carr’s pro se petition while

litigating two other claims regarding the letter discussed above.      Such an

attempt to incorporate an argument by reference, without inclusion in the

petition itself and without additional explanation or analysis as to the legal

validity of the claim, is an attempt to engage in hybrid representation. See

Johnson, infra.

      Pennsylvania courts have long prohibited hybrid representation. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011). When a

defendant or appellant is represented by counsel, the court will not consider

pro se filings.   Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (Pa. 2010).

Moreover, the PCRA court may only address issues raised in a counseled

petition when represented by counsel. Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32

A.3d 706, 713 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2011).         As we have clearly stated, “[i]t is

incumbent upon counsel to examine the merits of the pro se claims and

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determine whether those issues are worth pursuing in an amended petition.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2018). Any

attempt to simply incorporate pro se claims renders such claims waived on

appeal. See id.

       In this case, Carr’s counsel simply seeks to incorporate the entirety of

Carr’s pro se petition as argument and support for this third claim. In his

brief, the only mention of the claim is in his statement of the questions

involved and summary of the argument, both with footnotes directing this

Court to Carr’s pro se petition. See Appellant’s Brief, at viii, 5. Accordingly,

because Carr’s pro se claims cannot be incorporated into and are not

developed within Carr’s brief,8 his third claim is waived on appeal.9
____________________________________________

8 “We have repeatedly held that failure to develop an argument with citation

to, and analysis of, relevant authority waives the issue on review.”
Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 924 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (“The argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have . . .
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). As such,
“our appellate rules do not allow incorporation by reference of arguments
contained in briefs filed with other tribunals, or briefs attached as appendices,
as a substitute for the proper presentation of arguments in the body of the
appellate brief.” Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011).

9 Even if not waived, we would conclude Carr is not entitled to relief on his

third claim. Carr, at the time pro se, submitted a filing to the PCRA court
averring that Detective Howard Peterman, the lead detective on the case,
exhibited a “pattern and practice of wrongful misconduct,” which led to an
exoneration in another case. Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 6/28/22, at ¶ 5
(unnecessary capitalization omitted). The PCRA court treated this filing as a
response to its Rule 907 notice. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/21/23, at 2. A
review of the record shows that the PCRA court inquired into this claim and
was informed by the Commonwealth’s attorney that no misconduct disclosure
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Order affirmed.

Date: 11/29/2023

____________________________________________

form was found for Detective Peterman. See N.T. PCRA Dismissal Hearing,
11/22/22, at 3-4. Carr’s counsel also testified that he did not receive any
disclosure regarding Detective Peterman. Id. at 7. Judge DeFino-Nastasi
denied and formally dismissed Carr’s PCRA petition stating, on the record, that
allegations of misconduct by Detective Peterman “came out at trial” and as
such the “issues raised . . . have no merit.” Id. at 8. The PCRA court’s
dismissal of Carr’s PCRA and this claim is supported by record and, as such,
this claim, if not waived, would fail.

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