Court Opinion

ID: 9529785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:13.750292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.287458
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, specially concurring: Although I concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusion, I write separately to make an additional point regarding whether the term "product” in the Sales Representative Act (Sales Act) (820 ILCS 120/1 (West 1994)) encompasses both tangible goods and services or just tangible goods. Like the majority, I believe that the term "product” under the Sales Act encompasses only tangible goods. Although this conclusion is warranted by the reasons cogently explained by the majority, I believe this conclusion is also warranted by the language employed in the Sales Act when it was originally enacted in 1985. The 1985 Sales Act provided that a "principal” was a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity which, inter alia, "[m]anufacture[d], produce[d], importfed], or distribut[ed] a product for wholesale.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 2251(3)(A). As the term is commonly understood, "wholesale” refers to the sale of goods or commodities in quantity for resale. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2611 (1986) (defining the noun "wholesale” as "the sale of goods or commodities in quantity usu. for resale (as by a retail merchant)”; defining the adjective "wholesale” as "of, relating to, or engaged in the sale of goods or commodities in quantity for resale”). By employing the term "wholesale” in connection with the principal’s use of the product, I believe that the legislature evidenced its intent that the term "product” encompassed only tangible goods. As the foregoing definition illustrates, services cannot be manufactured, produced, imported, or distributed for wholesale. I recognize that the legislature amended the Sales Act in 1993 and substituted the term "sale” for "wholesale.” See Pub. Act 87— 948, eif. January 1,1993 (amending 820 ILCS 120/1(3)(A) (West 1992)). While it is true that normally an amendment is presumed to change the law as it formerly existed, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of an amendment must also be considered. Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 Ill. 2d 535, 543 (1989). In this case, I do not believe that the substitution of the term "sale” for "wholesale” marked a change in the legislature’s intent to have the term "product” encompass only tangible goods. The only pertinent legislative history on Public Act 87 — 948 is provided by Representative Cronin’s following statement: "(Senate Bill) 1708 amends the Sales Representative Act. Representative Levin and I have discussed this at length. It defines sales representative as one who contracts with a principal to solicit orders, deletes language providing that the Act does not apply to sales representatives who sell products to the ultimate consumer, so this applies not only to wholesale — people who sell to wholesalers — but as well as it applies to those who sell to retail outlets.” 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 18, 1992, at 142-43 (statements of Representative Cronin). Based on the available evidence, I believe that the legislature did not intend to change the meaning of "product” to encompass services when it substituted the term "sale” for "wholesale.” Accordingly, subject to the foregoing analysis, I concur with the analysis and conclusion of the majority.