Court Opinion

ID: 9462607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:45:20.774836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:40.490543
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
A few additional details are needed to round out the factual situation as presented by Judge Hoffman. The road on which the van was traveling was a two-lane highway and the traffic was light. After the vehicle had been stopped and the initial conversation had occurred between Bertucci and trooper Pabst, officer Paris testified that “We started to the front of the van and Mr. Bertucci stepped in front of Pabst and indicated he didn’t want him to look in the van for some reason or another.” The testimony continued:
“Q. There was no other conversation from Mr. Bertucci with either of you officers up to this point, is that correct?
A. Well, about that point he started telling why he was down here in a van. Other than that, none.
Q. Was that in response to any question of yours to him?
A. Well, we automatically looked in the car for booze, weapons, other people in the car and we seen the new boxes or what appeared to be factory-crated boxes.
ífc * # % Sfc
Q. You found nothing?
A. Neither beer nor weapons.
Q. Did you search the glove compartment at this time?
A. No, we did not.
Q. Was there any reason for you to believe at that point that a crime had been committed?
A. No, there wasn’t. * * *
Q. Were any traffic charges placed against Mr. Bertucci or the other individuals in his van?
A. No, there was not.
Q. Did you have a warrant to search the vehicle?
A. No, sir.
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Q. After searching the front of the vehicle, what did you do then?
*1148A. We asked Mr. Bertucci if he would open the rear of the van, that we would like to look in there which he did.
Q. What did you then do?
A. We looked a little closer at the boxes, at the invoices.
Q. Did you actually get into the van itself?
A. I don’t know sir. We didn’t crawl in. We just looked at the back boxes and at this time Mr. Bertucci changed his story from moving the van to Chicago to picking up some articles which—
Q. At that time you had no reason to believe that any offense had been committed, had you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there anything unusual about these boxes in the back of the van?
A. Just his story was the only thing.”
Admittedly, under certain circumstances police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle which has been moving on a highway. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed.543 (1925), the Supreme Court recognized such a search is constitutionally valid if probable cause exists. The difficult question then is: was there probable cause for a search without a warrant? In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1948), Mr. Justice Rutledge writing for the Court defined the phrase in general terms: “In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities . . . ‘The substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ . Since Marshall’s time at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion.” 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310, 93 L.Ed. at 1890. Mr. Justice Rutledge continued: “The troublesome line ... is one between mere suspicion and probable cause. . [A] citizen who has given no good cause for believing he is engaged in . [criminal activity] is entitled to proceed on his way without interference.” The decision emphasized that travelers on public highways may not be stopped and searched at the “officers’ whim, caprice or mere suspicion.” 338 U.S. at 177, 69 S.Ct. at 1311, 93 L.Ed.at 1891.
Here the question is whether the state troopers had probable cause to make the initial search of the van on the highway which resulted in a full search of the cartons at the police station or did they act on mere suspicion. The officers issued no citations for traffic violations, there were no arrests, and no weapons were found after the van was stopped on the highway. Consequently there was no reason for the state police to detain Bertucci and his passengers. It is apparent from the evidence that the police officers’ observation of the cartons in the rear of the van and Bertucci’s explanation for their being in the van aroused the suspicion of the police. But it was only suspicion. Under no circumstances could these observations represent sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search.
The majority attempts to invoke the plain view doctrine to justify the search. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the Supreme Court dealt extensively with the doctrine. There, the Court assumed that the police had probable cause to seize the automobile in question, but held that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement was inapplicable. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote: “Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an [article of incriminating character] is supported, not by warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. . And an object which comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. . Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.” 403 U.S. at 465-66, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d at 582. The doctrine, however, has severe limitations. Mr. Justice Stewart explained:
What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each *1149of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d at 583. (emphasis added.)
In the case before us, it could hardly have been “immediately apparent” to the police that the cartons they saw in the rear of the van were “evidence.” In fact, the testimony of officer Paris quite clearly indicates the officers had no reason to believe an offense had been committed, thus no reason to believe an event had occurred for which evidence might be seized. The fact that subsequent investigation showed the cartons contained stolen goods is irrelevant. “Nor is it material that the search was successful in revealing evidence of a viola-' tion of a federal statute. ... A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.” Byars v. United States, 273 U.S 28, 29, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520, 522 (1927)..
Coolidge also emphasized the need for prior justification for the initial intrusion which led to the seizure of an object in plain view. Here, there was no search incident to an arrest or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. What the police saw when they directed their flashlights toward the back of the van were some cartons. After the rear door of the van was opened they conducted a closer inspection and found that the cartons were labeled with shipping invoices.
Thus, though the cartons were in “plain view,” they were neither instruments of crime nor, at the moment, evidence of a crime. The Supreme Court stressed in Coolidge that the plain view doctrine “alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,” the discovery “must be inadvertent,” and occur after an “initially valid (and therefore limited) search.” The police may not justify a planned warrant-less seizure by maneuvering themselves within the plain view of the object they want. 403 U.S. at 468-70, 91 S.Ct. at 2039-40, 29 L.Ed.2d at 584-85. The circumstances in this case cannot render the “plain view” doctrine applicable.
The majority also constructs a theory based on “consent” to justify the search. (The district judge did not base his denial of the motion to suppress on any such theory.) But this, upon analysis, also fails.
A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible; however, the consent must be freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In this case there is no evidence of a valid consent. If anything, the evidence indicates an initial refusal by Bertucci to permit a search of the van. The troopers, however, proceeded to search the front of the van. When asked what they did next, officer Paris testified: “We asked Mr. Bertucci if he would open the rear of the van, that we would like to look in there which he did.” The consent theory hangs on this thin isolated statement. Given the circumstances preceding the request and the situation in general, this is too weak to support it. “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968).
Officer Paris testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Bertucci said *1150that if defendants could get to a telephone they could satisfy the officer that the cartons “were being picked up for an aunt.” The officer further testified that he and officer Pabst followed the defendants to the Mount Carmel police station. At the trial, officer Paris testified: “We directed them to drive to the Mount Carmel Police Department where calls could be made and confirm that this stuff did not belong to their aunt.” At the police station the defendants were advised of their Miranda rights. The officers apparently then opened the cartons and found that some of them contained blue jeans and others contained stereo equipment. Upon telephonic investigation it was ascertained that all the items were stolen. The majority opinion states:
The record before us discloses limited intrusions acceptable on grounds of inspection for weapons and intoxicants as well under the “plain view,” “consent,” and “automobile,” exceptions to the warrant rule. These limited intrusions in turn produced sufficient information to establish reasonable grounds for a full search of the shipping cartons in the rear of the van.
Since none of these exceptions to the warrant rule were applicable, in my view the police were not authorized to “direct” the defendants to the police station, to question them, or to open the cartons without a search warrant. The “fruits” of this illegal detention, questioning, and search were tainted by the illegal actions of the police at the highway scene and therefore should have been suppressed.
In sum, I think we must keep in mind what Mr. Justice Jackson wrote in his dissent in Brinegar:
[T]he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court.
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty.
We must therefore look upon the exclusion of evidence in federal prosecutions, if obtained in violation of the Amendment, as a means of extending protection against the central government’s agencies. So a search against [the defendants’] car must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman.
I would reverse.