Court Opinion

ID: 9777283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:06:06.313031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.653265
License: Public Domain

Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice, concurring. I join the opinion written by Justice Holt. I concur merely to state that we do not reach the issue of whether the judge of one Pulaski County municipal court with county-wide jurisdiction may come into office by appointment, as here, while others must be elected. Robert H. Dudley, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in finding the act creating the Pulaski Municipal Court is valid, and that the manner of selection of the judge, whether elective or appointive, is a valid exercise of legislative authority. However, the General Assembly may not exercise that authority in a manner which might not afford a litigant an impartial tribunal, and that has occurred in § 3 (a) of this act. Due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a litigant be afforded a trial by an impartial court. This is not a new concept, but rather is a bedrock principle dating back, at the least, to 1610 when Lord Coke stated the common law maxim that no man can be a judge of his own case, which is an expression of this principle, and thus voided an act of Parliament tending to contravene it. See Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke 1136, 77 Eng. Reprint 646 (1610). We have held that a litigant is denied due process of law when subjected to trial before a justice of the peace who receives fees and costs only when the accused is convicted. Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W. 2d 233 (1969). The Supreme Court of the United States most recently discussed the issue of trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial officer in Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). In that case the Mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, while sitting as a traffic judge, found Ward guilty of two traffic offenses and fined him $50 for each offense. The Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court reversed because the mayor’s responsibility for village finances, a major part of which was derived from fines and costs imposed by the mayor’s court, made the trial a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guaranty of a trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial officer. The Court held that the right to an appeal does not cure the defect as an accused is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance. There is no evidence in this case indicating the amount of revenue which Pulaski County expects to receive from this municipal court. However, we do take notice of the most recent accounting of Arkansas courts by the Judicial Planning Council, a committee appointed by this court. That accounting is published in The Financing of Arkansas Courts (1980). Table 21 reflects that in 1978 municipal courts in Arkansas produced revenues of $11,266,938 at a cost of $1,577,000. Table 18 states that $4,471,851 of revenues were collected at municipal levels in Pulaski and Perry Counties in 1978. Municipal courts produce substantial amounts of revenue and § 4 of the statute in dispute provides that Pulaski County shall receive all revenue produced by this court. The county judge has executive responsibility for the financial affairs of the county. Municipal courts are substantial revenue producing courts. Clearly the county judge could not sit as a municipal court judge, for the reason stated in Ward v. Monroeville, supra at 60. Plainly that “possible temptation” may also exist when the Mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the Mayor’s court. Section 3 (a) of the act in question gives to the county judge the power to appoint the municipal judge. The office of county judge in Arkansas is comparable to that of mayor in Ohio, as both are the chief financial officers of their respective governmental units. If the county judge cannot sit as a judge on this type of court, he should not be given the power to decide who does sit. The impartiality of the county judge could be so diminished that he or she might not act in a disinterested fashion in selecting the person to serve in a judicial capacity. A maxim of common law is no one can do that indirectly which cannot be done directly. . We must anticipate the future effect this type of appointment procedure would have on our justice system. If a mayor or a county judge becomes dissatisfied with the revenues produced by a fair and just municipal judge, that mayor or county judge could ask his legislator to pass, by “local courtesy,” a bill giving him the power to appoint the municipal judge. Given this set of circumstances, at what stage would our municipal courts become more interested in revenue production than in justice? Litigants in this State might not be afforded the impartial and disinterested judge which they are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. While neither side of the present case has argued the issue of the impartiality of a court, it is so fundamentally important that I have written this opinion without benefit of briefs and arguments on the subject. Obviously, this is not the preferable way to develop an issue and to write an opinion. The dangers are apparent. However, the practical application of the plurality opinion is so discomforting that I have decided it is best to hand this opinion down, even without the issues having been fully developed in the traditional adversary manner. This opinion is involved with legal principles only. There is no hint of impropriety by any of the individuals involved in this particular case. I find all sections of the act valid except § 3 (a) providing for appointment by the county judge. As the county judge had no power to make the appointment, a vacancy exists and should be filled under the general laws of this state. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Pürtle joins in this opinion.