Court Opinion

ID: 9949472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:03:36.949329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.875765
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 B.J. v. Superior Court CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

B.J.,                                                        B331724

         Petitioner,                                         (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP03095 A–C)
         v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,

         Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Real Party in Interest.
      ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary
writ. Tamara Hall, Judge Presiding. Petition denied.
      Law Office of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis for Petitioner.
      No appearance for Respondent.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
      Children’s Law Center and Taylor Lindsley for Minors.
                    _________________________
      B.J. (Mother) is the mother of A.Z., A.M., and I.M.,
dependent children of the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300.1 Mother filed a petition for
extraordinary writ seeking review of the court’s order
terminating family reunification services and setting a section
366.26 hearing for January 8, 2024. The petition is denied.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A.Z., A.M., and I.M. became dependents of the juvenile
court in 2019 after Mother, who was driving two of the children
while she was under the influence of alcohol and
methamphetamine, had a serious car accident in which both
children were injured, one severely.
      Although her reunification services previously had been
terminated, in January 2023 the juvenile court granted Mother’s
section 388 petition and ordered six additional months of
reunification services, specifically providing that Mother would
not receive case plan credit for previously completed programs.
Mother’s case plan required her to undergo weekly random and
on-demand drug and alcohol testing; parenting education;
individual counseling to address substance abuse and its impact
on children; and mental health counseling with a psychological
assessment and evaluation. She was also ordered to take all
prescribed psychotropic medications. On May 15, 2023, after
Mother missed two drug tests and the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or
Department) received reports that she was drinking alcohol, the
court also ordered Mother to complete a full drug and alcohol

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                2
program with aftercare and a full 12-step program with a
sponsor.
I.    August 23, 2023 Hearing and Ruling
       On August 23, 2023, the court conducted a contested review
hearing at which Mother and the maternal grandmother
testified. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the
court terminated reunification services and set a hearing
pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent
plan for the children.
       The court explained in detail the factual basis for its
findings and orders. It said it had provided Mother “time and
time again, opportunities to maintain sobriety, but Mother
chooses not to.” The court observed Mother had testified “she
ha[d] not consumed any alcohol and everyone [reporting her
alcohol consumption] is just not telling the truth.” However,
Mother’s social media during the current reunification period
showed her with a beer to her lips, contradicting her testimony.
The court credited evidence that Mother “uses alcohol in excess”
and was observed to be drinking or under the influence of alcohol
several times. First, Mother was drunk at the oldest child’s
birthday party, and that child was frightened when she
witnessed Mother stumbling and vomiting. Second, Mother
smelled of alcohol when she was picked up by one of the
caregivers to go to an amusement park with the children. Third,
the paternal grandmother had seen Mother stumbling and under
the influence of alcohol. Fourth, Mother asked for beer at the
home of one of the children’s caregivers. When the caregiver
refused because the children were present, Mother said she
would drink away from the children and proceeded to consume it.
Finally, one of the children reported that Mother drank alcohol “a

                                3
lot” and could identify the name of the beer she drank.
       The court found “not credible” and “disingenuous” Mother’s
testimony that her recent positive result for cocaine on a drug
test was due to diet pills.
       The court evaluated Mother’s testimony that she was
participating in a 12-step program, but she did not know what
step she was on because she did not complete them in order. The
court found the testimony “a clear indicator that Mother does not
know and is in complete denial of her . . . addiction problem,”
because “[t]he first step in the 12-step program is to admit one
has a problem, to admit one has an addiction. Unless and until
one can do so, they can’t move on to the second step, which is
acceptance.” The court expressed skepticism of Mother’s claim
that a family member was her 12-step sponsor, and it found
telling her description of herself as an addict rather than a
recovering addict. Noting these were terms of art in the recovery
context, the court explained that a recovering addict “admits that
they have an addiction and they are dealing with sobriety one
day at a time, and they maintain contact with their sponsor, and
they go to [12-step] meetings on a regular basis,” while an addict
continues to abuse substances and is in denial.
       The court found there was no evidence Mother had
completed any programming during the current reunification
period.
       The court concluded there would be a substantial risk
placing the children in Mother’s care, even if Mother were to
reside with the maternal grandmother. The maternal
grandmother could not be counted on to protect the children: the
children had previously been removed from her because of
physical abuse. The court found the maternal grandmother could

                                4
not be counted on to report objectively about Mother, as she
testified Mother is “perfect in all respects” but told one of the
children Mother went out at night frequently.
       Given all this evidence, and particularly Mother’s denial
that her addiction needed to be addressed, the court found there
was no evidence that in the next six months Mother would be
able to address the causes of dependency jurisdiction.
       The juvenile court found continued jurisdiction was
necessary because conditions still existed that justified the court
taking jurisdiction pursuant to section 300; Mother’s progress on
her case plan had been “unsubstantial”; by clear and convincing
evidence, returning the children to Mother’s physical custody
would create a substantial risk of detriment to them, creating a
continued necessity for and appropriateness of the current
placement; and by clear and convincing evidence, DCFS had
complied with the case plan in making reasonable efforts to
return the children to a safe home and to complete all necessary
steps to finalize their permanent placement. The court set the
section 366.26 hearing for January 8, 2024.
II.   Writ Petition
       Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ seeking
review of the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification
services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Mother makes
three claims in her petition and memorandum.
       First, Mother contends there was no substantial evidence
“to support a finding that the children suffered or there was a
substantial risk that the children would suffer if returned to their
mother’s care.” In support of this argument, Mother sets forth
general case law, then states she had completed her case plan
prior to January 2023; specifically, she had completed a relapse

                                 5
prevention program and classes on parenting, domestic violence,
and anger management; she attended therapy; and she had 12
negative drug tests and two no-shows. Additionally, she states
she maintained positive and consistent contact with the children.
Without analysis, Mother then concludes, “Clearly, there was no
substantial evidence” supporting the court’s finding.
      Second, Mother challenges the children’s continued
placement out of her custody. After stating general legal
principles, Mother asserts, “In this case, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the judgment, the evidence available to the
court did not support its conclusion that Petitioner’s mental
health history and religious beliefs amounted to substantial
evidence that showed, clearly and convincingly[,] that removal
was the only way to protect the child from the risks associated
with remaining in Petitioner’s custody.”2 She states DCFS
admitted she had completed her case plan and reiterates the
services she listed in her first argument. Without argument as to
how these facts demonstrate error, Mother concludes the court
erred when it failed to return the children to her with a safety
plan.
      Third, Mother asserts she did not receive reasonable
reunification services. After citing general case law, she states
she completed her case plan at agencies she found, not those to
which DCFS had referred her; “therefore, this Court must find
that DCFS did not make a good faith effort to provide [Mother]
with reasonable services, and the Department failed to meet its

2      Presumably this sentence is a result of a copy/paste error,
because here there are three children, and they were not removed
from Mother on the basis of her mental health history or religious
beliefs.

                                 6
burden of proof.” She repeats her completed programming, her
drug tests, and her positive visitation. Once more without
analysis, Mother then concludes that the court’s findings
regarding reasonable reunification services were not supported
by clear and convincing evidence and must be reversed.
      On November 21, 2023, we issued an order to show cause
and stayed the section 366.26 hearing scheduled for January 8,
2024.
      DCFS and the three children oppose Mother’s petition.
                          DISCUSSION
       Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
several of the juvenile court’s findings. “ ‘ “ ‘When a finding of
fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial
evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence[,] contradicted or uncontradicted[,] which
will support the finding of fact.’ ” ’ ” (Ashby v. Ashby (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 491, 511–512; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773.) “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” ’ ” (I.J., at p. 773.)
       “ ‘[I]t is presumed that the evidence is sufficient to support
[the trier of fact’s] factual findings, and it is the appellant’s
burden to demonstrate that it does not. . . . And in furtherance of
that burden, the appellant must fairly summarize the facts in the
light favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Symons Emergency
Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598.)

                                  7
Specifically, “ ‘[a] party who challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the
evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how
and why it is insufficient.’ ” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.452(b)(1), (3) [memorandum supporting writ petition seeking
review of a juvenile court’s setting order “must provide a
summary of the significant facts,” explain the significance of any
cited portion of the record and note any disputed aspects of the
record].) Presenting only facts and inferences favorable to one’s
position forfeits any claim of error. (Schmidlin, at p. 737.)
       Additionally, to demonstrate error, “appellant must present
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.
[Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and
authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’
[Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re
S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see also Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 [“Mere suggestions of
error without supporting argument or authority other than
general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for
appellate review”].) We are not obligated to make arguments for
litigants, and we may and do disregard conclusory arguments
failing to disclose the reasoning by which the litigants reached
the conclusions they ask us to adopt. (United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
       Finally, California Rules of Court, rule 8.452(b)(3) requires
the memorandum accompanying a petition for writ review of an

                                 8
order setting a section 366.26 hearing to “support any reference
to a matter in the record by a citation to the record.” We
“ ‘ “cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to
discover evidence on a point raised by [a party] when [their] brief
makes no reference to the pages where the evidence on the point
can be found in the record.” ’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.)
       Mother’s memorandum in support of her petition fails on
all these fronts. She ignores all unhelpful evidence and fails to
disclose the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order. Her
presentation of her own evidence is scarcely better: she offers
only conclusory factual statements without a single citation to
the record to support them. Additionally, Mother makes no legal
argument at all. She simply states general principles of law,
asserts a few purported facts without analyzing how they show
there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s findings,
and tacks on a conclusion that the evidence was insufficient and
she is entitled to relief.
       Construing the petition liberally (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.452(a)(1)), we must conclude Mother’s petition is so deficient as
to forfeit her challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The
dependency proceeding here has been ongoing for more than four
years and has resulted in a voluminous record: the clerk’s
transcript is more than 3,000 pages long, and the reporter’s
transcript runs to 14 volumes. Even if we were to overlook the
omission of citations to the record and search this extensive
record for evidence ourselves, Mother has not offered any
argument that would afford a basis for relief, and she has failed
even to acknowledge the evidentiary basis for the court’s ruling,
much less substantively dispute its sufficiency.

                                 9
       While a court may consider the merits of a petition despite
deficiencies where unusual facts show a refusal to entertain it on
the merits would risk grave injustice (Nahid H. v. Superior Court
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1056), an examination of Mother’s
specious arguments and the court’s ruling demonstrates there is
no such risk here. Mother had been ordered in May 2023 to
complete a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare and a 12-
step program with a sponsor; the court found there was no
evidence she had attended any programs during the current
reunification period, and it did not believe her testimony that she
was participating in a 12-step program given her implausible
testimony about it. The court found Mother used alcohol to
excess, had a positive drug test for cocaine, and was in complete
denial with respect to her addiction, none of which does she
dispute. Mother does not challenge any of the evidence upon
which the court relied in making its findings and orders, and she
does not contend its analysis of this evidence was in any respect
inaccurate.
       Mother’s entire argument against continued jurisdiction
and the children’s removal is a disingenuous claim that she had
completed her case plan before January 11, 2023, had 12 negative
tests and two no-shows, and had positive visits. But this
reunification period did not start until January 24, 2023, and on
that date the court ordered Mother to participate in a variety of
programs and services—with an express order that her
previously-completed services did not satisfy her case plan.
Mother’s misleading and unsupported factual representations
about her case plan and completed programming, therefore, have
nothing to do with the present reunification period. Her
argument that her reunification services were inadequate is the

                                10
same list of services she completed at some unspecified time and
the absurd pronouncement that because she completed her
programs at agencies she located and not those DCFS referred
her to, the court was required to find DCFS had not made a good
faith effort to provide her with services. We therefore find no risk
of grave injustice from our conclusion that Mother has forfeited
her challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.3

3     Mother’s memorandum in support of her position is so
poorly drafted that in some instances it cannot be determined
what orders she challenges. For instance, it is not clear whether
Mother claims the initial removal of the children from her
custody in 2019 or the refusal to return them to her custody at
the August 2023 hearing was not supported by substantial
evidence. To the extent Mother intends to challenge the 2019
disposition order (including the underlying jurisdictional
findings), that order has long been final and cannot now be
reviewed. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529,
532 [disposition order is the judgment for purposes of appeal; if
no timely appeal is made, the order is final and binding, the
issues it determined are res judicata, and it may not be attacked
on appeal from a later appealable order]; In re Candida S. (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1249 [jurisdictional finding is not separately
appealable but may be reviewed on appeal from disposition
order].)

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                         DISPOSITION
       The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition is
denied. The stay is dissolved. This opinion is final forthwith as
to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A) of the California
Rules of Court.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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