Court Opinion

ID: 9783762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:07:17.578658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:35.184390
License: Public Domain

BAILEY C. MOSELEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I concur with the majority’s scholarly determination that a person becomes a “party” to a lawsuit when he is named as such in a petition filed with a court (as opposed to when that person is served with citation), I cannot agree with some of the other determinations made to arrive at the majority conclusion. I also feel it advisable to address potentially-determinative arguments not mentioned in the majority opinion.
“Service” of Report Pursuant to Rule 21a?
The first concern lies with the claim by *108Zanchi16 that there was no expert report served on him pursuant to Section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (West 2011). The primary thrust of Zanchi’s argument is based upon his definition of “party,” a position which, as mentioned above, has little merit. However, Zanchi does mention (and the record supports) that at the time of the supposed service of the expert report, he had no obligation to respond because he had neither voluntarily filed a response nor had he been served with citation pursuant to Rule 106 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or any alternate means of citation. Tex.R. Civ. P. 106.
The predecessor of Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was Article 4590L This now-repealed and replaced statute, while requiring an expert report to be obtained by a health care liability claimant, used the term “furnish” when speaking of delivery of a copy of that report to the defendant. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d), repealed by Act of May 16, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.001 (West 2011)). The current statute requires that claimant “serve” a copy of the expert report on the defendant. The question then arises as to whether sending a copy of the expert report to Paris Regional Medical Center (where Zanchi served on the staff) by certified mail before he had been served with citation and before he had an obligation to respond to the suit complied with the obligation to “serve” him with a copy of the report within 120 days of the filing of the suit. This is compounded by questions of whether the certified mail receipt, signed by someone not proven to have the capacity to receive service on behalf of Zanchi, was sufficient evidence to establish a presumption that the report was served on him.
A number of intermediate appellate courts (including this Court) have determined that the term “serve” as used in the statute is tantamount to service pursuant to Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.); Amaya v. Enriquez, 296 S.W.3d 781, 783 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, pet. denied); Poland v. Ott, 278 S.W.3d 39 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Herrera v. Seton Nw. Hosp., 212 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.); Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. denied). Compliance with “Rule 21a sets up a presumption that when notice of trial setting properly addressed and postage prepaid is mailed, that the notice was duly received by the addressee.” Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.1987); see also Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.2005) (per curiam). It stands to reason, then, that the purpose of Rule 21a is to achieve actual notice and to set up presumptions to use in disputes about whether notice was achieved. See Netherland v. Wittner, 662 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hill v. W.E. Brittain, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1966, no writ). Under that rationale, in some circumstances (when it was proven that despite variance between the means of effective service under Rule 21a, the defendant *109nonetheless actually received a copy of the report within the statutory 120-day period) when that proof was made, it was deemed that sufficient compliance with the requirement of service of the report was made. See Goforth, 296 S.W.3d at 854; Spiegel v. Strother, 262 S.W.3d 481 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.). There is no mention in any of those cases, however, that the service or delivery of the expert report was made before service of citation on the defendant had been achieved or before a voluntary appearance had been made. Presumably, the case before us is unique in the fact that the report was transmitted and received (by someone) after the suit was filed, but before the defendant was either served with citation or had appeared.
Note that when the expert report was sent by certified mail to the hospital where Zanchi commonly worked, the postal receipt was signed by someone whom no one identified as being the authorized agent for Zanchi. In service of citation, the appellate courts have almost unanimously ruled that when there is service by certified mail, if the return receipt is not signed by the addressee, the service of process is defective. See Sw. Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Gamboa, 172 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.) (service defective when return receipt signed by someone other than addressee); Ramirez v. Consol. HGM Corp., 124 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor, 97 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Keeton v. Carrasco, 53 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Webb v. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ); Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. D.B. & B., Inc., 725 S.W.2d 764, 765-67 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pharmakinetics Labs., Inc. v. Katz, 717 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ). Certainly, these cases deal with attempts at service of citation and not with service of other papers under Rule 21a and a distinction can be made there. There is, however, a good reason to equate the application of these citation cases to an attempt to employ Rule 21a to situations in which the defendant has yet to have the responsibility to answer: once a person has been served with citation or has voluntarily appeared, there is a proven address to which such notices can be sent. In other words, the address for service under Rule 21a would be either that at which he was already successfully served or at some alternate address designated later by him in pleadings (such as the address of his attorney). It appears that this attempt to achieve service of a medical expert report under Rule 21a in a health care liability case prior to achieving service of citation may well be a case of first impression. The concurrence points out that there are no cases cited here to support the proposition that the same requirements as to service pertaining to service of citation would apply equally to the service of an expert report to an as-yet-unserved defendant. Because the circumstance here is thus far apparently unique, there are likewise no cases which can be cited to rebut that position, either.
One could liken the pre-citation service of the expert report in a health care liability suit pursuant to Rule 21a prior to the time that a defendant has a duty to respond to the pre-citation service of requests for admissions. As the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure currently stand, such requests may be served on another party no later than thirty days before the end of the discovery period. Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.1. The person receiving those requests for admissions would have thirty days after receipt of the requests to re*110spond to them (fifty days if service of the requests are achieved before the defendant’s answer date) or the requests can be deemed admitted without the necessity of a court order. Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.2.17 Would it be effective to serve requests for admissions on a defendant pursuant to Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure before they were ever served with citation, wait fifty days, and deem the requests admitted before the defendant was required to file an answer in the lawsuit? One would hardly think so. The Rules pertaining to requests for admission are written in contemplation either that the party from whom responses are requested is already “before the court” or that the requests would be served in the same manner as citation.
Rule 21a service should apply only after the party is actually before the court, either by compliance with the Rules pertaining to service of citation (e.g., Rule 107, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure) or by voluntary appearance. Here, we had neither of these circumstances at the time the expert report was mailed to Zanchi at the hospital. In these circumstances, there was neither service of citation on him at some situs nor any pleading filed by Zan-chi which nailed down the proper address for the transmission of such notices (such as the office address of his attorney); the certified mail receipt was signed by some person whose relationship to Zanchi remains unidentified. Should this ploy work to establish a prima facie case that Zanchi was “served” with it? That would be the result if Rule 21a is permitted to apply under these circumstances.
Since Zanchi had not already been put in the position of being imposed with an obligation to respond to anything in the suit, Rule 21a should not apply to service of the expert report. Because Rule 21a was never intended to apply under the circumstances we have here, there was no “service” of the expert report on Zanchi within the prescribed 120-day time period prescribed by the statute, nor was it served in such a manner as to suffice to meet the statutory requirement.
I would rule that the attempt at service pursuant to Rule 21a before Zanchi had an obligation to respond was ineffective.
Due Diligence Exception?
Lane also argued that the time requirements of Section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code do not apply if he demonstrates that due diligence was pursued in unsuccessful attempts to serve Zanchi with citation. In doing so, Lane apparently relies on a discussion of the due diligence doctrine in Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex.2011). In Stockton, the Texas Supreme Court explains that under the due diligence doctrine, “a plaintiff, who files a petition within the limitations period but does not complete service until after the statutory period has expired, is entitled to have the date of service relate back to the date of filing, if the plaintiff has exercised diligence in effecting service.” Id. The majority does not address this argument.
The problems with reliance on Stockton for the proposition that the due diligence doctrine does apply and, thus, potentially exculpates Lane from the harsh consequences of the statute are twofold: (1) although the supreme court discusses and *111explains the doctrine, it neither actually applies the due diligence doctrine to abrogate the dictates of the statute nor affirmatively holds that it should not apply; (2) after examining the circumstances and the trial court’s finding that the due diligence exception did apply, it rejected the notion that “a fact issue was raised concerning ... due diligence in the matter” and made a judicial determination that due diligence had not been shown. Id. at 617.
It is notable here that Lane made absolutely no attempt at personal service citation on Zanchi until about forty days after the suit was filed. Lane showed that the process server made unsuccessful attempts on four occasions in June to personally serve Zanchi at his home. Even though the process server was aware that Zanchi was a hospital-based physician at Paris Regional Medical Center, he attempted personal service citation only at Zanchi’s home, never attempting to serve Zanchi with citation at the hospital. Lane also showed that his attorney relied upon a paralegal’s mistaken representation that Zanchi had, in fact, been served with citation; however, there is no explanation given by Lane for inactivity in attempts to get service during the lapse of time between the last attempt by the process server to effect service on Zanchi at his home (June 21) and the paralegal’s mistaken representation that Zanchi had been served (August 10). No motion for substituted service was filed with the trial court until after the 120-day period for the service of the expert report had already expired. Personal service citation was finally served when the process server located Zanchi exiting his home when the process server was attempting to serve a substituted process. What this does not take into account is that Lane’s attorney, apparently realizing that the 120-day period for serving the expert report loomed like the messenger of death, did not send the expert report to Zanchi’s home (where all attempts at service of citation had been made), but to the hospital where he worked. The majority has found this service of the expert report was effective. Many people work during the day and would be absent from their homes. It appears oxymoronic for this Court to make a finding that service of the expert report on Zanchi pursuant to Rule 21a was effective when it was sent by certified mail addressed to him at the hospital address (this apparently having been construed by Lane as Zanchi’s “last known address” so as to comply with Rule 21a), yet fail to address the issue of due diligence when no effort was made to serve Zanchi — either by personal service or by certified mail — at the hospital address. Due diligence would have dictated that service of the citation and the expert report would have been attempted at the place of Zanchi’s employment promptly after efforts were unsuccessful at his home. As to the erroneous representation to Lane’s attorney that Zanchi had actually been personally served with citation, the error of the paralegal amounts to error by Lane’s lawyer and would not provide grist for the claim of due diligence.
Lane has failed to show facts necessary to support a due diligence claim as a matter of law.
Statutory Construction?
The third point relates to the difficulty of reconciling the statute to the procedures to be followed once one allows the service of the expert report before service of citation on the defendant.
The relevant statute reads as follows:
In a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed, serve on each party or the party’s attorney one or more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae of each expert *112listed in the report for each physician or health care provider against whom a liability claim is asserted. The date for serving the report may be extended by written agreement of the affected parties. Each- defendant physician or health care provider whose conduct is implicated in a report must file and serve any objection to the sufficiency of the report not later than the 21st day after the date it was served, failing which all objections are waived.
Tex. Civ. PraC. & Rem.Code ANN. § 74.351 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
This sets out two critical times, one for the service of the expert report by the claimant and one for the filing of service of objections to that report by the physician or health care provider.
If one, for instance, employs the due diligence exception to stall the requirement, then the health care provider who has been served with the expert report (but who has no obligation to respond to the lawsuit) must file his objections to the expert report before he has the duty to respond to the suit itself. The answer proposed by Lane to that dilemma is to apply a “relate back” time to extend the time for filing objections to the time the defendant must file an answer to the suit in chief.
If the relate back time is used, this not only impacts the date that service of the expert report must be delivered, it also dictates that the statutory time for filing objections to the report be likewise amended. Accordingly, if a court unilaterally tampers with the statutory deadline for the service of the expert report, in a circumstance like this it must also extend the time for lodging objections to it; otherwise, the time permitted for lodging objections to the report would be nullified. Accordingly, in order to do so, the court extending deadlines must rewrite the statute in an additional cogent spot.
In Stockton, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that difficulty can arise because of the way the statute is written. After making that observation, however, the supreme court stated that “[t]he Legislature, however, has chosen to commence the 120-day period from the date of filing, and ‘we are not free to rewrite the statutes to reach a result we might consider more desirable, in the name of statutory construction.’” Stockton, 336 S.W.3d at 619 (citing Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.1988)).
A court’s primary objective in construing statutes is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results. See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008).
Words can be vague and may have multiple shades of meanings, even completely opposite meanings (e.g., ravel, adjure, avocation, and inure). Even though the word “filed” may have different meanings in other contexts, in the context of Section 74.351, it has only one. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351. In that context, it means the date that the suit has been instituted against the health care provider; that can only mean that the claimant has 120 days from the date that the medical provider was made a defendant in the suit to serve the expert report.
To be sure, the way the Legislature drafted this legislation presents a potentially onerous (and, possibly, even ruinous) burden on a claimant against a physician or other health care provider in dictating the time that an expert report must be *113served on the defendant. It is, however, not a necessarily impossible burden.
The courts of appeals are obligated to follow the determinations of the Texas Supreme Court in determining the law. See In re K.M.S., 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex.2002). Given the strict adherence to the principles the Legislature laid down in adopting the Medical Liability law (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 74.001-.507 (West 2011)), if it will determine that a suit arising after a spider bite is a health care liability claim,18 it will also determine that Lane failed to meet the obligation in serving Zanehi with the expert report as required.
Due to these reasons, I would rule that the expert report was not served on Zan-chi in accord with the statute and direct the dismissal of Lane’s suit.

. The appellants here are treated as singular under the name “Zanchi” in the singular. Reference to the appellee is made as "Lane.”

. In Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), it was determined that after a person has been served with citation and after that person has attended a hearing and made a pro se approval of temporary orders, it is not required that he file a responsive answer before he has the obligation to respond to requests for admissions or risk having them deemed admitted.

. Omaha Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Johnson, 344 S.W.3d 392 (Tex.2011).