Court Opinion

ID: 9965735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:05:03.301971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:36.596582
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                     Case No. 5D2023-2570
                  LT Case No. 2018-CF-314-A
                 _____________________________

LATHOMAS S. DENNIS,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Robert David Malove, of the Law Office of Robert David Malove,
Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert Charles Lee,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                           May 3, 2024

LAMBERT, J.

     Lathomas Dennis appeals the summary denial of his Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief
in which he asserted two grounds of ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel. We affirm, without discussion, the postconviction
court’s denial of ground two. For the following reasons, we reverse
the summary denial of ground one of Dennis’s motion and remand
for further proceedings.

                         BACKGROUND

    Dennis was charged with four counts of attempted second-
degree murder and one count of shooting or throwing deadly
missiles into an occupied vehicle. Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of the lesser included offenses of attempted
manslaughter by act and convicted, as charged, of shooting or
throwing deadly missiles into an occupied vehicle. Dennis’s
convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal without
opinion. Dennis v. State, 314 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).

     Dennis argued in ground one of the subject motion that his
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and
thereafter introduce critical impeachment evidence concerning
Megan Gaylord, who was one of the victims and was the only
witness who identified Dennis at trial as the shooter. Gaylord
testified that she knew Dennis because they went to middle school
together and they also had sexual relations, a fact later mentioned
by the prosecutor during closing argument. In his sworn motion,
Dennis asserted that these facts were untrue and that counsel’s
failure to impeach this key witness prejudiced him because it
allowed Gaylord’s identification of him based on their prior history
to essentially remain unchallenged.

     In denying this ground of the motion, the postconviction court
did not attach any records to its order. Instead, the court
concluded that this evidence on how Gaylord became acquainted
with Dennis was immaterial or insignificant and, therefore,
counsel’s performance in not challenging or attempting to impeach
this testimony was not deficient.

                            ANALYSIS

    “In order to establish a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a defendant must show that counsel’s actions or
omissions were deficient and that the deficiency so affected the
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.”
McBride v. State, 252 So. 3d 389, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing

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Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 477 (Fla. 2011)). “To uphold the
. . . summary denial of claims raised in a [rule] 3.850 motion, the
claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the
record.” Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) (citation
omitted). If the denial of the motion is based on the records in the
case, a copy of that portion of the files and records that conclusively
shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief must be attached
to the final order. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5).

     Dennis is correct that a “failure to impeach a key witness may
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hipley v. State, 333
So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Bentley v. State, 867
So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)). Dennis alleged in his motion
that impeachment was important because there was no DNA,
fingerprint, or gunshot residue evidence implicating him in the
crimes charged; he made no confession; and there were no
witnesses, other than Gaylord, who placed him at the scene of the
crime. Where, as here, no evidentiary hearing is held on a rule
3.850 motion, these factual allegations must be accepted as true,
to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. Colon v.
State, 909 So. 2d 484, 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Peede, 748
So. 2d at 257).

     From these allegations contained in Dennis’s motion, the
credibility of the State’s key witness, Gaylord, would have been a
critical factor for the jury when assessing his guilt. See Klaus v.
State, 236 So. 3d 483, 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (recognizing that
the impeachment of a State’s key witness could have made a
difference at trial when “his ‘trustworthiness was critical to the
State’s case’” (citations omitted)).

    We disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion in its
order that how Gaylord became acquainted with Dennis was
immaterial. Gaylord’s positive identification of Dennis as the
shooter may very well have carried more weight with the jury
based on their prior history than if the two had never previously
met. Furthermore, the reliability of Gaylord’s testimony may have
been adversely impacted if her stated basis on direct examination
of knowing Dennis since middle school had been impeached for

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being untrue. 1 See Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1118 (Fla.
2013) (recognizing that counsel’s failure to adequately investigate
and impeach a State’s witness “deprived the jury of the ability to
make a fully informed decision about [the witness’s] credibility”).
With no transcript of Gaylord’s trial testimony attached to the
denial order, the extent of Dennis’s counsel’s efforts at effectively
impeaching Gaylord’s testimony is unknown based on the instant
record.

     Accordingly, because Dennis’s claim in ground one is facially
valid and has not been conclusively refuted by the record, we
reverse the order summarily denying ground one and remand for
the court either to hold an evidentiary hearing or to attach
additional records that conclusively refute this claim.

    AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part, REMANDED for further
proceedings.

BOATWRIGHT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    1 Gaylord was eighteen years old at the time she testified at

Dennis’s trial, and middle school would not have been that distant
in her past.

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