Court Opinion

ID: 9556187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:00:44.480961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:17.056739
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-3023
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                 Cornell Williams

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                      for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
                                 ____________

                             Submitted: May 10, 2023
                              Filed: August 16, 2023
                                  ____________

Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

STRAS, Circuit Judge.

       Cornell Williams conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a
felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Although he argues the district court 1 should have
suppressed the gun and shell casing found in his apartment, we affirm.

      1
        The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska.
                                          I.

      A 911 caller reported that someone in a nearby apartment had just shot a gun
from a balcony. The caller said the unit number was 32 and described the shooter
as a man in a wheelchair. It so happens that the occupant of that apartment was
Williams, who matched the description.

       Upon their arrival 20 minutes later, officers confirmed the 911 caller’s account
and talked to other witnesses. One implied that multiple people could be inside.

      The officers approached Apartment 32 cautiously with their guns drawn.
There was initially no response when they knocked on the door, but Williams
answered about a minute later. Once he did, he began rolling his wheelchair
backward. The officers entered the apartment to pat him down, but they found
nothing. One then asked for permission to conduct a quick sweep of the unit to make
sure no one else was there. Williams replied, “[y]es ma’am. You can do whatever
you want.”

       Once the sweep of the surrounding rooms was complete, Williams
complained about some sketchy characters that he had seen hanging out near the
trash cans below his balcony. One of the officers walked over to get a better look
and spotted a spent shell casing in plain view.

      Given the report of earlier gunfire, the discovery of the shell casing led to
more questions. Williams denied having a gun and added that he could not explain
how the shell casing ended up on the balcony. In the process, he admitted that, as a
convicted felon, he could not possess either.

       Williams finally confessed to being the shooter after the officers mentioned a
search warrant. He also admitted that he hid the gun in a kitchen cabinet. At his
direction, they opened the cabinet and retrieved it.
                                         -2-
       The government charged Williams with illegally possessing a firearm as a
felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to
suppress the evidence they found, he conditionally pleaded guilty. On appeal,
Williams challenges the steps the officers took from the moment they entered his
apartment. We have a split standard of review under the Fourth Amendment: de
novo for legal conclusions and clear error for any factual findings. See United States
v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2015).

                                         II.

      We start with the pat down. Williams views it as constitutionally problematic
because the officers entered his apartment without a warrant.

      Entering a home without a warrant to conduct a search is presumptively
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
459 (2011). The key word is presumptive: there are exceptions. One of them is for
“exigent circumstances,” United States v. Vance, 53 F.3d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1995),
which allows officers to conduct a search if they have an “objectively reasonable”
concern “for the safety of themselves or others,” United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d
1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

      Consider the situation the officers faced here. There were multiple
eyewitnesses who said that someone in a wheelchair in Apartment 32 had fired a
gun. See Omaha, Neb., Mun. Code § 20-196 (prohibiting the “discharge [of] an
instrument which releases a projectile by means of an explosive charge” in the city).
When Williams finally answered the door, the officers were face-to-face with a man
who matched the description of the shooter.

      Now consider their options. They could have stood at the door and questioned
a potentially armed suspect—someone who minutes before had allegedly fired a gun
from his balcony. See United States v. Roberts, 824 F.3d 1145, 1146–47 (8th Cir.
                                         -3-
2016) (discussing the problems with this option). They could have retreated and
applied for a warrant, which would have left other occupants of the building and
anyone inside Williams’s apartment in potential danger. Or they could do what they
did here: enter for the limited purpose of patting him down for a weapon before
questioning him. See United States v. Valencia, 499 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that officers could enter an apartment after a shots-fired call to “discern
if the shooter . . . remained inside”). The Fourth Amendment allowed them to avoid
further danger and “ensure [their] own safety” first. Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct.
2011, 2017 (2021); see Vance, 53 F.3d at 222 n.4 (explaining that officers are not
required to alleviate danger by “leaving the area”).

       It goes too far to suggest, as Williams does, that we are creating a new “gun
exception” to the warrant requirement. Someone having a gun in their home does
not create an exigency on its own. See United States v. Quarterman, 877 F.3d 794,
798 (8th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 243 (8th Cir.
1995). Rather, what matters is that Williams illegally fired it minutes before the
officers arrived. See Valencia, 499 F.3d at 816 (allowing officers to “enter the
apartment without a warrant to secure the []gun and to discern if the shooter or any
victims in need of medical attention remained inside” after a shots-fired call). A
suspect who has just illegally used a gun is on different Fourth Amendment footing
than someone who merely possesses one. See United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357,
1361 (8th Cir. 1980).

                                         III.

       Another exception to the warrant requirement covers just about everything
that happened next. First, when the officers asked Williams whether they could
“look” around “to make sure there’s nobody else in the apartment,” he replied, “[y]es
ma’am. You can do whatever you want.” Based on that reply, he consented to at
least a protective sweep of the apartment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973) (explaining the “well[-]settled” rule that consent negates the need
for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Alatorre, 863 F.3d
                                         -4-
810, 813 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing a protective sweep as “a quick and limited
search of [a] premises . . . conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others”
(quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990))).

       Second, after Williams blurted out that there had been suspicious activity
outside, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Williams had provided
consent to look there. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (using
objective criteria to determine consent). Particularly after he told one of the officers
just moments before that she could “do whatever [she] want[ed].” See United States
v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006) (allowing a search “within the
boundaries of [the defendant’s] consent”). The officer was then free to seize the
spent shell casing that was in plain view on the balcony. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1971) (“Where the initial intrusion that brings
the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also
legitimate.”).

       Third, consent extended to the retrieval of the gun itself after Williams
confessed to “fir[ing] the shot” and admitted that the gun was in a kitchen cabinet.
After all, he said “yes” when the officers asked him to move away “so they [could]
grab it,” and then told them its exact location when they had trouble finding it. It is
hard to imagine a clearer instance of consent through words and actions.2 See United
States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In assessing the scope of a
person’s consent, we must examine the totality of the circumstances, which includes
the language of a person’s consent and his actions during the officers’ search.”).

      2
       Asking Williams for permission was the right move. Exigent circumstances
would not have justified a protective sweep of the kitchen cabinets. Nobody could
hide in there, so there was no risk that someone would jump out and start shooting.
Cf. Buie, 494 U.S. at 328–29, 334 (allowing officers to search a basement while
serving an arrest warrant because it could have contained a hidden gunman).
                                          -5-
                                 IV.

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
               ______________________________

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