Court Opinion

ID: 9952656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 15:03:38.445692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:05.166119
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-2298
                  _____________________________

DAVID EDWARD JOHNSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradford County.
James M. Colaw, Judge.

                          March 20, 2024

B.L. Thomas, J.

     Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for
postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. He asserted that
he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney: (a) undermined his defense by presenting inconsistent
testimony; (b) opened the door to testimony that Appellant
exercised his right to remain silent when confronted by police; (c)
failed to object to inadmissible child hearsay statements; (d) failed
to seek appropriate redaction of the victim’s child protection team
interview; (e) elicited testimony about collateral, uncharged
crimes; and (f) failed to object to the victim advocate sitting with
the victim when she testified at trial and to the alleged victim
indicating that the victim advocate had been with her since the
outset of the case. Appellant argued that the cumulative effect of
trial counsel’s various instances of deficient performance deprived
him of a fair trial. The postconviction court found that several
claims constituted deficient performance but that Appellant failed
to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors.

     We find no merit in the claim about the victim advocate, but
because the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors here are
sufficient to undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome, we
reverse and remand for a new trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

     Appellant was charged with one count of lewd or lascivious
molestation on a person older than 12 but less than 16, in violation
of section 800.04(5)(c)(2), Florida Statutes.

     The State called the investigating detective as its first
witness. On cross-examination, trial counsel asked the detective if
she personally reached out to Appellant, if at any point in her
investigation she spoke to Appellant, or if she ever received any
statements from him. The State objected arguing the inability of
law enforcement to contact Appellant was a Miranda issue. The
trial court noted that the implication based on the phrasing of the
questions and the opening statement was that law enforcement did
not attempt to get Appellant’s version. Accordingly, the trial court
ruled the door had been opened for the State to fairly rebut that
implication.

    On redirect, the State asked why law enforcement was not
able to get Appellant’s statement. The Detective explained that
Appellant “wished to remain silent.”

     Trial counsel testified it was not a mistake asking questions
that opened the door on the right to remain silent. She had tried
other cases with that prosecutor, made the same implication, and
he did not catch it. She had planned to use it in her closing because
it had worked before.

    The State’s next trial witness was an investigator with the
Child Protection Team.

    The State asked the investigator: “The incident that was the
subject of this interview -- when did it occur,” to which the

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investigator responded, “There was more than one, but the most
recent had been the Sunday prior to the interview. 2/2 of 2020.”
The State asked, “What stood out about that Sunday?” The
response: “That it appeared to be an experience that had been
escalating and it was enough for her to be able to report it.”

     Additionally on direct, the investigator summarized the
events that the victim relayed to her on the evening of the incident,
including instances of indecent exposure, which were uncharged.
The recorded interview was then admitted and published to the
jury. The video included the victim’s description of various
incidences of indecent exposure that occurred on the evening in
question, before and after the charged molestation. Trial counsel
stipulated to the video of the CPT interview. She did not object to
any of the child hearsay statements or to testimony about the
uncharged offenses.

    On the first question on cross-examination, trial counsel
asked:

    Q. You stated earlier, during your direct examination,
    that you felt the behavior was escalating. Can you
    describe what you mean by “escalating”?

    A. The sexualized behavior -- there was some incidents
    that occurred prior to 2/2.

    Q. Were they sexual in nature as well?

    A. They were.

     The next witness was the victim’s mother, the daughter of
Appellant’s wife. The mother testified to the events and
circumstances that led to her calling the police. On cross-
examination, she testified to having talked with her mother about
going to the police and stated, “We had one conversation before I
went to the police.” Trial counsel asked, “What was that
conversation?” The answer:

         The conversation was -- I asked her, you know, [the
    victim] confided in my mom first. She told her what
    happened.

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        And then [the victim] came to me and told me what
    had happened.

         And so at that point, my mom had had an
    opportunity to talk to Dave. And I asked my mom, “Well,
    what did he say?” And, you know, she told me they had a
    conversation between her and Dave that he had said that
    [the inappropriate touching] was a mistake, and he didn’t
    mean to do it. And I told her that there was no way that
    was a mistake because she was laying on her stomach.

    The State called the victim as its last witness. On cross-
examination, trial counsel elicited testimony about two of the
uncharged exposure incidents. After the State rested, the court
was in recess for lunch allowing trial counsel time to talk to
Appellant about testifying.

     Trial counsel recalled the Child Protection Team investigator
as the first defense witness and asked about details from the
interview, including, once again, that Appellant exposed himself to
the victim that evening.

     Appellant then testified in his own defense. He testified
unequivocally that he did not touch the victim inappropriately or
expose himself. Trial counsel did not ask if he had told his wife
that the touching was accidental.

     Lastly, Appellant’s wife took the stand. Trial counsel did not
ask the wife if Appellant had told her the touching was accidental
and did not ask if she had made such a statement to her daughter.
On cross-examination however, Appellant’s wife confirmed that
she had had a conversation with Appellant where he admitted to
touching the victim but said it was an accident. The State then
asked, “But he did admit to touching her inappropriately.” And she
responded, “Right.”

     At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for postconviction
relief, trial counsel testified that it was a mistake to ask the
victim’s mother about the conversation. Counsel had not asked the
same question at deposition and she did not know what the answer
would be. Surprised by the statement at trial, counsel also
admitted that she did not discuss the statement with Appellant or

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his wife to find out if this testimony was true or impeachable before
calling Appellant and then his wife to testify.

     Trial counsel testified that the State had not filed the required
notice for the admission of child hearsay statements, but counsel
did not object to a single statement. She also admitted that the
State had not filed the required notice for admitting collateral
crimes, but she did not challenge any of them. She testified that
her strategy was to show the victim was not credible.

     Appellant has demonstrated counsel’s performance was
deficient because the acts and omissions discussed above were not
the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690. The cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced
Appellant, because “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

    REVERSED and REMANDED.

Osterhaus, C.J., and Nordby, J., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Thomas D. Sommerville, Law offices of Thomas Sommerville,
Orlando, and William R. Ponall, Ponall Law, Maitland, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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