Court Opinion

ID: 9522117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:08.86356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.784449
License: Public Domain

Reiber, C J.,
¶ 29. dissenting. Although I am concerned that the majority opinion should not be interpreted as affecting the master plan rules, reducing their use by applicants, I dissent on a more fundamental ground. The issue the majority decides was not raised below in a timely and proper manner and therefore should not be reviewable on appeal. I do not necessarily disagree with the majority’s holding that an administrative amendment under Act 250 Rule 34 may be inappropriate where, as here, a master plan application does not result in affirmative findings on all of the Act 250 criteria and a master plan permit. I would emphasize, however, that under the Master Permit Policy and Procedure a fully approved master plan application may well support a later *434administrative amendment where it would not materially affect any Act 250 criteria.
¶ 30. Even with that understanding, however, I am compelled to conclude that the majority opinion is advisory because the question it addresses — whether an administrative amendment under Rule 34 requires an underlying Act 250 permit — was not raised with the trial court before the entry of judgment but only later in a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend. Nor was there a challenge to the subdivision alignment of the very same acreage allowed by the first administrative amendment in March 2004. As the majority acknowledges, it is well settled that a “ ‘Rule 59(e) motion may not be used •... to raise arguments . . . that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’ ” N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 44, 184 Vt. 303, 965 A.2d 447 (quoting 11 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 28101.1, at 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)).
¶ 31. The majority acknowledges that the question it decides was not expressly raised with the trial court before entry of judgment, but asserts nevertheless that it was “at the core” of the case. Ante, ¶ 18. This is a stretch, considering that the only filing the majority references in this regard was a motion to alter submitted to the district commission questioning whether the proposed fifteen-lot subdivision qualified as a “record-keeping” or “minor revision” to an existing project under Rule 34(D). Far from challenging the fundamental applicability of Rule 34, therefore, the motion assumed that it applied but questioned whether it met the requisite criteria as a minor revision.
¶ 32. Mountainside avers that the question of whether an administrative amendment requires an underlying Act 250 permit was intrinsic to three of the fifteen issues set forth in its statement of questions, specifically Questions 1, 4, and 15. Question 1, however, merely asked whether Killington had filed a “complete application.” Question 4 asked whether the application for administrative amendment required a preliminary evaluation under Rule 34(E), which sets forth a balancing test, weighing the interests of flexibility and finality. Thus, it assumed the applicability of Rule 34 and merely questioned whether its balancing requirements had been met. Question 15 arguably comes closer but again simply asked whether the proposed fifteen-lot subdivision was proper without a review of the Act 250 criteria; it essentially questioned whether the proposed amendment was a *435material change under Rule 34 without challenging the rule’s fundamental applicability absent an underlying Act 250 permit.
¶ 33. It is well settled that Rule 59(e) “does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the [trial] court prior to the judgment.” Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Vallejo v. Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that “[arguments that could have been raised before may not be raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration” (quotation omitted)); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that Rule 59(e) “cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued” (quotation omitted)); Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that Rule 59(e) should be “used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources” and “may not be used to raise arguments ... for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation” (quotation omitted)). Mountainside plainly waived the issue the majority decides by failing to raise it either explicitly or implicitly throughout the lengthy litigation process that preceded the trial court’s entry of judgment. Accordingly, on this basis I would affirm the judgment.