Court Opinion

ID: 9727347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:31:35.208174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.539141
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Hoffman, C.J.
I concur in the result reached by-the majority opinion but disagree with the reasoning applied therein.
The majority opinion states that the execution and delivery of the deed to R. C. Krachenfels, Inc. by the Springfields did no more than create an “equitable mortgage.” This is true as between the parties to the deed. However, the controversy before this court involves a third party who is not involved in the transaction between Krachenfels and the Springfields.
The question before this court is who is the “owner” within Paragraph Four of the Acts of 1963, ch. 376, § 1, p. 963, § 43-701, Burns 1965 Repl., which provides for furnishing written notice to the “owner” of “the delivery or labor and the existence of lien rights within fourteen [14] days from the date of the first delivery or labor performed.”
In the instant ease the first delivery or labor performed by appellants was June 2, 1964 and July 27, 1964, and was furnished at the request of Krachenfels. Under §43-701, supra, appellants had until June 16, 1964 and August 10, *6801964, to furnish written notice to the owner. Timely written notice was essential to perfect a lien if the owner was not Krachenfels.
During all of the time hereinabove referred to Springfields were the owners as shown by the public records of Marion County. Not until September 18, 1964, was a deed recorded passing title from Springfields to Krachenfels.
The mechanics’ lien statute depends upon the public records to give it vitality. A no-lien contract is only effective when filed of record. A lien must be timely filed of record to give it existence. Notice of lien is required to be mailed to the latest address of the owner as shown by the public records. The description of real estate to be placed upon the notice of lien is that shown by the public records. The entire mechanics’ lien statute demonstrates the legislative intent that any person who wishes to acquire a lien upon any property, must depend upon the public records when acquiring or enforcing their mechanic’s lien.
The only logical and reasonable definition of the word “owner” as used in the mechanics’ lien statute is that person as shown to be the owner by the public records.
In the instant case the Springfields were the owners as shown by the public records, and they received no notice as required by the statute. Therefore, no lien was acquired by the appellants herein.
Note. — Reported in 281 N. E. 2d 580.