Court Opinion

ID: 7824574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:03:50.667428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:49.510372
License: Public Domain

R. H. “Buddy” Hixson, Special Justice, dissenting. In the case of Ragar v. Hooper, 299 Ark. 345, 772 S.W.2d 594 (1989), this Court correctly tracked the prior litigation between the parties. The parties have litigated both in circuit and chancery court. The matter before the Court at this time is a chancery action that has been before this Court in Ragar v. Hooper, 298 Ark. 353, 767 S.W.2d 521 (1989), wherein the first three counts in the plaintiffs present cause of action were correctly determined by this Court to have been decided at prior litigation and were thus barred by res judicata. That left appellant’s Cause of Action No. 4 remaining to be decided in chancery court. The appellees had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the last above cited Ragar case, and the lower court had granted that Motion for Summary Judgment on a date not set for hearing. Therefore, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for an appropriate hearing, with the required notice, on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by appellees. This Court, in remanding this cause, did so because the lower court should not have granted the summary judgment before the date it was set for hearing, unless it clearly appeared that Ragar could produce no proof contrary to the affidavits. When the lower court heard the motion, after a timely setting, it again granted the appellees’ motion from which the appellant appealed to this Court. The sole issue before the Court at this time is whether or not the lower court properly ruled on appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Cause of Action No. 4 of appellant’s complaint asked for an accounting from all the limited partners to determine whether or not all of the proceeds from the limited partners obligated to the limited partnership had, in fact, been paid. This Court, in Ragar v. Hooper, 298 Ark. 353, 767 S.W.2d 521 (1989), determined that limited partners were entitled to an accounting from the other limited partners when they remanded the case to the lower court for a proper presentation of that issue to the lower court. The legislature had set forth various responsibilities and limitations on limited partners in Ark. Code Ann. § 4-44-113 (1987) and Ark. Code Ann. § 4-44-104 (1987). Further, this Court in Stuckey v. Douglas, 240 Ark. 637, 401 S.W.2d 218 (1966) and Frank v. Pickens & Son Co., 264 Ark. 307, 572 S.W.2d 133 (1978) has held that accountings are proper devices to determine if the partners have conducted themselves properly and complied with the terms of the partnership agreement. The appellees addressed Cause of Action No. 4 by Motion for Summary Judgment with various affidavits and depositions, none of which, in fact, provides an accounting from the limited partners, but are directed toward the accuracy, or lack of accuracy, of the accounting of the general partner that the limited partners had contributed as agreed. If the limited partners are entitled to an accounting from each other as to their contributions, an accounting from the general partner as to the contributions of the limited partners does not, in fact, provide an accounting of the limited partners to determine if they have contributed as agreed. It is apparent that the general partner was attempting to thwart the appellant’s right to an accounting from the limited partners in that they had in prior proceedings filed for a protective order to prohibit appellant from deposing the sixteen (16) limited partners. The record is clear from the affidavits and/or depositions from the certified public accounting firm of Thomas and Thomas that the information furnished to them as to the general partners’ transactions is limited to the information as represented to them by management, the general partner. They did not audit or review the accompanying statement of charges and partners’ capital accounts, and therefore they did not express an opinion or any other form of assurance upon it. Limited partners are entitled to an accounting of the limited partners. An accounting of the general partners as to the activities of the limited partner does not satisfy that legal right. The action of the lower court in granting appellees’ Summary Judgment Motion has in effect ruled that the accounting furnished by the general partner answers the legal right of the limited partners to account to one another. The lower court should have required an accounting from the limited partners as to their contributions and withdrawals to determine if same complies with the agreements of the parties. It could be done simply by the showing of documented evidence of each limited partner’s contributions and withdrawals. Summary Judgments are extreme remedies and should not be granted where evidence presents itself in such a manner that reasonable men might differ. Clemons v. First Nat’l Bank, 286 Ark. 290, 692 S.W.2d 222 (1985). The question here is, has there been an accounting from the limited partners? There has not. For the reasons above, I would reverse and remand the lower court’s decision with directions that the limited partners be required to account for their contributions and withdrawals to determine if same comply with the laws governing partnerships and the agreement of the parties. Special Justice Alex G. Streett joins in this dissent.