Court Opinion

ID: 9496304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:22:52.229491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:29.122947
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
Concurring.
I join in the Majority’s excellent opinion in its entirety. I write separately, however, to further address and express my support the District Court’s “well founded” reservations concerning the potential for the Government to abuse the Speedy Trial Act. I share the District Court’s concern. To further illustrate the District Court’s frustration with the Government in this case, I will start with additional facts concerning the Appellee’s willingness to acquiescence to the Government’s requests for extension.
The defense agreed to these numerous extensions in the obvious hope of reaching a plea agreement. Neither woman had any prior criminal record and were (and apparently remain) willing to cooperate with the Government. Unfortunately, as *180the District Court noted in reference to the progress of a plea agreement with Peoples, “Despite that these extensions were secured to allow time for plea negotiations, in fact the Government met only once with Ms. Peoples.” United States v. Watkins, No. 02-120-1, 02-120-2, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12284, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 2002). Similarly, there were few meetings between the Government and Watkins. Both Appellees express a well-founded claim they felt the Government had simply forgotten them.
The Government, in a classic understatement, admits that the case was “somewhat back burnered.” App. at 107-08. That is not good enough. In addition, Peoples’ confinement conditions were terrible. After allegedly being sexually assaulted in the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, she was transferred from the frying pan to the fire — the Camden County Prison. See App. at 96. The conditions at the Camden County Prison are described as “notoriously poor,” and Peoples raises various complaints about her confinement. See id. at 95, 98. Throughout this time, which eventually totaled eight months, Peoples’ attorney attempted to contact the prosecution to reinitiate the negotiation process; but without success.
The District Court is empowered, when conditions warrant, to dismiss an indictment for failure to prosecute, even where the delay is not of constitutional proportions. See United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 513-14 (4th Cir.2000). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 48(b) and the court’s supervisory powers provide authority to dismiss indictments, and when warranted, to dismiss with prejudice. Id.; Fed. R.Crim. Pro. Rule 48(b); see also United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 113 n. 1 (3d Cir.1976) (noting that Rule 48(b) is a “restatement of the court’s inherent power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution.”).
Rule 48(b) states: “The court may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint if unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a charge to a grand jury; (2) filing an information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to trial.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 48(b) (2002). The advisory committee notes to the rule explain that Rule 48 operates independently from the Speedy Trial Rule. The Committee noted several cases addressing the court’s power under Rule 48 and stated that it did not intend to change the relationship between that power and the Speedy Trial Act.
Although I will not conclude at this time that it would be appropriate for this court or the District Court to sua sponte dismiss the importation indictment, I write separately to suggest that if the Government does not live up to its assurances to implement safeguards to prevent future mistakes, the courts are not without a remedy.