Court Opinion

ID: 9660811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:21:23.428329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:22.437792
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
By their motion for rehearing, the appellants (i.e., the Pates) contend, among other things, that this Court erred by overruling their seventh point of error advanced in their original brief filed in this cause. That point of error reads: “The court erred in refusing and failing to permit Plaintiffs [i.e., the Pates] to present evidence to the jury concerning standards of care accepted in the industry and bearing upon the duty and care of the Defendant [i.e., Tex-line] and the issue of causation of the accident in question” [emphasis added]. On rehearing, the appellants claim this Court erred because “the evidence excluded by the trial court is clearly admissible under Texas law, such error was preserved in the trial court, and such error was harmful to Appellants” [emphasis added].
The “standard of care accepted in the industry” that the appellants wanted to introduce was the National Electric Safety Code. That information was developed by Texline on its cross-examination of the appellants’ expert witness on a voir dire examination. In concluding that the National *246Electric Safety Code was inadmissible, we relied on B-R Dredging Co. v. Rodriguez, 564 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1978) and Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1934). Whitescarver presents the majority and prevailing position that the National Electric Safety Code is inadmissible to show negligence. The admissibility view is presented in City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939). The admissibility view from Hardy does not enjoy a significant following by courts from jurisdictions other than Alabama.
In Hardy, the court pointed out that “medical works and other scientific writings shown to be authority on the subject” are admissible in Alabama to show negligence. Thus, the court concluded that the National Electric Safety Code was admissible, as are any other scientific writings. The court readily acknowledged that its admissibility rule was not the prevailing view. Id. at 266. We point out that since the early case of St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 14 S.W. 309, 310 (Tex.1890), medical treatises and other similar scientific writings are not admissible in Texas to show negligence. Thus, the rationale for the decision in Hardy does not prevail in Texas. Consequently, we continue our reliance on Rodriguez and Whitescarver and adhere to our initial disposition of the appellants’ seventh point of error. Nevertheless, for other reasons that point of error must be overruled.
In their brief, the appellants claim the trial court erred by excluding the evidence which appears at pages 536 through 544 of the statement of facts. We have carefully reviewed the testimony. By that testimony, appellants’ witness stated that there are different classifications for different occupancies; that the facility in question falls under Class Two; that equipment is manufactured for various classifications of occupancy; that the label on a particular piece of equipment reveals the classification for which the equipment is approved; and that the equipment in the facility in question did not meet the provision for a Class Two occupancy. The witness further stated that the standards were generally accepted in the industry and that those standards were from the National Electric Safety Code.
The record shows that there was considerable testimony at the trial concerning the conditions on the premises in question and the “electrical motors, apparatuses, and/or wiring” at the facility. In response to special issues numbered one, two, two-A, two-B, three, and four, the jury found that: Texline failed to render the premises in question reasonably safe for Tommy Pate; Texline failed to warn Pate of any dangers on the premises; the dangerous conditions on the premises were known to and should have been discovered by Texline; Texline failed to properly maintain the “electrical motors, apparatuses and/or wiring” at the facility; and Texline failed to properly inspect the “electrical motors, apparatuses and/or wiring” at the facility. However, the jury failed to find that any of those matters was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question. In this Court, those determinations are not challenged by evi-dentiary points of error.
Consequently, when we consider the excluded evidence in the light of the jury’s unchallenged determinations and the other evidence in the record, we must conclude that the trial court’s refusal to admit the excluded testimony did not amount “to such a denial of the rights of the appellants] as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.” See Tex.R.Civ.P. 434. The appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.