Court Opinion

ID: 9599549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:34.220346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.711201
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to division 4 of the majority opinion and to *238the imposition of the death penalty.
During closing argument, the state argued that Jones’s failure to apologize to Roger Tackett’s family was “the kind of conduct that deserves the death penalty.” The impermissible inference from this argument was that Jones had a moral and legal obligation to confess to the murder by apologizing to the victim’s family in order to avoid the death penalty.45 This type of argument is fundamentally unfair because “[e]ven after he has been found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to confess, and he has a right to urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation of penalty.”46 “Acceptance of the [s]tate’s argument would place an accused in the paradoxical position of saying I am sorry for a crime of which I am not guilty.”47 The state’s argument in this case forced Jones into an “intolerable dilemma”48 of having to choose between his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and a sentence of death.
I acknowledge that this Court has held that it is permissible for the state to argue the defendant’s lack of remorse in certain circumstances when there is lawful evidence to support the argument.49 Here, there is no specific evidence of lack of remorse. We have never held that the defendant’s failure to apologize and confess is lawful evidence of a lack of remorse or that such failure permits the state to argue that a lack of remorse supports the imposition of the death penalty. Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on Hammond v. State,50 is misplaced. Hammond addressed only the specific comment made by the prosecutor in that case and does not stand for the general proposition that arguments regarding a lack of remorse can never constitute a comment on the failure to testify.
The impropriety of the state’s argument was compounded by its contention that the power of forgiveness belonged exclusively to Roger Tackett’s family members, and that Jones had not sought this forgiveness by apologizing for the murder. A logical but impermissible inference for the jury to draw was that it had no power to dispense mercy to Jones, contrary to OCGA § 17-10-2 (c), which provides, in pertinent part, that at the conclusion of the penalty phase, “the jury shall retire to determine . . . whether to recommend mercy for the defendant.” Furthermore, “mercy for the individual defendant *239is, by itself, a valid reason for a jury to decline to impose a death sentence - a jury can withhold the death penalty for any reason or no reason at all.”51
Decided November 20, 2000
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2000.
Albertelli & Israel, Kenneth T Israel, Ray B. Gary, Jr., Mitchell D. Durham, Clive A. Stafford-Smith, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Maria B. Golick, Russell J. Parker, Thomas A. Cole, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Because the state’s argument violated Jones’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and was so fundamentally unfair as to deny Jones due process,52 I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Judge Perry Brannen, Jr., join in this dissent.
Appendix.
Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780 (514 SE2d 205) (1999); Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296 (509 SE2d 45) (1998); Bishop v. State, 268 Ga. 286 (486 SE2d 887) (1997); Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592 (481 SE2d 821) (1997); McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378 (477 SE2d 814) (1996); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439 (469 SE2d 129) (1996); Mobley v. State, 265 Ga. 292 (455 SE2d 61) (1995); Meders v. State, 261 Ga. 806 (411 SE2d 491) (1992); Gibson v. State, 261 Ga. 313 (404 SE2d 781) (1991); Ferrell v. State, 261 Ga. 115 (401 SE2d 741) (1991); Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1 (401 SE2d 500) (1991); Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 82 (365 SE2d 99) (1988); Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461 (360 SE2d 258) (1987); Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616 (340 SE2d 891) (1986); Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622 (323 SE2d 801) (1984); Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187 (319 SE2d 420) (1984); Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255 (304 SE2d 882) (1983); Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630 (300 SE2d 640) (1983); Solomon v. State, 247 Ga. 27 (277 SE2d 1) (1981).

 Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1544 (3rd Cir. 1991).

 People v. Coleman, 459 P.2d 248, 254 (Cal. 1969), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. Superior Court, 928 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1997).

 Owen v. Texas, 656 SW2d 458, 460 (Tex. 1983).

 Id. at 460.

 Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873 (268 SE2d 316) (1980) (when defendant admits guilt); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 723 (386 SE2d 316) (1989) (when defendant says he would commit crime again).

 264 Ga. 879, 886 (452 SE2d 745) (1995).

 Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 359 (496 SE2d 674) (1998); OCGA § 17-10-2 (c).

 Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992).