Court Opinion

ID: 9599022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:54.077595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:16.441109
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court adequately complied with Crim.P. 11 prior to accepting the defendant’s plea of guilty to felony theft, with the result that the court properly denied his Crim.P. 35(b)1 motion to vacate his judgment and sentence. I disagree, and so respectfully dissent.
The defendant was charged with second degree burglary of a dwelling2 and felony theft.3 He entered into a plea bargain with the prosecution pursuant to which he would plead guilty to felony theft, and the burglary charge would be dismissed.
At the providency hearing, the trial court meticulously advised the defendant of the elements of the offense and the consequences of a plea of guilty to felony theft. It then asked the deputy district attorney for the factual basis for the plea, and the deputy responded,
The factual basis, your Honor, is that in El Paso County, May 8, 1975, Ralph Cu-shon had in his possession a variety of items, a lighter, jewelry, watches, some foreign currency, U.S. currency of some value, had those in his possession and he knew those were stolen items and had them in his possession without the permission of the rightful owner, that right*530ful owner being Bruce Preston Perry, and had the specific intent, the evidence would show, to deprive the rightful owner of those items.
After this recital the judge asked the defendant why he was pleading guilty. The defendant answered, “[t]o escape the risk of being convicted of the other charge [i.e., second degree burglary].” Although the defendant did not expressly assert his innocence at the time he offered his guilty plea, the trial court considered the plea to be of the type discussed in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and accepted it.4
In North Carolina v. Alford, supra, the United States Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to the acceptance of a guilty plea under circumstances where the defendant did not acknowledge guilt, stating:
Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
400 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171. The Court went on to say,
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea; and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence.
400 U.S. at 38, n. 10, 91 S.Ct. at 167-68, n. 10, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171-172, n. 10 (citations omitted).
In the instant case the record lacks any factual demonstration that the stolen property exceeds the value of $100 and is devoid of a waiver of this showing. Furthermore, contrary to the implication in the majority opinion, this is not simply a technical omission of an uncontroverted fact.5
Crim.P. 11 directs that the court determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. The reason for this has been explained by the United States Supreme Court in construing a substantially similar requirement in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[Although the procedure embodied in Rule 11 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, it is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 424-25 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
*531We have always required careful compliance with the requirements of Crim.P. 11. A guilty plea cannot be accepted absent a record affirmatively showing a factual basis as required by that rule. See People v. Murdock, 187 Colo. 418, 532 P.2d 43 (1975); People v. Alvarez, 181 Colo. 213, 508 P.2d 1267 (1973); People v. Randolph, 175 Colo. 454, 488 P.2d 203 (1971). If a conviction is predicated on a guilty plea obtained without compliance with Crim.P. 11 the defendant has the right to vacation of the judgment and sentence, and withdrawal of the plea. E.g., People v. Sandoval, 188 Colo. 431, 535 P.2d 1120 (1975); People v. Randolph, supra.
No amount of explanation to the defendant of the value element of the felony theft charge can serve as a surrogate for establishment of a factual basis to support that element of the charge, or for a waiver of a presentation of that basis in fact. This is not a case of mere lack of adherence to a ritual advisement format. See, e.g., People v. Lambert, 189 Colo. 264, 539 P.2d 1238 (1975). As the trial court found, and as the majority’s own recital of the facts amply demonstrates, a factual basis for the value element was not presented in any form at the providency hearing. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals determined, there is no foundation in the record to support a conclusion that the defendant waived the presentation of a full factual basis for the plea.
In my view the Colorado Court of Appeals correctly decided the issues and properly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Crim.P. 35(b) motion. People v. Cushon, 631 P.2d 1164 (Colo.App.1981). I would affirm the decision of that court.
I am authorized to say that Justice DU-BOFSKY and Justice QUINN join me in this dissent.

.Under the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended effective November 13, 1979, the grounds upon which the defendant relies are now included in Crim.P. 35(c)(2).

. Section 18-4-203, C.R.S.1973.

. Section 18^-401, C.R.S.1973.

. After the defendant responded that he was pleading guilty to avoid the risk of a burglary conviction, the court said:
Is that Alfred V. North Carolina (sic), you are doing it underneath that to avoid this five to forty year charge of burglary of a dwelling; you have a right to do so, Mr. Cushon.

. The majority states that “[njowhere in either his 35(b) motion or in his appellate pleadings does the defendant argue that the collective value of the stolen items was less than that required for conviction.” In his pro se motion under Crim.P. 35(b), however, the defendant stated “[tjhat the value of property in a theft charge must exceed 200 or more dollars whereas the value of property in the above mentioned case was 100 dollars and maybe less.” Furthermore, in his testimony at the Crim.P. 35(b) motion hearing the defendant stated his opinion that the value of the items in question was about $60 or $70. He said that if asked at the providency hearing he would have responded that the property was of a value less than $100.