Court Opinion

ID: 9914496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 15:05:05.423246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:17.050639
License: Public Domain

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                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-0210-22

IN THE MATTER OF
THE CIVIL COMMITMENT
OF C.M., SVP-109-00.
___________________________

                Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided January 2, 2024

                Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. SVP-109-00.

                Catherine F. Reid, Designated Counsel, argued the
                cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                Defender, attorney; Catherine F. Reid, on the briefs).

                Stephen J. Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued
                the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
                General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
                Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen J. Slocum, on
                the brief).

PER CURIAM
       C.M. appeals from the September 8, 2022, Law Division order continuing

GPS1 monitoring as a condition of his release from the Special Treatment Unit

(STU), the secure custodial facility designated for the treatment of persons in

need of involuntary civil commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator

Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

       C.M. was initially committed under the SVPA in 2000. His commitment

was continued after yearly reviews and affirmed in unpublished opinions. See

In re Civil Commitment of C.M., No. A-3821-05 (App. Div. May 30, 2007); In

re Civil Commitment of C.H.M., No. A-6137-02 (App. Div. June 28, 2004). In

our prior opinion, we described C.M.'s predicate offense as a 1987 "robbery and

aggravated sexual assault of an adult female,"

             during which C.M. invaded the victim's home, grabbed
             her neck, demanded money, ripped off her clothes and
             tied her up. He then forced his penis into the victim's
             mouth and attempted to penetrate her vaginally and
             anally. He then forced her into the kitchen where he
             attempted to stab her with a dull knife. The victim
             received two stab wounds before managing to escape.

             [In re Civil Commitment of C.M., slip op. at 5-6.]

C.M.'s prior history also included "the rape of a twenty-four-year-old woman."

Id. at 6.

1
    Global Positioning System (GPS).
                                                                         A-0210-22
                                       2
      Following an annual review hearing, C.M. was conditionally discharged

from the STU pursuant to a consent order entered on July 3, 2019, effective July

16, 2019. "The [SVPA] sets up a regime of annual reviews of a committed

individual to assess his or her need for continued commitment or conditional

discharge."   In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 120 (2002) (citing

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35). A person who is eligible for conditional discharge under

the statute must no longer "be likely to engage in acts of sexual violence because

the person is amenable to and highly likely to comply with a plan to facilitate

the person's adjustment and reintegration into the community" and "the court

may order that the person be conditionally discharged in accordance with such

plan." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(c)(1).

      C.M.'s discharge plan included several conditions, including being

subjected to GPS monitoring. See In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 353 N.J.

Super. 450, 456-57 (App. Div. 2002) ("To allow a person who has been

committed as a sexually violent predator to be released without conditions may,

in certain circumstances, place the safety and security of the public at risk " but

the "risk of harm to society may be reduced by the person's mandatory

compliance with conditions upon release.").

                                                                             A-0210-22
                                        3
      On September 8, 2022, the trial court conducted a discharge review

hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(c)(2), which requires a review hearing

within six months of the imposition of discharge conditions. During the hearing,

C.M. sought the removal of GPS monitoring. In support, C.M. asserted that

since his discharge from the STU, he had not reoffended, had been compliant

with required treatment, and had had no suspicious GPS trails. Following the

hearing, the judge entered an order with an accompanying oral opinion

continuing GPS monitoring along with the previously imposed conditions. This

appeal followed.

      On appeal, C.M. only challenges the continued imposition of GPS

monitoring, arguing the judge's "evaluation of the evidence was not conducted

against the standard outlined in the SVPA for continued imposition of restraints "

and the resulting order was inconsistent with the federal and state constitutions.

At oral argument, we were informed that at a subsequent discharge review

hearing conducted on July 24, 2023, an order was entered discontinuing GPS

monitoring. At our request, the parties submitted the attendant order. Because

the only issue raised on appeal is continuing GPS monitoring as a condition of

C.M.'s conditional discharge, the appeal is now moot.

                                                                            A-0210-22
                                        4
      "Courts normally will not decide issues when a controversy no longer

exists, and the disputed issues have become moot." Betancourt v. Trinitas

Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010). "A case is technically moot

when the original issue presented has been resolved, at least concerning the

parties who initiated the litigation." Ibid. (quoting DeVesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J.

420, 428 (1993) (Pollock, J., concurring)). Stated differently, "an issue is moot

when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect

on the existing controversy." Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super.

254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y.

Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. State Dep't of Treasury, 6 N.J. Tax 575, 582

(Tax 1984)).

      We will consider an issue notwithstanding its mootness if it "presents a

question that is both important to the public and likely to recur." Clymer v.

Summit Bancorp., 171 N.J. 57, 65-66 (2002); see In re Civil Commitment of

E.D., 183 N.J. 536, 540, 552 (2005) (electing "to address a challenge to the

procedures used to revoke a committee's conditional discharge and to recommit

under the [SVPA]" because the issues "may reoccur" but finding other issues

raised by the committee moot). We elect to dismiss this appeal as moot.

      Appeal Dismissed.

                                                                           A-0210-22
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