Court Opinion

ID: 9777489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:13:05.37249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:55.040244
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissenting.
On July 15,1991 in a trial before the court, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of theft of property with a value of at least $750 but less than $20,000. Appellant also plead true to two enhancement allegations. Appellant plead guilty without a negotiated plea bargain agreement. At that time, the trial court stated, “I’m going to accept the plea[,]” but passed the case until September when a drug treatment facility was expected to be open. On September 10, 1991, the trial court deferred finding appellant guilty and placed him on probation for ten years; thus appellant was placed on deferred adjudication probation.
In February of 1993, the State filed a motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt, and subsequently an amended motion. On July 2, 1993, upon a plea of not true by appellant, the trial court granted the State’s motion, entered a finding of guilt, revoked appellant’s probation, and sentenced him to life confinement in prison.1
On appeal, appellant claimed that the trial court committed error in accepting his guilty plea because such was not entered knowingly and voluntarily since the trial court failed to provide some of the admonishments required by Article 42.12, § 5, V.A.C.C.P., in particular the possible consequences of revocation of the probation, prior to his guilty plea. The court of appeals agreed. It concluded that the trial court reversibly erred in failing to comply with the mandatory provisions of Art. 42.12, § 5. Ray v. State, 877 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.App.-Eastland, 1994). The State, via the local district attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney, filed petitions seeking discretionary review. This Court granted both petitions.2
*130The majority finds that there is no statutory requirement or policy reason to compel a trial court to inform every defendant that pleads guilty of the possible consequences of a violation of deferred adjudication probation, as the information becomes relevant only after the court decides to defer adjudication. Op. at p. 126. First, I respectfully disagree. Second, I note that the majority overreaches to answer a question not raised by the granted grounds for review, nor raised by the parties to the lawsuit.
Article 42.12, § 5(a) states that the court “shall inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences ... of a violation of [deferred adjudication] probation.” Thus the statute mandates that the trial court “shall” so inform defendants of such possible consequences. In Price v. State, 866 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), a major part of this Court’s reasoning in holding that such an admonishment need not be given prior to ordering probation was that in a misdemeanor case the defendant need not even be present at any stage of a misdemeanor plea proceeding. Such reasoning is inappropriate in the instant case because the defendant is required to be present in a felony plea proceeding; i.e. Article 27.13, V.A.C.C.P., provides that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere “in a felony ease must be made in open court by the defendant in person[.]” Thus there must be a defendant present to make the felony plea and thus to hear and understand the required admonishments which “shall” be given as to the consequences of violation of the probation.
Also in Price, 866 S.W.2d at 611, this Court acknowledged that “it may be ‘better practice’ to admonish as to the consequences of deferred adjudication in a felony case[.]” It also acknowledged that “§ 5(a) requires the court to ‘inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences ... of a violation of probation[.]’ ” Id. at 612. The district attorney’s first ground for review presents the simple question of whether the trial court gave appellant the required admonishment of Art. 12.12, § 5(a). The court of appeals found that the trial court did not, i.e. “the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement” and “failed to inform appellant of the consequences of violating probation in accordance with Article 42.12, section 5.” Ray v. State, 877 S.W.2d at 427. The majority opinion refuses to say that the court of appeals was wrong and does not answer the question raised by that ground for review, but instead searches elsewhere to reverse the court of appeals.
The majority opinion at p. 127, concludes that § 5(a) does not require, either in felonies or misdemeanors, that the defendant entering an open plea of guilty or nolo con-tendere be informed prior to his plea of the possible consequences under § 5(b) of a probation violation; therefore, the failure to provide the information does not render such a plea involuntary. The statute at the time of appellant’s plea read as follows:
Sec. 5. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (d) of this section, when in its opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served, the court may, after receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and place the defendant on probation. The court shall inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of probation. If the information is provided orally, the court must record and maintain the court’s statement to the defendant. In a felony case, the period of probation may not exceed 10 years. In a misdemeanor ease, the period of probation may not exceed two years. The court may impose a fine applicable to the offense and require any reasonable terms and conditions of probation. However, upon written motion of the defendant requesting final adjudication filed within 30 days after entering such plea and the deferment of adjudication, the court shall proceed to final adjudication as in all other cases.
(b) On violation of a condition of probation imposed under Subsection (a) of this *131section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 24 of this Article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination. After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.
[Emphasis added.]
The majority strains to justify its conclusion by further concluding that the statute requires that the mandatory admonishments be provided at some time. The court of appeals found that there was a complete failure to inform appellant of the consequences of the violation of deferred adjudication probation. Ray v. State, 877 S.W.2d at 427. The majority does not dispute, contradict, or explain away this finding by the court of appeals; nor does the majority make reference to anywhere in the record that the trial court admonished appellant as to § 5(a) or (b) prior to, during, or after the plea of guilty.3 The issue of whether the trial court ever provided the mandatory admonishments should certainly be addressed before disposing of the grounds for review.
Additionally, I point out that admonishments are given to ensure that the plea is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. Article 26.13(b), V.A.C.C.P., specifically provides that “[n]o plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court unless it appears that ... the plea is free and voluntary.” Constitutionally required due process also requires a defendant’s guilty plea to be equally voluntary and knowing; and a guilty plea cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 425 (1969). If the admonishment is not given to the mandatorily present felony defendant until after he has made his plea, then the plea obviously was not necessarily made “knowingly,” i.e. with knowledge of the statutorily required admonishment about the consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation.
Because the majority holds that the statutorily required admonishment need not be given prior to a felony plea, and fails to address the court of appeals’ finding that the trial court wholly failed to provide appellant with the above-discussed statutorily required admonishments, I respectfully dissent.

. At the hearing on the motion to adjudicate, the trial court simultaneously conducted a bench trial on a new possession of heroin charge. It found appellant guilty and set punishment at 30 years confinement in prison and a fine of $1,000.

. The grounds for review are as follows:
The District Attorney's

Ground For Review No. 1

The court of appeals erred in holding that no admonishment pursuant to Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Article 42.12, § 5(a) was given to defendant by the trial judge in this case.

Ground For Review No. 2

The court of appeals erred in determining that appellant's plea was rendered involuntary based upon the court of appeals’ holding that the trial court failed to completely inform him in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a).

Ground For Review No. 3

The court of appeals erred in failing to apply a harm analysis to any perceived deficiency in the trial court’s information provided to appellant pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 42.12, § 5(a).
The State Prosecuting Attorney’s
(1) Does the failure by the trial court in a felony case to notify the defendant of the possible consequences of a revocation of probation prior to placing the defendant on deferred adjudication automatically render the defendant's plea involuntary?
(2) Is the trial court’s failure to notify the defendant of the possible consequences of a revocation of deferred adjudication probation, *130pursuant to Art. 42.12, § 5(a), V.A.C.C.P., subject to a harmless error test?

. The majority in a footnote, op. p. 126, recites a passage from the order placing appellant on probation. Such language is not in compliance with the requirements of Art. 42.12, § 5(a) and (b). The trial court cannot escape its judicial duty by asking a defendant if he has questions. The trial court is required to admonish a defendant according to law.