Court Opinion

ID: 9953838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:11:40.87346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.672326
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re G.E., 2024-Ohio-1074.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        CLARK COUNTY

 IN THE MATTER OF: G.E.                             :
                                                    :
                                                    :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-48
                                                    :
                                                    :   Trial Court Case No. 20230179
                                                    :
                                                    :   (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
                                                    :   Juvenile Division)
                                                    :
                                                    :

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                        Rendered on March 22, 2024

                                               ...........

LAWRENCE J. KRAMER, Attorney for Appellant

ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee

                                             .............

HUFFMAN, J.

        {¶ 1} G.E. appeals from his delinquency adjudication in the Clark County Juvenile

Court on charges of rape, attempted rape, and gross sexual imposition (“GSI”). The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the credibility of the witnesses, and the

findings of delinquency on charges of rape and attempted rape were not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. The State concedes that G.E.’s adjudication for GSI
                                                                                        -2-

was improper because there was no evidence that G.E. engaged in sexual contact with

the victim, E.S., for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person. The

findings of delinquency are affirmed as to the rape and attempted rape, and the finding of

delinquency is vacated as to the GSI. The matter is remanded to the trial court for a new

disposition.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶ 2} The events giving rise to this matter occurred on January 19, 2023, and

involved 13-year-old boys travelling home on a school bus from a junior high basketball

game. G.E. was subsequently charged with delinquency in the Clark County Juvenile

Court for the offenses of rape, attempted rape, and GSI. After a trial, the court found

G.E. delinquent on all three charges. It committed G.E. to the Ohio Department of Youth

Services for a minimum term of one year to a maximum term until his 21st birthday, but it

suspended the sentence.      The court placed G.E. on indefinite juvenile sex offender

probation and ordered him to complete intensive out-patient treatment with a certified

juvenile sex offender therapist. G.E. appeals.

                     ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ANALYSIS

       {¶ 3} G.E. asserts two assignments of error which we will consider together:

               THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

       APPLIED DIFFERENT STANDARDS TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE

       ACCUSER AND THE ACCUSED.

               APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR VIOLATING R.C. 2923.02(A),

       R.C. 2907.02(A), AND R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
                                                                                          -3-

       WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

       {¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, G.E. argues that it was unreasonable for the

trial court to overlook the contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of E.S., yet

dismiss G.E.’s testimony as rehearsed. In his second assignment of error, he argues

that most of the State’s witnesses supported his version of events, while E.S.’s testimony

was inconsistent and contradictory.

       {¶ 5} At trial, the State presented the testimony of E.S. and three other boys, all of

whom were on the bus when the offenses occurred, and the testimony of a detective who

investigated the incident. G.E. presented the testimony of his coach, who was also on

the bus, the bus driver, and he testified himself.

       {¶ 6} E.S. testified that on January 19, 2023, five or ten minutes into a bus ride

home after a basketball game, he was sitting in the second to last row of seats with his

feet on the seat beside him and his back to the window. While three other boys, including

G.E., were moving around the back of the bus in the aisle, G.E. leaned into E.S.’s seat

and placed his finger into E.S.’s rectum through his shorts and underwear. According to

E.S., this happened three times, although G.E. attempted to do it about eight times. The

second time it happened, G.E. got into E.S.’s seat and, while on top of him, forced his

finger inside E.S.’s rectum. The third time, G.E. pushed another boy, M.S., on top of

E.S., and G.E. pushed his finger inside E.S.’s rectum through his shorts while G.E. held

M.S. down on top of E.S. E.S. testified that another boy, A.P., took a photograph, and

M.S. got up, told him not to send the photo, and tried to take A.P.’s phone. During each

occurrence, E.S. told G.E. repeatedly to stop in a regular tone of voice. E.S. did not
                                                                                       -4-

immediately report the incident because he felt pressured not to say anything, but after

two weeks, and after G.E. was rude to E.S.’s brother, E.S. told his parents what had

happened.

      {¶ 7} On cross-examination, E.S. stated that there had been sufficient light for him

to clearly see G.E. He acknowledged that he did not see him the third time while M.S.

was on top of him until M.S. got up, but he heard G.E. laughing about the offense at the

time. Exhibit A, a video from the school bus, was played for the court. E.S. stated that

he had known G.E. since third grade and was “very clear” that G.E. touched him in the

manner described.

      {¶ 8} A.P. testified that he had observed G.E. “fingering” E.S. and “trying to shove

it up [E.S.’s] butt” one time. A.P. was on his phone at the time, but he denied taking any

photographs.    On cross-examination, A.P. testified that, although G.E. was moving

between seats, G.E. was in E.S.’s seat when the incident he observed occurred.

      {¶ 9} M.S. testified that he, G.E., and A.P. liked to switch seats while riding the

bus, and that E.S. had been “sitting with his back against the window with his legs spread

watching his phone.” According to M.S., G.E. “thought it was a joke to do it. So he went

into the seat” and “stuck his fingers up [E.S.’s] butt.” M.S. observed it happen one time

for about 10 seconds. On cross-examination, M.S. testified that it was “pretty dark” on

the bus. E.S. told M.S. about what had happened to him on the bus at school, and M.S.

acknowledged that what he had told the principal and the school resource officer had

been partially based upon what E.S. had told him. M.S. stated that G.E. had pushed him

into the “crevice” portion of E.S.’s seat. M.S. did not remember any photos being taken.
                                                                                          -5-

M.S. stated that the incident happened halfway through the bus ride.

       {¶ 10} A.V. testified that he had been on the bus on the date of the incident and

that G.E. had “tried to put his finger in [E.S.’s] behind.” A.V. heard E.S. tell G.E. to stop

a few times, and G.E. only stopped after being told to do so. A.V. did not recall anyone

taking photographs.

       {¶ 11} Detective Brian Melchi of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office was assigned to

investigate the allegations.   When Melchi advised G.E. about the allegations, G.E.

indicated “that there might be some kids trying to get him in trouble at school.” G.E.’s

mother showed Melchi messages from students “calling him out” for the incident. G.E.

denied having any physical contact with E.S. Melchi obtained surveillance video of the

bus trip and observed students moving around on the bus, but he was unable to identify

specific students. Melchi’s interview of G.E. was played for the court. Melchi indicated

that, as a matter of course, it is always best to obtain witness statements close in time to

an incident.

       {¶ 12} At the conclusion of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for an

acquittal. The court overruled the motion.

       {¶ 13} John Schmid, the eighth-grade basketball coach for the boys’ school, then

testified on behalf of G.E. Schmid was on the bus on January 19, 2023, in the front seat.

Schmid did not remember any commotion at the back of the bus and had not heard

anyone yelling “stop.” He learned of the incident after being contacted by E.S.’s father

and informed by the middle school principal.

       {¶ 14} School bus driver Kim Bereczky drove the bus on January 19, 2023; she
                                                                                            -6-

testified that there was nothing “special that stuck out” to her about the trip. According

to Bereczky, if someone had been yelling, she would have heard it and would have

immediately turned the lights on. She did not notice any students who seemed to be

upset getting off the bus after the trip.

       {¶ 15} G.E. testified that he, M.S., and A.P. had “all just hopp[ed] around on the

bus switching from seat-to-seat playing around and wrestling” like they did on every bus

ride; later, he was called into the principal’s office and “got accused of doing that stuff” to

E.S., which he denied doing. G.E. testified that he had been in the seat with E.S. for five

or ten seconds while jumping around; at the time, M.S. was in the “crevice,” E.S. “had his

legs up against the wall," and G.E. had his back to E.S. with his feet in the aisle. G.E.

was mostly able to identify himself and the other boys moving around in the back of the

bus, although it was “pretty dark.” G.E. testified that he had had no physical contact with

E.S., and he stated that his testimony was consistent with what he had told the principal

at school. G.E. stated that he never heard E.S. say “stop” and did not remember any

photographs being taken.

       {¶ 16} In rendering judgment, the juvenile court observed that G.E. had admitted

being in the same seat as E.S. while M.S. was in the “crevice.” The court further noted

that A.P. had observed G.E. put his finger in E.S.’s rectum, M.S. had observed G.E. put

his finger in E.S.’s rectal area, and A.V. had observed G.E. try to put his finger in E.S.’s

rectum and had heard E.S. tell G.E. to stop. The court found it significant that, on the

video of the bus ride, someone from the back of the bus could be heard saying “stop.”

The court found that neither Schmid nor Bereczky had paid attention to or addressed the
                                                                                           -7-

unruly behavior of the boys, which the video clearly depicted in the back of the bus.

       {¶ 17} The court specifically found that the testimonies of the witnesses and the

victim were “contradictory at times,” but that those contradictions were to be expected

given the age of the witnesses and the length of time from the incident to trial. The court

found, however, that “all the witnesses were consistent with their testimony that [G.E.]

touched the rectal area of the victim”; A.V. also testified that G.E. “tried to put his finger

in the victim’s rectum.”

       {¶ 18} The court found that G.E.’s testimony “appeared rehearsed” because he

was able to identify his actions and the other boys’ actions throughout much of the video,

despite the fact that it was unclear “which boy was attached to which boy image.” (It was

apparent that the dark images in the back of the bus were the boys jumping around and

hitting each other.) According to the court, because G.E. testified that the unruly behavior

reflected in the video was typical for the boys, it was “somewhat surprising” that he was

able to recall “the specific details of the movement of the boys for this particular ride.”

The court found G.E.’s testimony less credible than that of the other witnesses and E.S.

       {¶ 19} As to the testimonies of the other boys, the court noted that each was

consistent throughout, maintaining that they saw G.E. touching the victim’s rectal area.

The court found no reason why these witnesses would provide false testimony. Finally,

due to the darkness on the bus, the court concluded that none of the witnesses had been

in a position to witness whether G.E.’s finger actually penetrated the rectal area of the

victim; E.S. would have been the only person able to provide that level of detail, and E.S.

testified that G.E. did so on three occasions and attempted to do so several other times.
                                                                                            -8-

The court concluded that, although G.E. denied ever touching E.S., the “credible

evidence” suggested otherwise.

      {¶ 20} “A weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the

evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more

believable or persuasive.” In re D.B., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20979, 2005-Ohio-5583,

¶ 14, citing State v. Hufnagle, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15563, 1996 WL 501470 (Sept.

6, 1996). In a manifest weight challenge, the appellate court “weighs the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses, and determines

whether the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice as to warrant reversal. In re D.P., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2023-CA-33, 2024-Ohio-

480, ¶ 40, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d

517, ¶ 20. A judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest

weight of the evidence only in exceptional circumstances.          State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

      {¶ 21} It is well-settled that the “primary question of witness credibility lays with the

finder of facts.” In re A.E., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006-CA-153, 2008-Ohio-1864, ¶ 15,

citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 2008-Ohio-1864, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph

one of the syllabus.    “The factfinder may accept or reject all, part, or none of the

testimony of each witness.” Id., citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d

548 (1964). “ ‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly

competent to decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular

witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’ ”
                                                                                            -9-

Id., quoting In re J.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22063, 2007-Ohio-4551, ¶ 50, quoting

State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997). An

appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue

of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in

arriving at its verdict. In re C.M., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21363, 2006-Ohio-3741, ¶ 41.

       {¶ 22} As noted above, G.E. was adjudicated delinquent on charges of rape,

attempted rape, and GSI. R.C. 2923.02 proscribes rape as follows: “No person shall

engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other

person to submit by force or threat of force.” R.C. 2923.02 governs attempt and states:

“No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient

culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful,

would constitute or result in the offense.” R.C. 2907.05(A) proscribes GSI: “No person

shall have sexual contact with another * * * when * * * (1) The offender purposely compels

the other person * * * to submit by force or threat of force.”

       {¶ 23} Sexual conduct includes “the insertion, however slight, of any part of the

body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the * * * anal opening of another.”

R.C. 2907.01(A). Sexual contact is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone of

another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, [or] pubic region * * * for

the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).

       {¶ 24} Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that, as to the offenses of

rape and attempted rape, this is not an exceptional case in which the evidence weighed

heavily against G.E.’s convictions. On the video from the bus trip, boys can be seen
                                                                                         -10-

moving from seat to seat in the manner described by G.E. and E.S., but it was dark in the

back of the bus and, as Detective Melchi indicated, the individual identities of the boys

were not discernible. Moreover, the bus driver and the coach both appear to have been

paying no attention whatsoever to the activity behind them in the rear of the bus.

Although there were inconsistencies in the testimony about the point in time on the bus

trip when the offenses occurred, the level of darkness on the bus, and whether

photographs were taken, E.S. testified without hesitation that G.E. had placed his finger

in his rectum three times through his clothing and attempted to do so multiple other times.

The juvenile court credited E.S.’s testimony.      The juvenile court found G.E. to be

“rehearsed” and “less credible” than E.S. and the other witnesses, based upon G.E.’s

recitation of his actions and location on the bus during a situation that had been fluid and

had occurred months earlier. We defer to the court’s assessment of credibility. Each of

the other boys provided consistent testimony as to G.E.’s sexual conduct in touching E.S.

On these bases, G.E.’s adjudications for rape and attempted rape were not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶ 25} G.E. also argues that the trial court’s finding of delinquency because he had

committed GSI was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the State

acknowledges that “there was no evidence of sexual gratification.” State’s Brief at 7.

Failure to establish an element of an offense goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, not

its weight. “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to

the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
                                                                                      -11-

No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997). Because the State concedes that there was no testimony from any

witness that G.E. had engaged in sexual contact with E.S. for the purpose of sexually

arousing or gratifying either person, the finding of delinquency for GSI was supported by

insufficient evidence and must be vacated.

      {¶ 26} Based upon the foregoing, G.E.’s first assignment of error is overruled. His

second assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part. The trial court’s

adjudication is affirmed as to the findings of delinquency for committing rape and

attempted rape and is vacated as to the finding of delinquency for committing GSI. This

matter will be remanded for a new disposition in light of our having vacated the GSI, at

which time the trial court will consider whether any change in the disposition is

appropriate.

                                    .............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.