Court Opinion

ID: 9587332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:08.585345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:30.016784
License: Public Domain

*141On Motion for Rehearing.
Nichols, Presiding Judge.
No reference is made in the defendant’s motion for rehearing to any ruling in the majority opinion other than to the first two divisions which deal with the question of the plaintiffs’ right to recover under the allegations of their petition because that portion of the road on which their property abutted was converted into a cul-de-sac.
The defendant seeks to draw a distinction between rural property and urban property when, while the value per front foot may vary, there is no distinction in the rights in the owners of such property. The provisions of the Constitution that the protection of person and property shall be impartial and complete (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II; Code Ann. § 2-102), and that private property shall not be taken or damaged without just compensation being first paid (Art. I, Sec. Ill, Par. I; Code Ann. § 2-301), do not allow one rule for urban property owners and another for the owners of rural property.
If the plaintiff’s property has been damaged and depreciated in value, as alleged in the petition (and the measure of damages sought in the petition is the diminution in the market value because of the creation of the cul-de-sac), he is entitled to recover damages under the law as exemplified by the decision in the case *142of Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga. App. 615, supra, which authorizes a recovery for property owners between the dead-end and the first intersecting street.
The Supreme Court in the case of Ward v. Georgia Terminal Co., 143 Ga. 80, 82 (84 SE 374), recognized that the owners of land abutting a public street are entitled to damages where the portion of the street where the land abuts is converted into a cul-de-sac. Thus, in that case it was recognized that the damage suffered by such property owners is different, not in degree but in kind, from that suffered by property owners beyond the first intersecting street. While the defendant places much emphasis on a contention that the “first block” rule is an arbitrary rule used to determine when the “cul-de-sac” rule applies and when the “police power” principle applies, such is not the case, for after the “first block” or first intersecting street the property abutting such street does not abut upon a cul-de-sac. Therefore, while there has been a reference to the “first block” or first intersection, such reference refers, not as to which property owners abutting a cul-de-sac may recover but which owners of property have land abutting a cul-de-sac.
The defendant, in its motion for rehearing, refers to the inconvenience of having to travel a circuitous route as one of the alleged items of damage. Such is not the case, for the item of damage is the damage to the property and the measure in most cases would be the difference in market value before and after the cul-de-sac was created, and while the inconvenience in traveling to and from the property would definitely affect its market value such inconvenience is not the item upon which the damages are based or sought.
The defendant also relies upon another principle to support its position that in the construction of the interstate highway system more and more culs-de-sac will be created, and the burden upon the State, if recovery is permitted in such cases, would be too great. In answer to such contention it need only be said that the rights of parties are not to be determined by the possibility that other suits may be filed against the State, but by a determination of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the case as laid in his petition.
*143The case of Warren, v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 473 (93 NW2d 60), relied upon by the defendant is of course not binding on this court, and while that State may allow a double standard for the rights of its citizens (one for the owners of urban property and another for the owners of rural property), it is no excuse for this State to do the same. Nor is the excuse that rural property owners are not hurt as much as urban property owners sufficient. Assuming, that two tracts of rural property are identical except for their location, one 1 mile from town and the other 20- miles from such town, can it be disputed that the tract nearer town is far more valuable? Yet, if by placing the tract nearer town on a cul-de-sac which requires the owner to travel- 10 miles away from town to get to a road that leads to town is not such property then less valuable? On the other hand it is easily conceivable that urban property may be more valuable when the street upon which it abuts is turned into a cul-de-sac: e. g., residential property on a thoroughfare could be less desirable than an identical house two blocks away on a cul-de-sac. On the other hand business property (see the Felton case, 47 Ga. App. 615, supra), would be depreciated considerably if all motor traffic desiring to go to such business property were required to turn around in order to leave it. Each case must stand upon its own facts, and under the allegations of the petition and the established law in Georgia the petition was not -subject to the general demurrers attacking the allegations with reference to the cul-de-sac.

Rehearing denied.

Felton, C. J., Carlisle, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur. Eberhardt, J., concurs specially. Bell, Jordan, Hall and Russell, JJ., dissent.