Court Opinion

ID: 9742377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:12:16.272185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.004755
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, specially concurring: This court is clearly limited in its consideration of the issue presented in this case by the mandate of the supreme court in Renslow for prospective application of liability for preconception torts (Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250) and by the limitations period imposed by the statute of repose (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 — 213). I write separately only to voice my concerns over what I believe to be the unnecessarily premature cutoff of claims by DES grandchildren. The 1977 Renslow decision, upon which the majority opinion necessarily rests, established a duty to a woman, as a potential mother, even though no child had yet been conceived and thereby recognized a cause of action for her future-bom child based on preconception injuries. Thus, Renslow established that a legal duty is owed to a person not yet in existence when the cause of the harm is inflicted. The supreme court reasoned that “|l]ogic and sound policy require finding of legal duly in this case.” Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 359. In creating this extension of duty to a new class of plaintiffs, the supreme court considered the defendants’ assertion that a duty for preconception torts should not be imposed because of “the need for an end to responsibility, short of perpetual liability for a single wrongful act.” (Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 358.) As an example of such perpetual liability, the Renslow defendants mentioned “the specter of successive generations of plaintiffs complaining against a single defendant for harm caused by genetic damage done an ancestor in a nuclear accident.” (Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 358.) The supreme court found this argument unpersuasive: “While we aware that there may be similar potential for perpetual claims arising from chemical accident or long-term radiation exposure [citation], the case at bar is clearly distinguishable. The damage alleged is not, by its nature, self-perpetuating, nor is the plaintiff a remote descendant. We feel confident that when such a case is presented, the judiciary will effectively exercise its traditional role of drawing rational distinctions, consonant with current perceptions of justice, between which are compensable and those which are not.” (Emphasis added.) Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 358. While a court cannot conclusively state either with medical certainty or as a matter of law that the DES generations will necessarily cease at the third-generational stage, the likelihood of such an end is probably assured. Accordingly, the fear of perpetual liability being imposed by far-removed descendants seems meritless under these circumstances and needlessly unjust to the DES grandchildren. The supreme court in 1977 felt confident that the judiciary would draw rational distinctions comporting with justice when faced with future situations involving a wrong committed prior to a child’s existence. At that time, the disastrous effects of DES were only coming to light concerning the DES children. Only with the further passage of time could the injuries and deaths of DES grandchildren be reasonably known or considered. As an appellate court judge, I am constrained in this matter to apply prospectively the extended duty created in Renslow in 1977. The Hlinois Supreme Court, however, is not so confined and may now exercise its traditional role in recognizing the need to adjust duties to fit new and unique situations. Perhaps the grave, but time-limited, distress caused to DES grandchildren is not so far removed from the principles richly expressed in Renslow.