Court Opinion

ID: 9529741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:47.165011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:54.341738
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority takes the position that Smith is precluded from accessing the Patient's Compensation Fund because a qualified health care provider was not a signatory to the settlement agreement. Because I do not find Indiana Code section 27-12-15-3 (Burns 1994) that limiting, I dissent.
The statutory prerequisites for admission to the Patient's Compensation Fund are found in 1.C.'27-12-15-3. Hakin v. Reed, 567 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trams. denied. The first sentence of I.C. 27-12-15-3 provides:
If a health care provider or its insurer has agreed to settle its lability on a claim by payment of its policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), and the claimant is demanding an amount in excess of that amount, the following procedure must be followed:
"t * * *t * i
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act is in derogation of common law. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Ray, 551 N.E.2d 463 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. granted and opinion adopted, 558 N.E.2d 829 (Ind.1990). As such, it must be strictly construed against limitations on a claimant's right to bring suit. Tittle v. Mahan, 582 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ind. 1991). When interpreting the words of a single section of a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent to carry out the spirit and *1165purpose of the act. Detterline v. Bonaventura, 465 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), reh'g denied, trams. denied. We must ascertain and implement the legislature's intent by giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. Whitacre v. State, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), opinion adopted, 629 N.E.2d 12836 (Ind.1994). Where the legislature has not defined a word, we must attribute common and ordinary meaning to the word. Tucker v. State, 646 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
The "agreed to settle its liability" language of L.C. 27-12-15-38 is not defined in the Medical Malpractice Act. By its common and ordinary meaning, it does not require a written settlement agreement between a qualified bealth care provider and a victim of malpractice in order to access the fund. To the contrary, it merely requires proof of an agreement to settle liability. The means by which a party provides that proof is left open.
Thus, the question is whether Smith proved that a qualified health care provider "agreed to settle its liability." A look at the cireumstances surrounding the offer of settlement and the execution of the settlement agreement demonstrates that Panener, Thompson and PPS agreed to settle their liability with Smith Because Panener and Thompson were both qualified health care providers, doing business as PPS, Smith has met the statutory qualifications for access to the fund.
The offer of settlement was made eight days prior to trial. A medical review panel had issued a unanimous opinion that Pane-ner, Thompson and PPS failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care and that their conduct was a factor in Smith's damages. Panener, Thompson and PPS were all represented by the same attorney, John M. Clifton, Jr. All three were insured by the Medical Protective Company. The settlement offer was made by attorney Clifton. The offer stated that it was made by Summit on the condition that Summit be added as a defendant to the litigation and Panener, Thompson and PPS be dismissed from the litigation, with prejudice.
The Stipulation of Additional Party Defendant provides that Panener, Thompson and PPS stipulate and agree to Summit's addition as a defendant. The Stipulation of Dismissal of Certain Defendants, filed the same day as the Stipulation of Additional Party Defendant, is worded the same way. The dismissal and the agreement to pay were simultaneous, because without compliance with all the conditions, there would not have been a settlement.
It was Panener and Thompson, and their d/b/a PPS, who rendered health care to Smith. They were the only entities with any liability in this case. Their insurance company, Medical Protective, paid the settlement. Even though Medical Protective also insured Summit, Medical Protective was under no obligation to pay on Summit's behalf because the statute of limitation time had expired.
Panener and Thompson were both qualified health care providers and PPS was merely a name under which they did business. While the offer stated it was made on behalf of Summit, the conditions contained in that offer, combined with the manner in which they were accomplished are sufficient to establish that regardless of the signatories to the settlement agreement, it was Panener, 'Thompson and PPS who agreed to settle their liability to Smith The payment to Smith was made on their behalf.
Such a result does not defeat the spirit and purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act. As noted in Eakin, 567 N.E.2d at 150:
The statutory scheme attempts to balance the escalating costs of malpractice insurance with the realization that some incidents of malpractice produce devastating results, including astronomical medical bills. To effectuate this scheme, the legislature apportioned some of the financial responsibility to the health care providers and some of the financial responsibility to the fund. The health care providers must satisfy their obligation before access to the fund is allowed.
Panener and Thompson were qualified health care providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, meaning they had provided proof of financial responsibility and paid a surcharge to the fund. The settlement was the equiva*1166lent of $100,000, the maximum liability for qualified health care providers for a single injury.6 Because Pancener and Thompson were qualified health care providers and satisfied their obligation to the fund, the purpose of the Act is served.

. The majority also contends that the $100,000 payment was insufficient to access the Patient's Compensation Fund because the payment was made on behalf of more than one qualified health care provider. However, the majority cites no authority for its contention and I find no such limitation in the statute.