Court Opinion

ID: 9725293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:39:09.700799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.418818
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring). I concur in affirmance.
Not assuming to decide the point of course, and simply to introduce what follows, it seems to me that the plaintiffs have made out a case against the insurance agency with which they dealt, rather than a case against the defendant insurer. See annotation, 29 ALR2d 171, “Duty and liability of insurance broker <or agent to insured with respect to procurement, 'continuance, terms, and coverage of insurance policies.” Without explanation here, however, plaintiffs joined prior to trial in a stipulation providing:
“It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the attorneys for the above named parties that the .above entitled cause may be dismissed without prejudice and without costs, as to defendant Holly Insurance Agency, Inc. only.”
I allude to the above so that, if unbeknown to us plaintiffs are yet possessed of a right to proceed *613against the Insurance agency, nothing written here may be construed as creating “prejudice” where — by the stipulation — there is now no prejudice. Further, and in the same tenor, I cannot support the comment of the Chief Justice, dealing as it does with the agency as well as the insurer, that:
“Apparently neither defendant nor the Holly Insurance Agency desired to execute another agreement for insurance on plaintiffs’ property.”
There is nothing of record justifying such a conclusion. It is unproved, either way. If not challenged, it might adversely affect what was legally reserved by the “no prejudice” stipulation above. So and again, as in Mack v. Precast Industries, Inc., 369 Mich 439, 454, I respectfully suggest that “the adjective ‘apparently’ does not — by itself — supply facts.”
J. Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurred with Black,