Court Opinion

ID: 9916984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 01:00:31.455232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:16.627636
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30734          Document: 00517029245             Page: 1       Date Filed: 01/10/2024

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                       ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                   January 10, 2024
                                        No. 22-30734                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                       Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                              versus

   Travis R. James,

                                                Defendant—Appellant.
                       ______________________________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                 USDC No. 3:18-CR-21-1
                       ______________________________

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
             Travis R. James appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
   plea, arguing that it was not made knowingly and voluntarily because he
   received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court, applying the
   factors set forth in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1984),
   concluded that the balance of factors weighed against withdrawal. Finding
   that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.

             _____________________
   *
       This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 22-30734

                                    I. Background
           Following an investigation of drug-trafficking activity in and around
   Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the United States charged James in 23 counts of a
   28-count indictment returned March 1, 2018, alleging that he and 15 other
   defendants committed various drug-trafficking and firearm offenses. Over
   the next two years, the indictment was superseded four times.1
           James hired two attorneys, J. David Bourland and Ronald Haley, Jr.,
   to represent him. Bourland appeared on behalf of James at the initial
   appearance on the original indictment and continued to serve as his lead
   counsel for over three years. Bourland had previously represented James and
   other members of the drug-trafficking enterprise in state criminal matters.
   Haley enrolled as additional counsel in May 2018.
                                 A. Plea Agreement
           After receiving discovery, Bourland concluded that James could not
   succeed at trial and would be facing 30 years to life if convicted. With James’s
   permission, Bourland initiated plea negotiations with the prosecutors. His
   negotiations were largely successful. In exchange for James agreeing to plead
   guilty to the conspiracy count, the felon-in-possession count, and the charge
   of money-laundering conspiracy in the bill of information,2 Bourland
   convinced the United States to delete the prior-conviction enhancement to
   the § 846 conspiracy charge so that the mandatory minimum would be 10,
   rather than 20 years. The United States also agreed to dismiss the § 924(c)

           _____________________
   1
    Relevant to this appeal, at the arraignment for each superseding indictment, the district
   court informed him of the charges pending against him and the maximum possible penalties
   associated with those charges.
   2
    See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1 of the Fourth Superseding Indictment); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
   (Count 4), 1956(h); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(B)(i), 1956(h) and 2
   (Conspiracy to Launder Money from Bill of Information).

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   firearm count, which otherwise would have required a five-year consecutive
   sentence. With an estimated criminal history category of II or III, the United
   States estimated that James’s guidelines range for the drug offenses would be
   235 to 293 months or 262 to 327 months.
           Bourland also discussed the possibility of “informal cooperation” by
   James, who was unwilling to enter a formal cooperation agreement. The
   United States stated that it could advise the court of any “quiet proffer and
   assistance” provided by James without a cooperation agreement, indicating
   that it could acknowledge at sentencing that James “should get credit for
   each defendant that comes in after he pleads.” Bourland thought that, even
   without a substantial assistance motion, “maybe the court would be kind
   enough to take that into consideration at sentencing.”
           In a letter, Bourland informed James of the terms of the proposed plea
   agreement.3 The letter explained that neither the felon-in-possession charge
   nor the money-laundering charge would affect the guidelines calculation. A
   few weeks later, Haley met with James at the jail to discuss the plea
   agreement. James read the written plea agreement, and he and Haley signed
   it. The agreement advised James that the “maximum possible penalty [for
   the conspiracy count] is a term of life imprisonment, a fine of up to
   $10,000,000 and a lifetime of supervised release.” It advised that “[t]here
   is a mandatory minimum penalty on [the conspiracy count] of 10 years
   imprisonment and at least 5 years of supervised release.” It also advised on
   the role of the Sentencing Guidelines:
           The Court will determine in its sole discretion what the
           defendant’s sentence will be. While the Court must consider
           _____________________
   3
    The plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal, but because claims of ineffectiveness of
   counsel are excepted from the waiver, the waiver does not apply here. United States v.
   Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2020).

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          the United States Sentencing Guidelines in imposing sentence,
          the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding on the Court. The
          Court could impose any sentence from the minimum possible
          penalty up to the maximum possible penalty as set out above
          despite any lesser or greater sentencing range provided for by
          the Sentencing Guidelines.
   As part of the agreement, James acknowledged that no promises regarding
   sentencing had been made and that he understood that representations by his
   counsel about his anticipated sentence were only estimates and were not
   binding on the court.
          In advising James to accept the plea, his counsel represented to him
   that by pleading guilty he was avoiding a trial that would likely result in a
   conviction of 30 years to life. James’s counsel suggested that by pleading
   guilty he would receive a guidelines range between 15 and 20 years, and he
   would receive credit for codefendants who pleaded guilty after him. At no
   time did either counsel advise James that he could receive a life sentence by
   pleading guilty, however, he was repeatedly advised by the district court.
                              B. Plea Colloquy
          In October 2020, James pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea
   agreement. At the re-arraignment proceeding, the district court advised
   James about the sentencing process and the maximum and minimum
   penalties he faced, including a maximum of life imprisonment for the drug
   conspiracy charge, and James indicated his understanding. The district court
   specifically advised him that representations by his counsel regarding a
   possible sentence were estimates, not guarantees:
          The Court: I’m going to explain sentencing to you, Mr.
                     James. Mr. James, you’ve had two very able
                     attorneys. You need to understand that the
                     sentence—if they have predicted a sentence to

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                         you, it’s just exactly that: it’s a prediction. Do
                         you understand?
          James:         Yes, ma’am.
          The Court: All right. The Court does not know what the
                     sentence will be or will likely be until after the
                     Court receives the presentence investigation
                     report. That report has not been prepared yet.
                     Your lawyers don’t have that report. If the Court
                     doesn’t know what the sentence is going to be,
                     your lawyers don’t know what your sentence is
                     going to be. Do you understand that?
          James:         Yes, ma’am.
   The district court also explained the role of the Sentencing Guidelines and
   that “the Court can go up or down from the guidelines, depending on a
   number of factors.” After its colloquy with James, the district court accepted
   his guilty plea.
                           C. Presentence Report
          The Presentence Report (“PSR”) included a total offense level of 43
   and a total criminal history score of 15, establishing a criminal history
   category of VI. Based on these calculations, the guidelines range was life
   imprisonment. Bourland objected to the drug quantity, enhancement for use
   of threats, and the enhancement for sophisticated money laundering. The
   probation office issued a revised report that removed enhancements for use
   of threats and engaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood but retained the
   enhancement for sophisticated money laundering. However, there was no
   change in James’s total offense level or criminal history score in the revised
   PSR.
                       D. Motions to Withdraw Plea
          James moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea because his PSR did
   not reflect any “reduction or recommendation” despite the informal

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   agreement that he would receive credit for his codefendants pleading guilty.
   He accused the United States of breaching the terms of the plea agreement
   and sought to “force the government to honor the terms of its agreement or
   allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.” Significantly, at this time,
   James made no claim that the guidelines calculation in the PSR differed from
   the advice given by his attorneys. The motion was received by the clerk’s
   office on March 3, 2021, but it was not filed by the clerk because James was
   represented by counsel.
          Several weeks later, Bourland filed the pro se motion into the record,
   noting that he did not concur with the motion and filed it only as a courtesy
   to James. Then, Bourland withdrew as James’s counsel. The district court
   denied James’s motion to withdraw his plea without prejudice, accepting the
   United States’ argument in opposition that it had not breached any
   agreement because the PSR “was to be shared with the Court at sentencing,”
   which had yet to occur.
          In December 2021, Haley was suspended from practicing law in an
   unrelated case.      Shortly thereafter, James was assigned new counsel.
   Through new counsel, James filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty
   plea on August 19, 2022. In his new motion, he argued that Bourland and
   Haley were laboring under nonwaivable conflicts of interest and that he was
   misinformed of his sentencing exposure under the plea agreement.
          The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which
   Bourland and Haley testified.       Haley testified that he and Bourland
   “guesstimated” what James’s sentence would be based on the terms of the
   plea agreement. He testified that he never informed James that he could be
   facing a life sentence and admitted that he did not think James would have
   signed the plea agreement if he knew that he could have been sentenced to
   life imprisonment.

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          Bourland testified that with all his clients, he does his “very best to
   give a good [sentencing] estimate” but cautions that he will not make the
   ultimate decision. In this case, he explained that the Sentencing Guidelines
   were not mandatory and that the defense could request a variance with good
   reason. Bourland estimated a sentence “somewhere between 15 and 20
   years.” Bourland testified that he would not have advised that James take
   the plea agreement if he knew a life sentence was possible.
          At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion
   to withdraw from the bench, and later provided supplemental reasons in
   writing. The district court stated that “the real issue[] in this case [is]
   whether or not [James’s] plea was knowing and voluntary, and that turns on
   whether or not he received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Noting
   Bourland’s role as lead counsel, the court found that he “had a very close and
   reliable and trusting working relationship with Mr. James” and that he “gave
   [James] what his best estimate was based on what he believed that he could
   negotiate and what he believed that he could advocate to the Court.” And
   finding that James was advised at his re-arraignment that any sentencing
   estimate by his attorneys was merely a prediction, the court concluded that
   Bourland’s sentencing estimate did not vitiate the knowing and voluntary
   nature of the plea.
                                E. Sentencing
          At sentencing, the court granted Bourland’s objection to the
   adjustment for sophisticated money laundering, lowering James’s total
   offense level to 41 and his guidelines range to 360 months to life. The United
   States represented, as it had agreed to, that several codefendants pleaded
   guilty on James’s coattails. In response, the court acknowledged that James
   “set the example for some others who came forward and accepted
   responsibility.” However, the court did not lower the sentence on that basis,
   noting the seriousness of the offense, James’s leadership role, and James’s

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   criminal history. James was sentenced to 360 months on Count 1 of the
   indictment, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release, and a
   120-month term of imprisonment on Count 4 of the indictment and Count 1
   of the bill of information, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised
   release, all to run concurrently. James timely appealed. Fed. R. App. P.
   4(b)(2).

                          II. Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
   plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 443 (5th
   Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on
   an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id.
   (quoting United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 2019)).

                                 III. Analysis
              A. Standard for Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
          A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after the district court
   accepts the plea but prior to sentencing “for any reason the granting of the
   privilege seems fair and just.” United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th
   Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Rasmussen, 642 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir.
   1981)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The following factors should be
   considered when deciding whether a defendant shows a fair and just reason
   for withdrawal:
          . . . (1) whether or not the defendant has asserted his
          innocence; (2) whether or not the government would suffer
          prejudice if the withdrawal motion were granted; (3) whether
          or not the defendant has delayed in filing his withdrawal
          motion; (4) whether or not the withdrawal would substantially
          inconvenience the court; (5) whether or not close assistance of
          counsel was available; (6) whether or not the original plea was
          knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether or not the withdrawal

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          would waste judicial resources; and, as applicable . . . [(8)] the
          reasons why a defendant delayed in making his withdrawal
          motion.
   Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (internal citations omitted). The defendant bears
   the burden of proving the withdrawal is justified. Id. at 344. “No single
   factor or combination of factors is dispositive.” Strother, 977 F.3d at 443.
   Instead, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Carr, 740 F.2d at 344.
          “[T]he trial court’s decision regarding a withdrawal motion must be
   accorded ‘broad discretion.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
   120, 146 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also Rasmussen, 642 F.2d at 167 (“[I]t is well
   settled that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before the
   imposition of sentence. Instead, the right to do so is within the sound
   discretion of the trial court. . ..”)).
            B. Applying the Standard to James’s Motion
                                 i. Assertion of Innocence
          The first Carr factor asks whether the defendant has asserted his
   innocence. Carr, 740 F.3d at 343-44. “Under the Carr framework, the
   defendant must not only assert his innocence, but also provide a ‘substantial
   supporting record’ for this assertion in order to support his motion to
   withdraw.” Strother, 977 F.3d at 444. The district court concluded that this
   factor weighed against withdrawal, explaining that James “admitted his guilt
   under oath” and now “neither asserts his innocence nor presents any
   evidence to contradict the factual basis for the plea.”
          James concedes that “while [this factor] does not weigh in James’s
   favor, [it] should not weigh very much against him,” because “every
   defendant who has ever moved to withdraw a guilty plea necessarily had
   admitted his guilt under oath at his rearraignment.” But, as the United States
   notes, we have held that the lack of a timely and supported assertion of

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   innocence weighs against withdrawal.4 See Strother, 977 F.3d at 444, United
   States v. Lampazianie, 251 F.3d 519, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
   Badger, 925 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the district court did
   not err in concluding that this factor weighed against withdrawal.
                                ii. Prejudice to the Government
           The next Carr factor asks whether the government would suffer
   prejudice if the withdrawal motion were granted. Carr, 740 F.2d at 344. The
   district court concluded that this factor weighed against withdrawal,
   accepting the United States’ argument that “because five years have passed
   since the criminal conduct at issue—the Government will have to regather
   witnesses and victims spread across the country.”
           James argues that “any difficulties the Government may have had in
   taking James to trial were essentially same the day before James pleaded
   guilty as they were the day after James sought to withdraw his plea” because
   at the time James pleaded guilty, “other defendants had yet to enter guilty
   pleas.” The United States counters by noting that James’s first motion to
   withdraw his plea did not raise the same issues presently before us and was
   denied without prejudice. But “[t]he motion to withdraw that is the subject
   of this appeal was filed 21 months after the guilty plea and was heard two
   years after the guilty plea.” By the time that motion was heard and ruled on,
   eight years had gone by since the beginning of the charged conspiracy.
           We have held that the prosecution is prejudiced when “almost three
   years have elapsed since the superseding indictment was filed, and for some
   witnesses the relevant conduct occurred . . . over seven years ago.”
           _____________________
   4
    In so saying, we are mindful of the “importance of protecting the innocent and insuring
   that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400
   U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970). Innocent people do plead guilty for various reasons, but that is not
   the case for James.

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   Lampazianie, 251 F.3d at 525. Again, the district court correctly concluded
   this factor weighed against withdrawal.
            iii. Delay in Filing Motion to Withdraw and Reasons for Delay
          We next consider whether the defendant has delayed in filing his
   withdrawal motion and the reasons why the defendant delayed in making his
   motion. Carr, 740 F.2d at 344. We have held that the longer a defendant
   delays in filing a withdrawal motion, “the more substantial reasons he must
   proffer in support of his motion.” Lord, 915 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Carr, 740
   F.2d at 344). The district court found that James was not prompt in filing his
   motion to withdraw, focusing on the timeline from the release of the PSR to
   the filing of his first motion to withdraw, a delay of four months. The district
   court concluded that James’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea was not due
   to a “prompt change of heart” but was “in direct reaction to the PSR.”
          James argues that he “sought to withdraw his guilty plea once he
   discovered that he had been misled by his attorneys regarding the sentence
   he would receive, a discovery that he could not have made until he was
   presented with his PSR.” The United States counters that “James did not
   allege that he was misled by his attorneys until the second motion to
   withdraw, which was filed 21 months after the plea, 18 months after
   disclosure of the initial PSR, and 17 months after his pro se motion to
   withdraw.”
          We agree with the United States and find the district court erred in
   measuring the length of time between the release of the initial PSR and the
   filing of his pro se motion to withdraw. James’s first motion to withdraw was
   premised on his argument that the United States was not upholding its end
   of the bargain in granting credit for his unofficial assistance. It was denied
   without prejudice, as sentencing had not yet occurred to assure the United
   States upheld its end of the bargain, which it ultimately did. It was not until

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   James’s second motion to withdraw that he raised the claims before us
   today—that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel was
   ineffective. Accordingly, James’s motion to withdraw was the product of
   substantial delay as it was filed over a year later on August 19, 2022.
             Even if we measured the delay from the receipt of the PSR (February
   9, 2021) to James’s attempt to submit his pro se motion to withdraw (March
   3, 2021), as James concedes, our precedent supports the district court’s
   conclusion that this factor weighs against withdrawal because it was
   submitted 22 days later. In Carr, “[t]he defendant waited twenty-two days
   before filing his motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea. . ..” Carr, 740 F.2d
   at 345. This delay weighed against withdrawal. Id.; see also Badger, 925 F.2d
   at 104 (delay of three weeks weighed against withdrawal). Though there was
   more time until sentencing in the instant case than in Carr, we have stated
   that “[t]he purpose is not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to
   enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes
   that he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.” Id. That is precisely what
   happened here. Accordingly, this factor also weighs against withdrawal.
             iv. Substantial Inconvenience to Court & Waste of Judicial Resources
             We next consider whether withdrawal would “substantially
   inconvenience the Court” and “waste judicial resources.” Carr, 740 F.2d at
   344. “The district court’s assessment of this factor is entitled to substantial
   deference since it is in the best position to know the effect that the withdrawal
   had on its resources.” Carr, 740 F.2d at 345. The district court first stated
   that in the present case, “significant resources have already been extended
   on the re-arraignment proceeding and in preparation for James’s upcoming
   sentencing.” But it noted that “these logistical factors . . . are present in
   nearly every case,” and would not defeat a compelling presentation justifying
   withdrawal. Absent such a showing, however, it found these factors favor
   denial.

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          James argues that these factors “by their nature, can never weigh in
   favor of granting the motion,” and do not favor denial. The United States
   counters that “re-scheduling a complex trial would be a difficult task which
   would disrupt the court’s heavy docket.” It further notes additional areas
   where judicial resources would be wasted: “[t]he probation office conducted
   a presentence investigation culminating in a 66-page PSR” and “the
   investigating officer wrote a 15-page addendum and a 66-page revised PSR”
   addressing objections. Mindful of the substantial deference owed to the
   district court on these factors, we find the district court correctly determined
   that they weigh against withdrawal.
                            v. Close Assistance of Counsel
          Next, we consider whether the defendant received close assistance of
   counsel. Carr, 740 F.2d at 344. “Counsel’s assistance may be close without
   being effective.” United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir.
   2014). The district court noted that James had two attorneys active in his
   defense, that Bourland filed numerous motions on his behalf, that Bourland
   successfully negotiated a plea agreement and received concessions from the
   United States, that Haley visited James multiple times in jail, and that James
   expressly acknowledged that he was “well satisfied with both Mr. Bourland
   and Mr. Haley” at his re-arraignment.
          James concedes that he received close assistance of counsel, but
   argues that this factor should not favor denying the motion to withdraw
   because the “close assistance underlies the reason James seeks to withdraw
   his guilty plea” due to his attorneys “misadvise[].” Nonetheless, as the
   United States notes, we have held that close assistance of counsel weighs
   against withdrawal. Strother, 977 F.3d at 444-45.
          We have previously found close assistance of counsel where counsel
   negotiated a plea agreement, filed motions, discussed the case with the

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   defendant, and explained the defendant’s rights and the weight of the
   evidence. Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 445. Likewise, where counsel was available
   throughout the proceedings and the defendant expressed satisfaction with
   counsel’s performance. Strother, 977 F.3d at 445; Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1015-
   16. This is precisely the situation here. Accordingly, this factor too weighs
   against withdrawal.
                             vi. Knowing and Voluntary
          Finally, we reach the crux of James’s argument. A guilty plea involves
   the waiver of constitutional rights, so it must be “voluntary, knowing, and
   intelligent.” Strother, 977 F.3d at 445 (quoting Lord, 915 F.3d at 1016).
   “This requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges
   against him, the consequences of his plea, and the nature of the constitutional
   protections that he is waiving.” Id. When a defendant enters a guilty plea
   upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends, in part, on
   whether counsel’s advice “was within the range of competence demanded of
   attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
   must satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
   (1984). A defendant must show (1) that his “counsel’s performance fell
   below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that his counsel’s
   deficient performance caused him prejudice. United States v. Grammas, 376
   F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004). James’s Strickland claim fails “if he cannot
   establish either the deficient performance or prejudice prong; a court need
   not evaluate both if he makes an insufficient showing as to either.” Blanton
   v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2008).
          The district court concluded that counsel was not deficient, and that
   “even assuming that counsel’s Guidelines estimation was unreasonable,”

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   “the Court cannot say that [James] would have proceeded to trial.” The
   district court noted that “there remains plenty to gain by pleading guilty,”
   even with a guidelines range of life. “The Court has the ability to grant a
   variant sentence,” “[d]efense counsel ha[d] filed five unresolved objections
   to the guideline calculations,” and defense counsel had “discussed
   arguments for a downward departure from the Guidelines with counsel for
   the Government.” Further, although the district court considered under the
   reasonableness prong, it noted that despite counsel’s underestimation of the
   guidelines sentence, “James was plainly advised by the Court that,
   statutorily, he could receive a life sentence.”
          James argues that he trusted his attorneys, and reasonably relied on
   their affirmations that he would receive a lesser sentence. He also points to
   Bourland’s testimony that if he knew James was facing a life sentence, he
   would not have advised him to take the plea. The United States argues that
   James had no realistic chance of success at trial and that his primary interest
   was reducing his sentence, something a guilty plea is most likely to result in.
   It notes that the plea agreement reduced his minimum guidelines sentence
   by five years. It also claims that James presented no evidence that he would
   have rejected the plea agreement if he knew what the guidelines range would
   be, and that the contemporaneous evidence in the record weighs against a
   finding of prejudice as James was repeatedly informed of the maximum
   possible sentencing exposure he faced.
          Here, even if James showed deficient performance, he is unable to
   show prejudice. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in
   finding this factor also weighed against withdrawal. “To prove prejudice, the
   defendant must show ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
   counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
   different.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea, that
   means there is a reasonable probability that the defendant “would not have

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   pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at
   59; Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2017).
           This inquiry “focuses on a defendant’s decision[-]making.” Lee v.
   United States, 582 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). “When a defendant alleges his
   counsel’s deficient performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than go
   to trial, we do not ask whether, had he gone to trial, the result of that trial
   ‘would have been different’ than the result of the plea bargain.” Id. at 364.
   “Of course, in many cases a defendant’s prospects at trial are relevant to
   whether he or she would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty.”
   Valdez, 973. F.3d at 403. For example, “[w]here a defendant has no plausible
   chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a plea if the
   Government offers one.” Lee, 582 U.S. at 367.                 Factors relevant to
   determining whether a defendant would have gone to trial can also include
   “the risks [he] would have faced at trial,” “his ‘representations about his
   desire to retract his plea,’” and “the district court’s admonishments.”
   United States v. Batamula, 823 F.3d 237, 240 n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
   United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 2014)).
           Here, as acknowledged by Bourland and undisputed by James, there
   was no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial. “The record supports this
   strategic decision of weighing great risk of conviction and an unavoidable
   statutory maximum sentence versus entering the guilty plea and then seeking
   reduction to a sentence with mitigating factors that could come with the
   guilty plea.” Valdez, 973 F.3d at 405; see Lee, 582 U.S. at 367 (“And a
   defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from
   accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely
   after trial.”).
           Here, the United States offered an attractive plea deal because it
   agreed to drop the 924(c) count and take five years off James’s expected

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                                    No. 22-30734

   sentence. Where contemporaneous evidence suggests that James’s primary
   concern was minimizing his sentence, the district court’s determination that
   he had much to gain by pleading guilty is apt. “Courts should not upset a
   plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he
   would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead
   look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed
   preferences.” Lee, 582 U.S. at 369.
          As noted by the United States, the guilty plea provided multiple
   avenues for minimizing James’s sentence. Pleading guilty demonstrated
   acceptance of responsibility, offered the possibility of a downward variance
   for informal cooperation, and resulted in dismissal of the 924(c) count. Of
   note, the district court sentenced James to 360 months, when he was
   otherwise facing life. James’s pro se motion to withdraw also suggests his
   primary concern of minimizing his sentence through the plea agreement,
   because he faulted the United States for not providing a reduction for his
   informal assistance, not his attorneys for misadvising him.
          Finally, James was repeatedly informed of the statutory penalties,
   despite the purported errors of counsel. In the plea agreement itself, James
   was informed of the statutory penalties and that the Sentencing Guidelines
   were discretionary. James acknowledged he had not been made any promises
   regarding sentencing and understood that any representations were only
   estimates that did not bind the court. Further, the district court’s repeatedly
   admonished James about the possibility of a life sentence, including at the
   guilty plea colloquy, where he was informed of applicable statutory penalties
   and that any sentencing estimate by the attorneys was merely a prediction.
   Therefore, James understood he might not get the sentence predicted by
   counsel, but he chose to go forward. The district court did not err in finding
   this too weighed against withdrawal.

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Case: 22-30734    Document: 00517029245          Page: 18   Date Filed: 01/10/2024

                                  No. 22-30734

                             IV. Conclusion
         As the district court properly found, the balance of the Carr factors
   weighs against withdrawal of the guilty plea. We conclude that its decision
   was not an abuse of discretion and accordingly AFFIRM.

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