Court Opinion

ID: 9387615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:01:01.354288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.764164
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       FILED
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                         APR 18 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK,                         No. 19-17247

                Petitioner-Appellant,          D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00172-SPL
                                               District of Arizona,
 v.                                            Phoenix

CHARLES L. RYAN; ATTORNEY                      ORDER
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
ARIZONA,

                Respondents-Appellees.

Before: BYBEE, OWENS, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

      The Memorandum filed on January 23, 2023 is amended (1) by replacing the

phrase  in the penultimate sentence on page 3 with , and by inserting the following new footnote

immediately after the clause in that sentence that ends with :

          As we note below, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasons for
          explicitly rejecting Merrick’s Double Jeopardy challenge to
          Counts 23 and 24—viz., that the overlap between the two
          counts was irrelevant—would similarly apply to the Count 2
          Double Jeopardy issue. See infra at 6. Under these
          circumstances, the court’s failure to explicitly extend such
          reasoning to that additional Double Jeopardy challenge is
          insufficient to rebut the presumption.

      An Amended Memorandum reflecting these amendments is filed

concurrently with this order. With those amendments, the panel has voted
unanimously to deny the petition for panel rehearing and the supplemental petition

for panel rehearing. Judges Owens and Collins have voted to deny the petition for

rehearing en banc and the supplemental petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge

Bybee so recommends. The full court has been advised of both petitions for

rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on either of them.

See FED. R. APP. P. 35(f). Accordingly, the petition for panel rehearing and

rehearing en banc (Dkt. Entry 72) and the supplemental petition for panel rehearing

and rehearing en banc (Dkt. Entry 74, 76) are DENIED. No further petitions for

rehearing may be filed.

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                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 18 2023
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK,                             No. 19-17247

                  Petitioner-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00172-SPL

    v.                                             AMENDED
                                                   MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES RYAN, et al.,
                  Respondents-Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Arizona
                       Steven P. Logan, District Judge, Presiding
                       Argued and Submitted November 18, 2022
                                  Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BYBEE, OWENS, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

         Anthony Merrick appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus challenging, on Double Jeopardy grounds, his convictions

for certain offenses in Arizona state court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

         An Arizona jury convicted Merrick of 11 offenses, including one count of

fraud in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-2310 (Count 1); one count of

theft of property with a value of at least $4,000 in violation of Arizona Revised

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Statutes § 13-1802 (Count 2); and nine counts of credit-card theft in violation of

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-2102 (Counts 6, 8–11, 14–15, and 23–24). The

factual basis for all 11 of Merrick’s convictions was his unlawful receipt and

retention of 29 gift cards, each valued at $500. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-

2101(3)(c) (providing that, for purposes of § 13-2102, “[c]redit card” includes a

“stored value card”). The nine credit-card theft charges under § 13-2102 were

based on the allegation that, without the consent of the issuers, Merrick

“knowingly controlled” one or more of eight specific gift cards on various dates.

Counts 1 and 2 were based on Merrick’s unlawful receipt and retention of the 29

gift cards generally. Specifically, the fraud charge in Count 1 alleged that, through

fraud, Merrick “knowingly obtained a benefit” from the issuers, and the theft

charge in Count 2 alleged that, “without lawful authority,” Merrick “knowingly

controlled” gift cards worth $4,000 or more. At trial, the state argued that

Merrick’s theft charge involved more than $4,000, because “we have 29 gift cards”

and “$500 each equals $14,500.” Merrick was given concurrent sentences on all

counts.

      On appeal, Merrick argued, inter alia, that (1) his theft charge in Count 2

was multiplicitous of his nine credit-card theft convictions, in violation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause; and (2) some of the nine credit-card theft convictions

were multiplicitous of one another to the extent that they relied on the same gift

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card. The Arizona Court of Appeals partly agreed with the second argument and

vacated Merrick’s convictions on Counts 9, 10, 11, and 15. See State v. Merrick,

2012 WL 4955425, at *2–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2012). The court’s opinion

did not address Merrick’s other Double Jeopardy argument concerning Count 2,

but it expressly affirmed Merrick’s convictions on “Counts 1, 2, 6, 8, 14, 23 and

24.” Id. at *4. Merrick unsuccessfully sought review of the Count 2 Double

Jeopardy issue in the Arizona Supreme Court. After the district court denied

habeas relief, we granted a certificate of appealability limited to the Count 2

Double Jeopardy issue.

      As an initial matter, we reject Merrick’s argument that the deferential

standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d), do not apply to Merrick’s Count 2 Double Jeopardy claim.

“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has

denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the

contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). This same presumption

applies when—as here—“a state-court opinion addresses some but not all of a

defendant’s claims.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013). Merrick has

provided no persuasive basis for concluding that this presumption has been

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rebutted, 1 and we therefore treat the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision as having

rejected the Count 2 Double Jeopardy claim on the merits. Accordingly, under

AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief based on that claim unless the

state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)–(2). In applying these standards to a state court decision that did not

explain why it rejected this claim, we “must determine what arguments or theories

. . . could have supported[] the state court’s decision” and then “ask whether it is

possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added).

      Applying these standards, we conclude that fairminded jurists could

reasonably reject Merrick’s Count 2 Double Jeopardy argument. In addressing this

issue, we assume arguendo that Merrick is correct in contending that the elements

1
  As we note below, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasons for explicitly rejecting
Merrick’s Double Jeopardy challenge to Counts 23 and 24—viz., that the overlap
between the two counts was irrelevant—would similarly apply to the Count 2
Double Jeopardy issue. See infra at 6. Under these circumstances, the court’s
failure to explicitly extend such reasoning to that additional Double Jeopardy
challenge is insufficient to rebut the presumption.

                                          4
of a theft charge under § 13-1802 overlap with the elements of a credit-card theft

charge under § 13-2102, such that the two statutes do not define separate offenses

under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). But

just as two bank robberies may be charged under the same statute when a

defendant separately robs two banks, so too separate theft and credit-card theft

charges may be brought based on the defendant’s theft of distinct underlying gift

cards. See, e.g., United States v. Chilaca, 909 F.3d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 2018)

(noting that the inquiry turns on “the allowable unit of prosecution” under the

charged statute (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). On this record, a

reasonable jurist could reach such a conclusion here.

      As the case was charged in the indictment and presented at trial, only a total

of eight specific gift cards were at issue in the various credit-card theft counts. To

sustain the charge of theft involving at least $4,000 under Count 2, only eight of

the 29 cards at issue in that count were necessary, because each card was worth

$500. Accordingly, Merrick’s conviction on Count 2 would not be multiplicitous

to the extent that it rested on eight of the 21 cards that were not at issue in the

credit-card theft counts. Given that the state’s theory and evidence at trial were

that Count 2 was based on Merrick’s possession of all 29 gift cards, the Arizona

Court of Appeals could reasonably have concluded that, in convicting on Count 2,

the jury should be understood to have accepted the state’s undifferentiated reliance

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on all 29 cards. That would mean that the jury concluded that Merrick unlawfully

possessed all 29 cards, including the 21 cards that were not at issue in the credit-

card theft counts. And since only eight cards were necessary to sustain the charge

on Count 2, the Arizona Court of Appeals could reasonably have concluded that

Count 2 was more than amply supported by non-overlapping cards and that there

was therefore no Double Jeopardy violation. See Merrick, 2012 WL 4955425, at

*3 (similarly rejecting Merrick’s Double Jeopardy challenge to Counts 23 and 24,

despite the fact that one of the five cards charged in Count 24 overlapped with the

single card charged in Count 23).

      For substantially the same reasons, we further conclude that Merrick has not

shown a federal law error that “resulted in actual prejudice.” Davis v. Ayala, 576

U.S. 257, 267 (2015) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 2

      AFFIRMED.

2
 We decline to expand the certificate of appealability to include the additional
uncertified issues raised by Merrick in his supplemental pro se opening brief. See
NINTH CIR. R. 22-1(e).

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