Court Opinion

ID: 9745153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:38:09.643784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:56.860644
License: Public Domain

Spalding, J.
(dissenting) The court today remolds a statute, previously used only as a shield for the protection of the public against burglars, into a sword to be used against trespassers. In my view, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history supports this interpretation.
The majority rest their conclusion mainly on the premise that the meaning of the phrase "or to commit any other crime” as used in the statute is “plain” and therefore resort to canons of construction is unnecessary. I disagree. The doctrine of ejusdem generis has been consistently applied by this court in similar situations to interpret statutes, and I would apply it here to limit the statute’s reach, as the trial judge ruled, to crimes of an acquisitive nature.
*733A number of examples are illustrative. In Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46, the statute in question made it a criminal offence to publish, sell or distribute “any book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, or other thing . . . [which contains obscene matter]” (emphasis supplied). We said there that the maxim noscitur a sociis (the equivalent of ejusdem generis) should be applied to determine the meaning of “or other thing.” In Babcock Davis Corp. v. Paine, 240 Mass. 438, the statute referred to “heating apparatus, plumbing goods, ranges or other personal property” (emphasis supplied). We held, at pp. 440-441, that ejusdem generis applied to limit the statute’s application to items of personal property similar to those enumerated. In Wellesley College v. Attorney Cen. 313 Mass. 722, 727, the question was raised by a statute that applied only to “trusts created by will or other written instrument.” The phrase, “or other written instrument,” had been added by amendment, and the question was as to the meaning of the amending words. We held that they “must be interpreted to mean written instruments of the same kind and nature.” Other cases to the same effect are: Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 271, 278-280, Brailey v. Southborough, 6 Cush. 141, Wall v. Platt, 169 Mass. 398, 406, Becker Transp. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util. 314 Mass. 522, 526, and Salvation Army of Mass. Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 346 Mass. 492, 495.
The purpose of the doctrine is to give meaning to all the words of the statute. In order to avoid treating the specific words as surplusage, effect is given to both the specific and general words by treating the specific words as indicating a class, and the general words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything embraced in that class. Sutherland on Statutory Construction (3d ed.) § 4909, pp. 395-400. The reasoning of the majority that the words “or to commit any other crime” were added to the text “in lettering smaller than that of the text,” to vary it from its Vermont model, misses the point. If, as the majority hold, the Legislature meant to cover “any crime,” it could have effectively done so by not only adding the language it did, but also by omit*734ting the language, “to steal therefrom money or other property.” Since the Legislature chose to leave this language in the statute, the doctrine of ejusdem generis should be applied; otherwise the specific words become surplusage.
It is settled law that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 6. United States v. Boston & Maine R.R. 380 U. S. 157, 160. Application of the ejusdem generis principle, therefore, is especially appropriate ■ here. See, for example, People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 899, where the Supreme Court of California observed that, “In construing criminal statutes the ejusdem generis rule of construction is applied with stringency.” Consistent with the above interpretation also are both the use of the word “depository” and the title of the statute.
The majority reason further that the Legislature may well have intended to punish possession of instruments intended for use in committing a trespass. The short answer to this is that the crime of trespass in general did not appear on the Massachusetts statute books until almost ten years after the statute in question was passed, and it was almost thirty years later before trespass to buildings was made an offence.1 The assertion that the Legislature could have had in mind the “crime” of. trespass when it inserted the words “any other crime” seems to be, therefore, without foundation. Moreover, even if all other crimes were included, trespass itself would not be since it is not a separate crime committed after entry, but one committed by the very act of entry itself.
The judge below rested his decision in part on the ground that the Legislature could not have intended to prevent the commission of misdemeanors by making intent to use bur-*735glory tools to accomplish them a felony. I agree. As noted, there was no crime of trespass when the statute in question was passed. In 1890 the maximum penalty for the crime of trespass was a fine of $20. This remained the maximum penalty until 1969.2 That the Legislature contemplated the prevention of a crime punishable with a $20 fine by a separate crime punishable by ten years in prison is hardly conceivable. Consistent with this conclusion is that no case has been called to our attention — and I have found none — in which the statute under consideration in its more than 115 years of existence has been applied to a crime of a non-acquisitive nature.
My belief in the correctness of this conclusion is reinforced by G. L. c. 266, § 16A, which provides that one who breaks and enters a building in the nighttime or daytime with the intent to commit a misdemeanor is guilty of no more than a misdemeanor. The punishment (six months imprisonment) is to be contrasted with the ten year penalty provided by the statute in question. While I recognize that § 16A was enacted much later than § 49, it nevertheless evinces a legislative pattern that would not treat the offence here involved as a felony.
I would affirm the action of the court below in dismissing the indictment for failure to state a crime.

A statute in form similar to the present trespass statute was St. 1890, c. 410, which amended Pub. Sts. c. 203, § 99 (1882), to read: “Whoever without right enters upon or remains on or in the dwelling-house, buildings or improved or enclosed land of another, after being forbidden so to do . . . shall be punished by a fine not- exceeding twenty dollars.” Before 1882 the only trespass statute in Massachusetts concerned land under tillage and was first enacted in 1862 (St. 1862, c. 89). “Forcible entry” was indictable at common law, but the elements are not charged in the indictment before us. Commonwealth v. Shattuck, 4 Cush. 141, 145.

 Statte 1969, c. 463 § 2 increased the penalty to a fine of not more than 9>1UU or imprisonment for not moré than thirty days, or both.