Court Opinion

ID: 9839096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 18:00:26.314653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:39.039919
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LEAMON D. BRINSON,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                       DC-0752-14-1129-B-1

                   v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                        DATE: September 8, 2023
                 Agency.

           Steve M. Fesler, Sykesville, Maryland, for the appellant.
           Ray Goldstein and Nikki Greenberg, Washington Naval Yard, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                          BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                        Vice Chairman Harris issues a separate opinion.
                           Member Limon issues a separate opinion.

                                           ORDER
¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review which sustained his removal for
     misconduct.    The two Board members cannot agree on the disposition of the
     petition for review.     Therefore, the initial decision now becomes the final
     decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this appeal. Title 5 of the
     Code of Federal Regulations, section 1200.3(b) (5 C.F.R. § 1200.3(b)).       This
     decision shall not be considered as precedent by the Board in any other case.
     5 C.F.R. § 1200.3(d).
                                                                                          2

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 1
      You may obtain review of the final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of the final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable ti me
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to    the   court    at   the
following address:

1
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   3

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of     the final decision—including a disposition of your
discrimination claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district
court (not the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar
days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in
this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you
must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your
representative receives this decision.      If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                  4

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                       5

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 2 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

2
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of com petent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             6

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
            SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE CHAIRMAN CATHY A. HARRIS

                                                in

                        Leamon D. Brinson v. Department of the Navy

                           MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-B-1

¶1         For the reasons discussed below, I would grant the appellant’s petition for
     review, reverse the initial decision, and not sustain his removal.
¶2         The appellant was a WG-11 Electronic Industrial Controls Mechanic whom
     the agency suspended for 30 days on charges of insubordination and disrespectful
     conduct. Brinson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-
     0424-I-1, Appeal File (0424 AF), Tab 1 at 7-10. The appellant filed a Board
     appeal and raised some affirmative defenses, including an affirmative defense of
     age discrimination.    0424 AF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 5 at 3, Tab 19 at 2.            During
     discovery in those proceedings, the appellant, proceeding pro se, deposed his
     fifth-level supervisor, a Navy Commander and Public Works Officer. 0424 AF,
     Tab 4 at 3; Brinson v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-
     1129-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 27-37.           During the deposition
     questioning, the appellant called the Commander “a snake” and “an outright liar,”
     and he suggested that the Commander had “short man syndrome” or “little man
     syndrome.” IAF, Tab 10 at 33-34, 36.
¶3         While the suspension appeal was still pending, the agency proposed to
     remove the appellant for his conduct during the Commander’s deposition. 1 Id.
     at 23-26. The proposal was based on a charge of disrespectful conduct, with three
     specifications, referring to the “snake,” “outright liar,” and “little man” comments
     respectively.   Id. at 23-24.     The deciding official sustained the charge and
     removed the appellant effective August 27, 2014. Id. at 4-10.

     1
      The administrative judge ultimately affirmed the suspension in an initial decision that
     became final when neither party petitioned for review. 0424 AF, Tab 23.
                                                                                      2

¶4         The appellant filed the instant Board appeal, arguing among other things
     that the agency was not permitted to remove him for conduct in which he engaged
     during the course of protected activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 15 at 5, Tab 20
     at 6-11. After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision sustaining the removal. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID). He analyzed
     the appellant’s argument in the context of the charge and found that the appellant
     was not immunized from discipline for his disrespectful conduct merely because
     he committed it during litigation before the Board. ID at 5-10.
¶5         The appellant petitioned for review, and the Board remanded the appeal for
     the administrative judge to adjudicate the appellant’s argument as an affirmative
     defense under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) (reprisal for the exercise of appeal
     rights other than with regard to whistleblower reprisal). Brinson v. Department of
     the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-I-1, Petition for Review File,
     Tab 1, Tab 6 (Remand Order).         On remand, consistent with the Board’s
     instructions, the administrative judge advised the appellant of his burden of
     proving this affirmative defense under the standard set forth in Warren v.
     Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986).         Brinson v.
     Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No.DC-0752-14-1129-B-1, Remand File
     (RF), Tab 3 at 2. After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued a
     new initial decision again sustaining the removal. RF, Tab 20, Remand Initial
     Decision (RID). The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove
     his affirmative defense of retaliation under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), and he
     incorporated the remainder of his findings from the previous initial decision. RID
     at 6-11.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative
     judge’s analysis of his retaliation claim and making several additional arguments
     about the proceedings on remand. Brinson v. Department of the Army, MSPB
     Docket No.DC-0752-14-1129-B-1, Remand Petition for Review (RPFR) File,
     Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. RPFR File, Tab 3.
                                                                                        3

¶7         In its Remand Order, the Board identified 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) as
     the relevant clause under which to consider the appellant’s affirmative defense of
     retaliation for his prior Board appeal. Remand Order, ¶¶ 10, 13-17. This was
     incorrect.   As stated above, the appellant’s suspension appeal contained an
     affirmative defense of age discrimination under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(B).
     Therefore, his prior Board appeal was protected under that clause, and a claim of
     retaliation for filing that appeal is subject to the standards of 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
     See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (holding that 29 U.S.C.
     § 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a Federal employee who complains of age
     discrimination); Jones v. Department of Energy, 120 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 3 n.2 (2013)
     (stating that a claim of retaliation for equal employment opportunity (EEO)
     activity is cognizable under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)), aff’d, 589 F. App’x 972 (Fed.
     Cir. 2014); Davis v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, EEOC
     Appeal No. 01903228, 1990 WL 1109796 (Dec. 7, 1990) (holding that a
     mixed-case Board appeal with claims of discrimination under Title VII
     constituted protected activity for purposes of a Title VII reprisal claim); see also
     29 C.F.R. § 1614.101(b) (providing that no person shall be subject to retaliation
     for participating in any stage of administrative proceedings und er the Age
     Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)).          To prove a claim of retaliation
     under the ADEA, an appellant must show that his protected activity was a
     motivating factor in the agency’s action, although he may only be entitled to full
     relief if his protected activity was also a but-for cause of that action. Babb v.
     Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1173-74, 1177-78 (2020); Pridgen v. Office of
     Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22.
¶8         Although neither party has specifically briefed this issue, the record is fully
     developed, the material facts are not in dispute, and the outcome required under
     the law is clear. Therefore, in the interests of administrative efficiency, it would
     be appropriate to make a ruling on the matter at this time.          See Warren v.
     Department of Defense, 87 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 9 (2001).
                                                                                            4

¶9         The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has taken the
     position that participation in EEO activity, including participation in claims of
     age discrimination under the ADEA, enjoys broad protection, and that such
     protection is not limited by the content or manner of the participation. EEOC
     Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, Notice 915.004,
     2016 WL 4688886, at *5-*7 (Aug. 25, 2016) (Enforcement Guidance). Nothing
     in the statute limits protections to participation conducted in a certain manner.
     See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (providing that Federal employment “shall be made free
     from any discrimination based on age”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (prohibiting
     retaliation against private sector employees who have participate d in ADEA
     proceedings “in any manner”). The EEOC agrees with the several circuits that
     have held that an employer is prohibited from disciplining an employee for
     bringing even a false or malicious charge of discrimination or from engaging in
     unreasonable conduct during the course of such proceedings. 2 Id.; Jazmine F. v.
     Department of Defense, EEOC Petition No. 0320170007, 2023 WL 4653604,
     at *6-*7 (July 5, 2023); Verrett v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
     No. 01841488, 1985 WL 569353 (Nov. 13, 1985); see, e.g., Glover v. South
     Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999); Merritt v.
     Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 1997); Sias v. City
     Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. American
     Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1969). The Board must defer
     to the EEOC on this matter of substantive discrimination law.             See Pridgen,
     2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 40. The appellant’s conduct toward the Commander during the
     deposition may have been disrespectful, but this does not remove his conduct

     2
       The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have rejected the
     EEOC’s position on this issue. E.g., Gilooly v. Missouri Department of Health and
     Senior Services, 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005); Matson v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
     359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004). Notwithstanding this circuit split, the Board is obliged to
     follow the EEOC on this matter of substantive discrimination law.               Pridgen,
     2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 40.
                                                                                        5

      from the broad protections of the statute. 3 We must be mindful that attacks on the
      credibility of a witness are an essential aspect of cross examination, are at times
      necessary to prove pretext in discrimination and retaliation cases, and are a part
      of our adversarial adjudication process. Although there may be more elegant or
      effective ways to do so than directly calling a witness a “liar,” the statute still
      protects such activity in this context. Furthermore, parties must be permitted to
      develop their theories of the case and pursue their own litigation strategies. This
      is particularly true for pro se appellants, to whom the Board gene rally affords a
      measure of latitude in conducting their appeals.
¶10        The Member would find that the appellant’s statements were not “a
      legitimate exercise of his right to vigorously cross examine a witness.”
      Member’s Separate Opinion, ¶ 8. However, judgments about the motives of an
      appellant’s actions have no place in participation clause jurisprudence.        See
      Glover, 170 F.3d at 414-16; Jarvis M. v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, EEOC Petition No. 0320170006, 2023 WL 4653539, at *4 (July 5,
      2023).   The Member also cites to several cases for the proposition that an
      employer may discipline an employee for the manner in which he conducts
      protected activity.   Member’s Separate Opinion, ¶ 10.        However, I am not
      persuaded that any of this case law would support the imposition of discipline
      against this appellant. These are mainly opposition clause cases. Rollins v. State
      of Fla. Department of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1989);
      Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Rosser v. Laborers’ Int’l
      Union Local No. 438, 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1980); Hochstadt v. Worcester
      Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).           Unlike

      3
        Although the protections afforded by the anti-retaliation laws administered by the
      EEOC are “exceptionally broad,” Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1006 n.18, the EEOC has not
      held that they are without limit. For instance, we are aware of no case in which the
      EEOC or any court has found that an employer was prohibited from taking a personnel
      action against an employee who made threats or committed acts of violence during the
      course of EEO proceedings.
                                                                                         6

      activity protected under the participation clause, activity protected under the
      opposition clause must be conducted in a “reasonable” manner. Netter v. Barnes,
      908 F.3d 932, 937-38 (4th Cir. 2018); Johnson v. Frost, EEOC Appeal
      No. 11980023, 2001 WL 1353704, at *6 (June 28, 2001).                  Of the two
      participation clause cases, one of them concerns the discipline of an EEO
      manager for the manner in which he advanced a charge of discrimination.
      Whatley v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.
      1980).    Whatley presents a unique situation not present here, in which
      participation and job duties overlap.      Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the
      participation clause, I would not support an interpretation of the law that would
      insulate an EEO specialist from discipline for malfeasance in office, but that does
      not change my opinion about how the participation clause should apply to the
      facts of the instant appeal.       In the other participation clause case, the Board
      upheld an appellant’s removal for unlawfully accessing and disclosing employee
      records to support his discrimination complaint.        Williams v. Social Security
      Administration, 101 M.S.P.R. 587, ¶ 13 (2006). I agree that unlawful conduct is
      not protected by the ADEA, see Netter, 908 F.3d at 939, but discourtesy toward a
      deponent is not unlawful.      As far as I can tell, among jurisdictions that have
      adopted the Pettway rule, there is no precedent closely resembling the situation
      with which the Board is presented here, i.e., disrespectful behavior by a litigant in
      the context of pro se representation. The Member and I have, I believe, both
      approached this issue correctly by extrapolating from the general principles set
      forth in the statutes, case law, and official guidance. Nevertheless, we cannot
      reconcile our judgment on the ultimate question of how those principles should
      apply to these particular facts.
¶11         To be clear, I do not condone disrespectful behavior by a party or his
      representative towards any witness in a Board appeal, whether the appeal involves
      a claim of discrimination or not. However, as the EEOC observes, misconduct
      during the course of legal proceedings is normally addressed within the context of
                                                                                   7

those proceedings by the tribunal under whose authority the proceedings are
being conducted. Enforcement Guidance, 2016 WL 4688886, at *6. In a Board
appeal, consequences for misbehavior by a party or representative include adverse
rulings and sanctions, up to and including dismissal of the appeal. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.43.   In this case, the agency’s representative acted appropriately by
objecting to the manner of the appellant’s   questioning       and         ultimately
threatening to halt the deposition if the appellant continued in this way.      IAF,
Tab 10 at 33-34, 36.     As the agency did not move for sanctions, this was
apparently sufficient to resolve the issue, and that should have been the end of it.
The agency’s decision to continue the dispute outside the courtroom by taking an
adverse employment action against the appellant was per se retaliation under
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), which is a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(1). See Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007-08; Verrett, 1985 WL 569353, at *5.
By the very terms of the agency’s decision letter, the appellant’s protected
activity was a but-for cause of his removal.     IAF, Tab 10 at 4-10.      For these
reasons, I would not sustain the action. 4 See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B).

/s/
Cathy A. Harris
Vice Chairman

4
  Having decided the appeal on these grounds, I would not reach the remainder of the
appellant’s arguments on review.
                 SEPARATE OPINION OF MEMBER RAYMOND A. LIMON

                                                  in

                         Leamon D. Brinson v. Department of the Navy

                           MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-B-1

¶1           For the reasons explained below, I agree with the administrative judge’s
     initial decision that sustained the appellant’s removal and found that he failed to
     prove his affirmative defenses, and I would deny his petition for review.
¶2           The appellant was employed as an Electronics Industrial Controls
     Mechanic, WG-2606-11, working for the agency’s Naval Facilities Engineering
     Command (NAVFAC) Washington in Dahlgren, Virginia.                    He worked at the
     after-hours trouble desk for the agency’s Public Works Department, where he
     responded to requests for maintenance assistance from civilian and military
     personnel located at the South Potomac installations in Indian Head, Maryland
     and Dahlgren, Virginia.
¶3           Effective February 1, 2014, the agency suspended the appellant for 30 days
     based on three charges of misconduct. The charges included seven specifications
     of Disrespectful Conduct toward the Commander of NAVFAC Washington’s
     South     Potomac   division,    the    appellant’s   fifth-line   supervisor,   and    two
     specifications of Insubordination for willfully and intentionally refusing to obey
     the Commander’s orders.         Brinson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-14-0424-I-1, Appeal File (0424 AF), Tab 8 at 24-28, 37-43. The
     appellant filed a Board appeal, pro se, and raised several affirmative defenses,
     including age discrimination.          0424 AF, Tab 15 at 4, Tab 19 at 5.              While
     conducting discovery during the appeal, the appellant deposed the Commander. It
     is undisputed that, during the deposition questioning, the appellant called the
     Commander “a snake” and “an outright liar,” and he posed questions suggesting
     that the Commander had “short man syndrome” or “little man syndrome.”
                                                                                       2

     Brinson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 33-34, 36.
¶4        The agency proposed to remove the appellant for his conduct during the
     Commander’s deposition. Id. at 23-26. The proposal was based on a charge of
     Disrespectful Conduct for making the specific comments during the deposition
     noted above.    The deciding official sustained the charge and removed the
     appellant effective August 27, 2014. Id. at 4-10. The appellant filed the instant
     Board appeal arguing that the agency was not permitted to remove him for
     conduct in which he engaged during the course of protected activity. IAF, Tab 1
     at 6, Tab 15 at 5, Tab 20 at 6-11. After the close of the record, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision sustaining the removal.      IAF, Tab 25, Initial
     Decision (ID). He found that the appellant was not immunized from discipline
     for his disrespectful conduct merely because he committed it during litigation
     before the Board. ID at 5-10.
¶5        The appellant petitioned for review and the Boa rd remanded the appeal,
     finding that the administrative judge must adjudicate the appellant’s argument
     that he could not be disciplined for conduct that occurred during protected
     activity as an affirmative defense under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) (reprisal for
     the exercise of appeal rights other than with regard to whistleblower reprisal).
     Brinson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-I-1,
     Petition for Review File, Tab 1, Tab 6 (Remand Order). On remand, consistent
     with the Board’s instructions, the administrative judge advised the appellant of
     his burden of proving this affirmative defense under the standard set forth in
     Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
     Brinson v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-B-1,
     Remand File (RF), Tab 3 at 2. After the close of the record, the administrative
     judge issued a new initial decision, again sustaining the removal. RF, Tab 20,
     Remand Initial Decision (RID). The administrative judge found that the appellant
     failed to prove his affirmative defense of retaliation under             5 U.S.C.
                                                                                         3

     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), and he incorporated the remainder of his findings from the
     previous initial decision. RID at 6-11.
¶6        In his petition for review of the new initial decision, the appellant as serts
     that the administrative judge erred in ruling that he could be removed for his
     comments made while engaging in protected activity. Brinson v. Department of
     the Army, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-1129-B-1, Remand Petition for Review
     (RPFR) File, Tab 1. 1 The agency has filed a response to the petition. RPFR File,
     Tab 3.
¶7        First, for the reasons stated in the Vice Chairman’s separate opinion, I agree
     that the appellant’s allegation that the agency’s removal action was taken in
     retaliation for his prior Board appeal should have been adjudicated as a claim of
     retaliation for raising age discrimination. Accordingly, in order to obtain full
     relief for a claim of retaliation for protected activity under the Age
     Discrimination in Employment Act, the appellant must show that the protected
     activity was a but-for cause of the removal action.           Pridgen v. Office of
     Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22.
¶8        I further agree with the Vice Chairman that participation in claims arising
     under employment discrimination statutes generally enjoys broad protection, and
     that employees engaging in such protected activity must be allowed leeway for
     robust advocacy, including a full and fair opportunity to challenge the credibility
     of witnesses. Nonetheless, I am not convinced that under the facts of this case
     the appellant’s conduct during his deposition of the Commander falls within this
     broad protection, nor do I believe the charged conduct can be characterized as a
     legitimate exercise of his right to vigorously cross examine a witness while

     1
       The appellant also makes several other arguments in his petition, including that the
     administrative judge failed to rule on his motion to enter into evidence the Board’s
     record from his appeal of the 30-day suspension and that the administrative judge was
     biased against him. RPFR File, Tab 1. I have considered these arguments and would
     find that they provide no basis to disturb the Remand Initial Decision.
                                                                                         4

      prosecuting his appeal. In this regard, I would find that the conduct at issue in
      this case, including calling him a “snake” or suggesting that the Commander had
      “short man syndrome” or “little man syndrome,” was not protected by any
      anti-discrimination or anti-retaliation statute.
¶9          As pointed out by the Vice Chairman, the Equal Employment Opportunity
      Commission (EEOC) has not held that the protections afforded by the
      anti-retaliation laws it administers are without limit. Moreover, the courts have
      recognized that misconduct committed during litigation alleging employment
      discrimination is not protected under the anti-retaliation laws despite the fact that
      it occurred while the employee was engaging in protected activity. In Benes v.
      A.B. Data, Ltd., 724 F.3d 752, 753-54 (7th Cir. 2013), for example, the plaintiff
      alleged that his firing was in retaliation for his prior sex discrimination claim
      because the action was based on his behavior during an EEOC-arranged
      mediation session. The court rejected this argument, finding that participation in
      protected activity “doesn’t insulate an employee from being discharged for
      conduct that, if it occurred outside [that activity], would warrant termination.”
      Id. at 754 (citing Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center, 619 F.3d 741, 745 (7th
      Cir. 2010)).
¶10         In Whatley v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 632 F.2d 1325,
      1328-29 (5th Cir. 1980), the plaintiff alleged that he was asked to resign from his
      Equal Opportunity Compliance Officer position in retaliation for his protected
      activity, which consisted of filing a charge of discrimination with the Federal
      agency funding the defendant’s operations on behalf of an employee of the
      defendant. 2 The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the defendant
      had articulated a valid business reason for the action, i.e., that the action was
      based on the manner in which the plaintiff had handled the discrimination

      2
        The plaintiff’s supervisor had instructed him to inform the employee that she could
      file a discrimination claim with the EEOC or mail it to the funding agency. Whatley,
      632 F.2d at 1327.
                                                                                         5

      complaint and not the fact that he had processed it. Id. The court concluded that
      the plaintiff’s conduct was not protected from consequence by the anti -retaliation
      laws. Id. at 1329. A number of other circuit court and Board decisions stand for
      the same proposition. See, e.g., Rosser v. Laborers’ Int’l Union Local No. 438,
      616 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1980); Rollins v. State of Fla. Department of Law
      Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1989); Pendleton v. Rumsfeld,
      628 F.2d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for
      Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976). See also Williams v.
      Social Security Administration, 101 M.S.P.R. 587, ¶ 13 (2006) (finding that the
      anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII do not shield an employee from discipline
      for improperly obtaining and disclosing confidential documents for use in an
      EEOC proceeding); Bonanova v. Department of Education, 49 M.S.P.R. 294, 300
      (1991) (stating that not all conduct related to an employee’s opposition to
      discrimination is immune from discipline).
¶11         I believe that the type of conduct at issue in this case, name-calling and
      goading of a management official, similarly falls outside of the statutory
      protections.   I agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the
      appellant is not immune from discipline simply because his transgressions
      occurred while he was examining the Commander during a deposition.               The
      administrative judge gave careful and thorough consideration to the evidence
      bearing on the appellant’s retaliation claim and made appropriate credibility
      determinations, and I agree with his finding that the appellan t failed to refute the
      evidence that the removal action was taken because of the charged conduct, and
      not because it was committed while the appellant was participating in protected
      activity. Although the administrative judge analyzed the retaliation clai m under
      the Warren test, instead of considering it under the but-for standard set out in
      Pridgen, his conclusion that the appellant failed to show that the agency removed
      him because of his participation in protected activity is fully supported by the
                                                                                         6

      record, and I would find that he failed to show that his protected activity was a
      but-for cause of the agency’s action.
¶12         For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the initial decision, sustain the
      appellant’s removal, and deny his affirmative defenses.

      /s/
      Raymond A. Limon
      Member