Court Opinion

ID: 9707860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:22.671657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.964943
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this case should be remanded for a specific finding of fact as to Sandoval’s alleged paternity.
*817IC 1971, 31-3-1-6 does not support the majority’s assertion that “[a] finding as to whether Sandoval is or is not the father of Lisa Rosemarie Hamersley is crucial to the proper disposition of the adoption petition.” The statute provides in pertinent part:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a petition to adopt a child under eighteen [18] years of age may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed by:
(2) The mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father of such a child whose paternity has been established by a court proceeding;
“(g) Consent to adoption is not required of:
(2) The natural father of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established by a court proceed-iná[-]” (Emphasis added.)
I agree with the majority that Sandoval suffered no prejudice as a result of the dismissal of his petition to establish paternity. Sandoval had an ample opportunity to present evidence of paternity during the adoption proceeding. The key issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that paternity was never established.
Sandoval had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the natural father of Lisa. The trial court’s finding that paternity was never established was a negative judgment against Sandoval. Where an appellant has suffered a negative judgment in a bench trial in which the trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, that judgment may be disturbed only if clearly erroneous. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A). A finding is clearly erroneous only where the evidence is uncontradicted and will support no reasonable inference in favor of the finding.
The evidence in this case is not without conflict. Sandoval presents evidence of his cohabitation with the mother and his support of the child for a time after her birth. On the other hand, in the mother’s verified consent to the adoption she stated that the father of Lisa is unknown. There is also evidence that Sandoval voluntarily established his paternity of two prior children but failed to do so in Lisa’s case. Additionally, the evidence shows that while Lisa was in the custody of the Hamersleys, Sandoval failed to communicate significantly with her. Although Sandoval presented much testimony to show that he was unable to communicate with Lisa due to the efforts of both her mother and the Hamersleys, the issue before the court was -not whether the child was abandoned under IC 1971, 31-3-1 — 6(g)(1) but rather, had Sandoval presented sufficient evidence to establish his paternity. Abandonment becomes an issue only after paternity is established. The court specifically found that Lisa's paternity was never established. Such a finding is not clearly erroneous.
Consent to adoption is not required of the natural father whose child was born out of wedlock unless his paternity has been established by a court proceeding. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that paternity was not established. Sandoval’s consent was not required. I would therefore affirm the judgments of both trial courts.