Court Opinion

ID: 9551543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:54:57.560358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:05.941590
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur with the result reached by the Court in this case, and am likewise in complete agreement with the analysis set forth in the majority opinion with regard to the exceptions to the warrant requirement which would be required to justify a war-rantless seizure of the marijuana observed in the Spietz house. I am, however, of the opinion that a more thorough and explicit discussion of the parameters of the “Plain View” doctrine than that offered by the majority is necessary to insure a full understanding of why that doctrine does not permit the seizure in question.
The decision announced by this Court today, insofar as it is concluded that no war-rantless seizure under the aegis of the plain view doctrine is proper under the factual circumstances of this case, does not represent any new extension of the rule enunciated in Coolidge. Nor is it in any way inconsistent with the language and tenor of past discussions of the doctrine as appear in such cases as Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 513-516 (Alaska 1973). In view, however, of the complexities and sometimes confusing convolutions encountered in dealing with the concept of plain view seizures, and lest this decision be viewed as a departure from established precedent, I feel that valuable guidance may be found in the following excellent analysis set forth in Brown v. State, 15 Md.App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972), which I would hereby incorporate in toto to more clearly explicate our position:
In enunciating the rationale for the “Plain View” exception, Coolidge sets out “the two distinct constitutional pro*526tections served by the warrant requirement.” It protects against “any intrusion in the way of search or seizure” which is not justified by “a careful prior determination of necessity.” It then mandates that even “those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible.” It reasons that the “Plain-View” exception is not in conflict with the first objective because the plain view does not occur until after the valid intrusion has already been made and its purpose is already in progress. It then reasons that the plain view exception is consistent with the second objective “since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratory one.”
It becomes apparent that the “Plain View” Doctrine comprehends only one variety of the ocular “plain view’s.” It does not contemplate the non-intrusion visual observation, such as where evidence is in “open view” and therefore seizable in a “constitutionally non-protected area.” See Hester v. United States, [265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898 (1924)], wherein evidence was seen and was validly seized in an “open field,” notwithstanding police trespass upon the field. Nor does the "Plain View” Doctrine contemplate the pre-in-trusion visual observation of evidence in "open view" inside a “constitutionally protected area,” such as a house, garage, automobile, etc., from a vantage point outside the “constitutionally protected area." Here the valid visual observation simply furnishes probable cause for (1) the issuance of a warrant, Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925); or (2) the war-rantless entry of a vehicle or vessel, provided exigent circumstances are also present, United States v. Lee, [274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927)]; Scales v. State, 13 Md.App. 474, 284 A. 2d 45; or (3) the warrantless entry to effect an arrest for a crime being committed in the officer’s presence, Agnello, [Agnello v. United States], 269 U.S. 20, at 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145; Griffin v. State, 200 Md. 569, 92 A.2d 743. As a nonsearch, the visual observation itself is legitimate; but it may never, standing alone, justify an intrusion. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 52 S.Ct. 466, 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932). Thus, the formal “Plain View” Doctrine, as announced in Coolidge, is exclusively a post-intrusion phenomenon.
The chameleon-like quality of the phrase “plain view” stems from its loose employment to describe these visually similar but legally distinct situations. Although they share the common denominator of a nonsearching, sighting of evidence in “open view,” the non-intrusion observation needs no further justification for a seizure; the pre-intrusion observation does need some additional legal predicate for the intrusion necessary to effect the seizure; and the post-intrusion — or truly “Plain View” — observation has already validly surmounted the intrusion hurdle.
292 A.2d ,at 774-775 (emphasis added) (footnote deleted).
In the instant case we are dealing with the situation described by Brown, supra, as a
pre-intrusion visual observation of evidence in “open view” inside a “constitutionally protected area,” such as a house . , from a vantage point outside the “constitutionally protected area.” [which] simply furnishes probable cause for [the issuance of a warrant or an entry and seizure under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement].
Thus, as is pointed out in the majority opinion, the door of the Spietz residence operates for purposes of the respondent’s fourth amendment rights as the threshold of his “constitutionally protected area,” the reasonable boundary of his “expectation of privacy,” and, absent circumstances giving rise to an exception to the requirement, entry therein to seize items in plain view must be by a warrant.