Court Opinion

ID: 9744309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:00:04.628701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.446703
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYESSCOUGH, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I specially concur in part, and I respectfully dissent in part. Although the trial judge was certainly aware of the Montgomery balancing test, the record gives no indication that he conducted any balancing test, let alone a meaningful balancing test. The judge did not conclude that the probative value would outweigh the prejudice. Moreover, had the court conducted the meaningful balancing test, it most likely would have concluded that the probative value of admission of the conviction set forth in exhibit No. 1, burglary, a crime similar to those for which defendant was on trial — home invasion and unlawful restraint — would not outweigh the prejudice to defendant. The trial judge instead merely opted for the easy alternative — use of the mere-fact approach — obviating the need for the Montgomery balancing test. This court has previously recognized that to properly apply the Montgomery standard the trial court must consider the evidence that the jury will actually receive. People v. Holloman, 304 Ill. App. 3d 177, 183, 709 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1999) (“However, including in this evidentiary balancing process a fact which will never be admitted makes no sense”). Moreover, the supreme court later rejected use of the mere-fact approach. People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 464, 713 N.E.2d 532, 538 (1999). Accordingly, the trial court, in this case, committed plain error when it utilized the mere-fact approach. Further, defendant did not forfeit his right to object to use of the prior convictions or the use of the mere-fact approach by suggesting that the mere-fact approach be used in the alternative, nor is he estopped from raising the issue. At the time that defendant argued in the alternative, the supreme court had not spoken to the issue in Atkinson, and this court recommended use of the mere-fact method. The defendant should not be penalized by this change in the law since Atkinson must be applied retroactively. People v. Corrie, 294 Ill. App. 3d 496, 505, 690 N.E.2d 128, 134 (1998). Nonetheless, I concur with the majority that this error was harmless. “[T]he jury actually acquitted Sparks on the count of home invasion. This verdict is inconsistent with the underlying concern of the prior convictions rule; namely, that a jury may become so impassioned upon hearing of a defendant’s criminal history as to convict on character, not on evidence. Acquittal is not the action of a jury so disposed.” (Emphasis in original.) 314 Ill. App. 3d at 273. For this reason, I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.