Court Opinion

ID: 9418609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:33:58.366304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:07.052700
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brandéis
(with whom Mr. Justice
Holmes concurs), dissenting.
The rule of general law stated by the Court seems to me sound. But I think the judgment should be affirmed. The objection sustained by the Court — that the statute is void because it fails to provide that the Secretary of State shall notify the non-resident defendant — is an objection taken for the first time in this Court. It was not made or considered below; and it is not to be found in the assignments of error filed in this Court. The only objection made or considered below was that the state court lacked jurisdiction, because the defendant had not been personally served within the State. In other words, that while the State might require the defendant to appoint the Secretary of State as his agent to receive service, as held in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, service without such appointment is bad. When the case at bar was decided below, the validity for that objection was an open question. Before the case was reached for argument in this Court, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, settled that process other than personal service within the State may suffice to give jurisdiction over non-resident motorists. The objection now urged — that failure to prescribe the Secretary shall notify the non-resident denies due process — is an afterthought provoked by our decision in Hess v. Pawloski.
The nature of our jurisdiction under § 237 of the Judicial Code demands a rigorous adherance to the long estab*26lished practice that objections not raised or considered below cannot be relied on here. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 363; Edwards v Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 557; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 89; Detroit, Fort Wayne & Belle Isle Ry. v. Osborn, 189 U. S. 383, 390-391; Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446, 451; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 301. It is immaterial that Wuchter made a general objection that the statute violated the due process clause. Compare Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-201; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 632. The wisdom of that rule of practice is illustrated by what has happened in the case at bar. The reversal rests wholly upon a construction given to the New Jersey statute by this Court. It construes the statute as not requiring the Secretary of State to give notice to the defendant. Whether the Court of Errors and Appeals would have so construed the statute is at least doubtful. Had the objection been made there, it is possible — and indeed probable' — that the highest court of New Jersey would have construed the statute as requiring the notice. Its able opinion shows that it appreciates fully the requirements of the due process clause. See also Redzina v. Provident Institution for Savings, 96 N. J. Eq. 346.
For aught that appears, it may have been the uniform practice of the Secretary to give notice whenever the address of the defendant was ascertainable. Such an administrative construction would carry great weight with the courts of New Jersey, State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J. L. 1 ; Stephens v. Civil Service Commission, 101 N. J. L. 192, 194, as it would with this Court. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U. S. 337. Moreover, the rule that a construction which raises a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute will not be adopted if some other construction is open, is a rule commonly acted upon by the courts of New Jersey, Colwell v. May’s *27Landing Water & Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 245, 249; Atlantic City Water Works Co. v. Consumers Water Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 427, 437; State v. Tachin, 92 N. J. L. 269, 274, as it is in this Court. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 217; Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 261 U. S. 379, 383; South Utah Mines v. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325, 331; Matthew Addy Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 239, 245; Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 389-390; Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 251; Hopkins v. Southern California Telephone Co., 275 U. S. 393. Compare Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 268; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 546. As was said in St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 369: “We ought not to indulge the presumption either that the legislature intended to exceed the limits imposed upon state action by the Federal Constitution, or that the courts of the State will so interpret the legislation as to lead to that result.” See also Chicago, Terre Haute & Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283, 287.
While this Court has power to construe the statute, it is not obliged to do so. We have often recognized the propriety of remanding a case to a state court for the determination of a delicate question of state law. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 506; Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 291; Missouri ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 273 U. S. 126, 131; Cobb Brick Co. v. Lindsay, 275 U. S. 491. If the judgment is to be reversed, it should be specifically for the purpose of enabling the Court of Errors and Appeals to pass upon the objection first raised by the defendant in this Court.
In the case at bar, the objection is not lack of jurisdiction, but denial of due process because the statute did not require the Secretary to notify the non-resident defend*28ant. Notice was in fact given. And it was admitted at the bar that the defendant had, at all times, actual knowledge and the opportunity to defend. The cases cited by the Court as holding that he could deliberately disregard that notice and opportunity and yet insist upon a defect in the statute as drawn, although he was in no way prejudiced thereby, seem hardly reconcilable with a long line of authorities. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 238-239; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 436-437; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 227-228; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620; Aikens v. Kingsbury, 247 U. S. 484, 489. For the reasons stated, I do not need to attempt to reconcile them.