Court Opinion

ID: 9766726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:57:15.431985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:25.221863
License: Public Domain

BENAVIDES, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion and resulting decision of Justice Seerden, except insofar as its language reciting that the discretion of the trial court in imposing sanctions for discovery abuse is similar to the trier of fact in a criminal case assessing punishment within a range of punishment. As long as punishment is assessed within the allowable range of punishment for the offense committed (absent due process challenges and cruel and unusual considerations) there is no required review of the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the *390actual punishment assessed in a criminal case. On the other hand, however difficult it might be, we are to view the trial court sanction in a civil case with an eye toward whether the trial court’s act was arbitrary or unreasonable.
I do not believe that once having been established, a violation of the discovery rules per se mean that any of the sanctions allowed under Rule 215 may be imposed and is not subject to the test of whether the action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Indeed, our Supreme Court has expressly reiterated that “ ... [Ajnother way of stating the test is whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. [Citation omitted].” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 at 242 (Tex.1985).
The changes in the rule reflecting the “continuing pattern to broaden discovery and to encourage sanctions for failure to comply” referred to in Downer does not equate to an axiom that if the discovery process is abused, any sanction allowed by the rules is not subject to review. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242.
While the guiding rules and principles may be vague in the period of transition from “game playing” and a lax adherence to the discovery process toward the bold encouragement of the trial courts to use sanctions to bring about strict compliance, case law, logic and the particulars of each case with an eye toward the particular violation(s) and sanction(s) should result in the evolution of clearly articulated guidelines that should make the task more manageable for the reviewing courts. Certainly one can imagine a scenario where a sanction authorized by the rule could be arbitrary and unreasonable. One must trust that the development of law to correct intolerant discovery abuse will likewise be intolerant to an abuse in the corrective system.
Justice Kilgarlin in writing on the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice has written:
... [I]n many cases the gravity of the misconduct is a function of the plaintiffs culpability; the more culpable the plaintiff, the more likely final dismissal is justified. A showing of actual bad faith, as opposed to a lower degree of fault, such as negligence, may be necessary. The gravity of the plaintiff’s abuse of discovery may also be reflected in the resultant harm to the defendant. The greater the defendant’s harm, the greater the justification for dismissal with prejudice. For instance, if the plaintiff’s actions have precluded the defendant from obtaining helpful evidence, dismissal with prejudice may be necessary to protect the defendant. Other circumstances may call for the harsh sanction of final dismissal; but, in general, any time a trial court contemplates disposal of a lawsuit on procedural grounds rather than on the merits it must exercise caution, [citations omitted] Kilgarlin and Jackson, “Sanctions for Discovery Abuse Under New Rule 215,” 15 St. Mary’s L.J. 767 at 801, 802 (1984).
Justice Seerden’s opinion states quite clearly the discovery violations in the instant appeal and enumerates valid considerations properly before the trial court to satisfy me that the court did not abuse its discretion. The discovery violations together with outright misrepresentations by appellant’s attorney Evans reflect the type of “game playing” and abuse of the system that we cannot overlook in reviewing the trial court’s decision. Appellee could not proceed, to trial on trial date with the benefits of discovery allowed him or to which he was entitled by the Rules of Civil Procedure because of appellant’s discovery abuse. I agree with my brother Seerden that the record does not indicate that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.