Court Opinion

ID: 9712749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:15.34671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.165458
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. In my view, the proposed widening of River Street violates the statutory dedications of the land as a public common.
In 1807 the Pennsylvania Legislature dedicated a portion of the land in question in the following terms:
“And be it further enacted . . . That all that certain tract of land fronting the town lots in the borough of Wilkes-Barre, on the bank of the Susquehanna . be, and the same hereby is granted and set apart as a public common, and to remain as such forever.”
Act of April 9, 1807, Section III, 4 Sm.L. 411, Law Book Vol. XI at 47. (Emphasis added.)
*248Another parcel for the Common was dedicated by the Legislature in 1846:
“That all that certain tract of land, fronting the town lots in the borough of Wilkes-Barre, on the bank of the Susquehanna . . . and the same hereby is granted and set apart as a public common, and to be under the control and jurisdiction of the town council of said borough.”
Act of March 28, 1946, P.L. 196, § 6. (Emphasis added.)
The dedications expressly grant the land for use “as a public common.” The majority finds that the use of part of that land as a road does not violate the dedications. I cannot agree.
The majority concedes that our case law is that “land so dedicated . . . may be diverted by the responsible public officials neither to private uses . . . nor to public uses not within those designated or specified in the dedicatory language.” Yet that is precisely what is being done here. Although using the land as widened street is, no doubt, a public use as the majority finds, it is not use of the land as a “common” as I understand that term. The majority incorrectly equates “public use” with “public common.” Nor can I conclude, as the majority seems to, that such a taking of more than one half acre of the Common land for use as a street is de minimis.
I am also not persuaded that Penn DOT sustained its burden under Section 13 of the Act of May 6, 1970, P.L. 356, No. 120, as amended, 71 P.S. § 512 (Supp.1976), of showing that there is no feasible alternative to use of this historic and recreational land.