Court Opinion

ID: 9725699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:02:04.949513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:18.415089
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.

{dissenting).

i
While I agree with the majority that “a sentencing court need not consider the length of a consecutive or concurrent mandatory sentence when setting an indeterminate sentence,” ante at 95, I dissent from the majority’s decision that “the trial court erred when it modified defendant’s felony-firearm sentence and implicitly resentenced defendant to the same prison term for armed robbery sua sponte and without a resentencing hearing.” Ante at 100.
While the trial court may choose to treat the omission as a material factor and resentence in that event, it is not error to fail to do so. The sentence for the underlying offense was valid because it was based on accurate information. The defendant does not claim a mistake in the presentence report of which he was unaware, that his attorney was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty, or that the prosecutor was aware of the prior conviction and agreed to forgo the *106prior conviction in the plea or sentence bargain.1 Nor is this a situation in which defendant pleaded guilty of one offense and was sentenced incorrectly on an offense to which he did not plead guilty. See, e.g., People v Corlin, 95 Mich App 740; 291 NW2d 188 (1980).
The trial court had no discretion with regard to the sentence for the separate felony-firearm offense; thus, its correction nunc pro tunc, was a ministerial act not requiring a resentencing hearing. People v Maxson, 163 Mich App 467; 415 NW2d 247 (1987). Counsel for defendant acknowledged that he and the defendant had reviewed the presentence report “together,” and that “[f] actually . . . there are no corrections or additions that need to be made to this report.” The presentence report correctly reflected that the defendant pleaded guilty of the offense for which he was sentenced. While the trial court might have adjusted the sentence for the underlying offense downward had it known of the other felony-firearm conviction, the defendant foreclosed that option by his representation that the presentence report was accurate. The trial court may remit that forfeiture or decline to do so.
*107n
I do not dispute that the “cases presume that the correction of a sentence found invalid because of inaccuracies in information relied on at sentencing will occur at a resentencing hearing.” Ante at 99. Defendant has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of a conclusion that is unsupported in fact. Townsend v Burke, 334 US 736; 68 S Ct 1252; 92 L Ed 1690 (1948). The majority, however, is unable to find any authority applying this principle to find that a resentence is required at the behest of a defendant where what was omitted was information that would have been detrimental to the defendant if known to the sentencing judge. The situation before us is one in which the sentence was valid and the information on which it was based was accurate, but incomplete.
Defendant does not point to any specific error in the armed robbery sentence, in fact conceding its validity. Just as the prosecutor could not later seek to reopen a sentence where it had knowledge that the court had proceeded on the factually incorrect basis that the defendant had fewer convictions than he actually did, an omission that operates in the defendant’s favor, and to which the defendant does not object, does not render an otherwise valid sentence invalid.
In In re Jenkins, 438 Mich 364, 370; 475 NW2d 279 (1991), we explained:
In the current legal culture, the trial judge must bring to bear at the moment of sentencing all the knowledge, experience, and ability available, because the decision made at that moment will be that judge’s ultimate ruling. The sentencing process is carefully designed to ensure conscien*108tious and informed decision making as of that moment. Every effort is made to ensure that the judge has adequate and accurate information upon which to base the sentencing decision. Sentencing occurs only after the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, the prosecutor, and the victims have all had the opportunity to present their views to the court. MCR 6.425. In addition, the presentence report is prepared to provide the court with as much information as possible so that the sentence can be tailored to fit the circumstances. The parties have the opportunity to review the presentence report and to challenge the accuracy of any information it contains in advance of sentencing. MCR 6.425. The current system encourages the judge to thoughtfully consider every factor before sentencing the defendant. [Emphasis added.]
Judges may wish to amend sentences to reflect the downward adjustment in the underlying sentence they would have made had they been aware of the prior convictions, and may do so. However to hold that they must do so, undermines the interest in finality and discourages full disclosure by the defendant to counsel so that counsel can fulfill obligations both to the client and the court. Defendant and his counsel had an opportunity to argue that the sentence for the underlying offense should be tailored to the circumstances. People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 513-515; 287 NW2d 165 (1980). Under these circumstances, that opportunity came and went at the time of sentencing. From all that appears here, defendant knowingly profited from an inaccurate presentence report and now seeks relief from an inaccuracy for which he must be deemed responsible (because he does not allege ignorance of the facts). A trial judge may grant relief in such circumstances, but is not required to do so.
I would hold that the trial judge was not required to reopen the sentence for the underlying offense and *109hold a resentencing hearing. The felony-firearm determinate sentence was invalid, and its correction by the judge was a ministerial act because the judge had no discretion to impose a sentence other than that mandated by MCL 750.227b(l); MSA 28.424(2)(1). I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Justice Cavanagh’s view that a defendant could argue at resentencing that a two-year sentence was part of the plea bargain is a non sequitur. The question before us is not whether defendant could move to withdraw a plea on the basis that the resentencing violated a plea bargain or that the plea was involuntary because defendant did not understand the consequences. He could have so argued here. If successful in that argument, the result would not be resentencing, but either specific performance or an order allowing withdrawal of the plea. He has not made such claims.