Court Opinion

ID: 9965755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:07:39.62624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.135472
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2022-CA-0609-MR

DERICK BARNETT                                     APPELLANT

         APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.     HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                ACTION NO. 20-CR-001063

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2022-CA-0886-MR

DERICK BARNETT                                     APPELLANT

         APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.     HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                ACTION NO. 20-CR-001063

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE
                               OPINION
                 AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Derick J. Barnett (Barnett), was convicted of

flagrant nonsupport for failing to pay child support arrearages. He was sentenced

to serve two years and six months’ imprisonment, probated for five years. Barnett

was subsequently ordered to pay $106,025.62 in restitution, which constituted his

total delinquent balance at the time. Two separate appeals were filed, one from the

criminal conviction, and one from the restitution order. These cases have been

consolidated and both matters are addressed herein. Barnett raises the following

four arguments: 1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed

verdict; 2) the jury verdict was not unanimous; 3) his due process rights were

violated as a result of the Commonwealth’s unreasonable and prejudicial pre-

indictment delay; and 4) the court abused its discretion by ordering restitution. For

the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

             We will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict

“if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to

find guilt[.]” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)

(citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)) (emphasis added).

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When ruling on a directed verdict motion, the trial court must assume that the

Commonwealth’s evidence is true. Id. Our review is confined to the proof at trial

and the statutory elements of the alleged offense. See Lawton v. Commonwealth,

354 S.W.3d 565, 575 (Ky. 2011). Pursuant to the most current version of KRS1

530.050(2), for a jury to find a defendant guilty of flagrant nonsupport, the

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant:

                persistently fails to provide support which he or she can
                reasonably provide and which the person knows he or
                she has a duty to provide by virtue of a court or
                administrative order to a minor, a child adjudged
                mentally disabled, an indigent spouse, or indigent parent,
                and the failure results in:

                (a) An arrearage of not less than two thousand five
                hundred dollars ($2,500); or

                (b) Six (6) consecutive months without payment of
                support[.]

(Emphasis added.) In its Appellee brief, the Commonwealth summarizes the

Barnett’s charges:

                [R]ecords introduced by the Commonwealth reflected
                that in 2017, Barnett missed eight months’ payments. In
                2018, Barnett failed to make payments for 11 consecutive
                months. In 2019, Barnett failed to make payments for 10
                consecutive months, missing a total of 11 months’
                payments. Further, Barnett failed to make payments in
                either January or February of 2020. As a result of his
                failure, Barnett’s total arrearage, as of February 2020,
                was $70,472.47.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -3-
(Internal record citations omitted.) Multiple witnesses testified at trial, including

the child’s mother, Betty Coleman, and Jim Oxyer, an employee of the Jefferson

County Child Support Office. The Commonwealth introduced Barnett’s original

child support order, the child support worksheet, and an audit of his support

payments and arrearages.2

                Barnett also testified. He stated that he had been incarcerated from

approximately 2005 through 2012, and that he was previously arrested five times

for flagrant nonsupport. All three witnesses testified concerning Barnett’s previous

employment. Barnett testified that he worked incrementally in construction

between 2017 and 2020. No evidence was presented indicating that Barnett could

not work as a result of injury or illness. Rather, there was sufficient evidence

presented indicating that Barnett had the capacity to earn an income and, thus, he

could have “reasonably provided” the delinquent child support payments.

Furthermore, even when omitting consideration of the years he was incarcerated,

the evidence presented satisfies also KRS 530.050(2)(a) and (b) – even though

only one is required. There was no error in denying Barnett’s motion for a directed

verdict.

2
    The child, D.K.B., is emancipated.

                                           -4-
                Barnett next argues that the jury instruction was not unanimous, and

therefore reversal of his conviction is required. As summarized most recently in

Johnson v. Commonwealth:

                the Supreme Court of the United States made the Sixth
                Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous jury applicable
                to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. That
                changed little in the way of Kentucky law since our own
                constitution also guarantees unanimous jury verdicts.
                Ky. Const. § 7.

676 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Ky. 2023), reh’g denied (Sep. 28, 2023). In the present

case, the period in the indictment was September 27, 2004, through February 25,

2020. Barnett’s more precise argument here is that the jury instruction was

“duplicitous because numerous instances of the crime of nonsupport were

presented, yet the jury was only instructed on a single crime.” He requests

palpable error review pursuant to RCr3 10.26. “An error is palpable, we have

explained, only if it is clear or plain under current law . . . .” Commonwealth v.

Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). And in Sexton v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court indicated

that “reversal is not the universal, essential result of a unanimous verdict error.”

647 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Ky. 2022). More recently, the Court overruled several of its

previous unanimity cases and held that “[o]nly if, upon review, a court can

3
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -5-
conclude the error is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens

the integrity of the judicial process, will reversal be warranted. It should be so

egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.” Johnson, 676

S.W.3d at 417 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the absence of

controlling authority to the contrary, we cannot conclude that the standard in

Johnson has been satisfied here. There was no palpable error.

             For his next unpreserved argument, Barnett contends that his due

process rights were violated as a result of the Commonwealth’s unreasonable and

prejudicial pre-indictment delay. Barnett essentially argues that he was denied due

process because he was not previously tried as a result of his multi-decade

delinquency, although he had previously been arrested. Any prior indictments

appear to have been dismissed. In any event, “unjustified and prejudicial

preindictment delay may constitute a violation of due process and require

dismissal.” Kirk v. Commonwealth, 6 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Ky. 1999). However,

“dismissal is required only where there is both substantial prejudice and an

intentional delay to gain tactical advantage.” Id. (emphasis added). Barnett has

not sufficiently demonstrated either element. There is certainly no palpable error

here.

                                          -6-
             Lastly, Barnett argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering

restitution. Restitution is governed by KRS 532.032(1), which provides as

follows:

             Restitution to a named victim, if there is a named victim,
             shall be ordered in a manner consistent, insofar as
             possible, with the provisions of this section and KRS
             439.563, 532.033, 533.020, and 533.030 in addition to
             any other part of the penalty for any offense under this
             chapter. The provisions of this section shall not be
             subject to suspension or nonimposition.

We review a trial court’s findings regarding restitution for an abuse of discretion.

Bentley v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Ky. App. 2016). The test for

abuse of discretion is “whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

             Barnett’s primary contention is that the victim, Betty Coleman, had

already been paid monthly benefits through a social support system called

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). A similar system referenced

during the underlying restitution hearing was the Kentucky Transitional Assistance

Program (K-TAP). The child support audit reflects these payments. Pursuant to

these programs, the Commonwealth would pay Ms. Coleman during periods in

which Barnett was delinquent in his support obligations. Barnett therefore

contends that she had no recognizable financial loss necessary to be entitled to

                                         -7-
restitution. Otherwise, he asserts that Ms. Coleman would receive the benefit of

double recovery. In contrast, we are persuaded by the Commonwealth’s assertion

that:

             there is no double-recovery to Coleman because Oxyer
             testified that the child support office was a “flow-through
             system” and that the Commonwealth would recoup from
             Barnett the TANF benefit it advanced to Coleman.
             Kentucky’s administrative regulatory scheme is clear that
             there is no double recovery from a K-TAP benefit. See
             921 KAR 1:420. There is no basis for Barnett’s claim
             that Coleman would receive a double recovery.

Furthermore, the cases cited by Barnett are distinguishable. Compare Vaughn v.

Commonwealth, 371 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Ky. App. 2012) (holding that trial court

lacked authority to order defendants to pay restitution to reimburse the

Commonwealth for extradition costs) with Gamble v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W.3d

406, 410 (Ky. App. 2009) (concluding that money owed for past due child support

constitutes “restitution” within the meaning of KRS 532.350(1)).

             And although we agree with the Commonwealth as to the merits of

this issue, we also acknowledge that the restitution order at issue here omits a

payee. Therefore, we vacate the restitution order and remand this case for a new

order indicating to whom the support payments are to be paid. See Compise v.

Commonwealth, 597 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Ky. App. 2020) (“If an order of restitution

fails to set forth the provisions required by KRS 532.033, it is appropriate . . . to

vacate and remand such an order with instructions for the court to enter a proper

                                          -8-
order.”). To be clear, the order shall expressly indicate any money designated to

be paid to the Commonwealth pursuant to the applicable statutory, regulatory, or

other legal dictates. See KRS 532.033. Similarly, any funds ordered to be paid

directly to Ms. Coleman shall also be denominated.

             And since we are remanding, the court may consider whether the

$106,025.62 sum exceeds the $100,000.00 cap enumerated in KRS 533.030(3).

See Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 32 (Ky. 2011) (“Appellant’s

argument that the imposition of restitution in excess of the $100,000.00

violated KRS 533.030(3) is a true ‘sentencing issue’ and we review it despite the

lack of preservation.”). Any of Barnett’s remaining arguments on the issue of

restitution are either insufficiently preserved or otherwise unpersuasive.

             For the following reasons, we hereby AFFIRM Barnett’s conviction.

We VACATE the restitution order and REMAND for the entry of a new order in

accordance with this decision.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael C. Lemke                           Daniel Cameron
Louisville, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Christina L. Romano
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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