Court Opinion

ID: 9648585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:28:18.59571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:03.405787
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Mrs. Klein urges that we should reform the judgment by (1) holding the lien against her Hood Street house invalid; (2) instructing the trial court not to pay the proceeds of the sale of éxempt property to unsecured creditors; (3) properly divide the cash surrender value of appellee’s life insurance policy and (4) award the 1959 Oldsmobile to appellant. We sustain the first two contentions, the third in part and overrule the fourth.
Appellant first contends that we erred in holding there was evidence that monthly payments were made from community funds to discharge a purchase money lien on her Hood Street house, or that the trial court so found; that we erred in holding a lien was properly fixed against appellant’s Hood Street house, because there was no evidence, or finding, of enhancement in its value by reason of such payments, if any. Appellant says appellee did not plead that community funds were spent for the benefit of her separate property, for which the community was entitled to reimburse*774ment. She says that the lien for $1625.11, was fixed against her Hood Street house by virtue of a finding by the trial court that the wife was “generally” indebted to the community, presumably because of her general and free spending of community funds. Appellant says there is no evidence of enhancement in the value of said property by virtue of such payments by the community, if any. The rule relative to enhancement of the value of the property of one estate by payments made by another applies to improvements. It is not necessary to decide whether it applies to payments to discharge a purchase money debt and lien. The right to reimbursement between estates is not a fixed right in the property sought to be charged but only an equity. “The decisions have correctly classified the right of the one making such advancement as an equity, and the final determination of the rights of the respective parties is . to be determined upon equitable principles as to the amount of reimbursement, as well as the means of enforcing the same. It is not a mere question of balancing ledger accounts.” Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627. In Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334, the court said “interest paid during coverture out of community funds on the prenuptial debts of either the husband or the wife on land, and taxes, would not even create an equitable claim for reimbursement, unless it is shown that the expenditures by the community are greater than the benefits received.” It is true, as pointed out by appellant, that appel-lee definitely testified that he did not make any payment on the Hood Street house. However, he did thereafter testify that some check records showed payments out of a fund unnamed, for a purpose unstated, to Metropolitan Savings and Loan on Mrs. Ardis’ house on Hood Street. (See s. f. 355). Appellant correctly contends the trial court made no express finding that such payments were made out of the community estate to discharge- a purchase money debt and lien against appellant’s Hood Street house. Defendant’s exhibits 24, 25 and 26 show fourteen payments to Metropolitan of $48.95 and one of $112.61, aggregating $797.91. This could not sustain the lien to the extent of $1625.11 against appellant’s Hood Street house in favor of the community. The record shows that for some period of time during the existence of the marriage the Hood Street house was rented for $60.-00 per month. The rent belonged to the community. Since the right to reimbursement is but an equity and the record does not disclose that income from the property to the community was less than the amount paid out by the community, if any, on said property, under the holding of the Colden case, supra, there was not even an equitable claim for reimbursement. We sustain said first contention, grant the motion for rehearing to that extent and reform the judgment so as to disallow any lien in favor of the community against appellant’s Hood Street house.
We also sustain appellant’s second contention. The court cannot, over appellant’s objection, pay the proceeds of exempt property to unsecured creditors. We also sustain appellant’s third contention, in part. Under Article 3832a the cash surrender value of appellee’s life insurance policy, in force more than two years, is exempt from liability for debts and cannot, over appellant’s objection, be applied to the payment of unsecured creditors. It is community property and is to be divided between the parties in accord with established legal principles. See 20 Tex.Jur.2d 556, 559. As we understand the evidence, despite that pointed out by appellant, there was evidence that the automobile was not paid for out of appellant’s separate estate. Its status was a question of fact. The fourth contention is overruled.
No one asks for a reversal of the judgment. Appellant prays that it only be reformed. Our former judgment is set aside. Costs of appeal are taxed against the appel-lee. The motion for rehearing is granted in part and the judgment of the trial court is reformed in accord with our holdings on appellant’s first three stated contentions. As so reformed, the judgment is affirmed.