Court Opinion

ID: 9852237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:00.865931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.553186
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent because I believe that this case is an example of how persistent litigation can so warp the facts over a period of time that a travesty is imposed on a small rural county in Minnesota. On three separate occasions, the court of appeals has shifted position; thus giving rise to this protracted litigation. In addition, the court of appeals has improperly engaged in factfinding, and its findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
The record in this case reveals that, at every initial stage, no discrimination was found. A union grievance was denied, the Department of Human Rights found no discrimination, and the trial court found no discrimination. Moreover, in the first appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. On appeal to this court, we remanded not so much because we disagreed with the trial court’s finding of no discrimination, but because we believed that the trial court had not properly applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis mandated by earlier decisions of this court.
On remand, the trial court again found no discrimination; but on the second appeal, the court of appeals reversed its earlier decision and found that an opening for deputy assessor had existed for some time prior to the fall of 1979 and that plaintiff was wrongfully denied the opportunity to fill it until the fall of 1979. The case was remanded a second time. The trial court then found that any claim, if it existed, was barred by the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, on the third appeal, the court of appeals now says that it meant that there was a continuing discrimination even after the fall of 1979; therefore, the statute of limitations does not bar the suit. I believe this holding to be clearly erroneous and would reverse the court of appeals for the following reasons:
1. I pointed out in my partial dissent in the first appeal that, at some point, litigation must come to an end; yet, here we are on another appeal to this court. No discrimination was found at any level until the second appeal to the court of appeals. True, an advisory jury to the trial court in the first trial found some discrimination, but one has to wonder whether this finding was based solely on the sexist remarks of the county assessor rather than on any discrimination in action. This finding of the advisory jury, though rejected by the trial court, was resurrected by the court of appeals and will now cost Isanti County very dearly.
*692.In my opinion, the majority decision lacks foundation both in fact and law. When the plaintiff was first hired, she was hired as a stenographer and had only a high school education. Her subsequent training as a field appraiser was at county expense. The record shows that she was a difficult person with whom to work. She frequently refused directives from her boss and was disciplined by him on several occasions. At one time, she left the office considering herself fired over differences with the county assessor, but was allowed to return. In the year she was hired, two deputy assessors — Curtis Becker and Duane Johnson — were also hired. Their educational qualifications were far superior to those of Sigurdson; they were both college graduates and one of them had experience as a teacher and high school principal. Both had pertinent experience in farm work and knowledge of local farm values.
There is no question that, on many occasions, each employee in the office could be engaged in similar duties, which is typical in a small rural county with few employees in each department. The department head does not have the luxury of rigidly defining the job description for each person. People are expected to be versatile and able to perform a number of tasks.
As in the situation here, when difficult appraisal situations arose, decisions had to be made by those with superior qualifications. Curtis Becker, with whom Sigurd-son insists she should be compared, and Duane Johnson had college degrees, farm backgrounds and knowledge of rural buildings and values. In April 1976, Duane Johnson quit, leaving a deputy assessor position open. Is it discrimination if a county assessor does not fill this vacancy with a person of Sigurdson’s qualifications if the assessor believes the qualifications to be inadequate? I think not. A supervisor must be given some discretion in hiring, firing and placing people in positions for which they are best qualified. True, the county did not have a good job classification system, but how many small counties do? If the assessor here had specifically defined each person’s responsibilities and asked Sigurdson tq perform deputy assessor’s duties temporarily in the absence of a deputy, would she have helped out? I believe the answer would be “no” because, on one occasion, in a similar situation, Sigurd-son had asked her supervisor why she was being asked to do the requested work when she had been previously led to believe that she was not qualified to do it. We must also bear in mind that Sigurdson was elevated in job description and pay to that of a field appraiser when she completed her studies. However, that does not entitle the court to hold that, by becoming a field appraiser, she was entitled to demand the post of deputy assessor as well.
3. The majority’s decision opens up the possibility of many other possible claims of discrimination being brought years and even decades after the claimed act of discrimination took place. This is the very reason the discrimination statute contains a limitations period. Sigurdson knew for almost 2 years — from 1978 to 1980 — that the union was negotiating a contract with the county. Though she should have known that the contract was executed in March 1980, she waited more than 6 months before bringing any claim. When she did, it was after the statute of limitations expired.
4. Of course, the courts must be diligent in eliminating all unfair forms of inequality. However, it is one thing to promote equality; it is quite another for an appellate court to substitute itself for a trial court and engage in selective interpretation in order to find “facts” which constitute discrimination. Such conduct promotes inequality rather than equality. The majority’s decision will not promote equality, but rather gives plaintiff preferential treatment simply because of her sex.
Moreover, the second decision of the court of appeals indicated that the advisory jury’s damage recommendation should be considered as a guide by the trial court. By holding that the act of discrimination was a continuing violation for over a dozen years, the majority’s reasoning now exposes the county to damages which could far exceed the jury award and create a tremendous financial burden for a small county to bear where the facts do not, in my opinion, *70justify a conclusion of any discrimination, a finding supported by the union, the Department of Human Rights and the trial court.