Court Opinion

ID: 9389815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:04:04.379156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.926444
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed April 26, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-883
                      Lower Tribunal No. F04-8716B
                          ________________

                            Shayeon Swain,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L.
Fernandez, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
      In 2008, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Shayeon Swain

pleaded guilty to the charges of armed burglary, armed robbery, attempted

armed robbery, aggravated battery, and two counts of attempted second-

degree murder. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State nolle prossed other

pending charges, and agreed to a sentence of fifteen years’ state prison

followed by five years of reporting probation. The written order of supervision

provided that Swain was required to report to probation upon his release

from prison, and report to probation every month thereafter. At the time of

his plea, Swain signed an acknowledgment form confirming that he received,

read and understood these conditions and agreed to comply with them.

      On April 29, 2019, Swain’s probation officer filed an affidavit of violation

of probation, alleging Swain violated his probation by, inter alia, willfully

failing to comply with the instructions of his probation officer and failing to

report to his probation officer as directed. Based on the filing of the affidavit

of violation, a probation warrant was also issued for Swain’s arrest. That

probation arrest warrant remained outstanding for more than two years, until

June 21, 2021, when Swain was arrested on the warrant.

      Thereafter, the trial court held a violation of probation hearing. The

testimony presented at the hearing included that of Swain’s probation officer,

Ms. Lewis, who testified that on March 8, 2019, following Swain’s release

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from prison, she and Swain met at the probation office, where she instructed

Swain regarding the conditions of his probation and his obligation to report

monthly.   Ms. Lewis ensured Swain understood these conditions of his

supervision and answered any questions he had. Ms. Lewis advised Swain

of his next appointment with her (April 10, 2019) and provided him with a

letter that included the appointment date and time. Nevertheless, Swain

failed to report to the probation office on April 10 as directed and required,

and in fact he never reported to the probation office again. Ms. Lewis filed

the operative affidavit of violation of probation on April 29, 2019, and testified

that she did not know where Swain was for more than two years, when Swain

was taken into custody in 2021 on the outstanding probation warrant.

      Viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to upholding

the trial court’s findings, we hold there was competent substantial evidence

to establish (by the greater weight of the evidence) that Swain willfully and

substantially violated his probation by failing to report as directed by his

probation officer. See State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002) (“The

trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful

and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation

has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.”); Towns v.

State, 259 So. 3d 291, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that the appellate

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court reviews the trial court’s finding of willful and substantial violation for

competent substantial evidence under an abuse of discretion standard).

      While it is true that Swain also testified at the hearing and offered

testimony which, if believed, might diminish or negate the willfulness of his

failure to appear, it was for the trial court, as factfinder, to weigh the testimony

presented and make any credibility determinations necessary to resolve any

conflicts in the testimony or disputed issues of fact, including the

probationer’s intent in failing to comply with his conditions of supervision.

Carter, 835 So. 2d at 262 (“The trial court is in a better position to identify the

probation violator's motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the

violation is both willful and substantial”); Mendoza v. State, 349 So. 3d 912

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Robles-Martinez v. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, 88 So. 3d

177, 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“The testimony and other evidence presented

by the parties required the trial court, as the factfinder, to make credibility

determinations and resolve the conflicts in the evidence. It is not the function

of this court to re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court, but rather to determine whether there was competent substantial

evidence to support the trial court's factual determinations”). We therefore

affirm the trial court’s order revoking Swain’s probation upon a finding of a

willful and substantial violation.

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      In his second claim on appeal, Swain contends that the trial court erred

in entering an order designating Swain a Violent Felony Offender of Special

Concern (VFOSC) who poses a danger to the community, without making

the written findings required by section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2022),

which provides:

      (e) If the court, after conducting the hearing required by
      paragraph (d), determines that a violent felony offender of special
      concern has committed a violation of probation or community
      control other than a failure to pay costs, fines, or restitution, the
      court shall:

      1. Make written findings as to whether or not the violent felony
      offender of special concern poses a danger to the community. In
      determining the danger to the community posed by the offender's
      release, the court shall base its findings on one or more of the
      following:

      a. The nature and circumstances of the violation and any new
      offenses charged.
      b. The offender's present conduct, including criminal convictions.
      c. The offender's amenability to nonincarcerative sanctions
      based on his or her history and conduct during the probation or
      community control supervision from which the violation hearing
      arises and any other previous supervisions, including disciplinary
      records of previous incarcerations.
      d. The weight of the evidence against the offender.
      e. Any other facts the court considers relevant.

      2. Decide whether to revoke the probation or community control.

      a. If the court has found that a violent felony offender of special
      concern poses a danger to the community, the court shall revoke
      probation and shall sentence the offender up to the statutory
      maximum, or longer if permitted by law.

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      b. If the court has found that a violent felony offender of special
      concern does not pose a danger to the community, the court may
      revoke, modify, or continue the probation or community control
      or may place the probationer into community control as provided
      in this section.

(Emphasis added).

      If a probationer qualifies as a VFOSC and is found to have violated a

non-monetary condition of probation, the statute requires the trial court to

make written findings as to whether the probationer poses a danger to the

community. McCray v. State, 283 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). This

statutory requirement of written findings is mandatory, not discretionary.

Smith v. State, 306 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). We review this issue

de novo. McCray, 283 So. 3d at 408.

      We do not reach the merits of Swain’s claim because, as the State

correctly points out, Swain was required to first raise this claim of sentencing

error either at the time of sentencing or by way of a motion pursuant to

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), and the failure to do so renders

the claim unpreserved for appellate review. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(e) (“A

sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has

first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of

sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.800(b)”); Brannon v. State, 850 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2003); Holton v. State,

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318 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (by not filing a motion to correct

sentencing error pursuant to 3.800(b), defendant failed to preserve for

appellate review his claim that trial court erred in failing to make statutorily

required findings of dangerousness under VFOSC statute).

      Affirmed.

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