Court Opinion

ID: 9896625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:05:20.282062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:09.642223
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 In re Enrique R. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re ENRIQUE R., JR., et al.,                                 B325172
 Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                         Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04635E-H
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 MARISSA E.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed.
      Janet H. Saalfield, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Freeman Mathis & Gary and Christian E. Foy Nagy for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                          ____________________
       Appellant Marissa E. is the mother of Enrique R., Jr.,
Gabriel R., and Dolores R., whose father is Enrique R., Sr.
(R. father), and of Annabelle S., whose father is Omar S.
(S. father). Neither father is a party to this appeal. Mother
appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders as to all four children. We affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
       The referral prompting the current proceedings followed a
July 2022 act of violence perpetrated by a man named
Brandon H. against mother and the three R. children. Mother
was the initial target of the attack, but Brandon turned on the
children when they stepped in to protect mother. Mother and all
three children sustained significant injuries in the attack.
       Mother had been in a domestic relationship with Brandon
for several years prior to the attack during which there were
many incidents of domestic violence. Mother claimed the
relationship ended in November 2021, three months after she
obtained a restraining order against him. But documented
incidents of domestic violence continued even after the
relationship purportedly ended. Brandon came to mother’s
apartment in February 2022 to discuss reconciliation and choked
her when she asked him to leave. In April 2022, Brandon and
mother were in her bedroom arguing about their relationship
when Brandon became violent and then attempted to hang
himself.
       Police responded to two calls from mother in May 2022
concerning Brandon’s violations of the restraining order. But
there was evidence mother also allowed Brandon to have contact
with the family during that time. For example, on May 8, when
Anthony texted “Hungry,” mother responded “[Brandon]’s gonna

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make some pancakes.” On May 21, mother directed the children
to talk to Brandon when he knocked on the door. Late on the
night of May 26, Annabelle texted mother “where are you” to
which mother responded, “I was dropping off [Brandon] I’ll be
home soon.”
       In June 2022, mother warned the children by group text to
stay in their rooms and “please stay away from [Brandon] he’s
mad right now.” Later that month, Brandon joined the family
chat group using his Google account.
       There were conflicting accounts as to how Brandon came to
be at the family home on the date of his July 2022 attack on
mother and the children. According to mother, Brandon arrived
on his own after being released from the hospital following
surgery and he was angry at mother for not visiting him in the
hospital. Dolores initially corroborated this story but later
recanted, explaining mother had told her not to tell the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) the truth about Brandon. According to Dolores’s
revised account, mother had taken Brandon to the hospital for
his surgery, and, while there, confronted him about texts on his
phone from another woman named Crystal. Mother left when
Brandon responded by grabbing her shirt and twisting it until it
choked her. Nonetheless, mother, with Dolores, picked Brandon
up from the hospital and brought him back to her home. There,
mother took Brandon’s phone and again confronted him about
Crystal, prompting Brandon’s attack. Brandon’s account
corroborated Dolores’s revised account; he said mother was angry
about finding texts from Crystal on his phone at the hospital,
that he returned “home” to mother’s house after the hospital, and
that mother provoked the confrontation.

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        Following the attack, Brandon fled to Arizona. He was
later taken into custody and charged with attempted murder,
criminal threats, burglary, corporal injury in a previous dating
relationship, child endangerment, child abuse, assault by deadly
force, and violation of a court order.
        The Department received a referral about the family
shortly after the attack. It began an investigation and, on
August 25, 2022, obtained an order authorizing removal of the
children from mother. Judge R.A. Diaz signed the removal
authorization orders. Upon removal, the children were left in the
care of their respective fathers. The Department then filed a
petition alleging the four children were dependents within the
meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) due to mother’s failure to protect them from
Brandon. Among other things, the petition alleged she allowed
him access to the children despite his violent propensities and
despite a criminal restraining order.
        The juvenile court held a combined adjudication and
dispositional hearing on October 25, 2022. At the hearing,
mother testified about her history of domestic violence with
Brandon as well as with the R. father and S. father. She
conceded her relationship with Brandon had put the children at
risk. But she also testified to substantial personal growth since
the July 2022 attack, attained through eight domestic violence
courses she had attended. Mother said she was “working towards
. . . growing as a person but also growing as a parent to be better
for [her] children.”
        The juvenile court sustained the petition, maintained the
children’s removal, and ordered reunification services for mother.
        Mother timely appealed.

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                           DISCUSSION
      Mother’s appeal rests on four grounds, none of which has
merit. Mother also argues that we can and must review the
orders as to Annabelle despite the juvenile court terminating
jurisdiction and despite the potential prematurity of her notice of
appeal. The Department does not oppose a review of the orders
as to Annabelle. We affirm the court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders as to all four children.
1.    Mother’s Claimed Factual Error Did Not Occur
       Mother’s first argument is premised on her claim that the
juvenile court, despite no evidence of any domestic violence since
the July 2022 attack, found domestic violence was “still ongoing.”
Mother’s claim rests on a fallacious reading of the court’s
comments at the October 25, 2022 hearing.
       Immediately before the purportedly erroneous finding, the
juvenile court referred to the July 2022 attack as the “final
incident.” It then stated: “I do think mother is working at
addressing her issues and why she keeps involving herself with
relationships that involve domestic violence and taking more
accountability for what she has done to continue to allow this. [¶]
She sounds like she’s remorseful, but I do think, based on the
history of domestic violence, that it is still ongoing and that for
those reasons, the [petition] has been proven by a preponderance
of the evidence.” (Italics added.)
       Given that the juvenile court had just acknowledged the
July 2022 attack was the “final” act of domestic violence, it makes
no sense to interpret the words “that it is still ongoing” as mother
does. Rather, they plainly refer to mother’s “work[] at addressing
her issues.” Despite her testimony showing growth, she had a

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long history of abusive relationships and was only halfway
through her domestic violence classes.
      That the juvenile court was referring to mother’s progress
as “ongoing” is all the more obvious in the context of her litigation
position at the hearing. Her counsel asked to have the petition
dismissed on the ground that mother’s personal growth since the
July 2022 attack obviated the risk of future domestic violence.
The juvenile court’s statement she now tries to recast as a factual
error was a direct repudiation of her theory of dismissal. There
was no error.
      Similarly, we reject mother’s collateral claim that the date
and time information on the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders shows the court predetermined them.
Mother notes the orders contain in their heading “October 25,
2022 [¶] 8:30 AM,” but mother testified following a lunch recess
in her proceedings on October 25, 2022. A review of other minute
orders in the record makes plain that the times indicated in the
headers correspond to the calendar start time, not the time of
issuance. The October 25, 2022 hearing was scheduled to begin
at 8:30 a.m. Reference to that time in the header of the
challenged orders is not evidence the juvenile court
predetermined the matter. Indeed, the orders facially refer to
events at the hearing that necessarily occurred after 8:30 a.m.,
including the court’s taking of “JUDICIAL NOTICE AS STATED
ON RECORD” and that mother was sworn and testified.
2.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Fail to State the Facts
      Supporting Continued Removal
       Mother contends the juvenile court failed to specify the
facts constituting clear and convincing evidence to support
continued removal in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code

                                 6
section 361, subdivision (e) and California Rules of Court,
rule 5.695(h)(1). Section 361, subdivision (e) obligates a juvenile
court to “state the facts on which the decision to remove the
minor is based.” Rule 5.695(h)(1) is to the same effect.
       The juvenile court adequately identified the facts
supporting continued removal of the children from mother, as
follows: “So with regard to disposition, the court is incorporating
my findings and reasons in the jurisdiction portion to the
disposition hearing and again is adopting the arguments of
[counsel for the children and the Department] in finding that the
Department has met its burden by clear and convincing
evidence.” Mother does not acknowledge this statement in her
opening brief. In her reply, she merely asserts it was inadequate
because it did not “specif[y] . . . precisely what was being referred
to.” We disagree. The juvenile court clearly stated all the facts it
had recited in support of jurisdiction, and the arguments of
counsel for the children, supported its removal order. No purpose
would be served by requiring the court to repeat itself or
summarize the arguments of counsel made and reported in the
record only moments before the court’s ruling.
       As the appellant, it is mother’s burden to show prejudice.
(In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.)
Mother does not attempt to show a reasonable probability that
the outcome would have been different if the juvenile court
repeated itself or summarized counsel’s arguments. She
therefore offers us no basis on which to reverse for this claimed
error.

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3.    The Juvenile Court’s Failure to Discuss Authorities
      Mother Deems Relevant Is Not Error; the Proffered
      Authorities Are Not Controlling
        Mother next argues the juvenile court erred because it
“never indicated that it had considered” two recent decisions,
In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11 (Ma.V.) and In re Emily L.
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1 (Emily L.). Buried in mother’s argument
is, for the first and only time in her opening brief, her
acknowledgement that we review jurisdictional and dispositional
orders for substantial evidence. (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
227, 238.) We reject mother’s contention that Ma.V. and Emily L.
compel the conclusion that substantial evidence was lacking here.
        The Ma.V. court concluded two acts of domestic violence
against the mother (and not the children), which occurred
10 months before the jurisdictional hearing and were perpetrated
by a man with whom the mother had had no contact since, did
not amount to substantial evidence to support jurisdiction over
the children. (Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 22-23.) In
Emily L., this court concluded a physical altercation between a
mother and her minor child, which occurred 13 months before the
jurisdictional hearing and since which time the family had
undergone “epic changes,” was not substantial evidence to
support jurisdiction. (Emily L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 11,
15.)
        Here, the violence had occurred just three months prior to
the hearing, the children had been seriously injured by mother’s
failure to protect them from Brandon, and mother had a long
history of prioritizing her relationship with Brandon over the
safety of her children. Up until the time of Brandon’s
incarceration, repeated acts of domestic violence which mother
knew put her children at risk had not deterred her from

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maintaining a relationship with him. Moreover, mother had a
history of domestic violence with the children’s fathers. The
record contains sufficient evidence to conclude the risk of leaving
the children in mother’s care satisfied the requirements for
jurisdiction and continued removal while mother continued to
address the behaviors that had allowed significant physical harm
to come to her children.
4.    Mother Fails to Show the Commissioner Exceeded
      Her Authority in Any Way
       Mother finally discusses the status of the commissioner
who presided over the proceedings below. She asserts that
“[o]nly judges, referees, and temporary judges may preside in
juvenile dependency proceedings,” and notes “[t]here does not
appear to have been any order made which appointed
Commissioner Brackelmanns as a referee . . . .” She further
notes that, even if the commissioner were a referee, Welfare and
Institutions Code section 249 and California Rules of Court,
rule 5.540(b)(1) condition the effectiveness of a referee’s removal
order on a juvenile court signing the order within two court days,
and “the record still has not indicated that any removal of the
children from their mother during the stage prior to the filing of
the petition or in the current case had become effective by a
juvenile court judge within two court days of the order removing
the children.”
       As to whether the presiding commissioner was duly
appointed as a referee, the record is inadequate to assess
mother’s contention. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 [inadequacy of record to evaluate
contention precludes review].) Mother’s observation that the
commissioner was not identified in court documents as a referee

                                 9
does not preclude her general cross-assignment as a referee
pursuant to Government Code section 71622, subdivision (d).
(See In re Angelina E. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 583, 588.)
       As to the absence of a judge’s signature on the dispositional
orders, mother is again wrong on the facts. The record includes
prepetition orders authorizing removal signed by Judge Diaz.
Because the children had already been removed from mother, the
commissioner’s dispositional orders are not subject to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 249’s judicial countersignature
condition. (In re I.S. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197.)
                          DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders
as to each of the children are affirmed.

                        GRIMES, Acting P. J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        WILEY, J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

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