Court Opinion

ID: 9811752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:54.487542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:18.311990
License: Public Domain

On the Merits of Whether it was Frivolous
Walston brought three issues on appeal. We addressed only the first issue, finding it dispositive. Walston framed the issue as follows:

Issue One

Appellant has alleged that, more than four years ago, Appellees engaged in overt acts in furtherance of a continuing conspiracy to injure her, that Appellees’ *129co-conspirators have engaged in acts in furtherance of that conspiracy within the last two years, and that she has suffered continuing injury from the inception of the conspiracy. Where conspirators are jointly and severally liable for damages caused by a conspiracy, including damage caused by acts of co-conspirators— known or unknown to all — do two-year and four-year statutes of limitations preclude Appellant’s cause of action for continuing conspiracy against Appellees?
As I was preparing this dissenting opinion to the Rule 45 Order, I realized that I had failed to fully comprehend the complexity of Walston’s issue.
The fundamental issue addressed by the Court’s holding, which I believe to be an issue of first impression and certainly not frivolous, is, under the continuing tort doctrine as applied to a continuing conspiracy, does the statute of limitations on the damages caused by a conspiracy relieve a co-conspirator of liability for damages caused by the continuance of the conspiracy if the only damages that can be shown to be proximately caused by the co-conspirator’s participation in the conspiracy were incurred and known to the victim more than two years prior to the date suit was brought? Our answer, though inartfully articulated, is that under those unique facts the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense available to the co-conspirators to bar recovery.
Normally, a co-conspirator is jointly and severally hable for all damages caused by the conspiracy. Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex.1979) (“Once a conspiracy is proven, each co-conspirator ‘is responsible for all acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination.’ ”). And, the two year statute of limitations is applicable to a cause of action for conspiracy. Cathey v. First City Bank, 758 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). But under the doctrine of continuing tort, as long as the conduct constituting the tort is continuing and damages continue to occur, the victim’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitations. Twy-man v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990), rev’d, on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1998). See Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 431 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir.2005).
The Texas Supreme Court has not “endorsed nor addressed” the concept of the continuing tort doctrine. Greditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 n. 8 (Tex.2005). If the continuing tort doctrine is endorsed, the victim of a continuing tort should not be allowed to recover for damages that occurred prior to the commencement of the limitations period absent some tolling doctrine. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the commencement of the limitations period, which is when all elements of a cause of action have occurred, as compared to a tolling of the limitation period, which is when the deadline within which to bring the suit is delayed (tolled) for some reason. The distinction is most readily distinguishable in a suit by a minor. All the elements of a cause of action have occurred and the suit can be brought by a guardian or next friend, but the limitation period is tolled until the disability of minority is removed. To say the least, cases have been very inconsistent in the discussion of when a cause of action accrues, which is when the statute of limitations commences, and when the limitations period ends because a tolling event has ended or ceased to exist. For example, the discovery rule has sometimes been referred to as a delay in the accrual of the cause of action until it is *130discovered2 and alternatively described as a tolling of the limitations period until the cause of action is discovered.3 But if this Court endorses the concept of a continuing tort as described by the Austin Court in Twyman, Walston wins. If we limit the scope of the doctrine and recovery as herein described, she loses.
Walston contends various actors have conspired in the past to deprive her of her property. One of the actors she alleged is involved is the realtor, Stewart, appointed by the court to conduct the sale of a home. She alleges that Stewart became part of, and an actor in, the conspiracy at that time, 1994.
She argues that the conspiracy is ongoing to this day, causing her new damages. As such, she argues all the actors who ever participated in any part of the conspiracy remain jointly and severally liable for the damages currently resulting from the continuing conspiracy.
The opinion focused on the damages resulting from the sale of the home. The focus is on these damages because this is the result of the conduct engaged in- by Stewart — his part, if any, in the conspiracy, if any, was the sale of the home.
Walston has alleged a continuing tort, a civil conspiracy to take or impair her rights and property. She alleges that Stewart was a co-conspirator. The damages alleged to have been proximately caused by Stewart’s participation in the conspiracy are barred by the two year limitations period. But if Stewart is shown to be a co-conspirator, and if it is shown that the conspiracy continues, Stewart would be jointly and severally liable for the damages occurring within the limitations period, even though those are not the damages Stewart’s alleged participation caused. And normally a co-conspirator does not simply drop out of the conspiracy by inaction and remains liable unless the co-conspirator affirmatively rejects his former participation in the conspiracy. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-465, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (“Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish withdrawal or abandonment.”).
So the issue before us was whether the running of limitations on the only damages proximately caused by Stewart’s alleged participation in the conspiracy also had the effect of barring a recovery from Stewart for other damages alleged to have been caused by the conspiracy within the limitations period. Our answer was yes, the limitations period barred a recovery from Stewart.
I challenge the majority to find a case from this Court, or a court by which we are bound, that sets this as precedent. Indeed, I challenge them to find another case decided by any court that has this fact pattern.
I continue to believe that our holding was a correct extension of existing precedent to unique facts which has the effect of creating another defense not previously available to an alleged co-conspirator of a conspiracy that is alleged to be ongoing, a limitations defense. This defense is available even if the conspiracy otherwise continues, so long as it continues without the co-conspirator’s participation and the only damages shown to have been proximately *131caused by the co-conspirator’s participation occurred prior to the start of the limitations period.
Internal
The unique issue raised by Walston deserved a more complete discussion in the Memorandum Opinion. But it is no secret that we are a deeply divided court. Dueling Documents, Texas Lawyer, October 31, 2005, Vol. 21, No. 35, at 3; Mary Alice Robbins, Divided They Sit: Opinions Expose Deep Rift at Waco’s 10th Court, Texas Lawyer, January 17, 2005, Vol. 20, No. 46 at 1. As a deeply divided court, I have found that the less we write, the less there is to disagree about. Thus, if we can get to a result on which we all agree in a memorandum opinion, that is a good thing.
It probably would have been good to more fully explain in the opinion the novel theory Walston argued to avoid the application of the statute of limitations.
But the appeal is far from frivolous. We should not let frustration with a litigant or with each other affect the analysis of a legal issue or the result. My fear is that, as to the determination that this appeal was frivolous, either or both may have occurred.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, I do not join the order determining this appeal to have been frivolous. I dissent.

. Wagner & Brown v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex.2001).

. Brent v. Daneshjou, No. 03-04-00225-CV, 2005 WL 2978329, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 9249 (Tex.App.-Austin Nov. 4, 2005, no pet. h.)