Court Opinion

ID: 9588408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:15.259901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.729062
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I find myself in disagreement with the first division of the majority opinion, and since I believe that appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal should have been granted, I must file a dissent.
If a defendant charged with a non-capital felony enters a demand for trial in the term of court during which he was indicted or at the next succeeding term, he must be tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter, provided at both court terms there are juries impaneled and qualified to try him, or “he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment . . .” OCGA § 17-7-170 (b). The terms of court for the Superior Court of Walker County, where appellant was indicted, are statutorily set to commence on the first Monday of May and of November. OCGA § 15-6-3 (22) (D). Appellant was indicted during the November 1984 term of court and filed his demand for trial on December 3, 1984, during the court term at which the indictment was returned. It is undisputed that appellant was not tried during that *340term of court and that there was a sufficient number of qualified jurors impaneled to try cases. During the next succeeding regular term, the May 1985 term, there was, again, a sufficient number of qualified jurors impaneled to try cases. These jurors heard only civil cases, since no criminal cases were heard during the May 1985 term. Appellant was finally tried and convicted during the November 1985 term of court.
Since appellant was not tried during the term of court during which he made his demand for trial or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, he was entitled to an automatic discharge and acquittal. OCGA § 17-7-170 (b); Lawrence v. State, 174 Ga. App. 518, 519 (330 SE2d 445) (1985). However, “the defendant may waive his right to such automatic discharge by some action on his part or on the part of his counsel . . .” (Parker v. State, 135 Ga. App. 620 (4) (218 SE2d 324) (1975)), but the burden is on the State to show the waiver. Lawrence v. State, supra. The majority in the case at bar holds that appellant waived his right to automatic discharge by filing a motion in which he sought dismissal of the indictments against him on the ground that the grand and petit juries were not selected in conformity with the law. While the record reflects that appellant did indeed file such a motion, it was never ruled on by the trial court. From the stipulation of facts entered into by appellant and the State, we can glean that, on May 17, 1985, several criminal defendants (appellant not among them) filed motions challenging the array of the grand and traverse juries, and a hearing on the motions was held on May 23, 1985. On June 5, 1985, the trial court granted the motions of the criminal defendants and dismissed the indictments against each defendant who had participated in the May 23 hearing, i.e., each defendant whose motion was filed on May 17. Appellant, however, did not file his motion until May 24, the day following the hearing. Thus, he was placed in a legal limbo: his motion was meritorious as evidenced by the dismissal of the indictments lodged against those whose motions were filed on May 17, but he was not granted that relief. Instead, he was forced to wait eight more months while the county replaced its defective system of juror pool selection.
While appellant did file a motion, the failure to try him in the November 1984 or May 1985 term was not due to appellant’s motion. The failure of the trial court to conduct criminal trials during the May 1985 term was due to the ruling the trial court entered on the motions filed on May 17 by defendants other than appellant. This situation is analogous to that found in State v. McNeil, 176 Ga. App. 323 (335 SE2d 728) (1985). There, the defendant in a D.U.I. case made a demand for trial and filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude mention of breathalyzer test results. This court held that “if the motion in limine had been granted in McNeil’s case resulting in an *341appeal taken by the State, a waiver of his demand would have resulted.” Id. at 326. In McNeil, the State removed the case from the trial calendar to await appellate resolution of the breathalyzer issue in a different case. In the case at bar, appellant’s case was effectively removed from the trial calendar by the trial court’s decision in another case, which resulted in the failure to hold criminal jury trials during the May 1985 term of court. The actions taken by others, not appellant, prevented him from being tried timely. The decision of the trial court to cancel further criminal trials during the May 1985 term “should not and does not act as a waiver of [appellant’s] demand for trial.” Id. at 326. Because I am of the opinion that appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal should have been granted, I would reverse the judgments entered against appellant.
Decided December 1, 1986
Rehearing denied December 18, 1986
Glen M. Vey, for appellant.
David L. Lomenick, Jr., District Attorney, James D. Franklin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.