Court Opinion

ID: 9907260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 00:06:21.689289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:07.689046
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCartney, 2023-Ohio-4260.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      HIGHLAND COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                     : CASE NO. 22CA3

        v.                                      :

JAMES H. McCARTNEY,                             : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                    :

___________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

James H. McCartney, Marion, Ohio, Pro Se.1

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adam
J. King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for
appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:11-16-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas

Court judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in

persons and pandering obscenity involving a minor.                 James H.

McCartney, defendant below and appellant herein, assigns five

errors for review:

        1
      Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Courthouse, Ohio, also for
appellant. Appellant filed his pro se brief and included an
assignment of error regarding his inability to procure the services
of appointed counsel to represent him in his direct appeal. We
address this issue infra under appellant’s Fifth Assignment of
Error.
HIGHLAND,    22CA3                                                    2

            FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “REAGAN TOKES LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”

            SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE ACT VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
            DOCTRINE AND APPELLANT’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
            RIGHTS.”

            THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
            OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
            RIGHTS, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, UNITED
            STATES CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND
            16, OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

            FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ORDER
            A COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF THE DEFENDANT PRIOR
            TO HIS CHANGE OF PLEA.”

            FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
            DENIED APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO THE APPOINTMENT
            OF COUNSEL PURSUANT TO CRIM.R. 44.”

    {¶2}    In April 2021, a Highland County Grand Jury returned an

indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of trafficking

in persons in violation of R.C. 2905.32(A)(2)(a), a first-degree

felony, and (2) 15 counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor

in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5), all fourth-degree felonies.

Appellant entered a not guilty plea and the trial court appointed

counsel.

    {¶3}    Subsequently, the trial court granted counsel’s request

for a psychiatric evaluation to determine appellant’s competency to
HIGHLAND,    22CA03

                                                                        3
stand trial.    On May 27, 2021, the court held a hearing and found

appellant competent to stand trial.

     {¶4}   At his change of plea hearing, appellant entered

negotiated guilty pleas to (1) one count of trafficking in persons

in violation of R.C. 2905.32(A), a first-degree felony, and (2)

four counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in violation

of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5), all fourth-degree felonies.     The trial

court sentenced appellant to serve (1) ten years in prison for

human trafficking, (2) six months in prison on each pandering

obscenity charge, with the sentences to be served consecutively,

and (3) a mandatory five-year postrelease control term.     The court

also designated appellant a Tier III registered sex offender.

Consequently, the court sentenced appellant to serve the jointly

recommended 12-year prison sentence.    This appeal followed.

                                  I.

     {¶5}   Because appellant’s first two assignments of error are

related, we address them together.     Appellant asserts that the

Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional because it violates the

separation of powers doctrine and appellant’s procedural due

process rights.

     {¶6}   As appellee points out, because appellant did not raise

these issues during the trial court proceeding we are limited to a

plain error review.    However, Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate
HIGHLAND,     22CA3                                                    4

courts discretion to correct “[p]lain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights,” notwithstanding an accused's failure to meet

the obligation to bring those errors to the trial court’s

attention.     An accused bears the burden of proof to demonstrate

plain error on the record,     State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d

464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16, and must show “an error,

i.e., a deviation from a legal rule” that constitutes “an ‘obvious'

defect in the trial proceedings,” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d

21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002);     State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d

385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22.    However, even if the

error is obvious, it must have affected substantial rights.     The

Supreme Court of Ohio has “interpreted this aspect of the rule to

mean that the trial court's error must have affected the outcome of

the trial.”    Rogers at ¶ 22, citing Barnes.   Appellate courts are

“to notice plain error ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of

justice.’ ”    Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, quoting State v. Long, 53

Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the

syllabus.     Thus, our review in the case sub judice is limited to

plain error.

     {¶7}   Turning to appellant’s argument, in State v. Bontrager,

2022-Ohio-1367, 188 N.E.3d 607 (4th Dist.), we determined that the

Reagan Tokes Law does not violate constitutional rights to due

process and trial by jury, nor does it violate the constitutional
HIGHLAND,    22CA03

                                                                        5
requirement of separation of powers.    Id. at ¶ 49.   As we observed

in State v. Long, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA9, 2022-Ohio-3212 at ¶

8:

     We note that the Reagan Tokes Law has been found
     constitutional by the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and
     Twelfth Districts and also by the Eighth District sitting
     en banc.     See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 2nd Dist.
     Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153; State v. Hacker,
     2020-Ohio-5048, 161 N.E.3d 112 (3d Dist.); State v.
     Ratliff, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 21CA16, 2022-Ohio-1372;
     State v. Maddox, 2022-Ohio-1350, 188 N.E.3d 682 (6th
     Dist.); State v. Guyton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-
     203, 2020-Ohio-3837; State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470,
     185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.).

     {¶8}   Moreover, in State v. Hacker, ___Ohio St.3d___, 2023-

Ohio-2535, ___N.E.2d___, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently

resolved the conflict among Ohio appellate courts and determined

that Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law passes constitutional muster.      In

particular, the court held that the law does not violate the

separation of powers doctrine, does not violate a defendant’s right

to a jury trial, does not violate a defendant’s due process rights

and is not void for vagueness.

     {¶9}   Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first and second assignments of error.

                                  II.

     {¶10} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when

counsel failed to argue that the Reagan Tokes Law is
HIGHLAND,   22CA3                                                  6

unconstitutional.   However, as we point out in our analysis of

appellant’s first and second assignments of error, many courts have

upheld the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law.   See

Bontrager, 2022-Ohio-1367, at ¶ 49.   Thus, this argument is without

merit.

     {¶11} In addition, appellant argues that the trial court failed

to comply with Crim.R. 11 when it accepted his pleas.   Thus, we

assume that he argues that his counsel should have raised this

issue.

     Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides:

     (1) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea
     of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a
     plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the
     defendant personally and doing all of the following:
     (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
     voluntarily, with the understanding of the nature of the
     charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if
     applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for
     probation or for the imposition of community control
     sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

     (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
     defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or
     no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the
     plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

     (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
     defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
     waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses
     against him or her, to have compulsory process for
     obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
     require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
     reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot
     be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

We observe that appellant’s plea and his signed written plea
HIGHLAND,   22CA03

                                                                     7
agreement, which is included in the record, provides:

    I understand by pleading guilty I give up my right to a
    jury trial or court trial, where I could confront and have
    my attorney question witnesses against me, and where I
    could use the power of the court to call witnesses to
    testify for me. I know at trial I would not have to take
    the witness stand and could not be forced to testify
    against myself and that no one could comment if I chose
    not to testify. I understand I waive my right to have the
    prosecutor prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on
    every element of each charge.

    By pleading guilty I admit committing the offense and will
    tell the Court the facts and circumstances of my guilt. I
    know the judge may either sentence me today or refer my
    case for a pre-sentence report. I understand my right to
    appeal a maximum sentence, my other limited appellate
    rights and that any appeal must be filed within 30 days of
    my sentence. I understand the consequences of a conviction
    upon me if I am not a U.S. citizen.

    I enter this plea voluntarily.

    {¶12} Appellant appears to offer a general assertion that the

trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 during the plea

hearing, but does not set forth any specific complaint or precise

argument to identify any deficiency with his guilty pleas.

Moreover, our review reveals that the court engaged in an extensive

dialogue with appellant and trial counsel to ensure that appellant

fully understood the charges and the ramifications of his guilty

pleas.   Consequently, we believe that appellant entered knowing,

intelligent and voluntary pleas.   Therefore, we find no merit in

appellant’s claims that (1) trial counsel’s failure to challenge

the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law constitutes
HIGHLAND,   22CA3                                                    8

ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) he did not enter a

voluntary plea.

     {¶13} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s third assignment of error.

                                III.

     {¶14} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court erred when it failed to order a competency

evaluation prior to his change of plea.   Appellant contends that

the trial court had a duty to sua sponte order a competency

evaluation because he previously entered guilty pleas to similar

charges on two separate occasions and was “obviously in need of

mental health treatment due to this irrational behavior.”

     {¶15} As appellee points out, however, appellant omits that (1)

on April 20, 2021, counsel filed a motion for psychiatric

evaluation to determine appellant’s competency to stand trial and,

(2) on April 21, 2021, the trial court ordered the evaluation.      The

record also reflects that the court set a hearing to consider the

evaluation and, on May 27, 2021, issued an entry that referred to a

hearing to consider appellant’s Forensic Evaluation Service Center

evaluation and found appellant competent to stand trial.    Thus, it

appears that appellant did receive a competency evaluation and the

evaluator recommended that appellant be found competent to stand

trial.   It further appears that the court held a hearing to

consider the evaluation and determined appellant competent to stand
HIGHLAND,   22CA03

                                                                      9
trial.   No other indication appears in the record to suggest that

appellant’s competency should have been questioned at the change of

plea hearing.

     {¶16} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s fourth assignment of error.

                                   IV.

     {¶17} In his final assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

appointment of appellate counsel.    Appellant contends that he filed

a motion for appointed counsel with his motion for leave to file a

delayed appeal with this court on April 25, 2022.

     {¶18} On May 19, 2022, this court granted appellant’s motion

for delayed appeal.   After appellant filed his pro se brief and

raised the issue of appointed counsel, this court granted

appellant’s request for the appointment of appellate counsel.

Subsequently, appointed counsel submitted to this court on August

4, 2023 a statement that, after counsel reviewed the transcript of

the proceedings, reviewed the appellate brief, and conferred with

appellant, counsel requested that the matter be submitted to the

court for decision and judgment.

     {¶19} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s final assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.                              JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
HIGHLAND,   22CA3                                                   10

                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL
     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.