Court Opinion

ID: 9965650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 00:00:47.932118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.974412
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30491            Document: 64-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/02/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                               FILED
                                                                            May 2, 2024
                                     No. 23-30491
                                   ____________                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk
United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Trevor Selwyn Daniel, Jr.,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Louisiana
                             USDC No. 2:20-CR-79-1
                   ______________________________

Before Higginson, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Trevor Selwyn Daniel, Jr., was charged with possession with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Daniel filed a motion to suppress, which the district
court denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He now exercises that right, and
we AFFIRM.

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30491           Document: 64-1         Page: 2      Date Filed: 05/02/2024

                                      No. 23-30491

                                            I
       On February 12, 2020, Louisiana State Police Sergeant Brett McKee
was watching eastbound traffic while stationed on the shoulder of I-10. As a
member of the interdiction patrol, he was looking for traffic violations and
other, more serious criminal activity, including drug trafficking. McKee had
served on the patrol for two years and with the Louisiana State Police for
twelve.
       At some point that night, McKee observed a Toyota SUV driving
about two to three miles above the speed limit. The driver abruptly braked as
he passed, even though there was no traffic. McKee considered this to be
“stress-induced behavior”—that is, behavior that’s atypical of a law-abiding
driver—and began following the car. The car drifted over the white fog line
in violation of Louisiana law, so McKee pulled it over.1
       McKee told the driver, Daniel, that he was being stopped for improper
lane usage and asked him to exit the vehicle.2 Daniel complied but explained
that the car, which he said was a rental, braked suddenly because of its
adaptive cruise control. McKee and Daniel walked to the driver’s side so that
Daniel could get his ID and then around to the passenger’s side so that
Daniel could get the rental agreement.
       While walking around the car, McKee saw “four to five bags in the
back, large bags” and “a lot of trash,” including “a bunch of drinks” and
“fast food.” He commented that it looked like Daniel had been “on the
road.” Daniel said he had a security business and, seemingly losing track of

       _____________________
       1
        La. Stat. Ann. 32:79(1) (2024); State v. Waters, 780 So. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (La.
2001) (holding that “touch[ing] the right-hand fog lane on the shoulder” violates La.
Stat. Ann. 32:79(1)).
       2
           McKee’s body camera recorded their interaction.

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what he was doing, handed McKee a random paper and his entire wallet,
rather than just his ID.
       McKee then asked Daniel about his business-related travel. Daniel
responded vaguely, saying that he had a client “down there.” When McKee
twice followed up, Daniel clarified that he was traveling from “Texas” and
then, after some stuttering, “Sugarland.” McKee asked Daniel when he went
to Sugarland. Daniel hesitated, asked McKee what day it was (Wednesday),
and then said that he went to Sugarland on Monday.
       McKee and Daniel continued to talk while McKee looked over
Daniel’s ID and rental agreement. In response to McKee’s questions, Daniel
said that he did not have a gun in the car and that he was still in the “talking
stage” with a potential client in Sugarland. He told McKee that he started his
security business when he got out of the military and, when McKee asked
him which branch he served in and for how long, he answered quickly and
confidently.
       About four and a half minutes into the stop, McKee told Daniel that
he was going to his car to run computer checks. McKee used a program called
ELSAG, a license plate reader that tracks when a vehicle passes by certain
cameras, to see where Daniel’s car had traveled. The ELSAG database
showed that Daniel’s car had passed cameras far south of Sugarland, near the
Mexico border. McKee’s criminal-history check revealed that Daniel was a
convicted felon.
       McKee returned to Daniel and asked whether he had traveled
anywhere besides Sugarland, whether anyone else had driven the car, and
whether the car contained any illegal substances. Daniel responded “no” to
all. Daniel then denied McKee’s request to search the vehicle.
       At that point, about ten minutes into the stop, McKee contacted one
of the U.S. Border Patrol’s dog handlers to request a dog sniff. The dog

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handler and dog arrived about four minutes later. The dog conducted a “free
air sniff” around the vehicle and alerted to the driver’s side door. The
officers subsequently searched the vehicle and found a firearm and 25
kilograms of cocaine.
       Daniel was charged by indictment with possessing with the intent to
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). He later moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the traffic stop, arguing that (1) McKee lacked reasonable suspicion
to extend the stop by conducting the ELSAG and criminal-history checks
and arranging a dog sniff and (2) the dog’s alert did not give probable cause
to search his car. The government opposed the motion. A magistrate judge
held an evidentiary hearing, ordered post-hearing briefs, and ultimately
recommended that Daniel’s motion be denied. The district court accepted
the recommendations and denied the motion.
       Daniel pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Daniel
to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release.
       Daniel timely appealed.
                                      II
       On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual
findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Massi,
761 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2014). We view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the party who prevailed in the district court,” which here is the
Government. See id. at 520 (citation omitted). “When determining whether
the facts provided reasonable suspicion, we must give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers.” United States v. Henry, 853 F.3d 754, 756 (5th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And where, as here,

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“a district court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral
testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong because the
judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” See
United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005). We uphold the
district court’s ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to
support it.” Massi, 761 F.3d at 520 (citation omitted).
       Generally, the movant—here, Daniel—“has the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence in question was
obtained in violation of [his] constitutional rights.” See United States v.
Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). But because McKee
conducted the search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the Government
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its actions were
constitutional. See id.
                                      III
       We begin by considering whether McKee violated Daniel’s Fourth
Amendment rights by running an ELSAG search, checking Daniel’s
criminal history, and requesting a dog sniff.
       The Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” see U.S. CONST. amend. IV, “extends to vehicle stops and
temporary detainment of a vehicle’s occupants,” United States v. Andres, 703
F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013). We analyze the constitutionality of a traffic
stop under the two-step test from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See id.
First, “we determine whether the stop was justified at its inception.” Id. If it
was, “we determine whether the officer’s subsequent actions were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop of the
vehicle in the first place.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       “If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal
activity during his investigation of the circumstances that originally caused

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                                  No. 23-30491

the stop, he may further detain [the car’s] occupants for a reasonable time
while appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.” United
States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds
on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010). “[S]uspicion is reasonable if
it is based on specific and articulable facts and the rational inferences that can
be drawn therefrom.” Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d at 432. “Although a mere
‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion[] . . . the level of suspicion the
standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for
probable cause.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
       To determine whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion, we
“must examine . . . the totality of the circumstances known to the [officer]
when [he] made the investigatory stop and [his] experience in evaluating such
circumstances.” Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d at 433. “We give due weight to
the officer’s factual inferences because officers may ‘draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an
untrained person.’” United States v. Smith, 952 F.3d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).
       Daniel concedes that Terry’s first prong is satisfied because the initial
traffic stop for improper lane usage was justified. But he argues that, under
Terry’s second prong, McKee lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop
by searching the ELSAG database, checking his criminal history, and
arranging a dog sniff. The Government responds that the ELSAG and
criminal-history checks fell within the traffic stop’s original mission, but,
even if not, McKee had by then developed reasonable suspicion and could
extend the stop to conduct those checks. The Government also argues that
McKee had reasonable suspicion to request a dog sniff.

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                                       No. 23-30491

        Neither party cites, nor have we have found, any published cases from
our court that address whether a criminal-history check and ELSAG search
fit within a traffic stop’s original mission.3 In two unpublished cases, we have
assumed they do, but without confronting the question directly. See United
States v. Solis, No. 22-40029 & No. 22-40088, 2023 WL 107529, at *1 (5th
Cir. Jan. 4, 2023) (per curiam), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2478 (2023); United
States v. Rodriguez-Flores, 249 F. App’x 317, 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). But cf. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1179–80 (10th Cir.
2022) (“[T]he [license plate reader] search plainly exceeded the scope of the
stop’s traffic-based mission.”). We need not weigh in today because we
conclude that McKee already had a reasonable suspicion that Daniel was
engaging in other criminal activity by the time he ran the checks and
requested the dog sniff.
        McKee testified to, and his body-camera footage confirms, “specific
and articulable facts” that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Daniel was
engaged in other criminal activity. See Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d at 432.
        First, McKee observed that Daniel was traveling on I-10, which he
knew from years of experience is a major drug-trafficking corridor. “[T]ravel
along known drug corridors [is] a relevant—even if not dispositive—piece of
the reasonable suspicion puzzle.” Smith, 952 F.3d at 649.
        Second, McKee testified that Daniel appeared nervous while driving.
McKee saw Daniel brake “abruptly” when passing his car, even though
“[t]here was no traffic around” and he “wasn’t speeding,” and then drift
over the fog line—two driving behaviors that, according to McKee, could
        _____________________
        3
           Like other circuits, we have said that an officer may “request to examine a
driver’s license and vehicle registration or rental papers during a traffic stop and to run a
computer check on both.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507–08 (5th Cir. 2004).
But those types of checks are not an issue here.

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                                       No. 23-30491

suggest that Daniel was nervous about being near an officer because of
criminal activity. See United States v. Gonzales, 311 F. App’x 725, 726 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding that the officer had a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity in part because, “when Gonzales passed his
marked patrol vehicle, Gonzales tapped his breaks even though he was not
speeding”).
        McKee testified that Daniel continued to act nervous and evasive after
McKee pulled him over. While walking around Daniel’s car, McKee noticed
the trash and commented that Daniel must have been on the road for a while.
McKee testified that Daniel “chuckle[d],” “got really anxious” and lost
“function of what he was doing.” When McKee asked for Daniel’s rental
agreement, Daniel instead tried to give McKee his whole wallet and then gave
McKee the wrong document. In addition, when McKee asked where Daniel
was traveling from,4 Daniel at first answered “down there,” and only after
McKee twice followed up did he say “Texas” and then, finally,
“Sugarland.” McKee testified that, from his experience, Daniel’s “vague”
and “delay[ed]” responses suggested that he “either didn’t know where he
was coming from or he was trying to hide where he was coming from.” And,
by contrast, Daniel responded without hesitation to McKee’s questions
about his military service. “[N]ervous, evasive behavior,” such as Daniel’s
here, “is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” See Illinois

        _____________________
        4
           After Daniel volunteered that he was traveling for his “security business,”
McKee asked Daniel about his trip. These questions “were related in scope to [McKee’s]
investigation of the circumstances that caused the stop” and thus permissible under Terry’s
second prong. See United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2011); see also id. at
517 (“Such questions may efficiently determine whether a traffic violation has taken place,
and if so, whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest made.” (citation
omitted)).

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v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also United States v. McKinney, 980
F.3d 485, 495 (5th Cir. 2020).
       Third, Daniel told McKee that he arrived in Sugarland only two days
prior—a timeline that McKee testified was contradicted by the trash and four
to five large duffel bags that he saw in Daniel’s rental car. Cf. United States v.
Williams, 784 F. App’x 876, 882 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that “inconsistent
or implausible answers to questions can support reasonable suspicion”). The
trash signaled to McKee that Daniel was instead “traveling a . . . long
distance without stopping or . . . going somewhere, turn[ing] around and
coming right back,” such as to pick up and then deliver a product. Likewise,
the four to five duffel bags struck McKee as “a lot of luggage for one person
just for a short [two-day] trip.”
       Daniel argues that McKee’s observations had innocent explanations.
He contends that countless law-abiding drivers use I-10 and that those same
drivers might also be nervous when they pass an officer. And luggage and a
messy car, he says, are merely innocuous evidence of travel.
       However, to form a reasonable suspicion, McKee did not need to
“eliminate all reasonable possibilities of legal activity.” See Guerrero-Barajas,
240 F.3d at 433; see also Williams, 784 F. App’x at 882. “Reasonable
suspicion is a low threshold” that requires only “some minimal level of
objective justification.” United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). To the extent Daniel asks us to determine whether
each of McKee’s observations alone cross that threshold, we cannot oblige.
We “may not consider the relevant factors in isolation from each other” and
must instead evaluate the totality of the circumstances known to McKee. See
United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005).
       Those circumstances, taken as a whole, gave McKee a reasonable
suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, to confirm or
dispel that suspicion, McKee could constitutionally extend the stop to
conduct ELSAG and criminal-history checks and to request a dog sniff. See
Pack, 612 F.3d at 350, 362.
                                       IV
       We now turn to whether the dog alert gave McKee probable cause to
search Daniel’s car.
       When a dog’s alert is the purported basis for probable cause, “[t]he
question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the
facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense,
would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal
contraband or evidence of a crime.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248
(2013); see also United States v. Shen, 749 F. App’x 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (same); United States v. Ned, 637 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (“[A]n alert by a drug-detecting dog provides probable cause to
search.”). We may “presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered)
that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search” if a “bona fide
organization has certified [that] dog after testing his reliability in a controlled
setting.” Harris, 568 U.S. at 246–48. Daniel bears the burden of presenting
any evidence of unreliability rebutting this presumption. See id.; see also id. at
250 (“[The defendant] failed to undermine that showing [of reliability].”).
       Here, the dog’s handler testified that the dog was certified annually
by a U.S. Border Patrol K-9 instructor to detect cocaine and other drugs. The
government has thus made a prima facie showing that the dog is reliable, and
we may presume that its alert established probable cause. See id. at 246–48.
       Daniel, however, argues that the dog sniff was unreliable because the
dog (1) alerted by the driver’s side door, not the back hatch where the drugs
were later found; (2) had twice alerted in the field when no drugs were

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present; and (3) had performed only twelve field searches over the past three
years.
         All of Daniel’s arguments fail. That the dog alerted to the driver’s side
door does not indicate that the dog was unreliable—rather, as the dog’s
handler testified, the dog was trained to alert to the smell of drugs, and the
driver’s side had an open window from which the dog could have picked up
the scent. Same for the dog’s two false positives during prior field searches.
Field data “may markedly overstate a dog’s real false positives” because, for
example, “the dog may have smelled the residual odor of drugs previously in
the vehicle.” Id. at 245–46. “The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus
comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments.” Id. at 246.
Accordingly, the dog’s two false positives, over the course of at least twelve
searches, “have relatively limited import.” See id. at 245. Regardless, the
dog’s 83.3% field success rate assures us that its alert reflected at least a “fair
probability” that contraband would be found, which is all that’s required for
probable cause. See id. at 244. Finally, we are unconcerned by the number of
field searches that the dog had previously performed. The dog was certified
annually, the dog and its handler had worked together for three consecutive
years, and there were no signs that McKee or the handler “cued the dog” or
were “working under unfamiliar conditions.” See id. at 247. Thus, this “sniff
is up to snuff.” See id. at 248.
         Because the dog’s certification establishes its reliability and Daniel
fails to undermine that showing, we agree with the district court that the
dog’s alert gave McKee probable cause to search Daniel’s car.
         We AFFIRM.

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