Court Opinion

ID: 9682308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:15.321207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.678554
License: Public Domain

PRITCHARD, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion filed herein upon the ground that the precedents, Wheatly v. State, 559 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. banc 1977), citing and quoting Hoppe v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 235 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Mo. banc 1950); and Riley v. State, 680 S.W.2d 956 (Mo.App.1984), require a notice of a hearing, with opportunity of counsel, and the client, if necessary, to be present and be heard. It makes no difference whether counsel was appointed, or as here, was privately retained. In Riley, at page 958[2], it was said, “The better procedure in a Rule 27.26 proceeding is for the trial court, after movant has obtained either retained or appointed counsel, to give written notice of its intention to rule on a specific date on the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing will be granted. The time period allotted should be commensurate with the time necessary for movant’s counsel to confer with his client and to amend the petition in a lawyer-like manner.” [Italics added.] In this case movant was incarcerated in the pentitentiary, and counsel should have been notified of a hearing date to give him sufficient opportunity to confer with his client, and have him present at a hearing and to amend the motion if necessary. Such procedure would accord with the minimum requirements of due process of law.