Court Opinion

ID: 9470833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:17:04.34671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:07.504108
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the reversal of the district court’s dismissal of Count I and the pendent state claims. I agree that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the existence of an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering and alleged fraud with sufficient particularity except as noted in the panel opinion.
I do not agree, however, that plaintiffs failed to allege in Count II the existence of an “enterprise” distinct from the defendant “person” who conducted or associated with that enterprise for purposes of racketeering. Although careful amendment1 of the pleadings on remand as suggested by the panel opinion, 685 F.2d at 1061-62, could circumvent the person-enterprise identity problem, I would reach that question and hold that the corporate defendant, John Knox Village, can simultaneously be named as the enterprise through which the defendant or defendants conducted or participated in a pattern of racketeering. Cf. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986-90 (11th Cir.1982) (criminal RICO action), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 815, 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre Dame L.Rev. 237, 324-25 & n. 181 (1982). Contra Fields v. National Republic Bank, 546 F.Supp. 123, 124 & n. 5 (N.D.Ill.1982) (civil RICO action); cf. United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir.1982) (criminal RICO action), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983). Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the majority en banc opinion which concludes that John Knox Village cannot simultaneously be both a person and an enterprise under RICO.
I would also reach the question whether equitable relief is available to private parties under RICO, a question left undecided by the majority en banc opinion, and answer that question affirmatively. As noted by Professor Blakey,
*1366[S]ection 1964(a) is a general grant of equitable power. It is not limited on its face or in its legislative history. Section 1964(b) grants the government authority to seek relief, an authority that it was necessary to set out lest old learning be used to circumscribe the new governmental power to seek equitable relief. Nothing in section 1964(b) speaks in negative terms about an authorization for private parties to seek similar relief. Indeed, the governmental suits are to be brought on behalf of private parties. No satisfactory explanation can be offered as to why Congress would have precluded victims from seeking help themselves. Section 1964(c), moreover, says “sue and” and not “sue to.” The contrary argument would have to suggest that by adding the right to secure treble damage relief to the general right to sue Congress somehow manifested an intention to subtract the right to obtain other forms of relief. How addition might be converted with subtraction in a remedial statute that must be liberally construed strains even the legal imagination. Section 1964 ought to be read as authorizing both governmental and private suits to obtain equitable relief. To the degree that any ambiguity might be thought to exist in the choice of language, the liberal construction clause and the remedial purpose of the statute come down on the side of finding private suits to be authorized and that full relief can be granted. No satisfactory rationale can be offered, in short, to explain why a court ought to feel itself circumscribed in doing full justice for a victim under RICO.
58 Notre Dame L.Rev. at 331-32 (footnote omitted); see Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts — Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 Temple L.Q. 1009,1014,1038 nn. 132-33 (1980).

. The panel opinion suggested that plaintiffs in Count II may have intended to place the residential community in the role of the requisite RICO enterprise and noted that the “residential community, so perceived, would arguably be an ‘association in fact’ for purposes of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).” 695 F.2d at 1061; cf. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989 (11th Cir.1982) (criminal RICO action; problem of identity of person and enterprise would never have surfaced if the government had charged the defendants collectively as an “association in fact” and charged the corporation singly as the enterprise), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 815, 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983).