Court Opinion

ID: 9769784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:02:13.074923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:08.027448
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for reheating, Bekins correctly contends that we erred by awarding $5,000.00 for appellate attorney’s fees and an additional $5,000.00 in attorney’s fees for appeal to the Supreme Court. We reform our opinion and judgment to reflect an award of $41,949.85 attorney’s fees and costs, and an additional attorney’s fee of $5,000.00 only in the event Bekins appeals unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court or Williams successfully appeals to that court.
Bekins also contends that our disposition of its claim of limitations is improper because the documents reflecting the previous filing of this case in a different court were not before the trial court at the time it made its decision, and also because the record of discussion between counsel and the court indicates that the court denied Bekins’ motion because it was untimely, being first presented to the court while the jury was waiting for trial to begin.
This contention, even if correct, is not ground for reversal. Even if the trial court based its decision on evidence not before it, or on the untimeliness of the motion, and even if we concluded that such action constituted an abuse of discretion, the court’s ultimate decision was correct, and we will not reverse a correct decision, even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for the decision. Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 709 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex.1986). We focus on the result reached by the trial court, rather than the reasons stated in the order. Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
*586The trial court reached the correct result. We will not overturn its ruling.
Bekins also contends on rehearing that the Texas Railroad Commission has overriding control of all aspects of its operations and that Legislature through the Insurance Code cannot interfere with this control by imposing separate requirements for any insurance coverage it sold with its moving contract. As pointed out in the cases cited by Bekins, the Railroad Commission clearly has the authority to regulate transportation costs and fees. Bekins, however, has not cited us to any authority suggesting that its sale of insurance is similarly controlled to the exclusion of the Insurance Code.
Bekins relies on the case of Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, no writ). In Gentry, a nursing home provided medical care for its employees with specified health care providers. An employee obtained treatment from an undesignated doctor, and the employer refused to pay the claim. The court held that she could not recover under the Insurance Code because the benefit program could not be construed as an insurance policy and because the employer was not in the business of insurance, its medical benefit program being only incidental to the employer/employee relationship.
Gentry is distinguishable. The employee paid nothing to the employer for medical care: rather, it was a benefit of her employment. It was not a service sold to the employee. Thus, the court concluded that the benefit program was incidental to its business and to the relationship between the parties.1
In this case, Bekins sold a set dollar amount of coverage to a client for the purpose of insuring her property against damage caused by Bekins. Compare: Threlkeld-Covington, Inc. v. Baker Drywall Co., 837 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1992, no writ). It was not “incidental” to or only slightly connected with the main relationship created between the parties by contract, but was an integral part of Bekins’ overall sale of its moving services. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 1.111 (1984). The mere fact that Bekins’ main business is moving furniture does not mean that it does not also sell insurance to cover losses in its moving services.
The motion for rehearing is granted in part, and otherwise is overruled.

. If one act is "incidental" to another, it is (1) "occurring merely by chance or without intention or calculation,” or (2) "being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 587 (10th ed.1993).