Court Opinion

ID: 9689974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:50:43.688283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.989939
License: Public Domain

C. O. Grathwohl, J.
(dissenting). The majority and I both recognize that the question of whether child torture is a specific intent crime is unclear.
The child torture statute, MCL 750.136a; MSA 28.331(1), states that any "parent or guardian . . . who tortures such child, shall be guilty of a felony.” The statute does not define the term "torture.” A panel of this Court in People v Webb, 128 Mich App 721; 341 NW2d 191 (1983), interpreted "the child torture statute as requiring a showing that the defendant intentionally inflicted extreme, intense, or severe pain or injury upon the victim.” Webb, supra, p 727. This interpretation was based upon dictionary definitions, id., none of which utilize the term "intent.”
The Webb Court also believed that the distinction between child cruelty, MCL 750.136; MSA 28.331, and child torture "is not the defendant’s motive, but, rather, the degree of severity of the injury inflicted.” Id. However, the gravamen of child cruelty is cruel or unlawful punishment, willful or negligent deprivation of necessary food, clothing, or shelter, or abandonment, MCL 750.136; MSA 28.331. Specific intent is not an element of the crime of child cruelty. People v Jackson, 140 Mich App 283, 287; 364 NW2d.310 (1985); see also People v Alderete, 132 Mich App 351, 356-357; 347 NW2d 229 (1984). If child cruelty *226is not a specific intent crime and the differentiation between child torture and child cruelty is "the degree of severity of the injury inflicted,” Webb, supra, p 727; see also People v Shelton, 138 Mich App 510; 360 NW2d 234 (1984), one wonders how child torture can be a specific intent crime.
It is doubtful that the Legislature intended to make child torture a specific intent crime such that voluntary intoxication would be available as a defense. The purpose of the child torture statute is to protect children. Children, however, are more susceptible to violent, physical abuse when, as in the instant case, the parent or guardian is intoxicated. If the defense of voluntary intoxication is available against a charge of child torture, the statute would no longer protect children from extreme pain and injury in those instances when they need protection the most. See People v Gleisner, 115 Mich App 196, 200; 320 NW2d 340 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 1095 (1983) (intoxication was not available as a defense to resisting and obstructing a police officer because the purpose of the statute is to protect police officers in the discharge of their duties).
I would affirm.