Court Opinion

ID: 9417752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:34:24.838247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:33.982843
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,
after stating the case, delivered. the opinion of the court.
*219No difference material to the determination of the controversy exists between the cases, and as matter of convenience the statement refers to the amended act and the records in Nos. 398, 399 and 400.
The contention that the act in question is invalid because repugnant to the constitution of the State of Ohio lias been disposed of by the decision of the highest tribunal of that State sustaining its validity. State v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 492. These cases fall within no recognized exception to the general rule that the construction by the state courts of last resort of state constitutions and statutes will ordinarily be accepted by this court as controlling.
It is suggested that the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio should not be followed because the case in which it was announced did not involve a genuine controversy but was prepared for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication, and, under the circumstances, ought not to have been considered by that court. But it was for that tribunal to pass on this question, and, as it entertained jurisdiction and delivered a considered opinion which appears in the official reports of the court as its judgment of the validity of the Nichols law under the constitution of the State of Ohio, it is not within our province to review its determination in that regard.
This brings us to the only inquiry which it concerns us to examine.
The legislation in question is claimed to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States because in violation of the commerce clause of that instrument, and.because operating to deprive appellants of their property without due process of law, and of the equal protection of the laws.
We assume that the assessments complained of were made in pursuance of the definite rule or principle of appraisement recognized and established by the Nichols law, as construed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the question is whether the law prescribing that rule is valid under the Federal Constitution.
The nrincipal contention is that the rule contravenes the commerce clause because the assessments, while purporting to *220be on the property of complainants within the State, are in fact levied on their business, which is largely interstate commerce.
Although the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce, or the receipts received therefrom, or the occupation or business of carrying it on, cannot be directly subjected to state taxation, yet property belonging to corporations or companies engaged in such commerce may be; and whatever the particular form vof the exaction, if it is essentially only property taxation, it will not be considered as falling within the inhibition of the Constitution. Corporations and companies engaged in interstate commerce should bear their proper proportion of the burdens of the governments under whose protection they conduct their operations, and taxation on property, collectible by the ordinary means, doés not affect interstate commerce otherwise than incidentally, as all business is affected by the necessity of contributing to the support of government, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688.
As to railroad, telegraph and sleeping car, companies, engaged in interstate cbmmerce, it has often been held by this court that their property, in the several States through which 'their lines or business extended, might be valued as a unit for -the purposes of taxation, taking into consideration the ules tó ‘which it was put and all the elements making up aggregate value, and that a proportion of the whole fairly' and properly ascertained might' be taxed by the particular State, without violating any Federal restriction. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530; Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40 ; Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway, 142 U. S. 217 ; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &c. Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Cleveland, Cincinnati &c. Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18. The valuation was, thus, not confined to the wires, poles and instruments of the telegraph company; or the roadbed, ties, rails and spikes of the railroad company; or the cars of the sleeping car company; but *221included. the proportionate part of the value resulting from the combination of the- means^ by which the business was carried on,' a value existing to an appreciable extent throughout the entire domain of operation. And it has been decided that a proper mode of ascertaining the assessable value of so much of the Whole property as is situated in a particular State, is in the case of railroads, to take that partirf the"value of the entire road which is measured by the proportion of its length therein to the length of the whole, Pittsburgh &c. Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; or taking as the basis of assessment such proportion of the capital stock of a sleeping car company as the number of miles of railroad over which its cars are run in a particular State bears to the whole number of miles traversed by them in that and other States, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; or such a proportion of the whole value of the capital stock of a. telegraph company as the length of its lines within a State bears to the length of all its lines everywhere, deducting a sum equal to the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local taxation within the State, Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1.
Doubtless there is a distinction between the property of railroad and telegraph companies and that of express companies. The physical unity existing in the former is lacking in the latter; but there is the same unity in the use 6f the entire- property for the specific purpose, and there are the same elements of value arising from such use.
The cars of the Pullman Company did not constitute a physical' unity, and their value as separate cars did not bear a-direct relation to the valuation which was sustained in that case. The cars were moved by.railway carriers under contract, and the taxation of the corporation in Pennsylvania was - sustained on the theory that the whole propérty of the company might be regarded as a unit plant, with a unit value, a proportionate part of which value might be reached by the state authorities on the basis indicated:
No more reason is perceived for limiting the valuation of the property, of express companies to horses, wagons and furniture, than that of railroad, telegraph and sleeping car *222companies, to roadbed, rails and ties; poles and wires; or cars. The unit is a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons, safes, pouches and furniture; the contracts for transportation facilities; the capital necessary to carry on the business, whether represented in tangible or intangible property, in Ohio, possessed a value in combination and from use in connection with the property and capital elsewhere, which could as rightfully be recognised in the assessment for taxation in the instance of these companies as the others.
We repeat that while the unity which exists may not be a physical unity, it is something more than a mere unity of ownership. It is a unity of use, not simply for the convenience or pecuniary profit of the owner, but existing' in' the very necessities of the case — resulting from the very nature of the business.-
The same party may own a manufacturing establishment in one State and a store in another, and may make profit by operating the two, but the work of each is separate. The value of the factory in itself is not conditioned on thaf; of the store or vice versa, nor is the value of the goods manufactured and sold affected thereby. The connection between the two is merely accidental and growing out of the unity of ownership. But the property of an express Company distributed through different States is as an essential condition of the business united in a single specific use. It constitutes but a single plant, made so- by the very character and necessities of the business.
It is this which enabled the companies represented heredo charge and receive -within the State of Ohio for the year-ending -May 1, 1895, $2S2,L81, $358,519 and $275,4-46, respectively, on. the basis, according to their respective returns, of $42,065, $28,438 and $23,430, of personal property owned in that State, returns which -confessedly do not,- however, take into account contracts for transportation and accompanying facilities.
Considered as distinct subjects'of taxation, a horse is, indeed, a iiorse ; a wagon, a wagon ; a safe, a safe; a pouch, a poach ; but-liow is it that-$23,430 worth of horses, wagons, safes *223■and pouches produces $275,416 in a single year? Or $2S,438 worth, $358,519? The answer is obvious.
Eeliance seems to be placed by counsel on the observation of Mr. Justice Lamar, in Pacific Express Company v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 354, that “ express companies, such as are defined by this act, have no tangible property, of any consequence, subject to taxation under the general laws. There is, therefore, no way by which they can be taxed at all unless by a tax upon their receipts for business transacted.” But the reference was to the legislation of the State of Missouri, and the scheme of taxation under consideration here was' not involved in any manner.
The method of asrpssment provided by the Nichols law was as follows: “The said board shall proceed to ascertain and assess the value of the property of said express, telegraph and telephone companies in Ohio, and in determining the value of the property of said companies in this State, to be taxed within the State and assessed as herein provided, said board shall be guided by the value of said property as determined by the valúe of. the entire capital stock of said companies, and such other evidence and rules as \vill enable said board to arrive at the true value in money of Tihe entire property of said companies within the State of Ohio, in the proportion which the same bears to the entire property of said companies, as determined by the value of the capital stock thereof, and the other evidence and rules as aforesaid.”
And this provision was thus construed by- the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Jones:
“The board, in determining the value of the company’s property in this State for taxation,. is not required to fix the value of such property, upon the principle that the value of the entire property of the company shall be deemed the same as the value of its entire capital stock, thus making the respective values equivalents of each other. But, taking the market value of the entire capital stock as a datum, the board is to be only guided thereby in ascertaining -the. true'value in money of the company’s property in this State. The statute does not bind the bóard- to find the value *224of the entire property of the company equal to that of the entire capital stock.”
The court further said:
“ But the property of a corporation may. be regarded in the aggregate, as a unit, an entirety, as a plant designed for a specific object; and its value may be estimated not in parts, but taken as a whole. .If the market value — perhaps the closest approximation to the true value in money — of the corporate property as a whole, were inquired into, the market value of the capital stock would become a controlling factor in fixing the value of the property. Should all the stockholders unite to sell the corporate plant as ah entirety, they would not be inclined to sell it for less than the market value of the aggregate shares of the capital stock. Besides, while the amount of the capital stock may be limited by the charter and' the laws governing it, the real and personal property of the corporation may be constantly augmented, and may* keep pace with any increase in the value of the capital stock. The market value of the capital stock, it is urged, has no necessary relation to the. value ’of the tangible property of the corporation. But such is the well understood relation between the two that not only is the value of the capital stock an essential factor in fixing the market value of the corporate plant, but the corporate capital or property has a reflex action on the value of the capital stock. ...
“ If by reason of the good will of the concern, or the skill, experience and energy with which its business is conducted, the market value of the capital stock is largely increased, whereby the value of the tangible property of the corporation, considered as an entire plant, acquires a greater market value than it otherwise would'have had, it cannot properly be said not to be its true value in money within the meaning of the Constitution, because good will and other elements indirectly entered into its value. The mai’ket value of property is what it will bring when sold as such property is ordinarily sold in the community where it is situated ; and the fact that it is its market value cannot be questioned because attributed some-*225wbat to good will, franchise, skilful management of the property or any other 'legitimate agency.
“It will, wé think, be conceded that the earning capacity of real estate owned by the individuals may be considered in fixing its value for taxation. Take an office building on a prominent street in one of our large cities. It will not be doubted, that by care in the selection of tenants, and in the preservation of the reputation of the building, by superior elevator service, by vigilance in guarding and protecting the property, by the exercise of skill and knowledge in the general management of the premises, a good will of the establishment will be promoted, which will tend to an extra increase in the earning capacity and value of the building. For the purpose of taxation, it would be none the less the true value in money of the building, because contributed to by the operative causes that gave rise to the good will. We discover no satisfactory reason why the same rule should not apply to the valuation of corporate property — : why the selling value of the capital stock, as affected b}7 the good will of the business, should be excluded from the consideration of the board of appraisers and assessors under the Nichols law, charged with the valuation of corporate property in this 'State, especially as the capital stock, when paid up, practically represents at least an equal value of the corporate property.”
Similar views were expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sanford v. Poe, 37 U. S. App. 378, 395, Judge Lurton, delivering the opinion, saying:
“The tax imposed is not a license tax, nor a tax on the business or occupation, nor on the transportation of property through.the State, nor from points within the State to points iri other States, nor from points in other States to points within the State. It purports to provide for a tax upon property within the State of Ohio. Though this property is employed very largely in the business of interstate commerce, yet that does not exempt it from the.same liability to taxation as all other property within the jurisdiction of Ohio. This proposition is too well settled to need argument. . . .
“ Neither does the fact that the property of the express com*226panies was valued as a unit profit-producing plant violate any Federal restriction upon the taxing power of a State within which a part of that plant is found. The value of property depends in a large degree upon the use to which it .is put. If a railroad may be valued as a unit, rather than as a given number of acres of land, plus so many tons of rails and so many thousand ties and a certain number of depots, shops, etc., there is no sufficient reason why the property of an express company should not be treated as a unit plant. If the State of Ohio had a right to tax the property within the State, and to assess it at its true cash valúe, there is no Federal restriction which will prevent such property from being ‘ assessed at the value which it has, as used, and by reason of its use.’ . . .
“That an express company owns no line of railway and operates no railroad does not prevent the value of its property from being affected by the relation of each part to every other part, and the use to which a part is put as a factor in a unit business.”
The line of reasoning thus pursued is in accordance with the decisions of this court already cited. Assuming the proportion of capital employed in each of several States through which such a company conducts its operations has been fairly ascertained, while taxation thereon, or‘determined with reference thereto, may be said in some sense to fall on the business of the company, it is only indirectly. The taxation is essentially a property tax, and, as such, not an interference with interstate commerce.
Nor, in this view, is the assessment on property not within the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities of the State and for that reason amounting to a taking of property without due process of law. The property taxed has its actual situs in the State and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction, and the distribution among the several counties is a matter of regulation by the state legislature. Pullman's Palace Gar Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 22; State Railroad Tax cases, 92 U. S. 575; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 ; Erie Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492; Columbus Southern Railway v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470.
*227In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, tbe rule is considered that person's! property may be separated from its owner and he may be-'taxed, on its account, at the place where it is, although not the place of his* own domicil, and even if he is not a citizen or a resident of the State which imposes the tax; and the distinction between ships and vessels and other personal property is pointed out. The authorities are largely examined and need not be gone over again.
There is here no attempt to tax property having a situs outside of.the State, but only to place a just value on that within. Presumptively all the property of the corporation or company is held and used for the purposes of its business, and the value of its capital stock and bonds is the value of only that property so held and used.
Special circumstances might exist, as indicated in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &c. Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 443, which would require the value of a portion of the property of an express company to be deducted from the value of its plant as expressed by the sum total of its stock and bonds before any valuation by mileage could be properly arrived at, but the difficulty in the cases at bar is that there is no showing of any such separate and distinct propeity which should be deducted, and its existence is not to be assumed. It is for the companies- to present any special circumstances which may exist, and, failing their doing so, the presumption is that all their property is directly devoted to their business, which being so, a fair distribution of its aggregate value would be upon the mileage basis.
The States through which the companies operate ought not to -be compelled to content themselves with a valuation of separate pieces of-property disconnected from the plant as an entirety, to the proportionate part of which they extend protection, and to the dividends of whose owners their citizens contribute.
It is not contended that notice of the time and place of the meetings of the board was not afforded or that the companies were denied the opportunity to appear and submit such proofs, explanations, suggestions and arguments with reference to the assessment as they desired.
*228We are, also, unable to conclude that the classification of express companies with railroad and telegraph companies as subject to the unit rule, denies the equal protection of the laws. That provision in the Fourteenth Amendment “was not intended to prevent a State from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways,” nor was that amendment “ intended to compel a State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation.” Bell’s Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.
In Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 351, in which a tax on gross receipts of 'express companies in the State of Missouri was sustained, Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, well says:
“ This court has repeatedly laid down the -doctrine that diversity of taxation, both with respect to the amount imposed and the various species of property selected either for bearing its burdens or for being exempt from them, is not inconsistent with a perfect uniformity and equality of taxation in'the proper sense of those terms; and that a system which imposes the same tax upon every species of property, irrespective of its nature or condition or class, will be destructive of the principle of uniformity and equality in taxation and of a just adaptation of property to its bhrdens.”
And see Kentucky Railroad Tax cases, 115 U. S. 321; Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594.
The policy pursued in Ohio is to classify property for taxation, when the nature of the property, or its use, or the nature of the business engaged in, requires classification, in the judgment of the legislature, in order to secure equality of burden; and property of different sorts is classified under various statutory provisions for the purposes of assessment and taxation. The state constitution requires all property to be taxed by a uniform rule and according to its true value in money, and it was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Jones that the Nichols law did not violate that requirement.
In Wagoner v. Loomis, 37 Ohio St. 571, it was ruled that: “ Statutory provisions, wdiereby different classes of property are listed and valued for taxation in and by different modes *229and agencies, are not necessarily in conflict with the provisions of the constitution which require all property- to be taxed by a uniform rule and according to its true value in money.” And the court said': “A faithful execution of the different provisions of the statutes would place upon the duplicate'for taxation all the taxable property of the State, whether bank stocks or other personal property or real estate, according to its true value in money ; and the equality required by the constitution ha,s no other test.”
The constitutional test was held to be complied with, whatever the mode, if the result of the assessment was that the property was assessed at its true value in money.
Considering, as we do, that the unit rule may be applied to express companies without disregarding any other Federal restriction, we think it necessarily follows that this law is not open to the objection of denying the equal protection of the laws.
We have said nothing in relation to the contention that these' valuations were excessive. The method of appraisement prescribed by the law was pursued and there were no specific charges of fraud. The general rule is well settled that “whenever a question of fact is thus submitted to the determination of a special tribunal,.its decision creates something more than a mere presumption of fact, and if such determination comes into inquiry before the courts it cannot be overthrown by evidence going only to show that the fact was otherwise than as so found and determined.” Pittsburgh, Cincinnati &c. Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 434; Western Union Telegraph, Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1.

Decrees affirmed.