Court Opinion

ID: 9641294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:27:52.064802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.504943
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge
(concurring).
Preliminarily, I note that I agree completely with the majority’s conclusion that the question of whether evidence of a dishonorable discharge is admissible to prove bad character is not actually raised by the facts of this case. At trial, the appellant neither took the stand nor introduced evidence of his own good character. Therefore, his character was never at issue, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa.Super. 317, 213 A.2d 223 (1965); Commonwealth v. Steinberg, 189 Pa.Super. 381, 150 A.2d 131 (1959); J. Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 56-58 (3d ed. 1940), and not even evidence proper for proving character would have been admissible to prove that trait. Thus, whether a dishonorable discharge would be suitable to prove bad character in a case where character is properly at issue is totally irrelevant to the issue in this case, and it should remain, for the time being, a question unresolved in Pennsylvania.
The question raised by the facts of this case is whether appellant’s counsel opened up the subject of appellant’s military records, and, if so, whether the prosecution went too far in its exploration of the opened subject. Appellant’s military record was not mentioned at trial *432until his attorney examined a telephone company security officer, Mr. Meyers, as follows:
“Q. May I ask you just a couple more things here, sir. As part of your investigation did you obtain Mr. Stakley’s military discharge and military records as part of your investigation A. Yes, I did.
Q. May I ask you how the telephone company was, managed to get these, what are usually very classified documents?
Mr. Givan (the district attorney): I’ll object to that.
The Court: That’s sustained. There’s nothing classified about a military discharge. You recast that question.
Mr. Shaffer (defense counsel): I’ll withdraw the question.” (36-37)
The Commonwealth contends that appellant’s counsel opened up the subject of appellant’s military records by implying that the witness had unethically acquired the records. The dissent acknowledges the possibility of this effect, but reasons that such an effect could have been sufficiently countered by a discussion limited to the propriety of the witness’ acquisition of the records. I disagree.
A thoughtful examination of the question asked by appellant’s counsel reveals that its implication was not that the witness had acted improperly; the implication was that the telephone company had acted improperly. I believe that counsel’s questions were intended to conjure up visions of the “big brother” image which some perhaps overly imaginative persons have ascribed to the telephone company. Appellant’s counsel, employing a very interesting strategy, wished to portray the situation as being that of an innocent individual at the mercy of a corporate giant.
*433Under the circumstances, it was not only important for the jury to know how the telephone company acquired the records; it was also extremely important for the jury to know why the phone company was in possession of those records. Only by revealing both how and why the records were obtained could the implication of impropriety be erased.
Why, in fact, were the records obtained by Mr. Meyers? At an earlier hearing, appellant had accused Mr. Meyers of being responsible for appellant’s discharge from the army. Thus, the reason for the phone company’s possession of the records could not be revealed without also revealing appellant’s accusation, and, ultimately, appellant’s dishonorable discharge.
I believe that any prejudice suffered by appellant was caused by his own actions. First, at the preliminary hearing, appellant falsely charged Mr. Meyers with causing his discharge. Then, after Mr. Meyers ascertained that this fact was untrue, appellant falsely implied that his privacy had been unjustifiably invaded. The Commonwealth was entitled to place the true, innocent motivations of Mr. Meyers before the jury, and the fact that appellant’s character was inevitably revealed is not reversible error. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 A. 20 (1935); Commonwealth v. McKenna, supra.
I join, therefore, in affirming the judgment of sentence.