Court Opinion

ID: 9630175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:03:37.564622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:33.020934
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting:
The majority opinion in this case adds to the static already existing in the opinions of our Court when the matter of a death is attributed to the operation by a person of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In addition to this situation this Court should not vary from case to case in its position taken so many times to the effect that judgments must rest on firmer ground than that of speculation, and there can be no dispute of the fact in the instant case that the only evidence upon which a verdict or judgment could rest is the weakest of circumstantial evidence and the jury had to indulge in assumptions outside the record to reach 'the verdict of which complaint is here made.
In the majority opinion it is correctly stated that no witness wias able to identify defendant as the man at the *73wheel of the car at the moment the child was struck. The fact is, no witness even attempted to make any such identification, and the only thing identified was that the car involved was of the description of defendant’s automobile. If the jury was correct in assuming that defendant’s automobile w&s the only one of that description in all of the thousands of cars on the streets, then there could be no question about the matter of defendant’s automobile being involved in the accident. More than that, defendant is not the only colored person owning or driving an automobile. The missing link, which should defeat the judgment in this case, is that it was not established beyond guesswork that defendant was driving the car, even if it was his automobile that was involved.
Regardless of the amount or amounts of beer defendant had consumed during the evening, there is not one whisper in the testimony to the effect that he was under the influence of liquor, much less intoxicated. He vehemently denies driving his automobile at the time and place in question. If he was not driving the car, then it makes no difference about his “spiritual” condition; however, in that regard, “one man’s meat is another man’s poison.” Therefore, we have two vital and essential elements missing, which, if attempted to be supplied by circumstance, must result in speculation, and the assumption of facts not disclosed on the face of the record. We must not overlook the fact that it is easy for a jury, when a death is involved, to have prejudice aroused when liquor is mentioned, and more particularly with some jurors if the defendant is of a different race or color to that of the juror.
The instructions of which complaint is made, unquestionably state the law to be applied in proper cases; however, ia correct statement of the law is sometimes prejudicial to a defendant if the circumstances do not warrant the giving of the instruction. It must be remembered that jurors look upon and consider instructions as the *74voice of the court. The instructions given in the instant case, of which complaint is made, are as follows:
“Instruction No. 9
“The Court instructs the jury that Section 56 (a) of the Ordinances of the City and County of Denver (Ordinance No. 31, Series of 1950) provides as follows:
“ ‘It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle or street car within the city.’ ”
“Instruction No. 10
“The Court instructs the jury that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor as that phrase is used in the ordinances, upon which I have instructed you, when he has taken a drink of alcoholic liquor which affects him so that in the slightest degree he is less able, either mentally or physically, or both, to exercise a clear judgment, and with steady hands and nerves, operate an automobile with safety to himself and to the public, and when this physical and mental condition exists after imbibing intoxicating liquors, even though the person has had one drink thereof, he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”
In view of what we have herein observed concerning lack of evidence of intoxication; then even if defendant was driving the car, the giving of these instructions was error, because they were not based on the evidence, but presented what the jurors could easily feel that in the mind of the court such a condition existed. Our Court of Appeals in an earlier case, which never has been questioned, modified, or overruled, aptly expressed the law on this particular topic in the case of Fisk v. Greeley Electric Light Co., 3 Colo. App. 319, in the following language:
“The instructions should in all cases be based upon the evidence, and an instruction, no matter how correct the principle which it may announce, that impliedly assumes the existence of evidence which was not given, is *75erroneous. It is calculated to bewilder and mislead the jury by producing the impression that in the mind of the court, some such state of facts as the instruction supposes, may be inferred from the evidence given, or concealed within it.”
It is my firm conviction that the judgment herein should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions for a new trial, and that consideration be given to the views herein expressed.