Court Opinion

ID: 9392539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 14:05:42.592814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.622137
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0931-MR

SHELIA D. THOMPSON                                                APPELLANT

             APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 21-CI-004996

AMAZON HOME WARRANTY OF
KENTUCKY, LLC                                                       APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Shelia D. Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals from the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s order granting Amazon Home Warranty of Kentucky, LLC’s

(“Amazon”) motion for summary judgment and awarding Thompson a $1,500

judgment. Thompson also appeals from the circuit court’s order denying her

motion to reconsider. Finding no error, we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             This case concerns a disagreement over a home warranty agreement

(the “Agreement”) entered into between Thompson and Amazon in 2019. The

Agreement stated that Amazon would cover the costs to repair or replace covered

systems outlined in the Agreement, such as the water heater, heating system, or

refrigerator, if any such items became inoperable due to mechanical failure caused

by normal wear and tear. Additionally, Section X of the Agreement stated that

Thompson would limit any recovery to $1,500 and waive “consequential,

incidental, indirect, secondary, or punitive damages.” Finally, the Agreement

stated that the parties would resolve all disputes under the Agreement through

mandatory arbitration and waive any rights to a jury trial.

             In December 2019, Thompson’s heating system stopped working

correctly, so she alerted Amazon of the issues. Amazon assigned a contractor to

address Thompson’s request, who told Thompson that she would need a new

furnace. In January 2020, Thompson again requested service from Amazon for the

same issue. This time, Thompson selected the service technician, as allowed by

the Agreement. This technician also advised Thompson that she needed a new

furnace, as the technician discovered a heat exchanger crack.

             Thompson ultimately replaced the furnace for $3,305 and filed a

claim with Amazon for coverage under the Agreement for the furnace replacement

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cost. However, Amazon denied coverage under the Agreement, which expressly

excluded coverage for cracked heat exchangers. Specifically, under Section V,

Paragraph B of the Agreement, Amazon listed “cracked heat exchangers” as one of

the items not covered. Section VI, Paragraph N also listed “cracked heat

exchangers” as one of the items not covered.

             On March 29, 2021, Amazon made an offer of judgment of $1,500

under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 68. Thompson rejected the offer

and demanded payment for the total price of the new furnace she had purchased.

             Thereafter, on August 30, 2021, Thompson sued Amazon in Jefferson

Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and violation

of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”) concerning Amazon’s denial

of Thompson’s claims for her furnace. On April 4, 2022, Amazon moved for

summary judgment based on the Agreement’s plain language. In the alternative,

Amazon argued Section X of the Agreement limited its liability to a maximum of

$1,500. Thompson filed a countermotion for summary judgment.

             The circuit court entered an order on June 3, 2022, granting Amazon’s

motion and awarding Thompson $1,500 in damages. Additionally, the circuit

court awarded Thompson $5.00 for attorney fees under Kentucky Revised Statute

(“KRS”) 453.060(1)(b). Thompson filed a motion to reconsider with the circuit

court, which it denied. This appeal followed.

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             We will discuss further facts as they become relevant.

                                    ANALYSIS

             a. Standard of Review

             “The . . . purpose of . . . summary judgment is to terminate litigation

when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent

to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the

movant.” Roberson v. Lampton, 516 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky. 1974). A court should

only grant summary judgment “where the movant shows that the adverse party

could not prevail under any circumstances.” Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683

S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985) (citation omitted).

             An appellate court reviews the granting of a summary judgment to

determine “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citation

omitted). In making this determination, “[t]he record must be viewed in a light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all

doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,

Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). Because factual findings

are not at issue, an appellate court reviews the decision de novo. Scifres, 916

S.W.2d at 781 (citation omitted).

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             b. Discussion

             As a preliminary matter, Amazon has moved this Court to strike

portions of Thompson’s brief, and the motion was passed to this panel on the

merits. Thompson criticizes two “cut and paste” sections contained in the

“Conclusion” portion of Thompson’s brief purporting to show Amazon’s online

business ratings from Forbes and the Better Business Bureau.

             Amazon’s online business ratings are information that is outside of the

record on appeal in violation of CR 76.12(4)(c)(vii) (now RAP 32(E)(1)(c)). “CR

76.12(4)(c)(vii) clearly provides that ‘materials and documents not included in the

record shall not be introduced or used as exhibits in support of briefs.’” Godman v.

City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 367 (Ky. App. 2007). As such, we grant

Amazon’s motion to strike the offending portions of Thompson’s brief by separate

order. We have disregarded these materials in our consideration of this appeal.

             Thompson first argues on appeal that a party moving for summary

judgment “cannot move for summary judgment against itself and still receive a

grant of summary judgment in its favor.” However, Amazon was not necessarily

requesting a judgment “against itself,” but was requesting that the circuit court find

that the parties had a binding agreement and that the maximum payment limit

under such agreement was $1,500. As previously discussed, we review a circuit

court’s grant of summary judgment to determine whether there were any genuine

                                         -5-
issues of material fact and whether Amazon was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. We can do so in this case and do not see the way in which Amazon requested

the summary judgment to have impeded or otherwise affected our review.

             Thompson also argues that issues of material fact remained as to

whether the only mechanism for the failure of a heat exchanger is through cracking

or corrosion. However, we agree with the circuit court that Thompson failed to

present any evidence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding this issue. While

Thompson states that there is no other failure mechanism for a heat exchanger, she

provides no citation or other evidence upon which this Court can rely to find

evidence of a genuine issue of material fact.

             Additionally, the fact remains that the Agreement’s plain language

capped Amazon’s liability at $1,500. Indeed, “[w]hen no ambiguity exists in the

contract, we look only as far as the four corners of the document to determine the

parties’ intentions.” 3D Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson

County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 174 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Ky. 2005) (citation

omitted). “The fact that one party may have intended different results, however, is

insufficient to construe a contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous

terms.” Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky.

App. 2002). Thus, we conclude that the circuit court correctly determined that the

extent of Amazon’s liability was $1,500 under the Agreement’s plain terms.

                                         -6-
             Thompson additionally argues that Amazon has, essentially, conceded

liability on the other two counts alleged in her complaint – fraud,

misrepresentation, and violation of the Act – by requesting a summary judgment

against itself. Thus, she asserts that a trial is necessary to determine the extent of

Amazon’s liability to her under the Act. Thompson further argues that the Act

gives broad protection and entitles her to an award of both punitive damages and

attorney’s fees.

             In this case, however, Thompson has failed to prove anything other

than her confusion regarding the warranty she purchased. The Act states, “[u]nfair,

false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or

commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” KRS 367.170(1). However, the

exclusion of cracked, corroded, or rusted heat exchangers is not fraudulent,

misleading, or deceptive because the Agreement clearly stated what was and was

not covered. Kentucky’s highest Court has stated, “one who signs a contract is

presumed to know its contents[.]” Clark v. Brewer, 329 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky.

1959). Moreover, if that party “has an opportunity to read the contract which he

signs he is bound by its provisions, unless he is misled as to the nature of the

writing which he signs or his signature has been obtained by fraud.” Id. Because

Thompson has presented no evidence that Amazon attempted to conceal the

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applicable clauses in the Agreement, deceive or mislead her, or fraudulently induce

her to sign the agreement, we affirm the circuit court.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Juliana N. Madaki                          Franklin Yudkin
Louisville, Kentucky                       Louisville, Kentucky

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