Court Opinion

ID: 9722206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:20:15.060026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:31.981243
License: Public Domain

MALETZ, Judge
(concurring).
I am in accord with the well-reasoned opinion of Chief Judge Boe. Withal, I believe it may be helpful to add some further comments with respect to the defendant’s contention that when a national emergency is declared by the President — as was done in Proclamation 4074 — he has unlimited discretion to impose supplemental duties on imports by virtue of the authority delegated to him by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)). To the extent pertinent, that section provides:
(b) (1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; * * *; and the President may, in the manner hereinabove provided, take other and further measures not inconsistent herewith for the enforcement of this subdivision. [Emphasis added.]
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At the outset, it is fundamental that the court’s primary task, in determining whether section 5(b) authorizes the President to impose supplemental duties on imports, is to ascertain the Congressional intent and to construe the section in such a way as to give effect to that intent. This, in turn, requires the provision in issue to be reviewed, not as an isolated, discrete enactment, but in the context of the entire statute of which it is a part. United States v. California Portland Cement Company, 413 F.2d 161, 166 (9th Cir. 1969); Stanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 F.2d 298, 308 (9th Cir. 1961); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284, 290 (7th Cir. 1954).
The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 411 et seq.) came into being as a consequence of the common law doctrine of both England and the United States that during a state of war all commercial intercourse between citizens of belligerent states or countries is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the sovereign.1 Its declared purpose was “to mitigate the rules of law which prohibit all intercourse between the citizens of warring nations, and to permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain kinds of business to be *1177carried on.”2 This was accomplished by prohibiting and making unlawful all forms of trading with the enemy “except with the license of the President.” 40 Stat. 412, sec. 3(a).
The concept of legalizing trade with the enemy pursuant to license was carried over from the Civil War when legislation was enacted providing for a system of licenses and permits for trading with the inhabitants of the insurrectionary States. Thus, section 5 of the Act of July 13, 1861 (12 Stat. 255, 257) authorized the President to declare the inhabitants of a State or part of a State to be in a state of insurrection; and provided that “thereupon all commercial intercourse” by and between the citizens of those areas and the rest of the United States “shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue,” and that all articles coming from or proceeding to such areas shall be forfeited to the United States, together with the vehicle or vessel conveying them, provided, however—
[t]hat the President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section, the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. * * *
Pursuant to this Act, President Lincoln licensed and permitted trading between the citizens of the Union and the inhabitants of the insurrectionary States which was carried on under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.3 What is particularly significant is that the licensing authority delegated to the President and Secretary of the Treasury under the 1861 Act and as carried out in the executive orders, proclamations and regulations issued pursuant thereto, was never construed or even considered as including the power to impose taxes or duties.4
*1178In sum, as explained by Charles Warren, Assistant Attorney General and author of the measure, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 — like the Act of July 13, 1861 — “recognizes that there may be some kinds of business transactions or commercial intercourse between citizens of this country and enemies which may be carried on or performed with safety to the United States, and it provides for those transactions by means of a system of license.”5 Mr. Warren also observed that “[t]he provisions of * * * [the] bill greatly amplify and make more practical a system of license or permit which was provided for by the Government during the Civil War.”6 Thus, section 4 of the Act (40 Stat. 413, 414) contained elaborate provisions for control over branches or agencies of enemy corporations and enemy ally córporations doing business in this country, including insurance and reinsurance companies, under a procedure by which they could apply to the President for a “license to continue to do business.”
Section 5(a) (40 Stat. 415) gave the President the power to issue (and suspend or revoke) licenses to do business with the enemy or its allies and to perform any act otherwise made unlawful by the Act without such license. Further, section 5(b) (ibid) authorized the President “by means of licenses or otherwise” to investigate, regulate or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, export, or earmarkings of coin, bullion, or currency, and evidence of transfers of indebtedness or ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy *1179or neutral, or between residents of one or more foreign countries and any person in the United States.
More particularly, section 5 provided as follows (40 Stat. 415):
(a) That the President, if he shall find it compatible with the safety of the United States and with the successful prosecution of the war, may, by proclamation, suspend the provisions of this Act so far as they apply to an ally of enemy, and he may revoke or renew such suspension from time to time; and the President may grant licenses, special or general, temporary or otherwise, and for such period of time and containing such provisions and .conditions as he shall prescribe, to any person or class of persons to do business as provided in subsection (a) of section four hereof, and to perform any act made unlawful without such license in section three hereof, and to file and prosecute applications under subsection (b) of section ten hereof; and he may revoke or renew such licenses from time to time, if he shall be of opinion that such grant or revocation or renewal shall be compatible with the safety of the United States and with the successful prosecution of the war; and he may make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this Act; and the President may exercise any power or authority conferred by this Act through such officer or officers as he shall direct.
If the President shall have reasonable cause to believe that any act is about to be performed in violation of section three hereof he shall have authority to order the postponement of the performance of .such act for a period not exceeding ninety days, pending investigation of the facts by him.
(b) That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed.
Against this background of which Congress was well aware, as evidenced from the Congressional committee hearings, reports and debates in both Houses on the bill,’7 it is clear that section 5 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 was a revitalization, albeit in more elaborate form, of the licensing provisions of section 5 of the Act of July 13, 1861; that it conferred upon the President the same kind of regulatory licensing authority that was granted the President and Secretary of the Treasury in the 1861 Act; and that this authority was to be exercised not only over trade with the enemy (section 5(a)), but over credit transfers, foreign exchange transactions, exports of precious metals and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country (section 5(b)). It is equally clear that this licensing authority was not intended to be a grant of Congress’ power to impose *1180taxes or levy duties on imports. Hamilton v. Dillin, supra, 88 U.S. 73.
Indeed, grave concern was expressed by the Secretary of the Treasury over the fact that the Trading with the Enemy bill as approved by the House (H.R. 4960) did not provide for adequate Presidential control over imports, an omission he considered to be serious. Thus the Secretary explained: 8
* * * It may be necessary to regulate the importation of nonessentials of commerce in order to prevent any adverse and objectionable balance of trade involving settlement in gold. Through governmental control of imports it will also be possible to insure the most efficient employment of certain imported raw materials essential to the effective prosecution of the war. It is probable that in the adjustment of trade relations, now so profoundly affected by war conditions, better results could be obtained than are now possible if the Government had control of these matters when dealing with governments that have imposed restrictions upon the exports of raw materials needed by our war industries.
The Senate, upon being apprised of the Secretary’s views, approved a recommendation to add to H.R. 4960 a new section 11. This new section, which was subsequently agreed to by the House, provided (40 Stat. 422, 423) :
Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety so requires and shall make proclamation thereof it shall be unlawful to import into the United States from any country named in such proclamation any article or articles mentioned in such proclamation except at such time or times, and under such regulations or orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress: Provided, however, That no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another.
It is important to note that this broad power over imports conferred upon the President — who could allow their entry into this country “under such regulations or orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions” as he might prescribe — was not a part of the licensing provisions of the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act; rather, it was included,as a temporary wartime measure which, by its very language remained in effect only “during the present war” 9 and terminated at the close of that conflict.10 Moreover, it is significant that section 11, which delegated to the President such broad authority over imports, was never reenacted or even proposed for passage in the course of subsequent amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Section 5 on the other hand was constructed in terms of permanent legislation; accordingly, subsection (a) thereof automatically went into effect again at the outbreak of World War II. See Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S.404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945). Subsection (b), however, by virtue of subsequent amendment, became no longer limited in its application solely to periods of conflict. In this connection, on March 9, 1933, in order to deal with the domestic banking emergency, the President’s au*1181thority to act under section 5(b) was extended to any “period of national emergency declared” by him, and he was given the power to regulate “by means of licenses or otherwise * * * transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions.” 48 Stat. 1.11
On May 7, 1940, Congress by Joint Resolution (54 Stat. 179) (1) authorized the President, under section 5(b), “by means of licenses or otherwise,” to regulate transactions in stocks and securities in which any foreign country or national had an interest; and (2) confirmed an Executive Order of April 10, 1940 and regulations issued thereunder restricting all transactions and transfers of credit in which Norway and Denmark (which had been invaded by Germany) or their nationals had an interest.12
Section 5(b) was last amended on December 18, 1941, by section 301 of the First War Powers Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 839) in order to give the President more comprehensive control over the seizure, vesting and disposition of all property of any foreign country or national.13 To accomplish this purpose, the President was authorized, among other things, to regulate “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise * * * any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation * * * involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest * * *.”14 As summed up by Representative Kefauver on the House floor (87 Cong.Rec. 9865 (1941)):
It was explained to us by representatives of the Treasury that it was absolutely nepessary for the present act —5(b)—to be reenacted in order to enable thé Treasury to carry out its policy of freezing certain credits and of handling certain financial interests during the war. The explanation made to us, and I think it is carried out in this bill, is that the only change the Treasury wanted in 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act was to give the executive department power not only to passively freeze credits and to negatively handle the operation of some manufacturing plants by a system of licenses or controls that they have to work under at the present time, but also to give the President the power to actively put into operation those interests or those securities or plants that might be taken over and be seized under authority of 5(b) of the present act.
Thus it can be seen that the amendments to section 5(b) successively ex*1182tended the President’s licensing authority in the areas of foreign exchange, banking and currency transactions and transactions involving property in which foreign countries or nationals have an interest.15 However, nowhere in the Congressional debates, committee hearings or reports on section 5(b) and the amendments thereto is there even a glimmer of a suggestion that Congress ever intended — or even considered — this section as a vehicle for delegating any of its tariff-making authority.
Furthermore, a finding that the President has the power under section 5(b) to impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable simply by declaring a national emergency would not only render our trade agréements program nugatory, it would subvert the manifest Congressional intent to maintain control over its Constitutional powers to levy tariffs. The fact is that Congress has never lightly delegated its authority in this area and any delegation of such power has been — with the exception of section 11, the temporary wartime provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act —specific and restricted in its operation.
*1183Thus, our foreign trade agreement program, commencing with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 943), the subsequent amendments thereto, and culminating in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 872), has gradually expanded the authority of the President, in negotiating trade agreements, to modify, increase or reduce duties; however, this authority has always been subject to various restrictions and limitations.16
In fact, the legislative history of the trade agreement statutes is enlightening in connection with defendant’s claim of authority under the Trading with the Enemy Act. For during the entire course of the Congressional committee hearings,17 reports,18 and debates on the trade agreement statutes, it was never once suggested that the President already possessed emergency rate-making authority, either under the Trading with the Enemy Act or any other statute. Rather, it was frequently emphasized that the President was being given new power to impose tariffs19
Furthermore, as Chief Judge Boe observed in his analysis of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress’ refusal *1184to accede to the Senate’s proposal to insert a new provision (section 353) giving the President carte blanche authority to increase existing duties or impose new ones whenever he deemed it in the national interest, is a reflection of its firm stand against such unfettered and unrestricted delegation of its tariff-making authority to the President.
For all the foregoing reasons, it must be concluded that the regulatory licensing power delegated to the President by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act does not include the authority to assess the 10 percent import surcharge here in question.

. See e. g., The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Crunch) 181, 193, 3 L.Ed. 528 (1814) ; The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 161, 3 L.Ed. 520 (1814) ; Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 535, 18 L.Ed. 939 (1868) ; Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 542, 554, 19 L.Ed. 244 (1869) ; United States v. Lane, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 185, 195, 19 L.Ed. 445 (1869) ; Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U.S. 425, 429, 24 L.Ed. 453 (1877).

. S.Rep.No.111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), p. 1. See also Ex Parte Kurnezo Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 76, 63 S.Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed. 58 (1942).

. On August 16, 1861, the President issued a Proclamation (12 Stat. 1262) declaring that the inhabitants of certain States, with some exceptions, were in a state of insurrection; that all commercial intercourse with them was unlawful; and that all goods coming in from those States “without the special license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury” would be forfeited to the United States. On February 28, 1862, the President issued an executive order licensing and permitting such commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of the areas declared to be in insurrection and the citizens of the States of the Union “within the rules and regulations which have been or may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for the conducting and carrying on of the same on the inland waters and ways of the United States.” See Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 76, 22 L.Ed. 528 (1875). This was subsequently revised by the “License of Trade” issued by the President on March 31, 1863, permitting commercial intercourse with inhabitants of the insurrectionary States pursuant to regulations adopted on that same date by the Secretary of the Treasury and subsequently modified on September 11, 1863. Id. at 77, 78. The following year, the licensing of commercial intercourse by private citizens with inhabitants of the insurrectionary areas was vastly circumscribed and restricted by sections 4, 8 and 9 of the Act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. 376 and 377). See United States v. Lane, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 185, 186-187, 19 L.Ed. 445 (1869).

. In fact, the contrary position was taken by the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Dillin, supra, 88 U.S. 73. There the appellant contended that a license fee required by Treasury Department regulations to be paid as a condition for obtaining a permit to purchase cotton in insurrectionary areas was illegally exacted on the ground that it was essentially a tax and, therefore, an improper exercise of Congress’ power under the Constitution “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” Id. at 81. The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the license fee was not a tax imposed under the taxing power, but a “bonus” imposed under the war power of the government; that the power of the government to open and regu*1178late trade -with the enemy was intended to be conferred upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury in the Act of July 13, 1961; and that this included the power to impose such conditions as they saw fit, including payment of a license fee. The Court held (id. at 94 and 97) :
* * * The conditions exacted by him [the President] were not imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but of the war power of the government. The exaction itself was not properly a tax, but a bonus required as a condition precedent for engaging in the trade. * * *
•i* :!: * *
It is hardly necessary, under the view we have taken of the character of the regulations in question, and of the charge or bonus objected to by the plaintiffs, to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the act of July 13th, 1861, regarded as authorizing such regulations. As before stated, the power of the government to impose such conditions upon commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war as it sees fit, is undoubted. It is a power which every other government in the world claims and exercises, and which belongs to the government of the United States as incident to the power to declare war and to carry it on to a successful termination. We regard the regulations in question as nothing more than the exercise of this power. It does not belong to the same category as the power to levy and eolleot taxes, duties, and excises. It belongs to the war powers of the government, just as much so as the power to levy military contributions, or to perform any other belligerent act. [Emphasis added.]

. Testimony of Mr. Warren at Hearings on H.R. 4704 (the Trading with the Enemy bill) Before the House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), p. 32.

. Testimony of Mr. Warren at Hearings on H.R. 4960 (the Trading with the Enemy hill that was subsequently enacted) Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Commerce, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), p. 131. See also testimony of the General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board, id. at pp. 196-216; .55 Cong.Rec. 4852-4857 and 4862-4863 (1917). The Senate Commerce Committee in reporting out H.R. 4960 noted that the bill was susceptible of division into four portions. Thus, the Committee stated (S.Rep.No.111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), P. 3) :
The first portion defines the word “enemy” and prescribes the acts which shall be forbidden and which are made criminal if performed without license.
The second portion provides for a system by which any act otherwise unlawful and criminal may be licensed * * * if compatible with the safety of the United States and the successful prosecution of the war.
The third portion deals with the conservation and utilization of enemy property during the war.
The fourth portion deals with the entirely separable question of patents.

. The Congressional hearings, reports and debates thus referred to are cited in footnotes 8, 9, and 10, respectively, of Chief Judge Boe’s opinion.

. Letter from Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo to Senator Ransdell, dated Sept. 11, 1917, 55 Cong.Rec. 7013 (1917).

. Sections 3(d), 4(b), 13 and 14 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which also referred to the “present war,” similarly terminated at the conclusion of World War I.

. There was one exception to the termination of section 11, which exception was effected by the enactment on November 19, 1919 of H.J.Res. 269 (41 Stat. 361). That statute provided that “notwithstanding the prior termination of the present war,” the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act and of any Presidential Proclamation issued pursuant thereto which prohibited or controlled the importation of dyes and other products derived from coal tar were to be continued to January 15, 1920.

. Prior thereto, on September 24, 1918, the President was authorized under section 5(b) to regulate or prohibit “by means of licenses or otherwise” the hoarding or melting of gold or silver coin, bullion or currency, and to regulate (until two years after “the termination of the present war”) any transactions in bonds and certificates of indebtedness of the United States. 40 Stat. 966.

. See H.Rep.No.2009, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940), pp. 1-2. In 1941, the House Judiciary Committee pointed out that under the system of property control authorized by the 1940 amendment, “the Government exercises supervision over transactions in foreign property, either by prohibiting such transactions or by permitting them on condition and under license.” [Emphasis added.] H.Rep. No.1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), pp. 2-3.

. See H.Rep.No.1507, supra, note 12. See also S.Rep.No.911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), p. 2. With these added powers, the President could “reach enemy interests which masqueraded under * * * innocent fronts.” Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 485, 68 S.Ct. 174, 92 L.Ed. 88 (1947). On the effect of the 1941 amendment with respect to licensing foreign trade and credit transfers, see Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, 11 Law & Contemp.Prob. 17, 32 et seq. (1945-46).

. The words “instructions” and “importation” were added to section 5(b) by the foregoing 1941 amendment. However, there is no indication in the legislative history of this amendment as to the reason for the inclusion of these specific words.

. For an example of regulations which license or authorize transactions subject to executive control under section 5(b) upon declaration of a national emergency, see the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, as amended, 31 CFR Part 500 (1973). These regulations were first published by the Secretary of the Treasury (to whom the President had delegated the powers conferred upon him by section 5(b), 7 F.R. 1409, February 12, 1942) on December 19, 1950 (15 F.R. 9040) under the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, 64 Stat. A454, which has never-been revoked.
Section 500.201 of these regulations as amended, provides in pertinent jrart:
(a) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if either such transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of any designated foreign country, or any national thereof, or such transactions involve property in which any designated foreign country, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the effective date of this section had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect:
(1) All transfers of credit and all payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution or banking institutions wheresoever located, with respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or by any person (including a banking institution) subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
(2) All transactions in foreign exchange by any person within the United States; and
(3) The exportation or withdrawal from the United States of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, or the earmarking of any such property by any person within the United States.
(b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if such transactions involve property in which any designated foreign country, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the effective date of this section had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect:
(1) All dealings in, including, without limitation, transfers, withdrawals, or ex-portations of, any property or evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ; and
(2) All transfers outside the United States with regard to any property or property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(c) Any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect of evading or avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section is hereby prohibited. * * * *
Another example of the exercise under section 5(b) of Presidential authority to regulate international financial transactions is the Foreign Direct Investment Program established pursuant to Executive Order 11387 which was issued on January 1, 1968 (33 F. R. 47) on the basis of the continuing national emergency declared by President Truman in 1950. This program restricts transfers of capital to foreign countries by investors in the United States and requires repatria*1183tion to this country by such investors of portions of their foreign earnings and short-term financial assets held abroad.

. For example, even section 252(a)(3) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 TJ.S.G. § 1882(a)(3)), which gives the President substantial tariff-making authority is operative only under clearly defined conditions. It authorizes the President to impose duties or other import restrictions “to the extent he deems necessary and appropriate” on the products of any foreign country or instrumentality, but only in the event that such foreign country or instrumentality establishes or maintains unjustifiable foreign import restrictions against United States agricultural products whicli impair the value of tariff commitments made to the United States, oppress United States commerce, or prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis. Furthermore, he must first provide an opportunity for the presentation of views concerning such foreign import restrictions which are maintained against United States commerce and, upon request by any interested person, provide for appropriate public hearings. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(d).

. See Hearings on H.R. 8430 Before the House Comm, on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; Hearings on H.R. 8687 Before the Senate Comm, on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Comm, on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Comm, on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

. See H.Rep.No.1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; S.Rep.No.871, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; H.Rep.No.1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; S.Rep.No.2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; Conf.Rep.No.2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

. See, for example, the following Congressional comments on H.R. 11970, which was subséquently enacted as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962:
Rep. Brown. * * * I do not care which President may be in office, because I have opposed some of those things under a Republican administration just as I am against this proposal now to give the President of the United States unlimited powers in the field of trade tariffs, and import duties such as have never been exercised by any President in the past, have never been granted to any President. * * * 108 Cong.Rec. 11912 (1962).
* * * ❖ *
Sen. Curtís. * * * The pending bill represents the greatest delegation of power that has ever been given to any President. Heretofore our trade agreements have prevented a negotiation of 50 percent of the tariffs. This bill authorizes the President to wipe out the tariffs. It also authorizes him to impose tariffs even on goods that are not dutiable at the present time. Id. at 19756.
* * * * *
Sen. Humphrey. With regard to the first —the new authority which this act would delegate to the President: There are those who charge that the Trade Expansion Act would result in the full and complete abandonment of the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate tariffs. This act would do nothing of the kind. What it does is to continue for a limited fixed period the delegation of authority to set tariff rates within limits defined by Congress and with well-established safeguards that has [sic] been in effect since 1934. * * * [Emphasis added.] Id. at 19867.