Court Opinion

ID: 9410344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 22:03:35.510763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.032845
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/20/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                   DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 DALIA ROJAS,                               D077931

        Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                            (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00023795-
        v.                                  CU-MC-NC)

 HSBC CARD SERVICES INC. et al.,

        Defendants and Appellants.

 DALIA ROJAS,                               D078511

        Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                            (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00023795-
        v.                                  CU-MC-NC)

 HSBC CARD SERVICES INC. et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

       CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment order
of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge, and
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.
        Law Offices of Deborah L. Raymond and Deborah L. Raymond, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
        Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Julia B. Strickland, John R. Loftus, David
W. Moon and Christine E. Ellice for Defendants, Cross-appellants and
Respondents.

        This is the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit
against HSBC Card Services, Inc. (HSBC Card Services) and HSBC
Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (HSBC Tech Services; together, HSBC) for
violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Privacy Act; Pen. Code,

§ 630, et seq.)1 Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter
Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by
HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleges HSBC intentionally
recorded confidential calls without her consent, in violation of section 632,
subdivision (a). She also alleges HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her
cellular and cordless phones without her consent, in violation of section 632.7,
subdivision (a).
        The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas
appealed. (Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 427, 431
(Rojas I).) We reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to
show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. (Id., at pp. 429,
432.)
        On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer,
which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC
relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted. One
such exception is “section 998,” which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                        2
agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to
record the calls. HSBC also presented evidence that Rojas received recording
disclosures in connection with her HSBC credit card, through the
cardmember agreement and her monthly payment calls to HSBC. Rojas
elicited testimony that HSBC managers knew personal calls were being made
by call center agents, including by Alejandra, and denied she consented to
recording. The trial court entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the
court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also
found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of
consent. HSBC sought costs, including pursuant to its section 998 offer,
which Rojas moved to strike or tax. The court ruled the section 998 offer was
valid and denied Rojas’s motion.
      Rojas appeals from the judgment, contending the trial court made
several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and
that the evidence did not support its findings. Rojas also appeals from the
denial of her motion to strike or tax costs, arguing the section 998 offer was
invalid and the court erred in awarding HSBC expert costs, failing to
consider her limited resources in awarding those costs, and awarding costs

for unused trial exhibits.2
      We conclude the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing
lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas
impliedly consented to being recorded. We are compelled to affirm the

2     On our own motion, we consolidate the appeals for purposes of decision.
(See Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 481, fn. 1.)
HSBC also filed a protective cross-appeal from the judgment regarding a
summary adjudication ruling that Rojas could seek $5000 per violation,
rather than per action. Because we affirm the judgment, we do not reach the
cross-appeal.

                                       3
judgment under these circumstances. Although we determine the record does
not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls
between Rojas and her daughter, that determination does not require
reversal. What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time
recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential
liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal
calls may not mitigate that risk. On the costs order, we conclude the court
properly determined the section 998 offer was valid, and did not abuse its
discretion in awarding costs. The judgment and postjudgment order are
affirmed.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                            I.     Underlying Events3

A.    HSBC’s Salinas Facility

      During the relevant time period (March 2009 to May 2012), HSBC’s
business included issuing credit cards. HSBC Tech Services provided
telephone recording services to HSBC Card Services.
      Rojas’s daughter, Alejandra, worked at the HSBC Card Services call
center in Salinas, California (“the Salinas facility”). At this facility, all calls
to and from call center agent’s desk phones (i.e., customer-facing phones)
were recorded. There was no way for agents to disable recording on their
desk telephones. There was an automated disclosure for inbound calls, which
stated “This call is being recorded for quality purposes,” but no automatic
outbound recording disclosure.

3     This summary is based on the trial record, and includes facts that
became available after we reversed summary judgment in Rojas I. The
record as of summary judgment is reflected there.

                                         4
      James Ivey had managerial responsibilities for the fraud and disputes
departments in the Salinas facility. He oversaw department managers, who
oversaw unit managers, who supervised the agents. Alma Escamilla was a
unit manager, and then department manager in dispute processing. Leticia
Ramirez was a senior unit manager in dispute processing, and then a quality
manager.

B.    HSBC Workplace Policies Applicable To The Salinas Facility

      The Salinas facility was subject to two sets of written policies: “Inside
HR,” and “Scout.” Inside HR housed HSBC’s global, companywide human
resources policies. These included an “Electronic Monitoring and Device Use”
policy, which stated HBSC “periodically monitors and/or records certain
employee telephone conversations.” The policy also stated employees “may
use” telephones “for occasional non-work purposes,” and explained,
“[P]ersonal calls may be recorded, but should never be monitored; if you
identify a personal call in the course of monitoring an employee, the
monitoring should be discontinued immediately.”
      Scout was a “database of policies and procedures for all operational
units,” and had “more relevant information . . . specific to . . . operational
areas . . . within the call centers.” These policies included a “Call Avoidance”
policy, which barred employees from making outbound calls to avoid taking
inbound ones; a “Recording Disclosure to Third Parties” policy, which applied
when a non-cardmember was on the line; and a “Call Cardmember
Procedure,” for calls to resolve disputes, which said to “[u]se the following
suggested dialogue . . . [¶] [T]his call may be recorded and monitored for
quality assurance purposes” and required a recording disclosure to third
parties.

                                         5
      As we discuss post, HSBC also had a practice of sending a cardmember
agreement to all cardholders, which contained a recording disclosure.

C.    HSBC Records Calls To Rojas

      HSBC recorded over 300 calls from Alejandra to Rojas.4 Some calls
were made to Rojas’s cell phone; others were made to her home telephone
line, which had both corded and cordless handsets; and still others were to
her work telephone at J.C. Penney.

                                 II.    Litigation

A.    Lawsuit, Summary Judgment, And First Appeal

      Rojas sued HSBC for Privacy Act violations in 2014. In her operative
first amended complaint, she alleged HSBC “willfully employ[ed] . . .
recording . . . equipment” to record her communications “without [her]
knowledge or consent . . . .” She asserted one cause of action under section
632 (which covers “confidential communication[s]”), and a second cause of
action under section 632.7 (which applies to cellular or cordless phones, and

does not require confidentiality). (§ 632, subds. (a), (c); § 632.7, subd. (a).)5
      HSBC moved for summary judgment in 2016. The trial court granted
summary judgment, Rojas appealed, and we reversed. (Rojas I, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 431.) We discuss Rojas I in addressing intent, post. Here,
it suffices to say we held HSBC did not establish as a matter of law that it

4     HSBC produced 317 recordings in discovery, but the parties stipulated
there were 302 non-duplicative recordings. All but one was from Alejandra,
and the other was from an acquaintance of Rojas.

5     The operative complaint involved additional parties, who are not at
issue here. HSBC also filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity and
contribution against Alejandra, which also is not at issue.

                                         6
lacked the intent to record, and that a reasonable trier of fact could find it did
have such an intent. (Id. at p. 435.) The remittitur issued in 2019.

B.    Trial

      The case proceeded to an eight-day bench trial in 2020. One hundred

and nine call recordings were played at trial, and several witnesses testified.6
      Richard Marcy, HSBC Tech Services’ head of telecommunications for
the United States and Latin America, confirmed the Salinas facility used an
automatic recording disclosure on inbound calls, and testified they used
employee disclosures for outbound calls. He acknowledged they were able to
include an automatic disclosure or beep on outbound calls, but HSBC Card
Services decided not to do so. HSBC expert witness Darlene Geller-Stoff
testified this was consistent with best practices, and explained that
“launching the call with an automated message very, very significantly
decreases the chance that the call will be answered . . . .”
      Peter Garcia, Jr., a senior branch manager who had worked at call
centers including the Salinas facility, testified HSBC trained call center
agents to make recording disclosures on all outbound calls. Ivey, who led
fraud and disputes at the Salinas facility, explained call disclosures were a
“critical” training item, and “one of the things that [they] paid the most
attention to.” He acknowledged it was a “risk” the “agent won’t make the
proper disclosure to a merchant . . . .” Marcy similarly testified outbound
calls were a concern, “because they knew that not all agents were doing [the

6     We focus here on HSBC’s recording disclosure practices and asserted
ban on personal calls; Rojas and her calls from Alejandra; and Alejandra’s
managers’ awareness of her personal calls. We discuss other relevant
testimony, including HSBC’s workplace personal call policies and the
disclosures received by Rojas for her credit card, post.

                                        7
disclosure], and there was a risk.” All three witnesses indicated agent calls
were monitored to ensure compliance. Ivey and Garcia further testified
failure to provide an outbound recording disclosure was grounds for employee
discipline.
      Ivey and Garcia, as well as Salinas department manager Escamilla,
also testified HSBC policy barred call center agents from making personal
calls from their desks and agents would be disciplined or subject to corrective

action for this conduct.7
      Rojas and Alejandra also testified at trial. Rojas lived with Alejandra,
and Alejandra’s two children (Rojas’s grandchildren); Alejandra’s boyfriend
Enrique (the children’s father); and Rojas’s boyfriend. Rojas worked at J.C.
Penney and assisted Alejandra with childcare on her days off. Rojas knew
Alejandra worked for HSBC Card Services. Rojas had an HSBC Mastercard,
and received a recording disclosure when she called HSBC to pay her bill
each month. Rojas testified that if she needed to talk to Alejandra, she would
call Alejandra’s cell phone, Alejandra would see the missed call, and would
call back on her desk phone. When Alejandra called her, Rojas did not
receive “any indication” her calls were being recorded. Rojas said she “didn’t
have a phone number for Alejandra at her work.”
      Alejandra explained she would call Rojas back from her work phone,
because they “weren’t allowed to use [their] cell phones.” She subsequently
testified her boyfriend Enrique had her HSBC landline extension, and would
call her at that number. Alejandra acknowledged that if her “mother . . .
boyfriend, anyone . . . called in on the incoming line,” the incoming call would

7     The video deposition testimony of Escamilla and Ramirez was played
for the court.

                                       8
receive a recording disclosure.
      The call recordings played at trial included a call in which Rojas
completed a sale to a J.C. Penney customer while talking to Alejandra, and
calls to her home with others present, including one call that was “mostly a
conversation between [Enrique] and Alejandra,” with Rojas joining at the
end. The recordings also reflected background noise at the call center,
including a “voice speaking in the background on [one] call,” and Rojas
acknowledged Alejandra sometimes “had to speak softly” because she “didn’t
want the conversation to be overheard” and that, at one point, Rojas said,
“Talk to me louder” and Alejandra responded, “I can’t, I’m at work.”
      Ramirez, who was Alejandra’s direct manager, testified she was aware
Alejandra was making personal calls from her desk. Escamilla, who was
Alejandra’s “next-level manager” for a time, testified Alejandra was not
permitted to make personal calls from her cubicle, but she was not aware of
such calls.

C.    Statement of Decision

      After the bench trial, the trial court issued a proposed statement of
decision finding in favor of HSBC. Rojas filed objections. The court adopted
its proposed statement as the final statement of decision.
      The trial court explained there were 106 call recordings at issue, as it
accepted into evidence only the 109 recordings played during trial and Rojas
declined to pursue three calls to her J.C. Penney work phone line. In ruling
on Rojas’s Privacy Act claims, the court determined Rojas “fail[ed] to prove
the necessary elements of intent and lack of consent,” which are “essential
elements” under both section 632 and 632.7, and this “requires a finding in
HSBC’s favor on all of [her] claims.” The court also found Rojas did not
establish the landline communications were confidential for purposes of

                                       9
section 632, and could not recover for cellular or cordless calls under section
632.7 for additional reasons (or seek alternative relief for those calls under
§ 632). In rejecting Rojas’s testimony that certain calls to her home were
received on the cordless handset, the court expressly found she was “not
credible.” The court also noted during trial that it had a “hard time believing
some of [Rojas’s] testimony” regarding calls not played at trial.

D.    Judgment and Postjudgment Proceedings

      In July 2020, the trial court entered judgment for HSBC. HSBC filed
its memorandum of costs. Rojas moved to strike or tax costs, which the trial
court denied.
      Rojas appealed from the judgment, and subsequently appealed from the
order denying her motion to tax costs. We requested supplemental briefing
from the parties regarding a recent California Supreme Court decision
concerning recoverable costs for unused trial exhibits. (Segal v. ASICS (2022)
12 Cal.5th 651 (Segal).)
                                 DISCUSSION

             I.   Rojas’s Appeal From Judgment After Court Trial

      Rojas challenges the trial court’s determinations regarding intent,
consent, confidentiality under section 632, and additional rulings regarding
section 632.7. She further contends the court abused its discretion by
admitting into evidence and considering only call recordings played in court.
We conclude that although the court’s intent findings are not supported by
the record, the court properly analyzed the issue of consent to record and
substantial evidence supports its finding of implied consent, requiring
affirmance of the judgment. We need not and do not reach Rojas’s remaining
arguments.

                                       10
A.    Overview of Applicable Law

      1.     California Invasion of Privacy Act

      The California Invasion of Privacy Act was enacted to “ ‘protect the
right of privacy by, among other things, requiring that all parties consent to a
recording of their conversation.’ ” (Smith v. LoanMe (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183,
191 (LoanMe), citing Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 768–769
(Flanagan); see Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95,
122 (Kearney) [“it is unlawful under California law for a party to a telephone
conversation to record the conversation without the knowledge of all other
parties to the conversation”]; id. at p. 125 [state has “strong and continuing
interest in the full and vigorous application” of the Privacy Act].)
      Section 632, subdivision (a), “provides for liability when ‘[a] person . . .
intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication . . . uses a[] . . . recording device to . . . record the confidential
communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties
in the presence of one another or by means of a . . . telephone[] or other
device, except a radio.’ ” (LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 191.) A
“conversation is confidential” for purposes of section 632 “if a party to that
conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation
is not being overheard or recorded.” (Flanagan, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 768;
see § 632, subd. (c) [full definition of “confidential communication”].)
      “Other provisions within the statutory scheme reflect updates that
have been made from time to time in response to the emergence of new
communication devices.” (LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 191; ibid. [“The
Legislature augmented the statutory scheme in 1985, 1990, and 1992 ‘to take
account of privacy issues raised by the increased use of cellular and cordless
telephones.’ ”].)

                                         11
      Relevant here, section 632.7, subdivision (a) provides, “Every person
who, without the consent of all parties to a communication, intercepts or
receives and intentionally records, or assists in the interception or reception
and intentional recordation of, a communication transmitted between two
cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone,
two cordless telephones, a cordless telephone and a landline telephone, or a
cordless telephone and a cellular radio telephone, shall be punished” with
statutory damages and other remedies. (See LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 191–192; id. at p. 191, fn. 2 [“section 632.7 does not prohibit the
‘intentional interception or recording’ of a covered communication [citation];
it is concerned instead with the intentional recording of an intercepted or
received communication”]; see also Flanagan, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 771,
fn. 2 [§ 632.7 “applies to all communications, not just confidential
communications”].)

      2.    Standard of Review

      “It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that the judgment
appealed from is presumed correct.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
      “We apply well-established standards of review to a judgment based
upon a statement of decision issued after a bench trial. [Citation.] We
review questions of law de novo and we review the trial court’s findings of
fact under the substantial evidence standard.” (Gajanan Inc. v. City and
County of San Francisco (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 780, 791–792.)
      “ ‘When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence
contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ ”

                                       12
(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881, italics omitted;
see Durante v. County of Santa Clara (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 839, 842
(Durante) [“ ‘findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment
and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings’ ”];
Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson) [“It is not our
role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness

credibility.”].)8
      We also “must infer, following a bench trial, that the trial court
impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its decision,”
unless a party timely files objections identifying omissions or ambiguities.
(Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 48
(Fladeboe).) We review “implied factual findings under the substantial
evidence standard.” (Id. at pp. 59–60.)
      Only prejudicial error is grounds for reversal. (Soule v. General Motors
Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573–574 (Soule).) It is the appellant’s burden to
“show not only that the trial court erred, but also that the error was
prejudicial . . . .” (Hoffman Street, LLC v. City of West Hollywood (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 754, 772.)

8     To the extent Rojas suggests disputed facts are irrelevant, and
discounts them to argue factual issues were “undisputed” and subject to de
novo review, rather than substantial evidence review, she is incorrect. We
also reject her request in the “Conclusion” section of her opening brief that we
rule on a list of issues as a “matter of law.” We address issues of law to the
extent warranted by the foregoing standards.

                                       13
B.    Intent to Record

      Rojas contends the trial court erred in assessing intent to record under
sections 632 and 632.7, and substantial evidence does not support its finding
that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and Alejandra
(see, trial court’s findings on pp. 16–17, post). We agree substantial evidence

does not support the court’s findings.9

      1.       Additional Facts

      HSBC manager Ivey testified calls were recorded for “quality purposes”
and to have evidence of what took place in conversations with merchants and
consumers. Ivey, as well as HSBC managers Garcia and Escamilla, also
testified HSBC prohibited call center agents from making personal calls from
their desks.
      Specifically, Ivey stated “personal calls were a violation of the rules”
and “not allowed.” He explained it was covered in training that agents could
make non-recorded calls from a manager’s desk (for urgent calls), and a
phone bank in the lobby (for non-urgent ones). He agreed the Call Avoidance
Policy, which barred “outbound personal calls from [one’s] desk” was “one of
the written policies that instructed employees not to make personal calls,”
while acknowledging it “focused on employees who were receiving [inbound]
calls from customers.” He said there were also “specific documents within
Scout . . . that personal phone calls from [one’s] desk were not allowable,” but
they “weren’t able to be found.” When asked about the Inside HR Electronic
Monitoring policy’s treatment of personal calls (including that they “may be

9     Certain of Rojas’s contentions of legal error here do not accurately
capture our holding in Rojas I, or HSBC’s arguments in this appeal. Given
our conclusion that substantial evidence does not support intent to record, we
need not and do not discuss those contentions further.

                                       14
recorded”), he said Scout policies were “probably more specific.”10
      Ivey further testified there was progressive discipline for violating
personal call policies, which could result in an agent’s termination. He “knew
that call agents were making personal calls,” and was aware of a half-dozen
employees who were terminated for this conduct during the relevant time
period. He agreed there were “potentially others” who would have been dealt
with at lower management levels.
      Garcia, a senior branch manager who previously worked at the Salinas
facility, testified new hires were told personal calls on desk phones “were not
allowed.” He agreed personal calls could lead to progressive discipline ending
in an employee’s termination, and he had “come across an employee making a
personal call,” and asked them to stop. Like Ivey, he testified “there was a
written policy prohibiting personal calls” in Scout, but it was missing.
      Salinas facility department manager Escamilla similarly testified
personal calls were not permitted in employees’ work areas, but were allowed
from the lobby phone bank. She also indicated employees could make cell
phone calls from the lobby, cafeteria, or patio. She recalled a written “policy
against personal calls,” stating it “should be in one of the HR policies” and
her best recollection was that it was a “company-wide” policy and also
addressed cell phone use.
      Ramirez, Alejandra’s direct manager at the Salinas facility, also
testified about personal call policies and practices. She recalled that during
her own training, they were told they “really shouldn’t use our phone on our
desk to make personal calls,” and there were lobby phones they could use, but
did not remember anything in writing. She knew calls could be recorded.

10   Marcy, HSBC Tech Services’ head of telecommunications, also testified
generally that business units had “specific policies.”

                                       15
Ramirez testified the employees she managed were “generalists,” who had
more responsibility and flexibility, and they were “allowed to make personal
phone calls . . . to check up on their children or if there was an emergency,”
but not other types of calls. Ramirez was aware Alejandra was making
personal calls from her work area. She never stopped to listen, but “could
hear her checking up on her children, usually.” When asked if she overheard
conversations with Rojas, Ramirez said she “knew [Alejandra] was talking to
her mother,” but did not “know what the conversation was about.” Ramirez
“did not feel that [Alejandra] was making a large number of calls,” stating,
“[I]f that had been the situation, I would have addressed it with her directly.”
      Alejandra addressed personal call policies and practices, as well. Her
job duties at certain times included monitoring calls and updating policies,
and she did not remember seeing a written policy barring personal calls from
desk phones, and never worked on such a procedure. She also did not recall
Ramirez telling her personal calls could not be made from her work space,
and did not think personal calls had to be confined to emergencies or child
care. Rather, she called Rojas when she “needed to talk to her,” but
acknowledged “no one ever told [her] . . . that this was an acceptable
practice . . . .” She also acknowledged the Call Avoidance Policy applied to
her when she was logged into the queue to receive calls.
      The trial court found Rojas failed to prove HSBC’s intent to record the
calls between Rojas and Alejandra. The court explained: “HSBC prohibited
agents (such as Alejandra) from placing personal calls . . . at their desk,”
noting the evidence that “HSBC had a written policy prohibiting personal
calls,” “informed its employees” about it, and enforced it through progressive
discipline “ending in potential termination.” The court also found HSBC
trained employees to make personal calls on “managers’ non-recorded

                                       16
phones” or to “use a non-recorded phone or their personal cell phone away
from the call center floor.” The court concluded that “[w]hile HSBC operated
a recording system on its customer-service lines and intended to record the
calls made thereon, this only proves [it] intended to record all business calls
and is insufficient to establish intent to record [Rojas’s] personal calls with
her daughter made in violation of HSBC policy and without HSBC’s
knowledge.”
      Addressing an argument by Rojas that recording is intentional if there
is “knowledge to a substantial certainty” that it will capture a confidential
communication, the trial court said the standard “applies only to [s]ection
632” and Rojas “failed to satisfy [it] in any event . . . .” Rather, the court
stated, “HSBC implemented policies and procedures that would prevent
‘confidential’ communications . . . from occurring,” such as informing agents
their desk phones were subject to recording, using automated disclosures on
incoming calls, and requiring disclosures on outbound calls to third parties.
The court further stated, “Even if HSBC knew that a personal call may
occasionally take place and therefore be recorded, this does not, without
more, lead to the conclusion that a confidential communication within the
meaning of Section 632 would take place because even the parties to a
personal call should have reasonably expected under these circumstances
that it could be overheard, monitored, or recorded.”

      2.    Applicable Law

      Section 632 bars a person from “intentionally and without the consent
of all parties to a confidential communication . . . record[ing] the confidential
communication . . . .” (§ 632, subd. (a), italics added.) The “ ‘recording of a
confidential conversation is intentional if the person using the recording
equipment does so with the purpose or desire of recording a confidential

                                        17
conversation, or with the knowledge to a substantial certainty that his use of
the equipment will result in the recordation of a confidential conversation.’ ”
(Rojas I, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 435 citing Estate of Kramme (1978) 20
Cal.3d 567, 572, fn. 5 [requisite intent is “to record a confidential
communication, rather than simply an intent to turn on a recording
apparatus which happened to record a confidential communication”], italics
omitted).
      Section 632.7 also requires a “showing that [the defendant]
‘intentionally’ recorded” the communications at issue. (Rojas I, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 432, citing § 632.7, subd. (a).)
      In Rojas I, this court reversed summary judgment for HSBC, focusing
solely on intent to record. (Rojas I, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) At the
time, the undisputed facts were that HSBC used a “full-time telephone call
recording system”; it recorded the calls “ ‘on purpose’ ”; and its Electronic
Monitoring policy authorized employees to use company telephones for
personal calls and advised them “ ‘personal calls may be recorded.’ ” (Id. at
p. 433.) We held HSBC did not “establish[] as a matter of law that it did not
have ‘knowledge to a substantial certainty that [its] use of the equipment
w[ould] result in the recordation of a confidential conversation’ of an
employee and a third party like Rojas.” (Id. at p. 436.) Rather, we stated,
a “reasonable trier of fact could find that HSBC had the requisite intent
under sections 632(a) and 632.7(a).” (Id. at p. 435.) We explained:
“[T]he . . . calls at issue here were not recorded ‘ “by chance” ’ or
‘ “innocent[ly].” ’ HSBC knew that it was recording—and, indeed,
purposefully was recording—all of the calls, having previously told its
employees that they were authorized to use HSBC telephones for personal
use and that their personal calls might be recorded.” (Ibid.)

                                         18
      3.    Substantial Evidence Does Not Support The Trial’s Court’s Intent
            Finding

      Rojas contends the trial court finding that she failed to prove intent
“does not withstand the substantial evidence test.” We agree.
      HSBC’s trial theory was that because its workplace policies banned
personal calls, it did not intend to record those calls. This theory rests on the
premise that the ban worked, such that HSBC did not know personal calls
were being made and thus recorded. The trial court accepted HSBC’s theory,
finding Rojas failed to prove intent because HSBC barred agents from
making personal calls at their desks and the calls at issue were
“made . . . without HSBC’s knowledge.” The court also disagreed HSBC knew
confidential calls were being recorded, citing its recording disclosures and
reasonable privacy expectations. But the record negates HSBC’s theory, and
the court’s findings. Not only did HSBC policies not prevent personal calls,
but HSBC managers knew they were happening and Alejandra’s manager
even permitted them. These facts, coupled with HSBC’s full-time recording
system, meant HSBC knew personal calls were being recorded—including
any such calls that were confidential (for § 632) or received on a cellular or
cordless phone (for § 632.7). The record also does not support the court’s
further finding that HSBC lacked substantially certain knowledge that
confidential calls were being recorded. We explain.
      First, to the extent HSBC had a policy barring personal calls from
agents’ desk phones, that does not establish such calls actually were
prevented—particularly in the absence of a single, clear policy governing
personal calls and uniform enforcement of those policies. HSBC managers
Ivey, Garcia, and Escamilla did testify there was a written policy prohibiting
such calls, but Ivey and Garcia indicated it was a Scout policy which could no
longer be found, while Escamilla thought it was a company-wide HR policy

                                       19
that addressed cell phones as well. Ivey also testified the Call Avoidance
Policy was part of the personal call ban, but acknowledged it only applied to
some agents: those receiving inbound calls. And HSBC still had in effect its
global, companywide Electronic Monitoring policy, an HR policy that stated
employees “may use” telephones “for occasional non-work purposes,” and
“personal calls may be recorded.”
      That Scout policies are more specific than HR policies, as Ivey testified
and HSBC urges here, does not necessarily minimize confusion for a manager
trying to implement both. We also disagree with HSBC that the Electronic
Monitoring policy instruction to avoid “listen[ing] to any personal calls”
shows it “did not intend to record these calls in the first place.” The
instruction implies HSBC anticipated personal calls would be recorded.
      Second, and critically, there was undisputed evidence HSBC managers
knew personal calls were being made, including by Alejandra, while HSBC
concededly recorded all calls from agent’s desk phones at the Salinas facility.
(Cf. Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377 (Kight I) [company
was potentially liable under § 632 for supervisors’ secret, live monitoring of
calls; “corporation is a legal fiction that cannot act except through its
employees or agents”].) Ivey and Garcia were aware of employees who made
personal calls (at least half a dozen in Ivey’s case). Regardless of whether
those employees were subject to progressive discipline, HSBC’s policy did not
prevent all personal calls from being made. And, some employees were
simply allowed to make personal calls. Ramirez, Alejandra’s direct manager,
let her agents make calls concerning children and emergencies. Further, and
significantly, Ramirez knew Alejandra was making personal calls, including
to her mother (Rojas) and on unknown topics, and did not try to limit this

                                        20
practice. Instead, Ramirez said she “did not feel [Alejandra] was making a

large number” of calls.11
       We thus disagree with HSBC that Ramirez “did not testify that she
allowed [Alejandra] to make the hundreds of routine personal calls that are
at issue” here. (Emphasis omitted.) That is the only reasonable inference
from Ramirez’s testimony. Nor are we persuaded by HSBC’s contention that
Ramirez’s “allowance of personal calls in limited circumstances was contrary
to HSBC’s official policy for call center employees,” pursuant to which it notes
Ramirez herself was trained to make personal calls from the lobby. Ramirez
did not remember a written policy barring personal calls, and presumably
viewed her management practices as acceptable. If anything, her apparent
failure to implement HSBC’s desired personal call policy illustrates the
significant risk in relying on corporate workplace policies to limit Privacy Act
liability.
       Third, and in turn, there is no support for the trial court’s finding that
HSBC lacked “ ‘knowledge to a substantial certainty’ ” that confidential calls
were being recorded (i.e., the standard under section 632). The court
reasoned “occasional[]” recording of personal calls did not mean confidential
calls would be recorded, citing HSBC’s disclosure practices (e.g., requiring
agents to give third party disclosures) and stating “parties to a personal call
should have reasonably expected” they could be recorded. But HSBC was
recording all calls; HSBC manager Ivey and HSBC executive Marcy
recognized there was a “risk” a disclosure would not be made; and Marcy said

11    Although Escamilla testified Alejandra was not allowed to make
personal calls from her cubicle and she was unaware of any such calls, that
does not negate Ramirez’s undisputed testimony that Ramirez knowingly
allowed Alejandra’s personal calls.

                                        21
they “knew that not all agents” were making disclosures—meaning
confidential calls without disclosures would be captured. And, as we note
below, whether a party has reasonable privacy expectations for
confidentiality purposes turns on the “surrounding circumstances,” which
“may include the party’s own conduct and background . . . .” (Kight v.

CashCall, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 112, 133 (Kight II).)12
      In sum, notwithstanding HSBC’s personal call policies, HSBC knew
personal calls were being made from call center agents’ desk phones, and was
recording any such calls that were made—whether confidential, to a cellular
or cordless phone, or otherwise. We conclude this undisputed evidence
established HSBC had knowledge to a substantial certainty that its full-time
recording system in Salinas would result in the recording of a confidential
conversation under section 632, as well as a cellular or cordless conversation
under section 632.7. Rojas therefore met her burden of proof on intent, and
there was no substantial evidence for the trial court’s findings to the
contrary.

12      HSBC relatedly contends its disclosure policies were “expressly
designed to avoid recording calls without consent,” and there is liability “only
for . . . recording a call without consent.” HSBC’s point is not entirely clear,
but it appears to conflate two different issues (i.e., intent to record, and lack
of consent). HSBC also did not supply a separate heading or legal authority
for the point, and we do not consider it further. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [party’s brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading
or subheading” and “support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority”]; WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments
that are not supported by pertinent legal authority.”].)

                                       22
      However, as we explain next, substantial evidence does support the
trial court’s finding that Rojas failed to prove lack of consent to record,
meaning her Privacy Act claims fail.

C.    Lack Of Consent

      Rojas contends the trial court applied incorrect legal standards in
determining she did not prove HSBC lacked her consent to record the
conversations with Alejandra. We disagree, and further conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being

recorded.13

      1.      Additional Facts

      Rojas had an HSBC Mastercard, and knew Alejandra worked for HSBC
Card Services at a call center. When asked if she had a “credit card with
HSBC Card Services,” Rojas said “yes.”
      HSBC’s cardmember agreement contained a section titled “Monitoring
Practices,” which stated, “You agree that we may listen to and record phone
calls between you and our representatives.” The agreement indicated “we”
and “our” meant “HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.”
      HSBC manager Ivey testified it was a “normal course of action, and . . .
within the requirements” for the agreement to be sent to a cardmember.
Denise Mitchell, an HSBC senior manager of relationship management,
offered similar stipulated testimony that it was “standard business procedure
for [C]ard [S]ervices to send a copy of the cardmember agreement to the

13    As noted ante (and post), sections 632 and 632.7 require consent by all
parties. (§ 632, subd. (a); § 632.7, subd. (a).) By concluding Rojas did not
meet her burden on the consent issue, the trial court impliedly also found
Rojas did not prove lack of consent by Alejandra. Rojas does not dispute this
implied finding, and we need not and do not reach it.

                                        23
cardholder along with the credit card.” She said the agreement “would have
been sent with all network credit cards, including Mastercards,” during the
relevant time period.
      Rojas testified that to make her HSBC credit card payment, she called
the “1-800 number” customer service line “once a month.” She would receive
a disclosure that said, “This call may be recorded.” When asked “what did
you understand with regard to that particular call,” Rojas said, “That my call
will be recorded.”
      Rojas denied she had “any knowledge that [her] personal telephone
calls [with Alejandra] were being recorded by HSBC” until this lawsuit. She
also denied giving HSBC permission to record her personal calls.
      The trial court found Rojas failed to prove lack of consent. The court
explained she “called HSBC every month to pay her HSBC Mastercard bill,”
“heard an automated call recording disclosure every time,” and “was or
should have been aware that calls to and from HSBC’s call center were likely
to be recorded.” The court further explained “the HSBC cardmember
agreement sent to cardmembers such as [Rojas] . . . contained an express call
recording disclosure.” The court found “[b]oth forms of disclosure would have
placed [Rojas] on notice of recording and [she] therefore impliedly consented
to the recording of her calls,” citing Negro v. Superior Court (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 879, 892 (Negro) and its discussion of implied-in-fact consent.
The court concluded the evidence “more than establishes this level of inquiry
notice,” and at least “precludes [Rojas] from meeting her burden of proving
lack of consent under both Sections 632 and 632.7, as required.” The court
elsewhere noted Rojas “not only consented to receive the calls from HSBC,”
but she “also solicited the calls from HSBC by triggering a request that
Alejandra return her call from work.” (Some emphasis omitted.)

                                       24
      2.    The Trial Court Did Not Err In Assessing Consent

      Rojas argues the trial court erred in analyzing consent, because
“binding law” purportedly requires an “ ‘explicit advisement’ at the outset
of . . . recorded conversations.” She then argues the court’s “application of
‘implied consent’ is incorrect,” and the court improperly “[created] . . . a whole
new construction of ‘consent’ ” by “interpret[ing] . . . consent to mean implied
consent based on ‘inquiry notice . . . .’ ” Rojas arguably appears to mean that,
to the extent implied consent even applies under the Privacy Act, the trial
court got it wrong. Her position lacks merit.

            a.   Implied Consent Under The Privacy Act

       As a preliminary matter, implied consent constitutes “consent” under
the Privacy Act. Sections 632 and 632.7 both require a plaintiff to prove the
recording was made “without the consent of all parties,” but neither section
requires express consent. (§ 632, subd. (a); § 632.7, subd. (a).)
      In Kearney, supra, a choice of law case, the California Supreme Court
tacitly acknowledged a party’s consent to recording can be implied after
adequate notice. (Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 99–100, 120 [reversing
judgment after demurrer; California broker clients could sue Georgia
company branch under § 632, which “applies when a confidential
communication takes place in part in California”].) In describing section 632,
the Court explained that a “business that adequately advises all parties to a
telephone call, at the outset of the conversation, of its intent to record the call
would not violate” the section, reasoning that if a “party does not wish to
participate . . . he or she simply may decline to continue the communication.”
(Kearney, at p. 118; ibid. [§ 632 “simply prohibits . . . recording the
conversation without first informing all parties . . . that [it] is being

                                        25
recorded”].) Thus, consent under the Privacy Act is implied from continued

participation in the call following adequate advisement or notice.14

            b.   Explicit Advisement Of Recording On Each Call Is Not
                 Required

      Rojas contends that “[t]o put a consumer on ‘adequate notice’ that his
or her call is being monitored or recorded, binding law holds there must be an
‘explicit advisement’ ” at the “outset of the recorded conversations,” citing
Kearney and Kight I, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at page 1377. We disagree. As
we shall explain, neither Kearney, nor Kight I, stands for this proposition,
and multiple federal courts that have addressed the issue have determined
an explicit, on-call advisement is not required under the Privacy Act.
      First, the California Supreme Court stated in Kearney that an on-call
advisement was sufficient to avoid violating section 632—not that such
advisement was required to avoid liability under the Privacy Act. (Kearney,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 118.) Rojas cites language from a footnote, in which
the court disagreed with the Court of Appeal that “even in the absence of an
explicit advisement,” clients “ ‘know or have reason to know’ ” their broker
calls are recorded. (Id. at p. 118, fn. 10.) The court explained that “in light of
the circumstance that California consumers are accustomed to being
informed at the outset of a telephone call whenever a business entity intends
to record the call, it appears equally plausible that, in the absence of such
an advisement, a California consumer reasonably would anticipate that such
a telephone call is not being recorded . . . .” (Ibid., emphasis added.) But by
using the phrase “equally plausible,” the court preserved the other option:

14     This interpretation is consistent with section 632, subdivision (b),
which excludes from statutory coverage “an individual known by all parties
to a confidential communication to be . . . recording the communication.”

                                       26
a California consumer could assume they were being recorded. Thus, this
footnote does not require an explicit advisement; it just forecloses imputed
consent (i.e., one should have known). (Cf. Negro, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 890–892 [distinguishing imputed or constructive consent, from implied-
in-fact consent based on the circumstances].) Further, Kearney involved a
judgment following demurrer, and observed the Court of Appeal there
“did not cite anything in the record” for its point about client knowledge.
(Kearney, at p. 118, fn. 10.) In cases that proceed to trial, as here, there is
evidence from which a court can assess a party’s knowledge about being
recorded.
      Second, neither Kight I, nor our later decision in Kight II, held an on-
call recording disclosure is required; indeed, these cases make clear that prior
disclosures are relevant to expectations regarding monitoring and recording
under the Privacy Act. In Kight I, we reversed a summary adjudication
ruling that live, secret monitoring did not violate section 632, holding the
statute applied and there were triable issues of material fact as to
confidentiality, including whether plaintiffs reasonably expected
“conversations would not be secretly monitored.” (Kight I, supra, 200
Cal.App.4th at p. 1383; id. at p. 1396 [“The issue whether there exists a
reasonable expectation that no one is secretly listening to a phone
conversation is generally a question of fact that may depend on numerous
specific factors, such as whether the call was initiated by the consumer or
whether a corporate employee telephoned a customer, the length of the
customer-business relationship, the customer’s prior experiences with
business communications, and the nature and timing of any recorded
disclosures”].) In rejecting the defendant’s argument that a “ ‘warning
message ‘at the outset’ of [the] ‘borrower/lender relationship’ ” precluded

                                        27
confidentiality, we said this did “not establish as a matter of law plaintiffs
were adequately warned . . . all future calls . . . may be monitored and
recorded” and cited the Kearney footnote. (Id. at p. 1399, italics modified.)
      In Kight II, we affirmed a decertification order, and confirmed
monitoring expectations for confidentiality purposes turn on one’s particular
circumstances—including for those who did not receive on-call disclosures.
(Kight II, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [“surrounding circumstances . . .
may include the party’s own conduct and background”]; id. at p. 130
[plaintiffs had “ongoing business relationship with the defendant” and
“many . . . may have heard a monitoring disclosure statement at least once”];
id. at p. 132 [“Although the outbound calls did not include a disclosure
message, . . . individual issues remain for outbound-call class members
regarding the reasonableness of the claimed expectation of privacy under the
circumstances.”]; cf. Hataishi v. First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457, 1467 [affirming denial of class
certification for outbound call recipients; “[N]othing in the language of [§] 632
or the case law interpreting ‘confidential communication’ suggests that
recording a conversation without advising the other party constitutes a per se
violation of the statute”].)
      Finally, multiple federal court opinions, which we find persuasive, have
held that consent can be implied under the Privacy Act without an explicit

advisement on each call.15 (See, e.g., Maghen v. Quicken Loans Inc.
(S.D.Cal. 2015) 94 F.Supp.3d 1141 (Maghen I), affirmed at Maghen v.

15     “Decisions of . . . the lower federal courts,” although not controlling on
state law issues, may “be instructive to the extent we find their analysis
persuasive . . . .” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th
145, 175.)

                                        28
Quicken Loans Inc. (2017) 680 Fed.Appx. 554, 555 (Maghen II) [plaintiff’s
consent to recording shown by, inter alia, agreement to terms of service and
employee informing plaintiff at outset he worked for Quicken and was calling
about online inquiry]; Moledina v. Marriott Int’l, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Oct. 17, 2022)
___F.Supp.3d___, 2022 WL 16630276, at *7 (Moledina) [“surrounding
circumstances” indicated plaintiff “implicitly consented to being recorded”];
Torres v. Nutrisystem, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2013) 289 F.R.D. 587, 594–595 (Torres)
[denying class certification; consent would require individualized

inquiries].)16
      Maghen I is instructive. The plaintiff requested information from
Lending Tree and received calls from one of its network lenders, Quicken.
(Maghen I, supra, 94 F.Supp.3d at p. 1143.) The calls were recorded, and
Maghen sued Quicken under the Privacy Act. (Ibid.) The district court

16      (See also, e.g., Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Services, LLC (S.D.Cal.
Sept. 8, 2022) 2022 WL 4111871 (Brinkley), at *7 [“individual issues of
consent,” based on “nature, extent, and frequency” of phone calls prior to first
call recorded without disclosure, predominated]; AJ Reyes v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (S.D.Cal. May 19, 2016) 2016 WL 2944294, at *6 [“prior
awareness of a practice to record may be sufficient to demonstrate consent to
being recorded in the future,” but is question of fact]; Horowitz v. GC Services
Ltd. P’ship. (S.D.Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) 2016 WL 7188238, at p. *15 [warning at
outset of conversation is sufficient, but not always necessary]; but see, e.g.,
Mendell v. Am. Med. Response, Inc. (S.D.Cal. Mar. 23, 2021) 2021 WL
1102423, at *6 [finding commonality as to consent; “how to interpret Kearney
itself is a common question of law”]; Steven Ades & Hart Woolery v. Omni
Hotels Mgmt. Corp. (C.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2014) 2014 WL 4627271, at *12
[finding commonality as to consent; citing Kearney, but noting “absence of
any evidence of advance notice”]; Membrila v. Receivables Performance
Mgmt., LLC (S.D.Cal. Apr. 6, 2010) 2010 WL 1407274, at *3 [denying motion
to dismiss, based on lack of advisement at outset of call].)

                                       29
granted summary judgment, ruling in part that the plaintiff’s “agreement to
Lending Tree’s Terms of Use [was] sufficient to establish consent.” (Id. at
p. 1146; id. at p. 1143 [Terms of Use stated network lender “may [contact
you] . . . by telephone (on a recorded line)”].) The court explained: “Although
a warning at the outset of a conversation is sufficient to comply with Section
632.7, it is not necessary to do so in every circumstance,” noting Kearney did
“not hold[] that such advisement is required to the exclusion of all other
forms of notification.” (Ibid.) The court continued: “To adopt such a
requirement based on the language of Kearney would be to impose a much
more restrictive standard than that required on the face of Section 632.7.”
(Ibid.; see also White v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (S.D.Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) 2013
WL 756292, at *5 (White) [rejecting reliance on Kearney to preclude consent
based on cardmember agreement; declining to create “verbal disclosure
requirement that is not expressly provided by the statute itself”].)

            c.   Trial Court Did Not Incorrectly Apply Implied Consent

      Rojas next contends the “explanation of implied consent” in Griggs-
Ryan v. Smith (1st Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 112 (Griggs-Ryan) is “instructive”; it
focuses on “knowing[] agree[ment] . . . to the surveillance”; and the trial court
“disregarded” this standard. She argues the court improperly “[created] . . . a
whole new . . . consent” standard based on “ ‘inquiry notice,’ ” and factors like
whether she “should have been aware” of recording. We agree Griggs-Ryan
provides guidance on implied consent, but disagree the trial court erred in
analyzing implied consent here.
      First, Griggs-Ryan involved the federal wiretapping law, under which it
is “not unlawful . . . for a person . . . to intercept a . . . communication where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” (18 U.S.C.

                                        30
§ 2511(2)(d).) Federal courts have “uniformly held . . . implicit consent will
satisfy” such consent. (Berry v. Funk (D.C. Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1003, 1011
(Berry).) In Griggs-Ryan, the First Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
defendants in an action by a tenant who impliedly consented to his landlady’s
interception of his calls. (Griggs-Ryan, supra, 904 F.2d at pp. 113, 119; id. at
p. 117 [tenant was “repeatedly informed that all incoming calls were being
monitored”].) The court explained:
      “[I]mplied consent is ‘consent in fact’ which is inferred ‘from
      surrounding circumstances indicating that the [party] knowingly
      agreed to the surveillance.’ [Citations.] . . . The circumstances . . . will
      vary from case to case, but . . . will ordinarily include language or acts
      which tend to prove (or disprove) that a party knows of, or assents to,
      encroachments on the routine expectation that conversations are
      private.”

(Griggs-Ryan at pp. 116–117; accord, Negro, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 892
[describing implied consent standard in wiretapping context, quoting Griggs-
Ryan]; see Berry, at p. 1009 [“The key question in such an inquiry obviously

is whether parties were given sufficient notice.”].)17
      Federal cases have cited Griggs-Ryan and Negro (or cases using similar
language) in addressing implied consent under the Privacy Act, and we
conclude this application was appropriate. (See, e.g., Brinkley, supra, 2022

17    Rojas argues the trial court mistakenly cited Negro, because it is a
Stored Communications Act (SCA) case and supports a narrow view of
consent here. Negro is an SCA case, but addressed consent arguments that
related to federal wiretap law and suggested the SCA context warranted the
narrower view of consent. (Negro, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 889 [“the
context in which the consent issue is likely to arise in cases like this one
militates in favor of a narrower conception of consent, not a broader one”].)
As for the trial court, it cited the page of Negro describing implied consent,
which, as noted, quoted Griggs-Ryan—the standard Rojas urges is
“instructive.” (Id. at p. 892.)

                                        31
WL 4111871, at *5 [“[§] 632.7 does not define ‘consent,’ which may be
implied”; citing Negro]; Nei Contracting & Eng’g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates
Pac. Sw., Inc. (S.D.Cal. Sept. 15, 2016) 2016 WL 4886933, at *3 [citing
Griggs-Ryan and Negro, inter alia, for implied consent standards]; cf.
Moledina, supra, 2022 WL 16630276, at *7 [implied consent can exist where “
‘surrounding circumstances indicat[e] that the party to the call knowingly

agreed to the surveillance’ ”].)18
      Second, Rojas does not establish the trial court failed to apply the
foregoing implied consent standards. The court’s analysis reflects it focused
on specific circumstances that showed Rojas knew HSBC recorded calls (e.g.,
disclosures in the cardmember agreement and her monthly payment calls),
and found “[b]oth forms of disclosure would have placed [her] on notice of
recording,” such that her continued participation in calls from HSBC
established her implied consent to recording of the calls. (See Griggs-Ryan,
supra, 904 F.2d at pp. 117–118; Negro, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 892; see
Berry, supra, 146 F.3d 1003, at p. 1011 [“key question” is “whether parties

18    Neither party addressed legislative history in discussing implied
consent. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the history of the
enacting legislation for sections 632 and 632.7, solely to note it does not aid
our analysis. (§ 632 [Assem. Bill No. 860; Stats. 1967, ch. 1509]; § 632.7
[Assem. Bill No. 2465; Stats. 1992, ch. 298].) We located a reference to
“implied consent,” in the Comments section of an Assembly Bill Digest report
for Assem. Bill No. 860. The section poses comments and questions,
including: “Does the consent provided for in [sections] 631 and 632 have to be
express, or can it be implied? If implied consent is sufficient then serious
problems might arise regarding what actually constitutes implied consent.”
The source of this question is not identified, and no answer follows. We
observe the cases discussed herein make it clear that coherent standards for
assessing implied consent in fact exist and are readily applied by courts
under established authority.

                                      32
were given sufficient notice”].) Accordingly, although the court used the
terms “inquiry notice” and “should have been aware,” its analysis shows it
properly considered implied-in-fact consent. (Civ. Code, § 3528 [“The law
respects form less than substance”]; see Boysaw v. Superior Court (2000)
23 Cal.4th 215, 220 [rejecting interpretation of order that would “exalt form
over substance”].) Indeed, the court cited Negro’s discussion of implied-in-
fact consent and there is nothing to suggest it based its findings on Rojas’s
hypothetical, rather than actual, knowledge of HSBC’s recording practices.
(Compare Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 118, fn. 10 [Court of Appeal “did
not cite anything in the record” for its finding that clients “ ‘know or have
reason to know’ ” broker calls were recorded].) Further, while we conclude
there was no legal error, any such error (assuming it occurred) would have
been harmless, because substantial evidence still supports the court’s consent
findings, as we discuss in the next section. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
pp. 573–574 [only prejudicial error supports reversal]; cf. Am. Federation of
State etc. Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 879, 887
[affirming trial court despite erroneous collateral estoppel ruling, where
record supported judgment, and deeming the error harmless].)

      3.    Substantial Evidence Supports The Trial Court’s Consent Finding

      We now turn to the record and, as we must, we consider all evidence,
and draw all inferences, in favor of the judgment. (Durante, supra, 29

                                       33
Cal.App.5th at p. 842.)19 Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Rojas impliedly consented to the recording of Alejandra’s calls
from HSBC, and therefore did not prove lack of consent under the Privacy Act
(§ 632, subd (a); § 632.7, subd. (a).)
      First, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Rojas was
“placed . . . on notice”—that is, she was notified—that the calls at issue were
subject to recording. Rojas testified she had an HSBC credit card, and knew
Alejandra worked for HSBC at a call center. Thus, Rojas knew the same
company both issued her credit card and ran the call center from which
Alejandra called her. And, as the trial court found, Rojas’s cardmember
agreement for her HSBC credit card and her monthly payment calls disclosed
that HSBC records calls. On these facts, the court could find Rojas was
notified that, and therefore knew, the calls from Alejandra at HSBC were
subject to recording.
      We reject Rojas’s claim that the disclosures did not provide meaningful
notice of recording. We do not reweigh the evidence (Thompson, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 981), and Rojas’s specific objections lack merit. On the
cardmember agreement, she contends it states, “You agree that we may
listen to and record phone calls between you and our representatives,” and
“we” is defined only as HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., not HSBC Card Services or

19    Although Rojas objected below that the trial court did not address
certain facts (e.g., HSBC did not use automatic outbound disclosures; the
cardmember agreement was with HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.), this does not
impact our review. The court was only required to state ultimate facts
(Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 500); it did so,
finding Rojas failed to prove lack of consent, due to her implied consent; and
we review that finding for substantial evidence. (Fladeboe, supra, 150
Cal.App.4th at pp. 59–60.)

                                         34
HSBC Tech Services. But the agreement includes consent for
“representatives,” which encompasses employees of HSBC Card Services, like
Alejandra—and places no limit on the types of “phone calls” with such
representatives being recorded. Further, the issue is not whether HSBC
Card Services or HSBC Tech Services are parties to the agreement. It is
whether this HSBC document made Rojas aware Alejandra’s calls to her from
HSBC were recorded, and the trial court could find that it did. (See Maghen
I, supra, 94 F.Supp.3d at p. 1145 and fn. 3 [disagreeing “Lending Tree’s
Terms of Use [were] vague and ambiguous because [it] does not list Quicken”;
plaintiff’s “argument that he did not connect his agreement to Lending Tree’s
Terms of Use and Quicken’s phone call is unavailing”]; cf. White, 2013 WL
756292, at pp. *3,*5 [agreement stating defendant “may monitor and record”
and referring to defendant’s “affiliates, or its marketing associates”
sufficiently disclosed calls would be recorded]; cf. id. at p. *6 [rejecting
argument that agreement did not state “every telephone call will be
recorded”; whether it stated defendant “will record every . . . call or may
record any . . . call ha[d] no effect,” as plaintiff “consented to the possibility
that her telephone calls will be recorded in either circumstance”].)
      As for the payment calls, Rojas argues the message only said “may be
recorded,” and did not address future or personal calls. Rojas testified she
understood “may be recorded” meant the particular call was being recorded,
and that she made payment calls once per month—meaning she was being
reminded about HSBC’s recording practices on a continuing basis. (Cf., e.g.,
Torres, supra, 289 F.R.D. at p. 594 [contrasting caller who heard disclosure
“several months prior,” from caller who heard disclosure on preceding call].)
The fact that the recording disclosure on her monthly calls to HSBC did not
address personal calls does not help Rojas, either. By stating the call “may be

                                         35
recorded,” the disclosure warns all calls may be recorded, regardless of

content. (Cf. White, supra, 2013 WL 756292, at pp. *5–*6.)20
      Second, Rojas participated in numerous calls with Alejandra made from
an HSBC call center phone, after receiving the prior recording disclosures.
(See Griggs-Ryan, supra, 904 F.2d at p. 114 [tenant continued to receive calls
after being advised of recording by landlady]; cf. Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at p. 118 [if a “party does not wish to participate . . . he or she simply may
decline to continue the communication”].) Indeed, as the trial court found,
the record shows Rojas effectively solicited such calls. Although Alejandra
could receive inbound calls, did receive them from her boyfriend, and agreed
such calls had automatic recording disclosures, Rojas would call Alejandra’s
cell phone and Alejandra would call her back from her HSBC line—with no
automatic recording disclosure. Regardless of why Rojas called Alejandra in
this manner, the trial court could find she was aware of HSBC’s recording
practices from the prior disclosures, and chose to receive calls from an

employee at HSBC (Alejandra).21
      Finally, we recognize Rojas testified she did not know she was being
recorded, and would not have continued the calls had she known. But the
trial court could impliedly reject this testimony as not credible, or weigh the

20     Rojas contends HSBC could have included an automatic disclosure or
beep on outbound calls. As discussed ante, on-call disclosures may limit a
company’s Privacy Act liability, but the absence of such disclosures does not
foreclose a party’s implied-in-fact consent to recording for purposes of the
Privacy Act. (See Kearney, 39 Cal.4th at p. 118 [on-call advisement precludes
violation under § 632]; cf. LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 201 [party “can
avoid liability under [§ 632.7] by taking reasonable precautions, such as
obtaining the consent to record the statute requires”].)

21    The dissent does not address all of the evidence discussed herein,
including the manner in which Rojas received the calls.

                                       36
evidence regarding the prior disclosures more heavily than these denials. We
do not revisit credibility findings, or, as noted, reweigh the evidence.
(Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
      We conclude substantial evidence amply supports the trial court’s
finding that Rojas impliedly consented to HSBC’s recording, and thus did not
prove lack of consent. Because lack of consent is a required element under
both section 632 and section 632.7, we must affirm the judgment for HSBC.
As a result, we need not reach Rojas’s remaining arguments for reversal of
the judgment.

      II.   Rojas’s Appeal from Denial of Motion to Strike Or Tax Costs

      Rojas appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying her
motion to strike or tax costs. She contends HSBC’s section 998 order was
invalid, and the court also erred in awarding certain expert costs, purportedly
failing to consider her economic situation in setting those costs, and awarding
costs for unused trial exhibits. We reject each argument.

A.    Additional Facts

      1.    HSBC Makes A Section 998 Offer And Later Seeks Costs

      HSBC made a section 998 offer to Rojas in June 2019, after remand in
Rojas I. The offer stated in relevant part:
      “[D]efendants [HSBC Card Services] and [HSCB Tech Services] hereby
      offer to compromise and settle all claims of plaintiff Dalia Rojas
      (“Plaintiff”) against HSBC in the above-captioned action, on the
      following terms: 1. Within thirty (30) days of written acceptance of this
      offer, HSBC agrees to pay $11,000.00 to Plaintiff; [¶] 2. Upon
      acceptance of this offer and within ten (10) days from receipt of the
      above-referenced payment, Plaintiff will dismiss with prejudice her
      claims in the above-captioned action, against HSBC and release HSBC
      of all liability to Plaintiff; and [¶] 3. Each party will bear its own
      attorneys’ fees and costs.”

Rojas did not accept the offer.

                                       37
      After receiving a full defense judgment, HSBC filed a memorandum of
costs, seeking $61,716.90. Pertinent here, HSBC requested $40,720.09 for
“[e]xpert witness fees per . . . section 998,” for its expert Darlene Geller-Stoff.
This included $34,800 for opinion services, $831.25 for testimony at trial,
$2,400 for travel time, and $2,688.84 for expenses (i.e., “airfare, ground
transportation, and lodging for trial”) (expert costs). HSBC also requested
$8,528.97 for “[m]odels, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits” (exhibit
costs).

      2.    Rojas Moves To Strike Or Tax Costs

      Rojas moved to strike or tax costs. She argued the section 998 offer did
not “limit the release to liability arising from . . . the pending lawsuit,” and
was invalid, HSBC’s expert costs were thus unavailable, and these costs also
were not necessary or reasonable. She also argued the court could consider
her resources to assess the reasonableness of the award amount, and she was
in the “ ‘extremely low’ income category” for her county. She provided a
declaration stating that since she retired from J.C. Penney in 2016, her only
income each month was a military pension of $864.90 and an alimony
payment of $300; this “income barely covers [her] necessary living expenses”;
and she has “no other economic resources readily available to [her].” Finally,
Rojas contested the exhibit costs, stating “HSBC used only approximately
thirty percent of the exhibits” at trial, and provided a counsel declaration
which asserted this thirty percent figure and identified the numbers of listed
(488) and admitted exhibits (145).

      3.    HSBC’s Opposes Rojas’s Motion To Strike Or Tax Costs

      HSBC filed an opposition, which maintained the section 998 offer was
valid and the claimed costs were reasonable. It noted 302 of the 488 listed
exhibits were call recording transcripts which Rojas sought to be admitted

                                        38
into evidence. HSBC also provided a declaration from counsel John Loftus,
which attached “copies of the invoices for time spent by [expert] Geller-Stoff
in preparing for trial, traveling to trial and testifying at trial.” The
declaration attached receipts and invoices for photocopied trial exhibits, as
well.
        4.    Trial Court Denies Rojas’s Motion And Awards Costs

        The trial court denied Rojas’s motion, and awarded HSBC’s requested
costs of $61,716.90.
        First, the trial court determined the section 998 offer was valid. The
court stated the offer was “unambiguous and not susceptible to [Rojas’s]
interpretation,” but, rather, “applies to [her] claims in this action – not any
other present or future claims she has or might have.” The court elaborated:
        “Here, the 998 Offer is plainly between Plaintiff and Defendants and
        facially references only this lawsuit. Defendants clearly intended that
        Paragraph 2’s liability release provision be narrowly applied to
        Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit rather than hypothetical claims in
        other current or future actions. Paragraph 2, read in conjunction with
        the introductory paragraph, is clearly one term to Defendants’ “offer to
        compromise and settle all claims of plaintiff Dalia Rojas against HSBC
        in the above-captioned action. . . .’ Moreover, Paragraph 2’s language
        immediately preceding the liability release provision alludes only to
        Plaintiff’s ‘claims in the above-captioned action.’ ”

        Second, the trial court denied Rojas’s request to strike or tax the expert
costs. It noted post-offer expert costs are available under section 998. It then
found the costs were “facially proper charges,” and the costs memorandum
“constitutes prima facie evidence that the costs are proper and necessarily
incurred.” Rojas “[bore] the burden of providing competent evidence that the
costs are unnecessary or unreasonable,” but “fail[ed] to do so” and “merely
questions the reasonableness of various” cost entries. The court further
determined that even if Rojas had met her burden, it would have denied her

                                        39
request. The court explained HSBC “provided substantial evidence in [its]
opposition—despite having no obligation to do so—establishing that [Geller-
Stoff]’s fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and
reasonable in amount,” citing the Loftus declaration exhibits. The court
found this evidence was “sufficiently specific to allow [Rojas] and the court to
determine the reasonableness of [Geller-Stoff’s] fees.” It also noted Geller-
Stoff’s “lodging and meals should be allowable costs since she traveled from
Georgia . . . .”
       Third, the trial court indicated it had discretion to “consider [Rojas’s]
economic situation in fashioning a reasonable award of costs” under section
998. However, it could not “conclude on the current record that [Rojas] is
incapable of paying [HSBC’s] expert witness fees.” The court explained, “She
provides bare declaratory testimony as to her monthly income, yet no
information regarding, inter alia, her monthly expenses or ability to obtain
financial assistance from third parties. It addressed this issue at the costs
hearing, too, stating in part, “While I appreciate that [she] has indicated her
monthly income is what it is, . . . . her declaration was just too vague about
her financial circumstances . . . .”
       Finally, the trial court denied Rojas’s request to strike or tax costs for
exhibits not used at trial. It explained exhibit-related costs “are allowable . . .
provided they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact,” citing Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13). It acknowledged the then-
existing split of authority as to costs for unused exhibits, and stated the
Court of Appeal decision in Segal v. Asics America Corp. (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 659, which allowed them, was the “most persuasive and well-
reasoned.” The court then found the exhibit costs here were “reasonable and
necessary, and reasonably helpful to aiding the trier of fact.” As we discuss

                                        40
post, the California Supreme Court subsequently resolved the split in Segal,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 657, and held unused exhibit costs may be
recoverable, albeit on more limited grounds than stated in the Court of
Appeal decision.

B.    Applicable Law

      A “prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in
any action or proceeding.” (Code Civil Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)
      “Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 sets forth the items that are
and are not allowable as the costs recoverable by a prevailing party . . . . ‘as a
matter of right.’ ” (Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 52
(Chaaban); Code Civ Prov. § 1033.5, subd. (a) [items allowable as costs], subd.
(b) [items not allowable as costs].) “The statute also authorizes the trial court
in its discretion to award or deny an item of costs not mentioned in this
section.” (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 658, citing § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).)
      “All costs, whether expressly permitted under [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1033.5, subdivision (a) or awarded in the trial court’s discretion
pursuant to section 1033.5(c)(4), must be ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct
of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its
preparation’ (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2)) and ‘reasonable in amount’ (§ 1033.5,
subd. (c)(3)).” (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 658.)
      The opposing party may move to strike or tax costs. (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1034 [“Prejudgment costs . . . shall be . . . contested in accordance with rules
adopted by the Judicial Council.”]; Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp. (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [“[California Rules of Court,] [r]ule 3.1700(b) establishes a
procedure for contesting costs by means of a motion to tax costs”].)
      We “review a trial court’s determination on which costs are reasonably
necessary and reasonable in amount under the abuse of discretion standard.”

                                        41
(Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 739; see Goodman v. Lozano
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1339 [“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ”].)
      In addition, “ ‘[a] prevailing party who has made a valid pretrial offer
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 is eligible for specified costs,
so long as the offer was reasonable and made in good faith.’ ” (Najera v.
Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872, 877 (Najera).) The purpose of section 998
is to “encourage the settlement of litigation without trial, by punishing the
party who fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer from its opponent.”
(Elite Show Services, Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 263, 268
(Staffpro); see Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, 86 (Ignacio)
[§ 998 “establishes a procedure for shifting . . . costs upon a party’s refusal to
settle”].) To be valid, a section 998 offer must, among other things, “not
dispose of any claims beyond the claims at issue in the pending lawsuit.”
(Chen v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 117, 121 (Chen).) “The burden is on the offering party to
demonstrate that the offer is valid under section 998.” (Ignacio, at p. 86.)
      “We independently review whether a section 998 settlement offer was

valid.” (Ignacio, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 86.)22

22     Whether a section 998 offer was reasonable and made in good faith are
issues reviewed for abuse of discretion (Najera, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at
p. 877), but they are not before us. Rojas does not dispute reasonableness,
and did not raise good faith until her reply brief. We deem the point
forfeited. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446,
1453 [“[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be
considered”].)

                                        42
C.    Analysis

      1.    The Section 998 Offer Was Valid

      Most of Rojas’s costs arguments involve the section 998 offer, thus we
begin there. First, she argues the offer was invalid, because the “most logical
interpretation” is that the phrase “ ‘release HSBC of all liability to Plaintiff’
goes beyond the scope of the current lawsuit . . . .” We disagree.
      “In interpreting a section 998 offer, general contract principles apply
when they neither conflict with nor defeat the statute’s purpose of
encouraging the settlement of lawsuits prior to trial.” (Staffpro, supra, 119
Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) We “ ‘focus[] on the usual and ordinary meaning of
the language used and the circumstances under which the agreement was
made.’ ” (Chinn v. KMR Property Management (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 175,
183–184 (Chinn), disapproved on another ground in DeSaulles v. Community
Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1158.) The “meaning
of a contract must be derived from reading the whole of the contract, with
individual provisions interpreted together . . . .” (Zalkind v. Ceradyne, Inc.
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1027; see Bravo v. RADC Enterprises, Inc.
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 920, 923 [“we read documents to effectuate and
harmonize all contract provisions”].) A contract is ambiguous only if it “is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Fremont Indemnity
Co v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114.)
      Here, the opening paragraph of the section 998 offer states HSBC Card
Services and HSBC Tech Services “offer to . . . settle all claims of plaintiff
Dalia Rojas . . . against HSBC in the above-captioned action on the following
terms.” The offer then sets forth the terms: an $11,000 payment to Rojas
(paragraph 1); a provision requiring each party to bear its own attorney’s fees
and costs (paragraph 3); and, pertinent here, paragraph 2: “Plaintiff will

                                        43
dismiss with prejudice her claims in the above-captioned action, against
HSBC and release HSBC of all liability to Plaintiff.” HSBC disagrees,
contending “each of the numbered ‘terms’ in the offer plainly relates to the
‘claims of [Plaintiff] against HSBC in the above-captioned action’ ” discussed
in the opening paragraph. Applying the interpretive principles above, we
conclude only HSBC’s interpretation is reasonable and the offer is
unambiguous.
      Both the plain language of the offer, and its structure, reflect it applies
only to this case. The opening paragraph expressly states the offer is to settle
“claims . . . in the above-captioned action,” based on terms it then sets forth.
The terms in paragraphs 1 and 3 are plainly limited to this case. In
Paragraph 1, HSBC agrees to make an $11,000 payment to Rojas; HSBC was
not promising to make future payments to her. Paragraph 3 requires the
parties to bear their own fees and costs; the parties were not agreeing to
forego fees and costs in future actions. Viewing paragraph 2 in light of the
opening paragraph’s language, and the operation of the other terms, the
entire paragraph must be construed as limited to this case—not just the “will
dismiss” portion, as Rojas urges. If anything, the repetition of “above-
captioned action” in paragraph 2 emphasizes the offer’s limits. (Cf.
Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 (Linthicum) [“The
terms costs, fees and ‘mutual dismissal’ are obviously limited to the instant
lawsuit. There is no reason to interpret the term ‘all current claims’ found in
the same sentence as referring to anything other than the same lawsuit.”];
Chen, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 [criticizing “selective[] quoting” of the
settlement offer].)
      Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899 (Goodstein),
is instructive. The defendant bank in a slander of title and negligence action

                                       44
made a section 998 offer stating: “ ‘In full settlement of this action, [Bank]
hereby offers to pay [Goodstein] the total sum of $150,000 in exchange for
each of the following: [¶] 1. The entry of a Request for Dismissal with
prejudice on behalf of the Plaintiff in favor of [Bank]; [¶] 2. The execution and
transmittal of a General Release by [Goodstein] in favor of [Bank]; [¶] 3. Each
party is to bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees.’ ” (Id. at p.
905.) The defendant prevailed and received expert costs. Affirming costs, the
Court of Appeal disagreed the general release “required [the plaintiff] to
surrender ‘other present and future possible causes of action against the
defendant . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 907.) Rather, the “clear and unambiguous
language of the offer provide[d] that the terms and conditions applied only ‘in
full settlement of this action’ ” and “reasonably cannot be construed to apply
to other litigation . . . .” (Ibid.)
      Here too, “clear and unambiguous language” in the opening paragraph
limits the rest of HSBC’s offer to the instant case—meaning the liability
release in paragraph 2 “reasonably cannot” extend to future litigation.
(Goodstein, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 907.)
      Rojas argues Goodstein is distinguishable, because “there are specific
wording and phrasing distinctions,” as the offer there did not say “action” in
either the dismissal or release provisions (showing, she claims, that both
referred to the opening paragraph) and used the term “general release” (not
“all liability”). “But Goodstein’s point is not that a section 998 offer must
contain any particular language. Instead, its point is that the general rules
of contract construction apply to section 998 offers.” (Linthicum, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 272; ibid. [rejecting attempt to distinguish offer because it
“contain[ed] no language similar to ‘in full settlement of this action’ ”].)
      Rojas’s remaining arguments are not persuasive, either.

                                        45
      First, she contends the trial court’s determination that the offer was
“unambiguous and not susceptible to [her] interpretation” was “contrary to
the law that the offer must be strictly construed in favor of [her].” (See
Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1129 [a “section 998 offer
must be strictly construed in favor of the party sought to be subjected to its
operation”].) We disagree. Courts construe language for or against a party
when other interpretive principles have been exhausted. (Chinn, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 184 [addressing § 998 offers; citing rule under Civ. Code,
§ 1654 that “ ‘In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the
language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party
who caused the uncertainty to exist.’ ”].) Here, because the offer is
unambiguous, no construal of ambiguity is needed.
      Second, Rojas argues that if HSBC had “intended to clearly limit” the
liability release to this case, it would have said “release HSBC of all liability
to Plaintiff related to the above-entitled action.” (See Auburn Woods I
Homeowners Assoc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 717,
726 [release provision referenced “the ACTION”].) She also argues “HSBC’s
intent to expand the release beyond . . . this action is further illustrated by
[its] use of the word ‘liability’ as opposed to ‘claim,’ ” citing dictionary
definitions of the terms. We reject these arguments, too. No “particular
language” is required for a section 998 offer, and HSBC’s offer, viewed as a
whole, was unambiguous. (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 272; see
Berg v. Darden (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 721, 731 [no “ ‘magic language’ ” is
needed].)
      Finally, the cases cited by Rojas are distinguishable. Unlike here, the
offers in those cases encompassed litigants or claims beyond the present
action. (See Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692,

                                         46
694–698, 702 [defendant gas station won personal injury lawsuit and
recovered costs under § 998, and Court of Appeal reversed; offer released the
gas station, its attorney, and its insurance carrier on claims unrelated to the
lawsuit, thus diluting the payment term and making it difficult to value];
Chen, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 121–122 and fn. 5 [where homeowners
sued based on two of three insurer claims, and insurer made § 998 offer to
release “all claims,” offer was ambiguous and invalid]; Ignacio, supra, 2
Cal.App.5th at pp. 83–84, 88 [§ 998 offer attaching two page release with
“incredibly broad” language “encompass[ing] numerous claims . . . beyond
those at issue in the lawsuit” was invalid].)

      2.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Expert Costs

      Rojas next contends the trial court “erred by allowing expert costs that
were not supported by sufficient evidence showing that the fees charged were
reasonable or that the charges were reasonably necessary . . . .” She does not
establish any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
      First, the trial court did not err by concluding Rojas failed to meet her
burden in challenging HSBC’s costs. “If items on a memorandum of costs
appear to be proper charges on their face, those items are prima facie
evidence that the costs, expenses, and services are proper and necessarily
incurred. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the objecting party to show
them to be unnecessary or unreasonable.” (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept.
of Children & Family Servs. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 693.) “[M]ere
statements” in a motion to strike and attorney declaration “are insufficient to
rebut the prima facie showing.” (Rappenecker v. Sea–Land Service, Inc.
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) The court found HSBC’s claimed expert costs
were facially proper, and thus prima facie evidence of necessity—meaning the

                                       47
burden was on Rojas to show otherwise, and her motion to strike arguments

were insufficient to do so.23
       Second, Rojas does not establish the trial court abused its discretion by
finding that, regardless of her burden, HSBC’s evidence established its expert
costs were reasonable and necessary. Under section 998, if a defendant’s
offer is “not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable
judgment,” the court “may require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to
cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses . . . actually incurred
and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial . . . , or
during trial . . . , of the case by the defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd.
(c)(1).)
       Rojas disputes four expenses here: a “limousine” ride for $165; “[m]eals
in the amount of $273.43”; 1.8 hours of “[a]dministrative” time entries
totaling $675; and 72.8 hours of other time entries, totaling $27,150. We
address each in turn.

23      Thus, we reject Rojas’s suggestion that her motion sufficed to place the
burden on HSBC. (Cf. Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131
(Nelson) [“mere filing” of a motion to tax costs may be proper objection for
items of doubtful necessity, but disagreeing “mere objection to charges which
. . . appear to be proper” shifts burden].) Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1258 and Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807,
cited by Rojas, do not show otherwise. (Jones, at pp. 1266–1268 [affirming
expert costs, noting “absence of any information” from objecting party at
hearing]; Levy, at pp. 810, 816–817 [affirming taxation of costs, where
memorandum listed “other expenses authorized by statute and case law per
declaration,” declaration did not address them, and party did not
substantiate them after objection; presuming the “court, in its sound
discretion, found that the charges were excessive”].)

                                        48
            a.   “Limousine” Ride

      With respect to the “limousine” charge for $165, Rojas argues “[n]othing
indicates how use of a luxury ‘[l]imousine’ as opposed to a regular car via
Uber or Lyft was reasonably necessary . . . .” Transportation may be a
necessary and reasonable expense. (See Thon v. Thompson (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548–1549.) Rojas appears to assume “limousine” was a
factual description of the vehicle (not just branding), and that it was more
expensive than alternative forms of transport. But she identifies no evidence
for these assumptions. (Compare Thon, at p. 1549 [where counsel conceded
he took charter flight to save attorney fees for client, court erred by awarding
more than commercial flight cost].) The trial court was within its discretion
to find the cost reasonable.

            b.   Meals

      For the $273.43 in meal costs, Rojas argues the receipts do not show
how many people participated or what was ordered, and that a 50 percent tip
for one meal was excessive. It is not clear the 50 percent tip was even part of

the claimed meal costs.24 In any event, as the trial court recognized, HSBC’s
expert was from Georgia, and meal expenses for interstate travel may be
recovered. (Cf. Howard v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th at

24    Although an expense report shows Geller-Stoff claimed $273.43 for
meals, the receipts reflect three meals totaling $385.15 (for $45.13; $116.59;
and $223.43, of which $75 is an approximately 50 percent tip). On the receipt
for the $223.43 meal with the 50 percent tip, there is also a handwritten
number, $111.71. That $111.71 number, when added to the other two meals
($45.23 and $116.59) totals the claimed amount of $273.43. Thus, the
receipts suggest Geller-Stoff did not claim the entire $223.43 meal and may
not have claimed some or all of the tip.

                                       49
p. 541 [“meal expenses may be reasonably necessary where an out-of-state
attorney must travel to the deposition”].) Rojas does not establish the court
exceeded the bounds of reason, based on her speculation about the meals
generally or because one meal may have involved a generous tip.

            c.   Administrative Work and Other Entries

      Finally, Rojas contends the entries for $675 of administrative work
and other entries totaling $27,150 lacked sufficient detail. For the latter, her
only specific contention is that many entries state “Document Review,” and
there is no way to determine what documents were reviewed, whether the
work was duplicative, or if the review time was excessive. But section 998
allows expert costs “reasonably necessary in . . . preparation for trial,” and
both administrative work and document review may be necessary. (§ 998,
subd. (c)(1); see Chaaban, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [affirming expert
costs for “preparation time, trial testimony, and travel time”].)
      Further, the trial court found HSBC’s evidence was “sufficiently
specific” to determine the reasonableness of the claimed costs. Rojas does not
establish any specific level of detail was required. (See Jones, supra, 63
Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [no requirement that “copies of bills, invoices,
statements, or any other such documents be attached to the [costs]
memorandum”]; Thon, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1548–1549 [disagreeing
court erred by, inter alia, “awarding costs absent sufficient detail of the
expenditures”; defendant supplied itemized costs and attorney declaration
asserting necessity, and “absent an explicit statement by the trial court to the
contrary, it is presumed the court properly exercised its legal duty”]; cf. Syers
Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699 [attorney’s fees;
“ ‘Because time records are not required under California law . . ., there is no
required level of detail that counsel must achieve’ ”].)

                                       50
      3.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declining To
             Reduce Section 998 Costs Based On Rojas’s Economic Situation

      Rojas also argues the trial court abused its discretion in setting the
section 998 costs, by purportedly failing to consider undisputed facts
regarding her limited economic means. The court did consider Rojas’s
situation, and reasonably found her evidence insufficient to limit costs.
      In awarding costs under section 998, a court has “discretionary
authority” to “consider[] . . . a party’s ability to pay when determining the
appropriate recovery under that statute.” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1127 (LAOSD); see Santantonio v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 125, fn. 7 [§ 998 “permits the
trial court, via exercise of discretion, to consider a party’s ability to pay
costs.”]; cf. Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1561
(Seever) [trial court “must take account of the offeree’s economic resources,”
disapproved on other grounds in Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 668, fn. 5].)
      Here, the trial court recognized it had discretion to consider Rojas’s
economic situation and ability to pay, and did consider it. However, the court
found it could not conclude she was “incapable of paying” the expert costs,
explaining she provided “bare declaratory testimony as to her monthly
income” and “no information regarding, inter alia, her monthly expenses or
ability to obtain financial assistance from third parties.” These findings were
reasonable, as assessing economic circumstances requires information about
both income and expenses. (See LAOSD, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127
[evidence of inability to pay includes “ ‘gross income, . . . net income, . . .
monthly expenses, . . . assets, or any other information which . . . would lend
support to [the party’s] position,’ ” (italics added)].)
      We are not persuaded by Rojas’s contention that it was “undisputed”
her “ ‘extremely low’ ” income “barely covers her necessary living expenses,

                                         51
and that she has no other economic resources readily available to her.” She
did make these conclusory assertions about her expenses, in her declaration
supporting her motion to strike or tax costs. However, the trial court was not
required to accept them as credible—particularly when she did provide
specific information about her income. Indeed, there was evidence at trial
that Rojas lived with her boyfriend, her daughter Alejandra, and Alejandra’s
boyfriend, during the period relevant to her Privacy Act claims, reflecting
potentially shared expenses at some point.
      The trial court could fairly conclude Rojas did not justify a reduction in
expert costs under section 998. Although we might not have reached this
result, we cannot say the court’s decision was outside the bounds of reason.

      4.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Unused Exhibit Costs

      Finally, Rojas contends the trial court erred by allowing costs for
“models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits that were not admitted at
trial . . . .” We disagree.
      Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13) states,
“Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the
electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and
electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid
the trier of fact.” As noted above, another subdivision, (c)(4), “authorizes the
trial court in its discretion to award or deny an item of costs not mentioned in
this section.” (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 658.)
      At the time of the cost proceedings below and briefing here, there was a
“split of appellate authority regarding whether costs associated with unused
demonstratives and photocopies of trial exhibits are recoverable, either
categorically under section 1033.5(a)(13) or in the court’s discretion pursuant
to section 1033.5(c)(4).” (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 658; compare, e.g.,

                                       52
Segal v. Asics America Corp. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 659, 665 [costs for unused
exhibits may be awarded under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1033.5(a)(13), and under
(c)(4) “[f]or the same reasons”]; with, e.g., Seever, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1557–1561 [costs not recoverable under either section].) The California
Supreme Court subsequently resolved the split in Segal, affirming the Court
of Appeal’s disposition and holding, “[C]osts related to unused photocopies of
trial exhibits and demonstratives are not categorically recoverable under
section 1033.5(a)(13), but they may still be awarded in the trial court’s
discretion pursuant to section 1033.5(c)(4).” (Segal, at p. 657.) As noted, we
requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the impact of
Segal on this appeal, which they provided.
      First, under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Segal, the trial
court did not err by awarding costs for unused trial exhibits. (Segal, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 657.) Although the court erroneously determined the costs
were allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(13), as Rojas
notes in her supplemental brief, it still found they were “necessary” and
“reasonable,” the relevant considerations for the overarching cost standards
that apply regardless of the authorizing subsection. (Segal, at p. 667 [“It
bears repeating that any award of costs . . . must meet the requirements of
subdivision (c)(2) and (c)(3)”].) On this record, we can conclude that had the
court known subdivision (a)(13) was unavailable, it would have exercised its
discretion under section (c)(4) to award the costs. (See State ex rel. Rapier v.
Encino Hospital Medical Center (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 811, 839–841
[affirming costs, where trial court “exercised its discretion under subdivision
(a)(13) in determining that unused exhibits were reasonably helpful”;
“Although that award was ultimately mis-categorized, the same discretion

                                       53
exercised under subdivision (a)(13) supported awarding the costs under
subdivision (c)(4).”].)
      Second, Rojas does not establish the trial court abused its discretion in
evaluating the unused exhibit costs. She argued in her opening brief that the
“court failed to consider or analyze” whether these costs “were reasonably
helpful to the trier of fact,” but rather, “blanketly concluded that the costs
were reasonable and necessary, and reasonably helpful to aiding the trier of
fact.” The court was in the best position to draw these conclusions, including
the necessity and reasonableness determinations pertinent to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033.5, subd. (c)(4), and we presume it considered all
relevant matters in doing so. (Rozanova v. Uribe (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392,
405 [trial court is in “best position to evaluate” if exhibits were, inter alia,
“ ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation’ . . . and [their costs]
‘reasonable in amount’ ”]; see Evid. Code, § 664.) We note numerous exhibits
related to the call recordings—which both parties utilized at trial, and which
Rojas tried unsuccessfully to admit as a set and maintains in the appeal from
judgment should all have been admitted (a contention we do not reach,
having concluded the court’s consent finding supports affirmance). (Cf. Segal,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 667 [disagreeing costs for unused exhibits would
necessarily incentivize over-preparation]; id. at pp. 667–668 [disagreeing it
was illogical to require party to pay for costs it excluded from trial; “The
Legislature could have spelled out a categorical prohibition against shifting
costs for inadmissible exhibits, but did not.”].)
      In her supplemental brief, Rojas argues the trial court improperly
failed to place the burden of proof for “costs . . . not expressly authorized by
statute” on HSBC. Even if this were error, it would be harmless. HSBC
provided evidence for the exhibit costs, the court could conclude the evidence

                                         54
supported the necessity and reasonableness of the claimed costs, and, again,
the court was in the best position to make that assessment. (Cf. Nelson,
supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 111 [addressing exhibit costs; “[b]urden of proof is
not an issue in this instance, since, having presided over the trial, the trial
court had all the evidence needed to determine whether the items claimed

were reasonably helpful to the trier of fact.”].)25
      In sum, Rojas does not establish the trial court erred by denying her
motion to strike or tax HSBC’s costs.

25     Rojas’s authority for this argument, Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, cites Nelson to state that “where costs are not
expressly allowed by the statute,” the “burden is on the party claiming” them.
(Id. at p. 71, citing Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) Actually,
consistent with its comments on burden shifting, noted above, Nelson said the
claiming party was “required to prove the reasonableness and necessity of
items only if not properly claimed . . . .” (Id. at p. 130, emphasis omitted; see
id. at p. 131 [“The court’s first determination . . . is whether the statute
expressly allows the particular item, and whether it appears proper on its
face. [Citation] If so, the burden is on the objecting party”]; id. at 132
[“Messenger fees are not expressly authorized by statute, but may be allowed
in the discretion of the court. [Citations.] The trial court found the messenger
filings to be of doubtful necessity and unreasonable on their face . . . . The
burden was therefore properly placed upon [the claiming party],” emphasis
added].)

                                        55
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment and postjudgment order are affirmed. HSBC shall
recover its costs on appeal.

                                                               IRION, J.

I CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

                                   56
Dato, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

      The two operative privacy statutes – Penal Code sections 632 and 632.7
1 – each prohibit the intentional recording of certain phone conversations

without consent of all parties. Like the majority, I agree there is no
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that HSBC did not
intend to record hundreds of personal phone calls to plaintiff Dalia Rojas
from her daughter, an employee of an HSBC call center in Salinas,
California. Unlike my colleagues, however, I do not believe we can affirm the
judgment on the basis that Rojas impliedly consented to HSBC’s recording of
the calls. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

                                       A

      In the context of this case, the concept of “implied” consent requires
that the consenting party, knowing that the phone calls will be recorded, take
action (typically, continuing with the phone call) that impliedly indicates
agreement to permit the recording. Here, applying a deferential “substantial
evidence” standard of review, the majority opinion affirms the trial court’s
purported factual finding that Rojas impliedly consented. But it’s not nearly
that simple.
      First and foremost, the trial court never determined that Rojas knew
the calls were being recorded. (See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1st Cir. 1990) 904
F.2d 112, 117 [plaintiff must have “ ‘knowingly agreed to the surveillance’ ”].)
Rather, it concluded that she was on “inquiry notice” and “should” or “would”
have been aware of the recordings. But this is the wrong legal standard. (Id.
at p. 116 [“implied consent is not constructive consent”].) It is not enough
that Rojas objectively should have known the calls were being recorded, much

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
less that an inquiry (which she did not conduct) would have led her to that
conclusion. Instead, the question is subjective–did Rojas agree to having the
calls recorded? If she was told the call would be recorded and did not
thereafter “decline to continue the communication” (Kearney v. Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, 118 (Kearney)), there would be a
sufficient basis to conclude she impliedly consented to the recording. But
proceeding with a phone call cannot imply consent if Rojas wasn’t aware it
was being recorded. Any asserted neglect on her part in not asking if the
calls were recorded cannot create consent. By applying the wrong standard,
the trial court committed legal error, and its resulting conclusion cannot be
reviewed for substantial evidence.
      The majority opinion suggests that any legal error in misstating the
legal standard was harmless “because substantial evidence still supports the
court’s consent findings.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.) But this misapplies the
standard for prejudice. The question is not whether there is enough evidence
to support a finding of implied consent, but instead whether Rojas can show a
reasonable probability of a more favorable result had the court applied the
correct standard. (Strouse v. Webcor Construction, L.P. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
703, 718.) As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “ ‘probability’ in this
context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance,
more than an abstract possibility.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.)
      The trial court’s brief discussion of consent in its statement of decision
gives no indication that it found Rojas was actually aware the calls were
being recorded. Indeed, had it made that finding, there would have been no
need to mention the inapplicable concepts of “inquiry notice” and whether
Rojas “should have been aware” of the recordings. Given the nature of the

                                        2
evidence HSBC relied on to show Rojas’s knowledge that the calls were being
recorded (see post, part B), there is far more than a “reasonable chance” of a
different result. There is, in fact, compelling evidence that Rojas did not
consent.

                                        B

      As the Supreme Court observed in Kearney, “California consumers are
accustomed to being informed at the outset of a telephone call whenever a
business entity intends to record the call.” (39 Cal.4th at p. 118, fn. 10.)
At that point, the consumers “simply may decline to continue the
communication” if they do not want to be recorded. (Id. at p. 118.) On the
other hand, if they proceed with the call it is reasonable to infer they
impliedly consented to the recording.
      In this case, there is no dispute that HSBC did not inform Rojas “at the
outset” of any call with her daughter that anything was going to be recorded.
Instead, HSBC and the trial court relied on two advisements that Rojas
received in an entirely different context, unrelated to any phone call with her
daughter. She received both, fortuitously, because she happened to be an
HSBC credit card customer; neither had anything to do with her daughter’s
employment at an HSBC call center. In my view, neither supports a finding
of implied consent.
      The first of these advisements is contained in a prolix 14-page
“Cardmember Agreement” sent to Rojas because she applied for a credit card.
Included under a heading “Monitoring Practices,” sandwiched between
“Account Closure” and “Change of Terms,” the cardmember is told, “You
agree that we may listen to and record phone calls between you and our
representatives.” Elsewhere in the agreement there are two references to
phone calls. The cardmember can “call[ ] the number on the back of your

                                        3
card” to close the account. Or if the card is lost or stolen, the cardmember is
invited to call “[t]he phone number . . . listed on your billing statement.”
Both of these references are to calls placed by the cardmember to HSBC
about the credit card account. Nowhere does the agreement remotely suggest
that if the cardmember receives a personal call from a friend or relative who

happens to be employed by HSBC, that call will be recorded.2
      The second advisement relied on by HSBC and the trial court was the
automated one Rojas said she heard when she called the number on the back
of her credit card to make a monthly payment and was told, “ ‘This call may
be recorded.’ ” The fact that this call may be monitored, or even this kind of

2      The cardmember agreement is a written contract, the meaning of which
presents a question of law unless the foundational extrinsic facts are in
conflict. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865;
Medical Operations Management, Inc. v. National Health Laboratories, Inc.
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 886, 891.) Here, the foundational facts are
undisputed, and the language of the agreement is at best ambiguous as to
whether “phone calls between you and our representatives” includes personal
calls made to Rojas by her daughter, who was not calling in her capacity as
an HSBC representative. In deciding what the advisement means, our job is
to determine the most reasonable interpretation of the parties’ agreement in
light of the undisputed evidence. (See Founding Members of the Newport
Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 944, 955; Millsap v. Spilman (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 444, 446;
Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. 1333 North California Boulevard (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295–1296.) The question is how HSBC believed a
reasonable cardholder would have understood the statement, interpreting
any ambiguities against the drafter of the contract, HSBC. (Civ. Code,
§§ 1649, 1654.) Clearly, the most (if not only) reasonable interpretation of
the cardholder agreement is that it pertains to the recording of phone calls
regarding the credit card account. Even the key authority cited in the
majority opinion suggests as much. (Maghen v. Quicken Loans Inc. (C.D.Cal.
2015) 94 F.Supp.3d 1141, 1143, 1145−1146 [plaintiff’s agreement to Terms of
Use on mortgage refinance application, that referred to calls on a “recorded
line,” implied her consent to being recorded when a loan officer called about
her application], affd. 680 Fed.Appx. 554, 555.)

                                        4
call—i.e., one by the cardmember to HSBC to make a payment—does not give
notice that an entirely different and unrelated kind of call—a personal one by
an HSBC employee to her mother—will likewise be recorded.
      Equally significant, HSBC was forced to rely on these inapplicable and
inadequate advisements because it consciously chose not to provide actual
notice to call participants. Questioned about the automated advisements
that greeted the caller on every incoming call to the call center, HSBC
representatives conceded it was similarly feasible to include an automated
advisement on outgoing calls made from the call center, but that the company
declined to do so for business reasons because such an advisement would
“significantly decrease[ ] the chance that the call will be answered.” In other
words, HSBC believed that if customers really knew the call was being
recorded, many would not consent to participate. And it was better from
HSBC’s business perspective to keep them in the dark and address any
resulting privacy issues at a later time, if and when they arose.

                                       C

      Applying the proper legal standard, Dalia Rojas did not knowingly
consent to HSBC recording personal phone calls that her daughter—an
HSBC employee—made to her from work. She was never advised at the
outset of any call that it would be recorded, as California consumers are
accustomed to. (Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 118, fn. 10.) Neither of the
two totally unrelated advisements pointed to by HSBC and relied on by the
trial court gave Rojas any notice that calls from her daughter were being
recorded, such that she could then decide whether she wanted to discontinue
the call.

                                       5
      Because HSBC intentionally recorded Rojas’s phone calls without her
consent, in violation of sections 632 and 632.7, the judgment should be
reversed.

                                                                     DATO, J.

                                      6