Court Opinion

ID: 9811212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:13:00.097863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:41.758084
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, J.,
concur in part/dissent in part.
¶ 1 I concur in much of the rationale utilized by the majority, except I must point out that the trial court made erroneous findings. of fact in reaching its conclusion. I dissent to the majority's conclusion that this Court's earlier decision in Nilsen v. State, 2009 OK CR 6, 203 P.3d 189, need be overruled to any extent.
1 2 A foundational principle in the litany of United States Supreme Court cases discussing Terry1 type stops is that these types of cases must be decided on a case by case basis, examining the totality of the cireum-stances, 4.0. "the whole picture," to determine whether an officer has reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The totality of the cireumstances includes the source of information utilized to justify the stop and the degree of reliability of the information. Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687. As pointed out by the majority opinion, even a tip from an anonymous source may, when viewed in light of the totality of the cireumstances, exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
T3 This standard was utilized in Nilsen where this court held that an anonymous tip, standing alone, and without sufficient corroboration, was insufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. In that case, the details given by the anonymous caller were not sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed. Thus, our decision in Nilsen, holding that the stop was not justified, was correct.2
€ 4 The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts of Nilsen. When the facts of this case are judged under the same standard, a different result is required. The facts of the present case present a much stronger case supporting a reasonable suspi-clon.
{ 5 Here the trial court improperly identified the information as coming from an anonymous informant. On the contrary, this informant stayed in the area allowing themselves to be identified by the responding officer, which reduced the possibility that the information was false. The caller also *95left a name and cell phone number, which, combined with the caller's actions, indicate authenticity, rather than deception. The caller's actions did not reflect a desire to remain anonymous, thus the information given can be viewed as more reliable than the information coming from a totally anonymous source.
¶ 6 Thus, after a proper analysis of the source of the information under the totality of the cireumstances so eloquently outlined in the Court's Opinion, the stop in this case was properly based on sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.
¶ 7 As I find that there are no inconsistencies between Nilsen and the opinion in this case, there is no need to overrule any aspect of Nilsen. The trial court in this case simply erred in suppressing the evidence.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

. The same conclusion was reached in Lunsford v. State, 1982 OK CR 168, 652 P.2d 1243, where an uncorroborated anonymous tip was insufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)(holding that a bare-bones anonymous tip lacking any corroboration could not provide a reasonable suspicion for the stop).