Court Opinion

ID: 9705358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:04:03.720891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.301679
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 93. (dissenting). As the majority opinion carefully documents, courts around the country have *151divided over the proper interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause. Majority op. at 130-31. When numerous courts disagree about the meaning of language, the language cannot be characterized as having a plain meaning. Rather, the language is ambiguous; it is capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-informed persons even though one interpretation might on careful analysis seem more suitable to this court. Lincoln Savings Bank, S.A. v. DOR, 215 Wis. 2d 430, 452, 573 N.W.2d 522 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
¶ 94. I would hold that a reasonable person in the position of the insured would reasonably expect liability coverage. The pollution exclusion clause does not plainly and clearly alert a reasonable insured that coverage is denied for personal injury claims arising from lead paint. Therefore the pollution exclusion clause should be construed narrowly against the insurer with any ambiguity resolved in favor of coverage. Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).
¶ 95. For this reason, I dissent.