Court Opinion

ID: 9760482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:21.388731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.749877
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, appellant argues for the first time that no trial objection was necessary to preserve the constitutional question for review. Appellant quotes the following passage: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a defendant’s conviction is based should be addressed by appellate courts, even when such issues are raised for the first time on appeal.” Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Moore v. State, 672 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.)). Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the “Rabb rule.” See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the anti-stalking statute), rev’d, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)1; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. *740State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under which the appellant was arrested).2
Pointing to this line of cases, appellant argues that our reliance on Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) is misplaced. Curry held the appellant failed to preserve for review his constitutional challenge to the death penalty sentencing procedure in the Code of Criminal Procedure because the appellant failed to make a specific, timely objection. Id. at 496. Appellant argues that Curry, and the cases it relies upon, deal only with attacks upon a procedural statute, while the Rabb line applies to penal statutes under which the defendant has been convicted. Because appellant attacks the penal statute upon which appellant’s conviction is based, he argues Curry does not apply.
We disagree with the procedural/penal distinction drawn by appellant. One of the cases relied upon in Curry held that “[b]e-cause Article 37.071 [the death penalty sentencing procedure statute] was not facially unconstitutional, nor was it “void ab initio,’ appellant was required to object at trial in order to preserve any error for purposes of appeal.” Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995). Both Curry and Garcia relied upon another ease for the proposition that “even constitutional errors may be waived by the failure to object at trial.” Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly applied the “Briggs rule.” See, e.g., Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). The Briggs line of eases clearly indicates that unless the statute is facially unconstitutional, or void ab initio, one must preserve error for appeal. Nevertheless, we believe this line of cases is consistent with the Rabb line of cases.
We begin with the Court of Criminal Appeals explanation of forfeitable rights in Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). The Marin court stated:
[O]ur system may be thought to contain rules of three distinct kinds: (1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request. In the present context the most important thing to remember about the Texas law of procedural default is that it only applies to the last category.
Id. at 279.3
The Marin court described the first category of absolute rights as “nonwaivable, non-forfeitable systemic requirements” that are “essentially independent of the litigant’s wishes.” Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279. These absolute rights cannot be waived or forfeited by the parties. Id. As the “clearest” example of absolute rights, the Marin court pointed to laws that affect the jurisdiction of the courts. Id.
The second category of rights are those “widely considered so fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory process as to enjoy special protection in the system.” Id. at 278. A principle characteristic of these rights is that they are not forfeited by inaction alone and a criminal *741defendant must expressly relinquish the right. Id. 278-79.
The final category are those rights that must be expressly implemented before they will inure to the benefit of the litigant. Id. at 278. The majority of evidentiary and procedural rules are of this type: “[T]he rights of litigants in our system of adjudication are usually forfeited by a failure to exercise them.” Id. Applying this framework, we now discuss how Rabb interacts with Briggs.4
We have found one decision discussing the interaction between the Rabb rule and the Marin framework. Webb, 899 S.W.2d at 818. In Webb, the appellant argued section 25.07 of the Texas Penal Code was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 817. The court, sua sponte, discussed whether the issue was preserved for review:
We recognize that “[questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a defendant’s conviction is based should be addressed by appellate courts, even when such issues are raised for the first time on appeal.” See Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). However, Webb’s attack is not on the “statute upon which [his] conviction is based.” Rather, he complains that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence because the search of his person and seizure of the evidence were based on a statute that he alleges is unconstitutional. In our view, the Rabb rule is properly applied in instances where the questioned statute affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant, i.e., when the statute affects “the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case ... coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” If the challenge is valid, the judgment is void because an unconstitutional statute cannot confer authority upon the court to act. See Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Thus, the Rabb rule is a corollary of the rule that the jurisdiction of the court is a “category one” right that cannot be waived and may be questioned at any time.
Webb, 899 S.W.2d at 818 (some citations omitted). Because it concluded that a statute providing for the arrest of an individual does not go to the “judicial power” of the trial court to enter and enforce a judgment, the Webb court held the appellant did not preserve the complaint for appeal. Id.
We agree with this reasoning, but we add to it the distinction enunciated in Briggs: an appellant is not required to object at trial if he or she is challenging the facial constitutionality of the statute or arguing the statute is void ab initio. Briggs, 789 S.W.2d at 924. This is because only a facial constitutional challenge affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant. See Casares v. State, 768 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (“[A]n unconstitutional statute is void from its inception and cannot provide a basis for any right or relief.” (quoting Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (opinion on rehearing))); Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (“[A] void law is no law and confers no rights, bestows no power on anyone and justifies no act performed under it.”). On the other hand, a constitutional challenge to a statute as applied does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The statute does confer upon the court the power to act, although a challenge to the constitu*742tionality as applied may constitute a defense to a conviction under that statute. Thus, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “as applied” is not a nonwaivable, absolute requirement or prohibition. We conclude that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute as applied falls into the class of rights that may be forfeited by failure to assert them.
Because appellant in this case contests only the constitutionality of the statute as applied, appellant was required to object at trial. Appellant failed to meet this burden. We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
Appellant also contends this Court should have conducted a factual sufficiency review of the evidence. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). We denied appellant’s post-submission brief requesting a factual sufficiency review. In our original opinion we stated, “we decline to conduct a factual sufficiency review in this instance because appellant did not request such a review prior to oral submission.” Nevertheless, appellant renews the request to make such a review.
We again decline to review the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant did not raise this point of error in his original brief. Post-submission briefs containing new points of error will be considered only with leave of the appellate court. Rochelle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see also Wilson v. State, 811 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). “The idea that a party may force a new issue on an appellate court after briefs have been filed is foreign to the rules ...” Rochelle, 791 S.W.2d at 124. Appellant did not make the factual sufficiency argument in his original brief, and thus, we decline to address it.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice O’Neill filed December 12, 1996.

. In Long, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed the appellant’s facial challenge to the anti-stalking statute, but it declined to address the appellant’s contention the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied. Long, 903 S.W.2d at 52. The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed only the facial challenge to the statute. Concerning whether the issue was properly preserved for appeal, the Court simply noted "Although appellant did not raise his constitutional challenge at trial, the Court of Appeals held it appropriate to address his facial attack on the statute for the first time on appeal. The State does not challenge that holding.” Long, 931 S.W.2d at 287. The Court ultimately concluded the statute was unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 297.

. Raab has only been cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals twice, and both citations were found in concurring opinions. See Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Baird, J., concurring); Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 370 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (Campbell, J., concurring).

. The Court of Criminal Appeals has applied this framework a number of times since Marin. See, e.g., Reyes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Geesa reasonable doubt instruction is an absolute right that may not be forfeited); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (challenge to conflicting versions of death penalty sentencing procedure statute did not fall under absolute or waivable-only right) (plurality opinion); Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (failure to object to a jury argument or failure to pursue adverse rule forfeits the right to complain about the jury argument on appeal); Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation is an absolute prohibition); Powell v. State, 897 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (legislatively mandated effective date of statute is absolute systemic feature not subject to waiver), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 54, 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995).

. Certain language in the opinion suggests that the Court of Criminal Appeals decisions prior to Marin are not in conflict. The court stated in Marin:
Since its adoption in 1986, we have regularly applied [Rule 52(a) ] only in cases of forfeitable trial rights and never to the violation of fundamental systemic requirements or to the infringement of rights so important that their implementation is mandatory absent an express waiver.
Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280. The Marin court did not discuss in great detail where constitutional challenges fall in this category. It did point out, however, that many constitutional rights fall into the category of forfeitable rights.
When we say "that even constitutional guarantees can be waived by failure to object properly at trial,” we mean that some, not all, constitutional rights may be forfeited. On the other hand, certain, relatively few, rights must be protected by the system’s impartial representatives unless expressly waived by the party to whom they belong. Determining which category a right occupies will usually settle the question of procedural default in the context of a particular case.
Id. at 279 (citation omitted).