Court Opinion

ID: 9542496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:35:02.087063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:08.081461
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The result the court’s opinion reaches today is foreclosed by the controlling rule, our past decisions, and authoritative interpretation of the identical federal rule. And it should also be foreclosed by reticence to rely on a theory not raised or argued by the parties. I would affirm dismissal of West’s amended complaint as untimely; it did not relate back to West’s timely original complaint.
A. Facts
While driving William Bembry’s car, Hil-trud Buchanan collided with Carmen West’s vehicle. The collision occurred on June 17, 1993. On June 16, 1995, West commenced suit by filing a complaint naming William Bembry as the only defendant. The two-year statute of limitations expired the day after West sued Bembry. Because West served Bembry by mail, Bembry did not receive notice of the lawsuit until after the limitations period had run.
On September 25, 1995, more than three months later, and thus well after the limitations period had expired, West amended her complaint to substitute Buchanan as the only defendant. West has not explained why her original complaint named William Bembry; when deposed, West testified that she realized on the day of the accident that the driver of Bembry’s car was a woman. It is undisputed that Buchanan (and Bembry) did not learn of the lawsuit until after the limitations period expired.
B. The Court’s Decision
The court’s opinion holds that the amended complaint naming Buchanan, although filed after the statute of limitations had run, was timely because it related back to the timely complaint that named only Bembry. Because notice that Bembry had been sued was received by Bembry and Buchanan after the statute of limitations ran, but within the 120-day period Alaska Civil Rule 4(j) allowed for serving Bembry, the opinion reasons that the service grace period must be included “with*1072in the period provided by law. for commencing the action,” as provided by Alaska Civil Rule 15(e), in deciding whether the action against Buchanan was timely.
C. Alaska Civil Rule 15(c)
A complaint must be filed within the time specified by law, usually by the applicable statute of limitations adopted by the legislature. Absent exceptions not applicable here, an amended complaint filed after the limitations statute has run is untimely and must be dismissed unless the requirements of Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) are met. If they are met, the amended complaint relates back to the date when the original complaint was filed.
In this case, West timely commenced suit against the wrong defendant; she attempted to sue the right defendant only after the statute had run. Rule 15(c) treats this type of amendment differently from an amendment that simply changes the claims. “Rule 15(e)[’s] requirements are strictly construed when the amendment adds a new defendant.” 1 Rule 15(c) requires that Buchanan have received, “within the period provided by law for commencing the action,” notice that the action had been instituted. ’
The opinion defines this period to include the time set by the applicable statute of limitations plus the 120-day service grace period provided by Rule 4(j).
There are two main problems with this analysis. First, it is contrary to our Civil Rules, particularly Rule 15(c). Our rules distinguish between commencing an action and serving the defendant. Rule 3 addresses the “commencement” of an action. An action is “commenced” by filing a complaint.2 Rule 4 deals with process, i.e., serving the complaint. Subsection j of Rule 4 sets the time within which the plaintiff must serve a timely filed complaint on the defendant; it does not enlarge the time for commencing an action. Rule 15(e) observes the same distinction in language that mirrors the operative language in Rule 3; the operative language in Rule 4(j) is alien to the part of Rule 15(c) here in issue.
The opinion’s reliance on the service grace period conflates the purpose of that period with the doctrine of relation-back. Rule 4(j)’s service grace period sets the time in which the plaintiff must achieve service of a timely filed complaint on a defendant named in the complaint. Rule 15(c)’s doctrine of relation-back enlarges the time for correcting the name of the defendant if the proper defendant has received, within the limitations — not service — period, notice that suit was filed. The service grace period assumes a timely complaint; it does not enlarge the time for filing a timely complaint. Our decision today, however, engrafts the service grace period onto the limitations period to make timely an amended complaint that was not timely. Thus, it fails to distinguish between commencing an action and serving process.
The opinion also fails to distinguish between Bembry and Buchanan. It assumes that what is fair for Bembry (who could be served after the limitations period had run) is also fair for Buchanan. But their situations must be distinguished. Bembry was named in a timely complaint and Buchanan was not. Rule 4(j) has only one possible application to Buchanan: it required that she be served within 120 days after the amended complaint was filed. Moreover, we should not necessarily assume that Bembry and Buchanan must be treated identically when applying the service grace period. If Buchanan had gone to the courthouse on the second anniversary of the accident and asked if she was a defendant in a lawsuit, she would have learned that she was not. She was thus not in the position of a defendant who was timely sued but not yet served. This distinction may not be conclusive, and does not preclude amending the rule; but it certainly justifies applying the rule as written absent any amendment.
The opinion states that “to say that Bem-bry received timely and adequate notice but Buchanan did not would seem little more *1073than senseless formalism.”3 But the distinction the opinion rejects is embedded in our rule, and we should observe it. The opinion asserts that Rule 15(c) is “not a model of clarity.”4 Perhaps so, but it is sufficiently clear that we should apply it as written.
The second problem inevitably follows. The opinion changes the substantive law which governs the time for commencing an action. Even assuming Rule 4(j) purported to add 120 days to “the period provided by law for commencing” an action, it would necessarily extend every limitations period by 120 days as long as notice were received during that 120-day period. We should avoid such a substantive effect of a procedural rule. I read the words “provided by law” to refer to substantive law, not mere procedure. Our rule-making power does not give us authority to specify the time for commencing suit; that is for the legislature. We sometimes decide whether substantive court-made “law” delays or tolls the running of the statutory limitations period adopted by the legislature, but that is not what we are doing here.5
D. Our Prior Decisions
In my view, our decision in Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,6 controls. There we rejected Adkins’s attempt to amend his complaint to add Nabors after the statute of limitations had run. The court distinguishes Adkins from this case on the theory that Nabors did not receive notice of the suit until after the service period had expired.7 But that distinction ignores the rationale that governed Adkins: that the critical language in Rule 15(c) — “the period provided by law for commencing the action” — refers to the “limitations period.”8 That rationale was not mere dictum, but controlled the result.
The court looks to Siemion v. Rumfelt,9 to support its holding.10 In Siemion, we permitted an amended complaint to relate back when the newly-named defendant, Jeffrey, “had notice of the institution of the suit within the same time he would have known had he been a properly named defendant.”11 Because Rule 4(j) contemplates the possibility a properly named defendant will not receive notice of an action until 120 days after the statute of limitations expires, the court reads Siemion to support its holding here. But Jeffrey in fact had constructive notice within the applicable period of limitations,12 and Siemion cited Adkins with approval.13
Moreover, in Farmer v. State,14 relying upon language from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Schiavone v. Fortune,15 we stated that the relation back question was whether the defendant received notice within the limitations period.16
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be satisfied: (1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the second and third *1074requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.[17]
We have never disavowed our reliance on Schiavone's equation of the statutory limitations period with the language “the period provided by law for commencing the action.” Indeed, Siemion approvingly cites Schiavone and quotes the same language we quoted in Farmer.18
It seems unlikely the court in Siemion intended to hold that the time for commencing suit is enlarged by the service grace period, given that it did not cite Rule 4(j) or discuss the service grace period.
E. Schiavone v. Fortune
Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) was, until its amendment in 1991, identical to our Rule 15(c), federal interpretation of the unamended federal rule provides useful guidance. Until 1986, there was a dispute in the federal courts concerning the meaning of Rule 15(c)’s qualifying language — that notice must have been received “within the period provided by law for commencing the action.”
Some courts ruled that notice had to be received before the statute of limitations had run. To rule otherwise arguably would have deprived the new party of the right to invoke the statute of limitations defense and that might raise a question of procedural due process. Other courts noted that the rule was satisfied as long as the action was filed within the statutory period and notice was accomplished within the time allowed for service of process.[19]
That dispute, however, was resolved when the Supreme Court decided Schiavone v. Fortune.20 As explained in a leading treatise:
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that notice must be received within the statute of limitations and it is not sufficient to find that notice is given within the time for service. This conclusion, he noted, was required by the “plain language” of Rule 15(c). Further, he acknowledged
... there is an element of arbitrariness here, but that is a characteristic of any limitations period. And it is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process.[21]
The result reached in Schiavone was criticized by commentators.22 Nonetheless, the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, adhered to Schiavone's reading of Federal Civil Rule 15(c) prior to its amendment.23 We also approvingly quoted from Schiavone in Farmer and Siemion.24, Our court today disagrees with the six-justice majority in Schiavone. In interpreting our rules, we are certainly not bound by the federal courts’ interpretations of their rules. But because the plain language which convinced the Supreme Court is also found in our rule, I would place significant weight on that Court’s reasoned result.
Nonetheless our opinion today does invoke the federal experience in another way. In interpreting Alaska Civil Rule 15(e), our opinion relies on the post-Schiavone amendment of Federal Civil Rule 15(c).25 The 1991 amendment rewrote the federal rule to permit the result the court desires here.26 The opinion finds the 1991 amendment to be “further evidence of the purpose of the rule and that our interpretation is faithful to the achievement of this purpose.”27 This is pro*1075blematic. As a matter of construction, I would not read an amendment that permits a particular result to support a pre-amendment interpretation contrary to the unamended language and its prevailing interpretation. That the federal rule was amended suggests that we should rewrite our rule, not that we should simply reread it. Finally, for reasons discussed above, I think the court errs in assuming that Rule 15(c) has an underlying purpose that justifies the interpretation reached today.
F. Reliance on the Service Grace Period
Apart from my substantive disagreement with relying on the service grace period, it seems inappropriate to rely on it here. This issue was not preserved in the superior court.28 West’s opening and closing appellate briefs say nothing about Rule 4(j) or the 120-day service grace period.29 West instead asserts other theories — correctly rejected by the court here — on which her amended complaint should be considered timely. Because West did not even raise the issue, it is not surprising that Buchanan’s appellee’s brief does not discuss the issue, either. Buchanan could have persuasively argued that, the service grace period and Rule 4(j) have no application here. The court’s opinion consequently relies on a rule not cited by appellant in support of a rationale not advanced by appellant to reach a result that is not justified by our rules as written or by our past decisions.
G. Conclusion
I agree with the court’s resolution of the issues raised by West. But I disagree with the court’s resolution of the issue not raised by West, and would therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.

. Siemion v. Rumfelt, 825 P.2d 896, 899 n. 3 (Alaska 1992) (quoting McCutcheon v. State, 746 P.2d 461, 469 n. 16 (Alaska 1987)).

. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 3(a) ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”).

. Op. at 1071.

. Op. at 1069.

. See, e.g., Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Ins., Inc., 736 P.2d 763, 766-69 (Alaska 1987) (discussing conditions under which Alaska courts will delay or toll running of statutory limitations periods).

. 609 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1980).

. See Op. at 1068-69.

. 609 P.2d at 21.

. 825 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1992).

. See Op. at 1068-1069.

. Siemion, 825 P.2d at 900.

. See id.

. See id. at 899 n. 3.

. 788 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1990).

. 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986).

. See 788 P.2d at 49 (emphasis added).

. Id. (quoting Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29, 106 S.Ct. 2379) (emphasis added).

. See Siemion, 825 P.2d at 899.

. 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498, at 107-13 (1990) (footnotes omitted).

. See 477 U.S. at 30-31, 106 S.Ct. 2379.

. Wright, at 113-14 (footnote omitted) (quoting Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31, 106 S.Ct. 2379).

. See id. at 114.

. See id.

. See Farmer, 788 P.2d at 49; Siemion, 825 P.2d at 899.

. See Op. at 1070-71.

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 advisory committee’s note (1991).

. Op. at 1070-71.

. See Rowen v. Rowen, 963 P.2d 249, 255 (Alaska 1998) (refusing to consider father’s eligibility for “visitation credit" to reduce child support owed when father failed to raise issue at trial); Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Alaska 1987) (stating that matters not raised at trial will not be considered on appeal).

. We have consistently held that the failure to argue a point in a brief constitutes an abandonment of it and we will not consider it on appeal. See Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 406, 411 n. 8 (Alaska 1990); State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980); Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 691 n. 2 (Alaska 1970).