Court Opinion

ID: 9700536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:33:59.69655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.491660
License: Public Domain

Lanphier, J.,
dissenting.
The majority today, in ratifying the Hospital’s allegation that it was necessary for plaintiff to adduce expert medical or psychological evidence regarding her mental suffering and distress, ignores the obvious. The requirement that emotional distress be “medically diagnosible” as set forth in Parrish v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. 242 Neb. 731, 496 N.W.2d 914 (1993); Schleich v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 241 Neb. 765, 491 N.W.2d 307 (1992); and Turek v. St. Elizabeth Comm. Health Ctr., 241 Neb. 467, 488 N.W.2d 567 (1992), should not be read to mean “diagnosed.” While I agree that the court has stated that to be actionable, “ ‘emotional distress must have been so severe that no reasonable person could have been *274expected to endure it,’ ” I disagree that explicit proof of such distress by way of expert testimony is necessary in every case, particularly in this case.
In Eiting v. Godding, 191 Neb. 88, 91, 214 N.W.2d 241, 243-44 (1974), this court stated:
In personal injury cases where the injuries are objective and the conclusion to be drawn from proved basic facts does not require special technical knowledge or science, the use of expert testimony is not legally necessary. [Citation omitted.]
Courts generally limit such cases to those where the causal connection is clearly apparent from the injury itself and the circumstances surrounding it or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, knowledge, and observation of laymen.
It does not require “special technical knowledge or science” in order to realize that a parent would suffer emotional distress as a result of the notification of the death of a child. We should not close our eyes to what the rest of the world can see. We recognized this in James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 53, 375 N.W.2d 109, 113 (1985), when we quoted approvingly from Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980):
“[T]he interest assertedly injured is more than a general interest in emotional tranquility. It is the profound and abiding sentiment of parental love. The knowledge that loved ones are safe and whole is the deepest wellspring of emotional welfare. Against that reassuring background, the flashes of anxiety and disappointment that mar our lives take on safer hues. No loss is greater than the loss of a loved one, and no tragedy is more wrenching than the helpless apprehension of the death or serious injury of one whose very existence is a precious treasure.”
I can find no better expression that the loss of a child causes emotional suffering of such a universal character that no further proof of injury is necessary. The trial court read that portion of James v. Lieb into the record in overruling the motion for directed verdict. I agree.
Today’s decision requires plaintiff to prove with medical certainty, as part of a prima facie case of negligent infliction of *275emotional distress, that emotional distress resulting from the perceived death of a child is severe. Such a holding constitutes judicial overkill. The result will prove to be of benefit primarily, if not exclusively, to expert witnesses rather than the judicial system. I hope our society has not reached the point where we need a doctor to tell us what emotional impact results from loss of a child. Perhaps we have. Following a tragic death, we are increasingly seeing reporters for the electronic media inquire of a bereaved family member, “How do you feel?” Perhaps the judicial system is recognizing that nescience. I am reminded of Louis Armstrong’s answer to a request to define jazz: “Man, if you gotta ask you’ll never know.” This is not a case of hard facts making bad law, but, rather, hard law begetting bad results. I would affirm the verdict of the district court jury.
White and Shanahan, J J., join in this dissent.