Court Opinion

ID: 9757672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:53:17.058585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:42.539809
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, District Judge
(dissenting).
As the majority opinion correctly points out, while Section 4008 does not specifically authorize the Post Office to maintain a list of persons desiring to receive communist political propaganda, such a list is essential to effective implementation of the statutory scheme. Plaintiff, therefore, is in a position to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, even though his mail will not be detained in the future, if he has suffered, or is imminently threatened with, a legal injury as a result of the presence of his name on the list. The majority concludes as a matter of law that public disclosure of the list “is only an abstract possibility, not an immediate threat.” It refers to the prior Post Office practice of disclosing the names on such a list to Congressional committees, but relies upon an affidavit of the Associate General Counsel of the Post Office as depriving that prior practice cited by plaintiff “of whatever probative value it may have had.” This conflict on a crucial point raises a genuine issue as to a material fact — likelihood of public disclosure of the list— requiring denial of the government’s motion, whether it be treated as a motion to dismiss or as one for summary judgment. Cf. Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
The majority also finds that “ * * * Lamont does not indicate that the present circulation of the list to government personnel or any future distribution that may occur will result in any material injury, such as loss of customers or social ostracism,” and concludes that “classi-fieation as a person desiring to receive communist political propaganda * * * need not connote disapprobation.” It may be doubted whether one asserting the justiciability of a constitutional right to anonymity need show more in the way of injury than a threat of public disclosure, cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953) (concurring opinion), or, perhaps, more than the limited disclosure to Post Office personnel concededly present here.1 But, in any event, whether classification as a person desiring to receive communist political propaganda need connote public disapprobation is irrelevant, since it ordinarily does so connote, and social ostracism flows from this. Cf. Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 797, 66 S.Ct. 492, 90 L.Ed. 485 (1946).
Therefore, I dissent from the grant of the government’s motion. In addition, were I to follow the lead of the majority in making a finding as to this issue on this record, I would be inclined to conclude that there is a sufficient threat of injury to satisfy the requirement of “ripeness.” This conclusion would be, predicated largely on the irreparable nature of the threatened injury and the improbability of plaintiff having sufficient notice of public disclosure of the list to allow him to raise his constitutional objections before the injury is inflicted.
In addition, the majority opinion concedes that there are numerous exceptions to the doctrine that a litigant may not assert the constitutional rights of third parties. It concludes that this case is not appropriate for invoking one of the exceptions because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is, in his own right, an injured party. However, if the conclusion as to ripeness with regard to the list is incorrect (as I think it is), then the rights of third parties who themselves might be afraid to bring suit are *922significant. Thus, one of the arguments advanced against Section 4008 is that the standard of “communist political propaganda” is so vague that it could include relatively inoffensive publications.2 Yet, one who would make this argument in testing the constitutionality of Section 4008 must either announce an interest in communist political propaganda and invite social disapprobation or forego the mail affected by the Section. Allowing plaintiff in this suit to raise the rights of third parties would extricate them from this dilemma. Note, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1170 (1964).
There is another factor here which may not of itself furnish sufficient basis for denying the government’s action but which warrants comment. This is one of several actions brought to test the constitutionality of Section 4008 by a recipient whose mail has been withheld. In each ease, after the complaint had been served, the Postmaster General delivered such mail to the plaintiff and then asked the court to dismiss the action as moot.3 With commendable candor, the government admits that this device, if approved by the courts, will prevent any potential recipient of such mail from testing the statute.4 I doubt whether the doctrine of mootness or justiciability requires this result, cf. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 331-336, 82 S.Ct. 337, 7 L.Ed.2d 317 (1961) (dissenting opinion), particularly where a First Amendment right is allegedly involved.
This dissent is not to be taken as expressing any opinion as to the constitutionality of Section 4008, since the majority opinion does not reach these issues, and it would, therefore, be inappropriate for me to do so.

. Of. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139-141, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1941) (characterizing the listing challenged there as defamatory) ; Restatement, Torts § 577 (publication rule in defamation cases).

. Cf. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Colum.L.Rev. 1361, 1372 (1963).

. In addition to the instant case, complaints were filed in the Northern District of California (Heilberg v. Fixia, No. 41660, N.D.Cal.) and the Southern District of California (Amlin v. Shaw, No. 63-635-PH, S.D.Cal.). It appears that the government’s position in both cases was as stated in the text. See Transcript of hearing in the Heilberg case, dated October 24, 1963, p. 5; Judgment of Dismissal in the Amlin case, dated February 13, 1964, on the ground, inter alia, that there is no justificiable case or controversy.

. Transcript of oral argument, pp. 61-62.