Court Opinion

ID: 9351771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 17:06:36.247482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:40.686938
License: Public Domain

J-S40028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
    ROBERT STAPLES                                :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :   No. 500 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 2, 2020
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0000557-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                   FILED JANUARY 3, 2023

       Appellant Robert Staples appeals from the March 2, 2020 judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“trial

court”),   following     his   non-jury        convictions   for   aggravated   assault,

strangulation—applying pressure to throat or neck, terroristic threats with

intent to terrorize another, criminal mischief, theft by unlawful taking—

movable property, receiving stolen property, simple assault, recklessly

endangering another person (“REAP”), and false imprisonment.1 Upon review,

we affirm.

       The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed.                 As

summarized by the trial court:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 2718(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 3304(a)(5), 3921(a),
3925(a), 2701(a), 2705, and 2903(a), respectively.
J-S40028-22

     At or around 5:00 a.m. on December 2, 2018, [V.L. (“VL”)], the
     girlfriend of Appellant, was asleep in the bedroom she shared with
     Appellant located on Elbridge Street in the city and county of
     Philadelphia. VL testified that she was awoken by a slap to the
     thigh, which was delivered by Appellant. At this time, Appellant
     confronted VL about text messages that he found on an old
     cellphone, that dated back to before VL and Appellant were in a
     relationship. VL proceeded to get out of bed and put on clothes,
     while requesting that Appellant calm down. VL then walked from
     the bedroom to the kitchen. Appellant followed VL into the kitchen
     and physically got in VL’s face, eventually backing VL against a
     wall with their chests touching.

     While VL and Appellant were standing chest to chest, Appellant
     stated, “Oh, you are getting smart. You are pissing me off. I am
     really about to put my hands on you.” VL attempted to push
     Appellant away by placing both hands on Appellant’s chest and
     told Appellant to get away from her. Appellant backed up slightly
     as a result of VL’s push. In response, Appellant punched VL one
     time in the cheek area on each side of her face using both hands
     with closed fists. The altercation ended when VL silently grabbed
     her immediate belongings and ran out of the apartment. After
     leaving the apartment, VL drove to a friend’s house.

     At or around 1:30 p.m. on December 2, 2018, VL returned to the
     apartment with the intent to pick up her work uniform. Prior to
     VL returning to the apartment, Appellant told VL that he was no
     longer in the apartment via text message. When VL arrived at the
     apartment, she did not see Appellant’s car parked outside the
     apartment. To confirm, VL drove around the block looking for
     Appellant’s car but did not see it parked in the vicinity of the
     apartment. VL parked her car and entered the apartment, where
     she found Appellant and his son still inside. VL testified that
     Appellant was asleep in the bedroom when she initially entered
     the apartment. At this time, VL began to gather necessary
     belongings, but was unable to locate her purse or wallet.

     While VL was searching the apartment for her purse and wallet,
     Appellant approached VL saying, “Oh, you think you are going to
     be coming in here whatever time you want after you been out
     there fucking and sucking, being a whore.” A verbal altercation
     ensued, during which VL asked Appellant for her purse and wallet.
     Appellant replied that he would give it to her when he felt like it.
     Appellant then punched VL in the area of her nose and teeth. VL

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     attempted to defend herself but was unable due to the size
     difference between her and Appellant. VL testified that Appellant
     continued to punch her and pull her hair, causing her to hit her
     head on the kitchen counter and fall to the ground. Once VL was
     on the ground, Appellant placed his knees on VL’s forearms in
     order to pin her to the ground while laying on her back. VL
     attempted to call for help, to which Appellant responded, “Bitch,
     you don’t want to do that in here. I will kill you.” Appellant
     proceeded to choke VL using both hands, causing her to be unable
     to breathe. VL admitted that she thought she was going to die
     while being choked by Appellant. VL briefly lost consciousness.
     When VL awoke, she felt “a little woozy and dizzy.” Further, VL
     observed that although Appellant was still pinning her down,
     Appellant’s hands were no longer around her neck.

     After VL regained consciousness, Appellant grabbed VL by the hair
     and began indiscriminately punching her all over her upper body.
     During the beating, VL was able to feel her hair drenched in
     blood. Appellant eventually released VL, but when she attempted
     to leave the apartment, Appellant blocked the exit and expressed
     concern about the injuries VL had sustained. VL was unable to
     leave the apartment to go to the hospital due to Appellant blocking
     the exit. Furthermore, VL was unable to access her cellphone to
     call 911 because she had hidden her cell phone on top of the
     refrigerator prior to the altercation, in fear that Appellant would
     break said cell phone. The altercation ended when VL’s sister,
     [S.B.], arrived at the apartment.

     VL left the apartment with her sister but was still unaware of the
     location of her pocketbook and wallet. As a result, VL and her
     sister began to drive around the vicinity of the apartment looking
     for Appellant’s car. After about five (5) minutes of searching,
     Appellant’s car was located and VL was able to retrieve her
     pocketbook and wallet from Appellant’s unlocked car. VL and her
     sister then briefly returned to the apartment to grab VL’s work
     uniform and move VL’s car, before proceeding to their mother’s
     house. VL’s mother immediately drove VL to Temple University
     Hospital for treatment of her injuries.

     Officer Douglas interviewed VL at the hospital, where she
     confirmed that Appellant punched her in the face multiple times,
     causing her to hit her head. Hospital records show that VL was
     treated at Temple University Hospital for a neck abrasion, cheek
     contusion, chest wall contusion, superficial laceration to the lateral

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     neck, and occipital linear laceration to the scalp that required
     three staples to close. VL was discharged from the hospital a
     couple of hours after arrival. After being released from the
     hospital, VL stayed the night at her cousin’s house because she
     was too afraid to return home.

     On December 4, 2018, VL went to the police station to participate
     in a full interview. On this same date, VL obtained an emergency
     Protection from Abuse Order against Appellant. After obtaining
     the emergency Protection from Abuse Order, VL returned to the
     apartment with her sister and cousin to find her belongings
     destroyed. More specifically, VL found her TV busted, her speaker
     thrown into the toilet, and her clothes and shoes bleached and/or
     cut up. Appellant was the only individual with a key to the
     apartment. VL’s version of events was corroborated by the
     testimony of her sister, [S.B.]. After these incidents, Appellant
     repeatedly threatened VL via emails and text messages, which
     were provided to law enforcement.

     At trial, Appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant admitted
     to having an argument with VL about infidelity but claimed that
     this argument first began at 11: 00 p.m. on December 1, 2018.
     Appellant testified that after a brief verbal argument, VL left the
     apartment. About a half an hour later, Appellant gathered his
     belongings and placed them by the front door of the apartment.
     Per Appellant, Appellant sent a photo of said gathered belongings
     to VL and went to sleep. Appellant awoke at 2:00 a.m. to VL
     shaking him, at which point a second verbal altercation about
     infidelity ensued. During the second verbal altercation, Appellant
     testified that VL attempted to hit him, but he was able to grab her
     hand and throw it away from his face. Appellant asserted that
     when VL eventually hit him in the face he “mugged her” and said,
     “this is what you get.” Appellant denied that he pinned VL down,
     pulled VL’s hair, punched VL multiple times with a closed fist, and
     choked VL. Moreover, Appellant denied that he damaged VL’s
     property inside the apartment.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/22, at 2-6 (record citations omitted). Following a

bench trial, on November 19, 2019, the trial court found Appellant guilty of

the above-mentioned crimes.     The court, however, acquitted Appellant of

endangering the welfare of children under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).

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      On March 2, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of six to twelve years’ incarceration, followed by three years’ probation.

Appellant neither filed any post-sentence motions nor appealed his judgment

of sentence.

      On April 15, 2020, Appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46, seeking the nunc pro tunc

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. Following appointment of counsel,

the PCRA court granted relief on January 18, 2022.        Thereafter, Appellant

timely filed a notice of appeal.   The trial court directed Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant

complied, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his

conviction for aggravated assault.     In response, the trial court issued a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review.

      [I.] Whether the trial court erred, when it found Appellant [] guilty
      of aggravated assault (F1), as there was insufficient evidence,
      adduced at trial by the Commonwealth, to prove this criminal
      offense beyond a reasonable doubt[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted).

      A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

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      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

      The Crimes Code provides that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated

assault if he: (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes

such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1).    If the victim in fact suffers serious bodily injury, the

Commonwealth need not prove specific intent.         See Commonwealth v.

Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc), appeal denied,

940 A.2d 364 (Pa. 2007). The Crimes Code defines “serious bodily injury” as

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. “A person

acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when . . .

it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such

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a result[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i). “The intent to cause serious bodily

injury may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth

v. Hall, 830 A.2d 537, 542 (Pa. 2003).

       Based on our review of the record, as detailed above, we agree with the

trial court’s conclusion that, viewed in a light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the evidence establishes that the Commonwealth proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of aggravated assault.

As the trial court reasoned:

       Appellant punched the victim, VL, in the face and upper body
       numerous times, causing her to hit her head on the kitchen
       counter before falling to the ground. The impact to the head and
       upper body resulted in a neck abrasion, cheek contusion, chest
       wall contusion, superficial laceration to the lateral neck, and
       occipital linear laceration to the scalp that required three staples
       to close. This [c]ourt carefully weighed the testimony of the
       witnesses and observed photos of the victim’s injuries, which were
       also described within the medical records provided to the [c]ourt.
       This evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant intentionally
       caused the “protracted loss or impairment of the function” of the
       victim’s head and brain by repeatedly punching her in the head
       and face.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/22, at 8 (record citations omitted) (emphasis

added). The record is clear that Appellant repeatedly banged VL’s head on

the floor, choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and then punched her

after she regained consciousness.2 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s
____________________________________________

2 Appellant misrepresents the record when he claims that VL suffered head
injury when she hit her head on the kitchen countertop. Appellant’s Brief at
14. At trial, VL never claimed that the countertop was the cause of her
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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conclusion that, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

evidence establishes that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that Appellant committed aggravated assault. See Commonwealth

v. Burton, 2 A.3d 598, 603 (Pa. Super. 2010) (affirming judgment of

sentence for aggravated assault where defendant punched victim one time in

head while victim was not looking, and victim was knocked unconscious),

appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 2011). Appellant obtains no relief.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

injuries. On the contrary, VL specifically testified that Appellant caused her
injuries and her head “bust open” when Appellant “continuously banged my
head on the ground.” N.T., Trial, 11/27/19, at 65. Furthermore, insofar as
Appellant invites us to accept his proffered version of the events, we decline
the invitation. It is settled that we may not substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder—whether a jury or the trial court—because it is the province
of the factfinder to assess the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. See
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 1995) (“an appellate
court is barred from substituting its judgment for that of the finder of fact.”);
Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating
that “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,] who
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for
that for the finder of fact.”).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2023

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