Court Opinion

ID: 9481790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:31:38.329445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:32.658653
License: Public Domain

DeMASCIO, Senior District Judge,
Dissenting:
The majority has severed the parental consent provision in Kentucky’s statute concerning abortions performed upon un-emancipated pregnant minors. In the process, the court has effectively announced that consent statutes will not survive constitutional analysis thereby eliminating the dominant purpose of Kentucky’s consent statute.1 Because I do not believe that parental consent statutes are unconstitutional on their face, or that the district court “draft[ed] a new limiting condition”, or that the district court should have severed the two-parent consent provision, or unconstitutionally exercised its severance power in preserving the dominant purpose of Kentucky’s consent statute, I cannot join the majority opinion.
In an order dated November 11, 1984, the district court declared Kentucky’s Abortion Statute, H.B. 339, unconstitutional. In 1986, the parental consent provisions of the statute were amended in H.B. 589, as codified at KRS 311.732 and 311.990. The amended parental consent provision now provides, in relevant part, that an abortion shall not be performed upon a minor unless:
(1) The attending physician obtains the notarized informed written consent of the minor and both parents, if available; or
(2) if both parents are not available, the physician has the notarized written consent from the minor and the available parent or guardian; or....
On August 23, 1988, the district court held certain provisions of Kentucky’s amended statute unconstitutional and severed other provisions. The court held unconstitutional the notarization provision because it created an unnecessary burden on *1130the abortion decision. The district court held further that the two-parent consent requirement was unconstitutionally burdensome “except where the young woman reports that she lives at home with both parents.” This is so, the court held because the state’s interest in “protecting minors] from their own vulnerability and immaturity would be satisfied as soon as one parent was involved in the process.” The court went on to hold further that “the section of the statute which makes it a crime for the ... physician to perform the abortion unless he has received consent of both parents ‘if available’ is clearly unconstitutional because of its vagueness.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the “if available” language was severed from the statute in both the civil and criminal context.2 Although the district court severed the “if available” language the two-parent consent provision was not entirely severed. The two-parent consent provision still applies if the minor lives with both parents.
When a statute contains unconstitutional provisions, the invalid provisions may be severed unless the invalid provisions are essential and so interwoven with other provisions it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend severance. Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1417, 1428 (6th Cir.1980). The contention that the notarization requirement, the mandatory two-parent consent provision, and the “if available” language are integral to the meaning of the statute is untenable. The balance of the statute functions independently of these provisions. Severance of these clauses does not render the remainder of the statute inoperable. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 1479-80, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987). The relative inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the legislative intent, Id. at 685, 107 S.Ct. at 1480. The preamble of H.B. 589 indicates the legislative intent of providing parental consultation when a minor is considering an abortion. Despite severance of these provisions, the statute still furthers this legislative goal. The district court, therefore, upheld the requirement for consent of the parent or parents who live with the minor. In preserving the Kentucky Legislature’s intent to promote parental consultation, the district court acted entirely consistent with the severability clause which provides:
If any provision, word, phrase or clause of KRS 311.732 or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses, or application of KRS 311.732 which can be given effect without the invalid provision, word, phrase, clause or application and to this end, the provisions, words, phrases, and clauses of KRS 311.732 are declared to be severable (emphasis added).
“It is the duty of the courts to give effect to a severability clause and to make an elision, so as not to invalidate an entire act.” Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d at 1428, citing Moore v. Fowinkle, 512 F.2d 629 (6th Cir.1975).3 The district judge *1131properly applied the severance clause as he was obliged to do. The severance measure in H.B. 589 provides that severance is proper if application of the statute is invalid as applied to any person or circumstance. The Supreme Court has held that “as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents’ consent” does not unconstitutionally burden a minor’s right to seek an abortion, at least “when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 reh. denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 185, 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979) (Bellotti II).
The district court properly held that the application of the two-parent consent provision was unconstitutional as it applied to the circumstance of a minor living with only one parent or legal guardian. Efforts to locate the noncustodial parent are overly burdensome. The statute itself provides that if both parents are not available, the physician need only have consent of the “available” parent or the minor’s guardian. Hence, it was the Kentucky Legislature that supplied “a limiting condition” to the language “if available” not the district judge. Kentucky is aware that the consent of the custodial parent will suffice to provide consultation for a minor making an abortion decision. Hence, Kentucky approves of one-parent consent in the appropriate circumstances. But Kentucky chose to require consent of both parents when available. Kentucky may well believe that if the minor lives with both parents in a unified family home, it should not condone or require the minor to choose between them. That policy decision, agree with it or not, is surely for the State of Kentucky, not this court.
The majority is persuaded that the United States Supreme Court’s approval of a two-parent consent statute is so tenuous, it would be more prudent to require Kentucky to re-write this statute and, I suppose, to omit parental consent. But, the majority’s view omits any consideration of Kentucky’s by-pass procedure. Kentucky has established rules that permit a pregnant minor to avoid parental involvement by following an uncomplicated by-pass procedure. The Supreme Court has approved statutes governing a minor’s right to an abortion so long as a judicial by-pass procedure is included. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, the judicial by-pass procedure made it possible for a Minnesota statute requiring two-parent notification to withstand constitutional attack. The Supreme Court acknowledged that in drafting its two-parent notification requirement, the Minnesota Legislature followed guidelines set forth by the Court:
In providing for the by-pass, Minnesota has done nothing other than to attempt to fit its legislation into the framework that we have supplied in our previous cases. The simple fact is that our decision in Bellotti II stands for the proposition that a two-parent consent law is constitutional if it provides for a sufficient judicial by-pass alternative, and it requires us to sustain the statute before us here.
Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Kentucky Legislature has provided a comparable judicial by-pass procedure. Kentucky not only provides for a guardian ad litem to assist the pregnant minor, but will appoint a lawyer as well. The by-pass rules require that minors’ petitions to the court be kept confidential and may not be released to the public. The rule provides that confidentiality be enforced in the same manner as adoption records. There is no precedent that I am aware of that even gives hint that parental consent statutes with a comprehensive by-pass procedure will not pass constitutional muster. In fact, Hodgson v. Minnesota authorizes a state to impose regulations on a minor’s access to an abortion, provided a judicial by-pass procedure is included. In Hodg-son, the Court noted that the Minnesota statute is “the most intrusive in the nation” Id. at n. 5. Yet, the by-pass procedure saved the statute from constitutional attack.
Accordingly, I would find that the district court did not err in severing three unconstitutional provisions of Kentucky’s Parental Consent Statute: the notarization *1132requirement, the “if available” language, and the two-parent consent requirement as applied to a minor living with only one parent. These provisions were not intertwined with the remainder of the statute. When these three provisions are severed, the legislative intent of informed parental consent is still furthered by the remainder of the statute. I would affirm the district court’s construction of Kentucky’s Parental Consent Statute.

. There are a number of other states that require parental consent. For example, the State of Michigan has recently adopted such a provision. The State of Delaware requires the consent of parents residing in the same household. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 2931 n. 5, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990).

. The court's judgment makes no mention of the "if available” language. The judgment reads in pertinent part:
... [Enforcement of 1986 H.B. 589 is permanently enjoined as it requires informed written consent other than as follows:
(1) In all cases, the informed written consent of the minor seeking abortion.
(2) In the case of a minor living with both parents, the informed written consent of both parents.
(3) In the case of a minor living with only one parent or legal guardian, the informed written consent of that parent or legal guardian.

. The appellants rely upon Akron v. Akron Center for Productive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983), wherein the court rejected severance despite a severability clause. In that case, plaintiff argued that four sections of the statute were valid and severable. The Court, however, declined to sever because the sections required specific information for the attending physician to orally provide. Id. at 445 n. 37, 103 S.Ct. at 2501 n. 37. The court held invalid a related provision which stated that only the physician could provide this information. Id. at 449, 103 S.Ct. at 2502-03. Obviously, the provisions were intertwined and even the existence of a severance clause could not compel severance. In this case, the invalid provisions are not intertwined with the valid provisions. Severance would not result in a "radical dissection” in this case, so the severance clause can be enforced.