Court Opinion

ID: 9965578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 20:04:00.891785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.067267
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 220250-U

                                                                           FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                        Order filed: May 2, 2024

                                         No. 1-22-0250

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                       FIRST DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )   Appeal from the
                                                             )   Circuit Court of
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                             )
 v.                                                          )   No. 01 CR 373
                                                             )
 MARLON PORTER,                                              )   Honorable
                                                             )   Carol M. Howard,
        Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge, presiding.

        JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
        Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1     Held: Following a resentencing proceeding pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 547 U.S. 460
             (2012), a juvenile offender’s thirty-eight-year sentence for first-degree murder is
             affirmed when the record reflects that the circuit court considered all relevant
             factors in mitigation and did not consider any improper factors.

¶2     Following a resentencing proceeding, the defendant, Marlon Porter, appeals his new

sentence of thirty-eight years in prison for a murder that he committed when he was seventeen

years old. The defendant contends that the sentence failed to account for his potential for
No. 1-22-0250

rehabilitation and was the result of the circuit court considering improper sentencing factors. We

see no error and affirm.

¶3      In 2000, the defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree murder for the killing of

twelve-year-old Orlando Patterson. He and his codefendant, Lakisha Woodard, were tried

simultaneously by separate juries. The evidence at trial showed that on the evening of November

10, 2000, Woodard picked up the defendant in a car, gave him a gun, pointed out a young man on

the street who was standing with a group of children, and told the defendant to shoot him. Woodard

believed that the young man whom she had identified had slashed her face with a knife in a

previous altercation, and she wanted to retaliate. The defendant got out of the car, walked up to

the young man, and shot him in the back. The defendant later learned that Woodard had

misidentified the young man, who was actually the twelve-year-old Patterson. The jury found the

defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to fifty years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder

and an additional twenty-five years for personally discharging the firearm that caused Patterson’s

death, for a total term of seventy-five years.

¶4     The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that it was excessive and failed to account

for his subordinate role in planning the shooting, his young age, his limited criminal history, and

his potential for rehabilitation. We affirmed the sentence in an unpublished order. See People v.

Porter, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1223 (2006) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶5     In July 2007, the defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court

dismissed. This court affirmed that dismissal. See People v. Porter, 393 Ill. App. 3d 1103 (2009)

(table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

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No. 1-22-0250

¶6     In June 2017, the defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, seeking resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 547 U.S. 460 (2012).

The court granted leave to file and appointed counsel for the defendant. Counsel amended the

defendant’s successive petition and also filed a report from developmental psychologist Dr. James

Garbarino regarding the effect that the defendant’s upbringing and development might have had

on the defendant’s actions. In its response, the State agreed that the defendant was entitled to

resentencing. A resentencing hearing was held on December 14, 2021.

¶7     Dr. Garbarino was the first to testify at the hearing. He stated that he prepared his report

after reviewing the defendant’s 2004 presentence investigation (PSI), reviewing the transcript of

the defendant’s original sentencing hearing, and communicating with the defendant in writing and

over the phone. In these communications, Dr. Garbarino interviewed the defendant about his life

experiences and administered a standard survey called the Adverse Child Experiences Scale

(ACE). According to Dr. Garbarino, two thirds of Americans score a zero or one on the ACE scale,

and only one in one hundred score seven or higher. The defendant scored a seven. Dr. Garbarino

explained that the defendant’s childhood experiences, and specifically his having seen dead bodies,

witnessed violence, and lost people close to him, helped to create violent tendencies:

       “[T]hose kinds of traumas tend to inhibit the development of sophisticated, moral reasoning

       and the kind of prosocial behavior that we ideally hoped for in 17 years olds.

                That coupled with the fact that he was exposed to a lot of negative social

       environments growing up, all of which tend to distort thinking and feeling *** particularly

       about violence. What I often call a war zone mentality in which vigilantism created

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No. 1-22-0250

       assaults, hypervigilance without an assault, all of these things combined, it produces high

       levels of violence, particularly at the hands of adolescents.”

¶8     Dr. Garbarino was then asked about the defendant’s PSIs, and specifically whether he could

explain why the defendant gave very positive answers regarding his childhood in the original 2004

PSI but then painted a largely negative picture for the 2020 PSI prepared for the resentencing

proceeding. Dr. Garbarino stated that for several reasons it is common for young offenders to be

less likely to report trauma and adversity. For one, it is often considered taboo to disclose negative

family information, and in this particular case the defendant’s mother told him, “What goes on in

this house, stays in this house.” Additionally, Dr. Garbarino stated that defense attorneys

sometimes coach defendants to present a positive picture of their lives, and he explained that PSI

questions that ask about abuse inherently require the defendant to first define the way they have

been treated as abuse, which is often not something they accept and acknowledge until later in life.

¶9     The defense then asked Dr. Garbarino how the type of trauma that the defendant

experienced, specifically seeing a murder at six years old, witnessing the death of his best friend

when he was twelve, and seeing his father trying to drown his mother, might affect a person. Dr.

Garbarino explained that witnessing that type of trauma can have more of a negative effect than

actually being the target yourself and that it undermines positive development and makes you

vulnerable to various types of negative development.

¶ 10   Stanley Newby testified that he is a correctional food service supervisor and oversaw the

defendant’s work as a line server in the prison cafeteria. Newby observed that the defendant

interacted well with everyone, was consistent, kept an upbeat mood, and enlightened everyone

else’s mood, even in intense situations. Although that was the only capacity in which Newby

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No. 1-22-0250

worked with the defendant, he was aware that the defendant had obtained a job working for

Correctional Industries, which provides goods and supplies to many parts of the Illinois

Department of Corrections and other entities. According to Newby, jobs with Correctional

Industries are highly sought after by inmates, and obtaining such a job requires a GED,

recommendations from staff, and an interview. The job also requires a clean good-conduct record,

which Newby testified is very difficult to maintain at the defendant’s facility, particularly because

other inmates will sabotage inmates who work for Correctional Industries in an attempt to create

a job opening for themselves.

¶ 11   Anthony Lowery testified that he is the defendant’s uncle. He had known the defendant

since his birth and was familiar with his upbringing. Lowery reported that the defendant’s mother

suffered from anxiety and bipolar depression and the defendant’s father was a substance abuser

who physically abused his children and their mother. According to Lowery, the defendant’s

father’s abuse of his mother was so extensive that the repeated blows to the head lead to her having

Parkinson’s disease. The defendant’s father also beat the children with cable cords, stole the

children’s money, and rampaged through the house. Lowery explained that the defendant’s mother

placed a figurative “steel door” between the family business and the outside world, “prevent[ing]

any information from coming out, other than what she said it was” and “prevent[ing] other people

from reaching in to try to provide the necessary support that was needed to guide the young sons

into a positive pathway.” Lowery testified that he is the associate vice president of the community

housing program at the Safer Foundation, where he goes to prisons to speak with inmates who are

about to be released and also mentors young people who have juvenile convictions. Based on his

experience in that job, his opinion was that the defendant’s rehabilitation has been “outstanding.”

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No. 1-22-0250

¶ 12   Lastly, Lesetta Porter testified that she is the defendant’s half-sister. They share the same

father, whom Porter stated was incarcerated in Texas. Porter testified that, although she lived

separately with her mother, she was close with her half-brothers, including the defendant. Her

brothers told her about their father’s abuse and told her that they were always afraid when their

father came home. According to Porter, since he has been incarcerated the defendant has obtained

three degrees, become an ordained minister, and has counseled young boys. Porter stated that the

defendant has had and will always have family support.

¶ 13   The State introduced victim impact statements from Patterson’s father, mother, two sisters,

a cousin, and two aunts, following which the State rested.

¶ 14   The defendant gave a statement in allocution in which he gave the Patterson family his

“deepest and sincerest apologies” and stated that not a day goes by that he does not think about the

pain that he has caused. The defendant stated that he is not a “monster or cold-blooded” but rather

“was fractured, flawed, and ill-equipped to deal with that moment in [his] life.” He has spent every

moment of the last nineteen years trying to improve himself, and he hopes to save lives by

mentoring others.

¶ 15   The court then issued its ruling:

                “I have considered the factors in mitigation and aggravation. The clear aggravated

       factor is the fact of this case, this was a brutal, senseless -- senseless killing. To just walk

       up to someone, shoot them in the back of the head is cruel. So that is very, very aggravating.

                And I assure you, I have listened to all the witnesses testify today. And listening to

       the victim impact statements, the pain that those acts can cause, not only to Mr. Patterson's

       family but also to your family and to your loss. That, of course, is very [aggravating].

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No. 1-22-0250

                I have also considered the factors in mitigation. Those factors are set forth in the

      Miller opinion. They are also codified [in] 730 ILCS 5/5-415-10(f).

                And I have considered the fact that you were 17 years of age when this happened.

      That you were subject to the pressure of the codefendant who was older and apparently

      much crueler.

                I have already considered the factors involving your home environment. The fact

      that you were living in a situation where your mother was dealing with mental health issues

      and your father was on drugs.

                I have already considered your potential for rehabilitation and the accomplishments

      that you have made since this incident happened -- occurred, you have gone to school. Not

      only your high school diploma but also your college degree. And you have made efforts to

      turn your life around.

                You have worked with other people in the jail, hoping to steer the younger inmates

      from the life of crime that you found yourself in at an early age.

                This is a difficult case and I understand the family's pain. I know that no matter

      what is done today, Orlando Patterson will not be brought back.

                What I am going to do is to try to impose a sentence that I think is not only the

      horrible act that you committed and also the steps towards rehabilitation that you have

      taken.

                And considering all of those factors I think that a sentence of thirty-eight years in

      the Illinois Department of Corrections is the appropriate sentence.”

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No. 1-22-0250

¶ 16   One week later, the defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence in which he argued

that the court made a factual error when it said in its ruling that the defendant had shot Patterson

in the back of the head, when Patterson was actually shot in the upper back, and that his sentence

was excessive because the court failed to give adequate weight to his rehabilitation. At the hearing

on the defendant’s motion, the defendant reiterated the arguments made in the motion and added

that the court also should have considered the fact that it was Woodard, and not the defendant, who

planned the shooting. The court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, explaining:

                “At the sentencing hearing that this Court conducted on December 14th, I carefully

       considered all the factors in aggravation and mitigation. And one of the reasons that I re-

       sentenced Mr. Porter to 38 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections at that point was

       because all the efforts that he has taken to turn his life around. I carefully considered the

       factors or the evidence submitted in mitigation. *** I do believe that that 38-year sentence

       is appropriate. *** So the motion to reconsider the sentence in terms of reducing the

       sentence is denied ***.”

This appeal follows.

¶ 17   The defendant raises three issues in this appeal. In his first and third issues, which we will

consolidate, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and failed to account for his

rehabilitative potential. In his second issue, the defendant asserts that the court erred in misstating

that the defendant had shot Patterson in the back of the head, in considering inherent aspects of the

offense as aggravating factors, and in purportedly finding the offense “brutal and heinous.” We

see no merit to any of his arguments.

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No. 1-22-0250

¶ 18    We first address the defendant’s argument that his sentence is excessive and failed to

accurately reflect his rehabilitative potential. Citing several cases from the 1970s, namely People

v. Kish, 58 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1978), People v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1975), and People v.

Griffin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1972), the defendant asserts that the starting point for his sentence

should have been the statutory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and that any additional

time would be "dependent upon the court’s divination as to the length of time required to achieve

rehabilitation.” Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 767. Building on that principle, the defendant then

contends that the evidence presented at his resentencing proceeding showed that he has great

rehabilitative potential and that the court erred in purportedly adding eighteen years for

rehabilitation.

¶ 19    However, as the State points out in its answer brief, the defendant’s argument is fatally

flawed. The sentencing scheme that the defendant describes, and which was applied in the cases

he cites, was Illinois’ old indeterminate sentencing system under which a defendant would be given

a minimum and maximum sentence and then have his or her actual time of release determined later

by a parole board. See People v. Purcell, 2013 IL App (2d) 110810, ¶¶ 15–16 (explaining

indeterminate sentences). That indeterminate sentencing scheme was abolished and replaced

nearly fifty years ago with a determinate sentencing scheme under which there is a statutory

minimum and maximum sentence for each offense and the defendant is sentenced to a definite

term within that range. See People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 60 (1999) (“The primary change effected

by the 1977 legislation was to abolish our previous system of indeterminate sentencing and replace

it with a system of determinate sentencing.”); Lane v. Sklodowski, 97 Ill. 2d 311, 316–17 (1983)

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No. 1-22-0250

(explaining determinate sentencing). Thus, the defendant’s premise that his sentence unjustifiably

included eighteen years for rehabilitation is incorrect, and that flaw defeats his argument.

¶ 20   However, the defendant also makes a proper argument that his sentence is excessive and

that the court failed to accord sufficient weight to his rehabilitative progress. “A trial court has

broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to

great deference on review.” People v. Branch, 2018 IL App (1st) 150026, ¶ 34 (citing People v.

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010)). “Absent some indication to the contrary, other than the

sentence itself, we presume the trial court properly considered all relevant mitigating factors

presented.” Id. (quoting People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19). Reviewing courts

will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the circuit court’s (id. (citing People

v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20)), nor will they change a defendant’s sentence absent an

abuse of discretion (id. (citing People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 134004, ¶ 50)). “Moreover, a

sentence which falls within the statutory range is presumed to be proper and ‘will not be deemed

excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st)

130048, ¶ 42). A sentence is also deemed excessive if it is imposed “without regard for a particular

defendant's rehabilitative potential.” People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 25.

¶ 21   The defendant contends that his sentence is excessive because it was imposed without

regard for his rehabilitative potential. For support, he primarily relies on People v. McKinley, 2020

IL App (1st) 191907, in which this court reduced a juvenile offender’s thirty-nine-year sentence

for first-degree murder to twenty-five years when the defendant had presented “overwhelming”

evidence of his accomplishments and rehabilitation while in prison and “[t]he trial judge's brief,

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No. 1-22-0250

general references to defendant's rehabilitation indicate that the trial judge disregarded the extent

of defendant's rehabilitation and did not afford it adequate weight.” Id. ¶ 78. The defendant argues

that his case is analogous to McKinley and that his sentence should likewise be vacated because

the circuit court similarly failed to give adequate weight to his rehabilitation.

¶ 22    However, as an initial matter, Illinois courts generally do not compare sentences between

cases. Indeed, “[t]he propriety of the sentence imposed in a particular case cannot properly be

judged by the sentence imposed in another, unrelated case. Simply because a lesser sentence was

imposed in another case does not lead to the conclusion that the more severe sentence imposed in

the case at hand is excessive.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 56 (1999). Further, there were

additional reasons for the outcome in McKinley beyond the insufficient weight given to the

defendant’s rehabilitation, including that the trial court improperly cited the peer pressure placed

on the defendant as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating one (McKinley, 2020 IL App

(1st) 191907, ¶ 88), that the court gave improper weight to making the sentence a deterrent to

future criminal activity (id. ¶ 89), and that the court failed to consider the defendant’s youth as a

mitigating factor (id. ¶ 90).

¶ 23    The defendant does not allege that those latter factors are at play in this case. Rather, he

focuses on the circuit court’s failure to give adequate weight to his rehabilitation. However, unlike

the defendant in McKinley, we would not characterize the defendant’s evidence of rehabilitation

as “overwhelming.” It is undoubtedly positive and encouraging, but not as extensive as the

evidence presented in McKinley. See id. ¶¶ 73–77. Additionally, in its oral ruling the court

expressly stated that it had considered the defendant’s accomplishments in prison, including his

high school and college degrees, as well as the defendant’s work helping to steer younger inmates

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No. 1-22-0250

from a life of crime. But rather than disregarding or affording no weight to this evidence, the record

instead suggests that the court simply placed much greater weight on other factors, including the

manner in which the defendant committed the crime and the harm that the loss of such a young

child had on Patterson’s family, with the court labeling those factors as “very, very aggravating”

and “very [aggravating],” respectively. This weighing of the evidence is in the circuit court’s sound

discretion (see Branch, 2018 IL App (1st) 150026, ¶ 34), and we do not view the court’s exercise

of that discretion to be arbitrary or unreasonable in this case. Accordingly, we do not find the

defendant’s sentence to be excessive.

¶ 24   In his second issue, the defendant asserts that the circuit court made several additional

errors in its oral ruling. Specifically, he argues that the court erred (1) in finding that he had shot

Patterson in the back of the head, (2) in considering inherent aspects of the offense as aggravating

factors, and (3) in finding the offense to have been “brutal and heinous.” We find each argument

to be without merit and will address each in turn.

¶ 25   First, the defendant contends that his sentence must be reversed because the court relied on

an improper sentencing factor when it incorrectly stated that het shot Patterson “in the back of the

head” when Patterson was actually shot in the back between the shoulder blades. It is true that a

reviewing court will reverse a sentence when the trial court mentions an improper or incorrect

sentencing factor, unless the reviewing court can determine from the record that the improperly

considered factor did not increase the defendant’s sentence. See People v. Ross, 303 Ill. App. 3d

966, 984–85 (1999). But in this case we can conclude that the misstatement of fact did not affect

the defendant’s sentence. The defendant raised this issue both in his post-sentencing motion for

reconsideration and at the hearing on his motion, yet, after being corrected on the facts of the case

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No. 1-22-0250

and after hearing the defendant’s argument, the court reaffirmed the defendant’s thirty-eight-year

sentence. Thus, it is apparent that the court either understood the facts and simply misspoke, or

that the exact location where the defendant shot Patterson was not a factor in the sentence. Indeed,

in the context of the case it seems more likely that the important consideration for the court was

that the defendant shot Patterson from behind, without regard for precisely where the bullet hit.

Accordingly, we see no basis for reversal on this issue.

¶ 26     Second, the defendant asserts that the circuit court erred in citing as an aggravating factor

that the defendant caused serious harm. The defendant maintains that serious harm is inherent in

the offense of first-degree murder and cannot be considered as an aggravating factor. However,

the defendant does not specifically identify where the circuit court made such a finding, and,

indeed, it does not appear from the record that the court ever found that the defendant caused

serious harm. The court instead found only that the killing was “brutal,” “senseless,” and “cruel”

and that the defendant’s actions caused “pain” to both Patterson’s and the defendant’s families.

There was no finding that the defendant caused serious harm. This argument is, therefore, without

merit.

¶ 27     Lastly, the defendant asserts that the court erred in purportedly finding the offense to have

been “brutal and heinous” within the meaning of 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2020). The

defendant contends that such a finding was erroneous because his offense was not of the same

character as other “brutal and heinous” cases. However, the subsection of section 5/5-5-3.2 that

the defendant cites does not concern “brutal and heinous” crimes but instead relates to the

aggravating factor of “caus[ing] or threaten[ing] serious harm,” and the provision of section 5/5-

5-3.2 that does address “brutal and heinous” conduct, subsection (2)(a), pertains only to extended

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No. 1-22-0250

sentences, which the defendant did not receive. Moreover, the court did not actually find that the

defendant’s conduct was “brutal and heinous” as that term is used in Illinois sentencing law.

Instead, the court found that “this was a brutal, senseless -- senseless killing.” In our view, the

court’s use of “brutal” was more general and was not intended to be a legal finding that the offense

was “brutal and heinous.” Accordingly, we find the defendant’s argument to be meritless.

¶ 28   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

resentencing the defendant to thirty-eight years’ imprisonment, and we affirm the defendant’s

sentence.

¶ 29   Affirmed.

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