Court Opinion

ID: 9749861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:00:35.981307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:20.107240
License: Public Domain

TODD, J.,
Concurring:
¶ 1 I am mindful of the Majority’s expression of concern for a defendant who may have unwittingly lost his right to a direct appeal of his guilty plea through *1019counsel’s ineffectiveness. While I concur in the result reached by the Majority, I write separately to clarify the state of the record in this case and set forth why I agree that this matter is properly before us.
¶ 2 As the Majority notes, Appellant was represented initially by trial counsel, then the Public Defender’s Office, then Attorney Thomassey, and now Attorney Elash. In his PCRA petition, Appellant does not explicitly assert a layered ineffectiveness claim of all prior counsel as the Majority implies. Rather, Appellant hinges his claim for relief on the ineffectiveness of the Public Defender’s Office in failing to pursue a direct appeal of his guilty plea. In his amended PCRA petition Appellant states: “Petitioner was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective representation when the Public Defender’s Office faded to protect Petitioner’s constitutionally protected right to a direct appeal.” (Amended PCRA Petition, 9/30/98, at 3-4.) In his prayer for relief he further states: “WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Honorable Court find that the Public Defender’s Office rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and grant relief. ...” (Id., at 5.)
¶ 3 An allegation of the Public Defender’s ineffectiveness could have been raised by Attorney Thomassey in Appellant’s first PCRA petition filed in 1988. As it was not, it is now waived. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 454, 644 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1994) (ineffectiveness claims are waived if not raised at the earliest stage in the proceedings at which allegedly ineffective counsel is no longer representing the petitioner); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). Thus, it is the allegation of Attorney Thomas-sey’s ineffectiveness that is the key to Jordan’s petition.
¶ 4 PCRA waiver rules coupled with procedural rules regarding the preservation of appellate issues often “force a petitioner to frame his claims as ‘layered’ ineffectiveness claims, because there has usually been waiver by previous counsel’s failure to raise or preserve.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 252, 724 A.2d 293, 302 (1999). Our Supreme Court requires “strict adherence to the statutory language of the PCRA, and will afford post-conviction review only where a petitioner shows that the statutory exceptions to waiver in the PCRA apply, or where a petitioner properly raises claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Id. at 252, 724 A.2d at 303.
¶ 5 Therefore, in the most technical sense, Appellant has not properly framed the issue as a layered ineffective claim. However, implicit in the factual background set forth in his petition is what may be construed as an allegation of Attorney Thomassey’s ineffectiveness. For this reason, and in the interest of judicial economy (i.e., to avoid yet another ineffectiveness claim), I agree with the Majority that the matter is properly before us. With that premise, I concur in the disposition of the case by the Majority.