Court Opinion

ID: 9759616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:22:05.678215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.407206
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant, Dolores Valadez, (B.I.V.’s biological mother), brings three points of error in her motion for rehearing. The first two points complain that this Court erred in affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment against appellant on her paternity action against respondent, the alleged biological father. The third point argues that we erred in failing to remand for sanctions. Appellant also requests leave to file a supplemental transcript which contains an order from another lawsuit finding that the child’s presumed father is not his biological father. We overrule both points and deny the motion for rehearing.
The child who is the subject of this action was conceived and bom during appellant’s marriage to Mr. Adolfo Valadez. The un-controverted summary judgment evidence, which reflected these facts, conclusively showed that under Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 12.01(a)(1) a presumed father existed. Following the clear language of Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 13.01(a), which provides that a suit to establish a parent/child relationship may only be established between “a child who has no presumed father and the child’s biological father,” we affirmed summary judgment. We held that the appellant could not bring a paternity action under chapter 13 so long as a presumed father exists.
On July 1, 1992, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Austin Court of Appeals in State v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952 (1992). The Court held that the Attorney General could bring a paternity action under Chapter 13 of the Family Code to establish paternity against a man other than a presumed father and, in the same action, bring suit seeking to disestablish the paternity of the presumed father under Chapter 12 of the Family Code. Id. at 954.
Appellant argues that Lavan compels us to grant the motion for rehearing and reverse this cause because a presumed father’s existence does not constitute a complete bar to a paternity suit under Chapter 13 of the Family Code. Appellant also argues that the order in the supplemental transcript, which was signed well after the date of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, removes any impediment which might exist to the State’s filing of a paternity action in the instant case.
As an initial matter we address appellant’s motion for leave to file a supplemental transcript. The rules of Civil Procedure provide:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor. Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before *65the time specified for hearing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response. No oral testimony shall be received at the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if (i) the deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the motion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response. Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal. A summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness, or of an expert witness as to subject matter concerning which the trier of fact must be guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts, if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c).
This rule requires that all summary judgment evidence be filed before judgment is rendered. Judgment has been rendered, thus, it is too late to supplement the record. Gandara v. Novasad, 752 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
Moreover, as the rule specifically states: Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other responses shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c).
Appellant’s response to the motion for summary judgment merely argued that a question of fact exists regarding the child’s paternity. Appellant’s position on its motion for rehearing is that Adolofo Valadez is not the biological father. This issue was not expressly presented to the trial court by appellant’s response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
In a similar case, Trapnell v. First Foods, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied), we denied a party’s attempt to affirm the judgment on a ground not presented to the trial court in the motion for summary judgment. In that case a defendant sought affirmance of a summary judgment by way of a motion asking this Court to take judicial notice of a final judgment in a related federal case. The defendants argued that because of the final judgment in the federal case the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues in state court, and that summary judgment should be affirmed on that ground. However, collateral estoppel was not raised in the motion for summary judgment in the trial court. We wrote: “Texas procedure requires this Court to uphold a summary judgment on appeal only upon one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” Id. at 608. We denied leave to supplement the record with the judgment from the other court.
As in Trapnell, if we were to grant the motion to supplement the record, we would be reviewing an issue which was not expressly raised in appellant’s response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Rule 166a(c) prohibits this. Trapnell, 809 S.W.2d at 608.
The order which appellant asks us to consider should have been filed with the trial court, at the latest, before judgment was rendered. We cannot consider it at this point in appellate proceedings. At this late date it is untimely. We deny appellant’s motion for leave to file a supplemental transcript.
Regarding the merits of appellant’s motion for rehearing, we feel compelled to harmonize this decision with Lavan.
In Lavan, the Attorney General brought a paternity action against Mr. Lavan under *66Chapter 13. Lavan filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that a Chapter 13 action could not be brought because a presumed father existed. The State filed an amended pleading joining the presumed father as a party and seeking to disestablish his paternity with the child under Chapter 12. Notwithstanding the State’s amended pleading the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. Lavan, 802 S.W.2d at 80. The posture of Lavan was described by the Supreme Court as follows:
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals based its opinion on its interpretation of the language contained in § 12.06(a) of the Code, read in conjunction with § 13.01(a). 802 S.W.2d at 77-78. The court viewed the State’s case as one brought solely under Chapter 13 of the Code, that is, a suit to establish paternity when there is no presumed father; thus, it held that the statute’s expressed prohibition against such suits under that chapter when the child has a presumed father barred the State’s suit. Id. at 76. Additionally, relying on the language in Chapter 12, section 12.-06(a), that only expressly entitles a husband or wife to deny the husband’s paternity of a child born during their marriage in any suit affecting the parent-child relationship other than a suit under Chapter 13 of the Code, the court of appeals rejected the State’s arguments and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Lavan. Id. at 78. (footnotes omitted).
Lavan, at 954. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ holding that a § 12.06(a) action to disestablish paternity on a presumed child could only be brought by the husband or wife and held that there was nothing in the Family Code “that expressly prohibits the State from bringing a claim under Chapter 12 to disestablish the paternity of a presumed father in the same suit in which it brings a claim under Chapter 13 to establish paternity in an alleged biological father.”
The Supreme Court of Texas in La-van recognized that the Family Code provides: “a suit to establish paternity under Chapter 13 of the Code may only be brought when the child for whom paternity is sought to be established has no presumed father.” See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 13.01(a). However, Lavan carves a significant exception from this rule: Under Lavan, proceedings to disestablish paternity in one father and establish paternity in another may be brought in one action. Consequently, the Lavan Court held that the statutory impediment to an action establishing paternity in one alleged biological father while paternity is presumed in another is eliminated when the litigation is in this posture.
Here, only a Chapter 13 paternity action has been filed. The pleadings do not allege a Chapter 12 action seeking to disestablish the paternity in the presumed father. In fact there are no documents in the record before us which show that the presumed father has denied paternity or is a party to an action seeking to disestablish his presumed paternity. Hence, Lavan is inapplicable.
The unambiguous language in Chapter 13 specifically limits the filing of a paternity action to those situations in which the child involved has “no presumed father.” In cases involving a presumed father, without either a prior or current proceeding to disestablish paternity in the presumed father, no paternity action under Section 13.-01(a) can be brought.
We believe that the legislative purpose for the enactment of Section 13.01(a) is that every possibility that a presumed father is not the biological father should be exhausted before suits are filed which ultimately bastardize a child. We agree with the Supreme Court that it makes little sense not to allow a party to simultaneously bring a Chapter 12 action to disestablish paternity in a presumed father. This will save judicial resources by not requiring two separate actions to be filed under both Chapter 12 and 13 and it will minimize the time in which the child has no parent-child relationship with a father. However, Lavan does not change the rule in § 13.01(a) that a child with a presumed father may not have paternity established in another father.
*67In light of our disposition of the first and second points in appellant’s motion for rehearing, it is not necessary that we discuss point three. Tex.R.App.P. 90(a).
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied.