Court Opinion

ID: 9963243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 20:01:01.438909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.870706
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12195    Document: 32-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 20

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-12195
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        GULFPOINT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00086-SPC-NPM
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-12195

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                In this case, the district court granted summary judgment to
        Westfield Insurance Company on Gulfpoint Construction
        Company’s breach of contract claim. The district court held that
        Westfield was entitled to summary judgment for two reasons.
        First, Gulfpoint failed to give timely notice to Westfield, its
        insurance company, of property damage from Hurricane Irma, and
        failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice that arises from that
        failure. Second, even if Gulfpoint’s late notice did not preclude
        insurance coverage, the insurance contract did not allow Gulfpoint
        to recover replacement cost value (“RCV”) damages on property it
        had not yet repaired or replaced.
               After review, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and
        remand. To start, we agree with Gulfpoint that the evidence
        creates a genuine issue of material fact on rebutting the
        presumption of prejudice. But even so, the damages issue is
        potentially dispositive in Westfield’s favor. Gulfpoint does not
        contest the district court’s ruling that it cannot recover RCV
        damages under the circumstances, it merely argues that the district
        court’s conclusion does not end the case because it also seeks the
        actual cash value (“ACV”) of the property. The district court never
        ruled on that argument, so, rather than decide the issue in this
        posture, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand
        for the district court to consider the matter in the first instance.
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        23-12195                Opinion of the Court                       3

                                   I.       Background
                    A. Factual Background
               This case involves claims for roof and interior damage made
        after Hurricane Irma made landfall in Florida on September 10,
        2017. Westfield insured property owned by Gulfpoint. The policy
        at issue in this case included two relevant provisions. First, the
        notice provision says:
              E. Loss Conditions

              ...

              3. Duties In The Event Of Loss Or Damage
                       a. You must see that the following are done in the
                       event of loss or damage to Covered Property:
                       ...
                              (2) Give us prompt notice of the loss or
                              damage. Include a description of the property
                              involved.
        Second, the Replacement Cost provision says:
              G. Optional Coverages

              ...

              3. Replacement Cost

                       a. Replacement Cost (without deduction for
                       depreciation) replaces Actual Cash Value in the
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12195

                      Valuation Loss Condition, of this Coverage
                      Form.

                     ...

                      d. We will not pay on a replacement cost basis
                      for any loss or damage:

                             (1) Until the lost or damaged property is
                             actually repaired or replaced; and

                             (2) Unless the repairs or replacement are
                             made as soon as reasonably possible
                             after the loss or damage.

               Shortly after the Hurricane, Gulfpoint hired Crowther
        Roofing and Construction Services to inspect the damage and
        perform emergency repairs. Crowther fixed the damage that it
        found. Gulfpoint did not notify Westfield of the damage or repairs
        at that time.
               Two years later, however, Gulfpoint decided that the roof
        and interior damage was worse than it originally thought and
        submitted a claim to Westfield on September 6, 2019. Westfield
        retained an engineer, Blake Shatto, to inspect the building and
        evaluate any roof or water damage. Relying on Shatto’s report,
        Westfield determined that there was not covered wind damage to
        the roof or an opening in the roof or walls that allowed water to
        enter.
               Westfield denied coverage. Its initial denial letter stated that
        “[t]he claim was reported . . . on 9/6/2019, with a reported date of
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        23-12195               Opinion of the Court                         5

        loss presented as 9/10/2017,” meaning “the claim was presented to
        Westfield Insurance Company 2 years after the claimed date of
        loss.” The first letter also explained that the damages “did not
        appear to have been caused by a wind event,” and ended with a
        reservation of rights:
              Please be aware that neither this letter nor any actions
              taken by Westﬁeld Insurance Company or any of its
              representatives are intended to waive any of the
              terms or conditions of our policy of insurance with
              you and should not be construed as a waiver of any
              rights or defenses under said policy. Also, please be
              advised that this letter is not intended to set forth all
              issues of coverage which may arise from this loss
              under your policy of insurance with Westﬁeld
              Insurance Company.

               After receiving the letter, Gulfpoint retained an expert,
        James Hartney, to inspect the property as well. Hartney wrote a
        report disputing Shatto’s conclusions, opining that the damage was
        “exceedingly likely to be due to high winds caused by Hurricane
        Irma.” Gulfpoint submitted the report to Westfield and asked it to
        reconsider.
                Westfield refused to reconsider its coverage denial. It sent a
        second coverage denial letter in early January 2020, in which it
        stated that “no information presented in Mr. Hartney’s report
        alters the conclusions in [Westfield’s earlier engineering] report.”
        Thus, “Westfield’s position remain[ed] as stated in [the first claim
        denial letter]” and, “[a]s such, no claim payment [would] be made.”
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       23-12195

        Westfield again “expressly reserve[d] all of its rights and defenses
        under the policy of insurance or otherwise.”
                   B. Procedural History

               Gulfpoint filed this breach of contract lawsuit in Florida state
        court. Westfield removed the case to federal court based on
        diversity jurisdiction.
               Gulfpoint retained two experts relevant to this appeal. First,
        Gulfpoint retained a general contractor, Dennis James, to provide
        an expert opinion about the cost of repairing Gulfpoint’s property.
        In its expert report disclosure, Gulfpoint specifically stated that
        James would “offer an opinion regarding the value of the necessary
        repairs in order to restore [Gulfpoint’s] tile roof systems to their
        pre-loss conditions.” 1
               Second, Gulfpoint retained Byron Anderson to conduct an
        engineering evaluation of the damage to the property. Anderson
        explained that he “was able to formulate [his opinions]” despite
        reviewing the property two years after the storm “and was in no
        way prejudiced by the timing of [the] inspection,” especially
        because “no other windstorm event occurred at this location

        1 The parties debate whether that disclosure was sufficient to put Westfield on

        notice of a claim for ACV damages—which is usually measured as
        “replacement cost minus depreciation,” Trinidad v. Florida Peninsula Insurance
        Company, 121 So. 3d 433, 443 (Fla. 2013)—in light of the fact that James
        mentioned ACV occasionally in the report itself. As discussed below, we leave
        that question to the district court to decide in the first instance. See Section
        III.B & n.3.
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        23-12195               Opinion of the Court                          7

        between the time of Hurrican Irma and [Mr. Anderson’s]
        inspection which could have resulted in the damage observed to
        [Gulfpoint’s] building and its roof system.” Anderson ultimately
        concluded that the damage to Gulfpoint’s roof system and the
        interior water damage were the result of Hurricane Irma.
               Gulfpoint deposed Shatto regarding his investigation. Asked
        to explain “how having had to inspect that damage almost two
        years after Irma negatively impacted or limited [his] ability to”
        determine “the cause of any portion of the damage or rule out
        other potential competing causes of the same damage,” Shatto said
        this:
              [T]ime is going to do things . . . . It’s going to weather
              surfaces . . . . So, yeah, it does make it harder to date
              when things have happened, but at the end of the day,
              wind damage is wind damage. It’s a permanent
              deformation or movement of a material.

        But, he said, work invoices he was provided regarding the earlier
        repairs to the property demonstrated that the condition of the
        property had not materially changed since those repairs:
              Now, as far as the work invoices go, those were
              great. . . . because . . . they showed a couple of
              fractures with that dirty weathering of conditions
              that have been there for years. They pretty much showed
              the exact condition that I saw, and then they showed a
              couple of tiles that had been moved and some
              ﬂashing that looked like wind damage. So if I were to
              inspect that roof—if I had inspected that roof hand in
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                    23-12195

              hand with the Crowther Roof people, my report would have
              been identical . . . . I would have found the same partially
              formed cracks . . . . [M]y report wouldn’t have changed.

        (emphasis added).
               Westfield sought summary judgment based on two
        affirmative defenses. First, Westfield argued that “Gulfpoint [] did
        not give Westfield the prompt notice of the loss or damage” that
        was required to recover under the insurance contract. As a result,
        Westfield argued, “[it] and its experts were deprived of a fresh
        examination of the unrepaired damage to the roof.” Second,
        Westfield argued that Gulfpoint could not recover the cost of
        replacing its roof because it had not yet replaced the roof, as
        required by the policy.
              Gulfpoint opposed the motion. Among other things,
        Gulfpoint argued that Westfield was precluded from arguing that
        Gulfpoint had failed to give prompt notice of the damage.
        Gulfpoint also argued that it was also seeking the ACV of the
        property—not merely RCV. Gulfpoint distinguished a case in
        which the plaintiff had only sought RCV damages, explaining that
        James’s expert report “differentiate[d] the RCV with the ACV being
        claimed in this lawsuit.” See CMR v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 843 Fed.
        App’x 189 (11th Cir. 2021).
                The district court granted Westfield’s motion. First, the
        district court explained, Gulfpoint’s claim was barred by its failure
        to give prompt notice. The district court rejected Gulfpoint’s
        argument that Westfield should be precluded from asserting a
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        23-12195                Opinion of the Court                          9

        prompt-notice defense because Westfield had “[taken] issue . . .
        with Gulfpoint’s two-year delay in notifying the insurer” in its
        initial letter and expressly reserved all its rights and defenses under
        the Policy in both letters. Next, under the circumstances, the court
        concluded that the two-year delay in notifying Westfield of
        Hurricane damage “constitute[d] untimely notice.” Then,
        “[h]aving determined that Gulfpoint’s notice to Westfield . . . was
        untimely, the [c]ourt [then] presume[d],” as required by Florida
        law, that “Westfield was prejudiced by the delay”—and it found
        that Gulfpoint had not rebutted the presumption. In particular, the
        court reasoned that the fact that “both parties can form . . . different
        opinions about causation [of the damages] cannot rebut the
        presumption of prejudice,” especially because Gulfpoint’s
        argument was “complicated by the ‘emergency repair work’ [that]
        it undertook in the days following Hurricane Irma.”
               Second, the district court separately agreed that Westfield
        was entitled to summary judgment because Gulfpoint could not
        recover the RCV of the property because it had not, as the policy
        required, replaced the damaged property. Without addressing
        Gulfpoint’s argument that it had also asserted a claim for ACV
        damages, the district court concluded that, “[u]nder the Policy . . .
        Gulfpoint may not recover RCV damages” and so “Westfield [was]
        also entitled to summary judgment on this ground.”
               The district court entered judgment and Gulfpoint appealed.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-12195

                             II.     Standard of Review
               “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
        judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.” Bailey
        v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002). Namely,
        summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
        entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In
        applying this standard, the court must view all evidence in the light
        most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
        inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Burton v. City of Belle
        Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
                                   III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Gulfpoint argues that the district court erred in
        granting summary judgment on both the prompt notice and
        damages issues. We agree (in part) on prompt notice. As to
        damages, however, we conclude that the district court failed to
        address a potentially dispositive argument—so we vacate the grant
        of summary judgment and remand for the district court to consider
        that argument in the first instance.
                  A. Prompt Notice
               Gulfpoint argues that the district court erred in granting
        summary judgment on prompt notice both because (1) Westfield
        is estopped from raising the defense and (2) Gulfpoint rebutted the
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        23-12195                 Opinion of the Court                        11

        presumption that Westfield was prejudiced by the delay. 2 We
        reject the first argument, but we agree that Gulfpoint has created a
        genuine issue of material fact about whether it rebutted the
        presumption of prejudice.
                           i. Westfield is not estopped from raising a
                              prompt notice defense.
                Gulfpoint argues that Westfield “waived” any prompt notice
        rights under the insurance contract because it “investigated the loss
        and reached a decision based on the merits of the case,” i.e., that
        “the damage was caused by perils excluded under the policy,”
        failing to mention prompt notice until this litigation. Thus,
        Gulfpoint contends, under Florida’s “mend the hold” doctrine—a
        species of estoppel—Westfield cannot shift its defense now that
        litigation has commenced. We disagree.
                Florida courts recognize a species of estoppel known as the
        “mend the hold” doctrine. “[T]he phrase is a nineteenth-century
        wrestling term, meaning to get a better grip (hold) on your
        opponent.” Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357,
        362 (7th Cir. 1990). Florida courts have applied the doctrine such
        that a litigant may not change his position on contested issues after
        litigation commences to prejudice his opponent’s case. In O’Bryan
        v. Linton, the Florida Supreme Court described the principle this
        way: “a party who gives a reason for his conduct on anything

        2 Gulfpoint does not dispute that the two-year delay in giving notice to

        Westfield was not sufficiently prompt under the circumstances.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  23-12195

        involved in a controversy cannot, after litigation has started,
        change his ground and put his conduct upon a different
        consideration[.]” 41 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1949) (quotation omitted).
        Later cases demonstrate the same principle. See, e.g., Hodkin v.
        Perry, 88 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 1956) (affirming estoppel against the
        plaintiff appellant questioning the validity of a bylaw that he had
        “actively supported and voted for the adoption of” because it was
        inequitable that the plaintiff “had no objection to the by-law so
        long as it was to be used only against other doctors . . . and it was
        not until it was enforced against him that it became illegal.”);
        Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA
        1979) (“[H]aving successfully claimed that mediation was a
        required condition precedent to the filing of this action, the
        defendant may not now be heard to say that the delay specifically
        caused by the pendency of that very proceeding has resulted in the
        running of the statute of limitations.”)
               We need not discern the precise contours of the doctrine,
        however, because Gulfpoint’s argument fails even on a robust
        understanding of the doctrine’s sweep. Here, Westfield has not
        taken any new or different position because the coverage denial
        letters plainly reserved all rights under the insurance contract.
        Unlike the cases Gulfpoint cites (those discussed above), this
        reservation of rights put Gulfpoint on notice that all of the potential
        defenses under the insurance contract were available. What is
        more, Westfield expressly alluded to the timeliness of the notice
        when it noted, in the first letter, that “the claim was presented to
        Westfield . . . 2 years after the claimed date of loss.” Thus, the
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        23-12195               Opinion of the Court                         13

        assertion of the prompt notice defense in this litigation was not a
        new or different position for purposes of Florida’s “mend the hold”
        doctrine.
               Gulfpoint resists this conclusion, arguing that “[i]t is
        undisputed Westfield did not deny Gulfpoint’s claim based on any
        failure by Gulfpoint to promptly report the loss,” but rather
        because the damage was not caused by Hurricane Irma. But the
        fact that Westfield passed specifically on the question of whether
        the claimed damages were covered does not mean that it did not
        also reserve all its rights and defenses under the insurance
        contract—especially since Westfield also mentioned the delay in
        receiving notice in the first claims denial letter. Gulfpoint points to
        no authority suggesting that Florida’s “mend the hold” doctrine
        estops an insurer from raising contractual defenses where the
        insurer notes the factual basis for the defense and reserves all rights
        under the contract.
              Thus, we conclude that Gulfpoint has not shown that
        Westfield was prohibited from raising the prompt notice defense
        by Florida’s “mend the hold” doctrine.
                         ii. Gulfpoint rebutted the presumption of
                             prejudice.
                Having concluded that Westfield was not estopped from
        raising the prompt notice defense, we turn to Gulfpoint’s second
        argument on the prompt notice defense—that it successfully
        rebutted the presumption of prejudice. Gulfpoint argues that the
        district court “failed to appreciate all the evidence that showed
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-12195

        [that] Gulfpoint had rebutted the presumption of prejudice[.]”
        Gulfpoint points out that, “based on the reports of [Westfield’s]
        expert and Gulfpoint’s expert, there would have been no material
        difference had Gulfpoint reported the claim earlier.” So, while
        Westfield’s expert (Mr. Shatto) believed that the damage to
        Gulfpoint’s property was caused by normal wear-and-tear, not
        Hurricane Irma, his testimony did not suggest (and in fact disputes)
        that he was unable to investigate the loss because of elapsed time.
        We agree.
                “A notice of damage is” often, and is here, “a pre-condition
        to a claim.” De La Rosa v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 246 So.3d 438, 441
        (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). “If an insured breaches the notice provision”
        of an insurance policy, “prejudice to the insurer will be presumed,
        but [that presumption] may be rebutted by a showing that the
        insurer has not been prejudiced by the lack of notice.” Id. (quoting
        Stark v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 95 So.3d 285, 287–88 (Fla. 4th DCA
        2012)).
               “Whether the presumption of prejudice to the insurer has
        been overcome is ordinarily” a question of fact, so, to grant
        summary judgment, the record must “conclusively foreclose the
        insured’s ability to overcome the presumption of prejudice. Id.
        (alterations accepted) (quotation omitted). So, for example, in
        Shapiro v. First Protective Insurance Company, a Florida court found
        that whether the insureds had overcome the presumption was a
        fact question because their engineer, “based on his inspection,
        opined not only that the homeowners’ roof more likely than not
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        23-12195                Opinion of the Court                          15

        had been damaged as a direct result of Hurricane Irma in 2017, but
        also that this damage still could be observed as late as 2022, five
        years after Hurricane Irma.” 359 So.3d 777, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA
        2023); see also Stark v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 95 So.3d 285 (Fla. 4th
        DCA 2012) (similar). Conversely, in De La Rosa, “the record
        foreclose[d] the insured’s ability to overcome the prejudice to the
        insurer in evaluating the extent of the damage because of the delay
        in making the claim” because the insurer “would not be able to
        determine the damage at the time of the incident.” 246 So.3d at 441–
        42 (emphasis added). De La Rosa distinguished Stark on the ground
        that “even though there may be disputed issues of fact as to
        whether the insurer was prejudiced in determining the cause of the
        loss, the facts . . . show[ed] that the insurer would be prejudiced by
        the passage of time in investigating the extent of the loss, and thus,
        the cost of repair.” Id. at 442 (emphasis in original).
                Here, we cannot say that the record “conclusively
        foreclose[s]” Gulfpoint’s ability to overcome the presumption of
        prejudice under Florida law. Stark, 95 So.3d at 288 (quotation
        omitted). For one thing, much like in Shapiro, Gulfpoint’s expert
        testified that he “was able to formulate [his] opinions” despite
        reviewing the damage years after the fact, “and was in no way
        prejudiced by the timing of [the] inspection”—to the contrary, he
        said, “no other windstorm event occurred at [the property’s]
        location between the time of Hurricane Irma and [his inspection]
        which could have resulted in the damage observed to the
        [Gulfpoint’s] Building and its roof system.” See Shapiro, 359 So.3d
        at 782 (concluding that “the homeowners’ engineer’s affidavit”
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                 23-12195

        stating that the damage was caused by Hurricane Irma and still
        observable five years later “created issues of material fact as to
        whether the homeowners could overcome the presumed
        prejudice”).
               Indeed, Westfield’s own expert, Shatto, made clear that his
        investigation was not prejudiced by the passage of time. Asked to
        explain “how having to inspect that damage almost two years after
        Irma negatively impacted or limited [his] ability to” determine “the
        cause of any portion of the damage or rule out other potential
        competing causes of the same damage,” Shatto said this:
              if I were to inspect that roof—if I had inspected that
              roof hand in hand with the Crowther Roof people
              [who conducted the inspection and repairs days after
              the hurricane], my report would have been identical
              . . . . I would have found the same partially formed
              cracks . . . . my report wouldn’t have changed.

        Thus, as in Shapiro, there is plainly evidence from which a jury
        could infer that Westfield did not suffer prejudice in its
        investigation because of Gulfpoint’s delay in notifying them.
              Westfield’s argument to the contrary is principally based on
        De La Rosa. See 246 So.3d 438. Westfield contends that the district
        court correctly recognized that “the analysis of prejudice was
        complicated by the emergency repairs and the fact that Westfield
        had no opportunity to observe the damage prior to the repairs.”
        And it suggests that, as in De La Rosa, “Gulfpoint provides no
        testimony . . . to show that had an investigation been conducted
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        23-12195               Opinion of the Court                       17

        before the emergency repairs it would not have revealed anything
        materially different from the delayed investigation[.]”
               The problem for Westfield is that, in De La Rosa, the insured
        had renovated the entire bathroom after the water backup—so
        there could be no dispute that the insurer’s ability to evaluate the
        extent of the damage was hampered. See id. at 439. The insured
        contested the presumption of prejudice with evidence showing
        that “the only possible event that could have caused [that] type of
        damage was a one-time waste line water backup” and that such
        damages “would have been evident upon an inspection by the
        insurer.” Id. at 440 (emphasis added). But there was no dispute
        that the insurer was prejudiced “in evaluating the extent of the
        damage because of the delay in making the claim.” Id. at 441
        (emphasis added).
               Here, by contrast, the experts apparently agree that their
        investigations into the damage were not hampered—in any way—
        by the passage of time and minor repairs. So, unlike in De La Rosa,
        there is at least a fact issue on whether Gulfpoint’s delay in making
        a claim prejudiced Westfield. At a minimum, we cannot say that
        the record “conclusively foreclose[s]” Gulfpoint’s ability to
        overcome the presumption of prejudice under Florida law. Stark,
        95 So.3d at 288 (quotation omitted).
                                         *
               Thus, while Westﬁeld was not estopped from asserting the
        prompt notice defense, there is a genuine dispute of material fact
        as to whether that delay prejudiced Westﬁeld.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 23-12195

               However, the district court also granted summary judgment
        on an alternative ground: damages. We thus turn to Gulfpoint’s
        second argument—that the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment on its bid for RCV damages was not enough to end this
        case because it also seeks ACV damages.
                  B. Damages
               Gulfpoint argues that granting summary judgment based on
        the contractual unavailability of RCV damages was error because
        the district court ignored Gulfpoint’s bid for ACV damages.
        Because the district court never ruled on this potentially dispositive
        argument, we conclude the proper course is to vacate and remand
        for the district court to consider it in the first instance.
                As discussed above, the policy here establishes repair or
        replacement of damaged property as a prerequisite to recover
        replacement-cost value. Gulfpoint does not dispute that it has not
        made all the repairs on the claimed damage, so we agree that the
        district court correctly granted summary judgment on Gulfpoint’s
        claim for RCV damages. Ceballo v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 967 So.
        2d 811, 815 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that, under Florida insurance
        contracts, replacement cost damages typically do not arise unless
        and until the repairs or replacement have actually been
        completed).
               On appeal, Gulfpoint does not argue otherwise—it merely
        argues that this conclusion about RCV damages does not end the
        case because it also seeks ACV damages. And, though its argument
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        23-12195                   Opinion of the Court                                 19

        below was less clear, it raised the same issue in its summary
        judgment brief.
               The problem is that the district court did not address
        Gulfpoint’s argument about ACV damages below. The district
        court took Westfield at its word that “Gulfpoint’s expert disclosure
        suggests [that] Gulfpoint is seeking RCV damages,” and,
        interpreting the contract, agreed that “Gulfpoint has not
        performed the roof replacement it claims it requires.” Thus,
        without addressing the argument that Gulfpoint also sought ACV
        damages, the district court concluded that “Westfield is also
        entitled to summary judgment on this ground.”
               Because the district court appeared to rule that the RCV
        damages question was an independently sufficient basis for
        summary judgment, the question of whether Gulfpoint could or
        did also seek ACV damages is potentially dispositive. Rather than
        decide that question in the place of the district court, we conclude
        the better course is to vacate the grant of summary judgment and
        remand for the district court to consider the matter in the first
        instance.3

        3 Though we do not purport to prejudge the issue, and certainly not to suggest

        any particular outcome when the district court exercises its discretion in this
        matter, we pause to highlight two pertinent issues.
        First, while a plaintiff typically is not required to plead damages with
        particularity, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (requiring only “a demand for the relief
        sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”),
        one question might be whether the complaint adequately apprised Westfield
        or the court of Gulfpoint’s bid for ACV damages. See D.C. Docket No. 2:22-
USCA11 Case: 23-12195         Document: 32-1          Date Filed: 04/24/2024           Page: 20 of 20

        20                          Opinion of the Court                         23-12195

                                        IV.      Conclusion
              For these reasons, we vacate the grant of summary
        judgment and remand for the district court to consider whether
        Gulfpoint sought ACV damages, and thus whether the grant of
        summary judgment on RCV damages disposes of this case.
                VACATED AND REMANDED.

        cv-00086, Doc. 22 ¶ 21 (asserting that Westfield breached the contract by
        “[f]ailing to pay all benefits due”); see id. at 4 (praying for “judgment against
        the Defendant . . . for damages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs . . . and for
        such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper”). After all,
        “[a] plaintiff may not amend [its] complaint through argument in a brief
        opposing summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d
        1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).
        Second, “[i]n order to make a proper [expert] disclosure, parties must, by the
        deadline, disclose the identity of their experts ‘accompanied by a written
        report,’” which, in turn, “must contain a complete statement of all opinions
        the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,” not merely “the
        facts or data considered by the witness in forming them.” Guevara v. NCL
        (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 718 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
        26(a)(2)(B), 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)). And, under Rule 37, “[i]f a party fails to provide
        information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use
        that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was
        substantially justified or [is] harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). As discussed,
        the parties debate whether Gulfpoint’s expert disclosure adequately identified
        an opinion on ACV damages, as well as RCV damages. Thus, the district court
        might also consider whether Gulfpoint failed to disclose an expert opinion on
        ACV or supplement its disclosure with such an opinion—and, if so, whether
        that does or should preclude the use of such evidence. See, e.g., Romero v.
        Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008).