Court Opinion

ID: 9451076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:06:07.330535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:18.778518
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/4/23 In re Victoria A. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re Victoria A., a Person                                 B322340
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                        (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP04937)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 Kimberly S.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
     Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Kimberly S.
     Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Kimberly S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her five-year-old daughter
Victoria A. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1
Kimberly argues the juvenile court erred in finding the parental-
benefit exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (C)(1)(b)(i)) did not
apply because, in her view, the evidence supported a finding
Victoria had a strong, positive attachment to her and the court
did not correctly apply the legal standard in In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). Kimberly also argues the court erred
in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) did not apply. Because the court did not prejudicially err
in making either finding, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    Victoria Tests Positive for Drugs at Birth, and the
            Juvenile Court Removes Her from Kimberly
      When Victoria was born in July 2018, she tested positive
for methamphetamine and amphetamine. A social worker from
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services interviewed Kimberly, who stated that she used
methamphetamine two or three months before delivering Victoria
and that she “might have been around people who had been
using.” Michael A., Victoria’s father, told the social worker that
he was “a meth user” and that he took “a few hits” of

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
methamphetamine “every morning,” but that he would not “use
meth anymore.” A few days later Kimberly, with Victoria,
checked herself into an inpatient substance abuse treatment
center.
      The Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b), alleging (1) Kimberly’s substance abuse placed
Victoria at substantial risk of serious physical harm;
(2) Kimberly’s history and current use of methamphetamine
interfered with her ability to provide regular care and
supervision for Victoria, and (3) Michael’s substance abuse
rendered him incapable of providing regular care and supervision
for Victoria. The court detained Victoria from Michael and
released her to Kimberly on the condition that Kimberly remain
in the inpatient substance abuse treatment program or, if she
completed the program, that she reside with her mother,
Maribel O. The court warned Kimberly that, if she left the
program without completing it or did not test clean, the court
would remove Victoria from her care.
      On September 26, 2018 Kimberly and Michael pleaded no
contest to the allegations in the petition as amended,2 and the
court declared Victoria a dependent child of the court. The court
removed Victoria from Michael, released her to Kimberly, and
ordered Kimberly to complete parenting classes and extensive
drug rehabilitation.
      One month later, Kimberly completed her residential
substance abuse treatment program and moved with Victoria into
Maribel’s home. Eight months after that, the Department

2     The court combined the two counts against Kimberly into
one and made minor changes to the sustained allegations against
Michael that are not relevant to this appeal.

                               3
observed that Kimberly had complied with her case plan and
court-ordered programs and that Victoria appeared happy and
“very well cared for by her mother.” The Department
recommended the court terminate jurisdiction and grant joint
legal (with Michael) and sole physical custody of Victoria to
Kimberly.3
       One month later, Kimberly experienced a relapse and
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The
social worker also discovered that Kimberly no longer lived with
Maribel, which, as stated, was a condition the juvenile court had
imposed when the court released Victoria to Kimberly. The
Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387,
alleging Victoria failed to comply with the court’s orders. On
July 19, 2019 the court detained Victoria from Kimberly and
placed her with Maribel. The court ordered monitored visitation
for Kimberly for a minimum of three times per week for three
hours each visit. Two months later, the court sustained the
allegations in the supplemental petition and removed Victoria
from Kimberly.

     B.       Kimberly Fails To Reunify with Victoria
     At the six-month and 12-month review hearings (§ 366.21,
subds. (e), (f)), the juvenile court found Kimberly’s progress
toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement of Victoria outside her home had “not been

3     Michael did not comply with his case plan and failed to
make progress toward addressing the causes that gave rise to
Victoria’s placement outside his home. The court ultimately
terminated his parental rights to Victoria. He is not a party to
this appeal.

                                 4
substantial.” The Department’s status reports included multiple
positive toxicology test results. The court concluded returning
Victoria to Kimberly would create a substantial risk of detriment
and maintained Victoria’s placement with Maribel. On October
16, 2020 the court terminated reunification services for Kimberly
and set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing
under section 366.26.
       As Kimberly struggled to maintain sobriety, she also failed
to have consistent, quality visits with Victoria. For the first few
months after the court removed Victoria from her care, Kimberly
visited Victoria three times a week and was “loving and
attentive” with her; Victoria “showed a preference toward
[Kimberly] and appeared comfortable in her arms.” The social
worker reported, however, that by February 2021 Kimberly’s
visits had “become less frequent and consistent as time has
passed.” Maribel reported that, during visits, Victoria was not
“receptive” to Kimberly and did not “show any signs of distress”
when Kimberly left. The social worker observed Kimberly
interacted “generally well with Victoria,” except when Kimberly
would “ignore Victoria to use her cellphone.” The social worker
stated Victoria appeared “very bonded” to Maribel and called her
“‘Mama.’”
       In the winter of 2021 Kimberly gave birth to a baby boy,
Izaiah S. The Department placed Izaiah with Jose S. (Victoria’s
maternal grandfather), who shared a home with Maribel (and
Victoria).4 Because Kimberly could visit both children at the

4     Izaiah tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. The
Department found Kimberly continued to use “illicit substances”
while pregnant with Izaiah and had not re-enrolled in any drug
treatment programs. Izaiah is not a subject of this appeal.

                                 5
same time, her visits became more consistent. According to
Maribel, Victoria became “very jealous when anyone in the home
[gave] Izaiah too much attention.” Maribel stated she had to
“redirect” Kimberly if she ignored Victoria and used her cellphone
or focused on Izaiah. Maribel said Kimberly had “little patience”
for Victoria and did not seem able to “redirect” her in an “age
appropriate manner.”
       One morning in June 2021 Izaiah ingested amphetamine
and had to be hospitalized. In investigating this incident, the
social worker discovered Maribel had violated the juvenile court’s
order by allowing Kimberly to visit Victoria without a court-
approved monitor. Maribel admitted to the social worker that
Kimberly visited Izaiah without any supervision that morning,
that Kimberly spent the night in her home on two previous
occasions (while Victoria was present), and that Maribel had left
Victoria alone with Victoria’s maternal great-grandmother (who
was not an approved monitor).
       On June 9, 2021 the social worker placed Victoria in the
home of Angelica S., Victoria’s maternal great aunt. The
Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387,
alleging Maribel failed to comply with the court’s order (for
monitored visitation), which endangered Victoria’s physical
health and safety and placed her at risk of serious physical harm.
The court vacated its order placing Victoria in Maribel’s home.
       In the first few months of Victoria’s new placement,
Kimberly visited only “sporadically,” often canceled visits, and
failed to confirm her visits with the social worker. Kimberly
explained to the social worker that she could not visit
consistently because she had to “‘run errands,’” did not want the
visits to take place at the park, or did not have transportation

                                6
(the social worker said she had offered Kimberly a bus pass). The
social worker observed Victoria did not appear “extremely
attached” to Kimberly and did not show an “excessive amount of
distress” when visits ended.
       By November 2021 Kimberly was visiting Victoria once a
week and often “cut her visit short.” Kimberly said she was
“happy just to see her children briefly.” The social worker
observed Victoria enjoyed “taking up all of her mother’s
attention.”
       Four months later, in a report summarizing Kimberly’s
visitation, the social worker reiterated her prior observations
that Kimberly’s visits had become inconsistent and that Kimberly
frequently did not confirm visits, occasionally missed visits, and
“[m]ore often than not” cut the visits short. The social worker
stated that Victoria, while “familiar” with Kimberly, did not react
to Kimberly when she left the visits, although Angelica observed
in January 2022 that Victoria appeared “attached” to Kimberly
and got “upset” when Kimberly left. In a subsequent report the
social worker concluded that Victoria did not appear “to be well-
bonded” with Kimberly and seemed more entertained with the
food Kimberly brought or the slides at the park and that
Kimberly focused more on Izaiah during the visits. In her final
report before the selection and implementation hearing, the
social worker stated the visits occurred only once or twice a week
and, at Kimberly’s request, did not last the full length of the time
allocated for the visit.
       Victoria’s adjustment to her new placement, according to
Angelica, was not “without challenges.” But by February 2022
Victoria had “become attached” to Angelica and her husband,
Mr. S., and appeared to be “thriving” in their home. The social

                                 7
worker reported that Victoria was “happy and stable” in
Angelica’s care. Angelica and Mr. S. expressed their commitment
to adopt Victoria.

       C.     The Court Terminates Kimberly’s Parental Rights
       At the June 1, 2022 hearing under section 366.26 Kimberly
testified that she visited Victoria three times a month, but that
the social worker sometimes canceled the visits. Kimberly
described her activities with Victoria at the park, which included
playing with her, giving her food, and walking with Izaiah.
According to Kimberly, at the beginning of visits Victoria would
run to her, have a big smile on her face, and call her “mom.”
Kimberly acknowledged that Victoria also called Maribel and
Angelica “mom,” but asserted that Victoria knew Kimberly was
“her mom.” Kimberly said she and Victoria had “a good bond”
and a “good relationship.” When asked to explain why she
believed she and Victoria had a bond, Kimberly responded:
“I believe that, because [of] . . . the way we are with each other,
the way she is with me. She’s excited to see me. How we just get
along. . . . We have this perfect bond, like, I don’t know how to
explain it.” When asked to give an example of what Victoria did
on a visit that made Kimberly believe they had a bond, Kimberly
testified: “She smiles at me. . . . She’s happy with me. How she
wants to always play with me. How she wants me to, like, pay
attention to her more. . . . And she knows I’m her mom.”
Kimberly admitted that in 2022 she visited Victoria only once in
January, twice in February, and twice in March and that she did
not visit again until May. Kimberly stated that, although she
sometimes canceled visits, most of the time “they” canceled the
visits. When asked to name Victoria’s favorite color, Kimberly

                                 8
replied, “I don’t know.” When asked whether she knew if Victoria
had a favorite book, Kimberly said, “No, I don’t. I mean, because
I hardly see her and I hardly . . . have that connection with her
because I hardly see her. You get me? . . . So there’s not much
time for me to get those stuff from her.”
      Counsel for Kimberly asked the court not to terminate
Kimberly’s parental rights because the parental-benefit exception
applied. Counsel argued Kimberly did not visit more often
because she “was under the impression she was only allowed one
hour a week” and because the social worker sometimes canceled
the visits. Citing Angelica’s observation that Victoria “remains
attached to [Kimberly] and gets upset when [she] leaves,” counsel
for Kimberly argued that Victoria would benefit from continuing
to have a relationship with Kimberly and that losing contact with
Kimberly would be detrimental to Victoria. Counsel for the
Department argued that Kimberly did not regularly visit Victoria
and that the evidence showed Kimberly played “the role of a
distant relative or a family friend, but not somebody that
[Victoria] really relies on for emotional stability or someone that
conveys that maternal role.”
      The juvenile court found the question whether Kimberly
visited consistently was “close.” On the issue of the strength of
Victoria’s relationship with Kimberly, the court stated Kimberly
did not occupy a “parental role” with Victoria. The court stated:
“There’s not such a substantial, positive, emotional attachment
such that, . . . considering the benefits of a new adoptive
home, . . . termination would harm [Victoria].” Finding the
relationship between Kimberly and Victoria was “more akin to
[that of] a family friend,” the court ruled that, even if Kimberly
met her burden on the “the first prong on visitation,” she did not

                                9
meet her burden “on the second and third prongs.” The court
found that Victoria was adoptable and that the benefit of her
relationship with Kimberly was “outweighed” by the physical and
emotional benefit of adoption. The court terminated Kimberly’s
parental rights and transferred the care, custody, and control of
Victoria to the Department “for adoptive placement and
planning.” The court designated Angelica and Mr. S. as Victoria’s
prospective adoptive parents. Kimberly timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

        A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling the
           Parental-benefit Exception Did Not Apply

              1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a
parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set
a hearing under section 366.26.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 630; see Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,
624; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250.)
The purpose of a hearing under section 366.26 is “‘to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child’” after the juvenile
court has terminated reunification services. (Caden C., at p. 630;
see In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1076; In re
D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 268.) If the court finds “the
child is likely to be adopted,” the court must “terminate parental
rights to allow for adoption.” (Caden C., at p. 630; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1); Christopher L., at p. 1076; In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 690.) “But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one

                                10
specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.”
(Caden C., at pp. 630-631; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), (4)(A);
I.E., at p. 690.) One of those reasons, the parental-benefit
exception, requires the parent to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) “[T]he parent has regularly visited with the
child,” (2) “the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship,” and (3) “terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., at p. 629; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303,
316.)
       “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; see In re I.E.,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691; In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1131, 1151.) To establish the second element, “the parent must
show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., at p. 636; see I.E., at p. 691; In re J.D. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852.) “Concerning the third element—
whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the child due to’
the relationship—the court must decide whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose
adoption. [Citations.] Because terminating parental rights
eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the
relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental
rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts
need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected

                                11
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life.” (Caden C., at p. 633; see I.E., at p. 692; A.L., at
p. 1151.)
       “A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements. The determination that the parent has visited
and maintained contact with the child ‘consistently,’ taking into
account ‘the extent permitted by the court’s orders’ [citation] is
essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise essentially a
factual determination whether the relationship is such that the
child would benefit from continuing it. [¶] The third element—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child—is somewhat different. As in assessing visitation and
the relationship between parent and child, the court must make a
series of factual determinations. . . . All these factual
determinations are properly reviewed for substantial evidence.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640; see In re I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) “Yet the court must also engage in a
delicate balancing of these determinations as part of assessing
the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently
uncertain. . . . The court makes the assessment by weighing the
harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement
in a new, adoptive home. And so, the ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., at
pp. 639-640; see I.E., at p. 691.)

                                12
            2.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
                   Court’s Finding Kimberly Failed To Establish
                   Victoria Had a Substantial, Positive Emotional
                   Attachment to Her
       Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
Victoria did not have a substantial emotional bond with
Kimberly.5 According to the social worker’s reports, at times
Kimberly paid attention to Victoria and at times she did not,
especially after the birth of Izaiah. When Kimberly was able to
focus on Victoria, their time together consisted of playing on the
playground and eating. Because Kimberly often cut short her
visits with Victoria, there wasn’t time for much else. And
because Kimberly visited Victoria only once a month during the
six months before the section 366.26 hearing, it is not surprising
she did not know Victoria’s favorite book, snack, or color. The
social worker’s reports indicated Victoria had trouble controlling
her emotions, but there was no evidence Kimberly ever tried to
redirect her or teach her how to use words to express her
emotions. Kimberly testified Victoria was always happy and
excited to see her, but that would be true of a favorite friend or
relative. (See In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 [“Friendly
or affectionate visits are not enough.”].)

5     As did the juvenile court, we assume without deciding that
Kimberly consistently visited Victoria, though the record points
to the contrary conclusion. (See In re Eli B. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1073 [“It is unnecessary to address the first
element (regular visitation and contact) despite the agency’s
argument that mother did not prove that element either, because
the juvenile court did not err in rejecting the exception on other
grounds.”].)

                                13
       Aside from the bare assertion she and Victoria shared a
“perfect” bond, Kimberly did not provide any specific evidence to
show Victoria was strongly attached to her. (See Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“courts often consider how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents”];
cf. In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 856-857 [mother’s
visitation logs showed how she encouraged, comforted, and
taught her five-year-old son during their virtual visits and how
he frequently expressed his affection for her].) Indeed, the social
worker consistently observed that Victoria did not exhibit
distress at the end of her visits with Kimberly and that Victoria
seemed more interested in the playground equipment or snacks
Kimberly brought for her. (See In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th
at p. 692 [evidence the child “experienced no distress at the end of
visits” supported the juvenile court’s finding “the relationship
was not so substantial that its severance would be detrimental to
the child”].)
       Kimberly argues she presented evidence Victoria had a
substantial, positive emotional attachment to her. Kimberly,
however, misunderstands the substantial evidence standard of
review. “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial
evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have
reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see In re Eli B. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1072.)

                                 14
       Thus, we do not assess whether Kimberly presented
sufficient evidence Victoria had a strong, positive emotional
attachment to her, but whether substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s finding Victoria did not. As discussed,
substantial evidence supported that finding. Kimberly points to
evidence Victoria was attached to her and became upset when the
visits ended. But we presume the court discounted that evidence
(Angelica’s one-time comment in January 2022) because the
social worker’s observations, which covered a longer period than
Angelica’s observations, contradicted it. And those observations
were substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding.
       Kimberly faults the social worker’s reports for failing “to
substantially address [Victoria’s] attachment to [her].” By not
making this argument at the hearing under section 366.26,
however, Kimberly forfeited it.6 (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a
challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
made in the trial court”]; In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391,
1399 [“father forfeited the right to complain that his parental
rights had been terminated without an adequate selection and
implementation report” because he failed to raise the issue in the
juvenile court].)
       In any event, Kimberly had the burden to prove Victoria
had a significant emotional attachment to her. (See Caden C.,

6     On February 17, 2022, in response to an objection from
counsel for Kimberly, the court ordered the Department to
prepare a last minute information report to address “the quality
of parents’ visits and any parent bond that they may have.” The
Department submitted a report on March 1, 2022 that
summarized the interactions between Victoria and Kimberly.
Counsel for Kimberly did not object to this (or any other) report.

                                15
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re. J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526,
530-531.) She had the opportunity at the selection and
implementation hearing to present her version of the quality of
her visits with Victoria, but provided only general conclusions
there was a “good bond.” As discussed, substantial evidence,
including that Victoria spent three-fourths of her life outside of
Kimberly’s home and that, according to the social worker,
Kimberly and Victoria at times showed little interest in each
other, supported the court’s finding Kimberly failed to meet her
burden on this element of the parental-benefit exception.

              3.     The Court Correctly Applied Caden C.
      Kimberly contends the juvenile court relied on “improper
factors in assessing the third element” of the parental-benefit
exception. In particular, Kimberly cites the court’s comment: “‘It
does appear that [Kimberly] does not enjoy a parental role with
the child.’” (Italics omitted.) The juvenile court did not err.
      A finding the parent does not occupy a parental role does
not necessarily mean the juvenile court failed to determine
whether a child has a substantial, positive emotional attachment
to the parent under the second element of the parental-benefit
exception. The issue is whether the juvenile court assessed the
relationship (or lack of one) using the proper factors (and not
improper ones). For example, in In re Katherine J., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th 303 the juvenile court stated the father had not
occupied a “‘significant parental role.’” (Id. at p. 319.) The court
in Katherine J., however, concluded the juvenile court in that
case “also explained what it meant by this” term, which was that
the father’s “unresolved issues with substance abuse and
violence” compromised his attempts to maintain “a strong,

                                16
positive emotional attachment” with his child. (Id. at pp. 319-
320.)
      Here, although the juvenile court commented Kimberly did
not have a parental role, the court also found Victoria did not
have a “substantial, positive emotional attachment” to Kimberly.
That was a finding on the issue the court was supposed to
consider on the second element of the parental-benefit exception.
(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The court explained
the evidence showed Victoria’s relationship with Kimberly was
similar to that of a family friend, which was another way of
saying the relationship lacked a strong emotional attachment
“‘from child to parent.’” (Id. at p. 632; see In re Katherine J.,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 319 [“‘for the exception to apply, the
emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that
of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or
friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt’”]; In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [“an emotional attachment is one
where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend or
playmate and [whose] interactions with the parent were not
ambivalent, detached, or indifferent”].)
      Kimberly suggests the juvenile court may have considered
improper factors, such as whether she failed to address her
substance abuse problem or competently provided for Victoria’s
daily needs. The record does not support this suggestion. The
court made clear it was not comparing Angelica and Kimberly or
their homes and recognized it was “not a contest of who’s better.”
And when the court found Kimberly had failed to demonstrate
Victoria had a significant attachment to her, the court did not
mention Kimberly’s struggles with addiction.

                                17
      Nor did the juvenile court consider any improper factors in
ruling Kimberly failed to establish the third element under
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614. The court properly balanced the
harm of terminating the “family-friend” relationship Victoria had
with Kimberly against the “physical and emotional benefit”
Victoria would derive from the permanency and stability of
adoption, and the court found the latter outweighed the former.
Paraphrasing Caden C. at page 634, the court stated that, even
where the child may never live with the parent, terminating a
parent-child relationship “may be detrimental,” which showed
that the court recognized it should assess the harm to a child of
losing a substantial, positive relationship with a parent, not
whether the parent can provide a home for the child.

        B. The Court Did Not Err in Ruling ICWA Did Not
            Apply, and Any Error Was Harmless

            1.      Relevant Proceedings
      On a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)
judicial council form, Kimberly stated she did not have any
known Indian ancestry, and on his form Michael stated he
believed he may be a member of the Cherokee Tribe. At the
detention hearing the court confirmed that Kimberly stated she
did not have any known Indian ancestry and that Michael stated
he believed he had Cherokee ancestry on the maternal side of his
family. The court ordered the Department to speak with
Michael’s maternal grandmother and investigate whether her
family had any connection to the Cherokee Tribe.
      The Department investigator contacted Michael’s
grandmother, who provided information the investigator

                               18
documented on a Notice of Child Custody Proceedings for Indian
Child (ICWA-030) form. The Department sent the ICWA-030
form to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.7 The Department subsequently reported that the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians stated Victoria was not an
Indian child “in relation to the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians” and that the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma stated
Victoria was not an Indian child “in relation to the Cherokee
Nation.”
       Because the Department did not receive a response from
the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians, the social
worker sent a second ICWA-030 notice to that tribe (along with
all the other recipients of the first notice). She followed up with
several phone calls to the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, but was unable to reach a representative of that tribe.
       To investigate Victoria’s possible Indian ancestry through
Kimberly’s side of the family, the social worker called Maribel
(Victoria’s maternal grandmother). When Maribel answered, she
gave the phone to her daughter-in-law, Rocio M., who told the
social worker that Maribel wanted Rocio to translate. The social
worker asked Rocio if the family had any American Indian
ancestry, and Rocio said her family did not. The social worker
asked Rocio to ask Maribel if she was aware of any American
Indian ancestry on the maternal side of the family, and Rocio
said Maribel “denied having any American Indian ancestry.” The
social worker also interviewed Angelica (Victoria’s caregiver and

7     Kimberly does not challenge the adequacy of the notices to
the Indian tribes.

                                19
maternal great aunt), who denied the family had any American
Indian ancestry.
       At the 12-month review hearing, the court found that the
Department “exercised as much diligence” as it could to obtain
information from the Indian tribes Michael identified and that
“there’s been no indication that there is any membership in a
tribe that we can locate.” The court found ICWA did not apply
through Michael’s side of the family. The court made an implied
finding ICWA did not apply through Kimberly’s side of the
family.8
             2.    The Department Fulfilled Its
                   Duty of Inquiry
       Kimberly argues the juvenile court failed to ensure the
Department complied with its duty of inquiry under section

8      Citing the juvenile court’s August 7, 2018 minute order
after the detention hearing, the Department stated in its reports
the court had found at detention ICWA did not apply through
Kimberly’s side of the family. The court, however, did not make
that finding at the detention hearing. Thus, we again encounter
a minute order that includes findings the juvenile court did not
make, and again ask the court (or the clerk) to cease the practice
of entering orders not made at the hearing (and ask the
Department not to cite orders the court did not make). (See In re
T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298, fn. 20.) Nevertheless,
because the juvenile court here made an inquiry at the detention
hearing and considered the issue, the record in this case supports
an implied finding ICWA did not apply. (See In re G.A. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 355, 362 [findings may be implied where the
record reflects the juvenile court “‘considered the issue and
decided whether ICWA applies’”], review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S276056; In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506 [same].)

                                20
224.2, subdivision (b), to interview Victoria’s maternal
grandmother (Maribel), maternal great-aunt (Angelica), and
maternal great-uncle (Mr. S.). The Department argues that the
social worker interviewed Maribel (through Rocio, as a
translator) and Angelica and that, because Mr. S. was married to
Angelica, “it was unlikely he would have any additional
information regarding ICWA.” In her reply brief, Kimberly states
that the social worker did not interview Maribel through a
Spanish-speaking social worker and that, even though the
Department asserts Mr. S. was married to Angelica, “it was still
incumbent on [the Department] to ask the great-maternal uncle
if there was Indian ancestry in mother’s family.”9 Kimberly
misconstrues the Department’s duty to inquire about a child’s
possible Indian ancestry.
       Congress enacted ICWA to “protect Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”
(In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287; see In re J.C. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77.)10 “ICWA and governing federal
regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.101 et seq. (2022)) set minimal
procedural protections for state courts to follow before removing

9     Kimberly does not dispute that Mr. S. is married to
Angelica. There is no evidence Maribel had a brother who could
also be Victoria’s great-uncle.

10     “‘“Indian child” means any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.’” (In re J.C.,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77, fn. 2; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);
§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)

                               21
Indian children and placing them in foster care or adoptive
homes.” (In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; see In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) “In addition to
significantly limiting state court actions concerning out-of-family
placements for Indian children [citation], ICWA permits an
Indian child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise
jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding.” (Rylei S., at p. 316;
see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8.)
ICWA requires a child protective agency to “‘“notify the parent or
Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe . . . of the pending
proceedings and of their right of intervention.”’” (Isaiah W., at
p. 5; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); J.C., at p. 76.) “The notice
requirement is at the heart of ICWA because it ‘enables a tribe to
determine whether the child is an Indian child and, if so, whether
to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’”
(In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429; see Isaiah W.,
at p. 5.; T.G., at p. 288.)
       “To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in
dependency proceedings, . . . investigation of a family member’s
belief a child may have Indian ancestry must be undertaken.”
(In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 316; see § 224.2,
subd. (a) [the court and child protective services agencies “have
an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . .
is or may be an Indian child”]; In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 9; In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 289 [“just as proper
notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose,
an adequate investigation of a family member’s belief a child may
have Indian ancestry is essential to ensuring a tribe entitled to
ICWA notice will receive it”].) The duty to inquire “‘begins with
initial contact [citation] and obligates the juvenile court and child

                                 22
protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals
whether the child may be an Indian child.’” (Rylei S., at p. 316;
see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c); T.G., at p. 290.)
       Section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child protective
agency to ask “the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the
child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.”11 (See In re
J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; In re T.G., supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child “‘[i]f the court,
social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an
Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have
sufficient information to determine there is reason to know that
the child is an Indian child.’” (In re Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 316-317; see Rule 5.481(a)(4) [social worker
must conduct further inquiry if he or she “knows or has reason to
know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved”].) “If
those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an Indian
child, notice to the relevant tribes is required.” (Rylei S., at

11     An “‘extended family member’ shall be as defined by the
law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such
law or custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of
eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c); In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 78.)

                                23
p. 317; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3; J.C., at p. 78; T.G., at
p. 290.)
       “‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department,
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; see In re Antonio R.,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) “Thus, a juvenile court errs in
making a finding ICWA does not apply to the proceedings
without first ensuring that the Department has made an
adequate inquiry under ICWA and California law, and if
necessary, the court must continue the proceedings and order the
Department to fulfill its responsibilities.” (Antonio R., at p. 431.)
However, if “‘“the court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required in [section
224.2] have been conducted and there is no reason to know
whether the child is an Indian child, the court may make a
finding that [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings, subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.”’” (In re J.C., supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 78; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(b)(3).)
       Here, the Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry with
respect to Victoria’s extended family members on her mother’s
side by asking Maribel and Angelica about any possible Indian
ancestry. Section 224.2 did not require the social worker to
interview Mr. S., Victoria’s great-uncle (by marriage), because
the term “extended family members” under ICWA does not
include great-uncles (by marriage or otherwise). (See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c); see In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
1041, 1053 [the term “extended family members” “does not
include great-grandparents”].)

                                 24
       Kimberly does not argue the social worker should have
interviewed Mr. S. because, as a prospective adoptive parent, he
was someone who had “an interest in the child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b); see In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 131-132 [child
protective agency had a duty to interview the child’s caregiver
and prospective adoptive parent as someone who has “‘an interest
in the child’”]; In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 564,
fn. 2 [even if the great-grandfather was not an “extended family
member,” because he had been the child’s “primary caregiver” he
was “included within ‘others who have an interest in the child,’
for whom the statutory duty of initial inquiry is the same as for
‘extended family members’”]; In re M.B. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
617, 629-630 [child protective agency failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry because it “did not ask ICWA-related questions
of the maternal great-aunt,” who “had been identified as [the
child’s] prospective adoptive parent”].) Any error in failing to ask
Mr. S. about Victoria’s possible Indian ancestry, however, was
harmless. As discussed, Maribel and Angelica, direct lineal
ancestors of Victoria and in the same generation as Mr. S., both
denied any Indian ancestry on their side of the family.
In addition, Mr. S. was not in the same ancestral line as Victoria.
In these circumstances, Kimberly has not shown how Mr. S.
likely would have provided meaningful information relevant to
determining whether Victoria was or may be an Indian child.
(See In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435 [“in
determining whether the failure to make an adequate initial
inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the information in the
hands of the extended family members is likely to be meaningful
in determining whether the child is an Indian child, not whether
the information is likely to show the child is in fact an Indian

                                25
child”].)12 This is one of those cases where inquiring of an
extended family member or someone with an interest in the child
would not likely provide meaningful information about the child’s
possible Indian ancestry. (Cf. Antonio R., at p. 435 [“‘[i]n most
circumstances, the information in the possession of extended
relatives is likely to be meaningful in determining whether the
child is an Indian child—regardless of whether the information
ultimately shows the child is or is not an Indian child’”].)
       As for Kimberly’s assertion the social worker should have
used an official Spanish-language interpreter instead of relying
on Rocio to translate for Maribel, Kimberly has not cited any
authority for the proposition an official interpreter is required,
nor has she demonstrated any prejudice. (See In re Adrian L.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1 [failure to support an
argument with “reasoned argument and citations to authority”
forfeits the argument]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408
[same].) The social worker asked Rocio to ask Maribel if the
family had any Indian ancestry, and Rocio told the social worker
Maribel answered the question in the negative. Kimberly does
not claim Rocio made any mistakes in translating the social
worker’s questions or Maribel’s responses. There is no
reasonable probability interviewing Maribel again with a
different interpreter would have yielded any different answers.

12   The question of which standard of prejudice applies in
evaluating ICWA inquiry error is currently pending in the
Supreme Court in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review
granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.

                               26
                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s order terminating Kimberly’s parental
rights is affirmed.

                                            SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

                               27