Court Opinion

ID: 9867135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 15:00:59.770232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:31.567633
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13518    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 09/26/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13518
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       KHALIF EDWARDS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00352-ELR-AJB-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13518      Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 09/26/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13518

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Khalif Edwards, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
       the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release
       under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that we lack jurisdiction
       to hear his appeal because the district court failed to consider one
       of his arguments below, which he asserts makes the denial a non-
       final order. He also moves us to dismiss his appeal for the same
       reason. In the alternative, Edwards argues that the district court
       abused its discretion in denying his motion. The government, in
       turn, moves for summary affirmance.
              We review our own appellate jurisdiction de novo. United
       States v. Cody, 998 F.3d 912, 914 (11th Cir. 2021). Generally, we
       have jurisdiction to review only “final decisions of the district
       courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court’s order here
       “end[ed] the litigation on the merits and [left] nothing for the court
       to do but execute the judgment,” it was a final order. See Sabal Trail
       Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Cnty., 947 F.3d 1362,
       1370 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). We therefore have
       jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
             We review a district court’s determination about a
       defendant’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c) de
       novo. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021).
       And we review a district court’s ruling on an eligible defendant’s
       motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. Id.
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       22-13518                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

       Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of
       the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no
       substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is
       more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke
       Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1
              Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce
       a prisoner’s term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set
       forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
       finds that,” as relevant here, “extraordinary and compelling reasons
       warrant such a reduction” and “that such a reduction is consistent
       with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
       Commission.” The applicable Sentencing Commission policy
       statement is set out in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13. Bryant,
       996 F.3d at 1248. The application notes to § 1B1.13 establish four
       categories of circumstances in which “extraordinary and
       compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction exist: (1) qualifying
       medical conditions, (2) advanced age, (3) family circumstances, and
       (4) other circumstances in the defendant’s case that are determined
       by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to be extraordinary and
       compelling. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. 1.
              To grant a motion for compassionate release under
       § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court must ﬁrst ﬁnd that all three of the
       statutory prerequisites for relief are met: extraordinary and

       1 In our en banc decision in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

       Cir. 1981), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
       Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13518

       compelling reasons justifying release, consistency with § 1B1.13,
       and support in the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v.
       Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). Because all three
       conditions are necessary, “the absence of even one would foreclose
       a sentence reduction.” Id. at 1238. The movant bears the burden
       of proving that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under § 3582.
       Cf. United States v. Green, 764 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2014)
       (discussing the defendant’s burden under § 3582(c)(2)).
               In his motion, Edwards argued that the First Step Act
       expanded the authority of district courts to reduce sentences under
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) to encompass circumstances beyond those
       described in the Guidelines. Specifically, he argues that a
       compelling and extraordinary reason exists where the Bureau of
       Prisons fails to account for a district court’s intention that the
       sentence imposed would run concurrent to any sentence imposed
       in a state case.
              Even assuming that the district court did not consider this
       argument, such an error would be harmless because this argument
       is squarely foreclosed by our precedent. In Bryant, we considered
       whether § 1B1.13 remained an “applicable policy statement[]”
       under § 3582(c)(1)(A) after the First Step Act amended the statute
       to allow defendants to file for compassionate release, and whether
       the statutory amendment meant that district courts—not just the
       Director of the Bureau of Prisons—were authorized to determine
       that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release existed
       beyond those specifically described in the policy statement. Bryant,
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       22-13518               Opinion of the Court                        5

       996 F.3d at 1252–64. We held that § 1B1.13 “is an applicable policy
       statement that governs all motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A).
       Accordingly, district courts may not reduce a sentence under
       Section 3582(c)(1)(A) unless a reduction would be consistent with
       1B1.13.” Id. at 1262. “Thus, under Bryant, the only circumstances
       that can rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons
       for compassionate release are limited to those extraordinary and
       compelling reasons as described by Section 1B1.13.” United States
       v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021).
             Furthermore, the district court did not err in denying
       Edwards’s motion for compassionate release. Even construing
       Edwards’s pro se arguments liberally, he does not contend that his
       circumstances match any of the four categories of “extraordinary
       and compelling reasons” listed in § 1B1.13. He therefore has not
       met his burden of showing that he is eligible for a sentence
       reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), and the district court properly
       denied his motion for compassionate release.
              Consequently, the government’s position on appeal is
       “clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
       question as to the outcome of the case.” See Groendyke Transp., Inc.,
       406 F.2d at 1162. We therefore GRANT the government’s motion
       for summary aﬃrmance, and—because the district court’s decision
       was a ﬁnal judgment—we DENY Edwards’s motion to dismiss the
       appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
             AFFIRMED.