Court Opinion

ID: 9518418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:52:18.93545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:55.736568
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting), I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff is not entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits.
The appeal board relied upon the defense testimony that plaintiff did not suffer any identifiable psychosis or psychoneurosis, concluding that being merely nervous or fidgety "are not disabling in and of themselves, nor are they the basis for a psychiatric diagnosis”. It is my opinion that the board was incorrect in relying upon the lack of a specific psychiatric diagnosis for concluding that the plaintiff could not be disabled.
The issue is not whether there is a psychiatric diagnosis, but rather whether the plaintiff is in fact disabled. MCLA 418.401; MSA 17.237(401). The board erroneously found that the emotional difficulties of the plaintiff could not amount to a compensable disability. However, the proper question to be considered is not whether these emotional difficulties could amount to a compensable disability, but whether they did amount to such a disability in this case. I believe that to this extent, *254the board relied upon an improper standard of review since it is undeniable that plaintiffs emotional condition was caused by the employment situation.
I cannot understand the board’s determination that plaintiff was not disabled where, as here, the testimony undisputedly establishes that the plaintiff should not and could not return to his programs system analysis job without suffering psychologically. Where it is agreed that plaintiff should not and could not return to the employment which caused the disability without again placing himself in precisely the same situation which caused and forced him to leave that position, or again become disabled, then he is in fact disabled under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Allen v National Twist Drill & Tool Co, 324 Mich 660; 37 NW2d 664 (1949). Regardless of whether or not the psychiatrists who examined plaintiff agreed upon the psychiatric terminology or labeling, they did agree that it would be inadvisable for plaintiff to return to the job which caused his disability. In my opinion, since plaintiff was unable to return to his programs system analysis job, he was disabled. Furthermore, the fact that his emotional difficulty caused him to seek other job assignments and ultimately a resignation does not avoid the question of disability, but rather is evidence supporting the existence of disability.
Since the board has applied a fallacious legal standard in this case, I would reverse and remand the cause to the board for reconsideration. Zaremba v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 226; 139 NW2d 745 (1966), dissenting opinion of Judge Bronson in MacKenzie v Fisher Body Division of General Motors Corp, 48 Mich App 175, 180; 210 NW2d 357 (1973), lv granted, 390 Mich 808 (1973).