Court Opinion

ID: 9943815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 14:43:40.542425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:22.125576
License: Public Domain

I respectfully dissent.
The trial court entered judgment after sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend to the Ferraros' initial complaint on the sole ground the conduct alleged is absolutely immune from civil liability under Penal Code1 section 11172, subdivision (a). On review, the appellate court's role is well established. If we find any of the alleged conduct may not be subject to absolute immunity and if the complaint therefore states any viable cause of action against Chadwick/Children's Hospital, we should reverse the judgment.
 I. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Initially the majority correctly notes the Legislature enacted the Child Abuse Reporting Law, section 11165 et seq., as "acomprehensive reporting scheme aimed toward increasing the likelihood that child abuse victims would be identified."2
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 90, italics added.) *Page 98
The Ferraros' complaint alleges Chadwick/Children's Hospital reported to the proper authorities on October 9 or 10, 1983, their suspicions of suspected child abuse by the Ferraros identifying the Ferraros' son, Douglas, as the victim, who died at Children's Hospital on October 10. The complaint further alleges that as a result of Chadwick/Children's Hospital's statements, the child protective authorities took the Ferraros' daughter, April, from their custody, making her a dependent of the juvenile court.
Accepting these allegations as true for purposes of demurrer, the purpose of the Act was fulfilled, the authorities were notified and an identifiable possible victim of suspected child abuse, April, was placed in a position of safety. I would, therefore, agree with the majority that Chadwick/Children's Hospital's initial reporting, even if malicious and knowingly false and even if done with the intent to vex, annoy and harass the Ferraros, is afforded absolute immunity from criminal or civil liability under section 11172, subdivision (a).
However, I disagree that all postreporting conduct by Chadwick/Children's Hospital alleged in the complaint is similarly absolutely privileged as a matter of law, so as to support the sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend. This is not to imply the alleged conduct is not protected; it may be.
If Chadwick/Children's Hospital merely responded to inquiries by investigative governmental agencies, then their republication of their statements may also be privileged as encompassed within the definition of section 11167, "Report; contents."
The conduct alleged in the Ferraros' complaint, however, far exceeds the bounds of reporting or responding to inquiries. Paragraph XIV alleges that Chadwick/Children's Hospital republished their statements regarding the Ferraros on October 9, October 10, and November 2, 1983, January 31, 1984, and at various times between October 9, 1984, and December 1, 1985.
Paragraph XV alleges that neither of the defendants, Chadwick or Children's Hospital, was under any duty to investigate possible criminal conduct after an initial suspected child abuse report was made. Paragraphs XVI and XVII allege that other physicians opined the Chadwick/Children's Hospital's statements regarding the Ferraros were inaccurate and that such opinions were communicated to Chadwick/Children's Hospital. Paragraph XVIII alleges that notwithstanding these communications, Chadwick/Children's Hospital republished their statements to law enforcement officials with the express intention that such statements be the basis *Page 99 
for commencement of juvenile intervention as to April as well as criminal prosecution of the Ferraros.
Without actually acknowledging these allegations the majority states, "We cannot tell from the complaint whether the communications were in response to law enforcement inquiries or whether the communications were initiated by Chadwick and/or Children's Hospital. We conclude in either event these communications by a mandated reporter to child protective or law enforcement agencies that are statutorily entitled to receive and investigate reports of child abuse are `authorized' communications or reports under the Act, and, therefore, were protected by the immunity of section 11172, subdivision (a)." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 95.)
I disagree, because the majority rewrites the Child Abuse Reporting Law, under the guise of statutory construction, to extend absolute immunity to conduct far exceeding the scope of that required or authorized by the act. The act, as a comprehensive reporting scheme, provides absolute immunity for mandated reporters "for any report required or authorized by this article." (§ 11172, subd. (a).) The word "authorized" means "permitted, allowed or sanctioned" by Article 2.5 of the Penal Code, the Child Abuse Reporting Law.
The duty of such mandated reporters is clearly set forth in section 11166, subdivision (a), which provides in part: "[They]shall report the known or suspected instance of child abuse to a child protective agency immediately or as soon as practically possible by telephone and shall prepare and send a writtenreport thereof within 36 hours of receiving the information concerning the incident." (Italics added.) There is no dispute the initial telephonic and written reports are absolutely protected. The act further provides in section 11171, subdivision (a) for immunity as to X-rays taken without parental consent "but only for purposes of diagnosing the case as one of possible child abuse and determining the extent of such child abuse." The taking of X-rays is, therefore, "authorized" by the act. Section 11171, subdivision (b) establishes an exception to the physician-patient privilege and psychotherapist-patient privilege for information "reported pursuant to this article," thus creating another authorized act immunized from liability. Finally, section 11172, subdivision (a) provides absolute immunity to mandated reporters "for any report required or authorized by this article" including the taking, causing to be taken, or disseminating of photographs of a suspected victim of child abuse without parental consent.
Thus, it is clear the Legislature chose to protect mandated reporters from civil or criminal liability for certain reporting and related incidental conduct *Page 100 
specifically described in the act. The majority's opinion extends immunity to conduct outside the scope of the act, thereby inappropriately rewriting it.
The Ferraros' complaint, liberally read, alleges that Chadwick/Children's Hospital complied with their initial mandatory reporting roles but then went far beyond such roles voluntarily assuming the unauthorized roles of mandated reporters, investigators and prosecutors. Chadwick/Children's Hospital allegedly assumed such roles, hence they stand in the same position as any other person who institutes or causes meritless civil or criminal proceedings to be instituted against another person or persons. They should, therefore, be required to answer the allegations of the Ferraros' complaint on the merits.
In their rush to close the courthouse door on the Ferraros, the majority extends to Chadwick/Children's Hospital at the initial pleading stage an unlimited and heretofore unprecedented absolute immunity, shielding them from having to answer allegations of intentional, outrageous and malicious conduct without probable cause.
I have found no case extending to any person such unlimited absolute immunity, and the cases cited by the majority admittedly do not provide for such where the activity allegedly took place AFTER the reporting of suspected child abuse. I would, therefore, not grant absolute immunity for such alleged activity at the pleading stage under the guise of statutory construction which strains the interpretation of the word "authorized" to provide absolute immunity as a matter of law for activity to which the act does not extend.
If the evidence ultimately shows that Chadwick/Children's Hospital did not step outside their roles as mandated reporters and merely responded to inquiries by investigative governmental bodies, then they will have no liability. If, however, they inappropriately initiated civil or criminal proceedings or caused such proceedings to be initiated, then they will have to negate the Ferraros' allegations they acted intentionally, outrageously, maliciously and without probable cause. If they can do that they will have no liability and, in fact, will even be indemnified by the state for their attorney's fees. This indemnity arises whenever "the court has dismissed the action upon a demurrer or motion for summary judgment . . . or if he or she prevails in the action." (§ 11172, subd. (c).)
Although the Legislature has afforded mandated reporters full protection for compliance with the act, it has not extended such protection to conduct *Page 101 
alleged beyond the scope of the act. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground the alleged conduct is absolutely immune.
 II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
As an alternative basis for affirming the sustaining of the demurrers to the first, second and third causes of action for emotional distress, Chadwick/Children's Hospital contend these causes of action are barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3). Chadwick/Children's Hospital claim the statute of limitations commenced on these causes of action on December 10, 1983, when the juvenile court dependency action was dismissed and the court advised the Ferraros to seek civil redress for medical malpractice.
At a minimum, Chadwick/Children's Hospital contend the one-year period began running on March 5, 1984, the date the Ferraros served notices of professional negligence on them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 364) Neither contention has merit because the causes of action on the theories of emotional distress relate to their malicious prosecution cause of action. A cause of action for malicious prosecution must be brought within one year of the date of favorable termination of the civil or criminal proceeding which forms the basis for the subsequent malicious prosecution. The harm resulting from the maliciously instituted proceedings includes damages for emotional distress. (Bertero v. NationalGeneral Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43 [118 Cal.Rptr. 184,529 P.2d 608, 65 A.L.R.3d 878].) The complaint alleges the criminal proceedings were terminated on December 26, 1985; the complaint was filed on September 22, 1986, within the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, on its face, the complaint is not barred as to the second, third and fourth causes of action.
April's first cause of action for damages merits a different result. First, April's claim for loss of parental consortium cannot stand in light of Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 441 [138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858]. Further, the first cause of action appears to seek damages for April's emotional distress resulting from the dependency proceeding which was dismissed on December 10, 1983. As pleaded, it is therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3). Nevertheless, I would grant the Ferraros leave to amend this first cause of action absent the claim for loss of parental consortium because they should be afforded at least one opportunity to cure the *Page 102 
statute of limitations' defect if they can. (Larwin-SouthernCalifornia, Inc. v. JGB Investment Co. (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 626, 635 [162 Cal.Rptr. 52].)
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment dismissing the Ferraros' complaint and remand.
Appellants' petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 15, 1990.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 For ease of reference, we refer to the act as it existed at the time of the alleged conduct in the complaint except as noted. *Page 103