Court Opinion

ID: 9540238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:57.713537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:44.973670
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Mote, J.
— I wish to dissent. Section 1, Article 7, of the Constitution of Indiana provides that:
“The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish. [As amended March 14, 1881.]”
*636Section 2 of said Article provides that:
“The Supreme Court shall consist of not less than three nor more than five Judges; a majority of whom shall form a quorum. They shall hold their offices for six years, if they so long behave well.”
Section 4 of said Article provides that:
“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. It shall also have such original jurisdiction as the General Assembly may confer.”
Section 5 thereof provides that:
“The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every case, give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the decision of the Court thereon.”
By 1891 the burden on the Supreme Court, with the constitutional limitation of five judges, became very great. It was unable to maintain a current position in matters coming before it. There had been a growth in population; business was on the increase. The General Assembly, in its legislative wisdom and in an attempt to furnish relief to the Supreme Court of its excessive load, and in order to dispatch the decisions in appeals, as well as matters of original jurisdiction, created this, the Appellate Court of Indiana.
Since its creation in 1891, and in order further to provide relief from the accumulated mass of cases on appeal and review, the General Assemblies, from time to time, have increased the number of judges of this court to eight, provided for assignment to and decision of cases by divisions, and they have altered, by legislative enactment, the fields or areas of the law assigned not only to this court, but to the Supreme Court as well. See particularly §§ 4-202, 4-207, 4-208, 4-209, 4-212 and 4-214, Burns’ Indiana Statutes Annotated, 1963 Pocket Supplement.
*637In its wisdom, the General Assembly, also by legislative enactment, has established the jurisdiction of this court as final except under the statutory conditions of § 4-215, Burns’ Indiana Statutes Annotated, in part, as follows:
“The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court shall be final, except under the following conditions:
“First. If in any case, two [2] of the judges of either division are of the opinion that a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court is erroneous, the case, with a written statement of the reasons for such opinion, shall be transferred to the Supreme Court.
“Second. If a petition for a rehearing is filed by any losing party in any case in either of said divisions of the Appellate Court and said petition is overruled, the clerk of said court shall not certify the opinion and judgment in said case to the lower court until the expiration of thirty [30] days from the date of said ruling.
Said party may, at any time within thirty* 130] days after his petition for a rehearing has been overruled, file *638in the Supreme Court an application for the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the opinion of said division of the Appellate Court contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, or that a new question of law is directly involved and was decided erroneously. The application shall state with particularity the ground or grounds relied on. The party seeking to file such application shall, at the time of such filing, deposit with the clerk of the Supreme Court a cash deposit in the sum of fifty dollars [$50.00]. Upon the filing of such application, and said cash deposit, the clerk shall not certify to the lower court the opinion and judgment of said division of the Appellate Court, unless and until the Supreme Court denies the application. If the application be denied the said deposit of fifty dollars [$50.00] shall be paid by the clerk to the successful party or parties in the appeal for the defrayment of expenses incurred by said party or parties for briefing and other costs incidental to the appeal. If the application be granted the judgment of said division of the Appellate Court is thereby vacated, and the full amount of said cash deposit shall be returned to the party or parties making such application.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It fully is recognized that since the enactment of the Acts of 1937, ch. 91, § 1, p. 459, (§ 2-4718, Burns’ Indiana Statutes annotated) and as interpreted by the Supreme Court, that:
“All statutes relating to practice and procedure in any of the courts of this state shall have, and remain in, force and effect only as herein provided. The Supreme Court shall have the power to adopt, amend and rescind rules of court which shall govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of this state; such rules to be promulgated and to take effect under such rules as the Supreme Court shall adopt, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. The purpose of this act [§§ 2-4718, 2-4719] is to enable the Supreme Court to simplify and abbreviate the pleadings and proceedings; to expedite the decision of causes; to remedy such abuses and imperfections as may be found to exist in the practice; to abolish all unnecessary forms and technicalities in pleading and practice and to abolish fictions and unnecessary process and proceedings. [Acts 1937, ch. 91, § 1, p. 459.]”
*639This rule vesting power, however, does not permit adoption of rules which will abolish the substantive law of the state. In Square D Company v. O’Neal (1947), 225 Ind. 49, 72 N. E. 2d 654, the Supreme Court said:
“. . . This court cannot change a rule of substantive law nor could the General Assembly vest us with such legislative power.”
The Supreme Court heretofore has adopted and has amended and added to, from time to time, “Rules of the Supreme Court” which, it often has been held, have the force of law. We express the objective observation that at least some of said rules are neither clear nor have they been followed and adhered to with any degree of consistency. A myriad of opinions have been handed down in an apparent effort to clarify at least some of the rules so adopted by the Supreme Court, but the net effect thereof has been a lack of consistency in expressed application. Some of the rules, at least, leave much to be desired in the matter of nicety of expression and clarity. This is true with respect to Rule 2-17. Interpretations of Rule 2-17 have been such that there has been a wide diversity of opinion, not only in its expressed sense and meaning, but also in consistency of application. As a result, there can be, in our opinion, an honest difference of opinion between judges and lawyers concerning the meaning, breadth and depth of Rule 2-17, as well as its application to the facts in any given case.
In the instant case, by its opinion filed May 18, 1964, rendered on transfer to the Supreme Court, it is stated, among other things, that “The Appellate Court’s opinion does not suggest that appellant omitted a substantial verbatim provision of any relevant part of the policy, but says it (the Appellate Court) might have been deprived ‘of ascertaining whether or not other inferences could be drawn’ from some other part of the contract not set forth.” (Emphasis supplied.) It will be remembered that this appeal is based entirely and ex*640clusively on the contract, only parts of which are in the briefs, and we suggest that no responsible lawyer would attempt an interpretation of a contract without having before him the entire instrument, as well as all pertinent data relative thereto, including by-laws to which reference therein and thereto have been made.
Under “mutual provisions” of said contract or policy, we find this provision: “While this policy is in force, the named insured is a member of the company and, as such, is entitled to the privileges provided by the by-laws of the company.”
What does the last above quoted provision mean? We confess that we do not know; however, we do insist that inferences unfavorable to appellant and favorable to appellee legitimately could be drawn, particularly in the absence in the record of the by-laws of the company. We suggest that to conclude otherwise would not be consistent and consonant with an objective approach to the solution of the question on appeal. With such continuing convictions, we cannot violate our oaths of office, nor can we accept jurisdiction of the cause once transferred to the Supreme Court.
When this Court finally has overruled a petition for rehearing in a given case, this Court loses jurisdiction. The decision in a given cause is final until and unless the Supreme Court, on petition, transfers such cause to its jurisdiction under the provisions of the statute above cited and quoted, in which event, jurisdiction reposes finally and exclusively in that court.
My stated position is supported by a number of cases, among which are Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Burk (1961), 241 Ind. 683, 172 N. E. 2d 670, 175 N. E. 2d 137; and J. I. Case Company v. Sandefur (1964), 245 Ind. 213, 197 N. E. 2d 519.
In the Burk case, at page 691, point 6, our Supreme Court stated:
*641“. . . Having accepted transfer of the case this court is obliged to consider the case as if it were originally presented to this court on appeal. ...” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Sandefur case, the Supreme Court found that this Court had no right to decide the case upon the technical ground that the administratrix could not be substituted as a party plaintiff and that this Court thereby “erred and we (the Supreme Court) must therefore grant transfer in this case.” The Supreme Court then took up the merits of the case and rendered a decision and opinion therein in accordance with its own determination. As in the Burk case, supra, it, the Supreme Court, was “obliged to consider the case as if it were originally presented . . . on appeal.”
With lack of jurisdiction this Court, in my firm opinion, should not consider this matter further.
Faulconer, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 218 N. E. 2d 712.

 By Rule 2-23 of the Supreme Court, petitions to transfer shall be filed within twenty (20) days after a petition for rehearing- has been denied, which said petition shall set forth briefly:
“(1) That the Appellate Court decided the case with a written opinion, giving- the date when the opinion was filed;
“ (2) That the decision of the Appellate Court was against the party seeking the transfer;
“(3) That a petition for a rehearing was filed with the Appellate Court in time and that a rehearing was denied, giving the date of such denial.
“(4) That the opinion of the Appellate Court:
(a) contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, indicating the ruling precedent;
(b) or that the opinion of the Appellate Court erroneously deciding a new question of law, concisely stating the same;
(c) or that the Appellate Court failed to give a statement in writing of each substantial question arising on the record and the decision of the Court thereon. If this cause is relied on, the petition shall set out or exhibit so much of the record, assignment of errors, briefs and opinions as will affirmatively disclose such failure and establish that the petitioner was prejudiced thereby.”