Court Opinion

ID: 9404460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 05:06:59.736373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.875439
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PARIE WALLACE,                                                    FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                  June 22, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 9:00 a.m.
and

AFFILIATED DIAGNOSTIC OF OAKLAND and
ONE STEP REHAB LLC,

              Intervening Plaintiffs

v                                                                 No. 360537
                                                                  Wayne Circuit Court
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR                                   LC No. 20-006759-NF
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,

              Defendant-Appellant,
and

JANET SZCZOTKA,

              Defendant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and JANSEN and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In this case brought under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant Suburban
Mobility Authority for Regional Transport (“SMART”) appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s
order denying in part SMART’s motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),
(8), and (10). After suffering injuries from an automobile accident, plaintiff Parie Wallace

1
 Wallace v SMART, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered on July 21, 2022 (Docket
No. 360537).

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received medical treatment from various medical providers and executed assignments of rights in
exchange for the treatment. Plaintiff filed suit within one year of the accident, but the medical
providers did not. During the lower court proceedings, the medical providers revoked the
assignments in an apparent effort to save their claims from application of the “one-year-back rule,”
MCL 500.3145, by transferring those claims back to plaintiff. We are asked to decide, therefore,
whether those revocations saved the claims. We conclude they do not and, therefore, reverse in
part the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                       I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On October 2, 2019, plaintiff was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by SMART.
The accident in question occurred when defendant Janet Szczotka, traveling westbound on Ford
Road in Dearborn Heights, Michigan, allegedly turned right onto Vernon Street from the left lane,
causing a collision with the bus, which was traveling in the right lane. As a result of the accident,
plaintiff received treatment for injuries sustained in the accident and incurred bills from various
medical providers, including, as relevant here, C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists,
and Baz Eagle Transportation. In connection with the treatment these providers rendered, plaintiff
executed assignments to each of them, all of which occurred before plaintiff filed suit. In each
assignment, plaintiff transferred her right to collect insurance benefits related to the treatment she
received from each provider.

        On May 27, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking payment of personal injury protection
(“PIP”) benefits from SMART. Plaintiff alleged she incurred allowable expenses under the no-
fault act as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident; however, SMART failed to pay as
required. Plaintiff’s allowable expenses included bills from C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select
Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation.

        SMART moved for partial summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims for PIP benefits under
MCR 2.116(C)(7), MCR 2.116(C)(8), and MCR 2.116(C)(10). In its motion, SMART argued that
plaintiff was not entitled to claim PIP benefits from the medical providers because she assigned
her rights to pursue benefits claims for these services to the providers. Plaintiff opposed the
motion, arguing she had the right to pursue claims for benefits against SMART, notwithstanding
the assignments.

        During the trial court’s first hearing on SMART’s motion, the trial court adjourned to allow
supplemental briefing and to permit plaintiff to obtain revocations of the assignments. In January
2022, almost two years after the litigation started, plaintiff obtained revocations of the assignments
from C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation. In
response, SMART filed a supplemental brief arguing the revocations of the assignments were
improper because the claims assigned to the providers were barred under the one-year-back rule.
In other words, none of the providers pursued an action within one year of the denials and,
therefore, its liability for their claims already extinguished at the time plaintiff received the
revocations of assignment.

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        The trial court denied in part SMART’s motion for partial summary disposition on the basis
of the revocations.2 The trial court stated that the medical providers, as assignees, had the right to
give back plaintiff’s claims in order to pursue them and that SMART had notice that those claims
were at issue. Thus, because there was consideration exchanged for the revocations and because
granting plaintiff’s motion would “leave[e] Plaintiff[] on the hook,” the court denied SMART’s
motion as to the assigned claims. This appeal followed.

                                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Sterling
Heights Pain Mgt, PLC v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 335 Mich App 245, 249 n 1; 966
NW2d 456 (2020). The trial court granted in part and denied in part SMART’s motion for
summary disposition on the basis of assignments. Thus, we interpret the trial court’s order as
having considered the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), which states that summary disposition is
appropriate when there is “assignment or other disposition of the claim before commencement of
the action.”

        “When considering a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), it is proper for this Court
to review all the material submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the plaintiff’s claim.”
Bronson Methodist Hosp v Allstate Ins Co, 286 Mich App 219, 222; 779 NW2d 304 (2009). We
“must accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary
evidence and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 222-223.

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Under MCL 500.3107, PIP benefits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of
reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for
an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The no-fault act
allows injured claimants to pursue recovery of PIP benefits themselves or they may assign their
right to recovery to their medical providers. See Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto
Ins Co, 500 Mich 191, 217 n 40; 895 NW2d 490 (2017). A valid assignment occurs when the
assignor “manifest[s] an intent to transfer and must not retain any control or any power of
revocation.” Burkhardt v Bailey, 260 Mich App 636, 655; 680 NW2d 453 (2004) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).

        “When an assignment occurs, the assignee of a cause of action becomes the real party in
interest with respect to that cause of action, inasmuch as the assignment vests in the assignee all
rights previously held by the assignor.” Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 358872 and 358884); slip op at 5
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “A real party in interest is the one who is vested with the
right of action on a given claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The real-party-in-interest doctrine recognizes that litigation should

2
  The court granted SMART’s motion with respect to two providers that had brought their own
separate actions to recover benefits paid in connection with treatment for plaintiff. This portion of
the trial court’s order is not at issue in this appeal.

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be begun only by a party having an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy and
protects a defendant from multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action.” Id. at 6 (quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also MCR 2.201(B) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest”).

        On appeal, SMART argues that the trial court erred when it denied SMART’s motion for
partial summary disposition because plaintiff’s claims for benefits as to services rendered by C-
Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specials, and Baz Eagle Transportation were barred by the
one-year-back rule. SMART notes that plaintiff assigned to Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists,
Baz Eagle Transportation, and C-Spine Ortho the rights to collect PIP benefits from SMART for
services rendered, which divested plaintiff the right to pursue those PIP benefits. Moreover,
plaintiff did not retain the power to revoke the assignments at the time the assignments were
executed. When the medical providers revoked the assignments, they no longer had a right to
bring a cause of action against SMART because the claims were barred by the one-year-back rule.
SMART argues, therefore, that plaintiff was also barred by the one-year-back rule from pursuing
those claims.

        Relying on C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 358170 & 358171), plaintiff contends that because the
assignments were executed before plaintiff filed the lawsuit, and the revocations of the
assignments were executed after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, MCL 500.31123 provides plaintiff
with a cause of action against SMART. Specifically, plaintiff contends that she is a real party in
interest because “[t]he original assignments do not extinguish the provider’s right to recover
payment from plaintiff for bills which the provider does not receive reimbursement from the no-
fault carrier.” Plaintiff also argues that the one-year-back rule does not bar the previously assigned
claims because plaintiff’s complaint was filed on May 27, 2020, eight months after the accident.
Plaintiff also contends her claims for PIP benefits were tolled under MCL 500.3145 because
SMART sent denials to the medical providers, not to plaintiff.

       Recently, in Robinson v Szczotka, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued April 6, 2023 (Docket No. 359646),4 we addressed a factual scenario similar to that which
occurred in this case.5 There, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and thereafter

3
    MCL 500.3112 states, in relevant part:
                 Personal protection insurance benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an
         injured person or, in case of his or her death, to or for the benefit of his or her
         dependents. A health care provider listed in section 3157 may make a claim and
         assert a direct cause of action against an insurer, or under the assigned claims plan
         under sections 3171 to 3175, to recover overdue benefits payable for charges for
         products, services, or accommodations provided to an injured person.
4
  Although unpublished and, therefore, not binding, we may nevertheless consider Robinson for
its persuasive value. See Eddington v Torrez, 311 Mich App 198, 203; 874 NW2d 394 (2015).
5
  Indeed, it appears that the litigation in Robinson arose out of the same accident involving
Szczotka’s collision with the SMART bus.

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assigned her claims to her medical providers. Robinson, unpub op at 2. Like this case, after the
plaintiff filed her complaint, “she and a number of her medical providers executed ‘Mutual
Revocation[s] of Assignment(s).’ ” Id. In other words, to avoid application of the one-year-back
rule, the plaintiff sought to “revoke her assignments retroactively and litigate her own timely filed
claims.” Id.

         This Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for summary
disposition, reasoning that once the plaintiff assigned her interests to the medical providers, they
became the real parties in interest to the action. Id. at 6 (“[T]he medical providers as assignees
held the right to seek to recover the unpaid medical bills, and plaintiff no longer had a cause of
action to pursue, having transferred it away.”). The plaintiff’s creative solution—obtaining
revocations from the medical providers—did not otherwise save her claims because “one must be
the real party in interest at the time the lawsuit is filed, and a retroactive, or nunc pro tunc,
revocation may not be used to correct a factual problem that existed when the lawsuit was filed.”
Id. at 7. We explained:

       While plaintiff and her medical providers were at liberty to mutually decide to
       revoke the assignments, the revocations were effective as of the date that the
       revocations were executed and could not essentially eliminate the fact that the
       assignments had occurred prior to plaintiff filing suit. And, the medical providers
       had no timely claims to return to plaintiff as of the date of the revocations because
       the revocations occurred more than a year after services were rendered. Thus, the
       mutual revocations did not reassign any timely claims to plaintiff. [Id.]

         In this case, the majority of benefits at issue were assigned to the medical providers before
plaintiff filed her complaint. Plaintiff executed assignments to C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical,
Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation between October 2019 and January 2020. Thus,
upon execution of these assignments, these providers became the real parties in interest to the
claims for benefits, and only the providers could bring an action to recover said benefits. See
Farrar, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. After executing the assignments and during the
litigation, plaintiff obtained revocations for the assignments from C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical,
Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation in January 2022, after she filed her complaint.

        While the revocations of the assignments reassigned the providers’ claims for benefits back
to plaintiff, the revocations occurred more than a year after SMART denied the medical providers’
claims for benefits. Plaintiff and the providers executed the revocations in January 2022, and these
revocations transferred the providers’ interests to the claims for benefits back to plaintiff.
However, by the time plaintiff obtained these revocations, the providers no longer had valid claims
for benefits by operation of the one-year-back rule. See Robinson, unpub op at 7. SMART denied
Sierra Surgical’s claims on January 24, 2020, Select Specialists’ claims on February 11, 2020, Baz
Eagle Transportation’s claims on February 28, 2020, and C-Spine Ortho’s claims on April 8, 2020.
As such, the providers needed to bring an action against SMART within one year of its formal
denial, which they failed to do.

       Plaintiff’s reliance on C-Spine Orthopedics is misplaced. In that case, the injured
claimants’ claims were assigned to the plaintiff, C-Spine, in exchange for treatment resulting from
an automobile accident. C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2. C-Spine, in

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turn, assigned many of its accounts, including the claimants’ at issue, to factoring companies that
“provide financing to businesses with cash flow issues by purchasing outstanding invoices at a
discounted rate.” Id. After the litigation was started by C-Spine, the factoring companies entered
into counter-assignment agreements transferring back to C-Spine the rights they acquired. Id. This
Court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendant,
concluding that C-Spine, as the real party in interest, had standing to bring the initial suit, and the
counter-assignments permitted C-Spine to continue to pursue the action. Id. at 3-4.

       In contrast with C-Spine Orthopedics, however, when the transfer of the beneficial interest
from the medical providers to plaintiff occurred in this case, the medical providers did not transfer
an interest in a claim to which liability attached. When the medical providers revoked their
assignments for the benefit of plaintiff to pursue her claims after the litigation began, the medical
providers could no longer recover their claims by operation of the one-year-back rule. See MCL
500.3145. This issue was not present in C-Spine Orthopedics.

        Plaintiff attempts to sidestep this issue further by contending that MCL 500.3145(3) tolls
her claims for benefits because she never received a formal denial from SMART and she filed her
complaint in May 2020. Under that statutory section, “[a] period of limitations applicable . . . to
the commencement of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific
claim for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim.” MCL
500.3145(3). Plaintiff’s argument is ultimately unconvincing, however, because at the time
SMART denied the claims, the medical providers were the real parties in interest regarding
plaintiff’s claims for benefits under the executed assignments.

       By January 2022, when plaintiff obtained the revocations, each provider’s right to collect
on these claims for benefits had already been extinguished by the one-year-back rule. Thus, there
remained no actionable causes of action to give back to plaintiff. Therefore, the trial court erred
in denying in part SMART’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims as it relates to
the benefits plaintiff assigned to C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle
Transportation before she filed her complaint.

        Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction. SMART, as the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                               /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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