Court Opinion

ID: 9710977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:56.439523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.538435
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
In deciding whether to conduct all or part of a criminal trial in the absence of the accused, the court is governed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and by Ind. Code § 35-1-28-1, (Burns 1975) which provides that:
“No person prosecuted for any offense punishable by death, or by confinement in the state prison or county jail, shall be tried unless personally present during the trial.”
Even if appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in conducting the trial in his absence can be satisfactorily resolved insofar as it is based upon the constitutions, by resort to federal and state waiver principles, that claim cannot be so resolved by resort to those same principles insofar as it is based upon the above statute. In Miles v. State, (1944) 222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E.2d 779, this Court traced the common law background of the statute and concluded that the statute did more than merely guarantee a personal privilege of the accused. It sought to further the interest of society and the judiciary in the fairness and appearance of fairness of criminal trials. After reciting that the right of trial by jury to counsel and to be confronted by the witnesses may be waived, *594the court in making reference to the statute in its opinion said:
“If the statute, which is declaratory of the commonlaw practice, is to be given greater force even than these constitutional privileges it must be because of a public interest to be found behind the rule. We have already suggested the possibility that the common-law judges found that interest in forestalling contentions of prejudicial proceedings in accused’s absence. We see no reason why that same public interest does not now exist. Insistence upon the regularity of the proceedings gives stability to the criminal jurisprudence.” 222 Ind. at 317, 53 N.E.2d at 781.
The trial of a person who is not personally present demeans public confidence in the fairness of our system of criminal justice. The statute seeks to prevent this loss of public confidence. Accordingly, I would hold that such trials are not permitted even if the accused freely and voluntarily chooses to be tried in absentia, unless absolute necessity, such as that presented by the conduct of the defendant which threatens serious disruption of the proceedings, requires his absence.
Note. — Reported at 377 N.E.2d 628.