Court Opinion

ID: 9652931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:35:28.690672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:55.239106
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Art. I, § 18(a), Constitution of Missouri, provides “That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation * * *.”
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States, provides “In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; * *
The above provisions are satisfied when the charging instrument, here an “information,” tells an accused what the prosecution claims he did and the crime or crimes for which a conviction will be sought. As long as the essential differences between a homicide charged (e. g. capital murder) and the homicide convicted of (e. g. second degree murder) are purely the severity or degree of the mental intent of the accused there is no difficulty in applying the rule that a charge of the higher includes a charge of the lower. The overt acts are the same for both offenses and by charging the mental intent required for the higher the mental intent required for the lower is necessarily *837part of the higher.1 No additional or different fact need be proven or element satisfied to authorize a conviction of second degree murder than those shown for capital murder.
However, when the hybrid offenses which are pure creatures of statute are considered, the foregoing is not true, regardless of what name is given to the offense. The offense now called murder in the first degree set forth in § 565.003 requires for its commission that the defendant (1) perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate the felonies of arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping, and (2) that he kill someone unlawfully while so doing but without regard to whether the accused had a premeditated intent to kill. In short, the prosecution need not prove and the jury need not find the accused intended to kill the deceased in order to find the accused guilty of a violation of § 565.003 (first degree murder).
Second degree murder, the alleged lesser included offense, requires for its commission the premeditated intent to kill, and the jury must so find in order to convict of that offense. That another felony was being perpetrated when the killing occurred is not necessary to murder in the second degree.
It is apparent that the intent to kill required in second degree murder is not an element of first degree murder and, therefore, second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense of first degree murder as defined in § 565.003 because first degree does not include all of the legal elements of second degree. State v. Smith, 592 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Mo.banc 1979). Because it is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder it is not an offense that is included in the charge of first degree murder. State v. Smith, supra.
“A court may not instruct on an offense not specifically charged in the information or indictment unless it is a lesser included offense. This is because due process requires that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense not charged in the information or indictment.” State v. Smith, supra at 165. To convict a person of a crime not charged violates due process rights. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). In my opinion a conviction on a crime not charged denies an accused the constitutional right to notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. Art. I, § 18(a), Constitution of Missouri; Amendment VI, Constitution of United States.
The principal opinion does not hold that second degree murder was properly submitted as a lesser included offense of the crime denominated in § 565.003, called first degree murder, but rather justifies the submission of second degree murder upon a § 556.220, RSMo 1969, which, inter alia, appears to authorize a jury to find a defendant “guilty of any degree of such offense inferior to that charged in the indictment.” I do not believe the General Assembly intended, by § 556.220, to authorize a court or jury to commit an unconstitutional act and therefore do not agree that § 556.220 was intended to or does authorize the submission of an offense not charged in the information or necessarily included in the specific charge found in the information. Certainly a statute cannot legalize what is illegal under our state and federal constitutions.
Nor does the principal opinion hold that the charge of first degree murder necessarily included second degree murder and it is clear, under the criteria set forth in State v. Smith, supra, that it does not do so.
The point is that by charging a person with a homicide that does not require an intent to kill (§ 565.003) it cannot be said that he is on notice that the prosecution will attempt to convict him of a homicide that does require an intent to kill (§ 565.004).
Given the definitions of first and second degree murder in Missouri (§§ 565.003 and 565.004), due process prohibits the submis*838sion of second degree murder on a charge of first degree murder.
I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the second degree murder conviction.

. However, many problems would be solved and appeal time shortened if prosecutors simply set forth in the information or indictment the crimes the prosecutor intends to submit— whether technically lesser included or not.