Court Opinion

ID: 9964761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 19:01:09.118058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:41.434476
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 23-1761
MONICA L. RONGERE,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

CITY OF ROCKFORD,
                                                Defendant-Appellee.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
         No. 3:19-cv-50133 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
                    ____________________

    ARGUED FEBRUARY 5, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 30, 2024
                ____________________

   Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Monica Rongere worked for the City
of Rockford as Diversity Procurement Officer, though she of-
ten had other responsibilities beyond that role. On a few oc-
casions, Rongere expressed to her supervisors that she felt
overworked and underpaid, particularly compared to her
male colleagues. Her supervisors, however, believed Rongere
was failing to meet performance expectations. Ultimately, the
City terminated Rongere’s employment, citing her
2                                                  No. 23-1761

performance issues. Not convinced by the City’s justification,
Rongere sued the City under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Illinois Human Rights Act,
the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and Illinois common law,
bringing equal pay, sex discrimination, hostile work environ-
ment, and retaliation claims. At summary judgment, the dis-
trict court ruled for the City on the EPA, Title VII, and IHRA
claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the remaining state-
law claims. Rongere appealed. Because Rongere does not
identify adequate comparators for her equal pay and sex dis-
crimination claims, does not show that she engaged in pro-
tected activity based on an objectively reasonable belief for
her retaliation claim, does not present sufficient evidence of a
hostile work environment, and does not explain how the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction
over the remaining claims, we affirm.
                               I
   Although we ordinarily take the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to the party opposing summary judgment, in this
case, as we discuss further below, the district court rejected
many of Monica Rongere’s facts because of violations of Local
Rule 56.1 regarding how a party opposing summary judg-
ment must respond to the movant. We therefore proceed
based on the district court’s account of the facts.
     In 2016, Rongere began working for the City of Rockford,
Illinois, as Diversity Procurement Oﬃcer. In her role, Rongere
oversaw the City’s women- and minority-owned business en-
terprise program. Her duties included connecting with mi-
nority business owners in the community, encouraging them
to bid on City projects, monitoring vendor wages, and ensur-
ing compliance with federal and state wage laws. Nicholas
No. 23-1761                                                  3

Meyer, the City’s Legal Director, served as Rongere’s direct
supervisor. Rongere also worked with the City’s mayor,
Thomas McNamara.
   The City informed Rongere when it hired her that, within
about six months, her role would organically transition to
Citywide Grant Oﬃcer. Indeed, within a few days of starting,
she received a box of grant documents to manage and review,
and her supervisors acknowledged the expansion of
Rongere’s duties to cover overall contract compliance. Ulti-
mately, however, Rongere retained the title of Diversity Pro-
curement Oﬃcer for her entire employment with the City. For
her part, Rongere periodically expressed to Meyer that she
should be paid more and that she did substantially more work
than her role required. Additionally, Rongere told her super-
visors that she believed she was paid the same or less than her
male counterparts despite shouldering a heavier workload.
However, she admits that she did not actually know her col-
leagues’ salaries while she worked for the City.
    Rongere identiﬁed Michael Hakanson and Karl Franzen as
male colleagues who were compensated more than she was
despite working substantially less. According to Rongere,
Hakanson and Franzen were both “senior managers” just like
she was. More speciﬁcally, Hakanson served as Land Trans-
action Oﬃcer. In that role, Hakanson managed real estate
transactions, inspected properties, negotiated sales, con-
ducted title searches, and prepared miscellaneous real estate
documents. Hakanson’s salary equaled Rongere’s salary
throughout her employment. Franzen, who did earn more
than Rongere, started with the City as Economic Develop-
ment Coordinator. His duties included managing the City’s
economic development programs, helping retain and expand
4                                                  No. 23-1761

existing businesses, and seeking out new businesses for the
City.
    Over time, Rongere began to fall short of the City’s expec-
tations. For example, in the fall of 2017, the City planned a
meeting with women- and minority-owned businesses to re-
ceive feedback on the business enterprise program. Rongere
unexpectedly did not run the meeting, and Mayor McNamara
had to step in, much to his dissatisfaction. He voiced his dis-
pleasure to Meyer, who agreed that Rongere did not manage
the meeting properly. While Meyer did not directly discipline
Rongere for her performance at the meeting, he explained to
her that she would need to take the lead at the next one. Yet,
due to a lack of communication and poor management, no
subsequent meeting ever took place, again, to Mayor
McNamara’s disappointment. Meyer also grew frustrated
with Rongere’s communication style, particularly when she
raised concerns about certain projects but then failed to follow
up on them, thus leaving problems unresolved.
    Rongere viewed things diﬀerently. In her opinion, it was
the poor communication and workplace conduct of her super-
visors and colleagues that was unprofessional and ineﬃcient.
For instance, Rongere testiﬁed that male colleagues talked
down to her, ignored her, left her out of meetings, and kept
her out of making important decisions. Further, she was not
allowed to attend certain work conferences, unlike her male
colleagues. And she had to keep track of her paid time oﬀ and
complete her own administrative tasks while her male col-
leagues did not.
   Rongere’s relationship with the City reached its boiling
point in June 2018, when Rongere met with Meyer and reiter-
ated her complaints about her unequal treatment. Two days
No. 23-1761                                                    5

later, Meyer met with Rongere again and informed her that
the City was terminating her employment based on job per-
formance issues. Meyer sent Rongere a letter stating the same.
The letter was the ﬁrst written notiﬁcation from the City that
she failed to meet performance standards.
    Rongere, unconvinced by the City’s reasoning, instead be-
lieved her termination stemmed from her complaints. Ac-
cordingly, she sued the City and brought the following
claims: (1) equal pay and retaliation claims under the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); (2) sex discrimination, retaliation,
and hostile work environment claims under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775
ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.; (3) a retaliation claim under the Illinois
Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq.; and (4) an Illinois
common law retaliatory discharge claim.
    At the conclusion of discovery, the City moved for sum-
mary judgment on all claims. The district court ﬁrst noted that
Rongere failed to properly dispute the City’s statement of ma-
terial facts in violation of Local Rule 56.1. It therefore deemed
several of the City’s factual statements admitted. The court
then ruled for the City on the EPA, IHRA, and Title VII claims,
but it relinquished its jurisdiction over the remaining Illinois
Whistleblower Act and common law retaliatory discharge
claims. This timely appeal followed.
                               II
   As a preliminary matter, Rongere challenges the district
court’s conclusion that she violated Local Rule 56.1. Local
Rule 56.1 explains how a party opposing summary judgment
must respond to the movant’s statement of facts: “A response
may not set forth any new facts, meaning facts that are not
6                                                   No. 23-1761

fairly responsive to the asserted fact to which the response is
made.” N.D. Ill. Loc. R. 56.1(e)(2). “[D]istrict courts may re-
quire strict compliance with their local rules—a point we have
recognized time and again.” Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis,
966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020). We review their enforcement
for an abuse of discretion, and further give a district court’s
interpretation of its local rules “considerable weight.” Id.
    A review of Rongere’s responses to the City’s statement of
material facts leads us to conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion. Most of Rongere’s responses did not
address the City’s statements and instead articulated wholly
irrelevant and argumentative positions about her unfair
workload and treatment. As an example, consider paragraph
13 in the City’s statement of material facts, which the district
court deemed admitted:
       During the course of Plaintiff’s employment,
       Michael Hakanson held the position of Land
       Transaction Officer for the City. … The qualifi-
       cations and distinguishing features for the posi-
       tion of Land Transaction Officer for the City are
       contained in the job description for that posi-
       tion.
In response, Rongere disputed paragraph 13 by stating,
“Plaintiﬀ was working much more than Hakansan [sic] and
Franzen and she was being paid for one position when she
was being made to ﬁll two.” But the City’s factual statement
had nothing to do with how much Hakanson worked com-
pared to Rongere, nor did it oppose Rongere’s assertion that
she eﬀectively worked two positions. Rongere’s response
thus set forth “new facts” not “fairly responsive” to the City’s
assertions. The district court acted well within its discretion
No. 23-1761                                                    7

to ﬁnd the response, and many like it, deﬁcient and in viola-
tion of Local Rule 56.1.
    In the few instances where Rongere identiﬁes statements
that she may have properly disputed under Local Rule 56.1,
she altogether fails to explain how those factual disputes
would have changed the district court’s summary judgment
ruling. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (noting
that a party seeking to set a judgment aside because of an er-
roneous ruling carries the burden of showing prejudice); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must
disregard all errors and defects that do not aﬀect any party’s
substantial rights.”). For example, Rongere spends considera-
ble time discussing paragraphs 5 through 8 of the City’s state-
ment of material facts. Her main objection to those statements
is their general assertion that her “role as the Diversity Pro-
curement Oﬃcer was never expanded.” Rongere disputes
that contention with evidence that the City divided her job
into two separate roles following her termination. But even if
that dispute complied with Local Rule 56.1, Rongere fails to
show how it would have changed the district court’s sum-
mary judgment analysis, merely stating in conclusory fashion
that the factual dispute is “critical” to her EPA and Title VII
claims. Indeed, as will be evident below, the facts Rongere
disputes have no bearing on the resolution of her claims.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in ﬁnding
that Rongere’s responses to the City’s statement of material
facts violated Local Rule 56.1. At most, any error by the dis-
trict court was harmless. See Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575,
579–80 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that any error caused by the dis-
trict court’s invocation of a local rule did not aﬀect Stanciel’s
substantial rights and was therefore harmless).
8                                                   No. 23-1761

                               III
    Rongere challenges the district court’s summary judgment
ruling on her EPA, IHRA, and Title VII claims. We review a
summary judgment order de novo, construing the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor. James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307,
314 (7th Cir. 2020).
                               A
    We ﬁrst turn to Rongere’s equal pay claim. To demonstrate
a prima facie case under the EPA, a plaintiﬀ must establish
“(1) that diﬀerent wages are paid to employees of the opposite
sex; (2) that the employees do equal work which requires
equal skill, eﬀort, and responsibility; and (3) that the employ-
ees have similar working conditions.” Markel v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2002) (quo-
tation omitted). Under the second element, the plaintiﬀ must
show that the jobs being compared are “substantially equal”
based on job performance and content rather than job titles,
classiﬁcations, or descriptions. Id. at 913. Simply, the plaintiﬀ
must show a “common core of tasks” that makes a signiﬁcant
portion of the jobs “identical.” Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626,
632 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).
   Rongere cannot show that she and her comparators,
Hakanson and Franzen, had substantially equal jobs for the
City. The only evidence she presents is that all three employ-
ees held “senior manager” roles. But a job title is not enough.
Rongere’s job in substance, through her day-to-day tasks and
duties, diﬀered considerably from the jobs of Hakanson and
Franzen. Rongere, as Diversity Procurement Oﬃcer (and, ac-
cepting her assertion that she eﬀectively worked two roles, as
No. 23-1761                                                    9

Citywide Grant Oﬃcer), oversaw community outreach to di-
verse businesses and reviewed grant applications. Hakanson,
as Land Transaction Oﬃcer, managed real estate transactions,
negotiations, and inspections. And Franzen, as Economic De-
velopment Coordinator, organized and implemented the
City’s economic development programs to retain existing
businesses and seek out new ones. Rongere does not dispute
the core duties of her comparators’ roles. In fact, she all but
concedes her claim, acknowledging in brieﬁng that the senior
managers are all responsible for diﬀerent departments and
that “the actual work is diﬀerent.” That ends our inquiry.
Without proper comparators, Rongere’s equal pay claim can-
not survive summary judgment.
                               B
    Rongere next seeks reversal on her Title VII and IHRA sex
discrimination claims. These claims proceed under nearly
identical standards, so we address them together. See Bagwe
v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 n.39
(7th Cir. 2016). Rongere brings her sex discrimination claims
under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See
generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Under that framework, a plaintiﬀ must ﬁrst establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ.,
424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005). To establish a prima facie
case, a plaintiﬀ must show that “(1) she is a member of a pro-
tected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate
performance expectations; (3) she suﬀered an adverse em-
ployment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than
similarly situated male employees.” Id. If the plaintiﬀ meets
her burden, the defendant must provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action. Then, the burden shifts back to
10                                                    No. 23-1761

the plaintiﬀ to prove that the proﬀered reasons were mere
pretext. Id.
    The district court granted summary judgment to the City
for two alternative reasons: (1) Rongere failed to identify sim-
ilarly situated employees for her prima facie case, and (2) she
did not prove that the City’s reasons for her termination were
pretextual. While Rongere wrestles with the district court’s
second reason on appeal, she ignores the ﬁrst in her opening
brief (though she addresses it in her reply). This issue may
have been waived, see Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817,
821 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In situations in which there is one or more
alternative holdings on an issue, we have stated that failure to
address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any claim of
error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue.”)
(cleaned up), but if not, we agree with the district court’s res-
olution of the question.
    Typically, when identifying similarly situated employees,
a plaintiﬀ “must at least show that the comparators (1) ‘dealt
with the same supervisor,’ (2) ‘were subject to the same stand-
ards,’ and (3) ‘engaged in similar conduct without such dif-
ferentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.’” Coleman
v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 847 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation omit-
ted). Rongere falls short on the third prong. She had to show
that a male employee with a similar performance history as
her did not lose his job. See Simpson v. Franciscan All., Inc., 827
F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (“An employee who does not have
a similar disciplinary history and performance record as the
plaintiﬀ is not similarly situated.”). She did not. The record
does not establish that Hakanson, Franzen, or any other male
employee fell short of job expectations yet evaded
No. 23-1761                                                  11

termination. In fact, Rongere has not pointed to any evidence
of subpar work performed by any other colleague.
    Rongere instead reiterates a point she has stressed
throughout her case: Hakanson and Franzen worked fewer
hours than her and did not have to perform the same admin-
istrative and trivial tasks that she did, despite earning more
money. But this argument cannot save her claim. First,
Rongere never characterized her overwork as an adverse em-
ployment action for Title VII purposes. And second, even if
she had, her sex discrimination claim would still fail under an
overwork theory for the same reason as her equal pay claim:
Hakanson and Franzen’s jobs materially diﬀered from hers,
so even if they were treated more favorably by having to work
less, they would not qualify as similarly situated employees.
    While the similarly situated inquiry is ﬂexible, it is meant
to eliminate confounding explanatory variables between em-
ployees such that a reasonable jury can infer discriminatory
animus. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841, 846. By not articulating
how other male employees were “directly comparable” to her
“in all material respects,” id. at 846 (quotation omitted),
Rongere did not eliminate those confounding variables that
could explain away her termination or her comparatively
higher workload; she therefore failed to meet her prima facie
burden. In turn, we need not address her arguments regard-
ing pretext.
                               C
    Rongere fares no better on her retaliation claims. She
brought her claims under Title VII, the EPA, and the IHRA,
which are all analyzed under the same framework. See Volling
v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 382–83 (7th Cir.
12                                                  No. 23-1761

2016) (Title VII and IHRA); Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d
540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005) (Title VII and EPA). A plaintiﬀ must
prove three elements for a retaliation claim: (1) she engaged
in protected activity; (2) she suﬀered an adverse employment
action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the ad-
verse employment action and the protected activity. Miller v.
Polaris Labs., LLC, 797 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 2015). To satisfy
the ﬁrst prong, the plaintiﬀ must show that she held an objec-
tively reasonable belief that the action she opposed violated
the law. Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752–53 (7th
Cir. 2002). The district court granted summary judgment to
the City based on this requirement, concluding that no rea-
sonable jury could ﬁnd that Rongere reasonably believed that
she was paid less than her male counterparts or was otherwise
discriminated against based on her sex. We agree.
    Rongere’s principal complaint to the City was her belief
that she was paid less than her male coworkers in violation of
the EPA and Title VII. Of course, as Rongere notes, a retalia-
tion claim does not fail simply because, as we have concluded
here, the underlying conduct of the employer did not violate
the relevant statute as a matter of law. See id. at 752. However,
the record must still support an objectively reasonable belief
that the employer violated the law by paying male employees
more than female employees. Here, Rongere has not identi-
ﬁed evidence in the record supporting such a reasonable be-
lief. As discussed above, Rongere admits that her compara-
tors’ jobs diﬀered as to the actual work required, so she cannot
have reasonably believed that her employer paid male em-
ployees more than female employees for the same work. Even
more fatal to her argument, Rongere testiﬁed that she did not
know the salaries of other senior managers while she worked
for the City. We therefore have no trouble concluding that
No. 23-1761                                                   13

Rongere did not hold an objectively reasonable belief that the
City paid male employees more than female employees for
the same work.
    Rongere also invokes her overwork theory once more,
stressing that she eﬀectively worked two positions while her
male colleagues only worked one, performed additional ad-
ministrative tasks, and consequently could not take vacation
time like her male colleagues. But overwork alone is not ac-
tionable under the EPA, Title VII, or the IHRA. Rather, a “pro-
hibited motive” is required. See Lord v. High Voltage Software,
Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). To support the existence
of an objectively reasonable belief, Rongere needed at least
some evidence showing that her comparatively higher work-
load might have been based on her sex, but the record lacks
such facts. Cf. Fine, 305 F.3d at 752 (concluding that the plain-
tiﬀ had an objectively reasonable belief based on a substantial
and detailed record that included coworkers’ shared belief
that female employees were demoted based on their sex).
Working longer hours and performing more administrative
tasks than male colleagues with completely diﬀerent jobs
does not, without more, support an objectively reasonable be-
lief that the diﬀerential treatment stemmed from sex discrim-
ination. And as far as her lack of vacation time, Rongere her-
self chose not to take it due to her workload, and the City paid
out the unused vacation time upon her termination. That fact
oﬀers nothing to support an inferential leap toward discrimi-
natory conduct.
    Finally, Rongere notes that she met with her supervisors
multiple times and reiterated her belief that the City treated
male employees more favorably than her. She also empha-
sizes the suspicious timing of her termination, mere days after
14                                                 No. 23-1761

making her most direct complaints to Meyer. But while we do
not doubt the sincerity of Rongere’s belief, without evidence
of a discriminatory motive, that sincerity cannot transform
her belief into an objectively reasonable one. See id. And as to
the suspicious timing of her termination, that fact is indeed
relevant support for causation, see Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860
(noting suspicious timing as circumstantial evidence relevant
to proving causation), but it has no bearing on whether her
beliefs of sex discrimination and unequal pay were objectively
reasonable. Therefore, Rongere’s retaliation claims cannot
survive summary judgment.
                               D
    Finally, Rongere brings hostile work environment claims
under Title VII and the IHRA. As in previous sections, the ap-
plicable Title VII and IHRA standards are the same. Mahran v.
Advoc. Christ Med. Ctr., 12 F.4th 708, 714 (7th Cir. 2021). To
survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment
claim, a plaintiﬀ must show: (1) her work environment was
objectively and subjectively oﬀensive; (2) the harassment was
based on membership in a protected class or in retaliation for
protected behavior; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive;
and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Boss v. Castro,
816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th Cir. 2016). We consider hostile work en-
vironment claims based on the totality of the circumstances.
Id. “Deciding whether a work environment is hostile requires
consideration of factors like the frequency of improper con-
duct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or hu-
miliating (as opposed to a mere oﬀensive utterance), and
whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work
performance.” Id. To qualify as severe or pervasive under the
third prong, the conduct must be “extreme” considering all
No. 23-1761                                                  15

the circumstances. Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriﬀ’s Oﬀ., 989 F.3d
587, 600 (7th Cir. 2021).
    Rongere’s evidence falls well short of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim. Rongere spends the bulk of her argument em-
phasizing that hostile work environment claims typically in-
volve fact-intensive questions to be decided by a jury. That is
true, but not when the undisputed facts show nothing ap-
proaching severe or pervasive conduct such that a reasonable
jury would ﬁnd in her favor. Rongere’s evidence can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) After making complaints about her
pay and treatment, her supervisors would not return her
emails or acknowledge her presence; (2) she had to work
much longer hours and much harder than her colleagues; and
(3) she was spoken down to, ignored, and kept out of deci-
sions. While these facts might support a frustrating work en-
vironment, they do not support a hostile one under the law.
Aside from testifying generally that she “was talked down
to,” ignored, and “condescended to by males,” Rongere does
not identify speciﬁc statements or actions that could serve as
evidence of the severe or pervasive conduct she must show.
And the rest of her complaints are largely “about overwork
rather than about a place permeated with intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult. Such frustrations do not support a hostile
work environment claim … .” Boss, 816 F.3d at 920.
                              IV
   Having concluded that the district court properly granted
summary judgment, we must briefly address whether the
court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction over
Rongere’s remaining state-law claims. RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP
Prods. N.A., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012) “When fed-
eral claims drop out of the case, leaving only state-law claims,
16                                                 No. 23-1761

the district court has broad discretion to decide whether to
keep the case or relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672 F.3d at 478. In deter-
mining whether to relinquish jurisdiction, a district court
should weigh the factors of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity. Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d
1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994). “A general presumption in favor of
relinquishment applies and is particularly strong where …
the state-law claims are complex and raise unsettled legal is-
sues.” RWJ Mgmt., 672 F.3d at 478.
     The district court relinquished jurisdiction over the re-
maining Illinois Whistleblower Act claim and the related re-
taliatory discharge claim because they involved ambiguous
and unsettled issues of statutory interpretation. Specifically,
while the district court acknowledged that the judicial econ-
omy factor favored retaining jurisdiction, it observed that the
unique facts of the case—where a whistleblower worked for
the government—favored relinquishing jurisdiction to allow
Illinois courts to determine how the Illinois Whistleblower
Act might apply to such facts. Rongere does not contest that
analysis on appeal, and we will not fashion arguments on her
behalf. See Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]e are not in the business of formulating arguments for
the parties.”) (quotation omitted). The district court acted
within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction over the re-
maining claims.
                                                     AFFIRMED