Court Opinion

ID: 9544422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:32.844374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:56.803779
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
As recognized by the majority, what appears to be the greater number of the courts, upon considering this same question, have held to the contrary. These courts, including the courts of California and Washington, instead of seeking the “policy” of the guest statute, have considered the terms of the statute. In doing so, these courts have, in effect, applied the recognized rule that the guest statute, as a statute in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed against limiting common law remedies. Accordingly, these courts have held that the term “transported” has the common and accepted meaning of “carried” or “conveyed” and that when a plaintiff is not being “carried” or “conveyed” at the time of an accident he is not then being “transported” so as to come within the terms of the guest statute.① I agree with those decisions and with that approach to this issue.
The majority, however, would extend and expand application of the limitations imposed by the guest statute by seeking to find the “policy” of the guest statute as a whole, rather than by giving meaning to a *262term which the legislature has included in the statute. The majority says that if the result reached by this process is “harsh,” the remedy is for the legislature to modify or repeal the statute.
When, upon giving the terms of a statute their common and accepted meaning a harsh result is required, it is not unusual for a court to make such a suggestion to the legislature. It seems incongruous, however, for the majority to offer such a suggestion when such a “harsh result” could be easily avoided by a simple application of the terms of this statute. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

 See, for example, McCann v. Terhune, 12 Mich App 364, 162 NW2d 906 (1968).