Court Opinion

ID: 8203024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 23:42:58.699594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:00.556518
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 32. (dissenting). The majority acknowledges the presumption of constitutionality but fails to apply it to the retroactivity provision of 1997 Wis. Act 89. Had it applied the presumption, the legislation would pass constitutional muster. Even under the Martin test that the majority purports to apply, the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) must be upheld.
¶ 33. Retroactive legislation is presumed constitutional. Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995). Challengers bear a heavy burden to "prove the law to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46-47, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973). Despite the continued validity of these principles, the majority pays only lip service to the existence of the presumption and fails to demonstrate the application of the burden of proof.
¶ 34. Instead, the majority attempts to undercut the presumption of constitutionality by implying that the unsettling effect of retroactive legislation and the suspicion with which it is viewed in some way diminish the import of the presumption. Majority op. at ¶ 16. However, this misses the mark.
¶ 35. The unsettling effect and suspicion surrounding retroactive legislation explain the existence and application of the balancing test. Although retroactive legislation may be viewed with suspicion, constitutional restrictions on such legislation "are of limited scope." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267 (1994). Thus, the presumption of constitutionality and the burden of proof remain unaffected as part of the "established legal framework" within which the Martin balancing test occurs. Majority op. at ¶ 15. Had *430the majority applied the presumption, the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) would have survived the present constitutional challenge.
¶ 36. Having failed to apply the presumption of constitutionality, the majority also fails to apply the Martin test. In Martin, this court set forth the balancing test we must undertake in an analysis of retroactive legislation: "[W]e must weigh the public interest served by the retroactive statute against the private interests that are overturned by it." Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201.
¶ 37. Applying the balancing test, the Martin court concluded that the private interests abrogated by the retroactive statute that placed a cap on non-economic damages far outweighed the public interests served by the statute. As to the first part of its analysis, the court noted the "minimal, if any, public interest served by applying the retroactive cap" to limit a tort victim's recovery for damages. Id. at 211. The court concluded that aside from the "generic comments" offered in favor of caps on non-economic damages, there was a dearth of evidence supporting the assertion that the cap would lower medical malpractice costs or ensure health care in the future. Id.
¶ 38. The Martin court then examined the private interests at stake, including considerations of fundamental fairness, and observed the significant interest in preserving the substantive right of a tort victim to collect unlimited damages. Id. at 198. Retroactive application of the cap on damages would impair a fixed right to unlimited damages that had previously vested to the most severely injured of tort victims. Id. at 209. Balancing the two competing interests, the Martin court held the statute unconstitutional.
*431¶ 39. In the present case, the inverse situation exists: a dubious private interest balanced against significant public interests. The majority first considers the private interests affected by the retroactive legislation. It recognizes the private interests of ANPAC but primarily focuses its discussion on the private interests of the individual who may purchase insurance in reliance upon the cap on damages under the prior statute. Majority op. at ¶ 22.
¶ 40. At first blush, the majority's discussion holds some appeal. Upon closer examination, however, the discussion evades the reality that loss of society and companionship represents only one of several items of damages that may be attributable to the tortfeasor. More often than not, loss of society and companionship is coupled with other items of damages, including past and future pain and suffering, past and future wage loss, or past and future medical expenses. Generally, the exposure to financial liability under these types of damages far outweighs the financial exposure attributable to loss of society and companionship.
¶ 41. The suggestion is simplistic that insureds rely on reduced coverage because of the existence of the $150,000 cap on loss of society and companionship claims. There is no evidence that the amount of the damage cap for loss of society and companionship in and of itself was, or likely would have been, a consideration in determining the level of underinsured motorist coverage purchased.
¶ 42. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the majority's suggestion that the retroactive legislation frustrates an insurer's reasonable expectations of its exposure to liability. Majority op. at ¶ 21. Insurers like ANPAC sell policies with varying levels of cover*432age and charge premiums accordingly. When an insurer sells a certain level of coverage, be it $500,000 or $250,000 per person, its limit of liability is fixed at that amount.
¶ 43. This limit does not parse claims for loss of society and companionship from claims for past and future medical expenses or from claims for past and future wage loss. The exposure to liability is not increased beyond the level for which the insurer contracted and retained a premium. Here the record reflects that the limit of liability was $250,000 and the premium charged was $33. Nothing in the record suggests that the premium was in any way affected to account for the $150,000 cap on loss of society and companionship. Thus, any assertion of ANPAC's reliance to its detriment is tenuous.
¶ 44. In the absence of evidence in the record, the majority's claim is unpersuasive that the increase in caps will invade substantive vested rights of individual insureds or the insurers. However, it is against this unpersuasive premise that the majority then examines the public interests at stake.
¶ 45. The majority next identifies the public interests potentially served by this legislation, each of which it then dismisses. First, the majority concedes that tort law is intended to provide full compensation to injured parties. Majority op. at ¶ 25. However, the majority then attempts to reconcile its concession by deferring to the legislature's imposed limits on recovery in various re-formulations of the wrongful death statute. Majority op. at ¶¶ 25-26. According to the majority, since the legislature set the maximum damage amount at $150,000 at the time of the plaintiffs injury, that amount is necessarily full compensation.
*433¶ 46. The majority's deference to the policy choices of the legislature is at odds with the majority's simultaneous disapproval of the legislature's choice to enact retroactive legislation affording tort victims a greater measure of damages. A determination that the legislature is the final arbiter of determining compensation cannot also conclude that the legislature has no power to modify the amount of compensation as it sees fit.
¶ 47. Another public interest, access to the courts and legal counsel, is acknowledged by the majority. Yet, the majority misses its significance. The majority suggests that increasing the potential value of a wrongful death cause of action, so as to make representation by counsel more likely, is an interest served only by prospective legislation. Majority op. at ¶ 28.
¶48. The legislation at issue in this case was enacted in April 1998. Assuming a three-year statute of limitations, there still exist causes of action that can be brought, but that might not be litigated, because the potential for recovery remains so limited. As in the present case, if the wrongful death damages are sought in a complex automobile accident case or a medical malpractice case, and no other damages such as wage loss or pain and suffering are available, it may be difficult to find an attorney willing to undertake incurring the enormous costs of trial preparation when faced with such a limited potential for recovery. Such litigation often requires the hiring of expert witnesses, deposition costs, and days of preparation for a lengthy trial. The costs and attorneys fees alone could easily exceed the cap.
¶ 49. Given their proper due, the public interests served by the retroactive legislation at issue far outweigh the private interests. Unlike in Martin, where *434this court found the "minimal public interest" to be outweighed by a significant private interest, 192 Wis. 2d at 211, this case presents us with private interests of a dubious nature outweighed by legitimate and significant public interests. Adding the presumption of constitutionality to this analysis tips the scales even farther from the majority's conclusion.
¶ 50. The majority neither applies the presumption of constitutionality nor properly applies the Martin test to uphold this retroactive legislation. I conclude that ANPAC has failed to meet its burden of proving the challenged legislation unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 51. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissenting opinion.