Court Opinion

ID: 9492279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:37:16.522189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:13.747813
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Today our citizens have lost a little more freedom. The majority, unwittingly, completely obliterates the bright line that exists between mere suspicion and probable cause to search a vehicle. Justice O’Con-nor once wrote “[a] citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986). Although we have evolved from the more rigid two-pronged standard relating to probable cause,5 nevertheless, the Court has been quite specific in adhering to the difference between “particularized suspicion” to make an investigatory stop and probable cause to search a vehicle. Cf. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (“reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish *757probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”) Under the so-called Terry stop, (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), which the Supreme Court has recently indicated governs routine traffic stops, without a custodial arrest there can be no generalized search of a vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998).
The majority opinion relies upon Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), which states that “probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317. However, in utilizing such a definition it should be clear that the Court in no way intended to obliterate the line between mere suspicion and a substantial probability that criminal activity was afoot. In Gates, the Court was faced with the adequacy of a search warrant and emphasized that a reviewing magistrate’s probable cause determination must be based upon “a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding]’ that a search ivould uncover evidence of wrongdoing.... ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Probable cause means probability, not merely a suspicion, that an officer might find contraband. Gates illustrated the difference in the standards citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933), a case which involved liquor shipped illegally into the' United States. The Nathanson Court pointed out that where an officer simply believes that “he has cause to suspect and does believe” that liquor will be found on certain premises, his belief is not sufficient to create probable cause for a warrant to issue. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 44, 54 S.Ct. 11). As the Gates Court stated, “[a]n affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and the wholly coneluso-ry statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement.’,’ Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
It is clear that, if anything, the officer’s search of Neumann’s car was based on nothing more than an inchoate suspicion that the vehicle might contain an alcoholic container. Here, the officer did not see Neumann driving erratically but did clock him as driving five miles over the speed limit. Neumann was stopped and, as the officer approached the vehicle, he rolled down the window. He was asked for his driver’s license and his registration. When the officer approached the vehicle, Neumann lit a cigarette (hardly a basis to cite as a factor for probable cause). While Neumann was trying to locate his driver’s license and registration from his brief case, the officer was able to look around inside the vehicle for approximately two minutes. The officer observed nothing illegal at this time and did not smell any suspicious odor from within the vehicle. Thereafter, the .officer asked Neumann to come back to his patrol car so that he could issue a warning ticket for the speeding violation. It is now well-settled that the officer’s issuance of the traffic citation did not justify his search of the vehicle. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998). Once in the patrol car, the officer smelled a “faint” odor of alcohol and asked Neu-mann if he had been drinking. Initially Neumann denied drinking, but later admitted having one beer approximately one hour earlier in Mitchell, South Dakota. The officer then requested that Neumann take a breathalyzer test, which indicated a low alcohol content level of .013. Admittedly there existed no basis to arrest Neu-mann for intoxication. Furthermore, the officer had looked inside Neumann’s car earlier and had noticed that the seats were close to the floor board, which would make it impossible for any open cans or bottles containing alcohol to be on the floor. The officer also admitted that he never saw Neumann attempt to conceal or hide any*758thing from the time he was stopped until the time the officer decided to search the car.6
This case may seem somewhat insignificant to the average citizen; yet, it now stands as precedent that the Fourth Amendment is of little protection for a person’s privacy while driving a vehicle.
I respectfully dissent.

. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

. At oral argument the government relied a great deal upon the case of State v. Peterson, 407 N.W.2d 221, 223 (S.D.1987) (a 3-2 opinion). There the officer wanted to search the vehicle to determine whether the defendant was carrying drugs. However, lacking probable cause to search for the drugs, the officer pulled the defendant over after he had driven recklessly on the highway. When he approached the defendant, the trooper noticed a strong smell of alcohol coming from within the vehicle. See 407 N.W.2d at 222. Before searching the vehicle, the trooper also observed empty beer cans in plain view on the floor of Peterson's vehicle. Notwithstanding the strong reliance placed upon the Peterson case in the government’s brief and also at oral argument, the majority does not cite the Peterson case. The case clearly denotes articulable facts upon which probable cause existed to believe the vehicle contained an open container. In contrast to the present case, the officer did not see any open containers, did not smell alcohol coming from the car, and conducted the search only upon a hunch based upon the faint smell of alcohol on Neumann's breath.