Court Opinion

ID: 9417912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:43:47.707349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:30.685886
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan
dissenting.
By the final judgment in the Circuit Court the bill in this case was dismissed for want qf jurisdiction to entertain it and for want of equity; and from that judgment the plaintiffs prayed and were alloAved an appeal.
Subsequently an order was made by the Circuit Court certifying that the only' question-considered and decided was whether upon the bill and demurrei a case was presented of *494which it had jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Although the case involves questions of considerable importance, it was submitted here without oral argument. .
Could the Circuit Court take cognizance of this cause consistently with the act of Congress regulating its jurisdiction 1 This is naturally the fundamental, if not the only, question in the case. ' An answer t© the question requires a reference to several acts of' Congress^ including the Judiciary Act of August 13, 1888, corfecting that of March 3, 1887. 25 Stat. 433.
Section 629 of the Eevised Statutes enumerates in subdivisions the cases of ¡which the Circuit Courts of the United States may take original(cognizance.
In subdivision one of that section the Circuit Courts are given original cognizance “ of all suite of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of .costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where it is brought and a citizen of another State; ”, and in subdivision two, “of all suits in equity, where the matter, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are petitioners.” Eev. Stat'. § 629, sub-div. 1 and 2.
By the sixteenth subdivision of that section it is declared that the Circuit Courts shall have original cognizance “ of all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, - statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all. persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” The matter in dispute in such suite was not expressly required by the Eevised Statutes to have any money value.
By section 1979 of the Eevised Statutes, Title 24, “ Civil Eights,” it is provided that “ every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjécted, any citi*495zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” It has been said that this section as well as subdivision 16 of section 629 were based upon the first section of the act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, c. 22, entitled “ An act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes.” Holt v. Indiana Manuf. Co., 176 U. S. 68, 70.
Next came the act of March 3, 1875', which provided that “ The Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming'lands under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects; and shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under, the authority of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein,” 18 Stat. 470, c. 137. That act expressly repealed previous statutes in conflict with its provisions.
Then came the act of 1888, correcting that of 1887, and' which provides “That the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts Of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their author*496ity, or in which controversy the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the- sum or value aforesaid, or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or ■ a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign • States, citizens, or stibjects, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive .of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid.” By that act the conflicting provisions of previous acts were repealed, except in certain particulars, among which were the provisions relating to “any jurisdiction. or right mentioned ... in Title twenty-four of the Revised Statutes,” Civil Rights, under which Title § 1979 is found.
It is clear that under the act of 1888 a Circuit Court could not take original cognizance of a suit simply because it was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. The value of the matter in dispute in such a case must exceed $2000, exclusive of interest and costs.
The bill makes no allegation whatever as to the value of the matter in dispute, although, this court, speaking by the. Chief Justice, in Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Company, above cited, after, referring to the first section of the Judiciary Act of 1888, said: “This” [the question of the value in dispute in cases arising under the Constitution, or laws of the United States] “ was carefully considered in United States v. Sayward, 160 U. S. 493, and it was held that the sum or value named was jurisdictional, and that the Circuit Court could not, under the statute, take original cognizance of a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States unless the sum or value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs and interest, exceeded two thousand dollars. That decision was reaffirmed in Fishback v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 161 U. S. 96, 99.” It was added—contrary to the intimation given in the opinion in the present case — that “ the conclusion reached is not affected by the fact that the operation of the act of March 3, 1891, was to do away with any pecuniary limitation on appeals directly from the Circuit Courts to this court. The Paquete *497Habana, 175 U. S. 677.” Of course, it was not meant by that language that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, so far as the value of the matter in dispute is concerned, Was changed as to the cases embraced by the fifth section of the act of 1891. The act of 1891 left the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts as established by the act of 1888.
1. It cannot be disputed that the present suit is one arising -under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and it is clear that the value of the matter in dispute is made by the statute an essential element in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in such a case. But it has been suggested that this §.uit is .also embraced by subdivision 16 of § 629 and § 1979 of the Bevised Statutes — which provisions this court assumed, in Holt v. Manufacturing Co., and now assumes, were not repealed by any subsequent statute, and, therefore, that the value of the matter in dispute is of no consequence. But this suggestion overlooks the declaration of the court in that case to the effect that although the above provisions must be assumed to be still (1899) in force, they refer “to civil rights only.” 176 U. S. 72. In this view, subdivision 16 of § 629 and § 1979 of the Bevised Statutes have no bearing upon the present case, if the rights for the protection of which the present suit was brought are political rights, and not civil rights within the meaning of the statutes relating to “ Civil Bights.” Consequently the saving clause in the act of 1888 in respect of any jurisdiction ór right mentioned in Title 21 of the Bevised Statutes, Civil Bights, becomes immaterial in the present case. Whether this be so or not, the court refrains from declaring that the plaintiff could proceed under subdivision 16 of section 629 or section 1979 of the Bevised Statutes, without regard to the value of the matter in dispute. If this court thinks that this suit could be maintained under subdivision 16 of § 629 or under § 1979, or under both, without regard to the value of the matter in dispute^! submit that it should have been so adjudged.
2. Beferring to the suggestion that the act of 1888 gives the Circuit Court jurisdiction in all suits at law or equity, in which the matter in dispute is the sum or value of $2000 and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and con*498ceding that this court in Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 57, and Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487, recognized that the deprivation of a man’s political rights (those cases had reference to the elective franchise) may properly be alleged to have the required value in money, the court says : “ Assuming that the allegation [of value] should have been made in a case like this, the objection to its omission was not raised in the Circuit Court, and as it could have been remedied by amendment, we think it unavailing. The certificate was made alio intuitu. There is no pecuniary limit on appeals in this court under section 5 of the act of 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 828 ; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 683, and we do not feel called upon to send the case back to the Circuit Court that it might permit the amendment.”
It seems to me that this question as to the value of the matter in dispute was sufficiently raised in the Circuit Court; for the demurrer to the bill was, in part, on the ground that the facts stated did not make a case “ within the jurisdiction of the court.” But, passing that view, I come to a more serious matter. In cases of which a Circuit Court may take original cognizance, the value of the matter in dispute — which is mentioned in the statute in advance of any reference to the nature of the subject of the action — is as essential to jurisdiction as is the nature of the subject of such dispute. And yet the court says that an objection that the record from the Circuit Court does not show an allegation as to value is unavailing here, even if such allegation ought to have been made. That is a new, and I take leave to say a startling, doctrine. Must not this court upon its own motion decline' to pass upon, indeed, has this court, strictly speaking, jurisdiction to consider and determine, the merits of a case coming from the Circuit Court, unless it affirm atively appears from the record that the case is one of which that court could take cognizance ? Is not a suit presumably without the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court, unless the record shows it to be one of which that court may take cognizance ? Is it of any consequence that the parties did not raise the question of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court? If the record shows nothing more than that the case *499arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and if it does not affirmatively appear, in some appropriate way, that the value of the matter in dispute is up to the required amount, has this court jurisdiction to consider and determine the merits of the case ?
Let us look at some of the adjudged cases upon the general subject of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and see. what the duty of this court is when its own jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear from the record, pv when it does not appear that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction.
In Sizer v. Many, 16 How. 97, 103, which was an action for the infringement of letters patent: “ The sum taxed being less than $2000 no writ of error will lie under the act' of 1789. This act gives no jurisdiction to this court over the judgment of a Circuit Court, where the judgment is for less than that sum.- . . . The writ of error must therefore be dismissed for want-of jurisdiction.” In Brown v. Shannon, 20 How. 55, 58, which was an action to enforce the specific execution of a contract in relation to the use of a patent right: “ The sum mentioned in the bill . . . being less than $2000, whatever errors may be apparent in the proceedings and decree of the court below, we have yet no power under the act of Congress to-revise and correct them, and the appeal must be dismissed.” In Richmond v. City of Milwaukee, 21 How. 80, 82, which was an action to prohibit the conveyance of certain lots : “ There is nothing in the allegations of the partiés or in the evidence to show that the value of the lots in question exceeded $2000, nor anything from which it can be inferred. The appeal must therefore, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this courts In Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black, 271, 273, which was a cause in admiralty: “Without the fact of value being shown on the record, or by evidence aliunde, the court has no jurisdictions In Walker v. United States, 4 Wall. 163, 165, which was an action on a judgment for money: “This court has no appellate jurisdiction, except such as is defined by Congress. The act of Congress limits this jurisdiction to cases where the matter in dispute exceeds $2000. We can no more take jurisdiction where the matter does not exceed than we can where it is less *500than that sum. The amount in controversy in the case before us, ascertained in conformity with the settled principles of the court, does not exceed two thousand dollars. We have, therefore, no jurisdiction of the writ of error, and it must be dismissed.” In The Grace Girdler, 6 Wall. 441, which was an appeal in admiralty : “ While it is true that the greater part of the loss fell upon Lockwood as owner of the Ariel, and her belongings, there is nothing in the record which shows that the damage sustained exceeded $2000: And this is essential to jurisdiction.” In Ayers v. Watson, 113 Ú. S. 595, 598, which was an action of trespass to try title to land : “ Diverse state citizenship of the parties, or some other jurisdictional fact prescribed by the second section, is absolutely essential, and cannot be waived, and the want of it will be error at any stage of the cause, even though assigned by the party at whose instance it was committed.”
These cases relate to the jurisdiction of this court under statutes prescribing a certain amount as essential, upon writ of error or appeal, for the review of judgments rendered.in the Circuit Court.
• Looking now at cases in which the want of jurisdiction, in the Circuit Court has been held to preclude this court from going into the merits of the case adjudged, we find in King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 226, which was an action upon county warrants, this language : “ It does not appear that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the action. Unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, the presumption, upon writ of error or appeal, is that the court below was without jurisdiction.” In Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 587, which was an action upon a judgment, and in which case the question was whether an action upon a certain judgment was barred by limitation, this court said : “We are not, however, ■ _t liberty to express any opinion upon the question of limitaron, if the court, whose judgment has been brought here for i 3view, does not appear, from the record, to have had jurisdiction of the case. And whether that court had or had not jurisüction, is a question which we must examine and determine, even if the parties forbear to make it, or consent .that the case be *501considered upon its merits.” In Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 681, which, was an action for trover : “ We are confronted with the question of jurisdiction, which, although not ’raised by either party in the court below or in this court, is presented by the record, and under repeated decisions of this court must be considered.” In Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 83: “ Did the court below have jurisdiction of this case? If jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear, upon the record, it was error to have rendered a decree, whether the question of jurisdiction was raised or not in the court below. In the exercise of its power, this court, of its own motion, must deny the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, in all cases coming before it, upon writ of error or appeal, where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the' record on which it is called to act.” In Mattingly v. Northwestern Virginia Railroad, 158 U. S. 53, 57, which was an action to set aside certain conveyances and to foreclose a mortgage: “ Although it does not appear that the question of jurisdiction was raised in the court below by any plea or motion, yet as the record failed to affirmatively show jurisdiction, this court must take notice of the defect.”
According to the adjudged cases, the first inquiry which this court should make as to any case before it from an inferior Federal court is as to its own jurisdiction. If jurisdiction does not appear from the record then the writ of error or appeal should be dismissed.. If it is found to have jurisdiction for any purpose, then its next duty is to inquire as to the jurisdiction of the court below. When the latter court does not appear upon the record to have jurisdiction, then the duty of this court is to reverse the judgment and remand the case to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. I say “appear upon the record to have jurisdiction,” because, as we have seen, the presumption is that a cause is without the jurisdiction of a Federal court, unless the contrary affirmatively appears. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8 ; Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 115; Ex parte Smith, 94 U. S. 455 ; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646. In Brown v. Keene, Chief Justice Marshall said: “ The decisions of this court require that the averment of jurisdiction shall be positive; that the declaration shall state expressly the fact on which jurisdic*502tion depends. It is not sufficient' that jurisdiction may be inferred argumentatively from its averments.”
To these cases I will add that of M. C. & L. M. Railway v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382, in which this court said: “It is true that the plaintiffs below, against whose objection the error was committed, do not complain of being prejudiced by it; and it seems to be an anomaly and a hardship that the party at whose instance it was committed should be permitted to derive an advantage from it; but the rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on which, in the exercise of that power, it is called to act. On every writ of error or appeal,' the first and fundamental question, is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.”
In the above case of Holt v Manufacturing Co., 176 U. S. 68, which involved a question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, this court said: “ In this, as in all cases, if it appears that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and enter judgment accordingly.”
These principles have been expressly affirmed by this court in many other cases. And yet, according to the opinion in this case, if objection is not made in the Circuit Court to its jurisdiction, it will be unavailing to raise that question in this court, and we may proceed to determine the merits of the case. Such a doctrine, I repeat, is a new departure. The court, in effect says, that although it may know that the record fails to show a case within the original cognizance of the Circuit Court, it may close its eyes to that fact, and review the case on its merits. In view of the adjudged cases, I cannot agree that the failure of parties to raise a question of jurisdiction will relieve this court of its duty to raise it upon its own motion. The con*503trary view cannot be justified. This court may not assume jurisdiction to do that which it has no authority to do.
It will be appropriate to observe that the Circuit Court in effect propounds thé question whether it had jurisdiction of this case upon the record before it. That question necessarily involves the inquiry whether subdivision 16 of § 629 and § 1979 of the Revised Statutes were repealed by later acts. But that. point is left undecided, the court only assuming that those statutory provisions are still in force, but it does not say whether the suit could be maintained under those sections or under either of them without allegation or proof as to the value of the matter in dispute. Nor does the couri distinctly adjudge whether the case is embraced by the act of 1887-8; but simply assuming that the allegation of value should have been made in the bill, it proceeds to consider the case upon its merits. The question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court under the acts of Congress, the one certified, is thus left in the air, and the case is examined and disposed of upon its merits just as if jurisdiction of the Circuit Court appeared upon the record. There is no claim that the essential fact of value appears anywhere in the record, either in the bill or otherwise. Consequently, as already said, this court is without power to consider the merits.
The court says that the plaintiff had the right to appeal directly to this court under section 5 of the act of 1891, and that the certificate was unnecessary to found the jurisdiction of this court and could not narrow it. But it does not follow that this court can review the merits of the case, if the Circuit Court does not appear'to have had jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties.
My views may be summed up as follows: 1. This case is embraced by that clause of the act of 1887-8, which provides that the Circuit Court shall have original cognizance “ of all suits of a civil nature, . . . where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 2. That the sum or value of the matter in dispute in such cases is jurisdictional under the statute. 3. That as it did. not appear from the record, in any way, that the matter *504in dispute exceeded in value the jurisdictional amount, the Circuit Court could not take cognizance of the case or dispose of it upon its merits. 4. That least of all does this court have jurisdiction to determine the merits of this case. 5. That when a case comes here upon a certificate as to the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court, this court may not forbear to decide that question, and determine the merits of the case upon a record which does not show' jurisdiction in the Circuit Court.
As these are my views as to the jurisdiction of this court, upon this record, I will not formulate and discuss my views upon the merits of this case. But to avoid misapprehension, I may add that my conviction is that upon the facts alleged in the bill (if the record showed a sufficient value of the matter in dispute) the plaintiff is entitled to relief in respect of his right to "be registered as a voter. I agree with Mr. Justice Brewer that it is competent for the courts to give relief in such cases as this.
Sena v. United States.
No. 40. Petition for modification of judgment and for rehearing. June 1, 1903.
The opinion of the court in this case is reported ante, p. 233.
Mr. Justice Brown : It is ordered T>y the court that the decree of affirmance in this case be amended by adding the following words: “ so far as such decree orders that the petition be dismissed, but without prejudice to such further proceedings as petitioner may be advised to take.”