Court Opinion

ID: 9740492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:36:26.020506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.522503
License: Public Domain

Hastings, J.,
dissenting.
The dissenting opinion of Boslaugh, J., traces the origin and reason for the rule relating to spousal testimonial privilege. When considered against that backdrop, it seems obvious to me that once a court *284of competent jurisdiction has entered a decree of dissolution, whether subject to appeal or not, the marriage is no longer in existence within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505(2) (Reissue 1979).
Cases like Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N.W.2d 207 (1942), and Westphalen v. Westphalen, 115 Neb. 217, 212 N.W. 429 (1927), which refer to special circumstances such as property rights, right of inheritance, privilege to remarry, etc., are not applicable to this situation. To insist, for example, that a marriage is still in existence so as to prohibit the testimony of one spouse while the other spouse contests on appeal the amount of an alimony award makes no sense at all.
I do not believe that the testimony of Cheri Palmer should be rejected for the reason given in the majority opinion.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.