Court Opinion

ID: 9634901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:27:57.047458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:59.056413
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe the error in admitting the Linstead extraneous offense affected appellant’s substantial rights. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b).
The evidence of appellant’s guilt in this case was strong. Lopez saw her attacker at close range in a lighted area. She was so sure about appellant’s identity that when shown a photo array with no pictures of appellant, she told the officer that the man who attacked her was not shown in the array. Further she was able to confidently identify appellant as her attacker in both a later photo array and at trial. Lopez’s identification of appellant was corroborated by the finding of her purse in the backyard of appellant’s next door neighbor and by the evidence of the Davis offense. While appellant challenged Lopez’s identification of appellant on cross-examination and with alibi testimony, the alibi testimony was weak, and appellant was not able to seriously undermine the validity of Lopez’s identification.
In addition, while the testimony about the Linstead offense constituted a large portion of the trial, the entire evidentiary portion of guili/innocence lasted only two days. In addition, most of the evidence of the sexual assault was limited to scientific DNA testimony rather than emotionally-charged details about the offense. Thus, I believe that any potential the evidence of the Linstead offense had to distract the jury from its consideration of the charged offense was mitigated by the short time frame of the evidentiary portion of the trial and the technical nature of much of the testimony about the offense.
Finally, the majority opinion states that the Linstead offense had even less probative value in light of the admission of the Davis offense. However, the Linstead offense was important in finking appellant to the Lopez aggravated robbery because its similarity to the Davis offense helps fink the Davis offense to the Lopez aggravated robbery. In the Davis offense, the attacker approached the victim in her car rather than on foot and did not steal anything from the victim. This is also true of the Linstead offense. But because the purses from the Linstead offense and the charged offense were found together, the Linstead offense has substantial similarities with the charged offense. That substantial similarity, combined with the similarities between the Linstead offense and the Davis offense, help connect the Davis offense to the Lopez aggravated robbery. Consequently, while I agree that the probative value of the evidence was somewhat lessened for the purposes of a rule 403 analysis because of the strength of Lopez’s identification of appellant, I do not agree that the probative value of the Linstead offense was lessened even further as a result of the admission of the Davis offense.
After examining the record as a whole, I do not have “grave doubts” concerning whether the extraneous offense evidence had a substantial influence on the jury in its finding that appellant committed the charged robbery. Rather, I view that evidence as having at most only a slight effect *541or influence. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
I would hold that the error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights and, thus, affirm appellant’s conviction. Therefore, I must dissent.