Court Opinion

ID: 9730144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:02:32.070307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.136594
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C. J.,
concurring in the result.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case, I nevertheless believe that there is one further aspect of the case which may very well occur again on retrial, and for that reason I write separately.
In my opinion, if the evidence on the second trial concerning the steak knife is no different than it was at the first trial, it would be error for the court to submit the issue of the steak knife to the jury. The undisputed evidence at the first trial was that Williams did not own the car, did not own the knife, nor was aware that the knife was under the seat. Under such a fact situation the evidence, in my view, is insufficient to submit the issue to the jury.
Today, in State v. Harris, post p. 75, 77, 352 N.W.2d 581, 582-83 (1984), a case involving a minor in possession of alcohol, we said: “As a general rule, the mere presence of the minor passenger in a vehicle where alcohol is found is not sufficient by itself to convict the minor of possession. State v. Eberhardt, supra; State v. Faircloth, 181 Neb. 333, 148 N.W.2d 187 (1967).” I believe a similar rule should prevail with regard to a charge of being in possession of a deadly weapon.
Other jurisdictions which have addressed this question have reached similar conclusions. In the case of Commonwealth v. Almeida, 381 Mass. 420, 422-23, 409 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1980), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case>, there was no evidence that the defendant saw the gun or knew of its presence in the automobile. .. . The jury would have had to speculate that the defendant knew the gun was in the covered console of a car he borrowed that evening, merely *63from his presence in that car. We believe the evidence was insufficient “to warrant a reasonable inference of personal knowledge of the presence of the gun.”
And in State v. Krana, 246 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa Supreme Court said: “As to the principal issue, the law of Iowa is clear that while specific intent is not an element of this crime, the accused must be aware of the presence of the gun.” See, also, Commonwealth, Appellant v. Gladden, 226 Pa. Super. 13, 311 A.2d 711 (1973).
If there had been any evidence to create a fact question, it would have, of course, been proper for the trial court to submit that matter to the jury. But, here, the evidence did not raise a fact question. The uncontroverted evidence was that Williams did not know of the presence of the knife, that it did not belong to him, and that the car was obviously not his. There was simply no evidence from which a jury could conclude that Williams was in possession or had custody of the knife. As a matter of fact, the evidence in this case would seem to support a contrary conclusion. There is no explanation why Williams would have placed the gun, which he admittedly owned, into the glove compartment and the knife, which he did not own, under the seat. It was only by coincidence that he was even driving the vehicle at the moment they were arrested. Absent more evidence creating an issue of fact, I believe the court should not have submitted the issue of the knife to the jury.
White, J., joins in this concurrence.