Court Opinion

ID: 9726675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:03:30.044993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.698527
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
The facts are as stated by the dissent. We find that the trial court improperly granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was sufficient evidence to present jury questions concerning the existence of a reward1 and the presence of either inherent authority or ratification.
The law governing rewards and the rules defining implied authority are straightforward. It is difficult, however, to apply the precedent governing both areas to the same, unique set of facts. In general, any individual with the authority to make a contract may offer a reward and be bound by that offer. 67 Am Jur 2d, Rewards, § 7, p 6. The authority to contract may be inferred from the authority to manage a business. Such authority is limited to making "contracts which are incidental to such business, are usually made in it, or are reasonably necessary in conducting it”. 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 73(a), p 183. One of the factors to be considered in determining the extent of authority is the custom of similar businesses at the same time and place. See 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 34(b), p 118. See also Leo Austrian & Co v Springer, 94 Mich 343; *22954 NW 50 (1892), Kopprasch v New York Indemnity Co, 250 Mich 491; 230 NW 909 (1930).
Other courts have presumed authority in the president of a bank to offer, on behalf of the bank, a reward for information leading to the arrest of a defaulting teller, The Bank of Minneapolis v Griffin, 168 Ill 314; 48 NE 154 (1897). Similarly the authority to offer a reward for the arrest of persons maliciously destroying railroad tracks has been held to be within the implied authority of the railroad superintendent. Central Railroad and Banking Co v Cheatham, 85 Ala 292; 4 So 828 (1888).
The conflict resulting from an application of agency principles to the instant case is well illustrated by the divergence between our view and that of the dissent. The basic area of disagreement involves a question of perspective. The dissent views the question of implied authority from the perspective of the business. We view this question from the perspective of the plaintiff, especially that concerning the reasonableness of his reliance on the newspaper article.
Normally, the application of rules concerning usual course of business results in an equitable outcome in line with the parties’ expectations, advancement of commercial intercourse and considerations of fundamental fairness. Where the specific business exhibits a general course of behavior relative to the questioned acts, the inquiry generally will give greater focus to the specific concern than to the course of conduct in similar businesses. Where, as here, the transaction is one unusual to the specific business affected, the emphasis must differ. In such a case, significant emphasis must be placed on the course of business conduct in the community at large concerning *230rewards and on whether the recipient party "reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to [act] * * * and has no notice that he is not so authorized”. 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 161, p 378. A jury, as the repository of "community sense”, is in a unique position to decide questions of usual course of conduct and reasonable reliance in such unusual cases.
It has long been the policy of this jurisdiction that:
"[w]hen there is a disputed question of agency, if there is any testimony, either direct or inferential, tending to establish it, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine.” Miskiewicz v Smolenski, 249 Mich 63, 70; 227 NW 789 (1929).
See also Kwasny v Driessen, 42 Mich App 442; 202 NW2d 443 (1972). We, therefore, find that the question of implied agency liability was properly submitted to the jury and that the jury verdict should not have been disturbed.
We also find that there was sufficient evidence of ratification by inaction to present a jury question. The jury could have reasonably disbelieved the testimony of Albert Goodman, who claimed that he read the Detroit News but that he did not know of the reward. The jury could have reasonably held that the owner of a business would be especially attracted to news about that business in a paper which he read.
For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court and circuit court and remand this cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in conformance with the jury verdict. Costs to plaintiff.2
*231D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J., concurred.

 We concur in the dissent’s reasoning and holding regarding the existence of a reward oifer.

 In addition to upholding the district court verdict on its merits, the circuit court held that "the appeal was not timely filed, transcript adequately and timely provided, bond filed or briefs filed as required”. *231Our review of the record discloses that plaintiff did timely file his appeal to circuit court. Of the matters found faulty by the circuit court, timely filing is the sole jurisdictional requirement. GCR 1963, 705.5(a). Other defects may be modified or waived by the court in its discretion. GCR 1963, 705.15. Having found the above, the circuit court should not have considered the merits of the case. We, therefore, have deemed the ruling on the merits a waiver of any nonjurisdictional defects.