Court Opinion

ID: 9945515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 21:09:19.408111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:31.283290
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
       This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                       DOCKET NO. A-1626-21

IN THE MATTER OF
THE REVOCATION OF
G.G.'S1 FIREARMS
PURCHASER
IDENTIFICATION CARD
AND COMPELLING THE
SALE OF HIS FIREARMS.
_____________________________

                  Submitted January 18, 2024 – Decided February 5, 2024
                  Motion for reconsideration granted.
                  Resubmitted February 21, 2024 – Decided February 27, 2024

                  Before Judges Currier and Firko.

                  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                  Division, Bergen County, Docket No. GPR-0023-21

                  Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law, PC, attorneys for
                  appellant (Louis P. Nappen, on the briefs).

                  Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                  respondent (K. Charles Deutsch, Assistant Prosecutor,
                  of counsel and on the brief).

1
   We use initials because the trial court relied on sealed healthcare records in
its decision and to protect appellant's confidentiality. R. 1:38(a)(2).
PER CURIAM

        Appellant G.G. appeals from a December 23, 2021 Law Division order

granting the State's motion to revoke his Firearms Purchaser Identification Card

(FPIC) and compelling the sale of his firearms pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(c)(5). The court found that permitting G.G. to retain his FPIC was not in the

interest of the public health, safety, and welfare based on his history of

depression and suicidal ideation.      G.G. contends N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is

unconstitutional in light of Bruen2, and the statutes the State and trial court relied

upon are not disqualifiers to firearm possession or a statutory means to forfeit,

sell, or destroy firearms.     After reviewing the record and applicable legal

principles, we affirm.

                                          I.

        We summarize the facts developed in the record. On November 18, 2018,

the Wyckoff Police Department received a call reporting that a resident, thirty-

nine-year-old G.G., was missing and potentially suicidal. Earlier in the day,

G.G. attended a football game. His wife, L.G., was in Long Island. The two

had been experiencing marital difficulties and fought via text messages

throughout the day. One of G.G.'s text messages to his wife read, "Don't worry

2
    New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
                                                                                A-1626-21
                                          2
you will NEVER have to deal with me again and nobody." According to L.G.,

G.G. had previously told her "he [wa]s better off putting a bullet in his head so

[she] would not have to deal with him [a]gain." At the time, G.G. was taking

antidepressant medications, Wellbutrin and Cymbalta. G.G.'s father had passed

away one week earlier from pancreatic cancer.

      After L.G. returned home that evening and put their son to bed, she noticed

a single .40 caliber bullet on the floor of the couple's bedroom near the safe

where G.G. stored his firearms and ammunition. L.G. had never seen a gun or

a bullet anywhere near her husband before and was concerned in light of his text

message earlier that day. G.G. had been drinking excessively while his father

was in hospice care before he died.

      L.G. was unsuccessful in attempting to contact G.G. Ultimately, a family

member called the police, who found G.G. at a friend's home. G.G. was then

transported via ambulance to the hospital where he underwent a risk assessment

and a psychiatric evaluation. The hospital personnel noted he was intoxicated

and diagnosed him with depression and alcohol use disorder. Hospital staff

recommended G.G. follow up with a psychiatrist for medication monitoring, a

grief counselor, a marital counselor, and that he attend an alcohol rehabilitation

program.

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                                        3
      G.G. was discharged ten hours later by the covering psychiatrist because

he had no suicidal ideation, and no previous suicidal attempts were reported.

The hospital nurse who treated G.G. was uncomfortable releasing him unless he

surrendered his firearms. G.G. agreed to do so. The nurse also contacted the

Wyckoff Police Department about removing G.G.'s guns.

      Two days later, on November 20, 2018, G.G. voluntarily surrendered his

firearms to the Wyckoff Police Department. On April 12, 2019, G.G.'s counsel

requested the return of the firearms. The police denied the request. G.G. filed

a complaint against the Township of Wyckoff for the return of his firearms,

which included a handgun he had kept in his bedroom safe, a handgun previously

stored in a locked toolbox in his garage, and seven long guns kept in a

"construction toolbox" on a "top shelf" at a warehouse, which he accessed using

a forklift.    G.G. claims his complaint for the return of his firearms went

unanswered.

      Almost two years later, on March 26, 2021, the State moved to revoke

G.G.'s FPIC and compel the sale of his weapons under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5),

as not in the interest of public health, safety, or welfare. On December 22, 2021,

the trial court conducted a one-day virtual hearing. G.G. was represented by

counsel.      Wyckoff Police Patrol Officer Michael Flim, Sergeant Michael

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                                        4
DeMaio, and L.G. testified on behalf of the State. A psychiatrist, Dr. David

Brozyna, testified on behalf of G.G., and G.G. testified on his own behalf.

       Officer Flim testified about the efforts undertaken by the police to locate

G.G. on the day in question. Flim also explained how G.G. "surrendered" his

"Glock 17" to the police. G.G.'s counsel stipulated to G.G.'s weapons being

found in the house. On cross-examination, Flim stated G.G. told him the bullet

was on the bedroom floor because he was getting money out of the bedroom

safe, and "the bullet fell out."

       Sergeant DeMaio testified he was dispatched to G.G.'s residence on the

day in question in response to a "missing person[s] call with a mental health

component."     Sergeant DeMaio explained he received a phone call from a

hospital emergency room employee who expressed concern about G.G.'s mental

health and releasing him while he still possessed firearms. In response, Sergeant

DeMaio testified he conducted a NCIC3 check to determine if any firearms were

registered to G.G. Sergeant DeMaio stated he spoke to G.G. about surrendering

his firearms, where they were kept, and how they could be collected. The

weapons were recovered, but Sergeant DeMaio did not know if they were ever

returned to G.G.

3
    National Crime Information Center.
                                                                            A-1626-21
                                         5
      L.G. testified she has been married to G.G. for seven years, and they have

a five-year-old son. On the day in question, L.G. told G.G.'s good friend over

the phone that she was worried about her husband because his father recently

passed away, and it was "very out of the ordinary" to see a bullet on their

bedroom floor. She was also concerned that she could not get in touch with

G.G. because they had been arguing. L.G. testified G.G. took some weapons

out of their home for safety reasons after their son was born and kept them at a

warehouse, where he rented a shop. L.G. explained she has "never seen a gun"

in her home but knew the guns were there.

      On cross-examination, L.G. stated she never spoke to anyone at the

hospital about G.G. L.G. testified she had not observed G.G. drink alcohol in

their home in the past four years, but he does drink beer at football games. She

also mentioned there were "no issues right now" regarding their marriage.

      Counsel stipulated to Dr. Brozyna testifying as an expert in the field of

psychiatry. Dr. Brozyna stated G.G. requested an evaluation of his ability to

handle and maintain firearms and for the return of his firearms. Dr. Brozyna

reviewed G.G.'s hospital records and explained that G.G. was never "committed

to a hospital" for psychiatric reasons. In referring to the hospital records, Dr.

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                                       6
Brozyna testified there was no previous history of suicidal attempt and no

"apparent suicidal ideation."

      In describing G.G.'s demeanor during the evaluation, Dr. Brozyna stated

he was "very pleasant, very easygoing" and "[h]is mental status exam didn't

show any alterations in mental status . . . and no delusional thinking." Dr.

Brozyna did not detect evidence of a "depressive type phenomenon going o n,"

and his medication "seemed to be working very well." The expert stated G.G.

was "very frustrated" by his situation but had no "suicidal intentions." Within a

reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, Dr. Brozyna opined there was "no

problem whatsoever" with G.G. possessing a firearms permit and firearms. In

response to a question posed by the trial court, Dr. Brozyna responded that he

did not review G.G.'s primary care physician's records regarding G.G.'s history.

      On cross-examination, Dr. Brozyna stated he diagnosed G.G. with "a

major depressive disorder" as a "working diagnosis." Dr. Brozyna testified the

antidepressants G.G. was taking controlled his depressive disorder, and he was

in "full remission," meaning "there's no symptoms of a major depressive

disorder." Dr. Brozyna did not diagnose G.G. with alcohol use disorder.

      G.G. testified that he was never treated by a psychiatrist before November

2018. He began taking antidepressants "around the same time of the day in

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                                       7
question" because he experienced anxiety after his father passed away. G.G.

testified that he never attempted to commit suicide before November 2018 and

denied ever telling anyone that he would be "better off" putting a bullet in his

head.

        While attending the game, G.G. testified his wife was "badgering" him

about what time he was coming home. Regarding the text message about not

having to "deal" with him again, G.G. admitted he sent it after the game ended ,

but when he sent the text message, he had no intention of harming himself, or

anyone else, and he was not contemplating suicide. G.G. explained the text

message meant to convey to his wife that he was "intent" on leaving their house

and "potentially" ending the marriage. According to G.G., the marital discord

was due to his "working too much," not being home when he should, and a "few

instances" of drinking when he went out after work.

        G.G. testified he packed some clothes and took $2,500 out of the safe

before leaving the home that night because he planned to stay elsewhere for a

few days. G.G. explained he keeps guns "for self-protection." After he left the

house, G.G. testified he went to a friend's house. When the police arrived, G.G.

stated he told them his firearms were "locked up" at his house, and he was

unarmed.

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                                       8
       G.G. testified he went on his own accord to the hospital. He claimed he

did not see the bullet fall out when he took money and clothes out of the safe

but learned about it from Officer Robert Martino. G.G. testified he consented

to turn over his firearms to the police upon his discharge from the hospital and

cooperated in collecting them. G.G. represented that no domestic violence

complaints were ever filed against him.

       On cross-examination, G.G. stated he first applied for an FPIC in 1998,

which was approved by the municipality where he lived, and applied again in

2004 when he changed his address. That application was also approved.4 G.G.

admitted he never submitted a change of address application when he moved to

Wyckoff. In 2010, G.G. testified he applied for two handgun purchase permits

(HPP), which were approved. G.G. reiterated the import of the text message to

his wife was that perhaps he might seek a divorce. G.G. testified he had "maybe

four or five drinks over the course of the football game" on the day in question,

and he was drinking "more than usual" after his father died. G.G. stated he was

at the hospital for "[a]bout six hours," not ten hours.

       After considering the testimony and evidence, including Dr. Brozyna's

report, the hospital records, firearms documents, and counsel's arguments, the

4
    The record does not indicate which municipality approved the 2004 FPIC.
                                                                           A-1626-21
                                         9
trial court rendered an oral opinion granting the State's revocation motion and

finding G.G.s retention of his FPIC was not in the interest of the public health,

safety, and welfare. Regarding the testimony, the trial court found Officer

Flim's testimony "to be most direct, most credible, and consistent throughout."

The trial court emphasized it was only concerned with "whether or not it's in the

public health, safety, and welfare to allow [G.G.] to retain his firearms."

      The trial court stated "it was not convinced by a preponderance of the

evidence that there was a confinement for a mental disorder" and it was "not

altogether clear on whether or not there was an involuntary trip to the hospital

on that day." In addition, the trial court rejected Dr. Brozyna's opinion that G.G.

"does not pose a danger to himself, others, or property and that he can safely

handle and own firearms."

      In particular, the trial court criticized Dr. Brozyna's failure to address the

hospital records in detail, "particularly the flow notes," which contained "certain

information" reported by G.G. and his wife. The trial court highlighted that

G.G. has a "history of being treated for a major depressive disorder and anxiety"

and emphasized that Dr. Brozyna did not review G.G.'s records from his primary

care physician, who prescribes his anti-depressant medication, which "is

                                                                              A-1626-21
                                       10
relevant here." The trial court noted Dr. Brozyna simply relied on G.G.'s "self-

reporting" in formulating his opinions.

      The trial court found G.G.'s testimony that the bullet or shell casing must

have fallen out of the safe when he took out money was not credible. By a

preponderance of the evidence, the trial court found G.G. "placed that bullet

there himself," and "he did that on purpose" to send a "message to his wife."

The trial court explained that is "not the behavior one would expect of someone

who's expected to own, possess, and safely handle firearms." Based upon the

hospital records, the trial court noted the flow notes reflect a concern that G.G.

"had been drinking excessively" on the day in question. The trial court also

found evidence in the hospital records that G.G.'s treatment for depression

"preceded the 2018 incident by four years," and that L.G. informed hospital staff

that G.G. "becomes a different person when he drinks."

      The trial court noted G.G. appeared "physically nervous" to the point that

he "could even see him turn red at various points, even over video, during the

course of his testimony."    The trial court also found L.G. came across as

"nervous" during her testimony, but she was "credible" regarding her concern

for her husband based upon the text message he sent to her that "she would never

                                                                            A-1626-21
                                       11
have to deal with him again" in tandem with finding a bullet on their bedroom

floor. Ultimately, the trial court found G.G. was not truthful and stated:

            And again, I have a concern about the suicidal and
            provocative statements which one can infer were
            suicidal in nature. And even if they weren't—I will
            repeat, even if he had no real intention to harm himself
            or not, the very fact his actions in placing that round
            there for his wife to find, that in and of itself is
            extremely disturbing and that conduct is relevant. So
            for all of those reasons, I'm granting the State's motion
            to revoke.

      On December 23, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting the State's

motion to revoke petitioner's FPIC and compel the sale of his firearms and

ammunition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The trial court noted it was not

disqualifying G.G. based on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) because it was not

convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that he was "confined" due to a

mental disorder. The trial court also ordered G.G. to "immediately surrender to

law enforcement any firearms and ammunition in his custody or control, or

which he possesses or owns"; in lieu of immediate destruction, G.G. has "120

days from the date of this [o]rder to arrange for a Federal Firearms License

Dealer to purchase the firearms currently in the possession of the State," and if

G.G. does not arrange for the sale of firearms within 120 days, his firearms will

be subject to destruction; and G.G. is "prohibited from transferring, selling,

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                                      12
giving, assigning, or otherwise disposing of his firearms to an immediate family

member." This appeal followed. 5

      G.G. raises the following arguments for our consideration:

            POINT 1

            PER BRUEN, DENIAL OF SECOND AMENDMENT
            RIGHTS UPON A "NOT IN THE INTEREST OF
            PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, OR WELFARE"
            STANDARD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

                  A. In Accordance With Bruen, Government Must
                  Prove That Denying Second Amendment Rights
                  Upon A Statutory Standard Of "Not In The
                  Interest Of Public Health, Safety, Or Welfare" Is
                  Consistent With This "Nation's Historical
                  Tradition Of Firearm Regulation," (e.g., from
                  1791 to, arguably, 1868).

                  B. "Not In The Interest Of Public Health, Safety,
                  Or Welfare" Constitutes An Unconstitutional
                  Balancing Test Per Bruen.

                  C. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(C)(5)'s Denial Of People's
                  Second Amendment Rights As "Not In The
                  Interest Of Public Health, Safety Or Welfare"
                  Constitutes Exactly The Type Of Discretion Not
                  Permitted Under Bruen.

            POINT 2

            THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY ORDERING THE
            FORFEITURE OF FIREARMS PURSUANT TO NO

5
  Pursuant to the amended notice of appeal, G.G. appeals from the order entered
on December 23, 2021.
                                                                          A-1626-21
                                      13
            STATUTE AUTHORIZING THE FORFEITURE OF
            FIREARMS.

            POINT 3

            THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE N.J.S.A.
            2C:58-3(F) DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE
            FORFEITURE,    COMPELLED    SALE,  OR
            DESTRUCTION OF FIREARMS AND PROHIBITS
            ADDED CONDITIONS OR REQUIREMENTS NOT
            SET FORTH UNDER THE CHAPTER.

            POINT 4

            THE COURT BELOW ERRED BECAUSE
            "INTEREST OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY OR
            WELFARE" IS NOT A DISQUALIFIER TO
            FIREARM POSSESSION AND DOES NOT
            AUTHORIZE FORFEITURE OF FIREARMS.

            POINT 5

            IT IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED THAT ANY
            OPINION REFERENCE PETITIONER BY HIS
            INITIALS OR THAT THE MATTER OTHERWISE
            BE SEALED OR IMPOUNDED.

                                       II.

      Our review of "a trial court's legal conclusions regarding firearms licenses

[is] de novo." In re N.J. Firearms Purchaser Identification Card by Z.K., 440

N.J. Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 2015). A "trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)

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                                      14
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995)).

      If, however, an appellate court is reviewing a trial court's findings of fact,

the following standard of review applies:

            Ordinarily, an appellate court should accept a trial
            court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
            credible evidence. Deference to a trial court's fact-
            findings is especially appropriate when the evidence is
            largely testimonial and involves questions of
            credibility. Thus, an appellate court should not disturb
            a trial court's fact-findings unless those findings would
            work an injustice.

            [In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-
            17 (1997) (citations omitted).]

      N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 governs the purchase of firearms, including the issuance

of FPICs and HPPs. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), no FPIC "shall be

issued . . . [t]o any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of the

public health, safety or welfare." This provision "is 'intended to relate to cases

of individual unfitness, where, though not dealt with in the specific statutory

enumerations, the issuance of the permit or identification card would

nonetheless be contrary to the public interest.'" In re Z.L., 440 N.J. Super. 351,

356 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (App. Div.

2003)).

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                                       15
      "'A judicial declaration that [a person] poses a threat to the public health,

safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis.'"       In re

Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification Card Belonging to F.M. ,

225 N.J. 487, 505 (2016) (quoting State v. Cordoma, 372 N.J. Super. 524, 535

(App. Div. 2004)). The State "has the burden of proving the existence of good

cause for the denial by a preponderance of the evidence." Osworth, 365 N.J.

Super. at 77.

      We have found unfitness under subsection (c)(5) in a variety of

circumstances. For instance, the exclusion has been applied to those who have

disregarded New Jersey's gun laws. See Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. at 80-81;

State v. Cunningham, 186 N.J. Super. 502, 510-13 (App. Div. 1982). However,

misusing a weapon is not required for a denial under subsection (c)(5). F.M.,

225 N.J. at 514. We have also applied the statute to someone convicted of

disorderly persons offenses. See In re Sbitani, 216 N.J. Super. 75, 76-78 (App.

Div. 1987) (affirming denial of an FPIC because of the individual's conv iction

for possession of less than twenty-five grams of marijuana).

      In State v. Freysinger, 311 N.J. Super. 509, 516-17 (App. Div. 1998), we

applied the exclusion to someone who had been convicted of driving under the

influence, refused to undergo chemical tests, and struck his girlfriend with his

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                                       16
car before leaving her "unattended in the roadway." Individuals who have a

history of domestic violence—whether documented or admitted—also have

been found unfit to purchase a firearm under subsection (c)(5), even though they

had no convictions for domestic violence. F.M., 225 N.J. at 510-16; Z.L., 440

N.J. Super. at 356-59.

                                         A.

      We first address G.G.'s argument that the public health, safety, or welfare

standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is unconstitutional based on the

United States Supreme Court's decision in Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).6 We

recently addressed and rejected substantially the same argument. M.U., 475 N.J.

Super. at 190-95. In M.U., we found that N.J.S.A. 2C:59-3(c)(5)'s standard was

not unconstitutional in light of the new standard established by Bruen because

it is consistent with "this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," and

6
   Before Bruen, courts analyzed Second Amendment challenges under a two-
prong test. The first prong was focused on whether the challenged law burdened
conduct covered by the Second Amendment, and the second prong assessed
whether the challenged law withstood "means-end scrutiny." Bruen abolished
that framework and directed courts to focus on the text of the Second
Amendment and "the Nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation"
instead. Bruen notes, "[o]nly if a firearm regulation is consistent with this
Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct
falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'" 597 U.S. at 24.

                                                                               A-1626-21
                                        17
is not overbroad or impermissibly vague. Id. at 163. We see no reason to deviate

from that well-reasoned analysis and conclude N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is

constitutional for the same reasons. Therefore, we affirm the order granting the

revocation of G.G.'s FPIC and firearms.

                                        B.

      Next, G.G. contends the trial court erred by ordering the forfeiture of his

firearms pursuant to statutes that do not authorize the forfeiture, compelled sale,

or destruction of said firearms. He argues that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) and N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(5) solely address HPP and FPIC licensing issues, and these statutes

did not authorize the trial court to order the forfeiture of his weapons. The State

avers G.G.'s arguments are moot because he did not move before the Law

Division or this court for a stay, and the deadline to arrange for the sale of his

firearms has since elapsed. In M.U., we specifically rejected the mootness

argument in this context and held, "[t]he lack of a stay pending appeal is not

dispositive. Nor is the absence of an application for emergent relief." 475 N.J.

Super. at 202.

      In M.U., 475 N.J. Super. at 203, we addressed the forfeiture and compelled

sale of the petitioner's firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f). We reversed the

forfeiture and compelled sale of the petitioner's firearms and remanded for the

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                                       18
trial court to determine if the "firearms may be returned from the federally

licensed firearms dealer, or whether some other remedy is available."                Id.

Ultimately, we found that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) "did not provide any basis for the

forfeiture of firearms already possessed." Id. at 199. The same rationale applies

here.

        G.G. also argues that the trial court, in rendering its decision, solely relied

on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), which allows the Law Division to deny the issuance

of a FPIC or HPP, but does not act as a disqualifier to firearm possession or a

statutory means under which to forfeit, compel a sale, or destroy actual firearms.

In M.U. we also addressed the forfeiture and compelled sale of the petitioner's

firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), and found that "[a]lthough the State

argues that appellant's history of misconduct satisfied the public health, safety,

and welfare disqualifier, that disqualifier applies to the issuance of HPPs and

FPICs, rather than the right to possess firearms at home." 475 N.J. Super at 202.

        Our Court addressed this issue when it decided J.W.D.              There, the

defendant's FPIC and firearms were seized after his wife filed a domestic

violence complaint against him and a temporary restraining order (TRO) was

entered. 149 N.J. at 111. After the TRO was dissolved, the defendant wrote a

letter to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office requesting his FPIC and

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                                          19
firearms be returned. Id. The Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office returned

J.W.D.'s FPIC and firearms.

      J.W.D.'s wife filed a second domestic violence complaint against him and

obtained a TRO that again required confiscation of his FPIC and firearms.

J.W.D. filed a cross-complaint against his wife. Id. at 112. Following a trial,

the Family Part dismissed the complaints and dissolved the TROs. J.W.D. sent

a second letter to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office requesting the return

of his firearms.

      The State opposed, and after a hearing, the trial court ultimately found a

"volatile situation" and that continued possession of a FPIC and firearms by the

defendant "would not be in the interest of public health, safety , or welfare." Id.

at 113.

      Our Court continued its analysis in J.W.D. and held the Legislature

intended that "a court should not return weapons to a defendant who is a threat

to the public health, safety, or welfare." Id. at 116; see also State v. W.C., 468

N.J. Super. 324 (2021) (confirming J.W.D.'s conclusion that "the State is entitled

to forfeiture of weapons [. . .] if the court finds that the defendant is disqualified

from holding a [FPIC] [. . .] under N.J.S.A. 58-3(c)(5) because he or she poses

a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare"). The J.W.D. Court concluded

                                                                                A-1626-21
                                         20
the Legislature intended that courts not return weapons to a defendant in a

domestic violence action—even after dismissal of the complaint—if the court

finds that "the defendant poses a threat to public health, safety, or welfare."

J.W.D., 149 N.J. at 116. Our Court had to reconcile the FPIC statute with the

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, and

emphasized "the return of weapons to a defendant who is a threat to the public—

would be an invitation to a tragedy. We doubt the Legislature would have

intended so disastrous a result." Id.

      In State v. Cunningham, 186 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1982), prior to

the Court's decision in J.W.D., we similarly determined that when a firearm is

lawfully taken, "a return of the firearm to its owner at a time when the owner

would be disqualified from obtaining a permit to acquire the firearm constitutes

a transfer that is prohibited by the statute." Id. at 511. We stressed the clear

intention of "the statutory design is to prevent firearms from coming into the

hands of persons likely to pose a danger to the public." Id. This result is

achieved "by providing for the revocation of an [FPIC] when its possession has

become disqualified under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) subsequent to the issuance of the

card." Id. at 511-12.

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      Guided by these principles, G.G. is not entitled to have his FPIC or

firearms returned. Since the Wyckoff police lawfully obtained G.G.'s firearms

because he voluntarily surrendered them, and we agree with the trial court that

G.G. is no longer entitled to hold a FPIC pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5),

returning the firearms would be contrary to the Legislature's intent and well-

established law as enunciated in J.W.D. and Cunningham.          The State is

prohibited from transferring the firearms back to G.G.

      To the extent we have not addressed G.G.'s remaining arguments, we are

satisfied they are either moot or lack sufficient merit to warrant further

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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