Court Opinion

ID: 9704158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:24:43.826041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:09.684648
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
I agree that the appellee was entitled to summary judgment in her favor on the issue of whether the Special Committee possesses subpoena power. I also agree that appellant Maddalone was not entitled to summary judgment in his favor on the issue of whether he was required to answer the Committee’s questions regarding the source of the payment of his attorney’s fees. In my opinion, because neither party was entitled to summary judgment on this issue, the ease at bar should be remanded for further proceedings at which Maddalone and his attorney will have the opportunity to address the issue of “whether the revelation of the identity of the fee payer along with information regarding the fee arrangement would reveal a confidential communication between [Maddalone’s counsel] and the fee payer.” In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir.1990).
In Cherney, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted a motion to quash a Grand Jury subpoena that had been issued to David Cherney, an attorney who argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the identity of the person who paid legal fees to him on behalf of another person. While affirming that ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
*465[T]he government is correct in its charge that the privilege is limited to confidential communications and the decision to quash the subpoena in the instant case cannot be supported solely by the determination that disclosure would incriminate the fee payer. The proper question is whether the revelation of the identity of the fee payer along with information regarding the fee arrangement would reveal a confidential communication between Cherney and the fee payer.
The government argues that, regardless of the formation of this relationship, information concerning the payment of fees simply cannot be considered a confidential communication. In the circumstances of this case, we must disagree. A client’s motive for seeking legal advice is undeniably a confidential communication. See, e.g., Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494 n. 6. Accordingly, the privilege protects an unknown client’s identity where its disclosure would reveal a client’s motive for seeking legal advice. Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir.1965); Matter of Witnesses, 729 F.2d at 493.
Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
In Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.1965), while reversing an order holding Jackson L. Boughner, Esq. in civil contempt for his refusal to identify the client who retained him to deliver a cashier’s check to the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
The disclosure of the identity of the client in the instant case would lead ultimately to disclosure of the taxpayer’s motive for seeking legal advice. That this motive of the taxpayer is subject to the privilege is confirmed by Wig-more wherein he states “A communication as to * * * the ultimate motive of the litigation, is equally protected with others, so far as any policy of privilege is concerned.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2313, 609-610.
*466Considering the peculiar facts in this case, we subscribe to the statement in 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283, at page 803:
“ * * * [A]n attorney may not be compelled, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose his retainer or the nature of the transaction to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.”
Id. at 666.
A remand for further proceedings is not inconsistent with the proposition that “[t]here are good reasons why fee arrangements should not generally be protected by the attorney-client privilege.” In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 7, 602 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1992) (emphasis supplied). Because Maddalone was the prevailing party on the “payment of attorney’s fees” issue in the circuit court, he should not be denied the right to have the circuit court make a fact-specific determination of “whether the revelation of the identity of the fee payer along with information regarding the fee arrangement would reveal a confidential communication between [Maddalone’s counsel] and the fee payer.”