Court Opinion

ID: 9546180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:52.091646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:06.571062
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
concurring:
Because the admission of the tennis shoes and the bandana seized from the residence at 3300 West Ohio Avenue was, in my view, harmless error, I concur in the affirmance of the defendant’s conviction. I do not believe, however, that the circumstances of this case merit the application of the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as formulated and applied by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). The admittedly defective affidavit underlying the search warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to foreclose any objectively reasonable reliance upon the validity of the search warrant issued on the basis of the invalid affidavit.
I.
It should be noted that there were two red bandanas seized during the search pursuant to warrant conducted on November 16, 1981 — one seized from the interior of the 1971 Toyota automobile belonging to the defendant and the other seized from the house at 3300 West Ohio Avenue. I am satisfied that the affidavit established probable cause to search the Toyota automobile and that, therefore, the bandana seized from the automobile was properly admitted.1 With respect to the tennis *1164shoes and bandana seized from the home, however, it is quite obvious that the affidavit, when measured against applicable constitutional standards, is totally deficient in establishing probable cause to search the residence at 3300 West Ohio Avenue.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant be based on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is even more specific in the requirement of probable cause by expressly mandating that the probable cause necessary for the warrant, in addition to being supported by oath or affirmation, must be “reduced to writing.” See Hernandez v. People, 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996 (1963). The constitutional standard of probable cause involves a level of knowledge grounded in the practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act. E.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); People v. Ball, 639 P.2d 1078 (Colo.1982). In a search pursuant to warrant, this standard requires that the affidavit allege sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located on the premises to be searched. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302 (Colo.1982).
A judicial officer issuing a search warrant has the responsibility to determine whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This determination must be made on the basis of the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 n. 8, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); People v. Padilla, 182 Colo. 101, 105, 511 P.2d 480, 482 (1973); People v. Goggin, 177 Colo. 19, 21, 492 P.2d 618, 619 (1972). Were the rule otherwise, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment would be rendered meaningless. Because the nonconsensual physical entry into the home by a governmental official is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378-79, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo.1981), the constitutional requirement that the affidavit establish a factual basis for probable cause is particularly critical in the case of a warrant authorizing the search of a home.
The preface of the affidavit in this case stated that the affiant, Denver Police Detective Dock Foster, had “reason to believe” that there were located at the premises of 3300 West Ohio Avenue in Denver, Colorado, a white pair of Nike tennis shoes with the name “Janet” written on the left shoe, a red bandana, and several other items of specifically designated property. The factual basis for this belief, as alleged in the affidavit, was: (1) a report by one of the victims, identified by name, that on October 31, 1981, she had been sexually assaulted by a Spanish American male, 20 years of age, 5'9" tall, wearing blue jeans, a green T-shirt, and white Nike tennis shoes with the name “Janet” written on the left shoe, and driving a car with a license number CN 4714; and (2) a report from another victim, also identified by name, who stated that on November 4, 1981, a Caucasian 20 year old man, 5'8" tall and weighing approximately 130 pounds, wearing blue jeans and a red T-shirt, attempted to force her into a light yellow Datsun “with a red bandana hanging on the rear view mirror.” The affidavit of Detective Foster stated that his investigation “revealed that CN-4714 lists to Jerry M. Deitchman, of 1755 South Pecos Street on a 1971 Toyota” and that “Deitchman is a Caucasian (dark complexioned) male, 5'8" tall, 140 pounds.” (emphasis added).
Thus, not only did the affidavit fail to establish to a fair probability that Jerry M. Deitchman lived at 3300 West Ohio Avenue *1165and that the tennis shoes and the red bandana would be found at that location, but, in addition, it affirmatively stated that Deitchman’s address was at an entirely different location, namely, 1755 South Pecos Street. The search warrant for 3300 West Ohio Avenue, therefore, was manifestly invalid as unsupported by any showing of cause at all for its issuance.
II.
Because the seizure of the tennis shoes and the bandana from 3300 West Ohio Avenue was constitutionally infirm, it is necessary to determine whether the “good faith exception” to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to the circumstances of this case. I conclude that the good faith exception has no application here.
A.
In United States v. Leon, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, the affidavit for a search warrant was based primarily on a tip from an anonymous informant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court’s partial grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress, held that the information provided by the informant was inadequate to establish probable cause under the two-pronged test developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The Supreme Court, declining to consider whether the affidavit satisfied the “totality of circumstances” test announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, which rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, chose instead to modify the exclusionary rule by adopting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence wrongfully seized in a search pursuant to warrant. To qualify for the good faith exception, the police must obtain the evidence “in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” 104 S.Ct. at 3421.
The Supreme Court’s formulation of the exception was based on its perception that the exclusionary rule cannot be expected “to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” 104 S.Ct. at 3419. The reasoning here seems to be that as long as an affidavit alleges a colorable though technically insufficient case of probable cause to search and as long as a judge impartially reviews the affidavit and incorrectly concludes that probable cause exists, then, in view of the fact that reasonable minds frequently differ on the issue of probable cause, suppression of any evidence illegally seized under the warrant would merely penalize the police for the judge’s error and would not logically contribute to the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. The Court, however, cautioned that suppression remains an appropriate remedy in those circumstances where the police have no objectively reasonable basis for relying on the validity of the search warrant. One of the circumstances expressly exempted from the good faith exception is, as stated in Leon, the seizure of evidence pursuant to a search warrant “based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3422 [quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) ].
The good faith exception in Leon is bottomed in an objective standard of reasonableness. Irrespective of the many uncertainties that this exception might pose for Fourth Amendment doctrine, Leon does make crystal clear that subjective good faith is simply not enough to withstand a constitutional challenge to a search and seizure conducted under an invalid search warrant:
We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. “Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law en*1166forcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” [citations omitted]. The objective standard we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.
Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 20.
No principle is more basic to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the prohibition against a search based on a warrant totally lacking in probable cause. A police officer requesting a search warrant must be presumed to know that it is his constitutional responsibility to include in the affidavit sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the search of another’s home. Leon’s objective standard of reasonableness would be totally illusory if police officers are not to be held to at least this minimal standard of knowledge. Where, therefore, as here, a search warrant is constitutionally infirm due to the failure of the affidavit to establish probable cause, the applicability of the good faith exception should turn on whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for a police officer to rely on the validity of the warrant. Objective reasonableness in this context must be determined on the basis of the “indicia of probable cause” contained in the affidavit. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3422.
In this case the affidavit of Detective Foster was totally lacking in any indicia of probable cause to search 3300 West Ohio Avenue. Even if “indicia of probable cause” is equated with the diminished standard of plausible possibility, the affidavit fails the test. There is simply no recitation of facts which will support an inference, even to a plausible possibility, that Deitch-man lived at 3300 West Ohio Avenue or that the evidence sought by the police would be found there. That Detective Foster might have possessed independent knowledge of facts establishing Deitch-man's present address as 3300 West Ohio Avenue rather than 1755 South Pecos Street is, in my view, no aid to the establishment of the good faith exception. Such facts never made their way into the affidavit. Uncommunicated knowledge of facts never brought to the attention of the judge issuing the warrant neither mitigates the facial deficiency of the affidavit nor provides any discernible indicia that might arguably support an objectively reasonable reliance on the validity of the warrant. Utilization of the good faith exception to uphold the search and seizure in this case is to convert what I perceive to be nothing more than subjective good faith into an objective standard of reasonable reliance with respect to a search warrant that, so far as concerns the constitutional requirement of probable cause, was no more factually supported than a warrant issued without any affidavit at all. The Supreme Court, as I read Leon, never intended the good faith exception to encompass such a fundamental infirmity in the warrant process.2
B.
I find Massachusetts v. Sheppard, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737, *1167inapplicable to this case. In Sheppard, the police obtained a search warrant for a house owned by Osborne Sheppard, who was a boyfriend of the victim whose burned and beaten body had been found in a vacant lot. An affidavit in support of an arrest and search warrant was prepared by a police detective on a Sunday afternoon. The affidavit specifically listed various items that were sought by the police, including clothing of the victim and a blunt instrument that might have been used to kill her. The detective showed the affidavit to the district attorney, the assistant district attorney, and a police sergeant, all of whom concluded that it set forth probable cause for the arrest of Sheppard and the search of his home. Unfortunately, the only warrant form that the detective could find on that day was a narcotics warrant form. The detective-affiant took the affidavit and the warrant form to the residence of a judge, who examined the affidavit and stated that he would authorize the search. The detective then offered the warrant form to the judge and told the judge that he knew it dealt only with controlled substances. After unsuccessfully looking for a more suitable warrant form, the judge informed the detective that he would make the necessary changes in the warrant form so as to provide a proper search warrant. The judge took the form, made some changes on it, dated and signed the warrant, but failed to change the substantive portion dealing with controlled substances and also failed to expressly incorporate the affidavit into the warrant. The judge then returned the affidavit to the detective, telling him that the warrant was sufficient authority to carry out the search. Police officers thereafter went to Sheppard’s residence, limited the search to the items listed in the affidavit, and seized several incriminating items of evidence.
Sheppard was convicted of first degree murder, but the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed his conviction, holding that the incriminating evidence, although seized on the basis of a reasonable good faith belief in the validity of the warrant, should have been excluded. The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the facts clearly established “an objectively reasonable basis for the officers’ mistaken belief” in the validity of the warrant, 104 S.Ct. at 3428-29, and, in reversing the judgment, stated:
In sum, the police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake. “[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges.” [citation omitted]. Suppressing evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve. Accordingly, federal law does not require the exclusion of the disputed evidence in this case.
104 S.Ct. at 3429-30.
Unlike the error in Sheppard, the error in this case was not in the technical form of the warrant but in the affiant-officer’s failure to include in the affidavit the barest factual statement connecting 3300 West Ohio Avenue with the evidence sought by the police. This case, therefore, is plainly what the court in Sheppard expressly recognized was not within its holding: “an instance in which ‘it is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant.’ ” Sheppard, 104 S.Ct. at 3429 n. 7, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2345 (White, J., concurring). Reliance on Sheppard as authority for categorizing the illegal seizure in this case as a “technical violation” within the good faith exception is, by Sheppard’s own terms, necessarily misplaced.
III.
Because I view the admission of the tennis shoes and the red bandana seized from 3300 West Ohio Avenue as a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I believe it unnecessary to engage in an analysis of the admis*1168sibility of this evidence under the statutory good faith exception of section 16-3-308, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.). Since some members of the court have addressed this issue, however, I will briefly comment on it. In so doing, I refrain from expressing any view on whether the statutory “good faith exception” comports with article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. The reason why this question need not be answered at this time is that the statutory exception, by its own terms, is not applicable to the circumstances present here.
Section 16-3-308, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer ... as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation.
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section:
(a) “Good faith mistake” means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
(b) “Technical violation” means a reasonable good faith reliance upon a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled.
A “good faith mistake” as defined in subsection (2)(a) is restricted to “mistakes based on reasonable judgmental errors of fact rather than mistakes of law.” People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990, 995 (Colo.1984) (emphasis in original); see People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948, 950-51 (Colo.1983), cert. granted sub nom. Colorado v. Quintero, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386, cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 543, 78 L.Ed.2d 719 (1983).3 The only portion of the definition of “technical violation” relevant here is that which is directed to “a reasonable good faith reliance upon ... a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake.” This definition, however, expressly incorporates “good faith mistake” as defined in subsection (2)(a). Thus, the express language of section 16-3-308(2) compels the conclusion that the portion of the definition of “technical violation” which refers to reliance on a warrant later invalidated encompasses only good faith mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law.
No “technical violation” occurred in this case. Officer Foster had knowledge that the defendant lived at 3300 West Ohio Avenue. In executing the warrant, therefore, he was not laboring under some reasonable judgmental error concerning the location of the defendant’s home. On the contrary, the officer’s inadvertence in failing to include in the affidavit any facts linking the evidence sought to 3300 West Ohio Avenue was a basic error of law, not a judgmental mistake about some fact which, if true, would constitute probable cause. Under these circumstances, the lack of any indicia of probable cause in the affidavit to support the search warrant for 3300 West Ohio Avenue renders any reliance upon the warrant “far beyond the purview of a ‘technical violation' ” as that term is used in section 16-3-308(2)(b). People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 996. I would therefore hold that the seizure of the Nike tennis shoes and the red bandana from 3300 West Ohio Avenue did not qualify under Colorado’s statutory good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
IV.
Although I believe the Nike tennis shoes and the red bandana taken from the residence were the products of an unconstitutional search and were improperly admitted into evidence, I would nonetheless affirm the judgment. Before a constitutional error can be deemed harmless, a court must *1169be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury’s ultimate resolution of the case. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); LeMasters v. People, 678 P.2d 538 (Colo.1984); People v. Mack, 638 P.2d 257 (Colo.1981). A review of the trial proceedings convinces me that the source, quality, and quantity of the prosecution’s evidence, when considered independently of the tennis shoes and red bandana seized from the residence, were such that there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of the challenged evidence affected the jury’s verdicts.
During the prosecution’s case in chief, Detective Phillip Dinan testified that prior to the search of 3300 West Ohio Avenue on November 16, 1981, in which the tennis shoes and red bandana were seized, he took the defendant into custody pursuant to a court order for nontestimonial identification evidence. While the detective was waiting in the defendant’s home while the defendant dressed, he heard the defendant ask his wife to get him a pair of shoes. The defendant’s wife attempted to pick up a pair of tennis shoes on the floor in the bedroom of the home, but when the defendant told her “not that pair” she obtained a pair of boots from another part of the bedroom. Detective Dinan, according to his trial testimony, was able to observe the tennis shoes and described them as “[h]i-topped, white tennis shoes, like old style basketball shoes.” The detective also testified that, after taking the defendant into custody on this occasion, he saw parked outside the home a pale yellow “Toyota type vehicle” with the license number CN 4714 and a red bandana lying on the front seat.
The victim of the sexual assault that occurred on October 31, 1981, made an in-trial identification of the defendant as her assailant before any mention of the tennis shoes was made or before they were introduced into evidence.4 This victim, during the prosecution’s case in chief, described what her assailant was wearing at the time of the assault, and her description included “high-top Nike tennis shoes with neutral stripes, black shoe laces,” “size eight” with the word “Janet on the inside of the left or the left shoe on the ankle.” She also testified to her prior identifications of the defendant in a photographic array and in a lineup shortly after the assault. It was only after she had described the shoes worn by her assailant and had made an in-trial identification of the defendant that the tennis shoes were admitted into evidence.
The victim of the attempted kidnapping that occurred on November 4, 1981, testified during the prosecution’s case in chief that in the course of the offense she saw a red bandana hanging from the rear view mirror of her assailant’s car.5 She identified the defendant in court and testified to having previously identified him in a photographic array and lineup. At this point in the trial the prosecution showed her the red bandana seized from the automobile and the red bandana seized from 3300 West Ohio Avenue, and she characterized them as being similar in appearance to the bandana which she had seen in the automobile. The red bandana seized from 3300 West Ohio Avenue played no part in the in-trial *1170identification of the defendant by this victim.
Thus, both the prosecution’s eyewitness identification evidence and the circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant with the crimes charged originated in sources independent of the illegal seizure of the Nike tennis shoes and the red bandana from 3300 West Ohio Avenue. The actual admission of these two items of evidence was, under these circumstances, cumulative at best. More important, the prosecution’s other evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that, in my view, there was no reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the defendant’s conviction. I would therefore affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to say that Justice KIRSHBAUM concurs in the harmless error analysis in Part IV of this opinion.

. The affidavit alleged that one of the sexual assault victims, identified by name, reported having been kidnapped and assaulted on October 31, 1981, by a man driving "a small white car” with the license number CN 4714. The affidavit further stated that another victim, also identified by name, reported that a man tried to force her into his car on November 4, 1981, and that during this encounter the victim observed a “red bandana hanging on the rear view mirror.” The affidavit contained reports from two other women, also identified by name, who reported having been attacked by a man driving a white or a yellow Toyota with license number CN 4714 or CN 4741. Finally, the affidavit stated that the affiant, Detective Dock Foster, traced the license number CN 4714 to a 1971 Toyota owned by Jerry M. Deitchman of 1755 South Pecos Street. These factual allegations, in my view, provided probable cause for the search of the defendant’s 1971 Toyota automobile with license number CN 4714, which resulted in the seizure of the bandana from the interior of the automobile.

. Some aids of right judgment on the scope of the good faith exception may be gleaned from examples that arguably would provide an objectively reasonable basis for police reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. These examples might include search warrants issued on the basis of any of the following affidavits: (1) an affidavit stating that the defendant lived at “3030 West Ohio Avenue” and containing facts showing the presence of contraband or incriminating evidence at this address, when the actual address for which the warrant issues is 3300 West Ohio Avenue, the correct address of the home to be searched — in other words, a typographical error made by the officer in preparing the affidavit; (2) an affidavit listing the residence to be searched as 3300 West Ohio Avenue, but containing only the barest averment that the evidence sought had some connection with that residence, such as a statement that the suspect had been seen on occasions entering and leaving the premises; or (3) an affidavit containing stale information, such as statements showing that the suspect had lived at the house several months prior to the preparation of the affidavit but offering no account of his present whereabouts. These examples, I believe, would probably qualify for the good faith exception adopted by Leon because in each instance the affidavit alleges what is at least a colorable though technically insufficient case of probable cause.

. By contrast, the good faith exception promulgated by the United States Supreme Court makes no such distinction between errors of law and errors of fact. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); United States v. Leon, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

. This victim testified that on October 31, 1981, the defendant grabbed her as she walked by his car, forced her into his car, held her with a broken glass bottle to the throat, drove her some distance, and then compelled her to commit fellatio. As a result of this incident, the defendant was charged in two counts with first degree sexual assault, § 18-3-402, 8 C.R.S. (1978 and 1984 Supp.), and second degree kidnapping, § 18-3-302, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.). The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

. This victim testified that on November 4, 1981, as she walked by the defendant’s parked car, he grabbed her and attempted to force her into the car, but that she managed to escape. As a result of this incident, the defendant was charged with attempted second degree kidnapping, §§ 18-2-101, 8 C.R.S. (1978), and 18-3-302, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), and the jury returned a guilty verdict on this charge.