Court Opinion

ID: 9532149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:38.066749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:41.031889
License: Public Domain

WHITE, P. J.
I dissent.
The parties have resolved their controversy here to turn principally and solely on the issue of whether plaintiff’s property is “irrevocably dedicated to religious . . . purposes” or whether under plaintiff’s articles of incorporation, diversion of its taxed property to educational (nonexempt) purposes is authorized.
In the case of Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 755, 758 [221 P.2d 59], the Supreme Court cogently says:
“The rule of strict construction applies to the welfare exemption law and the institution seeking to benefit must clearly show that it comes within the terms thereof; but adherence to this rule does not require so rigid and narrow an interpretation of the exempting language as to defeat the apparent design of the lawmakers. In short, there must be a strict but reasonable construction of this law as applied, to the particular facts at hand.” (Italics added.)
Therefore, it seems apparent and manifest that the exemp- * tion of property used exclusively for “religious . . . purposes” should be held to include any purposes which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of religious purposes.
Defendant does not maintain that plaintiff is not now using its property for purely religious purposes, but seems apprehensive lest the latter’s property may subsequently be put to' an educational use, which does not qualify, and thereby abuse the exemption.
To me, this apprehension appears groundless and unwarranted. Such an exigency, should it arise, is provided for in the welfare exemption act itself. Under the terms thereof (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 254.5) it is provided that in order to qualify for exemption an application in affidavit form must be filed with the assessor on or before April 1 each year. If at any time plaintiff’s property was diverted to nonexempt *112uses, its exemptions would be immediately eliminated or curtailed.
The material parts of plaintiff’s articles of incorporation provide as follows:
“3. The purposes for which this corporation is formed are exclusively as follows:
(a) To conduct studies by literary research, by laboratory research, by field research and any and all other appropriate means for the purpose:
(1) of establishing the relationship between the facts and teachings of science and the facts and teachings of the Bible ;
(2) of encouraging a faith in and acceptance of the Bible as the infallible Word of God;
(3) of preparing an able and adequate presentation of the facts and teachings of the Bible as an alternative to Godless materialism with a standard of accuracy and excellence that shall assure its acceptance by institutions of learning both Christian and secular; and
(4) of devising ways and means of utilizing modern scientific devices and techniques as aids to the propagation of the gospel throughout the world;
and to this end to establish and maintain libraries and laboratories and to conduct field trips, and to do all other things appropriate to the purpose hereinabove stated. ’ ’
I am not unmindful of section 214(7) of the act, which provides that “This section shall not be construed to enlarge the college exemption or to extend an exemption to property held by or used as an educational institution of less than collegiate grade”; but this section plainly has reference to secular and not religious education. How would it be possible to disseminate a study of religion other than by the process of education? To hold otherwise would be to prohibit exemption of a religious institution maintaining Bible classes for education in religion. Plaintiff’s articles of incorporation plainly irrevocably dedicate its properties to the teaching of a philosophy of religion—of man’s utter dependability upon Almighty God in whatever achievements he may attain in the field of science. Whatever educational activities plaintiff may engage in under its articles of incorporation are solely and absolutely incidental to its religious purposes. If preparation and presentation “of the facts and teachings of the Bible as an alternative to Godless materialism” does not constitute an irrevocable dedication to reli*113gious purposes, it would be difficult indeed to conceive of a dedication that could be characterized as religious.
As I read the case of Pasadena Hospital Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 779 [221 P.2d 62], relied upon in the prevailing opinion, I am persuaded that it is not controlling here. In the ease just cited, the articles of incorporation stated the objects and purposes to be not only the establishment and maintenance of a hospital but “any other lawful purpose where pecuniary profit is not the object thereof,” thereby permitting the property to be used for “lawful purposes” other than “hospital purposes”; while in the case now under consideration, plaintiff’s articles of incorporation permit the use of its property for “educational purposes” only insofar as such educational activities refer and are incidental to the promulgation of its “religious purposes.”
It therefore follows that the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff’s property was entitled to the welfare exemption and the judgment should be affirmed.
Respondent's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 23, 1951. Carter, J., voted for a hearing.