Court Opinion

ID: 9493902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:05.662984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:06.173940
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with my colleagues as to Finley’s convictions on Counts I, II, III, V, and VI. I disagree, however, as to the conviction on Count IV. Under the unambiguous language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), use of a firearm (i) to provide security during a drug sale and thereafter (ii) to protect the stash of drugs retained after the sale (and during the contemplated additional sales) constitutes two separate firearm crimes in furtherance of two drug trafficking crimes. I appreciate the troubling result of this conclusion, namely a mandatory and consecutive 25!-year prison term for the second firearm conviction. But this is not the forum in which to challenge Congress’s provision of harsh penalties for serious crimes.
Section 924(c)(1)(A) criminalizes the possession of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... or ... in furtherance of any *209such crime.” This language states without qualification that use of a firearm in furtherance of two or more crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes is itself two or more additional crimes. . There is nothing in the language requiring that the predicate crimes be separated by a particular amount of time, and I am genuinely puzzled as to what pertinent ambiguity lurks in it or what word or phrase would clarify it should Congress so desire.
In reaching a different conclusion, my colleagues rely on the fact that courts have perceived ambiguities in the Section 924(c)(1)(A). However, the ambiguities addressed by these decisions arise from two factual situations quite different from the one we address here. The first ambiguity involves the possession of a firearm during a single act that happens to constitute two different crimes. See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 749 (D.C.Cir.1998) (invalidating second Section 924(c)(1) conviction where defendant’s shooting of single witness happened to constitute two separate federal crimes, because “there was only one use of the firearm”); United States v. Johnson, 25 F.3d 1335, 1336-38 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc) (invalidating sentence based on multiple Section 924(c)(1) counts where defendant simultaneously trafficked in more than one controlled substance, emphasizing that key fact was that defendant committed all predicate offenses simultaneously), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 53, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000). The second ambiguity addressed in other decisions involves the possession of multiple firearms during a single criminal act. See United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1334 (D.C.Cir.1995) (en banc); United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 674 (2d Cir.1993).
Whatever ambiguity Section 924(c)(1) may harbor as to the two situations addressed in Wilson and Anderson, the Section is strikingly unambiguous with regard to the very different issue presented here: whether, if two separate drug crimes are committed, continual possession of a fire-aim in furtherance of each constitutes two further crimes.
We all agree that, under our easelaw, Finley was properly convicted of two separate drug offenses. When a sale by a drug dealer does not exhaust the dealer’s stock and an additional quantity of drugs is retained with an intent to sell, the separate crimes of distribution and possession with intent to distribute have been committed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 45-47 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)).
Because Finley committed two drug trafficking crimes, his possession of a weapon in furtherance of those crimes constituted two more crimes under both the logic and language of Section 924(c)(1). At the time of the confirmatory buy, Finley possessed the gun to protect himself from the buyer. Then, after the sale, he possessed the gun to guard the remaining stash of drugs and to protect himself during the intended future transactions. The existence of two different drug trafficking acts thoroughly distinguishes the instant matter from Wilson, in which the defendant was convicted on two Section 924(c)(1) charges for a single criminal act: using a gun to kill a witness to prevent him from testifying, which constituted both first-degree murder and killing a witness to prevent his testimony. See Wilson, 160 F.3d at 749.1 The multiple-weapon issue *210addressed in Anderson of course has nothing to do with the present case.
Moreover, our caselaw has without deviation held that the continuous possession of a firearm during multiple criminal acts properly supports multiple 924(c)(1) convictions:
Congress considered the appropriate unit of prosecution to be the underlying drug-trafficking offense, not the separate firearms. Only where the defendant commits multiple drug-trafficking crimes or violent crimes, and the government can link the firearms to those crimes, may the government prosecute for multiple violations of § 924(c)(1).
Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 674 (internal citation omitted).2
Because there is nothing in the statute or caselaw suggesting that the predicate crimes must be separated by any particular amount of time, there is no reason to invoke the rule of lenity. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994) (“The rule of lenity ... applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.”), quoted in United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d 590, 593 (2d Cir.1999).
Finally, the test adopted by the present decision — that there can be only a single Section 924(c)(1) violation where the multiple predicate offenses are “simultaneous or nearly so” — introduces a standard so amorphous that it fails to apprise juries, courts, and defendants of what conduct violates Section 924(c)(1). As a result of the present decision, the lack of a close temporal relation among predicate acts is an element of multiple Section 924(c)(1) violations. Juries will have to be instructed on it, and, given the absence of more guidance as to how distant the temporal relation among the predicate acts must be, we can expect inconsistent verdicts. Even slight variations on the facts of the present case reveal potentially great difficulties. For example, if another drug customer appeared at Finley’s window three minutes after the confirmatory buy and another sale occurred, the arrest and discovery of the remaining stash and shotgun might have occurred ten minutes instead of four minutes after the first buy. Three drug crimes would have been committed, but the number of permissible firearms charges' — one, two, or three — would be a question on which the present decision offers no guidance. For another example, the officers might have continued to sur-veil Finley for several hours after the confirmatory buy but observed no further sales. An arrest at that point would have *211revealed the weapon and additional drugs, but the use of Section 924(c)(1) would be in doubt because of the amorphous temporal test adopted here. Moreover, district courts may have to address habeas petitions attacking convictions based on jury verdicts or guilty pleas, and, if the merits are reached, will face similar difficulties.3
Although I agree with the characterization of Finley’s sentence as draconian, I am less certain that the rule adopted by my colleagues will always seem as attractive as it may in the present context. All violent federal crimes broadly defined,4 as well as drug trafficking, are predicate crimes under Section 924(c)(1). Multiple violent crimes are often “simultaneous or nearly so,” and, for example, limiting the prosecution to one Section 924(c)(1) charge for- three rapid-fire, execution-style murders in the course of robbing a federally insured bank, each of which would be a separate crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), strikes me as odd.5
I would therefore affirm the convictions.

. Senator Mansfield's comments, relied upon by my colleagues, see ante at 207, do not undermine the application of the statute to both predicate drug offenses; rather, they *210support it. Senator Mansfield stated that his concern was with criminals who make the choice to use a gun more than once in connection with drug offenses. See 115 Cong. Rec. 34,838 (1969).

. At oral argument, Finley argued that under the indictment and the jury instructions, the jury was left free to find guilt on both drug counts (and thus both gun counts) based solely on the sale to the undercover officer without its ever having to reach the issue of whether he still possessed drugs after the sale. See Gore, 154 F.3d at 45-47. But while Finley might have been entitled to an instruction that guilt on the possession charge had to be based on his having a stock of drugs after the sale, he did not ask for such a charge and the failure to give it sua sponte is at best harmless error. Any jury that credited the undercover officer’s testimony as to the sale would surely have credited the testimony of the arresting officers about the drugs in Finley’s possession at the time of the arrest. See United States v. Jackson, 196 F.3d 383, 384-86 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that harmless error review applies to erroneous omission of element of offense from jury instructions (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))).

. A prisoner who pleaded guilty to multiple Section 924(c)(1) counts prior to the present decision could bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition based upon the arguable lack of temporal proximity of the predicate crimes. If one of the Section 924(c)(1) offenses were no longer a crime under the present decision, the plea would not have been knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 164 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (stating that when definition of element of crime changes, prior guilLy pleas based upon old definition "may be challenged as not having been knowing and voluntary” (citing Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir.1998))).

. Section 924(c) reads:
For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or properly of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

. There are other examples. El Sayyid No-sair was prosecuted for seditious conspiracy and other offenses that arose from, and were related to, a plot to bomb various buildings and structures in New York City, including the World Trade Center. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.1999). Nosair was observed with a gun immediately after the shooting murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane at the Marriot East Side Hotel in New York, and immediately attempted to flee the room in which the shooting had occurred. Id. at 105. On his way out of the room, he shot a man who sought to impede his exit; once outside the hotel, he shot a uniformed postal police officer. See id. Although these three uses of a firearm were part of the same criminal episode and evidently occurred in as rapid succession as Finley’s predicate crimes, No-sair was convicted on three Section 924(c)(1) counts, predicated on underlying counts of murder and attempted murder in aid of a racketeering activity and attempted murder of a postal employee. See id. at 148 n. 26. Similarly, Buford O’Neal Furrow, Jr. faces five separate 924(c) charges, for the alleged rapid-succession shooting of five children, predicated on underlying counts of violent interference, on account of race or religion, with federally protected activities. See United States v. Furrow, 125 F.Supp.2d 1170 (C.D.Cal.2000) (noting charging of multiple 924(c) counts).