Court Opinion

ID: 9963636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 22:21:58.9592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.132779
License: Public Domain

04/25/2024
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT NASHVILLE
                              Assigned on Briefs January 2, 2024

                                       IN RE NEVEAH W.

                   Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Davidson County
                     No. PT 257556     Sheila D. J. Calloway, Judge

                                 No. M2023-00944-COA-R3-PT

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial
court found that eight statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence
demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. The mother has appealed.1 Having determined that the petitioner did not prove
the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to visit the child prior to the
mother’s incarceration by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the trial court’s
finding as to that ground. Additionally, because the trial court made insufficient findings
of fact and conclusions of law concerning a separate statutory ground it termed,
“abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard,” we reverse the trial court’s
determination as to that ground as well. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other
respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.

        Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
                 Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.
BENNETT and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

C. Michael Cardwell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brittnie W.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jordan K. Crews, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services.

1
  The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to the child in the same proceeding. Inasmuch as
the father has not appealed the termination of his parental rights, we will confine our analysis to those
facts relevant to the mother’s appeal.
                                       OPINION

                         I. Factual and Procedural Background

        This case focuses on Neveah W., the minor child (“the Child”) of Brittnie W.
(“Mother”) and Christopher H. (“Father”). The Child was three years of age when the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed an emergency petition in the
Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) on September 29, 2017, seeking to have
the Child adjudicated dependent and neglected as to both parents. DCS filed the petition
after receiving a referral on September 12, 2017. The facts as recited in the referral and
incorporated into the petition stated:

              [The Child] (age 3) resides with her parents [Mother] and [Father] in
      Davidson County, TN. The family is homeless; they were staying in a
      hotel but checked out. Today officers were called out to . . . Doak Avenue
      in Nashville TN where a child was seen running out in the middle of the
      road while an adult ([Mother]) was seen asleep in the truck. By the time
      officers arrived to the scene the child was back inside the truck and was
      eating make-up. [Mother] was observed passed out in the driver’s seat.
      [Mother] was under the influence and there was a baggie observed in her
      lap with a white residue inside. There was also a white residue observed on
      her pants. It took a while to wake [Mother] and when she did finally wake
      up she admitted that the white residue in the baggie was crushed up
      [l]oratab pills. [Mother] admitted that she had been snorting the loratab and
      there was a straw also found in the truck that she used to snort loratab. It is
      believed that [Mother] does not have a prescription as there was no
      prescription bottle found. There was also a piece of cellophane with three
      round orange pills that displayed 029. It was found that these pills are
      Alprazolam and is an anxiety medication. [Mother] states that she takes
      this for her nerves however the pills were not in a prescription bottle. [The
      Child] was transported to Vanderbilt Children’s Hospital to be examined
      because it is unknown if the child ingested anything other than the make-
      up. [Mother] is being arrested and charged with child neglect and
      possession of a controlled substance. It is believed that the hospital social
      worker is speaking with a DCS case worker at this time. It is unknown
      where [Father] is at this time.

       According to the petition, DCS Child Protective Services Investigator Daniel
Griffin was informed by Vanderbilt Children’s Hospital that the Child’s urine was
positive for cocaine and opiates. Mother was arrested for child neglect and possession of
                                           -2-
a controlled substance after police officers found Mother in the vehicle with the drugs.2
Father reported to Mr. Griffin that he did not know how the drugs got into the Child’s
system. Neither parent had stable housing or could provide Mr. Griffin with a home
address.

       DCS Team Leader Larae Bodley had determined that the Child needed a safety
placement while Mother and Father worked with DCS to address their issues. Regarding
this decision, DCS averred in the dependency and neglect petition:

        [T]here are reasonable services available which can prevent or eliminate the
        necessity of the child’s removal to state custody at the present time; and . . .
        there is a less drastic alternative to removal, which can reasonably protect
        the child’s health.

               [DCS] further states that it is in the best interest of the child and the
        public that this proceeding be brought and that there are reasonable services
        available which can prevent or eliminate the necessity of the child’s
        removal at the present time; and that there is a less drastic alternative to
        removal, which can reasonably protect the child’s health and welfare.

The parents agreed to place the Child with a maternal great-grandmother (“Great-
Grandmother”). Based on the agreement of Mother, Father, and Great-Grandmother, all
parties entered into an Immediate Protection Agreement (“IPA”). Under the IPA, Mother
and Father were entitled only to supervised contact with the Child and no overnight
visitation.

       Mother subsequently violated the IPA by ceasing contact with DCS, and on
November 9, 2017, the trial court entered an emergency protective custody order
transferring custody of the Child to DCS. Based on the sworn statements of DCS Case
Manager Taneisha Maiten, the trial court found:

        [T]here is probable cause to believe that [the Child] is a dependent and
        neglected child within the meaning of the law, that the child is subjected to
        an immediate threat to the child’s health and safety to the extent that delay
        for a hearing would be likely to result in severe or irreparable harm, and
        there is no less drastic alternative to removal available which could
        reasonably and adequately protect the child’s health and safety pending a
        preliminary hearing; that it is contrary to the child’s welfare at this time to
        remain in the care, custody, or control of the parent/caretakers/custodians.
2
 During the termination trial, Mother testified that she had pled guilty to the charge of child neglect but
did not testify as to when.
                                                   -3-
           ***

                  The Court further finds that it is contrary to the child’s welfare to
           remain      in    the     care,   custody,     or    control     of    [her]
           parents/caretakers/custodians, due to the above-stated facts. There are no
           less drastic alternatives to removal and, all reasonable efforts have been
           made and services have been rendered to prevent or eliminate the removal
           of said child from her home, including [IPA Placement].

Upon ordering the Child into DCS custody, the trial court appointed Dana Trella Cary as
the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the Child’s best interest and requested a
court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) volunteer.

        On November 30, 2017, DCS developed a family permanency plan, which was
presented as an exhibit at trial. According to the trial court’s final order, the court ratified
the first permanency plan on December 19, 2017, and found the plan to be reasonable,
necessary, and in the best interest of the Child.3 Under the plan, Mother was required to
meet the following requirements: (1) undergo a parenting assessment and follow all
recommendations, (2) undergo an alcohol and drug (“A&D”) assessment and follow all
recommendations, (3) submit to random drug screens, (4) present herself to DCS, (5)
maintain contact and notify DCS of any contact information changes, (6) obtain and
maintain stable housing and a legal source of income with documentation to DCS, (7)
visit the Child a minimum of four hours per month, and (8) complete a mental health
assessment and follow all recommendations.

       The permanency plan was revised on November 8, 2018, adding the following
requirements for Mother: (9) sign a release of information for DCS to receive access to a
mental health assessment that Mother claimed she had undergone, (10) complete an
updated mental health assessment if the first was not current, (11) maintain a bonded
relationship with the Child, and (12) help Father establish paternity of the Child. The
permanency plan was revised again during a child and family team meeting conducted by
DCS on December 16, 2019, adding the following requirements for Mother: (13)
continue to drug test regularly and provide clean urine specimens, (14) continue to refrain
from drug use, and (15) complete a follow-up A&D assessment. In the December 16,
2019 plan, DCS also noted that “DCS will assist [Mother] with locating housing once she
makes herself available to [DCS].” According to DCS records, Mother did not
participate in the development of the initial permanency plan or the December 18, 2019
revision, but she did participate in the development of the November 8, 2018 revision.

3
    The ratification order itself is not in the appellate record.
                                                          -4-
       The trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing over the course of two days on
July 17, 2018, and October 18, 2018. Although the court apparently ruled from the bench
on October 18, 2018, the court did not enter an order adjudicating the Child dependent
and neglected until May 14, 2020.4 Incorporating the facts from the dependency and
neglect petition, including the original referral for the September 2017 incident leading to
the Child’s removal from Mother’s care, the trial court found that Mother had not
disputed the facts on which the petition was based. The trial court found that the Child
was dependent and neglected as to both parents pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §
37-1-102(b)(13)(G). The court further found that Mother had severely abused the Child,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27), due to Mother’s failure to
provide appropriate supervision with illegal substances in the car, resulting in the Child’s
ingestion of illegal substances.

       In February 2020, Mother was incarcerated in Sumner County on a charge of
violating her probation. During the termination trial, Mother testified that this period of
incarceration lasted three months: “March, April, May . . .” of 2020. Mother
acknowledged that “[a]s soon as [she] got released,” she “caught” new charges. She was
arrested on June 2, 2020, on charges of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. Mother was subsequently convicted of vehicular
homicide and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment.

       DCS filed its petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the
Child on June 5, 2020. DCS alleged statutory grounds against both Mother and Father of
(1) abandonment by failure to visit the Child in the four months preceding the filing of
the petition, (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the Child in the four
months preceding the filing of the petition, (3) “abandonment by incarcerated parent,” (4)
substantial non-compliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans,
and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and
physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. As to abandonment by
Mother as an incarcerated parent, DCS alleged that as an alternative to failure to visit and
support in the four months preceding the petition’s filing, Mother had failed to visit and
support the Child in the four months preceding Mother’s incarceration and also alleged
that prior to her incarceration, Mother had exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s
welfare. The petition alleged additional statutory grounds against Mother of (6)
abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home for the Child, (7) severe child abuse,
and (8) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child.

4
 In DCS’s termination petition and in the trial court’s termination order, the date of the dependency and
neglect adjudication is given as the last day of the hearing on October 18, 2018. However, the
adjudicatory order is date stamped May 14, 2020, and DCS acknowledges on appeal that it was not
entered until May 14, 2020.
                                                   -5-
       The trial court conducted a bench trial over the course of three days on September
2, 2022; November 10, 2022; and March 13, 2023. Father’s counsel appeared at the
beginning of trial and requested to withdraw from his representation because he had been
unable to contact Father. The trial court allowed Father’s counsel to withdraw, and the
proceedings continued without Father or his counsel present. Mother was incarcerated at
the time of trial and participated via telephone. The limitation on Mother’s ability to stay
for an extended period of time on the prison telephone system was a factor in the span of
time needed to complete the trial. DCS called Mother as an adverse witness and also
presented testimony from Belinda Pelicci, who testified that she had been the DCS family
services worker assigned to the case, through Youth Villages, since February 2022. DCS
presented as exhibits, inter alia, the dependency and neglect records and the permanency
plan records. Mother presented certificates she had earned while incarcerated, indicating
her completion of a 150-hour “Cognitive Intervention Program,” a life skills course, and
a twelve-step course.

        Undisputed testimony demonstrated that by the time of trial, the Child had been in
approximately twelve placements while in protective custody. After leaving Great-
Grandmother’s custody, the Child resided with Father’s aunt for a few months. At one
point, the Child had been in a pre-adoptive home, but that placement had been disrupted
due to the Child’s behavioral and mental health issues. Mother had been afforded
supervised visitation with the Child while the Child was in foster care in 2018. During
the termination trial, Ms. Pelicci testified that Mother’s last visit with the Child occurred
on December 12, 2018, and that the visit had been cut short because the foster parents
believed that Mother was under the influence of alcohol. According to Ms. Pelicci, DCS
subsequently determined that Mother’s visits with the Child should be suspended upon
the recommendations of mental health professionals who were treating the Child.5

       At the beginning of trial, the Child was receiving residential treatment at the
Youth Villages Inner Harbour campus in Georgia and had been living at the facility since
November 2021. By the last day of trial in March 2023, DCS had successfully placed the
Child in a potential pre-adoptive foster home. Ms. Pelicci testified that placing the Child
in her current foster home had involved many meetings between the Child and the foster
parents. Ms. Pelicci acknowledged that the Child had only been residing in the foster
home for a few days.

       The trial court entered a final order on May 30, 2023, terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the Child. As to Mother, the court determined by clear and
5
 The GAL indicated during trial that the trial court magistrate had entered an order suspending Mother’s
visitation rights. However, this order is not included in the appellate record, and the trial court did not
mention it in the final order.
                                                   -6-
convincing evidence that DCS had proven all of the statutory grounds alleged. The court
further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother timely appealed.

                                  II. Issues Presented

      Mother presents eight issues on appeal, which we have restated as follows:

      1.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to visit or
             financially support her.

      2.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton
             disregard for the Child’s welfare prior to Mother’s incarceration.

      3.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide
             a suitable home.

      4.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the
             reasonable responsibilities of the permanency plans.

      5.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from
             Mother’s custody persisted.

      6.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse against the
             Child.

      7.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that Mother had failed to manifest an ability and
             willingness to personally assume custody of or financial
             responsibility for the Child.

      8.     Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
             evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s
             parental rights.

                                           -7-
                                 III. Standard of Review

       In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine
“whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530
(Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record,
accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against
those findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d
507, 524 (Tenn. 2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however,
are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483
S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s
determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and
shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v.
Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

        “Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,
92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not
absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence
justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96,
97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our
Supreme Court has explained:

       The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.”
       Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of
       parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a
       complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations
       of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1);
       see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating
       parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and
       consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to
       “fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455
       U.S. at 754; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C.,
       452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to
       fundamentally fair procedures).

              Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair
       procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing
       evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of
       unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental
       parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).
                                            -8-
      “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief
      or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or
      substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re
      Bernard T. 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-
      convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as
      highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re
      Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183
      S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

      ***

      In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings,
      however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to
      whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a
      preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of
      the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319
      S.W.3d at 596-97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental]
rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,”
including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319
S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

                IV. Grounds for Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

       Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (West March 6, 2020, to current) lists the
statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

      (a)    The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
             with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to
             a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption
             proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or
             guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1,
             part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4 . . . .

      ***

      (c)    Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

                                           -9-
               (1)     A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that
                       the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights
                       have been established; and

               (2)     That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the
                       best interests of the child.

The trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding
of eight statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights: (1) abandonment by
failure to visit the Child, (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the Child, (3)
abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, (4) “abandonment by incarcerated
parent/wanton disregard,” (5) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; (6)
persistence of the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody, (7)
severe child abuse, and (8) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal
and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. We will address each
statutory ground in turn.

                                  A. Statutory Abandonment

      Concerning statutory abandonment, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1)
provides, as relevant to this action:

       (g)     Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be
               based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The
               following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing
               conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them
               from coming within another ground:

               (1)     Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-
                       102, has occurred; . . .

Regarding the definition of abandonment applicable to a parent’s failure to visit or
support a child, the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (West
March 6, 2020, to June 30, 2021) in effect at the time of the instant petition’s filing
defined abandonment in pertinent part as:6

6
  Effective July 1, 2023, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
102(1)(A)(i) to make the applicable time period three consecutive months when the child is under four
years of age. See 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 373 § 1 (H.B. 163).

                                               - 10 -
       For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the
       filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to
       terminate the parental rights of the parent or parents or the guardian or
       guardians of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of
       parental rights or adoption, that the parent or parents or the guardian or
       guardians either have failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed
       to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child[.]

       In this case, DCS filed the termination petition on June 5, 2020. The trial court
found that the relevant period pursuant to the statute was March 5, 2020, to June 5, 2020,
and further found that Mother had failed to visit and support the Child during that time
period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We note that the
four-month period preceding the petition’s filing actually began on February 5, 2020, and
ended on June 4, 2020. See In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
However, the trial court also found that “Mother was in the Sumner County Jail on
February 28, 2020” and that at the time of trial, Mother was “still incarcerated on a
Vehicular Homicide charge.” DCS pled in its termination petition that if the proof
demonstrated that Mother was incarcerated for any part of the four months preceding the
petition’s filing, the applicable time period for failure to visit and support would be the
four months preceding Mother’s incarceration.

        On appeal, Mother presents arguments regarding the grounds of failure to visit and
failure to support under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). However, DCS
presents arguments regarding failure to visit and support under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), which we determine is the applicable statutory
subdivision due to the fact that Mother was incarcerated for a portion of the four-month
period preceding the petition’s filing. We further determine that the grounds of
abandonment by failure to visit and by failure to support under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) were
properly pled by DCS. See, e.g., In re Paisley J., No. W2022-01059-COA-R3-PT, 2023
WL 4417390, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2023) (reversing the trial court’s findings of
abandonment by failure to visit and support under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) because the
applicable grounds under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) were not pled and were not tried by
implied consent).

       The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (West March 6,
2020, to June 30, 2021) in effect when the termination petition was filed provided in
relevant part:7

7
  Effective July 1, 2023, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
102(1)(A)(iv) to make the applicable time period three consecutive months or an aggregation of the first
ninety days when the child is under four years of age. See 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 373 § 5-6 (H.B.
163).
                                                 - 11 -
       (iv)   A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a
              proceeding, pleading, petition, or amended petition to terminate the
              parental rights of the parent or guardian of the child who is the
              subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption,
              or a parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the
              four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
              action and has:

              (a)    Failed to visit, has failed to support, or has failed to make
                     reasonable payments toward the support of the child for four
                     (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the parent’s or
                     guardian’s incarceration;

              (b)    Failed to visit, has failed to support, or has failed to make
                     reasonable payments toward the support of the child during
                     an aggregation of the first one hundred twenty (120) days of
                     non-incarceration immediately preceding the filing of the
                     action; or

              (c)    Has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a
                     wanton disregard for the welfare of the child[.]

(Emphasis added.)

       The trial court found that Mother was incarcerated on February 28, 2020. This
date appears to have stemmed from DCS’s factual averments in the termination petition
and from an exhibit presented through Ms. Pelicci’s testimony, indicating that a previous
DCS caseworker had met with Mother at the Sumner County Jail on February 28, 2020,
and had explained to Mother the criteria and procedures for termination of parental rights
at that time. DCS states in its appellate brief that Mother was incarcerated for three
months “[b]eginning on an unspecified date in March 2020.” Mother does not address
her exact dates of incarceration in her appellate brief. At trial, Mother testified that she
was incarcerated for three months in 2020 on a conviction for violation of probation and
that “[a]s soon as [she] got released” after completing the probation violation sentence,
she “caught” the new charges resulting in her vehicular homicide conviction. It is
undisputed that Mother was arrested on the vehicular homicide and related charges on
June 2, 2020.

      Thus, the trial court’s finding that Mother was incarcerated as early as February
28, 2020, is corroborated approximately by Mother’s testimony. It is unclear whether
                                           - 12 -
Mother may have been released for at least a full day prior to her June 2, 2020 arrest, but
Mother did describe the arrest as occurring “[a]s soon as” she was released. Therefore,
we determine that the applicable statutory period should have been computed as the four
months immediately preceding Mother’s incarceration in February 2020 pursuant to § 36-
1-102(1)(A)(iv)(a). The last day for which there is no indication in the record that
Mother was incarcerated was February 27, 2020. Accordingly, we conclude that the
statutory determinative period for failure to visit and support (“Determinative Period”)
began on October 28, 2019, and ended on February 27, 2020. See, e.g., In re Addisyn P.,
No. M2021-00871-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2167174, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16,
2022) (concluding that the relevant determinative period ended on “the day before [the
parent] was incarcerated) (citing In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2016)).

        This Court has previously determined that a trial court’s “miscalculation of the
relevant four-month period can be considered harmless when the trial court made
sufficient findings of fact that encompassed the correct determinative period,” see In re
J’Khari F., No. M2018-00708-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 411538, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 2019), and when the court’s “findings of fact and conclusions of law include
sufficient information to consider the correct four-month period,” see In re Braelyn S.,
No. E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 4200088, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2020).
Here, the trial court made findings in its final order concerning whether Mother had
visited the Child or made payments toward support of the Child during all of 2019 and
2020, inclusive of the applicable Determinative Period preceding her incarceration.
Additionally, in a section of its final order entitled, “Abandonment by Incarcerated
Parent/Wanton Disregard,” the trial court found that Mother had failed to visit or support
the Child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), albeit
misidentifying the applicable period therein as during Mother’s incarceration. Upon
careful review, we conclude that the trial court’s misidentification of the Determinative
Period constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we will proceed with review of the
abandonment grounds of failure to visit and failure to support during the proper
Determinative Period of four months preceding Mother’s incarceration.

      We note that Mother somewhat conflates the issues on appeal regarding
abandonment through failure to visit and abandonment through failure to support. She
concludes her argument by stating that the termination of her parental rights “based on
abandonment should be reversed.” However, abandonment through failure to visit and
abandonment through failure to support each constitutes a separate statutory ground for
termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636,
641-42 (Tenn. 2013) (determining that the record did not support the ground of
abandonment based on failure to support but did support the ground of abandonment
based on failure to visit).
                                           - 13 -
      Regarding willfulness for both failure to visit and failure to support, the statutory
abandonment definition provides:

       For purposes of this subdivision (1), it shall be a defense to abandonment
       for failure to visit or failure to support that a parent or guardian’s failure to
       visit or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear the
       burden of proof that the failure to visit or support was not willful. Such
       defense must be established by a preponderance of evidence. The absence
       of willfulness is an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the
       Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (West March 6, 2020, to current). See In re Nicholas
C., No. E2019-00165-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 3074070, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15,
2019) (“Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)[(I)], willfulness is an affirmative defense;
thus, the burden is upon [the parent] to establish that his [or her] failure to [visit or
support] was not willful.”).

                                1. Failure to Visit the Child

       The trial court found that Mother had not visited the Child since December 12,
2018, and that at this last visit, “the foster parents cut the visit short due to a belief that
Mother was under the influence of alcohol at the time.” The court further found: “[T]he
DCS team determined Mother’s visits should be suspended. Mother never attempted to
reinstate the visits until she was incarcerated.” The court thereby determined that Mother
had failed to visit the Child during the Determinative Period prior to Mother’s
incarceration. However, Ms. Pelicci acknowledged in her testimony that even if Mother
had been available for visitation with the Child, DCS would not have provided visitation
based on the Child’s mental health status.

       Mother did not file a responsive pleading raising the affirmative defense of lack of
willfulness. However, during trial, DCS’s counsel maintained during closing argument
that Mother’s failure to visit had been willful. Mother’s counsel then argued that
Mother’s failure to visit had not been willful because DCS had determined that it would
not be appropriate for Mother to have visitation with the Child due to the Child’s mental
health status. On appeal, DCS does not argue that Mother waived the affirmative defense
by waiting to raise it until closing argument. Instead, DCS states that it “does not dispute
Mother’s argument on appeal and therefore does not defend the trial court’s termination
of Mother’s rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.”

                                             - 14 -
       Upon review of the record as a whole and the parties’ arguments, we find that the
affirmative defense of Mother’s lack of willfulness in failing to visit the Child was tried
by implied consent. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02; Hiller v. Hailey, 915 S.W.2d 800, 804
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“Generally speaking, trial by implied consent will be found where
the party opposed to the amendment knew or should reasonably have known of the
evidence relating to the new issue, did not object to this evidence, and was not prejudiced
thereby.” (quoting Zack Cheek Builders v. McLeod, 597 S.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Tenn.
1980))). Furthermore, we agree with the parties on appeal and determine that the
evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother’s failure to visit the Child during the Determinative Period was willful. We
reverse the trial court’s finding on this statutory ground.

                         2. Failure to Financially Support the Child

      The trial court also found that DCS had proven the statutory ground of Mother’s
abandonment through failure to financially support the Child by clear and convincing
evidence. The Determinative Period set forth above for the ground of failure to visit,
October 28, 2019, through February 27, 2020, applies to this ground as well. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

       In its final order, the trial court stated in relevant part:

              Mother was ordered to pay support on behalf of the child in the
              amount of $194.33/month beginning April 1, 2019. She has not
              contributed to the support of the child since she has been in DCS
              custody. Although Mother testified that she made a payment
              through her taxes, there was no proof presented showing any
              consistent payments.

              ***

              As previously stated, both Mother and Father failed to visit or
              provide support of any kind for the child during the statutory time
              period. Therefore, there are grounds to terminate the parents’ rights
              based on their abandonment of the child by . . . failing to support the
              child.

Upon careful review, we determine that the record supports the trial court’s findings as to
this statutory ground.

                                              - 15 -
        The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(D) (West March 6,
2020, to June 30, 2021) in effect when the instant petition was filed defined “failed to
support” or “failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” as “the
failure, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to provide monetary support or the
failure to provide more than token payments toward the support of the child” and
provided that the parent’s ability to make only small payments was not a defense “if no
payments were made during the relevant four-month period.”8 Token support “means
that the support, under the circumstances of the individual case, is insignificant given the
parent’s means.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(B) (West March 6, 2020, to current).

        On appeal, Mother avers that she “testified that she provided financially for her
child including her tax refund and stimulus check.” She asserts that “[s]he provided
birthday and Christmas gifts for [the Child] before she was incarcerated.” Ms. Pelicci
testified that DCS was unable to locate proof that Mother paid child support with tax
refunds or stimulus checks, and Mother presented no evidence of payment at trial.
Mother testified that “they took” her stimulus check for child support. However, this
Court has made it clear that such intercepted payments do not constitute a voluntary
payment of child support. See In re Ima D., No. M2021-00022-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL
5441832, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2021); In re Bryce F., No. E2014-01380-COA-
R3-PT, 2014 WL 7403826, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014); In re Kadean T., No.
M2013-02684-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 5511984, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014)).
Consequently, such payment should “not be considered in determining whether Mother
failed to support her child during the relevant period.” See Kadean T., 2014 WL
5511984, at *7. It is unclear whether Mother’s claimed child support payment made
from her tax refund was voluntary. Regardless, Ms. Pelicci testified that DCS could
locate no record of any child support payments made by Mother, and Mother failed to
provide any documentary proof to refute that testimony.

       Mother argues that DCS failed to establish willfulness as to this ground because
DCS did not provide sufficient proof of the income Mother might have earned or her
expenses during the Determinative Period. DCS responds that it was Mother’s burden to
prove that her failure to support the Child was not willful, and we agree. See In re
Nicholas C., 2019 WL 3074070, at *13 (“Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)[(I)],
willfulness is an affirmative defense; thus, the burden is upon [the parent] to establish
that his [or her] failure to [visit or support] was not willful.”). Specific to the statutory
ground of failure to support the Child, the record does not reflect that Mother raised lack
of willfulness as an affirmative defense at any point during trial, and her appellate

8
  Effective July 1, 2023, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
102(1)(D) to substitute the phrase, “for the applicable time period,” in place of the phrase, “for a period of
four (4) consecutive months,” and to substitute “time” in place of “four-month.” See 2023 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, Ch. 373 § 3 (H.B. 163).
                                                    - 16 -
argument erroneously suggests that DCS has the burden to prove a lack of willfulness.
Accordingly, we determine that Mother has waived the affirmative defense of lack of
willfulness concerning this statutory ground. See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Hill,
582 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (“Failure to ple[a]d an affirmative defense
generally results in a waiver of the defense.” (quoting ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Johnson,
329 S.W.3d 769, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)).

        We therefore conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Child by
failing to financially support her during the Determinative Period.

                      3. Wanton Disregard Prior to Incarceration

      Mother challenges whether the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
based on a finding that she had abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton disregard for
the Child’s welfare prior to incarceration. Mother specifically contends that the trial
court made insufficient findings of fact in relation to this issue. DCS asserts that
Mother’s actions prior to her incarceration constituted wanton disregard. However, DCS
does not address the sufficiency of the trial court’s order concerning this ground. Upon
thorough review, we cannot discern from the trial court’s order that it made a finding of
wanton disregard.

       Regarding this statutory ground, the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
102(1)(A)(iv) in effect when the termination petition was filed defined abandonment by
an incarcerated parent in relevant part:

      (iv)   A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a
             proceeding, pleading, petition, or amended petition to terminate the
             parental rights of the parent or guardian of the child who is the
             subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption,
             or a parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the
             four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
             action and has:

             ***

             (c)    engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a
                    wanton disregard for the welfare of the child[.]

(Emphasis added.)

                                          - 17 -
       In the conclusion of its final order, the trial court found that Mother had
“abandoned the child by [her] incarceration four (4) months prior to the filing of this
petition” without mentioning wanton disregard. As noted in a previous section of this
Opinion, the trial court made its detailed findings regarding failure to visit and support
under a time period inapplicable to an incarcerated parent. The court then included
findings under the following heading:

       ABANDONMENT           BY      INCARCERATED           PARENT/WANTON
       DISREGARD T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1), § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), § 36-1-
       102(1)(B), § 36-1-102(1)(C), § 36-1-102(1)(D), and § 36-1-102(1)(E).

After citing the definition of abandonment under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and explaining
when each parent had been incarcerated, the court stated the following:

       Both parents have been incarcerated throughout the time the child has been
       in the custody of DCS. Furthermore, neither parent has visited, supported
       or made any financial payments for the support of the child. Therefore,
       there are grounds to terminate the parents’ rights based on their
       abandonment of the child by their incarceration.

Apart from the heading and the citation to the statute, the court did not mention “wanton
disregard” in its findings or conclusions of law.

        The trial court appears to have conflated into one single ground the three statutory
grounds possible under the abandonment definition applicable to an incarcerated parent.
As noted above, we have addressed the trial court’s findings regarding the grounds of
failure to visit and failure to support. Here, to the extent that the trial court may have
intended to find that Mother exhibited wanton disregard for the Child prior to her
incarceration, we must conclude that the court did not include sufficient findings of fact
and conclusions of law concerning this ground. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall
state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”).
Moreover, we cannot discern from the trial court’s judgment whether it terminated
Mother’s parental rights based on Mother’s wanton disregard for the Child or whether its
findings on this ground were merely additional findings concerning Mother’s failure to
visit and failure to support.

      Therefore, because the trial court did not include specific findings of fact to
support a legal conclusion that Mother exhibited wanton disregard for the Child prior to
Mother’s incarceration, we are compelled to reverse the court’s judgment with respect to
abandonment through wanton disregard. See In re Mickeal Z., No. E2018-01069-COA-
                                             - 18 -
R3-PT, 2019 WL 337038, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019) (opting to reverse the
judgment with respect to the deficient statutory ground as to one parent when this Court’s
ultimate disposition included the affirmance of the trial court’s termination of that
parent’s rights); see also In re Elijah F., No. M2022-00191-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL
16859543, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2022).

                             4. Failure to Establish a Suitable Home

      The trial court found that Mother had abandoned the Child through failure to
provide a suitable home. The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)
(West March 6, 2020, to June 30, 2021) in effect when the termination petition was filed
provided the following definition of abandonment related to this ground:9

                For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a
                parent or parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in
                order to make that child available for adoption, “abandonment”
                means that:

                ***

        (ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
                custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court
                order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed
                in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and
                neglected child, and the child was placed in the custody of the
                department or a licensed child-placing agency;

        (b)     The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of
                parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a
                licensed child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent
                removal of the child or that the circumstances of the child’s situation
                prevented reasonable efforts from being made prior to the child’s
                removal; and

        (c)     For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the
                department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or
                parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for
                the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians
9
  Effective July 1, 2023, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
102(1)(A)(ii)(a) by deleting the language, “a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a
child is” and substituting “a child is alleged to be.” See 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 253 § 7 (S.B. 264).
                                                      - 19 -
             have not made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable
             home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such
             a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a
             suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the
             department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a
             suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such
             efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward
             the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is
             in the custody of the department[.]

      Concerning this statutory ground, the trial court specifically found:

                    In this case, the court adjudicated the child dependent,
             neglected, and [severely] abused and placed her in DCS custody.
             The child was removed from the custody of Mother on November 8,
             2017. During the relevant period of November 8, 2017 to March 8,
             201[8], DCS made reasonable efforts to assist Mother to provide a
             suitable home for the child by creating a permanency plan to
             determine the tasks needed for Mother to regain custody.

                     Although Mother has had several DCS caseworkers during
             the pendency of the case, she was still unable to establish a suitable
             home for the child. She continued to have unstable housing,
             sometimes being homeless or living in unsafe situations. Mother
             also had criminal charges and periods of incarceration after the child
             was removed from her custody. Therefore, there are grounds to
             terminate Mother’s rights based on her abandonment of the child by
             failing to establish a suitable home for the child.

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate
against the trial court’s findings and agree that DCS presented clear and convincing
evidence to establish this statutory ground of abandonment.

       On September 29, 2017, DCS filed its petition alleging that the Child was
dependent and neglected due to the September 12, 2017 incident in which Mother was
charged with child neglect and possession of a controlled substance, followed by
Mother’s violation of the IPA when she ceased contact with DCS. On November 9,
2017, the trial court entered its emergency protective order, noting that the Child had
been removed from Mother’s custody the day before and finding probable cause that the
Child was dependent and neglected as to Mother. In the protective order, the trial court
found that Mother did not have stable housing and could not provide an address to DCS,
                                          - 20 -
that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the Child’s removal, and that the Child
entered DCS custody when continued efforts to locate Mother were unsuccessful. The
order also stated that Mother did not dispute the trial court findings.

        As the case progressed, Mother never established stable housing following the
Child’s removal and at the time of trial, had been incarcerated since February 28, 2020.
See In re Jakob O., No. M2016-00391-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 7243674, at *13 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016) (“[T]he proof necessary to support termination under this ground
need not be limited to any particular four-month period after removal.”). The trial court
found that “Mother [had] not been able to show if her addiction [was] under control when
in society rather than a state prison” and that Mother was unable to make an adjustment
to the situation before she became incarcerated. The evidence preponderates in favor of
these findings.

        Concerning what a suitable home entails and the relationship between a parent’s
efforts to establish a suitable home and DCS’s reasonable efforts to assist the parent, this
Court has elucidated:

               Here, we “consider[ ] whether a child has a suitable home to return
       to after the child’s court-ordered removal from the parent.” In re Adaleigh
       M., No. E2019-01955-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 1219818, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. Mar. 31, 2021). To terminate parental rights under this ground, the
       trial court must find “that a parent failed to provide a suitable home for his
       or her child even after DCS assisted that parent in his or her attempt to
       establish a suitable home.” In re Jamel H., No. E2014-02539-COA-R3-PT,
       2015 WL 4197220, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2015). A suitable home
       requires “‘more than a proper physical living location.’” In re Daniel B.,
       No. E2019-01063-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 3955703, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       July 10, 2020) (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. C.W., No.
       E2007-00561-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 4207941, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
       29, 2007)). A suitable home entails “[a]ppropriate care and attention” for
       the child, In re Matthew T., No. M2015-00486-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL
       1621076, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016), and that the home is “free
       of drugs and domestic violence.” In re Hannah H., No. E2013-01211-
       COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2014).
       DCS must make “reasonable efforts” to assist the parent by doing more
       than simply providing a list of service providers. In re Matthew T., 2016
       WL 1621076, at *7. The Department should utilize its superior resources
       in assisting with establishment of a suitable home, but “[its] efforts do not
       need to be ‘Herculean.’” In re Hannah H., 2014 WL 2587397, at *9
       (quoting Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Estes, 284 S.W.3d 790, 801 (Tenn.
                                           - 21 -
      Ct. App. 2008)), overruled on other grounds by In re Kaliyah S., 455
      S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2015); see also In re Matthew T., 2016 WL 1621076, at
      *7. Sole responsibility does not lie with DCS, and “[p]arents must also
      make reasonable efforts towards achieving the goals established by the
      permanency plan to remedy the conditions leading to the removal of the
      child.” In re Hannah H., 2014 WL 2587397, at *9.

In re C.N., No. M2020-01021-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 94403, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
10, 2022).

        On appeal, Mother argues that DCS did not provide specific proof that it made
reasonable efforts to assist her in establishing a suitable home. We determine this
argument to be unavailing. Throughout the Child’s time in protective custody, the trial
court repeatedly found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist Mother in
establishing a suitable home in light of Mother’s inconsistent contact. DCS had
encountered difficulty maintaining contact with Mother since the Child was first removed
from her custody more than six years prior to trial. In the permanency plans, DCS staff
noted that they would be able to assist Mother in looking for housing once she made
herself available to DCS. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c) makes it
clear that “[t]he efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in
establishing a suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such efforts
equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the same goal[.]” (Emphasis
added.) Again, Mother never obtained stable housing prior to incarceration and, as the
trial court found, her “communication with DCS was troublesome throughout this case.”

        We determine that the record supports the trial court’s findings regarding DCS’s
reasonable efforts and Mother’s failure to establish a suitable home. We therefore affirm
the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence regarding this statutory ground
of abandonment.

                 B. Substantial Noncompliance with Permanency Plans

       The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had failed to
substantially comply with the statement of responsibilities set out in the permanency
plans. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2) (West March 6, 2020, to current)
provides as an additional ground for termination of parental rights:

      (2)    There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian
             with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant
             to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4[.]

                                          - 22 -
      In its final judgment, the trial court reviewed Mother’s failure to substantially
comply with the requirements of the permanency plans and found:

              There was a permanency plan approved and entered during the years
       the child has been in DCS custody. The initial plan was entered on
       November 30, 2017 and both Mother and Father knew the requirements to
       be completed for reunification to occur. The Court ratified the initial
       permanency plan on December 19, 2017 and found it to be reasonable,
       necessary and in the best interest of the child. The permanency plan was
       revised on November 18, 2018 and December 16, 2019, but the
       requirements were the same in the plan.

       ***

              Mother did not complete any of the tasks assigned to her while she
       was in the community. Mother has completed some task[s] while
       incarcerated and submitted certificates of completion. . . . Therefore, there
       are grounds to terminate the parents’ rights based on their substantial non-
       compliance with the permanency plans.

       On appeal, Mother posits that although incarceration has restricted her ability to
comply with the permanency plans, “she has completed a substantial number of
comparable tasks to those specifically listed on the plan” since her incarceration,
including a cognitive intervention program, life skills course, twelve-step course,
parenting class, and group therapy. However, the standard for substantial compliance is
not whether any action at all has been taken by Mother. Rather, the standard is whether
the reasons for the Child’s removal have been remedied. See, e.g., In re Serenity S., No.
E2019-00277-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 522439, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020)
(explaining in response to the mother’s argument that “the trial court failed to give proper
credit to her for the requirements and responsibilities with which she did comply” that
“[t]he problem with Mother’s argument in this regard is that the overall goal of the
reasonable responsibilities in Mother’s permanency plans was to remedy the reasons for
the Children’s removal” (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2), 37-2-403(a)(2)(C))).

       Under the permanency plans, Mother was required to meet the following
requirements: (1) undergo a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, (2)
undergo an A&D assessment and follow all recommendations, (3) submit to random drug
screens, (4) present herself to DCS; (5) maintain contact and notify DCS of any contact
information changes, (6) obtain and maintain stable housing and a legal source of income
with documentation to DCS, (7) visit the Child a minimum of four hours per month, (8)
complete a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations, (9) sign a release
                                           - 23 -
of information for DCS to receive access to a mental health assessment that Mother
claimed she had undergone, (10) complete an updated mental health assessment if the
assessment if the first was not current, (11) maintain a bonded relationship with the
Child, (12) help Father establish paternity of the Child, (13) continue to drug test
regularly and provide clean urine specimens, (14) continue to refrain from drug use, and
(15) complete a follow-up A&D assessment.

       We recognize that Mother’s incarceration impeded her ability to comply with the
permanency plan requirements since February 2020. However, the first plan was
developed in November 2017, and throughout the pendency of this case, Mother failed to
complete the vast majority of the tasks required under the permanency plans. Mother’s
contact with DCS was problematic. She never obtained stable housing or a legal source
of income, and she did not undergo a parenting assessment. Although Mother testified
that she had undergone a mental health assessment, she did not provide DCS with any
documentation of the assessment or undergo an updated one as required by the
permanency plans. As to visiting the Child, although we have determined that the
evidence of Mother’s willfulness in failing to visit did not rise to the level of clear and
convincing, the fact remains that she had not visited the Child since December 12, 2018,
and had not taken any steps to reinstate the visits until her most recent incarceration.
Mother did complete an A&D assessment and rehabilitation treatment in 2018, but she
did not complete the required follow-up A&D assessment, and her June 2020
incarceration resulted from a vehicular homicide conviction for an incident that occurred
while she was admittedly driving under the influence of alcohol.

       Furthermore, nothing in the record supports Mother’s claim that the services and
programs she had completed while incarcerated were comparable to the tasks required by
the permanency plans. We commend Mother for making efforts to improve her life
during her incarceration. However, we determine that Mother’s efforts after the
termination petition’s filing were “too little, too late” to demonstrate substantial
compliance. See, e.g., In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d 541, 546-47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(affirming the trial court’s finding that the parent’s improvements made since the filing of
the termination petition were “too little, too late”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s
parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence of the statutory ground of failure to
substantially comply with the permanency plans.

              C. Persistence of Conditions Leading to the Child’s Removal

       The trial court determined that the statutory ground of persistence of the
conditions leading to removal of the Child from Mother’s custody had been proven by
                                           - 24 -
clear and convincing evidence. Relative to this statutory ground, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) (West March 6, 2020, to current) provides:

      (A)    The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
             custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a
             court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition
             has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a
             dependent and neglected child, and:

             (i)     The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,
                     preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or
                     guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable
                     probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further
                     abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care
                     of the parent or guardian;

             (ii)    There is little likelihood that these conditions will be
                     remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely
                     returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and

             (iii)   The continuation of the parent or guardian and child
                     relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early
                     integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;

      (B)    The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the
             termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard[.]

       In its final judgment, the trial court summarized its findings regarding this
statutory ground as to Mother as follows:

             The child has been removed from Mother’s custody for more than
      six (6) months. The conditions that led to the removal of the child from
      Mother were an inability to properly supervise the child, provide suitable
      housing and substance abuse issues. The conditions which led to the
      removal still exist, and there is little evidence that these conditions will be
      able to be remedied at an early date so the child can be returned. Mother is
      currently incarcerated and has the possibility of being incarcerated until
      2024. Mother is not able to provide suitable housing for the child at this
      time. Even if she is released early, Mother does not have a plan for
      providing suitable housing.          The continuation of the parent/child
      relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chance of an early integration
                                           - 25 -
      into a stable and permanent home. Therefore, there are grounds to
      terminate Mother’s rights based on the conditions which existed when the
      child was first removed from Mother’s custody[.]

        Upon thorough review, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court’s findings as to this statutory ground. By the time of trial, the
Child had been in protective custody for five years, far exceeding the statutory six-month
minimum. As established through the evidence respecting the statutory grounds of
abandonment and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, the conditions
that led to the Child’s removal persisted. Mother had not demonstrated sobriety outside
of incarceration since the Child’s removal, and Mother never obtained stable housing
prior to incarceration. As to her ability to supervise the Child, Mother never completed a
parenting assessment and did not take any steps prior to her incarceration to reestablish
visitation.

      Concerning the focus of the statutory ground at issue, this Court has explained:

      The persistence of conditions ground focuses “on the results of the parent’s
      efforts at improvement rather than the mere fact that he or she had made
      them.” [In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d,] 874 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)]. The
      goal is to avoid having a child in foster care for a time longer than
      reasonable for the parent to demonstrate the ability to provide a safe and
      caring environment for the child. In re Arteria H., 326 S.W.3d 167, 178
      (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), overruled on other grounds by In re Kaliyah S., 455
      S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, the question before the court is “the
      likelihood that the child can be safely returned to the custody of the
      [parent], not whether the child can safely remain in foster care.” In re
      K.A.H., No. M1999-02079-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1006959, at *5 (Tenn.
      Ct. App. July 21, 2000).

In re Kaisona B., No. W2020-01308-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 4319624, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 2021). “Under this [persistence of conditions] ground, a parent’s inability
to eliminate such conditions does not need to be willful.” In re Braden K., No. M2020-
00569-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 5823344, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2020) (citing In
re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)).

       Mother contends that the conditions that prevent the Child from returning to
Mother’s custody no longer exist or are likely to be remedied at an early date because she
expects to be released on parole no later than July 2024 and meanwhile has consistently
passed drug screens during her incarceration and participated in programs to address
issues causing the Child’s removal. As mentioned previously, we recognize that Mother
                                          - 26 -
has made progress while incarcerated to address these issues. However, the strides she
has made have occurred since the petition was filed, and her overall actions, including her
return to substance abuse following a prior incarceration, have not demonstrated that she
can maintain her sobriety in an uncontrolled environment. See, e.g., In re Zakary O., No.
E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2023)
(“Although Mother has made significant progress during her rehabilitation, as previously
discussed, due to Mother’s relapses, her sobriety has not been tested outside the
controlled environment of her rehabilitation program such that we can say that it would
be in the child’s best interest to be returned to her custody”); In re James W., No. E2020-
01440-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 2800523, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2021) (“Mother
should be commended for her recent efforts to refrain from further drug use and to
establish residential stability. However, the majority of her efforts took place after DCS
filed its termination petition.”).

        The evidence further supported a determination that continuation of the parent-
child relationship would greatly diminish the Child’s chances of integration into a safe,
stable, and permanent home, particularly considering Mother’s lack of cooperation with
DCS and the Child’s limitations for placement options. We therefore conclude that the
evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and agree that clear and
convincing evidence established this statutory ground for termination.

                                 D. Severe Child Abuse

      The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had severely
abused the Child. Regarding this ground for termination of parental rights, Tennessee
Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) (West March 6, 2020, to current) provides:

      The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child
      abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found
      by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition
      for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child[.]

As relevant to this action Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (West July 1,
2019, to current) defines “severe child abuse” as:

      Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) years
      of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in
      the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to
      the child[.]

As this Court has previously explained:
                                           - 27 -
       [A] parent’s conduct is “knowing, and a parent acts or fails to act
       ‘knowingly,’ when . . . she has actual knowledge of the relevant facts and
       circumstances or when . . . she is either in deliberate ignorance of or in
       reckless disregard of the information that has been presented to . . . her.”

In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re R.C.P., No.
M2003-01143-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 1567122, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2004)).
“The most serious consequence of a finding that a parent has committed severe child
abuse is that such a finding, in and of itself, constitutes a ground for termination of
parental rights.” In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d 188, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. M.S., No. M2003-01670-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL
549141, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005)).

       Following a hearing upon DCS’s dependency and neglect petition, the trial court
entered an adjudicatory order on May 14, 2020, finding the Child to be dependent and
neglected, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-l-102(b)(13)(G) (July 1, 2019, to
current), and the victim of severe abuse perpetrated by Mother pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27). In determining that this ground for termination of
parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence in its final order, the
trial court found that the adjudicatory order had become final because it was not
appealed.

        Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) allows a trial court to terminate a
parent’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse if the parent “has been found to have
committed severe child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court”
(emphasis added). It is well settled that a trial court may rely on a prior court order
finding severe child abuse and is not required to re-litigate the issue of severe abuse at the
trial to terminate parental rights. See In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d at 201; State, Dep’t of
Children’s Servs. v. M.S., No. M2003-01670-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 549141, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005). In the case at bar, the trial court properly found that the
May 14, 2020 adjudicatory order was res judicata as to the issue of whether Mother
committed severe child abuse because Mother never appealed the order. As this Court
concluded in a comparable situation:

       Because Mother did not appeal the trial court’s finding of severe child
       abuse within the time allowed by law, the order became a final order and
       the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. Thus, the trial court did
       not err in finding that Mother has committed severe abuse for purposes of
       terminating her parental rights.

                                            - 28 -
In re Serenity S., No. W2014-00080-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 6612571, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 2014).

        Mother asserts that the trial court erred in relying upon the finding of severe child
abuse contained in its adjudicatory order as a ground for termination of her parental
rights. According to Mother, she was unaware of the court’s finding of severe child
abuse and subsequent entry of the order. We note, however, that the May 14, 2020 order
contained a certificate stating that it was sent to Mother’s counsel on the same day.
Moreover, Mother’s counsel stated during trial that although Mother had initially denied
having knowledge that the order had been entered, “[o]bviously an order was submitted,
so I’ll leave it at that.” As this Court has repeatedly articulated: “It is well settled that
issues not raised at the trial level are considered waived on appeal.” See Duke v. Duke,
563 S.W.3d 885, 898 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Moses v. Dirghangi, 430
S.W.3d 371, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)). We therefore deem Mother’s issue regarding
her knowledge of the adjudicatory order to be waived, and we affirm the trial court’s
determination that this statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

                  E. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to
               Assume Custody of or Financial Responsibility for the Child

      The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence to support termination
of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14)
(West March 6, 2020, to current), which provides:

       A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability
       and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or
       financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s
       legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the
       physical or psychological welfare of the child[.]

      Our Supreme Court has explained the following with regard to this ground for
termination of parental rights:

       Two prongs must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate
       parental rights under this statute: (1) the parent or legal guardian failed to
       manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical
       custody or financial responsibility of the child; and (2) placing the child in
       the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial
       harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

                                            - 29 -
In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020).

       As to the first prong, our Supreme Court has instructed:

       [S]ection 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or
       guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume
       legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a
       person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing
       proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or
       willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

Id. at 677. Concerning the “substantial harm” requirement of the second prong, this
Court has observed:

               The courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose
       a risk of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable
       to precise definition because of the variability of human conduct.
       However, the use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First,
       it connotes a real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant.
       Second, it indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical
       possibility. While the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently
       probable to prompt a reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur
       more likely than not.

In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (footnotes
omitted in Maya R.)).

     In the instant action, the trial court found regarding this statutory ground as to both
Mother and Father:

              Both parents have failed to manifest an ability and willingness to
       personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of
       the child and placing her in their legal and physical custody would pose a
       risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the
       child. Neither parent has completed all of the requirements needed to be
       done in order to reunify with their child. For multiple years now the
       parents have failed to make consistent visits or even contact with the child.
       The child has little to no knowledge about either of her parents according to
       the child’s CASA advocate. Therefore, there are grounds to terminate the

                                             - 30 -
      parents’ rights based on their failure to assume custody or financial
      responsibility.

Upon thorough review of the trial court’s findings specific to Mother, we determine that
clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s conclusions as to this ground.

       Regarding the first prong, Mother maintains that the trial court’s findings “should
be reversed” because she had “manifested a willingness for her Child to return to her
custody.” Mother’s entire argument in support of her postulate, indeed in support of
reversing this ground, consists of one sentence: “Mother testified that while she currently
does not have the means to take custody of [the Child] due to her incarceration, she has a
plan to provide for herself and the Child once she is released from incarceration.”
However, our review of the record indicates that Mother’s testimony, coupled with the
courses she completed while incarcerated, were her only demonstrations of a willingness
to assume custody.

       We note that the trial court’s findings here are somewhat conclusory and would
benefit from more factual detail. See In re Cartier H., No. M2022-01576-COA-R3-PT,
2023 WL 7158076, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2023) (vacating the trial court’s
findings terminating the mother’s parental rights on this ground upon determining that the
court’s factual findings were conclusory as to the first prong of the mother’s failure to
manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody). However, coupling the trial
court’s factual findings under this ground regarding Mother’s failure to complete “the
requirements needed to be done in order to reunify with [her] child” and the court’s
findings in the order as a whole, the court did specifically find that Mother had not
demonstrated the ability and willingness to establish a suitable home or steady income,
provide for the Child financially through child support, maintain sobriety outside of a
controlled environment, or reintegrate into the Child’s life through compliance with the
requirements of the permanency plans. The evidence presented at trial supports these
findings. We agree with the trial court that DCS met its burden to establish this prong by
clear and convincing evidence.

       The second prong requires DCS to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
placing the Child in Mother’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial
harm to the Child’s physical and psychological welfare. Mother has not addressed this
prong in her appellate argument. As DCS notes, this Court has enumerated various
circumstances that support a finding of substantial harm:

      By way of illustration, forcing a child to begin visitation with a near-
      stranger would make psychological harm sufficiently probable. Or placing
      a child with a parent who engaged in repeated criminal conduct that
                                           - 31 -
      required incarceration would put a child at risk of substantial physical or
      psychological harm. And parents with a significant, recent history of
      substance abuse, mental illness, and/or domestic violence could lead to a
      conclusion of a risk of substantial harm.

In re Brianna B., No. M2019-01757-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 306467, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 2021) (internal citations omitted).

       The trial court determined that all of these circumstances were present.
Specifically, Ms. Pelicci testified that the Child had no demonstrated attachment to
Mother, had used “mom” to refer to her former foster parent, and had not been visited by
Mother since 2018. Furthermore, Mother was convicted of criminal charges throughout
this case, including the initial criminal charges of child neglect and possession of a
controlled substance, a subsequent criminal charge for violating her probation, and the
most recent criminal charge of vehicular homicide. Finally, as the trial court found,
Mother had not shown at the time of trial “if her addiction is under control when in
society rather than a state prison.” Mother completed one A&D assessment and
rehabilitation treatment in 2018. Nonetheless, her substance abuse issues persisted,
becoming a factor in the June 2020 accident that led to her vehicular homicide
conviction.

       The evidence also does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that placing the Child into Mother’s custody would pose a risk
of substantial harm to the Child’s physical and psychological welfare. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s determination regarding this statutory ground for termination of
Mother’s parental rights.

                              V. Best Interest of the Child

        When a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of at least one statutory
ground for termination of parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child
diverge, and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d 838, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523
(“The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that
there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela
E., 303 S.W.3d 240, (Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a
list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental
rights is in a child’s best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not
require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination
is in a child’s best interest. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S.,
182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the
                                           - 32 -
unique facts of each case.”). Furthermore, the best interest of a child must be determined
from the child’s perspective and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

       The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (West March 6, 2020, to
April 21, 2021) in effect when the instant petition was filed listed the following factors
for consideration:

      (1)    Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of
             circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the
             child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

      (2)    Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting
             adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services
             agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not
             reasonably appear possible;

      (3)    Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or
             other contact with the child;

      (4)    Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established
             between the parent or guardian and the child;

      (5)    The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely
             to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical
             condition;

      (6)    Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the
             parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional
             or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child
             or adult in the family or household;

      (7)    Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s
             home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the
             home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances
             or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or
             guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable
             manner;

      (8)    Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status
             would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian
                                          - 33 -
      from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for
      the child; or

(9)   Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent
      with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department
      pursuant to § 36-5-101.

Our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the best interest analysis:

These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the
termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to
the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing
In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts
considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a
preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In
re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey
S., 182 S.W.3d at 861). “After making the underlying factual findings, the
trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to
determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interest[s].” Id. When considering these
statutory factors, courts must remember that “[t]he child’s best interests
[are] viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re
Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the
child is the common theme” evident in all of the statutory factors. Id.
“[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in
conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the
best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

       Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote
examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of
statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.
Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts
and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant
each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a
factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon
the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the
consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the
                                    - 34 -
        analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171
        S.W.3d at 194). But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the
        obligation of considering all the factors and all the proof. Even if the
        circumstances of a particular case ultimately result in the court ascribing
        more weight—even outcome determinative weight—to a particular
        statutory factor, the court must consider all of the statutory factors, as well
        as any other relevant proof any party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

        As a preliminary matter, we address the trial court’s application of mixed versions
of the statutory best interest factors applicable to this action. In the final order, the trial
court stated that it had “considered the relevant and child-centered, non-exclusive factors
found at T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i).” The court then made specific findings in relation to
seven best interest factors, concluding that all relevant factors weighed in favor of
terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. Four of the factors considered by the
trial court were taken from the nine factors provided in the version of the statute in effect
at the time of the termination petition’s filing in June 2020. Three of the factors were
taken from the current version of the statute, which includes twenty best interest factors
and became effective on April 22, 2021. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 190 § 1 (S.B.
205). Inasmuch as the termination petition in this case was filed prior to the effective
date of the amendment, the statutory best interest factors provided in the prior version of
the statute, quoted above, are applicable here. See, e.g., In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d
708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

       Although Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her
parental rights was in the Child’s best interest, she has not set forth the best interest
factors from either version of the statute in her appellate brief and has not addressed
whether the trial court erred by choosing some factors from each set. DCS contends that
any error in the trial court’s choice of factors was harmless. As DCS notes, this Court
has previously held that reversible error does not occur when a court applies the new
factors despite the termination petition’s having been filed prior to the amendment’s
effective date “because the old factors are essentially contained within the new factors.”
See In re Bralynn A., No. M2021-01188-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2826850, at *9 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 20, 2022) (citing In re Da’Moni J., No. E2021-00477-COA-R3-PT, 2022
WL 214712, at *23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022)).10

10
  By contrast, in cases wherein the new statutory factors applied but the trial court considered only the
old factors, this Court has reversed the trial court’s findings and remanded for the trial court to reconsider
the best interest analysis based on the new factors. See, e.g., In re Alessa H., No. M2021-01403-COA-
R3-PT, 2022 WL 3332653, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2022) (“[T]the statute as amended adds a
                                                     - 35 -
       In a recent case, this Court was faced with a similar situation wherein the trial
court had “applied some amalgam of the old best interest factors and the new without
considering the entirety of either set.” In re Cartier H., 2023 WL 7158076, at *12. As
the Cartier H. Court explained:

                In some prior cases, we have held that it was not reversible error for
        the trial court to consider both some of the old and new factors in reaching
        its ultimate decision as to best interest. See In re Mitchell B., No. M2022-
        01285-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3619561, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24,
        2023); In re Da’Moni J., No. E2021-00477-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL
        214712, at *23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
        Apr. 1, 2022). Rather, we held that if the trial court’s ruling provides a
        detailed summary of the trial court’s reasoning such that this Court can
        make a meaningful review of the trial court’s findings, this practice is not
        error “so long as the factors considered are relevant to the facts presented in
        th[e] case.” In re Mitchell B., 2023 WL 3619561, at *6. In both cited
        cases, however, the trial courts entered detailed and thorough orders
        considering an abundance of best interest factors.

Id. at *13. In Cartier H., this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that termination of
the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest upon determining that the
trial court had “failed to make specific findings as to a number of relevant factors” under
the amended statute, which applied in that case. Id. at *14.

       Upon careful review, we determine that despite the trial court’s “conflat[ion] [of]
the old and new factors,” see In re Mitchell B., No. M2022-01285-COA-R3-PT, 2023
WL 3619561, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2023), the trial court here considered
relevant statutory factors in weighing the Child’s best interest, and the court provided a
thorough analysis. Under the circumstances of this case, and particularly considering the
prior version of the statute in effect at the time of the termination petition’s filing, we
deem harmless the trial court’s error in considering some old and some new statutory
factors. We will therefore proceed with our review of the trial court’s best interest
analysis.

        The trial court found factors one, four, five, and six from the applicable version of
the statute to be relevant and weighed them in favor of terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Child. Concerning factor one, whether Mother had made an adjustment of

number of ‘additional factors that should be considered, if relevant.’” (quoting In re Riley S., No. M2020-
01602-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 128482, at *14 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2022)).
                                                  - 36 -
circumstance, conduct, or conditions so as to make it in the Child’s best interest to be in
her home, the trial court found:

              Mother is incarcerated and will be until 2024 unless she is granted
      parole sooner. Mother has not been able to show if her addiction is under
      control when in society rather than a state prison. Mother was unable to
      make an adjustment to her circumstances before she was arrested on her
      current charges. . . . As of now, neither parent has a place that is suitable
      for the child.

       DCS demonstrated that Mother had made no adjustment in her situation prior to
her most recent incarceration, had failed to establish stable housing prior to her
incarceration, and had never completed a parenting assessment. Although Mother had
made progress in controlling her substance abuse and had completed a parenting class
while incarcerated, as the trial court found, “Mother [had] not been able to show if her
addiction [was] under control when in society rather than a state prison.” The evidence
preponderates in favor of the trial court’s findings as to factor one.

     As to factor four, whether a meaningful relationship had been established between
Mother and the Child, the trial court found regarding both parents:

      The child has been in the custody of DCS since 2017 and has had little to
      no contact with either parent during these years. The Court finds that the
      child does not have a meaningful bond with either parent.

While acknowledging that her bond with Neveah “may have weakened over time,”
Mother asserts that prior to her February 2020 incarceration, she “had a strong bond”
with the Child and “tried to visit her as much as possible when [the Child] was initially
placed with her great grandmother prior to DCS custody.” The Child was brought into
DCS custody through entry of the trial court’s emergency protective order on November
9, 2017, after Mother had violated the IPA she had entered into by ceasing contact with
DCS. Subsequently, Mother enjoyed some supervised visitation with the Child in 2018.
However, her last visit occurred in December 2018, after which DCS suspended
visitation at the recommendation of mental health professionals who were treating the
Child. By the time of trial, Mother had not visited with the Child for approximately four
years. We agree with the trial court’s finding that factor four weighs in favor of
terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       Concerning factor five, the effect a change of caretakers and physical environment
would have on the Child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition, the trial
court concluded:
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             This factor weighs in favor of [DCS]. Although the child has
      emotional and behavioral issues that are connected to her movement and
      instability, she is currently in a potential pre-adoptive home. Once the child
      has stability, she tends to become comfortable. The child has a better
      chance of recruitment for a pre-adoptive home once the parent’s rights have
      been terminated.

        Mother contends that because the Child experienced twelve placements while in
protective custody, including one year in a Youth Villages facility, the Child would be
“better off,” as Mother urged in her testimony, in her custody once she is released from
prison. Although the Child was still residing in the Youth Villages facility at the
beginning of trial in September 2022, Ms. Pelicci testified that the Child had bonded with
counselors there and had made positive progress with her mental health and behavioral
concerns. Ms. Pelicci further testified that by the conclusion of trial in March 2023, the
Child had been placed in a new pre-adoptive foster home, and that although she had only
been in the home for a few days, the placement preparation had involved several
successful meetings between the foster parents and the Child. Certainly the number of
placements the Child experienced is not ideal. However, by the time of trial, the Child
had achieved some measure of stability in her physical, psychological, and mental
condition that Mother simply could not provide. The evidence preponderates in favor of
the trial court’s findings as to this factor.

       Factor six involves whether the parent (or a person living with the parent) has
shown any type of abuse or neglect toward the Child. As noted previously, the Child was
adjudicated dependent and neglected and severely abused by Mother in the order entered
by the trial court in May 2020. We agree with the trial court that this factor weighs in
favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       As noted above, the trial court also considered three factors from the amended
version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1), factors (A), (C), and (K), all of
which are related to each other and also include elements of the prior factors. These
factors provide for consideration of:

      (A)    The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s
             critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the
             child’s minority;

      ***

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       (C)    Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in
              meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety
              needs;

       (K)    Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs,
              services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting
              adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions[.]

       Factor (A) emphasizes the Child’s critical need for stability and continuity of
placement. It is closely related to the old factor five, the effect a change of caretakers
would have on the Child’s condition, which is factor (B) under the amended statute.
Regarding Factor A, the trial court found that the Child did “not have an attachment” to
Mother, used “mom” to describe her former foster mother, and had not visited with
Mother since December 2018. Considering our review of the trial court’s findings in
relation to factor (5), we agree that the Child’s critical need for stability and continuity of
placement favored terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       Factor (C) concerns the parent’s demonstration of continuity and stability in
meeting the Child’s basic needs while factor (K) concerns the parent’s utilization of
offered services and assistance to make a lasting adjustment of circumstances. Factor (K)
mirrors in part factor two from the previous version of the statute: whether the parent has
failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts made by available social
services such that lasting adjustment does not appear possible. Taken together, under
factors (C) and (K), the trial court found that (1) Mother had not “completed the required
plans to regain custody” of the Child, (2) Mother’s “communication with DCS was
troublesome throughout this case,” (3) Mother was incarcerated at the time of trial, (4)
Mother had not “demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic
needs,” and (5) Mother had not “shown the ability to take care of [her] own needs, better
yet the child’s needs.” As with factor one, the court thus found that Mother had not
effected a lasting adjustment in her circumstances, conduct, or conditions.

        Within its best interest analysis, the trial court did not make an express finding
concerning whether DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist Mother in effecting a
change in her circumstances, which is part of factor (2) under the applicable version of
the statute and is factor (L) under the amended version. However, throughout the case,
the trial court did find that DCS had made reasonable efforts, and within its findings
regarding abandonment through failure to establish a suitable home, the court expressly
found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist Mother during the applicable time
period. The trial court also stated in its final order that “DCS [had] attempted to work
with Mother and Father while the child has been in custody, but DCS was unsuccessful in
getting either parent to complete their permanency plans.” Along these lines, the court
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found, as noted above, that Mother’s communication with DCS had been “troublesome,”
indicating that the lack of communication rendered it difficult for DCS to assist Mother
prior to her February 2020 incarceration.

        Within her argument regarding the statutory ground of abandonment through
failure to establish a suitable home, Mother disputes the trial court’s finding of reasonable
efforts as to that ground, but Mother does not address DCS’s efforts within her argument
concerning the best interest analysis. We have previously determined that Mother’s
argument within the statutory ground was unavailing. We also emphasize that DCS’s
efforts “shall be found to be reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the
parent or guardian toward the same goal.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c).
Therefore, we determine that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that factor
two—whether Mother failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by
DCS—weighs in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

       Furthermore, although the trial court did not directly refer to factors three and
seven, we determine that the court did make findings regarding factor three, whether
Mother had maintained regular visitation with the Child, and factor seven, whether the
physical environment of Mother’s home would be healthy, safe, and free from criminal
activity or abuse of controlled substances. Throughout its best interest analysis, the court
found that Mother had not visited the Child since December of 2018. The court also
found that Mother was incarcerated and that she had not demonstrated that she could
remain free from substance abuse when not incarcerated. Certainly, while incarcerated,
Mother did not have a safe physical environment for the Child. Moreover, Mother’s
criminal convictions, including those resulting from the incident that led to the Child’s
removal from her custody and those resulting from the June 2020 vehicular homicide,
demonstrated that Mother had repeatedly been involved in criminal behavior related to
substance abuse. We conclude that factors three and seven also weigh in favor of
terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       Other than an oblique statement that Mother had not “shown the ability to take
care of [her] own needs, better yet the child’s needs,” the trial court did not make any
findings as to factor eight, whether Mother’s mental or emotional status would be
detrimental to the Child or prevent Mother from effectively providing safe and stable care
and supervision. Mother testified that she had completed a mental health assessment at
some point early in the pendency of this case, and she also testified that she regularly
took her medications related to mental health. Ms. Pelicci testified that DCS had no
documentation of Mother’s mental health assessment. Mother’s repeated struggles with
substance abuse may well indicate a mental and/or emotional status that would be
detrimental to the Child or prevent Mother from effectively providing care. However,
beyond Mother’s substance abuse, DCS did not present evidence involving Mother’s
                                            - 40 -
mental or emotional status. Acknowledging that the trial court may have found factor
eight inapplicable, we conclude that factor eight weighs neither for nor against
terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       Finally, although the trial court made no finding in its best interest analysis
regarding factor nine, whether Mother had paid child support, the court did find clear and
convincing evidence of the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to pay child
support. We have affirmed this ground and therefore determine that factor nine also
supports termination of Mother’s parental rights.

       Based on our exhaustive review of the evidence in light of the statutory factors, we
conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the trial court’s
determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the best interest of the Child. Having also determined that statutory grounds
for termination were established, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s
parental rights.

                                     VI. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s determination as to the
statutory ground of abandonment through failure to visit the Child and, to the extent that
the trial court determined that Mother exhibited wanton disregard for the Child prior to
Mother’s incarceration, we reverse that determination for insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including
the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child. This case is remanded to the
trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment
terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child and collection of costs assessed below.
Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Brittnie W.

                                                    s/ Thomas R. Frierson, II____________
                                                    THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II., JUDGE

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