Court Opinion

ID: 9539708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:08:58.234374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:15.549796
License: Public Domain

BECTON, Judge.
Plaintiff, Duke University Medical Center (Duke) sought to recover medical expenses for services rendered to Robert L. Stainback, Jr., from his parents, Robert L. and Elizabeth Stain-back, and their insurer, Investor’s Consolidated Insurance Com*76pany (Investor’s). The trial judge found Robert L. Stainback liable for the entire balance due, notwithstanding that the statute of limitations may have run against Duke’s claim, because Stainback was equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar. Stainback appeals. We affirm.
I
Robert L. Stainback, Jr. was admitted to Duke on 21 May 1977 for treatment of injuries sustained in a bicycle-automobile accident. He was nine years old at the time. His father, Robert L. Stainback was legally responsible for his son’s medical bills and, in addition, signed a written statement accepting personal responsibility for the costs.
The medical expenses amounted to $42,812.90. The Midsouth Insurance Company paid $2,000 on the bill in June 1978. Stain-back, himself, paid a total of $8,584.95 with his last payment credited on 1 November 1979. The balance of $32,227.95 was not paid.
Stainback was also insured by Investor’s. However, Investor’s denied coverage and refused to pay any portion of the bill. Stainback initiated suit against Investor’s on 2 August 1978. He was represented by Bobby Rogers. Judgment was entered for Stainback on 13 May 1982 for $39,606.90, plus interest. Although Duke was aware of the suit between Stainback and Investor’s, it neither joined nor intervened in that suit.
The following factual findings to which Stainback takes exception were nonetheless supported in the record. On 15 August 1978 Bobby Rogers informed Duke by letter that suit had been filed against Investor’s. Also in the summer of 1978, Rogers told Duke that he was attempting to secure payment by Investor’s of the balance of Stainback’s bill and that he “would keep Duke informed of the situation.”
Mr. Rogers advised a Duke representative by telephone on 26 October 1983 that he would not pay the bill. Duke initiated this action on 18 November 1983.
II
Stainback first assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Like motions for summary *77judgment and failure to state a claim for relief, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is an interlocutory order and is not appealable. Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 S.E. 2d 384 (1952). Also, denials of motions for summary judgment and failure to state a claim are not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment on the merits. Harris v. Walden, 314 N.C. 284, 333 S.E. 2d 254 (1985) (Denial of motion for summary judgment not reviewable after case decided on the merits.); Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 340 S.E. 2d 755 (1986) (Denial of motion for failure to state a claim not reviewable on appeal after case decided on the merits.). The rationale for nonre-viewability after a trial on the merits is that the purpose of these preliminary motions —to bring litigation to an early decision on the merits when no material facts are in dispute —can no longer be served after there has been a trial. To grant review of these denials “would allow a verdict reached after a presentation of all the evidence to be overcome by a limited forecast of the evidence.” Harris, at 286, 333 S.E. 2d at 256. A similar rationale applies to denials of motions for judgment on the pleadings. The purpose of judgment on the pleadings is to avoid an unnecessary trial when an affirmative defense bars suit. Thus, permitting review of a denial after a judgment on the merits would allow a preliminary assertion of an affirmative defense to overcome a judgment reached after a full examination of the equities involved at trial. We hold that denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment in a trial on the merits.
Stainback’s final assignment of error —that the trial court committed reversible error in finding that he was equitably es-topped from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar to Duke’s cause of action —is the only issue properly before this Court. Stainback had a contractual obligation to pay Duke. The parties agreed in their briefs that Stainback made payments on 9 January 1978 and 1 November 1979. North Carolina General Statute Section 1-52(1) (1983) provides that a three-year statute of limitations is applicable to an action based on breach of contract. Stain-back failed to make any payment for more than four years prior to Duke initiating this action. We therefore find that the three-year statute of limitations has run and would bar Duke’s claim.
*78However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked, in a proper case, to prevent a defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. See Nowell v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 250 N.C. 575, 108 S.E. 2d 889 (1959); Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., 70 N.C. App. 309, 318 S.E. 2d 904 (1984). “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the everyday affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him. ... Its compulsion is one of fair play.” McNeely v. Walters, 211 N.C. 112, 113, 189 S.E. 2d 114, 115 (1937). “Actual fraud, bad faith, or an intent to mislead or deceive is not essential to invoke the equitable doctrine of estoppel in pais.” Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 139, 181 S.E. 2d 588, 593 (1971). Rather “it is sufficient that the debtor made representations which misled the creditor, who acted upon them in good faith, to the extent that he failed to commence action within the statutory period.” Watkins, 279 N.C. at 139, 181 S.E. 2d at 593 (1971) quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, Sec. 433.
In the case sub judice there are specific findings, supported by competent evidence, of conduct by Stainback’s attorney which was designed to mislead Duke. The trial judge, as trier of fact, found that Stainback’s attorney made statements to Duke which caused Duke to reasonably believe it would receive payment once the case between Stainback and Investor’s was decided. Stain-back’s final assignment of error is without merit.
We affirm.
Judge Wells concurs.
Judge ORR dissents.