Court Opinion

ID: 9797288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:17:43.692355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:40.564618
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent in this case because, in my view, the Hygiene Fire Protection District must comply with section 24-67-106(8)(b), C.R.S. (2009), (the "enforcement provision") of the Planned Unit Development Act of 1972 ("PUD Act"), sections 24-67-101 to -107, C.R.S. (2009), before it can condemn private property and build a fire protection station in a planned unit development ("PUD"). I agree with the majority that whether section 30-28-110(1)(c), CRS. (2009), (the "override provision") of the County Planning Act ("Planning Act"), see-tions 30-28-1011 to -404, also serves as an override to the PUD Act is a question of legislative intent. However, I do not agree that the General Assembly has in any way expressed an intent to allow political subdivisions to override the "innovative," "integrated," and "unified" approach to planning for "particular sites" that is encouraged by the PUD Act. See § 24-67-102 (PUD Act's legislative declaration).
The PUD Act creates "an alternative to traditional zoning," Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 708 (Colo. 1996), under which a county or municipality may create a comprehensive plan for land that is located within a single development district. See § 24-67-1088). The PUD Act defines "planned unit development" to mean an "area of land, controlled by one or more landowners, to be developed under unified control or unified plan of development ... the plan for which does not correspond in lot size, bulk, or type of use ... or other restriction to the existing land use regulations." § 24-67-101(8). The Act's definition of "planned unit development" evidences the legislature's intent that PUDs be freed from traditional land use requirements and allows counties and municipalities to design PUD communities as whole coordinated units.
The PUD Act emphasizes "integrated planning" and gives counties and municipalities the authority to depart from traditional zoning standards and, in designing a single PUD, determine placement of commercial properties, residential properties, open space, and industrial properties by considering the site as a whole. The PUD Act encourages flexibility in land use planning by permitting development to be tailored "to the particular site, thereby encouraging preservation of the site's natural characteristics." § 24-67-see also Best v. La Plata Planning Comm'n, 701 P.2d 91, 95 (Colo.App.1984) (upholding county's PUD regulations and noting that the "rigidity inherent in traditional zoning has led to its supplementation with the more flexible PUD zoning device"). Approval of every PUD must be based on a finding by the county that the proposed PUD plan is "in general conformity with ... any comprehensive plan for the county." § 24-67-104(1)(f).
In order to accomplish the PUD Act's flexible approach, the PUD Act's legislative declaration states:
(1) In order that the public health, safety, integrity, and general welfare may be furthered in an era of increasing urbanization and of growing demand for housing of all types and design, the powers set forth in this article are granted to all counties and municipalities for the following purposes:
*1074(d) To encourage innovations in residential, commercial, and industrial development and renewal so that the growing demands of the population may be met by greater variety in type, design, and layout of buildings and by the conservation and more efficient use of open space ancillary to said buildings; ...
(e) To encourage a more efficient use of land and of public services ...;
() To provide a procedure which can relate the type, design, and layout of residential, commercial, and industrial development to the particular site, thereby encouraging preservation of the site's natural characteristics; and
(j) To encourage integrated planning in order to achieve the above purposes.
§ 24-67-102.
The majority's application of the override provision to the PUD Act serves to allow governmental entities to ignore the legislative intent that PUDs be considered as whole units when decisions are made related to the placement of structures and the siting of open space, and instead, after a PUD has been planned, insert a structure in any location the entity chooses, regardless of the overall plan of the PUD. By allowing a public entity to disregard a PUD plan, a county cannot ensure that many of the goals of the PUD Act are achieved, such as encouragement of a more efficient use of land and public services, encouragement of integrated planning, efficient use of open space, and preservation of the site's natural characteristics. Here, this interpretation has the effect of allowing the Hygiene Fire Protection District to transform the character of the already planned PUD and locate a fire station within land planned as open space. Such an interpretation cannot be what the legislature intended when it enacted the PUD Act as an alternative to traditional zoning under the Planning Act.
Instead, requiring all parties seeking to modify existing PUDs-including governmental entities-to obtain county approval of the modification under the enforcement provision achieves the legislative goal of tailoring development to particular sites through integrated planning and consideration of the development as a whole.
The General Assembly instructed courts to "liberally construe" the PUD Act in order to further the Act's purposes. § 24-67-107(6). Contrary to the legislature's intent, the majority has interpreted the enforcement provision narrowly, rendering it inapplicable when any governmental entity submits an application for location and extent review pursuant to the Planning Act. This has the effect of allowing governmental subdivisions to alter entire PUD schemes by bypassing the enforcement provision and allowing them to site structures wherever they choose, regardless of the effect the location site will have on the PUD.
The majority places significance upon the fact that section 24-67-107(6) of the PUD Act states it was enacted "for the purpose of supplementing the provisions of" the Planning Act. The majority states that use of the term "supplement" shows the two acts are to be read together and harmonized. Maj. op. at 1069. However, use of the term "supplement" does not necessarily mean that the Planning Act and the PUD Act are to be read as entirely consistent with one another, nor does it mean that the PUD Act is subordinate to the Planning Act. Black's Low Dictionary defines "supplement" as "supplying something additional; adding what is lacking." Black's Law Dictionary 1452 (ith ed.1999); see also Webster's New College Dictionary 1438 (10th ed.2005) (defining "supplement" as "something added, especially to make up for lack or deficiency"). Because the PUD Act is intended to "supplement" the Planning Act, the PUD Act completes and provides additional requirements applicable to PUDs not present in the Planning Act. I believe the PUD Act was enacted to "supplement" the Planning Act by providing an alternative, or different, option for counties and municipalities to apply to zoning and land use planning than contained in the Planning Act.
Under our cannons of statutory construction, where two statutes address the same subject, courts should construe them together to avoid inconsistency. City & County of Denver ex rel. Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. Bd. *1075of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 753, 766 (Colo. 1989). The majority asserts that the Planning Act and the PUD Act address the same subject and should therefore be construed together to avoid inconsistency. Maj. op. at 1069. While I agree that the two acts address the same broad subject in that they both deal with the subject of land use planning and development, I do not agree that they address precisely the same subject matter.
The Planning Act and the PUD Act are contained in different statutory titles and deal with different land use planning situations. As discussed above, the PUD Act functions fundamentally differently from the Planning Act, allowing counties and municipalities to consider an entire parcel of land and the overall characteristic of the development when designing a PUD. Moreover, master plans under the Planning Act serve as comprehensive guidelines, while the PUD Act provides the framework for instruments that actually control site-specific land use. Because I see the PUD Act and the Planning Act as addressing different situations under the broad umbrella of land use planning and development, I do not find it necessary to attempt to read the two acts as entirely consistent. I believe the better approach is to find that the override provision does not apply to the PUD Act, as it is inconsistent with the legislatively declared purpose of the PUD Act, and hold that the enforcement provision applies to all parties seeking modification of a PUD, including governmental entities.
Similarly, as applied to PUDs, the enforcement provision is more specific than the override provision, and should therefore control the outcome in the present case. See City & County of Denver, 782 P.2d at 766 (specific provisions control over general provisions). The PUD Act's enforcement provision applies specifically to PUDs and provides the process parties must comply with when they wish to modify an already existing PUD plan. The Planning Act applies generally to county planning commissions and requires them to adopt master plans to direct the development of unincorporated lands. The override provision allows a political subdivision to override a county who has adopted a master plan's decision related to the construction of a structure in an unineor-porated area covered by the master plan. This process is distinct from the specialized procedures contained in the PUD Act under which parties seeking to modify a PUD plan must obtain approval from the county or municipality in order to assure that the modification is "consistent with the efficient development and preservation of the entire planned unit development ...." § 24-67-106(b). Furthermore, as discussed above, the PUD Act is intended to supplement the Planning Act, suggesting that it provides more specific information that was otherwise missing from the Planning Act-that is, information related to PUDs. Accordingly, I believe that the enforcement provision-a provision specifically related to modification of existing PUDs-is more specific than the override provision and should therefore control the present dispute. See City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105, 1118 (Colo.App.1994)(holding that the more specific County Land Use Act, section 24-65.1-101, C.R.S. (1988) (repealed 2005), prevails over the "broader" override provision contained in section 30-28-110(1)(c) ).
Finally, certain provisions of the PUD Act expressly incorporate provisions of the Planning Act. For example, section 24-67-104(1)(e) of the PUD Act states that notice of a public hearing regarding approval of a PUD "shall be given in the manner pre-seribed by" the Planning Act. Similarly, seetion 24-67-105(7) of the PUD Act allows for local PUD design, construction, and other requirements to depart from zoning and subdivision requirements adopted under the Planning Act, as long as local PUD regulations "substantially comply with the subdivision provisions" of the Planning Act. See also § 24-67-105.5(2) (referencing section 30-28 133(10) of the Planning Act's subdivision requirements). However, no provision of the PUD Act incorporates the extent and review process of the Planning Act or the override provision. If the General Assembly intended the override provision to apply to PUDs, it could have specifically incorporated these provisions in the PUD Act, as it did in other *1076sections of the PUD Act. Because the General Assembly did not include a reference to the override provision within the PUD Act, I believe the General Assembly intended that all entities-including governmental entities-must comply with the enforcement provision of the PUD Act. See Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 567 (Colo. 1998) (absence of specific provisions or language in a statute "is not an error or omission, but a statement of legislative intent").
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals' decision and hold that the override provision does not apply to the PUD Act. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE EID join in this dissent.