Court Opinion

ID: 9566785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:43:04.382269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:53.013459
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in part in the majority opinion’s ruling regarding the bill of particulars. I dissent from the remaining parts of the opinion, and, accordingly, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
I.
The trial judge denied the motion for a bill of particulars because it was not timely. The record reflects that the motion was not “made before a plea [was] entered.” Code § 19.2-230. Thus, I would affirm the trial judge’s ruling that the motion was not timely. I do not join in the majority’s discussion concerning the sufficiency of the indictment.
II.
Franklin McKinley Yeager’s trial counsel offered the following jury instruction:
*769If you find that there is not a reasonable explanation for the victim’s failure to report an alleged rape for a reasonable period after the incident occurred, you may be suspect and doubtful of the truthfulness of the victim’s story.
That instruction is a paraphrase of the following statement made by the Supreme Court in Willis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 560, 563, 238 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1977):
The failure to report an alleged rape by force and violence for an unreasonable period after the incident occurred casts suspicion and doubt on the truthfulness of the story of a prosecutrix unless there is a credible explanation given for such a delay.
The trial judge allowed Yeager’s counsel to argue to the jury the matters stated in the refused instruction. The trial judge refused to give the instruction, however, stating that it was a comment on the evidence. I believe the trial judge erred in refusing the instruction or some modified version of it.
The trial judge gave an instruction that informed the jury of its role in determining the credibility of witnesses. That instruction stated:
You are the judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. You may consider the appearance and manner of the witnesses on the stand, their intelligence, their opportunity for knowing the truth and for having observed the things about which they testified, their interest in the outcome of the case, their bias, and, if any have been shown, their prior inconsistent statements, or whether they have knowingly testified untruthfully as to any material fact in the case.
You may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony of a witness. However, after you have considered all the evidence in the case, then you may accept or discard all or part of the testimony of a witness as you think proper.
You are entitled to use your common sense in judging any testimony. From these things and all the other circumstances of the case, you may determine which witnesses are more believable and weigh their testimony accordingly.
The given instruction addressed the appearance of the witness, the witness’s manner on the stand, and other specific instances that the jury *770might have weighed in making an assessment of a witness’s credibility. That instruction did not inform the jury that the delay in reporting the incident was also a matter that the jury could have considered as affecting credibility. The law in Virginia, however, recognizes an unexplained delay as a matter that bears on credibility. See Willis, 218 Va. at 563, 238 S.E.2d at 813.
In this case, the evidence proved that the first incident for which Yeager was charged occurred in 1989, and the victim first made a report in 1991. Thus, the issue of unreasonable delay was not an abstract matter but, rather, was a matter proved in this case.
‘ ‘The purpose of an instruction is to furnish guidance to the jury in their deliberations, and to aid them in arriving at a proper verdict, so far as it is competent for the court to assist them. The chief object contemplated in the charge of the judge is to explain the law of the case, to point out the essentials to be proved on the one side or the other, and to bring into view the relation of the particular evidence adduced to the particular issues involved. In his instructions the trial judge should inform the jury as to the law of the case applicable to the facts in such a manner that they may not be misled.”
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 497, 500, 345 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1986) (quoting 75 Am. lur. 2d Trial § 573 (1974)). “ ‘Both the Commonwealth and the defendant are entitled to appropriate instructions to the jury of the law applicable to each version of the case, provided such instructions are based upon the evidence adduced.’ ” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 563, 570, 394 S.E.2d 509, 514 (1990) (quoting Simms v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 614, 616, 346 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1986)).
As recently as its decision in Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991), the Supreme Court. . . [restated] the following proposition: ‘‘[W]hen a principle of law is vital to a defendant in a criminal case, the trial court has an affirmative duty properly to instruct a jury about the matter.” Id. at 250, 402 S.E.2d at 681. Jiminez does not limit the trial court’s duty in this regard to situations where the issue constitutes a defendant’s sole defense or an element of the crime. Instead, we believe Jiminez articulates a guiding principle to be applied to the facts of each case.
*771Mery v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 821, 825, 407 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1991).
In Willis, the Supreme Court concluded that a delay of one month was an unreasonable delay in reporting a rape. 218 Va. at 563-64, 238 S.E.2d at 813. Whether the delay was unreasonable was obviously a matter for counsel to argue to the jury. The victim’s age was also a matter that counsel could have addressed in arguing whether the reason for the delay was reasonable. See Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 296, 299, 411 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1991). The victim’s immaturity, her natural inclination to trust and obey her father, and her testimony that her father had warned her not to tell anyone about the crimes or she would get in trouble, all constituted explanations that could have been argued to explain and justify failure to report the rapes promptly. See id. However, whether the failure to report the rape for an unreasonable period after the event, if lacking a reasonable explanation, might be considered in determining the credibility of the witness was a question of law to be instructed by the trial judge. The trial judge failed to inform the jury that under Virginia law the witness’s credibility can be affected by an unexplained delay in reporting the incident — an issue unrelated to the specific items stated in the credibility instruction that the trial judge gave to the jury. Thus, contrary to the principle that a “jury should not be left in the dark on [a] subject” that is material and vital to a defendant’s case, Mery, 12 Va. App. at 826, 407 S.E.2d at 21, the jury in this case was not fully informed on the law of credibility applicable to the facts of this case.
Nothing in the refused instruction comments on the evidence. The refused instruction states the law as it relates to an aspect of credibility. The jury should have been so instructed in conjunction with the credibility instruction that was given and that focused exclusively on the specific instances delineated in that instruction. If, however, the refused instruction might reasonably be deemed to contain language that comments on the evidence, refusal of the instruction was not the trial judge’s remedy. This Court has explicitly stated that “[w]e adhere to the rule that the trial court is not required to amend or correct an erroneous instruction, but the rule is subject to the limitation that when the principle of law is materially vital to a defendant in a criminal case, it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse a defective instruction instead of correcting it and giving it in the proper form.” Mery, 12 Va. App. at 826, 407 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973)). *772Whatever defect the trial judge may have perceived in the instruction could have been remedied by a modification.
When considering instructions for the jury, the trial judge must be mindful of the following principle:
The jury is not required to accept, in toto, either the theory of the Commonwealth or that of an accused. They have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true. In so doing, they have broad discretion in applying the law to the facts and in fixing the degree of guilt, if any, of a person charged with a crime.
Belton v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 5, 9, 104 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1958). “Therefore, the trial [judge] must instruct on both theories to guide a jury in their deliberations as to the law applicable to the case, depending upon how the jury decides the facts.” Foster v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 380, 383-84, 412 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1991). The trial judge’s failure to give the proffered instruction or some modification of it deprived Yeager of the right to have the jury fully instructed on the law applicable to the facts proved in this case.
III.
The trial judge erred in refusing to set aside the judgment for the period of time necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing and in refusing to grant the motion for a new trial.
At trial, Yeager offered into evidence two letters purportedly written by the victim to her cousin. The letters were addressed to the cousin and signed with the victim’s name. The cousin testified that the victim handed her the letters. The contents of the letters suggest that the victim was sexually active. In rebuttal, the victim testified that she did not write the letters.
In refusing to grant Yeager’s motion for a new trial, the trial judge assumed that Yeager obtained the expert analysis of the handwriting after trial. The analysis stated that when compared to other handwriting exemplars offered at trial from the victim, the letters appeared to have been written by the victim.
“[I]f the newly discovered evidence contradicts the factual basis of a witness’s testimony, a new trial may be granted when it appears that *773the newly discovered evidence has sufficient probative weight to produce a different result on retrial.” Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 461, 481, 390 S.E.2d 525, 536, aff’d en banc, 399 S.E.2d 29 (Va. App. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 840 (1991) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[i]f the witness sought to be impeached is ‘the key prosecution witness,’ then a new trial should be ordered, assuming all of the other requirements for a new trial are met.” Whittington v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 212, 216, 361 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1987) (citation omitted).
As in Whittington, Yeager’s “conviction rested solely on the [alleged] victim’s testimony.” Id. Although the victim said Yeager raped her, the Commonwealth did not present any medical or physical evidence that corroborated her claim. See id. The Commonwealth did present evidence obtained from a physical examination that the alleged victim had engaged in continued sexual activity. However, the DNA testing performed on blood, hair, and spermatozoa samples submitted for analysis did not inculpate Yeager. The testimony of the victim was the only evidence of his guilt.
The trial judge admitted the letters into evidence following a rape shield evidentiary hearing held before trial. The hearing was held on the morning of the trial. The victim’s cousin testified that the victim gave her the letter. That the victim would deny authorship of the letters with her signature was not reasonably foreseeable. Thus, the expert’s handwriting analysis was not obtained until after the trial. Because of the cost of obtaining a handwriting analysis, it would have been inefficient and unreasonable for Yeager’s counsel to have sought a handwriting analysis of the letters prior to the hearing based on speculation that the alleged victim would deny authorship of the letters.
The authenticity of the writing became a crucial issue that bore on the credibility of the victim. If the jury believed the expert’s analysis, the statements in the letter would have provided an alternative explanation for the only physical evidence of the alleged offense charged, and, thus, would have “contradicted] the factual basis” of the victim’s testimony. Mundy, 11 Va. App. at 481, 390 S.E.2d at 536. Moreover, the expert’s testimony, if believed, would show that the alleged victim committed perjury and would tend to cast doubt upon her credibility. Whether the victim’s testimony was to be believed, in light of the newly discovered evidence, was a question to be resolved by a jury and not by the trial judge acting on a motion for a new trial. Whittington, 5 Va. App. at 216-17, 361 S.E.2d at 452. If the jury had *774not believed the alleged victim’s testimony, no evidence pointed to Yeager’s guilt. See id.
The expert’s analysis was after-discovered evidence that tended to impeach the alleged victim’s testimony, which was the sole basis supporting the conviction. Consequently, the newly-discovered evidence, if believed, could have resulted in an acquittal. See id. at 217, 361 S.E.2d at 453. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for a new trial.
I dissent.