Court Opinion

ID: 9862123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:01:47.093442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:18.787556
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC, concurring in the judgment: I agree with the lead opinion except for its suggestions that the complicity doctrine "lack[s] *** a clear analytical basis,” is "difficult to discern” from contributory negligence, is difficult to apply, and "may be inconsistent with [the Dramshop Act].” (164 Ill. 2d at 89, 93.) These criticisms, although mere dicta, are unwarranted for the reasons explained below. First, this court in Nelson v. Araiza (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 534, articulated the history of the Dramshop Act and the basis for the complicity doctrine. The original Dram-shop Act of 1872 was a product of the temperance movement and was designed to promote temperance by curtailing the liquor trade. (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 538; see 235 ILCS 5/1 — 2 (West 1992) (the promotion of temperance remains a stated purpose of the current act).) Liability under the Dramshop Act has never been predicated on negligence or fault. (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 539.) Rather, the Act imposes "no-fault liability” upon dramshops for selling or giving alcoholic beverages to their patrons who subsequently injure third parties. (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 538.) To further the purposes of the Dramshop Act, the courts developed the complicity doctrine. (See Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 538-39.) The rule of complicity is that "one who actively contributes to or procures the intoxication of the inebriate is precluded from recovery.” (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 543.) The reason for the rule is that, if a plaintiff were allowed to recover in these instances, the Dramshop Act’s stated purpose of promoting temperance would be undermined. Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 538-39. Second, the Nelson court also explained the distinction between contributory negligence and complicity, and how they apply to the Dramshop Act. Both doctrines are "children” of the principle that a person should not profit from his or her own wrong. (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 539.) Contributory negligence, however, had absolutely no application to the Dramshop Act because the Act is not based on a negligence theory. (Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 539.) Only the rule of complicity can interdict recovery under the Dramshop Act. Complicity simply focuses on the plaintiffs role in causing the inebriate’s intoxication. Nelson, 69 Ill. 2d at 539. Third, the complicity doctrine has not proved difficult to apply. Courts that have followed the complicity rule as set forth in Nelson have properly applied the doctrine to the cases before them. (See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bobbie & Clydes, Inc. (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 856; Darguzas v. Robinson (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 362; Merritt v. Chonowski (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 192.) As noted in the lead opinion, those appellate decisions that have misapplied the doctrine were improperly relying on preNelson precedent. 164 Ill. 2d at 90-94 (discussing Lewis v. Champaign County VFW Post No. 5520 (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 73, Sterenberg v. Sir Loin, Inc. (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 631, and Parsons v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6372 (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 515). Lastly, I disagree with the statement that the complicity doctrine "may be inconsistent with the legislative scheme of placing the economic burden of intoxication-related injuries on dramshops.” (164 Ill. 2d at 93.) The General Assembly has amended the Dramshop Act several times over the years (see 235 ILCS 5/6 — 21, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 294-96 (Smith-Hurd 1993)), but has never altered the complicity rule as set forth by this court. Where the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial construction, it is presumed to have acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent. (Miller v. Lockett (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483.) The judicial construction then becomes a part of the statute itself. Consequently, the complicity doctrine must now be regarded as an integral part of the Dram-shop Act, consistent with legislative intent. Accordingly, any change to the settled rule of complicity should emanate from the legislative, and not the judicial, branch of government. I therefore concur except as noted. JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this concurrence.