Court Opinion

ID: 9370371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 09:10:08.781398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.193616
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-21-00206-CR
     ___________________________

  JARED FREDRICK WADE, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 396th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1523164D

  Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Jared Fredrick Wade appeals his sentence of ten years’ imprisonment

for causing bodily injury to a child. 1 In a single point, Wade asserts that his sentence is

grossly disproportionate to the offense. We will affirm.

                                     I. Background

       In November 2018, Wade, pursuant to a plea bargain, pled guilty to causing

bodily injury to a child, a third-degree felony. Under the terms of his plea agreement,

Wade received deferred adjudication and was placed on ten years’ probation.2

       In November 2021, the State, alleging seven probation violations, filed a

petition to proceed to adjudication. Specifically, the petition alleged that Wade had

violated the terms of his probation by: (1) committing the new offense of “improper

photo/video bath/dress room” in June 2021; (2) consuming alcohol; (3) submitting a

diluted urine sample; (4) testing positive for alcohol; (5) failing to pay sixteen months

of community supervision fees; (6) failing to provide a urine sample as instructed; and

(7) failing to pay lab fees in the amount $100.

       In December 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition to

proceed to adjudication. Wade pled “not true” to all seven of the alleged probation

violations. The State called four witnesses: two to testify primarily about the new

       The original complaint alleges that Wade struck the child with his fist.
       1

       In addition, Wade was required to pay a $1,000 fine and court costs.
       2

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improper video offense and two probation officers to testify regarding the remaining

alleged violations.

A. Improper Video Offense

       KW (Mother) 3 testified that she had previously been married to TW (Father)

and that they have three children: CW (age 17), TW (age 14), and PW (age 12). Father

worked for Wade and after divorcing Mother, moved into a shed behind Wade’s

house. Wade has children who are friends with Mother and Father’s children. Mother

would occasionally allow her children to visit Wade’s property and sometimes spend

the night. Mother testified that Wade and her daughter TW regularly communicated

via text. Mother and TW both testified that Wade would purchase things for TW and

take her to stores, tanning salons, and a gym known as “Lifetime.”

       In June 2021, all of Mother and Father’s children and some of their friends

were at Wade’s house for a cookout. Preparing for other guests to arrive, Wade paid

TW to clean his house. While cleaning, TW found a camera in the upstairs

bathroom—the one that she and her friends expected to use while at Wade’s house. 4

The camera, which was hidden in a Clorox bottle inside a trashcan, was pointed

towards the toilet and the shower. It was plugged in, hot to the touch, and had a blue

       3
          To protect their sensitive data, we refer to Mother and her family by their
initials. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).

       TW testified that she, her brother, and their friends planned to stay at Wade’s
       4

house overnight and that they would be showering in Wade’s upstairs bathroom.

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light. When TW questioned Wade about the camera, he said that he had placed it in

the bathroom because there were going to be strangers in his house and he wanted to

protect against theft.5

B. Other Probation Violations

       Tamara Battle, who was Wade’s probation officer in 2019, testified that Wade

had been placed on probation for the offense of injury to a child; that as a condition

of his bond, Wade was not allowed to have contact with children under the age of

17 other than his biological children; and that, while on probation, Wade had been

arrested for sexual assault of a child. Battle also testified that Wade had submitted a

dilute urine sample, that another of Wade’s samples had tested positive for alcohol,

and that Wade had admitted to consuming alcohol.

       Allysa Deleon, who was Wade’s probation supervisor from June 2020 to

September 2021, confirmed that Wade had submitted a dilute urine sample and had

failed to provide another required urine sample. She also testified that Wade had failed

to pay certain required supervision and lab fees.

C. Adjudication and Sentencing

       After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that, with the exception of

violation number two (alcohol consumption), the State had proven all of the alleged

probation violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court

       At the revocation hearing, Wade testified that he suspected Father of placing
       5

the camera in the bathroom.

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adjudicated Wade guilty of causing bodily injury to a child and sentenced him to ten

years in prison—the maximum sentence authorized by the Texas Penal Code for

Wade’s third-degree felony offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.34(a); 22.04(a)(3),

(f).

       This appeal followed. 6

                                    II. Discussion

       On appeal, Wade raises a single point, arguing that his ten-year prison sentence

is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which he was convicted.

A. Applicable Law

       “Generally, punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive,

cruel, or unusual punishment.” Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, no pet.) (first citing Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App.

1973); and then citing Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2001, no pet.)). Indeed, a trial court has “essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to impose

any sentence within the prescribed statutory range, Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990)), and any sentence within the statutory limits is virtually

“unassailable” on appeal provided that it is based upon the sentencer’s informed

normative judgment. Id. at 324. However, a narrow exception to this general rule

       On the same date that he filed his notice of appeal, Wade also filed a motion
       6

for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law.

                                            5
exists: the Eighth Amendment prohibits noncapital punishment within the statutory

limits if the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. 48, 59–60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021–22 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.

957, 997–1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment); State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Although the “precise contours [of the gross-disproportionality exception] are

unclear,” one thing is certain: it applies “only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case.”

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2703–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part

and concurring in judgment); see also Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23; Chavez,

213 S.W.3d at 323–24.

      To determine whether a noncapital sentence qualifies for this uncommon and

“somewhat amorphous” exception, we engage in a three-step review beginning with a

threshold analysis comparing the gravity of the offense to the severity of the sentence.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Chavez,

213 S.W.3d at 323–24. Assessing the gravity of the offense requires us to consider

(1) the harm that the defendant caused or threatened to the victim and to society,

(2) the defendant’s culpability, and (3) the defendant’s prior adjudicated and

unadjudicated crimes. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. We weigh these factors against

the defendant’s sentence, looking to precedent for guidance as to the constitutional

limits of proportional severity. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75, 102 S. Ct. 703,

706 (1982) (per curiam) (chastising lower courts for extending gross-disproportionality

                                            6
exception beyond the limits of precedent); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 317 (5th

Cir. 1992) (holding sentence was not grossly-disproportionate in light of both the

Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s precedent). In the rare case in which this

threshold analysis indicates gross disproportionality, we proceed to steps two and

three by comparing the defendant’s sentence with those received by similar offenders

in this jurisdiction and with those imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296–300, 103 S. Ct.

3001, 3012–15 (1983) (applying steps two and three).

B. Threshold Analysis

      As detailed above, the first step in determining whether a noncapital sentence is

grossly disproportionate involves comparing the gravity of the offense with the

severity of the sentence. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022; Simpson,

488 S.W.3d at 323; Bolar v. State, 625 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021,

no pet.). However, Wade has not presented any arguments or cited to any evidence in

the record concerning the gravity of his offense—causing bodily injury to a child.

Rather, employing a bit of legal legerdemain, Wade argues that his ten-year sentence is

grossly disproportionate to “the technical probationary violations [that he] committed.” 7

      7
        Though not raised as a separate point, Wade asserts that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he had violated his probation by
committing the improper video offense. However, to prevail at a revocation hearing,
the State is only required to prove one probation violation by a preponderance of the
evidence. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Bryant v. State,
391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex.

                                            7
[Emphasis added.] This is not the correct test. See Bolar, 625 S.W.3d at 666; see also

Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 365–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.

ref’d) (correcting appellant’s erroneous assumption that “he received fifteen years’

confinement for a curfew violation” and pointing out that appellant’s 15-year sentence

rested upon adjudication of guilt for crime alleged, not appellant’s violation of

probation requirements that led to revocation of deferred adjudication); Knight v. State,

No. 14-02-00615-CR, 2003 WL 1988555, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

May 1, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (addressing constitutionality

of appellant’s 25-year sentence based on offense of aggravated sexual assault of a

child, not based on appellant’s violation of probation requirements that led to

revocation of deferred adjudication). Having failed to address the gravity of his

offense—an essential part of the threshold analysis for determining whether a

sentence is grossly disproportional—in his briefing, Wade has arguably forfeited the

issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011) (holding that appellant’s point of error was “inadequately briefed and presents

Crim. App. 2009); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005,
pet. ref’d). Thus, to win on appeal, an appellant must successfully challenge all
grounds for revocation. Guerrero v. State, 554 S.W.3d 268, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Because the record supports the trial court’s findings that
Wade committed all but one of the other probation violations alleged in the State’s
petition—and Wade does not challenge these findings on appeal—we need not
consider his challenge to the finding that he committed the improper video offense.
See id.; see also Alexander v. State, No. 04-20-00480-CR, 2021 WL 6053736, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Dec. 22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).

                                           8
nothing for review as this Court is under no obligation to make appellant’s arguments

for her”); Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 653, 681, 685 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.)

(holding that because appellant failed to proffer any argument or authority with

respect to his claims, he waived any error as to claims due to inadequate briefing).

      Nevertheless, even setting aside the inadequate briefing issue,8 Wade’s

disproportionality argument fails on the merits. Under the Simpson factors, the gravity

of Wade’s offense is high. See 488 S.W.3d at 323. First, Wade’s crime—striking a child

with his fist—is a serious offense, harming not only the victim but also society, which

has a vested interest in protecting its most vulnerable members. Second, because

Wade pled guilty, his culpability for the underlying crime is clear. Third, the record

reflects that Wade has been charged with several additional crimes, including

aggravated sexual assault of a child, continuous sexual abuse of a child under age

fourteen, and sexual assault of a child under age 17. Based on the three threshold

factors, we conclude that Wade’s ten-year sentence—which is within the statutory

range—does not give rise to an inference of disproportionality. Because Wade’s

disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold test, we need not compare

      8
       Because we overrule Wade’s sole point on the merits, we need not address
whether he has forfeited the issue. See, e.g., Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 644–
45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (expressly declining to decide whether an objection was
required to preserve error on an issue because it could be overruled on the merits);
Dawson v. State, No. 14-95-01091-CR, 1998 WL 119675, at *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 1998, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)
(“Because we overrule this point of error on the merits, we do not address whether
error was preserved.”).

                                           9
his sentence to others for the same offense in Texas and elsewhere. See Bolar,

625 S.W.3d at 666; see also Nunnally v. State, No. 03-19-00807-CR, 2021 WL 4995502,

at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

      We overrule Wade’s sole point.

                                  III. Conclusion

      Having overruled Wade’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                    /s/ Mike Wallach
                                                    Mike Wallach
                                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 9, 2023

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