Court Opinion

ID: 9829585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:27:20.472705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:03.235917
License: Public Domain

On Second Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants were granted leave to file a second motion for rehearing, now under consideration.
In the opinion filed on their original motion for rehearing, we had occasion to say that “ * ⅜ * they (Garretts) failed utterly to disclose to him (Katz) a single fact that would have put him upon inquiry touching the validity of the mechanic’s lien.” Appellants challenge the correctness of this conclusion, on the ground that, the same is-not supported by the record; that is to say, by neither pleading nor proof. In reaching this conclusion, we followed, as we believe we should have done, the findings of the trial court heretofore fully set out in our original opinion, and, as appears in both opinions heretofore filed, the issue of estoppel by silence was both substantially pleaded and proven; hence it will serve no useful purpose to go over that ground again.
However, it may be conceded, for the sake of the discussion, that “estoppel by silence” was neither sufficiently pleaded nor adequately proven, and yet the result so far as appellants are concerned will be the same.
The trial court found and adjudicated, under adequate pleadings sufficiently sustained by evidence, that appellants made untrue statements under oath, asserting the existence of facts that would, if true, have sustained the validity of the mechanic’s lien com tract, that Katz relied upon these representations and, without notice of any vice in the transaction, made the investment and parted with his money. Estoppel on this ground alone was sufficient to sustain the judgment against the defendant, irrespective of whether estoppel by1 silence was either pleaded or proven.
Appellants raise the further question that the court erred in holding that necessary parties to Katz’s cross-action were not before the court; the point made is that Schmitt, the maker of the simulated mechanic’s lien note, was not a party to the suit.
The evidence conclusively showed that Schmitt had no interest in the note, or in the mechanic’s lien contract; hence it was! not necessary that he should have been made a party to the cross-action of Katz. Appellants sued for the cancellation of the mechanic’s lien contract executed by them, on the idea that, the same was simulated, unreal, and for that reason void. The evidence showed that Schmitt was a mere figurehead, selected by appellants and the lumber company to execute the mechanic’s lien contract as ostensible contractor for the purpose of floating and negotiating the note, an interest in which was subsequently sold to Katz. It was alleged by Katz in his cross-action that Schmitt, for value received, to wit $4,000 cash in hand paid, transferred.to him a $4,000 interest in the $5,000 note, and the lien against said property to secure same, and this $4,000 interest was afterwards recognized by appellants in the execution of the notes payable to Katz, sued upon in this ease. After a further careful reconsideration of all the questions raised in the motions for rehearing, the same are deemed without merit, and are in all things overruled.
Overruled.