Court Opinion

ID: 9607752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:01:37.746825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.845345
License: Public Domain

GEER, Judge,
concurring in the result only.
I agree with the majority opinion that plaintiff properly served defendant. I cannot, however, agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that no procedural error occurred in this casé. I believe that Rule 55 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff obtain an entry of default prior to seeking a default judgment.
It is undisputed that plaintiff never expressly moved for entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a). Instead, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b). The trial court allowed that motion and entered a default judgment without any mention of an entry of default.
*129I disagree with the majority that it is simply the better practice to pursue the two-step process beginning with the entry of default followed by a motion for default judgment. I believe that it is mandatory. See Strauss v. Hunt, 140 N.C. App. 345, 349, 536 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (2000) (observing that “[b]efore proceeding, we note that plaintiff should have first filed a motion for entry of default, which the clerk, or the trial court, should have ruled on before the trial court ruled on plaintiffs motion for judgment by default”; stating further that, in failing to move for entry of default, plaintiff committed “error of civil procedure” (internal citations omitted)); Board of Transp. v. Williams, 31 N.C. App. 125, 127, 229 S.E.2d 37, 39 (1976) (“[The defendants] argue that plaintiff failed to follow the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 55, which contemplates a two stage approach: entry of default by the clerk and, thereafter, entry of judgment by default. Obviously defendants are correct in their interpretation of the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 55, and if that Rule were applicable here, their position would have merit.”). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 55 comment (2007) (noting that there will be “an entry of default in all cases and a final judgment by default entered only after everything required to its entry has been done" (emphasis added)); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, 10A Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2682 (3d ed. 2007) (“Prior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a).”).
As the majority opinion indicates, nothing in Rule 55 specifically precludes a plaintiff from filing a single document requesting both an entry of default and a default judgment. Nevertheless; plaintiff, in this case, did not do so. Plaintiff never sought — in any document — entry of default. Further, no express entry of default ever occurred. Nothing in Judge Massey’s “Default Judgment” indicates that he — or anyone else — entered default.
I believe that Judge Massey could have deemed plaintiff’s motion for default judgment to be a motion for entry of default and entered default before considering the request for a default judgment. Moreover, this Court has indicated in dicta that the entry of default and the default judgment could, in certain circumstances, be contained in the same document. See Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 715, 220 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1975) (“The entry of default and entry of default judgment by the Clerk may be simultaneous and can be contained in the same document.”), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d 396 (1976). The record before this *130Court, however, does not permit any conclusion other than that a default judgment was entered without a prior entry of default.
Contrary to the majority opinion, I would, therefore, hold that the trial court’s default judgment violated the procedures set forth in Rule 55. This conclusion does not, however, necessarily require reversal. The only prejudice identified by defendant is that it was denied the more lenient standard of “good cause” applied under Rule 55(c) in considering whether an entry of default should be set aside.
As the majority opinion notes, a trial judge has concurrent authority to enter default under Rule 55(a). Judge Eagles concluded in her order that Judge Massey effectively entered default, and defendant failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry. Thus, defendant received the benefit of the more lenient standard. I agree with the majority opinion that no basis exists to overturn Judge Eagles’ determination regarding the lack of good cause.
Moreover, if Judge Massey had first entered default, as the rule requires, defendant would not then have been entitled to notice of plaintiff’s application for a default judgment. Rule 55(b)(2)(a), addressing the entry of default judgment by a judge, specifies: “If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, that party . . . shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such application.” When, however, the defaulting party has not “appeared,” no notice of the application for a default judgment is required. See Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Farmer, 427 F. Supp. 2d 807, 815 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (“As [defendant] has never entered an appearance in this action, the notice requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) does not apply.”); Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2687 (“[A] defaulting party who has failed to appear, thereby manifesting no intention to defend, is not entitled to notice of the application for a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2).”).
Defendant has made no argument that it “appeared” in this case within the meaning of Rule 55(b). Accordingly, even if plaintiff had sought and obtained an entry of default, defendant would not have been entitled to notice that plaintiff had also applied for a default judgment. The trial court could have entered the default judgment without defendant’s prior knowledge, and defendant would still be in the same position as it was during the proceedings below. In short, defendant was not prejudiced by the procedural errors. I, therefore, agree with the majority opinion that Judge Eagles did not *131err in refusing to set aside the default judgment and that the orders below should be affirmed.