Court Opinion

ID: 9707176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:04:31.013784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:27.793677
License: Public Domain

BURMAN, J., dissenting. I do not join in the view that, upon a consideration of all the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences legitimately arising therefrom and viewed in its aspect most favorable to plaintiff, there has been a total failure of proof that defendant was negligent. The pleadings established that plaintiff was proceeding easterly upon East Grant Highway, a through street, while defendant approached in a southeasterly direction on East Street, a secondary street upon which traffic was required to stop before entering East Grant Highway. Plaintiff testified that when she was approximately 100 to 150 feet from the East Street intersection she looked for approaching traffic on East Street. On the 75 to 80 feet of East Street that were visible to her she saw no vehicles at that time. She was then travel-ling about 20 miles per hour in the lane next to the curb. She proceeded, concentrating on her side of the road and looking for children in the area, and as she reached the East Street intersection she again looked up East Street and for the first time saw defendant’s car. The approaching vehicle, at that moment practically on top of her, instantaneously struck her left front fender and wheel causing her to veer over the curb into a tree and telephone pole. Defendant did not testify and called no witnesses in his behalf. His evidence consisted solely of two pictures of each damaged vehicle. The evidence firmly established that plaintiff was exercising due care for her own safety and for the safety of others immediately prior to the collision. She was proceeding on a through street at a reasonable rate of speed, keeping a watchful lookout, when she was struck without warning by defendant’s automobile. Though a party travelling on a preferential highway does not have an absolute right of way (Pennington v. McLean, 16 Ill2d 577, 158 NE2d 624) it is nonetheless true that plaintiff had the right to expect that defendant would stop at the stop sign and yield the right of way as required by law. (Thomas v. Buchanan, 357 Ill 270, 192 NE 215; Thomas v. Smith, 11 Ill App2d 310, 137 NE2d 117.) Negligence may be proven by evidence largely or entirely circumstantial in nature. (Thomas v. Smith, 11 Ill App2d 310, 316, 137 NE2d 117.) It seems to me that, from the same evidence which established plaintiff’s exercise of due care, the jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant, of necessity, failed to exercise due care. In other words, I do not think that the jury, confronted with evidence of plaintiff’s due care, but lacking direct and positive evidence of defendant’s negligence, was compelled to conclude that the collision was “unavoidable,” unaccountable, or in some way caused by totally non-negligent conduct. Bather, from inferences that reasonably could be drawn from the facts and circumstances in evidence, and through a process of logical deduction, it was possible for the jury to conclude that defendant failed to make the required stop at the intersection or failed to yield the right of way to plaintiff. Hence defendant’s negligence presented a question of fact, and not one of law as such it became when the trial court granted defendant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the Smith case cited above, under circumstances similar to those at bar, the Appellate Court said, at page 319: The condition of the automobiles, showing where they collided with each other, the fact that this was a through highway on which the plaintiffs were riding, the presence of signs requiring the defendants to stop before entering the intersection, all are mute witnesses and present questions of fact for the jury to resolve and determine as to just how the collision occurred. I find, therefore, that the entry of judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict was erroneous. The defendant’s motion for a new trial having been denied and no cross-appeal taken, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Janjanin v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 343 Ill App 491, 99 NE2d 578.