Court Opinion

ID: 9402700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 17:00:27.649333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.055857
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1813

                         UNITED STATES,

                           Appellee,

                               v.

                         MICHAEL BALSER,

                     Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

        [Hon. Landya B. McCafferty, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                 Kayatta, Lynch, and Thompson,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Jaye L. Rancourt for appellant.
     Anna Dronzek, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Jane E. Young, United States Attorney, and Seth Aframe, Assistant
United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.

                         June 16, 2023
           THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.          This case poses the question

of whether and when a police officer, admittedly lacking his own

probable cause, may seize and search a car at the direction of

another officer.        Enter Michael Balser.      Following a suspected

drug buy, Balser was pulled over by Salem, New Hampshire police

officer Stephen DiChiara while driving up I-93, but only after a

United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) task force officer

asked DiChiara to conduct the stop.            DiChiara stopped and then

seized the car, and a subsequent search of it uncovered roughly a

kilogram   of    cocaine.     From    there,   Balser   was   indicted   for

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, so he moved to

suppress evidence of the drugs, asserting that DiChiara could not

act solely on the DEA officer's probable cause. After the district

court   denied    the   motion,    Balser    conditionally    pled   guilty,

reserving his right to appeal the denial.           This is that appeal.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

                                  Background

           When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to

suppress, "we take the facts from the judge's decision and from

the hearing on the motion, presenting them in the light most

compatible with [her] ruling."          United States v. McGregor, 650

F.3d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 2011).

           Before getting to Balser's stop, we first offer a bit of

context on the federal drug investigation that precipitated it.

                                     - 2 -
                           DEA Investigation

             In 2017, the DEA began investigating a drug trafficking

organization (DTO) headquartered in Lawrence, Massachusetts that

it believed to be selling large quantities of heroin, fentanyl,

and cocaine.      As part of that DEA investigation, Salem, New

Hampshire police officer Nicholas Turner was assigned to work as

a task force officer, where he got versed in the ins-and-outs of

the DTO's business.     This is some of what he learned.       Typically,

a buyer would text the DTO's dispatch phone number and place their

drug-of-choice order, and the DTO would direct the buyer to pick

up   their   purchase   somewhere   in   Lawrence   (the   location   would

occasionally change).     The buyer would let the DTO know when they

were 20 or 30 minutes away from the meet-up spot.

             After about two years into the investigation, the DEA

team determined that its probe had "exhaust[ed]" -- they'd only

been able to arrest lower-level DTO members who wouldn't give up

any information and picking off those low-level members only caused

the DTO to change its dispatch number to avoid detection.             Turner

explained that the DTO's dispatch number changed often -- seven to

ten times after he joined the investigation -- and each time the

dispatch number changed, the team would need to procure the new

number from a confidential source to further its investigation.

So, to enhance its monitoring of illegal drug activity and make

inroads into nabbing DTO hierarchy, the team sought, and in late

                                    - 3 -
February 2019 a federal judge granted, a 30-day Title III wiretap

of the DTO's electronic communications (i.e., text messages and

call logs to and from the dispatch number).1

                           Balser's Drug Buy

          As part of his role in the investigation, Turner reviewed

wire intercepts between the DTO and its customers.     Some 15 days

in to the first wiretap surveil, the known dispatch phone number

went dead, so the DEA team had to track down a new number from a

confidential source, which it confirmed by making a controlled

purchase on that number.    Then on March 14, 2019, a judge approved

a second wire intercept of the new dispatch number, but after doing

so, there was a short transmission delay; it took the cell provider

about a day to begin providing messages from the new number to the

task force.   This got remedied on March 15, when Turner, working

from the Bedford, New Hampshire wire room (just across the state

line from Lawrence), received a "flood" of messages from that day

and the day before.

          Around 2:00 PM on the 15th, Turner began clearing the

deck of the prior day's messages when he noticed a conversation

     1 Often used in drug trafficking investigations, a so-called
Title III wire refers to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a Congress-created means for law
enforcement to surveil electronic communications, among other
media, if approved by a federal judge and certain other conditions
are met. See United States v. Cartagena, 593 F.3d 104, 108 n.1
(1st Cir. 2010).

                                - 4 -
between the DTO and a new player, Balser (whose phone number was

identified by the cell provider).       The back-and-forth from the

14th went like this:

            DTO: Are you still coming tomorrow?
            Balser: Yup.
            DTO: Okay, [no problem], my friend . . . See
            you tomorrow.
            Balser: Usual plus sample.
            DTO: [No problem], I'll add a ball of good
            soft on your order.
            Balser: For me, period, [thank you].     The
            sample is brown, right?
            DTO: One ball of brown and one ball of good
            soft.2

            Turner understood these messages to mean that Balser was

placing an order with the DTO to purchase drugs on March 15 (i.e.,

that day). Reviewing next the intercepts from earlier on the 15th,

Turner saw a message from the DTO to Balser, asking him to let the

DTO know when he was 30 minutes away from the pickup spot.      Around

2:30 PM, Turner, after getting caught up with all the old messages,

saw Balser's reply come in live.     Balser informed the DTO that he

was now 30 minutes away and heading toward 525 Essex St. in

Lawrence, as directed.    That location was familiar to Turner since

the   DEA   team   had   conducted   surveillance,   made   controlled

      2Turner explained that the DTO would provide samples for
their usual customers to grow their business. And some terminology
for those curious -- according to Turner, "good soft" generally
means powder cocaine; "brown" is often heroin, but sometimes
fentanyl.

                                - 5 -
purchases, and carried out some arrests there.                By that point, DEA

agents were in Lawrence ready to surveil the pickup spot.

              Balser then texted the DTO that he had arrived, the DTO

instructed him to enter the front door of the building and head up

to the fourth floor, and Balser texted back that he had made it

into the building.          Seeing the texts, Turner radioed to the DEA

agents (already on the ground near Essex St.) that the DTO had

directed Balser there.        He instructed them to close in on 525 Essex

St., as the messages suggested that Balser had just entered.

Agents responding to Turner's directive reported back that a white

Hyundai Sonata -- with Vermont plates registered to Balser -- had

parked nearby.       Agents had also observed Balser exit the Sonata

and enter 525 Essex St. with a backpack, then return to the car

about five minutes later and drive off.            The agents then followed

Balser   as    he   drove    away   from   Essex   St.   to    I-93   North,   and

maintaining their contact with Turner, told Turner to request that

a marked, uniformed police officer be dispatched to stop Balser's

car on the highway.

                      The Stop, Seizure, and Search

              That's when Turner reached out to DiChiara, a Salem

police officer working a daytime patrol shift, to request that he

intercept Balser's car.        DiChiara was no stranger to Turner or the

DEA investigation.      The two had worked together as police officers

in Salem, Turner had previously called up DiChiara when the DEA

                                      - 6 -
team needed a uniformed officer to stop a car on I-93, and the two

had   at   some   point   discussed   the   wiretap   and   the   ongoing

investigation.    Turner testified that he told DiChiara that there

was a Title III wiretap as part of an ongoing drug investigation,

that the car had been in Lawrence to complete a drug transaction,

that the car was now driving north on I-93 toward Vermont, and

that there were suspected drugs inside.3      Turner asked DiChiara to

smoke out a traffic violation to justify stopping Balser, and to

develop his own probable cause to seize and search the car that

was separate from the DEA's.      Turner explained that this type of

stop is called a walled-off or whisper stop, where local law

enforcement conducts a stop (or search) based upon their own

reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) to keep the broader

investigation under wraps.

      3Turner's testimony about what information he shared with
DiChiara over the phone conflicts with DiChiara's testimony:
DiChiara testified that he was only told to look for a white sedan
with Vermont plates, but that Turner did not direct him to make
the stop, nor did Turner convey any information about the drug
investigation or Balser's drug transaction that day. The district
court credited Turner's testimony and found DiChiara's testimony
not credible based in part on inconsistencies in the various police
reports DiChiara filed after the incident. We usually apply the
"highly deferential" clear error standard to a district court's
"credibility calls," letting them "stand unless we are left with
a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake."
McGregor, 650 F.3d at 820. Here, however, Balser has not raised
any argument that the district court clearly erred in crediting
Turner's testimony over DiChiara's.      By failing to raise any
credibility argument in his brief, Balser has waived it.        See
Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29 (1st
Cir. 2015).

                                 - 7 -
           After speaking with Turner, DiChiara was monitoring

traffic on I-93 when he spotted Balser's car drive by.              As per

Turner's directive, he pulled Balser over for, as he puts it,

"traveling too close" to the car in front of him and for having an

obscured license plate.       During the stop, DiChiara attempted to

develop his own probable cause to apprehend and search Balser's

vehicle. According to DiChiara, he concluded he had probable cause

to seize the car based upon several factors: (1) Balser's indirect

route from Massachusetts, where he claimed to be visiting his

mother, back home to Vermont, (2) Balser's apparent nervousness

(overly so) for a simple traffic stop, (3) Balser's cellphone

ringing during the stop and Balser not answering it, and (4) a

small piece of cotton on the driver's side rear floorboard, which

DiChiara said was "indicative of narcotics use."4            Believing he

had probable cause, DiChiara seized Balser's car, and had it towed

to the Salem police station, where a drug-sniffing dog (K9 Dash)

was deployed on the outside of the car.              Dash alerted to the

presence   of   drugs   in   Balser's   car,   and   with   that   positive

identification added to the reasonable-suspicion mix, DiChiara

applied for and received a warrant in New Hampshire state court to

search Balser's vehicle.      In it, he found a kilogram of cocaine.

     4 The government concedes that DiChiara lacked independent
probable cause, so we need not interrogate DiChiara's stated
justifications.

                                  - 8 -
                      District Court Proceedings

            On November 13, 2019, a federal grand jury sitting in

the District of New Hampshire indicted Balser on a single count of

possession    with   intent   to    distribute     cocaine.      See   21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).     Balser moved to suppress the drugs found

during the search of his car.      In support, he argued that DiChiara

lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop in the first place

and lacked probable cause to seize and search his car.                 In

response, the government invoked the collective knowledge doctrine

(more to come on that concept), asserting that the DEA's or

Turner's probable cause could be imputed to DiChiara when Turner

directed him to stop Balser's car.         After a multi-day evidentiary

hearing -- where both Turner and DiChiara testified -- the district

court denied Balser's motion to suppress.         Following that ruling,

Balser entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.          See Fed. R. Crim P.

11(a)(2).    The court sentenced Balser to time served with three

years of supervised release.       And here we are.

                              Discussion

            When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to

suppress, we review its legal rulings de novo and factual findings

for clear error, "and we must uphold a denial of a suppression

motion if any reasonable view of the record supports it."          United

States v. Gonsalves, 859 F.3d 95, 103 (1st Cir. 2017).            Balser

                                   - 9 -
brings appellate challenges of both the factual-error and legal-

error varieties, which we'll now take in turn.

                               Factual Errors

           Balser asserts that the district court made two factual

errors,   which   he   says,   "change   the    [legal]   analysis   of   the

suppression issue" (to erroneous, we gather).             He focuses on two

factual findings, but neither surpasses the high clear error bar.

See United States v. Siciliano, 578 F.3d 61, 67–68 (1st Cir. 2009)

("To find clear error, an inquiring federal court must form a

strong, unyielding belief, based on the whole of the record, that

a mistake has been made.").

           First, and somewhat confusingly, Balser claims that the

district court "possibly overlooked" the fact that Turner reviewed

the March 14 messages on March 15 after the wire went back up,

such that "[t]here was very little time" for Turner and the DEA

agents to exchange information about Balser. We gather that Balser

argues (again without full explanation) that given the short time

frame, the district court clearly erred by finding that Turner did

share information with on-the-ground DEA agents (and vice versa)

that Balser was headed to 525 Essex St. in Lawrence to complete

his drug transaction.     Even assuming the district court overlooked

the fact that Turner quickly reviewed the March 14 messages on the

next day, it supportably found that Turner and the DEA agents

exchanged information about Balser in real time on the 15th.

                                  - 10 -
Turner testified that he instructed the agents over the radio to

"position themselves near 525 Essex St." and explained to them

that Balser had placed an order with the DTO, and was heading

toward 525 Essex St., as directed by the DTO.               Turner and the

agents stayed in communication as Balser approached and entered

that address.    From there, the agents radioed back to Turner that

they had seen Balser get out of his car with a backpack, head in

to 525 Essex St., exit about five minutes later to get back in his

car, and drive off.       We therefore find no clear error where the

record supports the court's finding that Turner and the DEA agents

indeed shared this information.

            Second,   Balser    asserts    that   the    district    court's

findings    overstated    the   information   that     Turner   shared    with

DiChiara over the phone when Turner directed DiChiara to stop

Balser,    specifically   the   "observations     in   Lawrence"    and   "the

extent or content of the wire communications."           Though he doesn't

spell it out, we presume what Balser means by "observations in

Lawrence" are the on-the-ground agents' observations of Balser

leaving his car, entering 525 Essex St. with a backpack, returning

to his car, and driving off.        Similarly unexplained, we presume

what he is referring to as the "extent or content of the wire

communications" is the substance of the texts Balser exchanged

with the DTO.    But contrary to Balser's assertions, the district

court did not find that Turner shared any such "observations" or

                                  - 11 -
the content of Balser's communications picked up by the wire.

Instead, it found that "Turner told DiChiara that the car had been

in    Lawrence     where     the    driver     had      likely    completed     a   drug

transaction, that the car was headed north on Interstate 93, and

that Turner believed there were drugs inside the car[,]" and that

(emphasis ours), "Turner did not reference Balser's text messages

specifically, but he told DiChiara that this information was based

on   a   wiretap     from    an    ongoing    DEA       investigation."       Turner's

testimony, which the district court credited, supports the court's

factfinding.

              Finding   no    clear    error       on    either   front,   we   reject

Balser's argument that errors in the district court's factfinding

infected its probable cause analysis.

                              Collective Knowledge

              Balser contends that the district court erroneously

attributed Turner's probable cause to DiChiara to justify the stop,

seizure, and search of his car, since there's no dispute, he says,

that DiChiara failed to develop his own probable cause for any of

what transpired.           Specifically, Balser challenges the district

court's application of the collective knowledge doctrine to the

facts here.      Before assessing Balser's arguments for reversal, we

briefly walk through some background legal principles.

              Usually, police must "obtain a warrant before conducting

a    search    [or   seizure],"       as     the    Fourth    Amendment    requires.

                                       - 12 -
Gonsalves, 859 F.3d at 103.                But that general rule has several

exceptions, including the automobile exception. Id. The exception

applies   when,    as     here,       "a    moving      vehicle     susceptible       of

transporting contraband is lawfully stopped by the police on a

public highway."        United States v. Simpkins, 978 F.3d 1, 6 n.1

(1st Cir. 2020).       With that exception in play, all the police need

to search or seize a car is "probable cause to believe that

contraband is within the particular vehicle." Id. at 6; see United

States v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (same).                      And police

have   probable   cause       "when   the       totality     of   the    circumstances

suggests that 'there is a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in [the particular vehicle].'"

United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2009)).                         While

"reviewing the existence of probable cause . . . we look to the

collective   information        known      to    the   law   enforcement      officers

participating     in    the    investigation           rather     than    isolate    the

information known by the individual arresting officer."                         United

States v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017).                      This is the so-

called collective knowledge doctrine.

           Two of our sister circuits and several state courts have

helpfully labeled two categories where the collective knowledge

doctrine may apply:       vertical and horizontal.                See, e.g., United

States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493 (4th Cir. 2011); United

                                        - 13 -
States    v.    Chavez,      534    F.3d     1338,     1345–46    (10th     Cir.   2008);

Commonwealth v. Privette, 204 N.E.3d 967, 975-76 (Mass. 2023).

Vertical collective knowledge cases look like this:                        "[W]hen a law

enforcement officer with information amounting to probable cause

directs an officer who lacks the knowledge to make the arrest, we

'impute'       to    the     arresting       officer     the     directing     officer's

knowledge."         United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 193 (1st Cir.

1997) (emphasis ours); Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 493 (explaining

that    courts      "simply    .    .   .    substitute     the      knowledge     of   the

instructing officer or officers for the knowledge of the acting

officer").          Predictably, horizontal cases function differently.

There, courts pool or "aggregate information available to . . .

all the officers involved in the investigation."                      United States v.

Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis ours)

(citing Meade, 110 F.3d at 193-94).                  In other words, "a number of

individual law enforcement officers have pieces of the probable

cause    puzzle,       but     no   single      officer        possesses      information

sufficient for probable cause."                 Chavez, 534 F.3d at 1345.               The

two categories, however, are "by no means mutually exclusive," for

"the officer who has probable cause [in a vertical case] may

possess that information as a result of communication from other

officers."       See id. at 1345 n.12.

               Our prior cases have considered both scenarios without

using    the    same    bifurcated          nomenclature,      but    we've    noted    the

                                            - 14 -
distinction between directing another officer to make an arrest (a

so-called vertical case) and pooling or aggregating information

between multiple officers to create probable cause (a horizontal

case).5   See Meade, 110 F.3d at 194.   And here, Balser's core legal

argument for reversal goes all in on us finding that this is a

horizontal case.   Before proceeding, we note that both parties and

the district court used the same collective-knowledge lexicon, and

so, we follow suit and employ them too, with the caveat that the

two categories are not always cut and dry.      See Chavez, 534 F.3d

at 1345 n.12.

           With the basics of these two categories out of the way,

we move on to explain a key difference in their application.      As

the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently explained after

extensively surveying state and federal cases applying various

permutations of the collective knowledge doctrine, "[r]eliance

upon vertical collective knowledge has sparked little controversy

. . .[,]" while, on the other hand, "[f]ederal and [s]tate courts

     5 Our cases have not resisted these directional labels, and a
survey of out-of-circuit cases reveals no resistance either. Other
courts appear to simply distinguish their cases, like we have,
more substantively.    See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 627
F.3d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying collective knowledge
doctrine where "DEA agents asked local law enforcement officers to
stop a specifically-identified vehicle, and the local officers had
no knowledge of the facts underlying the DEA's probable cause"
(emphasis ours)); United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292 F.3d
1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying collective knowledge doctrine
where "pooled knowledge" of officers involved in investigation
amounted to probable cause for arrest).

                               - 15 -
are split over how broadly to apply the horizontal outgrowth of

the collective knowledge doctrine."            Privette, 204 N.E.3d at 975–

78; see, e.g., Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 494 (declining to expand

horizontal collective knowledge doctrine to permit after-the-fact

aggregation where on-scene officers did not share underlying facts

justifying reasonable suspicion with each other).                Our own case

law has yet to squarely address the "maximum reach" of the so-

called horizontal collective knowledge doctrine (i.e., aggregation

of   information       among    multiple    officers),      United   States    v.

Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing United States

v. Cook, 277 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding reasonable

suspicion      where    unconveyed     information    was     aggregated      from

different officers on the scene carrying out a stop, but also

expressing concern with courts more broadly pooling information to

justify searches)), although we have repeatedly permitted the

aggregation of information among multiple officers involved in an

investigation to find probable cause and uphold searches and

seizures, see, e.g., United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 573

(1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 107 (1st

Cir. 2004); Cook, 277 F.3d at 86.

            Jumping on what he sees as a split of authority, and a

dearth in our case law, Balser urges us to classify his case as

being   part    and    parcel    of   the   more   controversial     horizontal

                                      - 16 -
variety.6    He argues that Turner possessed some but not all the

information sufficient to support probable cause (though he fails

to specify in his brief what information Turner lacked), thus

needing to "pool[]" the information "relayed to him by multiple

members of the DEA task force," which prompted him to request that

DiChiara make the stop.      And because this is a horizontal case,

Balser says, Turner was required to share more of the underlying

facts about the investigation with DiChiara, beyond the basic

tidbits conveyed (that Turner believed Balser was driving up I-93

with drugs in his car).      Since Turner shared insufficient facts

about the investigation here (and because DiChiara failed to

develop independent probable cause of his own), the argument goes,

there was no probable cause for the stop, seizure, or search.

            We   disagree   with    the     basic   premise   of   Balser's

contention, which cuts our inquiry off at the start.               Like the

district court, we conclude that Balser's case is best viewed as

vertical, not horizontal, after homing in on the interaction

     6 Balser also argues briefly that the two seminal Supreme
Court cases establishing the collective knowledge doctrine did not
"clearly articulate approval of" it. We reject that argument out-
of-hand, as our longstanding precedent has applied the doctrine
based on these two cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira,
821 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo.
State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) and United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) to uphold arrest where knowledge
of one officer was imputed to another based on directive to make
an arrest); United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th 32, 44 (1st
Cir. 2021) (citing Hensley for the same).

                                   - 17 -
between Turner and DiChiara -- crucially, a fully clued-in Turner

directed DiChiara to stop Balser.

              By the time Turner called DiChiara to request the stop,

he (Turner) knew all the facts supporting his own probable cause

to believe that Balser had purchased drugs from the DTO and was

driving up I-93 with those drugs in his car.                   Turner had personally

reviewed all the wire intercepts from March 14 and 15 showing that

Balser had placed an order with the DTO, that he was heading to

525 Essex St. for the transaction, and that he arrived and entered

the building.        While DEA agents were on the ground to observe

Balser exit his car with backpack in hand to pick up the drugs,

then re-enter and drive off toward I-93 North, they communicated

these facts in real time to Turner in the wire room, so for our

probable cause inquiry, Turner possessed these facts, even if

indirectly.        See Williams, 627 F.3d at 255 (explaining that it's

not   relevant      whether        a    directing    officer     learns     information

firsthand      or    from      other        officers    involved       in       the    same

investigation, so long as that information amounts to probable

cause   and    leads      to   a       sufficient   directive     to    the     arresting

officer);     Chavez,      534     F.3d     at   1347   (determining        a   case    was

"vertical" where "the aspects of [a] DEA investigation that [were]

pertinent     to    the    probable        cause    inquiry    were    known     to"   the

directing DEA officer, such that the directing officer "had all

the   requisite      probable           cause    components").         With     all    that

                                           - 18 -
information in tow, Turner had probable cause to believe Balser

possessed drugs in his car.

            Turner then called up DiChiara and directed him to stop

the suspect vehicle.        In so doing, he explained that the DEA was

up on a wire, that an individual (Balser) had ordered drugs and

completed his purchase, and that            he then left the Lawrence,

Massachusetts area headed up I-93 North with drugs in his car.

Turner's directive to stop Balser was thus sufficient to attribute

Turner's probable cause to DiChiara.          See Meade, 110 F.3d at 197

(imputing directing officer's probable cause to arresting officer

after directive was given over radio to "locate the brown car and

arrest 'the third man'" involved in attempted robbery); United

States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 556–57 (1st Cir. 1986) (upholding

arrest ordered by superior, where DEA had probable cause but

arresting officer "admittedly lacked probable cause");               United

States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that

officer's directive that arrestee be body searched was enough to

impute the directing officer's personal knowledge to the searching

officer).    And we think the extent of the directive itself (as we

described    above)   was    sufficient,    too.   Other   courts   to   have

considered   analogous      factual   circumstances   have   affirmed     the

imputation of probable cause with similarly basic information

shared between the directing and arresting officers.            See United

States v. Celio, 945 F.2d 180, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding

                                   - 19 -
that state police had probable cause to stop and search a car based

solely upon DEA sharing "the location and direction of a specific

vehicle and its suspected contents" but not the "intricate details

of   its    surveillance");    see    also     Chavez,   534   F.3d   at    1347

(collecting cases from the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth

Circuits holding that in vertical cases, "a police officer may

rely on the instructions of the DEA (or other law enforcement

agencies) in stopping a car, even if that officer himself or

herself is not privy to all the facts amounting to probable

cause").7

             Given our conclusion that Turner's directive to DiChiara

was sufficient to impute Turner's probable cause to DiChiara, we

decline Balser's invitation to address both the outer limit of

horizontal     collective     knowledge       cases   and   the   quantum    of

information that must be shared between officers in horizontal

cases, since this is not such a case.          And Balser makes no argument

in the alternative that, should we find his case to be a vertical

      Because we conclude that Turner adequately directed DiChiara
      7

to apprehend Balser's car, we reject Balser's argument that the
collective knowledge doctrine cannot apply here because DiChiara
had no affiliation with the DEA investigation. Balser's argument
goes to horizontal cases. But there is no reliance here on the
aggregation of different pieces of information known by Turner and
DiChiara.   Rather, DiChiara acted at Turner's direction, so by
virtue of the directive, there was "necessarily a communication
between those officers, and they are necessarily functioning as a
team." United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1036, 1037 n.8
(9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

                                     - 20 -
one, as we have, he could still win.       Accordingly, we spy no legal

error   in   the   district   court's   denial   of   Balser's   motion   to

suppress.

                                Conclusion

             For these reasons, we affirm.

                                  - 21 -