Court Opinion

ID: 9726197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:36:57.475171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:24.059258
License: Public Domain

FLEMING, Acting P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I concur in parts 1 and 2 of the court’s opinion but dissent from part 3 dealing with evidence obtained inside Arredondo’s apartment during the course of a warrantless entry and search.
Under the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., IV Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) a warrantless entry and search of dwelling premises is unreasonable per se, unless it can be justified by some well-established exception to the warrant requirement. (Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 34 [26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413, 90 S.Ct. 1969]; People v. Haven (1963) 59 Cal.2d 713, 717 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927]; see also United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 10-11 [53 L.Ed.2d 538, 547-548, 97 S.Ct. 2476]; Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 763-765 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694-695, 89 S.Ct. 2034].) The burden of justification is especially heavy when, as here, an intrusion into dwelling premises is made by police officers in civilian clothes (T-shirts and Levis) during the dead of night (see Pen. Code, § 1533; People v. Watson (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 592 [142 Cal.Rptr. 245]) and when those inside are not directly linked to suspected crime. At bench, the state seeks to justify the warrantless entry and search which occurred here on alternative grounds of exigent circumstances and valid consent. Neither ground, in my view, serves to validate the search.
Exigent Circumstances. The sole facts relied on as exigent circumstances which created an emergency and justified unauthorized entry into the apartment were the ringing of the telephone inside the apartment, the sound of a woman’s voice, and the radioed information that Sanchez had made a telephone call from the sheriff’s station. This court has heretofore identified exigent circumstances as including “instances where those inside are likely to be armed, or likely to attempt escape, or likely to commit further crimes of violence if entry is sought in the statutory manner. In such instances the need to neutralize specific hazards excuses compliance with the statute and justifies forcible entry without identification, demand, and statement of purpose. Exigent circumstances may also include instances which involve pending destruction of evidence. The extent to which a prospective danger of such destruction will justify an unannounced entry is not entirely clear (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 29 [76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353]), *731but contemporaneous attempts at destruction of evidence, or conduct which reasonably appears designed to that end, constitute circumstances which will excuse compliance with section 844.” (People v. Boone (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 503, 508 [82 Cal.Rptr. 566].) At bench, the only claimed emergency was the need to forestall destruction of contraband suspected to be on the premises. Yet evidence that any such destruction was taking place, or was about to take place, is wholly lacking. All we have is police surmise that defendant telephoned Arredondo, that he asked her to destroy contraband, and that she was about to comply with his wishes. Such slender and tenuous suppositions about imminent destruction of evidence do not justify nocturnal intrusion by the police into inhabited premises at 3 o’clock in the morning. As noted earlier, the sanctity of dwelling houses at night is given the highest protection of the law. (Pen. Code, §§ 460, 1533; People v. Watson (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 592 [142 Cal.Rptr. 245], and cases there cited; cf. Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 34 [26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413, 90 S.Ct. 1969]; People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 271-275 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333].) I conclude no sufficient emergency existed to justify the unauthorized entry and search.
Consent. Deputy Williams testified that after knocking several times without receiving a response he opened the apartment door with the key taken from defendant’s pocket, but did not cross the threshold until he had been invited to do so by Arredondo. Thereafter Arredondo, who spoke no English, communicated through her 13-year-old daughter her consent to a search of the apartment. From this testimony the state concludes that the police entered the premises lawfully and the occupants consented to the subsequent search.
I am unable to accept this gossamer fabric as proof that police entry onto the premises was authorized by those inside. To me the entry smacks of midnight visitation without regard to the wishes of the occupants. Even if we accept the police account of their entry, technically the entry remained unlawful, in that it is physically impossible to unlock an outer door with a key and push it halfway open without temporarily intruding some part of the opener’s body inside. Technicalities aside, however, the security of persons in dwelling premises is effectively violated by exposure of the inside of premises to outside viewers at 3 o’clock in the morning. I find the entry unauthorized and unlawful and unjustified by any subsequent invitation of Arredondo to enter. Such being the case, Arredondo’s later consent to search the premises was also ineffective, for a consent to search which is inextri*732cably bound to an illegal entry is invalid. (People v. Haven (1963) 59 Cal.2d 713, 718 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927]; People v. Johnson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 629, 632 [68 Cal.Rptr. 441, 440 P.2d 921]; People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 163-164 [107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621]; People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 109 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135].) Significantly, the trial court made no finding that either the entry or the search had been consented to.
I would suppress the evidence obtained by the warrantless entry and search of Arredondo’s apartment, reverse the conviction for possession of heroin for sale, and reduce the sentence of imprisonment from six to five years.