Court Opinion

ID: 9737329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:22:10.27483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.129907
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The plaintiffs elected to proceed under article III, paragraphs G and H, and notified the defendant to halt the work. As the trial court stated, “If the owners chose through it’s [sic] authorized representative in the project to give notice under the terms of the contract, then it was required to give him seven days notice before moving onto [sic] the project to finish that not completed by the Defendant. The Plaintiff did not allow Defendant the required seven days to carry out the contract. The evidence shows that defendant was intending to start the project on November 19, 1979, and could have finished the same prior to the expiration of the seven day period.” In early November, after conversations between Mr. Devaull and Messrs. Antonochi and Norris of the architectural firm, the defendant dispatched a foreman, Mervin Burgiss, to the jobsite, to look it over, to make a core cut on the roof to be sure what the defendant was removing was what had been indicated to the defendant was on the roof, and also to determine the type of deck. The trial court found and the evidence supports the finding that the project was to commence on November 19, 1979, and that the defendant could have completed the project within seven days. It was for the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented. It does not appear that the trial court’s order was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The plaintiff had the option of terminating the contract pursuant to section F of article VII. As argued by the defendant, the plaintiff could have pursued coexistent remedies as did the owners in Board of Regents v. Wilson (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 26, 326 N.E.2d 216; Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 596, 342 N.E.2d 79; and Structural Sales, Inc. v. Vavrus (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 718, 477 N.E.2d 745. The plaintiff elected to pursue its remedy through the seven-day notice and should be bound thereby. The trial court should be affirmed.