Court Opinion

ID: 9686557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:55:27.515983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:20.187955
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Justice.
Michael Conway, a former deputy sheriff for Grand Forks County, filed a claim with the Board of County Commissioners (Board) to receive payment for 839.34 hours of compensatory time which he asserts that he had earned but was not allowed to use prior to the termination of his employment with the county. The Board denied Conway’s request, and the district court, on an appeal by Conway, entered a judgment affirming the Board’s decision. We reverse and remand.
The Board on April 10, 1979, by resolution, authorized county deputy sheriffs to earn compensatory time when on standby or on-call status:
“IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED that compensation be afforded for standby call or on-call status for all field deputies and jailers on the basis of one hour compensatory time for each three hours of standby or actual call time. Actual time served on duty while on-call shall be computed on the basis of one hour compensatory time for each hour actually served on duty while on-call. Said standby or call provision as stated above, shall be effective as of April 3, 1979.”
Conway asserts that although he earned 944.34 hours of compensatory time under the foregoing provision he was only allowed to use 105 hours of his earned compensatory time prior to his voluntary termination of employment with the county on August 31, 1981. Conway asserts that on numerous occasions he requested permission from his superior officers to use compensatory time but that many of his requests were denied “due to manpower shortages and the everyday needs of the Grand Forks County Sheriff’s Department.” That assertion is verified by Conway’s superior officers and is not disputed by the Board.
Conway appealed from the Board’s decision to the district court pursuant to Section 11-11-39, N.D.C.C., which provides in relevant part:
“11-11-39. Appeal from decision of board by aggrieved person — Bond— Costs and fees payable. An appeal may be taken to the district court from any decision of the board of county commissioners by any aggrieved person.”
*400The district court entered a judgment affirming the Board’s decision from which Conway has filed this appeal with this Court.
On appeal, Conway has raised three issues:
“1. Whether the Board of County Commissioners acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in denying Mr. Michael Conway’s request for monetary compensation for standby and on-call time accrued while working for the County as a field deputy.
“2. Whether the denial of compensation to Michael Conway constitutes unjust enrichment to the County of Grand Forks.
“3. Whether the Supreme Court may determine the amount of monetary compensation that the County of Grand Forks owes to Michael Conway.”
On an appeal from a decision of the district court through which it has reviewed a decision of a board of county commissioners, it is the function of this Court to independently determine the propriety of the Board’s decision without according any special deference to the district court’s review. Shaw v. Burleigh County, 286 N.W.2d 792 (N.D.1979).
Although we do not substitute our judgment for that of the Board, it is our function to determine whether or not the Board’s action comports with a correct interpretation of the law and whether or not the Board has acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. See, Shaw v. Burleigh County, 286 N.W.2d 792 (N.D.1979); Appeal of Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475 (N.D.1970).
It is undisputed that the 1979 resolution is a valid action of the Board which is the result of contract negotiations between the Board and the county deputy sheriffs. As such, it constitutes a duly promulgated and binding element of the county’s contractual employment relationship with Conway for which the Board must be held accountable. See, Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board, 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.1984). Having committed itself, under the resolution, to provide compensatory time to deputy sheriffs on a one-to-three basis for standby or on-call service rendered, the Board incurred a legal duty to honor that commitment as an integral part of its employment relationship with Conway.
We agree with the following rationale of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Bruce v. City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.2d 744 (Mo.Ct.App.1949), in upholding a public employee’s right to recover pay for unused compensatory time earned by working overtime hours:
“The city says, however, that Section three, which covers compensatory time off, makes no mention of pay. Suffice it to say that unless the employee received his pay, the time off would not be compensatory. The city also suggests that nowhere is compensatory time off on dismissal mentioned. It is obviously the recorded overtime which warrants the allowance of compensatory time off, and if a particular employee has such recorded overtime to his credit, there is nothing in the ordinance which denies him the compensatory time off which he has already earned merely because he is dismissed or his service otherwise terminated.” 217 S.W.2d at 748.
See also, Adams v. City of Modesto, 53 Cal.2d 833, 350 P.2d 529, 3 Cal.Rptr. 561 (1960).
We conclude that under the facts of this case the Board’s decision, denying Conway’s claim, constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable denial of Conway’s rights under the resolution. When Conway was denied, on numerous occasions, his right to use earned compensatory time, his right under the resolution to receive compensatory time was breached. For that breach Conway is entitled, by way of damages, to monetary compensation for the unused compensatory time that he had earned.
The question is not before us, and we do not decide today, whether or not a deputy sheriff would be entitled, upon termination of his employment, to monetary compensa*401tion in lieu of unused compensatory time where the employee did not request and was not denied the use of earned compensatory time through any action or decision of his superiors acting on the county’s behalf.
Having concluded that Conway is entitled to damages for the breach of his right to compensatory time under the resolution, it is unnecessary to discuss his request for damages under a theory of unjust enrichment.
Although Conway has asked this Court to determine the amount of compensation to which he is entitled, we conclude that we are unable to do so on the record before us. The Board does not agree with the number of compensatory hours or the hourly wage equivalents that have been submitted by Conway for compensation. The district court made no determination with regard to those matters because of its decision that Conway was not entitled to monetary compensation.
In accordance with this opinion, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further remand to the Board of County Commissioners for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and SAND, J., concur.