Court Opinion

ID: 9394697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:03:21.432983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.010534
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
 opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
 prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: May 16, 2023

                        S23A0034. O’NEAL v. THE STATE.

       ELLINGTON, Justice.

      Ryan O’Neal was convicted of malice murder, possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, and other related crimes

in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Jackson.1 On

      1 The crimes occurred on July 16, 2019. O’Neal was indicted by an Oconee
County grand jury in 2019 for charges related to the shooting death of Jackson.
That indictment was superseded when, on March 10, 2021, the Oconee County
grand jury issued a new indictment charging O’Neal, Akhemu Dunston, and
Dallas McCabe with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2, 3, and
4), criminal attempt to commit robbery by force (Count 5), criminal attempt to
commit a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act (Count 6), and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 7). O’Neal was solely charged
in the same indictment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (Count 8). By agreement of the parties, O’Neal was tried separately from
Dunston and McCabe. In April 2021, a jury found O’Neal guilty of malice
murder, one count of felony murder (Count 4), aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
The jury found him not guilty of the other charges. On April 1, 2021, the trial
court sentenced O’Neal to serve life in prison for malice murder and a
consecutive five-year sentence for the firearm offense. Because the jury found
O’Neal guilty of malice murder, the felony murder charge was vacated by
operation of law, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479)
appeal, O’Neal contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his murder conviction, the trial court erred by instructing

the jury on conspiracy and denying his request for an instruction on

voluntary manslaughter, and defense counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to a comment made by the prosecutor

during closing argument and failing to successfully defend against

the State’s request for a conspiracy instruction. He also asserts his

trial was fundamentally unfair because of the number of errors

made by the trial court. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to sustain O’Neal’s murder conviction; the trial court did not err by

instructing the jury on conspiracy because there was some evidence

to support the giving of that charge; the trial court did not err by

denying O’Neal’s request for a charge on voluntary manslaughter

because there was no evidence of provocation; O’Neal failed to

(1993), and the aggravated assault charge that formed the predicate for the
felony murder charge merged into the malice murder conviction as a matter of
fact for sentencing purposes. O’Neal filed a timely motion for a new trial on
April 12, 2021. Following a May 4, 2022 hearing, the trial court denied the
motion for a new trial, and O’Neal filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was
docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2022 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.

                                       2
demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient; and because there

is no merit in the errors alleged, O’Neal’s trial was not

fundamentally unfair.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented at trial showed the following. On the day of the crimes,

Jackson, who lived with his grandparents, contacted Akhemu

Dunston and arranged via text to purchase marijuana. After

messaging with Jackson, Akhemu contacted Dallas McCabe via text

about participating in a robbery. O’Neal, Akhemu, Akhemu’s

brother Quentin Dunston, and McCabe drove to Jackson’s

neighborhood that evening to deliver the marijuana. During the

drug transaction, Akhemu, who was seated in the front passenger

seat next to the driver, McCabe, asked to borrow Jackson’s phone.

When Akhemu refused to return the phone, Jackson leaned into the

vehicle in an attempt to retrieve the phone, and McCabe drove away,

dragging Jackson along the road as he did so. As Jackson and

Akhemu struggled over the phone, O’Neal, who was sitting behind

Akhemu, fatally shot Jackson in the chest, shattering the rear

                                 3
passenger-side window and causing Jackson to fall to the ground.

Just before midnight, Jackson’s grandparents found him bloodied

but still alive outside their door. Jackson died the next morning.

     Investigators searching near Jackson’s home after the shooting

found blood, shattered glass, and Jackson’s shirt and cell phone

approximately 100 yards from his house. Investigators ultimately

learned that just before he was shot, Jackson arranged to meet with

Akhemu at the end of Jackson’s driveway. Akhemu was detained by

police on a separate warrant, and after speaking with investigators,

he was arrested and charged with Jackson’s murder.

     Following Akhemu’s arrest, investigators spoke with Quentin,

who admitted that he was in the car with O’Neal, Akhemu, and

McCabe when Jackson was shot. Quentin stated that he, O’Neal,

and the other men in the car stopped at Jackson’s house to sell

Jackson marijuana, and while there, Akhemu asked to use Jackson’s

phone and refused to give it back. He said that as Jackson was

holding onto the car trying to get his phone, O’Neal took a gun from

his bag and shot Jackson. Quentin stated that after the shooting,

                                  4
when he suggested they go to the police, O’Neal cocked the gun and

pointed it at Quentin. 2

     O’Neal was arrested a few weeks after the shooting as he hid

in a closet in an apartment in Athens, Georgia. In the same closet,

police discovered a 9mm hand gun, ammunition, and a black fanny

pack. In his first statement to police, O’Neal admitted he was with

Akhemu and Quentin in the car driven by McCabe and that Jackson

was shot during an altercation between Jackson and Akhemu when

the 9mm hand gun in the fanny pack O’Neal was wearing

accidentally discharged. He also told investigators that he and the

other occupants of the car were “scared” when Jackson tried to get

his phone back. In a subsequent statement to police, O’Neal told

investigators that McCabe shot Jackson, and as McCabe drove

away, the gun fell into the back seat and into O’Neal’s fanny pack.

     2  Quentin was originally charged with Jackson’s murder, but the charges
were dismissed because the State concluded there was insufficient evidence to
show Quentin was a party to the crimes. After Quentin told prosecutors he
would invoke his Fifth Amendment privileges if called to testify at O’Neal’s
trial, Quentin was granted immunity. At trial, Quentin refused to admit
Akhemu was trying to steal Jackson’s phone, and he told the jury that McCabe,
not O’Neal, shot Jackson.
                                     5
     An examination of O’Neal’s cell phone and social media records

showed that O’Neal’s phone communicated with Akhemu’s and

Quentin’s phones before and after the shooting and communicated

with Akhemu’s phone multiple times after Akhemu set up the

meeting with Jackson. Phone records also showed that O’Neal’s

phone called McCabe’s phone several times after the shooting, when,

according to Quentin, Akhemu asked O’Neal to warn McCabe not to

drive his car because police were looking for a car with a broken

window. McCabe was arrested in Texas after his vehicle was

photographed by a license plate reader. The photo from the license

plate reader showed the rear-passenger window of McCabe’s car

covered with plastic.

     The medical examiner testified that Jackson suffered from

abrasions over most of his body consistent with “road rash” and died

as the result of a single gunshot wound to his left arm and chest. A

GBI forensic firearms expert testified that the gun found in O’Neal’s

possession was the same gun used to shoot Jackson; the gun was in

good, working order and required 7.25 pounds of pressure to pull the

                                 6
trigger; and the gun was not fired from inside the fanny pack.

     1. O’Neal asserts that the evidence presented at trial was not

sufficient to support his murder conviction. When evaluating the

sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of federal constitutional due

process, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most

favorable to the prosecution and consider whether it was sufficient

to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61

LE2d 560) (1979); Moore v. State, 311 Ga. 506, 508 (2) (858 SE2d

676) (2021). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve

conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most

favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of

the weight and credibility of the evidence.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d

313) (2013).

     (a) O’Neal first contends that the State failed to prove that he

killed Jackson with malice aforethought or an intent to kill. “A

                                  7
person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with

malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of

another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). “The State, of course,

must prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt to convict someone of

malice murder.” Benson v. State, 294 Ga. 618, 620 (1) (754 SE2d 23)

(2014). “Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to

take the life of another human being which is manifested by external

circumstances capable of proof.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (b). Malice may also

be implied “where no considerable provocation appears and where

all the circumstances of the killing show [the defendant acted with]

an abandoned and malignant heart.” Id. The malice necessary to

establish malice murder, be it express or implied, may be formed in

an instant, as long as it is present at the time of the killing. See Platt

v. State, 291 Ga. 631, 633 (732 SE2d 75) (2012). “It is for a jury to

determine from all the facts and circumstances whether a killing is

intentional and malicious.” White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 715 (1) (b)

(699 SE2d 291) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, the jury heard evidence authorizing it to conclude that

                                    8
O’Neal planned with others to rob Jackson during a drug transaction

and fatally shot Jackson and left him lying on the side of the road.

O’Neal then pointed a gun at Quentin when Quentin suggested they

go to the police and warned McCabe not to drive his car because

police were looking for a car with a broken window. O’Neal,

meanwhile, avoided arrest until a few weeks after the shooting,

when he was discovered hiding in a closet with the gun used to shoot

Jackson in his possession. O’Neal initially told investigators that the

gun accidentally discharged from inside his fanny pack, a claim not

supported by the physical evidence, and at trial, he argued that

someone else shot Jackson. Based on all of the foregoing evidence,

we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that O’Neal was guilty of Jackson’s

murder. See Dupree v. State, 303 Ga. 885, 887 (1) (815 SE2d 899)

(2018) (evidence of malice murder was sufficient where the

defendant physically assaulted victim before her death and left her

to die); see also Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 65 (3) n.4 (829 SE2d

81) (2019) (Evidence of flight and related conduct is “admissible as

                                  9
evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” (citation

and punctuation omitted)).

     (b) O’Neal also argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his murder conviction because Quentin’s testimony was

unreliable. Any questions about the reliability of Quentin’s

statements to investigators or testimony at trial, however, were for

the jury to decide. See Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 84 (1) (839 SE2d

630) (2020) (“We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or

inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and

reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.”).

     2. In another challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

O’Neal asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it

rejected his request for a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s

verdict was contrary to the law or evidence and strongly against the

weight of the evidence. See OCGA §§ 5-5-20 (authorizing a trial

judge to grant a defendant a new trial if it concludes the verdict of

the jury is “contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity”) and

5-5-21 (authorizing a trial judge to grant a defendant a new trial if

                                   10
it concludes the verdict of the jury is “decidedly and strongly against

the weight of the evidence”). These statutes, referred to as the

general grounds, require a trial court to exercise a “broad discretion

to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Hinton v. State, 312 Ga. 258, 262 (1) (c)

(862 SE2d 320) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). As an

appellate court, however, we do not independently review the

evidence as a thirteenth juror because the “decision to grant or

refuse to grant a new trial on the general grounds is vested solely in

the trial court.” Id. at 262 (1) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted).

And we “presume, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the

contrary, that the trial court did properly exercise such discretion.”

Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 108 (II) (a) (805 SE2d 98) (2017). The

trial court’s order states that after reviewing the evidence, argument

of counsel, pleadings, and filed transcripts, the trial court

determined that the jury’s verdict was not contrary to the law or

evidence and was not strongly against the weight of the evidence

presented at trial. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the

trial court properly exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror

                                   11
and this claim fails. See Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 532, 534 (1) (796

SE2d 671) (2017) (Because “the evidence was sufficient to support

the verdict,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion as the

“thirteenth juror” where, in its order denying the motion for new

trial, “the trial court recited it had weighed the evidence, including

the credibility of the witnesses, and found [the defendant] was not

entitled to a new trial on the general grounds[.]”).

     3. O’Neal argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give a

requested charge on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of

murder because the jury could have found that Jackson was shot as

a result of a sudden, irresistible passion caused by Jackson’s efforts

to retrieve his phone.

     Voluntary manslaughter is the killing of another person under

circumstances that would otherwise be murder when the killer “acts

solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion

resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion

in a reasonable person[.]” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). A trial court is required

to grant a defendant’s request for a charge on voluntary

                                  12
manslaughter if there is any evidence, however slight, supporting

the theory of the charge. See McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9 (2) (810

SE2d 77) (2018). “It is a question of law for courts to determine

whether the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to warrant

a requested charge.” Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 445 (2) (841 SE2d

696) (2020).

     This claim fails, however, because there was not even slight

evidence presented at trial of provocative conduct sufficient to

warrant the giving of a voluntary manslaughter charge. Although

there was some evidence that Jackson reached into the car to

retrieve his phone before he was shot, a voluntary manslaughter

charge is not warranted where the only evidence is that the victim

was resisting an unlawful act. See Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 221

(3) (526 SE2d 560) (2000) (Charge of voluntary manslaughter was

not warranted where the only alleged evidence of provocation was

that the victim resisted an armed robbery.); Turpin v. Christenson,

269 Ga. 226, 234 (12) (A) n.6 (497 SE2d 216) (1998) (Voluntary

manslaughter charge was not warranted where the only evidence of

                                 13
provocation was a struggle between the victim and the defendant as

the victim attempted to resist an armed robbery.); see also Johnson

v. State, 313 Ga. 698, 700 (873 SE2d 123) (2022) (The victim’s

physical resistance against a defendant’s unlawful act “is not the

type of provocation which demands a voluntary manslaughter

charge.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, the trial

court did not err by refusing to give a charge on voluntary

manslaughter.

     4. O’Neal next argues that it was error for the trial court to

instruct the jury on conspiracy because there was no evidence

showing he was a knowing participant in the planning of either the

drug transaction or the robbery.

     As an initial matter, we note that the State did not charge

O’Neal with conspiracy in the indictment. It is not error, however,

for a trial court to instruct the jury on the subject of conspiracy when

the evidence tends to show a conspiracy. See Holmes v. State, 272

Ga. 517, 519 (6) (529 SE2d 879) (2000). The State may prove a

conspiracy by showing “that two or more persons tacitly came to a

                                   14
mutual understanding to . . . pursue a criminal objective.” (Citation

and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 67, 69 (3) (495

SE2d 289) (1998). “Where there is no evidence of an express

agreement, an inference that two or more people tacitly came to a

mutual understanding to commit a crime can be drawn from the

nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the

alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.” Brown v. State, 304

Ga. 435, 441 (3) (819 SE2d 14) (2018) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And “[i]t is well established that presence, companionship

and conduct [that discloses a common design] before and after the

offense are circumstances which may give rise to the existence of a

conspiracy.” Turner v. State, 275 Ga. 343, 345 (2) (566 SE2d 676)

(2002).

     Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the inference that

O’Neal and at least one of the other men in the car had a mutual, if

only tacit, agreement to lure Jackson to meet with them under the

guise of a drug transaction and then rob Jackson of his money and/or

phone. In light of this evidence, it was not error for the trial court to

                                   15
charge the jury on conspiracy. See id. at 345 (2) (Evidence that the

defendant and another man drove the victim to the scene of the

crimes and were together in the hours after the crimes and the other

man was found in possession of one of the weapons used to shoot the

victim and gave a false name to police and fled when approached by

police was sufficient to support the State’s claim that the two men

were involved in a conspiracy.); see also Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255,

258 (4) (455 SE2d 27) (1995) (Evidence that the defendant and

another man picked up the victim together, concealed evidence, and

disposed of the body was sufficient to support an inference of an

understanding between the men to murder the victim.).

     5. O’Neal also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel based on counsel’s failure to: (a) object to a comment made

by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (b) more vehemently

object to the State’s request for a charge on conspiracy.

     In order to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that, but for such deficient performance,

                                 16
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would

have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668

(III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If the defendant fails to

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required

to examine the other. See Green v. State, 291 Ga. 579, 580 (2) (731

SE2d 359) (2012). With these principles in mind, we review O’Neal’s

claims of ineffective assistance.

      (a) O’Neal first alleges that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to object when, during the State’s

closing argument, the prosecutor commented that O’Neal “was

unable to tell you the truth of what happened to Joey Jackson.”3 He

      3 During this portion of the closing arguments, the prosecutor stated the
following:

      And finally, I want to talk to you about Joey Jackson, who I haven’t
      really talked about much at all since our first day of trial. This
      defendant is now older than Joey Jackson was at the time that he
      was murdered. And what Joey Jackson deserves from his
      community is justice. And that’s what his family deserves as well.
      And justice isn’t 66 percent justice or two-thirds justice. Justice is
      everybody who participated and played a role is held responsible.
      And the defendant was unable to tell you the truth of what
      happened to Joey Jackson. . . . But you have enough evidence,
      circumstantial and direct, to tell the truth about what happened

                                       17
argues that although the prosecutor may have been referencing

O’Neal’s initial statement in which he claimed the gun accidentally

discharged while inside his fanny pack, it could have been construed

by jurors as an improper comment on O’Neal’s choice not to testify

at trial.

      We    disagree.    The     challenged     comment      followed      the

prosecutor’s summary of the evidence and was part of the State’s

argument that the jurors had the opportunity to “speak the truth”

for Jackson by rendering a verdict of guilty. In this context, the

prosecutor’s    comment      could    reasonably      be   understood      as

highlighting the falsity of the statements O’Neal actually made to

investigators following his arrest and did not directly or necessarily

implicate O’Neal’s decision not to testify at trial. See Smith v. State,

279 Ga. 48, 49 (2) (610 SE2d 26) (2005) (Comments made by the

prosecutor regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify may

constitute reversible error if “(1) the prosecutor’s manifest intention

      to Joey Jackson. And the truth is that this defendant is guilty of
      participating in his murder.
                                     18
was to comment on the accused’s failure to testify, or (2) the remark

was of such a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily

take it to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify.” (citation

omitted)). Under these circumstances, any objection by trial counsel

to the prosecutor’s comment would have been without merit, and

counsel’s failure to object did not amount to ineffective assistance.

See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 475, 479 (4) (a) (831 SE2d 755) (2019);

Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 85-86 (10) (463 SE2d 868) (1995).

     (b) O’Neal also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to adequately object to the State’s request for a

conspiracy charge. For the reasons explained in Division 4 above,

there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy presented at trial to

support the giving of a charge on conspiracy. Accordingly, trial

counsel’s failure to object more vehemently to the giving of such

charge would have been meritless and does not amount to ineffective

assistance. See Jackson, supra, 306 Ga. at 479 (4) (a).

     6. Finally, we reject O’Neal’s argument that the cumulative

effect of the alleged errors so undermined his trial that a just result

                                  19
was not possible. In considering a claim of cumulative error, we

“evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be error, not the

cumulative effect of non-errors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 183 (2) (744 SE2d 763) (2013). As

explained above, O’Neal has failed to show that the trial court erred

in its instructions to the jury or that his trial counsel was

professionally deficient in the manners alleged. Therefore, none of

O’Neal’s claims of error have succeeded, there are no errors to

aggregate, and his claim of cumulative error also fails. See Chapman

v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 635-636 (2) (e) (724 SE2d 391) (2012).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 20