Court Opinion

ID: 9653135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:39:28.743616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:47.444648
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not believe that there is basis for finding that any substantial right of the defendant was violated on the taking of her fingerprints, and so would reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the fingerprints taken at police headquarters, and the defendant’s confession, and would remand the case so that the prosecution may proceed.
The case involves a willful murder in the course of a heist of furniture. The defendant, after full Miranda warnings, admitted her participation in November of 1981 by luring the victim to the location from which he was abducted and killed. Her statement, however, was suppressed. She remains subject to prosecution, but the unavailability of her voluntary confession certainly presents a substantial obstacle to conviction. I strongly suspect that the prosecutors will not find it practicable to proceed.
Police found a palm print on the back of the victim’s van. On January 22,1982 they received a tip that “the Blairs” had been seen carrying furniture into a house. The fingerprints of three other family members were available in law enforcement files, but none matched the palm print. The defendant’s prints were not on file. There was, however, an outstanding city traffic warrant against her.
I submit that the police had not only the right but even the positive duty to obtain the defendant’s fingerprints by any lawful means. The defendant could be lawfully arrested on the traffic warrant, and, hav*265ing been arrested, was subject to search just as any other arrestee would be. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). If the search disclosed evidence of other crimes, this evidence could be used for prosecution. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975). The search could include the taking of fingerprints for routine identification purposes. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C.Cir.1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 1632, 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964). Because of the outstanding traffic warrant the defendant had no privilege of withholding her fingerprints.
The defendant’s excellent briefs set forth her essential contention in the following language:
It is an abuse of police power and authority to lawfully arrest an individual for a parking warrant so that, as an incident to that arrest, they may search for and seize evidence on an exploratory basis while investigating a totally unrelated offense ...
This proposition is unsound, and is supported by no controlling authority. If the defendant is lawfully arrested the police have the right to exercise the power incident to lawful arrest. The defendant has no standing to complain simply because she was specially selected from among those subject to arrest on traffic warrants. Nor may she complain that her palm print was taken, while only one fingerprint is customarily taken from other traffic arrestees. The extent of the fingerprint identification taken is a matter for police discretion.
The principal opinion places great store in the order of events following the defendant’s arrest. I submit that the events between the time she was taken into custody on the afternoon of February 5, and the time she was released on bond on the afternoon of February 6, should be considered a single transaction. At the time of her release the police had her fingerprints. They were entitled to take them. They did not have any incriminating statement from her. After receiving Miranda warnings, she denied participation. The police had no more than they could have had if she had been arrested on the traffic warrant alone.
The principal opinion holds that there is a fact issue as to whether the defendant’s arrest on February 5,1982 was on a traffic warrant, as the arresting officer testified to, or on homicide charges, as is stated in the police report. It is then submitted that the trial judge had the right to resolve the conflicts in the evidence, and that, although he gave no reason for his ruling, his decision must be affirmed if it can be sustained on any basis.1 Although I am not fully satisfied as to the standard of review, I am prepared to argue for present purposes to apply the rule of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). The decision is legally erroneous under this standard.
There is a substantial problem when the trial judge does not indicate the basis for a decision. I do not believe that we should have to strain to find some conceivable factúal basis on which the trial court might have acted. The reasonable assumption is that the trial judge responded to the issues raised by the prevailing party, and agreed with the defendant’s contention that an arrest could not be made on the traffic warrant for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints. Inasmuch as I do not accept the argument, I would reverse the ruling.
Uncontradicted evidence shows that the police were fully aware of the traffic warrant at the time of the February 5 arrest.2 The defendant was booked on the traffic warrant on the morning of February 6, and held in custody until she could make bond. Had she been again fingerprinted after the booking on the traffic warrant, the fingerprinting would be valid. But it would be *266absurd to require the police to again take her fingerprints, when they had taken them only a few hours before. The fingerprinting thus violated no substantial right of hers.
Inasmuch as there was basis for a lawful arrest, the order of proceedings should make no difference. The time of booking on the traffic warrant is an immaterial circumstance. It would be ludicrous to suggest that suppression must be ordered because the police did not retake her fingerprints after she was booked on the traffic warrant.
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), now reinforced by Hayes v. Florida, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985), stands for the proposition that a citizen whose fingerprints are not otherwise available to the police may not be subjected to investigatory fingerprinting in the absence of probable cause for arrest. These cases are completely distinguishable for the reason that this defendant was subject to arrest. Her fingerprints were available, just as were prints already in the police files or those of people arrested for subsequent traffic violations. Hayes by its terms applies only to detention after the crime when fingerprinting is the sole object.
The holding is all the more unfortunate because it suppresses a voluntary confession, after proper Miranda warnings, under the “fruit of the poisoned tree” doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The confession was taken only after the defendant was arrested a second time, under a homicide warrant issued on probable cause because of the fingerprint correspondence. The principal opinion holds that the tree is poisoned because, without the palm prints, there would be no probable cause for arrest. Inasmuch as the prints were properly available, the poisoned tree doctrine is inappropriately applied. If the reason for the suppression is the order of events on the first arrest the holding represents a particularly unfortunate instance in which “the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926), Cardozo, Ch. J.
I agree with the principal opinion that we must depend on the trial judge for the resolution of most pretrial matters regarding the admissibility of evidence when challenged because of claim of constitutional privilege. It is the sense of § 547.200, RSMo Supp.1984, however, that orders of suppression be reviewable on appeal, and I sense a definite feeling on the part of the legislature that admissible evidence should be suppressed only for substantial cause. Busy trial judges seldom have the opportunity to make detailed findings. The facts before the trial court were not substantially in dispute. It must be assumed that the judge accepted the defendant’s contentions, as set out above and advanced. To me the question is whether a substantial privilege of the defendant’s was violated. I find no legal basis for saying that it was.
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that an arrest may not be used as a pretext for a search are distinguishable, and not helpful in solving the problem before us. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932), the court found that, while the arrest was pretextual, the items seized by the search “could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued upon ample evidence.” In Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.1961), a police officer claimed to have seen the defendant commit two minor traffic violations the day before the search. He then swore out a traffic warrant and an arrest and search were made. There was no outstanding traffic warrant. The court may well have disbelieved the officer’s claim.
The Missouri cases cited, State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656 (Mo.1970), and State v. Howell, 543 S.W.2d 836 (Mo.App.1976), involved arrests without probable cause. In Goodman, two men were arrested while walking down the side of a highway. The only reason for the arrest was because the men were strangers in a small town. Evi*267dence seized incident to the arrest was suppressed. In Howell, a murder suspect was arrested while walking down a street. The only evidence of his involvement in the crime was that he had been seen talking to the defendant two days earlier. Because there was no probable cause for the arrest, evidence seized incident to the arrest was suppressed.
The common theme of the pretext cases is that the police arrested people without reason. The police had a valid pre-existing warrant for Zola Blair’s arrest. Any procedural irregularities which occurred afterward should not invalidate the arrest. Cf. State v. Lamaster, 652 S.W.2d 885 (Mo.App.1983), holding that a later valid arrest was not tainted by a shortly earlier arrest for an improper reason.
I agree that the “good faith” cases of United States v. Leon, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v. Shepherd, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) are not directly on point, but find them to be indicative of a trend of limiting the operation of the exclusionary rule to cases of deprivation of substantial rights. The rule is designed not as an obstacle course for the police, but as a protection to the citizenry against invasion of privileged territory. It should not be applied to Zola Blair’s fingerprints, which are not in the privileged area.
Nix v. Williams, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) I find much more in point. There the court gave precedence to substance over form in holding that the fruits of an illegal custodial interrogation (a dead body) would not be suppressed, because normal degenerative processes would have betrayed the body’s presence at some point. I do not argue that the defendant’s fingerprints would have been discovered inevitably, but simply contend that they were available to the police during the defendant’s initial detention and therefore not tainted by questioning and detention for a homicide investigation.
The order of suppression should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

. It is of interest that the challenged ruling was made by Judge Coburn on the basis of a transcript of evidence heard by Judge Levitt.

. The arresting officer testified that he arrested her for an outstanding city warrant and also asked her to accompany us with regards to a pickup order issued by the crimes against persons unit.