Court Opinion

ID: 7004746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 03:48:27.420871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:10:02.232406
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it rests on the ground of qualified immunity for investigative techniques. I do not, however, join the discussion regarding knowing1 fabrication of evidence because I do not believe that Devereaux ever properly raised or developed that issue before the district court.
Thus, I express no opinion on whether the mere development of evidence (even knowingly false evidence) or the bringing of charges (even knowingly false ones) can by itself constitute a procedural or substantive due process violation within the meaning of the United States Constitution. That kind of conduct would surely be reprehensible, and only a rapscallion in official raiment would do such a thing. However, I would not establish (or refine) a possibly far reaching principle of constitutional law based on the record and presentation in this case.
' It may be easy to decide the question here, although, as the dissent demonstrates, even that is not necessarily true. But if that right exists, we must answer a number of questions. For example, when does the violation accrue? Is it at the first evil interview, at the first presentation to the prosecutor, at the time charges are filed, at arraignment on those charges, or at some earlier or later point? All of those issues remain to be decided. And when should an officer have had such positive *1083knowledge that the defendant was truly innocent that the further conduct of the investigation, or presentation to the prosecutor, violated the defendant’s constitutional rights? The dissent says that the evidence in this case would easily support a jury finding that the defendants have violated the newly delineated right. The majority says that the evidence is not even weighty enough to allow jury consideration. That is to say, no reasonable jury could decide that the right was violated. Given that degree of clarity, I must say that “a [social worker’s] lot is not a happy one.” W.S. Gilbert & A. Sullivan, The Pirates of Penzance (1879).
In short, along with the majority of the original panel, I would hold that Dever-eaux has not spelled out a constitutional right to have investigations conducted in any particular manner. Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir.2000). I would also declare that to the extent that there may be a constitutional right to be free from the development of knowingly false charges, Devereaux has not properly presented that issue. I would leave it at that.
With that caveat, I concur.

. By “knowing” the majority seems to mean knew or should have known.