Court Opinion

ID: 9897483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:02.095394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.785577
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion c:91-1

       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 WILLIAM RENE ALFARO,                                    No. 83316
 Appellant,
 vs.                                                       1.4

 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
 Respondent.

            Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to jury verdict,
on seven counts of sexual assault against a child under 14 and three counts
of lewdness with a child under 14. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
County; Barry L. Breslow, Judge.
            Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Las Vegas Defense Group, LI,C, and Michael V. Castillo and Michael L.
Becker, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Jennifer P. Noble, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe
County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. CADISH and PICKERING, JJ., and
GIBBONS, Sr. J.1

     1The    IIonorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice. participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.

                                                                 2. 3   2.119k:11
                                                 OPINION
                By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
                           A jury convicted appellant William Alfaro of seven counts of
                sexual assault against a child under 14 and three counts of lewdness with
                a child under 14 for acts cornmitted against ED, the daughter of a family
                friend, between June and December 2015. Alfaro denies the charges and
                raises insufficiency of the evidence as a principal issue on appeal. He also
                argues that the district court erred in not dismissing the lewdness counts
                as redundant to the sexual assault counts; in admitting evidence that he
                committed other uncharged bad acts against ED; in giving and refusing
                certain jury instructions; and in imposing the maximum sentence allowed
                by law, for an aggregate total of 275 years to life. We reverse one of the
                lewdness convictions as redundant to a sexual assault involving the sarne
                episode. And, while we agree with Alfaro that the district court erred in
                admitting two of the uncharged bad acts and in issuing a jury instruction
                unnecessarily defining "lewdness" separate from the statutory definition
                provided by NRS 201.230, we find those errors harmless. Finding no
                reversible error except the redundant lewdness count, we otherwise affirm.

                                                     A.
                            Alfaro was a family friend of ED's mother, Sara, and ED grew
                up calling him "Uncle Bill." ED's parents struggled with homelessness and
                addiction. When Sara, ED, and ED's younger brother found themselves
                with no place to live, Sara turned to Alfaro, who drove to California, picked
                them up, and brought them to Fernley, Nevada. In Fernley, Sara and the
                children lived with Alfaro, first at a house he had been sharing with a friend
                and, later, at the Lazy Inn motel.
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                           ED's father, Naylan, followed Sara and the children to the Lazy
                Inn. A heavy drinker, Naylan often fought with Sara and occasionally hit
                the children.  When money for the motel ran out, Sara returned to
                California, and NayIan and the children moved from Fernley to a
                rehabilitation shelter in Reno. The shelter evicted them after NayIan
                violated its ban on drugs and alcohol. Again without a place to live, Naylan
                and the children rejoined Alfaro, who had by then rented a room at the
                Gateway Inn in Reno.
                          The family stayed with Alfaro at the Gateway Inn from June 1
                through December 31, 2015. During this time, ED turned ten and entered
                the fourth grade. The room had one bed, which ED shared with Alfaro,
                while her brother slept on the floor with NayIan (or Sara, when she visited).
                Alfaro's charged acts of sexual assault and lewdness against ED all occurred
                at the Gateway Inn during this seven-month span, either at night while
                ED's father and brother were sleeping or when she and Alfaro were alone
                in the room together. The State would later charge Alfaro with, among
                other acts, forcing ED to fellate him and penetrating her vaginally with his
                penis and fingers and anally with his penis, his fingers, and a Sharpie pen.
                            ED said nothing about the abuse until Naylan moved the
                children from the Gateway Inn to the home of his girlfriend, Rochelle.
                MonthS later, the couple left the children with a friend of Rochelle's, to
                whom ED disclosed Alfaro's abuse. The friend called Child Protective
                Services, which interviewed ED and referred the case to law enforcement.
                Detective Ashley Harms interviewed ED and had her examined by Dr.
                Kristen MacLeod, a pediatrician board-certified in child abuse and neglect.
                The examination revealed no genital trauma, which Dr. MacLeod described

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                      as normal in child sex abuse cases, especially those involving delayed
                      reporting.
                                Alfaro voluntarily submitted to an interview with Detective
                      Harms, which lasted more than three hours. In the interview, Alfaro
                      adamantly denied abusing ED but corroborated basic details of ED's
                      account, including date range, location, that the two shared a bed, that they
                      occasionally engaged in what he characterized as horseplay, and that he
                      had a prescription for Soma, a muscle relaxant that ED told Harms Alfaro
                      would give her to facilitate his assaults. Alfaro also consented to a search
                      of his personal storage unit and his room at the Gateway inn. The searches
                      turned up Sharpie pens, which ED had said Alfaro used to assault her, but
                      did not uncover any nude pictures of ED, which ED also referenced in
                      speaking to Detective Harms.
                                                           B.
                                   The State charged Alfaro with eight counts of sexual assault
                      against a child under 14 and three counts of lewdness with a child under 1.4
                      for his acts at the Gateway Inn in Reno between June and December 2015.
                      He was not charged for any acts in Fernley, located about 30 miles outside
                      of Reno in Lyon County. Before trial, the district court granted the State's
                      motion to admit evidence at trial of four uncharged acts: that Alfaro took
                      nude photographs of ED, gave her Soma, showed her pornography, and had
                      her dress in fishnet. stockings. The former two acts were admitted as prior
                      uncharged sexual offenses under NRS 48.045(3), and the latter two as res
                      gestae under NRS 48.035(3).
                                   Although the charged acts dated back to 2015, trial di.d not
                      occur until 2021. At trial, the State presented testimony from ED, who was
                      by then 15 years old. It also called the woman to whom ED confided the
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                abuse, Detective Harms, and Dr. MacLeod. The State did not call Rochelle
                or any members of ED's family, and the defense called no witnesses. On
                stipulation of the parties, the State played a videotape of Alfaro's interview
                with Detective Harms during its case-in-chief.
                            The jury convicted Alfaro on all counts, except one the State
                abandoned during closing. Alfaro filed a motion for acquittal under NRS
                175.381(2) and for a new trial under NRS 176.515(4) on the bases of
                insufficient evidence and conflicting evidence; respectively.     Alfaro also
                challenged his lewdness convictions as redundant to his convictions for
                sexual assault. The motions were denied. Rejecting both Alfaro's and the
                State's recommendations, the district judge imposed the maximum
                sentence allowed by law, 10 consecutive terms of incarceration totaling 275
                years, in the aggregate, to life. This appeal timely followed.

                            Alfaro argues that we must reverse his convictions because they
                are not supported by sufficient evidence. The Due Process Clause of the
                Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criininal case against
                conviction "except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to
                convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
                element of the offense." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). In
                deciding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court
                does not "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
                established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."       Id. at 318-19 (internal
                quotation omitted). Instead, it asks "whether, after viewing the evidence in
                the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
                have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
                Id. at 319. See Franks v. State, 135 Nev, 1, 7, 432 P.3d 752, 757 (2019)

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                (stating that the "test for sufficiency upon appellate review is not whether
                this court is convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
                but whether the jury, acting reasonably, could be convinced to that certitude
                by evidence it had a right to accept") (quoting Edwards v. State, 90 Nev.
                255, 258-59, 524 P.2d 328, 331 (1974)).
                                                      A.
                            Alfaro    makes     two       distinct   sufficiency-of-the-evidence
                arguments. First, he argues, as he did in district court, that the State did
                not prove he subjected ED to the "sexual penetration" required by NRS
                200.366(1) to convict him of the sexual assaults charged in count I (alleging
                that Alfaro "put his penis into ED's anus on multiple occasions"), counts III
                and IV (alleging that he "put his penis into ED's vagina" two different
                times), and count VII (alleging that he "put his finger(s) into ED's anus").
                See Kassa v. State, 137 Nev. 150, 152, 485 P.3d 750, 755 (2021) (noting that
                appellate review of an order denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal is
                essentially the same as a review for the sufficiency of the evidence). Second,
                citing LaPierre v. State, 108 Nev. 528, 531, 836 P.2d 56, 58 (1992), and the
                lack of independent, corroborating evidence, Alfaro argues that ED's
                testimony lacked the specificity needed to support the convictions, requiring
                reversal on all counts.
                            The State sufficiently proved penetration for a rational juror to
                convict Alfaro on the contested sexual assault counts. As written at the
                relevant time, NRS 200.366(1) (2007) defined sexual assault as "subject[ing]
                another person to sexual penetration," while NRS 200.364(5) (2013) defined
                [slexual penetration" to mean "cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion,
                however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object m.anipulated or
                inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another,

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                including sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning." (emphases added).
                Alfaro points to instances during ED's testimony where she answered, "I
                can't remember" to a question about Alfaro putting "his front private part,
                his penis, into your body," or denied that he was able to "get any of his penis
                into your front private," as establishing a failure to prove penetration. But
                ED continued, explaining that when Alfaro tried to "push his penis into
                me ... it wouldn't work because I had started crying and said that it
                hurt . . . and was begging him stop," that Alfaro got the tip of his penis in
                her ants, and that he would use lubricants to facilitate his assaults when
                he had difficulty inserting his penis or fingers into her vaginal or anal
                openings. A rational juror could reasonably interpret this testimony to say
                that, while Alfaro could not fully insert his penis, penetration, "however
                slight" occurred, NRS 200.364(5), since ED would not have cried out in pain
                unless it did. See State v. Toohey, 816 N.W.2d 120, 129-31 (S.D. 2012)
                (finding sufficient proof of penetration under a similar statute where the
                child testified that the assault caused her pain) (collecting cases).
                            Alfaro's close parsing of ED's trial testimony also disregards the
                other evidence the jury properly could consider. That evidence included the
                handwritten note ED gave Detective Harms during their initial interview
                in 2016, in which ED wrote that Alfaro "would stick his front private part
                in my back private part, and push it in"; testimony from Detective Harms
                that, during the same interview, ED disclosed that Alfaro put his "front
                private part" in her "front and back private parts" and his fingers in her
                anus; arid testimony from Dr. MacLeod about similar statements ED made
                when she examined ED, also in 2016.          Although Alfaro omitted ED's
                handwritten note from the record on appeal, he stipulated to its admission
                as a trial exhibit and Detective Harms read from it during her testimony.

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                See Snipes 1). State, No. 82384, 2022 WI, 500678, at *1 & n.2 (Nev. Feb. 17,
                2022) (relying on testimony a witness read from an exhibit omitted from the
                record on appeal and noting that, since the appellant has the burden to
                provide a complete record on appeal, missing portions are presumed to
                support the judgment below). The jury also was entitled to consider ED's
                prior statements to Detective Harms and Dr. MacLeod in making its
                decision. See Crowley v. State, 120 Nev. 30, 35, 83 P.3d 282, 286 (2004)
                (holding that "when a trial witness fails, for whatever reason, to remember
                a previous statement made by that witness, the failure of recollection
                constitutes a denial of the prior statement" that makes the prior statement
                admissible as substantive proof).
                              Alfaro builds his case for complete acquittal on the same flawed
                foundation.      He concentrates on the generality of and occasional
                inconsistencies in Ell's testimony and emphasizes the lack of independent
                corroborating evidence. But "the testimony of a sexual assault victim alone
                [can be] sufficient to uphold a conviction." LaPierre, 108 Nev. at 531, 836
                P.2d at 58; see Franks, 135 Nev. at 7, 432 P.3d at 757 ("a lewdness victim's
                testimony need not be corroborated"). Our case law recognizes "that it is
                difficult for a child victim to recall exact instances when the abuse occurs
                repeatedly over a period of time." LaPierre, 108 Nev. at 531, 836 P.2d at 58.
                While the child must "testify with sorne particularity" about the charged
                incidents and do so in a way that supplies "reliable indicia that the . . . acts
                charged actually occurred," the child's testimony alone, if it meets these
                standards, can be sufficient to convict. Id.; see Rose v. State, 1.23 Nev. 194,
                163 P.3c1408 (2007). ED's testimony distinguished between Fernley, where
                Alfaro's uncharged grooming of her allegedly began, and the Gateway Inn
                in Reno, where the charged acts occurred. She adequately described the

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                time frame, place, and inanner of the activity underlying each count at trial,
                and her consistent, repeated disclosures to third parties, some of whom
                testified to those disclosures at trial, bolstered her testimony.
                            Almost six years passed between the charged acts of abuse and
                the trial. To the extent ED's testimony contained internal inconsistencies
                or conflicted with Alfaro's account, resolving competing narratives is the
                province of the jury, not to be disturbed if their verdict is supported by
                substantial evidence. See Guitron v. State, 131 Nev. 215, 221, 350 P.3d 93,
                97 (Ct. App. 2015).2 Because a rational trier of fact could have found in ED's
                testimony and the other evidence at trial the elements necessary to convict
                Alfaro, we reject Alfaro's argument for reversal on all counts.
                                                      B.
                            Alfaro was convicted on three counts of lewdness with a child
                under 14, pursuant to NRS 201.230, for touching or fondling E.D.'s breasts
                (count IX) and buttocks (count X) and kissing her on the mouth (count XI).
                On appeal, he challenges these convictions as redundant because the State
                failed to provide sufficient evidence that the lewd acts were separate and
                distinct from the acts for which he was convicted of sexual assault. On one
                count, we agree with Alfaro.

                      2Alfaro also challenges the order denying his motion for a new trial
                under NRS 176.515(4), based on conflicts in the evidence as to his guilt. See
                State v. Purcell, 110 Nev. 1389, 1394, 887 P.2d 276, 278-79 (1994). But NRS
                176.515(4) is permissive, see Washington v. State, 98 Nev. 601, 603, 655 P.2d
                531, 532 (1982), and reposes discretion in the district judge, whose exercise
                of discretion is not reversible except for "palpable" abuse, Domingues v.
                State, 112 Nev. 683, 695, 917 P.2d 1364, 1373 (1996). The district court did
                not abuse its considerable discretion in denying Alfaro's motion for new trial
                based on conflicts in the evidence.
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                              NRS 201.230(1) defines lewdness with a child as "any lewd or
                 lascivious act, other than acts constituting the crime of sexual assault . . ."
                 (emphasis added). This provision makes sexual assault and lewdness with
                 a child alternative or mutually exclusive offenses, "meaning as a matter of
                 statutory interpretation that the same act can yield a conviction for sexual
                 assault or lewdness [with a child] but not both." Jackson v. State, 128 Nev.
                 598, 612, 291 P.3d 1274, 1283 (2012) (discussing Braunstein v. State, 118
                 Nev. 68, 79, 40 P.3d 413, 421 (2002), and Crowley, 120 Nev. at 33-34, 83
                 P.3d at 285); see State v. Koseck, 113 Nev. 477, 479, 936 P.2d 836, 838 (1997).
                 Because "[t]he State has the burden to shoW that the defendant committed
                 a crime," and because a lewd act must not also constitute sexual assault,
                 NRS 201.230(1), "the State has the burden, at trial, to show that the
                 lewdness was not incidental to the sexual assault"—that is, that the lewd
                 and assaultive acts were adequately "separate and distinct" to support
                 convictions for both, Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 651-53, 119 P.3d 1225,
                 1234-35 (2005). To meet that burden, the State must provide sufficient
                 evidence of separateness such that a rational juror could reasonably find
                 two separate crimes. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 316. If the State
                 fails in that burden, the lewdness conviction must be reversed as redundant
                 to the sexual assault. Braunstein, 118 Nev. at 78-79, 40 P.3d at 420-21.
                             Separately charged acts of lewdness with a child and sexual
                 assault can occur "as part of a single criminal encounter," see Townsend v.
                 State, 103 Nev. 113, 120-21, 734 P.2d 705, 710 (1987) (analogizing to
                 multiple acts of sexual assault), if the defendant "stopped [the lewd] activity
                 before proceeding" to the assault, id. at 121, 734 P.2d at 710. The lewd act
                 cannot, however, be a mere "prelude" intended to "arouse" the victim or
                 "predispose" them to the assault. Crowley, 120 Nev. at 34, 83 P.3d at 285.

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                 If the State charges both sexual assault and lewdness with a child and fails
                 to provide "any evidence regarding the sequence of events and under what
                 circumstances the lewdness occurred," we must assume, lacking any
                 evidence to the contrary, that the charges are redundant. See Gaxiola, 121
                 Nev. at 653, 119 P.3d at 1235-36 (noting also that the victim did not indicate
                 whether the lewd act "occurred on a separate day or time frame" from the
                 charged sexual assault).
                             ED testified that Alfaro touched her breasts and buttocks at the
                 Gateway Inn, but her testimony does not establish that these acts occurred
                 at a time separate and distinct from his assaults, nor did the State ever ask
                 any clarifying questions to that effect. However, in his interview with law
                 enforcement, while Alfaro denied that he sexually assaulted ED, he stated
                 that he pinched ED's breasts and buttocks as a form of horseplay. Dr.
                 MacLeod later testified that grooming behavior can include "close physical
                 contact" and that it is inappropriate for an adult man to pinch a nine-year-
                 old girl's chest or buttocks. Because Alfaro's own statements describe acts
                 separate from a sexual assault that involved touching or fondling ED's
                 breasts and buttocks and Dr. MacLeod's testimony supports a finding that
                 Alfaro had the requisite "lewd and lascivious" sexual intent, NRS 201.230,
                 and ED's testimony places such acts in Reno, we conclude that a rational
                 juror could have found the same beyond a reasonable doubt and reject his
                 redundancy challenges to counts IX and X.
                             However, Alfaro did not admit to kissing ED on the mouth, and
                 her only relevant testimony at trial was that she awakened "one time" at
                 the Gateway Inn to find Alfaro digitally penetrating her and that he then
                 "French kissed" her. The State did not prove any other mouth kissing
                 separate and distinct from a charged sexual assault and, in fact, ED's trial

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i(
                             testirnony was that this only occurred once. The State therefore failed its
                             burden to provide sufficient evidence "regarding the sequence of events"
                             involving both lewd and assaultive acts, see Gaxiola, 121 Nev. at 653, 119
                             P.3d at 1235-36, and we reverse Alfaro's conviction under count XI
                             (lewdness with a child under 14) for kissing ED on the mouth.
                                                                 HI.
                                         In the alternative, Alfaro seeks a new trial based on evidentiary
                             and instructional error. While we agree that the district court erred in
                             admitting two pieces of prior misconduct evidence and in giving an
                             unnecessary jury instruction, the errors were harmless and do not provide
                             a basis for a new trial.
                                                                  A.

                                         NRS 48.045(2) states the general rule against using prior
                             misconduct to prove criminal propensity: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs
                             or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
                             that the person acted in conformity therewith."      Despite this rule, the

                             prosecution often seeks to introduce evidence of a defendant's uncharged
                             misconduct in sexual assault cases. Nevada's evidence code offers three
                             possible paths to the admission of such evidence. First, as with any other
                             prior misconduct evidence, evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct may
                             be admitted under NRS 48.045(2) for a non-propensity purpose "such as
                             proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
                             or absence of mistake or accident." Second, the Legislature adopted NRS
                             48.045(3) in 2015 to permit evidence of an uncharged sexual offense to
                             support a normally forbidden inference of criminal propensity in a sexual
                             offense prosecution. See Franks, 135 Nev. at 4, 432 P.3d at 755. And third,
                             NRS 48.035(3) permits the admission of evidence "so closely related" to the

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                charged act that the act cannot otherwise be described, commonly known as
                res gestae evidence.
                              Before trial, the State filed a motion to permit it to introduce
                evidence at trial of four instances of uncharged misconduct by Alfaro. The
                State did not argue, either in district court or on appeal, that the evidence
                qualified for admission under NRS 48.045(2)—a steep path that would have
                required the State to prove each act by clear and convincing evidence and
                to identify a legitimate non-propensity purpose for its admission. See
                Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985), superseded in
                part by statute as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 44-45, 83 P.3d 818,
                823 (2004).     Instead, the State moved for the prior acts' admission as
                evidence of uncharged sexual offenses under NRS 48.045(3), and as res
                gestae evidence under NRS 48.035(3). The district court admitted two acts,
                taking nude photographs of ED and giving her Soma, as evidence of
                uncharged sexual offenses under NRS 48.045(3), and two acts, making ED
                wear fishnet stockings and showing her pornography. as res gestae evidence.
                              The district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
                the nude photographs and the fishnet stockings on the bases it did. See
                Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 231, 298 P.3d 1171, 1178 (2013) (reviewing
                the adrnission of prior misconduct evidence for an abuse of discretion). This
                evidence did not meet the requirements for the admission of prior sexual
                offense and res gestae evidence. Although we ultimately determine its
                admission was harmless, the evidence was unnecessary and the errors
                avoidable, so we address them fully. Regardless of the path •taken to
                admission, compliance with the procedural requirements for admitting
                uncharged misconduct evidence is essential to balance the unique

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                challenges of prosecuting sexual offenses involving children with the
                defendant's right to a trial free frorn undue prejudice.
                                                          1.

                            NRS 48.045(3) creates an exception to NRS 48.045(2)'s ban on
                propensity evidence. It permits "the admission of evidence in a criminal
                prosecution for a sexual offense that a person committed another crime,
                wrong or act that constitutes a separate sexual offense." The requirements
                for admission under NRS 48.045(3) are set out in Franks v. State: (1) the
                uncharged act must constitute a sexual offense under NRS 179D.097; (2) it
                must be relevant to the charged offense; (3) the district court must make a
                preliminary finding that "a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance
                of the evidence that the act had occurred"; and (4) using the factors
                enumerated in United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001),
                the district court must determine that the probative value of the act. is not
                substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 135 Nev. at 4-
                6, 432 P.3d at 755-57.     The State must obtain advance permission to
                introduce such evidence by motion to the district court, outside the presence
                of the jury. Id. at 5, 432 P.3d at 756.
                            Both acts admitted under NRS 48.045(3) easily satisfy the first
                two Franks requirements. Taking nude photographs of a minor is a crime
                under NRS 179D.097(1)(h) and NRS 200.710 (criminalizing the production
                of child pornography), and giving Soma to ED prior to sexual contact is a
                crime under NRS 179D.097(e) (providing that a "sexual offense" includes
                administering a drug with the intent to enable or assist the commission of
                another sexual offense). Furthermore, both acts are relevant to the charged
                offenses because they demonstrate that Alfaro had a propensity to engage
                in sexual behavior with a child. See Franks, 135 Nev. at 6, 432 P.3d at 757.

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                             The State stumbles on the quantum of proof regarding the nude
                photographs. The district court decided the State's motion based on the
                preliminary hearing transcript and did not reserve or revisit its pretrial
                admissibility determination to take into account the evidence adduced at
                trial. While ED testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial that Alfaro
                gave her Soma to facilitate his assaults, see Keeney v. State, 109 Nev. 220,
                229, 850 P.2d 311, 317 (1993) (concluding that victim testimony alone met
                the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence required by NRS
                48.045(2)), overruled in part on other grounds by Koerschner v. State, 116
                Nev. 1111, 13 P.3d 451 (2000), only Detective Harms testified regarding the
                nude photographs based on her original interview with ED, and even that
                testimony was minimal and lacked specificity.          Searches of Alfaro's
                electronic devices, motel room, and storage unit failed to turn up any
                physical evidence of the photographs, nor did Alfaro admit to their
                existence.
                             This dearth of relevant supporting facts is also relevant to the
                last step of Franks. There, the district court weighs the probative value of
                the evidence with the threat of undue prejudice, which must include an
                evaluation based on a nonexhaustive list of factors from LeMay:
                             (1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts
                             charged, (2) the closeness in time of the prior acts
                             to the acts charged, (3) the frequency of the prior
                             acts, (4) the presence or lack of intervening
                             circumstances, and (5) the necessity of the evidence
                             beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.

                Franks, 135 Nev. at 6, 432 P.3d at 756 (quoting LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028).
                             While these factors are useful, their isolated presentation in
                Franks implies that consideration of the list is both necessary and
                sufficient. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Doane), 138 Nev., Adv.
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t h 1047,\
                Op. 90, 521 P.3d 1.215, 1222 (2022) (emphasizing that district courts must
                consider each LeMay factor). But revisiting LeMay reveals a more
                thoughtful, holistic analysis, including considerations of whether the prior
                acts were based on "proven facts," whether the acts corroborated or
                bolstered the victim's testimony and credibility, and whether their
                probative value was clear and not "capable of multiple characterizations."
                LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028-29. LeMay emphasized that neither these factors
                nor the ones adopted in Franks were exhaustive citing to yet more factors
                from the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 1032 n.1. And while we do not prescribe the
                same approach to the district courts. LeMay also stressed the
                appropriateness of the district court's decision to prevent the government
                from using such evidence in opening statement "until after the prosecution
                had introduced . . . its other evidence, in order to get a feel for the evidence
                as it developed at trial before ruling on whether LeMay's prior acts of child
                molestation could come in." Id. at 1028.
                            A careful reading of LeMay does not support rote processing of
                factors to arrive at a pretrial decision that is then cast in stone. Rather, the
                district court's task is to evaluate the probative value of the uncharged
                misconduct in relation to the charged crime and the state of the evidence,
                weighed against the threat of undue prejudice arising from any
                unnecessarily inflammatory, factually unsupported, or unduly duplicative
                aspects of the evidence. The five listed LeMay factors, adopted in Franks,
                can and should be used in service of that goal, but the reviewing district
                court should not feel constrained to use only those factors to the exclusion
                of other meaningful and helpful guidance provided in LeMay and elsewhere.
                See Chaparro u. State, 137 Nev. 665 670 497 P.3d 1187, 1.193 (2021) ("[T]he

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,)
                [LeMay] factors . . . are riot elements to be met before evidence is admissible
                but considerations for the district court to weigh.").
                           Returning to the evidence at issue here, admitting the nude
                photograph evidence cannot be justified under LeMay. Scant proof exists in
                the record that Alfaro took nude photographs of ED. But even accepting
                arguendo that the proof was enough to meet the Franks threshold
                preponderance-of-the-evidence test, the creation of child pornography is
                also a grave and separate offense that added little to the narrative
                underlying the charged offenses in this case. To justify the risk of prejudice
                and distraction this evidence carried, more in the way of certainty of the
                photographs' existence was needed. See 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird
                C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:86 (4th ed. 2022 Update) (discussing
                FRE 414, the federal analog to NRS 48.045(3), and noting that "uncertainty
                over prior [sexual] bad acts lessens their probative value and raises the risk
                of prejudice"). Evidence concerning the Soma pills, by contrast, met the
                LeMay standards: ED testified that Alfaro had her take Soma; this evidence
                was corroborated by Alfaro's prescription for Soma; and the evidence had
                high probative value since it strengthened ED's testimony by explaining
                how Alfaro used Soma to facilitate his assaults.
                                                      11.

                            The other two acts, making ED watch pornography and wear
                fishnet stockings, were admitted under NRS 48.035(3) as res gestae
                evidence. Both the State and the district court refer to res gestae evidence
                as evidence that "explains." provides "background" for, "completes the
                picture" of, or is "relevant" to the charged crime, and evince an
                understanding that virtually any act committed during the entire course of
                the charged conduct can be admitted as res gestae. These characterizations
                are not accurate.
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                              NRS 48.035(3), codifying res gestae, is an "extremely narrow"
                  basis for admissibility. Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 574, 119 P.3d 107, 121
                  (2005), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. State, 133 Nev. 693, 698,
                  405 P.3d 114, 120 (2017); see Bellon v. State, 121 Nev. 436, 444, 1.17 P.3d
                  176, 181 (2005); Sutton v. State, 114 Nev. 1327, 1331, 972 P.2d 334, 336
                  (1998). It is insufficient that the uncharged acts "explain," "make sense of,"
                  or "provide a context for" the charged crimes, Weber, 121 Nev. at 574, 119
                  P.3d at 121, or that the acts occurred at sorne ambiguous point in time
                  during the charged course of conduct.      An uncharged act may only be

                  admitted as res gestae if it is part of the same "transaction"-the same
                  temporal and physical circumstances-as the charged act. See Dutton v.
                  State, 94 Nev. 461, 464, 581 P.2d 856, 858 (1978) (admitting evidence of a
                  defendant's possession of a stolen item exchanged at the same time as the
                  stolen item for which he was charged), overruled on other grounds by Gray
                  v. State, 100 Nev. 556, 558 n.1, 688 P.2d 313, 314 n.1 (1984); Allan v. State,
                  92 Nev. 318, 320, 549 P.2d 1402, 1403 (1976) (admitting testimony from two
                  boys the defendant assaulted immediately prior to the charged crime in the
                  same room). The uncharged act and the crirne "must be so interconnected"
                  that it is nearly iinpossible for the witness to describe the crime without
                  referring to the uncharged act. Bellon, 121 Nev. at 444, 117 P.3d at 181; see
                  Cirillo v. State, 96 Nev. 489, 493, 611 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1980) (noting that
                  the uncharged act must be a "necessary incident" or "immediate
                  concomitant" of the charged crirne, or part of the same "continuous
                  transaction ).3

                        3The strict requirements of res gestae evidence reflect its derogation
                  of the general rule that the use of prior bad acts is "heavily disfavored,"
                  Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 730, 30 P.3d 1128, 1131 (2001), and that it
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                            The State also relies on Perez v. State to argue that prior acts
                are admissible if they constitute evidence of "grooming behavior," facially
                innocuous acts such as "gifts, praises, and rewards" used to "develop a bond
                between the victim and offender and, ultimately, make the victim more
                receptive to sexual activity." 129 Nev. 850, 853, 855, 313 P.3d 862, 864, 866
                (2013). But Perez speaks to the admissibility of certain expert testimony on
                grooming. Id. at 859, 313 P.3d at 868. That issue is not raised here, and
                this court has never held, nor does any statute provide, that evidence of
                grooming is categorically admissible, as res gestae evidence or otherwise.
                            Because ED testified that Alfaro made her watch pornography
                while committing the charged acts, and that Alfaro mimicked the acts in
                the pornography as she was watching it, the act qualifies as res gestae
                because it occurred at the same time and in the same place as the charged
                acts.   The evidence that Alfaro had ED dress up in fishnet stockings,
                however, does not qualify.    The fishnet stocking incident(s) occurred in
                Fernley, months prior to the charged acts, such that Ell could, and in fact
                did, describe the charged acts without referring to the fishnet stockings
                incident(s). Therefore, the district court erred in admitting evidence that
                Alfaro made ED wear fishnet stockings.

                does not balance prejudicial effect against probative value, State v. Shade,
                111 Nev. 887, 894, 900 P.2d 327, 331 (1995). Of note, and for these reasons,
                res gestae is falling out of favor nationwide. See, e.g., Rojas v. People, 504
                P.3d 296, 307 (Colo. 2022) (abolishing res gestae, following the "many
                jurisdictions [that] have determined that res gestae is incompatible with the
                modern Rules [of evidence]"); State v. Gunby, 144 P.3d 647, 663 (Kan. 2006)
                (same); see generally Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Character
                Assassination: Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Protect
                Criminal Defendants, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 769, 798-802 (2018).
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                                                        B.
                               Having concluded that the district court erroneously admitted
                   two prior bad acts, we consider the gravity of the error. We will affirm the
                   otherwise erroneous admission of evidence if it could have been admitted
                   another way, Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 260, 129 P.3d 671, 677 (2006),
                   or if the error was harmless such that it did not have "a substantial and
                   injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," Tavares v.
                   State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v.
                   United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
                               Evidence of the nude photographs, erroneously admitted under
                   NRS 48.045(3) (prior sexual offenses), could not have been admitted as res
                   gestae because the State provided no evidence as to when or under what
                   circumstances the photographs were taken. Conversely, evidence regarding
                   the fishnet stockings incident(s), erroneously admitted under NRS
                   48.035(3), could not have been admitted under NRS 48.045(3) because the
                   record does not support a determination that the act constitutes a sexual
                   offense under NRS 179D.097. See Franks, 135 Nev. at 4-5, 432 P.3d at 756.
                   And, while perhaps the erroneously admitted evidence could have been
                   admitted under NRS 48.045(2), the State did not make that argument in
                   district court or on appeal, thereby failing to identify the permissible non-
                   propensity purpose for admitting the evidence and, as to the nude
                   photographs, failing to prove the uncharged act by the clear and convincing
                   evidence required. See Petrocelli, 101 Nev. at 52, 692 P.2d at 508.
                               The question, then, is whether the error in admitting evidence
                   concerning the nude photographs and fishnet stockings was harmless. The
                   record in this case demonstrates that the erroneously admitted uncharged
                   acts had marginal relevance, and their potential for prejudice paled in

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                comparison to the acts with which Alfaro was charged, which the State
                adequately proved. We therefore deem the erroneous admission of the two
                prior acts harmless under the "substantial and injurious effect" standard
                applicable to evidentiary error. 4
                                                      C.
                            As for the jury instructions, Alfaro first contends that the court
                erred by rejecting his proposed instruction that a defense attorney may
                argue negative inferences arising from the State's failure to call important
                witnesses, citing Rimer v. State, 131 Nev. 307, 329, 351 P.3d 697, 713 (2015).
                But license to make an argument does not entitle Alfaro to a jury instruction
                to that effect, so we reject this claim out of hand.
                            Second, he argues that jury instruction no. 23, defining
                "lewdness" as it appears in Black's Law Dictionary and Berry v. State, 125
                Nev. 265, 280, 212 P.3d 1085, 1095 (2009), overruled on other grounds by
                State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 245 P.3d 550 (2010), conflicts with the
                definition of "lewdness" in the statute criminalizing lewdness with a child.
                NRS 201.230, under which Alfaro was charged. On de novo review, we
                agree that instruction no. 23 is not an accurate statement of the law, and
                the district court erred in giving it. Berry, 125 Nev. at 273, 212 P.3d at
                1091. Instruction no. 23 stated, "[1]ewdness is defined as sexual conduct
                that is obscene or indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness," but

                      'Neither Alfaro nor the State discuss harmless error as to the specific
                evidentiary errors that occurred, instead deferring the discussion to the
                larger context of Alfaro's cumulative error claim. Alfaro does not argue that
                the State's failure in this regard triggers a waiver analysis under Belcher v.
                State, 136 Nev. 261, 464 P.3d 1013 (2020). Assuming without deciding that
                Belcher applies, it is appropriate to address harmlessness because the
                record is short, and the issue is not close applying the Kotteakos standard.
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                "lewdness with a child" already has a statutory definition with four distinct
                elements, was laid out in instruction no. 20, and does not require further
                commentary, Summers v. Sheriff, 90 Nev. 180, 182, 52] P.2d 1228, 1228-29
                (1974). Furthermore, since instruction no. 23 does not mention physical
                contact and "lewdness with a child" requires it, instruction no. 23 perrnitted
                the jurors to convict Alfaro for merely "obscene or indecent" behavior, even
                if they found he never touched ED. This is not reversible error here,
                however, since it was plain from the evidence, the other jury instructions,
                and the charges themselves that the lewd acts for which Alfaro was Charged
                required a touching. See Carver v. El-Sabawi, 121 Nev. 11, 14, 107 P.M
                1283, 1285 (2005) (noting t.hat an instructional error is only reversible if it
                "resulted in a miscarriage of justice").
                                                      Iv.
                            Alfaro argues two errors at sentencing. First, he posits that the
                district court impermissibly relied on "prior uncharged crimes" in
                determining the appropriate sentence, in violation of Denson v. State, 112
                Nev. 489, 493-94, 915 P.2d 284, 287 (1996) (permitting the use of past "life,
                health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities," but not prior
                crimes), as evidenced by Judge Breslow's statement, "Crimes like this are
                against all little girls.   They're against society.... [S]ome crimes just
                transcend the actual people involved. This is one of them." While we do not
                condone the court's statements, they show that Judge Breslow was
                "offended by the facts of the crime committed," Canteron v. State, 114 Nev.
                1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998) (internal citations omitted), rather
                than prejudiced by "information or accusations founded on facts supported
                only by impalpable and highly suspect evidence," Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91,
                94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976).

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                           Second, Alfaro argues that the length of his sentence violates
                 the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
                 punishment because it is unreasonably disproportionate to the crime. See
                 Blurne v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (holding that a
                 sentence within statutory limits is not cruel and unusual unless the statute
                 is unconstitutional, or the sentence is "so unreasonably disproportionate to
                 the offense as to shock the conscience") (internal quotation omitted). But
                 his aggregate sentence of 275 years to life is within the statutory limits. See
                 NRS 200.366(3)(c) (establishing range of 35 years to life for each sexual
                 assault against a child); NRS 201.230(2) (establishing range of 10 years to
                 life for lewdness with a child). Alfaro argued for a sentence of 35 years to
                 life, while the State recommended 45 years to life. The sentence the district
                 court imposed differed from the recommended sentences because it ran the
                 sentences on each count consecutively. This court has upheld consecutive
                 life sentences on similar charges. See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 348,
                 213 P.3d 476, 490 (2009); but see Sirns v. State, 107 Nev. 438, 442, 814 P.2d
                 63, 65 (1991) (Rose, J., dissenting) (noting that, of the many bases for
                 reversal of a criminal conviction, the sentence "has the greatest ultimate
                 effect on the defendant"). While the sentence's length, the district court's
                 refusal to follow sentencing recommendations of either party, and the
                 court's remarks at sentencing are troubling, precedent does not support
                 reversal for resentencing where, as here, the sentence imposed is within
                 statutory limits and not unconstitutionally disproportionate.
                                                      V.
                             "The cumulative effect of errors may violate a defendant's
                 constitutional right to a fair trial even though the errors are harmless
                 individually." Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 535, 50 P.3d 1100, 1115

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                (2002). As discussed, the district court erred in admitting evidence of two
                acts of uncharged misconduct and in giving instruction no. 23. We must
                decide whether these errors, though harmless individually, support reversal
                for cumulative error.      In evaluating cumulative error, we consider

                (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the
                error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev.
                1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008).
                            This case rests, as many cases of sexual assault do, on the
                competing testimony of the victim and the defendant. There is no physical
                evidence of Alfaro's crimes, no members of ED's family testified, and Alfaro
                denied the charges against him in an interview played for the jury.
                However, we have repeatedly held that a child victim's testimony is
                sufficient for conviction, even if uncorroborated, if the victim testifies with
                some particularity" and bears "some reliable indicia." LaPierre v. State,
                108 Nev. 528, 531, 836 P.2d 56, 58 (1992).        ED's testimony met those

                requirements, and the district court, which observed the witnesses, found
                Ell credible and her testimony convincing.       Nor did the errors play an
                important role at trial—the State did not dwell on the erroneously admitted
                evidence, and the instructional error as to lewdness was not material to the
                facts and charges in the case. So, while Alfaro's crime and sentence are
                undoubtedly grave, the quantity and character of the errors was not such
                as to affect the verdict and we reject the cumulative error claim.

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  1947:1
                          For these rea.sons, we reverse Alfaro's conviction on count XI
                and remand for entry of an amended judgment of conviction but otherwi.se
                affirm.

                We concur:

                Cadish

                                             Sr. J.
                Gibb

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