Court Opinion

ID: 9951966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 16:05:42.085396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:44.489805
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 240015
                                  No. 2-24-0015
                           Opinion filed March 19, 2024
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of McHenry County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 23-CF-357
                                       )
JOSHUA SLATEN,                         ) Honorable
                                       ) Michael J. Chmiel,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
       Justice Hutchinson specially concurred.

                                           OPINION

¶1     The defendant, Joshua Slaten, appeals from the denial of his pretrial release under section

110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as

amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act

(Act). 1 See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act);

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18,

2023). For the following reasons, we reverse the order denying the defendant pretrial release.

       1 The Act is commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today

(SAFE-T) Act.
2024 IL App (2d) 240015

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3     On April 10, 2023, when the police attempted to pull the defendant over for a traffic

violation, he led the police on a car chase that started in Spring Grove, Illinois, and ended in

Kenosha, Wisconsin. Based on the incident, the State charged the defendant with various non-

felony offenses and the following felonies: aggravated fleeing and eluding a police officer (625

ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2022)) (2 counts; class 4 felony); aggravated identity theft

(720 ILCS 5/16-30(b)(1) (West 2022)) (2 counts; class 3 felony); unlawful possession of a credit

or debit card (id. § 17-32(b)) (2 counts; class 4 felony); and unlawful possession of a controlled

substance (id. § 570/402(c)) (class 4 felony). There were 25 counts in total.

¶4     After being stopped by Kenosha deputies, the defendant was arrested and incarcerated there

as a result of pleading guilty to charges stemming from the vehicle chase. On August 18, 2023,

the defendant wrote a letter to the circuit court of McHenry County, noting that he was in jail in

Kenosha County and that he had waived an extradition hearing and signed extradition papers. He

requested a public defender to face the charges in Illinois.

¶5     On December 22, 2023, as the defendant was nearing the end of his period of custody in

Kenosha, the State filed a verified petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1

of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged that the defendant was eligible

for detention and should be denied pretrial release based on a risk of “willful flight for class 3 and

greater felony offenses.” Alternatively, if not detained, the State asserted that there should be

conditions placed on the defendant’s pretrial release.

¶6     That same day, the defendant was present in court for his initial appearance in this case, a

public defender was appointed, and the trial court conducted a detention hearing. The State first

went over the facts of the case. The State noted that a police officer observed the defendant holding

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a cell phone and speaking into the phone while also driving. The officer activated his emergency

lights. The defendant first slowed down and appeared to be pulling over. However, when the

officer slowed down and pulled behind the defendant, the defendant accelerated and began to drive

away at a high rate of speed. The officer activated his sirens and emergency lights and began to

follow the defendant northbound on Wilmot Road. While driving, the defendant committed

multiple traffic offenses. The defendant ultimately crossed the Wisconsin state line and was

stopped by Kenosha County deputies. The officer interviewed the defendant. The defendant stated

that he decided not to stop because he had a suspended license and did not want to get arrested.

A search of the vehicle uncovered open alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, and identification cards

and credit/debit cards belonging to other people. The officer’s investigation indicated that the

defendant was not authorized to be in possession of the aforementioned cards.

¶7     Next, the State argued that eluding the police was intentional conduct aimed at thwarting

prosecution. The State further noted that the defendant had an extensive criminal history in Illinois

dating back to 1995. Many of his arrests were for drug possession and retail theft. In addition, the

defendant’s pretrial services report indicated that he had “geographical movement” in Illinois,

Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Tennessee. The State also noted that the defendant had failed

to appear in court on one occasion in 2009 in Tennessee. For these reasons, the State requested

that the defendant be detained pretrial based on the risk of willful flight.

¶8     The defendant stated that from April 10, 2023, until the date of the hearing, he was in

custody in Wisconsin. While in custody, he participated in a 36-hour per week program that

involved classes geared toward a positive return to society. He was a peer mentor and a leader of

a group. The defendant acknowledged that in McHenry County, in 2012, there was a single bond

forfeiture warrant issued, but it was quashed a week later, “showing that when he did fail to appear

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he immediately rectified that situation.” The defendant noted that his mother, son, and two sisters

all lived in Woodstock and that he had lived in McHenry County for the last 20 years. The

defendant argued that eluding the police was not a proper basis for a finding of willful flight, and

his criminal history in Illinois demonstrated that he had always appeared in court as required. The

defendant acknowledged that a warrant was issued with a cash bond set at $50,000, but that he

was electing to proceed under the Act. The defendant requested that the petition for detention be

denied.

¶9     Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s petition for detention. The trial

court stated that there were so many counts in the complaint that it could foresee “somebody not

wanting to have to deal with all this.” The trial court noted that there were “elements of missing

court dates” and that the charges “involve some element of [flight] as well.” The trial court found

that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant posed a risk of willful flight.

¶ 10   The trial court entered a written form order that same day. In the order the trial court

indicated that aggravated identity theft was a detainable offense, the defendant posed a real and

present threat of willful flight and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate

the threat. In the place on the form order for the trial court to enter its written findings, the trial

court stated that its finding was “based on the proffers offered as well as the evidence on the court

file. The Court finds that the charges involve some element of flight and there is evidence that the

defendant is a flight risk.” The defendant timely appealed from this order. The defendant filed a

memorandum in support of his appeal and the State filed a response.

¶ 11                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12   At the outset we note that, in his notice of appeal, the defendant raised, as grounds for

relief, that (1) the State failed to prove that he committed a detainable offense, (2) the State failed

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to prove that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of others or the community, (3) the

State failed to prove that he posed a risk of willful flight risk and that no conditions could mitigate

that risk, and (4) the trial court erred in its determination that no set of conditions would reasonably

ensure his appearance at later hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony

or Class A misdemeanor. However, in his memorandum, the defendant only presents argument in

support of the third issue. As such, the other issues are abandoned. See People v. Rollins, 2024

IL App (2d) 230372, ¶ 22 (finding defendant abandoned those Rule 604(h) claims raised in the

notice of appeal but not addressed in his memorandum).

¶ 13    On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the State met its

burden of proving (1) that he posed a high likelihood of willful flight and (2) that there were no

conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the risk of willful flight.

¶ 14    In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. Id. §§ 110-

2(a), 110-6.1(e). Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code as amended by the Act.

Id. § 110-1 et seq. Under the Code, as amended by the Act, a defendant’s pretrial release may only

be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e).

¶ 15   Relevant to this appeal, a court may deny a defendant pretrial release if the defendant “has

a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution and is charged with *** [a] felony offense

other than a Class 4 offense.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)(B). The Code defines “willful” flight as:

       “intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution.

       Isolated instances of nonappearance in court alone are not evidence of the risk of willful

       flight. Reoccurrence and patterns of intentional conduct to evade prosecution, along with

       any affirmative steps to communicate or remedy any such missed court date, may be

       considered as factors in assessing future intent to evade prosecution.” Id. § 110-1(f).

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To deny a defendant pretrial release based on willful flight, the trial court must find that the State

proved the following by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the

presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense as set forth in section

110-6.1(a) and (2) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the risk of the

defendant’s willful flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1), (3). Further, in its detention order, the trial court

must “make a written finding summarizing [its] reasons for concluding that the defendant should

be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not *** prevent the

defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 16    We review the court’s decision to deny pretrial release under a bifurcated standard. People

v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Specifically, we review under the manifest-weight-

of-the-evidence standard the court’s factual findings as to dangerousness, flight risk, and whether

conditions of release could mitigate those risks. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of

the evidence only where it is unreasonable or not based on the evidence presented. Id. We review

for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s ultimate determination regarding pretrial release. Id.

An abuse of discretion also occurs only when the trial court’s determination is arbitrary, fanciful,

or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id.

¶ 17    The defendant’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that he

posed a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution. The defendant argues that it was

improper for the trial court to consider the number of charges in this case as a basis for a finding

of willful flight because the nature of the criminal charges alone cannot be a basis to overcome a

defendant’s presumed eligibility for release. The defendant also argues that it was improper for

the trial court to consider the charges of evading the police because such charges cannot be the

basis for a finding that he posed a flight risk.

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¶ 18   In support of this contention, the defendant relies on People v. Sims, 2024 IL App (4th)

231335-U. In Sims, the defendant was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625

ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony. Sims, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, ¶ 4. The

State filed a petition to deny pretrial release based on the defendant having “a high likelihood of

willful flight to avoid prosecution.” Id. ¶ 4. At a detention hearing, in support of its petition, the

State cited the defendant’s extensive criminal history, that he had scored a four out of six on a

“failure to appear” assessment report, and that he had failed to appear in court on one prior

occasion. The State also relied on a probable cause statement from the police. Id. ¶ 5. The facts

showed that the police responded to a report of a car driving erratically on the interstate. The

police started following the vehicle but did not activate emergency lights or sirens. Id. Ultimately,

the driver crashed and ran from the vehicle. The police later found him walking in a cornfield.

Upon investigation, the police discovered that the vehicle had been stolen. Id. ¶ 6.

¶ 19   Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s petition to detain. Id. ¶ 10. The

trial court noted that the defendant had seen the police following him and had tried evade or elude

them. The trial court also noted that the defendant had a prior conviction for resisting a police

officer and noted the defendant’s score on the failure to appear assessment report. Id.

¶ 20   On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by relying on his attempts to

evade arrest as a basis for finding that he posed a high risk for willful flight. Id. ¶ 23. The

reviewing court agreed and stated that:

       “when determining under subsection 110-6.1(a)(8) whether the defendant may be detained

       based on ‘a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution,’ (725 ILCS 5/110-

       6.1(a)(8) (West 2022)) the trial court is to consider only ‘intentional conduct with a purpose

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2024 IL App (2d) 240015

        to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution’ as provided in the Code’s ‘willful flight’

        definition (See id. § 110-1(f)).” Id. ¶ 28.

The reviewing court explained that, while evading arrest could be viewed as obstructing the

criminal justice system, it did not reflect a “thwart[ing of] the judicial process to avoid prosecution”

within the meaning of section 110-1(f) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2022)), as that

phrase specifically referred to a defendant’s willful avoidance of prosecution by failing to appear

in court or engaging in other similar conduct. Sims, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, ¶ 28. The

reviewing court concluded that the trial court erred in relying on the defendant’s attempts to flee

from the police in making a threshold determination of whether the defendant posed a high risk of

willful flight. Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 21    The defendant also relies on People v. Perez, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U. In that case,

the defendant appealed the trial court’s order granting the State’s petition to detain him on the basis

that he posed a high risk of willful flight. Id. ¶ 9. In reversing the trial court, the reviewing court

determined that the trial court had not considered the proper statutory criteria. The reviewing court

noted that “willful flight” was defined in section 110-1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West

2022)). Id. ¶ 12. The reviewing court further stated:

        “Besides this definition, the only other guidance the Code gives to courts for evaluating

        ‘willful flight’ is in section 110-3(c), which tells us ‘a nonappearance in court cured by an

        appearance in response to a summons shall not be considered as evidence of future

        likelihood of appearance in court’ for purposes of willful flight risk assessment. 725 ILCS

        5/110-3(c) (West 2022). From these two sections, we glean that courts can only consider

        recurring, uncured failures to appear as evidence for a high likelihood of willful flight under

        the Code. Here the record indicates defendant failed to appear only once, on October 3,

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2024 IL App (2d) 240015

       2023, yet the court considered it as a ‘condition’ in the willful flight analysis. We hold the

       court improperly considered defendant’s isolated nonappearance as evidence of willful

       flight.” Id.

The reviewing court noted that the trial court was required to first determine whether the defendant

posed a high likelihood of willful flight and, if the defendant did post such a risk, was then required

to address whether there were any conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the

risk of willful flight. Id. ¶ 15. The reviewing court thus reversed the trial court’s decision finding

that the defendant posed a flight risk because the trial court failed to articulate how any of the

evidence in the case proved that the defendant intended to thwart the judicial process to avoid

prosecution. Id.

¶ 22   In the present case, we also conclude that there was not sufficient evidence to support the

trial court’s determination that the defendant posed a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution. Under Sims, the trial court could not consider that the charged offenses included

conduct involving eluding the police and evading arrest when making a threshold determination

of whether the defendant poses a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution. Sims, 2024

IL App (4th) 231335-U, ¶ 28. Further, the trial court could not consider the one bond forfeiture

warrant in McHenry County that was quashed because it was later cured. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

3(c) (West 2022); see also Perez, 2024 IL App (4th) 230967-U, ¶ 12. This leaves only the single

nonappearance in Tennessee in 2009, which also cannot be considered in a threshold determination

of willful flight. Perez, 2024 IL App (4th) 230967-U, ¶ 12 (courts can consider only “recurring,

uncured failures to appear as evidence for a high likelihood of willful flight under the Code”). The

final basis articulated by the trial court for its determination of willful flight was that this case

involved a 25-count complaint and it could foresee someone “not wanting to have to deal with

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this.” However, to justify pretrial detention, the Act requires clear and convincing proof of specific

articulable facts of the case, not generalities about the nature or number of the criminal charges.

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022) (noting the decisions regarding pretrial detention must

be individualized); see also People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18 (“more is required”

to overcome a defendant’s presumed eligibility for release than to focus on the nature of the

criminal charge alone).

¶ 23   Moreover, the record includes substantial evidence that the defendant did not pose a high

likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution. The record shows that the defendant had a lengthy

criminal history in Illinois dating back to 1995. Other than the bond forfeiture warrant, which was

quashed within a week, the record does not indicate that the defendant ever failed to appear for a

court date in Illinois. Further, the record shows that while in Wisconsin the defendant waived an

extradition hearing and signed extradition papers, thus evidencing an intent to appear in McHenry

County to face the charges against him in this case. Finally, the record indicates that the defendant

had family in McHenry County and that he had lived here for the last 20 years. Accordingly, under

the circumstances in this case, the trial court’s determination that the defendant posed a high

likelihood of willful flight was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 24   In so ruling, we note that the defendant’s second contention on appeal is that the State

failed to prove that there were no conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the

risk of willful flight, as required by section 110-6.1(e)(1)(3) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)(1)(3) (West 2022)). We agree. While the State’s petition for detention requested certain

conditions of release should the trial court deny its petition, the State never argued at the detention

hearing that there were no conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the

defendant’s risk of willful flight. Further, the trial court’s written order did not include a written

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finding summarizing why less restrictive conditions would not prevent the defendant’s willful

flight from prosecution as required by section 110-6.1(h)(1) (id. § 110-6.1(h)(1)). Thus, although

the defendant’s second contention has merit, we need not remand this case for the trial court to

address conditions of release in light of our holding that the trial court’s threshold determination

of willful flight was erroneous.

¶ 25                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26   For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

¶ 27   Reversed.

¶ 28   JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.

¶ 29   I agree with my colleagues that the detention order in this case must be reversed, but I

arrive at that conclusion on much narrower grounds. In making its findings, the circuit court said

very little that was specific to this defendant, and its written order contained no additional

information. Taking them together, the circuit court’s findings were insufficient to explain

defendant’s pretrial detention. See People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶¶ 15-20.

¶ 30   I disagree with the majority’s adoption of the unpublished decisions in People v. Sims,

2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, and People v. Perez, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U. In my view,

both decisions are incorrect, as they misinterpret the statutory authority. “Willful flight” is defined

as “intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution.” 725

ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2022). The statute goes on to explain how courts may construe prior missed

court dates, but it does not categorically forbid a court from assessing whether the present offense

demonstrates a high likelihood of willful flight. If that reading were somehow doubtful, then I

would turn to the canon that instructs us to avoid absurd results. Here, defendant stated that he

knew his license was suspended and did not want to be arrested. He then fled from Spring Grove,

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Illinois to Kenosha, Wisconsin, crossing multiple jurisdictions and endangering himself and

others. His conduct was egregious, and it is difficult to imagine a more vivid example of conduct

designed to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution. I do not believe the Act required the

circuit court judge to exclude defendant’s blatant act of willful flight from its consideration.

¶ 31   Although the State did not proceed on dangerousness grounds, running from the police in

a motor vehicle is an inherently dangerous act. It is also obvious evidence of willful flight.

Because I believe the circuit court’s findings were insufficient, I concur in the result, but that does

not mean the circuit court could not have determined defendant’s detention was justified with a

more thorough explanation of its reasoning.

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