Court Opinion

ID: 9695103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:06:45.702036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:08.305420
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 35.
{concurring). I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the court of appeals' decision, which upheld Selena as the legitimate child of Randy, should be affirmed. However, I write separately because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 767.463 may not be applied after genetic tests have been performed. Instead, I would apply § 767.463, and consider the best interest of the child, in order to resolve the present case. While I do not disagree with the majority's use of equitable estop-pel to arrive at its conclusion, I am satisfied that applying § 767.463 and considering the best interest of Selena is preferable to the majority's approach.
¶ 36. The majority opinion concludes that Wis. Stat. § 767.463 is patterned after Wis. Stat. § 767.458(lm), which applies only to marital children and states that a paternity action may not be dismissed once genetic tests have been performed. See majority op., ¶ 24. The majority further contends that, in enacting § 767.463, the legislature intended that a best interest hearing be conducted before genetic tests have been performed, so as to avoid potential constitutional implications that may arise after testing. Id. In addi*409tion, the majority notes that the need for genetic tests may be obviated if a best interest determination is made first. Id.
¶ 37. I would interpret Wis. Stat. § 767.463 as permitting the dismissal of a paternity action when in the best interest of the child, even after genetic tests have been performed.1 The clause "if genetic tests have not yet been taken" solely modifies the language preceding it. Because no such modifier is included regarding the dismissal of a paternity action, it appears that a court has discretion to dismiss a case, regardless of whether genetic tests have already been performed. Given the positioning of the modifying clause in the sentence, I would allow a court to dismiss the action even if genetic tests have already been performed. To interpret this language any other way would render the "best interest of the child" provision, under the circumstances here, superfluous. This court has previously stated that each word in a statute must be given effect, so as not to render any part of the statute superfluous. Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶ 16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.
¶ 38. Moreover, if Wis. Stat. § 767.463 is interpreted to permit dismissal of a paternity action only if genetic tests have not yet been performed, then § 767.463 would essentially serve the same function as Wis. Stat. § 767.458(lm). The inclusion of the modifying clause with respect to the first half of the sentence *410demonstrates the legislature's intent to achieve an outcome different from that provided for in § 767.458(lm).
¶ 39. I agree with the circuit court's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 767.463 has a different application than does Wis. Stat. § 767.458(lm). The circuit court aptly noted that the language of § 767.463 does not limit its application to the beginning of an action or prior to genetic testing. Section 767.463 simply grants courts discretion in that they may refuse to order genetic tests if they have not, thus far, been performed.
¶ 40. To read Wis. Stat. § 767.463 as allowing for dismissal only if genetic tests have not been performed is to remove effectively any best interest of the child considerations from the process. This cannot have been the legislature's intent. The best interest of the child is a significant consideration throughout Wisconsin's family law, including paternity matters. See In re Paternity of R.W.L., 116 Wis. 2d 150, 158, 341 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("(T)he primary interest in the paternity action is that of the child."). In In re Paternity of C.A.S., 161 Wis. 2d 1015, 1036, 468 N.W.2d 719 (1991), we further noted that considering the best interest of the child "reflect(s) a strong public policy of this state." The majority opinion's conclusion that § 767.463 must be read so as to preclude a best interest determination, after genetic tests have been performed, goes against Wisconsin's emphasis on the best interest of the child, and appears to be contrary to the intent of the legislature.
¶ 41. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

 1n relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 767.463 states the following:
(T)he court or circuit or supplemental court commissioner under s. 757.675(2)(g) may, with respect to a man, refuse to order genetic tests, if genetic tests have not yet been taken, and dismiss the action if the court or circuit or supplemental court commissioner determines that a judicial determination of whether the man is the father of the child is not in the best interest of the child.