Court Opinion

ID: 9959752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:02:57.355383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.200610
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-2108
                 LT Case No. 2020-CF-002718-A
                 _____________________________

SCOTT RUDOLPH,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Heidi Davis, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Allison A. Havens,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J.
Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

                         April 12, 2024

MAKAR, J.

    The constitutional “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures” was adopted to protect against the types of
governmental abuses of power that allowed people, their homes,
and their property to be subject to warrantless intrusions and
confiscations in Britain and its colonies. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly reminded us, this revered Fourth Amendment right is
first and foremost a protection of the home, a safe-guarded private
space for which a judicial warrant is necessary before government
can invade the premises. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)
(“But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first
among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (citation omitted)). Non-
judicial intrusions into the home, such as a warrantless entry by
law enforcement, are impermissible with limited exceptions.

     With this backdrop, the issue in this case involves the
warrantless intrusion into the home of Scott Rudolph, who
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, in
which he argued that sheriff’s officers violated his federal and state
constitutional rights when they used a flashlight to peer through
the opaque black vinyl wrapping that encased and made private
the enclosed front porch of his home. Because the officers exceeded
what is permissible for a “knock and talk” visit, entered Rudolph’s
home without a warrant, lacked reasonable suspicion or probable
cause for the search or entry, and had no exigent circumstances,
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

                                  I.

     Like much of Florida, Lake County is home to senior (55+)
retirement parks where people live year-round or visit during the
winter months. The county has become a retirement destination,
best exemplified by The Villages® to its northwest, a sprawling
retirement community (including into Lake County) which was the
“fastest growing U.S. metro area between 2021 and 2022,
increasing [in population] by 7.5%.”* One of the county’s senior
retirement parks is Holiday RV Village, a 200+ acre campus with

    * Large Southern Cities Lead Nation in Population Growth,

U.S.     Dep’t    of     Commerce,     (May      18,    2023),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/subcounty-
metro-micro-estimates.html.

                                  2
hundreds of recreational vehicle hookups and hundreds of homes
on small lots, making the community densely packed.

     In October 2020, tragedy befell a husband and wife residing
in one of those homes. Around 9:00 pm, the wife heard a knock on
their front door followed by a gunshot. She found her husband near
the front door with a fatal wound to his head and broken glass
strewn on the front steps. Officers were soon on the scene, going
door to door to canvass nearby homes and seek witnesses to what
happened.

     Two of the officers, working as a team, knocked on three or
four doors in the neighborhood but found no eyewitnesses. They
returned to the victim’s home where the supervising officer told
them to go to Rudolph’s home, which was next door. At that time,
neither officer knew who resided at the home, nor did they have
reason to believe that its owner was a suspect or that probable
cause existed to conduct a warrantless search; instead, it was
simply another attempt to see if a neighbor had seen or heard
anything.

     Rudolph’s home was “really dark,” suggesting no one was
home. The officers approached and knocked on the front door of the
enclosed porch, which was physically attached to the residence,
announcing their presence as law enforcement officers. From the
front doorstep, the officers were unable to see anything inside the
enclosed porch because the porch screens were covered with a
reflective opaque black vinyl that encased the entire room, acting
as a protective barrier against sunlight and the elements. See
Appendix. The front door had a welcome mat and a doorbell, which
the officers did not attempt to ring, testifying they did not see it.
The front door had a visible external lock but was unlocked at the
time of the incident.

     After receiving no response, the officers knocked a second
time. Again, no one answered. At that point, one of the officers
decided to use a flashlight to attempt to look inside. It was
impossible to see into the enclosed space without the flashlight (“Q:
In fact, you couldn’t see inside of this room without your flashlight?
A: Correct.”). The flashlight enabled the officer to see into the
interior, which was furnished with two dining tables, a side table,

                                  3
upholstered lounge chairs and dining chairs, a television, vertical
blinds, lamps, fans, a bookcase, and various personal belongings
(e.g., shoes); the room had carpeting, electricity, and air
conditioning. See Appendix.

     Assisted by the flashlight, the officer saw a rifle propped up
against one of the tables; she also saw that a sliding glass door
leading deeper into the residence was open. After back-up was
called, one of the officers opened the front door, entered the
interior, and announced her presence. Once inside, she went
through the sliding glass door into the next room where she saw
Rudolph sitting in a chair with a handgun on the floor. Rudolph
did not resist and was handcuffed and secured in a patrol car
without incident. He was later charged with the first-degree
murder of his neighbor and ultimately entered a plea subject to
appellate review of his motion to suppress.

                                II.

    The first constitutional question is whether Rudolph’s
enclosed porch—encased with opaque black vinyl and furnished
and used like an interior room—is a constitutionally protected
area of the home for which a warrant (or warrant exception) is
required to enter. We find that it is.

    The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures includes a home and its curtilage—the area
“immediately surrounding and associated with the home . . .
[which is regarded to be] part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). The Supreme Court has
identified four factors that relate to curtilage:

    the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
    home, whether the area is included within an enclosure
    surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which
    the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to
    protect the area from observation by people passing by.

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Under these
guideposts, a “property’s front porch and door area generally fall

                                4
within the constitutionally protected curtilage of the home.” State
v. Crowley, 232 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017); see generally
Wayne A. Logan, Florida Search & Seizure, § 4.30, Particular
Applications: Porches at 4-8 (2002 Ed.) (“Under the Dunn multi-
factor test, the porch of a single-family home would appear clearly
within a home’s curtilage.”). Consistent with Dunn, courts consider
steps taken to enclose and make an area private, such as adding
physical or visual barriers that reflect an owner’s subjective
expectation of privacy. See Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 524
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Putting up fences, or as in this case putting
up a visually impenetrable vinyl barrier and an external lock, are
affirmative steps to exclude the public and others from peering into
or gaining access to the space. Bainter v. State, 135 So. 3d 517, 520
(Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

     A front porch permanently attached to a home—whether
enclosed or open air—is normally within the home’s curtilage.
Indeed, each of the Dunn factors are present, demonstrating that
Rudolph’s enclosed porch is a constitutionally protected area. It
was a permanent part of his residence and was entirely covered
with an opaque black vinyl that made it impossible to see into the
room with the naked eye. The porch was furnished as if an interior
room, with multiple tables and chairs, a television, and personal
belongings; it had electricity, air conditioning, fans, and other
items indicative of a home’s interior. The porch door had a doorbell,
a welcome mat, and a lock, serving as the front door to the home.
These details collectively make clear that Rudolph’s enclosed and
visually impenetrable porch was a private space, like the other
interior portions of the home in which Rudolph had a reasonable
expectation of privacy; it is objectively reasonable in a state that
has popularized the concept of “Florida Rooms,” i.e., enclosed
sunrooms, which are ubiquitous and oftentimes made private by
the use of blinds, shades, and, in this case, an opaque black vinyl
covering. See Bainter, 135 So. 3d at 520 (stating that the judicial
inquiry “is whether the defendant exhibited an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable”).

     The second constitutional question is whether the use of a
flashlight to look inside the enclosed porch, after no one responded

                                 5
to the officers’ knocks, was an impermissible intrusion under the
circumstances. We find that it was.

     There is an implied license for law enforcement to approach a
home’s front door to conduct a “knock and talk” without needing
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to do so. Jardines, 569 U.S.
at 8 (“This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach
the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”). A
“knock and talk” is “only justified as a consensual encounter
during which officers are authorized to ‘approach a dwelling on a
defined path, knock on the front door, briefly await an answer, and
either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or
immediately depart.’” Calloway v. State, 118 So. 3d 277, 279 (Fla.
5th DCA 2013) (citations omitted).

     As a general matter, anything that can plainly be seen with
the naked eye from a lawful vantage point is not recognized as
private or deserving of constitutional protection. Powell v. State,
120 So. 3d 577, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“[T]he resident does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is plainly viewed
from the vantage point of a temporary visitor who walks along the
pathway or stands at the doorway.”). “However, knock-and-talk
activity by law enforcement that diverts from the customary path
to a home’s front door, or that exceeds other objectively reasonable
bounds, can present Fourth Amendment problems requiring the
suppression of evidence.” Crowley, 232 So. 3d at 476. For example,
police officers may approach a home and its curtilage to do a “knock
and talk” but not with a drug-sniffing canine. Jardines, 569 U.S.
at 9 (“An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation
assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker.”).
Likewise, the implied and limited license to approach a home’s
front entryway and curtilage is not an invitation to reveal and
explore its otherwise private interior with a flashlight. It’s one
thing to have a visitor knock on the front door; it’s quite another
for that same visitor to use invasive means to invade the privacy
of the interior. Id. (“To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine
(even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring
the front path with a metal detector or marching his bloodhound
into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would

                                   6
inspire most of us to—well, call the police.”).

     Here, the officers’ testimony makes clear that the rifle inside
the enclosed porch was not plainly viewed from the front step;
indeed, it could not be seen at all because the impenetrable vinyl
porch screen made it impossible to see what was inside without
external illumination. Cf. Koehler v. State, 444 So. 2d 1032, 1033
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (no expectation of privacy on unenclosed front
porch which was exposed to public view); State v. Detlefson, 335 So.
2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy on front porch of home where delivery men and others
could observe the plants). It was only when a flashlight was used
to peer into the private space that the rifle and the open sliding
glass door into the next room were seen. Because the rifle was not
plainly viewed from the officers’ vantage point outside of the
enclosed porch, the officers’ use of a flashlight to look past the
screen constituted an unlawful intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area. Police officers are often called upon to use
flashlights in nighttime situations, such as illuminating a public
pathway, structure or space, which is permissible; what occurred
here, however, was quite different—the flashlight was being used
to peer into an otherwise impenetrable private space.

     As the First District explained in Powell, “[u]nder certain
circumstances, implicit permission may exist to look through an
un-curtained window while standing on a front porch momentarily
to see whether the resident is approaching the door, assuming no
unreasonable means or devices are used.” 120 So. 3d at 587
(emphasis added). Here, no un-curtained window existed; instead,
the officer used a flashlight to break the close, allowing her to peer
into a private space. The officers, as they both testified, knocked
on Rudolph’s porch door solely to find witnesses. When Rudolph
didn’t answer the door, the officers’ license to engage in a “knock
and talk” ended; it was thereby improper to linger and use a
flashlight to peer inside in a manner no different than peering
through a keyhole. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9 (noting that officers
cannot position themselves at a home’s doorstep and “peer into the
house through binoculars with impunity. That is not the law, as
even the State concedes.”); see also Commonwealth v. Murray, 223
A.2d 102, 110 (Pa. 1966) (stating that “if detectives and private
intermeddlers may, without legal responsibility, peer through

                                  7
keyholes, eavesdrop at the table, listen at the transom and over
the telephone, and crawl under the bed, then all constitutional
guarantees become [a] meaningless aggregation of words, as
disconnected as a broken necklace whose beads have scattered on
the floor”).

     One of the officers explained that it was common practice in
the jurisdiction to enter private spaces, such as enclosed porches
with beds, furniture, blinds, and other indicia of privacy, when no
one answers their knocks; in these situations, they enter the space
and attempt to locate and knock on another door. This practice is
impermissible. As Justice Scalia noted in Jardines, officers “may
only approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer)
leave.” 569 U.S. at 8. It is well-established that officers may not
“look into windows or enter other protected areas around the home
simply because a knock on the front door goes unanswered.” Id.;
see State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408, 408−09 (Fla. 1981)
(concluding that entering backyard after no answer at front door
was an unlawful search); Lollie v. State, 14 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Fla.
1st DCA 2009) (finding that constitutional protection of side and
backyard areas of home “does not depend on whether someone
might be home”); Waldo v. State, 975 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA
2008) (holding that entry into side and backyards was unlawful
after “nobody answered” knock on front door); see also United
States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1154 (D. Or. 2011)
(concluding that entering curtilage and standing “within inches of
a window” to peer into the home as way to contact an occupant was
unlawful). As such, the practice of entering private enclosed
porches after initial knocks go unanswered to search for another
door within the home upon which to knock is insupportable. See
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9 n.4 (“[N]o one is impliedly invited to enter
the protected premises of the home in order to do nothing but
conduct a search.”).

     Finally, no exigent circumstances or other warrant exception
existed that would justify the use of a flashlight to peer into the
enclosed porch and enter the home after no one responded to the
officers’ knocks. The officers had no suspicion that an occupant was
a suspect or that probable cause to enter and search the home
existed (“Q: So at the time you chose to enter [Rudolph’s] home,

                                 8
there was no suspicion that he was a suspect and there certainly
was no probable cause that he was a suspect? A: Correct.”). No hot
or fresh pursuit was afoot; no emergency aid to occupants was
necessary nor was destruction of evidence taking place. The
officers were simply looking for possible witnesses, which is not an
exigent circumstance that makes resort to the warrant process
impractical. See Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA
2003) (“The sine qua non of the exigent circumstances exception is
‘a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant.’” (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)));
Herring v. State, 168 So. 3d 240, 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[I]f time
to get a warrant exists, the enforcement agency must use that time
to obtain the warrant.” (quoting Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d
716, 718 (Fla. 1977))). That the officers obtained a warrant soon
thereafter demonstrates this point.

     For the foregoing reasons, we agree that an unconstitutional
search and seizure occurred and that the trial court erred in
denying the motion to suppress. The officers had no authority,
after their knocks went unanswered, to use a flashlight or other
device to peer into a home’s enclosed porch that was heavily
masked with impenetrable black vinyl, furnished as an interior,
and designed to protect the owner’s reasonable privacy interest.
We do not address or opine on whether it was inevitable that the
weapon in Rudolph’s home would have been discovered or the
extent to which evidence or statements would be subject to
suppression, only that the manner by which the weapon was
initially discovered was impermissible.

    REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

WALLIS, J., concurs.
MACIVER, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

                                 9
                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                              Case No. 5D2022-2108
                                      LT Case No. 2020-CF-002718-A

MACIVER, J., concurring specially, with opinion.

     I concur with the majority’s holding in this case because we
are bound by the precedent of Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1
(2013). Because I am critical of that decision for the reasons stated
in the dissent by Justice Alito, I am equally critical of our holding
here. Simply put, I believe that the reasonableness of an officer’s
intrusion onto the curtilage of private property needs to be moored
to something more than the courts’ determination of the property
owner’s subjective intent in granting an implicit license. If a
private person’s activity would not violate some positive
prohibition (i.e., trespass) then the same activity by a law
enforcement officer should not be deemed an unreasonable search.
My view, though, would admittedly be a reversion to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence before Jardines; I therefore reluctantly
concur.

                                 10
APPENDIX

   11