Court Opinion

ID: 9961272
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Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:47.397577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:31.209152
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                                                         RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
                                                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2023-SC-0010-MR

JEFFREY ARINGTON                                                       APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM CARLISLE CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                             NO. 22-CR-00059

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                AFFIRMING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART

      In September 2020, a minor child, M.S. 1, alleged that Jeffrey Arington

raped her at his property in Carlisle County. A Carlisle County grand jury later

indicted Arington on one count of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree

sodomy, one count of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, and one

count of second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. A two-day trial took

place in September 2022, and a Carlisle County jury convicted Arington of all

counts charged against him. The Carlisle County Circuit Court sentenced

Arington to 51 years of imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s

recommendation. Arington now appeals to this Court as a matter of right, KY.

CONST. 110(2)(b), and argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his

motions for directed verdicts of acquittal as to his rape and sodomy charges, (2)

      1 This Court will refer to the minor victim by her initials.
the trial court’s instructions to the jury deprived him of his right to be free from

double jeopardy, (3) the trial court erred in permitting a Kentucky State Police

Sergeant to testify without first requiring the Commonwealth to lay the proper

foundation for that testimony, and (4) during sentencing, the trial court erred

in admitting victim impact statements from individuals who were not the

victim. This Court vacates Arington’s conviction for first-degree unlawful

transaction with a minor, and affirms his remaining convictions.

                                 I.   Background
      M.S. is the cousin of Arington’s son, and on September 17, 2020, M.S.,

then 15 years old, planned to visit Arington’s farm in Carlisle County for the

weekend. M.S. had been to Arington’s farm on multiple occasions and had

frequent interactions with Arington. Arington picked M.S. up from her home in

Marshall County and drove her to his farm. According to M.S., Arington offered

her multiple alcoholic beverages that he had in his truck during the drive to

Carlisle County. M.S. testified that she was not an experienced drinker at the

time, but drank four Smirnoff Ices. M.S. also testified that Arington offered her

his marijuana pipe, and she took two hits from that pipe. According to M.S.,

Arington stopped at two different gas stations on their drive and purchased a

case of beer at the second gas station. M.S. also testified that she drank three

or four more Smirnoff Ices that Arington offered her. Upon arriving at

Arington’s farm, M.S. was told that she would be sleeping in a camper on the

property. M.S. testified that she attempted to walk her dog before going into the

camper, and that she was dizzy. M.S. testified that once she went inside the

                                         2
camper she sat down on a couch and lost consciousness. She further testified

that Arington entered the camper at some point during the night and she

regained consciousness.

      M.S. testified that Arington sat on the bed inside the camper, told her to

come lay down on the bed, and instructed her to take her clothes off. M.S.

testified that she complied and took her shorts and underwear off. M.S. also

testified that she saw a handgun sitting on a nearby side table, but that she

did not know whether the gun was loaded or not. M.S. testified that Arington

then took her phone from her and placed it in another room. M.S. testified that

Arington then pushed her legs apart and licked her vagina for a few minutes

before putting on a condom and inserting his penis into her vagina. M.S.

testified that Arington then grabbed the back of her head, put his penis inside

her mouth, and used her head to move her mouth back and forth on his penis.

M.S. testified that Arington grabbed and moved her head because she was

falling asleep or was losing consciousness at the time. M.S. testified that

Arington then pushed her legs up, got on top of her, and inserted his penis

back into her vagina. M.S. testified that Arington ejaculated, told her to get

dressed, and left the camper for the night.

      M.S. testified broadly that she did not consent to any of the sexual acts

that Arington performed on her or that he made her perform on him. Rather,

when repeatedly asked by the Commonwealth whether she thought she might

get hurt or be in danger if she did not go along with Arington’s actions, M.S.

answered affirmatively each time. She testified that her fear that Arington

                                        3
would physically harm her was primarily induced by the gun she saw in the

bedroom of the camper and the fact that Arington took her phone.

      M.S. testified that she felt hungover the next morning and did not

remember what had happened to her the night before. She testified that shortly

after she woke up, Arington came into the camper and suggested that she

shower. M.S. joined Arington and others on the farm for activities throughout

that Friday, September 18, 2020. M.S. testified that at one point during the

day she called her then-boyfriend, B.S., and told him she thought she had a

bad dream. M.S. testified that she then realized that Arington had sexually

assaulted her. B.S. advised M.S. to speak to her mother. However, M.S.

testified that she did not call her mother until Saturday morning, September

19, 2020, once Arington had left the farm.

      M.S.’s mother took her to a local hospital where she was examined by

medical professionals who collected a sexual assault kit. Kentucky State Police

Sergeant Aaron Jestes was dispatched to the hospital to meet with M.S. and

her mother. He took possession of the sexual assault kit. Sgt. Jestes testified

that after interviewing M.S., he went to Arington’s property to interview

Arington. Sgt. Jestes testified that Arington denied providing M.S. with alcohol

and marijuana, denied having sex with M.S., and stated that he had slept in a

residence that was in the process of being constructed on his property the

night that M.S. alleged the sexual assault had occurred. With Arington’s

consent, Sgt. Jestes searched the property and collected a buccal swab from

Arington, as well as bedding from the camper. Sgt. Jestes testified that he

                                        4
found Smirnoff Ice and Bud Light beers in the refrigerator of the camper, but

did not find any marijuana, drug paraphernalia, or a condom or its wrapper in

his search. Sgt. Jestes also testified that he did not find any empty alcohol

containers in Arington’s truck. Sgt. Jestes also testified that M.S. had told him

Arington had purchased Miller Lite beers at the gas station on their way to

Arington’s farm, but Sgt. Jestes never found any Miller Lite containers while

searching the property.

      Sgt. Jestes further testified that based on M.S.’s description, he was later

able to locate the gas station in Graves County where Arington and M.S. had

stopped on their drive. Sgt. Jestes testified that he obtained surveillance

footage from a nearby car dealership that showed a red truck with identifying

features similar to those on Arington’s truck pull into the gas station on the

evening of September 17. Sgt. Jestes obtained records and a receipt from the

gas station that showed someone had purchased a pack of Miller Lite beers and

a condom at 10:33 p.m. that evening. However, the age verification on the gas

station receipt did not match Arington’s birthdate.

      M.S.’s sexual assault kit was sent to the KSP crime lab. There, analysts

analyzed multiple swabs from M.S., a cutting from the panties that M.S. was

wearing when she visited the hospital, and the buccal swab from Arington.

Sgt. Jestes testified that M.S. had informed him that she and her then-

boyfriend B.S. were sexually active with one another in the days or weeks prior

to the sexual assault. Accordingly, the KSP crime lab also analyzed a buccal

swab from B.S. A KSP analyst testified that semen was detected on M.S.’s

                                        5
vaginal and external genital swabs, and that presumptive testing was positive

for saliva detected on M.S.’s panties. Another KSP analyst testified that her

tests revealed DNA from two different individuals was present on the cutting of

M.S.’s panties. A different KSP analyst testified that DNA discovered on M.S.’s

panties was consistent with Arington and his paternal relatives. She testified

that the DNA match was 1,660 times more likely to occur if Arington or

someone from his paternal line had contributed to the DNA profile.

      Sometime after Sgt. Jestes spoke with Arington at his property, Arington

went missing. Sgt. Jestes testified that a boat belonging to Arington was

discovered mangled in a local river and that Arington’s truck was located

nearby. Sgt. Jestes testified that Arington was eventually discovered alive

roughly a week later in the nearby woods. Arington’s ex-wife, Summer Koons,

testified that sometime after M.S. alleged that Arington had raped her, Arington

sent Koons a letter in the mail, but told her not to read it. Koons testified that

Arington implied the letter was a suicide note. Arington was eventually arrested

after Sgt. Jestes received the KSP crime lab’s analysis of M.S.’s sexual assault

kit. After Arington’s arrest, Koons read Arington’s letter and gave it to Sgt.

Jestes. That letter was admitted into evidence at Arington’s trial. Relevantly,

Arington wrote to Koons that, “There is evidence that I had intercourse with

[M.S.]. If it’s true, and I’m thinking it is, then I have lost everything including

my soul, for I have caused a child to stumble.”

      In all, the Commonwealth called 10 witnesses during its case in chief

and Arington called one witness of his own, his mother. At the close of the

                                          6
Commonwealth’s case, Arington moved for directed verdicts on each of his rape

and sodomy charges. Arington later renewed that motion just prior to the trial

court’s reading of the jury instructions. The trial court denied both of

Arington’s motions. The jury deliberated for less than one hour, and found

Arington guilty of each charged offense. The jury recommended Arington

receive a 51-year aggregate sentence. Five individuals offered victim impact

statements at Arington’s final sentencing, and the trial court sentenced

Arington to 51 years of imprisonment.

      Arington now appeals to this Court.

                      II.   Motions for Directed Verdicts
      Arington argues to this Court that he was entitled to directed verdicts of

acquittal on his first-degree rape charge and both of his first-degree sodomy

charges because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of the

necessary element of forcible compulsion. We now affirm the trial court’s denial

of Arington’s motions for directed verdicts.

      This Court solidified its directed verdict standard in Commonwealth v.

Benham:

      On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purposes of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony.

                                        7
816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). “So long as the Commonwealth produces

more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges, a defendant’s

motion for directed verdict should be denied.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 617

S.W.3d 321, 324 (Ky. 2020). “On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict

is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury

to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of

acquittal.” Benham, 816 S.W.3d at 187.

      “A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when: (a) He engages in

sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion[.]” KRS

510.040(1)(a). “A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when: (a) He

engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person by forcible

compulsion[.]” KRS 510.070(1)(a).

             “‘Forcible compulsion’ means physical force or threat of
             physical force, express or implied, which places a person in
             fear of immediate death, physical injury to self or another
             person, fear of the immediate kidnap of self or another
             person, or fear of any offense under this chapter. Physical
             resistance on the part of the victim shall not be necessary to
             meet this definition[.]”

KRS 510.010(2).

      This Court has interpreted the statutes in KRS Chapter 510 to mean that

“forcible compulsion must be the means by which a defendant secures sexual

intercourse [or deviate sexual intercourse] with a victim for the conduct to

qualify as first-degree rape [or first-degree sodomy].” Yates v. Commonwealth,

430 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Ky. 2014) Perhaps put more simply, the illicit sexual act

“must be the result of an act or threat of physical force done by the defendant.”

                                         8
Id. As stated in KRS 510.010(2), forcible compulsion “can be accomplished in

two ways: by physical force or by threat of physical force.” Id. (emphasis

added). “In determining whether the victim felt threatened to engage in sex or

feared harm from the attacker, a subjective test is applied[,]” meaning the

statute does not require that the victim’s fear be “reasonable.” Newcomb v.

Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 80 (Ky. 2013) (citing James v. Commonwealth,

360 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Ky. 2012)); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 44

(Ky. 2017).

      At trial, M.S. testified that Arington never “physically threatened her” and

that he never told her “I’m going to hurt you”—but certain “cues” made her feel

threatened before Arington raped and sodomized her, namely the presence of a

handgun she saw on a table inside the camper and the fact that Arington took

her phone from her and placed it in another room. We conclude this evidence

was sufficient to support a finding of forcible compulsion and Arington’s

charges for first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy.

      In regard to the handgun, M.S. testified that she saw the gun once she

came into the bedroom of the camper where Arington was sitting. She testified

that she did not know whether the gun was loaded but it caused her to be

afraid. When asked whether it was unusual for there to be firearms present on

Arington’s property, M.S. testified, “No, but they were all in a safe. They were

all rifles and shotguns. The one that was beside the bed was a handgun.” She

stated she felt threatened by the handgun because, “if a gun had gone off

nobody would’ve suspected anything.”

                                        9
      In regard to her phone, M.S. testified that she had access to her phone

the entire time she was at Arington’s property, except for the timeframe he took

it from her while inside the camper. She further testified that Arington’s act of

taking her phone was the “number one” thing that caused her to feel

threatened just prior to the rape and sodomy. M.S. also generally testified that

“if a gun is just sitting there and your phone is taken, you know that that’s a

threat in general.”

      We have no trouble holding that the unusual presence of a handgun,

outside of the safe where M.S. knew guns to be kept, and in the same room

where Arington had instructed M.S. to lay down and remove her clothes, could

have implicitly suggested to M.S. that Arington intended to harm her with that

gun if she did not submit to his sexual advances. We observe this implicit

threat or tacit understanding was undoubtedly bolstered by the fact that

Arington took M.S.’s phone and removed it from the room where the handgun

was located. This Court has previously noted a “gun lying within reach” of a

Defendant as being contributory to a finding of forcible compulsion. See May v.

Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-000653-MR, 2007 WL 2404445, *5 (Ky. Aug. 23,

2007) (“[Victim] testified that Appellant intimidated her and her mother into

making a video of Appellant and [Victim] having sex because Appellant had a

gun lying within reach.”). M.S.’s testimony regarding the handgun was

certainly more than the “scintilla” required to prove that Arington had made an

implied threat to physically harm her if she did not acquiesce to his actions.

Taylor, 617 S.W.3d at 324.

                                        10
      Arington argues that previous statements M.S. made to Sgt. Jestes

denying that Arington ever threatened her should overcome her trial testimony

that she was threatened. However, we conclude that the jury was entitled to

believe whichever pieces of the conflicting evidence that it found credible. In

ruling on Arington’s directed verdict motions, the trial court was required to

reserve all questions of credibility and weight to the jury. Benham, 816 S.W.2d

at 187.

      Accordingly, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to make a

finding of forcible compulsion, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of

Arington’s motions for directed verdicts of acquittal as to his first-degree rape

and first-degree sodomy charges.

                        III.   Double Jeopardy Violation

      Arington now argues that the trial court’s instructions to the jury lacked

necessary specificity and required the jury to make inconsistent findings of

fact, thus depriving him of his right to be free from double jeopardy. Arington

concedes that he did not previously object to the trial court’s jury instructions

on double jeopardy grounds and requests palpable error review pursuant to

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. “A palpable error is one

resulting in ‘manifest injustice,’ i.e. a ‘probability of a different result or error so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.’”

Hunt v. Commonwealth, 326 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Martin v.

Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006)). This Court has previously held

that double jeopardy violations result in manifest injustice and warrant

                                          11
reversal of conviction. Towe v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 355, 358-59 (Ky.

2021) (citing Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641, 652 (Ky. 2009)).

      The trial court instructed the jury on one count of first-degree rape

(Instruction No. 5) and one count of first-degree unlawful transaction with a

minor (Instruction No. 6). The jury convicted Arington of both counts. Arington

now alleges that the trial court’s instructions as to these counts were so

unspecific as to allow the jury to convict him of both crimes for the same

criminal act: one act of “sexual intercourse.”

       “‘Sexual intercourse’ means sexual intercourse in its
      ordinary sense and includes penetration of the sex organs of
      one person by any body part or a foreign object manipulated
      by another person. Sexual intercourse occurs upon any
      penetration, however slight; emission is not required. ‘Sexual
      intercourse’ does not include penetration of the sex organ by
      any body part or a foreign object in the course of the
      performance of generally recognized health-care practices[.]”

KRS 510.010(8). The trial court instructed the jury as to this definition in

Instruction No. 4.

      As previously stated, a conviction of first-degree rape requires a finding

that the defendant engaged in “sexual intercourse” either “with another person

by forcible compulsion” or “with another person who is incapable of consent.”

KRS 510.040(1). The trial court’s instruction on first-degree rape, Instruction

No. 5, stated as follows:

      You, the Jury, will find Defendant, Jeffrey R. Arington, guilty under
      this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
      beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
             A. That in this county on or about the 17-18th day of
                September, 2020 and before the finding of the Indictment
                herein, the Defendant, Jeffrey R. Arington, engaged in
                sexual intercourse with M.S., a minor;
                                        12
             AND
             B. That the Defendant, Jeffrey R. Arington, did so by forcible
                compulsion.

(Emphasis added).

      Alternatively, a conviction of first-degree unlawful transaction with a

minor requires a finding that the defendant “knowingly induce[d], assist[ed], or

cause[d] a minor to engage in” either “(a) Illegal sexual activity” or “(b) Illegal

controlled substances activity other than activity involving marijuana or salvia .

. . .” KRS 530.064(1). This Court has previously held that the statute’s phrase,

“‘to induce’ signifies a successful persuasion; that the act has been effective

and the desired result obtained, and that ‘to engage’ denotes action and means

to employ one’s self; to take part in. Thus, to complete the offense, the minor

must consent to and actively participate in the activity.” Combs v.

Commonwealth, 198 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Ky. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) overruled on other grounds by Ray v.

Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250 (Ky. 2020). Assumedly, the trial court

attempted to reflect this interpretation of the statutory language in Instruction

No. 4, when it defined “illegal sexual activity” for the jury as, “Any and all

consensual sexual contact with a minor under the age of Sixteen (16).”

However, the trial court’s remaining instructions curiously never referenced

“illegal sexual activity” or consent again. Rather, the trial court’s instruction on

first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, Instruction No. 6, stated as

follows:

      You will find the Defendant, Jeffrey R. Arington, guilty of
      Unlawful Transaction With a Minor First Degree, Illegal Sex
                                          13
      Act, Under 16 Years of Age, under this Instruction if, and
      only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
      doubt all of the following:
             A. That in this county from on or about the 17-18th
                 day September 2020, and before the finding of the
                 indictment herein, the Defendant Jeffrey R.
                 Arington, knowingly induced, assisted or caused
                 the minor, M.S. to engage in sexual intercourse;
             AND
             B. That M.S. was less than 16 years of age;
             AND
             C. That the Defendant, Jeffrey R. Arington, knew that
                 M.S. was less than 16 years of age.

(Emphasis added).

      We have no doubt that an act of “sexual intercourse,” as defined in KRS

510.010(8) and Instruction No. 4, could constitute the requisite sexual activity

needed to convict Arington of unlawful transaction with a minor under

Instruction No. 6. However, the trial court’s conditioning of liability on a finding

of “sexual intercourse” without differentiating this act of sexual intercourse

from the act of sexual intercourse needed to convict Arington of first-degree

rape created an opportunity for a double jeopardy violation.

      At trial, M.S. testified to four distinct acts of sexual contact: that

Arington had licked her vagina (deviate sexual intercourse), penetrated her

vagina with his penis (sexual intercourse), put his penis in her mouth (deviate

sexual intercourse), and penetrated her vagina with his penis again (sexual

intercourse). In light of the trial court’s failure to differentiate between the two

acts of sexual intercourse referenced in its instructions, it is entirely possible

that the jury might have convicted Arington of first-degree rape and first-degree

unlawful transaction with a minor for one singular act of sexual intercourse.

                                         14
We note that the trial court’s remaining instructions did not instruct the jury

that it was prohibited from considering the same act on multiple counts, nor

did the Commonwealth seek to differentiate the instructions during its closing

argument.

      The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution, and KRS

505.020, generally preclude the Commonwealth from convicting a criminal

defendant of multiple offenses for the same criminal act. Towe v.

Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d at 358. KRS 505.020(1)(b) specifically prohibits

the prosecution of multiple offenses arising from the same criminal act when

“[i]nconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the

offenses[.]” Here, it is readily apparent that inconsistent findings of fact would

be required to find that Arington both forcibly compelled M.S. to engage in an

act of sexual intercourse (first-degree rape) and knowingly induced, assisted, or

caused M.S. to consensually engage in the same act of sexual intercourse (first-

degree unlawful transaction with a minor). Forcible compulsion in and of itself

is evidence of lack of consent. Yates, 430 S.W.3d at 889. Thus, because this

Court has no assurance that the jury did not premise Arington’s liability for

both crimes on the same act of sexual intercourse, and those crimes require

inconsistent findings of fact, a double jeopardy violation necessarily arises.

Even assuming that the jury properly attributed each crime to a separate,

distinct act of sexual intercourse, we are equally as certain that such a verdict

could not stand. There was no evidence elicited at trial that could have led a

                                        15
reasonable jury to believe that M.S. had consented to engage in one act of

sexual intercourse but was forcibly compelled to engage in the other.

      The remedy for statutory double jeopardy violations involving

inconsistent findings of fact is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense.

Kiper v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 736, 746 (Ky. 2012). Because both

convictions carry a Class B Felony designation, we vacate the offense with the

lesser sentence: first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor.

        IV.   Sgt. Jestes’s Testimony Regarding Gas Station Receipt

      Arington now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting certain testimony from Sgt. Jestes regarding the alcohol sales receipt

he had obtained from the gas station where Arington allegedly stopped with

M.S. on their way to Arington’s property. The Commonwealth concedes this

issue is preserved for this Court’s review. We review the trial court’s decisions

to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion

when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      Sgt. Jestes testified that after he determined which gas station Arington

and M.S. had stopped at on their drive, he obtained records and a receipt from

that gas station that showed someone had purchased a pack of Miller Lite

beers and a condom at 10:33 p.m. the same evening. However, the age

verification on the gas station receipt did not match Arington’s birthdate. The

Commonwealth, nonetheless, introduced the receipt into evidence. On re-

                                         16
direct, the Commonwealth asked Sgt. Jestes whether it was a “common

occurrence” for birthdates not to match the age verification on alcohol receipts

at gas stations. Sgt. Jestes responded by testifying that he himself had asked

the gas station clerk whether he always checked IDs when he made alcohol

sales. Before Sgt. Jestes could testify as to the clerk’s response, defense

counsel objected on hearsay grounds, as well as whether the Commonwealth

had laid the proper foundation for Sgt. Jestes to testify as to the commonality

of incorrect birthdates on gas station alcohol sales receipts. At the ensuing

bench conference, the trial court stated that Sgt. Jestes could testify as to his

experience, and overruled the objection. The Commonwealth then reframed its

question and asked whether Sgt. Jestes had known of other gas station alcohol

sales receipts that did not list the purchaser’s correct birthdate. Sgt. Jestes

answered affirmatively.

      Arington now characterizes Sgt. Jestes’s brief testimony on this matter as

a violation of Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 702 which governs expert

witness testimony. However, we conclude that Sgt. Jestes did not offer any

“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” that rendered his

testimony that of an expert witness. KRE 702. Rather than testify whether it

was a “common occurrence” for purchasers’ birthdates to not match the age

verification on gas station alcohol sales receipts, Sgt. Jestes merely testified to

his own experience with such receipts, i.e., that he had in fact known of other

receipts that did not correctly list the purchaser’s birthdate. Sgt. Jestes did not

offer any testimony about the general practices of gas station clerks or any

                                        17
other specialized knowledge. His testimony was clearly based on his own

personal knowledge and admissible pursuant to KRE 602. “As a general rule, a

competent witness may testify concerning matters of which he has personal

knowledge, including events he has personally observed and perceived.” Ruiz v.

Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 675, 683 (Ky. 2015) (citing KRE 602; Marshall v.

Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Ky. 2001)).

      Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this

evidence.

                        V.   Victim Impact Statements

      Finally, Arington argues that the trial court erred when it permitted

multiple individuals who were not “victims,” as statutorily defined by KRS

421.500, to present victim impact statements during his final sentencing.

Arington concedes this issue is only partially preserved and requests palpable

error review pursuant to RCr 10.26.

      After the jury returned its verdict, it recommended that Arington receive

a 20-year sentence for his first-degree rape conviction, 10-year sentences for

each of his first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and first-degree

sodomy convictions, and a one-year sentence for his second-degree unlawful

transaction with a minor conviction. The jury recommended that Arington

serve his sentences consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 51-years’

imprisonment. After the trial court received the jury’s sentencing

recommendation, it set a subsequent date for final sentencing following a

presentence investigation.

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      At Arington’s final sentencing in December 2022, defense counsel stated

that he had no objection to the reading of victim impact statements prior to the

imposition of the sentence. The trial court then permitted five individuals to

read written victim impact statements: first M.S., followed by M.S.’s mother,

then Arington’s ex-wife Summer Koons, then a woman who only identified

herself as “[A.K.’s]” grandmother 2, and finally, M.S.’s aunt, the mother of

Arington’s son. After the fourth statement, defense counsel objected and stated

that the Commonwealth had stretched the definition of the term “victim.” At

this point, certain statements made by the individuals had been emotionally

charged and accusatory. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted

the last woman to read her statement. Arington now argues that M.S. and her

mother were the only “victims” statutorily entitled to present victim impact

statements at his final sentencing, and thus the trial court erred when it

permitted the remaining individuals to give their own statements.

      KRS 421.520(1) states that the “victim has the right to submit a written

victim impact statement to the probation officer responsible for preparing the

presentence investigation report for inclusion in the report or to the court

should such a report be waived by the defendant.” The statute also requires

that the victim’s impact statement “shall be considered by the court prior to

      2 This woman did not read her own victim impact statement, but rather a

statement written by someone else. Based on the content and context of the
statement, we assume the author of the statement to be Summer Koons’s daughter
and we use initials to protect her identity. A.K.’s grandmother stated that A.K. could
not attend the sentencing and asked her to read the statement she had prepared.

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any decision on the sentencing . . . of the defendant.” KRS 421.520(3). KRS

421.500(1)(a)(1) relevantly defines a “victim” as “an individual directly and

proximately harmed as a result of . . . . The commission of a crime classified as

a felony[.]”

       If the victim is a minor, incapacitated, or deceased, “victim” also
       means one (1) or more of the victim’s spouse, parents, siblings,
       children, or other lawful representatives which shall be designated
       by the court unless the person is the defendant or a person the
       court finds would not act in the best interests of the victim.

KRS 421.500(1)(a).

       Here, it is readily apparent that M.S., a minor, and her mother were the

only statutorily defined “victims” with a right to present a written victim impact

statement to be considered by the trial court prior to its sentencing decision.

This Court has previously held that allowing others outside the statutorily

defined list of victims to give impact statements during the penalty phase of a

defendant’s trial does constitute error. See McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368

S.W.3d 100, 112 (Ky. 2012); Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 98 (Ky.

2012). Where these statements are admitted after the penalty phase, at final

sentencing, we have once stated that the trial court retains the discretion to

consider impact statements from other individuals affected by the crime.

Sherroan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 7, 24 (Ky. 2004). Arington argues that

the three individuals, aside from M.S. and her mother, who gave impact

statements were not so affected by his crimes as to permit a reading of their

statements. However, we see no need to pronounce whether admission of these

statements constituted error after the jury had given its sentencing

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recommendation, because it is abundantly clear that no manifest injustice

resulted from the admission of these statements. Not only did the trial court

sentence Arington in accordance with the jury’s recommendation—which we

note was not affected by the allegedly prejudicial victim impact statements—

but Arington also received minimum sentences on four of the five counts of

which he was convicted. 3

                                  VI.    Conclusion

      Having concluded that Arington’s conviction for first-degree unlawful

transaction with a minor constituted a double jeopardy violation, we vacate

that conviction and its corresponding sentence. We affirm the trial court in all

other respects.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

      3 Arington received minimum sentences of 10-years’ imprisonment on his first-

degree unlawful transaction with a minor conviction, as well as both of his first-degree
sodomy convictions. Arington also received the minimum one-year sentence on his
second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor conviction.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas Allen Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General

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