Court Opinion

ID: 9704170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:25:23.355589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:58.142456
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). The majority concludes that whether a sale of beer is made "within this state" is determined by the residency of the purchaser. The statutory language from which the majority draws *297its conclusion reads: "Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if. . . the property is delivered . . . to a purchaser . . . within this state. . . Section 71.07(2)(c)2, Stats. To reach its conclusion, the majority construes "within this state" to modify "purchaser," and then determines that a purchaser is not within this state if he or she resides outside Wisconsin but comes to Wisconsin to buy beer.
I had always thought that the way to determine whether an act occurred in Wisconsin was to observe the act, and then, using a map or survey, or common sense, conclude whether Wisconsin was the place where the act happened. It seems strange to examine a purchaser's driver's license, birth certificate, voting records or articles of incorporation to decide whether a person purchased beer in Wisconsin.
If a statute's meaning is clear on its face, a court is not to look outside the statute to determine legislative intent. In Interest of J.V.R., 127 Wis. 2d 192, 199, 378 N.W.2d 266, 269 (1985). Section 71.07(2)(c)2, Stats., is clear to me, and I would end my inquiry here, affirming the Tax Appeals Commission. The alternative plain meaning rule adopted in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 236, 332 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1983) providing that "the spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used" leads to the same conclusion. The spirit or intent of sec. 71.07(2)(c)2, Stats., is to provide revenue. Shelley v. Department of Revenue, 70 Wis. 2d 551, 557, 235 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1975).
The usual rule is that "as to questions of law, we will not reverse a determination made by the enforcing agency where such interpretation is one among several reasonable interpretations that can be made, equally *298consistent with the purpose of the statute." (Footnote omitted.) De Leeuw v. ILHR Dept., 71 Wis. 2d 446, 449, 238 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1976). This rule has also been stated as "[although this court is not bound by an agency's conclusion of law, we hesitate to substitute our judgment for that of the agency on a question of law if the agency's conclusion has a rational basis," American Motors Corp. v. LIRC, 119 Wis. 2d 706, 710, 350 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1984), and
While the courts are not bound by the department's interpretation of the statute, the department's interpretation is entitled to considerable weight if the interpretation is reasonable and does not conflict with the legislative purpose, the legislative history, prior court decisions or constitutional prohibitions.
Robert Hansen Trucking, Inc. v. LIRC, 126 Wis. 2d 323, 332, 377 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1985).
The majority concludes the interpretations of sec. 71.07(2)(c)2, Stats., advanced by the Tax Appeals Commission and Pabst are both reasonable. This conclusion is, of course, necessary given the majority's determination that the statute is ambiguous. The holding that should follow that conclusion is that we will adopt the interpretation chosen by the administrative agency. The majority does the opposite because it concludes that place of delivery is a condition of sale made irrelevant by the words "f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." It does not consider whether the Tax Appeals Commission reasonably could have concluded that place of delivery is not a condition of sale. More importantly, the majority does not consider whether the word "other" excepts place of delivery from the conditions of sale it makes irrelevant by its interpretation of sec. 71.07(2)(c)2.
*299Rules of grammar aside, the Tax Appeals Commission interpreted sec. 71.07(2)(c)2, Stats., as it did because it recognized that the statute applied to far more items than beer. Its opinion reads: "[T]he statute at issue herein is equally applicable to all corporations required to apportion their income for Wisconsin tax purposes. As to certain types of businesses, such as multi-state retailers, [Pabst's] interpretation would present an unmanageable and untenable record keeping problem." This is a rational reason to choose between two reasonable interpretations of the statute. Were I writing for the majority, I would affirm the commission's opinion.