Court Opinion

ID: 9908272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:11.76556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:06.149748
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals
                                NO. 2023-CA-0722-WC

GENERAL MOTORS                                                              APPELLANT

                   PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.               OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                         ACTION NO. WC-20-97001

THOMAS PAYNE; HONORABLE
GRANT S. ROARK,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD                                                                       APPELLEES

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON,1 AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: General Motors (GM) petitions for review of the Workers’

Compensation Board (Board) opinion entered May 19, 2023, affirming the

Opinion, Order, and Award, entered November 21, 2022, as well as the order on

1
 Judge Donna Dixon authored the Opinion before her tenure with the Kentucky Court of
Appeals expired on November 20, 2023. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative
handling.
reconsideration. Following a careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we

affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Thomas Payne worked as an electrician for GM. On January 13,

2020, Payne fell down GM’s stairs. He was diagnosed with bilateral quadriceps

tendon ruptures. Although Payne underwent surgical repair, he has not worked

since the accident. His treating physician prescribed a cane and eventually

released him to perform seated work only.

             Payne sought workers’ compensation benefits. As part of his claim,

he was deposed and testified he could not perform the duties of his job post-injury

due to the amount of walking, standing, and climbing required. He testified that he

could sometimes walk short distances without the use of an assistive device but

had difficulty maneuvering certain surfaces and often had to extend his arms in

front of himself, “like Frankenstein,” due to balance issues. Payne testified that he

could not stand for more than one hour. Payne receives Social Security Disability

benefits.

             Payne underwent an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME)

conducted by Dr. Robert Byrd, who found no deficits in Payne’s range of motion

(ROM). However, he noted that Payne walked with an antalgic gait and used an

assistive device. Dr. Byrd assigned a 20% whole person permanent partial

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impairment rating pursuant to the gait derangement table in the AMA Guides.2 He

opined that Payne needed no further medical treatment and that it was unlikely his

condition would improve as he had achieved maximum medical improvement.

                Subsequently, Payne underwent an IME performed by Dr. Ellen

Ballard. Payne walked in and out of Dr. Ballard’s office without using his

assistive device. He then accidentally left his assistive device in her office and was

called back to retrieve it. Payne stated that he had done so at other places but

usually remembered his device around the time he got to his car. Dr. Ballard found

no deficits in his ROM and declined to use the gait derangement table in the AMA

Guides. Ultimately, Dr. Ballard filed two reports and assigned a 2% whole person

impairment rating for pain in one report, based on her interpretation of the AMA

Guides, and a 0% impairment rating in the second report.

                A final hearing was held at which Payne testified consistently with his

prior deposition testimony. On November 21, 2022, the ALJ entered his Opinion,

Order, and Award in which he adopted Dr. Byrd’s opinions – finding Payne to be

permanently partially disabled (PPD) with a 20% impairment rating – and awarded

him 6% interest on all past due benefits pursuant to KRS3 342.040. GM petitioned

the ALJ to reconsider his Opinion, Order, and Award, which was denied. GM then

2
    American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th ed.).
3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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appealed to the Board, which ultimately affirmed the ALJ. This petition for review

followed.

                          STANDARD OF REVIEW

            The appropriate standard of review was summarized in Bowerman v.

Black Equipment Company, 297 S.W.3d 858, 866-67 (Ky. App. 2009).

                  Appellate review of any workers’ compensation
            decision is limited to correction of the ALJ when the ALJ
            has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
            precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
            evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice. [W.]
            Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
            1992). Our standard of review differs in regard to
            appeals of an ALJ’s decision concerning a question of
            law or a mixed question of law and fact vis-à-vis an
            ALJ’s decision regarding a question of fact.

                  The first instance concerns questions of law or
            mixed questions of law and fact. As a reviewing court,
            we are bound neither by an ALJ’s decisions on questions
            of law or an ALJ’s interpretation and application of the
            law to the facts. In either case, our standard of review is
            de novo. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky.
            App. 2001); Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky.
            App. 1998). De novo review allows appellate courts
            greater latitude in reviewing an ALJ’s decision.
            [Purchase Transp. Servs. v. Est. of Wilson, 39 S.W.3d
            816, 817-18 (Ky. 2001); Uninsured Emps.’ Fund v.
            Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. 1991)].

                   The second instance concerns questions of fact.
            KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as finder of fact, and
            has been construed to mean that the factfinder has the
            sole discretion to determine the quality, character,
            weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence, and to
            draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

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Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418,
419 (Ky. 1985); [McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514
S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1974)]. Moreover, an ALJ has sole
discretion to decide whom and what to believe, and may
reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various
parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes
from the same witness or the same adversary party’s total
proof. [Caudill v. Maloney’s Disc. Stores], 560 S.W.2d
15, 16 (Ky. 1977).

       KRS 342.285 also establishes a “clearly
erroneous” standard of review for appeals concerning
factual findings rendered by an ALJ, and is determined
based on reasonableness. Special Fund v. Francis, 708
S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986). Although an ALJ must
recite sufficient facts to permit meaningful appellate
review, KRS 342.285 provides that an ALJ’s decision is
“conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact,” and
that the Board “shall not substitute its judgment for that
of the [ALJ] as to the weight of evidence on questions of
fact[.]” Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining
Co., 634 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Ky. App. 1982). In short,
appellate courts may not second-guess or disturb
discretionary decisions of an ALJ unless those decisions
amount to an abuse of discretion. [Medley v. Bd. of
Educ., Shelby Cnty., 168 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Ky. App.
2004)]. Discretion is abused only when an ALJ’s
decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles. Downing v. Downing, 45
S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001).

...

       Generally, “arbitrariness” arises when an ALJ
renders a decision on less than substantial evidence, fails
to afford procedural due process to an affected party, or
exceeds her statutory authority. [K & P Grocery, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health Servs., 103 S.W.3d
701, 703 (Ky. App. 2002)].

                            -5-
Substantial evidence is “that which, when taken alone or in light of all the

evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a

reasonable person.” Bowling v. Nat. Res. & Env’t Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406,

409 (Ky. App. 1994). Our standard of review requires that we show considerable

deference to the ALJ and the Board.

                                       LEGAL ANALYSIS

                  On appeal, GM first argues that the ALJ erred in adopting Dr. Byrd’s

opinion that Payne qualified for a 20% impairment rating under the gait

derangement table in the AMA Guides because there was no substantial evidence

that Payne routinely uses an assistive device. The 20% rating therein “[r]equires

routine use of a cane[.]” (Emphasis added.) The testimonies of Payne, his treating

physician, and Dr. Byrd all support the findings of Dr. Byrd and the ALJ that the

20% impairment rating was appropriate for Payne based upon his use of an

assistive device. The fact that substantial evidence, such as the testimony of Dr.

Ballard, may also support a contrary conclusion is immaterial.4

4
    It is well-established that:

                  Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or
                  the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary
                  finding, “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
                  court to judge the credibility of the witnesses” because judging the
                  credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
                  exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the
                  correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal,” and

                                                  -6-
              Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held “[t]o be

grounded in the Guides is not to require a strict adherence to the Guides, but rather

a general conformity with them [and an] opinion that is based upon the Guides is

different from one that strictly adheres to the Guides.” Plumley v. Kroger, Inc.,

557 S.W.3d 905, 912-13 (Ky. 2018). In the case herein, “[b]ecause the evidence

revealed no more than a difference of medical opinion regarding the proper

interpretation of the Guides and the most accurate impairment under the Guides,

the ALJ was free to choose the expert upon whom to rely.” Id. at 912. Therefore,

we cannot say the ALJ erred in choosing to rely upon Dr. Byrd’s impairment

rating, which was based on the AMA Guides, even if it did not follow those to the

letter.5

              GM next argues that imposing prejudgment interest on a past-due

PPD award under KRS 342.040 is an unconstitutionally vague civil penalty.

However, KRS 418.075 requires that notice be provided to Kentucky’s Attorney

              appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are
              supported by substantial evidence.

Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (footnotes omitted).
5
   The only impairment ratings assigned to Payne were from Dr. Byrd and Dr. Ballard. While
GM argues on appeal that Dr. Byrd’s rating should have been 15% (because that rating only
“requires part-time use of cane or crutch for distance walking but not usually at home or in the
workplace”) instead of 20% based on the frequency Payne uses his assistive device, a 20% rating
is much closer to that level of impairment (15%) than the 2% rating proffered by Dr. Ballard.
Accordingly, the ALJ chose the rating that more closely followed GM’s interpretation of the
AMA Guides, although GM has not demonstrated that it is qualified to interpret them.

                                               -7-
General in any proceeding which involves the constitutionality of a statute. Upon

review of the record, we find no indication that notice was given to the Attorney

General at any stage of the proceeding below or on appeal. The Supreme Court of

Kentucky has held that the notification requirement is mandatory and should be

strictly enforced. See Austin Powder Co. v. Stacy, 495 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Ky. App.

2016). Because GM failed to comply with the notice requirement, we must decline

to address the issue. See id.

                                 CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion of the Board is hereby

AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THOMAS
                                          PAYNE:
 Jeremy N. Faulk
 Louisville, Kentucky                     W. Cravens Priest III
                                          Bowling Green, Kentucky

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