Court Opinion

ID: 9675522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:56:16.089774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.092277
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to distinguish the jury trial issue in this case from that in Hackett v Connor, 58 Mich App 202; 227 NW2d 292 (1975). I would reverse and remand for a jury trial for the reasons stated therein. Even if this result were not mandated by Hackett, supra, I am convinced that on this record I would have reached a different result had I been trier of fact. I believe the trial court’s finding that the "Contract of Employment specifically placed the power of management exclusively in the plaintiff and the individual defendants had no power to employ anyone” is clearly erroneous. The defendants contributed their name, money and expertise to this operation which was only one of several and to *678conclude that this neophyte plaintiff-manager would have exclusive control of the restaurant through his one-third interest is in my view clearly erroneous.
I also arrive at the opposite conclusion as to the specific findings in c, d, e, f, h, i, and j of the findings of fact contained in the trial court’s opinion, but I see no productive reason to elaborate since the majority remains unconvinced.
I will comment on the $2,500 award of attorneys’ fees to Paul W. Harty, plaintiff’s attorney, in the hope of changing at least one of my brothers’ votes on that score. Under any standard, the award of attorneys’ fees in this case was unjustified and unjustifiable.
On August 20, 1975, defendants were ordered to pay $2,500 to Mr. Paul W. Harty as attorney fees and costs. The record does not indicate the trial court’s reasoning for so ordering. The final order of July 27, 1977, approximately two years later, merely includes that attorney fee award because defendants had refused to pay it during the litigation and while both successful and unsuccessful attempts to appeal had been undertaken. In this appeal, appellee’s brief says that the award was made under the trial court’s inherent authority because of "defendants’ attorneys’ vexatious conduct” citing GCR 1963, 111.6. The majority likewise relies on rule 111.6, but I submit that there is no record support for that reliance.
No explanation is made for the trial court’s failure to rule on defendant’s motion to set aside the default on six successive Wednesdays nor do we have the record of those proceedings; the default was ultimately set aside by stipulation. No explanation is made for the taking of a default on a second amended complaint. No explanation is *679made for the rule violation in awarding the attorneys’ fees to Mr. Harty directly, rather than to the plaintiff. GCR 1963, 111.6. Finally, there are no proofs, nor explanation for the lack of proofs, as to the reasonable expenses incurred. More mystifying still is the fact that at least some of the activity of which the appellee complains was taking place in the lower court while a stay of execution was pending in this Court, conditioned upon the furnishing of a $20,000 bond. In the absence of any support in the record for the conclusion that defendants’ attorneys’ conduct warranted the award of attorneys’ fees, the award was patently erroneous.
In any event, the power to tax costs is covered fully by statute and court rule. MCL 600.2401; MSA 27A.2401. Attorney fees are to be taxed and awarded as costs only if authorized. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Allen, 50 Mich App 71; 212 NW2d 821 (1973), City of Center Line v 37th District Court Judges, 74 Mich App 97; 253 NW2d 669 (1977), City Bank & Trust Co v Kwaske Bros Construction Co, 78 Mich App 158; 259 NW2d 407, rev’d 402 Mich 844 (1977), Dassance v Nienhuis, 57 Mich App 422; 225 NW2d 789 (1975), Dozier v Automobile Club of Michigan, 69 Mich App 114; 244 NW2d 376 (1976), Shepard Marine Construction Co v Maryland Casualty Co, 73 Mich App 62; 250 NW2d 541 (1976), People v Cousino, 81 Mich App 416; 265 NW2d 355 (1978). These cases, it seems to me, translate into an appellate policy denying the trial court the use of the power of the purse against litigants who insist upon exercising their constitutional right to trial; in some contexts, that is due process. Nevertheless, if the majority opinion is upheld on this issue, it could revolutionize the practice of civil law in this *680state, for it is the business of judges to judge, not to intimidate. I fear the potential for abuse if this ruling is sustained.
In the very recent case of Charter Twp of Canton v Kaufman, 87 Mich App 719; — NW2d — (1978), the trial court awarded attorney fees and the argument to sustain the award was that the court had jurisdiction under GCR 1963, 504.1(2), claiming the court acquired the power to award the attorney fees from the language "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper”. Our Court had little difficulty turning away that contention and ruled that:
"While this rule may empower the court to tax costs as a condition of dismissal, it may still tax only those costs authorized by statute, GCR 1963, 526.1. Attorney fees are taxable only as authorized by statute, MCL 600.2405; MSA 27A.24Q5.” 87 Mich App 721.
I would reverse.
Addendum
Since the writing of the above dissent Judge Marutiak has communicated to this panel the following:
"I would concur in the Opinion of Judge Holbrook. I feel that he has adequately distinguished this case from the case of Hackett v Connor on the issue of the jury trial.
"I would, however, concur with that portion on the dissenting opinion of Judge Kelly which would deny the award of $2500.00 in attorney fees. I find insufficient compliance with GCR [1963], 111.6.”
Therefore the award of attorney fees is reversed. As to all other aspects Judge Holbrook’s opinion prevails.