Court Opinion

ID: 9382992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 14:17:10.552022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.000279
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bell, 2023-Ohio-1010.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                            :     APPEAL NO. C-210494
                                                 TRIAL NO. B-1803675
          Plaintiff-Appellee,              :

                                           :       O P I N I O N.
    VS.
                                           :

 MARKUS A. BELL,                           :

       Defendant-Appellant.                :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Derek W. Gustafson, for Defendant-Appellant.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}   A repudiated handshake launched an argument that ultimately ended

with the death of one victim and serious injury of a second. Defendant-appellant

Markus Bell was thereafter convicted of murder, felonious assault, tampering with

evidence, and having weapons under disability following a jury trial. On appeal, Mr.

Bell claims that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel through

cumulative error and that the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury

in connection with his self-defense claim. However, as explained in further detail

below, Mr. Bell does not carry the burden of establishing ineffective assistance of

counsel based on the extant record.      Nor can we say that the jury instructions

constituted plain error. Accordingly, we overrule both of Mr. Bell’s assignments of

error and affirm the judgment below.

                                          I.

       {¶2}   In June 2018, victims Shawn Kelley, Jr., (“Son”) and his father, Shawn

Kelley, Sr., (“Father”), walked toward the building where Mr. Bell lived with his

mother. Son and Mr. Bell had a contentious history including a recent spat when Son

declined to shake Mr. Bell’s hand, and Father hoped to speak with Mr. Bell and his

mother—an old friend of his—to prevent the dispute from escalating. As the Kelleys

approached the building, Mr. Bell emerged from the front door. Mr. Bell complained

to Father that Son would not shake his hand, and this slight really bothered him.

Father tried to calm him down, telling Mr. Bell that his son did not need to shake

anyone’s hand. Throughout this interaction, Father continued to call out for Mr. Bell’s

mother, believing that she could help defuse the situation.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶3}   After a while, according to Father’s testimony, the situation began to

simmer down. However, a friend of Mr. Bell’s began to agitate the matter, prodding

Son and Mr. Bell to fight. Son agreed, and then Mr. Bell (unexpectedly, at least to the

Kelleys) pulled out a gun. He pulled the trigger once, but the gun did not discharge.

At this point, Father stepped toward Mr. Bell to try to stop him from shooting again.

But as Father moved toward him, Mr. Bell managed to shoot multiple rounds, hitting

Father in his leg and also shooting Son.

       {¶4}   Father testified that his son urged him to get up and began to run away.

He did not realize at this point that his son had been shot. Father and Son ran to the

nearby fire station to seek medical assistance.

       {¶5}   Father was rushed to the hospital, where he was treated for a gunshot

wound to the leg. After multiple surgeries, doctors informed him that his leg would

never fully recover. While in the hospital, Father learned that his son had succumbed

to his wounds.

       {¶6}   Father also testified that neither he nor his son had a weapon that day

and that he had not been aggressive toward Mr. Bell (indeed, he sought to deescalate

matters). But Mr. Bell testified—consistent with his self-defense theory—that he fired

as the Kelleys approached him while he was backing away. He believed that they would

attack him, bolstered by Son’s agreement to engage in a fight.

       {¶7}   The state eventually indicted Mr. Bell for one count of murder, one

count of felony murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of tampering with

evidence, and one count of having a weapon while under disability (due to prior felony

convictions for burglary and drug-related offenses). During a lengthy pretrial stretch,

the court twice found Mr. Bell incompetent to stand trial and sent him to two

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

psychiatric facilities for treatment. In February 2021, however, the court concluded

that he was competent to stand trial, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted

Mr. Bell of all charges, and the court imposed an aggregate prison term of 32 years to

life. He now appeals this judgment, presenting two assignments of error.

                                           II.

       {¶8}   In his first assignment of error, Mr. Bell maintains that he was denied

his right to counsel based upon the ineffective representation of his trial counsel.

According to Mr. Bell, the failures of counsel permeated all stages of the proceedings,

and considered cumulatively, they operated to deny him his constitutional right to

counsel.

       {¶9}   “In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to effective

assistance of counsel under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” State v.

Evick, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2019-05-010, 2020-Ohio-3072, ¶ 45, citing the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10, Ohio

Constitution. In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we consider

“whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An

appellant must demonstrate that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2)

“the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To show prejudice, an

appellant “must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for

counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley,

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). And “[t]o justify a finding of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the appellant must overcome a strong presumption that, under

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”

State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995), citing Strickland at

689. It is often difficult for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim

on direct review (as in this case) because courts cannot stray outside of the trial record

to evaluate the ineffective assistance claim (which can happen during postconviction

review).

       {¶10} Mr. Bell concedes that the cited failings of counsel may seem

inconsequential when considered individually, but asserts that these perceived errors,

taken together, rise to the level of cumulative error necessitating reversal. However,

as we explain in greater detail below, we disagree.

       {¶11} To set some context, everyone acknowledged at trial that Mr. Bell shot

the Kelleys. In other words, Mr. Bell’s defense necessarily centered on self-defense.

As part of his self-defense claim, defense counsel cross-examined Father on whether

he or his son provoked Mr. Bell into shooting, cross-examined other witnesses on

whether they observed the Kelleys acting aggressively toward Mr. Bell, and explained

the theory and facts giving rise to the self-defense claim during closing argument. Trial

counsel called an expert witness to testify that Son’s toxicology screen revealed

methamphetamines in his system, which can cause a user to act aggressively. And trial

counsel called Mr. Bell himself to testify on his own behalf to share the narrative of

how and why he acted defensively.

       {¶12} Based on the evidence at hand, the trial court provided jury instructions

that conveyed the elements of self-defense to the jury. While there are certainly things

that counsel could have done to better advance Mr. Bell’s defense, the record does not

support the conclusion that, had counsel performed optimally, a reasonable

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have differed. See

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d 373. We proceed to address each of Mr.

Bell’s arguments in turn.

                                           A.

       {¶13} First, Mr. Bell argues that trial counsel failed to sufficiently investigate

his mental health status.       In this respect, he emphasizes the court’s prior

determinations of incompetency, and posits that trial counsel should have done more

to challenge his competency in the wake of the trial court’s subsequent finding of

competency.

       {¶14} But in February 2021, Dr. Charles Lee, an expert at Summit Behavioral

Healthcare who assessed Mr. Bell’s competency, concluded in his expert report that

Mr. Bell understood the charges against him and the potential penalties he faced, as

well as the roles of the various participants in the courtroom. Against this backdrop,

we cannot say that the record establishes that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in failing to further investigate his mental condition. It appears that counsel

fully explored the competency issues below, and nothing in the record hints at any

deficiencies in counsel’s performance after receipt of Dr. Lee’s report. Given Dr. Lee’s

report, Mr. Bell merely speculates that another expert would have reached a different

conclusion, and “[i]t is well established that mere speculation cannot support either

the deficient performance or prejudice requirement of an ineffective-assistance

claim.” State v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27774, 2018-Ohio-3198, ¶ 16,

citing State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 119. We

accordingly cannot say that trial counsel was ineffective in this regard.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           B.

       {¶15} Second, Mr. Bell alleges that counsel fell below the Strickland standard

during voir dire by failing to adequately question a number of jurors and failing to

exercise all of his peremptory challenges. In this regard, he identifies certain jurors

who held positive views of law enforcement, jurors who questioned whether they

would be good jurors, a juror who had been threatened with a gun in the past, and two

jurors who expressed misconceptions about the legal concept of self-defense, arguing

that these jurors’ potential biases were not sufficiently explored during voir dire.

       {¶16} At the same time, the prosecution questioned the jurors about some of

these issues, and the jurors generally assured the court that they could put aside their

personal feelings and assess the case on the merits. The jurors agreed to be fair and

impartial to both parties, and agreed that the verdict they reached would be based

solely upon facts of the case. To be sure, we can certainly imagine that some defense

counsel would have exercised peremptory challenges in this scenario. But generally,

“[d]ecisions on the exercise of peremptory challenges are a part of trial strategy * * *.”

State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 73, quoting

State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 341, 703 N.E.2d 1251 (1999).

       {¶17} Mr. Bell counters that his lawyer stated, on the record, that Mr. Bell did

not want him to exercise the peremptory challenges. In other words, he frames

counsel’s acquiescence to his client’s wishes under these circumstances to be

tantamount to abdication and relinquishment of the lawyer’s role. The trial record,

however, discloses nothing of the strategic calculus (or lack thereof) evaluated by trial

counsel with respect to the venire, and thus we see nothing that would take this

decision out of the realm of trial strategy. On the record at hand, we cannot say that

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable

representation with respect to voir dire.

                                            C.

       {¶18} Next, Mr. Bell asserts that counsel proved ineffective in failing to

substantively advance his self-defense claim during opening statement.           During

opening statement, counsel failed to articulate any theory justifying Mr. Bell’s use of

force, but rather generally asserted that the jury should consider why he may have

resorted to shooting the Kelleys. That “why,” revealed during trial, was a claim of self-

defense.

       {¶19} While it may have been advantageous for counsel to delineate the self-

defense claim in opening statement, we fail to see from the record that this prejudiced

Mr. Bell or that there is a reasonable probability that this affected the outcome of his

trial. As explained above, counsel thoroughly pursued the self-defense claim through

cross-examination of witnesses and the surviving victim, the testimony of an expert

witness, the testimony of Mr. Bell himself, and the trial court’s instructions on the

matter. And counsel ultimately tied all of these threads together during closing

argument. We can certainly imagine a better opening statement, but it is possible that

counsel may have wanted to see how the evidence unfolded at trial before jumping in

with both feet on self-defense. And “[s]imply because there might have been ‘another

and better strategy available’ does not mean that counsel provided ineffective

assistance.” State v. Blanton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29451, 2023-Ohio-89, ¶ 71,

quoting State v. Mohamed, 151 Ohio St.3d 320, 2017-Ohio-7468, 88 N.E.3d 935, ¶ 19,

and State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980).

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                            D.

       {¶20} Mr. Bell also takes issue with trial counsel’s failure to object at various

points throughout his trial. He first highlights counsel’s failure to object to certain

leading questions. But besides Mr. Bell’s failure to attempt to explain how he was

prejudiced by the questions, “it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow leading

questions on direct examination. * * * Therefore, [the Ohio Supreme Court does] not

find that the failure to object to any leading questions constitutes ineffective assistance

of counsel.” State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 449, 751 N.E.2d 946 (2001). On this

record, we see nothing that could rise to the level of ineffective assistance based on the

leading questions identified in Mr. Bell’s brief.

       {¶21} Mr. Bell also argues that counsel should have objected to coroner Dr.

Stephens’s comment regarding her opinion that Son was shot a second time while

turning away from Mr. Bell, as well as her statement, “I think [Son] was probably

thinking I had better get out of here.” But the comment that Son was shot while he

was turning away was based on the autopsy conducted by Dr. Stephens, so an objection

to this statement may well have been overruled. And while the latter statement

regarding Son’s thoughts certainly trespassed (improperly) on the speculative realm,

we cannot say that a failure to object here translates into ineffective assistance.

       {¶22} Finally, Mr. Bell maintains that counsel should have objected to certain

comments made by the prosecutor. Mr. Bell testified on direct examination that

Father said “we are not here for [bystander]” before the shooting, presumably

implying that Father suggested that he and Son were instead there to confront Mr.

Bell. During cross examination, the prosecutor incorrectly stated that Mr. Bell did not

previously testify to that. But Mr. Bell does not attempt to explain how counsel’s

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

failure to object to this statement prejudiced him or, to a degree of reasonable

probability, affected the outcome of his trial. And Mr. Bell contends that the state

mischaracterized his testimony regarding his disposal of the gun after the shooting.

But in fact, during direct examination, he stated that he threw his gun into the sewer,

and then later changed his story. Accordingly, it was not ineffective assistance for trial

counsel to fail to object to these statements.

       {¶23} Mr. Bell is also concerned that trial counsel did not object when the state

suggested during voir dire and again during its opening statement that the burden of

proof rested on the defense. But the prosecutor’s statement during voir dire clarified

that the trial court would give the definition of a self-defense claim, and the trial court

gave a clear and comprehensive instruction on self-defense, placing the burden of

proof on the state, so this misstatement failed to prejudice Mr. Bell. And while the

prosecution’s statement during opening that self-defense is an affirmative defense is

an incorrect statement of the law to which trial counsel should have objected, again,

the jury was properly instructed on the elements of self-defense and the burden of

proof. Accordingly, Mr. Bell fails to persuade us that there exists a reasonable

probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors with respect to failing to raise

objections at various points throughout trial, the result of his trial would have been

different.

                                            E.

       {¶24} Mr. Bell proceeds to assert that counsel failed to cross-examine certain

witnesses about whether they knew his motive in shooting at the Kelleys. This,

according to Mr. Bell, represents a lack of preparation and effort by trial counsel.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶25} It would appear that Mr. Bell had hoped that trial counsel’s cross-

examination of state witnesses would further advance his self-defense claim. He takes

issue with the fact that counsel never cross-examined these witnesses on whether they

knew why Mr. Bell shot at the Kelleys. But once again, trial counsel adequately

advanced Mr. Bell’s self-defense claim through various other methods. And asking

witnesses to speculate on his state of mind would not have been proper (a point we

just alluded to above). See State v. Blanton, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1031, 2018-

Ohio-1275, ¶ 21 (“Ohio law specifically precludes questions that require a witness to

speculate or guess about the thoughts of another.”). Moreover, some of the identified

witnesses, including police officers, testified that they arrived at the scene after the

shooting, and therefore were not qualified to speak on whether it appeared that Mr.

Bell acted consistent with self-defense.        Overall, cross-examination of witnesses

generally falls well within the zone of trial strategy, and Mr. Bell has not established

that counsel’s approach to cross-examination of the witnesses in this case constituted

ineffective assistance.

                                           F.

       {¶26} In addition, Mr. Bell complains that trial counsel did not present

medical records to corroborate his testimony that he had been shot in the past and

suffered serious wounds, rendering him more concerned about threats than the

average person.      These records would have undoubtedly provided additional

substantiation for Mr. Bell’s self-defense claim, but because counsel pursued other

methods of advancing this claim, and the jury was aware that Mr. Bell had been shot

in the past and thus was more sensitive, the decision not to present these records was

not substantially prejudicial.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶27} Along these same lines, Mr. Bell questioned why counsel did not call his

appointed expert, Dr. Weisman, to testify regarding his determination that Mr. Bell

suffered from a trauma/stress related disorder. In his report, Dr. Weisman opined

that Mr. Bell suffered from a psychotic spectrum disorder as well as a trauma or stress

related disorder. He also noted that, due to being shot in 2017, Mr. Bell experienced

hypervigilance and an exaggerated startle response, among other effects.

       {¶28} And again, while Dr. Weisman certainly would have added some

credibility to Mr. Bell’s self-defense claim, trial counsel’s failure to call him as a witness

does not rise to the level of prejudicing the defense so as to deprive Mr. Bell of a fair

trial, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.E.2d 674, and we cannot

say there exists a reasonable probability that his testimony would have affected the

verdict.

                                             G.

       {¶29} Paralleling his argument regarding trial counsel’s opening statement,

Mr. Bell also takes aim at counsel’s closing argument. Specifically, he notes that trial

counsel failed to mention in closing the state’s burden to disprove self-defense, that a

good-faith mistaken belief of great bodily harm is sufficient to warrant the use of self-

defense, and that the jury must put themselves in Mr. Bell’s position with his

characteristics, knowledge, and circumstances.

       {¶30} However, as discussed above when considering potential deficiencies in

trial counsel’s opening statement, counsel presented expert testimony, utilized cross-

examination of witnesses, and elicited Mr. Bell’s own narrative of how he endeavored

to defend himself to promote the self-defense claim throughout trial. And the trial

court gave jury instructions explaining the elements of a self-defense claim as well as

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the state’s burden of proof. The jurors knew that the burden of proof rested on the

state and were otherwise apprised of the elements of a self-defense claim. Accordingly,

we cannot say that there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different had trial counsel mentioned the details of the elements of a

self-defense claim during closing argument, so we do not find that counsel was

ineffective in this regard.

                                           H.

       {¶31} Finally, Mr. Bell takes aim at trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial

court’s jury instructions on fault and retreat. This issue is also featured in his second

assignment of error. However, as we discuss in further detail below, because these

instructions correctly encapsulated the law, Mr. Bell’s argument that counsel’s failure

to object to the instructions amounted to deficient performance that prejudiced him is

merely speculative.

       {¶32} While the Ohio Supreme Court does recognize that individual errors,

when considered together, can result in ineffective assistance of counsel, State v.

Graham, 164 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-6700, 172 N.E.3d 841, ¶ 169, in this case, we

cannot say that counsel’s claimed deficiencies, taken together, rose to the level of

reversible error. Having reviewed each of his arguments in turn and weighed their

cumulative effect, we must conclude that Mr. Bell has not carried the burden of

establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced his substantial

rights on the state of this record. See Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80

L.Ed.2d 674. Therefore, Mr. Bell has not demonstrated that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of counsel, and we overrule his first assignment of error.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           III.

       {¶33} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Bell claims that the trial court

committed plain error in issuing certain jury instructions. Specifically, he maintains

that the trial court’s instructions on self-defense were not supported by the evidence

in two instances.

       {¶34} “A trial court should confine its instructions to the jury to the issues

raised by the pleadings and the evidence.” Southside River-Rail Terminal Inc. v.

Crum & Forster Underwriters, 157 Ohio App.3d 325, 2004-Ohio-2723, 811 N.E.2d

150, ¶ 53 (1st Dist.). Generally, “[i]n reviewing a jury charge, an appellate court must

first consider whether the instruction was a misstatement of the law, and if so, whether

the erroneous instruction probably misled the jury.” Id. But here, because Mr. Bell

did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review his claim only for plain error.

See State v. Love, 2017-Ohio-8960, 101 N.E.3d 623, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.) (where defendant

“failed to object to the jury instructions and consequently * * * forfeited all but plain

error”). “To establish plain error pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), [the defendant] must

show ‘(1) that an error occurred, (2) that the error was obvious, and (3) that the error

affected the outcome of the trial.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Bandy, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-160402, 2017-Ohio-5593, ¶ 70. “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be

taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a

manifest miscarriage of justice.” Love at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d

91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶35} With respect to fault, the trial court gave the following instructions:

       The defendant was at fault if the defendant was the initial aggressor and:

       Shawn Kelley, Jr. did not escalate the incident to great bodily force or
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       deadly force; or the defendant provoked Shawn Kelley, Jr. into using

       force; or the defendant did not withdraw from the incident; or the

       defendant withdrew from the incident but did not reasonably indicate

       by words or acts to Shawn Kelley, Jr. of his withdrawal.

                                           ***

       To prove that the defendant, when using deadly force, did not act in self

       defense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of

       the following: The defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving

       rise to the gunshot wound of Shawn Kelley, Sr., * * *.

       {¶36} And with respect to retreat, the trial court instructed, in two instances:

“The defendant had a duty to retreat if he was in a place which he had no lawful right

to be. The defendant had no duty to retreat if he was in a place which he had a lawful

right to be.”

       {¶37} The trial court drew these jury instructions nearly verbatim from the

provisional Ohio Jury Instructions section on self-defense. See Ohio Jury Instructions

CR Section 421.21 (Rev. Nov. 5, 2022). The instructions represent correct statements

of the law pursuant to applicable case law and R.C. Chapter 2901. R.C. 2901.05 shifts

the burden to the state “to disprove self-defense involving deadly force by proving

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) was at fault in creating the situation

giving rise to the affray; or (2) did not have a bone fide belief that [he] was in imminent

danger of death or great bodily harm for which the use of deadly force was [his] only

means of escape, or (3) violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger[,]” State v. Smith,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190507, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 50, so the jury instructions in

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

this case properly explained how the state could meet its burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that Mr. Bell did not shoot the Kelleys in self-defense. As to the fault

instruction specifically, recent precedent from this court notes that one element of

self-defense in the use of deadly force is that “the defendant was not at fault in creating

the situation giving rise to the affray * * *.” State v. Neal, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

210166, 2022-Ohio-1290, ¶ 18. And with respect to the duty to retreat instruction,

pursuant to R.C. 2901.09, “a person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-

defense * * * if that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.”

R.C. 2901.09(B). The trial court so instructed.

       {¶38} Mr. Bell responds that even if the instructions correctly captured the

law, no evidence in the record (1) suggests that he was at fault, or (2) indicates that he

did not have a right to be where the shooting occurred. But this fact-specific objection

to the instructions is difficult for us to evaluate on appeal—such matters should have

been presented to the trial court for it to consider. And we can compare the situation

at hand to that in State v. Wallace-Lee, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-19, 2020-Ohio-

3681, ¶ 26. In Wallace-Lee, the defendant argued that it was not appropriate for the

trial court to give a fault instruction “because the evidence, in [defendant’s] view,

showed she was not at fault.” Id. But applying a plain error review, the Second District

rejected the defendant’s argument because “the instruction tracked the language used

in persuasive case law, and * * * there was a legitimate question regarding

[defendant’s] fault in initiating the fight[.]” Id. The court also noted that defendant

“cannot show that the ‘at fault’ definition provided by the trial court caused the jury to

reject [defendant’s] claim of self-defense[.]” Id. Similarly, here, the instructions

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

tracked the language found in relevant case law and we cannot say there was no

question regarding Mr. Bell’s fault. On this record, we do not see plain error.

                                   *       *      *

       {¶39} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule both of Mr. Bell’s

assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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