Court Opinion

ID: 9411053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:26:16.753954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.381687
License: Public Domain

J-A15015-23

                                   2023 PA Super 129

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ELISSA DEIBLE                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1258 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
                 Criminal Division at CP-33-SA-0000015-2022

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                     FILED: July 25, 2023

       Elissa Deible (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

after the trial court convicted her of animal cruelty, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(a).

We affirm.

                                         FACTS

       Appellant had owned a 17-year-old cairn terrier (the Dog) since he was

a puppy. N.T., 9/26/22, at 84, 92, 95. Appellant stated that on April 7, 2022,

the Dog “somehow got out” from the fence and latched gates at her home.

Id. at 81. The Dog had escaped before. Id.

       Alli Zacherl testified that she was driving on the evening of April 7, 2022,

when she saw “a dog running at me.” Id. at 6, 16. Ms. Zacherl stated:

             It was just like a little fluff ball and I noticed it was green so
       I just kind of looked at it. Then I realized it was a dog so I …
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15015-23

      drove up to it. I opened my door and it took him a second to
      come around to the side of my door, but then once he saw me, he
      … got excited to see someone, I think. …

             I was petting him and I saw the sticks and everything so I
      was trying to pick out what I could. … There were a ton of sticks
      just in his fur. So I started pulling out the ones that I could but
      then I started actually looking at him. Then I saw that there were
      some that were really stuck in there and then I saw metal that
      was imbedded. So, then that’s when I realized I didn’t know what
      was going on but I wanted to get him help ….

Id. at 6-7.

      Ms. Zacherl described “mats all over his face, his back was shaved and

he had … two distinctive pieces of metal on his back legs.” Id. at 7. The Dog

had sticks “on his belly, on his front legs, and his back legs.” Id. He had “a

waddle but he could walk.” Id.

      Ms. Zacherl called her friend, Summer Verdill (Summer), whose sister

is a veterinary assistant, because Ms. Zacherl “felt … the objects [that] were

in his fur, some of them were beyond my power of just pulling out[.]” Id. at

7-8. Ms. Zacherl took pictures of the Dog. Id. at 9. In the pictures, Ms.

Zacherl observed the Dog had

      a lot of mats all over around his nose and his mouth. Then his
      eyes, they kind of like hung over … and his ears were just
      completely hanging over with the fur and everything. Then his
      front paws have the sticks you can kind of see there. And … the
      top of his back is shaved but the bottom is still long.

Id. at 10.

      Ms. Zacherl drove the Dog to Summer’s house, where she got a collar

and leash, “because there wasn’t one on him.” Id. at 8-9. Next, Ms. Zacherl

and Summer, along with Summer’s sister Ginger Verdill (Ginger), drove the

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Dog to North Fork Veterinary Clinic. Id. at 11. Although the clinic was closed,

Ginger had called the veterinarian, Dr. Pierson, who met the women at the

clinic. Id. Dr. Pierson “shaved what she could of the [D]og,” which included

“basically everything but his face.”   Id. at 13.    Afterwards, Ms. Zacherl,

Summer, and Ginger took the Dog to Gateway Humane Society. Id. at 14,

16.

      Ginger Verdill testified that she is a veterinary assistant, and

corroborated Ms. Zacherl’s account of events on April 7, 2022, as well as the

Dog’s condition. Id. at 19-27. Ginger identified pictures taken of the Dog

that day, with metal and twigs in his fur, and noted the Dog was “severely

matted, especially under his eyes, [and] he’s green.”          Id. at 22-24;

Commonwealth Exhibits 5 & 6.

      The president of Gateway Humane Society, Linda Peterson, testified that

the Dog arrived at the shelter on April 7, 2022. Ms. Peterson “knew who the

[D]og belonged to because [the Dog] had come in on December 19 of 2021.”

Id. at 33. Ms. Peterson relayed that the Humane Society had publicized the

Dog and Appellant claimed him. Id. The Dog was matted in December 2021;

Ms. Peterson advised Appellant that “he needs groom[ing] and [Appellant]

said that she knew that.” Id. at 34, 36. After arriving at the Gateway Humane

Society a second time on April 7, 2022, he stayed until April 11, 2022, when

he was taken to another animal shelter. Id. at 34.

      Margo Stefanic, who operates Willow Run Sanctuary (Willow Run),

testified that a humane officer contacted her about the Dog on April 8 or 9,

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2022. Id. at 37-38. The humane officer “deemed [the Dog] a neglect case,

and [at the humane officer’s request, Ms. Stefanic] brought him [from

Gateway Humane Society] to Willow Run.” Id. at 38. Ms. Stefanic stated that

although the Dog’s body had been shaved, his “head and face was a disaster.

He was matted to the point of dread locks several inches long.”        Id.   In

addition to a “shade of green mostly on his head[, …] the crusting on his eyes

was serious.” Id. at 39. Ms. Stefanic continued to care for the Dog; at the

time of trial, the Dog had been in the care of Willow Run for 168 days. Id. at

45, 49.

      Jefferson County Humane Police Officer Debra McAndrew testified that

a veterinarian had contacted her about the Dog.      Id. at 62. According to

Officer McAndrew, “once ownership of the [D]og was determined,” she

contacted Appellant. Id. at 62-63. Officer McAndrew stated:

      [Appellant] explained that the [D]og was difficult to groom, [and]
      that the [D]og needed to be anesthetized in order to be groomed.
      I [asked] who was her veterinarian, [and Appellant relayed it was]
      Brookville Animal Hospital – Clinic. I asked her who had groomed
      the [D]og previously. [Appellant] could offer no name of a
      groomer, no name of a grooming clinic. She could not tell me
      when she herself had attempted to groom the [D]og. At that point
      I explained to her that I would reach out to the vet clinic … and I
      thanked her.

Id. at 63.

      Appellant gave Brookville Animal Clinic permission to speak with Officer

McAndrew. Id. at 64. When Officer McAndrew called the clinic, they indicated

the Dog had been seen most recently on July 31, 2020; the clinic also “sent

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[Officer McAndrew] the entire dog’s file.” Id. Officer McAndrew testified that

she “did not know the situation.”     Id. at 65.   However, from the file she

learned:

      The [D]og in 2020 had been sedated but the vet clinic did not do
      any type of shaving or grooming of the [D]og. They literally just
      sedated the [D]og.

Id. at 64.

      Officer McAndrew also stated:

      Nothing in the [Dog’s file] showed Cushing’s [or other disease].
      What I did find is throughout the years where the vet had noted
      that the [D]og was severely matted and needed grooming; feces
      were located at the [D]og’s rectum. That[,] along with no current
      grooming within a couple of years is why I continued to keep the
      [D]og in protective custody and filed [the] charge of cruelty.

Id. at 65. On cross-examination, Officer McAndrew testified that she “chose

to charge [Appellant with animal] cruelty based on the law.” Id. at 69; see

also id. at 70.

      Appellant testified that the Dog was aggressive when she groomed him,

and confirmed she had taken the Dog to Brookville Veterinarian Clinic on July

31, 2020, “with the idea of possibly putting [him] down.”       Id. at 83-84.

Appellant stated that the Dog “couldn’t stand, he wasn’t eating,” and Appellant

“thought for sure he was dying.”      Id. at 88.    She testified that the vet

discovered the Dog had Cushing’s disease. Id. at 89. According to Appellant,

the Dog has pain and enlarged organs, but “there’s not much you can do

besides make sure that you keep [him] comfortable.” Id. at 89, 91. The

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Commonwealth asked Appellant: “What sort of treatment do you have to give

[for the Dog’s] Cushing’s disease?” Id. at 89. Appellant answered: “Not

picking him up ... making sure he’s comfortable, just normal comfort[.]” Id.

      Appellant further testified that she has three children who love and miss

the Dog and want him back. Id. at 85; 95. Appellant said she “absolutely”

loves the Dog. Id. at 88. She testified the family loves the Dog and never

mistreated him; she introduced two photographs of the family and the Dog

laying together and snuggling. Id. at 85-86; 93-94; Defendant’s Exhibits C

& D. Appellant stated that she painted the Dog green for St. Patrick’s Day,

but used “a nontoxic spray,” and did not “think there was anything abus[ive]

about that.” Id. at 86. When viewing pictures of the Dog taken on April 7,

2022, Appellant opined that the Dog in the pictures “did not look like him,”

and “looks like he’s been running around [and] got into stuff.” Id. at 86; see

also Commonwealth Exhibits 3 & 9.       Appellant stated that when the Dog

escaped, he would get into “garbage, mud, anything he can get into.” Id. at

87. Appellant explained she tried “to groom him the best I can,” and “little

by little because he can only tolerate so much.” Id. at 90.

      Heidi Kunselman testified to being “pretty close” with Appellant. Id. at

71. Ms. Kunselman stated that she observed the Dog at Appellant’s home “all

the time,” and never saw any evidence that the Dog was mistreated. Id. at

71-72. She also stated that Appellant’s children had a “very good relationship”

with the Dog. Id. at 72.

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      Maureen Selvy-Bolia testified to meeting Appellant on April 2, 2022,

when Ms. Selvy-Bolia took her son for a sleepover at Appellant’s home. Id.

at 75, 78. Ms. Selvy-Bolia “did not believe the [D]og needed [to be seen by]

a vet[erinarian].” Id. at 77. She described the Dog as “green on the bottom

… and he was half groomed on the top, shaved down real close.” Id. at 76.

Ms. Selvy-Bolia explained the Dog was green “because St. Patty’s Day was

right before ….” Id. According to Ms. Selvy-Bolia, Appellant relayed that she

was “in the process of grooming him, that’s why he’s half like that, she does

it in steps.” Id. at 79.

                           PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On April 13, 2022, the Commonwealth cited Appellant with animal

cruelty in Magisterial District Court. The citation alleged Appellant “allowed

one 1[7] year old terrier dog to become so severely matted that the [D]og

had trouble walking, seeing[,] and there was foreign matter in the mats.”

Citation, 4/13/22.   The Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) heard the case on

June 9, 2022. The MDJ found Appellant guilty and ordered her to pay fines

and costs of $946.58. Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Common

Pleas on June 16, 2022.

      The trial court held a hearing de novo on September 26, 2022. Like the

MDJ, the trial court found Appellant guilty of animal cruelty. The trial court

ordered Appellant to forfeit the Dog to Willow Run, and pay costs of

prosecution, a $200 fine, and restitution to Willow Run of $2,000. Appellant

filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court “accepted as a motion for

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reconsideration.”   Order, 10/7/22.     The trial court denied the motion, and

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court have

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      Appellant presents five issues for review:

      1. WHETHER THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
      EVIDENCE?

      2. WHETHER THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
      EVIDENCE?

      3. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
      THE PROSECUTION AS DE MINIMUS?

      4. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
      ORDERING FORFEITURE OF THE ANIMAL?

      5. WHETHER THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE VACATED, AS 18 PA.
      C.S § 5533(A) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AS THE STATUTE IS
      VAGUE, AND VIOLATES APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
      REPUTATION?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

                                     ANALYSIS

      1. Sufficiency

      Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction

of animal cruelty, because “the crux of the complaint against [Appellant] is

that she neglected to groom her dog. Even if accepted as true, evidence of

neglect is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction of animal

cruelty.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.

      In considering Appellant’s argument:

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      We must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove
      every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We must
      view evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
      as the verdict winner, and accept as true all evidence and all
      reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact
      finder properly could have based its verdict.

Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 A.3d 299, 303 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation omitted).

      The Crimes Code provides that a person is guilty of animal cruelty “if

the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly illtreats, overloads, beats,

abandons or abuses an animal.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(a). Appellant disputes

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant recklessly illtreated the Dog.

Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. Appellant claims the evidence does not support a

finding that Appellant treated the Dog “cruelly or improperly.” Id. at 21 (citing

“Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary.”).      Appellant essentially argues she

was charged under the wrong statute. The General Assembly enacted two

offenses: neglect of an animal (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5532), and cruelty to an animal

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533).     According to Appellant, the creation of separate

offenses shows the General Assembly’s intent to distinguish actions and

inactions. Id. at 19. Appellant contends “affirmative actions” are required

under the cruelty to animal statute, and mere negligence cannot constitute

cruelty. Id. at 21. She maintains that the allegations against her constitute

mere negligence, and therefore, as a matter of law, the Commonwealth failed

to establish her cruelty to the Dog. Appellant also maintains the evidence was

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too unreliable and/or contradictory to support a finding that she was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 22. Citing particular findings, Appellant

argues that either there was no evidence of a particular fact, or the evidence

was contradictory.

      Appellant’s first sufficiency argument fails because the plain language of

the cruelty to animal statute prohibits “illtreatment.” Appellant concedes that

the “verb ‘ill-treat’ is to treat cruelly or improperly.” Appellant’s Brief at 21

(citing Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary). The trial court’s findings align

with the ordinary usage of the word “illtreat,” because the evidence was

sufficient to establish that Appellant treated the dog “cruelly or improperly.”

Notably, the General Assembly has abrogated the rule that where two statutes

apply, the Commonwealth may only prosecute under the more specific

statute. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9303 (providing, “Notwithstanding the provisions

of 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933 (relating to particular controls general) or any other

statute to the contrary, where the same conduct of a defendant violates more

than one criminal statute, the defendant may be prosecuted under all available

statutory criminal provisions without regard to the generality or specificity of

the statutes.”).

      In her second sufficiency argument, Appellant claims the evidence was

too unreliable or contradictory to support a guilty verdict. Appellant’s Brief at

22. Appellant appears to be arguing the rule that “[a]ny doubt about the

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so

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weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205

A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2019).               Here, any inconsistencies in the

evidence did not preclude the establishment of facts regarding animal cruelty,

and   the   trial   court,   as   factfinder,   was   capable   of   reconciling   any

inconsistencies.

      After hearing the evidence, the trial court stated:

      [I]n reviewing the pictures … [the Dog] has a lot of spruce twigs
      in his fur. … [There is] clearly a piece of metal that’s imbedded
      in the [D]og’s fur and it would take some period of time to get in
      there. … [H]is hair was too long and it was matted. That takes
      some time. Now the [D]og was old [and he] may have had some
      pain, but that doesn’t excuse [Appellant] as a dog owner. I think
      leaving its hair that long amounts to knowingly and recklessly ill
      treatment or abuse as it turned out. …

N.T., 9/26/22, at 99-100.

      The trial court further opined:

      [T]he statute under which [Appellant] was prosecuted makes it an
      offense merely to “illtreat” an animal either intentionally,
      knowingly, or recklessly. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(a)[. T]he credible
      evidence shows [Appellant] did exactly that. She was advised on
      December 19, 2021 that her dog needed grooming. See Hearing
      Transcript, 09/26/2022, p. 33. Yet it was not until early April of
      the following year that she even attempted to begin that process.1
      By then, his fur was so long and matted from time and untreated
      eye secretions that he could not walk properly, i.e., he waddled,
      see id. at 7 & 21, and had trouble navigating because he could
      not see the objects in front of him. See id. at 43-44. His condition
      was not the result of a singular escape on April 7, 2022, either;
      as one knowledgeable witness testified, matting so severe,
      wherein foreign objects had become deeply entangled in the
      [D]og’s fur, did not happen within just a couple of days. Id. at
      23-27.    All of those—the matted fur, the wood and metal
      fragments, the eye secretions, and even the waddle—were clearly

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          visible to the naked eye, and [Appellant], in choosing to ignore it,
          subjected her dog to ill treatment.2

          1 Given [Appellant’s] own testimony about how difficult it was to

          groom the [D]og and her representation to the Animal Clinic that
          he needed to be sedated first, the [c]ourt did not believe that she
          had groomed him “multiple times” between December 19, 2021
          and April 7, 2022. See id. at 82.

          2 By the time a third party had to deal with the effects of
          [Appellant’s] actions, the grooming process visibly caused the dog
          pain.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1 (footnotes in original).

          The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was

sufficient to prove animal cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate

court, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the

fact-finder.     See Commonwealth v. Hummel, 283 A.3d 839, 846 (Pa.

Super. 2022). Consequently, Appellant’s sufficiency argument does not merit

relief.

          2. Weight

          Appellant also argues the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 25-29. Appellant asserts that her “version of the events

is simply more credible and worthy of belief.” Id. at 26.

          Again, Appellant disregards that “[i]t is not for this Court to overturn

the credibility determinations of the fact-finder[.]” Commonwealth v.

Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006). In addition:

          Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
          discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
          is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has

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      had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
      appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
      and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
      court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
      denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict
      was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
      trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Landis, 277 A.3d 1172, 1183–84 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations omitted). To prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence,

“the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks

the conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 546

(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      The trial court did not find the verdict to be shocking. We repeat that it

is not our role to weigh evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-

finder.   Hummel, 283 A.3d at 846.        Appellant’s argument regarding her

credibility is unavailing, and there is no record or legal support for her weight

claim.

      3. De minimis infractions

      Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to “dismiss

the [animal cruelty] charge as de minimis.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. The trial

court concluded Appellant waived this issue because she did not raise it “until

a verdict had already been entered against her.”          Trial Court Opinion,

11/21/22, at 2. Appellant claims she preserved the issue by raising it in her

motion for reconsideration and concise statement of matters complained of on

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appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 30 n.7. Like the trial court, the Commonwealth

contends Appellant waived the issue, and emphasizes Appellant did not assert

the de minimis nature of the case “before, or during the summary trial.”

Commonwealth Brief at 15.1              In addition, the Commonwealth “wholly

disagrees with Appellant’s contention that [her] conduct was de minimis in

nature.” Id.

       Our standard in reviewing this claim is whether the trial court committed

an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 963 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). The Crimes Code provides:

                          § 312. De minimis infractions

       (a)    General rule.--The court shall dismiss a prosecution if,
              having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to
              constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant
              circumstances, it finds that the conduct of the defendant:

       (1)    was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
              expressly negatived by the person whose interest was
              infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
              defining the offense;

       (2)    did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought
              to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so
              only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of
              conviction; or

       (3)    presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably
              be regarded as envisaged by the General Assembly or other
              authority in forbidding the offense.
____________________________________________

1 Appellant does not address waiver in her reply brief.

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 312(a).

      This Court has explained:

      [N]either the statute nor case law requires a defendant to
      preserve the issue of de minimus infractions by means of inclusion
      in an omnibus motion. On the contrary, the language of the
      statute requires the trial court to dismiss the prosecution on its
      own accord, upon a determination that the defendant’s conduct
      involved de minimus infractions.

Commonwealth. v. Gemelli, 474 A.2d 294, 300 (Pa. Super. 1984).

      Pursuant to Gemelli, Appellant was not required to preserve this issue

prior to the hearing.    Gemelli, 474 A.2d at 300.       It is the trial court’s

responsibility to determine de minimis infractions. Id. Appellant asserts her

“alleged conduct satisfies all three prongs of the de minimis statute.”

Appellant’s Brief at 31 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 312(a)). However, the trial court

did not view Appellant’s infractions as de minimis. To the contrary, the trial

court was unequivocal in its view of the charged conduct. See Trial Court

Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1-2. Thus, this issue does not merit relief.

      4. Forfeiture

      Appellant argues the trial court erred by ordering her to forfeit the Dog,

and “justice demands the [D]og be returned to [Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief

at 33. Nonetheless, Appellant acknowledges the trial court had authority to

“order the forfeiture or surrender of an abused or neglected animal” pursuant

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to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5554(a).2 Id. at 32. Appellant also concedes that forfeiture

“is within the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id.

       Here, the trial court explained:

       As the evidence plainly indicated, [Appellant’s] offense was not a
       one-time event. The [D]og’s condition was the result of an
       extended pattern of neglect, and in light of that history and
       [Appellant’s] rather preposterous testimony, the [c]ourt had no
       reason to expect that the animal would fare any better in the
       future if returned to her care.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1-2.

       The record and law support the court’s order directing Appellant’s

forfeiture of the Dog to Willow Run. As such, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion, and the issue does not warrant relief.

       5. Constitutionality

       Lastly, Appellant claims the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutional.

The trial court concluded Appellant waived this issue because she failed to

raise it “until a verdict had already been entered against her.” Trial Court

Opinion, 11/21/22, at 2. Likewise, the Commonwealth states:

       At no time before or during proceeding[s] and trial did Appellant
       raise[] either claim. It was only after the verdict was rendered
       [that] these two claims arose. Appellant’s failure to enter a timely
       objection result[s] in waiver of these claims.

____________________________________________

2 The statute states that “in addition to any other penalty provided by law, the

authority imposing sentence upon a conviction for a violation of [cruelty to
animals] may order the forfeiture or surrender of an abused or neglected
animal of the defendant to a society or association for the prevention of cruelty
to animals duly incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 5554(a).

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Commonwealth Brief at 6.

      Appellant claims she preserved her constitutionality issue by raising it

in her motion for reconsideration and concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 33 n.9. She asserts the animal

cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague because there “is ambiguity in the

phrase, ‘illtreats ... an animal,’ [and t]he word ‘illtreats’ is not defined in the

statute.”   Id. at 35.   Appellant states that she was “accused of failing to

properly groom her dog[, and t]he language of the statute does not put an

ordinary person on notice that a failure to groom a dog would constitute a

violation of section 5533(a).”       Id.   In addition, Appellant asserts her

“reputation [has been] harmed for no legitimate and/or necessary purpose,”

resulting in “the deprivation of her right to reputation.” Id. at 35-36.

      “Generally speaking, issues not properly raised and preserved before

the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 2022) (citations

omitted) (reiterating that an appellant waives any claim that is not properly

raised in the first instance before the trial court and preserved at every stage

of an appeal.)). In addition, “a new and different theory of relief may not be

successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Pi

Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      We further observe: “When an appellant’s argument is underdeveloped,

we may not supply it with a better one.” Id. Appellant’s constitutionality

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argument is underdeveloped. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-36. Appellant cites

boilerplate case law to support her conclusory claims. Id. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court recently found waiver where an appellant

      submits only “generalized assertions[,] ... not arguments, much
      less reasoned and developed arguments supported with citations
      to relevant legal authority.” Spotz, 18 A.3d [244,] 326 [(Pa.
      2011)]; see also id. at 262 n.9 (finding equal protection claim
      unreviewable and waived for lack of development). This type of
      mere issue spotting without sufficient analysis or legal support
      precludes appellate review. See In re Beach’s Estate, 324 Pa.
      142, 188 A. 108, 108 (1936) (per curiam) (an “appellant must not
      only specifically assign as error any rulings complained of, but,
      further, must point out wherein the error lies and reasons
      therefor, or they will be deemed to have been waived”).

Commonwealth v. Armolt, No. 86 MAP 2021 at *12 (Pa. May 16, 2023).

      Appellant references the rule governing constitutional vagueness claims,

but does not reference the corresponding standard for constitutional

reputation claims. She also fails to explain the way in which she believes the

respective constitutional rights regarding vagueness and reputation were

violated. Accordingly, Appellant has waived her issue challenging the statute’s

constitutionality.

      Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Appellant properly

preserved and developed her constitutionality issue, she would not be entitled

to relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has instructed:

      A statute is presumed constitutional and will not be declared
      unconstitutional unless it “clearly, palpably and plainly” violates
      the Constitution. All doubts are therefore to be resolved in favor
      of a finding of constitutionality. A statute will only be found to be
      void for vagueness if it fails to define unlawful conduct with

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      sufficient definiteness so that ordinary people understand what
      conduct is prohibited. At the same time, a statute will only be
      deemed to be overbroad if it punishes a substantial amount of
      constitutionally protected conduct.

Commonwealth v. Craven, 817 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 2003) (citations

omitted).

      Here, the prosecutor began her closing argument by correctly

observing:

      To recklessly illtreat an animal, it’s by an act or omission to act,
      Your Honor. I’ve looked this particular statute up and there’s all
      kinds of case law that ranges from dairy farm neglect, abandoned
      dogs, someone piercing a kitten’s ears, not proper shelter. It’s
      just a myriad of things that the Courts have determined is animal
      cruelty.

N.T., 9/26/22, at 98.

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court have rejected

challenges to the constitutionality of the animal cruelty statute (and its

predecessor statutes).    For example, where an appellant challenged the

predecessor animal cruelty statute pertaining to animal fighting, 18 Pa.C.S.A.

5511(h), as overbroad and vague, this Court stated that “one may not

successfully challenge a statute for vagueness when his conduct clearly falls

within the prohibited acts set forth therein.” Commonwealth v. Balog, 672

A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations omitted). See also Craven, 817

A.2d at 452 (concluding subsection of animal cruelty statute making animal

fighting a felony “is constitutionally sound”); Commonwealth v. Barnes,

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629 A.2d 123, 129 (Pa. Super. 1993) (concluding animal cruelty statute was

“not unconstitutionally vague, …[a]lthough [a] term … [wa]s not defined”).

      Appellant claims she was convicted of animal cruelty because she “failed

to groom her dog,” and asserts that the “label” of animal cruelty “should be

reserved for those who actually commit acts of cruelty against animals.”

Appellant’s Brief at 35. Appellant’s assertion regarding “those who actually

commit acts of cruelty against animals,” disregards the statute and trial

court’s guilty verdict. Consequently, no relief is due.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2023

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