Court Opinion

ID: 9514811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:48.79048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.079840
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and concurring in result in part).
[¶ 49.] I concur in all respects except that I concur in result on Issue 3 for four reasons:
1. First, since we are affirming the trial court in denying additional disbursements (for attorney fees and expenses), it is not necessary to decide at this time whether or not they are permitted under the statute.
2. Second, since we decide to deny additional disbursements because the result was not entirely favorable to Peterson, any interpretation of the statute (SDCL 3-17-10) is not necessary to the holding, and therefore, simply dicta.
3. Third, it is a mistake to reach that unnecessary interpretation now for an even more important reason. It is wrong.
SDCL 3-17-10 is specific statutory authorization for an award of trial and appellate attorney fees. It provides in part: “If the final determination of such proceeding be favorable to such accused officer, he shall be allowed the reasonable and necessary expenses he has incurred in his defense, including a reasonable attorney fee, to be fixed by the court or judge[.]” (emphasis added). Obviously, the final determination is at the appellate level in the Supreme Court, not the trial court.
4. Fourth, it would be a mistake to have an incorrect, unnecessary interpretation on the books in this state because it *275would enable the County Commissioners to punish a county officer in circumstances like this, even though the initial determination, or trial court result, was entirely favorable to him. They could do this by forcing him to pay the cost and expenses of an appeal without personal costs to themselves. We should not provide them this one-sided advantage, especially when the Legislature intended otherwise.
[¶ 50.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this special writing on points 1 and 2.