Court Opinion

ID: 9389108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 17:07:00.910116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.010496
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Reed, 2023-Ohio-1324.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2022-A-0082

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

KASSANDRA REED,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00065
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                           OPINION

                                     Decided: April 24, 2023
                                 Judgment: Affirmed and remanded

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christine Davis, Assistant
Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson,
OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Kassandra Reed, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula County

Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to 24 months in prison for violating R.C.

2919.22(A), endangering children, a third-degree felony.

        {¶2}      Appellant has raised a single assignment of error arguing that the record

does not support the 24-month term of imprisonment.

        {¶3}     Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find appellant’s

assignment of error to be without merit. The trial court did not err in imposing a 24-month
sentence and appellant has not demonstrated that her sentence is contrary to law or that

the trial court should have imposed a community control sanction.

       {¶4}   Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of

Common Pleas.

                              Substantive and Procedural History

       {¶5}   Appellant’s seven-week-old child, M.R. (DOB 4-17-2022), received injuries,

including fractured bones, to all four extremities. According to the presentence

investigation, appellant’s husband and co-defendant caused those injuries. Appellant

waited several days before taking M.R. to receive treatment for these injuries. M.R. was

removed from the home due to the suspected abuse.

       {¶6}   On March 2, 2022, appellant was indicted on one count of Endangering

Children, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), a felony of the third degree. Appellant pled guilty

to the charge on July 7 and the matter was scheduled for sentencing.

       {¶7}   At the September 8 sentencing hearing, appellant requested a sentence of

community control while the State requested that prison be imposed, without specifying

a length of sentence. Appellant’s attorney said that a community control sanction was

appropriate because the child’s injuries were primarily caused by appellant’s husband,

appellant expressed remorse, and acknowledged that she failed to execute her duty of

care for the child. The State emphasized that M.R. had suffered for days before receiving

medical treatment for the multiple broken bones and fractures inflicted.

       {¶8}   The trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and

said that the extent of the injuries was “wrong on all levels.” The Court concluded that

under R.C. 2929.12, the “more serious factors override the less serious factors. * * * A

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term of community control would demean the seriousness of the offense, and would

demean the seriousness of the injuries to this infant.” The court said that it was giving

appellant credit for taking responsibility “and that is the only reason I’m not imposing the

maximum prison sentence.” The court ordered a 24-month prison term.

       {¶9}   Appellant timely appealed raising one assignment of error.

                             Assignments of Error and Analysis

       {¶10} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states:

       {¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO A TERM

OF 24 MONTHS [sic] INCARCERATION AS THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT

SUCH A SENTENCE.”

       {¶12} Appellant argues that the record “clearly and convincingly indicates that the

Trial Court should have imposed a community control sanction.” Appellant does not

argue that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony

sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 or the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C.

2929.12. She also acknowledges that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not provide a basis for

an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on a lack of support in the record

for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. See State v. Jones,

163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 27-29.

       {¶13} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) only applies to challenges to sentences imposed

under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), and R.C. 2929.20(I).

Appellant does not challenge her sentence in reference to any of these statutes. See

State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0020, 2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 7. Under

Jones, we cannot review alleged error under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 to evaluate

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whether the sentencing court’s findings for those sentences are unsupported by the

record. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 39.

       {¶14} Appellant claims that the trial court issued a sentence contrary to law under

R.C. 2929.12. However, appellant asserts that the limitation on review under R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(a) “essentially amounts to no review at all, assuming a trial court stays

within whatever sentencing range is established by statute.” We view this as a challenge

to the constitutionality of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) or Ohio’s high court ruling in Jones.

       {¶15} Although appellant argues that the foregoing holding of Jones renders her

sentence essentially unreviewable, that is not the case. We agree with that aspect of

Justice Fischer’s concurring opinion in Jones, which discusses the reviewability of R.C.

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12:

              There is also no reason to believe that a trial court's
              consideration under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 is wholly
              unreviewable. First, although, as the majority opinion
              explains, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not require a trial court
              to make any specific findings on the record, those statutes are
              not optional. Both statutes use the term “shall” multiple times
              in relation to other matters. For example, R.C. 2929.11(A) and
              2929.12(A) through (F) set forth matters that a sentencing
              court “shall consider,” and R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the
              trial court “shall be guided by” the three overriding purposes
              of felony sentencing. R.C. 2929.11(B) further states that the
              sentence imposed by the trial court “shall” meet certain
              specific criteria. * * * Second, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) expressly
              requires an appellate court to “review the record, including the
              findings underlying the sentence.” The breadth of this
              statutory provision necessarily means that if a trial court does
              make findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the appellate
              court may review those findings for certain limited purposes.
              Third, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides that an appellate court
              can modify or vacate a sentence on the ground that it is
              “otherwise contrary to law.” This court's holding today
              specifies what an appellate court may not do under this
              provision: it may not conduct an independent review of

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Case No. 2022-A-0082
               whether the record supports the sentence and substitute its
               own judgment regarding the appropriate sentence.

Jones, supra, at ¶ 46.
         {¶16} Unlike R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), which provides for limited review of whether

the record supports a trial court’s sentencing findings under specific statutes, R.C.

29534.08(G)(2)(b) does provide that a court may review whether a sentence is contrary

to law. Jones held that “legal dictionaries define ‘contrary to law’ as ‘in violation of statute

or legal regulations at a given time,’ e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed. 1990).” Id.

at ¶ 34. The phrase “contrary to law” is not “equivalent” to an “appellate court’s

conclusions that the record does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.”

Id.

         {¶17} Appellant’s argument that the trial court should have imposed a community

control sanction is unavailing. We see nothing about her sentence to suggest it is contrary

to law and appellant has not identified how the imposition of a 24-month sentence for a

third-degree felony was contrary to law. Her arguments essentially ask this Court to do

what it cannot do – review whether the record supported the trial court’s decision to

impose a prison term rather than a community control sanction. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)

does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on

its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11(A) and R.C.

2929.12(C) and (D). Id. at ¶ 39.

         {¶18} Having found no failure to comply with R.C. 2929.12 and no other basis

under which the sentence is contrary to law, appellants’ sole assignment of error is without

merit.

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       {¶19} As a final matter, the trial court’s judgment entry of sentence stated that it

considered R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and R.C. 2929.13(B) in sentencing appellant to

a felony of the third degree. However, R.C. 2929.13(B) applies to sentences for felony

offenses of the fourth or fifth degree except for felony drug offenses of violence. R.C.

2929.13(C) applies to felonies of the third degree and provides no presumption of prison

or community control; it simply requires the court to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.

2929.12, which we have determined the trial court did in this case.

       {¶20} Crim.R. 36 authorizes the trial court to correct “[c]lerical mistakes in

judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from

oversight or omission * * * at any time.” A nunc pro nunc entry may be used to correct a

sentencing entry to reflect the sentence the trial court imposed at the sentencing hearing.

State v. Dixon, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0114, 2022-Ohio-4158, ¶ 57, citing State

v. Vaughn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103330, 2016- Ohio-3320, ¶ 21; State v. Fugate, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2000-02-031, 2000 WL 1708508, *2 (Nov. 13, 2000). However, this

power does not extend to “show what the court might or should have decided, or intended

to decide, but what it really did decide.” McKay v. McKay, 24 Ohio App.3d 74, 75, 493

N.E.2d 317 (11th Dist.1985). “The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to have the

judgment of the court reflect its true action. The power to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc

is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually been

taken.” Id. A modification of an earlier judgment entry may not change “what the court

actually decided” in its final entry of sentence. Id. at 76. “‘An improper nunc pro tunc order

is void.’” State v. Powell, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0068, 2023-Ohio-344, ¶ 11,

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quoting State v. Jama, 189 Ohio App.3d 687, 2010-Ohio-4739, 939 N.E.2d 1309, ¶ 14

(10th Dist.).

       {¶21} Here, the issuance of nunc pro tunc judgment entry is an appropriate

remedy to make the trial court’s sentencing entry reflect its true action pursuant to the

requirements of R.C. 2929.13(C).

       {¶22} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to issue a nunc

pro tunc judgment entry to correct the clerical error in the judgment entry to reflect that

the trial court considered R.C. 2929.13(C) in sentencing appellant.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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