Court Opinion

ID: 9684093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:46:34.342131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.728434
License: Public Domain

LEVY, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that this cause of action should be affirmed but not for the reasons set out in Justice Dunn’s opinion. This Court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in this cause because the Texas Supreme Court has determined that a motion to reinstate is to be treated in virtually all respects as a motion for new trial. Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.1986). Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a, as amended, now provides the same time periods for filing and overruling the motion to reinstate as provided in Rule 329b governing motions for new trials, and should be just as efficacious in extending to 90 days after the dismissal order is signed the time for filing an appeal bond. A motion to reinstate qualifies by strong implication for inclusion under Rule 306c, entitled “Prematurely Filed Documents,” extending the appellant’s timetable for filing an appeal bond from 30 days to 90 days after final judgment. If we treat the motion to reinstate as filed on the same day, but subsequent to, the date the dismissal order was signed, i.e., on May 6, the appeal bond was proper*600ly filed within 90 days, i.e., on July 28. An incidental, but quite significant, result would be the avoidance of a procedural technicality depriving a party of an appellate adjudication on the merits when he clearly indicates his intention to appeal.
Inasmuch as I believe we have jurisdiction, I will address appellant’s point of error concerning whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reinstate.
Appellant filed suit in 1980. Between 1980 and 1984, when he filed,his first motion to retain, he did nothing to develop his case. Nevertheless, the court granted his motion to retain, but the appellant did not take any further action until March 29, 1985, when he addressed interrogatories to Chubb. On April 1, the case appeared again on the dismissal docket, and was subsequently dismissed on May 6, 1985.
The trial court may consider the entire history of a case in deciding whether or not to dismiss for want of prosecution. State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex.1984). Appellate review of dismissal for want of prosecution is pivoted on whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. Bevil v. Johnson, 157 Tex. 621, 307 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1957).
Appellant did nothing to prosecute his case for over four years. Only after receiving notice of impending dismissal did he act to keep the case on the docket. After the 1984 motion to retain was granted, he again failed to pursue the case. In light of the history of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing for want of prosecution.
I would overrule appellant’s point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.