Court Opinion

ID: 9400148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 16:06:15.268097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.427458
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 22-0710
                                Filed June 7, 2023

ROBERT SHRUM,
    Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

BOLDT GROUP, INC., and TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF
CONNECTICUT,
     Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

      An employee appeals a district court ruling on judicial review affirming the

denial of workers’ compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.

      Thomp J. Pattermann and Laura L. Pattermann of Law Office of Gallner &

Pattermann, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.

      Aaron T. Oliver of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellees.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
                                         2

BADDING, Judge.

      Robert Shrum was working as a welder for Boldt Group, Inc. (Boldt) in

September 2015 when he injured his right arm. He was diagnosed with a partial

biceps tear, underwent surgery, participated in physical therapy, and was released

to work less than one year later with no permanent restrictions. But while receiving

treatment for his arm, Shrum intermittently reported pain in his neck and right

shoulder.   Though Boldt and its insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company of

Connecticut, approved treatment for Shrum’s arm, they did not approve care for

the other conditions.

      So in January 2019, Shrum sought workers’ compensation benefits for his

“[r]ight shoulder, right bicep, [and] right neck.”1 Following a hearing, the deputy

workers’ compensation commissioner found those conditions were causally

related to the work injury, awarded him permanent partial disability benefits, and

granted his request for alternate and ongoing care. The commissioner reversed

the deputy’s decision on intra-agency appeal, and the district court affirmed the

commissioner on judicial review. Shrum appeals.

I.    Scope and Standard of Review

      To start, we need to clarify the scope of our review. Shrum claims that

“substantial evidence in the record supports the deputy’s finding that [he] suffered

injuries to his right arm, right shoulder and neck which arose out of and in the

course of his employment with Boldt” and “was entitled to care, indemnity benefits

and an award of industrial disability for the same,” while the “commissioner’s

1Shrum also made a claim for his lower back, which he amended to his upper
back at the arbitration hearing. But he does not pursue that claim on appeal.
                                          3

reversal is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Emphasis added.) But it’s the

commissioner’s final decision that is subject to judicial review, not the deputy’s

proposed decision.2 See KONE, Inc. v. Harrison, No. 10-0872, 2011 WL 649044,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Giere v. Aase Haugen Homes, Inc.,

146 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Iowa 1966) (noting that even though “[o]n substantially the

same evidence the deputy and the commissioner reached opposite conclusions,”

“it is the commissioner’s decision that we review”).

       When determining whether the commissioner’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, we look for “the quantity and quality of evidence that would

be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish

the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that

fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.” See Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(10)(f)(1). “[W]e judge the finding ‘in light of all the relevant evidence in

the record cited by any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the

relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it.’” Cedar Rapids

2  Shrum argues that “[t]o discount the Deputy’s firsthand observations” of his
credibility “and rely solely upon a written reduction of the evidence is a proposition
unsupported in Iowa law.” But the deputy did not make any express credibility
findings about Shrum—the only witness who testified at the arbitration hearing. Cf.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (2020) (noting a court reviewing the record as a
whole must consider “any determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who
personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses”). Even if the deputy had
made such findings, they would not be controlling. See Iowa State Fairgrounds
Sec. v. Iowa Civil Rts. Comm’n, 322 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa 1982) (“Even when
credibility is involved, the agency, not the hearing officer, is charged with the
authoritative responsibility to decide what the evidence means under the governing
statute.”); Miron Constr. v. Poula, No. 11-1165, 2012 WL 1058231, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 28, 2012) (affirming the commissioner’s rejection of a deputy’s finding
that a claimant “did not testify in a credible and straightforward manner”).
                                         4

Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(1)(f)(3)).

II.    Analysis

       In reversing the deputy’s decision, the commissioner found that Shrum

“failed to satisfy his burden of proof to establish his neck and shoulder conditions

are causally related to the work injury. Thus, the deputy commissioner’s finding

that claimant sustained industrial disability is respectfully reversed.” See Iowa

Code § 85.3(1) (2019); Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007)

(“The claimant has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that the injury arose out of and was in the course of the claimant’s employment.”).

As for Shrum’s right-arm injury, which Boldt stipulated was causally related to his

employment, the commissioner found that did not result in any permanent

impairment. The commissioner accordingly denied Shrum’s claim for permanent

partial disability benefits, along with his request for alternate or ongoing medical

care for his neck and right shoulder.

       Shrum claims the commissioner’s decision was not supported by

substantial evidence because the commissioner (1) relied on a factually inaccurate

expert report from treating physician Dr. Brian Warme; (2) discounted a report from

Shrum’s expert, Dr. Charles Taylon, who performed an independent medical

examination in August 2019; (3) incorrectly found Shrum experienced right

shoulder pain before his work injury; and (4) gave too little weight to physical

therapy notes documenting Shrum’s complaints of pain in his neck and right

shoulder after his work injury. Our resolution of these arguments, which will be
                                         5

discussed as they arise below, “is controlled in large part by the deference we

afford to decisions of administrative agencies.” Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 844.

      A.     Neck

      Starting with Shrum’s neck condition, the commissioner found:

              The deputy commissioner, in finding claimant’s neck condition
      is causally related to the work injury, relied on the report of Charles
      Taylon, M.D. A significant problem with Dr. Taylon’s report, however,
      is that claimant testified both at hearing and in his deposition that he
      was not making a neck claim against defendants.

The record shows that at Shrum’s deposition, Boldt’s attorney asked him, “Are you

claiming any neck or low back injury?” Shrum succinctly replied, “No.” The same

exchange took place at the arbitration hearing. We agree with the commissioner

that this testimony “greatly undermines Dr. Taylon’s opinion[]” that Shrum

“aggravated a mechanical musculoligamentous injury involving his neck and

shoulder.”

      The commissioner also found that Dr. Taylon’s report was undermined by

Shrum’s failure to mention neck pain to two of the physicians he saw after the work

injury. Shrum had an appointment with Dr. Charles Mooney, an occupational

medicine physician, on October 5, 2015.       In a self-assessment form, Shrum

reported the following symptoms: “all around elbow, forearm, wrist and hand[.] Dull

to shooting pain. Tightness in hand. [L]oss of grip.” He did not note any neck or

shoulder symptoms on a pain drawing that he completed for Dr. Mooney. The only

reference to neck pain in Dr. Mooney’s medical records was a notation in Shrum’s

past medical history that he had been in a “previous motor vehicle accident causing

neck pain.” That accident occurred in December 2007, following which Shrum saw

his primary care physician, Dr. Rodney Yager, for chronic neck, shoulder, and back
                                         6

pain in September 2008, August 2009, November 2011, December 2014, and

June 2015—just a few months before his work accident in September. After

Dr. Mooney referred Shrum to orthopedic surgeon Dr. Warme, Shrum again

confined his complaints to his elbow, forearm, and hand at their first visit in

December 2015. While Shrum did complain of “a little soreness” in his neck at his

first physical therapy appointment after the accident, he did not repeat that

complaint to a physician until February 2017. Substantial evidence accordingly

supports the commissioner’s determination that “notations of neck complaints after

the work-related injury are few and far between.”

       The commissioner further discounted Dr. Taylon’s “summary conclusion”

about Shrum’s neck because “Dr. Taylon failed to identify what, if any, of claimant’s

medical history he reviewed—or was even aware of.” Shrum challenges this

finding, noting that Dr. Taylon “specifically cites that the Claimant was seen for

neck pain in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011, as well as in 2015 before his injury.”

Shrum is correct that Dr. Taylon noted those dates in his report, but that was the

extent of his discussion about Shrum’s past medical treatment for his neck. See

id. at 845 (“[A]n expert’s opinion is not necessarily binding upon the commissioner

if the opinion is based on an incomplete history.”).

       Shrum further contends that “Dr. Warme’s records are also replete with

errors,” including Dr. Warme’s notation in December 2015 that “Shrum had not had

any physical therapy when, in fact, he had.” But it is the role of the commissioner,

as the fact finder, to determine the weight to be given to any expert testimony. See

Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Iowa 1998). In doing so, the

commissioner may accept or reject the expert opinion in whole or in part—even if
                                          7

that opinion is uncontroverted—so long as the commissioner states why it was

disregarded. See Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 1974).

The commissioner did so here, acknowledging that while Dr. Taylon “was the only

physician to specifically address [Shrum’s] neck,” he was disregarding that opinion

because “it is unclear whether Dr. Taylon had a full understanding of claimant’s

history, in addition to claimant’s failure to report neck complaints to his physicians,

and claimant’s testimony that he was not pursuing a neck claim.”

       We are satisfied from our review of the record that substantial evidence

supports the commissioner’s finding that Shrum’s neck complaints were not

causally related to the work injury.          See Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705

N.W.2d 665, 674 (Iowa 2005) (“[W]e do not determine whether the evidence might

support a different finding; instead we determine whether it supports the finding

made.”).

       B.     Right Shoulder

       Most of Shrum’s appellate brief is devoted to the commissioner’s rejection

of his right shoulder injury. On this issue, the commissioner found:

       [M]any of the same problems undercut the persuasiveness of
       Dr. Taylon’s report. There are no mentions of shoulder pain in the
       records from Dr. Mooney, and an intake form completed by claimant
       made no notations of shoulder pain. Claimant’s shoulder complaints
       do not appear in Dr. Warme’s records until mid-2016, and like his
       neck complaints, the first indication of claimant’s shoulder complaints
       in Dr. Yager’s records do not appear until February of 2017—more
       than a year after the injury. To Dr. Warme, claimant reported
       “chronic” shoulder pain, and again, to Dr. Yager, claimant did not
       attribute it to the work injury but instead claimant indicated it had
       been “going on for years” and worse “the last 3 months.”

       Shrum does not really challenge the finding that he did not report any

shoulder pain to Dr. Mooney, contending instead that “the tests performed by
                                        8

Dr. Mooney are commonly used to diagnose an injury to the shoulder.” But that is

a fact outside the record before us. See Hainey v. Protein Blenders, Inc., 445

N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“Our review is limited to the record made

before the agency officer.”). And, as related above, the medical forms that Shrum

completed for Dr. Mooney were confined to complaints about his elbow, forearm,

and wrist.

       Shrum does, however, challenge the commissioner’s finding that he did not

report shoulder pain to Dr. Warme until mid-2016, noting that he made complaints

before then to his physical therapist, who was in contact with Dr. Warme’s office.

Shrum points to a February 2016 record from Dr. Warme, where he noted that

“surgical repair of the bicep tendon ‘would not affect the other symptoms that he

has in the shoulder or the arm and hand.’” And in an April record, a nurse in

Dr. Warme’s office documented that Shrum “asked about having his right shoulder

checked out on the same claim.”        Dr. Warme addressed that issue at an

appointment in June where, like the commissioner found, he noted Shrum “has

chronic right shoulder pain.” But whether Shrum’s complaints of shoulder pain to

Dr. Warme surfaced in February or June, they were not the focus of Dr. Warme’s

treatment of Shrum’s work injury.

       As for Dr. Yager, the first time that Shrum reported right shoulder pain to

him after the work injury was in February 2017. The medical record from that

appointment states, as the commissioner found, “Patient is here with a history of

low back pain, cervical spine pain, and right shoulder pain which has been going

on for years. It has been worse for the last three months.” (Emphasis added.)

Shrum’s medical records from Dr. Yager before the work injury show that in August
                                        9

2009, Shrum reported “a history of chronic neck and shoulder pain, which has been

going on for 20 years, since he was involved in a motor vehicle accident.” In the

years that followed, Shrum continued to occasionally see Dr. Yager and a

chiropractor for shoulder pain.

       Shrum contends that past treatment was limited to his left shoulder. But his

medical records before the work injury show notations about both right and left

shoulder pain, or shoulder pain in general. And when he went back to see

Dr. Yager in February 2017, he did not link his shoulder pain to the work injury. A

reasonable person could accept this evidence as sufficient to conclude, like the

commissioner did here, that Shrum’s right shoulder condition was not aggravated

by the work injury. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(f)(1) (2020); Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty.

Sch. Dist., 722 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 2006) (stating evidence is substantial when

a reasonable person could accept it as adequate to reach the same finding).

       Yet Shrum argues the commissioner should have given more weight to his

physical therapy records, which show that he “complained of neck pain and

shoulder pain within a week of the date of the accident and continued to complain

of it regularly for months.” The commissioner “acknowledge[d] claimant reported

shoulder complaints in physical therapy,” but he found “the x-ray of his shoulder

was unremarkable, and when claimant returned to Dr. Warme after the x-ray, there

was again no discussion about shoulder pain or discomfort.” Shrum’s complaints

about this finding, like his other complaints above, would require us to reassess

the weight and credibility of the evidence—something we cannot do in conducting

a substantial-evidence review of an agency decision. See Arndt, 728 N.W.2d at

394.
                                         10

       In the end, the commissioner found Dr. Warme’s opinion “to be more

consistent with the greater weight of the evidence” “regarding causation of

claimant’s shoulder.” In a letter that was drafted by Boldt’s attorney, Dr. Warme

indicated by checkmark that he agreed with the following:

               As to the shoulder, Mr. Shrum first mentioned [that] to you at
       a visit on 6/07/16. The condition was noted to be chronic.
               ....
               As such, due to the delayed reporting to you, the alleged
       chronic nature of the condition, and the other information discussed
       above, you cannot attribute any shoulder . . . complaints to the
       9/16/15 work injury.

       Shrum takes issue with this letter for many of the same reasons discussed

above, including that in February and April 2016, Shrum’s medical records with

Dr. Warme mention his shoulder. But, again, it was “within the ‘peculiar province’

of the commissioner” to accept or reject the expert opinions before him. Pease,

807 N.W.2d at 845 (citation omitted). We only determine “whether substantial

evidence supports a finding according to those witnesses whom the commissioner

believed.” Arndt, 728 N.W.2d at 395 (cleaned up). The discrepancies that Shrum

protests on appeal are minor and not the type that render Dr. Warme’s opinion “so

impossible or absurd and self-contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by

the court.” Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 847–48 (citation omitted). We find substantial

evidence supports the commissioner’s findings about Shrum’s right shoulder.

       C.     Right Arm

       This leaves us with the commissioner’s determination that Shrum was not

entitled to permanent partial disability benefits for the stipulated right-arm injury.

On that issue, the commissioner discounted the five percent whole body

impairment rating assigned by Dr. Taylon, finding:
                                         11

              Dr. Taylon . . . offered no specifics as to the basis of his five
      percent whole body impairment rating. He did not cite to the AMA
      Guides to the evaluation of Permanent Impairment, nor did he even
      identify what body part or condition (or combination thereof) the
      rating was for.

See Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(x) (2019) (requiring use of the guides published by the

American Medical Association in determining percentage of impairment).

      In contrast, the commissioner gave greater weight to Dr. Warme’s opinion

on permanency:

              Dr. Warme opined claimant sustained no permanent
      impairment and released him to full-duty work without restrictions. At
      his last appointment with claimant, claimant reported “great strength
      and no pain.” While claimant testified he had some difficulties with
      his work after being released from Dr. Warme’s care, he sought no
      additional treatment and he continued his job assignments through
      the union without restrictions until he voluntarily took a different job.
      This evidence is more consistent with Dr. Warme’s opinion that
      claimant sustained no permanent impairment than it is with Dr.
      Taylon’s opinion regarding permanency—which again, has no
      explained basis. I therefore find claimant sustained no permanent
      impairment as a result of the work-related injury. The deputy
      commissioner’s finding regarding claimant’s entitled to [permanent
      partial disability] benefits is therefore respectfully reversed.

      Shrum repeats the same arguments about these findings as those already

discussed and rejected above.       For the same reasons, we find substantial

evidence supports the commissioner’s determination that Shrum did not suffer

permanent impairment from his right-arm injury.

      D.     Alternate or Ongoing Medical Care

      Because we agree with the district court that substantial evidence supported

the commissioner’s determination that Shrum’s neck and right shoulder conditions

were not caused by his work injury, Shrum’s claim for alternate or ongoing medical

care for those conditions also fails. See id. § 85.27(1) (requiring “[t]he employer,
                                          12

for all injuries compensable under this chapter or chapter 85A,” to furnish

reasonable medical care).

III.   Conclusion

       We, like the district court, conclude there was substantial evidence to

support the commissioner’s determination that Shrum’s neck and right shoulder

conditions were not causally related to his employment, as well as the

commissioner’s denial of permanent partial disability benefits for Shrum’s right-arm

injury and alternate or ongoing medical care for his neck and right shoulder. See

Warren Props. v. Stewart, 864 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 2015) (“On our review, we

determine whether we arrive at the same conclusion as the district court.”). We

therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

       AFFIRMED.