Court Opinion

ID: 9380987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:03.21469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.882407
License: Public Domain

J-A09013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 WILLIAM ROBERT JONES                     :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1156 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-22-CR-0002046-2008

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                 FILED: MARCH 21, 2023

      William Robert Jones appeals from the order entered July 20, 2022,

dismissing his second petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”) as untimely. We affirm.

      On November 17, 2008, Appellant pled nolo contendere to one count of

possession of child pornography due to his possession of three images

depicting nude females under the age of eighteen. Following a review of the

no contest plea colloquy and a discussion of the impact of sexual offender

registration, sentencing was deferred. Prior to sentencing, Appellant filed and

then withdrew a motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea. On April 10,

2009, Appellant affirmed that he wished to continue with the plea agreement

and was sentenced pursuant to that agreement to four years of probation.

Appellant was also required to register for ten years as a sexual offender under

Megan’s Law III.
J-A09013-23

      Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea, which was

denied. A timely direct appeal followed in which Appellant alleged that the

trial court erred when denying his motion to withdraw his plea. On May 13,

2010, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and Appellant did

not seek review with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      On August 30, 2010, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appointed counsel submitted an

amended PCRA petition and the court held an evidentiary hearing at which

Appellant, his mother, his sister, plea counsel, and sentencing counsel

testified. Appellant alleged that plea counsel coerced his plea when he told

him that he was “toast” if he went to trial, that he “wouldn’t last a minute in

jail,” and that he was “too pretty to go to jail.” See PCRA Court Opinion,

8/31/11, at 2. The PCRA court found Appellant’s testimony that plea counsel

coerced him to enter the plea incredible and denied the petition. On appeal,

this Court affirmed the decision of the PCRA court, and the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

      On March 28, 2022, Appellant filed a petition entitled “Notice of Petition

and Petition for an Order to Vacate Judgment,” which is the subject of this

appeal. In the petition, Appellant challenged his plea and the legality of his

sentence. See PCRA Petition, 3/28/22, at unnumbered 3. The PCRA court

properly treated the filing as a second pro se PCRA petition.              See

Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa.Super. 2001)

(treating defendant’s pro se motion challenging his guilty plea as a PCRA

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petition “regardless of the manner in which the petition is titled” because “the

PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for obtaining post-conviction collateral relief”).

The Commonwealth submitted an answer suggesting that Appellant’s petition

was not cognizable as he was no longer serving any sentence related to this

case. See Answer, 4/28/22, at ¶ 16. The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing as untimely

and lacking cognizability since Appellant was no longer serving a sentence.

See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 3-4. Appellant filed his objections and

on July 20, 2022, the court dismissed his petition. The PCRA court did not

order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement but did issue a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) opinion. This appeal followed.

      Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:

      1. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear a matter
         brought before it by way of fraud upon the court, and in clear
         violation of the constitutionally protected rights of the
         Appellant.

      2. Whether or not the trial court has the authority to ignore its
         ministerial duties.

Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      We begin with a discussion of the pertinent legal principles. Our “review

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,” and

we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record

and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 220 A.3d 1112, 1116

(Pa.Super. 2019).     Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual

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findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have

no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal

conclusions.”   Id.   “[W]here the petitioner raises questions of law, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. “It is

an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief

is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up).

      Before we may consider the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first

determine whether the petition was timely filed. Pursuant to the PCRA, any

petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of

time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness

requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the

merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.    See

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

      The time bar can “only be overcome by satisfaction of one of the three

statutory exceptions codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).” Id. Those

exceptions are as follows: “(1) interference by governmental officials in the

presentation of the claim; (2) newly-discovered facts; and (3) an after-

recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231,

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233-34 (Pa.Super. 2012); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Additionally, a

PCRA petitioner must present his claim within one year of the date the claim

first could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

       Appellant’s petition, filed more than ten years after his judgment of

sentence became final, is patently untimely. Thus, unless Appellant pled and

proved one of the three exceptions to the PCRA time-bar outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(1), we cannot address the claims asserted therein. On review of

the certified record and his brief on appeal, we find that Appellant has never

raised the applicability of any of these exceptions. Accordingly, we hold that

the PCRA court did not err when it dismissed his petition as being untimely

filed.1 We affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

1 We also note that, even if timely filed, Appellant is ineligible for PCRA relief.
The court sentenced Appellant on April 10, 2009, to serve four years of
probation. A review of the record reveals no subsequent amendments,
revocations, or alterations were made to Appellant’s sentence. Therefore,
Appellant’s sentence expired on April 10, 2013, nearly ten years before
Appellant filed the petition at issue in this appeal. Since Appellant is no longer
serving the sentence for his convictions in this case, he is ineligible for PCRA
relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v.
Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016) (holding petitioner was no longer
serving sentence, so he was ineligible for PCRA relief and petitioner’s
ineligibility deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain the petition).

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

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