Court Opinion

ID: 9721425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:58:58.436157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.752817
License: Public Domain

*1178BUTLER, J.
I dissent from so much of the majority opinion as concerns issues on sentencing and concur in the remainder.
With reluctance, I plunge into the murky waters of violent sex crime sentencing, mindful of other opinions which, like kelp, seek sunlight only to be swept away and moulder on a sandy beach, attracting vagrant flies and vexing unaware readers. The trial judge’s views on the subject deserve publication. “Having once made that determination, we then come to the area which we approach the Alice in Wonderland rule of the determinate sentencing law, and I was reminded as I thought about this in the middle of the night of President Carter’s statement about lusting in your heart. I’ve lusted in my heart for some changes in the determinate sentence law so trial judges can understand it, but then we might put the Appellate Courts out of work. I don’t think so, but we certainly might.” If indeed, the determinate sentencing law is the rabbit hole through which we enter Wonderland, I accept the invitation to the Mad Hatter’s tea party.1 I restate the sentence.
Jamison was convicted on count 1, rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) and count 2, a robbery (§ 211). Catherine was the victim of the rape which was followed immediately by the robbery of her property, all occurring within her apartment within the space of a couple of hours. Jamison used a gun in each offense (§§ 12022.3, subd. (a); 12022.5). The court determined the rape and robbery were separate individual offenses, each involving violence and concluded section 654 banning multiple punishment for acts committed within the same transaction was not applicable. The court then opted for consecutive sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c) and sentenced the rape count noting that term would have to be served after full completion of the robbery sentence.
The court imposed the upper term of eight years on the rape count, adding a three-year enhancement for the gun use. The court then sentenced Jamison *1179on the robbery count, imposing the midterm of three years and “staying” the enhancement on the gun use in the robbery under section 1170.1, subdivision (g) (now subd. (h)). The court stayed imposition of the weapon use as to the robbery, properly noting to punish Jamison again for the gun after a section 12022.3, subdivision (a) enhancement was already imposed would violate dual use of facts proscriptions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 441.) Although the court incorrectly relied on section 1170.1, subdivision (g) (now subd. (h)), which authorizes striking of enhancements if circumstances in mitigation are found (see People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 452 [169 Cal.Rptr. 364]), the stay was otherwise proper and we do not need to modify the judgment, except insofar as to point out the inaccuracy here. Jamison’s sentence thus totaled 14 years.
Simply stated, the court sentenced Jamison on the robbery to a full term under section 1170 and used section 667.6, subdivision (c) to impose another full, consecutive sentence for the rape. This was error. A single violent sex offense cannot be sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c). We said so in People v. Waite (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 585 [194 Cal.Rptr. 245] (pet. for hg. den. Nov. 23, 1983): “In summary, sections 1170.1 and 667.6 are merely computational sentencing statutes, each designed for use when imposing consecutive sentences on those who commit forcible sex crimes as defined in sections 261, 264.1, 286, 288, 288a and 289. Which sentencing statute applies depends upon whether more than one forcible sex crime was committed and the circumstances surrounding those crimes. If only one of the multiple crimes is a forcible sex offense, it must be sentenced under section 1170.1 as a ‘principal’ or ‘subordinate’ term with the other crimes. If more than one of the listed forcible sex crimes are sentenced together and they involve the same victim on the same occasion, the court has its option to sentence under either section 1170.1 or section 667.6, subdivision (c). Where the forcible sex crimes involve separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions, the court must sentence these crimes consecutively pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d).” (Id., at p. 594, italics added.) The italicized portion is included within an exhaustive, penetrating and authoritative analysis of the complex sentencing scheme involving violent sex offenses. This case requires that analysis be further developed.
Construction of the provisions of the determinate sentencing law must be undertaken against the legislative history of the act, policies underlying the various sentencing procedures and judicial interpretation so far accrued since the law’s effective date. As Waite and People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686] demonstrate, resolution of these sentencing issues requires consideration of all the act’s provisions to ascertain legislative intent and to reach results consistent with the policies *1180underlying the various sections of the act. Section 667.6, subdivision (c), viewed in this context, must be read with other provisions providing for the consecutive sentencing of various offenses. Here, simplicity is not a virtue and prolixity is not a vice.
Belmontes considered the relationship between section 667.6, subdivision (c) and section 1170.1 and held courts have the option to choose between these sections in sentencing violent sex offenses. While Belmontes did not address our issue as the defendant there was convicted and sentenced for multiple violent sex offenses affecting a single victim on the same occasion, the opinion clearly refers to multiple forcible sex offenses as contemplated by both subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 667.6 as do other cases. (People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406]; People v. Masten (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 579 [187 Cal.Rptr. 515].)
The majority cite People v. Belasco (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 974 [178 Cal.Rptr. 461] as holding a single violent sex crime may be sentenced consecutive to a nonviolent sex crime under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
In Belasco, the defendant was convicted of count I, rape (§ 261, subds. (2) and (3)), count II, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5) and count III, oral copulation by a person over 21 with a person under 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2). “He was sentenced to the state prison for the upper term of three years on count II as the court found ‘substantial aggravation’; said count was also found to be the principal term under Penal Code section 667.6. As to count I, he was sentenced to eight years, the sentence to run consecutively with count II pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6. The sentence as to count III was merged under Penal Code section 654 with count II and stayed until the sentences in counts I and II have been served.” (People v. Belasco, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 978.) The court then addressed the defendant’s contention section 667.6, subdivision (c) was improperly applied. “Pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c), the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper three-year term on count II and chose this sentence to be the principal term. The court then sentenced defendant to an eight-year consecutive term on count I, as the subordinate term.” (Belasco, supra, at p. 983.) The court affirmed the sentence. “Here, the crime in count II (unlawful intercourse with a minor—Pen. Code, § 261.5) is a nonviolent sex crime. Forcible rape (count I—Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 and 3) is a violent sex crime. Thus, the court properly exercised its discretion pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c) and imposed a sentence on count II (nonviolent sex crime) as the principal term and a sentence on count I (violent sex crime) as the subordinate term.” (Belasco, supra, at pp. 983-984.) Belasco misconstrues section 667.6, subdivision (c) in holding a violent sex crime cannot be a principal term. “If the court decides to apply *1181section 667.6, subdivision (c), the term [imposed] is consecutive to any other term of imprisonment, commences from the time the defendant would otherwise have been released, and may not be included in any determination pursuant to section 1170.1. Clearly, under the language of section 667.6, a violent sex crime sentenced thereto cannot be a ‘principal term’ in a sentence calculation under section 1170.1, subdivision (a). Consequently, where a defendant commits crimes in addition to a violent sex crime, the offense with the greatest term of imprisonment which is not a violent sex crime will be the principal term, all other felonies consecutively sentenced are computed as one-third of the midterm, and all violent sex crimes are full terms to be served consecutively to these and any existing terms.” (Belasco, supra, at p. 983, italics added.) Belmontes disapproves Belasco’s reasoning: “Thus, we conclude that if a defendant is convicted of both sex offenses and nonsex offenses, a trial court may properly designate the longest nonsex offense as the principal term and may treat all of the sex offenses under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
“In exercising its sentencing discretion, the court should make an individual determination as to each sex offense. Thus, a court could choose to have a sex offense serve as the principal term if it carried the longest sentence and to treat all other offenses—regardless of whether they include sex offenses listed in section 667.6, subdivision (c)—as subordinate terms under section 1170.1. A court could alternatively choose to treat some of the sex offenses under the principal/subordinate scheme of section 1170.1, while imposing fully consecutive sentences on others under section 667.6, subdivision (c). The computations under sections 1170.1 and 667.6, subdivision (c) are to be done separately; the total of the section 667.6 computation would then be added to the section 1170.1 total.” (People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 346.) A sentence under section 667.6, subdivision (c) is a decision concerning consecutive sentencing. (Belmontes, supra, at p. 347.) Once chosen, a section 667.6, subdivision (c) term is necessarily excluded from “any determination” under section 1170.1, subdivision (a). A term sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c) cannot be the principal term. So too, once a term is sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c), neither can it be a subordinate term.
The narrow view taken by the majority construing section 667.6, subdivision (c) has facial merit. The subdivision permits a full, separate and consecutive term for “each violation” resulting in a violent sex crime. The majority then reduces the word “crimes” in the next phrase, “whether or not the crimes are committed during a single transaction,” to the singular by construing the plural “crimes” as necessarily including the singular by reason of section 7. The balance of the subdivision speaks of “term” in the singular.
*1182The majority’s focus on the plural “crimes” in subdivision (c) incorrectly isolates that word and construes it separately and apart from the use of that word throughout the section. Subdivision (d) mandates full, separate and consecutive terms for violent sex offenses “. . .if such crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.” Here, the phrase “crimes” necessarily refers to more than one of the enumerated violent sex offenses listed in that section. It is a general rule of statutory construction when an identical term is used in part of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature intended its meaning to be the same throughout the entire section, absent an express exception. (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104].) It follows then the word “crimes” appearing in subdivision (c) is to be given the same meaning as its usage in subdivision (d) and refers to multiple violent sex offenses, not to a single one. “In enacting Penal Code section 667.6, the Legislature has chosen to treat violent sex offenses and violent sex offenders in a manner differently than other types of offenses and offenders. The statute is directed at recidivism by providing for longer enhancements for prior convictions of the same type of offense. The statute is directed at multiplicity of offenses by providing for full, separate, consecutive sentencing.” (People v. Karsai, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 242.) And Belmontes admonishes section 667.6, subdivision (c) is obviously a much harsher sentencing measure than section 1170.1. It is of course harsher because the consecutive terms contemplated by subdivision (c) are full terms and may not be diminished by the section 1170.1, subdivision (a) one-third the midterm limitation on the length of consecutive subordinate terms.
The rape of which Jamison was convicted is punishable by imprisonment for three, six or eight years in the state prison. (§ 264.) Jamison’s robbery is punishable by imprisonment for two, three or five years in the state prison. (§ 213.) As Karsai points out, violent sex offenses are punished differently than other offenses and section 667.6 is directed at multiplicity of violent sex offenses by providing for full, separate and consecutive sentencing. Using section 667.6, subdivision (c) to sentence a single violent sex offense does not add to the punishment prescribed by section 264 (three, six or eight years). To punish such a single violent sex offense separately from a nonviolent sex offense or a nonsex offense only enables the court to give a full term for such latter offense; in effect, the nonsex offense is treated more harshly. This result contravenes the legislative purpose of section 667.6.2
*1183This construction of the statute invites equal protection attacks. The defendant who robs a gas station and thereafter commits an unrelated violent sex offense receives two full terms—one for the robbery and one for the rape. I find nothing in the determinate sentencing law that permits a robbery to be punished at full term when coupled with a violent sex offense. My reading of section 667.6, subdivision (c) compels the conclusion reached by Karsai that only persons who commit multiple sex offenses are subjected to the harsher treatment acknowledged by Belmontes.
The majority points to the differences in language of subdivision (d) and subdivision (c) to the kind of crimes to which the respective sections are directed. Although I believe subdivision (c) is clear in its meaning, at best the phrase “whether or not the crimes are committed during a single transaction,” appearing in subdivision (c) is ambiguous. If so, under settled rules of statutory construction, we would be bound to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. (People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, 346.)
In summary, a single violent sex crime may not be sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c). Instead, it must be sentenced under the provisions of section 1170. When accompanied by a nonviolent sex offense or other felony and the court chooses to impose the terms for those felonies consecutively, the principal/subordinate term concept must be followed. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) I would remand for resentencing consistent with the views expressed, the court of course being free to sentence concurrently or consecutively so long as the sentencing is pursuant to sections 1170 and 1170.1, subdivision (a).
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 26, 1984.

“The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing this; but all he said was, ‘Why is a raven like a writing-desk?’
“ ‘Come, we shall have some fun now!’ thought Alice. ‘I’m glad they’ve begun asking riddles—I believe I can guess that,’ she"added aloud.
“ ‘Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?’ said the March Hare.
“ ‘Exactly so,’ said Alice.
“ ‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on.
“ 'I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s the same thing, you know.’
“ ‘Have you guessed the riddle yet?’ the Hatter said, turning to Alice again.
“ ‘No, I give it up,’ Alice replied. ‘What’s the answer?’
“ 'I haven’t the slightest idea,’ said the Hatter.
“ ‘Nor I,’ said the March Hare.
“Alice sighed wearily. T think you might do something better with the time,’ she said, ‘than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers.’ ” (Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.)

If Jamison is punished under section 1170.1, subdivision (a), the longer rape count (eight years) would be the principal term enhanced three years for the weapon use (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) and the robbery would be limited to one-third the midterm (one year), and the gun use would be stayed for a total sentence of twelve years.
Indeed, the facts here do not support a harsher sentence. The court stated it did not intend *1183to punish the robbery harshly when it imposed the midterm: “Moving over to count 2 which is the second box, the robbery, I have considered the statement and this is the area. And maybe some of the things I said in aggravation probably would apply to the robbery more so than to the rape, but I have found in weighing the mitigating and aggravating features and just the facts of the robbery exclusive of the rape, if you figure that the rape was over— let’s just consider the robbery. It may have lacked class, but it wasn’t particularly bad. It’s a mid-term robbery. ”