Court Opinion

ID: 9580100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:49.050079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:01.689672
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority’s opinion effectively overrules established *101precedent without so stating43 and ignores the Supreme Court’s decision in Daniel v. State,44 I respectfully dissent.
This case revolves around Stephen Ralph Bibbins’ alleged consent to the search of his vehicle during a traffic stop. Recently, our Supreme Court set forth a framework for analyzing the validity of such consent. First addressing the limits of a traffic stop, the Court in Daniel v. State noted that
[t]he officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention.45
A traffic stop usually should last no longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the stop, and its scope “ ‘must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’ ”46 Thus, under Daniel, the initial question is whether the police inquiry exceeded the permissible limits of a valid traffic stop. If the inquiry fell within those limits, the detention was lawful, and we address whether consent made during the lawful detention was voluntary.47 But, if the police inquiry exceeded the stop’s legal limits, we must analyze the constitutionality of the expanded encounter and determine whether it violated the Fourth Amendment.
Extending an encounter beyond the initial stop is not always unconstitutional.48 As found in Daniel,
lengthening the detention for further questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible in two circumstances. First, the officer may detain the driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has *102occurred or is occurring. Second, further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter.49
Once again, if the extended encounter was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, we immediately consider whether the consent was voluntary.50 If the encounter constituted an illegal second detention, however, we then determine “whether the consent was given voluntarily (under the totality of the circumstances test) and whether that consent was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure so that it was not the product thereof.”51
The Daniel framework ■— which binds this Court — thus presents three questions for analysis: (1) Did the police inquiry extend beyond the limits of the original traffic stop? (2) If so, was the extended encounter legal under the Fourth Amendment? and (3) If consent resulted during an illegal detention, was it both voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful detention that it was not the product thereof? I will discuss each question in turn.
1. Although the majority does not address the Daniel framework, the basis of its opinion appears to involve the first question. According to the majority, Special Agent Bauch’s request for consent to search Bibbins’ truck did not extend the original traffic stop. I strongly disagree.
As we found in State v. Gibbons, a case in which three members of the current majority joined, and the author of the current majority dissented, “[a]n officer who questions and detains a suspect for reasons other than those connected with the original purpose of the stop exceeds the scope of permissible investigation unless he has ‘reasonable suspicion’ of other criminal activity.”52 Gibbons is not alone in this pronouncement. We adhered to such principle before Gibbons, and we have followed it since.53
*103The record shows that when Bauch asked Bibbins for consent to search his truck, Bauch had already obtained the information from Bibbins’ license, had checked the information on the police computer, and had found “no problems.” But, instead of writing a ticket for the lane violation, otherwise continuing the traffic investigation, or returning the license, Bauch launched into an unrelated drug probe, without any objective basis at that time, and sought consent to search. I fail to see how such inquiry falls within the permissible scope of a lane-violation traffic stop under the language in Gibbons.
Moreover, I can find no reasonable distinction between this situation and several of our prior decisions. In Habib v. State,54 for example, an officer stopped a car for a seat belt violation. While speaking with the car occupants, he noticed that both the driver and passenger had dry mouths, which the officer believed to be consistent with marijuana use. The officer obtained permission to search the passenger, and the search revealed the odor of marijuana. The passenger admitted to smoking marijuana the previous day, and the officer at that point “ ‘felt like’ both men had been smoking.”55 The officer then obtained consent to search the driver, which produced no contraband, and consent to search the car, which revealed marijuana in the back seat. During this encounter, the two men were not free to leave, and the officer held the driver’s license.
The trial court granted the driver’s motion to suppress, determining that the officer lacked articulable reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop and launch a drug probe. It concluded that the officer proceeded on a “ ‘mere hunch’ ” based on the car occupants’ dry mouths. We affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the officer impermissibly exceeded the scope of the stop by conducting a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion.56
Similarly, in Smith v. State,57 an officer stopped a motorist for a suspected drunk driving violation. The officer questioned the driver about his manner of driving, but the driver had no odor of alcohol on his breath, and the officer did not administer any field sobriety tests. Instead, the officer requested consent to search the driver’s truck. When the driver refused, the officer asked whether the driver had *104narcotics in the vehicle. Although the driver denied having such contraband, the officer continued to detain him and asked a police dispatcher to send a drug dog to the scene. While waiting for the drug dog, the officer noticed a plastic bag in the driver’s mouth. The bag, which the driver spat out at the officer’s request, contained marijuana.
The trial court denied the driver’s motion to suppress, and we reversed.58 We concluded that, without reasonable articulable suspicion, the officer asked the driver questions “that did not relate to his suspicion that [the driver] was driving under the influence and that did not relate to any traffic violations, but instead probed into [the driver’s] possession of contraband, specifically narcotics, and culminated in the officer’s request to search [the] truck.”59 We found that such probe illegally exceeded the permissible scope of a DUI investigation.60 Thus, because the officer discovered the marijuana during an illegal detention, it should have been suppressed.61
Under established Georgia precedent, Special Agent Bauch exceeded the permissible limits of the initial traffic stop when he delayed the conclusion of that stop, commenced an unrelated drug inquiry, and asked consent to search Bibbins’ car.62 To find otherwise effectively overrules extensive case law.63
In its opinion, the majority asserts that Bauch’s request for consent to search did not unreasonably prolong — and thus did not impermissibly extend — the traffic stop. In several recent cases, we have indicated that “only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful.”64 I question whether such language properly follows the mandate that an investigative stop last no longer than necessary and have a scope carefully tailored to its underlying justification.65 Clearly, scope and duration are not synonymous. And I cannot agree with the majority’s suggestion that a drug inquiry conducted during a routine traffic stop in which the officer has found “no problems” somehow relates to issues of traffic safety and enforcement.66
*105Regardless, however, the record here shows that Bauch’s unrelated drug inquiry did, in fact, unreasonably prolong the detention. At the time Bauch requested consent to search, he had completed his traffic investigation. But, rather than writing Bibbins a ticket, returning his license, or otherwise releasing him, Bauch abandoned the purpose of the stop and conducted a fishing expedition for drugs.
This is not a situation in which an officer asked for consent to search while writing a traffic ticket, thus obtaining consent without prolonging the detention.67 On the contrary, Bauch’s actions unreasonably delayed the progression and conclusion of the stop.68 Regardless of the delay’s length, it extended the detention beyond that necessary to effectuate the stop’s purpose.69 This is the simple and single moment of analytical significance. Even the majority’s author has noted previously that a prolonged detention results when “[an] officer — without an apparent valid purpose since no investigation was being conducted into the traffic violation authorizing the stop — retained the detainee’s identification materials.”70
Although the State bears the burden of proof,71 it presented no *106evidence that Bauch’s request fell within the traffic stop’s permissible limits. In fact, the record shows the opposite. Accordingly, I find that Bauch extended the original traffic stop.72
2. The question thus becomes whether this prolonged encounter was constitutionally permissible. The State does not claim that Bauch had reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the stop. Instead, it contends that the stop became a consensual encounter during which Bibbins agreed to additional questioning, as well as the search of his truck. We must consider, therefore, whether the initial detention de-escalated into a consensual police-citizen encounter not implicating the Fourth Amendment.73
A consensual police-citizen encounter “has been defined as simply the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement official.”74 And an encounter constitutes “voluntary cooperation” if, given all of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave.75 In other words, no seizure occurs as long as a citizen feels free to disregard an officer’s questions and walk away.76
Although distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure is “ ‘necessarily imprecise,’ ”77 our Supreme Court has found that “ ‘an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver’s documents have been returned to him.’ ”78 We have similarly concluded that no reasonable person would feel free to leave a traffic stop before receiving his or her copy of the traffic citation.79
The record shows that Special Agent Bauch sought and obtained the alleged consent before returning Bibbins’ license or writing Bibbins a traffic citation. As a matter of law, therefore, Bibbins was not free to leave, and the traffic stop had not become a consensual encounter. Consequently, the continued detention, which extended *107the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion, was illegal.80
3. The final relevant question involves the validity of Bibbins’ alleged consent. As found by the Supreme Court, “[ejven where the driver and vehicle occupants have been illegally detained, the driver or owner of the vehicle may nonetheless voluntarily consent to a search of the vehicle.”81 Once again, the State bears the burden of proving such consent to be voluntary, and this burden is particularly heavy when the consent follows an illegal detention.82 Furthermore, if
an individual is illegally seized, searched or arrested, any consent obtained thereafter must be analyzed to determine both whether the consent was given voluntarily (under the totality of the circumstances test) and whether that consent was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure so that it was not the product thereof.83
The trial court did not specifically address the issue of consent. But even if Bibbins voluntarily agreed to the vehicle search, I believe that, as a matter of law, the illegal detention tainted the consent because the record reflects that the purpose of the continued detention was to request such consent. Under similar circumstances, we have held consent to search to be a product of the illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment.84 Precedent controls and takes note of similarities as well as sameness.
4. Having applied the analytical framework set forth in Daniel, I conclude that the trial court properly granted Bibbins’ motion to suppress. The State cannot establish that Bibbins validly consented to the search of his truck. The majority’s effort to find otherwise eviscerates significant case law and undercuts the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the bench, bar, and law enforcement personnel are left without guidance as to what officers can and cannot do during a traffic stop, a condition which the majority claims to correct.
*108I note that, under Daniel, Bauch could have obtained valid consent by allowing the stop to de-escalate into a consensual police-citizen encounter and then obtaining consent. But Bauch did not do so. Instead, he illegally extended a traffic stop, violating Bibbins’ Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.85
I am authorized to state that Judge Adams joins in this dissent.

 See, e.g., State v. Habib, 260 Ga. App. 229 (581 SE2d 576) (2003); State v. Gibbons, 248 Ga. App. 859, 863 (2) (547 SE2d 679) (2001); Smith v. State, 216 Ga. App. 453,455 (2) (454 SE2d 635) (1995). In his dissenting opinion in Gibbons, the author of the current majority expressly stated that Smith, supra, should be overruled. See Gibbons, supra at 869 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Although the current majority opinion does not expressly overrule Smith, it achieves this result.

 277 Ga. 840 (597 SE2d 116) (2004).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 841 (1).

 Id.

 See Buck v. State, 239 Ga. App. 828, 831 (522 SE2d 252) (1999) (when an individual consents to a search during a lawful detention, “the only question remaining is whether [the] consent to search was valid”).

 See Daniel, supra.

 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. See also Gonzales v. State, 255 Ga. App. 149, 150 (564 SE2d 552) (2002) (“Once a routine traffic stop has ended, an officer must have either valid consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct before conducting additional questioning and searching a vehicle.”).

 See Daniel, supra at 846 (3); Buck, supra.

 (Citation omitted.) Daniel, supra at 846-847.

 Gibbons, supra at 863 (2).

 See, e.g., Habib, supra at 230-231 (1) (officer impermissibly expanded scope of traffic stop for seat belt violation when he launched into a drug investigation and requested consent to search car without reasonable articulable suspicion); Almond v. State, 242 Ga. App. 650, 652 (530 SE2d 750) (2000) (“If during an investigatory stop the officer, without an articulable suspicion, proceeds to ask questions unrelated to the reason for the stop, the officer goes beyond the permissible scope of the investigation, and the further detention of the car driver exceeds that permitted by Terry v. Ohio[, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968)] and its progeny.”) (footnote omitted); Migliore v. State of Ga., 240 Ga. App. 783, 784 (525 SE2d 166) (1999) (“ ‘[A]n *103officer who questions and detains a suspect for other reasons exceeds the scope of permissible investigation unless he has “reasonable suspicion” of other criminal activity.’ ”); State v. Blair, 239 Ga. App. 340, 341 (521 SE2d 380) (1999) (same); Smith, supra at 455 (2) (officer exceeded permissible scope of DUI traffic stop when he “probed into [the defendant’s] possession of contraband, specifically narcotics,” and requested permission to search the defendant’s vehicle).

 Supra.

 Id. at 230.

 See id. at 230-231.

 Supra.

 Id. at 455.

 Id.

 See id.

 See id.

 See, e.g., Habib, supra; Gibbons, supra at 863-864; Migliore, supra; Smith, supra.

 See footnote 43, supra.

 (Punctuation omitted.) Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 715 (1) (a) (586 SE2d 400) (2003). See also Henderson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 278, 280 (551 SE2d 400) (2001) (physical precedent only).

 See Daniel, supra at 841 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (103 SC 1319, 75 LE2d 229) (1983) (plurality opinion)).

 The majority cites several cases for the proposition that a drug-related inquiry during a *105traffic stop “is reasonably related to legitimate highway public safety concerns ‘in light of the problem of interstate drug traffic.’ ” See State v. Hall, 235 Ga. App. 412, 415 (509 SE2d 701) (1998); Kan v. State, 199 Ga. App. 170, 171 (404SE2d281) (1991); O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga.App. 519, 520 (376 SE2d 406) (1988). I find nothing in the cited cases, however, that draws a link between a drug investigation and traffic safety. Similarly, although the majority asserts that the United States Supreme Court has “recognized the authority of an officer to ask a drug-related question during the course of a traffic stop,” the cases it relies upon do not approve or even address the legality of such questioning. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33 (117 SC 417, 136 LE2d 347) (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979).

 Compare Evans, supra at 715-716 (evidence supported trial court’s conclusion that drug-related questioning and request for consent to search car did not unreasonably prolong traffic stop where there was no undue delay between initial stop and issuance of traffic ticket and record showed that officer requested consent to search while writing ticket); Henderson, supra at 281 (police request for consent to search car for weapons and drugs did not impermissibly expand traffic stop where officers asked for consent while writing traffic ticket).

 See Gibbons, supra at 868 (Ruffin, J., concurring specially) (officer cannot delay issuance of a traffic citation in order to conduct fishing expedition for evidence of other criminal activity); State v. Johnson, 209 Ga. App. 84, 86 (432 SE2d 580) (1993) (“ ‘In assessing the effect of the length of the detention, it must be determined whether the police diligently pursued their investigation.’ ”).

 See Daniel, supra at 841.

 Evans, supra at 716.

 See State v. Taylor, 226 Ga. App. 690, 692 (487 SE2d 454) (1997). I cannot countenance the majority’s effort to shift the evidentiary burden here to Bibbins. The only cases cited to support its proposition that Bibbins bore the “evidentiary burden” of showing a subsequent illegality relate to searches pursuant to a search warrant. In Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212, 212-213 (465 SE2d 438) (1996), and State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 439 (315 SE2d 865) (1984), the Supreme Court found that, when a defendant challenges a search warrant on a basis other than the three statutory grounds listed in OCGA § 17-5-30 (a) (2), the State meets its evidentiary burden by producing the warrant and its supporting affidavit. The evidentiary burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the warrant was invalid. See Davis, supra; Slaughter, supra. Nothing in Davis or Slaughter, however, supports such burden shifting in a case that *106does not involve a search warrant. In fact, the Slaughter Court noted that “[b] ecause the burden is on those officers who conduct a search without a warrant to show that the search was conducted pursuant to an exception to the Fourth Amendment ([cit.]) warrant requirement, it can be said that a search without a warrant is presumed to be invalid and the burden is on the state to show that the warrantless search was valid.” Slaughter, supra at 436. Searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, on the other hand, are presumed valid. Id. at 437.

 See Habib, supra; Gibbons, supra at 863-864; Migliore, supra; Smith, supra.

 See Daniel, supra at 842 (2).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Id.

 See id.

 See id.

 Id.

 Id. at 843 (2) (a).

 See Faulkner v. State, 256 Ga. App. 129, 130 (567 SE2d 754) (2002). See also Daniel, supra at 844 (citing Faulkner).

 See Daniel, supra at 841. As noted by the majority, the Supreme Court determined in Daniel that, under the facts of that case, the officer obtained consent to search after the valid traffic stop had concluded and the post-stop contact had evolved into a consensual encounter. See id. at 849 (5). Citing this distinction, the majority argues that the Daniel analysis does not apply here. I disagree. Although the factual circumstances in Daniel produced a different outcome, the Supreme Court’s analytical framework is certainly applicable in this case. And under that framework, Bibbins allegedly consented to the search at a time when he was illegally detained.

 Id. at 846.

 See id.

 (Citations omitted.) Id. at 846-847.

 See Faulkner, supra at 131; Gonzales, supra at 150-151.

 According to the majority, my dissent hinges on the mistaken conclusion that Bauch’s search request itself turned an otherwise valid traffic stop into an illegal detention. This is an oversimplification of the issue. My point is not simply that the request rendered the stop illegal, but that it impermissibly exceeded the limits of the initial, valid traffic stop, raising Fourth Amendment concerns.