Court Opinion

ID: 9914907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 18:00:38.94264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:22.961191
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 21-50031

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 D.C. No.
                                                  3:19-cr-03506-
  v.                                               BGS-DMS-1

MARIO GONZALEZ-GODINEZ,
                                                    OPINION
                 Defendant-Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Southern District of California
       Dana M. Sabraw, Chief District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted November 15, 2023
                   Pasadena, California

                      Filed January 3, 2024

   Before: Barrington D. Parker, Jr.,* Jay S. Bybee, and
            Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

                      Opinion by Judge Lee

* The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge

for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by
designation.
2                    USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ

                           SUMMARY**

                           Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed Mario Gonzalez-Godinez’s
conviction for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a).
    A Border Patrol agent witnessed Gonzalez crawling on
the ground near a border fence, and Gonzalez admitted he
was a Mexican citizen without documentation. After
Gonzalez was arrested and taken to a border station, another
Border Patrol agent read him his Miranda rights as well as
his immigration-related administrative rights. Gonzalez
waived both sets of rights, then confessed that he had been
smuggled across the border that morning.
    Gonzalez argued that the Miranda warning was
inadequate because the agent also warned him that the post-
arrest interview may be his only chance to seek asylum. The
panel wrote that while these two warnings may have posed
difficult decisions for Gonzalez, they are neither
contradictory nor confusing. Observing that the record
suggests that Gonzalez understood his rights, the panel wrote
that Gonzalez’s gambit was to talk in hopes of seeking
asylum, despite the risks. The panel thus held that the
government did not need to provide further clarification to
the Miranda warning.
   Gonzalez also argued that his conviction should be
vacated under the corpus delicti doctrine because the

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.   It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                  USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ                  3

government      did     not     corroborate   his alienage
admission. Noting that the corpus delicti doctrine sets a low
bar, requiring only some evidence to support the confession,
the panel held that sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s
confession.

                        COUNSEL

Ryan W. Stitt (argued), Stitt Vu Trial Lawyers APC, San
Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
Jaclyn B. Stahl (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Daniel E. Zipp, Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate
Section Chief, Criminal Division; Randy S. Grossman,
United States Attorney; United States Department of Justice,
United States Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

                        OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

    One early January morning, a United States Border
Patrol agent witnessed Mario Gonzalez-Godinez crawling
on the ground near a border fence—a mere thirty yards from
Mexico. Gonzalez admitted he was a Mexican citizen
without documentation. After Gonzalez was arrested and
taken to a border station, another Border Patrol agent read
him his Miranda rights as well as his immigration-related
administrative rights. Gonzalez waived both sets of rights,
then confessed that he had been smuggled across the border
that morning.
4                 USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ

   Based on his statements to the Border Patrol agents,
Gonzalez was later convicted of attempted illegal entry
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). He raises two arguments on
appeal, both of which we reject.
    First, he asks us to toss out his confession, arguing that
the Miranda warning was inadequate because the agent also
warned Gonzalez that the post-arrest interview may be his
only chance to seek asylum. While these two warnings may
have posed difficult decisions for Gonzalez, they are neither
contradictory nor confusing. Criminal defendants often face
a fork in the road with potential peril on either path. The
record suggests that Gonzalez understood his rights, and
Gonzalez’s gambit was to talk in hopes of seeking asylum,
despite the risks. We thus hold that the government did not
need to provide further clarification to the Miranda
warnings.
    Second, Gonzalez invokes the corpus delicti doctrine
and asserts that the government failed to corroborate his
confession that he was a Mexican citizen who lacked
documentation. But the corpus delicti doctrine sets a low
bar, requiring only some evidence to support the confession.
Sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s confession.
    We thus affirm Gonzalez’s conviction.
                     BACKGROUND
    At around 8:30 a.m. in January 2019, U.S. Border Patrol
Agent Chad Hewitt saw from afar Gonzalez and another man
creeping on the ground around thirty yards from a border
fence that had been partially “taken down due to
construction.” As Agent Hewitt approached them, he
witnessed one man sliding down the embankment and the
other hiding in the brush. Agent Hewitt asked the men about
                   USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ                    5

“their citizenship, if they had illegally crossed the border and
where they may have done that,” and “if they had any
identification or documents that would allow them to be in
the United States legally.” Each man confirmed he was a
Mexican citizen without documentation.
   The men were arrested and taken to a processing station,
where another Border Patrol Agent, Marvin Jiron,
questioned Gonzalez in Spanish. Agent Jiron gave Gonzalez
a Miranda warning, advising him of his rights to silence and
counsel.     Agent Jiron also provided administrative
immigration warnings, stating that their conversation might
be Gonzalez’s “only opportunity” to tell the agents that he
was seeking asylum. Gonzalez voluntarily waived his
Miranda and administrative rights. He then admitted that he
had gone to a nearby port-of-entry, but after being turned
away, he paid a smuggler to get him to Richmond,
California, where he could work to support his family. He
added that he sought “protection” in the United States.
    The government charged Gonzalez with attempted
illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). At trial before
Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California,
Gonzalez moved to suppress his confession to Agent Jiron,
arguing that it was inadmissible under Ninth Circuit
precedent. Judge Skomal denied the motion. Gonzalez then
moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
government had not corroborated his confessions. Judge
Skomal denied that motion as well and found Gonzalez
guilty of illegal entry. He was sentenced to time served and
deported.
   The district court affirmed, and Gonzalez timely
appealed.
6                 USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ

                STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the adequacy of Miranda warnings de novo.
United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir.
2002). Corroboration is a “mixed question of law and fact
that is primarily factual,” so we review it for clear error.
United States v. Hernandez, 105 F.3d 1330, 1332 (9th Cir.
1997).
                        ANALYSIS
    Gonzalez seeks to vacate his conviction for two reasons.
First, he argues that his confession to Agent Jiron was
inadmissible because he received an inadequate Miranda
warning. Second, he contends that the government failed to
corroborate his admission that he was a Mexican citizen.
Neither argument succeeds.
    I. The government did not have a duty to clarify the
       right to remain silent, so Gonzalez’s confession to
       Agent Jiron was admissible.
    Gonzalez argues that we should cast aside his confession
to Agent Jiron—and thus vacate his conviction—on the
theory that the administrative immigration warning muddied
the Miranda warning he received. He claims that he did not
fully understand his right to remain silent in a criminal
proceeding because Agent Jiron also notified him that this
may be his only opportunity to assert an entitlement to
asylum.
    Gonzalez hitches his case on our circuit’s decision in San
Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 389. In San Juan-Cruz, as here,
border agents advised a defendant of his Miranda rights and
his administrative immigration rights. Id. We held that the
two warnings about the right to counsel directly conflicted:
the administrative warning informed the defendant that he
                  USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ                  7

had a right to counsel at his own expense, while the Miranda
warning stated that he had a right to government-provided
counsel free of charge. Id. at 388. Because those warnings
were contradictory and “affirmatively misleading,” id. at
387, the agents had a duty to clarify before taking the
defendant’s statement, id. at 389.
    San Juan-Cruz does not extend to our case for three
reasons.
    First, unlike in San Juan-Cruz, the warnings to Gonzalez
were not “affirmatively misleading” because there was no
clear conflict between the two warnings. Id. at 387. In San
Juan-Cruz, the defendant was at first told that the
government would not provide him with a lawyer for the
interview. Id. at 387–88. Soon after, he was advised that the
government would provide him with a lawyer if he could not
afford one. Id. at 388. We found that these two warnings
conflicted because the first warning said the government
would not provide him with a lawyer but the second
appeared to say the exact opposite. Id.
    But here, there was nothing misleading about the
warnings Gonzalez received. Agent Jiron told him he had
the right to remain silent and protect himself against
potential criminal charges—which was true. And Agent
Jiron also said that an interview may be his chance to seek
asylum in a separate immigration proceeding—which was
also true. While there may be some tension between those
rights, it merely reflects the difficult trade-off that
immigration defendants must sometimes make.             An
undocumented person may try to shield himself from
criminal prosecution by remaining silent, but that may
undermine his effort to seek asylum. Conversely, he may try
to make his case for asylum, but that may expose him to
8                     USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ

potential criminal liability. These are tough choices, but
they do not pose an inherent contradiction.1
    Second, San Juan-Cruz involved the right to counsel, not
the right to remain silent. We have forged different contours
in our case law for these two rights. We have taken a stricter
approach for the right to counsel, holding that, for example,
the police may not dissuade defendants from requesting
counsel, including by making it unclear whether there is
right to do so. See San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 389. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has held that police can cajole
defendants into waiving their right to remain silent—so long
as police do so without using threats or intimidation—once
they have notified the defendant of their rights. See, e.g.,
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979); Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 (2010). Police can, for
example, encourage a suspect to talk to proclaim his
innocence, appeal to the suspect’s conscience or religion, or
even suggest that honesty will help him somehow. Berghuis,
560 U.S. at 386. Informing Gonzalez that he could seek
asylum—despite his right to remain silent in a criminal
case—is no different from those police tactics that coax a
suspect into talking after being advised of his right to remain
silent.
   Nothing in the record suggests that Gonzalez
misunderstood his Miranda rights. Agent Jiron informed

1 Criminal defendants who face overlapping civil lawsuits face similarly

difficult choices: They can assert their Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination in civil suits, but that silence may be damning to their
cases. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (permitting
courts and juries to draw adverse inferences about civil defendants who
refuse to testify). On the other hand, they may choose to testify in civil
lawsuits to defend themselves in those cases, but their statements could
then be used against them in criminal proceedings.
                  USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ                   9

Gonzalez of his Miranda rights in Spanish, and Gonzalez
verbally said he understood and then signed a document
reaffirming it. The facts here fall within our “presum[ption]
that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or
her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise
has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection
those rights afford.” Id. at 385.
    Third, San Juan-Cruz relied on the totality of the
circumstances, finding that it was coercive enough to make
“the nature of [the defendant’s] rights” entirely unclear. San
Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d at 388. This was in part because the
government handcuffed the defendant to a chair and
interrogated him in a situation so “stressful” that it was
“unfair” to make him “sort out [the] confusion” the warnings
created. Id. Not so here. Nothing suggests that Gonzalez
faced similarly coercive conditions: Agent Jiron did not even
carry a gun, and Gonzalez signed a document saying he
understood his rights. Gonzalez also never said he was
confused and appeared to understand the choice he made.
    In short, the two warnings Gonzalez received were not
confusing. The agent accurately informed him about the
rights that applied in two separate, parallel proceedings. The
government was thus not required to clarify Gonzalez’s right
to silence.
 II. Gonzalez’s alienage admission was sufficiently
     corroborated.
   Gonzalez also argues that his conviction should be
vacated under the corpus delicti doctrine because the
government did not corroborate his alienage admission. The
corpus delicti doctrine recognizes that people sometimes
confess to crimes they did not commit, and thus precludes
the government from proving its case using only a
10                USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ

confession. United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583,
589 (9th Cir. 1992). But corpus delicti does not impose a
high bar for the government to clear, and it does not require
“evidence that would be independently sufficient to convict
the defendant.” United States v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d
906, 923 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, because corpus delicti
simply protects against convictions based on false
confessions, the government need only offer evidence that
“bolster[s] the confession itself.” Id. at 924 (alteration in
original) (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156
(1954)). So, if there is “some” independent evidence to
corroborate the confession, corpus delicti is satisfied.
Hernandez, 105 F.3d at 1332.
    The government here provided enough independent
evidence to corroborate that Gonzalez was a Mexican
citizen. As in United States v. Garcia-Villegas, Gonzalez
“twice admitted” it—once to Agent Hewitt at the border,
then again to Agent Jiron at the station. 575 F.3d 949, 951
(9th Cir. 2009). Further, circumstantial evidence of his
behavior at the border supports his confession: Gonzalez was
either sliding away from a partially deconstructed border
fence or hiding in the nearby brush early in the morning. See
id.    And the conditions under which Agent Hewitt
discovered him—in a remote, easy-to-cross area just a few
miles from the port-of-entry that turned Gonzalez away—
match the “very specific details” of his confession. Valdez-
Novoa, 780 F.3d at 925. Altogether, this evidence supports
Gonzalez’s confession that he is a Mexican citizen who
unlawfully entered the United States.
                     CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM Gonzalez’s conviction for attempted
illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).