Court Opinion

ID: 9569287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:12:27.249924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:58.385665
License: Public Domain

Sears-Collins, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the victim’s widow’s explanation for striking the male prospective juror was weak but sufficient. However, it seems clear to me that the widow offered no explanation within the meaning of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986).
Batson requires the prosecutor’s explanations to be “clear and reasonably specific.” Id. at 98, fn. 20. Moreover, the prosecutor may not “rebut the defendant’s case by denying that he had a discriminatory motive.” Id. at 98. Here, the widow’s statement that the strike “had nothing to do with the fact that he was black” is merely the denial of a discriminatory motive and may not be used to rebut the prima facie case. The widow also stated that the juror “may have looked familiar for some reason” and that “ [i]t could have been that [she] may have seen him in [her] job or . . . something similar.” Considering these comments in light of the widow’s statement that she needed to see the juror to actually know why she struck him, it is clear that the widow did not really remember why she had recommended that the juror be stricken; she was merely casting about for possible reasons as to why she wanted the juror stricken, but could articulate no actual reason. In sum, the widow’s statements do not amount to even a weak explanation for the strike. They are not “clear and reasonably specific” and, therefore, do not constitute an explanation at all under Batson.
I also take issue with the majority’s statement that the fact that the victim, the victim’s widow, and the appellant are black “tend[s] to undercut any motive to exclude [blacks] from the jury.” Majority opinion at 101, quoting Hernandez v. New York,_U. S--(111 SC 1859, 1872, 114 LE2d 395) (1991). In Hernandez, the United States Supreme Court listed the common ethnicity of the victim, the prosecuting witnesses, and the defendant as a factor on which the *105trial court might have relied to credit the prosecutor’s sincerity that he did not engage in purposeful discrimination.1 We then relied on this evidentiary tool in Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 43 (9) (427 SE2d 770) (1993), a case which I authored. Upon further reflection, however, I believe we should disavow the use of this principle.
Initially, I note that this evidentiary principle does not appear to be part of a federal equal protection doctrine that would be binding on this Court, but is simply a statement of an evidentiary principle that may be used by state courts. Moreover, even if it were part of federal equal protection doctrine, this Court is free to provide greater protection to a defendant or juror under our own Constitution than the United States Supreme Court does under the United States Constitution, and I would do so in this instance. Simply put, the fact that the involved parties are all black or of other ethnic or racial backgrounds does not necessarily mean, as is presumed in Hernandez, that a lawyer will not strike jurors for improper racial reasons. Some prosecutors may, for example, feel that blacks are more lenient on defendants than whites. They should not be able to strike all of the blacks from a panel based on this improper motivation and then rely, in even a small way, on the fact that the victim was black as a factor to support the conclusion that the strikes were not racially motivated. As another example, suppose a black person killed a prominent figure in the black community. Should the prosecutor be able to strike blacks from the jury solely because of their race and then rely on the fact that the victim and defendant are both black as a factor to support his position that he did not strike out of improper motives?2 The answer is clearly no. For these reasons, I believe the evidentiary principle set forth in Hernandez is based on a faulty foundation, and should not be followed.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to the majority opinion. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Benham joins in this dissent.
*106Decided March 14, 1994 —
Reconsideration denied March 31, 1994.
L. Clark Landrum, Herbert W. Benson, for appellant.
C. Paul Bowden, District Attorney, Gary C. McCoruey, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle L. Strausner, Staff Attorney, for appellee.

 This evidentiary principle was thus used in step three of the Batson analysis. In step one, the defendant must establish her prima facie case that the prosecutor has exercised his challenges on the basis of race. Hernandez, 111 SC at 1866. In step two, the prosecutor must offer race-neutral explanations for the strikes. Id. In step three, “the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried [her] burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id.

 Although I have given examples involving prosecuting attorneys because this case involves a criminal appeal calling into question a prosecutor’s strikes, similar examples could be given for defense lawyers or lawyers in civil cases.