Court Opinion

ID: 9749877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:01:48.686098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:59.065793
License: Public Domain

BERGER, J.,
Dissenting:
This Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of § 3902 is to “[protect] innocent persons from the negligence of unknown or impecunious tortfeasors.”18 Protection means compensation, and the goal of fully compensating innocent persons “has been applied by our courts in construing the uninsured motorist laws.”19 The majority *182does not mention, and apparently does not consider, this overriding legislative policy in analyzing the meaning of § 3902. Instead, it-says that the statute is unambiguous and that it plainly precludes stacking of UIM coverage for purposes of determining whether the underinsured motorist coverage provided by any one policy is triggered.
The majority’s premise — that the statute is unambiguous — does not bear scrutiny. It ignores the precedents from this Court, which demonstrate by their lack of unanimity that this statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. Indeed, in one of the more recent realignments of the majority and dissenters, two justices noted:
This Court has struggled for many years with the language of Section 3902(b) and our shifting consensus has provided little guidance to the bar or the trial courts. Our differences have resulted from disagreements, honestly held, over the meaning of a statute that is arguably ambiguous.20
In deciding whether § 3902(b)(2) is ambiguous, it is not enough to parse the language of that subsection. The entire statute must be considered.21 This Court has held, focusing on § 3902(c), “that Section 3902 permits stacking the policy limits of uninsured coverage in the absence of an express prohibition....”22 There is no express prohibition in § 3902(b)(2), yet the majority interprets that subsection as prohibiting stacking. An equally plausible interpretation, and one that is consistent with the overall purpose of the statute, is that § 3902(b)(2) does not address stacking at all. Under this view, the general rule allowing stacking absent an express prohibition would control.
Section 3902(b)(2) defines “underinsured motor vehicle” as one for which the limits of all liability coverage total less than the limits of “the uninsured motorist coverage.” In a separate sentence, the statute then requires insurers to state the limits of the underinsured coverage in the declaration sheet for the insurance policy. The question is whether, by using the term “the uninsured motorist coverage” instead of, for example, “all the uninsured motorist coverage,” the legislature intended to prohibit stacking. The answer to that question cannot be gleaned from the plain meaning of the language itself, which is why there are rules of statutory construction. The primary rule is that statutes should be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the legislature.23 Applying that rule, § 3902(b)(2) should be construed as permitting stacking.
I would affirm the Superior Court and, accordingly, I dissent.

. Frank v. Horizon Assur. Co, Del.Supr., 553 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1989). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arms, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 1060 (1984); Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 10 (1995); Nationwide Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Peebles. Del. Supr., 688 A.2d 1374 (1997).

. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arms, 477 A.2d at 1064.

. Nationwide Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Peebles, 688 A.2d at 1380.

. Spielberg v. State, Del.Supr., 558 A.2d 291 (1989).

. Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d at 14.

. Ingram v. Thorpe, Del.Supr., 747 A.2d 545, 547 (2000).