Court Opinion

ID: 9897389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:57.713215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.319316
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    May 22 2023, 8:37 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Meggan E. Smith                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Amy E. Karozos                                            Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          David A. Arthur
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Coila Bradford,                                           May 22, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-MI-2112
        v.                                                Appeal from the Parke Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Samuel A. Swaim,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          61C01-2207-MI-216

                                Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                Judges Riley and Pyle concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023                             Page 1 of 13
      Case Summary

[1]   Coila Bradford appeals the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, claiming

      that the trial court miscalculated the educational credit time she earned while

      incarcerated. Bradford contends that had the proper credit time been awarded,

      she would have the right to immediate discharge from the Indiana Department

      of Correction (the DOC).

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

[3]   Bradford pleaded guilty to committing three drug-related crimes and was

      sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years at the DOC on March 20, 2013.

      Although Bradford was placed on probation at some point, she committed a

      new criminal offense during that period. As a result, the State filed a petition to

      revoke Bradford’s probation. Following a hearing on April 9, 2021, the trial

      court revoked Bradford’s probation and sentenced her to an aggregate four-year

      term of incarceration.

[4]   Bradford opted into a Case Plan Credit Time (CPCT) agreement (the

      Agreement) with the DOC on October 21, 2021, to earn educational credit

      time. Under that program, the offender’s “individualized case plan [is

      considered, along with] a more holistic view of a person’s incarceration

      period.” Transcript Vol. II at 44. If it can be demonstrated that recidivism will

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023          Page 2 of 13
      be reduced and the offender shows progress toward being successful in the

      community, “[he or she would be awarded] credit time.” Id.

[5]   The Agreement provided that “[Bradford] will not earn credit time upon

      completion of [her] current program, but at the first CPCT review.” Exhibit 3.

      The Agreement further stated:

              Regardless of when the offender opts-in to using an
              individualized case plan the amount of educational credit time
              available is capped at the lesser of two (2) years, or one-third (1/3) of the
              person’s total applicable credit time.

      Id. (emphasis added).

[6]   After executing the Agreement, Bradford completed a “building trades”

      program in November 2021. Appellant’s Brief at 14. That program would have

      resulted in an award of ninety days of educational credit time prior to the

      DOC’s adoption of the CPCT curriculum in 2020. Bradford did not participate

      in any other formal DOC program after completing that course on November

      23, 2021. After three CPCT reviews, the DOC awarded Bradford a total of 119

      days of credit time, which represented completing the building trades program,

      receiving satisfactory DOC reports, and satisfying other goals adopted by the

      DOC on or after January 1, 2022.

[7]   On July 22, 2022, Bradford filed a “verified application for issuance of writ of

      habeas corpus,” claiming that she was being illegally restrained because she has

      “served her full sentence if she had been . . . awarded [the proper] credit time.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023                    Page 3 of 13
       Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 8. Bradford alleged that the DOC erroneously

       calculated the amount of educational credit time to which she was entitled

       under its policies and the credit time statutes. More specifically, Bradford

       asserted that the DOC should have awarded her sixteen months of educational

       credit time, i.e., one-third of her four-year sentence, in accordance with the

       Agreement, the relevant statutes, and the DOC’s policy. As a result, Bradford

       claimed that had her credit time been properly determined, she would have

       “already been released.” Id. at 8, 14.

[8]    Following a hearing on August 5, 2022, the trial court denied Bradford’s

       application for writ of habeas corpus, determining that Bradford’s restraint was

       not “illegal.” Id. at 75. The trial court recognized that “just because there are

       maximums that are set out in the statute for educational credit, that does not

       mean that the DOC ‘shall’ give that credit.” Id. (emphasis added).

[9]    Bradford now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       Discussion and Decision

[10]   At the outset, we note that educational credit time for those incarcerated in the

       DOC is not an entitlement or a guarantee. Simply put, offenders have no

       constitutional right to receive credit time. Budd v. State, 935 N.E.2d 746, 753

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Educational credit time furthers the purpose of

       rehabilitative justice only if it is earned by the offender. See Paul v. State, 888

       N.E.2d 818, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (observing that the intent of the

       educational credit time statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3, is to enhance

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023             Page 4 of 13
       rehabilitation by providing incentive to further one’s education while

       incarcerated), trans. denied.

[11]   Educational credit was initially offered to incarcerated individuals in the DOC

       in 1993. See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3 (1993). At that time, the statutes provided for

       completion of academic programs only, including a high school diploma or

       general equivalency degree, or an associate or bachelor’s degree. Id. An

       additional requirement—that the incarcerated individual had “demonstrated a

       pattern consistent with rehabilitation”—was later added. I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3

       (a)(2). In 2020, our legislature provided that educational credit could be

       awarded to offenders by completing “an individualized case management plan

       approved by [the DOC].” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(b)(3)(E). And in accordance with

       I.C. § 35-50-6-0.5(5):

               (5) ‘Individualized case management plan’ means educational
               credit which consists of a plan designed to address an
               incarcerated person’s risk of recidivism, and may include:

               (A) addiction recovery treatment;

               (B) mental health treatment;

               (C) vocational education programming;

               (D) adult basic education, a high school or high school
               equivalency diploma, a college diploma, and any other academic
               educational goal; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023         Page 5 of 13
               (E) any other programming or activity that encourages productive
               pursuits while a person is incarcerated and that may reduce the person’s
               likelihood to recidivate after the person’s release from incarceration.

       (Emphasis added). The CPCT program specifically considers the offender’s

       case plan, job performance, and “how the offender is performing in a given

       program.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 44.

[12]   Credit time is defined as “the sum of the person’s accrued time, good time

       credit, and educational credit.” I.C. § 35-50-6-0.5(3). And pursuant to I.C. §

       35-50-6-3.3(i) (effective through June 30, 2014), if a criminal offense was

       committed prior to July 1, 2014, the maximum amount of educational credit

       that an offender could earn was the lesser of: “(1) four . . . years, or (2) one-third

       . . . of the person’s total applicable credit time.”

[13]   Consistent with these statutes, the DOC incorporated the above parameters on

       credit time into its policies as follows:

               The maximum amount of credit time an offender may earn under
               this provision is the lesser of:

               (1) For offenses committed prior to July 1, 2014:

                        a. Four (4) years; or,

                        b. One-third (1/3) of the offender’s total applicable credit
                        time.

               (2) For offenses committed on July 1, 2014 or after:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023                   Page 6 of 13
                        a. Two (2) years; or,

                        b. One-third (1/3) of the offender’s total applicable credit
                        time.

       Exhibit 1 (emphases added).

[14]   Those who arrive at a DOC facility after January 1, 2022, are automatically

       placed in CPCT. On the other hand, offenders who were in DOC custody

       before that date—like Bradford—could opt into the CPCT program. The

       amount of credit time is determined through periodic reviews at the DOC that

       measure how the offender has been progressing in meeting individualized case

       management plan goals.

[15]   The educational credit that is available under the CPCT program is “[a]n

       amount determined by the department of correction under a policy adopted by the

       department of correction concerning the individualized case management plan,

       not to exceed the maximum amount described in subsection (j).” I.C. § 35-50-6-

       3.3(d)(9) (emphases added). I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3 does not set forth a minimum

       amount of credit time that may be earned; nor is there a guarantee of

       educational credit for meeting case plan goals or for completing a program.

       Additionally, if an offender completes a traditional program, it is considered at

       the CPCT review. The completed program does not result in a separate,

       identifiable award of credit.

[16]   John Mather, the Executive Director of Programs and Re-Entry Readiness at

       the DOC, testified at the habeas corpus hearing that the CPCT was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023                Page 7 of 13
       implemented and designed “to make it proportional to the amount of time that

       folks were working towards those goals under the new structure.” Transcript

       Vol. 2 at 48. The CPCT also takes into consideration that those offenders who

       arrive at the DOC after January 1, 2022, “will have their entire sentence to

       work on educational credit, yet those who are already in the prison system had

       opportunities under the prior scheme to earn educational credit for completing

       listed programs.” Id. Mather further testified that “it wouldn’t make sense in a

       situation for someone who their statutory maximum is . . . sixteen months, for

       them to participate in CPCT for only three months, and the[n] be awarded that

       full sixteen months.” Id. To be sure, the DOC sought to “set some parameters

       around how that time is awarded to make it proportional to the amount of time

       an individual is participating in [CPCT].” Id. at 47, 48.

[17]   Against this backdrop, Bradford contends that the credit time statutes and

       DOC’s policies entitled her to a total of sixteen months—or 487 days—of

       educational credit through CPCT, but the DOC awarded her only 119 days of

       credit time. She maintains that the DOC’s erroneous calculation of that time

       deprived her of the statutory ability to earn an additional 368 days. Bradford’s

       argument seemingly equates “eligibility” to earn credit time with an actual

       “award” of credit time.

[18]   Notwithstanding Bradford’s contentions, she presented no evidence that she did

       anything to earn additional credit time. Bradford did not acquire a college

       degree, high school diploma or the equivalent; nor did she enroll in—or

       complete—a technical program other than building trades that was counted

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023        Page 8 of 13
       toward her credited 119 days, along with “the other goals that she had worked

       towards during that time.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 49. Indeed, Bradford’s

       satisfactory job evaluations and her progress toward meeting various clinical

       review goals were factored into her earned credit time. Moreover, the evidence

       established that had Bradford not opted into the CPCT program, she would

       have earned only a maximum of ninety days for her completion of the building

       trades program. However, due to Bradford’s decision to opt into CPCT, she

       was awarded the additional days. Id. At no time was Bradford informed by

       any DOC representative that she would receive the maximum statutorily

       permitted credit time simply for opting in to CPCT.

[19]   Even assuming that Bradford may have been “eligible” to earn additional credit

       under the statutes and DOC’s policies, she has made no showing that she was

       entitled to extra days. To illustrate, in Fuller v. Meloy, 848 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006), the petitioners, who were incarcerated at the DOC, sought six

       months of credit time—which was the maximum amount of credit that could be

       earned under the statute—for completing a vocational program. When the

       DOC awarded the petitioners only three months of credit time, they sued, and

       the trial court upheld the DOC’s determination.

[20]   On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that

       the amount of educational credit to be awarded for completion of a vocational

       program is left to the DOC’s discretion. Id. at 1174. As the Fuller court

       determined, the DOC decides the amount of educational credit that is to be

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023          Page 9 of 13
       awarded to an offender, so long as the maximum allowed under the statute is

       not exceeded. See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(9). 1

[21]   As there is no minimum amount of time that the DOC is required to award,

       and there is no requirement that credit time must be awarded to all who

       participate in the CPCT program, Bradford has failed to demonstrate that she

       was automatically entitled to additional credit under the statutes or the DOC’s

       policies. See, e.g., Indiana Dep’t of Correction v. Haley, 928 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2010 (recognizing that the DOC determines what programs qualify for

       awarding credit). Neither the Agreement nor the relevant statutes promise that

       487 days—or even one day—will be awarded. And nothing in the educational

       credit time statute automatically grants the statutory maximum to each offender

       who opts into the CPCT.

[22]   As a result, Bradford is entitled to an amount of credit determined by the DOC,

       which is exactly what she received—an award of 119 days during her first year

       of participation in the CPCT under the statutes and the DOC’s policy. See

       Fuller, 848 N.E.2d at 1174. Bradford has failed to show that she is entitled to

       additional credit time.

       1
         I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(9) specifically states that “the amount of educational credit a person may earn under
       this section is an amount determined by the [DOC] under a policy adopted by the [DOC] concerning the
       individualized case management plan, not to exceed the maximum amount described in subsection (j).”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023                                 Page 10 of 13
       II. Constitutional Claims

[23]   Notwithstanding our conclusion above, Bradford argues that the DOC’s

       implementation of CPCT for those who opted into the program violated her

       due process rights. Bradford further maintains that the Agreement and DOC’s

       policies regarding those offenders who opt in to the CPCT program violate the

       ex post facto clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. 2

[24]   We initially observe that Bradford did not raise any constitutional challenges at

       trial. Thus, we may consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when raised

       for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., B.Z. v. State, 943 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2011) (declining to address the defendant’s state privileges and immunities

       clause challenge to the expungement statute because the issue was raised for the

       first time on appeal). Moreover, Bradford does not make a cogent argument on

       appeal regarding any alleged due process violations. For this additional reason,

       that issue is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (argument must be

       supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authorities and the record); see

       also Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[25]   Although Bradford has also waived her ex post facto claim, we note that

       Congress and the State are forbidden from enacting “any law which imposes a

       punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed;

       or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Ramon v. State, 888

       2
           U.S. Const. art I, § 10; Ind. Const. art 1, § 24.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023           Page 11 of 13
       N.E.2d 244, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The purpose of the ex post facto clause

       is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair

       warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties. Wallace v.

       State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind 2009). For the ex post facto prohibition to be

       violated, the action in question must apply to events occurring before its

       enactment and must disadvantage the prisoner. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,

       28 (1981).

[26]   Here, the implementation of CPCT did not change the definition of Bradford’s

       crime or alter her four-year probation revocation sentence. In Budd, no ex post

       facto violation was found because the amendment to the educational credit time

       statute did not increase the defendant’s sentence. 935 N.E.2d at 753. And in

       this case, Bradford’s ability to seek release from prison was enhanced—not

       reduced.

[27]   Indeed, Bradford does not dispute that she received more educational credit

       under CPCT than she would have under the previous structure, i.e., 119 days

       rather than 90 days. As a result, Bradford did not establish that she is adversely

       impacted by the maximum credit award when she opted into CPCT because, as

       discussed above, she did nothing to earn more than the 119 days she was

       awarded. It follows, therefore, that because Bradford has failed to show how

       her constitutional rights were substantially prejudiced, there was no ex post

       facto violation. See, e.g., Ramon, 888 N.E.2d at 253 (holding that no ex post

       facto violation occurred when a revised statute that permitted the State to

       amend a charging information at any time did not prejudice the defendant’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023          Page 12 of 13
       substantive rights, did not create any new crimes, change the elements of any

       crime, or alter the sentencing statutes). For all these reasons, Bradford’s

       constitutional challenges fail.

[28]   Judgment affirmed.

       Riley, J. and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2112 | May 22, 2023         Page 13 of 13