Court Opinion

ID: 9374515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 15:05:06.909159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.347177
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  21-P-856

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                JAY B. CHOUTE.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant was

 convicted of unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269,

 § 10 (n); unlawfully carrying a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a);

 and possession of psilocybin mushrooms, G. L. c. 94C, § 34.1

 Concluding that the search of the automobile was supported by

 1 The jury also convicted the defendant of unlawful possession of
 ammunition. On the defendant's motion, the trial judge entered
 a required finding of not guilty after the jury verdict on that
 charge pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420
 Mass. 1502 (1995). The trial judge provided no explanation for
 this, nor could there be sufficient evidence that the defendant
 knowingly carried a loaded firearm but insufficient evidence
 that defendant knowingly possessed ammunition. To the extent
 that the judge was motivated by the fact that the conviction of
 ammunition possession was duplicative of the conviction for
 unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm, the proper remedy was to
 set aside the verdict and dismiss the charge. See Commonwealth
 v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 54, 59 (2011). Accord Commonwealth v.
 Grayson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 749 n.1 (2019). In any event,
 the Commonwealth neither objected nor appealed, so the issue is
 not before us.
probable cause to find evidence of a larceny, the indicia of

drug distribution were properly admitted to show the defendant's

knowledge that the firearm was loaded, and the prosecutor did

not misstate the evidence, we affirm.

    1.   The motion to suppress.    "In reviewing the denial of a

motion to suppress, we '[a]ccept[] the judge's subsidiary

findings of fact absent clear error, give[] substantial

deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of

law, but independently review[] the correctness of the judge's

application of constitutional principles to the facts found.'"

Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 158-159 (2019),

quoting Commonwealth v. Lujan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 100 (2018).

    The defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied, as

the search was supported by "probable cause to believe that a

motor vehicle parked in a public place and apparently capable of

being moved contain[ed] . . . evidence of a crime."

Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624 (2008).    The search

here occurred after the defendant stole a smart tablet from the

victim's apartment, threatened her, and then fled.    In reporting

the theft to the police, the victim identified the defendant by

name, provided the license plate number of his getaway vehicle,

and also reported that, prior to the theft, the defendant had

shown her a gun that he kept in a silver lockbox and which was

in the vehicle with him.   Shortly after dispatch relayed these

                                2
facts to patrolling officers, officers found the defendant in a

parking lot standing behind the open trunk of the vehicle that

the victim had described.   These "facts and circumstances within

the officer's knowledge," id., quoting Commonwealth v. Miller,

366 Mass. 387, 391 (1974), gave them probable cause to search

the vehicle for evidence of the theft that took place minutes

earlier.   See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 384

(2015) ("officers . . . appropriately concluded that the vehicle

. . . contained evidence of [a] crime" where, among other

things, "vehicle match[ed] the exact description of the vehicle

used in [an] armed robbery").   See also Bostock, supra (probable

cause existed where, inter alia, defendant matched witnesses'

descriptions and was found "within minutes of the crimes").

    We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that there

was no probable cause to continue the search after the officers

found the tablet.   The tablet was not the only evidence of the

theft.   The report that the police received (and what was

relayed to responding officers) was that the defendant

threatened the victim and stole the tablet after having shown

her a firearm that he kept in a silver lockbox.   The lockbox and

firearm both corroborated the victim's report and explained why

the defendant's threat was credible.   Accordingly, the officers

had probable cause to continue their search of the vehicle for

them, which search permissibly included opening the unlocked

                                 3
lockbox.   See Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 383-384 (probable cause to

search vehicle for evidence justifies searches of closed

containers therein).    There was no error.

     2.    Evidence of drug distribution.     "Whether evidence is

relevant and whether its probative value is substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial effect are matters entrusted to

the trial judge's broad discretion and are not disturbed absent

palpable error."    Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 63

(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 242

(2017).    Because the defendant moved in limine to exclude this

evidence and objected to its admission at trial, the issue is

preserved.   See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 836

(2022).

     The trial judge acted within her discretion in admitting

evidence of the defendant's drug dealing, notwithstanding the

fact that the defendant was not being tried for distribution.2

See Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 836.     The defendant was charged with

possessing a loaded firearm, an element of which is the

defendant's knowledge that the firearm was loaded.      See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 601 (2018).      Evidence that

the defendant was distributing drugs was relevant to his

2 Although the defendant was initially charged with possession
with the intent to distribute in violation of G. L. c. 94C,
§ 32A, a nolle prosequi was entered with respect to that charge.

                                 4
knowledge that the firearm was loaded and his motive for

possessing the firearm.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass.

775, 783 (2016) (drug evidence relevant to defendant's

"knowledge, motive, or intent"); Commonwealth v. Young, 382

Mass. 448, 463 (1981) (evidence of drug dealing relevant to

motive).   Where the Commonwealth offered the evidence for these

permissible purposes, it was admissible unless "its probative

value [wa]s outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice."

Gonsalves, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass.

228, 249 (2014).

    We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that the

trial judge did not conduct that balancing thoroughly enough and

thus erred in admitting the evidence.   The transcript reveals an

engaging discussion between the parties and the judge about the

evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect, and the judge

ultimately denied the motion and overruled the defendant's

objections because she found the evidence "relevant, and not

overly prejudicial."   The defendant's objections also provided

the judge with opportunities to consider the issue anew.     We

discern no error in the judge's exercise of her discretion.

    Furthermore, the judge appropriately instructed the jury

that this evidence was relevant "solely on the limited issue of

the Defendant's knowledge and motive" and that they could not

consider it "for any other purpose," including "as proof that

                                5
the Defendant has any kind of criminal personality or bad

character."    Because we presume that the jury properly followed

this instruction, any potential prejudice was sufficiently

neutralized.   See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 737

(2019).3

     3.    The opening statement and closing argument.    The

defendant primarily takes issue with the prosecutor's statements

concerning what the defendant was doing when the police arrived

and the defendant's reactions to that arrival.4   The defendant

objected, and so we review for prejudicial error.   See

Commonwealth v. Cash, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 480 (2022).

     The prosecutor's remarks about the defendant's actions when

the police arrived were fairly supported by the evidence.       In an

opening statement, a prosecutor "may reference anything that

[the prosecutor] reasonably believes in good faith will be

proved by [the] evidence."    Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass.

614, 627 (2017).    Here, the prosecutor stated in opening that

3 The defendant relatedly contends that the judge should also
have given a limiting instruction when the evidence was
admitted. Although this may have been the "[b]est practice," it
was not required, as "[t]he timing of a limiting instruction is
. . . ultimately in the discretion of the trial judge." Bryant,
482 Mass. at 737.
4 The defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated

evidence in arguing that a housing rental application bearing
the defendant's name was found in a backpack. This argument is
without merit, as the prosecutor's statement mirrored officer
testimony that the document was found "in the main compartment
of the backpack."

                                  6
the defendant was "standing at the back of the vehicle with the

trunk open, his hands in the trunk, and a backpack."     This

remark was in fact supported by a video exhibit of the

defendant's interaction with the officers, which shows the

events unfolding as the prosecutor described.   This same

evidence also supports the prosecutor's closing argument

questioning whether the defendant's actions "look[ed] like a

person who's not digging through a backpack."   See Commonwealth

v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017).

    Similarly, we discern no error in the prosecutor's closing

argument remark that the defendant appeared "surprised" when the

police arrived because he had been caught "red-handed."     The

video footage shows that the defendant appeared flustered upon

noticing the police -- with his gaze shifting between responding

officers before ultimately turning to access the trunk again.

Accordingly, the prosecutor's remark reflects a "reasonable and

                               7
possible" inference from the evidence.        Commonwealth v. Parker,

481 Mass. 69, 74 (2018).

                                      Judgments affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Milkey,
                                        Ditkoff & Englander, JJ.5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    February 23, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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