Court Opinion

ID: 9720564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:36:13.229113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:19.582763
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe the undisputed facts did not establish a cause of action under either strict liability in tort or negligent design under the prior decision of this court. I deem it unwise, for reasons which are hereafter set forth, to extend the doctrines to the point that the majority opinion does, i.e., although without saying so it essentially makes the manufacturer an insurer.
The essence of the majority opinion is that the mere opinion of an expert, rendered after the fact, is sufficient to make a prima facie case admissible to *490the jury. Such an opinion may or may not be sufficient for that purpose. When legal doctrines are being extended it is for the court to define the extent of the growth. It is not a factual question to be determined by testimony, expert or otherwise.
It is not practical within the bounds of a brief dissent to discuss all of the fallacious underpinnings of the majority opinion so we mention only those which seem most significant.
The purpose of a bumper on a motor vehicle is not to guard against damage to either persons or property on high speed impacts. The bumper in this case was neither negligently designed nor was it unreasonably dangerous. It had no propensity to cause harm. This is not the case as in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N. W. 2d 601 (1971), where a gear in the steering mechanism was defective when it left the manufacturer and made the vehicle dangerous to drive and difficult to control and hence had a propensity to cause harm.
What the plaintiff has argued and what the court has accepted in this case is the contention that if a device is constructed in a different way, e.g., stronger, then liability follows because an injury happening in a particular fashion might have been avoided, even though the injury .might have occurred in any event had the circumstances of the action been different. The plaintiff has argued that either the bumper should have been shorter, not projecting in front of the wheel; or it should have been a breakaway bumper, which would not wedge; or it should have been stronger, so that it would not impinge on the wheel. However, in each of these alternatives it is clearly possible that the same result could have occurred even though through a different mechanism. In the case of the short bumper or the breakaway bumper the animal might have lodged between the wheel thus restricting steerability, or if the object struck had been some sizable hard or *491sharp object it might have deflated a tire and made the truck difficult to steer. If the object had been a hog it could have passed under a strong bumper, under the wheel, and thus put the truck out of control. If the object struck had been a horse or a moose, it might have, regardless of the bumper, been propelled upward into the windshield injuring the driver. In such cases ought the manufacturer to have designed and furnished a bumper of a type which would have prevented that particular kind of accident? Clearly that could be done.
In this case the truck owner selected the particular bumper which he wanted, one of light weight which reduced the total weight of the truck. No statute or design requirement of the law prohibits any of the alternatives which were available to the purchaser. Let us give another example. Instantly inflatable airbags for passenger compartments in motor vehicles are available- and are feasible. Are manufacturers liable because they are not furnished or because the user prefers not to have one?
What the court does in this case is devise a theory, after the fact, to afford liability for a particular accident happening in a particular way. This can be done in almost every case. It is probably possible by hindsight to design machines or parts which will avoid particular types of accidents. It is not reasonably possible to design something which will avoid injury in every case in every circumstance.
If the court’s purpose is one of social policy to assure that all injuries are to be compensated, then that should be done by the Legislature and the costs spread over the widest possible base.
A manufacturer does not have a duty to design a product which represents the ultimate in safety or design, but rather, has a duty to design a product which is reasonably safe. Mitchell v. Machinery Center, Inc., 297 F. 2d 883 (10th Cir., 1961); Marker v. Universal Oil Products Company, 250 F. 2d 603 *492(10th Cir., 1957); Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D. N. D., 1972); Garst v. General Motors Corporation, 207 Kan. 2, 484 P. 2d 47 (1971); and Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S. W. 2d 343 (Mo., 1964).
In Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., supra, this court applied the principles of Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402 A, p. 347, at p. 352. Comment i to that section states in part: “The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” It is common knowledge that bumpers on motor vehicles are not designed to avoid damage and injury in high speed impacts. Comment k to section 402 A of the Restatement says in part: “There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.” The trial court should have granted the motion for a directed verdict.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.