Court Opinion

ID: 9912791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:19.717929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:45.486464
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Newens CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097583

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 19CF06083)

           v.

 JOSHUA DANIEL NEWENS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Joshua Daniel Newens guilty of two counts of second
degree robbery and four counts of criminal threats and the trial court imposed
consecutive prison terms on all counts. On defendant’s original appeal, another panel of
this court agreed with defendant’s contention that two of the terms imposed must be
stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and we remanded for a full resentencing.1

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The trial court resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 10 years eight months in
prison and imposed fines, fees, and penalty assessments.
       On appeal, defendant asserts: (1) the trial court erred in failing to consider a
provision of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) enacted by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567), which, if applicable, provides for a presumption of low
term sentences; (2) if his first contention has been forfeited, he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights in
imposing fines, fees, and assessments without determining he had the ability to pay.
       While we conclude defendant forfeited his first contention premised on section
1170, subdivision (b)(6), we agree with his second contention that he was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to raise the issue, and further
conclude defendant was prejudiced as a result. We will remand for a full resentencing.
As such, we need not address defendant’s contentions concerning fines, fees, and
assessments.
                                    I. BACKGROUND
       Defendant entered a bank, demanded money, and threatened that he had a bomb
and was not afraid to kill everyone. (People v. Newens (Aug. 3, 2022, C094163)
[nonpub. opn.] (Newens).)2 Bank employees gave defendant more than $11,000, which
was recovered by police who arrived while defendant was still in the bank.
       An information charged defendant with two counts of second degree robbery
(§ 211—counts 1 & 2) and four counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)—counts 3-6).
Two of the criminal threats counts, counts 3 and 4, involved the same victims as the two
robbery counts. The information further alleged defendant had two or more prior strike

2 In an order filed May 19, 2023, we deemed defendant’s motion for judicial notice of
the appellate record from his appeal from the judgment to be a motion to incorporate by
reference the record in that case and, as such, granted the motion.

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convictions (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)), and two prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).
       A jury found defendant guilty on all counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found the prior conviction allegations to be true. Subsequently, the trial court
granted defendant’s motion in part, striking one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d),
1170.12, subd. (b)) and both prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).
       The trial court originally sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years
four months in state prison. On defendant’s direct appeal from the judgment, he asserted,
among other things, that section 654 required that two terms be stayed and that, following
passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), remand was required for
resentencing to permit the trial court to determine which two terms to stay. (Newens,
supra, C094163.) The People conceded the point, another panel of this court agreed, and
we vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for full resentencing. (Ibid.) We
concluded defendant’s remaining contentions, including contentions concerning changes
to section 1170, could be raised at resentencing. (Newens, supra, C094163.) Though we
did not address defendant’s section 1170 arguments, we noted in a footnote that, in
connection with those contentions, defendant may wish to focus on Senate Bill No. 567,
as opposed to Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 124),
because the former controlled over the latter. (Newens, supra, C094163.)
       At resentencing, defense counsel suggested the court could make one of the
criminal threats counts the principal term rather than one of the robbery counts, in effect
requesting that the court stay the terms on the robbery counts (counts 1 & 2) pursuant to
section 654 rather than the terms on the related criminal threats counts (counts 3 & 4).
(See §§ 654 [act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions
of law may be punished under either provision but not under more than one], 1170.1,
subd. (a) [principal term shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed for

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any of the crimes].) Defendant’s attorney did not raise Senate Bill No. 567 or section
1170, subdivision (b)(6).
       The trial court resentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 10 years eight
months in state prison, consisting of six years on count 1, the middle term of three years
doubled because of defendant’s prior strike; two years on count 2, one-third the middle
term of three years doubled; and 16 months each on counts 5 and 6, one-third the middle
term of two years doubled. The court imposed four-year terms, the middle term of two
years doubled, on counts 3 and 4 and stayed execution of those terms pursuant to section
654. The court imposed fines, fees, and assessments.
                                    II. DISCUSSION
A.     Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)(A)
       Defendant asserts he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred in
failing to consider the presumption of the low term sentence that applies based on his
psychological, physical, and childhood trauma which, he asserts, was a contributing
factor in his commission of the offenses. Defendant claims his contention is preserved
for our review because (1) the court had a statutory obligation to consider the
presumptive low term, and (2) our opinion in his direct appeal “should have put the trial
court on notice of its obligation to consider the presumption of the low term set forth in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).” We conclude defendant forfeited his contention.
       Senate Bill No. 567, effective January 1, 2022, made changes to section 1170
affecting trial courts’ sentencing discretion. Among other things, Senate Bill No. 567
added subdivision (b)(6) to section 1170.3 Insofar as relevant here, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) provides: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition

3 This particular change was effected by Senate Bill No. 567 incorporating amendments
to section 1170 made by Assembly Bill No. 124. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c).)

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of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical,
or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual
violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
       “Generally, if a party does not object to the sentence in the trial court, they may
not claim on appeal the trial court failed to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices.” (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778, citing People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.) In Tilley, another panel of this court concluded, as to
forfeiture of the same issue: “Defendant did not seek the lower term based on section
1170, subdivision (b)(6); object to the imposition of the middle term; or argue that
defendant suffered any psychological trauma as a result of mental illness. Accordingly,
this claim is forfeited.” (Tilley, supra, at p. 778.)
       For all of the same reasons, defendant here forfeited his contention. Contrary to
defendant’s contentions, neither the language of section 1170 as amended, providing that
the sentencing court “shall” impose the low term under the specified circumstances, nor
this court’s footnote in our opinion on defendant’s original appeal, in which we noted
defendant may wish to focus on the statutory changes to section 1170 effected by Senate
Bill No. 567 (Newens, supra, C094163), relieved defendant of his obligation to raise the
issue in the trial court to preserve it for appellate review.
B.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant asserts that, if he forfeited his first contention, he was denied of the
effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to raise the issue in the trial
court and he was prejudiced as a result. We agree.
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.

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(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987)
43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.)
       A reviewing court will not reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel unless “(1)
the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective
assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v.
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; accord, People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th
264, 266-267.) Here, the record does not affirmatively disclose that counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for not raising section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), and counsel
has not been asked for a reason. We proceed to address whether there could be no
satisfactory explanation for failing to raise this issue.
       As we shall discuss, defendant’s mental health issues and history of trauma were
evident in the trial record. Additionally, the potential applicability of changes to section
1170 were a matter of record at resentencing. Defendant’s attorney was aware of these
issues, as he represented defendant at trial, at the original sentencing, and at resentencing.
       As stated, we noted in our prior opinion that, at resentencing, defendant may wish
to focus on those changes to section 1170 effected by Senate Bill No. 567 as opposed to
Assembly Bill No. 124. (Newens, supra, C094163.)
       At resentencing, the trial court noted “there have also been some modifications in
our sentencing laws. However, the Court had imposed the mid term in this case
originally.” The court stated it was inclined to reimpose the original sentence, but with
the terms imposed on counts 3 and 4 stayed pursuant to section 654.
       In addressing the court, defense counsel did emphasize defendant’s mental health.
(See generally People v. Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 777-778 [while at least one
court concluded psychological trauma based on mental illness may be a circumstance
qualifying for low term presumption in § 1170, subd. (b)(6), that court emphasized

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mental illness alone did not qualify for low term presumption], citing People v. Banner
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) Defense counsel noted the court had not found him an
appropriate candidate for mental health diversion. He further indicated that several
mental health professionals “indicted that [defendant] has, does have good insight into his
mental illness and [is] likely to succeed with treatment.” Counsel further referred to the
fact that “all of these crazy nonsensical things that [defendant] has done[] never hurt
anybody . . . . He intended to get the FBI involved in his life and specifically said, hey
I’m going to pretend to pull a bank robbery.”
       The underlying circumstances of the crimes did suggest the possibility of mental
health issues. Defendant reported to a mental health professional administering a mental
health assessment that he thought people wanted to kill him and cut off his fingers. He
had been feeling paranoid and possibly delusional. Defendant reported that he had told a
police officer he was willing to pretend to rob a bank in order to get the FBI involved to
help him.
       In addition to defendant’s mental health issues, that defendant had a history of
trauma was a matter of record in defendant’s trial. According to the same mental health
assessment, defendant’s father was physically and verbally abusive, and, after defendant
was placed in foster care, his foster mother molested him. Defendant was diagnosed,
among other things, with PTSD.
       Notwithstanding the foregoing, defense counsel did not assert at resentencing that
the trial court should sentence defendant to low term sentences because defendant had
“experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence” which “was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
       The People correctly concede the record reflects that defendant suffered from
childhood trauma as well as mental illness. However, the People argue defense counsel
may have “recognized . . . that he could not make a causal link between any

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psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” and defendant’s crimes. In other words,
the People assert defense counsel may have concluded he could not establish that
defendant’s trauma was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense” as
required. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The People assert “[s]uch evidence does not exist in the
record.”
       We disagree. On a record silent on the matter, it is possible we may have agreed
with the People’s position that counsel concluded he could not establish the required
causal connection. However, this record is not silent on the matter.
       The same mental health assessment discussed previously states: “When asked
how his [mental health] contributed to his charges, [defendant] reports he believes if he
wasn’t on drugs, he more than likely would have never been in that situation. [He]
reports he is aware his behavior was erratic and not normal and was caused by his drug
use. [He] reports he was extremely paranoid and delusional. [He] reports he does drugs
to numb his pain from all of his traumas . . . . [He] reports for the longest time he
struggled to truly identify why he did drugs and it finally occurred to him he never really
dealt with his childhood trauma. . . . [He] reports it felt as if all of his pain and hurt hit
him at once.” (Italics added.) Elsewhere, a therapist who had treated defendant indicated
in a letter to the trial court that defendant had been diagnosed with PTSD, and that the
“extensive history of childhood trauma that [defendant] endured was the basis for his
PTSD diagnosis.”
       On this record, we cannot conclude that defense counsel’s hypothetical belief that
he could not establish defendant’s trauma “was a contributing factor in the commission of
the offense” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A)) provides a satisfactory explanation for his failure
to raise section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) at resentencing.
       The People’s other contention is that defense counsel may have opted instead to
focus on his argument that the robbery terms should be stayed under section 654.
However, first, if counsel could make the necessary showing pursuant to section 1170,

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subdivision (b)(6)(A), the relief sought would be mandatory; upon the requisite showing,
the court would be obligated to impose low terms “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Conversely, the relief sought pursuant to section 654 was discretionary (§ 654, subd. (a));
the court could choose to grant the relief sought, or not, at its discretion. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, once the trial court rejected defense counsel’s suggestion, in
effect, to stay the sentences imposed on the robbery counts pursuant to section 654, this
no longer provided a satisfactory reason for declining to make the argument for
mandatory low term sentences pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
         We conclude there is no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to raise this
issue.
         To show prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show a reasonable probability that defendant would have received a more favorable result
had counsel’s performance not been deficient. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466
U.S. at pp. 693-694; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) As stated, if
defense counsel could make the necessary showing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)(A), the relief sought would be mandatory and defendant would have been entitled
to low term sentences “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) At defendant’s original sentencing, the trial
court found the circumstances in aggravation did not outweigh the circumstances in
mitigation. At resentencing, the court stated only that “I definitely can’t do upper [term
sentences] because I don’t have aggravating circumstances that have been pled and
proven.” These statements are not determinative as to what the trial court will find at a
new resentencing. However, they do support the conclusion that there is a reasonable

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probability defendant would have received a more favorable result had counsel raised the
issue at resentencing.
       We conclude that, in failing to raise section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) at
resentencing, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and there is a reasonable probability defendant would have received a more favorable
result absent counsel’s shortcomings. We will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand
for a full resentencing. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
C.     Fines, Fees, and Penalty Assessments
       Because we are remanding for a full resentencing, we need not address
defendant’s contentions, relying mainly on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157, that the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights in imposing fines,
fees, and penalty assessments without determining defendant had the ability to pay.

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                                      III. DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing
consistent with this decision.
       Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(2), the
clerk of this court is ordered to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar upon
finality of this appeal. Further, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7,
subdivision (b), the clerk of this court shall notify defendant's trial counsel that the matter
has been referred to the State Bar.

                                                           /S/

                                                   RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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