Court Opinion

ID: 9639186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:07:07.150701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:13.731267
License: Public Domain

McNEILLY, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Andre Stanley Deputy was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of two counts of intentional Murder in the First Degree, two counts of Felony Murder, one count of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. Deputy was sentenced to death on each of the four murder convictions and thirty year terms on the robbery and weapon convictions. The majority has ruled that the late evening taped confession of the defendant was improperly admitted into evidence in violation of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a consequence the majority reversed the intentional murder convictions but affirmed the felony murder convictions and the underlying crimes of Robbery in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and also affirmed the sentences imposed thereon. I concur in the affirmances but disagree that the 10 p.m. statement was improperly admitted into evidence, and that consequently the intentional murder convictions should be reversed.
There is no issue raised in this appeal of abusive tactics by the police during the interrogation and custody although I am mindful and consider as part of the totality of circumstances Deputy’s claim of sleeping in a cold cell, of being threatened by the police with a “hollow point” in his head, and of being deprived of cigarettes and liquor. I am also mindful of the absence of *603proof by the State of an actual verbal or written relinquishment by Deputy of his right to counsel after his appearance before the committing Justice of the Peace. But sometimes actions speak louder than words.
Although the Trial Judge specifically ruled that Deputy knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he gave his February 8, 1979 statement at 10:00 p.m., he did not explore the impact of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right of defendant to have counsel present during any further interrogation after his initial appearance before the Justice of the Peace. The question was not raised either during the suppression hearing or at trial. But in Flamer, we assumed, and I do the same here, without agreeing with the assumption, that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to have counsel present were triggered by defendant’s initial appearance before the committing Justice of the Peace, an impartial State Court Official.
Pursuant to the mandate of Justice of the Peace Criminal Rule 2(b), Deputy was advised at his initial appearance before the committing Justice of the Peace, a neutral judicial officer, of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary hearing. Deputy also was advised under the Rule that he was not required to make a statement, that any statement made by him may be used against him and that he would be allowed by the Justice of the Peace a reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel. Having been so advised, Deputy expressed no desire to exercise any of the options explained to him and was thereupon ordered committed to the custody of the Sussex County Correctional Institution since the murder charges constituted non-bailable offenses. As was Flamer, Deputy was turned over to the State Police for transmittal to the Sussex County Correctional facility. The State Police delayed taking Deputy to the corrections facility and returned Deputy to the Police Station where he was detained nine hours. There was little, if any, communication with Deputy by the investigating officer or any other police officer during the nine-hour period he was confined to the holding cell at the police barracks. The detective in charge of the investigation did inform Deputy that he was going to Seaford and that when he returned he wanted Deputy to tell him the truth. But subsequent to returning from Seaford, the detective apparently was satisfied not to interrogate Deputy further and left the police troop for home and the night without any contact with Deputy. Shortly after the detective left for home, a traffic officer started Deputy on his way to the Sussex County Correctional Institute. In the meantime, the detective changed his mind and directed the transporting officer to return Deputy to the police station.
I do not in any way condone the action of the State Police in failing to transport Deputy to the correctional facility without delay after his arraignment before the Justice of the Peace. Unfortunately, the delay was the result of a police procedure which had become routine, at least in lower Delaware, by reason of the Justices of the Peace as a general rule having no one available to relieve the State Police of custody of committed defendants for the purpose of transporting such defendants to a correctional facility. Although the police did transport Deputy to the Sussex County Correctional facility and hence, did not violate the Order of the Justice of the Peace, transportation of a defendant after arraignment, to a correctional facility, should occur without delay. This would avoid potential Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations whose frequency of occurrence seems to increase when a defendant is left in police custody for a prolonged period of time.
As to the alleged Sixth Amendment violation, I conclude no violation occurred since considering the totality of circumstances Deputy waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In the recent case of U.S. v. Karr, 9th Cir., 742 F.2d 493 (1984), the *604Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Miranda warnings sufficiently inform an indicted defendant of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to allow an . intelligent waiver of that right. Recognizing the difference between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda and the Sixth Amendment right, the Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is analytically distinct from the Fifth Amendment right created by Miranda. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 n. 4, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The right attaches “when formal judicial proceedings are initiated against an individual by way of indictment, information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing.” United States v. Gouveia, [467] U.S. [180], 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2296, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). Unlike the Fifth Amendment right, the Sixth Amendment right does not depend on an explicit request by the defendant. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).
Karr’s rights under the Sixth Amendment attached when he was indicted. The issue is whether he validly waived them.
The standard for waiver of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel is the same: the waiver must be (1) voluntary, and (2) a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (Fifth Amendment); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242 (Sixth Amendment). Courts have split, however, regarding what warnings are required before an indicted defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the Sixth Amendment right.
The Second Circuit takes the strictest view. It has held that waiver of the right to counsel before trial requires “a clear and explicit explanation of the Sixth Amendment rights defendant is giving up.” United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1150 (2d Cir.1980). Miranda warnings alone are insufficient. Further, it has held that the rights must be explained by a neutral judicial officer, not by the prosecutor or agent seeking the waiver. Id. at 1153. The officer must show the indictment to the defendant, explain its significance, and highlight the seriousness of the defendant’s position. Id. See also United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir.1983).
No other circuit has adopted this standard. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found informed waivers where the defendant has received Miranda warnings and has indicated a willingness to talk. Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1075 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236, 238-39 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 634 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1856, 64 L.Ed.2d 275 (1980).
The Seventh Circuit has endorsed a case-by-case approach. Robinson v. Percy, 738 F.2d 214 at 222 (7th Cir.,1984). It has found waiver where the defendant received Miranda warnings and the surrounding circumstances show that he understood his right to counsel. Id.
Other circuits have adopted intermediate positions. See United States v. Payton, 615 F.2d 922, 924-25 (1st Cir.) (valid waiver where defendant was given Miranda warnings and was informed of indictment), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2950, 64 L.Ed.2d 830 (1980); United States v. Clements, 713 F.2d 1030, 1036 (4th Cir.1983) (waiver requires knowledge of indictment), vacated by an equally divided court, 728 F.2d 654 (4th Cir.1984) (en banc); Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879, 881-82 (8th Cir.) (waiver where defendant was given Miranda warnings, had previously invoked right to counsel, and had opportunity to consult counsel during interrogation), cert. denied, [464] U.S. [1020], 104 S.Ct. 556, 78 L.Ed.2d 728 (1983).
Karr, 742 F.2d at 495.
Listening to the tape of the confession taken at 10:00 p.m. on February 8, 1979 *605gives one the impression of a man who is knowingly, voluntarily and unhesitatingly answering every question put to him truthfully, directly, and without further subterfuge. To emphasize the point I quote Deputy’s final statements given at the very end of his 10:00 p.m. statement:
Q. You sure there is nothing you haven’t told us about this incident?
A. I have told you everything. Everything.
Q. You killed Miss Alberta Smith?
A. I guess so. I don’t know.
Q. What do you mean you guess so? A. I don’t know whether she was dead or not. She wasn’t moving.
Q. You’re reasonably sure she was dead. Probably she was dead.
A. Yeah.
Q. And there is no question about the truth. Everything you’ve told us is definitely the truth?
A. Everything is the truth.
Q. O.K. Have you been explained your Miranda rights? Your right to be silent and your right to an Attorney and all that?
A. Yes.
Q. How many times have you been told that since you have been apprehended? A. Two or three.
Q. Have you been asked if you want to see an Attorney?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you had the opportunity to talk to an Attorney if you wanted to see one? A. Yes.
I also look at Deputy, the thirty year old man, who is no stranger to the rigors of law enforcement, a thrice convicted felon, and under arrest for an unrelated murder allegedly committed by him in New Castle County. The evidence clearly supports a conclusion that Deputy is street wise. Had he wished to invoke any of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which he consistently declined to do each time those rights were explained to him from the moment of his apprehension, the clear inference is that he was knowledgable and wise enough to have done so had he so desired. His failure to request the assistance of counsel under the totality of the circumstances here can lead to no conclusion other than that he was willing to waive his right to consult or have counsel present and to spar with the police on his own. He knew his rights and said so. Based upon the totality of the circumstances I am satisfied the 10:00 p.m. statement under attack was properly admitted into evidence and that all convictions and sentences should have been affirmed.