Court Opinion

ID: 9716914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:53:50.910578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:50.033606
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(concurring). I agree with the result because any other result, in my view, would adversely affect jury service and would be inconsistent with Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 198 (1979). As the Commonwealth recognizes in its brief, there would have to be a hearing to determine whether the jurors were in some way affected by the presence of unauthorized persons in the jury room at the time of its deliberations. See id. at 196. Such a hearing would require evidence concerning the effect on jurors of the unauthorized presence of persons in the jury room during deliberations. Essentially, the eviden-tiary issue concerns the subjective mental process of the jurors, an inquiry forbidden by Fidler. Id. at 198. Under Fidler, jurors may not testify as to what happened in the jury room during deliberations, only as to extraneous matters in the jury room. In this case, it is clear that there were unauthorized persons in the jury room.
Further, for the jury system to function properly, jurors must be free from unwarranted harassment, and the jurors must not be inhibited in the give and take of their discussions. Regular use of postverdict hearings may stifle juror debate and jurors may be intimidated into reaching a popular result rather than risk posttrial examination regarding the reasons for their verdict. For these reasons, a hearing as to the effect the unauthorized persons had on the regular jurors is inappropriate. Fidler, supra at 196-198.
Last, the hearing itself is a significant governmental intrusion into the privacy of the jury deliberative process. Protection of the privacy of the deliberative process is a fundamental concern *500because “[community participation in the administration of the criminal law ... is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). For these reasons I concur.