Court Opinion

ID: 9536513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:01:02.495943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:36.361729
License: Public Domain

RANSOM, Justice (specially concurring). I specially concur to emphasize that counsel for Sanchez reached a plea agreement with the prosecutor in January, prior to the expiration of the extension. The parties understood that the plea agreement would be reduced to writing and would be presented to the court on March 15, after the expiration of the extension. Although the prosecution did not seek an additional extension, Rule 5-604 was not intended to require this Court to act each time delay is due to an express or implied stay for reasons directly related to the events specified in the Rule as triggering a recommencement. This reading of Rule 5-604 is consistent with the long standing position of this Court that the Rule should be given a common-sense interpretation to effect the prompt, orderly expedition of criminal trials and not to effect technical dismissals. See State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 774 P.2d 440 (1989); State v. Flores, 99 N.M. 44, 653 P.2d 875 (1982); State v. Benally, 99 N.M. 415, 658 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App.1983). It is in light of these principles that the six-month rule did not require dismissal of the charges in this case. Within a current six-month period, the parties at least impliedly agreed to stay proceedings pending the anticipated plea disposition, the rejection of which was an occurrence that operates to recommence the running of the six months under Rule 5-604. The Rule did not apply until the plea was rejected.