Court Opinion

ID: 9745000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:27:57.323932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:11.807513
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
My colleagues and I agree the trial court committed both constitutional and statutory error when it entertained a juror’s question on the law and evidence in the case in the absence of defense counsel. We part company only on whether that clear constitutional and statutory error requires a retrial. By downplaying evidentiary discrepancies on the key factual issue in the case and ignoring controlling precedent, the majority manages to conclude this error was harmless. I am unable to do so.
Identity of appellant as one of the robbers was the primary issue in the case. However, the witnesses’ testimony regarding whether appellant was *255the assailant was contradictory. Indeed, it was the testimony of one of the victims who testified appellant was not his assailant the jury requested for readback. The number of split votes in ballots taken over two days of deliberations on the single count of robbery underscores the fact this case was anything but open and shut. Nevertheless, the majority glosses over the probable prejudicial impact of the court’s error in communicating with the deliberating jury in the absence of defense counsel in what was already a close case on the issue of identity. The majority simply concludes the error was not prejudicial, and makes no attempt to analyze the effect the trial court’s error had on the verdict.
Moreover, and equally disturbing, the majority does not cite or even acknowledge controlling precedent before concluding the error in this case was harmless. The cases the majority relies on (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 253) bear no factual similarity to the case at bar. With the exception of People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009], none of the cases the majority cites in finding the error harmless, involved, as does this case, a trial court entertaining a juror’s question on the law and evidence applicable to the case in the absence of counsel. Consequently, these decisions provide no authority for finding the error harmless in this case. In Jennings the trial court’s error in communicating with the deliberating jury was deemed nonprejudicial, because there the court immediately notified counsel of its error and gave counsel the opportunity to suggest further instruction or clarification. The trial court in this case, by contrast, did not notify counsel of its error, promptly or otherwise, and consequently counsel had no opportunity to neutralize the prejudicial effect on the jury of the court’s improper communication.
Because this case was very close on the key issue of identity, and because counsel’s input regarding the effect of discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimony would likely have made a difference, I cannot find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would find the error prejudicial and reverse the judgment on this ground alone.
Discussion
I. Appellant’s Right to Counsel at a Critical Stage of a Criminal Trial Was Violated.
The jury requested certain testimony be read back during deliberations. The trial court notified defense counsel by phone who agreed to “simply send the reporter into the jury room to read the testimony that the jury has requested” without his presence. However, the court then brought the jury *256into the courtroom and orally questioned the jury regarding the specific sections of testimony requested to be read back. During this same meeting one of the jurors stated, “Well, I had the question about Mr. Tyler’s testimony, but also I wanted to know in the legal way that discrepancies in the testimony, is that enough cause for a reasonable doubt?” The court responded, “That’s something for the juror to decide. ... I can only refer you to the instruction that deals with discrepancies between one witness’ testimony and another. It outlines it’s something to be considered, whether it’s a fact of importance or a trivial detail, that you have to consider. It’s up to you to make those decisions.” The court then directed the jury to CALJIC No. 2.21.1 regarding discrepancies in testimony.
As the majority acknowledges, there is nothing to suggest defense counsel’s particularized waiver to be present at the readback of testimony to the jury in the deliberation room encompassed the right to be present to answer jury questions or for further substantive instructions from the court. According to the trial court’s description, defense counsel only waived his right to be present at the readback of testimony to the jury in the deliberation room.
A defendant “is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” {People v. Stewart (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 967, 972 [193 Cal.Rptr. 799].) Moreover, a defendant is afforded additional protection under Penal Code section 1138 which provides: “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.”
Communications between a jury and the court regarding clarification of facts or law dealing with the case represent a critical stage of the trial. {People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118]; see also People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981, 988 [146 Cal.Rptr. 129].) Therefore, a statutory and constitutional violation of the right to counsel occurs “where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel.” {People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290].)
I therefore agree with the majority the trial court erred in answering the juror’s question and in providing additional jury instructions without first contacting counsel.
*257II. Appellant’s Denial of Counsel When the Court Answered a Juror’s Question and Provided Supplemental Jury Instructions Was Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
“ ‘While denial of counsel at the critical stage of a criminal proceedings is not prejudicial as a matter of law, prejudice will be presumed if the denial may have affected the substantial rights of the accused. Only the most compelling showing to the contrary will overcome the presumption. The court must be able to declare a belief the denial of counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ . . .” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 384, citations omitted.)
In People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th 43, 68-69, the court reviewed several cases to distinguish when a court’s improper communication with a deliberating jury constitutes prejudicial error and when such error may be deemed harmless.
The Hawthorne court analyzed cases where the improper communication affected the substantial rights of the defendant and was therefore prejudicial error. For instance, in People v. Weatherford (1945) 27 Cal.2d 401,418 [164 P.2d 753], the trial court, through the bailiff and in the absence of defendant’s attorney, responded to a juror inquiry “ ‘[wjhether or not it was the duty of the prosecution or the defense to put the defendant on the scene.’ ” (Id. at p. 417.) The court’s reply, as well as the bailiff’s additional colloquy with the jury, was apparently “interpreted as meaning that the matter was none of the jury’s business.” (Id. at p. 419.) This ex parte communication concerning the prosecution’s burden of proof and the evidence constituted reversible error.
In People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612], in response to the jury’s question during deliberations “. . . the trial judge gave a self-defense instruction without notifying defense counsel or otherwise affording him an opportunity to object to the instruction before it was given.” (Id. at p. 622.) Again, the court found the error in instructing in counsel’s absence prejudicial.
Similarly, in People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 981 the court gave the jury additional instructions on the difference between first and second degree burglary and the definition of accessory and also provided them with a written copy of all instructions without informing counsel or permitting any response. (Id. at pp. 985-986.) Based on the lack of input from counsel regarding the law applicable to the case, this error was also found prejudicial.
*258Our high court distinguished these cases by noting “[i]n each circumstance, counsel could have taken some action on the defendant’s behalf to amplify, clarify, or modify the supplemental instruction or procedure.” (People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 68-69.) The trial courts’ failure in these cases to give notice to counsel or afford an opportunity to respond thus constituted statutory as well as constitutional error. “ ‘Penal Code section 1138 requires that any questions posed by the jury regarding the law or the evidence be answered in open court in the presence of the accused and his or her counsel, unless presence is waived. Communication between judge and jury during deliberations without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present impinges on a defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.’ ” (People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 69, citing People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 432 [193 Cal.Rptr. 711].)
The court in People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 69 distinguished the foregoing cases from the one before it. In Hawthorne the ex parte communication did not direct the jury on any question “regarding the law or the evidence.” For that reason the court would not “infer from either the fact of the communication or the absence of a contemporaneous verbatim record that a prejudicial contact occurred.” {Ibid.) From the totality of the circumstances presented in that case the court concluded the defendant had not suffered “an impairment of rights sufficient to affect the verdict.” {Ibid..)
In Hawthorne, during deliberations the jury sent the bailiff a note asking “What do we do now? After much extra deliberation one member of the jury is not sure the defendant is guilty or not guilty.” Since the trial judge was on vacation, he directed the bailiff to have the jury maintain the status quo pending notification of counsel and their agreement to any further instructions. The court found once the jury expressed a desire and intent to continue deliberating without a reply, the court had only one reasonable response: “Keep deliberating.”
The court found these circumstances more closely paralleled those found nonprejudicial in People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177 [148 P.2d 627]. In Alcalde, the jury sent the court a note inquiring, “ ‘May we render a decision of life imprisonment and not eligible for parole?’ . . . .” The court responded, “ ‘No.’ ” The defendant claimed reversible error “because of this communication between the judge and jury out of the presence of the defendant and his counsel.” {Id. at pp. 188-189, italics omitted.) Since the court could not have responded by any other answer than “No” or its equivalent, and since the answer of file trial judge could properly have been made over the objection of the defendant if the ordinary procedure had been followed, the communication was not deemed prejudicial. {Ibid.)
*259The facts of the case before this court are indistinguishable from the cases the Hawthorne court acknowledged constituted prejudicial error. It is only by ignoring the subject matter of the trial court’s discussion with the deliberating jury the majority can conclude otherwise. Here, the trial judge entertained a juror’s question on the law and evidence in the case in the absence of counsel. Next, the trial judge answered the question and provided an additional jury instruction, again without defense counsel being present. The court did not notify counsel of these events, who therefore could not object or offer any suggestions.1
Unlike the situations in Hawthorne and Alcalde, the trial court’s response to the juror’s question was not the only possible or correct response. Had counsel been present at the time the juror asked his question, counsel could have taken some action on appellant’s behalf to amplify or clarify the juror’s question. The juror’s question is not crystal clear and may be interpreted a number of ways. On appeal, appellant suggests a reasonable interpretation of the question is whether discrepancies in the testimony are enough to create a reasonable doubt to find the defendant not guilty. If this was the import of the juror’s question, counsel could have, for example, asked for a special instruction relating conflicting testimony to a reasonable doubt of guilt. (See, e.g., People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 189 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847].) Since we now know that at the time of the inquiry the jury balloting started at 6-3-3 and later moved to 10-1-1, this appears to be a plausible interpretation of what was bothering the jurors and the corrective action defense counsel could have requested if given the opportunity.
Furthermore, if given the chance, counsel could have requested a modification of the instruction the court did give, or request reinstruction on the definition of reasonable doubt (CALJIC Nos. 2.91, and 2.92) and the prosecution’s burden of proof (CALJIC No. 2.90). Because any of these efforts could have proved beneficial to appellant, counsel’s absence at the time of the court’s improper communication with the jury affected his substantial rights.
Because counsel could have taken some action to modify or clarify the instruction the court did give, the majority’s argument the instruction was correct in law and not inherently improper simply misses the mark. Defense counsel’s duty to protect and advance the interests of his or her client is not limited to ensuring the jury is not given wholly erroneous instructions.
*260According to People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 68, footnote 14, the standard of review in assessing the impact of an improper communication between the court and a deliberating jury is not settled. In that case the court noted both the “miscarriage of justice” standard (People v. Weatherford, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 418) and the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” test (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] (Chapman)) have been invoked in past cases (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815 [183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]). The Hawthorne court did not resolve the issue since prejudice was not found under either standard in that case.
More recent decisions have employed the Chapman standard of review of constitutional error in this context. Our decision in People v. Rubalcava (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 295 [246 Cal.Rptr. 75], is one such example. In that case, the defense stipulated the trial court could answer only those jury questions which did not require discussion or research. However, the court defined the concept of moral certainty for the jury without counsel or defendant being present. In using the Chapman test, we stated from our reading of the record we could not say this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “Because defense counsel was not present when the trial court extemporaneously responded to the jury’s question about the meaning of moral certainty, we can only conjecture about what appellant’s lawyer could have done had he been present.” (Id. at p. 301, italics omitted.) Nonetheless, we believed a reasonable attorney would have objected to any “clarification” of reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
The facts of this case closely resemble those of People v. Rubalcava. Since defense counsel was not present at the time the juror asked the question and the trial judge provided additional instructions, I can only conjecture as to the actions defense counsel actually would have taken. At a minimum, a reasonable attorney would have had the juror clarify the question regarding reasonable doubt and asked for instructions that were most favorable to appellant.
Similar to People v. Rubalcava, evidence of guilt in this case was far from overwhelming. The single most critical issue at trial was the identity of the person who robbed Robert Rosen. However, the testimony revealed serious discrepancies in the witnesses’ identification of appellant as the assailant. In finding the error harmless the majority chooses to minimize this vital evidence.
Robert Burns, a witness who heard the altercation and called 911, saw two men step into his line of vision when he yelled at them to stop fighting. One *261man was a large Black male who wore a turban. The other man was tall, wore Levi shorts, white shirt and had his long blond hair in a ponytail. Bums described this man as having a fu manchu type moustache which was so long it hung below the man’s chin.
Rosen, the robbery victim, described his assailant as tall, wearing a white blousey shirt and white trousers, six feet four inches tall, over two hundred pounds and long blond hair. Rosen did not recall seeing any facial hair.
Rosen testified he saw appellant several times both before and after the incident. Every time he saw appellant—significantly, with the exception of the night he was robbed—Rosen testified appellant was with his transvestite companion.
A few days after the incident in this case Rosen witnessed another robbery. Rosen testified he was “absolutely certain” the robber was appellant. However, the victim of the second robbery, Edmund Tyler, testified he did not think appellant was the one who robbed him. After being knocked down, Tyler stared directly at his assailant’s face. Tyler described the physical characteristics which distinguished his assailant from appellant: His assailant had a very chiseled face, perhaps Polish or Hungarian, with much more pronounced cheekbones than appellant’s. In addition, Tyler’s assailant had far more of a receding hairline titan appellant. Based on these differences Tyler did not think appellant was the person who had robbed him.
Apparently, the jury likewise considered this case to be close since it deliberated for almost two days on a single count before rendering a guilty verdict. Prior to the communication between the court and jury, the jury balloting had been 6-3-3 and 10-1-1 in favor of guilt. After the court’s discussion with the jury the balloting was 11-1 and the jury informed the court it had reached an impasse. The court then ordered the jury to resume deliberations and they returned two hours later with a guilty verdict.
On this record, I cannot conclude the error in denying defendant his right to counsel at the critical stage when the trial court was answering a juror’s question and providing supplemental jury instructions can be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 2, 1995. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

In contrast to the situation in People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 384, the trial court apparently did not give counsel notice, prompt or otherwise, of its “misstep” in communicating with the jury in the absence of counsel. Consequently, unlike Jennings the trial court did not give counsel the opportunity to object to the court’s communication or to suggest possible corrective measures.