Court Opinion

ID: 9710953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:20.494858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.354473
License: Public Domain

Jones, J. (concurring).
I agree with the majority that the Appellate Division’s order upholding defendant’s conviction should be affirmed, and that Millares’s statements regarding his pedigree information were nontestimonial. I write separately, however, because the circumstances objectively indicate that Millares’s statements concerning defendant’s identity, address and past conduct were not elicited by an interrogation designed to assist Officers Doyle and Riordan in meeting an ongoing emergency. To the contrary, they indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. Accordingly, these statements were testimonial under Crawford v Washington (541 US 36 [2004]) and Davis v Washington (547 US 813 [2006]), and defendant’s right of confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted these statements. Nevertheless, I conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I
Officers Doyle and Riordan both testified that on November 28, 2000, at about 4:14 a.m., they received a distress call over their radio stating that a man had been shot at 176th Street and Clay Avenue in the Bronx. Upon arriving at that location, both police officers exited their vehicle. Officer Doyle testified that he “went over to the victim, who was laying down.” Officer Riordan provided more detail as to what he and Officer Doyle did as they exited their vehicle. At trial, the following exchange took place:
“[people]: What, if anything, did you observe your partner do after you parked your car?
“[officer riordan]: Both my partner and myself walked over towards the crowd and I looked down and I saw a male laying down on the sidewalk.
“[people]: What did your partner do?
“[officer riordan]: My partner kneeled down next to the person laying down ....
“[people]: What did you notice about the person, what else?
*18“[officer riordan]: He was moaning loudly. I believe I heard people in the crowd, one or two saying, you know, that he was shot.
“[people]: Okay. And what, if anything, did you do?
“[officer riordan]: Well, upon hearing that[,] I immediately turned around and turned my flashlight on and started looking on the ground around the general area for any shell casings.”
Officer Riordan also testified that he left Officer Doyle with Millares.
Before speaking to Millares, Officer Doyle had an opportunity to observe that Millares was conscious, bleeding and grimacing in pain. Officer Doyle, who was trained to administer CPR, determined that he could not render any medical assistance to Millares. At trial, he was asked why he could not render medical assistance, to which he responded: “For the seriousness of his injury, I’m not trained to give assistance. I could make things worse.” Instead, Officer Doyle “called for an ambulance to respond to [a] man shot.” After calling the ambulance, Officer Doyle, who testified that he “wanted to get some information from [Millares],” bent down on one knee and began to question Millares. Officer Doyle asked Millares for pedigree information (his name, age, address and phone number) and then asked what happened. According to Officer Doyle’s testimony, Millares said he had an argument with defendant (whom he identified by his nickname “Bori”) and “Bori shot him three times.” Mill-ares also gave Officer Doyle specific information about where defendant resided. The following testimony was elicited at trial:
“[people]: Did the victim ever tell you where this person Bori lived?
“[officer doyle]: I don’t recall. I can’t remember.
“[people]: Would something refresh your memory?
“[officer doyle]: Yes, yes.
“[people]: I ask the witness be shown this piece of paper. . . .
“[people]: Does that refresh your recollection?
“[OFFICER DOYLE]: Yes.
“[people]: And did the victim, Jose Millares, indicate to you where this person Bori lived?
*19“[OFFICER DOYLE]: YeS.
“[people]: Where was that?
“[officer doyle]: 1818 Clay Avenue, Apartment 1A.”
After the ambulance came and went, Officer Doyle put up crime scene tape and cordoned off the area. When the detectives arrived on the scene, he gave them the information he had received from Millares.
II
The question before this Court is whether, objectively considered, Officer Doyle’s questioning of Millares produced testimonial statements. As explained by the Supreme Court in Davis, “[statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” (547 US at 822 [emphasis added]). Here, it is clear from the facts and circumstances that Officer Doyle’s interrogation of Millares was part of an investigation into past criminal conduct. One need only consider the actions of Officers Doyle and Riordan upon arriving on the scene to determine that they were not faced with an ongoing emergency or a concern of a future attack by the assailant (nor was there any indication that the assailant was still on the scene).
Right after Officers Doyle and Riordan came upon the crime scene, Officer Riordan immediately began to look for and recover evidence. Officer Doyle, on the other hand, initially sought to ensure Millares’s safety. Although Officer Doyle could not render medical assistance to Millares, he called an ambulance. However, as soon as he made that call, he could do nothing further for Millares except find out Millares’s pedigree information, which could assist the ambulance workers, and stay with him until the ambulance arrived. At this point, although Mill-ares was in extremis, Officer Doyle’s focus properly shifted from managing an emergency to investigating a past crime and gathering key information such as where defendant resided. Put differently, because it was objectively apparent that the emergency (i.e., the threat from the assailant) had passed, when Officer Doyle asked “what happened,” he was not trying to determine “what is happening.” Unlike the police officer in People v Bradley (8 NY3d 124 [2006]), Officer Doyle asked “what *20happened” not as a means of finding out what caused Millares’s injuries or determining what action needed to be taken in order to prevent further harm to Millares. Officer Doyle already had the answers to those questions before he spoke to Millares.
Thus, Officer Doyle’s interrogation of Millares regarding the crime committed against him, although completely appropriate and necessary, elicited testimonial statements—i.e., statements one would expect a witness to make at trial—which are subject to the constraints of the Confrontation Clause. As stated by the Davis Court:
“Police investigations themselves are, of course, in no way impugned by our characterization of their fruits as testimonial. Investigations of past crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests. While prosecutors may hope that inculpatory ‘non-testimonial’ evidence is gathered, this is essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be so. The Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that provision. But neither can police conduct govern the Confrontation Clause; testimonial statements are what they are” (547 US at 832 n 6).
Recognizing that police officers at a crime scene may shift their focus from addressing an emergency to conducting an investigation, Davis and Bradley contemplate that police interrogations can yield nontestimonial and/or testimonial statements based on the circumstances of the particular case.* Here, the majority’s view—that all of the statements made by Mill-ares to Officer Doyle were nontestimonial—fails to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis that what “the circumstances objectively indicate” about the purpose of a particular interrogation is controlling. The circumstances in this case do not objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation was at all times to assist the police in dealing with an ongoing emergency. In fact, the very existence of an ongoing emergency is belied by the trial testimony of Officers Doyle and Riordan, as well as their collective conduct at the crime scene.
*21Ill
Violations of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation are subject to a constitutional harmless error analysis (see People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265, 276 [1995]). Unless the People show that the error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” such error requires reversal of the conviction and a new trial (Eastman, 85 NY2d at 276). “Such errors are considered harmless when, in light of the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s verdict” (People v Douglas, 4 NY3d 777, 779 [2005], citing People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 240-241 [1975]). In deciding whether the People have met their burden for establishing harmlessness, a reviewing court must “consider both the overall strength of the case against defendant and the importance [of the improperly admitted evidence to that case]” (People v Goldstein, 6 NY3d 119, 129 [2005]).
Here, although it was error to admit Millares’s statements concerning defendant’s identity, address and past conduct, there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction. O’Carroll’s testimony at trial described the shooting in great detail. Further, much of O’Carroll’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence presented at trial. For example, O’Carroll testified that defendant, a man he knew very well, drew a .380 caliber automatic pistol from his “hoodie” pocket and fired three shots at Millares. According to O’Carroll, Millares fell wounded, but defendant kept firing until the weapon jammed. O’Carroll’s description of how defendant “unjammed” the pistol was corroborated by the People’s ballistic expert at trial. O’Carroll also detailed how defendant stood “Might on top of [Millares]” and twice fired his gun again after the wounded victim had fallen to the ground and crawled a few feet. One of the two bullets fired by defendant ricocheted off the floor of nearby truck and also hit Millares. O’Carroll’s testimony on this point was corroborated by the medical examiner who testified that the three bullet wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with a gunman standing over a prostrate victim and pointing the gun down at him. O’Carroll also testified that after the shooting, he saw Millares bleeding from the back. According to the medical examiner, Millares was shot in the back.
In light of O’Carroll’s testimony and the corroborating evidence presented at trial, there was no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s erroneous admission of the above-mentioned statements influenced the jury’s verdict. Thus, the *22People have met their burden for establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Graffeo and Read concur with Judge Pigott; Judge Jones concurs in result in a separate opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Smith concur.
Order affirmed.

 Accordingly, defendant’s unduly restrictive view of what constitutes an ongoing emergency (see majority op at 15) is unavailing.