Court Opinion

ID: 9897245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:11.192161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:58.747898
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Oct 30 2023, 8:29 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
R. Patrick Magrath                                         Larry W. Morrison
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP                        Morrison Elder Law
Madison, Indiana                                           Morgantown, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jimmy A. McIntosh, and                                     October 30, 2023
Cheryl McIntosh,                                           Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Respondents,                                    22A-PL-2522
                                                           Appeal from the Jennings Circuit
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Ryan J. King,
Roberta I. McIntosh, and                                   Special Judge
Nilah K. Simmons as Power of                               Trial Court Cause No.
Attorney for Roberta I.                                    40D01-2108-PL-105
McIntosh,
Appellees-Petitioners.

                                 Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                                Judges Crone and Felix concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                           Page 1 of 14
      Case Summary
[1]   Jimmy and Cheryl McIntosh appeal the trial court’s judgment determining they

      violated the Indiana Senior Consumer Protection Act (“SCPA”), 1 raising the

      following issues for our review:

                 1. Are select trial court findings of fact and conclusions of law
                 clearly erroneous?

                 2. Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard when
                 determining Jimmy and Cheryl violated the SCPA?

                 3. Did the trial court improperly validate a warranty deed?

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   At the time of trial, Roberta McIntosh was ninety-two years old. Around 2010,

      she was diagnosed with dementia. Due to her illness, Roberta is “pretty sharp

      sometimes and other times . . . she isn’t.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 82. During the trial,

      Roberta explained she wanted her property to be split equally among her living

      children but could not remember signing several legal documents.

[4]   In 2017, Roberta fell twice, injuring herself both times. As a result, she needed

      more intensive care once she returned home. Because none of Roberta’s other

      1
          Ind. Code ch. 24-4.6-6 (2013).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023           Page 2 of 14
      living children could provide this level of care, Jimmy—Roberta’s eldest son—

      and his wife Cheryl stepped up. By December 2017, both Jimmy and Cheryl

      had moved into Roberta’s home to assist her.

[5]   Around January 2018, Jimmy attempted to draft a warranty deed conveying

      ownership of Roberta’s home in Commiskey, Indiana, to him and his wife.

      Although Roberta signed this deed, it was unrecordable because it lacked a

      complete legal description of the property to be deeded. About two and one-

      half years later, Jimmy turned to a professional for help. Attorney Bradley

      Kage drafted a Quitclaim Deed transferring ownership of Roberta’s home to

      Jimmy and Cheryl. Upon learning of the deed, Nilah Simmons—one of

      Roberta’s daughters—informed Jimmy that Roberta did not want to sign the

      Quitclaim Deed. After Jimmy was told this and that Roberta’s Will had been

      lost, Nilah testified he got “very angry.” Id. at 48. As Roberta was sitting in a

      chair, Jimmy stood over her, got in her face, and yelled “some pretty harsh

      things to her.” Id. Jimmy told Roberta he would move out and the family

      would put her in a nursing home if she did not sign her house over to him and

      Cheryl. See id. at 48, 51. During this interaction, Roberta was “very stiff in her

      chair trying to get away from [Jimmy], and [Jimmy] wouldn’t back away from

      her.” Id. at 51. Nilah described the situation as “pretty scary.” Id.

[6]   On September 2, 2020, Jimmy and Cheryl took Roberta to Attorney Kage’s

      office and the parties executed the Quitclaim Deed. The next day, Jimmy took

      the deed to the recorder’s office to be recorded. That said, the Jennings County

      Recorder’s Office did not record the Quitclaim Deed until November 2, 2020.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023     Page 3 of 14
[7]   Approximately a week after Roberta signed the Quitclaim Deed, she executed a

      Last Will and Testament. Then, on September 24, 2020, Roberta executed a

      Power of Attorney naming Nilah as her attorney in fact. And on October 9,

      2020, Roberta executed a Warranty Deed. This Deed granted Roberta a life

      estate in her home and split the remainder equally among her living children.

      Nilah brought Roberta’s Power of Attorney and the Warranty Deed to the

      Jennings County Recorder’s Office to be recorded. Unbeknownst to Nilah, the

      Power of Attorney was not properly recorded. After Attorney Kage informed

      Nilah of this mistake, Nilah had the Power of Attorney properly recorded on

      April 19, 2021.

[8]   On August 10, 2021, Roberta and Nilah—as Roberta’s attorney in fact—filed a

      Petition to Quiet Title. The Petition alleged, among other things, Jimmy and

      Cheryl violated the SCPA and “either by mistake or error,” the Jennings

      County Recorder’s Office failed to record Roberta’s Power of Attorney. See

      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 14–16. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered

      specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined

      Jimmy and Cheryl violated the SCPA, Nilah filed Roberta’s Power of Attorney

      in “substantial compliance” with statutory requirements, the Quitclaim Deed of

      November 2, 2020, was void, and the Warranty Deed of October 9, 2020, was

      the legally controlling instrument. Id. at 171. The trial court ordered Jimmy

      and Cheryl to pay Roberta’s court costs and attorney’s fees totaling $8,050.

      Jimmy and Cheryl now appeal. Additional facts are provided when necessary.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023      Page 4 of 14
       1. The Challenged Findings of Fact are Not Clearly Erroneous
[9]    Jimmy and Cheryl argue several of the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly

       erroneous.2 When, as here, the trial court issues special findings of fact and

       conclusions of law sua sponte under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a “two-

       tiered standard of review—first determining whether the evidence supports the

       findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment.” Town of Linden

       v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 233 (Ind. 2023). “Any issue not covered by the

       findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing

       court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.”

       Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123–24 (Ind. 2016).

[10]   “We ‘shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless [they are] clearly

       erroneous,’ and we must give ‘due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial

       court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’” Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d

       600, 603 (Ind. 2014) (quoting T.R. 52(A)). “Findings of fact are clearly

       erroneous only when they have no factual support in the record, and a

       judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly

       found facts[.]” Id. at 603–04 (quotation and citations omitted). A finding or

       conclusion is clearly erroneous if we have a “firm conviction that a mistake has

       been made.” Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 482 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Yanoff

       2
        Jimmy and Cheryl also contend some conclusions of law are clearly erroneous because the trial court
       applied the incorrect legal standard. For clarity’s sake, we will address these arguments in Section 2 of this
       opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                                Page 5 of 14
       v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). When a party does not

       challenge the trial court’s findings, we must accept them as correct. See Madlem

       v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

       Findings 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f)

[11]   Jimmy and Cheryl argue the following findings are clearly erroneous:

               d. Jimmy McIntosh told Roberta McIntosh that she would have
               to be placed in a nursing home if she did not sign the property
               over to he [sic] and Cheryl.

               e. Jimmy McIntosh would yell in Roberta McIntosh’s face.
               Jimmy McIntosh testified he got so close to Roberta McIntosh’s
               face and yelled because she had difficulty hearing. Roberta
               McIntosh was able to hear and answer questions asked in the
               hearing by both attorneys. When asking questions, the attorneys
               were positioned three (3) to five (5) feet away from her. Roberta
               does have difficulty hearing consistent with her age.

               f. The Court finds that Roberta McIntosh would have been
               intimidated by someone yelling in her face, even if that person
               believed that somehow that was necessary and/or appropriate.
               This behavior was tantamount to coercion, undue influence,
               deception, and intimidation.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 158.

[12]   At trial, Nilah testified Jimmy stood over Roberta, yelled at her, and threatened

       to put her in a nursing home if she did not sign the property over to him and his

       wife. Nilah described Roberta’s frightened reaction to Jimmy’s behavior.

       Jimmy and Cheryl contend Nilah’s testimony was “contradicted by every other
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023      Page 6 of 14
       witness who” viewed the interaction; thus, in their view, these findings are

       clearly erroneous. Appellant’s Br. at 14. This is merely a request to reweigh

       evidence and judge witness credibility; tasks we cannot undertake. See Wysocki,

       18 N.E.3d at 603. These findings are adequately supported by the record and

       are not clearly erroneous.

       Finding 3(k)

[13]   Next Jimmy and Cheryl challenge Finding 3(k), which reads:

               k. Until Jimmy and Cheryl McIntosh asked Nilah Simmons to
               take Roberta McIntosh to sign the Quit Claim Deed, no one had
               been informed that Jimmy and Cheryl were currently trying to
               get Roberta McIntosh to sign the property over to them.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 158–59. At bottom, Jimmy and Cheryl challenge the

       finding because it “implies that the fact that Roberta was going to transfer the

       property to Jimmy and Cheryl was kept secret.” Appellant’s Br. at 16.

[14]   Although Jimmy testified that he informed all his siblings about his and

       Cheryl’s efforts to have Roberta sign over her property to them, several other

       family members testified they had never talked with Jimmy about his plans.

       The trial court was not required to accept Jimmy’s self-serving testimony. And

       again, we may not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility for ourselves.

       This finding is not clearly erroneous.

       Finding 3(n)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023     Page 7 of 14
[15]   Finding 3(n) provides:

               n. Jimmy and Cheryl McIntosh prevented other family members
               from visiting Roberta McIntosh privately.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 159. Although Nilah met with Roberta privately,

       several other family members testified they could not speak one-on-one with

       Roberta when they visited her. Tr. Vol. 2 at 68, 73. Because this finding has

       factual support in the record, we cannot say it is clearly erroneous.

       Finding 3(o)

[16]   Lastly, Jimmy and Cheryl challenge Finding 3(o), which reads:

               o. In January 2021, Jimmy and Cheryl McIntosh moved out of
               Roberta McIntosh’s residence. Just two (2) months after
               recording the Quit Claim Deed.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 159. In effect, Jimmy and Cheryl argue the record

       shows they “did not leave voluntarily but under threat of arrest.” Appellant’s Br.

       at 17. Regardless, the trial court’s finding is silent on the reason for Jimmy and

       Cheryl’s departure. At its core, the finding has factual support in the record.

       Jimmy recorded the Quitclaim Deed in November 2020, and he and his wife

       concede they moved out of Roberta’s home in January 2021. See Appellant’s Br.

       at 17. This finding is not clearly erroneous.

       2. The Trial Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard;
       Nonetheless, the Trial Court’s Findings Adequately Support
       the Judgment

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023     Page 8 of 14
       A. The Correct Standard Under the SCPA is a Preponderance of the Evidence

[17]   Jimmy and Cheryl contend the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard

       when it found they violated the SCPA. More specifically, Jimmy and Cheryl

       argue it is inappropriate to apply the burden-shifting paradigm used in some

       undue influence cases to private actions under the SCPA because the SCPA

       contains damage and penalty provisions not available in a common-law undue

       influence action. See Appellant’s Br. at 19. We agree.

[18]   Although we “defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to

       conclusions of law.” Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210

       (Ind. 2000). Rather, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.

       Town of Linden, 204 N.E.3d at 234. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies

       the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Wysocki, 18 N.E.3d at 604.

[19]   Effective July 2013, the SCPA is designed to “simplify, clarify, and modernize

       the law concerning the ownership, control, and use of property or assets of

       senior consumers” and to “protect senior consumers from financial exploitation

       from persons, who by deception or intimidation, obtain control over the

       property or assets of a senior consumer.” 3 I.C. § 24-4.6-6-2(b). A person

       commits financial exploitation of a senior consumer—thereby violating the

       SCPA—when the person “knowingly and by deception or intimidation obtains

       3
        Under the SCPA, an individual who is at least sixty years old qualifies as a “senior consumer.” I.C. § 24-
       4.6-6-3(5). Roberta—around ninety years old when the alleged violation occurred—is a senior consumer.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                             Page 9 of 14
       control over the property of a senior consumer or illegally uses the assets or

       resources of a senior consumer.” 4 I.C. § 24-4.6-6-4(a) (emphases added).

       Relevant to the claim here, Indiana Code Section 24-4.6-6-3(2) defines

       “intimidation” as “the conduct or communication by a person directed toward

       a senior consumer informing or implying to the senior consumer that the senior

       consumer will be deprived of food and nutrition, shelter, prescribed medication,

       or medical care and treatment if the senior consumer does not comply with the

       person’s demands.”

[20]   A senior consumer who is the victim of “financial exploitation” may bring a

       civil action against the person or persons who commit the unlawful act. See

       I.C. § 24-4.6-6-5(a). To recover, the senior consumer must prove—by a

       preponderance of the evidence—a person financially exploited him or her. I.C. §

       24-4.6-6-5(e).

[21]   Here, the trial court relied, in part, on common law undue influence principles

       to determine Jimmy and Cheryl violated the SCPA. Citing Carlson v. Warren,

       the trial court found Jimmy and Cheryl each had a confidential relationship

       with Roberta as a matter of law. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 168–69 (citing 878

       4
         Indiana Code Section 24-4.6-6-4(b) provides: “The illegal use of the assets or resources of a senior consumer
       includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of those assets or resources by undue influence, breach of a
       fiduciary relationship, fraud, deception, extortion, intimidation, or use of the assets or resources contrary to
       law.” (emphasis added). The Petition to Quiet Title, however, did not allege Jimmy and Cheryl illegally
       used Roberta’s assets or resources. Instead, the Petition contends Jimmy and Cheryl violated the SPCA by
       obtaining control over Roberta’s property by intimidation. Therefore, reliance on terms included in the
       statutory definition of illegal use, like undue influence, is misplaced.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                                Page 10 of 14
       N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Going further, the trial court presumed

       Jimmy and Cheryl exerted undue influence over Roberta. Id. at 169 (“[W]hen a

       [confidential relationship as a matter of law] exists and the fiduciary benefits

       from a questioned transaction, a presumption of undue influence arises and the

       burden shifts to the fiduciary to rebut the presumption.”) (quoting Carlson, 878

       N.E.2d at 851). Presuming undue influence, the trial court shifted the burden

       to Jimmy and Cheryl to prove by clear and convincing evidence the Quitclaim

       Deed was “completed in a fair and equitable manner.” Id. at 170. Concluding

       Jimmy and Cheryl did not meet their burden, the trial court invalidated the

       Quitclaim Deed, finding it was obtained in violation of the SCPA. We believe

       the trial court clearly erred by shifting the burden of proof to Jimmy and

       Cheryl.

[22]   Roberta and Nilah did not bring a common-law undue influence action.

       Instead, they alleged a violation of the SCPA. And Indiana Code Section 24-

       4.6-6-5(e) sets forth the burden of proof applicable to a private action brought

       under the SCPA—a preponderance of the evidence. By shifting the burden to

       Jimmy and Cheryl to rebut a presumption of undue influence by clear and

       convincing evidence, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and clearly

       erred. See Wysocki, 18 N.E.3d at 604.

       B. Applying the Correct Legal Standard, the Trial Court’s Findings Support Its
       Judgment

[23]   Although the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to make some of its

       conclusions of law, our review is not complete. Rather, we must determine

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023     Page 11 of 14
       whether the trial court’s findings support its judgment that Jimmy and Cheryl

       violated the SCPA under the appropriate burden of proof. Stated another way,

       based on the allegations in the Petition to Quiet Title, Roberta’s claim under the

       SCPA succeeds if she can prove—by a preponderance of the evidence—Jimmy

       and Cheryl knowingly and by intimidation obtained control over her property.

[24]   The evidence presented at trial established Roberta was ninety-two years old

       and suffered from dementia. The trial court heard testimony about two

       instances of Jimmy yelling in Roberta’s face. During one instance, Jimmy

       stood over Roberta while she was seated and threatened to put her in a nursing

       home if she did not sign over her property to him and Cheryl. Nilah, a witness

       to this incident, described this mother-son interaction as “pretty scary” and

       noted Roberta was “very stiff in her chair trying to get away from [Jimmy], and

       [Jimmy] wouldn’t back away from her.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 51. The trial court’s

       findings support a judgment that Jimmy and Cheryl obtained control over

       Roberta’s property knowingly and by informing or implying to Roberta she

       would be deprived of her shelter and the care she received from Jimmy and

       Cheryl if she did not comply with their wishes—i.e., by intimidation. See I.C. §

       24-4.6-6-3(2). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Jimmy and Cheryl

       violated the SCPA. 5

       5
        Upon finding Jimmy and Cheryl violated the SCPA, the trial court ordered the pair to pay Roberta’s court
       costs and attorney’s fees. Indiana Code Section 24-4.6-6-5 sets forth several remedies a trial court may
       provide a senior consumer who is a victim of financial exploitation. Among the options available are

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                         Page 12 of 14
       3. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Validating the Warranty
       Deed

[25]   Jimmy and Cheryl contend the trial court erred by finding the October

       Warranty Deed valid because it was recorded before Roberta’s Power of

       Attorney. Essentially, Jimmy and Cheryl contend substantial compliance with

       the requirements of Indiana Code Section 30-5-3-3 is not sufficient.

[26]   Generally, an attorney in fact may act under a power of attorney without

       recording the power of attorney with the county recorder. See I.C. § 30-5-3-3(a).

       But an attorney in fact must record a power of attorney authorizing the

       execution of a document that must be recorded—e.g., a deed—before presenting

       that document for recording. I.C. § 30-5-3-3(b). A county recorder may not

       accept a document for recording if the document was “executed . . . and is

       presented . . . by an attorney in fact whose power of attorney is unrecorded.”

       I.C. § 30-5-3-3(c). And a document presented by an attorney in fact for

       recording must “reference the book and page or instrument number where the

       instrument creating the power of attorney is recorded before the document may

       be presented by the attorney in fact.” I.C. § 30-5-3-3(e).

[27]   The parties agree these statutory requirements were not met. Roberta’s Power

       of Attorney naming Nilah as her attorney in fact was not recorded until April

       19, 2021—about six months after Nilah first attempted to record the Power of

       reasonable attorney’s fees. See I.C. § 24-4.6-6-5(d). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s monetary
       judgment in the amount of $8,050 in favor of Roberta against Jimmy and Cheryl.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023                             Page 13 of 14
       Attorney and Warranty Deed. But what more was Nilah to do? Nilah brought

       both the Power of Attorney and the Warranty Deed to the Jennings County

       Recorder’s Office on October 9, 2020. Nilah presented both documents to the

       Recorder’s Office and left believing she had taken all the steps necessary to have

       each document properly recorded. Once Attorney Kage informed her that the

       Recorder had failed to properly record the Power of Attorney, Nilah returned to

       the Recorder’s Office within days to correct the error. As the trial court found,

       Nilah “performed all acts necessary to appropriately record the Warranty Deed

       and continued to fulfill her duties as Power of Attorney once notified that there

       had been a mistake.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 166. The trial court also

       explained the Recorder’s Office failed to properly record the Power of Attorney

       due to “oversight, mistake, or error.” Id. at 167. Put another way, we discern

       no fault by Nilah and conclude—based on the circumstances of this case—she

       took all necessary steps to comply with the statutory requirements. Thus, the

       trial court did not err by validating the Warranty Deed dated October 9, 2020.

       Conclusion
[28]   Although the trial court, in part, applied the incorrect legal standard, sufficient

       findings support the trial court’s determination that Jimmy and Cheryl violated

       the SCPA. And the trial court did not err by validating the Warranty Deed

       executed October 9, 2020. Accordingly, we affirm.

[29]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Felix, J., concur.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2522 | October 30, 2023      Page 14 of 14