Court Opinion

ID: 9915170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 18:07:24.482221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:43.808159
License: Public Domain

J-A29042-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRADLEY FERRIS                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 90 WDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                 Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0009445-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 4, 2024

       Bradley Ferris (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed     after    the   trial court convicted him    of simple    assault and

strangulation.1 We affirm.

       The trial court recounted the facts presented at trial as follows:

       The Commonwealth presented its case through two witnesses.
       The victim, Matthew Miller [(Miller or complainant)], testified that
       he had been friends with Appellant for approximately ten years,
       but their friendship had ended prior to the incident on September
       19, 2021. N.T., 9/19/22, at 20. Around 5:00 p.m. on that date,
       Miller arrived at Tequila Cowboy, a bar in Pittsburgh. Appellant
       was also there, and Miller saw [Appellant] immediately upon
       entering. Id. at 22. Appellant approached Miller and a verbal
       altercation ensued wherein Appellant yelled obscenities at Miller.
       Id. at 23. After a few minutes, Miller walked away and went to
       the outside patio area. Id. at 24. While out on the patio[,] Miller
       felt an arm wrap around his neck in what he described as a choke
       hold. Id. at 24-25. As the [assailant] was behind him, Miller was
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2718(a)(1).
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       unable to see who it was, but he heard Appellant say, “I will
       fucking kill you if you hang out with my cousin again.” Id. at 25.
       Miller testified that Appellant kept his arm around [Miller’s neck
       for approximately] five to ten seconds, during which time [Miller]
       felt increasing pressure. Id. at 26. [Miller] started having trouble
       breathing and when Appellant released his hold, Miller collapsed
       onto the ground, saw stars, and lost control of his bowels. Id.
       When Miller looked over his shoulder he saw Appellant, who
       continued to yell obscenities and threats to kill him. Id. at 26-27.
       Appellant eventually left the area and Miller reported the incident
       to uniformed City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Gabriel Figuero[a],
       who was working off-duty security at the bar. Officer Figuero[a],
       who was called as a witness [at trial] by Appellant, testified that
       he reviewed surveillance footage[2] from inside the bar which
       captured Appellant walk up behind Miller and place his arm around
       [Miller’s] neck in a choke hold position. Appellant then lifted Miller
       up while his arm was still wrapped around Miller’s neck[;
       Appellant] held [Miller] upwards of five seconds before dropping
       him to the ground. N.T., 9/26/22, at 19-20. Officer Figuero[a]
       did not observe any injuries [to Miller. Id.] at 19[.] Miller
       complained of soreness to his neck that lasted a few hours but
       otherwise denied any physical injury. N.T., 9/19/22, at 31.
       [Miller] did not seek any medical treatment. Id. at 32.

              Victoria Norkevicus is Appellant’s cousin and testified for the
       Commonwealth that the weekend before this incident[,] she had
       gone for a ride on Miller’s family boat. Id. at 41. Although she
       was not at Tequila Cowboy on September 19, 2021, she was
       familiar with the incident because she received text messages
       from Appellant around 7:00 p.m. that evening referencing [the]
       boat ride and that Miller was just gagging. Norkevicus asked
       [Appellant] if he did something to Miller because she went on his
       boat[;] Appellant replied that he did. He also texted Norkevicus
       [stating Appellant had] told Miller that if he contacted
       [Appellant’s] family[, Appellant] would kill him. Id. at 39.

             At trial, Appellant did not deny the altercation with Miller or
       the text messages[,] but rejected that [Appellant’s actions were]
       intentional or done with any intent to harm [Miller]. N.T.,
       9/26/22, at 6-8, 11-17. However, [Appellant] continually testified
____________________________________________

2 The trial court explained the video “footage was not preserved for trial[.]”

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/23, at 7.

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      that he had no specific recollection of exactly how he physically
      contacted Miller. Id. at 11-17. [Appellant] explained that Miller
      antagonized him prior to the altercation by referencing a suicide
      attempt by Appellant, and that this caused [Appellant] to go into
      a rage. Id. at 5-7, 9. [Appellant] explained that he understood
      he acted poorly and left the bar after realizing that he was wrong.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/23, at 3-5 (footnote added; footnote in original

omitted; citations and some capitalization modified).

      On September 26, 2022, the trial court found Appellant guilty of

strangulation and simple assault. The court immediately sentenced Appellant

to one year of probation for strangulation, and a concurrent one year of

probation for simple assault.

      Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial on October

6, 2022. Appellant claimed his convictions were against the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence. Appellant filed a supplemental post-sentence motion

on October 31, 2022, expanding on his weight and sufficiency claims. The

trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 9, 2023.

Appellant timely filed this appeal. Appellant and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents four issues for review:

      I.    Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant]
            of strangulation where the Commonwealth failed to prove,
            beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] knowingly or
            intentionally impeded the breathing of complainant?

      II.   Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant]
            of simple assault where the Commonwealth failed to prove,
            beyond a reasonable doubt, that complainant suffered
            “bodily injury?”

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      III.    Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant]
              of simple assault where the Commonwealth failed to prove
              that he intended to cause “bodily injury” to complainant?

      IV.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
              [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion for a new trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization modified).

      Appellant first claims the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence to prove all elements of strangulation beyond a reasonable doubt.

See id. at 16-20. Specifically, Appellant argues that the mens rea element is

absent.      See id. at 18-20.    Appellant concedes he “put his arm around

[c]omplainant’s neck,” which caused complainant to collapse to the ground

and “see stars.” Id. at 19. Nonetheless, Appellant claims

      [h]ad it been [Appellant’s] goal to cut off [c]omplainant’s
      breathing, he surely would have kept his arm around
      [complainant’s] neck for a substantially longer period of time.
      However, [Appellant] let go after a handful of seconds at most
      because he did not want to physically injure his decades-long
      friend.

Id. at 20.

      The Commonwealth counters the evidence was sufficient to prove all

elements of strangulation because Appellant demonstrated his “intent to

impede [Miller’s] breathing.” Commonwealth Brief at 15. According to the

Commonwealth,

      Appellant essentially minimizes and/or ignores evidence
      demonstrating that he squeezed [Miller’s] neck - while lifting him
      off the ground - long enough for [Miller] to not only have difficulty
      breathing, but also caused him to see stars and lose control of his

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      bowels. … [A]ppellant threatened to kill [Miller] if he hung out
      again with [Appellant’s] cousin.

Id. at 17-18. The Commonwealth emphasizes that Miller’s “account of events

that occurred on the patio were corroborated by Officer Figueroa’s review of

the surveillance video.” Id. at 16.

      We evaluate Appellant’s sufficiency claim mindful of the following:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. Finally, the finder of
      fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight
      of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations

and ellipses omitted). The “uncorroborated testimony of a single witness [can

be] sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that

testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged

crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      The Crimes Code provides         a “person commits the         offense of

strangulation if the person knowingly or intentionally impedes the breathing

or circulation of the blood of another person by … applying pressure to the

throat or neck[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1). “Infliction of a physical injury

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to a victim shall not be an element of the offense. The lack of physical injury

to a victim shall not be a defense in a prosecution under this section.” Id. §

2718(b). The Crimes Code defines “intentionally” as the actor’s “conscious

object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.” Id. §

302(b)(1)(i). The Code defines “knowingly” as the actor being “aware that

his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist.”          Id. §

302(b)(2)(i). “Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and

it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant circumstances.”

Commonwealth v. Horlick, 296 A.3d 60, 63 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation and

brackets omitted). “[A]s there is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s state

of mind, intent is often established through circumstantial evidence alone.”

Id.

      This Court confronted a similar challenge to a non-jury conviction of

strangulation in Horlick. There, the defendant and his paramour (the victim)

had a physical altercation in a hotel room. Id. at 61-62. Defendant punched

the victim in the head and ribs and got on top of her after she fell to the

ground. Id. Defendant “placed both hands around [the victim’s] neck and

applied pressure which made it difficult for her to breathe.”       Id. at 62.

According to the victim, defendant’s “choking caused her to experience ringing

in her ears, she saw stars, urinated herself, and lost consciousness for a brief

second.”   Id.   The trial court found defendant guilty of strangulation and

simple assault and not guilty of aggravated assault. Id. On appeal, defendant

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challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his strangulation

conviction, claiming “the evidence is insufficient to prove he intentionally or

knowingly restricted [the victim’s] breathing.” Id.

      This Court held the evidence was sufficient to prove the mens rea

required for strangulation. We stated:

             As [defendant] concedes in his brief, his squeezing of [the
      victim’s] neck occurred while he was assaulting [the victim].
      Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to
      infer that [defendant] applied pressure on [the victim’s] neck with
      the intent to restrict her airway. We cannot accept [defendant’s]
      assertion that the finding of intent was based solely on “suspicion
      and surmise.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 (quoting Commonwealth
      v. Bausewine, 46 A.2d 491, 493 (Pa. 1946)). The mere fact of
      squeezing a person’s neck is well understood to impede
      that person’s breathing; this fact alone is enough for a fact-
      finder to reasonably infer that the result is known or
      intended. To be clear, we are not providing for strict liability.
      While this evidence is sufficient for a fact-finder to infer intent, the
      fact-finder may conclude other circumstances negate the
      reasonable inference about the defendant’s state of mind.

             Further, [defendant’s] release of his grip once [the victim]
      began to lose consciousness does not necessarily refute that
      [defendant] intended to restrict her airway.        The fact that
      [defendant] quickly regretted his actions does not negate the
      conclusion that he acted intentionally. The evidence was certainly
      sufficient to support the trial court’s verdict.

            Moreover, we emphasize that the statute does not set forth
      the point at which the victim’s breathing must be restricted to
      prove strangulation. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1). Here, the
      evidence established that [defendant] impeded [the victim’s]
      breathing by applying pressure to her neck and throat.

Horlick, 296 A.3d at 63 (emphasis added; citations modified).

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       Instantly, Miller testified that he unexpectedly encountered Appellant3

inside a bar and shouted obscenities at Miller. N.T., 9/19/22, at 23-24. Miller

“went to the outside patio of [the bar] to remove [himself] from that

situation.”   Id. at 24.     Appellant then approached Miller from behind and

placed Miller in a chokehold, “applying serious pressure to [Miller’s] throat.”

Id. at 25.     Miller confirmed that Appellant’s choking him caused him to

struggle to breathe. Id. at 26. Although Miller was unsure how long Appellant

maintained the chokehold, “[i]t was long enough to make me collapse and

have to recover after [Appellant] let go.” Id. During the assault, Appellant

threatened Miller: “I will fucking kill you if you hang out with my cousin again.”

Id. at 24. Miller testified that when Appellant released him: “I collapsed to

the ground and started to see stars and unfortunately, I couldn’t control my

bowels … because of the pressure applied.” Id. at 26. Miller stated that the

chokehold caused pain in his neck for a few hours. Id. at 28. Miller never

sought medical treatment. Id.

       Officer Figueroa testified that he reviewed surveillance video from the

bar that depicted Appellant’s assault of Miller:

       I observed [Appellant] walk up behind Mr. Miller and place his arm
       around him and begin choking. [Appellant] had a chokehold on
       [Miller]. [Appellant] kind of lifted [Miller] up with a chokehold and
       then dropped him.

____________________________________________

3 Miller stated that he and Appellant had been best friends for years until they

“had a falling out.” Id. at 20.

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N.T., 9/26/22, at 20. Officer Figueroa stated that Appellant choked Miller for

“three to five seconds, if that.” Id.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove the

mens rea of strangulation beyond a reasonable doubt. As in Horlick, “the

evidence established [Appellant] impeded [Miller’s] breathing by applying

pressure to [his] neck and throat.”       Horlick, 296 A.3d at 63.        “[I]t was

reasonable for the trial court to infer [Appellant] applied pressure on [Miller’s]

neck with the intent to restrict [his] airway.”         Id.   Further, Appellant’s

repeated threats to kill Miller during and after the assault provided additional

circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s intent.      Accordingly, Appellant’s first

issue lacks merit.

      In   his   related   second   and   third   issues,   Appellant   claims   the

Commonwealth failed to prove all elements of simple assault, and that

Appellant attempted to cause “bodily injury.” See Appellant’s Brief at 21-24.

Appellant emphasizes that Miller never sought medical treatment. Id. at 22.

Appellant further argues “although [c]omplainant experienced some pain, he

testified that it lasted only ‘for two or three hours, up until [complainant] went

to sleep that night.’” Id. (quoting N.T., 9/19/22, at 28). Appellant compares

this case to the facts presented in Commonwealth v. Kirkwood, 520 A.2d

451 (Pa. Super. 1987). See Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.

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       In Kirkwood, the defendant, while dancing at a tavern, approached

another dancing patron, “grabbed her by the arm and had begun to swing her

violently around the dance floor.” Kirkwood, 520 A.2d at 452. Defendant

ignored the patron’s pleas to stop, and “[t]he incident, she said, lasted

approximately forty seconds and left her with bruises and cut marks on her

arms.”    Id. at 452-53; see also id. at 453 (defendant’s unwilling dance

partner “testified[] she suffered pain in her arms and her right knee for a short

period of time thereafter.”). A jury convicted defendant of simple assault, and

defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. at 452, 453-

54. On appeal, this Court reversed. We explained:

       We conclude that th[e] evidence was insufficient to establish
       either the “physical impairment” or the “substantial pain” which is
       necessary to prove the crime of criminal assault as defined in 18
       Pa.C.S. § 2701. Temporary aches and pains brought about by
       strenuous, even violent, dancing are an inadequate basis for
       imposing criminal liability upon a dance partner for assault.

Id. at 454.

       Here, the Commonwealth argues it adduced sufficient evidence to prove

all   elements   of   simple   assault    beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.    See

Commonwealth Brief at 20-23. The Commonwealth states,

       [A]ppellant’s violent act of placing [Miller] in a chokehold and
       squeezing cannot be viewed as a “trivial” social contact like the
       dancing, albeit aggressive, in Kirkwood. Thus, this Court may
       agree with the trial court’s finding that [Miller’s] loss of oxygen,
       collapse and pain to his throat constituted bodily injury sufficient
       to support his simple assault conviction.

Id. at 22.

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          A person commits simple assault if he “attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 2301.

          Under section 2701(a)(1), a victim need not actually suffer bodily
          injury; the attempt to inflict bodily injury may be sufficient. This
          intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
          incident if a specific intent to cause bodily injury may reasonably
          be inferred therefrom.

In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d 767, 770 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

          The trial court in this case explained:

          Evidence demonstrated that Miller suffered bodily injury in that he
          became disoriented from loss of oxygen, collapsed, and
          experienced pain to his throat for several hours after the assault.
          That Miller failed to receive medical treatment is not dispositive to
          a finding of bodily injury. See In re M.H., 758 A.2d 1249, 1252
          (Pa. Super. 2006) [(rejecting argument that the failure to receive
          medical treatment after alleged assault precludes a finding of
          bodily injury)]; Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195,
          1196 (Pa. Super. 1994).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/23, at 7. We agree.

          Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove all elements of

simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt.           Contrary to Appellant’s claim,

Kirkwood is unavailing.         Appellant’s second and third issues do not merit

relief.

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       In his final issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion

in denying his post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence.

See Appellant’s Brief at 25-29.

       To prevail on this challenge, Appellant must establish that the evidence

supporting his conviction is “so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict

shocks the conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d

257, 265 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a weight

claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question

of    whether     the    verdict   is   against    the   weight   of   the   evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation

omitted).

       Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
       the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
       consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
       judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether the
       verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Id. (citation omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was

not against the weight of evidence….” Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d

80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis omitted).               “The weight of the evidence is

exclusively for the finder of fact[,] who is free to believe all, none, or some of

the    evidence    and     to   determine    the    credibility   of   the   witnesses.”

Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

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      Appellant asserts,

      based on a careful review of the entire record, the trial court’s
      application of such great weight to the Commonwealth’s
      inferential evidence of intent, in light of the overwhelming direct
      evidence to the contrary, shocks one’s sense of justice. Here, the
      evidence showed only that following a verbal argument[,
      Appellant] lost his cool and put his arm around complainant’s neck
      for not more than five seconds. Complainant did not seek any
      medical attention….

Appellant’s Brief at 28 (some capitalization modified).

      The Commonwealth argues the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in rejecting Appellant’s weight challenge. See Commonwealth Brief

at 24-29. According to the Commonwealth,

      Appellant … completely ignores the well-settled principle that
      assessing credibility is exclusively for the fact finder, and
      essentially asks this Court to set aside the trial court’s credibility
      determinations and reweigh the evidence, which it is not
      permitted to do.

Id. at 26-27 (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 643 (Pa. Super.

2017) (where “[a]ppellant essentially asks us to reassess the credibility of the

eyewitnesses and reweigh the testimony and evidence presented at trial,” this

Court “cannot and will not do so.”)).

      The trial court explained its rejection of Appellant’s weight claim:

            The court found the Commonwealth witnesses and evidence
      credible. Miller provided detailed testimony, which was
      corroborated during the defense case by Officer
      Figuero[a], when he testified to the surveillance footage
      that captured the assault. Likewise, Victoria Norkevicus[’s]
      testimony relative to Appellant’s motive and admission was
      supported by the text messages sent by Appellant.

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             Again, Appellant did not dispute the altercation at trial but
      refuted that his actions were intentional. Importantly, as it related
      to a weight challenge, Appellant made this assertion despite his
      inability to recall how he assaulted Miller. Instead, [Appellant]
      offered that he simply reacted poorly after being provoked by
      Miller. The court did not find Appellant credible. … Appellant
      was able to recall the events leading up to the physical altercation
      but repeatedly testified that he could not remember his actions
      that resulted in him being charged for these crimes. Despite this
      faulty memory, he asked the court, as fact finder, to find that his
      actions were not intentional.

            Thus, the court’s rejection of the defense and the credibility
      afforded to the Commonwealth witnesses and evidence in support
      of the convictions should not “shock” anyone’s sense of justice ….

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/23, at 9 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified).

      The record supports the trial court’s reasoning. A factfinder is generally

“free to believe some, all, or none of the Commonwealth’s evidence” and “free

to resolve inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony in either party’s

favor.”   Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1078 (Pa. 2017).

Appellant improperly asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the

factfinder, which we cannot do.         See Miller, supra; Talbert, supra;

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A new

trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must

have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of

witnesses.” (citation omitted)). As the trial court did not abuse its discretion,

Appellant’s final issue lacks merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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FILED: 1/4/2024

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