Court Opinion

ID: 9769717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:59:39.621874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:07.190839
License: Public Domain

*318OWEN, Justice,
joined by GONZALEZ and HECHT, Justices,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with most of the Court’s opinion. I cannot agree, however, that the provision of the divorce decree directing Mary Ann Acker to pay $50.00 per month as her share of the cost of insurance is unenforceable by an order of contempt.
The provision at issue says:
MARYANN ACKER is ORDERED AND DECREED to pay $50.00 per month as her cost of insuring the child to SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER beginning on the 1st day of June and $50.00 per month on the 1st day of each and every month thereafter.
The hearing on the divorce was held in May 1990. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, the divorce decree containing this provision was not signed until November 1990. The Court concludes, and I agree, that the trial court erred in holding Mary Ann Acker in contempt for failing to make payments from and after December 1990. But the trial court could hold Acker in contempt for failing to make payments on June 1, 1991 or on the first of any month thereafter. The Court erroneously concludes that because there is no year after “the 1st day of June,” the provision is ambiguous and too uncertain to support a finding of contempt under any set of circumstances.
I strongly suspect that if the divorce decree had been signed in May 1990, instead of November 1990, the Court would have little difficulty in concluding that Acker was unambiguously required to pay $50.00 per month for insurance on June 1 of 1990 and each month thereafter. The fact that the decree was signed in November should not affect the analysis.
The next June 1st after November 1990 was June 1st of 1991. There can be no confusion or dispute about this. The order unambiguously provides that payments are to commence on June 1st and are to continue each and every month thereafter. The parties and the trial court may well have intended for the provision to take effect on June 1 of 1990, since the divorce hearing was held in May 1990, and they could have anticipated that a signed decree would be in place by June 1 of that year. However, even if that were the subjective intent, the ordinary meaning of the unambiguous language used in the decree controls. See City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1968) (stating that when there is an unambiguous writing, objective, not subjective, intent controls)
Courts have had no difficulty in enforcing child support provisions that adequately advise a parent of his or her responsibilities. In Ex parte Malone, 788 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), the divorce decree directed the father to pay $20.00 per week beginning on November 9. No year was specified. The court of appeals correctly concluded that this adequately informed the relator of what he must do and when he must do it. Id. at 411-12. The Court attempts to distinguish Malone by reasoning that the order at issue in that case was signed on November 9, 1973 and provided that payment was to begin on “November 9.” This, the Court says, supports the trial court’s conclusion that payment was to begin “immediately.” 788 S.W.2d at 411. I see no distinction between “immediately” and the first June 1 after the decree was signed.
Other decisions upholding orders of contempt in the face of claims of ambiguity include Ex parte Tanner, 904 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (rejecting argument that child support order was vague because it did not specify location for payment); Ex parte Mathis, 822 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1991, orig. proceeding) (rejecting argument of ambiguity in location for child support payments, noting that relator was not held in contempt for failing to make payments at proper place, but for failing to make payments at all); Ex parte Graham, 787 S.W.2d 141, 142-43 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (holding that temporary divorce order directing husband to make monthly mortgage payments starting in September could not be construed to have more than one meaning even though no payee, due date, or amount was specified, *319because husband would know details of required payments).
The Court’s reasoning that there may have been some basis for doubt about Acker’s obligation is implausible. The Court says:
[T]he court rendering the decree could have concluded, based on its overall allocation of responsibilities between the parents, that Sherman should bear the entire insurance burden for some period of time, with Mary Ann’s obligation commencing in June of some future year.
Ante at 317.
The Court is quick to point out that “the record does not indicate that such is the case.” Ante at 317. I submit that this explanation of why the decree is ambiguous is “beyond the realm of reason,” to use the words of the Court. Id. When the provisions of the decree regarding insurance are considered in their entirety, it is readily apparent that Sherman was never to “bear the entire insurance burden for some period of time.” Id. The respective rights and obligations of the parents were specifically allocated in the decree:
SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER is ORDERED AND DECREED to keep and maintain at all times in full force and effect the medical health insurance coverage that now insures the parties’ child through insurance certificate number 587-30-1741-1 as issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, or successor company, on its group plan with Bendix Aerospace Company, or through such group plan as is available through other employment or other insurance provider. SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER is ORDERED AND DECREED to have the child covered as a dependent on his health care plan and MARY ANN ACKER is ORDERED AND DECREED to pay $50.00 per month as her cost of insuring the child to SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER beginning on the 1st day of June and $50.00 per month on the 1st day of each and every month thereafter. IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that MARY ANN ACKER pay sixty percent (60%) of any unpaid or non-covered medical/dental procedures, consultations, and/or evaluations, not covered under SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER’S group health care plan. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that SHERMAN LLOYD ACK-ER is to pay forty percent (40%) of any unpaid or non-covered medical/dental procedures, consultations, and/or evaluations, not covered under his group health care plan.
SHERMAN LLOYD ACKER is ORDERED AND DECREED to furnish to MARY ANN ACKER a true and correct copy of such major medical and health insurance policy or certificate and schedule of benefits as well as an identification card showing proof of insurance eligibility for the child, within fifteen (15) days following the signing of this Decree of Divorce, by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Even when there is some ambiguity in a divorce decree, courts have upheld contempt orders when parents disregarded their obligations entirely. See Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 757-58 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding) (rejecting ambiguity argument when child support order stated two different amounts because “[a] relator who knows with certainty that he is required to pay either $250 a month or $112.50 twice a month can be punished for contempt for choosing to ignore the order completely”); Ex paite Parrott, 723 S.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, orig. proceeding) (rejecting argument that child support order was ambiguous because it did not name to whom to make the payments); Ex parte Crawford, 684 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, orig. proceeding) (upholding contempt from child support order that contained different amounts because relator was aware that he was obligated to pay at least the lesser amount and ignored the order completely). Acker made no insurance payments at all under the decree. Even if she was uncertain in her own mind about whether her obligations commenced on June 1 of 1990 or June 1 of 1991, she knew that those obligations began on June 1, 1991 at the latest. She made no insurance payments for almost six years.
There is no doubt that in crafting decrees, the parties and courts should be careful to include entire dates. But when, as in this *320case, the obligation is reasonably clear from the face of the decree, the plain, ordinary meaning of a court order should be enforced. The Court’s decision allows parents like Acker, who know full well their obligations, to shirk those obligations with impunity.