Court Opinion

ID: 9959106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 17:01:18.329571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.842133
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8054     Document: 010111029838      Date Filed: 04/10/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         April 10, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  JAKE STANLEY DEWILDE,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-8054
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00003-SWS)
  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE                                     (D. Wyo.)
  UNITED STATES; DIRECTOR OF
  BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
  FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Jake Stanley DeWilde appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se

 Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the transfer or

 possession of machineguns. The district court dismissed the action for lack of

 jurisdiction, concluding that DeWilde lacked standing. Alternatively, the district

 court concluded that even if DeWilde had standing, the action should be dismissed

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8054    Document: 010111029838        Date Filed: 04/10/2024    Page: 2

 for failure to state a claim because machineguns are not protected by the Second

 Amendment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district

 court’s dismissal for lack of standing. We express no opinion on the merits of the

 Second Amendment claim.

                                            I

       This suit began when DeWilde attempted to represent a trust as a pro se

 non-attorney. He filed an initial complaint “Individually and as Trustee of the

 DeWilde Arms Trust.” R. at 5; see id. at 6, para. 3. In that capacity, he alleged that

 he applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) to make

 an M16 machinegun, but the ATF denied the trust’s application, citing § 922(o). See

 id. at 11, para. 19. Attached to the complaint is the application form submitted by

 DeWilde on behalf of the trust and denied by the ATF. It states that the application

 is filed on behalf of a “Trust or Legal Entity.” Id. at 15. The applicant on the form is

 identified as “DeWilde Arms Trust,” id., and DeWilde signed the application as

 “Jake DeWilde, Trustee,” id. at 16. According to DeWilde, § 922(o) violates his

 Second Amendment rights because he “desires to own an M16 machinegun for all

 lawful purposes, including defense of hearth and home and militia functions.” R. at

 11, para. 23. He requested a declaratory judgment that § 922(o) is unconstitutional

 and a mandatory injunction requiring the ATF to approve the trust’s application to

 manufacture a machinegun. See id., para. 25.

       The government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things,

 that DeWilde lacked authority to represent the trust as a pro se non-attorney, even

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 though he alleged he is the trustee. See id. at 54-55 (citing United States v. Lain,

 773 F. App’x 476, 477 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding that trusts are

 artificial legal entities existing independently of their trustees and may appear in

 court only through licensed counsel, “[s]o if the trustee is not a licensed attorney, he

 or she cannot represent the trust”)).

        To remedy the pleading defect, DeWilde amended the complaint. He dropped

 the trust as a party-plaintiff and instituted the action solely in his individual

 capacity—not as a trustee. See id. at 73. The rest of his allegations and demands for

 relief were substantively identical to those in the original complaint. The

 government then moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

        The district court raised standing sua sponte and concluded DeWilde failed to

 allege an injury in fact. The district court observed that he relied on two factual

 allegations to establish his standing: 1) he submitted the ATF application to make an

 M16 machinegun and 2) he desired to own an M16 machinegun. The court rejected

 his reliance on the first allegation, reasoning that the trust—not DeWilde—applied to

 the ATF to manufacture a machinegun, and DeWilde signed the application as a

 trustee—not in his individual capacity—yet the trust and the trustee were no longer

 parties to the amended complaint. The court pointed out that DeWilde filed the

 amended complaint solely in his individual capacity, he never applied to the ATF to

 make a machinegun in his individual capacity, nor did the ATF deny him an

 application. As for DeWilde’s second factual allegation—his desire to own a

 machinegun—the court ruled that the allegation was “too indefinite to establish a

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 particularized injury and insufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact.” Id. at 286-87.

 The court explained that DeWilde sought to invalidate a criminal statute prohibiting

 the possession and transfer of machineguns, but he did not allege that he owns,

 possesses, or transfers machineguns such that he faced a credible threat of

 prosecution. Instead, he merely alleged a general grievance that was insufficient to

 confer standing.

                                             II

       We review questions of standing de novo. Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United

 States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish

 standing, and a plaintiff must support each element of standing “in the same way as

 any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the

 manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”

 Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). Because the district court resolved the standing issue at

 the pleading stage, we, like the district court, “must accept as true all material

 allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the

 complaining party.” Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013);

 see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage,

 general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may

 suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that the general allegations embrace

 those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” (brackets and internal

 quotation marks omitted)). Although we afford pro se pleadings a liberal

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 construction, we will not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a

 plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v.

 New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

        “[S]tanding generally has three requirements: (1) an injury in fact;

 (2) causation; and (3) redressability.” Colo. Outfitters, 823 F.3d at 544. The injury-

 in-fact element requires that a plaintiff “offer something more than the hypothetical

 possibility of injury. The alleged injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual

 or imminent.” Id. “[I]mminence is . . . a somewhat elastic concept, [but] it cannot be

 stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too

 speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Id. at

 544-45 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context—a pre-enforcement

 challenge to a criminal statute—“a plaintiff must typically demonstrate (1) an

 intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional

 interest, but proscribed by the challenged statute,” and (2) that there exists a credible

 threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. at 545 (brackets and internal quotation marks

 omitted). “[I]t is not necessary that the plaintiff first expose himself to actual arrest

 or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute that he claims deters the exercise

 of his constitutional rights.” Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S.

 289, 298 (1979) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]hen

 plaintiffs do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a

 prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible, they do not

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 allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court.” Id. at 298-99 (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

        DeWilde relies on two factual allegations to establish his standing. First, he

 alleged that he submitted the application to the ATF to make a machinegun. This

 allegation fails to establish his standing because he did not submit the application on

 his own behalf. Rather, the application confirms that he applied to the ATF in his

 capacity as a trustee on behalf of the trust to enable the trust to manufacture a

 machinegun. As the district court pointed out, DeWilde himself has not, in his

 individual capacity, applied for or been denied an application to make a machinegun.

        DeWilde contends the district court misunderstood “the fundamental

 relationship between [him] and his trust, as well as the absolute powers he possesses

 in the administration of his trust.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. In essence, he asserts the

 district court mistakenly treated the trust as a distinct legal entity, thereby denying

 him the right to plead and conduct his case. But this argument fails to distinguish

 between DeWilde’s legal status as an individual, and the trust’s separate and distinct

 legal status as an artificial legal entity. Trusts are artificial legal entities that exist

 independently of their trustees. See Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics,

 LLC, 776 F.3d 1175, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015). If a trustee is not a licensed attorney, the

 trustee cannot represent the trust. See Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck, 20 F.3d

 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A nonlawyer, such as these purported ‘trustee(s) pro se,’

 has no right to represent another entity, i.e., a trust, in a court of the United States.”);

 see also In re Wilson, 860 F. App’x 147, 149-50 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished)

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 (applying the same analysis); Lain, 773 F. App’x at 477 (same).1 DeWilde disputes

 this rule, arguing it denies him the right “to plead and conduct his case personally.”

 Aplt. Opening Br. at 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654). But again, he is not the trust, and

 as a non-licensed pro se party, he cannot prosecute his case on behalf of the trust, see

 Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202

 (1993) (recognizing § 1654 does not allow “artificial entities” to appear in federal

 court without licensed counsel); see also Wilson, 860 F. App’x at 150 (rejecting the

 same argument).

       DeWilde’s second allegation also fails to establish his standing. He alleged he

 “desires to own an M16 machinegun for all lawful purposes, including defense of

 hearth and home and militia functions.” R. at 79, para. 23. In evaluating this

 allegation, our decision in Colorado Outfitters, 832 F.3d 537, is instructive. That

 case involved a Second Amendment pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that

 outlawed the possession, sale, and transfer of large-capacity magazines (LCMs). See

 id. at 542. The statute contained an exception that permitted grandfathered LCMs

 (those owned prior to the statute’s effective date) so long as the owner maintained

 continuous possession of the LCMs. See id. Standing was predicated in part on the

 testimony of a plaintiff who owned grandfathered LCMs and claimed the statute

 impacted her “because eventually, her LCMs will wear out and because it would be

 possible to lose her LCMs (or lose continuous possession of them) in the meantime.”

       1
         We may cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value. See 10th Cir.
 R. 32.1(A).
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 Id. at 551 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded this

 testimony “failed to demonstrate an imminent injury for purposes of mounting a

 pre-enforcement challenge to [the] statute” because it “expressed no concrete plans to

 engage in conduct that had any potential to violate [the statute].” Id.

        DeWilde’s allegations are similarly vague. He alleged that he “desires to own

 an M16 machinegun for all lawful purposes,” R. at 79, para. 23, but he alleges no

 concrete plan to possess or transfer a machinegun in violation of § 922(o). He also

 gives no indication that he has ever possessed a firearm, nor does he say when or if

 he plans to acquire or manufacture a machinegun or transfer one. See Lujan,

 504 U.S. at 564 (explaining that intentions to engage in conduct “without any

 description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when” the conduct

 will occur is insufficient). He simply “desires” to own a machinegun. But a “vague

 desire” to engage in some conduct is not enough to establish standing; “a plaintiff

 must describe concrete plans.” Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 875

 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme Court has

 instructed that ‘some day’ intentions do not support a finding of the ‘actual or

 imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id. at 874-75 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting

 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). DeWilde’s alleged “desire” to own a machinegun is too

 abstract to constitute a concrete, imminent injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016) (“A concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it must

 actually exist. . . . “[It must be] real, and not abstract.” (internal quotation marks

 omitted)). And without alleging when or even if he might possess or transfer a

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 machinegun, there is no suggestion he faces a credible threat of prosecution or

 investigation.

       Still, DeWilde asserts his allegations are virtually identical to those other

 courts have found sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. He adds that,

 not only did he allege that he desires to own a machinegun, but he also submitted the

 ATF application, provided his fingerprints and photograph, and paid the required tax

 stamp on the application. These latter efforts were taken on behalf of the trust,

 however, so they do not bolster his standing argument.

       To the extent DeWilde cites decisions from other courts, his cases do not help

 him. The non-binding decisions he cites from other circuits have been vacated or

 abrogated. See Teter v. Lopez, 76 F.4th 938 (9th Cir. 2023), vacated for reh’g

 en banc, 2024 WL 719051 (Feb. 22, 2024); Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San

 Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by N.Y.

 State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); Nat’l Rifle

 Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,

 194-95 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by Bruen, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2111.2 Moreover,

 these extra-circuit cases are distinguishable because standing was predicated on more

 concrete injuries. See Teter, 76 F.4th at 944 (plaintiffs were “forced to dispose of

 their butterfly knives” and “would purchase replacements” if the law were

       2
         For the first time in his reply brief, DeWilde cites two passing statements in
 Bruen, where the Court noted the petitioners “wanted” handguns. 142 S. Ct. at 2125.
 But these descriptors are meaningless because the Court did not engage in any
 standing analysis.
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  invalidated (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jackson, 746 F.3d at 967 (plaintiff

  would purchase ammunition if the legal prohibition were invalidated); Nat’l Rifle

  Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 190-91 (plaintiff prevented from purchasing handguns due to age

  restriction). And DeWilde’s remaining cases are all non-binding district court

  decisions cited for the proposition that an impairment on his “desire to make and

  own” a machinegun is enough to establish an injury in fact. Aplt. Opening Br. at 9.

  But as we have explained, binding precedent from this court and the Supreme Court

  requires more than “‘some day’ intentions.” Baker, 979 F.3d at 874 (quoting Lujan,

  504 U.S. at 564). A mere desire to possess a machinegun, untethered from any

  allegation that he faces a credible threat of prosecution, is insufficient to establish an

  injury in fact. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of

  standing.

                                              III

         The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                          Entered for the Court

                                                          Nancy L. Moritz
                                                          Circuit Judge

                                              10