Court Opinion

ID: 9486740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:58:19.833618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:54.256494
License: Public Domain

VRATIL, District Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I join the majority in its conclusion that Congress would want Pettyjohn to receive his attorneys’ fees despite his failure to make a timely fee application under the EAJA. However, I cannot join the majority’s decision to award attorneys’ fees in this case.
Under the American Rule, a federal court may award attorneys’ fees only where they are provided for by statute, by enforceable contract, or under three narrow common law exceptions. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621-23, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). The common law exceptions permit the award of attorneys’ fees (1) from a common fund; (2) as a sanction for willful disobedience of court order; and (3) where a party has acted vexatiously and in bad faith. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2133, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991).
I find no principled basis to award fees under the only statute which might have authorized fees in this case — the EAJA. The decisions which refuse to apply Melkonyan and Schaefer retroactively1 are alluring but ultimately misguided. Careftd analysis of Melkonyan and Schaefer reveals that the Supreme Court either applied or intended to apply the new rules, but that other factors *1576prevented findings of untimeliness on the existing records. See Misdagno v. Secretary, 786 F.Supp. 1120, 1123 (E.D.N.Y.1992). The cases which refuse to apply MeUconyan and Schaefer flout the Supreme Court’s clear instruction that new rules — especially jurisdictional rules — are to be applied retroactively. See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (retroactivity generally); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (new jurisdictional rules).
Pettyjohn does not and could not claim that his attorneys’ fees are recoverable under any contract or the common law exceptions, and the panel agrees that he cannot avail himself of the EAJA’s fee provisions. Thus, the majority’s equitable remedy constitutes an unauthorized departure from the American Rule. Moreover, the EAJA effects a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and any attorneys’ fees awarded outside the boundaries of the clearly-established exceptions to the American Rule exceed that limited waiver. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); 6 James Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.78[5.2] (1993).
Although this court lacks authority to rescue Pettyjohn, his cause is not without hope. The Supreme Court certainly understood the practical consequences of its pronouncements in MeUconyan and Schaefer. The fact that the Supreme Court countenanced an inequitable result signals an invitation for Congressional — and not judicial — intervention. In fashioning an equitable remedy, the majority has reduced the likelihood that Congress will hear the pleas of Pettjohn and similarly situated EAJA applicants by muffling the Supreme Court’s message.

. See, e.g., Sansano v. Sullivan, 788 F.Supp. 218, 224 (D.N.J.1992) (Melkonyan); Williams v. Sha-lala, No. 84-C-4341, 1993 WL 388574 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 24, 1993) (Schaefer).