Court Opinion

ID: 9534751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:37.173128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:14.526447
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority agrees that the Brady1 rule does not apply because the conviction was not procured through the use of materially false or perjured information in this case. The majority does apply the second prong of Brady in that the prosecution did not provide information in the form of the plea agreement, which might have been exculpatory to appellant. The Commonwealth responds that the plea agreement, already entered on the record with sentence imposed and being served, was fully available before appellant’s trial as a matter of public record. I agree with that position. Appellant had the information available at trial and pursued cross-examination of his co-defendant, Klingensmith, the primary witness against him, as to the plea bargain and whether it was an inducement for providing biased or false information against appellant. The bias motive was presented to the jury and could be argued by appellant to effect the credibility of the -witness. There was nothing about the plea bargain, the court’s understanding of it or Klingensmith’s understanding which could lead to the belief that he was required to do anything but testify honestly. When the Commonwealth was assured of that fact, it recommended the bargain to the court. Since sentence was imposed and entered into before the trial of appellant, the Commonwealth had relatively little coercive power over the witness.
Counsel for appellant has used a broad shotgun approach in attributing wrongdoing to the court and the Commonwealth in this case. My perception of this case is that this was a simple, routine plea agreement honestly conducted in which a co-defendant agreed to cooperate with the Commonwealth in return for fair and reasonable consideration for himself. The wheels of justice would stop at both the Federal and State *463levels if this process was denied. The claim of ineffectiveness of counsel and denial of exculpatory evidence because the Commonwealth did not submit to appellant’s request for discovery by acknowledging the plea agreement which was a public record at the time of trial rings hollow. The kind of plea agreement which requires disclosure is that in which the sentence is delayed pending testimony by the witness so that the Commonwealth may maintain coercive power over the witness and which thereby becomes an inducement to testify in a fashion to please the Commonwealth. Bias under those conditions becomes a critical issue. See Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 269 Pa.Super. 219, 409 A.2d 857 (1979).
The cross-examination by defense counsel as well as questions by the Commonwealth’s attorney clearly focused on whether the witness received any leniency or would receive any future favored treatment. The same trial judge presided at both trials, and since the majority already has rejected the allegation of wrongdoing by the court, it must be presumed she maintained the integrity of the judicial process by assuring an appropriate consideration by the jury of the plea bargain as it might reflect bias. Nothing on the record discloses that his testimony manifested an agreement which would result in any benefit or favored treatment to the witness. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).