Court Opinion

ID: 7812531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:14:27.550603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:30.867550
License: Public Domain

McCuüoch, C. J. Cypress Creek Drainage District, composed of a large area embracing certain lands in Chicot, Desha and Drew counties, was created by special statute in the year 1911 for the purpose of constructing drains to relieve the lands in the district from accumulated waters. Theretofore the surface water from a considerable portion of the area included in this district had drained into thé Mississippi River through Cypress Creek, and, in order to protect the lands from the Mississippi River overflow in times of high water, it was desired to close up the gap in the levee by damming up the levee across the mouth of Cypress Creek, and, in order to provide other means of draining this area, this district was created under a plan to carry the surplus waters in another direction; that is to say, to gather them up and carry them through a main drainage canal to the head of another stream, called Bayou Macon, through which the waters would be carried south, parallel with the Mississippi River, into Chicot County. Plans were formed for the construction of the improvement, and assessments of benefits to the lands in the district were'made, but, in litigation which arose between the district and certain landowners, before further progress had been made in the affairs of the district, it was decided that the plans exceeded in scope the authority conferred by the statute creating the district. Cypress Creek Drainage District v. Wolfe, 109 Ark. 60. After that decision was rendered, further legislation was found necessary to give authority for the construction of the improvement which would be adequate to the demands of the situation, so the G-eneral Assembly of 1915 enacted a statute (Acts 1915, p. 297) amending the original statute creating this district by enlarging the powers with respect to the extent of the improvement to be constructed, and, among other things, it was provided in that statute (§5) “that the assessment of benefits heretofore made by said district, as the same appears upon the assessment books therefor, is just and equitable, and the same is hereby confirmed and declared to be the assessment of benefits of said district.” The improvement was then constructed in accordance with the plans, which contemplated the construction of a large ditch, or canal, beginning in the northern portion of Desha County and running thence southerly about nineteen miles to the head of Bayou Macon, thus gathering up the surface waters and waters which drained through Cypress Creek and other streams and carrying them into the head of Bayou Macon, through which they flowed, as before stated, southward. The plaintiffs (appellants) are owners of lands included in said district which abut on Bayou Macon, and they instituted separate actions at law (fifteen in number) against the district, to recover damages alleged to have been caused by the flooding of portions of their lands which abut on Bayou Macon. It was alleged in the complaint, in each of the cases, that, by the construction of the main canal and other ditches and drains, the defendant district had diverted the waters of other creeks and streams, which were natural watercourses and carried large volumes of water, from their usual and ordinary courses into Bayou Macon, causing that stream to “overflow its banks and spread out over large quantities of plaintiff’s land, overflowing said land belonging to the plaintiff which was never overflowed before, and overflowing other lands belonging to plaintiff much quicker than was ever done before said ditch was constructed, and causing the same to remain inundated for a much longer period of time, resulting in permanent injury to the land of plaintiff, which injury became apparent after the construction of said ditch.” There are also allegations in each of the complaints, which are supported by the evidence, that the volume of water passing through Bayou Macon was greatly increased by reason of the construction of the drainage canal which emptied into the head of that stream, and that, prior to the construction of the canal, Bayou Macon carried only a small volume of water; that on each side of the bayou the banks were sloping, thus forming a low-lying area, or terrain, between the first bank or water’s edge and the second bank, or, as expressed by some of the witnesses, the “ultimate bank,” and the allegations as to overflowing of the lands of the abutting 'owners relate to portions of the land which thus lie between the first and second banks. The evidence shows that, prior to the construction of the drainage canal in question, these lands were subject to cultivation, and were in fact cultivated from year to year, and rarely ever overflowed, but that, since the construction of the canal and the increased volume of water carried through the bayou, the lowlands between the two banks overflowed with such frequency as to prevent the cultivation of crops. In each of the cases an answer was filed, tendering issues hereinafter discussed, and all of the cases were consolidated and tried together before the court sitting as a jury. After hearing the evidence, the court found the facts against the plaintiffs, and decided against them. Judgment was rendered accordingly, and appeals have been prosecuted to this court by all of the plaintiffs. • Counsel for the district present two grounds upon which liability now asserted should be denied and the judgments affirmed. 1. The anticipated benefits to the whole of the tracts of land owned by each of the. plaintiffs, including the lands now claimed as those damaged by the overflow, were assessed in accordance with the original statute creating the district, and, as has already been referred to, there was a section of the statute enacted in 1915 (supra) ratifying and confirming those assessments. This constituted a legislative determination of the correctness and validity of those assessments, which will not be disturbed in a judicial review unless shown to be arbitrary and unfounded. Sudberry v. Graves, 83 Ark. 344; Salmon v. Board of Directors, 100 Ark. 369; Alcorn v. Bliss-Cook Oak Co., 133 Ark. 118; Gibson v. Spikes, 143 Ark. 270. There is no attempt in the present litigation to attack the correctness of those assessments of benefits, but the contention is that, irrespective of the assessment of benefits, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for damages to their lands, or, rather, to recover for the value of the lands, which they 'Contend has in effect been taken in the operation of the improvement. That contention will be discussed later. The same section in the act of 1915 (supra) which confirmed the assessment of benefits' contains a further provision as follows: “All persons claiming that their lands would not be benefited by the making of the improvement contemplated by this act are hereby required to apply to the proper court of chancery, within sixty days after the passage of this act, to enjoin the enforcement of said assessment; and any person failing so to apply to the court of chancery within said sixty days shall be forever barred from contesting the assessment of benefits aforesaid.” The plaintiffs and other landowners in the district instituted an action in the chancery court of Desha County within sixty days after the passage of the act of 1915 (supra), attacking the correctness of the assessments, and a final decree was rendered in that cause substantially reducing the assessments of benefits on all of the lands of the plaintiffs. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the assessments' of benefits and the former suit in the chancery court relating thereto included only benefits to the lands in the district and had no reference to injury to the lands in the operation of the drainage project, which, in effect, constituted taking of property, and that, notwithstanding the finality of the assessment of benefits as adjudicated in the chancery court, the plaintiffs still have a right to maintain an action at law to recover compensation for the injury to their lands which, in effect, constituted a taking. The contention of the district is, on the contrary, that the lands of the plaintiffs were not actually taken and used in the construction and operation of the drainage project ; that there was only an injury to the land by reason of the construction of the improvement, which was taken into account in the assessment of benefits, the one being balanced off against' the other, and that the conclusive effect which must be given to the assessment of benefits and the litigation which finally adjudicated the matter constitute a bar to the right of plaintiffs to recover damages. The Constitution of this State provides that “private property shall not be taken, appropriated, or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor.” Art. 2, § 22. The constitutions of some of the States differ from ours in that the guaranty of compensation extends only to property taken for- public use, without expressly providing for compensation for property damaged. Such is the form of the provision in article 5 of the Constitution of the United States. In some of the decisions on this subject it has been held that constitutional provisions guaranteeing compensation merely for the taking of property only include damages for injuries resulting from an invasion or destruction of the property, and not merely an incidental injury; but decisions of other courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States (United States v. Lynch, 188 U. S. 446), hold that the constitutional guaranty relates to compensation for any injury done to property for public use. Of course, our Constitution involves no such distinction, for it expressly guarantees that compensation shall be paid for property either “taken,' appropriated or damaged for public use.” ' It is undeniable that the kind of injury which the plaintiffs claim they sustained to their property, and which the testimony tends to show, is protected by the constitutional guaranty. There is no controversy here over that question, but the point involved relates to the manner in which such compensation must be ascertained, adjusted and paid. . The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case cited above, and upon which learned counsel for plaintiffs rely with so much confidence, holds that the injuries to the property, or its destruction for public use, constitute a taking within the constitutional guaranty, but this decision has no relation to the question how the compensation may be paid, nor to the question, more directly involved in the present discussion, whether or not the incidental damage to the property in the construction of the improvement, regardless of its extent, may or may not be balanced off against the benefits which are to be derived. The law on that particular subject has, we think, been fully settled by the decision of this court in Gregg v. Sanders, 149 Ark. 15. In that case a levee district was formed for' the purpose of constructing a levee along White River, and the plaintiff in the case was the owner of a tract of land abutting on the river, a portion of which was actually taken and used in the construction of the levee. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover damages for the land so taken it was contended, on behalf of the district, that such damage should be balanced off and deducted from the appraised benefits to accrue to the remainder of plaintiff’s tract of land. We held against that contention, and in doing só we drew a distinction between lands actually taken and used and. those which were merely damaged incidentally in the construction or operation of the improvement. In disposing of the question we said: “The theory upon which rests the proceedings for the construction of local improvements by the imposition of special assessments on contiguous property is that the improvement is public in.its nature to the extent that the right of eminent domain may be authorized, but it is local to the extent that special benefits accrue to the adjoining property. The improvement is paid for out of special assessments based on such benefits, and when property is taken for use in the construction of the improvement, full compensation must be awarded in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, without deduction of the benefits which are to accrue to the owner on the remainder of his property. Damages to the property not taken may, however, be balanced off against the benefits which accrue, for damages must necessarily be taken into account in the estimate of benefits.” Discussing the question further in the same case, we said: “At any rate, we are convinced that the true rule is that, whether the taxes levied amount to the appraised benefits or not, there can be no deduction of any part of the benefits from the compensation to be allowed to a property owner for that portion of his property which is taken and used in the construction of the improvement, for the reason that he pays for his benefits in taxes, the same as other property owners, and it would destroy the rule of equality to require him to contribute to the common use any part of his property without compensation.” Counsel for appellants contend that the undisputed proof shows that the value of the property was totally destroyed, so that it constituted a taking of the property within the meaning of the law, and that the case of Gregg v. Sanders, supra, supports their right to recover damages in the present cases. In the first place, it may be said that there is a conflict in the testimony, and a finding of fact against them by the trial court, which is binding upon this court on appeal. The trial court found from the evidence that the damage to the lands of the plaintiffs was actually considered, by the assessors in making the assessment of benefits. In addition to that, we are of the opinion that, according to the undisputed evidence,' the property was not actually taken and used by the district in the operation of the project so as to separate it from the other lands of the plaintiffs and prevent the damage being balanced off against the benefits. The only portions of the land taken for the purpose of constructing the improvement were the lands covered by the drainage ditch. The waters were gathered up and thrown into Bayou Macon, but the incidental injury to lands abutting on Bayou Macon did not constitute a taking of those lands, though it resulted in injury for which compensation must be made within the meaning of the Constitution. The lands were frequently overflowed, but they remain the property of the plaintiffs for the enjoyment of such limited use to which they were susceptible in the damaged condition. Suffering the damages thus inflicted did not 'constitute a contribution of private property to public use in the sense that that portion of the land was separated from the remainder so as to prevent the balancing off of said damage against benefits to the whole of the lands. We think that the facts of the case bring it within the rule announced in Gregg v. Sanders, supra, and that the assessment of benefits, including the estimate of damages, was conclusive of the rights of plaintiffs to recover compensation. In other words, the finality of the assessment raises a conclusive presumption that they had been compensated by having the damages balanced off against the assessments of benefits. 2. It is equally plain that the plaintiffs, except possibly plaintiff R. H. Wolfe, are barred from recovery of damages on still another ground, now stated. The act of 1915 (supra) contains the following ' provision (§ 6) : “Said board shall obtain rights-of-way for its drains, ditches, canals, levees and dams without cost to the district, wherever possible, and it is empowered to make all necessary contracts for the acquisition of such rights-of-way. They shall have power to adjust and pay all damages that may accrue by reason of such drains, ditches, canals, levees and dams. Any property owner may accept the damages awarded to him by the board, or acquiesce in its failure to award damages in his favor, and shall be presumed to have acquiesced in the action of the board unless he gives said board notice in writing of his objection to the award made him, or the action of the board in failing to award him damages, within thirty days after the action of the board thereon.” This provision relates to the value of property actually taken and used and also any property which may necessarily be destroyed in the construction of the improvement, and if the injury to plaintiffs’ lands constitutes what they contend it to be, it falls squarely within this provision for the adjustment and payment of damages in the manner specified. The same section provides that, as soon as the board has determined upon the system of drainage and the award of damages to be made, it shall publish a notice, and the form of that notice is set forth in the statute. Another provision of the same section is as follows: “Any one who shall appear, and shall feel aggrieved at the action of the board on his complaint, shall, within five days after said meeting, file written notice with the board that he demands an assessment of his damages by a jury, and in such instances the board shall institute in the circuit court, in the county in which the lands lie, an action to condemn the lands that must be taken or damaged in the making of any proposed drain, ditch, canal, levee or dam.” It appears from the record in the present case that such an ascertainment of damages was made, or at least that the board formally ascertained that there were no damages to lands not actually 'taken in the construction of the canal, and that notice was duly published in accordance with the terms of the statute. Plaintiffs-did not respond to the notice nor pursue the remedy pointed out in the statute. There is some evidence in the record to the effect that plaintiff, R. H. Wolfe, presented a claim for damages to the commissioners, but as he too must be denied further relief on the first ground herein •stated, it is unnecessary to decide whether his claim constituted a demand for trial by jury within the-provisions of the statute. ' , ■ In the case of Dickerson v. Tri-County Drainage District, 138 Ark. 471, there was involved the procedure under a statute identical with the one now under consideration, and we held that the statute was valid, and that (quoting from the syllabus), “where the Legislature provides a method for ascertainment of compensation to be allowed owners of land taken under eminent domain for construction of drainage ditches, the constitutional guaranties are complied with.” In that case it was alleged1 that the plaintiff’s land was actually taken and used in the construction of the drainage ditch, and we held that the failure to appear and demand the right of trial by jury for the ascertainment of the amount of compensation for the property taken was conclusive of the right to later maintain an action for the recovery of damages. The decision in that case is conclusive of the present one, for the statute is the same, and the facts were less favorable to the plaintiff than those disclosed in the present case. Counsel for appellants rely on Road District v. Hall, 140 Ark. 241, as disclosing the distinction which exists in the present case from our decision in the Dickerson case, supra. The distinction found in the Hall case does not exist in the present case, for in that case there was a change of plans, subsequent to the assessment of benefits, whereby the road to be improved was widened, and the decision involved the question of recovery of compensation for property taken, subsequent to the assessment of benefits, for the widening of the road. There is no such distinction in the present case, for there has been no change in the plans and no additional taking or damage to the property further than the recurring injuries resulting from the frequent overflows. This damage was one which was in contemplation at the time the plans were formed to gather up the waters and east them into Bayou Macon, and this, according to the findings of the court and the evidence adduced in the case, was taken into consideration by the board of assessors in assessing the benefits. Whether such damages were, in fact, taken into consideration, is immaterial, for they should have been taken into consideration, and the failure of plaintiffs to complain in the manner provided in the statute bars them from the subsequent assertion of any claim for damages. Our conclusion on this point is, as on the other one already stated, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages, and that the judgment of the circuit court was correct. The judgment is therefore affirmed. Wood, J., disqualified.