Court Opinion

ID: 9631898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:54:51.284334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:03.552514
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority opinion states that the record presents a single question for resolution, and, though the question is not expressly stated, I assume that the question is, “What does a party in an unlawful detainer suit before a justice of the peace have to do with reference to furnishing bond, bonds, undertaking or undertakings in order to perfect an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace so that the matter may be tried de novo by the County Court.
*96Three situations may arise:
(a) The plaintiff (owner) seeks review.
(b) The defendant (occupant) seeks review, vacates the property or arbitrarily refuses to vacate during the pendency of the appeal.
(c) The defendant (occupant) seeks review and elects to remain in possession or fails to vacate pending final determination.
The right of appeal is a very valuable right which may not be taken away by legislation, though admittedly reasonable conditions may be imposed upon appellant, such as limiting the time for appeal, payment of costs, requiring bond to protect the opposing party, etc. I readily concede that the legislature should make provision that the appellant furnish suitable security to protect the appellee from all injury or damage that may accrue to the appellee by reason of the appeal. With equal assurance I am of the opinion that the legislature should not place any useless obstacles in appellant’s way.
The legislature has supplied enough, if not too much, legislation on the matter.
1. C.R.S. ’53, 79-13-2 (Laws 1861), provides:
“Appeals from judgments of justices of the peace, to the county court, shall be granted in all cases except on judgment confessed. The party praying the appeal * * * shall enter into a bond with security to he approved and conditioned as provided in Section 79-13-3 * * * ” (The condition provided in 79-13-3 is: Now if the said A.B. shall prosecute his appeal with effect and shall pay whatever judgment may be rendered by the court upon dismissal or trial of said appeal, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.)
2. C.R.S. ’53, 58-1-18 (Laws 1885 — An act in relation to forcible entry and detainer * * *), provides:
“If either party shall feel aggrieved * * * he may appeal, as in other cases tried before justices of the peace, except as hereinafter provided; but no such appeal by a *97defendant shall stay proceedings on such judgment, un- • less the appellant shall within forty-eight hours * * * file with the justice his undertaking to plaintiff with two or more sureties to * * * pay all costs which have accrued, or may thereafter accrue, and all damages which plaintiff may have sustained, or may thereafter sustain, in consequence of the wrongful detention of the premises in question during the pendency of such appeal. Upon taking such appeal and filing such undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall be thereby stayed * *
3. C.R.S. ’53, 58-1-23 (Laws 1891 — to amend an act in forcible entry and detainer) purports to amend Sec. 22, Unlawful detainer, Laws 1885, which provides for appeals and writs of error to the Supreme Court from judgments of the District, County or Superior courts. The only amendment made was to drop the word Superior; however, the legislature added the following:
“In all other cases where judgment is rendered for the possession of the premises the party appealing from such judgment, whether in justice courts or courts of record, in addition to the undertaking hereinbefore mentioned (C.R.S. ’53, 79-13-2, supra, or C.R.S. ’53, 58-1-18, supra, or both), shall make and file an additional undertaking with sufficient sureties to be approved by the justice or court in such sum as may be fixed by such justice or court conditioned for the payment to the plaintiff of all sums that may be awarded to the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the premises, pending such appeal.”
I shall make no extended effort to reconcile and give literal effect to all of the language contained in the foregoing statutes. I presume that the legislature was seeking to make available to litigants in forcible entry and detainer actions, the right of review'by appeal without unreasonable or useless conditions; while on the other hand intending to impose as conditions to the right of an appeal all reasonable requirements necessary to *98fully protect the appellee, plaintiff or defendant, from all damages that he might suffer because of the appeal.
Now let us take up each of the three situations, outlined above:
(a) The plaintiff (owner) is dissatisfied with the judgment of the justice of the peace and seeks to appeal. C.R.S. ’53, 79-13-2, adopted in 1861, grants him that right in clear language, on condition that he furnish bond conditioned that “ * * * prosecute his appeal with effect and shall pay whatever judgment may be rendered by the [appeal] courts * *
I respectfully submit that when plaintiff provides the above bond he has afforded his adversary full knd complete protection for any and all losses that he may suffer by reason of the appeal, and he should not be required to file “an additional undertaking * * * ” as provided in 58-1-18 or 58-1-23. McDowell v. Taylor, 117 Colo. 106, 184 P. (2d) 140. A requirement for a second bond places an undue burden on appellant and affords appellee no additional protection.
(b) The defendant (occupant) is dissatisfied with the judgment of the justice of the peace and seeks to appeal, elects to vacate the property or arbitrarily refuses to vacate but makes no effort to stay the issuance of a writ of restitution by furnishing bond. What I have said with reference to situation (a) above applies with equal force to this situation. Plaintiff’s remedy, if defendant remains in possession, is available after expiration of forty-eight hours — a writ of restitution. If defendant vacates, that in itself is his remedy, and even if he were to provide a second bond no possible liability could arise thereon, the defendant not being in possession of the premises pending such appeal.
(c) The defendant (occupant) is dissatisfied with the judgment of the justice of the peace and seeks to appeal, refuses to vacate and desires to stay the issuance of a writ of restitution during the pendency of the appeal. In such a situation the defendant (occupant) must furnish *99the appeal bond as stated in (a) and (b) above in order that the plaintiff (owner) may, if he prevails on appeal, be secured for his judgment and costs, and in addition must witiiin forty-eight hours after judgment before the justice, file an additional undertaking to secure the owner for losses he may suffer by reason of the “defendant’s wrongful detention of the premises in question, during the pendency of such appeal.” Certainly no one questions the fact that in such case the second bond is proper and serves a useful purpose, otherwise there could be no recovery commensurate with plaintiff’s loss occasioned by defendant’s unlawful detention of the property during the pendency of the appeal; on the other hand if there is no such detention and continued use and occupation, such bond would be absolutely meaningless, would serve no purpose and no liability could arise thereunder.
Convinced as I am that my treatment of the three situations outlined above is correct, I necessarily conclude that the requirement for an additional bond has nothing whatsoever to do with perfecting the appeal; the requirement of a second bond arises only in cases where the defendant seeks to stay the issuance of a writ of restitution. In the event the defendant files his appeal bond as provided in 79-13-2, but neglects to file within forty-eight hours after judgment the bond as provided in 58-1-18, which is the situation in the case at bar, writ of restitution could be issued, the defendant dispossessed, and the plaintiff’s possession restored. The appeal bond affords the plaintiff ample protection for his judgment and costs. A second bond would serve no purpose, since no liability could arise upon which recovery could be had and serves only to unreasonably and uselessly fetter and obstruct a defendant in the exercise of his right to invoke the aid of our courts.
■ Admittedly I have, in seeking to make an analysis of the statutes involved, largely ignored 58-1-23. This statute (Laws 1891) purports to amend Section 22 of the *100forcible entry and detainer act adopted in 1885, being Sec. 22, page 230 Session laws of 1885. Said Sec. 22 provided for appeals and writs of error, in unlawful detainer actions, from judgments of the district, county or superior courts of this state; it provided that:
“ * * * the condition of the undertaking an [on] appeal * * * shall be [as] required by this act in cases of appeal from justices of the peace * * *.”
The only change in the wording was to drop the word “superior” [court]. It will be observed that said Section 22 made no provision for bond providing security for plaintiff for damages that he might suffer arising out of the unlawful detention during the pendency of the appeal. Apparently, in an effort to rectify this omission, the legislature added the following:
“ * * * in all other cases [all cases other than those based on notice to pay rent or vacate] where judgment is rendered for the possession of the premises the party appealing (plaintiff or defendant) from such judgment, whether in justice courts or courts of record, in addition to the undertaking, hereinbefore mentioned, shall make and file an additional undertaking with sufficient sureties to be approved by the justice or court in such sum as may be fixed by such justice or court conditioned for the payment to the plaintiff of all sums that may be awarded to the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the premises, pending such appeal, either in said action or in any action thereafter instituted by the plaintiff against said defendant, during the pendency of said appeal.”
The above amendment or rather addition to the aforementioned Sec. 22, Laws of 1885, in so far as it refers t« courts of record, is desirable and needed legislation in that it serves to remedy an omission in said Sec. 22 and provides security for the plaintiff for damages arising out of the unlawful detention of the property during the pendency of the appeal — security that previous to 1891 did not exist; in so far as the amendment or addi*101tion refers to justice courts it is useless and meaningless for the reason that 58-1-18 (Laws 1885, p. 229) provides for an undertaking conditioned the sáme as 58-1-23 and even provides for better security in that under 58-1-18 the undertaking must be “with two or more sureties.” In my opinion the legislature did not mean to do a useless and meaningless act, and therefore 58-1-23 being Sec. 1, page 228, Laws of 1891, should be construed as being applicable to appeals from courts of record only, and that an additional bond be required only where stay of writ of restitution is sought.
I am not unmindful of the numerous decisions of this court, including those referred to in the majority opinion. In so far as those decisions are in conflict with the views herein expressed, they should be overruled; the fact that the construction of the law has become firmly entrenched should be no deterrent to correcting wrongs even though long endured, by so construing and interpreting the statute as to make it sensible, useful and just rather than meaningless and obstructive.
The majority opinion fails to mention McDowell v. Taylor, supra, wherein we held, contrary to the majority opinion that 79-13-2 is applicable to suits in unlawful detainer. In that case a plaintiff appealed from the judgment of a justice of the peace and filed only one bond — that provided by 79-13-2. The county court dismissed the case for want of a proper bond “with two or more sureties” as provided by 58-1-18. In reversing the county court, we said:
“It will be noted that the statute specifically requires that when a defendant appeals, if he wishes stay of execution he must file an additional bond signed by two or more sureties. (58-1-18) In the case at bar plaintiff is the appellant and the provision does not apply to him. He “may appeal as in other cases tried before justices of the peace,” and the only bond requirement is that “he enter into bond, with security to be approved.” ’35 C.S.A., c. 96, § 141 (now C.R.S. ’53, 79-13-2). It is ob*102vious that two sureties were not required on plaintiff’s bond.”
In my humble opinion the defendant having filed one bond as provided by 79-13-2 and having docketed the case in the County Court is entitled to have his case tried therein de novo; defendant having failed to vacate the premises or to take any steps to remain in possession as provided by 58-1-18, the plaintiff could at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours gain possession of his property by writ of restitution. The fact that plaintiff does not avail himself of his plain legal remedy cannot serve to deprive defendant of his plain legal right — the right of appeal. The rule to show cause should be discharged.