Court Opinion

ID: 9730324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:08:34.545027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.824271
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. I believe that if, indeed, a cause of action for alienation of affections ever had its place in the judicial process, that time has now long since passed and the cause of action should be eliminated. My basis for reaching this conclusion is, to a large extent, based upon the very same arguments made by the majority for permitting its continued existence. The majority suggests that “[i]t is manifest and undeniable that the people of Nebraska still hold the marital relationship in high regard.” While some of the people of Nebraska may still hold marriage in high regard, for a large number their behavior decries such statements. In 1982, for example, there were 14,081 marriages entered into in the State of Nebraska. During that same period of time, there were 6,508 dissolutions of marriage granted by our courts. To therefore suggest that the cause of action for alienation of affections should exist solely on the basis of the sanctity of marriage is to simply disregard reality. It is a nice thought, but *559simply not very realistic in light of the facts. While I completely agree with the majority as to how the public should view marriage, and I would support any program intended to ensure the continuation of marriage, I simply must recognize the facts as they exist.
The problems which a cause of action for alienation of affections can create in a society in which many outside influences affect the way we live are nümerous. The majority has properly noted that a cause of action for alienation of affections does not necessarily involve an amorous intruder. See, Lane v. Spence, 70 Neb. 204, 97 N.W. 299 (1903); Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson, 43 Neb. 269, 61 N.W. 577 (1895). One could easily envision a situation in which an employer may be sued for alienation of affections because one of the spouses believes that the other one has left the marriage to seek a career at the inducement of the employer. With nearly half of all marriages ending in divorce, the potential for alleged causes of action for alienation of affections is, in my mind, unlimited and has no relation to the realities of life. People are motivated today to leave marriages for reasons of their own and not because of some inducement by another. The independence of spouses today perhaps plays the greatest role in loss of affection and the destruction of a marriage. To encourage independence and freedom among the sexes and then to permit one of the spouses to sue because of the spouse’s inability to hold the marriage together seems to me to be totally inconsistent.
Nor am I unmindful of the fact, noted by the majority, that in most jurisdictions where the cause of action has been abolished, it has been done so by the legislature. However, where, as here, the cause of action is one created by the court, it is one which should be abolished by the court, in the same fashion as we abolished interspousal immunity. See Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979). As ob*560served by the Iowa court in Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981),
In the last analysis we think the action should be abolished because spousal love is not property which is subject to theft. We do not abolish the action because defendants in such suits, need or deserve our protection. We certainly do not do so because of any changing views on promiscuous sexual conduct. It is merely and simply because the plaintiffs in such suits do not deserve to recover for the loss of or injury to “property” which they do not, and cannot, own.
I believe that the cause of action should be abolished, and the sooner the better.