Court Opinion

ID: 9579095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:25.662207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:16.894567
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
This case, as it is presented to us, revolves around the proximate cause element of tort. I concur in the contributory negligence portion of the majority opinion and in the judgment. I see the proximate cause aspect as related to Winzurk and Storer in a somewhat different way.
Several additional facts evidenced help paint a clearer picture. When Burns’ vehicle collided with the Suburban, the latter was lifted *233into the air. Mrs. Burns suffered injuries from which she later died. The BMW was extensively damaged on the left side, behind the front quarter panel, with the worst damage being in the driver’s door area and the area immediately behind it. The impact compressed the car sideways and the roof buckled. The impact area on the Suburban was on the rear and the impact pushed its rear wheels completely off the pavement. It ended up nearly perpendicular to the police car in front of it.
As recognized in the majority opinion, the issue of proximate cause starts with the given that Winzurk’s parking on the emergency lane is negligence per se. OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I).
“ ‘To state a cause of action for negligence, there must be a legally attributable causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged injury.’ [Cits.] The inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery. [Cit.] In Georgia, questions of negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily reserved for the jury, but in plain and undisputed cases the court may make a determination as a matter of law. [Cits.]” Hercules v. Lewis, 168 Ga. App. 688 (309 SE2d 865) (1983); quoted in Southern Bell Tel. &c. v. Dolce, 178 Ga. App. 175, 176 (1) (342 SE2d 497) (1986).
The applicable measurement distinguishing proximate from remote is stated in OCGA §§ 51-12-8 and 51-12-9. “If the damage incurred by the plaintiff is only the imaginary or possible result of a tortious act or if other and contingent circumstances preponderate in causing the injury, such damage is too remote to be the basis of recovery against the wrongdoer.” OCGA § 51-12-8. “Damages which are the legal and natural result of the act done, though contingent to some extent, are not too remote to be recovered. However, damages traceable to the act, but which are not its legal and natural consequence, are too remote and contingent to be recovered.” OCGA § 51-12-9. The measurement is paraphrased in Gulf Oil v. Stanfield, 213 Ga. 436, 438 (99 SE2d 209) (1957). See also McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 6 (5) (303 SE2d 258) (1983); Western Stone & Metal v. Jones, 180 Ga. App. 79, 80 (348 SE2d 478) (1986); Southern Bell Tel. &c., supra.
It is true that there were numerous circumstances and actors creating the setting and activity which led to Mrs. Burns’ death. The drivers of the four vehicles in the original wreck presented an emergency which precipitated the evasive action taken by Burns and Rev. West. But for Burns’ BMW hydroplaning, there would have been no collision with the Suburban. It is assumed at this stage that this was not the result of Burns’ negligence. See Barlow v. Veber, 169 Ga. App. 65, 66 (1) (311 SE2d 501) (1983); Ford v. Pinckney, 138 Ga. App. 714, 716 (3) (b) (227 SE2d 430) (1976).
*234Given the fact that, for whatever reason, Burns was inexorably headed towards an accident and injuries even if the Suburban was absent, the evidence is not conclusive that she would have been killed whether the Suburban was present or not. It is a reasonable inference that she would have gone into the ravine as did other cars earlier and been injured but not killed. In other words, the evidence is not conclusive that the presence of the Suburban was not the last supervening, or efficient, or nearest cause of the particular injury she suffered, i.e., death, as opposed to a lesser injury. It is not plain, palpable, and indisputable that the particular injury complained of, death, would have occurred if her uncontrolled course of movement had not been altered by the Suburban. Cf. Hollingsworth v. Harris, 112 Ga. App. 290 (145 SE2d 52) (1965).
If the presence of the Suburban proximately contributed to her death (as opposed to injury short of death), even if it was not the sole cause, plaintiffs could recover some percentage so long as 50 percent or more of the proximate cause was not attributable to her.
Thus, jury questions remain as to whether the unlawful presence of the Storer vehicle was a proximate cause of Mrs. Burns’ death.