Court Opinion

ID: 9775128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:44:31.249753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:20.266803
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I believe that a conclusion that a separation agreement is unconscionable requires more than a finding that the property division is one-sided.
The law places a “definite and substantial burden” of proof upon a party seeking modification of a separation agreement. Peterson v. Peterson, Ky.App., 583 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1979). In Peterson, the Court of Appeals held that an agreement clearly could be set aside on the basis of fraud, undue influence, or overreaching, but not solely on the basis that it constitutes a bad bargain. Id. at 712. In Burke v. Sexton, Ky.App., 814 S.W.2d 290 (1991), another Court of Appeals panel held that proof that an agreement is “lopsided” and clearly detrimental to one party creates a presumption that the agreement is unconscionable. I agree; but that presumption is not irrebuttable.
Whether a property settlement agreement is “manifestly unfair or inequitable” cannot be determined by a mere comparison of the assets awarded to the respective parties. It is also appropriate to inquire into the reason why the moving party entered into such an agreement in the first place. Parties to a divorce action often have perfectly valid motives for agreeing to what appear to be bad bargains. Experience teaches that a person so inclined will give up virtually all of his or her earthly possessions in order to obtain a quick divorce and be free to marry again. Another will do so to avoid a custody battle, the outcome of which might otherwise be doubtful. And yet another will do so for cathartic reasons, e.g., to atone for his or her own marital misconduct. If so, what appears on the surface to be a bad bargain may not be so bad after all. In such a case, it is not manifestly unfair or inequitable to let a party lie in the bed he or she has freely made.
Consideration to support an agreement will not be deemed to be inadequate merely because the agreement operates to the disadvantage of one of the parties. Mutual promises themselves form a valuable con*335sideration for an agreement where there is benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee.
Bishir v. Bishir, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 823, 826 (1985). (Of course, if the inducement rose to the level of blackmail, such would constitute overreaching and even Peterson, supra, would mandate finding the agreement unconscionable.)
Thus, a party seeking to set aside a separation agreement can satisfy his or her burden of proof by evidence of fraud, undue influence or overreaching. Absent such evidence, the movant must prove that the agreement is so one-sided as to be not just a bad bargain, but so clearly detrimental to the movant’s interest as to create a prima facie case, i.e., a rebuttable presumption, that the agreement is manifestly unfair or inequitable. If the movant’s evidence is insufficient to satisfy this burden, the motion to set aside the agreement must be denied. But if the movant’s evidence proves prima facie that the agreement is manifestly unfair or inequitable, the burden of going forward shifts to the proponent of the agreement to produce evidence to explain why it would not be manifestly unfair or inequitable to enforce it. KRE 301.
The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a particular settlement agreement is manifestly unfair or inequitable. The judge’s decision in that regard can be tested on appeal by application of the “clearly erroneous” standard for review. CR 52.01. In Peterson, supra, the trial judge’s conclusion that the agreement was not unconscionable was held not clearly erroneous. Similarly, in Burke v. Sexton, supra, the trial judge’s conclusion that the agreement was unconscionable appears to have been held not clearly erroneous.
In the case sub judice, the trial judge found the agreement to be unconscionable. There is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that the agreement is so clearly against Appellee’s interest as to create a presumption of unconscionableness. The evidence also supports a finding that Appellant failed to adequately explain why it would not be manifestly unfair or inequitable to enforce it. Thus, the trial judge’s conclusion that the agreement is unconscionable is not clearly erroneous. For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case.
STEPHENS, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, J., join this concurring opinion.