Court Opinion

ID: 9781813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:32:33.326719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:39.753859
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result this court reaches, I write separately to explain why I agree, given my dissent in the opinion that decided Snyder's related criminal matter.1
The court concludes here that the hearing officer in Snyder's administrative lHeense rev-ccation proceeding erred by failing to give Snyder the benefit of a presumption that an independent blood test would have been favorable to Snyder2 Nonetheless, the court affirms because it holds that the error was harmless3
Snyder's right to that presumption originated in Snyder v. State (Snyder 1),4A this court's opinion in Snyder's criminal appeal. Four members of this court there concluded that the state deprived Snyder of due process when troopers denied his request for an independent blood test.5 The court therefore reversed Snyder's criminal convictions of DWI and refusal to submit to a breath test and remanded.6 It required the trial court on remand to remedy the due process violation by applying the favorable-test presumption.7
For the reasons I discussed at length in my Snyder I dissent,8 I would have held in that case that Snyder had no due process right to an independent blood test. Because I concluded that the state did not deprive Snyder of due process, I also disagreed with applying a favorable-test presumption on remand.9
Were it not for the court's opinion in Sry-der I, I would again conclude that the state did not deny due process to Snyder and that he was consequently not entitled to a presumption that the results of an independent blood test would have been favorable. Therefore, but for Snyder I, I1 would hold that the hearing officer did not err and I would affirm for that reason.
The doctrine of stare decisis normally compels my adherence to the holding of a prior decision of this court, even one in which I dissented. The state has not asked us to reexamine and overrule Snyder I. It has advanced no argument that would permit us to do so. In any event, our prior holding related to Dennis Snyder himself, turned on the identical factual transactions which govern this case, raised the same due process issue Snyder raises here, and created the remedial favorable-test presumption the hearing officer did not apply. Therefore, even assuming stare decisis does not apply, issue preclusion does. Snyder I squarely raised and resolved the same two issues-due process deprivation and the remedial presumption-that arise here, and the dispute involved the identical parties and factual transactions. I am therefore compelled to agree that it was error not to give Snyder the benefit of the presumption. And because I also agree that the error was harmless, I agree to affirm the revocation of Snyder's Heense.

. See Snyder v. State (Snyder I), 930 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1996).

 Op. at 775-777. P

 Op. at 776. »

 930 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1996).

. See id a

. 2a See id. at 1281.

. See id. at 1279-80.

. See id. at 1281-84 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).

. See id. at 1283-84 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting).