Court Opinion

ID: 9755501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:39:40.400243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:08.027829
License: Public Domain

STOWERS, Justice,
with whom CHRISTEN, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court's resolution of this appeal except as to its conclusion regarding the superior court's order on attorney's fees (Part V.D.). Rather than affirming the order denying attorney's fees, because I find the court's order unclear, I would remand and have the superior court clarify its order.
As the court's opinion explains, the Borough sought an award of fees under Rule 68 or Rule 82 as the prevailing party. Gold Country opposed the Rule 68 request, arguing that the Borough was awarded approximately $2,350 in attorney's fees when it prevailed in Gold Country's administrative appeal of the Planning Commission decision. But Gold Country's opposition to the motion for fees also conceded that the Borough could be entitled to fees under Rule 82; indeed, Gold Country filed a proposed order granting the Borough $2,453 in attorney's fees.
The superior court entered judgment in favor of the Borough but denied the Borough's request for attorney's fees under both Rule 68 and Rule 82. The court noted in its order that "the offer to settle made by the borough to Gold Country [was] not addressed in any way to [William] Cramer" and there was "no reason, under these facts, to award any attorney('s] fees ... against Cramer." The court further concluded that the "portion of [Gold Country's] suit which brought under serutiny the ... operation of local government is within the public inter*801est. To this extent an offer by the borough to settle a claim, so as to seek upon prevailing enhanced fees, would chill legitimate suits against the government."
After examining the record thoroughly, I remain uncertain of the basis for the superior court's order denying fees against Gold Country. Its order may indicate that the superior court intended to deny part of the Borough's fees under AS 09.60.010 because some part of the Borough's fees were incurred in connection with Gold Country's due process claim. Under some circumstances, that statute applies when constitutional claims are litigated; in particular, it can shield an unsuccessful litigant from fees associated with constitutional claims.1 But the superior court's order denying fees did not cite AS 09.60.010, nor does it explain how application of this statute could justify the denial of all of the Borough's attorney's fees. Similarly, though the superior court explained its reasons for denying the request for Rule 68 fees against Cramer, it did not explain, and I cannot discern, its reasons for concluding there was not a valid Rule 68 offer as to Gold Country.
I would therefore affirm the superior court's order denying attorney's fees against Cramer. But because I am unable to determine what statutory or rule-based authority the superior court relied upon to deny the Borough's motion for attorney's fees against Gold Country,2 I would remand to the superi- or court for clarification, and to make additional findings, if necessary.
In all other respects, I agree with the court's opinion affirming the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on Gold Country's Open Meetings Act and due process claims.

. Under AS 09.60.010(c)(2), the court "may not order a claimant to pay the attorney fees of the opposing party devoted to claims concerning constitutional rights if the claimant ... did not prevail in asserting the right, the action or appeal asserting the right was not frivolous, and the claimant did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring the action or appeal regardless of the constitutional claims involved."

. The court's opinion does an excellent job of explaining what it thinks the superior court's order sought to accomplish. But I think the court is reading more into the order than is there, and I would prefer to have the superior court explain its reasoning rather than engage in an exercise of legal hermeneutics. *