Court Opinion

ID: 9491877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:26:22.548444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:59.556382
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
joined by ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the court’s decision. I write separately to further address the issue of AM General’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. We have often stated in cases like this one where we address the denial of a Rule 50 motion that once a discrimination case has been submitted to the jury, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis drops out of the picture; the only issue in challenging a verdict is whether the jury’s finding on the ultimate issue — intentional discrimination — is supported by the evidence. E.g., Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir.1998).1 The parties’ discussion of cases applying McDonnell Douglas is a distraction. AM General’s burden on appeal is to show that based on the record evidence the jury could not have found that AM General intentionally discriminated against Wilson because of his age. Here there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of intentional discrimination. AM General concedes that it lied to Wilson about its motives for eliminating his position in the RIF. Although it was not much, Wilson presented some evidence that AM General’s president had age-related animus. And the record evidence was sufficient to support the inference that AM General’s late-proffered reasons for eliminating Wilson were lies. Such evidence indicated the real reason was intentional discrimination — the necessary second step for recovery. Telling was AM General’s unexplained failure to produce Wilson’s personnel file or other evidence corroborating the claimed conflicts with important clients or any supposed counseling regarding those problems. On this record, the jury was free to either infer intentional discrimination or reject that inference, but AM General cannot now complain about the jury’s choice. In affirming we do not need to focus upon the marginally relevant cases addressing the McDonnell Douglas analysis relied upon by the parties.

. It may in fact be more accurate to say that McDonnell Douglas drops out once a case goes to trial, that is, once it is past the summary judgment stage. The Rule 50 motion made after the jury’s verdict is merely a renewal of the motion made prior to the jury deliberations. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2) with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); see also Eastern Natural Gas Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 126 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th Cir.1997) (motion waived if not made at close of proof); and Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1364 (7th Cir.1996) (motion waived if not renewed after jury verdict). And we have held that the renewed motion may not be based on any ground not raised in the original motion. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir.1987); see also Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc., 121 F.3d 998 (5th Cir.1997) (same). Thus because we have repeatedly stated that the McDonnell Douglas analysis is irrelevant to the analysis of the renewed Rule 50 motion after the verdict, it must be equally irrelevant to the original Rule 50 motion made prior to the verdict.