Court Opinion

ID: 9841377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 06:05:23.894141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:00.626153
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   September 21, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 361415
                                                                   Wayne Circuit Court
MICHAEL WAYNE HUGHES,                                              LC No. 20-001266-01-FH

              Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

              Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 361416
                                                                   Wayne Circuit Court
MICHAEL WAYNE HUGHES,                                              LC No. 20-003338-01-FH

              Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In Docket No. 361415, defendant appeals by right the trial court’s judgment of sentence
under which defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated stalking and sentenced as a second-
offense habitual offender to 5 to 7-1/2 years’ imprisonment. In Docket No. 361416, defendant
appeals by right the trial court’s judgment of sentence under which defendant was convicted by a
jury of assault by strangulation and domestic violence and sentenced to 67 months to 10 years’
imprisonment for the assault conviction and 93 days in jail for the domestic violence conviction.
Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

                     I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                               -1-
        Defendant was convicted of assault by strangulation and domestic violence for an incident
involving his former girlfriend in a hotel room on April 21, 2019, in Detroit, Michigan, and of
stalking her from March until October 2019. The victim and defendant were intermittently
involved in a relationship from 2017 until April 2019. The prosecution presented evidence that
while the two were in a hotel room on April 21, 2019, defendant became upset about how the
victim was dressed. When the argument escalated, defendant emptied the victim’s purse, took her
phone, cracked it in half, and threw it. He then threatened to kill the victim as he dragged her by
her hair around the room and strangled her until she briefly passed out. A hotel guest who heard
someone screaming contacted hotel security. The victim regained consciousness when she heard
loud banging on their hotel room door. The police arrested defendant that night but released him
soon thereafter. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant engaged in a series of different
acts against the victim, both before and after the hotel incident, including throwing a brick at her
car, repeated calling and messaging her and her coworkers, and disseminating sexually explicit
photographs and videos of her to her family members and coworkers, and posting such material
on various social media platforms. The prosecutor also presented evidence of other acts of
domestic violence by defendant against the victim, his ex-wife, and another former girlfriend.

        At trial, defendant conceded that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of aggravated stalking, and
acknowledged that there may also be sufficient evidence to prove that defendant committed an act
of domestic violence by pulling the victim’s hair. Defendant argued, however, that the evidence
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of assault by
strangulation because there was no evidence to corroborate the victim’s testimony that defendant
strangled her. Defendant emphasized that the evidence presented during trial supported only the
stalking charge and that there was very little evidence to support the assault by strangulation
charge. Accordingly, defendant asked the jury to acquit him of assault by strangulation. The jury
found defendant guilty of aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i, assault by strangulation, MCL
750.84(1)(b), and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2), and defendant was sentenced as noted
above. This appeal followed.

                                 II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

       Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the
prosecutor to introduce evidence of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence against the victim,
a former girlfriend, and his ex-wife because the evidence was inadmissible under MCL 768.27b(1).
We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251-252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). “The decision to admit evidence
is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed unless that decision falls outside the
range of principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted.) “A decision on a close
evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.” Id. “Preliminary questions of
law, such as whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes the admission of particular evidence,
are reviewed de novo[.]” People v Bynum, 496 Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014).

                                                 -2-
                                           B. ANALYSIS

       MCL 768.27b provides that “in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an
offense involving domestic violence . . . evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of
domestic violence . . . is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant, if it is not otherwise
excluded under Michigan rule of evidence 403.” Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. “A trial court admits
relevant evidence to provide the trier of fact with as much useful information as possible.” People
v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 612; 806 NW2d 371 (2011). A defendant’s propensity to commit
a crime makes it more probable that he committed the charged offense. People v Watkins, 491
Mich 450, 470; 818 NW2d 296 (2012).

        Evidence may be excluded under MRE 403, however, “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
MRE 403. The rule is not, however, intended to exclude evidence simply because it is “damaging,”
as any relevant evidence will be harmful to the defendant to some extent. People v Mills, 450
Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995). Instead, it is “only when the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is
excluded.” Id. Unfair prejudice exists where there is “a danger that marginally probative evidence
will be given undue or pre-emptive weight by the jury” or “it would be inequitable to allow the
proponent of the evidence to use it.” Id. at 75-76. Courts should consider the following factors
when deciding whether to exclude other-acts evidence under MRE 403 as being overly prejudicial:

               (1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the
       temporal proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of
       the other acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the
       evidence supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for
       evidence beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Watkins, 491
       Mich at 487-488.]

When weighing the probative value of other-acts evidence, courts should consider the extent to
which the other-acts evidence supports the victim’s credibility and rebuts any attack on the
victim’s credibility. Id. at 491-492.

              1. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE INVOLVING THE VICTIM’S DOG

         Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his
treatment of the victim’s dog during an act of domestic violence against her because it was unfairly
prejudicial. In particular, the victim was allowed to testify that during an argument in 2017,
defendant put an extension cord around her dog’s throat, held up the dog by the cord, threatened
to kill the dog, and threatened her. Defendant’s commission of other assaults against the victim,
including the frightening and threatening act against her dog in her presence while threatening her,
was relevant to show defendant’s character or propensity to engage in domestic violence against
the victim, as well as to rebut defendant’s claims that he did not assault her in the hotel. See

                                                 -3-
Watkins, 491 Mich at 470. The evidence had a direct bearing on whether defendant had the
propensity to commit the charged acts.

        Defendant contends that admission of the evidence involving his treatment of the victim’s
dog should have been excluded under MRE 403 because its minimal probative value was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Defendant argues that the trial court “lumped” all the
allegations together and failed to weigh the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative
value. We disagree. The record discloses that the trial court addressed the admissibility of the
other-acts evidence in two different hearings, but defendant cites only the trial court’s discussion
from the first hearing. In his brief, defendant ignores the court’s additional discussion at the second
hearing, during which the court examined the allegations regarding the victim’s dog in the context
of comparing it to other evidence the court did not allow because it was unfairly prejudicial. The
court’s discussion from both hearings—including that it did not allow all of the proposed other-
acts evidence, finding some of the evidence to be unfairly prejudicial—demonstrates that the trial
court appropriately engaged in the required analysis.

         Defendant also challenges the first factor from Watkins—the similarity between the other
act and the charged assault—by emphasizing that the other act involved the victim’s dog and there
was no allegation concerning an animal in this case. Despite defendant’s argument, this factor
weighs in favor of admissibility. The other act and the current offense involved defendant’s acts
of domestic violence against the victim. There is no requirement under Watkins that defendant use
identical means in his commission of violence against the same victim during their dating
relationship. Defendant further contends that the victim’s testimony in this regard was not
corroborated by any evidence of harm to the dog, such as a veterinary bill. However, “[i]t is the
province of the jury to determine questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses. As the
trier of fact, the jury is the final judge of credibility.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637; 576
NW2d 129 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, the jury chose to believe
the victim’s account of events, absent corroborating evidence, which it was permitted to do.

        Defendant also argues that the evidence was unduly prejudicial because it portrayed him
as a person who abuses animals, which is “uniquely horrific.” Defendant’s argument merely
demonstrates that the evidence was damaging for the same reasons that it was relevant, which was
to show defendant’s character or propensity to engage in acts of domestic violence against the
victim, which is not a basis for finding that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under MCL
768.27b or MRE 403. Moreover, in its final instructions, the trial court gave a cautionary
instruction to the jury, explaining the limited, permissible use of the evidence, thereby minimizing
any potential for unfair prejudice. It is well established that jurors are presumed to have followed
their instructions. People v Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 13; 798 NW2d 738 (2011). Defendant has
not presented any basis for overcoming the presumption that the jury followed these instructions
and, consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the probative
value of the evidence involving defendant’s treatment of the victim’s dog was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

2. ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT’S FORMER GIRLFRIEND

       Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that
defendant committed acts of assault against a former girlfriend nine years before the incident in

                                                 -4-
the hotel. At trial, the witness testified that in December 2009, defendant dragged his former
girlfriend by her hair, stepped on her face, and strangled her. The evidence that defendant
committed acts of domestic violence against a former girlfriend that were similar to his alleged
acts against the victim was relevant to show defendant’s character or propensity to engage in the
same type of domestic violence against the victim, as well as to rebut defendant’s claims that he
did not assault her in the hotel. Defendant’s primary challenge to the admissibility of the evidence
is that the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403 because of the lack of temporal
proximity of the other acts to the charged crime.

         As defendant acknowledges, however, MCL 768.27b generally precludes “[e]vidence of
an act occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense . . . .” MCL 768.27b(4) (emphasis
added). Further, temporal proximity is but one factor that the court may consider and is not
dispositive on its own. Defendant’s nearly identical acts occurred less than 10 years before the
charged crimes in this case, and defendant has not proffered any persuasive argument to show that
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence.

                           3. DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL RECORD

        We also reject defendant’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial because “other-acts
evidence” regarding his prior criminal history was improperly introduced at trial. Defendant notes
that witnesses were allowed to give “other-acts” testimony that alluded to him having a prior
criminal history. Before trial, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of
defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against his ex-wife, but excluded evidence that
defendant was convicted of domestic violence involving his ex-wife or that he pleaded no contest
to that charge in 2019. In issuing its ruling, however, the trial court twice cautioned defense
counsel that such evidence would be permitted if counsel asked opened-ended questions that
elicited it. Defendant now cites his ex-wife’s testimony on redirect examination that she appeared
in court for defendant’s sentencing in 2019, after defendant pleaded no contest to domestic
violence.

        Defendant’s argument fails because before the cited testimony on cross-examination,
defense counsel asked defendant’s ex-wife about defendant pleading no contest in a case involving
her. The witness responded that she “thought we weren’t supposed to discuss that,” and the trial
court allowed her response that defendant now cites as reversible error. A defendant cannot claim
error on appeal on the basis of an error to which he contributed by plan or negligence. People v
Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 224; 663 NW2d 499 (2003), disapproved of on other grounds by
469 Mich 967 (2003). Thus, given that defendant opened the door to the testimony, defendant
cannot now claim that admission of the evidence was erroneous.

        Defendant also highlights the victim’s “other-acts” testimony that defendant was in jail for
a period in 2019. Contrary to what defendant asserts, this evidence was not offered as other-acts
evidence under MCL 768.27b but was offered to explain why there was a gap in the series of
events concerning the victim and to corroborate the victim’s testimony regarding the timeline.
Thus, the fact that defendant was incarcerated for a period was relevant to the charge of aggravated
stalking as it explained the timeline of events. See MRE 401. Further, to alleviate any potential
for prejudice, the trial court gave two cautionary instructions to the jury and, on both occasions,
defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied with the instructions. Defendant now argues that

                                                -5-
the trial court’s instructions “would not have been enough to overcome the prejudice,” but
defendant has not presented any basis, other than speculation, for overcoming the presumption that
the jury followed the court’s instructions. Breidenbach, 489 Mich at 13. In sum, defendant is not
entitled to a new trial on the basis of the challenged testimony.

                         4. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 768.27B

       Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence under MCL
768.27b because the statute is unconstitutional.1 Defendant asserts that the use of propensity
evidence is fundamentally unfair and violates his right to due process. We disagree.

        MCL 768.27b reflects the Legislature’s policy choice to allow juries to consider evidence
of other acts for propensity purposes in certain cases. See Cameron, 291 Mich App at 609-610.
“There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due
process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence.” Bugh v
Mitchell, 329 F3d 496, 512 (CA 6, 2003).2 Furthermore, evidence offered under MCL 768.27b is
subject to the requirement that the evidence be relevant and the requirement that its probative value
not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. These procedural safeguards
are considered sufficient to protect a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial. See United
States v LeMay, 260 F3d 1018, 1026 (CA 9, 2001) (concluding there was “nothing fundamentally
unfair about the allowance of propensity evidence . . . [a]s long as the protections of Rule 403
remain in place . . . .”). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that MCL 768.27b is
unconstitutional.

                                  III. JOINDER OF OFFENSES

       Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the prosecutor’s
motion to consolidate the two cases for trial. We disagree.

                                 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

         Whether joinder is appropriate is a mixed question of fact and law. People v Williams, 483
Mich 226, 231; 769 NW2d 605 (2009). “To determine whether joinder is permissible, a trial court
must first find the relevant facts and then must decide whether those facts constitute ‘related’
offenses for which joinder is appropriate.” Id. This Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings
for clear error, but reviews its interpretation of MCR 6.120(B), which is a question of law, de novo.
Id. The ultimate decision on permissive joinder of related charges lies “firmly within the discretion
of trial courts.” Breidenbach, 489 Mich at 14.

1
  Because defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of MCL 768.27b in the trial court, we
review this unpreserved constitutional issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
2
  Caselaw from lower federal courts is not binding on this Court but may be considered as
persuasive authority. Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich 751, 764 n 6; 918 NW2d 785 (2018).

                                                 -6-
                                           B. ANALYSIS

       MCR 6.120(B) states, in pertinent part:

              (B) Postcharging Permissive Joinder or Severance. On its own initiative,
       the motion of a party, or the stipulation of all parties . . . the court may join offenses
       charged in two or more informations or indictments against a single
       defendant . . . when appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair
       determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.

               (1) Joinder is appropriate if the offenses are related. For purposes of this
       rule, offenses are related if they are based on

               (a) the same conduct or transaction, or

               (b) a series of connected acts, or

               (c) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

               (2) Other relevant factors include the timeliness of the motion, the drain on
       the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice stemming from either
       the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the potential for
       harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.

        Joinder of the offenses was appropriate under MCR 6.120(B)(1)(c). Offenses are “related”
for purposes of MCR 6.120(B)(1)(c) when the evidence indicates that the “defendant engaged in
ongoing acts constituting parts of his overall scheme or plan.” Williams, 483 Mich at 235.
Defendant does not dispute that the two cases are related. Indeed, the evidence indicated ongoing
acts related to an overall plan of engaging in acts of violence against a domestic partner. All of
the charged offenses involved the same victim, and all of the acts arose from the same domestic
relationship and involved acts of domestic violence, and the timeframe for the series of different
acts of stalking against the victim overlapped with the date of the charged acts of assault by
strangulation and domestic violence in the hotel room. There was little potential for confusion
because the two cases were presented distinctively, and the facts were not complex.

        Moreover, defendant has not established prejudice. As the trial court found, if each case
was tried separately, the evidence supporting each charge would have been admissible in each
trial. “The admissibility of evidence in other trials is an important consideration because ‘[j]oinder
of . . . other crimes cannot prejudice the defendant more than he would have been by the
admissibility of the other evidence in a separate trial.’ ” Williams, 483 Mich at 237 (citation
omitted). Defendant contends that he was prejudiced because the evidence supporting the stronger
stalking case was predominate, cumulative, and impeded the jury’s ability to separate the assault
by strangulation offense from the stalking offense. Defendant speculates that the jury had the
impression that if he stalked the victim then he must have been guilty of assault by strangulation.
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, however, the court separately instructed the jury on each
offense and instructed that the prosecutor must meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for each element. As stated previously, juries are presumed to follow their instructions.
Breidenbach, 489 Mich at 13. Other than mere speculation, which is inadequate, defendant has

                                                    -7-
not presented any basis for overcoming the presumption that the jury followed these instructions.
In sum, joinder of the offenses was appropriate, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the prosecution’s motion for consolidation.

                                        IV. SENTENCING

       Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it assigned 25 points to the scoring
of prior record variable (“PRV”) 1 (prior high-severity felony convictions) on the basis of
defendant’s out-of-state conviction of aggravated battery. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        When reviewing a trial court’s scoring decision, the trial court’s “factual determinations
are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People
v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate
to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law,
is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

          PRV 1 is scored for “prior high severity felony convictions,” MCL 777.51(1), and PRV 2
is scored for “prior low severity felony convictions.” MCL 777.52(1). For purposes of PRV 1, a
prior high severity felony conviction includes a “felony under a law of . . . another state
corresponding to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, or D” or a “felony under a law
of . . . another state that does not correspond to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E,
F, G, or H and that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more.” MCL
777.51(2)(b) and (d). Consistent with MCL 777.51(1)(c), defendant was assessed 25 points for
PRV 1 for having one prior high-severity felony conviction, which was for his plea-based
conviction of aggravated battery in Florida, in violation of Fla Stat 784.045:

               A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:

               1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent
       disability, or permanent disfigurement; or

               2. Uses a deadly weapon.

Aggravated battery under Fla Stat 784.045 is a second-degree felony, punishable by a maximum
term of 15 years’ imprisonment. See Fla Stat 775.082(3)(d).

       Defendant argues that the Florida offense does not qualify as a high-severity felony under
MCL 777.51(2) because it is equivalent to Michigan’s offense of felonious assault, MCL 750.82,
which is a low-severity felony. MCL 750.82(1) provides:

               Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who assaults another person
       with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass knuckles, or other dangerous
       weapon without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less

                                                 -8-
       than murder is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4
       years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.

        The trial court correctly rejected defendant’s argument that the Florida offense of
aggravated battery corresponds to felonious assault in Michigan. The Florida aggravated-battery
statute plainly requires the commission of an actual battery, which requires that the defendant
either “[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement” or “[u]ses a deadly weapon.” Fla Stat 784.045(1)(a). In Michigan, felonious
assault is a simple assault that is aggravated by the use of a weapon and does not require the
commission of an actual battery. See People v Jones, 443 Mich 88, 100; 504 NW2d 158 (1993).
“An assault may be established by showing either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful
act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v
Starks, 473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 136 (2005). Thus, Florida’s aggravated-battery statute
does not correspond to Michigan’s felonious-assault offense. Because defendant’s Florida
conviction does not correspond with an applicable crime in Michigan, the trial court properly
considered whether the conviction was “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10
years or more.” MCL 777.51(2)(d)(emphasis added). Defendant does not dispute that the crime
of aggravated battery in Florida is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years.
Consequently, the trial court did not err by finding that defendant’s Florida conviction qualifies as
a high-severity felony and assessing 25 points to PRV 1.

                    V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 769.1K(1)(B)(iii)

        In his last argument on appeal, defendant asserts that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is
unconstitutional because it (1) infringes on his due-process right to appear before an impartial
judge because trial court judges are incentivized to convict defendants in order to impose costs to
raise money to fund the courts, and (2) violates the separation of powers because the funding
arrangement created by the statute prevents the judicial branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions of maintaining impartiality in criminal proceedings. As
defendant recognizes, however, this Court considered and rejected these same constitutional
arguments in People v Johnson, 336 Mich App 688, 692-705; 971 NW2d 692 (2021). Defendant
has failed to present any basis for distinguishing Johnson, which this Court is bound to follow
under MCR 7.215(J)(1). Consequently, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief with respect to
this issue.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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