Court Opinion

ID: 9962099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 19:01:43.875175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:51.251664
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
              C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                            ________________________

                                 No. ACM 40298
                            ________________________

                               UNITED STATES
                                   Appellee
                                          v.
                         Terry L. PITTMAN III
              Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                            ________________________
        Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary 1
                             Decided 22 April 2024
                            ________________________
Military Judge: Christina M. Jimenez (pretrial motions and arraign-
ment); Dayle P. Percle.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 19 April 2022 by GCM convened at Malm-
strom Air Force Base, Montana. Sentence entered by military judge on
9 May 2022: Confinement for 8 months, reduction to E-1, and a repri-
mand.
For Appellant: Colonel Anthony D. Ortiz, USAF; Major Jenna M. Ar-
royo, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Major
Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Captain Kate E. Lee, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne,
Esquire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, GRUEN, and MENDELSON, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge MENDELSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge ANNEXSTAD and Judge GRUEN joined.
                            ________________________

1 Appellant appeals his conviction under Article 66(b)(1)(A), Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2019 ed.) (2019 MCM), having been sentenced to more than six months’ confinement.
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                       ________________________
MENDELSON, Judge:
    A general court-martial comprised of a military judge sitting alone con-
victed Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of assault, in vio-
lation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 928; one specification of making a false official statement, in violation of Ar-
ticle 107, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 907; and one specification of communicating a
threat, in violation of Article 115, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 915.2 The military judge
sentenced Appellant to eight months of confinement, reduction to the grade of
E-1, and a reprimand. The convening authority took no action on the findings
or sentence.
    Appellant raises several assignments of error, which we have rephrased
and reordered as follows: (1) whether Article 115, UCMJ, is unconstitutionally
vague, or the charged Article 115, UCMJ, specification fails to state an offense;
(2) whether Appellant’s conviction for the Article 115, UCMJ, specification is
legally and factually sufficient; and (3) whether Appellant was denied his right
to a speedy trial under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 707 or the Sixth
Amendment.3 We also considered an additional issue, not raised by Appellant,
that was identified during this court’s Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d),
review: (4) whether Appellant is entitled to relief for facially unreasonable ap-
pellate delay in accordance with United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F.
2006), or United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Additionally, we
have identified an error in the entry of judgment (EoJ), which we correct in our
decree. We find no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights
occurred and affirm the findings and sentence.

                                  I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant’s fiancée sent him a text message claiming she had been raped
by TLP, an active duty Airman.4 After receiving the text message, Appellant
told two of his friends that he wanted to confront TLP, and the three drove to
the parking lot outside of TLP’s dorm room. Appellant called TLP from the

2 Unless otherwise specified, all references to the UCMJ and Rules for Courts-Martial

(R.C.M.) are to the 2019 MCM.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

4 TLP testified at trial that he did not sexually assault Appellant’s fiancée and was not

facing court-martial charges for the alleged offense.

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                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

parking lot and told him that he needed help with a broken-down car, as a ruse
to get TLP to come outside. Once TLP walked into the parking lot, Appellant
confronted him by asking if he knew his fiancée. When TLP denied knowing
Appellant’s fiancée, Appellant became angry and pulled a handgun from his
waistband, sliding the action of the gun back as if to charge a round in the
chamber.5 According to TLP’s testimony, upon seeing the gun he asked Appel-
lant whether he was going to shoot him. Appellant responded “yes.” TLP re-
plied that Appellant should “go ahead and shoot” him, and Appellant told TLP
to get on his knees and beg for mercy. When TLP refused, Appellant hit TLP
on the back of the head with the gun.

                                 II. DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Challenges
    Appellant contends, for the first time on appeal, that Article 115, UCMJ, is
unconstitutionally vague on its face, or in the alternative that the charged Ar-
ticle 115, UCMJ, specification fails to state an offense, because the requisite
mens rea is not specified. We are not persuaded and find no relief is warranted.
   1. Law
      a. Standard of Review
    We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Ali,
71 M.J. 256, 265 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing United States v. Disney, 62 M.J. 46, 48
(C.A.A.F. 2005)). “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
    Likewise, whether a specification fails to state an offense is a question of
law that we review de novo. United States v. Turner, 79 M.J. 401, 404 (C.A.A.F.
2020) (citation omitted). “Although a claim that a specification fails to state an
offense may be made at any time, if the claim is first raised after trial then the
deficient specification will be viewed with greater tolerance and will be liber-
ally constru[ed] in favor of validity.” Id. at 405 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he claim will fail ‘absent a clear showing of sub-
stantial prejudice to the accused – such as showing that the [specification] is
so obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to
charge the offense for which conviction was had.’” Id. at 406 (quoting United
States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1965)).

5 While TLP was not aware of it at the time, the gun was not loaded with ammunition.

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                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

      b. Fair Notice
   The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment6 “requires ‘fair notice’ that
an act is forbidden and subject to criminal sanction” before a person can be
prosecuted for committing that act. United States v. Vaughan, 58 M.J. 29, 31
(C.A.A.F. 2003) (quoting United States v. Bivins, 49 M.J. 328, 330 (C.A.A.F.
1998)). “It also requires fair notice as to the standard applicable to the forbid-
den conduct.” Id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974)). In other
words, “[v]oid for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should
not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated
conduct is proscribed.” Parker, 417 U.S. at 757 (citing United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
   Likewise, the Sixth Amendment provides that an accused shall “be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
       Thus, when an accused servicemember is charged with an of-
       fense at court-martial, each specification will be found constitu-
       tionally sufficient only if it alleges, either expressly or by neces-
       sary implication, every element of the offense, so as to give the
       accused notice [of the charge against which he must defend] and
       protect him against double jeopardy.
Turner, 79 M.J. at 403 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
    Thus, the constitutional concern implicated in both doctrines is one of fair
notice. Our superior court has identified several potential sources of “fair no-
tice,” including “the MCM, federal law, state law, military case law, military
custom and usage, and military regulations.” Vaughan, 58 M.J. at 31 (citations
omitted).
      c. Article 115, UCMJ
    Appellant was convicted of communicating a threat in violation of Article
115, UCMJ, which required the Government to prove the following three ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant communicated certain lan-
guage, expressing a present determination or intent to injure TLP presently or
in the future; (2) that the communication was made known to TLP; and (3) that
the communication was wrongful. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2019 ed.) (2019 MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 53.b.(1). With respect to the third ele-
ment, “the mental state requirement is satisfied if the accused transmitted the

6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

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                   United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the
communication will be viewed as a threat.” Id. at ¶ 53.c.(2).
       d. Mens Rea
    A central tenet of criminality is that “a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in
mind’ before he can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time
through various terms such as mens rea, scienter, malice aforethought, guilty
knowledge, and the like.” Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015)
(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)) (additional cita-
tion omitted). Silence in a statute does not prevent mens rea from being in-
ferred. United States v. Gifford, 75 M.J. 140, 142 (C.A.A.F. 2016). “[T]he Su-
preme Court has repeatedly inferred a mens rea requirement in instances
where it was necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent
conduct . . . .” Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The United States Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct.
2106 (2023), recently clarified the mens rea requirement for communicating a
“true threat” which falls outside First Amendment7 protections.8 The Supreme
Court held the defendant must have “some understanding of his statements’
threatening character,” and that “a recklessness standard is enough” to lie out-
side the First Amendment’s protection. Id. at 2113. In reaching its holding, the
Supreme Court summarized the hierarchy of “the three basic choices” of mens
rea under a subjective standard:
        Purpose is the most culpable level in the standard mental-state
        hierarchy, and the hardest to prove. A person acts purposefully
        when he “consciously desires” a result—so here, when he wants
        his words to be received as threats. Next down, though not often
        distinguished from purpose, is knowledge. A person acts know-
        ingly when “he is aware that [a] result is practically certain to
        follow”—so here, when he knows to a practical certainty that
        others will take his words as threats. A greater gap separates
        those two from recklessness. A person acts recklessly, in the most
        common formulation, when he “consciously disregard[s] a sub-
        stantial [and unjustifiable] risk that the conduct will cause harm
        to another.” That standard involves insufficient concern with
        risk, rather than awareness of impending harm. But still,

7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

8 “True threats are ‘serious expression[s]’ conveying that a speaker means to ‘commit

an act of unlawful violence.’” Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2114 (alteration in the original)
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). “True threats of violence, every-
one agrees, lie outside the bounds of the First Amendment’s protection.” Id. at 2113.

                                              5
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

       recklessness is morally culpable conduct, involving a “deliberate
       decision to endanger another.”
Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2117 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (ci-
tations omitted). The Supreme Court continued on to explain that “[i]n the
threats context, [recklessly] means that a speaker is aware ‘that others could
regard his statements as’ threatening violence and ‘delivers them anyway.’” Id.
(footnote omitted) (quoting Elonis, 575 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has set
forth the mens rea requirement embedded within the UCMJ offense of com-
municating a threat, most recently in United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408
(C.A.A.F. 2023), albeit in an Article 134, UCMJ, context.9 The court explained
the subjective standard that applies to the third element:
       In contrast to the first element, the third element’s requirement
       of wrongfulness is properly understood in relation to the subjec-
       tive intent of the speaker. In determining if the speaker’s subjec-
       tive intent was wrongful under the third element, the key ques-
       tion is not whether the speaker intended to carry out the object
       of the threat, but rather “whether the speaker intended his or
       her words to be understood as sincere.”
Harrington, 83 M.J. at 414 (citations omitted). As the court previously ex-
plained in United Sates v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164 (C.A.A.F. 2016), the subjective
intent of “wrongful” relates to mens rea because “a contrary understanding

9 The substantive elements of the Article 115, UCMJ, offense mirror those of the former

Article 134, UCMJ, offense, with the exception that the Article 134, UCMJ, terminal
element is no longer applicable. See 2019 MCM, App. 17, at A17-9. The 2019 MCM also
notes that in “migrating” this offense from Article 134 to Article 115, UCMJ, it explic-
itly incorporated the prior caselaw interpretations to the “explanation” sections of the
Article 115, UCMJ, offense. Id. (“The explanations for threat and wrongful are
amended and are consistent with Elonis v. United States, [575 U.S. 723] (2015), and
United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164 (C.A.A.F. 2016).”). Specifically, the explanatory
paragraph in the 2019 MCM was amended from the 2016 version to no longer include
acting recklessly as a sufficient mens rea to demonstrate wrongfulness. Compare Man-
ual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 110.c. (“[T]o establish that
the communication was wrongful it is necessary that the accused transmitted the com-
munication for the purpose of issuing a threat, with the knowledge that the communi-
cation would be viewed as a threat, or acted recklessly with regard to whether the
communication would be viewed as a threat.”), with 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 53.c.(2)
(“[T]he mental state requirement is satisfied if the accused transmitted the communi-
cation for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication
will be viewed as a threat.”).

                                             6
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

would render the third element superfluous.” Id. at 169 (footnote and citation
omitted).10
    Although Harrington (issued in August 2023) omitted mention of the Su-
preme Court decision in Counterman (issued in June 2023), we note Counter-
man does not change the Article 115, UCMJ, evidentiary landscape because
Counterman endorses the same subjective intent standard that “the defendant
must have some understanding of his statements’ threatening character.”
Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2113. While Counterman held a reckless mens rea
“is enough” to establish the subjective standard, Article 115, UCMJ, requires
a more culpable level—“wrongful”—which is defined in the 2019 MCM as a
purposeful or knowing mens rea. Compare Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2133,
with 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 53.c.(2).
   2. Analysis
    Appellant contends that, in light of Counterman, Article 115, UCMJ, is un-
constitutionally vague on its face because neither the 2019 MCM nor military
case law specify the mens rea necessary to establish wrongfulness. In the al-
ternative, Appellant argues the charged Article 115, UCMJ, specification fails
to state an offense because it does not allege the requisite mens rea. We find
Appellant’s arguments fail because both Article 115, UCMJ, and the charged
specification provide fair notice that Appellant’s acts were subject to criminal
sanction.
    On appeal, Appellant first argues “no source of military law, including the
statute, the MCM, or case law, establishes the level of mens rea that the Gov-
ernment must prove wrongfulness under Article 115[, UCMJ].” We disagree.
While silence in a statute does not prevent mens rea from being inferred,
Gifford, 75 M.J. at 142, we are not faced with a silent statute. The third ele-
ment of Article 115, UCMJ, explicitly provides that the communication be
“wrongful,” and “[t]he wrongfulness of [an] act obviously relates to mens rea.”
United States v. King, 34 M.J. 95, 97 (C.M.A. 1992). The President’s explana-
tion in the 2019 MCM, which serves as a source of “fair notice,” Vaughan, 58
M.J. at 31, defines the “wrongful” mental state as one in which “the accused
transmitted the communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with
knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” 2019 MCM, pt.

10 “The wrongfulness of [an] act obviously relates to mens rea (not elsewhere specified

amongst the elements) and lack of a defense, such as excuse or justification.” United
States v. King, 34 M.J. 95, 97 (C.M.A. 1992); accord United States v. Thomas, 65 M.J.
132, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (“The word ‘wrongful,’ like the words ‘willful,’ ‘malicious,’
‘fraudulent,’ etc., when used in criminal statutes, implies a perverted evil mind in the
doer of the act.” (Citation omitted)).

                                             7
                   United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

IV, ¶ 53.c.(2) (emphasis added). Thus, Appellant was on fair notice that com-
municating a threat with either a purposeful mens rea (with the purpose of
issuing a threat) or knowing mens rea (with knowledge that the communica-
tion will be viewed as a threat) is subject to criminal sanction.
    Appellant suggests that the MCM’s failure to further define the phrases
“for the purpose of” and “with knowledge” creates confusion. This suggestion
ignores well-established case law that sets forth and defines the hierarchy of
mens rea. See Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2117 (“A person acts purposefully
when he ‘consciously desires’ a result . . . . A person acts knowingly when ‘he is
aware that [a] result is practically certain to follow’ . . . .” (Alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a) (a person
acts purposefully when “it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result”), 2.02(2)(b) (a person acts knowingly when “he
is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result”).
    Appellant further contends that Counterman stands for the proposition
that only one of the three levels of subjective mens rea must be adopted by a
criminal statute, and that the 2019 MCM “muddies the waters” by adopting
two differing levels of mens rea. This interpretation misconstrues the Supreme
Court’s holding in Counterman. Counterman addresses, in the context of com-
municating a threat, the minimum level of mens rea that is required to estab-
lish criminality outside the First Amendment’s protections. In answering this
question, the Supreme Court held that “a recklessness standard is enough.”
Counterman, 143 S. Ct. at 2113. There is nothing in Counterman to suggest
more demanding levels of mens rea would constitutionally fail. The 2019 MCM
provides clear notice of a higher mens rea requirement for an Article 115,
UCMJ, offense—a purposeful mens rea (with the purpose of issuing a threat)
or knowing mens rea (with knowledge that the communication will be viewed
as a threat). 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 53.c.(2).11 We find no reasonable risk of con-
fusion where the 2019 MCM provides fair notice that the two highest levels of
culpability satisfy the mens rea requirement for an Article 115, UCMJ, offense.
   In sum, Appellant’s constitutional challenges fail. We find that Article 115,
UCMJ, provides fair notice that Appellant’s conduct was forbidden and subject
to criminal sanction. See Vaughan, 58 M.J. at 31. Moreover, we find the

11 In the hierarchy of culpable mental states, it is black letter law that proof of a higher

mens rea satisfies proof of a less culpable mental state. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(5) (“When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also
is established if a person acts purposely.”); see also Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
1817, 1823 (2021) (plurality opinion) (noting a limited and narrow distinction between
a purposeful and knowing mental state).

                                               8
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

charged specification is constitutionally sufficient as it expressly alleges every
element of the offense. See Turner, 79 M.J. at 403.
B. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
   Appellant argues that his conviction for communicating a threat is legally
and factually insufficient. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s claims.
   1. Additional Background
    The Article 115, UCMJ, specification alleges: “In that [Appellant] . . . did,
at or near Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, on or about 11 December 2020,
wrongfully communicate to [TLP] a threat to shoot him with a firearm.”
    During direct examination by trial counsel, TLP testified about the series
of events that unfolded once he walked out into the parking lot, believing he
was going to help a stranded Airman with a broken-down vehicle:
       Q. And then, what happens?
       A. Can you give me a second?
       Q. It’s okay.
       [[TLP] took a long pause and had tears on his face.]
       A. [Appellant] asked me, did I know who [his fiancée] was, and
       [I] said, “No,” because I didn’t know who she was. And then, he
       took out his weapon and charged it.
       Q. Okay. When you said, “Charged it,” what do you mean by
       that?
       A. [Indiscernible word] and cocked it back. So, he put one in the
       chamber.
       Q. When you’re saying, “It,” what are you referring to?
       A. The bullet.
       Q. Okay. You said a gun?
       A. Yes, ma’am.
       Q. Okay. Where did he pull the gun out of?
       A. I’m not too sure about that.
       Q. Okay. Was this a stressful situation for you?
       A. Not at the time, no.
       ....

                                          9
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

       Q. So you see him pull out a gun, what is going through your
       head when he pulls it out?
       A. At first I thought -- I asked him if he was going to shoot me,
       first off, to confirm he was going to kill me. And he said, “Yes,”
       so I was like -- I guess it was -- I originally thought that this was
       like a terrible place [to] die, but I was like, “Okay.”
       Q. Okay. So he says yes, he’s going to shoot you, what happens
       next?
       A. Then I told him to go ahead and shoot me. And then he got
       frustrated and he told me to get on my knees and beg for mercy.
       And I said, “No.” And he got mad and he hit me with the gun.
   On cross-examination, trial defense counsel asked TLP further questions
about the series of events:
       Q. At that point [Appellant] asked you if you knew who [his fi-
       ancée] was?
       A. Yes.
       Q. And at first you didn’t remember who she was?
       A. No, sir.
       Q. So you told him you didn’t know [Appellant’s fiancée]?
       A. Yes.
       Q. And then you saw him pull a gun out?
       A. Yes.
       Q. And when you saw that, you laughed at [Appellant], right?
       A. Yes.
       Q. You weren’t afraid of him, were you?
       A. No.
       Q. In fact, you told him to shoot you?
       A. Yes, sir.
       Q. And after you told him to shoot you is when he hit you?
       A. Yes, sir.
    On redirect examination, TLP provided further explanation of his reaction
in the moment when Appellant pulled out and charged the gun:

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                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

       Q. Okay. Now, I want to talk to you again about what you were
       feeling when [Appellant] was going through the gun, what emo-
       tions were you feeling?
       A. I didn’t feel anything. I just le[ft] it up to faith actually.
       Q. Okay. Now, why did you tell [Appellant] to shoot you?
       [Lengthy period of silence.]
       A. I just felt like, if that’s what he wanted to do, then so be it.
    While TLP testified that he asked Appellant whether he was going to shoot
him, the other two percipient witnesses to the events—Appellant’s two friends
who accompanied him, Airman First Class (A1C) RLL and A1C DRW—testi-
fied at trial that they did not recall Appellant threatening to shoot TLP.
A1C RLL testified that he “really can’t remember” Appellant threatening to
shoot TLP. A1C DRW testified “[t]his is kind of where it gets foggy” when asked
what Appellant said to TLP. A1C DRW explained, “There’s some kind of dia-
logue, I can’t remember what it was, cause like I said, I was in like a shocked
state.” Later, on cross-examination, A1C DRW clarified that he could not re-
member what TLP said, if anything.
   2. Law
  We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States
v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term reasonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean that the evidence must be free from conflict.” United States
v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v.
Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every rea-
sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.”
United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
As a result, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold
to sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The test for legal sufficiency “gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1973)).

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                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

    “The test for factual sufficiency is ‘whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses,’ [this] court is ‘convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.’” United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987)). “In conducting this
unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying
‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our]
own independent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof
of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399). As an evidentiary
standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require more than one wit-
ness to testify credibly. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 383
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (explaining the testimony of a single witness may satisfy the
Government’s burden to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt). This court’s review of the factual sufficiency of evidence for
findings is limited to the evidence admitted at trial. See Article 66(d), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866(d); United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
(citations omitted).
    The offense of communicating a threat encompasses both an objective and
a subjective standard. Harrington, 83 M.J. at 414. An assessment of whether
the language was sufficiently “threatening”—the first element—is judged from
the objective perspective from the viewpoint of a “reasonable person in the re-
cipient’s place.” Id. (citation omitted). An assessment of whether the speaker
intended the target of his communication to perceive it as a threat, or that he
knew the intended target would interpret it as a threat—the third element—
is viewed from the subjective perspective of the speaker. Id. (citation omitted).
In conducting the objective/subjective analysis, context matters and words
should not be considered in a vacuum. United States v. Brown, 65 M.J. 227,
231 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (“Context gives meaning to literal statements.”).
       Divorcing [the words] from their surroundings and their impact
       on the intended subject is illogical and unnatural. Legal analysis
       of a threat must take into account both the words used and the
       surrounding circumstances. Without such a subtle examination
       absurd results might arise, defeating both the text and purpose
       of paragraph [53.b.] of the [2019 MCM].
Id. at 232.
    With respect to the objective assessment of whether the language was suf-
ficiently threatening, “[a]lthough the recipient’s reaction to the alleged threat
provides useful context, it does not control any element of communicating a
threat . . . .” Harrington, 83 M.J. at 415. Even if the trier of fact found the

                                          12
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

recipient “did not actually feel threatened . . . the [factfinder] could neverthe-
less have concluded that [the recipient’s] reaction simply differed from that of
a reasonable person.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Phillips,
42 M.J. 127, 130 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (“Our only concern is whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person
in the recipient’s place would perceive the contested statement by appellant to
be a threat.” (Citations omitted)).
    With respect to the subjective assessment of the speaker’s intent, “the sur-
rounding circumstances may so belie or contradict the language of the decla-
ration as to reveal it to be a mere jest or idle banter.” United States v. Gilluly,
32 C.M.R. 458, 461 (C.M.A. 1963) (citations omitted). “A statement made under
such circumstances . . . is not wrongful.” 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 53.c.(2).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant contends his conviction for wrongful communication of a threat
is neither legally nor factually sufficient because the evidence does not estab-
lish the first and third elements. Specifically, Appellant argues (1) the Govern-
ment did not present sufficient evidence that Appellant made any communica-
tion as alleged in the specification; (2) any communication Appellant made does
not objectively qualify as a threat; and (3) the Government failed to establish
Appellant’s subjective intent to threaten TLP. For the reasons set forth below,
each of these arguments fail, and none of them undermine our confidence that
the evidence presented at trial established Appellant’s guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. Instead, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Appel-
lant directed a threatening communication towards TLP, which an objective
observer in TLP’s place would have perceived as a threat to shoot him. We also
conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant intended his
communication to be perceived by TLP as a threat, or at a minimum, knew
that TLP would perceive his threat as sincere. See Harrington, 83 M.J. at 414.
      a. Element 1 – Threatening Language
         i) Communication
    We are unconvinced by Appellant’s argument that the Government failed
to present sufficient evidence that he made any communication as alleged in
the specification. The specification alleges that Appellant communicated a
threat to shoot TLP with a firearm. At trial on direct examination, TLP testi-
fied that Appellant pulled out a gun and charged the weapon, as if to load a
bullet into the chamber. Upon seeing the gun, TLP “asked [Appellant] if he was
going to shoot [TLP], first off, to confirm [Appellant] was going to kill [him].
And [Appellant] said, ‘Yes.’” In this context, where Appellant drew a gun and
appeared to load a bullet into the chamber, we have no hesitation in concluding
a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s
                                          13
                United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

affirmative response of “yes,” to the question of whether he was going to shoot
TLP, constituted a communication of an intent to shoot TLP. Brown, 65 M.J.
at 231 (“Context gives meaning to literal statements.”).
    Neither TLP’s testimony on cross-examination, nor A1C RLL’s and
A1C DRW’s testimony that they did not recall a threat, disturbs our finding.
Appellant argues that TLP testified to a different version of events on cross-
examination in which Appellant “appeared to say nothing.” This argument
misconstrues the testimony. On cross-examination, TLP was asked a series of
leading questions, to which he gave yes or no answers. Significantly, TLP was
not asked on cross-examination about his question to Appellant nor about Ap-
pellant’s response. The fact that TLP did not testify on cross-examination
about Appellant’s communication of a threat was simply because he was not
asked about it, not because he was providing a different version of events.
TLP’s testimony on cross-examination in no way conflicted with his testimony
on direct examination about the question he asked—“I asked him if he was
going to shoot me”—and Appellant’s response—“he said, ‘Yes.’”
    Moreover, the fact that Appellant’s two friends, A1C RLL and A1C DRW,
could not recall what was said between Appellant and TLP once Appellant
drew the gun does not directly contradict TLP’s testimony. While A1C DRW
could not remember what was said because he was in a “shocked state,” he
nonetheless corroborated that there was “some kind of dialogue.” While their
testimony that they did not recall a threat could arguably be construed as evi-
dence that there was no threat communicated, in testing for legal sufficiency
we must draw every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the
Government. See Barner, 56 M.J. at 134. Moreover, in testing for factual suffi-
ciency, we find TLP’s testimony sufficiently credible that we are ourselves con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the threat was communicated. See Ro-
driguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. at 383.
         ii) Objective standard of “threatening” language
     Whether language qualifies as “threatening” for purposes of Article 115,
UCMJ, is measured from a “reasonable person in the recipient’s place”—that
is, from an objective perspective evaluating both the language of the commu-
nication itself as well as its surrounding context. Harrington, 83 M.J. at 414.
In the context of Appellant pulling out a gun and appearing to load a bullet
into the chamber, we conclude an objective person in TLP’s position would have
interpreted Appellant’s affirmative response—his answer “yes” to the question
of whether he was going to shoot TLP—as objectively threatening.
   Appellant seeks to avoid this conclusion by suggesting that “a mere affir-
mation to a question” may not qualify as threatening under the definition in
the 2019 MCM. While the literal word “yes” in a vacuum has no threatening
                                        14
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

connotation, we are not conducting our analysis in a vacuum. See Brown, 65
M.J. at 231–32 (“The words communicated certainly matter because they are
the starting point in analyzing a possible threat. But words are used in con-
text.”). In this context, where Appellant angrily confronted TLP with an appar-
ently charged gun, Appellant’s one-word answer of “yes” is fairly understood
as “yes, I am going to shoot you.” A reasonable person in TLP’s shoes would
have viewed Appellant’s response as objectively threatening in this context.
    Though not specifically argued by Appellant, we note that TLP’s subjective
response does not alter our findings. TLP testified that he was not afraid and
that he responded to the threat by laughing and telling Appellant to “go ahead
and shoot” him. He later clarified that he “didn’t feel anything” and “le[ft] it up
to faith.” While TLP may not have responded in a way that aligns with precon-
ceived notions of how someone would respond to a threatening situation, our
concern is not with TLP’s response—instead our concern is whether a reason-
able person in TLP’s place would have perceived the communication as threat-
ening. Harrington, 83 M.J. at 415 (“Although the recipient’s reaction to the
alleged threat provides useful context, it does not control any element of com-
municating a threat . . . .”). We are satisfied that, even if TLP himself did not
actually feel threatened, a reasonable person would have. Id. (concluding that
even if the recipient “did not actually feel threatened . . . the [factfinder] could
nevertheless have concluded that [the recipient’s] reaction simply differed from
that of a reasonable person”).
      b. Element 3 – Wrongful
   Whether the communication was wrongful for purposes of Article 115,
UCMJ, requires a subjective assessment of whether the speaker intended the
target of his communication to perceive it as a threat, or whether he knew he
would interpret it as a threat. Id. at 414. On this point, Appellant argues the
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate wrongfulness because “the evidence ap-
peared to show that [Appellant] was on ‘autopilot’ when he answered to an
escalating situation rather than actually intending to threaten [TLP] by his
words.” We reject the implication that Appellant’s own actions in escalating a
confrontation he initiated while brandishing a firearm absolve him of crimi-
nality.
    The wrongfulness of a threat is not reliant upon an accused’s intent to im-
plement it, but on his intent that the threat be “understood as sincere.” Id.
(quoting Rapert, 75 M.J. at 169 n.10). Indeed, the fact that a threat was uttered
while Appellant was in an agitated state demonstrates that it was more, not
less, likely to be understood as sincere. As our superior court explained in
United States v. Davis, “[t]hreats are most likely to be made while the
speaker is in an emotional state, and those are the threats most likely to speak

                                          15
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

the truth about the speaker’s seriousness . . . .” 19 C.M.R. 160, 163 (C.M.A.
1955).
    While we acknowledge it is also possible that in an agitated state the
speaker could say something outrageous without intent to execute the threat-
ened act, that fact alone does not undercut “wrongfulness” because it does not
undercut the likelihood that the speaker wants their message to be perceived
as sincere. Here, the evidence demonstrates that, in the heat of passion of be-
lieving TLP had sexually assaulted his fiancée, Appellant brandished a firearm
and appeared to load a bullet into the chamber while responding “yes” he was
going to shoot TLP. In evaluating the surrounding context, we see no evidence
that would indicate anything other than the Appellant’s purpose or knowledge
that his threat would be perceived as sincere.
    In sum, as to legal sufficiency, viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98. As to
factual sufficiency, after weighing the evidence in the record of trial and mak-
ing allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses, we are our-
selves convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reed, 54
M.J. at 41.
C. Speedy Trial
   Appellant contends all charges should be dismissed with prejudice because
the Government violated his right to speedy trial under both R.C.M. 707 and
the Sixth Amendment. We find no speedy trial violation.
   1. Additional Background
      a. Exclusions granted by the preliminary hearing officer (PHO)
      and chief circuit military judge (CCMJ) prior to the first arraign-
      ment
    The charges were preferred on 27 May 2021 and a PHO was appointed on
that same date. The Defense requested a delay of the Article 32, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 832, preliminary hearing from 9 June 2021 to 25 June 2021, which
time the PHO accordingly excluded from speedy trial computation, for a total
of 16 days (9 June 2021 to 24 June 2021—the day before the preliminary hear-
ing). On 16 June 2021, Appellant made a speedy trial request. After the pre-
liminary hearing, the charges were referred on 30 August 2021. At that time,
trial counsel stated they would be ready to proceed to trial on 20 September
2021 and the Defense stated they would not be ready to proceed to trial until

                                         16
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

27 February 2022. The CCMJ set an arraignment date of 28 October 202112
and excluded the time between 20 September 2021 (the prosecution trial ready
date) and 27 October 2021 (the day before arraignment) from speedy trial com-
putation, a total of 38 days. The parties do not dispute that as of the 28 October
2021 arraignment, 154 days had elapsed since preferral of charges, and 54 days
(the 16-day PHO exclusion plus the 38-day CCMJ exclusion) had been excluded
from speedy trial computation, meaning for the purposes of speedy trial com-
putation 100 days elapsed from preferral to arraignment.
      b. Exclusion granted by the general court-martial convening au-
      thority (GCMCA) after withdrawing charges
    At the first arraignment on 28 October 2021, the military judge called upon
Appellant to enter his pleas. Appellant, through his trial defense counsel, de-
ferred entry of his pleas and moved for a new preliminary hearing on the basis
that the PHO had an appearance of bias.13 Ultimately, on 6 November 2021,
the military judge issued a ruling granting the defense motion, finding the pre-
liminary hearing had not been in substantial compliance with Article 32,
UCMJ, and R.C.M. 405. Accordingly, on 29 November 2021, the GCMCA with-
drew the charges, appointed a new PHO, and ordered a new preliminary hear-
ing. Significantly, the charges were only withdrawn, but never dismissed, and
no new charges were preferred.
    The second preliminary hearing was held on 21 December 2021, which the
new PHO documented as the first date of mutual availability. On 6 January
2022, trial counsel submitted a request to the GCMCA asking for an exclusion
of time from 20 September 2021 to 27 February 2022—the time between trial
counsel’s original trial ready date and defense counsel’s original trial ready
date (before the charges were withdrawn for a new preliminary hearing). Trial
counsel argued in his request that this period should be excluded “[t]o account
for the time during which the defense counsel was not available for trial and
the time needed for a new Article 32[, UCMJ,] hearing.” On 7 January 2022,
the GCMCA granted the request, excluding 20 September 2021 through 27
February 2022 from speedy trial computation, a total of 160 days.14 On appeal,
the validity of this GCMCA exclusion of time is in dispute.

12 Counsel agreed to the arraignment date in the case-docketing memorandum.

13 The Defense did not claim the PHO had actual bias.

14 The period excluded by the GCMCA (20 September 2021 through 27 February 2022)

overlapped the period previously excluded by the CCMJ when scheduling the initial

                                          17
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

       c. Exclusion granted by the chief trial judge (CTJ) after charges
       were re-referred
    On 17 February 2022, the GCMCA re-referred the same charges and spec-
ifications to a general court-martial. At that time, trial counsel stated the Pros-
ecution would be ready to proceed to trial on 6 March 2022, but defense counsel
stated they would not be ready until 18 April 2022. The CTJ set the trial date
for 18 April 2022 and excluded the time from 6 March 2022 (the Prosecution’s
trial ready date) to 17 April 2022 (the day before the trial date), a total of 43
days. Appellant was arraigned on the re-referred charges and specifications on
18 April 2022. On appeal, the validity of this CTJ exclusion of time is not in
dispute.
       d. Speedy Trial Motion
    Prior to the second arraignment, defense counsel moved to dismiss the
charges and specifications claiming Appellant’s right to speedy trial was vio-
lated under both R.C.M. 707 and the Sixth Amendment. In the motion, the
Defense conceded that there were three proper exclusions of time from the
speedy trial clock: (1) the original PHO exclusion of time before the first pre-
liminary hearing (from 9 June 2021 to 24 June 2021); (2) the CCMJ exclusion
of time before the first arraignment (from 20 September 2021 to 27 October
2021); and (3) the CTJ exclusion of time before the second arraignment (from
6 March 2022 to 17 April 2022). However, the Defense argued the GCMCA
exclusion of time (from 20 September 2021 through 27 February 2022) was an
abuse of discretion.
    In denying the defense motion, the military judge ruled that the first ar-
raignment on 28 October 2021 stopped the speedy trial clock, and thus Appel-
lant was brought to trial within 120 days as required by R.C.M. 707.15 In the
alternative, if the speedy trial clock did not stop at the first arraignment, the
military judge found the speedy trial clock was tolled between the first arraign-
ment and the withdrawal of charges, and that a portion of the GCMCA exclu-
sion of time was valid—the time needed to accomplish a new preliminary hear-
ing and re-refer the charges. With respect to the Sixth Amendment claim, the
military judge denied relief because the delay itself was not facially unreason-
able and Appellant did not suffer prejudice.

arraignment (20 September 2021 through 27 October 2021). Trial counsel explained in
the request to the GCMCA that “it is questionable whether the [m]ilitary [j]udge’s prior
exclusion of time applies,” because the charges had since been withdrawn.
15 The military judge found that, taking into account the PHO and CCMJ exclusions,

the speedy trial clock was at day 102 at the first arraignment. We find the speedy trial
clock was at day 100 at the first arraignment.

                                            18
                   United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

       e. Leave
   Leave records show Appellant took 35 days of leave between 29 November
2021 and 21 January 2022.
    2. Law
       a. Standard of Review
    “In the military justice system, an accused’s right to a speedy trial flows
from various sources, including the Sixth Amendment . . . and R.C.M. 707 of
the Manual for Courts-Martial.” United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54, 57
(C.A.A.F. 2003). We conduct a de novo review of speedy trial claims. United
States v. Guyton, 82 M.J. 146, 151 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (first citing United States v.
Wilder, 75 M.J. 135, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2016); and then citing United States v.
Danylo, 73 M.J. 183, 186 (C.A.A.F. 2014)). However, we review decisions grant-
ing delay under R.C.M. 707, thereby rendering that time excludable for speedy
trial purposes, for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing United States v. Lazauskas,
62 M.J. 39, 41–42 (C.A.A.F. 2005)).
       b. Rule for Courts-Martial 707
    The Rule requires that an accused must be brought to trial within 120 days
of preferral of charges. R.C.M. 707(a)(1). For purposes of R.C.M. 707, an “ac-
cused is brought to trial . . . at the time of arraignment.” R.C.M. 707(b)(1).16
“Ordinarily, when an accused is not under pretrial restraint and charges are
dismissed, a new 120-day time period begins on the date of re[-]preferral.” Guy-
ton, 82 M.J. at 151 (emphasis added) (first citing R.C.M. 707(b)(3)(A)(i) (2016
ed.); and then citing United States v. Hendrix, 77 M.J. 454, 456 (C.A.A.F.
2018)).17 However, “[i]f charges are merely withdrawn and not subsequently
dismissed, . . . the R.C.M. 707 ‘speedy-trial clock continues to run.’” Id.

16 “Arraignment takes place when a military judge reads the charges to an accused and

calls upon the accused to plead.” United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54, 59 n.5 (C.A.A.F.
2003).
17 R.C.M. 707 was amended in the 2019 MCM, but there was no substantive change to

the relevant provision. See R.C.M. 707(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (“In the event of dismissal of
charges . . . a new 120-day period begins as follows: . . . [f]or an accused not under pre-
trial restraint at the time of dismissal . . . a new 120-day period begins on . . . the date
on which charges are preferred anew.”)

                                              19
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Leahr, 73 M.J. 364, 367 (C.A.A.F.
2014)).18
    “Applying the speedy trial provisions of R.C.M. 707(c) does not merely con-
sist of calculating the passage of calendar days” because the Rule provides that
certain days shall be excluded from the 120-day clock. Id. Specifically, the con-
vening authority prior to referral, or the military judge after referral, may
grant requests for pretrial delay, and such approved delays “shall be excluded
when determining whether the [120-day clock] has run.” R.C.M. 707(c). Nota-
bly, “[t]he R.C.M. ‘does not preclude after-the-fact approval of a delay’” by the
military judge or convening authority. Guyton, 82 M.J. at 151 (quoting United
States v. Thompson, 46 M.J. 472, 475 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
    “The decision to grant or deny a reasonable delay is a matter within the
sole discretion of the convening authority or a military judge . . . based on the
facts and circumstances then and there existing.” R.C.M. 707(c)(1), Discussion.
“However, this Court requires ‘good cause’ for the delay and also requires that
the length of time requested be ‘reasonable’ based on the facts and circum-
stances of each case.” Guyton, 82 M.J. at 151 (Citations omitted). Pursuant to
R.C.M. 707(c), the military judge or convening authority “is empowered to
grant delays, not blanket exclusions of time.” United States v. Proctor, 58 M.J.
792, 795 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003). “[A] ‘delay’ under R.C.M. 707 [is] ‘any in-
terval of time between events.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Nichols, 42 M.J.
715, 721 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995)).
      c. Sixth Amendment
    The Sixth Amendment demands that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend VI. “In military prosecutions, the accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy
trial protections are generally triggered when charges are preferred.” United
States v. Harrington, 81 M.J. 184, 189 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (footnote omitted) (citing
Danylo, 73 M.J. at 186). “Analysis of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim
requires consideration of the entire period of delay from . . . preferral of charges
until commencement of trial on the merits.” Danylo, 73 M.J. at 189 (citing
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1982)).

18 The convening authority “may for any reason cause any charges or specifications to

be withdrawn from a court-martial at any time before findings are announced.” R.C.M.
604(a). “Charges that are withdrawn should be dismissed . . . unless it is intended to
refer them anew promptly.” R.C.M. 604(a), Discussion. “Charges that have been with-
drawn . . . may be referred to another court-martial unless the withdrawal was for an
improper reason.” R.C.M. 604(b).

                                           20
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

    “We determine whether an appellant has been denied his right to a speedy
trial using the four-factor test that the Supreme Court established in Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).” Harrington, 81 M.J. at 189 (citing Wilder, 75
at 138). The four factors are: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4)
prejudice to the appellant.” Id. (quoting Danylo, 73 M.J. at 186). Prejudice un-
der Barker is “assessed in the light of the three interests of the accused which
the speedy trial right was designed to protect[:] . . . (1) preventing oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Guyton, 82 M.J.
at 155 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last, because the inability
of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A showing of
prejudice is required to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy
Trial Clause.” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 (1994); accord Danylo, 73 M.J.
at 189 (holding that the appellant “has not demonstrated prejudice that rises
to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation” and thus that his “Sixth Amend-
ment speedy trial rights were not violated” (citations omitted)).
   3. Analysis
      a. R.C.M. 707
   Appellant makes no argument with respect to three exclusions of time: (1)
the original PHO exclusion of time before the first preliminary hearing (from
9 June 2021 to 24 June 2021); (2) the CCTJ exclusion of time before the first
arraignment (from 20 September 2021 to 27 October 2021); and (3) the CTJ
exclusion of time before the second arraignment (from 6 March 2022 to 17 April
2022). We also find each of those exclusions of time to be valid.
    Appellant does, however, contend that the military judge made fundamen-
tal errors in two aspects of her R.C.M. 707 ruling: first, finding that the first
arraignment on 28 October 2021 stopped the speedy trial clock; and second,
alternatively finding that it was proper for the GCMCA to exclude the time
needed to accomplish a new preliminary hearing and re-refer the charges. For
the reasons set forth below, we agree with Appellant’s first contention and find
the first arraignment did not stop the speedy trial clock because charges were
merely withdrawn but not dismissed. However, while we find the entirety of
the GCMCA exclusion was not reasonable “based on the facts and circum-
stances then and there existing,” we do find the portion of time from the day
after the first arraignment to the day before the re-referral of charges, from 29
October 2021 to 16 February 2022, meets both good-cause and reasonable-in-
length standards. Taking into account the valid exclusions of time, the speedy

                                          21
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

trial clock was at day 118 when Appellant was brought to trial at the second
arraignment on 18 April 2022, in compliance with R.C.M. 707’s 120-day man-
date. For illustration purposes, our findings, as explained below, create the
following speedy trial chronology:

 Date         Days         Event                             R.C.M. 707 Speedy
              Elapsed                                        Trial Clock

 27 May 21    0            Preferral                         0

 9 Jun. 21    13           First day of PHO exclusion        12

 16 Jun. 21   20           Speedy trial demand               12

 24 Jun. 21   28           Last day of PHO exclusion         12

 25 Jun. 21   29           First preliminary hearing         13

 30 Aug. 21   95           First referral                    79

 20 Sep. 21   116          First day of CCMJ exclusion       99

 27 Oct. 21   153          Last day of CCMJ exclusion        99

 28 Oct. 21   154          First arraignment                 100

 29 Oct. 21   155          First day of valid portion of     100
                           GCMCA exclusion

 6 Nov. 21    163          Military judge grants defense     100
                           motion and orders a new prelim-
                           inary hearing

 29 Nov. 21   186          Charges withdrawn                 100

 21 Dec. 21   208          Second preliminary hearing        100

 16 Feb. 22   265          Last day of valid portion of      100
                           GCMCA exclusion

 17 Feb. 22   266          Re-referral of charges            101

 6 Mar. 22    283          First day of CTJ exclusion        117

 17 Apr. 22   325          Last day of CTJ exclusion         117

 18 Apr. 22   326          Second arraignment                118

                                            22
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

         i) The speedy trial clock was not stopped by the first arraign-
         ment
    The military judge found, and the Government argues on appeal, that the
first arraignment on 28 October 2021 stopped the speedy trial clock for pur-
poses of R.C.M. 707. In reaching this finding, the military judge relied on
United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54 (C.A.A.F. 2003). We find reliance on Cooper
inapposite in the instant case. Our superior court in Cooper held that arraign-
ment does not stop the Article 10, UCMJ, speedy trial clock.19 Id. at 59 (citing
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). In setting forth the proce-
dural background, the court summarily “agree[ed]” with the military judge’s
ruling that the arraignment satisfied the R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock, “which
is why th[at] appeal concern[ed] only whether Article 10[, UCMJ] was vio-
lated.” Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). Thus, although the facts of Cooper involved
re-opening the preliminary hearing and subsequent re-referral of identical
charges, the court’s holding does not address R.C.M. 707, much less the issue
of whether the speedy trial clock stops at arraignment in the event that charges
are later withdrawn but not dismissed.
    Our superior court has, however, directly addressed this issue in United
States v. Leahr, 73 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2014). In deciding whether the appel-
lant’s right to a speedy trial under R.C.M. 707 was violated, the court in Leahr
considered whether the convening authority’s actions taken after the first ar-
raignment amounted to a mere withdrawal of the original charges or included
the extra action of dismissal. Id. The court ultimately found the convening au-
thority dismissed the original charges, and that dismissal reset the speedy trial
clock pursuant to R.C.M. 707(b)(3)(A). Id. at 367. The court further held, “[i]f,
however, [the convening authority’s] action amounted to a withdrawal only,
the speedy trial clock was not reset” because “[i]f charges are merely with-
drawn and not subsequently dismissed, . . . the R.C.M. 707 ‘speedy-trial clock
continues to run.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Britton, 26 M.J. 24, 26 (C.M.A.
1988)). More recently, in Guyton, where charges were withdrawn after the first
arraignment and identical charges were subsequently re-referred, our superior
court reiterated that the R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock continues to run if the
charges are not subsequently dismissed. 82 M.J. at 151 (“If charges are merely
withdrawn and not subsequently dismissed . . . the R.C.M. 707 ‘speedy-trial
clock continues to run.’” (Quoting Leahr, 73 M.J. at 367)).

19 Article 10, UCMJ, is another source of speedy trial rights which applies when an

accused is placed in pretrial restraint, requiring “immediate steps” be taken to try the
accused or to dismiss the charges and release the accused. 10 U.S.C. § 810. Appellant
was not placed in pretrial restraint and Article 10, UCMJ, does not apply in this case.

                                            23
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

   Here, there is no dispute that, after the first arraignment, the convening
authority merely withdrew the charges without dismissal. Accordingly, the
R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock continued to run.
         ii) GCMCA’s exclusion of time
    We now turn to whether the GCMCA’s exclusion of time was an abuse of
discretion. As an initial matter, we note the GCMCA had proper authority to
grant the delay of the proceedings and exclude time related to the delay, as all
charges had been withdrawn and had not yet been re-referred. R.C.M. 707(c)(1)
(“Prior to referral, all requests for pretrial delay . . . will be submitted to the
convening authority . . . .”); see also United States v. Williams, 55 M.J. 302, 304
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (“When charges are referred to a court-martial, the court re-
tains jurisdiction of the case from the point of referral . . . except when the
convening authority withdraws the charges . . . .” (Citation omitted)). We also
note that an “after-the-fact approval of a delay” does not preclude the broad
latitude the convening authority has in deciding whether case-processing de-
lays prior to referral are excludable. See Guyton, 82 M.J. at 151 (citation omit-
ted). However, we must still test whether the exclusion met “good-cause and
reasonable-in-length standards,” Thompson 46 M.J. at 475, in light of the
“facts and circumstances then and there existing,” R.C.M. 707(c)(1), Discus-
sion.
    We do not find good cause for the entirety of the GCMCA’s exclusion, as it
was not reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time.
The delay was based upon the interval of time between two dates: the trial
counsel’s original trial ready date (20 September 2021) and defense counsel’s
original trial ready date (27 February 2022) after the first referral of charges.
However, at the time the GCMCA granted the exclusion on 7 January 2022,
the original trial ready dates were no longer “good cause” for a delay because
the charges had already been withdrawn and had not yet been re-referred.
Based on the circumstances at the time, counsel’s original trial ready dates
were no longer “events” that could establish reasonable grounds for a delay.
See Proctor, 58 M.J. at 795 (“A ‘delay’ under R.C.M. 707 [is] ‘any interval of
time between events.’” Id. (quoting Nichols, 42 M.J. at 721)). Moreover, the
CCMJ’s prior exclusion of time (from 20 September 2021 to 27 October 2021)
already accounted for the delay between the trial counsel’s original trial ready
date and the first arraignment.
    However, trial counsel’s request to the GCMCA also stated the delay was
needed to account for the time to conduct a new preliminary hearing—relief
which Appellant himself requested. We find the delay between the original ar-
raignment—when Appellant moved for a new preliminary hearing—and the
re-referral of charges meets both good-cause and reasonable-in-length

                                          24
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

standards. It was reasonable to exclude this time period, as it takes into ac-
count the time that elapsed for the military judge to provide her ruling on Ap-
pellant’s motion for a new preliminary hearing, to provide Appellant with the
relief he requested (withdrawal of the charges and a new preliminary hearing),
and the time needed for the GCMCA to make a decision anew on re-referral of
the charges. While 103 days passed between the military judge’s order for a
new preliminary hearing and the re-referral of charges, nothing in the record
indicates the delay request was a “rationalization for neglect or willful delay.”
Thompson, 46 M.J. at 475. In this light, we find the only time properly excluded
by the GCMCA was from 29 October 2021 (the day after the initial arraign-
ment) to 16 February 2022 (the day before the re-referral of charges). As set
forth in our chronology chart, supra, when taking into account the valid exclu-
sions of time, Appellant was brought to trial on day 118 and his R.C.M. 707
speedy trial rights were not violated.
       b. Sixth Amendment
    Under the first Barker factor—length of the delay—we assume without de-
ciding the delay of 326 days to bring Appellant to trial is facially unreasonable,
and turn to the remaining Barker factors.
    We find the second Barker factor—reasons for the delay—on balance
weighs slightly in Appellant’s favor. As set forth supra, significant delays re-
sulted from defense counsel availability. However, the majority of the delay
resulted from the military judge’s ruling that the original Article 32, UCMJ,
PHO had an appearance of bias, and the steps the Government needed to take
to afford Appellant the relief he requested. We note the case processing time
after the military judge’s order to conduct a new preliminary hearing until the
re-referral of charges, a total of 103 days, was not stellar. However, we are
mindful that “constant motion is not the standard so long as the processing
reflects reasonable diligence under all the circumstances,” and we see no indi-
cation that the delays were a deliberate attempt to hamper the Defense. United
States v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
   The third Barker factor weighs slightly in favor of Appellant. While Appel-
lant made a speedy trial demand on 16 June 2021, prior to the first Article 32,
UCMJ, preliminary hearing, he did not renew a speedy trial demand after the
charges were withdrawn. Moreover, after making the speedy trial demand, the
Defense requested significant delays for the preliminary hearing and the trial
date, which tend to belie the genuineness of a speedy trial demand.
    Turning to the final Barker factor, we find Appellant has failed to demon-
strate any of the three forms of cognizable prejudice. Appellant was not in pre-
trial confinement. Thus, Appellant’s argument focuses on the interests he had

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                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

in minimizing his anxiety and concern, and limiting the possibility his defense
would be impaired.
    Appellant contends he suffered anxiety because, pending his court-martial,
he remained on administrative hold at Malmstrom Air Force Base where he
was separated from his young son who was living in Texas. Appellant argues
he could only “sporadically” visit his son when he “had available leave.” How-
ever, leave records show Appellant was granted 35 days of leave between 29
November 2021 and 21 January 2022, belying his contention of only “sporadic”
ability to visit his son. We find Appellant has not demonstrated “‘some degree
of particularized anxiety and concern greater than the normal anxiety and con-
cern associated with’ the delay of his trial.” Guyton, 82 M.J. at 155 (quoting
United States v. Reyes, 80 M.J. 228, 229 (C.A.A.F. 2020)).
   Appellant also contends the delay impaired his defense because govern-
ment witnesses could not accurately remember important details from the as-
sault and communication of a threat. But the record does not indicate the pas-
sage of time impacted the witnesses’ ability to recall, but rather suggests the
shock and stress of the events, which included Appellant brandishing a firearm
that appeared to be charged with a bullet in the chamber, impaired the wit-
nesses’ ability to perceive in the moment.20 Moreover, to the extent the govern-
ment witnesses were unable to recall the details of the threat or the assault,
their lack of recollection did not prejudice the Appellant but instead had the
potential to work to his advantage.
        A . . . difference between the right to speedy trial and the ac-
       cused’s other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right
       may work to the accused’s advantage . . . . As the time between
       the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses[’] . . .
       memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its
       case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
    For the reasons cited above, Appellant has not demonstrated Barker prej-
udice. Further, because the other Barker factors weigh only slightly in his fa-
vor, the lack of prejudice demonstrates his Sixth Amendment speedy trial
rights were not violated. See Reed, 512 U.S. at 353 (a showing of prejudice is
required to establish a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation under Barker);
see also Guyton, 82 M.J. at 155 (holding where no prejudice was demonstrated,

20 A1C DRW testified “this is kind of where it gets foggy” when asked what Appellant

said to TLP. AIC DRW explained, “There’s some kind of dialogue, I can’t remember
what it was, cause like I said, I was in like a shocked state.”

                                          26
                 United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

and the other Barker factors only slightly weighed in the appellant’s favor,
there was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation).
D. Timeliness of Appellate Review
    Additionally, we consider whether Appellant is entitled to relief for a fa-
cially unreasonable appellate delay. Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135 (citations omitted);
Tardif, 57 M.J. at 223–24. We decline to grant such relief.
   1. Law
    We review de novo whether an appellant has been denied the due process
right to speedy appellate review. Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135 (citations omitted). A
presumption of unreasonable delay arises when appellate review is not com-
pleted and a decision is not rendered within 18 months of a case being dock-
eted. Id. at 142. A presumptively unreasonable delay triggers an analysis of
the four Barker factors. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135 (cita-
tions omitted). A presumptively unreasonable delay satisfies the first factor,
but the Government “can rebut the presumption by showing the delay was not
unreasonable.” Moreno, 63 M.J at 142. Assessing the fourth factor of prejudice,
we consider the interests of “prevention of oppressive incarceration pending
appeal;” “minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the
outcome of their appeals;” and “limitation of the possibility that . . . grounds
for appeal, and . . . defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired.”
Id. at 138–39 (citations omitted). In the absence of prejudice as identified in
Moreno, a due process violation exists only when “the delay is so egregious that
tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and
integrity of the military justice system.” United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353,
362 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
    Furthermore, we are required by Article 66(d), UCMJ, to determine which
findings of guilty and the sentence or part thereof “should be approved.” 10
U.S.C. § 866(d); see also Tardif, 57 M.J. at 224. In Tardif, the CAAF recognized
“a Court of Criminal Appeals has authority under Article 66[ ][, UCMJ,] to
grant relief for excessive post-trial delay without a showing of ‘actual prejudice’
within the meaning of Article 59(a).” 57 M.J. at 224 (citation omitted). The
essential inquiry under Tardif is whether, given the post-trial delay, the sen-
tence “remains appropriate[ ] in light of all circumstances.” Toohey, 63 M.J. at
362 (citing Tardif, 57 M.J. at 224).
   2. Analysis
    Appellant’s case was docketed with the court on 5 October 2022. The delay
in rendering this decision after 5 April 2024 is considered presumptively un-
reasonable. The reasons for the delay include the time required for Appellant
to file his brief on 8 September 2023, the Government to file its answer on 23

                                          27
                  United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

October 2023, and Appellant to file his reply brief on 17 November 2023.21 Ap-
pellant has made no specific claim of prejudice, and we find none. Because we
find no particularized prejudice, and the delay is not so egregious as to ad-
versely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the mili-
tary justice system, there is no due process violation. See Toohey, 63 M.J. at
362.
    We also conclude there is no basis for relief under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ,
or Tardif in the absence of a due process violation. See United States v. Gay,
74 M.J. 736, 744 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
Considering all the facts and circumstances of Appellant’s case, we decline to
exercise our Article 66(d), UCMJ, authority to grant relief for the delay in com-
pleting appellate review.
E. Entry of Judgment
    In our review of the findings and sentence as entered into the record under
Article 60c, UCMJ, we note an error in the required contents of the EoJ. See
R.C.M. 1111(b). Although the finding of guilty to the Specification of Charge
III is entered correctly, the summary of that offense is not. The summary in-
correctly states TLP’s last name where it should state Appellant’s last name.22
The charge sheet and the Statement of Trial Results do not contain this error.
We note Appellant has not claimed prejudice from the error and we find none.
Rather than remand the case, we employ our authority under R.C.M.
1111(c)(2) and modify the EoJ in our decretal paragraph.

                                III. CONCLUSION
    The entry of judgment is modified as follows: for the Specification of Charge
III, the findings language is modified by excepting TLP’s last name in the por-
tion that reads “in that SENIOR AIRMAN TERRY L. [TLP’s last name] actu-
ally struck,” and substituting therefor Appellant’s last name and suffix, such
that it reads “in that SENIOR AIRMAN TERRY L. PITTMAN III actually
struck.” The findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error
materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles
59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d).

21 Appellant filed ten motions for enlargement of time, all of which were opposed by

the Government.
22 We note that both the victim TLP and Appellant had the same rank and initials.

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            United States v. Pittman III, No. ACM 40298

Accordingly, the findings, as modified, and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

               FOR THE COURT

               CAROL K. JOYCE
               Clerk of the Court

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