Court Opinion

ID: 2964667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:10.242615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:03.491640
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1410

                        W. DOUGLAS PITTS AND GLORIA MARTINEZ,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                           and DiClerico,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Lisa  R. Daugherty,  with whom  Thomas E.  Scott and  Davis,
               __________________              ________________      ______
          Scott, Weber & Edwards were on brief for appellants.
          ______________________
               Robert  D.  Kamenshine,  Attorney,  Appellate  Staff,  Civil
               ______________________
          Division,  Department  of Justice,  with  whom  Frank W.  Hunger,
                                                          ________________
          Assistant   Attorney  General,   Guillermo  Gil,   United  States
                                           ______________
          Attorney, and Barbara L.  Herwig, Attorney, Appellate Staff, were
                        __________________
          on brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 8, 1997
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Plaintiffs-appellants    were
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. 
                               ___________

          mistakenly  arrested by  federal drug  enforcement agents  at the

          airport in San Juan, P.R. in  April 1993.  They filed actions for

          tort damages  against four individual federal  agents pursuant to

          Bivens  v.  Six Unknown  Named Agents  of  the Federal  Bureau of
          ______      _____________________________________________________

          Narcotics,  403 U.S.  388 (1971),  and against the  United States
          _________

          under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C.    1346(b),

          2671 et seq.  On February  13, 1996, the district court dismissed
               _______

          plaintiffs-appellants' complaint  in its entirety  as time-barred

          under  the  applicable  federal   and  Puerto  Rico  statutes  of

          limitations.  We affirm. 

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    On  April 21,  1993,  appellants W.  Douglas Pitts  and

          Gloria Mart nez  were approached by defendant  Jefferson Moran, a

          plain-clothed  Drug  Enforcement  Agency ("DEA")  agent,  in  the

          airport in San  Juan and  informed that they  were under  arrest.

          Three  other DEA  agents  surrounded them,  handcuffed them,  and

          transported  them   to  DEA  headquarters.     Only  after  being

          fingerprinted  and  photographed,   appellants  claim,  did   co-

          defendant DEA  agent Edward Hern ndez  inform them of  the reason

          for  their arrest.  Apparently two  witnesses identified Pitts as

          the man who had given them a package of heroin  earlier that day.

          Pitts was questioned and his briefcase was searched; Mart nez was

          allegedly   strip-searched.     Appellants  were   released  from

          detention   approximately  six  hours   after  being  arrested.  

          Appellants'  complaint  alleged  that  they  were  physically and

                                         -2-

          verbally abused and sought damages on a number of legal grounds.1

          Because  the issue on appeal is whether the suit was time-barred,

          however, we review the details concerning the timing and contents

          of  communications between  appellants and  governmental agencies

          after the incident just described.

                    The mistaken  arrest occurred on  April 23, 1993.   The

          complaint was filed in district  court on November 23, 1994.   On

          July  19, 1993, however, appellants' counsel sent a letter to the

          DEA stating  appellants' intent  to pursue  a claim  "against the

          United  States" arising  from  the  actions  of DEA  agents,  and

          requesting damages and "an apology from your  office as well as a

          reprimand  of the agents involved."   A response  letter from the

          DEA dated  August 6, 1993  stated that  the appellants' July  19,

          1993  letter did not  satisfy the  procedural requirements  for a

          claim against the United States under the FTCA. 

                    On August  18, 1993, appellants' counsel  sent a second

          letter to the DEA, followed by a third letter on August 30, 1993,

          which  repeated  the  appellants'  intention to  pursue  a  claim

          against the  government, stated that counsel  had been authorized

          to   represent  the  appellants,  and  provided  the  appellants'

          signatures.  The DEA replied to appellants' August 18 letter in a

          letter dated September  9, 1993, stating that appellants' July 19

          and  August 18 letters also failed to satisfy the requirements of

                              
          ____________________

          1    Plaintiffs'  complaint  alleged:  assault,   battery,  false
          imprisonment,  intentional  infliction  of   emotional  distress,
          invasion  of privacy,  unconstitutional  search and  seizure, and
          negligence.

                                         -3-

          a  "claim"  under the  FTCA.   Appellants'  counsel replied  by a

          letter  of September 15, 1993 stating that it was the appellants'

          view that the  August 18  letter did indeed  constitute a  proper

          claim under the FTCA.  Finally, the DEA sent a  letter on January

          4,  1994  denying the  claim against  the  United States  made in

          appellants' July 19, 1993 letter, and noting that the denial "may

          be appealed" to a federal district court within six months.  More

          than six months elapsed between January  4, 1994 and the date the

          complaint was filed, November 23, 1994.2  

                    The  district  court granted  the appellees'  motion to

          dismiss the complaint  as untimely under both  Puerto Rico's one-

          year  statute of  limitations  (with regard  to  the tort  claims

          against  the  officers)  and  the  FTCA's  six-month  statute  of

          limitations  that runs from  the time  of the  final denial  of a

          claim by the pertinent governmental agency.  These letters are at

          the heart of this appeal because the appellants contend: (1) that

          Puerto  Rico's  one-year statute  of limitations  governing their

          Bivens   action  was  tolled   under  the   "extrajudicial  claim
          ______

          exception"  by their letter of August 18, 1993, and did not begin

          running at least until the  Government's denial letter of January

          4, 1994;   and (2) that the requirement under  the FTCA that they

          file suit against the  government within six months of  the final
                              
          ____________________

          2   In addition, beginning  in November 1993,  the plaintiffs and
          the  DEA exchanged  correspondence regarding  appellants' request
          for the names and identities of the DEA agents involved under the
          Freedom of Information Act,  a series of letters  that culminated
          in a  letter of  April  10, 1995  from the  DEA formally  denying
          appellants' request for information concerning the identities  of
          the unknown agents.

                                         -4-

          denial of their  claim does  not render their  November 23,  1994

          complaint time-barred  because the  government's January  4, 1994

          denial letter did not trigger the six-month limitations period.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

          I.   Claims Against the Agents
          I.   Claims Against the Agents

                    Appellants  do not dispute the settled proposition that

          their claims against Mor n, Hern ndez, and  two other unknown DEA

          agents  are   subject  to  Puerto  Rico's   one-year  statute  of

          limitations governing,  inter alia,  personal injury torts.   See
                                  __________                            ___

          P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31    5298(2) (1991); cf. Ram rez Morales  v.
                                                    ___ _______________

          Rosa Viera,  815 F.2d 2, 4  (1st Cir. 1987).   Rather, they argue
          __________

          that  the period, which would  have barred their  suit from being

          brought after April 21,  1994, was tolled  under the Puerto  Rico

          tolling statute's  extrajudicial claim provision.   See P.R. Laws
                                                              ___

          Ann. tit. 31   5303 (1991).3  Specifically, they argue that under

          the   Puerto  Rico   Supreme   Court's   interpretation  of   the

          extrajudicial claim  provision, their  claim was tolled  from the

          time  of their  August  18,  1993  letter  to  the  DEA  (stating

          appellants' "intent  to submit a claim against  the United States

          government" and requesting  a "reprimand" of the  officers) to at

          least January  4,  1994,  the  date of  the  government's  letter

          purportedly denying the  claim, at which point, under Puerto Rico

          law,  the one-year period would  have been restarted  at zero and

                              
          ____________________

          3  Section 5303 provides: "Prescription of actions is interrupted
          by their institution before the courts, by extrajudicial claim of
          the creditor,  and by any  act of acknowledgment  of debt by  the
          debtor."

                                         -5-

          would have begun to run anew.  See Rodr guez Narv ez v.  Nazario,
                                         ___ _________________     _______

          895 F.2d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1990).

                    The  problem  with appellants'  argument is  that their

          August 18 letter -- like the other letters they sent to the DEA -

          -  did  not  identify  any  legal  claim against  the  individual

          officers,  and therefore  cannot  be deemed  to  have tolled  the

          statute  of  limitations as  to  the suit  against  the officers.

          Puerto  Rico   Supreme  Court  decisions  applying   the  tolling

          provision  of section  5303 indicate  that one  of the  necessary

          requirements  of  an  extrajudicial  claim for  the  purposes  of

          tolling is the  requirement of "identity."   See Galib-Frangie v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 95 JTS 71 at 922  (P.R. 1995); see also
          ________________________                                 ________

          Kery v. American Airlines, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 947, 951-53 (D.P.R.
          ____    _______________________

          1995) (summarizing  Puerto Rico  Supreme Court interpretation  of

          section 5303).   The  identity requirement  means  that the  same

          right  and the same relief affected by the statute of limitations

          must appear in the extrajudicial claim.  See Nazario, 895 F.2d at
                                                   ___ _______

          44; Kery, 931 F. Supp. at  954.  To satisfy this requirement, the
              ____

          extrajudicial  claim  must be  made  against the  same  debtor or

          passive subject of the right in question, and not against a third

          party.    Nazario,  895 F.2d  at  44  (citing  Velilla v.  Pueblo
                    _______                              _______     ______

          Supermarkets, Inc., 111 P.R.R. 732, 734-35 (P.R. 1981)).    
          __________________

          Appellants' August  18 letter,  addressed to the  associate chief

          counsel of the DEA, states an intent to make a "claim against the

          United   States  government"  and   also  requests   an  official

          "reprimand" of the  officers involved.   It does  not assert  any

                                         -6-

          legal  claims  directly  against   the  officers.    The  letter,

          therefore, fails to  satisfy the requirement of  identity for the

          purposes of the extrajudicial claim doctrine.  Appellants, citing

          the Galib-Frangie  decision, argue  that the Puerto  Rico Supreme
              _____________

          Court has  recently ruled  that the extrajudicial  claim doctrine

          should  be applied  liberally.   We  are  not persuaded  by  this

          argument, because  nowhere in  the Galib-Frangie opinion,  or, to
                                             _____________

          our  knowledge, in any other  recent decision of  the Puerto Rico

          Supreme  Court, is  there any  support for  a departure  from the

          well-established rule that  an extrajudicial  claim must  request

          the same type of  relief against the same defendants.4   In fact,

          in Galib-Frangie, the case relied on by the appellants, the court
             _____________

          iterated that  the identity requirement is  a necessary condition

          of an extrajudicial claim under section 5303.   Galib-Frangie, 95
                                                          _____________

          JTS  71 at 922.   Moreover, the learned  commentary on this civil

          code provision suggests that an extrajudicial claim must serve as

          a  notice or demand to the  "passive subject of said right," here

          the  DEA agents.   See Nazario,  895 F.2d at  44 (quoting Spanish
                             ___ _______

          civil  code commentator  Diez Picazo).5   The DEA  agents plainly
                              
          ____________________

          4  In the  case of Zambrana-Maldonado v. Commonwealth,  92 JTS 12
                             __________________    ____________
          (P.R.  1992), for  example,  the court  stated specifically  that
          extrajudicial  claims must  be read  in their  totality and  in a
          liberal  fashion,  and  yet also  held  that  the  claim must  be
          received by the same debtor of  the right who is the defendant in
          the subsequent lawsuit.  Id. at 9171-74.
                                   ___

          5  According to Diez Picazo:

                    In  principle, claim  stands  for  demand  or
                    notice.   That is: it is an act for which the
                    holder of a substantive right,  addresses the
                    passive subject of said right, demanding that

                                         -7-

          could  not  be  apprised  of  a  damages  suit  against  them  as

          individuals by a  letter stating  an intention to  bring a  claim

          against the government.

                    In  the  alternative,  appellants  argue  that  summary

          judgment was improper because a question of  material fact exists

          as  to whether the individual  DEA agents received  copies of, or

          were otherwise informed  of, the  letters.   This argument  fails

          because, even assuming  they received copies of the  letters, the

          content of  the letters would  not put them  on notice as  to the

          possibility of being sued individually for damages.

                    These  considerations  lead  us  to  conclude that  the

          district court  properly applied Puerto  Rico law in  finding the

          suit against the DEA agents to be time-barred.

          II.  The Claim under the FTCA
          II.  The Claim under the FTCA

                    FTCA claimants  must file suit in  federal court within

          six  months of the date on which  the federal agency to which the

          claim  has been addressed mails  notice of final  denial of their

          claim.   See 28 U.S.C.   2401(b).   Here, it is not disputed that
                   ___

          the DEA sent  a letter on January 4, 1994  to appellants' counsel

          stating that,  in response to  appellants' July 19,  1993 letter,

          "[t]o the  extent that this  correspondence can  be construed  as
                              
          ____________________

                    he adopt  the required conduct.   The  claim,
                    then, is a pretension in a technical sense.

          Nazario, 895 F.2d  at 44 (quoting Diez Picazo).   We note as well
          _______
          that  the commentary  of Diez  Picazo, unfavorable  to appellants
          here,  was cited as an authority regarding the requirements of an
          extrajudicial  claim  in  the Galib-Frangie  decision,  the  very
                                        _____________
          decision appellants  argue harkens a change  in the extrajudicial
          claim doctrine.  See Galib-Frangie, 95 JTS 71 at 923.
                           ___ _____________

                                         -8-

          claim  [sic] against the United States of America pursuant to the

          Federal Tort Claims Act  (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.    2671 et seq.,  such
                                                             _______

          claim is denied."  Appellants filed their suit  under the FTCA in

          November 1994, more than  six months after the DEA  denial letter

          was mailed,  and thus their FTCA  claim was properly found  to be

          time-barred.

                    On appeal, two meritless arguments have been proffered.

          The first is that the  January 4 letter cannot be deemed  a final

          denial  because  it  did  not  specifically  address  appellants'

          August 18, 1993 letter.   We find, however, that the  language of

          the letter  was unambiguous  in denying appellants'  claim, which

          was  made in  both the  July  19, 1993  and the  August 18,  1993

          letters.6

                    Second,  appellants  argue  that the  January  4 letter

          failed to  satisfy regulations governing  the content of  an FTCA

          claim denial letter, see 28 C.F.R.    14.9(a), because it did not
                               ___

          state  that the  claimant  may "file  suit"  in a  United  States

          District Court within six months.7  We are unmoved by appellants'

                              
          ____________________

          6    The August  18  letter was  merely  a follow-up  letter that
          repeated the allegations and  claims made in the July  19 letter,
          and only added the signatures of appellants Pitts and Mart nez.

          7  The regulation  at 28 C.F.R.   14.9(a) provides,  in pertinent
          part:

                    The notification of final  denial . . . shall
                    include a statement that, if  the claimant is
                    dissatisfied  with the agency  action, he may
                    file  suit  in an  appropriate  U.S. District
                    Court  not later  than six  months after  the
                    date of mailing of the notification.

                                         -9-

          argument  that the  DEA's failure  to use  the words  "file suit"

          created any confusion.   We  find that the  DEA's statement  that

          "[t]his  denial may be appealed to  the appropriate United States

          District  Court within  six months  of this  letter,"   while not

          using  the  words  "may  file  suit,"  adequately  satisfied  the

          requirements of regulation 14.9(a) by giving sufficient notice of

          the  six-month limitations  period applicable  to their  right to

          file suit in district court.  Cf.  Hatchell v. United States, 776
                                        ___  ________    _____________

          F.2d  244, 245-46  (9th Cir.  1985) ("We  decline to  require any

          specific  verbal  formulation  to  ensure   compliance  with  the

          regulations governing denial of claims.").

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For the  reasons stated  in this opinion,  the district

          court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants is affirmed.
                                                                 ________

                                         -10-