Court Opinion

ID: 9914143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:12:35.122489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:27.126066
License: Public Domain

STATE OF VERMONT

RUTLAND COUNTY
ROBERT MEE )
) Rutland Superior Court
Vv. ) Docket No. 122-2-08 Rdcv
)
ROBERT HOFMANN, Commissioner, )
Department of Corrections ) CONF ORMED COPY
RUTLAND SUPERIOR COURT
JUL 18 2008

DECISION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 28, 2008

Plaintiff Robert Mee is an inmate who seeks the expungement of a disciplinary
report for “introduction of any item that constitutes a danger to the order of the facility,”
and relief from its collateral consequences.’ He contends that the disciplinary report was
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing because the Department of
Corrections never articulated what item (“contraband”) was allegedly introduced, nor
found any “contraband,” nor explained how the alleged item constituted a danger to the
order of the facility. Defendant Commissioner of the Department of Corrections argues
that the decision of the hearing officer should be affirmed because it is supported by
“some evidence” of guilt.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed May 28, 2008 by attorney
Dawn Seibert of the Prisoner’s Rights Office. Oral argument was heard on June 39,
2008. Mr. Mee was present and was represented by Ms. Seibert, who appeared by phone.
Defendant was represented by attorney Emily Carr, who also appeared by phone. Prior to
the hearing, on June 2, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which is
not ripe, but addresses the same facts and issue.

Review of all of both parties statements of undisputed facts shows that material
facts are undisputed. Mr. Mee is an inmate at the Marble Valley Regional Correctional
Facility. On February 2, 2008, he received a visitor in the visiting area, which is
monitored by corrections officers and security cameras. During the visit, an officer
observed Mr. Mee engaging in suspicious behavior consistent with receiving an item
from the visitor and either “packing” the item or passing it to another inmate.” Both
inmates were strip-searched before returning to their living units per standard procedure,
but no contraband was found.

' The parties have not disputed that the collateral consequences faced by Mr. Mee are a sufficient
deprivation of liberty to invoke Mr. Mee’s right to procedural due process. Conway v. Gorcyzk, 171 Vt.
374, 376-77 (2000); Sandin v. Conner, 515 US. 472, 484 (1995). Plaintiffs counsel stated at a status
conference that the DR at issue in this case prevents him from being eligible for work camp.

? “Packing” refers to the act of inserting contraband into a body cavity for the purpose of concealment.
The suspicious conduct was then brought to the attention of Correctional Facility
Shift Supervisor Travis Denton, who observed the security videotape of the visiting room
and agreed that the videotape showed Mr. Mee engaging in behavior consistent with
“packing.” He ordered a search of the living units of Mr. Mee and the other inmate,
which was performed approximately fifteen to thirty minutes after the inmates had
returned to their cells. No contraband was found.

Mr. Mee and the other inmate were then placed into “dry cells,” or rooms without
running water so that if either inmate eliminated any contraband along with their waste, it
could be recovered. Again, no contraband was found.

DOC subsequently issued Mr. Mee a disciplinary report for a Major A#7 DR
violation for “possession, manufacture or introduction of any item that constitutes a
danger to the order of the facility including, but not limited to, weapons, dangerous
instruments, escape tools, or communication devices (e.g., cell phones).” At the
disciplinary hearing, the Department relied upon the security videotape, a staff report
filed by Mr. Denton, and a staff report filed by Corrections Officer II Don Nicoll, who
investigated the matter. Mr. Denton’s staff report described the contents of the videotape
and the results of the searches, which found no contraband. Mr. Nicoll’s staff report
agreed that the videotape showed behavior consistent with the act of “packing,” but
cautioned that “although his actions appear to be suspicious, there is no clear indication
of him being in possession of any contraband, nor is there any clear indication that he
passed contraband off to another resident.” After the hearing, the hearing officer found
by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Mee was guilty of introducing an item that
constituted a danger to the order of the facility. ~

Mr. Mee now seeks review of this determination under V.R.C.P. 75. For the
purposes of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Mee concedes that the videotape
shows behavior consistent with “packing,” and that an inmate would only “pack” an item
if it were prohibited by the facility. He contends, however, that his conviction should be
reversed because the Department has not explained how the alleged item, if any,
constituted a danger to the order of the facility.

DOC contends that the conviction should be affirmed because it is supported by
circumstantial evidence. See Silva v. Coughlin, 1992 WL 116744 at *5 (S.D.N.Y., May
18, 1992) (Mukasey, J.) (explaining that disciplinary reports may be proven by
circumstantial evidence). DOC asserts that the security videotape and staff reports show
that Mr. Mee engaged in behavior consistent with the act of “packing,” and that this
provides circumstantial evidence that Mr. Mee attempted to introduce an item prohibited
by the facility. DOC also suggests that the failure to locate the actual contraband can be
explained by the 15 to 30 minute window between when Mr. Mee returned to his living
unit and the search, which could have provided Mr. Mee with an opportunity to hide or
conceal the item. Finally, DOC contends that any item prohibited from the correctional
facility also constitutes a danger to the order of the facility, and that the circumstantial
evidence accordingly provides “some evidence” of guilt in this case.
The role of this court is to determine “whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Herring v.
Gorcyzk, 173 Vt. 240, 243 (2001) (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56
(1985)). Although this is a deferential standard of review, a prisoner accused of a
disciplinary violation may not be punished unless his guilt is established before the
hearing officer by a preponderance of the evidence. LaFaso v. Patrissi, 161 Vt. 46, 54
(1993). “On judicial review of the sufficiency of evidence at a prison disciplinary
hearing, the hearing officer’s final determination must be upheld if it is supported by
‘some evidence’ in the record.” Herring, 173 Vt. at 243 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455).

Plaintiff relies upon two federal cases that cast doubt upon the Department’s
reasoning. The first is Hayes v. McBride, in which the federal district court reversed a
disciplinary report for possession of an intoxicant because the State did not present any
evidence to establish the identity of the yellow-orange liquid found in the inmate’s cell,
and did not establish that the liquid constituted an intoxicant. 965 F. Supp. 1186, 1189-
90 (N.D. Ind. 1997). The court explained that while the State was not required to
introduce the actual contraband found in the prisoner’s cell in order to prove possession,
see Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 (3rd Cir. 1992) (Alito, J.), the State was required to
determine that the substance “was, in fact, an intoxicant.” Id.

Similarly, in Smith v. Robinson, the court held that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the inmate had possessed contraband where the State presented
evidence that a number of items had been found in the inmate’s cell, including nails and a
screwdriver, but did not present evidence showing that the items were contraband within
the meaning of the applicable disciplinary regulation. 495 F. Supp. 696, 700-02 (E.D.
Pa. 1980). Taken together, these two cases reflect the principle that, when proving —
disciplinary violations based upon possession of a prohibited item, the State is required to
show that alleged contraband items are in fact prohibited under the regulation at issue.

Circumstantial evidence establishes “some evidence” that Mr. Mee introduced
something into the facility, and that the item was prohibited by the facility. Under the
reasoning of Hayes and Smith, the issue is whether the record contains “some evidence”
to show that the item was, in fact, an “item that constituted a danger to the order of the
facility” within the meaning of DOC Directive #410.01.

DOC admits that there is no direct evidence of the identity or nature of the item
allegedly introduced, but suggests that the court may infer that any item prohibited by the
facility also constitutes a danger to the order of the facility. This inference is
impermissibly overbroad because it blends the distinction between possession of ordinary
“contraband” and possession of “items that constitute a danger to the order of the
facility,” which are treated differently by DOC itself, as shown in DOC Directive
#410.01. The proposed inference is additionally overbroad because it ignores distinctions
between a wide variety of possession-based offenses for different categories of prohibited
items, all of which are set forth in the DOC Directive.
The DOC Directive defines “contraband” as “anything not authorized to be in an
inmate’s possession.” Possession of contraband items is classified as a Minor M#02 DR
violation as long as the contraband item is not separately described as a Major
disciplinary violation. Thus, possession of an item that is prohibited by the facility is
classified as a Minor DR violation unless possession of the item is specifically classified
as a Major DR violation.

The DOC Directive defines at least five possible Major DR violations based on
possession of items specifically prohibited by the facility. These violations include
possession of (1) “alcohol, narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogenic substances
or marijuana . . . or related paraphernalia,” (2) “any amount of tobacco in excess of one
cigarette,” (3) “stolen property,” (4) “tattooing tools,” and (5) “any item that constitutes a
danger to the order of the facility.” Proof of these violations requires proof that the item
possessed fits the proscribed category, and DR violations based upon possession of these
specific items are subject to different sanctions depending upon which prohibited item
was possessed.

For example, possession of an item that constitutes a danger to the order of the
facility is a “Major A” offense, which is the most serious category of offenses reserved
for “violent acts or serious threats to institutional security or personal safety,” and which
is punishable by 0-30 days disciplinary segregation, among other sanctions. The severity
of the offense is consistent with the non-exhaustive list of items described as constituting
a danger to the order of the facility, including weapons, dangerous instruments, escape
tools, or communication devices. On the other hand, possession of stolen property is a
“Major B” offense, which is less serious, and which is punishable by 0-5 days
disciplinary segregation. Minor violations are the least serious offenses, and subject to
some sanctions, but not disciplinary segregation.

In other words, DOC itself makes distinctions between different types of
contraband, at two levels. First, there are items that are prohibited but possession results
in a minor violation (“regular” contraband). Second, there is a group of five categories of
items that call for a stronger disciplinary response. Each of the five types are specifically
defined, the one at issue in this case being contraband that constitutes a “danger to the
order of the facility.” The fact of such distinctions contradicts DOC’s argument that
anything that is prohibited and hidden by an inmate is dangerous to the order of the
facility. Furthermore, an inmate could easily want to hide an item of less serious
contraband in order to avoid even a minor disciplinary violation; the fact of hiding is not
sufficient to carry an inference that the item meets the standard of representing
dangerousness within the facility.

What distinguishes a DR violation for possession of an item that constitutes a
danger to the order of the facility from a range of other Major and Minor DR violations,
including possession of mere contraband, is “some evidence” that the item constitutes a

danger to the order of the facility.
In this case, even assuming that there is “some evidence” that Mr. Mee introduced
a contraband item into the facility, there is no evidence in the record to show that the item
falls into the category of an item that constitutes a danger to the order of the facility,
‘which is an essential element of a Major A#7 DR violation. In light of the reasoning set
forth in the Hayes and Smith opinions, and the lack of evidence concerning the nature of
contraband in this case, this court cannot conclude that the disciplinary report is
. supported by “some evidence” in the record, and it must therefore be reversed.

ORDER
(1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 28, 2008, is granted; and

(2) DOC is ordered to expunge the Major A#7 Disciplinary Report from
Plaintiff's file.

Dated at Rutland, Vermont this 17" day of July, 2008.
¢
Hon. Md Miles Teachout
Presiding Judge