Court Opinion

ID: 9626058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:00:56.799306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:15.290816
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
With the greatest respect for the majority, I cannot bring myself to concur in their opinion. I do not believe that their opinion makes a just disposition of *176this case. Not a single decision which the prevailing opinion cites supports its holding which is that unless a complaint 'that alleges facts showing that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the def endant is filed by an administrator who, at the time of the filing, was a regularly appointed administrator, the situation is a nullity; and the complaint cannot be amended by an administrator who was later regularly appointed but not until after the limitation period had run.
Cockerham, v. Potts, 143 Or 80, 20 P2d 423, is worthy of attention. In that case the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was the duly appointed administrator of the deceased’s estate. As a matter of fact, he was not appointed until more than two months had run after he filed the complaint. Thus, when he, as purported administrator, filed the complaint, no administrator whatever had been appointed. This court affirmed the judgment which the plaintiff recovered. It pointed out that the filing of the complaint before letters of administration had been issued to the plaintiff involved nothing more than the legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue. It held that “There can be no question but that any judgment obtained by plaintiff would be a complete bar to any subsequent action for the cause mentioned in the complaint.” In the case now before us, if the plaintiff were permitted to continue the action and won judgment, there could be no question hut what if the defendant paid the judgment the plaintiff’s satisfaction of the judgment record would release the defendant completely. The good sense of the Cockerham, decision makes a strong appeal to cne’s sense of justice. In the case now at bar nineteen days after the Multnomah Probate Court had terminated the plaintiff’s appointment as administrator (because it lacked power to have appointed *177him), he was duly appointed in Yamhill County (the proper county) and filed an amended complaint. When the plaintiff’s authority as administrator was terminated in Multnomah County, the complaint that he had filed and which alleged a good cause of action was not stricken. It is true that the Cockerham case did not involve a statute of limitation; but when the courts in instances such as the Cockerham case face a situation in which the amended complaint was not filed until the statute of limitations had run, they employ what is termed the Doctrine of Dating Back. I will now give it attention.
The Doctrine of Dating Back dates back an amended complaint, which was not filed until after the limitation period had expired, to the day when the original complaint was filed, provided, of course, that the original and the amended complaints alleged the same cause of action. Possibly an irregularity occurred in the appointment of the administrator, or possibly none whatever was appointed until after the limitation period governing the filing of the action had run. Or possibly the original complaint omitted an ingredient essential to the statement of a cause of action.
Mr. Justice Holmes said in New York C & H R R Co. v. Kinney, 260 US 340, 67 L Ed 294, 43 S Ct. 122:
“Of course, an argument can be made on the other side, but when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified 'Conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.”
Based upon the principle of justice expressed by Justice Holmes in the passage just quoted from him, the courts have created the Doctrine of Belating Back. *178Under that doctrine if there was filed on behalf of the estate of a deceased a complaint which averred facts showing a good cause of action against an alleged tortious defendant even though some material irregularity had occurred in the appointment of the administrator or in the averment of the cause of action, the courts relate back the amended complaint — which is intended to overcome the defects — even if it was not filed until the limitation period had run and give it the filing date of the original complaint. In that manner the courts deem that the amended complaint was filed on the day of the original complaint. The courts explain that in that way the plaintiff is given a day in court and is not rejected upon a mere technicality. Of course, the courts insist that the amended complaint must be based upon the same cause of action that is set forth in the original complaint.
This court has employed that rule in the following cases: Mills v. Feiock, 229 Or 618, 368 P2d 327; Schulmerich v. First National Bank, 220 Or 528, 349 P2d 849; Railton v. Redmar, 209 Or 80, 304 P2d 408; Drake Lumber Co. v. Paget Mortgage Co., 203 Or 66, 274 P2d 804; Board of Medical Examiners v. Buck, 192 Or 66, 232 P2d 791; Ross v. Robinson, 174 Or 25, 147 P2d 204; Richardson v. Investment Company, 124 Or 569, 264 P 458, 265 P 1117.
Douglas v. Daniels Bros Coal Co., 135 Ohio St 641, 22 NE2d 195, 123 ALR 761, is a good illustration of the application of this principle of law. It has been cited approvingly many times. In that case the complaint filed by a widow who brought an action for the tortious death of her husband alleged that she was administratrix of the deceased’s estate. Actually, she had not been appointed and had not even filed a petition for her appointment. The omissions were not *179discovered until the limitation period had run. Then the plaintiff secured her appointment as administratrix and filed an amended complaint. The defendant, in a proper manner, challenged the complaint. The trial court sustained the attacks. In reversing, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
“It is well settled in Ohio that if an amended petition does not set up a new cause of action it will not he barred by the statute fixing a period of limitation for the institution of suit, but will relate back to the date of the filing of the original petition. [Citations] The rule of relation back was followed in Archdeacon, Adm’r v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. 76 Ohio St. 97, 81 N.E. 152, Missouri K. & T.R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 33 S. Ct. 135, 57 L Ed. 355, Ann Cas. 1914 B, 134, and Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Osborne’s Adm’r, 114 Va. 13, 75 S.E. 750, all of which were wrongful death cases.
“In the instant case, the original petition alleges that plaintiff is the duly appointed and qualified administratrix of the estate of her husband, Verne Douglas, deceased. The amended petition alleges that at the time of the filing of the original petition plaintiff erroneously believed herself appointed but was in fact not appointed and qualified as such administratrix; that since the filing of her original petition, the error was discovered and she has been appointed and qualified as such administratrix. The amended petition further states that she adopts and ratifies her act in commencing the suit. In all other respects, the petition and amended petition are identical insofar as they relate to the claims made against defendants. The amended petition in no manner changes the cause of action as originally stated, and does not set up a new cause of action.”
The majority, after citing the Ohio decision just reviewed, state: “We are unable to agree.” The following decisions approved and followed the Ohio deci*180sion: Graves v. Welborn (1963), 260 NC 688, 133 SE2d 761, 765; Smith v. Boyers (1959), 110 Ohio App 291, 169 NE2d 479, 484; Church of God, et al v. Tomlinson Church of God, et al (1952), 193 Tenn 583, 247 SW2d 63, 67; Griffin v. Workman (1954), Fla, 73 So2d 844, 847. 'So far as I have been able to ascertain, the majority’s opinion is the only one that disapproves the Ohio decision. The majority cite with approval Graves v. Welborn, snpra. It expressly approves and follows the Ohio decision.
Williams v. Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co., 111 Kan 34, 206 P 327, is another case in which the successful administrator was not appointed until long after the limitation period had expired. In that case a resident of Kansas lost his life in an accident in Missouri. The rights of the parties were governed by a Missouri .statute which enabled the maintenance of an action for the death to be prosecuted by a Missouri-appointed administrator only. Those who were entitled to the benefit of the statute had an administrator appointed in Kansas who thereupon filed an action. On the eve of the trial it was discovered that only a Missouri administrator could maintain the action. By that time the one year limitation statute had run and more than three years had expired. Nevertheless, at that juncture, a Missouri administrator was appointed and filed an amended complaint. The judgment entered in his favor was affirmed. The decision, in so doing, declared:
“Of 'Course the Kansas administrator had no •legal capacity to sue, and consequently could not maintain the action * *
It continued:
“While the Missouri administrator filed an amended petition, the cause of action was the same *181as that originally filed — for damages to William Minney for 'the wrongful death of Archibald, under the laws of Missouri. * * *”
We quote again:
“* * * But it was of prime importance in this case that substitution of such Missouri administrator be made in 'the action already begun; otherwise the Missouri statute (one-year limitation) would bar it altogether. * * *”
In reaching its conclusion, the court quoted from one of its earlier holdings, as follows:
“ ‘Great latitude is given to the trial court in ■the matter of the amendment of pleadings, with a view of curing defects, supplying omissions, and preventing injustice. Our statute in terms authorizes the adding or striking out of the name of any party or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any respect. Gen. <Stat. 1897, c. 95, § 139; Gen. Stat. 1899, § 4389. Here a mistake was made in bringing suit in the name of the payee of the note instead of the party to whom the payee had indorsed and transferred it. While it is a radical amendment to substitute one plaintiff for another, such an amendment is clearly within the power of the court, under the plain provisions of the Code, and Weaver v. Young, 37 Kan. 70, 14 Pac. 458, is directly in point and settles the question in favor of the substitution. In that ease an amendment was permitted striking out the name of one party who was the sole plaintiff and substituting another and distinct party, after it was shown that the first name was used by mistake.’ 62 Kan. 860, 62 Pac. 671, citing many earlier Kansas cases.”
The following decisions have approved and followed the decision just mentioned. I know of none that have disapproved. In re Keenan’s Estate (1953), 175 Kan 207, 262 P2d 835, 837; Cudney v. United Power and *182Light Corp. (1935), 142 Kan 613, 51 P2d 28, 31; Early v. Burt (1932), 134 Kan 445, 7 P2d 97; Sundgren v. Topeka Transportation Co. (1955), 178 Kan 83, 283 P2d 444, 449; Boudreau v. New England Trans Co. (1944), 315 Mass 423, 53 NE2d 92, 94; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan (10 Cir, 1942), 127 F2d 32, 37.
The foregoing surely makes it clear that the development which bars the running of the limitation period is not the appointment of an administrator but the filing of a complaint which avers in the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant. Obviously, if the plaintiff procured the appointment of a score of administrators, the running of the limitation period would not be halted. But for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the passage above quoted, the running of the limitation period is barred when the plaintiff files a complaint which shows that he has a just claim against the defendant. The majority do not seem to understand the difference just noted.
Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or 589, 392 P2d 768, may, upon hasty examination, appear to be in point. That, however, is not true. In that ease the deceased died in November 1960. An administrator was appointed timely in Umatilla County; he completed administration August 24, 1961. His appointment was evidently free from defects because our decision states that the estate was “duly administered in Umatilla County.” Four months after the completion of administration, but eleven months before the limitation period would expire, the plaintiff applied in Wasco County for his appointment as administrator “in order that a claim may be filed against said estate” by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not the individual who as administrator had administered upon the estate. The case was not *183concerned with, the doctrine of relation back, the statute of limitations, or the amendment of a pleading. In so stating, I do not disparage the decision in the slightest degree.
Let us bear in mind that no one claims that the plaintiff in the case at bar is an interloper or intruder.
The crucial development is not the appointment of an administrator but the filing of the amended complaint. Frequently the attack upon it is made with a contention that it does not state the same cause of action as the original pleading. The doctrine of relation back will not enable a plaintiff to switch from one cause of action to another, but plaintiffs may be changed.
Clark on 'Code Pleading, at page 731, states:
“* * * And unless there has been so great a change in the material operative facts that an entirely different fact situation is presented, the amendment should be allowed. This is the theory of the Federal Buies, which is reached through the device of relating back to the original complaint or defense any amendment stating a claim or defense arising out of the ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.’ ”
At page 732, Clark declares:
“* * * the following cases, allowing the amendment after the statute would bar a new action, may be cited: * * * where it made a party coplaintiff who was originally made defendant; * * * where it charged defendant as an individual, rather than in a representative capacity, or set forth that the action was brought by the widow as administratrix, instead of by herself and children as 'the real parties in interest.”
*184The following is taken from 34 Am Jur, Limitations of Actions, § 271, page 221:
“* * * According to many courts, mere substitution of parties plaintiff without substantial or material changes from the claims of the original pleading does not of itself constitute setting forth a new cause of action in an amended pleading, and may be made after the expiration of the limitation period. * * *”
See also King v. Solomon, 323 Mass 326, 81 NE2d 838, 8 ALR2d 1, and the annotation which begins in the volume last cited at page 6.
In the case at bar when the fifth amended complaint was filed no attempt was made to amend a pleading that was a nullity. The fourth amended complaint and its predecessors had not been stricken from the files and no demurrer to any of them had challenged their sufficiency. The plaintiff had been properly appointed administrator in Yamhill County. When the .second, third, fourth and fifth amended complaints were filed the Yamhill County administrator appeared in them as plaintiff. The Multnomah Probate Court had gone no further than to vacate the order which it had previously entered appointing an administrator for the estate. After the probate court had vacated that order no court dismissed this action and no court was asked to do so. The complaint remained intact as originally filed. Each complaint plainly stated a good cause of action, and we are aware of no reason why they were not subject to amendment.
It will be noticed that this opinion cites and reviews cases that are .squarely in point; in fact, those decisions went much farther than we are required to go. In addition, this opinion cites many additional decisions that also took the same view that this opinion takes *185and mentions texts where still other -supporting authorities are listed.
Now let us take brief note of the decisions cited in the prevailing opinion.
Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 NC 412, 99 SE 240, 5 ALR 284, has no application whatever to 'the ease before us. The decision does not mention the doctrine of relation back nor a -statute of limitation. In that ease an individual named James Seism was moving from one county in North Carolina into another. Before he reached the second county his car turned over and he was killed. The sole issue before the court was: which county has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator. The court resolved the issue solely under a local statute governing domicile.
In Pearson v. Anthony, 218 Iowa 697, 254 NW 10, no administrator was appointed and no petition seeking the appointment of one was filed within the limitation period. After the limitation period had run and an administratrix had been appointed “No proceedings were taken,” so the decision states, “to amend the petition or substitute the administratrix as a party.” Shepard’s Northwestern Citator cites only Griffin v. Workman, 73 So2d 847 (Florida), as having cited this ease. The Florida decision did not follow Pearson v. Anthony. Shepard’s Northwestern Citator indicates that Pearson v. Anthony received attention in 8 ALR2d at page 54. It is there cited in support of the statement “Where the amendment making the -substitution of plaintiff introduces a different cause of action the statute of limitations does not cease to run * * Nothing of that kind is present in the case at bar.
The following quotations taken from Graves v. *186Welborn, 260 NC 688, 133 SE2d 761, reveal the court’s adherence to the doctrine of relation back:
u* * * it is obvious, therefore, that unless the plaintiff’s appointment as administratrix related bade to the institution of this action, or to the time the order adjudicating her right to letters was signed, it cannot survive defendant’s denial of the allegations in paragraph one of the complaint.
“In order to protect property rights and to protect one who, prior to his appointment, has acted to preserve the estate, it is the universal rule that all previous acts of the personal representative prior to his appointment which were beneficial in nature to the estate and which would have been within the scope of his authority had he been duly qualified, are validated upon his appointment which relates back to the death of the intestate for this purpose. Jones v. Jones, 118 NC 440, 24 SE 774; 21 Am Jur, Executors and Administrators § 211; see Annot, 26 ALR 1359.
“Although the appointment of an administrator relates back to the date of the death of decedent for many purposes, the courts are not in accord as to whether it will relate back so as to validate an action brought prior to the appointment.
“We think that the reasoning of the Ohio Court in Douglas v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., supra, is sound and applicable to the facts of the instant case. Unlike Pearson v. Anthony, supra, our case was not instituted by one pretending to lie the administrator. * * *
w w #
“For the reasons stated, the order of the court below dismissing the action is reversed.”
It should be noted that the North Carolina decision, from which I just quoted, cited, approved, and followed Douglas v. Daniels Bros Coal Co., supra. A previous page of this memorandum reviews that deci*187sion. It will be recalled that when the plaintiff’s complaint in that case was filed the plaintiff had not been appointed administratrix and that her appointment did not take place until after the limitation period for filing a complaint had expired.
For a review of Forehand v. Hall (Mo.), 355 SW2d 940, I accept the following headnote found in the Southwestern Reporter:
“A wrongful death action. The Circuit Court, G-reene County, William R. Collinson, J., sustained a motion to dismiss the amended petition of an administrator de bonis non, who was appointed after widow resigned her position as administratrix, and a motion to strike the administrator’s motion to substitute a minor child, of the deceased as plaintiff and to amend the petition, and the administrator appealed. The Supreme Court, Houser, C., held that more than six months but less than one year after alleged wrongful death, widow had no cause of action as widow or as administratrix of decedent who was also survived by minor son, and, therefore, widow’s institution of wrongful death action at such time as administratrix did not toll the one year statute of limitations, and that amended petition filed by decedent’s minor child after expiration of one period of limitations could not relate back to action filed within period by administratrix who, on date of filing, had no cause of action as surviving wife or as administratrix and no joint cause of action with child. Judgment affirmed.”
It will be observed that there is nothing in that holding that supports the position of the defendants in the case at bar.
Griffin v. Workman (Florida), 73 So2d 844, is sufficiently stated in the following headnote:
“Action for wrongful death, instituted by de*188ceased’s father, who had not qualified as administrator at time of filing. Father subsequently qualified, but the Circuit Court, Suwannee County, R. H. Rowe, J., dismissed the complaint, and father appealed. The Supreme Court, Sebring, J., held that where no fraud or inequity was involved, and no new cause of action would have been presented by allowing father to prosecute action to conclusion, father’s letters of administration would be deemed to relate back to deceased’s death, validating father’s action on behalf of estate. Order reversed with directions.”
The majority cite American Ry Express Co. v. Reeves, 173 Ark 273, 292 SW 109. Headnotes 1 and 2 of 292 SW 109 read as follows:
“Under Crawford & Moses’ Dig. § 1049, both filing of complaint and issuance of summons thereon are required to ‘commence’ action, and until then statute of limitation is not arrested.
“Where action instituted Jan. 15, 1921, by alleged trustee of shipper’s estate to recover loss in shipment while defendant was being operated under federal control was dismissed for defective parties, complaint amended making shipper plaintiff, and summons was issued on February 12, 1925, action was barred by two-year limitation in Transportation Act Cong. Feb. 28, 1920, § 206(a), being U.S. Comp. St. § 10071 y4 cc, in view of Crawford & Moses’ Dig. § 1049, providing that action is commenced by filing complaint and issuing summons thereon; dismissing action as to alleged trustee and amending complaint substituting shipper being equivalent to institution of original action by shipper.”
The majority depend upon Floyd Plant Food Co. v. Moore, 197 Ark 259, 122 SW2d 463. The pertinent headnotes set forth in 122 SW2d 463 are the following:
“Where corporation’s action on note was instituted three days before running of statute of limita*189tions and nine months thereafter a second corporation sought to be made a party plaintiff and filed amended complaint alleging that second corporation purchased note from first corporation and that first corporation was owned by second corporation and had been dissolved, second corporation could not claim that the corporations were identical, as respects question whether second corporation’s recovery on note was barred by limitation.
“Where corporation’s action on note was instituted three days before running of statute of limitations and nine months thereafter a second corporation sought to be made a party plaintiff and filed an amended complaint alleging that second corporation purchased notes from first corporation and that first corporation was owned by second corporation and had been dissolved, evidence supported finding that the corporations were not identical, and that second corporation’s recovery was barred by limitations.
“One plaintiff cannot be substituted for a nonexistent plaintiff to circumvent the bar of the statute of limitations which had completed its running subsequent to filing of action by the nonexistent plaintiff.”
I do not believe that the authorities which the majority cite support their view. To weaken or blot out the doctrine of relation back is most unfortunate. I dissent.
Mr. Justice Sloan joins in this dissent.