Court Opinion

ID: 9700994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:57:48.341029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:52.732833
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Today we reaffirm Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161 (1978), and hold that “a restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a hospital and a physician is not per se unreasonable and unenforceable.” Ante, 183 N.J. at 41, 869 A.2d at 887. I join the Court in so holding.
However, to the extent the Court also “blue pencils” the restrictive covenant at issue here in a manner that renders it meaningless, I must respectfully dissent. Circumscribing the geographic limits of the restrictive covenant so as to place the very conduct prohibited by the restrictive covenant tantalizingly outside the restrictive covenant’s reach gives the party that successfully sought to enforce the restrictive covenant nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory. There can be no question that considerations of patient care are critically important in the judicial calculus of whether a restrictive covenant is injurious to the public. However, the conduct of the restricted physician here in singling out the one hospital most convenient to his personal preferences that also has a need for his medical specialty as his justification for violating a restrictive covenant he voluntarily signed three different times over a five-year period — and ignoring all other alternatives that would not have violated the covenant he freely and voluntarily entered into with the hospital employer that allowed him to develop his expertise in the first instance — is little more than rank bootstrapping. This is even more so because the employment agreement this physician voluntarily signed contained his representation that the terms of the restrictive covenant
*65(i) ... are necessary and appropriate for the reasonable protection of [plaintiffs] interests; (ii) each and every covenant and restriction is reasonable in respect to its subject matter, length of time and geographical area; and (iii) [plaintiff] has been induced to enter into this Agreement with [defendant] and is relying upon the representation and covenant by [defendant] that he will abide by and be bound by each of the covenants and agreements set forth [in the restrictive covenant section of the employment agreement].
[Emphasis added.]
When, as here, equitable considerations are paramount, those actions constitute crass opportunistic behavior deserving of nothing more than our condemnation. Therefore, because I would affirm in all respects the thoughtful opinion of the Appellate Division, Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. More, 365 N.J.Super. 84, 838 A.2d 472 (App.Div.2003), I must respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s opinion that “blue pencils” the geographic limits of the restrictive covenant and remands the case to the Chancery Division.
For affirmance in pari, reversal in part, remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LAVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE — 6.
For concurrence in part, reversal in part — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.