Court Opinion

ID: 9885622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:08:13.576245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.381678
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J. (dissenting).
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of possession of a weapon as a felony and sentencing him to a five-year term of probation. The plea followed denial of appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence. Since, for the reasons hereinbelow stated, I believe the motion to suppress should have been granted, I vote to reverse the instant conviction.
The suppression hearing disclosed that at. approximately 1:45 p.m. on July 3, 1974, a police officer on traffic duty was informed by several pedestrians that a woman was being assaulted in a nearby garage. The officer proceeded to the described premises and found a woman "crying and screaming” on the ground. The woman further informed the officer that defendant, who was then driving a car out of the garage, "got a gun”.
The officer approached the automobile, ordered defendant out of it and frisked him; but found no weapon on his person. Custody of defendant was then turned over to two other officers who had, by then, arrived on the scene; and the first officer proceeded to search the automobile. Not finding a weapon in plain view, or under the seat, the officer opened a *116brown paper bag lying on top of some clothing in an open, satchel and found a loaded .357 magnum pistol and some ammunition therein. Defendant was thereupon indicted for possession of a loaded firearm and of possession of the firearm plus the ammunition which could be used to discharge it.
Although the police officer testified that he immediately placed appellant under arrest, and the People contend on this appeal that defendant was arrested for assault, the suppression court apparently validated the search under the officer’s common-law or statutory right to investigate, stop and search. (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210; CPL 140.50.) I find no justification for the full blown search of the automobile, in the circumstances of this case, under either contingency.
If appellant was arrested prior to the discovery of the gun there was no probable cause therefor. The police officer acted on nothing more than unsubstantiated reports from unknown persons that a woman had been assaulted. No one pointed to defendant as the perpetrator. Even the presumed victim, crying on the ground, did not accuse appellant of assault; only of possession of a gun. The events which preceded the arrival of the officer were never detailed. So far as the instant record is concerned, the crying woman vanished after she alerted the officer to the fact that defendant possessed a weapon. As far as the assault is concerned, it is just as conceivable that the woman was assaulted by another, perhaps a boy friend with whom she was having an altercation, and that the perpetrator had been frightened off or chased away when defendant displayed a weapon, possibly to defend the assault victim. I have, of course, no more knowledge of the actual events than my colleagues; but I cannot bridge the evidentiary gap to find facts sufficient to support probable cause for an assault arrest when there are none articulated here. Accordingly, the search cannot be validated as incident to a lawful arrest. In such connection, it is also parenthetically noted that defendant was never charged with assault.
Turning then to the common-law and statutory right to inquire, there is even a question as to whether the frisk was permissible. (People v Bronk, 31 NY2d 995.) But even assuming it was, a frisk was the limit of the permissible intrusion. (People v Green, 35 NY2d 193.) After defendant was found to be "clean”, the officer was obliged to proceed with his investigation before a full blown search of the automobile and its contents could be justified.
*117Based on the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be reversed and vacated, the motion to suppress granted and the indictment dismissed.
Lupiano, Birns and Capozzoli, JJ., concur with Lane, J.; Murphy, J. P., dissents in an opinion.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County rendered April 17, 1975, affirmed.