Court Opinion

ID: 9894244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 00:00:27.871887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:11.843035
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50575     Document: 00516951232         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/31/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                     FILED
                                                                          October 31, 2023
                                  No. 23-50575                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                     Clerk

   In re TikTok, Incorporated; TikTok Pte., Limited;
   ByteDance, Limited; ByteDance, Incorporated,

                                                                     Petitioners.
                  ______________________________

                      Petition for Writ of Mandamus to
                       the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 6:21-CV-504
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
          A writ of mandamus is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.
   TikTok, Incorporated, and various related entities contend that the district
   court’s denial of their motion to transfer to the Northern District of Cali-
   fornia was so patently erroneous that this rare form of relief is warranted.
   After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the conscientious district court’s
   opinion, and the factual record, we agree. This case was brought by a Chinese
   plaintiff, challenges conduct that took place mostly in China and to a lesser
   extent in California and rises or falls with proof located outside the Western
   District of Texas. Under our precedent, denying petitioners’ motion to
   transfer was a clear abuse of discretion, and because petitioners satisfy the
   other requirements for mandamus relief, their petition for writ of mandamus
   is granted.
Case: 23-50575        Document: 00516951232              Page: 2       Date Filed: 10/31/2023

                                          No. 23-50575

                                              I.
           TikTok is a popular application that allows users to edit and share
   short videos. The application depends in part on software that enables video
   and audio editing by its users. Beijing Meishe Network Technology Co., Ltd.
   (“Meishe”), is a Chinese company and the owner of several Chinese copy-
   rights covering the source code for a specific type of video- and audio-editing
   software. 1 Meishe alleges that one of its former employees disclosed that
   source code to petitioners, who used the code to develop a video-editing
   functionality that was then implemented into the current version of TikTok.
   The development of the video-editing functionality took place in China and
   was implemented into TikTok in part by a team of engineers located in
   California.
           That team of engineers works in petitioners’ Mountain View office,
   within the Northern District of California. One member of the engineering
   team works remotely from Irving, Texas, in the Northern District of Texas
   and 113 miles from the relevant Western District of Texas courthouse in
   Waco. 2 Petitioners do have a large presence in the Western District of Texas
   in the form of a 300-person office in Austin. But the Austin office is a busi-
   ness office that does not perform engineering work, and no employee in the

           _____________________
           1
             The parties do not dispute at this point in the litigation that the Chinese copy-
   rights are enforceable in the United States. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2); Fourth Est. Pub.
   Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct. 881, 891 (2019) (recognizing that Con-
   gress removed foreign works from the Copyright Act’s registration requirement).
           2
             The engineer’s exact address is in the record filed under seal, and we may take
   judicial notice of the distance between this address and the Waco federal courthouse. Cf.
   United States v. Herrera-Ochoa, 245 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that courts
   may take judicial notice of a “clear adjudicative fact: geographical location.”); Swindol v.
   Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that judicial
   notice may be taken sua sponte on appeal). Petitioners’ contentions that this engineer has
   since moved to California lack record support.

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                                          No. 23-50575

   Austin office was involved in the development or implementation of the
   video-editing functionality. The only employees who can access the source
   code used in the video-editing functionality are the Chinese employees who
   developed it and the California engineering team who implemented it.
           In May 2021, Meishe filed this lawsuit in the Western District of
   Texas, Waco Division. It alleged copyright infringement and trade-secret
   misappropriation, false advertising under the Lanham Act, and state law
   claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting a
   breach of fiduciary duty. All claims stem from petitioners’ alleged use of
   Meishe’s source code to develop and implement TikTok’s current video-
   editing functionality. Meishe also filed lawsuits in China alleging substan-
   tially the same claims; those suits are ongoing.
           Petitioners first filed a motion to dismiss Meishe’s claims and a
   motion to stay the case pending adjudication of the Chinese lawsuits. Shortly
   thereafter, petitioners moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer the case to
   the Northern District of California. Almost a year later, a magistrate judge
   issued a recommended order denying transfer, 3 and the district court
   adopted that order in full. 4 While the motion to transfer was pending, the
   case proceeded though discovery, and a trial date was set for April 2024.
   Upon denial of the motion to transfer, petitioners petitioned this court timely
   for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to transfer this case to the
   Northern District of California.

           _____________________
           3
           Beijing Meishe Network Tech. Co. v. Tiktok Inc., No. 6:21-cv-504, 2023 U.S. Dist.
   LEXIS 63036 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2023).
           4
             Because the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report in full, all ref-
   erences to the district court’s analysis are synonymous with references to the magistrate
   judge’s recommended order.

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                                        No. 23-50575

                                             II.
            Plaintiffs are permitted to engage in a certain amount of forum-
   shopping. Cf. Bechuck v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 814 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir.
   2016) (recognizing that Rule 41(a)(1) permits voluntary dismissal to secure a
   plaintiff’s preferred forum). Defendants can protect themselves from the
   most blatant forum-shopping by invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That statute
   allows a district court to transfer “any civil action to any other district or
   division where it might have been brought” when the “convenience of
   parties and witnesses” and “the interest of justice” so require.                    Id. 5
   “[M]andamus is an appropriate means of testing a district court’s § 1404(a)
   ruling.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
   banc).
            A petitioner must satisfy three requirements for a writ of mandamus.
   First, there must be “no other adequate means to attain the relief . . .
   desire[d].” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380–
   81 (2004). Second, the “right to issuance of the writ” must be “clear and
   indisputable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the § 1404(a) con-
   text, “the second requirement . . . captures the essence of the disputed
   issue.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 311. That is because this circuit has estab-
   lished that the first “mandamus requirement is satisfied in the motion-to-
   transfer context.” In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 287 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (per curiam). Third, and finally, “even if the first two prerequisites [are]
   met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that
   the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381.

            _____________________
            5
             All parties agree that this case “might have been brought” in the Northern Dis-
   trict of California.

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                                    No. 23-50575

                                        III.
          Petitioners have a clear and indisputable right to the writ where “the
   district court clearly abuse[s] its discretion . . . in denying [the] transfer
   motion.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 311. That means the Northern District of
   California must be “a clearly more convenient venue than the” Western
   District of Texas such that “the district court’s ruling to the contrary was a
   clear abuse of discretion” leading to a “patently erroneous result.” Radmax,
   720 F.3d at 287, 290 (cleaned up).
          The district court should grant a motion to transfer venue under
   § 1404(a) where
          “the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly
          more convenient,” taking into consideration (1) “the relative
          ease of access to sources of proof”; (2) “the availability of
          compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses”;
          (3) “the cost of attendance for willing witnesses”; (4) “all
          other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
          tious and inexpensive”; (5) “the administrative difficulties
          flowing from court congestion”; (6) “the local interest in hav-
          ing localized interests decided at home”; (7) “the familiarity of
          the forum with the law that will govern the case”; and (8) “the
          avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in]
          the application of foreign law.”
   Id. at 288 (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315). No factor is of dispositive
   weight, and we have cautioned against a “raw counting of the factors” that
   “weigh[s] each the same.” Id. at 290 n.8. Indeed, we have found an abuse
   of discretion even where a majority of factors are neutral. See id. at 290
   (granting mandamus when five factors were neutral and three weighed in
   favor of transfer). That is because Volkswagen recognized that a district court
   abuses its discretion by denying transfer when “not a single relevant factor
   favors the [plaintiff’s] chosen venue.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 318.

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                                        No. 23-50575

          The district court denied petitioners’ motion to transfer after finding
   that five of the eight factors were neutral, and three weighed against
   transferring to California.      As we explain, that well-intended conclusion
   “was a clear abuse of discretion” leading to a “patently erroneous result.”
   Id. at 287, 290 (cleaned up). We address each factor in turn.

   The relative ease of access to sources of proof
          The first factor focuses on the location of “documents and physical
   evidence relating to the [case].” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 316. “The question
   is relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access.” Radmax, 720 F.3d
   at 288. That means this factor weighs in favor of transfer where the current
   district lacks any evidence relating to the case. See Volkswagen, 545 F.3d
   at 316. But when “the vast majority of the evidence [is] electronic, and
   therefore equally accessible in either forum[,]” this factor bears less strongly
   on the transfer analysis. In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n Am., Inc., 52 F.4th
   625, 630 (5th Cir. 2022).
          The district court determined that this factor was neutral with respect
   to transfer because “most, if not all of the relevant documents are electronic
   and can be available as easily in Texas as in California.” TikTok, 2023 U.S.
   Dist. LEXIS 63036, at *12. The record flatly contradicts that conclusion. As
   the district court recognized, the petitioners’ source code is the most impor-
   tant evidence in this case. It is undisputed that only certain of petitioners’
   employees can access the source code because petitioners have placed it
   behind a security clearance. Therefore, the key evidence may be electronic,
   but unlike in Planned Parenthood, it is not “equally accessible in either
   forum.” 52 F.4th at 630. Rather, the record established that there are two
   groups of employees with this security clearance: The Chinese employees
   who developed the video-editing functionality and members of the California
   engineering team who implemented the functionality into TikTok.

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                                          No. 23-50575

           The district court concluded that the source code was accessible as
   easily in Texas as in California because one member of the California engin-
   eering team with the needed security clearance worked remotely in Irving,
   Texas. But the court erred by comparing Texas with California when it
   should have been comparing the Western District of Texas with the Nor-
   thern District of California. Cf. Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 307 (comparing the
   Eastern District of Texas with the Northern District of Texas). The one
   employee in Texas who possessed the needed security clearance lived in the
   Northern District of Texas.
           There are no employees in the Western District of Texas who can
   access the source code. The only way it can be accessed there is if out-of-
   district individuals travel into the district, “bringing” the electronic evidence
   with them. 6 That, of course, is possible, but the question under the first
   factor is “relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access.” Radmax,
   720 F.3d at 288. It is relatively easier to access to the source code in the
   Northern District of California—where a majority of the engineering team is
   based—than it is in the Western District of Texas, where the source code can
   be accessed only by bringing far-flung individuals into the district. The dis-
   trict court abused its discretion in finding that the source code was accessible
   as easily in Texas as in California.
           The district court also based its conclusion that this factor was neutral
           _____________________
           6
             This discussion should not be seen as unsettling the understanding that the first
   factor looks only at ease of access to non-witness evidence, while the second and third
   factors relate to the convenience of each forum for witnesses. See In re Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d
   1332, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (applying Fifth Circuit law). To the extent there is any
   overlap between the factors in this case, it flows from the fact that only a select few indi-
   viduals have access to the key non-witness evidence in this case. The non-witness evidence
   “travels” with the employees who have the needed security clearance. Therefore, the loca-
   tion of those individuals necessarily bears on which forum has relative ease of access to
   sources of proof.

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                                           No. 23-50575

   on a finding that petitioners’ “President of Global Business Solutions . . .
   lives and works in [the Western District of Texas] along with over 300 other
   employees.” TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036, at *12–13. In the district
   court’s view, petitioners’ large presence in the Western District of Texas
   raises an “extremely plausible and reasonable inference” that these employ-
   ees possess some relevant documents. Id. But the district court cannot rely
   on the mere fact that petitioners have a general presence in the Western
   District of Texas because Volkswagen commands courts to assess its eight
   factors considering the circumstances of the specific case at issue. 7
           Neither the district court nor Meishe identifies any record evidence
   showing that any employee in the Western District of Texas possesses proof
   relevant to this case. The district court relied on deposition testimony and
   witness declarations from several of petitioners’ employees. That evidence,
   however, only establishes that a high-ranking company executive and other
   employees worked in Austin as members of a “Global Business Solutions
   Group.” It does not tie those individuals to this case, or show that they do
   any work related to the video-editing functionality or its implementation, or
   support the proposition that any of them would have physical proof relevant
   to the adjudication of Meishe’s claims. Based on what is in the record—as
   distinguished from Meishe’s unsupported contentions in various litigation
   documents—it is pure speculation whether any of petitioners’ Austin-based
   employees possesses or has access to proof relevant to this case.
           Abuse-of-discretion review is deferential; it is not a rubber stamp. We
   must credit a district court’s reasonable inferences when they are rooted in
   record evidence. But where, as here, there is nothing in the record support-

           _____________________
           7
                Cf. Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 312 (finding a clear abuse of discretion where “nothing
   . . . ties this case to the Marshall Division.”).

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   ing its conclusions, we may comfortably say that the court has committed a
   clear abuse of discretion in surmising that petitioners’ employees in the Wes-
   tern District of Texas possess evidence related to this case.
          Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer because, as in Volks-
   wagen, no evidence relevant to this case is in the transferor district. The
   district court committed a clear abuse of discretion in concluding otherwise.
   The availability of compulsory process
          The second factor focuses on “the availability of compulsory process
   to secure the attendance of witnesses.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. This
   factor favors transfer where “non-party witnesses . . . are outside the [Wes-
   tern] District’s subpoena power” and “a proper venue that does enjoy
   absolute subpoena power for both depositions and trial” is available. Id.
   at 316 (cleaned up). “[T]he availability of compulsory process receives less
   weight when it has not been alleged or shown that any witness would be
   unwilling to testify.” Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630–31 (internal quo-
   tation marks omitted).
          The parties dispute whether the district court determined that this
   factor was neutral or weighed against transferring to California. Meishe con-
   tends that the district court determined this factor was neutral with respect
   to transfer because petitioners had not identified any non-party witnesses
   who are unwilling to testify. Petitioners do not dispute that they failed to
   identify any non-party witnesses who are unwilling to testify. Rather, they
   contend that the district court erred in finding that, absent such a showing,
   this factor disfavored transfer. The district court’s holding on this factor is
   admittedly subject to interpretation. The court first said that it “agreed”
   with Meishe’s contention that this factor “weighs against transfer[,]” but
   then said that “this factor fails to support transfer.” TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist.
   LEXIS 63036, at *14–16.

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          Though the district court have been more explicit, the overall tenor of
   this part of its opinion shows that it determined this factor was neutral. On
   the very next line after expressing agreement with Meishe’s contention, the
   court explicitly said that petitioners have “again failed to show that this factor
   favors transfer, and certainly doesn’t show that NDCA is clearly more con-
   venient.” Id. at 16. Therefore, whatever the court meant by expressing
   agreement with Meishe’s contention that this factor disfavored transfer, it
   actually held that this factor was neutral.
          Given that Planned Parenthood allows district courts to afford this fac-
   tor “less weight when it has not been alleged or shown that any witness would
   be unwilling to testify[,]” we cannot say that the district court committed a
   clear abuse of discretion in holding that this factor is neutral when petitioners
   have failed to identify any unwilling non-party witness. Planned Parenthood,
   52 F.4th at 630–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
   The cost of attendance for willing witnesses
          The third factor focuses on “the cost of attendance for willing wit-
   nesses.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. Our circuit uses a “100-mile thresh-
   old” in assessing this factor. Id. at 317. “When the distance between an
   existing venue for trial . . . and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than
   100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to the witnesses increases in direct
   relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Id. (internal quotation
   marks omitted). This is an “obvious conclusion” because “it is more con-
   venient for witnesses to testify at home[,]” and “additional distance means
   additional travel time . . . meal and lodging expenses” and time “witnesses
   must be away from their regular employment.” Id. (cleaned up). Witnesses
   also suffer “personal costs associated with being away from work, family, and
   community” when they testify far from home. Id.
          The district court determined that this factor was neutral primarily

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   because “the key witnesses and the employee at the heart of the misappro-
   priation claim are in China.” TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036, at *20.
   That conclusion ignores our 100-mile test. Indeed, the district court failed
   to discuss that part of Volkswagen. Accepting the court’s finding that the
   “bulk of relevant witnesses [are] in China[,]” it is indisputable that the Nor-
   thern District of California is clearly more convenient for these witnesses
   than the Western District of Texas. 8
           It is true that one of the engineers who implemented the video-editing
   functionality lives in Irving, Texas—only 113 miles from the Waco federal
   courthouse. But most relevant witnesses are in China or California. The
   presence of one Texas witness cannot overcome the immense inconvenience
   that the majority of relevant witnesses would face if this case were to be tried
   in Texas. 9 These witnesses would have to travel thousands of extra miles,

           _____________________
           8
            Cf. In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying Fifth Circuit
   law to hold that this factor clearly favored transfer when some key witnesses were from
   Japan and “would each have to travel an additional 1,756 miles or 7 hours by plane to Texas
   as compared with Washington State.”).
           9
             The district court found that there were witnesses in the Western District of
   Texas relevant to determining Meishe’s damages. That finding was a clear abuse of dis-
   cretion because—as with the findings under factor one—the record is devoid of any evi-
   dence supporting an inference that petitioner’s Austin employees have any knowledge of
   or connection to this specific dispute. In concluding otherwise, the district court relied on
   the same depositions and witness declarations as it did in factor one. But as we have already
   explained, that evidence only establishes that a high-ranking company executive and other
   employees worked in Austin as members of a “Global Business Solutions Group.” The
   evidence amounts to an acknowledgement of these employees’ existence and a recognition
   that they work in petitioners’ business department. It is rank speculation whether these
   employees have any knowledge that would make them relevant witnesses.
           Therefore, as in factor one, the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion
   by including petitioners’ Austin employees in its analysis. And even if there were relevant
   witnesses in the Western District of Texas, that does not change the fact that the vast
   majority of witnesses, including the individual who supposedly misappropriated the source
   code, are located thousands of miles from Waco.

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   incurring substantial “additional travel time . . . meal and lodging ex-
   penses[,]” time “away from their regular employment[,]” and “personal
   costs associated with being away from work, family, and community.”
   Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317 (cleaned up).
          In sum, the district court’s analysis of this factor should have ended
   with its recognition that “the bulk of relevant witnesses [are] in China.”
   TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036, at *20. Under Volkswagen’s 100-mile
   threshold, the Northern District of California is a clearly more convenient
   venue for most relevant witnesses in this case. The district court committed
   a clear abuse of discretion in concluding otherwise.
   All other practical problems
          The fourth factor considers “all other practical problems that make
   trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d
   at 315. This factor weighs against transfer when petitioners “inexcusably
   delayed” bringing their motion until “late in the litigation.” Planned Parent-
   hood, 52 F.4th at 631. But “garden-variety delay associated with transfer is
   not to be taken into consideration when” weighing this factor. Radmax, 720
   F.3d at 289.     Additionally, a hypothetical question about whether the
   transferee forum would have personal jurisdiction over a party cannot, by
   itself, justify a conclusion that this factor weighs against transfer. See Def.
   Distrib. v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435–36 (2022).
          The district court determined that this factor weighed against transfer
   because it had already committed significant judicial resources to the matter
   and developed a “body of knowledge” relating to the case. Petitioners con-
   tend that the court abused its discretion in considering knowledge acquired
   and resources expended after the filing of their § 1404(a) motion. We agree;
   under the specific facts of this case, the court abused its discretion in consid-

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   ering post-motion events under this factor. 10 “[D]isposition of a [§ 1404(a)]
   motion should [take] a top priority in the handling of a case.” In re Horseshoe
   Ent., 337 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003). A district court that disregards this
   command without reason by taking an excessively long time to rule cannot
   then turn around and use the progress the case has made while the § 1404(a)
   motion was pending as a reason to deny transfer.
           The magistrate judge did not issue the recommended order until
   approximately 11 months after petitioners had originally filed their motion to
   transfer. The district court did not adopt that recommendation and enter the
   official order denying transfer until approximately 14 months after peti-
   tioners had originally filed their motion. A delay of this length is a plain vio-
   lation of our instruction to give § 1404(a) motions “a top priority in the
   handling of a case.” Id. Neither the district court nor the magistrate judge
   has offered any adequate explanation for why this motion lingered on the
   docket for such a long period of time in contravention of Horseshoe’s com-
   mand. 11 We cannot accept Meishe’s view that this factor permits a district

           _____________________
           10
              Petitioners cite Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960), and Nintendo to con-
   tend that district courts are per se forbidden from considering post-motion events under this
   factor. Blaski is inapposite because the relevant part of the opinion was interpreting a
   different part of § 1404(a). See Blaski, 363 U.S. at 343 (interpreting the phrase “where it
   might have been brought.”).
            Nintendo does analyze the second and third factors “[a]t the time Nintendo
   requested transfer.” 589 F.3d at 1197. But the Federal Circuit never held that this temporal
   frame applied throughout the § 1404(a) analysis; the case never even discussed this factor.
   See id. at 1198–1200. Petitioners have cited no binding case that supports a per se limitation
   on a district court’s ability to consider post-motion events when assessing this factor. We
   decline to draw that bright line here. Rather, under the specific circumstances of this case,
   the court abused its discretion in considering post-motion events.
           11
              The magistrate judge did note that petitioners had filed a reply to Meishe’s oppo-
   sition to the § 1404(a) motion that contained several voluminous exhibits. But that cannot
   explain the extended delay because the magistrate judge explicitly said “[t]he Court will
   also not undertake a detailed analysis of voluminous exhibits for which a pinpoint citation

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   court to ponder a § 1404(a) motion for over a year and then, when it finally
   rules on the motion, punish the moving party’s diligent litigation efforts
   undertaken in the interim by relying on post-motion progress to hold that this
   factor weighs against transfer. This is especially so where, as here, it appears
   petitioners would have been subject to sanction for non-compliance with the
   discovery process.
          In sum, the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by
   delaying the resolution of petitioners’ § 1404(a) motion for nearly a year
   without adequate explanation and then holding that the post-motion knowl-
   edge acquired, and the judicial resources expended after the motion was filed,
   weighed against transfer. The court also committed a clear abuse of discre-
   tion in considering potential personal jurisdiction problems under this factor
   because Defense Distributed held that hypothetical questions of jurisdiction
   cannot tip this factor against transfer. See 30 F.4th at 435–36. Therefore,
   this factor is—at most—neutral.
   The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
          The fifth factor considers “the administrative difficulties flowing
   from court congestion.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. The focus is on
   “docket efficiency[,]” an issue we have recognized “the district court is
   better placed” to evaluate. Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 631. This factor
   normally weighs against transfer when the “case appears to be timely pro-
   ceeding to trial before the” transferee district. Id.
          The district court determined that this factor weighed against transfer
   because the case was moving though discovery and proceeding quickly to

          _____________________
   was provided.” TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036, at *7. In any event, the exhibits
   were less than 2,000 pages, which—while lengthy—is not so extensive as to justify many
   months of delay in ruling.

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   trial, which the district court had set for April 2024. Petitioners contend that
   the court abused its discretion by considering progress made after they filed
   their § 1404(a) motion. Petitioners also contend that the time to trial is com-
   parable in both districts. 12 Meishe responds that Planned Parenthood allows
   for consideration of post-motion case progress by recognizing that factor five
   normally weighs against transfer when the “case appears to be timely
   proceeding to trial before the” transferee district. Id. But Meishe fails to
   note that the petitioner in Planned Parenthood “inexcusably delayed” in filing
   the § 1404(a) motion until “months into the discovery period.” Id. (internal
   quotation marks omitted). Because the petitioner there had “inexcusably
   delayed[,]” the district court was within its discretion to consider the prog-
   ress the case had made as that motion was pending. See id.
           But we have the exact opposite situation here: It was the district
   court—not petitioners—that was responsible for the delay. If a court can
   consider post-motion case progress when a party “inexcusably delay[s]” in
   bringing its § 1404(a) motion, it follows that when a court “inexcusably
   delay[s]” in ruling on a § 1404(a) motion, it cannot misuse this factor by
   pointing to how close the case is to trial when the court finally rules. See id.
   As we have explained in factor four, we can find no good reason why the
   district court disregarded Horseshoe and took over a year to issue a final ruling
   on petitioners’ motion.

           _____________________
           12
              That contention is foreclosed by Planned Parenthood’s recognition that, as a gen-
   eral matter, “the district court is better placed” to evaluate its “docket efficiency.”
   52 F.4th at 631. The district court believes it can try the case faster than can the Northern
   District of California, given the extensive progress the case has made over the last year.
   Petitioners have not shown that that determination was such an abuse of discretion as to
   justify second-guessing a court’s view of its own docket. Therefore, this factor hinges on
   whether the court abused its discretion by considering post-motion case progress in its
   analysis.

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           Therefore, the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by
   determining that this factor weighed against transfer based on case progress
   made after petitioners filed their § 1404(a) motion. This factor was—at
   most—neutral. 13
   The local interest in having localized interests decided at home
           The sixth factor considers “the local interest in having localized
   interests decided at home.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. We look not to
   “the parties’ significant connections to each forum . . . but rather the signifi-
   cant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to
   a suit.” Def. Distrib., 30 F.4th at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted).
   “Indeed, the place of the alleged wrong is one of the most important factors
   in venue determinations.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, “this factor weighs
   heavily in favor of transfer [when] . . . there is no relevant factual connection
   to the [transferor district].” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317–18. Also, this factor
   can weigh against transfer when the “citizens of [the transferor district] have
   a greater stake in the litigation than the citizens of [the transferee district].”
   Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 632.
           The district court determined that this factor was neutral because the
   critical conduct occurred in China, and the case primarily concerns the in-
   fringement of Chinese copyrights and the misappropriation of Chinese trade

           _____________________
           13
               A quick note is in order to emphasize the narrowness of our holding with respect
   to factors four and five. We are presented with unusual circumstances. Petitioners filed
   their § 1404(a) motion timely, yet the district court took no action on the motion for
   months, with the record showing no adequate reason for the delay. Moreover, the court
   failed to grant a stay, so the case proceeded through discovery for almost a year. When the
   court finally ruled, it used the case progress its delay engendered as a reason for denying
   transfer. If we were to hold that this is a proper exercise of discretion, a district court would
   have absolute control over whether these two factors weighed in favor of transfer. Such a
   result is inconsistent with the principles underlying § 1404(a) and not mandated by any of
   our cases.

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   secrets. Therefore, the district court could not say that the Northern District
   of California had a greater local interest in this case than did the Western
   District of Texas. Petitioners attack this holding by contending that the Nor-
   thern District of California has a local interest in the dispute because many of
   the engineers who implemented the video-editing functionality are based in
   that district.
           It is true that, as in Volkswagen, the transferor district has “no relevant
   factual connection to the” dispute. Id. at 318. 14 Therefore, it would have
   been error to hold that this factor weighed against transfer. But unlike in
   Volkswagen, the potential transferee district has little local interest in this
   dispute. Contra id. at 317–18 (noting that the entire event took place in the
   transferee district). Meishe’s source code was allegedly misappropriated in
   China by Chinese engineers. The implementation of that misappropriated
   code into TikTok was the only relevant event that occurred in the Northern
   District of California. The “event[] that gave rise to [the] suit” took place in
   China. See Def. Distrib., 30 F.4th at 435.
           Therefore, neither the citizens of the Northern District of California
   nor the citizens of the Western District of Texas can fairly be said to have a
   strong interest in this dispute. See Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 632. Thus,
   we cannot say that the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion in
   concluding that this factor was neutral with respect to transfer.
   The familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
           The seventh factor considers the current district’s “familiarity with
   the law that will govern the case.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. This factor
           _____________________
           14
              As discussed above, the district court abused its discretion by finding that peti-
   tioners’ Austin employees have relevance to this dispute. The record is devoid of evidence
   supporting that conclusion, and therefore the existence of the Austin employees cannot
   bolster the holding on this factor.

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   most “commonly applies where the destination venue is in a different
   State—in which case that State’s familiarity with the applicable law would be
   especially probative to the transfer analysis.” Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th
   at 632 n.5. This means that we must look to the law the district court will be
   called on to apply, including whether the current district court “would be
   bound to [the transferee court’s] law concerning such claims.” Def. Distrib.,
   30 F.4th at 436.
          This factor does not weigh in favor of transfer when both districts are
   “equally capable of applying the relevant law.” Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289.
   We recognize that “[f]ederal judges routinely apply the law of a State” other
   than the one in which they sit” and have hesitated to find that this factor
   weighs in favor of transfer when there are no “exceptionally arcane features
   of Texas . . . law that are likely to defy comprehension by a federal judge sit-
   ting in [California].” Def. Distrib., 30 F.4th at 436 (cleaned up).
          The district court held that this factor weighed against transfer
   because some of Meishe’s claims were based on Texas law, and it “is better
   equipped to handle [these claims].” TikTok, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036,
   at *28. It also dismissed petitioners’ contention that California law would
   govern Meishe’s state law claims under Texas choice-of-law rules as “irrele-
   vant” and “pure speculation.” Id. Those conclusions were error for two
   reasons.
          First, Defense Distributed does not allow the district court to dismiss
   petitioners’ choice-of-law contention blithely. 30 F.4th at 436. Because this
   factor focuses on the governing law, courts must make a good-faith attempt
   to ascertain which jurisdiction’s law will apply, even when the outcome of
   that choice-of-law analysis is not entirely clear.
          Second, even if Texas law unequivocally governed petitioners’ state-
   law claims, that alone is not enough to hold that a Texas federal judge is better

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   equipped to handle these claims. Defense Distributed requires something
   more: There must be some “exceptionally arcane features of Texas . . . law
   that are likely to defy comprehension by a federal judge sitting in [Califor-
   nia].” Id. (cleaned up). Neither the district court nor Meishe has offered any
   explanation for why the Texas law governing Meishe’s state-law claims is so
   “exceptionally arcane” that the judges of the Northern District of California
   would be less equipped to handle these claims.
          In short, the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by
   holding that this factor weighed against transfer without first attempting to
   determine the governing law. Even accepting its conclusion that Texas law
   applies, the court erred by assuming that it was more capable at applying
   Texas law than are the judges of the Northern District of California when the
   court identified no exceptionally arcane aspects of Texas law governing
   Meishe’s state-law claims. This factor was, at most, neutral.
   The avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws
          The eighth factor focuses on “the avoidance of unnecessary problems
   of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d
   at 315. Petitioners do not contest the district court’s determination that this
   factor is neutral.

                                          IV.
          In summary, factors one and three weigh in favor of transfer. All other
   factors are neutral with respect to transfer. A district court abuses its discre-
   tion by denying a motion to transfer when “virtually all of the events and
   witnesses regarding the case . . . are in the transferee forum.” Radmax,
   720 F.3d at 290; see also Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 318 (“The only connection
   between this case and the [transferor forum] is plaintiffs’ choice to file
   there.”). Here, as in Volkswagen, not a single factor weighs in favor of
   refusing transfer. The Western District of Texas contains no relevant evi-

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                                     No. 23-50575

   dence, is thousands of miles away from the vast majority of relevant wit-
   nesses, and is wholly unconnected to the underlying dispute. This case con-
   cerns Chinese intellectual property that was allegedly infringed and misap-
   propriated by employees located in China. The only individuals in the
   United States who have any documented connection to this dispute are
   located outside the district. The Northern District of California is a clearly
   more convenient venue to adjudicate this case.
          The only thing connecting this case to the Western District of Texas
   is Meishe’s decision to file suit there. The district court’s decision to retain
   this case and deny petitioners’ motion to transfer was a “clear abuse of dis-
   cretion” leading to a “patently erroneous result.” Radmax, 720 F.3d at 287,
   290 (cleaned up). Therefore, petitioners’ “right to issuance of the writ” is
   “clear and indisputable.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81.

                                         V.
          The reader will recall that petitioners must establish three require-
   ments to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. The entirety of the
   opinion thus far has focused on the second requirement: Whether peti-
   tioners’ right to the writ is clear and indisputable. We determined that it is.
   The first “mandamus requirement [the lack of an appellate remedy] is satis-
   fied in the motion-to-transfer context.” Radmax, 720 F.3d at 287 n.2.
   Therefore, all that remains to decide is whether, “in the exercise of [our]
   discretion[,]” we are “satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circum-
   stances.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81.
          “[W]rits of mandamus are supervisory in nature and are particularly
   appropriate when the issues also have an importance beyond the immediate
   case.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 319. We have recognized that § 1404(a)
   decisions often have “importance beyond the immediate case . . . [b]ecause
   venue transfer decisions are rarely reviewed,” and “district courts have . . .

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   applied [our] tests with too little regard for consistency of outcomes.” Id. In
   the fifteen years since Volkswagen, we have issued fewer than ten precedential
   opinions applying its test. This is despite the fact that district courts within
   our circuit have been called on to apply Volkswagen in over 2,000 cases, and
   the Federal Circuit—which is bound by our law when certain procedural
   matters arise in patent cases—must review many of these decisions with little
   guidance from our court. Indeed, in the last few months the Federal Circuit
   has reached conflicting outcomes in reviewing mandamus petitions from the
   Western District of Texas. 15 Therefore, granting mandamus in this case will
   improve “consistency of outcomes” by further instructing when transfer
   is—or, for that matter, is not—warranted in response to a § 1404(a) motion.
   Therefore, the writ is appropriate under these circumstances, meaning peti-
   tioners have satisfied all three requirements needed for the issuance of the
   writ.

                                       * * * * *
           The petition for writ of mandamus, requiring transfer to the Northern
   District of California, is GRANTED.

           _____________________
           15
             Compare In re Microsoft Corp., No. 2023-128, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 14095, at *6
   (Fed. Cir. June 7, 2023) (per curiam) (granting mandamus) with In re Apple, Inc., No. 2023-
   135, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21364, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2023) (per curiam) (denying
   mandamus).

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