Court Opinion

ID: 9955968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 20:10:08.165935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:43.511818
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Gideon v. Page, 2024-Ohio-1219.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[State ex rel.] Mark R. Gideon,                           :

                 Relator,                                 :          No. 23AP-492

v.                                                        :       (REGULAR CALENDAR)

The Honorable Jaiza N. Page et al.,                       :

                 Respondents.                             :

                                               DECISION

                                     Rendered on March 29, 2024

                 On brief: Law Offices of James P. Connors, and James P.
                 Connors, for relator.

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Brian D. Zagrocki, for respondent, Judge Jaiza N. Page.

                 On brief: Frost Brown Todd LLP, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and
                 Thaddeus M. Boggs, for respondent, City of Worthington.

                                  IN PROHIBITION
                    ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Relator, Mark R. Gideon, owns property that respondent, the City of
Worthington (“City”), sought to take by initiating appropriation proceedings in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. That eminent-domain action was initially
dismissed without prejudice by respondent, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
Judge Jaiza N. Page (“Judge Page”), pursuant to Loc.R. 25.03 and Civ.R. 41(B), on account
of the parties’ failure to timely put on a final entry of dismissal following settlement, as
ordered by the trial court. But, on motion by the City explaining the matter was not settled
No. 23AP-492                                                                                                2

because Mr. Gideon refused to execute the settlement documents, Judge Page vacated the
entry of dismissal and scheduled the matter for a hearing on the City’s motion seeking
enforcement of the settlement agreement.
        {¶ 2} Mr. Gideon now seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Page from
moving forward with that hearing. For the following reasons, we deny the writ.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 3} In the underlying action against Mr. Gideon,1 the City sought to appropriate
Mr. Gideon’s private property through eminent domain to replace an existing underground
sanitary sewer on his property with a larger sewer line that does not discharge raw sewage.
On October 10, 2022, the parties entered into a tentative settlement agreement—
conditioned on City Council’s approval—during mediation with the trial court’s magistrate.
The magistrate advised the trial court of the settlement, and, on October 12, 2022, the court
put on an entry noting the settlement and directing the parties to put on a final entry of
dismissal within 60 days or risk dismissal (without prejudice) for want of prosecution
pursuant to Loc.R. 25.03 and Civ.R. 41(B)(1).
        {¶ 4} Although City Council approved the settlement in early November, Mr.
Gideon refused to execute the settlement documents, asserting the written agreement
prepared by the City contained terms that materially deviated from what was agreed to in
October. Counsel thus did not submit a proposed dismissal entry or otherwise
communicate to the court that the matter was not settled. Accordingly, on January 10,
2023, Judge Page put on, sua sponte, an entry dismissing the case without prejudice,
pursuant to Loc.R. 25.03 and Civ.R. 41(B)(1), for want of prosecution. That entry further
stated that “the parties may [hereafter] submit an amended agreed entry reflecting the
terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.” (Jan. 10, 2023 Journal Entry.)
        {¶ 5} On February 8, 2023, the City filed a motion to vacate the January 10, 2023
entry of dismissal and to enforce the settlement. Mr. Gideon objected to that motion on
jurisdictional grounds and contested the existence of such agreement by alleging the City’s
proposed settlement documents “deviated materially from what was agreed on” at the

1 In evaluating entitlement to a writ, a court may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related

cases when they are not subject to reasonable dispute insofar as they affect the current original action
without converting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Mobley v. O’Donnell, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-193, 2021-Ohio-715, ¶ 9, quoting State ex
rel. Nelson v. Russo, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000); Pearson v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-313, 2014-
Ohio-5563, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 10.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                3

October 10, 2022 mediation. (See Feb. 23, 2023 Memo Contra at 2.) On July 6, 2023, the
trial court granted the City’s motion to set aside the dismissal entry and scheduled a hearing
on the issue of whether a settlement had actually been reached.
         {¶ 6} Before that hearing took place, however, Mr. Gideon appealed from the trial
court’s July 6, 2023 entry granting the City’s motion to vacate to this court under case No.
23AP-475. On September 5, 2023, we dismissed that case for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Specifically, we found that because the trial court’s January 10, 2023 entry dismissing the
case without prejudice was not a final, appealable order, the July 6, 2023 entry vacating
that dismissal was also not a final, appealable order. We then denied Mr. Gideon’s
application for reconsideration, application for en banc consideration, and motion to certify
a conflict on October 26, 2023. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined jurisdiction over that
case on February 20, 2024. (See Case Announcements, 2024-Ohio-555 at case No. 2023-
1564.)
         {¶ 7} While his appeal in case No. 23AP-475 was pending, Mr. Gideon commenced
this original action on August 15, 2023, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Page
from conducting “any further proceedings” in the case below and “to correct the results of
prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions including the Decision and Entry filed July 6,
2023.” (Aug. 15, 2023 Compl. at ¶ 40-41.) Respondents each filed a motion to dismiss Mr.
Gideon’s complaint for a writ of prohibition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
         {¶ 8} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who issued the appended decision,
including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate determined that Mr.
Gideon’s complaint failed to state a cause of action in prohibition and, accordingly, has
recommended that we grant respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismiss the complaint.
(Dec. 8, 2023 Mag.’s Decision at 10-11.)
         {¶ 9} Mr. Gideon now objects to the magistrate’s conclusions of law. (See Dec. 22,
2023 Objs. to Mag.’s Decision.) We note Mr. Gideon’s objections were timely filed under
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). We are therefore required to independently review the objected to
matters and evaluate whether “the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues
and appropriately applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d).
         {¶ 10} Before addressing the merits of Mr. Gideon’s objections, we note that Mr.
Gideon has not objected to the magistrate’s findings of fact. Nonetheless, having reviewed
No. 23AP-492                                                                                4

the record and the magistrate’s factual findings—and in the absence of any objection
thereto—we find no error in the magistrate’s determinations of the facts.

II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 11} Mr. Gideon objects to the magistrate’s determination and application of the
law to find that dismissal was appropriate under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). For the reasons that
follow, we overrule Mr. Gideon’s five objections to the magistrate’s decision.
       {¶ 12} “Prohibition is an extraordinary writ issued to prevent a court or tribunal
from usurping or exercising judicial power or judicial functions which have not been
conferred upon it by law.” State ex rel. Daily Reporter v. Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin Cty., 56 Ohio St.3d 145 (1990). “The writ of prohibition is a high prerogative writ
to be used with great caution in the furtherance of justice and only where there is no other
regular, ordinary, and adequate remedy.” State ex rel. Stark v. Summit Cty. Court of
Common Pleas, 31 Ohio St.3d 324, 325 (1987).
       {¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Mr. Gideon must establish that (1)
Judge Page is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other
adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Fiser v. Kolesar, 164
Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-5483, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted, 138 Ohio
St.3d 527, 2014-Ohio-1406, ¶ 15.
       {¶ 14} The absence of an adequate remedy at law is not a required element if it can
be shown that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. State ex rel.
Martre v. Cheney, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4594, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Jones v.
Paschke, 168 Ohio St.3d 93, 2022-Ohio-2427, ¶ 6. If a trial court does not patently and
unambiguously lack jurisdiction, however, a direct appeal is generally “considered an
adequate remedy that will preclude a writ of prohibition.” State ex rel. Smith v. Hall, 145
Ohio St.3d 473, 2016-Ohio-1052, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 15} “ ‘[I]n order to dismiss a complaint for a writ under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must
appear beyond doubt from the complaint, after presuming the truth of all material factual
allegations and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the relator, that the relator can
prove no set of facts warranting extraordinary relief.’ ” State ex rel. Squire v. Phipps, 10th
Dist. No. 23AP-137, 2023-Ohio-3950, ¶ 2, quoting State ex rel. Lewis v. Holbrook, 10th
No. 23AP-492                                                                              5

Dist. No. 07AP-5, 2007-Ohio-4459, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Hunter v. Patterson, 75 Ohio
St.3d 512, 513-14 (1996).
       {¶ 16} In this case, the magistrate cited statutory authority and case law supporting
his finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider—and grant—the City’s motion to
vacate the January 10, 2023 entry of dismissal and to schedule the matter for a hearing on
the City’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (See Mag.’s Decision at 6-10.) In
addition to rejecting Mr. Gideon’s contention that Judge Page patently and unambiguously
lacks jurisdiction over the case after it was dismissed on January 10, 2023 pursuant to
Loc.R. 25.03 and Civ.R. 41(B)(1), the magistrate also found that Mr. Gideon has an
adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal. (Mag.’s Decision at 5, 9-11.) Based on
these findings, the magistrate determined Mr. Gideon cannot prove, as a matter of law, any
set of facts that would entitle him to the extraordinary relief in prohibition he requests.
Accordingly, the magistrate has recommended that we grant respondents’ motions to
dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and deny the requested writ.
       {¶ 17} Mr. Gideon challenges the magistrate’s conclusions of law by submitting the
following five objections for our review:

                 1. The decision failed to address the key fact that
                    respondent Judge Page patently and unambiguously
                    lacks jurisdiction over this case.

                 2. The decision erred by failing to address the
                    overwhelming legal authority that demonstrates that
                    respondent Judge Page patently and unambiguously
                    lacks jurisdiction over this case.

                 3. The decision erred by dismissing this action based on
                    the erroneous conclusion that relator has an adequate
                    remedy by way of appeal.

                 4. The decision erred by failing to apply the proper
                    standard of review for a motion to dismiss pursuant to
                    Civ. R. 12(B)(6).

                 5. The decision erred by applying legal authority that is
                    inapposite.

(Emphasis sic and bold deleted.)
No. 23AP-492                                                                                                 6

        {¶ 18} Because Mr. Gideon’s first, second, third, and fifth objections all pertain to
the magistrate’s finding “that there is no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction,” we
address these four objections first and together. We then review his fourth objection, which
challenges the magistrate’s application of Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

        A. Judge Page does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction.
        {¶ 19} “Jurisdiction” refers to three distinct legal concepts: jurisdiction over the
subject matter, jurisdiction over the person, and jurisdiction over a particular case. See,
e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 18, citing Pratts v.
Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11-12. Often unspecified, the general use of
this polysemic word “has repeatedly required clarification as to which type of ‘jurisdiction’
is applicable in various legal analyses.” (Citations omitted.) Kuchta at ¶ 18.
        {¶ 20} “Prohibition will generally lie only for an absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) Martre, 2023-Ohio-4594 at ¶ 17, citing Jones, 2022-
Ohio-2427 at ¶ 8. See also State ex rel. Welt v. Doherty, 166 Ohio St.3d 305, 2021-Ohio-
3124, ¶ 16.
        {¶ 21} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases.2 Kuchta at ¶ 19, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio
St.2d 86, 87 (1972). “ ‘A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard
to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Corder v. Ohio Edison
Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14, quoting Kuchta at ¶ 19. “Instead, ‘the focus
is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting
State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional
analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among
different courts.”).
        {¶ 22} Common pleas courts “have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters * * * as may be provided by law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). Thus,
when a common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear a case,

2 In comparison, “[a] court’s jurisdiction over a particular case refers to the court’s authority to proceed or

rule on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kuchta at ¶ 19, citing Pratts at ¶ 12.
Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a particular case involves consideration of the rights of
the parties. Id. at ¶ 19. “Personal jurisdiction” refers to a court’s power to render a valid judgment against
a particular individual. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 36.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                               7

“ ‘it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed that jurisdiction.’ ” Schlegel v.
Sweeney, 171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 14, quoting Ohio High School Athletic Assn.
v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, ¶ 9.
        {¶ 23} There is no dispute that Judge Page has exercised judicial power over the case
below, No. 21CV-6139, and intends to continue exercising that power by proceeding with a
hearing on the City’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Indeed, a hearing on
that motion is presently scheduled for April 23, 2024.3 (See Mar. 15, 2024 Notice of
Hearing in case No. 21CV-6139.) And Mr. Gideon does not dispute that the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case when the suit was
filed. Indeed, Ohio’s Eminent Domain Act provides subject-matter jurisdiction in
appropriation cases to the court of common pleas in the “ ‘county in which the property
sought to be appropriated is located.’ ” Schlegel at ¶ 12, quoting R.C. 163.01(D), and citing
R.C. 163.05.
        {¶ 24} At issue is whether Judge Page had subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate the
January 10, 2023 entry of dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), based on the disagreement
between the parties on whether the matter was actually settled, and to hear and issue a
ruling on the City’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
        {¶ 25} Civ.R. 60(B) provides:

                On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
                relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
                judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

                         (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
                             neglect;

                         (2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
                             could not have been discovered in time to move for
                             a new trial under Rule 59(B);

                         (3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
                             or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
                             misconduct of an adverse party;

3 On March 19, 2024, Mr. Gideon filed a motion in this case requesting that we stay, or alternatively, enjoin

by preliminary injunction, any further proceedings in the trial court pending the outcome of this appeal.
Based on our resolution of this writ action, we deny the March 19th motion as moot.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                8

                      (4) The judgment has been satisfied, released or
                          discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
                          based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
                          it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
                          have prospective application; or

                      (5) Any other reason justifying relief from the
                          judgment.

              The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
              reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the
              judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A
              motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality
              of a judgment or suspend its operation.

              The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall
              be by motion as prescribed in these rules.

       {¶ 26} Mr. Gideon does not dispute the existence of several Civ.R. 60(B) grounds for
granting relief from the January 10, 2023 entry of dismissal. In fact, his complaint for a
writ of prohibition contains many allegations that clearly support it. (See Compl. at ¶ 5-21.)
For instance, there are questions of whether the parties were mistaken about the terms of
their October 10, 2022 agreement and whether the City was surprised when it learned Mr.
Gideon would not execute the settlement documents, thus invoking Civ.R. 60(B)(1). In any
event, the propriety of the trial court’s substantive basis for granting the City’s motion to
vacate the dismissal entry is not at issue in this case.
       {¶ 27} Instead, Mr. Gideon claimed in his prohibition complaint that Judge Page
lacked jurisdiction to grant the City’s motion to vacate because the Loc.R. 25.03 entry of
dismissal divested Judge Page of her ability to exercise any judicial power in the eminent
domain case brought by the City after January 10, 2023. (Compl. at ¶ 38-41.) His position
is that the dismissal entry did not adequately express the trial court’s intention to retain
jurisdiction to enforce of the settlement agreement, as contemplated by Infinite Sec.
Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties II, 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-Ohio-1101. Specifically,
the January 10, 2023 dismissal entry in this case stated: “The parties may hereafter submit
an amended entry reflecting the terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.” Similarly, the
trial court’s October 12, 2022 notice of settlement entry provided: “If the Court enters an
entry of dismissal, the parties may subsequently submit an amended agreed entry reflecting
the terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.”
No. 23AP-492                                                                                 9

       {¶ 28} The inherent incongruity in his argument is worth noting. On the one hand,
Mr. Gideon acknowledges his refusal to execute the settlement documents and alleges this
is because those documents materially deviate from the agreed-upon terms. On the other,
Mr. Gideon insists the dismissal entry is valid even though—based on the allegations Mr.
Gideon makes in his prohibition complaint—the matter has not actually been settled
because the parties now disagree about the terms of their settlement agreement.
       {¶ 29} But even setting aside the inconsistency in his position, Mr. Gideon’s legal
basis for claiming Judge Page did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the City’s
motion to vacate the entry of dismissal on July 6, 2023 and thus cannot proceed on the
City’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement is without merit. Predominately, this is
because the principal case on which he relies does not support his argument.
       {¶ 30} In that case, Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C., the Ohio Supreme Court
recognized that, “as a general principle, a trial court may retain jurisdiction to enforce a
settlement agreement when it dismisses a civil case.” Id. at ¶ 25. But, to do so, the dismissal
entry must contain “a clear indication that the trial court intends to retain jurisdiction to
enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.” Id. at ¶ 30. At the same time, the court has
declined to require “specific or hypertechinical language.” Id. at ¶ 31. And, the court has
expressed that, “[i]f there is uncertainty as to the terms of the settlement agreement, the
court should hold a hearing to determine whether an enforceable agreement exists.”
(Citations omitted.) Id.
       {¶ 31} Contrary to Mr. Gideon’s assertion, however, Infinite Security Solutions,
L.L.C., is inapposite given the procedural posture of this case. The party-insurer in that
case moved to vacate the dismissal entry pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), arguing that dismissal
without prejudice was a mistake because the settlement had not been finalized as to, among
other things, the apportionment of the proceeds between the parties. Id. at ¶ 10. In denying
the motion to vacate as moot, the trial court “held that its dismissal was conditional, that it
retained jurisdiction to determine the priority issue without vacating the dismissal
entry, and that [the insurer’s] claim to the settlement funds had priority.” (Emphasis
added.) Id. at ¶ 11, 33. The appellate court disagreed, instead finding the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter a post-dismissal judgment on the priority issue because of its
unconditional prior dismissal of the case. Id. at ¶ 13. On discretionary appeal, the Ohio
Supreme Court agreed that the trial court’s dismissal entry was not conditional because it
No. 23AP-492                                                                                10

failed to adequately state the trial court’s intention to retain jurisdiction over the
enforcement of the parties’ settlement agreement. Id. at ¶ 32.
       {¶ 32} Fatal to Mr. Gideon’s argument, however, is that the Infinite Security
Solutions, L.L.C. court expressly declined to rule on whether the trial court had jurisdiction
to vacate the dismissal under Civ.R. 60(B). Id. at ¶ 33. Noting that neither the trial court
nor the appellate court considered the insurer’s entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B),
the court remanded the case to the trial court to address that issue. See id. at ¶ 33-34.
       {¶ 33} In this case, the City moved to vacate the dismissal entry, pursuant to Civ.R.
60(B), before seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. (See Feb. 8, 2023 Mot. to
Vacate; Mar. 3, 2023 Reply.) Unlike in Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C., the trial court
granted the Civ.R. 60(B) motion and vacated the dismissal before it sought to consider the
City’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (See July 6, 2023 Decision and Entry
on Pl.’s Mot. to Vacate.) And, as stated above, Mr. Gideon’s complaint reinforces the City’s
argument in support of its motion to vacate—and the trial court’s finding—that relief under
Civ.R. 60(B) is appropriate. (See Compl. at ¶ 5-19.)
       {¶ 34} We have expressly held that a trial court “ha[s] jurisdiction to consider [a]
motion to vacate [its] Loc.R. 25.03 dismissal” under Civ.R. 60(B) where, as is the case here,
there is “a question of whether the matter was actually settled.” Hill v. Briggs, 111 Ohio
App.3d 405, 409-11 (10th Dist.1996). And, notably, Mr. Gideon does not contend otherwise
in his complaint for the writ of prohibition.
       {¶ 35} Whether the dismissal entry adequately conveyed the trial court’s intention
to retain jurisdiction over the case for purposes of enforcing the settlement agreement is
thus irrelevant to the issue of whether Mr. Gideon is entitled to a writ of prohibition. The
January 10, 2023 dismissal entry was vacated pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), and the propriety
of that decision is not before us. Pursuant to Hill, the trial court clearly has subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case since its entry dismissing the case without prejudice for want of
prosecution under Loc.R. 25.03 and Civ.R. 41(B)(1) no longer stands.
       {¶ 36} The subject matter of this dispute—eminent domain—falls squarely within
the jurisdiction granted by the Ohio Constitution and Revised Code to the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas.        Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own
jurisdiction, and a writ of prohibition will not lie where an adequate remedy by appeal is
No. 23AP-492                                                                                  11

available. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council v. Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin Cty., 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289 (1996); Squire, 2023-Ohio-3950
at ¶ 18-21.
       {¶ 37} Mr. Gideon’s first, second, third, and fifth objections conflate the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case with its legal authority to grant the relief sought.
But, of course, “[t]here is a distinction between a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over a case and a court that improperly exercises that subject-matter jurisdiction once
conferred upon it.” Pratts, 2004-Ohio-1980 at ¶ 10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Enyart v.
O’Neill, 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656 (1995) (“the fact that [a judge] may have exercised that
jurisdiction erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by prohibition”).
       {¶ 38} To the extent Mr. Gideon claims the settlement agreement should not be
enforced, due to, for instance, material differences in the agreed upon terms, that issue is
not before us. And, whether Judge Page has ruled—or will rule—correctly in exercising the
trial court’s jurisdiction is a matter that must be left in the first instance to this court on
direct review.
       {¶ 39} For these reasons, we find no error in the magistrate’s findings of fact or
conclusions of law on Mr. Gideon’s jurisdictional argument. Accordingly, Mr. Gideon’s
first, second, third, and fifth objections to the magistrate’s decision are without merit.

       B. The magistrate correctly applied the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard.
       {¶ 40} In his fourth objection, Mr. Gideon contends the magistrate’s decision fails
to properly apply Civ.R. 12(B)(6) to its analysis. We disagree.
       {¶ 41} Dismissal of an extraordinary writ action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate
if it appears beyond doubt, taking all factual allegations in the complaint as true, that the
relator can prove no set of facts entitling him to extraordinary relief in prohibition. Martre,
2023-Ohio-4594 at ¶ 16, citing Jones, 2022-Ohio-2427 at ¶ 5.
       {¶ 42} Courts are permitted to take judicial notice of appropriate matters when
ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh,
128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. It is axiomatic that this court may take judicial
notice of the docket and record in the case subject to the writ action in order to determine
whether the writ complaint—which seeks to prohibit past and future conduct by the court—
sufficiently states a claim for relief. See, e.g., State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh, 161 Ohio
St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-3533, ¶ 12-20.
No. 23AP-492                                                                               12

       {¶ 43} In Ohio, a plaintiff is not ordinarily required to plead operative facts with
particularity. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Beretta USA Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-
2480, ¶ 29. Under the notice pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A), the plaintiff need only
plead sufficient, operative facts to support recovery under his claims. See, e.g., Wildi v.
Hondros College, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-346, 2009-Ohio-5205, ¶ 12. Nevertheless, to
constitute fair notice, the complaint must allege sufficient underlying facts that relate to
and support the alleged claim; the complaint may not simply state legal conclusions. See
id.
       {¶ 44} On review, we find Mr. Gideon’s complaint insufficient even under Ohio’s
notice pleading standard. It is true that Mr. Gideon’s complaint generally alleges the three
elements necessary to establish entitlement to the requested writ. (See Compl. at ¶ 34.)
But, he does not provide any facts or allegations to support his legal conclusions that “[t]he
exercise of judicial power is legally unauthorized under the circumstances” and “[i]f the writ
is denied, Mr. Gideon will incur injury for which no adequate legal remedy exists.” (Compl.
at ¶ 34.)
       {¶ 45} The basis of Mr. Gideon’s prohibition complaint is that the January 10, 2023
entry of dismissal divested Judge Page of subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the City’s
motion to enforce the settlement agreement because the dismissal entry did not contain the
language necessary to retain jurisdiction, meaning the January 10, 2023 dismissal was
unconditional. But, as explained above, Mr. Gideon’s allegations are inapposite to proving
his entitlement to the requested writ because that dismissal entry was subsequently vacated
on July 6, 2023 pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).
       {¶ 46} The fundamental flaw in Mr. Gideon’s complaint, then, is that it fails to
identify a meritorious jurisdictional defect. Moreover, his writ complaint contains no facts
or allegations pertaining to the unavailability of any adequate legal remedy. To the
contrary, his writ complaint contains quotations from case law holding that
“notwithstanding the availability of appeal,” prohibition will issue where “a lower
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause.” (Emphasis added.)
(Compl. at ¶ 36-37.) Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate’s determination that Mr.
Gideon’s complaint fails to state a valid claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition.
No. 23AP-492                                                                            13

       {¶ 47} For these reasons, Mr. Gideon’s contention that the magistrate failed to
properly apply the law when it determined dismissal was warranted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
is without merit. As such, his fourth objection is not well-taken.

III. DISPOSITION
       {¶ 48} Upon review of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of the
record, and due consideration of Mr. Gideon’s objections, we find the magistrate has
properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law. Accordingly, we
overrule Mr. Gideon’s five objections; adopt the magistrate’s decision, including the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein, as our own; grant respondents’
motions to dismiss; deny the writ; and dismiss this action in prohibition.

                                                                     Objections overruled;
                                                               motions to dismiss granted;
                                                                writ of prohibition denied.

                     MENTEL, P.J. and BEATTY BLUNT, J., concur.
No. 23AP-492                                                                           14

                                      APPENDIX

[State ex rel.] Mark R. Gideon,              :

              Relator,                       :

v.                                           :                   No. 23AP-492

The Honorable Jaiza N. Page et al.,          :              (REGULAR CALENDAR)

              Respondents.                   :

                         MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

                             Rendered on December 8, 2023

              Law Offices of James P. Connors, and James P. Connors, for
              relator.

              G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian D. Zagrocki,
              for respondent Judge Jaiza N. Page.

              Frost Brown Todd LLP, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and Thaddeus M.
              Boggs, for respondent, City of Worthington.

                               IN PROHIBITION ON
                         RESPONDENTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

       {¶ 49} Relator, Mark R. Gideon, has filed this original action requesting a writ of

prohibition against respondents The Honorable Jaiza N. Page (“Judge Page”) and City of

Worthington (“city”), seeking an order preventing Judge Page from taking any further

action or conducting any further proceedings in Franklin County Common Pleas Case

No. 21CV-6139, and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions

including the decision and entry filed July 6, 2023. Relator has also filed a December 6,
No. 23AP-492                                                                             15

2023, motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a December 6, 2023, motion for

preliminary injunction.

Findings of Fact:
       {¶ 50} 1. Respondent Judge Page is a trial court judge in the Franklin County Court

of Common Pleas in Columbus, Ohio.

       {¶ 51} 2. Respondent city is located in Ohio.

       {¶ 52} 3. Relator owns property in the city.

       {¶ 53} 4. Judge Page presides over Franklin C.P. No. 21CV-6139, an eminent-

domain action in which the city is the plaintiff and relator is the defendant.

       {¶ 54} 5. In his complaint for writ of prohibition filed in the present case, relator

alleges that, on October 10, 2022, he and the city reached an agreement to settle the

eminent-domain action, and the parties agreed to execute a written agreement. The city

requested 60 days in which to submit the dismissal entry contemplated by the agreement

to obtain approval from city council.

       {¶ 55} 6. On October 12, 2022, Judge Page issued an order that indicated the

following:

              Counsel notified the Court that the within cause of action has
              been settled. Counsel shall prepare the appropriate entry for
              the Court’s approval within Sixty (60) days of the filing of this
              notice. Failure to file said entry may result in dismissal as for
              want of prosecution pursuant to Local Rule 25.03.

              If the Court enters an entry of dismissal, the parties may
              subsequently submit an amended agreed entry reflecting the
              terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.

       {¶ 56} 7. In his complaint, relator further alleges the following: (1) the city made

little or no effort to consummate the settlement after October 10, 2022; (2) city council

approved the settlement on November 7, 2022; (3) in December 2022 , the city forwarded
No. 23AP-492                                                                                 16

to relator a proposed agreed judgment entry, but that entry included several terms that

were not discussed or agreed upon; (4) on January 4, 2023, relator responded through

counsel to propose a written settlement agreement and release and dismissal entry, as

agreed to on October 10, 2022; and (5) the city rejected relator’s proposals, and the parties

were unable to reach an agreement.

       {¶ 57} 8. On January 10, 2023, Judge Page entered an entry of dismissal, which

indicated:

              The Court notified the parties and/or counsel herein that an
              entry of dismissal must be submitted to the Court within Sixty
              (60) days of the notice of settlement, or the case would be
              dismissed pursuant to Loc.R. 2503 and Civ.R. 41. The parties
              have failed to submit an appropriate entry to the Court, and
              have failed to notify the Court, in writing, as to the cause of
              such delay. Therefore, the Court hereby ORDERS that this
              case be DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall
              terminate the case from the Court’s active docket.

              The parties may hereafter submit an amended entry reflecting
              the terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.

(Emphasis sic.)

       {¶ 58} 9. On February 8, 2023, the city filed a motion to vacate the January 10, 2023,

dismissal order and enforce the settlement agreement.

       {¶ 59} 10. On February 23, 2023, relator filed a memorandum contra, in which he

asserted that the trial court had been divested of jurisdiction on January 10, 2023, when it

filed the dismissal entry.

       {¶ 60} 11. The trial court set the city’s motion to vacate dismissal and enforce

settlement agreement for a hearing on May 1, 2023.

       {¶ 61} 12. After the May 1, 2023, hearing, the trial court filed a July 6, 2023, decision

and entry, in which it granted the city’s February 8, 2023, motion to vacate dismissal and

enforce settlement agreement.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                17

       {¶ 62} 13. Claimant appealed the July 6, 2023, decision and entry, and in

Worthington, Ohio v. Gideon, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-475 (September 5, 2023) (journal entry

of dismissal), this court dismissed the appeal, finding that, because the trial court’s initial

dismissal without prejudice was not a final, appealable order, the court’s subsequent entry

vacating that dismissal was also not a final, appealable order. Claimant filed an application

for reconsideration and en banc consideration and a motion to certify conflict, both of

which this court denied in Worthington, Ohio v. Gideon, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-475 (October

26, 2023) (journal entry).

       {¶ 63} 14. On August 15, 2023, relator filed the present complaint for writ of

prohibition, in which he seeks an order preventing Judge Page from taking any further

action or conducting any further proceedings in Franklin C.P. No. 21CV-6139, and to

correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions including the decision and

entry filed July 6, 2023.

       {¶ 64} 15. On September 14, 2023, the city filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

       {¶ 65} 16. On September 18, 2023, Judge Page filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

       {¶ 66} 17. On December 6, 2023, relator filed motions for TRO and preliminary

injunction, seeking to prevent Judge Page from holding further hearings on the matter until

this court determines the present prohibition action.

Conclusions of Law:
       {¶ 67} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate’s decision that this court

should grant respondents’ motions to dismiss relator’s complaint for writ of prohibition.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                  18

       {¶ 68} “The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from

exceeding their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, 156 Ohio St.3d 351, 2019-

Ohio-932, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, (1998). To

demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that a respondent:

(1) has exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise

of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will cause injury for

which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists. Roush at ¶ 5.

       {¶ 69} “[W]here an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction

over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of

jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”

State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98 (1996). Accord State ex rel. Sartini

v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, ¶ 24 (concluding the fact the judge had already

exercised judicial power by granting a motion, such did not preclude the opposing party

from obtaining a writ of prohibition, as prohibition will lie to correct the results of previous

jurisdictionally unauthorized actions).

       {¶ 70} A court may dismiss a complaint seeking a writ of prohibition pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if, after all factual allegations in the complaint are presumed true and all

reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that relator could

prove no set of facts entitling him or her to the requested extraordinary writ. State ex rel.

Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St.3d 561, 2007-Ohio-814, ¶ 5. “Although factual allegations in

the complaint are taken as true, ‘unsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered

admitted * * * and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.’ ” Justice v. Jefferson-

Pilot Life Ins., 10th Dist. No. 98AP-177 (Dec. 24, 1998), quoting State ex rel. Hickman v.

Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 (1989).
No. 23AP-492                                                                                  19

       {¶ 71} The magistrate may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related

cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the

present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199,

2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v.

Fitzgerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh,

128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of

pleadings that are readily accessible on the internet. See Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No.

16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d

195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters,

including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet, in determining

a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion); and Giannelli, 1 Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6

(3d Ed.2015) (noting that the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice

of other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet). In addition, courts

may take judicial notice of appropriate matters in determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing

Co. v. Schroeder, 76 Ohio St.3d 580-81 (1996); Draughon at ¶ 26 (a court may take judicial

notice of appropriate matters, including judicial opinions and public records accessible

from the internet, in determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion without converting it to a motion

for summary judgment).

       {¶ 72} In the present case, one argument raised by respondents is dispositive of their

motions to dismiss. Respondents argue, among other things, that relator’s writ of

prohibition should be dismissed because he has an adequate remedy at law by way of direct

appeal of the trial court’s final judgment. For the following reasons, the magistrate agrees.
No. 23AP-492                                                                             20

       {¶ 73} In State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 160 Ohio St.3d 359,

2020-Ohio-3080, the Supreme Court of Ohio discussed writs of prohibition and adequate

remedies in the ordinary course of law, as follows:

              To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator ordinarily
              must prove that a lower tribunal is about to exercise judicial
              or quasi-judicial power without authority and that there is no
              adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex
              rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-
              Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. * * *

              ***

              [I]n State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285
              N.E.2d 22 (1972), paragraph two of the syllabus, we
              recognized an exception to the general rule, holding that a writ
              of prohibition may issue correctively to arrest the continuing
              effects of an order when there was “a total want of
              jurisdiction” on the part of the lower tribunal. A few years
              after Gusweiler, we began to associate the exception with the
              modifying phrase “patent and unambiguous.” See State ex rel.
              Gilla v. Fellerhoff, 44 Ohio St.2d 86, 87-88, 338 N.E.2d 522
              (1975). We also began using that term with respect to a related
              exception adopted in Gusweiler at 329[,] namely, that the
              availability of an adequate remedy is immaterial when a
              tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. See,
              e.g., State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 595,
              1994-Ohio-327, 629 N.E.2d 446 (1994). Over time, we have
              issued writs of prohibition to correct the results of
              unauthorized exercises of authority, notwithstanding the
              availability of an appeal, if the tribunal patently and
              unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment at
              issue. See, e.g., State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 142 Ohio St.3d
              469, 2015-Ohio-2004, 32 N.E.3d 452, ¶ 8. * * *

              We typically will not hold that a tribunal patently and
              unambiguously lacked jurisdiction if the tribunal “had at least
              basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed.” Gusweiler at 329.
              Therefore, in prohibition cases involving statutorily created
              tribunals of limited jurisdiction, we ordinarily ask whether the
              General Assembly gave the tribunal authority to proceed in
              the matter at issue. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goldberg v.
              Mahoning Cty. Probate Court, 93 Ohio St.3d 160, 162, 2001-
              Ohio-1297, 753 N.E.2d 192 (2001); State ex rel. Natalina
              Food Co. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 55 Ohio St.3d 98, 100,
              562 N.E.2d 1383 (1990).
No. 23AP-492                                                                              21

       {¶ 74} “The term ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the court’s statutory or constitutional

authority to hear a case.” State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, ¶ 10. “The

concept encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case as well as jurisdiction

over the person.” Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory

power of a court to adjudicate a case. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-

2913, ¶ 23.

       {¶ 75} This court recently decided State ex rel. Squire v. Phipps, 10th Dist. No.

23AP-137, 2023-Ohio-3950, which addressed circumstances analogous to the present case

and guides the decision here. In Squire, in addressing whether the relator was entitled to a

writ of prohibition because the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked

jurisdiction to hold certain fee hearings after voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A) due to

the allegedly improper determination that there was a prevailing party, a magistrate of this

court explained:

              Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution confers on
              the courts of common pleas “original jurisdiction over all
              justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings
              of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by
              law.” A common pleas court is a “court of general jurisdiction,
              with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all matters at
              law and in equity that are not denied to it.’ ” Bank of America,
              N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 20, 21
              N.E.3d 1040, quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554,
              558-59, 29 N.E. 179 (1891). Subject to limited exceptions, R.C.
              2305.01 grants the courts of common pleas subject-matter
              jurisdiction over “all civil cases in which the sum or matter in
              dispute exceeds the exclusive original jurisdiction of county
              courts.” Because of this general grant of jurisdiction, “a court
              of common pleas has jurisdiction over any case in which the
              matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit unless
              some statute takes that jurisdiction away.” Ohio High Sch.
              Ath. Ass’n v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845,
              ¶ 9, 136 N.E.3d 436. Thus, when it has been found that “a
              court of common pleas patently and unambiguously lacks
No. 23AP-492                                                                                22

               jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly
               removed that jurisdiction.” Id.

Id. at ¶ 44.
       {¶ 76} The magistrate in Squire then explained that it was indisputable that a

common pleas court generally possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve breach of

contract claims and that such jurisdiction encompasses the authority to award attorney fees

pursuant to a prevailing-party contractual provision. The magistrate cited case law

regarding voluntary dismissals under Civ.R. 41(A) and the effect of a trial court’s grant of

summary judgment on such dismissals. The magistrate then noted that, although the cited

case law made it clear that a court has jurisdiction to consider issues related to a prevailing

party, the facts in the present case differed significantly from those cases. However, the

magistrate found that “[a]lthough there may be a genuine question as to whether the

common pleas court properly exercised jurisdiction in determining there was a prevailing

party, this does not lead to the conclusion that the common pleas court patently and

unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 52, citing Ashley v. Kevin O’Brien & Assocs. Co.,

L.P.A., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-354, 2022-Ohio-24, ¶ 22 (stating that even if the trial court has

misjudged these circumstances, which was a possibility not unambiguously apparent from

this record, and therefore errs in permitting the two depositions ordered, subject to

privilege and presumably other objections, a writ of prohibition would not lie); State ex rel.

Enyart v. O’Neill, 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656 (1995) (stating that prohibition does not lie to

prevent a merely erroneous decision by the court, and the fact that a judge may have

exercised that jurisdiction erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by

prohibition). The magistrate concluded that, instead, this question was resolvable through

appeal, and because an appeal presents an adequate remedy at law to correct any errors in

the trial court’s determination, the relator could not demonstrate entitlement to the
No. 23AP-492                                                                                23

extraordinary remedy of prohibition. Squire at ¶ 53, citing State ex rel. Fraternal Order of

Police, Ohio Labor Council v. Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, 76 Ohio St.3d

287, 289 (1996) (finding that absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court

having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party

challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal). The court

overruled the relator’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision.

       {¶ 77} The Second District Court of Appeals addressed similar issues in State ex rel.

Harwell v. Wiseman, 2d. Dist. No. 26600, 2015-Ohio-4718. In Harwell, the court

explained that whether a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction for purposes

of a writ of prohibition is a question of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 9,

citing Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d at 73 , quoting State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio

St.3d 404, 409, 534 (1988) (prohibition tests and determines solely and only the subject-

matter jurisdiction of the trial court). The court also noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio

has acknowledged the general rule that if a trial court has general subject-matter

jurisdiction, prohibition will not lie to correct or prevent an error. Id. citing State ex rel.

Shumaker v. Nichols, 137 Ohio St.3d 391, 2013-Ohio-4732, ¶ 14, citing Suster at 74. The

court in Harwell then addressed what it found was the primarily relevant issue: whether

the trial court judge, as a judge of the county common pleas court, had general subject-

matter jurisdiction, which is the power of a court to entertain and adjudicate a particular

class of cases. The court explained that, where it is apparent from the allegations that the

matter alleged is within the class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered

to act, jurisdiction is present, and any subsequent error in proceeding is only error in the

exercise of jurisdiction, as distinguished from the want of jurisdiction in the first instance.

The court in Harwell concluded that the trial court had general subject-matter jurisdiction
No. 23AP-492                                                                                  24

over the case, and therefore did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to act.

The court then found that whether the trial court’s exercise of judicial authority was

unauthorized because the trial court was divested of jurisdiction was a question the court

need not resolve, given the relator had an adequate remedy at law and a viable avenue in

which to raise that argument. The court noted that a party asserting the trial court’s lack of

jurisdiction must first argue that issue in the trial court, and then, if it loses on that issue,

assign that as error in any subsequent appeal.

       {¶ 78} The Ohio Supreme Court reached similar conclusions using the same analysis

in State ex rel. Dailey v. Dawson, 149 Ohio St.3d 685, 2017-Ohio-1350. The court found in

Dailey that a court need not expressly rule on the jurisdictional issue since the court’s

review is limited to whether jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking. Id. at 688-

89, ¶ 20. Thus, short of a trial court’s patent and obvious lack of jurisdiction, an appeal

constitutes an adequate legal remedy to raise any claimed error in a court’s failure to

properly determine its own jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 20-21, quoting State ex rel. Skyway Invest.

Corp. v. Ashtabula Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 130 Ohio St.3d 220, 2011-Ohio-5452, ¶

10, quoting State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, ¶ 5

(finding that, in the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court

having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party

contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal). Thus, the court in Dailey

explained, if a court has general subject-matter jurisdiction, the court can determine its

own jurisdiction in the case, and if a party disagrees with his exercise of jurisdiction, the

party can file a motion. Id. If the party disagrees with his decision on that motion, the party

has an adequate remedy by way of appeal. Id.
No. 23AP-492                                                                                25

       {¶ 79} Applying the above holdings to the present case, the magistrate finds that

relator has an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal. Clearly, the trial court had

general subject-matter jurisdiction over the eminent-domain action. Common pleas courts

“have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law,”

Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B), and the Eminent Domain Act provides

jurisdiction in appropriation cases to the court of common pleas in the “county in which the

property sought to be appropriated is located.” Schlegel v. Sweeney, 171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-

Ohio-3841, ¶ 12, citing R.C. 163.01(D) and 163.05. The exception for patent and

unambiguous lack of jurisdiction is not available to relator here because the trial court had

general subject-matter jurisdiction over the appropriation case. Although relator raises

extensive arguments and legal authority as to whether the trial court had jurisdiction to

address and grant the city’s February 8, 2023, motion to vacate the January 10, 2023,

dismissal order and enforce the settlement agreement, and the parties vigorously dispute

the applicability and interpretation of the case law on this point, the magistrate need not

make this determination at this juncture to dispose of relator’s complaint for writ of

prohibition. As this court found in Squire, although there may be a genuine question as to

whether the common pleas court properly exercised jurisdiction in addressing the city’s

motion to vacate the dismissal order and enforce the settlement agreement, this does not

lead to the conclusion that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked

jurisdiction. Even if the trial court has misjudged these circumstances, which was a

possibility not unambiguously apparent from this record, and therefore erred in addressing

the motion to vacate the dismissal order and enforce the settlement agreement, a writ of

prohibition does not lie, as the fact that a judge may have exercised that jurisdiction

erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by prohibition. Therefore, finding that
No. 23AP-492                                                                            26

there is no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, and the trial court had general

subject-matter jurisdiction over eminent-domain cases, the trial court could determine its

own jurisdiction to address the motion to vacate the dismissal, and relator’s challenge to

the court’s jurisdiction may be resolved via direct appeal, which constitutes an adequate

remedy at law. For these reasons, relator cannot demonstrate entitlement to the

extraordinary remedy of prohibition, and respondents are entitled to dismissal of relator’s

complaint for writ of prohibition. See generally State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 10th Dist.

No. 02AP-438, 2002-Ohio-6104, ¶ 11 (declining to decide whether the court had

jurisdiction over this proceeding because the analysis is restricted to determining whether

respondents patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, and having found that

respondents do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over this matter, the

extraordinary writ of prohibition cannot lie, because the relators have an adequate remedy

at law to raise their jurisdictional claims).

       {¶ 80} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant respondents’

motions to dismiss relator’s complaint for writ of prohibition. In addition, given this

determination, we deny relator’s December 6, 2023, motions for TRO and preliminary

injunction.

                                                /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                                THOMAS W. SCHOLL III

                               NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

               Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
               error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
               legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
               finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
               53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
               to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
               53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
No. 23AP-492                                                                 27

           magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
           decision.