Court Opinion

ID: 9549820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:25:17.316561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:57.102792
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(dissenting) — The majority remands for a new trial after concluding that the trial court committed reversible error by giving the following jury instruction in a prosecution for attempted burglary:
A person who attempts to enter or remain unlawlully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the jury to have been made without such criminal intent. This inference is not binding upon you and it is for you to determine what weight, if any, such inference is to be given.
This instruction is derived from a Washington pattern jury instruction, WPIC 60.05, which in turn is based on RCW 9A.52.040.1 Both WPIC 60.05 and RCW 9A.52.040 allow juries in burglary prosecutions to infer that a defendant intended to commit a crime on the premises when he unlawfully entered or remained in a building. An instruction of this nature is appropriate not only in a burglary case, but also in a prosecution for attempted burglary *880where the evidence shows that the defendant illegally entered the building. State v. Bassett, 50 Wn. App. 23, 26, 746 P.2d 1240 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1016 (1988). The Legislature has broadly defined an entry in this context to include "the insertion of any part of [a person's] body" into a building. RCW 9A.52.010(2); see also Bassett, at 26 (insertion of finger through window constitutes entry); State v. Couch, 44 Wn. App. 26, 31-32, 720 P.2d 1387 (1986) (pushing open a trap door constitutes entry). Because the jury reasonably could have found that an entry occurred in the present case — Jackson kicked the Plexiglas window some 10 inches back into the building — the instruction was proper. So reasoned the Court of Appeals in this case, and so should we. See State v. Jackson, 51 Wn. App. 100, 102-05, 751 P.2d 1248 (1988).
Instead, the majority engages in an abstract and protracted discussion of the nature of presumptions and inferences. Unfortunately, the court does not discuss the case that addresses presumptions and inferences in the very context at issue here, jury instructions based on RCW 9A.52.040. In State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985),2 this court explained that there are four fundamental types of presumptions: conclusive presumptions, persuasion-shifting presumptions, production-shifting presumptions, and permissive inferences. Instructions based on RCW 9A.52.040 are analyzed as permissive inferences when the defendant presents evidence in his own case, as occurred here. Johnson, at 616-20. Permissive inferences are "constitutionally impermissible only when 'under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.'" Johnson, at 616 (quoting County Court of Ulster Cy. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979)).
*881By contrast, the majority concludes that "[a]n inference should not arise where there exist other reasonable conclusions that would follow from the circumstances." Majority, at 876. The majority's conclusion conflicts with the well-accepted notion that juries are not bound to find for the defendant merely because reasonable inferences can be drawn either in favor of guilt or innocence. See State v. Gosby, 85 Wn.2d 758, 764-68, 539 P.2d 680 (1975) (rejecting the requirement of a multiple-hypothesis instruction); State v. Randecker, 79 Wn.2d 512, 517, 487 P.2d 1295 (1971). The mere existence of contrary reasonable inferences does not necessarily preclude juries from finding guilt. Randecker, at 517. The Johnson standard recognizes these principles, the majority's does not.
Applying the Johnson standard to the present case is not difficult. There is, of course, a rational connection between Jackson's act of kicking in a window and an inference of an intent to commit a crime inside the building. Because the requisite rational connection exists in this case regardless of the existence of other rational inferences, the instruction was properly given to the jury.
The majority concludes not only that the trial court erred in using this instruction, but that the error was prejudicial, requiring a reversal of the conviction below. The majority presents the basis for its holding as follows:
Here, the giving of the instruction could not be harmless error since it tended to prove an element of the commission of a crime. The instruction coming from the trial judge indicated that the defendant had entered the building and did so with the intent to commit a crime against the property therein. We do not need to determine whether the "overwhelming evidence" test would be applicable since we are convinced the inference of intent instruction was not harmless.
Majority, at 877.
I disagree both with the majority's interpretation of the instruction, and with its application of the law of harmless error. The instruction in no way "indicated" that Jackson intended to commit another crime; it merely informed the *882jurors that they were permitted to infer this intent from the evidence presented. As for the test of harmless error, the majority implies that an error relating to presumptions or inferences can never be harmless when it relates to an element of the crime. The case law holds directly to the contrary. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-82, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986); State v. Johnson, supra at 620-21.
If I were to reach the issue of harmless error, I would adopt the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in this case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that any error in instructing the jury based on RCW 9A.52.040 would be harmless because the jury would have been permitted to make the inference as to Jackson's intent even if the RCW 9A.52.040 instruction were not used. See Jackson, at 104 n.3.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's holdings in sections I and II of its opinion.31 would affirm the Court of Appeals in upholding the conviction below.
Brachtenbach, J., concurs with Durham, J.

RCW 9A.52.040 reads as follows:
"In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent."

In Bergeron, we emphasized that the portion of Johnson that is relevant to this case is still good law. See Bergeron, at 19.

Despite my dissent on the first two issues, I concur fully in the analysis of sections III and IV.