Court Opinion

ID: 9897588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:17:39.713053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.763337
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Jenkins v. Dragoo & Assocs., Inc., 2023-Ohio-4103.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Daryl Jenkins et al.,                                :

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,              :
                                                                    No. 22AP-564
v.                                                   :          (M.C. No. 2020CVF-4241)

Dragoo and Associates, Inc.,                         :         (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellee.                 :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on November 14, 2023

                 On brief: Isaac Wiles & Burkholder, LLC, and Dale D. Cook,
                 for appellants. Argued: Dale D. Cook.

                 On brief: Willis Law Firm, LLC, William L. Willis,
                 Dimitrios G. Hatzifotinos, Solomon J. Parini, Clint B.
                 Charnes, and Alexander H. Maxwell, for appellee. Argued:
                 Alexander H. Maxwell.

                       APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Daryl Jenkins and Zorica Louis-Fernand, appeal from
a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court following a bench trial in which the
court found against appellants on their claims in a landlord tenant dispute and found in
favor of defendant-appellee, Dragoo and Associates, Inc., on its counterclaim for breach of
contract for unpaid rent.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} The following findings of fact are drawn primarily from the trial court’s
judgment entry of August 17, 2022, as well as relevant portions of the record. Appellee
manages a complex of 334 townhomes. On September 22, 2017, appellant Daryl Jenkins
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 2

(individually “appellant Jenkins”) signed a 6-month lease agreement with appellee for a
residential unit located on Bridgeford Drive in Westerville, Ohio. The terms of the lease
were “from September 22, 2017, through March 21, 2018, for $1,970.00 per month, with a
deposit of $300.00.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 1.)
       {¶ 3} On January 8, 2020, appellants filed a complaint against appellee asserting
claims for unlawful trespass, breach of quiet enjoyment, failure to perform maintenance
and repairs, and return of security deposit. On March 2, 2020, appellee filed an answer as
well as a counterclaim for breach of contract for unpaid rent.
       {¶ 4} On June 6, 2022, the matter came before the trial court for a bench trial.
Appellant Jenkins testified that he and his wife, appellant Zorica Louis-Fernand
(individually “appellant Louis-Fernand”), “completed a Move-In Condition Form outlining
needed repairs along with accepted ‘AS-IS’ conditions.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 1.)
Appellant Jenkins “claimed that none of the defects were corrected,” and this claim was
“countered by two maintenance tickets dated September 22 and 25, 2017, listing all the
repairs being completed.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 1.)
       {¶ 5} Appellant Jenkins testified that appellee “entered the residence multiple
times,” but that “[appellant Jenkins] never gave his personal consent to enter the
residence.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.) Appellant Jenkins “claimed the colored tags used
by [appellee] to notify him of their plan to enter were insufficient, in that they were hung at
the garage door which he never used to enter the residence,” and he “also took issue with
the debris and footprints left on the carpet when maintenance personnel entered the
residence.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.)
       {¶ 6} Appellant Jenkins testified regarding “an incident where the mattress was
ajar, and a drawer of a dresser located in the garage had been pulled out and left on the
floor.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.) Although “no items were missing,” he contacted police.
(Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.) Appellant Jenkins “also stated * * * he demanded from
management that he must be present at any time maintenance personnel would be entering
the residence.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.)
       {¶ 7} According to appellant Jenkins, appellee’s “assessment of a $75.00 fine for
having a dog in the apartment periodically when his wife visited was egregious,
No. 22AP-564                                                                                3

notwithstanding the fact the lease prohibited pets,” and he “specifically took exception to
the notice management gave him that they would enter ‘on/or after’ a specific date to
inspect for evidence of a pet without his permission.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.) Appellant
Jenkins stated he “raised all of his concerns in a letter to the corporate office, but was not
satisfied with the response.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 2.) Appellant Jenkins placed his rent
payments into an escrow account and ultimately “vacated the residence on January 30,
2018, without giving a required 30-day notice.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.)
       {¶ 8} Appellant Louis-Fernand testified regarding “an incident when she had to
stop maintenance personnel from entering” the residence. (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.) She
“emphasized her preference that personal notice for maintenance should be given directly
through email or text messaging.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.)
       {¶ 9} Appellee’s property manager, Mike Snyder, testified that “24-hour notices are
always provided prior to maintenance personnel entering any residence in the apartment
complex.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.) Snyder related that appellee’s notices “always include
the date maintenance personnel would be entering, the reason they would be entering, and
that the notices are always posted on the garage doors of all the 300-plus units in the
apartment complex.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.) At trial, appellee “provided a copy of the
notice to change the furnace filter and to inspect smoke detectors that went to all
residences.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.) Snyder “stated that maintenance personnel were
never permitted to enter the residence [of appellant Jenkins] to do the required work except
for addressing the initial list of defects when [appellant Jenkins] moved in.” (Aug. 17, 2022
Entry at 3.)
       {¶ 10} Snyder “presented a letter written by his counsel to [appellants’] counsel
addressing the dog and which gave notice to [appellants] that they must provide access to
the property to allow for required maintenance (filters and smoke alarms) consistent with
the Revised Code or [his] tenancy would be terminated in 30-days.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry
at 3.) He also “presented a copy of the No Pet Declaration that was signed by [appellant
Jenkins] on September 22, 2018.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 3.)
No. 22AP-564                                                                                4

       {¶ 11} The trial court rendered a decision on August 17, 2022 concluding appellants
failed to demonstrate a violation of Ohio law on the part of appellee and finding in favor of
appellee on its counterclaim for failure to pay rent in the amount of $1,658.

II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 12} Appellants appeal and assign the following four assignments of error for our
review:
              [I.] The trial court erred in granting judgement against Zorica
              Fernand for unpaid rent as she was not on the lease.

              [II.] The trial court erred in its finding of reasonable notice for
              the multiple entries into Daryl Jenkins’ apartment as the
              method of notice was not reasonably calculated to be received
              by him.

              [III.] The trial court finding that the lease was broken without
              cause was against the manifest weight of the evidence as the
              requested repairs were not made within a reasonable time and
              Mr. Jenkins did not unreasonably restrict access to his
              apartment.

              [IV.] The trial court erred in failing to find a violation of R.C.
              5321.04(B) and 5321.04(A)(8) as there were multiple entries
              on one notice and the unauthorized entries were
              accomplished in an unreasonable manner without proper
              notification to Mr. Jenkins.

III. Analysis
       {¶ 13} We will consider appellants’ assignments of error out of order, initially
addressing the second, third, and fourth assignments of error together, as they are
interrelated. Under these assignments of error, appellants assert the trial court erred in:
(1) finding appellee provided reasonable notice for multiple entries into appellant Jenkins’
apartment, (2) finding the lease was broken without cause, and (3) failing to find a violation
of R.C. 5321.04(B) and (A)(8). We first address appellants’ contention the trial court erred
in finding appellee provided reasonable notice for entries into the residence and their
related argument that the court erred in failing to find violations under R.C. 5321.04(B) and
(A)(8).
No. 22AP-564                                                                                5

       {¶ 14} Generally, “[i]n reviewing a civil appeal from a bench trial, this court applies
a ‘manifest weight standard of review.’ ” Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Berman, 10th Dist. No.
17AP-563, 2019-Ohio-1068, ¶ 14, quoting Benton Village Condominium Owners Assn., Inc.
v. Bridge, 8th Dist. No. 106892, 2018-Ohio-4896, ¶ 13. See also Walker v. Hartford on the
Lake, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-271, 2016-Ohio-7792, ¶ 27 (“In reviewing a decision
reached at a bench trial we utilize a manifest weight standard.”). Under this standard, “[a]
reviewing court ‘will not reverse the judgment as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence if some competent, credible evidence supports all the essential elements of the
case.’ ” Berman at ¶ 14, quoting Huntington Natl. Bank Successor v. Miller, 10th Dist. No.
14AP-586, 2016-Ohio-5860, ¶ 13, citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., Inc., 54 Ohio
St.2d 279, 280 (1978). However, “where an appeal from a bench trial presents a question
of law, we review such questions de novo.” Marshall v. Snider-Blake Business Serv., Inc.,
10th Dist. No. 21AP-700, 2022-Ohio-1869, ¶ 13, citing Coomer v. Opportunities for
Ohioans with Disabilities, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-158, 2022-Ohio-387, ¶ 13.
       {¶ 15} Under Ohio law, “[d]isputes between a landlord and tenant are governed by
R.C. 5321.05, which is commonly referred to as the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act.” Levine v.
Kellogg, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-338, 2022-Ohio-3440, ¶ 9, citing Whitestone Co. v.
Stittsworth, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-371, 2007-Ohio-233, ¶ 7, citing Vardeman v. Llewellyn,
17 Ohio St.3d 24, 26 (1985). It has been observed that “the Landlord-Tenant Act balances
the legitimate rights of each party.” T.K.D. Ents. v. Zimmerman, 4th Dist. No. 97CA44
(July 2, 1998).
       {¶ 16} R.C. 5321.04 sets forth obligations of a landlord who is a party to a rental
agreement. Pursuant to R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), a landlord is required, “[e]xcept in the case of
emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, [to] give the tenant reasonable notice of the
landlord’s intent to enter and enter only at reasonable times.” Under that provision,
“[t]wenty-four hours is presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to
the contrary.” R.C. 5321.04(A)(8). R.C. 5321.04(B) states in part that if a landlord “makes
an entry in violation of division (A)(8) * * *, makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable
manner, or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful that have the effect of
harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages * * *, obtain injunctive relief
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 6

* * *, and obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney’s fees, or may terminate the rental
agreement.”
       {¶ 17} R.C. 5321.05 delineates the obligations of a tenant under a rental agreement.
R.C. 5321.05(B) states in part: “The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent for the
landlord to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the premises, make ordinary,
necessary, or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements.”          Thus, R.C.
5321.05(B) “confers on the landlord a right of access to the property for * * * making needed
or agreed repairs.” T.K.D. Ents.
       {¶ 18} In the present case, the trial court found against appellants on their claims
that appellee failed to provide proper notice of entry and that it acted in violation of R.C.
5321.04(A)(8) and (B). Specifically, the court held that, pursuant to R.C. 5321.05(B),
appellee was entitled to enter the unit to make “such necessary repairs as changing furnace
filters and checking smoke alarms.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 4.) The court further found
appellants “unreasonably restricted access to the premises and expected unreasonable
accommodations.” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 4.) The trial court deemed appellants’ “position
that the exact time of entry had to be given, that [appellant] Jenkins had to be present, and
that direct text/email messaging was required is not consistent with the law.” (Aug. 17,
2022 Entry at 4.) Rather, the court concluded, “[t]he record reflects that [appellee] gave
adequate and reasonable notice to [appellants] pursuant to the lease and Ohio law,” and
that appellee “was not required * * * to provide personal notices or other special
accommodations requested by [appellants].” (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 4-5.)
       {¶ 19} We initially note that, during the bench trial of this matter, counsel for
appellants did not dispute the fact appellee posted a 24-hour notice of its intent to enter the
residence to perform maintenance or inspections. Specifically, counsel acknowledged
appellants “were given the notice within the 24-hour period. The 24 hours is not a
question.” (Tr. at 93.) Counsel argued, however, “[o]ur contention would be that [appellee]
cannot enter a premises without consent and shouldn’t be entering the premises that are
unoccupied unless they asked for specific permission from the tenant.” (Tr. at 93-94.)
Appellants argue on appeal that the “antiquated practice” of posting notice on a garage door
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 7

“was not reasonably calculated to reach [appellant] Jenkins and was thus unreasonable as
a matter of law.” (Appellants’ Brief at 14.)
       {¶ 20} The evidence at trial indicates appellee posted notices for work to be
performed (i.e., for repairs, to change furnace filters, inspect smoke detectors) by placing a
letter in an envelope and posting it on the garage door of each of appellee’s more than 300
rental units, including the unit rented by appellant Jenkins. Trial exhibits admitted into
evidence included notices posted by appellee on appellant Jenkins’ rental unit dated
(respectively) October 24, 2017 (plaintiff’s exhibit E), January 9, 2018 (plaintiff’s exhibit
L), and January 15, 2018 (plaintiff’s exhibit M); each of the respective notices indicated that
maintenance work was scheduled to occur the following day.
       {¶ 21} During his testimony, appellant Jenkins did not dispute receiving the notice
dated October 24, 2017, which stated in part that appellee’s staff “will enter your
[residence]” on Wednesday, October 25, 2017 “to complete your furnace filter change and
smoke detector inspections.” (Pltfs.’ Ex. E.) Appellant Jenkins testified, however, “I had
not given my consent.” (Tr. at 17.) Appellant Jenkins further stated he did not discover the
notice until October 25, 2017 although he acknowledged, during cross-examination, that
he did not know “when it was [placed] on the door.” (Tr. at 40.)
       {¶ 22} Regarding appellants’ consent argument, we note R.C. 5321.04(A)(8) does
not contain language restricting a landlord’s right to entry only upon consent of the tenant.
Rather, the statute requires “reasonable notice” of a landlord’s intent to enter and “only at
reasonable times.” R.C. 5321.04(A)(8). Under Ohio law, 24-hour notice is “presumed to
be reasonable.” Ayres v. Simmons, 4th Dist. No. 93 CA 827 (Sept. 30, 1993), citing R.C.
5321.04(A)(8).
       {¶ 23} As to the issue of whether the notice was reasonable, the trial court heard
testimony that appellee’s standard practice was to post notice of entry near the garage door
of each rental unit. Snyder, appellee’s property manager, testified that notice of intent to
enter is “put * * * in writing with the date the notice was delivered, the date that
maintenance will be entering, the reason they’ll be entering, and then it is posted on a
correspondence clip on the trim to the left of the garage door on every unit.” (Tr. at 74.)
Snyder stated that, in the course of his 14 years of experience as property manager, the best
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 8

method of providing notice to residents has been to post the notice beside the garage door
“because every home has a garage; and by putting notices on doors, people never saw them,
so we put them on the garage -- on the trim next to the garage door, so when people are
pulling in, they see them.” (Tr. at 74.)
       {¶ 24} In arguing that posting a notice on a garage door constitutes an “antiquated
method,” appellants cite to Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), a case involving the
posting of an eviction notice to public housing tenants in a forcible entry and detainer
action. The issue in Greene involved due process concerns based on evidence that posting
notice of summons on a door could be easily removed by others, i.e., based on testimony
presented in that case indicating eviction notices posted by process servers were removed
from apartment doors by children and other tenants. The holding in Greene, however, was
limited to “the circumstances of this case,” and the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that
“posting notice on the door of a person’s home would, in many or perhaps most instances,
constitute not only a constitutionally accepted means of service, but indeed a singularly
appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person who cannot conveniently be served
is actually apprised of proceedings against him.” Id. at 452-53.
       {¶ 25} Greene, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that posting on a door
(e.g., a garage door) is an insufficient method of notice, as recognized by the Supreme Court
and other Ohio appellate courts. See Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 104 Ohio
St.3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, ¶ 9 (distinguishing Greene on the basis there was “no evidence
that tenants in the area have experienced the removal of notices from apartment doors,”
and holding the notice provision of Ohio’s forcible entry and detainer statute (R.C.
1923.04(A)) “permits a landlord to post a three-day notice to vacate on the outside of the
door to the premises”). See also Castlebrook Apts. v. Ballard, 2d Dist. No. 22421, 2008-
Ohio-4633, ¶ 15, citing Cincinnati Metro. at syllabus (“At trial, Castlebrook proved * * * that
notice was properly served * * * by posting a notice on the door of the apartment.”).
       {¶ 26} In the present case, appellee introduced exhibits at trial indicating it provided
at least 24-hour notice of entry by posting a letter on each garage door of the residential
units, and appellee provided testimony that such method was utilized based on its
experience that residents were most likely to observe the notice letters as they pulled into
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 9

their garage. The trial court, based on consideration of the statutory provisions at issue and
the evidence presented, concluded appellee provided “adequate and reasonable notice” to
appellant Jenkins. (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 4.) Upon review, we agree that, as a matter of
law, the notice was reasonable and in accordance with statutory requirements.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to find a violation of the notice
requirements of R.C. 5321.04(A).
       {¶ 27} We next address arguments raised by appellants under the third and fourth
assignments of error; both assignments of error challenge, in large part, certain factual and
credibility determinations of the trial court as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Under the third assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court’s finding
that the lease was broken without cause was against the weight of the evidence based on
their contention that requested repairs were not timely made and that they did not
unreasonably restrict access to the residence.        Appellants assert, under the fourth
assignment of error, that multiple entries were made on a single notice.
       {¶ 28} In support of their argument under the third assignment of error, appellants
point to their own trial testimony that repairs documented on a move-in sheet were not
timely made and that they did not unreasonably hinder appellee’s efforts to gain access to
the residence. Appellants maintain they had ample justification in terminating the lease,
and essentially contend the trial court should have given more weight to their testimony on
these issues.
       {¶ 29} The trial court, however, was confronted with conflicting testimony and
evidence as to the issues of whether repairs were properly made and whether appellants
unreasonably withheld consent to allow appellee to perform repairs and maintenance, and
it is clear the trial court credited the testimony and evidence of appellee over that presented
by appellants. As noted by the trial court in its decision, appellee countered appellants’
claim that repairs were not addressed with evidence, including work maintenance slips,
indicating requested work was performed. The trial court also found, on disputed evidence,
that appellants unreasonably restricted access to the residence.
       {¶ 30} During the bench trial, the trial court heard testimony from appellee’s
property manager, Snyder, regarding interactions he had with appellants during the terms
No. 22AP-564                                                                              10

of the lease; on direct examination, Snyder identified defendant’s exhibit 5 as notes he
“typed out immediately after the residents left my office.” (Tr. at 77.) One of the notes
related that in September 2017, on the date appellant Jenkins signed his lease, appellant
Jenkins submitted a “move-in inspection form” and “a work order was written.” (Tr. at 78.)
Snyder documented that appellant Jenkins “verbally provided permission to enter,” and
“[t]he work order was completed September 25th, 2017, at approximately 1:20 p.m.” (Tr.
at 78.) Included among the exhibits admitted at trial were two maintenance tickets, dated
September 22 and 25, 2017, containing handwritten checkmarks within a box beside the
notation “[w]ork [c]ompleted,” and which also reflect handwritten notations describing the
work performed on lines following the word “[r]emarks.” (Pltfs.’ Ex. D.) Snyder testified
the maintenance slips indicate the requested work was performed.
       {¶ 31} Snyder further documented that on October 24, 2017, “at approximately
12:00 p.m[.], a 24-hour notice to enter, from management, was posted on the
correspondence clip on the trim around the garage door * * * noting our intention to enter
on October 25th, 2017, for preventative maintenance including changing furnace filters.”
(Tr. at 78-79.) Snyder’s notes stated that “[o]n October 25th, at approximately 1:00 p.m.,
our lead maintenance technician knocked on the door of [appellant Jenkins’ residence].
When no one answered, he knocked again. At that point, he heard a dog bark.” (Tr. at 80.)
Testimony at trial indicated appellant Louis-Fernand was inside the residence when the
maintenance worker knocked on the door, and she testified she “put [her] foot in the door
so the maintenance -- I actually prevented him from physically coming in.” (Tr. at 62.)
       {¶ 32} Regarding the issue of unpaid rent, Snyder testified appellant Jenkins moved
out of the residence prior to termination of the lease, and that rent was not paid for the
month of February (2018) and for 18 days of March (2018). Snyder further testified that
appellant Jenkins did not provide notice of intent to vacate as required under the terms of
the lease. Appellant Jenkins testified he gave appellee notice he was vacating the residence
on the date he moved out (January 30, 2018), and he acknowledged during cross-
examination that he did not pay rent for the remainder of the lease term (i.e., for the month
of February and part of March). Appellant Jenkins stated he did not “recall” whether the
lease required him to provide 30-days written notice of intent to vacate. (Tr. at 48.)
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 11

       {¶ 33} As the finder of fact, the trial court was required to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and resolve questions of fact. See, e.g., D.D. v. B.B., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-509,
2022-Ohio-1032, ¶ 35 (where case “largely turned on the testimony of appellant and
appellee,” trial court “was required to determine their credibility in evaluating that
testimony”). Further, “[i]n a bench trial, it remains that ‘the trial judge is best able to view
the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these
observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’ ” Wallace v. Ferguson,
5th Dist. No. 12-CA-5, 2012-Ohio-4839, ¶ 17, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Under Ohio law, “ ‘[i]n determining whether a civil judgment
is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court is guided by a presumption
that the findings of the trial court are correct.’ ” Berman at ¶ 14, quoting Huntington Natl.
Bank v. Miller, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-586, 2016-Ohio-5860, ¶ 13, citing Seasons Coal Co. at
80.
       {¶ 34} As indicated, the trial court heard conflicting testimony and evidence during
the bench trial as to whether requested repairs were performed and whether the tenant
unreasonably withheld consent for maintenance personnel to perform necessary work, and
the court resolved those conflicts in favor of appellee. In this respect, “the weight to be
afforded evidence and witness credibility are issues within the province of the trial court”
and, “as the trier of fact,” the court was “free to believe the evidence and testimony”
submitted by appellee over that of appellants. Stittsworth at ¶ 48. Upon review, we
conclude the record contains competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s
factual findings in rendering judgment in favor of appellee on its counterclaim for unpaid
rent and in its determination the lease was terminated by the tenant without cause.
       {¶ 35} Appellants also contend there was evidence of multiple entries made on one
notice regarding an inspection for the presence of a pet; according to appellants, such
conduct constitutes a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(8). In support of their claim that
multiple entries occurred, appellants point to plaintiffs’ exhibit H, a document from
appellee’s property manager to appellant Jenkins, dated October 26, 2017, noting that
maintenance staff “recently attempted to complete a furnace filter replacement service in
your [residence],” at which time “they noticed that you currently have a dog in your
No. 22AP-564                                                                                   12

[residence].” (Pltfs.’ Ex. H.) The letter further stated in part: “This letter shall also serve as
notice that management will enter your [residence] on and/or after Friday, October 27,
2017 to inspect for evidence of the pet.” (Pltfs.’ Ex. H.)
       {¶ 36} While appellants assert there was more than one entry by appellee as to the
notice regarding a pet, the record reflects that trial testimony on this issue was limited.
Defendant’s exhibit 5 references the fact that a maintenance worker discovered a pet at the
residence on October 25, 2017. As previously noted, the record indicates appellee provided
24-hour notice (on October 24, 2017) for the attempted entry on October 25, 2017, in order
for a maintenance worker to replace furnace filters and inspect smoke alarms. Thus, such
notice of entry was prior to, and unrelated to, the notice regarding a pet provided on
October 26, 2017. Defendant’s exhibit 5 further references that on October 30, 2017,
Snyder conducted an inspection, accompanied by a police officer, to check for the presence
of a pet (and noting that a maintenance worker had been denied access on October 25, 2017
to perform preventative maintenance).
       {¶ 37} As to the entry on October 30, 2017, the record indicates appellant Jenkins
received at least 24-hours’ notice in writing regarding the issue of a pet. On cross-
examination, counsel for appellants questioned Snyder whether “multiple entries [were]
ever made with that single notice?” Snyder responded: “No.” (Tr. at 86.) Snyder further
testified that appellee provided a 24-hour written notice to appellants prior to each entry
into appellant Jenkins’ residence. Here, despite appellants’ contention that multiple
entries were made on the same notice regarding the pet, the evidence presented on this
issue was, at best, conflicting and inconclusive, and we find no error by the trial court in
failing to find a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(8).
       {¶ 38} Based upon the foregoing, appellants’ second, third, and fourth assignments
of error are without merit and are overruled.
       {¶ 39} Finally, we address the first assignment of error, in which appellants assert
the trial court erred in granting judgment against appellant Louis-Fernand. Appellants
note the trial court’s entry granting judgment in favor of appellee in the amount of $1,658
for unpaid rent on its counterclaim arguably purports to render judgment against
“[p]laintiffs,” i.e., not only appellant Jenkins but also against appellant Louis-Fernand.
No. 22AP-564                                                                                 13

(Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 5.) Appellants contend appellant Louis-Fernand was not on the
lease, and there is no evidence she assumed the lease or the obligations under it.
       {¶ 40} In response, appellee argues appellant Louis-Fernand was an intended
beneficiary of the lease agreement and assumed the obligations under the lease. According
to appellee, appellant Louis-Fernand testified that she picked up the keys with her husband
and was frequently a guest at the residence.
       {¶ 41} Generally, “only a party to a contract or an intended third-party beneficiary
thereof may be named as a defendant in an action for breach of a contract.” Kirby v. Cole,
163 Ohio App.3d 297, 2005-Ohio-4753, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). Under Ohio, “the ‘intent to benefit’
test” is used “to determine whether a third-party is an intended beneficiary.” Boatwright
v. Penn-Ohio Logistics, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 39, 2012-Ohio-6238, ¶ 53. Such test “requires
the promisee to have an intent to benefit a third party; the third party cannot merely be an
‘incidental beneficiary.’ ” Id., quoting Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp., 130 Ohio St.3d 196, 2011-
Ohio-5083, ¶ 11-12.
       {¶ 42} In Huff, the Supreme Court observed that “[c]ourts generally presume that a
contract’s intent resides in the language the parties chose to use in the agreement.” Huff at
¶ 12, citing Shifrin v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638 (1992). Further, “
‘[o]nly when the language of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances
surrounding the agreement invest the language of the contract with a special meaning will
extrinsic evidence be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties’ intentions.’ ” Id.,
quoting Shifrin at syllabus. Thus, Ohio law “requires that for a third party to be an intended
beneficiary under a contract, there must be evidence that the contract was intended to
directly benefit that third party.” Id. In general, “the parties’ intention to benefit a third
party will be found in the language of the agreement.” Id.
       {¶ 43} In the present case, the rental agreement, dated September 22, 2017, states it
is “between DRAGOO AND ASSOCIATES, INC.” and “Daryl Jenkins,” and a line on the
lease for “total occupancy” has the typed number “1.” (Emphasis sic.) (Pltfs.’ Ex. A at 1.)
Appellant Jenkins’ signature appears on the line above “Signature of Resident.” (Pltfs.’ Ex.
A at 6.) Appellant Louis-Fernand is not named in the agreement, nor did she sign the rental
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contract. Thus, appellant Louis-Fernand was not a party to the lease agreement, nor do any
of the terms indicate the lease was entered directly for her benefit.
       {¶ 44} Because the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, resort to
extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent is unnecessary. We note, however, even assuming
extrinsic evidence was relevant, the evidence presented at trial indicated appellant Louis-
Fernand resided in Chicago and visited her husband on alternate weekends in Ohio. Here,
the evidence does not suggest the parties to the lease agreement intended to directly benefit
appellant Louis-Fernand, and any benefit she derived in visiting the residence was merely
incidental to the agreement. Further, the fact that appellant Louis-Fernand accompanied
her husband to pick up keys to the residence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to show
intent by the parties to directly benefit her at the time the lease agreement was executed,
nor is the spousal relationship alone sufficient to show assumption of liability on a contract.
See, e.g., Estep v. Elam, 2d Dist. No. 18750 (Oct. 12, 2001), citing Simon v. Zipperstein, 32
Ohio St.3d 74 (1987) (“Relatives of a contracting party are not in privity of contract simply
because of their familial relationship to a party to the contract.”). Accordingly, we find
unpersuasive appellee’s assertion that appellant Louis-Fernand was an intended
beneficiary of the lease and that she assumed the obligation to pay rent along with appellant
Jenkins.
       {¶ 45} Because the decision of the trial court renders judgment against “[p]laintiffs”
as a result of “[p]laintiffs breaking the lease,” appellants’ first assignment of error is well-
taken and is sustained. (Aug. 17, 2022 Entry at 5.) We therefore remand this matter to the
trial court to modify its judgment to remove the monetary award against appellant Louis-
Fernand and to reflect that the award in favor of appellee on its counterclaim for unpaid
rent is entered solely against appellant Jenkins.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 46} Based on the foregoing, appellants’ first assignment of error is sustained,
appellants’ second, third, and fourth assignments are overruled, the judgment of the
Franklin County Municipal Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent
with this decision.
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                                                                Judgment affirmed in part;
                                                                         reversed in part;
                                                     and cause remanded with instructions.

                     BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur.

JAMISON, J., concurring.

       {¶ 47} Because the landlord’s entry with law enforcement was not raised, I write
separately.
       {¶ 48} I would find that the landlord invaded the privacy of appellant and
interfered with his quiet enjoyment of the apartment when he went in with law
enforcement. This is a factor that I would have considered in determining damages.
Although I concur with the majority decision, I think the landlord should be instructed
against unlawful search of appellant’s residence.
       {¶ 49} I take no issue with the recitation of facts, therefore, I adopt them fully. R.C.
5321.01(A) defines a tenant as “a person entitled under a rental agreement to the use and
occupancy of residential premises to the exclusion of others.” R.C. 5321.04(A) sets forth
obligations to which the landlord must abide by and include: “(7) Not abuse the right of
access conferred by division (B) of section 5321.05, of the Revised Code; (8) Except in the
case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, give the tenant reasonable notice of the
landlord’s intent to enter and enter only at reasonable times. Twenty-four hours is
presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”
       {¶ 50} There is no dispute that the landlord gave notice to enter or that on at least
one occasion a dog was heard in appellant’s residence. Angello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 33 (1925), explicitly decided that “[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought
is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without
a warrant. And such searches are * * * unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showing probable cause.” Id. at 33. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613
(1961). Tenants cannot deny the landlord entry if reasonable purpose and/or reasonable
notice is provided by the landlord. The entry to a tenant’s apartment to perform an
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investigative search, for a dog on the premises, accompanied by law enforcement, is not the
anticipated reasonable purpose.
       {¶ 51} Landlords may enter if there is an emergency, to inspect the premises, to
make necessary repairs, or to show the property to prospective tenants or buyers. The
landlord may have believed that he was inspecting the premises for the presence of a dog,
but there is no right for a landlord to grant entry to law enforcement. He did not give notice
to the tenant that law enforcement would be accompanying him. “[A] landlord cannot
validly consent to the search of a tenant’s apartment for Fourth Amendment purposes.”
State v. Norman, 12th Dist. No. CA2014-02-033, 2014-Ohio-5084, ¶ 31. See Chapman;
State v. Callan, 8th Dist. No. 95310, 2011-Ohio-2279, ¶ 18. The landlord would probably
argue that he was searching for a dog, but he nevertheless gave consent for law enforcement
to enter and search with him.
       {¶ 52} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
       {¶ 53} Because I believe appellant’s rights were violated when the landlord called
law enforcement to enter the apartment went beyond the search of common areas, I concur
in the decision but write separately.