Court Opinion

ID: 9518713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:00:06.074896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:17.749311
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
dissenting.
Our supreme court adopted Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the protection of clients and the avoidance of misunderstanding and resulting fee disputes. It has held that in the absence of a written contingency fee agreement, an attorney can recover on a quantum meruit basis to avoid unjust enrichment of the client. Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ind.1999). Here, the trial court ordered and the majority affirms a quantum meruit recovery which unjustly enriches the lawyer who failed to reduce his contingency fee agreement to writing in clear violation of the rule. I am troubled that an attorney who breaches the clearly set forth requirement that contin-geney fee agreements be in writing can, nevertheless, receive a bonus nearly tripling what he would have recovered on an hourly rate basis and, thus, recover more on a quantum meruit theory than he would have recovered had the invalid oral fee agreement been valid. As a result, I respectfully dissent.
The trial court found that a 25% contin-geney fee agreement was entered into pri- or to January 1, 1987, the effective date of Rule 1.5 which requires that contingency fee agreements between lawyer and client be in writing, and concluded that the contingency fee agreement was, therefore, a *286valid contract.14 It then states that the 1991 oral agreement increasing the contin-geney fee to 80% was invalid because it was not in writing. I agree with both of these conclusions, but I differ regarding the legal effect of the 1991 oral agreement. The trial court found "clearly the parties were setting aside the first agreement in creating a second agreement" and concluded that "Clearly, ... the parties revoked that contract to make a new one."
What was clear to the trial court is not to me. Nothing in the Record supports the conclusion that the parties either revoked the earlier agreement or manifested an intent to do so. To the contrary, I believe that the parties were simply attempting to modify their earlier agreement to increase the contingency. After Rule 1.5 became effective on January 1, 1987, the 1986 oral contingency agreement could only be modified in writing. Thus, the 1991 oral contingency agreement increasing the contingency was an attempt to modify the prior agreement. It was ineffective to do so because it was not in writing. The fact that it did not effectively modify the earlier agreement, however, does not revoke that agreement. It remained in effect and should determine the outcome of this proceeding. I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment equal to the 25% contingency.
I am troubled by the fact that the trial court imposed a sanction of treble damages regarding the $21,000 paid by Majors to Mysliwiee. Our supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction regarding discipline of attorneys. Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A). I believe that by imposing the sanctions for Mysliwiee's misconduct, the trial court improperly entered that area that is exclusively reserved to our supreme court.

. The majority states at footnote 4 of the opinion that the parties are in agreement that the trial court's finding thai the parties entered into a 25% contingency agreement in June 1986 was in error and notes that Mysli-wiec testified that the June 1986 agreement was for a one-third contingency, and Majors testilied that there was no contingency fee agreement at all. I believe the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding that the pariies entered into a valid oral contingency agreement prior to January 1, 1987. The evidence also clearly supports the fact that Mysliwiek agreed to reduce the contingency fee to 25% of the recovery. Record, pp. 4667-4669.