Court Opinion

ID: 9848360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:17:58.150992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:15.427260
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The main opinion presumes the judgment of a court of record to be invalid without any showing of the record to that effect. This is at variance with the general law in the United States as set out in 30A, Am.Jur., Judgments § 28:
A judgment is, under general rules applicable to the subject, not presumed to be erroneous, but, to the contrary, is *431presumed to be valid until vacated by some proper proceeding instituted directly for the purpose of correcting errors therein, where the judgment is within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the same. Under such circumstances the judgment so rendered raises a presumption that the court acted impartially, honestly, justly, after due consideration, for good reason, correctly, in conformity to law, and in accordance with its duty; that the proceedings were regular, in conformity with settled usage, sufficient to support the judgment, and based upon proper grounds; and that every requisite, including the pleadings, and every fact necessary to sustain the judgment, was present, except where negatived by the record. * * *
Until this day the law in Utah has been in harmony with that set out above, as is shown by the decision in the case of Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, at page 407, 385 P.2d 154, at page 155, wherein the court said of the Utah Reports:
At no place in the record on appeal is there any indication as to what evidence was stipulated to in the chambers of the trial court; apparently no written stipulation of such evidence was prepared, for such is not a part of the record; and no stenographic transcript of such stipulation, if there was one, is part of the record. Apparently, no oral evidence was taken, as there is no transcript of any such evidence in the record. In short, no evidence of any kind or character, oral, stipulated or otherwise, appears in the record before this Court. * * *
Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct if nothing in the record appears to the contrary, and all doubts are resolved in their favor. The record on appeal in this cause being devoid of any and all evidence, it must be assumed that the proceedings in the court below established a sufficient basis to support and justify the court’s findings, conclusions and judgment. (Citations omitted.)
In the Watkins case there was no showing made that the record was not available, but that should not in the absence of unusual circumstances change the basic principles of law that judgments of a court of record are presumed to be valid in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
In the instant case there is more than a presumption of validity of the judgment. There is sufficient in the record before this court to sustain the judgment of the trial court. True it is that there was a long delay between the filing of the complaint and the entry of the final judgment, but the delay is not grounds for holding the judgment invalid. There is no claim of any estoppel in the matter. The fact is that the defendant has lived outside of Utah for most of the time since the complaint was filed. He has been represented by four *432lawyers with long intervals of time in between when he had no counsel at all. On one occasion after his lawyer withdrew he did nothing for over two years, and then he appointed another attorney only after being notified to do so by the plaintiff.
After a hearing of the instant matter the trial court on January 5, 1961, entered a memorandum decision as follows:
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the above entitled Court. Evidence was adduced on behalf of both parties; the matter was submitted; depositions and statements were furnished, and the Court now being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $6,762.73. The Court makes this finding based upon the following:
(A) That any prior breach by the plaintiff, if any, would not be a bar to the application of the forfeiture provision of the agency supervisor contract ; and
(B) That the evidence indicates clearly that the forfeiture provision should be applied, and particularly in view of the evidence adduced upon the depositions submitted with the statements of the parties.
***** 4
It is no fault of the plaintiff that the clerk’s minutes do not allow the defendant to ascertain which court reporter took the various proceedings at trial. If no reporter was present, it was as much the responsibility of the defendant as of the plaintiff to see that one was in attendance.
The plaintiff apparently assumed the memorandum decision of the trial judge as set out above to be equivalent to a judgment, but when the defendant came to Utah on March 17, 1966, and questioned the matter, the plaintiff refreshed the memory of the trial judge (who for all we know needed no refreshing) as follows:
(A) It filed an affidavit of the former treasurer and record keeper of the plaintiff wherein he said that he was a witness in the case at the time of trial; that he now remembers that he testified that the defendant owed plaintiff an amount somewhere between six thousand and seven thousand dollars.
(B) Its counsel certified that at the trial of the matter the treasurer testified that the defendant owed plaintiff the sum of $6,762.73.
(C) The judge’s memorandum decision was before the court.
In addition thereto, there were two depositions taken of the witnesses Mortensen and Cosby, one on August 8, 1960, and one on August 22, 1960. These were received *433by the judge on January 5, 1961, the date of the memorandum decision.
The defendant claims that these depositions were not before the court because they were received without being sealed.
What occurred is rather obvious as shown by the following facts in the record of this case:
The hearing was held on August 1, 1960. At that hearing the following occurred:
MR. IVERSON: If the Court please, I would be very pleased to submit within the next two weeks a deposition, within which Counsel may cross-examine this witness if he wants, or if it please the Court, if the Court would care to take a few minutes of the Court’s time, to cross-examine. But I think we could do it in a very short manner with a deposition.
I, therefore, make the motion, instead of introducing the statement of Mr. Mortensen, that I be permitted to submit, within two weeks, an affidavit covering the matters set forth in this agreement, in which Counsel may have a right to cross-examine the witness.
MR. LARSON: And will you make him available so that I can cross-examine him?
MR. IVERSON: Oh, yes, we will make him available. I will represent to the Court that he comes to Salt Lake every weekend, and I am certain that I won’t have difficulty in getting this.
MR. LARSON: All I want is a right to cross-examine.
MR. IVERSON: It would be fair to the Court to make a deposition available. May the order be that we submit a short deposition on this matter?
MR. LARSON: That will be fine.
MR. IVERSON: That is all that we have then, your Honor.
On November 23, 1960, the defendant’s counsel gave to the court “Defendant’s Statement of Case,” and therein he refers to the testimony given in the depositions of Mortensen and Cosby. On the same date the plaintiff’s counsel gave “Plaintiff’s Statement of Case” to the court, and he refers to the testimony in the deposition of Cosby.
The deposition of Mortensen was taken pursuant to the agreement and for the purpose of being considered by the court, and the court did consider it before making his ruling in the memorandum decision. The parties intended that the judge read the deposition when submitted to him and never intended that he hold another session of court just for the purpose of ordering the deposition to be opened and published.
*434The main opinion completely overlook's Rule 75(m) of the Rules of Civil Procedure which is as follows:
Appeals When No Stenographic Report Available. In the event no stenographic report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or is available, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection, for use instead of a stenographic transcript. This statement shall be served on the respondent who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto within 10 days after service upon him. Thereupon the statement, with the objections or proposed amendments, shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the court in the record on appeal.
The appellant made no effort whatsoever to comply with this rule, although the respondent did in a measure comply therewith. The burden is upon the appellant to show error and this rule allows him a method of doing so under the circumstances of this case. He has failed in that regard, and this case should not be sent back for a new trial.
The trial court should be affirmed in this matter, and the plaintiff (respondent) should have its costs.