Court Opinion

ID: 9954904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:00:42.997241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.336348
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-1288                                                  September Term, 2023
                                                             FILED ON: MARCH 27, 2024

CADILLAC OF NAPERVILLE, INC.,
                   PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
                  RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 22-1321

                         On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
                                  for Enforcement of an Order
                            of the National Labor Relations Board

       Before: MILLETT, WILKINS, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges

                                        JUDGMENT

        This case was considered on the record from the National Labor Relations Board and the
briefs and arguments of the parties. The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and has
determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons
stated below, it is

         ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be DENIED and the
National Labor Relations Board’s cross-application for enforcement be GRANTED.

                                            *   *    *

        Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act respectively prohibit employer
interference with protected union activity and employer discrimination to “discourage
membership” in a union. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). In the decision and order under review, the
National Labor Relations Board concluded that automobile dealership Cadillac of Naperville
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(“Naperville”) violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging union steward John
Bisbikis following a strike. For the reasons set out below, we deny Naperville’s petition for review
and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

                                                 I

       The service mechanics at Naperville went on strike in August 2017. See Cadillac of
Naperville, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2650 (2022).
John Bisbikis had worked as a mechanic at Naperville for fifteen years, serving as a union steward
for over ten years. Frank Laskaris is Naperville’s owner and president.

        On June 29, prior to the strike and while negotiations on a new collective-bargaining
agreement were underway, Bisbikis met with Laskaris. Id. at 710. Bisbikis asked Laskaris to
rescind Naperville’s new policy requiring workers to pay for part of the cost of their uniforms, a
request Laskaris rejected. Id. Laskaris then referred to the “sputtering labor negotiations” and
“warned” Bisbikis that “things would not be the same” if the mechanics decided to strike. Id.
(quotation marks omitted).

        Shortly after the collective-bargaining agreement expired on July 31, the mechanics went
on strike. Id. On August 9, Naperville informed Bisbikis and five other strikers that they had been
permanently replaced. Id. On September 15, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which
the union ratified on September 17 along with a successor collective-bargaining agreement. Id.

        On September 18, Bisbikis and two union representatives met with Laskaris to discuss the
strikers returning to work. Id. at 710–11. At the start of the meeting, “Laskaris stated that he did
not want Bisbikis present because Bisbikis was a ringleader of the strike and Laskaris no longer
wanted to employ him.” Id. at 711. One of the union representatives advised Bisbikis to leave;
Bisbikis did so. Id. Later that morning, Bisbikis and the two union representatives returned to
Laskaris’s office. Id. When Laskaris denied ever talking with Bisbikis on June 29, Bisbikis called
Laskaris a liar. Id. Laskaris told Bisbikis he should “get the f*** out before I get you the f***
out.” J.A. 58. Bisbikis responded by calling Laskaris a “stupid jack off” in Greek. Id. (quotation
marks omitted). As Bisbikis left the room, Laskaris said that “even if I have to take you back, now
I’m firing you for insubordination.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

        Later that day, Laskaris sent Bisbikis a “notice of termination for insubordinate conduct
and inappropriate language.” J.A. 59 (quotation marks omitted); J.A. 262. The letter stated that
“[t]his offensive and insubordinate behavior is a direct violation of . . . Naperville’s Standards of
Conduct” and a “terminable action.” J.A. 262.

                                                 II

        The union filed a complaint against Naperville alleging, as relevant here, that Naperville
violated the Act by firing Bisbikis. Over time, and in differing factual circumstances, the Board
has applied different standards to determine whether a discharge allegedly prompted by an
employee’s statutorily protected activity violates the Act. Two are relevant here: the four-factor
Atlantic Steel test, Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979); accord Stephens Media, LLC
v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2012), and the Wright Line burden-shifting
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framework, Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc. (“Wright Line”), 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089
(1980); accord Ozburn–Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB, 833 F.3d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Over
the course of this case, the Board has applied both standards to this record—reaching, under both,
the same conclusion in response to the same arguments advanced by Naperville here.

        The Board initially applied the Atlantic Steel test and, in June 2019, concluded that
Naperville’s discharge of Bisbikis violated the Act. Naperville appealed. While that appeal was
pending before this court, the Board issued General Motors, LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21,
2020), overruled in Lion Elastomers, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (May 1, 2023). General Motors held
that Wright Line, not Atlantic Steel, provided the appropriate standard for analyzing the type of
conduct at issue in this case, a holding General Motors made retroactive. Id. at *1–2, *10–11. In
light of General Motors, the Board asked us to remand the issue of Bisbikis’s discharge so that the
Board could apply Wright Line in the first instance. Cadillac, 14 F.4th at 719. We did so. Id. at
720.

        On remand, the Board reached the same conclusion under Wright Line that it had under
Atlantic Steel—that Naperville violated the Act by firing Bisbikis. Naperville again appealed.
After Naperville filed its notice of appeal (but before it filed its opening brief), the Board reversed
course again, overruling General Motors and returning to the Atlantic Steel standard, a holding it
again declared retroactive. Lion Elastomers LLC, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *3, *14 (May 1, 2023).

        We uphold the Board’s findings if they are “supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” Fort Dearborn Co. v. NLRB, 827 F.3d 1067, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)) (quotation marks omitted).

                                                 III

       We affirm the Board’s conclusion that Naperville violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by discharging Bisbikis. The Board’s application of the Wright Line standard is fully
supported by substantial evidence in the record.

         Under Wright Line, the General Counsel bears the initial burden to make out a prima facie
case that the protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse action. Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. at 1085–87; accord Ozburn–Hessey, 833 F.3d at 218. If the General Counsel meets
this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the
adverse action anyway. Ozburn–Hessey, 833 F.3d at 218. If substantial evidence supports the
Board’s finding that the protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the adverse action, then the
employer’s action is unlawful unless the record as a whole compels accepting the employer’s
affirmative defense. Id. at 217–18. If the reasons advanced by the employer are pretextual, the
employer necessarily fails to meet its burden. Id. at 218–19.

                                                  A

         In the decision and order under review, the Board concluded that the General Counsel met
the initial burden to show that Bisbikis’s protected activity was a motivating factor in Naperville’s
decision to terminate his employment by establishing that Naperville knew Bisbikis was engaged
in protected activity and that Naperville exhibited animus toward that activity. Naperville
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challenges only the Board’s finding that Naperville exhibited animus towards Bisbikis’s union
activity. But substantial evidence supports that finding.

        First, Laskaris threatened Bisbikis on June 29 that “things would not be the same” if the
mechanics went on strike. Cadillac, 14 F.4th at 715 (quotation marks omitted); see id. at 716–19.
Second, Laskaris made multiple threatening statements to other employees in response to their
participation in the strike. Id. at 714–19. Indeed, as this court affirmed in the prior appeal, those
threats in fact independently violated the Act, which further strengthens the inference of animus.
See id.; Vincent Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Third, singling
out Bisbikis as one of only six employees to be permanently replaced while striking is yet further
evidence of animus, particularly given Bisbikis’s role as a union steward, longstanding positive
working relationship, and lack of disciplinary record at Naperville. See NLRB v. Davidson Rubber
Co., 305 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1962).

        Finally, on the same day that he discharged Bisbikis, Laskaris said he did not want Bisbikis
at the meeting to discuss the strikers’ return to work because Bisbikis was a ringleader and because
the strike was “all [Bisbikis’s] fault.” J.A. 303 (quotation marks omitted). Laskaris made clear
that he did not want Bisbikis or the other permanently replaced strikers to work at Naperville again.
Indeed, the timing of the discharge—immediately after Laskaris’s criticisms of Bisbikis’s union
activity—also supports the inference of animus. See Schaeff Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 264, 268
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Power Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Laskaris himself
articulated this connection by saying that “even if I have to take you back, now I’m firing you for
insubordination.” J.A. 58 (quotation marks omitted); J.A. 303.

       That evidence of Laskaris’s hostility to Bisbikis’s union activity in connection with the
2017 strike is easily sufficient to support the Board’s conclusion that Naperville exhibited anti-
union animus in discharging Bisbikis. See Wendt Corp. v. NLRB, 26 F.4th 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir.
2022); Power Inc., 40 F.3d at 418.

        Naperville’s arguments to the contrary lack merit and fail to engage with key portions of
the record. First, Naperville asserts that there is simply “no evidence of animus.” Pet’r Br. 24–
25; Pet’r Reply Br. 5. As described above, there is. Indeed, at oral argument Naperville’s counsel
conceded that “it would be a difficult case for us to say that there was no prima facie case.” Oral
Arg. Tr. 7:11–12. Second, Naperville argues that one piece of evidence the Board relied on—
Laskaris’s June 29 warning to Bisbikis that “things would not be the same” if the mechanics
decided to strike—was irrelevant because it had no relation to the September 18 confrontation.
Pet’r Br. 23. But that threat—which itself independently violated the Act, Cadillac, 14 F.4th at
715–16—related to the very strike that precipitated the September confrontation.

                                                 B

        Because the General Counsel made out a prima facie case, the burden shifted to Naperville
to show that it would have fired Bisbikis anyway. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s
conclusion that Naperville failed to meet its evidentiary burden. Naperville argued before the
Board that Bisbikis’s conduct violated the code of conduct referenced in Bisbikis’s termination
letter. But Naperville never introduced that code of conduct, nor did it introduce evidence that any

                                                 4
employee had previously been disciplined under it, much less for “similar” conduct. Frazier Indus.
Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 750, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On appeal, Naperville suggests that firing an
employee for directing an epithet toward a supervisor is simply workplace common sense,
regardless of what may or may not have been in Naperville’s code of conduct. The reason
Naperville gave for discharging Bisbikis, however, was not that it was workplace common sense,
but that Bisbikis’s behavior violated Naperville’s code of conduct—a justification that Naperville
never substantiated. Naperville also contends—again without citation or support—that the Greek
insult used by Bisbikis was so egregious that it warranted firing Bisbikis anyway. Such a bare
assertion in Naperville’s briefs on appeal does not change the Board’s conclusion below that
Naperville did not meet its evidentiary burden under Wright Line.

        Moreover, the circumstances suggest that Naperville’s stated reason for the discharge was
pretext. On the very same day that Bisbikis uttered his epithet, Laskaris had already asserted that
he did not want to employ Bisbikis. Cadillac, 14 F.4th at 711. In their later exchange, Bisbikis
uttered a single insult in response to Laskaris telling him to “get the f*** out before I get you the
f*** out.” J.A. 58. That this occurred in the context of a workplace where profanity was
“common”—as demonstrated by Laskaris’s own statements in this interaction—provides even
further support for the Board’s conclusion. J.A. 304; see Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood,
LLC v. NLRB, 45 F.4th 234, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2022). We therefore reject Naperville’s challenge to
the Board’s conclusion that, under the Wright Line test, Naperville violated Sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act in discharging Bisbikis.

                                                 IV

        Given the unusual circumstances of this case, we will not remand to the Board to apply the
Atlantic Steel standard, despite the Board’s intervening decision holding that it will revert to
applying Atlantic Steel. See Lion Elastomers, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *3.

        Neither party seeks remand for the Board to perform (another) Atlantic Steel analysis. See
Pet’r Br. 30; Pet’r Reply Br. 11; Resp’t Br. 50–51. Naperville has argued throughout the entire
case that Wright Line should apply. See Pet’r Br. 20, 22; Oral Arg. Tr. 18:14–21. And the Board
seeks enforcement of its order applying Wright Line. See Resp’t Br. 48 n.14; Oral Arg. Tr. 12:21–
23, 13:10–17, 16:23–17:8. Wright Line has not been overruled and remains a viable standard for
finding a violation under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, even if the Board has indicated that
it now intends Atlantic Steel to govern a situation like this one. See Resp’t Br. 48 n.14; Oral Arg.
Tr. 12:8–12.

        Moreover, the Board has already applied the Atlantic Steel standard to this record and
reached the same conclusion that it did under Wright Line. Naperville’s counsel also conceded at
oral argument that, were we or the Board to apply Atlantic Steel, Naperville would not advance
any arguments other than those it has advanced in this appeal. See Oral Arg. Tr. 4:20–5:3, 18:20–
25. As we have explained, those fact-based arguments lack merit and, despite the opportunity to
do so, Naperville has not offered any reason they would affect the outcome under the Atlantic Steel
standard any more than under Wright Line. Remand would therefore be “an idle and useless
formality” as there is no possibility that the Board will change its conclusion on this record. NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969).
                                                 5
       For the foregoing reasons, we deny Naperville’s petition for review and grant the Board’s
cross-application for enforcement.

                                            *    *   *

        Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).

                                                Per Curiam

                                                             FOR THE COURT:
                                                             Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                     BY:     /s/
                                                             Daniel J. Reidy
                                                             Deputy Clerk

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