Court Opinion

ID: 9377394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 19:01:08.676025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.737433
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-6158    Document: 010110822697   Date Filed: 03/07/2023   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                     PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     March 7, 2023

                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

         Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                    No. 21-6158

  AARON KEITH, a/k/a AK, a/k/a
  Keke,

         Defendant - Appellant.
                      _________________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Oklahoma
                       (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00260-SLP-45)
                      _________________________________

 Gail K. Johnson of Johnson & Klein, PLLC, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-
 Appellant.

 Steven W. Creager, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, United
 States Attorney; David McCrary, Assistant United States Attorney; and Nick M.
 Coffey, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma
 City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                      _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                 _________________________________

 PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       In our legal system, criminal defendants have a right to a speedy trial—

 they cannot languish in pretrial detention. The Sixth Amendment and the
Appellate Case: 21-6158   Document: 010110822697     Date Filed: 03/07/2023   Page: 2

 Speedy Trial Act (STA) say as much. But the onus is on defendants to “spot[]

 violations of the [STA].” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 502 (2006)

 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)). After months of delay in his drug-

 conspiracy prosecution, Aaron Keith unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the

 indictment on speedy-trial grounds. After his motion was denied, a jury

 convicted him of all charges. He now renews those speedy-trial arguments.

       Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                 BACKGROUND

 I.    Factual Background

       Keith joined the Irish Mob Gang (IMG), a prison gang, while serving an

 Oklahoma state sentence. Like many gangs, the IMG was in the drug trade.

 From their prison cells, Keith and his IMG confederates coordinated large drug

 transactions outside of prison. Using contraband cell phones, members acted as

 intermediaries between drug suppliers and buyers on the outside. In November

 2018, during its ongoing investigation into the IMG, the FBI wiretapped an

 IMG leader’s cell phone. Many conversations recorded on the wiretap

 implicated Keith in the gang’s drug dealing. Keith’s role in the conspiracy was

 nearing its end.

 II.   Procedural Background

       In October 2018, in the first of three indictments, a federal grand jury

 charged 39 IMG members and affiliates with drug conspiracy and other drug

 and money-laundering offenses. Keith wasn’t among the indicted defendants.

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 Given the conspiracy’s reach and the extensive discovery involved, the

 government moved to declare the case complex and to continue the trial. The

 district court granted the unopposed motion after finding under the STA that the

 “ends of justice” outweighed the public’s and defendants’ interests in a speedy

 trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In a separate scheduling order, the court

 set trial for February 11, 2020.

       On December 12, 2018, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment,

 this time naming 55 defendants, including Keith. Keith was charged with drug

 conspiracy and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. He was

 arraigned on December 19, at which time the STA clock began. According to

 the prior scheduling order, each newly indicted defendant had two weeks after

 being arraigned to object to the proposed schedule. “A failure to object,”

 cautioned the court, “will be deemed a Defendant’s acknowledgment and

 approval of [the complex-case designation] and the scheduling deadlines.”

 Keith didn’t object, tacitly consenting to the February 2020 trial date.

       A.     Pretrial Delays

       A year passed without incident. But on January 6, 2020, with only six

 defendants remaining for trial, two of Keith’s codefendants moved to continue

 the trial to August 2020. Citing their newly appointed counsels’ need to review

 discovery and prepare for trial, the two defendants informed the court that

 “[a]ll parties have conferred and are in agreement with this requested

 continuance.” Suppl. R. at 678–79. Keith didn’t object, so the court made new

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 “ends-of-justice” findings and continued the trial to August 11, 2020. In

 determining that the continuance wouldn’t prejudice the defendants, the court

 mistakenly understood that Keith and the other defendants were serving state

 sentences. But in fact, Keith had completed his state sentence two weeks earlier

 and was seeking a federal detention hearing.

       Though the parties didn’t know it yet, a global pandemic was looming.

 Once COVID-19 made an August 2020 trial date uncertain, the government and

 the four remaining defendants submitted a joint status report. There, the parties

 detailed

       (1) that the defendants would be ready for trial in August but wanted
       it to be conducted “as ‘normally’ as possible”;
       (2) that the U.S. Marshals Service might encounter problems serving
       defense subpoenas;
       (3) that there could be logistical challenges, such as the need for a
       Spanish-language interpreter for one defendant;
       (4) that COVID-19-related prison restrictions made it difficult for
       the government to prepare its several in-custody witnesses;
       (5) that the government proposed three separate trials to maintain
       proper social distancing, but that Keith and a codefendant objected
       to being tried separately; and
       (6) that the government didn’t think an August trial was possible.

 A week after filing the status report, the government obtained a second

 superseding indictment against seven defendants, including the four from the

 status report. The second superseding indictment charged Keith with one count

 of drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and

 one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation

 of § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).

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          In July, the government moved to continue the trial from August to

 November 2020, citing COVID-19’s effect on trial preparations and a need for

 extra time for plea negotiations. The government advised the court that Keith

 didn’t object to this continuance. Indeed, Keith had rejected the government’s

 offer to be tried alone in August; the government reported that Keith “would

 rather wait and be tried with” his codefendants. Agreeing with the government’s

 proffered reasons and making another ends-of-justice finding, the court granted

 the motion and reset trial for November 3, 2020. 1

          On November 4, 2 the parties selected a twelve-member jury and four

 alternates. But the court did not swear in the jury. Several Deputy U.S.

 Marshals had been exposed to COVID-19, which hindered transport of the

 many in-custody witnesses, so the court told the jury to return on November 9

 to be sworn. When two jurors noted that they had conflicts on November 9, the

 court pushed the trial date to November 10. At last, everything was in line for

 trial.

          1
        Between July and November, three of the seven remaining defendants
 pleaded guilty. Of the last four defendants, two apparently were never arrested,
 making Keith and Christopher Gunn the last defendants remaining. Keith and
 Gunn would eventually be tried jointly.
          2
         Though the court’s scheduling order had set trial for November 3, 2020,
 jury selection did not begin until November 4. The court had continued the trial
 to its “November 2020 trial docket,” which ended up falling on November 4.

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       Unfortunately, COVID-19 had other plans. On November 6, a juror

 notified the court of a positive test for the virus, prompting the court on

 November 9 to postpone trial until at least November 30 under public-health

 protocols. In response, on November 16, the government moved to excuse the

 jury and begin later with a separate jury panel. The government hypothesized

 that a 26-day delay risked the jury’s being too distracted by COVID-19 and

 potentially having researched the case beforehand. In one sentence, Keith

 objected to the government’s motion. 3 Ultimately, the court granted the motion

 on November 23. It cited the Western District of Oklahoma’s latest General

 Order 20-26, which prospectively suspended jury trials throughout December.

 Based on this court-wide order, the court noted that the original jury, if

 unexcused, would be held in limbo for over two months. Excusing the jury

 without declaring a mistrial, and making another ends-of-justice finding, the

 court continued the trial to January 12, 2021.

       On January 5, 2021, the Chief District Judge issued General Order 21-1,

 suspending jury trials through February. The next day, concerned about these

 and future delays, the district court sua sponte continued Keith’s trial again

 after entering new ends-of-justice findings. “Given all of the logistical issues

       3
         Keith did not explain why he was objecting. R. vol. 1, at 447 (“COMES
 NOW, Defendant Aaron Keith, by and through counsel, and objects to
 Plaintiff ’s Motion for Order Excusing the Current Jury and Restarting Jury
 Selection and requests this Court deny the Motion.”).
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 involved,” the court announced, “a more realistic and ‘firm’ date for this trial is

 in May 2021.” So May 11, 2021, became the new trial date.

       On January 21, Keith and Gunn jointly moved to dismiss the indictment

 on statutory and constitutional speedy-trial grounds. Despite the pandemic, they

 now took a view that “life goes on”—so too should the courts. Arguing that the

 court could mitigate COVID-19 concerns by “implementing recommended

 safety protocols,” Keith and Gunn contested the need for any of the three ends-

 of-justice continuances. And as for the Sixth Amendment, they maintained that

 all four Barker factors supported dismissal. The court denied their motion in a

 fifteen-page order.

       B.     Trial and Sentencing

       On May 11, 2021, a jury trial finally began. Over five days, the

 government called 25 witnesses, including several former IMG members. Keith

 rested without presenting evidence or calling witnesses. Before closing

 arguments, Keith objected to the proposed jury instructions for not including a

 multiple-conspiracies instruction. Citing United States v. Davis, 995 F.3d 1161

 (10th Cir. 2021), the court overruled his objection.

       In the end, the jury convicted Keith on both counts. From a total offense

 level 43 and a criminal-history category VI, Keith faced an advisory guideline

 of life imprisonment. Varying downward, the court sentenced him to 480

 months’ imprisonment. Keith’s timely appeal followed.

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                                   DISCUSSION

       Keith raises two appellate issues: (1) whether the 29-month interval in

 bringing the case to trial violated his statutory or constitutional speedy-trial

 rights and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by not giving a

 multiple-conspiracies jury instruction. He acknowledges that the latter issue is

 foreclosed by our precedent and raises it only to preserve it. We discuss these

 issues in turn.

 I.    Speedy-Trial Rights

       Keith claims that the district court’s five continuances of his trial date

 violated his speedy-trial rights under the STA and the Sixth Amendment. Our

 standard of review for the denial of a speedy-trial motion to dismiss is twofold.

 We review STA issues (including a district court’s decision to grant an ends-of-

 justice continuance) for abuse of discretion, and we review constitutional

 speedy-trial issues de novo. United States v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1174–75

 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Within the STA abuse-of-discretion

 framework, we review the district court’s compliance with the STA’s legal

 requirements de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. (citing United

 States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009)).

       A.     Speedy Trial Act

       Keith argues that the district court’s ends-of-justice continuances violated

 the STA.

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       To effect the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the STA requires that a

 federal criminal defendant be tried within 70 days of the indictment or initial

 appearance, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If the defendant

 isn’t tried within those 70 days, the court must dismiss the indictment on the

 defendant’s motion. § 3162(a)(2). But this 70-day timeline has many

 exemptions that blunt the STA’s stringent remedy. Relevant here is the STA’s

 ends-of-justice continuance, under which a district court can exclude time if it

 sufficiently explains on the record why “the ends of justice served by taking

 such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

 speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(7)(A). This exception is “meant to be a rarely used tool

 for those cases demanding more flexible treatment.” Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1269

 (quoting United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1989)).

       From December 19, 2018, to May 11, 2021, the court approved five ends-

 of-justice continuances, divisible into five periods of delay. And a sixth period

 occurred in November 2020 between the first jury panel’s selection and its

 excusal. The court excluded all 873 calendar days between arraignment and

 trial from Keith’s 70-day STA clock. We provide a chart below as a handy

 reference for the timeline, and we then discuss each period individually.

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                                                                    Challenged in
                                       District-Court
       Period of Delay                                              Keith’s Motion
                                    Explanation for Delay
                                                                     to Dismiss?
   First continuance           Need for preparation in this
   12/19/2018 – 02/11/2020     complex case with many defend- No.
   418 days                    ants and vast discovery
   Second continuance          Two codefendants had new at-
   02/11/2020 – 08/11/2020     torneys who needed time to pre- No.
   182 days                    pare for trial
   Third continuance           Logistical and safety challenges
   08/11/2020 – 11/04/2020     because of COVID-19 and more Yes.
   85 days                     time for plea negotiations
   First jury panel selected
                               Trial put on hold because a juror
   11/04/2020 – 11/23/2020                                       Yes.
                               contracted COVID-19
   19 days
   Fourth continuance
                               W.D. Okla. General Order 20-26
   11/23/2020 – 01/12/2021                                         Yes.
                               (no jury trials in December)
   50 days
   Fifth continuance
                               W.D. Okla. General Order 21-1
   01/12/2021 – 05/11/2021                                       Yes.
                               (no jury trials through February)
   119 days

        First, after determining that the case’s complexity warranted an ends-of-

  justice finding, the court in a scheduling order set trial for February 11, 2020.

  Though invited to object to this schedule, Keith did not.

        Second, in January 2020, two codefendants moved to continue the trial

  because their newly appointed counsel needed time to prepare for trial. Keith

  agreed to the continuance. The court made an ends-of-justice finding and reset

  trial for August 11, 2020.

        Third, in July 2020, the government moved to continue the trial because

  of COVID-19’s effect on trial preparations and the need for extra time for plea

  negotiations. Keith didn’t object. In fact, he rejected the government’s offer to

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  be tried alone in August. The court made an ends-of-justice finding and reset

  trial for November 3, 2020.

        Fourth, after a juror on the first panel contracted COVID-19, requiring

  that the trial be delayed until at least November 30, the government moved to

  excuse the jury. Keith objected without giving a reason. The court made an

  ends-of-justice finding and continued the trial to January 12, 2021.

        Fifth, after the Western District of Oklahoma by general order suspended

  jury trials in January and February, the court made a sua sponte ends-of-justice

  finding and continued the trial to May 11, 2021. Only then—on January 21—

  did Keith move to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, which the court denied.

  Trial began on May 11, 2021.

              1.       Waiver

        On appeal, Keith attacks all five ends-of-justice continuances as

  improper and unsupported by the court’s ends-of-justice findings. Before we

  address his arguments, we examine two key precedents to determine the proper

  scope of our review, considering whether Keith waived challenges to any of the

  five continuances.

                       a.    Under United States v. Loughrin, Keith waived his
                             challenges to the first and second continuances.

        The STA has a waiver provision: If the defendant fails to “move for

  dismissal prior to trial,” he waives any argument for dismissal under the STA.

  18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). And even if the defendant does file an STA-based

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  motion to dismiss, he still preserves for appeal only arguments about contested

  excluded time identified in the motion to dismiss. United States v. Loughrin,

  710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), aff ’d on other grounds,

  573 U.S. 351 (2014). In other words, a defendant’s STA-based motion to

  dismiss must challenge each continuance disputed on appeal. Id. We cannot

  review any unpreserved STA arguments, even for plain error. Id. (citation

  omitted). This rule makes sense—we want defendants to “adequately develop[]”

  their arguments and “give the district court the opportunity to further explain

  its reasoning for granting a continuance.” Id. (citation omitted).

        Keith’s motion to dismiss (filed January 21, 2021) did not challenge

  either the first continuance after the court’s complex-case designation (covering

  the time between his arraignment on December 19, 2018, and February 11,

  2020) or the second continuance related to his codefendants’ new counsel

  (covering the time between February 11, 2020, and August 11, 2020). As for the

  first continuance, his motion to dismiss accepted the validity of the district

  court’s scheduling order. And as for the second continuance, his motion to

  dismiss acknowledged that this delay was “necessitated” by the codefendants’

  entry of new counsel and that “it was in the best interests of all the Defendants

  not to oppose the requested continuance.” So that left Keith’s motion to dismiss

  as contesting just the third, fourth, and fifth continuances, all of which related

  to COVID-19. That means he conceded as excludable time the interval between

  his initial appearance and August 11, 2020—the trial date set after the second

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  continuance and the beginning of the third period of delay. This is also how the

  district court interpreted the motion to dismiss. R. vol. 1, at 499 (“Here, the

  focus of Defendants’ challenge is the continuances since August 11,

  2020 . . . .”).

         Yet on appeal, Keith asks us to find STA violations from the first and

  second continuances, too. We hold that Keith has waived any objection to these

  two periods of delay. See Loughrin, 710 F.3d at 1121. Because of this waiver,

  we eliminate from consideration the time from Keith’s arraignment on

  December 19, 2018, to August 11, 2020—600 days. 4 See id. (“Accordingly, the

  [waived time period] at issue here do[es] not count toward Loughrin’s seventy-

  day tally.”). That leaves us with 85 calendar days during the third delay, 50

  days during the fourth delay, and 119 days during the fifth delay. 5

         4
         The STA clock starts on “day zero.” United States v. Channon, No. 21-
  2027, 2022 WL 6872077, at *6 (10th Cir. Oct. 12, 2022) (unpublished) (citing
  Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(A)); see also United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d
  1312, 1317, 1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 2014) (counting 356 days between May 24,
  2011, and May 15, 2012).
         5
          Raising a separate ground for waiver, the government contends that
  Keith has waived any ability to contest the first three continuances because he
  did not move to dismiss before his original trial proceedings in November
  2020. § 3162(a)(2). But the government provides no authority that this statutory
  provision applies when the jury is ultimately excused without a mistrial and
  months later another jury is selected and trial completed. We need not rule on
  this question to affirm.
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                     b.    Under United States v. Nevarez, Keith waived his
                           challenge to part of the fifth continuance.

        Another key case limits Keith’s speedy-trial arguments for unexcludable

  time, this time looking forward—not backward—from his motion to dismiss.

  After Keith’s appeal was fully briefed, we decided United States v. Nevarez,

  55 F.4th 1261 (10th Cir. 2022). There, the district court continued Felipe

  Nevarez’s criminal case several times for ends-of-justice reasons even before

  COVID-19 led to more ends-of-justice continuances. See id. at 1262. The

  parties and the court agreed that the deadline to begin trial without an STA

  violation was February 18, 2021. See id. at 1265. In other words, the 71st day

  would be February 19. 6 See id. At a status conference on February 17,

  Nevarez’s counsel orally objected to any trial being beyond the STA’s 70-day

  mark. Id. at 1263–64 (“Mr. Nevarez objects to his trial being beyond

  speedy trial, which, of course, is tomorrow.”). The district court noted the oral

  objection. Id. at 1264. Soon after, the government moved to continue the trial

  and to exclude time under the STA, and the court continued the trial to April

  2021. See id. at 1262, 1265.

        6
          The record in Nevarez reveals that in November 2020, the district court
  chose to continue the trial to February 18 because it had calculated February 18
  as the 70th unexcluded day. But it then excluded all time up to February 18
  from the STA clock, so none of that time ultimately counted toward the 70
  days. Neither the government nor Nevarez challenged this on appeal. See
  Nevarez, 55 F.4th at 1265 n.2 (“We need not determine the date when a
  violation of the [STA] would have occurred in this case . . . .”).
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        On appeal, Nevarez and the government disagreed about whether an oral

  motion could suffice to preserve the STA issue for appellate review. See id.

  at 1263–64. But we passed over that issue (whether a written motion was

  required) and affirmed on an alternative ground: that the motion to dismiss was

  premature. Id. at 1265. Adopting the Sixth Circuit’s approach, we ruled that

        [m]eeting the requirements of § 3162(a)(2) is not simply a question
        of presenting a “motion” in a form that this Court deems satisfactory,
        it is also a question of presenting it at the right time. Premature mo-
        tions will not suffice. An actual violation of the [STA] must exist at
        the time the motion is made. After all, “a motion for dismissal under
        the [STA] is effective only for periods of time which antedate its
        filing.” When a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment based on
        an [STA] violation that has yet to occur, that motion cannot succeed
        and “‘the right to challenge any subsequent delay is waived’ unless
        the defendant brings a new motion to dismiss.”

  Id. at 1264–65 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407, 411

  (6th Cir. 2014)).

        Nevarez waived a challenge to the latest continuance because to reach 71

  days, his motion needed to incorporate unexcluded time in the future. To

  prevail on an STA-based motion to dismiss, Nevarez had to “challenge the

  continuance on day seventy-one (or later), a course [he] never took.” Id.

  at 1265 (quoting Sherer, 770 F.3d at 411). So Nevarez’s motion challenging

  future delay was “premature” by two days, and by not moving to dismiss later,

  when that delay had happened, he waived his STA challenge for that interval.

  Id.

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         Applying this rule here, we note that, as in Nevarez, Keith’s motion to

  dismiss is partially based on a claim of future unexcludable time (after January

  21, 2021). So it fails, too. After all, Keith couldn’t move to dismiss “based on

  a[n] [STA] violation that ha[d] yet to occur”; he could look only backward for

  unexcludable time. See id. at 1264–65 (“A motion for dismissal under the

  [STA] is effective only for periods of time which antedate its filing.” (cleaned

  up) (quoting Sherer, 770 F.3d at 411)). To avoid waiving a challenge to the 110

  days’ delay that postdated his motion, Keith needed to file another motion to

  dismiss—“a course [he] never took.” Id. at 1265 (quoting Sherer, 770 F.3d

  at 411).

         But Keith’s arguments about past unexcludable time are still fair game.

  In his motion to dismiss, he also asserted an “actual violation” of the STA

  based on the district court’s past determinations of excluded time in its ends-of-

  justice findings. Id. For past excluded time, Keith argues that the continuances

  violated § 3161(h)(7) and that the sum of those prior delays exceeded 70 days.

  Zedner, 547 U.S. at 509 (“Because this [invalid] continuance by itself exceeded

  the maximum 70–day delay provided in § 3161(c)(1), the [STA] was

  violated . . . .”).

         Under Nevarez, Keith’s universe of possible unexcludable time on appeal

  has thus shrunk to 85 calendar days during the third period of delay, 50 days

  during the fourth period of delay, and 9 days during the fifth period of delay.

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              2.    The First “Trial”

        Having bookended Keith’s STA challenge with Loughrin and Nevarez, we

  must now decide how to treat the ill-fated November 2020 trial proceedings.

  How do we regard the 19 days between the first jury’s being selected on

  November 4 and its being excused on November 23: as excludable or

  unexcludable STA time? Under the STA, trial must “commence” within 70 days

  from the initial appearance. § 3161(c)(1). And we have held that, for STA

  purposes, “a jury trial commences with the voir dire.” United States v. Arnold,

  113 F.3d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on state-law grounds

  by State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).

        Arnold didn’t involve post-voir dire delay, but United States v. Martinez

  did. There, the parties selected a jury on September 26, but they didn’t begin

  opening statements until October 25. 749 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1984),

  abrogated on other grounds by Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).

  With 29 days’ delay between these two events, the parties disputed when the

  trial had “commenced” under § 3161(c)(1). Id. We held that trial began “when

  the jury was selected.” Id. And because the STA clock stopped running at jury

  selection, we concluded that the government had commenced trial within 70

  days. See id. at 604–05.

        Other circuits agree. See United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 443–44

  (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1986);

  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Duberry, 923 F.2d 317, 321 (3d Cir. 1991); United

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  States v. Brown, 819 F.3d 800, 810 (6th Cir. 2016). But those circuits “will not

  hesitate to find that a trial has not actually ‘commenced’ within the requisite

  time” if they “perceive an intent to merely pay the [STA] lip service.”

  Gonzalez, 671 F.2d at 444. Here, the district court’s 19-day delay after voir dire

  wasn’t a dodge around the STA. The court delayed swearing in the jury for five

  days because several Deputy U.S. Marshals had been exposed to COVID-19,

  hindering transport of in-custody witnesses; delayed it another day because of

  juror scheduling conflicts; and delayed it further because a juror contracted

  COVID-19. These were legitimate reasons to delay swearing in the jury.

        On November 4, 2020, the government fulfilled its STA obligation by

  timely commencing Keith’s trial proceedings. We now hold that the trial

  extended until November 23, when the first jury was excused. So those 19 days

  are excludable time. With that, we turn to the district court’s third, fourth, and

  fifth continuances to see whether that time should count toward the 71-day

  mark or whether it was properly excluded for STA purposes. 7

        7
           The government also argues for two STA clocks. By its reckoning, one
  clock governed the interval from Keith’s arraignment on December 19, 2018, to
  the first jury selection beginning on November 4, 2020, and the other clock
  restarted with no time elapsed once the court excused the first jury on
  November 23, 2020. This “two-clock” theory relies on § 3161(e), a provision
  that restarts the 70-day clock “following a declaration by the trial judge of a
  mistrial or following an order of such judge for a new trial.”

         We reject the two-clock theory. Subsection (e)’s language “order . . . for a
  new trial” means an order granting a defendant’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial
  after a guilty verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see also United States v. Pitner,
                                                                          (continued)
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              3.     Ends-of-Justice Continuances

        To recap, with Loughrin and Nevarez gnawing Keith’s possible

  unexcludable time before and after his motion to dismiss, Keith can attack only

  the third period of delay (85 days), the fourth period (50 days), and a small part

  of the fifth period (9 days). We now turn to analyze whether the district court

  complied with the STA in its ends-of-justice continuance orders.

        We begin with the third continuance. Ahead of an August 11, 2020 trial

  date, the government moved to continue the trial because of COVID-19’s effect

  on trial preparations and the need for extra time for plea negotiations. The court

  made an ends-of-justice finding and reset trial for November 3, 2020. Keith

  argues that the court’s findings were insufficient because the court didn’t

  explain why a three-month continuance was necessary and didn’t justify a need

  for plea-negotiation time.

        To weigh the ends of justice against the public’s and defendant’s best

  interests in a speedy trial, courts consider four nonexclusive factors:

        (i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding
        would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossi-
        ble, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

  307 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting this language to mean
  “the granting of a motion for new trial or its equivalent, which would upset a
  verdict of conviction and occasion a new trial” (emphasis added)). We have
  never applied § 3161(e) to situations like Keith’s, where a jury was selected,
  not sworn, and later excused. After excusing a jury in an ordinary (non-
  COVID-19) prosecution, the parties would begin a second jury selection
  expeditiously, not after waiting ten weeks. We won’t give the government a
  windfall by restarting the 70-day clock under § 3161(e) when the court never
  declared a mistrial.
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        (ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number
        of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel
        questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate
        preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the
        time limits established by this section.

        (iii) Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in
        the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a
        time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the
        indictment within the period specified in section 3161(b), or because
        the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are
        unusual or complex.

        (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which,
        taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within
        clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain coun-
        sel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government con-
        tinuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the
        attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for ef-
        fective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due dili-
        gence.

  § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–(iv). Courts need not address factors that don’t apply.

  United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

  States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 798 (10th Cir. 1993)). 8 But “the record must

  clearly establish the district court considered the proper factors at the time such

  a continuance was granted.” United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431, 1433

  (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Improper factors to consider include

  “general congestion of the court’s calendar,” “lack of diligent preparation,” and

  “failure to obtain available [government] witnesses.” § 3161(h)(7)(C).

        8
          Keith omits the third factor, which applies to situations in which the
  indictment is delayed. This didn’t happen here, so we agree that this factor is
  not in play. See Watson, 766 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Occhipinti, 998 F.2d at 798).
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        We see no abuse of discretion here. The district court’s order stated that

  it “considered the factors” in § 3161(h)(7)(B) and that the ends of justice

  outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

  The court supported its ends-of-justice findings by identifying “the current

  state of the COVID-19 pandemic in Oklahoma” (citing W.D. Okla. General

  Orders 20-13 & 20-18), the “unique challenges” related to the need for “safety

  protocols,” the parties’ “trial preparation,” defense counsels’ “ability to meet

  with their respective clients,” and the COVID-19-related difficulties in calling

  witnesses (especially, as the court noted, witnesses from Texas, where COVID-

  19 was more widespread). It twice incorporated more specific facts from the

  motion to continue. And so incorporated, the government’s motion detailed the

  various District general orders and COVID-19 case counts, the extensive

  evidence and many witnesses, the difficulties in meeting with those witnesses,

  the near-impossibility of social distancing in the courtroom with three

  defendants and their attorneys, and the risk that COVID-19 would thwart the

  ability to select a representative cross-section of the public to serve on the jury.

        Keith doesn’t challenge any of these facts as clearly erroneous. He

  objects only that the court didn’t explain why it continued the trial for three

  months instead of one or two. But Keith doesn’t support his argument with

  precedent or language from the STA. The district court evidently hoped that the

  “current state of the COVID-19 pandemic in Oklahoma” and the other logistical

  challenges would improve by November. Given that the government would have

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  tried the case in November but for one infected juror, this prediction had merit.

  And the court’s COVID-19 approach aligned with those of districts across the

  country. See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1049 (9th Cir.) (per

  curiam) (remanding case for district court to enter new ends-of-justice finding),

  cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2716 (2022); United States v. Leveke, 38 F.4th 662, 670

  (8th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion for COVID-19 ends-of-justice findings), cert.

  denied, 143 S. Ct. 386 (2022); United States v. Roush, No. 21-3820, 2021 WL

  6689969, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2021) (same), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1187

  (2022). The district court acted within its discretion by excluding these 85 days

  from the STA clock, so none of this time counts toward the 70-day limit.

                                    ⁎     ⁎      ⁎

        Even if Keith convinced us that the district court’s fourth and fifth

  continuances (respectively spanning 50 and 9 days) were unexcludable time

  under the STA, those two periods would add up to only 59 days, not 71. So we

  need go no further and thus do not discuss the propriety of the fourth and fifth

  continuances. Because more than 70 unexcludable days had not elapsed

  between Keith’s arraignment and his motion to dismiss, he cannot show an STA

  violation.

        Our holding doesn’t diminish that an ends-of-justice continuance still

  should be “a rarely used tool for those cases demanding more flexible

  treatment.” Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515). We

  simply agree that “surely a [once-in-a-century] global pandemic . . . falls

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  within such unique circumstances.” Olsen, 21 F.4th at 1047. We affirm on

  statutory speedy-trial grounds.

        B.     Sixth Amendment

        Keith also argues that the district court’s ends-of-justice continuances

  violated his constitutional speedy-trial right.

        The Sixth Amendment guarantees the “right to a speedy and public trial”

  for all criminal defendants. U.S. Const. amend. VI. We assess constitutional

  speedy-trial claims by balancing the four Barker factors: “(1) the length of

  delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right;

  and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d 774, 780

  (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32 (1972)).

  No single factor controls our analysis. See id. (quoting United States v. Seltzer,

  595 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010)). We discuss each factor in turn.

        Length of delay. To trigger a Barker analysis, there must be

  “‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay,” meaning delay approaching a year. Id.

  (citations omitted). The government concedes that the 29-month delay in

  bringing Keith to trial is presumptively prejudicial. 9 We find that this first

  factor favors Keith.

        9
           Though Keith initially tallies a 35-month delay from indictment to
  sentencing, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-
  trial guarantee no longer applies “once a defendant has been found guilty at
  trial.” Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016). After the government
  cited Betterman in its brief, Keith conceded that the delay was only 29 months.
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        Reason for delay. This second factor is “[t]he flag all litigants seek to

  capture.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986). We must

  evaluate the government’s reasons “for not bringing the defendant to trial in a

  timely fashion.” Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1326. In evaluating the government’s

  reasons, we weigh different justifications differently. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

  For example, intentional government tactics to delay the trial weigh heavily

  against the government; “neutral” reasons (such as “overcrowded courts”)

  weigh against the government but less so; and “valid” reasons (such as a

  “missing witness”) justify the delay. Id. But a defendant’s actions that delay his

  own trial weigh heavily against him. Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1326 (quoting

  United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th Cir. 2010)).

        In its order denying Keith’s motion to dismiss, the district court

  identified two reasons for the delay: “the massive amount of discovery in this

  complex case and the COVID-19 pandemic.” It placed the “pandemic-driven

  reasons” in the “valid” category and found that this factor did not support

  Keith. On appeal, Keith blames all the delay—owing to the case’s complexity,

  codefendants obtaining new counsel, COVID-19, and the first jury’s being

  dismissed—on the government.

        The first delay, spanning 418 days, came from the district court’s

  scheduling order and designation that the case was complex. Delays owing to

  the nature of large, multidefendant conspiracies with vast discovery are

  justifiable. Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1327. This reason slightly favors the

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  government. The second delay, spanning 182 days, occurred because two

  codefendants needed more time for their newly appointed counsel to review

  discovery and prepare for trial. This, too, is a valid reason (prompted by

  codefendants) that does not support Keith’s constitutional claim. See id. As the

  government points out, Keith bears some responsibility for the third delay,

  which spanned 85 days. Recognizing the logistical difficulties in trying all four

  remaining defendants together because of COVID-19, the government offered

  to try Keith separately in August 2020. But Keith rejected this offer, prompting

  the government to move to continue the trial to November. Keith’s rejection of

  an earlier trial date weighs heavily against him. See id. at 1326 (quoting

  Larson, 627 F.3d at 1208).

        The third delay also resulted from COVID-19-related challenges. So too

  did the fourth and fifth delays, comprising 50 and 119 days. These delays

  cannot fairly be attributed to the government or to Keith. To our knowledge, no

  circuit has yet published an opinion classifying COVID-19 delays under the

  second Barker factor. 10 We choose to treat COVID-19 as a truly neutral

  justification—not favoring either side. The extenuating circumstances brought

  about by the pandemic prevented the government from trying Keith in a speedy

  fashion.

        10
         In an unpublished memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit classi-
  fied COVID-19 delays as “valid” under Barker. United States v. Marquez, No.
  21-30134, 2022 WL 16849065, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2022).
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        We conclude that the second factor slightly favors the government.

        Keith’s assertions of his right. For this factor, we assess “whether the

  defendant ‘actively’ asserted his right, which requires more than merely

  ‘moving to dismiss after the delay has already occurred.’” United States v.

  Koerber, 10 F.4th 1083, 1110 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Batie,

  433 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 326 (2022). At

  bottom, we must measure “whether the defendant’s behavior during the course

  of litigation evinces a desire to go to trial.” Id. (quoting Batie, 433 F.3d at

  1291). We can evaluate Keith’s behavior by “‘weigh[ing] the frequency and

  force of [his] objections’ to the delay.” Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1328 (second

  alteration in original) (citations omitted). We have called this factor the “most

  important” one, Batie, 433 F.3d at 1291, entitled to “strong evidentiary

  weight,” Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1274 (quoting United States v. Dirden, 38 F.3d

  1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1994)).

        The district court found that Keith raised his speedy-trial right only once:

  in the motion to dismiss, which wasn’t enough under the third factor. Keith

  claims that his objection to excusing the jury and his motion to dismiss count as

  “repeatedly” asserting his speedy-trial right.

        We agree with the district court’s characterization. Keith’s “behavior

  during the course of litigation” did not show that he wanted a speedy trial.

  Koerber, 10 F.4th at 1110 (quoting Batie, 433 F.3d at 1291). Keith did not

  object to the district court’s first scheduling order, allowing it to go into effect.

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  He agreed to the continuance that his codefendants sought in January 2020. And

  after rejecting the government’s offer to be tried separately in August 2020, he

  didn’t object to the government’s requested continuance. The first time Keith

  objected to a continuance was when the government moved to excuse the first

  jury, but he didn’t explain why he was objecting. Only after the district court

  sua sponte continued the trial from January to May 2021 did Keith move to

  dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. He never invoked his speedy-trial right before

  moving to dismiss in January 2021.

        Moving to dismiss alone doesn’t count as “actively” asserting one’s

  speedy-trial right. See Koerber, 10 F.4th at 1110 (citations omitted). And

  Keith’s one-sentence objection to excusing the jury in November 2020 was

  hardly forceful. Even charitably interpreting this unsupported objection as

  being for speedy-trial reasons, Keith still waited 700 days to raise his speedy-

  trial right. Keith’s single objection to excusing the jury is best characterized as

  “[in]frequent” and “[un]forceful.” Id. (quoting United States v. Latimer,

  511 F.2d 498, 501 (10th Cir. 1975)). Because the third factor may indeed be the

  “most important” one, Batie, 433 F.3d at 1291, it weighs heavily against Keith.

        Prejudice. Finally, “[w]e assess prejudice in light of the particular evils

  the speedy trial right is intended to avert: pretrial incarceration; anxiety and

  concern of the accused; and the possibility that the defense will be

  impaired.” Koerber, 10 F.4th at 1110 (alteration in original) (quoting Batie,

  433 F.3d at 1292). Showing prejudice is the defendant’s burden. Medina,

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  918 F.3d at 781 (quoting Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1179). We can presume prejudice

  when there has been “extreme” delay, meaning a six-year-or-greater delay. Id.

  (citations omitted). Ordinarily, however, a defendant must offer specific

  evidence of how the delay prejudiced him; failure to do so will “eviscerate” his

  claim. Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1329 (citations omitted).

        Keith’s asserted prejudice comes from “oppressive pretrial incarceration

  and the resulting anxiety”—after all, he had completed his state sentence in

  January 2020. Though he mentions that a witness died during the delay, Keith

  disclaims the witness’s death as another ground for prejudice because “the

  record does not include any specific allegations concerning this witness and

  what they would have testified to.”

        Though “prolonged pretrial incarceration is a well-established type of

  prejudice that a defendant may rely upon in making a Sixth Amendment speedy

  trial claim,” Margheim, 770 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1180),

  Keith’s arguments about “oppressive pretrial incarceration” and “anxiety” fail

  because they are too general. He doesn’t “show some special harm suffered

  which distinguishes his case.” United States v. Hicks, 779 F.3d 1163, 1169

  (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir.

  2012)). In Margheim, for example, the defendant supported his pretrial-

  incarceration-as-prejudice claim with specific facts: He was on “lockdown” for

  18 hours a day and started taking anxiety and depression medications. 770 F.3d

  at 1329. By contrast, Keith offers no specifics. True, Keith finished serving his

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  state sentence while the federal charges were pending. But Keith’s harm from

  being in pretrial detention for 484 days is the same as the harm suffered by

  “any other arrestee awaiting trial.” United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1273

  (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dirden, 38 F.3d at 1138). Keith hasn’t shown

  prejudice.

        Because Keith cannot point to any prejudice stemming from the delays in

  his case, the fourth factor weighs against him.

                                    ⁎      ⁎     ⁎

        The first factor favors Keith. The second factor slightly favors the

  government. The third factor strongly favors the government. And the fourth

  factor also favors the government. On balance, Keith has failed to show that the

  delays violated the Constitution. This case isn’t the “unusual” one where “the

  Speedy Trial Act has been satisfied” yet the Sixth Amendment was violated.

  Koerber, 10 F.4th at 1109 (quoting United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d

  458, 464 (10th Cir. 2006)).

        We affirm on constitutional speedy-trial grounds.

  II.   Multiple-Conspiracies Instruction

        Keith contends that the district court should have given a Tenth Circuit

  Pattern Jury Instruction about multiple conspiracies. At trial, he attempted to

  disassociate himself from the wide conspiracy charged in the indictment and

  instead place himself in a separate, smaller conspiracy. A multiple-conspiracies

  instruction tells the jury that it must find that the defendant belonged to the

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  conspiracy charged in the indictment; proof that the defendant participated in

  some other conspiracy isn’t enough to convict.

        We won’t reverse a district court’s failure to give a multiple-conspiracies

  jury instruction if the given instructions impart that “the government had the

  burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the [single] conspiracy as alleged,

  and that the evidence should be considered separately as to each individual

  defendant.” United States v. Cushing, 10 F.4th 1055, 1073 (10th Cir. 2021)

  (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675

  (10th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 813 (2022). Keith recognizes that

  Evans forecloses his argument about the multiple-conspiracies instruction and

  raises it only for preservation. In doing so, Keith admits that the other

  instructions meet Evans’s two-part test. We agree and affirm under Evans.

                                   CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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