Court Opinion

ID: 9918884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 20:07:51.88539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.081080
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2024-Ohio-146.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO ex rel.                                   CASE NO. 2023-P-0044
BRIAN M. AMES,

                 Relator-Appellant,                     Civil Appeal from the
                                                        Court of Common Pleas
        - vs -

PORTAGE COUNTY BOARD                                    Trial Court No. 2021 CV 00141
OF COMMISSIONERS,

                 Respondent-Appellee.

                                               OPINION

                                      Decided: January 16, 2024
                                         Judgment: Affirmed

Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator-Appellant).

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Christopher J. Meduri, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Respondent-
Appellee).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Brian M. Ames, appeals the entry granting summary judgment in

favor of appellee, the Portage County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”). We affirm.

        {¶2}     On April 30, 2021, Ames filed an amended verified complaint in mandamus,

declaratory judgment, and injunction against the Board. In his amended complaint, Ames

alleged that the Board had committed five violations of R.C. 121.22, the Open Meetings

Act (“OMA”), during a board meeting held on March 11, 2021.
        {¶3}    In the first count of his amended complaint, Ames maintained that, prior to

the Board meeting, two commissioners of the three-commissioner Board discussed

dismissing a public employee. Ames alleged that this discussion amounted to conducting

official business outside of a public meeting in violation of R.C. 121.22.

        {¶4}    In the second count of his amended complaint, Ames maintained that the

Board’s meeting room was limited to a 10-person capacity at the time of the meeting at

issue. Because the Board and its clerk occupied four of the available seats, only six seats

were available to the public. As the time approached for an executive session with the

Sheriff and others, Ames claimed that a commissioner gestured to members of the public

to leave the meeting room prior to entering executive session. Ames alleged that this

conduct denied members of the public the right to observe the meeting and amounted to

a violation of R.C. 121.22(C).

        {¶5}    In the third count of his amended complaint, Ames maintained that the

Board entered into an unscheduled executive session to consider the dismissal of a public

employee.       Immediately upon returning from executive session, a commissioner

announced that the Board was going to dismiss the employee as of that date. Ames

alleged that the Board reached the decision to dismiss the employee during executive

session, which he claimed amounted to a violation of R.C. 121.22(H).

        {¶6}    In the fourth count of his amended complaint, Ames alleged that certain

discussions between an assistant prosecutor and the Board regarding the March 11, 2021

meeting violated the OMA. However, Ames later moved to dismiss this count.1

1. On December 4, 2023, this court issued a limited remand for the trial court to address Ames’ motion to
dismiss. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order on December 5, 2023, specifying that “Defendant’s
9/13/21 motion to dismiss Count 4 of his Amended Complaint is hereby granted.” The trial court’s reference
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        {¶7}    In the fifth count of his amended complaint, Ames maintained that prior to

entering into the executive session to discuss the dismissal of a public employee, a

reporter present at the meeting inquired from a commissioner as to whether there would

be any further action taken after the executive session. The commissioner replied in the

negative. Ames claimed that in reliance on the commissioner’s reply, several attendees

left the meeting. However, proceedings did continue after the executive session ended.

Ames alleged that those individuals who left the meeting in reliance on the

commissioner’s reply were excluded from a portion of the meeting “by deception.”

        {¶8}    In September 2021, Ames moved for summary judgment, which the trial

court denied. Ames noticed an appeal from the denial of his summary judgment motion,

which this court ultimately dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. State ex rel.

Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0109, 2022-Ohio-

1207, ¶ 1.2

        {¶9}    On October 13, 2021, the Board filed a motion for summary judgment,

incorporating its opposition to Ames’ motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Ames

filed a brief in opposition. On June 20, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment

to Ames as the “defendant” is mere clerical error, and we conclude that the trial court has effectively
dismissed Count 4 of the complaint.

2. In his notice of appeal, Ames stated that he was appealing both the “10/13/2021 Order denying summary
judgment to Relator Brian Ames” and the “6/20/2023 Order granting summary judgment to the Portage
County Board of Commissioners.” Although Ames attached the latter order to his notice, he failed to attach
the denial of his summary judgment motion. Instead, Ames attached a separate order issued by the trial
court on October 13, 2021, which did not rule on his summary judgment motion. Loc.R. 3(C)(2) provides
that “[t]he appellant shall attach to the Notice of Appeal, a copy of the judgment entry or entries being
appealed. Appellant’s failure to attach a copy of the judgment entry or entries may result in the dismissal of
the appeal sua sponte and without notice.” Nonetheless, as we conclude herein that summary judgment
was properly granted in favor of the Board on the claims on which Ames sought summary judgment, Ames’
motion for summary judgment was properly denied.
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to the Board and entered judgment in favor of the Board on Ames’ claims. Ames assigns

six errors from the trial court’s judgment.

       {¶10} At the outset, we note that “[w]e review decisions awarding summary

judgment de novo, i.e., independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.”

Hedrick v. Szep, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2020-G-0272, 2021-Ohio-1851, ¶ 13, citing

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

              Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary
              judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No
              genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
              (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
              and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
              can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence
              most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
              for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to
              that party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Allen v.

5125 Peno, LLC, 2017-Ohio-8941, 101 N.E.3d 484, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Holliman v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Ohio St.3d 414, 415, 715 N.E.2d 532 (1999). “The initial burden is

on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue of material fact

exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). “If the movant

meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine

issue of material fact exists for trial.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher at 293.

       {¶11} Here, in his first assigned error, Ames argues:

       {¶12} “The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Board

based on a motion that was not properly before the trial court.”

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       {¶13} In his first assigned error, Ames maintains that the Board’s summary

judgment motion was not properly before the court because it was filed after the case was

set for trial, without requesting leave.

       {¶14} Civ.R. 56(B) provides:

              A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
              asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time,
              move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
              judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part of the claim,
              counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment action. If
              the action has been set for pretrial or trial, a motion for
              summary judgment may be made only with leave of court.

       {¶15} Here, after our dismissal of Ames’ prior appeal, the trial court issued an

order stating, in pertinent part, “Plaintiff-Relator’s appeal having been dismissed,

Defendant-Respondent’s motion for summary judgment remains pending for eventual

resolution. Plaintiff-Relator has filed an objection to certain of the motion’s exhibits but

Plaintiff-Relator has not yet filed any brief in opposition.”   The trial court then provided

Ames a certain time to file a brief in opposition. Thereafter, in a judgment entry dated

November 21, 2022, the trial court stated that it “should have made clear in its prior order

that it was granting leave to Defendant-Respondent [to] file its 10/13/21 motion for

summary judgment and that therefore it was ripe for adjudication.” Accordingly, the court

did grant the Board leave to file its motion.

       {¶16} Further, even had the court not so specified that leave was granted, the trial

court’s ruling on the merits of the motion effectively granted leave for purposes of Civ.R.

56(B). Aames Capital Corp. v. Wells, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20703, 2002 WL 500320, *8

(Apr. 3 2002); Juergens v. Strang, Klubnik & Assoc., Inc., 96 Ohio App.3d 223, 234, 644

N.E.2d 1066 (8th Dist.1994) (“The acceptance of the motion by the court after the case

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Case No. 2023-P-0044
has been set for pretrial is in itself by leave of court albeit without the formal writing saying

‘I seek the leave of court.’”).

       {¶17} Accordingly, Ames’ first assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶18} In his second assigned error, Ames maintains:

       {¶19} “The trial court erred by not using and considering all the evidence on the

record in resolving the motions for summary judgment.”

       {¶20} Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part, that “[s]ummary judgment shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written

admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any,

timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

       {¶21} Further, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E):

               Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
               knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
               in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
               competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.
               Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers
               referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with
               the affidavit.    The court may permit affidavits to be
               supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further
               affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
               supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
               rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s
               pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as
               otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
               showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶22} Here, in ruling on the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court

stated that it would not consider the attachments to Ames’ amended complaint because

the attachments were not properly identified, described, or authenticated.
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Case No. 2023-P-0044
       {¶23} Ames maintains that the trial court was required to consider the attachments

to his complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C). However, as set forth above, Civ.R. 56(E)

provides that the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations of

the pleadings but is instead required to set forth specific facts “by affidavit or as otherwise

provided in this rule” showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion.

Accordingly, the trial court did not error in failing to consider unauthenticated attachments

on which Ames relied in opposing summary judgment.

       {¶24} Therefore, Ames’ second assigned error lacks merit.

       {¶25} In his third assigned error, Ames contends:

       {¶26} “The trial court erred by denying Mr[.] Ames summary judgment and

granting the Board summary judgment as to Count 1 of his Amended Complaint.”

       {¶27} Ames maintains that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that two

commissioners, Vicki Kline and Anthony Badalamenti, discussed the employment of the

director of budget and finance prior to the meeting in violation of the OMA. As this

allegation formed the first count of Ames’ amended complaint, he argues that summary

judgment was improperly granted to the Board on this count.

       {¶28} The OMA governs meetings of public bodies. Pursuant to R.C. 121.22(C):

              All meetings of any public body are declared to be public
              meetings open to the public at all times. A member of a public
              body shall be present in person at a meeting open to the
              public to be considered present or to vote at the meeting and
              for purposes of determining whether a quorum is present at
              the meeting.

              The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any public body
              shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be
              open to public inspection. The minutes need only reflect the
              general subject matter of discussions in executive sessions
              authorized under division (G) or (J) of this section.
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      {¶29}    R.C. 121.22(B)(2) defines a “meeting” as “any prearranged discussion of

the public business of the public body by a majority of its members.”

      {¶30} In the Board’s motion for summary judgment, it maintained that there was

no prearranged meeting between the two commissioners prior to the board meeting, and

the OMA does not prohibit unplanned encounters between members of the public body.

In support of its position that the conversation of Kline and Badalamenti was not

“prearranged,” the Board pointed to the commissioners’ deposition testimony. During

Kline’s deposition, the following exchange occurred:

              Q.      * * *. Did you have any discussion with another
              commissioner concerning the director of budget and finance
              prior to the meeting [on March 11, 2021]?

              A.     Tuesday before Thursday, [Badalamenti] stuck his
              head in my office to say good morning and I said good
              morning. And he asked me if I had ever seen [the director’s]
              resume. I said no, because he was here before me, so I never
              saw it. So he was hired before me. And he just kinda shook
              his head and he said, I feel like I’m going in circles. I really
              do. And I said, well, I can kind of understand that sometimes.
              And then he left.

      {¶31} In Badalamenti’s deposition, the following exchange occurred:

              Q.      * * *. Did you have any discussion with another
              commissioner concerning the director of budget and finance
              prior to the meeting of March 11th?

              A.     Discussion? No.

                    Give me a definition of discussion, 20 seconds, a
              minute, five minutes, ten minutes?

              Q:     Did you have any conversation at all?

              A:     We had -- the morning that you’re referring to, I got
              there early to pull [the director’s] -- his records. I knocked on
              the door and said good morning to Commissioner Kline and
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Case No. 2023-P-0044
             that was about it. And then we -- she said, hey, we thought
             about letting [the director] go last year. Would you? I said,
             yes. And that was the conversation --

             Q.     Okay.

             A.     -- discussion, I guess. There wasn’t one.

      {¶32} Based upon the deposition testimony, the Board satisfied its Dresher

burden of establishing that the exchange between the two commissioners was not a

“meeting” to which the OMA applies, as, although a majority of the public body was

present, the exchange was not “prearranged.” In response, Ames argued that R.C.

121.22 requires that all discussions regarding official business be conducted in meetings.

      {¶33} Although the OMA governs meetings of public bodies even if not denoted

as “meetings,” it does not prohibit impromptu discussions between board members. State

ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 668 N.E.2d 903 (1996); see

also Haverkos v. Northwest Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2005-Ohio-3489, 995 N.E.2d

862, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.) (To succeed on a claim under the OMA, the claimant “must

demonstrate that there was (1) a pre-arranged (2) discussion (3) of the public business

of the public body in question (4) by a majority of its members.”). Ames did not present

any summary judgment materials indicating that the exchange between the

commissioners prior to the meeting was prearranged.

      {¶34} Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to the Board on this

claim, and Ames’ third assigned error lacks merit.

      {¶35} In his fourth assigned error, Ames argues:

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      {¶36} “The trial court erred by [ ] denying Mr[.] Ames summary judgment and

granting summary judgment in favor of the Board as to Count 2 of Mr. Ames’ Amended

Complaint.”

      {¶37} Due to COVID restrictions, it is undisputed that the room utilized for the

meeting was limited in occupancy to ten people at the time of the March 11, 2021 meeting.

Four of the ten permitted occupants were the three commissioners and their clerk.

Accordingly, the meeting room permitted space for only six members of the public to

observe from within the room. Ames argues that such limited space is contrary to law, as

the meeting space was inadequate to fit the public attendees present for the meeting.

      {¶38} In its motion for summary judgment, the Board maintained that the facts

alleged by Ames did not amount to an OMA violation. The Board maintained that it was

undisputed that those who were not able to observe the meeting from within the meeting

room due the occupancy restrictions were permitted to observe the meeting from the hall

outside the open meeting room door until the Board entered executive session.

      {¶39} In response, Ames failed to advance any materials indicating that the public

was unable to observe the meeting from outside the meeting room’s open door in the hall.

Accordingly, Ames failed to meet his reciprocal burden on summary judgment. Therefore,

Ames’ fourth assigned error lacks merit.

      {¶40} In his fifth assigned error, Ames maintains:

      {¶41} “The trial court erred by [ ] denying Mr[.] Ames summary judgment and

granting summary judgment in favor of the Board as to Count 3 of Mr. Ames’ Amended

Complaint.”

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Case No. 2023-P-0044
      {¶42} Ames argues that the Board decided to discharge the director of budget and

finance during executive session and that the Board was precluded from making such a

decision during an executive session.

      {¶43} R.C. 121.22(H) provides:

             A resolution, rule, or formal action of any kind is invalid unless
             adopted in an open meeting of the public body. A resolution,
             rule, or formal action adopted in an open meeting that results
             from deliberations in a meeting not open to the public is invalid
             unless the deliberations were for a purpose specifically
             authorized in division (G) or (J) of this section and conducted
             at an executive session held in compliance with this section.
             A resolution, rule, or formal action adopted in an open meeting
             is invalid if the public body that adopted the resolution, rule, or
             formal action violated division (F) of this section.

      {¶44} Relevant here, R.C. 121.22(G) provides:

             Except as provided in divisions (G)(8) and (J) of this section,
             the members of a public body may hold an executive session
             only after a majority of a quorum of the public body
             determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an executive session
             and only at a regular or special meeting for the sole purpose
             of the consideration of any of the following matters:

             (1) To consider the appointment, employment, dismissal,
             discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a public
             employee or official, or the investigation of charges or
             complaints against a public employee, official, licensee, or
             regulated individual, unless the public employee, official,
             licensee, or regulated individual requests a public hearing. * *
             *. If a public body holds an executive session pursuant to
             division (G)(1) of this section, the motion and vote to hold that
             executive session shall state which one or more of the
             approved purposes listed in division (G)(1) of this section are
             the purposes for which the executive session is to be held, but
             need not include the name of any person to be considered at
             the meeting.

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       {¶45} Here, Ames does not dispute that an executive session was permissible to

discuss the issue of the director’s termination. Instead, Ames maintains that the Board

was not permitted to reach a decision on this issue during the executive session.

       {¶46} In its motion for summary judgment, the Board contended that formal action

to dismiss the director was not made during the executive session. In support, the Board

pointed to the meeting minutes, which demonstrate that discussion as to the terms of the

director’s dismissal continued in the open meeting after executive session and was at

issue during the next several board meetings.

       {¶47} In opposition, Ames relied on a commissioner’s statement, made

immediately after executive session, that the board was dismissing the director. Ames

maintained that this statement evinces that the board reached an impermissible collective

decision during the executive session.

       {¶48} However, the OMA does not preclude the Board from reaching an informal

consensus during executive session. R.C. 122.22(H) provides that formal action of any

kind is invalid unless adopted in an open meeting of the public body.

       {¶49} Accordingly, as Ames provided no evidence that a triable issue of fact

existed as to whether formal action was taken during executive session, his fifth assigned

error lacks merit.

       {¶50} In his sixth assigned error, Ames contends:

       {¶51} “The trial court erred by [ ] denying Mr[.] Ames summary judgment and

granting summary judgment in favor of the Board as to Count 5 of Mr. Ames’ Amended

Complaint.”

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      {¶52} Ames argues that the Board impermissibly conducted public business after

the executive session because a commissioner had informed a reporter that there would

be no further public business. The Board maintains that this count does not state a

cognizable claim.

      {¶53} The depositions indicate that a commissioner may have incorrectly

informed an attendee that no action would be taken following the executive session.

However, there is no summary-judgment evidence that the reporter was instructed to

leave or otherwise prohibited from observing the portion of the meeting following

executive session. Ames has not presented any case law that such a misstatement by a

single member of the public body amounts to “exclusion of the public by deception.”

      {¶54} Accordingly, Ames’ sixth assigned error is overruled.

      {¶55} The judgment is affirmed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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