Court Opinion

ID: 9543151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:36.105987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:46.771306
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I do not believe that “costs” as reimbursement for expenses incurred are the “costs” contemplated in State v. Holder (1973) 260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799. The Holder case dealt with a specific statute, the Eminent Domain Act. Furthermore, as noted by Justice DeBruler in the majority opinion, the word “costs" as there considered included only those expenses of trial “which are prescribed by statute to be paid to the court.” Id. at 339, 295 N.E.2d at 801. The opinion observed that the legislature did not apparently intend to include in the statute, such “costs” as are contemplated by Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 53.5, i.e., reimbursement for expenses incurred from delay occasioned by the other party.
In any event, notwithstanding the “American Rule” and notwithstanding specific inclusion in other trial rules of attorney fees as recoverable, I am of the view that the courts have the inherent authority to award attorney fees where necessary to compensate a litigant who has been unduly burdened or prejudiced. See Hamilton v. Hamilton (1986), 2d Dist.Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 590, trans. denied; State v. Hicks (1984) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 1146 (Sullivan, J. concurring, 465 N.E.2d at 1151 et seq.); Briggs v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co. (1983) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 989, trans. denied.
I concur in the reversal of the interlocutory order here because there was no evidence that the award was necessary as actual compensation for expenses incurred as a result of the delay.