Court Opinion

ID: 9445018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:18:31.865345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:06.218433
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Count I so far as is presently relevant charged that:
“The said false and fraudulent material statement contained in the aforementioned affidavit was that there has been no committee or organization known as United May Day Committee since May, 1948.
*706“The said statement was and was then and there known by defendant to be, false and fraudulent, in that in the years [in question] there was a committee and organization known as United May Day Committee.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Count II differed importantly only in its reference to a “committee and organization having the name United May Day Committee.” (Emphasis supplied.) The jury found the appellant guilty on the first count and not guilty on the second.
The trial judge carefully instructed the jury as to the difference between an organization which was “known as” United May Day Committee and one “having the name” United May Day Committee. He said, in part: “What is meant by ‘known as’, but in I think quite simple language, is this: Was it a matter of common knowledge? Was it commonly called United May Day Committee; was it generally known, not by a handful of people, but by many people. If it was known by many people as United May Day Committee, then it was an organization which was known as United May Day Committee.” Reference also was made to the testimony that business firms, members of the “Committee” and Mr. Weinstoek himself referred to the organization or group as United May Day Committee. The trial judge continued: “If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this group, this organization, this unincorporated group, was known as and used itself the term or title ‘United May Day Committee’ then you . . . move to a second question, which is equally essential and which also must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: Did Mr. Weinstoek know that it was generally known as the United May Day Committee?” With admirable care, the trial judge instructed upon each and every properly applicable aspect of the jury’s problem, but for present purposes we need refer but briefly to one other portion of the charge:
“[‘The Attorney General’, Mr. Sacher said,] served Mr. Weinstoek with a copy of his petition, which had the effect of informing him that this United May Day Committee, as the Attorney General called it, was to be cited before the Board for such action as the Board might take, if any, with respect to it. And he served Mr. Weinstoek, on the theory that Mr. Weinstoek was a leading member of it, or officer, or what not.
“Mr. Weinstoek received that; and through his lawyer, and also directly himself — which is the gravamen of the allegation made here — ■ he made an affidavit, [the one here involved] which his lawyer submitted to the . . . Board. .
“He made his affidavit on or about June 8, 1953. And he moved, through his lawyer, to quash the service upon him, which would have had the effect, temporarily at least, of dismissing the case lodged with the Board against what was known as the United May Day Committee.” (J.A. 18.)
The jury was told that the statement “be it true or false — which is for you to say — the statement made by the defendant here was material.”
Examination of the affidavit appearing in the appendix to the majority opinion will reveal that Weinstoek swore that “There has been no committee or organization known as United
May Day Committee since May 1948” and he further swore to be untrue a statement in the Attorney General’s petition that “ ‘there has existed and operated in the United States an organization known by various names, which is now known as the United May Day Committee.’ ” Such statements were comprehended within the first count, as above set forth. The evidence disclosed that the “Committee” not only identified itself as “United May Day Committee” for various business purposes, but under that' name its telephone was listed, pursuant to a contract in the appellant’s name for a telephone located in his office. Appellant was shown himself to have addressed various meetings “in the name *707of the United May Day Committee” and to have been introduced as “the fighting Secretary of the United May Day Committee, Louis Weinstock.”
After the Attorney General’s petition had been served upon appellant, the latter filed with the Subversive Activities Control Board and served upon the Attorney General a motion to quash the petition reading in part:
“Louis Weinstock, the person to whom the petition was delivered, moves to quash the service thereof on the following grounds:
“1. Service of the petition was not made upon the Respondent (United May Day Committee), as required by the (Internal Security) Act and the (Board’s) Regulations.
“2. The movant is not an officer of Respondent.
“3. There is no Respondent upon which service can be made or against which the relief prayed for in the petition can be granted for the reason that the United May Day Committee is not in existence, either under that name or any other name, and was not in existence on the date of the service of the petition on movant.
“Movant submits the annexed affidavit1 in support of the foregoing motion.”
It is true that the affidavit speciously sets forth purported facts to describe what appellant’s counsel called the “amorphous” character of the unincorporated group, but the nature of the organization, whatever it was, was a proper subject for inquiry by the Board. The whole purpose of the motion to quash and the supporting affidavit was to induce the Board, in reliance upon the affidavit, to quash the service and to bring about dismissal of the proceedings. Appellant asked and expected the Board to rely upon his sworn statements. Had the Board accepted and relied upon the Weinstock affidavit, his motion to quash would have been granted. Appellant’s whole challenge to the proceedings before the Board as well as to the prosecution of himself depends upon his insistence that these various short-lived committees were not “known as” the “United May Day Committee.” Appellant’s statements became infused with materiality because he made them material.
Another, but not entirely unrelated, ground predicates the correctness of the ruling by the trial judge. The relief sought by the Attorney General from the Board did not depend upon whether the Committee or each of several committees annually came into being for a week or two or more, only then to be dissolved. European May Day demonstrations have been notorious for years, and their importation into New York (as well as other cities in the United States) for the exploitation of Communist aims, the method of their organization, the means taken to promote them, the sources of their finances and comparable fields of inquiry lay properly within the Board’s jurisdiction. In United States v. Dennis, 2 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 201, was developed a record which was found by the Supreme Court, Dennis v. United States, 1951, 341 U.S. 494, 498, 71 S.Ct. 857, 861, 95 L.Ed. 1137, to support the broad conclusion “. . . that the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language . . ..” (Emphasis supplied.) Weinstock’s tactics as revealed by his “false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations,” within the language of the statute, were designed to pervert the function of the Board.2 The first *708count of the indictment charged that: “The said false and fraudulent material statement contained in the aforementioned affidavit was that there has been no committee or organization known as United May Day Committee since May, 1948.” The jury agreed, indeed it could have come to no other conclusion than that Weinstock’s statement was false, fictitious or fraudulent. The first and chief ground, supra, upon which appellant in his motion sought to quash the petition, vis.: “that service was not made upon the Respondent” (United May Day Committee), when coupled with the supporting affidavit, false in the particulars mentioned, had no other purpose than to cause the Board to take action in reliance upon it. Construing comparable language to that found in the statute applicable here, the Court said:
“The amendment indicated the congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described. We see no reason why this apparent intention should be frustrated by construction.” United States v. Gilliland, 1941, 312 U.S. 86, 93, 61 S.Ct. 518, 522, 85 L.Ed. 598.
Thus, the Weinstoek affidavit in the particulars previously considered and his motion to quash constituted an abuse and a perversion of the processes of the Board. That appellant’s false statements can be deemed anything but material under the circumstances seems to me beyond acceptation.
Finally, even the “amorphous” character of the Committee was in issue, both as to its status as an entity by whatever name known, and at the time when service was accomplished. Every possible effort was made as shown on this record to persuade the Board to accept as fact the various statements appearing in the affidavit. It seems to me quite inconsistent to say that the very statements which can convince the majority and thus influence its decision could have had no such effect upon the Board. The fact that the Board rejected them goes to the question of perspicacity rather than materiality, I respectfully suggest.
I believe the trial judge was correct and that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

. See appendix to majority opinion.

. His “tactics” are not under fire, to be sure, whether obstructionist and frustrating or not, but it is not without significance that he swore that the “Committee” went out of existence the very day before process was served on the appellant. As to the pattern of such tactics by counsel in not unrelated circumstances, see United States v. Sacher, 2 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 416, 423-425, affirmed, 1952, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717.