Court Opinion

ID: 9739251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:09.893957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.086001
License: Public Domain

DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 221. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I dissent from the court's resolution of the certified issue, Part V of the majority opinion. The majority concludes that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), "fundamentally altered" the Court's jurisprudence regarding the applicability of the Fourth *369Amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the context of Fifth Amendment Miranda1 violations. Majority op., ¶ 66-67.
¶ 222. As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has generally distinguished between Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations for purposes of the "fruits" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation is generally considered tainted and must be suppressed. Id. at 488. However, in the Fifth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has twice refused to extend the Fourth Amendment "fruits" doctrine to derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
¶ 223. This distinction stems from the difference between the constitutional rights sought to be protected:
But as we explained in Quarles and Tucker, a procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a broad application of the "fruits" doctrine. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable searches, no matter how probative their fruits. The exclusionary rule, when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. Where a Fourth Amendment violation "taints" the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether the confession may be admitted in evidence. Beyond this, the prosecution must show a *370sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the Fourth Amendment violation.
The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (second emphasis added, internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶ 224. Thus, while a Miranda violation generally requires suppression of the unwarned statement, the twin justifications for suppression — ensuring the trustworthiness of evidence and deterring police misconduct —are less compelling in the case of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation. Id. at 308.
¶ 225. Elstad and Tucker were based in part on the status of Miranda warnings as a judicially-created "prophylactic" intended to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446. In Dickerson, the Supreme Court held that Miranda established a constitutional rule. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
*371¶ 226. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Miranda in Dickerson, and also clarified that "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively." Id. Dickerson thus put to rest the debate about Miranda's status as a mere judicial "prophylactic" requirement or a full-fledged constitutional rule, but it did not otherwise change the Supreme Court's Miranda jurisprudence. Dickerson held "that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. There is nothing in Dickerson that extends Miranda's application beyond "the admissibility of statements," and the holdings of Elstad and Tucker remain in place as "progeny" of Miranda.
¶ 227. This conclusion is borne out by language in Dickerson acknowledging the continuing difference between the application of the "fruits" doctrine in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts:
The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), we stated that " '[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.' " 166 F.3d, at 690 (quoting Elstad, supra, at 306). Our decision in that case — refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases — does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. This language undercuts any claim that Dickerson effectuated a change in the law regarding the general inapplicability of the "fruits" doctrine to derivative evidence obtained as a result of a *372Miranda violation. Indeed, this passage signals the Court's intention to stay the course.
¶ 228. The majority notes the split in the federal appellate courts on the implications of Dickerson for the "fruits" doctrine in the context of a Miranda violation. Majority op., ¶¶ 56-62. Only the Tenth Circuit has held that as a result of Dickerson, the "fruits" doctrine now applies to Miranda violations. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying "fruits" doctrine to negligent failure to give Miranda warnings); The First Circuit has held that the "fruits" doctrine might now apply to a Miranda violation, depending upon the circumstances, and more particularly, whether the violation was intentional or merely negligent. United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002)(de-clining to apply "fruits" doctrine to negligent failure to give Miranda warnings, but leaving open the question whether it applies to intentional Miranda violations).
¶ 229. In contrast, the Third and Fourth Circuits have held that Dickerson did not alter the general inapplicability of the "fruits" doctrine to Miranda violations. United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001)(holding that "fruits" doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002)(holding that "fruits" doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Patane, 123 S. Ct. 1788, and has not acted on a certiorari petition in Faulking-ham. The Court denied certiorari in DeSumma, 535 U.S. 1028, and Sterling, 536 U.S. 931.
¶ 230. Dickerson left intact the Supreme Court's long-standing distinction between Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations for purposes of suppression of derivative evidence under the "fruits" doctrine. Dickerson's declaration that Miranda announced a con*373stitutional rule does not affect the trustworthiness of physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation, and I am not convinced that the deterrence rationale in this situation is enough on its own to justify suppression. While Miranda is a constitutional rule and not a mere judicial "prophylactic," suppression of derivative evidence that flows from a Miranda violation does little to deter violations of the underlying constitutional right in question, the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
¶ 231. Accordingly, I conclude that Dickerson does not require us to overrule State v. Yang, 2000 WI App 63, ¶¶ 32-38, 233 Wis. 2d 545, 608 N.W.2d 703, in which the court of appeals reversed the suppression of a gun that was seized as a result of a Miranda violation, citing Elstad and Tucker. Although Dickerson's clarification of the constitutional status oí Miranda has some implications for the doctrinal underpinnings of the Elstad-Tucker rule, there is nothing in Dickerson to indicate that Elstad and Tucker are no longer good law. As such, we need not overrule Yang, and suppression of the sweatshirt as derivative evidence obtained as a result of the Miranda violation in this case is not required.
¶ 232. Neither is suppression required as a result of an alleged Edwards2 violation, an issue the majority does not reach as a result of its conclusion on the certified question. Edwards requires the police to cease questioning a suspect who clearly invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the Edwards rule does not apply unless the *374suspect unambiguously and unequivocally requests counsel. See also State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶ 29, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.
¶ 233. In Davis, the Supreme Court concluded that a suspect who says, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" has not clearly and unambiguously requested counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462. In Jennings, we held, consistent with Davis, that a suspect who says "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer" has not clearly and unambiguously requested counsel. Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶ 36. Here, the circuit court concluded that Knapp's statement "I was calling my lawyer in Milwaukee" was not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel under Davis. I agree. Knapp's reference to counsel is similar to those at issue in Davis and Jennings. Because Knapp did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his right to counsel, I would affirm the circuit court's conclusion that there was no Edwards violation.
¶ 234. The majority's conclusion on the certified question also means that it need not reach Knapp's claim that the officers had an obligation to "knock and announce" prior to entering the outer stairway to the upstairs apartment that Knapp shared with his brother. On this issue, I would affirm the circuit court's conclusion that the police had no duty to "knock and announce," because Knapp did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the staircase leading up to the apartment. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The exterior door was unlocked and had no doorbell; the stairway was not used for private purposes and functioned essentially as an exterior entryway to the apartment's actual threshold. I agree with the circuit court that Knapp had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the outer hallway, and therefore the *375officers were not required to "knock and announce" until they reached the upstairs apartment door. See, e.g., State v. Edgeberg, 188 Wis. 2d 339, 524 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in an unlocked porch that contained few private possessions).
¶ 235. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from Part V of the majority opinion, and would instead affirm the circuit court's denial of suppression of the bloodstained sweatshirt. In all other respects, I concur.

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).