Court Opinion

ID: 9673171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:07:37.275847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.491115
License: Public Domain

George Howard, Jr., Judge, dissenting. Unlike the majority, I think there is merit to appellant’s argument that the trial judge committed reversible error in permitting a State’s witness, Allen Ophof, to testify about the mechanics of the Arkansas Parole System in general and the application of the rules, in particular, to Ophof s sentence to the Department of Correction. The following is the exchange that took place between the prosecuting attorney and Ophof, over the objections of the appellant: By Mr. Farris: Q. And you went down there and how long did you spend in the penitentiary? A. Seven months and eight-days. Q. Isn’t it pretty common knowledge that if you mind your manners when you go down there and stay on your P’s and Q’s. . . . By Mr. Davis: Objection, Your Honor, this is irrelevant to this proceeding. By the Court: I haven’t heard the question yet, Mr. Davis. Don’t answer Mr. Ophof, until I rule. You may continue. By Mr. Farris: What is the objection? By Mr. Davis: It is irrelevant, to this proceeding. By Mr. Farris: Well, the reason it is not irrelevant, Your Honor, is he tried to leave the inference with the jury that this man was paroled solely because he gave a statement to Sgt. Reynolds and I am trying to show that that is not the case. By the Court: You may continue. By Mr. Farris: Q. You have been down then at the penitentiary and seen just about how the parole law works, haven’t you? A. Yes, Sir. Q. And don’t you know that you end up, if you are good and don’t get in any fights and put in solitary or anything like that, you spend a sixth of your time if you are a first offender, is that right? A. Yes, Sir. Q. So if a jury gives you a sentence of say three years, you do six months. Appellant argues, logically and persuasively, that the jury was told, in effect, that whatever sentence is imposed, appellant would be released upon serving a fractional part of the sentence and, therefore, in order for appellant to be confined to the penitentiary for any appreciable length of time, the jury should assess a stiff sentence. Appellant claims that he was prejudiced by this testimony. The majority, while recognizing that the testimony was highly prejudicial, avoids the force of appellant’s argument by concluding that appellant’s counsel invited the testimony when counsel asked Ophof, the State’s witness, on cross-examination if Officer Reynolds had promised him an early parole if he (Ophof) cooperated in the case pending against appellant.1  While the State was entitled, on redirect examination, to inquire of Ophof whether a deal had been offered Ophof, I submit the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Ophof to give a comprehensive analysis of the State’s parole program, before appellant’s jury, when such testimony was not relevant to any issue. Moreover, I do not agree that the testimony was invited by the line of inquiry made by appellant’s counsel. Appellant’s inquiry was proper on cross-examination; and the majority recognizes that it was proper. For the sake of argument, assuming that appellant invited the extended excursion into the policies and practices of Arkansas’ parole system, the action of the trial court in not sustaining appellant’s objections is still a manifest abuse of its discretion. Under Rule 403 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, it is provided: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . The trial court was duty bound to sustain the objections of appellant to the testimony upon finding that the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value that might be derived from Ophof s testimony. The record is silent as to any compliance, on the part of the trial court, with the provisions of Rule 403. Aside from the majority’s recognition of the prejudicial effect of such testimony, our Supreme Court, in Thackston v. State, 205 Ark. 493, 169 S.W. 2d 130 (1943), has indicated the prejudicial effect of testimony pertaining to the policies and practices of the parole system. In Thackston v. State, supra, the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that it ought to fix appellant’s sentence at twenty-one years and stated: ‘. . . you must bear in mind that he is entitled to parole when he has served a third of his time ... if he makes a good prisoner.’ The trial court immediately stated: ‘The court will sustain the objection and say to you gentlemen that you mustn’t consider that for any purpose in arriving at your verdict. That is something you are not concerned with and shouldn’t be considered by you whatever.’ While our Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction, who had received the minimum punishment under the law, our court said: There can be no doubt that the effect, if any, of this argument was eliminated by the court’s prompt, emphatic and vigorous admonition to the jury that it must not consider this remark for any purpose. In the instant case, appellant received the maximum sentence on the charge for which he was found guilty. Moreover, the trial court gave no cautionary instructions to the jury. It is plain, from a careful consideration of the testimony offered by Ophof detailing the parole system, the testimony was calculated to influence the jury against a recommendation of clemency. Appellant was prejudiced indeed. Accordingly, I dissent.   Ophof denied that he ever cooperated with the State in the prosecution of the charges against appellant.