Court Opinion

ID: 9831820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:23:37.375152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.339496
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant calls attention to what it terms an error in stating the facts in the original opinion with reference to the time when Brooks and Bunn were, engaged in buying timber for the appellees. It is claimed that there is no evidence in the record to show that at the time Bunn was buying timber either Brooks or any other person was engaged in the same character of business for the appellees. The record does not sustain that contention. Blocker, one of the appel-lees, testified: “I am acquainted with the witness J. R. Bunn. I am acquainted with W. P. Brooks, and both of them worked for us during the years 1905 and 19,06.” The following question and answer are taken from Bunn’s testimony: Question by counsel for appellant: “Now let’s get that down clear. The way I understand your agency is that you could buy at any place on the Frisco Railroad where you had prices on the particular stuff, or where you found stuff, except in places where there was another party engaged in buying for them? A. Well, if it hadn’t been too far away, except if it been too far away and the freight rate would be too high I wouldn’t get it. Grant and Hugo, I believe, was all the places that I bought any stuff on the Frisco Railroad. I heard Mr. Miller say they had somebody up there at Kellond Switch on the Frisco buying timber for them during the time I was working for them, and I had about all I could look after down there. When I made a purchase of stuff, I was to load it on the cars.” We think this testimony justified our statement of the facts as previously given. However, if the view we take of the case is correct, it is wholly immaterial whether or not Bunn was at the time the only person engaged in buying timber for appellees.
In view of the extended argument made by appellant in its motion for a rehearing with reference to the assignments involving the consideration of the release executed by the witness Bunn, purporting to act as an agent for Blocker & Miller, we think it proper to more fully state the grounds upon which we sustained the rulings of the trial court. If this release was properly excluded from the jury, it follows that many of the other assignments presented in appellant’s *162brief, relating to this, instrument were correctly overruled. In th^ original disposition of tbe case we did not discuss the question of Bunn’s agency, but held that the assignments were without merit even' upon the assumption that he was an agent. The defense based upon that release depends upon the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the following conclusions: (1) That Bunn was at the time the agent of Blocker & Miller; (2) that he had actual or apparent authority to execute the release; (3) that, if he had no such authority, his execution of the release was afterwards ratified by Miller; (4) the estoppel of the appellees because of having received the benefits resulting from the execution of the release. We shall discuss only the first two questions; the others we' think were sufficiently considered in the original opinion.
[11] Taking these in their order, the first is, Was Bunn, at the time the agent of the appellees? The testimony of Bunn himself is perhaps the most favorable to the appellant upon that issue of any to be found in the record. He says; “I made a contract with Blocker-Miller Company some time in 1905, they to furnish me with a list of prices they would pay for certain classes of timber. They agreed to pay me that price for the timber f. o. b. the loading station. They advanced me money, and with that money I would buy from Dick, Tom, ,and Harry, or anybody, and I give them checks or paid the money — give those checks in my own name, never give any checks on Blocker-Miller ^Company for that. When I would get a car load of stuff, would ship that out according to shipping instructions given to me by Blocker-Miller Company, and then I would charge Blocker-Miller Company in my account with them for the value of that stuff, and they, in turn, would credit my account .with them for the value of the stuff according to the prices agreed upon. Q. That stuff was yours until loaded on the ears? A. Well, I couldn’t say. I don’t know whether you would— Q. You bought it in your name? A. Yes. Q. And loaded it on the cars? A. Yes. Q. And they were to accept it after loaded on the cars? A. Yes, sir. Q. They had not paid you anyway? A. No, sir. They -agreed to pay me so much for a certain, class of timber loaded on the cars at a certain place, and to help me buy timber in sufficient quantities they simply furnished me money in advance; and the cars were shipped out according to their instructions, subject to inspection at the other end of the line, and if any .exceptions at the other end of the line I lost it — that is, it was charged up to me by Blocker-Miller Company.”
The following propositions of law may be considered elementary: The agent is the representative of the principal concerning the business which forms the subject-matter of the agency.. What the agent does is done for the principal, and the latter is entitled to claim all the benefits resulting from the service thus rendered. If Bunn was the agent of Blocker & Miller in buying timber from those who had it for sale in that community, then the timber purchased by Bunn became the property of Blocker & Miller immediately upon its delivery to Bunn, and they became liable for the payment of the purchase price to those from whom it was obtained. In transactions where the relation of principal and agent exists, the former cannot be held liable to one from whom property is purchased for one price and to the agent for another. If the agent as such buys, he buys for his principal, and the price he pays is paid for the principal. The title acquired is the title of the principal. The retention of title by one who acquires property at. one price to be again sold to another at a different price is wholly inconsistent with the relation of principal and agent. But such was the situation of Bunn with reference to' Blocker & Miller. He bought timber from whom he pleased, paid for it with cheeks of his own at whatever price he saw fit, sold it to Blocker & Miller at a fixed price determined by a previous understanding, and took the difference as his profit. The facts of this ease, when tested by the usual rules for determining the question of agency, do not present an issue for submission to the jury. Bunn was not Reid out as an agent by the appellees. All that he did was entirely consistent with, the actual nature of the contract under which he operated. There was no evidence that the appellees at any time treated him, either privately or in public, as one having authority to represent them in the purchase of timber. It was Bunn’s duty under his-contract to load the timber purchased by him on the cars. Bet us suppose that after having done this he procured bills of lading from the railroad company, and directed, in accordance with instructions previously given, the destination of the goods. Would that of itself imply authority to act as a gen-, eral agent to execute releases of timber upon the right of way? We think not. The service of shipping or of procuring bills of lading for the shipper is no more than might be done by any person who delivers goods f. o. b. the cars at a point distant from the purchaser.
But, passing to the second question, and assuming that Bunn was an agent, what would be the limit of his apparent authority? The rule is that “every agency carries with it, or includes in it as an incident, all the powers which are necessary or proper or usual as a means to effectuate the purpose for which it was created, unless the power is circumscribed to something less by the authority creating the agency or by the circumstances of the business to which the agency relates.” Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 461. Bunn’s agency, if he had any, was *163to purchase arid- ship timber of a specified kind. This might include the authority to make a contract with reference to the timber handled by him similar to the contract involved in the case of Birge-Forbes v. Railway Co., 115 S. W. 333, cited and relied upon by appellant. But can it be said that it would also include the power to make a general contract not only as to the timber handled by him, but one including that which might be handled at the same time by other agents at other points, or by other contractors at other times? The release here under consideration was unlimited in its terms as to the time of its duration, and was to operate upon all timber owned by Blocker & Miller and placed upon the right of way along the appellant’s main line. The evidence shows that Burin had no actual authority to make so sweeping a contract. At most, Bunn’s apparent authority would include the power of making contracts concerning the timber with which he had some business connection. This authority would not apparently embrace timber handled exclusively by Brooks and others, and with which Bunn had nothing to do.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss further the remaining questions involved in this motion.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.