Court Opinion

ID: 9639351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:13:42.870722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:16.319432
License: Public Domain

SIBLEY, District Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from the judgment of affirmance. The fourth count, if treated as one for malieious prosecution, does not sufficiently allege that the prosecution had terminated and favorably to the plaintiff, and the general demurrer to it on this ground should be sustained. If, as both sides contend and as I think, it was intended to be a count for false imprisonment, that part of it which alleges the personal malice of the agent of the defendant as an aggravation of the false imprisonment should have been stricken on the special objection that the corporation was not liable on account of this aggravation. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13 S. Ct. 261, 37 L. Ed. 97. The verdict was expressly rendered on all four counts, and it is impossible to tell what influence the fourth count and the evidence submitted under it had in fixing its amount. A new trial is the necessary result of the errors in dealing with the fourth count. Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 5 S. Ct. 296, 28 L. Ed. 835; Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 27 S.Ct. 412, 51 L. Ed. 708; Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 440, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 421, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186.