Court Opinion

ID: 9456955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:07:45.971511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:09.731326
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part);
This court was presented with essentially one question on this appeal: was there an adequate basis for the trial judge’s determination that Mr. Christensen did realize that he was representing appellant at the station-house line-up ? I agree with the opinion of the court that we must answer this question in the affirmative.
On the other hand, for me this answer does not exhaust the issues in the case. The following questions trouble me: (1) Does not United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), require effective assistance of counsel at line-ups? (2) If so, does defendant have the burden of coming forward with affirmative evidence that assistance of substitute counsel was ineffective? (3) Does the Government have the ultimate burden of persuading the judge beyond a reasonable doubt that assistance of substitute counsel was in fact effective? (4) Does a substitute counsel have special obligations to record his observations and opinions of the line-up and to see that trial counsel is given copies of those records before trial? (5) In addition, is trial counsel under an obligation to inquire of substitute counsel concerning the details of the line-up? (6) If neither substitute nor retained counsel has taken steps to communicate with the other, does that failure constitute ineffective assistance of counsel for the purpose of the Wade per se rule, so that testimony concerning the line-up may not be introduced by the Government at trial?
While some of these questions are stated in argumentative fashion, I do not pretend to have answers to them. What troubles me is that in this case these questions were not plainly raised by defense counsel below (though I have no doubt that he considers many of them implicit in his objections). As a result, not only is the record barren of testimony directly concerning many of the factual issues, but there are no direct rulings by the trial judge on these issues for us to review. It would be very well for us to affirm this conviction on the ground stated by the court’s opinion, except that appellant might well be going to jail while the substitute counsel arrangements at the police station did not meet the constitutional standards. Substitute counsel procedures have been approved by this court only conditionally,1 and the facts of this case should make us wonder if different rules are not necessary. It is familiar principle that this court, “vested with the penultimate authority and responsibility for the supervision of criminal justice in the District of Columbia,”2 must carefully examine existing practices to ensure that fundamental rights are not being lost through inadequate procedural safeguards.3 *735Consequently, I would remand this case for evidentiary hearings on the practices of substitute counsel at station-house line-ups, as followed in this case, and for the trial judge to make initial rulings on the constitutionality of the practices he finds.
Remanding would be pointless, of course, if any error discovered were going to be harmless. I must register my dissent, therefore, from the court’s alternative holding of harmless error. It is a very close question, because of the weight of evidence against appellant; but where neither the fruits nor the instruments of the crime are discovered in appellant’s possession, and where the evidence against him, however strong, consists only of identifications, I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that testimony of a line-up identification by the victim of the crime did not persuade an average juror.

. See United States v. Kirby, 138 U.S. App.D.C. 340, 427 F.2d 610 (1970): “Experience in tlie application of these procedures may reveal that general improvements are needed. * * * And it is always open in future cases to undertake consideration of whether, because of inadequate regulations or lax administration, it is necessary to invoke a stricter rule.”

. Blue v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 317, 342 F.2d 894, 896 (1964).

. Ensuring that the opportunity to be assisted by effective counsel is not an empty right has long required careful *735judicial attention to tlie realities of pretrial proceedings. See, e. g., Ricks v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 334 F.2d 964 (1964). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), another case which raises the substitute counsel question: “In any event, the circumstance lends emphasis to the conclusion that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, * * * the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real .sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.” [Emphasis added.]