Court Opinion

ID: 9915345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 14:01:44.037504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:24.733652
License: Public Domain

COURT OF CHANCERY
                                       OF THE
                                 STATE OF DELAWARE
    LORI W. WILL                                                   LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR                                                       500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
                                                                     WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
                               Date Submitted: January 4, 2024
                                Date Decided: January 5, 2024

    John M. Seaman, Esquire                        Michael A. Pittenger, Esquire
    Eliezer Y. Feinstein, Esquire                  William R. Denny, Esquire
    Abrams & Bayliss LLP                           Matthew F. Davis, Esquire
    20 Montchanin Road, Suite 200                  Nicholas D. Mozal, Esquire
    Wilmington, DE 19807                           Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP
                                                   1313 North Market Street
                                                   Wilmington, DE 198091

         RE:       Ted D. Kellner v. AIM Immunotech Inc. et al.,
                   C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW

Dear Counsel:

         I write regarding plaintiff Ted D. Kellner’s Motion for an Injunction

Pending Appeal (the “Motion”).1 For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is

denied.

         The Motion concerns my December 28, 2023 post-trial opinion in this

matter (the “Opinion”).2 In the Opinion, I held that certain of AIM Immunotech

Inc.’s advance notice bylaws were invalid. I also held that the plaintiff failed to

comply with valid advance notice bylaws and that the members of AIM’s board of

1
    Pl.’s Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal (Dkt. 275) (“Mot.”).
2
 Post-Trial Op. (Dkt. 273) (“Op.”). Capitalized terms not defined herein have the
meanings given in the Opinion.
C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
January 5, 2024
Page 2 of 6

directors did not breach their fiduciary duties by rejecting Kellner’s attempt to

nominate three director candidates.

         The Motion was filed on January 3, 2024 just before 5:00 p.m.—six days

after the Opinion was issued.3 In the Motion, Kellner asks that I enjoin AIM from

going forward with its annual meeting scheduled for today, January 5, pending his

appeal of the Opinion.         Yesterday afternoon, AIM filed an opposition to the

Motion, arguing that Kellner’s request for an injunction is procedurally improper,

legally deficient, and barred by laches.4 Last night, Kellner filed a reply in further

support of the Motion.5

          Under Court of Chancery Rule 62(c) and Supreme Court Rule 32, this Court

has discretion to grant an injunction pending appeal. In exercising that discretion,

the court considers the so-called Kirpat factors: (1) “a preliminary assessment of

likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal”; (2) “whether the petitioner will

suffer irreparable injury if the stay is not granted”; (3) “whether any other

interested party will suffer substantial harm if the stay is granted”; and (4)

“whether the public interest will be harmed if the stay is granted.”6 Because the

3
    See generally Mot.
4
    Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal (Dkt. 279) (“Defs.’ Opp.”).
5
    Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal (Dkt. 280).
6
 Kirpat, Inc. v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356, 357 (Del.
1998) (citation omitted).
C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
January 5, 2024
Page 3 of 6

first factor “directs the trial court to assess the strength of its own reasoning and

judgment, ‘the “likelihood of success on appeal” prong cannot be interpreted

literally or in a vacuum.’”7 Instead, the court considers the remaining factors

before “assessing whether the movant has presented a question that raises a fair

ground for review by our Supreme Court.”8 I proceed accordingly.

         Regarding the second factor, Kellner argues that he will suffer irreparable

harm absent an injunction since AIM’s annual meeting will occur before his appeal

is resolved.9 But if Kellner prevails on appeal, he can pursue appropriate relief,

such as a new vote on his nominees.10 Additionally, any harm Kellner may face is

partly “self-inflicted” since he “chose to submit [his] nomination notice on the eve

of the deadline set by the advance notice bylaw.”11                  Thus, this factor

7
 Zhou v. Deng, 2022 WL 1617218, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2022) (citing Kirpat, 741
A.2d at 358).
8
    Rosenbaum v. CytoDyn Inc., 2021 WL 4890876, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2021).
9
    Mot. ¶ 6.
10
   See Defs.’ Opp. ¶ 19 (citing Hammann v. Adamis Pharms. Corp., C.A. No. 2021-0506-
PAF, at 16-18 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2021) (TRANSCRIPT) (declining to enjoin an annual
meeting pending resolution of the case where the “Court could order a new meeting for
the election of directors or could order the Company to allow plaintiff to run an opposing
slate at next year’s annual meeting”)). Kellner’s press release about the Motion
acknowledges this realty. See id. Ex. 5.
11
     CytoDyn, 2021 WL 4890876, at *2; see Op. 84.
C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
January 5, 2024
Page 4 of 6

overwhelmingly disfavors an injunction—a conclusion compounded by Kellner’s

delay in filing the Motion.12

         The third factor is a wash. On one hand, Kellner argues that the stockholder

franchise will be harmed if his slate of nominees is not voted upon.13 On the other

hand, further delaying the annual meeting pending an uncertain appeal also impairs

the franchise. And an injunction would deny AIM the benefit of its advance notice

bylaws, which are intended to “permit orderly . . . election contests.”14

         The fourth factor is likewise in equipoise. Advance notice bylaws implicate

the “‘private interests of particular corporate constituencies,’ not the public

interest.”15 Any public interest in defending stockholder rights is counterbalanced

by the corporate interest served by safeguarding advance notice bylaws.

         Returning to the first factor, I agree that Kellner’s appeal presents matters

warranting thorough consideration. As the Opinion pointed out, the evolution of

advance notice bylaws requires the court to “carefully balance the competing

12
     See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13
     Mot. ¶ 6.
14
  BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Tr. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd., 224 A.3d
964, 980 (Del. 2020).
15
  CytoDyn, 2021 WL 4890876, at *3 (citing Klassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 2013 WL
5967028, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2013)).
C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
January 5, 2024
Page 5 of 6

interests at play.”16 I endeavored to do just that in resolving Kellner’s facial

challenge by applying settled law to novel bylaw provisions adopted amid a

looming proxy contest.

         Yet Kellner’s “as applied” challenge—the one serving as a gating matter for

whether his nominees should be placed on the ballot—covers well-trodden ground.

The resolution of that claim turned on factual findings that arrangements or

understandings animating Kellner’s nomination were obfuscated from AIM’s

board and stockholders. Kellner was required to disclose these arrangements or

understandings.17     He did not.      Moreover, given Kellner’s concealment of

meaningful information, I concluded that the Board acted reasonably in rejecting

the notice to protect important corporate objectives that AIM’s advance notice

bylaws promote. Kellner needed only to be forthcoming. He was not. As such,

the first factor weighs in favor of denying the Motion.

16
     Op. 42.
17
   The AAU Provision of the Amended Bylaws was invalid insofar as it required
disclosures about Stockholder Associated Persons. Rather than reform the provision, I
assessed whether Kellner disclosed information consistent with 2016 Bylaws, which were
validly enacted on a clear day. Op. 70-76. I did not, as Kellner suggests, engage in
“judicial reformation” of the bylaw. Mot. ¶ 10(b). Nor did I attempt to blue pencil it. I
considered whether Kellner withheld information about arrangements or
understandings—disclosures required not only by legitimate aspects of the AAU
Provision in the Amended Bylaws, but also expressly called for in the 2016 Bylaws. The
2016 Bylaws did not present any additional disclosure requirements. Irrespective of
which set of bylaws applied, there is no doubt that Kellner and his counsel knew he
needed to disclose the sort of arrangements or understandings that he obscured.
C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
January 5, 2024
Page 6 of 6

      On balance, the Kirpat factors indicate that an injunction pending appeal is

unwarranted. Nothing prevents Kellner from pursuing his appeal and seeking

appropriate relief if he prevails. To enjoin the annual meeting, however, risks

further inequity.

                                            Sincerely yours,

                                            /s/ Lori W. Will

                                            Lori W. Will
                                            Vice Chancellor