Court Opinion

ID: 9583962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:21.059677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:07.990278
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Morris, Schneider & Prior, LLC, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
1. I agree with the majority that the statements in McCalla, Raymer &c. v. C.I.T. Financial Svcs., 235 Ga. App. 95 (508 SE2d 471) (1998), relied on by the defendant are not controlling precedent. However, under general principles of agency law, an agent may be held individually liable for his own tortious acts. Oglethorpe Realty Co. v. Hazzard, 172 Ga. App. 98, 99 (3) (321 SE2d 820) (1984).
All agents, by an express undertaking to that effect, may render themselves individually liable. Every agent exceed*134ing the scope of his authority shall be individually liable to the person with whom he deals; so, also, for his own tortious act, whether acting by command of his principal or not, he shall be responsible', for the negligence of his underservant, employed by him in behalf of his principal, he shall not be responsible.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 10-6-85. Further, in Miller & Miller v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 569 (25 SE 578) (1896), our Supreme Court held that an attorney who merely acted as an agent to collect a debt and had no knowledge of the actual facts in the matter could still be sued. See also Haas & Howell v. Godby, 33 Ga. App. 218, 222-223 (125 SE 897) (1924). Further,
[w]hoever meddles with another’s property, whether as principal or agent, does so at his peril, and it makes no difference that in doing so he acts in good faith, nor in case of an agent, that he delivers the property to his principal before receiving notice of the claim of the owner. If an agent takes the property of another without his consent and delivers it to the principal, it is a conversion, and trover will lie for the recovery of the property or for damages, as the plaintiff may elect. An agent, who for and in behalf of his principal takes the property of another without the latter’s consent, is as to him guilty of a conversion, although being ignorant of the true owner’s title, the agent may have acted in perfect good faith; and such agent may be sued in trover for the property, even after his delivery of it to his principal. Also such an agent may be sued jointly with his principal for such conversion.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Graham v. Frazier, 82 Ga. App. 185, 195-196 (4) (60 SE2d 833) (1950).
The law firm is not absolved of liability merely because it acted as attorney for the lender and server, and, accordingly, the grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
2. Although the points raised by the majority in Division 2 ultimately may be correct, those issues were not asserted in the law firm’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, McCarter was given no opportunity to address them, and, of course, the trial court never ruled on them.
Under this record, we should not rule on these issues. A plaintiff is not required
to respond to issues which are not raised in the motion for summary judgment or to present its entire case on all alie*135gations in the complaint — even on issues not raised in the defendants’ motion. Indeed, until appellees pierced the allegations of [McCarter’s] complaint on a particular issue, [she] was neither required to respond to the motion on that issue, nor required to produce evidence in support of [her] complaint on that issue. See also Bales v. Central Bank &c. Co., 204 Ga. App. 675, 676 (420 SE2d 358) [(1992)]: The issues that must be rebutted on motion for summary judgment are those raised by the motion. Consequently, [McCarter] was not required to present proof on all matters raised in [her] complaint until [the law firm] pierced [her] complaint on those issues.
Decided December 1, 2000.
Mark D. Welsh, for appellant.
Morris, Schneider & Prior, Larry W. Johnson, Brian S. Tatum, for appellees.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 (1) (458 SE2d 876) (1995). Additionally,
due process requires that a party be given reasonable opportunity to contest a claim that there are no genuine issues of material fact. There having been no notice to [McCarter that this court] might consider the merits of the issue of [her claim], a holding that [she could not recover], tantamount to an award of summary judgment against [her], would deny [her] due process.
Coweta County v. Simmons, 269 Ga. 694 (507 SE2d 440) (1998). “Accordingly, we may not consider whether summary judgment would have been proper for any other reason. [Cit.]” Fedeli v. UAP/Ga. Ag. Chem., 237 Ga. App. 337, 339 (1) (514 SE2d 684) (1999).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Smith and Judge Miller join in this dissent.