Court Opinion

ID: 9634102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:28:37.800118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:11.402600
License: Public Domain

MELLOY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the portions of the majority opinion that affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the sex discrimination claims (Sections II.A and II.B) and that dismiss without prejudice the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act claim (Section III). However, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim (Section II.C). I would find the district court erred by weighing the evidence of retaliation, resolving issues of disputed fact, and ruling as a matter of law that Florence Hervey did not suffer retaliation. The district court found that Hervey failed to establish the third element of a prima facie retaliation case: a causal nexus between the protected conduct and the adverse action. This finding was in error. “The plaintiffs burden at the prima facie case stage of the analysis is not onerous, and ‘[a] minimal evidentiary showing will satisfy this burden of production.’ ” Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1119 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted).
The majority discounts the breadth of evidence regarding the temporal connection between Hervey’s protected conduct and the adverse employment actions and overlooks Hervey’s other supporting evidence. The majority looks at the adverse actions in isolation and fails to consider the totality of the circumstances. See Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5 of Lonoke County, Ark., 874 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir.1989). While I agree with the majority’s statement that generally more than a temporal connection is needed, evidence of temporal connection can be strong evidence of retaliatory intent in some cases. “Viewed within the context of the overall record, temporal proximity may directly support an inference of retaliation, and it may also affect the reasonableness of inferences drawn from other evidence.” Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1122. Hervey provided strong evidence of timing and presented a submissible case that is also based on evidence other than temporal connection. “WTiere reasonable fact finders could extend an inference in favor of the non-moving party without resorting to speculation, we may not declare the inference unjustifiable simply because we might draw a different inference.” Id. at 1118. The evidence here does “create a real issue as to the genuineness of the supervisor’s perceptions and beliefs,” ante at 725, and “support[s] a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive,” ante at 726.
As the majority states, Hervey did not go to work February 10-11, 2004. Mastín called her on February 11 to find out why she had not been at work. He claimed that she lied about leaving a voicemail message for him, and he told her they would talk about it the next day. During their February 12 meeting regarding her alleged failure to follow protocol for requesting leave, Hervey told Mastín that she had contacted the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. Mastín responded that Hervey was no longer a supervisor, that he would recommend that Hervey wear a brown shirt (she wore a white shirt, signifying management status), and that *728when Nelson returned, the three of them would meet. The majority states that “Mastín told Hervey that he would recommend ... she wear [a different shirt] because she was no longer a supervisor.” Ante at 723. Viewing Hervey’s declaration in the light most favorable to her, Hervey stated that Mastín demoted her. This was a materially adverse action, and not merely a recommendation. Mastín told Her-vey: “I will suggest to the sheriff that you report to work from now on in brown because you are no longer a supervisor.” Even assuming that Mastín only recommended Hervey’s demotion, however, an unexecuted recommendation can constitute an adverse employment action in combination with other retaliatory acts. See Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir.2001) (“[The defendant] argues that her ‘draft’ evaluation of [the plaintiff], which was never in fact implemented, cannot constitute an adverse employment action because it did not have a tangible effect on his employment duties. While it is true that a draft evaluation alone could not be considered an adverse employment action, we consider the cumulative effect of [the defendant’s] discriminatory actions rather than determining whether any individual action upon which the claim relies was sufficiently adverse.” (emphasis added)).
Significantly, no evidence cited by the defendants supports their argument that Mastín planned on disciplining Hervey for improperly taking leave before Hervey told Mastín that she would be filing a complaint against him. The district court states that “Mastín informed Hervey of his intention to discipline her before Hervey informed Mastín of her intention to file a complaint.” However, the exhibit that the district court cites for support does not support this statement. The exhibit merely states that Mastín said, “Well, stop in my office when you come to work tomorrow ... [t]o discuss this issue.” Culberth Deck Ex. 89 at 16. All Mastín told Hervey on February 11 was that “when [Hervey] came into work the next day, he wanted to talk to [Hervey.]” Hervey App. 34 (emphasis added). Mastín said nothing about discipline or a demotion.
The majority’s insistence that “there is no reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive” because “even if Mastín concocted his version of the voicemail incident, Mas-tín did so before Hervey advised him of her protected activity” is unjustified. Ante at 724-25. The majority points to no evidence establishing that Mastín definitively planned on disciplining Hervey prior to them meeting. The majority cites to notes that Mastín made in Hervey’s personnel file about the February 12 meeting. The notes list six reasons for his recommendation that Hervey “continue as Jail Administrator with duties to be reviewed and discussed but wear the same uniform as the other correctional officers.” Mastín, however, wrote the notes after the meeting, and there is no evidence tending to show he believed any of the reasons warranted discipline prior to Hervey’s disclosure of her complaint. According to Her-vey, Mastín did not discuss five of the six reasons listed on the note. Accepting Hervey’s characterization of the meeting and viewing Mastin’s notes in a light most favorable to Hervey, at least two reasonable inferences adverse to the defendants exist. First, Mastín disciplined Hervey solely for her untruthfulness, and because Hervey denies she was untruthful, a jury question exists as to whether the perceived untruthfulness was Mastin’s true motivation for the discipline. Second, Mastín retaliated against Hervey for filing the complaint and attempted to conceal his retaliatory motive by listing numerous, facially valid reasons for discipline in the notes.
*729Contrary to the majority’s assertion that Mastin’s “action was a logical consequence of Hervey’s pre-existing disciplinary problems,” ante at 723, his action was not logical because it was the first time that Hervey had been disciplined at all for her alleged insubordination and incompetence. Previously, she had only been given oral reprimands to follow directives and to improve her performance. The sudden demotion was unexpected and came “moments,” ante at 724, after Hervey told him she was filing a complaint against Mastín. Further, the notes do not suggest that Mastín had made up his mind to strip Hervey of her supervisory role or to recommend that she not wear a supervisor uniform before Mastín and Hervey met on February 12. The notes are a reflection of his thoughts after the meeting and do not rebut the retaliatory inference. Taken in a light most favorable to Hervey, we may not assume that Mastin’s calling of a meeting on February 12 shows a preexisting plan to discipline her. Thus, a material question of fact was raised as to whether Hervey’s demotion was due to her failure to request leave properly and alleged lies, or due to Mastin’s reasons listed in her personnel file, or due to her filing of the complaint.
On February 18, Mastín took Hervey’s master key to the courthouse and replaced it with a key that only opened her office door. He also assumed some of her responsibilities: he posted a memo stating that he would approve all vacation and leave requests, office schedules, and memos regarding the agency. The same day, Hervey alleged that her loss of supervisor status was retaliation by Mastín in a letter to the Koochiching County Attorney; she cited the taking of her key and her responsibilities as indications that the situation was worsening. On March 2, Mastín and Nelson called a meeting with Hervey regarding the events of February 10. They reprimanded her for her failure to properly request leave from Mastín before taking time off and for lying to Mastín regarding her request for time off. Mastín and Nelson stated that reoccurrences of these actions would result in discipline. However, Hervey disputes that she violated any procedure for taking time off, and Mastín admitted that he retroactively approved leave “all the time.” Given the procedural posture of this case and our duty to view facts favorably to Hervey, we must assume that Hervey properly requested time off.
But even if we assume that she did not comply with the leave policy, a question of fact remains regarding whether Hervey alone was singled out for discipline for retaliatory purposes. See Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1123 (“Viewed in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff], a reasonable jury could find [her supervisor’s] adverse and selective application of the policy to be evidence that his reliance on the policy was merely pretext to hide a retaliatory motive.”). Although the majority tries to rebut the retaliatory inference regarding selective discipline, ante at 725, the majority and Phillips v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 216 F.3d 703 (8th Cir.2000), focus on the amount of evidence of disparate treatment necessary to support a finding of pretext. Phillips, 216 F.3d at 706. In doing so, the majority fails to take the facts in a light most favorable to Hervey, looks at the evidence of disparate treatment as a series of isolated events, and fails to consider the totality of all of the evidence viewed in context. For example, beyond the fact that Hervey was disciplined in the first place, it is significant that she was severely disciplined for violating a policy that Mastín rarely upheld. Further, the majority discounts the gravity of inferences a jury might draw if the jury concludes Mastín concocted post-hoc *730rationales for his actions, as Hervey alleges regarding Mastin’s six point memo.
On June 4, 2004, Hervey filed a notice of claim with the Koochiching County Auditor. A fax dated June 21 and addressed to Nelson contained a notice of a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. A week later, Mastín disciplined E911/Cor-rections Officer Gary Loop and Hervey for improper use of a county credit card. Nelson told Loop that Nelson did not want to discipline Loop, but that Nelson had to because of Hervey. Loop stated that “[Nelson] told me that he had been close to reconciling the conflict with Florence Hervey and her then attorney, Bruce Big-gins, but that he had gotten angry about what had been said in trying to reconcile the conflict and that, in essence, ‘no way was he going to do it now.’ ” This type of selective discipline — discipline only happens if Hervey is involved — again creates an inference of retaliatory intent towards Hervey. The majority disagrees, ante at 725 n. 4, taking the opposite inference: that the incident shows the lack of selective discipline because Loop was also disciplined. But given our duty to resolve inferences in favor of Hervey, I must conclude that this incident shows retaliatory intent.
On July 13, 2005, Hervey requested several vacation days to attend depositions in this ease. Although she did not indicate the purpose for her request, the days she requested were the days that depositions, including those of Mastín and Nelson, were scheduled, and the defendants’ counsel received notices of the depositions on July 8. Mastín denied Hervey’s request two days later. On July 18, Hervey’s current counsel wrote to the defendants’ counsel regarding the denial and stated that Hervey timely submitted the request and ensured her shifts were covered and that Hervey was unaware of any other such denials of vacation requests by Mastín. Mastín later approved the request without any explanation. A few days after Her-vey’s counsel’s letter, Mastín and Nelson issued a final notice that unless Hervey’s performance immediately improved, she would be terminated. They suspended her without pay for fifteen days for failing to meet daily with Mastín and failing to meet job expectations, citing sixteen specific examples. They also notified her staff of the suspension before notifying her and deactivated her card key such that she could not let herself into the building that morning. The adverse employment actions occurred close in time to the depositions, but even more significant is the humiliating way the actions were carried out: she was the last to know and had to be let into the building she used to run. The humiliation creates a stronger inference of retaliation than the discipline alone. Cf. Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir.2008) (“Rather, whether a work environment is so hostile or abusive as to alter the terms and conditions of employment is to be judged in light of all the circumstances, including ... whether it is ... humiliating .... ” (quotation omitted)); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1997) (holding there was a “distinct possibility” in a § 1983 action that the strip search and accompanying sexual humiliation was in retaliation for the individual’s non-cooperation and noting the possibility that the search was merely a pretext to humiliate).
The majority’s response to the retaliatory inference drawn from the humiliation falls short. The majority comments that Hervey’s supervisors may have wanted “to embarrass Hervey because of her insubordination alone, or simply because they were mean-spirited,” but this comment is a result of drawing an inference against Hervey, which should not be done at the summary judgment stage.
*731On August 17, 2005, Hervey met with Mastín and Nelson regarding the suspension. Hervey again requested documentation (she had asked for documentation twice during her suspension) supporting the allegations listed in the suspension letter because she did not understand why she had been suspended. Mastín and Nelson refused, stating that the attorneys wrote the letter and had all the documentation. After ten months and at least one motion to compel, the defendants responded to Hervey’s request for documentation on May 17, 2006. They claimed attorney-client privilege and stated that Hervey already had the other listed documents. While the majority sees nothing wrong with this discovery dispute, ante at 726 n. 5, I think it is significant that it took ten months and judicial intervention before the defendants could respond that they were not producing any additional documents at all. Hervey notes that she never refused to meet with Mastín, and a January 6, 2005, directive stated that she must meet with Mastín every day “unless there is a reasonable cause not to.” Hervey argues that she had reasonable cause — either her or Mastin’s schedule did not permit a meeting — on each occasion that she failed to meet with Mastín.
The timing of the adverse employment actions — each shortly after developments in the litigation — is important in this case. I believe that the timing and other evidence in this case strongly support an inference of causation for the purpose of the prima facie case. Additionally, this same evidence raises material questions of fact as to whether the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretext. The majority and I argue back and forth on the inferences that should or can be drawn from the facts.6 When genuine issues of fact exist, summary judgment is not appropriate. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Our disputes illustrate that the jury needs to decide this issue. For these reasons, the summary *732-736judgment on the retaliation claim should be reversed and remanded for trial.

. In particular, the majority emphasizes the need to protect employers from unscrupulous employees who interject allegations of discrimination or retaliation as shields to "insulate themselves from discipline” after becoming cognizant of their disfavored status in the workplace. Ante at 723. I note two difficulties with undue reliance on this line of reasoning. First, while it is important to point out that this strongly voiced and commonly repeated suspicion of employees’ motives may be an important consideration, it is also important to point out that this characterization of employees is difficult to support at the summary judgment stage. It requires courts to make strong adverse inferences about the employees' states of mind. In general, I do not believe it is appropriate, at the summary judgment stage, to ascribe such manipulative motives to employees. Second, just as an instance of protected conduct by an employee should not be viewed as an impenetrable shield against future discipline by an employer, the existence of a blemished work record, or an employee’s pre-existing status as a less-than-ideal-employee, should not be used as a rug under which employers and courts may sweep claims of retaliation. Our laws against discrimination and retaliation are not in place merely to protect employees with otherwise unblemished records, and we must guard against the establishment of standards that deprive all but the most deserving employees of jury trials. While I share the majority’s concern that some employees may attempt to "work the system” by taking protected actions when they believe discipline is imminent, we should not support granting summary judgment based in large part on suspicions of employees’ motives.