Court Opinion

ID: 9670057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:13:30.667218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.015954
License: Public Domain

CurriE, J.
(dissenting). If we interpret the majority opinion correctly, it holds that a notice given for the purpose of complying with sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., is sufficient, even though one of the essential requirements prescribed by the statute to be contained therein is omitted, if (1) the person to whom the notice is given has it within his power to readily ascertain the information omitted, or already possesses such information prior to the service of the notice; (2) such omission is due to inadvertence with no intent to mislead; and (3) the person to whom the notice is given is not actually misled thereby.
Sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., provides in part as follows:
“No action to recover damages for an injury to the person shall be maintained unless, within two years after the happening of the event causing such damages, notice in writing, signed by the party damaged, his agent or attorney, shall be served upon the person or corporation by whom it is claimed such damage was caused, stating the time and place where such damage occurred, a brief description of the injuries, the manner in which they were received and the grounds upon which claim is made and that satisfaction thereof is claimed *207of such person or corporation. Such notice shall be given in the manner required for the service of summons in courts of record.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Staszczuk v. Gilman Mfg. Co. (1915), 159 Wis. 615, 150 N. W. 982, the court had before it the question of compliance with this statute, then sub. 5 of sec. 4222, Stats., and in its opinion stated (p. 617) :
“The release above set forth does not comply with the statute even if treated as a notice served, which it was not intended to be. It fails to state 'one at least of the essential requirements of the statute, namely, that the plaintiff claims satisfaction of the defendant for the injuries.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing quotation from the Staszczuk Case was quoted with approval by this court in Voss v. Tittel (1935), 219 Wis. 175, 262 N. W. 579, and was commented upon therein as follows (p. 180) :
“That case is authority for the proposition that if the notice fails to state any one of the essential requirements of the statute it is not sufficient.”
We, therefore, have this court stating in 1935 that it has been the law of this state ever since the decision in the Staszczuk Case in 1915 that if the notice fails to state an essential requirement of the statute it is fatally defective. Voss v. Tittel, supra, held that “place” was an “essential requirement” of the statute. “Tim$” would stand in the same category in that respect as “place.”
It is highly significant that the legislature during the nearly thirty-eight years that have elapsed since the Staszczuk decision has not seen fit to amend the statute so as to render effective a notice which fails through inadvertence to state an essential requirement, such as time or place, if the party receiving the notice is not prejudiced by such omission. We respectfully suggest that the effect of the majority opinion *208is to accomplish such amendment of the statute by judicial legislation. It is the position of the minority of the court that, however desirable the objective attained by the majority opinion may be, such is properly a function of the legislature and not of this court. A statement made by this court in Pietsch v. Milbrath (1905), 123 Wis. 647, 101 N. W. 388, 102 N. W. 342, 68 L. R. A. 945, 107 Am. St. Rep. 1017, is particularly pertinent (p. 670) :
“The legislature is the judge, and the sole judge in such matters, subject to no judicial review whatever, so long as it acts within the boundaries of reason. It is far better that occasionally one should suffer severely from the enforcement of the law, as the court finds it, than that they should endeavor to bend the law out of its manifest scope to avoid that result.”
The legislature saw fit to enact one exception in the statute which relieved against failure to strictly comply with its requirements, in certain specified respects. This exception reads as follows:
“No such notice shall be deemed insufficient or invalid solely because of any inaccuracy or failure therein in stating the description of the injuries, the manner in which they were received or the grounds on which the claim is made, provided it shall appear that there was no intention on the part of the person giving the notice to mislead the other party and that such party was not in fact misled thereby; . . .”
The general rule of statutory construction applicable, which tends to rule out any implied exceptions where a statute contains an express exception,'is well stated in 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, p. 455, sec. 434, as follows:
“The specification by the legislature of exceptions to the operation of a general statute, does not necessarily operate to preclude the court from applying other exceptions. However, where express exceptions are made, the legal presumption is that the legislature did not intend to save other cases *209from the operation of the statute. In such case, the inference is a strong one that no other exceptions were intended, and the rule generally applied is that an exception in a statute amounts to an affirmation of the application of its provisions to all other cases not excepted, and excludes all other excep-. tions or the enlargement of exceptions made” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion is based upon the authority of three decisions of this court, viz., May v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1899), 102 Wis. 673, 79 N. W. 31; Budke v. Holvick (1949), 255 Wis. 293, 38 N. W. (2d) 479; and Trapino v. Trapino (1951), 260 Wis. 137, 50 N. W. (2d) 467. However, an analysis of these three decisions discloses that none of them involved a notice which completely omitted, or failed to comply with, one of the essential requirements of the statute, as did the notice in the instant case.
The notice in May v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra, was alleged to be defective because of failure to state the place of the accident. The material facts of this case are set forth in the majority opinion. The effect of the court’s opinion in the May Case was to hold that it is not essential to set forth a technical legal description of premises in order to comply with the “place” requirement of the statute, but, if the place where the damage occurred is sufficiently described in the notice so that the party to whom it is addressed can readily ascertain the place from such description contained within the four corners of the notice, there is compliance with the statute. Mr. Justice Winslow in the opinion in that case stated (p. 676) :
“Fairly and reasonably construed, the notice states that the cattle came upon the track through a gate in the right of way fence where such right of way runs through the farm of John Walterscheit, in the town of Blooming Grove, in Dane county, and were killed on said right of way, i. e. the right of way through Walterscheit’s farm, by reason of the, negligence of the company in failing to keep the gate closed and in carelessly running its engine and train. Certainly, *210this seems reasonably definite and certain. If the company did not know where the farm of John Walterscheit was, it was easily ascertainable.”
We submit that the majority opinion, which places great reliance upon the words “easily ascertainable” appearing in the last sentence of the above-quoted portion of the opinion, completely misinterprets such phrase. The words “easily ascertainable” have reference to being ascertainable from the description of the place contained in the notice,-and not from, extrinsic facts not set forth in the notice. The majority opinion, on the other hand, interprets these words to mean that, even though the notice fails to contain any description of the place where the damage occurred, the notice would still not be defective if the party to whom it was addressed could find the place from extrinsic facts.
The case of Budke v. Holvick, supra, involved a notice which it was conceded complied with the statute in every way except that Claude Budke, the party giving the notice, did not sign his name at the bottom thereof, but the words “Claude Budke” were typed at the bottom of the notice. The statute required that the notice be “signed by the party damaged, his agent, or attorney.” The question, therefore, was whether a typed signature instead of one in handwriting was a compliance with the statute. The weight of authority is to the effect that where a statute requires the instrument to be “signed” by a person, a printed or typed signature is sufficient. Hamilton v. State (1885), 103 Ind. 96, 2 N. E. 299, 53 Am. Rep. 491; Smith v. Greenville County (1938), 188 S. C. 349, 353, 199 S. E. 416; Maricopa County v. Osborn (1943), 60 Ariz. 290, 300, 136 Pac. (2d) 270; and Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane (D. C. Cal. 1948), 79 Fed. Supp. 117, 128.
In Herrick v. Morrill (1887), 37 Minn. 250, 33 N. W. 849, the Minnesota court held that the statutory requirement, that a summons be signed, was complied with where the *211summons bore the printed names of plaintiff’s attorneys. Likewise in Hamilton p. State, supra, the Indiana court held that the statutory requirement, that an indictment be signed “by the prosecuting attorney,” was complied with where the name of the prosecuting attorney appeared in print on the bottom of the indictment. Surely, if a printed signature on a summons or indictment is sufficient, a typed signature on the notice required by sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., should also be held to be effectual.
The party giving the notice in Trapino v. Trapino, supra, which involved an action for damages arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in Wisconsin, was faced with the difficulty of serving the notice of injury upon a nonresident residing in Missouri. Sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., requires that the notice “shall be given in the manner required for the service of summons in courts of record.” Even though the damages claimed arose out of an automobile accident happening in Wisconsin, the notice could not properly be served on the commissioner of motor vehicles under sec. 85.05 (3), which permits “all legal processes” to be served on the commissioner of the motor vehicle department in any action against a nonresident operator of a motor vehicle for damages arising out of an accident caused by him in Wisconsin. Such statute does not authorize said commissioner to transmit such notice by registered mail to a nonresident addressee. In Tarcsynski v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. (1952), 261 Wis. 149, 52 N. W. (2d) 396, this court stated (p. 153) :
“The words'process’or‘processes’as used in sec. 85.05 (3), Stats., were obviously intended to mean the means of subjecting a party to the jurisdiction of a court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously a notice given pursuant to sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., does not subject a party to the jurisdiction of the court, nor is it given with respect to any proceeding already *212pending in court. Therefore, under our decision in the Tarczynski Case such a notice does not constitute a “process” and cannot be served under sec. 8S.05 (3). This leaves as the only other alternative statute, which might possibly apply, sec. 262.12, which statute permits personal service of a summons outside the state in certain cases where the defendant is a nonresident, but it is doubtful if this statute is applicable to actions for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. It is inconceivable that the legislature could have intended that the notice required by sec. 330.19 (5) could never be given to a nonresident residing outside of the state. Therefore, this court in Trapino v. Trapino, supra, logically concluded that the service of the notice in the state of Missouri by a deputy sheriff of that state was a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that such notice be given “in the manner required for the service of summons in courts of record,” viz., by personal service.
The statement with respect to substantial compliance contained in our decision in the Budke Case, which is so strongly relied upon in the majority opinion, was in reality dictum because that case actually involved full compliance instead of substantial compliance. In any event, the doctrine of substantial compliance therein announced should not be extended to a case like the instant one where there is total absence of compliance with one of the essential requirements of the statute, viz., "time."
For these reasons we conclude that the learned trial court was right in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and the judgment should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Fairchild and Mr. Justice Brown authorize me to state that they concur in this dissenting opinion.