Court Opinion

ID: 9693007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:29.360955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.710798
License: Public Domain

D. F. Walsh, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent. I am not persuaded under the facts of this case that either the examining magistrate or the acting circuit judge had a duty sua sponte to conduct a Walker1 hearing to determine the voluntariness of defendant’s waiver of his right to remain silent or his Fifth or Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during post-testing interrogation by the polygraph examiner._
*54The defendant voluntarily agreed to submit to the polygraph examination. When he went to the state police post in Flint to take the exam, he was accompanied by his attorney. He was advised and acknowledged in writing while his attorney was present that he understood that the polygraph exam consisted of a testing phase preceded by a questioning phase and followed by a questioning phase, that he had a right to remain silent, and that anything he said during the testing phase or during the questioning before or after the testing phase could be used against him at trial. He was informed that the test and the questioning that preceded and followed it could not be conducted with his attorney present but that he could stop answering questions at any time during the test or during the questioning before or after and consult with his attorney.
All of this advice was given to the defendant while his attorney was present, and, while his attorney was still present, defendant acknowledged that he understood the advice and waived his right to remain silent and to have his attorney present during the test and during the questioning before and after. During all the time that defendant was being questioned by the polygraph examiner his attorney remained available at the state police post.
I find no error in the failure of the magistrate or the acting circuit judge sua sponte to conduct a Walker hearing nor do I find that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the incriminating statements was clearly erroneous.
I would affirm.

 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).