Court Opinion

ID: 9747064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:54:51.212648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.630136
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The narrow issue raised in this appeal is whether the description of services rendered by a township solicitor, as set forth in the solicitor’s invoices, constitutes attorney work product as a matter of law. In affirming, the majority concludes that “all information from the solicitor relating to pending or impending litigation is inaccessible” to the public under the law commonly known as the Right to Know Law (Law).1 (Majority op. at 854) (emphasis added).
The majority reasons that: (1) the Law and the Sunshine Act2 are in pan materia because they relate to the same class of things (access to information about actions by public agencies);3 (2) because they are in pari materia, the statutes shall be construed together, if possible; (3) section 8(a)(4) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 708(a)(4), permits an agency to hold executive session for the purpose of consulting with its attorney regarding information in connection with litigation; (4) this exemption from the Sunshine Act’s requirement to hold public meetings is not limited to attorney work product; and, therefore, (5) all information from the solicitor related to pending or impending litigation is inaccessible to the public under both statutes.4 (Majority op. at 853-54.)
Under the analysis employed by the majority, all disbursements made by a gov-*856emment agency that flow from deliberations shielded from public scrutiny under the Sunshine Act would be protected from disclosure under the Law. I submit that the majority’s analysis ignores the important distinction between the two statutes and is contrary to well-settled law.
Significantly, although the Law and the Sunshine Act are similar in design, they are not .applicable to the same specific issues. The Sunshine Act applies to official action and deliberations by a quorum of agency members and requires that the same take place at a public meeting. The Law, on the other hand, applies only to “public records,” a term specifically defined by that statute to mean certain documents, i.e., “any account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement of funds ... and any minute, order or decision by an agency....” 65 P.S. § 66.1 Because the statutes are intended to apply to different, specific matters, application of the two statutes will yield different results, even where the general matter at issue is substantially similar.
The Sunshine Act permits an agency to meet in executive session for the purpose of: discussing any employment matter; discussing the negotiation or arbitration of collective bargaining agreements; considering the purchase or lease of real property; consulting with an attorney; and discussing other matters protected by a lawful privilege. 65 Pa.C.S. § 708. However, once public funds are expended, regardless of whether the expenditure flows from deliberations in an executive session, documents reflecting that expenditure are public documents subject to access under the Law. 65 P.S. § 66.1. See Tribune-Review Publishing Company v. Westmoreland County Housing Authority, 574 Pa. 661, 833 A.2d 112 (2003) (holding that litigation settlement between a public entity and its employees was a public document under the Act); Legal Capital, LLC v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 702 A.2d 869 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), aff'd, 557 Pa. 10, 731 A.2d 132 (1999) (holding that settlement records concerning medical malpractice claims were public records under the Right to Know Law unless a statuto*857ry exception to the act applied)-, and Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Township, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 627 A.2d 297 (1993) (holding that settlement agreement between township and private party was a public record subject to disclosure under the Law).
There is no dispute that records reflecting attorney work product doctrine do not qualify as public records under the Law. LaValle v. Office of General Counsel, 564 Pa. 482, 769 A.2d 449 (2001). However, LaValle does not support the majority’s statement that certain types of privilege “may exclude the invoices ” from the definition of a public record. (Majority op. at 853.) Rather, the court in LaValle held that the report at issue was not subject to disclosure under the Law “to the extent that [it] constitutes work product ....” Id. at 497, 769 A.2d at 458. Therefore, I believe that the narrow issue raised in this case, i.e., whether the descriptions of services rendered as set forth in an attorney’s invoice constitutes attorney work product as a matter of law, must be addressed.
The work product doctrine evolved from the holding in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (recognizing a qualified immunity from discovery “for the work product of a lawyer”),5 and is embodied in Pa. R.C.P. No. 4003.3, which states:
Subject to the provisions of Rules 4003.4 and 4003.5, a party may obtain discovery of any matter discoverable under Rule 4003.1 even though prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative, including his or her attorney, consultant, surety, indem-nitor, insurer or agent. The discovery shall not include disclosure of the mental impressions of a party’s attorney or his or her conclusions, opinions, memo-randa, notes or summaries, legal research or legal theories. With respect to the representative of a party other than the party’s attorney, discovery shall not include disclosure of his or her mental impressions, conclusions or opinions respecting the value or merit of a claim or defense or respecting strategy or tactics.
The comment to the rule states that this rule is carefully drawn and means exactly what it says. “It immunizes the lawyer’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes summaries, legal research and legal theories, nothing more.” Pa. R.C.P. No. 4003.3, Explanatory cmt.— 1978.
The majority’s broad holding (that all information from the solicitor related to litigation, not just attorney work product, is inaccessible to the public under both statutes) would lead to an absurd result: an individual such as Plaintiff would not be entitled to review documents related to litigation under the Law, but would be entitled to obtain production of the same documents through discovery, which only protects attorney work product.
The specific question presented here has not been decided by our appellate courts. However, federal decisions have addressed the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine in the context of discovery disputes. Federal courts have held that attorney billing statements and time records are subject to the attorney-client privilege to the extent those records reveal the nature of services *858performed. See e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516 (E.D.Pa.1996). However, federal courts have repeatedly reviewed documents in camera when deciding claims that documents are protected from discovery under the attorney-client and/or work product privilege. For example, see Valenti v. Allstate Insurance Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 200 (M.D.Pa.2003), wherein the “description of services” was redacted from legal invoices in an action seeking attorney fees. The court reviewed a privilege log listing more than 100 redacted documents, with all of the redactions based on claims that the redacted material related to an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions or legal strategy. After reviewing the unredacted documents, the court rejected numerous assertions that the descriptions of services were protected by the work product doctrine as unfounded. See also Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 632988, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6658 (E.D.Pa. No. 97-4499, filed May 5, 2000), and Garvey v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 167 F.R.D. 391 (E.D.Pa.1996), reflecting the court’s in camera review of documents claimed to be protected by the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. Similarly, in the context of a probate proceeding, In re Estate of Wood, 818 A.2d 568 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 696, 882 A.2d 479 (2005), our superior court instructed the trial court to review material in camera to determine if protection under the work product doctrine was warranted.
Contrary to the approach taken by the majority here, in these cases the courts declined to base their decisions on the mere assertions of a party that the privilege applies. I, too, would decline to accept the Township’s mere assertions in this matter as sufficient to support the grant of summary judgment. Instead, I would hold that the issue presented here is a mixed question of fact and law that cannot be answered without review of the solicitor’s invoices.6
The trial court did not review the invoices at issue, and its determination is not supported by any other evidence of record. Accordingly, I would reverse.

. Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, as amended, 65 P.S. §§ 66.1-66.9.

. 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.

. I agree that the Law and the Sunshine Act are part of a series of enactments designed to provide a comprehensive format governing public access to official information and meetings of public agencies. The two statutes are distinguishable, however, in that the intent of the Law is to ensure the availability of government information to the citizens of the Commonwealth by permitting access to official information, Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Allegheny County Housing Authority, 662 A.2d 677 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995) appeal denied, 546 Pa. 688, 686 A.2d 1315 (1996), whereas the object of the Sunshine Act was to open the decision-making processes of state government to greater public scrutiny and accountability. Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 368 A.2d 675 (1977).

.The majority then cites Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and states that "the solicitor properly protected the information in the absence of his client’s consent to disclose *856it.” (Majority op. at 854.) However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to government agencies, but only to professionals engaged in the practice of law. Because Plaintiff here requested public records from the Township itself and not from the Township’s counsel, the Rules of Professional Conduct have no bearing on this matter.
In quoting the explanatory comment to Rule 1.6, the majority impliedly holds that this rule provides a separate basis for denying public access to the entire invoice under the Law. Such a holding has no support in the law, and it ignores the critical distinction between private entities, to whom the Law does not apply, and public entities, which are accountable to the public for the expenditure of public funds. Unlike a private individual, a township may not conceal the fact that it has engaged legal representation once the township has disbursed public funds or entered into a contract to do so. See 65 P.S. § 66.1.
In addition, the majority does not conclude that the redacted information at issue in this case is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, I note that it is well-settled that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to all documents prepared by an attorney. See, e.g., Slusaw v. Hoffman, 861 A.2d 269 (Pa.Super.2004) (holding that invoices were not privileged documents to the extent that they do not disclose confidential communications), and Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 782 A.2d 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (holding that the defendants failed to establish that any documents for which they claimed attorney-client privilege were confidential communications for which attorney-client privilege is properly invoked). There is no indication in the majority opinion, or in the record, that the redacted information consists of or reflects confidential communications between attorney and client.

. The majority dismisses the analysis of the work product doctrine undertaken in cases concerning discovery issues. I submit, however, that whether attorney work product is protected from disclosure by discovery rules, statute or common law, the determination of whether particular information is or is not attorney work product requires the same analysis.

. Reading Eagle Co. v. Council of City of Reading, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 412, 627 A.2d 305 (1993), the case upon which the majority relies, does not support the majority's analysis. In Reading Eagle Co., the issue before the court was the specificity of the reason for holding executive session that must be disclosed to the public under section 8 of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 708. The court observed that section 8 of the Sunshine Act acknowledges that the public is better served if the governing body is permitted to have private discussions of litigation matters. However, we determined that the reason given for the executive session must be genuine and meaningful, and one the citizen can understand, because permitting “generalized fluff would frustrate the very purpose of the Act.” Reading Eagle, 627 A.2d at 307 (quotation omitted). We rejected the city council’s contention that the public could be adequately informed without identifying the general nature of the complaint to be discussed at executive session; we also rejected the city council’s assertion that the outcome of our decision was unduly burdensome.