Court Opinion

ID: 9849178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:44.384869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:05.157083
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented is whether a provision for grievance arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement concerning a police officer bargaining unit may be invoked after the collective bargaining agreement has expired and the union and the public employer have bargained to impasse. We would hold that the right to grievance arbitration is preserved by Section 13 of Act 312.
Section 13 of Act 312 provides:
During the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel, existing wages, hours and other conditions of employment shall not be changed by action of either party without the consent of the other but a party may so consent without prejudice to his rights or position under this act.
Section 13 was designed to extend after impasse the pera’s prohibition against unilateral action by either the public employer or the union. The Legislature deemed it necessary to preclude unilateral action after impasse to assure that the critical services performed by police officers and fire fighters would not be affected by a labor dispute. It is not consonant with the purpose of Act 312 to conclude, because there was some time interval between impasse and the invocation of Act 312, that the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment existing at the time of impasse no longer govern and that the public employer may, either during the hiatus or at any time thereafter, unilaterally change the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment existing at the time of impasse.
We would hold that the poam and Diedre Jaklin*31ski had the right to arbitrate the grievance arising out of her discharge.
I
Diedre Jaklinski began her employment as a deputy sheriff in the Ottawa County Sheriff’s Department in September, 1977.1 The collective bargaining agreement gave the county and the sheriff, the joint employers, the right to discharge or fail to rehire employees for just cause. The union representative was given the right to seek binding arbitration of "grievances,” defined as "a claim, reasonably and sensibly founded, of a violation of this agreement and/or violation of the rules and regulations of the Ottawa County Sheriff Department and/or Ottawa County.”
The collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1979, and the joint employers and the poam began negotiating a new contract. The mediator declared on April 14, 1980, that an impasse had been reached in negotiations. The impasse was not the result of differences regarding the grievance-arbitration procedure or the just-cause provision.
The poam petitioned, on April 29, 1980, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission for interest arbitration under Act 312. An amended petition was filed June 9, 1980. The interest arbitration hearing was held in March, 1981, and an award was issued in August. The award concerned economic provisions. The grievance and arbitration procedures were not affected.
In December, 1980 — after the contract had expired, impasse had been declared, and Act 312 *32arbitration had been invoked — Jaklinski received notice that she would not be reappointed. This was based on substandard performance evaluations and alleged inability to perform adequately. Jaklinski and the poam filed a grievance with the joint employers on December 9, 1980, claiming the failure to reappoint violated the just-cause discharge provision of the expired contract. The joint employers refused the request for grievance arbitration on the ground that the right to arbitrate a grievance terminated on the date the contract expired. Jaklinski’s employment ended on January 1, 1981.
The joint employers commenced this action seeking a stay of arbitration. The merc appointed an arbitrator to arbitrate the grievance. A year later, on March 5, 1982, the circuit judge enjoined the arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed relying on § 13 and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nolde Bros, Inc v Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 US 243; 97 S Ct 1067; 51 L Ed 2d 300 (1977).
II
Act 312, applicable to police officers and fire fighters, provides that either party may invoke its procedures to compel interest arbitration. The "procedures for the resolution of disputes” set forth in the act are designed to assure "the high morale” necessary for the performance of these critical police and fire department services.2 Section 13, providing for the continuation during compulsory arbitration proceedings of existing wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, is part of that dispute resolution procedure.
*33Act 312 supplements the pera.3 The words "wages, hours and other conditions of employment,” appearing in § 13 of Act 312, track language in § 15 of the pera providing that there is "a mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees” to bargain in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” This Court has said:
The subjects included within the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” are referred to as "mandatory subjects” of bargaining. Once a specific subject has been classified as a mandatory subject of bargaining, the parties are required to bargain concerning the subject, and neither party may take unilateral action on the subject absent an impasse in negotiations. [Central Michigan University Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan University, 404 Mich 268, 277; 273 NW2d 21 (1978).]
This Court has on a number of occasions, held that grievance and arbitration procedures are mandatory subjects of bargaining.4 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the merc opinions, referred to in the opinion of the Court, holding that "grievance and arbitration procedures aré not mandatory subjects of bargaining . . . conflict with Michigan Supreme Court cases on the issue and must be considered erroneous.” Because grievance arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the pera prohibits unilateral action regarding grievance arbitration procedures before impasse.
At impasse, under the pera, either party may take unilateral action consistent with its last *34offer.5 The employer can lower wages and change the provisions governing other mandatory subjects of bargaining.6 In the private sector strikes and lockouts occur during this period.7 Section 13 is designed to prevent, in labor disputes involving police officers and fire fighters, the turmoil that may result from unilateral action. To assure that these employees continue to work, unilateral action even after impasse is forbidden. This includes unilateral action concerning grievance arbitration procedures and all other mandatory subjects of bargaining.8 Until the arbitrator renders a decision, the status quo is preserved.
The opinion of the Court reads § 13 to mean that after impasse there are no "existing wages, hours and other conditions” to preserve, because at impasse the joint employers no longer have a duty not to alter mandatory subjects of bargaining, including the grievance arbitration procedure. That reading, in my opinion, defeats the purpose of the provision.
Section 13 is designed to assure that police and fire department services are not negatively affected because of unilateral action during negotiations. The solution adopted by the Legislature is to extend the prohibition against unilateral action after impasse. According to the opinion of the *35Court, unless Act 312 is invoked before or at the very moment of impasse, the prohibition against unilateral action after impasse does not become operative.
Requiring the union to invoke binding arbitration before impasse unnecessarily burdens the interest arbitration system and impedes independent party to party negotiation. It serves no purpose because the pera already precludes unilateral action before impasse.9
Requiring instantaneous invocation of Act 312 arbitration is an unduly rigid construction of § 13. There is no indication in Act 312 that time is of the essence — that if the union does not invoke Act 312 immediately upon impasse then instanter there no longer are any "existing wages, hours and other conditions.”
It does not serve the purpose of Act 312 to conclude that because there is some time interval between impasse and invocation of Act 312 procedures that the public employer could either during the hiatus or — as here — at any time thereafter unilaterally change the existing wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.10 So construing the act may result in exactly the kind of confrontation between the public employer and police officers and fire fighters that Act 312 was designed to forestall.11_
*36The Legislature enacted § 13 as part of Act 312 to bar unilateral action after impasse. The public employer and police officers and fire fighters and their representatives are encouraged to reach agreement without resorting to economic weapons because of the danger that the victim in this case would be the public.12 While they negotiate, the status quo is preserved. Either party may invoke Act 312 interest arbitration at any point. If they reach impasse, but both choose to wait before arbitrating, neither party would be prejudiced. If, after impasse, one party chooses to take unilateral action, the other party may still invoke Act 312 and there then would be proceedings pending before an arbitration panel.
Although the language could be improved upon, the "existing” conditions frozen by Act 312 "[d]uring the pendency of proceedings” are the provisions of the expired contract concerning the mandatory subjects of bargaining, including any provisions concerning grievance arbitration procedures.
The pera already prevented unilateral action with respect to these contract provisions before impasse. Section 13 extended this protection after impasse. This construction of the act effectuates the stated purposes of assuring an "expeditious, effective and binding procedure” necessary in the legislative judgment to preserve the "high morale” of police and fire department employees, and the exhortation that the "provisions of this act . . . shall be liberally construed” by the courts.13
*37Ill
The disposition of this appeal which we believe to be correct would make it unnecessary to consider the Nolde analysis.
We would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Levin, J.
(separate opinion). I write separately to express my disagreement with the opinion of the Court, which in addition to holding that the right to grievance arbitration is not preserved by § 13 of Act 312 holds, as a matter of construction of the public employment relations act, that after impasse and expiration of a collective bargaining agreement a grievance arbitration provision can no longer be invoked.
General principles of labor law preserve after impasse, without regard to § 13, the right to grievance arbitration. Nolde Bros, Inc v Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 US 243; 97 S Ct 1067; 51 L Ed 2d 300 (1977) — which I would assim*38ilate as part of our jurisprudence — established a strong presumption in favor of an arbitration clause surviving contract expiration. For this presumption to be rebutted, the parties must have indicated a contrary intention, either expressly or by clear implication. No such intention was expressed or implied in this collective bargaining agreement.
The right to arbitrate after contract expiration does not depend on the nature of the underlying obligation. Whether the underlying dispute concerns discharge or a right that has sometimes been described as vested is not determinative.
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should not "become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.”1
I
The opinion of the Court finds the Nolde analysis to be inapplicable.
A
Nolde sets forth the common law of federal labor relations on the question whether an arbitration clause survives contract expiration. Nolde involved a dispute concerning contract provisions providing for binding arbitration of all grievances and for severance pay on termination of employment of all employees having three or more years of active service. The contract provided that it would remain in effect until July 21, 1973, and continue in effect thereafter until there was a new *39agreement or either party gave a week’s notice of termination. The union gave notice of termination on August 20, 1973. The contract accordingly terminated on August 27. Negotiations continued, but on August 31, after the union threatened to strike, the employer chose to close the plant permanently. Wages and vacation pay were distributed. The employer, however, refused the union’s demand for severance pay, and declined arbitration, claiming that the contractual obligation to arbitrate expired when the agreement terminated. The United States District Court accepted the employer’s argument. The United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the duty to arbitrate can survive the expiration of the contract when it "affects . . . rights, like severance pay, that employees earn and that may or may not 'vest’ for future enjoyment — contingent upon a particular event.”2
Reviewing the lower court decisions, the United States Supreme Court "established a strong presumption favoring arbitrability.”3 The right to arbitrate, said the Court, did not necessarily expire with the contract. The arbitration clause survives contract termination unless the parties expressly, or by clear implication, indicate a contrary intent. If the operative effect of the arbitration clause survives, the Court will not concern itself with the character of the underlying right being arbitrated. If the underlying right "would have been subject to resolution under [the arbitration] procedures had it arisen during the contract term,” it could be arbitrated afterwards.4
The Court summarily disposed of the district *40court’s conclusion that because the duty to arbitrate is "a creature of the collective bargaining agreement and [neither] . . . party [can] be compelled to arbitrate any matter in the absence of a contractual obligation,” the duty necessarily expires when the agreement terminates.5 The Court said:
Carried to its logical conclusion that argument would preclude the entry of a post-contract arbitration order even when the dispute arose during the life of the contract but arbitration proceedings had not begun before termination. The same would be true if arbitration processes began but were not completed, during the contract’s term. Yet it could not seriously be contended in either instance that the expiration of the contract would terminate the parties’ contractual obligation to resolve such a dispute in an arbitral, rather than a judicial form.[6]
The Court went beyond a mere rejection of the district court’s conclusion that the arbitration clause automatically expired when the contract termination became effective. The Court said that "where the dispute is over a provision of the expired agreement, the presumptions favoring arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear implication.”7
In explaining the need for a strong presumption in favor of maintaining arbitration after the contract expired, the Court attempted to define the actual and presumed intent of the parties.8 The *41Court noted that "[w]hile the termination of the collective bargaining agreement works an obvious change in the relationship between employer and union, it would have little effect on many of the considerations behind their decision to resolve their contractual differences through arbitration.”9 The Court said these considerations were the parties’ confidence in the arbitration process, their choice of a prompt and inexpensive tribunal, the arbitrator’s special competence and experience in general in interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and the parties’ original belief that the arbitrator was the best judge of what this particular contract meant, and, finally, the alternative to arbitration would be a lawsuit — "the very remedy the arbitration clause was designed to avoid.”10 The Court also said that the parties "drafted their broad11 arbitration clause against a backdrop of well-established federal labor policy favoring arbitration as the means of resolving disputes over the meaning and effect of collective bargaining agreements.” The Court believed the context in which the contract was written "affords a basis for concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship” including those brought after the contract had expired.12
B
The Court gave no indication that the presumption in favor of arbitration applies to certain grievances, but not others. While the decision concerned severance pay, the language is comprehen*42sive. Affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Court did not adopt the Fourth Circuit’s distinction between rights that can be said to have vested and other rights arising under the contract.13 In the course of discussing the arguments of the parties, the Court noted that "the Union maintained that the severance wages . . . were in the nature of 'accrued’ or 'vested’ rights,” but the Court did not appear to consider this distinction in determining arbitrability. "As the parties’ arguments demonstrate, both the Union’s claim for severance pay and Nolde’s refusal to pay the same are based on their differing perceptions of a provision of the expired collective-bargaining agreement.”14 This alone is sufficient because,
in determining the arbitrability of the dispute, the merits of the underlying claim for severance pay are not before us. . . . [Wjhatever the outcome, the resolution of that claim hinges on the interpretation ultimately given the contract clause providing for severance pay. The dispute therefore, although arising after the expiration of the collective bar*43gaining contract, clearly arises under that contract.[15]
The Court did not appear to be concerned with the character of the underlying right. Whether severance is the type of right that expires or vests seemed to be irrelevant.16 The Court’s focus was not on the right being arbitrated but on the right to arbitration. The merits of the underlying claim will be decided by the arbitrator, the person in the best position to interpret the meaning of the contract.17 The underlying obligation need only be "arguably created by the expired agreement,”18 that is to say, the parties are arguing over the meaning of a provision of the old contract.
C
The opinion of the Court would limit the Nolde rationale to vested rights. The vested rights approach draws a distinction between "certain rights, such as pension, disability, seniority and vacation benefits [that] can accrue or vest during the life of the contract,” and others such as the right not to be discharged except for just cause, which are said not to vest or accrue during the life of the contract. The difference between the two is held to be that the "right not to be discharged except for just cause is of equal strength at the *44moment the contract is signed and at the moment the contract terminates. It does not entitle its holder to increased benefits over time, nor is its exercise contingent on other events.”
There are a number of flaws in this approach, some of which have already been considered. To reiterate, the Court in Nolde could have readily adopted the vested-rights approach by simply following the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. The Court’s language conflicts with such a narrow holding; when the Court mentioned vested rights it did so in the course of saying that the underlying obligation is not to be considered as long as the dispute arguably concerns the interpretation of the old contract. Also, the policy arguments the Court stressed in explaining the "strong presumption” in favor of arbitration even after termination apply equally well to rights that do not vest: the parties’ confidence in the arbitration process, their choice of an inexpensive and expeditious forum, their desire to avoid the courts, and their negotiation of a contract designed to be interpreted by an arbitrator.
The vested-rights approach ignores the Court’s warning not "to become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.”19 The opinion of the Court quotes this passage, but at the same time recognizes that parties may explicitly agree to their own definition of "accrued” or "vested” rights. Even without idiosyncratic definitions, the difference between rights that can vest and rights that cannot is difficult to determine. As one commentator noted, "rights under a collective bargain*45ing agreement are not readily classified as accruable or non-accruable. Nearly all benefits and job security become available only after the employee has worked some specified period.”20 Unlike courts that had adopted the vested-rights approach, the United States Supreme Court seemed to recognize and to avoid the difficulties inherent in interpreting collective bargaining agreements, the express and implied intricacies of which were meant to be decided by arbitrators.
This Court should heed the Court’s admonition and reject the vested-rights approach.
II
Nolde has been applied in two cases involving demands for arbitration based on alleged violations of just-cause discharge provisions. The nlrb, relying on the language and the comprehensive scope of the reasoning of Nolde, concluded that the "strong presumption” of arbitrability applies also to discharges. A United States District Court, however, read Nolde to have implicitly adopted the lower court’s distinction between rights that can and cannot vest; it held that severance pay is a right that can vest and discharge only for just cause is not.
A
In American Sink Top & Cabinet Co, Inc v Millmen-Cabinet Makers Local 550, 242 NLRB 408 (1979), an employee was discharged three months after the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The nlrb found the discharge arbitrable on the basis of Nolde. The board followed the same three-step analysis the United States Supreme Court employed. The board rejected the argument *46that the right to arbitration automatically expires when the contract terminates; instead, quoting Nolde, the board held that in the "absence of some contrary indication, there are strong reasons to conclude that the parties did not intend their arbitration duties to terminate automatically with the contract.” As for the underlying obligations being arbitrable, the board again quoted Nolde, holding "the parties’ obligations under their arbitration clause survive contract termination when the dispute [is] over an obligation arguably created by the expired agreement.” An alleged violation of the contract’s discharge provision that could have been arbitrated during the contract term could, thus, be arbitrated after expiration.21
The board read Nolde to mean
that if a dispute would have been arbitrable if it occurred when the contract was in effect, it remained arbitrable even though it occurred after the contract expired, regardless of the nature of the dispute, so long as the grievance was "arguably” raised as a contractual dispute and the contract did not expressly state that the duty to arbitrate terminated with the contract’s expiration.
In Digmor Equipment & Engineering Co, 261 NLRB 1175 (1982), the board relied on Nolde and American Sink to find another post-termination of contract discharge to be arbitrable.
B
The joint employers rely on a decision of a United States District Court, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Worker’s Int’l Union, Local No 4-23 v American Petrofina Co of Texas, 586 F Supp 643 *47(ED Tex, 1984). There post-contract arbitration of an alleged violation of a just-cause discharge provision was rejected. Petroñna, I believe, misreads Nolde by applying the vested-rights analysis to determine whether the right to arbitrate survives.
The district court’s decision in Petroñna was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on grounds that render the district court’s conclusions dicta at best. Without discussing whether the duty to arbitrate survived beyond the expiration date of the old contract, the Fifth Circuit held that
the issue of whether this dispute falls under the arbitration clause of the newly-instituted collective bargaining agreement between the parties must be submitted to an arbitrator pursuant to that agreement since we cannot say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause of that agreement is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers this dispute. [Oil, Chemical & Atomic Worker’s Int’l Union, Local No 4-23 v American Petrofina Co of Texas, 759 F2d 512, 516 (CA 5, 1985).]
Moreover, the district court did not read Nolde as limiting arbitration only to those rights that can vest. It said that "arbitration will be ordered in situations where the dispute centers around [sic] an event that took place either totally or in part during the term of the contract.” 586 F Supp 647. (Emphasis supplied.) This would appear to include arbitration of discharges that take place after the contract expires when the discharge was based at least in part on activities that took place during the term of the contract. Similarly, see Glover Bottled Gas Corp v Teamsters Local No 282, 711 F2d 479 (CA 2, 1983), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a grievance arising out of post-contract firing *48of employees for refusal to take a polygraph test related to a theft investigation was arbitrable when the theft and the refusal to take the test occurred during the term of the contract. See also Leonard, Post-contractual arbitrability after Nolde Brothers: A problem of conceptual clarity, 28 NY L Sch L R 257, 290 (1983), stating that "[o]f crucial significance in this analysis is the question of when the operative facts underlying the grievance occurred . . . .”
Jaklinski was discharged on the basis of alleged substandard performance evaluations and inability to perform her duties. She had been employed for three years, two of which were covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Although the record is not clear on this point, the period of time in which her performance was said to be substandard may have included some part of those two years. Thus, even if the district court’s decision in Petroñna were a correct statement of the law of post-contract arbitration, the grievance should be held to be arbitrable because the resolution of the dispute would likely involve an appraisal of Jaklinski’s job performance in the two years she worked under the contract and the parties had agreed that an arbitrator would make that appraisal. The Petroñna statement is not correct because the district court would require exactly what the United States Supreme Court in Nolde sought to avoid: an examination of the merits of the underlying obligation.
Ill
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. The right to grievance arbitration is preserved both by the common law of labor relations as articulated in Nolde and by § 13 of Act 312.

 Initially, the collective bargaining agent was the Ottawa County Deputy Sheriffs Association. Beginning in October, 1979, the bargaining agent was the Police Officers Association of Michigan.

 MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31).

 MCL 423.244; MSA 17.455(44); Local 1277, AFSCME v Center Line, 414 Mich 642, 652; 327 NW2d 822 (1982).

 See Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674, 681; 246 NW2d 831 (1976).

 Detroit v DPOA, 408 Mich 410, 449; 294 NW2d 68 (1980); DPOA v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 55, 56; 214 NW2d 803 (1974).

 Arbitration might be an exception to this rule because of Nolde. Nevertheless, it is not clear how Nolde affects the mandatory subjects of bargaining analysis because the two approaches have been kept separate. See Leonard, Post-contractual arbitrability after Nolde Brothers: A problem of conceptual clarity, 28 NY L Sch L R 257, 269 (1983) (trying to unify the two approaches).

 American Ship Bldg Co v NLRB, 380 US 300; 85 S Ct 955; 13 L Ed 2d 855 (1965).

 See generally Local 1277, AFSCME v Center Line, 414 Mich 654, stating that Act 312 covers mandatory, but not permissive, subjects of bargaining.

 CMU Faculty v CMU, 404 Mich 268, 277; 273 NW2d 21 (1978).

 The time interval between and invocation of Act 312 procedures in the instant case was fifteen days. If there was an extended time interval, then, depending on the circumstances, a different result might be appropriate. In this connection, we note that the act states that "the employees or employer may initiate binding arbitration proceedings by prompt request therefor . . . .” MCL 423.233; MSA 17.455(33). (Emphasis supplied.)

 See Dearborn Fire Fighters v Dearborn, 394 Mich 229, 247; 231 NW2d 226 (1975), stating that Act 312 "represents a legislative attempt to prevent the dire consequences of strikes or work stoppages by . . . policemen and firemen.”

 Dearborn Fire Fighters, 394 Mich 279, stating that "[w]hen policemen engage in a strike, the community becomes immediately endangered by the withdrawal of their services.”

 Even if Act 312 does not prevent the employer from making unilateral changes after impasse, the opinion of the Court appears to be flawed in holding that nothing remains. The Court says that at impasse the employer no longer has a duty not to act unilaterally with the result that there are no existing conditions to preserve. The second proposition does not necessarily follow from the first.
*37There clearly are existing conditions, although it may be uncertain what they are. The employer’s discretion is not unbounded. Any unilateral changes made would have to be consistent with the final offer to the employee’s representative. DPOA v Detroit, n 5 supra, 56. See also Bi-Bite Foods, Inc v Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Taxicab Drivers Union, 147 NLRB 59 (1964); Gorman, Labor Law, pp 445-446. At impasse, the duty to bargain is "not terminated but only suspended.” The "employer may not take action disparaging to the collective bargaining process . . . .” Morris, The Developing Labor Law (2d ed), p 636.
Given that the employer must make an offer consistent with his previous negotiating position, an argument could be made that the earlier offers made by the County of Ottawa included an arbitration clause, and therefore an arbitration clause would have to be a part of any unilateral change. Although the grievance procedure was not discussed in negotiations, this was probably because both parties expected the existing procedure to be included in the new agreement. The arbitration provision was in fact included in the new agreement.

 United Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 US 574, 585; 80 S Ct 1347; 4 L Ed 2d 1409 (1960).

 Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v Nolde Bros, Inc, 530 F2d 548, 553 (CA 4, 1975).

 Nolde Bros, 430 US 254.

 Id. at 252.

 Id at 250-251.

 Id. at 251.

 Id. at 255.

 Goetz, Arbitration after termination of a collective bargaining agreement, 63 Va L R 693, 705 (1977): "By their contract the parties clearly expressed their preference for an arbitral, rather than a judicial, interpretation of their obligations under the collective-bargaining agreement.”

 Id. at 254.

 Id.

 Broad in the sense that it covers a wide range of disputes.

 Id. at 254-255.

 Federated Metals Corp v United Steelworkers, 648 F2d 856, 861 (CA 3, 1981); United Mine Workers of America v Jericol Mining, Inc, 492 F Supp 132, 136 (ED Ky, 1980) ("The Supreme Court’s Nolde opinion was not based on notions of 'vesting.’ ”) Goetz, n 8 supra at 716 ("The Supreme Court’s failure to comment on this distinction suggests that the Court does not consider the nature of the dispute important”); Note, Post-contract arbitrability since Nolde Brothers, 54 U Colo L R 103, 108 (1982). But see Hudson School Board v King, 98 Mich App 517, 520; 296 NW2d 296 (1980) (although finding a right to arbitrate under an existing contract, the Court in dictum noted "Nolde ... is distinguishable . . . since . . . [it] concerned an accrued and vested right to severance pay upon termination whereas the dispute here did not 'arise under’ the expired contract.”); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Worker’s Int’l Union, Local No 4-23 v American Petrofina Co of Texas, 586 F Supp 643, 648 (ED Tex, 1984) (Nolde "limited . . . only to accrued rights and benefits), rev’d on other grounds 759 F2d 512 (CA 5, 1985); Petroñna is discussed in Part 11(B).

 Nolde, 430 US 248-249.

 Id. at 249.

 Goetz, n 8 supra at 704 (“Apparently the court need make no effort to determine whether the contractual right asserted has the legal effect of surviving termination of the contract”).

 Nolde Bros, 430 US 253; United Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, n 1 supra at 582 (The labor arbitrator is chosen, because the parties "expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop . . .”).

 Nolde Bros, 430 US 252.

 United Steelworkers v Warrior, 363 US 585.

 Goetz, n 8 supra at 720-721.

 See Leonard, Post-contractual arbitrability añer Nolde Brothers: A problem of conceptual clarity, 28 NY L Sch L R 257, 267 (1983).