Court Opinion

ID: 9731947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:02:35.310751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.116645
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In Grummel v Decker, 294 Mich 71, 77; 292 NW 562 (1940), our Supreme Court expressly held that provocation was a complete defense to a common-law dog-bite claim. Our Supreme Court has not overturned Grummet. The majority opinion essentially concludes that our state’s adoption of comparative fault extinguished the defense of provocation in common-law dog-bite cases. But this analysis overlooks the fact that contributory negligence and provocation are distinct defenses. VonBehren v Bradley, 266 Ill App 3d 446, 449-450; 640 NE2d 664 (1994). While contributory negligence eliminates a plaintiff’s claim because public policy demands that a plaintiff reasonably act to protect his own safety, provocation eliminates a dog owner’s duty to prevent the dog from doing damage. Id. at 448-450. So the provocation defense resembles the “open and obvious danger” doctrine and other duty-based defenses that remain unaltered by the adoption of comparative fault. Glittenberg v Dough-boy Recreational Industries (On Rehearing), 441 Mich 379, 403; 491 NW2d 208 (1992); see also O’Sullivan v Shaw, 431 Mass 201, 206; 726 NE2d 951 (2000) (listing the authorities and majority jurisdictions that find accordingly).
I again note that our Supreme Court established the defense, so we should resolve any doubt about its continued viability in favor of deference. Boyd v W G *543Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993). In my opinion, the trial court erred when it failed to determine initially whether the defense eliminated the common-law claim and later refused to instruct the jury on the defense’s applicability. I would vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial on plaintiff’s common-law claim.