Court Opinion

ID: 9503324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:41:19.536824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:23.198055
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring.
The majority correctly concludes, after interpreting ORS 30.275(9), that, in an action under the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.260 to 30.300, a plaintiff commences an action within the time allowed by law if the plaintiff complies with the 60-day service rule stated in ORS 12.020(2). I write separately to draw attention to certain aspects of the majority’s analysis that are not supportable.
The statute in question, ORS 30.275(9), provides:
“Except as provided in ORS 12.120, 12.135 and 659A.875, but notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action, an action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent *84of a public body within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall be commenced within two years after the alleged loss or injury.”
The majority properly begins with the text of that statute, especially the clause: “notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action [.]” In response to the city’s arguments, the majority first correctly rejects the claim that plaintiffs reading of the statute results in redundancy. Second, the majority correctly concludes that the rule of the last antecedent, on which the city relies, has application only “where no contrary intention appears.” 343 Or at 75. As the majority correctly opines, a “contrary intention appears” from the balance of ORS 30.275(9). The majority points out that the city’s “last antecedent” argument contradicts an important judicial rule — ejusdem generis — for interpreting statutory text and also contradicts the clear contextual purpose of ORS 30.275(9), i.e., the specification of the limitations period applicable to Oregon Tort Claims Act actions.
For me, the majority’s analysis of text and context demonstrates the legislature’s intent without serious contradiction. Certainly the city’s arguments, as listed by the majority, would nullify the application of significant contextual statutes regarding litigation by children and persons with mental disabilities with no evidence in ORS 30.275(9) or any other statute that the legislature intended that result.
So far, so good. But it is at that point in its discussion that the majority commits an analytical error: without explanation, it labels the city’s proposed statutory interpretation as “[grammatically * * * permissible.” 343 Or at 74. As a consequence of that label, the majority concludes that ORS 30.275(9) is ambiguous, requiring the court to explore legislative history.
The majority’s conclusion, in my view, is not correct. This court does not examine statutory grammar in isolation. Rather, we must determine legislative intent by considering initially the entirety of statutory text and context. As noted, a proper examination of those aspects of ORS 30.275(9), and not only its grammar, demonstrates that the city’s proffered *85statutory interpretation is not reasonable, i.e., is not, in context, “grammatically * * * permissible.”
The majority nonetheless embarks on a discussion of legislative history. Stated more precisely, the majority embarks on a discussion of other aspects of the legislative history of ORS 30.275(9), such as whether a two-year period of limitations should apply and whether the statute should require the delivery of a tort claim notice. Notably, the majority acknowledges that it has discovered no explanation, by any legislator or anyone else, regarding the meaning of the introductory clauses of ORS 30.275(9). Nevertheless, the majority transforms that silence in the legislative record into affirmative evidence of the legislature’s intent that removes all reasonable doubt about what the legislature meant to accomplish.
I cannot join in that reasoning. Legislative silence about the intent underlying a legislative proposal is just that: silence. Legislative silence regarding the “notwithstanding” clause in ORS 30.275(9) confirms nothing about the legislature’s intent in enacting that clause. Consequently, the silence in the legislative history regarding that clause cannot illuminate, much less clarify or remove, an ambiguity that supposedly arises from its text and context.
As noted, I conclude that ORS 30.275(9) is not ambiguous, and I draw that conclusion from an examination of statutory text and context. I would not resort to legislative history because no statutory ambiguity justifies that step.
For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s disposition of this case. Gillette, P. J., joins in this concurring opinion.