Court Opinion

ID: 9918468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 01:00:48.466098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:41.063676
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50406         Document: 00517031940             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-50406
                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                January 12, 2024
   Jaime Antonio Martinez,                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
                                                                    Petitioner—Appellant,

                                             versus

   FNU Rosalez, Warden,

                                                Respondent—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:22-CV-1297
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Jaime Antonio Martinez seeks the ability to pursue his habeas corpus
   petition in the district court. For the reasons contained herein, the district
   court’s ruling is AFFIRMED and Martinez’s motion for judicial notice is
   DENIED.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50406      Document: 00517031940           Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/12/2024

                                     No. 23-50406

                                           I.
                    A. Facts and Procedural History
          On February 10, 2006, Jaime Antonio Martinez, a United States
   citizen, was convicted in Mexico of aggravated homicide and was sentenced
   to 27 years, one month, and six days of imprisonment.
        1. Treaty Between Mexico and the United States
          A bilateral international treaty between the United States and Mexico
   allows American citizens convicted of crimes in Mexico to be transferred to
   the United States to serve their sentence. See Treaty Between the United States
   of America and the United Mexican States on the Execution of Penal Sentences,
   U.S.–Mex., Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 7399 (Treaty). One of the requirements
   for a transfer is that the offense of conviction must also be an offense in the
   receiving country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100(b), 4101(a). Upon transfer, the United
   States Parole Commission is “tasked with converting a Mexican conviction
   . . . into a parallel conviction under the laws of the United States.” Frascarelli
   v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 857 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2017). The Commission
   “does not re-sentence the transferee, nor does it revisit questions of guilt or
   innocence.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, it “determine[s] a release date
   . . . as though the offender were convicted in a United States district court
   of a similar offense.” Id. at 704 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(A)). An
   appeal from the Commission’s determination is treated “as though the
   determination appealed had been a sentence imposed by a United States
   district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(2)(B).
          Pursuant to the Treaty, Martinez was transferred to the United States
   two years after his Mexican conviction on March 10, 2008, to serve the
   remainder of his foreign sentence. Upon his transfer, the Commission
   determined that the offense of conviction was most like first-degree murder
   and set his release date after service of 168 months of imprisonment. In

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   November 2008, while Martinez was serving his sentence, he was convicted
   in two separate unrelated cases. As a result, he was sentenced to an additional
   combined 99 months of imprisonment 1, set to begin on June 1, 2025, or the
   date of completion of his sentence under the Treaty, whichever date comes
   sooner. On April 22, 2019, Martinez completed his foreign sentence and
   began serving his combined federal sentence.
               2. Bureau of Prisons and the First Step Act
           Once relocated, inmates transferred under the Treaty are in the
   Attorney General’s custody and are subject to the same laws, same
   conditions, and the same period of time imposed by the sentencing court as
   offenders convicted in a court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4102(2),
   4103, 4105(a). Acting on the Attorney General’s behalf, the Bureau of
   Prisons (BOP), is tasked with “administering” and calculating any time
   credits against a transferred prisoner’s sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503
   U.S. 329, 335 (1992). In doing so, the BOP considers time credited towards
   a sentence at the same rate as applicable to prisoners convicted in a United
   States district court. 18 U.S.C. § 4105(c)(1)–(3).
           Section 4105(c)(4) also specifies that a federal sentence imposed while
   a prisoner is serving a foreign sentence shall be aggregated with the foreign
   sentence as if the foreign sentence was a federal sentence. When a federal
   “term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to
   an undischarged term of imprisonment,” those sentences are considered
   “multiple terms of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). And “[m]ultiple
   terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be
           _____________________
           1
              The separate unrelated offenses were for possession with intent to distribute over
   five kilograms of cocaine and failure to appear for an offense committed prior to the
   issuance of his foreign conviction. These offenses and Martinez’s sentence will be referred
   to in this opinion as the “federal sentence.”

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   treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of
   imprisonment.” Id. § 3584(c).
          The First Step Act (FSA) enacted on December 21, 2018, after
   Martinez was already serving his foreign sentence, allows certain prisoners
   to participate in incentive programs and earn time credits that will be applied
   toward pre-release custody or an early transfer to supervised release. See id.
   § 3632. The statute defines a prisoner as 1) a person sentenced to
   imprisonment for a federal criminal conviction, and 2) “a person in the
   custody of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. § 3635(4). The statutory framework
   describes ineligibility factors, including “if the prisoner is serving a sentence
   for a conviction under [certain specified] provisions of law.” Id. §
   3632(d)(4)(D). There are seventy primarily federal offenses that can make a
   prisoner ineligible for FSA time credits. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D). As relevant
   here, one disqualifying conviction is “[a]ny section of chapter 51[] relating to
   homicide.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxv) (emphasis added).
               3. Denial of § 2241 Petition and Appeals.
          In December 2022, Martinez filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition
   alleging that the BOP had improperly disallowed certain time credits he was
   due under the FSA and had failed to make the requisite pre-release referral.
   Martinez argues that the BOP had initially listed him as eligible for time
   credits under the FSA, switched him to ineligible, then back to eligible, and,
   finally, back again to ineligible. The stated basis for Martinez’s ineligibility
   was his foreign conviction, but Martinez argued that he had already
   completed his foreign sentence. Rosalez conceded that the BOP initially
   erred by classifying Martinez as eligible for FSA time credits and that the
   error was caused by the BOP’s classification of Martinez’s foreign sentence
   as a prior sentence.
          The BOP corrected that error by treating Martinez’s foreign sentence

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   as one of his current, aggregated sentence obligations and that he was now
   ineligible for FSA time credits because his foreign homicide conviction was
   a disqualifying offense. Accordingly, Rosalez moved for dismissal or in the
   alternative denial of Martinez’s petition. Martinez opposed that motion and
   argued that: 1) the BOP had not aggregated his foreign sentence with his
   federal sentences, and 2) even if the BOP had aggregated those sentences,
   his foreign conviction was not a disqualifying offense under the FSA because
   the FSA’s list of disqualifying offenses did not include foreign offenses.
           A magistrate judge determined, however, that the BOP properly
   aggregated Martinez’s foreign sentence with his consecutive federal
   sentences for purposes of calculating FSA time credits. Because Martinez’s
   foreign conviction correlated to a domestic conviction for first-degree
   murder, a disqualifying offense for FSA purposes, the magistrate judge
   concluded that the BOP correctly listed him as ineligible to earn FSA time
   credits. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended granting Rosalez’s
   motion and denying Martinez’s § 2241 petition. Martinez timely filed written
   objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district
   court conducted a de novo review of the record, adopted the magistrate
   judge’s report, granted Rosalez’s motion to dismiss, and denied Martinez’s
   § 2241 habeas petition. 2 Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal on May 22,
   2023.
           Martinez proceeds pro se on appeal, arguing that he should be deemed
   eligible for FSA time credits because he is not currently serving a sentence
   for a disqualifying offense. He contends that his offense does not qualify as

           _____________________
           2 Rosalez also raises an issue of ripeness. There is not a ripeness issue here since

   Martinez’s Section 2241 petition argues (whether correctly or not) that he should have
   been released in October of 2022, so the merits issue is before us.

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                                        No. 23-50406

   first-degree murder because it was committed outside of the United States. 3
   In his reply brief, he also argues that his foreign sentence and federal sentence
   should not have been aggregated for FSA purposes because his foreign
   sentence was completed.
                                             II.
           A § 2241 petition is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the
   prison authorities’ determination of the duration of a prisoner’s sentence.
   Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner does not
   need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.
   Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
   In the § 2241 context, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
   error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. “A factual finding is not clearly
   erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v.
   Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 618 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). The court “may affirm the denial of habeas relief on any
   ground supported by the record.” Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th
   Cir. 2000).
                 A. Martinez’s Sentences Were Properly
                              Aggregated.
           Martinez first argues that his foreign and federal sentences were
   erroneously aggregated. Although multiple terms of imprisonment are not
   aggregated in all contexts, aggregation is explicitly applicable in the
   administrative context of consolidating a prisoner’s consecutive sentences.
   See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c); see also United States v. Chapple, 847 F.3d 227, 230
   (5th Cir. 2017) (agreeing that “§ 3584 only applies to aggregation ‘for

           _____________________
           3
            There is no language in the first-degree murder guidelines that state the murder
   must be committed in the United States.

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                                     No. 23-50406

   administrative purposes’ and does not impact the court’s judicial discretion
   under [18 U.S.C.] § 3582”). Section 4105(c)(4) specifies that a federal
   sentence imposed while a prisoner is serving a foreign sentence shall be
   aggregated with the foreign sentence as if the foreign sentence was a federal
   sentence. When a federal “term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant
   who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,” those
   sentences are “multiple terms of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).
          Here, Martinez’s federal sentences were imposed while he was still
   serving his foreign sentence, and all those sentences were aggregated for
   administrative purposes. Because his two federal sentences were combined
   and imposed to run consecutively to his foreign sentence, he is currently still
   serving the single, aggregated sentence based on those multiple terms of
   imprisonment when viewed in the administrative context. See id. §§ 3584(c),
   4105(c)(4).
          Even though the inmate data sheet does show that Martinez’s current
   aggregated sentence consists of the terms of his federal sentences, it also lists
   his foreign sentence as one of his current obligations. This supports the
   district court’s determination that Martinez was serving an aggregated
   sentence that included his foreign sentence. We agree with the district court
   that aggregation in the administrative context under §§ 3584(c) and
   4105(c)(4) was proper for purposes of FSA time credits. Teed v. Warden
   Allenwood FCI Low, No. 23-1181, 2023 WL 4556726, 1–2 (3d Cir. July 17,
   2023) (affirming the denial of a § 2241 petition and holding that the BOP
   properly determined that Teed was ineligible for FSA time credits because
   he was serving an aggregated sentence based in part on a disqualifying
   conviction for failing to register as a sex offender) (unpublished).
          Martinez argues and Rosalez concedes that the FSA does not include
   foreign convictions in its list of disqualifying offenses. 18 U.S.C. §

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   4106A(a)(b)(1)(A); § 3632(d)(4)(D). Rosalez counters that, because a
   foreign sentence is converted into a federal sentence by means of the
   Commission’s determination of a similar federal offense, that similar offense
   is used to decide if the transfer prisoner is disqualified for FSA purposes.
   Even if the FSA is not viewed within that overall transfer context, we defer
   to the BOP’s reasonable interpretation of the FSA. See Lopez v. Davis, 531
   U.S. 230, 242 (2001) (holding that the BOP’s reasonable interpretation of
   the statute governs as long as it has “filled the statutory gap in a way that is
   reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design”) (internal quotations
   omitted); Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that
   BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 was permissible).
           Here, the BOP’s program statement regarding FSA time credits
   states that “treaty transfer[] inmates . . . who are serving their sentence in
   Bureau custody are not eligible to earn [FSA time credits].” We hold that
   the district court correctly determined that Martinez’s foreign conviction
   was a disqualifying conviction for FSA purposes because, for administrative
   purposes, Martinez was serving a sentence that was construed as a sentence
   for first-degree murder under § 1111. 4 Therefore, we AFFIRM the district
   court’s denial of Martinez’s habeas petition because his sentences were
   properly aggregated, and he was not eligible to earn FSA time credits.

           _____________________
           4
              Martinez contends that his foreign offense cannot be equated to first-degree
   murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 because it does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of
   subsection (b). His argument lacks merit because the Commission was not convicting
   Martinez of a § 1111 offense by making the transfer treaty conversion, see Frascarelli, 857
   F.3d at 705 (noting that the Commission’s conversion does not involve resentencing or
   revisiting questions of guilt or innocence). Although the inmate data sheet mistakenly lists
   his converted offense as 18 U.S.C. § 1114, such a mistake is immaterial because § 1114 is
   also a disqualifying conviction under FSA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxv).

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      B. Martinez’s Motion for Judicial Notice is Denied
                      as Unnecessary.
          Lastly, on July 5, 2023, Martinez filed a motion requesting judicial
   notice of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in Jones v. Garza,
   No. 4:22-CV-764, 2023 WL 3354135, (N.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2023)
   (unpublished). “[J]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
   proceeding.” Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Grp.
   Int’l, 762 F.2d 454, 461 (5th Cir.), on reh'g sub nom. Colonial Leasing of New
   England, Inc. v. Logistics Control Int’l, 770 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
   Fed. R. Evid. 201(d)). We “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and
   the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.
   201(c)(2).
          In Jones, the magistrate judge disagreed with the BOP’s
   determination that Jones was ineligible for FSA time credits because the
   BOP treated Jones’s conspiracy conviction as if he had been convicted of the
   underlying offense, which was a disqualifying conviction. Jones, 2023 WL
   3354135, at 3–6. That decision is not precedential and does not address the
   relevant issues in this appeal. Additionally, since Martinez’s habeas appeal
   fails on the merits, this motion is also moot.
                                         III.
          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling regarding
   Martinez’s habeas petition and his motion for judicial notice is DENIED
   AS MOOT.

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