Court Opinion

ID: 9853024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:23.634886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:39.996307
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent, I would affirm the judgment for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Agee in the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, which opinion reads, as follows:
In action 65627 defendant was charged by information with burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), in that on or about May 31, 1965, he entered the Hall of Justice in San Francisco with the intent to commit theft therein. Three prior felony convictions were charged by an amendment to this information. These were admitted by defendant before trial.
In action 65648 defendant was charged by information with burglary, in that on or about May 29, 1965, in San Francisco, he entered the automobile of Stanley Karatz, when the doors thereof were locked, with the intent to commit theft.
In a jury trial concluded on September 8, 1965, defendant was convicted of second degree burglary in both actions.
The first point raised by defendant on appeal is that material evidence against him was obtained by an unlawful arrest.

Legality of Arrest

On June 2, 1965, about 1:15 a.m., Officer De Brunn of the San Francisco Police Department saw defendant-appellant and another man walking down Sixth Street near Howard Street, in San Francisco.
*657The officer knew appellant and was aware that he had been arrested on two occasions by fellow officers when he was observed carrying large quantities of clothing out of motel parking areas.1 The officer had himself on numerous occasions stopped appellant as he was coming out of alleys in this same area and, without exception, had always found a “screwdriver or a piece of wire, some tool on him. ’ ’
In fact, the officer had on a prior occasion chased and arrested appellant upon seeing him smash a car window with a brick. On that occasion, the appellant was wearing black stockings over both hands and had a screwdriver and eoathanger on his person. The officer testified that these are implements customarily used in gaining entrance to automobiles when the windows are rolled up and the doors locked.
At the time in question automobiles were, as usual, parked on Sixth Street for the night. The officer testified that there had been a large number of auto burglaries in this district and that appellant, as he was walking along, was moving his head from side to side and looking around.
The officer was in a marked patrol car. He called to appellant by name and asked if he could talk to him. Appellant came over to the car. The officer asked him what he was doing and where he was now living. Appellant replied that he lived with “my friend,” pointing to the man with him, and that he was going home. Appellant said that he had just moved there and did not know the address. The friend said he lived at 111 Mason Street.
The officer thereupon said to appellant, “Sam, you’re going in the wrong direction.” Appellant replied, “I lied to you, ... I’m going to see a couple of girls.” He stated that he did not know where the girls lived but would “have to look for it.”
The officer then asked appellant what he had in the paper bag he was holding. Appellant dropped the bag and said, “What bag?” When the bag hit the pavement there was a “clank” and it fell over. The officer then saw about three inches of a pry bar protruding out of the end of the bag.
At this point the officer warned appellant that he did not have to answer any questions, that anything he said could be *658used against him, and that he had the right to an attorney. (No “Dorado”2 question has been raised by appellant.)
The officer picked up the bag and found inside a hacksaw, a file, and the pry bar.3 Appellant stated that they were his and that he used them on his job. When asked where he worked, appellant replied that it was automobile work but that he had just gotten the job and ‘ ‘ I don’t know the name. ’ ’
The officer thereupon arrested appellant for illegal possession of burglar’s tools. (Pen. Code, § 466.) The tools were admitted in evidence over appellant’s objection that they were the product of an illegal arrest.
Penal Code section 466 provides in pertinent part as follows : “Every person having upon him or in his possession a picklock, crow, keybit., or other instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter into any building ... is guilty of misdemeanor.” “Building” as used in section 466 includes a motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
Penal Code section 836 provides in pertinent part that “A peace officer may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person; 1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence.” The undisputed evidence is that the tools which appellant had in his possession (in the presence of the arresting officer) were commonly used as “burglar’s tools.” However, there is no violation of section 466 unless the possessor of such tools intended to use them in the manner described in that section.
It is now well settled in California that a peace officer may make a lawful arrest without a warrant when circumstances exist that would cause a reasonable person to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed in his presence. (Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 320 [239 P.2d 876].)
As stated in Farnsworth v. Cote, 199 Cal.App.2d 762, 767 [19 Cal.Rptr. 45], the decisive factor is whether “ [a] reasonable person confronted by the scene which the officers viewed . . . could have an honest and strong suspicion of appellant’s guilt of a violation of [a designated misdemeanor]. ’ ’
Moreover, as stated in People v. Garrison, 189 Cal.App.2d 549, 557 [11 Cal.Rptr. 398], “The question of reasonable and probable cause must be measured by the facts presented to the officer at the time he is required to act.” In determining such question, an officer is justified in taking into account the past conduct, character and reputation of the person sus*659pected. (People v. Wickliff, 144 Cal.App.2d 207, 212 [300 P.2d 749].)
Under the circumstances of this ease, as related above, we are of the opinion that Officer De Brunn had reasonable and probable cause to believe that appellant had the intent to use the tools in his possession for the commission of a burglary.
We are further of the opinion that the prosecution need not establish that such intent was directed to a specific building or motor vehicle. (See out-of-state eases interpreting similar statutes, cited in footnote 80 of 12 C.J.S., Burglary, § 69, and 1966 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part.) There are no California cases which discuss this point.
Having determined that the arrest was lawful, we hold that the seizure of the tools being carried by appellant was reasonably incident to such arrest.

Legality of Search of Hotel Boom

On May 27,1965, appellant had rented a room in a hotel for one week. On June 4, the day following the expiration of appellant’s tenancy, the police entered this room after first obtaining the hotel manager’s consent to do so. No search warrant had been obtained. Certain articles, including a briefcase and a 2-foot pry bar found in a suitcase belonging to appellant were seized and later admitted in evidence at the trial.
The specific purpose of the police in searching the room was to look for the other half of a broken hacksaw blade found at the scene of the Hall of Justice burglary.
The prosecution concedes that a landlord or hotel manager cannot give consent to a search of rooms during the tenancy of the occupant. (Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889]; People v. Cruz, 61 Cal.2d 861 [40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889].) However, it relies upon the fact that appellant’s right to occupy the room had expired. In other words, it was no longer “appellant’sroom.”
In People v. Van Eyk, 56 Cal.2d 471, 478 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326], the court stated: “The record is sufficient to show that the hotel room in which the narcotics were found on September 15 was no longer defendant’s room. He rented it on September 13, paying for one day only .... Defendant’s tenancy could be found to have expired before the search was made, and the manager of the hotel was entitled to permit the police to enter and search the room. ’ ’
We hold that, in the instant case, the hotel manager had the *660right on June 4, 1965, to consent to the entry and search of the room by the police.

Consolidation of Actions for Trial

Action 65627 was tried alone and ended on August 19, 1965 in a jury disagreement. On August 25, 1965, the prosecution moved to consolidate this action with action 65648 for trial. In response to the court’s inquiry, appellant’s counsel stated that he had “no argument to present on the matter.'’ The court thereupon ordered the consolidation under the power given to it under Penal Code section 954.
Such failure by appellant to object or demand separate trials waives any right to now raise the point on appeal. (People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 175 [238 P.2d 1001] ; People v. Bennett, 119 Cal.App.2d 224, 226 [259 P.2d 476] ; People v. Van De Wouwer, 91 Cal.App.2d 633, 640 [205 P.2d 693].)
Moreover, the two offenses charged are of the same class, burglary; appellant is the only defendant named in each charge; both offenses were committed in the same city approximately one day apart.
Appellant argues that the consolidation was sought by the prosecution in order to strengthen its ease in the first action, the outcome of the prior trial having demonstrated the weakness of that action. Even though this speculation were to be accepted, it does not follow that the consolidation of a weak case with a strong ease warrants the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering such consolidation. (People v. Gryszkiewicz, 88 Cal.App.2d 230, 234 [198 P.2d 585].)
We find no error or abuse of discretion in the consolidation of the two actions in a single trial.

Trial Judge’s Comment on the Evidence

California Constitution article VI, section 19, as amended in 1934, provides as follows: “The court may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses. ’ ’
Appellant complains of the following comment made by the trial judge to the jury: “By the Constitution of this State a *661judge of this court'presiding in a trial of an action is authorized within proper bounds to comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness. It is the opinion of this Court, based on the evidence, that the guilt of the defendant Sam Brock as to both of the offenses here charged, has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. I would caution you, however, that it is your right and your duty to exercise the same independence of judgment in weighing my comment on the evidence as you are entitled to exercise in weighing the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel. You will keep in mind that you are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of all questions of fact submitted to you. Such authority as the Trial Judge has to express his personal thought on any of these matters is confined to the sole purpose of aiding you in arriving at a verdict and may not be used, and it is not used in this case, to impose his will upon you or to compel a verdict. ’ ’
The foregoing statement does not exceed the bounds of proper comment. As stated in People v. Friend (1958) 50 Cal.2d 570, 578 [327 P.2d 97]: “The extent to which a judge is free to comment on the evidence is shown by the fact that it has frequently been recognized that a judge may express his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, so long as the province of the jury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded. (People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 383 [260 P.2d 1]; People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 893 [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 658-659 [140 P.2d 828]; People v. Warren, 16 Cal.2d 103, 114 [104 P.2d 1024] ; People v. Eudy, 12 Cal.2d 41, 47 [82 P.2d 359]; People v. Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 729 [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Yokum, 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 258 [302 P.2d 406]; People v. Huff, 134 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [285 P.2d 17]; Pomerantz v. Bryan Motors, Inc., 92 Cal.App.2d 114, 119 [206 P.2d 440]; People v. Busby, 40 Cal.App.2d 193, 202 [104 P.2d 531].) ”
To the foregoing citations may be added the recent ease of People v. Williams (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 389, 402 [45 Cal.Rptr.427],

Sufficiency of Evidence in Action 65627

At some time between Sunday noon, May 30, 1965, and 8 a.m. on the following day, the lock on the door entering into the property clerk’s office at the Hall of Justice was jimmied and the bolt attached thereto was sawed. The sufficiency of the *662evidence to establish the corpus delicti of a burglary is not in dispute.
Expert testimony established that the pry bar used to jimmy the lock was the same as that found in appellant’s hotel room on June 4,1965.
Numerous finger and palm prints of appellant were found on said door on Monday morning, May 31, 1965. This door had been washed with an "all-purpose cleanser ’ ’ on the preceding Wednesday or Thursday. The testimony is that such a washing would have completely obliterated any prints then on the door.
Appellant had an explanation for his prints being on the door. He testified that he had been incarcerated in the county jail at San Bruno and had gotten out on Wednesday, May 26, 1965; that he went to the property clerk’s office about 11:30 a.m. of that day to get some keys that belonged to him; that he was told there to go to the burglary detail in the same building; that in entering the property clerk’s office he pressed both of his hands upon the door in order to open it.
The jury did not have to believe this testimony of appellant. Inspector Siegfried of the San Francisco Police Department testified that on the day of his arrest, June 2, 1965, appellant stated to him that “he hadn’t been anywhere near the Hall of Justice” since April 27, 1965, the day when he was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail.
Inspector Kramer of the San Francisco Police Department testified as to the location on the door of appellant’s palm prints and fingerprints.
Thereafter appellant took the stand and gave the following answer to the following question: “ Q. Uh-huh. Can you tell me, Mr. Brock, how your fingerprints and palm prints got on all the different areas of the door that was described by Inspector Kramer? A. Well, now, I cannot explain how my prints could get all spread around that far. I merely used one portion of the door to enter. Now, I’m not saying maybe someone that’s—I think they are getting—they’re kind of getting things a bit saying my prints could be in that many places. I don’t see how it could possibly be that many places because, like I said, I used one section of the door to enter, and I had to use both hands to shove or push the door. ’ ’
Appellant cites People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104 [41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700], There a second degree murder conviction was reversed on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. One of the items of evidence was discussed as follows: *663“The police found a man’s shoeprints, including two heel-prints, in the blood near the body. Although one of defendant’s heels bears an unusual gash that might be expected to show up in a print, there is no evidence of such a gash in the heelprint. ’ ’
We fail to see the connection between the shoe-prints in the Hall case and the finger and palm prints in the instant case. Nor do we accept appellant’s contention that his “fingerprints are inconclusive since they have been explained away ....’’
Appellant makes the further statement that “All other evidence [i.e., other than the prints] was purely speculative.’’ We do not think that the expert testimony positively identifying the pry bar found in appellant’s room as the same tool which had left marks on the door in question was in any sense “speculative.’’
There is no doubt in our mind that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction in action 65627.

Variance Between Pleading and Proof in Action 656Í8

The information alleged that the automobile burglarized was that of Stanley Karatz. The proof showed that it belonged to Bernard Krause.
Krause had driven Karatz to the Merchandise Mart on Market Street. Karatz left his briefcase in the car and Krause locked the doors. When they returned, the car had been broken into and the briefcase had been taken. This was the briefcase which the police found in appellant’s room.
The foregoing allegation with respect to the owner of the property burglarized was not a material error. (Pen. Code, § 956.) A variance is not material unless it is of such a substantive character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense. (People v. Williams, 27 Cal.2d 220, 226 [163 P.2d 692] ; see also People v. D’Antignac, 101 Cal.App.2d 7, 8 [224 P.2d 900], and People v. McGilver, 67 Cal. 55, 56 [7 P. 49].)
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 31, 1967.

All of the testimony as to the officer's knowledge of appellant’s ‘1 past ’ ’ was elicited out of the presence of the jury and was limited to the issue of whether the officer had reasonable and probable cause to arrest the appellant.

People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].

Another officer testified that such tools were commonly used "in burglaries.