Court Opinion

ID: 9620988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:50:14.240648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:56.869240
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there was no error or abuse of discretion in the admission of the “Fourth of July” statement or the “candyman” statement.
The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662 (Ky.2000). A ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence should not be disturbed unless the trial judge abused his discretion. Gor-man, supra. Even if the trial judge admitted the statement for a wrong reason, there is no abuse of discretion here which justifies the appellate relief.
In large measure, this case turns on the doctrine of “present sense impression,” which is a well-recognized exception to the general rule regarding the inadmissibility *806of hearsay -within KRE 803(1). Time is an important element in the exception. Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466 (Ky.1998). A lapse of time is permissible. In this matter there was approximately a 15-minute lag between the alleged event and the statement. In my view, there is an uncertainty as to what the statement actually means. A plausible argument can be made that it is a reference to all the lights and commotion from the police and emergency vehicles at the scene. In any event, such uncertainty supports the proposition that the admission of the statement was harmless. RCr 9.24. The isolated reference to the statement did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, and thus should not be the basis for reversal. There is no prejudicial error, if any, because three eyewitnesses testified that they saw Terry shoot the victim. Two eyewitnesses testified that he robbed the victim after shooting him. There is very strong direct evidence of guilt and, therefore, any error in the admission of evidence could be considered nonprejudicial.
The record here indicates that Nourse gave the murder weapon to Terry and then disposed of the shell casings. He also washed the blood off of the money. At the time of the trial of Terry, Nourse had several other charges pending against him, and he claimed his fifth amendment right not to testify at this trial. Under all the circumstances, his statement that Terry shot the victim could certainly be against his penal interest and thus covered by KRE 804.
In the final analysis, the trial judge ultimately sustained the objection to the statement and admonished the jury to disregard the testimony. Thus any defect in the testimony had been cured. See Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky.1993) overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky.1997). The trial judge properly denied the motion for mistrial as unwarranted.
In this matter the defendant received a fundamentally fair trial and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed in all respects.
GRAVES, J., joins this dissenting opinion.