Court Opinion

ID: 9718305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:20:43.547259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:58.300747
License: Public Domain

*29Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
On January 13, 1969, appellant’s case was called for trial. After he entered a plea of not guilty, appellant’s counsel, the assistant district attorney a,nd the trial judge went into conference in the judge’s chambers. When the conference ended the assistant district attorney stated in open court that defense counsel had advised him that defendant wished to enter a plea of guilty to murder generally. Appellant was then questioned by the trial judge as to his understanding of the plea: “Q. Now, has [sic] any threats or promises been made to you to change your pleas of not guilty to guilty? A. No, Your Honor. Q. Have any promises been made to you, either by the District Attorney or through counsel or any one else, as to what your sentence will be? A. No, Your Honor.”
Evidence was then taken concerning appellant’s degree of guilt, after which the assistant district attorney addressed the court: “ [A] s to any consideration of sentence, ... I would say, having gone into this case . . . and freely discussed it at great length yesterday even on the telephone with Mr. Sinclair [defense counsel], I told him yesterday that I would make the statement to the Court that ... it is my understanding the sentence at Broadmeadows would be a maximum of two years. . . .” (emphasis added)1 The court then found *30appellant guilty of second degree murder and deferred sentence pending a pre-sentence investigation.
On April 8, 1969, appellant filed a petition for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his plea was entered on a belief that he would only get two years in jail. On June 12,1969, the court considered appellant’s petition; on July 29, the petition was denied en banc, three judges dissenting. On August 20 the court sentenced appellant to six to twelve years imprisonment. This appeal followed.
The question presented by this appeal is what is the proper standard for granting leave to withdraw a guilty plea when such motion is made prior to sentencing. It is my view that prior to sentencing leave should be allowed whenever the defendant advances any fair and just reason for withdrawal, unless the Commonwealth can show that it was substantially prejudiced by its reliance on the defendant’s guilty plea.
1 begin by noting that this Court has never articulated the important distinction between pre-sentence and post-sentence plea withdrawals.2
3 “Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the *31right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.” Kadwell v. United States, 315 F. 2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963).
This practical difference between the two situations certainly indicates that a more liberal view should be taken toward pre-sentence plea withdrawal. See Comment, “Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts,” 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 759 (1965). Indeed, the federal courts have apparently adopted this approach. In United States v. Stayton, 408 F. 2d 559, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1969) (emphasis in original), the court stated: “In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice. . . . This does not mean that every motion for withdrawal before sentence should be granted. There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the right to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court.... If the government can show substantial prejudice, then the motion, in the trial court’s discretion, may be denied.” Accord Kadwell v. United States, 315 F. 2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963); Gearhart v. United States, 272 F. 2d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Poole v. United States, 250 F. 2d 396, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; see Bergen v. United States, 145 F. 2d 181, 187 (8th Cir. 1944). See also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583 (1927) (dictum) (emphasis added) : “The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.”
The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, §2.1 (Approved Draft 1968) likewise makes a distinction between pre-sentence and post-sentence withdrawal. Section 2.1 (a) provides: *32“The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty . .. whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”3 Section 2.1(b), on the other hand, provides: “. . . Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”
Applying that standard to the instant • case, it is quite clear that appellant should have been given leave to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. Appellant has advanced a “fair and just” reason: He first believed that the judge had agreed to a plea bargain for a two year sentence, but later realized that the judge was not informed of, and did not concur in, the bargain. This erroneous impression was conveyed to him by the fact that the trial judge met with counsel in chambers before he withdrew his plea of not guilty, by the assistant district attorney’s recommmendation of two years at the degree of guilt hearing, and by the representations of defense counsel. Defense counsel in fact testified that “I would be less than frank . . . not to admit that I think I did raise in his [the defendant’s] mind the feeling that if both of us recommended it [a two year sentence] our recommendations would be accepted [by the trial judge].” The assistant district attorney testified: “I realize there was [sic] many pitfalls which the Commonwealth had in this particular case. ... I made the statement to Mr. Sinclair [defense counsel] that if I were asked I would say, yes, that *33I feel under all the circumstances of this case ... a two year sentence [would be appropriate] . . . and I did so state to Mr. Sinclair.”
The appellant was obviously somewhat confused about the binding nature of the agreement. This confusion was shown at the degree of guilt hearing where appellant testified that no promises had been made, but the assistant district attorney testified that a plea bargain had been arrived at before the hearing.4 After the degree of guilt hearing appellant wisely began to question the agreement. Hence his desire to withdraw the plea. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 56 n.*, 252 A. 2d 689, 691 n.* (1969) (where trial judge cannot keep plea bargain, he should allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea) ; Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 272, 278, 142 A. 2d 174, 177 (1958) (“The defendant’s plea of guilty was induced by promises of a recommendation of leniency . . . and on that ground the majority of us are of the opinion that the sentencing judge is clearly chargeable with an abuse of discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.”); cf. United States v. Paglia, 190 F. 2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.) (dictum).
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, does not assert any prejudice, nor can any be shown in the instant case. I see no reason, therefore, why appellant should not now be allowed to exercise his right to have the Commonwealth prove his guilt. He has not deceived the court in any way, nor did he fail to act promptly, nor did he wait until the trial court announced sentence and then seek to change his plea. Appellant was merely the victim of an admitted plea bargain which he thought would bind the judge. Certainly it cannot matter that the judge, unbeknownst to appellant, was not aware of the plea bargain and was not in any way *34bound by the agreement. Such a misunderstanding can occur easily and we should not penalize appellant for it.
Accordingly, I dissent and would allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty.
Mr. Justice Pomeroy joins in this dissent.

 While the inconsistency between the assistant district attorney’s statement and the defendant’s as to a plea bargain most likely indicates the defendant’s confusion at this point, it may also stem from an erroneous belief that the court would not have accepted the plea if the bargain were known. The proper procedure, however, is to alert the judge to the bargain; if the judge later finds that he cannot concur in it, he should permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if the defendant desires. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 56 n.*, 252 A. 2d 689, 691 n.* (1969) ; ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, §2.1(a) (ii) (4) (Approved Draft 1968).

 None of the eases relied on by the majority for its strict standard mate any distinction between the two situations. Compare Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A. 2d 521 (1964) (post-sentence withdrawal) ; Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A. 2d 338 (1963) (motion for withdrawal made after court announced degree of guilt) ; Commonwealth ex rel. O’Niel v. Ashe, 337 Pa. 230, 10 A. 2d 404 (1940) (no facts given) ; Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 326 Pa. 69, 191 Atl. 167 (1937) (after sentence of electrocution) ; Commonwealth v. Shawell, 325 Pa. 497, 191 Atl. 17 (1937) (post-sentence) with Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A. 2d 540 (1967) (pre-sentence withdrawal, but motion made one year after entering plea and mating statements of guilt in trial of co-defendant) ; Commonwealth v. Cole, 384 Pa. 40, 119 A. 2d 253 (1956) (before imposition of death penalty).

 The majority relies on Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A. 2d 338 (1963), for a standard which is quite similar to the one enunciated by the ABA for post-sentence withdrawals. It is to be noted that Rirlcland itself was a ease in which withdrawal was not requested until after the proposed bargain had fallen through.

 See note 1 supra.