Court Opinion

ID: 9831688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:17:37.377888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.076231
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In appellants’ motion for rehearing, this is said: “There is no pleading that there was a waiver to. furnish an abstract on April 27th, and further there is no pleading that the appellees agreed to accept the lease without the examination of title, and the opinion of the court goes off on a wrong theory and sidesteps the objection urged and the contention made by the appellants.” 4
That construction of the pleading is incorrect, as shown by allegations in plaintiffs’ trial amendment wherein it was alleged that on April 27th, when the fee owners executed the lease to the defendants, they and plaintiffs “offered to deliver to the defendants an abstract of title and the defendants waived a delivery at said time and agreed that they would get the abstract, after being told where it was, when they got ready to have it examined. That plaintiffs believed that the title was satisfactory and from that time on had heard no complaint or objection as to the title until about the 18th day of May, 1934, at which time the defendants breached the contract. That by the acts and conduct of the defendants herein, they waived the question of delivery of the abstract and examination thereof and accepted the title to said lease.”
Special issue No. 12, shown in our original opinion, presented the issue of waiver, so pleaded, and was relied on by plaintiffs to excuse their failure to deliver the abstract of title within the time required by their contract, and they are in no position to complain that it was an evi-dentiary issue only. Nor did plaintiffs object to its submission on any ground. Article 2185, Rev.Civ.Statutes.
While the pleading of parol agreement and waiver, shown in plaintiffs’ trial amendment, was not embodied in their second amended original petition, yet the defense of the statute of frauds invoked against that petition was also available *814against the allegations of the parol agreement and waiver, shown in plaintiffs’ trial amendment, which was expressly made in aid of plaintiffs’ second amended petition. The trial amendment was overlooked by us on original hearing. However, in view of the conclusion reached that all 'of appellants’ assignments of error discussed above should be overruled and the judgment affirmed, it becomes unnecessary for us to discuss the merits of appellees’ counter proposition that the judgment should be sustained, for the further reason that the parol agreement, set out in plaintiffs’ trial amendment, was in violation of the statute of frauds (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 3995) Appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.