Court Opinion

ID: 9745519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:06:55.447571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:29.669318
License: Public Domain

*802MCDONALD, J., Concurring and Dissenting
I agree with part II of the majority opinion that under the facts of this case the trial court correctly refused to instruct that Scott’s reasonable belief Kristina was 16 years old established a defense to the nonforcible sex crimes. (Counts 2, 4 and 6—Pen. Code, §§ 261.5, subd. (d) and 288a, subd. (b)(2).)11 also agree with parts III and IV that the trial court correctly instructed with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 and found true the prior serious or violent felony conviction allegation. However, I do not agree with part I (lesser included offense analysis) and as a result I also do not agree with part V (limitation on credits).
In part I the majority concludes that the count 2 offense (unlawful intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age) is not a lesser included offense to the count 1 offense (forcible rape), and the counts 4 and 6 offenses (oral copulation by a person over 21 years of age with a minor under 16 years of age) are not lesser included offenses to the counts 3 and 5 offenses (forcible oral copulation), respectively. Were the majority comfortable with this conclusion, part I would have ended at that point; no further discussion of Scott’s argument that section 1023 barred retrial of counts 1, 3 and 5 was necessary. However, part I continues with a discussion that concludes double jeopardy and section 1023 would prohibit retrial of the forcible sex offenses (counts 1, 3 and 5) if the nonforcible sex offenses (counts 2, 4 and 6) were lesser included offenses of the forcible sex offenses under the elements test but not if they were lesser included offenses under only the accusatory pleading test. In my opinion counts 2, 4 and 6 are lesser included offenses to counts 1, 3 and 5, respectively, under the accusatory pleading test, and section 1023 as applied in People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] (Fields), bars retrial of the greater offenses.
The California Supreme Court recently summarized the principles of lesser included offenses in People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713]. In Lopez, the court stated at pages 288 and 289:
“To determine whether a lesser offense is necessarily included in the charged offense, one of two tests (called the ‘elements’ test and the ‘accusatory pleading’ test) must be met. The elements test is satisfied when ‘”all the legal ingredients of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense [are] included in the elements of the greater offense.” [Citation.]’ . . .
“Under the accusatory pleading test, a lesser offense is included within the greater charged offense ‘ “if the charging allegations of the accusatory *803pleading include language describing the offense in such a way that if committed as specified the lesser offense is necessarily committed.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” If either test is met the lesser included offense is necessarily included in the charged offense. (19 Cal.4th at p. 288.)
In this case the charging allegations of counts 1 and 2, considered together, describe the offense as follows: On or about September 5, 1996, Scott, a person over 21 years, did unlawfully have and accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with Kristina, a minor under 16 years of age not his spouse, against said person’s will, by means of force, violence, duress, menace and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury in violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2). As so charged, if section 261, subdivision (a)(2) is committed, the lesser offense of section 261.5, subdivision (d) is necessarily committed.
The charging allegations of counts 3 and 4, considered together, describe the offense as follows: On or about September 5, 1996, Scott, being over 21 years of age, did unlawfully accomplish an act of oral copulation with Kristina, a person under the age of 16, which act was accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace and feat or immediate and unlawful bodily injury in violation of section 288a, subdivision (c). As so charged, if section 288a, subdivision (c) is committed, the lesser offense of section 288a, subdivision (b)(2) is necessarily committed. Counts 3 and 4 are described in the charging allegation as the “first instance” to distinguish the charge from counts 5 and 6, which are described as the “second instance.”
Similarly, the charging allegations of counts 5 and 6, considered together, describe the offense as follows: On or about September 5, 1996, Scott, being over 21 years of age, did unlawfully accomplish an act of oral copulation with Kristina, a person under the age of 16, which act was accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury in violation of section 288a, subdivision (c). As so charged, if section 288a, subdivision (c) is committed, the lesser offense of section 288a, subdivision (b)(2) is necessarily commit-ted.
Therefore, under the accusatory pleading test set forth in Lopez, as charged count 2 is a lesser included offense to count 1, count 4 is a lesser included offense to count 3, and count 6 is a lesser included offense to count 5. The majority disagrees with my view because the offenses were pleaded in different counts (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 795-796). However, if merely pleading in separate counts avoided the issue of lesser included offenses *804determined under the accusatory pleading test, there would be no accusatory pleading test; the test could always be avoided by merely using multiple counts for the same offense. (See People v. Rush (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 20 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 15] [lesser included offenses found in separate counts under the accusatory pleading test].) The majority also refers to People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48] for the proposition that a person may be convicted of multiple offenses arising from a single act or individual course of conduct, although section 654 bars multiple punishment. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 795, fn. 6.) However, the majority’s quotation from Ortega includes the caveat that the proposition does not apply if one offense is a necessarily included offense to the other. Because here the nonforcible offenses are lesser included offenses to the forcible offenses, the majority’s quote from Ortega, although correct, by its terms is inapplicable to this case.
The majority’s analysis is based on two concepts; double jeopardy and a perceived distinction between elements lesser included offenses and accusatory pleading lesser included offenses. The majority’s position assumes that under the accusatory pleading test, but not under the elements test, the nonforcible sex crimes are lesser included offenses to the forcible sex offenses. It then concludes that only elements test lesser included offenses may be considered in a double jeopardy analysis. The problem with the majority’s position is that no one, other than the majority, contends the bar to retrial of the forcible sex offenses is based on double jeopardy principles. Therefore, even if the majority’s perceived distinction between elements test and accusatory pleading test lesser included offenses is Correct, it is not relevant to this case.
First, the majority opinion characterizes Scott’s appellate contention to be that his convictions of the nonforcible sex offenses were implicit acquittals of the forcible sex offenses because the former were lesser included offenses of the latter and as a result retrial of the forcible sex offenses was barred by double jeopardy principles. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 793-794.) The majority opinion has mischaracterized Scott’s position. Scott does not argue that double jeopardy bars retrial of the forcible sex offenses; Fields rejected the double jeopardy argument. (Fields', supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 303 [“We thus conclude that under the double jeopardy principles embodied in the California Constitution [and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution], when jurors deadlock on a greater offense, an acquittal on that charge will not be implied by the jury’s verdict of guilty on a lesser included offense”].) Rather, Scott’s appellate argument is based on the holding in Fields that “pursuant to section 1023 and [People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512]], the conviction of the lesser offense in the first trial *805operated to bar the retrial of defendant on the greater offense, regardless of the first jury’s deadlock on the greater offense.” (Id. at p. 307.)
The Fields decision was not based on double jeopardy principles but rather on the following considerations:
1. “[O]nce a conviction on the lesser offense has been obtained, ‘“to [later] convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the lesser.” ’ ” (Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 306.)
2. A contrary rule would vitiate section 1023 by permitting the prosecution to start with “ ‘prosecution of the lesser offense and proceeding up the scale.’ ” (Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307.)
3. Problems of application of a contrary rule, including instructions to the jury in the second trial. (Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307, fin. 5.)
4. Consistency with “[t]he acquittal-first rule, requiring the jury to expressly acquit the defendant before rendering a verdict on the lesser offense” (Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 309), as set forth in People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 334 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572],
To avoid the problem presented in Fields and in this case, the Supreme Court in Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th 289, set forth detailed rules addressed to trial courts and prosecutors. The court stated at pages 310 and 311:
“As our opinion today makes clear, under Kurtzman, when the jury returns a verdict on the lesser included offense, it must also render a corresponding verdict of acquittal on the greater offense. If a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense is recorded and the jury discharged without having rendered any verdict on the greater offense, a retrial on the greater offense is barred under section 1023, regardless of whether the jury expressly deadlocked on that charge. We recognize, however, that there may be instances such as occurred here in which, contrary to the rule of Kurtzman, the jury renders only a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense. If this occurs, the trial court may properly decline to receive and record this verdict of conviction pending further deliberations by the jury. More specifically, prior to discharging the jury, the trial court has the authority pursuant to section 1161 to direct the jury to reconsider its lone verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense in light of Kurtzman and the acquittal-first rule. [Citation.] By making use of such a procedure, the trial court can prevent the unintended consequences flowing from the jury’s mistake in returning a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense while deadlocking on the greater offense.
“Section 1161 provides in pertinent part: ‘When there is a verdict of conviction, in which it appears to the court that the jury have mistaken the *806law, the court may explain the reason for that opinion and direct the jury to reconsider their verdict, and if[,] after the reconsideration, they return the same verdict, it must be entered. . . .’If, contrary to Kurtzman, the jury renders only a verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense, without a corresponding verdict of acquittal on the greater offense, its verdict of conviction is incomplete ‘under the law and the instructions.’ [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the trial court is permitted, pursuant to section 1161, to direct the jury to reconsider its verdict of conviction in light of the acquittal-first rule.
“Prior to the discharge of the jury, during which time the trial court is empowered to direct the jury to reconsider a lone verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense in light of Kurtzman, the incomplete verdict of conviction rendered by a jury ‘mistaken in the law’ does not implicate a defendant’s double jeopardy interest in avoiding retrial on the greater offense. [Citations.] By contrast, if the jury renders an incomplete verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense, and the rendered verdict is received by the court and recorded, and the jury is discharged, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to direct jurors to reconsider their irregular verdict. [Citations.] Under such a scenario, the consequence of the ‘mistake in the law’ should be borne by the People, rather than the defendant. Thus, once the jury is discharged after rendering a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense, without a corresponding verdict of acquittal on the greater offense, the defendant stands convicted of the lesser included offense, and retrial on the greater offense is barred notwithstanding the jury’s deadlock on that charge. (§ 1023.)
“Placing the onus on the People to bring an incomplete verdict of conviction to the trial court’s attention prior to jury discharge is appropriate because it preserves the possibility that, after reconsideration pursuant to section 1161, the jury will decline to return the requisite verdict of acquittal of the greater offense. Should this occur, the incomplete verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense initially rendered by the jury is of no effect, and the prosecutor may move the trial court to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury, and set the entire matter for retrial. [Citations.] Alternatively, when faced with a deadlock on the greater offense and a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense, the People may prefer to forgo the opportunity to convict the accused of the greater offense on retrial in favor of obtaining a present conviction on the lesser included offense. [Citation.] In that case, the People should move the trial court to exercise its discretion to dismiss the charge on the greater offense in furtherance of justice under section 1385.”
Neither the language nor the rationale of Fields distinguishes between elements test and accusatory pleading test lesser included offenses for purposes of the retrial bar of section 1023.
*807Second, the majority seems to adopt the view that a lesser included offense so determined under the accusatory pleading test is not a “necessarily” lesser included offense and therefore has limited application. For example, the majority opinion does not express disagreement with the Supreme Court in Fields, it merely concludes that Fields does not apply if the lesser included offense is so designated under the accusatory pleading test rather than under the elements test because under the former it is not a necessarily lesser included offense. I find no rationale for this distinction. Certainly there is no reference to that distinction in Fields, which does not use the term “necessarily included offense,” and the rationale of Fields applies as much to accusatory pleading test lesser included offenses as to element test lesser included offenses. Furthermore, Lopez defined accusatory pleading lesser included offenses as necessarily lesser included offenses.
The majority acknowledges that for purposes of jury instructions, a lesser included offense under the accusatory pleading test is the equivalent of a lesser included offense under the elements test. If the trial court must instruct on the lesser included offense, then the appropriate instruction concludes: “However, the court cannot accept a guilty verdict on a lesser crime unless you have unanimously found the defendant not guilty of the . . . greater crime.” (CALJIC No. 17.10.) This instruction is consistent with Fields and makes no distinction between elements test lesser included offenses and accusatory pleading lesser included offenses. Therefore, in this case, the trial court erred by accepting guilty verdicts on the nonforcible sex offenses (lesser included offenses) without requiring a verdict of acquittal on the forcible sex offenses (greater offenses). Under these circumstances, the jury has returned an irregular verdict and if the court, as here, releases the jury, “the defendant stands convicted of the lesser included offense, and retrial on the greater offense is barred notwithstanding the jury’s deadlock on that charge. (§ 1023.)” (Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)
Although the majority opinion acknowledges that instructions on the lesser included offense determined under the accusatory pleading test must be given (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 795-796), it ignores the ramifications of the instruction requirement set forth in Fields. It also acknowledges that offenses determined to be lesser included offenses under the accusatory pleading test are subject to the provisions of section 1159. By its terms, section 1159 is applicable to “necessarily included” lesser offenses. If section 1159 is applicable to accusatory pleading lesser included offenses, then those offenses are by definition “necessarily” lesser included offenses. (But see People v. Scheldt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 162, 167-168 [282 Cal.Rptr. 228].)
In my opinion the Fields decision is binding on this court and dispositive of the issue of whether the forcible sex offenses on which the jury in Scott’s *808first trial could not reach a verdict can be retried following Scott’s convictions on the lesser included nonforcible sex offenses. Based on the authority of Fields, I conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to retry Scott on the alleged forcible sex offenses.
The People argue that even were Scott’s retrial barred, there was no objection in the trial court and this contention may not be raised for the first time on appeal. I note, however, that there is no reference in Fields to the requirement of raising the bar first in the trial court, although that is clearly the best procedure. In any event, if the issue must be raised first in the trial court and was not, Scott received ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel not raising the issue. Furthermore, the ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial because it resulted in three convictions that under Fields were barred from retrial.
I would reverse Scott’s convictions for the three forcible sex offenses (counts 1, 3 and 5) and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing and reconsideration of the credit limitation issue.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 10, 2001.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.