Court Opinion

ID: 9772173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:30.193511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.925765
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I would agree with the majority opinion in so much that the order of March 25, 1988 is void ab initio and that in very limited situations, such as those presented by these facts, habeas relief is an appropriate remedy. RCr 11.42 procedures are wholly inadequate when a citizen is detained without authority of law. The opinion does not however adequately analyze the underlying problem and potential harm it will cause the criminal justice system.
The opinion should stress the fact that habeas relief need not be generally available whenever a prisoner believes he was wrongly convicted or that some collateral attack on the sentence is possible. RCr 11.42 works well in those situations. The majority opinion is inviting every inmate to launch any and all conceivable attacks on their respective sentences through habeas actions. Such an open invitation will inundate the local courts with a multitude of filings. The local court will be required to analyze and decide each one even though many will ultimately prove to be without merit.
A better alternative is to recognize that while the second sentencing order is indeed void, the initial order was contrary to law and should therefore also be considered void. Marcum was convicted of second degree burglary and PFO I. The original sentence entered against him was two years for burglary which was ordered enhanced to five years because of the PFO status.
Burglary in the second degree is a Class C felony. KRS 511.030(2). KRS 532.060(2)(c) requires the court to order a sentence of “not less than five years nor more than ten years” on conviction of a Class C felony. Marcum was also found guilty of being a Class I PFO. KRS 532.080(6)(b) requires that upon conviction of a Class C felony, a PFO I “shall be sentenced to” a period of “not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.”
The original sentence of two years enhanced to five was on its face a violation of the requirements of the statutes. Since the original sentencing order of the court was outside the scope of the court’s authority, it too is void.
This now leaves us with a situation where Marcum has been convicted of a crime, has been incarcerated for a period of years but has actually never been properly and legally sentenced. As noted by Marcum in his appeal of the denial of habeas relief, the trial court no longer retains jurisdiction over the matter. Without such power, the trial court is indeed unable to enter an appropriate order of sentence.
The only alternatives are to allow Marcum to go free even though he has not served a minimum sentence as required by the statute, which is the posture suggested by the majority opinion, or to correct the error which has resulted in such an absurdity. The only court which currently maintains jurisdiction over this subject matter and person is this Court. Any order which attempts to correct the error below can only come from this Court.
The Supreme Court is limited to “appellate jurisdiction only, except it shall have the *213power to issue all writs necessary in aid of ... the complete determination of any cause, or as may be required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.” Kentucky Constitution § 110. This Court has the power to order the complete determination of Mar-cum’s sentencing and it may act to exercise control over the trial court which failed to order appropriate sentencing.
The only reasonable alternative available is for this Court to take the admittedly rare and extreme measure of ordering the trial court to cause a legal and formal sentencing order to be entered into the record as expeditiously as is possible. That sentence must conform to KRS 532.080 and impose a sentence of not less than ten years nor more than 20 years. The only rational solution to this inadvertent human error is to issue such an order.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissent.