Court Opinion

ID: 9390869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 19:11:36.26449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.762339
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                    April 28, 2023
No. 21-0764 – State of West Virginia v. Aaron Glenn Hoard                             released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                                  EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                  SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA
Wooton, Justice, concurring:
             I concur in the Court’s judgment because I believe that this case presents the

rare instance in which the doctrine of harmless error can properly be applied to uphold the

validity of a conviction despite the denial of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights –

in this case, the right to silence as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States

Constitution and by article III, sections 5, 10, and 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.

             In my view, this was a very close case. It is so well established that “it is

reversible error for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant in regard to his pre-trial

silence or to comment on the same to the jury[,]” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Walker, 207

W. Va. 415, 533 S.E.2d 48 (2000) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233

S.E.2d 710 (1977)), that I am amazed at the prosecutor’s stubborn insistence that she had

the right to do exactly that. Further, I cannot understand the circuit court’s refusal to take

any action when defense counsel objected. Although it was within the court’s discretion to

deny the motions for mistrial, the court’s failure to sustain the objections, or to offer to

instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper comment in opening statement and

her improper question on cross examination of the petitioner, or even to tell the prosecutor

to knock it off, exceeded the outer limits of that discretion.

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              In short, the error here was clear. The petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated – twice. Defense counsel made specific, contemporaneous objections both times

the prosecutor crossed the constitutional line. The circuit court failed to take any corrective

action. Thus, the only question on appeal is whether the error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See State v. Blair, 158 W. Va. 647, 659, 214 S.E.2d 330, 337 (1975)

(“appellate courts are not bound to reverse for a technical violation of a fundamental

right.”).

              In harmless error analysis, all roads lead to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

18 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court surveyed state and federal case law and

statutes defining the doctrine and formulating various tests to determine its applicability.

Having done so, the Court observed that

              [a]ll of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose
              insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors
              or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed
              the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some
              constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are
              so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
              the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
              automatic reversal of the conviction.

386 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added); see also O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-38

(1995) (“If, when all is said and done, the [reviewing court] ... is sure that the error did not

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand[.]

. . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without

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stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially

swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.

The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from

the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial

influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946)).

               However, post-Chapman analysis in federal and state cases, including cases

decided by this Court, have routinely applied the harmless error doctrine to constitutional

errors that are, in my view, far from “unimportant and insignificant,” and in cases where

those errors could well have influenced the jury. See, e.g., State v. A.B., 247 W. Va. 495,

881 S.E.1d 406 (2022) (harmless error applied where defendant was forced to go to trial

with counsel who had an actual conflict of interest, as well as to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel and a possible Brady 1 violation); State v. Jako, 245 W. Va. 625, 862

S.E.2d 474 (2021) (confrontation clause violation); State v. Delorenzo, No. 21-0456, 2022

WL 17038560 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2022) (memorandum decision) (exclusion of relevant

expert testimony supporting defendant’s sole defense). Indeed, the expansion of the

harmless error doctrine, which is now routinely applied to both constitutional and non-

constitutional error, great or small, has led me to characterize the doctrine as a “magic

       1
           Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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wand that seemingly makes all constitutional violations disappear.” Edwin W. v. Mutter,

No. 21-0419, 2023 WL 356199, at *3 (W. Va. Jan. 23, 2023) (memorandum decision)

(Wooton, J., dissenting).

              All this being said, as noted supra I believe that the errors in this case – two

separate comments by the prosecutor on the petitioner’s pre-trial silence – although clear

errors, and with a significant potential for prejudice, 2 were harmless under the facts and

circumstances of this case. Following three days of jury selection, the petitioner’s trial

continued for five more days. The evidentiary portion of the trial transcript alone contains

more than 1,600 pages. Within those 1,600 pages are the two comments at issue, the first

a statement made during the State’s opening statement, 13 words in length (“The one

interview we didn’t get was with Aaron Hoard or his girlfriend[,]”) and the second a

question posed to the petitioner, 8 words in length (“But you never told police that, did

you?). The prosecutor didn’t follow up on either statement at the time or, critically, in either

portion of her closing argument. See Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Mills, 211 W. Va. 532, 566

S.E.2d 891 (2002) (“Remarks made by the State's attorney in closing argument which make

specific reference to the defendant's failure to testify, constitute reversible error and

       2
        The second comment in particular would suggest to the jury that an innocent man,
a man who testified unequivocally that “I didn’t murder [the victim],” would surely have
professed his innocence to the police.
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defendant is entitled to a new trial.”) (citation omitted)). Additionally, the State’s evidence

was strong, 3 and the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to put on his defense.

             For all of these reasons, I concur with the majority’s determination that

although the prosecutor’s comments on the petitioner’s pre-trial silence were error, the

error was harmless under the rigorous analysis established in Chapman. The prosecutor in

this case crossed the constitutional line – twice – but under the unique facts and

circumstances presented here, I do not believe that the errors could have had a substantial

influence on the jury’s decision. O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 438.

       3
        I would not, however, join in the majority’s characterization of the evidence as
“overwhelming,” because the events of November 3, 2019, were subject to differing
inferences and interpretations by the factfinders. In that regard, the jury, which had the
opportunity not only to hear the evidence but also to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,
found the evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict. I can find no reason to
second-guess that finding.
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