Court Opinion

ID: 9620097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:38:20.085751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:47.396200
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge.
This is a wrongful death áction initiated by the appellant to recover damages for the death of her 17-year-old son, who was killed when a pick-up truck he was driving collided with a truck driven by appellee Curtis Smith and owned by appellee Coastal Boilers, Inc. The evidence at trial was very much in conflict. The appellant contended that her son was hit from the rear, while the appellees contended that the collision was head-on. The jury returned a verdict for the appellees, and this appeal followed from the denial of the appellant’s motion for new trial. Held:
1. The court did not err in charging the jury on the theory of accident. Although we cannot agree with the appellees that the issue of accident was set forth in the pleadings (the appellees consistently alleged in their amended answer that the collision resulted from the decedent’s negligence), there was some evidence at trial from which the jury could have concluded that neither party was at fault. "In searching the record to find whether or not there was evidence authorizing the charge on the law relative to accident, we must keep in mind that: 'To warrant the court in charging the jury on a given topic, ... it is not necessary that the evidence should shine upon it with a clear light. It is enough if glimpses of it be afforded by the evidence.’ ” Cobb v. Big Apple &c., Inc., 106 Ga. App. 790, 792 (128 SE2d 536) (1962). The jury in this case heard testimony to the effect that the sun was shining over appellee Smith’s shoulder at the time of the collision and that the decedent was traveling in the opposite direction. Therefore, they may have concluded that the sun was shining directly into the decedent’s eyes and that this caused a temporary blindness which led to the collision without fault on his part. Although such a conclusion was certainly not demanded by the evidence, we cannot say as a matter of law that it was unauthorized.
2. It is contended that the court committed reversible error in charging the jury that the appellant *23could not recover "unless negligence is proved against the defendants as alleged in the petition(Emphasis supplied.) There was evidence at trial of several acts of negligence by the appellee which had not been alleged in the complaint. Therefore, any attempt to limit the jury’s consideration to the specific allegations raised in the complaint would have been improper. See generally Johnson v. Myers, 118 Ga. App. 733, 776 (165 SE2d 739) (1968); O’Quinn v. James, 127 Ga. App. 94, 95 (1) (192 SE2d 507) (1972). However, we do not believe that the charge could reasonably have been interpreted in such a manner when considered in its entirety. In fact, most of the additional acts of negligence not raised in the complaint but placed in issue at trial were the subject of specific individual jury instructions. This enumeration of error is without merit.
3. We find no harm in the court’s refusal to charge the provisions of Code Ann. § 68A-804, which gives local governments the authority to reduce the state speed on state highways below the normal 55 miles per hour where a determination is made that conditions warrant such a reduction. It is highly unlikely either that a reasonable juror would question that local authorities have such power or that the issue contributed to the verdict one way or the other.
4. The fourth enumeration of error is deemed abandoned for failure to provide argument or citation of authority in support thereof. See Rule 18 (c) (2) (Code Ann. § 24-3618 (c) (2)).
5. The final enumeration of error is directed towards the exclusion of a deposition which the appellant offered as evidence for the purpose of establishing the mechanical condition of the vehicle which the decedent was driving. The deponent was the owner of the vehicle. Since being deposed he had moved; however, there was no competent evidence showing where he resided at the time of trial or indicating that the appellant had made any effort to locate him.
Code Ann. § 81A-132 (a) (3) provides for the use of a deposition as evidence at trial under certain specified circumstances, all of which deal with the witness’s unavailability to testify. Since the appellant failed to *24establish where the witness resided and failed to show that any effort had been made to locate him, the trial court did not err in finding that his unavailability had not been established and in refusing to admit the deposition under the above Code section. See Building Assoc., Inc. v. Crider, 141 Ga. App. 825 (6) (234 SE2d 666) (1977).
Submitted July 11, 1979 —
Decided October 24, 1979 —
Richard D. Phillips, for appellant.
James M. Thomas, Francis Stubbs, for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, C. J., Quillian, P. J., Shulman, Birdsong and Underwood, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Smith and Carley, JJ., dissent.