Court Opinion

ID: 9959593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 13:08:08.871258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:33.729931
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Segovia, 2024-Ohio-1392.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        CLARK COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                         :
                                                       :
       Appellee                                        :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-35
                                                       :
 v.                                                    :   Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-0247
                                                       :
 NEIL SEGOVIA                                          :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                       :   Court)
       Appellant                                       :
                                                       :

                                                  ...........

                                                  OPINION

                                        Rendered on April 12, 2024

                                                  ...........

JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant

ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee

                                                .............

HUFFMAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Neil Segovia appeals from his conviction for felonious assault. He raises

arguments related to the admissibility of evidence, the weight and sufficiency of the

evidence, and his sentence. Because we find his arguments to be without merit, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                              Procedural History
                                                                                         -2-

       {¶ 2} Segovia was indicted on April 24, 2023, on two counts of felonious assault.

Before trial, the State filed a notice indicating that it intended to introduce evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts by Segovia pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B); specifically, the

State intended to offer testimony by the victim, Jerome Gleaves, that Segovia’s motive

for the assaults was an unpaid drug debt owed by Gleaves to Segovia. The same day,

Segovia filed a response asserting that the proposed evidence “would not tend to show

opportunity, plan or identity” and that its probative value was outweighed by unfair

prejudice. Segovia was tried in July 2023, and the jury found him guilty on both counts;

the trial court merged the two offenses at sentencing. The court imposed an indefinite

sentence of 8 to 12 years in prison.

                                       The Evidence

       {¶ 3} Multiple witnesses testified at trial. The evidence presented was as follows.

                                       Jerome Gleaves

       {¶ 4} Gleaves testified that, on March 28, 2023, he resided at an apartment on

West College Avenue in Springfield.           On that date, Segovia visited Gleaves

unexpectedly, demanding money. Gleaves had met Segovia a couple of years earlier,

had recently become reacquainted with him, and had purchased cocaine from him.

According to Gleaves, he sometimes saw Segovia every other day, and sometimes only

once in three weeks. Gleaves testified that seven or eight days prior to March 28, he

had been “jumped” in his apartment by two people who lived “downstairs”; his assailants

“sucker punched” him with “a pair of brass knuckles” in the face, “crush[ing]” his face.

Gleaves’s dentures were broken in half, his jaw was broken in two places, and his nose
                                                                                         -3-

was broken in three places; he had been in the hospital for seven days and had been

discharged only two days before his encounter with Sevogia on March 28, 2023.

Gleaves testified that the surgeon told him that the damage to his face was so severe

that, if he got hit one time in the face, it was “going to kill [him].”

       {¶ 5} According to Gleaves, he had been giving Segovia money “like once every

month for like three months ahead of time,” and Segovia took “just about [his] whole

check.” Gleaves then gave Segovia his Direct Express card, and Segovia would take

that to the bank and “take all the money out.” On March 28, 2023, Gleaves did not

believe that he owed Segovia any money, but Segovia said that Gleaves “owed him”

(Sevogia) because something was missing from belongings Segovia had left at Gleaves’s

house. According to Gleaves, Segovia believed that Gleaves had been paid that day,

but Gleaves had not. Segovia started “pacing back and forth” and said “this ain’t going

to work. I’m going to kill you.” Segovia then “started wailing” on Gleaves; Gleaves, on

the floor, tried to protect his face while Segovia repeatedly punched and kicked him in the

back and beat him in the back with a wooden mop handle he found in the apartment.

Segovia repeatedly said, “let me see that face.” Gleaves testified that he had been

“scared to death.” To “[b]uy time,” he told Segovia that his Direct Express card was at

the home of Rose Mills, with whom he had a child, although the card was actually in

Gleaves’s pocket.

       {¶ 6} Segovia demanded that Gleaves accompany him to Mills’s home in

Springfield, a short drive away, to retrieve the Direct Express card. Gleaves told Segovia

that he was in pain and thought Segovia had broken his ribs, and Segovia told him to
                                                                                      -4-

“shut up.” Gleaves knew that there was no money on the card. He had not paid rent

for three months because Segovia “got [his] money for three months prior,” and Gleaves

“didn’t want to die.”

       {¶ 7} When they arrived at Mills’s address, Gleaves went to speak with her on her

porch while Segovia watched. Gleaves acted like Mills handed something to him and

got back into the car with Segovia, who asked to “hear the balance” on the card. Gleaves

pretended to call about the balance but then quickly hung up, because he believed that if

Segovia heard the money was already gone, he would probably kill him.

       {¶ 8} Law enforcement officers were subsequently dispatched to Gleaves’s home

on March 28, 2023. They took pictures of his injuries from the previous assault and of

the injuries inflicted by Segovia, which were later shown to the jury. Gleaves had been

apprehensive about telling the responding officers that he was a drug user and that the

incident with Segovia had been related to a drug debt, because he was fearful and did

not want to go to jail. When he was taken to the hospital, Gleaves was diagnosed with

a ruptured spleen and four broken ribs from the encounter with Segovia on March 28,

2023. According to Gleaves, he had trouble breathing and “felt like something was

stabbing” his lung. He had surgery to stop the bleeding in his spleen. Gleaves was

subsequently shown a photo lineup at the hospital by detectives, and he identified

Segovia in “[a]bout 3 seconds.”

                                       Rose Mills

       {¶ 9} Rose Mills testified that on March 28, 2023, she lived on Larch Street in

Springfield. On that date she received a call from Gleaves, who was yelling into the
                                                                                         -5-

phone that he needed the beating to stop and was coming to get his bank card, which

Mills did not have. Mills understood that Gleaves was in some sort of trouble and told

him not to bring anyone dangerous to the home where she and their child lived. Gleaves

kept yelling that he was on his way, and Mills met him at the front door. According to

Mills, when Gleaves arrived, he was holding his side, moaning, and shaking, and he

seemed very nervous. Gleaves left after a short time.

       {¶ 10} Within the hour, Mills received another call from Gleaves saying that his

side still hurt, and she advised him to go to the hospital. Mills usually saw Gleaves every

other weekend and knew that he had a drug problem. Three days before Gleaves came

to her home with Segovia, Mills had taken him to the hospital for treatment of his facial

injuries. At that time, Gleaves’s eye and jaw had been swollen and bruised, and he had

not been complaining of any rib pain.

                               Officer Zachary Chenoweth

       {¶ 11} Officer Zachary Chenoweth was a training officer with the Springfield Police

Department on March 28, 2023, and he was dispatched to Gleaves’s address on West

College Avenue after 4:00 p.m. on a report of a possible assault. Chenoweth testified

that Gleaves “had obviously been assaulted” and had several bruises and abrasions.

Gleaves advised Chenoweth that some of his injuries were from a previous assault and

that he also had new injuries from an assault that had just occurred. According to

Chenoweth, Gleaves’s new injuries were red, and he had bruising on his face that

appeared to have been previously inflicted. Chenoweth identified the photos he took of

Gleaves’s injuries. In his training and experience, Chenoweth testified that the new
                                                                                       -6-

injuries on Gleaves’s back and shoulder area appeared consistent with blunt force

trauma. Gleaves told Chenoweth that he only knew his most recent assailant as “Neil”

and provided “a very vague description” of Segovia as a “shorter male, light-skinned dark

male.” Chenoweth called for a medic to take Gleaves to the hospital.

       {¶ 12} On cross-examination, Chenoweth testified that Gleaves reported that he

had borrowed $200 from “Neil” to move into his apartment, which he had already repaid,

that he had given “Neil” his Direct Express card, and that “Neil” had then left. Gleaves

further stated that he had been struck seven or eight times in the face by “Neil.” Gleaves

did not report to Chenoweth that he had gone to Larch Street after the assault and then

returned home.     Chenoweth testified that Gleaves did not appear to be under the

influence of drugs or alcohol at the time.

                                  Detective Joshua Lish

       {¶ 13} Detective Joshua Lish testified that, on March 29, 2023, the detective

assigned to Segovia’s case had asked him to administer a photo lineup to Gleaves. Lish

knew nothing about the case or any of the suspects involved. Lish identified the photo

array he administered, which was signed by Gleaves and had Segovia’s photo circled.

Lish testified that Gleaves selected Segovia “almost immediately,” and Lish wrote on the

key page to the lineup that Gleaves indicated that he was “100,000 percent sure” of

Segovia’s identity as his assailant.

                                 Detective Justin Massie

       {¶ 14} Detective Justin Massie testified that he worked in the Crimes Against

Persons Unit of the Springfield Police Department, having been so employed for four and
                                                                                        -7-

a half years. During his career, Massie had investigated “hundreds if not thousands” of

cases. In Massie’s experience, delayed reporting of crimes and of details of crimes was

common, especially if the victim had also been involved in criminal activity.

       {¶ 15} Massie described the process he employed to generate a photo lineup to

present to Gleaves.    He had also obtained a release from Gleaves for his hospital

records, which were admitted into evidence. According to Massie, Gleaves’s injuries

from March 28, 2023, were consistent with being hit with a blunt object. Gleaves advised

Massie that he had reported the prior assault to Wittenberg University police, and Massie

confirmed with that department that Gleaves had reported a separate assault prior to

March 28, 2023.

       {¶ 16} On cross-examination, Massie testified that Gleaves had not told him that

Gleaves had had almost daily contact with Segovia for six months prior to the assault or

that, prior to that contact, he had not seen Segovia in two years. Massie had been under

the impression from Gleaves that Segovia appeared at Gleaves’s door unexpectedly to

collect on a two-year old debt. Gleaves told Massie that he had been assaulted a few

days earlier, and the prior injuries to his face were visible. Gleaves described being

punched in the face by Segovia but reported that “the actual injury and all the pain he was

suffering to his face” had been caused by another person during an entirely separate

incident.

       {¶ 17} Gleaves told Massie that he had accompanied Segovia to Mills’s house on

Larch Street on March 28, and Massie was aware that Gleaves had not reported that fact

to the first responders.    Massie testified that the hospital records indicated that
                                                                                         -8-

Gleaves’s account of the March 28 incident was that he had let an individual into his

apartment whom he considered to be a friend, and that person had then struck him with

a baseball bat; the hospital records also indicated that Gleaves had a history of chronic

substance abuse and was on Suboxone. Notes by a social worker in Gleaves’s records

indicated that Gleaves reported that he felt safe to go home and safe in his family and

intimate relationships, and that he had been attacked by people he thought were his

friends because of “a girl.” Gleaves was coherent when he spoke to Massie in the

hospital.

       {¶ 18} The defense did not call any witnesses at trial.

                                     Evid.R. 404(B)

       {¶ 19} Segovia asserts three assignments of error. His first assignment of error

is as follows:

                 THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

       PERMITTED THE JURY TO HEAR INADMISSIBLE EVID.R. 404(B)

       EVIDENCE.

       {¶ 20} Segovia argues that Gleaves’s testimony that Segovia was a drug dealer

was not properly admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). He asserts that neither motive

nor identity was a material element in dispute and that the probative value of any evidence

that he was allegedly a drug dealer was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. According

to Segovia, his identity was not in dispute because Gleaves testified that he knew

Segovia, identified him to responding officers, and identified him in court. He argues that

motive was unclear given the differing accounts of the incident Gleaves provided to law
                                                                                          -9-

enforcement and hospital personnel, which contradicted Gleaves’s trial testimony

regarding the alleged drug debt. Segovia asserts that the State improperly used other

acts evidence to boost Gleaves’s credibility and to make Segovia “look bad in front of the

jury.”

         {¶ 21} The State responds that the purpose of the prior bad acts evidence was

directly tied to motive and to Segovia’s identity. According to the State, the purpose of

the evidence was not to prove that Segovia acted in conformity with his character as a

drug dealer, but to demonstrate why he assaulted Gleaves and why Gleaves was able to

identify him in a photo lineup as his assailant. The State asserts that Segovia cannot

argue that his identity was not in dispute and yet maintain his innocence. Finally, the

State asserts that Segovia’s motive and identity were “highly material to proving his guilt.”

         {¶ 22} “ ‘A hallmark of the American criminal justice system is the principle that

proof that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not

admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to

commit crime.’ ” State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651,

¶ 20, quoting State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975). This principle

“is premised on our understanding of human nature: the typical juror is prone to ‘much

more readily believe that a person is guilty of the crime charged if it is proved to his

satisfaction that the defendant has committed a similar crime.’ ” Id., quoting State v.

Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 174-175, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).

         {¶ 23} “The general principle that guides admission of evidence is that ‘[a]ll

relevant evidence is admissible * * *.’ ” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-
                                                                                       -10-

2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 11, citing Evid.R. 402. To be relevant, evidence must have “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Evid.R. 401.

      {¶ 24} Evid.R. 404(B), however, provides exceptions to the general principle that

all relevant evidence is admissible and states:

      (B) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.

      (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not

      admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular

      occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

      (2) Permitted Uses * * *. This evidence may be admissible for another

      purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

      knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. * * *

      {¶ 25} To be admissible under Evid.R. 404(B)(2), the “key is that the evidence

must prove something other than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.”

Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ 22. In other words,

“while evidence showing the defendant’s character or propensity to commit crimes or acts

is forbidden, evidence of other acts is admissible when the evidence is probative of a

separate, nonpropensity-based issue.” Id.

      {¶ 26} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has put forth a three-step analysis for a trial

court to use in determining the admissibility of other acts evidence.” State v. Walter, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 29614, 2013-Ohio-2700, ¶ 62, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio
                                                                                        -11-

St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20. “The first step is to consider whether

the other acts evidence is relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Williams at ¶ 20, citing Evid.R. 401. The second step requires the trial court to “consider

whether evidence of the crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the character of

the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether the other acts

evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in Evid. R. 404(B).”

Id. The third step requires the trial court “to consider whether the probative value of the

other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.,

citing Evid.R. 403. “The defendant's other act ‘must have such a temporal, modal and

situational relationship with the acts constituting the crime charged that evidence of the

other acts discloses purposeful action in the commission of the offense in question.’ ”

Walter at ¶ 63, quoting State v. Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 7, 10, 359 N.E.2d 87 (1st

Dist.1976), citing State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 159, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).

       {¶ 27} “The admissibility of other-acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a

question of law. The [trial] court is precluded from admitting improper character evidence

under Evid.R. 404(B), but it has discretion to allow other-acts evidence that is admissible

for a permissible purpose.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Graham, 164 Ohio St.3d 187,

2020-Ohio-6700, 172 N.E.3d 841, ¶ 72, citing Hartman at ¶ 22, citing Williams at ¶ 17.

       {¶ 28} The trial court reasonably concluded that evidence of an unpaid drug debt

owed by Gleaves to Segovia was relevant and admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B).

Gleaves characterized his relationship with Segovia as situational and one of drug user
                                                                                            -12-

(Gleaves) and drug dealer (Segovia), and the assaults disclosed purposeful action by

Segovia to collect an unpaid debt. The offense was not remote in time to Gleaves’s

ongoing drug-related relationship with Segovia. Most significantly, the evidence was

offered for the legitimate purpose of establishing Segovia’s identity and his motive,

namely that he came to Gleaves’s apartment to collect on a past due drug debt.

Gleaves’s testimony regarding the drug debt was not offered to establish Segovia’s

propensity to commit crime as a drug dealer. Although this testimony was prejudicial to

Segovia, it was not unduly so, and the trial court did not err in admitting it.

       {¶ 29} Finally, we note that the court instructed the jury that, if it found the evidence

of Segovia’s alleged drug activity to be credible, it was only to consider that evidence “for

the limited purpose of determining whether and to what extent it establishe[d] motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment.” We have noted that

“[c]urative instructions are generally viewed as sufficient to remedy the risk of undue

prejudice.” State v. Gray, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2019-CA-7, 2020-Ohio-1402, ¶ 48, citing

Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, at ¶ 24; State v.

Wharton, 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3132, 2010-Ohio-4775, ¶ 26-28.                     “Juries are

presumed to follow instructions.” Gray at ¶ 48, citing State v. Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403,

414, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000).

       {¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, Segovia’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                        Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

       {¶ 31} Gleaves’s second assignment of error is as follows:
                                                                                           -13-

              THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT

       AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO

       SUSTAIN SEGOVIA’S CONVICTIONS.

       {¶ 32} Segovia argues that the evidence showed that he “did not knowingly cause

serious physical harm” or “use a stick to deliver deadly harm.” According to Segovia, the

evidence established that Segovia allegedly wanted Gleaves’s debit card and that

Gleaves was able to drive with Segovia to get it; he asserts that, if believed, this evidence

showed that he was not trying to kill Gleaves but only injure him, such that the stick was

“not a deadly weapon.” Segovia notes that there were many discrepancies in Gleaves’s

versions of events and asserts that he was not credible. According to Segovia, Gleaves

“had more of a motive” to lie to incriminate Segovia than Segovia had to hurt Gleaves.

       {¶ 33} In response, the State argues that Gleaves’s testimony established the prior

relationship between Gleaves and Segovia, including that Gleaves knew who Segovia

was but did not know his last name. This knowledge was corroborated by the speed and

confidence with which Gleaves identified Segovia in the photo line-up. The State notes

that the mop handle was found in Gleaves’s apartment and asserts that there was enough

evidence in the record to establish that Segovia had acted knowingly in causing serious

physical harm. Finally, the State asserts that the mop handle was “capable of inflicting

death” and was “used as a weapon.”

       {¶ 34} “ ‘ * * * [A]lthough sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal

concepts, * * * a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the

evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.’ (Citations omitted.)” State v. Curtis,
                                                                                          -14-

2020-Ohio-4152, 157 N.E.3d 879, ¶ 44 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. McCrary, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11; State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 35} “* * * [A] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the

evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more

believable or persuasive.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-

525, ¶ 12. “ ‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). See also Curtis at ¶ 19.

       {¶ 36} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony

are primarily matters for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Griffith, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 26451, 2015-Ohio-4112, ¶ 28, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227

N.E.2d 212 (1967). “Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the

witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find

that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial

deference be extended to the factfinder's determinations of credibility. The decision

whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the
                                                                                             -15-

peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v.

Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). This

court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue of witness

credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its

verdict. State v. Bradley, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 1997-CA-03, 1997 WL 691510, *4

(Oct. 24, 1997).

       {¶ 37} R.C. 2903.11 proscribes felonious assault: “(A) No person shall knowingly

do either of the following: (1) Cause serious physical harm to another * * *; (2) Cause or

attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon or

dangerous ordnance.” R.C. 2901.22(B) defines “knowingly” as follows:

       A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware

       that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably

       be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when

       the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When

       knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,

       such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is

       a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a

       conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

Serious physical harm is defined as: “Any physical harm that involves some permanent

disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement; [or] * * * Any

physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering

or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(d-e).
                                                                                       -16-

      {¶ 38} “The degree of harm that rises to the level of ‘serious’ physical harm is not

an exact science, particularly when the definition includes such terms as ‘substantial,’

‘temporary,’ ‘acute,’ and ‘prolonged.’ ” State v. Irwin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 06MA20,

2007-Ohio-4996. “Under certain circumstances, a bruise can constitute serious physical

harm because a bruise may satisfy the statutory requirement for temporary serious

disfigurement.” State v. Bootes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23712, 2011-Ohio-874, ¶ 19,

citing State v. Worrell, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04-AP-410, 2005-Ohio-1521, ¶ 47-51,

reversed on other grounds by In re Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d

313, 2006-Ohio-2109, 847 N.E.2d 1174. The Eighth District found sufficient evidence of

serious physical harm where the victim “suffered a black eye, bruising and swelling to the

right side of her face, scratches on her neck, and bruising on her thighs and buttocks.”

Bootes at ¶ 19, citing State v. Plemmons-Greene, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92267, 2010-

Ohio-655. “ ‘Where injuries to the victim are serious enough to cause him or her to seek

medical treatment, the finder of fact may reasonably infer that the force exerted on the

victim caused serious physical harm as defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(5).’ ” State v. Lee,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82326, 2003-Ohio-5640, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Wilson, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 77115, 2000 WL 1369868, *5 (Sept. 21, 2000).            “Where the assault

causes a bone fracture, the element of serious physical harm is met.” Id., citing State v.

Thomas, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18881, 1999 WL 76227 (Feb. 17, 1999).

      {¶ 39} R.C. 2923.11(A) defines a deadly weapon as “any instrument, device, or

thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon,

or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” We have held that, in addition to being
                                                                                         -17-

capable of inflicting death, the article must have been either designed or specially adapted

for use as a weapon or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon. “Either alternative

branch of the second requirement can be employed to prove the proposition. When use

is a factor, the manner of its use and the nature of the instrument itself determin[e] its

capacity to inflict death.” State v. Schooler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19627, 2003-Ohio-

6248, ¶ 21, citing State v. Deboe, 62 Ohio App.2d 192, 406 N.E.2d 536 (6th Dist.1977).

       Illustrations of things, innocent in themselves, that may be capable [of]

       causing death include a baseball bat, a Coke bottle, a toy pistol and an

       unloaded gun. The statute is not limited to instruments that are dangerous

       or deadly per se, but includes anything that may be possessed that has an

       actual or potential danger of serious or deadly harm under the

       circumstances encountered * * *.

State v. Clark, 2d Dist. Clark No. 19627, 1979 WL 208322, *1 (May 23, 1979).

       {¶ 40} The record contains sufficient evidence to support Segovia’s convictions,

and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Gleaves

testified that, in the assault by Segovia, he suffered a ruptured spleen, necessitating

surgery, and four broken ribs. In addition to Gleaves’s testimony about his injuries, the

photos of the injuries to his back established serious physical harm. That Gleaves had

been newly assaulted, in addition to the previous assault to his face, was readily apparent

to Officer Chenoweth, who was able to discern the fresh injuries from the ones inflicted in

a prior separate incident. The officers testified that the new injuries were consistent with

blunt force trauma. Like a baseball bat, the mop handle was not dangerous per se, but
                                                                                          -18-

it was wielded as a weapon by Segovia to inflict injury on Gleaves, including broken bones

that required medical treatment.

       {¶ 41} While Gleaves did report differing versions of his encounter with Segovia,

the jury credited Gleaves’s testimony that Segovia used a deadly weapon to inflict serious

physical harm, and we defer to the jury’s credibility assessment.             Gleaves was

understandably reluctant to disclose the nature of his relationship with Segovia, and there

was testimony that delayed reporting of the details of an offense is a common occurrence

among those engaged in illegal activity themselves.         The jury reasonably credited

Gleaves’s testimony.

       {¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, Segovia’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                        Sentencing

       {¶ 43} Segovia’s third assignment of error is as follows:

              SEGOVIA’S MAXIMUM SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

       {¶ 44} Segovia asserts that he was amenable to community control sanctions. He

also contends that his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to state at

the sentencing hearing that it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing

in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors listed in R.C. 2929.12. He argues that the

trial court appears to have “solely relied upon Segovia’s criminal history when it

determined its maximum sentence.”

       {¶ 45} We must apply the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) when

reviewing felony sentences, pursuant to which we may increase, reduce, or modify a

sentence, or vacate a sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing, only if we
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clearly and convincingly find either: “(1) the record does not support the sentencing court’s

findings under certain enumerated statutes, or (2) the sentence is otherwise contrary to

law.”   State v. McCoy, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2023-CA-11, 2024-Ohio-98, ¶ 24, citing

State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9, citing R.C.

2953.08(G)(2).

        {¶ 46} The trial court was not required to make any findings under the statutes

enumerated in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). As such, we simply consider whether Segovia’s

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. “A sentence is contrary to law when it does not

fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the

purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 29291.11 and the

sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.”      State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99

N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

        {¶ 47} “ ‘The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.’ ” McCoy at ¶ 26,

quoting State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). “Although the

trial court must consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, neither statute requires a trial court

to make any specific factual findings on the record.” Id., citing State v. Jones, 163 Ohio

St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20.           “ ‘It is enough that the record

demonstrates that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 prior to

imposing its sentence.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Trent, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-61,

2021-Ohio-3698, ¶ 15.
                                                                                          -20-

       {¶ 48} Finally,   “the   Supreme   Court    of   Ohio   has   explained   that   R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(b) ‘does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a

sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12.’ ”         Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Jones at ¶ 39.       “Nothing in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 42. “Therefore,

when reviewing felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, this court does not analyze whether those sentences are

unsupported by the record, but only whether they are contrary to law.” McCoy at ¶ 27.

       {¶ 49} The trial court’s judgment entry states that it considered the criteria in R.C.

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. As a second-degree felony, Segovia’s felonious assault

carried a presumption of prison. R.C. 2929.13(D). The stated minimum term imposed

was within the statutory range of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years for a

felony of the second degree, and the maximum term was properly determined to be the

minimum term plus half of the minimum term.             R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a).    Therefore,

Segovia’s indefinite 8-to-12-year prison term was within the authorized range and not

otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶ 50} The third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 51} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                      .............
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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.