Court Opinion

ID: 9641578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:35:20.184165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:38.334662
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to qualify Mr. Merritt, the Director of the Little Rock Veteran’s Counseling Service, as an expert. The appellant sought to introduce testimony from Merritt to explain the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One theory for the defense was that the accused was suffering from severe stress since his service in Vietnam and, therefore, the homicide was committed “under circumstances that would be murder but for the influence of extreme emotional disturbance . . .”, i.e., manslaughter (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1504(1) (a)). The appellant has correctly stated that whether a witness qualifies as an expert is largely within the trial court’s discretion, citing Dixon v. State, 268 Ark. 471 (1980). The decision of the trial court will not be reversed in the absence of abuse of such discretion. The appellant has cited the case of Dildine v. Clark Equipment Co., 282 Ark. 130 (1984), for the proposition that a liberal interpretation should be given by the trial court in determining whether a witness qualifies as an expert. In Dildine the appellant brought a products liability suit to recover for personal injuries sustained when he was thrown from a front end grain loader. At the trial, the court refused to allow the appellant’s witness, Dr. Robert Mink, to testify as an expert. This Court held that this case required reversal under U.R.E. 702, which states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In reversing, we based our decision largely on the fact that Dr. Mink’s background showed that he possessed significant experience and training in the field of mechanical engineering. In Dildine, the witness had a Ph.D., a masters degree in machinery design, and was the Chairman of the Engineering Department of A.S.U. We noted that there was no evidence to the contrary to show that the witness was not qualified to testify as an expert. In the instant appeal, the witness had a masters degree in social work, had extensive training in stress disorders and had five years experience in counseling with Vietnam Vets who experienced symptoms of PTSD. Therefore, I think the trial court erroneously denied the appellant’s request to qualify this witness as an expert. To hold otherwise would in fact render U.R.E. 702 meaningless and allow only educational achievement to qualify a witness as an expert. Without saying so it seems to me the majority opinion requires a witness in this field to possess a medical degree before he may testify as an expert. It is my opinion that Mr. Merritt was qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training and education. He should have been allowed to testify. The denial deprived the appellant of one of his best defenses, and amounted to an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion. I also agree with appellant’s argument that any evidence that he was sent to a reform school as a juvenile should have been excluded. Arkansas Stat; Ann. § 45-444 specifically proscribes the introduction of a juvenile record in any civil or criminal proceeding, except other proceedings under the Act. Appellant’s wife was a factual witness on behalf of the State. The defense also called the wife as a witness. She was not called as a character witness. As a defense witness she stated that she had been married to appellant since 1971 and that she was not aware that the defendant had been convicted of any crime. During cross examination the State asked, “Are you aware of Jimmie ever having been convicted of a crime?” She replied, “No.” The state was then allowed to ask the witness if she knew the appellant had been sent to the Boys Training School twenty-five years ago, at the age of 15. The witness replied, “Yes.” Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 45-444 (Repl. 1977), in pertinent part states, “No evidence adduced against a juvenile in any proceeding under this Act (45-401 — 45-449) nor the fact of adjudication or disposition, (emphasis added) shall be admissible against such juvenile in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding. . . .” The state argues appellant invited the question by asking if the witness was aware of a prior conviction of the defendant. The state cites Reel v. State, 288 Ark. 189, 702 S.W.2d 809 (1986), as authority. I think Reel is inapposite because it dealt with testimony of a character witness pursuant to U.R.E. 405(a). In the case before us the witness had not given an opinion about appellant’s reputation or truthfulness. We held in Kellingsworth v. State, 275 Ark. 252, 631 S.W.2d 1 (1982), that the state cannot, under the guise of rebuttal evidence, impeach a witness on a collateral matter. The reason for the rule, we stated in Kellingsworth, is that to permit such tactic would only distract the jury from the main issue, waste time and prejudice a defendant. In my opinion the state asked the question solely to prejudice the appellant before the jury. Furthermore, there is no evidence that appellant was ever convicted of a “crime.” Twenty five years ago, when appellant was 15 years of age, juveniles were routinely sent to “training schools” upon request of a parent or other interested person. The state is also in error in stating that U.R.E. 609(d) would allow the admissibility of the testimony in question. This rule states in part, “The Court may in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused . . . .” (Emphasis added). The evidence here was that the accused had been adjudicated as a juvenile. The appellant himself, in the absence of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-444 and U.R.E. 609(d) might have been properly subjected to cross-examination. Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979). Even then the probative value of such question must be weighed against the prejudical effect. Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 432, 645 S.W.2d 690 (1983). For the reasons above stated I would reverse the case and remand it for a proper trial.