Court Opinion

ID: 9612988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:13:22.300591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:56:21.748425
License: Public Domain

*728Fletcher, Justice,
dissenting.
While I concur in Division 3, I dissent because the majority’s interpretation of the final sentence of OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) is inconsistent with the legislative intent and purpose of the statute. As the majority notes in footnote 1, subsection (c) was enacted in response to the holding in Hatcher v. Allied Products Corp., 256 Ga. 100 (344 SE2d 418) (1986) that the statute of repose did not apply to negligence actions. The legislature recognized that to provide a statute of repose for strict liability claims while exempting negligence actions effectively destroyed the purpose of the statute, which was to eliminate stale claims and provide a definite time beyond which a manufacturer is no longer subject to liability. Thus, the legislature’s purpose in expanding the scope of OCGA § 51-1-11 was to breathe life back into the statute of repose.
Contrary to the majority’s strained construction of the statute, the legislature cannot have intended in the same breath to remove failure to warn claims from the ambit of the statute of repose. Such a construction would eviscerate the remainder of § 51-1-11, because, as the majority’s opinion demonstrates, a,claim based on the sale of a defective product may almost always be couched as a failure to warn of the danger in the product. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 FSupp. 262, 296 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (“the elements of plaintiffs’ strict liability theory are essentially the same as the elements of their theory of negligent failure to warn”), aff’d in part and modified in part on other grounds, 788 F2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
Furthermore, the plain language of OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) that the duty to warn is triggered “once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer” contemplates an actual knowledge standard. A constructive knowledge standard disregards the fact that the legislature intended to expand the reach of the statute of repose. Had the legislature intended to embrace the constructive knowledge standard, it would have so provided. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 16-12-80 (a); 34-8-34; 43-30-13 (expressly incorporating constructive knowledge standard).
Although the majority refuses to reach the issue, the evidence is clear that Batten has not established that Chrysler “should have known” of the alleged danger even under a constructive knowledge standard. Plaintiffs’ failure to warn theory is that Chrysler should have known of a defect in the redesigned 1978 seat belt because of problems with the 1975 seat belt and should have warned of this defect at the time the car was sold. However, in reaching his opinion that Chrysler should have known of the defect, plaintiff’s expert relied upon documents relating to the 1975 retractor, not the redesigned 1978 retractor installed into Batten’s vehicle. The expert also admitted that he had no evidence other than this accident that the redesign failed to correct the earlier problem. The existence of one accident, *729without other evidence, cannot as a matter of law be constructive notice to the manufacturer of a danger of which it should have warned prior to the accident.
Decided December 5, 1994 —
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1994.
Freeman & Hawkins, Joe C. Freeman, Jr., Stephen M. Lore, Charles R. Beans, Dillard, Bower & East, Terry A. Dillard, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., for appellant.
Berrien L. Sutton, Ronald W. Hallman, for appellees.
King & Spalding, Chilton D. Varner, Lawrence A. Slovensky, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt joins in this dissent.