Court Opinion

ID: 9565310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:01.862037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:32.546438
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent. The majority opinion gives short shrift to the rule of strictissimi jur-is, which we have approved in other cases concerning the interpretation of suretyship contracts. M.H. Walker Realty v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922) (affirmed in dicta Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, Utah, 668 P.2d 557 (1983)). In M.H. Walker Realty, we recognized the special status of those who voluntarily assume the obligations of others: “In the case of a private or voluntary surety without compensation the surety is held to be a favorite of the law, and the contract, the performance of which he guarantees, is construed strictly in favor of the surety.” 60 Utah at 463, 211 P. at 1009. In the present case, the respondents agreed to indemnify the principals for “all damages and costs which may be awarded against [them] on the appeal or on a dismissal thereof_” (Emphasis added.) The respondents did not commit themselves by this or any other language in their contract to pay the amount of the underlying judgment; they agreed only to indemnify the principals for amounts awarded against them by this Court as a result of their appeal.
The majority opinion’s reliance on the existence of a separate cost bond as indicative of the respondents’ intent to have the bond cover the underlying judgment is misplaced. That reliance overlooks the fact that the respondents are strangers to this action except in their capacity as sureties on the bond at issue. The principals, not the respondents, filed the cost bond. Further, even if the intent of the principals may be imputed to the respondents, the existence of the cost bond does not demonstrate an intent to have the separate bond in question cover the underlying judgment. Indeed, if the respondents had desired this result, they would not have filed a separate cost bond, since bonds filed in accordance with Rule 73(d), Utah R.Civ.P., are for “the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages for dalay_” (Emphasis added.) I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.
LEONARD RUSSON, District Judge, sat.