Court Opinion

ID: 9725757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:09:05.213851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.465998
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, specially concurring: I take this opportunity to state my views on the issue of prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges during the voir dire in a criminal trial to exclude persons from the jury solely on account of their race. I. Swain v. Alabama In Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from a jury in a criminal trial solely on account of their race did not deny the defendant equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The court held, however, that a defendant would prevail on such a claim if he could demonstrate that a prosecutor in a county was systematically excluding persons from juries for racially motivated reasons “in case after case.” (380 U.S. 202, 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 774, 85 S. Ct. 824, 837.) The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declared the principles articulated in Swain to be controlling in Illinois. People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 138, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1204; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252, 273-80, 454 N.E.2d 220, 229-33. Although Swain is the law in Illinois, I continue to believe that the better rule is found in the California case of People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890. (People v. Lavinder (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 662, 671, 430 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Johnson, J., dissenting)). There, the California Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries violated a defendant’s right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, guaranteed by the California Constitution. (See Commonwealth v. Soares (1979), 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499; State v. Crespin (1980), 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716.) The third division of this court concurred with the Wheeler-type standard in People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046, rev’d (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202, relying on the impartial-jury guarantee of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The third division held that when it reasonably appeared to a trial court that the State was using its peremptory challenges solely to exclude black jurors because of their race, the burden shifted to the State of demonstrating that the exclusions were for reasons other than race. (People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040, 436 N.E.2d 1046.) Relying on its previous decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this approach and reaffirmed its allegiance to Swain. See People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202. II. Criticism of Swain Both the legal profession and the general public have criticized Swain v. Alabama because (1) it defeats the sixth amendment goal of a fair jury and (2) it contains a standard that is unfair to defendants and is almost unattainable. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari in a group of cases raising the issue, Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States Supreme Court stated the following: “The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community is rendered meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury. *** The desired interaction of a cross section of the community does not take place within the venire; it is only effectuated by the jury that is selected and sworn to try the issues. The systematic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection process.” McCray v. New York (1983), 461 U.S. 961, 967-68, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322, 1325, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2442 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting). Many legal commentators have written scholarly critiques of Swain v. Alabama. (McCray v. New York (1983), 461 U.S. 961, 964-65 n.1, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322, 1324 n.1, 103 S. Ct. 2348, 2440 n.1.) This pernicious practice is so widespread throughout Illinois and the nation that concerned citizens discuss it publicly. (See People v. Frazier (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 160 app. 2, 469 N.E.2d 594, 601 app. 2; Waltz, Now It’s Harder for Lawyers to Pick Biased Jury, Chicago Sun-Times, July 13, 1982, at 30, col. 1.) Five justices of the United States Supreme Court have indicated that such use of a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges is sufficiently serious to merit the court’s review at a later date. (See McCray v. New York (1983), 461 U.S. 961, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun and Powell, JJ.; dissenting opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.) Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has become the first Federal appeals court to apply the sixth amendment impartial jury guarantee to the prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges for racially motivated reasons. The court recently held that a defendant need demonstrate prosecutorial misuse at his trial only and not in case after case. McCray v. Abrams (2d Cir. 1984), 750 F.2d 1113. Swain v. Alabama is criticized intensely because its “case after case” standard is unfair and, arguably, impossible to meet. Justice Marshall noted the unfairness of Swain when he stated the following: “Since every defendant is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should therefore be free from the invidious discrimination of state officials, it is difficult to understand why several must suffer discrimination because of the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges before any defendant can object.” (Emphasis in original.) McCray v. New York (1983), 461 U.S. 961, 964-65, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322, 1324, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2440 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Dissenting from the Illinois Supreme Court’s reversal of the appellate court’s decision in Payne, Justice Seymour Simon noted the unachievable nature of the Swain standard when he stated the following: “The Swain requirement of systematic exclusion of black jurors in case after case, however, presents a nearly insurmountable hurdle for an individual defendant, and I have found only two cases decided since Swain where defendants actually established this systematic exclusion. [Citations.] It is obvious why defendants have established so little misuse of peremptory challenges under the Swain standard. The prosecutors are the only people who know why peremptory challenges are used against black persons, and they are not telling anyone. It seems to me that if this court imposes the Swain requirements on defendants, the only way defendants could get solid evidence on the misuse of peremptory challenges in case after case would be to subpoena assistant State’s Attorneys and even State’s Attorneys to testify at a hearing during voir dire or in a civil class action suit by prospective black jurors or black defendants. Certainly this would provide a spectacle that should be avoided if any alternative is available, and I submit one which this court is inviting by this decision and by its prior decisions in Davis and Williams.” People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 147-48, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Simon, J., dissenting). Despite the apparent impossibility of meeting the case after case standard, I believe that it has been met in this case. The number of Illinois defendants who claim prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges is large and ever-increasing. (People v. Frazier (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156-57, 469 N.E.2d 594, 598-99 (listing 46 cases).) Acknowledging that our supreme court rejected this interpretation of Swain in Payne, I believe that the sheer number of cases that raise the issue demonstrates that prosecutors in Illinois have been purposely and systematically using peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries in case after case. People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 152-54 (Simon, J., dissenting). III. The Appearance of Justice Now that I have discussed Swain and its Illinois offspring, I turn to the effect of those decisions on our society. This decision and the many others denying defendants’ sixth amendment claims, relying on Swain and its Illinois offspring, destroys the appearance of justice in our courtrooms. A criminal trial is a public event whose significance reaches beyond the truth or falsity of the accusation. A trial includes the ceremonial trappings of history, the appearance of justice, and the participation of citizens in passing judgment. Our entire society, therefore, is represented at a criminal trial. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814. The State, through the prosecutor, practices racial discrimination when it uses peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries. In light of the public nature of criminal trials, “we must be ever solicitous that those in attendance witness a system of justice in its truest sense and not a system of de facto racial discrimination.” (People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 rev’d (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202.) Indeed, the practice causes injury to “the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.” Ballard v. United States (1946), 329 U.S. 187, 195, 91 L. Ed. 181, 187, 67 S. Ct. 261, 265. Actions speak louder than words. The fundamental proposition that racial discrimination practiced in Illinois courts is repugnant to the law of Illinois and should be condemned cannot be overstated (see People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 139) (Clark, J., specially concurring). These statements, however well-intentioned, do not remove the appearance of injustice when courts appear to condone racial discrimination through the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. As Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asked in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Martin (1975), 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A.2d 290, 295, “Is justice to sit supinely by and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is available? Is justice only obtainable after repeated injustices are demonstrated? Is there any justification within the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy that permits the use of a presumption to hide the existence of an obvious fact?” The judiciary must stop this discrimination in its courts to avoid appearing to be an accomplice to it. IV. Conclusion In light of the following analysis, I completely agree with the measures that the third division of this court noted in People v. Frazier (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 158 app. 1, 469 N.E.2d 594, 599 app. 1. The assistant State’s Attorney who prosecuted the present case at trial was Mary Ann Callum. Her name is reprinted so that interested persons may study the actions of the office of the State’s Attorney of Cook County according to the case after case standard of Swain. “Of course, [I] pass no judgment and make no inference regarding [her] conduct or motive in the present case or in any other case.” People v. Frazier (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 155; People v. Goodum (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356, 468 N.E.2d 1237, 1241. Insofar as the majority correctly applied the present law of Illinois to the facts of this case, I concur in the result.