Court Opinion

ID: 9900507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:32.548219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.891019
License: Public Domain

Before
                    HOLIFIELD, KIRKBY, and DALY
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                      v.

                   Dylan J. DIOGUARDI
       Mechanist’s Mate Nuclear Third Class Petty Officer
                       (E-4), U.S. Navy
                          Appellant

                             No. 202200223

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 30 October 2023

  Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                            Military Judges:
                        Rachel Trest (arraignment)
                           Eric A. Catto (trial)

Sentence adjudged 27 June 2022 by a general court-martial convened
at Naval Station Mayport, Florida consisting of a military judge sitting
alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1, confine-
ment for 18 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishon-
orable discharge. 1

1 Appellant received 129 days of pretrial confinement credit.
             United States v. Dioguardi, NMCCA No. 202200223

                            For Appellant:
      Lieutenant Commander Daniel C. LaPenta, JAGC, USN (on brief)

                              For Appellee:
               Lieutenant Ebenezer K. Gyasi, USN (on brief)
      Lieutenant Commander James P. Wu Zhu, JAGC, USN (on brief)

                         _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                         _________________________

PER CURIAM:
    Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, by a military judge sitting
alone as a general court-martial of one specification of attempted sexual abuse
of a child involving indecent communication in violation of Article 80, Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], for communicating indecent language to a
fictitious child named “Haylee.” 2
   Appellant asserts a single assignment of error: that Appellant’s sentence—
specifically, the dishonorable discharge—was inappropriately severe. We find
no prejudicial error and affirm.

                              I. BACKGROUND

    On 3 November 2021, Appellant, who was then 20 years old, was using the
dating app “Skout” looking for a sexual partner. “Skout” is intended for use by
people over the age of 18. At the same time, a law enforcement agent was also
on “Skout,” posing as a female named “Haylee.” Upon discovering “Haylee’s”
profile, Appellant messaged her on the app. After an exchange of greetings,
Appellant continued the conversation by calling her cute. They then proceeded
to discuss their ages and intentions.
   “Haylee” told Appellant that she was 14 and would be turning 15 in Decem-
ber. Appellant believed that “Haylee” was a 14-year-old girl and had lied about
her age to get on the app because her profile said that she was 113 years old.

   2 10 U.S.C. § 880.

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                  United States v. Dioguardi, NMCCA No. 202200223

The conversation continued and Appellant told “Haylee” that he was looking
for “friends with benefits or people to have sex with.” 3 They continued messag-
ing on the app and discussed the number of previous sexual partners each had
been with.
    When “Haylee” asked Appellant what he wanted to do with her, he initially
responded “to chill and whatever happens or doesn’t happen happens.” 4 In re-
sponse to further questioning, he responded “I want to fuck.” 5 Appellant agreed
to meet up with “Haylee” at her home and proceeded to drive there. Upon ar-
riving at what he believed was “Haylee’s” address, he parked in the driveway,
knocked on the door, and was arrested by law enforcement personnel.
    Appellant was charged with one specification of attempted sexual assault
of a child, one specification of attempted sexual abuse of a child involving sex-
ual contact, and one specification of attempted sexual abuse of a child involving
indecent communication. 6 At trial Appellant pleaded guilty only to this last
specification, for which the maximum punishment is confinement for 15 years,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to paygrade E-1, and a dishon-
orable discharge.
   Appellant entered into a plea agreement whereby the convening authority
would, in exchange for Appellant’s plea of guilty to attempted abuse of a child
involving indecent communication, withdraw and conditionally dismiss the
other two specifications. 7 In addition to limiting a sentence of confinement to
between 6 and 24 months, the terms of the plea agreement allowed the military
judge to award forfeitures, a reduction in paygrade, and a punitive discharge. 8

    3 R. at 35.

    4 Id.

    5 Id.

    6 10 U.S.C. § 880.

    7 We note specifications 1 and 2 of the charge were withdrawn by the Government

pursuant to the plea agreement. On the record, the military judge granted the Govern-
ment’s motion to withdraw those specifications but the specifications were never formally
dismissed. The record, as a whole, is clear that it was the intent of the parties that the two
specifications to which the Appellant pleaded not guilty were to be dismissed without prej-
udice to ripen into prejudice upon completion of appellate review. Our opinion here effectu-
ates that intent. Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge are dismissed and prejudice will at-
tach at the conclusion of appellate review.
    8 Appellate Ex. IV at 5.

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              United States v. Dioguardi, NMCCA No. 202200223

    During the sentencing phase of the court-martial, Appellant produced two
character letters, one from his brother and the other from a childhood friend,
that stated they support him and will continue to support him despite being
aware of the charge to which he was pleading guilty. 9 Appellant also made an
unsworn statement wherein he discussed his difficult childhood, apologized to
the Navy and his shipmates, asked the court to recognize that he “sincerely
feels guilt, shame, and disgust” for the crime he committed, and described his
post-confinement plans. 10
    In its argument on sentencing, the Government requested 24 months’ con-
finement and a bad-conduct discharge. Appellant’s trial defense counsel asked
the court to adjudge a sentence of six months confinement and a reduction to
E-1. The military judge subsequently awarded a reduction to paygrade E-1,
confinement for 18 months, and a dishonorable discharge.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

   Appellant asserts his sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the
goals of sentencing in the military justice system. We disagree.
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. 11 This Court may only affirm
“the sentence, or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct
in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved.” 12 In exercising this function, we seek to assure that “justice is done
and that the accused gets the punishment he deserves.” 13 The review requires
an “individualized consideration of the particular accused on the basis of the
nature and seriousness of the offense and the character of the offender.” 14 We
have significant discretion in determining sentence appropriateness but may
not engage in acts of clemency. 15
   In determining a sentence, “the court-martial shall impose punishment
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and to

   9 Def. Ex. A.

   10 R. at 104.

   11 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 4 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   12 Article 66(d)(1)(A), UCMJ.

   13 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

   14 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   15 United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

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             United States v. Dioguardi, NMCCA No. 202200223

maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces.” 16 The court must con-
sider such factors as the nature and circumstances of the offenses, the history
and characteristics of the accused, impacts on the victims, and impacts on the
command. 17 Additionally, the sentence must reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense, promote respect for the law, provide for just punishment, promote ade-
quate deterrence, protect others from future crimes of the accused, and reha-
bilitate the accused. 18 After examining and weighing each of these factors in
the present case, we conclude Appellant’s sentence is not inappropriately se-
vere.
    Finally, we note that “Appellant’s punishment was the predictable result
of a [plea agreement] that he negotiated and voluntarily entered into with the
convening authority.” 19 He has already received the benefit of his bargain, in-
cluding both the withdrawal and dismissal of his other charged offenses and a
significant sentence limitation. As we have previously stated, “we generally
refrain from second guessing or comparing a sentence that flows from a lawful
pretrial agreement.” 20

   16 R.C.M. 1002(f).

   17 R.C.M. 1002(f)(1) and (2).

   18 R.C.M. 1002(f)(3).

   19 United States v. Bocage, No. 202000206, 2022 CCA LEXIS 311, *7 (N-M Ct. Crim.

App. May 25, 2022) (unpublished).
   20 United States v. Widak, No. 201500309, 2016 CCA LEXIS 172, *7 (N-M. Ct.

Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2016) (unpublished).

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             United States v. Dioguardi, NMCCA No. 202200223

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 21
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   21 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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