Court Opinion

ID: 9907291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 00:07:21.300558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:15.434923
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ball, 2023-Ohio-4352.]

                                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                             TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           CLERMONT COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Appellee,                                 :     CASE NO. CA2023-03-016

                                                  :             OPINION
     - vs -                                                      12/4/2023
                                                  :

 NICOLE L. BALL,                                  :

        Appellant.                                :

    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                        Case No. 2021 DR 000283

Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A. Horton, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F. Benintendi, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

        M. POWELL, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Nicole Ball, appeals a judgment entry of the Clermont County Court

of Common Pleas ordering her to pay the costs involved in her extradition from Texas to

Ohio. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                                 Clermont CA2023-03-016

                 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL POSTURE.

       {¶ 2} In 2021, Ball was indicted by the Clermont County Grand Jury on one count

of passing bad checks and one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle. At the time of the

indictment, Ball was serving a federal sentence in Texas. Upon Ball's release from federal

custody, she waived extradition and was returned to Ohio to face the charges pending

against her in Clermont County.

       {¶ 3} Ball was arraigned on the Clermont County charges on October 27, 2022.

The trial court found that she was indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. Ball

entered not guilty pleas. The trial court set bond at $10,000 and remanded Ball to the

Clermont County jail. A pretrial hearing was scheduled for November 10, 2022.

       {¶ 4} On October 28, 2022, the Clermont County Sheriff's Office filed an interstate

rendition cost bill with the clerk of courts indicating it had incurred costs of $4,164 in

returning Ball to Ohio from Texas. On the same day, Ball posted bail and was released

from the Clermont County jail. At the time of Ball's release from the Clermont County jail,

she was subject to holders from two counties, including Butler County. On November 10,

2022, Ball was taken into custody by Butler County; she was subsequently committed to

the Ohio Reformatory for Women.

       {¶ 5} Ball failed to appear for the November 10, 2022 pretrial hearing because she

was in the custody of Butler County; the trial court issued a bench warrant for her arrest.

The Ohio Reformatory for Women subsequently notified the Clermont County Prosecutor

and the trial court that Ball had requested final disposition of her Clermont County

indictment. See R.C. 2941.401. On January 20, 2023, the trial court again found that Ball

was indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. On February 6, 2023, Ball entered a

guilty plea to passing bad checks, a fourth-degree felony. The trial court accepted Ball's

plea and found her guilty of the offense.

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       {¶ 6} At a sentencing hearing held on February 27, 2023, the trial court sentenced

Ball to a ten-month prison term and ordered her "to pay court costs." The sentencing entry

likewise provided that Ball "shall pay the court costs in this case." On March 2, 2023, the

clerk of courts filed a statement of costs totaling $4,514. Of that total, the sum of $4,164

related to the costs of Ball's extradition from Texas to Ohio to face the Clermont County

indictment.

       {¶ 7} Ball appeals, asserting in a single assignment of error that "[t]he trial court

erred in assigning the costs of extradition as court costs to be paid by [Ball]."

                                      II. DISCUSSION.

A. Assessment and Collection of Court Costs Under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) and R.C.
   2949.14.

       {¶ 8} R.C. 2947.23(A) provides that "[i]n all criminal cases, including violations of

ordinances, the judge or magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution,

including any costs under [R.C.] 2947.231, and render a judgment against the defendant

for such costs."

       {¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has construed the phrase "costs of prosecution" in

R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) as follows:

              The phrase "costs of prosecution" has not been statutorily
              defined. However, this court clarified the term "costs" in State
              ex rel. Franklin Cty. Commrs. v. Guilbert (1907), 77 Ohio St.
              333, 338: "Costs, in the sense the word is generally used in this
              state, may be defined as being the statutory fees to which
              officers, witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their
              services in an action or prosecution, and which the statutes
              authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment or sentence."
              See also State v. Perz, 173 Ohio App.3d 99, 2007-Ohio-3962,
              ¶ 36, 42 [6th Dist.] (holding that costs of prosecution are those
              expenses directly related to the court proceeding and
              remanding for the trial court to determine "the actual costs of
              prosecution"); State v. Christy, [3d Dist.] Wyandot No. 16-04-04,
              2004-Ohio-6963, ¶ 22 ("The expenses which may be taxed as
              costs in a criminal case are those directly related to the court
              proceedings and are identified by a specific statutory

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             authorization"); State v. Holmes, [6th Dist.] Lucas No. L-01-
             1459, 2002-Ohio-6185, ¶ 20 ("The 'costs of prosecution' * * * are
             the court costs incurred in the prosecution of the case").

Middleburg Hts. v. Quinones, 120 Ohio St.3d 534, 2008-Ohio-6811, ¶ 8.

      {¶ 10} Consistent with the supreme court's characterization of the "costs of

prosecution" in Quinones, extradition costs are directly related to a criminal prosecution in

that the prosecution cannot proceed unless the accused is brought within the trial court's

jurisdiction. Extradition costs are specifically identified by R.C. 2949.14 as a component of

the costs of prosecution ("the clerk of the court of common pleas shall make and certify

under the clerk's hand and seal of the court, a complete itemized bill of the costs made in

such prosecution, including [extradition costs]") (Emphasis added.) The Second Appellate

District has also found that the costs of prosecution include extradition costs. State v.

Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25315, 2013-Ohio-1925, ¶ 15 ("the trial court in the instant

case properly considered extradition costs as a cost of prosecution pursuant to R.C.

2947.23[A][1]"). Thus, extradition costs are correctly considered as included within the

"costs of prosecution."

      {¶ 11} Commenting upon the import of R.C. 2947.23(A)(1), the supreme court has

recognized that "[b]y statute, the imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants is

mandatory. * * * As we have explained, this strict statutory language 'requires a court to

impose costs against all convicted defendants,' indigent or not." (Emphasis sic.) State v.

Taylor, 161 Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, ¶ 6, quoting State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d

580, 2004-Ohio-5989, ¶ 8. This court has likewise construed R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) and

observed that

             Unlike financial sanctions and fines issued pursuant to R.C.
             2929.18 and 2929.32, "the imposition of court costs under R.C.
             2947.23 does not require the trial court to first consider the
             defendant's ability to pay." State v. Hodge, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
             14CA010648, 2015-Ohio-3724, ¶ 15. A defendant's financial

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             status is therefore "irrelevant to the imposition of court costs."
             State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258, 2007-Ohio-4006, ¶ 3.
             Accordingly, a sentencing court must include the costs of
             prosecution in the sentence and render a judgment against the
             defendant for costs even if the defendant is indigent. White at
             ¶ 8. The legislature has imposed, and the Ohio Supreme Court
             has upheld, a mandatory duty placed upon trial courts.

State v. Babyak, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2019-08-025, 2020-Ohio-325, ¶ 10, citing the

supreme court's White decision.

      {¶ 12} Despite the mandatory nature of a sentencing court's responsibility pursuant

to R.C. 2947.23(A)(1), Ball argues that R.C. 2929.14 prohibits a sentencing court from

imposing extradition costs upon an indigent felony offender. R.C. 2949.14 provides

             Upon conviction of a nonindigent person for a felony, the clerk
             of the court of common pleas shall make and certify under the
             clerk's hand and seal of the court, a complete itemized bill of the
             costs made in such prosecution, including the sum paid by the
             board of county commissioners, certified by the county auditor,
             for the arrest and return of the person on the requisition of the
             governor, or on the request of the governor to the president of
             the United States, or on the return of the fugitive by a designated
             agent pursuant to a waiver of extradition except in cases of
             parole violation. The clerk shall attempt to collect the costs from
             the person convicted.

B. Cases Construing Assessment and Collection of Court Costs under R.C.
   2947.23(A)(1) and R.C. 2949.14.

      {¶ 13} Ball claims that she is indigent based upon the trial court's having found her

so "on two separate occasions," presumably referring to the trial court's October 27, 2022

and January 20, 2023 orders that she qualified for court-appointed counsel. Ball contends

that R.C. 2949.14 prohibits the trial court from assessing her with extradition costs because

the statute applies only to nonindigent persons and therefore she "cannot be ordered to pay

extradition costs." In support of her argument, Ball cites State v. Beckwith, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111024, 2022-Ohio-2362; State v. Maurer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103162,

2016-Ohio-1380; State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108438, 2020-Ohio-1272; and

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Jones, 2013-Ohio-1925.

         {¶ 14} In Maurer and the Second Appellate District's Jones opinion, the courts of

appeals upheld orders imposing the costs of extradition and observed that "under R.C.

2947.23(A)(1) and R.C. 2949.14, the trial court may impose the cost of extradition upon a

non-indigent felony defendant[.]" Jones at ¶ 15; Maurer at ¶ 30.1 However, neither case

involved an indigent offender. Thus, the courts of appeals were not called upon to consider

whether R.C. 2949.14 prohibits the imposition of extradition costs under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)

upon an indigent felony offender. "A reported decision, although a case where the question

might have been raised, is entitled to no consideration whatever as settling * * * a question

not passed upon or raised at the time of the adjudication." State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d

502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 11.

         {¶ 15} On the other hand, the Eighth Appellate District's opinions in Jones and

Beckwith each hold that R.C. 2949.14 prohibits assessment of extradition costs against an

indigent felony offender: "[R.C.]2949.14 does not authorize the trial court to assess the

costs of Beckwith's extradition as prosecution costs against an indigent felony offender."

Beckwith, 2022-Ohio-2362 at ¶ 31; Jones, 2020-Ohio-1273 at ¶ 34.

         {¶ 16} In White, the supreme court considered the interplay of R.C. 2747.23 and

2949.14, and determined that "R.C. 2949.14 does not govern a court's ability to assess

costs.    It governs only a clerk's ability to collect assessed costs from nonindigent

defendants. Moreover, R.C. 2947.23 does not prohibit a court from assessing costs against

an indigent defendant; rather it requires a court to assess costs against all convicted

defendants." (Emphasis sic.) White, 2020-Ohio-5989 at ¶ 8.

         {¶ 17} In State v. Roux, 154 Ohio App.3d 296, 2003-Ohio-4876 (7th Dist.), the

1. In Jones, the trial court had imposed the same costs of extradition in each of two cases. The court of
appeals ordered that the costs of extradition in one of the cases be vacated to prevent a double payment.
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                                                                    Clermont CA2023-03-016

Seventh Appellate District commented upon the differing purposes of R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)

and R.C. 2949.14:

               A distinction exists between ordering a defendant to pay costs
               and actually collecting those costs. R.C. 2947.23 merely
               provides that the court include costs as part of a defendant's
               sentence and render a judgment for those costs. This section
               makes no distinction between indigent and nonindigent
               defendants. In later attempting to collect the court-imposed
               costs, the clerk must then follow R.C. 2949.14. Therefore, we
               hold that a trial court may order an indigent defendant to pay
               court costs as part of his sentence.

Id. at ¶ 16. See also State v. May, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2001-A-0037, 2003-Ohio-6979,

¶ 23 ("R.C. 2947.23 expressly states that the trial court 'shall' include court costs as part of

a defendant's sentence. In addition, R.C. 2949.14 does not prohibit the imposition of court

costs on an indigent defendant").        There is nothing in the language of R.C. 2949.14

suggesting it circumscribes a sentencing court's duty to impose court costs under R.C.

2947.23(A)(1). On the contrary and as recognized by White, Roux, and May, R.C. 2949.14

applies to clerks of court, not trial courts.

       {¶ 18} Furthermore, accepting Ball's argument would mean that all felony offenders

who are indigent at the time of sentencing would be exempt from court costs. R.C. 2949.14

does not treat extradition costs differently from other court costs. That is, if R.C. 2949.14

prohibits a sentencing court from assessing extradition costs against an indigent felony

offender, then it also prohibits assessment of all other costs against such an offender.

Interpreting R.C. 2949.14 as advocated by Ball would strip a sentencing court of its

discretion to impose court costs against an indigent offender who the court believes would

have the future wherewithal to pay the costs of her prosecution and forever foreclose

collection.

       {¶ 19} The trial court, therefore, did not err in ordering Ball to pay the costs of her

extradition from Texas to Ohio as part of the "costs of prosecution." Ball's assignment of

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error is overruled.

                                     III. CONCLUSION.

       {¶ 20} For these reasons we decline to follow the Eighth Appellate District's opinions

in Beckwith and Jones. We hold that: (1) R.C. 2947.23 requires a sentencing court to

assess court costs, including the costs associated with an offender's extradition, against all

convicted defendants without regard to the offender's indigency; and (2) R.C. 2949.14 limits

only the clerk of court's authority to collect court costs from an indigent felony offender and

has no bearing on a sentencing court's duty to impose court costs in the first instance.

       {¶ 21} For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

       S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.

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