Court Opinion

ID: 9812830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:49:11.265023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:44.334348
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting. Elmira Helms being desirous of obtaining a support in her old age in exchange for her land, conveyed it to William Helms “in consideration of one dollar and the further consideration of the support during the natural life of the party of the first part,” and then in her poor way she added “and it is further understood and agreed between the parties that the above lands shall stand good for the support and maintenance of the said Elmira Helms during her natural life.” She was not a learned and *174technical lawyer. Had she been, the instrument would have been worded differently, but it is impossible not to see that these parties “understood and agreed” upon something different from an absolute and untrammeled conveyance, and that in fact, the consideration being for the grantor’s support, the grantee was not to have the land absolutely unless and until such consideration was fully paid. It was agreed that the “lands shall stand good for the support and maintenance of said Elmira Helms during her natural life The parties understood this and expressed it intelligibly, though not in words of technical art. The plaintiff being out of possession cannot recover,' certainly not in a court combining equity with law, without showing a compliance with his contract. Drisbach v. Serfass (Pa.), 3 L. R. A., 836; Williams v. Bentley, 27 Pa., 294. In fact, the Court would adjudge upon the evidence that by the abandonment of the performance of his part of the contract by the plaintiff the instrument became null and void. Hawkins v. Pepper, 117 N. C., 407. Upon the face of the agreement, if there was no support whatever, there was to be no conveyance in.exchange. The contract was in the nature of a conveyance, reserving the vendor’s lien till the purchase-money was paid, whereupon only the title should become absolute. Till then it “stood good” was retained to secure such payment. In many States the vendor’s lien exists till the purchase-money is paid, though there be no reservation in the deed, and such was formerly the law in this State. Wynne v. Alston, 16 N. C., 163, later overruled by Womble v. Battle, 38 N. C., 182, upon the sole ground that our registration law was intended to destroy all secret liens or reservations not upon the face of the deed. The reasoning does not apply here, where the condition is expressed, nor to the grantee in the instrument, for, as to him, the agreement is binding with or without registration. There is no reason the parties *175cannot, and in such cases as tbis there is every reason why they should, retain title till the consideration is paid. Such provision showing the manifest intent of the parties should be construed according to the actual understanding and agreement of the parties and upheld in this court of equity, however it might have been in a court of law. It is not technical language that we should seek, but to effectuate the true agreement and understanding of the parties.
In fact, the grantee never took possession of the land at all, nor listed it at any time for taxation, nor paid any part of the consideration; he admitted such facts both before and since Elmira’s death, and, in consequence of such default and abandonment of the contract, Elmira executed another deed to Gabriel Helms, under whom the defendant Haney Plelms claims, to secure her support, which she thus obtained. The defendants offered this evidence, and in view of the contract that the “lands shall stand good' for the support of Elmira Helms during her natural life,” the evidence should have been admitted. It matters little whether these words constituted an inartificially expressed mortgage, or a retention of the vendor’s lien, or a defeasance upon failure of consideration. The important consideration is to effectuate the true and manifest agreement of the parties, which requires that the plaintiff, who has paid nothing whatever for the land, shall not recover it in spite of his agreement that the land “shall stand good” for the purchase-money, against those who paid the stipulated consideration after the plaintiff had abandoned and wholly failed to execute the contract. The evidence offered and excluded went to show that proper technical words to make this instrument a conveyance on condition, or a mortgage, were omitted by “ignorance or mistake,” grounds held sufficient in Green v. Sherrod, 105 N. C., 197; Norris v. McLam, 104 N. C., 159; Frazier v. Frazier, 129 N. C., 30. Indeed when, as was *176offered to be shown here, it was agreed between the parties at the time the deed was delivered that it should operate as a mortgage, as against the original grantee, the Court will so decree, though the defeasance clause was not omitted through ignorance, mistake, fraud or undue advantage. Waters v. Crabtree, 105 N. C., 394; Watkins v. Williams, 123 N. C., 170; Porter v. White, 128 N. C., 42; Fuller v. Jenkins, 130 N. C., 554.
In Laxton v. Tilley, 66 N. C., 327, the words “In consideration of $200 and the faithful maintenance of T. L. and wife” were held a charge upon the land, and there are several cases of like purport. But here the clause is added, “stands good for the support of” the grantor during her natural life, which is stronger, and, taken in connection with the evidence offered that the grantee never accepted or acted upon such contract, but immediately abandoned and altogether failed to act upon the contract, the Judge should not have instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, but he should have left it for them, in view of the ignorance of the grantor and the evidence of language cotemporaneous with the execution of the deed, to say whether the intention was to make a conveyance subject to the grantor’s lien. If so, the purchase-money not having been paid, the title remained vested in the grantor and passed by her subsequent conveyance to the grantor of the defendant. There was an allegation in the complaint that technical words to express the “condition precedent” were omitted by ignorance or inadvertence. It was error to refuse to submit such issue and evidence to prove it. Davidson v. Gifford, 100 N. C., 18.
This was a conveyance upon condition “the land was to stand good,” remain the property of the grantor until and unless its owner, Elmira, was “supported during her natural life” by William Helms. Not having complied with this condition, and not having paid a dollar to the support of *177Elmira, but having stood by while others were supporting her under a similar contract made after his abandonment of this agreement, William Helms should now recover the land from those who did support Elmira. It would be unconscionable. Being in possession, Elmira could not re-enter for condition broken. Frost v. Butler, 22 Am. Dec., 199. It is not conceivable that Elmira contracted that if William Helms did not support her, and should refuse xo execute the contract altogether, that she reserved the privilege to bring suit and have him declared a trustee and ordered to recon-vey. She had neither the knowledge nor the means to do this, and where would she have gotten a support during the years of such litigation? Her contract, both written and verbal, was dictated by common sense — “the land was to stand good” for her support, and if William Helms did not give the support the land was good, it was to -remain hers till the support was completed. No other construction can reasonably and justly be placed upon this agreement of the parties; construed otherwise, it is a nullity.