Court Opinion

ID: 9925367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 16:03:55.362842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:06.160112
License: Public Domain

2024 IL 129155

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT

                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 129155)

      In re MARRIAGE OF MASUD M. ARJMAND, Appellant, and MUNEEZA
     R. ARJMAND, Appellee (Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, et al., Appellees).

                              Opinion filed January 19, 2024.

        JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
     Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                         OPINION

¶1       At issue in this case is whether, in conjunction with an appeal under Illinois
     Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), the appellate court had jurisdiction
     to consider prior orders denying appellant’s petition and motion for substitution of
     judge. For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment
     concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and motion.

¶2                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶3       This appeal takes place in the context of a dissolution proceeding that has
     remained ongoing for well over a decade. In 2009, petitioner, Masud M. Arjmand,
     filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to respondent, Muneeza R. Arjmand. The
     same year, the circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage that
     incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement. However, in 2011
     respondent filed a petition to vacate the dissolution judgment pursuant to section 2-
     1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILC 5/2-1401 (West 2010)), alleging that
     the judgment was unconscionable because the marital settlement agreement was
     secured by coercion and fraudulent concealment of income and assets. The circuit
     court, via Judge Timothy J. McJoynt, granted the petition in 2012, leaving in place
     only the dissolution of the parties’ marriage.

¶4       Petitioner appealed the circuit court’s ruling and sought to stay the proceedings
     in the circuit court while the appeal was pending. In February 2013, the circuit court
     granted petitioner’s motion and, “as a condition of bond,” restricted the parties’
     ability to encumber or dispose of certain investment assets that they owned before
     the entry of the initial dissolution judgment, including stocks and funds held in
     brokerage accounts.

¶5      The appellate court entered an order in October 2013 affirming the circuit
     court’s grant of respondent’s section 2-1401 petition. In re Marriage of Arjmand,
     2013 IL App (2d) 120639.

¶6       In July 2014, respondent’s attorney, Bryan Estes of the Stogsdill Law Firm
     (collectively, the Stogsdill defendants) sent a letter to Morgan Stanley Smith
     Barney, LLC (Morgan Stanley), enclosing a copy of the February 2013 order and
     requesting compliance with the order. Morgan Stanley then restricted petitioner’s
     access to the assets that he held with the company.

¶7       In April 2015, Morgan Stanley sought to intervene in the dissolution case to
     clarify the February 2013 order with respect to petitioner’s accounts, as the parties
     had made conflicting demands regarding the accounts. The circuit court tabled the

                                             -2-
       request pending resolution of several appeals by petitioner related to the February
       2013 order.

¶8         In August 2015, petitioner filed a complaint in the Cook County circuit court
       against Morgan Stanley and several affiliated entities (collectively, the Morgan
       Stanley defendants) and the Stogsdill defendants, alleging various causes of action
       stemming from the restriction of petitioner’s access to his assets. Petitioner alleged
       significant damages resulting from, among other things, being unable to pay
       substantial business and personal obligations. The action was transferred to the
       Du Page County circuit court, where it was dismissed with prejudice by Judge
       Ronald Sutter in August 2016 as an improper collateral attack on an order entered
       in the dissolution proceeding.

¶9         In December 2017, Judge McJoynt found that Accenture Founders Shares stock
       that petitioner held with Morgan Stanley was his nonmarital asset but that the
       injunctive portions of the February 2013 order remained in full force and effect as
       to petitioner and respondent only.

¶ 10       Petitioner filed a petition under section 2-1401 in August 2018 seeking to
       partially vacate the August 2016 order. Judge Sutter denied the petition, and the
       appellate court affirmed the ruling. Arjmand v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC,
       2019 IL App (2d) 180785-U.

¶ 11      On December 23, 2019, petitioner filed a new complaint, within the dissolution
       proceeding, against the Morgan Stanley and Stogsdill defendants (collectively
       defendants), raising largely the same claims.

¶ 12      Days later, on December 27, 2019, petitioner filed a “Third Petition for
       Substitution of Judge [f]or Cause and for Assignment to a Judge in a Different
       Appellate District,” pursuant to section 2-1001(a)(3)(ii) (735 ILCS 5/2-
       1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2018)) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1 The petition
       contained many allegations regarding the restriction of petitioner’s Morgan Stanley
       account. Petitioner filed an amended petition for substitution the following month.
       Judge McJoynt ruled that there could be cause if petitioner’s allegations were
       accepted as true, such that he would have another judge rule on the petition. Judge

           1
            Petitioner filed his first petition for substitution of judge for cause in February 2014 and his
       second petition for substitution of judge for cause in December 2014. Both petitions were denied.

                                                      -3-
       Robert Kleeman denied the petition on June 3, 2020, and he later denied petitioner’s
       motion to reconsider.

¶ 13       Petitioner then filed, on July 6, 2020, a “Motion for Substitution of Judge as of
       Right or Alternatively for Recusal as to [Morgan Stanley] Complaint.” See id. § 2-
       1001(a)(2)(ii). Judge McJoynt denied the motion on August 6, 2020, on the basis
       that he had already made hundreds of substantive rulings in the dissolution case and
       there was no evidence of interest, bias, or prejudice. He subsequently denied
       petitioner’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 14       On November 19, 2020, Judge McJoynt granted defendants’ motions to dismiss
       the complaint against them with prejudice, based on res judicata from Judge
       Sutter’s ruling. He also granted the Morgan Stanley defendants’ request to dismiss
       two counts with prejudice for failing to state a claim against those defendants.
       Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which Judge McJoynt denied on April 28,
       2021. The order contained findings under Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason
       for delaying enforcement or appeal of the denial of the motion to reconsider and
       the November 19, 2020, dismissal order, nunc pro tunc. Petitioner filed a timely
       notice of appeal, citing the April 2021 order and “all orders in [the] procedural
       progression leading to it.” He stated that he sought reversal of the April 2021 order
       and the November 2020 dismissal order.

¶ 15       In a summary order, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
       dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as barred by res judicata, because Judge Sutter’s
       2016 dismissal was not based on the merits of the claims. No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 10
       (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). It
       remanded the case for the circuit court to consider whether the dismissal was proper
       on any other grounds. Id. ¶ 11. This portion of the judgment is not at issue here.

¶ 16       Petitioner also challenged the denials of his petition and motion for substitution
       of judge. The appellate court stated that there was no Illinois Supreme Court rule
       allowing for an interlocutory appeal from the denials of the substitution requests.
       Id. ¶ 12. Therefore, they could be reviewed only on appeal from a final order. Id.
       Petitioner relied on Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d
       184, 186-87 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 179 Ill. 2d 1 (1997), where the
       Appellate Court, Fourth District, held that it could review a decision on a motion
       for substitution of judge in conjunction with an interlocutory appeal under Illinois

                                               -4-
       Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). The appellate court here stated that
       Berlin was from another appellate district and therefore not binding on the court.
       No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 13. The appellate court instead relied on the Second District case
       In re Marriage of Nettleton, 348 Ill. App. 3d 961, 970-71 (2004), which disagreed
       with Berlin on the basis that Illinois Supreme Court rules do not allow review of
       such orders in interlocutory appeals. No. 2-21-0285, ¶ 13. The appellate court
       therefore concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the rulings on the petition and
       motion for substitution of judge. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 17       We granted petitioner leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
       We allowed the Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
       to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
       345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 18                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19       The Illinois Constitution grants the appellate court jurisdiction to hear appeals
       from final judgments of the circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. The
       constitution further allows this court to “provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate
       Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts.” Id. Therefore, the
       appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are
       not final, unless an Illinois Supreme Court rule provides for jurisdiction. Johnson
       v. Armstrong, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 19.

¶ 20       In this case, petitioner appealed pursuant to Rule 304(a), which states in
       relevant part:

          “If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an
          appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
          of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding
          that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.
          *** In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than
          all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not
          enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry
          of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the
          parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

                                                -5-
       The construction of Illinois Supreme Court rules is a question of law subject to
       de novo review. People v. English, 2023 IL 128077, ¶ 13. We interpret our rules in
       the same manner as statutes, with the primary concern being to give effect to our
       intent, most commonly shown through the rule’s plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
       Likewise, we review de novo the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction. In re
       Marriage of Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 11.

¶ 21        Rule 304(a) supplanted former section 50(2) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev.
       Stat. 1957, ch. 110, ¶ 50(2)). In re Marriage of Lentz, 79 Ill. 2d 400, 407 (1980).
       We have described section 50(2) as “not one which either curtails or grants
       appellate jurisdiction, but *** one which fixes the procedure in the trial court as to
       the conditions affecting the terms upon which an appeal may be taken in advance
       of a determination of the entire case.” Ariola v. Nigro, 13 Ill. 2d 200, 207 (1958).
       Prior to section 50(2), a wider scope of judgments was immediately appealable. See
       Barnhart v. Barnhart, 415 Ill. 303, 309 (1953) (“A decree is final [and appealable]
       if it determines the ultimate rights of the parties with respect to distinct matters
       which have no bearing on other matters left for further consideration or if the
       matters left for future determination are merely incidental to the ultimate rights
       which have been adjudicated by the decree.”). A judgment was traditionally defined
       as the court’s determination on the issues presented by the pleadings, which
       ascertained and fixed absolutely and finally the rights of the parties to the lawsuit.
       Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 119 (1978). “Because judgments are final
       in nature, the rule developed that judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims
       were not only appealable, but had to be appealed if the rights of the party against
       whom the judgment had been entered were to be preserved.” Id. This led to
       “undesirable fragmentary appeals.” Id. The legislature therefore enacted section
       50(2) to discourage piecemeal appeals and to remove uncertainty about
       appealability when a final judgment was entered on fewer than all matters of
       controversy. Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 119 Ill. 2d 296 (1988);
       Ariola, 13 Ill. 2d at 207.

¶ 22       As stated, Rule 304(a) has since replaced section 50(2). To be considered final
       for Rule 304(a) purposes, the order must dispose of the rights of the parties, either
       upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate part thereof.
       Johnson, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 21. “[I]t is not the court’s finding that makes the
       judgment final, but it is the court’s finding that makes this kind of a final judgment

                                               -6-
       appealable.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a), Committee Comments (rev. Sept. 1988); see also
       Johnson, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 20 (Rule 304(a) language cannot confer appellate
       jurisdiction for a nonfinal order). Like section 50(2), the policy considerations
       underlying Rule 304(a) include “ ‘discouraging piecemeal appeals in the absence
       of some compelling reason and *** removing the uncertainty as to the appealability
       of a judgment which was entered on less than all of the matters in controversy.’ ”
       The Carle Foundation v. Cunningham Township, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 15 (quoting
       In re Marriage of Lentz, 79 Ill. 2d at 407). In other words, “a Rule 304(a) appeal is
       an exception to the general policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals.” Elg v.
       Whittington, 119 Ill. 2d 344, 354 (1987).

¶ 23       We note that in the instant case the circuit court entered a Rule 304(a) finding
       on the portion of the litigation that dismissed petitioner’s separate claims as to
       defendants, giving the appellate court jurisdiction to review that order. The
       substitution of judge rulings would not have been subject to their own Rule 304(a)
       findings for appeal because they were not “final” in that they did not dispose of the
       parties’ rights as to a separate part of the controversy. See Johnson, 2022 IL
       127942, ¶ 21; People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (1981)
       (“Preliminary orders in a pending case are not appealable because they are
       reviewable on appeal from the final order.”). The question here is whether the
       appellate court has jurisdiction over such a ruling in an appeal of the subsequent
       order under Rule 304(a).

¶ 24        The appellate court has issued conflicting opinions regarding whether it has
       jurisdiction over rulings on requests for substitution of judge in conjunction with
       an appealable interlocutory order. Petitioner relies primarily on Berlin, 268 Ill. App.
       3d at 186-87. There, the Fourth District held that, in an interlocutory appeal of a
       grant of a preliminary injunction under Rule 307(a)(1), it had jurisdiction over a
       ruling on a motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right. Id. The appellate
       court stated that the “scope of the review under Rule 307 is to review any prior
       error that bears directly upon the question of whether the order on appeal was
       proper,” which included “whether the judge hearing the request for interlocutory
       injunctive relief should have been sitting in that matter.” Id. at 187. According to
       the court, a contrary holding would allow “a judge who should not be hearing a
       motion for interlocutory injunctive relief to hear that matter without the objecting
       party having any recourse.” Id. at 186-87. The Appellate Court, First District, has

                                                -7-
       followed Berlin. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Freed, 2012 IL App (1st) 110749,
       ¶¶ 14-16 (the defendants forfeited the issue of whether the circuit court erred in
       refusing to grant their motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right because
       they did not raise the issue in their prior interlocutory appeal); Partipilo v. Partipilo,
       331 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398 (1st Dist. 2002) (citing Berlin without additional
       analysis); see also In re A.N., 324 Ill. App. 3d 510, 512 (4th Dist. 2001) (applying
       Berlin’s rationale to the State’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1)
       (eff. Nov. 1, 2000)).

¶ 25       Respondent and the Morgan Stanley defendants cite In re Marriage of
       Nettleton, 348 Ill. App. 3d 961, in which the Appellate Court, Second District,
       reached a different result. In that case, the husband appealed under Illinois Supreme
       Court Rule 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) from an order of indirect civil contempt,
       and he also sought review of his motions for substitution of judge. In re Marriage
       of Nettleton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 962. The court stated that, pursuant to Rule
       304(b)(5)’s plain meaning, the only order subject to review was the circuit court’s
       finding of contempt, which necessarily required a review of the temporary
       maintenance with which the husband had refused to comply. Id. at 968. In contrast,
       the rulings on the motions for substitution were interlocutory and reviewable only
       on appeal from the final order. Id. at 969.

¶ 26       The In re Marriage of Nettleton court stated that Berlin was distinguishable
       because there the court reviewed uncontroverted facts to determine whether the
       motion for substitution was timely filed before a substantive issue had been ruled
       upon, whereas in the case before it, the facts were controverted. Id. at 970. Even
       otherwise, it “believed[d] that the supreme court rule should prevail over the ruling
       of Berlin, such that [it was] precluded from reviewing the merits of the rulings on
       the motions.” Id. The court stated that a contrary interpretation would allow a party
       to circumvent supreme court rules by obtaining an appeal by refusing to comply
       with an order and being found in contempt, at which time the party could appeal
       the contempt order as a means to “challenge all other orders with which the party
       is dissatisfied.” Id. at 971. The Appellate Court, Third District, has followed In re
       Marriage of Nettleton. See In re Marriage of Morgan, 2019 IL App (3d) 180560,
       ¶ 14; see also U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. IN Retail Fund Algonquin Commons,
       LLC, 2013 IL App (2d) 130213 (concluding that in an appeal under Rule 307(a)(1)

                                                 -8-
       the court lacked jurisdiction over an order granting the plaintiff’s motion for
       substitution of judge as a matter of right).

¶ 27        Petitioner additionally cites In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23,
       and Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979), for the
       proposition that appellate review includes not only the order specifically appealed
       but also all orders in the procedural progression of that order. In re Marriage of
       O’Brien was before this court on an application for a certificate of importance under
       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316 (eff. Dec. 6, 2006), after a judgment of dissolution
       had been entered. The wife argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over
       an order denying substitution for cause, because the husband’s notice of appeal did
       not specify that he was appealing that particular order. In re Marriage of O’Brien,
       2011 IL 109039, ¶ 21. We stated that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed
       and that they “confer jurisdiction even if the order was not expressly mentioned in
       the notice of appeal, if that order was ‘a “step in the procedural progression
       leading” ’ to the judgment which was specified in the notice of appeal.” Id. ¶ 23
       (quoting Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435, quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
       567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)). We stated that, because the denial of the
       husband’s petition to substitute was a step in the procedural progression leading to
       the final judgment specified in his notice of appeal, the appellate court had
       jurisdiction to review the order. Id.

¶ 28       The issue in Burtell was also the construction of a notice of appeal on review
       from the final judgment of the case. The notice of appeal listed the final money
       judgment, but not a prior order in which the circuit court found that a joint venture
       existed and ordered an accounting. Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 431-32. We stated:

          “When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment only, or from a part of a
          specified judgment, the court of review acquires no jurisdiction to review other
          judgments or parts thereof not so specified or not fairly to be inferred from the
          notice as intended to be presented for review on the appeal. If from the notice
          of appeal itself and the subsequent proceedings it appears that the appeal was
          intended, and the appellant and the appellee so understood, to have been taken
          from an unspecified judgment or part thereof, the notice of appeal may be
          construed as bringing up for review the unspecified part of the order or
          judgment. Such a construction would be appropriate where the specified order

                                               -9-
          directly relates back to the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.
          Paraphrasing the language of Elfman, the unspecified judgment is reviewable if
          it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in
          the notice of appeal.” Id. at 434 (quoting Elfman Motors, 567 F.2d at 1254).

       We stated that the order finding the existence of a joint venture was a preliminary
       determination necessary to the ultimate relief that plaintiff sought, namely a money
       judgment based on an accounting. Thus, “it was sufficiently closely related” to the
       money judgment specified in the notice of appeal that the appellate court had
       jurisdiction to consider the order. Id. at 436.

¶ 29        We conclude that the appellate court here was correct in its determination that
       Rule 304(a) did not confer jurisdiction to review the rulings on the petition and
       motion for substitution of judge. In re Marriage of O’Brien and Burtell are
       distinguishable from this situation because they involved the construction of a
       notice of appeal in an appeal from the final judgment in the case. Interlocutory
       orders that are not immediately appealable are subject to review upon appeal from
       the final judgment in the case. See id. at 433 (the appeal from a final judgment
       “ ‘draws in question all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the
       judgment’ ” (quoting Elfman Motors, 567 F.2d at 1253)). Therefore, the
       substitution of judge order in In re Marriage of O’Brien was appealable when the
       final judgment in the case was entered. Typically, a “notice of appeal confers
       jurisdiction on a court of review to consider only the judgments or parts of
       judgments specified in the notice of appeal” (General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242
       Ill. 2d 163, 176 (2011)), but although the substitution of judge order was not listed
       in the In re Marriage of O’Brien notice of appeal, we liberally construed the notice
       of appeal to include that order as “ ‘a “step in the procedural progression leading” ’
       to the judgment which was specified in the notice of appeal” (In re Marriage of
       O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23 (quoting Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435, quoting Elfman
       Motors, 567 F.2d at 1254)). Again, there was no question that the substitution of
       judge ruling was appealable at that time because a final judgment had been entered
       in the case, and the controversy was only in construing the notice of appeal to
       determine whether the appellant sufficiently invoked review of the order.

¶ 30      Here, the dispute is focused not on the scope of the notice of appeal but rather
       on the broader question of whether Rule 304(a) could give the appellate court

                                               - 10 -
       jurisdiction to review the substitution of judge rulings. Rule 304(a) applies
       exclusively to final orders. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). In an
       interlocutory appeal under Rule 304(a), the circuit court has determined that, in
       spite of the court’s general policy disfavoring fragmented appeals, “there is no just
       reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both” of a particular “final
       judgment.” Id. In this manner, a Rule 304(a) appeal is limited in scope and does not
       pave the way for review of all prior orders. See also Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill.
       2d 420, 424 (1996) (the intended scope of review under Rule 304(a) is tailored to
       particular issues). The circuit court in the instant case entered Rule 304(a) findings
       on the order dismissing petitioner’s complaint against the Stogsdill and Morgan
       Stanley defendants and the denial of petitioner’s motion to reconsider, such that the
       extent of the appellate court’s review was restricted to determining whether the
       dismissal was in error. Cf. Postma v. Jack Brown Buick Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 399
       (1993) (in an appeal under Rule 307(a)(1), the only question properly before the
       court is whether there was a sufficient showing made in the circuit court to sustain
       its order granting or denying interlocutory relief); People v. Ernest, 141 Ill. 2d 412,
       424 (1990) (stating, in an attorney’s appeal from a finding of direct criminal
       contempt, that the propriety of an order denying a motion for substitution of judge
       was not before the court and that a “court order made within the proper exercise of
       jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous, must be obeyed until the order is modified
       or set aside by the trial court or reversed on appeal”). Accordingly, even if petitioner
       had expressly listed the substitution of judge rulings in his notice of appeal along
       with the orders specified in the Rule 304(a) findings, Rule 304(a) would not give
       the appellate court jurisdiction to review the rulings on the substitution requests.

¶ 31       One could argue that review of certain orders appealed under Rule 304(a) could
       require review of prior rulings in order to address the merits of the particular order
       appealed. See IN Retail Fund Algonquin Commons, LLC, 2013 IL App (2d)
       130213, ¶ 22 (“[R]eview of an interlocutory order may well require review of
       ‘attendant’ prior orders, i.e., those intertwined with the merits of the interlocutory
       order.”). Rulings on petitions and motions for substitution of judge do not fall into
       this category, as they are independent of the substantive merits of the order at issue
       in a Rule 304(a) appeal. Whether a substitution request should have been granted
       is not intertwined with the merits of the final judgment subject to Rule 304(a)
       review.

                                                - 11 -
¶ 32       It is true, as petitioner highlights, that all orders entered after an erroneous
       denial of substitution are a nullity and must be vacated. Palos Community Hospital
       v. Humana Insurance Co., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 34. Petitioner argues that, by
       considering the denial of a petition for substitution of judge during an interlocutory
       appeal, we would be promoting the efficient use of judicial and party resources
       during the proceedings. Respondent counters that, if we allow jurisdiction, it could
       open the floodgates to appellate challenges by parties who seek to upend the
       progress of their cases, as they could file pretextual requests for injunctions and
       then obtain appeals to also challenge the rulings on the substitution motions.

¶ 33       We note that this marriage dissolution case has been litigated for more than 10
       years even without a reversal of a substitution of judge ruling, which suggests that
       considerations of judicial economy and the preservation of party resources have not
       been top of mind. More significantly, “[p]rinciples of judicial economy may not
       trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by” an Illinois Supreme Court rule. People
       v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 141 (2003)). There is no Illinois Supreme Court rule
       that independently allows for an appeal from an interlocutory order resolving a
       petition or motion for substitution of judge. Rule 304(a) provides for review of just
       the intermediate final judgment that the circuit court has allowed the party to appeal
       from, along with any previous orders that must necessarily be reviewed because
       they are intertwined with the merits of the judgment with the Rule 304(a) finding;
       Rule 304(a) does not provide jurisdiction to review rulings on requests for
       substitution of judge. 2

¶ 34                                       III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35       For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court dismissing
       the portion of petitioner’s appeal pertaining to the rulings on his petition and motion
       for substitution of judge.

           2
             As the issue before us pertains to an appeal under Rule 304(a), we do not resolve whether
       rulings on requests for substitution of judge could be reviewed in conjunction with other types of
       interlocutory appeals.

                                                    - 12 -
¶ 36   Affirmed.

                   - 13 -