Court Opinion

ID: 9381242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 15:03:53.602338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.613773
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 22, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                              No. 3D22-33
                       Lower Tribunal No. 17-25250
                          ________________

                       Jose A. Lopez Guevara,
                                  Appellant,

                                      vs.

                           Marie S. Lamothe,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto
Diaz, Judge.

     Ricardo Torres, Jr., for appellant.

     Max A. Goldfarb, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, HENDON and BOKOR, JJ.

     HENDON, J.
     Jose A. Lopez Guevara (“Guevara” or “Appellant”) appeals from an

adverse final summary judgment. We reverse.

Background

     The Appellee, Marie S. Lamothe (“Homeowner”), hired Guevara to

perform a variety of remodeling and repair services to her property. Over

the course of his services, she paid him a total of $32,500.00. 1 The record

contains a March 18, 2017 “Roofing Proposal/Contract” showing a

company header for “All Construction & Developers, Inc., General

Contractor,” indicating contractor license numbers, and signed by “sales

rep.” Mauricio Corredor. Hand inscribed above the company logo is “Jose

A. Roofing.”

     In October 2017, the Homeowner filed a complaint for damages

naming as defendants Guevara, Mauricio Corredor, and All Construction

and Developers. 2 The Homeowner asserted counts for fraud, unjust

enrichment, contract implied at law, and violation of the Florida Deceptive

and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”). The Homeowner alleged in

1
  The record contains copies of cashed checks from the Homeowner to,
variously, “Jose A. Roofing,” “Jose A Lopez Guevara,” and “Jose Lopez.”
2
  The Homeowner asserted in the complaint that All Construction &
Developers had been voluntarily dissolved in May 2017. The record does
not say what became of defendant Corredor during the litigation and this
appeal deals solely with defendant Guevara.

                                     2
her complaint that Guevara and Corredor claimed to be in the construction

business, that they would remodel the Homeowner’s property for $40,000,

and would provide her with a detailed contract of work to be performed.

She alleged they did not provide an additional contract, and despite her

payments to Guevara, she contended that the work to her house was not

completed.

     Guevara answered the complaint, generally denying the allegations.

Guevara asserted in his affidavit that he is not the party who entered into

the alleged contract for house repair. Guevara stated that he is the

Homeowner’s neighbor, and as he is a construction worker, he agreed to

provide the labor for her home remodeling because she was acting as her

own contractor and would pull her own permits. Guevara attested that he

provided a substantial amount of labor and completed major renovations to

the property. He claimed that he and the Homeowner had a disagreement

wherein she asked him to perform more work but was unwilling to pay him

more than what she already paid him. Guevara claimed that the value of

labor he performed at the Homeowner’s direction and under her

supervision exceeds what she actually paid him.

     The Homeowner subsequently filed a motion for summary final

judgment. In her motion, the Homeowner asserts that she paid Guevara

                                    3
$32,500.00 for repair services to her house, that Guevara does not hold

any licenses relating to contracting, and that he did not complete the

majority of the promised work.

      The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was reset many

times, and ultimately took place on November 30, 2021. 3 The trial court

granted the Homeowner’s motion for summary final judgment. The trial

court found that Guevara agreed to repair the Homeowner’s real property

for $40,000.00; that the Homeowner paid Guevara $32,500.00; that

Guevara did some of the work, but as alleged in the Homeowner’s motion

for summary judgment, failed to install tile flooring, failed to install a new

roof or paint the house, failed to repair a ceiling, did not remodel the

kitchen or build out the bathroom or install new drywall throughout the

house, did not replace damaged wood framing, and did not repair the air

conditioning ducts. Further, the trial court determined that Guevara

admitted that he did not carry a contractor’s license, citing to section

489.128 and 489.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes, regarding contractor license

requirements. Guevara appeals, contending that genuine issues of material

fact remain that preclude summary judgment.

3
 There is no transcript in the record of the summary judgment hearing and
no motion for rehearing appears in the record.

                                      4
        Our standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo.

Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130

(Fla. 2000). Because the trial court entered summary judgment on

December 7, 2021, the amended summary judgment rule, Florida Rule of

Civil Procedure 1.510(a), effective May 1, 2021, applied. 4

Analysis

        There is no transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the record,

so this Court cannot know what was argued below. Ordinarily, the lack of a

transcript precludes appellate review. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of

Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979). However, the record

contains disputes of fact, and the trial court provided its findings of fact and

conclusions of law in its order, which allows this Court to evaluate the

correctness of the ruling. See Chaiken v. Suchman, 694 So. 2d 115, 117

4
    Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) provides:
         (a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary
         Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment,
         identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
         defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court
         shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
         no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
         entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court shall state on
         the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion. The
         summary judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be
         construed and applied in accordance with the federal summary
         judgment standard.

                                        5
(Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding lack of transcripts of attorney's fee hearing

was no impediment to appeal where the record showed issues had been

raised below).

      We conclude that the trial court erroneously based its legal

conclusions on inapplicable law. The trial court cites to section 489.128,

Florida Statutes, which provides in subpart (1), that “[a]s a matter of public

policy, contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1990, by an unlicensed

contractor shall be unenforceable in law or in equity by the unlicensed

contractor.” Further, “[f]or purposes of this section, an individual is

unlicensed if the individual does not have a license required by this part

concerning the scope of the work to be performed under the contract.”

§489.128(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2022). Here, the record shows that there

was no contract between Guevara and the Homeowner, 5 and that Guevara

never claimed to be a “contractor” or to hold a contractor’s license. 6

5
  The record shows that a “proposal,” not a contract, was signed by “sales
rep” Corredor under a corporate logo. It is not signed by the Homeowner or
by Guevara, and does not provide any detailed description of services to be
performed. It is thus irrelevant to the issue on appeal.
6
   The arrangement between Guevara and the Homeowner can be
considered an implied contract, as evidenced by the multiple checks she
wrote to Guevara for, variously, “construction” and “materials.” Courts will
find the existence of an implied contract of employment where “services
were performed under circumstances fairly raising a presumption that the
parties understood and intended that compensation was to be paid.”

                                       6
      The trial court cites to the definition of “contractor” in section

489.105(3)(c), Florida Statutes, which states, in relevant part,

      (3) “Contractor” means the person who is qualified for, and is
      only responsible for, the project contracted for and means,
      except as exempted in this part, the person who, for
      compensation, undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself
      or herself or by others construct, repair, alter, remodel, add to,
      demolish, subtract from, or improve any building or structure,
      including related improvements to real estate, for others or for
      resale to others; . . .

The exemption referred to in subsection (3)(c) exists in section

489.105(7)(a), which provides that no “contractor license” is required for,

      (7)(a) Owners of property when acting as their own contractor
      and providing direct, onsite supervision themselves of all work
      not performed by licensed contractors:

            1. When building or improving . . . one-family or two-
            family residences on such property for the occupancy or
            use of such owners and not offered for sale or lease . . .

Guevara alleged in his affidavit that this is exactly the circumstances under

which he agreed to provide remodeling and repairs to the Homeowner’s

house. He contends that the Homeowner told him that she would be acting

as her own contractor and would acquire the necessary permits, and as a

consequence he was not required to hold a contractor’s license. The trial

court’s legal basis for granting summary judgment to the Homeowner, that

Aldebot v. Story, 534 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (citing Tipper
v. Great Lakes Chem. Co., 281 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla.1973)).

                                      7
Guevara was an unlicensed contractor and that the “contract” is

unenforceable, is thus incorrect.

     In addition, we disagree that the Homeowner showed that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that she is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. The record is entirely too vague to conclude that there

remain no genuine issues of material fact. For example, Guevara asserts

that he provided labor and materials in excess of what the Homeowner

paid him for, but the record on appeal is woefully insufficient and the trial

court merely recited the Homeowner’s asserted facts verbatim from her

motion for summary judgment. On de novo review of this record, there

appears to be a disagreement between the two parties as to what services

Guevara agreed to perform, what services he actually performed, and what

the Homeowner expected or demanded that he perform.

     We conclude that summary judgment was erroneously granted.

Accordingly, we reverse the summary final judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

     Reversed and remanded.

                                     8