Court Opinion

ID: 9730722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:21:49.602139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:08.884658
License: Public Domain

*16Schreiber, J.,
concurring. This case should properly turn on the issue of whether there was sufficient support in the record for the trial court’s factual findings (1) that the defendant’s vehicle had been searched before its impoundment, (2) that the impoundment had not been made pursuant to a standard procedure, and (3) that the impoundment had been a “pretext” to justify the search.1 Having examined and analyzed the record, I am generally in accord with the following comments of Judge Botter in his dissenting opinion below:
There was substantial credible evidence supporting these findings, and they should not be disturbed in this court. State v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 162 (1964). *• * * The testimony indicates that the search was a pretext for a criminal investigative motive. The arresting officer was a member of the narcotics squad. He testified that he discovered the outstanding traffic warrant by examining the warrant files in different precincts. He had previously executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence without success. In addition, there was no need to examine the glove compartment at the scone. Defendant had been removed from the vehicle and the officer testified that he did not suspect that the vehicle contained a weapon, nor did he fear defendant. In fact, two officers were present. While no finding was made that the claimed seizure of the vehicle was a pretext for a criminal investigation, this evidence buttresses the trial judge’s findings that the search occurred before the officers intended to impound the vehicle. [145 N. J. Super. 480, 493 (1976)]
Although not every traffic violation will justify a search of every part of a vehicle, if a traffic violator is arrested and taken into custody, the police may properly search the car *17for weapons if they reasonably believe it necessary for protection or to prevent an escape. State v. Boykins, 50 N. J. 73, 77 (1967). Here the trial court found that the defendant was arrested after he stepped out of the car and that the police officer stated the search was not made for safety reasons. Apparently the defendant was transported to police headquarters in the detective’s car so there was no necessity to search the defendant’s automobile for weapons in connection with its use. Therefore, the search in this case was unreasonable because there was no nexus between the arrest and the search. Cf. State v. Zito, 54 N. J. 206 (1969) (warrantless search of automobile trunk proper where occupants arrested for failing to give good account of themselves and suspected of involvement in burglary).
The majority’s holding that impounding a vehicle and inventorying its contents in accordance with routine police procedures when the driver is arrested for a motor vehicle ofEense is an “unconstitutional invasion of the driver’s zone of privacy unless the driver either consents or is given a reasonable opportunity to make other arrangements for the custody of the vehicle” is too sweeping a declaration. I would hope that the majority would at least permit detention of the vehicle during questioning of the driver at the scene, for information so derived may give rise to a basis justifying a search.
Even more important is my disagreement with the underlying philosophy of the majority opinion as to the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976), stated that the proper test to be applied in measuring the propriety of a motor vehicle search was whether the search in light of all the circumstances was unreasonable. He quoted approvingly from Mr. Jnstice Black’s last writing on the Fourth Amendment:
*18The Fourth Amendment does not require that every search be made pursuant to a warrant. It prohibits only “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances. The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its own facts. [428 U. S. at 373, 96 S. Ct. at 3099, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1007 (emphasis in original), quoting from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 509-510, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2059-2060, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 608 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)]
Instead of fashioning the question pursuant to this guideline, the majority assumes that the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants must always be obtained before any search is permissible unless the search falls within certain limited exceptions.2
A comparison of the approach suggested by Chief Justice Burger and that endorsed by the majority in this case illustrates the two competing theories that have evolved in *19construing the Eourth Amendment. The language of the Amendment hears repeating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [U. S. Const., Amend. IV]3
The Amendment consists of two distinct clauses which are not connected. People should be secure against unreasonable searches and no warrants shall issue except upon probable cause. The sentence does not read that warrantless searches are unreasonable. Rather, the first clause sets down the ultimate standard that searches shall not be unreasonable, irrespective of the particular requirements of the warrant clause; whereas the second clause establishes the test of reasonableness for a specific type of search.
Constitutional history sheds some light on this dichotomy in the Amendment and suggests that many types of searches did not require warrants.4 In colonial days concern centered on general warrants which had been used to accomplish unreasonable and oppressive searches. T. Tayior, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 41 (1969). In 1761 the use of general warrants to enforce the revenue laws was vigorously attacked in court by the Boston merchants, but to no avail. 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 106-147 (Wroth and Zobel ed. 1965). Enforcement of these warrants provoked *20violent opposition. They were an anathema in the colonies. Taylor, supra at 38; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624-625, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529, 29 L. Ed. 746, 749 (1886). Taylor concludes that our constitutional framers were disturbed by the use of the general warrant rather than warrantless searches. Taylor, supra at 41. He asserts that the constitutional provision that a warrant shall issue upon probable cause and with sufficient particularity was inserted to eliminate this specific evil.
Equally significant at the time was the routine practice of searching a felon and the place in which he was found without a warrant. Taylor, supra at 29. No disquiet was evidenced about such searches and the constitutional safeguard inserted was that such searches be reasonable. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 327, 98 S. Ct. 1818, 1828, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 321 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus the warrant clause established one category of reasonable searches, the framers recognizing that the standard of reasonableness might in some instances require a warrant and in others not.
Therefore, those types of searches which, without some procedural safeguards, might come to resemble the searches conducted under the general warrants of colonial times, most clearly fall within the group requiring warrants. Beyond that, it is for the courts to determine whether and to what extent reasonableness requires conformity to the warrant clause. The difficulty arises when the court is faced with circumstances, purposes or objects which were not considered by the framers. Thus, for example, when the Supreme Court has considered the application of the Fourth Amendment to administrative searches, there seems to be general agreement that reasonableness requires something less than strict application of the warrant clause. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra. (The majority, although requiring a warrant, diluted the concept of probable cause and the dissent would have eliminated the need for a warrant.) Similarly South Dakota v. Opperman, *21supra, and. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), suggest that reasonableness does not require compliance with the warrant clause when the purpose of the search is benign as distinguished from the investigation of criminal activities.
The so-called exceptions to the warrant requirement are really categories of searches which, in terms of purpose, place or circumstances, differ from those searches which the warrant clause was clearly designed to cover. Por example, a search incident to an arrest is designed to protect the police (different purpose) and is directed toward evidence of a specific crime for which the suspect has been arrested (circumstances not like the general warrant.) Thus reasonableness can be satisfied by a standard different than that contained in the warrant clause. Cf. State v. Boykins, 50 N. J. 73, 78 (1967), where Chief Justice Weintraub wrote:
The Fourth Amendment forbids only such searches as are unreasonable. The familiar dbctrine that a search may be made as an incident to an arrest does not exhaust the subject of reasonable searches without a warrant. Rather it represents merely a category of reasonable searches.
When the warrant clause is thus read as merely stating the reasonableness standard to be applied in a particular factual setting, the first clause can then be seen as embodying the ultimate standard against which to determine the legality of searches and seizures. When confronted with purposes, objects or circumstances not envisioned by the framers, the wiser, and indeed the proper course is to apply the reasonableness clause; not to automatically force the new situation into the warrant clause category. Upon considering the nature of a particular class of searches, a court may well determine that reasonableness requires compliance with the warrant requirements.
In the case before the Court, we are dealing with an object not within the contemplation of the framers — the automobile. The majority insists on applying the warrant requirement to *22searches of those objects, allowing warrantless searches only when one of the narrow “exceptions” applies, [7-9 N. J. at 15]. This rigid interpretation ignores the long line of Supreme Court cases that have determined, in essence, that the greater mobility of automobiles and the reduced expectations of privacy associated with them allow some standard of reasonableness other than the warrant requirement. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra at 315 n. 10, 98 S. Ct. at 1822 n. 10, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 313 n. 10.5 Indeed, rather than being the general rule with respect to automobiles, the warrant requirement is the narrow exception. Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 593, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 2470, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 336 (1974), distinguishing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), on the ground that the car in Goolidge was parked in a private driveway. This Court has recognized that “[i]t is important that we keep in mind the nature of the thing searched. * * * [W] arrant-less searches of automobiles may be valid in situations which would not justify warrantless searches of homes and offices.” State v. Gray, 59 N. J. 563, 568 (1971).
The approach which I am advocating here is the one which was repeatedly expounded by Chief Justice Weintraub. His anatysis of search and seizure questions began with the premise that only unreasonable warrantless searches are proscribed b3r the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Davis, 50 N. J. 16 (1967), cert. den. 389 U. S. 1054, 88 S. Ct. 805, 19 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1968), he wrote:
Tlie Fourth Amendment does not bar all seal ches and seizures. It bai'S only those that are “unreasonable.” The concepts developed in this wrea remain subordinate to that ultimate standard. The ques*23tion, then, is whether what was done must be said on the total factual complex to be “unreasonable.” [50 N. J. at 22 (emphasis supplied) ]
He reminded us that offsetting factors — the individual’s right to be protected from crime and the public’s interest in police efforts to prevent crime — must be considered and weighed against the intrusion upon the privacy of and the inconvenience to the individual. The Chief Justice forcefully and carefully described those interests in State v. Boykins, 50 N. J. 73 (1967), a ease involving an automobile search.
We must recur to the basic proposition that the Fourth Amendment bars only searches that are unreasonable. “Since the Fourth Amendment speaks, not in terms that are absolute, but rather of unreasonableness, it necessarily calls for a continuing reconciliation of competing values. Pre-eminent in the galaxy of values is the right of the individual to live free from criminal attack in his home, his work, and the streets.” State v. Davis, 50 N. J. 16 (1967). That primary individual right demands that government be equal to the reason for its being — the protection of the individual citizen, and in deciding whether a search is unreasonable if the officer does not know precisely what it will uncover, we must keep in mind that the police have a preventive role as well as the duty to deal with crimes already committed. State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460 (1967). And finally it is worth repeating that the immediate question is whether evidence of unimpeachable probative worth shall be suppressed with the obvious hurt to other individuals and to public values involved, not because the Fourth Amendment says that evidence illegally obtained shall not be used, but rather because the judiciary, believing it was unable to fashion a remedy for its breach, settled upon the sanction of suppression to compel obedience to its command. State v. Davis, supra, 50 N. J., at 22.
Here we are not dealing with the privacy of a home, or of a place of business. We are not dealing,with something which is immobile and is thereby limited in its usefulness to the criminal element. Rather the subject is a motor vehicle, which, for all its blessings, is high among the agencies of crime. The automobile is perfectly suited for that use. It provides cover for weapons, contraband, and the fruits of crime. It supplies a capacity to strike without warning and to leave without trace. No discussion of crime can ignore the automobile, or the fact that the incidence of crime is hinged directly to the amount of privacy we accord it. [Id. at 81-82 (emphasis supplied) ] *24Suppression is a judge-made device to deter future acts of insolence in office rather than to rectify a wrong already done. It must not be overlooked that the contest is between the first right of the individual — the right to be protected from crime — and the right of the individual to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure, and that when criminals are set loose because patent evidence of their guilt is suppressed, a heavy price is exacted, not from an abstraction called the State or the police or society, but from law-abiding individuals whose right to be protected is thereby impaired. [54 N. J. at 210-211]
*23He expressed the same thought in State v. Zito, supra:
*24Chief Justice Weintraub’s analysis has been firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. State v. De Simone, 60 N. J. 319, 324 ,(1972); State v. McNair, 60 N. J. 8, 12 (1972); State v. Gray, 59 N. J. 563, 567 (1971); State v. Carter, 54 N. J. 436, 448 (1969), cert. den. 397 U. S. 948, 90 S. Ct. 969, 25 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1970); State v. Barnes, 54 N. J. 1, 10 (1969), cert. den. 396 U. S. 1029, 90 S. Ct. 580, 24 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1970); State v. Campbell, 53 N. J. 230, 233 (1969); State v. McKnight, 52 N. J. 35, 58 (1968). I cannot subscribe to its rejection.
Chief Justice Hughes joins in this opinion.
Hughes, C. J., and Pashman and Schreiber, JJ., concurring in the result.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Sullivan, Pashman, Clieeord, Schreiber and Handler and Judge Coneord — 7.
For affirmance — None.

The trial court mistakenly stated that the State had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that probable cause existed for the search. The burden is by a fair preponderance of the evidence. See R. 3:5-7 (b) and Pressler, Current N. J. Court Rules, Comment R. 3:5-7(b) at 370 (1978). See also, e.g., State v. Whittington, 142 N. J. Super. 45, 51-52 (App. Div. 1976). This issue has not been raised, considered or briefed by the parties. However, it is clear from the trial court’s analysis that it would have reached the same factual conclusions irrespective of the standard applied.

Supreme Court opinions have wavered between these concepts. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705, 68 S. Ct. 1229, 1232, 92 L. Ed. 1663, 1669 (1948) (adopting the “cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable”) with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66, 70 S. Ct. 430, 435, 94 L. Ed. 653, 660 (1950) (holding that the test “is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable”). Although Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), returned to the philosophy of Trupiano, in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 439, 448, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713, 718 (1973), the Court referred to reasonableness as the “ultimate standard” and declared “[t]he Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required.” Professor Weinreb commented in 1974 that “for the moment, the seesaw between the two clauses of the amendment is tilted away from the warrant clause.” “Generalities of the Fourth Amendment,” 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 77 (1974). Since then both views have been expressed. Compare South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978), which emphasized the warrant clause concept.

The phraseology of the State Constitution is virtually the same. N. J. Comst. (1947), Art. I, par. 7.

Mr. Justice Powell has acknowledged that: “The Court on occasion has also looked to history to discern whether certain types of government intrusion were perceived to be objectionable by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. [1], at 7-9 [ 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538].” Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, --, 99 S. Ct. 421, 435, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 407 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).

Tliat footnote recites that “[t]he fact that automobiles occupy a special category in Fourth Amendment case law is by now beyqnd doubt, due, among other factors, to the quick mobility of a car, the registration requirements of both the car and the driver, and the more available opportunity for plain-view observations of a car’s contents.”