Court Opinion

ID: 9897460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:07.504629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.583006
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion LIU

                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   TYLER JAMES BOLDEN,                                 No. 85099-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                              FÏJ E1
                   Respondent.                                                OCT 19 202
                                                                             EL
                                                                          CLERK
                                                                         BY
                                                                              C   EF DEPUTY CLERK

                              Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a
                   guilty plea, of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years.
                   Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jasmin D. Lilly-Spells, Judge.
                              Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

                   JoNell Thomas, Special Public Defender, and Melinda Simpkins and Robert
                   Arroyo, Chief Deputy Special Public Defenders, Clark County,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, and Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
                   County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
    NEVADA                                                                        il-14051
MI 1947K
                                                             OPINION
                          By the Court, WESTB.ROOK, J.:
                                         At his sentencing, appellant Tyler James Bolden objected to the
                          imposition of extradition restitution as well as the cost of a psychosexual
                          evaluation on the basis that he lacked the ability to pay. Over his objection,
                          the district court ordered Bolden to pay both the restitution and the full
                          evaluation cost but waived the $25 administrative assessment fee required
                          under NRS 176.062(1).
                                         ln this appeal, we consider whether and to what extent the
                          district court must make an investigative inquiry into a defen.dant's ability
                          to pay extradition restitution under NRS 179.225(2) before ordering the
                          defendant to pay that restitution.         We also consider whether NRS
                          176.139(7) requires the district court to make a similar inquiry prior to
                          requiring the ,defendant to pay the psychosexual evaluation cost.
                                         We conclude that the plain language of NRS 179.225(2). requires
                          the district court to inquire, prior to sentencing, into the defendant's ability
                          to pay extradition restitution in light of any existing obligations for child
                          support, victim restitution, or administrative assessments.                NRS
                          179.225(2)(a)-(c).. The district court's statutory duty is satisfied by asking
                          the defendant whether they have any such obligations that would be
                          impacted by the imposition of extradition restitution and by determining
                          whether the defendant is able to pay such obligations or, alternatively, if
                          extradition restitution would prevent the defendant from satisfying those
                          obligations.
                                         In contrast, we conclude that the plain language of NRS
                          176.139(7) does not require the district court, sua sponte, to conduct a
                          similar investigative inquiry before requiring a defendant to pay for the cost

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA                                                     2
CO) 19•171i    ...ea. •
                        of a psychosexual evaluation. Rather, it is incumbent upon the defendant
                        to object to the psychosexual evaluation cost based on their inability to pay,
                        and the defend.ant bears the bui...den to substantiate that inability to pay
                        before the court can reduce or waive the psychosexual evaluation cost.
                        However, once a defendant has done so, the court must mak.e findings On
                        the record as to the extent of the defendant's ability to pay and must impose
                        the cost of the psychosexual evaluation only to that extent.
                                    In this case, because the district court did not undertake an
                        investigative inquiry prior to ordering Bolden to pay extradition restitution
                        under NRS 179.225(2) or address Bolden's alleged inability to pay the
                        psychosexual evaluation cost following his timely and substantiated
                        objection, we affirm the judgment of conviction, vacate the sentence as to
                        restitution and the cost of . the psychosexual evaluation, and remand for
                        resentencing.
                                       PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTOR Y
                                    After bei.ng extradited from Michigan to Nevada, Bolden
                        entered into negotiations with the State to plead guilty to one count of
                        attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years. His negotiation
                                                                               . .
                        included an agreement to pay extradition restitution, if an.y was ordered,
                        and an agreement to undergo a psychosexual evaluation pursuant to NRS
                        1.76.139.
                                    .At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the court
                        impose restitution for extradition expenses in the amount of $3525, as well
                        as the cost of Bolden's psychosexual evaluation in the amount of $1689.30.
                        Bolden objected to both. the extradition restitution and psychosexual
                        evaluation cost and claimed. that he did not have the ability to pay either
                        amount. Bolden specifically referenced NRS 179.225 in support of his
                        assertion that the extradition restitution should be waived. The district
COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA                                                  3.
(0) 19471i    aiSPIt,
                      court reviewed NRS 179.225 and stated that it "read that statute only to
                      say that the Administrative Assessment fee can be [waived.]"             After
                      sentencing Bolden to a term of 42 to 144 months in prison, the district court
                      di.d "not find a basis to waive the extradition cost" and imposed both the
                      extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost in full but waived
                      the $25 administrative assessment required under NRS 176.062(1). Bolden
                      now appeals, challenging the imposition of the restitution for his extradition
                      expenses and the cost .of his psychosexual evaluation.
                                                      ANALYSIS
                                  In this appeal, we address the following i.ssues: (1) whether and
                      to what extent NRS 179.225(2) requires the district court to conduct an
                      investigative inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay before ordering the
                      defendant to pay extradition restitution, and (2) whether NRS 176.139(7)
                      imposes a similar investigative requirement on the district court to inquire
                      as to the defendant's ability to pay the cost of a psychosexual evaluation
                      before ordering the defendant to pay that cost.
                                  The decision to impose restitution under NRS 176.033(3),
                      including extradition restitution pursuant to NRS 1.79.225, is a sentencing
                      determination. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 12, 974 P.2d 133, 135 (1999).1
                      The district court has broad discretion when sentencing a defendant, and
                      "in the absence of a showing of abuse of such discretion, we will not disturb
                      the sentence." Parrish, v. State, 116 Nev. 982, 988-89, 12 P.3d 953. 957
                      (1980) (quoting Deveroux v. State, 96 Nev. 388, 390, 610 P.2d 722, 724

                            1.We note that although Martinez addressed restitution to victims of
                      crime Under NRS 176.033(3) (formerly codified as .NRS 176.033(1)(c), see
                      2019 Nev. Stat.,. ch. 633, § 10.5, at 4382), the same statute provides for.both
                      restitution to victims of crime as well as restitution to the State of Nevada
                      or other governmental entity for extradition expenses.

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA

(0) 1947H    4441PD
                   (1980)). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is
                   arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason."
                   Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (quoting
                   Jackson v. State, 11.7 Nev.. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001)).
                   Imposition of extradition restitution
                               nolden first contends that the district • court abused its
                   discretion    when    it imposed extradition       restitution without first
                   investigating his ability to pay under NRS 179.225(2).2 To evaluate this
                   argument, we must engage i.n statutory interpretation, which, like other
                   questions of law, we review de novo. See Doolin v. State, Dep't of Corr., 134
                   Nev. 809, 811, 4.40 P.3d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 2018). "The goal of statutory
                   interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Id. (internal
                   quotation marks omitted). To determine the Legislature's intent, we begin
                   by looking at the statute's plain language. Id. In doing so, we "interpret a
                   rule or statute in harmony with other rules or statutes." Id. (internal
                   quotation marks omitted).
                                 Here, the relevant language is contained in subsections (2) and
                   (3) of NRS 179.225:
                                         2. If a person is returned to this State
                                  pursuant to this' chapter or Chapter 178 of NRS and
                                  is convicted of or pleads guilty, guilty but mentally
                                  ill or nolo contendere to, the criminal charge for
                                  which the•person was returned or a lesser criminal
                                  charge, the court shall conduct an. investigatipn. of
                                  the financial status of the person to determine the
                                • ability to' make restitution. In conducting the

                         2NRS 179.225 addresses only extradition restitution. Accordingly,
                   unless specifically noted otherwise, our discussion herein applies only to
                   extradition restitution and not to any other type of restitution.

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA                                               5
(()) 1947B
                               •investigation, the court shall determine if the
                                person is able to pay any existing obligations for:
                                     (a) Child. support;
                                     (b) Restitution to victims of crimes; and
                                     (c) Any administrative assessment required
                               to be pa.id pursuant to NRS 62E.270, 176.059,
                               176.0611., 176.0613, 176.062 and 176.0623.
                                      3. If the court determines that the person is
                               financially able to pay the obligations described in
                               subsection 2, it shall, in addition to any other
                               sentence it may i.mpose, order the person to rnake
                               restitution for the expenses incurred by the Office
                               of the Attorney General or other governmental
                               entity in returning the person to this State. The
                               court shall not order the person to make restitution
                               if payment . of restitution will prevent the person
                               frOm paying any existing obligations 'described in
                               subsection 2. Any amount of restitution .remaining
                               unpaid•cdnstitutes a civil liability arising upon the
                               date of the completion of the sentence.
                               Under the plain language of NRS 179.225(2), the district court
                   is required to undertake an investigative inquiry in all eXtradition cases
                   that result in a conviction. See Thomas v. State, 88 Nev. 382, 384, 4:98 P.2d
                   1314, 1315 (1972) (recognizing that "shall" is generally construed as
                   mandatory):- Th.e subject matter of that inquiry is mandated by statute: the
                   court "shall." inquire into "the financial status ofthe : person to determine
                   the ability to make restitution." NRS 1.79.225(2). In doing so, the district
                   court "shall" inquire if t.he d.efendant has the ability. to pay any existing
                   obligations for child Support, victim restitution, or administrative
                   assessments aa . listed in NRS 179.225(2)(a)7(c).
                               The purpose of the investigative inquiry is not to determine
                   whether the defendant has the present ability to pay extradition restitution
                   in a general sense. Rather, the second sentence of NRS 179.225(2) narrows

COURT OF APPEALS
          OF
      NEVADA                                               6
f()) 1947ll
                     the scope of that inquiry to require only an investigation into the
                     defendant's ability to pay existing obligations within the three categories
                     listed in NRS 179.225(2)(a)-(c): child support, victim restitution, and
                     administrative assessment's..
                                    This limited investigatory purpose is further supported by the
                     text of NRS 179.225(3), which mandates two alternative 'outcomes,
                     depending on the defendant's ability to pay for the specific'obligations listed'
                     in subsection 2. If the court determines that the defendant is "financially
                     able to pay the obligations described in subsection 2," then extradition
                     restitution "shall" be ordered. See Thomas, 88 Nev. at 384, 498 P.2d at 1315.
                     On the oth.er hand, the court "shall not" order the defendant to pay
                     extradition restitution "if payment of restitution will prevent th.e person
                     from paying" the existing obligations listed i.n subsection 2.             NRS
                     .179.225(3).
                                    Because the consequences set forth in subsection 3 relate only
                     to the defendant's ability to pay for the three categories of obligations listed
                     in subsection 2, it follows that the scope of the court's investigative inquiry
                     in extradition restitution cases is limited to ascertaining the defendant's
                     ability to pay, fbr the enumerated obligations. See City of Henderson v.
                     Amado, 133 Nev. 257, 259, 396 P.3d. 798, 800. (2017) (explaining that
                     appellate courts construe statutes "as a whole," while readi.ng statutes "in
                     a manner that makes the words and phrases essential and the provisions
                     consequential"); see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
                     (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must
                     look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
                     and design of the statute as a whole.").

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA                                                 7
(01 1947U    42*->
                               Alth.ough the plain language of NRS 179.225(2) is not
                   ambiguous, .and th.us i.t is not necessary to resort to 'legislative history, we
                   nevertheless note that -the legislative history supports our construction of•
                   the statute. See Gilman v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 7, 527
                   P.3d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 2023). When. NRS 1.79.225(2) was enacted, the
                   Legislature intended the obligations listed in NRS 179.225(2) to be
                   prioritized over extradition restitution in this situation. Hearing on A.B.
                   4.65 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 67th Leg. (Nev., May 14, 1993).3 The
                   legislative history of NRS 179.225 indicates that the purpose of the statute
                   was to ensure that existing obligations for child support, victim restitution,
                   and administrative assessments were paid; this further comports with the
                   plain language of N.RS 179.225(3), which exclusively concerns the payment
                   of existing obligations and prohibits the district court outright from
                   :imposing extradition restitution if doing so would prevent the satisfaction.
                   of those obligations.
                               Therefore, when conducting an investigation under NRS
                   179.225(2), the district court is required to ascertain whether the defendant
                   has any existing obligations listed in. NRS 179.225(2)(a)-(c) and, .if so,
                           •
                   determine if the imposition of extradition restitution would. impact the
                   defendant's ability to satisfy those obligations. The court is not required to

                         3 We also recognize that the importance : of prioritizing victim
                                                      •

                   restitution was reaffirmed. by the passage of MarSy's Law, which entitles
                   crime victims "to have all .monetary payments, money and: property
                   collected .from any pers.on who has been ordered to make restitution be first
                   applied to paY the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim." See Nev.
                   Const. art. 1, § .8A(1)(p).

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     N EVADA                                              8
lin 1947B
                   independently investigate whether the defendant has the ability to pay
                   restitution generally outside the parameters of those existing obligations.4
                               Notably, NRS 179.225(2) is silent regarding how the district
                   court must conduct this investigation. Because the plain language of the
                   statute does not include .any specific procedural requirements, the
                   particular manner in which the district court undertakes this investigation
                   remains in the coures di.scretion. Thus, the district court may satisfy its
                   statutory duty by asking the defendant brief questions on the record to
                   ascertain whether the d.efendant has any existing obligations listed in NRS
                   179.225(2)(a)-(c), their ability to pay such obligations, and whether ordering
                   extrachtion restitution would prevent the d.efendant from paying such
                   obligations.5 The district court's finding regarding a defendant's ability to

                         4 We note that when determining restitution to a crime victim, the
                   district court is not required to consider the defendant's ability to pay. See
                   Martinez, 115 Nev. at 13, 974 P.2d at 135. (concluding thaL"there is no
                   requirement jhat the district . court consider a defendant's ability to . pay in
                   determining at sentencing the amount of restitution" to a battery victim
                   (citing NRS•176.015)). Unlike restitution to a crime'victim, which. does not
                   require, consideration of a defendant's ability to . pay in the procedures
                   outlined in NRS 176.015, see id., the inquiry Outlined in NRS 179.225(2)
                   does expressly require the district court to consider the defendant's ability
                   to pay before imposing extradition. restitution to the extent that it. impacts
                   the defendant's ability to pay the existing obligations 6iiumei.ated in the
                   statute. • Nothing •in this opinion should be construed as restricting the
                   district court's discretion . beyond what _is already provided by law i.n
                   deterniining the priority of payments'. See," e.g., Nev. Const. art. 1§ 8A(1)(p)
                   (prioritizing Payments to satisfy victim restitution); NRS 209.463(3), (4)
                   (detailing the priority in which deductions from inmates' wages must be
                   applied.)..
                                                                                    . .
                          5We. note that both the child supPort obligations enumerated in NRS
                                            . .
                   179..225(2)(a) and the "administrative assessments required to . be paid"
                   enumerated jn NRS 179.225(2)(c) (emphasiS added) . contemplate

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA                                             . 9
(0) 1947B
                       pay is a factual determination entitled to deference on appeal. See, e.g.,
                       Sunseri u. State, 137 Nev. 562, 564, 495 P.3d 127, 131 (2021) ("Mhis court
                       gives deference to the di.stri.ct court's factual findings as king as they are
                       supported by the record.").
                                   The State argues on appeal that the district court did n.ot abuse
                       its discretion in imposing the extradition restitution in this case because
                       Bolden agreed to par this restitution in his plea agreement. While the plea
                       agreement states that Bolden will be- ordered to reimburse th.e State of
                       Nevada for any expenses related to his extradition, the State fails to
                       demonstrate that this plea provision absolved the district court of its duty
                       to ensure th.at Bolden would be able to pay the obligations listed in NRS
                       179.225(2). Further, requiring the district court to impose extradition
                       restitution without considering the obligations in NRS 179.225(2)(a)-(c)
                       would subvert the legislative intent of the statute to prioritize the existing
                       obligations over extradition restitution. See Hearing on A.B. 465 Before the
                       S. Judiciary Comm., 67th Leg. (Nev., May 14, 1993).
                                   Bolden contends that when the district court waived the $25
                       administrative assessment,. it was precluded from imposing extradition
                       restitution under NRS 179.225(3) because the waiver constituted a finding
                       that Bolden lacked the ability to pay extradition restitution. However, the
                       record does not reflect that the district court made any express finding
                       regarding Bolden's ability to pay restitution.

                                                ••
                       prospective payments. Accordingly, the statute clearly indicates that the
                       district court should consider not just preexisting obligations, but also those
                       being imposed contemporaneously in the case before the court. See Ford u.
                       State, 127 Nev. 608, 622 n.8, 262 P.3d 11.23, 1132 n.8 (2011) (stating the
                       supreme court has "long adhere[d] to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (words
                       are known by—acquire meaning from—the company they keep)").

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA                                                 10
(0) 19.17B    relDr,
                               In this ca.se, because the record does not reflect that the district
                   court investigated whether Bolden had any exi.st.ing obligations under NRS
                   179.225(2)(a)-(c) that would be impacted by an, : award of extradition
                   restitution, we ,cannot determine if the court was required to impose or
                   prohibited from imposing restitution under NRS 179.225(3).6 Because the
                   district court • imposed extradition restitution without conducting the
                   investigative inquiry required under NRS 179.225(2), we conclude that the
                   district court abused its discretion.
                               On remand, we direct the district court to comply wi.th the
                   mandatory provisions of NRS 1.79.225. The court shall inquire whether
                   Bolden has existing obligations for child support, victim restitution, or
                   administrative assessments. If Bolden has existing obligations, then the
                   court must make a determination on the record as to whether he is able to
                   pay such . obligations or, alternatively, if extradition restitution would
                   prevent Bolden from satisfying those obligations; NRS 179.225(3) either
                   requires the court to impose or prohibits the court from impOsing
                   extradition restitution based on the outcome of that determination.
                   Imposition of the psychosexual evaluation cost
                               We next turn to Bolden's second contention, that the district
                   court erred when it imposed the cost of Bolden's psychosexual evaluation

                         "A . presentence investigation report can provide information
                   regarding a defendant's -existing' obligations. See NRS 176A.200 ("The
                   Division. shall:inquire i.nto the Circumstances of the offense, criminal record,
                   social .history and present condition of the defendant."); NRS 176.145(1)
                   (requiring the report to contain information regarding the defendant's
                   financial condition, the financial loss to the -victim, and whether the
                   defendant has an obligation for the support of a child). Tlowever, the district
                   court still must investigate and determine whether the in.formation in the
                   presentence investigation report i.s accurate as of the time of sentencing.

COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
    NEVADA                                                 11.
(0) 1947B 4410.
                   without first conducting an inquiry into his ability to pay or making factual
                   findings regarding his inability to pay. While we find that the districtcourt
                   abused its discretion by fai.ling to account for Bolden's inability to pay .under
                   these circumstances, we disagree with Bolden's claim that the•district Court
                   is, sua sponte, required to conduct an investigative inquiry, similar to that
                   required by NRS 179.225(2), befbre imposing the cost of' a psychosexual
                   evaluation.
                                 NRS 176.139(7) states, 'If a psychosexual evaluation is
                   conducted pursuant to this section, the court shall . . . [oirder the defendant,
                   to the extent of the defendant's financial ability, to pay for the cost of the
                   psychosexual evaluation."       Unlike NRS 179.225(2), which expressly
                   provides. that the district court must undertake an. investigative inquiry to
                   determine the defendant's ability to pay . when . determining extradition
                   restitution, NRS • 176.139(7) states only that the court shall order the
                   defendant to pay the cost of the psychosexual. evaluation "to the extent of
                   the defendant's financial ability." On its face, the plain language of NRS
                   176.139(7) does not require the district court to initiate any investigative
                   inquiry. Ramos v. State, 137 Nev. 721, 722, 499 P.3d 1178, 1.180 (2021)
                   (stating that when interpreting a statute, the appellate courts first look to
                   the statute's plain language to determine its meaning and will enforce it as
                   written if the language is clear and unambiguous); cf. NRS 179.225(2).
                                 "Nevada follows the maxim 'expressio uthus est exclusio
                   alterius,' the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." State u.
                   Javier C., 128 Nev. 536 541, 289 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2012). Additionally,
                   "Nevada law also provides that omissions of subject matters from statutory
                   provisions are presumed to have been intentional."           Dep't of Tax'n v.
                   DaimlerChryster Servs. N. Am., LLC, 121 Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d 135, 13.9

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA                                               12
(0) I947B
                    (2005).7 Because NRS 179.225(2) contains an express obligatign that the
                    district court must .conduct an inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay
                    before imposing extradition restitution, the omission of similar language
                    from NRS 176.139(7) is presumed intentional.8 Id. Therefore, we decline
                    to read an investigative obligation into NRS 176.139(7) where the statute
                    does . not expressly require it. See Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. 770, 773, 406 P.3d
                    476, 479 (2017) (declining to read a suppression. remedy into a statute,
                    "especially when our Legislature has proven in the criminal context that it
                    knows how to write one").
                                 Because NRS 176.139(7) does not require the court to initiate
                    an investigative inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay prior to ordering
                    the defendant to pay the cost of a psychosexual evaluation, it is incumbent
                    upon the defendant to object to the imposition of the cost. See deremias v.
                    State, 134 Nev. 46, 412 P.3d 43 (201.8) ("The failure to preserve an
                    error . . .,forfeits the right to assert it on appeal."). If the defendant objects
                    to the psychosexual. evaluation cost based on an inability to pay that
                    amount, then the defendant must also ,provide substantiation of their

                          7 See also, J.A. Cor6,,AdMinistrative Laiv and the Interpretation of
                    Statutes, 1 U. Toronto L.J. 286, 298 (1936):•
                                 [1]f Parliament in legislating speaks only of specific
                                 things and specific situations, it is a legitimate
                                 inference that the particulars exhaust the
                                 legislative will. The particular which is• omitted
                                 from the particulars mentioned is the .casus
                                 omissus, which the judge cannot supply because
                                 that would amount to legislation.
                          8We• note that the pertinent .portion of NRS 179.225 was enacted in
                    1993, see 1993 . Nev. Stat., ch. 331., § 3, at 935-36; and the pertinent portion.
                    of' NRS 176.139 was enacted .in 1.997, see 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 449, § 3, at
                    1638.

COURT OF APPEALS

         OF
      NEVADA                                               13
(0) 1).47F    ADD
                        inability to pay.. Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 798,
                        805, 102 P.3d 41, 4.6 (2004) ("The initial burden of establishing indigency is
                        on the defendant." (citing to Nikander v. •Dist. Court in & for First Judicial
                        Dist., 711 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Colo. 1986))); see also Widdis v. Second Judicial
                        Dist. Court, 114 Nev.. 1224, 1229, 968 P.2d 1.165, 1168 (1998) (placing the
                        burden "squarely.on the defendant" to demonstrate indigency).
                                    Like an indigency determination, the determination of a
                        defendant's ability to pay the cost of a psychosexual evaluation is a factu.al
                        determination that remains within the sound discretion of the district court.
                        See Rodriguez, 120 Nev. at 807, 102 P.3d. at 4.7 (citing Nikander, 711 P.2d
                        at 1262). When determining the defendant's ability to pay, the court may
                        consider evidence such as whether the defendant was represented by
                        appointed counsel, a financial affidavit that establishes indigency, the
                        presentence investigation report, the defendant's current or prospective
                        custody status, or . other . evidence of their financial inability to pay the
                        psychosexual evaluation cost. See Gilbert v. State, 99 Nev. 702, 704 n.1, 669
                        P.2d 699, 700 n.1 (1983) (noting appellant's indigency status was supported
                        in the presentence report and because appellant was represented by a
                        public. defend.er); Nikander, 711 P.2d at 1262 (statinv that factors to
                        consider when determining indigency "include whether the defendant has
                        any dependents, whether he is employed, income from all sources, real and
                        personal property owned, extent of any indebtedness, necessary living
                        expenses," and state and federal poverty guidelines); cf. Widdis, 114, Ney. at
                        1229-30, 968 P.2d at • 1168-69 (issuing a writ of mandamus directing the
                        district court to make an indigency determination because an affidavit of
                        indigency was filed while appellant was incarcerated, but the appellant was
                        subsequently released on bail and began immediate full-time employment).

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA                                                    4
(0) 1947R    aylri, •
                                •   If the court d.etermines th.e defendant is indigent or unable• to
                        pay the full psychosexual evaluation cost, the district court must reduce
                        that cost. NRS 176.139(7). Unlike NRS 179.225(3), which prohibits the
                        court   frorn   •
                                                 any • extradition restitution under certain
                                            imposing
                        circumstances, NRS 1.76.139(7) requires the court to order the psychosexual
                        evaluation cost only "to the extent of the defendant's •financial ability." The
                        proviso "to the extent of" immediately precedes the limitation regarding the
                        defendant's ability to pay and qualifies the district court's otherwise
                        mandatory obligation to impose the psychosexual evahmtion cost. See State
                        v. Beemer, 5]. Nev. 1.92, 192, 272 P. 656, 658 (1.928) (explaining that the
                         natural and appropriate office of the proviso being to restrain or qualify
                        some preceding matter," a statutory proviso "should be construed with
                        reference to the immediately preceding parts of the clause to which it is
                        attached." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                    'in this case, Bolden made a timely objection to the psychosexual
                        evaluation cost based on his inability to pay. Although we note that Bold.en
                        made only bare assertions of his inability to pay, he was also represented in
                        court; proceedings by. the Clark County Special Public Defender's Office, and
                        therefore, the lower court, had already made a finding of indigency that
                        would entitle .Bolden to the appointment of counsel. Moreover, the State
                        does not seem to dispute Bolden's indigent status. Gilbert, 99 Nev. at 704
                        n.1, 669 P.2d at •70. 0 13..1') While NRS 176.1.39(7) does not mandate that the

                             • 9Bol den contends on appeal that the district court's file coptained . his
                        financial affidavit, which Bolden subthitted to qualify for the' appointment
                        of counsel and which•verified his indigent status. The State disagrees as to
                        Bolden's specific assets and income identified in the financial, affidavit but
                        otherwise does not dispute that the financial affidavit was available to the
                        district court.

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                               15
(()) 1447H    ADP   .
                     psychosexual evaluation cost be waived in every circumstance where there
                     h.as been a finding of indigency, Bolden's timely objection, coupled with
                     evidence of his indigent status, was sufficient to require the district court to
                     evaluate the psychosexualevaluation cost in relation to Bolden's ability to.
                     pay in whole or in part and make findings on the record.. Becanse the
                     district court made no findings as to Bolden's ability to pay.the psychosexual
                     evaluation Cost before it imposed the cost in full, we conclude that the
                     district court abused its discretion. On remand, we direct the district court
                     to consider Bolden's ability to pay for the psychosexual evaluation and make
                     findings on the record. In doing so, we remind the court that it shall impose
                     such cost only "to the extent of the defendant's financial ability{ ] to pay" it.
                     NHS. 176.139(7).
                                                     CONCLUSION
                                  We conclude that NRS 1.79.225(2) requires the district court to
                     undertake    an investigative inquiry       prior   to imposing extradition
                     restitution. In this case, the district court abused its discretion by imposing
                     the extradition restitution without first determining whether Bolden had
                     the ability to pay any existing obligations for child support, victim
                     restitution, or administrative assessments. As a result, the court could not
                     determine whether imposing restitution was mandatory or prohibited
                     under NRS 1.79.225(3).
                                 Further, while the district court is not required to undertake a
                     similar investigative :inquiry before imposing the cost of a psychosexual
                     evaluation under NRS 176.139(7), the court is statutorily required to
                     impose the cost only to the extent of the defendant's ability to pay. Bolden
                     timely objected. on the basis of his inability to pay, which was supported by
                     evidence in the record, and the district court abused its discretion by
                     imposing the full cost without first evaluating :Bolden's ability to pay a.nd
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEvADA                                                 16
(0) I947B    4401D
                       mak.ing findings• on the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
                       conviction, but we vacate Bold.en's sentence as to extradition restitution and
                       the cost of the psychosexu.al. evaluation. and remand to th.e district court for
                       resentencing.m.

                                                                                          7
                                                            Westbrook

                       We concur:

                             1°We also conclude that the district court erred by failing to impose
                       the $25 administrative assessment as mandated by NRS 176.062(1). The
                       statute provides that the court "shall" impose the assessment and does not
                       include any waiver provisions. On remand, we direct the district court to
                       impose the administrative assessment.

COURT   Of APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA                                                 17
(0) 1947F.    .4iPp>