Court Opinion

ID: 9715215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:57:47.242223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.587808
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the premises at issue here do not fall within the curtilage concept. I do not agree, however, with the court’s additional holding that the cause must be remanded for a continuation of the suppression hearing. In my view, the evidence that was presented at the hearing adequately demonstrates that the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the area searched. As the majority notes, determining whether a person may claim the protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment requires consideration of two separate questions: whether the individual “manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and, if so, whether the expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. (California v. Ciraolo (1986), 476 U.S. 207, 211, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210, 215, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811. See also Smith v. Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226-27, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580.) Based on the evidence that was adduced at the suppression hearing, I would conclude that the defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises in question, or at least an expectation that we should recognize as reasonable. Although the gravel area where the vehicles were parked was situated behind the defendant’s commercial building and did not enjoy direct access to the street, other evidence suggested that the area was accessible to persons in the vicinity and that the defendant did not otherwise seek to exclude the public from it. The defendant had the burden of demonstrating that the search was illegal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114 — 12(b)), and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous (People v. Saeehao (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 522, 534). The trial judge was in the best position to resolve the parties’ conflicting proof, and I would uphold that decision.