Court Opinion

ID: 9643721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:38:37.214195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:02.675518
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

The majority here holds "that the mere appearance of impropriety is not of itself sufficient to warrant disqualification of an entire State’s Attorney’s office, based upon one member’s prior representation of a defendant presently under prosecution.” In reaching this result, the majority states that it relies upon the rationale of Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976) and Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980). In my view, the majority has radically departed from the controlling principles established in Sinclair and Lykins. I decline to join in this departure. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976), this Court considered "whether a state’s attorney, consistent with this State’s public policy ... may initiate or participate in a prosecution when he has a conflicting private interest in a civil matter.” Sinclair, 278 Md. at 244, 363 A.2d at 469-70. This Court held, in essence, that a State’s attorney who has a conflict of interest that might impair his obli*299gation to act impartially toward both the State and the accused in a criminal matter is, as a matter of public policy, disqualified from initiating or participating in the prosecution of that criminal matter. This conclusion was premised upon the rationale that, when a State’s attorney has a conflict of interest, an appearance of impropriety is created.
In reaching its result, this Court quoted from The American Bar Association Project On Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating To The Prosecution Function, § 1.2 (a) and its Commentary, (Approved Draft, 1971), as follows:
" 'A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict of interest with respect to his official duties.’ ... 'It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor avoid participation in a case in circumstances where any implication of partiality may cast a shadow over the integrity of his office.’ ” Sinclair, 278 Md. at 259, 363 A.2d at 478 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).1
*300It further quoted from Derlin v. Derlin, 142 Md. 352, 364, 121 A. 27, 31 (1923), which itself quoted with approval language from 2 R.C.L. 974 ¶ 51:
" 'An attorney at law who has once been retained and received the confidence of a client, is thereafter disqualifíed from acting for any other person adversely interested in the same general matter, however slight such adverse interest may be. Nor does it matter that the intention and motive of the attorney are honest. This rule is a rigid one, and designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent.’ ” Sinclair, 278 Md. at 253-54, 363 A.2d at 474-75 (emphasis added).
It additionally quoted from State v. Detroit Motors, 62 N.J.Super. 386, 391, 163 A.2d 227, 229-30 (L.Div. 1960):
" 'The principle long ago was recognized that no man can adequately or properly serve two masters, and this is the chief subject of Canon 6 [(now Canon 5)] of the Canons of Professional Ethics____ The books are replete with cases indicating that any appearance of evil in connection with the administration of public office should and must be avoided; and particularly is this true of those offices involved in the enforcement of the law.’ ” Sinclair, 278 Md. at 255-56, 363 A.2d at 476 (emphasis added).
Moreover, this Court said:
"These decisions seem to suggest what we think is the controlling principle of this case: if a prosecutor *301has, or would clearly appear to a reasonable person having knowledge of the pertinent facts to have, any pecuniary interest or a significant personal interest in a civil matter which may impair his obligation in a criminal matter to act impartially toward both the State and the accused, then he is, on the basis of this State’s public policy, disqualifíed from initiating or participating in the prosecution of that criminal cause. The corollary to this principle is that if a prosecutor who would have been disqualified is involved in his official capacity in the bringing of charges (by way of indictment or information) against the defendant, then upon timely objection the charges will be dismissed, or if such a prosecutor participates in his offícial capacity in the prosecution of the case, then upon timely objection any resulting conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered.”Sinclair, 278 Md. at 254-55, 363 A.2d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
More important, this Court said:
"We ... conclude that the defendant need not prove actual prejudice because, on the basis of public policy, it will be presumed to exist as a matter of law.”Sinclair, 278 Md. at 255 n.8, 363 A.2d 475 n.8 (emphasis added).
Thus, in Sinclair this Court specifically recognized that the impartial exercise of a State’s attorney’s function is so essential to the fair and equal administration of justice that a State’s attorney must not only be impartial in the exercise of his duty, but also must appear to be so. Additionally, this Court established the principle that when a State’s attorney in a criminal matter has a conflict of interest, an appearance of impropriety is created, and that, as a matter of public policy, such a State’s attorney is disqualified from participating in the prosecution of that criminal matter. Proof of actual prejudice to the accused is not necessary for such disqualification. As a corollary to this principle, this *302Court determined that an appearance of impropriety on the part of a State’s attorney requires dismissal if that State’s attorney was involved in bringing the charges and that an appearance of impropriety on the part of a State’s attorney requires reversal and a new trial conducted by a special prosecutor if that State’s attorney merely participated in the prosecution.2
In Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980), there was evidence to show that an attorney who had represented the accused in a civil matter later became the State’s Attorney. Thereafter, he presented evidence against the accused to a grand jury that resulted in an indictment. There was no evidence to show that information previously confided by the accused to the State’s Attorney had been presented to the grand jury.
The accused contended that prosecution by the State’s Attorney or his assistants, two of whom were members of the *303law firm that succeeded to the State’s Attorney’s practice, constituted a conflict of interest. Additionally, the accused maintained that as a result there was an appearance of impropriety that should not only bar that State’s Attorney’s and his assistants’ participation in the prosecution, but should also require dismissal of the indictment.
The trial court determined that although there was no actual impropriety on the part of the State’s Attorney, there was the appearance of impropriety and that, consequently, to permit the State’s Attorney’s participation was not in accord with the sound administration of justice. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the indictment. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment and held that neither the State’s Attorney "nor his assistant could 'be disqualified from performing their prosecutorial duties in this case.’ ” Lykins, 288 Md. at 78, 415 A.2d at 1117.
The majority of this Court specifically found that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it "determined that another prosecutor should be appointed because of the appearance of impropriety,” and "that to permit appearance on behalf of the State of former private counsel for an accused was not in accord with the sound administration of justice.” Lykins, 288 Md. at 84, 415 A.2d at 1121. However, the majority disagreed with the trial court’s "conclusion that dismissal of the indictment was authorized.” Lykins, 288 Md. at 84-85, 415 A.2d at 1121. Rather, it determined, over my dissent, see Lykins, 288 Md. at 87, 415 A.2d at 1122 (Davidson, J., dissenting), that under the particular circumstances the appropriate action to be taken by the trial court was "to supplant the prosecutor, not to bar the prosecution.” Lykins, 288 Md. at 85, 415 A.2d at 1121. The majority modified the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for the appointment of a special prosecutor and a new trial.
Thus, in Lykins, this Court held, in essence, that when a State’s attorney, in a criminal matter, has a conflict of interest resulting from his prior representation of the accused in a civil matter, an appearance of impropriety is created; that, *304as a matter of public policy, such a State’s attorney and his assistants are disqualified from participating in the prosecution of that criminal matter; that it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice to the accused to require disqualification; and that an appearance of impropriety on the part of a State’s attorney requires reversal and a new trial conducted by a special prosecutor. Consequently, Lykins reaffirmed the principle established in Sinclair that the appearance of impropriety on the part of a State’s attorney in a criminal matter requires disqualification from participation in the prosecution.3
The application of the principles established in Sinclair and Lykins dictates that when a State’s attorney in a criminal matter has a conflict of interest resulting from his prior representation of an accused in that criminal matter," the appearance of impropriety that is created is sufficient, in and of itself, to disqualify that State’s attorney from participating in the prosecution of that criminal matter. In my view, these same principles lead to the conclusion that when any member of a State’s Attorney’s office has such a conflict of interest, the appearance of impropriety that is created is sufficient, in and of itself, to disqualify the entire State’s Attorney’s office.
Here the record shows that Fritz, then an Assistant Public Defender, was assigned to represent the accused in a criminal matter. Discussions between Fritz and the accused concerned "everything the accused knew about the case.” Before the case was tried, Fritz was appointed Assistant State’s Attorney. At that time, he possessed confidential information material to that criminal matter which could be advantageously utilized by any member of the State’s Attorney’s office that might prosecute the accused.
*305When Fritz undertook to represent the accused, he assumed an obligation of loyalty that required him to preserve the confidences of his client by not revealing any confidential information related to him.4 When Fritz subsequently joined the staff of the State’s Attorney’s office, he assumed an obligation of loyalty to that office and to each of its members, and undertook to assist that office and each of its members in the prosecution of those accused of crimes. These circumstances show that Fritz was confronted with a conflict of interest arising from his obligation to his former client and his obligation to his present associates.5 Consequently, Fritz had a conflict of interest that might impair his obligation to act impartially to both the State and the accused in a criminal matter. Thus, an appearance of impropriety was created and, under Sinclair and Lykins, Fritz would be disqualified.
*306More important, Fritz’s conflict might well have resulted in the revelation of the accused’s confidences to any member of the State’s Attorney’s office. As a result, an appearance of impropriety was created, not only with respect to Fritz, but also with respect to the entire State’s Attorney’s office.* ****6 Although the State’s Attorney denied that Fritz had revealed confidential information to any member of the State’s Attorney’s office, neither the accused nor the public were independently able to verify that fact. Because, under these circumstances, the appearance of impropriety was not and could not be vitiated, the entire State’s Attorney’s office should be disqualified.
*307Accordingly, I would hold, on the basis of this State’s public policy, that the entire State’s Attorney’s office be disqualified from participating in the prosecution of the accused; that the conviction be reversed; and that the case be remanded for a new trial conducted by a special prosecutor. Courts in some other jurisdictions have reached the same result. E.g., State v. Latigue, 108 Ariz. 521, 523, 502 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1972); People v. Stevens, Colo.App., 642 P.2d 39, 41, cert. denied, P.2d (1982); Fitzpatrick v. Smith, 432 So.2d 89, 91 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983); State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 388, 524 P.2d 999, 1004 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988 (1974); People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 420-21, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (1980); State v. Cooper, 63 Ohio Misc. 1, 4, 409 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1980).
In reaching this result, I am cognizant of the fact that minor practical difficulties result from a rule requiring disqualification of the entire State’s Attorney’s office.* *****7 However, in my view, the necessity for public confidence in the *308administration of justice far outweighs such minor practical difficulties. I adhere to my previously expressed view that:
" 'Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by the rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. That faith is justified and can exist only when the people are convinced that justice is administered evenhandedly. The exercise of a State’s Attorney’s broad prerogative to determine whom, what and how to prosecute must adhere rigidly to the standards of conduct established by law. Any act not in accordance with those standards, because it impairs the confidence of the people in the integrity of the exercise of the State’s sovereign power to indict and prosecute, tends to destroy the people’s faith in the fair and equal administration of justice. Such acts are not to be sanctioned or condoned by the courts.’ ” Sinclair v. State, 27 Md.App. 207, 230-31, 340 A.2d 359, 373 (1975) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted), quoted in Lykins, 288 Md. at 92, 415 A.2d at 1124-25 (Davidson, J., dissenting).

. It should be noted that ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-1.2, Conflicts of interest, (1980) provides:
"A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict of interest with respect to official duties. In some instances, as defined in codes of professional responsibility, failure to do so will constitute unprofessional conduct.”
The Commentary to Standard 3-1.2 provides in pertinent part:
"When the possibility of a conflict of interest arises, the prosecutor should recuse himself or herself and make appropriate arrangements for the handling of the particular matter by other counsel in accordance with the principles contained in this chapter. It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor avoid participation in a case in circumstances where any implication of partiality may cast a shadow over the integrity of the office.” (Footnote omitted.)
It should be further noted that Md. Rule 1230, and Appendix F, ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9 provides:
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.”
EC 9-6 provides in pertinent part:
"Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to ... strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.” (Emphasis added.)

. In Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 81, 415 A.2d 1113, 1119 (1980), as here, the majority of this Court said:
"It will be seen that Sinclair does not stand for the proposition that a mere appearance of impropriety on the part of a prosecutor is ground for dismissing an indictment. There was an obvious appearance of impropriety in Sinclair. Hence, if the mere appearance of impropriety had been a sufficient ground for dismissal, we would have dismissed the information and would not have remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.”
I do not agree that in Sinclair "[tjhere was an obvious appearance of impropriety.” Lykins, 288 Md. at 81, 415 A.2d at 1119. Indeed, in Sinclair this Court specifically pointed out that although it was alleged that the State’s Attorney had a conflict of interest, the trial court had not determined whether the alleged conflict of interest did in fact exist. Sinclair, 278 Md. at 260, 363 A.2d at 478. The Court specifically stated that its remand was for the purpose of affording the trial court the opportunity to determine this question of fact. Sinclair, 278 Md. at 260, 363 A.2d at 478. Until it was established that a conflict of interest did in fact exist, there was and could be no appearance of impropriety.
If on remand the trial court had determined, as a matter of fact, that the State’s Attorney had a conflict of interest, an appearance of impropriety would have been created. In light of this Court’s statement that "the defendant need not prove actual prejudice,” Sinclair, 278 Md. at 255 n.8, 363 A.2d at 475 n.8, it is patently clear that dismissal would have been required because the State’s Attorney was involved in bringing the charges. Thus, notwithstanding this Court’s remand, Sinclair stands for the proposition that a mere appearance of impropriety on the part of a State’s attorney is grounds for dismissing an indictment.

. Recently, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347, 353, 456 A.2d 20, 23 (1983), this Court, in a civil case, reiterated the principle that an attorney who has once been retained and received the confidence of a client is thereafter disqualified from acting for any other person adversely interested in the same general matter however slight such adverse interest may be.

. Md. Rule 1230, and Appendix F, ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, provides:
"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.”
EC 4-1 provides in pertinent part:
"Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confídences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer....” (Emphasis added.)
EC 4-5 provides in pertinent part:
"A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client....” (Emphasis added.)
EC 4-6 provides in pertinent part:
"The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment. .. ."(Emphasis added.)

. Md. Rule 1230, and Appendix F, ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5, provides:
"A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.”
EC 5-1 provides:
"The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within *306the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal'' interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.” (Emphasis added.)

. Md. Rule 1230, and Appendix F, ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 provides in pertinent part:
"Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
"(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105 (C).
"(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment.” (Emphasis added.)
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.5, Commentary at 44-45 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
"The particular form of conflict of interest that arises when two lawyers who are associated in the practice of law appear on both sides of a case has been the subject of legislation in many states. These statutes typically make it a misdemeanor and provide for the revocation or suspension of the license of an attorney who in any way participates as prosecutor and then advises in the defense of the same case.
"A number of courts have imposed professional discipline upon a lawyer who appeared on both sides of the same case, either first *307as prosecutor and later as defense counsel or first as defense counsel and later as prosecutor.
"In all of these situations the controlling consideration is the avoidance of any possibility of division or dilution of loyalties. Relationships between lawyers who are associated in practice are so close and the potential for conflict is so great, given the lack of any strong reason for permitting such representation, that a flat prohibition is warranted against lawyers from the same firm or office appearing as prosecutor and defense counsel. Similarly, it would not be sound to permit one who regularly serves as a prosecutor to appear as defense counsel opposing one who ordinarily is his or her associate in the prosecution office.” (Footnotes omitted.)

. It should be noted that in Maryland it is not administratively difficult to obtain the appointment of a special prosecutor. As stated in Lykins, 288 Md. at 86, 415 A.2d at 1121-22:
"The appointment of a special prosecutor may be accomplished in one of three ways. (1) The trial court may invoke the powers vested in it under Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) § 2-102 (a) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and designate some attorney as assistant counsel for the State. (2) As was done in State v. Ensor and Compton, 277 Md. 529, 356 A.2d 259 (1976), the Attorney General may be requested to designate one of his assistants to be appointed by the trial court as assistant counsel for the State. (3) The State’s *308attorney may request the Governor to require the Attorney General under Constitution Article V, § 3 to aid the State’s attorney in prosecuting the action.”