Court Opinion

ID: 9517216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:09:34.273902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:37.806882
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. The majority believes that a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis justifies the probable cause finding in the warrant. However, this is not a case where an officer articulated several incidents of minor, suspicious activity that were “sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed by the person suspected.” Bennett v. State, 345 Ark. 48, 53, 44 S.W.3d 310, 313 (2001) (holding that officer’s smelling of unstable denatured alcohol alone was not sufficient to support search of storage building where it was located). On the contrary, each of the facts relied upon in the warrant, on its own, is constitutionally precluded from being the basis of a finding of probable cause. The cumulative effect of such impermissible facts adds nothing to the analysis of whether probable cause existed. The majority agrees that the affidavit failed to provide indicia of reliability for the confidential informants’ information and could not, alone, provide probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. They also agree that the assertion of Abshure’s prior criminal activity “is entitled to no weight in appraising a magistrate’s decision on a warrant.” The majority’s holding that the affidavit as a whole presented a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed rests entirely upon the surveillance conducted by the police. The majority finds that the affidavit cited three facts identified by law enforcement surveillance that were sufficient to warrant the suspicion that a crime had been committed by Abshure: (1) lots of late-night activity, (2) a strong chemical odor at Abshure’s residence, and (3) Mr. Thomas’s presence for a continuous day and night. These facts' are no more than general summaries of law enforcement observations. Bare, conclusory statements are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Collins v. State, 280 Ark. 453, 658 S.W.2d 877 (1983). “And while inferences the magistrate may draw are those which a reasonable person could draw, certain basic information must exist to support an inference.” Id. at 456, 658 S.W. 2d at 878. “We use a practical, common sense approach to examine search warrants but that approach cannot cure omissions of facts that are undisputedly necessary. This is especially true where great leeway is already given to authorities to use undisclosed informants and pure hearsay as a reason to search a person’s home.” Id. at 456, 658 S.W.2d at 879. In reaching its determination that these facts are constitutionally sufficient to support the magistrate’s probable cause finding, the majority relies heavily upon Fouse v. State, 73 Ark. App. 134, 43 S.W.3d 158 (2001). The majority articulates details of activity observed in Fouse, not details of activity observed at Absure’s residence, deemed to be suspicious, including the suspects’ use of counter-surveillance measures. While the court in Fouse found, as in this case, that the statements of the confidential informants failed to establish probable cause, the Fouse opinion made it clear that the details of the personal observations by law enforcement was the critical factor in upholding the probable cause finding that the suspects were operating a methamphetamine lab and chop shop. A number of sheriffs deputies and task force agents confirmed the smell of ether originating from the residence, members of the drug task force personally observed the counter-surveillance measures of armed suspects acting as guards at the residence, aerial surveillance corroborated the presence of a large collection of automobiles and officers heard the movement of large items. The affidavit in Fouse contained details of the officers’ observations over a four- month period and included such details as agents observing “a four wheeler traveling around the wooded area to the west of the residence and the lights pointed away from the residence as if to observe individuals approaching” and that “agents observed individuals using infrared lighting devices commonly used in association with night-vision goggles and smelled ether respectively.” Fouse, 73 Ark. App. at 143-44: 43 S.W.3d at 164-65. In stark contrast, no specific activity of any kind is identified at the residence of Abshure during the surveillance. The affidavit merely recites the conclusory phrase, “lots of late-night activity.” Late-night activity is not criminal activity. When nothing in the surveillance indicates criminal conduct, the surveillance cannot corroborate an informant’s allegation of criminal activity. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969). The majority concludes that the surveillance in this case sufficiently corroborated the information by the informants. The underlying premise of that conclusion is that “lots of late-night activity” at a citizen’s residence must indicate criminal activity. That premise is untenable. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to ascertain probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusion of another. Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 233, 697 S.W.2d 899, 9 (1985)(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). “An affidavit should speak in factual and not mere conclusory language. It is the function of the judicial officer, before whom the proceedings are held, to make an independent and neutral determination based upon facts, not conclusions, justifying an intrusion into one’s home.” Heaslet v. State, 77 Ark. App. 333, 340, 74 S.W.3d 242, 246 (2002) (quoting State v. Broadway, 269 Ark. 215, 218, 599 S.W.2d 721, 723 (1980)). It is impossible for a judicial officer to make an intelligent finding of reasonable cause upon this affidavit that cites no facts and that describes no specific action or activity observed by the officers. See Heaslet, 77 Ark. App. at 333, 74 S.W.3d at 246 (citing Garner v. State, 307 Ark. 353, 357-58, 820 S.W.2d 446, 449 (1991)). In Heaslet, supra, cited by the majority, this court applied this basic analytic approach in the context of an affidavit which cited the findings necessary to authorize a nighttime search, but failed to cite specific facts to justify those findings: In this case, the officers merely checked off the conclusory statements to establish reasonable cause. It is obvious that the affidavit form was drafted to reflect the requirements for reasonable cause as set out in Rule 13.2 because the language is basically the same. However, there were no specific facts presented to show that the place to be searched was difficult of speedy access, that the objects to be seized were in danger of imminent removal, or that the warrant could only be safely or successfully executed at nighttime. The affidavit only contained three statements in addition to the three checked conclusory statements. These statements provided merely that confidential informants had stated that [the suspect] was making methamphetamine. Heaslet, 77 Ark.App. at 340, 74 S.W.3d at 246. This same lack of specificity nullifies any weight that could be afforded the officers’ sense of smell. Although the affidavit states that a chemical odor was present, the smell was not identified as that of an illegal or legal substance. It was not identified as any substance at all, only a chemical odor. The affidavit does not even allege that the chemical odor was associated with a substance that could be used to make an illegal substance. Even if the odor had been specifically associated with a particular substance, the officer’s smell of a noncontraband substance, without other factors, would not cause a cautious man to believe a crime has been committed, nor should the mere storage of a noncontraband substance subject a law abiding citizen to the mercy of an over-zealous officer. See Bennett, supra, 345 Ark. at 53, 44 S.W.3d at 313. No precedent has sanctioned the issuance of a search warrant based simply on a trained officer’s smell of a legal substance, when that substance has legitimate uses, but also might be used to make an illegal substance. See id. Following that reasoning, no precedent could sanction the issuance of a warrant based on an unidentified chemical odor. Neither can the mere observation that Mr. Abshure had a house guest for a period of one day and night support the conclusion that the two were engaged in criminal conduct. No details as to what the officers specifically observed the two doing during that time period are provided. The majority’s conclusion that Mr. Thomas’s presence supports the informants’ allegation that the two were engaged in cooking methamphetamine could possibly be justified if the affidavit provided any specifics as to their activity, such as engaging in countersurveillance measures. However, no statements of facts regarding their activity is presented at all. Accordingly, I would reverse.