Court Opinion

ID: 9947253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 15:01:22.729231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.871519
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
           v.
                                                        Criminal Action No. 23-73-15 (CKK)
    KARON OLUFEMI BLALOCK,
                Defendant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                       (March 4, 2024)

          Defendant Karon Olufemi Blalock is charged by indictment with conspiring to distribute,

with others, thousands of counterfeit pills of fentanyl. On November 16, 2023, Magistrate Judge

Robin M. Meriweather of this jurisdiction ordered Defendant detained pending trial. Before the

Court is Defendant’s [257] Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order (“Motion”

or “Mot.”). Defendant requests that the Court review Magistrate Judge Meriweather’s detention

order and release him on pretrial conditions. Mot. at 1, 3–4. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1

the relevant legal authority, and the record before the Court, the Court shall DENY Defendant’s

[257] Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order.

                                      I.   BACKGROUND

          A. Procedural Background

          On March 9, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendants Hector David

Valdez, Craig Eastman, and Charles Jeffrey Taylor. ECF No. 1 (sealed). Additional defendants

were indicted on April 26 and May 18, 2023. ECF No. 25; ECF No. 74 On November 6, 2023, a

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    The Court’s consideration has focused on:
      • Defendant’s Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order, ECF No. 257; and
      • The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Review of Detention (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”),
         ECF No. 260, and exhibits therein.

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grand jury returned a third superseding indictment, adding, among others, Defendant Blalock. ECF

No. 134 (sealed). On November 17, 2023, a grand jury returned a fourth superseding indictment—

the operative indictment—in this matter. ECF No. 174. Following the third superseding indictment,

Magistrate Judge Meriweather issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was executed on

November 13, 2023. ECF No. 148. That same day, Defendant appeared before Magistrate Judge

Meriweather, who ordered Defendant to be temporarily detained (for three days). See Minute Entry

(Nov. 13, 2023). On November 16, 2023, Defendant appeared for a detention hearing before

Magistrate Judge Meriweather, who ordered Defendant to be detained pending trial. See Minute

Entry (Nov. 16, 2023).

       Defendant subsequently filed the pending Motion on February 5, 2024, requesting the Court

to review Magistrate Judge Meriweather’s detention order and set conditions of release. ECF

No. 257. The Government opposes Defendant’s motion, filing its opposition on February 20, 2024.

ECF No. 260.

       B. Factual Allegations

       In its opposition, the Government details the allegations against Defendant, including

messages exchanged between Defendant and two co-defendants in this case, as well as additional

messages from another individual on social media indicating that Defendant was distributing illicit

drugs. Broadly, the Government alleges that Defendant was a “prolific distributor of pills.”

Gov’t’s Opp’n at 21.

       To support its claims, the Government recounts purported messages between Defendant

and co-Defendant Valdez. Id. at 15–17. For example, on September 23, 2022, Valdez messaged

Defendant, stating, “I can give you a better ticket too.” Id. at 15. Defendant responded, “When

I’m ready leave me alone” and “Ite bet.” Id. Valdez then stated: “75 cents and okay bet my bad.”

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Id.

See id. at 15. The Government proffers that the above exchange demonstrates Valdez offering to

sell pills to Defendant for $0.75 each. Id. On December 10, 2022, Valdez messaged Blalock

again, stating, “When you need more pops,” “I got you at 50 cents,” and “Fire ones.” Id. at 15–

16.

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Id. at 16. The Government claims that this exchange indicates that Valdez offered Defendant pills

for $0.50 each and that the “pills were of high quality.” Id. On January 18, 2023, Valdez again

messaged Blacklock, this time stating: “I can do blues at 48 cents now,” meaning Valdez lowered

the price for the pills once again. Id.

       In addition to text messages with Valdez, the Government states that Defendant

communicated with some of the co-defendants in this case via social media as well. See id. at 18.

For instance, on September 19, 2022, Valdez offered to sell pills to Defendant at a cheaper price.

Id.

See id. On December 17, 2020, co-Defendant Taylor messaged Defendant, stating “Rd you know

somebody got perks,” to which Defendant responded, “How many.” Id. at 19. Taylor then asked

Defendant, “What kind.” Id. The Government proffers that the quantity Taylor was seeking was

dependent on the type of pills Defendant had available. Id. Defendant eventually responded, “I

gotta c wat he got proll 5s or 10s,” meaning, according to the Government, 5mg or 10mg of

oxycodone pills. Id. Taylor stated that he wanted “6.” Id.

       The Government also claims that Defendant received messages via social media from

potential customers regarding the illicit pills. For instance, on March 2, 2022, a social media user

messaged Defendant, telling him that his “30s high as Shyt.” Id. at 18. The Government proffers

that this individual was “praising the quality” of Defendant’s “M-30 fentanyl pills.” Id. According

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to the Government, Defendant then informed this individual that he sold pills at $4.50 each. Id.

Id. at 19. The Government alleges that the above interaction also indicates that Defendant knew

at least some of the pills he was distributing contained fentanyl, as opposed to legitimate

oxycodone. Id. at 21–22. Because oxycodone pills do not variate in quality, this alleged customer

“praising” Defendant’s pills means that the pills were counterfeit and Defendant was aware of it.

Id. at 22.

        Finally, the Government claims that Defendant obtained the illicit pills by travelling to

California. Id. at 16. The Government supports this claim by recounting various messages

between Defendant and Valdez. See id. at 16–17. For instance, on September 16, 2022, Defendant

asked Valdez to pick him up from the airport. Id. at 17.

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Id. Earlier that year, on July 28, 2022, Valdez messaged Defendant, stating, “Pops when you come

to get more I got you in a better ticket too.” Id. According to the Government, Valdez was

solicitating Defendant for “more sales of pills at a better price.” Id. Moreover, the Government

claims that financial records obtained during this investigation demonstrate approximately $4,300

in Apple payments from Defendant to Valdez. Id. In addition, flight records show that Defendant

has travelled to Los Angeles, California approximately forty (40) times over the course of the

alleged conspiracy. Id.

                                 II.   LEGAL STANDARD

       A defendant ordered detained by a magistrate judge may file “a motion for revocation or

amendment of the order” with “the court having original jurisdiction over the offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The Court applies de novo review to the question and is “free to use in its

analysis any evidence or reasons relied on by the magistrate judge, but it may also hear additional

evidence and rely on its own reasons.” United States v. Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C.

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2011) (BAH) (quoting United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF)).

“The motion shall be determined promptly.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b).

       In our society, “liberty is the norm” and “detention prior to trial or without trial is the

carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Bail Reform

Act permits pretrial detention in only “carefully defined circumstances.”           United States v.

Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A detention hearing must be held only if a case

involves any of an enumerated set of offenses, including an offense “for which a maximum term

of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in[, inter alia,] the Controlled Substances Act,”

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), or if the defendant poses a serious risk of flight or of trying to obstruct

justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a witness or juror, id. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B).

       The question for the Court is whether any “condition or combination of conditions will

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and

the community.” Id. § 3142(e)(1). “In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the

defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Vasquez-Benitez,

919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In determining whether a defendant should be detained

pending trial, the Court must consider “the available information” concerning four enumerated

factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence

against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s

release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

       “To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear

and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273,

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1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). That standard requires the Government

to establish that the defendant “poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety” that cannot

be sufficiently mitigated by release conditions. Id. at 1280; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.

“Detention cannot be based on a finding that defendant is unlikely to comply with conditions of

release absent the requisite finding of dangerousness or risk of flight; otherwise[,] the scope of

detention would extend beyond the limits set by Congress.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283. Detention

based on risk of flight, on the other hand, requires the Government to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will assure the

defendant’s appearance as required. United States v. Vortis, 785 F.2d 327, 328–29 (D.C. Cir.

1986).

                                    III.    DISCUSSION

         The Court concludes that the evidence presented by the Government in its briefing requires

Defendant Blalock’s detention pending trial.

         A. Legal Principles

         The Court shall begin by addressing the proper standard to apply at this stage of

proceedings.    As explained above, Defendant has appealed his detention order pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). Such an appeal is subject to de novo review, in which the Court must engage

in a searching, “factbound inquiry” to determine the danger to the community and/or risk of flight.

United States v. Sabol, 534 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2021) (EGS) (citing Munchel, 991 F.3d at

1283) (cleaned up).

         In determining whether Defendant is a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court

considers the Section 3142(g) factors, including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence”; (3) “the history and characteristics” of the defendant;

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and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be

posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). With respect to the second factor—the

weight of the evidence—the Court notes that this factor is a “common-sense consideration.”

United States v. Blackson, No. 23-cr-25, 2023 WL 1778194, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2023) (BAH).

If, for instance, the evidence is “overwhelming, credible, helpful, and important to the

government’s case in chief,” then there may be an increased risk that the defendant “will flee to

avoid future court proceedings,” and it may further “indicate that the defendant is a present danger

to himself or the community if the government’s allegations later prove to be true.”             Id.

Conversely, if the evidence is “circumstantial, contradicted, or unreliable,” then the defendant

would have “less reason to duck court proceedings” and the evidence does not support the view

that defendant is a danger to the community. Id.

       The Court shall consider these factors based upon the present record without holding an

additional hearing. See Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (permitting district court to use in its

analysis the evidence relied on by the magistrate judge); see also United States v. Anderson, 384 F.

Supp. 2d 32, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2005) (PLF) (taking into consideration the indictment, “the briefs and

other papers submitted by the parties, the proceedings before [the magistrate judge], the

[magistrate’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the evidence and proffers before [the

court]”). Based on the current record, the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence

supports a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the

“safety of any other person and the community” or Defendant’s appearance at trial. Accordingly,

the Court orders that Defendant shall remain detained pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

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       B. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged

       Turning to the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court first considers the “nature and

circumstances of the offense charged” including whether the offense involves “a controlled

substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). In this case, a rebuttable presumption of detention applies

because Defendant has been charged by indictment with serious violations of the Controlled

Substances Act. See id. § 3142(e)(3)(A); ECF No. 174 (operative indictment); United States v.

Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d 154, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (RCL). Even the possession with intent to

distribute “9.11 grams of fentanyl and .89 grams of powdered cocaine” triggers such a

presumption. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 165–66. Here, a grand jury has found probable cause

that Defendant was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl that ran

from August 2020 until the present day, and the Government has presented evidence that

Defendant was a “prolific distributor of pills.” See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15–19. The Court must

therefore presume that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

Defendant’s appearance as required or the safety of the community.

       To rebut this presumption, Defendant must “offer some credible evidence” that he will not

endanger the community or flee if released. United States v. Cherry, 221 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32

(D.D.C. 2016) (GMH). The Court finds that Defendant has failed to do so here. He argues, for

instance, that his charged offense “entails less intrinsic risk to the community than the other

offenses listed in the [Bail Reform Act], such as crimes of violence, human trafficking, terrorism,

and possession of firearms and explosives.” Mot. at 2. Regardless of the other crimes listed in the

statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), Congress has already determined that the offense Defendant

is charged with requires the Court to apply a rebuttable presumption of detention, see id.

§ 3142(e)(3)(A). Noting that other crimes may “entail [more] intrinsic risk to the community”

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does not prevent the rebuttable presumption from applying in this case. Mot. at 2; see also 18

U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A).      Furthermore, Defendant offers no evidence—let alone credible

evidence—that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk if release. See generally Mot.

In addition, the Government is alleging that Defendant was selling fentanyl pills, at least to an

extent, “disguised as legitimate oxycodone.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 21.

       The Court concludes that the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor of

detention. Defendant is charged with conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to

distribute 400 grams or more of a substance containing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846. This charge carries a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, with a maximum

of life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). As the Government puts it, “it is common knowledge that

fentanyl kills,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 20; this investigation began with the overdose death of a D.C.

resident who appears to have obtained her drugs through the member(s) of this conspiracy, id. at

3–4. “Moreover, this is not the case of an individual seller working alone.” Brown, 538 F. Supp.

3d at 167. The Government alleges not just a conspiracy among the defendants in this action, but

vast distribution across the United States. Therefore, Defendant’s “alleged participation in the

conspiracy charged thus strongly suggests that, if released, he would have the means to purchase

and distribute narcotics and thereby endanger [not just] the D.C. community,” but also

communities throughout the United States. Id.

       Furthermore, the additional defendants in the third superseding indictment have been

ordered detained pending trial as well. See, e.g., ECF No. 167; ECF No. 182 (sealed); ECF

No. 184; No. 191; ECF No. 231; ECF No. 255. In each of these cases, there was sufficient

evidence of fentanyl drug trafficking to warrant and support their detention pending trial.

Releasing this defendant, who is a “prolific” fentanyl trafficker in the District of Columbia, would

                                                11
be contrary to the other detention orders in effect. Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of

detention.

       C. Weight of the Evidence

       The weight of the evidence against Defendant also favors continued pretrial detention. The

Government presents communications between Defendant and other co-defendants in this case,

including Defendants Valdez and Taylor, substantiating its claim that Defendant did in fact

participate in this alleged conspiracy by dealing with illicit drugs. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15-19.

The Government also recounts communications between Defendant and another social media

account, indicating that Defendant would obtain the pills from a supplier—such as Defendant

Valdez—and sell the pills to a customer. Id. at 18.

       In all, the Court finds that the weight of this evidence is strong. See Brown, 538 F. Supp.

3d at 168–69. Given the evidence to date, this factor weighs in favor of detention. See United

States v. Brockhoff, 590 F. Supp. 3d 295, 304 (D.D.C. 2022) (CKK); see also Blackson, 2023 WL

1778194, at *10.

       D. History and Characteristics of the Defendant

       Under the third Section 3142(g) factor, the Court must consider a defendant’s “history and

characteristics,” including his “character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,

financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history

related to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court

proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).

       Given Defendant’s serious criminal record, this favor also weighs in favor of detention

pending trial. According to his Pretrial Services Report, Defendant has 21 prior arrests, 5 prior

convictions, and 5 bench warrants. See Pretrial Services Report (“PSR”), ECF No. 263. One prior

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conviction involved Attempted Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (Firearm), id. at 3, and another

conviction involved Second Degree Assault, Theft (less than $100), Resisting Arrest, and Failing

to Obey, id. at 4. Defendant was also convicted for possession of a controlled substance (not

marijuana) in 2017. Id. The Government argues that Defendant’s criminal history “reflects a

wanton disregard for the criminal justice system,” and that the conduct alleged against him in the

operative indictment is “not out of the ordinary for him” given his 2017 conviction involving a

controlled substance. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 23.

       On the other hand, Defendant argues that he does not have a “substantial history of failing

to appear for court,” as only one of the five bench warrants was executed, with the remaining four

having been quashed. Mot. at 2–3. Defendant further argues that only one of his prior convictions

is of concern (Attempted Assault with a Dangerous Weapon). Id. at 3. The Court’s concern is not

alleviated. Bench warrants typically are issued when an individual fails to comply with a court

order or fails to appear in court. Even without considering his bench warrants, Defendant appears

to have a serious criminal history, with numerous arrests and five convictions. See PSR, ECF

No. 260. In all, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of detention.

       E. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Defendant’s Release

       The final factor that the Court must consider is “the nature and seriousness of the danger

to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g)(4). Conspiring to distribute fentanyl presumptively renders a defendant a serious danger

to the community. See Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 170; cf. also United States v. Bethea, 763 F.

Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2011) (RCL) (narcotics trafficking generally). Particularly so given the

vast amount of drugs at issue here. More generally, “the lethality of fentanyl and scourge of . . .

opioids on this community [and communities around the country] further demonstrate the serious

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danger Defendant’s release could pose.” United States v. Bolivar, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171

(D.N.M. 2020). And, the significant statutory penalties Defendant faces provide him with a strong

incentive to flee.

        Defendant argues that home detention and electronic monitoring would “adequately

protect[] the community” and alleviate any concerns the Court may have that Defendant “would

flee or break the law.” Mot. at 3. Defendant requests that he be restricted to the home of his

mother, who resides in the District, because she “needs her soon” given her medical conditions.

Id. Defendant explains that he would take care of his mother, and, because his mother cannot

work, his mother would “always be present to watch over” him. Id.

        The Government, however, maintains that Defendant’s custodian should not be

“transformed into [Defendant’s] jailer,” particularly considering her medical conditions. Gov’t’s

Opp’n at 24. Furthermore, his mother should not be expected to report any infractions of

Defendant’s release conditions, id., as “[she] needs her son as much as he needs her,” Mot. at 3.

        While the Court sympathizes with Defendant’s situation, the Court must nonetheless

reasonably ensure the safety of any other person and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Here,

the Government presented strong evidence indicating that Defendant knowingly and intentionally

trafficked counterfeit pills. See generally Gov’t’s Opp’n. As such, the Court’s concern regarding

the safety of the community, or Defendant’s appearance at trial, is not alleviated. Therefore, this

factor also weighs in favor of detention.

                                            *    *       *

        All in all, even if Defendant could rebut the presumption of detention, the Court finds that

no set of conditions can address the threat of danger he poses to the community or mitigate his risk

of flight. Notably, Defendant’s PSR states: “No condition or combination of conditions can

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reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or safety to the community.” PSR, ECF No. 263, at

1. The Government has shown that Defendant has a strong incentive to flee given the seriousness

of the charges, the apparent weight of the evidence, and the substantial statutory penalties he is

facing. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Section 3142(g) factors require pretrial detention.

                                   IV.    CONCLUSION

       The record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination

of conditions can be imposed that would reasonably assure the safety of the community or

Defendant’s presence at trial if he was released pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Therefore,

the Court DENIES Defendant’s [257] Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order.

       Dated: March 4, 2024

                                                      /s/
                                                     COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
                                                     United States District Judge

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