Court Opinion

ID: 9903052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:28:58.456813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:05.051719
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

KRISTOPHER MICHAEL GOODWIN,

           Appellant,

v.                                       Case No. 5D22-0661
                                         LT Case No. 2019-CF-01412

STATE OF FLORIDA,

         Appellee.
________________________________/

Decision filed June 16, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Putnam County,
Howard O. McGillin, Jr., Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender,
and    Darnelle    Paige   Lawshe,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona
Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

     AFFIRMED.

WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
SOUD, J., concurs, with opinion.
SOUD, J., concurring.                          Case No. 5D22-0661
                                               LT Case No. 2019-CF-01412

      I join in affirming this case and write to address Appellant Kristopher

Goodwin’s claim of inconsistent verdicts.

                                      I.

      Edward and Karmen Eustace returned home from Walmart on a

Sunday afternoon to find the back door of their house “wide open” and a blue

bin sitting on their back deck. Believing something was amiss, Mr. Eustace

entered through the open door, saw a “good quarter inch” of standing water

on the floor, and, after expressing his surprise, observed Appellant run down

the hallway and out the front door. The Eustaces suffered, inter alia, more

than $2,500 damage to their residence resulting from the burglary. At least

one gun, a .22 caliber rifle, stored in the master bedroom closet, was missing

after the burglary and never recovered. Further, a tool shed located on the

property suffered approximately $200 of damage.

     Appellant was ultimately arrested and charged with seven crimes:

Count I (Burglary While Armed); Count II (Criminal Mischief Causing

Damage in Excess of $1,000); Count III (Burglary of a Structure Causing

Damage in Excess of $1,000); Count IV (Burglary of an Unoccupied

Conveyance); Count V (Grand Theft); Count VI (Grand Theft of a Firearm);

                                      2
and Count VII (Resisting an Officer Without Violence). During trial, Appellant

moved for judgment of acquittal as to Count III, arguing that the undisputed

evidence before the jury was the damage to the shed was less than the

$1,000 threshold. 1 The State, however, argued that Count III deliberately did

not identify a particular structure and that Count III included the house 2 itself.

The trial court granted the motion in part, precluding argument to the jury that

the shed formed a basis for conviction on Count III, but allowed the State to

proceed with Count III as it pertains to the house.

      The jury acquitted Appellant of Counts I (Burglary While Armed) and

VI (Grand Theft of a Firearm)—the only two charges involving the rifle.

Appellant was convicted of the remaining five counts, including Count III

(Burglary of a Structure Causing Damage in Excess of $1,000).

                                        II.

      Appellant claims the jury’s verdicts on Counts I and III are

impermissibly inconsistent because the jury’s acquittal on Count I (Burglary

While Armed) removed the possibility that burglary to the house could be the

      1
        Appellant did not file a motion for statement of particulars. His
argument that Count I was the charge addressing the dwelling and Count III
was “intended” by the State to address the shed is of no moment. Nothing in
the amended information identifies the shed as the subject of Count III.
      2
        The term “house” is used when referencing Count III to avoid
confusion with Count I, which designates the structure as a “dwelling,” a
defined and precise term under the burglary statute. See section II.B, infra.
                                        3
basis of a guilty verdict on Count III (Burglary of a Structure Causing Damage

in Excess of $1,000). This argument presents a pure question of law and is

reviewed de novo. See Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007)

(citations omitted); see also Mitchell v. State, 274 So. 3d 1136, 1138 (Fla.

5th DCA 2019); Conrad v. State, 977 So. 2d 766, 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

                                        A.

      Generally, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida. Brown,

959 So. 2d at 220. Inconsistent verdicts are accepted because they can

result from lenity and not speak to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Id.3

      Florida law recognizes one exception to the general rule permitting

inconsistent verdicts—when there is a “true” inconsistent verdict. Truly

inconsistent verdicts are “those in which an acquittal on one count negates

a necessary element for conviction on another count.” Id. (quoting Gonzalez

v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 444 So. 2d 417

(Fla. 1983)); see also State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996). A

jury’s verdicts against a defendant will be vacated when truly inconsistent

      3
        Florida juries, of course, are not permitted to disregard the law in
reaching their verdicts. As juries are routinely instructed in Florida courts, “[I]t
is important that you follow the law . . . in deciding your verdict. . . . Even if
you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. For
more than two centuries we have lived by the constitution and the law. No
juror has the right to violate rules we all share.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)
3.13 (emphasis added).
                                         4
verdicts are returned on “legally interlocking” charges where “the underlying

felony was a part of the crime charged—without the underlying felony the

charge could not stand. The jury is, in all cases, required to return consistent

verdicts as to the guilt of an individual on interlocking charges.” Brown, 959

So. 2d at 220−21 (citations omitted). 4 This exception is warranted when the

verdicts against a single defendant are truly inconsistent because the

possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs the rationale for

allowing the verdicts to stand. Id. at 221.

                                       B.

      To address Appellant’s claim of truly inconsistent verdicts, I must

consider the broader context of Florida’s burglary statute set forth in section

810.02, Florida Statutes (2019). Generally, in Florida, burglary of an

unoccupied structure is a third-degree felony, punishable by five years in

prison. See § 810.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. If the structure burglarized is a dwelling,

that burglary is classified as a second-degree felony, punishable by fifteen

years in prison. See § 810.02(3)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. Further, under Florida law

      4
        See, e.g., Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979) (guilty verdict
on felony-murder set aside where jury failed to find defendant guilty of the
underlying felony); Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981) (defendant
could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during
commission of a felony where jury failed to find him guilty of underlying
felony).
                                        5
pertinent to this case, burglary is a first-degree felony punishable by life in

prison if during the burglary of a dwelling, structure, or conveyance, one

assaults or batters another person, is or becomes armed within the dwelling,

structure or conveyance, or causes damage to the dwelling or structure in

excess of $1,000. See § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat.

      Relevant here, Appellant was charged with two different counts of

burglary. Count I charged burglary of a structure, specified as a dwelling,

while becoming armed. Count III charged burglary to a structure (not

specified as a dwelling) and causing more than $1,000 in damage. Each

count is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Appellant was

found not guilty on Count I and guilty on Count III.

                                       C.

      While the State seemingly concedes the verdicts on Counts I and III

are logically (or factually) inconsistent, it seems clear that the verdicts are in

fact consistent. The record before us strongly suggests the jury simply

concluded the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that

Appellant stole a firearm during the burglary and, accordingly, returned the

verdict of not guilty on Count I (Burglary While Armed). It is noteworthy that

the jury answered the interrogatories on its original verdict form for Count I

notwithstanding its not guilty verdict. The jury concluded the State proved the

                                        6
structure was a dwelling but failed to prove Appellant was armed with a

dangerous weapon or firearm. Consistent therewith, the jury also acquitted

Appellant on Count VI (Grand Theft of a Firearm). These two counts—I and

VI—are the only two counts involving a firearm. Appellant was convicted on

all other counts. Importantly, he was convicted on Count II (Criminal Mischief

in Excess of $1,000), involving the same damage to the property charged in

Count III.

      Even assuming arguendo the verdicts on Counts I and III are logically

inconsistent, they are not “true” inconsistent verdicts. These counts are in no

way “legally interlocking” charges where the acquittal on Count I negates an

element to be proven on Count III. See Brown, 959 So. 2d at 220−21. While

Counts I and III arise out of the same criminal episode, they charge different

crimes. Count I charged burglary (i) of a structure that was a dwelling, see

section 810.02(3)(a)–(b), Florida Statutes, and (ii) that Appellant became

armed during the burglary. See § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Count III, on the

other hand, charged Appellant with burglary of (i) a structure (not alleged to

be a dwelling) and (ii) causing damage in an amount exceeding $1,000. See

§ 810.02(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat.

      As such, Counts I and III are not legally interlocking such that an

inconsistent verdict would be impermissible and require setting aside the

                                      7
jury’s verdicts. Simply stated, Count I is not “part of” Count III. See Brown,

959 So. 2d at 220−21. The acquittal on Count I does not preclude the jury

from finding Appellant burglarized a structure (i.e., the house) and caused

more than $1,000 in damage, even if the structure damaged in Count III was

the dwelling contemplated in Count I. Such verdicts, even if logically

inconsistent, are not legally inconsistent.

      Accordingly, this case is rightly affirmed.

                                       8