Court Opinion

ID: 9568597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:32.205441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:08.368404
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent on the treatment of Issue 1, impeachment of State’s own witness. I fully concur in the balance of the opinion.
First of all, I question whether the issue is even preserved for the purpose of appeal. The record reflects that defense counsel objected to the introduction of the testimony as substantive evidence. There was considerable discussion as to Sharon’s possible status as a conspirator, an aider, or abetter, or as an unindicted principal, so as to come within the hearsay exception of admissions against interest. At one point in a motion hearing, the trial court said: “Do you come to the same conclusions, Mr. Alberts, on this and feel that the [Jensen] testimony is only admissible through impeachment?” To this, defense counsel, Mr. Alberts, replied: “That’s correct, your hon- or.” (Motion Hearing on status of Sharon Novaock, 5-12-86, page 59.) Throughout most of the record, before the deposition was read into evidence, the trial court was withholding its decision on the defense objections because the testimony might be admissible under some theory. But, when it came time to read Sharon’s testimony, the court admitted it only for the purpose of impeachment and so instructed the jury. It appears defense counsel acquiesced.
With respect to the discussion on the merits, while the majority would distinguish this case from State v. Rufener, 401 N.W.2d 740 (S.D.1987) (Rufener II) and State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793 (S.D.1981), I think the differences are only cosmetic. I am concerned that the language used by the majority is too loose and invites prosecutors to evade the “strawman” problem by simply asking some additional questions that may be irrelevant or cumulative.
As the majority opinion held in United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.1975), the prosecutor may be tempted to get before the jury prior inconsistent statements made by the witness and, while such impeachment might somehow enhance the *109truth-finding process, yet this must be balanced against the notion of fairness upon which our system is based. “Foremost among these concepts is the principle that men should not be allowed to be convicted on the basis of unsworn testimony.” Id. at 190 (citations omitted). The Morlang decision also instructs us in this regard:
We must be mindful of the fact that prior unsworn statements of a witness are mere hearsay and are, as such, generally inadmissible as affirmative proof. The introduction of such testimony, even where limited to impeachment, necessarily increases the possibility that a defendant may be convicted on the basis of unsworn evidence, for despite proper instructions to the jury, it is often difficult for them to distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence.
Id. at 190.
Can there be any question but what the most important information that State sought to extract from Sharon was the bloody condition of her husband’s clothing and shoes? Although the majority characterizes it as useful and important prosecution evidence, most, if not all of the testimony which was otherwise adduced from Sharon, was cumulative. There was other testimony linking Ashker to Novaock and the use of the green pickup truck that day. The thing that strikes me, and it seems rather obvious is: Why would a prosecuting attorney, who has a witness delivering all of that useful evidence the majority speaks of, turn around and deliberately attempt to impeach that witness? The only reason possible is that the prosecutor felt it more important to get the otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury than to support the veracity of his witness.
The prosecutor certainly was not caught by surprise. Sharon’s testimony was presented in deposition form so State was on notice from the time of the taking of the deposition as to what her testimony would be. Nor, does it appear from this record that Sharon was “recalcitrant or unscrupulously tampered with.” Sharon appeared to testify freely on every other facet, and the prosecutor did not see fit to attempt to qualify her as a hostile witness, so I distinguish this case from United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1980), upon which the majority relies.
Nor, can I say that the admission of the evidence was harmless error. This conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution was throwing everything before the jury that it could possibly sweep up. The testimony of the blood on Novaock’s clothing and shoes was the closest to a “smoking gun” State could come up with and the prosecution was determined to get it before the jury. Ashker might very well have been convicted without Jensen’s evidence; but, in my mind, it is certain that he was convicted because of it. I would therefore reverse.