Court Opinion

ID: 9853390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:47:45.018676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.619875
License: Public Domain

*579Justice MEYER
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The claimant cannot recover under G.S. § 97-29 or G.S. § 97-30 because the Commission found that her disability arose from and following her contraction of pulmonary fibrosis, a nonoccupational related condition, which she contracted long after her retirement from the defendant’s service. Likewise, claimant cannot recover under G.S. § 97-31(24) based upon findings of disability, presumed or proven, related to an occupational disease. If, indeed, disability exists, the recovery must be had pursuant to G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30.
This claimant has already received an award of $4,000 pursuant to G.S. § 97-31(24) of which the majority apparently approves, as it has not set that award aside but simply remanded the case for consideration of an alternative recovery under G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30. The majority apparently recognizes that if the claimant suffers disability (i.e., inability to earn wages) and recovers for total or partial disability under G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30, she cannot then recover under G.S. § 97-31(24), or vice versa. G.S. § 97-31 plainly provides that recovery thereunder “shall be in lieu of all other compensation.” The majority clearly concedes that recovery cannot be had under both G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30 and G.S. § 97-31(24).
The North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, as it relates to occupational diseases, is very specific and does not support the majority’s conclusion. I need only repeat what this Court said in Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 51-52, 283 S.E. 2d 101, 105 (1981):
G.S. 97-52 provides in effect that disablement of an employee resulting from an “occupational disease” described in G.S. 97-53 shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident. This section provides specifically:
The word “accident” . . . shall not be construed to mean a series of events in employment of a similar or like nature occurring regularly, continuously . . . whether such events may or may not be attributable to the fault of the employer and disease attributable to such causes shall be compensable only if culminating in an oc*580cupational disease mentioned in and compensable under this article. (Emphasis added.)
G.S. 97-53 contains the comprehensive list of occupational diseases for which compensation is provided in the Act.
By the express language of G.S. 97-53, only the diseases and conditions enumerated therein shall be deemed to be occupational diseases within the meaning of the Act.
Byssinosis is not “mentioned in and compensable under” the Act, except by virtue of G.S. 97-53, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Section 97-53. Occupational diseases enumerated; . . . the following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases within the meaning of this Article:
(13) Any disease . . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.
My interpretation of our Act is detailed in Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E. 2d 458 (1981). It suffices here to say only that any disease, in order to be compensable, must be an occupational disease, or must be aggravated or accelerated by an occupational disease or by an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. G.S. § 97-53 (13); Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E. 2d 189 (1979); Anderson v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E. 2d 265 (1951). We also said in Hansel-. “The clear language of G.S. 97-53 is that for any disease, other than those specifically named, to be deemed an ‘occupational disease’ within the meaning of the Article, it must be ‘proven to be due to,’ causes and conditions as specified in that statute.” Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. at 52, 283 S.E. 2d at 105. I fail to see how the “significant contribution” principle can satisfy the “proven to be due to” requirement of the statute.
*581I also continue to adhere to my position that there is no basis in law or in fact for the proposition that “for the purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis.” There is indeed a vast practical difference in “chronic obstructive lung disease” and “byssinosis.” Chronic obstructive lung disease can be due solely to any one or a combination of diseases such as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, etc., which may be totally unrelated to an individual’s occupation. It is correct to say that whether chronic obstructive lung disease is compensable depends upon other factors. In my view, those factors are aggravation or extenuation by conditions of the workplace. The claimant here does not have an occupational disease as defined in our Workers’ Compensation Act because her condition is due to pulmonary fibrosis. It is obvious that whatever condition this claimant might have could not have been aggravated or accelerated by the inhalation of cotton dust because she had not been exposed to cotton dust during the numerous years of her retirement before the onset of her pulmonary fibrosis.
However, even if I could agree with the principles expressed in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E. 2d 359 (1983), and that those principles are applicable to this claimant’s situation, the medical evidence in this case does not meet the Rutledge requirement of “a significant contributing factor.”
Even in Rutledge, the majority required that the occupation-related cause be “a significant causal factor” in the disease’s development. Even the medical evidence most favorable to the claimant in this case does not meet the “significant” contribution test. The majority flatly holds that it is sufficient if the pulmonary impairment “could have been contributed to” by the occupation-related cause. The majority’s acceptance of something less than the Rutledge standard is obvious, and its holding in this regard is internally contradictory. I quote from the majority opinion:
In this case there is sufficient evidence from which the Commission could have found that cotton dust exposure was a significant causal factor in the development of Mrs. Harrell’s obstructive lung disease. Dr. Kunstling testified: “She probably has obstructive impairment caused by cotton dust ex*582posure” and “I feel there is an element of pulmonary impairment present which could have been contributed to by her cotton dust exposure.” The record, therefore, contains adequate support for the Industrial Commission’s conclusion that Mrs. Harrell’s entire obstructive lung disease was an occupational disease. (Emphasis added.)
In order to properly address what I believe to be the majority’s primary error, it is necessary to recount briefly the procedural course of this claim prior to its reaching this Court.
The claimant filed a claim on 25 July 1979, seeking disability benefits for lung disease which she claimed was related to cotton dust in her prior textile mill employment. On 27 May 1980, Deputy Commissioner Lawrence B. Shuping, Jr., issued his opinion and award, wherein he found that the claimant had contracted an occupational disease, but that she was not disabled from work as a result of the occupational disease or any other physical condition until the year 1977, at which time she became disabled from work as a result of and following contraction of a nonoccupational pulmonary fibrosis. Deputy Commissioner Shuping concluded, as a result of the occupational disease which he found, that claimant had suffered permanent injury to two important internal organs and that it could reasonably be “presumed” that she had suffered a diminution of her future earning power by reason of such loss. The Deputy Commissioner subsequently awarded the claimant $4,000 for permanent damage to her lungs pursuant to the provisions of G.S. § 97-31(24). The Full Industrial Commission (Commissioner Robert S. Brown dissenting) affirmed the Deputy Commissioner’s opinion and award.
The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Industrial Commission, and the defendants cross-appealed. Based upon the cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals held that the Industrial Commission had erred, as a matter of law, in awarding benefits for an occupational disease under the provisions of G.S. § 97-31(24). Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 56 N.C. App. 697, 289 S.E. 2d 846 (1982).
The claimant-appellant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a rehearing pursuant to Rule 31, and the rehearing was allowed. On 29 March 1983, the Court of Appeals entered an order rescinding *583the previous order granting the petition for rehearing and denied the claimant’s petition.
Any fair and impartial review of the evidence presented in this case will reveal overwhelming evidence in support of the Commission’s finding that the claimant’s presumed disability resulted entirely from a nonoccupational pulmonary fibrosis of unknown etiology. I would point out that the claimant had not been exposed to cotton dust since she last worked in a weave room, which was more than 16 years prior to her death, and she had not worked at all since her voluntary retirement from defendant’s employment over 15 years ago. She was not examined by Dr. Kunstling, on whose testimony the majority relies, until 1979, some 10 years after she retired. The claimant’s evidence tended to show that she had worked for many years in cotton mills and had last worked for defendant Harriet & Henderson Yarns in 1969. Her reason for leaving the mill employment was related to the transfer of her husband and was unrelated to her health. Thereafter, the claimant remained at home in order to care for her son. The claimant testified to the occurrence of “cold symptoms” prior to leaving the defendant’s employ, but there was no evidence that she suffered disability, or severe breathing problems, until 1977.
Medical evidence presented at the hearing clearly showed that the claimant suffered from chronic lung disease which rendered her incapable of physical exertion. The medical evidence overwhelmingly attributed claimant’s lung impairment primarily to nonoccupational “restrictive lung disease.” There was some evidence, however, that claimant also suffered from “obstructive lung disease,” which Dr. Ted R. Kunstling, of the Textile Occupational Disease Panel, thought “could have been contributed to by her cotton dust exposure.” Dr. Kunstling further stated that it would be “speculative” for him to assess any relative contribution of obstructive impairment to the claimant’s overall condition and stated that the tests “indicate that the impairment is restrictive” in nature.
The claimant’s major exception involves that portion of the Full Commission’s Finding of Fact No. 10, which states:
... at which time she became disabled (from work) as a result of and following contracting nonoccupational pulmo*584nary fibrosis. The significant aspect of claimant’s current pulmonary disability is as a result of her restrictive lung disease (pulmonary fibrosis) which arose independent of and following her voluntary retirement from the defendant’s employ in 1969. (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Kunstling stated that “[pjulmonary fibrosis is a process of scarring which occurs in the lungs .... It cannot be an end product of long-term exposure to cotton dust.” He further stated his belief that the intervening process (pulmonary fibrosis) which had occurred (after the claimant left work) had contributed significantly to her pulmonary impairment. Additionally, his comment, contained within his written evaluation, specifically states that:
This minor degree of airway obstruction (from cotton dust) would probably not be significantly disabling in the absence of restrictive lung disease.
Dr. Kunstling also testified that he believed the claimant to be unable of performing even light housework as the result of her impaired pulmonary function and that he believed the spirometric tests indicated that the claimant’s impairment was restrictive. Dr. Kunstling’s notes of 5 October 1979 also reflect the fact that in 1977 the claimant began experiencing increased difficulty with breathing, which he ascribed to her pulmonary fibrosis with moderate restrictive pulmonary impairment.
Dr. Allen H. Lee’s notes also indicate that, to his knowledge as her family physician between 1949 and 1977, she had no respiratory complaint prior to 1977.
A third physician, Dr. Harvey Grode, testified with respect to the etiological factor behind the claimant’s lung disease. He testified that:
I did not arrive at a diagnosis of byssinosis with regard to Mrs. Harrell. ... It is still my opinion that I prefer to look upon it as if Mrs. Harrell were suffering from pulmonary fibrosis of unknown etiology. (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the claimant introduced into evidence medical records from Eastern North Carolina Hospital in Wilson, North Carolina. Those records contained the opinions of several physicians who treated the claimant during 1978. One physician, Dr. H. Banerjee, stated:
*585X-ray of the chest shows peribronchial fibrosis, particularly at the bases, extending up to the costodiaphragmatic recesses, from the cardiac margins. She had been investigated in the past, and was proved to be tuberculosis negative. There are some granulomatous appearances in the rest of the lung field, which are faint, and this corresponds to her history of having worked on a farm, especially with all kinds of vegetables, tobacco, and even in close contact with the soil.
Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that there is overwhelming evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the claimant’s disability resulted from a nonoccupational related pulmonary fibrosis. The evidence overwhelmingly rebuts any finding that the claimant had contracted obstructive pulmonary disease as a result of occupational exposure. There is not one scintilla of evidence to indicate that at the time of claimant’s retirement she was suffering from any permanent impairment, of any form. Specifically, the claimant testified that around the time she quit work in 1969, she was having cold symptoms, but that she left work because her husband had moved away and taken another job and she needed to be around to take care of a sick son. Dr. Kunstling’s testimony indicated that the claimant was not noticeably impaired from performing work at the time she stopped in 1969 and that the history which he had received indicated that the claimant was more symptomatic in 1979 than she had been at the time of her retirement 10 years earlier. This essentially echoed the remarks which Dr. Kunstling had made in his formal evaluation report, wherein he stated, “Mrs. Harrell’s history suggests that she was not significantly impaired at the time she stopped working in 1969 . . . .”
Additionally, Dr. Allen H. Lee of Selma, North Carolina, the claimant’s family physician, wrote a short note (which was stipulated into evidence) in which he stated that he had known the claimant since 1949 and that “from 1949 until 1977, she had no lung disease that I am aware of. . . . As far as I know, she had no lung symptoms before July 1977.”
There is a plethora of evidence to support the finding that claimant’s impairment arose as the result of pulmonary fibrosis *586and not as the result of obstructive lung disease due to cotton dust exposure.
The consensus of all the testimony with respect to the nature of the claimant’s impairment is perhaps best set forth in the concluding paragraph of Dr. Kunstling’s report:
It is my feeling that Mrs. Harrell was not disabled at the time of her retirement, that her restrictive pulmonary impairment is not characteristic of cotton dust exposure, but that she may have a minor element of airway obstruction which could have been exacerbated by exposure to cotton dust. This minor degree of airway obstruction would probably not be significantly disabling in the absence of restrictive lung disease. (Emphasis added.)
This testimony assuredly does not meet the “significant causal effect” test.
I would also note that I find some aspects of the majority opinion quite confusing. The opinion seems to approve apportionment in this language:
[W]e think the proper course is to remand the case to the Commission to determine whether occupational or nonoccupational disease was the cause of Mrs. Harrell’s disability. If the medical evidence would support a finding that her occupational, obstructive lung disease partially contributed to her disability and her nonoccupational, restrictive lung disease independently and not aggravated by occupational disease also partially contributed to her disability, she would be entitled to compensation for so much of her wage-earning incapacity as was attributable to her occupational disease.
Yet it seems to actually hold that the facts here do not permit apportionment:
In this case, however, the medical evidence does not permit any reasonable apportionment of her disability between occupational and nonoccupational disease. Dr. Kunstling characterized the task of “assessing the relative contribution of restrictive and obstructive elements” of Mrs. Harrell’s disease as “speculative.”
*587I also find the majority opinion confusing on the question of whether disability (i.e., inability to earn wages) is required in this claimant’s situation. The majority opinion seems to require a showing of “disability”:
Because the evidence will permit no such apportionment, plaintiff is entitled to an award for her entire disability if her occupational disease was a substantial and material factor in bringing about that disability.
Yet, the majority seems to go further and hold that the existence of a “disability” is not a predicate to recovery:
Disablement (or death), they argue, is a condition that must occur before G.S. 97-52 makes occupational diseases compensable.
Defendant’s argument is based on an overly technical reading of the statute. The purpose of G.S. 97-52 is to enable a worker to recover for disability caused by occupational disease under G.S. 97-29. The words “disablement or death” merely describe a condition that must occur before recovery may be had under G.S. 97-29. They do not predicate recovery under G.S. 97-31 upon disability. Recovery under that section, as noted above, is permitted regardless of actual ability or inability to earn wages.
Frankly, I am unable to determine what the majority holds in this regard.
I would hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to allow the award of benefits pursuant to G.S. § 97-31(24) because it was based on a finding of disability (i.e., inability to earn wages) related to an occupational disease. If there is disability, recovery must be pursuant to G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30.
I would also hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to remand to the Industrial Commission for an award pursuant to G.S. § 97-29 or 97-30 because the Commission had already found that claimant’s disability arose from and following the contraction of nonoccupational related pulmonary fibrosis.
Chief Justice BRANCH joins in this dissenting opinion.