Court Opinion

ID: 9412915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 22:00:43.362894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:32.282159
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30041     Document: 00516842419          Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                              FILED
                                                                     August 1, 2023
                                 No. 22-30041
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                              Clerk

   Great Lakes Insurance, S.E.,

                                                              Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Gray Group Investments, L.L.C.,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:20-CV-2795
                  ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
         Hello, Dolly
         Well, hello, Dolly
         It’s so nice to have you back where you belong . . . .1
         Great Lakes Insurance, S.E. insured the Hello Dolly VI, a boat owned
   by Gray Group Investments, L.L.C. The Hello Dolly sank in Pensacola,

         _____________________
         1
           From the Musical Production “Hello Dolly!” Music and lyrics by Jerry
   Herman, copyright 1963.
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                                    No. 22-30041

   Florida, during a hurricane. Gray Group filed a claim under the insurance
   policy, Great Lakes denied coverage, and Great Lakes then sought a
   declaratory judgment that it properly did so. Ironically, the question largely
   turned on whether, contra her musical namesake, the Hello Dolly was “back
   where [she] belong[ed],” for purposes of coverage. The district court agreed
   with Great Lakes that she was not. We affirm.
                                        I.
                                        A.
          Hurricane Sally struck the Gulf Coast in September 2020. In its path
   lay the Hello Dolly VI (hereafter, the Vessel), which was moored behind Gray
   Group’s eponymous member Michael Gray’s house in Pensacola. The
   Vessel sustained damage during the storm and sank at its mooring. The
   Vessel was insured under an insurance policy issued by Great Lakes. Great
   Lakes also insured several other watercraft within Gray Group’s fleet under
   similar policies. Though the operative policy provided coverage for “named
   windstorms,” Great Lakes denied coverage, asserting that Gray Group had
   breached several warranties.
          Specifically, Great Lakes faulted Gray Group for breaching the
   “hurricane protection plan” (the HPP) that Gray Group had submitted in
   response to Great Lakes’s “hurricane questionnaire” (the HQ). The HQ
   requested the Vessel’s location during hurricane season and asked a series of
   questions regarding Gray Group’s contingency plans in the event of a
   hurricane. In the HPP, Gray Group stated that the Vessel would be located
   at the Orleans Marina in New Orleans, Louisiana, and detailed the protective
   measures Gray Group would take when a hurricane approached.
          The parties contest whether the HPP was incorporated by reference
   into the insurance policy, and, if so, whether Gray Group breached the HPP.

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   Before laying anchor there, we briefly chart the policy’s incorporation clauses
   and the underlying documents at issue.
          There are two incorporation clauses in the insurance policy. The first
   provides that “[t]his insuring agreement incorporates in full [Gray Group’s]
   application for insurance[.]” The second states that “[t]his is a legally
   binding insurance document between [Gray Group] and [Great Lakes],
   incorporating in full the application form signed by [Gray Group].”
          Gray Group submitted various documentation to facilitate
   underwriting for the policy at issue. Three such documents are particularly
   relevant: the “Application Form,” the HQ, and the HPP. In the Application
   Form, Gray Group represented that the “primary mooring location of [the]
   Vessel . . . between July 1st [and] Nov[.] 1st” would be the Orleans Marina. In
   the HPP, Gray Group again named the Orleans Marina in response to the
   HQ’s request for the “marina or residence where [the] [V]essel [would be]
   located between 1st July and 1st November[.]”          Whether the policy’s
   incorporating clauses encompass these underwriting documents determines
   the seaworthiness of Gray Group’s appeal.
                                         B.
          After denying coverage, Great Lakes sought a declaratory judgment
   that Gray Group breached the HPP by failing to evacuate the Hello Dolly VI
   to safe harbor, keep the Vessel fully manned, deploy the anchor, and moor
   the Vessel at the Orleans Marina. Gray Group countersued, contending that
   the HPP was not incorporated into the policy, and in any event, that Gray
   Group did not breach the HPP.
          Gray Group moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court
   denied the motion, holding that the phrase “application for insurance” was
   ambiguous because it could refer solely to the Application Form, or to a
   broader set of documents inclusive of the HQ and the HPP. Therefore, the

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   district court found that evidence outside the pleadings was necessary to
   determine the meaning of “application for insurance.”
          The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Great
   Lakes contended, inter alia, that regardless of whether the HPP was
   incorporated, the Application Form certainly was, and Gray Group
   misrepresented facts in the Application Form. Gray Group filed a motion to
   strike that argument. The district court granted Gray Group’s motion
   because “Great Lakes did not allege any misrepresentation by Gray Group in
   its complaint.”
          However, the district court agreed with Great Lakes on its other
   points and granted it summary judgment. Specifically, the district court held
   that the phrase “application for insurance” was ambiguous but that extrinsic
   evidence showed that the parties intended “application for insurance” to
   encompass the HPP. Continuing the analysis, the court concluded that Gray
   Group’s statement in the HPP that the Vessel was to be located at the
   Orleans Marina during hurricane season was also ambiguous.             Again
   resorting to extrinsic evidence, the court found that the HPP meant that the
   Vessel would be moored at the Orleans Marina for the majority of hurricane
   season. The court determined that the HPP’s “marina or residence”
   location constituted a warranty by Gray Group and found that the Vessel had
   not in fact been moored at the Orleans Marina for the majority of hurricane
   season. Gray Group had thus breached its warranty, justifying Great Lakes’s
   denial of coverage.
          Gray Group timely appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of
   its motion for judgment on the pleadings as well as the court’s summary
   judgment for Great Lakes.

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                                               II.
          We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the
   pleadings de novo. Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017). We
   apply the same standard to a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
   Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 62 F.4th 174, 178 (5th
   Cir. 2023). Under New York law,2 we review a district court’s interpretation
   of an insurance policy de novo. High Point Design, LLC v. LM Ins. Corp., 911
   F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying New York law).
                                               A.
          Gray Group’s position is straightforward. It urges that “application
   for insurance” is unambiguous—the clause refers only to the Application
   Form—and Great Lakes did not plead a breach of the Application Form.
   Thus, no need for extrinsic evidence, and the district court’s analysis and
   judgment run aground. Alternatively, Gray Group posits that if “application
   for insurance” is ambiguous, then the clause is insufficient to incorporate an
   external document as a matter of law due to that ambiguity.
          Great Lakes takes a different tack, contending that Gray Group’s
   responses to the HQ, through the HPP, were incorporated into the insurance
   policy through the “application for insurance.”                        Per Great Lakes,
   “application for insurance” is ambiguous, but uncontroverted extrinsic
   evidence establishes that the parties intended the term to include the HPP.
          So we must first consider (1) whether the term “application for
   insurance” is ambiguous, and, if so, (2) whether that ambiguity precludes
   incorporating by reference Gray Group’s responses to the HQ via its HPP.

          _____________________
          2
              The parties agree that New York law applies in this case.

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                                         1.
          Under New York law, “an insurance contract is interpreted to give
   effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the clear language of the
   contract.” Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
   Co., 472 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
   Whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. A
   contract is ambiguous when its terms “could suggest more than one meaning
   when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined
   the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the
   customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the
   particular trade or business.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
          The Great Lakes insurance policy at issue “incorporat[es] in full the
   application form signed by [Gray Group].” The policy also “incorporates in
   full [Gray Group’s] application for insurance[.]” Gray Group contends that
   both phrases refer to the same thing: the Application Form. Great Lakes
   counters that the phrase “application for insurance” plausibly includes more
   than just the Application Form—like, say, the documents Gray Group
   submitted during underwriting (including the HPP)—such that the policy’s
   language is ambiguous.
          We agree that the phrase “application for insurance” is ambiguous.
   The Application Form is clearly labeled as such, so the corresponding policy
   reference seems clear. But the “full” “application for insurance,” slightly
   different nomenclature, implies a broader set of documents, including the
   Application Form and those Gray Group submitted during underwriting.
   The difference in verbiage is critical because under principles of contract
   interpretation, “[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
   throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in
   meaning.” Landry’s, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 4 F.4th 366,

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   370 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner,
   Reading Law 170 (2012)); see also Two Farms Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co.,
   628 Fed. App’x 802, 805 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying New York rule that “a
   word used by the parties in one sense will be given the same meaning
   throughout the contract in the absence of countervailing reasons”) (citation
   and quotation marks omitted)). Because “application for insurance” “could
   suggest more than one meaning” to a “reasonably intelligent person,” Parks
   Real Estate, 472 F.3d at 42, the term is ambiguous. So, we sail on to
   determine the effect of that ambiguity.
                                        2.
          The parties’ disagreement as to the effect of the ambiguity is premised
   on competing understandings of New York’s incorporation by reference
   doctrine. Gray Group posits that an incorporating clause must clearly
   identify an incorporated document; therefore, if the clause is unclear, it
   cannot effectuate a valid incorporation by reference. Essentially, Gray Group
   contends that if there is any ambiguity in what is incorporated, then the
   document in question is not. Great Lakes counters that the meaning of an
   ambiguous incorporating clause can be determined by extrinsic evidence, as
   with any other contractual provision. Therefore, a finding of ambiguity does
   not foreclose incorporation by reference—it merely shifts the issue to the
   factfinder. We agree with Great Lakes.
          The Court of Appeals of New York has long recognized the concept
   of incorporation by reference. See In re Bd. of Comm’rs of Washington Park,
   52 N.Y. 131, 134 (1873); see also Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N.Y. 140 (1850). Under
   New York law, a document is incorporated into a contract if “(1) it is clearly
   identified in the agreement, and (2) the contract contains language that
   clearly communicates that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the
   referenced material into the contract, rather than merely to acknowledge that

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   the referenced material is relevant to the contract.” Matter of Linn Energy,
   L.L.C., 927 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks
   omitted) (“New York courts use an objective standard, asking whether a
   reasonable person would understand the specific document to be
   incorporated by reference.”). “[T]he paper to be incorporated into a written
   instrument by reference must be so referred to and described in the
   instrument that the paper may be identified beyond all reasonable doubt.”
   PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis
   omitted) (quoting Chiacchia v. Nat’l Westminster Bank USA, 124 A.D.2d 626,
   628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)). “[I]t must be clear that the parties to the
   agreement had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated terms.” Id.
   (citation and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine “is grounded on the
   premise that the material to be incorporated is so well known to the
   contracting parties that a mere reference to it is sufficient.” Chiacchia, 124
   A.D. 2d at 628; see also Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 295 n.6 (2d
   Cir. 2015).
          For nearly as long as New York has recognized incorporation by
   reference, its Court of Appeals has allowed “[p]arol evidence . . . to prove
   the identity of the paper [that the parties attempted to incorporate].” Bd. of
   Comm’rs of Washington Park, 52 N.Y. at 134. New York courts have held
   that, generally, an ambiguity as to the identity of the incorporated document
   creates a fact issue. See, e.g., Maines Paper & Food Serv., Inc. v. Keystone Assoc.,
   134 A.D. 3d 1340, 1342 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (weighing the evidence to
   determine whether the purportedly incorporated document was sufficiently
   identified in the executed contract); Kenner v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 254
   A.D.2d 704, 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that “[t]here is a triable
   issue of fact whether the oblique reference in the rental agreement to an
   otherwise unidentified ‘rental document jacket’ meets th[e] exacting
   standard [of incorporation by reference]”); Chiacchia, 124 A.D. 2d at 628

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   (“Whether the paper encompassing the bank rules was referred to or
   described in the rental agreement such that it could be identified beyond all
   reasonable doubt constitutes a question of fact precluding summary
   judgment.”). But “[i]f the extrinsic evidence is ‘so one-sided that no
   reasonable person could decide the contrary,’ the court may resolve the
   ambiguity as a matter of law.” Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Aspen
   Ins. UK Ltd., 652 F.3d 584, 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (applying
   New York law).
          Gray Group relies on Linn Energy for the proposition that if a
   purportedly incorporated document is not “clearly identified in the
   agreement,” 927 F.3d at 353, i.e., if the incorporating clause is unclear, then
   there is no valid incorporation. True, “the paper to be incorporated . . . by
   reference must be . . . identified beyond all reasonable doubt.” PaineWebber,
   81 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Chiacchi, 124 A.D. at 628). But that does not alter
   the general rule that a court may examine extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
   meaning of an ambiguous contract. See Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Commercial
   Union Ins. Co., 309 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (“If an ambiguity is found, the
   court may accept any available extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning
   intended by the parties during the formation of the contract.” (cleaned up))
   (applying New York law). Consistent with the New York cases discussed
   earlier, the general rule about consulting extrinsic evidence is as shipshape
   when ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous incorporating clause as it is
   in any other context.
                                         B.
          Having surveyed the waterfront, we may cruise through the remaining
   issues on appeal.       Gray Group urges that the district court erred by
   (1) denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) finding that the
   HPP was incorporated into the policy; and (3) concluding that the Vessel’s

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   “marina or residence” location provided by Gray Group in the HPP was a
   warranty that required the Vessel to moor at the Orleans Marina for the
   majority of hurricane season.
                                               1.
           We affirm the district court’s denial of Gray Group’s motion for
   judgment on the pleadings.3 “We evaluate a motion under Rule 12(c) for
   judgment on the pleadings using the same standard as a motion to dismiss
   under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d
   540, 543–44 (5th Cir 2010). We thus must determine “whether, in the light
   most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.”
   Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the policy
   language at issue is ambiguous. While that is not dispositive as to whether
   the underwriting documents in question were validly incorporated by
   reference, it does mean that the scope of the policy’s incorporating language
   turns on extrinsic evidence beyond the scope of the pleadings. Accordingly,
   the district court did not err in denying Gray Group’s Rule 12(c) motion.
                                               2.
           Next, we consider whether Gray Group’s HPP, with its
   representation that the Vessel’s “marina or residence” location during

           _____________________
           3
               Great Lakes argues that Gray Group failed to preserve its incorporation by
   reference argument in the district court. It is axiomatic that “[w]e will generally not
   countenance arguments not raised before the district court,” McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 852
   F.3d 444, 455 (5th Cir. 2017), but Gray Group adequately raised the argument. Gray Group
   urged in its motion for judgment on the pleadings that “[t]he policy does not incorporate,
   attach, reference or ever mention the [HQ or the HPP],” and the district court noted that
   the incorporation argument was before it: “[Gray Group] moved for judgment on the
   pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that the pleadings establish
   that the [HQ/HPP] was not a warranty because the agreement does not incorporate
   it . . . .”

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   hurricane season was the Orleans Marina, was included in the policy’s
   ambiguous incorporation of Gray Group’s “application for insurance.” To
   remind, the full clause reads: “This insuring agreement incorporates in full
   [Gray Group’s] application for insurance[.]” Under New York law, the
   burden rests on the insurer to prove that its interpretation of an ambiguous
   policy provision is correct. Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas, 652 F.3d at 589.
   “[T]he court may accept any available extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
   meaning intended by the parties during the formation of the contract [and]
   may resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law” “[if] the extrinsic evidence is
   so one-sided that no reasonable person could decide the contrary[.]” Id.
   (quotation marks and citation omitted).
           The district court did not err in concluding that the HPP was
   incorporated into the policy. For starters, under a bolded header labeled
   “WARNING,” the HQ, which prompted Gray Group’s submission of the
   HPP, advised that “this declaration and warranty shall be incorporated in its
   entirety into any relevant policy of insurance.” Gray Group’s Fleet Risk
   Manager, Louis S. Crew, Jr., signed the HQ directly beneath that warning.
           The parties’ prior course of dealing removes any lingering doubt that
   Gray Group’s “application for insurance” encompassed the HPP. In 2017,
   Great Lakes’s underwriter notified Gray Group that another policy4 then in
   force would expire in 15 days if Gray Group did not provide additional
   requested documentation, including a hurricane protection plan as to the
   insured watercraft. The underwriter followed up eight days later to remind
   Gray Group that the document remained outstanding and that failure to send
   it would void coverage. This exchange repeated itself in 2019, when Great
           _____________________
           4
             This policy covered a different boat owned by Gray Group, but it is undisputed
   that Gray Group’s other vessels were insured under policies materially identical to the one
   at issue here.

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   Lakes reminded Gray Group’s broker that the requested hurricane
   protection plan “forms part of the policy.” Additionally, Gray Group’s
   Crew testified in his deposition that he “underst[oo]d that it [(the HPP)]
   would be incorporated into the policy.”
          Against this backdrop, the district court did not err in holding that the
   extrinsic evidence was “so one-sided that no reasonable person could
   decide” that the HPP was not incorporated into the policy. As it was
   properly incorporated, our next port-of-call is the interpretation of the HPP,
   and specifically the HPP’s representation regarding the Vessel’s “marina or
   residence” during hurricane season.
                                           3.
          In the HPP, Gray Group stated that the Orleans Marina was “the
   marina or residence where [the] [V]essel [would be] located between 1st July
   and 1st November.” The district court concluded that this statement is
   ambiguous.5 The court then relied on several email exchanges between the
   parties to ascertain its meaning. In 2019, Great Lakes’s broker asked Gray
   Group’s agent whether one of Gray Group’s boats would be in the Bahamas
   or Florida during hurricane season and explained that the information was
   important because if so, the premium would increase to account for the
   greater risk. Later in 2020, Gray Group’s agent contacted Great Lakes’s
   agent to ask if the same boat could travel to Florida and the Bahamas once
   hurricane season began. Great Lakes’s agent responded:
          [The] application form showed that the[] mooring location
          during July to November would be Mississippi[,] and [the
          underwriters] rated the risks as such. If [a boat] change[d its]
          _____________________
          5
             We discern no error in the district court’s determination that the HPP’s
   representation as to where the Vessel would be located is ambiguous. And Gray Group
   does not contend otherwise.

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          mooring location to [the] Bahamas for the majority of hurricane
          season[,] then this must be re-rated. We rate on the
          assumption of where the vessel will be for the majority of the
          season.
   The agent also stated that “[i]f [the boat] will spend the majority of that
   season in Mississippi[,] then the premium can stay the same[.]” In 2020,
   Great Lakes’s underwriter again noted that “to amend the mooring location
   during the hurricane season” may require a premium increase.
          Considering this evidence, the district court concluded that the
   HPP’s representation regarding the Vessel’s “marina or residence” location
   meant “the place where the [V]essel [was] to be moored the majority of
   hurricane season.” We agree with the district court that the evidence
   establishes that the parties’ contractual intent was that the Vessel be moored
   at the Orleans Marina for, if not the majority, at least some portion of
   hurricane season. We acknowledge that the email exchanges regarding the
   “mooring location” pertain to the Application Form, which requested the
   “primary mooring location” of the Vessel, and not the HQ or the HPP,
   which adduced “the marina or residence” where the Vessel would be
   “located” during hurricane season. Nevertheless, we conclude that the
   evidence also crystallizes the meaning of the HPP’s representation about
   where the Vessel would be “located.”
          First, both the Application Form’s request and the HPP substantively
   center on the Vessel’s location during hurricane season. Whatever the
   distinctions between the “primary mooring location” and the “marina or
   residence” where the Vessel would be “located” during the season, Gray
   Group listed the Orleans Marina in response to both. At bottom, the extrinsic
   communications between the parties illuminate the parties’ intent as to both
   the Application Form and the HPP: Great Lakes requested that Gray Group
   provide the marina where the Vessel would be located for the same reason it

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   requested its primary mooring location, viz., because the insurer rated its
   policy premium “on the assumption of where the [V]essel [would] be for the
   majority of the season.” Cf. Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York
   Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 773 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting proposed
   interpretation where “it cause[d] the word to carry different meanings in
   different iterations within the same contractual provision, indeed within the
   same sentence”).
          Inversely, Gray Group proffers no evidence to suggest a different
   interpretation of the HPP’s representation. This dearth of proof to the
   contrary only buttresses the district court’s interpretation of the HPP’s
   language. See Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas, 652 F.3d at 589; see also Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
          Finally, and logically, the HPP’s representation about the “marina or
   residence” where the Vessel would be “located” must mean something.
   Whether the provision means that the Vessel was to be located at the Orleans
   Marina “the majority of hurricane season,” or for some lesser period, or for
   only intermittent docking, it is undisputed that the Vessel was never at the
   Orleans Marina during the 2020 hurricane season. Thus, regardless of the
   precise requirement that the HPP imposed, Gray Group did not meet it. All
   that remains is to determine the effect of that lapse.
                                          4.
          The district court concluded that the HPP’s representation regarding
   the Vessel’s “marina or residence” location was a warranty such that Gray
   Group’s breach of it voided the policy both under New York law and the
   terms of the policy. We consider only the latter justification and easily
   conclude that the district court did not err in its analysis.
          The policy provides that:

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          Where any term herein is referred to as a ‘warranty’ or where
          any reference is made herein to the term ‘warranted,’ the term
          shall be deemed a warranty and regardless of whether the same
          expressly provides that any breach will void this insuring
          agreement from inception, it is hereby agreed that any such
          breach will void this policy from inception.
   The HPP expressly identifies its contents, including the information in
   question, as warranties, providing that the insured “declare[s] that the
   particulars and answers in this form are correct and complete in every
   respect,” and that “this declaration and warranty shall be incorporated in its
   entirety into any relevant policy of insurance.” Therefore, under the terms
   of the policy, as validly augmented by the HPP, Gray Group warranted that
   the Vessel would be “located” at the Orleans Marina during hurricane
   season. Gray Group’s breach of that warranty voided the policy ab initio,
   such that Great Lakes properly denied coverage.
                                       III.
          The Hello Dolly VI never got “back where [she] belong[ed].” Gray
   Group’s representations to the contrary were validly incorporated into the
   policy as warranties, and Gray Group’s breach of its warranties justified
   Great Lakes’s denial of coverage when the Hello Dolly sank. Accordingly,
   the district court properly granted summary judgment for Great Lakes.
                                                                 AFFIRMED.

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