Court Opinion

ID: 9593880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:32.450036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:17.734350
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Grand Rapids padlock ordinance is a valid exercise of municipal authority. Therefore, I dissent.
i
In a remarkable cloud of dust, this Court has again ventured into the long-established area of municipal law and trampled basic principles designed to define fundamental government functions. Asserting superior knowledge of the unique harm prostitution and drugs visit on the City of Grand Rapids, this Court reaches out, with absolutely no apposite authority, and reverses a unanimous Court of Appeals decision.1 That panel properly recognized that the home rule act, however liberally interpreted, does not confer upon a municipality the powers of an equity court or the power to dictate what jurisdiction a circuit court may possess. The majority completely fails to comprehend the separation of powers determination made by the Court of Appeals. That Court did not determine that the separation of powers principle must apply to local governments. It simply stated the obvious — that the principle does apply at the state level and that our constitution vests judicial power exclusively in our state courts.
The majority, in treating the due process issue in four understandably terse paragraphs, labors through several casuistic steps to save the ordinance. After *274listing provisions that allow a property owner to present evidence, to cross-examine and to have an attorney, all very “due” process, the majority then acknowledges that “the [city] commission determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a property is a public nuisance . . . Ante, p 250. It goes on to blithely assert that, of course, the city council could render an impartial decision because “[i]t is not in the interest of any city to padlock rental properties . . . .” Id., p 272. This is a strange statement, indeed, after having labored so mightily to establish how uniquely important it is to the City of Grand Rapids to be able to stamp out this vice without having to resort to state nuisance law.
After today’s ruling by this Court, I can’t imagine why cities throughout Michigan would not jump at the chance to have all ordinance violations “tried” by their city council, which enacts the ordinance, which has its building or police or fire departments enforce and prosecute under the ordinance, and, to complete the circle, which then determines if there has been a violation. Perhaps, this Court, in an effort to compensate for its decision in Paragon v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568; 550 NW2d 772 (1996), which gave zoning boards of appeal superior zoning authority over their creating city councils, now wishes to bless city councils across this state with unprecedented authority.
n
Although as a prudential matter we generally do not decide cases on grounds not argued by the parties, we have the inherent authority to do so. Because the record presented in this case is fully adequate for the ruling I contemplate — specifically, because it con*275tains all possible justifications defendant could offer in support of its ordinance — I deem it appropriate to decide this case on a ground not argued by the parties: the doctrine of implied preemption.
The Michigan nuisance abatement statute, MCL 600.3801 et seq.; MSA 27A.3801 el seq., addresses the problems of illegal drugs and prostitution, and, in conjunction with MCR 3.601, sets forth the procedure applicable statewide for determination and abatement of a public nuisance. Accordingly, I would hold that the Grand Rapids padlock ordinance is impliedly preempted and, therefore, invalid.
The Michigan nuisance abatement statute provides as follows:
Any building ... or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution ... or used for the unlawful manufacture, transporting, sale, keeping for sale, bartering, or furnishing of any controlled substance ... is declared a nuisance .... Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance. [MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801.]
Section 3805 authorizes the Attorney General, the prosecuting attorney of a county, or any citizen of the county to “maintain an action for equitable relief ... to abate said nuisance and to perpetually enjoin [a use] for any of the purposes or by any of the persons set forth in section 3801, or for any of the acts enumerated in said section.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3815 sets forth the admissible evidence and standard of proof relevant to the determination whether a nuisance exists. Subsection 3825(1) provides that once the existence of a nuisance has been *276established “an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment . . . The order is to direct the removal from a building or place of all furniture, fixtures, and contents and the sale of these items. Furthermore, and relevant to the case at bar, the order is to direct the “effectual closing of the building or place against its use for any purpose, and so keeping it closed for a period of 1 year, unless sooner released as in this chapter provided.” And finally, subsection 3840(1) provides that if the owner of such building or place “pays all costs of the proceeding, and files a bond with sureties approved by the circuit judge, in the penal sum of not less than $1,000.00 nor more than $50,000.00, conditioned that he will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent the same from being established or kept therein within a period of 1 year from the date of the judgment, the court may order such premises to be delivered to the owner and if the bond is given and costs therein paid before order of abatement, the action shall be thereby abated as to that building only.” (Emphasis added.)
The factors to be considered in a preemption analysis are as follows:
A municipality is precluded from enacting an ordinance if 1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme, or 2) if the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation.
*277In making the determination that the state has thus preempted the field of regulation which the city seeks to enter in this case, we look to certain guidelines.
First, where the state law expressly provides that the state’s authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be exclusive, there is no doubt that municipal regulation is pre-empted.
Second, pre-emption of a field of regulation may be implied upon an examination of legislative history.
Third, the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme may support a finding of pre-emption. While the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme is not generally sufficient by itself to infer pre-emption, it is a factor which should be considered as evidence of pre-emption.
Fourth, the nature of the regulated subject matter may demand exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state’s purpose or interest.
As to this last point, examination of relevant Michigan cases indicates that where the nature of the regulated subject matter calls for regulation adapted to local conditions, and the local regulation does not interfere with the state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has generally been upheld.
However, where the Court has found that the nature of the subject matter regulated called for a uniform state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has been held pre-empted. [People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314, 322-325; 257 NW2d 902 (1977) (citations omitted).]
In my opinion, the third and fourth factors weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion that the Grand Rapids ordinance is preempted by the nuisance abatement statute, which, along with MCR 3.601,2 specifies the *278procedure for obtaining a judicial declaration that a certain property is a public nuisance because it is a site of illegal drug activities or is used for purposes of prostitution, and for abatement of such nuisances.
The consideration of uniformity is of paramount importance, and this consideration is implicated by the fact that violations of the Grand Rapids ordinance, like violations of the state nuisance abatement statute, can only be determined, and penalties enforced, by a court. Grand Rapids City Charter, title V, § 52(b).3 Since the City of Grand Rapids does not have a municipal court, the only available forum is a state court, and the state has an obvious interest in having uniform rules of procedure and evidentiary standards in its courts.
Furthermore, all the concerns expressed by the City of Grand Rapids in enacting its ordinance are addressed and provided for in the state nuisance abatement statute. And there is no reason for us to assume that the blight visited on Grand Rapids by the criminal activities at issue here is more consequential than that suffered by any other affected community in this state. In sum, the pervasiveness of the state statutory scheme and the very significant interest in statewide uniformity weigh heavily in favor of a finding of implied preemption in this case. In fact, to the extent *279that the Grand Rapids ordinance differs from the nuisance abatement statute, I would hold that it is in direct conflict with the statute. It is not plausible to argue that the Grand Rapids ordinance merely supplements the state statute.
in
Defendant claims that the Court of Appeals erred by characterizing the Grand Rapids City Commission as merely a legislative body, arguing instead that it is both legislative and administrative, and that, under the administrative rubric, it properly may exercise quasi-judicial power to declare the existence of a nuisance. It is true that we previously have recognized the dual nature — both legislative and administrative— of the Grand Rapids City Commission. See Babcock v Grand Rapids, 308 Mich 412, 413; 14 NW2d 48 (1944). However, because this case does not require it, I do not essay an exhaustive discussion of the quasi-judicial powers available to administrative bodies. And neither do I address the differences — significant or otherwise — between administrative bodies such as municipal commissions and state administrative agencies.4 It suffices to note that even if the social ills the City of Grand Rapids sought to interdict were matters of uniquely local concern, and therefore within the city’s administrative purview, the attempt to confer on itself the power to determine the existence of a *280public nuisance would still be an improper encroachment on a purely judicial function, as clearly contemplated in and defined by statute.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Everett v City of Marquette, 53 Mich 450, 452; 19 NW 140 (1884), Chief Justice Cooley enunciated a principle and a rule of law that continue in full effect in our jurisprudence: “Maintaining a nuisance is a public offense; and the fact, as in other cases of alleged criminality, is to be tried on proper accusation and in the regular courts.” (Emphasis added.)
rv
My resolution of this case makes it unnecessary to further address plaintiffs due process challenge to Ordinance No. 93-39, or plaintiffs claim that the abatement remedy provided for in the ordinance is de facto a forfeiture. I also decline to address plaintiffs arguments relative to the ordinance’s attempt to define the scope and standard of circuit court jurisdiction, except to note again that I am unaware of any source of authority, certainly none is cited by the majority, empowering a municipality to in any way address the jurisdictional or substantive aspects of the circuit court’s power.
v
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and would remand this matter to the circuit court for entry of a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Grand Rapids Ordinance No. 93-39.

 I find it ironic that all three Court of Appeals panel members happen to be from Grand Rapids.

 In relevant part, the court rule provides as foEows:
(A) Procedure to Abate PubEc Nuisance. Actions to abate pubhc nuisances are governed by the general rules of procedure and evidence apphcable to nonjury actions, except as provided by the statutes covering pubMc nuisances and by this rule.

 The majority mischaracterizes the reason for the citation to § 52(B) of the Grand Rapids City Charter. The state’s interest in uniformity in its courts exists independently of § 52(B), or any other city charter or municipal ordinance for that matter. I cite § 52(B) only as the proof that nuisance abatement proceedings will be conducted in state courts.
Furthermore, the majority’s reference to the home rule cities act is irrelevant in this context. The Grand Rapids City Charter was adopted pursuant to Const 1963, art 7, § 22, not the act. Therefore, because there is no conflict between the city charter and the act, the city charter is the only provision relevant to the actual point at issue here.

 I would, however, emphasize that there are differences, and that there is no basis fpr treating the Grand Rapids City Commission as if it were a state administrative agency, as the majority impliedly does in upholding the ordinance’s attempt to confer appellate jurisdiction on the circuit court. I would also note that I am unaware of any source of authority empowering a municipality to in any way address the jurisdictional or substantive aspects of the circuit court’s power.