Court Opinion

ID: 9960081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:01:55.931112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.201551
License: Public Domain

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                       Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

            MULLINS, J., with whom ROBINSON, C. J., joins, dis-
         senting. The trial court denied the motion to open filed
         by the defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and 1188 Stratford
         Avenue, LLC, because ‘‘[it was] untimely, and it ha[d]
         no basis.’’ (Emphasis added.) This ruling can be read
         in one of two ways. As the majority contends, it could
         mean that the court believed that the motion was untimely,
         and, because it was untimely, the court applied (or at
         least was required to apply) its inherent, common-law
         authority to review the untimely motion solely for fraud,
         duress, or mutual mistake. Another plausible meaning,
         though, is that the court denied the motion on two
         distinct, alternative bases: because it was untimely and
         also because it had no basis, i.e., it failed on its merits
         under General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212.1 In my
         view, this second reading is not only plausible but the
         far better reading, given that the trial court never once
         mentioned, or questioned the parties on, the elements
         needed to prevail on an untimely motion to open. Rather,
         it focused exclusively on the elements necessary to
         prevail under § 52-212.
            Although I believe that the trial court’s ruling rests
         on two separate bases, at worst, the ruling is unclear.
         Consequently, I believe that reversal is irreconcilable
         with our well established, highly deferential standard
         of review. There has been no motion for articulation to
         clarify which of these two readings the court intended.
         Under such circumstances, we typically presume that
         the trial court was correct and affirm the judgment if
         there is any legitimate basis for doing so. Here, there
         is such a legitimate basis: nothing in Dizenzo’s affidavit
         in support of the defendants’ motion to open established
         with particularity, as the defendants must under § 52-
         212, that they were prevented by mistake from raising
         a valid defense. And, after a hearing at which the trial
             1
                 All references to § 52-212 are to the 2019 revision of the statute.
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                Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

       court focused on the issue of whether the defendants’
       alleged mistake was a valid one that prevented them
       from appearing, the court concluded that the motion
       ‘‘ha[d] no basis.’’ Because the defendants failed to pro-
       vide a reasonable justification for their failure to appear
       and defend, and because the Appellate Court majority
       properly applied well established law, I must respect-
       fully dissent.
          Although the majority aptly lays out the facts, a few
       are worth highlighting to illuminate my position. Dizenzo
       leased the subject vehicle in November, 2012, using
       funds provided by the plaintiff finance company, Mer-
       cedes-Benz Financial. He drove the vehicle and made
       his monthly payments under the lease/financing agree-
       ment for fifteen months, through February, 2014. At
       that point, when the dealership was unable to provide
       service that he deemed satisfactory, Dizenzo unilater-
       ally declared that the agreement was void, simply left
       the car at the dealership, and ceased making payments
       to the plaintiff.
         In February, 2017, when the defendants undisputedly
       received notice of this action, they did not file an appear-
       ance. They also filed no appearance six months later,
       in August, 2017, when the defendants received notice
       of the plaintiff’s motion for default; or the following
       month, in September, 2017, when the defendants received
       notice that they had been defaulted;2 or in May, 2019,
       when the defendants received notice of the plaintiff’s
       motion for judgment; or in June, 2019, when the defen-
       dants received notice that the trial court rendered a
       default judgment. The defendants did not enter an
       appearance, engage counsel, or take any measures to
       defend the action until July, 2019, when they were
         2
           The notice on the default for failing to appear specifically informed the
       defendants that, ‘‘[i]f you file an appearance in this case before the judgment
       is entered against you, the default for failure to appear will automatically
       be set aside by the clerk. Practice Book [§] 17-20 [d].’’
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         served with postjudgment discovery. In the defendants’
         motion to open and Dizenzo’s supporting affidavit, the
         only explanation offered for this ongoing failure to
         appear and defend the suit was the assertion that,
         ‘‘when he was sued in 2017, [Dizenzo] mistakenly
         thought this matter was resolved . . . .’’ The affidavit
         does not indicate why Dizenzo continued to hold that
         belief after he was sued, as he received a series of
         notices that the plaintiff was pursuing a default and,
         later, a default judgment.
                                               I
            Like the majority, I am troubled by the trial court’s
         determination that the defendants’ motion to open was
         untimely, after both the defendants’ counsel and court
         staff made the court aware that the motion was timely.
         Even the court itself acknowledged that the motion was
         timely.3 The court’s ruling that the motion was untimely
         was clearly erroneous, as the motion was filed two
         months after the court rendered judgment. Unlike the
         majority, I do not find that that erroneous determination
         could not be untethered from the court’s separate deter-
         mination that the motion also had no basis. Nor do I
         find that the untimely designation dictated how the
         court actually conducted the hearing.
            My analysis centers on the highly deferential standard
         by which we review a trial court’s denial of a motion
         to open a default judgment. ‘‘Whether proceeding under
         the common law or a statute, the action of a trial court
         in granting or [denying a motion] to open a judgment
           3
             During the hearing, the trial court miscounted the months and, as a
         result, believed that the defendants had failed to timely file their motion to
         open within four months from when judgment was rendered, as § 52-212
         (a) requires. Specifically, the court thought that five months, rather than
         two, had passed since the judgment was rendered, but it was promptly
         corrected by the defendants’ counsel that the motion to open was timely.
         Acknowledging that the motion was timely, the court responded: ‘‘All right.
         So, we are barely in time.’’
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       is, generally, within the judicial discretion of such court,
       and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless
       it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its
       discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S.
       Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 381,
       260 A.3d 1187 (2021). ‘‘In determining whether the trial
       court abused its discretion, this court must make every
       reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The
       manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not
       be disturbed [as] long as the [trial] court could reason-
       ably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d
       1121 (2022). Indeed, we have long recognized that ‘‘the
       orderly administration of justice requires that relief
       be denied unless the moving party alleges and shows
       reasonable cause for relief under the statute.’’ (Empha-
       sis added.) Testa v. Carrolls Hamburger System, Inc.,
       154 Conn. 294, 300, 224 A.2d 739 (1966).
          In cases in which the record is ambiguous or the
       basis for the trial court’s denial of a motion to open is
       unclear, and there is no motion for articulation, we
       consistently have affirmed the judgment, giving the trial
       court the benefit of the doubt and construing the record
       in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment
       of default.4 We have deferred to the discretion of the
       trial court even when it made inconsistent or erroneous
       findings. See, e.g., Jenks v. Jenks, 232 Conn. 750, 754–56,
       657 A.2d 1107 (1995) (when supporting record was
          4
            See, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 139–40, 989 A.2d 588 (2010)
       (declining to review defendant’s claim when trial court simply marked defen-
       dant’s motion to open ‘‘ ‘denied’ ’’ and could have done so for various
       reasons); Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 423–24, 969 A.2d 157 (2009) (‘‘[We
       must assume] . . . that the trial court understood the defendant’s claim
       consistent with the plaintiffs’ objection thereto . . . . [The] order . . .
       leaves open the possibility that the trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ objec-
       tion on the [alternative] ground that the defendant had not demonstrated
       that he had been ‘prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause
       from prosecuting the action or making the defense.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.)).
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         ‘‘sparse,’’ trial court made inconsistent findings as to
         motion to open, and plaintiff did not seek articulation,
         record was construed to support judgment); Kiessling
         v. Kiessling, 134 Conn. 564, 567, 59 A.2d 532 (1948)
         (‘‘[i]f the default judgment was proper on any of the
         grounds alleged, it should stand’’); Genung’s, Inc. v.
         Rice, 33 Conn. Supp. 554, 556–59, 362 A.2d 540 (1976)
         (subjecting trial court’s erroneous finding to harmless
         error analysis and upholding denial of motion to vacate
         default judgment on alternative grounds).
            In short, the fact that there are two plausible interpre-
         tations of the trial court’s order does not give rise to
         the clear abuse of discretion necessary to overturn the
         judgment, especially in the absence of a motion for
         articulation. The only question we must answer is
         whether, drawing every reasonable presumption and
         construing any ambiguities in favor of upholding the
         judgment, the trial court reasonably could have con-
         cluded that the defendants had failed to satisfy their
         burden under at least one prong of § 52-212 (a). See,
         e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, 210 Conn. App. 703, 713, 270
         A.3d 743 (2022) (describing two prongs of § 52-212 (a)).
         I believe it could.
                                         II
                                         A
            The majority employs a mechanical approach to the
         trial court’s decision that I do not share. It concludes
         that the initial timeliness finding is dispositive and nec-
         essarily dictates which standard the court applies: § 52-
         212 for timely filed motions, or the court’s common-
         law authority to consider untimely motions. This view
         leaves no room for the common practice by which a
         court issues alternative rulings denying a motion, such
         as when a motion is untimely but the defendants also
         failed to make the showing necessary to satisfy the
         substantive requirements of § 52-212.
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          To start, there is no dispute that the defendants’
       motion to open was filed pursuant to § 52-212; although
       the motion does not explicitly reference § 52-212, it
       invokes the language and legal standard of that statute,
       alleging that the defendants ‘‘have good defenses’’ and
       that they mistakenly thought that the matter had been
       resolved. As such, the defendants had to satisfy all of
       § 52-212’s requirements: (1) the motion must be timely;
       General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (a); (2) it must
       be verified by the oath of the defendants or their attor-
       ney; General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (c); (3) it
       must demonstrate that the defendants had a good cause
       of action or defense at the time of judgment; General
       Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (a); and (4) it must
       ‘‘particularly set forth’’ how mistake, accident, or other
       reasonable cause prevented them from prosecuting or
       defending the action. General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)
       § 52-212 (a) and (c). Failure to satisfy any one of these
       elements is grounds to deny the motion to open. Accord-
       ingly, the trial court, in concluding that § 52-212 was
       not satisfied, could have found that any one of these
       elements, or any combination thereof, had not been
       established. Nothing in the law prevents the court from
       denying a motion as untimely and, in the alternative,
       denying it because it fails on the merits.
          In fact, the very thing that the majority says the trial
       court cannot possibly have intended to do—determined
       that the motion to open was untimely but proceeded
       also to assess whether it satisfied the requirements of
       § 52-212—is precisely what the Appellate Court did in
       Lewis v. Bowden, 166 Conn. App. 400, 141 A.3d 998
       (2016). In that case, the defaulted father moved to open
       a judgment of paternity approximately twenty-seven
       years after the trial court rendered judgment. Id., 402.
       The Appellate Court observed that ‘‘nearly thirty years
       [had] passed before he tried to open the judgment.’’ Id.,
       404. Nevertheless, the court stated that ‘‘[a] motion to
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         open a default judgment is governed by . . . § 52-212’’;
         id., 402; it recited the language of that statute establish-
         ing the reasonable cause standard, and it proceeded to
         assess the merits of the father’s claim according to that
         statutory standard. See id., 403–404; cf. Celanese Fiber,
         Division of Celanese of Canada, Ltd. v. Pic Yarns, Inc.,
         184 Conn. 461, 465–67, 440 A.2d 159 (1981) (with respect
         to closely related statute, General Statutes (Rev. to
         1979) § 52-212a, governing opening of civil judgments
         and decrees, concluding that motion to open was prop-
         erly denied because it was untimely and there was no
         claim of fraud or mistake under common-law standard,
         but proceeding to explain that, even assuming arguendo
         that motion had been timely filed within four month
         limitation period, trial court would have been well
         within its discretion to deny motion on merits under
         statutory standard).
            It is not uncommon for courts to follow this sort
         of belt-and-suspenders approach, determining that a
         motion, claim, defense, or argument fails on multiple,
         alternative grounds, both procedural and substantive.5
         Here, the trial court appears to have done just that by
         ruling that the defendants’ motion to open was untimely
         and that it had no basis. I fail to see why that is not
         one plausible reading of the trial court’s decision in this
         case. And, if it is, we are bound to adopt it.6
            5
              See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 338 Conn. 66, 88, 257 A.3d 259 (2021); In re
         Angela V., 204 Conn. App. 746, 757–58, 254 A.3d 1042, cert. denied, 337
         Conn. 907, 252 A.3d 365 (2021); Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction,
         181 Conn. App. 778, 780, 790, 189 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186
         A.3d 707 (2018); see also, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 139, 989
         A.2d 588 (2010).
            6
              The majority suggests that ‘‘the record does not conclusively establish’’
         whether the trial court followed this sort of belt-and-suspenders approach.
         But we have never required that the record conclusively establish that the
         trial court got it right. Rather, we have said time and again that we must
         make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the judgment,
         construe ambiguities and gaps in the record against the complainant, in the
         absence of an articulation, and then reverse only if it is clear that the trial
         court got it wrong. See, e.g., Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217
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         As noted, the defendants filed their motion to open
       pursuant to § 52-212—the majority concedes as much,
       and that is how the parties argued the case. See footnote
       1 of the majority opinion and accompanying text. Aside
       from the trial court’s erroneous calculation of the timeli-
       ness of the motion, when the court conducted the hear-
       ing, it focused on determining whether the defendants
       had good defenses that they were prevented from rais-
       ing. There is no mention whatsoever in the motion,
       the accompanying affidavit, or the hearing transcript
       of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or anything else that
       might invoke, or suggest that the court was applying,
       the court’s inherent, common-law authority to consider
       untimely motions to open. Again, the majority concedes
       as much.
          Indeed, the entire hearing was focused on, and all
       the questions posed by the trial court were directed at,
       the various statutory requirements imposed by § 52-212.
       The trial court began by questioning the defendants’
       counsel as to the timeliness of the motion to open. The
       court then entertained a back-and-forth between the
       parties as to the first substantive prong of § 52-212 (a),
       the existence of a potentially meritorious defense. See,
       e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, supra, 210 Conn. App. 713.
       The alleged meritorious defense was that the car was
       essentially a lemon, given the repeated problems and
       safety issues Dizenzo had experienced. Thus, the defen-
       dants’ counsel argued that the defendants had the right
       to terminate the lease and would raise this as a part
       of their potential counterclaim. The plaintiff’s counsel
       countered that this defense was time barred. The court
       also pushed the defendants’ counsel on the relevance
       of the defendants’ purported claims against the automo-
       bile dealership, which is not the plaintiff, given that the
       plaintiff finance company is a different entity. During
       Conn. 476, 482, 586 A.2d 1157 (1991); see also, e.g., Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn.
       App. 504, 517, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022).
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         this dialogue, the defendants’ counsel invited the court
         to follow the example of a case in which another judge
         of the Superior Court had opened a judgment ‘‘within
         the four [month]’’ limitation period and allowed the
         defaulted party to plead in a potentially meritorious
         counterclaim.
            As to the second substantive prong of § 52-212 (a),
         the trial court pressed on the defendants’ claim that
         they were prevented by mistake from asserting a
         defense. See, e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, supra, 210
         Conn. App. 713. The court questioned both parties about
         this prong of the test, seeking any support for the defen-
         dants’ purported belief that the plaintiff had not
         intended to proceed with the action. The court ques-
         tioned the defendants’ counsel at length as to the rea-
         sonableness of Dizenzo’s mistaken belief that the action
         was not going forward and his attendant decision not
         to file an appearance or to retain counsel, including the
         facts that (1) the affidavit itself made no mention of the
         supposed conversations in which the plaintiff allegedly
         represented that the action would not proceed, (2)
         Dizenzo failed to obtain any written confirmation of
         this purported agreement, despite being an experienced
         business owner, and (3) any representations that the
         dealership made to Dizenzo would be irrelevant insofar
         as the finance company was the plaintiff.
            When the trial court ended the hearing and denied the
         defendants’ motion to open, stating that ‘‘[the motion
         is] untimely, and it has no basis,’’ this ruling came
         directly on the heels of this discussion, in which the
         court had questioned the parties as to both substantive
         prongs of § 52-212 (a), and in which the defendants’
         counsel had been unable to provide any support for the
         mistake theory, other than counsel’s own representa-
         tions, or any other explanation (aside from negligence)
         of how the defendants were prevented from appearing.
         There was no discussion of, or reference to, the com-
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       mon-law standard. On the basis of the foregoing, after
       the unfounded timeliness determination, the court clearly
       applied the § 52-212 standard in denying the motion.
                                       B
          The record clearly supports the conclusion that the
       defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating
       good cause under the second substantive prong of § 52-
       212 (a). Under § 52-212 (a), a defaulted party must make
       a showing that it ‘‘was prevented by mistake, accident or
       other reasonable cause from . . . making the defense.’’
       Section 52-212 (c) further requires that the defaulted
       party ‘‘particularly set forth the reason why [that party]
       failed to appear.’’ (Emphasis added.) In the present
       case, the only reason the defendants offered for the
       failure to appear is their own mistake. The defendants,
       in their motion to open and Dizenzo’s affidavit, alleged
       only the conclusory statement that they ‘‘mistakenly
       thought this matter was resolved’’ when the plaintiff
       filed suit in 2017. That hardly qualifies as the particular-
       ized showing required by § 52-212 (c). See, e.g., Eastern
       Elevator Co. v. Scalzi, 193 Conn. 128, 132–34, 474 A.2d
       456 (1984).
         For the sake of argument, however, suppose we set
       aside the defendants’ burden of production, look beyond
       the conclusory allegation of mistake, and accept the repre-
       sentations of counsel during the hearing that Dizenzo
       believed he had the assurances of the plaintiff that the
       action would not proceed. The question is whether even
       that would qualify as a reasonable mistake under § 52-
       212 so as to justify a failure to appear and defend. It
       would not.
         We have long held that negligence does not qualify
       as a ‘‘mistake’’ for purposes of § 52-212 (a). See, e.g.,
       Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford
       Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240–41,
       492 A.2d 159 (1985) (‘‘[n]egligence is no ground for
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          vacating a judgment, and it has been consistently held
          that the denial of a motion to open a default judgment
          should not be held an abuse of discretion [when] the
          failure to assert a defense was the result of negligence’’).
          When a party receives notice that it has been sued, the
          law expects that the party will enter a timely appearance
          and take steps to defend the action. See, e.g., Disturco
          v. Gates in New Canaan, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 526,
          535, 253 A.3d 1033 (2021) (‘‘[§ 52-212] is remedial, but
          it cannot be so construed as to authorize relief . . .
          [when] a defendant indeed has received proper notice
          of the underlying action and the . . . motion for
          default yet failed to file an appearance’’ (citation omit-
          ted; internal quotation marks omitted)); Fontaine v.
          Thomas, 51 Conn. App. 77, 83, 720 A.2d 264 (1998)
          (‘‘[A]lthough the defendant had actual notice of the
          pending case . . . he failed to take any action . . . .
          [Although] his mistaken perception of what steps he
          had to take [may have] prevented him from defending,
          his error does not constitute a . . . mistake . . . .’’).
          Failure to act born of carelessness, indifference, or
          ignorance of the law simply does not excuse default.
          See, e.g., 47 Am. Jur. 2d 50–52, Judgments § 659 (2017);
          see also, e.g., Dziedzic v. Pine Island Marina, LLC,
          143 Conn. App. 644, 652–53, 72 A.3d 406 (2013) (‘‘[t]he
          fact that the defendant chose to ignore [the legal] pro-
          cess, and now rues this decision, is not a basis to open
          . . . the judgment’’ (internal quotation marks
          omitted)).
             Importantly, this rule applies even when the defen-
          dant fails to appear out of a mistaken belief that the
          plaintiff does not intend to prosecute the action. See,
          e.g., Giano v. Salvatore, 136 Conn. App. 834, 844, 46
          A.3d 996 (‘‘[t]he defendant’s mistaken belief that the
          plaintiff would be withdrawing the case is no excuse
          for her failure to plead’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 926,
          55 A.3d 567 (2012); Nelson v. Contracting Group, LLC,
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       127 Conn. App. 45, 49–50, 14 A.3d 1009 (2011) (motion
       to open was properly denied when defendant failed
       to defend because of mistaken belief that plaintiff’s
       counsel would contact him before moving forward with
       litigation); Berzins v. Berzins, 105 Conn. App. 648, 652–
       53, 938 A.2d 1281 (‘‘even if the defendant had relied on
       any statements made by the plaintiff, his subsequent
       negligence supersedes his purported reliance . . . [as
       he] could have called the court at any point to inquire
       about the status of the action’’ (internal quotation marks
       omitted)), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156
       (2008); Rino Gnesi Co. v. Sbriglio, 83 Conn. App. 707,
       710, 713, 850 A.2d 1118 (2004) (defendants’ alleged mis-
       understanding following conversation with plaintiff’s
       counsel regarding case status was deemed negligent
       and, therefore, was not valid justification under § 52-
       212).
          These principles are illustrated nicely in Pelletier v.
       Paradis, 4 Conn. Cir. 396, 232 A.2d 925 (1966), cert.
       denied, 154 Conn. 745, 226 A.2d 520 (1967). The defen-
       dant in that case moved to open a default judgment,
       contending that his attorney had advised him that he
       need not defend the suit because the applicable one
       year limitation period had expired, and, thus, the plain-
       tiff had no legal claim against him. Id., 398. He further
       alleged that, after his attorney offered to discuss the
       matter with the plaintiff’s attorney, he heard nothing
       more from the plaintiff for nearly one year, and his
       attorney then inadvertently forgot to respond to the
       summons. See id., 398–99. On the basis of these repre-
       sentations, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion
       to open the default judgment. Id., 399.
         The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court reversed.
       See id., 400. It acknowledged that a trial court has broad
       discretion in such matters. See id., 397–98. But it con-
       cluded, as a matter of law, that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s failure
       to appear and assert his defense . . . was not due to
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          any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause, unmixed
          with negligence or inattention, so as to constitute a
          sufficient reason to warrant the opening of the judg-
          ment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 399–400. The Appellate
          Division articulated the following rule: ‘‘A party to a
          suit in court must give it the care and attention [that]
          a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows [on] his
          important business. If he fails to do so he cannot obtain
          relief from a judgment resulting from his negligent fail-
          ure to take the proceedings required for his protection.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 399.
            The present action fits squarely within the previously
          mentioned paradigm. Even if there was an initial agree-
          ment not to pursue this action, the plaintiff clearly
          became serious enough about the matter to hire coun-
          sel, draft a complaint, pay the filing fee, and file suit.
          Employees at the Mercedes-Benz dealership may well
          have told Dizenzo that they did not believe that the
          plaintiff—the finance company—planned to proceed
          with the action. The employees might have been mis-
          taken about that. The plaintiff also might have changed
          course at some point without informing the dealership
          or the defendants. Dizenzo may have simply misunder-
          stood from the outset whether there was an agreement
          not to pursue this matter.
             The one thing Dizenzo knew for sure, when he received
          notice of the lawsuit, was that he had been sued. He
          also knew from the filing of the default notice that the
          case was moving forward and that, if he simply filed
          an appearance, the default would be set aside. The defen-
          dants’ reliance on the prior purported agreement with
          the plaintiff does not excuse their failure to act, particu-
          larly after they had received notice of the action and
          the default. At minimum, as the Appellate Court noted
          in Berzins v. Berzins, supra, 105 Conn. App. 648, they
          ‘‘could have called the court at any point to inquire
          about the status of the action.’’ Id., 653. Had they taken
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       the minimal, prudent step of filing an appearance, with
       or without legal representation, then the defendants
       would not have been defaulted. The law deems the
       failure to do so negligent, and a mistake arising from
       or intermixed with one’s own negligence is not a valid
       mistake under § 52-212.
                                       C
         The majority says that, even if the trial court did
       apply the correct legal standard, its application of that
       standard was tainted by its mistaken belief that the
       defendants’ motion to open was untimely. This, the
       majority contends, is because the inquiry embedded in
       the second prong of § 52-212 (a), which asks whether
       there was good cause for the default, ‘‘has a temporal
       component because . . . depending on the circum-
       stances presented, it may include consideration of the
       length of time that the defendants were prevented from
       asserting such a defense . . . .’’ The majority suggests
       that an evidentiary hearing will be required to resolve
       what it calls this ‘‘critical factual dispute . . . .’’ Foot-
       note 5 of the majority opinion.
          I disagree for two reasons. First, as I just discussed,
       a negligent mistake is not a valid mistake under § 52-
       212. Failure to file an appearance after receiving notice
       of the lawsuit, and again after receiving notice of
       default, was negligent. As the trial court established
       through its questioning, even if the plaintiff had expressed
       some hesitation to proceed with the action, failure to get
       that agreement in writing also was negligent. Because
       there was no valid mistake that prevented the defen-
       dants from filing an appearance and raising a defense
       at the outset, I fail to see how the passage of additional
       time could transform what began, and persisted, as a
       series of negligent decisions into a reasonable mistake,
       so as to mislead the trial court. Nor is there any factual
       dispute that could be resolved on remand in a way
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          that would legitimize the defendants’ ongoing failure
          to appear, given our well established law in this area.
            Second, the record belies the theory that the trial
          court’s analysis was influenced by its belief that the
          motion to open was untimely. At the hearing, the parties
          raised the question of timing. The plaintiff’s counsel
          argued that any defenses relating to the 2012 lease were
          by then time barred, while the defendants’ counsel
          countered that the plaintiff’s two year delay in prosecut-
          ing the action was evidence that it never intended to
          prosecute it. But the trial court dismissed the impor-
          tance of the lengthy delay, stating: ‘‘That’s not proof of
          anything.’’ Thus, the court itself appears not to have
          put much stock in the passage of time. It never said
          that the two year delay influenced its decision, and,
          without an articulation, I would not presume that it did.
                                          D
             Ultimately, the majority recognizes that it is not
          entirely clear whether the trial court’s determination
          that the defendants’ motion to open ‘‘ha[d] no basis’’
          resulted from its application of the two part legal stan-
          dard of § 52-212 (a) for timely filed motions or the
          common-law legal standard for untimely filed motions.
          The majority further recognizes that it would have been
          more prudent for the court to have stated the factual
          and legal bases for its decision or for the defendants
          to have sought clarification through a motion for articu-
          lation. See footnote 3 of the majority opinion. Normally,
          we require articulation before reading an unclear or
          ambiguous order in a manner that would result in rever-
          sal. See, e.g., Speer v. Dept. of Agriculture, 183 Conn.
          App. 298, 302, 192 A.3d 489 (2018) (when bases for trial
          court’s denial of motion to open judgment of nonsuit
          were unclear from record, Appellate Court sua sponte
          ordered trial court to articulate factual and legal bases
          for denial). But the majority resolves that concern by
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       concluding that the application of either standard here
       was an error. I would not brush aside the necessity for
       an articulation so quickly.
          In point of fact, the defendants’ motion to open was
       a timely filed motion, and, as I explained, the trial court
       clearly applied the statutory standard for timely filed
       motions in its questioning during the hearing. Thus, in
       my view, the court got the timeliness analysis wrong,
       but it got the legal standard right. The majority contends
       that, even if it is true that the trial court applied the
       correct standard and reached a permissible result, that
       discretionary judgment must be reversed because the
       court should have used an incorrect standard in order to
       be consistent with its own erroneous timeliness finding.
       The erroneous timeliness finding was harmless here,
       and I am not aware of any case in which this court
       or the Appellate Court has reversed a discretionary
       judgment of a trial court on such a basis.
         In any event, to the extent that the trial court’s timeli-
       ness determination makes things at all unclear about
       which standard the court applied—one that is correct,
       or one that is incorrect—that is not grounds for reversal.
       In such cases, we either read the ambiguity to support
       the judgment or we give the trial court a fair opportunity
       to clarify its ruling. See, e.g., id.7
          7
            The majority contends that following our established practice and order-
       ing the trial court to articulate the basis for its decision would be of no
       avail under the particular circumstances of this case because ‘‘the basis the
       trial court provided for its decision was indisputably inaccurate . . . .’’
       Footnote 3 of the majority opinion. I disagree. I see no reason to reverse
       the judgment and start the process from scratch simply because the trial
       court’s error as to timeliness might have infected its analysis of the merits.
       Why not just ask? If we were to order an articulation, sua sponte, and the
       trial court were to clarify that (1) its determination that the defendants’
       motion to open had ‘‘no basis’’ was an independent, alternative basis for
       denying the motion under the second prong of § 52-212, and (2) that determi-
       nation was unrelated to questions of timeliness and was predicated solely
       on the court’s determination that the defendants had no valid basis for their
       failure to enter an appearance, aside from their own negligence, then I see
       no possible grounds for reversing the judgment.
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             In sum, although the trial court’s ruling is not a model
          of clarity, the majority’s interpretation of that ruling is
          certainly not the only, or, in my view, even the best,
          interpretation. In the absence of an articulation from
          the trial court, we are left with two plausible interpreta-
          tions. I believe that the interpretation that makes the
          most sense and is supported by the record is that the
          court ruled alternatively that the defendants’ motion to
          open was untimely, which was wrong, but also that the
          motion had no basis, which was correct. Because the
          mistake the defendants alleged here was not an excus-
          able one under the law, and there was no demonstration
          that they were otherwise prevented from raising a valid
          defense, there is an adequate independent basis in the
          record to affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment uphold-
          ing the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to
          open. Our standard of review dictates that we affirm.
          Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.