Court Opinion

ID: 9898868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:00:47.866406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:35.815106
License: Public Domain

21-6251
    Chimbo-Toaponta v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Conroy, IJ
                                                                           A205 199 622

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of November, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                   JON O. NEWMAN,
                   RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
                   MICHAEL H. PARK,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    MIGUEL CHIMBO-TOAPONTA,
            Petitioner,

                   v.                                            21-6251
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Manuel D. Gomez, Manuel D. Gomez &
                                      Associates P.C., New York NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                   Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, Senior
                                   Litigation Counsel; Lynda A. Do, Trial
                                   Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                   United States Department of Justice,
                                   Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Miguel Chimbo-Toaponta, 1 a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks

review of a March 29, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a May 9, 2018, decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chimbo-

Toaponta, No. A205 199 622 (B.I.A. Mar. 29, 2021), aff’g No. A205 199 622 (Immig.

Ct. N.Y. City May 9, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

      In lieu of filing a brief, the Government moves for summary denial of

Chimbo-Toaponta’s petition for review. Rather than determine if the petition is

1 Although this is the name that the agency used and the parties have not moved
to correct it, the petitioner’s name is given as Juan Miguel Chimbo-Toapanta on
his identity documents.
                                           2
frivolous as required for summary denial, see Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.

1995), we construe the Government’s motion as its brief and deny the petition on

the merits.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., without the

findings that it reversed or declined to reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual findings,

including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence, and we

review questions of law and the application of fact to law de novo. Hong Fei Gao

v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), . . . any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,

without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the

heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”            8 U.S.C.

                                         3
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.        Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s determination that Chimbo-Toaponta was not credible as to

his claim that members of an opposing political party assaulted him on account of

his political opinion.

      The agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency between Chimbo-

Toaponta’s hearing testimony and earlier credible fear interview regarding the

number of times he was harmed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). During his

credible fear interview, he reported that he was beaten twice by supporters of an

opposing political group because of his support for his own party; during those

beatings in July 2009 and November 2010 (or 2011), the opposing party supporters

hit him with fists and kicked him. He did not mention that he had been a political

candidate or that he sustained other injuries.       By contrast, during his merits

hearing, Chimbo-Toaponta initially testified that he was assaulted once by

supporters of opposing candidates, who cut his arm with a broken bottle in early

April 2009 because he was running for office. He repeatedly denied that there

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were any other instances of harm in Ecuador, except that he was warned not to

run again in 2011. When asked why he previously stated that he was harmed in

July 2009, he said that he could not remember the month. Then, when asked

whether he was also attacked in November 2010, he changed his testimony to say

that he was physically attacked at that time, but by members of his community

who were angry about losing land to development projects, not by members of an

opposing party. Although the agency described the discrepancy between the

interview and testimony as relating the number of assaults, as outlined above,

Chimbo-Toaponta’s accounts were also inconsistent as to the date and manner of

the 2009 assault, and the reasons for both assaults.    Moreover, we note that

Chimbo-Toaponta’s written statement varied from both accounts, by describing

an assault with a broken bottle on a specific date in late April 2009, and then an

incident when members of his community threatened to shut off his water in 2011

because he refused to run for political office.

      The agency also reasonably relied on Chimbo-Toaponta’s inconsistent

statements regarding the name of his political party.              See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). When asked for the name of the party during his hearing, he

said that it was called “Independiente Quereno” or “List 68,” and he said that it

                                          5
did not have any other names. However, in his written statement, he referred to

the party as “Decision Civica” or List 68, and during his credible fear interview,

he gave the name “Nove Paiz.” 2

       Instead, Chimbo-Toaponta argues that the above inconsistencies are

explained by his difficulty understanding Spanish, his nervousness testifying at

his hearing, and his lack of education. These explanations are not compelling.

See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more

than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Chimbo-Toaponta repeatedly asserted

to the immigration court that his best language was Spanish, and notwithstanding

the interpreter’s reservations about whether that was accurate, he said that he

understood the interpreter, his attorney declined to argue that Chimbo-Toaponta

2 Chimbo-Toaponta does not challenge the agency’s reliance on the credible fear
interview record. In any event, the agency may consider statements made in a
credible fear interview when assessing an applicant’s credibility so long as “the
record of [the] credible fear interview displays the hallmarks of reliability.” Ming
Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009). The record here displays indicia
of reliability: the interview was documented in a typewritten list of questions and
responses, Chimbo-Toaponta did not express difficulty understanding the
interpreter, and the interviewer asked questions designed to elicit an asylum
claim. See id.
                                           6
had difficulty understanding his merits hearing, and the record reflects that he

understood and responsively answered questions posed.          Chimbo-Toaponta’s

purported nervousness during his hearing would not explain why his written

statement, like his initial testimony, omitted the second alleged instance of

physical abuse—particularly as the written statement contained different

allegations of abuse during approximately the same period. See Hong Fei Gao, 891

F.3d at 78–79 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the omission of certain facts,

an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would

reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.”).

Likewise, his limited education does not compellingly explain why he could not

remember how many times he was assaulted, or why he would testify the party

had no other names but then give additional names for the party.

      Chimbo-Toaponta also argues that the above inconsistencies are too minor

to support the adverse credibility determination. We disagree. These multiple

inconsistencies provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

determination because they relate to the alleged persecution. 3 See Likai Gao v.

3 We decline to reach the agency’s third inconsistency finding, related to whether
there was an interpreter at two “master hearings.” Even assuming error, remand
is not required when “overwhelming evidence in the record makes it clear that the
                                        7
Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might

preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.

Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xian Tuan Ye

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Where the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding is based on specific examples in the record of inconsistent

statements . . . about matters material to [a] claim of persecution . . . , a reviewing

court will generally not be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was

compelled to find otherwise.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[E]ven where an IJ

relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters

collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be

deemed consequential by the fact-finder.” (quoting Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d

395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006)). The adverse credibility determination was dispositive of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief

were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–

57 (2d Cir. 2006).

same decision is inevitable on remand.” Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.
2019). This is such a case, given the inconsistencies regarding the alleged assaults.
                                          8
      Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Chimbo-Toaponta’s challenge to the

BIA member’s decision to resolve his appeal unilaterally rather than refer it to a

three-member panel. See Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 465 (2d Cir. 2006)

(“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review a claim that a single BIA member erred in

deciding to resolve unilaterally an appeal of an IJ’s order and not to refer the case

to a three-member BIA panel.”).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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