Court Opinion

ID: 9670291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:17.926445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.662303
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and hold that the residency rules promulgated by defendant Portage Public Schools conflict with state law and are therefore invalid.
i
Defendant contends that, in the absence of a court-appointed guardian, Deonte cannot be a resident of its school district for purposes of the School Code, MCL 380.1 et seq.; MSA 15.4001 et seq. I disagree.
Section 1148 of the School Code, MCL 380.1148; MSA 15.41148, defines residency of students for public school enrollment purposes as follows:
Except as provided in section 1711, a child placed under the order or direction of a court or child placing agency in a licensed home, or a child whose parents or legal guardians are unable to provide a home for the child and who is placed in a licensed home or in a home of relatives in the school district for the purpose of securing a suitable home for the child and not for an educational purpose, shall be considered a resident for education purposes of the school district where the home *657in which the child is living is located. The child shall be admitted to the school in the district. [Emphasis added.]
The above statutory provision clearly provides that, if a child meets the state-mandated requirements for residency, the child "shall be considered a resident for education purposes of the school district” and "shall be admitted to the school in the district.”
It is well established that residency for educational purposes is not the equivalent of legal domicile. School Dist No 1, Fractional, of the Twp of Mancelona v School Dist No 1 of Twp of Custer, 236 Mich 677, 681-682; 211 NW 60 (1926). Further, as stated by the Supreme Court in School Dist No 1, our school laws are to be liberally construed consistent with Michigan’s public policy of encouraging free public education:
The State endeavors to foster and encourage education. It wants every child within its limits to have equal opportunity with other children in the free privileges of the public schools. And while the theory of the school law is that a child is restricted to these free privileges to the district in which it resides, it is not intended that it must acquire a residence in that district in the technical sense of the term. In recognition of this policy of the State, and the necessities of children for a free education, the courts construe the school laws liberally and distinguish residence from domicile in its technical sense.
The rule as to what constitutes residence entitling children to the privileges of public schools is well stated in the note to Commonwealth v School Directors of Upper Swatara Twp, 26 L R A 581:
"So far as a rule can be deducted from the cases upon this subject, it seems to be that a child is entitled to the benefit of the public schools in the district in which it lives if it has gone there in *658good faith for the purpose of acquiring a home and not for the purpose of taking advantage of school privileges. But that it will not be permitted to go into a district chiefly for the purpose of getting school advantages.” [236 Mich 681-682.]
Consistent with School Dist No 1, the attorney general has rendered three opinions on issues of educational residency under the School Code. In OAG, 1976, No 5004, p 457 (May 13, 1976), the attorney general rendered an opinion that applied School Dist No 1 and Shapiro v Ann Arbor School Dist, 14 Mich App 738; 165 NW2d 919 (1968), to three different examples. In the final example, a father living in Nebraska was unable to provide a proper home for his child. For this reason, the child was transferred to his grandparents who lived in a Michigan school district. Under these facts, the attorney general opined that the child was an educational resident of the Michigan school district in which he was living.
Later, in OAG, 1979, No 5574, p 393 (September 18, 1979), the attorney general expressed an opinion that a child placed with a relative pursuant to a power of attorney under § 405 of the Revised Probate Code, MCL 700.405; MSA 27.5405,1 becomes a resident of the school district in which the relative resides as long as the purpose of the placement was to secure a suitable home. However, if the student was placed with a relative not for the purpose of securing a suitable home but for educational purposes, the child would not become a resident of the school district.
Finally, in OAG, 1981, No 5925, p 234 (June 23, 1981), the attorney general rendered an opinion that the determination of residency for school *659enrollment purposes is a question of fact. Further, that consistent with the School Code, a school district may require reasonable verification that a child meets the statutory residency requirements.
ii
In the present case, defendant school district defends its residency rules as a verification mechanism used to confirm compliance with the residency requirements of the School Code. Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges that defendant’s rules conflict with the School Code by imposing burdens and restrictions on educational residency that are inconsistent with the School Code. I agree with plaintiff.
The School Code does not require the appointment of a legal guardian as a condition of educational residency. On the contrary, the statute defines educational residency as court-ordered place: ment or placement by the parent or guardian in a licensed home or the home of a relative. The district’s rule, in effect, rewrites the statute by deleting the later statutory definition of educational residency, which includes "a child placed . . .in a home of relatives in the school district for the purpose of securing a suitable home for the child and not for an educational purpose.” While the school district would prefer not to make a factual determination regarding the purpose of the placement of a child in the home of a relative, the statutory requirements of educational residency may not be rewritten for the purpose of expediency.
The majority apparently recognizes that a rule requiring the establishment of a legal guardianship and the termination of a parent’s parental rights would be exceedingly harsh and unreason*660able. Accordingly, the majority has modified the school district’s rules to require the establishment of a "limited guardianship” and the suspension of a parent’s parental rights as prerequisites for educational residency. Although defendant’s rules require a "legal guardianship as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,” my colleagues conclude that defendant intended to require a limited guardianship rather than a regular guardianship. No support for this, conclusion is offered other than defendant’s announced disdain for making a factual determination required by the School Code regarding the reason for a child’s placement with a relative.
The residency rules promulgated by defendant limit enrollment and thereby reduce costs. These rules also violate state law. Students like Deonte Carpenter are denied their right to a free public education by the enforcement of residency rules that are more restrictive than allowed by state law. The School Code, which is to be liberally construed consistent with the public policy of fostering and encouraging free public education, is seriously undermined by defendant’s restrictive residency rules.
in
Having found defendant’s residency requirements to be invalid, I would encourage defendant to employ the procedure that this Court approved in In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 826; 318 NW2d 567 (1982):
Petitioner argues that the respondents’ children must be made temporary wards of the court so that the children can receive emergency medical care and enroll in school. We reject this argument. *661Although school districts have policies discouraging students from living with persons other than their parents or legal guardians, these policies are aimed at preventing children from living away from their parents and enrolling in school districts strictly for educational reasons. When a child’s parents live outside a school district or are unable to care for the child and the parents have chosen to place the child with relatives within a district, school districts may examine each case individually and accept the parents’ signatures on forms attesting to the fact that the child’s residence in that district with persons other than his or her parents is not solely for the purpose of enrolling the child in school in that district.
I would reverse on the ground that the rules promulgated by defendant violate the School Code. I find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issues raised by plaintiff.

 In the present case, the power of attorney regarding Deonte was written in conformity with this statutory provision.