Court Opinion

ID: 9860475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:23:07.244739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:15:50.782628
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK, dissenting: Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff was found guilty of criminal contempt rather than civil contempt. The line of demarcation between civil and criminal contempt is often indistinct. (Harvey v. Carponelli (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 448, 452-53, 453 N.E.2d 820.) With a mindset that said civil contempt, the trial court was oblivious to the possibility that some day these proceedings would be deemed criminal contempt. The trial court specifically stated that the contempt is indirect civil contempt and the burden is the preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, the majority finds to the contrary and concludes that the contempt is criminal. To apply the litmus test distinguishing between criminal and civil contempt, the trial court must determine if the intent of the sanction is to punish for past deeds or to coerce future compliance with court orders. Punitive sanctions are criminal and coercive sanctions are civil. However, substance prevails over form. Where sanctions are punitive, but referred to as civil, respondent must be accorded criminal contempt due process. (People v. Rodriguez (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 149, 514 N.E.2d 1033.) The court may as a sanction sequester a respondent’s funds for civil contempt. Geittmann v. Geittmann (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 470, 467 N.E.2d 297. The majority finds that the fines were imposed in retribution of plaintiff’s past violation of the restraining order, and not to compel future compliance with the order. The record does not support the finding. We should not ignore the trial court’s pronouncements that addressed future compliance with the trial court’s order: “THE COURT: For these events, Mr. Luttrell is fined $1,000 apiece. Mr. Luttrell should be mindful of the fact that this is the only time he will be fined for any conduct under this order. The next time this matter comes, if it prevails, if further conduct is presented where this court is convinced that the orders are being violated, Mr. Luttrell will be assured that he will spend some time in the county jail.” The propriety of fines or incarceration as sanctions for an act of civil contempt is well settled. Fines and incarceration have uniformly been recognized as proper sanctions for violations of a prohibitory injunction of a civil nature. Rothchild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Manufacturing Co. (1912), 256 Ill. 196, 99 N.E. 920. Here, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay $2,000 to the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County. The clerk was not instructed to disburse the funds or dispose of them in an ultimate way. Until this is done, plaintiff has not been permanently deprived of these funds. The funds are merely sequestered and subject to further order of the trial court. If the trial court directs the clerk to disburse the funds to an agency of government or another entity, for their own use, the trial court loses jurisdiction and the plaintiff is permanently deprived of said funds. In civil contempt respondent may reverse the sanction by purging the contempt. In this case the trial court retains jurisdiction over the funds and has not ordered the ultimate disposition. Plaintiff’s subsequent compliance or noncompliance with the trial court’s order will determine an ultimate disposition of the funds by the trial court. As with other sanctions for civil contempt, the sanction here allows plaintiff to purge the contempt by compliance with the order. The evidence is sufficient to prove by a preponderance that respondent willfully violated the restraining order. It is inherent in the trial court’s order of contempt and the sanctions imposed that these funds are retained for the purpose of assuring future compliance with the trial court’s order. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand this case for further proceedings.