Court Opinion

ID: 9891695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:09:53.326593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:08.132595
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                                 FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  2023 CA 0299

    BOONE SERVICES, LLC (FORMERLY BOONE SERVICES, INC.)

                                    VERSUS

                             CLARK HOMES, INC.

                                             Judgment Rendered      OCT 18 2023

                  On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court
                     In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
                                State of Louisiana
                  Trial Court Docket Number C696631, Sec. 24

                     Hon. Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding

Teresa D. Cop                               Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Craig L. Kaster                             Boone Services, LLC
Zachary, Louisiana

Peter T. Dudley                             Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana                      Clark Homes, Inc.

           BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND GREENE, JJ.
PENZATO, J.

       Plaintiff/appellant, Boone Services, LLC, appeals a judgment rendered by the

trial court on July 18, 2022 following a bench trial. The judgment awarded Boone

 21, 005. 84 but also awarded $ 90, 000. 00 to defendant/ appellee, Clark Homes, Inc.,

as liquidated damages, to be applied as an offset or compensation against the amount

owed to Boone.

       We amend the trial court' s judgment, which erroneously identified Boone

Services, Inc. as the plaintiff and rendered judgment in favor of and against Boone

Services, Inc., to identify Boone Services, LLC as the plaintiff.          For the following

reasons, the judgment, as amended, is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and amended

in part, and we render judgment accordingly.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This dispute arises out of a December 19, 2012 contract between Clark

Homes, owner of the project ( Twin Lakes Estates                 Subdivision), and Boone,

contractor.   Boone filed suit against Clark Homes on June 3, 2020, alleging that it

was owed $    169, 485. 01 for work performed during phase 1 of the project pursuant

to the December 2012 contract.'         Boone sought payment of this amount, plus 12%

contractual interest.    Clark Homes answered Boone' s suit, denying any sums were

owed to Boone. Clark Homes further asserted that it was entitled to $ 300. 00 per day

in liquidated damages, as provided in the contract, due to Boone' s failure to complete

the work within the time specified in the contract. Thus, Clark Homes asserted, as

an affirmative defense, that it was entitled to an offset from any amount found to be

owed to Boone.

1 The Twin Lakes Estates Subdivision project was divided into two filings or phases. Boone
asserted claims arising out of both phases, which were disposed of in the judgment on appeal.
Boone does not assign error to the trial court' s judgment concerning the second phase. Thus, we
address only Boone' s claims concerning the first phase.

                                                2
         A bench trial was held on May 10 and 13, 2022. The trial court took the matter

under advisement and instructed the parties to file proposed factual findings and

conclusions of law as well as a proposed judgment. In a written judgment, signed

on July 18, 2022, the trial court overruled Boone' s evidentiary objection, asserted at

trial,   to the admissibility of evidence offered by Clark Homes to support its

affirmative defense of compensation or offset for liquidated damages. The trial court

rendered judgment in favor of Boone and against Clark Homes in the amount of

 21, 005. 84 and rendered judgment in favor of Clark Homes and against Boone in

the amount of $90,000. 00 in liquidated damages, to be applied as an offset against

the amount owed to Boone.        The trial court also issued written reasons for ruling,

discussed more fully below. This suspensive appeal by Boone followed.

                         AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT

         As an initial matter, we note that the trial court' s judgment, particularly the

decretal language, erroneously identifies Boone Services, Inc. as the plaintiff and

renders judgment in favor of and against Boone Services, Inc. However, the petition

identifies the plaintiff as ` Boone Services, LLC ( formerly Boone Services, Inc.)."

Although the contract identifies ` Boone Services, Inc." as the contractor, Tracey

Boone signed the contract as CEO of Boone Services, LLC.             The parties do not

dispute that Boone Services, LLC was the contractor and is the proper party plaintiff.

The identity of the plaintiff organization was not an issue raised at trial. Notably,

the introduction of the judgment identifies Boone Services, LLC as the plaintiff, who

participated at trial.   It is evident that any reference to Boone Services, Inc. in the

judgment was made in error.

         Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164, an appellate court shall " render any

judgment which is just, legal and proper upon the record on appeal."         The record

before us is complete, and we deem it just, legal, and proper to amend the trial court' s

July 18, 2022 judgment to identify Boone Services, LLC as the proper party plaintiff.

                                             3
See Fagan v. LeBlanc, 2005- 1845 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2110106), 928 So. 2d 576, 584-

585, wherein this court amended the trial court' s original judgment to identify " Sue

LeBlanc, D.D.S."     as the proper party defendant.           In Fagan, the original judgment

erroneously identified the defendant as " Sue C. Clark, D. D.S."           This court found it

just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal to revise the judgment pursuant to

La. C. C. P. art. 2164.    Fagan, 928 So. 2d at 585.          Similarly, see Lewis v. Temple

Inland, 2011- 0729 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 1119111),        80 So. 3d 52, 65, wherein judgment

was entered against two non-parties, and this court amended the judgment to add the

proper defendant as the party cast in judgment. Pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 2002, if

a judgment is rendered against a defendant who has not been served and has not

entered a general appearance, like Boone Services, Inc., that judgment is an absolute

nullity.   When the appellate court notices an absolute nullity, the court is likewise

empowered to vacate or correct the judgment on its own motion. La. C. C. P. art.

2164; Lewis, 80 So. 3d at 65 n.9. Therefore, we amend the trial court' s July 18, 2022

judgment to identify Boone Services, LLC, rather than Boone Services, Inc., as the

proper party plaintiff.

                                         DISCUSSION

       In six of seven assignments of error, Boone asserts that the trial court failed to

properly interpret the parties' contract and, in doing so, erred by failing to award

damages to Boone in the full amount of its demand and erred by applying an offset

in favor of Clark Homes.        To the extent we must interpret the parties' contract, we

2 In Fagan, the trial court signed an amended judgment to correct the error. However, because the
amended judgment was contrary to La. C. C. P. art. 1951, this court vacated the amended judgment
and reinstated the original judgment before revising the original judgment to identify the proper
party defendant. Fagan, 928 So. 2d at 580, 584- 585.
  During opening remarks, Boone asserted that its claim on the first phase was $ 168, 237. 68
  1, 247.33 less than the demand asserted in the petition).

                                                 4
apply the de novo standard of review.' See Lonesome Development, LLC v. Town of

Abita Springs, 2021- 1463 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 29/ 22), 343 So. 3d 831, 839, writ

denied, 2022- 01158 ( La. 1111/ 22), 349 So.3d 3 ( An appellate court applies the de

novo standard of review to contract interpretation.) Conversely, where no contract

provision applies or where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of the

contract,   we    apply the       manifest     error    standard     of   review.    See Lonesome

Development, LLC, 343 So. 3d at 839.

       In the remaining assignment of error, Boone challenges the trial court' s

evidentiary ruling, which we review using the highly deferential abuse of discretion

standard.   Landry a City ofMandeville, 2021- 1362 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4127/ 22), 342

So. 3d 337, 346, writ denied, 2022- 00828 ( La. 9/ 27122), 347 So. 3d 155. An abuse of

discretion generally results from a conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary

manner, which means the absence of a rational basis for the action taken. Thus, a

trial court' s discretionary action will not be disturbed on review if reasonable people

could differ as to the propriety of the trial court' s action. Landry, 342 So.3d at 346-

47.

        We address this evidentiary assignment of error first since a finding of error

may affect the applicable standard of review. See Wright v. Bennett, 2004- 1944 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 9/ 28/ 05), 924 So. 2d 178, 182.

Evidence and Liquidated Damages5

        In related assignments in error, Boone contends that the trial court erred by

admitting evidence offered by Clark Homes to support its entitlement to liquidated

damages, erred by failing to find that Clark Homes waived its right to liquidated

4 In each assignment of error, Boone cites a contract provision, which it asserts is applicable to the
issue raised. After reviewing the contract, the evidence admitted at trial, and each issue presented,
we find some of the contract provisions cited by Boone are inapplicable. However, where a
contract provision applies or is otherwise pertinent to the issue raised, it is discussed in this opinion.
5 These issues are raised in Boone' s first ( waiver), fourth ( additional contract days), and fifth
 evidence) assignments of error.

                                                    5
damages by making the final payment under the contract, and erred by finding that

Boone was not entitled to additional contract days, which would have reduced or

eliminated delay damages. Concerning contract days, Boone asserts that it was

entitled to additional time for weather delays.    Boone also contends that the trial

court used an incorrect start date and completion date when computing the amount

of time it took Boone to complete the work.

      Evidence

      During trial, Boone objected as opposing counsel questioned Jim Clark

owner/president of Clark Homes) concerning Clark Homes' s claim for $90, 000. 00

in liquidated damages. Boone asserted that "[ tjhis claim has never been brought."

The trial court allowed Boone to lodge an objection " on the area of testimony

involving an assertion of delay damages"       and stated that it would rule on the

testimony' s admissibility after trial. As noted, the trial court subsequently overruled

the objection in the July 18, 2022 judgment. The court' s written reasons do not

address this ruling.

      Although Clark Homes did not assert a reconventional demand for liquidated

damages, it properly raised the affirmative defense of compensation prior to trial.

See La. C. C. art. 1893. In its answer, Clark Homes raised the affirmative defense of

compensation and specifically pled that, upon information and belief, Boone

      failed to complete the contract work in the time specified and the
      contract provides for liquidated damages of $300. 00 per day for each
      day beyond the specified completion date; therefore, Clark Homes, Inc.
      is entitled to an offset from any amount found to be owed for the
      liquidated damages provided by the contract.

In the pretrial order, Clark Homes asserted that it was entitled to an award of

liquidated damages against Boone for its failure to timely complete the work.

      Additionally, Boone submitted testimony and documentary evidence at trial

concerning weather delays, as well as the contract start and completion dates — the

same facts that were central to the determination of whether Clark Homes was

                                           M
entitled to an offset for delay damages.               Therefore, Boone cannot show that the

admission of duplicative testimony on these issues, offered by Clark Homes, had a

substantial effect on the outcome of the case. See La. C.E. art. 103( A) ("Error may

not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a

substantial right of the party is affected.") See also Wright, 924 So. 2d at 183 ( The

proper inquiry for determining whether a party was prejudiced by a trial court' s

alleged erroneous ruling on the admission or denial of evidence is whether the

alleged error, when compared to the entire record, had a substantial effect on the

outcome of the case.        If the effect on the outcome of the case is not substantial,

reversal is not warranted.)       Boone failed to satisfy its burden of proving prejudice

caused by the trial court' s evidentiary ruling.           See Wright, 924 So. 2d at 183 ( The

party alleging prejudice by the evidentiary ruling of the trial court bears the burden

of proof.)'   We find no error in the admission of the challenged evidence.

       Waiver

       Boone argues that Clark Homes waived its rights against Boone when Clark

Homes made a payment of $3, 097. 15 to Boone in August 2014, which Boone

maintains was the final payment on the phase 1 contract. Although the trial court' s

written reasons do not expressly address Boone' s waiver argument, the trial court

implicitly rejected this assertion by awarding Clark Homes $ 90, 000. 00 in liquidated

damages for 300 delay days.

       Boone relies on Article 90 of the general conditions of the contract, which

states, in part, " The making and acceptance of the final payment shall constitute a

b Boone raises new arguments on appeal concerning the propriety of Clark Homes' s affirmative
defense of compensation, including Boone' s assertion that compensation was improper because
Clark Homes' s claim was not a liquidated debt. See La. C. C. art. 1893. Boone did not raise these
issues before the trial court; therefore, we decline to consider them on appeal. See Fontenot v.
Louisiana Department of'Pubiic Safety & Corrections, 2021- 1213 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 418122), 342
So. 3d 28, 35 ( As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider issues that were not raised in
the pleadings, were not addressed by the trial court, or are raised for the first time on appeal.)   We

also note that these arguments concern the merits of Clark Homes' s claim, not the admissibility of
the evidence at issue.

                                                   7
waiver of all claims by the Owner...."'          Boone introduced email exchanges from

August 2014 between Ferris Engineering & Surveying, LLC, the engineer on the

project, Boone, and Clark Homes, which state that the " remaining balance" owed to

Boone was $ 3, 097. 15.     Boone also introduced evidence of the payment made by

Clark Homes, which includes a memo stating, " I" Filing completed to date balance."

       Although no payments were made by Clark Homes to Boone after August

2014, the trial record reflects that this was not the last payment to be made by Clark

Homes to Boone on this phase of the project. Mr. Clark explained that, at the time

the check was issued, there were ongoing disputes between Clark Homes and Boone,

and he contemplated additional payments may be due to Boone. The language used

in the memo, " to date balance,"          supports this assertion.          Additional evidence

submitted at trial reflects that, in July 2014, the parties disagreed regarding the

number of penalty days to be assessed against Boone for purposes of delay damages

and the amount owed to Boone for additional excavation work —the same disputes

at issue in this litigation. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court' s

factual conclusion that Clark Homes did not make a final payment such that it

waived its rights pursuant to Article 90.

       Additional Contract Da s

       Ferris determined that work began on the project on December 19, 2012 and

was completed on April 14, 2014.          Boone argues that the trial court erred by using

these dates to calculate the total time it took Boone to complete the work. Again,

the trial court' s written reasons do not expressly set forth this factual finding, but it

is implicit in the trial court' s conclusion that Boone took a total of 480 days to

complete the project, 300 days over the 180 -day period provided in the contract.

  The general conditions of the contract were incorporated into and made a part of the contract.
 Final payment" is not defined in the contract or the general conditions.
         The contract states that the contractor, Boone, shall commence work under

the contract within seven calendar days of a written notice to proceed. Article 70 of

the general conditions of the contract provides that computation of contract time

shall commence on the seventh day following the date of the notice to proceed and

every calendar day following shall be counted in the contract time.                Boone

established at trial that it did not receive a written notice to proceed.   On February

27, 2013, Ferris asked Boone to provide the date it started work.           According to

Boone' s interoffice emails, Boone started work on January 21, 2013.           However,

these emails do not reflect that Boone advised Ferris of this purported start date.

         To establish the start date, Boone also relied on testimony from Dustin Bowie,

Boone' s project manager, who simply confirmed Boone' s " position" that work

began on January 21, 2013 according to the email. Boone offered no other evidence

to dispute the December 19, 2012 start date used by Ferris and accepted by the trial

court.

         Boone also maintains that contract time, and, therefore, delay damages, ended

on November 8, 2013.        Tracey Boone, managing member of Boone Services, and

Mr. Bowie testified that Boone' s work was substantially complete by November 8,

2013, meaning that Clark Homes was able to use the project for its intended purpose

 a   residential   subdivision).    However,   as noted by Clark Homes, the contract

provision that provides for liquidated damages discusses work that is " complete,"

not " substantially    complete."    Specifically, the contract states that the contractor

agrees to pay the owner $ 300. 00 per day, " which amount shall be considered as

liquidated damages due the Owner by reason of the Contractor' s failure to complete

the Contract within the specified time." ( Emphasis added.) Article 91 of the general

                                               E
conditions of the contract states, " The Contract will be considered complete when

                                   S
all work has been finished... "

        Communication between the parties, introduced into evidence at trial, reflects

that Boone' s work on this phase of the project was not complete on November 8,

2013.     Instead, work continued through the spring of 2014. Photographs of the site

taken by Mr. Boone in March 2014 support a finding that Boone' s work was not

complete at that time.     Additionally, Mr. Clark testified that Boone' s work was not

complete on November 8, 2013.

        Most significantly, in May 2014, Mr. Boone emailed Ferris and Clark Homes,

using December 17, 2012 and April 15, 2014 as the contract start/ end dates in his

explanation for why Boone should not be assessed with penalty days.9 Mr. Boone

testified that he used these dates, assigned by Ferris, to show that Boone should not

be charged liquidated damages, even if the " wrong dates" were used. However, Mr.

Boone acknowledged that his email did not state that he disagreed with the dates

assigned by Ferris. To the extent the trial court reconciled Mr. Boone' s testimony

with his email by making a credibility determination, the manifest error standard

requires that we give great deference to this determination. See Hebert v. Rapides

Parish Police Jury, 2006- 2001 ( La. 4/ 11107), 974 So. 2d 635, 654, on rehearing

 1/ 16/ 08). Thus, we find the record supports the trial court' s conclusion that Boone' s

work began on December 19, 2012 and ended April 14, 2014, and we find no

manifest error in this factual finding. See Lonesome Development, LLC, 343 So. 3d

at 839.

S Article 91 also states that the contract will be considered complete when final inspection is made
by the engineer, the project is accepted in writing by the owner, and the owner is furnished with a
Clear Lien and Preferential Certificate. There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate if or
when these things occurred, particularly on or before November 8, 2013.

9 It is unclear why Mr. Boone used December 17, 2012 and April 15, 2014, rather than the dates
used by Ferris, December 19, 2012 and April 14, 2014.

                                                 10
         Finally, Boone argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant Boone an

extension of contract time due to precipitation or wet conditions. This argument has

merit.   The contract provides, in the Time Limit section:

         A request by the Contractor for an extension of the contract time will
         be considered only if, in support of the request, the Contractor shall
         allege delay in the performance of the work by either or all of the
         following causes:

             C) Precipitation or wet conditions in excess of normal amounts or
            times for the location of the project or the time of year. The
            Engineer shall make the determination of validity of claims for
            delays of the type and said decision shall be binding on the
            Owner and Contractor. ( Emphasis added.)

         Boone requested that the contract time be extended by 255 days due to

precipitation or wet conditions.    Ferris, the engineer, determined that Boone was

entitled to 212 adverse weather days.    On July 17, 2014, Ferris emailed Boone and

Clark Homes with its recommendations for the resolution of the dispute concerning

the delay days. Ferris noted that the time of construction went well beyond the 180

days allowed by the contract, explaining, " It is a well- known and documented fact

that weather played a critical part of this situation."

         A contract between the parties is the law between them, and the courts are

obligated to give legal effect to such contracts according to the true intent of the

parties.    Waterworks District No. 1 of Desoto Parish v. Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections, 2016- 0744 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2117117), 214 So. 3d 1,

5, writ denied, 2017- 0470 ( La. 5/ 12/ 17), 219 So. 3d 1103.   In the contract, Clark

Homes and Boone gave Ferris the authority to determine the validity of weather

delay claims and expressly agreed that the engineer' s decision " shall be binding" on

both parties.    The trial court erred when it failed to enforce this provision of the

contract.   Thus, we find that, pursuant to Ferris' s binding determination, Boone was

entitled to extend the contract time by 212 days due to precipitation or wet

conditions.     We reduce the number of additional contract days ( in excess of 180
days) from 300, assigned by the trial court, to 88 to account for the 212 weather days

determined by Ferris. We find that Clark Homes is entitled to liquidated damages

in the amount of $26,400. 00, to be applied to offset the amount owed to Boone

pursuant to La. C. C. art. 189VO

The Ponds'

         Pursuant to the contract, Boone was to excavate two ponds, a total of 140, 000

cubic yards, at a unit price of $2. 68.       This line item included excavating, spreading,

and compacting the dirt on the subdivision lots. The original plans specified that the

ponds would be dug to hold five feet of water.

         In June 2013, after excavation began, Boone was instructed to dig the ponds

to hold at least eight feet of water above debris, stumps, and logs that were to be

relocated to the bottom of the ponds.            Clinton Kennerly, chief engineer for Ferris

involved in this project,         testified that putting the stumps into the ponds and

excavating to hold eight feet of water changed the scope of work that Boone agreed

to undertake pursuant to the original project plans. This additional excavation plan

was made during a meeting attended by Ferris, Mr. Boone, and Mr. Clark. Ferris

confirmed this decision in an email recapping the parties' meeting, addressed to Mr.

Clark and Mr. Boone. Mr. Clark responded, " Agreed."                 The parties never signed a

written contract amendment or change order concerning the additional pond

excavation.

          The dispute arising out of this additional work on the pond concerns three

issues. First, Boone maintains that the parties agreed to a price of $3. 32 per cubic

yard for the additional dirt excavated pursuant to the June 2013 directive to increase

the depth of the pond.          Conversely, Clark Homes asserts that no agreement was

10
     Eighty-eight days past the 180 -day contract time multiplied by $300 per day equals $ 26,400. 00
liquidated damages.

 1 These pond -related issues are raised in Boone' s second ( price), third ( quantity), and fourth
 additional contract days) assignments of error.

                                                   12
reached; therefore, the original contract per unit price applied to any additional dirt

excavated and moved by Boone. The trial court made the factual determination that

Clark Homes never agreed to increase the unit price to $ 3. 32 for dirt excavated in

excess of 140, 000 cubic yards, the original contract quantity.

      Second, the parties dispute the quantity of dirt excavated by Boone in excess

of 140, 000 cubic yards.   Boone maintains that the trial court erred by finding that it

only excavated an additional 7, 838 cubic yards, rather than 49, 624 cubic yards as

determined by Ferris.

      Finally, Boone contends that the trial court erred by finding that Boone was

not entitled to additional contract days and, instead, should have granted Boone 50

contract days to complete the additional excavation work.

      Price

      Article 84( E) of the general contract conditions states,

       If the unit prices are stated in the Contract Documents..., and if the
       quantities originally contemplated are so changed in a proposed Change
       Order that application of the agreed unit prices to the quantities of work
      proposed will create a hardship on the Owner or the Contractor, the
      applicable unit prices shall be equitably adjusted to prevent such
      hardship.

       Boone asserts that the change in quantity of dirt to be excavated from the

ponds created a hardship, which required an adjustment of the unit price.            On

September 11, 2013, Boone emailed Ferris, stating that the price to lower the ponds

to the new depth was $ 3. 32 per cubic yard.    Mr. Clark was included on this email

but did not respond. Boone asserts that, through Mr. Clark' s silence, Clark Homes

agreed to the modification of the price increase.

       A contract may be modified by mutual consent.        While modification can be

presumed by silence, inaction, or implication, one person may not change the terms

unilaterally.   Cajun Constructors, Inc. v. Fleming Construction Co., 2005- 2003 ( La.

App. 1 st Cir. 11115106), 951 So.2d 208, 214, writ denied, 2007- 0420 ( La. 415107),

                                           13
954 So. 2d 146.        Written contracts for construction may be modified by oral contracts

and by the conduct of the parties.           This is true even when the written contract

contains the provision that an owner is liable only if the change orders are in writing.

It is a question of fact, therefore, as to whether there were oral agreements that

modified the      written contract.      Further, the party asserting modification of an

obligation must prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts or acts giving rise to

the modification.        La. C. C. art. 1831; Cajun Constructors, 951 So. 2d at 214.

       The trial court made the factual determination that Clark Homes did not agree

to increase the price per cubic yard to $ 3. 32.        The record supports this finding.

Particularly, after Boone advised Ferris and Clark Homes of the proposed new per

unit price, Boone repeatedly tried to confirm that Mr. Clark accepted this price,

evidencing Boone' s understanding that the parties had not reached an agreement on

this issue.    On September 25, 2013, Boone followed up on its September 11th " Twin

Lakes Pond Depth" email, asking, "[ H] ow do we go about getting an agreement on

paper ( or email) from [Mr. Clark] about the price?" On November 22, 2013, Boone

emailed       Ferris    and   Mr.   Clark   concerning the   additional   pond   excavation.

Pertinently, Boone explained, " The issue that Boone Services has is that the price to

go deeper than plan grade in the ponds has a different unit price associated with it

than what is established in the original contract. Can we set up a meeting Monday

to sit and talk this through?"       There is no evidence a meeting took place.

       The next communication on this issue occurred on January 24, 2014, when

Mr. Clark stated in an email to Boone and Ferris that he had a " problem with the

additional charge for another 50, 000 yards of dirt." No evidence was admitted to

prove that an oral agreement was reached after Mr. Clark sent this email. Mr. Boone

testified that there was no agreement in writing from Clark Homes ( Mr. Clark) on

the increased price proposed by Boone. To the contrary, the record reflects that

Ferris advised Boone on July 21, 2014 that, " In the absence of any evidence to the

                                                14
contrary, I have no alternative except to presume that the contract price is still valid

for the remainder of material removed from the ponds."

       The trial court' s factual conclusion on this issue also required credibility

determinations.     Mr. Boone testified that Mr. Clark verbally assured him that Boone

would be paid the " accelerated costs."          Conversely, Mr. Clark testified that he never

agreed to the increased unit price of $3. 32.            According to Mr. Clark, the idea was

 bandied back and forth but there was never a meeting of the minds" on this issue.

We find no manifest error in the trial court' s decision to credit Mr. Clark' s

testimony. 12 See Blake v. City ofPort Allen, 2014- 0528 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 11 / 20/ 1. 4),

167 So. 3d 781, 790 ( Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous.)

       Quantity

       Boone relies on surveys and determinations made by Ferris to support its

assertion that it moved 49, 624 cubic yards in connection with the additional pond

excavation.
                 On July 17, 2014, Ferris advised Boone and Clark Homes that it

determined that Boone moved a total of 189, 624 cubic yards ( 140, 000 cubic yards

as originally contemplated by the contract plus an additional 49, 624 cubic yards).

       In this section of its brief, Boone cites a contract provision, which states, in

        The quantities specified in the " Schedule of Items," attached hereto
       under the date September 05, 2012, though determined in advance with
        as much accuracy as possible, are approximate only and are used herein
        solely for the purpose of determining the total shown of said Schedule
        of Items. The amount to be paid the Contractor shall be determined by
        the actual quantities as determined by the Engineer at the unit prices
        agreed to in said Schedule of Items. ( Emphasis original.)

12 Boone did not ask the trial court or this court to equitably adjust the price if a finding was made
that there was no agreement between the parties on the increased price. Because we bind no error
in the trial court' s factual finding that the parties did not agree to increase the unit price, we do not
address Boone' s argument that the additional excavation created a hardship pursuant to Article
84( E) of the general conditions of the contract.

                                                    15
       Boone' s reliance on this language is misplaced. 13 This provision concerns the

schedule of items, which set forth the original scope of work, and ensures that all

parties are aware and agree that adjustments may be made to the original estimates.

However, the additional pond excavation was undisputedly a change in the original

scope, not merely an adjustment to the original quantity estimated in the schedule of

items. See Clovelly Oil Co., LLC v. Midstates Petroleum Co., LLC, 2012- 2055 ( La.

3/ 19/ 13), 112 So. 3d 187, 192 ( A contract must be interpreted in a common- sense

fashion, according to the words ofthe contract their common and usual significance.)

       Additionally, unlike the contract provision concerning the validity of claims

for delays for wet conditions, this contract provision does not state that the

engineer' s decision is binding on the owner and the contractor. The same is true

regarding Article 30 of the general conditions of the contract, which states, in part,

           A. The Engineer will be, in the first instance, the interpreter of the
               requirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of the
               performance thereunder by both the Owner and Contractor. The
               Engineer      will,    within    a        reasonable   time,     render   such

               interpretations       as he   may deem necessary               for the proper
               execution or progress of the work.
           B. Claims, disputes and other matters in question between the
               Contractor and the Owner relating to the execution or progress
               of the work or the interpretation of the Contract Documents shall
               be referred initially to the Engineer for decision, which decision
               he will render in writing within a reasonable time.

       The evidence also suggests that Ferris understood that its determination was

not binding on Boone and Clark Homes.                       In its July 17, 2014 email, Ferris

acknowledged its contractual responsibility to resolve disputes but recognized that

an agreement must be reached between the parties. Since neither the parties nor the

trial court were bound to accept Ferris' s calculations, the trial court made a factual

determination concerning the quantity of dirt excavated by Boone in excess of

13
  Notably, application of this provision is contrary to Boone' s argument that the additional
quantity of dirt moved should be paid at an increased price, since this provision states that the
contractor will be paid the unit prices stated in the schedule of items.

                                                    16
140, 000 cubic yards stated in the schedule of items. This required the trial court to

choose to credit one expert over another.

      Boone relied on testimony from Mr. Kennerly, who was accepted as an expert

in the fields of civil engineering and civil site work. According to Mr. Kennerly,

Ferris concluded that Boone moved a total of 189, 624 cubic yards during pond

excavation using a topographical survey of the fill material ( dirt) removed and

applying a 30% compaction factor. Mr. Kennerly explained that Ferris compared

the elevation before digging and the elevation of the area outside of the ponds after

work was complete.     This provided an estimate of the amount of dirt removed from

the ponds.

      On cross examination, Mr. Kennerly acknowledged that the elevations used

for the topographical survey may be influenced by various factors, including hauling

in additional dirt from areas other than the ponds. Mr. Clark testified that he owned

the 60 -acre tract of land, which would become Twin Lakes Estates Subdivision, for

several years before Boone began work on the project.              Prior to   Boone' s

involvement, Mr. Clark hired another company to dig out a silted -up cattle pond and

spread the dirt to raise the level of the area.

      Clark Homes offered testimony from Charles St. Romaine, who was accepted

by the trial court as an expert in civil surveying. By measuring the size or volume

of the interior of the ponds, Mr. St. Romaine determined that Boone moved a total

of 147, 838 cubic yards, with a 10% rate of error.   Mr. Kennerly acknowledged that

the type of survey performed by Mr. St. Romaine, a hydrographic survey, was a valid

method for determining the amount of dirt excavated from the ponds.

       Confronted with two expert opinions, two permissible views of the evidence,

the trial court chose to credit the testimony, opinions, and calculations provided by

Mr. St. Romaine.      Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Similarly, where

                                            17
the factfinder' s determination is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one

of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous.

This rule applies equally to the evaluation of expert testimony, including the

evaluation and resolution of conflicts in expert testimony. Adams v. Rhodia, Inc.,

2007- 2110 ( La. 5121108), 983 So. 2d 798, 806- 07.             Therefore, we find no manifest

error in the trial court' s factual finding that Boone excavated 7, 838 cubic yards of

dirt in excess of 140, 000 cubic yards.

       DUs

       The final issue, as it relates to the ponds, is whether Boone should have been

awarded 50 contract days to complete this work, which would reduce the number of

penalty days assessed against it for failing to complete the contract within 180 days.

       In Ferris' s July 17, 2014 email to Boone and Clark Homes, wherein Ferris

acknowledged its responsibility to resolve disputes, Ferris stated that there was an

informal extension of time for removal of additional soil from the ponds.                       Ferris

determined that Boone should be granted 25 days to account for this additional work.

As with its determination regarding the quantity of dirt actually excavated, Ferris

recognized that the parties must reach an agreement on this issue. Its determination

was not binding.

       Consequently,       the   trial   court   was    again    required     to   make     a   factual

determination concerning whether Boone was entitled to additional days for pond

excavation."      We find the record reasonably supports the trial court' s finding that

no additional days were owed, particularly considering the trial court' s conclusion

that Boone excavated an additional 7, 838 cubic yards of dirt, rather than 49, 624 as

is Article 30( C) states that the engineer will exercise his best efforts to insure faithful performance
by both the owner and the contractor and will not show partiality to either.        Boone argues that
Ferris showed partiality to Clark Homes by finding that Boone was entitled to 25 days, as
suggested by Clark Homes, rather than 50 Clays requested by Boone. Because we find Ferris' s
decision was not binding on the trial court and is, therefore, immaterial, we do not address this
argument.

                                                   18
claimed by Boone. Mr. Bowie testified that 50 additional days for moving an

additional 50, 000 cubic yards of dirt was reasonable. However, Boone offered no

evidence to establish that it actually took 50 days to complete the additional pond

work. Mr. Clark testified that he never agreed to an extension of the contract time.

         If the factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its

entirety, a reviewing court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been

sitting as the trier of fact, even if it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Adams, 983 So. 2d at 806.

Seed and Fertilize Line Item"

         The contract schedule of items includes " seed and fertilize R/ W 15' servitude"

for a total price of $3, 486. 00.     Boone first included this work in its request for

payment no. 11 for the period ending January 25, 2014.          Boone requested a total

payment of $164, 609. 84, which included charges for the additional pond excavation.

Since the parties continued to dispute the amount owed for the additional work,

Ferris recommended that Clark Homes pay for current billing items only in the

amount of $30, 149. 84, which included the seed and fertilize work. Clark Homes

paid $   23, 779. 64 to Boone in connection with request for payment no. 11.

         Mr. Boone testified at trial that Clark Homes did not provide an explanation

for why it paid $ 6, 370. 20 less than Ferris recommended. However, Mr. Boone also

testified that Clark Homes did not pay the seed and fertilize line item and explained

that Clark Homes disputed this charge, because Clark Homes maintained that it

performed the work, not Boone. Mr. Boone explained that work of this nature, i.e.,

seeding and fertilizing, was often done multiple times throughout a project. " It' s

just a constant maintenance item, seed and fertilizing, as you disturb grass you' ve

got to replant, replant, replant."

  This issue is raised in Boone' s sixth assignment of error.

                                                19
        Boone again included " seed and fertilize" as a line item on its request for

payment no. 12, dated July 7, 2014, listed as an amount incurred and included in its
total due to date. On August 6, 2014, Ferris emailed Clark Homes with a summation

of the payment discrepancies with Boone, particularly concerning Boone' s request

for payment no. 12. Ferris noted that " seed and fertilize" was included as a line item

charge on request for payment no. 12, but that Clark Homes deducted this item from

Boone' s work, because Clark Homes maintained that it performed the work, not

Boone. This resulted in a difference of $3, 486.00.

          In an email on August 15, 2014 concerning the payment discrepancies, Mr.

Boone stated that Mr. Clark agreed that Boone would be paid for the " seeding item

 because]      we dressed the pond banks up several times for him."                Mr. Clark was

shown this email at trial and identified his initials written on Mr. Boone' s August

15, 2014 email. Mr. Clark was asked, " And isn' t it correct that when you executed

this and signed your initials you were agreeing that Boone would be paid for the

seeding and fertilizing?" He responded, " Yes."             Clark Homes offered no evidence

to establish that Boone did not perform the work and was not owed the full contract

amount for this line item.

          Neither the judgment nor the trial court' s written reasons address Boone' s

demand for payment for the seed and fertilize line item.                  Instead, the judgment

dismisses Boone' s remaining claims with prejudice."                    Generally, silence in a

16 We note that the judgment lacks clarity concerning which claims by Boone were dismissed. The
judgment awards Boone $21, 005. 84 against Clark Homes, finds that Clark Homes is entitled to an
offset in the amount of $90,000. 00, then overrules Boone' s evidentiary objection. Following this,
the judgment states, " IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that all claims of the Plaintiff, Boone Services, [ LLC], be dismissed with prejudice, at Plaintiff' s
costs." (   Emphasis original.)   It is evident from the record that this paragraph was intended to
 dismiss the remaining claims asserted by Boone, which were not otherwise addressed in the
preceding paragraphs set forth in the judgment. However, we decline to amend this portion of the
judgment, under the authority provided by La. C. C. P. art. 2164, because, for reasons discussed in
this opinion, we reverse the dismissal of Boone' s claims for payment for the seed and fertilize line
item, for interest on late payments made on requests for payment nos. 1 through 6, and for interest
on all sums found to be due, and render judgment in favor of Boone on these claims. We affirm
the dismissal of Boone' s claim for interest in connection with requests for payment nos. 7, 10, 11,
and 12.

                                                  20
judgment of the trial court as to any issue, claim, or demand placed before the court

is deemed a rejection of the claim and the relief sought is presumed to be denied.

See Unisys Corporation v. Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles Through Hodges,

2018- 0556 ( La. App. 1st. Cir. 12128118), 270 So. 3d 637, 654.                 On appeal, Boone

argues that the trial court erred by failing to award payment of $3, 486. 00 for the seed

and fertilize line item. Clark Homes did not address this assignment of error in its

appellee brief.

       After reviewing the evidence, which establishes that Boone performed the

work and Mr. Clark acknowledged that Boone was to be paid for this line item, we

find a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the trial court' s finding that Boone

is not entitled to payment for the seed and fertilize line item and the trial court' s

finding to the contrary is manifestly erroneous.                 See Stobart v. State through

Department of Transportation &             Development., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993).

Therefore, we find that Boone is entitled to an award of $3, 486. 00, plus 12% interest

from the date payment was due 17 See La. C. C. art. 2000. The evidence reflects that

Ferris approved this portion of Boone' s request for payment no. 11 on February 24,

2014, making payment due 10 days later, on March 6, 2014. See Article 80 of the

general conditions of the contract, set forth below.

Interest on Late Payments and Sums Awarded'

       Article 80 of the general conditions of the contract states,

       A.  Should the Owner fail to pay an approved Request for Payment
       within ten ( 10) days from the date of approval by the Engineer or should
       he fail to inform the Engineer and the Contractor in writing of his
       reasons for withholding payment, the Owner shall pay the Contractor
       interest on the amount of the request for payment at the rate of twelve
         12%) percent per annum until payment is made.

17 Boone seeks an award of interest on the sums owed to it "being sought through this lawsuit" in
assignment of error no. 7.

 g This issue is raised in Boone' s seventh assignment of error. Although Boone' s petition does
not clearly set forth a claim for interest on late payments, the parties expanded the pleadings
pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 1154, which pertinently states, " When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised by the pleading."

                                                  21
       Boone asserts that Clark Homes failed to pay requests for payment nos. 1

through 7 and nos. 10 and 11 within 10 days from the date of approval by Ferris and

also failed to inform Ferris and Boone in writing of the reasons for withholding full

payment on requests for payment nos. 10, 11, and 12. Thus, Boone seeks an award

of 12% interest on the late payments from the date Ferris approved the requests until

each was paid.

       Again, neither the judgment nor the trial court' s written reasons address

Boone' s demand for contractual interest. Therefore, this silence is deemed a denial

of the claim. See Unisys Corporation, 270 So3d at 654.

       Interest on Requests for Payment Nos. 1 through 7

       Clark Homes maintains that Boone failed to prove when payment was made

on requests for payment nos. 1 through 7 and, therefore, is not entitled to interest.

However, Boone introduced Exhibit 4, which includes a chart or summation of all

billings made and specifies the date each request for payment was submitted, the

date each was approved by Ferris, and the date payment was received. Clark Homes

offered no evidence to contradict this.

       Pertinently, Exhibit 4 sets forth the following:

       Request for payment no. 1 in the amount of $83, 569.31               was approved by

Ferris on February 27, 2013, and submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 12 days later, on March 11, 2013.               Thus, payment was 2

days late. Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount

of $27.59 per day, for a total of $55. 18, due to CIark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 1 within the contractually agreed upon time. 19

19 The contract provides a 12% per annum interest rate, which calculates to a rate of .000329 per
day (. 121365 = . 000329). To determine the interest due on each request for payment, the daily
interest rate was multiplied by the total amount owed, which calculated the amount of interest
owed per day. This figure was multiplied by the number of days the payment was late.

                                               22
        Request for payment no. 2 in the amount of $254, 583. 55 was approved by

Ferris on March 26, 2013, and submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 20 days later, on April 15, 2013. Thus, payment was 10

days late. Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount

of $83. 76 per day, for a total of $837. 60, due to Clark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 2 within the contractually agreed upon time.

        Request for payment no. 3 in the amount of $302, 313. 05 was approved by

Ferris on May 2, 2013, and was submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 15 days later, on May 17, 2013. Thus, payment was 5 days

late.   Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount of

 99. 46 per day, for a total of $497. 30, due to Clark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 3 within the contractually agreed upon time.

        Request for payment no. 4 in the amount of $350,380. 55 was approved by

Ferris on June 3, 2013, and was submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 17 days later, on June 20, 2013. Thus, payment was 7 days

late.   Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount of

  115. 28 per day, for a total of $806. 96, due to Clark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 4 within the contractually agreed upon time.

        Request for payment no. 5 in the amount of $87, 314. 71       was approved by

Ferris on June 26, 2013, and was submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 19 days later, on July 15, 2013. Thus, payment was 9 days

late. Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount of

 28. 73 per day, for a total of $258. 57, due to Clark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 5 within the contractually agreed upon time.

        Request for payment no. 6 in the amount of $55, 281. 59 was approved by

Ferris on July 29, 2013, and was submitted by Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.

Boone received payment 18 days later, on August 16, 2013.         Thus, payment was 8

                                           23
days late. Boone established that it is entitled to an award of interest in the amount

of $18. 19 per day, for a total of $145. 52, due to Clark Homes' s failure to pay request

for payment no. 6 within the contractually agreed upon time.

         Request for payment no. 7 in the amount of $32, 328. 93 was approved by

Ferris in the amount of $30, 654. 13 on September 30, 2013, and was submitted by
                                               2'
Ferris to Clark Homes the same day.                 Boone received payment 10 days later, on

October 10, 2013. Thus, payment was not late, and no interest is owed.

         Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1921 provides that "[ t] he court shall

award interest in the judgment as prayed for or as provided by law."             Since the word

 shall"
           is mandatory, courts lack discretion to deny interest if interest is prayed for

or provided for by law. Unisys Corporation, 270 So. 3d at 654. Pursuant to La. C. C.

art. 2000, when the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages for delay

in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from the time it is due, at

the rate agreed by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, at the rate of legal

interest as fixed by La. R.S. 9: 3500. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to

award interest to Boone on all delinquent payments. We find that Boone is entitled

to a total of $2, 601. 13 in interest for late payments made on requests for payment

nos. 1 through 6.

          Interest on Requests for Pa ment No. 10

          Boone' s initial request for payment no.              10 was approved by Ferris on

December 19, 2013 and included a request for payment of retainage in the amount

of $108, 568. 34.    Boone revised request for payment no. 10 on December 25, 2013

to request a retainage payment of $72, 423. 96.                There is no evidence that Ferris

specifically approved the revised request. Additionally, it appears that Clark Homes

was first notified of the revised amount requested on January 23, 2014. Boone was

paid $    50, 000 on January 24, 2014 as a partial retainage payment.              There is no

21 Ferris did not approve $ 1, 674. 80 of this request, which is not at issue.

                                                    24
evidence of when or if Boone received payment of the remainder of the retainage.

For these reasons, Boone failed to establish that Article 80 applies to revised request

for payment no. 10.

      Interest on Requests for Payment No. 11

      We have already determined that Boone is entitled to interest on the seed and

fertilize line item on request for payment no. 11.     As noted, this request included

costs for the additional excavation, which Ferris did not approve for payment.

Additionally, by February 24, 2014, when Ferris approved a portion of this request,

Mr. Clark had provided written notice of his disagreement concerning the additional

excavation work.    We find Article 80 does not apply.

      Interest on Requests for Payment No. 12

      Finally, as Clark Homes points out, Ferris never approved Boone' s request for

payment no. 12.    Article 80 does not apply to this request for payment.

      Interest on Sums Awarded

      Boone also argues that it is entitled to an award of interest on any amount

awarded in this litigation. The trial court awarded $ 21, 005. 84 to Boone for 7, 838

additional cubic yards of dirt excavated from the ponds ( at $ 2. 68 per cubic yard),

but did not award interest on this sum. This was legal error. See La. C. C. P. 1921;

La. C. C. art. 2000; Unisys Corporation, 270 So. 3d at 654.

       During trial, Mr. Boone testified that Boone sought 12% interest on the full

amount of its demand from July 17, 2014, the date Ferris emailed the parties with a

proposed resolution concerning delay days and the additional pond excavation.

Therefore, this is the date Boone maintains that payment became due. We find that

Boone is entitled to interest on the award of $21, 005. 84 from July 17, 2014.     We

further find that Article 80, which provides 12%    per annum interest, does not apply

to this award, which falls outside the scope of its provisions.          Therefore, the

applicable interest rate is fixed by La. R. S. 9: 3500. See La. C. C. art. 2000.

                                           25
                                      DECREE

      We amend the trial court' s July 18, 2022 judgment to identify Boone Services,

LLC, rather than Boone Services, Inc., as the proper party plaintiff.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence offered. by

Clark Homes, Inc. to support its affirmative defense of liquidated damages.

      We find no manifest error in the trial court' s factual findings concerning the

price per cubic yard, quantity of dirt, and contract days for the additional pond

excavation performed by Boone Services, LLC. Therefore, we affirm the portion of

the trial court' s July 18, 2022 judgment, which enters judgment in favor of Boone

Services, LLC and against Clark Homes, Inc. in the amount of $21, 005. 84.

However, we find the trial court erred by failing to award interest to Boone Services,

LLC on this sum. Therefore, we amend this portion of the trial court' s July 18, 2022

judgment and render judgment favor of Boone Services, LLC and against Clark

Homes, Inc. to award legal interest to Boone Services, LLC on the sum of

 21, 005. 84 from July 17, 2014 at the rate fixed by La. R.S. 9: 3500.

      The trial court manifestly erred by determining that Boone was not entitled to

payment for the seed and fertilize line item.    We reverse the portion of the trial

court' s July 18, 2022 judgment that denied relief and dismissed this claim by Boone

Services, LLC, with prejudice.     We render judgment in favor of Boone Services,

LLC and against Clark Homes, Inc. in the amount of $3, 486. 00, plus 12% interest

from March 6, 2014, the date payment was due.

      The trial court erred by failing to award interest to Boone Services, LLC on

late payments made on requests for payments nos. 1 through 6, as provided by the

contract.   Therefore,   we reverse this portion of the trial court' s July 18, 2022

judgment and render judgment favor of Boone Services, LLC and against Clark

Homes, Inc. to award interest to Boone Services, LLC in the amount of $2, 601. 10.

                                          26
We affirm the trial court' s dismissal of Boone' s claim for interest related to requests

for payment nos. 7, 10, 11, and 12.

      We find the trial court erred by awarding 300 additional contract days to Clark

Homes, Inc. and by awarding $ 90, 000. 00 in liquidated damages as compensation

pursuant to La. C. C. art. 1893 in favor of Clark Homes, Inc.      We find that Boone

Services, LLC exceeded the contract time by 88 days.         Therefore, we amend this

portion of the trial court' s July 18, 2022 judgment and render judgment in favor of

Clark Homes, Inc. and against Boone Services, LLC in the amount of $26, 400. 00 as

compensation pursuant to La. C. C.P. art. 1893.

      Costs of this appeal shall be divided equally between the parties.

      JUDGMENT AMENDED. AS AMENDED, JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

                                           27