Court Opinion

ID: 9859772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:36:26.76852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:22.848886
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COUSINS dissenting: I dissent. The trial judge’s ruling should not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 144, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). The facts in the instant case, inter alia, establish that the mother and uncle were in the presence of the minor before the minor was questioned, the youth officer was present with the minor during questioning, and the minor never requested to see his mother after being taken to the police station even though he was aware of her arrival there with him. Moreover, respondent was given his Miranda warnings on several occasions prior to questioning, and the police fully complied with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/3 — 8 (West 1994)). In addition, respondent had two previous experiences with the criminal justice system: a charge for possession and a station house adjustment for battery just a few weeks before the incident. See People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 479, 660 N.E.2d 951 (1995) (familiarity with criminal system lessens coercive possibilities); People v. Denton, 256 Ill. App. 3d 403, 406, 628 N.E.2d 900 (1993). Thus, under the totality of circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the trial court. The precedents on this issue strongly support the trial court’s decision, as we have upheld a trial court’s determination on voluntariness under weaker total circumstances than the instant matter. In the following cases, parents were not even informed when their minor was taken into custody, in violation of the Juvenile Court Act: People v. Muhummad, 257 Ill. App. 3d 359, 629 N.E.2d 106 (1993) (defendant questioned for six hours at night); People v. Lash, 252 Ill. App. 3d 239, 624 N.E.2d 1129 (1993); People v. Williams, 275 Ill. App. 3d 249, 256, 655 N.E.2d 1071 (1995); Denton, 256 Ill. App. 3d 403. In Williams, no youth officers arrived until 4:15 a.m., and the minor had already gone through seven hours of custody and two interrogations. In Denton, no youth officers were present when questioning began. Denton, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 404. Although police refused to let Brenda see her son during questioning, the Juvenile Court Act does not require this latitude, and this court and others have upheld several confessions where police have directly refused to allow a parent to see his or her child. See In re D.C., 244 Ill. App. 3d 55, 613 N.E.2d 1139 (1992); People v. Bobe, 227 Ill. App. 3d 681, 592 N.E.2d 301 (1992); People v. Pace, 225 Ill. App. 3d 415, 587 N.E.2d 1257 (1992). In contrast, no case has ever found a confessions coerced when a youth officer has been present for questioning after a valid arrest and proper Miranda warnings, and there are additional factors cited above that also favor the voluntariness of the confession. The majority is correct that the presence of a youth officer does not make a minor’s confession voluntary per se, but the majority has not and cannot cite supporting authority under the circumstances in this matter. The majority makes four crucial errors in analyzing the circumstances present in this case. First, the majority repeatedly emphasizes the coercive nature of the police arrival at Mr. Hudson’s house. Brenda and Mr. Hudson testified that the police had their guns drawn as they entered, but both also testified that respondent was asleep and that the police woke him up. The majority opinion correctly describes the testimony, yet concludes its analysis by asserting that respondent was taken at gunpoint. However, there was no testimony that police ever aimed a weapon at respondent; and any actions by police while respondent was asleep are immaterial to the voluntariness of his confession. Second, the majority claims that respondent did not have an opportunity to confer with either his mother or uncle even though he sat next to them on his car ride between police stations. The majority’s first rationale is that they could not confer because no interrogation was occurring at the same time. This court rejected that argument in People v. Brown, 235 Ill. App. 3d 479, 491, 601 N.E.2d 1190 (1992), where, as in this matter, the minor’s mother knew that police would be questioning her son. See also In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1013, 431 N.E.2d 759 (1982) (confession voluntary when minor sat next to father in police station before questioning). The majority’s other rationale is that any conversation would not have been private from the police or Terrell Wyatt. Nevertheless, the majority provides no authority for its claim that absolute privacy is required, and the court in S.D.S. did not consider privacy in its conclusion that the minor could confer at the police station while his father sat next to him. See S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. Third, the majority contends that respondent’s previous police interrogations for crimes of possession and battery would not give him an "understanding of how to conduct himself’ during interrogation in a murder case, and, thus, his previous police experiences did not lessen the coercive nature of the questioning at issue. However, the majority provides no authority to support its assertion, and no basis exists for the claim that previous police experience must be crime-specific in order to render familiarity with the criminal system and lessen coerciveness. See Denton, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 406 (minor’s previous dealings with police supported voluntariness of murder confession). Fourth, the majority contends that respondent’s learning disabilities left him particularly vulnerable. Although respondent’s reading and writing skills are weak, his math and communication skills are within normal limits for his age. Respondent’s intelligence and communication skills are the relevant issues for a knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver, and there is almost no evidence that respondent lacked these skills as compared with other 14-year-olds. Respondent could fully comprehend the oral Miranda warnings, and his reading skills are irrelevant to a determination of voluntariness. The only two relevant factors that the majority has properly included are the night interrogation and Brenda’s absence from questioning. Analyzing the former, interrogations at night do not necessarily make an atmosphere coercive. See People v. Anderson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 657 N.E.2d 57 (1995) (minor at station entire night); People v. M.S., 247 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 618 N.E.2d 623 (1993) (fact that minor slept while at police station indicates that environment may not have been frightening and coercive). The interviewing detectives stated that respondent was coherent and alert while questioning took place, and the degree that night interrogation could have affected an individual is best weighed by the trier of fact. People v. Bounds, 111 Ill. 2d 1, 33, 662 N.E.2d 1168 (1995) (eight hours not unreasonably long). The court could have properly found that the brief night questioning in this case was not unduly traumatic. Lastly, the majority cites the officers’ refusal to allow Brenda’s request to see respondent. Although it is preferable to have parents present during questioning (People v. Johnson, 236 Ill. App. 3d 125, 132 (1992)), their presence is only one factor to consider under the totality of circumstances test. Williams, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 256; People v. Hernandez, 267 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 (1994). As opposed to this single factor, the police allowed respondent a chance to confer with his mother and uncle before questioning, fully complied with the Juvenile Court Act, repeatedly gave Miranda warnings that respondent — who had experience with the justice system — acknowledged he understood, never lied to respondent, always had a youth officer present for questioning, allowed respondent food and drinks, and conducted two interviews which together lasted less than 45 minutes. The majority relies heavily on People v. Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d 844, 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995). However, in Montanez, a youth officer was not present when questioning began. We stated in Montanez: %t[W]here the State failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that a juvenile defendant had an opportunity to confer with an interested adult, either a parent or a youth officer, this court has held that the police conduct rendered his confession inadmissible.” (Emphasis in original.) Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 854. The parental restrictions in this case are no more severe than in D.C., Bobe, or Pace, all of which allowed the minor’s statements because a youth officer was present. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Brenda’s absence did not foster a coercive atmosphere under the totality of circumstances in this matter, and, thus, the court’s determination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I dissent.