Court Opinion

ID: 9849212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:15.609994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:07.977394
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J.
I concur fully in the Chief Justice’s opinion. The court’s telling
the jury that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers,” *521although error, clearly had no “ ‘effect on the judgment.’ ” {Johnson v. United States (1997) 520 U.S. 461, 470 [117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550, 137 L.Ed.2d 718].) That those two witnesses were peace officers was an easily verifiable, objective fact the defense did not and, no doubt, could not contest. The error did not “ ‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that effect.” {Ibid.)
I write to emphasize a narrow basis for finding the error harmless. In Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 [113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182], the high court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, found error in defining reasonable doubt reversible per se because the error infected the entire verdict. There was “no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” as to any fact. {Id. at p. 280 [113 S.Ct. at p. 2082].) Accordingly, there was “no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate.” {Ibid., original italics.) Here, by contrast, the error affected only a tiny part of the verdict. The jury made most of the factual findings its guilty verdict implies beyond a reasonable doubt. There is an “object” upon which harmless error scrutiny can operate: the actual verdict.
Justice Scalia recently summarized his position: “The error in the present case can be harmless only [1] if the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces this one or [2] if it is impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find without finding this point as well.” {California v. Roy (1996) 519 U.S. 2, 7 [117 S.Ct. 337, 339-340, 136 L.Ed.2d 266] (cone, opn. of Scalia, J.), original italics.) This formulation suggests two separate tests. In this case, it appears that the jury verdict on other points does not “effectively embrace[]” the one removed from the jury. But, applying the second test, it is impossible, “upon the evidence,” for the jury to find what it did find beyond a reasonable doubt without also finding the removed fact as well. The verdict shows the jury rejected the defense position on every contested point beyond a reasonable doubt. This jury believed the critical witnesses’ testimony, even those portions the defense challenged. This jury could not possibly find what it actually did find without also finding the unchallenged missing element.
Sullivan is consistent with this view. The question, it says, “is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” {Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 279 [113 S.Ct. at p. 2081].) “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely *522unattributable to the error.” (Ibid., original italics.) Here, we can examine what this actual jury actually did to assure ourselves the error did not contribute to its verdict. “[T]he jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error.” (Id. at p. 280 [113 S.Ct. at p. 2082], original italics.)
Finding the error harmless on this basis is not “speculating” on what a “reasonable” or “hypothetical” jury might have done, but is instead analyzing what this actual jury actually did. (Cf. dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, at p. 528; dis. opn., of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 556-557, fn. 3.) dissent.