Court Opinion

ID: 9494550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:40:05.693593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:28.011121
License: Public Domain

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Throughout most of Pennsylvania’s counties, the county commissioners constitute both the executive and the legislative branch of government, “generally regulating the affairs of the county.” 16 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 509(a) (1955).1 As such, the commissioners are the chief political and governmental authorities, exercising all the corporate powers of the county. Id. § 512. With respect to county affairs, commissioners have long been vested with vast discretionary powers. Kistler v. Carbon County, 154 Pa.Super. 299, 35 A.2d 733, 739 (1944).
Despite their many governmental duties, Beaver County Commissioners employ only one secretary apiece. Because of the manifold demands placed on County Commissioner Bea Schulte, her secretary, Dolores Armour, performed many tasks requiring confidentiality and high levels of responsibility. With significant political and administrative duties, Armour functioned as more than a clerical secretary. Armour was an integral component of the commissioner’s office, helping Schulte to serve her constituents effectively.
In Elrod v. Burns, the Supreme Court held a political employee who “acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals” may be dismissed because of her political beliefs without violating the First Amendment. 427 U.S. 347, 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The Court also noted that “[n]o clear line can be drawn between policy-*435making and nonpolicymaking positions” and that “[t]he nature of the[employee’s] responsibilities is critical.” Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. Four years later, in Branti v. Finkel, the Supreme Court stated the ultimate “question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the performance of the public office involved,” taking into account the “vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.” 445 U.S. 507, 517-18, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980).
Recent cases have clarified how courts should determine whether the dismissal of political-patronage employees, like Dolores Armour, pass constitutional muster. This “functional analysis” may turn, for example, on whether a difference in political affiliation between employer and employee will be “highly likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out” the official’s duties. Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 (3d Cir.1981) (finding city solicitors’ party affiliations relevant to the performance of their responsibilities). If so, the employee’s dismissal does not violate the First Amendment.2 Of course, as the District Court here observed, “the constitutional limitations on political patronage extend to intraparty political disputes as well as interparty political disputes.” Opinion at 419 (citing Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596, 601-02 (3d Cir.1995)).
As the majority acknowledges, “access to confidential information may support a political-affiliation job requirement even in the absence of a decision-making function.” Supra at 432 (citing Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633, 638-39 (3d Cir.1991)). Given the sensitive correspondence, resolutions, telephone messages, and partisan material arriving in the commissioner’s office each day, Commissioner Schulte needed a loyal lieutenant. If Armour’s political loyalties diverged from her employer’s, it would appear that she should not be constitutionally protected against dismissal from her confidential post.
The majority properly refuses to “over-rel[y]” on Armour’s access to confidential information. But the testimony unmistakably demonstrated more than Armour’s access to confidential information. It also proved that Armour performed administrative and political tasks requiring discretion and judgment. Armour served as Schulte’s private secretary and administrative assistant from January 1996 through February 1999. During that period, she attended meetings of the Aliquippa Family Preservation Network on Schulte’s behalf, sometimes voting her proxy. Whenever possible, Armour answered constituents’ requests herself. Armour also attended political functions and fundraisers with Schulte, testifying these events were designed “to get [Schulte’s] name out.” Furthermore, Armour acted as the liaison between Schulte and department heads. Admitting that her duties required political acumen, Armour testified “[t]he high level of confidentiality and responsibility reaches far beyond the desk, often into our personal lives.” Armour also conceded that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for her position and that she would never have been hired had she not actively supported Schulte’s 1996 *436successful campaign for office.3 As the District Court noted:
Each time [Armour] responded to a concern of a constituent, she was representing Schulte in a political nature. It is likely that Democratic constituents who seek redress from their Democratic commissioner, or simply express concerns of a political nature, expect that the commissioner’s secretary shares their political ideology. In other words, Democratic constituents should find comfort in expressing their concerns to the commissioner’s secretary, whom the voters felt would express or relay the issues accurately and compassionately to the commissioner.
Opinion at 424-425.
In addition to this evidence, the District Court considered testimony from others regarding the role of commissioners’ secretaries. Beaver County Commissioner Dan Donatella declared his secretary “operates as his eyes and ears, both politically and otherwise.” Jo Johnson, secretary to Beaver County Commissioner Nancy Loxley, testified her position required political loyalty because Loxley discussed in confidence political as well as party issues. Both Johnson and Joan Clarke, secretary to Commissioner Donatella, described their jobs as “political.” Clarke testified that she represented Commissioner Dona-tella “when I am anywhere politically.”
In light of their duties, the Beaver County Commissioners’ secretaries functioned as political and governmental assistants. Cf. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 100 S.Ct. 1287. Other Courts of Appeals have repeatedly concluded policymakers’ assistants’ jobs are not protected by the First Amendment.4 The District Court correctly reached the same result in this case.
Armour’s duties were constitutionally indistinguishable from those of a mayor’s secretary. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, “Viewed in its functional aspect, a mayor’s secretary is clearly the type of position that involves access to confidential and political material, and political loyalty ... is an essential attribute of the job.” Faughender, 927 F.2d at 914. It is difficult to imagine that the Mayor of Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, or the President of their City Councils, would be unable to employ a secretary who was not politically loyal.5 County commissioners in *437Fourth Class counties, representing the executive and legislative branches of government, must have at least as much right as mayors to employ secretaries who further the commissioners’ political and governmental agendas.
Nevertheless, the majority finds summary judgment inappropriate because of conflicting evidence whether a commissioner’s secretary is “clerical” in nature. Supra at 432. As we noted in Zold, “When the issue on appeal turns on a constitutional fact ... appellate courts have the obligation to give such facts special scrutiny.... An appellate court in such instances may draw its own inference from facts in the record.” 935 F.2d at 636. I see no outstanding issues that require factual resolution. That the District Court must apply a functional, case-specific test does not render summary judgment inapplicable. We have previously declared summary judgment appropriate in political-dismissal cases, depending, of course, on the facts. Boyle, 139 F.3d at 397; Ness, 660 F.2d at 522. This is such a case.
Applying the same test as the District Court, I find no “genuine issue of material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), after affording the non-moving party all “reasonable inferences,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Nor do I find “reasonable” an inference that Armour’s duties were primarily clerical. An officeholder’s “clerical” employees do not vote her proxies, resolve constituents’ requests, or have access to the office’s most sensitive and confidential political and governmental information, as did Armour. The District Court held, “In essence, plaintiff was a conduit between the Democratic constituents and Commissioner Schulte, their elected representative.” Opinion at 425.
The majority frames the issue as whether summary judgment was appropriate, given Armour was a “nonpolicymaking, secretary-clerk serving in roughly equal parts an elective county executive (County Commissioner) and a non-elective county administrator (Chief Clerk).” Supra at 429. I do not read the court’s opinion as an attempt to segregate Armour’s duties between the “political” and the “nonpolitical.” Of course, were that the standard, “political” employees in state or municipal government would be virtually nonexistent. Necessity demands the staffs of elected officials perform several tasks— governmental, political, administrative, and clerical. Clerical duties, even if they are “roughly equal” to more specialized obligations, do not render those employees “nonpolitical.”
The District Court found that an “absence of political cohesion” between Armour and Schulte would potentially damage the commissioner’s work, rendering Arm-’ our an employee subject to dismissal on political grounds. Opinion at 425, quoted supra at 426-427. Having reviewed the record, I would agree.6
*438Because I would affirm the judgment of the District Court, I respectfully dissent.

. This is true in counties of the Third to Eighth Classes, comprising sixty-two of Pennsylvania's sixty-seven counties. Philadelphia is Pennsylvania's only First Class county, with more than 1,500,000 inhabitants (1,585,577 in the last census). Allegheny is a Second Class county, with a population between 800,-000 and 1,500,000 inhabitants (1,336,449). There are three Second Class A counties, with populations ranging from 500,000 to 800,000 inhabitants: Montgomery (678,111), Delaware (547,651), and Bucks (541,174). Beaver is a Fourth Class county, with a population between 150,000 and 225,000 inhabitants (186,093). In counties from the Third to Eighth Classes, excepting home-rule counties, the executive and legislative officers are the county commissioners.

. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir.1998); Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 384 (3d Cir.1998); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir.1993). A similar test was employed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a case the majority cites for support of a "categorical rule,” Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir.1991). Faughender was also an appeal from summary judgment.

. Armour became involved in Schulte's campaign for county commissioner when Schulte’s husband, a Pennsylvania district justice, asked Armour to assist his wife. Armour testified she did "[wjhatever was asked” in the campaign, including attending organizational meetings and functions, driving Schulte to the polling places, and posting Schulte’s signs throughout the county. After Schulte’s election, the commissioner-elect asked Armour to serve as her secretary, which Armour immediately accepted. Armour began working the day Schulte took her oath of office.

. E.g., Baker v. Hadley, 167 F.3d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding dismissal of employees in county auditor’s office where the auditor intended the positions to be "confidential, policymaking jobs for which political affiliation was an appropriate requirement”); Soderstrum v. Town of Grand Isle, 925 F.2d 135, 140-41 (5th Cir.1991) (finding a police chief’s secretary was a "confidential employee,” based in part on a "realistic understanding of the confidential relationship between secretaries and their bosses”); Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1988) (noting political affiliation is "an appropriate requirement when there is a rational connection between shared ideology and job performance”); Santiago-Correa v. Hernandez-Colon, 835 F.2d 395, 397 (1st Cir.1987) (observing political officials may fire " 'confidential’ employees, like personal secretaries” because of "political affiliation”).

.As noted in Faughender, “A mayor’s secretary must undertake those functions in relation to the flow of information, whether by writing, speech, or personal visit, to and from the mayor’s office, that the mayor wants the *437secretary to perform. A particular secretary’s duties may be circumscribed, but the function of the office is constant.” 927 F.2d at 913-14.

. I would also affirm the District Court’s alternative holding — that Armour did not demonstrate her support of Joseph Askar for a local judgeship was a “substantial or motivating factor” in her termination. Opinion at 425-426. The evidence demonstrated Schulte only questioned Armour once about her involvement with Askar, and Armour denied any "direct” involvement with Askar's campaign. With no other evidentiary support, Armour did not meet her burden of proving that her political affiliations led to her dismissal.