Court Opinion

ID: 9453061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:01:10.931776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:54.018651
License: Public Domain

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                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12661
                           ____________________

        CAJULE CEDANT,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                        D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-24877
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                21-12661

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
                Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) outlines two types
        of pretrial disclosures for expert witnesses—one lengthy and one
        more sparing. Without guidance from this Court, district judges
        have split on when these witnesses must complete more detailed
        Rule 26(a)(2)(B) written reports instead of the less onerous Rule
        26(a)(2)(C) disclosures. Here, the district court said that any expert
        testifying about causation had to follow Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
               That was incorrect. According to the Rule’s text, what
        matters is when and why an expert witness came to the case, not
        the content of his testimony. Experts who are “retained or
        specially employed to provide expert testimony” prepare extensive
        Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports, while others can submit a Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
        disclosure. And whether an expert was “retained” hinges on how
        she formed her relationship with the party she will testify for—not
        on the content of the testimony. Here, because Cajule Cedant’s
        doctors were initially hired to treat him rather than to testify, he
        only needed to file the less burdensome disclosures.
               But these baselines are subject to change, because Rule
        26(a)(2) also empowers district courts and parties to adjust the
        default rules. While the court could have exercised this discretion
        and decided that experts testifying about certain topics needed to
        file written reports, its ruling below was framed as a mandatory
        application of the Federal Rules.
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        21-12661                Opinion of the Court                           3

               For that reason, we vacate the order excluding Cedant’s
        experts. On remand, the district court may evaluate his filings
        under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) as written. Or it may modify those
        requirements by issuing a new order requesting Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
        reports for causation witnesses. If so, that decision will be an
        exercise of the discretion built into Rule 26(a)(2) to adjust its default
        requirements, which are defined by the relationship between a
        party and its expert witnesses.
                                           I.

               Cedant sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
        Act, seeking to recover for damages he allegedly suﬀered in an
        accident with a U.S. Postal Service truck. Identifying “an analogous
        state tort cause of action is required for an FTCA cause of action.”
        Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015). Florida
        law applies here, and in negligence cases like this one it requires the
        usual showing of duty, breach, causation, and harm. See Williams
        v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2007).
               The focus in pretrial litigation was on that third element,
        causation. Though Cedant incurred post-crash medical expenses
        for the treatment of various non-visible injuries, the United States
        insisted that his pain and other medical problems predated the
        accident. To meet his burden to show that the crash caused his
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                  21-12661

        injuries, Cedant planned to rely on expert testimony from several
        doctors who treated him after the crash. 1
                The district court’s initial scheduling order set a deadline for
        the parties “to exchange expert witness summaries/reports
        pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2),” and
        communicated substantive instructions governing the exchange of
        those expert materials. Those instructions included a requirement
        that “treating physicians offering opinions beyond those arising
        from treatment” must file a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report. In support, the
        order cited Muzaffarr v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., an unpublished
        district court opinion asserting that “opinions on causation”
        categorically require Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports. Muzaffarr v. Ross
        Dress for Less, Inc., No. 12-61996-Civ, 2013 WL 3850848, at *1 (S.D.
        Fla. July 26, 2013).
                Cedant responded with what he called a “Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
        Disclosure.” The filing included a disclaimer that no witness had
        been “retained” or acquired expert knowledge for “the purpose of
        litigation”; instead, each had formed “expert opinions as to the
        cause of injury” in “the course of treating their patient.” The
        disclosure was signed by Cedant’s counsel, and was accompanied
        by a set of short letters prepared and signed by two of Cedant’s
        doctors briefly outlining their opinions.

        1 Both sides agreed that Florida law required expert testimony to show that

        the crash caused his injuries.
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        21-12661              Opinion of the Court                        5

               When the government suggested in an email exchange that
        Cedant had not complied with all of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s
        requirements, he moved to extend the filing deadline because his
        treating physicians needed “additional time to complete their Rule
        26(a)(2)(B) reports.” The district court denied the motion, but
        Cedant still submitted an out-of-time “Amended Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
        Disclosure,” which clarified that none of his expert witnesses
        maintained a list of their prior testimony.
                The government moved for summary judgment, invoking
        Rule 37. That Rule bars, among other things, testimony from
        expert witnesses who failed to comply with their Rule 26 pretrial
        disclosure requirements unless that failure was “substantially
        justified” or “harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The government
        argued that Cedant’s reports were untimely, and that because they
        did not comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) in any event, he had offered
        no evidence to prove that the crash caused his injuries. And
        without evidence of causation, the government said, he could not
        prove negligence. Cedant responded that he had submitted Rule
        26(a)(2)(B) reports merely out of “an abundance of caution,” and
        could not “be forced to file” any such report because his physicians
        were “non-retained experts” who treated him after the accident.
        He also moved for partial summary judgment on “liability.”
                Rather than granting summary judgment to either side, the
        district court instructed the parties to “suggest necessary
        alterations to the Court’s scheduling order”—potentially giving
        Cedant another chance to submit timely reports. But after the
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-12661

        parties failed (for whatever reason) to offer any suggestion, the
        court issued a revised order with a new deadline for expert witness
        reports.
               When the new due date arrived, Cedant submitted the same
        reports as before (with the same disclaimer about non-retained
        witnesses). He also filed separate Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures for
        his experts “in the alternative.” The government again moved for
        summary judgment, contending that the written reports remained
        inadequate under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and that the alternative
        disclosures likewise failed to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s
        requirements. Cedant responded by claiming that he had
        submitted redundant disclosures “in an abundance of caution,” and
        that his filings complied with all the disclosure requirements of
        Rule 26(a)(2)(C).
               This time, the district court granted the government’s
        motion for summary judgment. Both the “Court’s orders and
        Florida law are clear,” it said, that “to prove causation, prognosis,
        and/or future implications of the injury, the Plaintiff must satisfy
        Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s requirements.” The district court held that none
        of Cedant’s filings satisfied those requirements, and conducted no
        analysis on whether they satisfied Rule 26(a)(2)(C). Based on its
        view that the reports were inadequate, the court excluded Cedant’s
        experts under Rule 37(c)(1)—which left him with no admissible
        evidence that the accident caused his injuries. Cedant now appeals
        that decision, as well as the denial of his earlier summary judgment
        motion.
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        21-12661               Opinion of the Court                         7

                                         II.

               Our review of the district court’s decision to grant summary
        judgment is de novo, as is our review of the district court’s
        interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Peppers v.
        Cobb Cnty., 835 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2016); Pickett v. Iowa Beef
        Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment stands or falls with the
        propriety of excluding Cedant’s experts under Rule 37(c)(1), a
        decision we review for abuse of discretion. See Prieto v. Malgor, 361
        F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2004).
                                         III.

              This appeal requires us to explain a few things before
        turning to the specifics of Cedant’s case: the baseline requirements
        of Rule 26(a)(2); when those requirements apply by default; and
        how courts and parties can modify them.
               The bottom line is that Rule 26(a)(2) provides default rules
        governing expert witnesses’ pretrial disclosures. These rules place
        a greater burden on retained experts (who initially got involved in
        the suit to testify) than they do on non-retained experts (who have
        some independent connection to the facts underlying the suit).
        And they focus “exclusively on whether the expert was retained,
        not the nature of the activity that the expert engaged in to form
        conclusions” or the ultimate subject matter of the testimony.
        David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence § 4.2.2(b)
        (3d ed. 2021). But the defaults are just that—defaults. Rule 26(a)(2)
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                     21-12661

        also offers discretion to those closest to the case—the district court
        and the parties—to adjust the default pretrial disclosures, requiring
        more or less information from expert witnesses.
                                             A.
               Expert witnesses are distinct from fact or “lay” witnesses in
        several ways. To start, experts have fewer constraints on the scope
        of their testimony, including the power to opine on matters of
        scientiﬁc or technical concern based on otherwise inadmissible
        facts or data that they did not personally observe. Compare Fed. R.
        Evid. 701, with Fed. R. Evid. 702, and Fed. R. Evid. 703; see also Fed.
        R. Evid. 705.
               Because they can oﬀer such uniquely powerful opinion
        testimony—testimony that often cannot be rebutted without
        expert testimony from the other side—expert witnesses are subject
        to one of two disclosure requirements set out in Rule 26. A witness
        who is “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony
        in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly
        involve giving expert testimony” has signiﬁcant pretrial disclosure
        requirements under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Those include a thorough
        “written report” with six substantive parts, 2 unless “otherwise

        2 These components are detailed, covering everything from the opinions the

        expert will share to the compensation she will receive:
             (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express
             and the basis and reasons for them;
             (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;
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        21-12661                    Opinion of the Court                                  9

        stipulated or ordered by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). For
        all other expert witnesses, only a less onerous, two-part3 Rule
        26(a)(2)(C) “disclosure” is required, again unless “otherwise
        stipulated or ordered by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
               The diﬀerence between written reports and disclosures is
        meaningful. For one, a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) written report must be
        “prepared and signed” by an expert, while a Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
        disclosure may be submitted by a party on behalf of its expert. See
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). And because written reports must
        include the “basis and reasons” for “all opinions” oﬀered by the
        expert, plus the “facts or data considered by the witness,” they are
        often sprawling compared to the short summary of opinions

              (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;
              (iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications
              authored in the previous 10 years;
              (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years,
              the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and
              (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and
              testimony in the case.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
        3 These are:

              (i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present
              evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and
              (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected
              to testify.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i)–(ii).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-12661

        required in a Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure.         Fed. R. Civ. P.
        26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
               The two reports that the government submitted here—
        which no one disputes complied with Rule 26(a)(2)(B)—oﬀer
        excellent examples of what it takes to fulﬁll these requirements.
        The government retained two professional experts whose primary
        job appears to be preparing reports and testifying. The ﬁrst expert
        said that in a typical year he reviews 40–50 “medical legal matters,”
        appears in about 25 depositions, and testiﬁes at three to ﬁve trials.
        The second expert charged $800 per hour to review records, plus
        $1,100 to examine Cedant. Those numbers exclude the cost of
        actually drafting a written report or preparing any necessary
        exhibits. And both of the government’s experts reviewed at least
        25 documents amounting to over 2,154 pages. What’s more,
        professional experts like these do not often work alone—instead,
        close cooperation between experts and attorneys is the norm.
        “Rarely will an expert report satisfy the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) standard
        unless counsel for the party retaining the expert was actively
        involved in its preparation.” Don Zupanec, Expert Report—
        Omission of Required Information—Supplementation, 24 No. 3 Fed.
        Litigator 11 (2009).
               Cedant’s doctors—and their relationship with his counsel—
        are very diﬀerent. The record reﬂects that Cedant’s attorneys were
        not able to work closely with these experts, who had active medical
        practices treating patients. In fact, the attorneys struggled to even
        get a response—especially over the holiday season.
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        21-12661               Opinion of the Court                       11

                The district court had to decide whether Cedant’s experts
        had the same disclosure requirements as the government’s. On the
        one hand, the relationships between the experts and the parties
        who hired them were asymmetrical—the government’s experts
        were primarily witnesses, while Cedant’s experts were primarily
        treating physicians. But on the other, all of the experts were
        testifying on the same subject—causation. The question, though,
        is what matters under the Federal Rules.
                                         B.
               District courts in our Circuit have taken a range of
        approaches to categorizing expert witnesses under Rule 26(a)(2).
        Some have based their decisions on the Rule’s discussion of
        retained versus non-retained witnesses. See, e.g., Torres v. Wal-Mart
        Stores E., L.P., 555 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Others
        have imposed requirements based on the topic of an expert’s
        testimony. See, e.g., Muzaﬀarr, 2013 WL 3850848, at *1. In resolving
        this disagreement, we start with the text. First, the provision
        setting out the more-detailed requirements:
              Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless
              otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this
              disclosure must be accompanied by a written
              report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the
              witness is one retained or specially employed to provide
              expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the
              party’s employee regularly involve giving expert
              testimony. The report must contain: [six detailed
              components].
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    21-12661

        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Witnesses governed
        by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) are often called “retained experts” as a
        shorthand. See, e.g., Goodman v. Staples the Off. Superstore, LLC, 644
        F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 2011). 4
               Rule 26(a)(2)(C), in turn, is structured as a less arduous
        catch-all for witnesses who fall outside the scope of Rule
        26(a)(2)(B):
               Witnesses Who Do Not Provide a Written Report. Unless
               otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the
               witness is not required to provide a written report,
               this disclosure must state: [two less-detailed
               components].
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). So if an expert witness does not need to
        file a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report, then a party does need to file a Rule
        26(a)(2)(C) disclosure on her behalf. The shorthand for these
        witnesses is “non-retained.”
               The crucial textual inquiry, then, is what it means to be a
        retained witness. The bare text of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) seems to present
        two possibilities. Neither, we note, has anything to do with the
        content of the expert’s testimony—both are focused on the
        relationship between the expert and the party. It could be that an
        expert is “retained” only if his connection to the litigation was,

        4 Our use of the term “retained expert” in no way diminishes the application

        of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to a witness who is specially employed to provide expert
        testimony, or whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving
        expert testimony. “Retained expert” is merely a convenient shorthand.
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        21-12661                   Opinion of the Court                                13

        from the beginning, as a paid expert witness. Alternatively, an
        expert could become “retained” as soon as a party starts paying her
        to be an expert witness—regardless of how she first became
        associated with the case.
               We think the former is the best reading of the Rule. A party
        “retains” someone for a purpose, and that purpose is most naturally
        defined at the beginning of the relationship. So Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
        asks us to assess the initial reason the expert was hired. We look to
        when an expert was “retained” or “specially employed” by a party
        and evaluate whether that retention was “to provide expert
        testimony in the case” or for some other purpose. Fed. R. Civ. P.
        26(a)(2)(B).
              No one is arguing for the alternative, hyper-literalist
        approach—that any paid expert is necessarily a “retained” expert.5
        And for good reason. Reading “retained” to cover any witness paid

        5 Instead, the government cites Goodman, 644 F.3d at 826; Brooks v. Union Pacific

        Railroad Co., 620 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010); and Meyers v. National Railroad
        Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 619 F.3d 729, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2010), to support its
        arguments that expert witnesses need to file written reports when testifying
        on causation. But both Brooks and Meyers were decided before Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
        became effective in December 2010. See Amendments to Federal Rules of
        Civil Procedure, 559 U.S. 1139 (2010); Brooks, 620 F.3d at 896, 899 n.3; Meyers,
        619 F.3d at 729. As a result, neither case deals with the boundaries between
        Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(a)(2)(C). And rather than engage with the text,
        Goodman simply bases its holding on Brooks and Meyers. 644 F.3d at 825–26; see
        also Fielden v. CSX Transp., Inc., 482 F.3d 866, 871–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
        a rule that causation witnesses must always file expert reports even before
        Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was adopted).
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                     21-12661

        in exchange for expert testimony would render Rule 26(a)(2)(C) a
        virtual nullity, reserved for a hypothetical sliver of expert witnesses
        who agree to testify without pay. That interpretation of “retained”
        also wrongly focuses on a single term in isolation from the wider
        scheme of the Federal Rules. The better approach is to remember
        that “the meaning of a word depends on the circumstances in
        which it is used. To strip a word from its context is to strip that
        word of its meaning.” Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2378 (2023)
        (Barrett, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
                Our textual reading—that an expert’s status as a retained
        witness depends on the original purpose of his retention—is
        supported by the Rule’s history. A study of Rule 26 over time
        reveals that the distinction between those experts initially hired to
        testify and those experts whose familiarity with the facts of a case
        is more organic extends back to the very first Federal Rule on
        pretrial expert disclosures.
               The 1970 Advisory Committee—in response to the
        increasing number of cases in which “expert testimony [was] likely
        to be determinative”—enacted the first pretrial expert disclosure
        requirements in Rule 26(b)(4). 1970 Committee Notes on Rule
        26(b)(4). 6 Though the new Rule’s text discussed two categories of
        experts, it really set out three. First, for any witness that a party

        6 “Although not binding, the interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes

        are nearly universally accorded great weight in interpreting federal rules.”
        Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation
        omitted).
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        21-12661                    Opinion of the Court                            15

        “expect[ed] to call as an expert witness at trial,” certain pretrial
        disclosures were required upon request from the opposing party.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (1970). 7 Second, for an expert who was
        “retained or specially employed” by a party but was “not expected
        to be called as a witness,” disclosures were not generally required.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (1970). Finally, the Committee Notes
        clarified that any expert “whose information was not acquired in
        preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer
        with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the
        subject matter of the lawsuit” should “be treated as an ordinary
        witness”—meaning that no pretrial disclosures were required.
        1970 Committee Notes on Rule 26(b)(4). That last group of experts
        sounds a lot like the one we have identified in the text of the current
        Rule 26(a)(2)(C).
              Over time, experience proved that even for experts who
        needed to file pretrial disclosures, the information disclosed under
        Rule 26(b)(4) was frequently “sketchy and vague.” 1993
        Committee Notes on Rule 26(a)(2). In 1993, the Advisory
        Committee broadened the scope of disclosure requirements by

        7 The 1970 Rule explained that a party could be asked to

              identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
              witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is
              expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions
              to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds
              for each opinion.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (1970).
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                        21-12661

        recommending the modern Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Beyond expanding
        the specific requirements for a written report, 8 the 1993
        amendment abandoned Rule 26(b)(4)’s unworkable distinction
        between experts that a party “expected” to testify or not. Instead,
        the new Rule 26(a)(2)(B) applied to any expert “retained or
        specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case”—
        exactly like the current Rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (1993).
               Even while increasing the reporting requirements for some
        expert witnesses, the Advisory Committee emphasized that one
        group still had no pretrial disclosure duties: experts who were not
        “retained or specially employed to provide such [expert] testimony
        in the case.” 1993 Committee Notes on Rule 26(a)(2). The new
        Rule thus maintained the old distinction between retained and
        non-retained experts, and the Advisory Committee even included
        treating physicians as an example of experts who could be “deposed

        8 Like the modern Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the 1993 amendment approach required

        an expert to prepare and sign a written report. And the content of that report
        was much closer to the current Rule than the 1970 approach:
              The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be
              expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other
              information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any
              exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the
              qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored
              by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be
              paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which
              the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
              preceding four years.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (1993).
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        21-12661               Opinion of the Court                         17

        or called to testify at trial without any requirement for a written
        report.” Id.; see also, e.g., Prieto, 361 F.3d at 1319; Downey v. Bob’s
        Disc. Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011).
                Equilibrium, however, was not yet reached. District courts
        often over-imposed the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), even
        when it was “straightforward” that a particular witness should not
        be compelled to file a more detailed report. Fielden v. CSX Transp.,
        Inc., 482 F.3d 866, 869–70 (6th Cir. 2007). Enter Rule 26(a)(2)(C),
        which was introduced in 2010. For the first time, the text of Rule
        26 explicitly clarified that all non-retained witnesses were
        exempted by default from Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s reporting
        requirements. But to compensate, the new Rule also added a more
        limited set of pretrial disclosure requirements for non-retained
        witnesses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
               Here too the Committee’s Notes support the “why-they-
        were-hired” distinction between retained and non-retained experts.
        Courts, the Committee said, “must take care against requiring
        undue detail” from Rule 26(a)(2)(C) witnesses, “keeping in mind
        that these witnesses have not been specially retained and may not
        be as responsive to counsel as those who have.” 2010 Committee
        Notes on Rule 26(a)(2)(C).
               This history confirms our conclusion that neither category
        of expert witnesses defined in Rule 26(a)(2)—retained or non-
        retained—has to do with the subject of the expert testimony.
        Instead, the categories depend on when and why an expert witness
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                       21-12661

        was hired. 9 A retained expert witness typically will get involved in
        a case to provide expert testimony and will derive her knowledge
        of the case from preparation for trial. A non-retained witness, on
        the other hand, will have at least some first-hand factual awareness
        of the subject matter of the suit. 10
               Treating physicians, the type of expert witnesses involved
        here, are first hired by their patients to treat rather than to testify.
        But make no mistake—Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is not limited to treating
        physicians. The expert’s job title, the subject or scope of his
        testimony, and the way that he formed his opinions are irrelevant
        inquiries for Rule 26(a)(2) purposes. The only question presented

        9 This is true at least in the “retained” and “specially employed” contexts. Fed.

        R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). An expert witness “whose duties as the party’s employee
        regularly involve giving expert testimony” may have been hired for some
        other purpose initially, but had his duties evolve into regularly providing such
        testimony. Id. An example may be a scientist or engineer hired by a company
        to develop new products, who transitions over time into an expert witness
        routinely providing evidence when the company is sued.
        10 For this reason, non-retained witnesses are sometimes called “hybrid”

        witnesses, but the term is not used consistently. Compare Goodman, 644 F.3d
        at 826, with Downey, 633 F.3d at 7. Wigmore, for instance, identifies several
        distinct types of so-called hybrid witnesses—and a tendency for courts to
        conflate them. See The New Wigmore § 4.2.2(b). While we used that term once
        before the 2010 amendments creating Rule 26(a)(2)(C), see Prieto, 361 F.3d at
        1318 n.7, we now think designating these experts as “non-retained expert
        witnesses” better reflects the current text of Rule 26.
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        21-12661                   Opinion of the Court                                19

        by the Rule’s text is whether the witness was retained as an expert
        or otherwise employed as described in Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 11
                                               C.
                As we have said, though, these default rules are not the end
        of the story. The text of Rule 26(a)(2) offers flexibility to adjust the
        initial rules for each category of experts: subsections (B) and (C)
        each contain a caveat that reports and disclosures must include the
        specified components “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
        court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)–(C) (emphasis added). So the
        Rule explicitly empowers district courts (through orders or local
        rules) and parties (through written stipulations) to modify the usual
        disclosure requirements. Accord 1993 Committee Notes on Rule
        26(a)(2). This allows for adjustments to the default rules as the
        circumstances of a case demand.

        11 The First and Ninth Circuits are in some tension on this point, with the

        Ninth holding that Rule 26(a)(2)(C) applies only to the extent that a non-
        retained witness forms expert opinions during the course of treatment. See
        Goodman, 644 F.3d at 826. We agree with the First Circuit’s conclusion
        rejecting that approach as atextual and concluding that non-retained witnesses
        incur no additional disclosure requirements by supplementing their firsthand
        knowledge with information supplied by others. See Downey, 633 F.3d at 7 &
        n.3. Considering other data besides personal knowledge does not change the
        relationship between a party and its witness. And the Federal Rules of
        Evidence allow opinion testimony based on facts or data that “the expert has
        been made aware of or personally observed.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. A non-
        retained expert is no less of an “expert” for Rule 703 purposes just because he
        filed a different pretrial disclosure than a retained expert. Cf. Downey, 633 F.3d
        at 7; David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence § 4.2.2(b) n.73.1
        (2023 Cumulative Supp.).
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                        21-12661

               Parties or courts thus may adjust the Rule 26(a)(2) defaults
        to require either more or less information, from either retained
        witnesses or non-retained witnesses. 12 Indeed, as the number of
        parties and the extent of disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(2)
        expanded, so did the discretion available to district courts to modify
        those requirements. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1970),
        with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2010). In 1970, discretion
        under Rule 26(b)(4) was limited and only went in one direction—
        more disclosures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1970). But
        now, the Rule’s text contains no distinction between adding or
        subtracting disclosure requirements. That expanded discretion
        reflects that the district court managing the case is generally in the
        best position to know what level of disclosure is appropriate for a
        given expert in a particular lawsuit.
                                              IV.
               With this understanding of Rule 26, Cedant’s case is easily
        resolved. Rather than anchor its approach to the text of the Federal
        Rules, the district court believed that caselaw required treating
        physicians to submit Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports when testifying on
        causation. See Muzaffarr, 2013 WL 3850848, at *1. But that

        12 In addition to the discretion provided under Rules 26(a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C),

        Rule 26(e) gives courts the power to order parties to supplement their expert’s
        disclosures or written reports. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(B). Parties may move
        for the court to issue such orders to their counterparties. See, e.g., Griffith v.
        Gen. Motors Corp., 303 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2002). Additionally,
        parties have a duty to supplement their disclosures with “additional or
        corrective information” in certain circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).
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        21-12661                  Opinion of the Court                               21

        approach is divorced entirely from the text of Rule 26(a)(2)—which
        Muzaffarr did not engage with at all. 13
               To be sure, this was not the first time a court adopted a
        content-based approach to Rule 26. See, e.g., Goodman, 644 F.3d at
        825–26. But while various motives for such purpose-based
        readings can be presumed, none can overcome the text and history
        of Rule 26(a)(2). And again, the default rules set out in the text can
        be adjusted if appropriate, whether by local rules, court orders, or
        the parties’ stipulations. But that’s not what happened here.
        Rather than exercise its discretion to require more disclosures from
        Cedant’s experts than the default rules do, the district court set out
        a blanket policy that it said was mandated by Rule 26(a)(2).
               That holding was wrong. Cedant was correct in arguing that
        his experts were non-retained witnesses under Rule 26(a)(2); before
        he ﬁled suit, he had a doctor-patient relationship with each one as
        they worked to treat his injuries. Cedant was also right that such
        non-retained experts generally are not required to ﬁle a Rule
        26(a)(2)(B) report simply because they are testifying on a speciﬁc

        13 Instead, Muzaffarr attempts to justify its rule by citing Williams v. Mast

        Biosurgery USA, Inc., which noted that the testimony of treating physicians can
        “purport to provide explanations of scientific and technical information not
        grounded in their own observations,” and that it should be treated as expert
        rather than lay testimony when it does so. 644 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011).
        But just because such physicians should be treated as experts does not mean
        they must be treated as retained experts. Indeed, in Williams, the treating
        physicians did not fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B), and we noted that they
        were nevertheless admitted. Id. at 1315 n.1.
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        22                          Opinion of the Court                          21-12661

        subject, such as causation. By default, non-retained witnesses like
        these only need to ﬁle Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures. Muzaﬀarr and
        cases like it that assert otherwise are wrong on this point. See
        Muzaﬀarr, 2013 WL 3850848, at *1. 14
               When the district court wrongly believed Cedant’s experts
        were required by law to submit full Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports, it
        applied an incorrect legal standard. Excluding those witnesses
        under Rule 37 for their failure to ﬁle written reports was thus an
        abuse of discretion. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1259. Because that Rule
        37 exclusion was the sole basis for the summary judgment order,
        we vacate it.
               But we aﬃrm the district court’s earlier decision to deny
        Cedant’s motion for partial summary judgment on “liability.” To
        show liability here, Cedant needed to prove all the elements of
        negligence under Florida law: duty, breach, causation, and harm.15
        Until the district court decides whether Cedant has any admissible

        14 See also, e.g., Brown v. Best Foods, a Div. of CPC Int’l, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 385, 388

        (N.D. Ala. 1996) (“Rule 26 focuses not on the status of the witness, but rather
        the substance of the testimony.” (quotation omitted)); Singletary v. Stops, Inc.,
        No. 6:09-cv-1763-Orl-19KRS, 2010 WL 3517039, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010);
        In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2051-MD, 2012 WL 5199597, at
        *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2012); Kondragunta v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co.,
        No. 1:11-cv-01094-JEC, 2013 WL 1189493, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2013).
        15 A motion for summary judgment on liability can be “partial” as parties

        could, for example, still go to trial over the amount of damages owed. See,
        e.g., Gen. Television Arts, Inc. v. S. Ry. Co., 725 F.2d 1327, 1329–30 (11th Cir.
        1984).
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        21-12661              Opinion of the Court                      23

        causation evidence, summary judgment on his behalf is
        impossible. And Cedant’s argument that the motion sought
        summary judgment only on breach and duty is belied by the
        motion itself, which purports to prove “the negligence and
        culpability of ” the government’s driver in “causing the Plaintiﬀ’s
        injuries.”
                                  *     *      *
               No rule requires any non-retained expert witness to ﬁle a
        written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). And whether a doctor is
        retained (or not) depends on whether she was hired to testify or to
        treat. But district courts retain the discretionary power to tailor
        disclosure requirements.        Because the district court here
        misunderstood that its power to require detailed submissions from
        Cedant’s witnesses was discretionary, we VACATE the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment for the government. We
        REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings
        consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court should
        address whether Cedant’s disclosures complied with Rule
        26(a)(2)(C), or it should issue a new scheduling order invoking its
        discretionary authority to adjust the default requirements of Rule
        26(a)(2). We AFFIRM the denial of Cedant’s motion for summary
        judgment.