Court Opinion

ID: 9699940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:59:23.254314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:00.934770
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 17. dissenting. Because I believe that landowners had standing to appeal under pre-amendment 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b)(4), I respectfully dissent.
¶ 18. To begin, the majority disregards the fact that developer here explicitly concedes that pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) did not require interested persons to participate at the municipal level — e.g., the planning commission — as a threshold to filing an appeal to the Environmental Court.5 This position is consistent with the Environmental Court’s long-standing interpretation of the statute. Nonetheless, developer argues, and the majority accepts, that “the statute imposed an obligation on the named individuals to petition the Planning Commission in writing before they rendered a decision.” These two positions are directly in conflict, as petitioning the planning commission pre-decision would de facto result in participation at the municipal level.
¶ 19. I agree with developer that participation at the municipal level was not a prerequisite to an Environmental Court appeal at the time the appeal in question was filed. Pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) defined an “interested person” as:
Any ten persons owning real property within a municipality listed in subdivision (2) of this subsection who, by signed petition to the [planning commission], the plan or a bylaw of which is at issue in any appeal brought under this title, allege that any relief requested by a person under this title, if granted, will not be in accord with the policies, purposes or terms of the plan or bylaw of that municipality.
Furthermore, pre-amendment § 4471(a) provided in plain terms that an “interested person may appeal a decision of... a planning commission... to the environmental court.” In 2004, the Legislature amended § 4471(a) to explicitly require *643“participation] in a municipal regulatory proceeding” as a threshold to appealing a planning commission decision. See 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 107 (effective July 1, 2004).
¶ 20. In its analysis, the majority overemphasizes a single word, “petition,” in an otherwise ambiguous statute, relying on its dictionary definition to argue that the Legislature intended that the planning commission retain authority to act at the time that it receives such petition.6 Notwithstanding the confusing language of the statute, pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) should be interpreted in light of the recent amendments to § 4471(a). As the majority notes, “[w]e generally presume that an amendment to a statute was meant to change the law unless circumstances clearly show that only a clarification was intended.” Ante, ¶ 13. Thus, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole, the reasonable construction is that pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) did not require interested persons to file a petition with the planning commission before it issued its decision, just as its counterpart, § 4471(a), did not require participation at the municipal level for standing to appeal prior to the 2004 amendment. See Holton v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 2005 VT 42, ¶ 21, 178 Vt. 147, 878 A.2d 1051 (rules of statutory construction require that we consider the statute as a whole and give effect to each part). Otherwise, these obviously complementary sections would have contradicted one another. The amendments were intended to change, not clarify, the rules on standing in appeals.
¶ 21. Further adding to the ambiguity of pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) is the fact that it is contained in the statutory section, § 4464, which provides for appeals from the administrative officer to the municipal board. The definition of interested persons only applies to appeals to the Environmental Court from the municipal board by cross-reference to § 4471. With regard to appeals from the administrative officer to the municipal board, § 4464(b)(4) simply requires appellants to alert the local board to their position on the issues in question. The statute should have the same function with respect to the Environmental Court, alerting the court to the appellants’ position on the matter being appealed. Viewed in this way, the petition serves the purpose of a notice of appeal, which is filed in the forum from which the appeal is taken. Because its purpose is to inform the appellate body of the appellants’ position, it makes no sense that the petition should be filed before the municipal board renders its decision. Thus, landowners were not required to participate at the municipal board level to be considered interested persons for purposes of an appeal to the Environmental Court, just as they were clearly not required to participate before the administrative officer to qualify as interested persons for purposes of an appeal to the municipal board.
¶ 22. In addition, the majority’s interpretation of pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4) would result in a conflict between amended §§ 4465(b)(4) and 4471(a). The majority claims that § 4464(b)(4) unequivocally required interested persons to participate at the municipal level by *644filing a petition with the municipal board prior to its decision to have standing for an appeal to the Environmental Court. It further contends that § 4471(a) was amended to reflect this municipal participation that was already required under the statutory scheme. Section 4471(a), however, requires municipal-level participation not by the filing of a petition, but by “offering, through oral or written testimony, evidence or a statement of concern related to the subject of the proceeding.” Thus, under the majority’s interpretation, interested persons would now be required to participate at the municipal level both by filing a pre-decision petition with the respective board pursuant to § 4465(b)(4) and by offering testimonial or written evidence related to the subject at issue pursuant to § 4471(a) to have appellate standing. I believe the more reasonable interpretation is that § 4465(b)(4) merely requires interested persons to file a notice of appeal at the municipal board, while § 4471(a) defines the type of municipal level participation now required for appellate standing.
¶ 23. In any event, the majority’s statutory interpretation unfairly singles out this case for unique treatment. Given the historical practice and interpretation of standing prior to the amendments, the ambiguity of the language of pre-amendment § 4464(b)(4), and the 2004 amendment to § 4471(a), landowners should be given the benefit of the pre-amendment interpretation. See In re Milton Arrowhead Mountain, 169 Vt. 531,533,726 A.2d 54, 56 (1999) (mem.) (recognizing general rule that statutes regulating right to appeal should be construed in favor of those exercising the right). I would affirm on the standing issue and reach the merits of the cross-appeal.
¶ 24. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins this dissent.
Motion for reargument denied April 24, 2008.

 Developer explicitly states in its brief that it “agrees that the statu[t]e as it existed at the time did not require that the parties participate at the municipal level.” Thus, developer concedes that the statute has consistently been interpreted as such, but argues for a different interpretation in this case.

 1 am not willing to deny standing to parties otherwise entitled to appeal based on the definition of one word in the statutory language, taken from dictionaries that it is not even suggested the Legislature referred to in drafting the relevant legislation. Nor am I convinced by the majority’s assertion that § 4464(b)(4)’s requirement that a petition be filed at the planning commission to trigger an appeal mandates that the planning commission retain authority over the matter at the time the petition is filed, as notices of appeal are always required to be filed in the lower tribunal, despite the fact that it retains no further authority over the matter.