Court Opinion

ID: 9962000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 14:06:28.135026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:38.865306
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1729-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TONY CANTY, a/k/a
TONY R. CANTY, TONY
LEE CANTY, TONY L.
CANTY REDDICK,
TONY REDDING, TONY
RIDDICK, JASON JAMES,
and TONY L. REDDICK,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted April 10, 2024 – Decided April 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 07-12-1018
                   and 07-12-1019.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).
            William C. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
            for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant
            Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Tony Canty appeals from the trial court's order denying his

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant collaterally

challenges his conviction of multiple counts of first-degree robbery and weapons

offenses. He was ultimately sentenced, after remand, to an aggregate thirty-

five-year term, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

            POINT I

            DEFENDANT      RECEIVED   INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL'S
            FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE HIS
            CASE PRIOR TO TRIAL.

            A. APPLICABLE LAW.

            B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
               FAILING TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE
               DEFENDANT'S CASE WHICH RESULTED IN
               THE JURY BEING TAINTED BY EVIDENCE
               WRONGFULLY ENTERED AGAINST HIS
               INTEREST FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE
               TRIAL.

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                        2
             POINT II

             DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY APPELLATE
             COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE
             WRONGFUL DENIAL OF HIS SEVERANCE
             MOTION BECAUSE A JOINT TRIAL PREDICATED
             ANY PLEA OFFER TO INCLUDE TESTIMONY
             AGAINST HIS CO-DEFENDANT RESULTING IN
             DEFENDANT BEING FORCED TO OFFER FALSE
             TESTIMONY (Not Raised Below).

             POINT III

             DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] SHOULD
             NOT     BE    TIME[-]BARRED     BECAUSE
             DEFENDANT'S DELAY IN FILING WAS DUE TO
             EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND THE INTERESTS OF
             JUSTICE REQUIRE HIS CLAIMS BE HEARD.

We affirm.

                                        I.

      To resolve the issues raised in this PCR appeal, we need not discuss the

trial evidence, which is detailed in our unpublished opinion on defendant's direct

appeal. See State v. Canty, Nos. A-2842-10, A-3813-10 (App. Div. Aug. 12,

2013). We briefly summarize the facts to give context to this appeal. The State

presented evidence that one night, defendant, co-defendant Jaquan L. Lee, and

a third individual robbed three groups of persons at gunpoint. One of Lee's

former girlfriends testified that she drove defendant, Lee, and others from one

robbery to another. A second former girlfriend of Lee's testified that she loaned

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                        3
Lee the car, which matched the victims' description, including the license plate

number.

      Defendant was arrested when the vehicle was stopped, and the police

approached. Inside the car were various items taken in the robberies along with

two sawed-off shotguns armed with shells.        Two of the victims identified

defendant in court as one of the perpetrators with a sawed-off shotgun.

Defendant matched the physical description the victims gave, including wearing

a black hoodie and a knotted blue bandana, with a knot in the back of his neck

and the cloth in front, where it could be pulled up to cover his face.

      In addition to this evidence, the State disclosed prior to trial that

defendant's DNA was found on one of the stolen cell phones and a Detroit Lions

jacket that police seized from the vehicle. However, during trial, as the State

was near the end of its case, it came to light that, as a result of a transposed

number, the State's DNA report had mistakenly identified defendant as the DNA

contributor when in fact, the DNA on the items belonged to Lee. Defendant was

excluded as a DNA contributor on every item of evidence in which DNA was

sampled.

      Lee's trial counsel asked the trial court to exclude the DNA evidence, or

declare a mistrial, arguing it prejudiced her defense. Defendant's counsel argued

                                                                           A-1729-22
                                        4
the mistake is probative evidence and was helpful to defendant. Following

argument, the trial court allowed the State's DNA expert to testify that buccal

samples were taken from both defendants; the State tested items that were likely

to yield good DNA samples; and defendant was excluded from the DNA samples

taken from the cell phone and jacket found in the vehicle. The DNA expert did

not testify as to whether the DNA samples matched Lee's DNA.

      On July 22, 2021, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant claimed it "[c]ame to his

attention from the Office of the Public Defender PCR unit that the State filed a

Giglio/Brady1 letter regarding a witness in [his] case." Appointed PCR counsel

1
  In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
[constitutional principles of] due process . . . ." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

            "[T]o determine whether a Brady violation has
            occurred: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to
            the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment
            evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the
            evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the
            evidence must be material to the defendant's case."
            State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019).

In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court extended Brady's scope to include
material evidence that would bear upon the credibility of the State's witnesses.
405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). The Court cautioned, however, "[w]e do not . . .
automatically require a new trial whenever 'a combing of the prosecutors ' files

                                                                          A-1729-22
                                       5
filed an amended PCR petition 2 alleging trial counsel was ineffective for his

failure to: (1) conduct an adequate investigation; (2) negotiate a plea that was

not contingent on the cooperation of co-defendant Lee; and (3) secure a

severance prior to trial.

      After hearing argument, the PCR court rendered an oral opinion denying

defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. The PCR court concluded

defendant's petition was time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a) because it was filed

more than five years following entry of his judgment of conviction (JOC). The

PCR court noted the Rule in part permits the filing of a PCR petition beyond the

after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely
to have changed the verdict . . . .'" Id. at 154 (quoting United States v. Keogh,
391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)). Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) codifies the standards set
forth in Brady and Giglio in our State:

             "[E]vidence is material if there is a 'reasonable
             probability' that timely production of the withheld
             evidence would have led to a different result at trial."
             Brown, 236 N.J. at 520 (citing United States v. Bagley,
             473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). "In deciding materiality,
             'we examine the circumstances under which the
             nondisclosure arose' and '[t]he significance of a
             nondisclosure in the context of the entire record.'" Id.
             at 518-19 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
             Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 199-200 (1991)).
2
 The amended PCR petition is not contained in the appendices, but its contents
were summarized by the trial court in its decision.
                                                                              A-1729-22
                                         6
five-year deadline where a defendant demonstrates excusable neglect for the late

filing but found defendant failed to assert any explanation to establish excusable

neglect. The PCR court also determined the late filing of the petition would

prejudice the State if the case were retried because crucial evidence and

witnesses "are likely gone and the memories of the incident have almost

certainly dimmed if they have not been completely forgotten," and adhering to

the time-bar prevents uncertainty related to a re-litigation of the matter.

      Although the PCR court concluded defendant's petition was time-barred,

it also addressed the merits of defendant's arguments in his pro se and amended

petitions: (1) trial counsel's failure to investigate the claim was not supported

by specified competent evidence that "would have or could have altered the

verdict"; (2) the failure to negotiate a plea also failed because defendant did not

present evidence that trial counsel impaired the plea negotiations; and (3) trial

counsel's failure to file a severance motion should have been made on the direct

appeal.

      The PCR court also denied defendant's petition for a new trial based on

newly discovered evidence, finding the evidence defendant referred to was not

material to his defense, and therefore, would not have been considered as

exculpatory. The PCR court reasoned that even if the proffered evidence was

                                                                              A-1729-22
                                         7
used to strike the testimony of a State's witness, it would not have affected the

outcome of the trial. A memorializing order was entered. This appeal followed.

                                        II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he

is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To sustain this burden, the petitioner

must allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the

Strickland two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the defendant must

establish, first, that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

                                                                              A-1729-22
                                         8
different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

       When assessing Strickland's first prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 669. "Merely because a

trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey,

161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound

trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

       Under Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. That is, "counsel's errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately, "[a]n error by

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the

judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at

691.

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                        9
      Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must assert that

errors existed at the trial level that could have been ascertained by appellate

counsel's review of the record, but were never raised as issues on appeal. See

State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 359-61 (2009). To obtain a new trial based on

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, it must be established that appellate

counsel failed to raise an issue that would have constituted reversible error on

direct appeal. See id. at 361. Appellate counsel will not be found ineffective if

counsel's failure to appeal the issue could not have prejudiced the defendant

because the appellate court would have found either, that no error had occurred

or that it was harmless. State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 365 (1995); see also State

v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 499 (2004).

      Further, "[a]ny factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of

relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and

based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an

evidentiary hearing." R. 3:22-10(c); see State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

      Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with

an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. The mere raising

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                       10
of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Rather, "[i]f the court perceives that holding

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the

defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court

determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved

by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J.

Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013)).

      "Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing,

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,

540-41 (2013). However, "we review under the abuse of discretion standard the

PCR court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v.

Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 148 N.J.

at 157-58).

                                                                             A-1729-22
                                       11
      Rule 3:22-12 prescribes the time limitations for filing first petitions for

PCR. Pertinent here, the Rule generally provides that "no petition shall be filed

. . . more than [five] years after the date of the entry . . . of the judgment of

conviction (JOC) that is being challenged." R. 3:22-12(a)(1). 3

      There are two exceptions to the five-year time limitation. First, the five-

year time limitation does not apply where the PCR petition "alleges facts

showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable

neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if . . . defendant's factual

assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time-bar would result in a

fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). Second, the five-year limitation

does not apply where the PCR petition "alleges a claim for relief as set forth in

[Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(A) or (a)(2)(B)] and is filed within the one-year period set

forth in [Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)]." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(B).

      Defendant filed his petition on July 22, 2021, more than five years after

the JOC. He did not contend one of the exceptions applied. For the first time

on appeal, defendant asserts his petition should not be time-barred because there

3
   Defendant's original JOC was entered on September 7, 2010. The amended
JOC was entered on September 20, 2013. In State v. Dugan, we held that a
defendant must file his petition "within five years of whatever judicial action he
is attacking." 289 N.J. Super. 15, 19-21 (App. Div. 1996).

                                                                              A-1729-22
                                        12
is no record that he was advised of his PCR rights and applicable filing time

limits, which he claims constitutes excusable neglect under the first Rule 3:22-

12 exception.

        "Excusable neglect provides the means for a court to address and correct

a criminal judgment where 'adherence to it would result in an injustice.'" State

v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 145, 159 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting State v.

McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 485 (1997)). To establish "excusable neglect" under

Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A), a defendant must demonstrate "more than simply

providing a plausible explanation for a failure to file a timely PCR petition."

Ibid.

        In assessing whether a defendant has demonstrated excusable neglect, a

court must weigh "the extent of the delay," "the purposes advanced by the five -

year rule," "the nature of defendant's claim[,] and the potential harm . . .

realized" by defendant, State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 251 (2000) (citing

Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 580), as well as the "cause of the delay, the prejudice to

the State, and the importance of the [defendant's] claim in determining whether

there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits," Norman, 405 N.J.

Super. at 159 (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)).

                                                                              A-1729-22
                                        13
      "Ignorance of the law and rules of court does not qualify as excusable

neglect," State v. Merola, 365 N.J. Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002), aff'd, 365

N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Murray, 162 N.J. at 246), and a

defendant's decision to "remain intentionally ignorant of . . . legal consequences"

does not support a finding of excusable neglect, State v. Brown, 455 N.J. Super.

460, 471 (App. Div. 2018).

      Measured against these principles, defendant's petition and amended

petition—filed eight years after his conviction—do not support a finding of

excusable neglect.     As we have explained, defendant failed to assert any

explanation to establish excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1). Defendant

makes a bald assertion that he was unaware and uninformed of his right to file a

PCR petition, but as the PCR court aptly noted, defendant failed to submit a

certification or affidavit in support of his claim. More than simply a "plausible

explanation" is required, as determined by the PCR court.

      Moreover, even considering defendant's excusable neglect argument,

which was not raised before the PCR court, 4 there is still not a sufficient basis

4
  It is well settled that we will not consider questions or issues not raised at trial
unless the questions raised pertain to the trial court's jurisdiction or concern a
matter of great public interest. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009). But
this "limitation on the scope of appellate review is not absolute." Ibid. "[O]ur

                                                                               A-1729-22
                                        14
shown to relax the time restraints because of the severe prejudice to the State.

See Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. at 400 ("If excusable neglect for late filing of a

petition is equated with incorrect or incomplete advice, long-convicted

defendants might routinely claim they did not learn about the deficiencies in

counsel's advice on a variety of topics until after the five-year limitation period

had run."). The crimes occurred in 2007, almost seventeen years ago, and

memories of witnesses, if they can even be located, have likely faded or are

completely forgotten. The goal of Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) is achieved to ensure the

finality of this matter and any uncertainty with regard to a potential re-trial. The

PCR court was correct in its analysis.

                                         III.

      Defendant next argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate his case. In his PCR petitions, defendant did not specify any facts

in support of this claim and only broadly claimed trial counsel was ineffective

trial and appellate courts are empowered . . . to acknowledge and address trial
error if it is 'of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an
unjust result.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 1:7-5). "Further, our appellate courts retain the
inherent authority to 'notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial
court[,]' provided it is 'in the interests of justice' to do so." Ibid. (quoting R.
2:10-2).

                                                                              A-1729-22
                                         15
for not investigating his case, and was "unprepared." Accordingly, the PCR

court rejected this claim, finding defendant "failed to provide any specific and

competent evidence that if an investigation was properly performed, it would

have revealed evidence that would have or could have altered the verdict."

Therefore, defendant's argument is flawed and procedurally barred.

      On appeal, defendant presents the argument for the first time that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the State's proofs against him

relative to the DNA evidence and "led to the erroneous belief" he had to defend

the "erroneous evidence" linking him to the crimes. Defendant argues he was

prejudiced by the incorrect DNA evidence, which his trial counsel "failed to

uncover" before trial, and that trial counsel should not have relied on the expert

DNA report as written. Defendant further avers that no curative instruction

could have corrected the injustice that occurred late in the proceedings.

      Defendant failed to raise this argument in his PCR petitions, and we

therefore reject it. Robinson, 200 N.J. at 20. The DNA mix-up caused by the

transposition of identifying numbers for defendant and Lee did not undermine

the defense strategy. While the error was discovered nine days into trial,

defendant presents no evidence that the error could have been found by his trial

counsel before the trial started. Moreover, even though it was initially thought

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                       16
that defendant's DNA was found inside the car, trial counsel effectively argued

he was not connected to the robberies beyond merely standing near the legally

parked car used in the crimes, and he did not have any proceeds on his person.

And, it was always known that defendant's fingerprints were not discovered

anywhere on the car or on any of the items inside the car. Thus, the defense

strategy was not prejudiced by a failure to investigate the DNA evidence.

      The theory of defendant's case did not have to be revisited as he contends.

In fact, the State's DNA expert ultimately testified that defendant's DNA was

not found in the car, which cured any potential prejudice because it corroborated

trial counsel's claims that defendant was not forensically linked to the car. And,

trial counsel's failure to seek a mistrial did not result in prejudice because co -

defendant Lee's attorney requested a mistrial, which was denied.          We are

convinced defendant was not denied his constitutional right to effective

assistance of trial counsel under either Strickland/Fritz prong.

                                       IV.

      Finally, defendant argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the wrongful denial of his severance motion because a joint

trial predicated any plea offer to include testimony against co-defendant Lee

resulting in defendant offering "false" testimony. Again, we disagree.

                                                                             A-1729-22
                                       17
      Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal and is procedurally

barred.   Robinson, 200 N.J. at 20.     However, we will address defendant's

argument.

      "Two or more defendants may be tried jointly 'if they are alleged to have

participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or

transactions constituting an offense or offenses.'" State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138,

159-60 (2001) (quoting R. 3:7-7). Courts generally prefer to try co-defendants

jointly, "particularly when 'much of the same evidence is needed to prosecute

each defendant.'" Id. at 160 (quoting State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 605 (1990)).

"That preference is guided by a need for judicial efficiency, to accommodate

witnesses and victims, to avoid inconsistent verdicts, and to facilitate a more

accurate assessment of relative culpability." Ibid.

      A single joint trial, however, may not take place at the expense of a

defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Sanchez, 143 N.J. 273, 290 (1996).

When considering a motion for severance, a trial court should "balance the

potential prejudice to defendant's due process rights against the State's interest

in judicial efficiency." Brown, 118 N.J. at 605 (quoting State v. Coleman, 46

N.J. 16, 24 (1965)). Trial courts apply a rigorous test for granting severance.

Brown, 170 N.J. at 160. A mere claim of prejudice is insufficient to support a

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                       18
motion to sever. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 274 (1988). A defendant does

not have the right to severance simply because he or she believes a separate trial

"would offer defendant a better chance of acquittal." State v. Johnson, 274 N.J.

Super. 137, 151 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting State v. Morales, 138 N.J. Super.

225, 231 (App. Div. 1975)).

      Our review of a motion to sever is limited. The decision to sever rests

within the trial court's discretion. State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 149 (2014).

We defer to the trial court's decision on a severance motion unless it constitutes

an abuse of discretion. Ibid.

      Here, defendant moved to sever based on potential prejudice arising from

gang affiliation. The trial court considered that argument in denying the motion

to sever reasoning such a risk could be cured by a jury instruction.

Subsequently, the trial court ruled that the witnesses would not be permitted to

mention gang affiliation. On appeal, defendant is not claiming that the denial

prejudiced defendant because of gang affiliation. Instead, defendant claims: (1)

the motion to sever should have been granted because there the evidence did not

tie him to the crimes; and (2) he was prejudiced by being tried with Lee.

      However, the record does tie defendant to the crimes because: (1) victims

from the robberies had similar descriptions of defendant's appearance—wearing

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                       19
a black hoodie, jeans, and a blue bandana; (2) Sade Ingram identified defendant

as the person she picked up and who committed the robberies with Lee; and (3)

the police observed defendant in a group with Lee and Ingram near the car

shortly after the third robbery and apprehended him. Therefore, we are satisfied

that the severance motion was properly denied because the record sufficiently

tied defendant to the crimes, and he fails to establish the prima facie elements—

deficient performance and prejudice resulting from the deficiency—that his

appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.

      Moreover, defendant's claim that joinder prevented him from accepting

the State's plea offer without having to testify against Lee and without the offer

being contingent upon Lee's acceptance is also unsupported by the record. The

plea offer was predicated on each party testifying against their respective co-

defendant, which we held Lee recognized as a continuing requirement of the

pre-trial plea offer after the DNA mix-up. State v. Lee, No. 3209-17 (App. Div.

June 1, 2020) (slip op. 6) ("[Lee] insisted he would have accepted the plea offer,

including testifying against Canty, if necessary.").

      Given the plea offer was always contingent, we noted "[w]hen co-

defendant Lee rejected the offer, the State was under no obligation to extend a

separate or different offer to defendant. In essence, because Lee did not want to

                                                                            A-1729-22
                                       20
accept the terms of the plea agreement, it resulted in the plea not being available

to . . . defendant." Further, defendant's claim that the plea offer required him to

give "false" testimony is also negated by the record because, for the same

reasons, the record tied defendant to the crimes, he was also tied to Lee and

therefore could not claim to not know Lee, or have been near the car, or

committed the robberies.

      Affirmed.

                                                                             A-1729-22
                                       21