Court Opinion

ID: 989001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:00:32.485236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:34.396885
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MAURICE T. GAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 95-6801
HOWARD GRANT; THOMAS CARTER;
ROBERT CHAMBERS; THOMAS
STEWART; CORPORAL LOCKLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-93-2470-AW)

Argued: March 8, 1996

Decided: April 8, 1996

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stephen John Cullen, MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellant. Kathleen Susan Hoke, Staff Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
of Maryland, Carmen M. Shepard, Assistant Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Maurice T. Gay, an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Adjust-
ment Center,1 complained to Maryland's Inmate Grievance Office
(IGO) that four correctional officers assaulted him and denied him
medical care. After two adversary hearings at which witnesses testi-
fied under oath and at which Gay was allowed to call and cross-
examine witnesses, the IGO found Gay's allegations to have no basis
in fact. Gay did not take an administrative appeal, nor did he seek
review of the IGO's findings in state court pursuant to Md. State
Gov't Code Ann. § 10-222. Instead, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in federal district court. In his complaint he realleged the
claims previously denied by the IGO, and he claimed that the admin-
istrative law judge who presided over the second hearing denied him
due process of law by cutting that hearing short. The ALJ ended the
second hearing after Gay attempted to question witnesses about irrele-
vant issues and after Gay insulted a witness and the ALJ. The ALJ
had warned Gay that his continued disruptive behavior would force
her to terminate the hearing.2

In the § 1983 action the magistrate judge recommended that sum-
mary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants because Gay
chose to pursue his claims before the IGO and because Gay's claims
were found to be meritless after he was given a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate them. After de novo review the district judge adopted
_________________________________________________________________
1 This prison is Maryland's "Supermax" facility, used to house the most
violent and disruptive male inmates.

2 When the ALJ ended the second hearing, Gay had called all of his
witnesses but one, the prison's custodian of medical records. The ALJ
found, "Even if [the] hearing had proceeded to its conclusion, it [was]
apparent from the testimony of record that [Gay] would have been
unable to sustain his burden."

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the magistrate's report and recommendation and ordered summary
judgment to be entered in favor of the defendants.

We agree with the magistrate and district judges that because the
IGO proceedings were judicial in nature, were fairly conducted, and
would be given preclusive effect by Maryland courts, Gay is collater-
ally estopped from using § 1983 to relitigate facts and issues decided
against him in the earlier proceedings. See University of Tennessee v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986); United States v. Utah Constr.
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); Layne v. Campbell County
Dep't of Social Servs., 939 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1991); Batson v.
Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1200 (Md. 1992). Furthermore, the ALJ's
decision to end the second hearing did not deny Gay due process of
law, see Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482-83
(1982), because due process does not require that Gay be allowed to
disrupt the hearing he was granted, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979).

Accordingly, we affirm on the thorough reasoning of the magistrate
judge, whose report and recommendation were adopted by the district
judge.

AFFIRMED

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