Court Opinion

ID: 9884284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:51:05.712896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.311183
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the majority's substantive analysis, I respectfully part *392ways from the disposition of the case. I believe that the trial court has only two limited options on remand. First, it may summarily grant Gerber's petition. Ind. Code § 35-38-5-1(d)(1). In the alternative, the trial court may set the matter for a hearing. 1C. § 35-38-5-1(d)(2). In the event it elects to hold a hearing, however, the trial court may only deny Gerber's petition if it finds that (1) the conditions in subsection (a) of the expungement statute have not been met; (2) Gerber has a ree-ord of arrests other than minor traffic offenses; or (8) additional criminal charges are pending against Gerber. ILC. § 85-38-5-1(f). If none of those three findings are made, the trial court is required to grant the petition. Id.
I do not believe, however, that the trial court has the option to summarily deny Gerber's petition on remand. A summary denial is authorized under only two circumstances: (1) if the trial court finds that the petition is insufficient; or (2) if a law enforcement agency has filed a notice of opposition and submitted sworn statements setting forth the agency's reasons for resisting the expungement. I1.C. § 35-38-5-(d)(8). Here, neither a notice of opposition nor sworn statements were filed; consequently, the latter subsection does not apply. Furthermore, the trial court explicitly stated that it did not find Gerber's petition to be insufficient. Tr. p. 34. I see no reason to give the trial court a second chance to review Gerber's petition and change its decision; nothing in the underlying facts or law has changed since the trial court's initial order was entered. Thus, I do not believe that the trial court has the authority to enter a summary denial of Gerber's petition on remand and dissent to the extent that the majority opinion reaches a contrary conclusion. In all other respects, I concur with the majority.