Court Opinion

ID: 9479888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:31:42.185281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:41.029598
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion because I believe that the denial of Abbott’s Sixth Amendment rights was not harmless error.
The majority did not reach the issue of whether admission of the statements made by Abbott violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, because I feel that the error here was not harmless, I shall decide whether the rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), applies to the instant case. In Jackson, the ed counsel during an arraignment for charges of murder. Subsequent to the arraignment, the police initiated further questioning on the charges, and the defendants gave statements to the police. The Supreme Court ruled that after a request for an attorney has been made, any subsequent waiver by a defendant of the right to counsel is invalid as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.
In the instant case, Abbott was arraigned for traffic violations and requested an attorney at that time. Two days later, the police questioned Abbott about his suspected involvement in a murder. On appeal the state contends that the charges must be the same or related for a Jackson violation to occur. While there may be circumstances under which the time elapsed and the difference in the subject matter render Jackson inapplicable, this is not that case. Here the police questioned Abbott only two days after his arraignment. More importantly, even though the charges were unrelated, the facts from which they both arose were the same. The police first connected Abbott to the murder because he was driving the victim’s car and had the victim’s wallet and identification papers. Where, as here, the later charges are based on the same subject matter as the initial charges, allowing the interrogation undermines the Sixth Amendment right to rely on counsel as a "medium” between the accused and the state. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632, 106 S.Ct. at 1408-09. In light of these factors, I believe that Jackson is applicable and that the admission of Abbott’s statements was error.
A reviewing court can allow a conviction to stand if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). I think that the admission of Abbott’s statements was not harmless error. The majority is correct in noting that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the guilty verdict, such as Ash-craft’s testimony and the fact that Abbott was driving the victim’s car. Nevertheless, the admission of Abbott’s statements pre-*872eluded Abbott from making an effective defense. The statements made by Abbott were contradictory and not believable. They certainly cast doubt on Abbott’s veracity and credibility in the minds of the jurors. Without these statements, Abbott possibly could have taken the stand without preconceptions about the truthfulness of his testimony. Thus, I conclude that the decision of the district court granting a new trial should be affirmed.