Court Opinion

ID: 9477417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:23:13.07839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:52.310969
License: Public Domain

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that exigent circumstances did not justify the officer’s warrantless entry into Warner’s leased premises. We review the ultimate issue of whether exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrant-less entry under the de novo standard, United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (9th Cir.1986). The totality of circumstances in this case demonstrate a “need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Id. at 1278, citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). On that basis, I would reverse the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.
Determining the existence of exigent circumstances requires use of an objective test. “[Ajlmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him ... would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate”? Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citations omitted).
At the moment when the officer entered Warner’s leased premises, he knew all of the following information: that Warner’s landlord had smelled chemical fumes on two occasions, most recently on that very day; that Warner’s landlord had observed boxes of formaldehyde and ether in Warner’s premises; that these boxes of chemicals had been in the summer heat for at least two weeks; that these chemicals were associated with illicit drug manufacturing; that these chemicals posed a risk of explosion; and that it was a very hot day. The majority correctly points out that the officer could not, himself, smell the odors described by the landlord. However, even without the benefit of his olfactory sense, all of the above information warrants a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an immediate entry is not only appropriate, but necessary to protect life and avoid serious injury.
The facts of this case parallel those in Echegoyen, infra. In Echegoyen, this Court upheld a warrantless entry because the officers suspected the residence was the scene of illicit narcotics activity, the officers smelled ether and thought it might pose a fire hazard, the residence was in a remote location, the area had limited firefighting resources, and they were notified early in the morning. Although the entry in our case occurred in the mid-afternoon, rather than early in the morning, and took place in a densely populated area, rather *406than in a remote area, a man of reasonable caution could have readily concluded that the threat to a greater number of people posed an even greater exigency than that in Echegoyen.
Additionally, the conclusion that a bona fide emergency existed was “buttressed by the behavior of the officer[ ] upon entering the dwelling.” Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1279. As in Echegoyen, upon entering the dwelling, the officer proceeded to reduce the hazards of fire and explosion by phoning the fire department, while the landlord ventilated the area.
Considering the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at time of his entry into Warner’s leased premises, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to uphold the belief of a man of reasonable caution that immediate entry into the premises was necessary to protect life and avoid serious injury. Therefore, I respectfully dissent form the majority's decision to affirm the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.