Court Opinion

ID: 9902085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 21:00:57.26724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:44.623747
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0255p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                              ┐
THOMAS BALTRUSAITIS; GUILLERMO ANTUNEZ; PATRICK
                                                              │
BARTH; RICHARD BROECKER; RYAN BUDEK; TUYEN
                                                              │
CHU; DARRYL CRAIG; SATISH DOSHI; JOHN FLETCHER;
                                                              │
EMORY GASPERAK; JON HUTCHINSON; ALAN R.
                                                              │       No. 22-1383
JARZEMBOWSKI; FRANK KOTSONIS; SANDRA D. LANGE;                 >
ARTHUR LAURIN; KEVIN LUCZAK; TIM MAURO-VETTER;                │
REGINALD MCINTYRE; CARL OBERNDORFER; JEROME                   │
PEACOCK; EJAZ RAHMAN; CHARLIE RICKMAN; MARK                   │
ROSINSKI; GREG RYNTZ; MICHAEL SAVOSKY; BRIAN                  │
SCHIFFMAN; FRED SCHNELL; GREGORY SKONIECZNY;                  │
LISA SOWINSKI; SURAJ TANDON; CHANCE TESS; JAMES               │
VIRIGLIO; BRIAN WARDA; COREY WATKINS; DANNY                   │
WOODRUFF; HAROLD WRIGHT; JOHN ZELL; JAMES                     │
ZIEMIANSKI,                                                   │
                              Plaintiffs-Appellants,          │
                                                              │
                                                              │
       v.                                                     │
                                                              │
INTERNATIONAL    UNION,    UNITED    AUTOMOBILE,              │
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS                  │
OF AMERICA; FCA US, LLC; ALPHONS IACOBELLI;                   │
JEROME DURDEN; MICHAEL BROWN; DENNIS WILLIAMS;                │
GARY JONES; NORWOOD H. JEWELL; VIRDELL KING;                  │
KEITH MICKENS; JOHN DOES 1–10,                                │
                              Defendants-Appellees.           │
                                                              ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Port Huron.
                  No. 3:20-cv-12793—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge.

                                    Argued: July 20, 2023

                           Decided and Filed: November 22, 2023

             Before: GILMAN, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
 No. 22-1383                    Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                      Page 2

                                     _________________

                                          COUNSEL

ARGUED: Kenneth D. Myers, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Elisabeth Oppenheimer,
BREDHOFF & KAISER, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee UAW. Julia M. Jordan,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee FCA. ON BRIEF:
Kenneth D. Myers, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Elisabeth Oppenheimer, Jacob Karabell,
BREDHOFF & KAISER, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee UAW. Julia M. Jordan,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, Washington, D.C., Steven L. Holley, Jacob E. Cohen, Justin
M. Zaretzky, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, New York, New York, Brian M. Schwartz,
MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Appellee FCA.
Michael A. Nedelman, NEDELMAN LEGAL GROUP, PLLC, Farmington Hills, Michigan, for
Appellee Iacobelli. Judith S. Gracey, THE GRACEY LAW FIRM, PLLC, Keego Harbor,
Michigan, for Appellee Durden.
                                     _________________

                                           OPINION
                                     _________________

       LARSEN, Circuit Judge.       Plaintiffs are current and former engineers employed by
automaker FCA US LLC (now Stellantis). In 2011, FCA transferred the work that plaintiffs had
previously performed at FCA’s company headquarters to a new location.            Plaintiffs were
unhappy with the transfer, and in 2015 they filed a grievance with their union, the United Auto
Workers (UAW). The UAW failed to pursue it. In 2017, plaintiffs filed essentially the same
grievance, but the UAW again did not pursue it. By this time, plaintiffs had learned of a massive
bribery scheme involving FCA and the UAW. Plaintiffs believed that those bribes had affected
the 2011 job-relocation process, as well as the UAW’s treatment of their grievances. In 2018,
plaintiffs filed the same grievance again. Nearly two years later, the UAW found the grievance
meritorious. Plaintiffs then sued FCA, the UAW, and various individual defendants in October
2020, raising claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that
the statute of limitations barred both claims.    The district court agreed and dismissed the
complaint. For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                       Page 3

                                                  I.

       Because this case is at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stage, “the factual
allegations in the complaint are what matter.” Gen. Motors, LLC v. FCA US, LLC, 44 F.4th 548,
551 (6th Cir. 2022). We quote them liberally and accept them as true. Id.

       Plaintiffs are 47 current and former engineers employed by FCA in the Advance
Manufacturing Engineering Powertrain (AMEPT) division.                  In late 2011, then-FCA Vice
President of Employee Relations Alphons Iacobelli transferred “the work performed by the
AMEPT division at the Chrysler Technical Center (CTC) located at FCA’s company
headquarters in Auburn Hills, Michigan, to the [Trenton Engine Complex] in Trenton,
Michigan.” R. 4, Amended Complaint, PageID 337.

       Plaintiffs were unhappy with the transfer. “[I]t added significant time to their daily
commutes, approximately an hour each way, in addition to the increased fuel costs and vehicle
wear and tear.” Id. at 338. What’s more, plaintiffs “did not receive a relocation allowance.” Id.
Shortly “after the transfer began, plaintiffs became aware that [various] transfer provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement were being violated.” Id. Other workers, including most of
AMEPT management, continued to work out of the CTC, or nearby locations; and “those who
avoided the long commute to Trenton had more time available to work overtime assignments.”
Id. at 339. Plaintiffs raised other concerns with the transfer, including the unfair use of company
cars and what plaintiffs believed “to be an increase in the number of non-bargaining unit (NBU)
employees doing bargaining unit work.” Id. at 340. In addition, the “long commute to Trenton
and low morale attributable to unequal implementation of the transfer” caused a decline in the
number of salaried-bargaining-unit (SBU) employees in the group. Id. UAW leadership did
nothing, taking “company-friendly positions on a number of issues” and not properly handling
grievances filed by plaintiffs.    Id. at 340–41.      According to plaintiffs, “prior local union
leadership enjoyed privileges such as increased access to overtime as a result of their
acquiescence to management in union matters.” Id. at 341.

       In 2015, plaintiffs filed a grievance regarding the 2011 transfer, seeking $30,000 in
compensation for each affected employee. That “grievance was not pursued by the union
 No. 22-1383                     Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                       Page 4

beyond the second step” of the internal union grievance process. Id. In 2017, plaintiffs filed
another grievance related to the job relocation on behalf of all employees in the transferred
group. This time, plaintiffs alleged that the “illegal Transfer of Operations” was the result of
collusion between FCA and “corrupt UAW officials.” Id. at 341–42. Plaintiffs sought $172,800
in compensation for each employee, “as well as a $45,000 car voucher per employee to
compensate for added mileage placed on their vehicles.” Id. at 342. Plaintiffs “also requested
that employees be relocated back to CTC” along with “all work traditionally performed by SBU
employees.” Id.

        The collusion allegations in the 2017 grievance stemmed from “the government’s
indictment of Alphons Iacobelli on July 26, 2017 for violation of federal labor law and tax
evasion.” Id. That indictment revealed that “from about 2009 until the Iacobelli indictment was
made public in 2017, high-level FCA officials had been paying bribes to UAW officials in
exchange for the UAW negotiating company-friendly contracts and acting in the company’s
interests on grievances.” Id. at 343. According to plaintiffs, the indictment was the first “public
acknowledgment” of any government investigation into the scandal and the first information they
“had that their complaints and grievances had been affected by bribery between FCA and the
UAW.” Id. Plaintiffs alleged:

                Unbeknownst to plaintiffs at the time when plaintiffs were transferred in
        2011, or when they complained to the company about uneven implementation of
        the transfer process in 2012, or when they complained repeatedly to their union
        leadership, or when they watched as grievances were not properly handled, or
        when they filed a grievance in 2015, high-level officials at [FCA] and the UAW
        were engaging in a wide-ranging, long-lasting criminal bribery scheme aimed at
        saving [FCA] millions of dollars by having the union take company-friendly
        positions, i.e., interpreting contractual language in a way that deprived [FCA]
        employees, like plaintiffs, of fair representation and derailing the exact type of
        grievances that plaintiffs were attempting to bring.

Id. at 346.

        FCA responded to the 2017 grievance, saying that it was untimely and lacked merit.
Plaintiffs moved the grievance to the next step in the internal review process, but FCA gave the
same response and “also asserted that the grievance was the same as the one filed in 2015.” Id.
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                         Page 5

at 344. The UAW then withdrew the grievance at “the next stage in the process.” Id. Plaintiffs
learned of this on November 3, 2017, and appealed internally on December 8, 2017. The appeal
was deemed untimely, and plaintiffs did not pursue further review.

       On February 2, 2018, plaintiffs filed another grievance, essentially identical to the 2017
one. The 2018 grievance followed a path similar to the 2017 grievance, but this time, plaintiffs
timely appealed the union’s withdrawal of the grievance. At the last step in the UAW’s internal
appeal process, the union determined that plaintiffs had done enough to discharge “their
obligation to exhaust internal union remedies” and could “proceed with any external processes or
remedies available to them.” Id. at 346.

       On October 16, 2020, plaintiffs sued FCA, the UAW, and various officials, including
Iacobelli. Plaintiffs brought two RICO claims, claims for federal and state civil conspiracy, a
fraud claim, and two LMRA hybrid claims, for breach of the CBA and for violation of the duty
of fair representation. All defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Plaintiffs responded and voluntarily dismissed their federal civil-conspiracy claim.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the statute of
limitations barred both the LMRA and RICO claims.                 The court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

       Plaintiffs timely appealed, challenging the dismissal of their LMRA and RICO claims.

                                                  II.

       We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.
2002). “We construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, and examine whether the complaint contains ‘sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ohio Pub.
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 830 F.3d 376, 382–83 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
 No. 22-1383                    Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                     Page 6

                                               A.

       Plaintiffs first challenge the dismissal of their LMRA claims as time-barred. Section 301
of the LMRA allows federal courts to hear “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees.”            29 U.S.C. § 185(a).    “It
encompasses suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and
employers.” Swanigan v. FCA US, LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs here have brought a “hybrid claim,” so they “must prove both (1) that the employer
breached the collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair
representation.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he two claims that make up a hybrid claim are
‘inextricably interdependent.’” Id. (quoting DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 164 (1983)).

       Plaintiffs’ hybrid LMRA claims are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. See
29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172. “A hybrid § 301/fair representation claim
accrues against both the union and the employer when the employee knew or should have known
of the acts constituting either the employer’s alleged violation or the union’s alleged breach.”
Lombard v. Chrome Craft Corp., 264 F. App’x 489, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Bowerman
v. UAW, 646 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2011).

       Our cases make clear that plaintiffs’ LMRA claims were untimely. Plaintiffs pursuing a
hybrid claim must sue once they “reasonably should know that the union has abandoned” their
claim. Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742, 751 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In
Saunders, the limitations period began when the union decided not to pursue the employee’s
grievance at “the second stage of the grievance process,” which “end[ed] the Grievance
Procedure and dispos[ed] of the grievance.” Id. at 752. In Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., the
limitations period began “when the union steward refused to pursue [plaintiffs’] claim” because
that was “the latest date at which plaintiffs should have known of the union’s breach.” 32 F.3d
997, 1001 (6th Cir. 1994). And in Robinson v. Central Brass Manufacturing Co., the limitations
period began “when the deadline for requesting arbitration passed without action by the Union.”
987 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1993).
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                        Page 7

       Here, the statute of limitations began to run in 2015.           That year, plaintiffs filed a
grievance regarding the 2011 transfer, seeking $30,000 in compensation for each affected
employee. That “grievance was not pursued by the union beyond the second step” of the
grievance process. R. 4, Amended Complaint, PageID 341. At that point, plaintiffs knew that
the UAW had “abandoned” their claim, and the limitations period began to run at that time.
Saunders, 879 F.3d at 751–52. Plaintiffs had six months to file their lawsuit but waited until
October 2020. The LMRA’s six-month statute of limitations thus bars plaintiffs’ LMRA claims
stemming from the 2015 grievance.

       Plaintiffs contend, however, that the 2017 and 2018 grievances reset the clock. This
argument plainly fails with respect to the 2017 grievance. The UAW withdrew that grievance on
November 3, 2017, and plaintiffs appealed internally on December 8, 2017. The appeal was
deemed untimely, and plaintiffs didn’t pursue further review. So even if the 2017 grievance
could have reset the clock, the limitations period on the 2017 grievance began to run sometime
near the end of 2017, rendering plaintiffs’ 2020 complaint untimely.

       The 2018 grievance requires additional consideration. If we assume that the limitations
period was tolled while plaintiffs utilized internal procedures, see Robinson, 987 F.2d at 1242,
then the limitations period for the 2018 grievance began on May 6, 2020, when plaintiffs had
exhausted all internal remedies. Plaintiffs would have had until sometime in early November
2020 to file their complaint, rendering their October 16, 2020 complaint timely. The district
court concluded, however, that the 2018 grievance was a mere recast of the 2015 grievance and
that “Plaintiffs [could not] rely on the filing of yet another grievance in 2018 to dodge the
LMRA’s short six-month statute of limitations.” Baltrusaitis v. UAW, 2022 WL 868423, at *5
(E.D. Mich. March 23, 2022); see also Plunkett v. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 247 F. App’x
604, 606 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot toll the statute of limitations by repeatedly filing
grievances on the same issue.” (citation omitted)). We agree.

       Plaintiffs argue that the 2018 grievance differed from the 2015 grievance because it
contained new allegations that the bribery scheme had affected the UAW’s handling of the job
relocation. They urge us to follow the UAW’s internal Public Review Board, which concluded
that the 2018 grievance was timely because plaintiffs couldn’t have known earlier of the bribery
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                     Page 8

scheme that caused the misconduct. But as explained previously, plaintiffs’ complaint shows
that they knew shortly after the job relocation that FCA was not following the CBA’s transfer
requirements and knew of the UAW’s willingness to side with FCA and its unwillingness to
assist plaintiffs.

        New allegations of bribery and corruption don’t change that result. They merely explain
facts that plaintiffs already knew—that the UAW was acting contrary to plaintiffs’ interests.
And the bribery and corruption themselves cannot support plaintiffs’ § 301 claim. Bribery and
corruption are the subject of § 302 of the LMRA, which prohibits bribery between an employer
and a union. 29 U.S.C. § 186. That criminal provision, however, contains no private right of
action. See Ohlendorf v. United Food & Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 883 F.3d 636, 640, 641–
42 (6th Cir. 2018). And an employee may not repackage a § 302 claim as a § 301 claim. See
Swanigan, 938 F.3d at 785. “Plaintiffs cannot shoehorn what is truly a criminal-bribery matter
under the Act into an inapplicable civil provision.” Id. So the allegations of bribery and
corruption alone are not actionable, and the conduct underlying the 2018 grievance is identical to
that of the earlier grievances. Plaintiffs offer no authority suggesting that they may reset the
limitations clock by filing repeated grievances based on the same underlying conduct.

        Equitable tolling due to fraudulent concealment does not save plaintiffs’ LMRA claims
either. Even if plaintiffs could establish fraudulent concealment, the district court reasonably
concluded that “such tolling clearly ended after the July 2017 federal indictment publicly
exposed the allegations of corruption that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ current claim[s].”
Baltrusaitis, 2022 WL 868423, at *5. That does nothing to save plaintiffs’ 2020 complaint,
which came almost three years after the clock would have begun to run in early 2018. Cf.
DeShetler v. FCA US, LLC, 790 F. App’x 664, 672 (6th Cir. 2019) (rejecting equitable-tolling
argument that was premised on FCA’s and the UAW’s bribery scheme).

        The district court didn’t err by concluding that plaintiffs’ LMRA claims were barred by
the six-month statute of limitations.
 No. 22-1383                           Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                                Page 9

                                                        B.

        Plaintiffs also brought two RICO claims, “alleg[ing] that Defendants committed
racketeering violations by participating in a bribery scheme that violated the LMRA with the
intent of lowering FCA’s labor costs by transferring the Plaintiffs’ work locations.” Baltrusaitis,
2022 WL 868523, at *6. RICO claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley–Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).

        In Rotella v. Wood, the Supreme Court explored the accrual rules for civil RICO claims.
528 U.S. 549 (2000). It noted that, at one time, the circuit courts had taken “[t]hree distinct
approaches” to the accrual question. Id. at 553. Some circuits “applied an injury discovery
accrual rule[,] starting the clock when a plaintiff knew or should have known of [the] injury.” Id.
“Some applied the injury and pattern discovery rule . . . under which a civil RICO claim accrues
only when the claimant discovers, or should discover, both an injury and a pattern of RICO
activity.” Id. And another applied the “last predicate act” rule, under which “the period began to
run as soon as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and the pattern of
racketeering activity, but began to run anew upon each predicate act forming part of the same
pattern.” Id. at 554. Three years before Rotella, the Court had “cut the possibilities by one in
rejecting the last predicate act rule.” Id. (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189
(1997)).

        Left with two choices, the Court in Rotella “eliminate[d]” the injury and pattern
discovery rule as “unsound,” and instead applied the injury-discovery rule. Id. at 554–55.
Applying that rule here, plaintiffs’ claims are untimely.1

        Plaintiffs knew of their injuries stemming from the alleged pattern of racketeering
sometime around 2011 or 2012. According to the amended complaint, that’s when they learned
of the jobsite transfer and that FCA and the UAW were not complying with the CBA transfer
protocols. The complaint alleges that the transfer “added significant time to [plaintiffs’] daily

        1
          The Court did leave open the possibility that the proper rule might be an “injury occurrence” rule, under
which discovery would be irrelevant. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554 n.2. But the Court did not rule on that option
because the parties had not briefed it. See id. Plaintiffs’ claims would also be untimely under an injury-occurrence
rule.
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                     Page 10

commutes, approximately an hour each way, in addition to the increased fuel costs and vehicle
wear and tear.” R. 4, Amended Complaint, PageID 338. Plaintiffs did not receive relocation
allowances, despite their belief that they were entitled to them. According to the complaint,
plaintiffs learned “[s]oon after the transfer began . . . that the transfer provisions of the [CBA]
were being violated.” Id. Moreover, some employees were allowed to stay at the CTC, avoiding
the burdens of the transfer, but not plaintiffs. The alleged harms flowing from the transfer and
FCA’s “unequal implementation of the transfer” caused plaintiffs to complain to both FCA and
the UAW, as early as 2012. Id. at 339–40. Under the injury-discovery rule, plaintiffs’ RICO
claims accrued when they “knew or should have known of [the] injury.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at
553. Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiffs knew they had been harmed
in 2011 or 2012, and the statute of limitations began to run at that time.

       Plaintiffs raise four arguments in response. First, they suggest that Rotella did not reject,
but instead adopted, the injury-and-pattern discovery rule. We need not spend long on this
claim. Plaintiffs rely on an unpublished decision of this court, which in turn relied on the injury-
and-pattern discovery test announced in our pre-Rotella caselaw. See Sims v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
151 F. App’x 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Isaak v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 169 F.3d 390,
399 (6th Cir. 1999)). Unpublished authority is not binding on this court. See In re Blasingame,
986 F.3d 633, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 2021). And Rotella, which does bind us, could not have been
more explicit in its “eliminat[ion]” of the injury-and-pattern discovery rule. See 528 U.S. at
554–58.

       Plaintiffs next argue that their claims are saved by the separate-accrual rule.          We
disagree. In Klehr, the Supreme Court noted that “some Circuits have adopted a ‘separate
accrual’ rule in civil RICO cases, under which the commission of a separable, new predicate act
within a 4-year limitations period permits a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused
by that act.” 521 U.S. at 190. That rule comes with limitations: “the plaintiff cannot use an
independent, new predicate act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other earlier
predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period.” Id. Instead, the “new act” must
have “caused . . . harm over and above the harm that the earlier acts caused.” Id.
 No. 22-1383                         Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                             Page 11

        The separate-accrual rule does not help plaintiffs. First, although some circuits have
applied this rule to RICO claims, see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1105
(2d Cir. 1988), we never have.2 See Appellant Br. at 20 (conceding the point). And the Supreme
Court didn’t expressly do so in Klehr either. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 190. Regardless, the rule
does not apply here. Plaintiffs don’t point to any new injuries sustained during the limitations
period; they point only to the UAW’s denials of each of their grievances. In other words,
plaintiffs complain that the UAW repeatedly failed to fix the injuries they sustained in the 2011
transfer. Those grievance denials didn’t create “harm over and above the harm that the earlier
acts caused.” Id.

        Plaintiffs next argue that the statute-of-limitations question should not have been resolved
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012).
But “dismissing [a] claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate” when “the allegations in the
complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.” Id. That is the case here. The
complaint reveals when plaintiffs learned of their injuries (almost a decade before they filed).
Plaintiffs counter that fact questions remained regarding when they knew of the RICO
conspiracy. But as discussed above, the Supreme Court has rejected the injury-and-pattern
discovery rule.     Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554–58.           Instead, the Court has made clear that the
limitation period begins when plaintiffs’ injuries occurred or when they should have known of
them. Id. at 554 & n.2. Those dates appear on the face of the complaint, so the district court
didn’t err by resolving the issue on a motion to dismiss.

        Finally, plaintiffs say that their claims are subject to equitable tolling. The Supreme
Court in Rotella suggested that equitable tolling might be available when a RICO pattern
involves fraud and thus “remains obscure in the face of a plaintiff’s diligence in seeking to
identify it.” Id. at 561. Even so, the Court took care to note “the very nature of such tolling as
the exception, not the rule.” Id. Here, the district court concluded that any equitable-tolling
argument failed because plaintiffs did not act with diligence in filing their lawsuit. See Campbell
v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First

        2
          We have applied the separate-accrual rule in the analogous Clayton Act context, however. See DXS, Inc.
v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 100 F.3d 462, 467 (6th Cir. 1996).
 No. 22-1383                      Baltrusaitis, et al. v. UAW, et al.                       Page 12

Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n a RICO case, the plaintiff must
both use due diligence to discover that he has been injured and by whom even if the defendant is
engaged in fraudulent concealment, and diligently endeavor to sue within the statutory
limitations period or as soon thereafter as feasible.”). Plaintiffs learned of their injuries as early
as 2011 and learned of the bribery allegations in July 2017 but waited until October 2020 to file
their complaint, with no explanation for the delay. Equity favors those who diligently pursue
their known rights. See Continental Can Co. v. Graham, 220 F.2d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 1955).
Plaintiffs didn’t do so and haven’t shown that the district court abused its discretion by not
applying equitable tolling to save their RICO claims.          See Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of
Rochester v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2015) (equitable tolling would not
“extend the limitations period” in a RICO case where plaintiffs waited more than a year to file
suit after learning of defendant’s predicate acts); cf. Zein v. Holder, 509 F. App’x 505, 509 (6th
Cir. 2022) (recognizing that the district court did not abuse its discretion when petitioner waited
nine months after the deadline to file a motion to reopen).

       For these reasons, the district court didn’t err by dismissing plaintiffs’ RICO claims as
barred by the statute of limitations.

                                                ***

       We AFFIRM.