Court Opinion

ID: 9537950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:27:46.254435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:33.525625
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK,
dissenting:
The majority concludes that Deputy Sheriff Don Alder (Alder) was required to advise the defendant Charles Cleburn (defendant) of his Miranda1 rights prior to questioning the defendant in his home because the setting was custodial.
I disagree with the majority affirmance of the trial court’s finding that the questioning of the defendant in the kitchen of his home took place in a custodial setting. I believe, as we have previously held, that “the trial court’s ultimate constitutional ruling cannot be squared with the court’s evidentiary finding of fact.” People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 734 (Colo.1987).
I.
The evidence from which the trial court made its findings was uncontradicted and reflects the following events. Alder was assigned on September 7, 1988, to investigate a report that someone menaced a young man. The incident took place in sparsely populated Colorado Acres in Western Fremont County. Alder interviewed the victim, who gave him a description of an older person. The victim’s description matched the defendant. Alder and posse-man Dan Ogden2 contacted the defendant at his home that evening. Alder advised the defendant that he needed to talk to him, whereupon the defendant invited Alder and Ogden into the kitchen. Alder asked the defendant, in the presence of Ogden and the defendant’s wife, if he had had a run-in with a young kid that afternoon after school, to which the defendant replied “Yes.”3
Alder advised the defendant that the young kid said that there had been a weapon, and Alder asked the defendant if he used any sort of a weapon. The defendant’s wife responded that the defendant had a BB gun. Alder asked the defendant if he had any hunting rifles. The defendant acknowledged he had hunting rifles and shotguns. Alder and the defendant conversed in normal, calm tones, and neither one made demands or threats on the other. Alder asked the defendant about *789his rifle collection.4 Alder then advised the defendant that the young man described the weapon as a lever-action .30-.30, and inquired whether the defendant had such a gun. Alder prefaced his request to look at the defendant’s lever-action rifle with the statement, “[y]ou don’t have to let me.”5 After the defendant produced the .30-30, Alder asked if he could take the rifle with him, and the defendant agreed.
Alder left the house, went to his car, and concluded that he should take the defendant into custody. Alder returned to the house, asked the defendant to step outside, and placed him under arrest.
II.
A police officer is required to issue a Miranda warning when he subjects a person to interrogation in a custodial setting. There must be both custody and interrogation before Miranda warnings are required. People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d 43, 49 (Colo.1988). The test for determining if a person is in custody, or in a custodial setting, is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself deprived of his freedom in a significant way. Id.
In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), a state police officer called the defendant and asked if he could meet with him to “discuss something.” Id. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 713. The defendant agreed to meet with the officer at the state patrol office. When they met at the office, the officer and the defendant sat across a desk in a closed room and the officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest. The officer then told the defendant that he wanted to talk to him about a burglary and that his truthfulness would possibly be considered by the district attorney or judge. The defendant then admitted taking the property. The Supreme Court held that there was “no indication that the questioning took place in a context where [the defendant’s] freedom to depart was restricted in any way.” Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. The *790Court stated that the defendant “came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a V2-hour interview [the defendant] did in fact leave the police station without hinderance.” Id. The court concluded that “[i]t is clear from these facts that [the defendant] was not in custody ‘or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)); cf. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 1096, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1968) (defendant questioned by police in his own bed found to be under custodial interrogation where testimony of police officers was that the defendant was under arrest and not free to leave).
In People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo.1984), we reversed the trial court’s order suppressing statements made by the defendant during a conversation he had with an investigator from the district attorney’s office. The trial court suppressed the defendant’s statements because the investigator did not readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights. The facts of the case, however, demonstrated that the defendant entered the investigator’s office and began conversing with him voluntarily. 'Id. The polygraph examiner placed the defendant in the investigator’s office while the defendant waited for a ride home. Id. at 198. The defendant was not under arrest when he was in the investigator’s office, and during the defendant’s conversation with the investigator another officer interrupted and asked the defendant to let him know when he was ready to leave. Id. at 198. We held that the record was “devoid of any evidence to support the district court’s determination that the defendant was ‘in custody’ at the time of the ... interview.” Id. at 203. In People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d at 49, we reached a similar conclusion. In Milhollin the defendant was riding a motorcycle when he became involved in an accident with a car. An officer investigating the accident found the defendant in a hospital awaiting surgery. Without advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the officer asked the defendant if he was the rider of the motorcycle. The defendant responded that he was. We reversed the trial court order suppressing the defendant’s statement that he was the rider of the motorcycle because we concluded that the defendant was not in a custodial setting. Id. at 50-51. We stated that there was “no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the defendant, at the time he was asked whether he was the driver of the [motorcycle], reasonably believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed by the officer to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 52.
Mathiason, Thiret, and Milhollin dictate a result different from the one reached by the majority. Alder and Ogden visited the defendant at his home. When the defendant answered the door Alder did not ask if he could come in, but the defendant invited him in. Alder and his companion were in uniform, see Milhollin, 751 P.2d at 45, and Alder immediately asked the defendant if he had been involved in an incident with a young kid earlier that day. The defendant answered Alder’s questions. When Alder asked the defendant if he owned a lever-action rifle like the one described by the victim, the defendant answered that he did. Alder then asked if he could see the gun, but reminded the defendant that he did not have to produce it. The defendant, however, produced the gun and let Alder take it with him. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free at any time to end the conversation, ask Alder to leave, or leave himself. The situation was clearly distinguishable from an arrest. Milhollin, 751 P.2d at 52.
The trial court found that the defendant was in custody because Alder used the defendant’s friendship with him to subtly coerce the defendant into revealing incriminating information.6 There is no evidence *791to support this finding of the trial court. The only testimony at the pretrial hearing came from Alder. Alder did not suggest that he attempted to influence the defendant, and the record reveals that Alder was actually careful not to pressure the defendant. The court’s findings of subtle coercion and custodial interrogation were based on a subjective test of Alder’s friendship and not on objective evidence of whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would consider himself deprived of his freedom in a significant way. I would hold as a matter of law that the trial court’s ultimate constitutional ruling cannot be supported by the trial court’s evidentiary findings of fact.
III.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly suppressed the lever-action rifle seized at the defendant’s home. In my opinion the defendant voluntarily consented to Alder’s seizure of the rifle.
The issue is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s consent was freely and voluntarily given. Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201. The trial court concluded that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search and seizure because Alder used subtle coercion to obtain the defendant’s consent,7 and the defendant’s consent was derived from Alder’s exploitation of his failure to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights. I do not agree with the trial court’s second reason because, in my view, there was no Miranda violation. See part II, above.
I also believe that the trial court erred in concluding that, on the basis of Alder’s use of subtle coercion, the defendant's consent was not voluntary. There is no testimony in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Alder used the defendant’s friendship with him to coerce the defendant to involuntarily consent to the search. The testimony in the record only supports the conclusion that the defendant and Alder were acquainted and were on good terms. Not every interaction between law enforcement officials and citizens who are acquainted produces an atmosphere of coercive pressure. See People v. Nisser, 189 Colo. 471, 542 P.2d 84 (1975) (no unreasonable search where undercover agent who is personally acquainted with defendant gains entry to defendant's residence by invitation and observes or is handed contraband). In this case there was no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Alder used his acquaintance with the defendant in a coercive manner.
Alder’s manner indicates that he did not coerce the defendant into consenting to the search. Alder did not ask to simply “look around” before searching the defendant’s closet. Cf. Thiret, 685 P.2d at 200 (defendant’s oral consent to “look around” was not a consent to search). Alder told the defendant that the victim described the weapon as a lever-action rifle. Before the defendant produced the .30-30, Alder reminded him that he did not have to show him the rifle. Despite this warning the defendant voluntarily produced the rifle.
People v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 1369 (Colo.1983), involved an investigation of a suspicious fire by an investigator from the Aurora Fire Department. The investigator questioned the defendant after the defendant had left the scene of the fire. The investigator asked the defendant if he could see the pair of pants the defendant *792was wearing at the scene of the fire. Id. at 1377. The defendant consented and handed a burned pair of pants to the investigator. Id. at 1377-78. When the investigator observed the burn spots he asked the defendant if he could have the pants, and the defendant replied, “Yes.” Id. at 1378. We noted that, “while the defendant’s knowledge of his right to withhold consent is a factor to be considered, an advisement of this right is not a condition to a finding of voluntary consent.” Id. at 1377. We held that “the evidence supported] the ruling of the trial court that, under the totality of the circumstances, [the defendant] voluntarily consented to relinquish the burned pants to the fire investigator.” Id. at 1378. We also noted that
[a]s in People v. Elkhatib, ... “there was no evidence of coercion, either in the form of an officer’s claim of lawful authority to search regardless of the defendant’s permission, or a threat or subtle promise calculated to flaw the defendant’s judgment.... Nor is there any evidence of deception as to the officer’s stated purpose” in examining the pants.
Id. (quoting People v. Elkhatib, 632 P.2d 275, 278 (Colo.1981)).
The same analysis applies in this case. There is no evidence that Alder used his acquaintance or friendship with the defendant to “subtly coerce” the defendant into producing the rifle. Alder did not deceive the defendant or make any subtle promises, hints or suggestions. Under the totality of the circumstances the defendant voluntarily consented to the search and seizure.
I am authorized to say that Justice ROVIRA and Justice MULLARKEY join in this dissent.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Alder testified that both he and Ogden were in uniform and both were armed when they went to the defendant’s house. Alder also testified as follows:
Q: What did you — how did you make contact with him?
A: I walked up to his house and knocked on the door.
Q: And what happened then?
A: I went and asked him — I told him that I needed to talk to him. He told me to come on in, and so we went into his kitchen.

. Alder testified as follows:
Q: Okay. What did you say to him at that time?
A: I told him — I asked him if he had a run in with a young kid that afternoon, that evening, after school.
Q: What did Mr. Cleburn respond to that?
A: He said, "Yes”, he had.
Q: And how did you ask the question?
A: That’s basically the way I did it. I was just standing there, and I said — I called him Bo. I said, "Did you have a run in with a young kid this afternoon?” I wasn’t pushy or anything; loud.

. Alder testified as follows:
Q: Did you ask anything else? Was there any further conversation between you and the Defendant at that time?
A: At that time, I asked him — I says [sic], "Do you have any rifles? Any hunting rifles?" And he said, "Yes.” He says [sic], "I have a .270.” And so I went and asked him, "Would it be all right if I looked at it?” And he said, “Yes."
Q: At that time, what did Mr. Cleburn do?
A: He got up out of the chair and started walking to the bedroom. Actually, we walked through the living room. And he got up and started walking that way.
Q: What did you do?
A: I went and asked him — I said, "Would it be all right if I come with you?”
Q: Why did you ask that question?
A: Well, two reasons: The first one was, I wanted to see what he was actually going to do and — but he was going in to mess with gun [sic], and I didn't like that; somebody going in to another room and coming back out with a gun.
Q: What was your demeanor at this time?
[[Image here]]
A: Just following him; you know, not — I don’t know how you want to say. We was [sic] still very calm, talking.
[[Image here]]
A: .... I seen [sic] him move a gun in a scabbard to pick up another gun. And so he brought me the — he handed it out and come walking around behind the door then and said, "Here it is.” So I asked him, I said, "Is it all right to take it out of this here and take a look at it?” And he said, "Sure.” And so I took it out and looked at it, and I checked and see [sic] if it was unloaded because I didn’t want it laying around.

. Alder testified as follows:
Q: Did you ask any further questions at that time?
A: Yeah. I asked him — I says [sic], "Well, the young kid had told me that there was a lever action rifle.” And I says [sic], "Do you have something like that, like a .30-30?” I says [sic], "Would it be all right if I looked?” I says [sic], “You don’t have to let me." And he says — "Well," he says, "I do have a lever action .30-30.”
[[Image here]]
A: Okay. Then I went and — I asked him, I says [sic], "Is this all?” I says [sic], "Could I take another look in your — back in here and see if you have any more rifles?” You know, "I don’t have to — I mean, you don’t have to let me in there if you don’t want to.” And he said, “No, you can come back and look.”_
[[Image here]]
A: Okay. Then I said, "This here — the young kid said that it was a lever action that was shot at him.” I said, “Would it be all right if I take this with me to take it and investigate it?” And he said, "Yes.”

. The trial court held that:
The court would find that from all of the facts present, the Defendant was in fact in custody; although there had been no technical arrest. All of the facts, looking at the objective standards, leads a reasonable person to believe that he was in custody in fact. And then we have that subtle coercion, too. It’s not the *791threatening type of thing, but it is the use of a relationship by the Deputy. Whether he did it consciously or unconsciously, maybe, is immaterial. But the effect upon the Defendant that, you know, this is a friend who has come to help me; that type of thing. Where he had not been advised at all that a particular item was being sought for a specific criminal prosecution, and the Deputy knew all of this. He knew he was looking for a .30-30. He knew the Defendant was the one who was alleged to have pointed it prior to that at a victim.

. The trial court found that
[a]s far as the consent is concerned, that goes under the totality [of the circumstances], too. It goes back to the friendship type of thing. The questioning was based upon that. And in the Court’s opinion and finding, it implied subtly the relationship, and the consent flowed from that, and the same thing took place.