Court Opinion

ID: 9789912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:43:50.972241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.171754
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with that part of the majority opinion which holds that the statements made by the defendant on March 14 are admissible, and so much of Part III as disapproves the holding of the court of appeals that an express waiver is necessary to support a finding that an accused has relinquished the right to counsel. 670 P.2d at 774. However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a part of the defendant’s March 14 statement should be suppressed and the remand for a further hearing on the June 28 statement.
An experienced trial judge spent the better part of two days in hearings on the motion to suppress. With reference to the March 14 statement, the trial court made the following findings which I quote in full because they express far better than I can the totality of the circumstances surrounding this defendant’s arrest and statement.
“The testimony disclosed that the Defendant initially called in to report a suicide at a motel in Boulder. Based upon the officers’ investigation, i.e. the position of the body, position and condition of the gun, and inconsistencies in Defendant’s explanation, among other things the Defendant was arrested on a charge of First Degree Murder. Defendant does not argue that his arrest was illegal, and the Court finds probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant without a warrant. Therefore, any statements made cannot be suppressed because of illegality of arrest.
“Upon arrival at the booking room, Defendant was advised of his rights per Miranda. The rights were read from a written form and complied with legal requirements (People’s Exhibit ‘B’). Defendant understood his rights but declared he did not waive his rights and wanted to talk to his attorney first. Defendant had also been advised that he was arrested on suspicion of murder. The investigation stopped when Defendant said he wanted to talk to his attorney. Detective Sinclair then told the Defendant he was going to perform tests on his hands to see if he had recently fired a gun. Defendant then volunteered the information, and not in response to a question, that T fired a gun earlier in the evening’ (of the murder). He further stated (not in response to a question) that he had fired a rifle about 7:00 p.m. at the Colorado University rifle range with an individual named ‘Clay.’ These statements were volunteered, not in response to questions, and are admissible.
“On the same date March 14, 1977, Defendant requested that he be allowed to talk to Detective Diezi, a friend, whom he had known over the years. Diezi came at the Defendant’s request. The Defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights (as in the first advisement), said he had an attorney, wanted to waive his rights and gave a statement to Diezi. This interview was at Defendant’s request, was voluntary; he waived his rights and the statement is admissible.
“On March 14, the Defendant also requested that he be allowed to talk to Detective Long, also a long time friend. He was again advised of his rights. Long asked the Defendant if he wished to talk with his attorney first. Defendant said he did, and he was permitted to call his attorney. After talking with his attorney, Defendant asked if he could have a P.R. Bond. Long replied, ‘No.’ Defendant then volunteered statements, not in response to any questions. The Court holds he waived his rights and made voluntary statements, which are admissible.” (Emphasis in original.)
*779In connection with the June 28 statement the trial court found that although the defendant initially requested the opportunity to talk to the police about a burglary, he initiated the subject of the murder and wanted to talk about it. The trial court also found that when the interview began the defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, “said he understood his rights, waived his rights and said he wanted to talk.”
The trial court also determined that the interview lasted about one and one-half hours, the defendant’s statement was logical, reasonable and not rambling, and the words and phrases used by the defendant indicated that he was thinking clearly and recalling times and incidents with precision. After making these extensive findings the trial court concluded that no undue pressure was used against the defendant and accordingly denied the motion to suppress.
In People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo.1982), a case involving a defendant who was under 18 years of age, we set out certain basic principles concerning the admission of a confession. We noted that a confession must be voluntary, and the burden is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntarily made. We also held that the fact that a statement was obtained without notification of counsel and out of the presence of counsel does not by itself amount to an unconstitutional violation of the defendant’s rights. Further, we reaffirmed the principle that a defendant could waive his right to counsel as well as his right to remain silent, but the waiver must be knowing and intelligent, although it need not be express.
The teaching of Thorpe is two-fold. First, the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver is to be determined from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Second, the trial court should look at the totality of circumstances, and its findings of fact concerning the voluntariness of a confession will be upheld if supported by the record.
Most recently in People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505 (Colo.1983), where we affirmed the suppression of statements made by the defendant, we took pains to affirm the oft-stated proposition that it is “for the trial judge to evaluate equivocal words or acts in the context of the relevant circumstances” and “an appellate court is in no position to weigh conflicting testimony presented to the trial court.” We further stated that “[o]n review, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact where they are supported by adequate evidence in the record.” Id. at 509.
Here, the findings of the trial court find substantial support in the record, and its conclusion that the defendant waived his rights follows the principles laid down in Thorpe.
In my view the majority, in order to arrive at the conclusion it does, has disregarded the trial court’s findings and substituted its own to support the conclusion that the totality of the circumstances requires suppression of part of the March 14 statement which necessitates a new trial, and the remand for a further hearing.
I dissent and would reverse the court of appeals.