Court Opinion

ID: 9841109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 08:08:54.379442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:48.045152
License: Public Domain

In The
                              Court of Appeals
                     Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                   No. 07-23-00132-CR

                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT

                                           V.

                           ISRAEL NAVARETTE, APPELLEE

                       On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
                                 Lubbock County, Texas
           Trial Court No. CC-2023-CR-0368, Honorable Mark Hocker, Presiding

                                 September 20, 2023
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

      The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of Israel

Navarette to quash a subsequent information. Through it, the State charged him with

driving while intoxicated. This information followed an earlier one dated April 22, 2020,

and accusing him of the same offense. Yet, the April 2020 instrument was dismissed by

the State due to it being accompanied by an unsworn complaint. That resulted in the

subsequent one at issue here, to which the State attached a sworn complaint. It was filed

on February 21, 2023.     But, because the underlying offense allegedly occurred on
February 1, 2020, Navarette deemed the instrument tardy; that is, limitations had expired.

So, he moved to quash the new information. The trial court agreed and quashed the

instrument. This appeal ensued. Through it, the State argues the trial court erred

because the original information tolled limitations despite the defective complaint. We

reverse.

       Discussion

       In computing limitations, the time during the “pendency of an indictment,

information, or complaint” is excluded from the calculation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 12.05(b); State v. Drummond, 501 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “[D]uring

the pendency” means the period of time “beginning with the day the indictment,

information, or complaint is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and ending with the

day such an accusation is . . . determined to be invalid for any reason.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 12.05(c); Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 83.              A “court of competent

jurisdiction” is one with jurisdiction of the offense. Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 482

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Jenkins v. State,

592 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). And, “[t]he presentment of an indictment or

information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.” TEX. CONST. art. V,

§ 12(b); Ex parte Ulloa, 514 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (stating that “Article

V, § 12 confers jurisdiction over a person upon the filing of an indictment or information”).

       Regarding an information, it “cannot be presented . . . unless it is filed with a

complaint.” Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 81; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22.

(stating that “[n]o information shall be presented until affidavit has been made by some

credible person charging the defendant with an offense”). Such a complaint “is a sworn

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affidavit, duly attested to by the district or county attorney, that is made ‘by some credible

person charging the defendant with an offense.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 21.22).

       Here, the record illustrates that a complaint actually accompanied the first (April

2020) information. Yet, all concede that it was “unsworn,” and the dispute at bar concerns

the effect of that unsworn complaint on tolling limitations. Does the absence of a proper

attestation or affiant somehow void or nullify the effect or presentation of an information

when calculating whether limitations was tolled? We answer, “No.”

       No doubt, the complaint at issue was defective for being unsworn. Yet, as noted

years ago in Aguilar v. State, 846 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc), “under

the explicit terms of the constitution itself, the mere presentment of an information to a

trial court invests that court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, regardless

of any defect that might exist in the underlying complaint.” Id. at 320 (emphasis added).

This pronouncement led our sister court in Carlson v. State, No. B14-92-00173-CR, 1994

Tex. App. LEXIS 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 3, 1994, no pet) (mem. op.),

to reject the proposition that an unsworn complaint deprived the Harris County court at

law of jurisdiction. Id. at *4 (wherein the complaint upon which the assault charge was

based was unsworn). As it said, “a defective complaint is no longer ‘jurisdictional’ in the

traditional sense.” Id. So, an unsworn complainant accompanying an information does

not deprive the county court at law of being a court of competent jurisdiction.

       Following this reasoning leads us to conclude that filing the April 2020 information

with the defective complaint sufficed to invest the Lubbock County Court at Law Number

1 with jurisdiction over the cause. That began the period contemplated within article

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12.05(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Because the period ended with the dismissal

on February 21, 2023, the intervening 34 months must be excluded when calculating

limitations. So excluding the period means that limitations had not expired when the

second information and complaint were also filed on February 21, 2023. That is, less

than two years had lapsed between appellant allegedly committing the misdemeanor and

the State refiling its information and complaint charging him with the crime. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.02(a) (stating that “[a]n indictment or information for any

Class A or Class B misdemeanor may be presented within two years from the date of the

commission of the offense, and not afterward”); Rodriguez v. State, No. 08-02-00342-CR,

2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6585, at *14 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 31, 2003, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (involving the utter absence of an accompanying

complaint and holding that “even a defective charging instrument will, according to the

terms of Article 12.05, serve to toll the statute of limitations until a court with jurisdiction

enters an order invalidating that charging instrument”).

       Accordingly, we sustain the State’s issue, reverse the order quashing the February

21, 2023 information, and remand the cause.

                                                           Brian Quinn
                                                           Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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