Court Opinion

ID: 9497935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:03:59.844278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:30.817918
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that we should not raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte, and that the eyewitness identifications in this case violated due process, I respectfully dissent.
I find it troubling that the majority has raised procedural default in this case despite the Supreme Court’s instruction in Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 118 S.Ct. 478, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997), that “procedural default is normally a defense that the State is obligated to raise and preserv[e] if it is not to lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.” Id. at 89, 118 S.Ct. 478 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While we have held that we have the discretionary power to raise issues of procedural default sua sponte, see Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir.2000), I believe that this is an inappropriate case to exercise such discretion. See Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir.2004) (concluding that because the state decided to challenge the defendant’s claims on the merits, rather than arguing procedural default, the state had waived this defense). Where, as here, the record indicates that the prosecution made the conscious decision not to assert procedural default, instead choosing to argue the case on its merits, we ought to decline to consider procedural default as a defense. See Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1095, 119 S.Ct. 1517, 143 L.Ed.2d 668 (1999) (indicating that when it is evident that the state intentionally declined to raise procedural default as a defense the court should be wary of raising the issue sua sponte); Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1037, 140 L.Ed.2d 103 (1998) (suggesting that in raising the defense sua sponte, federal courts must be wary of “acting as advocates for the state rather than as impartial magistrates”).
I also disagree with the majority’s application of the Biggers test in this case, as the identification procedures employed were unduly suggestive and the eyewitness identifications lacked sufficient independent indicia of reliability. At the outset, I fail to see how the majority can deem the highly improper identification procedures employed by the police as “only minimally suggestive.” Even the state in its brief concedes that the district court properly concluded that the line-up procedure employed was unduly suggestive. Respondent Br. at 16 (noting that it is undisputed that the witnesses’ observance of Howard in the courtroom prior to identifying Howard as the shooter was unduly suggestive); see also J.A. at 701 (D. Ct. Op. at 11) (indicating that permitting the witnesses prior to the line-up to observe Howard in the courtroom under circumstances suggesting that Howard was the defendant was “impermissibly suggestive”). Furthermore, we have in the past deemed as unduly suggestive courtroom contact between a defendant and a witness under circumstances similar to those pre*487sented in this case. See Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 896 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 3196, 96 L.Ed.2d 683 (1987) (procedure employed was unduly suggestive where witness was unable to identify the defendant until the witness sat next to him at a codefendant’s trial); see also United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir.1989) (procedure was unduly suggestive where police-officer witness observed the defendant in state court prior to identifying the defendant); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 658 (5th Cir.1997) (“it is obviously suggestive to ask a witness to identify a perpetrator in the courtroom when it is clear who is the defendant”); United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir.1995) (concluding that the procedure was unduly suggestive where the witnesses observed the defendant being brought out of the courtroom prior to identifying the defendant). As a result, I would conclude that the witnesses’ multiple observations of Howard in the courtroom seated at the defense table,1 one of which occurred a mere hour before the live line-up, were nothing short of unduly suggestive.
Additionally, despite the majority’s position to the contrary, there are insufficient independent indicia of reliability to bolster the three witnesses’ identifications of Howard as the shooter. The record suggests that both Chorney and Carter selected the wrong individual as the shooter when presented with the photo array immediately following the shooting. The majority contends that this misidentification is only minimally problematic as the men depicted in photograph one (the photograph of Howard) and photograph four (the photograph selected by the witnesses as the shooter) resemble one another. I disagree with the majority’s assessment of these two photographs, as the men depicted in them do not look at all similar to me. I believe this misidentification by Chorney and Carter therefore severely undercuts the reliability of their later identifications of Howard.
The majority’s assessment of the third Biggers factor, the accuracy of a witness’s prior description of the criminal, is also flawed. The majority focuses on the fact that the witnesses’ prior descriptions of the shooter were not inaccurate. The majority fails to consider, however, the fact that reliability can be undercut not only by inaccurate prior descriptions but also by a sparse prior description which becomes more detailed as a result of an unduly suggestive identification procedure. See Thigpen, 804 F.2d at 897 (noting that accuracy refers not only to whether a prior description matches a suspect but also “how particularly a description matches a suspect”) (emphasis in original); see also Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 138 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1118, 122 S.Ct. 930, 151 L.Ed.2d 892 (2002) (“Nor do the descriptions of the shooter given by [the witnesses] instill any confidence as to the reliability of their identifications ... for though they provided general information as to the shooter’s age, height, and weight, they provided virtually no detail about his face.”). In this case, that the witnesses described the shooter in exceedingly general terms and only mentioned Howard’s distinctive hair style and facial features after observing him in the courtroom weakens the reliability of their identifications.
Finally, the other Biggers factors do not indicate that there are sufficient independent indicia of reliability to overcome the unduly suggestive identification proce*488dures employed in this case. I agree with the majority that the witnesses had a good opportunity to observe the shooter while they attempted to repossess Schumate’s truck. I am disinclined, however, to believe that the witnesses were exceedingly focused on the shooter’s physical characteristics rather than the weapon he was carrying, particularly after the shooter began shooting at the tow truck. Raheem, 257 F.3d at 138 (suggesting that “it is human nature for a person toward whom a gun is being pointed to focus his attention more on the gun than on the face of the person pointing it”); Roger Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1013, 1018-19 (1995) (explaining that research indicates that “witnesses exposed to violence are better at recalling the perpetrator’s general actions than they are at describing the perpetrator.”). Additionally, while all three witnesses expressed certainty that the identification of Howard as the shooter was accurate, their conviction should be skeptically viewed under the circumstances of this case. See Rogers, 126 F.3d at 659 (noting that certainty should not be given undue weight where there has been an in-court observation of the defendant prior to identification as “[ejven the best intentioned among us cannot be sure that our recollection is not influenced by the fact that we are looking at a person we know the Government has charged with a crime”). Finally, while the three months that elapsed between the shooting and the live line-up is not a great length of time, it does not bolster the faulty identifications which occurred in this case.
For all these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s denial of Howard’s petition for habeas relief.

. Two of the eyewitnesses, Gapinski and Carter, also testified to having seen Howard being brought into the courtroom by court security and seated at the defense table during at least one of the two aborted preliminary hearings.