Court Opinion

ID: 9685116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:23:23.989759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:02.449243
License: Public Domain

HALE, Justice
(dissenting).
As I understand the majority opinion in this case, the judgment of the trial court is ■being reversed as to' all parties solely because of the alleged misconduct of the jury in discussing the proposition that appellee, hereafter referred to as defendant, supposedly had no protective insurance. Being unaible to agree to the judgment of reversal and the opinion upon which it is based, I respectfully enter my dissent thereto for two principal reasons, viz: (1) it appears to me that appellant, hereafter referred to as plaintiff, is in no position to complain of the conduct of the jury in discussing whether defendant' did or did not have any insurance coverage, and (2) I do not think plaintiff has discharged the burden of showing that the discussion of which he complains constituted material misconduct of such character that injury probably resulted to him, within the meaning of Rule 327 TRCP.
On February 8, 1951, our court handed down its original opinion in this cause in which, for the reasons therein set forth, it overruled each of the 9 points of error upon which the appeal is predicated. Although I was not in full agreement with the reasons therein set forth as to why plaintiff’s First Point should be overruled, I was in agreement with the conclusion there reached for the reasons upon which this dissent is now based.
It was undoubtedly improper for plaintiff to prove of offer to prove, in the presence of the jury, as he did, .-that he was a beneficiary under the compensation policy as alleged by Travelers’ Insurance Co., hereafter referred to as the insurance company, or the amount of benefits which had accrued or would accrue to him thereunder, or that his action against defendant was brought with the cons.ent of the insurance company, because all of these matters were irrelevant and immaterial in so far as the jury was concerned and were reasonably calculated to confuse and mislead the jury and becloud the issues which the jurors were being called upon to decide. Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S.W.2d 811 and authorities. All of the able and experienced counsel in this case must have known that such improper conduct would in all reasonable probability open up a veritable “Pandora’s box” on the question of protective insurance, and they should have anticipated and foreseen that some such discussion as that which actually occurred in the jury room might reasonably be expected to result from such misconduct, regardless of any proper admonitory instruction which the trial court might give to the jury with, respect thereto. To have expected less- from the jurors would have been to expect too much of human nature or too little of human intelligence, or a combination of both.
My brethren are inclined to the view, as expressed.in the majority opinion, that the improper conduct of plaintiff in electing to prove before the jury the status of his contractual relation with the • insurance company was induced either in whole or in part by the misconduct of counsel for defendant in creating in the minds, of the jury the opinion that plaintiff had some character of protection in the way of .insurance before the plaintiff made direct proof of that fact, I do,not share that view. I find nothing which indicates' that counsel for defendant improperly, attempted at any time to prove in the presence of the jury that the defendant or plaintiff did or did not have any insurance protection. ■ But, be that as 'it may, if the counsel for defendant had done so, or if he improperly prodded the counsel for plaintiff into such misconduct, I fail to.see how that would relieve either, of the parties from the consequences of, the mutual misconduct o.f both. On the contrary, it appears to me that such action would only estop both of the parties from complaining of what they had deliberately induced the jury to do. • After the plaintiff had introduced in evidence before the jury *558the policy of insurance described in the insurance company’s plea in intervention, he placed the insurance company’s adjuster, Alverson, on the witness stand, and after having proved Iby Mr. Alverson the amounts which the insurance company had .paid out to plaintiff and for his benefit, the counsel for plaintiff then asked Mr. Alver-son as to whether plaintiff had obtained from the insurance company authority to bring this suit against the third' party defendant, and after some exchange of the views between the counsel for plaintiff and defendant as to whether plaintiff was entitled to make such proof before the jury, it was then stipulated in the presence of the jury that plaintiff had not waived any of his rights against the insurance company by bringing this suit and that the insurance company was obligated to make compensation payments to plaintiff for 401 weeks, amounting to approximately $10,000.
I see no valid reason why plaintiff’s counsel should have willingly injected the complete status of plaintiff’s protective insurance into the case in the presence of the jury upon any theory except the supposition that such improper matter would tend to swell the amount of the damages which the jury might award, if any, so that plaintiff would have a substantial amount for his own benefit after the insurance company had recouped its loss in the approximate sum of $10,000. I believe the trial judge was authorized under all the evidence adduced at the hearing of plaintiff’s motion for new trial to find that whatever discussion the jurors might have had with respect to whether defendant did or did not have protective insurance emanated from and was attributable solely to the improper conduct of counsel in deliberately injecting into the case the status of plaintiff and the insurance company with respect to compensation insurance. Hence, upon the most elemental principles of waiver and estoppel which underlie the doctrine of invited error, I do not think the plaintiff is in any position to complain of the conduct of the jury in discussing the matter of protective insurance. 3 T.J. p. 1031, Sec. 731.
The record in this cause shows that plaintiff and the insurance company were each represented in the trial court by the law-firm of MoCampbell, Wood & Kirkham. The insurance company did nothing in the trial court other than to file and present its plea in intervention. It did not object to anything that happened in the court below and it has not appealed or attempted to appeal from the judgment that was rendered against it. Since plaintiff’s counsel definitely chose to introduce the subject of protective insurance to the jury as an attractive lure on behalf of their client, regardless of why such was done and poisonous though such subject was in its obvious possibilities, it appears to me that in all good conscience plaintiff has no just ground for complaint because some or all of the confused jurors hesitated or refused in the consideration of the beclouded issues to swallow the hook, line and sinker, along with the tainted 'bait, which had been improperly cast in their midst. Having definitely -aimed and fired for a swollen recovery, it is my opinion that plaintiff should not now be heard to complain of missing the mark, even though his faulty marksmanship might have been due in part to the recoil of an overloaded gun.
Furthermore, if it could be said that plaintiff is in any position to complain of the alleged misconduct of the jury in discussing the proposition of protective insurance, I do not think he has conclusively discharged the burden of showing material misconduct of such character that injury probably resulted to him. Some of the jurors testified that during their deliberations concerning a proper answer to issues 18 and 19 they were of the opinion that it was not of much importance how they should answer such issues because they had already found the defendant was negligent. Most of the jurors testified in effect that they thought plaintiff wuold be entitled to recover a judgment against defendant under the verdict they had rendered. Of course, each and all of the jurors knew and could not help but know without any evidence of any kind whatsoever, that the defendant either did or did not have protective insurance. One or the other horns of that dilemma would necessarily be a self-evident fact to anyone. However, *559there was no showing from the evidence in this case that any particular juror was of the opinion that defendant did or did not have any protective insurance at the time when he finally voted “Yes” on issue 18 or 19, or that he was in any wise influenced to vote “Yes" on either of such issues ibecause he was of the opinion that the defendant did not have such insurance.
Viewing all the evidence adduced upon the hearing of plaintiff’s motion for new trial and upon the trial of the merits in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and action in failing to grant a new trial, as I think it is the duty of our court to do, I cannot say that material misconduct was shown or if so that, from the record as a whole, injury probably resulted to plaintiff by reason thereof. In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.