Court Opinion

ID: 9411384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 18:01:01.672562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.446721
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD LU,                                      No.    22-55457

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                5:20-cv-01062-CBM-SHK
 v.

SAUN D. JACKSON,                                MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant,

and

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; JAMES
HERINGTON; DOES, 1 through 10,

                Defendants.

EDWARD LU,                                      No.    22-55683

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                5:20-cv-01062-CBM-SHK
 v.

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; SAUN D.
JACKSON; DOES, 1 through 10,

                Defendants,

and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
JAMES HERINGTON,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                  Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

                        Argued and Submitted July 14, 2023
                               Pasadena, California

Before: SANCHEZ and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON,** District
Judge.

      Defendant Deputies Saun Jackson and James Herington appeal the district

court’s denials of their motions for summary judgment on Edward Lu’s (“Lu’s”)

excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We “review orders denying

qualified immunity under the collateral order exception to finality.” Ballou v.

McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 421 (9th Cir. 2022). “On interlocutory appeal, we review

de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity and view the facts in the

light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Estate of Aguirre v. Cnty. of

Riverside, 29 F.4th 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2022). The deputies are not entitled to

qualified immunity if their “conduct (1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was

clearly established at the time of the violation.” Ballou, 29 F.4th at 421.

      **
            The Honorable Brian A. Jackson, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

                                          2
   1. We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the

Defendants for Lu’s claim that the deputies used excessive force by pointing their

guns at him during the execution of a valid search warrant. Defendants arrived at

Lu’s residence to execute a search warrant for evidence of marijuana cultivation

and weapons. Defendants, along with other deputies, pointed their guns at Lu from

the moment he exited his house until the deputies were able to put him in

handcuffs and pat him down.

      First, Defendants did not violate Lu’s constitutional rights because pointing

guns at Lu was reasonable force. “Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful

balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). It was not unreasonable for the deputies to point their guns at Lu

until he was handcuffed. While Lu was calm and compliant, the deputies were

executing a felony search warrant for drugs and firearms, which “is the kind of

transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or

destroy evidence.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). Defendants’

interests in ensuring officer safety and facilitating an orderly search outweigh the

intrusion on Lu’s rights.

                                          3
      Second, even assuming a constitutional violation, there was no clearly

established law at the time of the incident that would have alerted the deputies that

pointing a gun in these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment. In denying

qualified immunity, the district court relied on Robinson v. Solano County, 278

F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). But Robinson is distinguishable. There, the officers

were responding to a dispatch reporting a misdemeanor. Id. at 1014. The only

factor favoring a use of force in Robinson was that Robinson had earlier been

armed with a shotgun. Id. Here, the deputies were executing a valid felony search

warrant for marijuana cultivation and weapons. At the time of the incident, it was

not clearly established that while executing a felony search warrant for drugs and

weapons, briefly pointing guns at a suspect until the deputies could handcuff him

constituted excessive force.

   2. We also reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the

Defendants for Lu’s claim that the deputies’ use of properly applied handcuffs was

an unreasonable seizure. “[A] warrant to search for contraband founded on

probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the

occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S.

at 705. The “safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons [is]

sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100

(2005). Therefore, there was no constitutional violation.

                                           4
REVERSED.

            5