Court Opinion

ID: 9403118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 15:06:09.394334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:04.610305
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221845

No. 1-22-1845
                                                                              FIRST DISTRICT
                                                                              SECOND DIVISION
                                                                              June 20, 2023

STEVEN LEVINE,                                                )       Appeal from the
                                                              )       Circuit Court of
        Plaintiff-Appellant,                                  )       Cook County.
                                                              )
        v.                                                    )       No. 22 L 5173
                                                              )
UL LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,                 )       Honorable
                                                              )       Patrick J. Sherlock,
        Defendant-Appellee.                                   )       Judge Presiding.

        JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
        Presiding Justice Fitzgerald-Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment and
        opinion.

                                             OPINION

¶1      Plaintiff, Steven Levine, filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County

against defendant, UL LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (UL) for wrongful

termination. UL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The

circuit court of Cook County granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3      This appeal is from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss a complaint at the pleading

stage of litigation. This fact, illuminated by the standard of review in such cases, leads us to take

the pertinent facts necessary to resolve the appeal from plaintiff’s complaint and accept those

allegations as true.

¶4      Plaintiff served as UL’s employee from September 2009 until October 19, 2021. During

that time, plaintiff possessed a valid concealed carry license pursuant to the Firearm Concealed

Carry Act (Act) (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2020)). Defendant has an employee handbook and

required plaintiff to review the handbook and sign an acknowledgment that plaintiff read and
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understood the handbook. Defendant’s employee handbook provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

               “While we cannot list every form of unacceptable behavior, here are some

       examples:

                                                ***

               Carrying firearms, weapons, or dangerous substances at any time, on

       premises owned or occupied by UL, unless state law provides otherwise.

               Note: This prohibition applies only to the extent allowed by applicable

       state law. In those states that specifically give you the right to maintain a lawfully

       possessed firearm in a locked vehicle in our parking lot, you will be permitted to

       maintain a firearm in your own locked vehicle in compliance with the law. Under

       those circumstances, you are strictly prohibited from removing the firearm from

       your vehicle or carrying it on your person or into a building.”

¶5     On September 9, 2021, plaintiff parked his personal vehicle on defendant’s property in

defendant’s outdoor parking lot. On September 9, plaintiff had locked in his vehicle two pistols

and ammunition. The manner in which plaintiff locked the guns and ammunition in his vehicle

while he was at work complied with the requirements of the Act.

¶6     On September 9, 2021, burglars broke into plaintiff’s vehicle and another vehicle in

defendant’s parking lot. The burglars stole plaintiff’s two guns and ammunition. On October 19,

2021, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment. Defendant stated the reason for the

termination was plaintiff’s obstruction of defendant’s investigation into the burglaries by not

disclosing the handguns and ammunition to defendant’s investigators after the burglary. Plaintiff

alleges, in full, “this was merely pretextual, as the real reason [plaintiff] was terminated was

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[defendant’s] disapproval of [plaintiff] possessing the firearms in his vehicle in the first place.”

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that plaintiff’s termination violated public policy and Illinois law.

¶7      Plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated him in retaliation for plaintiff allegedly

exercising his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, and section

65(b) of the Act (id. §65(b)). Plaintiff alleges the purpose of section 65(b) is to facilitate the

exercise of those alleged rights. Plaintiff alleges that section 65(b) of the Act evinces a “clear

mandate of public policy” that persons have the right to store firearms when entering private

property that has prohibited possessing concealed firearms on its property. Therefore, plaintiff

alleges, defendant’s act of terminating plaintiff’s employment for storing his handguns and

ammunition in his vehicle while parked in defendant’s parking lot “violated a clear mandate of

public policy.”

¶8      On August 5, 2022, defendant filed a motion pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with

prejudice. Defendant asserted that, after the burglary from the vehicles, it conducted an

investigation into the break-ins. Defendant’s motion repeated that defendant terminated plaintiff

“for obstructing the Company’s investigation of the theft by failing to disclose the missing

firearms to [defendant’s] investigators.” Defendant asserted that plaintiff obstructed defendant’s

investigation by failing to disclose “the firearms—or their theft—to [defendant’s] investigators.”

¶9      Defendant argued that retaliatory discharge is a “ ‘limited and narrow exception’ ” to the

rule that an employer may terminate an at-will employee for “no reason at all” and that the

exception only applies if an “employer violates a ‘clear mandate of public policy.’ ” Defendant

argued that plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law

because plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that plaintiff’s termination “violates a ‘clear mandate

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of public policy.’ ” Defendant noted that to state a claim for retaliatory discharge requires a

plaintiff to allege the discharge was in retaliation for activities and that the discharge violates a

clear mandate of public policy. Defendant asserted that, where a plaintiff cites a statute to

support a claim of retaliatory discharge, the question is “whether a public policy is clearly

mandated” by the statute and, if so, whether the termination violated that clear public policy

mandate. Defendant argued that our supreme court has a “narrow definition of public policy” for

retaliatory discharge cases and that under this “narrow definition” plaintiff cannot prove any set

of facts to bring his termination within the scope of the exception to the at-will employee

termination rule.

¶ 10   Defendant argued that, in practice, Illinois courts have only recognized public policy

exceptions to the rule for at-will employees “where (1) the discharge stems from asserting a

worker’s compensation claim or (2) the discharge is for ‘whistleblowing.’ ” Defendant also

argued that a public policy restricting the power of the government—rather than placing

restrictions on private individuals—cannot form the basis of a retaliatory discharge by a private

employer. In this case, defendant argued, the statute plaintiff relies on is a restriction on the

power of government to punish certain behavior surrounding firearms but does not speak to “the

parameters of a private employer’s obligations with respect to its employee’s possession of

firearms.” (Emphasis omitted.)

¶ 11   Regarding the provision in the Act permitting firearm licensees to keep firearms in their

vehicles on property that has restricted the carrying of concealed firearms on their property,

defendant argued that plaintiff read section 65(b) outside its “broader context and purpose.”

Defendant argued the statute, like the United States and Illinois Constitutions, evince a public

policy regulating the government’s ability to restrict the right to keep and bear arms; they do not

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limit a private employer’s ability to restrict its employees’ ability to bring guns to work. Thus,

defendant argued, even if plaintiff were correct and the reason given for his termination was

pretextual, plaintiff’s terminations “would not violate the very narrow ‘clear mandate of public

policy’ requirement.”

¶ 12   Defendant argued the

       “clearly mandated public policy’ exception to the rule on termination of at-will

       employees should not be expanded to conduct that does not violate the Act. Defendant

       also argued the scope of the public policy exception to at-will employment should be

       limited to “what has been recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court.”

¶ 13   Furthermore, defendant argued that plaintiff only pled “conclusory allegations of alleged

pretext which are insufficient to plead a claim for wrongful termination,” also warranting

dismissal for failure to state a claim. Defendant asserted that although plaintiff alleges that

defendant’s real reason for terminating plaintiff was its alleged “disapproval” of plaintiff’s

possession of firearms in his vehicle, plaintiff “alleges no facts to suggest that [defendant] was

hostile to [plaintiff’s] possession of guns.” Defendant also argued that the complaint contains no

factual allegations whatsoever substantiating the allegation that defendant’s stated reason for

terminating plaintiff was retaliation for plaintiff exercising his rights. Defendant argued (1) that

plaintiff cannot use these conclusory allegations to state a claim in hopes that discovery will

yield support for his speculation, (2) that plaintiff cannot cure these deficiencies through

amendment, and (3) that, therefore, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 14   On November 14, 2022, following full briefing by the parties, the trial court granted

defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court noted that “actions for retaliatory

discharge have generally been sustained only in two situations: 1) where the discharge stems

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from exercising rights pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act; or 2) where the discharge is

for ‘whistleblowing’ activities, namely the reporting of illegal or improper conduct.” The trial

court found that the authorities stood for the proposition that merely referencing a constitutional

or statutory provision in a complaint does not give rise to a retaliatory discharge cause of action.

Instead, a review of the public policy underlying the enactment of the provision must reveal a

clear indication that this right is intended to apply to the employer-employee relationship. The

court found that the federal and state constitutions and the Act merely “provide protection from

the government’s restriction on plaintiff’s right to keep and bear arms.”

¶ 15   The court concluded:

       “Absent any specific legislation restricting an employer’s right to infringe on an

       employee’s right to keep and bear arms, the Court does not extend the [retaliatory

       discharge] cause of action beyond those judicially recognized, specifically discharge in

       retaliation for exercising rights under the workers’ compensation act and for actions

       related to whistleblowing.”

The court found plaintiff failed to plead any allegations that fall within those two exceptions to

the at-will employment rule.

¶ 16   This appeal followed.

¶ 17                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18   This appeal comes on a trial court judgment granting a motion to dismiss a complaint at

the pleading stage of litigation. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020). The manner in which this

court reviews such judgments is familiar:

               “We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to

       section 2-615 of the Code and may affirm the trial court’s dismissal for any

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        reason supported by the record. [Citation.] A section 2-615 motion to dismiss tests

        the legal sufficiency of a complaint, i.e., whether the allegations of the complaint,

        when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, state sufficient facts to

        establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. [Citation.] When

        ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-

        pled facts in the complaint and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. [Citation.]

        We do not, however, take mere conclusions of law or fact contained within the

        challenged pleading as true unless they are supported by specific factual

        allegations. [Citation.]

                ‘A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it

                clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle

                the plaintiff to recover. Because Illinois is a fact-pleading

                jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring his or

                her claim within the scope of the cause of action asserted.’

                [Citation.]” Cretella v. Azcon, Inc. 2022 IL App (1st) 211224, ¶ 11.

¶ 19    There is no question defendant was plaintiff’s at-will employee who, except under certain

circumstances, could be discharged for “any reason or no reason. [Citations.]” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 500 (2009). One exception

to this general rule “arises where there has been a retaliatory discharge of the employee.” Id. In

Illinois, the tort of retaliatory discharge is “limited and narrow.” Id. “To state a valid retaliatory

discharge cause of action, an employee must allege that (1) the employer discharged the

employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee’s activities, and (3) that the discharge violates a

clear mandate of public policy. [Citations.]” Id.

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¶ 20    Two elements are at play in this appeal: (1) whether plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts

to properly allege that plaintiff’s termination was for plaintiff’s activities and whether, if it was,

that discharge violates a “clear mandate of public policy.” Although the former is based on the

allegations of fact in the complaint and the latter is based on the allegations of law in complaint,

when reviewing a judgment granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code,

both inquiries concern a question of law for this court that we review, without deference to the

trial court, de novo. 1 2 Id. at 499 (“A court reviews de novo an order granting a section 2-615

motion to dismiss.”); see also Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 296 Ill. App. 3d

675, 682-83 (1998); Lipinski v. Martin J. Kelly Oldsmobile, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 1139, 1144

(2001) (“we will disregard mere conclusions of law”).

¶ 21   If we determine that the Act evinces a clearly mandated public policy that private

employers of at-will employees must permit concealed carry license holders to store firearms in

their vehicles on the employer’s property, then we must consider whether plaintiff’s complaint

alleges sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim that plaintiff’s termination was in retaliation

for plaintiff exercising that policy. We first address whether plaintiff has pleaded a “clearly

mandated issue of public policy” because any judgment on the question of whether plaintiff

sufficiently pleaded retaliation would be pointless if no clearly mandated public policy is

implicated. The trial court has already expressed its belief that it cannot expand the “public

policies” that can be pleaded in a retaliatory discharge complaint beyond rights under the

        1
          Although, we are cognizant that our supreme court has noted that “the element of
retaliation, which involves causation and motive, is factual in nature and generally more suitable
for resolution by the trier of fact. [Citations.]” Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 502.

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Workers’ Compensation Act or for whistleblowing. To properly resolve this appeal, the

questions for this court are whether the tort of retaliatory discharge is limited to those two public

policies or whether it may be expanded, within our supreme court’s guidance, to include other

public policies; and, whether section 65(b) of the Act evinces such a policy.

¶ 22    We find, for the reasons stated below, that (1) the tort of retaliatory discharge is not so

“limited and narrow” that it may not encompass termination in retaliation for actions in

accordance with other “clearly mandated public policies,” specifically, those not yet recognized

by this or our supreme court, (2) section 65(b) of the Act evinces a “clearly mandated public

policy” for purposes of the tort of retaliatory discharge, and (3) plaintiff failed to plead facts to

sufficiently allege that defendant terminated him in retaliation for his conduct in accord with the

policy in section 65(b) of the Act but plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend his

complaint.

¶ 23                    A. Scope of Public Policy in Retaliatory Discharge

¶ 24    This court has found that, in practice, Illinois courts have found the public policy element

to be met where (1) the discharge stems from asserting a worker’s compensation claim or (2) the

discharge is for “whistleblowing,” i.e., reporting of illegal or improper conduct. Sutherland v.

Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 356 Ill. App. 3d 620, 626 (2005) (citing Geary v. Telular Corp., 341

Ill. App. 3d 694, 701 (2003) (collecting cases)). 3 However, in Turner, our supreme court did not

limit the scope of the meaning of “clearly mandated public policy” to only those implicating

protections under the Workers’ Compensation Act or for whistleblowing. See Turner, 233 Ill. 2d

at 500-04. In fact, the Turner decision fails to ever mention the Workers’ Compensation Act or

        This court recognized these findings in Gonzales v. Garfield Park Conservatory Alliance, 2020
        3

IL App (1st) 190739-U, ¶ 19.
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whistleblowing. See id. Instead, the court implicitly permits plaintiffs to at least attempt to show

the expression of a “clearly mandated public policy” for purposes of the tort of retaliation in

different statutes. See id. at 505.

¶ 25    The Turner court explained, however, that “the mere citation of a constitutional or

statutory provision in a complaint will not, by itself, be sufficient to state a cause of action for

retaliatory discharge. Rather, an employee must show that the discharge violated the public

policy that the cited provision clearly mandates.” Id. In expressing what “clearly mandates”

means in this context, our supreme court explained that “ ‘clearly mandated public policy’

implies that the policy will be recognizable simply because it is clear. ‘An employer should not

be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific

guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations. [Citations.]’ ” Id. at 503

(quoting Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992));

accord Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chemical, Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa 2000) (stating that

requirement of “well-recognized and clear public policy” “helps ensure that employers have

notice that their dismissal decisions will give rise to liability”). Examples of general expressions

of public policy that do not suffice to give rise to a claim of retaliatory discharge, according to

our supreme court, “include ‘right to marry’ a coworker [citation]; ‘product safety’ [citation];

‘promoting quality health care’ [citation]; and ‘the Hippocratic Oath’ [citation].” Turner, 233 Ill.

2d at 503.

¶ 26    Moreover, our supreme court quoted favorably its earlier discussion of the meaning of

“clearly mandated public policy” in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130

(1981), as follows:

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               “ ‘There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that

       public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the

       State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and,

       when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. [Citation.] Although there is no

       precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies

       from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving

       retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s

       social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.’

       [Citation.]” Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 500-01 (quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130).

Additionally, the constitutional or statutory provision relied upon by the plaintiff must do more

than limit the power of government. See Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 527 (1985)

(rejecting argument that violation by “anyone” of provisions that are “limitations only on the

power of government” is a violation of a clearly mandated public policy).

¶ 27   Based on the foregoing, we find that a “clearly mandated public policy,” for purposes of

the tort of retaliatory discharge, is not limited to policy arising from the Workers’ Compensation

Act or from whistleblower protections. Rather, a “clearly mandated public policy” may be found

in any of the State’s “constitution[,] statutes[,] and *** judicial decisions.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 500. To qualify as a “clearly mandated public policy” for

purposes of the tort of retaliatory discharge, the alleged policy must not be limited to a restriction

on government power but must, collectively not individually, “strike at the heart of a citizen’s

social rights, duties, and responsibilities.” Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130-31 (“The cause of action

is allowed where the public policy is clear but is denied where it is equally clear that only private

interests are at stake.”). We must also examine the statutory provision to determine whether it

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reflects the policy that the plaintiff alleges. See Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 505-06 (“We do not read

section 3 of the Medical Patients Rights Act to establish a clearly mandated public policy of

patient safety that was violated by plaintiff’s discharge. *** It is apparent that, as far as this

section addresses medical record preparation at all, it is only concerned with record

confidentiality, rather than record timeliness.”). Finally, the discharge must violate the public

policy clearly mandated by the statute. Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 527; Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 503

(“Unless the employee identifies a clear mandate of public policy that is violated by the

employee’s discharge, the complaint will not state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.”).

¶ 28    We turn now to an application of these principles to the policy allegedly espoused in

section 65(b) of the Act.

¶ 29           B. Section 65(B) of the Act States a Clearly Mandated Public Policy

¶ 30    We find that section 65(b) of the Act evinces a clearly mandated public policy that may

form the basis of a claim of retaliatory discharge. We find section 65(b) of the Act:

                (1) espouses the policy for which plaintiff relies on it (Turner, 233 Ill. 2d

        at 505-06);

                (2) is more than a restriction on the power of government to punish

        concealed carry license holders and does concern the relationship of private

        individuals, including employers and employees (Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 527

        (rejecting constitutional and statutory provisions limiting the power of

        government as indicators of public policy); id. at 528 (rejecting finding a clearly

        mandated public policy for purposes of a claim of retaliatory discharge where the

        provisions at issue “mandate nothing concerning the relationship of private

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       individuals, including private individuals in the employer-employee

       relationship”));

               (3) provides specific guidance to employers that dismissal in retaliation for

       exercising the policy at issue may give rise to liability (Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 503

       (holding “generalized expressions of public policy fail to provide essential notice

       to employers”)); and

               (4) in this case, plaintiff’s discharge violates that policy (id.).

¶ 31   Plaintiff argues that the public policy contained in section 65(b) of the Act is a policy to

facilitate Illinois’s citizens’ rights to keep and bear arms and right to self-defense by enabling the

rights of concealed carry license holders not to have to leave their firearms at home when visiting

locations that have prohibited firearms or face criminal liability. Section 65(b) of the Act

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

               “(a-10) The owner of private real property of any type may prohibit the

       carrying of concealed firearms on the property under his or her control. The

       owner must post a sign in accordance with subsection (d) of this Section

       indicating that firearms are prohibited on the property, unless the property is a

       private residence.

               (b) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (a-5) [(not at issue here)], and (a-10)

       of this Section except under paragraph (22) or (23) of subsection (a) [(also not at

       issue)], any licensee prohibited from carrying a concealed firearm into the parking

       area of a prohibited location specified in subsection *** (a-10) of this Section

       shall be permitted to carry a concealed firearm on or about his or her person

       within a vehicle into the parking area and may store a firearm or ammunition

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        concealed in a case within a locked vehicle or locked container out of plain view

        within the vehicle in the parking area. A licensee may carry a concealed firearm

        in the immediate area surrounding his or her vehicle within a prohibited parking

        lot area only for the limited purpose of storing or retrieving a firearm within the

        vehicle’s trunk. ***

                ***

                (d) Signs stating that the carrying of firearms is prohibited shall be clearly

        and conspicuously posted at the entrance of a building, premises, or real property

        specified in this Section as a prohibited area, unless the building or premises is a

        private residence. Signs shall be of a uniform design as established by the [Illinois

        State Police] and shall be 4 inches by 6 inches in size. The [Illinois State Police]

        shall adopt rules for standardized signs to be used under this subsection.” 430

        ILCS 66/65 (West 2020).

¶ 32    We find that the purpose of section 65(b) of the Act is not merely to constrain the power

of the government to prosecute concealed carry license holders for taking their firearms into the

parking areas of prohibited property. “The public policy underlying a statutory or constitutional

provision is found by examining the history, purpose, language and effect of the provision.”

Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at 527. “The basic intent of the legislature can be ascertained by examining the

terminology of the statute, its goals and purposes, the natural import of the words used in

common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and the general structure of

the statute as a whole.” Costello v. Governing Board of Lee County Special Education Ass’n, 252

Ill. App. 3d 547, 557 (1993); see also Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (2013) (construing

structure of statute).

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¶ 33       The Act does establish criminal culpability and punishment for a violation of its

provisions. See 430 ILCS 66/70(e) (West 2020) (“Except as otherwise provided, a licensee in

violation of this Act shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation

is a Class A misdemeanor.”). Nonetheless, section 65 of the Act makes no mention of

prosecution under the Act. To find that the only purpose of section 65(b) is to restrain

prosecution of license holders under section 70 would have to rely on the “except as otherwise

provided” language in section 70 but nothing in section 65. Further, section 65(b), read as a

whole, imposes an obligation on private property owners in relationship to the rights of

concealed carry license holders, without mention of the power of government to enforce that

obligation. Id. § 65(b). The statute does mandate something in the relationship between private

individuals, including individuals in the employer-employee context. In that relationship, the Act

mandates that employers who prohibit firearms on their property must post signs to that effect

and permit concealed carry licensees to keep firearms in their vehicles in compliance with the

statute.

¶ 34       We also find that the guidance provided by the statute is clear and specific. Section 65(b)

is not a generalized expression of a public policy favoring concealed carry license holders.

Section 65(b) provides clear direction to private property owners, including employers, and

license holders, in a specific context. Under the statute, license holders know precisely how and

when to secure their firearms, and employers know precisely what they must do under the public

policy at issue or face liability for a discharge that violates that policy.

¶ 35       Moreover, the Act itself is found in the Public Safety chapter of the Illinois statutes. In

addition to the Act (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2020)), the Public Safety chapter of the Illinois

statutes addresses such matters as hazardous substances (430 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2020)),

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poison prevention packaging (430 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2020)), boiler and pressure vessel

safety (430 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2020)), and amusement ride and attraction safety (430 ILCS

85/2-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The placement of the Act in the chapter on Public Safety itself

suggests its purpose is neither exclusively nor primarily related to the power of the government

to prosecute concealed carry license holders or to revoke their licenses but that its purpose is

related to the safety of the public with regard to a potentially dangerous implement. See Costello,

252 Ill. App. 3d at 557; Maracich, 570 U.S. 48. Section 65(b) provides—and its primary purpose

appears to be—the creation and delineation of an exception to the right of private property

owners to prohibit firearms on their property and that exception is in favor of concealed carry

license holders. We find that the policy embodied in such an exception is to balance the rights of

concealed carry owners to the fullest degree possible against the rights of private property

owners. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 812 S.E.2d 527, 530-31

(Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (Dillard, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Ellington, J.) (finding that in a

similar statute the Georgia General Assembly sought to balance these sacrosanct rights of

property owners and to keep and bear arms); Minnesota Police & Peace Officers Ass’n v.

National Football League, A15-0317, 2015 WL 4877998, at *3 n.6 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17,

2015) (“The structure and text of subdivision 17 show the various policy considerations that the

legislature weighed in determining the appropriate balance between permit holders’ rights to

carry and the rights of private-property owners.”).

¶ 36      Furthermore, the policy at issue in section 65(b) goes beyond plaintiff’s private interests.

Examples of private interests for which the court has disallowed retaliatory discharge claims

include

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       “a dispute over a company’s internal management system (Keneally v. Orgain,

       [606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980)]), where the worker took too much sick leave (Jones

       v. Keogh, [409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979)]), where the worker tried to examine the

       company’s books in his capacity as a shareholder (Campbell v. Ford Industries,

       Inc., [546 P.2d 141 (Or. 1976)]), where the worker impugned the company’s

       integrity (Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., [270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978)]),

       where the worker refused to be examined by a psychological-stress evaluator

       (Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., [573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)]), where the

       worker was attending night school (Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., [551 S.W.2d 811

       (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)]), or where the worker improperly used the employer’s

       Christmas fund (Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, [563 P.2d 54 (Idaho

       1977)]).” Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 131.

This is not a case where the policy involves only a private interest where the policy implicates

general societal rights concerning firearms and the rights of all private property owners. Further,

our supreme court has recognized “[t]here is no public policy more important or more

fundamental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.

See Ill. Const. 1970, Preamble; Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).” Id. at

132.

¶ 37   Finally, accepting the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint as true, plaintiff’s termination

violated the policy espoused in section 65(b). Based on the allegations in the complaint, (1) the

statute permitted plaintiff to secure his handguns in compliance with the statute in his vehicle,

even while on defendant’s parking lot, (2) the plaintiff secured his handguns in his vehicle in the

parking lot, and (3) defendant terminated him because of it.

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¶ 38   Accordingly, we find plaintiff can state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based

on section 65(b) of the Act.

¶ 39                    C. Plantiff Failed to Sufficiently Allege Retaliation

¶ 40   Our finding that plaintiff can state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on

section 65(b) of the Act notwithstanding, we find that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to

state a claim that defendant terminated him in retaliation for storing his handguns in his vehicle

in defendant’s parking lot. We agree with defendant that plaintiff has pled no specific facts to

support that claim but states it only as a conclusion. Plaintiff tacitly admits the defect by asking

this court to remand so that plaintiff may conduct discovery on the issue.

¶ 41   When the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, it did so with the erroneous

belief that plaintiff could not state a legal claim for retaliatory discharge based on section 65(b)

of the Act. Therefore, from the court’s perspective, plaintiff could never state a cause of action

for retaliatory discharge, even in an amended complaint.

       “A dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code should be made with prejudice only

       where it is clearly apparent that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling

       recovery. *** If a plaintiff can state a cause of action by amending his complaint,

       dismissal with prejudice should not be granted.” (Internal quotation marks

       omitted.) Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 210470, ¶ 81.

¶ 42   In this case, we have determined that section 65 implicates public policy, such that an

employee who is discharged in retaliation for exercising rights based on section 65 can state a

cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We are “unwilling to say that plaintiff[ ] would be

unable to draft [his] complaint in such a way as to properly allege *** a cause of action.” Id. We

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note that before discovery plaintiff may allege supporting facts “on information and belief.” This

court has stated:

        “In some cases, certain relevant facts of a cause of action will not be known to the

        plaintiff. ‘Where facts of necessity are within defendant’s knowledge and not

        within plaintiff’s knowledge, a complaint which is as complete as the nature of

        the case allows is sufficient.’ [Citation.] At times, plaintiffs ‘may be forced to

        present allegations of express authority upon information and belief.’ [Citation.]

        ‘ “[A]n allegation made on information and belief is not equivalent to an

        allegation of relevant fact” [citation], but at the pleading stage a plaintiff will not

        have the benefit of discovery tools’ to discern facts hidden from the plaintiff.

        [Citation.] The plaintiff will have knowledge of what he did to learn the facts that

        he alleges on information and belief, and should allege any efforts taken to

        discover those facts.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.) In re Estate of

        DiMatteo, 2013 IL App (1st) 122948, ¶ 83.

¶ 43    We also note our supreme court’s recognition that “the element of retaliation, which

involves causation and motive, is factual in nature and generally more suitable for resolution by

the trier of fact. [Citations.]” Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 501 n.1. We find there is a set of facts on

which plaintiff may be entitled to recover for retaliation but plaintiff has not pled them.

Therefore, we find that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss but erred in

dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

¶ 44    For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court, granting the motion to

dismiss with prejudice, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment, to the extent it is

based on failure to allege a “clearly mandated public policy,” is reversed. The judgment granting

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the motion to dismiss for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim that plaintiff’s

termination was in retaliation for acting under the public policy in section 65(b) of the Act is

affirmed. However, to the extent the dismissal is with prejudice, it is reversed and the cause

remanded with instructions to allow amendment of the complaint.

¶ 45                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in

part, reversed in part, and remanded.

¶ 47    Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶ 48    Cause remanded.

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                    Levine v. UL LLC, 2023 IL App (1st) 221845

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-L-5173;
                          the Hon. Patrick J. Sherlock, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 David G. Sigale, of Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., of
for                       Wheaton, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                 Sara Eber Fowler and Danielle M. Kays, of Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
for                       of Chicago, for appellee.
Appellee:

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