Court Opinion

ID: 9704500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:25.93916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.032886
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). Defendants were charged with and, after a jury trial in Detroit Recorder’s Court, convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, phencyclidine. MCLA 335.341(l)(b); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(b). Both defendants admitted acting as intermediaries in a drug transaction between a narcotics agent and a narcotics peddler, but defendant Pente claimed to be acting under duress and defendant Rhinehart claimed to have been entrapped. Each defendant appeals his conviction.
A. Defendant Rhinehart
Rhinehart’s conviction must be reversed. Although he does not raise the issue, we note that the trial court submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury. In the recent case of People v Cushman, 65 Mich App 161; 237 NW2d 228 (1975), this Court reversed a defendant’s conviction on the grounds that the trial court submitted the entrapment issue to the jury. The absence of an objection was not considered an impediment to review:
"A trial court is bound to follow the law notwithstanding the fact that the parties are negligent in not calling it to the court’s attention.” 65 Mich App at 166.
*395Because the parallel to the present case could not be more exact1 and because we are impressed by the analysis, we adopt Cushman’s reasoning and result. See also People v Sheline, 64 Mich App 193; 235 NW2d 177 (1975).
B. Defendant Pente
Pente’s most substantial claim of error concerns the trial court’s closing instructions to the jury. The trial court made no mention at all of the intent required for a conviction under the statute, nor any comment on the elements of duress. Although a recitation of the information and the applicable statute, as was done here, ordinarily is a sufficient charge to the jury, e.g., People v Wheat, 55 Mich App 559, 562-563; 223 NW2d 73 (1974), Pente’s reliance on the defense of duress requires that the court articulate the necessity of a criminal mens rea for conviction and the significance of duress.
Pente had admitted his participation in the transaction but denied that he was wilfully involved. Although we may have doubts that there was a tenable defense of duress, it is the jury that must determine if Pente acted with the requisite intent. People v Harmon, 53 Mich App 482, 486; 220 NW2d 212 (1974), aff’d, 394 Mich 625; 232 NW2d 187 (1975). Pente testified that the narcotics agent "had a gun on me” and had issued what could be considered a threat. This is sufficient evidence of duress to allow the jury to pass on the defense. People v Harmon, supra, at 486.
*396As was stated in People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975):
"The instruction to the jury must include all elements of the crime charged, * * * , and must not exclude from jury consideration material issues, defenses or theories if there is evidence to support them.” 393 Mich at 349-350. (Citations omitted.)
Although the court did state Pente’s theory of the case, the court did not adopt any part of defendant’s proposed instruction on intent and duress.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the jury was "clearly instructed” in Pente’s theory of duress. All that the court did was to recite Pente’s theory, without informing the jury that duress may be a valid defense. The error of this omission is verified by the court’s instruction to the jury that Rhinehart’s defense was "a good defense in law”. Pente’s defense was not similarly described and his theory suffered by comparison.
The jury might have known what theory Pente was advancing, but had no understanding of the viability of his argument because of the lack of duress instructions.
1 am not convinced that defense attorney reached an agreement that all instructions on duress be excluded. The record suggests that he merely withdrew his own partially erroneous instruction.2 The trial court erred in refusing to *397recite at least part of defendant’s requested jury instruction on the necessity of criminal intent and the viability of a duress defense. Cf. People v Pepper, 389 Mich 317; 206 NW2d 439 (1973).
I concur in the reversal of Rhinehart’s conviction, but dissent from the affirmance of Pente’s conviction. I would reverse both convictions.

 The only fact which might distinguish the present case from People v Cushman, 65 Mich App 161; 237 NW2d 228 (1975), is the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s case. Although the motion was based on an entrapment argument, we cannot view the court’s summary denial as a ruling on the entrapment issue. Neither defendant had testified at this point and the court was without sufficient facts to pass on the entrapment issue.

 Defendant’s requested charge follows:
"Defendant Pente has raised the defense that he did not have the necessary specific intent to committ (sic) the crime of delivery of Phencyclidine. It is an obligation of the people to prove that Mr. Pente intended to participate in the crime of delivery of PCP and that his participation was free of all duress and coercion and that participation was of his own free will and volition.”
The first sentence of the proposed charge is in error in this case, where defendants were charged with delivery, not with possession with intent to deliver. Delivery of a controlled substance does not *397require "specific intent”, but only requires general criminal intent. See People v Dyson, 56 Mich App 59, 63-64; 223 NW2d 364 (1974). The trial court should have supplemented the instruction with a definition of duress:
"To establish the defense of duress it is necessary that a defendant show that the violation of law for which he stands charged was necessitated by threatening conduct of another which resulted in defendant harboring a reasonable fear of imminent or immediate death or serious bodily harm.” People v Harmon, 53 Mich App 482, 485-486; 220 NW2d 212 (1974), aff'd 394 Mich 625; 232 NW2d 187 (1975).