Court Opinion

ID: 9901621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 06:06:09.801063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.948892
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

In re NC, Minor.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                   November 21, 2023
               Petitioner-Appellant,                               9:15 a.m.

v                                                                  No. 361548
                                                                   Alger Circuit Court
NC,                                                                Family Division
                                                                   LC No. 20-004569-DL
               Respondent-Appellee.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and SWARTZLE and YATES, JJ.

GLEICHER, C.J.

        Nine days after the Oxford High School shooting, a junior high school student in Munising
found a threatening note in a school bathroom. School officials called the police and locked down
the school. Suspicion soon fell on NC, who was removed from his class and questioned in the
principal’s office by the Munising Chief of Police. The question presented in this interlocutory
appeal is whether NC was in custody during the interview and should have been advised of the
rights described in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The
trial court suppressed NC’s statements, finding the interview custodial. We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        In the morning of December 9, 2021, just over a week after the Oxford school shooting in
Michigan, Police Chief John Nelson arrived at NC’s school to investigate a shooting threat after a
student found a note in the girls’ bathroom. Peter Kelto, the school superintendent, and Mike
Travis, the school principal, discussed the situation with Nelson, and they placed the school on
lockdown. During the lockdown, someone shared with school staff a video showing then 13-year-
old NC holding a shotgun and pointing it at the camera. The video included text saying, “be ready
tmrw,” meaning “be ready tomorrow.” The video became the focus of the authorities’
investigation. The note in the girls’ bathroom was never attributed to NC.

                                               -1-
       Nelson had coached NC in youth sports for many years, and his son was a friend of NC’s.
Nelson did not recall ever having contacted NC in a law-enforcement capacity, but he knew that
NC had “contact in a criminal context” with other officers in his department. Kyle Connaughton,1
NC’s father, testified that NC was in the court system one other time and had gone through “the
Diversion Program.”

       Nelson testified that within five minutes of reviewing the video, he and Travis removed
NC from his classroom. Nelson did not initially talk to NC after he was pulled from class, and
Travis never informed NC why he was being removed. Nelson was in full uniform and carried a
loaded firearm as the three men escorted NC from his classroom to the high school office. Travis
and Nelson deposited NC in the main office to wait for his father to arrive.

        After Kyle’s arrival and with Travis present, Nelson told Kyle about the video and the need
to question NC about it. Nelson acknowledged that he never told Kyle that he wanted to question
NC about a potential crime. Nelson and Travis then escorted Kyle into Travis’s office, which was
directly adjacent to the main office. NC had remained seated alone in the main office for
approximately 30 or 40 minutes before the interview began. Kyle recounted that when he first saw
NC in the office, an officer stood nearby.

        Nelson interviewed NC in Travis’s office. NC sat directly across from Nelson at a meeting
table, and Kyle was to NC’s left. Travis sat at his desk toward the back of the room. Travis’s
office doors remained closed during the interview. The interview was relatively brief, 30 minutes
at most,2 and Nelson was the primary questioner. Nelson began by telling NC about the
“disturbing” video school staff received, and asked NC to explain. NC told Nelson he understood,
explaining that he made the video a while ago—approximately one week before—and sent it to a
friend who edited it, inserted music, and sent it back to him. Ultimately someone shared the video
with a private group of friends on social media around the same time it had been made. Nelson
observed that the contents and timing of the video were concerning given the recent shooting at
Oxford High School. NC responded that the video and its “be ready tomorrow” warning were “in
reference to a school shooting,” but he said it was only a joke. Kyle did not participate in the
interview.

        Nelson never gave NC Miranda warnings because he did not believe NC was in custody.
Nelson also never told NC that “he was gonna be under arrest” or that “he wasn’t gonna be able to
go home.” Nelson acknowledged never telling Kyle or NC that NC was free to leave, or that they
could contact a lawyer. Kyle similarly testified that Nelson never asked him for permission to
interview NC, told him that he and NC were free to leave the interview, or informed him that he
and NC could consult a lawyer. Kyle did not believe he was able to remove NC from the school
or from the interview.

1
    We refer to NC’s father as “Kyle.”
2
  According to Nelson, the interview lasted approximately five minutes. Travis testified that the
interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. Kyle testified that the interview lasted 15 or 20
minutes at minimum, and that he and NC “were outta there in 30.”

                                                -2-
        Kyle testified that he asked for permission to support NC during the interview, and that he
believed the only reason he was permitted to be present was because he promised to be a silent
observer. Nelson denied ever telling Kyle to be quiet, that he could not speak, or that he could not
interfere with what was going on. But Nelson conceded that it was very possible Kyle asked
whether he could silently observe the interview. Nelson also conceded that he never told Kyle that
“he didn’t have to be silent” during the interview.

        Travis insisted that he never told NC or Kyle that they were forbidden from leaving before
or during the interview, or that Kyle could not speak during the questioning. Travis conceded,
however, that in his experience students rarely terminated a conversation with the principal, an act
potentially punishable as insubordination. Travis conceded that being interviewed by the police
at school can be intimidating, and he agreed that most ordinary 13-year-olds would not walk out
of a conversation with the school principal or feel as if they could just get up and leave, let alone
during an interview that also involved the police and potentially the school superintendent. Travis
believed this to be especially true when a student’s parent had been summoned to a meeting.

        Nelson testified that NC seemed reasonably intelligent and did not appear to be injured,
visibly intoxicated, physically abused or threatened, or deprived of food, sleep, or medical
attention. Kyle, however, testified that NC appeared confused, trembly, and scared during the
interview. NC was not physically restrained or handcuffed, and the interview was unrecorded.
The school remained on lockdown throughout the interview. NC was not arrested that day, and
he left with Kyle. Travis suspended respondent from school for 10 days because of the video.

      The prosecution charged NC with making a false report or threat of terrorism contrary to
MCL 750.543m,3 and an intentional threat to commit an act of violence against students or school
employees on school grounds or school property contrary to MCL 750.235b(1).4 NC moved to

3
    MCL 750.543m provides:
                 (1) A person is guilty of making a terrorist threat or of making a false report
         of terrorism if the person does either of the following:

                (a) Threatens to commit an act of terrorism and communicates the threat to
         any other person.

                 (b) Knowingly makes a false report of an act of terrorism and communicates
         the false report to any other person, knowing the report is false.

                 (2) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant
         did not have the intent or capability of committing the act of terrorism.

                (3) A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable by
         imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or
         both.
4
    MCL 750.235b(1) provides, in relevant part:

                                                  -3-
suppress his statements to Nelson, arguing that Nelson subjected him to a custodial interrogation
without providing Miranda warnings. The prosecution responded that NC’s interview was
noncustodial, obviating the need for Miranda warnings. At a hearing, the trial court acknowledged
that some facts weighed against the need for Miranda warnings, including (1) the brevity of the
interview, (2) the absence of any coercive or repetitive questions, (3) Kyle’s presence, (4) that NC
was not arrested, restrained, or physically prevented from leaving, and (5) that NC was permitted
to leave with Kyle after the interview.

        Nevertheless, the court concluded that NC was in police custody during the interview. The
court determined that an objective, reasonable 13-year-old in NC’s position “would’ve felt that he
could not leave the principal’s office during the question[ing] by Chief Nelson.” The court noted
the existence of inherently coercive factors during the interview, including the location of the
questioning in the principal’s office, the formality of the interview, Kyle’s silence throughout, and
the “lack of acknowledgment [by Nelson or Tavis] of the freedom to leave.” The court also noted
Kyle’s testimony that NC appeared scared and trembly during the interview.

       The court further reasoned:

       [T]his is no seasoned criminal that’s sitting in the principal’s office waiting to talk
       to police. This is a young man who’s frightened, who’s scared, and who has a—
       who has a lot to be frightened and scared about because he has triggered this
       avalanche of responses that I don’t think for a second, he thought was going to
       happen . . . .

               And the [c]ourt wants to reflect back to that testimony, is—we had a young
       man in class, he was taken out by the principal, escorted by law enforcement to a
       place where he was held within eyesight of everyone, no cuffs, but, certainly, [NC]
       did not feel like he could leave that—that place until the questioning took place.
       And his dad comes in, there’s a situation where we go into the principal’s office
       and there’s no question that this is not a school questioning any longer this is a law
       enforcement questioning because Mr. Travis leaves the table and goes to his
       computer and begins work independent of what’s happening during this
       questioning period. This is absolutely law enforcement. It’s exclusively law
       enforcement and it takes place while Mr. Travis is working up the suspension of
       [NC]. There’s some testimony that Mr. Travis added in a thought, or a concept,
       whether or not, geez, this is real concerning because it comes so close to Oxford,
       but that isn’t the end all and be all, and it’s clear that Chief Nelson was the one

                A person who verbally, through the use of an electronic device or system,
       or through other means intentionally threatens to use a firearm . . . to commit an act
       of violence against any students or school employees on school grounds or school
       property if the threat can be reasonably interpreted to be harmful or adverse to
       human life, or dangerous to human life as that term is defined in [MCL 750.543b],
       is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or
       a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.

                                                -4-
       doing that questioning and that at that point it effectively created a transition from
       school custody to inferred law enforcement custody that a reasonable 13-year-old
       would have been in a position to contemplate.

        The court ruled that Nelson should have given NC Miranda warnings before questioning
him, and granted NC’s motion to suppress. We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to
appeal.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        The prosecution argues that NC’s statements should not have been suppressed. According
to the prosecution, the trial court improperly focused only on the fact that NC was not advised that
he was free to leave, and therefore clearly erred by finding that NC was in custody, necessitating
Miranda warnings.

        “Whether a person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda warnings requirement is a
mixed question of law and fact that must be answered independently after a review of the record
de novo.” People v Cortez (On Remand), 299 Mich App 679, 691; 832 NW2d 1 (2013). This
Court reviews “for clear error a trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances
surrounding the giving of the statement,” but it reviews “de novo the trial court’s ultimate decision
concerning a motion to suppress.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire
record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
People v Barritt, 325 Mich App 556, 561; 926 NW2d 811 (2018) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        The trial court did not clearly err by finding that Nelson subjected NC to a custodial
interrogation. The totality of the circumstances support that Nelson subjected NC to a custodial
interrogation, and the trial court properly suppressed NC’s statements to Nelson because he was
not given Miranda warnings.

        The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the United States and Michigan
Constitutions. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; Barritt, 325 Mich App at 561; Cortez,
299 Mich App at 691. To protect this right, police must generally precede any “custodial
interrogation” with adequate Miranda warnings. See Cortez, 299 Mich App at 691, quoting
Miranda, 384 US at 444. “ ‘[C]ustody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Barritt, 325 Mich App at 562. Because
Miranda warnings are meant to “protect the individual against the coercive nature of custodial
interrogation,” they are not required unless “there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom
as to render him in custody.” JDB v North Carolina, 564 US 261, 270; 131 S Ct 2394; 180 L Ed
2d 310 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Statements made by a defendant to the
police during a custodial interrogation are not admissible unless the defendant voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waives the constitutional right against self-incrimination.” Barritt,
325 Mich App at 561-562.

        “[T]o determine whether a defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogation,” this
Court must “look at the totality of the circumstances.” Cortez, 299 Mich App at 691. The inquiry
is objective, and we must “consider both whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation

                                                -5-
would believe that he or she was free to leave and whether the relevant environment present[ed]
the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in
Miranda.” Id. at 691-692 (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). Various
factors are relevant to whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, including but not
limited to: “(1) the location of the questioning . . . ; (2) the duration of the questioning . . . ; (3)
statements made during the interview . . . ; (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints during
the questioning . . . ; and (5) the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning[.]” Barritt,
325 Mich App at 562-563. Additionally, if the suspect is a juvenile, this Court may objectively
consider the juvenile’s age when determining whether he or she would have felt free to leave or to
terminate the encounter “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police
questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.” JDB, 564 US at
271-272, 277. “It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.” Id. at 264-265.

         While there is significant caselaw addressing the role that a juvenile’s age plays in the
Miranda custody analysis, see, e.g., id.; People v Elliot, 494 Mich 292, 310 n 9; 833 NW2d 284
(2013), no binding Michigan caselaw has substantively addressed the situation we confront here:
questioning a juvenile in a school or a principal’s office. In People v Mayes, 202 Mich App 181;
508 NW2d 161 (1993), this Court briefly discussed but did not resolve a custody issue under
similar circumstances, and instead addressed whether the juvenile’s trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress the defendant’s confession. Id. at 190. The juvenile defendant in
Mayes was a senior in high school who “was summoned to the principal’s office at his school” and
subsequently frisked and interrogated by a police officer. Id. This Court concluded that the
juvenile’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress his inculpatory statements
because the Miranda issue “could have gone either way.” Id. at 189-191.

       The Mayes Court reasoned that there were facts that both supported and undermined a
conclusion that the juvenile would not have felt free to leave under the totality of the
circumstances. See id. at 190-191. The Court reasoned that:

        Although[] the police officer testified that [the] defendant was free to leave at any
        time, there was no evidence that this message was conveyed to [the] defendant.
        These facts could support a finding that [the] defendant reasonably believed that he
        was not free to leave. On the other hand, no one ever told [the] defendant that he
        was under arrest, and he was permitted to leave the principal's office after being
        questioned. The detention was brief and occurred in a school principal's office
        rather than at the police station or a squad car. Thus, the questioning was
        noncustodial, and the environment was not police dominated. Considering the
        totality of the circumstances, one could make an argument that defendant was
        effectively under arrest. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

       The United States Supreme Court in JDB, 564 US at 276, though focused on whether a
juvenile’s age at the time of questioning is relevant to the custodial-interrogation analysis, also
noted that “the effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of the
person questioned,” and that the juvenile’s “presence at school is compulsory and [his or her]
disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action.” Following JDB, several states have held

                                                  -6-
that a juvenile being questioned at a school or in a principal’s office is relevant to whether the
juvenile was subjected to a custodial interrogation.

       The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that “the schoolhouse is a unique forum
because schoolchildren inherently shed some of their freedom of action when they enter the
schoolhouse door, given educators’ need to control the school environment,” holding that a
juvenile is “under custodial interrogation when he [or she] is subjected to additional restraints
beyond those generally imposed during school.” In the Matter of DAH, 277 NC App 16, 23; 857
SE2d 771 (2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Holguin v Harrison, 339 F
Supp 2d 1052, 1058 (ND Cal, 2005) (juvenile was in custody during police questioning in the
school principal’s office, in part, because the interrogation “took place in a disciplinary setting
where a reasonable student, such as [the juvenile], would feel compelled to obey authority and
answer questions when asked.”). The DAH Court further held that “an interview that features
heavy [officer] involvement or direction will often qualify as a custodial interrogation,” and the
mere presence of an officer during an interrogation, “even when the [officer] remains silent,” “can
create a coercive environment that goes above and beyond the restrictions normally imposed
during school, such that a reasonable student would readily believe they are not free to go.” DAH,
277 NC App at 28-29. But see MH v State, 851 So 2d 233, 233-234 (Fla App, 2003) (“The mere
presence of a law enforcement officer, when a student is being questioned by a school official,
does not amount to a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.”).

        The Indiana Supreme Court also determined that police questioning of a juvenile in a
principal’s office “points toward custody” because “no student feels free to just walk out of the
principal’s office[.]” BA v State, 100 NE3d 225, 232 (Ind, 2018). Similarly, the Ohio Court of
Appeals stated that “most children confronted by an adult authority figure asking about an incident
at school would not feel free just to walk away,” and it found the juvenile in custody when
interviewed at school by a law enforcement official where an active police investigation was
underway, the school was placed on lockdown, and the student was retrieved for questioning and
interviewed by various law enforcement personnel. In re LG, 82 NE3d 52, 56 (Ohio App, 2017).

        Additionally, in NC v Commonwealth, 396 SW3d 852, 855 (Ky, 2013), the Kentucky
Supreme Court addressed whether a student subject to criminal charges “is entitled to the benefit
of the Miranda warnings before being questioned by a school official in conjunction with a law
enforcement officer.” The Court noted that “the absence of law enforcement involvement is a
significant factor that demonstrates when Miranda warnings are not implicated.” Id. at 856.
However, the Court held that the juvenile was subjected to a custodial interrogation and entitled
to Miranda warnings, reasoning as follows:

               The facts of this case demonstrate that [the juvenile] was in custody under
       the “all relevant factors” test set forth in [JDB, 564 US at 280]. He was taken from
       his classroom by a law enforcement officer, who was clearly identified as such, and
       who wore a gun. He was seated in the assistant principal’s office, and the door was
       shut. The law enforcement officer sat down right beside him, across from the
       assistant principal. The assistant principal testified that he expected [the juvenile]
       to stay put, which was no doubt conveyed by his demeanor.

                                                -7-
               Neither the officer nor the assistant principal told [the juvenile] that he was
       free to leave. His mother was not contacted and told of the charges until after the
       questioning and confession. His first responses indicated that he believed that he
       was subject to school discipline. He was initially questioned by the assistant
       principal instead of the officer, thereby leading him to believe this was only a school
       discipline matter. The record does not indicate a lack of respect toward the school
       official indicative of a belief that he did not have to be there and talk. [Id. at 862.]

The Court concluded, “No reasonable student, even the vast majority of seventeen year olds, would
have believed that he was at liberty to remain silent, or to leave, or that he was even admitting to
criminal responsibility under these circumstances.” Id.

        Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a juvenile was in custody during police
interviews at school under the following circumstances:

               Here we have a 14–year old boy, by all accounts, a child of average
       intelligence and maturity for his age. Before the October 10 interview, M.A.K. had
       no experience with the police or with police questioning. M.A.K. was removed
       from his class and escorted to the school police liaison office without being told
       why. Upon arrival, he was told he was not under arrest, but was not told that he
       was free to leave or that he was free to refuse to answer questions. He was not
       asked if he wished to speak with his parents or return to class. M.A.K. was given
       a hall pass and allowed to return to class only after police were satisfied with his
       statements. [In re Welfare of MAK, 667 NW2d 467, 472 (Minn App, 2017).]

Given these facts, the Court concluded that a reasonable person in MAK’s position would not have
felt free to leave. Id.

        We find these cases persuasive and hold that while the fact that police questioning occurred
at school or in a principal’s office alone is not dispositive of custody, it is still a highly relevant
factor to consider in a Miranda custody analysis involving juveniles at school. Indeed, the
movements of a juvenile at school are generally restricted in ways not ordinarily applicable to
adults. Thus, that a juvenile was interviewed by law enforcement at school or in a principal’s
office, along with the circumstances surrounding the questioning, are relevant considerations in a
custody analysis.

         Here, the trial court found that the totality of the circumstances supported that Nelson
subjected NC to a custodial interrogation, and we are not firmly and definitely convinced this
determination was mistaken. Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the court did not ignore the
totality of the circumstances and unduly rely only on that fact that NC was never advised that he
was free to leave. Indeed, the court explicitly mentioned various facts weighing against NC being
in custody—specifically, it noted (1) the brevity of the interview, (2) the lack of any coercive or
repetitive questions, (3) Kyle’s presence, (4) that NC was not arrested, restrained, or physically
prevented from leaving, and (5) that NC was permitted to leave with Kyle after the interview. We
also recognize that NC had a previous encounter with law enforcement and a preexisting
relationship with Nelson, potentially alleviating any inherent coerciveness present during the
interview.

                                                 -8-
        Nevertheless, NC was a 13-year-old boy at the time of the interview. NC was removed
from his classroom by Travis, the principal, who was accompanied by Nelson, an armed police
officer in full uniform. Travis and Nelson escorted NC to the main office without explanation,
where he was required to wait with an officer nearby. The backdrop was a school in lockdown;
students were not free to leave or move about the school. Nelson acknowledged that the interview
occurred while the school remained in “a shelter in place environment” and that this environment
“could be a . . . stressful situation” for some students. Travis agreed that a “shelter in place”
environment is an “incredibly stressful and heightened” environment.

        Travis confirmed that students, especially 13-year-olds, would not feel free to just get up
and leave a meeting in the principal’s office, particularly with law enforcement and a parent
present. Indeed, Travis stated that a student’s attempts to walk out of a conversation with the
principal “could be considered insubordination,” and he agreed that “[m]ost ordinary 13-year-
olds” would not feel as if “they could just get up and leave” while being interviewed by an officer
in the principal’s office because it is “an intimidating situation.” Moreover, Nelson, not Travis,
conducted the interview. Travis’s office doors were closed throughout the questioning. Neither
NC nor Kyle was told that NC was free to leave the interview, that NC did not have to answer
Nelson’s questions, or that he could consult a lawyer. And although Kyle was present during the
interview, he did not participate. Kyle believed that he was not free to withdraw NC from the
interview and leave, and that he was permitted at the interview only as a silent observer.

        These facts sufficiently support that Nelson subjected NC to a custodial interrogation.
Specifically, the location of the interview, NC’s young age, the manner in which the interview was
initiated and conducted, the school’s lockdown, and the failure to inform NC that he was free to
leave or free to refuse to answer Nelson’s questions support that NC was in police custody. See
JDB, 564 US at 271-272, 277; Barritt, 325 Mich App at 562-563. A school environment can be
deemed coercive given that a student’s freedom of movement is restricted, see DAH, 277 NC App
23, 28-29, and “the effect of the schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of
the person questioned,” JDB, 564 US at 276. The school’s lockdown status here only increased
the inherent coerciveness of the interview. See In re LG, 82 NE3d at 56; NC, 396 SW3d at 862.
Further, that respondent was interrogated by an officer in the principal’s office “points toward
custody” because “[o]f course, no student feels free to just walk out of the principal’s office[.]”
BA, 100 NE3d at 232.

        NC was questioned by law enforcement in an environment and under circumstances
suggesting he was not free to leave, and he was never told that he could leave at any time. As the
trial court acknowledged, some facts weigh against a finding of custody. But we find no clear
error in the trial court’s finding that under the totality of the circumstances, Miranda warnings
were required. The trial court properly suppressed NC’s statements to Nelson.

       We affirm.

                                                            /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                            /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                            /s/ Christopher P. Yates

                                               -9-