Court Opinion

ID: 9960385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 11:08:47.102109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:25.084917
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-23-00658-CV

                                         A. S., Appellant

                                                 v.

                Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

                FROM THE 421ST DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY
           NO. 21-FL-237, THE HONORABLE CHRIS SCHNEIDER, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               A.S. (Father) appeals the trial court’s order of termination, which terminated his

parental rights to Y.R. (Child).1 In four appellate issues, Father maintains that the findings made

against him under statutory predicate grounds for termination Paragraphs (E), (N), and (O) and

under the best-interest ground were not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

We reject Father’s arguments, concluding that the evidence was sufficient under Paragraph (E)

and best interest, and affirm the order of termination.

                                         BACKGROUND

               The Department’s involvement with Child here began in 2021 when Child was

one year old and Child’s mother was alleged to be abusing drugs and prostituting. Father was not

       1
         The same order also terminated Child’s mother’s parental rights, but the mother does not
challenge the order in this appeal.
then involved in Child’s life—he did not even know about Child’s existence, according to his

testimony—and the suit continued for some time before Father became involved.

               Back in 2018, Father finished a state prison sentence of about four years for the

enhanced offense of unlawful possession of a firearm, and he moved to Amarillo, where he took

up using and dealing methamphetamine and cultivated a relationship with Child’s mother. The

next year, Father was again incarcerated—on a new, federal charge of felon in possession of a

firearm. He served about 36 months in prison, after which he had to serve a term of probation.

               Child was born in 2020 while Father was still incarcerated for the federal

felon-in-possession charge. The Department took temporary managing conservatorship of Child

in 2021 and placed her in foster care.2 Child’s mother named Father as potentially being Child’s

father to the Department. In 2022, the Department first pleaded for termination of Father’s parental

rights, and Father answered the suit. Later that year, in quick succession, Father was released on

probation from his federal incarceration, paternity-test results confirmed his parentage of Child,

and the trial date in the parental-rights-termination suit approached. Because the trial so quickly

followed the confirmation of Father’s parentage, the parties agreed that the Department would take

permanent managing conservatorship of Child and Father would be given a Family Service Plan

and the chance to complete the Plan to obtain conservatorship of Child. Father’s Plan was made

an order of the court, but he ended up not fulfilling all that his Plan required.

               During his probation for the federal felon-in-possession charge and during this suit,

Father resumed his methamphetamine habit, later admitting as much to his probation officer. This

       2
          The Department later tried placing Child with some of her mother’s relatives, but the
relatives quickly expressed an inability to deal with Child’s behavioral issues. The Department
placed Child back with the foster family, where Child remained through trial.

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resulted in the government’s seeking to revoke his probation and charging him in a superseding

indictment with possession with intent to distribute and his reincarceration pending the new

charge. All the while, Father’s sister reached out to Department personnel to offer to be a

placement for Child. Yet when Department personnel sought to have her home cleared as a

potential placement, the sister dropped out of contact with the Department for months. Not until

around summer 2023 was the sister’s home study fully approved.

               In August 2023, the parties tried the Department’s request that Father’s parental

rights be terminated before an associate judge. Father’s federal charge for possession with intent

to distribute was still pending, so he was incarcerated during the trial. He testified that he would

plead guilty to simple possession, which would likely result in his incarceration for another

three or so years. The associate judge rendered judgment terminating Father’s rights, and Father

requested a de novo hearing before the district court. Child was almost four years old at the time

of the trial before the district court. At that trial, the court admitted into evidence the transcript

and exhibits from the trial before the associate judge and took further testimony from Father and

a Department caseworker. Afterward, the district court signed its order of termination of Father’s

parental rights, which Father now appeals.

                                           DISCUSSION

               Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

two elements of termination of parental rights—the statutory predicate ground and the best-interest

ground. To terminate parental rights, the Department must prove both one of the statutory

predicate grounds and that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). The Department must prove

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both elements by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.206(a); In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; accord In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002).

               Legal-sufficiency review of the evidence to support termination requires reviewing

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding under attack and considering undisputed

contrary evidence to decide whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the finding was true. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018).

“Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding

against all the evidence favoring the finding.” Id. at 631. “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in

light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in

favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or

conviction that the finding was true.” Id. When reviewing the evidence, we must “provide due

deference to the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness

testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.”

In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).

I.     The evidence was sufficient to support the finding against Father under statutory
       predicate ground Paragraph (E).

               In his first appellate issue, Father maintains that the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support the finding against him under statutory predicate ground

Paragraph (E). Paragraph (E) applies when a parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional

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well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). For these purposes, “‘[e]ndanger’

means ‘to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.’” In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996)

(per curiam) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).

“Although ‘“endanger” means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects

of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child

or that the child actually suffers injury,’” id. (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533), or even that the

conduct happen in the child’s presence, Pruitt v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

No. 03-10-00089-CV, 2010 WL 5463861, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem.

op.). “Endangerment does not have to be established as an independent proposition, but can be

inferred from parental misconduct alone,” and courts may look to conduct “before the child’s birth

and both before and after the child has been removed by the Department.” Id. “A factfinder may

infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical

or emotional well-being,” and “[t]hose risks can be developed by circumstances arising from and

surrounding a parent’s behavior.” In re R.R.A., __ S.W.3d __, 2024 WL 1221674, at *6 (Tex.

Mar. 22, 2024). “Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers

the child’s physical and emotional well-being.” Pruitt, 2010 WL 5463861, at *4.

               Important under Paragraph (E) is whether the endangerment of the child’s

well-being was the direct result of a person’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act.

See T.M. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00174-CV, 2021 WL 4692471,

at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 8, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373,

382 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021).                   “Termination under

subsection (E) requires more than a single act or omission, and the Department must show a

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voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent, considering a parent’s actions

both before and after the child was removed from the home.” T.M., 2021 WL 4692471, at *6.

               The evidence here showed three sets of circumstances supporting a Paragraph (E)

finding. First was evidence of illegal-drug use by Father. “[A] parent’s use of narcotics and

its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as” endangering conduct. In re J.O.A.,

283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). Drug use “exposes the child to the possibility that the

parent may be impaired or imprisoned.” J.M. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

No. 03-21-00274-CV, 2021 WL 5225432, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2021, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (quoting M.D. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00531-CV,

2021 WL 1704258, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “[A] pattern

of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish

a substantial risk of harm,” and factfinders can reasonably credit as evidence of endangerment

evidence “that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’”

R.R.A., 2024 WL 1221674, at *7 (quoting J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345).

               Evidence that the parent used illegal drugs while a suit to terminate the parent’s

rights is pending is especially supportive of termination under Paragraph (E). See T.M., 2021 WL

4692471, at *6. Plus, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s missing Department-requested

illegal-drug tests during a termination suit that the tests missed would have come up positive. See

J.M. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00187-CV, 2022 WL 7163637, at *12

(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

               Father admitted to his probation officer that he used methamphetamine for help

coping with stress, and Father used methamphetamine while this suit was pending. He admitted

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during the trial before the district court that his use of methamphetamine to cope suggests that he

is addicted to the drug. And he admitted during the trial before the associate judge that he used

methamphetamine while he was still on federal probation. This methamphetamine use resulted in

the new federal charge for possession with intent to distribute, and Father agreed to plead guilty to

simple possession. His punishment had not yet been decided by the federal court by the time

this suit went to trial before the state district court, but he estimated that the punishment would be

about three years in prison. He also admitted how long-term his methamphetamine use has been—

it dated back to at least 2014. He admitted to arrests for possession of still other controlled

substances, occurring in 2001 and 2002. Exhibits admitted into evidence show that after the 2002

arrest, Father pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance. He also missed

most of the drug tests that his court-ordered Plan required of him.

               Second, another way that parents can endanger their children by conduct is by

subjecting the children to uncertainty and instability. See S.S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., No. 03-21-00695-CV, 2022 WL 2542007, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin July 8, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). They can do so by repeatedly engaging in conduct that gets them incarcerated:

       [I]ncarceration does support an endangerment finding “if the evidence, including
       the imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering
       the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” A parent’s criminal history—
       taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and
       whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists—can support a finding
       of endangerment. Imprisonment thus “is certainly a factor” the trial court may
       weigh when considering endangerment.

In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tex. 2021).

               Father’s criminal history includes: the 2002 guilty pleas, leading to concurrent

five-year prison sentences; a 2010 prison sentence of 18 months for evading arrest with a vehicle;

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a 2014 sentence of five years in prison for enhanced unlawful possession of a firearm; the

2020 federal sentence of 41 months for the offense of felon in possession of a firearm; and the

2023 federal revocation of probation for the admitted methamphetamine use and the ensuing

superseding indictment for possession with intent to distribute, under which Father pleaded guilty

to simple possession. He has been incarcerated ever since it was confirmed to him that he is

Child’s father.

                  Finally, a parent’s failure to participate in a Department-requested Family Service

Plan can be considered in endangerment analysis. See E.J. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., No. 03-23-00104-CV, 2023 WL 4139041, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 23, 2023, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); In re J.A.V., 632 S.W.3d 121, 132 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). A

related failure to participate in Department-offered visits with the child can constitute emotionally

endangering conduct for the child. See In re A.F., No. 07-19-00435-CV, 2020 WL 2786940, at *7

(Tex. App.—Amarillo May 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re S.I.H., No. 02-11-00489-CV,

2012 WL 858643, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                  Father admitted the Department’s good-faith efforts to work with him in this

suit and that while he was released from incarceration during this suit, the Department “wanted

[him] to work services to try to see if [he] could get [Child] back.” But Father undisputedly

did not complete the tasks required in his Plan and ordered by the court. While he did attend

the psychosocial evaluation and started therapy, he was unsuccessfully discharged for three

consecutive no-shows. He also failed to take some required classes (though he took some others)

and missed most of the required drug tests. Before he was reincarcerated while this suit was

pending, he had chances to visit Child in person at a Department office, but he attended only one

such visit while missing about six others. He similarly attended some video calls with Child but

                                                   8
missed many others. These missed chances helped lead Department personnel to conclude that

Father had established no relationship with Child.

               Faced with all this evidence, Father’s argument on appeal is unavailing. He argues

in support of his evidentiary-sufficiency challenge that because he “had never been the caregiver

of [Child] or knew he was the father of [Child] until September 2022,” “[h]e could not and did not

endanger her.” This argument fails to consider the long-time feature of the law of endangerment

that “it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually

suffers injury,” see M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269 (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); see also R.R.A.,

2024 WL 1221674, at *6 (“[E]ndangerment does not require a parent’s drug use to directly harm

the child.”), or the feature that the parent’s endangering conduct need not happen in the child’s

presence, see Pruitt, 2010 WL 5463861, at *4. Father’s illegal-drug use and repeated conduct

leading to incarceration still exposed Child to jeopardy and loss even if Father did not do those

things while around Child. And as the Department points out, knowledge of paternity is not a

prerequisite to a showing of Paragraph (E) endangerment. In re N.N.M., No. 04-19-00369-CV,

2020 WL 4808704, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re

J.H.G., No. 01-16-01006-CV, 2017 WL 2378141, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1,

2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, a father’s conduct before the establishment of his

paternity can be considered as evidence of an endangering course of conduct under Paragraph (E).

See In re M.R., No. 02-22-00118-CV, 2022 WL 4545534, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); N.N.M., 2020 WL 4808704, at *5.

               In all then, under the applicable legal- and factual-sufficiency standards, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support termination under Paragraph (E) and overrule

Father’s first appellate issue. Because proof of only one statutory predicate ground is needed to

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support termination, we need not reach Father’s second and third issues, which attack the findings

made against him under statutory predicate grounds Paragraphs (N) and (O). See Tex. R. App.

P. 47.1; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232–35 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).

II.    The evidence was sufficient to support the best-interest finding against Father.

               In his remaining appellate issue, Father maintains that the evidence was legally

and factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding made against him. When reviewing

best-interest findings, factors that courts consider include (1) the child’s wishes, (2) the child’s

emotional and physical needs now and in the future, (3) emotional or physical danger to the child

now and in the future, (4) the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody, (5) programs

available to help those parties, (6) plans for the child by the parties seeking custody, (7) the

stability of the proposed placement, (8) the parent’s conduct that may indicate that the existing

parent–child relationship is improper, and (9) any excuses for the parent’s conduct. In re J.W.,

645 S.W.3d 726, 746 (Tex. 2022) (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).

This list is not exhaustive, not all factors need be proven to determine best interest, and proof

of only one factor may in a particular factual context support termination. See M.L. v. Texas Dep’t

of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00541-CV, 2023 WL 2025710, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Austin Feb. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); S.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

No. 03-20-00039-CV, 2020 WL 3892796, at *16 (Tex. App.—Austin July 10, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Evidence probative under the statutory predicate grounds may also be probative of

best interest. A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631–32.

               While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 26; A.B. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00054-CV, 2023 WL

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4424848, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Just as it is imperative

for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also

essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that

right.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26; A.B., 2023 WL 4424848, at *2. The strong presumption supporting

keeping children with their biological parents can be overcome by contrary evidence. A.B.,

2023 WL 4424848, at *2; Aguilar v. Foy, No. 03-10-00678-CV, 2012 WL 677497, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Austin Mar. 1, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

               The evidence recounted above about the Paragraph (E) finding is relevant to best

interest as well. That evidence shows an inability by Father to stop using illegal drugs. It shows

that he has spent and will continue to spend much of his time incarcerated. And it shows that he

did not take many of the steps that could have helped him form a bond with Child. By contrast,

other evidence showed that Child is very bonded with her foster family, considers the foster parents

to be her mom and dad, and is thriving and having all her needs met in their home. Father admits

Child’s bond with them. The foster mother, who testified, shared that she and her husband had

been married for 10 years and had an adopted child. The foster mother usually stays at home and

watches both Child and their adopted child. The foster family has Child in speech and behavioral

therapy and has provided her with monthly contact with her maternal grandparents and visits with

Father’s sister. The foster mother is willing to set up email contact with Father and Child’s mother

so that they can send future messages to Child. Child is healthy and on target developmentally in

the foster family’s care, and the foster parents want to adopt her. We thus see in the record

evidence supporting termination under Holley factors two, three, four, six, seven, and eight.

               Most of Father’s arguments on appeal concern his preference that Child be placed

with his sister instead of with the foster family, thus invoking the plans-for-the-child Holley factor

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(and potentially others). He faults the Department for not identifying his sister quickly enough as

a potential placement and for not working hard enough to place Child with her. And he explains

how he believes that his sister passes muster under many of the Holley factors.

               Yet the evidence allowed the trial court, as factfinder, to draw reasonable inferences

for the foster family as a placement better serving Child’s best interest compared with placement

with Father’s sister. See S.S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00608-CV,

2024 WL 131757, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). After Father’s

sister had identified herself to Department personnel as a willing placement, she fell out of contact

with the Department for several months when Department personnel were seeking to have her

home approved as a possible placement. The home study has since been approved. Although she

testified at trial that she stopped contacting the Department so that she could discuss with Father

what he wanted for Child, the trial court reasonably could have discounted this explanation and

instead reasonably inferred that she was not as eager to provide Child a home as were the foster

parents. See A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (requiring due deference to factfinders’ evaluations of

witness credibility and demeanor). Relatedly, though Father’s sister participated in some visits

with Child, she missed five scheduled visits and in all but one instance did not offer an explanation

to Department personnel for why she had missed. The visits that she did attend, including one in

person, generally went well. She explained in testimony her experience with the kind of behavioral

issues that Child has shown and that she would be protective of Child, even from Father, and treat

Child as her own and adopt her. Finally, even if Father’s parental rights would be terminated, the

Department could still place Child with Father’s sister, and termination alone does not prevent

Father’s sister from being a major part of Child’s life.

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               In all under the applicable legal- and factual-sufficiency standards and through the

prism of the Holley factors, we conclude that the evidence allowed the trial court to conclude that

terminating Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. When the focus is appropriately

placed on Child’s best interest, the evidence allowed the trial court to conclude that maintaining

Father’s parental rights was not in Child’s best interest. We overrule Father’s final appellate issue.

                                          CONCLUSION

               We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

                                               __________________________________________
                                               Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: April 12, 2024

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