Court Opinion

ID: 9950260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 17:01:03.747627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:17.881901
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8001     Document: 010111014765       Date Filed: 03/13/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          March 13, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  JANE DOE, an individual; MARY DOE,
  an individual; JAMES DOE, an individual,

        Plaintiffs - Appellants,

  v.                                                          No. 23-8001
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:21-CV-00106-ABJ)
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SUBLETTE                                 (D. Wyo.)
  COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9;
  SUPERINTENDENT STEVE LOYD, of
  Sublette County School District No. 9, in
  his individual capacity; STEVE LOYD,
  Title IX Coordinator, in his individual
  capacity; MR. JEFF MAKELKY,
  Principal, of Big Piney High School, in his
  individual capacity and JOHN SMITHS, 1-
  5,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before ROSSMAN, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
                  ________________________________

                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       Jane, James, and Mary Doe filed a complaint asserting claims under Title IX

 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1688, and 42 U.S.C.

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8001    Document: 010111014765         Date Filed: 03/13/2024    Page: 2

 § 1983. The Does’ claims were asserted against, inter alia, the Board of Trustees of

 Sublette County School District No. 9, Superintendent Steve Loyd, and Principal Jeff

 Makelky (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Board”). The Board sought

 summary judgment on at least the following two grounds: (1) the Does’ complaint

 was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations and (2) the claims set out in

 the amended complaint failed on the merits. The district court ruled in favor of the

 Board on both grounds and entered judgment accordingly. The Does appeal, asserting

 the district court erred in ruling their claims untimely and without merit. This court

 holds Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2014) compels the

 conclusion that the Does’ claims are untimely. Thus, exercising jurisdiction pursuant

 to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court’s judgment.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

 A. Factual Background1

       This case arises out of the alleged sexual harassment and assault of Jane Doe

 by Aaron Makelky.2 During much of the relevant period, Jane was a student and

 Aaron a teacher at Big Piney High School. The relationship between Jane and Aaron

       1
          Because we resolve this appeal on timeliness grounds alone, this court sets
 out a significantly limited overview of the background facts. Any genuine factual
 disputes are viewed in the manner most favorable to the Does, the non-moving
 parties. McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010). Notably, although
 the parties dispute the legal implications of the facts relevant to the issue of
 timeliness, they do not meaningfully dispute the relevant background facts.
       2
        Aaron Makelky is the son of defendant Jeff Makelky. [Dist. Ct. Order at 10]
 To avoid confusion, this opinion uses first names when referring to the Makelkys.
 The same protocol is used as to the plaintiffs Jane, James, and Mary Doe.
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 started in the fall of 2014, when Jane was placed in Aaron’s tenth-grade history class.

 In the middle of the school year, Jane’s sophomore year, Aaron taught a lesson

 encouraging students to do their best. Jane was struggling academically and this

 lesson resonated with her. Jane’s grades improved and she started confiding in

 Aaron. Jane also began occasionally babysitting for Aaron’s family. Because Jane did

 not have a driver’s license, Aaron would pick her up from her house.

       During the summer of 2015, Jane began exercising in the school weight room.

 There were usually other students in the weight room during Jane’s workouts and her

 father, James, would often join her. Aaron and other teachers were responsible for

 overseeing the weight room. Jane continued to work out in the weight room during

 her junior and senior years. There were times Aaron hugged her or kissed Jane’s

 forehead while she was in the weight room.

       By the fall of 2015, Jane was a regular babysitter for Aaron’s family and, as a

 result, became increasingly close to them. Aaron began referring to Jane as his

 adopted daughter. In April 2016, Aaron’s wife did Jane’s hair and makeup for the

 prom. Shortly thereafter, when Jane received a poor test score, Aaron left an

 encouraging letter in her locker. As Jane grew closer to Aaron’s family, Aaron gave

 her advice and resources regarding confrontations she was having with her family

 over religion.

       Jane participated in Junior Legislature during her junior and senior years.

 Aaron was the advisor for this after-school activity. On a Junior Legislature trip, Jane

 used profanity. In response, Aaron allegedly required that Jane engage in physical

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 activity as punishment. According to Jane, Aaron made her turn around so her back

 was facing him and her male teammates while she completed the physical activity.

         During the summer between her junior and senior years, Jane lived in Boise,

 Idaho, with her biological mother. Jane remained in contact with Aaron through

 social media while she was in Boise. Jane returned to Wyoming before the start of

 her senior year. She was struggling with family conflict and her faith. Jane did not

 want to attend church with James and her stepmother, Mary and, therefore, felt she

 needed to move out of the family home. Jane moved in with a local family and went

 through a period of limited communication with James and Mary. By the winter of

 2016, James and Mary moved out of state.

         On February 1, 2017, Jane had a conflict with her advisory period teacher,

 Brent Hibbert. Hibbert mentioned Jane’s parents in front of other students. Jane felt

 Hibbert unnecessarily interfered in her business, angrily left the classroom, and

 reported the incident to Principal Jeff Makelky. Hibbert was acquainted with Jane’s

 parents and a member of their church. The next day, Jeff allowed Jane to transfer out

 of Hibbert’s advisory class without James’s or Mary’s permission. According to Jeff,

 parental consent was not required when a student transferred between advisory

 periods because it is not a “for credit class.” Hibbert called Mary after the incident.

 He told Mary that Jane became angry when he advised her to speak with her parents

 and had been allowed to transfer to another advisory class. Mary told Hibbert she

 would call Jeff to discuss the incident. Shortly thereafter, James called Jeff to discuss

 Jane.

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       James called Jeff because he was concerned that Jane transferred from

 Hibbert’s class without his consent. The participants described the conversation as

 tense. At one point, Jeff indicated he thought James was an absentee parent. James

 claims he told Jeff he needed to speak with him about a potentially inappropriate

 relationship between a student and a teacher. James did not, however, recall if he

 provided details about the nature of Aaron and Jane’s relationship and never made a

 follow-up appointment with Jeff to discuss the issue further. According to Jeff,

 nothing about the conversation led him to believe James was concerned about sexual

 harassment or an inappropriate relationship between Jane and Aaron.

       Mary claims Hibbert called a second time and suggested Jane and Aaron had

 become too close. Hibbert told Mary that Jane and Aaron were often alone in his

 classroom with the door closed. Hibbert testified, however, that he never saw

 anything inappropriate occur between Jane and Aaron and that his concerns were

 based on what he had heard from other teachers. Subsequently, Mary called

 Superintendent and Title IX Coordinator, Steve Loyd, and stated she had heard Jane

 and Aaron were spending a lot of time together, particularly in the weight room.

 Loyd said he would look into the matter and get back to her. Similarly, at some point

 during the year, Hibbert met with Loyd to discuss, inter alia, the relationship between

 Jane and Aaron.

       After receiving Mary’s call, Loyd went to the high school to observe Jane and

 Aaron. He observed the weight room when Aaron was supervising. Jane was in the

 weight room with other students, the door was propped open; and Loyd did not

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 observe anything out of the ordinary. Loyd also attended a class taught by Aaron in

 which Jane was a student. Again, he did not observe anything out of the ordinary.

 Finally, because he was aware Jane was Aaron’s “teacher’s assistant,” Loyd visited

 Aaron during his planning periods at least twice. On one of those occasions, Loyd

 discussed concerns about Aaron meeting one-on-one with Jane and advised Aaron to

 keep the classroom door open. Sometime after these visits occurred, Loyd shared

 with Mary that he had observed Aaron and Jane and did not think their interactions

 were cause for concern.

       In April of 2017, Jeff was driving past the school and saw Aaron’s and Jane’s

 vehicles in the school parking lot on a day school was not in session. Jeff sent a text

 to Aaron informing Aaron that Jane needed to go home. Jane saw this text on Aaron’s

 phone. Jeff did not enter the building to see what was occurring or confirm Jane had

 left. Jeff did, however, state he immediately received a response from Aaron

 indicating Jane was leaving.

       A few weeks before graduation, Aaron asked Jane to stay after school to help

 in his classroom. While they were in the classroom, Aaron massaged Jane’s back,

 kissed her on the forehead, and hugged her. During that hug, Jane could feel that

 Aaron had an erection. Jane recalled feeling uncomfortable and attempted to leave

 the room. Aaron told Jane he knew they had feelings for each other upon which they

 could not act. Jane drove home shaking and in silence, “feeling like a brick.”

       Jane alleges that after graduation, her encounters with Aaron became more

 sexual in nature. These encounters included kissing, Aaron touching Jane’s breasts,

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 and oral sex. At the end of the summer, Jane left for college. Jane and Aaron

 purportedly remained in touch through social media.

       Jane turned eighteen years old on March 4, 2017; she graduated from Big

 Piney High School on May 26, 2017. After high school, Jane attended college,

 graduating with a bachelor's degree in Marriage and Family Studies. She also

 participated in a religious mission with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day

 Saints. During this mission, Jane discussed her relationship with Aaron with her

 mission companion. This was the first time Jane disclosed that her contact with

 Aaron was sexually inappropriate. After Jane returned from her mission, she began to

 suffer from, and seek treatment for, anxiety and PTSD resulting from her contact

 with Aaron. On October 31, 2019, Jane visited her family physician, Dr. Isac

 Simpson. In response to diagnostic questions, Jane explained to Dr. Simpson that her

 relationship with Aaron was sexual in nature. After this visit, on November 6, 2019,

 Dr. Simpson contacted the Sublette County Sheriff’s office and explained that Jane

 had revealed she had been groomed and sexually abused by Aaron while attending

 Big Piney High School. The Sublette County Sheriff’s office investigated Dr.

 Simpson’s report and, ultimately, decided not to charge Aaron.

 B. Procedural Background

       On May 26, 2021, exactly four years after Jane graduated from Big Piney High

 school, Jane, James, and Mary sued the Board.3 The Does’ complaint set out the

       3
       The Does filed an amended complaint on September 9, 2021, and a second
 amended complaint on September 18, 2021. The second amended complaint is the
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 following four causes of action: (1) “First Claim for Relief—Post-Report Deliberate

 Indifference in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq.”; (2) “Second Claim

 for Relief—Retaliation in Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq.”; (3)

 “Third Claim for Relief—Disparate Treatment & Impact, in violation of Plaintiff’s

 Constitutional and Federal Rights, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; and (4) “Fourth

 Claim for Relief[—]Failure to Train, in Violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional and

 Federal Rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The third cause of action was set out

 only on Jane’s behalf; claims one, two, and four were set out on behalf of Jane,

 James, and Mary.4

 operative pleading for purposes of this appeal. Although the Does’ second amended
 complaint supersedes the original complaint’s allegations, it does not affect its
 timing. May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing Fed. R.
 Civ. P. 15).
       4
          The Board did not question, and the district court did not explore, whether
 James and/or Mary have statutory standing to raise Title IX claims on their own
 behalf. In addition to the first and second causes of action, which are specifically
 based on Title IX, the fourth claim, although nominally arising under § 1983, is
 critically tethered to Title IX. Section 1681(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o
 person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
 benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
 receiving Federal financial assistance.” Courts have recognized that to have statutory
 standing to assert a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
 alleged violative conduct excluded that plaintiff from, denied that plaintiff the benefit
 of, or subjected that plaintiff to discrimination under a federally funded program or
 activity. See Rossley v. Drake Univ., 958 F.3d 679, 683-85 (8th Cir. 2020) (collecting
 cases). Parents acting in their individual capacity, rather than as a representative of a
 minor child, generally do not state an actionable claim under this provision. See id.;
 see also Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that
 district court ruled parents did not have individual claims under Title IX). Because
 the question whether James and/or Mary can state a cause of action under Title IX is
 one of statutory, rather than Article III standing, See Dohaish v. Tooley, 670 F.2d
 934, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1982), and because the issue was not raised by the Board, this
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       The Board moved for summary judgment. It argued the timeliness of the Does’

 claims was measured by the four-year limitations period set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann.

 § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C). Relying heavily on Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1212-13, 1215-17, the

 Board argued Jane’s claims accrued no later than the event a few weeks before

 graduation in which Aaron, inter alia, hugged her with an erection. Jane understood

 the wrongfulness of Aaron’s actions immediately thereafter. As to James’s and

 Mary’s claims, the Board noted they complained in early February of 2017 about the

 possibility of an inappropriate relationship between Jane and Aaron. Loyd informed

 them within a month, well before graduation, that his investigation had not turned up

 anything inappropriate. Thus, the Does’ failure-to-train and retaliation claims would

 have also accrued well before Jane’s graduation.

       The district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. It ruled

 Varnell compelled the conclusion that all claims set out in the Does’ complaint

 accrued before Jane’s graduation. Because the Does did not file their complaint until

 more than four years later, i.e., four years after the date of Jane’s graduation, the

 claims fell outside the limitations period set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-

 105(a)(iv)(C).

 court does not consider whether any of the three claims brought by James and Mary
 state valid causes of action.
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                                     III. ANALYSIS

  A. Standard of Review

        This court “reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

  same legal standard used by the district court and examining the record to determine

  if any genuine issue of material fact was in dispute; if not, we determine if the

  substantive law was correctly applied.” United States ex rel. Sorenson v. Wadsworth

  Bros. Constr. Co., 48 F.4th 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation and alteration

  omitted). “[W]e view the factual record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom

  most favorably to [the Does] as the nonmoving part[ies].” Id. (quotation omitted).5

  B. Discussion

        Like the district court, we conclude Varnell controls whether the Does’ claims

  were filed outside the applicable limitations period. Accordingly, this court begins by

  setting out Varnell’s factual background and relevant holdings in some detail.6 In

  Varnell, Amber Shaw coached Tori Varnell in several sports. 756 F.3d at 1210.

  During that time, from approximately January 2005 to early 2007, Shaw “repeatedly

        5
          The Does assert the district court’s “decision should be reversed as it tended
  to make inferences about the facts in the light least favorable to Jane Doe and her
  family.” Does’ Opening Br. at 6. As noted above, however, this concern is not
  implicated as to the issue of the timeliness of the claims set out in the Does’
  complaint. See supra n.1. And, in any event, because this court’s review is de novo,
  any such error on the part of the district court “has no effect on our review of the
  issue.” United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1047 (10th
  Cir. 2004).
        6
        Surprisingly, especially given its prominence in the Board’s summary
  judgment briefing and in the district court’s order granting the Board summary
  judgment, the Does’ opening brief does not contain a single citation to Varnell.
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  sexually abused” Varnell. Id. Varnell did not report the abuse because Shaw

  “instructed her not to tell anyone and she feared social repercussions.” Id. at 1210-11.

  After she graduated from high school in 2010, Varnell told her “spiritual mentor

  about the alleged abuse.” Id. The mentor told Varnell the conduct she described was

  criminal and, if she failed to report Shaw, other girls could suffer abuse. Id. This

  discussion led Varnell to realize the abuse was not her fault and she had a duty to

  protect other girls by reporting Shaw’s sexual abuse. Id. Varnell reported the abuse to

  her mother, who reported the abuse to a school official, who, in turn, reported the

  abuse to law enforcement. Id. Shaw was, thereafter, indicted by a state grand jury. Id.

  Almost two years later, in 2012, Varnell was examined by a psychiatrist. Id. As of

  the date of that examination, the psychiatrist opined as follows:

         [Varnell] did not realize that she was being “emotionally manipulated”
         and did not appreciate the “consequences to her of this two-year training
         epoch during her years of adolescent personality and sexual identity
         formation, or upon her anxiety level.” Further, [Varnell] did not
         comprehend how the abuse had “troubled and quietly damaged her,” and
         she only began recognizing the harm done to her after speaking to her
         spiritual mentor in 2010. . . . [Varnell] did not fully comprehend the
         emotional and physical damage she had suffered and would suffer
         because of the abuse.

  Id. (record citations omitted).

         Two weeks after her meeting with the psychiatrist, Varnell sued the school

  district and district officials. Id. She raised, inter alia, claims under Title IX and §

  1983. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground Varnell’s claims were time

  barred. Id. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding

  Varnell’s federal claims were time barred. Id. Varnell appealed, contending “her

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  federal-law claims are timely (a) because the limitations period was tolled by

  (i) N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37–1–30 (a child-sexual-abuse statute), (ii) her mental

  incapacity, and (iii) fraudulent concealment, and (b) because her claims did not

  accrue until 2010 when she first understood the injury she had suffered.” Id.

        This court affirmed. Id. at 1212-17. Varnell began by recognizing that because

  § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, “the settled practice [is] to adopt a

  local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy

  to do so.” Id. at 1212 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held

  that state limitations period adopted should be the “‘general or residual statute for

  personal injury actions.’” Id. (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989)). It

  is settled law in this circuit that the applicable statute for Wyoming is, as noted and

  applied by the district court, the four-year limitations period set out in Wyo. Stat.

  Ann. § 1–3–105(a)(iv)(C) (setting four-year limitations period for “[a]n injury to the

  rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated”). Gee v.

  Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 2010). Varnell further held that the same

  limitations period that applies to claims under § 1983 also applies to claims based on

  Title IX. 756 F.3d at 1213. Furthermore, Varnell specifically rejected the notion that

  a special state limitations period applicable to claims of sexual abuse could serve as

  the borrowed limitations period for claims like those raised by both Varnell and the

  Does here. Id. (“It should be obvious from our above discussion that [New Mexico’s

  special state statute for personal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse] is

  irrelevant to § 1983 [and Title IX] cases because it does not apply to torts in general.

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  . . . And even if we could do as [Varnell] requests and construe [the special statute]

  as a tolling provision, it still fails the same general-applicability requirement.”).7

         Having reaffirmed and refined the applicable process this court must undertake

  in borrowing a state limitations period for Title IX and § 1983 claims, Varnell moved

  on to address the question of claim accrual. Id.at 1215-17. It began by recognizing

  the question of accrual is one of federal, not state law. Id. at 1215. Varnell held that

  claims like Varnell’s and the Does’ are most analogous to the common-law tort of

  battery.8 Such claims accrue no later than the date of the last offense contact. Id. at

  1216. Finally, Varnell rejected the assertion that a failure to understand the extent of

  injury could delay accrual:

         [Varnell] argues that her claims accrued much later because she did not
         realize the extent of her psychological injury until shortly before filing
         suit. She relies on what is known as the “discovery rule,” which delays
         accrual of a claim until the plaintiff knew or should have known the
         facts necessary to establish her cause of action, such as the fact that a
         surgeon left a sponge in the plaintiff’s abdomen after an operation. But
         even if the discovery rule applies to her § 1983 claim, [Varnell] knew
         long before she filed suit all the facts necessary to sue and recover
         damages. Although she may not have known how harmful [Shaw’s]
         abuse was, the cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the
         injury is not then known or predictable. Were it otherwise, . . . the

         7
           This aspect of Varnell’s holding conclusively disposes of the Does’ assertion
  that the relevant limitations period is the one set out in Wyoming’s special limitations
  period for childhood sexual assault. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(b). Accordingly,
  especially given the Does’ failure to contest this issue in their opening brief, this
  court need not, and does not, consider the matter further.
         8
          Because they have not addressed the issue on appeal, the Does have waived
  any argument that some or all claims set out in their complaint are more analogous to
  a common-law tort other than battery, resulting in an alternate date of accrual. See
  Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1014 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Issues not raised in the
  opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” (quotation omitted)).
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        statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he
        had been harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the
        sole hands of the party seeking relief.

  Id. (quotations and citations omitted).9

        The facts underlying Varnell and the facts in the instant case are virtually

  identical. Accordingly, Varnell compels the conclusion that the Does’ claims are

  untimely. The Does’ attempts to resist this conclusion can be rejected in short

  measure. In addition to the arguments already resolved above, the Does make related

  claims that the district court should have considered pre-assault heightened risk10 and

  should have adopted the accrual rule set out by the Sixth Circuit in Snyder-Hill v.

  Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686 (6th Cir. 2022). The problem for the Does is they do

  not identify where in the complaint they raise a pre-assault heightened risk claim.

  Indeed, their first claim is specifically delineated as a post-assault claim. No aspect

  of the claim focuses on events occurring at Big Piney High School before Aaron’s

  interactions with Jane. Likewise, the second claim in the Does’ complaint is a

        9
           Again, this aspect of Varnell conclusively disposes of the Does’ argument
  that Jane did not fully understand the nature and extent of her injuries until she met
  with a medical professional in 2019 and, therefore, her claims did not accrue until
  after that appointment. This is also true if the Does’ argument in this regard is an
  attempt to argue for a later accrual date based on an allegation of incapacity. Varnell,
  756 F.3d at 1214.
        10
           For helpful discussions of the differences between “pre-assault heightened
  risk” and “post-assault” deliberate indifference claims, see Chapman v. Seuffert, No.
  1:23-cv-00991, 2024 WL 310093, at *6-12 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2024), and V.E. v.
  Univ. of Md. Balt. Cnty, No. 1:22-cv-02338, 2023 WL 3043772, at *3-6 (D. Md.
  April 21, 2023).

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  retaliation claim focusing on the Board’s reaction after it was allegedly informed of

  an inappropriate relationship between Aaron and Jane. The third claim, brought only

  by Jane, asserts the harassment she suffered violated the equal protection clause of

  the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Doe’s fourth and final claim is a failure to

  train claim. While it is certainly true that certain aspects of this claim focus on the

  Board’s actions prior to Aaron’s harassment of Jane, the Does make no effort in their

  appellate briefing to explain how or why, under the facts of this case, their failure-to-

  train claim falls within the narrow rubric of a pre-assault heightened risk claim. They

  cite no authority to support such a proposition and make no argument analogizing

  their particular failure-to-train claim to the pre-assault heightened risk claim at issue

  in Snyder-Hill.11 Because the Does did not advance a pre-assault heightened risk

  claim, the district court did not err in failing to consider such a claim. And, because

  Varnell provides the rule of law as to the accrual of post-assault deliberate

  indifference claims, the district court properly applied Varnell to determine the

  claims set out in the Does’ complaint were untimely under Wyoming’s four-year

  limitations period.

        11
           The factual allegations in Snyder-Hill are extreme. It was plausibly alleged
  therein that a large public university undertook a two-decades long campaign to
  cover-up, facilitate, and normalize sexual abuse of students by a physician employed
  by the university. 48 F.4th at 691-93. It was also plausibly alleged that, given the
  university’s actions, no reasonable student would have been able to discover that the
  university’s own actions exposed the students to a danger of abuse should they come
  into contact with the physician. Id. at 691-97. Here, there is no allegation, let alone
  evidence, of a coordinated campaign on the part of the Board to cover-up its training
  regime, either before or in the aftermath of Aaron’s alleged harassment and assault of
  Jane.
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         Finally, pointing to the fact Jane engaged in a sexual relationship with Aaron

  during the summer after her graduation, the Does assert their claims are rendered

  timely under the continuing-violation doctrine. This assertion is inadequately briefed

  and, thus, waived. See Burke, 935 F.3d at 1014. The Does do not cite to a single

  relevant authority, let alone authorities addressing whether and how the doctrine

  could relate to the claims set out in the Does’ complaint. Moreover, the Does simply

  assume Aaron’s acts during the summer after graduation amount to violations of their

  Title IX and Fourteenth Amendment rights on the part of the Board. As noted by the

  Board, however, this is a highly debatable proposition given that, at the time, both

  Aaron and Jane were adults and, arguably, Aaron was not under the control of the

  Board. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644-47 (1999)

  (discussing the parameters of liability under Title IX). In its order granting the Board

  summary judgment, the district court noted this exact failure in concluding the

  continuing-violations doctrine did not render the Does’ claims timely. Absent truly

  meaningful briefing on the issue, this court declines to opine as to the applicability

  and parameters of the continuing-violations doctrine in Title IX and § 1983 cases like

  the instant case.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

         The Does have failed to demonstrate the district court erred in concluding,

  based on Varnell, the claims set out in the complaint are untimely. Thus, the

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Appellate Case: 23-8001   Document: 010111014765       Date Filed: 03/13/2024   Page: 17

  judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming is hereby

  AFFIRMED.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Michael R. Murphy
                                            Circuit Judge

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