Court Opinion

ID: 9479341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:15:08.176552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:57.968481
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in those part of Judge Kennedy’s opinion entitled “The 1986 Amendments as a ‘Clarification,’ ” and “Retroactive Application.” I would add to the “clarification” discussion, however, that the district court was not free to reevaluate a statutory interpretation reached by this court. In light of Boddie I, the district court should have determined only whether the subsequent elimination of the “injuri*273ous act” phraseology had retroactive effect. I agree that the amendment could only have prospective application. Congress may not, in the guise of a change in legislation, effect the legal outcome of actions between private parties which had already taken place; it may not usurp the judicial function to decide a particular case or controversy.
I disagree with that part of Judge Kennedy’s opinion which holds the statute in question to be unconstitutionally vague particularly after an initial remand by this court. This part of the Wiretap Act has been reviewed and accepted as constitutional by every other circuit which has considered it. The Eighth Circuit considered the specific language questioned by my colleagues in Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794 (8th Cir.1971). The court in Meredith made the following observations about the statute and the question before it.
Since concededly no criminal or tor-tious act is involved, the specific question before us is whether the conversation was intercepted “for the purpose of committing any * * * injurious act” under § 2511(2)(d)....
It is to be observed that § 2511(1) of the statute outlaws all interception, use, or disclosure of oral or wire communications. Standing by itself, this prohibition would apply to any interception, use, or disclosure by or with the consent of one of the parties to the communications, as well as by third parties. Such a provision would of course go considerably beyond existing law in this area. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). Congress however did not intend such a result, but provided in §§ 2511(2)(c) and (d) that certain interceptions with the consent of one of the parties to the communication would not be unlawful.
Meredith, 446 F.2d at 797 (footnote omitted).
The court also construed the meaning of the term “injurious act:”
It does seem that by using the term “injurious act” in conjunction with “criminal and tortious acts”, it was intended to reach certain kinds of harmful conduct which might not strictly be criminal or tortious. The scope of such harmful conduct must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, it seems apparent from the context in which the statute was enacted that the sort of conduct contemplated was an interception by a party to a conversation with an intent to use that interception against the non-consenting party in some harmful way and in a manner in which the offending party had no right to proceed.
Id. at 799.
In the context of a specific challenge by a criminal defendant for vagueness, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Act’s constitutionality:
But assuming, arguendo, that Edelson does have standing, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s claim that the term “criminal,” “tortious” and “injurious act” are so vague that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). On the contrary, we find the statute to be sufficiently explicit to “inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.” Id. 46 S.Ct. at 127.
United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1292 (7th Cir.1978) (footnote omitted, brackets in original).1
The meaning of the Act was considered again by yet another circuit in Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.1978), which aligned itself with *274the two other circuits. Moore considered the legislative history in more detail in its interpretation:
Moore next argues that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury as to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(d), the exception to the blanket prohibition against willful interception applicable to a party to the communication not acting under color of law. As already mentioned, a person is not entitled to this exemption if his purpose was to commit a criminal, tortious or injurious act. Moore objects because the jury was instructed that in determining whether Anderson recorded with the purpose of committing an injurious act it could consider, inter alia, whether the conversations were recorded for the purpose of improperly terminating Moore’s franchise. Moore contends that if Anderson’s purpose was to terminate Moore’s franchise properly it also would amount to an injurious act.
Congress did not define the meaning of “injurious act.” While we acknowledge that the term embraces acts not easily classified as either “criminal” or “tor-tious,” we cannot believe that Congress intended it to be read to embrace every act which disadvantages the other party to this communication. Such a reading would nullify the exemption created by § 2511(2)(a)(d). Presumably there is some disadvantage in having any conversation intercepted in the absence of consent of all parties. Congress, we believe, intended to permit one party to record conversation with another when the record is acting “out of a legitimate desire to protect himself.”
Moore, 589 F.2d at 965-86.
In footnotes 3 and 4 from the above cited portion from Moore, the court noted:
3. The statute originally exempted from its prohibition any interception of a wire or oral communication where one of the parties to the communication consented. 2 U.S.C.Cong. & Ad.News, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2181 (1968). Senator Hart objected to this exemption because it was too permissive, possibly allowing one party to monitor the communication for “insidious purposes such as blackmail, stealing business secrets, or other criminal or tortious acts in violation of Federal or State laws.” id. at 2236. Senators Hart and McClellan proposed an amendment to narrow the exemption, part of which was enacted as § 2511(2)(a)(d). Senator Hart cast the only light upon the meaning of “injurious act” stating, “We propose to prohibit a one party consent tap, except ... for private persons who act in defensive fashion ... [WJhenever a private person acts in such situations with an unlawful motive he will violate the criminal provisions of title III and will also be subject to a civil suit. Such one party consent is also prohibited when the party acts in any way with an intent to injure the other party to the conversation in any other way. For example the secret consensual recording may be made for the purpose of blackmailing the other party, threatening him, or publicly embarrassing him_ 114 Cong.Rec. 147694 (May 23, 1968).
4. Senator Hart, further describing the purpose of the amendment, noted that it did not prohibit “such recording in other situations when the party acts out of legitimate desire to protect himself and his own conversations from later distortion or other unlawful or injurious uses by the other party.” 114 Cong.Rec. 14694 (May 23, 1968).
The Fourth Circuit also considered an asserted cause of action against, interestingly enough, American Broadcasting Company, and made no indication that the language of the phrase in question rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1305 (4th Cir.1983). See also Benford v. American Broadcasting Co., 502 F.Supp. 1148 (D.Md.1980), affd mem., 661 F.2d 917 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Holton v. Benford, 454 U.S. 1060, 102 S.Ct. 612, 70 L.Ed.2d 599 (1981), for treatment of an episode remarkably like the one in the instant case. In Benford, even congressional defendants’ claims of immunity were held not to prevail in the face of a civil claim brought under the statute in question.
*275I find the decisions of these courts to be both instructive and constructive and that their reasonable interpretations of the Act preclude a finding that the statute, before its amendment following Boddie I, was unconstitutionally vague. “Injurious act” could thus encompass not only a criminal but also a tortious act as well as a “defensive” act to protect oneself from blackmail or extortion, or it may mean a “threatening act” or one designed to cause another person unnecessary or improper public humiliation or embarrassment with a malicious or fraudulent motive. It may be fairly interpreted, in my view, in a narrow sense in light of congressional concerns regarding personal privacy.
In Boddie I, moreover, we cited Meredith and Moore with approval, and that “[T]he determination of whether an interception was made with a purpose to commit any criminal tortious or injurious act, must be made on a ‘case-by-case basis.’ ” 731 F.2d at 338 n. 4 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000, 97 S.Ct. 530, 50 L.Ed.2d 611 (1976)). The prior panel in Boddie I made no finding and gave no hint that this court considered the statutory language unconstitutional. Indeed, it would have been disingenuous for the Boddie I panel to interpret a statute it believed to be unconstitutionally vague.
Very recently, the Supreme Court has stated that “where the literal meaning of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ ... we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.” Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Dept. of Justice, — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2566, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984-85, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989). Again, the Court stated, “ ‘the circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,’ for example, ‘may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.’ ” Id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 2566 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)). The words, “injurious act,” then should be read in light of congressional purpose and narrowly construed as has been done by a number of courts that have examined the statutory language in question.
I also object to the majority’s contention that the first amendment is somehow implicated in this case. As conceded by my colleagues, “the wiretapping statute proscribes the noneonsensual interception of a communication, not the use of it.” Yet the majority, however, refers to some dicta in By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 960 (7th Cir.1982), which states “we doubt anyway that a tape recording which was never used could form a basis for liability under section 2511(2)(d),” and infers that the statute really punishes the “dissemination” of the recording. From this, the majority reasons that, because of the statute, defendants “might be deterred from publishing” an interview which has been secretly recorded. I believe the majority stretches the meaning and intent of the statute so as to construe it as “likely to inhibit newsgathering and reporting.” Rather, it deters only noncon-sensual recording intended to injure, embarrass, or insult the nonconsenting party. There is not in this situation a genuine “freedom of the press” issue as generated by Judge Kennedy in her discussion of this statute. Nor do I find the case of Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976), to provide an “apt comparison” to this case.
I would not declare, in the face of the precedent herein discussed, the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. I, therefore, dissent from the affirmance of the district court, and would, instead remand for the reasons indicated.

. I question the majority’s view that this was dicta. Before turning to the vagueness issue, the Edelson court stated that "it is by no means clear” that the statute could be applied to the "non-recording” party. Although the court could have based its decision on that question, it proceeded to address the vagueness question and resolve the issue on that basis. Edelson, 581 F.2d at 1292.