Court Opinion

ID: 9444280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:55:03.717262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:47.732974
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge:
I am constrained to dissent.
Defendant’s verified amended motion, filed July 5, 1952, to set aside his conviction of August 12, 1942, pursuant to section 2255, title 28 U.S.C.A., and rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal *603Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., following : contains the
“24. Movant has been denied the substance of a fair trial, in contravention and violation of the laws and Constitution of the United States, for the following reasons:
“A. The legal representation afforded to movant by his chief counsel, the late Oscar F. Smith, was in effect no legal representation and was not such benefit of counsel in a criminal proceeding as is guaranteed to all defendants by the Constitution and laws of the United States, because the said Smith had entered into a conspiracy with the prosecution in said cause to deprive movant of a fair trial and aid in movant’s conviction upon the unwarranted charges in the indictment in said criminal cause.
“B. The said Smith was approached by an emissary of the prosecution shortly after his retention by movant as chief defense counsel, and warned that if he did not ‘pull his punches’, and aid in ‘putting Pelley away’, his wife, a German alien, would be deported.
“C. That the incident herein-above in Subparagraph 24B hereof referred to did transpire was acknowledged to movant by the said Smith at a much later date, after the damage to movant and his defense had been completely perpetrated.
“D. Movant does not know whether or not Floyd G. Christian, associate defense counsel, was aware of the threat made to Smith or was conscious of the effect it had upon Smith’s conduct of the defense, * * »>>_
The amended motion sets forth 19 “acts and omissions of defense counsel” (said to be only a part of them) “supporting movant’s contention that his right to a fair trial and an adequate defense was violated”.
This point was not presented in any of the prior unsuccessful attempts of defendant to set aside his conviction.
An allegation that his chief counsel had entered into a conspiracy with the prosecution to deprive him of a fair trial and to aid in his conviction is a statement of ultimate fact. It is issuable and traversable (71 C.J.S., Pleading, § 12, p. 33) in a criminal proceeding, where the applicable rules are the same as in civil pleadings, 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, § 100, p. 983.
It is not necessary to lengthen this opinion by reciting the 19 items of alleged dereliction of defendant’s chief counsel, as set forth in the motion. Without any such recital, it is clear that, if the facts in regard to the conspiracy can be proved by defendant on a hearing on his motion, he could not have received a fair trial. That the defendant makes no charge against his other counsel, Mr. Christian, is immaterial in passing upon the sufficiency of the motion. It might become a circumstance to be considered upon a hearing on the motion. The fact that attorney Smith is now deceased is also immaterial in testing the legal sufficiency of the motion. On a hearing on the motion, that fact would be a circumstance for consideration as to credibility.
If, unknown to a defendant on trial in a criminal case, his chief counsel has been coerced or intimidated by the prosecution, through threats of deportation of the counsel’s wife, into entering into an agreement with a representative of the prosecution to withhold an effective defense, the presence in the case of an able, conscientious and honest associate counsel might not necessarily offset the damaging effects resulting from the consequent dereliction of the chief counsel. If one hires a team of horses to pull a loaded wagon, he is not getting proper service if only one of the horses is performing its proper function while the other is pulling back. If this charge in the motion can be proved true, defend*604ant did not receive a fair trial under the constitution.. Not only should he be afforded an opportunity to prove this serious charge, but, as a matter of justice to the deceased counsel, this charge, now spread of record, should not be left standing. The stigma upon a dead man should be obliterated if defendant cannot prove it.
I believe that the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court for a hearing upon the motion, limited solely to the charge of conspiracy referred to in this opinion.