Court Opinion

ID: 9367812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 21:03:15.732556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.418013
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (4th) 220088-U
            NOTICE                                                                         FILED
This Order was filed under                                                            February 1, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                  NO. 4-22-0088
                                                                                        Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed                                                       4th District Appellate
                                     IN THE APPELLATE COURT                               Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                              OF ILLINOIS

                                          FOURTH DISTRICT

    WILLIAM N. ALWAN,                                            )      Appeal from the
                  Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,        )      Circuit Court of
                  v.                                             )      Peoria County
    KICKAPOO-EDWARDS LAND TRUST,                                 )      No. 07L334
    CENTENNIAL TRUST, VILLENEAUVE TRUST, and                     )
    DENNIS P. LaHOOD,                                            )
                  Defendants,                                    )
    (Kickapoo-Edwards Land Trust, Centennial Trust,              )      Honorable
    Villeneauve Trust, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-           )      David A. Brown,
    Appellants).                                                 )      Judge Presiding.

                    JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
                    Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

   ¶1       Held: The trial court’s finding that plaintiff was improperly removed from the three
                  partnerships and its determination of the appropriate relief, as well as the denial of
                  relief on all remaining claims and counterclaims, are not against the manifest
                  weight of the evidence.

   ¶2               Plaintiff William N. Alwan filed a multi-count complaint against three partnerships

   and one of its managers asserting that he was wrongfully discharged from the partnerships; he

   brought claims for breach of the partnership agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of

   the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) (805 ILCS 205/100 et seq. (West 2006)). Defendants

   Kickapoo-Edwards Land Trust, Centennial Trust, Villeneauve Trust, and Dennis P. LaHood filed

   counterclaims seeking damages against plaintiff for capital contributions owed to the partnerships
and, alternatively, for damages resulting from plaintiff wrongfully abandoning his partnership

obligations.

¶3             Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of plaintiff on the wrongful

expulsion count, held that plaintiff was entitled to his percentage share of the profits and losses of

each partnership upon wind up of the partnerships, and ordered other protections to safeguard

plaintiff’s interest. The trial court found against plaintiff on his remaining claims and found against

defendants on their counterclaims.

¶4             Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) finding he was improperly

terminated from the Villeneauve partnership; (2) miscalculating the financial relief to which he

was entitled; (3) concluding that plaintiff did not contribute the same amount as other partners;

(4) denying his requested relief for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of contract; and

(5) denying relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West

2006)). The partnerships cross-appealed, arguing the trial court’s decision denying their

counterclaims was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶5             We affirm.

¶6                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶7             Plaintiff was a partner in three land trust partnerships formed in the late 1970s and

early 1980s. The three partnerships, all defendants, are as follows: the Centennial Land Trust

partnership (Centennial) (formed December 1, 1975); the Kickapoo-Edwards Land Trust

partnership (K-E) (formed January 16, 1979); and the Villeneauve Development Company general

partnership (Villeneauve) (formed May 30, 1984). The original partners were a group of friends

and businessmen who planned to purchase real estate and develop the properties for profit. Several

of the partners—Joseph Rafool, Joseph Alwan (plaintiff’s brother), Gerald Couri, and plaintiff—

                                                 -2-
were partners of each partnership. Phillip Couri (Gerald’s brother) was a partner in K-E and in

1999 became the partnerships’ attorney. Dennis LaHood, whose father was a partner in K-E and

Villeneauve, was not a partner but later became a manager for certain partnership functions.

Plaintiff owned a 20% interest in Centennial and a 12.5% interest each in K-E and Villeneauve.

¶8                                              A. Pleadings

¶9             In 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint against the three partnerships and one of its

managers, Dennis LaHood, which was amended in 2011. The amended complaint set forth six

counts, specifically: (1) wrongful expulsion from the partnerships (count I); (2) breach of fiduciary

duties relating to access to business records and excluding plaintiff from partnership business and

profits (count II); (3) violations of the 1917 UPA relating to access to partnership records (count

III); and (4) breach of the various partnership agreements relating to access to records and making

payments/distributions (counts IV-VI). In August 2018, plaintiff filed an amendment setting forth

count VII, which sought to compel defendants’ purchase of plaintiff’s partnership interests

pursuant to sections 601 and 701 of the UPA; however, count VII was later dismissed with

prejudice and is not at issue in this appeal.

¶ 10           The defendants filed a counterclaim seeking damages of $342,719.92 against

plaintiff for unpaid capital contributions and monies owed to the partnerships; alternatively, the

counterclaims sought $479,242.55 in damages for plaintiff’s alleged wrongful abandonment of his

partnership obligations.

¶ 11           We note that a prior appeal occurred in this case—an interlocutory appeal to the

Third District Appellate Court in Alwan v. Kickapoo-Edwards Land Trust, 2018 IL App (3d)

170165—wherein the appellate court held that the 1997 UPA applied to all partnerships after 2008.

No further amendment of the complaint followed.

                                                    -3-
¶ 12                                     B. Trial Testimony

¶ 13            The following testimony and evidence were adduced at the December 2021 trial.

¶ 14                                     1. The Partnerships

¶ 15            The three partnerships were formed during the late 1970s and early 1980s to

purchase land for future developments, and each partner was required to make initial capital

contributions. The Centennial and K-E partnership agreements did not expressly provide for

further “capital calls”—additional capital contributions from the partners—but Villeneauve

contained such a provision at paragraph 7, permitting additional contributions “[w]henever the

reasonable demands of the business *** shall require additional capital.” These additional

contributions were to be “determined by the managing partners” and “contributed by the partners

in proportion to their initial capital accounts.”

¶ 16            Under the Villeneauve agreement, a failure to make required additional

contributions subjected the deficient partner to 8% interest and a continued deficiency beyond 30

days could “be deemed by the Partnership to be a withdrawal from the Partnership by the

delinquent partner effective as of the last day of said thirty day period of their intention to treat

said failure as a withdrawal by the delinquent partner.” Paragraph 17 of the Villeneauve agreement

also provided a method for calculating the value of a former partner’s share in the partnership,

which was to be calculated as of the last day of the month in which dissolution occurs.

¶ 17            Two of the partnership agreements—Centennial and Villeneauve—contained

clauses concerning the right of a partner to inspect the books and records. Paragraph 3.02 of the

Centennial agreement provided, in part: “The books and records shall be open to the reasonable

inspection and examination of the Partners or their duly authorized representatives during

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reasonable business hours.” Paragraph 13 of the Villeneauve agreement contained a similar clause.

The K-E agreement did not contain a clause regarding access to the books and records.

¶ 18                             2. The 1993 Demand for Capital

¶ 19           Disagreements arose during the early 1990s as to whether plaintiff was current in

his capital contributions. In November 1993, Gerald Couri, one of the partners, sent plaintiff a

letter stating that, “[a]ccording to Joe Rafool’s records,” plaintiff was behind $34,751.68 in his

contributions; Couri’s letter asked plaintiff to make his required contributions. Rafool’s daughter,

Barbara Rafool-Patterson, who was Rafool’s business secretary, testified that Rafool was then

managing partner of the partnerships and handled the partnerships’ books. Couri’s letter further

stated that plaintiff had contributed $105,708.26 “over the past 16 years” and specified the amounts

paid on four properties—the Cone Property (part of Villeneauve), the Anderson Property (part of

Centennial), the Huverstahl Property (part of Centennial), and the Miller Property (part of K-E).

¶ 20           The November 1993 letter prompted a meeting to discuss the alleged deficiency

involving plaintiff, plaintiff’s then-wife Sally Alwan, plaintiff’s son David Alwan (who assisted

his father with his businesses), Gerald Couri, and Dennis LaHood (who was then acting as his

deceased father’s estate representative and was not a partner individually). According to plaintiff,

Sally Alwan, and David Alwan, plaintiff had asked for records that justified the claimed

deficiency: “documentation of what [plaintiff] *** had contributed and what [the partnerships]

were claiming *** he had [contributed].” David testified his father had also asked for

documentation of what the other partners had contributed and what they owed. Sally, David, and

plaintiff each testified that no such documentation was ever provided to plaintiff by the partnership.

                                                -5-
¶ 21           Plaintiff also maintained that he had paid his share, although he had no records to

confirm his contributions. According to plaintiff, his records were lost in a fire at one of his

businesses.

¶ 22           Handwritten ledger documents purportedly prepared by Joe Rafool were admitted

into evidence; they showed that plaintiff had contributed $104,788 to the three partnerships. These

ledger sheets, which were purported by counsel to be attached to a 1993 letter from Gerald Couri

to plaintiff’s then-attorney, Steve Kouri, were shown to David Alwan at trial. Although David

testified that he had not seen the letter until the time of trial and that he did not know whether his

father, plaintiff, had received a copy, David admitted he had seen the ledger sheets before and that

he had wanted more documentation from the partnership. He acknowledged, however, that he did

not know whether the partnerships kept the level of detailed documentation he was requesting, and

he did not know whether any of the other partners had received any further detailed documentation.

¶ 23           Based on the evidence at trial, it does not appear that the deficiencies in the accounts

referenced in the 1993 letter were rectified.

¶ 24                          3. The Death of Partner Joseph Rafool

¶ 25           In July 1996, original partner Joseph Rafool died. According to Rafool-Patterson,

Gerald Couri and Dennis LaHood met with her at Joseph’s office and the two retrieved the

partnership checkbooks (one for Centennial/K-E and one for Villeneauve). She testified that

Gerald and LaHood also took her father’s partnership records, which she described as two roughly

foot-tall files of largely handwritten records. She further testified that Gerald and LaHood told her

they would make her copies of all the documents, but they never did.

¶ 26           LaHood recalled the interaction differently, acknowledging that Gerald Couri took

the two checkbooks but no other records. LaHood also said the meeting occurred shortly before

                                                -6-
Joseph Rafool died, not after. At that time, LaHood’s only role in the partnerships came in his

capacity as executor of his late father’s estate. LaHood also testified that he had been told that

Joseph’s son-in-law burned Joseph’s partnership records after his death.

¶ 27                           4. The Death of Partner Gerald Couri

¶ 28           In early 1999, original partner Gerald Couri died. In February, LaHood was asked

to take over from Gerald Couri as manager of paying bills and invoices and was asked to handle

county rezoning issues and property sales. At that time, LaHood took possession of the two

checkbooks but not any other records. LaHood testified that he was not the partnerships’ general

manager and was not a partner in any of the partnerships. Moreover, he only made contributions

to the partnership on behalf of his father’s estate.

¶ 29                    5. Additional Demands for Capital and Accounting

                                     and the 2004 Terminations

¶ 30           LaHood testified that at some point in the early 2000s—the dates are not clear—

plaintiff came into his office and wanted to know what was going on with the partnerships,

especially Villeneauve. LaHood said he explained the development plans and then called a

partnership meeting, which plaintiff attended. LaHood testified that the partners explained their

goals for Villeneauve and “asked [plaintiff] to get his capital input up-to-date, and if he wasn’t

gonna do it, we’d talk to each other” and “everybody agreed to give him his $104 to 105,000 back,

just leave us alone.” According to LaHood, plaintiff responded by asking for $1 million.

¶ 31           LaHood then testified that David Alwan had come to his office at some point in

2003 and said, “my family knows that my father’s behind on payments” and that “[w]e want to get

him updated and back in standing ***.” LaHood called a partnership meeting—which plaintiff did

not attend—and the partners suggested that plaintiff “could make payments over seven years and

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at three percent.” This offer was conveyed to David Alwan, who (according to LaHood) said,

“okay. That sounds agreeable.” LaHood testified that he never received a check from plaintiff,

plaintiff’s son David, or plaintiff’s then-wife Sally.

¶ 32           At the request of the partnerships, LaHood called a meeting with plaintiff in early

2004. LaHood explained that, during the meeting, “I went over exactly what we were doing. We

were selling the property in Centennial. We were trying to sell the Kickapoo land, and they had

plans before I got involved of a subdivision in East Peoria on Villeneauve.” Plaintiff responded by

stating he would not pay another penny.

¶ 33           In May 2004, defendant LaHood sent a letter to plaintiff stating the following:

“After our meeting of May 17, 2004, you were advised that you must bring your account current

within seven (7) days. At that time, I told you that the principal indebtedness you owed was

$46,401.68 plus interest at 8%.” According to that letter, the partnerships’ accounting firm had

calculated the additional interest owed on the principal obligation through May 31, 2004, of

$146,927.62, which brought the total amount due to the partnership to $194,249.56. The letter

continued: “Since you failed to bring your account current as you were advised in our meeting of

May 17, 2004, you have been declared in default of your partnerships’ ownership, and all your

rights and interest in the partnerships ha[s] been terminated.”

¶ 34           The letter, however, extended plaintiff “one last opportunity to purge” himself of

his default status, by making full payment within one week of the letter. The letter did not set forth

the specific amounts owed to each partnership but referenced the same entities listed in the 1993

letter: Cone Development, Kickapoo Development, and Centennial Trust.

¶ 35           LaHood testified that another meeting occurred in August 2004 at plaintiff’s then-

attorney Bruce Thiemann’s office, with Thiemann, David, plaintiff, Phillip Couri, and LaHood

                                                 -8-
present. LaHood said the meeting was “[t]o see if we [could] iron out the problem with [plaintiff].”

LaHood said that, at this meeting, Thiemann asked for documents dating back to 1999, when

LaHood had taken over. LaHood said he produced those documents: “Every one. Every single

check. The check register. The—the bank statement. All the sales that were made at the time. The

tax records. Everything that I had.”

¶ 36           Phillip Couri, the partnerships’ attorney (and a partner in K-E and Villeneauve),

agreed with LaHood’s statements, adding: “I went over to Thiemann’s office with a box of records.

In fact, it may have been a box and a half.” Couri stated, “I *** gave him the records so he had all

the records of the calculations that I would [have] had.”

¶ 37           Terrence McGrath, an accountant for the partnerships, testified that he delivered

copies of tax returns from 1981 to 1997 to attorney Thiemann. McGrath acknowledged that he no

longer had copies of the tax documents and did not know what had happened to them. LaHood

also acknowledged that his copies of the financial documents he produced to Thiemann were

destroyed by one of LaHood’s business associates.

¶ 38           Although plaintiff denied having ever received documents from the partnership, he

acknowledged that copies may have been delivered to his attorney. This was confirmed by

plaintiff’s son, David, who admitted that “[t]here were records provided that were handwritten

records. And we were asking for receipts and documentation to back up and validate the

handwritten records. I do remember seeing handwritten records.” When asked to be more specific

about what additional documents he and his father were looking for, David responded: “Receipts,

proof of any documentation of what expenses might have been, how and why we owed more

money.” Despite these purported productions, plaintiff maintained at trial that he had never

received any documents from the partnerships.

                                               -9-
¶ 39              According to plaintiff, he paid an additional $24,200 in capital contributions over

the documented $105,000 shown in Rafool’s handwritten ledger. At least one exhibit offered into

evidence noted these additional payments by plaintiff in relation to the “Anderson” property, but

the contribution dates are not clear. Moreover, the partnership records produced at trial contained

both documents—one ledger sheet with the additions and one without—and no explanation or

reconciliation.

¶ 40                               6. Post-2004 Partnership Events

¶ 41              Centennial ceased doing business in 2013, and K-E ceased operations in 2014.

After 2005, the majority of investment occurred in the Villeneauve partnership. It does not appear

that any of the partnerships were “wound up” under the UPA.

¶ 42              Valerie Fitzgerald, a certified public accountant, was hired by LaHood in 2021 to

“look at the partnership returns, tax returns, and other that were available to give an opinion as to

what happened through the years as far as the activity that had happened and the cash—follow the

cash through the years.” Fitzgerald testified that the original land purchase cost for Centennial was

$173,500 in 1977. She said that the final tax return (2013) indicated that the “land was sold, and

there was a net profit [for 2013] of $46,185.” She testified there were total cash distributions to

the partners of $574,964, “and then the partners contributed it to Villeneauve.” Her report, which

was admitted into evidence, stated that the “advance was to develop the land in Villeneauve and

produce further profit.” She stated her conclusions on Centennial as follows: “the Centennial Land

Trust was profitable in the land that they bought and sold and that the excess funds or some of the

excess funds that they had from that sale was then advanced to Villeneauve.”

¶ 43              Concerning K-E, Fitzgerald testified that the original land purchase cost in 1977

and 1978 was $160,000. Her report indicated that “[j]ust over 5 acres were sold between 1984 and

                                                 - 10 -
1988” for a gross sales price of $93,500, and the remaining acreage was sold in 2014 for $600,000.

The closing statement showed a gross sale price of $600,000 from the 2014 sales, from which

certain costs were deducted. Fitzgerald said, “[i]t went to pay off a mortgage. It went for

commission—real estate commission and then other common closing costs.” The remaining

$386,000 of the purchase price after the closing costs “were distributed *** for legal fees and other

expenses $278,000 and then the remaining [$108,958.89] was distributed to the partners.”

Fitzgerald then corrected herself, stating that, “[d]istributions is not the correct term,” and then

explained that some of the cash went to Villeneauve, similar to what happened in Centennial. She

concluded that the K-E partnership was “profitable with the land that they had purchased and sold

and that there was some of the cash from those sales that was advanced to Villeneauve Land Trust.”

¶ 44           As to Villeneauve, Fitzgerald testified that the original land purchase in 1978 was

$337,000. She noted an appraisal value in June 2004 of $280,000, which compared to a $403,380

cost basis on the 2005 tax return. She said the 2005 tax return showed “that the cost of the land

from the end of 2004 went from 403,000 to 2.8 million” and explained that “[d]uring this time,

they were starting to develop the land to be sold as residential lots.” She added that, at the end of

2007, the loan balance on the Villeneauve properties was $3.4 million, and at the end of 2008 that

number was down to $3,334,000. She explained, “during 2008, the development of the lots was

complete and they were starting to sell them, and so the land value between the end of 2007 and

2008 decreased because some of the land was sold.”

¶ 45           Fitzgerald said that sale of the Villeneauve lands produced “a loss of $109,654”

and an overall loss of “over $1.7 million over those years.” She explained, “Villeneauve had some

bad luck because right when they were going to start selling their lots, this recession happened so

my conclusion was that they likely would have been profitable in their endeavors except for the

                                               - 11 -
timing of it.” She said in 2012, the loans from Centennial to Villeneauve went from $379,000 to

$463,000 and that at the end of 2012, that number was down to $439,000.

¶ 46           She was asked, “If there was an effort to determine someone’s shares as of January

1, 2005, the only data we have is the tax returns showing what was happening at the end of 2004?”

She responded, “That’s the only information I have is the tax return.” Counsel then asked, “Do

you know if in the opinion you gave or the educated guess I guess as it was phrased that the overall

loss of three corporations put together was [approximately one] million, what effect it would have

if you eliminated everything that occurred counter your 2005 forward in Villeneauve?” Fitzgerald

answered, “Then there would not be a net loss.” Counsel asked further, “How much of your total

1.1 figure is Villeneauve?” to which she answered, “[a]bout 1.9 million.”

¶ 47           Fitzgerald said she was not asked to value the partnerships as a valuation expert

and was not a land appraiser. She also admitted that she did not have access to the tax records from

1981 to 2005. She also testified that at the end of 2004, the investment in land of Villeneauve was

$403,000 and the “total asset picture” for that company was $405,076. There was no mortgage on

the Villeneauve property at that time. The expansion of that partnership occurred after 2004.

¶ 48           At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the court directed a verdict in favor

of defendant LaHood in his individual capacity on all counts of plaintiff’s amended complaint.

¶ 49                                     C. Judgment Order

¶ 50           In December 2021, the trial court issued its memorandum order with its conclusion.

The court found that plaintiff was wrongfully expelled from the three partnerships, and that he was

therefore entitled to his percentage share of the profits and losses of each partnership upon their

winding up. He also ordered other protections to safeguard plaintiff’s interest, but denied plaintiff’s

requested relief on all other claims. Concerning the termination claims, the court held: “The court

                                                - 12 -
finds that [plaintiff was] deficient in [his] capital contributions. By how much is difficult to tell

due to the incomplete nature of the partnership records. However, even if the [plaintiff was] behind,

the partnerships still needed to follow the Act, which they clearly did not do.”

¶ 51           Finding that plaintiff remained a partner in all three partnerships, the court ordered

that plaintiff was “entitled to [his] percentage of the profits and losses of each of the partnerships,

when the partnerships are wound up.” Moreover, the court ordered:

               “When doing so, the court directs [plaintiff is] entitled to at least [his] percentage

               share of the roughly $109,000 distributions to partners that was made in 2014 (as

               reflected by the accountant’s report). Ordinarily, the court would order that such a

               distributive share would be reduced by whatever shortfall in capital contributions

               are attributed to [plaintiff]. However, due to the lack of partnership records, that

               shortfall is impossible to determine with any degree of confidence. As such, while

               the court finds the so-called terminated partners were behind, it also finds the

               partnerships are unable to prove the amount of such shortfall. Therefore, the

               partnerships are not entitled to decrease [plaintiff’s] distributive share based upon

               the deficiencies in the capital contributions as of the date of the purported

               terminations. Such a result also seems equitable in light of the ongoing operations

               of the partnerships and the exclusion of the plaintiffs from those activities.”

¶ 52           Noting that the next proper step for the partnerships is “that their affairs be wound

up pursuant to the provisions of the Act,” the court ordered the partnerships to provide plaintiff

“with full and complete access to the partnership records, pursuant to the Act,” so that he “may

participate in the decision making relating to how best to wind up the affairs of the respective

                                                - 13 -
partnerships.” The court then denied “the rest of the relief requested by the parties in their

respective claims or counterclaims.”

¶ 53           This appeal followed.

¶ 54                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 55           This case involves a complex set of fact occurring over the course of approximately

40 years. Incomplete business records, the death of several partners, and the partnerships’ loose

approach to management of their affairs makes the issues even more difficult. We commend the

trial court for its effort in navigating these complex transactions and relationships.

¶ 56           Plaintiff’s appeal presents three general issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in

finding he had been improperly terminated from the Villeneauve partnership; (2) as to his improper

termination from Centennial and K-E, whether the court properly determined his damages and

partnership share on reinstatement into the partnership and upon wind down; and (3) whether the

trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s requested relief for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of

the partnership agreements. Defendants’ cross-appeal challenges the trial court’s ruling denying

their counterclaims for payment of delinquent capital contributions. Each issue is one of fact,

governed by the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review. Stewart v. Thrasher, 242 Ill.

App. 3d 10, 15 (1993). Under a manifest weight standard, the fact-finder’s determinations are

affirmed unless an opposite result is clearly apparent. Id. (citing Gerill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove

Builders, Inc., 128 Ill. 2d 179, 192-93 (1989)).

¶ 57                       A. Termination of Plaintiff’s Partner Status in

                                 Centennial and K-E Partnerships

¶ 58           The trial court concluded that plaintiff was improperly expelled from the Centennial

and K-E partnerships. We begin by noting that this issue is not before the court, as appellees have

                                                - 14 -
conceded the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on this issue in their appellee brief. Thus, we

affirm the trial court on this finding and conclude that plaintiff was wrongfully expelled from and

remains a partner in the Centennial and K-E partnerships.

¶ 59                       B. Termination of Plaintiff’s Partner Status in

                                      Villeneauve Partnership

¶ 60           The trial court further found plaintiff was ineffectively terminated as a partner in

the Villeneauve partnership. According to the trial court, Villeneauve failed to follow its own

partnership terms for ousting a partner who failed to make required capital contributions.

¶ 61           “The court’s review of [the Villeneauve] partnership agreement shows the

partnership, to remove a partner, was required to make a demand on a partner to come current in

contributions, and if the partner did not after a certain period of time, the partnership may elect to

dissolve.” The court continued, “There is no evidence that any one or all the partnerships ever

elected to dissolve” and, in fact, “continued their activities well after the so-called termination” in

2004-05. The trial court concluded, “even though the Villeneauve partnership agreement had a

mechanism for removal, it was not utilized properly.”

¶ 62           Even looking to the terms of the UPA, the court observed, none of the Act’s

dissolution provisions “appear to apply to the factual situations presented herein.” The court found

“[t]here was no proof of unanimous vote of the partners” on plaintiff’s removal. Based on these

conclusions, the trial court found, “neither by the terms of the agreements nor by the terms of the

[UPA], [was plaintiff] properly removed” as a partner. As such, the court found that plaintiff

remained a partner in Villeneauve.

¶ 63           Again, our review of the trial court’s findings is under the manifest weight of the

evidence standard. It is well understood that a judgment should be affirmed where “the record

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contains any evidence to support the trial court’s judgment.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d

519, 570 (2010). Here, plaintiff has failed to identify or explain how the trial court’s decision on

Villeneauve is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence was presented that the

Villeneauve partnership gave notice of termination (May 2004 letter) and considered plaintiff

terminated (January 2005 letter), but there is little to no evidence concerning what happened next,

other than that the partnership moved forward without plaintiff’s involvement. While this perhaps

suggests an understanding that plaintiff had been terminated, this implicit conclusion does not

satisfy the Villeneauve partnership agreement’s termination provision or even the UPA. No

evidence was presented concerning a partnership vote; and while the trial court is correct that it

appears some partners may have consented to LaHood providing plaintiff with notice of

termination, there is no evidence of an actual vote and no evidence that any representative of

Joseph Rafool, who was at that time still a partner, voted to terminate plaintiff.

¶ 64           We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s

finding that plaintiff was not properly terminated from Villeneauve because the partnership

agreement’s provisions were not properly utilized, and we find that the trial court’s finding was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 65                        C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Self-Dealing

¶ 66           The trial court denied relief on plaintiff’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty

regarding operation of the partnership and alleged self-dealing, finding that “[b]y all indications,

the partners continued their efforts to make profits and develop out and sell the respective parcels.”

The court further found that plaintiff failed “to prove actual self-dealings by certain individuals

being compensated for their services out of a closing on the sale of one of the parcels.” The trial

                                                - 16 -
court held, “[t]hose payments were done with the full knowledge of the partnerships, not in secret,

and there was inadequate proof that the payments weren’t appropriate or reasonable.”

¶ 67           Similarly, the trial court rejected “the claim that it was wrong for Centennial and

[K-E] to loan cash to Villeneauve. There was no evidence that such a transaction was underhanded

or done with an improper purpose.” Moreover, the court concluded that “the loans or transfers

further support[ ] the conclusion that the overall business purpose of the partners was to develop

out all of the properties, not just one or two.” According to the court, “While it might be easy for

[plaintiff] to second guess the investment into the Villeneauve development after the fact, the 2008

downturn in the market and the resulting losses by Villeneauv[e] don’t amount to malfeasance or

misconduct, just bad timing.”

¶ 68           In a bench trial, the trial judge is the trier of fact. Vician v. Vician, 2016 IL App

(2d) 160022, ¶ 27 (citing Battaglia v. 736 N. Clark Corp., 2015 IL App (1st) 142437, ¶ 23). “The

trial court is in a superior position to observe witnesses, judge their credibility, and determine the

weight their testimony should receive.” Id. (citing Battaglia, 2015 IL App (1st) 142437, ¶ 23). Our

standard of review is one of manifest weight of the evidence and we decline to disturb the trial

court’s findings unless an opposite result is apparent. “If the record contains evidence to support

the trial court’s judgment, the judgment should be affirmed.” Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 570. We find

that the trial court’s rationale for its ruling is sound and supported by the record, and it is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 69                                  D. Partnership Records

¶ 70           Plaintiff raises two contentions with respect to partnership documents. First, he

argues that he was improperly denied access to various partnership records, and second, he argues

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for damages due to the purported destruction of partnership records. We address these contentions

separately. He frames these claims under several legal theories.

¶ 71                              1. Access to Financial Records

¶ 72           Plaintiff’s claims of breach of partnership agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, and

violations of the UPA relate primarily to his claim that he was denied access to various partnership

records. Plaintiff points to several clauses in the various partnership agreements, as well as the

UPA, which guarantee each partner access to partnership records. Similarly, plaintiff complains

that the records provided were incomplete. Plaintiff advocates application of the presumption of

Couri v. Couri, 95 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1983), that all doubts and obscurities created by a party’s own

negligent failure to keep adequate records should be “properly resolved against him.”

¶ 73           Here, the trial court denied plaintiff’s claims regarding any breach of fiduciary duty,

breach of the partnership agreements, and violation of the UPA, but ordered that the partnerships

“provide [plaintiff] with full and complete access to the partnership records, pursuant to the Act,

so [he] may participate in the decision making relating to how best to wind up the affairs of the

respective partnerships.”

¶ 74           Our standard of review on this issue is the manifest weight of the evidence.

Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52, 72 (2006). To reverse, an opposite result

must be clearly apparent. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). Here, it was the trial judge’s

prerogative to determine the credibility of the witnesses, to weigh the evidence and draw

reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidentiary record. Young v.

Wilkinson, 2022 IL App (4th) 220302, ¶ 84 (citing Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill. App.

3d 365, 376 (2004)).

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¶ 75           We conclude that the trial judge could well have found that partnership records

were kept, albeit handwritten, and that partnership records were delivered to plaintiff’s former

counsel, Bruce Thiemann, at some point in 2004. Although plaintiff testified that he “never

received any records,” he did acknowledge that some were possibly given to his attorney.

Moreover, his son, David Alwan, admitted that documents were given to Thiemann and that he

had reviewed them. Our conclusion is further supported by the testimony of LaHood, Phillip Couri,

and McGrath, who each testified that partnership records and tax records were delivered to attorney

Thiemann. LaHood said these records covered 1999-2005, which were the years plaintiff’s

attorney had requested.

¶ 76           We also decline plaintiff’s invitation to apply the presumptions outlined in Couri

against the various partnerships. In Couri, two brothers were involved in a dispute over the

dissolution of a partnership. During the litigation, the defendant, who was the managing partner

and responsible for virtually all financial aspects of the partnership, was ordered to preserve all

financial records. The records, however, were partially destroyed, and what remained were

incomplete or not in compliance with established accounting procedures. At trial, the court

resolved all doubts and obscurities created by the defendant’s “own negligent failure to keep

adequate records” against the defendant, based on his duty as managing partner responsible for all

financial aspects “to maintain regular and accurate records and to account for partnership

transactions.” Couri, 95 Ill. 2d at 98 (citing Altschuler v. Altschuler, 410 Ill. 169, 196-97 (1951)).

¶ 77           Plaintiff asks this court to apply this same presumption in this case, i.e., to construe

all inferences created by the lack of complete financial records against the partnerships. In Couri,

however, the individual defendant was the partner responsible for maintaining financial matters

and was under court order to preserve all financial documents. The court made it clear that it was

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his individual actions as a managing partner that gave rise to his particular duty; the partnership

was not named as a party. In this case there were several partners—some of whom are now

deceased—who served as financial managers. None of these former partners were named as

individual defendants here, unlike the facts in Couri. Moreover, Dennis LaHood, a manager for

the partnerships who was named as a defendant below but was dismissed on a directed verdict, is

also not a party to this appeal. Finally, unlike Couri, there was no order in this case to preserve

financial records. Plaintiff is essentially asking this court to infer a presumption against the entirety

of the partnerships—of which he is a partner—based on the purported actions of various non-party

individuals. We do not read Couri so broadly, and we decline to impose such a presumption.

¶ 78            The record here was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that sufficient

partnership records were kept and produced; we will not reverse simply because there is contrary

or conflicting evidence. See Scalise v. Board of Trustees of the Westchester Firemen’s Pension

Fund, 264 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1035 (1993) (A finding may not be against the manifest weight of

evidence even if there is “some evidence” contradicting it.). Stated another way, “[i]t will not

suffice to show that the record will support a contrary decision; rather, if the record contains any

evidence to support the trial court’s judgment, the judgment should be affirmed.” Department of

Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp., 209 Ill. 2d 471, 488 (2004).

¶ 79            The trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove his claim with respect to

the creation and sharing of partnership records is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 80                             2. Destruction of Financial Records

¶ 81            Although not pleaded as a separate issue, plaintiff spends considerable time here

on the alleged destruction of documents by various partners or individuals acting on behalf of those

partners. Plaintiff contends that records were burned by the Rafool estate, that LaHood lost records,

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and that the accountants lost tax documents. This argument appears most significantly as part of

plaintiff’s written argument relating to breach of a fiduciary duty. However, a cursory examination

of the amended complaint shows that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty related solely to access

to records and did not seek any relief based on the destruction of records. For this reason, we

conclude that the arguments of record destruction are irrelevant and that any issue relating to

records destruction has been forfeited and is not before this court. See Haudrich v. Howmedica,

Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996) (“[I]ssues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may

not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 82           Moreover, plaintiff has also failed to identify what relief he should have been

granted due to the alleged destruction of records. We note that the trial court addressed plaintiff’s

destruction of records arguments and found “the lack of documentation is not dispositive of the

case.” In its discussion of the partners’ capital contributions, the trial court observed:

¶ 83           “Plaintiffs point the finger at the partnerships for not having the documentation,

               while some witnesses point their finger at the Rafool Estate for destruction of

               documents, or at least not stopping the destruction of evidence. In addition, there

               was no explanation as to why plaintiffs don’t have their own records of what they

               contributed over the years.”

¶ 84           Again, the breach of fiduciary duty claim did not plead anything concerning

improper destruction of records, and there were also no claims for spoliation of evidence. Like the

trial court, we conclude the state of the documentation and who might be responsible for its

destruction—if it even occurred—do not coherently connect to any of plaintiff’s claims or alleged

injuries.

¶ 85                     E. Operation of Partnerships as a Single Business

                                                 - 21 -
¶ 86           Plaintiff further asserts the trial court erred by concluding that the three

partnerships, despite having separate and distinct partnership agreements, and at times, different

partners, were operated as a single business. The trial court expressly pointed out that “a

straightforward application of the Partnership Act or review of the agreements won’t resolve the

disputes herein largely because the partners’ conduct over the decades wasn’t always, or even

often, consistent with the Act and/or oftentimes even their various written agreements.” As a result,

the trial court’s order stated, it had been tasked to “figure out how the partnerships were actually

operated (which better represents the intent of the partners than perhaps the partnership agreements

do).”

¶ 87           Even after careful review of the court’s order and plaintiff’s arguments, we cannot

decipher how this conclusion by the trial court is in any way a detriment to plaintiff. Moreover, at

no place in his amended complaint does plaintiff reference any claim based on the purported

singular operation of the three partnerships. Equally so, plaintiff fails to cite any authority to this

court supporting his claim that such a conclusion is in legal or factual error. We, therefore,

conclude this issue is not relevant to our disposition and disregard plaintiff’s arguments on this

point.

¶ 88                              F. Unequal Capital Contributions

¶ 89           Plaintiff also takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that he did not make the

same capital contributions as the other partners. In its order, the trial court found that plaintiff was

“deficient in [his] capital contributions. By how much is difficult to tell due to the incomplete

nature of the partnership records.” Here, we again note that our review of the trial court’s ruling is

under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. “[I]f the record contains any evidence to support

the trial court’s judgment, the judgment should be affirmed.” 151 Interstate Road Corp., 209 Ill.

                                                 - 22 -
2d at 488. Once again, it is difficult to correlate this argument to a specific claim and the relief

sought in that claim. Evidence was produced that supported that conclusion. The handwritten

ledgers showed that the contributions were uneven, as did the letters sent to plaintiff. Moreover,

LaHood testified that David Alwan acknowledged that the family knew plaintiff was behind in his

contributions. This evidentiary basis is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion, and we

decline to disturb that finding on review.

¶ 90            As a further point, we can only assume that this argument has some relationship to

plaintiff’s basic argument that he was improperly terminated from the partnerships—if the capital

contributions were not deficient, then there would have been no basis for the terminations. Since

the trial court found all three partnership terminations were improper, reinstated plaintiff as a

partner, and ordered that any profit distributions were not to be offset by any capital contribution

shortfalls, it is difficult to see how this issue is connected to any relief plaintiff might obtain.

¶ 91                   G. Claims Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act

¶ 92            As a final argument, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by failing to apply the

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq.(West 2006)). Not only has plaintiff

failed to cite any legal authority for this proposition, but it appears that the issue was never raised

below beyond a passing reference during closing arguments. See Wagner v. City of Chicago, 166

Ill. 2d 144, 147 (1995) (“[A]s a general rule, any issue not raised at the trial court level is waived.”)

(citing Fawcett v. Reinertsen, 131 Ill. 2d 380, 386 (1989)). Indeed, this failure is admitted by

plaintiff in his reply brief. Therefore, we find this issue is forfeited on appeal.

¶ 93                                           H. Relief

¶ 94            The trial court awarded plaintiff relief as follows: (1) plaintiff was reinstated as

partner in each partnership; (2) when the partnerships are wound up, plaintiff will be entitled to

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his percentage share of the profits and losses of each partnership; (3) when distributing profits and

losses, plaintiff will be entitled to “at least [his] percentage share of the roughly $109,000

distribution to partners that was made in 2014 (as reflected in the accountant’s report)”; and (4) the

partnerships are “not entitled to decrease [plaintiff’s] distributive share” based upon his

deficiencies in capital contributions “as of the date of the purported terminations.” The court

further ordered the partnerships to provide plaintiff with “full and complete access to partnership

records” so that he “may participate in the decision making relating to how best to wind up the

affairs of the respective partnerships.”

¶ 95           Plaintiff makes two main arguments here. First, he argues that the trial court erred

by finding he was only entitled to receive a proportionate share from the $109,000 distribution at

the time of the Centennial closing in 2014. As part of this argument, he contends that the trial

court’s ruling (1) failed to allow him any recovery from K-E; (2) makes no accounting of the

earlier Centennial sales; and (3) ignores certain sums that were taken from the partnership by

LaHood and Phillip Couri for undocumented fees and loans. Second, he argues that the trial court

erred in adopting his data for the calculation of damages, namely the materials contained in exhibit

E-155.

¶ 96           On the first argument, the trial court’s finding respecting the $109,000 distribution

in 2014 does not in any way limit plaintiff from recovering, if appropriate, additional monies from

K-E at the time the partnerships are wound up. The court found that plaintiff was “entitled to [his]

percentage share of the profits and losses of each of the partnerships, when the partnerships are

wound up.” (Emphasis added.) It further concluded that none of the partnerships were legally

wound up, as defined under the UPA. But more importantly, the language complained of—the

court’s reference to the $109,000—is stated as a minimum entitlement. The court stated, “When

                                                - 24 -
[winding up the partnerships], the court directs [plaintiff is] entitled to at least [his] percentage

share of the roughly $109,000 distribution” from 2014. (Emphasis added.) This statement is in no

way a limitation upon plaintiff’s ability to recover, but instead establishes a minimum threshold of

distribution to which plaintiff is entitled. We find the trial court’s language is not as restrictive as

plaintiff contends.

¶ 97           As to plaintiff’s ability to recover for prior sales and his arguments that LaHood

and Couri took undocumented fees and loans, plaintiff’s arguments fail to cite any portion of the

record and cites no supporting legal authority, both of which are clear violations of Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2019

IL App (4th) 150544-B, ¶ 43. “The failure to provide proper citations to the record is a violation

of Rule 341(h)(7), the consequence of which is the forfeiture of the argument.” Hall v. Naper Gold

Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12. We decline to consider these issues.

¶ 98           As to the second argument, we note that exhibit E-155 was, at best, a demonstrative

exhibit; it was not admitted into evidence and was not considered by the trial court in any form or

fashion. While plaintiff references several financial exhibits—which apparently went into the

loss/profit numbers set forth in exhibit E-115—he offered no supporting testimony and certainly

no expert testimony to make sense of these exhibits. Moreover, while several of the exhibits

referenced by plaintiff from the years 1977-2014 show property sales, they fail to present a

complete picture. As the evidence revealed at trial, many tax records from these early years are no

longer available and the K-1 statements do not appear to be complete. While we make no factual

findings on review, we note that the trial court could have readily drawn these same conclusions

in deciding not to award the relief plaintiff now seeks. Without a more complete record and without

some testimony explaining the records, we cannot do so on appeal. “[I]t is well settled that all

                                                 - 25 -
reasonable presumptions are in favor of the action of the trial court and that the burden is on the

appellant to show affirmatively the errors assigned on review; he has the burden of overcoming

the presumption that the trial court’s judgment was correct.” Behrstock v. Ace Hose & Rubber Co.,

147 Ill. App. 3d 76, 86 (1986).

¶ 99           We conclude that the trial court’s determination of the appropriate relief was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 100                      I. Defendants’ Counterclaims/Cross-Appeal

¶ 101          The partnerships filed counterclaims seeking damages for unpaid capital

contributions to each of the partnerships and alternatively sought damages caused by plaintiff’s

alleged failure to honor his partnership obligations. The latter claim, count IV, is not raised on

appeal and is not considered.

¶ 102          The trial court denied all relief on the counterclaims without comment but indirectly

referenced the substance of defendants’ counterclaims when in addressing the relief awarded to

plaintiff. After awarding plaintiff his percentage share of the profits and losses of each of the

partnerships when they are “wound up,” the court stated:

               “Ordinarily, the court would order that such a distributive share should be reduced

               by whatever shortfall in capital contributions are attributed to [plaintiff]. However,

               due to the lack of partnership records, that shortfall is impossible to determine with

               any degree of confidence. As such, while the court finds the so-called terminated

               partners were behind, it also finds the partnerships are unable to prove the amount

               of such shortfall.”

The court, therefore, concluded, “the partnerships are not entitled to decrease [plaintiff’s]

distributive share based upon the deficiencies in the capital contributions as of the date of the

                                               - 26 -
purported terminations.” The court then observed, “[s]uch a result also seems equitable in light of

the ongoing operations of the partnerships and the exclusion of [plaintiff] from those activities.”

¶ 103          These findings, although made as part of the court’s discussion of plaintiff’s various

termination/expulsion claims, nevertheless dispense with the matters asserted in the counterclaims

seeking recoupment of the capital contributions.

¶ 104          Under Illinois law, a claimant seeking damages in a breach of contract action must

“ ‘establish an actual loss or measurable damages resulting from the breach in order to recover.’ ”

In re Illinois Bell Telephone Link-Up II & Late Charge Litigation, 2013 IL App (1st) 113349, ¶ 19

(quoting Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 149 (2005)). It is

also the claimant’s obligation to establish a reasonable basis for computing damages. Kirkpatrick

v. Strosberg, 385 Ill. App. 3d 119, 130 (2008); Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 222 Ill. 2d 75,

107 (2006). Thus, damages must be proved with “reasonable certainty and cannot be based on

conjecture or speculation.” Cadle Properties of Illinois, Inc., Fortune Investments, LLC, 2021 IL

App (1st) 200556, ¶ 44. Here, the partnership failed to meet that burden.

¶ 105          Here, we agree with the trial court that defendants have presented insufficient

evidence of their damages, nor have they provided a reasonable means to calculate the deficient

capital contribution amounts. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

¶ 106                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 107          For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court on all grounds.

¶ 108          Affirmed.

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