Court Opinion

ID: 9721754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:07:56.795243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.522283
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring in result.
The interpretation given the juvenile - statutes in the first part of the majority opinion is strained and at odds with the simple straight-forward language involved. Indiana Code § 31-6-4-13 provides in seetion (d) and (e) as follows:
"(d) The court shall next determine whether the prosecutor intends to seek a waiver of jurisdiction under IC 31-6-2-4. If waiver is sought, the court may not accept an admission or denial of the allegations from the child under subsection (i) and shall schedule a waiver hearing and advise the child according to subsection (e).
(e) The juvenile court shall inform the child and his parent, guardian, or custodian, if that person is present, of:
(1) The nature of the allegations against the child; .
(2) The child's right to:
(A) Be represented by counsel;
(B) Have a speedy trial;
(C) Confront witnesses against him;
(D) Cross-examine witnesses against him;
(E) Obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process;
(F) Introduce evidence on his own behalf;
(G) Refrain from testifying against himself; and
(H) Have the state prove that he committed the delinquent act charged beyond a reasonable doubt;
(8) The possibility of waiver to a court having criminal jurisdiction; and
(4) The dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court if the child is adjudicated a delinquent child."
Once the question of counsel is determined and the State is seeking a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, the Court then is required to "schedule a waiver hearing and advise the child according to subsection (e)." These provisions unquestionably contemplate the situation where the State has filed a delinquency petition and moved for waiv*275er of juvenile jurisdiction. I interpret these provisions to grant the statutory right to the child and parents to be informed by the court itself of the allegations against the child and the trial rights available in the forth coming hearing, whether that future hearing is one on waiver or delinquency, and without regard to whether the juvenile will be called upon to admit or deny the allegations of the petition, and without regard to whether counsel was previously obtained or appointed. The initial hearing should be conducted in my view, where the alleged delinquent is on the waiver track, because the statute requires it. What should be done by an appellate court when confronted with a record which shows that an initial hearing was not held before the waiver hearing commenced is another matter.
In this area, it is axiomatic that it is only juvenile jurisdiction properly acquired that can be waived. Summers v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E2d 320. Appellant contends that the failure of the juvenile court to conduct an initial hearing as required by § 81-6-4-18 prevented it from acquiring jurisdiction, and that therefore the waiver of jurisdiction itself was void. The basic premise is not true. The final steps in the acquisition of jurisdiction are the decision of the court to take jurisdiction, and the filing of a formal petition of delinquency. Mallard v. State, (1979) 180 Ind.App. 692, 390 N.E.2d 218. The initial hearing is required to be held upon each such petition, and it is therefore evident that jurisdiction is acquired prior to the hearing.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.