Court Opinion

ID: 9389077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 16:07:39.542311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.740027
License: Public Domain

J-S43040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHARIKA BRINSON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2120 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 9, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0003403-2018

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHARIKA BRINSON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2121 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 9, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0003404-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 24, 2023

       Charika Brinson1 appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgments of sentence

imposed following her convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault

____________________________________________

1We note that the names Charika Brinson and Chakira Brinson appear to be
used interchangeably both throughout the record and on filings with this Court
and the trial court. Indeed, the trial court acknowledges that Charika Brinson
was previously known as Chakira Brinson. See, e.g., N.T. Trial, 3/27/19, at
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S43040-22

of a child less than six years of age and endangering the welfare of children

(EWOC).2 Appellant raises claims concerning evidentiary rulings by the trial

court, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and the discretionary

aspects of her sentence. We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

        The underlying charges stemmed from Appellant’s arrest following
        an investigation of the alleged neglect and repeated physical
        abuse of two female complainants F.B., then age three (3) years
        and C.B., then age five (5) years between June 2016 through
        August 2016. The trial evidence established that both victimized
        children had been entrusted to Appellant’s custodial care together
        into Appellant’s residence located at 659 [North] 41st Street, in
        West Philadelphia by the children’s biological mother, [W.B].
        Appellant and [W.B.] were distant relatives and close friends.
        Appellant agreed to supervise and house three of [W.B.’s] children
        while [W.B.] was serving a six-month period of incarceration
        starting in June 2016. Appellant initially agreed to also care for
        [W.B.’s] then thirteen-year old son, N.B. However, this child
        initially stayed under the care of Appellant’s sister Sharee Brinson
        in a different residence. N.B. left [Sharee] Brinson’s care in late
        July 2016 to reside with his maternal great aunt [D.B.]

        The cumulative trial evidence unequivocally proved that from June
        2016 through August 2016, Appellant had subjected both small
        statured girls to abhorrent conditions, by denying them
        necessities including food, forcing them to sleep on the dirty and
        cold floor, and regularly beating both children with various objects
        including belts, brushes, and shoes. Their older brother N.B. had
        been prevented from visiting his sisters until early August 2016.
        He then noticed that both girls had appeared visibly skinnier and
        covered in bug bites and unusual marks. N.B. reported his fears
        for them and described their poor appearance to his aunt [D.B.]
        Upon learning of the girls’ maltreatment, [D.B.] began valiant
____________________________________________

6; N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 5. For our purposes, the captions reflect the name
that was used on both Appellant’s notice of appeal and docketing statement.

2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(8) and 4304(a)(1), respectively.

                                           -2-
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     efforts to retrieve her nieces along with F.B.’s biological father and
     C.B.’s stepfather, [E.A.]

     Reuniting these girls with their family had proved to be most
     difficult; Appellant began a campaign to keep C.B. and F.B. away
     from their family’s view. Appellant constantly moved both girls
     and provided their family members with deliberately false
     information about their location. After an extensive search and
     the intervention of third parties, both traumatized children were
     finally reunited together with [D.B.] and [E.A.] in late August
     2016.

     Immediately upon recovering these two emaciated children,
     [D.B.] and [E.A.] were alarmed by both children’s poor physical
     condition and drastically negative changes in personalities. They
     testified that before June 2016 both young girls had been happy-
     go-lucky, bright, and hopeful. After their stay with Appellant, both
     sisters had been unusually quiet, withdrawn, and skittish. [D.B.]
     and [E.A.] promptly took both girls to Children’s Hospital of
     Philadelphia (hereinafter “CHOP”), for emergency treatment.

     At CHOP, emergency medical examinations of [the children’s]
     bodies displayed multiple abuse sourced traumatic bruising
     including linear and belt buckle type markings. Each child also
     presented [with] additional physical conditions consistent with
     significant neglect including, malnourishment, ringworm infection,
     and bed bug bites. The swelling on the girls’ stomachs had been
     so profound, the treating physicians had grave concerns that their
     spleens may have ruptured. Both girls were admitted and treated
     for at least a week in the hospital.

     Shortly after arrival at CHOP, five-year-old C.B. revealed that
     Appellant had routinely physically beaten and kicked both sisters
     which had caused their injuries while they were in Appellant’s
     home. Subsequently, CHOP child abuse specialist and expert,
     Kate Henry, M.D., interviewed C.B. and conducted a physical
     exam of both girls.[fn1] During her examination of the girls, Dr.
     Henry observed rectangular discolored marks consistent with the
     shape of a belt buckle and scarring on the[] inner thighs of both
     children. At trial, Dr. Henry expertly opined that these were
     patterned injuries [that] had not been caused accidentally, but
     rather had been the result of intentional and repeated striking with
     physical objects like a belt and buckle. Dr. Henry interviewed C.B.
     who had informed her that Appellant had beaten her multiple
     times with a belt.

                                     -3-
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        [fn1]   Dr. Henry did not interview F.B. due to her age.

     Based on her observations and C.B.’s consistent statements, Dr.
     Henry had determined and diagnosed both girls as having suffered
     repeated physical abuse with Appellant as the named perpetrator.
     Dr. Henry reported her expert findings of neglect and physical
     abuse of both girls by Appellant to the City of Philadelphia
     Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”).

                                    *    *    *

     Following the physician’s report to DHS social services agency, the
     matter was referred to the City of Philadelphia Police Department
     Special Victims Unit and assigned to investigator Officer Jose
     [Viera]. While the original DHS report had originally captioned
     and listed Appellant’s sister [Sharee] Brinson as the person to be
     investigated, Officer [Viera’s] investigation quickly identified
     Appellant as the primary suspect. Officer [Viera] interviewed and
     obtained signed or videoed statements from both victim children
     C.B. and F.B., their older brother N.B., father and stepfather
     [E.A.], and their aunt [D.B.]

     During her interview, five-year-old C.B. described Appellant as a
     “monster” and again affirmed that Appellant forced both sisters to
     sleep on the floor and would regularly beat them with objects
     ranging from brooms to belts. Three-year-old F.B. similarly
     revealed that Appellant had repeatedly hit her with “shoes and a
     belt.”

                                   *     *     *

     Before trial began, Appellant’s counsel acknowledged on the
     record that he had received advance “Notice of Intent to Proceed
     by Way of the Tender Years Exception to the Hearsay Rule” from
     the Commonwealth, that had reflected the intention to introduce
     hearsay evidence in the form of C.B. and F.B.’s descriptions of
     Appellant’s abuse to their [father and] stepfather [E.A.]

     Cumulative trial evidence presented by the Commonwealth had
     included factual testimony elicited from the children’s mother,
     [W.B.], the two victims F.B., C.B., their older brother N.B., their
     father and stepfather [E.A.], their aunt [D.B.], the investigator
     Officer [Viera], and expert opinion and factual testimony of Dr.
     Kate Henry which had been corroborated by the certified medical
     records. Initially, [W.B.] testified to how she had entrusted
     Appellant to care for her daughters during her incarceration and

                                        -4-
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     related the hasty arrangements that she had made to enable their
     stay with her close friend, Appellant.

     Prior to testifying, [the trial court] engaged in mirrored dual
     colloquies with both children victims, F.B. now aged six (6) years
     and C.B. now aged eight (8) years to confirm their competency to
     testify. After the initial inquiry and absent any defense objection,
     [the trial court] found both children competent to testify. Both
     F.B. and C.B. testified quite convincingly in front of the jury [] that
     Appellant had forced them to sleep on the floor, had refused to
     feed them, and regularly beat them and mistreated them
     severely.

     Their older brother, N.B., now aged [fifteen] years, their aunt
     [D.B.], and their [father and] stepfather [E.A.], credibly and
     consistently related the sequence of events including their
     discovery of abuse and the extreme endeavors that they had
     undertaken to locate and remove the girls from Appellant’s
     clutches. These three witnesses also vividly described the drastic
     and alarming changes in their physical and mental appearances
     and conduct of both traumatized children immediately after their
     rescue. [E.A.] reiterated that[ shortly after their rescue,] both
     girls fitfully and fearfully confided in him that Appellant had
     repeatedly hit them.

     Dr. Henry provided the jury with thorough and cogent expert
     testimony that had been soundly based on her physical
     examinations of F.B. and C.B. and her interview with C.B. She
     thoroughly explained and described the patterned injuries that
     unequivocally had showed physical abuse, and C.B.’s statements
     that Appellant was the source of those injuries. Substantiating
     medical reports and photos of the injuries taken by doctors and
     nurses at CHOP were introduced. Officer [Viera ] testified to the
     course of his investigation, including his interview with F.B. and
     C.B., where they again repeated the allegations against Appellant.

     During trial, [the trial court] sustained relevance and hearsay
     objections by the Commonwealth’s attorney when defense
     counsel attempted to discuss a DHS report filed against
     Appellant’s sister, [Sharee] Brinson, in his opening statemen[t].
     [The trial court] also overruled defense counsel’s hearsay
     objection to [E.A.’s] testimonial recollection of what his daughters
     had told him about Appellant’s physical abuse of them, under the
     “Tender Years” hearsay exception.

                                      -5-
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       After hearing all arguments, and discussing all evidence, the jury
       returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on two counts of each
       docketed charge related to each child: aggravated assault of a
       child under [six years of age], graded as a felony of the second
       degree; and endangering the welfare of children through course
       of conduct[,] graded as a felony of the third degree.

Trial Court Op., 4/25/22, at 1-7 (citations omitted, some formatting altered).

       On July 9, 2019, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of three

to eleven years’ incarceration, to be followed by six years’ probation.3

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence

and discretionary aspects of her sentence. On February 4, 2020, Appellant’s

post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law.

____________________________________________

3  Specifically, the trial court imposed a sentence of two to six years’
incarceration and four years’ probation for each count of aggravated assault.
The trial court also sentenced Appellant to one to five years’ incarceration and
two years’ probation for each count of EWOC. The individual sentences at
Docket No. 3403-2018 were structured consecutively. The trial court ordered
the sentences imposed at Docket No. 3404-2018 to be served concurrent to
the sentences imposed at Docket No. 3403-2018. The result was an
aggregate sentence of three to eleven years’ incarceration followed by six
years’ probation.

At the time of sentencing, Appellant’s prior record score (PRS) was a zero.
See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g. at 25. The standard minimum guideline range for
aggravated assault was six to fourteen months’ incarceration, plus or minus
six months for aggravating or mitigating factors. The trial court’s sentence
for aggravated assault fell outside the aggravated range, but did not exceed
the statutory maximum for a second-degree felony. The standard minimum
guideline range for EWOC was three to twelve months, plus or minus six
months for aggravating or mitigating factors. The trial court’s sentence for
EWOC was within the standard guideline range.

                                           -6-
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       On February 11, 2021, Appellant filed a timely Post Conviction Relief

Act4 (PCRA) petition seeking to reinstate her direct appeal rights nunc pro

tunc. After the trial court granted Appellant’s motion on September 16, 2021,

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement.      The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court err in sustaining the Commonwealth’s
          objection on the grounds of relevancy, when defense counsel
          said during his opening statement that the Department of
          Human Services initially opened an investigation into
          Appellant’s sister, [Sharee] Brinson, not [Appellant], in
          violation of Appellant’s right to a fair trial and the right to
          present a complete defense pursuant to the PA Constitution,
          Article I, § 8 and the United States Constitution, 6 th
          Amendment[?]

       2. Did the trial court err in admitting, over defense counsel’s
          objection, inadmissible hearsay, in the form of a prior
          consistent statement in violation of Pa.R.E. 613 when C.B.’s
          father testified that “[C.B.] just said that she was beaten and
          they wouldn’t feed them. They made them sleep on the cold
          floors” to bolster the complainant’s credibility after having first
          accused [A]ppellant’s sister of abuse, and which went beyond
          the scope of notice provided for the Tender Years hearsay
          exception, in violation of [A]ppellant’s right to a fair trial and
          the right to present a complete defense pursuant to the
          [Pennsylvania] Constitution, Article I, § 8 and the United States
          Constitution, 6th Amendment[?]

____________________________________________

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Because Appellant did not file a notice of
appeal after her post-sentence motions were denied by operation of law, her
judgment of sentence became final for the purposes of the PCRA on March 5,
2020.    See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).        Accordingly,
Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed.

                                           -7-
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      3. Did the trial court err in finding that the evidence at trial was
         sufficient as a matter of law to convict Appellant of the crime
         of aggravated assault as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(8)
         and [EWOC] as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1) when the
         evidence of record does not establish that Appellant caused or
         intended to cause bodily injury to [the victims] nor did it
         establish that Appellant knowingly endangered the welfare of a
         child by violating a duty of care, protection or support,
         respectively?

      4. Did the trial court err in finding that the greater weight of the
         evidence established Appellant as the perpetrator beyond a
         reasonable doubt as to the crimes of aggravated assault and
         [EWOC] where the Commonwealth did not establish each and
         every element of the times and did not meet its burden?

      5. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence that was unduly
         harsh, excessive, inconsistent with the Sentencing Code,
         contrary to fundamental norms underlying the sentencing
         process because it did not take into consideration the
         information contained in the pre-sentence [investigation (PSI)]
         report, the mental health report, arguments for mitigation,
         [A]ppellant’s lack of any prior criminal background?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3 (formatting altered).

                             Evidentiary Issues

      Appellant’s first two claims relate to evidentiary rulings made by the trial

court. First, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it sustained the

Commonwealth’s objection during Appellant’s opening statement after

Appellant referenced a DHS investigative report stating that the initial focus

of the investigation was Appellant’s sister, Sharee Brinson. Appellant’s Brief

at 9. Appellant argues that “the preclusion of this evidence without any valid

justification based on the rules of evidence limited Appellant’s ability to mount

a full and fair defense.” Id. at 14.

                                       -8-
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      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings using the abuse of discretion

standard of review.    Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa.

Super. 2020).    A finding of abuse of discretion “may not be made merely

because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,

or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”

Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 178 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

      With respect to opening statements, our Supreme Court has explained:

      “The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury how
      the case will develop, its background and what will be attempted
      to be proved; but it is not evidence.” Commonwealth v.
      Montgomery,        626      A.2d   109,    113     (Pa.    1993).
      In Montgomery, we acknowledged that “as a practical matter the
      opening statement can often times be the most critical stage of
      the trial, because here the jury forms its first and often lasting
      impression of the case.” [Id. at 113]. The prosecution, as well
      as the defense, is afforded reasonable latitude in presenting
      opening arguments to the jury. Such latitude is not without
      limits.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943, 950 (Pa. 2007) (some citations

omitted, formatting altered).    Importantly, as noted by the Parker Court,

opening statements are not evidence. Id. at 947. The Court further noted

that, “it is legitimate during opening statements for . . . defense counsel . . .

to verbally describe, in detail, the evidence he intends to prove, including

tangible pieces of evidence.” Id. at 951.

                                      -9-
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      In the instant case, the trial court notes that after opening statements,

the trial court “advised defense counsel that he would not be permitted to

introduce evidence of the initial DHS report at trial.” Trial Ct. Op. at 24-25

(citing N.T. Trial, 3/26/19, at 31). The trial court further explained: “In terms

of whether or not [DHS is] investigating [Sharee Brinson] . . . is one, hearsay

and two, DHS records normally as to who they’re investigating and the source

of the complaint is private, so that was an inappropriate reference, all right,

so be careful.” Id. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the DHS report

was irrelevant pursuant to Pa.R.E. 401 because “[t]he subject of . . . DHS’s

stated initial intention to investigate [Sharee Brinson] had zero bearing on the

overarching question of whether Appellant’s maltreatment of C.B. and F.B.

had satisfied the statutory elements of each conviction.” Trial Ct. Op. at 25.

      The trial court also rejected Appellant’s claim that the court’s ruling

precluded her from raising a full defense.         Specifically, the trial court

explained:

      [The trial court’s evidentiary ruling] did not prevent Appellant
      from raising the theory, and introducing testimony evidence that
      Appellant was not involved with F.B. and C.B. and that [Sharee
      Brinson] had been caring for and subsequently abusing both girls.
      [Appellant’s] counsel introduced the theory in his opening
      statement, he inquired about Sharee Brinson’s involvement with
      caring for C.B. and F.B. at every opportunity on cross-examination
      and presented the same theory again in his closing. While not
      admitted into evidence, defense counsel presented Officer [Viera]
      with the DHS report itself and discussed the investigation into
      [Sharee] Brinson. The jury had a full opportunity to hear the
      theory and deemed it false against the weight of the
      Commonwealth’s evidence.

                                     - 10 -
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Id. at 27.

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection during Appellant’s

opening statement concerning the admissibility of the initial DHS report

implicating Sharee Brinson.    See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838.       The fact that

Sharee Brinson was the initial subject of an earlier DHS report was not

relevant to “the overarching question” concerning Appellant’s mistreatment of

the children. See Trial Ct. Op., at 25. Further, Appellant was not precluded

from eliciting testimony concerning Sharee Brinson’s involvement during

cross-examination and again during closing arguments. Therefore, the trial

court’s evidentiary ruling did not preclude Appellant from presenting a full

defense, including the theory that Sharee Brinson was solely responsible for

abusing C.B. and F.B. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this

issue. See Saez, 225 A.3d at 178.

      In her next claim, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it

permitted the Commonwealth to present inadmissible hearsay testimony from

E.A. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Specifically, Appellant refers to E.A.’s testimony

that Appellant withheld food from C.B. and F.B. and forced the children to

sleep on the floor. Id. at 15-16. Appellant argues that this testimony was

inadmissible hearsay because it went beyond the scope of the Tender Years

notice that was provided to Appellant prior to trial.    Id. at 16.   Appellant

further contends that the testimony was also inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 613

because Appellant did not cross-examine C.B. or F.B. Therefore, Appellant

                                     - 11 -
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argues that E.A.’s testimony was an improper means of bolstering C.B. and

F.B.’s credibility. Id.

      Before we review the merits of Appellant’s issue, we must first

determine whether the issue has been properly preserved for appellate

review. Rule 103 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence requires a party to,

at the time of the ruling admitting evidence, make a timely and specific

objection, stating the specific ground for the objection, unless it was apparent

from the context of the objection.     Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1).   Rule 103 does not

require a party to renew an objection once the court has ruled on the record,

be it before or during trial. Pa.R.E. 103(b); see also Commonwealth v.

Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 264 (Pa. 2015) (holding that objecting party must

make a timely objection stating the specific ground for the objection unless it

was apparent from context).

      In the instant case, the following exchange occurred during the

Commonwealth’s direct examination of E.A.:

      [The Commonwealth]: What did your daughter tell you?

      [Trial counsel]: Objection to hearsay.

      [The trial court]: Overruled.

      A:    She said that –

      Q:    If you need time to remember – would it help to see a copy
            of your statement?

      A:    No. She just said that she was beaten and they wouldn’t
            feed them. They made them sleep on cold floors.

      Q:    Who did you understand them to be referring to when she
            said they?

                                      - 12 -
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      A:    [Appellant] and her sister.

      Q:    And did she say anything else about what [Appellant] did to
            her?

      A:    She said that they hit her with brushes – I guess a hair
            brush, and then hit them with belts.

      Q:    And did you ever have any conversations with [F.B.]?

      A:    Yes.

      Q:    And what did [F.B.] tell you?

      A:    Sort of the same thing and was particularly disturbed about
            sleeping on the cold floor.

N.T. Trial, 3/27/19, at 13-14.

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth elicited testimony

that exceeded the scope of the Tender Years’ notice. Specifically, Appellant

refers to E.A.’s testimony concerning statements from the victims in which

they claimed that Appellant withheld food and forced the victims to sleep on

the floor. However, although Appellant made a broad objection to hearsay

before the testimony was elicited, that objection was denied due to the trial

court’s pre-trial Tender Years ruling. Moreover, Appellant made no further

objection concerning the scope of the testimony.     See id.   Therefore, this

issue is waived.      See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); Walter, 119 A.3d at 264.

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                         Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her

convictions for aggravated assault. Specifically, Appellant contends that the

“there was no direct evidence that Appellant caused [or] attempted to cause

                                      - 13 -
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bodily injury to either F.B or C.B. [or] that Appellant endangered the welfare

of either child.” Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. In support, Appellant asserts that

F.B. “denied that Appellant abused her or caused her any injury,” during her

testimony at trial. Id. at 19. Further, Appellant contends that although C.B.

testified that Appellant hit both victims with a hairbrush on more than one

occasion, C.B. “previously accused Appellant’s sister, [Sharee Brinson], of

causing her injuries when she disclosed the abuse at the hospital.”          Id.

Appellant also argues that “[d]espite the trial court’s erroneous assertion . . .

that [F.B. and C.B.] were ‘emaciated,’ Doctor Henry testified that she

observed no signs of malnutrition in either child” and that she could not

determine when the injuries occurred because “they appeared to be scars,

rather than recent injuries.”    Id.   Therefore, Appellant concludes that the

evidence did not “establish that either girl sustained their injuries while in

Appellant’s care[,] nor did the testimony preclude the possibility that the

injuries were sustained prior to their mother turning their care over to

Appellant and her sister.” Id.

      Our standard of review when presented with a sufficiency of the

evidence claim is as follows:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

                                       - 14 -
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      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proof of proving every element of the
      crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
      passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
      evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

      In order to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault of a child less

than six years of age, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that a defendant over the age of eighteen “attempt[ed] to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to a child less than

six years of age . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(8).

      The Crimes Code defines EWOC as follows: “a person supervising the

welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or

supervises such a person, commits an offense if he [or she] knowingly

endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or

support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

      In sufficiency of the evidence cases, this Court has crafted a three-prong

test to determine whether a defendant is in violation of Section 4304(a)(1) of

the Crimes Code:

      (1) the accused must be aware of his or her duty to protect the
      child; (2) the accused must be aware that the child is in
      circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or

                                     - 15 -
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     psychological welfare; and (3) the accused either must have failed
     to act, or must have taken action so lame or meager that such
     actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s
     welfare.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 337 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

     Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

     The record was replete with evidence that Appellant had adopted
     the role of the girls’ temporary caretaker from June 2016 to
     August 2016, while the girls’ mother was serving her term of
     incarceration. [W.B.] testified that she arranged for Appellant to
     care for her girls, including that she provided Appellant with the
     girls’ medical and Social Security cards. Both C.B. and F.B.
     testified that they were living with and were under the care of
     Appellant. N.B. testified that when he saw his sisters, they were
     living with Appellant. Appellant herself reached out to [W.B.], to
     inform her about [an] injury [to] C.B.’s finger, and that it required
     a trip to the hospital. When [D.B.] and [E.A.] attempted to
     recover the children, they reached out to Appellant, who promptly
     began evading the family. Appellant was clearly aware that she
     had been entrusted with a duty of care for both girls.

     The cumulative evidence overwhelmingly established Appellant’s
     duty of care towards C.B. and F.B. The remaining statutory
     elements similarly were proven. Both victimized children provided
     convincing trial testimony that Appellant had forced them to sleep
     on the floor, had refused to feed them, and regularly beat and
     kicked them. The jury as factfinder evaluated a wealth of
     testimony to corroborate their testimony. [D.B.] and [E.A.] both
     testified that they noticed a drastic change in both the appearance
     and demeanor of both girls; how both C.B. and F.B. looked
     underweight after their stay with Appellant and that they were
     now skittish and unhappy.

     The jury also evaluated the expert opinion of Dr. Kate Henry, who
     had described in detail the extent of C.B. and F.B.’s physical
     injuries. She described how both girls had needed a CAT scan for
     a swollen stomach, as doctors were concerned that they had
     ruptured spleens and their weeklong medical treatment in the
     hospital. She detailed that both little girls had been covered in

                                    - 16 -
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      bug bites and had similarly patterned bruises and scars on their
      legs and thighs. She thoroughly opined that those injuries could
      not have occurred in a vacuum and were unmistakable indicators
      of abuse. Th[e] jury was left with no reasonable doubt that
      starvation and repeated beating of these two very young children
      to the extent that they need[ed] emergency medical treatment,
      placing them in the hospital for a week, had constituted a course
      of conduct by their caregiver that had harmed both their physical
      and psychological welfare.

                                  *     *      *

      It is uncontested that the children were less than six years of age
      and had suffered bodily injuries in the form of bruises, scars, and
      malnutrition. Furthermore, the record is rife with convincing
      evidence that Appellant had intentionally caused these injuries.
      Both children reported credibly . . . that Appellant had struck them
      with belts and other objects, had forced them to sleep on the floor,
      [which culminated] in a weeklong hospital stay. [D.B.] and [E.A.
      became] alarmed upon observing that both girls had considerable
      weight loss and had appeared to be psychologically scarred after
      their stay with Appellant. Dr. Henry, the Commonwealth’s expert,
      who examined F.B. and C.B., had provided clear opinion and
      factual testimony that the girls’ injuries had been intentionally
      [caused] and that their injuries had not resulted from any
      accident.    The cumulative evidence proved well beyond a
      reasonable doubt that Appellant’s abhorrent conduct had been the
      rooted cause of both children’s injuries. The jury correctly
      concluded that Appellant had intentionally caused the harm.

Trial Ct. Op. at 29-31 (formatting altered).

      Based on our review of the record, in viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence establishing Appellant’s guilt for both EWOC and aggravated assault.

See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330-31.              As noted by the trial court, the

Commonwealth presented evidence establishing that repeatedly hit C.B. and

F.B. with brushes and belts, and by doing so caused injury and threatened

both children’s physical and psychological welfare.        See 18 Pa.C.S. §

                                      - 17 -
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2702(a)(8); Sebolka, 205 A.3d at 337. Although Appellant maintains that

her sister, Sharee Brinson, was responsible for the children’s injuries, we will

not re-weigh the evidence the evidence and substitute or judgment for the

fact-finder.5 See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330. Accordingly, we conclude that

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                              Weight of the Evidence

       Appellant next argues that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of

the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 20. Specifically, Appellant reiterates that

although C.B. accused Appellant of abuse at trial, C.B. had previously

identified Sharee Brinson as the perpetrator when she was first interviewed at

the hospital. Id. at 21. Appellant also notes that F.B. denied that Appellant

had abused her at trial. Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that “the evidence

that should have been given the most weight were C.B.’s statements at the

hospital, which was closer in time to the abuse she endured,” and were not

influenced by “other people’s suggestiveness.” Id.

       When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we are

governed by the following standard:

       When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we
       review the trial court’s exercise of discretion. A reversal of a
       verdict is not necessary unless it is so contrary to the evidence as
       to shock one’s sense of justice. The weight of the evidence is
       exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none
____________________________________________

5 To the extent Appellant asks this Court to focus on inconsistencies in the
victims’ testimonies, we reiterate that any question of credibility is within the
exclusive province of the factfinder, and this Court will not disturb the
factfinder’s credibility determination. Bragg, 133 A.3d at 331.

                                          - 18 -
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      or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
      witnesses. The fact-finder also has the responsibility of resolving
      contradictory testimony and questions of credibility. We give
      great deference to the trial court’s decision regarding a weight of
      the evidence claim because it had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      The cumulative evidence that had been presented by the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was credible, convincing, and
      compelling. Neither the conviction for the aggravated assault on
      C.B. nor any of the other verdicts shocked anyone’s sense of
      fairness or justice. The record is replete with testimonial evidence
      that thoroughly disproved Appellant’s defense theory and
      repeated attempts to pass fault onto her sister. As stated, both
      children presented credible testimony identifying Appellant as the
      source of their injuries. . . . Testimony further corroborated by
      [E.A.] and [D.B.’s] observations of the girls’ appearance, [D.B.]
      and N.B. confirming both girls were indeed in Appellant’s care, and
      expert testimony by Dr. Henry affirming that their injuries were
      caused intentionally and indicated abuse.           The cumulative
      evidence of guilt was overpowering.            Thus, the evidence
      sufficiently established all charges of which Appellant was found
      guilty and that no trial court error had been committed because
      none of the jury’s verdicts had been entered against the weight of
      the evidence. Since no error has been committed, no remedy is
      warranted.

Trial Ct. Op. at 34 (formatting altered).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claim. See Roane, 204 A.3d at

1001. Although Appellant claims that C.B.’s statements at the hospital were

“more reliable,” we will not reweigh or disturb the trial court’s credibility

                                     - 19 -
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determinations on appeal. See id. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

                        Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      In her final issue, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of her sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, Appellant argues

that the trial court failed to consider sentencing factors such as the protection

of the public or Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Id. at 23-24. Appellant also

argues that the trial court “focused solely on the seriousness of the offenses

and the impact of the victim to the exclusion of all mitigating factors” and did

not give any consideration to the mitigating factors contained in the PSI

report. Id. Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to state

sufficient reasons for imposing Appellant’s sentence or provide an adequate

justification for deviating from the sentencing guidelines when it imposed a

sentence in excess of the aggravated range. Id. at 23.

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      [her] issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

                                      - 20 -
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Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

      “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal”).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).       “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved her sentencing claim

in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the

issue in her Rule 1925(b) statement.        Appellant has also included a Rule

2119(f) statement in her brief. Further, we conclude that Appellant has raised

a substantial question for review.       See Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748

A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (claim that trial court double-

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counted factors already taken into account in sentencing guidelines

constitutes a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d

913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020) (claim that court imposed aggravated-range

sentence without considering mitigating factors is a substantial question);

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(substantial question raised where the appellant argues that sentencing court

failed to set forth adequate reasons for sentence imposed).

     Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

     Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
     sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
     absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
     of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
     the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
     sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
     judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
     arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

     Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
     is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9781(c)
     and (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

        The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
        the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

           (1) the sentencing court purported to sentencing within
           the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
           erroneously;

           (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
           guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
           application of the guidelines would be clearly
           unreasonable; or

           (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
           sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

        In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
        sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

                                    - 22 -
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      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

      In reviewing the record, we consider:

         (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
         history and characteristics of the defendant.

         (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
         defendant, including any presentence investigation.

         (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

         (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some

citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and

[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892

A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

Additionally, the trial court “must consider the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at

848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report exists, this Court will “presume

that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.”   Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

      Additionally, this Court has explained that

      the sentencing court is required to consider the sentence ranges
      set forth in the sentencing guidelines, but it [is] not bound by the

                                     - 23 -
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     sentencing guidelines.      The court may deviate from the
     recommended guidelines; they are “merely one factor among
     many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” A
     court may depart from the guidelines “if necessary, to fashion a
     sentence which takes into account the protection of the public, the
     rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of the
     particular offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the
     victim and the community.” When a court chooses to depart from
     the guidelines[,] however, it must “demonstrate on the record, as
     a proper starting point, [its] awareness of the sentencing
     guidelines.” Further, the court must “provide a contemporaneous
     written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from
     the guidelines.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered). “The requirement that the court

provide a contemporaneous written statement is satisfied when the judge

states his [or her] reasons for the sentence on the record and in the

defendant’s presence.” Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 321 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

     “When reviewing a sentence outside of the guidelines, the essential

question is whether the sentence imposed was [un]reasonable.” Id. (citations

omitted).   “A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to properly

account for” the four statutory factors of Section 9781(d). Sheller, 961 A.2d

at 191. “Even if the sentencing court relied on factors that were subsumed

into the guideline recommendation, . . . there is no abuse of discretion when

the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the

sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 192 (citations omitted). Finally, we note that

a sentencing court is not required to ignore context and impose a sentence in

a vacuum, where the offense at issue and the corresponding sentencing

                                   - 24 -
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guidelines are the only factors permissibly considered by a sentencing court.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 939 A.2d 974, 980 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that the trial court ordered a PSI report, which

it reviewed prior to sentencing. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/9/19, at 6. At the

sentencing hearing, the trial court also noted that it had reviewed “extensive”

reports from DHS, a mental health assessment, and the sentencing guidelines

applicable to each conviction. Id. at 6, 25.

      The trial court further noted the following:

      The road to rehabilitation, [Appellant], beings with acceptance of
      responsibility for one’s actions and indeed remorse for one’s
      actions. I have seen zero from you. Not only that, within the DHS
      reports and assessments, the multiple comments, particularly
      yours to this day, you still deny that you even had care of these
      children, which really, really, given all that has occurred, is most
      shocking.

      You have a right to a trial, absolutely. You’re not being penalized
      for a trial, but as I told you before the mitigating circumstance of
      acceptance of responsibility is not present here.              More
      importantly, when I evaluate what to do here, I evaluate the
      person that is before me. I evaluate the net effect of what that
      person did. I understand that to a degree you had to have been
      overwhelmed, which, you know, identifies one of the issues here,
      but you went out of your way to take out your anger on two lovely
      little children who did absolutely nothing to deserve your wrath.

      And I am struck by the fact that when the efforts of [W.B.’s] family
      members, particularly their Aunt [D.B.], after being — trying to
      locate these children, you actively hid them along with members
      of your family. There was no reason to do that except to cover
      up what you were doing. That, to me, indicates a particular
      mindset that is most disturbing. The net effect upon those two
      lovely little girls is life-lasting. You didn’t just keep them in an
      unkempt situation, their conditions were horrific. You wouldn’t

                                     - 25 -
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     put any animal or any human being in those conditions. And you
     repeatedly beat them.

                                 *     *      *

     So I looked at the all the circumstances here from beginning to
     end. And, quite frankly, that was why, to this day, I still have a
     great concern for your children, because I do agree with your
     counsel that some of the methods of how we deal with anger are
     learned behavior. . . .

     This situation occurred because [W.B.] chose you instead of her
     family members to take care of her two girls.            And the
     machinations that that family had to go through to get them back
     before something worse happened should never have occurred. I
     blame you for that. That was intentional. So for you at this point
     in time to continually say I, I, I, I, I, indicates to me you are
     nowhere near having any understanding or comprehension of
     what you did wrong, or care of others aside from yourself. That
     is most disturbing.

     Because I would think that someone in your position before [the
     trial court] at this point in time would have reflected otherwise.
     So I do agree with your counsel that you do need direction, but
     for every action there is a reaction. For every form of behavior,
     there’s a consequence. And I don’t agree that we should lower
     the bar of expected behavior based upon our upbringing. Because
     if we were to lower behavior to suit bad behavior, the only thing
     that happens is it’s lowered behavior and less care. You had a
     responsibility to those children. If you couldn’t deal with the
     responsibility, all you had to do was give them back before
     something bad happened instead of taking out your rage on them.
     I do not wish to take any mom from a child. Sometimes it’s
     needed. This is one of them.

Id. at 21-25.

     In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

     [Appellant] has made no demonstration that [the trial court]
     abused its discretion when imposing the respective sentences. As
     the record reflected cogent sentencing factors and rationales [sic]
     reasons had been recited. [The trial court] considered the
     aggravating and mitigating circumstances after [it] acknowledged
     full review of the prepared investigatory reports and mental health

                                     - 26 -
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      assessments. The gravity of the offense and the ongoing impact
      Appellant’s actions had on the children and their family and the
      recommended Sentencing Guidelines that had been applicable had
      been reviewed and incorporated. Additional conditions ordered by
      [the trial court] included that Appellant receive continual anger
      management classes, and parenting classes, to help ensure her
      ability to reemerge as a productive member of society. [The trial
      court] weighed all relevant factors required and determined a
      sentence that fell far beneath the statutory maximum.

Trial Ct. Op. at 38.

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54. The record reflects that the

trial court considered the PSI report, the appropriate sentencing factors, and

the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. See Fullin, 892

A.2d at 849-50; see also Watson, 228 A.3d at 936 (stating that, where a

PSI report exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors” (citation

omitted)). Additionally, we note that the record reflects that the trial court

demonstrated that it was aware of Appellant’s sentencing guidelines, having

explicitly referenced the mitigated, standard, and aggravated range sentence

for each of Appellant’s offenses. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 25. Ultimately,

the trial court explained that an aggregate sentence of three to eleven years’

incarceration was necessary in light of the circumstances of this case and the

ongoing impact that Appellant’s actions had on the minor victims.         See

                                    - 27 -
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Durazo, 210 A.3d at 321; Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190.6               Under these

circumstances, because the trial court’s findings are supported by the record,

we have no basis to conclude that the trial court’s sentences or application of

the guidelines was unreasonable. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54. For these

reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2023

____________________________________________

6 Appellant’s sentencing guidelines reflect that the sentence imposed for the
aggravated assault charges was in excess of the aggravated
range. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 227 A.3d 1277, 1288 (Pa. Super.
2020) (explaining that “[w]hen deviating from the sentencing guidelines, a
trial judge must indicate that he [or she] understands the suggested ranges”
(citations omitted)).

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