Court Opinion

ID: 9378812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 18:00:23.369559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.251717
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20224         Document: 00516673979             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/13/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                 March 13, 2023
                                        No. 22-20224                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   Zhang Yang,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Nobilis Health Corporation; Harry Fleming; David
   Young; Kenneth J. Klein,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                  USDC 4:19-CV-145

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Zhang Yang appeals the district court’s decision to deny his request
   for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
   Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   Yang’s motion because of his reliance on alleged evidence he obtained from
   a third-party complaint, we AFFIRM.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20224        Document: 00516673979              Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/13/2023

                                         No. 22-20224

                                 I.       Background 1
                            A.      Yang’s Initial Suit & Appeal
           Yang filed a class action suit in federal district court against Nobilis
   Health Corporation and various officers within the corporation (collectively
   “Nobilis”). He alleged that Nobilis misrepresented and hid its financial
   failings and missteps in communications to the public and shareholders in
   violation of federal securities laws. The district court referred the case to a
   magistrate judge, who recommended that Yang failed to: (1) plausibly allege
   actionable misrepresentation and (2) properly plead scienter under the
   Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). The district court
   rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation on Yang’s failure to plead
   misrepresentation but adopted its conclusion that he did not plead scienter.
   Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case and Yang appealed.
           On appeal, a panel of this court considered whether Yang adequately
   pleaded scienter under the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards. See
   Yang v. Nobilis Health Corp., No. 20-20538, 2021 WL 3619863 (5th Cir. Aug.
   13, 2021); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (requiring plaintiffs in a
   securities fraud action to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
   inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”). First,
   the panel examined Yang’s allegations against Nobilis’ corporate officers
   individually. See Yang, 2021 WL 3619863 at *2. It concluded that his
   complaint failed to make a single allegation, standing alone, that supported a
   strong inference of scienter. Id. Second, the panel conducted a holistic review
   of Yang’s complaint to determine if all the scienter allegations, taken

           1
            The underlying facts of this dispute were covered in one of our previous decisions.
   See Yang, 2021 WL 3619863. Therefore, we only provide the most pertinent facts to the
   current dispute herein.

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   together, sufficed to meet the heightened pleading standard. Id. It again
   concluded that Yang failed to establish scienter. Ultimately, the panel
   affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
               B.    Yang Files a Rule 60(b) Motion During His Appeal
          As this court was considering Yang’s appeal on scienter, he moved for
   relief from the district court’s judgment under Rule 60(b). He based his
   motion on alleged concessions and statements Nobilis made in other
   proceedings. The district court did not consider his Rule 60(b) motion until
   eight months after the panel affirmed its dismissal for failure to plead
   scienter. In light of the panel’s final judgment on Yang’s appeal, the district
   court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and declined to grant or deny his
   motion. See Yang v. Nobilis Health Corp., No. 20-20538, 2022 WL 991991, at
   *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2022) (declining to address Yang’s Rule 60(b) motion
   because “the case [was] no longer on appeal . . . [and] the Fifth Circuit never
   ordered [the district court] to indicate whether it would be inclined to grant
   or deny the Rule 60(b) motion”)).
          In the alternative, the district court explained that if it had jurisdiction
   over the merits of Yang’s motion, it would deny the motion because: (1) the
   new evidence that he offered wholly relied on a complaint from a separate
   case that the parties eventually settled; and (2) he offered no evidence of
   misconduct to support his Rule 60(b)(3) claim that Nobilis made improper
   factual attacks on the accounts of the confidential witnesses in the case. See
   Yang, 2022 WL 991991 at *2 (internal quotations omitted). Yang timely
   appealed.
          On appeal, Yang asks us to consider whether the district court erred
   in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to address his Rule 60(b) motion. If
   we determine that the district court erred on jurisdiction, he asks that we also
   consider whether: (1) the district court erred in declining to consider Nobilis’

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   statements in a third-party’s complaint; and (2) he properly pleaded scienter
   with the inclusion of Nobilis’ statements from the third-party complaint.
                        II.     Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny relief under Rule
   60(b) for abuse of discretion. See Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632,
   638 (5th Cir. 2005). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its
   decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
   of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Tex. Utils., 179 F.3d 258, 265 (5th
   Cir. 1999)).
                               III. Discussion
                                 A.      Jurisdiction
          Yang argues that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked
   jurisdiction over his Rule 60(b) motion. He asserts that because we did not
   address the content of his motion on appeal, the district court had jurisdiction
   do so. We agree.
          Rule 60(b)(2) permits courts to relieve parties from a final judgment
   or order when there is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
   diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.”
   Rule 60(b)(3) allows the same relief if an opposing party engages in fraud,
   misrepresentation, or misconduct. Generally, plaintiffs may seek relief from
   a judgment under Rule 60(b) even when that judgment is on appeal. See, e.g.,
   Winchester v. U.S. Attorney for S. Dist. of Tex., 68 F.3d 947, 949 (5th Cir.
   1995). However, once an appeal is initiated, it divests the district court of
   jurisdiction over the merits of a Rule 60(b) motion, “except to take action in
   aid of the appeal.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., 38 F.3d 1404, 1413
   n.3 (5th Cir. 1994). Once we have resolved the case on appeal, “the district
   court re-assumes jurisdiction.” BHTT Ent., Inc. v. Brickhouse Café & Lounge,

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   LLC, 858 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Arenson v. S. Univ. Law Ctr.,
   963 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1992)).
          In Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, the Supreme
   Court clarified that a district court that reassumes jurisdiction following an
   appellate court’s mandate is not required to obtain leave to consider post-
   judgment motions. 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976). The Court acknowledged that “in
   the past both [it] and many Courts of Appeals have required appellate leave
   before the District Court could reopen a case which had been reviewed on
   appeal.” Id. It explained, however, that “the arguments in favor of requiring
   appellate leave [were] unpersuasive” because “the appellate mandate
   relate[d] to the record and issues then before the court, and does not purport
   to deal with possible later events.” Id. Accordingly, it concluded that “the
   district judge is not flouting the mandate by acting on” a post-judgment
   motion that contained content not considered on appeal. Id. (citing 11
   Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
   Practice and Procedure § 2873, pp. 269-270 (1973)).
          Here, the district court abused its discretion by declining to address
   Yang’s motion on jurisdictional grounds. In accordance with BHTT, the
   district court reassumed jurisdiction over Yang’s post-judgment motions
   once the mandate issued in his appeal. See 858 F.3d at 313. In turn, under
   Standard Oil, the district court was free to either grant or deny his motion
   because it presented information not considered by this court on appeal. See
   429 U.S. at 18. Thus, the district court erred in determining that it lacked
   jurisdiction over his motion.
          While jurisdiction was the district court’s primary basis for denying
   Yang relief, it was not the only grounds that it provided. See Yang, 2022 WL
   991991 at *2 (explaining that “in the event this Court does have jurisdiction

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   to consider Plaintiff’s motion, the Court denies the motion”). We next
   address the district court’s alternative basis for denial of his motion.
                             B.      Yang’s Argument on the Merits
                 1.      The District Court’s Alternative Reasons for Denial
           Yang advanced two arguments in his Rule 60(b) motion before the
   district court. First, that allegations made in a third-party complaint (“the
   BBVA complaint”) against Nobilis proved that the company acted with
   scienter when allegedly misrepresenting its finances and its ability to collect
   on its account receivables. 23 Second, that Nobilis made “improper factual
   attacks” on the accounts offered by confidential witnesses. The district court
   considered each argument and denied his motion. 4
           On Yang’s reliance on third-party pleadings, the district court
   explained that he could not depend on evidence obtained from a third-party’s
   complaint because the Fifth Circuit has “made clear that a complaint is not
   evidence of the charges contained in it.” Yang, 2022 WL 991991 at *2 (citing
   American Cancer Soc. v. Cook, 675 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2012)). Regarding
   his second contention, it first examined that Rule 60(b)(3) required him to
   “muster clear and convincing evidence (1) that [Nobilis] engaged [in] fraud
   or other misconduct and (2) that this misconduct prevented [him] from fully

           2
             See BBVA USA v. Fleming et al., No. 3:20-cv-01708-M, ECF No. 1-3 (N.D. Tex.
   June 26, 2020).
           3
               Notably, this case was never litigated because the parties settled the dispute out
   of court.
           4
             Yang fails to adequately argue that the district court abused its discretion in
   denying his Rule 60(b)(3) assertions because he failed to point to “improper factual
   attacks” of the confidential witnesses in his primary brief on appeal. Consequently, he has
   waived consideration of that argument. See Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 251 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (“Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that
   argument.”).

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   and fairly presenting his case.” Id. (citing Nat’l City Golf Fin., a Div. of Nat’l
   City Com. Cap. Co., LLC v. Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2018)).
   Ultimately, it held that he “offer[ed] no evidence of misconduct to support
   his [Rule 60(b)(3)] claims.” Id.
         2.      Whether the District Court Erred By Not Considering Nobilis’
                          Statements in a Third-Party Complaint
           Yang argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
   considering alleged statements and concessions Nobilis made in the BBVA
   complaint. He argues that Turner v. Cincinnati Insurance Company and United
   States v. Gluk prove that the district court could have relied on third-party
   pleadings to establish that Nobilis acted with scienter, as required by the
   PSLRA. 9 F.4th 300, 315 (5th Cir. 2021); 831 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2016). We
   disagree.
           Whether a third-party’s pleadings constitute admissible evidence has
   been repeatedly litigated in this court. 5 The relevant inquiry focuses on the
   way a plaintiff seeks to use the third-party pleadings and how the pleadings
   came into existence. See, e.g., Turner, 9 F.4th at 315. We first examine United
   States v. Gluk, a securities-fraud case that Yang asserts supports granting his
   Rule 60(b) motion. See 831 F.3d at 608. There, we permitted the inclusion of
   third-party documents created by the SEC because they were admissible
   under the public record exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 614
   (permitting the admission of facts from a third-party document when they
   were “factual findings from a legally authorized investigation” by the SEC).
           Additional guidance on the admissibility of third-party pleadings is
   also found in the insurance context, where we routinely rely on these types

           5
             See, e.g., Cook, 675 F.3d at 529; Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 F.4th 300, 315–17
   (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Gluk, 831 F.3d 608, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2016).

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   of pleadings to determine insurance companies’ duties to defend or
   indemnify policyholders. For example, in Turner the parties contested
   whether a third-party pleading sufficed to determine an insurance company’s
   duty to indemnify. 9 F.4th at 315. We explained that a district court may
   admit a third-party pleading as extrinsic evidence in this context when it is
   “not concerned with the accuracy of the facts in the complaints filed in the
   two different lawsuits.” Id. (emphasis in original). We further highlighted
   that this principle was especially relevant in an insurance proceeding
   involving the mere “evidence of relatedness” of the two complaints. Id.
          Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
   that Yang could not rely on allegations made in the BBVA complaint as new
   evidence for proving scienter. Yang’s reliance on Gluck is misplaced. First,
   he provides no legal authority to support that the information in the BBVA
   complaint is admissible hearsay under the public record exception, or any
   other hearsay exception. Even if he could reconcile that deficiency, Gluck
   only supports the conclusion that facts determined through an official SEC
   investigation are admissible as evidence in litigation directly or indirectly tied
   to that investigation. See 831 F.3d at 613–14. But the BBVA complaint is not
   an official SEC document, nor does it cite to any SEC investigations. So, the
   district court correctly decided not to rely on the BBVA complaint as reliable
   evidence of scienter.
          Turner is similarly unhelpful to Yang’s argument. First, the instant
   appeal is not an insurance dispute. Much of this court’s rationale in Turner
   relied on the fact that third-party pleadings have a special use in the insurance
   context. See 9. F.4th at 314 (noting that because insurance cases “frequently
   do not go to trial, the parties may offer extrinsic evidence to prove or negate
   the insurer’s duty to indemnify if the underlying lawsuit never goes to trial or
   if trial does not develop the facts necessary to determine policy coverage”).
   Putting that aside, Yang’s reliance on Turner is still unpersuasive because he

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   relies on the “accuracy of the facts” in the BBVA complaint. Id. at 315.
   Indeed, much of the argument in his brief on appeal relies on the BBVA
   complaint in a legally conclusory fashion. In Turner, we expressly rejected
   this exercise and only relied on the extrinsic third-party pleadings insofar as
   they evinced “evidence of relatedness” between the two state-court lawsuits.
   9. F4th at 314–315.
          In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
   Yang’s motion because he relied on alleged statements made by Nobilis in
   third-party pleadings. See Hesling, 396 F.3d at 638; Kennedy, 179 F.3d at 265.
                              IV.    Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
   dismissing Yang’s Rule 60(b) motion.

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