Court Opinion

ID: 9777161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:00:59.009769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:26.513540
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13949   Document: 26-1    Date Filed: 08/29/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13949
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       JAMES NATHANIEL DOUSE,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SABRINA TRAEGER,
       In her individual capacity,
       CANOE CREEK NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,
       Canoe Creek Homeowners Association, Inc.
       c/o Access Management,
       CASTLE MANAGEMENT, LLC,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13949          Document: 26-1          Date Filed: 08/29/2023           Page: 2 of 6

       2                           Opinion of the Court                         22-13949

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02098-TPB-JSS
                             ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              James Douse, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       sua sponte order dismissing his Fair Housing Act (FHA) complaint
       against Sabrina Traeger, Canoe Creek Neighborhood Association,
       Inc., Canoe Creek Homeowner’s Association, Inc., and C/O Ac-
       cess Management (collectively, the defendants), 1 for lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction. Douse contends the district court had jurisdic-
       tion over his action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(n), and
       the defendants committed fraud, are intentionally discriminating
       against him, have retained his property unlawfully, and are exces-
       sively increasing his homeowner’s association assessments. After
       review, 2 we affirm the district court.

       1 Douse names Castle Management, LLC, as a new party in the caption of his

       appeal, but Castle Management was not a party to the action in the district
       court, so Douse may not name them as a party on appeal. See e.g., Kimberly
       Regenesis, LLC v. Lee Cnty., 64 F.4th 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2023) (in the context
       of standing, holding that parties who did not participate in the district court
       may not appeal).
       2 We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter

       jurisdiction de novo. Hall v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans’ Affs., 85 F.3d 532, 533 (11th Cir.
       1996).
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       22-13949                Opinion of the Court                          3

               Federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject matter
       jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala.
       v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Federal ques-
       tion jurisdiction exists if the cause of action arises from the Consti-
       tution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The threshold
       question in determining whether a claim presents a federal ques-
       tion jurisdiction is whether the claim “arises under” the Constitu-
       tion, laws, or treaties of the United States. See United States v. Blue
       Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 156 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir. 1998).
              The FHA provides it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent
       after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for
       the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
       dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
       status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The Act further pro-
       hibits “any person or other entity whose business includes engag-
       ing in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate
       against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the
       terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color,
       religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” Id.
       § 3605. Regarding brokerage services, it is:
              unlawful to deny any person access to or membership
              or participation in any multiple-listing service, real es-
              tate brokers’ organization or other service, organiza-
              tion, or facility relating to the business of selling or
              renting dwellings, or to discriminate against him in
              the terms or conditions of such access, membership,
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13949

              or participation, on account of race, color, religion,
              sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

       Id. § 3606. Finally, the FHA makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimi-
       date, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or en-
       joyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
       account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
       exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
       [§§] 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606.” Id. § 3617.
               The district court did not err when it dismissed Douse’s
       complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Douse’s argu-
       ment relating to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(n) fails for two
       reasons. First, he failed to present his Rule 4(n) jurisdiction argu-
       ment in the district court, so he has waived any such argument on
       appeal. See Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994) (stat-
       ing we will generally not consider issues raised for the first time on
       appeal that were not presented in the district court). Second, the
       Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot confer jurisdiction on the
       district court, so Douse cannot rely on Rule 4(n) as a basis for the
       district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over his case. See Diaz v.
       Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Federal
       Rules of Civil Procedure do not create an independent basis for fed-
       eral subject matter jurisdiction.”).
               Reviewing the face of Douse’s complaint and assuming all
       of Douse’s allegations are true, Douse failed to allege facts that re-
       late to or establish that the defendants violated the FHA. See Law-
       rence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining
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       22-13949               Opinion of the Court                          5

       when a case is dismissed based on the complaint, we look to the
       face of the complaint to determine whether subject matter jurisdic-
       tion existed, assuming all the allegations contained in the com-
       plaint are true). The district court did not err when it determined
       it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Douse’s case because his
       FHA claims were wholly insubstantial and frivolous. See Blue Cross
       & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1998)
       (stating even though a claim arises under the Constitution, laws, or
       treaties of the United States, it may be dismissed for lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction if “such a claim is wholly insubstantial and friv-
       olous”). As the district court found, Douse’s complaint was inade-
       quate and incomprehensible because, although Douse asserted his
       claims arose under federal law, he failed to include any factual alle-
       gations under the FHA count of his complaint. See Barnett v. Okee-
       chobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating factual
       findings concerning subject matter jurisdiction made by the district
       court are overturned only if clearly erroneous).
               Likewise, the factual allegations Douse raised in other por-
       tions of his complaint did not encompass conduct prohibited by the
       FHA because they did not relate to the sale or rental of a dwelling.
       Even if the district court construed his complaint as related to the
       sale or rental of a dwelling, Douse’s allegations did not state a basis
       for relief under the FHA because Douse did not allege the $1,000
       pool construction deposit or his HOA assessments related to dis-
       criminatory conduct by the defendants on the basis of one of the
       FHA’s protected classes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06; Barnett, 283 F.3d at
       1238. Finally, the FHA provisions that Douse cited in his complaint
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13949

       are irrelevant to his state law contract claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-
       06, 3617. Thus, even assuming all of Douse’s allegations are true,
       he failed to allege the defendants committed conduct that was pro-
       hibited by the FHA, warranting the district court’s dismissal for
       lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at
       410.
              Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sua sponte dismis-
       sal of Douse’s pro se civil complaint under the FHA for lack of sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction. 3
               AFFIRMED. 4

       3Douse raises several issues for the first time on appeal that are not relevant to

       the outcome of his appeal, including new factual allegations against the de-
       fendants, and we do not consider them. Also, in his reply brief, Douse argues
       for the first time that, for purposes of alleging an FHA cause of action, he is
       Black, a disabled Vietnam War veteran, a senior citizen, and a Florida resident.
       Of those classes, only his race is relevant to the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-
       06. In any event, this Court does not consider arguments raised for the first
       time in a reply brief, and he fails to argue that his race played any role in the
       defendants’ conduct. See Herring v. Sec., Dept. of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th
       Cir. 2005) (stating arguments that are “raised for the first time in a reply brief
       are not properly before a reviewing court” (quotation marks omitted)).
       4 The defendants’ motion to impose sanctions for damages and costs under

       Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 is DENIED.