Court Opinion

ID: 2964759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:36.632299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:25.745879
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-1839
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                  RICHARD MORETTO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                 [Hon. A. David Mazzone, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                             and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            Bernard Grossberg  with  whom  Erin K.  Kelly  was  on brief  for
       appellant.
            George  W.  Vien, Assistant  United  States  Attorney, with  whom
       Donald K.  Stern, United States Attorney, was on  brief for the United
       States.
                                ____________________
                                    June 11, 1997
                                ____________________

                 Per Curiam.   Richard Moretto was  convicted in 1991  of
            conspiracy to  distribute cocaine, 21  U.S.C. S  846, and  of
            witness intimidation, 18 U.S.C. S 1512.  At sentencing he was
            found to  be a career  offender based  on prior  convictions,
            U.S.S.G. 
                    S 
                      4B1.1, 
                            and 
                                sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment and
            a term of supervised  release.  This court affirmed both  the
            conviction and sentence  on direct appeal.  United States  v.
            Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S.  945
            (1993).
                 Thereafter, 
                            Moretto succeeded in having a state court set
            aside  two prior  state convictions,  undermining his  career
            offender status.  He petitioned under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 to set
            aside his original sentence.  The district court agreed  and,
            after 
                 further proceedings in June 1996, resentenced Moretto to
            108 months' imprisonment, a term of supervised release, and a
            fine of $12,500.  Moretto now appeals from this new sentence,
            arguing 
                   that 
                        the district court miscalculated the sentence and
            improperly imposed a fine.
                 Although 
                         Moretto's 
                                  appeal has been well briefed, we do not
            think that  the district  court erred  on any  of the  issues
            presented in this court.  The only difficult question is  the
            calculation  of drugs  attributed  to Moretto,  which  became
            decisive after the career offender label was lifted.  The key
            evidence was the testimony of Moretto's customer that over  a
            four 
                to 
                   five 
                       month 
                             period, he had purchased between one and two
                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            ounces of cocaine from  Moretto every week or other week  "or
            so."
                 Averaging, the district court found that it was fair  to
            attribute to  Moretto  14 deliveries  of 1.5  ounces  apiece.
            Twenty ounces (rounded down from 21) equates to 567 grams  of
            cocaine, which  is well  over the  500 gram  minimum used  to
            determine Moretto's base offense level of 26.  U.S.S.G.      
            S 2D1.1(c)(7).  Moretto argues now, as he did in the district
            court, that such  averaging is forbidden by United States  v.
            Sepulveda
                    , 
                      15 
                        F.3d 
                             1161, 
                                   1197-98 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
            512 U.S. 1223 (1994).
                 In 
                   United 
                         States
                                
                                v. 
                                   Webst
                                        er, 54 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995),
            this 
                court 
                      upheld estimates "drawn from ranges with relatively
            tight margins,"  distinguishing Sepulveda  as involving  much
            wider ranges.  Sepulveda itself made clear that the court was
            not adopting a  "per se rule" in  favor of selecting the  low
            point 
                 in 
                    an 
                       estimated range.  15 F.3d at 1199.  We think there
            is no magic rule to determine when a mid-range estimate seems
            to make sense but the use  of such an estimate here does  not
            appear to us to be clear error.
                 Further, 
                         the 
                            district 
                                     court attributed to Moretto, but did
            not  include in  its calculus,  an additional  ten ounces  of
            cocaine  provided to  the witness  by another  member of  the
            conspiracy after  Moretto  had departed  for prison.    Since
            Moretto had introduced the new seller to the witness for  the
                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            specific  purpose  of   continuing  the  sales,  Moretto   is
            presumptively liable under the relevant conduct guideline for
            foreseeable 
                       transactions effectively arranged by Moretto while
            still a working member of the conspiracy.  U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3 &
            comment. 
                    n.2(c)(6).  Even if the district court had arrived at
            a  low-end estimate  of Moretto's  own cocaine  sales to  the
            witness, the  inclusion of  this additional  ten ounces  (283
            grams) in the  drug quantity calculus would have resulted  in
            sentencing 
                      at the same base offense level as the court applied
            below.  Id. S 2D1.1(c)(7).
                 Moretto also objects to the district court's refusal  to
            treat him as a minimal or minor participant deserving a four-
            or two-level downward  adjustment in his  favor on either  of
            these grounds.  U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2.  If a lesser member of  the
            conspiracy were automatically a minimal or minor participant,
            Moretto 
                   might 
                         have 
                             a 
                               point; but we do not read the guideline in
            that  fashion.    Here,  Moretto  played  a  substantial  and
            continuing role in the  conspiracy, and the district  court's
            refusal 
                   to 
                      award him "minimal" or "minor" status was not clear
            error.
                 The 
                    district 
                             court's refusal to depart downward, based on
            diminished 
                      capacity, U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, was a factual judgment
            not  infected by  legal error  and therefore  not subject  to
            review.  United States v. Robles-Torres, 109 F.3d 83, 87 (1st
            Cir. 1997).  The two-level obstruction of justice  adjustment
                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            was amply  justified on  the facts  and provided  for by  the
            guidelines.  U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1.  And, there being no  evidence
            whatever of vindictiveness, the court had authority to impose
            a fine  on resentencing even though  none was imposed in  the
            initial sentence.   North Carolina  v. Pearce,  395 U.S.  711
            (1969); see also Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
                 Affirmed.
                                         -5-
                                         -5-