Court Opinion

ID: 9928262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:02:13.6608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:42.826639
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 69
                           ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                           DIVISION III
                                           No. CR-23-321

                                                    Opinion Delivered January 31, 2024
 JEFFERY MATLOCK
                                              APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
                                    APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                              [NO. 30CR-22-75]
 V.
                                                    HONORABLE STEPHEN L. SHIRRON,
 STATE OF ARKANSAS                                  JUDGE

                                      APPELLEE AFFIRMED

                               WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

       Appellant Jeffery Matlock was found guilty by a Hot Spring County Circuit Court jury of

possession of a firearm by certain persons, second-degree domestic battery, and first-degree

terroristic threatening. He was sentenced to a twenty-nine-year term of incarceration in the Arkansas

Department of Correction.1 On appeal, Matlock argues that the circuit court erroneously admitted

hearsay statements. We find no error and affirm.

       On February 26, 2022, Matlock was charged by information as a habitual offender pursuant

to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-5012 with the offenses of kidnapping under Arkansas Code

       1 Matlock was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of incarceration of seventeen years, six
years, and six years, respectively.
       2   (Supp. 2023).
Annotated section 5-11-102,3 a Class Y felony; possession of firearms by certain persons under

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103,4 a Class B felony; domestic battering in the second

degree under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-26-304,5 a Class C felony; theft of property (car)

under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-103,6 a Class C felony; theft of property (credit card)

under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-103, a Class D felony; aggravated assault of a family or

household member under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-26-306,7 a Class D felony; terroristic

threatening in the first degree under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-301,8 a Class D felony;

and fraudulent use of a credit card under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-37-207,9 a Class D

felony.

          Officer Josh Killian of the Malvern Police Department testified that on February 21, 2022,

he responded to a 911 call of a trespass in progress. Upon arrival, Officer Killian encountered Carla

Thompson and Matlock in a heated disagreement. Thompson expressed that she wanted Matlock to

leave her home. Matlock explained that he resided in the residence. Because he was able to establish

          3   (Repl. 2013).
          4   (Supp. 2023).

          5   (Supp. 2023).
          6   (Supp. 2023).
          7   (Supp. 2023).

          8   (Supp. 2023).
          9   (Repl. 2013).

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residency, Matlock was not removed from the property. Officer Killian informed Thompson that

she would have to follow proper eviction procedures to remove Matlock from the home.

       Thompson’s neighbor, Raquel James, testified that the next afternoon, Thompson banged on

her door screaming for help. Thompson was barefoot, had handcuffs on one hand, her face was

bloody, and she pleaded for help, saying, “He’s got a gun, he’s going to kill me.” James testified that

Thompson appeared to be truly terrified. James saw a man standing outside of Thompson’s house

and then saw that same man speed away in a gray car. James stated that she called 911 for help.

       Officer Jack Seely, a detective with the Malvern Police Department, testified that he

responded to the “assault not in progress” call. When he arrived on scene, Officer Seely saw a visibly

upset Thompson outside the home wearing no shoes or jacket, despite the cold temperatures.

Thompson had dried blood above her left eyebrow, and on her left wrist was a set of red handcuffs.

Officer Seely testified that Thompson provided the following verbal statement:

       She advised after the officers left the night prior on the 21st, I believe, that Jeffery Matlock
       had assaulted her, kept her from leaving her house, threatened to kill her with her gun,
       attempted to set the house on fire. He eventually had fallen asleep, she was able to run out
       of the house, run to the neighbor’s house, beat on the door long enough for the people to call
       9-1-1. She advised me that while she was outside the house, that Mr. Matlock observed her
       at the house, went back in, I guess, to her house, and left shortly after in a — — her Hyundai
       Tuscon, and she believed that he had — — she — — still — — or he still had her gun when
       he left.

Photographs depicting dried blood above Thompson’s eye and bruising on her hands were introduced

into evidence without objection after Officer Seely confirmed the pictures accurately represented

Thompson’s physical condition at the scene.

       Detective Curtis Kyle, the lieutenant of the criminal-investigation division of the Malvern

Police Department, testified that on February 25, information was received regarding Matlock’s

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whereabouts. Officers responded to the residence and discovered Matlock hiding behind a blanket

in the corner of the laundry room, near the back door. Matlock was arrested and taken into custody.

        Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to use evidence pursuant to Arkansas Rule of

Evidence 803(24). The motion claimed Thompson testified during a bond hearing that she fabricated

the allegations against Matlock. However, after the February 21–22 incident, Thompson signed and

submitted a sworn affidavit seeking a protection order against Matlock. In the affidavit, Thompson

alleged that Matlock pushed and shoved her, dragged her down the hall by her hair, choked her,

handcuffed her, and threatened to kill her. Thompson’s affidavit also stated that Matlock “proceeded

to cuddle with [her]” while he held a gun to her ribs. The State sought to use the affidavit in the event

Thompson took the stand and disclaimed the allegations. Following a hearing on the State’s motion,

the circuit court found the affidavit admissible as evidence of a material fact, no other evidence on

point was available through reasonable efforts, and the interest of justice would best be served by

admitting the affidavit.

        The State filed another motion in limine seeking to admit Thompson’s out-of-court

statements to her neighbor, James, and Detective Seely. After another hearing, the circuit court

found the statement Thompson made to James admissible under the excited-utterance hearsay

exception. The circuit court found Thompson’s statement to Detective Seely at the scene admissible

because she made the statement while “under duress and making statements based on her emotional

circumstances” and it was further admissible under “multiple exceptions” to the general rule against

the admission of hearsay.

        At trial, as detailed previously, both James and Detective Seely testified to the statements

made by Thompson immediately after her encounter with Matlock. Nonetheless, Thompson took

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the stand and repudiated the allegations against Matlock. Thompson insisted that she lied when she

made the statements because she was mad and hurt that Matlock was leaving her for another woman.

Thompson testified that Matlock did not hit, choke, or push her. She stated that he did not drag her

by her hair and that she placed the handcuff on herself. Thompson testified that she hired Matlock’s

defense attorney “’[c]ause it was the right thing to do, ’cause what I had done was wrong and I felt

guilty for what I had done. I needed to make it right.”

       The jury found Matlock guilty of possession of a firearm by certain persons, second-degree

domestic battery, and first-degree terroristic threatening and sentenced him to serve consecutive

terms of incarceration of seventeen years, six years, and six years, respectively, for a total term of

twenty-nine years imprisonment.10 Matlock now appeals his convictions.

       A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding evidentiary issues.11 We will not reverse a

circuit court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion and a showing of

prejudice.12 Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit

court’s decision but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due

consideration.13

       10Matlock was acquitted of kidnapping and aggravated assault of a family or household
member. The theft-of-property charges and the fraudulent-use-of-a-credit-card charge were nolle
prossed.
       11   Washington v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 224, 575 S.W.3d 626.
       12   Huddleston v. State, 339 Ark. 266, 5 S.W.3d 46 (1999).
       13   Washington, supra.

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        Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.14 Hearsay is not admissible unless it meets an exception provided by law or by the rules of

evidence.15

        On appeal, Matlock challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit into evidence three out-

of-court statements: (1) Thompson’s statement to her neighbor; (2) Thompson’s statement to

Detective Seely; and (3) Thompson’s affidavit in support of her petition for a protective order against

Matlock. Matlock contends that each statement constituted hearsay that does not meet any exception

to the general rule against hearsay admission.

        At the outset, we note that although Matlock purports to challenge the circuit court’s

admission of three separate statements, he fails to develop any discernible argument regarding

Thompson’s statements to her neighbor and to law enforcement, particularly, Detective Seely.

Instead, his argument on appeal focuses on Thompson’s affidavit accompanying her protective-order

petition. We do not consider an argument when the appellant presents no convincing argument in

its support.16

        Out of caution, despite Matlock’s failure to craft an argument on the issues, we note that the

circuit court did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting Thompson’s statements to her neighbor

and Detective Seely. An excited utterance is a statement relating to a startling event or condition

        14   Ark. R. Evid. 801(c).
        15   Ark. R. Evid. 802.
        16   Hollis v. State, 346 Ark. 175, 55 S.W.3d 756 (2001).

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made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 17 The

relevant inquiry is whether the statement was made under the stress of excitement or was made after

the declarant calmed down and had an opportunity to reflect, which is a matter within the circuit

court’s sound discretion.18 Thompson’s statement to her neighbor was made immediately following

her escape from Matlock, where she had been handcuffed, attacked, held at gunpoint, and repeatedly

told she was going to die. James testified that when Thompson banged on her door, she (Thompson)

was screaming, pleading for help, visibly upset, and scared. Thompson’s statement to her neighbor

was properly admitted as an excited-utterance exception to hearsay.

       Likewise, Thompson’s statement to Detective Seely was also properly admitted into evidence

as an excited utterance. Admissibility is not to be measured by any precise number of minutes, hours,

or days but requires that the declarant is still under the stress and excitement caused by the event. 19

The court looks at the lapse of time between the event and the statement, the age of the declarant,

the declarant’s physical and mental condition, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter

of the statement.20 Thompson’s statement to Detective Seely was made soon after she freed herself

from handcuffs and fled to her neighbor’s home begging for help. Thompson was still barefoot,

bloody, and distraught from the hours of being terrorized by Matlock. Thompson was still under the

stress of the traumatic event when she provided a statement to law enforcement.

       17   Ark. R. Evid. 803(2).
       18   Ludwick v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 347, 635 S.W.3d 330.

       19   Ludwick, supra.
       20   Talley v. State, 2010 Ark. 357, 377 S.W.3d 222.

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       Matlock contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the

statement Thompson made when she filed for a protective order. Essentially, he alleges that the

statement was hearsay and was made in preparation for a court proceeding and has “no guarantees of

trustworthiness.” Matlock argues that Thompson’s ultimate dismissal of the protective order serves

as proof of the falsity and unreliability of the statement. Matlock urges that Thompson’s retraction

of the allegations in the protective-order affidavit are compelling indications that Thompson was lying

when she made the statement and allegations contained therein.

       A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination

concerning the statement; and the statement is inconsistent with her testimony and, if offered in a

criminal proceeding, was given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or

other proceeding, or in a deposition.21 There is no dispute that Thompson’s affidavit in support of

her petition for an order of protection was made under oath, as required by the statutes governing

protection orders.22 Furthermore, Thompson testified at Matlock’s trial and was subject to cross-

examination. Accordingly, Thompson’s affidavit was not hearsay and was not subject to exclusion

under hearsay rules.

       Affirmed.

       GRUBER and THYER, JJ., agree.

       Gregory Crain, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

       21   Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(1).
       22   See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-201(e)(2) (Repl. 2020).

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