Court Opinion

ID: 9466990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:35:07.419138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:05.571532
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Appellants Pendleton and Martin were two black women Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) who were relieved of their EEO counselor jobs for “active participation” in an employee protest on January 29, 1973 against racial discrimination in the Food Services Division. The district court referred the matter for trial to a United States magistrate appointed to act as special master. The magistrate issued findings and conclusions justifying appellants’ termination as EEO counselors on the ground that “active participation” in this employee protest was not protected activity under § 704(a), the anti-retaliatory provision of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (1976). The district judge adopted the magistrate’s findings and conclusions and a majority of this panel affirms that action by the district court.1.
Before concluding that appellants’ behavior was inappropriate to their role as EEO counselors and hence that their separation from their EEO positions was not violative of § 704(a), I would remand for particularized findings:
(1) on the state of race relations between management and employees at WRAMC in January, 1973;
(2) on the ■ functions and responsibilities of appellants’ positions as EEO counselors; and
(3) on the precise nature and extent of appellants’ “active participation” in the employee protest which precipitated their dismissals as EEO counselors (a subject on which there is much conflicting evidence in the record).2
*1101. Race Relations at WRAMC
The magistrate’s opinion adopted by the district court referred to the “widely acknowledged racial troubles at the institution” as well as to the “weaknesses of the EEO program” prior to this time. It also mentioned “substantial evidence adduced at the hearing . . . that the civilian job
structure at Walter Reed had long placed blacks in lower level positions and that the Center’s administration had traditionally evinced hostility toward efforts to improve personnel and race relations problems.” However, in his findings, which were adopted by the district court, the magistrate made it clear that he thought the background of race discrimination at Walter Reed irrelevant. He stated:
At the outset, it is important to note what this case is not about. First, even though substantial evidence adduced at the hearing suggest that the civilian job structure at Walter Reed had long placed blacks in lower level positions and that the Center’s administration had traditionally evinced hostility towards efforts to improve personnel and race relations problems, the issue in this action is not whether blacks generally were subject to racial discrimination at Walter Reed. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, which presumably would have put in issue whether there was “across the board” discrimination at Walter Reed, was denied.
Joint Appendix (J.A.) 78.
The record shows that for some time pri- or to this protest the racial situation at Walter Reed was, in the words of the EEO officer for the Office of the Surgeon General, “very, very tense.” Trial Transcript (Tr.) 30. There had been prior protests (Tr. 96-98, 239-40, 372, 507) and a “lockout” of outside speakers at a planned rally. Tr. 64, 105, 504-08. Over 80% of the 1500 black employees belonged to an organization called UBAD (United Blacks Against Discrimination). (Pendleton was co-chairman (Tr. 166) and Martin secretary (Tr. 211) of UBAD at the time of these events.) The District of Columbia Congressional Representative, Hon. William Fauntroy, after having been “locked out” from the rally already mentioned, became engaged in discussions between employees and the WRAMC management. Tr. 580-88. A Civil Service Commission team which conducted an investigation in January 1973 characterized “race relations” at WRAMC as a “major problem” and continued:
Minorities distrust management and allege past and present discriminatory practices.
Progress in correcting past problems is slow and hampers management efforts to achieve credibility with dissatisfied work force, which remains generally angry, bitter and frustrated over what they feel are systems which do not respond to their needs.
Tr. 565.
The nature of an EEO counselor’s role, as outlined in the relevant regulations and counseling manual and discussed below, necessarily derives from, and depends upon, the context of “minority group” relations where the counselor works. In determining the scope of protection against retaliation to be afforded these EEO counselors under § 704(a), the racial context should not have been ignored.3
2. Appellants’ Roles as EEO Counselors
The magistrate made no particularized findings or conclusions on the functions and responsibilities of these EEO counselors. The only finding which expressly addressed the nature of appellants’ roles as counselors was that, “[a]s an EEO counselor, Pendleton counseled other employees and brought their grievances to management’s attention.” J.A. 77.
*111The EEO program at WRAMC had been revitalized shortly before the incidents here at issue in an attempt to deal with persistent racial tensions and appellant Pendleton had been appointed a fulltime chief EEO counselor.4 It is apparent that perceptions as to what role an EEO counselor should play in this situation varied widely. The Civil Service Commission report already mentioned recognized the problems which these differing perceptions posed and recommended that “[t]op level management [at WRAMC] . clearly define responsibilities and duties of EEO staff, establish its expectations in each program and set logical objectives and time frames for accomplishments in affirmative action programs.” Tr. 459.
The Army regulations establishing the EEO counseling program (CPR § 713.2e(5)) referred to the counselor as a “bridge between employees and management^ who is] . responsible for attempting to resolve problems which are brought to his attention by employees.” The regulations cautioned that the counselor should “avoid assumption of an advocacy role in behalf of either management or an employee,” (id.), but also emphasized that:
Since the equal employment opportunity counselor’s ability to communicate effectively is of the utmost importance, employees will be selected for such assignments with due regard for their knowledge and awareness of minority groups’ backgrounds, traits, customs and/or language, and the likelihood of their acceptability to such groups.
The Army’s EEO counseling manual, issued January 17, 1973, told counselors they “function independently of the formal system”; that they were “neutral” parties to whom employees could “openly relate.” Dept, of the Army, EEO Counseling, CPP, 74, 5-1 (Jan. 17,1973). The manual continued: Id.
As a counselor, . . you should have your finger on the pulse of the work environment; you should know the feelings of women and minority group employees, the work situation, supervisor-employee relations, and you should be the person on whom employees rely to add credibility to the system.
Your chief goal then is to hear the problem and to get the parties talking on the issues. Your major effort is to work with the broken lines of communications, to repair them whenever you can, and at least to bridge them when repairs are not possible. You are most of all a communications bridge.
Id. at 5-1, 6-1.
Neither the regulations nor the manual said anything about attendance at. or participation in group protests, but counselors besides Pendleton and Martin made it a practice to go to such protests in order to “have empathy” (Tr. 270), to “know exactly how employees and management feel” Id., because “in order to be . .an active participant in the resolution of the problems, you first had to understand and know what was going on.” Tr. 297-98.5
*112William Moncrief, commanding general of WRAMC at the time of these incidents, and the individual who ordered appellants’ dismissal as EEO counselors, testified that appellants’
performance in [the] demonstration [at issue] underlined to me their inability to perform satisfactorily as EEO counsellors; that this demonstration and their leadership in this demonstration was inimical to my interpretation of what an EEO counselor should be, and the EEO counselors reflected, as far as I was concerned, the image of the command and this just was not the image that I wanted Walter Reed to have.
Tr. 523.
When Moncrief first learned that this “demonstration” was about to occur, he told Pendleton to “see that it was called off.” Tr. 445, 465, 467, 520, 543.6 When she instead attended and “participated” in it, she was terminated, along with Martin. Although the magistrate found that several other counselors attended this protest (J.A. 80; Tr. 270, 297-98), it appears that only Pendleton and Martin were terminated for so doing. Tr. 203.
However the counselors may have perceived their EEO roles, it seems clear that WRAMC management thought of the counselors as “an extension of management” and that they “serve[d] at the pleasure of management.” Tr. 556 (testimony of WRAMC civilian personnel officer).7
3. Appellants’ Participation in the Protest
The magistrate found the “precise extent of [appellants’] . . . participation in the food services’ demonstration [ ] unclear” (J.A. 80), but that they were “active participants,” not “mere bystanders and observ*113ers.” J.A. 81. These were the only findings made by the magistrate on the nature and extent of Pendleton’s and Martin’s participation in the January 29, 1973 protest.
The magistrate stated that the protest in question consisted of a group of employees,8 accompanied by media representatives, converging at noontime on an office of the head of the Food Services Division and spilling over into the hallway adjoining the cafeteria.9 J.A. 80. During the protest a list of grievances was read and the group voiced encouragement to the protestors. No violence or threat of violence occurred.10 J.A. 79-80. Nor apparently, was obscene or abusive language used. Tr. 245.
The protest’s “unprotected” nature, according to the magistrate, stemmed from the fact that it occurred in a military medical facility requiring “less deviance from routine and greater freedom from disruption” (J.A. 84);11 the time and place — noon near the cafeteria (id.);12 its “abnormally vocal” quality (J.A. 80); and the fact that it was done against the specific wishes of the commander. Id.
Nothing in the record requires the conclusion that Pendleton’s and Martin’s attendance at this protest was inconsistent with their EEO counselor roles, given the context of racial tension at WRAMC. Indeed they and other counselors had been present at prior demonstrations, and it would not be an unreasonable reading of their manual to infer that as “bridges” they had special dispensation to attend such meetings in order to fulfill their job of attempting informal resolution of disputes and keeping management informed of employee grievances. This might well be true whether or not the protest — as to other employees — stayed within the uncertain boundaries of “protected activity” under Title VII.13
*114Thus it becomes critical to decide what appellants did at the protest that could be considered inconsistent with their EEO roles, given the background of race relations in which they functioned. A finding of inconsistency with their EEO roles might well depend upon exactly what happened at the meeting and whether appellants’ contribution aggravated or mitigated disruption, helped to build or to burn “bridges.”
The deficiency of the magistrate’s findings on this score has already been noted. My review of the record indicates substantial conflicting evidence in this respect— conflict which should have been and should now be resolved by the trier of fact. Some witnesses testified the two women did nothing more than, or different from, any other participants at the meeting. Tr. 282, 284. Pendleton was accused by a few military observers of making remarks during the meeting dramatically illustrating her sympathy with the protestors.14 The only such evidence as to Martin, however, was that she said “Right on, Sister” (Tr. 320) and, in response to the Food Service Division chief’s reference to employees as “boys” remonstrated: “These are not boys; these are men.” Tr. 200, 320.15 Neither woman appears to have participated in the planning of the protest or in the reading or discussion of the grievances.16 Tr. 607 (testimony of witness present at both planning and holding of protest).
In sum, I do not think a simple finding that two EEO counselors “actively participated” in a peaceful — if noisy — protest during a turbulent period in race relations at the medical complex, without more, renders their conduct unprotected under Title VII’s ban against retaliation for opposition to discriminatory practices and I would remand for more detailed findings about what they did and why it was inconsistent with their EEO counselors’ roles in the context of Walter Reed’s racial troubles in 1973.

. In an earlier order, also appealed here, the district court ruled that the claims of EEO counselors Pendleton and Martin were not “typical" of those of the class they sought to represent and hence the class could not be certified under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Because of the majority’s disposition of the Pendleton and Martin claims on the merits, I do not discuss the class action issue here.

. In my view the magistrate’s failure both to make such particularized findings and to incorporate these findings in the balancing required under § 704(a), Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976), infra, note 13, constitutes error. Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426, 433 (5th Cir. 1977) (district court’s finding of antitrust liability remanded for more specific factual findings) (“ ‘The findings and conclusions we review must be expressed with sufficient particularity to allow us to determine rather than speculate that the law has been correctly applied.’ ”), quoting Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc. v. Tracor/MAS, Inc., 520 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Ring v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (district court’s failure to balance first amendment freedoms of dismissed public employee against asserted governmental interest constitutes error).
I find no error in the factual findings that were made, but in the failure to make the additional or more particularized factual findings necessary to analysis under § 704(a). Such error is not governed by the “clearly erroneous” rules of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2). See Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d at 432-34 (Rule 52(a) requirement that facts be found “specially” distinguished from “clearly erroneous” standard of review applicable to facts found); Servo Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 1968) (remand in view of absence of sufficiently particularized findings in master’s report on which to predicate district court’s judgment).
Error may be noticed and corrected by the district court regardless of the fact of, or timeliness of, objections to a master’s findings. 5A, J. Moore Federal Practice 'i 53.11, 2991 (2d Ed. 1979). In any event the appellees do not argue *110the lack of objection or untimeliness of objections to the findings and conclusions of the special master appointed here. Nor do they contend that the appeal taken to this court was untimely.

. See discussion infra, note 13.

. Prior to January, 1973, Pendleton had been very active in employee grievance activities, including earlier protests inside the hospital complex and meetings between Rep. Fauntroy and hospital officials. She had been selected in the summer of 1972 over 24 other candidates for the chief counselor position despite or even because of her high visibility in bringing employee grievances to management’s attention. As an EEO counselor, she had been officially cited for “outstanding ability to cooperate with others . . . . [She] exercises tact and diplomacy in all her dealings and is respected and admired by her coworkers.” J.A. 77.

. Pendleton herself testified that a major aspect of EEO counseling was to look at the background out of which the complaint came and to try to see if there were any kinds of systematic violations of policy, of regulations, or any suggestions or recommendations that could be made that would insure that this particular problem would not arise again.
Tr. 88.
She said she attended the demonstration in question “for the purpose of observing and also to see what complaints would be raised with regard to employees who were working there.” Tr. 120.
*112Martin testified that her concept of an EEO counselor was “[t]o bring to the attention of management the problems in the areas that the complainants had.” Tr. 196. She continued:
[0]ne of the first things that 1 was told by the EEO office . . . was that anything that concerned the people, the employees at Walter Reed, any meeting that concerned them or any gathering, they knew of, the EEO counselor should attend. And I attended everything I could.
Tr. 199-200.

. Moncrief stated, as part of the EEO investigation resulting from Martin’s dismissal:
I said, Ms. Pendleton, I want you to get back to whoever “they” are, and tell them that I will not tolerate a demonstration or a confrontation that disrupts activities of this installation.
I said you get back to them and tell them that they can have the theatre, out here on the grass, or in any parking lot that they want, but they will not demonstrate in any office and disrupt the mission of this hospital.
I told her once again that you better get back to your colleagues. I am not going to have this, and I am not going to tolerate your participation, because you are an EEO counselor. I am not going to tolerate your participation in this demonstration in any office on this facility.
Opposition of Defendants to Motion for Certification as a Class Action. Ex. II, Ene. 1, Ex. 0 at 7-8.
Colonel Davis, who was present at the Moncrief-Pendleton meeting, testified that Pendleton’s response was that “she would talk with the other counsellors, but she did not know what influence she might have over them. . ” Tr. 445. Pendleton testified that she responded by expressly asking General Moncrief whether he was directing her not to attend the protest and that Moncrief answered in the negative. Tr. 119. She further testified that she offered to make any statement Moncrief wanted her to at the demonstration. Tr. 119. An EEO officer at the WRAMC, also present at the meeting, thought Moncrief had told Pendleton to get in touch with leaders of the demonstration to call it off, and that Pendleton said she could not. Tr. 465. He also thought Moncrief then “told [Pendleton] to contact all counsellors and at least be sure they did not attend, or for them to do what they could to not have it. . Tr. 467. At trial General Moncrief was asked whether he told Pendleton specifically that EEO counselors could not attend the protest. He replied, “I told her to tell anybody that she knew who was going to be in the demonstration that I would not tolerate it.” Tr. 543.

. This was at least in part because management considered appellants’ positions as EEO counselors “temporary.” Id. Speaking of Pendleton, Moncrief testified at Martin’s EEO hearing:
I told her that this being a temporary appointment she should understand that she was in this job as long as she behaved, and as long as she acted as I felt an EEO Counsel- or should.
Ex. 0 supra, note 4 at 5.

. Estimates varied considerably on how large the group was, from 40-50 (Tr. 271) (testimony of an EEO counselor) to around 70. Ex. 0, supra, note 4 at 8 (Moncrief statement).

. Both staff and ambulatory patients are apparently fed in the cafeteria. Tr. 274.

. H. A. Nohsey, a military officer who was present, testified in answer to the following question:
Q And so, as I understand it, the essence of this meeting was that a large group of people came into Colonel Preston’s office, one man read a list of demands and got encouragement from the group, other employees may have made some statements regarding the grievances and then the group dispersed. Is that correct?
A That’s more or less it.
Tr. 360.

. There is no evidence in the record to show what, if any, disruption to the cafeteria’s operations or to patient feeding actually occurred. Tr. 217, 299, 479-81.

. General Moncrief had told Pendleton the protestors could conduct their protest elsewhere than in the vicinity of the cafeteria. The record is not clear whether that offer was made to anyone apart from Pendleton.

. The magistrate here found that the object of the demonstration — “what they perceived as unlawful employment practices” — was presumably legitimate, but the “manner” of the opposition was not. J.A. 81-82. He said appellants had rights as employees and
even as EEO counselors, a right and a duty to express their grievances and it is unrealistic and a far too narrow a reading of the statute to exclude all demonstrations from the Act’s protection or to limit protests to areas of the employer’s choosing.
J.A. 83.
Recognizing that the precise limits of employee self-help “protected” activity were unclear, the court nevertheless apparently found this protest outside those limits, citing, inter alia, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848, 97 S.Ct. 135, 50 L.Ed.2d 121 (1976). J.A. 82-83. As the court in Hochstadt noted:
Neither in its wording nor legislative history does section 704(a) make plain how far Congress meant to immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity when it declared it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter ...”
The statute says no more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any explanation. The proceedings and floor debates over Title VII are similarly unrevealing. Courts are thus left to develop their own interpretation of protected opposition.
545 F.2d at 230 (Citations omitted). Here, as in Hochstadt,
*114it is [not] clear to what extent militant self-help activity . . . such as particular types of on-the-job opposition to alleged discrimination, vociferousness, expressions of hostility to an employer or superior and the like, are protected.
Id. at 231. The balancing test put forth in Hochstadt, which considers “the requirements of the job and the tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting,” id., should also include the history of discrimination in that setting. See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 433 (1976).

. One officer witness claimed that Pendleton told a black chief cook to “get out from behind the desk with the while [sic] folks and come around and stand with the niggers.” Tr. 320. Another said she yelled at one point, “They are killing us in here and they are getting a nigger to do it.” Tr. 365, 370-1. (The same witness also described her conduct as “basically the same as anyone else’s participating in the demonstration." Tr. 365.) Other attendees said she never talked at all. Tr. 282, 284.

. The “men, not boys” and “right on” remarks are the only evidence of Martin’s “active participation” in the record. One officer said she was “participating” because “she was, you know, near the front of the group.” Tr. 346. Another answered:
Q What did you see Helen Martin do?
A Voicing her protest with the rest, the same as the rest of the crowd
THE COURT: What specifically did you see her doing, if anything?
THE WITNESS: Cheering with the rest of the crowd.
Tr. 366.

. Moncrief had apparently little information concerning the extent of Pendleton’s and Martin’s participation in the protest. What the record showed was that Moncrief who was not present heard from another officer, also not present, who heard from one that was present that Pendleton and Martin were there. Tr. 521, 547 (testimony of Moncrief).