Court Opinion

ID: 9895847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:30.050466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:44.408656
License: Public Domain

J-A18035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  LINDSAY M. WHOLAVER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  FRANKLIN T. WHOLAVER, JR.                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1026 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 2020-414-CD

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                       FILED: November 8, 2023

       Franklin T. Wholaver, Jr. (Husband) appeals the contempt order issued

by the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas.             The trial court had

previously directed Husband to list for sale the marital residence, which he co-

owned with Lindsay M. Wholaver (Wife). The court determined that Husband

refused to list the house for sale, and it found him in contempt. On appeal,

Husband challenges the court’s contempt determination and resulting

sanction.    Separately, Husband claims that the certified transcript of the

contempt hearing was inaccurate. 1 We affirm.
____________________________________________

1 Husband timely filed a separate appeal concerning the transcript issue.    See
25 WDA 2023. This Court then issued a Rule to Show Cause, seeking clarity
as to whether the trial court’s transcript ruling constituted a final, appealable
order. Husband explained that, while the transcript issue could be fairly
construed as a subsidiary issue of the contempt decision, he could not have
known about the alleged defective transcript until he obtained it as part of his
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A18035-23

       The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. Wife filed for

divorce in March 2020.           In February 2022, while equitable distribution

litigation was still pending, Wife petitioned for special relief, requesting that

the marital residence be listed for sale. After a hearing, the trial court granted

Wife’s petition and ordered Husband to list the house. See Order of Court,

3/16/22. Relevant to this appeal is the directive that Husband had to contact

Ryen Realty within a week to initiate the process. Any proceeds from the sale

would be held in escrow pending a decision on equitable distribution. Husband

filed for reconsideration, which the court denied.

       Three months later, in June 2022, the parties’ equitable distribution

claims were tried before a hearing officer. At that hearing, where both parties

appeared with counsel, Husband requested that the marital residence be

awarded to him; the hearing officer explained that the trial court’s order

forcing the sale of the residence could not be contradicted. The equitable

distribution was continued for a second day, but in the interim, Wife filed an

____________________________________________

appeal from the contempt ruling. This Court discharged the Rule to Show
Cause and took the matter under advisement.

However, Husband did not file a brief on the transcript docket (25 WDA 2023),
causing this Court to subsequently dismiss the transcript appeal. Only later
did it become apparent that Husband neglected to file a brief on the transcript
docket, because he had already filed a consolidated brief on the instant
contempt docket (1026 WDA 2022). In that brief, Husband addressed both
the contempt issues and the transcript issue. Wife followed suit in her appellee
brief.

Having the benefit of the full appellate procedural history, we conclude that
Husband preserved the transcript claim.

                                           -2-
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emergency petition for civil contempt, wherein she alleged that Husband

refused to comply with the March 2022 order compelling him to list the house

for sale.

      On July 19, 2022, the trial court held a consolidated hearing to resolve

the contempt matter, as well as an ancillary custody issue. After resolving

the custody issue, the court turned to the contempt matter:

            The court:        I’ll consider the record closed with
                              regard to [the custody] issue. What
                              about the other matter? That is the
                              petition   for   civil  contempt   for
                              disobedience of a court order. What do
                              you want to tell me or present in
                              regards to that?

N.T., 7/19/22 (Day 1) at -39-40.

      At that point, Wife’s counsel outlined her case. She began with a brief

overview of the procedural history. Noting Husband’s noncompliance and that

the house had yet to be listed with Ryen Realty, Wife’s counsel explained that

Wife had contacted the company to see if it was waiting on information from

her. Counsel noted that Husband had a history of not following orders, even

after he was told to comply. Counsel added that, not only did Husband fail to

comply with the order, but he actually requested an award of the residence at

the subsequent equitable distribution hearing. Wife’s counsel concluded that

Husband refused to obey the court order, which caused Wife to incur counsel

fees. See id. at 40-41.

                                    -3-
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       After this summary, the trial court asked if Wife’s counsel intended to

submit a proposed bill for legal services – i.e., whether she sought counsel

fees as a remedy. Id. at 41. Wife’s counsel answered in the affirmative, and

the court then said to Husband’s counsel:

          The court:               I am assuming that [Wife’s counsel]
                                   wants this [bill] introduced as an
                                   exhibit, so I believe if you wish that
                                   you do have the right to question her
                                   as to this bill. Do you wish to do so?

          Husband’s counsel: I would, Your Honor, whenever it’s
                             time for me to do so.

          The court:               Let us mark this as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.
                                   I am going to need to take a quick
                                   recess.

          Husband’s counsel: Your Honor, if she is resting,[2] I am
                             going to make a motion to dismiss this
                             petition right away, perhaps even
                             before we go to break if I could, and I
                             could [elicit] as to why?

          The court:               Please do.

Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (footnoted added).

       Husband’s counsel then explained that he was moving for dismissal

because Wife, having rested her case, “failed to establish a right to relief” –

i.e., failed to set forth the prima facie elements of contempt. Id. at 44; see

____________________________________________

2 Husband argues that this is where transcript is defective. According to
Husband, the transcript “intentionally or negligently” omits a passage where
Wife’s counsel indicated, clearly and affirmatively, that she was resting her
case.

                                           -4-
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also Husband’s Brief at 36. After Husband’s oral motion to dismiss, the trial

court stated:

        The court:                 All right. So what we are going
                                   to do --.

        Wife’s counsel:            If you want testimony, Your
                                   Honor, I will gladly do that.

        The court:                 We are going to continue this.
                                   You are going to have to bring
                                   [the] realtor in here. You are
                                   going to have to line up anybody
                                   that you have. If that is the way
                                   that we are going to do it, then
                                   that is the way we are going to
                                   do it. I imagine that you will
                                   then have to amend your
                                   contempt petition to include
                                   further --.

        Wife’s counsel:            Additional fees,   Your   Honor.
                                   Absolutely.

        The court:                 Okay. Let us do this order. [The
                                   court    then     issued     the
                                   continuance   order    on    the
                                   record.]

Id. at 44-45.

     Husband objected to the continuance, which the trial court noted. The

court then presided over the second day of the contempt hearing on August

18, 2022. After hearing evidence and testimony, the court found Husband

was in contempt.     See Order of Court, 3/18/22.      The court sanctioned

Husband by sentencing him to a ten-day period of incarceration. The term

was to begin a few weeks later, on September 16, but the court set a hearing

                                    -5-
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the day before, on September 15, to determine whether Husband purged

himself of the contempt by signing the requisite documentation to list the

residence for sale. Separately, the court sanctioned Husband for his contempt

by ordering Husband to pay Wife’s counsel fees, amounting to $3,015. Id.

      Husband worked with the real estate company to list the house, thereby

purging himself of that aspect of the contempt order, before the term of

incarceration could begin. Husband asked the trial court to stay the counsel

fees provision, which the court granted. Husband then appealed the contempt

order.

      Husband’s counsel alleges that when he received the transcript of the

contempt proceedings, he realized that the transcript did not include the

passage where Wife’s counsel indicated, affirmatively, that she was resting

her case. Husband then filed an objection and subpoenaed the court reporter.

The court held a hearing and solicited briefs from the parties.     The court

reporter testified that she reviewed her notes from the contempt hearing and

that the transcript, as published, was accurate. The court overruled Husband’s

objection to the transcript.   As noted above, Husband then filed a second

appeal regarding the transcript issue.

      Husband sets forth the following nine issues, which we reorder for ease

of disposition:

            1. Did the trial court err by not properly ruling on
               Husband’s Motion to Dismiss after Wife rested her
               case?

                                     -6-
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            2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by making a sua
               sponte ruling objection to continue the hearing and
               allow Wife to reopen her case?

            3. Did the trial court err by not properly ruling on
               Husband’s Objection to filed transcript?

            4. Did the trial court err by not finding the order was
               “clear, definite and specific”?

            5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding a
               violation of its order without proper evidence or
               foundation as to when Husband contacted the realtor?

            6. Did the trial court err by not making proper findings
               to find Husband in contempt?

            7. Did the trial court err by making improper evidentiary
               rulings during the hearing on evidence that pertained
               to “wrongful intent”?

            8. Did the trial court err by awarding an unreasonable
               amount of attorney’s fees as punishment for
               contempt?

            9. Did the trial court err by not finding beyond a
               reasonable doubt that the purge condition of paying
               attorney's fees could be accomplished?

Husband’s Brief at 9-10 (style adjusted).

      Husband’s first three appellate issues concern the allegedly defective

transcript and the trial court’s procedure during the first day of the contempt

hearing. We address these matters contemporaneously. Our analysis begins

by observing the court’s procedure.

      The hearing on July 19, 2022, was a consolidated hearing on both

custody and contempt. At the start of the custody portion of the hearing,

Wife’s counsel asked whether the court would like to proceed by “testimony

or argument.” See N.T., 7/19/22 (Day 1) at 3. The court replied, “If you wish

                                      -7-
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to present testimony, we can do that.” Id.       The court then conducted a

traditional evidentiary hearing. Upon the conclusion of the custody portion,

the court moved onto the contempt matter. However, there was no inquiry

whether counsel should proceed by “testimony or argument.” See supra;

see also id. at 43.    The court simply asked Wife’s counsel: “What do you

want to tell me or present in regards to [the contempt matter]?” Id.

      As we detailed above, Wife’s counsel summarized her allegations and

presented her bill for bringing the contempt matter. Husband then moved to

dismiss, claiming Wife did not prove contempt as a matter of law because Wife

rested her case without introducing testimony or evidence. The court denied

Husband’s motion and continued the contempt matter for a full evidentiary

hearing. On appeal, Husband claims the court’s decision to continue the case

was also an error.

      In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its procedure

regarding its handling of contempt issues:

         This court’s standard procedure is to begin with legal
         argument on the potential issues of the case. Upon Wife’s
         counsel concluding her legal argument, Husband moved to
         have the petition dismissed. However, this court found that,
         in the interest of justice, a dismissal would be inappropriate
         without first allowing Wife to present evidence and
         testimony on her claims of contempt. Thus, the hearing was
         continued so that this Court could rule on the contempt after
         all relevant evidence had been presented.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), at 3-4.

                                        -8-
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      We begin our review by observing that the Rules of Civil Procedure shall

be liberally construed to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every proceeding to which they are applicable.” Pa.R.C.P.

126. “The court at every stage of any action or proceeding may disregard any

error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the

parties.” Id. It is well-settled that trial courts have the broad authority on

this point:

         In all civil litigation, the trial judge possesses broad power
         and discretion to control the course of the trial. See 1
         Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 48:1 (1999 ed.). While
         every litigant is “entitled to a fair and impartial trial, …that
         does not mean that a trial [j]udge must be a ‘mere
         moderator.’” Keating v. Belcher, 119 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa.
         1956). “It is axiomatic that the conduct of a trial is the
         province of the judge.” [His or her] discretion, exercised
         without abuse, must control.” DeFulvio v. Holst, 362 A.2d
         1098, 1099 (Pa. Super. 1976); see also Leasure v. Heller,
         258 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1969) (trial court is allowed wide
         discretion to exercise control over conduct of counsel,
         provided court does not abuse or arbitrarily exercise its
         discretion).

Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

      Not only do we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion,

we also find Husband’s arguments to be disingenuous. The trial court had

broad discretion to control the proceedings as it saw fit. According to Wife, it

is “customary for the trial court to hear contempt petitions by way of legal

argument and attorney proffered evidence.” See Wife’s Brief at 10. Husband

counters that “in a contempt case, where [Husband] could be put in jail, more

than opposing counsel’s word is necessary to render a decision.”            See

                                      -9-
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Husband’s Brief at 35. However, it was apparent that the trial court was only

prepared to proceed by attorney proffered evidence if the parties agreed.

Once the court realized that the contempt issue was not going to be resolved

quickly or amicably without a proper evidentiary hearing, the court continued

the matter to another day. The court’s rulings prejudiced neither party; in

fact, the court explicitly delayed the hearing to afford both parties ample

opportunity to be heard. Regardless of whether Wife’s counsel indicated that

she “rested,” it was clear Wife never began her case-in-chief. Even if the

court’s decision to hear preliminary legal argument was suspect, the court

avoided any potential error by continuing the matter for a full evidentiary

hearing.

      In sum, we conclude that the question of whether Wife’s counsel

“rested” is irrelevant; Husband’s challenge to the accuracy of the transcript is

moot; moreover, the trial court did not err when it denied Husband’s motion

to dismiss, or when it continued the contempt matter for a proper evidentiary

hearing.

      The    remainder     of   Husband’s   appeal    concerns    the   trial   court’s

substantive contempt decision.        To resolve those claims, we observe the

following standard of review:

           This Court’s review of a civil contempt order is limited to a
           determination of whether the trial court abused its
           discretion. If a trial court, in reaching its conclusion,
           overrides or misapplies the law or exercises judgment which
           is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is
           the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by
           the evidence of record, then discretion is abused.

                                        - 10 -
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B.A.W. v. T.L.W., 230 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Thompson

v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 (Pa. Super. 2018), aff’d, 223 A.3d 1272

(Pa. 2020). “In considering an appeal from a contempt order, great reliance

must be placed upon the discretion of the trial judge.” Marian Shop, Inc. v.

Baird, 670 A.2d 671, 673 (Pa. Super. 1996). To that end, we note that the

trial court, sitting as “the factfinder, while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence, is free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence.” See Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d 196, 204 n.3

(Pa. 2022).

      To establish that a party is in civil contempt, there must be proof by a

preponderance of the evidence 1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific

order that he or she is alleged to have disobeyed, 2) that the act that

constituted the contemnor’s violation was volitional, and 3) that the

contemnor acted with wrongful intent. B.A.W., 187 A.3d at 406 (citations

omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court concluded Wife met her burden under each

prong of the contempt analysis.     Husband challenges the court’s findings

under each element.     We discuss them in turn, beginning with his fourth

appellate issue.   Husband argues that the March 2022 order lacked the

requisite specificity to compel his compliance. See Husband’s Brief at 45. The

March 2022 Order provided, in relevant part:

               1. The residence located at [] shall be listed for sale
                  with Ryen Realty immediately.

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               2. [Husband] shall contact Ryen Realty within seven
                  (7) days from [the] date of this Order to initiate the
                  process.

Order of Court, 3/16/22, at ¶¶ 1-2.

      Husband maintains that when Paragraphs 1 and 2 are read together, “it

becomes confusing to a reasonable person what is expected of him to comply

with the order.” See Husband’s Brief at 45. Husband maintains that it was

impossible for him to know what must be done after he contacted the realty

company and under what timeframe. Id.

      The trial court called Husband’s lack-of-specificity argument “ludicrous.”

See T.C.O. at 5. The court doubted that Husband even called Ryen Realty

within seven days, but assuming that he did, it was obvious to the trial court

that Husband did not want to house to be listed. At the hearing, Husband

admitted that he did not know why it mattered if the house was sold through

Ryen Realty. He also said that listing the house was not a “high priority” for

him because he allegedly had offers on the table. Id. at 39.

      After review, we find Husband’s argument specious. As the trial court

noted, Husband did virtually nothing. The court did not find Husband credible.

It was clear that Husband understood what was required of him, and that he

slow-walked the sale, not because the order was ambiguous, but because he

disagreed with the court’s directive. Husband’s fourth issue is without merit.

      Husband’s fifth appellate issue dovetails with his argument that the

order lacked specificity. Specifically, Husband argues that Wife did not prove

he failed to comply with the order, because she did not call anyone from Ryen

                                      - 12 -
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Realty to be a witness. See Husband’s Brief at 43-45. In Husband’s view, the

court’s decision lacked a proper foundation.

      Recall that when the trial court continued the contempt matter for a full

evidentiary hearing, the court stated: “You are going to have to bring [the]

relator in here. You are going to have to line up anybody that you have.” See

N.T. (Day 1), at 44-45. Ultimately, Wife decided to proceed only with her own

testimony and Husband’s testimony.        On appeal, Husband maintains that,

without the testimony from a witness from Ryen Realty, Wife could not prove

that Husband failed contact the real estate company, per the March 2022

order. Alternatively, Husband argues the trial court afforded Wife’s testimony

improper weight. See Husband’s Brief at 45.

      Essentially, Husband askes this Court to re-weigh evidence. However,

such is the purview of the trial court, which sits as the factfinder and passes

upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

Stevenson, 283 A.3d at 204 n.3.      As such, the trial court is free to believe

all, part, or none of the evidence. Id.

      At the hearing, Wife testified that she reached out to Ryen Realty

multiple times after not hearing any updates about the listing. See N.T.,

8/18/22 (Day 2) at 13, 14. She testified that “Ryen Realty did not provide

any sort of information on the residence within their system for me to comply

with.” Id. at 13. Counsel then asked Wife whether any arrangements were

made to have the house listed, based on her conversation with Ryen Realty.

Husband’s counsel objected on grounds of hearsay, and the trial court

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sustained the objection. On cross-examination, Husband’s counsel asked Wife

if she had actual knowledge of whether Husband contacted Ryen Realty. Wife

testified: “Without putting hearsay in as an objection, I am unaware of that

happening, to the best of any knowledge, with the company.” Id. at 21. Wife

stated, however, that she asked Husband on several occasions whether he

contacted Ryen Realty. Husband told Wife to worry about herself. Id. at 14.

Notwithstanding the sustained hearsay objection, Wife was able to testify that

she reached out to the company on multiple occasions, including six weeks

before the hearing, and that the residence was still not listed by the company.

Id. 16.   Meanwhile, Husband testified: “I can’t force Ryen Realty in how

quickly they move. I contacted them. I asked for [a sale agreement to list

the house], and there is nothing more I can do at that end.” Id. at 33.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explicitly found Wife to be

credible. See T.C.O. at 5. In turn, Wife’s testimony served as a sufficient

basis for the court to infer that Husband failed to abide by the March 2022

order. The court ordered Husband to initiate the process in March 2022, and

five months later, at the time of the August 2022 contempt hearing, the house

was not listed. Husband’s fifth issue is without merit.

      Husband’s sixth appellate issue concerns the third prong of the

contempt analysis, namely whether Husband acted with wrongful intent.

Husband argues that the trial court was only concerned with whether he

violated the order, not whether he acted with requisite state of mind. See

Husband’s Brief at 40-43. In other words, Husband argues that the court

                                    - 14 -
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completely skipped the third prong of the contempt analysis.        Contrary to

Husband’s characterization, however, the trial court was clear, both in its

order and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that Wife proved all three elements of

contempt. See T.C.O. at 5; see also N.T. (Day 2) at 40 (“Defendant has

failed and refused to contact Ryen Realty…”).         Thus, the court did not

misapply the law by neglecting the intent element, and this argument fails.

      In his seventh appellate issue, Husband advances a separate challenge

to the trial court’s wrongful intent finding. Husband dresses this contention

as an evidentiary claim. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred when

it prevented him from testifying (and eliciting Wife’s testimony on cross-

examination) about why he did not take more active steps to list the house.

See Husband’s Brief at 42-43.

      To explain, Husband’s position was that, if he failed to exercise diligence

in his communication with Ryen Realty, it was only because he had already

received two offers on the house – one from a friend, and one from a neighbor.

Husband maintains that he wanted to entertain these offers first to avoid

paying a commission to a realtor, thereby maximizing the net profit (or

minimizing the loss) to the marital estate.

      During his cross-examination of Wife, Husband sought to elicit Wife’s

concessions on these points. See generally N.T. (Day 2) at 21-22. Then,

during his direct examination, Husband sought drive the point home. The trial

court entertained these arguments briefly, before ultimately directing

Husband to move on. In the trial court’s view, whether Husband received

                                     - 15 -
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other offers was irrelevant. Id. at 22-23. On appeal, Husband concludes that

this line of questioning was relevant, and the court’s exclusion of the same

constituted an abuse of discretion.

       To resolve this claim, we first recognize that the admission of evidence

is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a

decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its

discretion. Wilson v. Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 514 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted). We reiterate that an abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment, but, inter alia, an exercise of judgment that is manifestly

unreasonable. Id.

       We discern no abuse of discretion for two reasons.           First, it did not

appear to the trial court that Husband had acted in good faith.3 If the offers

were legitimate, Husband could have simply sought the court’s leave to

proceed without Ryen Realty. Husband admitted that he did not take this

course of action. See N.T. (Day 2) at 29-30. Indeed, Wife testified that she

would have been amicable to a sale-by-owner, except that she did not believe

that the offers from Husband’s friend and from the neighbor were real:

          Wife:      It’s not that I refused to accept [the offers], I asked
                     [Husband] a multitude of times, to provide me with
                     an actual offer of sale on the home. I am not going

____________________________________________

3 “If the alleged contemnor is unable to perform and has in good faith
attempted to comply with the court order, contempt is not proven.” In re
Estate of DiSabato, 165 A.3d 987 at 992 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis
original).

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                  to agree to sell a home in a one-sentence message
                  through [a co-parenting app], no. […]

                  If he was sincere on selling the house, yes. I asked
                  for a formal agreement to be provided [to my
                  attorney], and we’d go from there. I never said
                  that I was going to not accept any offer. I actually
                  asked him to proceed to the next step.

Id. at 21-23.

      Five months had elapsed between the March 2022 order directing the

sale and the August contempt hearing. Quite plainly, the trial court did not

believe Husband’s claims that there were actual offers, let alone that a sale-

by-owner was imminent. The court entertained Husband’s position for a while,

but when it told Husband to move on, we cannot say that the court’s ruling

was manifestly unreasonable.

      The second reason we discern no abuse of discretion is more

straightforward. Whether Husband could have received a better price, without

going through Ryen Realty, was no longer the question. On March 16, 2022,

the court issued an order to facilitate the sale of the house as fast as possible

to stop the drain on the marital estate. At that point, Husband had to follow

the court’s process. See Stevenson, 283 A.3d at 205 (“contempt of court is

the obstruction of the court’s orderly process.”). He failed to do so. Husband’s

seventh claim is without merit.

      Husband’s eighth and ninth appellate issues concern the trial court’s

remedy for Husband’s contempt – namely, the imposition of counsel fees as a

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sanction.4     The purpose of awarding counsel fees in this context is “to

reimburse an innocent litigant for the expenses the conduct of an opponent

makes necessary, such as the cost of the contempt hearing, so it can be

coercive and compensatory but it cannot be punitive.” Thomas v. Thomas,

194 A.3d 220, 226 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We review an award

of contempt sanctions in the form of counsel fees for an abuse of discretion.

Id. (citation omitted).

         Husband claims that the trial court’s award of counsel fees was

unreasonable.      See Husband’s Brief at 46.      The total award was $3,015.

Because Wife’s counsel represented during the initial argument that she

charged a flat fee of $2,500, Husband claims that any amount over that was

unreasonable.      Husband also argues that counsel’s fees were inflated, and

that Wife’s counsel never expected her client to pay these extra fees. Husband

calls it “a convenient method to swindle [Husband] out of more money.” Id.

at 47.

         We disagree. The bill from Wife’s counsel appropriately reflects the fact

that the contempt hearing was continued to a second day. Although Husband

cites the brevity of the evidentiary hearing (approximately an hour), the fees

____________________________________________

4 As a preliminary matter, we note that both parties misattribute the source

of the trial court’s award. In their Briefs, the parties cite 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503
(Right of participants to receive counsel fees). However, “[a]n award of
attorney’s fees as a sanction in a civil contempt case is separate an apart from
the statutory provisions for attorney’s fees under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503.”
Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 226 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).

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were not just for the temporal length of the hearing, but also accounted for

preparation of the documents and the hearing, as well as incidental expenses

Wife incurred due to Husband’s failure to initiate the sale process with Ryen

Realty.   Nothing in the record suggests that the award was punitive or

otherwise unreasonable, and thus we discern no abuse of discretion.

      Husband also challenges the award, because the court did not first

establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had the ability to pay the

counsel fees. For support, Husband relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in

Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1977). There, the High Court held

that, to impose civil contempt, the court must be convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt, from the totality of evidence, that the contemnor has the

present ability to comply with the order.     See Barrett, 386 A.2d at 621.

According to Husband, “[s]ince the order, as crafted, could have put

[Husband] in jail until such time as he paid [the award], the trial court had to

have made a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of [Husband’s] present ability

to pay the attorney’s fees.” See Husband’s Brief at 48. According to Husband,

the court erred when it failed to make such findings, either in its order or in

its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Husband’s reliance on Barrett is misplaced. Critically, his argument is

predicated on the assumption that his threatened incarceration was based on

nonpayment of counsel fees. But that was not what the trial court ordered.

Husband only faced incarceration if he did not show that he had listed the

property for sale with Ryen Realty.     See Order of Court, 8/18/22 at ¶4.

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Because Husband did not face imprisonment for the nonpayment of the

counsel fees, the court did not first have to establish, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Husband had the present ability to pay those fees. See Barrett,

386 A.2d at 621. (“Since to condition a person’s avoidance of or release from

imprisonment on his performing acts beyond his power to perform in in effect

to convert a coercive sentence into a penal one without the safeguards of

criminal procedure, we are of the opinion that the stricter evidentiary standard

of the criminal law should apply with regard to the issue of present ability.”);

see generally B.A.W., 230 A.3d at 408.

       In the context of this case, the sanction of fees was compensatory in

nature. Even if the sanction might be construed as coercive in nature, the

sanction could not evolve from coercive to punitive (i.e., penal), because at

least at this point in the litigation, Husband did not face imprisonment if he

failed to pay the fees. 5 Because the heightened standard was not triggered,

Husband’s final claim is without merit.

       In sum:     the trial court did not err when it continued the contempt

matter for a full evidentiary hearing; the accuracy of the transcript was

immaterial, thereby rendering moot the court’s decisions involving the same;

the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined Wife met her burden

and proved all three elements of the contempt analysis; the court’s imposition
____________________________________________

5 Of course, assuming Husband is unable to pay the counsel fee award, he

would have available an affirmative defense if/when Wife seeks further redress
for his subsequent non-compliance. See, e.g., In re Estate of DiSabato,
165 A.3d at 992.

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of counsel fees, as a sanction for contempt was reasonable; because Husband

did not face incarceration upon any nonpayment of fees, the court did not first

have to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Husband had the present

ability to pay the fees.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 11/08/2023

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