Court Opinion

ID: 9584924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:59.118753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:11.802971
License: Public Domain

Judge BECTON
dissenting:
The majority decides the reasonableness of Robert Bradley’s non-payment of support solely upon its review, and acceptance, of the Department of Correction’s finding that Robert Bradley, the respondent, violated a prison regulation which resulted in the loss of his work-release privilege. Specifically, the majority states:
Where, as here, the parent had an opportunity to provide for some portion of the cost of care of the child, and forfeits that opportunity by his or her own misconduct, such parent will not be heard to assert that he or she has no ability or means to contribute to the child’s care and is therefore excused from contributing any amount.
*480Ante, p. 4-5. In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, our courts should not, in my view, summarily accept the Department of Correction’s (or any employer’s) judgment relating to a parent’s ability to remain gainfully employed. A judgment that Bradley failed to comply with prison regulations resulting in the loss of his work-release privilege should not, ipso facto, dispose of the issue before the court — i.e., whether Bradley should be denied his “parental rights.” Neither In Re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 281 S.E. 2d 47 (1981), nor In Re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E. 2d 236 (1981), which the majority cites, mandates that. Realizing that an inmate of a North Carolina correctional facility “ ‘upon being considered for honor grade status, or work release, is not entitled, either under the State or Federal Constitutions, to procedural due process rights,’ ” Goble v. Bounds, 13 N.C. App. 579, 582, 186 S.E. 2d 638, 640 (1972), affirmed 281 N.C. 307, 188 S.E. 2d 347 (1972), and that an employer can terminate an employee for almost any reason, except a constitutionally impermissible reason, I dissent.
No one disputes that Bradley’s interest in retaining his parental rights is substantial. “A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L.Ed. 2d 640, 650, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160 (1981). See also Clark, 303 N.C. at 600, 281 S.E. 2d at 53. That is why “[t]he burden of DSS [the Department of Social Services] on the merits of the petition is a heavy one.” In re Clark, 303 N.C. at 604, 281 S.E. 2d at 55. The burden on DSS to prove facts which would support termination is by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” G.S. 7A-289.30(e).
In this case, there was no testimony at the parental rights termination hearing regarding Bradley’s circumstance in prison, detailing why he was terminated from work-release, or indicating when he would again be eligible for work-release or for parole. The trial court based its decision to terminate Bradley’s parental rights solely on its examination of the records of the Department of Correction which were submitted by DSS. Again, a court should not substitute the judgment of the Department of Correction regarding an inmate’s ability to follow prison regulations for its determination of whether the inmate should retain his parental rights.
*481In my view, the parental rights termination proceeding was inadequate to determine the question presented. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental rights is clearly present when the trial court acts on unexplained Department of Correction records. In this regard I do not believe that the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that Bradley failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care of his minor children.
Bradley’s attorneys, in their brief, aptly expressed my more fundamental difference with the majority by raising the following questions: (1) Was the $801.07 that Bradley contributed while in custody a “reasonable portion” for the time period involved? (2) Because Bradley’s “ability to pay” was contingent upon his ability to retain his work-release status, should the extreme consequence of loss of parental rights befall him for losing such status? (3) If, as a prisoner, Bradley has no earning power at all, should not the “ability to pay” standard mean that he is not required to make any contributions at all until he regains some means of earning money? (4) If Bradley’s prison status were soon to change, (for example, if he were to retain his work-release privilege or be paroled), should not requirements of payment be suspended until an “ability to pay” exists?
Simply put, I believe that the element of “willfulness” has to be read into G.S. 7A-289.32(4); otherwise, the State could terminate the rights of every parent who is fired or whose nonpayment of support for the six-month statutory period is unintentional, inadvertent, or beyond that parent’s control.
In my view, it was error as a matter of law for the trial court to terminate Bradley’s parental rights on the facts of this case. Further, I do not believe the findings by the trial court support the conclusion that Bradley failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care of his minor children. Moreover, at the very least, the trial court failed to apply the Biggers “ability to pay” standard with the “great flexibility” envisioned by our Supreme Court in Clark.
I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the trial court.