Court Opinion

ID: 9926583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 09:12:21.628231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:27.392514
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                     EL PASO, TEXAS

 ESTELLA SOTO MARTINEZ,                           §               No. 08-23-00006-CR

                               Appellant,         §                   Appeal from the

 v.                                               §           120th Judicial District Court

 THE STATE OF TEXAS,                              §             of El Paso County, Texas

                               Appellee.          §               (TC#20190D05626)

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       After hearing evidence presented in the guilt-innocence phase of trial, a jury found

appellant Estella Soto Martinez guilty of misapplication of fiduciary property, theft, and forgery

of a financial instrument. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 32.45(c)(5), 31.03(e)(5), 32.21(d). The

trial court subsequently assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment on the first two offenses,

and two years’ imprisonment on the third offense, with all sentences running concurrently.

Martinez brings four issues on appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND

       By a three-count indictment, Martinez was charged with misapplication of fiduciary

property in the aggregate amount of $30,000 or more but less than $150,000 (Count I), theft of

property in the aggregate amount of $30,000 or more but less than $150,000 (Count II), and forgery
of a financial instrument (Count III). The charges all stem from her employment as a bookkeeper

working for VIBA Transportation (VIBA), a non-emergency medical-transportation company

owned by Roberto Wallace.

       Prior to trial, Martinez filed two motions relevant to this appeal. First, she moved to

generally suppress all evidence the State had planned to introduce at trial, contending the evidence

was obtained without probable cause and without a valid warrant. Second, she moved for a

Daubert/Kelly hearing for expert witnesses who may be called to testify as experts under Rule 702

of the Texas Rules of Evidence. The trial court carried both motions for trial and each were

considered during the State’s presentation of evidence.

       During the guilt-innocence phase, the State presented witness testimony and documentary

evidence. Prior to calling its first witness, the State admitted Viba’s payroll and banking records.

As its first witness, the State called Wallace to testify as the State’s complaining witness. Wallace

hired Martinez to work for his company in October 2015. As a bookkeeper, her duties and

responsibilities included accounts payable and receivable, preparing the company’s payroll, and

performing general matters related to human resources. Regularly, Martinez prepared and

processed the payroll account for the company. Martinez was the only employee authorized by

Wallace to write payroll checks. As far as her training, he testified she was trained by “the person

leaving,” who gave her the “what-to-do’s.” He could not recall the length of her training period.

       Facing financial difficulties, Wallace testified he looked into his company’s business

records in December 2017. In reviewing bank records, he soon noticed two checks were cashed in

the same amount during the same week. When he viewed each check, he saw that Martinez was

listed as payee on both checks. The two-check pattern immediately struck him as odd. Generally,

Martinez averaged 40 hours of work each week, though the exact number of hours varied. For

example, Wallace explained some weeks it could be 40 hours and 10 minutes and other weeks it

                                                 2
could be 39 hours and 50 minutes. Wallace approximated he would pay Martinez about $700 every

two weeks. Employees were never paid once a week. Martinez never asked him for a loan and he

never paid her additional money outside her usual compensation.

       After reviewing his records, Wallace found the same two-check pattern occurred each pay

week beginning after Martinez had been hired by the company. After reviewing cashed checks all

written in the same amount, Wallace printed out a payroll register of checks made payable to

Martinez. After he confirmed the payroll checks had cleared his bank account, he found additional

checks were made payable to her. At that point, Wallace decided not to confront Martinez but

instead reported his concerns to the El Paso Police Department (EPPD). At that point, he decided

to wait and “see if she would do it again.” The next week, he confirmed she repeated the pattern.

       As a second witness, the State called Carlos Ponce, a detective assigned to the financial

crimes division of the of the EPPD. Detective Ponce testified his unit regularly investigated

charges to include embezzlements, forgeries, and identity thefts. He has worked in that capacity

for over 7 years. Ultimately, he was assigned to investigate Wallace’s complaint against Martinez.

In that capacity, he spoke to Wallace frequently as the investigation began. Martinez continued to

work for the company during that time. At a point when Wallace expressed concerns about

continuing to employ Martinez, Detective Ponce ran her name for warrants discovering she had an

outstanding traffic warrant. He and his partner next went to VIBA’s premises. After confirming

Martinez’s identity, and the warrant status, they arrested her. At the scene, they asked her to point

out her purse and keys, which they collected as personal belongings. After transporting Martinez

to police headquarters, Detective Ponce emptied her purse of its contents, checking for items

disallowed from the jail facility. In doing so, he soon found a payroll check in her purse, which

was signed by Wallace and dated two weeks prior.

                                                 3
        Once Detective Ponce showed Wallace the check recovered from Martinez’s purse, he

identified it as a check from his company (State’s Exhibit 3A and 3B).1 Wallace described for the

jury that it was soon discovered that a piece of one check was glued to a separate check. He

identified his signature on State’s Exhibit 3B, which was glued on top of the other check identified

as State’s Exhibit 3A. Wallace identified State’s Exhibit 3A as a check written out to Martinez in

the amount of $642.83, dated January 19, 2018. He confirmed that State’s Exhibit 3A did not

contain his signature.

        Detective Ponce testified their investigation revealed that Wallace’s signature had been

physically overlaid and glued onto the check marked as State’s Exhibit 3A. Detective Ponce

confirmed that State’s Exhibit 3A was not authorized by Wallace. Detective Ponce next obtained

bank records belonging to VIBA and Martinez. From those records, he discovered excessive

deposits made to her account.

        As the State’s third witness, Yvonne Scarpinato testified she was employed by the El Paso

District Attorney’s Office as a forensic accountant. She described her job duties as assisting

prosecutors with reviewing documentation and assisting the office with formatting records for ease

of understanding during trial. Relevant to this case, Scarpinato reviewed records of the case

including bank statements of several of Martinez’s bank accounts, checks issued to her from

VIBA, payroll check registers, and VIBA bank statements. Scarpinato explained she examined the

payroll check registers for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and part of 2018. She noticed that copies

of checks to Martinez were either endorsed as “Estella Soto” or “Estella S. Martinez.”

        Scarpinato explained that she compiled all of Martinez’s payroll checks and W2 forms into

a binder, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 4. As to her findings, Scarpinato testified all the

1
  Martinez had objected on grounds of lack of proper foundation, lack of chain of custody, and hearsay. Overruling
these objections, the trial court admitted the evidence.

                                                        4
payroll checks issued by VIBA had cleared VIBA’s bank account. She found that some of those

checks were deposited into Martinez’s bank account, but some were not. Said differently, she

found all checks issued to Martinez by VIBA had cleared VIBA’s bank account. But not all of

these checks were deposited into Martinez’s bank accounts. Scarpinato explained that, because

they did clear VIBA’s account, a possibility is the checks were not deposited into Martinez’s

accounts, but instead were cashed. Matching the total of payroll checks with Martinez’s W2s,

Scarpinato opined Martinez had been properly paid for each payroll check.

       Scarpinato also assisted in compiling State’s Exhibit 5, a two-volume set of voluminous

bank records previously admitted under State’s Exhibit 1, which she had organized to make the

documents easier to follow and read. State’s Exhibit 5 included copies of additional checks that

had cleared VIBA’s account. Scarpinato testified the “extra checks” were issued by VIBA to

Martinez and represented pay periods for which Martinez had already been paid per her review of

Exhibit 4. She explained she reviewed each check corresponding with each pay period, noting

duplicate checks were found for certain pay periods. In summary, Scarpinato found 61 properly

issued payroll checks and 86 other checks that were not properly issued. Finally, Scarpinato

created a spreadsheet summarizing all checks issued to Martinez to include both authorized payroll

checks and unauthorized checks, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 6. Scarpinato testified that,

over the course of Martinez’s employment with VIBA from October 2015 to 2018, she was paid a

total of $43,457.62 in properly authorized payroll. For that same time period, Scarpinato also

described that Martinez had been paid additional checks deposited to her bank account totalling

$63,435.35.

       After the close of evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts.

Martinez elected to have her punishment assessed by the trial court. After a punishment hearing,

the court sentenced her to ten years’ confinement for Counts I and II, respectively, and two-years’

                                                5
confinement for Count III. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Martinez timely

filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

                                            DISCUSSION

       Martinez presents four issues on appeal, which she briefed in the following order. First,

she asserts the trial court erred when it allowed Yvonne Scarpinato to testify as an expert witness.

Second, she contends the search of Martinez’s purse was unreasonable. Third, she argues the trial

court erred when it modified her proposed jury instruction regarding the admissibility of State’s

Exhibit 3A and 3B, which were found after a search of Martinez’s purse. Lastly, she maintains the

trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial. Following Martinez’s lead, we address the

issues of the appeal as she ordered them.

       A. Expert witness testimony

       In her first issue, Martinez contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the

State to introduce opinion testimony from an expert witness. She urges the witness lacked

qualifications as an expert.

            1. Standard of review and applicable law

       We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert

testimony. See Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. 2019). We will not disturb the trial

court’s ruling if it lies within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Russeau v. State, 291 S.W.3d

426, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably or

arbitrarily without reference to guiding rules or principles. State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Even if expert testimony is erroneously admitted, reversal is warranted

only if the appellant further demonstrates the erroneous admission affected her substantial rights.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

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       A trial court serves as a gatekeeper deciding preliminary challenges to witness

qualifications and evidence admissibility. TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128,

131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In discharging its role, the trial court is vested with the often-difficult

task of determining what is irrelevant or likely to confuse the jury in its decision-making process.

See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Texas Rule of Evidence 702

provides, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 702. To be admissible, the proponent of the expert evidence must

demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the testimony is “sufficiently reliable and

relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results.” Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 335–36

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). To

this end, the proponent must prove: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the testimony is based on a

reliable scientific foundation; and (3) the testimony is relevant to the issues in the case. Wolfe, 509

S.W.3d at 336. “These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and

(3) relevance.” Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131.

            2. Analysis

       Before Scarpinato testified, the trial court conducted a Kelly/Daubert hearing outside the

presence of the jury. Scarpinato described she was currently employed as a forensic accountant for

the District Attorney’s Office. She had been employed in that office for three years. She earned a

bachelor’s degree in accounting from the University of Texas at El Paso. Also, she held a licence

as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), authorized to practice in the State of Texas. She was first

licensed in 2012, and her license has never lapsed. To maintain her CPA license, Scarpinato must

complete a total of 120 hours of continuing education every three years, and a minimum of 20

                                                  7
hours each year. After college, she worked for nine years as an auditor for the United States

Securities and Exchange Commission, nine years as a senior auditor for the Internal Revenue

Service, and nearly six years in private practice preparing tax returns and providing bookkeeping

services.

       Originally, the State offered Scarpinato as a lay witness—not as an expert in forensic

accounting—taking the position that her qualification as an expert was unnecessary based on the

anticipated scope of her testimony. Scarpinato had personal knowledge of the accounting records

and evidence involved in the case. After the Kelly/Daubert hearing, the State changed its position,

offering Scarpinato as an expert in the field of forensic accounting, and accounting generally.

Martinez objected, asserting the issues of the case did not require expert testimony. Moreover, she

urged there was “a danger of both reliability and relevance” in regard to Scarpinato’s testimony.

Martinez further argued Scarpinato’s testimony required no expertise and the State had not elicited

any opinion testimony.

       The trial court found that Scarpinato qualified as an expert as a forensic accountant. The

court noted it would be helpful to the jury to have Scarpinato’s summarization of her findings after

her review of the voluminous records of the case. Additionally, the trial court found that

Scarpinato’s testimony would be “highly relevant.” After Martinez asked for a ruling on reliability,

the court responded it had also found her testimony reliable. Once Scarpinato appeared before the

jury, Martinez renewed her objection as “improper 702 evidence.”

       On appeal, Martinez asserts Scarpinato was not qualified to testify as an expert. She urges

she did not consult with an expert in the field, she never previously testified as an expert, and she

did not have any specific training as a forensic accountant.

       The State responds the issue is unpreserved as Martinez failed to object on the grounds of

qualification. Rather, it claims Martinez only objected to relevance and reliability. This Court has

                                                 8
held that an expert’s qualifications, reliability, and relevance raise distinct questions and issues,

and an objection based on one requirement does not preserve error as to another. See Martinez v.

State, No. 08-17-00165-CR, 2019 WL 4127261, at *14 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 30, 2019, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (citing Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 645, 655–56

(Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)); see also Urquhart v. State, 128 S.W.3d 701,

706 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.). Assuming without deciding whether

Martinez preserved error on qualification as an expert, we nonetheless conclude her argument still

fails.

         First, Martinez cites no authority suggesting that an expert witness must have testified as

an expert previously or must have consulted another expert before qualifying as an expert witness

in a case. Second, Scarpinato testified she was a licensed CPA since 2012 and had been employed

as a forensic accountant for the previous three years. She further testified that, before practicing

forensic accounting, she was employed as an auditor for 18 years and she used the same skills as

an auditor as she did as a forensic accountant. Scarpinato was able to compile and explain the

numerous bank records and show how she reached her sum of authorized and unauthorized payroll

checks. From our record, there is no indication that Scarpinato’s education, training, and

experience were too limited or otherwise inadequate for her to qualify as an expert in forensic

accounting. Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Rhomer v. State, 569

S.W.3d 664, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

         Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Scarpinato’s testimony. We overrule Martinez’s first issue.

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       B. Motion to Suppress

       In her second issue, Martinez contends the trial court erred when it denied her motion to

suppress evidence found in her purse. She argues the State’s search of her purse was unreasonable

and not performed in accord with EPPD’s procedures.

            1. Standard of review and applicable law

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Martinez

v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In doing so, we must view the record in

the light most favorable to the trial court’s conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it falls

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. (citing State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We apply “a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference

to a trial court’s determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon

the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and

mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Id. at 922–23. Moreover, when

no findings of fact are obtained or provided, we assume the trial court made implicit findings of

fact that support its decision so long as those findings are supported by the record. Montanez v.

State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

       The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides for “the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; Igboji v. State, 666 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

“Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be accomplished pursuant

to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be

searched or seized.” Igboji, 666 S.W.3d at 613. “[A] warrantless search or seizure is per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception to the

warrant requirement.” Id. Once a defendant has shown that a warrantless search or seizure has

                                                 10
occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove an exception to the warrant requirement applies.

Id.

       As relevant here, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the search-incident-

to-arrest exception contains two distinct propositions: “The first is that a search may be made of

the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made

of the area within the control of the arrestee.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).

Under the second type of search incident to arrest exception, searches of the person, or of property

within the immediate control of the person, are always justified upon no more justification than

the arrest itself. Id. at 235. The Court of Criminal Appeals has recently held that:

       [when] an arrestee is in actual possession of a receptacle at the time of, or
       reasonably contemporaneously to, his custodial arrest, and that receptacle must
       inevitably accompany him into custody, a warrantless search of that receptacle at
       or near the time of the arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search
       incident to the arrestee’s person. Such a search requires no greater justification than
       the fact of the lawful arrest itself.

Price v. State, 662 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

             2. Analysis

       Prior to trial, Martinez filed a motion requesting suppression of all evidence the State

planned on introducing at trial because it was obtained without probable cause and without a valid

warrant. During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Detective Ponce began testifying in front of the

jury on his investigation. Martinez soon requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury, which

the court granted.

       Detective Ponce continued describing that “white collar” crimes typically take a while to

investigate, but Wallace was dissatisfied with their pace. For this reason, Detective Ponce decided

to run Martinez for warrants, resulting in his discovery of an outstanding traffic warrant. Once he

and Detective Hicks confirmed she remained employed by VIBA, they went to the company’s

                                                 11
office. When they walked in, Ponce obtained positive identification of Martinez. Detective Hicks

placed Martinez under arrest for the traffic warrant. Ponce testified that, at that point, Martinez

was not under arrest for any alleged thefts. Ponce’s partner conducted a pat-down and proceeded

to collect her belongings, including her purse. They transported Martinez to headquarters. Once at

headquarters, Detective Ponce emptied Martinez’s purse as an inventory search incident to arrest.

While searching the purse, Ponce discovered a payroll check with Wallace’s signature. Ponce

testified he did not read Martinez her Miranda warnings at any point. Ponce asked Martinez about

the check and she confirmed it was her paycheck. Ponce asked her why she had a payroll check

two weeks after she got paid. Martinez responded that she had done a mobile deposit. Ponce asked

her why she did not shred the check, but she did not respond. Ponce then told her he wanted to ask

her about an incident that occurred at work and Martinez said she wanted to talk to an attorney.

Ponce testified he did not ask her anything else. He then completed paperwork and transported her

to the county jail.

        Martinez asked the trial court to suppress the check found in her purse, previously admitted

as State’s Exhibit 3A and 3B, because the search was conducted without a warrant. 2 The State

responded by asserting that the search of Martinez’s purse was justified as an inventory search or,

in the alternative, as a search incident to arrest. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

found the search of the purse valid as a search incident to arrest.

        On appeal, Martinez asserts that Detective Ponce testified he did not know the EPPD

inventory policy, and he merely used the ruse of an inventory search to find evidence on a case

that he had not yet done work on. In opposing, the State argued that Detective Ponce’s search of

2
 Martinez also argued that statements made when she was under arrest should be suppressed because she was not
Mirandized. The trial court agreed and suppressed the statements. This is not an issue on appeal.

                                                     12
the purse was justified because it was a search-incident-to-arrest. The State also argued, in the

alternative, that the search also qualified under the inventory search exception.

       Because we may uphold the trial court’s ruling on any ground that would support the

court’s order, we need not address whether Ponce sufficiently knew the inventory policy and if the

search qualified as a valid inventory search. See Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). When “an arrestee is in actual possession of a receptacle at the time of, or reasonably

contemporaneously to, his custodial arrest, and that receptacle must inevitably accompany him

into custody, a warrantless search of that receptacle at or near the time of the arrest is reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to the arrestee’s person.” Price, 662 S.W.3d at

438. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that no greater justification is needed than the lawful

arrest itself. Id. Martinez does not challenge the legality of the underlying arrest. See id.; Stewart,

611 S.W.2d at 437. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that the officers conducted a lawful search incident to arrest. See Stewart, 611 S.W.2d at 437.

       For this reason, we overrule Martinez’s second issue.

       C. Jury charge error

       In Martinez’s third issue, she asserts the trial court abused its discretion regarding the jury

charge because it did not include her requested language.

            1. Standard of review and applicable law

       We review jury-charge error claims under a two-step process to determine whether error

occurred, and, if so, whether appellant was sufficiently harmed to warrant reversal. Kirsch v. State,

357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If appellant objects, she is entitled to reversal if, on

the record as a whole, the error was sufficient to cause her some harm. Almanza v. State, 686

S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).

                                                  13
       A defendant’s right to the submission of an Article 38.32 jury instruction “is limited to

disputed issues of fact that are material to [her] claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that

would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). Article 38.23 provides:

       No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
       of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of
       the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on
       the trial of any criminal case.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.23(a). Before a defendant is entitled to the submission of a

jury instruction under Article 38.23(a), she must satisfy three requirements:

       (1) The evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact;

       (2) The evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and

       (3) That contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged
       conduct in obtaining the evidence.

Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 510. “If there is no disputed factual issue, the legality of the conduct is

determined by the trial judge alone, as a question of law.” Id. If non-disputed facts are sufficient

to support the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then the disputed fact issue is not submitted

to the jury because it is not material to the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. Id.

             2. Analysis

       During the charge conference, the State requested the trial court remove the Article 38.23

instruction concerning the exhibits showing the check obtained from Martinez’s purse. The State

argued that there was no disputed fact issue for the jury to resolve and, therefore, the instruction

was not necessary. In response, Martinez asserted the evidence that Detective Ponce “was there

for the traffic warrant” but that he was also “there at the behest of Mr. Wallace” constituted a

factual dispute for the jury’s resolution. Martinez contended that she wanted an addition that the

jury could disregard “any testimony pertaining” to the exhibits. The trial court concluded that “if

                                                  14
the jury finds that it’s in violation of any Constitutional law, state or U.S., then it can disregard the

evidence.” It then read what the instruction would state:

        Regarding State’s Exhibit 3A and 3B, if you believe or have a reasonable doubt,
        that this evidence was obtained in violation of any provision of the Constitution or
        laws of the State of Texas or the Constitution or law of the United States of
        America, then the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.

Martinez did not lodge an objection or submit a proposed instruction.

        On appeal, Martinez asserts the trial court erred because it did not include an Article 38.23

instruction in the form she had requested. Specifically, Martinez asserts she requested a jury

instruction stating as follows:

        Now before you consider the testimony of Detective Carlos Ponce concerning
        State’s Exhibit 3A and 3B taken from Estella Soto Martinez, you must first find
        beyond a reasonable doubt from Detective Carlos Ponce’s testimony regarding his
        execution of a traffic warrant that Detective Carlos Ponce had probable cause to
        believe and did believe that Estella Soto Martinez was under arrest for the traffic
        warrant and Detective Ponce conducted the search subject to that warrant and after
        arresting Estella Soto Martinez for that warrant, and if you do not so find beyond a
        reasonable doubt, you will disregard such testimony and evidence.

Our record does not show that Martinez presented this language to the trial court. In fact, the first

mention of the proposed instruction is in Martinez’s motion for new trial. Martinez asserts the

language the trial court approved was insufficient to instruct the jury on an essential issue of fact

and how the jury should resolve it as exclusive factfinders of the case.

        Here, the record shows the trial court did include an Article 38.23 instruction, over the

State’s objection. From our review of the record, Martinez received the relief she requested.

Martinez provides no authority in support of her complaint that the instruction was not specific

enough. Moreover, the record does not support Martinez’s claim that she submitted a proposed

instruction with different language included.

        For this reason, we overrule Martinez’s third issue.

                                                   15
       D. Motion for new trial

       In her final issue, Martinez asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion new trial.

             1. Standard of review

       A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for new trial is generally reviewed for an

abuse of discretion, subject to reversal only when such ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. See

Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

              2. Analysis

       In support of her fourth issue, Martinez asserts that due to the voluminous amount of

evidence, her trial counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare for trial and was forced to argue

her motion to suppress and Kelly/Daubert hearing during the trial. Martinez contends this had a

negative effect on her trial counsel’s ability to effectively represent her. The State asserts Martinez

failed to preserve error in her fourth issue because her claim on appeal does not comport with any

ground in her new-trial motion.

       After trial, Martinez filed her motion for new trial challenging the trial court’s rulings on a

challenge for cause of a potential juror, the expert testimony, the suppression motion, and the

denial of the requested jury instruction. Martinez’s motion did not contain any complaint on trial

counsel’s lack of adequate time to prepare for trial, a complaint regarding ineffective assistance of

counsel, or a complaint that the trial court denied a motion for continuance. Additionally, Martinez

did not request a hearing on her motion for new trial.

       Any complaint regarding her trial counsel’s performance or inadequate time to prepare for

trial was not raised by objection at the time of trial or in Martinez’s motion for new trial. We

conclude this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Routier

v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (argument on appeal differs from objection

at trial); McCarley v. State, 763 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.)

                                                  16
(argument on appeal differs from ground in motion for new trial). To the extent we could consider

Martinez’s complaints as raised for the first time on appeal, we otherwise determine she waives

any error as she does not support her argument with any citations to authority or does she

adequately develop her argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

       Accordingly, we overrule Martinez’s fourth issue.

                                         CONCLUSION
       We affirm.

                                             GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

January 23, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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