Court Opinion

ID: 9352042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 19:00:19.876944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:49.049105
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20565    Document: 00516596932         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/04/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                       January 4, 2023
                                 No. 21-20565                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Douglas Petersen, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of
   Brian Petersen; Pamela Petersen, Individually, and as Administrator of
   the Estate of Brian Petersen,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                     versus

   Bridgitt Johnson, EMT; Wellpath Recovery Solutions,
   L.L.C.; Southwest Correctional Medical Group,
   Incorporated; City of Conroe, Texas; Darrick Terrail
   Dunn,

                                                      Defendants—Appellees.

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 4:20-CV-4243

   Before Higginbotham, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
         Brian Petersen was caught in a sting operation conducted by the
   Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force for the City of Conroe, Texas.
   Via a dating app, Petersen agreed to meet up with a 14-year-old boy—who
   was actually Darrick Dunn, an undercover Task Force detective. After
   circling the meeting spot for two hours, all the while communicating with
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   Dunn via the dating app, Petersen was arrested and later charged with online
   solicitation of a minor. He posted bail and was released.
           Two days later, Petersen committed suicide by carbon monoxide
   poisoning. Thereafter, his parents sued numerous defendants in a § 1983
   lawsuit alleging claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, municipal
   liability, and state law negligence claims. The district court granted the
   defendants’ motions to dismiss. We affirm.
                                               I.
           Dunn is a detective employed by the City of Conroe assigned to the
   Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. In July 2019, the Task Force
   conducted a sting operation to apprehend sexual predators on the prominent
   dating application “Grindr.”             As part of the operation, Dunn went
   undercover using the Grindr profile name “Fresh Meat.”
           On July 31, Dunn received a message from a profile registered to
   Petersen, a 39-year-old teacher working in Conroe. The exchange began as
   follows: 1
           Petersen:        How’s your week going?
                            Are you looking for something tonight?
                            And yes, I can host.
           Dunn:            You into younger boys

           1
             Dunn and the City of Conroe attached the Grindr chat to their motions to dismiss.
   Generally, “the factual information to which the court addresses its [Rule 12(b)(6)] inquiry
   is limited to the (1) the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the
   complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of
   Evidence 201.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019).
   But “[w]hen a defendant attaches documents to its motion that are referred to in the
   complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claims, the court may also properly consider
   those documents.” Id.

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          Petersen:      What?
                         Age?
                         ?
                         You there?
          Dunn:          I’m here.. under 18
          Petersen:      There’s a lot so wriggle room in that.
          Dunn:          Lol.. r u into younger boys
          Petersen:      I’m into guys who are interesting. I’m not
                         particularly into younger guys, but I don’t write
                         them off either.
          Dunn:          [Sends Picture]
          Petersen:      Lol How old though?
          Dunn:          Well I’m young just letting you know.. but I’m
                         fun and cool
          Petersen:      How old?
                         You look fun and cool. I just need info to make a
                         choice.
                         ?
                         I can host.
          Dunn:          U free tomorrow
          Petersen:      Maybe. It depends on if you give me information.
          Dunn:          What information
          Petersen:      First off, age.
                         Then maybe a few questions after that.
          Dunn:          I’m 14
   After some further back and forth, Dunn told Petersen that he was going to
   bed.

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         The next day, August 1, 2019, Dunn and Petersen continued their
   conversation:
         Petersen:       What sexual experience do you have?
         Dunn:           I been with 2 guys before if that’s what yur asking
         Petersen:       Yeah. So you know how to take it?
                         When are you available and for how long?
         Dunn:           Of course… I’m free today from 1-10pm… my
                         mom will be working
         Petersen:       Where would I pick you up?
          Dunn:          My apartment… where will we go??
         Petersen:       My house.
   After tentatively agreeing to meet at 2 p.m., Petersen asked Dunn for a
   “shirtless pic” and a voice message. Dunn sent a non-shirtless picture of the
   same individual as before. He also sent a 13-second voice message, to which
   Petersen responded: “Lol Your voice is not what I was expecting.” Petersen
   declined to send his own picture, explaining that “[t]he age differential
   makes sending a picture very risky.” Dunn expressed hesitancy over the
   purpose and location of their meeting, to which Petersen responded, “I
   understand if you want to not meet.” Petersen said he “generally only me[]t
   with guys 25+,” and that he was nervous too. Rather than go to his house,
   Petersen suggested they “talk for a bit. I drop you back off. Then we talk on
   here to see if we want to continue anything today.”
          At 2 p.m., Petersen told Dunn to head over to the Sonic Drive-In near
   Dunn’s apartment.       Over the next two hours, Petersen detailed his
   whereabouts:
          Petersen:      Are you at the entrance of sonic?
          Dunn:          Not yet.

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                        ...
         Petersen:      I will circle once.
                        Are you close?
                        Or there?
                        Starting my circle.
         Dunn:          Walking there now
         Petersen:      You are just now starting to walk?
         Dunn:          I’m out of the apartments
         Petersen:      Tell me when you’re there and I’ll start driving
                        back
         Dunn:          Ok. . and what do I look for, a car.. truck.. van??
                        [emoji]
         Petersen:      Almost there
         Dunn:          Where do I go
         Petersen:      Entrance to sonic
                        Side entrance near the apartments
         Dunn:          Side entrance to what
         Petersen:      Sonic
                        Sorry lots of traffic
         Dunn:          it’s hot.. I’m gonna stand inside a restaurant and
                        wait
         Petersen:      Outside next to the sign. I’ve been sitting in my
                        car forever. You can stand outside fo[r] a couple
                        minutes
                        Entrance sign
                        About to turn. Are you there?
         Dunn:          I’m at the first financial building across from
                        sonic

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                         Should I walk to sonic??
          Petersen:      Yes please
          Dunn:          Ok which entrance?
          Petersen:      Side near the apartments
          Dunn:          Lots of cars here
          Petersen:      Go out by where the cars enter and exists [sic]
                         next to the street
          Dunn:          ‘This is too much.. what you driving??
                         [emoji]
          Petersen:      Are you there?
          Dunn:          Yes.
   According to Dunn’s incident report, which was attached to the second
   amended complaint, “[d]etectives observed a male sitting alone in a silver
   passenger car across from the Sonic. The driver drove to the Sonic parking
   lot and back . . . several times,” which “led [detectives] to believe the driver
   was possibly Petersen.” Dunn and the other detectives stopped the driver,
   starting the chain of events that precipitated this action.
          The second amended complaint alleges that during the stop, “Dunn
   took, without a search warrant, [Petersen’s] phone from him without
   [Petersen’s] permission and accessed the text messages and other
   information therein.” Dunn’s incident report somewhat consistently states:
   “I got the driver’s cellphone and located the ‘Grindr’ app displayed. The
   conversation between Petersen and I [sic] was also displayed on the app,
   which helped us positively identify Petersen as my suspect.”
          Dunn arrested Petersen and charged him with online solicitation of a
   minor, a second-degree felony. Petersen was transported to the Montgomery
   County jail and booked. According to the second amended complaint,
   Petersen experienced “a very high level of anxiety, fear, depression,

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   hopelessness, thoughts of suicide, and other great mental anguish”
   immediately following the arrest.
          Southwest Correctional Medical Group, Inc. and Wellpath Recovery
   Solutions, LLC provided contractual mental health and medical care services
   at the Montgomery County jail.           EMT Bridgitt Johnson worked for
   Southwest and Wellpath at the jail. 2 Upon Petersen’s arrival, Johnson
   screened him and had him fill out a suicide prevention form. No other
   medical professional evaluated Petersen, and no further care was provided.
          Petersen posted bail and was released from custody the next day. He
   committed suicide two days later. In his suicide note, attached to the second
   amended complaint, Petersen stated that he believed he “wasn’t going to
   meet a teen,” but rather an “adult” engaging in “age play.”
          On December 14, 2020, Petersen’s parents, Douglas and Pamela
   Petersen, acting individually and as the administrators of Petersen’s estate,
   sued the Wellpath Defendants in the Southern District of Texas. They
   sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that the Wellpath
   Defendants violated Petersen’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
   process. They also sought relief under Texas state law theories of medical
   negligence and gross negligence.
          In February 2021, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding
   Montgomery County as a defendant. Montgomery County and the Wellpath
   Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the Wellpath Defendants
   but did not rule on Montgomery County’s motion. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs
   filed a second amended complaint, asserting claims against Dunn in his

          2
             Unless otherwise specifically noted, Southwest, Wellpath, and Johnson are
   hereafter collectively referenced as the “Wellpath Defendants.”

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   personal capacity and the City of Conroe under §§ 1983 and 1985, and
   seeking wrongful death damages. They alleged that Dunn, with the City’s
   oversight and approval, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
   “because of his false arrest, malicious prosecution, and illegal search of
   [Petersen’s] phone.”
           Dunn, the City of Conroe, and Montgomery County each filed Rule
   12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. Dunn sought
   dismissal of “all or, alternatively, part of [the] Plaintiffs’ action against him
   on the ground of qualified immunity.” Otherwise, both Dunn and the City
   argued that the Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint failed to state a
   plausible claim for relief. On October 5, 2021, the district court granted the
   defendants’ motions. The Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s
   order, as well the court’s prior order dismissing the Wellpath Defendants. 3
                                               II.
           We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. In
   re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). “To
   survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
   matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
   face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
   Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
   the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
   reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
   Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
   of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

           3
               While Montgomery County is named in the briefs, no section addresses the
   Plaintiffs’ claims against the County. The Plaintiffs therefore abandoned these claims on
   appeal, see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); they
   later filed an unopposed motion to dismiss Montgomery County, which this court granted.

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   suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “We may affirm a district
   court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on any grounds raised below and supported
   by the record.” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007).
                                             III.
           We first address the Plaintiffs’ claims against Dunn and the City of
   Conroe. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation
   of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
   show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
   color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Plaintiffs
   assert that they stated plausible claims against Dunn for (A) false arrest and
   illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and (B) malicious prosecution
   under the Fourteenth Amendment, and against the City of Conroe for
   (C) municipal liability. For these alleged violations, the Plaintiffs seek
   wrongful death damages. 4
                                              A.
           “Qualified immunity protects government officials” like Dunn “from
   civil liability in their individual capacity to the extent that their conduct does
   not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Cass v. City
   of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). “A plaintiff
   seeking to overcome qualified immunity must show: ‘(1) that the official
   violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
   established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
   al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Once qualified immunity is raised, “the

           4
             The Plaintiffs do not appear to have alleged wrongful death as a separate claim,
   aside from seeking damages on that theory.

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   burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the
   defense.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009).
          The Plaintiffs contend that Dunn is not entitled to qualified immunity
   because he violated Petersen’s clearly established constitutional rights by
   arresting him without a warrant and without probable cause. But their
   contention falters because Dunn had probable cause to arrest Petersen and
   did not violate any clearly established constitutional right in doing so.
          In the false arrest context, qualified immunity will apply “if a
   reasonable officer could have concluded that there was probable cause upon
   the facts then available to him.” Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir.
   2001); see Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204. “Probable cause justifying an arrest
   ‘means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are
   sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
   believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
   committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Hogan v. Cunningham, 722
   F.3d 725, 731 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37
   (1979)). Actual probable cause is not necessary; merely arguable probable
   cause is sufficient to trigger qualified immunity. Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 207
   (“[P]laintiffs must allege facts permitting an inference that defendants lacked
   arguable (that is, reasonable but mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.”);
   see also D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018). Defeating qualified
   immunity is thus “a significant hurdle.” Brown, 243 F.3d at 190. Here, the
   Plaintiffs ultimately fail to clear it.
          Petersen was arrested for online solicitation of a minor in violation of
   Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(c). Section 33.021(c) provides that:
          A person commits an offense if the person, over the
          Internet . . . knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person,
          including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage

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          in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual
          intercourse with the actor or another person.
   The statute defines a “minor” as “an individual who is younger than 17 years
   of age; or an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years
   of age.” Id. § 33.021(a)(1). “[T]he gravamen of the offense . . . is the
   knowing solicitation of a minor to meet a person, with the intent that the
   minor will engage in some form of sexual contact with that person.” Ex Parte
   Zavala, 421 S.W.3d 227, 231–32 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d).
   Texas courts have held that the crime “is committed, and is completed, at
   the time of the request, i.e., the solicitation.” Id. at 232. Accordingly, “[t]he
   requisite intent arises within the conduct of soliciting the minor, and must
   exist at the time of the prohibited conduct of solicitation.” Id.
          The operative question is thus whether a reasonable person knowing
   the facts and circumstances available to Dunn would have believed that
   Petersen knowingly solicited a person he thought was a minor with the intent
   that the minor engage in sexual contact with Petersen. The Plaintiffs
   maintain that the answer is no, for two reasons. First, they contend that no
   reasonable person would have believed that Petersen thought he was
   communicating with someone he believed to be under the age of 17. They
   reassert their complaint allegations that the images Dunn sent of “a so-called
   ‘14-year-old’” were “taken many years prior to the text exchange between
   [Petersen] and Dunn”; that “Dunn left a 13-second voice [message]
   contain[ing] the voice of an obviously much older man than a 14-year-old”;
   and that the context of the Grindr exchange clearly showed that Petersen
   believed he was speaking with “someone engaging in ‘age play.’”
          The district court rejected this argument, correctly concluding that
   “Petersen’s subjective belief about Dunn’s real age is immaterial to the
   probable cause analysis.” That analysis instead turns on the belief of a
   reasonable person in Dunn’s position, knowing the facts and circumstances

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   available to Dunn at the time of Petersen’s arrest. And based on the Grindr
   exchange, a reasonable officer could have believed that Petersen was
   communicating with someone who Petersen believed was under 17. Dunn
   described himself (as the Grindr user “Fresh Meat”) as a 14-year-old boy on
   three separate exchanges with Petersen and indicated that he had just started
   school at Conroe High. And Petersen repeatedly made comments consistent
   with a belief that Dunn was underage. For example, Petersen stated: “I can’t
   [send a picture]. The age differential makes sending a picture very risky.”
   He also referenced “back to school shopping,” and explained that he knew
   “a lot of people” at Conroe High, including “nephews [Dunn’s] age that are
   involved in a lot.” Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ argument, the Grindr chat
   amply supports a reasonable belief that Petersen thought he was
   communicating with a 14-year-old boy.
          Second, the Plaintiffs assert that “a reasonable person would not
   believe that [Petersen] was speaking with Dunn with the requisite intent to
   engage in sexual [contact].” The record also belies this assertion. Early in
   the conversation, after Dunn stated he was 14, Petersen asked “What sexual
   experience do you have?” Once Dunn indicated he had “been with 2 guys,”
   Petersen asked, “So you know how to take it?” Petersen then followed up
   with “When are you available and for how long?” They agreed that Petersen
   would pick Dunn up near “[t]he Park Apartments” and that they would go
   to Petersen’s house. But as Petersen neared the pickup spot, Dunn indicated
   he was “nervous.” Petersen said, “I understand if you want to not meet.”
   He then clarified “we won’t go to my place. You come to me. We talk for a
   bit. I drop you back off. Then we talk on here to see if we want to continue
   anything today.”
          After Petersen drove near the Sonic “for over an hour,” Dunn
   eventually agreed to meet, saying “we can just talk for a [bi]t.” Petersen then
   headed to the Sonic, offering to “circle once” while Dunn walked over.

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   Their conversation continued, with Petersen detailing his location and
   movements. Petersen messaged Dunn when he arrived, saying he was at the
   “[s]ide entrance near the apartments” and “[o]utside next to the sign.”
   When Dunn still did not show, Petersen complained that he had “been sitting
   in [his] car for forever,” repeated his location, and gave instructions for
   finding his car. The detectives stopped Petersen and arrested him near the
   agreed pickup spot.
          The Plaintiffs assert that, given Dunn and Petersen’s eventual
   agreement to meet in public and “just talk,” no reasonable person could have
   concluded that Petersen intended for Dunn to engage in sexual contact. But
   their assertion fails under Texas law because “[t]he crime of soliciting a
   minor on the internet under section 33.021(c) is completed at the time of the
   internet solicitation . . . .” Ganung v. State, 502 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex.
   App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.). Because the actor’s intent is adjudged at the
   time of the solicitation, “it does not matter what happens after the
   solicitation occurs [or] whether the solicited meeting actually occurs.” Id.
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Here, Dunn had probable cause to believe that Petersen committed
   the offense once Petersen asked Dunn about his availability and the parties
   tentatively agreed to go to Petersen’s house. By that point, the parties had
   been communicating on an online dating site; Dunn had indicated he was 14;
   and Petersen had asked about Dunn’s sexual experience and whether Dunn
   “kn[e]w how to take it.” Their eventual hesitancy does not matter—the
   online solicitation had already occurred. See id. (explaining the crime occurs
   at the time of the online solicitation). Given this background, a reasonable
   officer could have concluded that Petersen asked to meet with the intent to
   engage in sexual contact with “Fresh Meat.” We therefore agree with the
   district court that—at the very least—arguable probable cause existed to
   arrest Petersen. The false arrest claim was thus properly dismissed.

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          And this is so regardless of the alleged improper search and seizure of
   Petersen’s phone. According to the Plaintiffs, “probable cause did not exist
   for the only crime of which [Petersen] could have been guilty (online
   solicitation of a minor), thus the seizure” of the phone was “illegal along with
   the arrest absent probable cause.” The Plaintiffs are incorrect because, as
   just explained, probable cause already existed for Petersen’s arrest
   irrespective of the phone’s seizure.
          As for the alleged search of the phone, the Plaintiffs assert that
   Petersen was only identified as a “possibl[e]” suspect for the crime; Dunn
   had to search the phone to confirm Petersen’s identity. But this is belied by
   the same record that substantiates probable cause. As detailed above, Dunn
   had more than enough information to identify Petersen, including his play-
   by-play movements around the agreed rendezvous point, before the putative
   search occurred. Any evidence obtained by the search—regardless of its
   legality—was therefore immaterial to Petersen’s arrest. See Henderson v.
   United States, 405 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (describing a
   situation where probable cause for an arrest existed independently of the
   fruits of the search at issue). Moreover, the Plaintiffs failed to allege any
   injury that resulted from the search apart from the arrest, or request any
   damages not tied to the arrest itself. See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290
   (5th Cir. 2005) (“Section 1983 does require a showing of proximate
   causation[.]”); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308
   (1986) (“[T]he abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis
   for § 1983 damages.”). The district court therefore correctly dismissed the
   Plaintiffs’ illegal search and seizure claims.
                                          B.
          The Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim likewise fails.         The
   Plaintiffs alleged that “Dunn charged [Petersen] with a second-degree felony

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   even though, if Dunn is to be believed about telling [Petersen] he was 14,
   [Petersen] could only be charged with a third-degree felony.” The district
   court granted dismissal, finding the Plaintiffs failed to state “a cognizable
   claim.”
          We agree. The Plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 33.021 is based on a
   misreading of the statute. Petersen was arrested and charged for online
   solicitation of a minor under § 33.021(c). A violation of subsection (c) is a
   second-degree felony if, inter alia, the offense “involves an individual whom
   the actor believes to be younger than 17.” See Tex. Penal Code
   § 33.021(a), (c), (f). Such was the case here. Petersen was therefore correctly
   charged, and the Plaintiffs’ argument misses the mark. The malicious
   prosecution claim was properly dismissed.
                                          C.
          Because the Plaintiffs’ claims against Dunn fail, their municipal
   liability claim against the City of Conroe must also fail. Indeed, to establish
   municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of a
   constitutional right. See Groden v. City of Dallas, Tex., 826 F.3d 280, 283 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (listing the factors for municipal liability claims). As the Plaintiffs
   do not do so, the district court did not err in dismissing their municipal
   liability claim.
                                         IV.
          Lastly, we turn to the Plaintiffs’ claims against the Wellpath
   Defendants. The Plaintiffs sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,
   alleging that the Wellpath Defendants violated Petersen’s Fourteenth
   Amendment right to due process, and under Texas state law theories of
   medical negligence and gross negligence. These claims lack merit.

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          To sustain a § 1983 claim against the Wellpath Defendants, the
   Plaintiffs “must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
   laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
   committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at
   48. The Plaintiffs reason that because Southwest and Wellpath provided
   contract services for a governmental entity (Montgomery County) and
   Johnson worked for Southwest and Wellpath, the Plaintiffs have shown that
   the Wellpath Defendants acted “under color of state law.” Even so, the
   Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Wellpath Defendants must be dismissed
   because the Wellpath Defendants owed no duty under the Fourteenth
   Amendment at the time of Petersen’s suicide.
          The duties owed to a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth
   Amendment arise out of the “special relationship” between the state and the
   detainee. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324 (5th Cir.
   2002) (per curiam). In other words, the state has a duty to protect a detainee
   from certain private dangers by virtue of the state’s “incarceration,
   institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.” Id. This
   “special relationship” has limits—it does not extend beyond the confines of
   custody. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
   201 (1989) (“[T]he State does not become the permanent guarantor of an
   individual’s safety by having once offered him shelter. Under these
   circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to protect [the
   inmate].”); see also Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir.
   1996) (en banc) (holding that the state owes a duty under the Due Process
   Clause “to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
   human needs, including medical care and protection from harm, during their
   confinement” (emphasis added)).
          Petersen committed suicide two days after he was released from
   custody. Because he was no longer in the state’s custody, the “special

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   relationship” had ended, and the Wellpath Defendants owed him no duty of
   care. See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
   (“[T]he state creates a ‘special relationship’ with a person only when the
   person is involuntarily taken into state custody and held against his will
   through the affirmative power of the state; otherwise, the state has no duty
   arising under the Constitution to protect its citizens against harm[.]”
   (emphasis added)); accord Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37, 39
   (1st Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have been apprised of no case recognizing due process
   liability for suicide based on police conduct except for death during
   custody.”); Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 1998)
   (plaintiffs cannot maintain that the state had an obligation to stop a pre-trial
   detainee from committing suicide once he had been released from jail).
   Consequently, the Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim under § 1983, and
   their §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against the Wellpath Defendants were properly
   dismissed.
          The Plaintiffs’ state law negligence claims against the Wellpath
   Defendants fare no better. “The elements of a medical negligence claim are:
   (1) a duty to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a failure to conform to
   the required standard; (3) actual injury; and (4) a causal connection between
   the conduct and the injury.” Methodist Hosp. v. German, 369 S.W.3d 333, 338
   (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Even assuming the other
   elements are met, the Plaintiffs’ negligence claims stall at causation.
          “Proximate cause has two components: (1) foreseeability and
   (2) cause-in-fact.” Rodriguez-Escobar v. Goss, 392 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex.
   2013) (per curiam). “For a negligent act or omission to have been a cause-
   in-fact of the harm, the act or omission must have been a substantial factor in
   bringing about the harm, and absent the act or omission—i.e., but for the act
   or omission—the harm would not have occurred.” Id. Relevant here, the
   Supreme Court of Texas has held that a medical provider’s “failure to

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   hospitalize a person who later commits suicide is a proximate cause of the
   suicide only if the suicide probably would not have occurred if the decedent
   had been hospitalized.” Id. Nothing alleged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint
   satisfies that high threshold, particularly given the fleeting interaction
   between Petersen and EMT Johnson, and the interval of time between
   Petersen’s release from custody and his suicide. As with the other claims
   against the Wellpath Defendants, the district court did not err in dismissing
   the Plaintiffs’ negligence claims.
                                        V.
          To sum up: The district court did not err in granting the defendants’
   motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs do not state plausible claims against Dunn
   or the City of Conroe under §§ 1983 and 1985, as Dunn had probable cause
   to arrest Petersen and therefore did not violate Petersen’s constitutional
   rights. The Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against the City of Conroe
   fails for the same reason. The Wellpath Defendants owed Petersen no duty
   upon his release from custody, thus defeating the Plaintiffs’ §§ 1983 and 1985
   claims against them.     And finally, Plaintiffs cannot show the requisite
   causation to sustain their state law negligence claims.
                                                                 AFFIRMED.

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