Court Opinion

ID: 9637153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:59:00.346927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:53.897977
License: Public Domain

CHASANOW,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Court seems to be either subtly altering the rational basis test, or paying lip service to that test but refusing to apply it in the instant case. The test as set out in Murphy v. Edmonds is:
Generally under [the rational basis] test, a court “ ‘will not overturn’ ” the classification “ ‘unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.’ ”
325 Md. 342, 355, 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2406, 115 L.Ed.2d 410, 430 (1991), in turn quoting, Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176 (1979)). Further,
[a] statutory classification reviewed under the rational basis standard enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality *109and will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly arbitrary. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 356, 601 A.2d at 108.
In the instant case, the Court restates the rational basis test with a far different spin. “To withstand such equal protection scrutiny, the zoning ordinance in question ... must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” 331 Md. 89, 104, 626 A.2d 372, 379 (1993). The strong presumption of constitutionality seems to have been ignored both in the restated rational basis test and in its application in the instant case.
The majority holds:
To differentiate between permissible residential tenant classes by creating more strenuous zoning requirements for some and less for others based solely on the occupation which the tenant pursues away from that residence is that sort of arbitrary classification forbidden under our constitutions.
331 Md. at 106, 626 A.2d at 380. I disagree. The zoning ordinance at issue permits student mini-dormitories in residential zones provided the mini-dorms meet the rather strict requirements of the ordinance. If a student mini-dormitory fails to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance, it is still permissible within a residential zone provided a special exception is obtained. There is no contention that the dormitory regulation is arbitrary or irrational, only that the student/non-student classification is arbitrary and irrational.
It is not arbitrary or irrational for the Prince George’s County Council to assume that, generally, residential college students will wish to live as close to their college campus as possible. It is not arbitrary or irrational for that legislative body to further assume college dormitories housing college students will, unless regulated, tend to be most highly concentrated in residential neighborhoods surrounding a college campus, whereas other non-student similar group residences will probably be more uniformly disbursed throughout the county. Because non-student group residences probably will not be as *110concentrated in any single geographic area as will student group residences near a college campus, there is a basis for zoning regulations addressing these student mini-dorms. It is not irrational to regulate student mini-dorms by requiring a special exception so as to avoid too high a concentration of unregulated, possibly substandard, student mini-dormitories in residential neighborhoods adjacent to institutions of higher learning.
In Creative School v. Board, 242 Md. 552, 572, 219 A.2d 789, 801 (1966), this Court held that a Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance which required a special exception for a private school, with no similar requirement for a public school, did not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees. We stated that “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time of the enactment of the statute must be assumed.” Id. at 572, 219 A.2d at 800 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1911)). Several states of facts reasonably can be conceived that would justify the student/non-student classification. We can conceive that some students of the University of Maryland and Bowie State University might not like to five in the campus dormitories and would prefer to live off campus but close to their universities. We can con-, ceive that as full or part-time students, they may only have limited funds and are therefore more willing to tolerate crowded, inferior living quarters. Real estate speculators, seizing upon this market, may buy small, inexpensive single-family residences close to these institutions of higher learning and rent formerly single-family homes to several students per house. Many of these students have cars which they might park on the street. As only nine-month tenants, the students may not be concerned about maintaining the property. Intolerant neighbors inconvenienced by the shortage of parking spaces and concerned about declining aesthetics of their neighborhoods may put their homes up for sale. Prospective buyers may not be eager to move into a neighborhood with neglected, crowded student group residences, so the specula*111tors may be able to purchase more houses at deflated prices. The speculators, without doing anything more than is minimally necessary to rent the properties, can create more mini-dorms in close proximity to these two Universities. Soon there may be a real danger that many quiet college residential neighborhoods will be saturated with student mini-dorms. These assumed justifications are not irrational or arbitrary.
It is also easy to conceive that there is no such problem with non-students or people with other occupations. These non-students are more likely to be employed full-time than are students, and with more money to spend on housing, they presumably may be less willing to tolerate crowded, inferior living conditions. Also, since they will live in the same residence all year long, rather than only for nine months of the year, the premises are less likely to be neglected. Non-student group residences are more likely to be disbursed throughout the county and not clustered around the two Universities.
These hypotheses are conceivable and should not be dismissed as irrational. This Court may believe that the hypothetical justifications for the zoning ordinance are not probable or not likely to occur, but that is not the issue. The issue is whether these hypothetical justifications for the legislation are irrational—they are not. There has been no showing that the County Council was wrong in believing there was a particular problem with student mini-dorms or assuming that, because of their concentration around college campuses, student group residences could be a significant problem unless regulated.
Petitioners also contend that this zoning regulation is a denial of equal protection because it is underinclusive and, if the county is going to regulate group residences, it should uniformly regulate all group residences. I disagree. Even if the County Council chose to regulate one major aspect of the group residence problem (student group residences), rather than all aspects of the problem (all group residences), that should not invalidate the statute.
*112In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court discussed why the judiciary must be hesitant to void, on equal protection grounds, underinclusive legislation:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. (Citations omitted).
348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573 (1955). The fact that the County Council initially dealt with only one aspect of a problem does not render the legislation invalid.
This Court might not agree with the legislative perception of the mini-dorm problem adjacent to a residential college campus or with the legislative solution, but we should not substitute our judgment for that of a legislative body. Nor should we declare any statute invalid unless the strong presumption of validity is overcome and unless it is clearly demonstrated that the legislative body acted irrationally and arbitrarily. The strong presumption of validity of the zoning ordinance at issue has not been overcome. This zoning regulation of student mini-dorms, that if unregulated, might become a problem in residential neighborhoods surrounding a college campus, has not been proven to be clearly arbitrary and irrational.
The majority opinion calls to mind Justice Hugo Black’s statements in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963). Justice Black applauded courts for abandoning the practice of holding “laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely....” Id. at 730, 83 S.Ct. at 1031, 10 L.Ed.2d at 97. Instead, Justice Black expounded: “We have returned to the original constitu*113tional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Id In reaching its holding today, this Court may have taken a step backward.
I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of Judge Larnzell Martin of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County as well as the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Both of those courts found a rational basis for creating the special exception zoning classification for mini-dorms.
Chief Judge MURPHY and Judge RODOWSKY have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissent.