Court Opinion

ID: 9380939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:00:43.127403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.547388
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                         March 21, 2023
                                  No. 22-30297                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk

   Anastasia Nedd Allen,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   United States Postal Service, Louis DeJoy, Postmaster
   General,

                                                           Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 2:20-CV-304

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
         Plaintiff-appellant Anastasia Nedd Allen brings claims of age
   discrimination and retaliation against her former employer, the United States
   Postal Service (“USPS”). The district court granted summary judgment to
   USPS on all of Allen’s claims. Allen now appeals. For the following reasons,
   we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE and REMAND in part.
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514           Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

                                          I.
          In April of 2018, USPS hired Allen as a “city carrier assistant” subject
   to a ninety-day probationary period. At all relevant times, Allen was either
   fifty-three or fifty-four years old. Allen was assigned to the North Central
   Carrier Station (“Central Station”) in New Orleans. In July, before her
   probationary period lapsed, station manager Joseph Porche fired her. In
   August, Allen initiated Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) contact
   regarding her termination. She alleged that USPS fired her because of her
   age, marital status, and disability, and also alleged a hostile work
   environment. 1 In November, Allen and USPS resolved the complaint in a
   written settlement, pursuant to which Allen would be reinstated as a carrier
   assistant. Allen asserts that she asked Porche not to put her on another
   probationary period, and Porche replied that “he does not like to hire older
   workers because they tend to get hurt and go on restriction until they retire.”
   According to Allen, Porche said that “he did not need another carrier with
   restrictions on his clock.” On December 8, 2018, Allen began her reinstated
   position at Central Station, subject to a renewed ninety-day probationary
   period.
          The facts and circumstances of Allen’s second period of employment
   are disputed. USPS submitted summary-judgment evidence that Allen was
   “inefficien[t],” “result[ing] in expanded street time and delayed mail, which
   cost the USPS additional money.” An employee evaluation form indicated
   that, as of January 7, 2019—thirty days into Allen’s renewed probationary
   period—Allen’s performance was “unacceptable” in three of the six areas
   subject to evaluation: work quantity, work quality, and dependability. Her

          1
            The summary-judgment record does not contain Allen’s 2018 EEO complaint,
   but USPS does not dispute that these claims formed the basis of the complaint.

                                          2
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514           Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

   performance was “satisfactory” in the areas of work relations, work
   methods, and personal conduct. At the sixty-day mark, Allen’s performance
   was deemed “unacceptable” in all six areas. According to a declaration by
   her supervisor, Charlotte Lagrue, Allen’s “deficiencies include[d] poor
   scanning, clock ring errors, and delaying the delivery of mail.” Lagrue also
   attested that Allen “gets distracted and forgets important items that she
   needs to complete her task[s],” including her scanner. According to USPS,
   Allen “was not receptive to feedback.” She “was advised of her deficiencies
   during her probationary period[,] and her work did not improve.”
          Allen’s summary-judgment evidence tells a different story. Her most
   substantial piece of evidence is her own twelve-page affidavit, in which she
   asserts that her USPS supervisors generally undermined her efforts to
   succeed in her reinstated position. She writes specifically that “Porche and
   Lagrue set [her] up to fail so Porche could terminate [her] for poor
   performance.”
          Allen includes specific factual allegations supporting her version of
   events. She attests that Lagrue instructed her to “clock in daily to the street
   time code upon [her] arrival at work,” which forced her to “perform office
   duties while on street time,” thus creating “the appearance of expanded
   street times.” Further, according to Allen, the “[d]elayed mail was due to
   Supervisor Lagrue hiding mail from [her] and not giving [her] an arrow key
   to open mail receptacles on [her] route.” Allen also attests that Lagrue
   “refused to let [her] sort . . . and prepare [her] mail for delivery . . . before
   leaving the station.” According to Allen, another carrier sorted her mail, “so
   it was often mis-sorted.” “Dealing with missorted mail added to [her] street
   time and resulted in delayed mail.” Allen also states in her affidavit that
   Porche and Lagrue “altered [her] clock rings to reflect street time rather than
   actual office time.” She attests that Porche and Lagrue would hide mail and
   parcels from her before she left on her route, and then would call her back,

                                          3
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514          Page: 4     Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   claiming that she had left mail and parcels. According to Allen, she did not,
   as Lagrue says, leave her scanner in the building. Allen says that her scanner
   was “taken by someone” when she went to the restroom, and she could not
   leave to deliver mail until she received another scanner.
          Allen also attests to specific remarks made by Porche and Lagrue. In
   addition to her claim that in November 2018 Porche said he disfavors hiring
   older workers, Allen asserts in her affidavit that, when Porche would give her
   instructions, “he would always end the conversation by stating ‘this is not a
   setup’ with a smirk on his face.” Allen also states that, at some unspecified
   time, Lagrue told her to “get [her] old ass back to work.”
          Allen’s affidavit also contains assertions that her supervisors treated
   her less favorably than they treated a younger carrier, Chloe Bickman, by not
   allowing Allen to sort mail on her routes, to work a consistent route, or to be
   off on Saturdays. Allen further asserts that Bickman “never got auxiliary
   mail in addition to the daily mail for her route,” while Allen “got auxiliary
   mail on a daily basis.” She states that Bickman “was assigned easier mail
   routes to cover.” She asserts that she, unlike Bickman, “was given more than
   three bundles of mail on a walking route,” was “denied an arrow key when
   needed,” and “was not given a voyager card or pin,” and so “had to purchase
   gas for the mail truck with [her] own credit card.”
          On January 6, 2019, approximately one month into her reinstated
   employment, Allen initiated another informal EEO contact. She alleged that
   she was being targeted for age-based discrimination and retaliation for her
   prior EEO activity. Allen asked Glenn Webster, a shop steward for the
   National Association of Letter Carriers, to represent her in connection with
   the complaint.
          Allen asserts that, on January 18, 2019, she attended a meeting at her
   own request with Porche and the shop steward from her first EEO complaint.

                                         4
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514          Page: 5   Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   She says that she asked Porche to observe her as she delivered mail and
   performed other carrier duties, “to prove [she] did not have performance
   issues to him.” Porche had not, according to Allen, observed her personally.
   Porche “agreed and said he would walk with [her] by the end of the week,”
   but never did.
          Allen also recounts an event occurring on January 30, 2019, writing
   that Lagrue did not give her the arrow key that she needed to access
   “collection boxes, outdoor parcel lockers, cluster boxes units, and apartment
   panels on [her] route.” According to Allen, this resulted in her “having to
   bring back some mail to the station because [she] could not deliver it without
   the key.” She further asserts that there were other times when Lagrue “did
   not provide [her] with an arrow key for routes that required it,” and that
   Allen “asked for a key whenever the route required one.” Allen says that
   “Lagrue would never give [her] the arrow key. She would say that she forgot,
   or she would not answer [Allen’s] phone calls to remind her.”
          The arrow-key saga continued. Allen attests that on February 22,
   2019, when she retrieved her keys for her mail truck, she “noticed that the
   arrow key was missing,” and told Lagrue. Lagrue told Allen she would find
   an arrow key for her, but she “never looked for the key.” According to Allen,
   she told Lagrue that she “needed to leave for the routes as [she] had two
   [routes] to cover that day.” She says that while she was out on her routes,
   she called Lagrue three times for the arrow key, but Lagrue did not answer
   her calls. Accordingly, she “had no choice but to return the mail that
   required delivery with the arrow key.” In Allen’s words, “[t]his is another
   example of Lagrue setting [her] up to fail during [her] second probationary
   period.”
          With respect to her performance evaluations, Allen asserts in her
   affidavit that Lagrue listed inaccurate dates on the written form. As to the

                                         5
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514          Page: 6   Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   thirty-day evaluation dated January 7, 2019, Allen states that no such
   evaluation happened on that day, and that it instead took place on January 26,
   2019, on her forty-ninth—not thirtieth—day of work. She accordingly
   asserts that Lagrue backdated the evaluation form “to give the appearance
   that she conducted [Allen’s] evaluation timely on the [thirtieth] day.” In a
   similar vein, Allen asserts that her sixty-day evaluation—reportedly on
   February 6, 2019—in fact took place on February 16, 2019, and that the
   evaluation form was backdated in this respect as well. Given that the
   evaluations happened only twenty-one days apart, according to Allen, she did
   not have “sufficient time to get the proper training and improve [her]
   performance.” Lagrue, in her declaration, denies backdating any of Allen’s
   evaluations.
          In addition to her own affidavit, Allen submitted the declaration of
   Glenn Webster, who, as Allen’s representative in the EEO process,
   personally reviewed her entire complaint file. Webster states that Allen’s file
   did not contain certain “documentation necessary to substantiate the
   termination of her employment during her second[] probationary period.”
   He then lists six types of documents that were absent from Allen’s file,
   including “PS Form(s) 4588 Observation of Work Practices” that would
   show that “Allen’s work practices had been observed by her supervisors and
   found to be deficient;” a “PS Form 1813 Late Leaving Report” that would
   show that “Allen was using excessive time to deliver mail;” and a “PS Form
   1017-A Time Disallowance Record” that would show that “Allen was
   extending her time on her mail delivery routes.” Webster further states that
   Allen’s file contained certain documentation that did not support her second
   termination on account of job performance, including her “Employees
   Everything Report,” which “shows ‘Clock Rings/Operations’ being
   changed by management personnel daily,” and “[d]ates on the PS Form 1750

                                         6
Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514           Page: 7   Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   Evaluation/Probation Report” that “conflict[] with actual evaluation
   dates.”
          USPS fired Allen on February 26, 2019. The letter of separation,
   signed by Porche, lists three reasons for Allen’s separation: (1) “Failure to
   perform work which meets the expectations of the position,” (2) “Fail[ure]
   to accomplish tasks in an efficient and timely manner,” and (3) “Fail[ure] to
   work at a sufficient speed to keep up with the amount of work required by the
   position.” In March of 2019, Allen filed a formal EEO complaint alleging
   that her second termination was based on age discrimination and retaliation
   for her prior EEO activity.
          In addition to her claims based on her termination from her second
   probationary period at Central Station, Allen also brings claims based on
   three incidents of non-selection for hire at other USPS locations to which she
   applied. First, in February 2019, before her second termination, Allen
   interviewed with a USPS location in Metairie, Louisiana.             Metairie
   Postmaster Matthew McFall attests in a declaration that Allen’s interviewer,
   Chad Taylor, recommended her for hire. Allen states in her affidavit that,
   after her termination from Central Station, she called Taylor to ask whether
   she had been hired in Metairie. According to Allen, Taylor told her that
   Porche had said “unfavorable things” about her to McFall, and so McFall
   did not hire her. McFall denies speaking to Porche about Allen, and instead
   states that when personnel “processed” Allen, they learned that she had
   been terminated from the USPS.
          Second, in April 2019, Allen interviewed for a position at a USPS
   location in Marrero, Louisiana. In May, Allen was informed that she was not
   hired. Allen asserts that Porche and Lagrue “gave false and misleading
   statements” to the Marrero Postmaster, Alisa Leonard, resulting in her non-
   selection for the Marrero position. Leonard admits in her declaration that

                                         7
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514          Page: 8      Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   she spoke to Allen’s previous manager and supervisor, i.e., Porche and
   Lagrue, who told Leonard that Allen “was a difficult employee who
   challenged everything they would tell her.” Leonard states that she was told
   that “when instructions would be given,” Allen “would go straight to the
   union to verify if she had to follow the instruction.” She says that her
   “decision not to hire [Allen] was based on the fact that she had been
   separated twice for unsatisfactory performance and the information
   [Leonard] received from [Allen’s] previous [m]anager and [s]upervisor.”
   Leonard denies basing her decision on Allen’s age or EEO activity.
          Third, Allen again applied and interviewed for a position at the
   Metairie station. Again, Chad Taylor recommended that she be hired.
   Though Allen was “initially selected for the position,” she was notified on
   May 21, 2019 that the offer was rescinded. The next day, Allen met with
   Tracy Segura, a USPS field recruiter. Segura told Allen that she was the
   person who rescinded the job offer. The explanation for the recission is
   subject to dispute. Segura attests in a declaration that Allen’s offer was
   rescinded because she had been separated twice from USPS. Allen, on the
   other hand, states in her affidavit that Segura told her that she rescinded the
   job offer because Allen was “at war with the post office due to [her] current
   EEO activity.” Segura denies saying this and denies having knowledge of, or
   access to, Allen’s EEO activity at the time of the recission. Allen also states
   that she had a conversation with McFall, the Metairie Postmaster, in May of
   2019, and McFall told her that “he rescinded the job offer for the second
   Metairie job opening . . . due to [Allen’s] EEO activity.”
          Allen amended her EEO complaint to include claims for age
   discrimination and EEO retaliation, arising out of her (1) first non-selection
   for the Metairie position, (2) non-selection for the Marrero position, and
   (3) second non-selection for the Metairie position.

                                         8
Case: 22-30297      Document: 00516683514           Page: 9    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

          On October 30, 2019, in a final agency decision, USPS dismissed all of
   Allen’s claims of discrimination and advised her of her right to file a civil
   action. On January 28, 2020, Allen filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
   the Eastern District of Louisiana. USPS moved for summary judgment on all
   claims, and the district court granted the motion in full. The court dismissed
   as procedurally barred all of Allen’s claims pertaining to her first EEO
   complaint in 2018. The district court also dismissed the eight claims
   presented by Allen’s second EEO complaint: (1) age discrimination as to
   (i) her second termination from Central Station, (ii) her first non-hiring at
   the Metairie station, (iii) her non-hiring at the Marrero station, and (iv) her
   second non-hiring at the Metairie station; as well as (2) retaliation for her
   prior EEO activity as to (i) her second termination from Central Station,
   (ii) her first non-hiring at the Metairie station, (iii) her non-hiring at the
   Marrero station, and (iv) her second non-hiring at the Metairie station.
          The district court entered final judgment in favor of USPS, and Allen
   timely appealed.
                                          II.
          Allen does not specify in her briefing before us which dismissals by the
   district court she appeals. However, not all of her claims are adequately
   briefed, and failure to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of the issue.
   N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Cigna Healthcare, 952 F.3d 708,
   711 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496,
   499 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). We accordingly conclude that Allen has abandoned
   multiple claims on appeal. First, she does not mention the district court’s
   dismissal of her claims pertaining to her first EEO complaint in 2018.
   Second, she fails to brief the district court’s dismissal of her claims arising
   from her non-selection for hire at the Marrero station. Third, while she
   makes various references to her first interview and subsequent non-hiring at

                                          9
Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514            Page: 10     Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

   the Metairie station, she does not provide arguments or legal citations
   contesting the district court’s dismissal of her claims arising out of this non-
   hiring. She instead dedicates her Metairie-related briefing to the contention
   that the May 2019 recission of her offer, i.e., the second non-hiring, was
   retaliatory. Finally, Allen’s briefing on her second non-hiring at the Metairie
   station is confined to her retaliation theory; she does not discuss the Metairie
   station vis-à-vis her age-discrimination claims.            Allen has therefore
   abandoned all of these claims. The district court’s dismissal of these claims
   is affirmed.
          This leaves three claims on appeal: (1) age discrimination as to her
   second termination from Central Station; (2) retaliation as to her second
   termination from Central Station; and (3) retaliation as to her second non-
   hiring at the Metairie station.
                                         III.
          We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence
   in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Badgerow v. REJ Props., Inc.,
   974 F.3d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is
   warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
   material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
   Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A disputed fact is material if it
   “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. In
   making this assessment, the court “may not make credibility determinations
   or weigh the evidence.” Kevin M. Ehringer Enters., Inc. v. McData Servs.
   Corp., 646 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
   Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

                                         10
Case: 22-30297       Document: 00516683514              Page: 11       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                         No. 22-30297

           We first address Allen’s age-discrimination claim and then turn to her
   retaliation claims.
                                              IV.
           The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) prohibits
   employers from firing, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against
   any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment, because of her age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Under
   the Act’s federal-employee provision, which covers the U.S. Postal Service,
   “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment
   who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination
   based on age.” Id. § 633a(a). This provision “demands that personnel
   actions be untainted by any consideration of age.” Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct.
   1168, 1171 (2020) (emphasis added). We generally assess ADEA age-
   discrimination claims relying on circumstantial evidence under the burden-
   shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
   (1973). 2 Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010).
           To establish her prima facie case of age discrimination, Allen must
   show that (1) she was discharged, (2) she was qualified for the position,

           2
              In Babb v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court held that federal-employee ADEA claims
   under § 633a(a) do not require a showing of but-for causation. 140 S. Ct. at 1171. At least
   one federal court of appeals has interpreted Babb as having “foreclosed using the full
   McDonnell Douglas framework regarding ADEA claims . . . as to federal-sector employees.”
   Lewis v. Sec’y of U.S. Air Force, No. 20-12463, 2022 WL 2377164, at *10 (11th Cir. June 30,
   2022); see Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 992 F.3d 1193, 1204 (11th Cir. 2021)
   (“Without quite saying as much, . . . it seems that the Supreme Court accepted Babb’s
   argument ‘that the District Court should not have used the McDonnell Douglas
   framework.’”). The parties before us have not cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Babb,
   and both parties embrace the McDonnell Douglas framework. Because we conclude that
   Allen’s claim survives summary judgment even under the more demanding McDonnell
   Douglas framework, we do not decide the extent to which Babb renders McDonnell Douglas
   an inappropriate means of analyzing § 633a(a) claims.

                                               11
Case: 22-30297        Document: 00516683514              Page: 12       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                         No. 22-30297

   (3) she was within the protected class when she was discharged, and (4) she
   was “either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced
   by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of h[er] age.” Id.
   (quoting Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007)).
           If Allen succeeds on her prima facie showing, the burden shifts to
   USPS to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Allen’s
   termination. Id. If USPS does so, the burden shifts back to Allen to show
   that the articulated reason is pretextual. Id. She may show pretext “either
   through evidence of disparate treatment” or by showing that USPS’s
   “proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’” Moss v. BMC
   Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc.,
   333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff’s “prima facie case, combined
   with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is
   false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
   discriminated.” Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 476 (5th
   Cir. 2015) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48).
           We conclude that there are issues of fact precluding summary
   judgment for USPS on Allen’s age-discrimination claim. As to Allen’s
   second termination from Central Station, we agree with the district court that
   Allen has carried her burden to show that she was within the protected class,
   was discharged, and was qualified for her position. USPS does not dispute
   these findings on appeal. 3
            But we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Allen failed
   on her prima facie showing by not submitting evidence that she was

           3
              In the district court, USPS disputed Allen’s qualifications for the position, but
   the district court properly found that Allen need only show that she meets “objective hiring
   criteria.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001). On appeal, USPS
   does not argue that Allen fails the qualification requirement of her prima facie case.

                                               12
Case: 22-30297         Document: 00516683514                Page: 13       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                            No. 22-30297

   discharged because of her age. Allen asserts in her affidavit that she was
   treated less favorably than a twenty-six-year-old younger carrier assistant,
   Chloe Bickman. She provides a series of examples in support of this claim,
   including that Bickman was given many privileges that Allen was denied.
   Allen also points to two age-related remarks from her superiors at USPS. She
   attests that upon reinstating her, Porche said that he does not like to hire
   older workers because they “tend to get hurt and go on restriction until they
   retire.” Porche said that he “did not need another carrier with restrictions
   on his clock.” Allen also attests that Lagrue once told her to get her “old
   ass” back to work.
           We begin with Allen’s comparison to Chloe Bickman. To qualify as
   “similarly situated” for the purpose of an employment-discrimination claim,
   the employees being compared must have the same job or responsibilities,
   share the same supervisor or have their employment status determined by
   the same person, and have comparable violation histories. Lee v. Kansas City
   S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The district
   court found that Allen could not rely on a comparison to Bickman because
   Allen failed to identify Bickman’s age, supervisor, violation history, or
   whether she was also a probationary employee. But the record contains this
   information.       Specifically, the final agency decision on Allen’s EEO
   complaint notes that Chloe Bickman was twenty-six years old, and that she,
   like Allen, was a probationary 4 city carrier assistant at Central Station in New

           4
                The record support for the fact that Bickman was a probationary employee is
   USPS’s recounting of Allen’s own assertion. But USPS has not contradicted this fact in
   either its final agency decision or as a party to this appeal. (USPS says in its brief that Allen
   has “failed to establish” that Bickman was a probationary employee, but this statement
   ignores the agency decision in the record and conspicuously stops short of denying that
   Bickman was probationary.) We therefore find that at this stage, this undisputed assertion
   in the record is sufficient to create a fact issue as to Bickman’s probationary status.

                                                  13
Case: 22-30297        Document: 00516683514               Page: 14       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                          No. 22-30297

   Orleans, supervised by Charlotte Lagrue. Allen and Bickman thus had the
   same job, at the same location, under the same supervisor. As to similar
   violation histories, the agency decision states that there was “no indication
   that Ms. Bickman engaged in the same misconduct or subpar performance as
   [Allen].” But while Bickman may indeed lack a history of misconduct, at this
   stage the summary-judgment record precludes a dispositive finding that her
   violation history is different from Allen’s, as Allen has submitted sworn
   statements contradicting the very “misconduct” and “subpar performance”
   with which she is charged. To discard the Bickman comparison on the basis
   of Allen’s and Bickman’s divergent “violation histories” is to credit USPS’s
   account of Allen’s employment, while discrediting Allen’s own. This is
   impermissible at the summary-judgment stage. Kevin M. Ehringer Enters.,
   646 F.3d at 325.
           Allen’s prima facie showing finds further support in her evidence of
   age-related comments by Porche and Lagrue. Workplace remarks offered not
   as direct evidence but as “circumstantial evidence alongside other alleged
   discriminatory conduct” must satisfy a “more flexible” two-part test. 5 Reed
   v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012). Under this test, the
   plaintiff must show “(1) discriminatory animus (2) on the part of a person
   that is either primarily responsible for the challenged employment action or
   by a person with influence or leverage over the relevant decisionmaker.” Id.
   (citations omitted).        Here, Allen’s evidence of Porche’s and Lagrue’s

           5
             We often describe this test as “more flexible” because it is less stringent than our
   other “stray remarks” test, which applies to employer remarks offered as direct evidence
   of discrimination. See Goudeau, 793 F.3d at 475. Age-related remarks offered as direct
   evidence of discrimination must “be proximate in time to the terminations, made by an
   individual with authority over the employment decision, and related to the challenged
   decision.” Id. (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996)). Allen
   does not offer Porche’s and Lagrue’s comments as evidence of direct discrimination.

                                                14
Case: 22-30297       Document: 00516683514           Page: 15   Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                      No. 22-30297

   remarks is “just one ingredient in the overall evidentiary mix,” Goudeau, 793
   F.3d at 475, so the remarks are subject to the flexible two-part test.
             Porche’s comment that he does not like hiring older workers satisfies
   this test.     First, the remark creates an issue of fact as to Porche’s
   discriminatory animus, as it reflects a “desire to replace older employees
   with younger ones.” McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
   Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 458 (5th Cir. 2019). Second, it is undisputed that Porche
   is the person “primarily responsible” for Allen’s termination. Reed, 701 F.3d
   at 441.
             Similarly, Lagrue’s instruction to Allen that she get her “old ass”
   back to work also satisfies the two-part test. First, the remark “references
   age in a derogatory or stereotypical way,” and thus creates a fact issue as to
   Lagrue’s discriminatory animus. McMichael, 934 F.3d at 458. Second, while
   Lagrue was not the person who fired Allen, she qualifies as a person with
   “influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker.” Russell v. McKinney
   Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000). Lagrue was Allen’s
   supervisor and is the person who conducted Allen’s performance
   evaluations. She is no “ordinary coworker” lacking influence over Allen’s
   employment status. See id.
             Accordingly, Allen’s evidence of (1) Porche’s comment, (2) Lagrue’s
   comment, and (3) unfavorable treatment compared to Bickman, collectively
   create genuine disputes of fact material to Allen’s prima facie showing on her
   age-discrimination claim. The burden therefore shifts to USPS to articulate
   a nondiscriminatory reason for Allen’s termination. USPS has done so: it
   says that Allen was fired for poor job performance.
             The burden thus shifts back to Allen to show that the proffered reason
   was pretext. She may do so by showing that USPS’s explanation is “false or
   ‘unworthy of credence.’” Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578. Here, too, issues of

                                           15
Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514            Page: 16   Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

   material fact preclude summary judgment for USPS. Most significantly,
   Allen’s twelve-page affidavit, sworn to under penalty of perjury, contains
   extensive factual assertions supporting her contention that USPS made it
   impossible for her to succeed upon her reinstatement at Central Station. The
   uniting theme of her affidavit is that “Porche and Lagrue set [her] up to fail
   so Porche could terminate [her] for poor performance.” This is a direct
   challenge to USPS’s proffered explanation.
          In the affidavit, Allen details multiple specific incidents suggesting, at
   best, innocence of poor performance and, at worst, sabotage. Notably, none
   of these facts was discussed by the district court. Allen states that her
   expanded street times owe to Lagrue’s instruction that she clock into street
   time even when working in the office, and to her supervisors’ altering of her
   clock rings to reflect street time rather than office time. She states that
   supervisors hid mail from her and then summoned her back, claiming that
   she had left mail behind, that they assigned her different routes, making it
   difficult for her to learn and deliver one route, and that Lagrue repeatedly
   denied her an arrow key necessary to complete certain deliveries, causing her
   to return to the station with undelivered mail. These facts, if ultimately
   found credible at trial, would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
   USPS’s proffered explanation for Allen’s termination is false or unworthy of
   credence.
          Additionally, Webster’s declaration further undermines USPS’s
   proffered reason. According to his personal review of Allen’s file, multiple
   forms that would have documented Allen’s performance deficiencies were
   absent. And the documents that he did find in the file tend to support Allen’s
   version of events, including a report showing that Allen’s clock rings were
   changed by management daily. The district court did not give proper weight
   to Webster’s declaration, noting that it “merely delineates [Webster’s]
   personal observations about how Allen’s noted deficiencies might have been

                                          16
Case: 22-30297       Document: 00516683514              Page: 17       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                         No. 22-30297

   better documented.” But a lack of documentation of Allen’s purported job
   deficiencies is germane to Allen’s theory of pretext in this case: that
   management’s claims of poor performance were artificial. See McMichael,
   934 F.3d at 459 (“A plaintiff can also show pretext by showing a departure
   from standard procedure.”). Notably, USPS offers no explanation for the
   dearth of documentation noted in the Webster declaration. A reasonable
   factfinder could rely on Webster’s declaration in support of a finding that
   USPS’s stated reasons for Allen’s termination were pretextual.
           Finally, we hold that application of the “same actor” inference in
   favor of USPS is not appropriate under these facts. The district court, at
   USPS’s urging, reasoned that Allen’s effort to show pretext is undermined
   by the fact that Porche—the person responsible for firing her—was also the
   person who hired her. This may seem a straightforward application of our
   case law, under which, “when the individual who allegedly discriminated
   against the plaintiff was the same individual who hired the plaintiff,” there
   arises “an inference that discrimination was not the motive behind plaintiff’s
   termination.” Russell, 235 F.3d at 228 n.16 (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc.,
   82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996)). This inference rests on the proposition that
   it is “irrational” to suspect that “animus exists in termination but not in
   hiring.” Brown, 82 F.3d at 658 (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th
   Cir. 1991)). “From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, it hardly
   makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes . . . only to fire them
   once they are on the job.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Proud, 945 F.2d at 797).
           But application of the “same actor” inference here does not comport
   with the rationale beneath the inference. While it is true that Porche was the
   person who re-hired Allen, 6 he did so pursuant to a settlement of her EEO

           6
              The parties do not point to record evidence indicating whether it was Porche who
   initially hired Allen at USPS in April 2018. The district court based its “same actor”

                                               17
Case: 22-30297         Document: 00516683514                Page: 18       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                            No. 22-30297

   complaint, which itself arose out of his having previously fired her. Allen’s
   re-hiring thus does not reflect a presumptive absence of animus on Porche’s
   part. On the contrary, animus in Allen’s termination is consistent with
   animus in what was, according to Allen, not an arms-length hire but instead
   a begrudging re-hire effectuated to settle a discrimination complaint. Cf.
   Fitzpatrick v. Pontotoc Cnty., 612 F. App’x 770, 776 n.5 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting
   in an age-discrimination case that “[t]he same actor inference likely does not
   apply” to an employer’s decision to retain an employee, rather than a
   decision to hire him).
           For these reasons, USPS has failed to demonstrate that there are no
   genuine disputes of material fact. Summary judgment was not appropriate
   on Allen’s age-discrimination claim as to her February 2019 termination from
   USPS. The order of the district court is reversed in this respect.
                                                 V.
           We next consider Allen’s claims that she was subject to retaliation for
   her prior EEO activity. The Supreme Court has held that the federal-
   employee provision of the ADEA “prohibits retaliation against a federal
   employee who complains of age discrimination.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553
   U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). “[R]etaliation claims
   under the ADEA also utilize a burden-shifting analysis at the summary-
   judgment stage, starting with the prima facie case.” 7 Heggemeier v. Caldwell

   inference on Allen’s re-hiring by Porche in November 2018. USPS sticks to this approach
   on appeal. We therefore do not consider the effect of the same-actor inference on a scenario
   in which Porche was also the initial hiring official.
           7
             As noted supra note 2, the Supreme Court held in Babb that federal-sector ADEA
   claims under § 633a(a) do not require a showing of but-for causation, and at least one circuit
   has read Babb to foreclose use of the McDonnell Douglas framework for such claims. Lewis,
   2022 WL 2377164, at *10; Babb, 992 F.3d at 1204. As Babb was concerned only with age-
   discrimination claims, not retaliation claims, see 140 S. Ct. at 1171, it may fairly be said that

                                                  18
Case: 22-30297        Document: 00516683514              Page: 19       Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                         No. 22-30297

   Cnty., 826 F.3d 861, 869 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311,
   315 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           To make her prima facie showing on her ADEA retaliation claim,
   Allen must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered
   an adverse employment action, (3) there is a causal link between the
   protected activity and the adverse employment action, and (4) she was
   qualified for the position. Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d
   490, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255
   F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2001)).
                                               A.
           We begin with Allen’s retaliation claim vis-à-vis her second
   termination from Central Station. The only element of Allen’s prima facie
   case at dispute on appeal is her showing that there was a causal link between
   her protected activity and her discharge.
           The district court found that Allen could not establish causation based
   on timing alone. We agree that the approximately six-month gap between
   Allen’s initial EEO contact in August of 2018 and her termination in
   February 2019 is too long to support Allen’s prima facie showing. See Clark
   Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (noting that the

   Babb casts no doubt on the use of McDonnell Douglas for retaliation claims. But federal-
   employee ADEA claims based on retaliation derive from the same statutory provision as
   those for age discrimination. Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 479 (holding that “the statutory
   phrase ‘discrimination based on age’” in § 633a(a) “includes retaliation based on the filing
   of an age discrimination complaint”). Accordingly, the post-Babb viability of McDonnell
   Douglas with respect to federal-employee ADEA retaliation claims remains an open
   question. But again, because the parties here have not briefed the issue and instead embrace
   McDonnell Douglas, and because Allen’s evidence suffices to withstand summary judgment
   even under McDonnell Douglas, we need not decide the precise effect of Babb in this case.

                                               19
Case: 22-30297        Document: 00516683514              Page: 20        Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                          No. 22-30297

   temporal proximity must be “very close” and citing with approval cases
   rejecting three-month and four-month periods as insufficiently proximate).
           But Allen also initiated EEO contact on January 6, 2019,
   approximately seven weeks before her termination, complaining of age
   discrimination. This too is protected ADEA activity. See Gomez-Perez, 553
   U.S. at 491. And as the district court acknowledged, this timing is sufficiently
   close to meet Allen’s causation burden at the prima facie stage. See, e.g.,
   Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 F. App’x 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (accepting a two-and-a-half-month period as sufficient for causation at the
   prima facie stage); Richardson v. Prairie Opportunity, Inc., 470 F. App’x 282,
   287 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that a “less than two-month span between the
   protected activity and the adverse action is sufficient ‘temporal proximity’
   for a prima facie showing of causation.”). But the district court then erred
   by concluding that Allen had “not produced any evidence” that Porche had
   knowledge of this renewed contact.                Allen had indeed produced such
   evidence, and again, it is contained in her affidavit. Allen attests that,
   “[b]ased on [her] understanding of the USPS’s handling of EEO complaints,
   [her] complaint EEO ADR Specialist, Cabrini Hales[,] then contacted
   Porche, Lagrue, and [Bianca] Martin to see if there could be a resolution via
   redress if possible.” Viewing the evidence most favorably to Allen as the
   nonmovant, this sworn assertion creates a genuine dispute of material fact as
   to whether Porche was aware of Allen’s January EEO contact by the time he
   fired her in February. 8 We therefore conclude that Allen has created a
   genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her renewed EEO contact is

           8
             Contrary to the district court’s finding, Porche’s declaration stating that he knew
   of Allen’s 2018 complaint does not somehow defeat this fact issue. Porche does not
   mention—much less deny knowledge of—Allen’s 2019 complaint.

                                                20
Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514            Page: 21     Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                     No. 22-30297

   causally linked to her termination weeks later. She has thus made her prima
   facie showing for the purposes of withstanding summary judgment.
          Again, USPS proffers Allen’s poor job performance as its
   nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, and again Allen must
   demonstrate that this reason is pretextual. We have already concluded, in
   assessing Allen’s age-discrimination claim, that Allen’s evidence creates a
   fact issue as to whether USPS’s proffered reason for her termination is
   pretextual. Specifically, Allen has submitted evidence that her supervisors
   set her up for failure by obstructing her efforts to succeed at her job, including
   by hiding her mail, making her clock into street time when she was in fact in
   the office, and denying her the tools necessary for her deliveries. Moreover,
   Allen has submitted evidence, via Webster’s declaration, that USPS did not
   document the performance deficiencies it relies on as the basis for Allen’s
   termination. And again, the circumstances of Porche’s “hiring” of Allen
   render inappropriate the “same actor” inference. A reasonable jury could
   find, based on this evidence, that USPS’s reason for terminating Allen was
   pretext for retaliation based on her EEO activity directed against the USPS.
          Summary judgment for USPS was inappropriate on this claim, and the
   judgment of the district court is reversed in this respect.
                                          B.
          Finally, we turn to Allen’s retaliation claim as to the May 2019
   recission of her offer at the Metairie Post Office. We find that material
   factual disputes preclude summary judgment on this claim as well. Allen
   asserts in her affidavit that McFall told her that “he rescinded the job offer
   for the second Metairie job opening . . . due to [her] EEO activity.”
   Similarly, Allen states that USPS field recruiter Tracy Segura told her that
   the offer was rescinded because Allen was “at war with the post office due to
   [her] current EEO activity.” Because Allen’s affidavit testimony about

                                          21
Case: 22-30297     Document: 00516683514           Page: 22    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30297

   Segura’s and McFall’s remarks constitutes direct evidence of retaliation, we
   need not proceed through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
   See Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without
   inference or presumption.”); Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.,
   887 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The McDonnell Douglas test is
   inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”
   (quoting Portis v. First Nat’l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also
   Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (“[I]f a plaintiff is able
   to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving
   all the elements of a prima facie case.” (citation omitted)). A reasonable jury
   could, based on this evidence, find that Allen’s offer for the Metairie station
   was rescinded in retaliation for her protected EEO activity directed against
   USPS.
           We therefore reverse summary judgment as to this claim.
                                         VI.
           The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and
   REVERSED in part. Summary judgment is reversed as to Allen’s age-
   discrimination and retaliation claims arising out of her February 26, 2019
   termination from USPS Central Station, as well as her retaliation claim
   arising out of the May 2019 recission of her job offer at the Metairie USPS
   station. Dismissal of all other claims is affirmed.
           We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         22