Court Opinion

ID: 9411805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 22:00:54.148002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:13.898309
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1661

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                    FERNANDO SANTIAGO-LOZADA,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

         [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                Gelpí, Thompson, and Montecalvo,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant.
     Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom   W.   Stephen   Muldrow,   United   States   Attorney,   and
Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

                          July 27, 2023
            GELPÍ,         Circuit      Judge.         Appellant        Fernando

Santiago-Lozada ("Santiago-Lozada") challenges the procedural and

substantive     reasonableness       of    the   district    court's     variant

sentence of twenty-four months above the mandatory minimum of

sixty months    in    an    18 U.S.C.     § 924(c)   count   stemming    from   a

carjacking.    He posits that his cumulative sentence, which exceeds

the 123 months recommended by the parties, was unreasonably based

on factors already considered in his guideline sentence range

("GSR") computation and that the district court's justification

was also insufficient. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I.       BACKGROUND

            We recap the salient facts. Where, as here, a sentencing

appeal "follow[s] a guilty plea, we glean the relevant facts from

the change-of-plea colloquy, the unchallenged portions of the

presentence investigation report [("PSR")], and the record of the

[sentencing] hearing."         United States v. Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th

652, 653 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Melendez-Rosado,

57 F.4th 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2023)).1

           A. JANUARY 25th ARMED CARJACKING (COUNTS 7 & 8)

             On January 25, 2020, at approximately 2:00 a.m., an

 adult male ("Victim 1") entered his vehicle, a red 2018 Hyundai

 Accent parked near "La Placita" in Santurce, Puerto Rico, when

     1  Santiago-Lozada did not object below                 to   the   PSR.   The
relevance of this will become apparent infra.

                                     - 2 -
 Santiago-Lozada stepped out from a nearby vehicle and pointed a

 firearm at him.    Santiago-Lozada proceeded to pull Victim 1 out

 of the car and demanded Victim 1's car keys and cell phone.

 Victim 1 complied.    Santiago-Lozada also ripped off the chains

 Victim 1 was wearing around his neck, and told him to step back

 or he would shoot him.     Victim 1 obeyed.       Santiago-Lozada then

 entered the Hyundai and sat in the driver's seat while another

 individual who accompanied him took to the passenger seat.          They

 drove away in Victim 1's vehicle.

          B. JANUARY 31ST ARMED CARJAKING (COUNTS 1, 2, 3 & 4)

            Six days later, on January 31, 2020, at approximately

12:50 a.m., again in Santurce, Puerto Rico, Santiago-Lozada (along

with another individual) carjacked an Uber driver ("Victim 2" or

"Uber driver") as he waited by Canals Street for someone to request

his   services.2    Both   culprits   approached    the   Uber   driver's

vehicle -- a blue 2017 Kia Forte -- and Santiago-Lozada pointed a

firearm at him.    The carjackers made the Uber driver move to the

backseat.   Santiago-Lozada then drove to an ATM nearby so that the

Uber driver could withdraw money from his bank account.          The Uber

driver was unable to complete the transaction, so Santiago-Lozada

drove to a different ATM.    Santiago-Lozada exited the vehicle and,

      2Both carjackings took place in the same vicinity.             The
individuals  accompanying  Santiago-Lozada differed  in             each
instance.

                                - 3 -
holding a firearm, ordered the Uber driver to withdraw the balance

of the account.         As the Uber driver withdrew the $340 that was

available, Santiago-Lozada stood behind him, pressing the weapon

to his waist and threatening to shoot if the Uber driver looked at

him.   The Uber driver handed the money over.                Santiago-Lozada and

his partner-in-crime then drove and dropped off the Uber driver at

a movie theater in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, and continued away in the

carjacked Kia.

         C. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            A   federal     grand    jury     charged    Santiago-Lozada       and   a

codefendant      (not   a   party    to   this   appeal)      in    an   eight-count

indictment.      Santiago-Lozada was charged in six counts, the first

four (Counts 1-4) related to the January 31st Uber carjacking,

while the latter two (Counts 7-8) related to the January 25th

carjacking:      Counts 1 and 7, carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2119(1) and (2); Counts 2 and 8, using, carrying, and brandishing

of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in

violation   of    18 U.S.C.    § 924      (c)(1)(A)(ii)       and    (2);   Count 3,

kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and (2); and

Count 4, bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and

(2).

            Santiago-Lozada         entered    into     an   agreement      with   the

government in which he would plead guilty to Counts 1, 2, and 7.

Counts 1 and 7 pertained to the two carjackings (the January 31

                                       - 4 -
Uber carjacking and the January 25 carjacking, respectively),

while Count 2 concerned the use or possession of the firearm in

relation to the January 31st carjacking of the Uber driver.    For

Count 2, the agreement permitted Santiago-Lozada to plead to the

lesser included offense of using and carrying a firearm, see

§ 924(c)(1)(A), rather than to brandishing the same.3   The parties

further recommended an imprisonment sentence of 123 months, which

included sixty-three months for the two carjacking counts, to be

served concurrently, and sixty months for Count 2 -- the § 924(c)

count -- to be served consecutively.   The district court accepted

Santiago-Lozada's non-binding guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A) & (B).

          The PSR calculated the applicable sentencing guidelines

for both carjacking counts as follows. The January 25th carjacking

of Victim 1 (Count 7) carried a base offense level of 20, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), plus a five-level enhancement because a

firearm was brandished, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), and

a two-level enhancement because the robbery involved a carjacking,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5), for a total offense level of

27.   Meanwhile, the January 31st carjacking of Victim 2 (Count 1)

      3The mandatory minimum penalty for using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under
§ 924(c) is five years' imprisonment, whereas the mandatory
minimum penalty for brandishing is seven years' imprisonment. See
§ 924 (c)(1)(A)(i) & (ii).

                              - 5 -
likewise      carried     a   base     offense     level       of    20,    pursuant      to

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a),          plus    a   four-level       enhancement        because      a

person was abducted in the commission of the offense, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A), and a two-level enhancement because the

robbery involved a carjacking, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5),

for a total offense level of 26.                    Given that Santiago-Lozada

pleaded guilty to Count 2 -- possession of a firearm associated

with    the       January 31st   carjacking        of    the    Uber       driver    --   no

additional enhancement was added for the firearm as to Count 1.

See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. n.4.

              Next,     the   PSR    grouped      both   carjacking         counts.       See

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a), (b), and (c).                 This resulted in a combined

adjusted offense level of 29.             Finally, three points were deducted

for Santiago-Lozada's acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).          As a result, the total offense level for the

grouped carjacking offenses was 26 with a criminal history category

of I.     Santiago-Lozada's advisory GSR for the grouped carjacking

counts (Count 1 and 7) amounted to sixty-three to seventy-eight

months' imprisonment.               Moreover, the § 924(c) count (Count 2)

carried       a    consecutive       mandatory     minimum          of   sixty      months'

imprisonment which is also the applicable guideline sentence.                             See

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b).

              During sentencing, the district court at the outset

adopted the PSR's unobjected-to guideline calculations.                             It next

                                          - 6 -
turned to the        sentencing     factors       in    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and

considered Santiago-Lozada's age, education level, unemployment

near   the   time    of     his   arrest,    and       consumption    of   controlled

substances, noting that Santiago-Lozada had been hospitalized for

hallucinations.

             Next,    the    district       court      addressed     the   nature    of

Santiago-Lozada's offenses of conviction.                  It highlighted that in

the January 25th armed carjacking (Count 7), Santiago-Lozada also

ripped the chains from Victim 1's neck and robbed his wallet and

cell phone.        As to the January 31st armed carjacking (Count 1),

the    district     court    emphasized      that      Santiago-Lozada      not     only

kidnapped Victim 2, but also forced him to withdraw funds from his

bank account, all while pressing a gun to his back and threatening

to shoot if the Uber driver looked at Santiago-Lozada.

             The    district      court    acknowledged      the     parties'     joint

sentencing recommendation, however, ultimately disagreed with it:

"[A] sentence of 123 months does not reflect the seriousness of

the offenses, does not promote respect for the law, does not

protect the public from further crimes by [] Santiago[-Lozada],

and does not address the issues of deterrence and punishment."                        As

such, the district court imposed a sentence of imprisonment of

seventy-eight months for Counts 1 and 7 (the upper end of the

applicable GSR) and eighty-four months for Count 2 (twenty-four

                                          - 7 -
months over the mandatory minimum of sixty months imprisonment),

to be served consecutively, for a total of 162 months.

              Santiago-Lozada sought reconsideration of his sentence,

arguing     that    the   plea   agreement's    recommendation   was   indeed

sufficient.        In his view, mitigating factors -- such as the fact

that he was under the influence of drugs while committing the

crimes and his age -- should have been given greater weight.             The

district court, in turn, displayed photos of the January 31st

carjacking         provided      by   the     government    in   discovery.4

Santiago-Lozada's attorney responded to the district court that

"My client . . . accepted responsibility, and he is repentant of

what he did."        The district court continued:         "Yes, but this is

brandishing.        Not only is it brandishing, but it's otherwise

used . . . . I could have given [Santiago-Lozada] two more points.

Your request for reconsideration is denied." This appeal followed.

II.       DISCUSSION5

              "Appellate review of a criminal defendant's claims of

sentencing error involves a two-step pavane."               United States v.

      4The photographic evidence was obtained from the ATM's
surveillance camera. The images show the Uber driver withdrawing
money while Santiago-Lozada stood behind him holding the firearm
to his waist.
     5 In addition to Santiago-Lozada's sentencing arguments, he

also makes a case for why his plea agreement's waiver of appeal
clause is unenforceable. The terms of that clause are clear, and
the government does not contend it applies here. Thus, we need
not address the matter any further.

                                      - 8 -
Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2019).               "We first examine

any claims of procedural error.           If the sentence is procedurally

sound, we then examine any claim of substantive unreasonableness."

United States v. Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2022).

         A. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS

             Santiago-Lozada's procedural reasonableness challenge,

which makes its debut on appeal, takes aim at the way in which the

district court got to its eighty-four-month sentence for Count 2,

representing     a   twenty-four-month        upward     variance      from    the

sixty-month    guideline       sentence   (which   is    also    the   statutory

minimum).6     See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4.         Santiago-Lozada was initially

charged with two counts of "brandish[ing]" a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), but he ultimately pleaded to a lesser offense

of "possess[ing]" a firearm, § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) in Count 2, which

related only to the January 31st carjacking, that in Count 1.

             According    to    Santiago-Lozada,       the   district     court's

upward   variance    is    procedurally      unreasonable       because   it    is

unsupported by the record. In his telling, the only individualized

finding -- brandishing of a firearm -- which the district court

relied on for its upward variance (as to Count 2's § 924(c)

brandishing during the carjacking of the Uber driver), he argues,

     6 Santiago-Lozada does not challenge on appeal the imposition
of a sentence of seventy-eight months -- the upper end of the
applicable guideline as to the carjacking counts (1 and 7) rather
than the lower end of sixty-two months recommended by the parties.

                                     - 9 -
was one that it had already taken into account in its calculation

of   the   GSR     as   to   a   carjacking     count   (Count 7,   the   first

carjacking), resulting in a five-level increase there.

            The parties agree that our review as to the procedural

claim is for plain error because it was not raised at sentencing.7

"Under the plain error standard, a defendant must show that (1)

'an error occurred,' (2) which was 'clear or obvious,' (3) 'that

affected his substantial rights,' and (4) 'seriously impaired the

fairness,        integrity,      or    public     reputation   of    judicial

proceedings.'"      United States v. Vázquez-Martínez, 812 F.3d 18, 23

(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d

57, 66 (1st Cir. 2014)).              "As the party claiming plain error,

[Santiago-Lozada] 'must carry the devoir of persuasion as to all

four of these elements.'" United States v. Merced-García, 24 F.4th

76, 80 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Pinkham, 896 F.3d

133, 136-37 (1st Cir. 2018)).

            Santiago-Lozada has not carried his plain-error burden.

"[W]hen a sentencing court relies on a factor already accounted

for by the sentencing guidelines to impose a variant sentence,

      7 The government urges that Santiago-Lozada's procedural
reasonableness argument is waived for failure to adequately
develop the same. Putting the merits of this assertion aside, an
answer either way will make no difference to our outcome today,
thus we need not address the issue at this time. We thus sidestep
the waiver issue and proceed to our plain-error review of
Santiago-Lozada's procedural reasonableness argument.

                                       - 10 -
[it] must indicate what makes that factor worthy of extra weight."

United States v. Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2020)

(quoting United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir.

2020)) (second alteration in original).    Here, the factor relied

on by the district court for its upward variance as to Count 2 --

that Santiago-Lozada brandished and used a firearm during the

carjacking of the Uber driver -- was not fully accounted for in

the GSR calculus.   Count 2 -- one will recall -- is the firearm

offense connected to the carjacking of the Uber driver (which was

charged as Count 1 of the indictment).   There was no adjustment to

Count 1 for brandishing or using a firearm.   As such, the mandatory

minimum for Count 2 did not take into account that during the

carjacking of the Uber driver Santiago-Lozada used and brandished

a firearm.8

          "We have made it clear that '[t]he plain error hurdle is

high,'" Merced-García, 24 F.4th at 79 (quoting United States v.

Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, 956 (1st Cir. 1989)), and, additionally,

"[t]he plain-error bar for challenging a district court's factual

     8 Santiago-Lozada's brief points (without elaboration) to
United States v. Carrasquillo-Sánchez, 9 F.4th 56 (1st Cir. 2021),
for support. There, we found plain error when the sentencing court
failed to provide a legally sound explanation for its upward
variance "because all the factors on which it relied for [the same]
were either already factored into Carrasquillo's GSR or not
specific to his case." Id. at 62. In this instance, however, the
factor relied upon for increasing Santiago-Lozada's Count 2
sentence was not factored into the GSR.

                              - 11 -
findings"   --    as   Santiago-Lozada    attempts   to    do   here   --   "is

especially high,"      United States v. González-Andino, 58 F.4th 563,

568 (1st Cir. 2023).         Given that Santiago-Lozada presented no

objections below to the PSR, he now may not dispute the facts

therein, "nor can he take issue with the PSR's determinations"

regarding his relevant conduct.9 United States v. Morales-Cortijo,

65 F.4th 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2023); see also United States v.

González-Rodríguez, 859 F.3d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 2017) (reasoning

that a party's failure to object to the facts laid out in the PSR

constitutes      an    admission   of    those   facts).        And    because

Santiago-Lozada's claimed errors stem from factual findings he

never asked the district court to make, "the error[s] cannot be

clear or obvious unless he shows that the desired factual finding[s

are] the only one[s] rationally supported by the record below."

Morales-Cortijo, 65 F.4th at 34 (quoting González-Andino, 58 F.4th

at 568).    Santiago-Lozada has not made this showing.           His claimed

errors are based on factual findings the district court adopted

     9   The PSR also provided that

            [t]he Court may exercise its discretion by
            considering a sentence under a variance,
            pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, U.S.C.
            § 3553(a).   The    Court   may    take   into
            consideration the defendant's history and
            characteristics, the nature and circumstances
            of the offense, as well as the need to promote
            respect for the law and afford adequate
            deterrence for the crimes committed by the
            defendant.

                                   - 12 -
from the unobjected-to PSR, and hence are supported by the record.

See id.

                For the foregoing reasons, Santiago-Lozada's procedural

reasonableness claim fails.

           B. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS

                Santiago-Lozada    next       argues        that       his   sentence   is

substantively       unreasonable.         Below,       Santiago-Lozada's          counsel

argued in the motion for sentence reconsideration that "123 months

was more than sufficient."          This well-kept the issue for appeal.

See Holguín-Hernández v. United States,                     ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct.

762, 766 (2020) (preservation occurs when a defendant "advocates

for   a    sentence      shorter   than       the    one     ultimately        imposed").

Accordingly,       our    review   is     for       abuse    of     discretion.         See

Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th at 655; United States v. Jurado-Nazario,

979 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2020).                 Santiago-Lozada contends that

his sentence is substantively unreasonable because there is no

basis     for    distinguishing    his    case       from     the      "run-of-the-mill"

carjacking offense contemplated by the sentencing guidelines, and

because "[n]o particular circumstance was pointed out by the

district court to adequately support a varian[t] sentence." United

States     v.    Rivera-Santiago,       919     F.3d    82,       85    (1st   Cir. 2019)

(alterations in original).

                In the sentencing paradigm "reasonableness is a protean

concept."        United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.

                                        - 13 -
2008).    As such, "'[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in any

given    case   but,   rather,    a    universe     of     reasonable          sentencing

outcomes.'       Our   task,     then,    is     'to      determine           whether   the

[challenged]     sentence      falls     within        this         broad      universe.'"

Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th at 113 (quoting first United States v.

Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011), then United States v.

Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020)).

            Santiago-Lozada       engaged      in      the     carjacking         of    two

individuals at gunpoint on two separate occasions -- six days

apart.    For these crimes and for further unlawfully possessing a

firearm, the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment

of   162 months.         The     district      court         concurrently          imposed

seventy-eight      months -- the         upper      end        of       the    applicable

guideline -- as to the carjacking counts (Counts 1 and 7) rather

than the lower end recommended by the parties.                       As to Count 2, it

varied upward by twenty-four months over the guideline sentence

(which is also the statutory minimum) of sixty months, imposing a

sentence of 84 months.         Santiago-Lozada argues that said variance

is not supported by the record.

            "Defendants        are      entitled          to        a       'sufficiently

particularized and compelling' explanation when they are subject

to   a    significant     upward       variance."               United         States    v.

Carrasquillo-Sánchez, 9 F.4th 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting

United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 43 (1st Cir. 2008)).

                                      - 14 -
"It is well established that a district court may vary above or

below a guideline range so long as it offer[s] a 'plausible and

coherent rationale' for its variance."         Rivera-Santiago, 919 F.3d

at 85 (quoting United States v. Alejandro-Rosado, 878 F.3d 435,

439 (1st Cir. 2017)) (alteration in original).              "When a § 3553(a)

consideration is already accounted for in the guideline range, a

sentencing court 'must articulate specifically the reasons that

this   particular   defendant's    situation      is    different   from   the

ordinary situation covered by the guidelines calculation.'"                Id.

(quoting United States v. Guzmán-Fernández, 824 F.3d 173, 177

(1st Cir. 2016)).     Unlike a within-the-range sentence, an upwardly

variant sentence requires a "heightened" degree of explanation.

See United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 91 (1st Cir.

2021).    When -- as in this case -- "a sentencing court imposes a

variant   sentence,    that   sentence     must    be    explained,    either

explicitly or by fair inference from the sentencing record."

United States v. Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016).

           The GSR calculated in the PSR and adopted by the district

court would apply to a defendant who possessed a single firearm,

see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), and because Counts 1 and 7 were

grouped, both carjackings were treated as a single carjacking

count, see U.S.S.G. § 3d1.4(a),(b)&(c).

           The district court in fact addressed the factors that

differentiated        Santiago-Lozada's           offense       from       the

                                  - 15 -
"run-of-the-mill" firearm offense contemplated by the guidelines.

See Rivera-Santiago, 919 F.3d at 85–86.                    "Although the appellant

may disagree with the relative weight that the court assigned to

these   factors   as     opposed      to    the     weight    that    it    assigned   to

potentially mitigating factors, disagreement over the [district]

court's   'choice      of    emphasis'        is    not   enough     to    undermine    an

otherwise    plausible           sentencing    rationale."           Padilla-Galarza,

990 F.3d at 91 (quoting United States v. Ledée, 772 F.3d 21, 41

(1st Cir. 2014)).

            The district court imposed a variant sentence as to the

firearm count, finding it was warranted to reflect the actual

seriousness of the offense.                The aggravating factors, along with

the   remainder     of      the    district        court's    explanation      for     the

sentences, formed a solid foundation for its sentencing rationale.

The district court offered a plausible and coherent rationale for

its       twenty-four-month                upward         variance          considering

Santiago-Lozada's overall relevant conduct as it pertains to his

use of the firearm in Count 2.                 When describing the offenses of

conviction -- the back-to-back at gunpoint carjackings contained

in Counts 1 and 7 (six days apart) and Count 2's possession of a

firearm     relating        to     Count     1 -- the        district      court     noted

Santiago-Lozada's violent use of a firearm during both incidents.

And, it highlighted that Santiago-Lozada pointed his firearm at

Victim 2, kidnapped him, threated to shoot him, and took him to an

                                           - 16 -
ATM and, as the court said, "forced him to debit all the money

from his bank account" while pressing the firearm against his

waist.     This suffices to explain the sentence imposed as to the

§ 924(c) count.       Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d at 38.           Moreover, the

remaining facts considered by the district court to vary upward as

to   the   § 924(c)    count   were    not    used   to     construe    the     flat

sixty-month guideline for said particular offense (Count 2).10 See

Ortiz-Pérez,    30    F.4th    at    115     n.4);   cf.    United     States     v.

Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United

States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2020)) ("[W]hen

a sentencing court relies on a factor already accounted for by the

sentencing guidelines to impose a variant sentence, [it] must

indicate what makes that factor worthy of extra weight.").

            For purposes of appellate review, a district court's

explanation for varying upward should be precise and robust.

Although here it arguably did not quite reach this level, the

district court nonetheless offered a plausible and sufficiently

coherent    rationale    for   the    variance.       See    Guzmán-Fernández,

824 F.3d at 177.      The variant sentence imposed as to the § 924(c)

count fell comfortably within the wide universe of plausible

       Although the other § 924(c) offense relating to the January
      10

25th carjacking (Count 8) was dismissed, the district court could
well take into account relevant conduct arising thereunder "as
long as that conduct was not used in constructing the defendant's
guideline range." Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th at 115 n.4 (quoting United
States v. Fernández-Garay, 788 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015)).

                                     - 17 -
sentencing outcomes, even when the same is consecutive to the

concurrent upper end guideline sentence imposed as to the two

carjacking counts.    We find no abuse of discretion.

          Woven into Santiago-Lozada's arguments is his complaint

that the district court failed to consider or "minimiz[ed]" and

gave "[in]sufficient weight" to mitigating factors, such as his

youth, mental state, and drug use, in fashioning his sentence.11

We review this preserved claim of error for abuse of discretion,

see, e.g., Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th at 113, mindful that "a sentence

will be deemed substantively reasonable as long as it rests on "a

plausible rationale and . . . represents a defensible result,'"

United States v. Rijos-Rivera, 53 F.4th 704, 710 (1st Cir. 2022)

(quoting Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 21).

          Many of our usual substantive-reasonableness principles

are in play here.    To begin with, we note that the sentencing court

has discretion over the weighing of § 3553(a) factors and we "will

not disturb a well-reasoned decision to give greater weight to

particular sentencing factors over others."        United States v.

Caballero-Vázquez, 896 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting

     11 Generally speaking, it is not abundantly clear whether
failure to consider mitigating factors goes to the procedural or
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. See United States v.
Caballero-Vázquez, 896 F.3d 115, 120 n.1 (1st Cir. 2018). It is
difficult to ascertain from Santiago-Lozada's briefing which type
of reasonableness (or both) he is arguing.        The difference,
however, is not material here, so we simply note these ambiguities
and move on.

                                - 18 -
United States v. Santini-Santiago, 846 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir.

2017)). Also, "a sentence is not substantively unreasonable simply

because the court chose not to attach to certain of the mitigating

factors the significance that the defendant thinks they deserve."

United States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2022)

(citations omitted).        Moreover, "[m]erely raising potentially

mitigating factors does not guarantee a lesser sentence."                 Id.

at 49. "[T]he district court must consider all § 3553(a) factors,"

but "it need not do so in 'some sort of rote incantation when

explicating its sentencing decision.'"         Alejandro-Rosado, 878 F.3d

at 439 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir.

2006)); see also United States v. Pupo, 995 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir.

2021) ("A district judge need not 'verbalize its evaluation of

each and every [§] 3553(a) factor' nor do so in painstaking

detail." (quoting United States v. Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d

232, 240 (1st Cir. 2019))).       "At a minimum, a district judge need

only 'say enough for us to meaningfully review the sentence's

reasonableness.'"       Pupo, 995 F.3d at 30 (quoting United States v.

Correa-Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2015)).

           Each of these principles apply with full force in this

substantive-reasonableness challenge, which is readily refuted by

the record.   The district court here stated that it had considered

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, see United States v. Daoust,

888 F.3d   571,   576    (1st   Cir.   2018)   (noting   that   an   explicit

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statement by the court that it considered all relevant factors is

entitled    to     significant          weight),     and    specifically       detailed

Santiago-Lozada's age, history of drug use, and hospitalization

for hallucinations, cf. Pupo, 995 F.3d at 31.                           This evidences

adequate        consideration           of     mitigating         factors.            See

Alejandro-Rosado,         878    F.3d    at   439;    see    also   Serrano-Delgado,

29 F.4th at 30 (finding the district court demonstrated that it

considered mitigating factors by expressly noting them); United

States v. Santa-Soler, 985 F.3d 93, 99 (1st Cir. 2021) ("[I]t is

incorrect to assume -- as the defendant does -- that his failure

to persuade the court to impose a more lenient sentence implies

that the mitigating factors he cites were overlooked."); Clogston,

662 F.3d at 593 ("That the sentencing court chose not to attach to

certain    of    the     mitigating      factors     the    significance       that   the

appellant       thinks    they    deserved      does       not   make    the   sentence

unreasonable.").

            Finding a plausible rationale as well as a defensible

result,     we     conclude        that       Santiago-Lozada's          sentence      is

substantively reasonable and that the district court, hence, did

not abuse its discretion.

III. CONCLUSION

            We need not tarry further.               The sentence of the district

court is

            AFFIRMED.

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