Court Opinion

ID: 9918580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-15 15:08:21.185351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:30.678026
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 9, 2024

                                       In The

                                Court of Appeals
                                       For The

                           First District of Texas
                              ————————————
                    NOS. 01-22-00697-CV & 01-22-00698-CV
                             ———————————
                                 D.G.W., Appellant
                                          V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 314th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
               Trial Court Case Nos. 2020-01788J & 2020-01789J

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The trial court entered orders transferring D.G.W. to the Institutional Division

of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to serve out the remainder of two

determinate-sentencing judgments there. On appeal, D.G.W. contends in a single

issue that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring him. We affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND

      In prior delinquency proceedings, D.G.W. pleaded “true” to two counts of

aggravated robbery, stipulating that he used a deadly weapon, a firearm, to commit

theft from two different victims on separate occasions and intentionally and

knowingly threatened and placed his victims in fear of imminent bodily injury and

death. In re D.G.W., Nos. 01-21-00094-CV & 01-21-00134-CV, 2022 WL 2347738,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The

trial court adjudicated D.G.W., who was 16 years old when he committed the

aggravated robberies at issue, delinquent and assessed determinate sentences of 12

years with the Texas Juvenile Justice Department accompanied by the possibility of

transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice once he became an adult. Id.

On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s determinate-sentencing judgments. Id.

      After D.G.W. turned 18 but before he turned 19, when the trial court would

ordinarily consider whether to release him or transfer him to an adult prison to serve

the rest of his determinate sentences, the trial court held an early transfer hearing due

to disciplinary problems. Four witnesses testified. The State called Alanna Bennett

to testify. D.G.W. called his mother, his case manager, and his brother to testify.

      Bennett is a Texas Juvenile Justice Department court liaison. She testified as

the representative for the Department, which requested an early transfer of D.G.W.

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      According to Bennett, D.G.W. engaged in “some destructive behavior” while

in custody, “accumulating minor and major rule violations,” and was admitted into

“at least two behavior programs.” D.G.W.’s behavior was problematic enough to

result in his removal from his correctional therapy for “violent offender treatment.”

In addition, he was unable to attend treatment for alcohol and drug abuse due to his

behavior. Both the violent-offender treatment and alcohol-and-drug-abuse treatment

are mandatory programs he has to complete while in the Department’s custody.

      With respect to D.G.W.’s rules violations, he had “170 total incidents on

record” between February 12, 2021, when he came into the Department’s custody

and June 29, 2022, when the trial court held the early transfer hearing. Most of

D.G.W.’s rules violations were minor ones, and they most often consisted of

“disrupting school activities, refusal to follow staff instructions, threatening others,

refusal to participate in activities, possession of unauthorized items, vandalism,

using profanity, loud and disruptive behavior and being in an undesignated area.”

      But ten of D.G.W.’s rules violations were classified as major. They included

“assault of staff, unauthorized contact or bodily injury,” as well as more than one

incident involving indecent exposure, multiple incidents of masturbation, and

extortion. Bennett testified that D.G.W. tried to touch staff with his penis, exposed

his genitals to staff, and ejaculated in front staff. Due to his sexually aggressive

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behavior, which is directed at female staff in particular, the Department placed him

on a “female boundary plan,” and female staff cannot be alone with him.

      The Department took additional actions to address D.G.W.’s behavioral

issues, including referral “for meetings with the youth services team, the behavior

intensive intervention program,” and “the redirect program.” A psychiatrist

evaluated D.G.W. to see if he needed medication. But no medication was prescribed

as a result of this evaluation, and Bennett stated that none of the Department’s

additional actions were successful in altering D.G.W.’s behavior. Thus, the

Department recommended that D.G.W. be transferred to the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice to serve out the remainder of his determinate sentences.

      In making this recommendation, Bennett also referred back to the two

aggravated robberies for which D.G.W. had been adjudged delinquent. In those

robberies, he had “lured the victims and instructed them to disrobe in order to

embarrass” them. Bennett opined that his pattern of sexually aggressive behavior

with the staff was similar in nature and intent, in that D.G.W. has said he behaves

this way “just to get a rise out of the staff, just to embarrass staff and bother them.”

      Bennett further opined that the Department did not have viable treatment

alternatives for D.G.W. On cross-examination, she conceded that departmental staff

are trained in behavioral modification. But Bennett testified that D.G.W. had not

been cooperative, noting that he refused the counseling that was provided to him. In

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Bennett’s opinion, D.G.W. “has no internal motivation to make any changes.”

Bennett acknowledged that there was one treatment program that had not been

tried—the so-called Phoenix program, which is a “behavior modification program”

that is reserved for those who have inflicted moderate to severe injury on another

youth or staff. But Bennett did not think D.G.W. qualified for this program and stated

that she “would not want to get to that point” with him at any rate, meaning that she

did not wish to see his behavior escalate to the point he qualified for the program.

She believed D.G.W.’s behavior was escalating. But given his failure to cooperate,

she did not think D.G.W. was a candidate for further programs with the Department.

      D.G.W.’s mother testified that she was concerned that sending her son to an

adult prison would not “rehabilitate him at all.” She stated that it is obvious that

something is wrong with her son’s mental health and that he needs treatment.

      Christian Wall had been D.G.W.’s case manager for about a month at the time

of trial. Through him, D.G.W. introduced several educational certificates into

evidence. These certificates showed that D.G.W. had completed training for basic

communication skills, basic employability skills, an introduction to hand tools, an

introduction to construction drawings, and an introduction to material handling.

      Wall testified that D.G.W. had shown some progress during the preceding

month. Wall further testified that D.G.W. had been respectful while in his presence.

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      D.G.W.’s older brother, who was 21 years old at trial, testified last. He

testified that he is close to D.G.W. and did not believe it would be in D.G.W.’s best

interest to be transferred to an adult prison. He opined that “putting him in a place

where there are people worse than him” would not help rehabilitate D.G.W. He

further testified that he had seen a “huge change” in his brother’s behavior during

the last two to four months that D.G.W. had been in the Department’s custody. In

particular, he said D.G.W. now talks about religion and has employment goals.

      After both sides rested, Oliver Sprott, who served as D.G.W.’s guardian ad

litem, recommended that the trial court reject the Department’s early-transfer

request. Sprott noted that D.G.W.’s nineteenth birthday was about six months away

and advocated he be given this additional period of time to show rehabilitation.

Sprott opined that D.G.W. knows right from wrong and is capable of improving.

      The trial court entered two orders—one as to each underlying delinquency

adjudication—transferring D.G.W. to the Institutional Division of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice to serve out the rest of his determinate sentences.

                                  DISCUSSION

      D.G.W. appeals from the trial court’s transfer orders. He argues the trial court

erred in transferring him early because he had begun to show progress toward

rehabilitation and was eligible for an additional behavior-modification program—

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the Phoenix program. Therefore, returning him to the Texas Juvenile Justice

Department would have been more reasonable than early transfer to adult prison.

                               Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision to transfer a juvenile from the Texas

Juvenile Justice Department to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice for an abuse of discretion. In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In general, in this context, if some

evidence supports the decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Id.; accord In re

C.D.T., 98 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

                                 Applicable Law

      At a transfer hearing, the trial court may consider written reports and

documents from a variety of sources, including employees of the Texas Juvenile

Justice Department and the juvenile’s guardian ad litem. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.11(d). In deciding whether to transfer, the trial court may also consider “the

experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to the Texas

Juvenile Justice Department or post-adjudication secure correctional facility, the

nature of the penal offense that the person was found to have committed and the

manner in which the offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute

to society, the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim’s

family, the recommendations of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, county

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juvenile board, local juvenile probation department, and prosecuting attorney, the

best interests of the person, and any other factor relevant to the issue to be decided.”

Id. § 54.11(k). But the trial court need not consider all these factors, and it may assign

different weights to the factors it does consider. In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d at 312.

                                        Analysis

      The question before us is whether some evidence supports the trial court’s

decision to transfer D.G.W. to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. If some

evidence supports its decision, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

      Some evidence supports the trial court’s decision. The penal offenses D.G.W.

admitted committing—two counts of aggravated robbery—are serious ones. When

he committed them, he used a firearm. D.G.W. also forced his victims to take off

their clothes in an attempt to humiliate and degrade them. These serious offenses are

some evidence supporting the trial court’s transfer decision. See, e.g., id. at 312–13

(relying in part on penal offenses that resulted in delinquency adjudication as some

evidence supporting trial court’s transfer decision).

      After being adjudged delinquent based on the aggravated robberies and

receiving two determinate sentences, D.G.W.’s conduct while in the Texas Juvenile

Justice Department’s custody has been deplorable. In less than a year and half, he

has committed 170 rules violations. Multiple violations are sexually aggressive in

nature, including indecent exposure, masturbation, and ejaculation before staff. The

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trial court heard testimony that D.G.W. has intentionally and knowingly engaged in

this conduct for the purpose of aggravating and embarrassing the staff, female staff

in particular, with whom D.G.W. is no longer allowed to be alone as a result.

D.G.W.’s conduct while in custody is some evidence supporting the trial court’s

transfer decision. See, e.g., In re C.D.T., 98 S.W.3d at 283 (relying on misconduct

while in custody as some evidence supporting trial court’s transfer decision).

      Despite the preceding evidence, D.G.W. argues the trial court abused its

discretion by transferring him to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice early

because his behavior has shown recent improvement and there is at least one more

alternative behavior-modification program for which he is eligible. Thus, D.G.W.

maintains, it would have been more reasonable for the trial court to deny the request

for early transfer and reassess his behavior in six months, when he would turn 19.

      D.G.W.’s argument is incompatible with the applicable standard of review.

D.G.W. does not truly contest that some evidence supports the trial court’s decision;

instead, he argues that this evidence is outweighed by other evidence. In other words,

D.G.W. is making a factual-sufficiency argument. But we have rejected the notion

that transfer decisions are reviewed for factual sufficiency. See id. (holding that

transfer decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, not legal and factual

sufficiency, and that trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as some evidence

supports its transfer decision). The question is not whether the trial court made the

                                           9
most reasonable decision but rather whether it was a reasonable one in the sense of

having some basis in the evidence. See In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d at 312 (noting that

we may not reverse merely because we disagree with transfer decision, as long as

decision is within trial court’s discretionary authority).

      In any event, even if we were to incorporate some form of factual sufficiency

review in our evaluation of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, doing so here

would not alter the outcome. The evidence of D.G.W.’s ostensible improvement was

limited. The primary witness who testified about his improvement was Wall, who

had only interacted with D.G.W. for a month before trial. Similarly, the educational

certificates admitted into evidence had all been issued within a month or so of trial.

The trial court, sitting as factfinder, could have reasonably discounted this evidence,

which was recent and postdated the Department’s request for early transfer, and

placed more weight on the evidence of D.G.W.’s delinquency and concerning

conduct in custody. See id. (stating trial court need not consider all factors and may

place different weights on factors it considers in deciding whether to transfer); see,

e.g., In re A.E.B., No. 01-19-00517-CV, 2021 WL 2931438, at *12 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (observing that trial court

was entitled to give greater weight to significant history of delinquency and

delinquent conduct that led to juvenile commitment than successful completion of

program for serious violent offenders while in custody).

                                           10
      Notably, D.G.W. did not put on any evidence that his most egregious

behavior—his sexually aggressive conduct toward female staff—had improved.

D.G.W.’s respectfulness to Wall—a male—is inapposite in this particular respect.

And assuming for argument’s sake that D.G.W. remained eligible for one as-yet-

untried behavior-modification program, a fact which the Department disputes, the

trial court heard testimony that D.G.W. had been uncooperative in prior treatment.

Thus, the trial court could have reasonably found further efforts would be fruitless.

      Based on this record, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See,

e.g., In re R.G., 994 S.W.2d at 312–13 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion

in transferring, notwithstanding evidence that juvenile had obtained G.E.D.,

successfully completed programs at facility, and improved in behavior over time).

                                  CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s orders transferring D.G.W. to the Institutional

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

                                              Gordon Goodman
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.

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