Court Opinion

ID: 9955926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:10:29.340138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:40.506108
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Siler, 2024-Ohio-1211.]

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                      CASE NOS. 2023-A-0060
                                                              2023-A-0061
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,                         2023-A-0062
                                                              2023-A-0063
         - vs -
                                                    Criminal Appeals from the
LAMAR SILER,                                        Court of Common Pleas

                  Defendant-Appellant.
                                                    Trial Court Nos. 2022 CR 00423
                                                                     2022 CR 00424
                                                                     2022 CR 00519
                                                                     2023 CR 00477

                                             OPINION

                                        Decided: March 29, 2024
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christopher R. Fortunato,
Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Margaret Brunarski, Ashtabula County Public Defender, and Michael J. Ledenko,
Assistant Public Defender, 22 East Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For
Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}      Lamar Siler, appellant in these consolidated appeals, appeals the

judgments of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him, after he

entered a plea of guilty in four separate cases, to a total term of 16-months’ imprisonment.

We affirm.
       {¶2}   In trial court Case No. 423, appellant was indicted on one count of

Aggravated Burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A) and (B), a first-degree felony, and

one count of Assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C), a misdemeanor of the first

degree.

       {¶3}   In trial court Case No. 424, appellant was indicted on one count of Trespass

in a Habitation when a Person is Present or Likely to be Present, in violation of R.C.

2911.12(B) and (E), a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of Assault, in violation

of R.C. 2903.13(B) and (C), a misdemeanor of the first degree.

       {¶4}   In trial court Case No. 519, appellant was indicted on one count of

Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and

(C)(4)(a), with a forfeiture specification for Money in a Drug Case pursuant to R.C.

2941.1417(A).

       {¶5}   Finally, in trial court Case No. 477, appellant was indicted on one count of

Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), a felony

of the fifth degree, and one count of Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(a), a felony of the fifth degree.

       {¶6}   Appellant ultimately entered a plea of guilty to the following: In trial court

Case No. 423, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of Breaking and Entering, in violation

of R.C. 2911.13(A) and (C), a felony of the fifth degree, and Assault, in violation of R.C.

2903.13(A) and (C), a misdemeanor of the first degree.

       {¶7}   In trial court Case No. 424, appellant pleaded guilty to Trespass in a

Habitation, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B) and (E), a felony of the fourth degree, and one

                                             2

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
count of Assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(B) and (C), a misdemeanor of the first

degree.

       {¶8}   In trial court Case No. 519, appellant pleaded guilty to Trafficking in

Cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(4)(a). And,

in trial court Case No. 477, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated

Possession of Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth

degree.

       {¶9}   At the change of plea hearing, the state submitted it would not oppose

community control. The state also recommended Northeast Ohio Community Alternative

Program (“NEOCAP”) as an alternative to incarceration. Although the parties agreed to

jointly recommend a sentence of community control, appellant stated he understood that

the trial court was not bound by the sentencing recommendations set forth in the plea

agreement.

       {¶10} The matters were consolidated for sentencing. During the hearing,

appellant, via counsel, took issue with a negative assessment of NEOCAP, which rejected

his request to attend the program, claiming appellant was not amenable. In support of

community control, however, appellant asserted he was not on probation at the time of

his plea; appellant noted he had not been in legal trouble since he had been released

from prison in 2016. Further, appellant emphasized he had substance abuse problems

which led to the underlying charges and exhorted the court, notwithstanding NEOCAP’s

assessment, to place him in a facility to address these problems.

       {¶11} The state did not oppose community control sanctions and also indicated

that the court order appellant to enter into NEOCAP for treatment. The prosecutor

                                             3

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
observed that “[e]ven though NEOCAP for some reason said that they didn’t think he was

a candidate for NEOCAP, let’s hope that he is or that the Defendant demonstrates to the

staff there that he will be a good candidate.”

       {¶12} One of the victims of appellant’s crimes, Harold Barnard, provided a victim

impact statement to the court. Mr. Barnard stated he is the owner of the house into which

appellant broke and entered. He asserted he and another victim, a female staying in the

residence, were traumatized by appellant’s acts. Mr. Barnard stated appellant kicked in

his door, which cost $200 to repair, and Mr. Barnard paid “hundreds of dollars” installing

a surveillance system around the home. According to Mr. Barnard, appellant stalked the

female victim and caused her to be evicted from previous homes before she moved in

with him. Although the female victim did not attend the sentencing hearing, and defense

counsel objected to Mr. Barnard’s characterization of the female’s experiences, the trial

court allowed Mr. Barnard’s statement.

       {¶13} After considering the record, the statements of the state and defense

counsel, the victim impact statement, and the pre-sentence investigation report, the trial

court rendered the following sentences: In trial court Case No. 423, nine months in prison;

in trial court Case No. 424, 16 months in prison; in trial court Case No. 519, nine months

in prison; and in trial court Case No. 477, nine months in prison. The trial court ordered

all sentences to be served concurrently for a total term of 16 months’ imprisonment.

       {¶14} Appellant now appeals and assigns the following as error:

       {¶15} “The trial court erred by sentencing Mr. Lamar Siler to a term of

incarceration for offenses that carry a statutory presumption to impose community control

sanctions.”

                                             4

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
       {¶16} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), “[a] court that sentences an offender for a

felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing.” Further, the

sentencing court “shall consider the factors * * * relating to the seriousness of the conduct”

and “to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” R.C. 2929.12(A).

       {¶17} R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in

pertinent part, that after an appellate court’s review of the record, it “may increase, reduce,

or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the

sentence and remand * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the sentence is *

* * contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); State v. Meeks, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-

A-0060, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11.

       {¶18} “A sentence is contrary to law when it is ‘in violation of statute or legal

regulations’ * * *.” Meeks at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-

6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34. Thus, “‘[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall

within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0020, 2021-

Ohio-789, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

       {¶19} Appellant contends the trial court erred by sentencing him to a term of

imprisonment for offenses that carry a statutory presumption to impose community control

sanctions. Appellant appears to argue that, considering the statutory presumption in favor

of community control, his 16-month prison sentence is contrary to law. We do not agree.

       {¶20} R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) creates a presumption in favor of community-control

sanctions for nonviolent fourth- and fifth-degree felonies meeting certain criteria. It states:

                                              5

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
             Except as provided in division (B)(1)(b) of this section, if an
             offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth
             or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a
             qualifying assault offense, the court shall sentence the
             offender to a community control sanction or combination of
             community control sanctions if all of the following apply:

             (i)   The offender previously has not been convicted of or
             pleaded guilty to a felony offense.

             (ii)   The most serious charge against the offender at the
             time of sentencing is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree.

             (iii) The offender previously has not been convicted of or
             pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense of violence that the
             offender committed within two years prior to the offense for
             which sentence is being imposed.

(Emphasis added.)

      {¶21} Regarding the felonies to which appellant pleaded, appellant pleaded guilty

to felony-four Trespass in a Habitation and was sentenced to 16-months in prison. See

trial court Case No. 424. He also, however, pleaded guilty to felony-five Breaking and

Entering and sentenced to nine months in prison.           See trial court Case No. 423.

Furthermore, appellant pleaded guilty to Trafficking in Cocaine and Aggravated

Possession of Drugs, felonies of the fifth degree, and was sentenced to nine-months in

prison on each. See trial court Case Nos. 519 and 477, respectively.

      {¶22} Appellant claims that the criteria in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) were met. We

disagree for multiple reasons. This court has held that, applying the plain language of the

statute, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) only applies upon a court’s sentencing an offender (after

conviction or guilty plea) for a single fourth- or fifth-degree felony, not multiple such

crimes. State v. Bentley, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0017, 2017-Ohio-8943, ¶ 19,

citing State v. Parrado, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0069, 2016-Ohio-1313, ¶ 23.
                                             6

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
Even though his prison terms were ordered to be served concurrently, appellant still

pleaded guilty to and was convicted for each of the crimes at issue. In this regard, the

presumption of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) does not apply because he pleaded guilty to and

was convicted of multiple fourth- or fifth-degree felonies. Bentley at ¶19; Parrado at ¶ 23;

see also State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0017, 2017-Ohio-251, ¶ 5. In

this respect, appellant’s argument lacks merit.

        {¶23} Even if appellant could overcome this legal snarl, the court pointed out

during the sentencing hearing that appellant’s criminal record includes a prior felony

conviction in which he was sentenced to prison. Appellant’s counsel also conceded this

fact. With this in mind, appellant’s record would render him ineligible for the presumption

under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a)(i) (which requires a person convicted of or who pleads guilty

to a felony-four or -five to not have a prior conviction to a felony offense). As such, even

had appellant been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one fourth- or fifth-degree felony, he

was not eligible for the presumption in favor of community control as set forth under R.C.

2929.13(B)(1)(a).

        {¶24} Assuming, however, appellant was eligible for the presumption of a

community-control sanction, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b) contemplates exceptions to the

presumption which would negate appellant’s eligibility. That section provides, in relevant

part:

              (b) The court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an
              offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the
              fourth or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that
              is a qualifying assault offense if any of the following apply:

              ***

                                             7

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
             (ii) If the offense is a qualifying assault offense, the offender
             caused serious physical harm to another person while
             committing the offense, and, if the offense is not a qualifying
             assault offense, the offender caused physical harm to another
             person while committing the offense.

             (iii) The offender violated a term of the conditions of bond as
             set by the court.

             ***

             (ix) The offender at the time of the offense was serving, or the
             offender previously had served, a prison term.

      {¶25} The record demonstrated that appellant caused physical harm to the victims

during the assaults to which he pleaded guilty. Appellant violated his bond by not

appearing for scheduled pretrials. And, appellant had previously served a prison term.

Given these points, the trial court had the discretion to impose prison because three of

the R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b) exceptions applied. See State v. Paxon, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2019-T-0011, 2019-Ohio-3551, ¶ 20.

      {¶26} With these points in mind, the trial court, in imposing sentence made the

following statements at the hearing:

             The court’s reviewed the presentence investigation reports.
             They’re extensive documents and they provide the court with
             much information about you, Mr. Siler. There’s four cases
             here. The court is familiar with the offenses in these cases
             that you pled to. The court further reviewed your past criminal
             record, and there’s a juvenile record listed. It does include a
             couple of assaults and a couple of other adjudications.

             At the adult level, there’s a disorderly conduct, it looks like a
             misdemeanor, in 2008; then an OVI. In 2009, there was a
             felony conviction on a 2008 CR 501 from the Ashtabula
             County Court of Common Pleas. In that case, you were
             sentenced to prison for eight years.

             And then there’s a period of time where there was no criminal
             activity listed here after you were released from prison and
                                            8

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
             prior to you getting these four cases here before the court, and
             the court reviewed the rest of the information here in the
             presentence investigation report.

             Now, the court’s considered the purposes and principles of
             the sentencing statutes, as the over-riding purposes are to
             punish the offenders and to protect the public from future
             crime. The court’s considered both recidivism and
             seriousness factors. The court notes that Mr. Siler does have
             a prior criminal record, as reviewed by the court, including the
             past felony conviction for which he was sentenced to prison.
             There’s a juvenile record the court reviewed as well. There
             was a span of time without criminal activity, and Mr. Siler led
             a law-abiding life during those years.

             Mr. Siler, you didn’t appear for all of your hearings before the
             court: 423, 424, and 519; and then you failed to show up for
             pre-trials on the 423 case - - or you failed to show up for pre-
             trials on those, and then also on the 423 case you failed to
             comply with pretrial supervision. That’s per the record and the
             docket. But in those three cases, you didn’t show for those
             pre-trials.

             Now, the court is concerned here. You do have a record. You
             were previously sent to prison, and then you continued here
             to commit some additional crime, these four cases for which
             you’re being sentenced. Victims were involved in a couple of
             these cases. The court does note these are lower-level
             felonies.

             There’s a joint recommendation between the state and the
             defense for you to be sentenced to community control and
             probation in these matters, and your attorneys have done a
             very nice job for you in these matters. However, for the
             reasons that the court placed on the record here as it related
             to factors, the court is not going to follow that joint
             recommendation and is going to sentence you to prison.

             The court finds that community control would demean the
             seriousness of the conduct in these cases and its impact upon
             the victim, and it would not adequately protect the public.
             Therefore, a sentence of imprisonment is commensurate with
             the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, and a prison
             sentence does not place an unnecessary burden on the state.

                                            9

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063
      {¶27} The court proceeded to enter sentence as described above. Appellant’s

16-month prison sentence for the felony-four Trespass in a Habitation is within the

statutory range. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) (felony four punishable between six and 18

months in prison).    And the court considered all requisite statutory factors.   We

accordingly hold appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law.

      {¶28} Appellant’s sole assigned error lacks merit.

      {¶29} The judgments of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas are

affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

                                           10

Case Nos. 2023-A-0060, 2023-A-0061, 2023-A-0062, 2023-A-0063