Court Opinion

ID: 9578405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:54.809839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:05.170600
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority. In Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958), the Supreme Court abolished the strict distinction between support awards and property settlements in dissolution actions for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the dissolution decree by contempt proceedings. In so doing, the Supreme Court recognized the strong public interest of the State in dissolution proceedings and its need to protect the interests of the public in such matters as well as to protect the welfare of the parties. Decker v. Decker, supra at 464. In Decker the court concluded that contempt proceedings are a proper remedy to enforce the dissolution court's order, irrespective of whether the court labels the award one of property or support, unless the defaulting party demonstrates (1) that he does not have the means to comply with the order or (2) that the provision sought to be enforced has no reasonable relation to his duty to support his spouse and/or children. Decker v. Decker, supra at 465. Accord, McFerran v. McFerran, 55 Wn.2d 471, 348 P.2d 222 (1960); Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wn.2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959).
As applied to the present case, the Decker rule allows Ms. Young to enforce the court's order that Mr. Young pay *848her $250 per month out of his military pension by contempt proceedings, irrespective of the fact that the dissolution court clearly labled such payments a "property settlement," unless Mr. Young is able to show that the award has no reasonable relation to his duty to support his former wife. I would hold as a matter of law, from a review of the record before this court, that Mr. Young is unable to carry this burden and demonstrate that the award has no relation to Ms. Young's support.
In determining whether an award is reasonably related to the support of a spouse, we must look beyond the label placed on it by the dissolution court to. the substance and purpose of the provision. Brantley v. Brantley, supra at 721. See also In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 658, 565 P.2d 790 (1977); In re Marriage of Rink, 18 Wn. App. 549, 571 P.2d 210 (1977) (holding that the use of the terms "support" and "property division" are not controlling in determining whether or not an award in a dissolution action is just and equitable). In the present case it should first be noted that this was a marriage of long duration and that the parties were middle-aged at the time of the dissolution. In response to Mr. Young's petition for dissolution of the marriage, Ms. Young sought maintenance for her support and a fair and equitable division of all the community property, including the military pension. The court, however, did not award actual maintenance to Ms. Young but made a division of the community property that was roughly equal. In its findings of fact the court noted that both spouses were employed and each had take-home pay of approximately $400 per month. The record also discloses that Mr. Young's military pension provided an additional net income of $425 per month.
In view of the low monthly income of each party, the court's action in awarding Ms. Young a portion of the pension, payable at the rate of $250 per month, was certainly motivated by a desire to equalize the monthly income of each spouse so that both would have a minimum level of *849support. As such, a review of the record leads to the "inescapable conclusion" that the award was reasonably related to Ms. Young's support and, therefore, that it may be enforced by contempt proceedings. McFerran v. McFerran, supra at 475. See also Boudwin v. Boudwin, 162 Wash. 142, 298 P. 337 (1931) (defining spousal support as funds whose sole object is to provide food, clothing, shelter and other necessities incident to support).
In its opinion, the majority seems to conclude that for this court to affirm the contempt finding would require a judicial recharacterization of the pension award as support. It cites Kinne v. Kinne, 82 Wn.2d 360, 510 P.2d 814 (1973), which held that property settlements are not subject to judicial modification in face of the clear agreement of the parties incorporated in the dissolution decree that the award of property be final. The questions of modification and recharacterization, however, are not at issue in the present action. For the rule of Decker to apply, the award need not be formally characterized as support; it need only be reasonably related to the support of the spouse seeking to enforce the award. Decker v. Decker, supra at 465.
For the reasons discussed herein, I would affirm the order of the trial court holding Mr. Young in contempt of court.
Reconsideration denied December 26, 1980.