Court Opinion

ID: 9495925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:13:25.953894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:16.159942
License: Public Domain

LEVAL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
A.
The majority affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant because it concludes that under the ADA “there must be a causal link between the specific condition which-limits a major life activity and the accommodation” sought by the employee. Maj. Op. at 104. I do not disagree with the majority’s perception of this requirement. The requirement, however, is satisfied in this case.
As the majority agrees, Felix satisfied the statute’s requirement to be classified as “disabled” because of evidence that her Posh-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) involved impairment of a major life activity — the ability to sleep. If she suffered impairment of a major life activity, she was entitled to “reasonable accommodation! ]” of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The majority asserts, correctly in my view, that Felix has no statutory entitlement to accommodation unless the demanded accommodation would alleviate (or avoid aggravating) her sleep disorder. Her evidence shows exactly that.
Felix submitted evidence that working underground in the subway would aggravate her inability to sleep, and, conversely, that working above ground (the requested accommodation) would alleviate the disability (or avoid aggravating it).1 If the requested accommodation was “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute, *110she was entitled to it.2
B.
Judge Jacobs, speaking for himself alone and not for the court, contends that my argument “is based on the buried assumption that an employee is disabled (and an employer owes an accommodation) even when the impairment is caused by the particular job and would not exist if the employee did something else.” Cone. Op. at 108. He is mistaken. My argument is in no way premised on that assumption.
As the majority opinion notes, “[Felix’s] doctors diagnosed her with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (‘PTSD’) [including] recurrent problems with insomnia.” Maj. Op. at 103-104. The majority concludes, correctly, “[H]er disability was her insomnia.” Id. at 104. There is no suggestion that her insomnia occurred only when she worked underground. To the contrary, her ability to sleep was impaired during her twelve months of medical leave, when she was not working at all. Felix may be entitled to an accommodation (only if reasonable) in the form of an above-ground assignment because a jury could find that work below ground aggravates her sleep disorder.3
In short, the case has nothing to do with human cannonballs who want to sell circus tickets. Our case is quite different and is really very simple. A plaintiff who is disabled by reason of inability to sleep has requested relief from an assignment that aggravates the sleep disorder. Her entitlement depends on whether the requested accommodation is “reasonable,” given the nature of the employer’s business. That question was never addressed because the district court granted summary judgment, failing to recognize that the accommodation was sought to alleviate the disability. We should remand for trial.

. The evidence showed, for example, that Felix did not sleep for more than one or two hours per night for over two weeks, after being asked by her psychiatrist to visit a subway token booth on June 7, 1996. Felix's medical evaluations recommended work above ground, stating that below-ground assignments would aggravate her PTSD, the condition that caused the sleep disorder. Although the doctors did not state this with optimal clarity, a fact finder could easily find on the basis of the medical opinions that work below ground would aggraváte the sleep disorder.

. The majority avoids dealing with the relationship between the impairment of the major life activity and the requested accommodation by observing that "Felix did not argue to the NYCTA that she was unable to work in the subway because such work aggravated her insomnia.” Maj. Op. at 106. Even if this is so, it is irrelevant. NYCTA’s own doctors found that Felix had developed a sleep disorder, and that it was aggravated by going underground. NYCTA was thus well aware that above-ground assignment would alleviate her disability.

. Judge Jacobs correctly observes that the reasonableness of a requested accommodation is usually determined by performing a cost-benefit analysis. I do not argue that the costs of Felix's requested accommodation are necessarily outweighed by the benefits, but only that she was entitled to a chance to demonstrate at trial that they are. Judge Jacobs appears in addition to argue that the remedy of reasonable accommodation can never be found on the basis of emotional conditions that are not susceptible to confirmation by objective tests. On this position I express no opinion, other than to note that it represents Judge Jacobs’s personal view and not the holding of the court.