Court Opinion

ID: 9659179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:34:22.644616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:04.745158
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes as a matter of law there was probable cause for Children’s arrest. It does so after an exhaustive review of the facts. The jury, however, on proper instructions, found the facts to be otherwise. We have said:
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made, regardless of whether it was contradicted; moreover, a court must draw every legitimate inference in aid of the evidence. If reasonable minds could differ on the issue, it should be submitted to the jury. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(2), (17); Larsen v. United Federal Savings & Loan Association, 300 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1981); Beitz v. Horak, 271 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Iowa 1978); Curran Hydraulic Corporation v. National-Ben Franklin Insurance Company, 261 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Iowa 1978).
Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa 1982). It seems clear to me that reasonable minds could differ on the existence of probable cause here. Therefore, the issue was properly for the jury to determine.
The evidence is simply not as compelling as the majority indicates. Contradictions abound. The majority quotes and relies on June Temple’s testimony of what she told Officer Burton: “I just had some guy expose himself to me.” The majority further quotes her testimony:
Q. I see. Did you or did you not tell him [Burton] that there was a man in there that exposed himself or words to that effect? [Objection, ruling.] The Witness: Yes, I did.
But Temple contradicted this when she was cross-examined:
Q. Okay. Did Officer Dunn say to you in sum and substance, “Did you see this man’s genitals or his penis or anything of that nature?” A. I don’t remember.
Q. Well, this is important now. Do you remember him asking you that? A. No, I don’t.
Q. All right. Do you remember telling him at that time that, yes, I did see the man’s penis or genitals? A. No.
Q. In fact, you never did tell him that, did you? A. No.
*683Q. And you never told Mr. Burton that either, had you, prior to that time? A. No, I didn’t.
The jury could have found that Dunn arrested Children solely as the person who allegedly exposed himself at Stevensons on January 25. Dunn’s answer to the petition and testimony both concede this: “In further answer to plaintiff’s petition, this defendant states that the plaintiff’s arrest was based upon an incident happening at the Stevenson store in Charles City, Iowa, on the 25th day of January 1979.” Dunn testified to the same effect:
Q. Okay. But you had to arrest him for indecent exposure some place. Where were you arresting him? Where was the place that you claimed at that point before you arrested him where he’d made an indecent exposure? Where? A. Ste-vensons in the Cedar Mall.
The jury could also have found that Dunn made the arrest without first ascertaining from Temple that Children had actually exposed himself on that occasion. Again, Dunn admitted this in his testimony:
Q. And June Temple had never told you that she had actually seen any exposure prior to April the 8th, 1979; isn’t that true? A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And on April the 8th, 1979, before you arrested Mr. Children, you never asked her whether she’d seen an exposure either, did you? A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Yes. That is correct, you didn’t ask her? A. Yes.
Dunn conceded that he had insufficient probable cause to arrest Children after first determining that Children was not intoxicated, despite the dispatcher’s report that Children was the flasher suspect. The jury could therefore have concluded that Dunn did not have reasonable grounds to believe that an exposure had occurred on January 25, and that his arrest of Children, based solely on that incident, was unlawful.
We have said that it is “for the jury to pass upon [conflicting testimony] under proper instructions from the court.” Jettre v. Healy, 245 Iowa 294, 298, 60 N.W.2d 541, (1953) (emphasis added). The trial court should not be reversed for sending the disputed questions to the jury.
I would affirm.
LARSON, and CARTER, JJ., join this dissent.