Court Opinion

ID: 9726989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:15:58.650887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.491261
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
Since substantial aspects of the majority’s reasoning are predicated on waiver by and/or acquiescence of Appellant respecting debatable legal points, it is difficult to discern the extent to which the decision is meant to control future arguments concerning, in particular, the relevance of the Sentencing Commission’s regulations, or the recidivist philosophy, to interpretation of the Three Strikes Law. Thus, while I concur in the disposition of this appeal in light of Appellant’s presentation, I maintain reservations concerning undeveloped counterarguments, particularly the position that ambiguity in the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “separate criminal transactions” entitles defendants who may be subject to the Three Strikes Law to the benefit of the rule of lenity, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1) (providing that the provisions of a penal statute be strictly construed); Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586, 593, 722 A.2d 657, 660 (1998) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court), and, correspondingly, that the recidivist philosophy should inform the Court’s interpretation of the statute. See generally Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 533 Pa. *158294, 299, 621 A.2d 990, 992 (1993) (applying recidivist philosophy in addressing the pre-1995 version of Section 9714 and describing the rule of construction as premised on the theory that sentence enhancement is intended to punish more severely offenders who, after being reproved, continue to engage in criminal activity, and that the heavier penalty for a second conviction should not be “visited upon the one who has not had the benefit of the reproof of a first conviction.”). Notably, the legislative history reflects that at least some members of the General Assembly believed that the statute would apply only where a defendant had been subject to both a first and second strike under the statute. See generally Legis. J. — Senate at 255 (Sept. 18, 1995) (comments of Senator Greenleaf) (explaining that, for the third strike provision to apply, the defendant would be in his late 20s or early 30s because of having served the mandatory sentences imposed under the first and second strike provisions); accord id. at 265 (Sept. 19, 1995); Legis. J. — House at 414 (Oct. 3, 1995). Moreover, other jurisdictions are divided concerning how to treat convictions arising out of spree type crimes under their respective habitual offender statutes, see generally Annotation, Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of Penalty Under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th §§ 2-5 (2003) (collecting cases),1 further suggesting that such relevant counterarguments should not be dismissed out of hand for purposes of future cases.
I also would not consider the meaning of separate criminal transactions for purposes of Section 9714 in relation to the “same criminal episode” language underlying the compulsory *159joinder rule in Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, given the substantially different aims of the statutes. Accord Commonwealth v. Fries, 362 Pa.Super. 163, 174, 523 A.2d 1134, 1139 (1987) (concluding that reliance upon Section 110 was misplaced in interpreting what constitutes separate criminal transactions under the Sentencing Guidelines in light of the differing purposes). Finally, I am not fully in alignment with the substantive Section 110 analysis offered by the majority relative to this case.2

. For example, courts in other jurisdictions have focused upon: the location and time between the offenses, the number of victims involved, the existence of sequential docket numbers, and whether the defendant entered guilty pleas on the same date, was represented by the same • attorney, and received concurrently imposed sentences. See, e.g., Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of Penalty Under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th at § 2b. Here, although the crimes involved different victims and separate locations, the time between the crimes was relatively brief, common issues of law and fact existed, the charges were consolidated, Appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses at the same time, and he received concurrent terms of incarceration.

. Under Section 110, crimes are treated as arising from the same criminal episode where there is a temporal and logical relationship, with the latter requirement focusing upon the existence of common issues of law and fact. See Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 491-92, 458 A.2d 177, 181-82 (1983). In this case, the crimes were separated by only eighteen minutes. Moreover, shared issues of law and fact arguably existed, as the crimes were perpetrated by the same co-defendants, involved identical offenses, including conspiracy, and were subject to a single investigation by the same detective. In addition, evidence of one offense would have been admissible in the trial of the other to establish, inter alia, identity, motive, and intent. See generally Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (providing for the admission of other crimes evidence). Indeed, in apparent recognition of such circumstances, the offenses were consolidated and charged sequentially as 1625 and 1625-A in the criminal information. See generally Pa.R.Crim.P. 563 (governing joinder of offenses).