Court Opinion

ID: 9838919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 19:01:14.81752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:53.267492
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13397    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 09/08/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13397
                           ____________________

        BETTY DENSON,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        DONALD GERTEISEN,
        LINDA GERTEISEN,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00228-SCJ
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                    22-13397

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and
        PROCTOR,* District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court
        erred in granting summary judgment on a premises-liability claim
        arising under Georgia law. While this case was pending on appeal,
        the Georgia Supreme Court issued a decision addressing issues rel-
        evant here. We therefore vacate the district court’s order granting
        summary judgment and remand so that the district court may con-
        sider this new decision in the first instance.
                                              I.
               In October 2018, Betty Denson and her family rented a cabin
        in Georgia for a short-term stay. The cabin was owned by Donald
        and Linda Gerteisen. The cabin was a two-story home in which a
        wooden staircase connected the main and upstairs floors. Two
        steps of the staircase were two triangular platform steps that turned
        at an angle. At the beginning of her stay, Denson fell and hit her
        head while going down the cabin’s staircase. She was later diag-
        nosed with a traumatic brain injury.
              The cabin was built in 1997 pursuant to a design template.
        About five years later, the builder sold the cabin to the Gerteisens.
        Before the cabin was sold, the property was permitted, passed all
        county inspections, and received a certificate of occupancy. At the

        * Honorable R. David Proctor, United States District Judge for the Northern

        District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        22-13397                Opinion of the Court                          3

        time of the sale, the builder was not aware, and had not received
        any notice, that any part of the cabin had been designed in violation
        of any building code. An independent inspection of the cabin, com-
        pleted at the time of the sale, did not reveal any issue with the stair-
        case, and the Gerteisens did not modify or alter the staircase during
        their ownership.
                When Denson rented the cabin, the Gerteisens had not been
        residing there. Instead, they used the property as a short-term va-
        cation rental, managed by and rented through Vacasa Vacation
        Rental, a vacation-property management company. Besides adver-
        tising, booking, and managing rentals, Vacasa provided other ser-
        vices including cleaning after every rental; providing towels,
        sheets, and amenities to renters; and alerting the Gerteisens of any
        necessary repairs to the property. Vacasa also inspected the prop-
        erty after each stay ended.
               During the 16 years that the Gerteisens owned and rented
        out the cabin as a vacation home, they did not observe any issue
        with the staircase and never were notified of any issues with it. The
        Gerteisens sold the property in late 2018, about a month after Den-
        son’s stay.
                                          II.
                Denson sued the Gerteisens for her injury, bringing a prem-
        ises-liability claim arising under Georgia law. She alleged that the
        Gerteisens owed a duty of care to her as an invitee to the property.
        See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (stating that an owner of land is liable to in-
        vitees for “injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13397

        keeping the premises . . . safe”). They breached this duty, she pled,
        by maintaining the cabin’s staircase in a dangerous condition.
                The Gerteisens moved for summary judgment. In their mo-
        tion, they argued that although a property owner generally owes a
        duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for all invitees,
        a different standard applied to them because they were “out-of-pos-
        session” landlords. Under Georgia law, an out-of-possession land-
        lord is one who has “fully parted with possession and the right of
        possession.” O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. Such a landlord is responsible only
        “for damages arising from defective construction” or “from the fail-
        ure to keep the premises in repair.” Id. Because Denson failed to
        introduce any evidence supporting liability under either a defec-
        tive-construction or failure-to-repair theory, the Gerteisens argued,
        they were entitled to summary judgment.
               They further argued that even if they were not out-of-pos-
        session landlords and § 44-7-14 did not govern Denson’s claim, the
        claim nevertheless failed. The Gerteisens acknowledged that if they
        were not out-of-possession landlords, they owed Denson a duty to
        exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. But they ar-
        gued that Denson had failed to introduce evidence showing that
        they breached this duty.
               In opposing the Gerteisens’ motion for summary judgment,
        Denson argued that § 44-7-14 was inapplicable to a short-term va-
        cation rental because an owner of such a property was not an out-
        of-possession landlord. Instead, she said, the owner of a short-term
        vacation rental was more akin to an “innkeeper or depository for
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        22-13397                  Opinion of the Court                          5

        hire.” Doc. 45 at 5. 1 And because the Gerteisens were not out-of-
        possession landlords, they owed a duty of care to her as an invitee
        to the property and thus were liable for the hazardous condition
        the staircase created.
               Denson also argued in the alternative that even if the Ger-
        teisens were out-of-possession landlords and § 44-7-14 applied, they
        were liable because her injury arose from a construction defect or
        because they failed to keep the premises in good repair. To support
        her position, Denson relied on evidence showing that the staircase
        violated local building codes based on its handrail dimensions,
        handrail height, and walkline widths.
                The district court granted summary judgment to the Gertei-
        sens. After reviewing relevant case law and the record, including
        the role of Vacasa and the services it provided, the court concluded
        that the Gerteisens had fully parted with possession and the right
        of possession, and so they were out-of-possession landlords. The
        district court rejected Denson’s argument that because the Gertei-
        sens offered the cabin as a “short-term vacation rental[],” they
        should be treated as “innkeeper[s].” Doc. 59 at 17 (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               Having determined that the Gerteisens were out-of-posses-
        sion landlords, the district court ruled that they owed Denson the
        narrow duties set forth in § 44-7-14—that is, they could be held

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13397

        liable only if Denson proved defective construction or a failure to
        keep the premises in repair.
               To prevail on a theory of defective construction, the court
        explained, Denson needed to show that the Gerteisens “‘knew or
        by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known,’ before
        the tenancy was created, of a ‘structural defect.’” Doc. 59 at 19
        (quoting WCE Holdings B, LLC v. Lewis, 870 S.E.2d 522, 525 (Ga. Ct.
        App. 2022)). “A structural defect is the kind that would have been
        discovered during a pre-purchase building inspection.” Id. at 20 (in-
        ternal quotation marks omitted).
                After reviewing the record, including the testimony of Den-
        son’s building-inspection expert, who opined that there were at
        least three defects in the staircase—improper handrail dimensions,
        height, and walkline widths—the court found there was evidence
        that the staircase’s construction was defective. But because Den-
        son’s expert failed to opine on whether the defect would have ap-
        peared in a pre-purchase building inspection, the court concluded
        that the Gerteisens were entitled to summary judgment under a
        defective-construction theory.
                 To prevail on a failure-to-repair theory, the court observed,
        Denson must prove two elements: “a duty to repair” and “no-
        tice . . . of the defect.” Id. at 18 (quoting Gainey v. Smacky’s Invs.,
        Inc., 652 S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). The Gerteisens had a
        duty to repair, the district court concluded, but there was no evi-
        dence in the record that the Gerteisens had knowledge about any
        defect in the staircase. To support its conclusion, the court pointed
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        22-13397                Opinion of the Court                          7

        to the pre-sale inspection that showed no defects and a lack of com-
        plaints about the staircase while the Gerteisens owned and rented
        out the cabin. Thus, summary judgment was granted on the fail-
        ure-to-repair theory.
               Having concluded that Denson failed to raise a genuine dis-
        pute of material fact as to defective construction or failure to repair,
        the district court granted summary judgment to the Gerteisens.
        The court did not address their additional, alternative arguments
        for why they were they entitled to summary judgment. Denson
        timely appealed.
                                          III.
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in
        favor of the non-moving party. Newcomb v. Spring Creek Cooler Inc,
        926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropri-
        ate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
        the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 56(a).
               On appeal, Denson argues that she adduced sufficient evi-
        dence to survive summary judgment on her premises-liability
        claim, which arose under Georgia law. She argues that O.C.G.A.
        § 44-7-14 does not “apply to transient vacation rental arrange-
        ments” such as the arrangement between Denson and the Gertei-
        sens. Appellant’s Br. at 1. According to Denson, the arrangement
        between herself and the Gerteisens was similar to an innkeeper-
        guest relationship. This relationship meant that the Gerteisens
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13397

        owed her an ordinary duty of care, which they breached by main-
        taining the staircase in a dangerous condition. And so, she says, she
        was not required to establish defective construction or failure to
        repair under the standard of care applicable to out-of-possession
        landlords.
               In this diversity case we must apply Georgia law “and decide
        issues of state law the way it appears the state’s highest court
        would.” Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc, 986 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.
        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[o]n state law is-
        sues, we are bound by the decisions of the state supreme court.” Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
                After the parties finished briefing the appeal, the Georgia Su-
        preme Court issued its decision in Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason
        clarifying the framework used under Georgia law to determine
        when a landlord-tenant relationship exists. 889 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga.
        2023). The Efficiency Lodge litigation began when long-term resi-
        dents of an extended-stay motel fell behind on their rent payments.
        Id. at 793. The motel threatened to evict them and lock them from
        their rooms. See id. at 792–93. The motel claimed that it had the
        authority to lock out the residents from their rooms because Geor-
        gia law grants a remedy that allows an “innkeeper” to remove a
        holdover “guest.” See id. at 795 (citing O.C.G.A. § 43-21-3.2).
              The residents sued, claiming that the motel could not re-
        move them from the rooms unless it filed dispossessory actions
        against them as required by a Georgia statute governing landlord-
        tenant relationships. See id. at 793–95 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-49,
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        22-13397               Opinion of the Court                         9

        50, 55). In the lawsuit, the trial court ultimately granted permanent
        injunctive relief, concluding that the motel was not an inn and thus
        was required to initiate dispossessory proceedings to remove the
        residents. Id. at 794.
               The motel appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which
        affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. Looking to Georgia’s inn-
        keeper statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that be-
        cause the residents were not “transient guests of a hotel as such is
        understood by a reasonably common person,” an innkeeper-guest
        relationship did not exist between the motel and its residents. Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the Georgia Court
        of Appeals concluded, the motel was a landlord that had to un-
        dergo dispossessory proceedings to evict the residents. Id.
                The motel then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
        The Supreme Court described the “key question” in the case as
        “whether the parties [had] created a landlord-tenant relationship.”
        Id. at 792. The Court began by contrasting the landlord-tenant re-
        lationship with the innkeeper-guest relationship. Id. at 795. It de-
        scribed an innkeeper-guest relationship as a “transient, non-posses-
        sory relationship.” Id. The Court observed that “the landlord-ten-
        ant relationship and innkeeper-guest relationship are mutually ex-
        clusive.” Id. But it also noted that “the absence of a landlord-tenant
        relationship does not necessarily mean that parties are in an inn-
        keeper-guest relationship.” Id.
              Turning to the landlord-tenant relationship, the Court ex-
        plained that a landlord-tenant relationship is created “when a
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13397

        property owner ‘grants,’” either expressly in a written agreement
        or through implied possession by the tenant with the landlord’s
        consent, “to another the right ‘simply to possess and enjoy the use
        of’ the owner’s property, either for a fixed time or at the will of the
        grantor.’” Id. at 792 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-7-1). In other words,
        “the hallmark of a landlord-tenant relationship” is the “transfer of
        the right of possession—the grant by the owner and acceptance by
        another.” Id. at 795.
               The Court instructed how courts should determine whether
        such a transfer occurred. Id. at 796. “Because transferring the right
        to possession requires a grant by the owner and acceptance by an-
        other,” the intention of the parties determines whether a grant by
        the owner and acceptance by another occurred. Id. The parties’ in-
        tention, the Court continued, can be shown by express agreement,
        such as a contract or lease, but even without express agreement,
        intent may be discerned through “evidence from the parties’ ar-
        rangement and the circumstances as a whole.” Id. Said differently,
        intent can be shown through other evidence establishing that “a
        person [was] in actual possession of the property . . . with the
        owner’s consent.” Id. (emphasis added).
               The Court proceeded to evaluate these two concepts: pos-
        session and consent. Id. at 797–800. Possession, the Court noted,
        involves “sufficient acts of ownership and control with respect to
        the subject property.” Id. at 797. In a residential context, a landlord-
        tenant relationship is ordinarily established when “a person does a
        collection of things . . . normally associate[d] with using the subject
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        22-13397               Opinion of the Court                       11

        property as her dwelling place—as her home.” Id. When a renter
        uses a property as a home, and “not just as a place to sleep or stay
        for a short time,” she can be expected to “maintain[] a relatively
        continuous physical presence.” Id. at 797-98. For example, a renter
        maintaining a relatively continuous physical presence, “perform[s]
        routine cleaning and maintenance; add[s], remov[es], or alter[s] fix-
        tures, furnishings, and decor; and keep[s] belongings there.” Id. In
        short, “acts of ownership and control” that indicate the renter is
        using the property as her “dwelling place” establish possession. Id.
        at 797–98.
               As to the concept of consent, the Court explained that con-
        sent may be express or implied. Id. at 799. A written agreement
        may plainly establish consent to transfer the right to possess and
        use the property. Id. But “[e]ven an agreement between the parties
        that does not expressly transfer the right to possess and use the
        property may shed light” on the question of consent. Id. For exam-
        ple, the agreement could allow or prohibit the “kinds of acts of
        ownership and control that can establish possession.” Id. On the
        one hand, the Court explained, the agreement could require the
        renter to “provide [her] own furniture, take out the trash, and keep
        the premises clean”—acts consistent with an agreement to transfer
        possession. Id. On the other hand, the agreement could prohibit
        the renter “from making any alterations, performing maintenance,
        or having visitors”—acts inconsistent with an agreement to trans-
        fer possession. Id.
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                         22-13397

               In addition, when the written agreement is ambiguous or no
        written agreement exists between the parties, a court may look to
        the “parties’ course of conduct” to determine consent. Id. at 800.
        For example, if an owner knew of and allowed a renter to do things
        consistent with possession, such as “decorating and furnishing the
        premises, taking on responsibility for cleaning and maintenance,
        entertaining houseguests, [or] changing the locks,” these facts may
        establish consent. Id. Conversely, if an “owner discouraged or was
        unaware of these or other acts of ownership or control,” a lack of
        consent may be established. Id.
                After laying out this analytical framework for determining
        whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed, the Court declined
        to decide whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed between
        the motel and residents. Id. at 802. Instead, the Court remanded the
        case, leaving it to the trial court to apply the framework in the first
        instance to the facts of the case. Id.
              We follow a similar path today. Because Efficiency Lodge had
        not yet been decided when the district court granted summary
        judgment, we remand to the district court for reconsideration.2

        2 Given our de novo standard of review, it is within this Court’s discretion to
        address whether, in light of Efficiency Lodge, there was a general issue of mate-
        rial fact about the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between Denson
        and the Gerteisens. See Clarks v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 609 (11th Cir.
        1991). Often, in deciding appeals from summary judgments, we forgo the op-
        tion to remand to the district court. In this case, however, we exercise our
        discretion to remand for the district court to answer this question in the first
        instance. See id.
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        22-13397                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        Using the Efficiency Lodge framework, the district court should de-
        termine whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed between
        Denson and the Gerteisens. If a landlord-tenant relationship did not
        exist, then the court’s basis for summary judgment, that is, the ap-
        plication of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, was erroneous. 3 In turn, the court
        should determine what legal relationship existed between the par-
        ties. The court should not consider itself bound to conclude that
        the relationship is either landlord-tenant or innkeeper-guest. An-
        other legal relationship may define the relationship between Den-
        son and the Gerteisens more appropriately. See, e.g., O.C.G.A.
        §§ 43-21-2 (defining depositories for hire as “[p]ersons entertaining
        only a few individuals, or simply for the accommodation of

        3 In granting summary judgment, the district court relied on several Georgia
        cases involving tenants who fell on staircases in properties they had rented and
        unsuccessfully tried to recover from their landlords. In each of those cases,
        Georgia courts applied the out-of-possession landlord statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-
        7-14.
        But nothing in those cases tells us whether a landlord-tenant relationship ex-
        isted here. The tenants in those cases undisputedly were using the premises as
        their dwelling place. See Martin v. Hansen, 755 S.E.2d 892, 893–94 (Ga. Ct. App.
        2014) (noting that Hansen, the injured party, was “leasing” the property from
        the owner and that she was injured “[a]fter living in the home for approxi-
        mately five months”); Steele v. Chappell, 474 S.E.2d 309, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
        (noting that the property owner was the injured party’s “landlady” and that
        the injured party had “leased” the house from her for several years). In con-
        trast, here, there is a dispute about whether Denson was using the cabin as her
        dwelling place and thus whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13397

        travelers”); 51-3-1 (defining duty of care owed to persons invited
        on premises by owner of land).4
                                              IV.
               In light of intervening guidance from the Georgia Supreme
        Court that was not available to the district court at the time of its
        decision, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand
        the matter for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

                VACATED and REMANDED.

        4 The Gerteisens urge that even if a landlord-tenant relationship did not exist,

        we should affirm on alternative grounds. See Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC,
        793 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that we may affirm on any
        basis supported by the record). They reassert several arguments, which were
        submitted to but not examined by the district court, why they are not liable to
        Denson even if no landlord-tenant relationship existed. But the district court
        never addressed these alternative arguments. The district court may evaluate
        them in the first instance on remand if it deems necessary. See Mamani v.
        Sánchez Bustamante, 968 F.3d 1216, 1240 n.26 (11th Cir. 2020).
        In addition, because we determine that remand is appropriate for the district
        court to consider anew whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed, we also
        do not reach the question whether, if there was a landlord-tenant relationship
        and § 44-7-14 applied, Denson presented sufficient evidence to establish that
        the Gerteisens were liable under a defective-construction or a failure-to-repair
        theory of liability.