Court Opinion

ID: 9955764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:15:05.925878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:20.634866
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0326-MR

NORVIN SPROWS                                                        APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
             ACTION NOS. 18-CR-000958 AND 17-CR-001609-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: LAMBERT, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Norvin Sprows, pro se, appeals the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s denial of his Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 motion

for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

            Sprows was indicted on June 5, 2017, for first-degree assault, first-

degree burglary, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and subsequently on

March 29, 2018, an indictment charged Sprows with being a first-degree persistent

felony offender. The charges related to an incident which occurred during the
evening of April 1, 2017, during which Sprows and two other unnamed subjects

forced entry into victim Robert Farris’ apartment and beat him. At the time,

Sprows was staying in an apartment rented by Farris. Earlier that day, Sprows and

Farris were involved in a verbal altercation resulting in police officers being called

to the scene. Farris requested Sprows be removed from the apartment, but the

responding officers believed Sprows was living there and indicated they could not

make him leave if it was his lawful residence. However, Sprows ultimately left the

apartment on his own accord before returning later that evening to commit the

offenses for which he was convicted.

             The Commonwealth extended a plea offer to Sprows for a total

sentence of eight (8) years which was rejected. A jury trial was conducted during

which the Commonwealth relied primarily on the testimony of Farris to link

Sprows to the incident. Sprows was found guilty on all charges and received a

sentence of twenty (20) years. The conviction was upheld on direct appeal in

Sprows v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000374-MR, 2019 WL 2462489 (Ky. Jun.

13, 2019).

             On April 15, 2020, Sprows filed an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his

conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied

without a hearing by the trial court on July 13, 2020. On April 20, 2022, Sprows

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filed a motion for a belated appeal which was granted by this Court. This pro se

appeal follows.1 Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

               A trial court’s ruling on an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky. App. 2014). To

succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the movant must

demonstrate that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced the

outcome of the proceeding. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). “The defendant must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. If the record refutes the claims raised in an RCr

11.42 motion, no hearing is required. See Hensley v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.3d

434, 436 (Ky. App. 2010). “RCr 11.42(2) requires that the motion state

1
  Sprows’ brief lacks a preservation statement and record pinpoint citations required under
Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4). When a brief fails to substantially
comply with the RAPs, our options are to: “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the
review; (2) to strike the brief or its offending portions; or (3) to review the issues raised in the
brief for manifest injustice only.” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010)
(citation omitted). “[T]he manifest injustice standard of review is reserved only for errors in
appellate briefing related to the statement of preservation.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d
147, 155 (Ky. 2021). We can determine with ease the preservation of each claim raised on
appeal and can readily locate the pertinent portions of the record at issue. Furthermore, we
extend leniency based on Sprows’ pro se status. See Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d
234, 236 (Ky. 1983). Thus, we choose to ignore these deficiencies and proceed with a normal
review.

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specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on

which the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this

section shall warrant a summary dismissal of the motion.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

             On appeal, Sprows presents five (5) claims asserting that trial counsel:

1) failed to motion for a directed verdict; 2) did not subpoena a witness who would

have laid a foundation to admit an audio recording which would have impeached

Farris’ credibility; 3) failed to impeach Farris with evidence he was a convicted

felon and under the influence of alcohol and cocaine on the night of his attack; 4)

erroneously advised Sprows to reject a plea offer for eight (8) years because of the

strength of the impeaching audio recording evidence; and 5) was ineffective due to

the prejudicial effect of cumulative errors.

             Firstly, Sprows argues that, since he was a resident of Farris’

apartment, there was insufficient evidence to prove a required element of first-

degree burglary: that he unlawfully entered. See Kentucky Revised Statute

(“KRS”) 511.020. As a result, Sprows contends trial counsel should have moved

for a directed verdict upon the conclusion of the prosecution’s case. The video

record clearly demonstrates trial counsel made such a motion, and it was denied.

             Turning to the second claim, Sprows maintains that the failure to

subpoena his girlfriend, Lasha Scott, was prejudicial because it would have laid the

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foundation to admit evidence of a cellular phone recording she made during a

conversation with Farris. The defense alleged at trial that the recording contains an

exonerating statement from Farris explicitly saying he “knows [Sprows] didn’t do

this” in reference to the charges. However, the record demonstrates that trial

counsel indicated he attempted but was unable to locate Ms. Scott for service of a

subpoena, and Farris acknowledged making the statement during cross-

examination. Therefore, we conclude trial counsel was not ineffective for failing

to call Ms. Scott as a witness and playing the recording to the jury would not have

changed the outcome of the trial.

             Sprows’ third claim alleges that trial counsel failed to impeach Farris

with evidence that he used cocaine and consumed alcohol around the time he

implicated Sprows to the police and that he was a convicted felon. In direct

refutation, the video record demonstrates Farris was questioned by trial counsel

regarding his drug and alcohol usage during cross-examination, and Farris

admitted to both during his testimony though he maintained it did not impair his

recollection of the incident. Additionally, Sprows failed to plead what felony

Farris was previously convicted of, and when considering the totality of the

evidence produced at trial, we are not persuaded there is a reasonable probability

impeaching Farris regarding this would have changed the outcome of the verdict.

                                         -5-
                 In Sprows’ fourth claim, he asserts trial counsel influenced him to

reject a plea offer of eight (8) years on the basis he would be acquitted if the jury

heard Ms. Scott’s recording of Farris. Sprows states the audio was never played at

trial; however, as previously indicated, the record demonstrates that Farris

admitted making the alleged exonerating statement during his own testimony. It is

immaterial that the audio was not played because its contents were conceded by

Farris himself. Thus, it cannot be said that trial counsel was ineffective in this

regard.

                 Furthermore, Sprows did not plead this claim with sufficient

specificity to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The possibility that trial counsel

misjudged the strength of this evidence in achieving a favorable outcome does not,

in the absence of other pleadings, demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

See Webb v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-0058-MR, 2020 WL 5868320, at *3

(Ky. App. Oct. 2, 2020) (“[Appellant’s] best evidence is that the jury’s verdict

proved the advice to be bad. That is never sufficient cause to require an

evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, much less to grant the motion.”).2

                 Lastly, the trial court was correct in its ruling concerning the fifth

claim of cumulative error. Citing McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694,

2
    Although unpublished, Webb is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to RAP 41.

                                                -6-
701 (Ky. 1986), the trial court’s order states, “As all the previous allegations were

meritless, they have no cumulative effect.” We agree.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court’s Order denying

Sprows’ RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Norvin Sprows, pro se                      Daniel Cameron
LaGrange, Kentucky                         Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Courtney J. Hightower
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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