Court Opinion

ID: 9677397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:51:26.31108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:55.794203
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(dissenting). The trial judge erred reversibly — twice. He denied plaintiff’s right, assured by GCB 1963, 302.4 (2), to read in evidence the critical portion of defendant Burditt’s deposition.1 Then he denied plaintiff’s separate right to call defendant Burditt to the stand for eross-exam*130ination; a right which was assured anew by the reenactment — effective January 1, 1963; RJA, PA 1961/No 236, § 2161  —of the act of 1909 (CL 1915, § 12554); also by presently quoted GCR 1963, 507.4. Division 2 erred in turn when it upheld these rulings (2 Mich App 557).
First: GCR 1963, 302.4 provides:
“.4 Use of Depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the- rules of evidence, may "be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any 1 of the following provisions: * * *
“(2) The -deposition of a party * * * may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.”
Our waxing and now multiloquent difficulty with this unambiguous and simply phrased rule of court recalls Justice Holmes’ pungent remark (Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 US 197, 401 [24 S Ct 436, 468, 48 L ed 679, 726]) : “What we have -to do in this ease is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words.” They are quoted above.
If Burditt was “an adverse party” within the quoted rule, and I hold that he was, 3 then the only restriction upon the “use” of Burditt’s deposition as sought below was the test of admissibility “under the rules of evidence.” The rule as quoted is un~ *131restrictive and bids no ban upon “use” of an adversary’s deposition because he is present in court. In such regard the rule nullifies the former practice, exemplified most recently in Thelen v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 304 Mich 17. So our inquiry is refined to question whether, tested by objection of counsel (of which there is none in the record save that he “would like to take a recess to determine if there are any inadmissible matters”), any part or portion of the deposition was inadmissible.
I look upon the deposition as consisting entirely of legitimate cross-examination of an adverse party, designed partly to draw out admissions against that party’s interest and partly to elicit — as it did— substantive proof which was admissible as against both defendants. Plaintiff was entitled under the quoted rule to have the deposition as offered, not hacked out parts of it, read before the jury as a part of his case in chief.4
And what was that substantive proof? No matter how uncertain and evasive its nature, the deposition as offered tended under Schratt (cited and quoted post) to establish that plaintiff’s decedent was seated as a passenger in the right front of the southbound car; that she consequently was not the driver thereof. That was an essential fact which, along with actionable negligence as charged against both defendants, plaintiff was required to establish preponderantly in order that he might recover against both defendants. The sad result of the trial judge’s dual error aforesaid was that the jury was denied the value, not only of hearing read the important part of Burditt’s deposition, but also of seeing and hearing Burditt — an interested witness— for appraisal of his credibility. It is a regrettable *132fact that Burditt, an eyewitness ivho formally admitted in his pleading that defendant Roby (not the decedent) was driving the southbound car, was not called to the stand by the trial judge. (See GCR 1963, 506.1), all counsel after such dual error having been unwilling — understandably—to vouch for or call him.
I perceive no reason for any current or early disturbance of the rules set forth in Schratt v. Fila, 371 Mich 238, under heading “Defendant’s' prior statement as substantive evidence.” (p 241), or for nit picking that precedentially helpful decision into a state of nervous uncertainty where none exists now. Plaintiff rightfully cites the decision in support of his contention that “To exclude the statements as substantive evidence is to block from the court a valuable piece of evidence without good reason.”
Schratt settled something definitely under the heading quoted above. I indorsed the opinion, along with the others, feeling that we had laid down this good and presently applicable rule (pp 245, 246):
“In the instant case, certainly Fila did more than identify the statement. It is also equally clear from the quoted testimony that he did less than deny the contents of the statement. It would seem therefore that under the rule in the Perry Case,  use of the statement in this case cannot be confined to impeachment purposes. Even though Fila admits the truth of his statement but then denies its effect, to exclude the statement as substantive evidence is to block from the court a valuable piece of evidence without good reason. We agree with the view stated in McCormick on Evidence, § 39, p 75: (Here follows the complete quotation of McCormick which Justice Brennan has set forth and dissected, ante at 122).
*133“We conclude, therefore, that the prior written statement of defendant Fila was admissible as substantive evidence. Confusing and self-contradictory as Fila’s testimony was, it was properly a question for the jury.”
There is nothing new or novel about the foregoing procedural observations. They portray only what was lectured and discussed in detail during Michigan’s ICLE meetings of 1963-1965; indeed only what “some not very difficult words” were meant to convey. Judge Gilmore, one of the ICLE lecturers on this phase of practice, has recorded the following-comment, immediately below quotation of Rule 302.4 (“E. [§ 13.204] Use of Depositions”):
“In short, at the trial or upon hearing of a motion, any part or all of a deposition, insofar as admissible, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or had notice thereof under any one of the following conditions:
“(1) impeachment of the testimony of deponent as witness;
“(2) for any purpose if the deposition is one of an adverse party or the agent of an adverse party; * m
“This means that by calling the adverse party it is possible to open the door to allow the opponent to get into evidence through cross-examination of his own witness things he probably could not get in by direct examination. A deposition, carefully taken prior to trial and used against the party in trial, can serve the same purpose as calling the adverse party for cross-examination without subjecting the attorney to many of its possible hazards.
' “It is true that some trial judges frown upon the use' of a deposition of a party for purposes other than impeachment, if the party is present, feeling that the party being present he should he put on the stand if his testimony is sought. However, the *134rule clearly permits the use of the deposition and the trial court, although not happy with the practice, cannot prevent it. Therefore it should be considered in proper cases.” 1 Michigan Civil Procedure Before Trial (ICLE), pp 635-637.
That portion of defendant Burditt’s deposition which the trial judge eliminated from jury consideration appears in connected italics in the appendix. Such elimination was prejudicial error because the eliminated portion includes admissible substantive testimony given by “an adverse party.” That, party was an eyewitness of crucial events bearing upon the issue of liability of both defendants. That such eliminated portion included certain admissions of defendant Burditt formed no basis for the ruling below. In the circumstances disclosed here a need for cautionary jury instruction only (as to effect of admissions made by one only of two defendants) arose in favor of defendant Roby. He had no right to demand more.
Second: After defendant Burditt’s deposition had been thus excised and read, plaintiff’s counsel called defendant Burditt to the stand with announcement of intent to cross-examine him as an adverse party. Upholding objection of counsel for both defendants, the trial judge ruled:
“The Court. Let the record show that yesterday during the trial the defendant, William Burditt, was present in court. That despite this fact the attorney for the plaintiff chose not to call Mr. Burditt to the stand, either as his own witness or as an adverse party under the statute. Instead he chose to place before the jury the testimony of William Burditt taken in a deposition on September 15, 1964. At the time he did this he did not announce this testimony was taken or introduced as cross-examination. Prior to the introduction of the deposition or the reading of the deposition into evidence, as *135a result of a conference between counsel in chambers, certain portions of the deposition were stricken. In the main, those portions which were stricken were those where an attempt was made during the course of the deposition to impeach Mr. Burditt’s testimony because of certain alleged prior statements made by him. It was the ruling of the court yesterday that no proper foundation had been laid in the course of the deposition which would make the prior statements admissible for impeachment purposes. I think that brings us up to date, until we reached the point now where Mr. Abram or Mr. Dean attempts to call Mr. Burditt, who is again present in court, for cross-examination. I see no inconsistency between the rule and the statute. The rule permits the deposition to be used for any purpose which would be either for cross-examination or a method by which the witness’ testimony might be introduced as the plaintiff’s own witness. The statute permits the calling of the opposite party for cross-examination. I see no inconsistency between the two, but I do see an inconsistency where an attempt is made to do both; on one day, call him as your own witness, and the next day call him for cross-examination. Yesterday, having discovered, at least insofar as the ruling of the court was concerned, that there were defects in the deposition, insofar as using the prior statements for impeachment purposes, because no foundation had been laid, the plaintiff now seeks to call the same witness personally to the stand, I suppose, with the attempt to lay a proper foundation, whereby the prior statements might become useful for impeachment purposes. I am unable to see how he can do both. Yesterday he made him his own witness; today he now wants to cross-examine him. I think I shall sustain the objection made at this time as to calling him under the statute for cross-examination after introducing his testimony as his own witness through the deposition.”
*136I hold such denial of right of statutory cross-examination to be reversible error. Neither the former statute nor the present enactment have carried any words which thus restrict the right which section 2161 of RJA and coordinate GCR 1963, 507.46 unreservedly provide. When the witness called is an “opposite party,” and due announcement of purpose is made, the accorded right of cross-examination is “the same as if he were called by the opposite party.” As recently redeclared in Petrosky v. Dziurman, 367 Mich 539, 548,’ “Defendant’s testimony so developed stood [stands] .in no different position in the case than it would had it been called out by cross-examination after he had taken the stand in his own behalf.” '
The continued purpose and employed utility of the current statute and court rule appear pointedly in Aphoresmenos v. McIntosh, 189 Mich 680; City of Detroit v. Porath, 271 Mich 42; Cohn v. Mary Lee Candies, Inc., 293 Mich 157; and, most recently, in the comment by Honigman & Hawkins (2 Michigan Court Rules Annotated, pp 394, 395):
“6. Cross-examination of Opposite Party or Agent.
“Subrule 507.4 provides that a party may call, as witnesses any other parties, or their agents, and that these witnesses may be cross-examined by the party calling them and the testimony given by such persons may be contradicted and impeached. This rule is based upon a former statutory provision, CL 1948,. § 617.66 (Stat Ann §27.915), which has now been brought forward as EJA § 2161. The rule involves no. change in former practice. Its purpose is to permit calling an opposite party as a witness, in order to get at the truth of facts within *137Ms knowledge without the limitations as to contradictions and impeachment normally applicable to one’s own witnesses, and without the risks of having to vouch for his testimony.”
The foregoing comment by Honigman & Hawkins was doubtless taken, in part, from Waller v. Sloan, 225 Mich 600, 603-605:
“If defendant Sloan’s testimony proved plaintiff’s ease in what way has defendant been harmed? The purpose of the statute is to level former technical rules and to get at the facts in issue. Evidently the cross-examination was no ‘fishing expedition’ for the complaint is that it proved plaintiff’s case. It did.
“What does the statute mean in giving ‘the right to cross-examine such witness the same as if he were called by the opposite party.’ The so-called ‘orthodox rule’ extending the right of cross-examination to all points material to issues involved, and not limiting it to matters brought out on direct examination, has ever prevailed in this State. People v. Barker, 60 Mich 277 (1 Am St Rep 501), and cases there cited. The legislature was aware of this rule and employed the term ‘cross-examine’ advisedly. It must be remembered in considering cases upon the right to cross-examine that the Michigan rule does not prevail in a majority of the States. * * *
“Plaintiff had a right, if he could, to make out his case by the testimony of defendant. If the statute admits of abuse in the nature of a search of a defendant’s side of a case before a plaintiff enters upon proof of his case the legislature can provide a remedy. It is, however, no abuse of the statutory leave, and does not at all offend justice, for a plaintiff to ‘make out Ms case from the cross-examination of defendant.’ ”
Did the fact that plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to read in evidence all of defendant Burditt’s depq*138sition, affect Ms subsequently claimed right to call defendant Burditt to the stand for cross-examination? The evenhanded answer is that the privilege 302.4 (2) provides, and the privilege section 2161 and Rule 507.4 provide, are separate and independent. At election of a party otherwise entitled to employ the two, that party may utilize one, or the other, or both.
A final point requires discussion. As previously noted defendant Burditt moved separately for a directed verdict. The trial judge ruled that plaintiff had not made out a submissible case of actionable negligence as against Burditt. Burditt’s said motion was granted. A separate judgment for Burditt entered. As for defendant Roby, the usual questions were submitted to the jury, followed by verdict for Roby and entry of a separate judgment in his favor.
Plaintiff duly claimed an appeal from denial of his motion for new trial as against Roby. He failed to appeal from the judgment for Burditt. The latter judgment now being final, question arose at conference whether the points dealt with above, that is, right of plaintiff to read in evidence Burditt’s deposition and right of plaintiff to call him to the stand for cross-examination, had not become moot and hence nonreversible; the point being that, since Burditt no longer is an “opposite party,” plaintiff now cannot utilize Burditt’s deposition as before and also may not call Burditt other than as his own witness.
The undersigned, having found that prejudicial errors were committed against plaintiff during the trial, concludes that plaintiff is entitled to reversal for new trial as against defendant Roby. The errors thus found were committed largely on request gf Roby’s counsel, Tainting as they did the verdict *139of the jury which absolved Roby, they were prejudicial.
It is not for ns to say that plaintiff on retrial cannot make out a snbmissible case as against Roby, or that any case he may submit as against Roby will fail for want of availability to him of the mentioned statute and rules. This follows particularly in view of the fact that plaintiff’s counsel, even though disabled from employment of the procedures upheld by this opinion, may yet call Burditt to the stand for direct examination concerning identity of' the driver of the Kingsley car7 and for invocation if necessary of the trial judge’s discretion to permit confrontation, of Burditt, with his deposed and recorded statements regarding identity of the driver of the Kingsley car. See Bresch v. Wolf, 243 Mich 638; also Higdon v. Kelley, 339 Mich 209, 217-219, where the practice is fully discussed with citation and quotation of applicable authority. We note in passing that Bresch and Higdon were civil actions for damages, as is this case of Ruhala.
The respective judgments of the circuit court and Court of Appeals — entered for Roby — should be reversed with remand for retrial. Plaintiff should have costs of all three courts.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

*140
APPENDIX

Pertinent text of deposition of defendant William Bnrditt; parts italicized were ordered not read to the jury.
“Examination by Mr. Abram: * * *
“Q. You say that you saw this vehicle, what lrind of a car was it ?
“A. Well, I didn’t know at the time, but it is a ’57 Chevrolet, I found that out afterwards.
“Q. All right, and as you saw the rear end swing west, you said, now, you said you were 150 feet away from it at that time ?
“A. I would say approximately, something like that, I don’t know.
“Q. How many lanes is there on Dixie Highway?
“A. Pour lanes.
“Q. And that would be two lanes north and two south?
“A. ■ Two lanes north and two south.
“Q. Is there a shoulder also ?
“A. Oh, yeah, there is gravel, not paved like some of them, it is gravel.
“Q. Is there room for a car on that?
“A. No, not without going in the ditch.
“Q. All right, and what speed were you going when you first saw this car swing out?
“A. Not over 30.
“Q. Then you proceeded, as you told us, and about how far were you from this other vehiclé which you later found out to be the Kingsley car when the two vehicles came into collision?
“A. How far what?
“Q. Plow far were you away, — will you read the question?

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter.)

“Mr.. Abram. Strike the question.
*141“Q. {By Mr. Abram.) How far were you from the Kingsley vehicle when you realized that the Kingsley vehicle was not going to swing around, as you described to us ?
“A. Oh—
_ “Mr. Ambrose. Just give the best you can, in terms of distance estimates. If you can’t, say you can’t, but if you can, give it the best you can.
“A. Maybe 40, 50 feet.
“Q. {By Mr. Abram.) And at that point did you then apply your brakes ?
“A. Yeah, I couldn’t do nothing. If I had known that was going to happen I could have gone ahead and gone in the ditch, hut I didn’t even know he was going to come across the center line. Lots of times you will see them skidding and they will straighten out and go on.
“Q. At the time you were 40 or 50 feet away, that was the first time you had applied your brakes, is .that right?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. At the time you were 40 or 50 feet away and going 30 miles an hour, you slowed down at that point, didn’t you?
“A. Yes. '
“Q. Would you tell us how slow a speed you were going?.
“A. That was an old ’54, when you didn’t give her the gas, you ain’t going very fast; I would say maybe 15, 20 miles an hour is all I was moving at the time of the impact. Of course, I have no way .of.proving it, I don’t know.
“Q. What part of your car collided with the other car ?
“A. The front end, the whole front end.
“Q. And what part of the Kingsley car was injured? ■
“A. That would be the hack door, from the back door to the rear.
*142“Q. Did you see the passengers in the car before you hit?
“A. I noticed them when they first started to swing around, I could see through the car.
“Q. Could you tell me the sex of the passengers in the car ?
“A. Pardon?
“Q. The sex of the passengers in the car ?
“A. It looked to me like a man a woman.
“Q. And which side was the woman sitting on?
“A. I have a picture in my mind that when that car first started to come around, like that, that this woman was behind the wheel, that is just the impression I got, and I still have that picture in my mind. It seems when we hit, she was over to my side of the car, what I mean, not my side, I mean the side that I hit on the car.
“Q. Then you saw the woman in the car just before you hit ?
“A. I don’t know what I saw then, I can’t tell you. (Plaintiff’s Deposition Exhibit No. 1 marked for identification.)
“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) Mr. Burditt, do you remember a police o'fficer coming to your home?

“A. Yeah.

“Q. And him asking you some questions right on the day of the accident?

“A. Yeah.

“Q. Now, was your memory fresher of the accident then than it is now?
“A. I don’t know, I was pretty sore. My face, this side of my face was all banged up, and my chest and my leg.
“Q. At that time do you remember being asked this question, ‘William, did you see the passengers in the car before you hit,’ and you replied, ‘Yes, Sir.’ Do you remember that question and answer?

“A. Yeah.

“Q. The next question: ‘Could you tell me the sex of the passengers and where they were sitting in the car?’
*143“A. ‘A male and female; the woman was sitting on the passenger’s side when we hit.
“Q. ‘Then you saw this woman in the car just before you hit9

“A. ‘Yeah.

“Q. ‘William, you said earlier that a woman was on your side when you hit, so you would say that the man in the car was driving¶

“A. ‘He had to have been, there was a man driving.

“Q. ‘William, has anyone else contacted you with reference to any statements before I came?
“A. ‘No.
“Q. ‘Have any promises been made to you in regards to the taking of this statement?

“A. ‘No.

“Q. ‘Is this the truth to the best of your knowledge?

“A. ‘Yes, sir.’

“Do you remember those questions and those answers?

“A. Yes.

“Mr. Ambrose. Gould we have the police officer identified?
“Mr. Abram. This whole exhibit is marked, but it is Gerald H-o-u-g-h.
“Mr. Ambrose. What police department is that?
“Mr. Abram. Michigan State Police.
“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) Do you remember those questions and those answers?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Were those qtiestions true and correct?
“A. They must have been at the time.
“Mr. Ambrose. Wait a minute, I should have ivarned you that once in awhile I may want to interject and object to something; if so, you stop right then and let me finish my objection. I am not certain, Bob, that you phrased your questions the ivay, — maybe I misunderstood, you, asked him if the questions were true and correct?
*144“Mr. Abram. I was next going to ash him if the answers that he gave were true and correct.
“Mr. Ambrose. I don’t think he would have any way of knowing whether questions are true and correct.
“Mr. Abram. Your objection is noted.
“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) The answers and the questions that 1 just read, were they the questions and answers that were given to you that day and you replied to?
“A. As far as I know now they were.
“Q. Have you given a statement to any other person as to how this accident occurred?
'“A. A manby the name of Moody.
“Mr. Abram. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion.)

“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) Now, go on and tell us ivhat you said, you gave a statement to a man?
“A. It seems, to me that this Mr. Moody was out and I talked to him.
“Q. All right, do you know why he came out there, did he identify himself?
“A. Well, I think, well this is —
“Mr. Ambrose. Go ahead.
“The witness. He was Mr. Moody’s insurance man, he said he was.
“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) Mr. Moody’s?
“A. Or Mr. Roby’s.

“Q. He said he was representing Mr. Roby?

“A. Yes, James Roby.
“Q. Did you give a statement to anybody else?
“A. No.
“Q. Have you testified in any proceedings?
“A. Saginaw.
“Q. When was that?
■ “A. Gee, I don’t know, it must be a couple months ago, — no, wait a minute, it must be about two ■months ago.
“Q. And that was in a court, a trial?
“A. Saginaw, yes, sir.
*145“Q. Are these the only statements you have evérgiven to anybody?

“A. Pardon?

“Q. Are these the only statements and only testimony you have ever given to anybody as to how this accident occurred?
“A. Yeah, — well, I talked to him today.
“Q. So you have given four statements, is that correct, one to your representative, one to a representative of Mr. Roby, one to the police, and you have testified in a court trial, is that right?

“A. Yeah, that would be four.

“Q. That would be the four statements you have given?

“A. Yeah.

“Mr. Abram. Mr. Ambrose, may I look at that statement?
“Mr. Ambrose. Yes.
“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) In this statement—
“Mr. Ambrose. I am going to object to proceeding until I let him read that, I think it is only fair to him to let him read it.
“Mr. Abram. All right.

{Plaintiff’s Deposition Exhibit No. 2 marked for identification.)

“Q. (By Mr. Abram.) Mr. Burditt, you have had the opportunity just now to review a statement that you gave on December 9, 1963, to a Mr. Donald Cook?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. Now, that was how long after the accident?
“A. Two days.
“Q. On that occasion he asked you certain questions about how the accident happened?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. And you gave him certain answers, is that correct?
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. After a series of questions you were asked, and I am showing you this, ‘I see, do you know, was she knocked out of the car or anything,’ and your *146answer at that time was, ‘She was laying half out of the car on the right-hand side, she was half out and half inf
“A. Yeah.
. “Q. Now, is that correct, to the lest of your memory?
“A. I didn’t see anything, I was still by the ditch when the man with the wrecker came np, Hank Gray, I know him, and he took me and pnt me in the police car. That is when I saw Mrs. Kingsley laying there on the pavement. It looked to me, well, I saw it when they came with the ambulance, because they forced the door further, and her legs and this was laying up in the car. The rest of her was laying on the pavement. They had covered her up with a blanket, but I didn’t see that until the garage man took me over and put me in a police car.
“Q. The question I am ashing you and the answer is correct?-
“A. Yeah.
- “Q. Now, the next question that was ashed you: ‘I see, do you know who was driving the other car,’ and the answer, ‘Well, I’ll tell you the same as 1 told the State Police and his wife, the man was not driving the car.’
“A. The woman was not driving the car.
“Q. Excuse me, ‘the woman was not driving the car,’ is that correct?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. Now, the next question is, ‘The woman was not driving,’ and the answer, ‘Right, not driving the car.’ Is that correct?

“A. Uh-huh.-

“Mr. Abram. I have nothing further.
“Mr. Des Jardins. I don’t think I have any questions.
“Mr. Ambrose. That’s all.
(Deposition concluded.)”

 See appendix hereto for unbroken transcript of defendant Burditt’s deposition.

 Our statute (cited now as RJA 2161) has for 58 consecutive years provided that any party of record may be called, as a matter of right, for cross-examination by any other party of record where the record shows that there is an issue between them to be tried. That is the essence of it. The statute since January 1, 1963, has been fitted, not only to Rule 302.4 but also to GCR 1963, 507.4 (quoted post).

 The only exception would be tbe short and isolated reference to “Mr. Moody’s insurance man.” See appendix, post at 144.

 “A Parties as Witnesses. Parties or persons who were their employees or agents at the time of the happening of the transaction out of -which the aetion aro.se, when called as witnesses by the opposite party, may be cross-examined by the party calling them and the testimony given by such persons may be contradicted and impeached.”

 See Welty Estate v. Wolf Estate, 345 Mich 408, 411, for cases concerned with identity of the driver of a motor vehicle, there being no direct proof of identity and, in one case, denial by one accused-of hitting and running that he was the driver of the hit-run ear.