Court Opinion

ID: 9957279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 22:01:02.128816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:15.317514
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
FLEMING, HAYES, and POND
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
Vv.
First Lieutenant ADALBERTO BRINKMAN-CORONEL
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20220225

Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii
Michael E. Korte, Military Judge
Colonel Marvin J. McBurrows, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: William E. Cassara, Esquire (argued); Captain Justin L. Watkins,
JA; William E. Cassara, Esquire (on brief and reply brief).

For Appellee: Captain Anthony J. Scarpati, JA (argued); Colonel Christopher B.
Burgess, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA; Major Chase C.
Cleveland, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew T. Grady, JA (on brief)

22 March 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

FLEMING, Senior Judge:

Appellant asserts four errors before this Court, two of which merit discussion
but ultimately no relief.! We find the military judge did not abuse his discretion
when he did not disqualify himself from presiding over appellant’s court-martial.
Nor did the military judge abuse his discretion when he denied appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence discovered from a search of appellant’s phone. We affirm the
findings and sentence in our decretal paragraph.

1 We have given full and fair consideration to the matters personally raised by
appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and
find they also merit brief discussion but ultimately no relief.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225
BACKGROUND

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of attempted sexual assault of a child who has attained the age
of twelve years, attempted sexual abuse of a child, absence from place of duty,
communication indecent language, two specifications of wrongful possession of
child pornography, and three specifications of wrongful distribution of child
pornography, in violation of Articles 80, 86, and 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 886, and 934. The military judge
sentenced appellant to be dismissed from the service and to be confined for nine
years and ten days.*

Appellant was stationed in Hawaii and was pending a potential administrative
separation from the service for alleged cocaine use. In preparation for the pending
administrative separation, appellant’s husband, ma a former servicemember with
twelve years of service, had already relocated to Michigan to prepare for their life
after the Army. During this separation from his spouse, appellant was arrested for
attempted sexual offenses with a child. Appellant’s criminal activity was discovered

2 Contrary to what happened on the record, the Statement of Trial Results (“STR”)
states that a “not guilty” finding was entered for Specification 2 of Charge II.
Appellant was found guilty, but the military judge merged Specification 2 with
Specification | for sentencing, as laid out in note 3. Additionally, the STR states
that Specification 3 of Charge II was “[d]ismissed after merger with other findings”
when in fact the military judge sentenced appellant for that offense, see note 3. We
amend the Statement of Trial Results, as incorporated into the Judgment of the
Court, to correct these errors. See Rule for Courts-Martial 1111(c)(2); United States
v. Pennington, ARMY 20190605, 2021 CCA LEXIS 101, at *5 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
3 Mar. 2021) (summ. disp.) (“Exercising our authority under R.C.M. 1111(c)(2), we
note and correct the following issues in appellant’s post-trial documents... .”).

3 The military judge acquitted appellant of a third attempted sexual offense with a
child and merged the remaining two Article 80 convictions for sentencing. The
military judge sentenced appellant to be confined for 60 months for those violations.
The military judge also merged the two convictions for possession of child
pornography for sentencing, and sentenced appellant to be confined for 9 months for
those offenses. The military judge sentenced appellant to be confined for 13 months
for each of the three distribution of child pornography convictions. Finally, the
military judge sentenced appellant to be confined for 8 days for the communication
of indecent language and 2 days for the absence. As the sentences to confinement
were ordered to run consecutively, the total punishment adjudged was 9 years and 10
days and a dismissal.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-—ARMY 20220225

by law enforcement officers participating in Operation Keiki Shield, a task force
targeting crimes against children in Hawaii.*

Appellant was caught communicating through the Grindr messaging
application with a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Special Agent (SA), whom
appellant believed was a fourteen-year-old boy named “Skyler.” Upon being
informed by “Skyler” that “Skyler” was only 14, appellant initially blocked, but then
unblocked, “Skyler’s” Grindr profile to erase their previous chat. Appellant
initially told “Skyler” that “Skyler” really was not supposed to be on Grindr but
appellant then proceeded to discuss sexual acts with “Skyler” and made plans to
meet him that day for anal sex. On 4 April 2021, appellant was arrested by CID
agents when he arrived at the predetermined location to meet “Skyler.”

During his arrest, appellant was informed that he was suspected of attempted
sexual assault with a child, indecent language, and possession or distribution of
child pornography. Appellant was advised of his Article 31(b), UCMJ rights and
declined to give a statement. A military magistrate also denied CID’s verbal request
to search appellant’s phone, seized during his apprehension, for evidence of child
pornography.°

After his arrest, appellant was released the same day to his company
commander, Captain (CPT) Appellant was “shaken” regarding his arrest and the
alleged serious pending criminal offenses against him. Captain [J who was
concerned about appellant’s well-being given his arrest and “shaken” reaction,
ordered appellant to comply with unit sign-in requirements even though appellant
was on leave in the local area. Appellant initially complied with the unit sign-in
requirements, but when appellant failed to sign-in at 0600 on 6 April 2021 or
respond to follow-up texts from his command, CPT {drove to appellant’s on-base
home.

Upon reaching appellant’s home, CPT Whaia not observe appellant’s vehicle
and there was no response from inside the house. Captain testified he was then

* Appellant challenged the military judge for cause after voir dire due to his previous
role as the Special Victim Prosecutor (SVP) for Hawaii, which included providing
advice to law enforcement agents executing Operation Keiki Shield. In the SVP
role, the military judge also worked with and mentored the government counsel
assigned to appellant’s case. The military judge did not have any involvement with
appellant’s case, or any knowledge of it, until the case was referred to trial. When
he was challenged for cause, he denied the challenge without further explanation
other than to indicate he would speak with his supervisory judge about it. There is
nothing further in the record regarding the request for recusal.

° Ultimately, a search authorization was granted for this phone.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

concerned “something might be very, very wrong.” Captain BR coordinated with
military police and the base housing director about entering appellant’s home to
conduct an emergency search for appellant. Captain [also called

appellant’s husband in Michigan, for consent to conduct a “health and welfare
check” of appellant’s home. provided CPT Bw ith consent to enter the home.
Captain bs the house but did not find appellant. [J who was still on the
phone with CPT became concerned and revealed previous disturbing text
messages from, and conversations with, appellant.

Eo CPT Mi that appellant had sent fi a concerning ge through
Facebook Messenger the night of 4 April 2021. Appellant had sent message
instructing him to “come IMMEDIATELY back to Hawaii... book the next available
flight as soon as you see this message... get to the house, look inside the green
hoover, under the bag... You will find my phone there... The password is... Go to
the images, there will be videos in the folder titled ‘camera.’” Two hours later,
appellant messaged BE cain and told him “please disregard the previous
messages. I had a crisis. I’m better now.” Because of the time difference between
Hawaii and Michie did not see the messages until he awoke on 5 April
2021. By the time was able to speak with appellant, appellant assured

that appellant was fine and Kid not need to return to Hawaii.

After relaying these messages, EMMEHirected CPT i. go into the closet
where the green hoover vacuum cleaner was located to look for appellant’s phone.
Captain Be: not find the phone in the vacuum cleaner, eventually left appellant’s
home, notified CID that appellant was missing, and requested CID’s assistance in
locating appellant. A few hours later, SA the CID agent overseeing the law
enforcement search for appellant, called nd asked him for consent to enter
appellant’s home again “to look for signs of life” and “to check for anything that
might help us and assist... us locating” appellant. BE onsented. Special Agent
= CID agent at appellant’s home, found the phong jn the green hoover vacuum
cleaner [hereinafter vacuum phone]. Special Agent fi testitied she asked for
“consent to seize and search the phone to locate anything that might help” and

consented, saying “do whatever [you need] to do to find” appellant.

Special Agent GR testified the vacuum phone was unlocked when he found it
and no password was required. Special Agent stated it was CID policy to
coordinate with a CID Digital Forensic Examiner (DFE) prior to conducting a
manual search of a seized phone but, after consulting with SA that policy was
disregarded and_an immediate manual search of the vacuum phone was conducted.
Special Agent WB stated because CID was “looking for any signs of where
[appellant] may have gone, including” any information from the videos, that the
agents disregarded policy and went with “our gut[s], like our perspective was that
we were going to [immediately] look through these videos to identify if [appellant]
made an indication to where he was, where he may have gone that morning.”
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

Special Agent BB manually reviewed the videos at appellant’s home. The
videos depicted appellant saying goodbye to family members and expressing remorse
for what he had done but did not indicate his location. Special Agentfestified he
collected the vacuum phone, placed it in airplane mode, and drove it to the CID
office for a digital forensic extraction later that day because that he best way to
search the phone and keep it “forensically sound.” Special Agent testified he did
not “want to go through the depths of the phone to alter too much data,” however,
placing the vacuum phone in airplane mode blocked incoming and outgoing signals
and stymied a possible method of determining appellant’s current location.

The CID DFE, SAM was instructed by SA a. perform an extraction of the
vacuum phone for “signs of life” to include recent activity, financial transactions,
and the videos previously reviewed by SA mm Special Agent attempted to
conduct a logical extraction as soon as he received the vacuum phone, but he ran
“into issues with the particular” model and “actually obtaining the extraction” so it

k approximately three hours after the phone was found. After the extraction, SA

iltered the data for the most recent activity and found the videos. The videos
were dated soon after appellant’s release from CID custody on the evening of 4 April
2021. While looking for and viewing these videos, SA[falso saw a thumbnail
image of what appeared to be a prepubescent male. He made a note of observing
suspected child pornography but “continued to search the device because, again, the
priority at that point was looking for signs of life.”®

He then searched the vacuum phone for the most recent communication
activity and discovered messages on the Telegram application that referenced sex
with a child. He then looked at “USAA [banking] transactions,” as SA Bhad been
briefed that was the type of banking system used by appellant. Special Agent Bi dia
not conduct a Google search history or review other bank transactions. Appellant
alleges in his Grostefon matters that viewing either his Google search history or
other bank transactions would have pinpointed the hotel in which he was staying and
expedited his safe return.

Special Agent BP: his search late in the evening with appellant still
missing but with the intent of further reviewing the full extraction of the vacuum
phone the following day in an attempt to locate appellant. Special agents continued
to search numerous locations around Hawaii looking for appellant. The military
judge found “CID searched far (locations all around Oahu), near (the home), and
close (vacuum phone). They searched hospitals, beaches, and restaurants for signs
of him to prevent the worse-case scenario.” Ultimately, CPT Biffiled a missing

° On a later date, after appellant was located, CID sought and received a search
authorization from a military magistrate to look for additional child pornography on
the vacuum phone based on SA i. initial observation of suspected child
pornography.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

person report with the Honolulu Police Department at 2330 hours on April 6, 2021.
The Honolulu Police Department found appellant in a hotel room less than 8 hours
later, incoherent from an apparent overdose.’

LAW AND DISCUSSION
A, Disqualification of Military Judge

“An accused has a constitutional right to an impartial judge.” United States v.
Butcher, 56 M.J. 87, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “An impartial and disinterested trial judge is the foundation on which the
military justice system rests, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as
important as avoiding impropriety itself.” United States v. Berman, 28 M.J. 615,
616 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). To ensure every military accused receives an impartial
judge, the President promulgated Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 902, which
provides the framework for when a military judge must be disqualified from
participating in a court-martial whether for actual bias or the appearance of bias.

Rule for Courts-Martial 902(a) addresses the appearance of bias, placing a
duty upon a military judge to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which that military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Appearance of bias is determined objectively. Hasan v. Gross, 71 M.J. 416, 418
(C.A.A.F. 2012).

Rule for Courts-Martial 902(b) outlines five specific circumstances in which a
military judge is categorically disqualified from a proceeding for actual bias. The
circumstances relevant to appellant’s assignment of error are found in subsection
(1), which mandates recusal when a military judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding.” R.C.M. 902(b)(1); see Butcher, 56 M.J. at 90 (noting R.C.M.
902(a) governs the appearance of bias while R.C.M. 902(b) governs specific
disqualifying circumstances). A military judge may not accept waiver of any ground
for challenge under R.C.M. 902(b). R.C.M. 902(e).

Disqualification for actual bias under R.C.M. 902(b)(1), “must be based upon
extra-judicial, personal knowledge, not knowledge gained through performance of
judicial duties.” United States v. Black, 80 M.J. 570, 574 (Army. Ct. Crim. App.
2020) (cleaned up). “Personal means the bias or prejudice must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” Jd. (cleaned up); see
Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549-551 (1994).

7DBC, CPT a. and CID SAs’ concerns regarding appellant’s safety were well-
founded as he spent three weeks hospitalized for kidney failure after his overdose.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

When a military judge’s impartiality is challenged on appeal, “the test is
whether, taken as a whole in the context of this trial, a court-martial’s legality,
fairness, and impartiality were put into doubt” by the military judge’s actions.
United States v. Burton, 52 M.J. 223, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (cleaned up). When
conducting this test, we apply an objective standard of “[a]ny conduct that would
lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned....” United States v. Kincheloe,
14 M.J. 40, 50 (C.M.A. 1982) (cleaned up). Allegations of partiality “must be
supported by facts or ‘some kind of probative evidence’ which would warrant a
reasonable inference of lack of impartiality on the judge’s part.” Id.

If we determine the military judge should have disqualified himself, we then
analyze the facts to determine if the error was harmless. “In a plain error context we
look to see if the error materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the appellant”
pursuant to Article 59(a), UCMJ. United States v. Martinez, 70 M.J. 154, 159
(C.A.A.F. 2011). Even absent material prejudice to a substantial right pursuant to
Article 59(a), UCMJ, a judge’s failure to disqualify himself may still require a
remedy after applying the test laid out in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862-864 (1988) for an appearance of bias.

In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining
“whether a judgment should be vacated” based on a judge’s appearance of partiality:
“[1] the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, [2] the risk that the
denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining
the public’s confidence in the judicial process.” Jd. at 864. The Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces (CAAF) applies the same three-part test in analyzing cases
involving a military judge’s appearance of partiality pursuant to R.C.M. 902(a). See
United States v. Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 80-81 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

The analysis for the third Liljeberg factor is “similar to the standard applied
in the initial R.C.M. 902(a) analysis” in that we apply an objective standard and
view the issue of disqualification through the eyes of a reasonable member of the
public. Martinez, 70 M.J. at 159-60. However, the analysis of the third Liljeberg
factor is much broader than the initial R.C.M. 902(a) analysis because “we do not
limit our review to facts relevant to recusal, but rather review the entire proceedings,
to include any post-trial proceeding, the convening authority action, [appellate
proceedings], or other facts relevant to the Liljeberg test.” Id. at 160. Put simply,
courts consider the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the basis for
disqualification to determine if a remedy is warranted. See, e.g., United States v.
Kish, No. 201100404, 2014 CCA LEXIS 358 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 17 Jun. 2014)
(considering both the military judge’s actions during appellant’s court-martial and
the military judge’s public comments made two weeks after appellant’s trial as part
of the analysis of Liljeberg’s third factor); see also Berman, 28 M.J. at 618 (“What
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

happened on 4 December and after between [the military judge and the prosecuting
attorney] is relevant to our assessment of their relationship prior to that date”).

Here, we do not find that the military judge was disqualified from presiding
over appellant’s trial under R.C.M. 902(a) or (b). Appellant alleges no actual bias
under R.C.M. 902(b), and we find none. As evidence of an appearance of partiality
under R.C.M. 902(a), appellant points to the military judge’s familiarity with and
involvement in Operation Keiki Shield, his self-described expertise regarding sexual
assault prosecutions, and his working relationship with government counsel.

While we give the military judge’s ruling on the recusal motion little
deference in that he failed to provide his rationale, we can surmise from his
forthcoming responses during voir dire that it was not an abuse of his discretion to
deny the recusal request. The military judge indicated the steps he had taken to
shield himself from potential cases when his selection as a military judge was
confirmed. While he advised law enforcement on Operation Keiki Shield when he
was a Special Victim Prosecutor, it was in reference to specific cases. The military
judge had no prior knowledge of appellant’s case until it was referred to trial. While
the military judge did express expertise regarding sexual assault crimes, that is true
of many military judges, particularly those with recent litigation experience.
Finally, while the military judge worked with the government trial counsel on
previous cases, he was never in a supervisory relationship with them and expressed
no favorable or unfavorable opinion of them.

Because we find no error in denying the recusal motion, we do not test for
material prejudice or apply the Liljeberg test. We do, however, note that even under
a Liljeberg totality of the circumstances analysis, there is nothing in the record to
suggest an appearance of partiality by the trial judge such that public confidence in
the system would be impacted if the case were affirmed.

B. Motion to Suppress

Appellant challenges the military judge’s ruling denying the motion to
suppress all evidence derived from the search of the vacuum phone after it was
seized by CID. He argues CID exceeded the scope of i qualified consent to
search the phone to find appellant when they seized the phone and, hours later,
conducted a limited logical extraction that concluded after the finding of child
pornography while appellant was still missing. Further, to the extent CID was
proceeding under an emergency search exception, appellant argues their failure to
conduct the search in a good faith effort to render immediate medical aid, to obtain
information to assist in rendering such aid, or to prevent immediate or ongoing
personal injury invalidates that warrantless search. Appellant argues the actions
taken by CID are far more indicative of a desire to find and preserve evidence of a
crime.
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

A military judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, and the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the party
that prevailed at trial. United States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

An abuse of discretion occurs when:

(1) the military judge predicates a ruling on findings of fact
that are not supported by the evidence of record; (2) the
military judge uses incorrect legal principles; (3) the
military judge applies correct legal principles to the facts in
a way that is clearly unreasonable; or (4) the military judge
fails to consider important facts.

United States v. Lattin, 83 M.J. 192, 198 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (quoting United States v.
Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (internal citations omitted)).

“An abuse of discretion must be ‘more than a mere difference of opinion. The
challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly
erroneous.’” United States v. Black, 82 M.J. 447, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2013)).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const., amend. IV. The President has implemented the Fourth Amendment
through Military Rules of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 311-317. United States v.
Hoffman, 75 M.J. 120, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2016). Just as people have the right to be
“secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,” pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, people also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell
phones. United States v. Wicks, 73 M.J. 93, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2014). Cell phones “may
not be searched without probable cause and a warrant unless the search. . .falls
within the one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” J/d.
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall under one of
the several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967).

C. Consent
1. Common authority

One “jealously and carefully drawn” exception to the warrant requirement
“recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual
possessing authority.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (citations
omitted). “Voluntary consent to search may be obtained from the person whose
property is to be searched or from a fellow occupant who shares common authority
over the property.” United States v. Weston, 67 M.J. 390, 392 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(citations omitted). Military Rule of Evidence 314(e)(2) provides “[a] person may
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

grant consent to search property when the person exercises control over that
property.” “‘The validity of the third party consent does not hinge on niceties of
property law or on legal technicalities’ . . . but is instead determined by whether the
third party has joint access or control of the property for most purposes.” Black, 82
M.J. at 451 (quoting United States v. Rader, 65 M.J. 30, 32 (C.A.A.F. 2007))
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A third party has authority to
consent to a search when he possesses ‘common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.’” Rader, 65 M.J. at 32
(quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

In Rader, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] explained:
common authority is the:

mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that
the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit’ the search.

Id. at 33 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7).

The government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
“that a third party has joint access and control to the degree that such control confers
a right to consent to search.” Black, 82 M.J. at 451 (citing Mil. R. Evid. 314(e)(5)).
The degree of control a third party possesses over property is a question of fact
whereas whether that control is sufficient to establish common authority is a
question of law. Jd. (citing Rader, 65 M.J. at 33). Even if the third party purporting
to give consent lacks actual authority to consent, the search may still be reasonable
“if the facts known to the police when the purported consent is given ‘would
[warrant a man of reasonable caution to conclude]’ that the consenting party had
authority over the premises.” United States v. White, 40 M.J. 257, 258-59 (C.M.A.
1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

In the present case, appellant gave BR onmon authority over the vacuum
phone by providing its unique hidden location, the password, and directing him to
particular videos appellant wanted to view. While appellant may have intended
to revoke common authority over the phone with his “disregard” message,
that was not clearly communicated to nor did appellant take any steps to
revoke common authority such as moving the phone from its unique hidden location
within a green hoover vacuum located in the closet or changing the phone’s
password.

10
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

Regardless, CID reasonably relied on mm: consent to search the vacuum
phone, given a: status as the husband of appellant, his knowledge of the exact
location of the hidden phone inside the hoover vacuum cleaner, its password, and the
videos he ibed being located on the phone. As such, it was reasonable for CID
to rely on a. consent to search the vacuum phone, subject to any limitations to
the scope of his consent.

2. Scope of Consent

Military Rule of Evidence 314(e)(3) provides “[c]onsent may be limited in
any way by the person granting consent, including limitations in terms of time,
place, or property, and may be withdrawn at any time.” The test for measuring the
scope of consent is one of “objective reasonableness — what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). “Even though that is a
question of law, factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what [a]
reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that
was given.” United States v. Gallegos-Espinal, 970 F.3d 586, 591 (Sth Cir. 2020)
(quotes and citations omitted). Determining the scope of a consent to search
requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances “including the interaction
between the parties, the purpose of the search, and the circumstantial evidence
surrounding the search.” Black, 82 M.J. at 459 (Sparks, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 679 (8th Cir. 2015)).

In the present case, the military judge found placed no restrictions on
CID’s use of the vacuum phone. According to the testimony of ie. multiple
CID agents, GE ovided consent to search the vacuum phone to find his husband.
Specifically, JBtated “do whatever you need to do to find my husband.” We
analyze {Fs statement in two segmented parts.

First, the language “do whatever you need” places no restriction on the time,
place, or manner that CID was authorized to search the vacuum phone. This
segmented language supports the military judge’s finding of fact that BE placed
“no restrictions” on CID’s search of the vacuum phone. The language “to find my
husband,” however, places a condition on the scope of CID’s search in that it must
relate to the purpose of finding appellant. When we review the entirety of Bs
statement in this context, there is a restriction placed on the scope of the CID search
of the vacuum phone: the method of search must relate to the purpose of finding
appellant. As long as CID’s search of the vacuum phone w lated to the purpose
of finding appellant, we agree with the military judge that gave broad consent

regarding the time, place, or manner of the CID search.

Appellant argues the CID agents’ actions in searching the vacuum phone
constituted subterfuge, in large part because there were allegedly more efficient

11
BRINKMAN-CORONEL-ARMY 20220225

searches that could have been performed on appellant’s vacuum phone with a greater
likelihood of finding more useful and timely information regarding his location.
While we agree with our colleague in the dissent that CID likely might have been
able to conduct a more efficient search to locate a missing person, we instead are
required to analyze the actual steps employed by CID to determine if the method of
search was within the scope authorized by and the related purpose of finding
appellant.

We find SA BB vas actively attempting to find appellant, so much so, he and
SA MiReviated from CID policy when SA manually reviewed the vacuum phone
videos at appellant’s home without prior coordination with a CID DFE. These
agents followed their “gut” by disregarding CID policy hoping to more readily
ascertain appellant’s location with an immediate manual review of his phone.
Despite SA review of the videos, no information regarding appellant’s location
was revealed.

Special Agent WB seized the vacuum phone and then drove it to the CID office
for DFE examination. Special Agent BB s act of placing the vacuum phone in
airplane mode and driving it to the CID office for a DFE examination was not only
consistent with his understanding of best CID practices at the time but also
addressed his fear of altering potentially helpful recent activity usage data within the
vacuum phone if he attempted any additional manual review. The agent’s fear of
altering recent data, which could locate appellant, provides a reasoned explanation
as to his decision to drive the phone to the CID office to be immediately reviewed in
a “forensically sound” manner by SA a a DFE, who was a trained expert in
conducting searches on a cell phone.

A full digital forensic extraction of appellant’s vacuum phone began as soon
as SA BB received the phone. Special Agent Bilexperienced some technical issues
with conducting an extraction_on appellant’s particular phone. As soon as the

extraction was complete, SA orted the contents of appellant’s vacuum phone to
prioritize recent activity to filter out data unlikely to find appellant. He first filtered
through the recent data to locate the videos viewed by SA as that was “a starting

point of. . the last known activity.” While looking for recent activity in the preview
or “table” view of the software, SA Mjsaw an image of what appeared to be a
prepubescent male. Special Agent MM briefly noted the existence of possible child
pornography, but he did not “continue to search into that” and instead continued
searching appellant’s phone for other recent activity in an attempt to ascertain
appellant’s current location.’ SA Miia not turn “off the lights and [go] home”

8 Although the dissent references SA Js decision to go home late in the evening,
after finding evidence of child pornography but prior to appellant ultimately being

(continued . . .)

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after almost immediately observing suspected child pornography upon his first
review of the phone and the four videos, as proffered by the dissent, but he instead
continued to search the phone for recent activity as that was his “priority at [that]
time.”

Now on appeal, appellant and the dissent, may point to a different or allegedly
better way to conduct a search for a missing person, such as not placing the phone in
airplane mode and taking it to the CID office for a full extractj ut the method in
which CID conducted the search comported with the scope il: consent to find
appellant. While the CID agents may have been better served deviating from
prescribed ‘best practices’ of ‘forensic preservation’ and ‘digital extraction’ to more
efficiently locate appellant, CID acted within their training to undertake efforts to
locate appellant. In that light, the agents’ acts are not “inexplicable” as the dissent
would otherwise suggest. As noted by our superior court regarding cell phones and
the employed method of search:

when it comes to cell phones and computers, although one search
method may be objectively “better” than another, a search method is
not unreasonable simply because it is not optimal. Here, the examiner
was not rummaging through Appellant’s phone, even though the
defense expert pointed to a different — and perhaps even better — way to
conduct the search.

United States v. Shields, 83 M.J. 226, 232 (C.A.A.F. 2023).

We find the military judge did not abuse his discretion denying defense’s
motion to suppress evidence after finding CID possessed valid consent from to
search appellant’s vacuum phone and the method of search was within the scope of

s authorization.’

found, we note SA BB was not the lone CID agent involved in the search for
appellant, and multiple CID agents were searching Hawaii to find appellant. Special
Agent Bhaiso intended to continue his search the next day, but the superseding event
of appellant being located negated the need for SA a: continued review. Special
Agent jthen ceased searching appellant’s phone and waited for a magistrate
authorization prior to taking any further action.

° As we find the military judge did not abuse his discretion denying appellant’s
motion to suppress evidence regarding s consent to search the vacuum phone,
the issue of whether CID’s search was also proper under an emergency exception is
mooted.

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CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire record the findings of guilty and the sentence
are AFFIRMED.

Judge POND concurs.
HAYES, Judge, dissenting in part:

I agree with my colleagues and find the military judge did not abuse his
discretion when he did not disqualify himself from presiding over appellant’s court-
martial. However, I would find the military judge abused his discretion when he
denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered from a search of
appellant’s phone. Law enforcement both (1) exceeded the scope of the consent to
search the phone and (2) failed to conduct an emergency search in a good faith effort
to respond to the purported emergency. Finding both prejudice and grounds to apply
the exclusionary rule to deter law enforcement misconduct, I would affirm the
findings of guilty of Charge I and Charge III and their specifications and would set
aside and dismiss with prejudice the findings of guilty of Charge II and its
specifications.

As the majority aptly noted, appellant’s husband, i: a former
icemember with twelve years of service. At the time of the search in question,

ad vacated the quarters he shared with appellant in Hawaii and relocated to
Michigan with the expectation that appellant w join him there upon his
separation from the Army. While in Michigan, received a call from appellant’s
commander, ceT i who was concerned “something might be very, very wrong”
because appellant had recently been arrested, had_not signed in as required, and was
not answering the door at his residence. Ceptain il asked or his consent to

check” which [i granted.

enter the home and conduct a “health and welfare
Appellant could not be located.

Hours later, SA GR alica Bb cain and asked him for consent to enter the
home “to check for signs of life” and “anything that might help us... locating”
appellant. BB: ranted consent. When CID found the ‘vacuum phone’ they asked

for “consent to seize and search the phone to locate anything that might help.”

who had previously received the disturbing messages from his husband as
documented in the majority opinion, responded “do whatever [you need] to do to
find my husband.”

At this point, there should be no dispute that the sole purpose of the search of

the phone, and the sole reason consent was provided to search it, was to find
appellant — who was believed to be, and apparently was, in a life-threatening

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situation. This was a search for a missing person, plain and simple. In that context,
the following actions by CID are inexplicable:

(1) the seizing agent immediately put the phone in ‘airplane mode’ which
prevented any outgoing or incoming calls or data;

(2) the seizing agent did not conduct any rudimentary searches of the phone
beyond a review of the ‘goodbye’ videos already known to exist by (for
example, no attempt was made to discover recent searches or calls or messages);

(3) the seizing agent sent the phone for Digital Forensic Examination (DFE)
in order to search it in the most “forensically sound” manner;

(4) the DFE agent discovered evidence of child pornography on the phone and
reported that discovery prior to locking up the phone overnight, with appellant still
missing. He did not document or report any findings that might have assisted in the
search for appellant, who was found by local authorities hours later and hospitalized
for an extended period.

The majority relies on United States v. Shields, 83 M.J. 226 (C.A.A.F. 2023)

to justify these actions as suboptimal, but not unreasonable. Shields is
distinguishable because it concerned the reasonableness of a search for criminal
activity. Here, law enforcement officials were ostensibly searching for a missing
person. Any search undertaken to find or preserve evidence of criminal activity,
such as a forensic DFE, was unreasonable in this case unless its primary aim was to
find appellant, as discussed below.

A. Scope of Consent

The military judge found BB i aced no limitations on his consent to search
the vacuum phone. This was clea r. According to the testimony of MB and
multiple law enforcement agents, Pe evices consent to search the vacuum phone
to find his husband. Specifically, ated = hatever [you need] to do to find
my husband.” This is clearly a limitation. as only authorizing law
enforcement to search the phone for information that would assist them in finding
his husband, given the exigent circumstances he believed existed as a result of the
information being provided to him by those same law enforcement agents. Had
appellant returned home after granted consent but before law enforcement
began their search, they would have had no authority to search the phone, because it
would not have served to find appellant.

The military judge’s failure to recognize this qualifying language as a

limitation on the scope of the consent rendered his subsequent determination that
law enforcement had consent to seize and search the phone flawed. For example, his

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ruling made no mention of the fact the seizing agent did not conduct any
rudimentary searches of the phone to discover recent searches or recent calls or
messages, but instead seized the phone and sent it for digital forensic examination in
order to search it in the most “forensically sound” manner. As a result, the phone
remained in airplane mode and locked up overnight after the DFE agent found
evidence of child pornography on the phone. It is hard to imagine any action by law
enforcement that would have been more clearly outside the scope of the consent or
more inconsistent with the goal of finding appellant. Given appellant was convicted
of possessing the child pornography found on his phone, this clear error materially
prejudiced appellant.

B. Emergency search exception

An emergency search to save a life or for related purposes does not require
probable cause. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). Military Rule of
Evidence 315(a) permits the admission of evidence obtained under exigent
circumstances when relevant and not otherwise inadmissible under the Military
Rules of Evidence or the Constitution. The emergency search exception appears in
Mil. R. Evid. 314(i), which provides:

Evidence obtained from emergency searches of persons or
property conducted to save life, or for a related purpose, is
admissible provided that the search was conducted in a
good faith effort to render immediate medical aid, to
obtain information that will assist in the rendering of such
aid, or to prevent immediate or ongoing personal injury.

In determining whether emergency circumstances exist, the question is not
whether in fact an actual emergency existed, but whether the police officer
reasonably believed that one existed under the available facts and circumstances
known at the time of entry. United States v. Muniz, 23 M.J. 201, 208 (C.M.A. 1987).

It was objectively reasonable to conduct an emergency search in this instance.
Appellant was missing and law enforcement officials were aware that he had been
arrested for serious crimes and had directed his spouse to videos in which he was
saying goodbye to members of his family. Law enforcement had grounds to take all
reasonable measures to find appellant. Had those measures resulted in the discovery
of criminal misconduct, the evidence would have likely been admissible under the
emergency search exception.

However, the text of Mil. R. Evid. 314(i) requires a good faith effort to render
aid, obtain information that will assist in rendering aid, or to prevent immediate or
ongoing personal injury. Similar to these law enforcement agents’ actions when
provided consent, their actions in the face of a life-threatening emergency belie any

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intent to save appellant’s life or prevent injury to his person. While the Honolulu
police were jumping into action to locate appellant before he caused himself further
harm, and indeed it would appear they prevented such harm, military law
enforcement proceeded to: (1) deactivate the vacuum phone, one of the most helpful
tools they had to find appellant; (2) seize that phone to keep it “forensically sound”
as opposed to searching it immediately for clues as to appellant’s whereabouts; and,
(3) cease the DFE overnight after they discovered evidence of child pornography,
and while appellant was still missing.

But for the actions of the Honolulu police in finding appellant before he killed
himself, intentionally or otherwise, this case might never have come to trial. I fail
to see any evidence of good faith on the part of military law enforcement personnel
conducting the search of the phone to justify an emergency exception search. I also
fail to see how the diligence of other law enforcement officials searching for
appellant has any bearing on the scope or good faith of the search of appellant’s
phone. As such, I would find the military judge committed clear error by admitting
the evidence that was obtained and relied on to convict appellant.

C. Exclusionary Rule

A finding or sentence of a court-martial may not be held incorrect on the
ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights
of the accused. Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a). “Although the Fourth
Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained
in violation of its commands, the Supreme Court long ago created an exclusionary
rule that forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” United States v.
Lattin, 83 M.J. 192, 197 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10,
(1995); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)) (cleaned up).

“Evidence derivative of an unlawful search, seizure, or interrogation is
commonly referred to as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and is generally not
admissible at trial.” United States v. Conklin, 63 M.J. 333, 334 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). “[T]his exclusionary
rule is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect.” Lattin, 83 M.J. at 197 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (quotation marks omitted)). The exclusionary rule “serves to
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or systemic negligence.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144
(2009).

For the exclusionary rule to apply, “the deterrent effect of suppression must

be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system.” Jd. at 147. In Lattin,
the CAAF explained, “[i]n other words, if the government cannot use evidence that

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the police obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment, the police will have an
incentive not to violate the Fourth Amendment.” 83 M.J. at 197.

The President codified the exclusionary rule in Mil. R. Evid. 311(a), which
provides:

Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or
seizure made by a person acting in a governmental
capacity is inadmissible against the accused if:

(1) the accused makes a timely motion to suppress or an
objection to the evidence under this rule;

(2) the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the person, place, or property searched; the accused had a
legitimate interest in the property or evidence seized when
challenging a seizure, or the accused would otherwise
have grounds to object to the search or seizure under the
Constitution of the United States as applied to members of
the Armed Forces; and

(3) exclusion of the evidence results in appreciable
deterrence of future unlawful searches or seizures and the
benefits of such deterrence outweigh the costs to the
justice system.

Additionally, “[t]he prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence . . . that the deterrence of future unlawful searches or seizures is not
appreciable or such deterrence does not outweigh the costs to the justice system of
excluding the evidence.” Mil. R. Evid. 311(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added). The CAAF
referred to the former as the “appreciable deterrence test” and the latter as the
“balancing test.” Lattin, 83 M.J. at 197. A military judge’s assessment of these
matters is reviewed for a clearly unreasonable exercise of discretion, which is a less
deferential standard than clear error. /d. at 198. (citing United States v. Rudometkin,
82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2022)).

I would find a disturbing lack of good faith on the part of law enforcement in
this case to (1) stay within the scope of the consent they were provided, or (2) to
take action to save life or render immediate aid. To the contrary, what I have
observed is a search that exceeded the scope of consent, and actions that were
clearly inconsistent with any effort to save or aid appellant. The military judge
found that the search was lawful, and the evidence admissible, under both theories.
I disagree with both findings and, for the reasons already stated, would find the trial
judge’s reliance on clear errors made in his findings to be an abuse of his discretion

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that materially prejudiced appellant. Because law enforcement acted with careless
disregard of both the scope of the consent to search and the necessity to act in good
faith in an emergency search, I would find it appropriate to employ the exclusionary
rule in this case to deter police misconduct in the future.

Whether undertaken in an emergency for the purpose of saving a life, or
undertaken with consent for the same purpose, the circumstances in this case
demanded a departure from “best practices” and “forensic preservation” and “digital
extraction.” It is abundantly clear in this case that law enforcement recognized a
golden opportunity to search for and find evidence upon which to base additional
charges against appellant, who had recently been arrested for attempting to have sex
with a minor. Having previously been denied an initial warrant to search appellant’s
other phone for evidence of child pornography, a warrant which was later granted,
the DFE used the exigent circumstances of appellant’s disappearance to search
for evidence of additional crimes. Once he found that evidence, no other findings
were documented or reported that evening. For all intents and purposes, he turned
off the lights and went home — while appellant was still missing. Such action cannot
be condoned and most certainly should not be rewarded.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court

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