Court Opinion

ID: 9705841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:23:30.207596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:04.595885
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
concurring.
The county authorized and commenced operation of a sanitary landfill upon a tract of land adjacent to that owned by appellants (Taylor-Chalmers). It is undisputed that (1) the county was legally entitled to operate a landfill upon that location; (2) the county took no land belonging to Taylor-Chalmers; and (8) the operation of the landfill has created no nuisance affecting the ownership interests of Taylor-Chal-mers.
Taylor-Chalmers instituted this action for inverse condemnation 1 alleging that the mere action of locating a sanitary landfill next to its property reduced the highest and best2 use to which its tract of land might be put and, thus, constituted a taking without just compensation.3
The traditional view, acknowledged by several Indiana decisions, is that there is to *534"taking" in the constitutional sense with respect to owners of real estate who have no portion of their tract of land (whether for fee, easement, or temporary right-of-way) taken by the governmental action; they merely are near to or adjoin the government project. Weldon v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 143, 279 N.E.2d 554; Glendenning v. Stahley (1910), 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E. 234; Merchants Mut. Tel. Co. v. Hirschman (1909), 43 Ind.App. 283, 87 N.E. 238; Evansville & R.R. Co. v. Charlton (1893), 6 Ind.App. 56, 33 N.E. 129. Compare, however, State v. Stefaniak, supra.
Similarly, the traditional view, also espoused in Indiana, has been that acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers requiring adherence to regulations and statutes which promote order, safety, health and general welfare do not amount to a taking within the contemplation of the fifth amendment or article 1, section 21 of the Indiana Constitution. State v. Ensley (1960), 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342, 346; Foreman v. State ex rel. Dept. of Natural Resources (1979), 180 Ind.App. 94, 387 N.E.2d 455; City of Gary v. Ruberto (1976), 171 Ind.App. 1, 354 N.E.2d 786.
There is, however, the so-called modern view which points toward a recognition of compensable intrusions beyond those ree-ognized in the classic eminent domain proceeding. This view appears largely traceable to the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in United States v. Causby (1946), 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206.
In Causby the plaintiffs' chicken raising business had been destroyed and their en-jJoyment of their residence impaired due to the frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft at low altitude over their property. The federal government had leased the nearby airport outside Greensboro, North Carolina for military use because of World War II, and the landing and takeoff pattern passed aircraft over plaintiffs' property at a height of about 88 feet. Although it reversed the decision of the Court of Claims due to inadequate findings, the majority opinion agreed with the Court of Claims' determination that there was a sufficient direct invasion of plaintiffs' domain to constitute a "taking" within the constitutional sense.
While Causby has sometimes been characterized as a "right to airspace" case, the majority opinion stresses that proper concern is for "the owner's loss, not the taker's gain" and that the government's "intrusion" was so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of his property and limit his exploitation of his ownership rights. Compare, eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631.
As the Court subsequently stated in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 LEd.2d 106:
"The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest."
Thus, the determination is one involving a balancing of interests and accordingly depends largely upon the particular cireum-stances of a given case rather than some set formula. Penn Central Transp. Co., supra, 438 U.S. at 125, 98 S.Ct. at 2659. However, in cases involving government's regulation of the use of private property (largely through zoning ordinances) the Court has determined that the two most pertinent inquiries to be made are whether the regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests or whether it denies an owner economically viable use of his land. Agins, supra, 447 U.S. at 261, 100 S.Ct. at 2141. Concerning the latter inquiry the Court in Penn Central Transp. Co., supra, concluded that no taking occurred merely because government prohibited "the most beneficial use of the property," 438 U.S. at 125, 98 S.Ct. at 2660, recognized a distinction between existing and merely prospective uses, and held that where the landowners were still able to obtain a "reasonable return" on their in*535vestment within the operation of the regulation (the City of New York's Landmarks Preservation Law) the regulation constituted no taking, 438 U.S. at 137, 98 S.Ct. at 2665.4
While no Indiana decisions have yet adopted the view that government regulation of use, as by planning or zoning, may constitute a taking in the constitutional sense, both the result and the language employed by our Supreme Court in Stefaniak, supra, evidence some departure from the traditional view. There, the court held that a question for the jury existed although the state had not taken any of the claimants' land, stating: 5
"A taking in eminent domain, by the modern prevailing view, includes substantial interference with private property which destroys or impairs one's free use and enjoyment of the property, or one's rights and interests in the property.”
238 N.E.2d at 454 (citations omitted).
It is not now necessary to determine the extent of the departure from the traditional view signalled by Stefuniak. In the case before us there is admittedly no government regulation of the use to which Taylor-Chalmers may put its land which is pertinent to the complaint, nor has there been any physical intrusion on, under or over the land owned by Taylor-Chalmers. Furthermore, again by admission, the only "taking" asserted is the loss of "highest and best use," and that use was not what the land was actually being used for at the time in question.6
Although I am inclined to believe that standing alone neither the mere location of the landfill nor the loss of highest and best use could as a matter of law constitute a sufficient interference to amount to a "taking," it would be error to dissect the total circumstances in that fashion. Penn Central Transp. Co., supra. The total cireum-stances allege no more than government's lawful use of adjacent land which affected for these appellants only the supposed highest and best use to which their land might be put. I find that as a matter of law under such cireumstances there is no taking in the constitutional sense.
Accordingly, I concur.

. See IC 32-11-1-12.

. "Highest and best use" is a familiar benchmark in eminent domain law, and is most commonly used to recognize that an owner may not at the time of an appropriation be using his property for the most valuable use to which it is then naturally adapted. See State v. Hamer (1936), 211 Ind. 570, 199 N.E. 589. While the owner is entitled to compensation for property taken on the basis of its "highest and best use," it should be borne in mind that this refers to a conclusion based upon opinion, not a fact in the objective sense. Thus in fixing value the law only required that the factfinder be permitted to consider uses to which the land may be adapted but for which it has not actually been used. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Hurm (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 371. What is actually at issue is simply the fair market value of the land or interest.

. While appellants in their brief rely solely upon article 1, section 21 of the Indiana Constitution, the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, applies as well. See, eg., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith (1980), 449 U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 LBd.2d 358.

. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322, quoted with approval in Pern Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125, 98 S.Ct. at 2659.

. The state's action in compensating for the construction of a highway bypass caused plaintiffs' lot to become a corner lot thereby subjecting it to several zoning restrictions from which it had previously been free. In addition, a new limited access fence caused drifts of snow to accumulate to a depth of three to four feet blocking plaintiffs' egress from their driveway, a problem was created through the construction of a drainage ditch, and plaintiffs suffered a loss of privacy in their back yard.

. It appears that a potential sale of the property to a commercial developer was lost when the landfill was created.