Court Opinion

ID: 9401126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 19:13:42.410549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.904226
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00384-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DAVID MICHAEL ISASSI,                                                      Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 105th District Court
                         of Kleberg County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

      Appellant David Michael Isassi appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his

community supervision, adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon, a second-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), and

sentencing him to twenty years’ imprisonment. In one issue, Isassi argues his twenty-year
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense in violation of the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST.

amend VIII. We affirm.

                                         I.     BACKGROUND

        A grand jury returned an indictment charging Isassi with two counts of aggravated

assault. The first count alleged that Isassi caused bodily injury to the complainant while

using or exhibiting a hammer. See id. The second count alleged that Isassi threatened

the complainant with imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting a knife. See id. Isassi

pleaded guilty to count two pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for the State’s

recommendation to dismiss count one. The trial court accepted Isassi’s guilty plea,

ordered the dismissal of count one, and placed Isassi on deferred adjudication-community

supervision for seven years.

        The trial court later held a hearing on the State’s second amended motion to revoke

community supervision and adjudicate guilt, during which the State proceeded on the

following alleged violations:       1   (1) failing to abide by zero tolerance supervision;

(2) possessing a firearm; (3) tampering with evidence; (4) associating with persons of

disreputable or harmful character; (5) admitting to marijuana use; (6–7) testing positive

for cocaine and marijuana; (8) failing to report to Isassi’s community supervision officer;

(9) failure to submit to a urinalysis; and (10–19) failing to pay court costs, fines, and fees.

Isassi pleaded not true to each alleged violation.

        1 The State filed two previous motions to revoke and adjudicate guilt, which resulted in the trial

court amending the conditions of Isassi’s community supervision. We renumber the allegations set out in
the State’s live motion to reflect its abandonment of four counts.

                                                    2
      After hearing evidence, the trial court found the allegations that Isassi tampered

with evidence and tested positive for cocaine and marijuana not true. The trial court found

true the remaining allegations. The trial court revoked Isassi’s community supervision,

adjudicated him guilty for aggravated assault, and sentenced Isassi to twenty years’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                          II.    CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A.    Standard of Review & Applicable Law

      The Eighth Amendment—made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment—prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, which includes

extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Graham v. Florida, 560

U.S. 48, 58–60 (2010); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); id.

amend. XIV. An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim

based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime

and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A successful

challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and requires a finding of “gross

disproportionality.” Id. at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). To

determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, “a court must judge the

severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the

culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated

offenses.” Id. at 323 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60). “In the rare case in which this

                                            3
threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court should

then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders

in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id. “If this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the

sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id.

      “Only twice has the Supreme Court held that a non-capital sentence imposed on

an adult was constitutionally disproportionate.” Id. (first citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.

277 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without parole was a grossly disproportionate

sentence for the crime of uttering a no-account check for $100); and then citing Weems

v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that fifteen years punishment in a prison

camp was grossly disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a public record)). A trial

court’s discretion to assess punishment within the statutory range is essentially

unfettered. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Generally,

punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See

Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet.

ref’d). Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a second-degree felony punishable by

imprisonment “for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.” TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 12.33(a).

B.    Preservation

      “[We] may not reverse a judgment of conviction without first addressing the issue

of error preservation.” Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (first

citing Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); and then citing

                                            4
Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). To preserve a

complaint that a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must

present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds

for the ruling desired. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2019, no pet.) (holding that to preserve a disproportionate-sentencing complaint, the

defendant must make a timely, specific objection in the trial court or raise the issue in a

motion for new trial); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).

C.     Analysis

       Isassi did not object in the trial court that his sentence was disproportionate to the

offense charged or unconstitutional in any manner. Furthermore, the trial court’s twenty-

year sentence falls within the statutory punishment range for a second-degree felony.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a). Accordingly, we hold that Isassi failed to preserve

this complaint for our review. See Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28 (“Because the sentence

imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights

[appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are not so fundamental as to have relieved

him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial objection.”).

       Even if we were to address Isassi’s Eighth Amendment claim and assume a

threshold inference of disproportionality, he presented no evidence in the trial court, and

presents no argument on appeal, “compar[ing] [his] sentence with the sentences received

by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same

                                               5
crime in other jurisdictions.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. Absent this comparative

analysis, we are unable to conclude that the sentences are grossly disproportionate. See

id.; Quick v. State, 557 S.W.3d 775, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet ref’d)

(concluding that twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault was not grossly

disproportionate); see also Esquivel v. State, No. 13-21-00179-CR, 2022 WL 17492274,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 8, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge where appellant

offered no comparative evidence of sentences received by other offenders). We overrule

Isassi’s sole issue.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                             L. ARON PEÑA
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
8th day of June, 2023.

                                               6