Court Opinion

ID: 9949587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 21:17:03.118785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:34.180827
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                March 11, 2024
                                                                                 C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                                                                               SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA

                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re H.H. and A.D.

No. 23-87 (Jackson County CC-18-2022-JA-46 and CC-18-2022-JA-47)

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother F.H.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Jackson County’s January 17, 2023,
order terminating her parental rights to H.H. and A.D.,2 arguing that the court erred by allowing
the children’s written and verbal statements to be entered as evidence and terminating her parental
rights. Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum
decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In April 2022, the DHS filed a petition alleging that petitioner abused and neglected her
children by engaging in acts of domestic violence with her boyfriend in front of the children, using
drugs in the presence of the children, and grabbing H.H. by the throat and slamming him against
a wall. According to the record, this was petitioner’s third abuse and neglect case, although the
record is unclear what conditions the prior petitions addressed. It appears that she was granted at
least one improvement period in each of her two prior cases. Petitioner completed improvement
periods in both prior cases and the children were returned to her care.

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Andrew J. Katz. The West Virginia Department of Human
Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General
Andrew Waight. Counsel Erica Brannon Gunn appears as the children’s guardian ad litem
(“guardian”).

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
                                                 1
       At an August 2022 adjudicatory hearing, petitioner admitted by stipulation that she had
abused drugs and exposed the children to domestic violence. The court accepted petitioner’s
admissions and adjudicated her of abusing and neglecting the children.

        In November 2022, the court held a dispositional hearing. The court heard testimony from
A.D.’s therapist, A.D.’s grandmother, and A.D.’s former therapist. At the hearing, the guardian
called A.D.’s grandmother as a witness and she played a recorded conversation between herself
and A.D. during which A.D. disclosed sexual abuse at the hands of petitioner and petitioner’s
boyfriend. The guardian stated that the purpose of the recorded statement was to prove, among
other things, that an improvement period for petitioner was inappropriate. Additionally, A.D.’s
former therapist testified that A.D. had previously made disclosures of sexual abuse. The DHS
presented a letter from H.H. alleging sexual abuse at the hands of petitioner’s boyfriend. The court
admitted the recorded conversation and the letter over petitioner’s objections.

        The court ultimately terminated petitioner’s parental rights.3 The court found that petitioner
abused her children and permitted her boyfriend to abuse them as well. The court further found
that petitioner exposed the children to domestic violence. The court noted that petitioner received
services during her two previous proceedings and found that there were no more services that could
be offered to petitioner that had not already been offered. Further, the court concluded that there
was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and
neglect in the foreseeable future, if ever, and that the potential for further abuse and neglect was
so great as to preclude the use of resources to mitigate or resolve family problems or assist
petitioner in fulfilling her responsibilities to the children. It is from this order that petitioner
appeals.

        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner argues that the circuit
court erred by allowing H.H.’s letter and A.D.’s recorded statement to be entered into evidence
because the evidence was not disclosed until the day of the dispositional hearing. However, none
of the authorities upon which petitioner relies can entitle her to relief. First, petitioner argues that
the introduction of this evidence violated Rule 8(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. However, her reliance on this rule is misplaced, as Rule
8(b) sets forth the procedure for the taking of a child’s testimony. Here, the record shows that no
such testimony was offered. Second, petitioner claims that the introduction of this evidence at the
dispositional hearing violated Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings. However, that rule requires counsel for the DHS to provide “[a]ny relevant written
or recorded statements made by the respondents (or any one of them), or copies thereof, and the
substance of any oral statements which the petitioner intends to offer in evidence at the trial made
by the respondents (or any one of them).” (Emphasis added). Here, the DHS did not introduce any
statements made by respondents. Thus, petitioner’s reliance on this rule is similarly misplaced.

       3
         H.H.’s father’s parental rights were terminated below. A.D.’s father previously
relinquished his parental rights. The permanency plan for the children is adoption in their
respective current placements.
                                                   2
         Having established that the authorities upon which petitioner relies cannot entitle her to
relief, we further find no error in the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. We have held that

       “[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory
       provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia Code § 49-
       4-604,] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives
       when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West Virginia Code
       § 49-4-604(c)(6)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially
       corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). The circuit court noted that
petitioner received services on two prior occasions and made specific findings that there were no
services that could remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect. The record contains ample
evidence to support the circuit court’s findings that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that it was
necessary for the children’s welfare to terminate petitioner’s parental rights. See W. Va. Code §
49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting circuit court to terminate parental rights upon finding no reasonable
likelihood conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and
when necessary for the children’s welfare). Regardless of the evidence petitioner claims was
improperly introduced, the court made adequate findings to terminate petitioner’s rights upon
ample evidence that petitioner does not challenge on appeal. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the
court erred is without merit.

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
January 17, 2023, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 11, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice William R. Wooton

DISSENTING:

Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice C. Haley Bunn

                                                  3
BUNN, Justice, dissenting:

        I dissent to the majority’s resolution of this matter. I would have set this case for Rule 19
oral argument to thoroughly address petitioner’s due process argument. We have held that,

               “West Virginia Code, Chapter 49, Article [4], Section [601 (2015)], as
       amended, and the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States
       Constitutions prohibit a court or other arm of the State from terminating the parental
       rights of a natural parent having legal custody of his child, without notice and the
       opportunity for a meaningful hearing.” Syl. Pt. 2, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207
       S.E.2d 129 (1973).

Syl. pt. 3, In re T.S., 241 W. Va. 559, 827 S.E.2d 29 (2019). Petitioner’s assignment of error, which
the majority does not address in this memorandum decision, is based on the introduction of
evidence, at the dispositional hearing, related to new allegations that were not included in the
petition alleging abuse and neglect. DHS did not provide petitioner with notice of this evidence
until the beginning of the dispositional hearing. Deciding whether this last-minute notice deprived
petitioner of a meaningful hearing in violation of her due process rights warrants consideration on
the Rule 19 docket. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice
Hutchison joins me in this dissent.

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