Court Opinion

ID: 9791787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:17:53.370747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.486334
License: Public Domain

Ott, C. J.
(dissenting) — The majority reverse the trial court for the reason that
“. . . upon reviewing the record, we are in doubt as to whether or not the trial court, in the changing of custody to the defendant, considered the infliction of punishment upon the plaintiff for violation of the court’s orders.”
In my opinion, the record and the findings of the trial court sustain the court’s findings of appellant’s unfitness and that the welfare of the child required that custody be awarded to the respondent.
December 5, 1958, Maxine M. Shaffer, in a contested divorce proceeding, was granted a decree of divorce from Jack Eugene Shaffer. In the original divorce action, the court made no finding of the mother’s fitness to have custody of their infant daughter, then only a few months of age. The decree, in this regard, provided “That subject to the further order of the court herein the plaintiff [Maxine M. Shaffer] be and she is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties.”
September 21, 1961, and again on January 8, 1962, the same trial judge heard the evidence presented upon a petition to modify the decree relative to the custody of the minor child. The record further discloses these facts:
(1) Subsequent to the decree of divorce and prior to her remarriage, appellant became pregnant and had a miscarriage.
(2) Appellant deliberately disobeyed the mandate of the court by removing the minor child from the state of Washington, and, when summoned to account for her conduct, falsely represented that she had remarried and had a good *705home for the child. Her testimony in this regard was as follows:
“Q. Were you married in February of 1960 at the time you and Mr. Shaffer signed an agreement by which he agreed to permit you to take your child to the State of Oregon? A. No. I lied about that. I just told him that to get away. I had to be back to work the next day. . . .
“Q. Now this document recites: ‘It is my understanding that Maxine has remarried and that she has a home in Lebanon large enough to care for Cindy Joe and her other two children by a previous marriage’, and you admit that those statements were false? A. I lied to him because I wanted to get back to Oregon, get back to work. . . .”
(3) The decree of divorce granted to respondent regular visitation privileges with his daughter. Appellant’s testimony established that she kept the father from seeing his child for nearly 3 years.
“Q. Now Mrs. Erickson [appellant], did Mr. Shaffer telephone you some time before the first of June of this year, and ask to have this child during the month of June? A. His mother wrote me a letter, but she has never seen the baby since she was a baby. Jack hasn’t seen her for years, three years.”
After hearing these facts of immorality, dishonesty, and defiance of orders of the court on the part of appellant, the trial court concluded:
“. . . That the Court is not satisfied that Plaintiff is at this time a fit person to have custody of said child; that the Court is satisfied as to Defendant’s fitness to have custody of said child.
“The best interest and welfare of said child require that the divorce decree entered December 5, 1958 should be modified so as to award the care, custody and control of . . . [the] minor child of the parties, to the defendant, Jack Eugene Shaffer, until the further order of the Court, the plaintiff to have reasonable rights of visitation with her minor child, the visits by plaintiff until the further order of the Court should be in Grays Harbor County, State of Washington.”
*706We have stated that “ . . . respect for law and order, and compliance with court orders, does [sic] bear upon fitness.” Sweeny v. Sweeny, 43 Wn. (2d) 542, 552, 262 P. (2d) 207 (1953). Pregnancy out of wedlock, false representations to those in authority relative to marital status, and deliberate dishonesty are proper considerations in determining unfitness to have custody of a minor child. Patterson v. Patterson, 51 Wn. (2d) 162, 316 P. (2d) 902 (1957); Sweeny v. Sweeny, supra.
The majority' hold that punishment of the parent for contempt may not be visited upon the child, in custody matters, and that custody of the child it not to be used as a reward or punishment for the conduct of the parents. The best interest of the child is the paramount and controlling consideration. Thompson v. Thompson, 56 Wn. (2d) 244, 352 P. (2d) 179 (1960).
With these legal principles, I am in full accord. In the instant case, however, the trial court considered not only the appellant’s disobedience of the orders of the court but, also, the entire evidence, and found the appellant to be unfit at this time, and that “The best interest and welfare of said child require” that custody be awarded to the respondent. It is difficult to see how the trial judge could have made it any clearer to the judges of this court that he had the best interest and welfare of the child in mind in entering his order changing custody.
If, since the decree of modification was entered, conditions have changed which may now affect the best interest and welfare of the child, the appellant can seek to regain custody, as provided by law. This court should not reverse a trial court upon the speculation that subsequent facts may merit a change of custody.
Finally, we have consistently held, in custody proceedings, that the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the record clearly preponderates against them. Patterson v. Patterson, supra; Munroe v. Munroe, 47 Wn. (2d) 391, 287 P. (2d) 488 (1955); Chat-*707wood v. Chatwood, 44 Wn. (2d) 233, 266 P. (2d) 782 (1954); Sweeny v. Sweeny, supra.
In the very recent case of Cumbie v. Cumbie, ante p. 669, 379 P. (2d) 918 (1963), this court again approved the rule announced in Chatwood v. Chatwood, supra, at p. 240:
“5. Trial courts must necessarily be allowed broad discretion in custody matters, because so many of the factors to be considered can be more accurately evaluated by the trial judge, who has the distinct advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses, and is in a better position to determine their credibility, than the members of an appellate court, who have access only to the printed record on appeal, and to the briefs and argument of counsel.”
Accord, Patterson v. Patterson, supra.
The decree of modification should be affirmed.
Hill and Hamilton, JJ., concur with Qtt, C. J.