Court Opinion

ID: 9558176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:03:46.840727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:26.089074
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I am in accord with the reasoning of Judge Donworth’s dissent as it relates to the nonliability of the city of Seattle on the basis of the proposition that in the supervising of prisoners serving sentences imposed by its municipal court, the city was engaged in a governmental function.
Assuming the law of this state to be what the majority declared it to be in Kelso v. Tacoma (1964), 63 Wn. (2d) 913, 390 P. (2d) 2, it is clear that the court’s action in that case in abrogating the rule of municipal immunity from tort liability while engaged in the exercise of governmental functions, was based on Laws of 1961, chapter 136, § 1 (codified as RCW 4.92.090) and Laws of 1963, chapter 159, § 2. The collision which caused the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred August 23, 1958, and the plaintiffs commenced their action in March of 1959. There is no indication that the legislation, so broadly construed in Kelso v. Tacoma, supra, was intended to be retroactive in its application. See Hammack v. Monroe Street Lbr. Co. (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 224, 339 P. (2d) 684.
While I do not concur with Judge Donworth on the foreseeability issue, I would, however, affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action against the city of Seattle for the reasons given by Judge Donworth in that portion of his dissent dealing with the issue of governmental immunity.
September 17, 1964. Petition for rehearing denied.