Court Opinion

ID: 9757761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:58:14.174675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.033930
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(dissenting). I do not quarrel with the holding that the judgment must be modified to a conviction of larceny in the fourth degree because there was insufficient evidence of the value of the property which is the subject of the larceny. I would not have reached this issue, however, because I disagree with the position of the majority that there was sufficient “direct and circumstantial” evidence to support a finding that the defendant knew or believed that the boat had'“probably been stolen” during the period of time he received, retained or disposed of it, as is necessary for the offense of larceny by receiving stolen property. General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-119 (8).
The only direct evidence concerning the knowledge of the defendant that the boat was stolen came from *208David Williams. At one point in his direct examination, after saying that the defendant had berated him for not disclosing that it was the YMCA boat, he testified that he had told the defendant the boat was stolen,1 as the majority opinion states. Later in his direct *209testimony, however, he changed his statement to indicate that he had merely told the defendant that “the boat was just only an insurance fraud” and had been reported “stolen for insurance purposes.”2 Williams then testified that in a later conversation, when he went back to obtain his money for the boat, he found out from the defendant that the boat was stolen and that it belonged to the YMCA.3 On cross-examination he reiterated that he had merely told the defendant that the boat was the subject of an insurance fraud and that, by the time he later learned that the boat had been stolen, it had been disposed of by the defendant.4 He *210also said that he thought that Larry Brackett, in whose yard he first saw the boat, was claiming that the boat was stolen in order to obtain some insurance money.5 He repeated twice on redirect examination that he had merely told the defendant the boat was part of an insurance fraud.6 do not comprehend how the testimony of this key witness, taken as a whole, can be construed by the majority to indicate that the defendant was told the boat was stolen at any time when he had possession of it.
The majority also appear to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish the element of knowledge or belief of the “stolen” status of the property. The opinion, however, fails to specify precisely which circumstances are relied upon as proof that the defendant was aware that the boat was stolen, in contradistinction from its involvement in an insurance fraud. The plenitude of circumstances recited is as consistent with the one as with the other. The suspicious nature of the transaction, the low price paid for the boat, the obliteration of identification numbers and the use of the term “hot” in reference to the boat jibe equally well with a belief on the part of the defendant that Brackett wanted to dispose of a boat for which he had made an insurance claim and *211was using Williams as an intermediary, just as the latter testified. Where the evidence as a whole is reasonably capable of a noncriminal explanation, it must be viewed in that light. State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 485-86, 29 A.2d 582 (1942).
The majority do not, at least explicitly, adopt the position that knowledge that the boat was involved in an insurance fraud satisfies the statutory requirement of knowledge or belief that the property “has probably been stolen.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-119 (8). Such a broad interpretation of “stolen” might well be socially desirable but would conflict with the basic principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 125, 394 A.2d 716 (1978); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555, 271 A.2d 99 (1970). We have previously held that an error of judgment in failing to realize the stolen character of property is not the equivalent of guilty knowledge. State v. Newman, 127 Conn. 398, 401, 17 A.2d 774 (1940); see State v. Appletree, 35 Conn. Sup. 531, 533-34, 394 A.2d 744 (1977).
Although few would shed a tear for the defendant, whose social culpability is as great as if he had actual knowledge of the theft of the boat while it was in his possession, it is fundamental that no person may be convicted except where every element of the crime charged has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view that standard was not met in this case. Accordingly, I dissent.

 Williams testified that in late August, 1977, he first saw the boat in the yard of his friend Brackett, who had actually stolen the boat. A few days later he brought the defendant to see the boat in the yard. The first testimony of Williams about what he told the defendant of the status of the boat was as follows:
“Q. Did you tell him where it (the boat) had come from?
“A. I told him that it was an insurance fraud.
“Q. You told this to the defendant?
“A. Yes.”
Williams next testified on this subject as follows:
“Q. Did you tell him it was a few months old?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did you tell him it was a little bit hot?
“A. Yes.”
Later in his direct examination Williams testified that a week or two after his first encounter with the defendant, as a result of which the defendant took possession of the boat, he visited the defendant at his place of business to request his money. The defendant told him to come back about a week later. Williams did not observe the boat on the premises at that time. He then testified as follows:
“Q. As you went to leave, did you observe the boat there at that time, the Boston Whaler?
“A. No.
“Q. As you went to walk out the door, did you say anything to him?
“A. Not that I recall.
“Q.. Did he say anything to you?
“A. ■ Not that I recall.
“Q. Did he (defendant) say anything to you about the YMCA?
“A. That was a while after. I think it was the second time I went back. He said it was the YMCA boat.
“Q. What did he say to you?
“A. He asked me why didn’t I tell him it was the YMCA boat.
“Q. Did he tell you what he had done with the boat?
“A. He said he had gotten rid of it in New York.
“Q. What else did he tell you on that occasion?
“A. I don’t recall.
“Q. Had you told him the boat was stolen?
“A. Yes.”

 This portion of the testimony was as follows:
“Q. When you brought him to the Boston Whaler in August of 1977 and showed it to him, was there any question but you told him that it was stolen?
(Objection overruled)
“A. At the beginning of when I first brought Sal to the boat, it was, T understand that the boat was just only an insurance fraud.’
“Q. That’s what you told him?
“A. To report it stolen for insurance purposes.
“Q. Is that what you told him?
“A. Yes, that’s what I told Sal.”

 This testimony followed immediately after that set forth in footnote 2:
“Q. Did you later have other conversations with him about the boat being stolen in August of 1977?
“A. Yes, when I went back to get money from him. I found out the boat was stolen. He had gotten rid of it. Then he told me it was a YMCA boat.”

 This testimony was as follows:
“Q. And the first time when you were scared was with the Milford police, and at that time you said that Mr. Scielzo knew the boat was stolen, didn’t you? That’s what you told the Milford police the first time, wasn’t it?
“A. That it was an insurance fraud, and afterwards, I found it was stolen.
“Q. But first you told him it was an insurance fraud?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You didn’t tell him later it was stolen, right?
“A. That’s when I found out about it, yes.
“Q. And the boat was sold by that point, wasn’t it?
“A. Yes, as far as I know.
“Q. It wasn’t on the property of the Marine Engine Service Company, was it?
“A. No, it wasn’t.”

 This testimony was as follows:
“Q. So you didn’t know the boat was stolen when you first saw the boat, did you?
“A. No.
“Q. All you thought was that Larry Brackett was claiming it was stolen in order to get some insurance money, right?
“A. Yes.”

 This testimony was as follows:
“Q. Now, when you were asked, sir, whether or not you told the investigator for the defense that the boat was part of an insurance fraud, that was true, you did tell the defendant that, didn’t you?
“A. Yes. . . .
“Q. What did you tell the investigator for the defense about whether or not it was stolen?
“A. That it was an insurance fraud.”