Court Opinion

ID: 9759310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:11:53.122973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.091281
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
This dissenting and concurring opinion is respectfully filed. In my opinion, the opinion of the Court should be as hereinafter set out.
Appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment. In late September, 1989, an opinion was filed in this appeal. One justice dissented. The opinion appears and is reported at 779 S.W.2d 877. We *936make reference to our opinion of September 28, 1989.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for further consideration to our Ninth Court of Appeals. The only time the case was orally argued was on June 15,1989. The Ninth Court of Appeals then consisted of Chief Justice Dies and Justices Brookshire and Burgess. Chief Justice Dies retired from the Court effective as of August 30, 1989. Chief Justice Ronald Walker was sworn in to his new office on September 1, 1989. It is correct that the Court of Appeals’ opinion was delivered on September 28, 1989. We refer to our opinion on the motion for rehearing. Id. at 883. Chief Justice Dies, now retired, fully concurred in the opinion of the Court before his retirement, but was not active on the Court on September 28, 1989. The Supreme Court determined that since Justice Burgess dissented, a concurrence, if proper and agreed to, of Justices Brook-shire and Walker was necessary to decide the case. Hayden v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 786 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.1990). The Supreme Court wrote: “Chief Justice Dies no longer had the authority to participate in the decision.” Id. at 261. At least two active justices on a panel must concur. Hence, the remand.
Through the office of our Clerk, we invited the parties and their respective attorneys of record to reargue the matter. However, each side declined to do so. We have followed the mandate of the Supreme Court and we have further considered this appeal.
We adhere to and reaffirm the opinion expressed as the majority or Court’s opinion of September 28, 1989, reported and cited as above set out.
We think it cannot be gainsaid that the original plaintiffs definitely asked for relief under the summary judgment practice. Hence, the plaintiffs, in fairness, ought to be willing to follow the rules of the summary judgment practice. Thus, under the unusual record in this case Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a should govern and be considered the paramount rule. The original dissent conceded that the date of service and the manner of service were fact issues. Hayden, supra, 779 S.W.2d at 883 (Burgess, J., dissenting). The original dissent also writes that this Court has acknowledged that trial courts are in a superior position to find facts. But again, in a summary judgment proceeding trial courts simply do not find facts.
Under this record we cannot agree that the “factual issues concerning the request for admissions and their answers” are, in effect, separate and distinct from the summary judgment practice. Id. at 883. In the context of the entire record before us, we reaffirm that the procedures set out under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a are applicable and further, Tex.R.Civ.P. 169 does not exclusively control and govern the outcome of this appeal being from the granting of a motion for summary judgment. We therefore, again, reverse the judgment of the trial court below and remand the cause for trial on the merits of the case. The original dissent recites this: “[tjhis error, if it was, can and should be cured by reformation rather than reversal.” 779 S.W.2d at 883. The methodology however, of an appellate reformation or the means thereof, if any, are not in any wise set forth in the original dissent.
It must be stressed that the request for admissions filed by Diane Hayden and others demanded that within ten (10) days after the service of this request that the defendant admit or deny under oath certain, limited following facts. The demand on the very first page of the request for admissions was in error. The demand did not comply with Rule 169. But the original dissent insists that “[tjhis summary judgment case turns on whether the requests for admissions were timely answered. If they were, the summary judgment was improper; if they were not, the requests were deemed admitted and the summary judgment was proper.” Id. at 882.
Even though the Haydens insisted that the answers be made within ten (10) days, even the original dissent concedes that under Tex.R.Civ.P. 169 that it is only after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the date of service that the requests are deemed admitted. Id. at 883. That is simply not *937the Haydens’ position in their own pleadings for requests for admissions. The Haydens’ position involves extrinsic acts or actions.

The judgment signed May 21, 1988, inter alia, provided that the minor Stephanie Hayden receive a certain amount plus certain future weekly benefits of $40.68 until July 18, 1989, and of $81.37 until January 21, 2005. And similarly to the minor plaintiff Alicia Hayden there was awarded a certain sum in cash plus future weekly benefits of $40.68 until July 18, 1989, and thereafter future weekly benefits of $81.37 until January 21, 2005, and thereafter future benefits of $162.75 until October 17, 2010.

Upon a review of all of the requests for admissions of fact upon which the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was based, there is no request for admission of facts that dealt with a long duration of time extending in the case of Stephanie until the year 2005 and in the case of Alicia until the year 2005 and thereafter until October 17, 2010, A.D. Query: How can the Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company know what all the facts will be in connection with the living patterns and life plans of Stephanie and Alicia for more than a decade in the future, and in the case of Alicia, more than two decades in the future? This is beyond our ken. We think these future decades and the events therein are beyond the ken of Stephanie and Alicia. But there were no requests for admissions of fact concerning these distant, future years. Nevertheless, under the original dissent the summary judgment as entered was proper. See and analyze Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 8306 § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
Under this unusual record, and we would venture to say unique judgment, wherein the requests for admissions was stapled under the interrogatories and under the request for the production of documents— these staplings were extrinsic actions (as to Liberty Mutual). These acts having been done and performed by the Haydens, are in our opinion extrinsic acts and matters that would definitely put Liberty Mutual at a disadvantage in correctly following the appropriate rules. This is especially true in view of the fact that the requests for admissions absolutely demanded a response to be made within ten (10) days when the correct rule specifically allowed thirty (30) days.
Thus, under all these facts and the entire record we conclude that Tex.R.Civ.P. 1 entitled OBJECTIVE OF RULES is certainly applicable here. It is a general, paramount rule and provides that the proper objective of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable, and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law. Query: What is wrong with affording a just, fair, equitable, and impartial adjudication of the rights of all the litigants herein under the established principles of substantive law by means of a trial on the merits with a jury trial, if either party properly requests a jury?
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded in full for a trial on the merits. I concur with the reversal of the judgment below. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent inasmuch as the Court declines to order a full trial on the merits of the whole case.