Court Opinion

ID: 9534325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:39.622494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:17.974557
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in rejection of recommendation). I agree with the master1 that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Judge Szymanski was or should have been *473aware of any impropriety or illegality in the Pap-pas-Renkoski transaction.
It appears, however, that Judge Szymanski sought to facilitate that transaction and allowed his status as a judge to be exploited to advance private business interests. This was inappropriate and violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(C)(1).
It does not appear, however, that this was a continuing course of conduct or other than an isolated, atypical transaction.2 While the Judicial *474Tenure Commission would have been justified in privately admonishing Judge Szymanski, discipline is not warranted and accordingly I join in rejecting the recommended order of censure.

 The master, in his report, said in part:
"It is not claimed by the commission, nor can it be, that the respondent’s conduct was illegal or criminal since he has been absolved of any criminal liability. * * * It is claimed, however, in paragraph 4 of the complaint that at the three luncheon meetings of June 9, July 13 and August 18, 1971, there were discussions of a wrongful, improper, immoral and unethical scheme to obtain liquor licenses from the [Liquor Control Commission]; that the respondent did participate in these discussions; knew the purpose and nature of same to be improper, immoral and unethical and that he did counsel and advise Pappas and Renkoski, and did offer to assist them in the implementation of the scheme, knowing the same to be wrongful, improper, immoral and unethical. 'Scheme’ is defined in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language as: 'a plan, design or program of action to be followed.’ While Renkoski and Pappas were engaged in planning to obtain liquor licenses for clients of Pappas, the weight of evidence does not, in my opinion, establish that their activities were wrongful, improper, immoral or unethical. While the conversations and the tapes, plus Renkoski’s testimony, are open to interpretation that someone was being bribed, it is equally open to interpretation that Renkoski was being paid for the services of himself and his contact to process and obtain liquor licenses. * * * The respondent’s participation in the discussions and advice and guarantee can be construed as violative of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and GCR 1963, 932 only if the negotiations between Pappas and Renkoski are construed as wrongful, improper, immoral and unethical. I do not find by the preponderance of evidence that it was.”

 GCR 1963, 932.4(d) provides that conduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct "may constitute” cause delineated in Const 1963, art 6, § 30 for judicial discipline, but that violation of the Code does not necessarily require the imposition of discipline:
"The question in every case is whether the conduct complained of constitutes misconduct in office or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice or there is other cause delineated in Const 1963, art 6, § 30, not whether a particular canon or disciplinary rule has been violated. All the circumstances are to be considered in deciding whether action by the commission is warranted.”
It is not the practice of the tenure commission to issue a formal complaint for every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct brought to its attention. Instances of judicial intemperance on or off the bench or lethargy in performance of judicial duties are, for example, ordinarily dealt with by private admonition that the judge must conform his behavior to the standard of the code and that continuing nonconformance will result in the issuance of a formal complaint.
An isolated instance of allowing one’s status as a judge to be exploited by another person is of the same order of magnitude as the kind of conduct which does not ordinarily occasion a formal complaint.
See, also, the draft Standards of Judicial Discipline prepared by the American Bar Association Joint Committee on Professional Discipline, which provide that a state’s judicial inquiry/discipline/tenure commission may, in lieu of filing a formal complaint, issue a private reprimand or dispose of the complaint by informal adjustment, including informing or admonishing a judge that his conduct is or may be cause for discipline:
"Dispositions. The commission may make any of the following dispositions:
"(a) An unjustified or unfounded complaint may be privately dismissed by the commission without giving notice to the judge.
"(b) The commission may issue a private reprimand.
"(c) The commission may by informal adjustment dispose of a complaint by:
*474"(1) Informing or admonishing the judge that his conduct is or maybe cause for discipline;
"(2) Directing professional counseling and assistance for the judge; or
"(3) Imposing conditions on a judge’s conduct.” American Bar Association, Joint Committee on Professional Discipline, proposed Standards of Judicial Discipline, § 6.6.