Court Opinion

ID: 9961724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:12:47.645141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:45.076649
License: Public Domain

J-S40025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ERIC JOHNSON                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2613 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002426-2020

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED APRIL 19, 2024

       Eric Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of third-degree murder, three violations of

the Uniform Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of crime.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual background of this appeal as

follows:

       [In November 2019, Johnson] entered a bar located on the corner
       of Emerald and East Tioga streets in Philadelphia. Sometime after
       [Johnson] entered the bar, the decedent, Harry Speech
       [(“Speech”)], entered. Within minutes of . . . Speech entering the
       bar, [Johnson] and Mr. Speech began arguing. [Johnson] and . .
       . Speech continued to argue as they exited the bar. . . . [A]cross
       the intersection from the bar, [Johnson] pulled out a handgun and
       shot . . . Speech in the face, abdomen, thigh, and buttocks. . . .
       Speech’s friend, Michael Hart ([“Hart]”]), helped him into an SUV
       and attempted to get . . . Speech to the hospital. Police stopped
       . . . Hart’s car and realized that . . . Speech had been shot. . . .
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a).
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       Speech was placed into a police car and taken to Temple
       University Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on November
       21, 2019. The medical examiner determined that . . . Speech’s
       death was caused by gunshot wounds to his head and abdomen.
       [A police log about the stop of Hart’s car indicated that Hart
       initially described the suspect who shot Speech as a Hispanic
       male.2 Hart later described the suspect to detectives as a Black
       male.]

              Police collected video surveillance from several different
       locations and prepared a compilation video, which showed the
       shooting in its entirety [(“the compilation video”).          The
       compilation video showed the shooting suspect run off with two
       other people.]

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 2 (citations to the record omitted).

       Officer Tyler Smith (“Officer Smith”) worked in the district covering the

neighborhood around the bar, and he had known Johnson for about three

years from seeing him in the area on an almost daily basis. See N.T., 4/6/22,

at 115, 120-21. Officer Smith viewed the compilation video and identified the

shooting suspect as Johnson. See id. at 114-15, 117. Officer Smith contacted

the detectives investigating the shooting, gave them a statement, and

identified Johnson again from still photographs taken from surveillance

cameras. See N.T., 4/7/22, at 81.

       Detectives also interviewed Johnson’s paramour, Karley Weisenbach

(“Weisenbach”). See id.at 50, 82. Weisenbach stated that the day before

the shooting, she had given birth to her and Johnson’s child and, on the night

____________________________________________

2 Johnson is a Black male. Hart did not testify at trial because the
Commonwealth was not able to locate him. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 104. Upon
the defense’s request, the Commonwealth stipulated to the reading of the
police log into the record. See id. at 106-08, 112.

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of the shooting, she was still in Holy Redeemer Hospital (“the hospital”). See

id. at 45-46. She told detectives that she had texted Johnson about the birth

of their daughter, and he called her, but she did not see him until after her

discharge a few days after giving birth.         See id. at 46-47.   Weisenbach

identified Johnson from still photographs and gave detectives Johnson’s phone

number. See id. at 50-51, 52-53, 82. Detectives obtained a warrant for

phone records based on Johnson’s phone number, and they obtained cell site

location information that placed Johnson’s SIM card around the scene of the

shooting of Speech.3        See id. at 82-83, 118.    Police arrested Johnson in

February 2020. See id. at 85. While Johnson was in custody pending trial, a

fellow inmate, Thomas Graham (“Graham”), who was familiar with both

Johnson and Speech, spoke with Johnson while on a prison bus; Graham later

told his stepfather, a former police detective, that Johnson admitted to

shooting and killing Speech, and Graham’s stepfather contacted police. See

N.T., 4/6/22, at 128-33, 150.

       Shortly before trial, defense counsel advised the Commonwealth of

Johnson’s intent to raise an alibi defense that he was with Weisenbach at the

____________________________________________

3 There were different phones at issue in this case, a red phone seen on the

compilation video, and a pink and white phone later seized from Johnson at
the time of his arrest. The cell site location information was based on the SIM
card associated with Johnson’s phone number, and the Commonwealth
presented circumstantial evidence that the SIM card had been in the red phone
on the night of the shooting. See N.T., 4/7/22, at 86-88, 123-25, 133-44.

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time of the shooting.         See N.T., 4/5/22, at 5-6.4   The Commonwealth

undertook a further investigation into the possible alibi defense and obtained

additional evidence against Johnson. This included a recording of a March

2022 prison phone call from Johnson to Weisenbach, during which Johnson

and Weisenbach argued about her contacting his attorney to say that he was

with her at the hospital. See id. at 10-14. Weisenbach also gave another

statement to detectives two days before trial, and she indicated that Johnson

was trying to have her corroborate his alibi, but she refused to lie. See id. at

13; see also N.T., 4/7/22, at 48, 58.

       At trial, the Commonwealth played the compilation video that showed

the shooting of Speech, and the events before and after the shooting. See

N.T., 4/7/22, at 129-62. Detective Thorsten Lucke (“Detective Lucke”), who

had prepared the compilation video and analyzed the data from Johnson’s

phone number, corroborated information obtained from Johnson’s phone

number to portions of the compilation video. See id. at 138-41 (indicating

that the phone records of a sixty-three second phone call matched the video

of the suspect receiving a phone call and then hanging up after sixty-three

seconds).     Detective Lucke further indicated that the cell site location

____________________________________________

4  Johnson, through defense counsel, had also requested that the
Commonwealth search his phone for pictures of him with Weisenbach at the
hospital. See N.T., 4/5/22, at 8-9. The Commonwealth was not able to access
the phone taken from Johnson at the time of his arrest. See id. at 9; see
also N.T., 4/8/22, at 92-93.

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information never located Johnson’s phone number near the hospital where

Weisenbach gave birth. See id. at 119.

      The Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer Smith concerning

his identification of Johnson after viewing the compilation video. See N.T.,

4/6/22, at 115. During cross-examination, defense counsel noted that the

portion of the compilation video showing the shooting of Speech were in black

and white and less clear than the other portions of the compilation video. See

id. at 122-23.

      Weisenbach testified that Johnson never visited her at the hospital

where she gave birth.    See N.T., 4/7/22, at 45.     Over defense counsel’s

objection, the Commonwealth played the prison phone call between Johnson

and Weisenbach, and Weisenbach testified that she refused to lie for Johnson

and say that he was with her at the hospital. See id. at 53-55. During cross-

examination, defense counsel elicited Weisenbach’s testimony that she was

angry at him for seeing other women and disrespecting her pregnancy. See

id. at 59-61. Defense counsel also elicited her testimony that a child welfare

agency had removed her child from her care, and she would not want Johnson

to have custody of their child if he were released from prison. See id. at 75.

      Johnson’s fellow inmate, Graham, also testified that Johnson told him

that Speech and Johnson “had some words” earlier on the day of the shooting,

and Johnson later saw Speech at the bar. N.T., 4/6/22, at 134. Johnson then

told Graham that he “hit that N too many times[,] and he died,” which Graham

took to mean that Johnson killed Speech. Id. at 132, 134. Defense counsel

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impeached Graham with Graham’s open cases for burglary and arson, for

which he was awaiting sentencing; his lengthy criminal record, which included

crimen falsi; and his substance abuse issues. See id. at 136-43, 149.

      Johnson testified at trial and asserted that on the night of the shooting

he was at the hospital with Weisenbach and their child. See N.T., 4/8/22, at

11. Johnson testified that he and Weisenbach had a difficult relationship and

they argued over whether he would sign the child’s birth certificate, whether

he would take a paternity test, and his wish for the child to take his last name.

See id. at 13. He stated he intended to take full custody of the child. See

id. He denied asking Weisenbach to lie for him during the prison phone call;

rather, he asserted, he was urging her to tell the truth. See id. at 56.

      During closing arguments, defense counsel highlighted portions of the

compilation video. See N.T., 4/8/22, at 127-32. Defense counsel argued that

the person whom the Commonwealth alleged shot Speech had been

predominantly using his left hand to carry and use his phone and, therefore,

must have been left-handed.      See id. at 130-31 (arguing that because a

phone is a valued possession, a person would hold their phone in their

dominant hand). He then noted that the person who shot Speech used his

right hand to hold the firearm and asserted that detective missed those

details. See id. at 132.

      The jury found Johnson not guilty of first-degree murder, but guilty of

the third-degree murder and the remaining offenses. On July 6, 2022, the

trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of thirty-five to seventy

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years of imprisonment.5 In support of its sentence, the court referenced the

presentence investigation report and thoroughly discussed the facts of the

case, Johnson’s arguments at sentencing, and the aggravating factors upon

which it imposed sentence. See N.T., 7/6/22, at 41-50. This included the

trial court’s discussion that it believed Johnson had perjured himself when

insisting that he had been with Weisenbach at the time of the shooting and

suborned perjury when attempting to have Weisenbach corroborate his alibi.

See N.T., 7/6/22, at 45-48.          Johnson filed timely post-sentence motions,

which the trial court denied. Johnson timely appealed, and both he and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Johnson raises the following issues on appeal, which we have reordered

for disposition:

       I. Whether the adjudication of guilt for murder in the third degree
          is based upon insufficient evidence where the Commonwealth
          failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Johnson]
          possessed the requisite mental state for third degree murder?

       II. Whether [Johnson’s] convictions are against the weight of the
           evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice for the
           following reasons:

____________________________________________

5 The trial court imposed the following consecutive terms of imprisonment:
third-degree murder—a standard range sentence of twenty to forty years;
possession of firearm prohibited—an above the guidelines sentence of ten to
twenty years; firearms not be carried without a license—an aggravated range
sentence of three and one half to seven years; carrying firearms on public
street in Philadelphia—a standard range sentence of one to two years;
possessing an instrument of crime—a standard range sentence of six to twelve
months. See Sentencing Order, 7/6/22, unnumbered at 1; N.T., 7/6/22, at
49-50. Johnson was thirty-two years old at the time of sentencing.

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            a. Detectives did not interview . . . Hart to question him
               more closely about his description of the perpetrator as
               being a Hispanic male,

            b. Identifying witness [Officer Smith] was equivocal about
               his identification from a less clear black and white version
               of surveillance video,

            c. [Graham] was a drug addicted thief with multiple
               convictions for burglary, arson, etc. who had a strong
               motive and incentive to fabricate,

            d. [Weisenbach] possessed strong motives to fabricate
               associated with her resentment that the [Johnson]
               refused to sign the birth certificate for their child,
               demanded a paternity test and was contesting placement
               of the child in a contemporaneous dependency case, and

            e. The surveillance video depicts two different men, one who
               was left[-]handed and another who was right[-]handed?

      III. Whether the court abused its discretion at sentencing creating
           a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate
           because it is contrary to the norms underlying the Sentencing
           Code where:

            a. The court sentenced 32[-]year[-]old Johnson to an
               aggregate upward departure from the guidelines of 35-
               70 years of incarceration where that length of sentence
               would not make [Johnson] eligible for parole until he
               reached the age of 77 where such a sentence amounts
               to a life sentence for the crime of third[-]degree murder.

            b. The court failed to give the proper weight to mitigating
               factors consisting most notably of the absence of a
               significant psychiatric disorder that predicted future
               violent propensities, a relatively stable upbringing[,] and
               [Johnson’s] concern for his children.

Johnson’s Brief at 6-7 (some capitalization omitted).

      In his first issue, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his conviction for third-degree murder.

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      Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is as follows:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is
      whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact[-]finder to find every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may
      not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
      the fact-finder.    In addition, we note that the facts and
      circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by a fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,]
      no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated[,] and all
      evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
      of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lowry, 55 A.3d 743, 751 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal

citation omitted).

      Third-degree murder occurs upon “the killing of an individual with

malice.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(internal citation omitted). This Court has stated that “malice” includes “not

only particular ill will toward the victim, but also wickedness of disposition,

hardness of heart, wantonness, and cruelty, recklessness of consequences,

and conscious disregard by the defendant of an unjustified and extremely high

risk that his actions may cause serious bodily harm.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). A fact-finder may infer malice “from the use of a deadly weapon

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upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Knox, 219 A.3d

186, 195 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

       Johnson contends that the evidence demonstrates that he acted amid

an argument that provoked an uncontrollable passion and rage during an

argument with Speech over a woman. See id. at 24, 26.6 He argues that his

mental state was a critical issue at trial, and the jury’s finding that he acted

with malice was unreasonable. See id. at 26.

       With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence for third-degree murder,

the trial court ably explained that there was ample evidence that Johnson,

having shot Speech in the face and abdomen, employed a deadly weapon on

vital parts of his victim’s body. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 13. We

agree that this evidence was sufficient to prove Johnson acted with malice.

See Knox, 219 A.3d at 195.

       We add that Johnson attempts to interject principles of voluntary

manslaughter into his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for third-

degree murder.7 Where the defendant denies killing the victim, the principles

of voluntary manslaughter do not apply. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sanchez,

82 A.3d 943, 980 (Pa. 2013) (noting that when a defendant denies committing
____________________________________________

6 Johnson apparently refers to a portion of the prison phone call and
Weisenbach’s testimony that she told Johnson “something along the lines of
you did this over a b[].” N.T., 4/7/22, at 55.

7 “[V]oluntary manslaughter is a form of homicide that involves the specific

intent to kill, but contains no legal malice as a result of passion and
provocation.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1260-61 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (en banc) (internal citation omitted).

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the killing a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter is not required). Here, at

trial, Johnson expressly denied shooting Speech and asserted that he was at

the hospital with Weisenbach.          See N.T., 4/8/22, at 10-11.   There are no

indications that Johnson sought a voluntary manslaughter instruction, or the

jury considered the principles of voluntary manslaughter as a means of

negating malice.      Thus, his suggestion on appeal that he acted under an

uncontrollable passion or rage that negated his ability to form malice relies on

inapt legal principles, see Sanchez, 82 A.3d at 980, and theories that he

neither raised nor developed at trial. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36

A.3d 592, 598 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (concluding that Truong waived a

theory of “imperfect self-defense” when he raised it for the first time on

appeal).8 Accordingly, we reject the argument that Johnson’s mental state at

the time of the shooting was a critical issue at trial, and we conclude his

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence merits no relief.

       In his second issue, Johnson asserts that his convictions were against

the weight of the evidence. The following principles govern our review:

             A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
       against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
____________________________________________

8 Even if Johnson had admitted to shooting Speech, there was no evidence for

a jury to have found that he had been acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim. The mere fact that
he had a verbal argument with Speech would not establish such provocation.
See Truong, 36 A.3d at 600 (noting that “[t]he test for [serious] provocation
is whether a reasonable person confronted by the same series of events,
would become impassioned to the extent that his mind would be incapable of
cool reflection”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

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      of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
      mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
      facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
      role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the
      facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
      them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
      justice. It has often been stated that a new trial should be
      awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
      to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
      imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
      prevail.

            An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
      a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
      review applied by the trial court:

         Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
         exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
         of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
         evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity
         to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court
         will give the gravest consideration to the findings and
         reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
         court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight
         of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
         granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
         conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight
         of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
         interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (internal

citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). An appellate court,

therefore, reviews the trial court’s decision on a weight of the evidence claim

for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441,

464 (Pa. 2019).

      Johnson presents two claims concerning the weight of the evidence.

First, like his sufficiency issue, he claims that there was credible testimony

from Weisenbach that he and Speech had been arguing over a woman. See

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Johnson’s Brief at 24. He asserts that his actions were more akin to acting in

the heat of passion than acting with reckless disregard to the value of Speech’s

life. See id. He concludes that the jury disregarded the history of the dispute

between him and Speech and “obvious evidence that [he] act with intense

rage[,]” such that the trial court should have ordered a new trial. See id.

      Johnson’s first claim is waived. As noted above, Johnson did not pursue

voluntary manslaughter at trial, nor could he when he expressly denied

shooting Speech. See Truong, 36 A.3d at 598; see also Sanchez, 82 A.3d

at 980.   Furthermore, Johnson’s post-sentence motion and Rule 1925(b)

statement, both of which were identical to his statement of questions involved

on appeal, challenged the weight of the evidence based only on the evidence

of the alleged misidentification that he killed Speech.    See Post-Sentence

Motion, 7/15/22, unnumbered at 2; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/30/22,

unnumbered at 1; Johnson’s Brief at 6. Johnson did not fairly suggest a claim

that the jury’s finding of malice was against the weight of the evidence, nor,

under the circumstances of this case, would such a claim be readily discernible

from the record. Cf. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1224 (Pa.

2021) (vacating this Court’s decision that Rogers’s Rule 1925(b) statement

was too vague where the weight of the evidence claim was readily

understandable from the context of the record). Indeed, the trial court did

not address a challenge to the weight of the evidence concerning malice. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 4-12. Therefore, Johnson failed to preserve

his claim that the finding of malice was against the weight of the evidence,

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and we will not address it. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830,

835 (Pa. Super. 2018) (concluding a post-sentence motion and Rule 1925(b)

statement challenging the weight of identification testimony did not preserve

a claim that the findings of premeditation and specific intent to kill were

against the weight of the evidence); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii).

      Johnson’s second weight of the evidence claim challenges the finding he

shot Speech.       Johnson rehashes his trial theories that: (1) Hart initially

identified the suspect as a Hispanic male, but detectives failed to interview

Hart about that description; (2) Officer Smith identified Johnson from the poor

quality black and white portion of the compilation video showing the shooting;

(3) Graham, Johnson’s fellow inmate, was unworthy of belief and had an

improper motive to fabricate his testimony about Johnson’s admission to

killing Speech; (4) Weisenbach had improper motives to fabricate her

testimony and refuse to corroborate his alibi; and (5) the compilation video

showed that the person the Commonwealth alleged shot Speech had

predominantly been using his left hand before the shooting, but the person

who shot Speech held the gun in his right hand. See Johnson’s Brief at 24-

25.

      The trial court rejected Johnson’s claim and explained that the

compilation video alone clearly established that Johnson shot Speech. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 4-5 (noting, inter alia, that at trial, Johnson

“looked exactly like the stocky bearded man” in the portion of the compilation

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video from the bar, and the portion of the compilation video showing the

shooting, despite being less clear than the video from bar, also showed the

stocky bearded man with the same clothes, height, build, hairline, and general

appearance pulling a gun and shooting Speech) (footnote omitted). Moreover,

the trial court addressed the five specific arguments raised by Johnson and

concluded that they did not establish a basis to challenge the weight of the

evidence, which overwhelmingly demonstrated he shot Speech. See id. at 6-

11.

      Johnson’s repetition of his trial theories does not establish an abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny his post-sentence motion for a

new trial. The trial court carefully considered the record and rejected each of

Johnson’s arguments with references to the record. We agree with the court

that the jury was entitled to resolve the issues raised by Hart’s initial

description of the suspect as a Hispanic male, the reliability of Officer Smith’s

identifications of Johnson from the compilation video, and the defense’s

closing argument that the person shown in the bar was left-handed while the

shooter was right-handed.     See Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055 (noting that “a new

trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or

because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different

conclusion”) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, we agree that the jury

was free to find Graham and Weisenbach credible notwithstanding the

defense’s impeachment. See Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 768

(Pa. Super. 2023) (noting that “the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or

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none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses”),

appeal denied, 362 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 8614241 (Pa. 2023). As noted by the

trial court, the evidence against Johnson, which included the compilation

video, was overwhelming, and the jury’s finding that Johnson shot Speech

does not shock one’s sense of justice. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court decision, and Johnson’s weight of the evidence claim fails. See

Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.

      Johnson’s third issue implicates the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.

      A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute,

but rather, “must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 348 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal

citation omitted).   To reach the merits of such a claim, this Court must

determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [the defendant]
      preserved [the] issue; (3) whether [the defendant’s] brief includes
      a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
      appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and
      (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question
      that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-30 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      When we examine whether a substantial question exists, our inquiry

focuses on the reasons for which the appeal is sought as stated in the

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement. See Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180

A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018). A Rule 2119(f) statement that relies on

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mere “incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions

of law” is inadequate. See id.

      Here, Johnson has timely appealed and filed a timely post-sentence

motion challenging the discretionary aspects of the trial court’s sentence.

Johnson’s post-sentence motion, and his Rule 1925(b) statement, asserted

that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate

sentence that amounted to a de facto life sentence and failing to consider

mitigating factors. See Post-Sentence Motion, 7/15/22, unnumbered at 2;

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/30/22, unnumbered at 1-2.            Johnson has

included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.    However, that statement

reads:

      There is a substantial question presented about the sentence
      imposed . . . because the sentence is manifestly unreasonable and
      excessive under the circumstances of the case and contrary to the
      norms underlying the Sentencing Code and because the [c]ourt
      found [Johnson] guilty of perjury and suborning perjury where
      [he] had not been charged, tried or convicted of those crimes.

Johnson’s Brief at 21.

      We conclude Johnson has not preserved a substantial question for

review. Johnson’s Rule 2119(f) statement alleges that the trial court relied

on uncharged crimes. See id. A claim that a trial court abused its discretion

by improperly relying on uncharged crimes may raise a substantial question;

however, Johnson did not preserve this claim at sentencing, in his post-

sentence motion, or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.

Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (noting that

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although a claim stated in a Rule 2119(f) statement could raise a substantial

question, it was not preserved at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion).

Therefore, Johnson has waived his assertion that the trial court improperly

sentenced him for uncharged crimes.

       Furthermore, Johnson’s bald assertion that a sentence is manifestly

unreasonable and excessive “under the circumstances of a case” is too vague

to raise a substantial question. See Radecki, 180 A.3d at 468 (noting that

this Court “does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors”). Therefore,

Johnson has failed to establish a basis for reviewing his discretionary aspects

of sentencing claims.

       Even if Johnson had preserved his claims and stated them in a manner

to warrant appellate review, we would affirm. The trial court reasoned that it

considered all relevant sentencing factors, including mitigating factors, and its

finding that Johnson perjured himself and suborned perjury did not require

reversal because that finding was proper and only one among other factors

justifying its aggregate sentence. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 15-18;

see also Commonwealth v. Thurmond, 407 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Pa. Super.

1979) (noting that “consideration of false testimony is justified only if certain

requisites, guaranteeing the probative value of this evidence, are satisfied”);9

____________________________________________

9 The Thurmond Court set forth the following criteria, and rationales, for
allowing a sentencing court to consider a defendant’s false testimony at trial:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Commonwealth v. Bowersox, 690 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa. Super. 1997)

(concluding the belief that false testimony cannot be the sole reason for

imposing an aggravated sentence).              The record supported the trial court’s

reasoning, see N.T., 7/6/22, at 41-50, and Johnson’s conclusory arguments

established no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s sentencing

decisions. See Johnson’s Brief at 27-28. Thus, no relief would be due.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

       First, the misstatements must be willful. Unless the defendant
       has willfully offered false testimony, the fact that the testimony
       was untrue does not of itself show that the defendant is not likely
       to respond to efforts at rehabilitation. Second, the misstatement
       must be material, not of marginal importance. Only material
       falsehoods sufficiently bear on a defendant’s character to justify
       enhancing punishment.         Third, the verdict of guilt must
       necessarily establish that the defendant lied, not merely that the
       jury did not believe his testimony. This requirement ensures that
       a defendant can receive a stiffer penalty based on giving false
       testimony only when the finder of fact has determined, beyond a
       reasonable doubt, that the testimony was willfully false. Fourth,
       the verdict must be supported by sufficient credible evidence. If
       the jury’s verdict is to form the basis for enhancement of
       sentence, that verdict must have a rational foundation in evidence
       of record. Fifth, the trial court, if not acting as the trier of fact,
       must observe the testimony allegedly false. The cold record of
       the testimony and the verdict affords a meager basis for the
       sentencing court to determine whether the defendant’s testimony
       demonstrated a character not likely susceptible to rehabilitation.
       Finally, the court may consider the defendant’s lying only as one
       fact among many bearing on sentence.

Thurmond, 407 A.2d at 1359-60 (internal citations omitted).

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Date: 4/19/2024

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