Court Opinion

ID: 9538245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:33:19.876463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:41.676278
License: Public Domain

PERRY, J.,
dissenting.
After serious consideration of the personal loss, and perhaps personal injustice, which could result to the petitioner from a denial of his application, and my duties as a member of this court intrusted in such matters with the welfare of the public and. the profession, I am compelled to disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority.
The fact that petitioner was at one time a card-carrying member of the Communist party carries no weight in my thinking, except insofar as his membership therein at the time of joining and his actions in connection therewith reflect upon his present moral character.
The majority point out that the petitioner ■ is equipped with excellent mental faculties, therefore no reason seems to exist for any belief that he did not know the morhl import of his actions. In fact,- with *278relation to a falsification to the Coast Guard, to which I will refer later, he stated, “Yes, I felt I had a code of morals even while I was in the Party. However, I don’t mean to suggest that it was consistent with that personal code of morals to falsify Coast Guard affidavit.”
As stated by the majority, petitioner entered the United States Navy in 1946. It is common knowledge that one who enters the armed forces of this country takes an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, yet within two years after his discharge from the Navy he joined an organization whose reputed purpose was the overthrow of that Constitution. He must have known, with the publicity existing at that time, that his membership in the organization was inimicable to respect for the laws of this country and the rights of the people of this country as guaranteed by that Constitution. His efforts to conceal his connection with the organization at that time clearly disclose his actions would not stand the light of truth.
That petitioner once believed in the doctrine of rule by might instead of rule by law is found in his statement that he believed force was justified if necessary to achieve a political goal.
The petitioner’s greatest lack of moral character is disclosed in the revelation of a deliberate falsehood perpetrated against this country when at a time this country, as it still is, was engaged in what has been termed a cold war with Eussia and Communist China.
For security purposes applicants for longshoreman work in New York harbor were required to make application to the Waterfront Commission of that harbor. In this application was this question, as set out in the majority opinion: “Do you knowingly or wilfully advocate the desirability of overthrowing or destroy*279ing the Government of the United States by force or violence, or are you a member of a group which advocates such desirability, knowing the purposes of such group include such advocacy?”, the petitioner answered in the negative.
The majority opinion does not comment upon this falsehood. In my opinion this is an act which clearly shows a lack of moral stamina.
The petitioner admitted he knew his action was wrong, yet knowing this he did the act, and salved his own conscience with the thought that others have before acted falsely. He states he did no act of sabotage, but this very act was an attempt to sabotage his government’s lawful purpose.
The practice of law is a privilege — not a right. In re Weinstein, 150 Or 1, 6, 42 P2d 744; Re Application of Jesse Crum, 103 Or 296, 204 P 948. A lawyer is a trusted officer of the courts, and into his hands are intrusted the client’s innermost confidences, his valued possessions, and on occasion, even his life itself.
Good moral character is difficult of exact definition, but for the lawyer its elements must include simple honesty, fairness, respect for the rights of others, and the laws of the state and nation. In my opinion moral character is disclosed in past deeds, not in protestations of reform when a desired purpose is to be gained.
The entire burden of the majority’s opinion is that the petitioner has reformed. In what manner, the opinion is unclear. If they mean he has changed his views as to the values of communism as opposed to democracy, that is well and good, but the real question is whether his moral fiber has changed. He stated he had moral values above those taught by the Communists, but his own conscious values did not prevail. *280His own moral values did not stand the test in the past, and since then, have not been tested. Can it then be said, since he has abandoned his communistic views his moral fiber is stronger than before? Evidence which supplies merely a belief of reformation of moral views deserves consideration, but it does not, in my opinion, meet the burden of establishing proof of good moral character.
The fact that one guilty of misconduct which would clearly disqualify him for admission to the Bar may establish that he has subsequently had a clean record for several years would not necessarily justify this court in concluding that his moral fiber would not again break under sufficient temptation. So, in the matter before us, can we say without doubt in our minds that the petitioner will not, if endowed with fervor for a cause, violate his trust as a lawyer to uphold the laws of this state and nation, or give false testimony, though knowing it morally wrong?
When petitioner applied for admission to law school he continued to conceal his unlawful communist activities. In fact, petitioner did not at any time voluntarily make a clean breast of his hidden activities. It was not until a member of the law firm by which petitioner was employed confronted him with a direct question which could not be evaded that petitioner finally disclosed that he had been a communist. This continued deception deepens the doubt as to petitioner’s reformation, even in his beliefs.
I realize the efforts which the petitioner has put forth to prepare for the practice of law, and I have the greatest respect and admiration for the judgment of those who in anywise sponsored his cause, but to me it is clear the petitioner has failed to meet the *281burden of showing good moral character for the practice of law, and this court ought not to permit the people of this state to be used as a proving ground for the purpose of determining whether or not there has been reformation.
For the reasons given, I dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice McAllister joins in this dissent.