Court Opinion

ID: 9626625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:19:57.935029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:31.343534
License: Public Domain

*310Staples, J.,
dissenting.
I think the 1932 amendment to section 5134 of the Code-should be construed as intended to require the wife to account to the husband for that part of the medical and other personal injury expenses which he paid, and that the wife is entitled to retain as her own property only so much of these expenses recovered in her personal injury suit as she herself paid or is legally obligated to pay. As I view the statute, it was intended to effect merely a change in the form of the remedy theretofore available to the husband to recover, for his own benefit, these damages sustained by him. The primary purpose was to avoid harassment of the defendant by multiple litigation and to insure that all of the issues arising out of the tort committed by him would be settled in one action. The wife’s action to recover personal injury expenses should therefore be regarded as for the benefit of her husband, to the extent above indicated.
It is clear that the amendment does not destroy the right of action to recover for these damages suffered by the husband. On the contrary, as construed in the majority opinion, it expressly preserves it, but transfers the husband’s right of action to the wife as well as the beneficial interest therein. Such a result is contrary to all concepts of equity and justice. It may be that in most cases no harm would result, but where the husband and wife are estranged, or the wife is mentally incompetent, as in this case, it might be disastrous to the interests of the husband. Moreover, there would be no incentive on the part of the wife to minimize the cost of her medical and hospital bills because the greater the expense which the husband is required to pay the greater would be the amount of her, recovery from the tort-feasor by reason thereof. The net result would be, in effect, a transfer of that much of the estate of the husband to the estate of the wife.
The reason given by Judge Burks, a revisor of the Code of 1919, for abolishing the right of the husband to recover *311damages for the loss of services of his wife was that, as a matter of fact, the wife is equally as interested in devoting her services to the welfare of her home and children as the husband is, and their interests are so blended that it is difficult to tell what part should be recovered by the wife and what part by the husband. There is no difficulty, however, in ascertaining and proving the amount of expenses incurred by the husband in the treatment and care of his wife as a result of her injuries. Nor has any good, or even plausible, reason been advanced why the money of the husband, which the law requires him to pay for her cure, should be taken from him and given to the wife who has already received the benefit of its expenditure.
The appellant contends that to deny him reimbursement out of the funds recovered for medical and hospital expenses paid by him would be a denial of due process. I think the position is well taken. The amendment of section 5134, as construed by the majority opinion, is clearly unconstitutional as to any previously existing right of action which a husband may have had to recover for medical expenses of his wife in a personal injury case. It is well settled that an existing cause of action is a vested property right which cannot be taken away by legislative enactment without violation of the guarantee of due process. 12 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 661, 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 599, p. 1196. A right of action to recover damages for an injury is property which a legislature is without power to destroy, Angle v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 151 U. S. 1, 19-21, 14 S. Ct. 240, 38 L. ed. 55. But a person has no property right, in a constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy so long as there is preserved for his benefit a substantial right to redress by some effective procedure. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 332, 54 S. Ct. 140, 78 L. ed. 342; Allen v. Motley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 875, 170 S. E. 412.
Since the statute, as construed by the court, is obviously unconstitutional as to a vested right of action in favor of a *312husband for reimbursement for personal injury expenses incurred by him for his wife prior to the enactment of the amendment, it must be construed, as to such a husband, as affecting only the form of his action and not as destroying his substantive right. This is true because “If its language be such that its meaning is so cloudy, obscure and ambiguous that it is open to more than one construction, one of which would render it void or of doubtful validity, and the other is reasonable and in harmony with the Constitution and conforms to the general purpose of the statute and its associated provisions, then we must adopt such construction as sustains its validity. Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, section 498.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 639, 648, 2 S. E. (2d) 343.
If, therefore, the validity of the amendment is to be sustained, it must be interpreted as providing for recovery by the wife for the benefit of the husband of reimbursement for expenses which had been paid by him prior to the amendment’s passage.
It seems clear, also, that this same interpretation must obtain as to such expenses incurred by the husband subsequent to the amendment, because the language of the amendment makes no distinction between rights of reimbursement existing at the time and those which might arise in the future.
The interpretation of the amendment adopted in the majority opinion runs counter to the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence as handed down to us in the English common law. This appears from the following extract from an opinion delivered in the year 1760 by Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of England: “If the defendant be under an obligation from the ties of natural justice to refund, the law implies a debt, and gives this action (indebitatus assumpsit), founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s case, as it were upon a contract ... In one word, the gist of this action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.” Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005.
*313In Adkins v. Commonwealth, 175 Va. 590, 599, 9 S. E. (2d) 349, the following is quoted with approval: “In an early Virginia case, Judge Lyons said: ‘There are rules for construing statutes; and one is, that the best construction of the statute is, to construe it as near to the reason of the common law as may be, and by the course which that observes in cases of its own.’ ”
As construed by the court the amendment transfers a property right from the husband to the wife. It is not claimed that this result is predicated upon any known principle of law, equity or justice, or that it serves any lawful purpose. Obviously, such a provision is purely arbitrary. It is a well-established principle of our constitutional law that no person may be deprived of his property by arbitrary or capricious legislation. In discussing the application of the due process clause to such cases, Mr. Justice Gregory, in Williams v. Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 488, 14 S. E. (2d) 287, said:
“* # * This (the due process clause) is perhaps the most widely-discussed phrase in the Federal Constitution, and many thousands of words have been used to discuss its applicability to various situations. ‘When applied to substantive rights it is interpreted to mean that the government is without right to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property by an act that has no reasonable relation to any proper governmental purpose, or which is so jar beyond the necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary exercise of governmental power? 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 567.” (Emphasis supplied).
The following statement which is taken from the opinion •of Mr. Justice Spratley in American-LaFrance v. Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 14, 192 S. E. 758, is equally applicable to the standard of fairness and equity which it should be our goal to achieve in the case at bar: “As justice is the fundamental aim of the courts, we must liberally construe each law, each ground of logic and reason, to attain it. When for any reason, technical or otherwise, faith is lost *314in that effort, or in the results so sought to be achieved, the foundation of our society becomes undermined.”
Let us consider, then, what the rights of a married woman were, in cases similar to this, before the 1932 amendment.
Prior to the enactment of section 5134 of the Code a wife could not recover, as an element of damage for a personal injury to her, medical and hospital expenses unless she had paid them out of her separate estate. Where such expenses were paid by the husband, or he was obligated to pay them, they involved elements of damage which were deemed properly recoverable by him. Richmond Ry., etc., Co. v. Bowles, 92 Va. 738, 744, 745, 24 S. E. 388.
And in Sykes v. Brown, 156 Va. 881, 159 S. E. 202, it was held that a plaintiff in a personal injury suit could not recover as an element of damage the expense of medical care unless it was paid by the plaintiff. “If it was paid by a volunteer, then plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on this item of damage.”
In United Dentists v. Bryan, 158 Va. 880, 887, 164 S. E. 554, it was held, before the 1932 amendment to section 5134, that a married woman could recover for the cost of medical bills incurred by her due to a personal injury, provided she was personally liable -for their payment.
A case quite pertinent here is Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785, 792. There it was held that in Connecticut a wife might maintain an action for personal injuries inflicted upon her by the negligent driving of an automobile by her husband. In such an action, the wife, as one of the elements of damage, sought to recover the amount of hospital and doctor bills which were paid by her husband, the defendant. These were charges which he was himself directly and, primarily obligated to pay. It was held that the trial court properly ruled that the wife was not entitled to recover such sums.
In the case at bar, the practical effect of the court’s opinion is to permit the wife to recover such expenses from her *315'husband even though her injury resulted, not from his negligence, but the negligence of a stranger.
It is contended by the defendant in error that, even if :a husband has a legal cause of action against his wife for moneys due by her to him, he could not maintain an action ;against her except by express statutory authority, and, therefore,, the husband’s claim should be denied in this proceeding. This contention is based upon the argument that it is contrary to the public policy of the State to permit either a husband or a wife to sue the other. It is very clear, however, that the rule is otherwise. In Moreland v. Moreland, 108 Va. 93, 60 S. E. 730, it was held that the wife might maintain an action of assumpsit against the husband upon a ■contract by which he agreed to provide certain funds for .her support. See also to the same effect, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 174 Va. 255, 277, 6 S. E. (2d) 612, and cases cited.
I think the judgment complained of should be reversed .and the case remanded with directions to allow the appellant’s claim.
Hudgins, C. J., and Gregory, J., concur in .this dissent.