Court Opinion

ID: 9698076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:41:10.357388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:38.105049
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
It is my view that the Wiretap Act applies only to oral communications in which a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy; in the instant matter, Appellee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his conversation with a police informant.
The Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5701, et seq., defines an oral communication as “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702. This language mirrors the test for expecta*263tion of privacy in Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 463-64, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (1988), aff'd, Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) (“first, whether appellant has exhibited an expectation of privacy;' and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”).
In Blystone, a majority of this Court rejected the appellant’s claim that section 5704 of the Wiretap Act (which provides exceptions to the prohibition against taping or transmitting conversations) violated the Pennsylvania Constitution. In doing so, the majority found persuasive the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971). In White, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversation made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.” Id. at 751, 91 S.Ct. at 1126, 28 L.Ed.2d at 458. We noted that the Supreme Court “recognized the simple fact that a thing remains secret until it is told to other ears, after which one cannot command its keeping. What was private is now on other lips and can no longer belong to the teller.” Blystone, 519 Pa. at 464, 549 A.2d at 87. Therefore, in the instant matter, Brion, by disclosing his criminal involvement to a confidant, did not exhibit an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The majority fails in its attempt to distinguish the instant facts from those in Blystone; Blystone’s expectation of privacy was lost not because Blystone was not in his home, but because he chose foolishly to divulge his participation in the crime to an informant. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Blystone contains any reference to the location of the conversation, nor do they rely on that factor to decide the case. Indeed, in this case, the majority summarizes the Blystone holding without any reference to the location of the *264conversation, but instead acknowledges that there was “no constitutional defect in the statute because Blystone had no reasonable expectation of privacy once he chose to disclose his confidence to the informant.” Op. at 288. Thus, the location is not a distinguishing factor because it was not a consideration in the original Blystone decision.
Regardless of any distinguishing facts between Blystone and the instant matter, this case fits squarely within the holding of Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 519 Pa. 415, 548 A.2d 1211 (1988), which in my view controls. In Rodriguez, this Court upheld as constitutional the interception of the appellant’s conversation with a consenting informant in a private residence. As the majority notes, the record in Rodriguez is not clear as to the. ownership of the house in which the conversation was recorded. Nevertheless, the appellant had standing to challenge the search of the residence because he was on the premises at the time of the search. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 309-10, 513 A.2d 373, 378 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987) (listing standards for asserting standing to object to an unconstitutional search or seizure); Commonwealth v. Treftz, 465 Pa. 614, 351 A.2d 265, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940, 96 S.Ct. 2658, 49 L.Ed.2d 392 (1976). Thus, the situation in Rodriguez is indistinguishable from the facts before us today.
A majority of this Court in Rodriguez rejected the argument that the government’s actions violated Rodriguez’s constitutional right to privacy and explicitly relied upon Blystone and extended the Blystone rationale to a case involving the surreptitious recording of a conversation in a private residence. Rodriguez, 519 Pa. at 418, 548 A.2d at 1213. Thus, Rodriguez controls the instant matter and compels the conclusion that Brion’s constitutional right to privacy is not violated by the Wiretap Act.
Because I believe that the Wiretap Act survives constitutional scrutiny, I need not address the Commonwealth’s argument that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule *265should apply for evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement officials’ acting pursuant to a duly enacted (but later held to be unconstitutional) statute.1 The conduct here does not violate the defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights, and the evidence was properly admitted.
Accordingly, the Order of the Superior Court should be affirmed and the judgment of sentence reinstated.2
PAPADAKOS and CASTILLE, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. However, I must address the disposition of the Commonwealth’s argument by the majority. The majority is incorrect in perfunctorily dismissing the Commonwealth’s argument based upon Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991). In Edmunds, a majority of this Court held that our constitution did not recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant to a constitutionally defective search warrant. The issue before us today is whether our constitution allows a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when the evidence was obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective statute. This issue requires an analysis of related case law, as well as unique issues of state and local concern that relate to the use of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional statute.

. Assuming for the sake of argument that there exists a heightened expectation of privacy in one’s home, nevertheless it is debatable as to whether this case presents an uncontroverted finding that this is a home. The record leaves unanswered the relevant question of whether this defendant was conducting a criminal business enterprise that was open to those members of the public who sought marijuana. Such an enterprise would reduce the defendant's expectation of privacy in the conversations relating to his "business.” If indeed the home does present a zone of privacy warranting greater protection with relation to the Wiretap Act, a factual finding of whether this is a home remains necessary.