Court Opinion

ID: 9591724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:07:02.670056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:40.571345
License: Public Domain

McDonald, P.J.
(dissenting). I would hold the probate court erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights under § 39(1), MCL 710.39(1); MSA 27.3178(555.39)(1) rather than § 2 of chapter XIIA, *338MCL 712A.2; MSA 27.3178(598.2), as required by § 39(2), MCL 710.39(2); MSA 27.3178(555.39)(2).1
As stated in the majority opinion, our Supreme Court in In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216; 273 NW2d 35 (1978), interpreted § 39 as creating two categories of putative fathers and providing different standards for termination of the rights of each. The first group is comprised of putative fathers who have established no “custodial relationship” with the child and who have provided no “support” for the mother or child before the notice of hearing for termination of parental rights. The second group consists of those putative fathers who have established some type of custodial or support relationship before the notice of hearing. The court further noted the statute provides for the termination of the parental rights of the second group only pursuant to the general jurisdictional provisions of chapter XILA of the Probate Code.
In this case it is undisputed respondent provided $200 toward the support of the mother during her pregnancy and before the notice of hearing. This contribution constituted forty percent of respondent’s total assets. The respondent was in prison during the pregnancy and delivery of the child and was unable to provide any additional support. Clearly this fact places respondent in the second group of § 39 described in Barlow because it constitutes some type of a support relationship, as opposed to the nonsupport of the first group of fathers.
*339The majority seems to be fashioning a third group, i.e., those putative fathers who have some type of a support relationship, but whose support is insufficient to meet the needs of the mother and child. Neither the language of the statute nor our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in Barlow recognizes such a group.
As stated by the majority, because the Adoption Code is in derogation of the common law, its provisions are to be strictly construed. The majority’s opinion is not a strict construction of § 39(1) and (2). If the Legislature wanted to expand the meaning of “support” in § 39(2) as it did in § 51(6), MCL 710.51(6); MSA 27.3178(555.51)(6) it could have easily done so.
The majority’s holding seriously undermines the stringent requirements for terminating parental rights under chapter XIIA by expanding the pool of putative fathers eligible for termination of their rights under the standard set forth in § 39(1). This determination is clearly contrary to the intent of the Legislature as interpreted by the Court in Barlow.
I would remand to the probate court and direct the termination proceedings be conducted pursuant to chapter XIIA, § 2 of the Probate Code.

 Section 51(6), MCL 710.51(6); MSA 27.3178(555.51)(6) would not apply to the adoption of a newborn baby because in order to terminate parental rights § 51(6)(b) requires the court to find the other parent having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a period of two years or more before the filing of the petition. (Emphasis added.)