Court Opinion

ID: 9724827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:16:05.22584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:06.763503
License: Public Domain

Lynch, J.
(dissenting). The opinion of the court would have it appear that its logic and result are natural extensions of American Grain Prods. Processing Inst. v. Department of Pub. Health, 392 Mass. 309 (1984), because, “[i]t would be illogical to construe [G. L. c. 94, §§ 186, 192 (1986 ed.)] as permitting the department to ban completely a chemical pesticide which Federal law allows, while prohibiting it from setting more stringent regulations for use.” Ante at 394. This reasoning obscures the critical distinction between the issue squarely posed by the instant case and the issue actually decided in American Grain Prods., supra. Here, the court decides the issue of whether a tolerance set by a State regulation, which is more stringent than a tolerance for the same substance set by Federal regulations, violates the legislative command that “[s]uch standards, tolerances and definitions shall conform to the standards, tolerances and definitions, if any . . . adopted for the enforcement of the federal food, drug and cosmetic act . . . .” G. L. c. 94, § 192. In contrast, the reasoning and holding of American Grain Prods., supra, rested on the explicit determination that there had not been an establishment of any Federal standard or tolerance. Id. at 313-316. Indeed, this critical distinction was apparent to the court then, and it should not be ignored now. “We believe, furthermore, that the two changes in the section show the aim of the Legislature to require *396conformity only with Federal ‘standards, tolerances and definitions,’ and not with any other kind of rule or regulation” (emphasis in original). Id. at 316.
American Grain Prods., supra, therefore, stands for the proposition that conformity is required between State and Federal standards and tolerances. Allowing State regulations 400% more restrictive than the Federal standards is to read the conformity requirement out of the statute. Once again, this court has not only taken another “step toward agency nonaccountability and carte blanche,” id. at 332 (Lynch, J., dissenting), but also now abdicates the judicial function of interpreting the scope of the only source of authority for agency action in this area. In the long run, this court’s refusal to deal with issues concerning the legitimacy of agency decisionmaking can only undermine the legitimate authority accorded agencies by the Legislature. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.