Court Opinion

ID: 9767355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:17:17.499721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.708579
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Reheak.
Neil, Chief Justice.
The defendants have filed a petition to rehear renewing the contention that there is no evidence to support the plaintiff’s theory that the deceased had a cancer at the time of the alleged accident, etc., and hence there could be no acceleration of a condition that did not exist.
In the petition to rehear counsel refers to an excerpt from the opinion, which is criticized on the ground that there is no evidence to sustain the conclusion. It reads, as follows: “We think it is reasonable to conclude that *281the deceased had a cancerous condition of the spine at the time of the accident, because at the time of the operation it was the size of a grapefruit and had spread into the surrounding tissue and muscles of the neck and upper back. It is really unreasonable to think that this unnatural and unhealthy condition could have developed from the time of the accident to the time of the operation which was approximately four months. ’ ’
When this opinion was considered in conference a member of the Court suggested that this paragraph be elided. But a majority was of opinion that a reasonable construction of the language, considered in the light of other expressions in the opinion, was not in fact objectionable; that the opinion when taken as a whole conveyed the idea which the Court had in mind, that the deceased had a diseased condition, or an “unnatural and unhealthy condition”, in the upper part of the spine at the time of the accident. It is doubtless true that the descriptive word, “cancerous”, as used in the quoted paragraph was inappropriate when viewed from a strictly technical standpoint. But it does not follow that the final conclusion of the Court was incorrect.
■ The evidence shows conclusively that from the moment the deceased lifted the forty pound box of cheese, and felt the terrific pain in his spine, he was doomed. The medical proof, as pointed out and copied in the original opinion, sustained the plaintiff’s theory that the accident contributed to the death of the deceased. We here quote the testimony of only one medical expert, Dr. Cox:
‘ ‘ Q. Could such an injury, accompanied by the sudden and immediate pain thereafter, have contributed to this young man’s death? A. Yes, it could. The facts being as you stated them, probably the injury hastened his death. ’ ’
*282We respectfully refer the counsel to the full testimony of Dr. Cox and other medical experts referred to in the original opinion.
It is further insisted that the cases of Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S. W. (2d) 22, and Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S. W. (2d) 977, are not applicable. We are convinced that the holding of the Court in these cases was controlling authority.
In Storie v. Taylor Supply Co., 1901 Tenn. 149, 228 S. W. (2d) 94, 97 (not referred to in the original opinion) it was held that "the employer takes the workman as he finds him and ‘assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person’ ”, opinion by Mr. Justice Burnett, citing Swift and Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S. W. (2d) 388. To the same effect is McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S. W. (2d) 942. In this case the prior unhealthy condition of the employee was "leukemia” or cancer of the blood. The immediate cause of death was "blood poisoning” which hastened Carney’s death.
In addition to our own cases, herein cited in support of plaintiff’s claim for compensation and that this conclusion is not based on "speculation”, an interesting case from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, 48 N. W. (2d) 735, 738, is directly in point. In this case the employee, Pittman, was struck on the nipple of the right breast by the body of an electric drill. Within two months a tumor was present in the same place and his breast had to be removed. About three years later he became disabled and soon after died of cancer of the lungs. In affirming the Industrial Commission’s award of death benefits it was said by Chief Justice Lortng, speaking for the Court: "In this case, *283we Rave been presented with a rather elaborate discussion of medical theories as to the possibility of a cancer being caused or aggravated by trauma. It was conceded by all of the doctors who were witnesses that the medical profession has incomplete knowledge concerning the canses of cancer and the factors influencing its growth and spread in the human body. The theories which the profession has developed are in large part based upon empirical studies. Since we, as judges, lay no claim to expertness in these matters, we can add nothing to the discussion, nor can we be expected to resolve those conflicts which the medical profession itself has been unable to resolve. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, we think that we are bound to treat the opinions of these doctors as something more than speculation and conjecture, which are but polite terms for unscientific guesswork.”
For other recent cancer cases in which compensation was allowed see 4 NACCA Law Journal, 69-70, notes 325-327.
While counsel for the petitioners has presented his petition to rehear in a fine way we are constrained to disagree with him. The petition is accordingly denied.
All concur.