Court Opinion

ID: 9699437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:24:09.74803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:50.353127
License: Public Domain

Sullivan, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion that the proffered evidence arguably had a “relevant potential.” However, I cannot join in the remand to have the trial court make “a highly discretionary determination as to the admissibility of the defendant’s proffered evidence which weighs and takes into account the degree of relevance *467of the disputed evidence as against the Rule 4 considerations which militate for rejection of it.” (p. 457). Such a remand would allow the trial judge, in his discretion, to grant defendant a new trial at which this evidence would be admissible.
Should this happen and once defendant is permitted to produce evidence as to the happening of these four or five other criminal episodes and then comes forward with proof of alibi for some of them, the State then would have the right either to produce proofs as to their non-similarity, or to present whatever evidence it had connecting defendant with them. The result would be that although defendant was being charged with only one crime involving one victim, the jury at the retrial would be asked to consider numerous collateral issues including similarity or non-similarity of these other offenses, and defendant’s innocence or guilt as to- them even though defendant is not on trial as to these offenses. The danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury is enormous. Questions as to burden of proof, degree of proof required and instructions to the jury would be only some of the difficulties presented.
Because of these problems, I would not remand to the trial court. Instead I would hold that, conceding that the proffered evidence arguably had some relevant potential, the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury is so enormous and so far outweighed the claim of relevancy, that the evidence manifestly should have been rejected under Evidence Rule 4. Since the trial judge properly excluded the evidence, I would affirm.
Justice Sohreiber joins in this dissent.
For remandment — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Clifford and Handler and Judge Conford — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Justice Pasiiman — 1.
For affirmance-^Justices Sullivan and Schreiber — 2.