Court Opinion

ID: 9573247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:50:49.469833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:57.224612
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority holding. The majority found the preeminent issue to be "whether an unemancipated minor child can sue her grandfather for a negligent tort.” They concluded the grandfather "was certainly the head of the household” and "in loco parentis to the granddaughter” and to allow a granddaughter to sue her grandfather under the facts of this case "would violate the public policy of this state.”
I must dissent for two reasons. First, I do not agree that the evidence of record established the grandfather was "in loco parentis to the granddaughter.” Secondly, under the facts of this case I find no legal restraint upon the granddaughter bringing this action against her grandfather.
1. "The term 'in loco parentis’ means in the place of a parent, and a 'person in loco parentis’ may be defined as one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption.” 67A CJS 548, Parent & Child, § 153. "Grandparents, as such, do not stand in loco parentis. And a grandfather may assume the care and custody of his grandchild under circumstances entirely consistent with the continued existence of the natural relationship between father and child and without any intention to sever that relationship.” 59 AmJur2d 190, Parent & Child, § 92. "The relationship of in loco parentis is established only when the person intends to assume *419toward the child the status of a parent.” (Emphasis supplied.) 59 AmJur2d 185, Parent & Child, § 88; State ex rel. Gilroy v. Superior Court for King County, 37 Wash. 2d 926 (226 P2d 882). "The assumption of the parental relationship is largely a question of intention, which, it has been said, should not be lightly or hastily inferred [Rutkowski v. Wasko, 286 App. Div. 327 (143 NYS2d 1)].. . [and] its existence is normally a factual question, to be determined on the trial.” 59 AmJur2d 185, Parent & Child, § 88; Dodd v. United States, 76 FSupp. 991 (Ark. 1948).
Georgia cases on establishment of this relationship usually deal only with the particular factual predicate in that case. See Eaves v. Fears, 131 Ga. 820 (64 SE 269); Howard v. Randolph, 134 Ga. 691 (68 SE 586); Hicks v. Williams, 135 Ga. 433 (69 SE 547). They provide little guidance. Howard, 691 (2) supra, cited by the majority for establishing the relationship of "in loco parentis,” holds: "Where a person assumes the relation of a parent to a child not of kin, which he takes from an orphanage at the tender age of three years, and faithfully discharges the duties of that relation by receiving' such child into his family and educating and supporting her as if she had been his own child ... stood in loco parentis ...” Even our own court fares little better. In City of Albany v. Lindsey, 11 Ga. App. 573, 575 (75 SE 911), we held that "one who accepts the gift of a child and, in pursuance of the gift, performs all the parental duties, towards it, stands in loco parentis to the child.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From a review of all authorities it is established that the relationship of "in loco parentis” is firm and fixed and of continuing character — that of parental rights and obligations to the minor child. It is not a relationship that can be transferred from one to another on a day to day basis. The crucial criterion of the parent is that of "intent,” and it is to be determined in a jury trial. See generally 59 AmJur2d 185, Parent & Child, § 88. Before a parent can be deprived of his or her inherent parental right over the child (Code Ann. § 74-108 (Code § 74-108)), there should be "a clear, definite, and certain voluntary contract releasing her right to the child to a third person...” (Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689 (22 SE2d 514)) and "a *420clear and strong case must be made, and the terms of the contract, to have the effect of depriving him of his control, should be clear, definite, and unambiguous. Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479 (2 Am. St. R. 48); Looney v. Martin, 123 Ga. 209 (51 SE 304); Beavers v. Williams, 199 Ga. 113, 124 (33 SE2d 343).” Waldrup v. Crane, 203 Ga. 388, 390 (46 SE2d 919); Fleming v. Reeves, 243 Ga. 411, 412 (254 SE2d 362); Hilliard v. Hilliard, 243 Ga. 424 (254 SE2d 372). The issue of "in loco parentis” was never raised or discussed at the trial of the instant case. What can be gleaned from the record is found mostly in the stipulated facts of the Consolidated Pre-Trial Order, which states: "Plaintiff and Nena Kaye Maddox had been living with defendant since January 29, 1975 at the 7085 Bankhead Highway address. Nena Kaye Maddox was temporarily separated from Wilbur F. Maddox, the Next Friend of plaintiff and her natural father . . . Defendant and Mrs. Queen now reside at a different address, but plaintiff, Michele Kaye Maddox and Nena Kaye Maddox are still living at the Bankhead Highway address. At the time of the accident, Nena Kaye Maddox had been employed with the Georgia State Patrol Office in Atlanta, Georgia, and had been so employed since April or May 1975.”
The father is now exercising parental control and his right to bring this action. The mother was then exercising parental control, working, and apparently supporting herself and her child. Ownership of the house is uncertain. The grandfather has moved out and the daughter and granddaughter now live there. There is no evidence of relinquishment of any parental authority by the father or mother to the defendant. There is no evidence of the assumption of any parental right or supervision by the defendant. There is no evidence relating to custody or control of the minor. There is no evidence of the intent of the defendant to assume the position of "in loco parentis,” or intent of the father to relinquish it. If the issue of liability is to rest on this determination, it should be litigated and determined by the jury, and not assumed by this court from the one fact that the child lived in the same household as her grandfather. I find a lack of evidence to support the conclusion of the majority that the grandfather was "in loco parentis” to the granddaughter.
*421The question of whether insurance should be considered is universally condemned. See 59 AmJur2d 255, Parent & Child, § 156; however, where the majority decision is bottomed on "public policy,” as a policy matter — we should consider the effect of the majority decision on insurance coverage by grandparents for their negligent acts. Under the majority rule, grandparents are not legally liable for their negligent acts against their grandchildren who live with them. Thus, even if they have insurance to cover their negligence — as in the instant case, insurance companies are no longer liable to care for the injured grandchildren because there is no liability on the part of the grandparent. This is important for one reason. "The rule of parental immunity from tort liability has been held not to apply where the reason for the rule fails ...” 67A CJS 508, Parent & Child, § 129 (b). Thus, "the presence of insurance is a factor in minimizing the danger of disrupting family harmony” which is the basis for the "public policy” rule of this state. 81 ALR2d 1163, § 3.
2. The majority found that it would violate public policy of this state to permit a granddaughter to sue her grandfather "under the facts of this case.” The reasoning and logic of the majority is persuasive. But as in all legal actions involving intrafamilial plaintiffs and defendants two decisions must be made. The first is the moral decision of whether one should sue a member of the immediate family. The second is the legal obligation of immediate family members to one another. I contend that the moral decision of whether a person is to sue a member of his immediate family is personal — not legal. This court has made the moral decision for all persons in this state. I find no legal basis for this personal decision.
Neither is there a legal bar to bringing this action, under the facts of this case. The right of members of the immediate family to sue one another has always been surrounded by controversy. "At common law, there was no rule of immunity between parents and children for their torts. When the doctrine of immunity originated, it was based entirely on public policy views of the courts...” 67A CJS 505, Parent & Child,-§ 127. Neither is there a statutory prohibition in this state for this type of action. *422The general rule is that suits for negligent torts are forbidden between husband and wife, and children and parents. "The doctrine of family immunity extends only to the spouse and an unemancipated minor child.” Howard Concrete Pipe Co. v. Cohen, 139 Ga. App. 491, 493 (229 SE2d 8). The holding of the majority extends the intrafamilial immunity doctrine to a grandfather. The courts of this nation are going in the other direction. The modem trend is to restrict the doctrine. See Annot. 19 ALR2d 425,427 and cases cited therein; 59 AmJur2d 253, Parent & Child, § 151. Recent cases have liberalized the right of family members to sue other family members. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 724-725 (70 SE2d 152); Annot. 81 ALR2d 1156, § 1. The present status may be summed up as: "Whereas in the field of parent-child and husband-wife relationships there has been a tradition, in the American courts at least, to deny the right of such parties to sue each other in tort — although the recent trend has been to liberalize this rule — the arguments advanced in favor of precluding the maintenance of such actions between such closely related parties have never found acceptance where the relationship involved was that of sibling, ancestor, or other collateral relative.” 81 ALR2d 1156, § 1. The majority decision extends intra-family immunity to an ancestor — a grandfather. "Some jurisdictions have judicially abolished the parental immunity rule. [See Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (479 P2d 648)]. Others not previously committed have rejected it. At least two have abrogated it prospectively in [certain] situations . . .” 59 AmJur2d 253, Parent & Child, § 152. In Spaulding v. Mineah, 239 App. Div. 460, 268 NYS 772, affd. mem. op. 264 NY 589 (191 NE 578), a verdict in favor of a two and one-half year old child against its grandmother for negligent operation of a car was sustained where the child was sitting in the lap of his mother, who was supervising the driving of the grandmother, who only had a learner’s permit. Accordingly, I conclude that the relationship of granddaughter and grandfather does not bar this action.
3. Because I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and permit this action, I must next consider the *423issue of whether the fact that the negligent tort was inflicted by the mother of the child would bar the action. I find that it does not. The negligence of parent cannot be imputed to the child. Walden v. Coleman, 217 Ga. 599, 603 (124 SE2d 265). Thus, the negligence of a parent would not prevent an action by the child against a third party.
In Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 732 (70 SE2d 156), this court sanctioned an action by a father on behalf of an unemancipated child, against the employer of the child’s mother, who injured her child while driving a company furnished car on company business. In holding that the immunity of the parent from liability for injury to her unemancipated child, due to negligence of the parent, would not extend to the parent’s employer, we reasoned that an employer was responsible for the torts of his employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 730. Accord, Chase v. New Haven &c. Corp., 111 Conn. 377 (150 A 107); Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469 (179 S 908); see also Annots. 68 ALR 1500, 116 ALR 650. Accordingly, it is the law of this state that where the negligence of the parent is the cause of the injury, this will not bar the action of the child.
4. This leaves only the issue of liability of the grandfather for the negligent torts of his daughter. It is axiomatic that a principal is held liable for the torts of his agent, acting within the scope of his authority and the prosecution of the business of the principal (Verddier v. Neal Blun Co., 128 Ga. App. 321, 322 (196 SE2d 469); Code Ann. §§ 105-108, 4-311 (Code §§ 105-108, 4-311)), and every person is liable for "torts committed by his wife, his child, or his servant, by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business ...” Code Ann. § 105-108. (Code § 105-108).
" 'A child, whether minor or adult, may occupy the position of a servant or agent of his parent, and for his (or her) acts as such the parent may be liable under the general principles governing the relation of master and servant or of principal and agent.’ ” Dunn v. Caylor, 218 Ga. 256, 258 (127 SE2d 367). Thus, the criterion is whether the daughter was using the lawn mower by the command of or in the prosecution of the (master’s) *424business. I find that she was.
The word "business” has been given a liberal interpretation. It has not been restricted to pursuit of employment for profit. Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 278 (87 SE 10); Standford v. Smith, 173 Ga. 165, 167 (159 SE 666). For example, the application of the law of master and servant and principal and agent has been applied to the "family car doctrine.” Stewart v. Stephens, 225 Ga. 185, 186 (166 SE2d 890). The same doctrine also applies to airplanes and boats. Id.; Kimbell v. DuBose, 139 Ga. App. 224, 228 (228 SE2d 205). In holding the doctrine applicable to boats, the Supreme Court said "This is not an extension of the family-purpose ^doctrine to boats, but is simply the application of the rule of master and servant, or principal and agent, to boats as well as automobiles.” Stewart v. Stephens, 225 Ga. 185, 186, supra. It is evident that the automobile, the boat, the airplane and "the riding lawn mower” in the instant case, all serve a similar "family-purpose.” The riding lawn mower is the equivalent of the automobile. It is powered by a gasoline engine, has four wheels, a steering mechanism, a transmission, brake and clutch, forward and reverse gears, and some have lights and electric starters. Thus, just as a child using the family automobile is engaged in the "business” of the parent, a child using a lawn mower for the purpose for which it was purchased and intended, with the express "permission of the parent, express or implied,” (Stewart v. Stephens, 225 Ga. 185, 186, supra), as in the instant case, is engaged in the "business” of the parent.
I would reverse.