Court Opinion

ID: 9579323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:53:54.399311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:27.016299
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.,
dissenting. From the second division of the opinion and the judgment affirming this case, I dissent. The first special ground of the amended motion for a new trial contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial on motion of defendant’s attorney on account of improper and prejudicial remarks made by the solicitor-general in his argument to the jury following the conclusion of the introduction of the evidence. The argument complained of is as follows: “I am going to prove what Bone told the officers out there in Mississippi about what transpired here in Macon.” According to this ground of the amended motion for a new trial, the remarks of the solicitor-general immediately preceding the foregoing statement were as follows: “Bone is out in Mississippi and we cannot get him until they are through with him, and when we do get him we will have him up here, then we will prove our case again, by legal evidence.”
There is no evidence that Bone made any statement to the officers in Mississippi. Arguments of counsel shall be confined to the law and the facts involved in the case then before the court. See Code (Ann. Supp.) § 24-3319; Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615. Code §.81-1009 provides as follows: “Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same; and, on objection made, he shall also *352rebuke the counsel, and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the plaintiff’s attorney is the offender.” When the improper argument complained of here was made by the solicitor-general, the defendant moved for a mistrial. It was not incumbent upon the trial court to grant the mistrial unless, in his discretion, it was necessary to order a mistrial to correct the improper impression. However, the motion for a mistrial was broad enough to make the ruling of the court the basis for a review. In Brooks v. State, 55 Ga. App. 227, 231 (189 S. E. 852), quoting from Southern Railway v. Brown, 126 Ga. 1, 6 (54 S. E. 911), it is held as follows: “When improper argument is made by counsel, counsel for the opposite party, in order to make the action of the judge in reference to the same the basis for a review, may object to the argument, and rest simply on the objection; and if the court fails to take any notice of the objection and allows the argument to proceed, this conduct may be reviewed, or he may, in addition to his objection, move for appropriate instructions to the jury, or for a reprimand or rebuke of counsel, in order that the jury may be impressed with the grave nature of the impropriety which has taken place; or, if the impropriety is of a very grave character, he may move for a mistrial, and upon the refusal of the court to do that which ought to have been done on the motion made, whatever its nature may be, the conduct of the judge will then be a subject for review by this court.” On motion of counsel for a mistrial, the failure of the court to do that which ought to have been doné becomes a subject for review here. The ruling of the court was as follows: “Gentlemen of the jury, we are trying the case of the State against Clifton Osteen. You are concerned in the trial of this case with the guilt or innocence of Clifton Osteen only, you are not concerned as to the trial of this case with the guilt or innocence of any other party whatsoever. Any remarks that may have been made which might reflect on the guilt or innocence of any other person than Clifton Osteen you will disregard, because you are concerned, as I say, with the guilt or innocence of this defendant only.”
The instructions of the court failed to carry a rebuke of *353counsel, which is made mandatory by Code § 81-1009 hereinbefore quoted, where the argument of counsel is improper. This improper argument could not be said to be harmless. In the first place the verdict was not demanded by the evidence. Also, the evidence of the State tended to show a conspiracy between Bone, this defendant, and another person. Any statement made by Bone in Mississippi would necessarily have been after the conclusion of the conspiracy and would not have been admissible against this defendant. Wall v. State, 153 Ga. 309 (2, b) (112 S. E. 142); Lance v. State, 166 Ga. 15 (2) (142 S. E. 105). Wilkerson v. State, 73 Ga. 799 (3) (supra), cited by the majority, is not applicable here because there it appears that the statement of the co-conspirator was made pending the conspiracy. However, the testimony of witnesses as to the association of Bone and the defendant would naturally tend to cause the jury to speculate on what the solicitor-general would prove Bone told the officers in Mississippi about the participation of this defendant in this burglary. It could have but implied to the jury that had he been permitted to do so the solicitor-general would have proved that Bone told the officers in Mississippi that this defendant participated in the crime. As was said in Mitchum v. State, supra, at page 634: “When counsel are permitted to state facts [not in evidence] in argument and to comment upon them, the usage of the courts regulating trials is departed from, the laws of evidence are violated, and the full benefit of trial by jury is therefore denied. . . To an extent not definable, yet to a dangerous extent, they are evidence, not given under oath—without cross-examination, and irrespective of all those precautionary rules by which competency is tested.”
The instructions of the trial court were to the effect that the jury was not to consider any remarks made by counsel which might reflect on the guilt of Bone, they being only concerned with the guilt or innocence of this defendant. However, the instructions failed to go far enough to instruct the jury to disregard these particular remarks and contained nothing from which the jury could have inferred any rebuke by the court of the solicitor-general for the making of the remarks in question.
I concur in the remaining divisions of the opinion.