Court Opinion

ID: 9522091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:46.596552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:17.543703
License: Public Domain

dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. 1.0. 35-88-1-4 provides as follows:
"See, 4. (a) The defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced. If the defendant is not personally present when sentence is to be pronounced, the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
(b) Sentence may be pronounced against a defendant corporation in the absence of counsel, if counsel fails to appear on the date of sentencing after reasonable notice."
I read this provision as having a twofold purpose. One concerns the right of the defendant to be present in person and by counsel and to speak on his own behalf regarding the proper penalty. 'The other is to restrict the power of courts when sentencing. In the practice of law, except in situations made specific by statute, courts do not sentence in absentia. This practice follows the public policy which is at the base of this statute, which is that a system which condones in absentia sentencing is *1181subject to abuse, where for example a court permits defense counsel to appear for sentencing without the defendant and to receive the formal sentencing decision. When this occurs, the importance and deterrent effect of the sentence is diminished or lost altogether. This latter purpose of the statute has nothing to do with insuring the interests of the defendant. It is instead intended to serve the public good. The only way to serve both goals of this statute is by construing the requirement that the defendant be present for sentencing, as jurisdictional. The majority in this case, and the Court of Appeals in Crank v. State (1987), Ind.App., 502 N.E.2d 1355, are in error in failing to discern this important feature of the statute.