Court Opinion

ID: 9446521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:57:17.247693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:41.088098
License: Public Domain

BURGER, Circuit Judge.
I concur fully with what Judge PRETTYMAN has said and add this comment only because of the importance of the question and the volume of appeals affected.
In two recent cases1 the Supreme Court has dealt with appeals in forma pauperis, one dealing with the right of the appellant to have counsel and the other with the right to have a transcript at public expense. These cases were disposed of by per curiam opinions. The importance of the subject matter, if nothing else, rules out any suggestion that the cases did not receive careful consideration. Had the Court intended a drastic change in a basic standard in so important a field,2 it seems to me it *739would have by some discussion or treatment made that clear. The statute permits an appeal in forma pauperis to be denied or dismissed if “not taken in good faith” or if “frivolous,” or “malicious.”3 Thus, the Supreme Court in its use of “frivolous” in Johnson and Farley was merely using the statutory language. There is certainly nothing in this which by itself imports any change in standards for appeals in forma pauperis. The most that can be read into the very brief orders of the Court in the Johnson and Farley cases is a reliance on the language of the statute, rather than on terms which many courts had used interchangeably with the statutory terms.
In various contexts the courts have used a variety of terms to describe an insufficient question, such as “without merit”,4 “futile”,5 “unworthy”,6 “manifestly vexatious”,7 “no substantial question”,8 “baseless”, “not meritorious”,9 and of course as to appeals in forma pauperis, the statutory words “frivolous” and “not taken in good faith”.10 The cases involving appeals in forma pauperis reflect a tendency to equate these other terms to the statutory terms and to use the terms interchangeably.11 Most of these characterizations, including the statutory terms, have connotations and a range of meaning which render them somewhat less than precise. If a “substantial question” test is applied to appeals in forma pauperis in the sense of important question, it would clearly be *740too strict a test. On the other hand, if “substantial question” is interpreted as I think it has been, as meaning the appeal must present a question or issue which has some substance or some merit, some scintilla of prospect of success, then it is not too high a standard. An appeal which raises a question or questions which have no substance has no prospect of success and is therefore without merit and “frivolous”, and “malicious” and “not taken in good faith.”
To say that the “United States can afford to let poor defendants take criminal appeals that the rich could take” does not set a standard of law but suggests what might arguably be a socially desirable goal. The “rich,” as Judge PRETTYMAN pointed out, can take any appeal, the well-to-do can take almost any, the moderately well-to-do can take some, depending on their urgency. Any argument equating the “rich” to the “poor” has strong emotional appeal but it overlooks some important factors. Literally applied it would make appeals mandatory for the “poor.” If all criminal appeals are to be reviewed, regardless of merit, Congress should tell us so.

. Johnson v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593; Parley v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529.

. As has been suggested and argued.

. Section (d) states “The court * * * may dismiss the case * * * if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” This was substantially the language of the statute when it was first passed in 1892 (27 Stat. 252). That statute dealt only with poor plaintiffs, but in 1910 (36 Stat. 866) was amended to include poor defendants and parties on appeal. The 1910 amendment in establishing in forma pauperis privileges for parties on appeal, stated that no such privileges were available if the court certified that in its opinion the appeal was “not taken in good faith.” Thus, in forma pauperis appeals must be taken in good faith, and be not frivolous or malicious. Kinney v. Plymouth Kock Squab Co., 1915, 236 U.S. 43, 35 S.Ct. 236, 59 L.Ed. 457.

. E. g., Gilmore v. United States, 8 Cir., 1953, 131 F.2d 873.

. Ibid.

. See Brinkley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., C.C.W.D.Tenn.1899, 95 F. 345.

. Ibid.

. Morris v. Igoe, 7 Cir., 1953, 209 F.2d 108; Higgins v. Steele, 8 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 366, 369; see Aylor v. United States, 5 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 968.

. Ellis v. United States, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 386, 249 F.2d 478.

. See McMillan v. Taylor, 1946, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 160 F.2d 217; Wheeler v. Reid, 1948, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 175 F.2d 829, 831. The latter case equated “not taken in good faith” to include cases where the question was one as to which there was no reasonable basis for a different conclusion. See also Ellis v. United States, supra note 9. See also United States v. Johnson, 1946, 327 U.S. 106, 113, 66 S.Ct. 464, 467, 90 L.Ed. 562, a case involving a pre-paid appeal, in which Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said:
“ * * * the Circuit Court of Appeals here after studying the issues raised and upon determining that the only objection was to the trial court’s findings on conflicting evidence, should have decided that this does not present a reviewable issue of law and on its own motion have dismissed the appeal as frivolous.” (Emphasis added.)

. We should not overlook 28 U.S.C. § 753 (f), in which Congress appears to equate frivolous with the absence of a substantial question:
“ * * * Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal or habeas corpus proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by the United States out of money appropriated for that purpose. Fees for transcripts furnished in other proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall also be paid by the United States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous but presents a substantial question. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)