Court Opinion

ID: 9475262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:21:47.617858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:36.418416
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
I join with the majority in upholding the convictions of David Williams and Wayne *1038Russell but at the same time I am convinced that the court should sustain the jury’s conviction of Debbie Williams.
“When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm a verdict of guilty if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, establishes that any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560] (1979),” United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 902 (7th Cir.1986). The defendant Debbie Williams challenges the sufficiency of the government’s proof of her being a member of a conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.1 Specifically, she maintains that the district court erred in admitting the statement of her co-conspirator David Williams in evidence against her at trial because the government failed to establish a proper basis for the admission of the statement at the Santiago hearing. Absent that statement, she contends the evidence was insufficient to convict her. The majority states that “the evidence adduced at the Santiago hearing failed to provide a basis for the admissibility of the co-conspirator’s statement against Debbie Williams,” and that “[i]n the absence of that erroneously admitted evidence ... no rational trier of fact could have found Debbie Williams guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” I disagree with each of these conclusions.
A. The government established a proper basis for the admission of David Williams’ statement at the Santiago hearing.
The prosecution stated at the Santiago hearing, at trial, and on appeal that it sought admission of David Williams’ statement “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that Debbie Williams did in fact physically count out $22,000 to $24,000 in drug purchase money paid over by herself and her husband to Marlow in July, 1983. Fed.R.Evid. 802 provides that “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided in [other] rules ...” The government sought to have the statement of David Williams admitted, relying on Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that a “statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
In United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir.1978), this court stated that Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “requires a preliminary determination by the trial judge as to the admissibility of the declaration of a co-conspirator.” Id. at 1131. The court went on to state that “[u]nder Rule 104 the competence of a co-conspirator’s declaration justifying its admissibility depends upon whether or not the existence of the conspiracy has been sufficiently established, and whether under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. In United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.1983), this court stated that in order to invoke Rule 801(d)(2)(E), “the government must prove by a preponderance of independent evidence that a conspiracy existed, that both the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Coe, 718 F.2d at 835. Thus, *1039to establish the admissibility of David Williams’ statement at the Santiago hearing the government had only to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant, David Williams, was a member of the conspiracy, that Debbie Williams was also a member of the conspiracy, and that David Williams’ statement to Marlow in the presence of his wife, Debbie Williams, was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Debbie Williams concedes that the government proved that a conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine existed and that her husband was a member of that conspiracy. Appellant’s Brief at 29-30. Debbie Williams does not contest the fact that her husband’s statement that Debbie had “already counted the money” was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Debbie’s only contention on appeal is that the government failed to establish at the Santiago hearing that Debbie Williams was a member of the conspiracy. Appellant’s Brief at 30.
The law is clear that “[o]nce the Government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the Government need only offer ‘slight evidence’ to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985).2 In analyzing whether the government established a proper foundation for the admission of David Williams’ statement at the Santiago hearing, we must remember the admonition that “[t]he formalities of an agreement are not necessary and are usually lacking since the mark of a successful conspiracy is secrecy.” United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741 (7th Cir.1969). The clandestine nature of conspiracies should make us especially tolerant of circumstantial evidence of conspiratorial agreement. United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir.1984). The government is not required to prove its entire case with direct evidence of covert, marital conspiracy or else forego prosecution of this vicious, insidious crime. “[I]t is settled that the possible inference of a defendant’s guilt may be created by either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1006-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 96, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971).
“A conviction may rest solely on circumstantial evidence, such as that presented in this case. United States v. Young, 568 F.2d 588, 589 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2174, 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977). Such evidence is ‘intrinsically as probative as direct evidence,’ United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir.1979), and accordingly, is considered under the standard for determining the sufficiency of direct evidence. Durns v. United States, 562 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 490, 54 L.Ed.2d 319 (1977).”
United States v. Two Eagle, 633 F.2d 93, 97 (8th Cir.1980). Indeed, circumstantial evidence “may be the sole support for a conviction.” United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir.1985). “Circumstantial evidence is not less probative than direct evidence, and, in some instances, is even more reliable.” United States v. Andrino, 501 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.1974). See United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.1969).
The government presented substantial circumstantial evidence at the Santiago hearing to establish that Debbie Williams was a member of a conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine specifically that: (1) Debbie Williams was present in Colorado Springs when her husband David Williams paid Michael Marlow $22,000 in packs of $1,000 for methamphetamine that David Williams had previously received (Tr. 1706); (2) Debbie Williams furthered the conspiracy by taking care of a co-conspirator’s (Marlow’s) children and returning the *1040children to Evansville, Indiana, in order that Marlow could travel to Las Vegas and participate in another drug transaction (Tr. 1710); (3) Debbie Williams advised David Williams of a phone message from Tim Harvey, a known drug dealer and one of her husband’s suppliers (Tr. 1740); (4) probable cause was found for the issuance of a search warrant for the residence of Debbie and David Williams where over $40,000 in currency and 38 grams of methamphetamine were discovered concealed in a vanity cabinet under the bathroom sink of Debbie and David Williams’ home (Tr. 1743); (5) although her husband had no visible means of support, David Williams often had large sums of money in his possession and traveled to different parts of the country with Debbie accompanying him on occasion (Tr. 1701, 1706, 1711, 1720, 1763); and (6) the reference in the transcript to a trip Debbie Williams made with David Williams during which he turned over cash to Riley, a known drug dealer (Tr. 1732).
Given the overwhelming amount of evidence, direct and circumstantial, presented at the Santiago hearing, the government submitted far more than the required “slight evidence” required to establish “to prove that an individual [Debbie Williams] was a member of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir.1985). From a review of the record, the majority mistakenly holds that the government at the Santiago hearing failed to prove that Debbie Williams was a member of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and, thus, David Williams’ statement to Marlow made in Debbie Williams’ presence that Debbie “had already counted the money” should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. I am unable to agree, in light of the amount of evidence the government presented of a clear, convincing, direct and circumstantial nature, that the government failed to prove that Debbie Williams did not know of and did not participate in a conspiracy to sell and distribute illegal drugs. Common sense reveals that drug dealers do not conduct their illicit transactions in the presence of strangers to their conspiracies. See United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir.1984). Drugs and cash were hidden at the Williams’ residence, and large sums of money passed between David Williams and known drug suppliers in Debbie Williams’ presence. All of this drug-related activity in Debbie’s presence, and the very presence of this large amount of money and drugs in her home, her accepting and relaying drug information, and her conveyance of a co-conspirator’s children to their home in order to allow him to further the conspiracy make it more than obvious that Debbie Williams had knowledge of and actively participated in the conspiracy. The law and society have long recognized the particular danger that collective criminal activity (conspiracy) poses to our way of life. In Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
“Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.”
Id. at 593-94, 81 S.Ct. at 325. We have joined other courts in repeatedly quoting and applying the language of the Eighth Circuit in Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 858, 867-68 (8th Cir.1947) that:
“Once there is satisfactory proof that a conspiracy has been formed, the question of a particular defendant’s connection with it may be merely a matter of wheth*1041er the stick fits so naturally into position in the fagot as to convince that it is part of it. It is therefore possible for the circumstances of an individual defendant’s participation in an established conspiracy to become substantial from their weight in position and context, though in abstraction they may seem only slight.”
See, e.g. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1305 (7th Cir.1976).
The majority grounds its erroneous holding that “the evidence adduced at the Santiago hearing failed to provide a basis for the admissibility of the co-conspirator’s statement against Debbie Williams” on United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir.1979). Although the Dalzotto court held in one section of the opinion that “[m]ere presence at the scene of the crime or association with conspirators or knowledge that something illegal is going on will not by themselves support a conspiracy conviction.” Dalzotto, 603 F.2d at 645 (emphasis added). At the same time, the law is eminently clear that the government need only present that amount of evidence required to meet the preponderance of evidence standard and is not required to present evidence at the Santiago hearing sufficient to establish the proof required for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Dalzotto does not provide a sound foundation for the majority’s argument that “[t]he government thus could not demonstrate [at the Santiago hearing] that Debbie Williams was a member of the conspiracy without introducing some evidence that went to more than her association.” On the contrary, for some reason the majority fails to set forth that part of the Dalzotto opinion that states:
“[PJresence is put forward here to establish the existence of the conspiracy merely as a precondition for the admission of other evidence. For that purpose it need only be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Although presence is insufficient to sustain conviction for conspiracy, it may nonetheless make participation in the conspiracy ... ‘more likely than not.’ ”
Dalzotto, 603 F.2d at 645 (emphasis added).
Evidence submitted at the Santiago hearing demonstrated that Debbie Williams was present when her husband paid the drug supplier Marlow $22,000 in Colorado Springs. In addition, Debbie admits that at the Santiago hearing, “the Government’s evidence established, under a joint possessory theory, that she was in possession of some methamphetamine at her residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 31.
Furthermore, “[PJresence has been sufficient evidence of knowing participation in a conspiracy when there were suspicious circumstances, and the existence of the conspiracy was already established.” United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir.1979). See also United States v. Mancellos, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 256 (7th Cir.1971). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) “calls for generous treatment of this avenue of admissibility.” Fed.R.Evid. 801, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, R. 801(d)(2). The focus of our inquiry should be the reliability of David Williams’ alleged “hearsay” statement. Evidence of Debbie’s membership in a conspiracy, (i.e. her being party to an agreement to possess and distribute methamphetamine) should only bolster (not subtract from) the inherent reliability of David Williams’ supposedly “hearsay” statement.
The government offered proof through the testimony of agents at the Santiago hearing that Debbie Williams accompanied her husband David on what he referred to as “business trips.” Specifically, “in or about July, 1983, ... at Colorado Springs ... David Williams and Debbie Williams delivered approximately twenty-two to twenty-four thousand dollars ... to (Mar-low) ,.. that David Williams and Debbie Williams were present when the money was delivered and that the money was delivered in packs of $1,000.” (Tr. 1706). Debbie knew of Marlow’s participation in a *1042conspiracy to distribute the illegal drugs, and in furtherance of this conspiracy, she agreed to take care of Marlow's children and to return them to Indiana, enabling Marlow to travel unencumbered to Las Vegas to consummate another drug deal. (Tr. 1710. See also Tr. 883-85). Debbie also relayed a phone message from Tim Harvey, a known drug supplier, to her husband. Furthermore, testimony at the Santiago hearing established that over $40,000 and thirty-eight grams of methamphetamine had been stored in a vanity under the bathroom sink of the Williams’ home.
Even though the government is not required to meet the highest burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, at. a Santiago hearing, the government established beyond a reasonable doubt that Debbie Williams not only knew of the drug conspiracy, but also actively participated in the same.
B. Absent the hearsay statement there was sufficient evidence introduced at trial to support the conviction of Debbie Williams.
I fail to understand how the majority can conclude that Debbie Williams was not a member of the alleged conspiracy to distribute drugs. Debbie Williams forgets and casts aside the overwhelming amount of circumstantial evidence and successfully directs the majority’s attention to her new-found theory concerning the absence of direct evidence that “[she] ever agreed to sell methamphetamine to anyone [or] ever sold any methamphetamine ...” (Appellant’s Brief, at 25). However, courts have repeatedly held that the “inference of the defendant’s guilt of a criminal offense may be created either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence” and “circumstantial evidence is of equal probative value to direct evidence.” United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1006-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 96, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971). Indeed, circumstantial evidence “may be the sole support for a conviction.” United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir.1985). It is also well settled that “[0]nce the Government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the Government need only offer ‘slight evidence’ to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985). Debbie Williams concedes on appeal that her husband was a member of the conspiracy and does not deny that she had knowledge of the conspiracy.
Debbie argues on appeal only that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was a member of the conspiracy.3
At trial, the evidence established that Debbie Williams accompanied her husband on trips to Colorado Springs, Colorado, Custer, South Dakota; and New Orleans, Louisiana; and on each of these trips her husband made substantial drug purchase payments in her presence. In Colorado Springs her husband paid as follows: Mar-low $22,000; in New Orleans, Debbie’s husband paid Riley $10,000; and in Custer he paid Rodney Shaddy $25,000 for previously delivered drugs.
The trial transcript during the questioning of Marlow reads:
“Q. Now, you met with them in their hotel room?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Who was present?
A. Debbie Williams, Dave Williams and myself.
Q. How much money was delivered to you?
A. Approximately $22,000.
Q. By whom?
A. David and Debbie Williams ...”
(Tr. 883) (emphasis added). In addition to paying Marlow the drug money, Debbie and her husband conveyed his (Marlow’s) children in their car to Evansville, Indiana in order that Marlow might travel unen*1043cumbered to Las Vegas, Nevada, to consummate another drug deal. (Tr. 1710).
In 1984, Debbie Williams also accompanied her husband to the Mardi Gras festival in New Orleans, Louisiana, and at that time, her husband (David) paid about $10,-000 to another drug supplier, Riley, in Debbie's presence. (Tr. 434-5) During this entire period and in particular during the first four months of 1984, Debbie’s husband was unemployed and collected unemployment compensation, yet she and her unemployed husband travelled to New Orleans, Louisiana and Custer, South Dakota. At trial, the government clearly established that Debbie and her unemployed husband spent large amounts of cash without having any other visible means of income or support. It is obvious that Debbie and her husband used the profits from these drug sales to finance their trips and maintain their lifestyle.
In July of 1984, Debbie and David Williams traveled to Custer, South Dakota to make another drug-related payment. In Debbie’s presence, her husband paid out $25,000 to Rodney Shaddy, explaining at that time that there had been some drug shrinkage and thus the payment was unexpectedly small. (Tr. 1038-9, 1067-70) Rodney Shaddy testified as follows:
“Q. (By Mr. Thar) I believe the question is, Mr. Shaddy, when he took the envelope out and put it on the table what did he say to you and what did you say to him?
A. At first it was just small talk for a couple of minutes, and then he picked up the envelope and took out a piece of paper that was in the envelope and he said that Tim was expecting more money than this, but he said there was some shrinkage and he had on a piece of paper some numbers in pounds and ounces. He said to show this to Tim when you see him because this right here will explain why there is not as much money here as Tim thought he had coming to him.
Q. You indicated there was a woman in the room. Did she ever engage in any conversation?
A. No, she never did.
Q. Was she present throughout the conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. How much money was in the envelope?
A. $25,000.”
(Tr. 1040-41).
On August 14, 1984, Debbie’s husband telephoned his supplier, Tim Harvey, in order to arrange a drug deal. A transcript of that phone call reveals that he was returning the supplier’s call. (Tr. 1248). Debbie had received this call from Harvey and informed her husband of it. The record reveals that Debbie had knowledge that Tim Harvey directly and indirectly4 supplied her husband with the drugs he sold and in fact she carried his telephone number in her purse. (Government Ex. 168, Tr. 1277). In addition, the record discloses that Debbie and David Williams’ only contacts with Tim Harvey were for the purpose of making drug deals. Obviously, the jury could reasonably infer that Debbie well knew the supplier’s (Harvey’s) purpose in calling, and her husband’s purpose in returning the call. Therefore, in notifying her husband of Harvey’s call, Debbie knowingly acted as an intermediary between her husband and the seller who was ready, willing, and able to sell and deliver the drugs, much as a marketmaker or broker would connect a seller and buyer in the stock market or the real estate market. In this case, the jury was instructed that “you should weigh the evidence and give credit to the testimony in light of your own experience and observations in the ordinary affairs of life.” Jury Instruction No. 44. Thus, the members of the jury were entitled to use the common sense they had gained in the ordinary affairs of their *1044daily lives. The jury could reasonably infer that in relaying Harvey’s telephone message to her husband, Debbie knowingly furthered a drug sale which would produce income for herself and her husband.
The government, after establishing probable cause, obtained a search warrant for the residence of Debbie and David Williams. The subsequent search of the Williams’ home revealed large amounts of money and drugs stashed in the Williams’ house. Debbie’s counsel conceded that the jury could reasonably infer that this money was derived from drug sales. (Tr. 1324) Considering that Debbie was present on at least three occasions when her husband paid drug suppliers large amounts of cash and that she travelled with him to consummate at least three drug deals, it is inconceivable that she had no knowledge of the source of money and drugs hidden in her home. She knew of her unemployed husband’s drug transactions. She well knew that the money her husband used to finance their trips and maintain their lifestyle could only come from his drug sales.
Debbie’s purse contained $1,165 in cash even though, as I pointed out earlier, she and her husband were unemployed. Her purse also held many slips of paper bearing telephone numbers of her co-conspirators, such as Tim and David Harvey, and the hotel room numbers in which they had met to transact their illicit drug business. (Government Exhibit 168, Tr. 1277).
Thus, the record clearly supports an inference that not only did Debbie Williams know of the conspiracy, but that knowing of it, she acted in furtherance of the conspiracy; and that so knowing and so acting, she profited by the conspiracy. Based on the evidence before it, the jury was justified in concluding that the government established beyond a reasonable doubt that Debbie Williams was a member of the conspiracy.
In United States v. Mancellas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.1978), a unanimous panel wrote that “presence or a single act will suffice [for conviction of conspiracy] if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or act was intended to further the ends of the conspiracy.” In Mancellas, the court relied on this fundamental principle of conspiracy law to uphold the conviction of a man whose sole contacts with conspirators were driving one of them from the airport to several motels, dropping him off at his home, picking him up again the following morning, and being present in a motel room in which a drug transaction was taking place. The court held that the “circumstances ... made it highly unlikely that [the defendant’s] presence was innocently explainable.” 580 F.2d at 1308. Similarly, Debbie Williams was no “innocent bystander.” Debbie Williams was present at and actively participated in numerous drug transactions with her husband. She conveyed a co-conspirator’s children across the country to their home in order that her co-conspirator might participate in another drug transaction. She carried the phone numbers of known drug dealers in her purse as well as hotel and room numbers where drug transactions had taken place. She was also present when government agents, pursuant to a search warrant, confiscated over $40,000 in cash and 38 grams of methamphetamine from the home she shared with her husband. “This is not a case where an otherwise innocent party is implicated by his mere presence.” Dalzotto, 603 F.2d at 645 (emphasis added). The government’s evidence clearly established that Debbie’s presence and acts “were intended to further the ends of the conspiracy.” Mancellas, 580 F.2d at 1308.
In United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 256 (7th Cir.1971), another unanimous panel upheld the conspiracy conviction of a defendant present during a drug transaction. The defendant and the co-conspirators also knew each other’s unpublished telephone numbers. The court held that “a business, rather than purely social, relationship ... could reasonably be inferred.” Id. I have already pointed out that common sense suggests that drug dealers do not conduct their illicit transactions in the presence of strangers to their conspiracies. *1045See United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir.1984). Cf. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1306 (7th Cir.1976) (“the other conspirators’ willingness to discuss illegal activities in their presence, knowing [the defendants] were police officers, is also to some extent indicative of [the defendants] participation.”) United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir.1984). Here, drug dealers openly discussed their deals in Debbie’s presence. Indeed, Marlow testified that he received money from Debbie and her husband. Marlow testified as follows:
“Q. Now, you met with them in their hotel room?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Who was present?
A. Debbie Williams, Dave Williams and myself.
Q. How much money was delivered to you?
A. Approximately $22,000.
Q. By whom?
A. David and Debbie Williams ...”
(Tr. 883) (emphasis added).
A well known drug supplier, Tim Harvey, counted on Debbie to relay a phone message to facilitate a drug deal. (Tr. 1248). Debbie knowingly kept, in her purse, the information necessary (telephone and hotel room numbers) to contact drug dealers and suppliers on a moment’s notice. (Government Ex. 168, Tr. 1277). Here too, “a business, rather than purely social, relationship ... could reasonably be inferred.” Holmes, 452 F.2d at 256.
The majority refuses to accept the jury’s conviction of Debbie on the basis of this circumstantial evidence, even though the law is well settled that: “A conviction may rest solely on circumstantial evidence____” United States v. Young, 568 F.2d 588, 589 (8th Cir.1978). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is intrinsically as probative as direct evidence even where the conviction rests solely upon circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir.1979). By refusing to accept the probative value of this circumstantial evidence, this court today mandates that the government present direct evidence of a partner’s (wife’s) participation or forego prosecution of partners for conspiracy to distribute drugs. This court must affirm a conviction if, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “The court of appeals is bound by the rule that resolution of conflicting evidence is exclusively within the discretion of the jury, as the trier of fact, and its verdict must be given added weight when the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses is considered.” United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751 (10th Cir.1984). “Issues of credibility, the weight of the evidence, and conflicts in evidence are, of course, matters for the jury.” U.S. v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 464 (5th Cir.1975). “Furthermore, a jury may believe only part of a story, and disbelieve another part.” Id.
“Without a doubt, the public has a strong interest in prosecuting narcotics dealers.” United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir.1981). “Traffic in illicit drugs is a matter of pressing national concern____” United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir.1983). Drug abuse can and does produce devastating effects in the lives of our fellow Americans, and our governmental agencies must be allowed, within the confines of our cherished constitutional safeguards, to effectively prosecute drug conspirators in this country. By requiring greater evidence to uphold the conviction of Debbie Williams, the court today places another obstacle in the government’s battle against drugs.
The evidence presented demonstrated that Debbie Williams was present in Colorado Springs when her husband paid Mar-low $22,000. She saw her husband pay $10,000 to Riley, another drug supplier, in New Orleans. Debbie witnessed her husband pay over $25,000 to Rodney Shaddy, another drug dealer, in Custer, South Da*1046kota. The evidence showed that Debbie kept the telephone numbers of drug dealers in her purse and that she relayed a drug supplier’s message to her husband. Debbie also helped convey Marlow’s children back to Indiana, enabling co-conspirator Marlow to travel unencumbered to Las Vegas and consummate another drug deal. Debbie carried large sums of cash in her purse even though neither she nor her husband were employed. Large amounts of cash and drugs were concealed in the Williams’ residence. Finally, Debbie and her unemployed husband used the profits of their drug sales to support their lifestyle and finance their trips. It is settled law that “[ojnce the Government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the Government need only offer ‘slight evidence to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir.1985). It is obvious that there is far more than slight evidence that Debbie Williams participated in the conspiracy. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming that Debbie Williams took part in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically as probative as direct evidence,” United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir.1979). Circumstantial évidence “may be the sole support for a conviction.” United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir.1985). Because of the substantial amount of evidence against Debbie Williams, I must dissent.
I also dissent because the government established more than a sufficient basis for the admission of David Williams’ statement at the Santiago hearing that Debbie “counted the money.” Debbie Williams concedes that the government established that her husband David was a member of the conspiracy charged, and does not deny that she had knowledge of the conspiracy. The government was only required to produce “slight evidence” that Debbie was a member of the conspiracy in order to support Debbie’s conviction. I believe the government produced substantially more than “slight evidence” that Debbie Williams actively participated in the conspiracy and accordingly I agree with the decision of the trial court and I would affirm her conviction.

. Debbie Williams was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846, in conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
21 U.S.C. § 846 reads:
"§ 846. Attempt and conspiracy.
Any person who . attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fíne or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) reads:
“(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance;"

. "The slight evidence rule is no more a substitute for the preponderance standard used for admission of co-conspirator hearsay than it is for the reasonable doubt standard used for the ultimate determination of guilt. It merely describes the type of evidence that may suffice to prove involvement under these standards ...”' United States v. Medina-Herrera, 606 F.2d 770, 773 n. 3 (7th Cir.1979).

. Conviction of Debbie under 21 U.S.C. § 846 required only "proof of an agreement” (between someone else and her) to violate § 841(a)(1).

. The drugs that David Williams purchased from Riley and Marlow were manufactured by Harvey.