Court Opinion

ID: 9393765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 12:02:40.443792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.338356
License: Public Domain

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                PRYOR v. BRIGNOLE—DISSENT

   D’AURIA, J., with whom ECKER, J., joins, dissenting.
Today, in Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928,         A.3d
(2023), one of two companion cases to the present case
that we also decide today, a majority of this court holds
that an appeal from the denial of a special motion to
dismiss filed pursuant General Statutes § 52-196a, our
anti-SLAPP statute, constitutes an appealable final judg-
ment under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191
Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), if the special motion
to dismiss is premised on a ‘‘colorable claim’’ that the
underlying cause of action is based on the defendants’
exercise of their rights to free speech, to free associa-
tion, or freedom to petition the government. Smith v.
Supple, supra, 930; see id., 960. I dissented in Smith
because I do not interpret § 52-196a to grant either a
right to an immediate appeal, a right to immunity from
suit, or any analogous right not to proceed to trial before
an appellate court has reviewed the trial court’s gate-
keeping determination. In that dissent, I detailed not
just my disagreement with the majority’s statutory con-
struction analysis—especially its interpretation of the
nature of the right § 52-196a creates—but also my belief
that an appeal of that gatekeeping ruling, on a record
assembled in an expedited fashion under the statute,
does not permit the level of judicial scrutiny often
required to adjudicate weighty constitutional issues at
the appellate level, especially such intensely fact based
issues as whether statements were made in a public
forum or on a matter of public concern. See id., 966,
971–72, 1001–1002 (D’Auria, J., dissenting). Therefore,
in my view, the denial of these motions should not
constitute appealable final judgments.1 See id., 966,
1001–1002 (D’Auria, J., dissenting).
   My disagreement with the majority in Smith was also
premised, in no small part, on my belief that the color-
able claim standard the majority established in that
case is such a low bar as to be essentially no bar at all,
permitting appeals from the denial of virtually every
special motion to dismiss. Any illusions that the color-
able claim standard will provide the Appellate Court—
where, in the first instance, these interlocutory appeals
will almost always be filed and any final judgment chal-
lenges resolved—with a tool to bat aside and short-
circuit appeals that have little hope of prevailing are,
in my view, dashed by the majority’s determination in
the present case that the Appellate Court improperly
dismissed the defendants’ appeal and that, therefore,
even this appeal will have to be briefed, argued, and
decided before the parties return to the trial court.
  The plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor, brought this action
against the defendants, Timothy Brignole and Brignole
Bush & Lewis, LLC, claiming that an anonymous letter
Brignole sent to various news outlets about the plaintiff
breached the nondisparagement provision of their set-
tlement agreement and caused the plaintiff to sustain
(1) harm to his reputation and interests, (2) economic
damages, and (3) the loss of the benefit of the settlement
agreement. Both defendants filed special motions to
dismiss the action as a SLAPP suit pursuant to § 52-
196a, contending that the plaintiff’s breach of contract
claims were based on Brignole’s ‘‘right of free speech
in connection with a matter of public concern . . . .’’
The trial court denied the defendants’ motions, conclud-
ing that, because Brignole had denied sending the let-
ters at issue, the defendants had failed to satisfy their
‘‘initial burden’’ under § 52-196a (e) (3) of showing, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that they were being
sued as a result of Brignole’s exercise of his free speech
rights. In other words, the trial court determined that
the defendants, having denied that Brignole sent the
letters, could not avail themselves of the statute’s pro-
tections because they could not demonstrate that they
were being sued for the exercise of their first amend-
ment rights insofar as there was no such exercise accord-
ing to them. They therefore had not invoked the special
motion procedure afforded under § 52-196a for its
intended purpose: to protect those claiming they had
been sued for exercising their first amendment rights.
   The defendants filed separate appeals with the Appel-
late Court, and, without opinion, the Appellate Court
dismissed the appeals for lack of a final judgment. As
I indicated previously, I would hold that the Appellate
Court properly dismissed the appeals because I do not
believe that the legislature intended to provide either
a statutory right to appeal the ruling or any kind of
right that would satisfy the second prong of Curcio.2
   The majority, however, holds that the defendants
have asserted ‘‘a colorable claim that Brignole’s con-
duct, as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, is based on
the exercise of his ‘right of free speech,’ as that term
has been defined by our legislature in § 52-196a (a) (2).’’
The majority’s holding means that the defendants can
have their cake and eat it, too. That is, Brignole can
deny that he disparaged the plaintiff but can still stop
his lawsuit in its tracks and take advantage of a proce-
dure by which the trial court must give priority to the
defendants’ motions. See General Statutes § 52-196a (e)
(1) (‘‘[t]he court shall conduct an expedited hearing on
a special motion to dismiss’’). And, having been unsuc-
cessful, the defendants can perpetuate this special treat-
ment by taking a rarely afforded interlocutory appeal
of the denials of their special motions to dismiss, pre-
venting the plaintiff from pursuing his case for as long
as the appellate process takes. The plaintiff must hurry
up and wait for someone who actually denies engaging
in constitutionally protected speech at all.
  The majority’s only support for this proposition is
that ‘‘courts in [two] other jurisdictions presented with
similarly worded anti-SLAPP statutes have also consid-
ered the merits of special motions to dismiss, even in
cases in which the defendant has denied making all or
some of the underlying statements alleged.’’ The major-
ity goes on to state: ‘‘Because the issue before us is limited
to whether the defendants in the present case have
asserted a colorable claim to the protections afforded
by our state’s anti-SLAPP statute, as required to obtain
an immediate review of the trial court’s denial of their
special motions to dismiss under the second prong of
Curcio, we need not determine whether any of the
foregoing persuasive authority is either factually distin-
guishable or legally correct.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
   The difficulty I have with the majority’s approach—
which provides a procedural advantage to defendants
for which there is no analogue for plaintiffs—is similar
to the difficulty I had with the majority’s interpretation
of a different part of the statute in Smith. That is, in
its zeal to examine precedents of other state courts and
follow suit, the majority does not conduct any kind
of analysis of Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, under
Connecticut’s own legal principles (including, specifi-
cally, General Statutes § 1-2z), to determine if § 52-196a
even arguably supports the majority’s contention that
a defendant may deny making the alleged statements—
a defense that does not involve any constitutional
rights—while taking advantage of the benefits afforded
under § 52-196a. Irrespective of what courts in other
states have held, once we have properly construed § 52-
196a, we might conclude that its protections do not even
colorably extend to a defendant who denies making a
statement at all.
   Under a proper § 1-2z analysis, for the defendants to
succeed on their special motions to dismiss under § 52-
196a, they must have raised in their motions a defense
that their actions constituted protected speech. Specifi-
cally, § 52-196a (b) provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n
any civil action in which a party files a complaint . . .
against an opposing party that is based on the opposing
party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to peti-
tion the government, or right of association under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
the state in connection with a matter of public concern,
such opposing party may file a special motion to dismiss
. . . .’’ Also, subsection (e) (3) of § 52-196a directs that
the court ‘‘shall’’ grant the motion if the moving party
‘‘makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint . . . is
based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free
speech, right to petition the government, or right of
association . . . .’’
  At least arguably, the language of § 52-196a (b) indi-
cates that a defendant has a right to file a special motion
to dismiss only when the underlying action is based on
the defendant’s right of free speech, right to petition
the government, or right of association. Similarly, the
plain language of subsection (e) (3) suggests that a
defendant must raise and establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the plaintiff’s action violates his
first amendment rights. Although the defendants in the
present case did raise a first amendment defense in
their special motions to dismiss, they also raised as their
main defense that Brignole did not make the alleged
statements. Although it is standard and acceptable pro-
cedure for parties to plead and argue in the alternative,
§ 52-196a creates a special proceeding that the statute
makes very clear is reserved only for those invoking
constitutional rights that are imperiled. It is thus at least
arguable under the statutory language that § 52-196a
does not apply to defendants who contest making the
statements at issue. If true, then a plaintiff’s own consti-
tutional right—of access to courts—would be unneces-
sarily compromised in favor of those whom the statute
does not protect. I see no impediment to deciding that
issue in this certified appeal, even as a matter of whether
the defendants have a colorable claim.
   Accordingly, for the reasons detailed in my dissent
in Smith, and for the reasons discussed in this opinion,
I respectfully dissent.3
   1
     Rather, I interpret § 52-196a as granting a new procedural right, entitling
the defendants to raise as early as possible in the litigation their preexisting
right to immunity from liability when the underlying defense is premised
on their exercise of a first amendment right or a state constitutional analogue.
The defendants had the right to file a special motion to dismiss early in the
litigation process, with discovery and its associated costs and burdens stayed
until the trial court resolved the special motion. See Smith v. Supple, supra,
346 Conn. 970–71, 976, 987–88 (D’Auria, J., dissenting).
   2
     As I indicated in my dissent in Smith, under my interpretation of the
statutory right at issue, the defendants have received the intended benefits
of § 52-196a. See Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 966 (D’Auria, J., dis-
senting). The trial court, acting in its gatekeeping function, considered the
merits of the underlying lawsuit, determining that the defendants had failed
to ‘‘ ‘[make] an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,’ ’’ estab-
lishing that the plaintiff brought the underlying lawsuit abusively or frivo-
lously to chill the defendants’ right to free speech. More specifically, the
trial court ruled that nothing in the record demonstrated that Brignole had
actually exercised his right to free speech. Thus, the defendants, ‘‘early in
the process,’’ had the opportunity to ‘‘try to dismiss a frivolous or abusive
claim that has no merit’’ and did not have to incur significant costs of
litigation until they received a determination on their motion. (Internal
quotation marks omitted. ) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332, 382 n.36, 246
A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied,         U.S.    , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209 L. Ed. 2d
529 (2021).
   3
     I also disagree with the rescript in this case. I would not saddle the
Appellate Court with a remand and ask it to decide, even in the first instance,
the several novel issues that the majority’s approach to our statute creates
in a case such as this. For one reason, we are going to have to resolve these
questions anyhow at some point. Moreover, if it turns out that the trial court
properly denied the special motions to dismiss, the plaintiff’s action has
already been delayed almost three years.