Court Opinion

ID: 9401189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 09:09:50.720265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.231493
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-22-00435-CV
      ___________________________

   JARON MAURICE LYNCH, Appellant

                      V.

SAMANTHA JACQUELINE LOPEZ, Appellee

   On Appeal from the 231st District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 231-719628-22

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. Introduction

      In a single issue, Appellant Jaron Maurice Lynch challenges the trial court’s

denial of his motion for new trial directed at a ten-year family-violence protective

order rendered because Appellant represented “a credible threat to the physical safety

of” Appellee Samantha Jacqueline Lopez. We overrule Appellant’s issue because his

motion failed to present facts supporting a prong of the proof necessary to obtain a

new trial—that he had a meritorious defense to Appellee’s claim that she was entitled

to a protective order. Further, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial based on his

claim that the protective order improperly prohibits his possession of a firearm. A

section of the Family Code enables Appellant to challenge this allegedly objectionable

prohibition. Because the Family Code provides an adequate remedy for Appellant to

mount a challenge to the firearm prohibition, there is no reason for equity to

intervene and abrogate the entire protective order and thus deprive Appellee of the

order’s protections from Appellant’s threat of future family violence. Accordingly, we

affirm.

                     II. Factual and procedural background

      Appellant’s brief sets out the chronology and background of this matter in a

succinct fashion:

                                          2
      On July 5, 2022, [Appellee] filed an application for a protective order in
      the 231st District Court, alleging various bad acts[1] by [Appellant].

             On July 6, 2022, the trial court signed a temporary ex parte
      protective order and show[-]cause order, ordering [Appellant] to appear
      in the 231st Associate Court on July 19, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.

             On July 19, 2022, [Appellee] filed a motion to reissue citation and
      temporary ex parte order and show[-]cause order because of lack of
      service on [Appellant]. The trial court signed a temporary ex parte order
      and show[-]cause order that same day, ordering [Appellant] to appear in
      the 324th Associate Court on August 2, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.

            On July 20, [Appellant] was served at “100 N. Lamar” in Tarrant
      County, which is the Tarrant County Corrections Center, where
      [Appellant] was imprisoned at the time. The return ordered [Appellant]
      to appear in the 231st Associate Court on August 2, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.

             On August 2, 2022, the associate judge held a final trial.
      [Appellant] did not appear, and the bailiff called the hallways and called
      the 324th Associate Court as well. [Appellee] testified that [Appellant]
      and she had been engaged, that [Appellant] had committed various bad
      acts against her, that she believed [Appellant] had charges against him
      for other bad acts, and that she was concerned for her future safety. She
      also testified that [she] and [Appellant] together did not have any
      children. [Record references omitted.]

      After rendition of the default protective order, Appellant filed a motion for

new trial that was supported by his declaration.            Though the declaration

acknowledged that Appellant had received the application for a protective order

setting the date of a hearing, Appellant professed that he was confused and thought

that the protective-order matter was the same matter as a criminal charge pending

against him. No one attended the protective-order hearing on Appellant’s behalf

      1
       Appellee’s brief notes that she filed the application based upon allegations of
“family violence,” not “bad acts.”

                                          3
because Appellant claims that he mistakenly believed the lawyer whom he had hired

to handle the criminal matter would be handling the matter of which he had received

notice. The declaration also stated, “I have young children that this protective order

will adversely affect my conservatorship, access, and possession if this protective

order stands.” The declaration did not deny that Appellant had committed family

violence against Appellee.

      The trial court signed notices and amended notices of hearing for the motion

for new trial, but for reasons not explained in the record, it was apparently not heard

and was overruled by operation of law. Subsequently, Appellant filed a notice of

appeal.

                                     III. Analysis

      A.     Appellant’s motion for new trial failed to present facts that support
             one of the prongs of proof necessary for him to obtain a new trial—
             that he had a meritorious defense to Appellee’s request for a
             protective order.

      The standard of review and the elements that Appellant had to establish to

obtain a new trial were recently reiterated by the Texas Supreme Court when it listed

the prongs of the venerable Craddock test:

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of
      discretion. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006). The rule of
      Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines[, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.]
      1939),] entitles a defaulting party to a new trial when[] “(1) the failure to
      appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference[] but
      was the result of an accident or mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets
      up a meritorious defense, and (3) granting the motion will occasion no
      delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.” Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma,

                                             4
      288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009) (citing Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126). . . .
      If a defaulting party moves for a new trial and satisfies Craddock, then the
      trial court abuses its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. [Id.] at 926.

B. Gregg Price, P.C. v. Series 1 – Virage Master LP, 661 S.W.3d 419, 423–24 (Tex. 2023).

The Craddock test applies to determine whether a trial court should set aside a no-

answer default judgment. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307,

308–09 (Tex. 2012).

      Another venerable supreme court opinion—Ivy v. Carrell—establishes what

allegations are necessary to meet the Craddock test’s second prong by setting up a

meritorious defense. 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966). A later opinion of the

supreme court describes the standard of Ivy as follows:

      The second prong of the Craddock test requires [a new-trial movant] to
      “set up” a meritorious defense in its motion for new trial. [Craddock,]
      133 S.W.2d at 126. Setting up a meritorious defense does not require
      proof “in the accepted sense.” Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214. Rather, the
      motion sets up a meritorious defense if it alleges facts which in law
      would constitute a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action and is
      supported by affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof
      that the defendant has such a defense. Id. (testimony given at the
      motion for new trial hearing used to determine whether defendant
      provided prima facie evidence of a meritorious defense); see Guar. Bank v.
      Thompson, 632 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. 2006).

Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 927–28 (footnote omitted). “A meritorious defense is one that,

if true, would cause a different result on retrial, though it need not be a totally

opposite result.” Take 5 LLC v. Smith, No. 05-22-00390-CV, 2023 WL 1229028, at *5

(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing L’Arte De La Mode, Inc. v.

Neiman Marcus Grp., 395 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)).

                                             5
      Setting up a meritorious defense requires the articulation of the facts

supporting the defense because “conclusory statements are not sufficient to meet the

second Craddock element.”       Djomo v. Tchengwe, No. 01-20-00581-CV, 2022 WL

2836805, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(first citing Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 928; and then citing Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214); see also

Dupuy v. Williams, No. 14-19-00463-CV, 2021 WL 5707430, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (applying Craddock in the

context of a challenge to a default protective order and holding that trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying motion for new trial when appellant failed to provide

prima facie proof of meritorious defense to protective order).

      When a motion for new trial fails to present evidence supporting one of the

necessary prongs of proof—such as the failure to establish a meritorious defense—we

will affirm the denial of the motion for new trial based on that failure alone. Abuzaid

v. Modjarrad & Assocs., P.C., No. 05-16-00777-CV, 2017 WL 5559591, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because it is dispositive of

appellants’ thirteenth issue, we first consider whether appellants satisfied the second

prong of the Craddock test by setting up a meritorious defense as to the [appellee’s]

suit on a sworn account.”); see also Djomo, 2022 WL 2836805, at *2 (holding that trial

court properly exercised its discretion by denying motion for new trial directed to

entry of protective order because appellant’s motion failed to allege facts establishing

a meritorious defense).

                                           6
      Here, Appellant failed to set up a meritorious defense, and his failure to

establish that prong of the Craddock test is fatal to his claim that he was entitled to a

new trial. With respect to his claim of a meritorious defense, the total extent of the

statements in Appellant’s declaration are as follows:

      I have young children that this protective order will adversely affect my
      conservatorship, access, and possession if this protective order stands. I
      believe justice will not be properly served unless a full and complete new
      trial is granted. Failure to grant a new trial and allow me to present
      evidence would create a result that is so unjust and unfair as to constitute
      an abuse of discretion.

This paragraph states the adverse consequences of the entry of the protective order

but presents no facts that would constitute a defense to its rendition. Specifically, the

declaration does not deny that the abuse about which Appellee testified had occurred

or claim that she had a motive to falsify her testimony. See Cantu-Garcia v. Medrano,

No. 14-21-00171-CV, 2022 WL 16645509, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[Appellant’s] motion and declaration sufficiently

set up a meritorious defense; he explicitly denied the alleged conduct occurred and

offered a motive for [appellee] to have fabricated the allegation.”).        Simply, the

declaration does not offer even conclusory statements of facts supporting the

existence of a meritorious defense. Further, Appellant’s subjective belief that justice

will not be served unless he receives a new trial is not evidence, see, e.g., Tex. Div.–

Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994), and even if it were, it has no

bearing on the existence of a defense.

                                            7
       Appellant has presented no facts that meet the second prong of the Craddock

test. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion when it did not hear his motion

for new trial because that motion lacked the facts necessary to show that Appellant

would be entitled to relief. 2

       B.     Appellant’s contention that the protective order contains an
              erroneous provision does not warrant the granting of a new trial;
              the Family Code provides Appellant an adequate remedy to
              address the alleged impropriety by allowing him to seek
              modification of the order.

       Appellant argues that legal developments after the rendition of the protective

order warrant a new trial because the order improperly prohibits him from possessing

a firearm. Specifically, he argues that

       at the time [he] could make a complaint in the trial court regarding the
       constitutionality of the prohibition against possessing a firearm, case law
       was clear that the prohibition was held to be constitutional. See United

       2
        Appellant also argues that his

       timely motion and declaration establish a meritorious defense because he
       explained that he was in jail at the time of trial, August 2, 2022, but the
       default protective order required him to complete a batterer’s
       intervention and prevention program by August 12, 2022, only ten days
       later. . . . The record is devoid of any evidence that [Appellant] could
       actually have completed these services due to his incarceration, and
       because it required the program to be completed at specified locations
       outside of the jail, his incarceration would have precluded him from
       doing so.

In addition to the fact that this argument is not made in the motion for new trial, the
declaration contains no facts supporting it. The declaration does not state that
Appellant was in jail on August 12, 2022. Further, the order did not require Appellant
to complete the batterer’s course by August 12 but merely required him to enroll in
the course by that date.

                                           8
      States v. Rahimi, No. 21-11001, 2023 WL 1459240, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 2,
      2023) (recognizing that challenges to constitutionality of law prohibiting
      possession of firearm was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956
      F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th
      Cir. 2001)). Based on new case law that was decided after the time to
      make a complaint, the default protective order’s prohibition of
      [Appellant’s] “[p]ossessing a firearm” is unconstitutional. See id. at *10
      (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) that prohibits possession of firearm under
      civil protective order unconstitutional; relying on N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
      Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)); see Blair v. Fletcher, 849 S.W.2d
      344, 345 (Tex. 1993) (holding that appellate decision should be made in
      light of change in the law). Although the court in Rahimi said the validity
      of the underlying protective order was not at issue, the reasoning from
      Rahimi applies just the same—civil proceedings are insufficient to
      prohibit the possession of firearms. See [2023 WL 1459240,] at *6. This
      would further result in a different outcome in a new trial.

      As conceded by Appellant, he did not make this argument to the trial court

because the “new case law . . . was decided after the time to make a complaint.” We

cannot understand how the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new

trial based on an argument that it did not hear. And as Appellee notes, the case cited

by Appellant 3 deals with federal law and not the provisions of the Texas Family Code

that apply to the requirements of a protective order in a family-violence context. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.022(b)(6) (“In a protective order, the court may prohibit

the person found to have committed family violence from[] . . . possessing a firearm,

unless the person is a peace officer, as defined by Section 1.07, Penal Code, actively

      3
          Although Appellant cites “United States v. Rahimi, No. 21-11001, 2023 WL
1459240, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023),” that decision was withdrawn because it was
superseded on March 2, 2023, by United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023),
petition for cert. filed, No. 22-915 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2023).

                                             9
engaged in employment as a sworn, full-time paid employee of a state agency or

political subdivision . . . .”).

       But there is a more fundamental reason why Appellant’s argument is

unavailing. Appellant does not deny that he has committed family violence or that the

violence that he committed in the past warrants a finding that he might commit such

violence in the future. Instead, he challenges a narrow aspect of the protective order.

That challenge—should it be valid—does not require the intervention of equity to

grant him a new trial. Appellant has a remedy, and that remedy is adequate to address

his complaint without having to take the further step of holding a new trial.

       Here, the Family Code provides a remedy by which Appellant may obtain relief

without abrogating the protections of the order that Appellee may need to shield her

from Appellant. Section 87.001 of the Family Code accords Appellant the right to ask

the trial court to modify the protective order should he contend the protective order’s

firearm provision is no longer valid.     See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 87.001.        The

parameters of Section 87.001 were described by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals as

follows:

       In addition, under Family Code [S]ection 87.001, “[o]n the motion of
       any party, the court, after notice and hearing, may modify an existing
       protective order to[] (1) exclude any item included in the order[] or (2)
       include any item that could have been included in the order.” Tex. Fam.
       Code Ann. § 87.001 . . . . Under this statute, the trial court retains
       jurisdiction and authority to modify the Order throughout its pendency,
       including after this appeal from the Order comes to an end. See id.; L.S.
       v. Shawn, No. 13-17-00224-CV, 2018 WL 4100857, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—
       Corpus Christi[–Edinburg] Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.S.,

                                          10
      217 S.W.3d 685, 686–87 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.); Cooke v.
      Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). During
      the effective period of the Order, the trial court retains the power and
      jurisdiction on the motion of any party, and after notice and hearing, to
      modify the Order by either deleting or adding items to the order,
      without any requirement of a showing of changed circumstances. See
      Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 87.001; L.S., 2018 WL 4100857, at *2–3; . . .
      S.S., 217 S.W.3d at 686–87; Cooke, 65 S.W.3d at 788.

J.A.T. v. C.S.T., 641 S.W.3d 596, 616–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet.

denied).

      Further, the Craddock test is an equitable doctrine. In re Marriage of Williams, 646

S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022). The Craddock test is not directed at errors that may be

present in a judgment but is a remedy designed to protect a party from an excusable

failure to answer. As noted recently by the supreme court, “[a] motion under Craddock

does not attempt to show an error in the judgment; rather, it seeks to excuse the

defaulting party’s failure to answer by showing the Craddock elements.” Id.

      There is no need for equity to intervene in this case. Appellant offers no

defense to the fact that the order was needed to protect Appellee and thus has not

offered the necessary grounds to excuse his failure to answer. Further, he has a

mechanism available to challenge a provision of the order that he argues has become

invalid based on events that occurred after its rendition. Craddock’s equitable rule

serves no purpose when Appellant has another adequate remedy to address the

alleged impropriety in the order. See Frost Nat’l Bank v. Burge, 29 S.W.3d 580, 596

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“Equity invokes the ‘court of

                                           11
conscience,’ and it applies only when ‘the legal remedy is not as complete as, less

effective than, or less satisfactory than the equitable remedy.’” (citing First Heights

Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 605 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

1993, writ denied))).

      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue and hold that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing Appellant’s motion for new trial to be overruled

by operation of law.

                                  IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the default protective order.

                                                     /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                     Dabney Bassel
                                                     Justice

Delivered: June 8, 2023

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