Court Opinion

ID: 9680463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:32:16.629142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.723840
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
Being convinced that this conviction should not be reversed, I must dissent. Not only do I believe the majority has misconstrued the prior holdings of this Court in Harris v. State, 499 S.W.2d 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Moore v. State, 403 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), as they apply to this case, I believe also that the majority ignores the purpose of the driving while intoxicated statute in arriving at their conclusion.
The purpose of the law is to protect people against drunk drivers while using public roads, streets or thoroughfares. Blackburn v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 572, 204 S.W.2d 619 *739(1947). Or stated another way, the object and purpose of the law is to prevent men, women and children from being wounded and maimed by persons driving automobiles while in a state of intoxication. Johnson v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 175, 147 S.W.2d 811 (1941).
The record before us shows that the McDonald’s lot here in question was open to the public; that it had designated parking places; that there were routes of ingress and egress from two different streets; and that it was possible to use the lot as a thoroughfare between the two streets. In this record I believe it qualifies as a “public road.” This, coupled with the purpose of the statute, leads” me to conclude that the DWI statute was enforcible against this appellant on the lot in question.
For these reasons, I dissent.