Court Opinion

ID: 9640508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:07:22.198591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.488414
License: Public Domain

REID, Associate Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that: “The evidence heard by the trial court was sufficient to support its conclusion that the children were neglected.” I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s analysis of the cross-examination and expert testimony issues.
At the time the March 1999, neglect petition was filed in this case Jas.J. was seven and one-half years old, and Jam.J. was five and one-half years old. When the hearings on the petition took place approximately one year later, they were still very young children. Both children, according to the principal of their elementary school, manifested behavioral problems after the events of March 1999. The teacher’s assistant in Jas.J.’s classroom testified that Jas.J. began acting out in class. She was “not listening,” and moved “in and out the chair all on the floor, doing everything ... except what the teacher was telling her to do.” Each child participated separately in *921six sessions, each lasting approximately 55-60 minutes, with a therapist and social worker from the Children’s National Medical Center who diagnosed them as suffering from an adjustment disorder. The therapist and social worker reported that when Jas.J. was her patient, “she was still remembering and saying that she was afraid to be at home because ... the person who hit her [K.C.] ... was still in her home.”
Despite these indicators that the children were vulnerable and had been in distress, the majority vacates the trial court’s judgment and remands this case for additional proceedings, in part because the trial judge concluded that the children should not be subjected to interview, testimony and cross-examination. In addition, the majority sets forth a balancing test involving three steps that a trial court must follow before deciding that a child should not testify. This type of test not only is unnecessary on this record, in my view, but it also results in appellate intrusion into an area better left to the discretion of the trial judge who is better able to decide how to handle complex, sensitive matters that undoubtedly involve the highest emotions of parents, bad memories and fears of children, and the adversarial mind-set of attorneys who represent these parties.
Here, it is clear that the trial judge listened to the arguments of the mother’s counsel, the guardian ad litem for the children, the attorney for the mother’s fiancé, and government counsel before exercising her discretion in rejecting the requests that the children be interviewed and that they be compelled to testify as hostile witnesses. The mother’s counsel advised the court that she wanted to interview Jas.J. “informally to see whether she can recall. Not necessarily to go into exactly what happened, but whether she can recall correctly what happened, if possible.” Counsel for the mother added that she wanted to “see whether [Jas.J.’s] memory goes as far as that part because it’s important for us to know what this child can recall or cannot recall.” There was no proffer from the mother’s counsel of any factual basis for believing that Jas.J. had lied to anyone.
The guardian ad litem opposed the informal interview of the children because:
[Jas.J.] is very reluctant to talk about it. Her mother has told her, and her mother has told both children that she, her mother, will go to jail if they talk about this. Obviously, the children are reluctant to talk to anybody about it. And I said no.
When counsel for the mother “ask[ed] ... to call [Jas.J.] as a hostile witness,” the trial court responded:
Absolutely not. If the Guardian Ad Li-tem has indicated that the child will not speak informally, the Court does not require or force children to testify in proceedings of this nature. This is a civil case. This is not a criminal case. This case is aimed towards the best interests of the children.
The trial judge signaled that, in making the decision whether to allow the children to testify, she ultimately was guided by the best interests of the child standard, even though the recommendation of the children’s guardian ad litem carried great weight. According great weight to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, however, did not mean that the trial judge faded to exercise her discretion, as is apparent from the following colloquy between the trial court, the guardian ad li-tem, and counsel for the mother’s fiancé.
Counsel for the mother’s fiancé asked that both children be called as hostile witnesses and cross-examined because “[t]he Government is introducing what they said *922in hearsay.”12 The guardian ad litem for the children opposed the request, saying:
[T]he children told a story, repeatedly they told the same story to the detective and to the doctors and to the psychiatrists at the time that this happened. I don’t know what good it would do almost a year later to have them break it up to be cross-examined. They are small children. Their memory may be hazy and may not be hazy. They don’t want to talk about it and they told a very consistent story. And I don’t know what good it would do now to cross-examine them.
The following exchange then took place:
THE COURT: When they are approached in any way, is there emotional— is there an emotional impact on them?
GUARDIAN AD LITEM: Of telling the story[?]
THE COURT: Yes.
GUARDIAN AD LITEM: Yes.
THE COURT: Or speaking in front of their parents?
GUARDIAN AD LITEM: Yes, there is. They are afraid that their mother is going to go to jail.
The trial court made it clear that the children would not testify, even if the government needed them to prove neglect, because the guardian ad litem’s position was consistent with the best interests of the children:
With the [guardian ad litem’s] opposition and [she] is the legal representative of these children, the Court is not going to require them to testify. Now, if the Government can’t make their case without them, that’s fine. If they can, that’s fine. But the Court is not going to force them in opposition of their legal representative and fiduciary who is supposed to do what is in their best interests. The Court is not going to require it.
In response to the mother’s counsel’s insistence that Jas.J. could “tell the court what happened in the absence of [her mother and her mother’s fiancé because] there is no harm,” the trial judge declared: “The Court has found there is [harm].”
“ ‘Cases involving the [requested] testimony of abused children require special consideration.’” In re Brandon W., 56 Conn.App. 418, 747 A.2d 526, 581 (2000) (quoting In re Noel M., 23 Conn.App. 410, 580 A.2d 996, 1001 (1990)). In my view, that “special consideration” must unfold under the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as that discretion is exercised, see Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979), and as long as that “ ‘discretion [is] exercised not arbitrarily or willfully but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.’ ” Id. at 361 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)). In this case, the trial judge listened to the arguments of *923counsel regarding the issue of whether the children should be interviewed or should testify as hostile witnesses, and heard other options mentioned, such as taking their testimony outside the presence of the parents. In exercising her discretion as she resolved the issue, however, the trial judge concluded that any testimony would cause harm to the children, and that it was in their best interests not to testify.
I see no abuse of discretion. We previously have recognized that: “In most states, judges have discretion concerning whether or not to interview a child, and a party usually cannot require a judge to [do so].” In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 476 (D.C.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, where a guardian ad litem does not consent to the interview, as here, the majority of jurisdictions disallow the interview. Id. That the trial court’s discretionary ruling in this case was sound is apparent, even if one applies some sort of a balancing test.
The mother’s counsel requested the interview with Jas.J., not because she wanted “to go into exactly what happened,” or because of a reasonable suspicion that Jas.J. had lied about the abuse of K.C. and the infliction of physical punishment by her mother, but because she needed to know “whether [Jas.J.] can recall correctly what happened, if possible.” That the judge did not abuse her discretion becomes clear, at least to me, when that kind of vague purpose is balanced against the harm to the child of recalling the physical abuse of K.C. and the additional physical punishment of her mother, and the fear that her testimony would cause her mother to go to jail. Allowing the children to be called as hostile witnesses undoubtedly would have exacerbated the harm to children already in distress, and nothing on this record convinces me that Jas.J.’s account of the physical abuse on March 10, 1999, would have been shaken. Indeed, Jas.J.’s account of what happened to her was remarkably consistent, whether as told to Detective Wright-Taylor, or Dr. DeWolfe, or Dr. Herring. In short, I would not vacate the trial court’s judgment of neglect on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the mother to call Jas.J. and Jam.J. as hostile witnesses.
Nor would I vacate the judgment on the ground that the trial judge wrongly excluded the testimony of Dr. Hamlin, an expert whom K.C. desired to call as a witness. On November 29, 1999, the children’s guardian ad litem gave notice of her intent to call Dr. Rosa Herring as an expert witness. The mother’s actual trial counsel13 entered her appearance on December 17,1999, and obtained a voucher to secure the services of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Lanning E. Moldauer, “to rebut a therapy report and [to] testify!] [about] his finding.” The hearings in this matter commenced on January 21, 2000. Not until February 10 and 11, 2000, did the mother and K.C. seek to present expert witness testimony. By that time, two days of hearings had been completed — on January 21 and February 7.
Under the circumstances of this case, I see no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Hamlin. “The decision to impose discovery sanctions is left to the broad discretion of the trial court.” Jung v. Jung, 791 A.2d 46, 49 (D.C.2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In a ten-page order, the trial court explained its reasons for denying the request by the mother and K.C. to present expert *924testimony. It reviewed the case law and the arguments presented by the parties, and weighed the appropriate factors. The court specifically stated that: “[T]he [guardian ad litem] alleges to have no knowledge of the existence or content of the proposed testimony of Dr. Moldauer, the [mjother’s witness. The [guardian ad litem] was also not aware of the alleged examination by the other proposed expert witness, Dr. Hamlin.” Moreover, while the trial court stated that “[t]he testimony of Dr. Hamlin seems especially probative of the issue of abuse charged on the part of [K.C.] ....,” the court went on to say:
The fact remains however, that such justification remains mere speculation without knowing more of the substantive aspects of the proposed testimony. The standard to be applied in these instances is not prejudice, but “incurable prejudice,” .... Therefore, while the exclusion of potentially relevant testimony may prejudice the [m]other and [K.C.], it is not characterized as “incurable prejudice.”
Furthermore, Dr. Hamlin’s testimony would not have refuted Jas.J.’s statements regarding the incident of March 10, 1999. As the trial court asserted: “The fact that Dr. Hamlin’s treatment [of Jam.J., not Jas.J.] took place before the incident on March 10, 1999, may mitigate its relevance but the existence of his testimony may still refute some of the allegations of sexual and physical abuse ... alleged to have taken place before the incident in question.” In sum, I am satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Hamlin.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. The trial court properly admitted statements Jas J. made to medical personnel at the Children's National Medical Center less than a week after the March 10, 1999 incident, under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule. See In re S.S., No. 00-FS-609, 821 A.2d 353 (D.C. April 17, 2003), 2003 D.C.App. LEXIS 220 (statement made by a child to a doctor at Children’s Hospital after abuse by a family member admitted under the treatment exception to the hearsay rule); Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220, 226 (D.C.2002) (" 'Under the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule, statements made by a patient for purposes of obtaining medical treatment are admissible for their truth because the law is willing to assume that a declarant seeking medical help will speak truthfully to medical personnel.' ") (quoting Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 210 (D.C.1993)).

. Prior to the entrance of the mother’s actual counsel at trial, three other individuals were assigned to represent her. Two withdrew their appearances, and the mother claimed she never received any communication from the third.