Court Opinion

ID: 9715001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:51:16.569451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:30.431858
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with the majority's determinations that: (1) Allied Waste and IBC are not liable for the negligence of Wireman and Irvine under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; (2) Allied Waste and IBC are not liable for the negligence of Wireman and Irvine under the fourth exception to the general rule of nonliability of a principal for a contractor's negligence; and (8) IBC is not liable for the negligence of Wireman and Irvine under the second exception to the general rule of nonliability of a principal for a contractor's negligence. However, I dissent from the majority's determination that Allied Waste is not liable under the second exception to the general rule of nonliability of a principal for a contractor's negligence. Rather, I conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist on this issue, and I would affirm the trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment.
As noted in the majority opinion, under Bagley v. Insight Communications Co., 658 N.E.2d 584 (Ind.1995), a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor unless one of five exceptions applies. The five exceptions are:
(1) where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work;
(2) where the principal is by law or contract charged with performing the specific duty;
(8) where the act will create a nuisance;
(4) where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken; and
(5) where the act to be performed is illegal.
658 N.E.2d at 586. I agree with Appellees that the second exception is applicable here.
The eight-page purchase order between Mittal and Allied Waste provided, in part:
* " * * # *
The purpose of this order is to furnish our partial requirements of: Bulk stream removal haz/non-haz removal disposal non hazard
# # * # x C
Remove, properly pkg., label, transport & dispose of waste associated w/the job. Transport directly to off-side EPA permitted disposal facility approved by Inland Steel. DOT approved shipping containers to be provided by contractor.
Provide necessary sves. to obtain required disposal permits and/or approvals at EPA approved/permitted disposal sites prior to transport of items to disposal site. All disposal sites must be identified to Ispat Inland.
Provide appropriately permitted, 1i-censed & insured transport vehicles. Include the following information:
-DOT/EPA carrier safety rating
-EPA identification #
-Certificate(s) of insurance
-State transporter permit number
-Spill Contingency Plan(s)
[[Image here]]
Supplier warrants that the work and services shall be performed with that degree of skill, care, and judgement customarily accepted as sound, quality, pro*265fessional engineering practice and procedure and that the supplier shall exercise sufficient diligence to insure the technical correctness and accuracy of the work and services.
x x x x x C
Appellant's Appendix at 209-211.
I conclude that this case is more like the contracts in Stumpf v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 863 N.E.2d 871 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, and Perryman v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied, than the contracts in Walker v. Martin, 887 N.E.2d 125 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), reh'g denied, trans. denied, and Armstrong v. Cerestar, USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). trans. denied, which are relied upon by the majority. Under the Purchase Order, Allied Waste assumed a contractual duty to transport the waste with "appropriately permitted, licensed & insured transport vehicles" and to check the DOT/EPA safety ratings. Appellant's Appendix at 209. I conclude that Allied Waste assumed a contractual duty to provide safe transport for the waste, and the second Bagley exception applies. Further, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Allied breached its duty and, if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause of Ap-pellees' damages.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.