Court Opinion

ID: 9394220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 18:03:27.936947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.039851
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/12/23 P. v. Boullard CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322987

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MA048600)
           v.

 LANDRY BOULLARD,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
      Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      In 2010 a jury convicted Landry Boullard of attempted
murder and found true an allegation he attempted to commit the
murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. In 2022
Boullard filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code
former section 1170.951 (now section 1172.6), alleging that he
was convicted of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and that he could not be
convicted of attempted murder under current law. The superior
court found Boullard failed to state a prima facie case for relief
and denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
We affirm the order denying the section 1170.95 petition, deny
Boullard’s request under section 1172.75 to strike four prior
prison term enhancements, and direct the superior court to
correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    A Jury Convicts Boullard of Attempted Murder and
            Other Crimes
      In February 2010 James Kofahl, his wife, and three
relatives went to see a movie in a theater. Boullard sat with a
woman and a child in the row in front of Kofahl and his family.
During the movie, the woman with Boullard answered her cell
phone and began talking. Kofahl said, “Would you please turn
your cell phone off. We all paid good money to come see a movie.”
Boullard turned around and said something to Kofahl. Boullard

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
stood up, walked up the aisle toward the rear of the theater, and
a minute later walked back down the aisle and out of the theater
through a front entrance. A second man also walked down the
aisle and left the theater. The woman and child who had been
sitting with Boullard got up and left.
       Boullard reentered the theater holding a six-inch metallic
object, ran toward Kofahl, and made a punching motion toward
Kofahl’s face. Justin Dowd, Kofahl’s brother-in-law, pushed
Boullard away from Kofahl, and Boullard fell over a row of seats.
Dowd tackled Boullard, and Mark Albright, who was sitting in
the row in front of Kofahl, grabbed Boullard. A second man
jumped on Albright’s back and, along with Albright and Boullard,
fell onto a landing at the bottom of the steps. Albright’s wife saw
Boullard throw what looked like a meat thermometer on the
floor. Boullard left the theater with the man who had jumped on
Albright’s back.
       Law enforcement officers found a rectangular thermometer
with a five- to six-inch metal rod in the aisle of the theater. The
thermometer was the same kind of thermometer used by
students in an air conditioning technician program Boullard had
attended.
       The attack left Kofahl unconscious and bleeding with a
puncture wound in his neck above his clavicle. When Kofahl
arrived at the emergency room, he was in a coma, having trouble
breathing, and placed on life support. A neurosurgeon placed a
drain in Kofahl’s brain to relieve the pressure caused by
extensive bleeding. Kofahl spent five weeks in the hospital and
suffered permanent damage to his vision. Albright sustained a
small puncture wound above his ear lobe. Dowd sustained a
puncture wound underneath his arm.

                                 3
       Witnesses to the altercation identified Boullard on the
theater’s security camera footage. Four witnesses identified
Boullard from a six-pack photographic lineup. Law enforcement
searched Boullard’s home and found a pistol locked in a safe.
       A jury convicted Boullard on one count of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of possession of
a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). On the attempted
murder conviction, the jury found true allegations that Boullard
attempted to commit the murder willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation; that Boullard personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon (the thermometer); and that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury. (§§ 664, subd. (a), 12022,
subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subds. (a) & (b).). Boullard admitted that
he had one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the
meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)) and one prior conviction for a serious felony within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and that he had
served four prior prison terms within the meaning of former
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
       The trial court sentenced Boullard on his attempted
murder conviction to a prison term of life with a minimum parole
eligibility of 14 years (seven years, doubled under the three
strikes law), plus 15 years for the enhancements (five years for
the prior serious felony conviction, five years for inflicting great
bodily injury causing the victim (Kofahl) to become comatose,
four years for the prior prison term enhancements, and one year
for using a deadly or dangerous weapon). The court also
sentenced Boullard to consecutive determinate terms on his two
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon (Albright and Dowd)

                                 4
and his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.2 We
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Boullard (Mar. 19, 2012,
B231333) [nonpub. opn.].)3

      B.    The Superior Court Denies Boullard’s Petition Under
            Section 1172.6
      In January 2022 Boullard filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. In his petition Boullard alleged that he
was convicted of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and that he could not now be
convicted of attempted murder because of legislative changes to
sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The superior
court appointed counsel, and the People and Boullard filed briefs.
      The superior court denied Boullard’s petition, ruling
Boullard had failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The
court stated that, although the jury was instructed on the natural
and probable consequences theory, the jury “found the attempted

2      The trial court sentenced Boullard on one of his convictions
for assault with a deadly weapon to eight years (the upper term
of four years, doubled under the three strikes law), and on the
other one to two years (one-third the middle term of three years,
doubled). On his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon,
the court sentenced Boullard to 16 months (one-third the middle
term of two years, doubled). Thus, Boullard’s aggregate sentence
was life in prison with a minimum parole eligibility of 14 years,
plus 26 years four months, which is relevant to Boullard’s
argument under section 1172.75.

3      In his direct appeal Boullard did not challenge any aspect
of his attempted murder conviction. He argued only substantial
evidence did not support one of his convictions for assault with a
deadly weapon.

                                 5
murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation” and
that “a person could not be found to have acted with
premeditation and deliberation in the absence of express malice
and/or specific intent to kill.” Boullard timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

       A.    Section 1172.6
       Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder
exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)4
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule. (Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
       Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or
she could not now be convicted of murder because of the
legislative changes to the definitions of the crime. (See People v.

4       The Legislature later renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (See People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708,
fn. 2.)

                                 6
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 957; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Effective
January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to apply
to individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
       If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963;
see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a
response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) The court may consider the record of conviction, which
will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section 1170.95, allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”
(Ibid.; see People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.) But “[i]f the record of conviction

                                  7
‘“‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,’”’
. . . then the trial court is justified in rejecting them.” (Eynon, at
p. 975; see Lewis, at p. 971.) We review de novo an order denying
a petition under section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order
to show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545;
People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
        Where the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may
also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.; see People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-854.)

      B.      Boullard Is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6
              on His Attempted Murder Conviction
       Boullard argues he made a prima facie showing he was
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because the jury
was instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory.
The People argue that, because the jury found true the allegation
Boullard attempted to murder Kofahl willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation, the jury necessarily found Boullard acted
with intent to kill and therefore is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6. The People are correct.

                                  8
              1.     Relevant Proceedings in the Trial Court
      The trial court instructed the jury on attempted murder
with CALCRIM No. 600: “The defendant is charged . . . with
attempted murder. To prove that the defendant is guilty of
attempted murder, the People must prove that: the defendant
took a direct but ineffective step toward killing another person;
and the defendant intended to kill that person.”
      The trial court instructed the jurors that they could convict
Boullard of a crime either as a perpetrator or as someone who
aided and abetted a perpetrator who directly committed the
crime. The court instructed the jurors that they could find
Boullard guilty as an aider and abettor if they found he knew the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime, knew of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and specifically intended to and
did aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the
perpetrator’s commission of a crime.
      The trial court also instructed the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine with CALCRIM No. 402. The
court told the jurors that, to find Boullard guilty of attempted
murder under that doctrine, they had to find Boullard was guilty
of assault with a deadly weapon; during the commission of
assault with a deadly weapon a coparticipant in that crime
committed attempted murder;5 and under the circumstances a
reasonable person in Boullard’s position would have known
attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of
assault with a deadly weapon.

5     CALCRIM No. 402 states: “A coparticipant in a crime is
the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the perpetrator.
It does not include a victim or innocent bystander.” (See People v.
Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 612.)

                                 9
       Regarding the allegation Boullard attempted to commit the
murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, the trial
court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 601: “If you find
the defendant guilty of attempted murder . . . , you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation
that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with
deliberation and premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if
he intended to kill when he acted. The defendant deliberated if
he carefully weighed the consequences for and against his choice
and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant
premeditated if he decided to kill before acting.”
       During closing argument, counsel for Boullard discussed
the attempted murder charge and argued that Boullard did not
intend to kill Kofahl and that Boullard did not premeditate or
deliberate. Counsel conceded, however, Boullard was the person
who attacked Kofahl. Counsel for Boullard acknowledged he had
stated during his opening statement “it was another person that
did it,” but counsel conceded “the evidence didn’t show that. It
came out to be that, based on the testimony, that it was Mr.
Boullard that attacked the victim in this case, which was Mr.
Kofahl.”6

            2.    The Jury’s True Finding Boullard Acted
                  Willfully, Deliberately, and with Premeditation
                  Precludes Him from Relief
     Because the jury found Boullard attempted to commit the
murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, the jury

6     Counsel for Boullard argued another man, not Boullard,
attacked Dowd and Albright (the two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon).

                               10
necessarily found Boullard had the intent to kill. The jury
instruction made clear that, to find the allegation true, the jury
had to find the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt “the
attempted murder was done willfully.” The jury instruction
further stated: “The defendant acted willfully if he intended to
kill when he acted.” Because the instruction referred to the
“defendant,” not the “attacker” (e.g., CALCRIM No. 3474;
CALJIC No. 9.50) or “would-be slayer” (e.g., CALJIC No. 8.67),
and Boullard was the only defendant, the jury found Boullard
intended to kill. And as discussed, Boullard is not eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 if he acted with the intent to kill.
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1) & (3); see People v. Jenkins (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 924, 934 (Jenkins) [“a defendant is ineligible for
relief if the trier of fact found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intended to kill”].) This is true even if the jury
disregarded counsel for Boullard’s concession Boullard was
Kofahl’s actual attacker and considered whether Boullard was
guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor: Because the
jury found Boullard acted willfully in committing attempted
murder (i.e., intended to kill), the jury could not have convicted
Boullard on a natural and probable consequences theory. (Cf.
Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1256 [“By their true finding
of the drive-by shooting special circumstance, the jurors defined
the theory of the crime and found [the defendant] had acted with
the intent to kill, the ‘“functional equivalent” of express malice.’”];
People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 183-184 [“By
convicting appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder,” the jury “in effect found that appellant was a direct
aider and abettor of the killings” because the jury instruction
required the jury to find he acted “‘with the specific intent to

                                  11
agree to commit . . . first degree murder and with the further
specific intent to commit such offense.’”].)
       Boullard’s reliance on People v. Montes (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 1001 (Montes) is misplaced. In Montes a jury
convicted the defendant of attempted murder and found true the
allegation the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. (Montes, at p. 1003.) As
here, the trial court in Montes instructed the jury on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 1008.) But that is
where the similarities end. In Montes the defendant was
prosecuted as an aider and abettor, not as a perpetrator of the
attempted murder. During closing argument, the prosecutor
“referred to the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
provided the jury with examples of what natural and probable
consequences could arise in [the defendant’s] circumstances, and
argued that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] shoes would
know that an assault may lead to an attempted murder.”
(Montes, at p. 1007.) The superior court in Montes denied the
defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 without issuing an
order to show cause, ruling, among other things, the defendant
“‘possessed the intent to kill or the jury could not have convicted
him of attempted murder.’” (Montes, at p. 1004.) The court in
Montes reversed, holding the jury found “the perpetrator (not [the
defendant]) intended to kill and the perpetrator’s attempted
murder was a natural and probable consequence of [the
defendant’s] intent to participate in the target offense of assault.”
(Id. at p. 1008.) It does not appear the trial court in Montes
instructed the jury on a theory of attempted murder that

                                 12
required the jury to find the defendant (rather than the
perpetrator) intended to kill.7
       Here, in contrast, the trial court’s instruction (CALCRIM
No. 601) did not allow the jury to find the allegation true if the
jury found someone other than Boullard intended to kill. In
defining willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation, the trial
court’s instruction referred only to “the defendant”: “The
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted.
The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the
consequences for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant premeditated if he
decided to kill before acting.” By finding Boullard acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation, the jury necessarily found
the defendant (Boullard) “intended to kill when he acted.” And as
discussed, counsel for Boullard conceded Boullard was not an
aider and abettor, but the actual attacker. (See People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [record of conviction includes closing
arguments]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 102
[same].)
       Nor does Jenkins, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 924, on which
Boullard also relies, support Boullard. In Jenkins the defendant
was convicted of second degree murder and kidnapping. The
People argued that the defendant was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because the trial court, by declining under
section 654 to stay execution of the sentence on the kidnapping

7     The opinion in Montes does not reveal whether the court
instructed the jury on direct aiding and abetting (in addition to
natural and probable consequences), nor does the opinion
describe the instruction on willfulness, deliberation and
premeditation.

                                13
conviction, necessarily found the defendant “‘formed a separate
intent and objective for each offense’” and “implicitly found that
[the defendant] formed an intent to aid and abet murder—that is,
an intent to kill.” (Jenkins, at p. 934.) The court in Jenkins held
the trial court’s implied finding under section 654 did not
preclude relief under section 1172.6 because the trial court made
that finding by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a
reasonable doubt. Here, of course, the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt Boullard attempted to commit murder willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation.8
       Boullard also contends that the superior court, in
concluding the jury did not rely on the natural and probable
consequences theory, engaged in improper judicial factfinding.
But the court did not engage in any factfinding. The court did
not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations;
instead, it based its decision on the jury instructions and the
verdict. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [court may reject
allegations in the section 1172.6 petition if they are refuted by
facts in the record of conviction].) Nor did the superior court, as
Boullard asserts, rely on our opinion in Boullard’s direct appeal
“to establish the facts of the case.” In denying Boullard’s petition,
the superior court recited the factual summary from our prior
opinion, but the court did not refer to any part of that factual

8      The court in Jenkins also stated that, although the jury’s
true finding on a witness-killing special circumstance (which
requires an intent to kill) under section 190.2 ordinarily would
render a defendant ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, the
finding did not preclude relief in that case because the trial court
struck it. (Jenkins, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.)

                                 14
summary in making its ruling, and Boullard does not point to any
fact the superior court relied on in denying his petition.
       The jury’s true finding on the allegation Boullard acted
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation established as a
matter of law Boullard intended to kill, and excluded the
possibility the jury relied on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Because the jury did not impute malice to
Boullard or convict him under a now-invalid theory, Boullard can
“presently be convicted of murder” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)),
notwithstanding the changes to sections 188 and 189. (See
People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864, 867-868
[defendant was “ineligible for relief under section [1172.6] as a
matter of law” because the jury did not convict him under a
theory of liability affected by the Legislature’s changes to sections
188 and 189].)

      C.      Boullard Is Not Entitled to Resentencing Under
              Section 1172.75 in This Proceeding
       Boullard asks us to strike the four one-year prior prison
term enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and direct the
superior court to resentence him under section 1172.75. Boullard
may be eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, but he
cannot obtain that relief in this appeal.
       “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b),
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379-380.) In 2020 the Legislature amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b), to limit the enhancement to prior prison terms for

                                 15
sexually violent offenses. (§ 667.5, subd. (b); Stats. 2019, ch. 590,
§ 1; Burgess, at p. 380.) In 2021 Senate Bill No. 483, which added
section 1171.1 (later renumbered as section 1172.75), made the
change retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 12.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides: “Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (See People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)
       Boullard argues, the People concede, and we agree
Boullard’s prior prison term enhancements are “legally invalid”
under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), because the trial court did
not impose them for prior convictions for sexually violent
offenses. But Boullard provides no authority for his request for
resentencing on these enhancements in an appeal from an order
denying a petition under section 1172.6.
       Instead, section 1172.75 provides a procedure for Boullard
and other defendants to seek resentencing on convictions that
include these no-longer-valid enhancements. The Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county correctional
administrator must first identify individuals currently serving
terms that include such an enhancement and provide the court
with their names, dates of birth and case numbers. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b).) “Upon receiving the information,” if the court
determines a judgment includes an invalid enhancement, “the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 399.) Section 1172.75 prescribes two timelines for this

                                 16
process. For “individuals who have served their base term and
any other enhancement and are currently serving a sentence
based on the [now-invalid] enhancement,” the deadline for review
and resentencing was October 1, 2022. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1).)
For individuals like Boullard, who are not yet serving time on an
invalid enhancement, the deadline is December 31, 2023.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
       Boullard was sentenced in 2011 to an aggregate prison
term of the equivalent of 40 years four months to life. Under
section 1172.75, subdivision (c)(2), he is scheduled to be
resentenced within seven months—decades before he is due to
begin serving any time for the four one-year prior prison term
enhancements. Boullard argues we should order the superior
court to resentence him now under section 1172.75,
subdivision (c)(2), “in the interests of judicial economy and
efficiency.” We see no reason to allow Boullard to circumvent the
statutory process and potentially cut in line in front of other
defendants who, unlike Boullard, will soon be serving sentences
based on now-invalid enhancements. (See People v. Burgess,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 382-383 [“the Legislature’s purpose
in staggering the schedule [was] to minimize the impact on trial
courts, while ensuring that those inmates currently serving time
on the invalid enhancements are prioritized for relief, so they do
not lose the benefit of the ameliorative change in the law”].)

      D.     The Superior Court Should Correct a Clerical Error
             in the Abstract of Judgment
      Boullard asserts, the People concede, and we agree the
abstract of judgment contains a clerical error. Boullard was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (former
section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), now section 29800, subdivision

                                17
(a)(1)), but the abstract of judgment incorrectly cites
section 12001, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court should correct
that mistake. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
[appellate court has the authority to correct a clerical error in an
abstract of judgment at any time]; People v. Gobert (Mar. 22,
2023, D080018) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, ___ [2023 WL 2592369, p. 7]
[same].)9

9     In his opening brief, Boullard contended the abstract of
judgment contained a second error regarding an enhancement on
his conviction for attempted murder, but in his reply brief
Boullard abandoned that argument.

                                 18
                         DISPOSITION

       The order denying Boullard’s petition under section 1172.6
is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of
judgment to state Boullard was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a felon under former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1),
now section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), and to send a corrected
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

                                              SEGAL, J.

We concur:

                  PERLUSS, P. J.

                  ESCALANTE, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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