Court Opinion

ID: 9773909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:03:18.259625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:59.017653
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BENDER, J.:
I respectfully dissent. Initially, I take issue with the Majority’s conclusion that the tip provided by the confidential informant (Cl) was sufficiently specific and adequately corroborated by Detective Sergeant Nolan’s observations. The Cl reported nothing more than could be observed by a passerby on the street, and Sergeant Nolan’s observations, made with the naked eye from almost two blocks away, offer meager corroboration. Even viewed in their totality, those factors do not establish probable cause for a war-rantless arrest, conducted on private property, without exigent circumstances. In addition, I dispute the Majority’s conclusion that the taint imposed by the war-rantless seizure of Williams’s wife’s SUV (which was patently illegal) is purged by the independent source rule. In point of fact, the conduct of the Erie Police was unlawful from the moment of Williams’s arrest and remained so throughout the warrantless seizure that followed. The officers acted illegally in removing the vehicle from the defendant’s driveway thus tainting any subsequent effort to obtain evidence from it. Consequently, the canine search on which the Majority relies remains unlawful and the evidence seized should be suppressed.
The need for judicial suppression of evidence corresponds directly to the extent to which the police run afoul of the law in obtaining it. Consequently, our analysis of questions of suppression begins with the presumption that “[wjhere a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible.” Commonwealth v. Ruey, 586 Pa. 230, 892 A.2d 802, 807 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, 608 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1992)). This constraint, which the Majority does not acknowledge, is indispensable to our disposition of the questions Williams raises.
In support of his first question, Williams asserts that the evidence police seized, *624consisting of $600 in cash and seven eight-balls of cocaine, properly should have been suppressed, as both were the products of an illegal arrest which police conducted without probable cause when he alighted from his vehicle. Brief for Appellant at 18-14. Absent some statutory provision to the contrary, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause to believe that “(1) a felony has been committed; and (2) the person to be arrested is the felon.” Commonwealth v. George, 878 A.2d 881, 884 (Pa.Super.2005). Probable cause typically exists “[w]here the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that [the offense in question] has been committed.” Id., see also Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 785 A.2d 87, 90 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gibson, 536 Pa. 123, 638 A.2d 203, 206 (1994)).
Where, as here, the arresting officer acted in reliance on information provided by an informant, probable cause depends on assessment of three factors: (1) the informant’s veracity and reliability as documented by prior experience with the police, (2) the basis of his knowledge of the events or circumstances he reported, and (3) the particularity of the information he conveyed. See Luv, 735 A.2d at 90-93 (collecting and analyzing cases). Although our Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that the tip of an “unusually reliable” informant may provide probable cause even where the basis of the informant’s knowledge is unclear, see In the Interest of O.A., 552 Pa. 666, 717 A.2d 490, 496 (1998) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)), the Court has been cautious in conferring the mantle of reliability on any informant in the absence of objective observations to substantiate the reported information. Indeed, the Court has admonished specifically that “[w]here police are acting solely on the basis of an informant’s tip and the reliability of the confidential informant is not established by objective facts, it is essential that the tip provide adequate indication that the informant has actual knowledge that criminal conduct is occurring or has occurred at the time the warrantless arrest is made.” Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The Court has directed accordingly that “[w]hen police are relying on an informant’s tip, it is important that the tip provide information that demonstrates ‘inside information[,]’ a special familiarity with the defendant’s affairs.” Id. at 496. Such information is subject to police corroboration through observation of the circumstances described in the tip, and is thereby verified as grounds for probable cause. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Whitters, 805 A.2d 602, 606 (Pa.Super.2002) (“When relying on an informant’s tip, it is crucial that the tip provides information demonstrating a special familiarity with the defendant’s affairs .... When the tip provides this inside information, police corroboration of that information imparts reliability to the tip, supporting a finding of probable cause.”). In the absence of such information, however, the tip cannot provide grounds for a probable cause determination:
If the facts that are supplied by the tip itself are no more than those easily obtained, then the fact that the police corroborated them is of no moment. It is only where the facts provide inside information, which represents] a special familiarity with a defendant’s affairs, that police corroboration of the information imparts indicia of reliability to the tip to support a finding of probable cause.
O.A., 717 A.2d at 498 (emphasis added). Such information also serves the salutary purpose of assuring that informants are not motivated, either by promises of le*625niency in pending prosecutions or, as here, by cash payments from the police, to provide speculative information culled from hearsay or casual observation of circumstances readily seen by anyone on a public street.
Upon review of the totality of the circumstances known to the Erie Police, including the tip provided by the confidential informant, I cannot find sufficient trustworthy information of a felony in progress to demonstrate probable cause. The substance of the tip, as related by Sergeant Nolan at the suppression hearing, provided only limited information:
I received a called [sic] from a confidential informant who informed me that he or she had, just in the last five minutes, or just within the last couple minutes, had [sic] seen Rosha Williams, the defendant, seated in a black Expedition with large, large rims in the BOO Block of Myrtle, and that Williams had several baggies of crack cocaine on him that he was selling.
N.T., Suppression, at 4-5. Unfortunately, this tip, although provided by an informant that Sergeant Nolan considered reliable, offers no suggestion of either the basis of the informant’s knowledge or sufficient detail to indicate a level of familiarity with Williams’s affairs. See Whitters, 805 A.2d at 606. It does not detail the circumstances by which the informant came upon the information he provided, and offers no information beyond the location and description of Williams’s vehicle, save for the allegation that Williams had “several baggies of crack cocaine on him.” Even that detail could not be corroborated, however, as when Sergeant Nolan ultimately stopped him, Williams did not have drugs on his person.
Moreover, although Sergeant Nolan attempted to corroborate the tip through observation, his recollections at the suppression hearing are completely devoid of detail — likely due to the distance from the scene at which he parked. What observations he made were further limited by the lack of ambient light, further limiting his perception, and the fact that he did not use binoculars or any other visual aid. Moreover, he saw nothing in the hands of the men who approached Williams’s vehicle and did not report seeing them take anything from their pockets. Id. at 17. He saw no money, no drugs, indeed, no exchange of any kind. Id. at 7-8, 17. Objectively, he could report only that he saw three of the four men who approached the SUV look up and down the street and saw them reach inside the vehicle. Id. at 8. He offered no objective estimate of how long their hands remained inside, merely opining that it seemed “longer than what I would believe a handshake would last.” Id. at 17. This characterization is entirely subjective, both in its assessment of how long a handshake should take and in its assumption that a handshake is the only innocent conduct in which Williams’s acquaintances could have engaged by reaching inside the SUV. Thus, the Majority’s conclusion that the Cl’s tip was corroborated by “direct observation of Appellant’s behavior in conducting three drug sales within a twenty-minute period,” Majority Op. at 617, is unfounded and incorrect. In fact, Sergeant Nolan saw almost nothing and what he did see was of little significance.
The Majority’s effort to excuse these deficiencies by citing Nolan’s past experience is equally unavailing; an officer’s experience is not a substitute for solid police work in the case then under investigation. Although our Supreme Court has indeed recognized that an officer’s experience “may be fairly regarded as a relevant factor in determining probable cause,” see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d *626928, 936 (Pa.2009), our law continues to require contemporaneous observation, see id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (1973)), not speculation about unseen handshakes or the motivations of someone “in a black Expedition with large, large rims.” Under more compelling circumstances we have declined even to find reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention. See Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.Super.2002) (concluding that “furtive” shoulder movements observed by an arresting officer through the back window of a car after officer stopped motorist for a traffic infraction did not provide reasonable suspicion for passenger’s detention).
In addition, I reject the majority’s conclusion that unspecified “complaints from other [anonymous] citizens that Appellant sold drugs from that location” substantiated that Myrtle Street was “[an area] where narcotics were sold regularly” at the time of the events in this case. Majority Op. at 616-17 (citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa.2009)). Although a verifiable determination of an area’s character as high crime may relax the constitutionally required level of scrutiny to be imposed on determinations of probable cause, imprecise characterizations based on layered hearsay offered up by untrained, anonymous observers are of no value in summoning constitutional muster.
The Majority’s analysis falls similarly short in its suggestion that “appellant’s reputation from other sources as a drug dealer on Myrtle Street supported the Cl’s tip.” Majority Op. at 617 (emphasis added). In point of fact, a defendant’s “reputation” is constitutionally irrelevant to the validity of the tip which, as discussed supra, can be verified only through demonstrated familiarity with the circumstances occurring at the time the tip is tendered. See O.A., 717 A.2d at 498. Thus, I find the inadequacy of Sergeant Nolan’s observations self-evident and the resulting stop unlawful.
As the Majority recognizes, the interaction of the Erie Police with Williams culminated in the latter’s arrest, which occurred when police placed Williams in handcuffs, confined him to the police car, and drove him to the police station. To support the arrest, however, Sergeant Nolan could point only to the discovery on Williams’s person of the money he felt in Williams’s pocket during the Terry patdown.1 The police did not seek a warrant to search the SUV at that time; nor did Sergeant Nolan discern the baggy tucked into the headliner until the vehicle was parked at the Erie police station. Consequently, the police had no objective evidence at that time of any contraband inside the vehicle. Although the officers apparently recognized that they did not have probable cause for a search of the vehicle until they verified the likely presence of illegal drugs at the police station, they failed to recognize the complete absence of probable cause to take Williams into custody. In fact, they acted on no more than a hunch based on an uncorroborated tip, a wad of cash found on Williams’s person, and tenuous “observations” by Sergeant Nolan. Even considered together, deficient as they are, these elements do not establish probable cause. Accordingly, I would find Williams’s arrest illegal and all discoveries made thereafter to be “fruit of the poisonous tree” subject to suppression.
Were the Majority to adopt such a disposition of Williams’s challenge to the legality of his arrest, I would find no occasion to consider his challenge to the warrantless removal of the SUV from his *627driveway and the resulting discovery of cocaine under the headliner. Because the Majority reaches a contrary conclusion, however, I will address that issue further. Regrettably, the Majority offers no direct recognition that the police acted illegally in removing Williams’s vehicle from the constitutionally protected space of Williams’s home. See Majority Op. at 618 (discussing Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101, 103-04 (1978)). Nevertheless, it reasons that the taint of illegality resulting from the vehicle’s removal is ameliorated by the independent source rule. I find this disposition untenable. Removal of the vehicle was flagrantly illegal and the discovery of the cocaine inside resulted directly from that illegality.
Addressing the search of a vehicle following the driver’s arrest, our Supreme Court has recognized:
It is reasonable ... for constitutional purposes, for police to seize and a hold a car until a search warrant can be obtained, where the seizure occurs after the user or owner has been placed into custody, where the vehicle is located on public property, and where there exists probable cause to believe that evidence of the commission of a crime will be obtained from the vehicle.
Holzer, 389 A.2d at 106-07. However, the Court has also acknowledged that the same actions on private property are problematic:
Where the vehicle is located on the defendant’s private property (garage or driveway), it becomes more difficult, although not impossible, to find the police conduct reasonable, since there has been a greater infringement upon defendant’s expectations of privacy.
Id. at 106 n. 7 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 n. 20, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). In accordance with the constraints imposed in Holzer, the Majority recognizes that the presence of Williams’s vehicle on private property “constitutes a significant impediment to condoning the police conduct herein.” Majority Op. at 618. Consequently, the Majority invokes the independent source rule to insulate the subsequent discovery of contraband inside the vehicle from the inevitable mandate of the exclusionary rule, which compels that the evidence be suppressed.2 Tracking the rule, the Majority concludes that “Appellant cannot obtain relief based upon the improper seizure of his vehicle because no evidence resulted from that seizure. Rather, his conviction is premised entirely upon evidence completely untainted by the police misconduct at issue herein.” Majority Op. at 621. On this issue, the Majority is simply wrong.
Contrary to the Majority’s determination, the independent source rule does not apply here for the simple reason that the seizure of the vehicle from Williams’s driveway was itself an illegal act to which the subsequent discovery of cocaine was directly attributable. The police had no more authority to seize the vehicle and remove it from the property than they had *628to search it while it remained there. Given the absence of anything on Williams’s person beyond a wad of cash, a search of any sort, including a canine sniff, could not be sustained while the SUV remained on Williams’s private property. Evidently cognizant of that, the police simply removed the vehicle from the driveway with the obvious intent of rendering the planned canine sniff and subsequent search constitutionally permissible.
I cannot conceive how so transparent an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement can be deemed lawful conduct “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of illegality and render the evidence “lawfully discovered,” see Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). Rather, the conduct of the police in removing the vehicle to defeat the warrant requirement should be recognized for what it is: an exercise in brazen illegality without which the drugs in question would never have been discovered. Sergeant Nolan saw nothing suggesting that Williams remained in possession of drugs after his arrest; the patdown revealed no contraband (contrary to the Cl’s tip) and the police could see nothing inside the vehicle while it remained in the driveway. Had the police departed Williams’s home and left the vehicle where it was, they would have been hard-pressed to search the vehicle at all, as they had no constitutionally sound basis to do so. Thus, their removal of the vehicle was not, as the Majority accepts, “so attenuated [from illegal conduct] as to dissipate the taint” of illegality, but rather, was a matter of necessity if the police ever expected to lay hands on the contraband their “hunch” told them was there. Their actions were plainly illegal and, contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, the discovery of the cocaine inside the vehicle was part and parcel of that illegality.
For the foregoing reasons, all of the evidence admitted as a result of Williams’s arrest and the seizure of his wife’s vehicle should be suppressed. Because the Majority declines this course, I must respectfully dissent.

. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

. The independent source rule operates to negate the exclusionary rule by distinguishing the manner in which the evidence in question was obtained. If the evidence was obtained through some means other than unlawful conduct of the police, it is obviously not subject to suppression on the basis of the unlawful search. Similarly, if the connection between that unlawful search and the evidence seized can be "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,” see Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), an "independent source” is established. In either event the exclusionary rule is rendered inapplicable, as exclusion of the evidence would provide no deterrent to future unlawful conduct by the police.