Court Opinion

ID: 9584206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:45:30.984061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:06.033703
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In a motion for rehearing counsel for the municipality urges this court to pass upon the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on other grounds than the specific issue that was submitted by the trial court for review, namely, sufficiency of the ante litem. Citing those cases which hold this court has the right to affirm a judgment which may be correct for any reason, it is requested we now pass upon-the plaintiff’s own negligence and the intervening negligence of a third person. In the posture of this case and the applicable law this court declines.
The record shows that on September 29, 1971, the trial judge entered an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in general terms and included therein a certificate for immediate review. Two days later the trial court withdrew the previous judgment and substituted another order limiting his ruling to the sufficiency of the ante litem notice. The trial judge goes on to say, "this order is intended to clarify the order vacated and limit the ruling of the court to the foregoing ground” and thereupon certifies that "the court deems the question of sufficient importance to warrant immediate decision by the appellate court.”
It should be noted that § 56 of the Civil Practice Act, codified as Code Ann. § 81A-156, dealing with summary judg*565ments provides in subparagraph.(h) that "an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party, shall be subject to review by appeal . . ,”1 (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of the passage of the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18 et seq.) there was no reference therein specifically to the procedure dealing with appeals on summary judgments. This was clarified by the 1968 amendatory Act (Ga. L. 1968, p. 1073) through a specific statement that "review of orders and judgments with respect to motions for summary judgment shall -be . governed by § 56 (h) as amended of the Georgia Civil Practice Act [approved March 18, 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 609), as amended.]” The summary judgment statute permits submission to this court of a specific "issue” as was done here by the trial judge. Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h).
It will be observed that an order granting summary judgment is by the terms of the statute expressly subject to review by appeal as contrasted with an order denying summary judgment which is not-subject to review by direct appeal or otherwise unless the trial judge grants the necessary certificate for review. In the light of this language contained in subparagraph (h) of Code Ann. § 81A-156 we can only interpret the substituted order of the trial judge as intended to have this court pass on the single "issue.” This is particularly true when it is recognized that no certificate for immediate review was needed for this appeal. Obviously, the trial judge wanted this court to pass upon the correctness of his ruling on the single "issue.”
Defendant municipality now -has the right reserved under these circumstances to move for a summary judgment on the additional grounds that were not considered by the trial judge in certifying to this court 'the single "issue” of the legality of the ante litem notice. See Suggs v. Brotherhood &c., 106 Ga. App. 563 (127 SE2d 827); 6 Moore, Fed. Prac*566tice (2d Ed., 1961 Supp.) § 56.14, p. 70 and § 56.08, p. 2048.
We have reviewed the cases cited in the motion for rehearing dealing with the sufficiency of the ante litem notice and adhere to our original ruling on this point.

Rehearing denied.

The editorial note in the-Annotated Code points out that subparagraph (h) is peculiar to Georgia and does not appear in the Federal Rules.