Court Opinion

ID: 9651184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:09:45.57558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:30.692249
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I would agree with the Milans that the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in admitting the portion of Miner’s videotaped deposition where Miner offered inconsistent testimony regarding the status of his driver’s license at the time of the accident. Because I believe that this was reversible error, I feel compelled to dissent.
The trial court may properly exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury. Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa.Superior Ct. 14, 473 A.2d 584 (1984). For the purposes of this rule, prejudice does not mean detrimental to a party’s case, but rather, an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. Id. Although this decision is entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion, I believe that discretion was abused here because the evidence admitted was more prejudicial than probative.
The majority justifies admission of this testimony based on its relevance to the issue of Miner’s credibility, his “character for truthfulness.” As the only witness to the accident other than Robert Milan, the majority properly attributes great importance to Miner’s version of the accident. Having proclaimed the significance of Miner’s testimony to the ultimate determination of liability in this action, the majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence concerning the status of Miner’s driver’s license *292because of its impact on the jury’s assessment of Miner’s veracity. I disagree.
Although witness credibility is always relevant, the status of Miner’s driver’s license was collateral to the crucial issue in this case. Here, the jury had to determine whether Miner caused the accident by negligently operating the vehicle. Whether Miner was properly licensed to drive at the time of the accident was information logically unrelated to this determination of causation. Emanuel v. Ketner, 440 Pa. 141, 269 A.2d 759 (1970). It is clear that DOT’S cross-examination of Miner elicited evidence in direct conflict with Miner’s prior testimony regarding his driver’s license; however, this matter had nothing to do with how the accident happened and could only serve to mislead the jury.
The prejudicial character of this evidence is particularly apparent here, where the negative impact of the evidence and the likelihood that its admission would confuse the jury was intensified by the trial court’s charge to the jury that Miner’s failure to have a valid driver’s license was negligence as a matter of law.1 Linked with this jury instruction, admission of evidence that Miner lacked a valid driver’s license could have led the jury to reach its decision based on something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.
Potentially misleading evidence may be admitted if it is sufficiently probative or important to the case to warrant the risk. Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 499 Pa. 597, 454 A.2d 547 (1982). However, I believe that the probative value of this evidence was minimal compared to its potential for prejudice. Extensive, legitimate evidence of Miner’s negligence, which is the relevant issue here, existed in the numerous admissions resulting from Miner’s failure to respond to DOT’s complaint to join. These admissions, twice repeated during the course of the trial, were introduced to the jury as binding and conclusive with regard to Miner’s actions during the accident. Thus, in *293contrast to the opinion of the majority, I can discern no pressing need to have supplied the jury with Miner’s inconsistent testimony on a collateral matter, ostensibly to enable it to assess Miner’s credibility with regard to his version of the accident, where the jury had an abundance of incontestable evidence on which to base a determination of liability.
Because the evidence regarding the status of Miner’s driver’s license was more prejudicial than probative in this case, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. I would reverse on those grounds.

. The fact that the trial court later revised its instructions to state that driving without a valid driver's license did not constitute negligence as a matter of law but instead was to be deemed evidence of Miner’s negligence, does not alter my opinion regarding the impropriety of this matter.