Court Opinion

ID: 9916770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:08:18.534618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:58.589666
License: Public Domain

No. 18              January 10, 2024                  149

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               ARTHUR LLOYD COWAN,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Coos County Circuit Court
                 21CR42118; A178003

  Andrew E. Combs, Judge.
  Submitted September 18, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Alex Jones, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
150                                                    State v. Cowan

          ORTEGA, P. J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment, based on his con-
ditional guilty plea, for criminal driving while suspended
or revoked, ORS 811.182. He challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop,
maintaining in a single assignment of error that the police
did not have probable cause for the stop. We conclude that
the evidence supports a conclusion that the registration
plate for defendant’s truck was in violation of ORS 803.550,
which in turn supports the trial court’s conclusion that there
was probable cause to stop defendant for a traffic violation.1
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress, and we affirm its judgment.
          We review for legal error a trial court’s denial of
a motion to suppress. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d
421 (1993); see also State v. Husk, 288 Or App 737, 739, 407
P3d 932, rev den, 362 Or 665 (2018) (establishing that in
conducting such review, we determine “[w]hether the facts
establish[ed] probable cause to stop [the defendant] for a
traffic violation”). In making that assessment, we are bound
by the trial court’s findings of fact if there is sufficient evi-
dence in the record to support them. Ehly, 317 Or at 75. If
the trial court did not make express findings of fact on all
pertinent issues, we “presume that the facts were decided in
a manner consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion.”
Id. Based on those standards, we state the facts consistently
with the trial court’s factual findings.
         Trooper Carnahan “followed behind” the truck
driven by defendant and, unable to read the truck’s rear
registration plate, decided to stop defendant for a traffic
violation. Once defendant was stopped, Carnahan learned
that defendant’s driving privileges were suspended due to a
prior DUII conviction, and he arrested defendant. The state
indicted defendant with one count of criminal driving while
suspended or revoked, ORS 811.182, based on the allegation
that he “unlawfully and feloniously dr[o]ve a motor vehicle
upon a highway or premises open to the public, during a
    1
      Although the term “license plate” is more commonly used, ORS 803.550
refers to “registration plate” and we conform to that usage.
Cite as 330 Or App 149 (2024)                                              151

period when defendant’s driving privileges * * * were revoked
in [the] state.”2
         Defendant moved to suppress all evidence derived
from that traffic stop. In his memorandum supporting the
motion, he argued that Carnahan lacked probable cause
to believe that he had violated the law thereby rendering
the stop in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.3 He contended that because his truck’s reg-
istration plate was displayed in the required location and
there was nothing blocking or obstructing view of the plate,
he “did not fail to display registration plates” as required
by ORS 503.540 and that, accordingly, Carnahan lacked
the required objective basis to believe it more likely than
not that he had committed an offense. See ORS 131.005(11)
(establishing the probable cause standard as requiring
such a basis). Alternatively, defendant argued that even if
Carnahan had probable cause to stop him, that probable
cause dissipated once Carnahan approached the truck and
was able to read the registration plate, all of which occurred
before he learned that defendant was prohibited from driv-
ing due to his felony status.
          At the suppression hearing, the state offered into
evidence footage of the incident recorded by Carnahan’s
body camera and evidence that defendant’s driving privi-
leges had been revoked. Carnahan testified that, as part of
his law enforcement training, he was familiar with Oregon
traffic statutes regarding display of registration plates. He
recounted that he drove four to six feet behind defendant’s
truck during “complete daylight” for “under a minute” and
was close enough to see the registration plate, but he could
not read it despite trying “several times.” Carnahan pulled
behind defendant’s truck when defendant stopped at a gas
station, “walked up [and] looked” at the rear registration
plate, but still was unable to read the plate because it was

    2
      A person who is found driving while their driving privileges have been sus-
pended or revoked as a result of “a conviction for felony driving while under the
influence of intoxicants” is subject to a charge of felony criminal driving while
suspended or revoked. ORS 811.182(3).
    3
      A person has the right to “be secure * * * against unreasonable search or
seizure * * *.” Or Const, Art I, § 9.
152                                                    State v. Cowan

a “very old” and “worn-out plate.”4 He approached defen-
dant, advised him of his rights, and asked for his driver’s
license and the truck’s plate number. Defendant indicated
that he did not know the number for the registration plate,
handed Carnahan an Oregon identification card, and, when
asked, confirmed that his driving privileges had been “sus-
pended.” Carnahan walked to the front of defendant’s truck
and ascertained the plate number by looking at the front
registration plate, which was readable. Carnahan entered
the information into his computer and “received a readout
* * * that [defendant’s] driving status was suspended at the
felony level.” Carnahan then arrested defendant.
         The state argued that Carnahan had probable
cause for violations of both ORS 803.540 and ORS 803.550
(concerning “illegal alteration or illegal display of a registra-
tion plate”), based on the evidence that the registration on
defendant’s truck was illegally altered so as to be unread-
able. Defendant remonstrated that the state had not proved
that he had knowingly modified the registration plate as
provided in ORS 803.550 and renewed his argument that
there was nothing wrong with the way the plate was dis-
played. Generally, he maintained that the state had not met
its burden to show that Carnahan had probable cause to
stop or arrest defendant under either statute and asked the
court to grant his motion to suppress.
         The court concluded that Carnahan had probable
cause to stop and investigate defendant for a traffic violation
and denied defendant’s motion. It found that Carnahan’s tes-
timony was credible, including the testimony that he could
not read the registration plate on the back of defendant’s
truck even at a distance of six feet. According to the court,
Carnahan’s inability to read the registration plate during
daylight at such close proximity gave him probable cause to
stop defendant for a violation of ORS 803.540. The court fur-
ther found that the fact that defendant provided an Oregon
identification card instead of a driver’s license, indicating
that defendant did not have a valid driver’s license, prompted
Carnahan to ask about defendant’s driving status, based on
    4
      Before contacting defendant, Carnahan called dispatch and provided
a number that, according to him, was a guess of what he thought defendant’s
license plate was.
Cite as 330 Or App 149 (2024)                                                    153

probable cause that his driver’s license was suspended. The
court was silent as to whether probable cause also existed
for a violation of ORS 803.550.
        After the court’s ruling on his motion to suppress,
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his
right to challenge that ruling under ORS 135.335. On
appeal, he renews his argument that neither ORS 803.540
nor ORS 803.550 supports a conclusion that Carnahan had
probable cause to stop him under the circumstances. We are
unpersuaded.
        The question is whether Carnahan had probable
cause to believe that defendant had violated either ORS
803.540 or ORS 803.550.5 That requires us to engage in
our usual mode of statutory analysis, first considering the
text and context of the statute at issue, and then examin-
ing any legislative history—if that “appears useful” to our
analysis—to discern what the legislature intended. State
v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Here,
even assuming without deciding that ORS 803.540 does not
support the state’s probable cause argument, we conclude,
based on statutory analysis of ORS 803.550, that Carnahan
had probable cause to stop defendant for a violation of ORS
803.550 on this record.
        The relevant part of ORS 803.550 provides:
        “(1) A person commits the offense of illegal alteration
    or illegal display of a registration plate if the person know-
    ingly does any of the following:
            “(a) Illegally alters a registration plate in a man-
    ner described in subsection (2) of this section.
              “* * * * *
            “(c) Operates any vehicle that is displaying a
    registration plate that is illegally altered in a manner

     5
       Although the trial court did not address ORS 803.550, the court’s silence
does not affect our review, as both parties presented arguments under both stat-
utes below. We, therefore, will affirm the trial court’s ultimate conclusion—that
Carnahan had probable cause to stop defendant—if either statute supports that
conclusion. See State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 295, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (“When a trial
court makes a ruling, we [may] affirm that ruling on appeal, even if the trial court’s
legal reasoning for the ruling was erroneous, if another legally correct reason and,
to the extent necessary, the record developed in the trial court support the ruling.”).
154                                                 State v. Cowan

   described in subsection (2) of this section or that is illegally
   displayed as described in subsection (3) of this section.
           “* * * * *
            “(2) A registration plate is illegally altered for
   purposes of this section if the plate has been altered, mod-
   ified, covered or obscured in any manner including, but not
   limited to, the following:
            “(a) Any change of the color, configuration, num-
   bers, letters or material of the plate.”
ORS 803.550(1), (2) (emphases added).
        Defendant argues that illegal alteration or display
under ORS 803.550(2) applies only to situations in which
a person has “illegally altered” a plate, rather than to sit-
uations where the plate is difficult to read due to age and
weather. He contends that, although the use of the passive
voice in ORS 803.550(2) creates some ambiguity, the text
and context of the statute suggest that the illegal alteration
must be performed by a person. We disagree.
         We begin with the text and context of ORS
803.550(2). Gaines, 346 Or at 171. First, we observe that the
text of ORS 803.550(2) plainly states that there is a violation
whenever a registration plate has been “altered, modified,
covered or obscured in any manner,” not limited to when
those actions are performed by a person. In context, ORS
803.550(1)(a) prohibits a person from illegally altering a
plate, while ORS 803.550(1)(c) prohibits a person from oper-
ating a vehicle with a plate that is illegally altered. ORS
803.550(1)(c) and (2) combined support a conclusion that a
person who knowingly operates a vehicle with a registration
plate that has been altered “in any manner” is in violation
of the statute. ORS 803.550(2) focuses on “a person” who
“knowingly” operates a vehicle that displays a registration
plate that has been altered, not on who or what has done the
altering.
         Second, as the state argues, the evident purpose of
ORS 803.550 is to ensure that registration plates serve their
proper function by requiring that they be easily readable
and by authorizing higher penalties for drivers who know-
ingly display plates that have been altered in any manner,
Cite as 330 Or App 149 (2024)                               155

regardless of who or what caused the alteration. See State v.
Ankeny, 306 Or App 300, 308, 474 P3d 406 (2020) (indicating
that the purpose of “registration plates [is to] provide evi-
dence of authorization to drive on Oregon roads”). That pur-
pose is served by focusing the responsibility on the driver to
ensure that the plate has not been altered “in any manner,”
whether by a person or by natural causes. ORS 803.550(2).
         We turn to the second part of the statutory
analysis—that is, the legislative history. Gaines, 346 Or at
172. Defendant has provided us no legislative history that
would contradict our conclusion that the text and context
of ORS 803.550(2) indicates that the legislature intended
that statute to apply to the type of circumstances at issue
here. Thus, we do not consider it. See id. (noting flexibility in
court’s consideration of legislative history).
          The evidence here establishes that Carnahan had
probable cause to stop defendant for a violation of ORS
803.550. Probable cause exists when “there is a substantial
objective basis for believing that more likely than not an
offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has
committed it.” ORS 131.005(11); see also State v. Hayes, 99
Or App 322, 325, 781 P2d 1251 (1989) (“When determining
whether there is a substantial objective basis, the totality of
the * * * circumstances is considered” and “the officer must
have a subjective belief, along with an objective basis that
the [defendant] has committed an offense.”).
         Here, because defendant was driving a truck with
a registration plate that had been altered by becoming so
“worn out” that Carnahan could not read it despite several
attempts at close range, Carnahan had “a substantial objec-
tive basis for believing that more likely than not” defendant
had violated ORS 803.550. See ORS 803.550(2)(a) (providing
that “[a]ny change of the color, configuration, numbers, let-
ters” suffices). Accordingly, Carnahan had probable cause
to stop defendant, and the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress.
         Affirmed.