Court Opinion

ID: 9577234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:18.12891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:12.733395
License: Public Domain

Baker, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I cannot concur in the majority opinion.
It appears to me that to affirm the judgment in this case will be in direct conflict with the case of Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., et al., 194 S. C. 494, 10 S. E. (2d) 17, and the long line of cases therein cited, the soundness of which decisions cannot be questioned.
While the prevailing opinion sets out paragraph 7 of the complaint which contains specifically the acts of negligence, willfullness and wantonness on the part of the corporate defendant, and of its engineer in charge of the operation of its engine (locomotive) at the time of the accident, the sole co-defendant, of which the plaintiff-respondent complains, and which acts of alleged negligence, willfullness and wantonness are separated as between the corporate defendant and the engineer as its servant, yet I think that other portions of the complaint, paragraphs 3, 6 and 8, should, also and along with paragraph 7, be set out for contextural and other reasons hereinafter appearing. We quote said paragraphs of the plaintiff-respondent’s complaint:
“3. That upon information and belief, the defendant, Harry McNeer, is a resident of the County of Charleston, said State, and is employed by his co-defendant as a locomotive engineer and was operating the locomotive engine of his co-defendant at the time and place hereinafter mentioned.” (Emphasis added.)
“6. That on information and belief, on September 4, 1948, plaintiff’s intestate was riding as an invited quest in the automobile owned and operated at the time by Ernest Brunson, *498and as the said automobile was in the act of crossing the intersection, having approached the same from the West, plaintiff’s intestate and the car in which he was riding was struck by one of the engines of the corporate defendant traveling in a northerly direction and being operated at a high and dangerous and unlawful rate of speed by the engineer in charge thereof without sounding the bell or blowing the whistle, as required by law to be done in such cases, and without keeping a proper lookout for motorists using the said public road and crossing. Plaintiff’s intestate was struck and his body was so injured and mangled that he died from the injuries shortly thereafter; that remnants of his body and of the automobile in which he was riding were scattered and strewn along the said right-of-way of the defendant railway company for a distance of between three-fourths of a mile and one mile North of the scene of impact.
“7. That without limiting the generality of the foregoing allegations of negligence, willfullness and wantonness, plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that her intestate’s death was proximately caused by the defendants in the following particulars:
“(a) In failing to maintain the said crossing in a safe and usable condition in that the iron rails were allowed to project above the level of the ground as hereinabove referred to:
“(b) In failing to place signs on the road immediately adjacent to the crossing with the words ‘RAILROAD CROSSING’ printed thereon in large letters as required by the statute law of the State.

“The delicts alleged in (a) and (b) are delicts directly chargeable to the corporate defendant, Southern Railway Company;

“(c) In failing to sound the bell or blow the whistle as the train approached the said crossing;
“(d) In failing to keep the proper lookout for persons using the same;
“(e) In operating, and permitting the said engine to be operated, at a high and dangerous rate of speed — so great that the train was run for a distance of more than three-*499quarters of a mile after it struck the automobile in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding;
“(f) In failing to have lights on the said engine at the time and place as the collision occurred late one evening and the weather was cloudy and visibility was so bad that ordinary prudence and care required that lights on the train be turned on.
“8. That the acts of negligence, willfullness and wantonness herein alleged as having been committed by the corporate defendant and the defendant engineer combined and concurred to proximately cause the death of plaintiff's intestate, and plaintiff alleges that she is now entitled to recover of the said defendants on account of said wrongful death the sum of * * (Emphasis added.)
The only specification of negligence submitted to the jury was “(d) In failing to keep the proper lookout for persons using the same (the crossing).”
The complaint in this action may be gone over with a fine tooth comb, but nowhere therein will it be found that any servant or agent of the corporate defendant was charged with failing to keep a proper lookout for persons using the crossing at which plaintiff-respondent’s intestate met his death other than the engineer who was controlling the movement of the locomotive engine at the time, and who, as aforesaid, was joined in the action as a co-defendant. In fact, if there can be any doubt as to whether the other paragraphs of the complaint confined the delict complained of and submitted to the jury, to the engineer, such doubt is dispelled by paragraph 8 of the complaint, which limits the reliance of the respondent on the delict of any servant or agent of the corporate defendant, under the doctrine of respondent superior, for a recovery against the corporate defendant, to the engineer.
The jury, by its verdict, having absolved the co-defendant engineer of any negligent act, the appellant corporate defendant was clearly entitled to have a verdict directed in its favor non obstante on its motion seasonably made.
OxnER, J., concurs.