Court Opinion

ID: 9694995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:03:30.628333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.530556
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). There are two related problems with this case. The first has to do with an evolving consensus among court of appeals publication committee members that the court of appeals is powerless to overrule its erroneous decisions. The second problem is the effect that this consensus has on appellate decisionmaking. This case is an example of that effect.
Until recently, when the court of appeals concluded that a prior case had been wrongly decided, the incorrect portion of the opinion in that case was overruled or withdrawn. See Kimpton v. School Dist. of New Lisbon, 138 Wis. 2d 226, 234 n.4, 405 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.4 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Dunn, 117 Wis. 2d 487, 492, 345 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). Of course, we have always used the doctrine of stare decisis to explain our decisions. We have recognized that sec. 752.41(2), Stats, (officially published opinions of the court of appeals have statewide precedential effect), embodies the concepts of precedent and authority. In re C.J., 120 Wis. 2d 355, 358 n.3, 354 N.W.2d 219, 221 n.3 (Ct. App. 1984). That concept was repeated by the supreme court several months before the court of appeals became operational on August 1, 1978, in In re Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 82 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149, 149-50 (1978). The court said: "The published decision of any one of the panels has binding effect on all panels of the Court.” Id.
*590Until recently, we had not held that stare decisis, or the concepts of precedent and authority, had anything other than their usual meanings. These concepts have always recognized that case law is not written in stone, and that occasionally, under limited conditions, courts find it necessary to overrule outmoded or erroneous holdings.
Rule 809.23(2), Stats., provides for a publication committee of the court of appeals. That committee determines whether a court of appeals opinion will be published. Recently, the committee began to question the authority of the court of appeals to overrule itself, and ultimately concluded that we could not do so. A case in which that occurred would not be published, and therefore, pursuant to Rule 809.23(3), Stats., could not be cited as authority. Subsequently, in Ranft v. Lyons, 163 Wis. 2d 282, 299-300 n.7, 471 N.W.2d 254, 260-61 n.7 (Ct. App. 1991), we concluded that although we had previously erred, we were required to follow the erroneous opinion.
Two reasons for our conclusion existed. First, the language of In re Court of Appeals, 82 Wis. 2d at 371, 263 N.W.2d at 149-50, and secondly, a concern that the power to overrule would be abused, leading to a situation where the precedential effect of an opinion would last only until the issue arose before another panel.
I do not believe that either reason necessarily leads to our conclusion. In re Court of Appeals was written at a time when the nature of the yet-to-be court was undecided. Whether the four districts would follow the federal system, with the supreme court settling conflicts among the districts, was a matter then being discussed among the bar, and in the ongoing campaigns to elect the first court of appeals judges. The answer to this question would implement the statewide development of *591the law, a primary purpose of the supreme court. State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665, 307 N.W.2d 200, 216 (1981). In re Court of Appeals answered that question, and several others, so that planning for the new court could be done in time for its August 1, 1978 starting date. It is in this context that the supreme court noted that a published decision of any court of appeals panel has binding effect on all panels, a concept also found in sec. 752.41(2), Stats. In that context, it is not a necessary conclusion that a court of appeals panel does not have the power to overrule the precedent found in a previously published opinion.
Nor do I think that overruling erroneous past precedent would become everyday fare for the court of appeals. During the time that the court considered that it could correct its own errors, it did so, but on a very limited basis. See State v. Marty, 137 Wis. 2d 352, 362-63 n.1, 404 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 n.1 (Ct. App. 1987) (previous court of appeals opinion overruled due to conflict with later United States Supreme Court opinion). In Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 431-32, 147 N.W.2d 633, 645 (1967), the court explained the reluctance with which courts depart from the rule of stare decisis. Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 238 n.12, 321 N.W.2d 182, 190 n.12 (1982), compiled several cases which noted that change was possible within that rule. More recently, the Supreme Court has discussed the nature of the doctrine of stare decisis. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. —, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699-709 (1992), a plurality of the Court extensively examined the doctrine and concluded that a prior case would not be overruled. Though Casey's adherence to precedent was the result of factors not present in court of appeals cases, the *592principle that stare decisis is a substantial disincentive to change is applicable to any court.
The responses of panels to a perceived inability to overrule erroneous past precedent have been varied. In Ranft, 163 Wis. 2d at 299-300 n.7, 471 N.W.2d at 260-61 n.7, we concluded that we must perpetuate past errors. Another response has been to artificially limit the erroneous holding. "This rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars." K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 66-69 (1960), reprinted in R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 820 (1976). An example of this response is In re L.S.G., 170 Wis. 2d 231, 237-38, 487 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 1992). In L.S.G., we distinguished the holding in a prior case because the issue of paternity was raised in a divorce case rather than a paternity case. Another response is to acknowledge the existence of prior cases, but not follow their holdings. This case is an example of that response. I am not comfortable with any of these responses.
Using this case as an example, it is first necessary to determine why the majority concluded that sec. 895.52, Stats., is inapplicable to these facts. The majority's reasoning is found in one sentence: "Because his mother was not engaged in a recreational activity, neither was David." Majority op. at 580. It is undisputed that David's mother and Walter Hadden were both at the pond. Therefore, the mother's intent is the sole reason why the majority concluded that David was not engaging in a recreational activity.
But in Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 802, 469 N.W.2d 214, 216-17 (Ct. App. 1991), we also faced the problem of a very young child injured while accompanying another. In Nelson, Jowe Nelson, twenty-one months old, accompanied Jan Schreiner to a campground, where Jowe was burned in a campfire. *593Schreiner is described as Jowe's "putative" father, but the briefs in Nelson make clear that Schreiner's only relationship to the child was a previous relationship with the child's mother. Jowe's guardian ad litem argued that because Jowe could not form the intent to engage in recreational activity, sec. 895.52(2)(a), Stats., did not apply to her. We held otherwise, concluding that the nature of the activity controlled.
Nelson was not the first case to consider the appropriate test to determine whether an injured person was engaged in a recreational activity. In Silingo v. Village of Mukwonago, 156 Wis. 2d 536, 544, 458 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1990), we concluded that the goal of sec. 895.52, Stats., was not served by making the test for "recreational activity" subjective. We said:
Instead, we adopt an objective test which requires that all social and economic aspects of the activity be examined. Relevant considerations on this question include, without limitation, the intrinsic nature of the activity, the type of service or commodity offered to the public, and the activity's purpose and consequence. While this approach does not preclude consideration of the user's subjective assessment of the activity, such assessment is not controlling.
Id. at 544, 458 N.W.2d at 382-83 (emphasis in original).
Thus in Nelson, we followed Silingo, noting: "Actions whose intrinsic nature are recreational and are conducted at a public facility or service dedicated to exercise, relaxation or pleasure may be recreational activities without further proof of the actor's mental purpose." 161 Wis. 2d at 802, 469 N.W.2d at 216-17. We concluded: "[Jowe] accompanied her putative father, whose avowed purpose was camping and other *594recreation. The intrinsic nature of the child's playful activities and the recreational nature of the camp facility objectively and irrefutably suggest conduct within the contemplation of the statute." Id. at 803, 469 N.W.2d at 217. The intent of Jowe's mother played no part in our opinion.
The issue is not, as the majority asserts, whether a person was carried to a recreational activity against his or her express will. In Nelson, we observed: "If young children are excluded from the limit of owners' liability because they cannot form the mental intent to engage in recreation, the statute is rendered largely ineffective." Id. at 802, 469 N.W.2d at 216. The majority, by focusing on the subjective intent of a parent, has avoided the real issue — whether sec. 895.52, Stats., immunizes the city of Janesville.
What the majority fails to acknowledge is that the child's relationship to the adult accompanying the child is not significant. In Nelson, the adult had no relationship to the child. The activity (camping) was the controlling factor. Here, the activity, observing a fishing hole, is recreational. That factor is what the legislature focused on when it stated its intent: "[T]he legislature intends that, where substantially similar circumstances or activities exist, this legislation should be liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability." Section 1, 1983 Wis. Act 418 (emphasis added).
Because the majority does not overtly overrule or withdraw the language from Nelson and Silingo, the conclusion reached by the publication committee, exemplified in Ranft, 163 Wis. 2d at 299-300 n.7, 471 N.W.2d at 260-61 n.7, is not violated. But the holdings of Nelson and Silingo are effectively overruled because the only relevant fact now is the subjective intent of the *595child's parent. The majority has taken a factor, which we have clearly held to be non-controlling in Silingo and which was irrelevant in Nelson, and elevated it to a controlling factor. We now have a rule that when a child is injured while accompanying several persons, the subjective intent of the child's parent determines whether the child was engaging in a recreational activity. When, as often happens, a child accompanies two parents, the majority's holding suggests that the subjective intent of the less enthusiastic parent controls. One cannot reach that conclusion by following Nelson and Silingo.
When we distinguish cases based upon irrelevant factors, or ignore indistinguishable precedent, we foster uncertainty in the law and make it difficult for attorneys to give definitive advice to their clients. This encourages litigation, which may result in more opinions which further unsettle the law. If clarifying the law is progress, we may be heading backwards. I conclude that our recent perceived inability to correct erroneous past precedent is ill-advised.
There is another reason I dissent. The cases discussing sec. 895.52, Stats., generally recognize that the legislature has adopted an emphatic position of landowner immunity when injury occurs while a person is engaging in recreational activity. That position is found in a message to Wisconsin judges included in the preface to 1983 Wis. Act 418, the bill which enacted sec. 895.52. It reads:
The legislature intends by this act to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit. While it is not possible to specify in a statute every activity *596which might constitute a recreational activity, this act provides examples of the kinds of activities that are meant to be included, and the legislature intends that, where substantially similar circumstances or activities exist, this legislation should be liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability. The act is intended to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme court decisions interpreting section 29.68 of the statutes if the decision is more restrictive than or inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
The majority has ignored the legislature's message and the decisions of this court which interpret sec. 895.52, Stats. The cases in which we have followed this statement of legislative intent are: Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, 170 Wis. 2d 77, 487 N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1992); Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 469 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1991); Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. City of Darlington, 160 Wis. 2d 418, 466 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1991); Kostroski v. County of Marathon, 158 Wis. 2d 201, 462 N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1990); Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 Wis. 2d 790, 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990); Kruschke v. City of New Richmond, 157 Wis. 2d 167, 458 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1990); Moua v. Northern States Power Co., 157 Wis. 2d 177, 458 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1990); Silingo v. Village of Mukwonago, 156 Wis. 2d 536, 458 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990); Sauer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 448 N.W.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1989); Taylor v. City of Appleton, 147 Wis. 2d 644, 433 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1988); and Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1988). On only three occasions have we concluded that immunity does not exist. See Mooney v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 164 Wis. *5972d 516, 476 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1991); Lee v. Elk Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 103, 473 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1991); Douglas v. Dewey, 154 Wis. 2d 451, 453 N.W.2d 500 (Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court in this case construed sec. 895.52, Stats., liberally in favor of property owners, as the legislature required it to do. Were I writing for the majority, I would affirm.