Court Opinion

ID: 9482182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:42:45.429306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:49.146530
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I disagree with the majority’s dictum that if Indiana Code § ll-10-l-7(a) were “the only source of authority to segregate inmates, they would have a liberty inter-est_” Maj.Op. at 1252.1 Indiana Code § ll-10-l-7(a) states that “[a]n offender may be involuntarily segregated from the general population of a facility or program if the department first finds that segregation is necessary for the offender’s own physical safety or the physical safety of others.” I would rule that this language fails to create a protected liberty interest, as it does not provide specific direction to the decisionmaker that if certain substantive predicates exist, a specified outcome must follow; in short, the statute does not contain the “explicit mandatory language” the Supreme Court deems necessary to create a liberty interest.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated the prerequisites for finding a state-created liberty interest:
“We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our earlier decisions, that the regulations contain ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. [460,] 471-472, 103 S.Ct. [864,] 871-72.... In sum, the use of ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ in connection with the establishment of ‘specific substantive predicates’ to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871.”
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). The majority disdains the requirement of “explicitly mandatory language,” describing it as dicta, and criticizes prior decisions of this Court that applied the Supreme Court’s criteria. See Maj.Op. at 1252-53. The majority admonishes that “[w]e must not be mesmerized by judicial language taken out of context and hardened into formula.” It then misinterprets Thompson, thus undermining the Supreme Court's emphasis on “explicitly mandatory language”: “the Supreme Court defined ‘explicitly mandatory language’ to mean ‘specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow,’ and gave as an example of such a directive ‘administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates.’ ” Maj.Op. at 1253. The majority, for obvious reasons, quotes only a part of the sentence (and thus only a portion of the reasoning), which states: “The regulations at issue in Hewitt mandated that certain procedures be followed, and ‘that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates.’ ” Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the language quoted from Hewitt, read in context, makes clear that it was the mandatory nature of the procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations *1256in combination with the substantive predicates that created the liberty interest:
“[I]n this case [Pennsylvania] has gone beyond simple procedural guidelines. It has used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed, see n. 6 supra, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates— vis., ‘the need for control,’ or ‘the threat of a serious disturbance.’ Petitioners argue, with considerable force, that these terms must be read in light of the fact that the decision whether to confine an inmate to administrative segregation is largely predictive, and therefore that it is not likely that the State meant to create binding requirements. But on balance we are persuaded that the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.”
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that the liberty interest in Hewitt emanated from the “language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed” combined with the factor “that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates” rather than merely from the substantive predicates.2 If substantive predicates without a specified outcome constituted “explicitly mandatory language,” as the majority states, all that is necessary to create a protected liberty interest in a similar factual situation is specific substantive predicates that are (1) binding,3 (2) exhaustive, and (3) definite, as the majority posits. See Maj.Op. at 1252. But it is clear that the Supreme Court requires more: “In sum, the use of ‘explicitly mandatory language,' in connection with the establishment of ‘specific substantive predicates’ to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest.” Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 (emphasis added).
Indiana Code § 11-10-1-7 clearly contains “specific substantive predicates” to guide the decisionmaker as to whether an inmate should be placed in administrative segregation: “An offender may be involuntarily segregated from the general population of a facility or program if the department first finds that segregation is necessary for the offender’s own physical safety or the physical safety of others.” Ind.Code ll-10-l-7(a). The substantive predicates are (1) “the offender’s own physical safety” and (2) “the physical safety of others.” But as in Thompson, the statute “lack[s] the requisite relevant mandatory language.” Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1910. Contrary to the assertion of the majority {see Maj.Op. at 1252-53), it certainly does make a difference that the Indiana statute fails to use “explicitly mandatory language.” As the Supreme Court noted in Thompson, “our method of inquiry in these cases always has been to examine closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations.” Id. at 1909. While the majority has found a protected liberty interest in implicit language, the Supreme Court has clearly “articulated a requirement ... that the regulations contain ‘explicitly mandatory language.’ ” Id. at 1910 (emphasis added). As well-established precedent in this Court demonstrates, placing a protected liberty interest in “grammatical categories,” such as the “explicitly mandatory language” the Supreme Court requires, enables a court to determine with confidence whether a protected liberty interest has been created. See Castaneda v. Henman, 914 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.1990); Russ v. Young, 895 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir.1990); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1144 (7th Cir.1988); see also Wallace v. Robinson, *1257940 F.2d at 246-47. By finding a protected liberty interest through implied language, the majority introduces confusion into the analysis that can only serve to create chaos and uncertainty in our respective courts and legislative bodies as to when and under what circumstances state statutes and regulations have created such interests.
The majority adds further disorder to the question of a creation of protected liberty interests through quoting the Supreme Court’s definition of “explicitly mandatory language” — “specific directives to the deci-sionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow” — and even stating a formula consistent with that definition: “if X (the substantive predicate), then Y (the specified outcome, from which the enforcement officials are not free to depart).’’ Maj.Op. at 1253 (emphasis added). But the majority states that “[i]t ... makes no difference ... that the statute does not require but only permits segregation....” Maj.Op. at 1252-53 (emphasis original). If a statute is mandatory when it “does not require but only permits segregation,” how can it also comply with the Supreme Court mandated “specified outcome, from which the enforcement officials are not free to depart”? The majority’s latter statement follows the Supreme Court’s directive that “if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest. ” Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 (emphasis added). For reasons unknown the majority has failed to accept the Supreme Court’s standard, for Indiana Code § 11-10-1-7 fails to mandate a particular outcome from the substantive predicates. The statute does allow prison authorities to involuntarily segregate an inmate — “[a]n offender may be involuntarily segregated” — but it falls short of meeting the Supreme Court’s requirement in Thompson that “a particular outcome must follow” if officials believe “that segregation is necessary for the offender’s own physical safety or the physical safety of others.”4 I disagree with the majority’s statement that “[i]t ... makes no difference ... that the statute does not require but only permits segregation — most statutes leave discretion to the persons charged with its enforcement rather than commanding them to enforce the statute to the hilt_” Maj.Op. at 1252-53 (emphasis original). I do agree that “most statutes leave discretion to the persons charged with ... enforcement,” and that is the precise problem with the majority’s opinion — most statutes do not create protected liberty interests. But the majority’s approach would open Pandora’s box and create a flood of litigation to make it easier for the social engineers of the prison system to manipulate our penal system through making it possible to find a protected liberty interest in any statute that contains substantive predicates (without a mandatory outcome) that guide decision-makers in their administration of prison life. It is particularly inappropriate to expand the protected liberty interest doctrine to statutes that not only provide prison officials discretion in whether to act, but allow the prison authorities to exercise that discretion on the basis of their subjective beliefs. In Indiana, it is immaterial whether conditions exist to make segregation necessary, for the Indiana administrative segregation statute is without objective criteria for the determination thereof; prison officials need only believe, in their *1258subjective opinion, that conditions exist in which the prisoner’s physical safety or that of others is at risk.
I agree that the judgment of the district court dismissing the plaintiffs suit should be affirmed, but I am convinced that it is unnecessary to journey into that wide abyss of due process law through judicially creating a liberty interest of this type out of whole cloth. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“the problems that arise in the day-today operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. ‘Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’ We further observe that, on occasion, prison administrators may be ‘experts’ only by Act of Congress or of a state legislature. But judicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial. ”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878-79, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 578 (7th Cir.1985) (federal courts should defer to the Executive Branch). While we are dealing with a statute here rather than prison regulations, as in Wolfish, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Supreme Court has revealed its reasoning in clear and unambiguous language that federal courts should defer to the judgment of the legislative bodies and prison authorities who are responsible for the day-to-day administration of prison facilities in most cases. Since the Indiana statute does not include the “explicitly mandatory language” the Supreme Court required in both Hewitt v. Helms and Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, I would affirm the district court and hold that Indiana Code § 11-10-1-7 does not create a liberty interest.

. Since Indiana Code § ll-10-l-7(a) is not‘‘the only source of authority to segregate inmates," the majority’s entire discussion of it appears to be dictum.

. Mandatory procedures standing alone are likewise inadequate to create a protected liberty interest. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471, 103 S.Ct. at 871; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-51, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747-48, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983).

. The fact that a statute is binding, and failure to follow it is a violation of state law, fails to create a liberty interest: "Violations of state law do not automatically offend against the Constitution too.” Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 248 (7th Cir.1991).

. I recognize that in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-91, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1260-62, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), the Supreme Court found a protected liberty interest in a statute that merely allowed (without a mandate) prison authorities to transfer an inmate to a mental hospital if a designated physician found that the prisoner was suffering from a mental disease or defect that could not be treated properly in prison. It is significant that the Court also found that such a transfer, even without a statute allowing it, required due process. Since subsequent cases have focused on mandatory language and a specified outcome, I question whether the Court would find a protected liberty interest in a similar statute involving a lesser curtailment of liberty. Thus, while Thompson does not state that it is overruling Vitek, Vitek fails to negate the requirement more recently stated in Thompson that in order to create a protected liberty interest, a statue must dictate that "a particular outcome must follow.” Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1910.