Court Opinion

ID: 9862783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:10:34.434817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:33:02.452803
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion’s failure to reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death.
I would sustain appellant’s second point of error, that “the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the extraneous of-feñse of aggravated kidnapping to show appellant’s motive to avoid apprehension by police.” I would further find that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death.
The record reflects that the jury convicted Randall Wayne Hafdahl, aka Jack Douglas Cone, aka Robert Eugene Moore, aka Blue Eyes, henceforth appellant, of committing the murder of James Delbert Mitchell, Jr., an Amarillo police officer, while Mitchell was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, namely, investigating a traffic accident. The “acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty” causes the offense of murder of a peace officer to be elevated to the offense of capital murder of a peace officer. See V.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 19.03(a)(1), which provides that a person commits the offense of capital murder of a peace officer if, knowing that the person is a peace officer, he intentionally murders the peace officer and the peace officer is then acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty.
After the jury answered in the affirmative all three of the special issues that it was requested to answer, see Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., the trial judge, as he must do under Art. 37.071(e), Y.A.C.C.P., sentenced appellant to a premature death.
Appellant asserts in his second point of error that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to hear, over objection, evidence that went to an unadjudicated, unindicted extraneous offense of aggravated kidnapping that appellant allegedly committed over three years before he allegedly committed the capital murder of Officer Mitchell. The extraneous offense was admitted to show both appellant’s “motive” and “intent" when he shot Officer Mitchell.
The general rule in Texas is that extraneous offense evidence or testimony, that relates either to adjudicated or unadjudicated extraneous offenses, may not be admitted into evidence against the accused. This is because the “introduction of [an] ‘extraneous offense’ transaction is inherently prejudicial, since the accused has no notice he will be called upon to defend against it, and his ‘propensity to commit crimes’ is not material to whether he is guilty of the specified conduct which is charged by the State.” Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Thus, an accused should never be tried for some collateral and extraneous offense, or for being a *403criminal generally, and extraneous offense testimony or evidence should never be admitted into evidence against the accused unless some exception to the general rule of inadmissibility is first established by the State. See Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bates v. State, 643 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); and Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Also see Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, that is not applicable to this cause because it was not in effect when appellant’s trial occurred.
When appellant’s trial occurred, this Court’s general three (3) part test for trial courts to use in making the determination whether an extraneous offense may be admitted into evidence against an accused during his trial was then in effect. It provided that before such became admissible evidence, (1) the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed or was a participant in the extraneous offense, see, for example, Wallace v. State, 679 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), and McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 31 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); (2) the extraneous offense is relevant to a material issue in the case; and (3) the probative value of the extraneous offense outweighs its presumptively inflammatory or prejudicial potential, see, for example, Soffar v. State, 742 S.W.2d 371, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Williams v. State, supra, at 346.
The record reflects that during the guilt stage of appellant’s trial, when the prosecutors were putting on their case in chief against appellant, the trial judge was informed by the prosecutors that they intended to introduce evidence that would show appellant’s “intent” and “motive” for shooting Officer Mitchell. This evidence consisted of one unadjudicated, unindicted extraneous offense of aggravating kidnapping and one extraneous felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. Evidence going to the latter showed that appellant had been placed on probation, and thereafter, pursuant to the State’s motion to revoke appellant’s probation, a capias for appellant’s arrest issued. Appellant does not complain on appeal about the admissibility of this evidence. Therefore, I will not discuss why that evidence was admissible on the issue of appellant’s “motive” or “intent” to shoot Officer Mitchell.
The trial judge conducted a hearing outside the jury’s presence in order to make the determination whether the State’s proffered evidence was admissible, after which he, the trial judge, overruled appellant’s objections and ruled that the State would be permitted to present to the jury evidence going to both the unadjudicated and unindicted extraneous offense of aggravated kidnapping and the adjudicated offense of delivery of a controlled substance, to show appellant’s “intent” and “motive” for shooting Officer Mitchell.1
After carefully searching the record for evidence that might satisfy the first part of the above three part test, that appellant either committed or participated in the commission of the extraneous offense of aggravated kidnapping, and finding only evidence going to the fact that appellant was *404charged with such offense, I must find that the trial judge clearly erred in admitting into evidence testimony that went to the extraneous offense of aggravated kidnapping. Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Landers v. State, 519 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr. App.1975); Thompson v. State, 615 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); 3 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 7.05[8][a], at pp. 73-62.2(8) and (9).
In Fentis, supra, this Court stated the following:
It is elementary that an accused’s connection with an extraneous offense must be shown with some degree of certainty before evidence of that offense can come in, assuming it is relevant. [Citations omitted.]
The harmfulness of this error [in admitting extraneous offense testimony that showed that the the defendant had been charged with killing a peace officer, without connecting the defendant to the extraneous offense] needs little discussion. Appellant was on trial for assaulting a peace officer with intent to kill ... The prejudice thus planted in the minds of the jurors can hardly be doubted.
In this cause, at the hearing held outside the jury’s presence, regarding the aggravated kidnapping offense, the prosecution proved that appellant had been arrested in Rockwall on September 4, 1982, pursuant to an arrest warrant that issued out of Grand Prairie for allegedly committing thp offenses of aggravated kidnapping and auto theft in Grand Prairie while using the name of Robert Eugene Moore. The prosecution also proved that appellant was transferred from Rockwall to Grand Prairie on September 7, 1982, after which, because the case was “referred to the FBI”, appellant was “released pending the outcome of the investigation by the federal authorities.” The prosecution also showed through hearsay that the complainant in the aggravated kidnapping case was unable to attend court “because of health reasons ... pregnant with twins ...” No attempt was made by the State, however, to continue this cause until the complainant was able to attend court. The evidence also established that “the FBI” never filed any kind of criminal charges against appellant; in fact, from this record, it does not appear that “the FBI” or the State of Texas ever took any further action on the two cases. Appellant’s objections to the trial judge admitting into evidence the fact that appellant had been charged with committing the aggravated kidnapping offense were overruled by the trial judge, and the jury was permitted to hear testimony that was almost the same as that adduced at the out-of-the-jury’s presence hearing regarding the aggravated kidnapping offense, except I do not find where the jury was made aware of the auto theft charge. The date of the alleged aggravated kidnapping offense was August 20, 1982, which was over three years before the offense at bar was allegedly committed on November 11,1985.
Given the above, I find and hold that the trial judge clearly erred in admitting into evidence before the jury testimony about the unadjudicated and unindicted extraneous criminal offense of aggravated kidnapping — because the State failed to prove that appellant either committed or participated in the commission of that offense. Appellant’s second point of error should be sustained, and this Court should next decide whether the trial court’s error in admitting into evidence over objection the extraneous offense testimony concerning the aggravated kidnapping offense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Rule 81(b)(2), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides: “Criminal cases. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under Rule 81(b)(2), supra, before this Court can label the patent evi-*405dentiary error that occurred at the guilt stage of appellant’s trial “harmless”, the State must demonstrate to this Court, with sufficient clarity, in the context of the case, why this Court can state, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error made no contribution to the conviction of the defendant.
I find that in the context of the case, the potential for prejudice stemming from admitting an extraneous crime of violence, such as aggravated kidnapping, when introduced during a capital murder trial for murdering a peace officer, when the peace officer was acting in the lawful discharge of his duties as a peace officer, elevates to the point of vibrant kinetic energy when the evidence of the extraneous offense presented amounts only to a mere accusation, and no evidence is presented that might reflect or indicate that the defendant either committed or participated in the commission of the offense.
In this instance, I cannot state, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is not a reasonable possibility that the error in admitting into evidence the testimony about the extraneous offense of aggravated kidnapping made no contribution to the jury’s decision to find appellant guilty of the alleged offense of capital murder of Officer Mitchell. First, the charged offense was capital murder, and thus the jury was very likely to be swayed by evidence tending to show appellant’s character as violent. I find that this kind of evidence reflects very prejudicially on the character of the accused for violence. Secondly, although the subject of pretrial publicity is not before this Court, it cannot be ignored that there was a great deal of adverse, pretrial publicity about the murder of Officer Mitchell. Finally, the testimony relating to the aggravated kidnapping cause was re-presented at the punishment stage of the trial. Also see Turner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). In such circumstances, I find that there is too much of the reasonable possibility in the harm analysis under Rule 81(b), and not enough “no” in any harm analysis, to hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death of the trial court should be reversed.
MILLER, J., joins.

. As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary (1968 edition), at page 727, “Intent and motive should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted.” The defendant’s "intent” is always an issue in a capital murder case. However, the defendant's “motive” for committing the crime, though it may be relevant, is never essential to the State’s case against the accused. It may, however, be used to establish the defendant’s "intent” when he allegedly committed the crime which he has been accused of committing. Also see the concurring opinion that Judge Phillips filed in Loudres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 407, 411-412 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). In Wallace v. State, 679 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (On State’s Motion for Rehearing), this Court, speaking through Judge Clinton, pointed out the following: "In Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), it was observed that ’... motive refers to an emotion that would provoke or lead to the commission of a criminal offense. Evidence to show motive is the circumstantial evidence that would appear to cause or produce the emotion. When it is said that evidence going to show motive is admissible, it is meant that the circumstantial evidence is admissible that would appear to cause or produce the emotion that would in turn provoke or incite the commission of the criminal offense, [citations omitted].’ ’’