Court Opinion

ID: 9451191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:09:28.038756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:36.506772
License: Public Domain

*459WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
In paragraph (3) of the foregoing opinion, the majority reverse the conviction because of one sentence in the trial judge’s charge which they quote:
“It is recognized that a drug addict is inherently a perjurer when his own interests are concerned and his testimony should be received with suspicion and acted upon with caution.”
The majority characterize this sentence as “obviously erroneous,” and say that it was “aimed so pointedly at the Appellant” that his conviction cannot be allowed to stand. I cannot agree.
It is my view that the sentence in the charge about the credibility of a drug addict, upon which the majority base reversal, rélated only to the four sentences which preceded it, in which the District Judge1 was discussing the witness Tomlinson, a drug addict who testified for the Government. The entire reference to Tomlinson is as follows:
“One of the witnesses called by the Government in rebuttal was a man named Tomlinson who was a narcotics addict and an informer.
“The Government is not relying on his testimony alone but primarily bases its reliance on the testimony of Officer Brooks.
“But Tomlinson was called as a rebuttal witness by the Government after the defendant’s witnesses Parks and Gary had testified that they had never seen him on the occasions in question.
“You should scrutinize the testimony of a paid informer closely for the purpose of determining whether it is colored in any way so as to place guilt upon a defendant in furtherance of his own interest.
“It is recognized that a drug addict is inherently a perjurer when his own interests are concerned and his testimony should be received with suspicion and acted upon with caution."
It is at once apparent that the sentence about a drug addict’s credibility logically followed and was a part of the Tomlin-son discussion which preceded it. The jury was being warned to consider whether Tomlinson, an addict, had colored his testimony so as to place guilt upon the defendant, in furtherance of his own interest in being a successful and useful informant. In isolating one sentence in the charge from its context, the majority violate the elementary rule that a judge’s charge to a jury must be considered as a whole. This case well illustrates the reason for the rule.
It should be noted too that the instruction about Tomlinson was given pursuant to an express request therefor by appellant’s counsel, who was warned by Judge Pine that, as the defendant was admittedly an addict, the instruction might cut both ways. Counsel said he would take that chance. It is noteworthy that the charge made no reference to the fact that the defendant was an addict; such a reference probably would have been made if the sentence of the charge on which the majority base reversal had been “aimed pointedly” at the appellant.
Astute counsel for the appellant undoubtedly would have objected to this portion of the charge had he understood it as the majority now construe it. He did not object. I think the plain error rule cannot properly be invoked here. Moreover, as suggested in the brief for the United States, any error in the trial judge’s statement about the untruthfulness of addicts was prejudicial to the Government — not to the appellant.
In discussing this question, the Government says in its brief, “Appellee does not contend that the statement concerning the credibility of an addict is medically or legally correct.” The majority opinion accepts this and without elaboration states the drug addict’s credibility *460instruction was “obviously erroneous.”2 I think the Government should have made the contention that the statement is correct. During the last fifty years I have had many opportunities to observe the way drug addicts testify in criminal cases about matters which concern their own interests. On the basis of that experience, I believe Judge Pine was correct in saying they are inherently perjurers and I see no reason why a jury should not be told this fact of life.
For the reasons given, I dissent from the reversal of this conviction. In all other respects, I agree with the majority opinion.

. District Judge David A. Pine.

. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698 (1933), cited by the majority in support of their “obviously erroneous” statement, is factually distinguishable. There, the trial judge, told the jury he believed the defendant was lying because he “wiped his hands during his testimony.” This was, indeed, “obviously erroneous.” But here. Judge Pine’s remark that a drug addict is inherently a perjurer when his own interests are concerned, and that his testimony should be received with suspicion and acted upon with caution, was directed to the Government witness, Tomlinson. The difference is apparent.