Court Opinion

ID: 9399755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 14:07:48.755753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.077551
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                          STATE V. BOOKER

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                  STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                 V.

                                  MALIK M. BOOKER, APPELLANT.

                                Filed June 6, 2023.   No. A-23-118.

       Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: KIMBERLY MILLER PANKONIN, Judge.
Affirmed.
       Alton E. Mitchell for appellant.
       Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Matthew Lewis for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and WELCH, Judges.
       WELCH, Judge.
                                        I. INTRODUCTION
         Malik M. Booker appeals the order of the Douglas County District Court denying his
request to transfer his criminal case to the juvenile court. Finding no abuse of discretion by the
district court, we affirm.
                                   II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
                                  1. FACTS LEADING TO CHARGES
        In the evening hours of October 16, 2022, Omaha police officers heard shots fired while
on an unrelated call. Officers proceeded to the area, observed a vehicle known to have been stolen,
and initiated a short pursuit during which the stolen vehicle fled at high speeds, without headlights,
and violated stop signs. After the vehicle finally stopped, the passenger, later identified as Booker,

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fled on foot. When he was apprehended, Booker possessed an AM-15 rifle. The stolen vehicle was
valued at $5,784.
         During their investigation, officers recovered several casings from the scene and learned
that a home had been struck by gunfire. Four rounds hit an inhabited house and one of those shots
went through a living room window and narrowly missed an individual who was inside the house
sitting on his couch. Testing confirmed that the casings found at the scene were fired from the rifle
recovered from Booker and another gun found in the vehicle on the driver’s seat. As a result of the
events, Booker was charged with discharging a firearm at an inhabited house, occupied building,
or occupied motor vehicle, a Class ID felony; theft by receiving property valued at $5,000 or more,
a Class IIA felony; and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest/willful reckless driving, a Class
IV felony.
                                     2. MOTION TO TRANSFER
       In November 2022, Booker filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. A one-day hearing
thereon was held in January 2023. At the time of the hearing, Booker was 17 years old.
                                (a) Evidence Adduced by the State
        The State adduced evidence as previously set forth and the State offered, and the court
received, the following exhibits: Booker’s criminal record; the police report related to the charged
incidents; and an incident police report and arrest warrant arising out of Booker’s alleged
involvement in a carjacking that occurred in Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on October 15,
2022, also involving an assault rifle.
        Angi Messick testified that as a specialized probation officer with Douglas County Juvenile
Probation, she supervises high risk youth including youth associated with gangs. Messick testified
that she had never worked with Booker and that Booker had never been on juvenile probation in
Douglas County.
        According to Messick, interventions and services available in a juvenile proceeding include
group homes and community-based services such as electronic monitoring, day and evening
reporting, cognitive groups, and treatment if recommended by a therapist. She noted that placing
juveniles in group homes or other housing providing rehabilitation “help youth have different
positive behavior change” which is beneficial for community safety. She further testified that
group homes with rehabilitative services have more services to offer youths than the Douglas
County Youth Center. However, Messick noted that the charges against Booker would affect his
placement options and that after a child turns 18 years old, the availability of services decreases
“because a lot of places, group homes, [and] some services, will deny working with a youth after
the age of 18.” She further explained that due to Booker’s age, it was unlikely that he could be
placed in a group home and services would most likely be limited to the Youth and Rehabilitation
and Treatment Center (YRTC) in Kearney, Nebraska.
        Messick also explained that before Booker could be transferred to juvenile court, he would
have to “clear everything” through both the Douglas County District Court and the Lancaster
County District Court and then be adjudicated prior to receiving services which “could take up to
six months.” Further, the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction over Booker and services would
end when Booker turned 19, even if Booker had not fully participated in rehabilitation.

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                                 (b) Evidence Adduced by Booker
        In support of Booker’s motion to transfer to juvenile court, the defense adduced testimony
from Heather Santoro, the Department of Health and Human Services case manager for Booker’s
family. Santoro testified that she became case manager for the Booker family approximately 2½
years ago based on a referral stemming from educational neglect by the parents which she
described as “when students miss a significant amount of time from school without excused
absences or any valid reason for missing school.” Santoro testified that she meets with Booker and
his siblings on a monthly basis; that she referred Booker for individual therapy related to
depression and PTSD; and that other services available to Booker included in-home intensive
family preservation, peer-to-peer mentoring, and gang intervention services. Santoro testified that
during her time working with Booker, she did not see any indications that Booker was involved in
gang activity.
        Santoro stated that Booker “has a big heart. He cares very, very, deeply. He’s very
committed to his friends and his family. . . . [He] misses his mom and his dad very, very much.
And he wants to succeed. He wants to do well in school. He’s a good kid.” She also described
Booker as “a deep thinker” who is “very quiet, very guarded, [and] very wounded.” However, she
admitted that during her time working with Booker, his progress has been slow.
                                     3. DISTRICT COURT ORDER
        The district court overruled 17-year-old Booker’s motion to transfer to the juvenile court
in a 9-page order. Although the district court’s order included detailed analysis, the court did not
specifically lay out its findings regarding each factor set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (Cum.
Supp. 2022). However, in the order, the court concluded:
                Given the serious nature of the offenses, [Booker’s] age, maturity and the security
        of the public, the Court finds that the juvenile system would be inadequate to address these
        needs. Having balanced the public protections and societal security against the practical
        and non-problematic rehabilitation of [Booker], the Court finds and concludes that a
        transfer of jurisdiction is not appropriate and a sound basis exists to retain jurisdiction.

Specific findings contained in the court’s order will be addressed in the analysis portion of this
opinion. Booker has timely appealed to this court.
                                  III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
        Booker contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
transfer based upon the court’s determination that a sound basis existed to retain the case in district
court.
                                  IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
        A trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer a pending criminal proceeding to the juvenile
court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hunt, 299 Neb. 573, 909 N.W.2d 363 (2018).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable
or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. Id.

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                                           V. ANALYSIS
        Booker argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to transfer
because the State failed to meet its burden to show the case should not be transferred to the juvenile
court.
        Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01(3) (Reissue 2016) grants concurrent jurisdiction to the juvenile
court and the county or district courts over juvenile offenders who: (1) are 11 years of age or older
and commit a traffic offense that is not a felony, or (2) are 14 years of age or older and commit a
Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II, or IIA felony. Actions against such juveniles may be initiated either in
juvenile court or in the county or district court. In the present case, the allegations against Booker
put him within this category of juvenile offenders, and the State filed the charges against Booker
in the district court.
        When Booker moved to transfer his case to juvenile court, the district court conducted a
hearing pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2022), which required
consideration of the following factors set forth in § 43-276(1):
        (a) The type of treatment such juvenile would most likely be amenable to; (b) whether there
        is evidence that the alleged offense included violence; (c) the motivation for the
        commission of the offense; (d) the age of the juvenile and the ages and circumstances of
        any others involved in the offense; (e) the previous history of the juvenile, including
        whether he or she had been convicted of any previous offenses or adjudicated in juvenile
        court; (f) the best interests of the juvenile; (g) consideration of public safety; (h)
        consideration of the juvenile’s ability to appreciate the nature and seriousness of his or her
        conduct; (i) whether the best interests of the juvenile and the security of the public may
        require that the juvenile continue in secure detention or under supervision for a period
        extending beyond his or her minority and, if so, the available alternatives best suited to this
        purpose; (j) whether the victim or juvenile agree to participate in restorative justice; (k)
        whether there is a juvenile pretrial diversion program established pursuant to sections
        43-260.02 to 43-260.07; (l) whether the juvenile has been convicted of or has
        acknowledged unauthorized use or possession of a firearm; (m) whether a juvenile court
        order has been issued for the juvenile pursuant to section 43-2,106.03; (n) whether the
        juvenile is a criminal street gang member; and (o) such other matters as the parties deem
        relevant to aid in the decision.

        The customary rules of evidence shall not be followed at such hearing and, “[a]fter
considering all the evidence and reasons presented by both parties, the case shall be transferred to
juvenile court unless a sound basis exists for retaining the case in county court or district court[.]”
§ 29-1816(3)(a).
        As the Nebraska Supreme Court has explained, in conducting a hearing on a motion to
transfer a pending criminal case to juvenile court, the court should employ “a balancing test by
which public protection and societal security are weighed against the practical and
nonproblematical rehabilitation of the juvenile.” State v. Stevens, 290 Neb. 460, 465, 860 N.W.2d
717, 725 (2015). “In order to retain the proceedings, the court need not resolve every factor against
the juvenile, and there are no weighted factors and no prescribed method by which more or less

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weight is assigned to a specific factor.” Id. “The burden of proving a sound basis for retention lies
with the State.” Id.
        When a district court’s basis for retaining jurisdiction over a juvenile is supported by
appropriate evidence, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer
the case to juvenile court. State v. Hunt, 299 Neb. 573, 909 N.W.2d 363 (2018).
                                  1. FACTORS FAVORING RETENTION
        Although the district court did not specifically lay out is findings regarding each factor set
forth in § 43-276, after reviewing the entirety of that order, we would classify the following factors
as factors the district court found weighed in favor of the district court retaining jurisdiction over
Booker.
                                (a) § 43-276(1)(a) – Type of Treatment
                                         Amenable to Juvenile
          Regarding the type of treatment such juvenile would most likely be amenable to, the court
stated:
                  A transfer to juvenile court in this case would not allow [Booker] much time, if
          any, to work with the issues that present from these serious allegations and his escalating
          conduct. [Booker] is seventeen (17) years of age and was seventeen (17) at the time of the
          offense. He will turn eighteen (18) years old in roughly three months, on May 31st[, 2023].
          He also has a warrant out of Lancaster Court for Robbery and Use [of a] Firearm to Commit
          a felony . . . It is very questionable whether [Booker] would have time to avail himself of
          the benefits and services offered in juvenile court. Before [Booker] could even start being
          evaluated in juvenile court, he would have to have [the] charges in Lincoln resolved as
          well. Only after both cases were resolved in District Court, would he begin the adjudication
          process which can take up to six (6) months. At best case, this would leave a year or less
          for service and treatment for serious violent crimes and issues that clearly would need more
          time. Santoro acknowledged that progress was slow with Booker and his issues could not
          be fixed overnight.
                  Additionally, with [Booker] turning eighteen (18) in May [2023], and the criminal
          charges involving use and possession of a gun, the type of services potentially available to
          Booker are extremely limited. Messick . . . explained [that,] in her opinion and experience,
          [Booker] would be limited to services at YRTC.
                                (b) § 43-276(1)(b) – Whether Alleged
                                     Offenses Included Violence
        The district court found that “[t]he offenses clearly involved violence, including the use
and possession of a firearm. Many people . . . could have easily been killed as a result of [Booker’s]
actions.”
                                  (c) § 43-276(1)(c) – Motivation for
                                        Commission of Offenses
        The district court noted that the “motivation of the crimes was unknown but the actions are
clearly adult in nature.”

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                                (d) § 43-276(1)(d) – Age of Juvenile
                                  and Others Involved in Offenses
        Regarding the age of the juvenile and the ages and circumstances of any others involved in
the offense, the court noted that Booker was 17 years old at the time the offenses were committed
and would turn 18 in late May 2023. The court noted that Booker’s age would allow insufficient
time for service and treatment for the serious and violent offenses for which Booker had been
charged.
        Although the district court did not mention the age of the co-defendant, the police reports
which were admitted into evidence established that the co-defendant was also 17 years old at the
time that the offenses were committed.
                         (e) § 43-276(1)(e) – Previous History of Juvenile
        Regarding the previous history of the juvenile, including whether he had been convicted of
any previous offenses or adjudicated in juvenile court, the district court found that Booker did not
have any prior adjudications or convictions in Nebraska. However, the court noted that Booker
had three missing juvenile entries in his record and that Booker had a Lancaster County warrant
for his arrest for robbery and use of firearm to commit a felony which involved a carjacking.
                            (f) § 43-276(1)(f) – Juvenile’s Best Interests
       Regarding the best interests of the juvenile, the court stated that “[t]he best interests of
[Booker] and society require detention or supervision beyond what [the] Juvenile Court could
provide for him if he even had a desire to avail himself of services.”
                        (g) § 43-276(1)(g) - Consideration for Public Safety
        Regarding the consideration of public safety, the court noted that “[w]ithout any threat of
violence or provocation, [Booker] shot an AM-15 rifle multiple times at an occupied dwelling.”
The court further noted that Booker “has shown escalating violent criminal propensity. The
consideration of public safety from this type of unnecessary violence is a grave concern for the
Court.” The court also stated that “[c]onsideration of public safety weighs in favor of retaining
jurisdiction over [Booker] for a longer period of time than the roughly a year remaining in his
minority.”
                       (h) § 43-276(1)(h) – Juvenile’s Ability to Appreciate
                                  Nature/Seriousness of Conduct
        Regarding the consideration of the juvenile’s ability to appreciate the nature and
seriousness of his or her conduct, the district court stated in its conclusion that it found that, given
several factors including Booker’s maturity, the juvenile system would be inadequate to address
Booker’s issues.
                            (i) § 43-276(1)(i) – Best Interests of Juvenile
                                        and Security of Public
        Regarding whether the best interests of the juvenile and the security of the public may
require that the juvenile continue in secure detention or under supervision for a period extending

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beyond his or her minority and, if so, the available alternatives best suited to this purpose, the court
stated that Booker’s best interests and society
        require detention of [Booker] beyond what [the] Juvenile Court could provide for him if
        he even had a desire to avail himself of services. Consideration of public safety weighs in
        favor [of] retaining jurisdiction over [Booker] for a longer period of time than the roughly
        a year remaining in his minority.
                               (j) § 43-276(1)(l) – Unauthorized Use
                                      or Possession of Firearm
       The court found that “[t]he offenses clearly involved violence, including the use and
possession of a firearm.”
                                  2. FACTORS FAVORING TRANSFER
        The district court appeared to find that two factors supported transfer to the juvenile court.
The first factor is § 43-276(1)(n) – Gang Membership; the district court found that no evidence
had been adduced regarding whether the Booker was a criminal street gang member. We note that
Santoro testified that during her time working with Booker, she did not see any indications that
Booker was involved in gang activity. The second factor is § 43-276(1)(m) – Juvenile Court Order;
the district court found that no evidence had been adduced regarding whether a juvenile court order
had been issued for Booker pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016).
                                        3. NEUTRAL FACTORS
        The district court’s order identified three factors in its analysis that it appeared to consider
neutral. Those are: (1) § 43-276(1)(j) – Restorative Justice; the court found that there was no
evidence adduced regarding whether the victim had agreed to participate in restorative justice; (2)
§ 43-276(1)(o) – Other Relevant Matters; the court’s order did not address any other relevant
matters; and § 43-276(1)(k) – Juvenile Pretrial Diversion Program; the court found that there was
no evidence adduced regarding whether there is a juvenile pretrial diversion program established
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-260.02 to 43-260.07 (Reissue 2016 and Cum. Supp. 2022).
                                    4. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
         Although the district court’s analysis of factors under § 43-276(1) revealed several factors
favoring transfer, there is no arithmetical computation or formula required in a court’s
consideration of the statutory criteria or factors. State v. Esai P., 28 Neb. App. 226, 942 N.W.2d
416 (2020). There are no weighted factors, that is, no prescribed method by which more or less
weight is assigned to each factor specified by statute. Id. It is a balancing test by which public
protection and societal security are weighed against the practical and nonproblematical
rehabilitation of the juvenile. Id. “This means that a trial court must balance a juvenile’s
amenability to complete rehabilitation by age 19 against the public’s safety in the event that
rehabilitation fails or requires more time than anticipated.” State v. Leroux, 26 Neb. App. 76, 118,
916 N.W.2d 903, 929 (2018).
         As we often state in our review of juvenile transfer cases, these are difficult decisions for
the trial court and for this court on appeal because of the young age of the defendants. However, a
young age by itself does not support a transfer to the juvenile court. See State v. Esai P., supra

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(setting forth cases of defendants as young as 14 or 15 years of age in which criminal proceedings
were retained in district court because factors favoring public protection outweighed juvenile’s
young age, such as involvement with gangs and guns, violent nature of crime, or unlikely success
of rehabilitation before juvenile reaches age of majority).
         Booker argues that, in performing its balancing analysis, the district court erred because
the practical and non-problematic rehabilitation of Booker outweighs any concerns for public
security and protection. He argues that Booker was charged with committing serious offenses
when he was 17 years old, that the offenses were isolated and that Booker did not have a violent
criminal past, there was no evidence of premeditation, and that Booker needed “positive role
models and rehabilitation through juvenile court and juvenile probation services.” However, the
district court was clearly concerned with the serious and violent nature of the offenses which
involved the use of a firearm, the safety of the public, and Booker’s need for supervision over a
period of years exceeding the limited time that the juvenile court would have to work with him.
         After reviewing the entirety of the record and the district court’s order, we believe this case
falls within the category of the “theme” this court expressed in State v. Leroux, supra. After
summarizing numerous cases and their holdings, which we will not repeat here, this court held:
                 The theme evident in the cases discussed above is this: When a juvenile commits a
         violent crime, the trial court is not likely to grant a request to transfer to the juvenile court
         because (1) the juvenile court will lose jurisdiction when the defendant turns 19 years of
         age which may not allow sufficient time for the complete rehabilitation of the juvenile, and
         therefore retention is necessary to ensure public safety, and (2) there is no secure youth
         detention facility available which can safely provide the appropriate services and treatment
         for a juvenile who has committed a more serious offense. This means that a trial court must
         balance a juvenile’s amenability to complete rehabilitation by age 19 against the public’s
         safety in the event that rehabilitation fails or requires more time than anticipated. The trial
         court’s decision carries the consequence that if the decision is wrongly made, we have
         either missed an opportunity to rehabilitate a juvenile outside the negative influences of
         adult incarceration or failed to adequately incarcerate a potentially dangerous juvenile who
         will go on to commit further violent crimes. . . .

State v. Leroux, 26 Neb. App. 76, 118, 916 N.W.2d 903, 929 (2018).
        Here, the district court concluded that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction would not be
sufficient given factors including the serious and violent nature of the charged offenses, which
included the use of a firearm; the court’s concern for public safety; and the fact that the juvenile
court would automatically lose jurisdiction over Booker when he turned 19 years old regardless of
whether he had benefitted from services provided to him. Based upon our review of the record, we
cannot say that the court’s basis for retaining jurisdiction over Booker was not supported by
appropriate evidence. When a district court’s basis for retaining jurisdiction over a juvenile is
supported by appropriate evidence, it cannot be said the court abused its discretion in refusing to
transfer the case to juvenile court. State v. Leroux, supra. Accordingly, based upon the evidence
in this case, the majority of which supported the State’s burden of proving a sound basis for
retaining jurisdiction in the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s order
denying Booker’s request to transfer his case to juvenile court.

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                                        VI. CONCLUSION
       Finding no abuse of discretion by the district court in its decision to retain jurisdiction over
Booker, we affirm the district court’s order denying Booker’s motion to transfer the proceedings
to juvenile court.
                                                                                            AFFIRMED.

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