Court Opinion

ID: 9470037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:55:40.134359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:41.921712
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I join in the court’s judgment and, save on one point, in its opinion. Though I agree on affirmance, I have difficulty with the court’s position on the relationship of the discretionary function exemption to neurologic testing in airman medical certification procedures. I thus write to elucidate my approach to questions of application of the exemption, and to explain my grounds for a different outcome thereon.
I
The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes liability in damages upon the United States for the wrongful acts or omissions of its *611employees,1 but subject to a number of exceptions.2 One, supplied by Section 2680(a), exempts claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”3 The phrase “discretionary function or duty,” however, is much less encompassing than the words themselves might suggest. The mere fact that the employee’s responsibilities require some exercise of judgment is not enough;4 it is discretion of a special kind to which Section 2680(a) speaks. In Dalehite v. United States,5 undoubtedly the leading case on the subject, the Supreme Court explained that Congress, in excepting various types of activity from risk of liability under the Act, exercised care to protect the Government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmental functions.”6 Consonantly, the Court declared, “[t]he ‘discretion’ protected by the section ... is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law.”7 And, of the steps Congress took “to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations,” 8 the Court more recently has labeled Section 2680(a) the “[mjost important.”9
A quarter-century ago, when first confronted by the discretionary function exemption, this circuit heeded these teachings. *612In Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co.,10 a mid-air collision resulting in multiple fatalities was attributed to negligence of federal employees directing air traffic from an airport control tower. The Government argued that the exemption “incorporates into the Act the historic principle that the courts will not, in a private action, revise or review executive conduct involving the exercise of judgment or discretion of a public character,” 11 and the court had “no doubt that the principle was consciously restated by Congress when it” enacted the exemption.12 The court rejected, however, the Government’s further contention “that the tower operators’ duties are public in nature and involve the exercise of discretion and judgment,” 13 holding instead “that the tower operators merely handled operational details which are outside the area of the discretionary functions and duties referred to in § 2680(a).”14 “[Discretion,” the court added, “was exercised when it was decided to operate the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to operate it negligently.” 15
The discretionary function exemption thus emerged from Eastern Air Lines as a safeguard against interference, through the medium of a tort action, with “executive conduct involving the exercise of judgment or discretion of a public character.”16 This concept has received recognition in later decisions of this court,17 and other courts have shared it.18 As Daiehite makes explic*613it, it forecloses intrusions on such governmental prerogatives as policy judgment and decision,19 planning and initiation of programs and activities,20 and execution thereof in accordance with official instructions21 As applied by other federal courts, the range of the exemption is fairly broad.22
The exemption could not, however, have been intended to subvert the very purpose for which the Act was adopted: subjection of the United States to liability in damages “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”23 when the latter “would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”24 As Dalehite itself acknowledges, “the draftsmen [of Section 2680(a)] did not intend it to relieve the Government from liability for such common-law torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of an employee ... of the administering agency.”25 The exemption was not designed to bar liability for personal injury negligently inflicted by a government employee upon an inmate of a federal prison,26 or liability for death stemming from the negligence of a government agent in dealing with a highjacked aircraft.27 Situations judicially deemed beyond the exemption’s ambit, notwithstanding involvement of some element of discretion, are both numerous and varied.28
I do not suggest that the test formulated in Eastern Air Lines is necessarily the panacea for all of the perplexing problems the discretionary function exemption is prone *614to breed.29 Concededly, the nature of the exemption is yet to be fully and clearly defined, and its boundaries are yet to be firmly marked. Nevertheless, the matter on which I differ from my colleagues hardly seems to require greater clarity or precision than Eastern Air Lines already affords. The subject of our disagreement is the type of judgment summoned by the procedures established for issuance of airman medical certificates, and simple adherence to Eastern Air Lines’ guiding principle, I think, leads to a sound conclusion. In a word, we need only determine whether those procedures called for any “exercise of judgment or discretion of a public character.”30
II
Whatever the reach of the discretionary function exemption with respect to other activities, many courts have held that medical decisions by governmental personnel are beyond its pale,31 and for reasons strongly appealing to me. Ordinarily, medical decisions do not involve any consideration of public interests or policy;32 normally, they are predicated upon factors having medical value only. Governmental medical personnel may be required to observe prescribed procedures and to apply prescribed standards, but in the end their judgments usually rest upon medically-significant facts, medical knowledge and skill, and medical phenomena, not unlike those rendered in the private medical sector.33 To be sure, medical determinations invariably draw on discretion, but medical rather than governmental judgment is what is generally utilized.34 When no “exercise of judgment or discretion of a public character” is discerni*615ble, no basis for invocation of the exemption is present.
Decisions in this circuit amply support this rationale. In Hitchcock v. United States,35 we held the discretionary function exemption inapplicable to a claim of negligence based upon a failure to inform a woman given pre-exposure rabies immunization injections of risks incidental thereto — a violation of the physician-patient duty.36 We “read section 2680 and Dalehite and its progeny to establish the rule that, where the government acts negligently for reasons unrelated to public policy considerations, it is liable to those it injures;”37 applying that test, we found “that the acts and omissions found actionable were not ‘so fraught with ... public policy considerations’ as to render them discretionary within the meaning of the Act.”38 Factually closer to the case at bar is Duncan v. United States,39 where an airline pilot sought a medical certificate under the regulations involved here, and the holding was that negligence in denying the certificate was beyond the scope of the exemption.40 Duncan relied upon the Second Circuit’s decision in Hendry v. United States,41 which reached the same conclusion with respect to a determination by federal medical personnel that a ship’s officer was a paranoid schizophrenic and unfit for sea duty.42
My colleagues dismiss Hendry, and with it Duncan, on the argument that “[i]n this case, however, the neurologic standard left the Air Surgeon a limited policy judgment as to whether appellant’s medical condition would allow him to perform safely the duties of a commercial pilot.”43 They explain:
In making his decision, the Air Surgeon had to evaluate how, and the likelihood that, appellant would have future neurologic problems that could impinge on his performance as a pilot. Then the Air Surgeon had to calculate the possible effects of the problems on air safety.44 This was not just a matter of testing known medical facts against a clear medical standard. For these reasons, we conclude that the specific determinations of the Air Surgeon about this appellant’s neurologic fitness constituted an exercise of discretion under the terms of the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).45
With deference, I cannot accept this reasoning. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is empowered to issue an airman certificate if, after investigation, he finds that the applicant therefor “possesses proper qualifications for, and is physically able to perform the duties pertaining to, the position for which the airman certificate is sought.”46 FAA regulations prescribe numerous requirements to be met by applicants,47 including possession of an appropriate medical certificate.48 Pursuant to statute,49 the Adminis*616trator has delegated to the Federal Air Surgeon authority “to issue or deny medical certificates,” but only “to the extent necessary to ... [e]xamine applicants for and holders of medical certificates for compliance with applicable medical standards; and .. . [i]ssue, renew, or deny medical certificates to applicants and holders based upon compliance or noncompliance with applicable medical standards.”50 The neurologic standard applicable here uniformly specifies, with respect to each of the three classes of medical certificates, that the applicant must have
[n]o other convulsive disorder, disturbance of consciousness, or neurologic condition 51 that the Federal Air Surgeon finds
(a) Makes the applicant unable to safely perform the duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate that he holds or for which he is applying; or
(b) May reasonably be expected, within two years after the finding, to make him unable to perform those duties or exercise those privileges; and the findings are based on the case history and appropriate, qualified, medical judgment relating to the condition involved.52
I see nothing that requires or permits a decision on anything other than medical considerations.53 The authority delegated to the Federal Air Surgeon is expressly limited to certification or noncertification dependent upon the applicant’s compliance with medical standards,54 and the neurologic standards relevant here uniformly require the Air Surgeon’s “findings” to be based on the case history and appropriate, qualified, medical judgment relating to the condition involved.”55 True it is that the determination must be made in terms of the applicant’s ability to safely perform the duties imposed, or exercise the privileges conferred, by the certificate sought,56 but a straightforward reading of the regulations confines that determination to the effect of the applicant’s neurologic health on air safety.57 It no more involves a discretionary exercise of a public character than a conclusion that person is too ill to work, or to operate a motor vehicle or motorboat, or is well enough to do so. I thus would conclude that the medical certification process calls for a decision wholly medical in nature, and not for a judgment intercepted by the discretionary function exemption.
Ill
Disagreement with my colleagues on application of the exemption to the neurologic phase of airman medical certification does not, however, alter my outcome on the appeal. The District Court did not consider the exemption at all; instead, it carefully examined appellant’s charges of negligence and held that none was sustained by the evidence.58 My review leads me to conclude *617that the court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous,59 nor its legal determinations faulty. I would dispose of the neurologic-testing issue on this basis, and, encountering no further difficulty with today’s decision, I join in affirmance of the District Court’s judgment.

. “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages. ...” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). See also id. § 1346(b).

. See id. § 2680.

. The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused....
Id. § 2680.

. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, “[¡judgment is exercised in almost every human endeavor. It is not the mere exercise of judgment, however, which immunizes the United States from liability for the torts of its employees.” Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1975) (footnote omitted). See also J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1428, 47 L.Ed.2d 359 (1976); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841, 88 S.Ct. 76, 19 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967); Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 923, 930-931 (E.D.Mich.1981).

. 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). The case emanated from an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer produced in a federally-initiated and -controlled program for export to areas under military occupation following World War II.

. Id. at 32, 73 S.Ct. at 966, 97 L.Ed. at 1439.

. Id. at 34, 73 S.Ct. at 967, 97 L.Ed. at 1440 (footnote omitted).

. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1858, 10 L.Ed.2d 805, 815 (1963).

. Id. While this appeal draws in only the second part of § 2680(a) — the discretionary function exemption — the same congressional objective is easily discernible in the first part. See note 3 supra. There, by excepting “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,” Congress “intended to preclude any possibility that the [Act] might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized activity, such as a floodcontrol or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious, or that the statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid.” Dalehite v. United States, supra note 5, 346 U.S. at 29 n. 21, 73 S.Ct. at 964 n. 21, 97 L.Ed. at 1437 n. 21, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945). See also Dupree v. United States, 247 F.2d 819, 824-825 (3d Cir.1957); Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 867-868 (6th Cir.1978).

. 95 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 200-206, 221 F.2d 62, 73-79, aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, 76 S.Ct. 192, 100 L.Ed. 799 (1955).

. 95 U.S.App.D.C. at 202, 221 F.2d at 74-75 (emphasis supplied).

. Id. at 202, 221 F.2d at 75. This is not to be taken as a suggestion that the discretionary function exemption borrows the governmental-proprietary distinction from municipal law. Eastern Air Lines rejected that notion, id. at 201-202, 221 F.2d at 73-74, as the Supreme Court was later to do also. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48, 53-54 (1955); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 376-377, 1 L.Ed.2d 354, 358 (1957). To say that the exemption immunizes judgments “of a public character” is no more than to reflect the view that Congress did not. extend the assimilation of governmental and private liability to the point that it would support claims for damages based on discretionary exercises in areas wherein the courts have traditionally declined to substitute their judgment for that of the official to whom the discretion was confided.

. 95 U.S.App.D.C. at 202, 221 F.2d at 74-75.

. Id. at 202, 221 F.2d at 75.

. Id. at 205, 221 F.2d at 77. The court distinguished Daiehite on the ground that each of the acts there characterized as negligent was directed by the fertilizer-production and -distribution plan previously formulated. Id. at 204, 221 F.2d at 76-77. Indeed, the Daiehite Court itself declared that “[t]he decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government’s fertilizer program.” 246 U.S. at 42, 73 S.Ct. at 971, 97 L.Ed. at 1444.

. The Eastern Air Lines court likened its interpretation of the discretionary function exemption to Daiehite’s pronouncement that “[t]he ‘discretion’ protected by the section ... is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law.” 346 U.S. at 34, 73 S.Ct. at 697, 97 L.Ed. at 1440 (footnote omitted). That, said Eastern Air Lines, “is the ‘historic principle,’ referred to in the Government’s brief,” see text supra at note 11, “about which there can be no dispute.” 95 U.S.App.D.C. at 203 n. 15, 221 F.2d at 76 n. 15.

. Hitchcock v. United States, 214 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 207-208, 665 F.2d 354, 363-364 (1981); Sami v. United States, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 184-185, 617 F.2d 755, 766-767 (1979). See also Majority Opinion (Maj.Op.) at 600.

. E.g., Smith v. United States, supra note 4, 375 F.2d at 248 (“[t]he United States is immune from liability in the present case not because of the mere fact that government officials made choices, but because the choices made affected the political (not merely the monetary) interests of the nation”); Miller v. United States, supra note 9, 583 F.2d at 866 (discretionary function exemption “does not insulate the Government from liability for all mistakes of judgment of its agents, but only for significant policy and political decisions, the types of governmental decisions which should not be circumscribed by customary tort standards”); Downs v. United States, supra note 4, 522 F.2d at 997 (“the basic question concerning the ex*613ception is whether the judgments of a Government employee are of ‘the nature and quality’ which Congress intended to put beyond judicial review”) (quoting Smith v. United States, supra note 4, 375 F.2d at 246) (citation omitted).

. Dalehite v. United States, supra note 5, 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968, 97 L.Ed. at 1441.

. Id. at 34-36, 73 S.Ct. at 967-968, 97 L.Ed. at 1440-1441.

. Id. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968, 97 L.Ed. at 1441.

. E.g., Goddard v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 304, 306-307, 287 F.2d 343, 345-346, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 910, 81 S.Ct. 1085, 6 L.Ed. 235 (1961) (timing of condemnation proceedings); Morton v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 85, 228 F.2d 431, 432 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 975, 76 S.Ct. 452, 100 L.Ed. 845 (1956) (transfer of prisoner to, and care afforded prisoner in, federal medical center); J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 4, 515 F.2d at 98-99 (delay of National Labor Relations Board in securing compliance with reinstatement order); Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 457-458 (6th Cir. 1980) (“no hazard” determination respecting television tower vis-a-vis air traffic, and failure to require marking of guy wires); Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.1980) (decision on type of communication system to be maintained between drug informants and their contacts); Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353 F.Supp. 1249, 1256-1259 (D.D.C.1973), aff'd, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 497 F.2d 684, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 102, 95 S.Ct. 497, 42 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974) (formulation and implementation of riot control plan). See also Golden Holiday Tours v. CAB, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 294 n. 6, 531 F.2d 624, 626 n. 6 (1976); cases collected in Sami v. United States, supra note 17, 199 U.S.App.D.C. at 184, 617 F.2d at 766.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2674(a) (1976), quoted supra note 1.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).

. Dalehite v. United States, supra note 5, 346 U.S. at 34, 73 S.Ct. at 967, 97 L.Ed. at 1440; accord, Crouse v. United States, 137 F.Supp. 47, 49 (D.Del.1955); Sullivan v. United States, 129 F.Supp. 713 (N.D.Ill.1955). See also Downs v. United States, supra note 4, 522 F.2d at 995.

. United States v. Muniz, supra note 8.

. Downs v. United States, supra note 4, 522 F.2d at 994-998.

. E.g., Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., supra note 10, 95 U.S.App.D.C. at 200-206, 221 F.2d at 73-79 (direction of air traffic); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1063-1069 (3d Cir.1974) (compliance with standard governing release of polio vaccine); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13, 16-18 (4th Cir.1963) (supervision of mental patient); Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 594-598 (5th Cir.1973) (design and manufacture of aircraft injection seat); United States v. DeCamp, 478 F.2d 1188, 1191-1192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, 94 S.Ct. 232, 38 L.Ed.2d 158 (1973) (observance of safety regulation).

. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 Geo.L.J. 81 (1968).

. See text supra at note 11. Though my colleagues mention “the guiding distinction between ‘planning’ and ‘operational’ duties,” Maj.Op. at 600, citing Sami v. United States, supra note 17, 199 U.S.App.D.C. at 183-184, 617 F.2d at 765-766, the test they undertake to apply seemingly is the one I espouse. See Maj.Op. at 600, 603-604 & nn. 18-19.

. E.g., Supchak v. United States, 365 F.2d 844, 845-846 (3d Cir.1966) (examination by Veterans Administration medical officer); Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir.1980) (decision by Army physician to refer patient to private hospital); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir.1966) (failure of Air Force psychiatrist first treating mentally-ill airman to inform second Air Force psychiatrist, who took over treatment, of airman’s threats on wife’s life); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723, 724-725 (5th Cir.1950) (injection administered in Army hospital); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737-739 (10th Cir. en banc 1977) (treatment by Air Force physician); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir.1949), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (treatment by Army medical personnel); Doyle v. United States, 530 F.Supp. 1278, 1284-1285 (C.D.Cal.1982) (diagnosis by Army psychiatrist); Dishman v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 567, 570-571 (D.Md.1950) (treatment by Veterans Administration physician); Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F.Supp. 543, 548 (D.Mass. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952) (treatment by Army physician); Moon v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 140, 144 (D.Nev. 1981) (diagnosis and treatment by Veterans Administration psychiatrists); Rufino v. United States, 126 F.Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.N.Y.1954) (insulin therapy at Veterans Administration hospital); Hunter v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 411, 412-413 (M.D.Tenn.1964) (diagnosis by prison physician). Sometimes the decision-maker is called upon to weigh public as well as medical considerations, in which event a different result may be warranted. See, e.g., Smart v. United States, 207 F.2d 841, 842-843 (10th Cir. 1953); compare White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13, 17-18 (4th Cir.1963).

. See Rise v. United States, supra note 31, 630 F.2d at 1070; Jackson v. Kelly, supra note 31, 557 F.2d 738, 739; Doyle v. United States, supra note 31, 530 F.Supp. at 1283; Moon v. United States, supra note 31, 512 F.Supp. at 144.

. See Costley v. United States, supra note 31, 181 F.2d at 725; Jackson v. Kelly, supra note 31, 557 F.2d at 738, 739.

. See Jackson v. Kelly, supra note 31, 557 F.2d at 738-739. Compare Spencer v. General Hosp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 58, 425 F.2d 479, 489 (en banc 1969) (Wright, J., concurring) (“[tjhis is not to say that the performance of an operation does not involve judgment and discretion. The point is that medical, not governmental, judgment and discretion are involved”) (emphasis in original); Henderson v. Bluemink, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 164-165, 511 F.2d 399, 402-403 (1974).

. Supra note 17.

. Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S.Ct. 560, 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972).

. Hitchcock v. United States, supra note 17, 214 U.S.App.D.C. at 207-208, 665 F.2d at 363-364.

. Id. at 207, 665 F.2d at 363, quoting Sami v. United States, supra note 17, 199 U.S.App.D.C. at 185, 617 F.2d at 767.

. 355 F.Supp. 1167 (D.D.C.1973).

. Id. at 1169-1170.

. 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.1969).

. Id. at 779-783.

. Maj.Op. at 604 n. 18.

. In further elucidation, they say:
In making his decision, the Air Surgeon was presumably to consider such factors as the responsibilities of a commercial airline pilot, the technology of the aircraft, the demands inherent in the nation’s flight traffic system, and the available backup personnel and equipment.
Id. at n. 18.

. Id. at 604.

. 49 U.S.C. § 1422(a)-(b) (1976).

. 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.1-201 (1982).

. Id. § 61.3(c).

. 49 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1976).

. 14 C.F.R. § 67.25(a) (1982) (emphasis supplied).

. Some neurologic conditions are absolutely disqualifying. Id §§ 67.13(d)(2)(i) (first-class medical certificate); 67.15(d)(2)(i) (second-class certificate); 67.17(d)(2)(i) (third-class certificate).

. Id. §§ 67.13(d)(2)(ii) (first-class medical certificate); 67.15(d)(2)(h) (second-class medical certificate); 67.17(d)(2)(h) (third-class medical certificate) (emphasis supplied).

. Even if the regulations were less explicit in regard to the type of decision to be made, it would be strange indeed for Congress to impose on medical experts the responsibility of determinations requiring expertise in the many other aspects of air safety. And see note 57 infra.

. See text supra at note 50.

. See text supra at note 52.

. See text supra at note 52.

. Aside from clarity of the regulations’ specifications, medical certification is but a part of the much larger process of ascertaining fitness to pilot an aircraft — a process by which fitness from viewpoints other than medical is thoroughly investigated. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.1— 61.201 (1982).

. Beins v. United States, Civ. No. 79-3322 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1981) (findings of fact and conclusions of law), Appendix 1.

. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).