Court Opinion

ID: 9739335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:12:30.600931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.727214
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
On October 2, 1968, the day appellant’s jury trial started, the Noblesville Daily Ledger, a newspaper of general circulation in Hamilton County, printed an article concerning a hearing held on September 30, 1968, on one of appellant’s pre-trial motions. The article said:
“On Monday Judge Edward F. New, Jr. held that three ‘newly discovered witnesses’ in the case may remain unidentified until the trial. The prosecution maintains the three have feared the consequences of testifying. The three were involved in a conversation with Napier in which he stated he was the driver of the car in which Stidham was killed. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The record discloses that not one witness ever testified in the trial of this cause as to a conversation with appellant in which the latter admitted being the driver of the death vehicle. At trial appellant testified that he was not the driver of the car.
On October 3, 1968, appellant called this article to the trial court’s attention and the court held a hearing which revealed *650that five jurors admitted having read the article. The trial court then proceeded to question the jurors in order to determine whether their having read the article would influence their decision in the case. The following is the relevant part of the record of that examination of the jurors:
“Now you folks that read those articles, can you assure me that you can go ahead with this trial without any influence on your decision in this case, based upon anything you read in these articles? You sir? You think you can? I think it’s got to be a little stronger than that. Are you sure you can?
JUROR: I’ll say I’m quite sure.
THE COURT: All right good. Who else here?
JUROR: I’m positive sir.
THE COURT: All right good. Who else sir. Mr. Evans?
JUROR: (Answer is not audible)
THE COURT: Well you know the facts then?
JUROR: Right.
THE COURT: Well what I’m interested in, is whether or not you can continue as a juror during the rest of this trial and deliberate with your fellow jurors without anything that you read having any influence or bearing on your final decision.
JUROR: I can.
THE COURT: You can? About you? Have you read it?
JUROR: Yes I read it.
THE COURT: Can you disregard it?
Juror: (Answer not audible).
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Roberts?
JUROR: No, fact is I don’t think I read anything that wasn’t brought out or that we have already heard here. (Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: All right, good enough. All right show the defendant’s motion is overruled.”
Appellant made a motion for a mistrial which the trial court overruled and it is that ruling which is urged as error on appeal.
*651The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. 1, § 13, of the Constitution of the State of Indiana specifically guarantee to every accused the absolute right to a public trial by an impartial jury. This guarantee necessarily encompasses the requirement that the jury’s verdict be based upon evidence received in open court, not evidence obtained from outside sources. Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U. S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600; Rideau v. Louisiana (1963), 373 U. S. 723, 83 S. Ct. 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663; Baniszewski v. State (1970), Ind., 261 N. E. 2d 359. In Patterson v. Colorado (1907), 205 U. S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556, 51 L. Ed. 879, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
“The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.” 205 U. S. at 462.
The above quoted article was obviously the kind of outside influence which could undermine appellant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and the trial court, when the article was called to his attention by appellant, took the proper first step of determining whether any of the jurors had read the article. The record shows that five jurors admitted having read the article. It was then up to the trial court to decide the ultimate issue of whether there was a “reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news will prevent a fair trial”. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra. The Sheppard test was recently adopted by a unanimous Court in Baniszewski v. State, supra, and is clearly applicable here.
In order to resolve the ultimate issue the trial court proceeded to question the jurors who had read the article to determine whether having read the article would influence their decision in the case. Regardless of whether the trial court’s question reflected the proper legal standard it is clear that in the case of two of the jurors, the record does not permit us to affirm the trial court ruling permitting them to remain on the jury.
*652First, it is clear that the last juror’s answer to the trial court inquiry was ambiguous at best and could reasonably be interpreted as revealing that he had been greatly prejudiced by the article. That response was as follows:
“JUROR: No, fact is I don’t think I read anything that wasn’t brought out or that we have already heard here.”
This answer was given in spite of the fact the juror admitted having read the article which stated that three witnesses would testify that appellant admitted driving the death car, and no such evidence was brought out at trial. It might have been that the juror had already forgotten part of the article and was not being influenced by it. On the other hand it would be reasonable to interpret his response as revealing that he had so absorbed the extra judicial allegation that he. was treating it as if it had come out at the trial. Due to this latter possible interpretation of the juror’s response, I would hold that the trial court erred in permitting the juror to remain on the panel without a thorough probing of his state of mind.
Second, it is obvious that we cannot determine how the fourth juror answered the trial court inquiry because the record merely shows an inaudible response. Therefore, we have no way to know how the juror rated his own ability to be impartial in spite of the article, and thus no way to review the trial court decision to permit the juror to remain on the panel. It is not sufficient to say that since the trial court left the juror on the panel he must have given an adequate answer to the trial court. The United States Supreme Court has held that in cases concerning the pre-judicial impact of media publicity the appellant tribunal has a duty to make an independent evaluation of the relevant facts. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Baniszewski v. State, supra.
I believe my position is support by Marshall v. United States (1959), 360 U. S. 310, 79 S. Ct. 1171, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1250, where the jurors had been exposed through “news accounts” to information concerning the defendant’s prior convictions and *653other past conduct which the trial court ruled too prejudicial to be submitted to the jury. The court described the trial court procedure as follows:
“The trial judge on learning that these news accounts had reached the jurors summoned them into his chamber one by one and inquired if they had seen the articles. Three had read the first of the two . . . and one had read both. Three others had scanned the first article and one of those had also seen the second. Each of the seven told the trial judge that he would not be influenced by the news articles, that he could decide the case only on the evidence of record, and that he felt no prejudice against petitioner as a result of the articles. The trial judge, stating he felt there was no prejudice to petitioner, denied the motion for mistrial.” 360 U. S. at 312.
In spite of that the Supreme Court reversed saying:
“We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. The prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecutor’s evidence. ... It may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by protective procedures.” 360 U. S. at 312, 313.
It is not crucial that in Marshall the evidence disclosed to the jurors in the news reports was ruled legally inadmissible in the trial court. An accused’s constitutional right to an impartial jury is violated when there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s decision will be influenced by facts or allegations that were not presented to the jury during the trial. Why they were not presented to the jury at the time is irrelevant. In Marshall, as in our case, the jurors were exposed to news reports of facts which were never submitted to the jury at the trial. As Justice Holmes said in Patterson v. Colorado, supra:
“The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.” (Emphasis added.)
*654In future cases of this kind I recommend that the trial court follow the procedures outlined in the approved draft of the ABA Standards Eelating to Fair Trial and Free Press. In particular, Standard 3.5(f) reads:
“(f) Questioning jurors about exposure to potentially prejudicial material in the course of the trial; standard for excusing a juror.
“If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial goes beyond the record on which the case is to be submitted to the jury and raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court may on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. The examination shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the examination shall be kept. The standard for excusing a juror who is challenged on the basis of such exposure shall be the same as the standard of acceptability recommended in section 3.4(b), above, except that a juror who has seen or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material shall be excused if reference to the material in question at the trial itself would have required a mistrial to be declared.” (Emphasis added.)
Standard 3.4(b):
“ (b) Standard of acceptability.
“Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror’s testimony as to his state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. A prospective juror who states that he will be unable to overcome his preconceptions shall be subject to challenge for cause no matter how slight his exposure. If he has seen or heard and remembers information that will be developed in the course of trial, or that may be inadmissible but is not so prejudicial as to create a substantial risk that his judgment will be affected, his acceptability shall turn on whether his testimony as to impartiality is believed. If he admits to having formed an opinion, he shall be subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequivocally that he can be impartial. A.prospective juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other incriminating matter's that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to chai*655lenge for cause without regard to his testimony as to his state of mind.”
Under this standard the trial court would have had to excuse the jurors who had read the article in question because any statement at the trial by a witness that there were three other witnesses who would testify that appellant admitted driving the car, when in fact there were no such witnesses would clearly have required a mistrial be declared.
The Standards also set out methods by which the trial court can minimize the publication of prejudicial information at critical times in the criminal process and thus possibly prevent this type of thing from occurring in the future.
Note.—Reported in 266 N. E. 2d 199.