Court Opinion

ID: 88797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:47+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.519773
License: Public Domain

85 U.S. 112 (1873)
18 Wall. 112
BEST
v.
POLK.
Supreme Court of United States.

*114 *115 Mr. T.J.D. Fuller, in support of the ruling below.
Mr. J.W.C. Watson, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
In order to carry out in good faith Indian treaties, effect *116 must be given to the intention of the parties to them; and from the different provisions of the treaties which are applicable to this case, no well-founded doubt can exist of the proper construction to give to the sixth article. The cession in the first treaty contemplated the ultimate abandonment of the lands by the Indians. This treaty did not prove satisfactory, and the Indians asked, and the United States conceded to them, a limited quantity of land for a permanent home. This object could not be obtained if it were meant to give only an equitable title to the Indians. Such a title would soon become complicated by the encroachments of the white race; and that the Indians supposed they were providing for a good title to their "reservations" is manifest enough, because they declare, in the second treaty, that they wish to have the management of their affairs in their own hands.
This disposition, which was natural under the circumstances, the United States yielded to, and agreed, when the body of the lands were surveyed, to reserve from sale certain limited portions on which the reservations should be located. This was done in obedience to a just policy, for it would have been wrong, considering the dependent state of these Indians, to hold them to their original engagement. The United States could not afford to do this, and, therefore, willingly consented to re-cede to the Indians enough lands for their wants. Can it be doubted that it was the intention of both parties to the treaty to clothe the reservees with the full title? If it were not so there would have been some words of limitation indicating a contrary intention. Instead of this there is nothing to show that a further grant, or any additional evidence of title, were contemplated. Nor was this necessary, for the treaty proceeded on the theory that a grant is as valid by a treaty as by an act of Congress, and does not need a patent to perfect it. We conclude, therefore, that the treaty conferred the title to these reservations, which was complete when the locations were made to identify them. This was the view taken of this subject by the highest court of Mississippi soon after this treaty went into *117 operation, in litigations which arose between the white race and the Indians themselves concerning the effect to be given to these reservations.[*] In all these cases the Indian reservee was held to have preference over the subsequent patentee, on the ground that the United States had parted with the title by the treaty. These decisions, furnishing a rule of property on this subject in Mississippi, were not brought to this court for review, as they could have been, but have been acquiesced in for a quarter of a century. To disturb them now would unsettle titles bonâ fide acquired.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a patent is void which attempts to convey lands that have been "previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated."[] "It would be a dangerous doctrine (say the court in New Orleans v. United States[]) to consider the issuing of a grant as conclusive evidence of right in the power which issued it. On its face it is conclusive, and cannot be controverted; but if the thing granted was not in the grantor no right passes to the grantee. A grant has been frequently issued by the United States for land which had been previously granted, and the second grant has been held to be inoperative."
If, therefore, the location of the land in controversy was properly made, the legal title to it was consummated, and the subsequent patent was unauthorized. And this brings us to the consideration of the question whether the evidence on the subject of the location ought to have been received by the court.
This evidence consists of the certificate of the register of the land office at Pontotoc that the reserve of a Chickasaw Indian (naming him) was located on the disputed section in June, 1839, under the provisions of the sixth article of the Chickasaw treaty, and a copy of the roll, number, reserve, *118 and location is given, showing this to be the case. It is insisted that this certificate did not go far enough; that it ought to have shown that a list, including this Indian, was furnished by the seven chiefs to the agent, and that the agent certified to the register and receiver, prior to the location, that he believed the list to be accurate. If this were so no presumption could arise that local land officers, charged with the performance of a duty, had discharged it in conformity with law.
It would be a hard rule to hold that the reservees under this treaty, in case of contest, were required to prove not only that the locations were made by the proper officers, but that the conditions on which these officers were authorized to act had been observed by them. Such a rule would impose a burden upon the reservees not contemplated by the treaty, and, of necessity, leave their titles in an unsettled state. The treaty granted the land, but the location had to be fixed before the grant could become operative. After this was done, the estate became vested and the right to it perfect, as much so as if the grant had been directly executed to the reservee. It has been frequently held by this court that a grant raises a presumption that the incipient steps required to give it validity have been taken.[*]
The grant, in this case, was complete when the location was made, and the location is, in itself, evidence that the directions of the treaty on the subject were observed, and it cannot be presumed that the officers empowered to make the location violated their duty. Even if the agent neglected to annex a proper certificate to the roll of Indians entitled to the reservations, it is difficult to see how the Indians could be prejudiced by this neglect. We conclude, therefore, that the certificate of the register was competent evidence, and if the locations were not as there stated, it is easy for the plaintiff below to show that fact. The same effect was given to a similar certificate of this same officer, *119 by the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, as early as 1848, in an action of ejectment brought by a Chickasaw Indian, for a tract of land claimed by him in virtue of a location made in his behalf as a reservee, against a party claiming by patent subsequent in date to the location of his reservation. And this decision was reaffirmed by the same court in 1854, in the case of another Indian suing for his land under similar circumstances.[*] It must have been supposed at the time by the losing parties that these decisions were correct, or else the opinion of this court would have been asked on the point involved. After such a length of acquiescence, it would produce great mischief to hold this evidence to be incompetent.
It is objected that the paper offered in evidence should have been certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office; but this was not necessary, for copies of records appertaining to the land office, certified by the register, are evidence in Mississippi, and similar statutes exist in nearly all the Western and Southwestern States.[]
Another objection is taken to the certificate of Edmondson, on the ground that when it was given his term of office had expired. This objection cannot be sustained, for the certificate bears date the 2d March, 1849, and he was commissioned to hold the office of register "during the term of four years from the 2d day of March, 1845." The word "from" always excludes the day of date.[]
It is argued that in ejectment a stranger to the outstanding title cannot invoke it to defeat the action. Whether this be so or not depends on the laws of the State; but the point does not arise in this case, for there was no opportunity for the defendant to connect himself with the Indian title after the court refused to let the evidence on the subject of this title go to the jury.
*120 The decision respecting this evidence necessarily disposed of the case.
JUDGMENT REVERSED, and a
VENIRE DE NOVO AWARDED.
NOTES
[*]  Wray v. Doe, 10 Smedes & Marshall, 461; Newman v. Doe, 4 Howard (Mississippi), 555; Niles et al. v. Anderson et al., 5 Id. 365; Coleman v. Doe, 4 Smedes & Marshall, 46.
[]  Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 Howard, 284; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 728; Reickart v. Felps, 6 Wallace, 160.
[]  10 Peters, 731
[*]  Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 5 Wheaton, 293; Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Peters, 436.
[*]  Wray v. Doe, 10 Smedes & Marshall, 452; Hardin v. Ho-yo-ho-Nubby's Lessee, 27 Mississippi, 567.
[]  See Revised Code of Mississippi.
[]  See 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 385, and the authorities therein cited.