Court Opinion

ID: 9392629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 18:00:44.21278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:47.336211
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30546        Document: 00516739994             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                         May 5, 2023
                                      No. 22-30546                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   Vanoy Allen,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Incorporated,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee,

   Our Lady of the Lake Hospital Physicians Group, L.L.C.,

                                               Respondent—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 3:19-CV-575
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Dennis, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Vanoy Allen alleges she was subjected to a hostile work environment
   due to her race while employed at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 22-30546

   (Hospital) and brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She further alleges
   that this treatment constituted constructive discharge in violation of Title VII
   and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
   of the Hospital on both claims. Because Allen failed to raise a genuine dispute
   of material fact as to whether her treatment rose to the level of a hostile work
   environment or constructive discharge and the evidence is insufficient as a
   matter of law to support her claims, we affirm.
                                          I
          Allen began working as a registered nurse (RN) at the Hospital in
   2011, then in 2012 was in the Cardiac Intensive Care Unit (CICU), and
   transferred to the Heart and Vascular Universal Cardiac Unit (HVCU) in
   2013. In December 2014, Allen changed her employment status from RN to
   PRN, which indicated that she worked on an “as needed” basis to provide
   supplemental staffing. Evidence in the record indicates PRNs did not receive
   the same benefits as fulltime nurses. She continued to work as a PRN until
   she resigned in October 2018.
          When Allen was categorized as an RN, she performed some shifts as
   a charge nurse, a position with higher pay. However, she stopped receiving
   charge nurse shifts when she voluntarily changed her employment status to
   PRN. Kathy Hussain, a supervisor, testified that generally, the expectations
   were that PRN nurses would not perform in the charge role and generally
   would not admit patients directly from the Operating Room immediately post
   open heart surgery.
          Allen alleges she faced discrimination while working at the Hospital.
   She filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
   Commission (EEOC) on December 15, 2017, alleging discrimination based
   on race, age, and retaliation. The EEOC found no cause and issued a right to
   sue letter in 2019. Allen then filed this lawsuit pro se.

                                          2
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                                           No. 22-30546

          In her complaint, Allen alleged racial discrimination, racial
   harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1
   and Louisiana state law; racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
   § 1981; and intentional infliction of emotional distress and age discrimination
   under Louisiana state law. The Hospital filed a motion for partial dismissal,
   and the district court dismissed: Allen’s race discrimination, harassment, age
   discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought
   under state law; hostile work environment and harassment claims to the
   extent they went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge; and allegations
   relating to discrete acts of discrimination more than three hundred days
   before the EEOC charge.
          Allen then retained counsel and filed an amended complaint, which
   asserted a race-based hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
   and constructive discharge and retaliation claims under Title VII and 42
   U.S.C. § 1981. The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, which
   Allen opposed as to her hostile work environment and constructive discharge
   claims. She did not oppose the motion for summary judgment regarding her
   retaliation claim.
          The district court granted the Hospital’s motion for summary
   judgment. The district court entered final judgment, and Allen timely
   appealed the dismissal of her hostile work environment and constructive
   discharge claims. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
   U.S.C. § 1291.
          The district court summarized Allen’s evidence as:
          [T]he sum of Plaintiffs[’] competent summary judgment
          evidence shows the following: Dr. Boedefeld publicly
          _____________________
          1
              42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

                                                3
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          complained that Plaintiff was hired only because she was Black
          (in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld twice refused to discuss cases
          with Plaintiff (in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld twice publicly
          yelled at Plaintiff (in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld once
          “questioned” Plaintiff’s supervisor (in 2017); a co-worker
          once publicly referred to Plaintiff as a “bitch” (in 2016);
          Supervisor Hussain once said at a staff meeting “Vanoy you
          don’t have a voice” (unspecified date); Plaintiff once
          requested to work a shift in the CICU, and the shift was
          awarded instead to two “full-time nurses” from another unit
          (in 2018); and, finally, Supervisor Hussain once refused
          Plaintiffs[’] request for a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s annual
          performance review (in 2018).
   The district court concluded that “[e]ven assuming that all of the foregoing
   slights were racially motivated, the aggregate of these insults falls well-short
   of what is required to save a hostile work environment claim from summary
   judgment” and that the burden for a constructive discharge claim was even
   higher.
          Allen argues that the district court also should have credited
   (1) evidence that white nurses Paulette Savoy and Dani Coss were given
   charge nurse duties while under PRN status, which resulted in higher pay,
   even though Allen was not; (2) testimony from Melissa White, a secretary,
   indicating “that white nurses were given charge nurse shifts 90% of the
   time;” (3) testimony from Barbara Hill that Dr. Boedefeld made generalized
   complaints about black nurses when Allen was not present and “reneged on
   a directive to fire a nurse upon learning she was white, and not black;”
   (4) unauthenticated interview notes from Samantha Valentine showing that
   white nurses were permitted to attend a training that black nurses were not;
   and (5) evidence a co-worker once referred to Allen as “hostile” when
   talking to a supervisor.

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                                                    II
             We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standard as the district court.2 “We will affirm the district
   court’s decision if we ‘find that no genuine issue of material fact remained
   for trial and that judgment was proper as a matter of law.’”3 “An issue of
   material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
   nonmovant,”4 and the “facts must be particularized, not vague or
   conclusory.”5 “While we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
   the nonmoving party, ‘conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated
   assertions may not be relied on as evidence by the nonmoving party.’”6 We
   will first address Allen’s hostile work environment claim and then address
   her constructive discharge claim.
                                                    A
             Allen argues that the district court erred in dismissing her hostile work
   environment claim. As the district court explained, courts apply the same
   rubric to analyze racial discrimination claims under Title VII and under 42

             _____________________
             2
              See West v. City of Hous., 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing
   Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2019)).
             3
             Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
   Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 56(a).
             4
            Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
             5
            Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Kariuki
   v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 505 (5th Cir. 2013)).
             6
                 West, 960 F.3d at 740 (citing Carnaby v. City of Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir.
   2011)).

                                                     5
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   U.S.C. § 1981.7              “To survive summary judgment on a hostile work
   environment claim based on race . . . discrimination, a plaintiff must show
   that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered unwelcomed
   harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her membership in a protected
   class; (4) the harassment ‘affected a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment’; and (5) ‘the employer knew or should have known’ about the
   harassment and ‘failed to take prompt remedial action.’”8                                  “To be
   actionable, the work environment must be ‘both objectively and subjectively
   offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one
   that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’”9
             The district court’s analysis primarily assessed the fourth factor,
   whether the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or
   privilege of employment. “To affect a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment, the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
   the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
   environment.”10 “The alleged conduct must be objectively and subjectively
   hostile or abusive,” and “[t]he totality of the employment circumstances
   determines whether an environment is objectively hostile.”11 “Although no
   single factor is determinative, pertinent considerations are (1) ‘the frequency
   of the discriminatory conduct’; (2) ‘its severity’; (3) ‘whether it is physically
             _____________________
             7
            See Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021); Lauderdale v.
   Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007).
             8
                  West, 960 F.3d at 741 (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir.
   2002)).
             9
             Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
   Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)).
             10
              West, 960 F.3d at 741-42 (quoting Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d
   473, 479 (5th Cir. 2008)).
             11
                  Id. at 742 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993)).

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                                             No. 22-30546

   threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance’; and (4) ‘whether
   it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’”12 In
   determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, we consider
   whether a reasonable jury could find the conduct so severe or pervasive as to
   alter a term or condition of employment.13 We agree with the district court
   that Allen failed to provide evidence that would defeat summary judgment.
                                                   1
           We begin by analyzing whether the evidence credited by the district
   court is sufficient for Allen’s claim to survive summary judgment. First,
   although we do not require a plaintiff to show a certain number of instances
   of harassment,14 Allen has failed to show that the harassment she faced was
   frequent.15 The evidence credited by the district court consists of ten

           _____________________
           12
                Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
           13
                See Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2005).
           14
              See E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Under
   the totality of the circumstances test, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe,
   could give rise to a viable Title VII claim as well as a continuous pattern of much less severe
   incidents of harassment.” (citations omitted)).
           15
              Compare West, 960 F.3d at 742 (concluding plaintiff failed to show her
   harassment was frequent or pervasive when some conduct occurred “once,” “twice,” or
   “occasionally” and plaintiff failed to provide evidence of frequency of “other complained-
   of conduct”), Mendoza v. Helicopter, 548 F. App’x 127, 129 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (“[T]he complained of conduct occurred sporadically over a several year
   period and cannot accurately be described as pervasive.”), and Hockman v. Westward
   Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding conduct was not
   pervasive when the plaintiff “did not even estimate how many times [the] conduct
   occurred”), with Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2011)
   (holding a genuine dispute existed when the plaintiff “endured a pattern of name-calling of
   a half-dozen times daily” that “may have interfered with his pecuniary interests” and
   when, “[o]n many occasions, there were incidents of physical intimidation and/or
   violence” involving the plaintiff’s supervisor), Lauderdale v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just., 512
   F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding harassment pervasive when plaintiff received
   unwanted phone calls “ten to fifteen times a night for almost four months”), and Farpella-

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                                                No. 22-30546

   incidents over seven years. Allen argues that the district court erred by
   requiring her to show she suffered from severe and pervasive conduct
   amounting to a certain number of harassing incidents. Allen is correct that
   the standard is severe or pervasive and that, by requiring conduct to be both
   severe and pervasive, the district court “impose[d] a more stringent burden
   on [her] than required by law.”16                     Even so, none of her allegations
   substantiated by evidence are sufficiently egregious that they are actionable
   without being pervasive.17
           Additionally, Allen has failed to show that the alleged actions were
   severe, physically threatening, or humiliating. Hostile work environment
   claims are not intended to function as a “general civility code.”18 Sporadic
   use of abusive language, one shift denial, and one refused meeting are not
   severe or humiliating under the governing standard,19 and Allen has not
   alleged any physical threats.

           _____________________
   Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding harassing
   conduct was pervasive when it was described as occurring “two or three times a week”).
           16
                See Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435.
           17
              See id. at 435-36; Dailey v. Shintech, Inc., 629 F. App’x 638, 640, 644 (5th Cir.
   2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming grant of summary judgment for employer on
   hostile work environment claim even though plaintiff’s supervisor called him “a ‘black
   little motherf—r’ on at least two occasions,” the supervisor said “he would ‘kick his black
   a—s,’” and a coworker called plaintiff “a ‘ni—er’”).
           18
             See Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 163 (“Title VII . . . is not a ‘general civility code,’ and
   ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
   not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”
   (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998))).
           19
              See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (“Properly applied, [the standards for judging
   hostility] will filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace,
   such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional
   teasing.’”) (quoting B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in
   Employment Law 175 (1992)); Vallecillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 155 F.
   App’x 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (concluding that supervisors

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           Finally, Allen has not alleged that these actions prevented her from
   succeeding in the workplace. On the contrary, she argues that “[t]he fact
   that Allen continued to perform her job well, and that [the Hospital] did not
   discipline her, or terminate her employment in the traditional sense, should
   not detract from [Allen]’s showing of pervasive or severe conduct sufficient
   to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.”
           Therefore, even assuming, as the district court did, that all the actions
   were based on Allen’s race, the evidence is insufficient to survive summary
   judgment.20 Objectively, a reasonable person would not find the actions
   Allen experienced to be offensive enough to constitute a hostile work
   environment.21         We now turn to the evidence that Allen argues was
   improperly credited or not credited by the district court.

           _____________________
   calling the plaintiff “Che Guevara” and an “aggressive Hispanic” were “not sufficiently
   severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment” “even if these statements
   can be classified as racially offensive”).
           20
               See, e.g., Friend v. McAdams, 861 F. App’x 825, 830 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (concluding evidence African American employee was assigned to work
   under captain who (1) did not like black people; (2) screamed at her; (3) did not name her
   to her preferred position’ (4) refused to meet with her; (5) stated she would not be around
   much longer; (6) directed a supervisor to write up things she did wrong; (7) became upset
   when her name was mentioned; and (8) required her in her role as a police officer to dismiss
   tickets issued to white people did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive); Harris v. Drax
   Biomass Inc., 813 F. App’x 945, 948 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding
   evidence that plaintiff (1) was yelled at for not doing job correctly; (2) requested but did not
   receive training on certain equipment; (3) heard racist comments made by supervisor to a
   different African American employee; and (4) would not be allowed by supervisor to wait
   in a group of African American employees for work to begin to be insufficiently severe or
   pervasive).
           21
                See Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009).

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                                         2
          Allen argues that the district court erred by crediting testimony from
   Hussain that PRN nurses would generally not perform the charge nurse role.
   Allen argues that (1) her testimony and the testimony of Coss and Savoy
   discredit the testimony of Hussain; (2) the written guidelines were not
   created until after she was denied charge nurse shifts; and (3) Hussain is an
   interested witness. Allen’s testimony included “that she believed she was
   denied charge nurse shifts because of her race” and that she asked Hussain
   and her supervisors why she was not given charge nurse shifts and they
   responded with no reason until eventually informing her that it was because
   she was a PRN. Coss and Savoy’s testimony included that they were white
   and received charge nurse shifts despite being PRN nurses.
          The district court explained that Allen “fail[ed] to specifically cite
   evidence controverting that PRN nurses ‘provide supplemental staffing’”
   and “traditionally did ‘not perform in the charge role and generally would
   not admit patients directly from the Operating Room immediately post open
   heart surgery.” The district court, citing Allen’s opposition to summary
   judgment, concluded that “a fair reading of her evidence tends to support”
   certain shifts not generally being available to nurses with PRN status. In
   explaining why it did not credit Allen’s evidence of discriminatory shift
   denials, the district court stated that “Plaintiff contends that from 2014
   onward, [the Hospital] systematically refused to schedule her for charge
   nurse shifts or for fresh post open heart surgery shifts—i.e., precisely the
   shifts that were not traditionally available to PRNs under [the Hospital’s]
   unwritten and written guidance.”
          Evidence that two white PRN nurses received charge nurse shifts,
   Allen’s supervisors did not immediately provide her with an explanation for
   her shift assignments, and a policy not initially in writing does not create a

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   genuine dispute of material fact regarding a hostile work environment. Allen
   admits that she acted as a charge nurse while she worked as an RN but
   stopped receiving charge nurse shifts when she voluntarily changed to PRN
   status. Additionally, Allen admitted in her opposition to summary judgment
   that the Hospital had a policy regarding tasks for PRN nurses, though she
   disputed that it was consistently applied. Allen has failed to show a genuine
   dispute of material fact as to why she was denied charge nurse shifts after
   changing to PRN status.
                                         3
          Allen argues that the district court “erroneously raised or altered
   Allen’s burden of proof and erroneously declined to consider CSR White’s
   deposition testimony.” In her deposition, White testified that she could not
   remember how often white nurses would be assigned charge nurse shifts and
   could not remember having previously told Allen’s counsel that ninety
   percent of the time charge shift nurses were white. However, Allen’s counsel
   played back a recording of a prior conversation to refresh White’s memory.
   After her recollection was refreshed, White was asked: “Is that correct, then,
   your belief that about 90 percent of the time the white nurses would be given
   charge nurse shifts?” and responded: “Yes, because it may have had seven
   Caucasian nurses versus three black nurses, but the seven Caucasian nurses
   may have had more experience at being a charge nurse.”
          The district court stated that if it was established that ninety percent
   of the time white nurses were assigned to be charge nurses, “conceivably”
   that “could be relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claims of hostile work
   environment and constructive discharge.” However, it stated “that this
   testimony is too vague and conclusory for purposes of creating an issue of fact
   at summary judgment. Accordingly, it is disregarded.”

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           Allen argues the district court placed a higher burden on her than is
   appropriate at summary judgement because it required her to “‘definitively’
   establish or prove that white nurses were given charge nurse shifts 90% of the
   time” whereas she only needed to raise a genuine issue of fact. Further, she
   argues that the testimony was not vague or conclusory. However, we agree
   with the district court that, especially in light of the conflicting evidence that
   Allen was denied the shifts due to her status as a PRN, White’s testimony
   was too vague to raise a genuine issue of fact. It was proper for the district
   court to disregard the evidence on this ground.22
                                                 4
           Finally, we need not decide whether the district court erred by not
   crediting (1) testimony from Barbara Hill that Dr. Boedefeld made
   generalized complaints about black nurses when Allen was not present and
   “reneged on a directive to fire a nurse upon learning she was white, and not
   black;” (2) unauthenticated interview notes from Samantha Valentine
   showing white nurses were permitted to attend training that black nurses
   were not; and (3) evidence that a co-worker once referred to Allen as
   “hostile” when talking to a supervisor. Assuming arguendo that this evidence
   is credible, it shows that complaints were made about black nurses outside of

           _____________________
           22
             See Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen
   we have held self-serving affidavits or depositions insufficient to create a fact issue, it is
   because their contents were either conclusory, vague, or not based on personal
   knowledge.” (citations omitted)); Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 505 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (“[W]ithout more, a vague or conclusory affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine issue
   of material fact in the face of conflicting probative evidence.” (citation omitted)); TIG Ins.
   Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating a non-movant
   cannot defeat summary judgment by presenting “conclus[ory] allegations and denials,
   speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
   argumentation” (citation omitted)).

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                                            No. 22-30546

   Allen’s presence,23 Allen may have missed one training event,24 and a
   coworker once insulted Allen. Even were we to consider this additional
   evidence, the totality of the evidence is insufficient to support a hostile work
   environment claim.
           Allen argues for the first time in her reply brief that other evidence
   also created genuine issues of material fact. However, issues raised for the
   first time in a reply brief are forfeited.25
           We agree with the district court that Allen has failed to raise a genuine
   dispute of material fact regarding whether the harassment was severe or
   pervasive. We therefore do not address the remaining factors. Because the
   district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of
   material fact as to Allen’s hostile work environment claim and that the
   Hospital was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the
   dismissal of Allen’s hostile work environment claim.
                                                  B
           Allen argues that the evidence above creates genuine issues of material
   fact which preclude the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment as to
   Allen’s constructive discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII.
   As the district court ably explained, “[t]o prove a constructive discharge, a
   ‘plaintiff must establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a

           _____________________
           23
              See Septimus v. Univ. of Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 612 (5th Cir. 2005) (examining sex-
   based hostile work environment and stating “[a]ll of [plaintiff]’s other summary judgment
   evidence on this claim pertained to other women in the [company], not [plaintiff], and
   therefore is not relevant”).
           24
             See Harris v. Drax Biomass Inc., 813 F. App’x 945, 948 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (holding evidence not severe or pervasive even though plaintiff
   requested but did not receive training on certain equipment).
           25
                See United States v. Ponce, 896 F.3d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

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                                           No. 22-30546

   reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’”26 This “requires a
   greater degree of harassment than that required by a hostile environment
   claim.”27 The district court correctly reasoned that because Allen did not
   show a sufficiently hostile environment to support a hostile work
   environment claim, she cannot succeed on her constructive discharge
   claim.28 We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
                                                 C
           Finally, Allen argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on
   her motion to compel discovery prior to ruling on summary judgment.
   According to Allen, the motion to compel discovery requested information
   regarding “potential comparators.”                 The district court reasoned that
   comparator evidence could not save Allen’s hostile work environment or
   constructive discharge claims “because such evidence is not relevant to the
   dispositive issue of whether [Allen] was subjected to objectively severe,
   pervasive, and/or intolerable harassment” and Allen had “waived the right
   to argue that comparator evidence is relevant . . . by failing to even brief the
   issue.” An argument is forfeited if the party with the burden of proof or
   persuasion fails to brief it in the district court.29 We therefore do not address
   it here.

           _____________________
           26
              Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Faruki v.
   Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997)).
           27
            Id. (citing Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir.1998)); see also
   Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 167 (5th Cir. 2007).
           28
             See Vallecillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 155 F. App’x 764, 768 (5th Cir.
   2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citation omitted).
           29
                See Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2017).

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Case: 22-30546   Document: 00516739994           Page: 15   Date Filed: 05/05/2023

                                  No. 22-30546

                              *        *         *
         The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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