Court Opinion

ID: 9430622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:13.274169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.254920
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the “ends of justice” would be served by plenary consideration of respondent’s second federal habeas petition and that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), directly controls the merits of this case, I dissent.
I — I
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), we held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive petition for habeas relief or its equivalent under 28 U. S. C. §2255 where “the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.” The decision whether to hear a successive petition, we stated, was committed “to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges.” Id., at 18. We declined to define precisely “the *462ends of justice,” observing that the phrase “cannot be too finely particularized.” Id., at 17.
Today four Members of the Court argue that we should reject Sanders’ “sound discretion” standard and contend that the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence.1 Ante, at 454, and n. 17. In support of this standard for consideration of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist theory of this Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence. The plurality implies that federal habeas review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal petition a properly preserved claim that his conviction was obtained in violation of constitutional commands. Rather, the plurality suggests that a prisoner is entitled to habeas relief only if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incarceration outweighs the State’s interests in the administration of its criminal laws. Ante, at 452-453, and nn. 14-16. The plurality further intimates that federal review of state-court convictions under 28 U. S. C. §2254 is predicated solely on the need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent person, stating that “[djespite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas review imposes upon the States], Congress has continued to afford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, ‘recognizing the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty.’” Ante, at 454, n. 16 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491-492, n. 31 (1976)). Having thus implied that factual innocence is central to our habeas jurisprudence generally, the plurality declares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of “the ends of justice.” Neither the plurality’s standard for *463consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative history, or our precedents.2
*464At least since the middle of this century, when we decided Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), it has been clear that “habeas lies to inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial,” Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 685-686 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.), that has not been procedurally defaulted, with the narrow exception of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. Stone v. Powell, supra. As we stated just two Terms ago, there is “no doubt that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to ‘interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action.’” Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972)).
Contrary to the plurality’s assertions, the Court has never delineated the general scope of the writ by weighing the competing interests of the prisoner and the State. Our cases addressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitutional error made at trial or on appeal have balanced these interests solely with respect to claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court. See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982); Murray v. Carrier, post, p. 478. Recognizing that “the State’s interest in the integrity of its rules and proceedings and the finality of its judgments . . . would be undermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore procedural forfeitures in state court,” Reed v. Ross, supra, at 10, we held in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, that a state prisoner generally must show cause and actual prejudice in order to obtain federal habeas corpus relief of a procedurally defaulted claim. See also Engle v. Isaac, supra. But even as we established the cause-and-prejudiee standard in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, we emphasized that the “rule” of Brown v. Allen, supra, “that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have the *465federal habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim ... is in no way changed,” by our adoption of special rules for procedurally defaulted claims. Waimuright v. Sykes, swpra, at 87.3
Furthermore, Stone v. Powell, supra, on which the plurality heavily relies, did not establish a new regime for federal habeas corpus under which the prisoner’s interests are weighed against the State’s interests and under which he usually forfeits habeas review unless he can make out a color-able showing of factual innocence or unless the constitutional right he seeks to protect generally furthers the accuracy of factfinding at trial. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, the Court expressly stated that its “decision . . . [was] not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally.” Id., at 495, n. 37 (emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply “reaffirm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . . emphasized] the minimal utility of the [exclusionary] rule” in the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. Subsequent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as creating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limitations on federal habeas review to any other context. Kimmelman v. Morrison, ante, p. 365 (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment right to effective-assistance-of-counsel claims where the principal allegation and manifestation of inadequate representation is counsel’s *466failure to litigate adequately a Fourth Amendment claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to claims of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to claims by state prisoners that the evidence in support of their convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required under In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)).
Despite the plurality’s intimations, we simply have never held that federal habeas review of properly presented, nondefaulted constitutional claims is limited either to constitutional protections that advance the accuracy of the factfinding process at trial or is available solely to prisoners who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence. On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas review “what we have to deal with is not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved.” Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Congress has vested habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases in which the petitioner claims he has been detained “in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3), and, “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty alike.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, ante, at 380. Thus:
“Even if punishment of the ‘guilty’ were society’s highest value ... in a constitution that [some] Members of this Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities under the Constitution forged by the Framers .... Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason be denied at the trial itself. What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication of such rights on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights *467at trial?” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 523-525 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The habeas statute itself certainly does not provide any justification, either for limiting the scope of habeas review generally or for narrowly defining the ends of justice to make ha-beas relief available on a successive petition only to prisoners who can make a colorable showing of factual innocence.
With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review, § 2241, which grants federal courts the statutory authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State and the prisoner. In pertinent part, it states simply that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3). Nor does anything in the legislative history of the habeas statute support the view that Congress intended to limit habeas review in the manner proposed by the Court. For more than 30 years, our construction of the habeas statute to permit federal collateral review of virtually all nondefaulted constitutional claims — with the narrow exception, over dissent, of Fourth Amendment claims — without reference to actual guilt or innocence or to the competing interests of the State and the prisoner, has been unmistakably clear. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953). Several times during this period, Congress has had the Court’s interpretation expressly brought to its attention through bills proposing drastic revision of federal habeas jurisdiction. See L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies §19, pp. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant bills introduced in past several Congresses). Each of those times, Congress steadfastly refused to make any significant changes in this Court’s construction of that jurisdiction. Id., §19, at 92 (“[S]ince 1948 the only amendments to the [habeas] statutes that the Congress has approved have . . . simply tracked contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions”) (footnote omitted). The fact that *468Congress has been made aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to leave it undisturbed, “lends powerful support to [its] continued viability.” Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409, 419 (1986).
With regard to the specific question whether factual innocence is a precondition for review of a successive habeas petition, neither § 2244(b) — which governs applications for writs of habeas corpus to state courts that are filed subsequent to the disposition of a prior federal habeas petition, its legislative history, nor the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (hereafter Rules Governing Section 2254), support the plurality’s position. Section 2244(b), as amended in 1966, states in relevant part that a subsequent petition “need not be entertained . . . unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court... is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.” (Emphasis added.) By its very terms, then, § 2244(b) merely informs district courts that they need not consider successive petitions; that is, the statute gives district courts the discretion not to hear such petitions. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which were adopted in 1976, states that a “second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.” (Emphasis added.)
Congress clearly intended that courts continue to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear by reference to the Sanders ends-of-justice standard. First, nothing in the House or Senate Reports accompanying the bill that amended §2244 in 1966 suggests that Congress *469wished to abandon the Sanders standard. See H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Second, the legislative history of the Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders.4 H. R. Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). Third, the Advisory Committee’s Notes relating to Rule 9(b) state that Sanders provides the relevant standards for subsequent petitions and indicate that the district courts have the discretion to refuse to entertain vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions:
“In Sanders y. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the court, in dealing with the problem of successive applications, stated:
“ ‘Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.’ [Emphasis added].”
“Sanders, [28] U. S. C. §2244, and [Rule 9(b)] make it clear that the court has the discretion to entertain a successive application.
“Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not *470eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out:
“‘Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.’ 373 U. S. at 18.
“. . . In rare instances, the court may feel a need to entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U. S. at 1, 16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discouraged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough to require a means of dealing with them. For example, a successive application, already decided on the merits, may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge in multijudge courts. . . . This subdivision is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions ... so that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and fuller consideration.” 28 U. S. C., p. 358.
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that the problem Rule 9(b), or § 2244(b), seeks to correct is that of a guilty prisoner seeking repeated federal review of the same constitutional claim. Rather, it is apparent that the Rule attempts to remedy only the problem posed by vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions. The Committee explicitly contemplated, though, that nonabusive, “meritorious [subsequent] petitions” would receive “ful[l] consideration.” Ibid.
When we review habeas cases, our task is “to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction enacted by Congress.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). With respect to successive habeas petitions, giving “fair effect” to the intent of Congress is to construe “the ends of justice” as Sanders did — to mean that it is within the sound discretion of the court to refuse to hear abusive, meritless petitions and to hear petitions in which the prisoner advances a potentially meritorious claim and provides a good justifi*471cation for returning to court a second time with the same claim.5
In the instant case, respondent alleged a potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim. He also advanced a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time with this claim. Between his first and second federal habeas petitions, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), a case in which the facts were substantially similar to the facts of respondent’s case6 and in which we elaborated on the Sixth Amendment’s prohibition against government interference with an accused’s right to counsel, a prohibition that we had previously recognized in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977). The intervention of Henry, supra, clarified the appropriate analysis for Sixth Amendment claims like respondent’s; thus the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion by granting reconsideration of respondent’s constitutional claim under the dispositive legal standard.7
*472I — I I — I
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred with respect to the merits of respondent’s habeas petition. According to the Court, the Court of Appeals failed to accord §2254(d)’s presumption of correctness to the state trial court’s findings that respondent’s cellmate, Lee, “at no time asked any questions” of respondent concerning the pending charges, and that Lee only listened to respondent’s “spontaneous” and “unsolicited” statements, App. 62-63. As a result, the Court concludes, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that this case presents the question, reserved in Henry, swpra, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission into evidence of an accused’s statements to a jailhouse informant who was “placed in close proximity but [made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.” Id., at 271, n. 9. I disagree with the Court’s characterization of the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the state court’s findings and, consequently, I disagree with the Court that the instant case presents the “listening post” question.
The state trial court simply found that Lee did not ask respondent any direct questions about the crime for which respondent was incarcerated. App. 62-63. The trial court considered the significance of this fact only under state precedents, which the court interpreted to require affirmative “interrogation” by the informant as a prerequisite to a constitutional violation. Id., at 63. The court did not indicate whether it referred to a Fifth Amendment or to a Sixth Amendment violation in identifying “interrogation” as a precondition to a violation; it merely stated that “the utterances made by [respondent] to Lee were unsolicited, and volun*473tarily made and did not violate the defendant’s Constitutional rights.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state court’s finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions regarding the crime. Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741, 745 (CA2 1984) (“[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct questions . . .”), but concluded that, as a matter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry, supra, and Massiah, supra, encompasses other, more subtle forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt questioning. The court suggested that the police deliberately placed respondent in a cell that overlooked the scene of the crime, hoping that the view would trigger an inculpatory comment to respondent’s cellmate.8 The court also observed that, while Lee asked respondent no questions, Lee nonetheless stimulated conversation concerning respondents’ role in the Star Taxicab Garage robbery and murder by remarking that respondent’s exculpatory story did not “ ‘sound too good’ ” and that he had better come up with a better one. 742 F. 2d, at 745. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent’s case did not present the situation reserved in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminating remark within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who “makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.” 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. Instead, the court determined this case to be virtually indistinguishable from Henry.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as the “medium” between himself and the State. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 176 (1985). Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment “imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused’s choice to *474seek [the assistance of counsel],” id., at 171, and therefore “[t]he determination whether particular action by state agents violates the accused’s right to . . . counsel must be made in light of this obligation.” Id.,, at 176. To be sure, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever, “by luck or happenstance,” the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. It is violated, however, when “the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). As we explained in Henry, where the accused has not waived his right to counsel, the government knowingly circumvents the defendant’s right to counsel where it “deliberately elicit[s]” inculpatory admissions, 447 U. S., at 270, that is, “intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel.” Id., at 274.
In Henry, we found that the Federal Government had “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements from Henry based on the following circumstances. The jailhouse informant, Nichols, had apparently followed instructions to obtain information without directly questioning Henry and without initiating conversations concerning the charges pending against Henry. We rejected the Government’s argument that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. We pointed out that under Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), it is irrelevant whether the informant asks pointed questions about the crime or “merely engage[s] in general conversation about it.” 447 U. S., at 271-272, and n. 10. Nichols, we noted, “was not a passive listener; ... he had ‘some conversations with Mr. Henry’ while he was in jail and Henry’s incriminatory statements were ‘the product of this conversation.’” Id., at 271.
*475In deciding that Nichols’ role in these conversations amounted to deliberate elicitation, we also found three other factors important. First, Nichols was to be paid for any information he produced and thus had an incentive to extract inculpatory admissions from Henry. Id., at 270. Second, Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as an informant. Ibid. “Conversation stimulated in such circumstances,” we observed, “may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents.” Id., at 273. Third, Henry was in custody at the time he spoke with Nichols. This last fact is significant, we stated, because “custody imposes pressures on the accused [and] confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents.” Id., at 274. We concluded that by “intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcerated and therefore was “susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents.” Ibid. Like Nichols, Lee was a secret informant, usually received consideration for the services he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to produce the information which he knew the police hoped to obtain. Just as Nichols had done, Lee obeyed instructions not to question respondent and to report to the police any statements made by the respondent in Lee’s presence about the crime in question. App. 62. And, like Nichols, Lee encouraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing with him on the subject over the course of several days and by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not convince anyone without more work. However, unlike the situation in Henry, a disturbing visit from respondent’s brother, rather than a conversation with the informant, seems to have been the immediate catalyst for respondent’s *476confession to Lee. Ante, at 440; Wilson v. Henderson, 82 Civ. 4397 (SDNY, Mar. 30, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a-26a. While it might appear from this sequence of events that Lee’s comment regarding respondent’s story and his general willingness to converse with respondent about the crime were not the immediate causes of respondent’s admission, I think that the deliberate-elicitation standard requires consideration of the entire course of government behavior.
The State intentionally created a situation in which it was forseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, Henry, 447 U. S., at 274 — it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of the crime and designated a secret informant to be respondent’s cellmate. The informant, while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a relationship of cellmate camaraderie with respondent and encouraged him to talk about his crime. While the coup de grace was delivered by respondent’s brother, the groundwork for respondent’s confession was laid by the State. Clearly the State’s actions had a sufficient nexus with respondent’s admission of guilt to constitute deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 While a majority of the Court today rejects, either implicitly or explicitly, this argument, I believe it appropriate to explain why the plurality’s view is incorrect.

 The plurality asserts, ante, at 456-456, n. 18, that it addresses only the standard applicable to successive habeas petitions and that I mis-eharacterize its opinion by suggesting that the dictum, contained in Part II-B of the plurality’s opinion, regarding the purpose and the scope of the Great Writ has any significance. While the plurality correctly states that what would have been the holding of Part III of its opinion, had that Part commanded a Court, would have directly governed only successive petitions, methinks my Brothers and Sister protest too much about their general discussion of the writ. In order to mask the fact that it fashions its factual-innocence standard from whole cloth, the plurality attempts to justify that standard by reference to the plurality’s view of “the historic purpose of habeas corpus.” Ante, at 454; see also ante, at 448-452. Consequently, in order to comment upon the plurality’s standard for successive petitions, I find it necessary first to address the plurality’s treatment of the general scope and purposes of the Great Writ. Thus, the “first six pages of the dissent” has as much “relevance” to this case as does Part II-B of the plurality’s opinion. Ante, at 455-456, n. 18.
The plurality further chastises me for failing to propose a precise definition of the “ends of justice” standard of Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), and for adhering to Sanders by leaving the decision whether to hear successive petitions to the “sound discretion of the federal trial judges.” Id., at 18. The plurality argues that Sanders left open “the critical question of what considerations should inform a court’s decision that successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the ‘ends of justice.’” Ante, at 455-456, n. 18. Sanders did leave that question open, but in a different sense than the plurality suggests. In Sanders, we acknowledged that the meaning of the phrase “ ‘the ends of justice’... cannot be too finely particularized,” 373 U. S., at 17, and, in recognition of this fact, we left it to the “sound discretion” of federal trial judges to make case-by-ease determinations of what the ends of justice require. The plurality, while purporting merely to elucidate Sanders’ “sound discretion” standard, would replace discretion with a single legal standard — actual innocence. And, while the plurality asserts that there is a need for a more refined standard, it offers no evidence that, over the 23 years since Sanders was decided, federal trial courts have had difficulty applying the “sound discretion” standard or have so abused their discretion with respect to successive petitions that revision of our longstanding interpretation of § 2244(b) is warranted.

 In other words, we have recognized an exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to abstention rules. See, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943). However, like other judicially created exceptions to federal jurisdiction conferred by Congress, it is a narrow exception to the “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise that jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976).

 While the discussion in the House Report regarding Rule 9(b) focuses on that portion of the Rule that governs abuse of the writ, rather than petitions that repeatedly allege the same claims, it is clear that the Committee intended Rule 9(b) to conform in its entirety to existing ease law, particularly to Sanders v. United States. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 6-6 (1976).

 1 agree with the plurality that actual innocence constitutes a sufficient justification for returning to court a second time with the same claim. I do not agree, though, that a prisoner’s inability to make a showing of actual innocence negates an otherwise good justification, such as respondent’s.

 The facts of this case demonstrate the arbitrariness of the Court’s rule. The initial federal habeas petitions filed by respondent and by Henry presented virtually identical claims. Because our decision in United States v. Henry may have altered the law of the Circuit in which respondent’s prior petition failed, it is only just that respondent’s claim be reviewed under the proper constitutional standards.

 The plurality’s factual-innocence standard also presents some significant institutional problems. First, this standard requires the federal courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact — the federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or innocence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central purpose of habeas review — the evaluation of claims that convictions were obtained in violation of the Constitution. Second, it is unclear what relevance the plurality’s standard would have in a case in which a prisoner alleges constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Guilt *472or innocence is irrelevant in that context; rather, there is only a decision 'made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live or die. Presumably, then, the plurality’s test would not be applicable to such claims.

 The Court of Appeals noted that “[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that ‘someone’s messing with me.’ ” 742 F. 2d, at 745.