Court Opinion

ID: 9396484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 19:00:42.392644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.405093
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13054     Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 05/22/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 22-13054
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        STEPHEN M. ALFORD,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cr-00052-MCR-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13054

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Stephen Alford appeals his sentence of 63 months’
        imprisonment, imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of
        conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He argues that the district court
        erred by imposing a 20-level offense enhancement based upon the
        intended pecuniary loss amount of his offense because his victim did
        not incur any actual pecuniary loss. After careful review, we
        conclude that the district court’s error, if any, was harmless; thus,
        we affirm Alford’s sentence.
                                 I.     Background
               A federal grand jury returned a four-count superseding
        indictment charging Alford with three counts of conspiracy to
        commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2 (Counts
        1 through 3), and one count of attempted prevention of seizure, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (Count 4). Alford pleaded guilty to
        Count 3 in exchange for the government’s promise to dismiss the
        remaining charges. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”)
        detailed the offense conduct as follows.
               In March 2021, Alford’s associate, Robert “Bob” Kent, text
        messaged a former government official, “D.G.,” and offered to
        assist him in stopping a federal criminal investigation into the
        activities of a member his family, who was also a government
        official. Kent informed D.G. that, in exchange for the assistance of
        D.G. and his family member in obtaining the release of Robert
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        22-13054                    Opinion of the Court                                  3

        Levinson 1 from Iran, Kent could assist in obtaining a pardon from
        President Donald Trump for D.G.’s family member. Kent met
        with D.G. in person and informed him that D.G. would need to
        arrange for $25 million to be deposited into a trust account to
        facilitate Levinson’s release. Kent reiterated to D.G. that his
        partner, later identified as Alford, could make the investigation into
        D.G.’s family member “go away.”
                D.G. later met with Alford, who informed D.G. that he was
        working with an attorney to raise funds for Levinson’s release.
        Alford gave D.G. his business card during this meeting, which D.G.
        later turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). At
        a subsequent meeting consensually recorded by the FBI, Alford
        informed D.G. that he would need $15.5 million to execute the
        plan to release Levinson (rather than $25 million, as Kent informed
        D.G.) and that, once Levinson was released, Alford could arrange
        for the investigation into D.G.’s family member to be dropped,
        obtain a pardon, and keep D.G’s family member out of prison.
        Alford memorialized that offer in a text message to D.G. after the
        meeting.
              Alford met with the FBI several days later, at which time he
        confessed that he “made materially false promises in order to

        1 Robert Levinson is a retired FBI agent who traveled to Iran on a business trip
        and was reported missing in 2007. He is still missing. See FBI Washington, FBI
        Washington Field Office Statement on the 16th Anniversary of the Abduction of Robert
        A.             Levinson,                 https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-
        offices/washingtondc/news/fbi-washington-field-office-statement-on-the-
        16th-anniversary-of-the-abduction-of-robert-a-levinson (Mar. 9, 2023).
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-13054

        defraud [D.G.] out of money.” Alford, once learning about a search
        warrant obtained by the FBI for his phone, made false statements
        to federal officials, evaded agents in a low-speed car chase, and
        concealed the location of his phone. He eventually pleaded guilty
        to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
               The PSI calculated Alford’s base offense level under
        § 2B1.1(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
        (“U.S.S.G.”) as seven and applied a twenty-level enhancement
        because the offense involved an intended loss of $25 million,
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).2 The PSI also applied (1) a
        three-level adjustment, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a), because
        the victim, D.G., was a former government officer and the offense
        was motivated by the victim’s status; (2) a two-level adjustment,
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, for obstruction of justice relating to
        Alford’s false statements to the FBI, concealment of his phone, and
        evasion of arrest; and (3) a total three-level decrease under U.S.S.G.
        § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for his timely acceptance of responsibility. After

        2 Under § 2B1.1(b)(1), various enhancements are applied to the base offense
        level “[i]f the loss [attributed to the defendant’s offense] exceeded $6,500[.]”
        Where the loss is “[m]ore than $9,500,000” but less than or equal to
        $25,000,000, the offense level is increased by 20. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K)–(L).
        The guidelines themselves do not define “loss,” but the guidelines’
        commentary for § 2B1.1(b)(1) provides that “loss is the greater of actual loss
        or intended loss,” defining “actual loss” as “the reasonably foreseeable
        pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,” and “intended loss” as “the
        pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict . . . includ[ing]
        intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to
        occur[.]” Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3.
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        22-13054               Opinion of the Court                         5

        the adjustments, the PSI calculated Alford’s total offense level as
        29.
               The PSI calculated Alford’s criminal history score as nine,
        with two additional points added pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d)
        because he committed the instant offense while under supervision
        for various state fraud convictions from 2017, resulting in a total
        criminal history score of 11 (in category V). Alford’s statutory
        maximum term of imprisonment under Count 3 was 20 years,
        pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, and his guideline
        imprisonment range was 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment.
               Alford filed several objections to the PSI, including that the
        loss amount attributed to him in the PSI was erroneous because he
        did not intend to cause any pecuniary harm and “loss” as used in
        U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) did not support the commentary’s definition
        of “intended loss.” The district court held an initial sentencing
        hearing during which it stated that it would consider Alford’s
        objection as to the commentary’s “intended loss” definition and
        issue a separate written decision on the objection. The district
        court’s written decision ultimately sustained Alford’s objection,
        finding that the commentary’s definition of “intended loss” was not
        entitled to any deference and concluding that “intended loss” fell
        outside the scope of “loss” in the text of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). The
        government filed a motion for reconsideration.
                The district court held a second sentencing hearing, at which
        it stated that it would vacate its previous order sustaining Alford’s
        objection:
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13054

               I’m not going to grant the [government’s] motion to
               reconsider, but I’m going to vacate the order
               [sustaining Alford’s objection], and here is why. [I
               spent] a lot of time . . . reviewing . . . the evidentiary
               record for this sentencing. And the sentence that I’m
               going to impose today is going to be the same
               sentence regardless of the guideline objection or
               whichever guideline I use. . . . I’m going to apply the
               guideline with the 20-level increase, and then I’m
               going to vary. And again, likely I’m going to impose
               the same sentence I would if the guideline objection
               had been sustained.

               After hearing argument on Alford’s other objections and
        D.G.’s victim impact statement, the district court noted that,
        having overruled his “intended loss objection,” Alford’s guidelines
        range was 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment, whereas his
        guidelines range would have been 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment
        if his objection had been sustained. While the district court
        emphasized Alford’s extensive criminal history and the
        “reprehensib[ility]” of Alford’s fraudulent statements to D.G., it
        also noted several mitigating factors, including that Alford was the
        only individual charged, that the victim did not lose any money,
        and that Alford seemed to believe in the operation to save
        Levinson. The district court then imposed a 63-month term of
        imprisonment, followed by period of 3 years’ supervised release,
        stating that it based its decision on the factors provided in 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a), Alford’s personal history and characteristics, and the
        seriousness and nature of the offense. The district court reiterated
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        22-13054               Opinion of the Court                          7

        that the sentence imposed would have been the same, even if it had
        not applied the 20-level offense enhancement, given Alford’s
        criminal history. The district court dismissed the remaining counts
        and adjudicated Alford guilty of Count 3.
               Alford timely appealed his sentence.
                                   II.    Discussion
               Alford argues that the district court erred when it overruled
        his objection to the 20-level offense enhancement pursuant to
        U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). After review of the briefs and record below,
        we affirm Alford’s sentence. Because the district court stated that
        Alford’s sentence would have been the same regardless of whether
        the 20-level offense enhancement was applied, we review his
        sentence for substantive reasonableness under our precedent in
        United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). And
        because we conclude that Alford’s sentence was substantively
        reasonable, we affirm his sentence.
                We ordinarily review the district court’s interpretation and
        application of the guidelines de novo. United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d
        1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). However, we will not decide a
        guidelines issue if it made no difference to the sentence imposed by
        the district court and the ultimate sentence imposed was
        reasonable. Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349–50. In other words, if the
        district court states that the sentence would not have changed with
        a different guidelines calculation, we assume that the district court
        committed an error, calculate the guidelines range without that
        error, and then analyze whether the imposed sentence would be
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13054

        substantively reasonable under the revised guidelines range. Id. at
        1349. If it is substantively reasonable, then we will not address the
        disputed guidelines issue because “it would make no sense to set
        aside [a] reasonable sentence and send the case back to the district
        court [if] it has already told us that it would impose exactly the
        same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to affirm.” Id.
        at 1350. As the party challenging the sentence, it is the defendant’s
        burden to prove the unreasonableness of his sentence considering
        the record and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id.
                We will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable
        “only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
        district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
        § 3553(a) factors” as evidenced by a sentence “that is outside the
        range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
        United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion and
        imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only if it “(1) fails to
        . . . consider[] relevant factors that were due significant weight;
        (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
        (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper
        factors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th
        Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “We do not presume that a
        sentence outside the guideline range is unreasonable and must give
        due deference to [a] district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
        factors, as a whole, justify the extent of [a] variance” above the
        guidelines range. Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222. One indicator of
        reasonableness is whether the sentence falls “far below the
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        22-13054               Opinion of the Court                         9

        statutory maximum penalty.” United States v. Osorto, 995 F.3d 801,
        823 (11th Cir. 2021).
               The district court, in imposing a sentence, must consider
        several statutory factors under § 3553(a). Specifically, it must
        impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
        necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
        respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate
        deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with any
        needed correctional treatment or training. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
        It must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,
        the defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences
        available, the applicable guidelines range, any pertinent policy
        statements, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities between
        similarly situated defendants. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
               The district court is not required to state on the record
        explicitly that it has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors nor
        must it discuss each of them at sentencing. United States v. Kuhlman,
        711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). “Rather, an acknowledgment
        by the district [court] that [it] has considered the § 3553(a) factors
        will suffice.” United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir.
        2007). Additionally, “[w]e have taken a holistic approach in
        evaluating the district court’s explanation of the sentence imposed”
        such that “[o]ur review is not limited to the district court’s closing
        remarks.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir.
        2010).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-13054

               Where the district court varies from the guidelines range in
        imposing a sentence, “the justification [for the variance must] be
        sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”
        United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
        (quotation omitted). The weight given to any specific § 3553(a)
        factor is “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
        United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation
        omitted). Moreover, the district court is free to consider any
        information relevant to a defendant’s background, character, or
        conduct in imposing an upward variance. United States v. Tome, 611
        F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
               Assuming, as we must under Keene, that the district court
        committed an error in calculating Alford’s guidelines range, we
        start by calculating his guidelines range without the assumed error.
        470 F.3d at 1349. Had the district court sustained Alford’s objection
        to the 20-level enhancement, his base offense level would have
        been seven. Additionally, the offense level would have been
        adjusted further: (1) a three-level increase because the victim, D.G.,
        was a former government officer and Alford’s offense was
        motivated by the victim’s status; (2) a two-level increase for
        obstruction of justice; and (3) a total three-level decrease under for
        Alford’s timely acceptance of responsibility. Thus, his total offense
        level would have been nine. Based upon an offense level of nine
        and a criminal history score of 11 (in category V), Alford’s
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        22-13054                    Opinion of the Court                                 11

        guidelines advisory range of imprisonment would have been 18 to
        24 months’ imprisonment. 3 U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A.
                Alford has not demonstrated that his sentence of 63 months’
        imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.4 After review of the
        record below, we are not left with “a definite and firm conviction”
        that Alford’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. Goldman,
        953 F.3d at 1222. There is no indication that the district court
        (1) failed to consider relevant factors that were due significant
        weight; (2) gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant

        3 The district court incorrectly used a base offense level of ten, rather than
        nine, when calculating Alford’s guidelines range of imprisonment at the
        second sentencing hearing. For purposes of this appeal, however, the district
        court’s misstatement is not material, as we are obligated to calculate the
        correct guidelines range, irrespective of any error committed by the district
        court.
        4 In fact, Alford does not put forth any argument whatsoever regarding the
        substantive reasonableness (or lack thereof) in his briefing, instead arguing
        that we should reach the merits of his “intended loss” objection. Alford argues
        that even though “the district court [stated that it] would not impose a
        different sentence on remand,” we should “exercise [our] discretion to rule
        on” the merits of his objection because it “is a matter of pressing concern for
        the bench and bar.” He, however, ignores Keene, which applies directly to
        cases such as this, where the district court expressly stated that it would have
        imposed the same sentence, irrespective of the guidelines calculation. 470
        F.3d at 1349. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th 1315, 1326 (11th Cir. 2021),
        cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 814 (2022) (citing Keene and stating that, while “[t]he
        parties dispute[d] how” a certain section of the U.S.S.G. “should have been
        applied[,] . . . it [was] not necessary for this Court to decide th[at] issue or
        remand for new proceedings because even if there was a [g]uidelines error, it
        did not affect [the defendant’s] sentence”).
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                22-13054

        factor; or (3) committed a clear error of judgment in considering
        the proper factors. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. Rather, the
        district court stated that it considered the statutory factors under
        § 3553(a) in determining Alford’s sentence, particularly his
        extensive criminal history and the “reprehensible” nature of his
        fraudulent statements to D.G. Based upon those considerations,
        the district court stated that the record supported a term of
        imprisonment that exceeded two years, but also that the record did
        not support a term of imprisonment that reached the statutory
        maximum of twenty years, given various mitigating factors. The
        district court is entitled to give more weight to any one or number
        of the § 3553(a) factors. Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. The 63-month
        sentence falls within the range of permissible sentences. The
        record reflects that while no money changed hands and no
        additional individuals involved in the scheme were charged, Alford
        made admittedly false, fraudulent, and “reprehensible” statements
        to D.G. that implicated not only D.G.’s family but also the family
        of Mr. Levinson. And while the district court’s sentence represents
        an upward variance from the revised guidelines range of 18 to 24
        months’ imprisonment to a term of imprisonment of 63 months,
        such a variance is significantly lower than the statutory maximum
        of 20 years’ imprisonment and falls well within the permissible
        range of sentences on this record. See Osorto, 995 F.3d at 823. For
        these reasons, the sentence imposed by the district court was
        substantively reasonable. See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1350.
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        22-13054              Opinion of the Court                      13

                                 III.   Conclusion
               Assuming under Keene, 470 F.3d at 1350, that the district
        court erred in applying the 20-level offense enhancement, any error
        was harmless because the district court still would have sentenced
        Alford to a substantively reasonable term of 63 months’
        imprisonment. We therefore affirm Alford’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.