Court Opinion

ID: 9567417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:40.122991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:36.097347
License: Public Domain

Waller, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, it was for the jury to determine whether Kreutner acted with reasonable diligence in discovering she had a cause of action against David.
A cause of action accrues when an injury is discovered or “reasonably ought to have been discovered.” Strong v. S.C. School of Medicine, 316 S.C. 189, 447 S.E. (2d) 850 (1994). The “reasonably ought to have been discovered” requirement is a “reasonable diligence” standard. The exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances would put a person of common knowledge on notice that some right has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist. Id. The reasonableness of a party’s actions in discovering a claim is an issue to be decided by the jury. Santee Portland Cement v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 299 S.C. 269, 384 S.E. (2d) 693 (1989).
Here, David maintained throughout that he was having the mortgages recorded and would forward them to Kreutner.1 He nonetheless returned the mortgages to her in 1986, never advising that they had not, in fact, been recorded. David contends the fact the mortgages were returned to Kreutner unmarked in 1986 should have put her on notice they were unrecorded. I disagree. In my opinion, a person of common knowledge would not know the requirements of recording a mortgage recorded in compliance therewith, Moreover, a jury could find, consistent with David’s assurances, that a reasonable person would have believed the mort*288gage under Florida law, and would not be expected to recognize a mortgages recorded in compliance therewith. Moreover, a jury could find, consistent with David’s assurances, that a reasonable person would have believed the mortgages had been recorded until the 1989 title search revealed otherwise.
Summary judgment is proper only when it is clear there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Koester v. Carolina Rental Center, 313 S.C. 490, 443 S.E. (2d) 392 (1994); Rule 56(c), SCRCR The evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Even when there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them, summary judgment should be denied. Id.
In my opinion, there is a genuine issue as to when Kreutner knew, or should have known, she had a claim against David. I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and hold that the issue was one for the jury.

 In my view, the fact that David repeatedly “stonewalled” Kreutner’s requests was insufficient to put her on notice that he had failed to record the mortgage.