Court Opinion

ID: 9791884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:00.385772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.607112
License: Public Domain

Alexander, C.J.
(dissenting)—In my opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the affidavit of prejudice filed by Wilbur Lemon's counsel. Therefore, I dissent.
*575Since this state's early days, all parties to a lawsuit have possessed the statutory right to exercise what amounts to a peremptory challenge to the judge assigned to hear the case. RCW 4.12.050. In order to exercise that right, a party need only file an affidavit stating that the judge before whom the action is pending is prejudiced against that party. If the affidavit of prejudice is filed, before the assigned judge has made a discretionary ruling in the case, the prejudice is deemed established and "the judge to whom [the motion] is directed is divested of authority to proceed further into the merits of the action." Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Transp., 102 Wn.2d 457, 460, 687 P.2d 202 (1984). " [Arrangement of the calendar, the setting of an action, motion, or proceeding down for hearing or trial, . . . shall not be construed as a ruling or order involving discretion . . .". RCW 4.12.050.
Respondent concedes that the trial court had not made any discretionary rulings prior to the time counsel filed the affidavit of prejudice. The trial court's refusal to recognize the affidavit was based on its determination that the affidavit had not been "timely presented" pursuant to the Pierce County Superior Court's former local rule 12. I can find no fault with the trial judge's mechanical application of that rule. The trial court's error, in my judgment, was not a failure to understand the local rule, but rather; its recognition of the validity of the local rule in these circumstances. To accord validity to the local rule was to fail to recognize that every party has the right to a change of judge without inquiry if the requirements of RCW 4.12.050 are satisfied. Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Tramp., supra. Those requirements were satisfied when Wilbur Lemon's counsel filed the affidavit of prejudice before the assigned judge had made any rulings in the case. The trial court, therefore, had no discretion but to step aside and assign the case to another department.
The position I express in this dissent is not a departure from any position we have taken in the past. In the case of *576In re Gibson, 4 Wn. App. 372, 377, 483 P.2d 131 (1971), we observed that:
Where an affidavit has been timely filed, the moving party is entitled to a change of judge as a matter of right. An affidavit of prejudice is timely if it is made before the judge has made any ruling in the proceeding.
(Citations omitted.) Nothing has occurred since Gibson, that should cause us to retreat from that position. Indeed, in the Marine Power case, our Supreme Court noted that any implication that a party must seek to disqualify the judge immediately upon learning his or her identity was "anomalous" to that court's interpretation of RCW 4.12-.050. The mere fact that the trial judge's ruling finds support in a local rule is not at all significant. The trial court's ruling, albeit in accordance with the local rule, is clearly inconsistent with RCW 4.12.050, in that it engrafts a requirement of "timely presentation" which is not in the statute. No authority has been cited to us, and I know of none, which suggests that superior court judges have authority to make local rules that detract from rights granted by statute.
The majority devotes a great deal of attention to its discussion of the reasonableness of the local rule as a device to increase court efficiency. I cannot disagree with the majority. Undoubtedly the efficiency of the superior court would be increased to an even greater extent if RCW 4.12.050 were to be totally repealed. The statute has not, however, been repealed. The Legislature, since it enacted this statute in 1911, has accorded litigants the right to challenge superior court judges. While this right may be considered a nuisance by some, it is a right guaranteed to all litigants. Courts cannot ignore this right or sweep it away in the name of efficiency. Recently our Supreme Court addressed this very issue when it said:
The history of RCW 4.12.050 reflects an accommodation between two important, and at times competing, interests: a party's right to one change of judge without inquiry and the orderly administration of justice. The history also reflects a *577decision to accord greater weight to the party's right to a change of judge. . . .
PUD 1 v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 339, 349, 797 P.2d 504 (1990).
I am not unmindful of the fact that our Supreme Court has long recognized that an affidavit of prejudice need not be honored, notwithstanding that it was filed before a discretionary ruling had been made in the case, if to do so would in a real sense interfere with the orderly administration of justice. State v. Funk, 170 Wash. 560, 17 P.2d 11 (1932); Black v. Yoder, 171 Wash. 341, 17 P.2d 850 (1933). In the Funk and Black cases, however, the affidavit was untimely in a practical sense.6 Here, there is no contention by respondent that the affidavit of prejudice was untimely in that sense. It was submitted far in advance of the trial date and very soon after counsel learned the identity of the trial judge. No one could seriously argue that its recognition by the superior court judge to whom the case was assigned would have seriously impeded the arrangement of the court calendars of the multi-judge Pierce County Superior Court. The failure to recognize the validity of the affidavit was error and we should reverse.7
Reconsideration denied December 28, 1990 and January 11,1991.
Remanded to the Court of Appeals at 116 Wn.2d 1018 (1991).

In response to the concerns expressed in the Funk and Black cases, the Legislature amended RCW 4.12.030 to provide that in order to be effective in superior court in 1-judge counties, the affidavit must be filed no later than the day the case is called for trial.

It is noteworthy that the Pierce County Superior Court judges have recently repealed local rule 12 and adopted a new local rule relating to affidavits of prejudice. The rule, Pierce County LR 40, reads as follows:
(d) Reassignment for Inability To Hear.
(1) If the departmental judge for a case for any reason is unable to hear a preassigned matter, he or she may, at his or her discretion or upon *578application of either party, transfer such case to the court administrator for reassignment.
(2) In the event the departmental judge is unable to hear a case on the date set because of a conflicting schedule, the case will be transferred to the court administrator for reassignment.
While awaiting such reassignment, litigants and their witnesses shall remain available until 2:00 p.m. of the scheduled trial date unless excused earlier by the court administrator.
If it is not possible for the Court Administrator to reassign a case on the scheduled trial date due to lack of an available department, the case must be renoted with the previously assigned department for a new trial date.
It appears that the new rule, unlike its predecessor, is generally consistent with RCW 4.12.050. One can only speculate as to the reasons for the change in the local rule.