Court Opinion

ID: 9778459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:05:34.15376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:09.394302
License: Public Domain

SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s judgment but write separately to explain how I reach the same result by somewhat different analysis.
For purposes of this summary judgment, Garza effectively stipulates to the material facts. DeRuy was last treated by Garza on October 9, 1991; therefore, the two-year statute of limitations contained in article 4590i barred the assertion of her claim no later than October 9, 1993. However, DeRuy did not know or have reason to know of her alleged injury until June 1994, and she did not file suit until June 7, 1995.
Because we must assume for purposes of this summary judgment DeRuy did not know or have reason to know of her alleged injury until after her assertion of her claim Ayas barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, we must conclude the statute is unconstitutional as applied. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex.1984) (“We hold that [the statute] is unconstitutional, under the open courts provision, to the extent it purports to cut off an injured person’s right to sue before the person has a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong and bring suit.”).
The stipulated facts thus raise a single question: If a limitations statute is unconstitutional as applied under the open courts provision, what limitations period, if any, applies? In Nelson, the court did not apply a one-year statute or any other. Rather, it simply held the plaintiffs’ “cause of action ... is not barred by limitations.” Id. One year later, in Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.1985), the court said even less, a point highlighted by Justice Kilgarlin’s concurrence, which attempted to fill the void by analogizing to “good cause” for delay in filing a workers’ compensation claim. Id. at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). Justice Robertson, on the other hand, suggested the doctrine of lach-es might be used to determine whether the plaintiffs’ claim was timely filed. Id. at 13 (Robertson, J., concurring).
Lacking guidance from the supreme court, the courts of appeals have simply held one or another period of time is or is not a reasonable time to file suit as a matter of las. See Fiore v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 233, 237-38 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (thirteen-month delay is unreasonable as a matter of law); LaGesse v. PrimaCare, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1995, writ denied) (fifty-week delay is unreasonable as a matter of law); Melendez v. Beal, 683 S.W.2d 869, 872-73 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (suit may be filed within two years of discovery of wrong); accord Hall v. Dow Corning Corp., 114 F.3d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1997) (applying Texas law and holding a fifteen-month delay is unreasonable as a matter of law); cf. Bradford v. Sullivan, 683 S.W.2d 697, 697 (Tex.1985) (per cu-riam) (reversing and remanding, without *754explanation, summary judgment against plaintiff who filed suit eleven months after discovery). It is on these cases that Garza relies in arguing DeRuy’s delay of almost one year was unreasonable as a matter of law.
In my view, holding the two-year statute of limitations contained in article 4590i unconstitutional as applied under the open courts provision does not authorize this court or any other to effectively adopt a statute of limitations of whatever length in this or any other case. Rather, whether the plaintiff filed her claim within a reasonable period of time must be resolved by reference to some other law. See, e.g., Neagle, 685 S.W.2d at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring) (standards of good cause for delay in filing worker’s compensation claim); id. at 18 (Robertson, J., concurring) (principles of common law and equity such as laches); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.051 (Vernon 1997) (residual limitations period). However, because Garza relied solely on the contention that a period of one year was unreasonable as a matter of law, we need not decide the appropriate standard in this appeal.
For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s judgment reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.