Court Opinion

ID: 9479434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:18:30.260985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:02.445265
License: Public Domain

MIKVA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Today this court finds that government employees who stand to lose their jobs as a result of what we must assume — at this stage — to be illegal contracting out decisions are not entitled to raise their claim in court. This is not the first time that our circuit has attempted to restrict the standing of those who may sue under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). In a series of cases a few years ago, including Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S.Ct. 363, 70 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981) and Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C.Cir.1982), this circuit created a demanding test for standing under § 702 using the same zone of interest rubric the majority employs again here. The test was far more difficult to meet than any promulgated by the Supreme Court itself and, not surprisingly, the Court specifically disapproved it two terms ago in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 n. 15, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). This lesson is lost on the majority today, who pursue the same goal by only slightly different means, despite the Supreme Court’s clear signals that the goal itself is inappropriate.
Originally, the zone of interest test for § 702 claims was adopted, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829-30, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), to enlarge, not restrict, the class entitled to protest administrative action. See American Friends Service Committee v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 49 (D.C.Cir.1983). The Supreme Court has repeated loudly and clearly that courts are to welcome those pursuing grievances under the APA. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), the Court said that “the Administrative Procedure Act’s generous review provisions must be given a hospitable interpretation” and that “only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review” (internal quotations deleted). In Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67, 90 S.Ct. 832, 837-38, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970), the companion case to Data Processing, the Court cautioned that “preclusion of judicial review of administrative action adjudicating private rights is not lightly to be inferred” and that “judicial review * * * will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” In its most recent opinion on the subject, the Court reiterated that while the zone of interest test is a gloss on § 702 and provides some limit to access, it “is not meant to be especially demanding,” and there need only be “a plausible relationship” between the interest plaintiff asserts and the policies underlying the relevant statutory framework. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396, 399, 403, 107 S.Ct. at 756, 757, 759.
In the 19 years since the Court announced the zone of interest test for § 702 claims, it has yet to find any party before it outside that zone. It has only once found that plaintiffs, though within the zone of interests, were statutorily precluded from bringing suit, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 348, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). See also Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (interpreting Block as finding preclusion). In Block, the Court found that *1055granting standing for the plaintiffs would have permitted an end run around a carefully constructed administrative review procedure, enacted by Congress to resolve the same kind of complaint as plaintiffs brought, with only limited resort to the court system.
Nonetheless, the majority today has found a way to deny standing under § 702 to the plaintiff here. That the National Federation of Federal Employees (“NFFE”) satisfies Article Ill’s standing requirements is scarcely in doubt. Its members have suffered substantial injury in fact. The Fort Sill contracting out decision led to the abolition of 401 positions. More than 200 employees were scheduled for discharge, 125 others for demotion. Nor is there a difficult question as to causality or redressability. Plaintiffs claim is that the Army artificially inflated the cost of the most efficient in-house performance of the Fort Sill functions and artificially deflated the cost of converting to using a private contractor, with the result that letting the contract to Northrup only appeared to be the least expensive means of getting the job done when actually in-house services were least expensive. If plaintiff is correct, the distortions certainly are causally related to the Army’s decision to hire Northrup. If plaintiff could pursue this matter and prove all its claims, the army decision sub judice would have to be vacated and the Army would be required to choose again the least expensive option, which would be shown to be the in-house services.
The majority neither acknowledges nor refutes this. Instead, it holds that the union and its members are not within the zone of interests of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (“1921 Budget Act”), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1979 (“OFPPAA”), or the 1987 Department of Defense Authorization Act (“1987 Authorization Act”). Its reasoning is as follows: (1) the federal employees’ real interest is in keeping their jobs; (2) the statutes at issue do not indicate any congressional interest in maintaining or enlarging federal employment— they, in fact, show an interest in reducing employment when it can save money without sacrificing governmental needs; (3) the only way the employees can assert an interest in enforcing the rules aimed at increasing government economy and efficiency is as taxpayers, and under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), no taxpayer standing is available to challenge these government actions.
The majority’s claim — that NFFE’s members are really only interested in keeping their jobs and that this interest is either marginally related to or inconsistent with Congress’ purposes and that the members cannot assert an interest in enforcing the rules applying to contracting out decisions except as taxpayers — is wholly at odds with the Supreme Court’s reasoning and decisions in its APA zone of interest cases.
The data processing companies, in the Court’s first zone of interest case, were really only interested in keeping their profits, an interest certainly marginally related to Congress’ purposes in enacting the banking laws, but the Court held that they had standing to enforce the banking laws’ rules restricting bank activities. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156-58, 90 S.Ct. at 831-32. Likewise, the travel agents in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 91 S.Ct. 158, 27 L.Ed.2d 179 (1970); the investment companies in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971) (“ICT’); and the discount brokers in Clarke, all interested solely in their bottom line, were permitted to assert the public interest in restricting bank activities.
In each of these cases, the Court understood plaintiffs’ interest as a desire to hold on to their profits. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 829; Arnold Tours, 400 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 158; ICI, 401 U.S. at 620, 91 S.Ct. at 1093; Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403, 107 S.Ct. at 759. In each of these cases, the Court neither found nor suggested that such an interest was to be found among Congress’ purposes in enacting the statute that the plaintiffs sued under. In Data Processing, the Court specifically distinguished Flast as irrelevant. Flast, it said, was a taxpayer suit, whereas *1056this was a competitor’s suit and the two “do not necessarily track one another.” Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 829. Thus, the Court has repeatedly granted standing to plaintiffs whose actual motivation is marginally related to Congress’ purposes, but whose asserted interest is consistent with them. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156-58, 90 S.Ct. at 831-32; Arnold Tours, 400 U.S. at 46-47, 91 S.Ct. at 159; ICI, 401 U.S. at 620-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1093-94; Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403, 107 S.Ct. at 759.
In the Supreme Court’s most recent zone of interest case, Clarke, the Court made explicit what had been implicit in both Data Processing and ICI. “The Court’s concern,” it said of the Data Processing decision, “was to ensure that the data processors’ association would be a reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest * * *. [Although expressed in relation to Article III requirements,] the concern that the plaintiff be ‘reliable’ carries over to the ‘zone of interest’ inquiry, which seeks to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives.” Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. at 756 n. 12 (some internal quotations deleted). Clarke explains that the Court in ICI did not take issue with the dissent’s assertion that “there was no evidence that Congress had intended to benefit the plaintiff’s class when it limited the activities permitted national banks.” Clarke, 479 U.S. at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 757. The Court explained that “it was enough to provide standing that Congress, for its own reasons, primarily its concern for the soundness of the banking system, had forbidden banks to compete with plaintiffs by entering the investment company business.” Id.
The majority’s argument is essentially that the court should look behind the plaintiff’s asserted interest and consider its subjective interest. Under the majority’s logic, a criminal defendant, in whose house or on whose person contraband is found, would not have standing to assert a fourth amendment claim because his “real” interest is in being free of all searches and seizures, not just unreasonable ones. That is not the law of standing and never has been.
Not surprisingly, the majority cites very little authority to support its fundamental premise that the employees cannot assert an interest in having the government conform to the law in making a contracting out decision. That which it does cite is either inapposite or without legal force. The two cases cited for the proposition that “for zone of interest purposes we must look to [plaintiffs’] personal interests, not to the interests amounting to generalized grievances of all citizens,” see Majority Opinion (“Maj. Op.”) at 1048 n. 22, are not even zone of interest cases. Nor are they opinions in which the court muses on the subject of how to approach zone of interest questions. They do not, in short, support in any way the proposition for which they are cited.
The first case, ASAR CO, Inc. v. Kadish, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989), does contain a standing question: whether the state taxpayers or the teachers’ association who brought the suit meet Article Ill’s standing requirements. But Article III standing is not the subject at issue in the majority’s opinion. The majority expressly decline to address it. Maj. Op. at 1041 n. 8. Similarly, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), does not involve zone of interest questions, only an Article III one. The majority’s further attempts to support its flawed premise include only a law review, and a handful of cases or parts of cases involving defects in Article III standing that do not address the question here: whether those claiming to be aggrieved under the APA are permitted to vindicate the public interest as private attorneys general. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.Cir.1987), involves an Article III question, causality, and a prudential third-party standing question. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), is a taxpayer standing case. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974), includes both citizen *1057and taxpayer standing. None involve a zone of interest analysis. The majority asserts without explanation that assessing zone of interest standing follows “logically the same analysis” as determining Article III standing. See Maj. Op. at 1051.
The questions, however, are altogether different. To have standing under Article III means to have “a personal stake in the outcome.” See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179, 94 S.Ct. at 2948. It means that the plaintiff’s interest must be sufficiently concrete that he will be a determined, practical advocate. Thus, the Court bars a person with only a “generalized grievance,” such as the plaintiff claiming citizen standing in Schlesinger or general taxpayer standing in Richardson. But, the federal employees suing here have as personal and concrete a stake as the framers of Article III could have had in mind; they have lost their jobs. To be arguably within the zone of interests of a statute, on the other hand, means that Congress plausibly expected someone such as the plaintiffs to enforce its expressed statutory intentions — a wholly separate inquiry. When the Supreme Court in Richardson and Schlesinger says that it is irrelevant in determining standing that no one else would have standing either to bring the claim, it is saying that if unlawful behavior does not actually cause anyone any tangible harm, then Congress will have to be the overseer. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179, 94 S.Ct. at 2947-48. When the majority says that it is irrelevant to the zone of interest inquiry that no one else could have standing to bring a claim either, it is saying that Congress must be understood to be indifferent to whether its statutes are being complied with.
The zone of interest inquiry is at base an inquiry into Congress’ intent. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347, 104 S.Ct. at 2454-55. Standing is permitted, as the majority explains at xx, to those whom Congress intended to be relied on to challenge agency disregard of the law. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. But how that intent is to be determined is explained by the Supreme Court in the same paragraph: there is a presumption of judicial review of agency action which is overcome when there is a fairly discernible congressional intent to preclude it. Id. Thus, it is the majority who have stood the “intent to rely” test on its head. See Maj. Op. at 1052.
This circuit has recently had occasion to consider the precise question of how the Supreme Court’s zone of interest decisions are to be parsed as they apply to plaintiffs whom Congress was not affirmatively trying to protect. In Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 3157, 104 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1989) (‘HWTC”), an association of hazardous waste control companies challenged the agency’s rules as too lax. The companies’ competitive injuries were that lax rules meant lower profits for them, as there would be fewer occasions when other companies would be required to hire their services. There was no claim that Congress enacted the environmental law to increase the companies’ profits.
This court analyzed the Supreme Court’s zone of interest decisions and concluded that: “In the absence of apparent congressional intent to benefit, however, there may still be standing if some factor — some indicator that the plaintiff is a peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative neglect— supports an inference that Congress would have intended eligibility.” Id. 861 F.2d at 283. This court read Clarke, I Cl, and Data Processing as examples of this latter standing. Id. 861 F.2d at 284. It explained:
The [Supreme] Court may have inferred congressional approval of such challengers on the view that those whom Congress explicitly sought to benefit would make relatively unsuitable plaintiffs. For example, it is hard to picture a person or firm that could assert injury in the form of “the dangers of possible loss of public confidence in banks and the danger to the economy as a whole of speculation fueled by bank loans for investment purposes[.]”
HWTC, 861 F.2d at 284 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 398 n. 13, 107 S.Ct. at 756 n. 13). In contrast, competitors suffer *1058“sharp, clear losses” when banks invade forbidden territory. Id. 861 F.2d at 284. This court then applied this analysis to HWTC. Because it specifically found that there were other identifiable potential plaintiffs, intended to be protected by Congress, who were “highly suitable champions of enforcement,” this court concluded that there was no evidence of congressional intent to rely on HWTC and its members. Id.
HWTC’s reading of the Supreme Court’s zone of interest pronouncements is not only sensible and supportable, it is this circuit’s own recent precedent. As such, it should be the approach applied to the case at bar by the majority. It would, however, yield the opposite result. There is no evidence that Congress intended to benefit federal employees when it passed at least two of the three statutes at issue, and ambiguous evidence as to the third. Thus the question, according to HWTC, is whether there is some factor — such as that federal employees are peculiary suitable challengers of administrative misfeasance — that would support an inference that Congress would have intended that they have standing. That factor is present here.
The federal employees suffer “sharp, clear losses” whenever over-estimates of the cost of in-house performance of a government function or under-estimates of the cost of converting to private contractors results in selection of a more expensive choice to do the work than is available in-house. Though Congress has, in each of the statutes under which plaintiff claims standing, expressed a clear purpose favoring economy in the conduct of governmental affairs, no other parties are motivated to enforce any rules preventing this particular type of waste. The winning bidder can hardly be expected to challenge cost calculations when it has won. The losing bidders might sue if the winning bidder was given some advantage over them. They might also sue if the government under-estimated the cost of in-house performance or over-estimated the cost of converting to private contractors, but they have nothing to gain from errors in the opposite direction.
The only people who suffer loss if the government commits the type of errors alleged in this case, besides the employees, are taxpayers. Notwithstanding the majority’s caution, it is not difficult to come to this conclusion. The only people affected when contracting out decisions are made are the federal employees, the agency, the winning bidder, private companies who either lost or would have competed but for some failure, and the people who foot the bill — the taxpayers. The agency cannot sue itself. All of the private companies— whether the winning bidder, the losing bidders, or potential competitors — are placed in an advantageous position when the government overestimates the in-house costs and therefore would not be able to allege the harm necessary to meet Article III standing requirements. Lastly, no taxpayer, as the majority has persuasively explained, would meet the personal stake requirement of Article III in order to sue on such a claim. The displaced federal employees, on the other hand, have been harmed, and, unlike HWTC, there is no one else eligible and motivated to enforce Congress’ purpose.
Therefore, applying the law of standing consistently with Supreme Court and our own precedent, the federal employees, and therefore the union plaintiff here, do have standing unless the statutes or their legislative histories reveal a congressional intent to preclude reliance on this particular class of plaintiffs. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. As HWTC indicates, the availability of another potential plaintiff whom Congress affirmatively sought to protect may defeat standing. In the only Supreme Court case — as well as in every post-Clarke D.C. Circuit case — rejecting APA standing, another potential plaintiff was found to be available. In Block, consumers challenged orders setting milk market orders (minimum prices paid to producers) on the ground that the prices were too high. The Court found that milk handlers were equally motivated to challenge high prices, and that Congress had contemplated that they would do so. Block, 467 U.S. at 346, 104 S.Ct. at 2454. *1059In HWTC, this court found that the consumers of environmental purity were “highly suitable champions of enforcement.” HWTC, 861 F.2d at 284. In Water Transport Association v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189 (D.C.Cir.1987), this court, in denying standing to water carriers, found that shippers and ports had standing to bring the same claim and were contemplated by Congress as the parties to be relied on in enforcing the provisions of the statute. Id. at 1190 n. 6, 1192, 1195 n. 48, 1197.
While the existence of an alternative plaintiff, affirmatively contemplated by Congress, may not always be sufficient ground to deny standing, see International Ladies’ Garment Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 (D.C.Cir.1983), neither the Supreme Court nor this court (since Clarke) has denied APA standing when, as here, no alternative plaintiff can be found. In Block, the Supreme Court also emphasized another factor. It found that Congress had provided that the handlers were to first subject a price challenge to administrative review before suing in court and had prohibited injunctions in such suits. Block, 467 U.S. at 347-48, 104 S.Ct. at 2454-55. The Court explained that permitting consumers to sue directly would permit handlers, either as consumers or by joining forces, to manage an end run around both restrictions and that this showed that Congress did not intend consumers to have standing. Id. at 348, 104 S.Ct. at 2455. NFFE’s standing in the case sub judice would not implicate this concern either; none of the three statutes under which plaintiff claims standing include any limitations on judicial review that plaintiffs standing would circumvent.
The 1921 Budget Act was enacted to centralize the budget process and make it more economical. This is emphasized repeatedly in its legislative history. For example, its chief sponsor, Rep. James W. Good, said in describing the evil the law was intended to remedy: “We have been talking about economy in Government affairs, and at the same time have been practicing extravagance. * * * It will be necessary to adopt a system of economy and efficiency in every department, establishment, and bureau in order that the Government of the United States may obtain what it has never obtained before in all its history, and that is a dollar’s worth of service, if possible, for every dollar expended.” 61 Cong.Rec. 980 (1921). Thus, an action brought by NFFE to assure that the Army chooses to obtain needed services by the least expensive means is wholly consistent with Congress’ purposes.
The majority contends that there is no evidence that Congress actually contemplated the “protection of employment of federal employees.” Maj. Op. at 1046. This, however, has no bearing on the question, as the Supreme Court has specifically noted that such affirmative evidence is unnecessary for a plaintiff to come within the zone of interests of a statute. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400, 107 S.Ct. at 757-58. The majority next points to two statements in the legislative history showing that Congress contemplated that some federal workers would be discharged as a result of efforts to eliminate duplication and waste, and that Congress would actively seek to eliminate “excess” employees when service would not be injured thereby. Maj. Op. at 1046 n. 19, 1046-47. Again, this has no bearing on the question of standing. Congress’ interest in streamlining government and firing unneeded workers, is scarcely inconsistent with NFFE’s suing to force the Army to choose the most cost-effective method of securing needed services. And there is no evidence in the legislative history of hostility to federal employees per se or to continued federal employment — as long as it is economical.
OFPPAA, like the 1921 Budget Act, was aimed at increasing the economy and efficiency of the federal government. The majority denies standing on the ground that the statute and its legislative history do not contain evidence that NFFE’s interest is more than marginally related to Congress’ purposes — again, implicitly applying the test disapproved in Clarke. Maj. Op. at 1048. What makes NFFE’s interest more than marginally related to Congress’ purposes in enacting OFPPAA is not any explicit language in the statute or legislative *1060history about federal employees; rather it is NFFE’s unique ability to enforce Congress’ clearly expressed interest in the government obtaining services at the lowest cost. See HWTC, 861 F.2d at 283.
The majority also denies standing under OFPPAA on the basis of a Senate Report which it says shows that Congress favored the private sector over federal employees, presumed “that private sector performance is more economical and efficient” and called for strict review of in-house costs. Maj. Op. at 1049. The majority, however, is reading more into the report than is there. That report does indeed say that the OMB’s contracting out policy is based on three principles: reliance on the private sector, retention of functions in-house which are “inherently governmental in nature,” and choosing the most economical approach after rigorous cost comparisons of contract versus in-house costs. S.Rep. No. 144, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
Nothing in the report, nor in the amendment Congress passed, however, evinces any interest in changing the contracting out system from one of absolute neutrality between federal employees and private contractors where the lowest bid wins, see OMB Circular A-76, to one which “favors” the private sector or presumes that the private sector is more economical and efficient. If Congress wanted to establish a presumption that the private sector is always more economical than government, why did it continue to permit time-consuming, lengthy cost comparisons before each and every contracting out decision? If Congress favored the private sector, why did it not require the government to use private enterprise for every function which is not “inherently governmental in nature”? The reason Congress acquiesced in OMB’s provider-neutral' decision-making strategy is that its interest was, first and last, in saving money — an interest which NFFE’s suit is not only consistent with but promotes. Finally, neither the Senate report nor OFPPAA say anything at all about review of estimated costs, in-house or otherwise.
The 1987 Department of Defense Authorization Act was, like most authorization statutes, aimed at many things. Two sections are pertinent to this inquiry, § 1223 and § 1224. The majority’s sole focus is on § 1223(b), the 1987 Authorization Act provision under which NFFE is suing. This is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and results in a distorted view of Congress’ intention toward contracting out. In Data Processing, the Court looked not only to the provision under which plaintiffs sued but also to a related although wholly different act, passed decades later, to find that plaintiffs satisfied the zone of interest test. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155-56, 90 S.Ct. at 830-31. The Court again confirmed the appropriateness of interpreting the phrase “a relevant statute” in § 702 broadly, for the purposes of the zone of interest test, in its most recent decision on the issue. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396-97, 107 S.Ct. at 756.
Looking no further than the 1987 Authorization Act itself, but at the immediately surrounding provisions as well as the one plaintiff sues under, it is clear that Congress’ stance throughout was neither consistently pro-federal employee nor pro-private contractor. The contracting out provisions were enacted under a section entitled “Economy and Efficiency.” Pub.L. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3976. Congress’ interest was in an economically run defense program and its statutory choices manifest a deliberate attempt to construct a purposeful balance among the interests involved. Cf. Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (finding plaintiff within zone of interests of federal statutes because they were attempting to enforce the “purposeful balance” Congress had struck).
The legislative history cited by the majority is the Senate Report explaining the Senate’s version of § 1223(b). Maj. Op. at 1050. The Senate committee, as the majority explains, called for “realistic and fair” cost comparisons because it believed that the Department of Defense (“DOD”) was putting its thumb on the scale to maintain defense functions in-house. The Senate’s version also made no mention of the ten percent differential that, under OMB rules, *1061was added to any private contractor’s bid to cover various hidden costs. In addition, the Senate’s version prohibited conversion of any commercial or industrial activity performed by a private contractor to performance in-house, excepting emergency conditions, unless the Secretary of Defense informed Congress first and provided it with a detailed five-year cost projection of the two alternatives.
Thus, the majority’s detection of a pro-private contractor bias in the Senate committee’s report is not without foundation, although even the Senate committee continued to call for DOD to choose the lowest cost alternative rather than insisting on private contractors wherever national security permitted. See S.Rep. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 6413, 6472. However, the bill described by that Senate report did not pass in its entirety, and several of the changes worked in conference are instructive.
For example, § 1223(a), as enacted, requires the Secretary of Defense to procure supplies and services from the private sector “if such a source can provide such supply or service to the Department at a cost that is lower (after including any cost differential required by law, executive order, or regulation) than the cost at which the Department can provide the same supply or service.” 1987 Authorization Act, Pub.L. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3977 (emphasis added). This language, in particular the insistence that prescribed cost differentials be added to private contractor bids before comparing them with in-house cost estimates, was added in conference. See H.R.Conf.Rep. 1001, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 526, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6413, 6585. It replaced § 1233 of the 1986 law that simply required the Secretary to ensure that private contractors are used when they would be cost effective and in the best interests of national security. See id.; Pub.L. 99-145, 99 Stat. 734. It may be debatable whether this change manifests an intention to protect federal employees, as appellant argues, but it certainly shows that Congress had no preference for private contractors over federal employees, if the employees were the cheapest alternative. And it shows that Congress wanted to make sure that the scales could be tipped toward employees if this would better reflect real costs (or a policy decision).
The Senate’s tough reconversion was also changed in conference. Instead of being prohibited from converting functions back in-house unless he submitted a five-year projected comparative cost study, the Secretary was left free to return functions from private contractor to government. Congress decided to require the Secretary only to maintain data comparing the projected cost of continuing the contract to the actual cost of in-house performance and to submit such data to Congress after the first and second six months after the change. See H.R.Conf.Rep. 1001, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 527, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 6413, 6586; Pub.L. 99-661, § 1224, 100 Stat. 3977-78. Again, while the initial Senate bill might have been interpreted as demonstrating a pro-private contractor bias, the statute as enacted shows that any such bias was eliminated before passage.
An earlier statute, in effect when the Fort Sill decision was made, sheds further light on Congress' purposes with regard to contracting out. It provided:
(a) No commercial or industrial type function of the Department of Defense that on October 1, 1980, is being performed by Department of Defense civilian employees may be converted to performance by a private contractor—
(1) to circumvent any civilian personnel ceiling; or
(2) unless the Secretary of Defense provides to the Congress in a timely manner—
(A) notification of any decision to study such commercial or industrial type function for possible performance by a private contractor;
(B) a detailed summary of a comparison of the cost of performance of such function by the Department of Defense civilian employees and by private con*1062tractor which demonstrates that the ■performance of such function by a private contractor will result in a cost savings to the Government over the life of the contract and a certification that the entire cost comparison is available;
(C) a certification that the Government calculation for the cost of performance of such function by Department of Defense civilian employees is based on an estimate of the most efficient and cost effective organization for performance of such function by Department of Defense civilian employees; and
(D) a report, to be submitted with the certification required by subparagraph (C), showing—
(i) the potential economic effect on employees affected, and the potential economic effect on the local community and Federal Government if more than 50 employees are involved, of contracting for performance of such function; * * *
Pub.L. 96-342, tit. V, § 502, 94 Stat. 1086 (1980), as amended by Pub.L. 97-252, tit. XI, § 1112(a) (1982), 96 Stat. 747, reprinted at 10 U.S.C. § 2304 note (emphasis added).
Understood in context, Congress’ passage of § 1223(b) indicates that the words “realistic and fair” were meant literally. The Senate report makes it clear that the committee was concerned with abuses that favored in-house performance. But not only is there no indication that the Senate would have been indifferent to DOD abuses that favored private contractors, there is every indication — in both the 1987 Authorization Act as well as the 1980 one — that Congress as a whole intended to disfavor any abuse which rendered cost comparisons unreliable. Thus, NFFE’s suit, which challenges such an allegedly unreliable cost comparison, promotes Congress’ interest in choosing the most cost-effective supplier of DOD needs and is well within the zone of interests of the relevant statutory framework.
Only one circuit has addressed the question of whether federal employees have standing to challenge cost comparisons in contracting out decisions. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1668 v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1977) (involving the contracting out of an air force cafeteria). In Dunn, the Ninth Circuit decided that the union did not have standing to assert such a claim, but it decided this without examining the 1921 Budget Act or OFPPAA or any DOD Authorization Acts. The opinion summarily dismissed plaintiff’s standing to challenge cost comparisons, “for the reasons set forth earlier in this opinion.” Dunn, 561 F.2d at 1315. The only standing discussion earlier in the opinion was whether plaintiff had standing to bring a different claim under the Service Contract Act. The court found that plaintiff was not within the zone of interests of that act. Id. at 1313. But since NFFE is not suing under the Service Contract Act, and since the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have considered whether federal employees are within the zone of interests of the three statutes at issue here, I fail to see what force the Ninth Circuit’s decision can have on our analysis of the case before us.
Congress passed a law aimed at saving money. It established a procedure and standards for the Army to follow in seeking such savings. This court frustrates that laudable purpose by putting the procedures and standards beyond any judicial review. Because NFFE is the only party available to enforce an affirmative requirement that Congress has enacted and because nothing in any of the three statutes or their legislative histories indicates a Congressional intent to preclude NFFE’s standing, I would find that NFFE satisfies the prudential requirements for standing to bring this suit, as well as the constitutional requirements. I would also find that the Army’s decision to contract out the logistics work at Fort Sill is reviewable. The reviewability of OMB Circular A-76 is governed by our previous decisions. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. FLRA, 744 F.2d 842 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (deciding that OMB Circular A-76 was an “applicable law” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2) and a “law, rule, or regulation” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii)), cert dismissed, *1063476 U.S. 19, 106 S.Ct. 1678, 90 L.Ed.2d 19 (1986); Department of the Treasury v. FLRA, 862 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1988) (same). Section 1223(b) of the 1987 Authorization Act should also be held to be reviewable, as its limitation, requiring cost comparisons to be “realistic and fair” — meaning accurate — is no less specific than the limitation found reviewable by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13, 91 S.Ct. 814, 821-22, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (that statute prohibited use of parkland unless there was no “feasible and prudent alternative”). I would therefore reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.
Today’s decision is a direct rebuff to the Supreme Court’s § 702 jurisprudence. Not content to have tried and failed, this circuit again attempts to prune the APA’s broad grant of standing, with little regard for Congress’ will and with insufficient attention to the Supreme Court’s or its own precedent. The decision results in a no man’s land with no review by anybody for important parts of two statutes and a regulation adopted pursuant to two others. Congress never signalled that it intended or desired such a bizarre outcome. I respectfully dissent.