Court Opinion

ID: 9851058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:06:44.867582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.088293
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge, dissenting.
On motion for summary judgment by a defendant in a tort action in which the petition alleged that the defendant “negligently caused” an “automobile” to fall upon the plaintiff, it appeared without dispute that plaintiff, who had some experience in the matter, volunteered to help the defendant install some shock absorbers on an automobile, and that in the process it was discovered by both parties that an automobile jack being used to raise and lower the automobile was doing some slipping and that in the course of the operation while the plaintiff was under the automobile, the jack slipped and the automobile fell on the plaintiff. Such evidence refutes the charge that the defendant negligently caused the automobile to fall upon the plaintiff and further shows that the failure of the defendant to warn the plaintiff that the jack would slip, even if negligent, was not the causative factor, as the evidence shows without contradiction that the plaintiff knew of such defect and discovered it at the same time as the defendant. One who has knowledge of a defect and voluntarily assumes an obviously dangerous position in reference thereto can not complain of the failure of another to warn him of such defect. Wade v. Roberts, 118 Ga. App. 284, 287 (163 SE2d 343); Beasley v. Elder, 88 Ga. App. 419 (1, 2) (76 SE2d 849). In my opinion, the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
*466■ The ruling of the majority is based primarily upon an assumption the evidence fails to show the plaintiff knew the jack was defective. In support of this they state that the plaintiff testified that he did not examine the jack at all (see page 48 of the record) and that plaintiff’s statement further that he did not know that the jack was “no good” (page 48 of the record). Both of these statements were made about his knowledge prior to his subsequent discovery that the jack was slipping (see pages 87 and 88 of the record in which the following questions were asked and the following answers were given by the plaintiff) : “Q. Now at the time he jacked it down this first time did the jack itself drop down any more than he wanted it to? A. I think it did. Q. It slipped a little bit that time, didn’t it? A. Yes, sir.” And then again referring to the first time: “Q. And that is when the spring popped and also when the jack slipped down, is that right, now? A. He took the wheel off before the jack slipped.” These questions were asked after numerous answers to other questions in which the plaintiff said the lug wrench, used to hold the spring down so that the shock absorbers could be installed, had slipped. There was a prior area when this questioning was going on where there was some confusion as to what was doing the slipping, but the questions above and the answers above cleared up the matter. This testimony related to the “first time” they jacked the car up and were letting it down to exert pressure on the wrench to hold the spring. The occasion when the car was jacked up and the plaintiff crawled under it and was injured was the third or fourth time it had been jacked up and let down (page 91 of the record).
The majority seemingly questioned the fact that the plaintiff was a volunteer because the defendant testified that after the plaintiff had volunteered to show him what he was doing wrong that he, the defendant, asked the plaintiff to “show me what had to be done.” This constituted no more than an acceptance of the help already volunteered.
The majority also relies upon a contention that the plaintiff’s testimony raises an issue as to whether the defendant was operating the jack at the time it failed. While the plain*467tiff testified that he had called the defendant to let the jack down and testified that he was letting it down at the time it fell (pages 51 and 90 of the record), he subsequently on cross examination said that he really did not know whether the jack slipped down or slipped out from under the bumper (page 92 of the record). Whether or not the defendant was operating the jack was immaterial as there is no evidence whatsoever that he caused it to slip, other than the statement of the defendant, which he denied making, testified to by one of the witnesses that the defendant was crying “Oh, my God, it’s my fault,” proves nothing other than it was the defendant’s opinion that it was his fault. An admission of fault admits nothing unless that admission be coupled with facts showing fault. Any facts showing it was his fault are completely lacking, and the evidence of the defendant having pierced the pleadings alleging it was his fault and the plaintiff having presented no testimony contrary thereto, the defendant as to this fact is entitled to prevail on the motion for summary judgment. The most that the defendant’s statement could mean, under the evidence, was that he was following the plaintiff’s instruction in lowering the jack which the plaintiff and the defendant knew had previously slipped during such operation. The plaintiff assumed the risk of the jack’s slipping, he having had prior knowledge that it would slip when operated. There was a lot of conflicting evidence in the case between the parties, but there was no conflict on any material fact essential to the determination of the motion for summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Jordan and Judge Eberhardt concur in this dissent.