Court Opinion

ID: 9628344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:17:23.454016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:04.398192
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the decision of the court in this ease. I believe that this court ill-advisedly has forfeited one of the valuable attributes of State sovereignty. The right to legislate with respect to the disposition of land lying within its borders is a significant right of sovereignty. In this instance the court without any authority to support its position has surrendered that right to our sister state of Colorado.
In reaching its conclusion in this case the majority has assumed that a cause of action to foreclose this mortgage arose in the State of Colorado. Otherwise there is no justification for invoking § 1-3-117, W.S. 1977. I disagree that any cause of action to foreclose this mortgage arose in the State of Colorado, and I cannot accept as authority for that proposition Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592 (1978); and Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, rehearing denied 61 P. 867 (1899), neither of which involves a mortgage foreclosure. I think those cases must be limited to the promissory note situation, and as so limited I do not disagree with them. They are distinguishable from this case, however, by virtue of that limitation.
I am led to the conclusion that an examination of statutory language such as that found in § 1-3-117, W.S.1977, particularly the phrase “where the cause of action arose,” demands a recognition that a “cause of action” in such a context includes an available remedy. Jurisdiction must exist in the courts of a state to adjudicate between parties upon the claim which is asserted (here judicial foreclosure of a mortgage) in order for a cause of action to arise. Strong v. Lewis, 204 Ill. 35, 68 N.E. 556 (1903); Green v. Kensinger, 199 Kan. 220, 429 P.2d 95 (1967); Washington Sec. Co. v. State, 9 Wash.2d 197, 114 P.2d 965, 135 A.L.R. 1330 (1941). No cause of action to foreclose this mortgage was available in the State of Colorado. Montana Valley Land Co. v. Bestul, 126 Mont. 426, 253 P.2d 325 (1953). That proposition sufficiently is established for me by § 1-5-101, W.S.1977, which provides for venue only in the county in which the real estate is located. Sub silentio the majority opinion would abrogate that statute. 3 Powell on Real Property, ¶ 463, p. 696.51 (1979).
I find that the treatises support the rule that the statute of limitations of the state in which real property is located will control with respect to an action to foreclose a mortgage on such property. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 229 (1971); Leflar, Conflict of Laws, § 145, p. 279 (1959). While different statutory language is involved, this clearly would be the law in our neighboring state of Montana. Hoge-*402voll v. Hogevoll, 117 Mont. 528, 162 P.2d 218 (1945). The wisdom of the Montana legislature in espousing specifically the rule which I urge that we adopt by construction of our statute is apparent. Only Montana law will influence title to real property in Montana.
We have established the rule in Wyoming that in a transaction such as the one before the court in this case we will recognize alternative remedies. Even though an action on the note in this instance is foreclosed, the alternative remedy of judicial foreclosure of the mortgage is not. Cf. National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387 (1948). The rationale of this case furnishes additional support for the concept that the “cause of action” alluded to in our borrowing statute assumes a remedy.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case under the foregoing rationale. I do not find it necessary to rely upon the right of the parties to contract as to the applicable law, although they did in this case adopt the mortgage foreclosure statutes of the State of Wyoming in their mortgage. I would then extend the concept which we began to develop in the case of Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714 (1979), to cover the execution of the mortgage in this instance. My conclusion would be that the mortgagors held the title as tenants in common.