Court Opinion

ID: 9390264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:08:03.881702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.792488
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re B.P., 2023-Ohio-1377.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE B.P., ET AL.                             :
                                               :          No. 112332
Minor Children                                 :
                                               :
[Appeal by S.P., Mother]                       :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                  Case Nos. AD21907534, AD21908236, AD21908237,
                     AD21908238, AD21908239 and AD21908240

                                        Appearances:

                 Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Appellant, Mother, appeals an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (the “juvenile court”), granting permanent

custody of her six children to appellee, the Cuyahoga County Division of Children

and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). She claims the following errors:
      1. The trial court’s award of permanent custody to DCFS, despite
      DCFS’s failure to make reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued
      removal of the children from their home and to return the children to
      their home violated state law and appellant’s due process of law as
      guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State
      Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

      2. The trial court’s decision to award permanent custody to DCFS was
      against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      3. The trial court’s failure to discuss the wishes of the children and their
      relationship with Mother in determining the best interests of the
      children constitutes reversible error.

               We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

                         I. Facts and Procedural History

               On August 30, 2021, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that B.P., who

was born five days earlier, was a dependent child. The complaint requested an order

granting temporary custody of B.P. to the agency and set forth the following

allegations:

      1. Mother has five other children who were removed from her case [sic]
      and placed in the emergency pre-dispositional custody of CCDCFS. A
      complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody to CCDCFS is
      pending. * * *

      2. The home in which the family resides is unsanitary, inappropriate,
      and unsafe. The home is covered in trash, spoiled food, insects, and
      feces. The only toilet in the home is non-functional and is leaking
      biohazardous waste through the first floor ceiling.

      3. Mother and father * * * have a domestically violent relationship.
      [Father] has threatened to kill mother and the child’s siblings. Mother
      has continued to maintain a relationship with [Father] and had [sic]
      allowed him access to the children despite the ongoing violence.

      4. Mother and [Father] fail to adequately supervise the child’s siblings.
      Due to inadequate supervision, there is inappropriate sexual contact
      between the child’s siblings.
      5. [Father] has a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sex abuse, in
      which case the victim was under the age of thirteen. [Father] is
      required to register as a Tier III sex offender. * * * [Father] has several
      convictions for Failure to Register and Attempted Failure to Register.
      ***

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and placed B.P. in temporary

custody.

             Less than one month later, on September 17, 2o21, CCDCFS filed

additional complaints alleging that Mother’s five other children, C.P., Nat.P.,

Na’S.P., Ni.P., and No.P., were abused and neglected. With the filing of these

complaints, the agency dismissed previously filed complaints for temporary custody

of the five children that were not resolved within the required statutory time period.

The five, nearly identical complaints reiterated the allegations set forth in the

complaint in B.P.’s case regarding the unsanitary conditions of the home, the violent

relationship between Mother and N.P., father of the five youngest of Mother’s

children, and inappropriate sexual conduct. In the prayers for relief, the agency

requested an order placing the children in the agency’s temporary custody. The five

children identified in the complaints had previously been removed from Mother’s

home in June 2021, pursuant to an ex parte telephonic order. Following a hearing,

the court adjudicated the children dependent and placed them in the agency’s

temporary custody.

            In May 2022, CCDCFS filed motions in each of the children’s cases

seeking to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. Trial on the motions

commenced in November 2022.           Jason Vicens (“Vicens”), a supervisor with
CCDCFS assigned to the case, testified that the agency developed a case plan for

Mother that provided services for mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations

and treatment as well as domestic violence and parenting education. (Tr. 63.)1 The

case plan also provided services aimed at helping Mother obtain suitable housing.

(Tr. 63.)

             Vicens explained that although Mother completed domestic violence

and parenting education, she did not appear to benefit from those programs.

Mother completed domestic-violence education at Able Counseling in February

2022. However, after completing the program, she continued her relationship with

N.P., who had physically and sexually abused her and the children. (Tr. 65.)

Although Mother legally divorced N.P., the agency did not find the divorce “genuine”

because case workers repeatedly observed Mother and N.P. together after their

divorce. (Tr. 69, 82.) Vicens stated, “I’ve also personally seen them together at a

visit when I showed up unannounced.” (Tr. 69-70.)

             Mother also completed parenting services through Catholic Charities,

but she continued to blame the children for the family’s involvement with CCDCFS.

Vicens noted that Mother failed to take responsibility for her own role creating the

conditions that caused the removal of the children. (Tr. 64.)

             With respect to the mental-health component of the case plan, Vicens

explained that Mother was referred to the Juvenile Court Diagnostic Clinic because

      1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to the transcript refer to the transcript of the
hearing held on November 3, 2022.
she self-reported that she had schizophrenia.        Dr. Douglas Waltman (“Dr.

Waltman”), a psychologist with the Juvenile Court Diagnostic Clinic, completed a

psychological evaluation of Mother. Dr. Waltman testified that despite extensive

testing, he found no significant mental issues with Mother. He did, however,

conclude that Mother lacks insight into her own behavior and sees herself as fine

when in fact she is not. (Tr. 42.) For example, Mother knew that her husband, N.P.,

was a convicted sex offender, but she did not believe it was a valid conviction. (Tr.

40.) She also held the opinion that the CCDCFS cases concerning her children were

“entirely unwarranted.” (Tr. 39.)

            Dr. Waltman explained that people like Mother, who lack insight into

themselves, “have a tendency to not take responsibility for their actions.” (Tr. 42.)

As an example, Dr. Waltman testified that Mother provided excuses as to why her

home was in disarray. He also explained that Mother views herself as an innocent

victim of CCDCFS. (Tr. 42-43.)

              Vicens testified that housing was a component of Mother’s case plan

because she and the children were living in “deplorable conditions” when the

children were removed. He stated:

      Upon investigation, the home was found to have garbage, diapers, a
      large amount of flies/insects, [a] broken front door window, a bunch of
      spindles missing from the stairs, [and] feces smeared on the wall.

      The toilet from upstairs was so not properly working that it was leaking
      through the ceiling.

      Also the children’s bedding was not appropriate in terms of cleanliness.
      So there was a lot of issues with the condition of the home.
(Tr. 66.) Although Mother was afforded services to help her remedy problems in the

home or to otherwise obtain suitable housing, Mother refused to allow Vicens access

to the house for an inspection. (Tr. 67.) Vicens explained:

      I know I’ve attempted to see the * * * home on at least four occasions
      throughout the life of the case, most recently this past summer which
      once again I didn’t get access to, and prior to that was in February 2022
      which I did not get access, but upon going to the home there was at least
      10 to 14 bags of trash next to the porch in various stages of
      decomposition in terms of discarded food, but also beer and liquor
      bottles that I observed.

(Tr. 67.) Therefore, Vicens was unable to say that Mother had remedied the

conditions in the home that contributed to the children’s removal.

             Vicens testified that he referred Mother for a drug and alcohol (“AOD”)

assessment through Moore Counseling after she tested positive for cocaine on a five-

panel hair follicle test in September 2021. (Tr. 84.) Mother never completed the

AOD assessment. According to Vicens, Mother blamed the positive drug-test result

on the fact that she kissed N.P. on the lips. (Tr. 84.) Vicens was concerned that

Mother was minimizing the seriousness of her substance-abuse problem and the fact

that she continued a romantic relationship with someone who was using illegal

substances. (Tr. 84.)

              As previously stated, N.P. is the father of Mother’s five youngest

children. J.G. is the father of C.P. N.P., father of Mother’s youngest five children,

did not engage in any of the services offered as part of his case plan. (Tr. 68-69.) He

also failed to verify a residence that could be investigated by CCDCFS. (Tr. 68-69.)

According to Vicens, C.P.’s father, J.G., is mentally disabled and is unable to take
custody of C.P. (Tr. 72.) Indeed, J.G.’s brother has been appointed to serve as J.G.’s

guardian. (Tr. 72.)

                 C.P. was placed in a residential treatment facility due to her

particularized needs and behaviors. (R. 291, GAL report.) Laurie Nagle (“Nagle”),

C.P.’s therapist at Genacross Family and Youth Services, testified that C.P. has been

undergoing both individual and group therapy to address anxiety related to her

history of sexual and physical abuse. (Tr. 16.) C.P. reported to Nagle that her

stepfather, N.P., raped her multiple times over a period of years before she was

removed from Mother’s custody when she was 14 years old. (Tr. 16-18.) C.P. told

Mother about the rapes multiple times, and Mother put a lock on C.P.’s bedroom

door to keep her safe. (Tr. 19.) There was no evidence that Mother reported the

rapes to police or that she took any other action.

                 C.P. disclosed to Nagle that she witnessed N.P. performing oral sex on

her youngest sister and that N.P. whipped her younger brothers and sisters with a

belt many times. (Tr. 19.) C.P. also observed N.P. attempt to choke Mother and

forced Mother to perform oral sex on him. (Tr. 20.) Although C.P. now lives in a

residential treatment facility, she fears that N.P. will show up with a gun and rape

her. (Tr. 21.)

                 Felicia Croston (“Croston”), a licensed social worker with National

Youth Advocates Program, testified that she is Na’S.P.’s therapist. Na’S.P. was five

years old at the time of trial. (Tr. 52.) Croston testified that she was helping Na’S.P.

“learn to deal with the trauma, sexual, and physical abuse from her parents.” (Tr.
50.) Na’S.P. reported to Croston that N.P., whom she refers to as her “old dad,” hit,

pinched, and slapped her. She also reported that Mother touched her vagina and

stuck a plastic knife in her vagina. (Tr. 52-53.) Na’S.P. further disclosed that N.P.

also sexually abused her. (Tr. 53.) Vicens testified that Na’S.P. refused to visit her

parents. Vicens stated:

       [Na’S.P.] has been adamant from day one that she does not want to visit
       with her parents to the point of, you know, shutting down or being very
       clingy with the foster parent prior to visits, and also showing concern
       for her siblings to go to visits.

(Tr. 72.)

              When asked about visitation with the other children, Vicens stated

that Nat.P., No.P., Ni.P., and B.P. visited with Mother. The children, who all suffer

from asthma, were living in two different foster homes. According to Vicens, both

foster families reported that the children had increased breathing difficulties that

required additional treatments after visits that were not normally required. (Tr. 92.)

Vicens explained that the visits exacerbated their breathing difficulties to the point

that the children’s doctor wanted to stop the visits. (Tr. 93.) Vicens explained that

because all the children experienced exacerbation of their breathing difficulties

following visits and the children live in two different homes, the problem does not

originate in the homes but with the visits themselves. (Tr. 93.) Both foster families

also reported that the children were clingy after the visits. (Tr. 91.)

              In separate journal entries, the juvenile court granted the agency’s

motion to modify custody and ordered that all of Mother’s children be placed in the
agency’s permanent custody.      The court also found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that returning custody of the children to either of their parents would be

contrary to the children’s best interests. Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s

judgment.

                              II. Law and Analysis

                   A. Reasonable Efforts at Reunification

             In the first assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court

failed to make adequate findings relating to the agency’s reasonable efforts to

reunify her with the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.419.

             This court addressed the first issue in Mother’s argument in In re C.N.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81813, 2003-Ohio-2048, wherein we explained:

      R.C. 2151.419 requires the court to determine whether the public
      children services agency that filed the complaint in the case has made
      reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely
      home. However, that statute applies only to hearings held pursuant
      R.C. 2151.28, division (E) of R.C. 2151.31, R.C. 2151.314, R.C. 2151.33 or
      R.C. 2151.353. The motion for permanent custody in this case was filed
      pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.          Therefore, the reasonable efforts
      demonstration is not required in the instant permanent custody
      analysis.

Id. at ¶ 37. See also In re I.A.-W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111217, 2022-Ohio-1766,

¶ 17 (juvenile court is not required to make a reasonable-efforts determination when

it was ruling on a motion for permanent custody); In re Baby Boy M., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 91312, 2008-Ohio-5271, ¶ 41 (same).

              Mother concedes existing precedent from this court holds that

reasonable-efforts findings are not required in permanent custody cases but argues
that this court’s precedent misinterprets the law. However, the Ohio Supreme Court

has also held that a juvenile court is not required to make a reasonable-efforts

determination when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In In re C.F., 113

Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, the Ohio Supreme Court

explained:

      By its terms, R.C. 2151.419 applies only at hearings held pursuant to
      R.C. 2151.28, 2151.31(E), 2151.314, 2151.33 or 2151.353. See R.C.
      2151.419(A)(1). These sections involve adjudicatory, emergency,
      detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional
      hearings for abused, neglected, or dependent children, all of which
      occur prior to a decision transferring permanent custody to the state.
      The statute makes no reference to a hearing on a motion for permanent
      custody. Therefore, “[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to
      motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or
      to hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.” In re
      A.C., supra, 2004-Ohio-5531, ¶ 30.

      This does not mean that the agency is relieved of the duty to make
      reasonable efforts. At various stages of the child-custody proceeding,
      the agency may be required under other statutes to prove that it has
      made reasonable efforts toward family reunification. To the extent that
      the trial court relies on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) at a permanency hearing,
      the court must examine the “reasonable case planning and diligent
      efforts by the agency to assist the parents” when considering whether
      the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a
      reasonable time. However, the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not
      mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable
      efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent
      custody.

      Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in a hearing
      on a motion for permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.
      However, except for some narrowly defined statutory exceptions, the
      state must still make reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the
      child-custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental rights.
      If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been
      made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it
      must demonstrate such efforts at that time.
Id. at ¶ 41-43.

              The juvenile court in this case previously determined that the agency

had made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the children from Mother’s home

when it granted predispositional temporary custody of the children to CCDCFS. In

separate journal entries dated September 20, 2021, the court found, in relevant part:

      The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
      the removal of the child from the home. Relevant services provided to
      the family and the reasons those services were not successful: Mother
      was referred to Murtis Taylor and Catholic Charities and Court’s
      Diagnostic Clinic.

      Father has been linked with Beech Brook for parenting education.
      Father was referred for hair follicle testing and possible domestic
      violence education.

Thereafter, Mother appeared with counsel for an adjudicatory hearing in December

2021. At that time, Mother stipulated to the allegations of the complaint, as

amended, and the children were adjudged to be dependent and placed in the

temporary custody of the agency. In separate journal entries, the court made

relevant findings similar to the following:

      The Court finds that the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
      Family Services has made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the
      child, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from the home,
      or to make it possible for the child to return home. The case specific
      findings are:

      Mother’s case plan objectives are parenting education, domestic
      violence education, substance abuse and basic needs. The parents, on
      their own, went to Beech Brook for parenting education. Supportive
      visits have started. There is a parenting coach through Beech Brook.
      Domestic violence education services are being sought through
      Catholic Charities or Beech Brook. Mother was referred to Moore
      Counseling for substance abuse for cocaine.
      Father’s case plan objective are parenting education, domestic violence
      education and substance abuse. A referral was made for domestic
      violence education. A drug screen needs to be completed.

      The child is participating in counseling.

(R. 131, AD21907543.) The trial court also issued a journal entry in each child’s case

on July 5, 2022, explicitly finding that “CCDCFS has made reasonable efforts to

finalize a permanency plan. Those efforts include: substance abuse, parenting,

domestic violence, mental health, and housing.” (R. 224, AD21907543; R. 235,

AD21908236; R. 170, AD21908237; R. 165, AD21908238; R. 165, AD21908239;

R. 169, AD21908240.)

              None of these findings were challenged by way of objection or appeal.

Therefore, because the trial court made reasonable-efforts findings during the

pendency of these cases before the permanent-custody proceedings, the

requirements of R.C. 2151.419 were satisfied. Moreover, despite Mother’s argument

to the contrary, the court also made the following reasonable-efforts findings in each

of the judgment entries granting the agency’s motion for permanent custody:

      The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
      the removal of the child from her home, or to finalize the permanency
      plan, to wit: reunification. Case plan services for mother include
      mental health, domestic violence, and housing. Mother completed a
      mental health assessment at the diagnostic clinic. Mother completed
      parenting classes, however has not benefited from those services.
      Mother completed domestic violence through Able Counseling, but has
      not benefited from those services. It is unknown if Mother has housing.
      The Father never engaged in case plan services.

      * * *

      The Court further finds that following the placement of the child
      outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning
      and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the
      problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home,
      the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially
      remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s
      home.

Therefore, the juvenile court not only complied with the requirements of R.C.

2151.419 in its journal entries granting temporary custody of the children to the

agency, it also made reasonable-efforts findings in its final judgment entries

granting permanent custody of the children to the agency even though it was not

required to do so. We discuss the evidence supporting those findings in our analysis

of the second assignment of error. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is

overruled.

                     B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In the second assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court’s

decision to award permanent custody of her children to CCDCFS was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Mother contends the evidence demonstrates that

she remedied the conditions that caused the children to be removed because she (1)

divorced N.P. and there was nothing more she could do to protect her children, (2)

complied with all case plan requirements, (3) regularly visited the children and

demonstrated a bond with them, and (4) removed the dangers that caused the

children to be removed from her care in the first place.

              A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest * * * in the care, custody,

and management of [his or her child].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102

S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The termination of parental rights is regarded as
“‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” In re J.B., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio

St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14. Consequently, parents “‘must be

afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’” In re Hayes,

79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d

1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991).

              Nevertheless, a parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her

child is not absolute. In re L.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110789, 2022-Ohio-529,

¶ 49. “‘[T]he natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare

of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principal to be observed.’” In re

L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham,

59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

               Ohio statutes governing child custody and protection “appropriately

reflect the need to balance * * * [the] parents’ * * * interest in the custody, care,

nurturing, and rearing of their own children, and the state’s parens patriae interest

in providing for the security and welfare of children under its jurisdiction[.]” In re

Thompson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1358, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1890 (Apr.

26, 2001).

                              1. Standard of Review

              R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a juvenile

court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523,

115 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). This first prong authorizes
the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after

a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the

following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and

there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-

month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents

from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused,

neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state

or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).

              Only one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) must be

established to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis for granting permanent

custody of a child to a child-protection agency. In re D.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110505, 2021-Ohio-3821, ¶ 27, citing In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104881,

2017-Ohio-657. If any one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) is

established, the court may move to the second prong of the analysis, which requires

the juvenile court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether it is in

the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to

R.C. 2151.414(D).
               “A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains

some competent, credible evidence from which the court could have found that the

essential statutory elements for permanent custody had been established by clear

and convincing evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-

1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16.

               “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be

established.’” In re T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99931, 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).

                   2. First Prong: R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e)

              With respect to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the

juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the children were

neither abandoned nor orphaned, but they could not be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents.

              When assessing whether a child cannot be placed with either of the

child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s

parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a juvenile court must consider the factors

outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E). In re A.V., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101391, 2014-Ohio-

5348, ¶ 58; In re R.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98065 and 98066, 2012-Ohio-4290,

¶ 14; In re B.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107732 and 107735, 2019-Ohio-2919, ¶ 13.

A juvenile court is only required to find that one of these factors is met in order to
properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent. In re Ca.T.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108969, 2020-Ohio-579, ¶ 27, citing In re V.C., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 102903, 103061, and 103367, 2015-Ohio-4991, ¶ 42.

              The juvenile court found that the children could not be placed with

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) provides that the court shall

enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with either parent if it finds that

      [f]ollowing the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
      notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
      agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
      caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
      continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
      causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.

              Vicens testified that although Mother engaged in parenting and

domestic-violence education programs, she failed to benefit from those services.

(Tr. 63-64.) As an example, Vicens explained that although Mother completed

parenting classes through Catholic Charities, she continued to blame the children

for the family’s involvement with CCDCFS.          Vicens stated that Mother “was

minimizing and projecting blame on others for involvement with DCFS.” (Tr. 64.)

              Dr. Waltman’s testimony corroborates Vicens’s opinion. Referring to

Mother’s involvement with CCDCFS, he explained that “she portrays herself as being

an innocent victim, that the case against her from Children’s Services is

unwarranted.” He further explained, “She had explanations for why the home was
unkempt and basically did not take responsibility for any of the concerns that

Childrens Services had.” (Tr. 42-43.)

              Although Mother completed the domestic-violence component of her

case plan and divorced N.P., she continued her relationship with him even though

he physically and sexually abused her and the children. (Tr. 65-66.) Indeed, a

CCDCFS’s worker observed Mother with N.P. together two days prior to trial. (Tr.

65-66.)

              Mother’s case plan also required her to provide suitable housing for

the children. At the time the children were removed from her care, Mother’s house

was in a “deplorable” condition. (Tr. 66.) Throughout the pendency of the case,

Mother never allowed Vicens to inspect the house. Vicens testified that he visited

the exterior of the house and observed “at least 10 to 14 bags of trash next to the

porch in various stages of decomposition in terms of discarded food, but also beer

and liquor bottles[.]” (Tr. 67.) The guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Christina M. Joliat

(“Joliat”), also stated in her report that the “children were found in deplorable home

conditions and even without the children present [Mother] is unable to maintain

appropriate housing.” (GAL Report.) Therefore, the record contains competent,

credible evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that “notwithstanding

reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parent to

remedy the problems that initially caused the child[ren] to be placed outside the

home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the

conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.” Therefore, the
juvenile court properly concluded that the children could not or should not be placed

with Mother within a reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

               3. Second Prong: Best Interests of the Children

              Having determined that the manifest weight of the evidence supports

the juvenile court’s finding that the children could not or should not be returned to

either parent within a reasonable time, we now turn to the second prong of our

analysis, which requires the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence,

whether it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the

agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).

              We recognize that, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact

the court’s decision will have on the lives of the parties concerned, the juvenile court

enjoys broad discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in

the child’s best interest. In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th

Dist.1994). We, therefore, review a juvenile court’s determination of a child’s best

interests under R.C. 2151.414(D) for an abuse of discretion. In re D.A., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47.

               An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

This court has held that an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court

“applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on

clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401,
2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). When applying the abuse-of-

discretion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22

(8th Dist.).

               R.C. 2151.414(D) provides two alternative tests for determining

whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest. “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),

the juvenile court weighs multiple factors * * * to decide whether granting an agency

permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” In re S.C., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 21AP-203, 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38, quoting In re J.P., 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 18AP-834, 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39. “By contrast, ‘under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), if

the juvenile court makes [each of] the four enumerated findings, permanent custody

is per se in the child’s best interest and the court “shall” commit the child to the

permanent custody of the agency.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

               In this case, the juvenile court applied R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which

requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to (1) the

interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings,

relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may

significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the

child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child;

(4) the child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of

placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and

(5) whether any factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are applicable.
                 Although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent-custody determination, “there is not

one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In

re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. And, only

one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find that

permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

102350, 2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has clarified

that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each

of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). In re A.M., 166

Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 184 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31. “Consideration is all the statute

requires.” Id.

                 The journal entries granting permanent custody of the children to the

agency in this case state that the court considered

      the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
      parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents; the wishes of the child;
      the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been
      the temporary custody of a public children services agency or private
      child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition
      for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period;
      the child’s need for legally secure permanent placement and whether
      that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
      custody; and, the report of the Guardian ad Litem[.]

(R. 263, AD21908240.)

                 The court’s journal entry establishes that the court considered the

factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and evidence in the record supports the

court’s conclusion that permanent custody is in the children’s best interests. With
respect to the interaction and interrelationship of the children with their parents,

siblings, relatives, and foster parents, several witnesses testified that C.P. and

Na’S.P., two of the older children, refused to visit with their parents because they

were afraid of them as a result of prior physical and sexual abuse. (Tr. 21, 26, 52, 55,

72.) The GAL also noted that C.P. and Na’S.P. were fearful of their parents and

refused to visit them. The other four children had visits with Mother, but they

displayed regressive behaviors after visits and their breathing issues were noticeably

exacerbated by the visits. (Tr. 72-75, 91-95, 112.) Thus, this factor weighed in favor

of permanent custody because the children were clearly not comfortable visiting

their parents.

                 R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of the child’s wishes as

expressed directly or through a GAL. At the time of trial, the children were 16, 6, 4,

3, 2, and 1 year old. Thus, the five youngest children lacked the capacity to express

their wishes in a meaningful fashion. The oldest child, C.P., is a “highly autistic child

with ADHD.” (Tr. 20, 70.) C.P.’s therapist testified that C.P. refuses to speak to

Mother, does not want to have contact with her, and does not want to go home with

her. (Tr. 26.) The GAL notes in her written report that Na’S.P. “continues to refuse

to visit and has made disclosures regarding abuse by [Mother, N.P., and C.P.].” She

also states that C.P. has refused all contact with Mother due to her continued

relationship with N.P. (Tr. 291, AD21908236.) And, based on her investigation, the

GAL recommended to the court that it grant permanent custody of the children to

CCDCFS.
              R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) requires consideration of the children’s

custodial history, including whether the child has been in temporary custody for 12

or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides,

that for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),

      a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an
      agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to
      section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after
      the removal of the child from home.

              The oldest five children were removed from Mother’s custody

pursuant to an ex parte telephonic order on June 23, 2021. The youngest child, B.P.,

was removed by another ex parte telephonic order on August 28, 2021, three days

after his birth. The permanent custody trial began on November 7, 2022. Therefore,

the children were in temporary custody for over 12 months of a consecutive 22-

month period at the time of trial.

              Finally, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires the court to consider the

child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether such placement can be

achieved without a grant of permanent custody. As previously stated, the juvenile

court found that the children “cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within

a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.” If the juvenile court

finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the enumerated factors in

R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to each of the child’s parents, the juvenile court must find

that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414(E).
              The juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), that after

the children were placed in temporary custody and notwithstanding reasonable

planning and diligent effort by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the

problems that caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parents “failed

continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the

child to be placed outside the child’s home.” (R. 263, AD21908240.) And, as

previously stated, this finding is supported by competent, credible evidence. Having

found that one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to each of the

child’s parents, the juvenile court had to find that the child cannot be placed with

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

R.C. 2151.414(E).

              None of the parents filed any motions suggesting that an alternative

caregiver might be available for any of the children. Vicens testified that the agency

attempted to find relatives who might qualify to serve as alternative caregivers for

the children, but those efforts were not successful.        (Tr. 76-78, 83, 88-89.)

Moreover, the GAL testified that the children were doing well in their foster homes

and that C.P. was progressing in her group home. (Tr. 111.) Again, the GAL

recommended that the children be placed in permanent custody.

              Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say that the juvenile court

acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in determining that permanent

custody was in the children’s best interests. We, therefore, overrule the second

assignment of error.
                           C. The Children’s Wishes

              In the third assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred

in failing to discuss the children’s wishes and their relationships with their parents

in the judgment entries granting permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS.

However, as previously stated, “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court

to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)

through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d

127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 184 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31. See also In re M.S.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111974, 2023-Ohio-316 (same).

              The juvenile court’s journal entries granting permanent custody

expressly state that the court considered the best-interest factors in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). And, as discussed in our analysis of Mother’s second

assignment of error, the evidence adduced at the permanent custody trial clearly and

convincingly supports the juvenile court’s findings. Therefore, the third assignment

of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the common

pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR