Court Opinion

ID: 9615411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:36:22.327186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:56.421599
License: Public Domain

MOELLER, Vice Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion except for that portion of it which sets aside the statutory aggravating factor of “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). The majority concludes that the trial court’s finding that the killings were for the purpose of eliminating witnesses does not, by itself, support an (F)(6) finding. My disagreement is twofold. First, I do not believe that the majority’s approach properly places the issue before this court. Second, even if the majority had properly reached the issue, I am not convinced that it is either proper or wise to hold that witness elimination as a motive for killing can never alone support an (F)(6) finding.
Such a holding is unnecessary to the resolution of this case, since the majority concludes, as do I, that defendant’s sentences should be affirmed without regard to the validity of the (F)(6) finding. My initial concern is one of methodology. We have repeatedly stated the rule to be that we independently reweigh statutory aggravating circumstances in death penalty cases. E.g., slip op. at 45. Given this rule, we should not, in my opinion, set aside an (F)(6) finding (or any other statutory aggravating circumstance) unless and until we have ourselves independently reweighed the evidence on the point and found it lacking. If the reweighing is truly an independent reweighing, as we have repeatedly asserted, this court can consider all the relevant evidence properly in the record and is not limited to the precise item or items that persuaded the trial court. See State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 407, 411-12, 857 P.2d 1261, 1265-66 (1993); State v. Riles, 175 Ariz. 358, 372, 857 P.2d 1212, 1226 (1993); State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 115, 865 P.2d 765, 776 (1993); State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 528-29, 809 P.2d 944, 953-54 (1991). Thus, until we have examined the entire record and concluded that witness elimination is in fact the only evidence of heinousness or depravity, the issue of whether witness elimination by itself can support an (F)(6) finding is not properly before this court. Because this court has not engaged in any such review in this case, the (F)(6) finding should not be set aside.
Even if the majority opinion had properly reached the issue, I disagree with its conclusion that, as a matter of law, witness elimination alone can never support an (F)(6) finding. First, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this court has previously upheld a finding of depravity based solely on a finding of witness elimination. In State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 71, 786 P.2d 395, 401 (1989), we held that the record supported the trial court’s finding that “the murder was committed in *290an especially heinous or depraved manner because the motive for the killing was to eliminate the victim as a witness.” Id.
The majority opinion minimizes Marlow on the theory that Marlow “erroneously cited” three prior cases of this court. Op. at 1037 n. 8 (discussing Marlow, 163 Ariz. at 71, 786 P.2d at 401 (citing State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 715 P.2d 721 (1986); State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984); State v. Smith, 141 Ariz. 510, 687 P.2d 1265 (1984))). I do not believe we can so easily disregard Marlow. The majority is correct to the extent that none of the cases cited in Marlow holds that a finding of witness elimination alone supports an (F)(6) finding. My review of these cases, however, reveals that each holds that witness elimination as a motive for killing illustrates or tends to show heinousness or depravity. Correll, 148 Ariz. at 481, 715 P.2d at 734; Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570, 691 P.2d at 661; Smith, 141 Ariz. at 511-12, 687 P.2d at 1266-67.
Relying on these cases, the court in Mar-low did decide that under the circumstances of that ease, witness elimination alone was in fact enough to support an (F)(6) finding. I do not see how the Marlow court erred in citing, in support of that holding, cases where witness elimination was an important consideration in upholding a similar finding. Mar-low is a relatively recent decision of this court that is directly on point, and it is a mistake to disregard it.
Finally, quite aside from the problem of not following our own precedent, it is an unwise construction of our death penalty statute to say that, as a matter of law, witness elimination alone can never support an (F)(6) finding. If the majority believes that the circumstances of this particular case do not support an (F)(6) finding, it should so hold and leave the larger question open for future cases. I am not willing to foreclose the possibility that some day a case will present circumstances where witness elimination alone may very well support a finding of heinousness or depravity. An example of such a case might be the murder of a government witness arranged by gangs or organized crime under circumstances not falling within the aggravating pecuniary value provisions of § 13-703(F)(4) or (5).
For these reasons, I concur in the result, but dissociate myself from the majority’s discussion concerning the trial court’s (F)(6) finding. It is both unnecessary and unwise to hold that witness elimination alone can never satisfy § 13-703(F)(6).
MARTONE, J., concurs.