Court Opinion

ID: 9960905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:03:35.388866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:02.118361
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed April 17, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0940
                       Lower Tribunal No. 21-11532
                          ________________

     Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                        Yimi Elis Santos, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice
Butchko, Judge.

     Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., and Paulo R. Lima and Elizabeth K.
Russo, for appellant.

     Feiler, Leach & Chong, and Martin E. Leach, for appellees.

Before EMAS, SCALES and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, the insurer and

defendant in the breach of contract action below, appeals the trial court’s

award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing insureds. The insurer does not

challenge the insureds’ entitlement to fees but alleges that the amount

awarded was unreasonable and unsupported by competent, substantial

evidence.

      The insureds received a judgment of $43,500 in their favor and moved

for attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2022).

They also submitted affidavits from their four attorneys attesting to their

hourly rates and a total of 388.2 hours worked on the case. In opposition,

the insurer submitted an itemized reduction report analyzing the billable time

and requesting a reduction of 182 hours for excessive, cumulative, or

ministerial work.

      The trial court held a short evidentiary hearing, during which the parties

proffered competing expert testimony as to the reasonableness of the hourly

rates and billable hours. The insurer’s expert testified that the rates and

hours were grossly excessive and referred the court to the reduction report.

The insureds’ expert did not dispute the reported sum of 388.2 hours, but

recommended that the court reduce the hours of three of the attorneys by 10

hours each as a “general reduction” to account for potential excessive time,

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without any correlation to the reasonableness of specific billing records;

rather, the expert testified that the reduction was based on his personal

experience as a fee expert, noting that “that’s just the way I do it. I made a

reduction, I thought it was a fair reduction.”

      After the hearing, the court accepted the insureds’ proposed award in

totality and awarded the lodestar amount of $254,525.00 in fees, accounting

for the 30-hour reduction for a total of 358.2 hours between the four

attorneys. The court did not make specific findings as to the reasonableness

of the rates or the billing records proffered by the insureds. This appeal

followed.

      We review orders on attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. See Island

Travel & Tours Ltd. Co. v. MYR Indep., Inc., 307 So. 3d 829, 831 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2020). “In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, a

trial court is required to use the lodestar approach and consider the eight

criteria set forth in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.

2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).” Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deshpande, 314

So. 3d 416, 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Under the lodestar approach, “[t]he

number of hours reasonably expended, determined in the first step,

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, determined in the second step,

produces the lodestar, which is an objective basis for the award of attorney

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fees.” Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151. “Once the court arrives at the lodestar

figure, it may add or subtract from the fee based upon a ‘contingency risk’

factor and the ‘results obtained.’” Id. Additionally, “[i]n determining the hourly

rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of

the reduction or enhancement factors, the trial court must set forth specific

findings.” Id.1

      In Deshpande, we reversed an attorney fee award in an analogous

situation in which the trial court simply adopted the plaintiff’s proposed fee

amounts verbatim, including a flat reduction in hours, without making

particularized findings as to the number of hours or the appropriateness of

any reductions:

      The court did not make any specific findings as to disputed time
      entries which may have been excessive, vague, duplicative or
      ministerial. Nor did the court apply any particularized reductions
      or make any findings as to the appropriateness of reductions.
      Rather, without explanation, the court adopted the Plaintiff’s fee
      expert's 10% blanket reduction to the number of hours
      expended. We find this reduction arbitrary and unsupported.
      Because the $441,805.14 fee award in this case is not supported

1
  The insureds argue that the insurer failed to preserve the issue on appeal
by failing to ask for a rehearing. We disagree. See, e.g., In re Amends. to
Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.530, 373 So. 3d 1115, 1115 (Fla. 2023) (“This
change makes clear that the rules apply only when a judge is required to
make specific findings of fact and not when a party seeks to make other
challenges to a trial court's order.”). Here, the insurer challenges the trial
court’s reliance on unsupported, or conclusory, expert testimony, in making
the ultimate findings of fact.

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      by competent, substantial evidence, we reverse the lodestar
      amount.

314 So. 3d at 420; see also Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Casanas, 336 So.

3d 746, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (same); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s

London v. Candelaria, 339 So. 3d 463, 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[T]he

Insureds’ fee expert admitted during his testimony that he did not conduct a

line-item analysis of the time records as required, but instead simply reduced

the hours billed by 7.5 percent with no proffered rationale for this reduction.

Further, the trial court announced at the conclusion of the hearing that it was

reducing the hours billed by an across-the-board cut of fifteen percent. As

Lloyd's points out, we recently rejected this methodology in [Deshpande and

Casanas]. . . . In the instant case—as in Deshpande—the lodestar amount

is not supported by competent substantial evidence because the trial court

did not make ‘specific findings’ as to its determination of the number of hours

and, instead, applied an arbitrary, across-the-board cut of fifteen percent.”).

      Like Deshpande, we find the insureds’ expert’s use of a 10-hour-per-

lawyer cut, untethered to the record, to be arbitrary.       However, unlike

Deshpande, we do not remand with directions for the trial court to accept the

reductions proffered by the insurer’s expert, as there is evidence and

testimony proffered by both sides. Cf. 314 So. 3d at 420 (citing Winter Park

Imports, Inc. v. JM Fam. Enters., Inc., 77 So. 3d 227, 231 (Fla. 5th DCA

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2011) (“[A]s a general rule, where a party seeking fees and costs has been

afforded an evidentiary hearing, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple

to prove its claim.”)). Here, as there remain disputed issues of fact, the

appropriate remedy is to remand for further development of the record and

to allow the trial judge to make the appropriate findings regarding the lodestar

amount. As our sister court explained:

      Generally, when the record on appeal is devoid of competent
      substantial evidence to support the attorney’s fee award, the
      appellate court will reverse the award without remand for
      additional evidentiary findings. However, when the record
      contains some competent substantial evidence supporting the
      fee or cost order, yet fails to include some essential evidentiary
      support such as testimony from the attorney performing the
      services, or testimony from additional expert witnesses, the
      appellate court will reverse and remand the order for additional
      findings or an additional hearing, if necessary.

Diwakar v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 143 So. 3d 958, 961

(Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, “because the

record contains some evidence which, if explained, could support the award,

reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing is the more appropriate

disposition.” Black Point Assets, Inc. v. Ventures Tr. 2013-I-H-R by MCM

Cap. Partners, LLC, 236 So. 3d 1134, 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

      Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court

to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing, affording the trial court the

opportunity to consider the insurer’s reduction report and make sufficient

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findings as to the reasonable amount of billable hours, rates, and any

reductions.

     Reversed and remanded with instructions.

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