Court Opinion

ID: 9488128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:37:06.331622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:42.591533
License: Public Domain

OWEN, District Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, concluding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the judicial enforcement of the subpoena that is before us. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shell, 466 U.S. 54, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984) at 65,104 S.Ct. at 1629, it is stated:
[T]he existence of a charge that meets the requirements set forth in § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial enforcement of a subpoena issued by the EEOC.
Section § 2000e-5(b) further directs that the Commission’s charge:
be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.
Pursuant to that, the Commission promulgated regulations as to the contents of the charge as follows:
Each charge should contain ... [a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3) (1994).
In a proceeding involving an allegation of a “pattern-and-praetice” violation, as here, Shell, at 73, 104 S.Ct. at 1633, held that the Commission’s content regulation requires that:
[ijnsofar as he is able, the Commissioner should identify the groups of persons that he has reason to believe have been discriminated against, the categories of employment positions from which they have been excluded, the methods by which the discrimination may have been effected, and the periods of time in which he suspects the discrimination to have been practiced.
Shell further provides that “the EEOC is entitled to ‘access only to evidence relevant to the charge under the investigation.’ ” Id. at 64, 104 S.Ct. at 1629. Shell further observes that the purpose for this is “Congress’ desire to prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained investigative authority....” Id. at 65, 104 S.Ct. at 1629.1
*449Against this background, the two charges that are made here by the EEOC against Superior, while setting forth a starting point of February 7, 1990, are otherwise but a mere tracking of the statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, which under subsection (a)(2) makes it
an unlawful employment practice to ... classify ... employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s ... sex[.]
And paragraph 1 of the charge reads:
[T]he unlawful discriminatory practices include ...:
Classifying and/or referring employees and applicants for employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects their status as employees, because of their sex.
Next, the statute under subsection 2000e-2(b) makes it
an unlawful employment practice ... to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his ... sex_
And paragraph 2 of the charge reads:
[T]he unlawful discriminatory practices include:
Failing and/or refusing to refer for employment or otherwise discriminating against individuals on the basis of their sex.
The charge thereupon concludes with the following:
The persons aggrieved include all individuals who are, have been, or may in the future be affected by the unlawful employment practices complained of herein.
Thus, the charge, by merely tracking the statute, tells Superior virtually nothing.2 It therefore, in my judgment, does not constitute an adequate charge under Shell to give us jurisdiction.3
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instructions that the EEOC be directed to articulate an adequate charge, if it can, and thereafter provide Superior Temporary Services, Inc. with a meaningful and adequate notice of circumstances of the allegedly unlawful employment pattem-and-practice discrimination. Then, if a remedy or resolution cannot be negotiated (see Shell at 90,104 S.Ct. at 1642) there is time enough to come to the Courts for enforcement of an administrative subpoena. Unless and until that is done, I deem it wholly inappropriate for the EEOC to impose the substantial expense and disruption this subpoena will occasion on any enterprise, especially one as small as the one before us.

. It is notable that even the Shell dissent at 90, 104 S.Ct. at 1642 agrees with this in its pointed observation:
Experience teaches that Government administrative agency investigations can be prone to abuse; they are likely to be conducted more *449reasonably, more carefully, and more fairly, when the concerned parties are adequately notified of the causes of the investigation that are in progress.

. The statute further provides that "the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such employ-er_" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Shell observes that the purpose of the notice is "to ensure that the employer [i]s given some idea of the nature of the charge.” Shell at 75. Not only does the EEOC’s notice in this case add nothing to what was contained in the charge itself, but the notice itself, doing again nothing more than tracking the statute § 2000e-2(b) which reads "race ... or national origin”, erroneously asserts the charge to be based solely on "race and national origin” whereas the charge is based solely on "sex”.

. I note that in Shell, where the central issue was the adequacy of the charge to entitle the Commission to "secure judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena compelling the employer to disclose personnel records and other material relevant to the charge[J” the information in that charge, which Shell found to be adequate, asserted discrimination against Blacks and discrimination against women, and the jobs by categories from which each was excluded. Shell at 57 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. at 1625 n. 1.