Court Opinion

ID: 9764323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:19:02.213541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.835213
License: Public Domain

P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice. On March 14, 1979, Teresa Williams signed a sale agreement with O’Neal Ford, agreeing to trade her 1973 Dodge Charger toward the purchase of a newer automobile. The sale was contingent upon Mrs. Williams securing the necessary financing for the transaction. By agreement, her car remained in O’Neal Ford’s custody while she sought financing. Some three weeks later, after being unable to obtain the financing, she returned to O’Neal Ford to pick up her car. However, the car had been sold to a used car wholesaler by O’Neal Ford. Mrs. Williams demanded $1,200, the trade-in allowance listed on the March 14 agreement. O’Neal Ford refused to pay the demanded amount. Several days after Mrs. Williams’ demand of $1,200, O’Neal Ford repurchased the car and offered to return it to Mrs. Williams. She refused the return of the car stating that she was due the $1,200. O’Neal Ford informed Mrs. Williams that she would be charged a storage fee for each day the car remained on the premises. The fee would eventually consume the value of the car. Mrs. Williams brought suit against O’Neal Ford, alleging conversion of the 1973 Dodge Charger and praying for $ 1,200 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. A jury awarded her $1,200 in compensatory damages and $22,500 in punitive damages. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted by the trial court as to the punitive damages and the compensatory damages were allowed to stand. The appeal is before us pursuant to Rule 29 (1) (o) involving an issue in the law of torts. Appellant, Teresa Williams, contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury award of punitive damages. Our examination of the record reveals there is substantial evidence to support an award of punitive damages. We reverse. We have held a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper where there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, and one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable and material certainty and precision, compel a conclusion one way or another. It must force or induce the mind to pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture. Findley, Administratrix v. Time Insurance Co., 269 Ark. 257, 599 S.W.2d 736 (1980). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment n.o.v. is rendered, here, appellant Teresa Williams. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herring, 267 Ark. 201, 589 S.W.2d 584 (1979), we stated that “although the taking was proper, the retention of the personalty after demand for its return constituted a submissible fact question on the issue of punitive damages.” Here, the requisite malice could be inferred from acts that are analagous. We will discuss the acts present in this case. Teresa Williams’ testimony is clear that no one from O’Neal Ford mentioned the possibility of getting her car back until she retained an attorney, and he put O’Neal Ford on notice of the potential legal action. The following testimony by Clyde Booth, general manager of O’Neal Ford, was presented to the jury: Q.: All right. Now I want to ask you, after being put on notice that your company was going to be sued for punitive damages to punish you did you all do anything at any time up to this point to give her that $1,200? A.: The only thing that I know we — the only thing that I can recollect is that we offered her her car back. I don’t think at any time we offered her $1,200. Q.: And sitting here right today you are not willing to give her $1,200 are you? A.: No. Q.: Or any portion of it? A.: Yes, I’ll give her — now, at this point I would give her — I would return her car, the same thing that we offered. The jury was aware of the circumstances of all the parties. They knew that Teresa Williams was a young black woman whose husband was away in the service of his country at the time of this occurrence; that she had three small children to transport to school and other places; and that she had essentially no experience in the marketplace. In voir dire this jury was asked if they felt merchants in the area should treat a black person in the same fashion as the merchant treats a white person. The response was affirmative in voir dire and is reflected by their award of punitive damages. The jury, acting as the conscience of the community, saw fit to punish the conduct of O’Neal Ford. Taking into account the jury’s superior vantage point on these matters including the credibility of the witness and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, we hold there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. See Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 598 S.W.2d 748 (1980). Reversed. George Rose Smith, Hickman, and Dudley, JJ., dissent.