Court Opinion

ID: 9536270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:57.580998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.795044
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OE
ABE, J.
It appears that the majority of the court has decided that because in Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969), we permitted a father to sue his unemancipated, minor son, here, a minor child should be permitted to sue his parents.
I believe in Tamashiro we did not affirmatively decline *489to adopt the parent-child immunity doctrine, and at page 79 we said:
“The public policy rationale for the parent-child immunity is further weakened by the fact that at common law, suits were allowed between parent and child especially with respect to contract and property rights. Prosser, Law of Torts, 885 (3d ed. 1964). Some of these suits are deeply antagonistic. We doubt a tort action in which recovery from an insurer is highly probable, would more seriously jeopardize the family relationship or discipline.
“We therefore hold that this jurisdiction will not adopt the doctrine which prohibits suits by parents against their children. This holding, we caution, is limited to this adversary relationship because other intrafamily adversary situations may involve problems or considerations different from the one at hand.”
The City cites Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967), where the court permitted a suit by a minor against her mother for personal injuries suffered as a result of the mother’s negligent driving of an automobile and asks this court to follow it as authority to allow this suit against the parents. It is to be noted that the Alaska court at page 15 said:
“At this time we believe it unnecessary to attempt to define precisely what scope should be given to the doctrine of parental immunity. Eather, we limit our decision to the factual situation before us, and hold that the unemancipated minor has a right of action against her mother for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the parent’s negligent driving.
* * * * *
“We are of the further view that although the existence of liability insurance does not create liability *490its presence is of considerable significance here; To persist in adherence to family-harmony and parental-discipline-and-eontrol arguments when there is automobile liability insurance involved is in our view unrealistic. If there is insurance there is small possibility that parental discipline will be undermined, or that the peace of the family will be shattered by allowance of the action.”
In. the other cases1 cited by the City, where an: unemancipated, minor child was allowed to sue his parents, insurance policies were involved so that the real parties in interest, parties responsible for the damages, were insurance companies.
It should be pointed out in Tamashiro, we were very careful to hold that the rule of the case was not intended to apply to all cases involving “intrafamily adversary relationship” because, I believe, we recognized that public policy rationale of intrafamily immunity has a role in our society and jurisdiction.
Even in this era of technical and scientific achievement, I do not believe that we humans have become so impersonal that we may be considered mechanical or automated’ beings. In my opinion, even today, a human being is a creature of emotions. By this, I mean that one’s life is greatly influenced by One’s emotion; more than it should be, probably, but that is the fact of life.' 'A human being is neither á robot nor an electronic computer — he is a living organism composed of flesh and blood whose behavior is greatly influenced by emotion.
In iny opinion as long as warm blood runs in our veins, one’s behavior cannot be controlled at all times by reason or logic, and emotional stress will have a great influence *491on one’s conduct. Thus, to permit a minor to sue her parents in this action, I believe, would unnecessarily tax the emotions of the parties and may bring about intrafamily discord and jeopardize parent-child relationship and therefore the doctrine of intrafamily immunity should be invoked here.
I believe that this court appreciates the fact that an insurance company is the real party defendant in many cases, though a suit is brought against an insured named as defendant because judgment, against him is satisfied by an insurance company. Also, I believe, that this court realizes, that though the mention of insurance in the presence of jurors may be regarded as sufficient ground for a mistrial, the majority, if not all, of the jurors is cognizant of insurance coverage in cases being tried by them.
In my opinion, this court should legally give recognition to this factual situation and permit insurance companies to be named as actual parties because they are the real parties in interest. H.R.C.P. Rule 17(a). If this practice is permitted, this court would not be faced with the problems posed by this action and it will-help to simplify the issue of “intrafamily adversary’ relationship.” Also) it may avoid the issue whether an attorney representing an insured, but retained by an insurance company, may not be violating § 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.'
I would affirm.

 Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961); Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (U.S.D.C., D.C. 1968).