Court Opinion

ID: 9575407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:13:33.430984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:10.272642
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring). I concur in the judgment of the Court. While I agree with the application of Great American Ins Co v Queen, 410 Mich *23273; 300 NW2d 895 (1980), to the facts of this case, I write separately to indicate my view of the limitations of the Queen doctrine.
Mr. Bialochowski was injured on June 13, 1980. He applied for no-fault benefits a month later. On August 13, 1981, he settled with Cross Concrete, the third-party tortfeasor, for $750,000. In August of 1982, he received approximately $11,000 in past-due no-fault benefits. Since the record does not indicate otherwise, I would assume that Cross Concrete had notice of Mr. Bialochowski’s claim for no-fault benefits and that they settled for noneconomic and excess economic damages only. Thus, Mr. Bialochowski presumably did not receive a double recovery in retaining both his settlement with Cross Concrete and his workers’ compensation benefits.
But, in cases in which an injured employee neither claims nor receives no-fault benefits prior to settlement, and third-party tort pleadings do not indicate a no-fault theory of liability, the possibility of double recovery exists if no reimbursement is made to the workers’ compensation carrier. Extending Queen to such cases is contrary to the Legislature’s intent to prevent duplicate recovery.
The problem arises because the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act and the no-fault act differ in their provisions for third-party tort recovery.
[T]he tort recovery under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act is for all damages, economic and noneconomic, MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827), whereas a § 3135 recovery [no-fault third-party tort recovery] is only for "noneconomic loss” which by definition excludes all benefits payable under no-fault. [Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477, 511; 274 NW2d 373 (1979).]
*233Thus, under the wdca, an injured employee must reimburse the workers’ compensation carrier because the third-party tort recovery basically duplicates the elements of damage already compensated by the wdca.
Section 827(5) of the wdca . . . permits the injured party to recover "any amount” from the third party, including amounts that would duplicate workers’ compensation benefits. "[T]ort recovery under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act is for all damages, economic and noneconomic . . . .” Workman .... This duplication is eliminated, however, by the statutory requirement for reimbursement of the payer of workers’ compensation benefits out of the recovery obtained from the third-party tortfeasor. [Great American Ins Co v Queen, supra, 101 (opinion by Ryan, J., concurring in the result).]
The no-fault act, however, allows recovery in tort only for noneconomic and excess economic loss, which the act itself does not compensate.1
Under the no-fault act, recovery from third par*234ties based upon tort is limited to those injuries that fall outside the coverage of no-fault benefits: noneconomic loss and economic loss exceeding no-fault benefits. Thus, there is no duplication of compensation and, therefore, no need to reimburse the no-fault insurance carrier. [Id., 102.]
Had Mr. Bialochowski failed to apply for no-fault benefits prior to settlement and failed to limit his third-party suit to no-fault residual tort recovery, Cross Concrete would no doubt have assumed that the case did not involve a no-fault theory of liability. Thus, in settling, Cross would have factored both noneconomic and economic losses into its settlement offer because an injured employee may sue for both under the wdca. Under those circumstances, without a reimbursement to Reliance, Mr. Bialochowski would have recovered twice for his below threshold economic loss — once from Reliance, in the form of wdca benefits, and again from Cross Concrete, in the form of a third-party tort settlement.
In this case, even though he did not limit his third-party action to no-fault residual tort liability, Mr. Bialochowski applied for no-fault benefits a full year prior to settlement with Cross Concrete and did eventually receive no-fault benefits. Also, Cross Concrete raised a defense of no-fault residual tort liability.2 The assumption then is that Cross Concrete settled only for noneconomic and excess economic damages. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court._
*235Boyle, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 (1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101(3) and (4) was in effect is abolished except as to:
(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).
(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his or her liability by the amount of taxes that would *234have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he or she had not been injured. [MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135.]

 See the brief of the plaintiff-appellee, pp 18-19.