Court Opinion

ID: 9687485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:31:15.371304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.944203
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 39. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). The State presented the following issue of law for this court to decide: Does the drifting or weaving of a motor vehicle within a *23single traffic lane several (or a few) times over two blocks give an experienced patrol officer reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop for possible drunk driving? The State seeks an affirmative answer and a per se rule that repeated drifting or weaving within a single lane alone, absent any obvious innocent explanation for the drifting or weaving, justifies a traffic stop. The majority opinion answers with a resounding "no."
HH
¶ 40. I agree with the majority opinion that the court should not adopt a bright-line rule declaring that the drifting or weaving of a vehicle within a single lane alone gives rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for a law enforcement officer to conduct an investigative stop of that vehicle. Majority op., ¶ 2.11 agree with the majority that adopting the State's standard would "allow essentially unfettered discretion and permit the arbitrary invasions of privacy by government officials addressed by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11." Majority op., ¶ 21.
¶ 41. I also agree with the majority opinion that the constitutionality of the stop of Robert Post's vehicle must be judged under the totality of the circumstances test. In short, the "determination [of reasonable suspicion] is based on the totality of the circumstances, in accordance with Wisconsin jurisprudence." Majority op., ¶ 14.
*24¶ 42. This case is not just about Robert Post. This is an important case because the rule of law announced by the court today applies with equal force to all who drive. "Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed."2
¶ 43. A traffic stop is a "major interference in the lives of the [vehicle's] occupants." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 479 (1971). Significant interests are at stake when determining the permissibility of a traffic stop. An invasion of privacy occurs every time a law enforcement officer stops a car, regardless of the motivation for the stop. "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated. . . because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."3 Traffic stops "interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time," and they "may create substantial anxiety" for those detained.4 Moreover, a traffic stop provides law enforcement officers with an opportunity for further intrusion on the driver and passengers.
HH I — 1
¶ 44. I disagree with the majority opinion's application of the totality of circumstances standard in the instant case.
¶ 45. The standard by which this court reviews a circuit court or court of appeals decision on the consti*25tutionality of a stop is well established. A reviewing court accepts the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but determines the application of constitutional principles to those facts independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses. Majority op., ¶ 8.
¶ 46. The majority opinion is not faithful to this standard of review: The majority opinion engages in its own fact-finding and ignores relevant facts in setting forth the totality of the circumstances in the instant case.
¶ 47. The circuit court made no findings of fact; it issued a brief memorandum decision describing some facts. The memorandum decision describes Post's car as appearing to be "canted"5 or moving between the roadway centerline and the parking lane, drifting with no sudden, jerky, or violent movement.
¶ 48. The circuit court did not apply the totality of circumstances test. Rather, the circuit court decided in its memorandum decision, as a matter of law, that "based on the training and experience of Officer Sherman, drifting even within one's own lane gives a suspicion that the driver may have been intoxicated."
¶ 49. The majority opinion mines the testimony of the law enforcement officer, who was the only witness to testify, when exploring the totality of the circumstances. The officer, at various times in his testimony, characterized Post's car as having "drifted," "canted," and traveled in an "S type manner" in a "smooth *26motion" from the unmarked parking lane to a foot from the center lane dividing the two lanes of traffic. The officer testified that Post's car "did not drift more than 5 feet." The officer also testified that the width of Post's vehicle was eight feet and further estimated that the single traffic lane, which included unmarked space for parking, was approximately 22-24 feet wide.
¶ 50. The majority opinion questions the accuracy of the officer's estimate of the width of Post's vehicle as eight feet but nonetheless accepts it and the other estimates provided by the officer as valid measurements. Majority op., ¶ 34 n.ll. The majority opinion then goes outside the record to show that the officer's estimate of the width of the parking and driving area makes the width of the parking and driving area twice as wide as a "standard" single lane. Majority op., ¶ 36.
¶ 51. The majority opinion then performs its own calculations of the "S" pattern on the basis of the officer's testimony of the dimensions of the roadway and car, and finds that Post's weaving was "between five feet and nine feet." Majority op., ¶ 35. The officer never made this calculation.
¶ 52. Even more problematic, the majority opinion appears to treat what the officer described as Post's car "canting" in the parking lane as a separate factor from Post's car weaving and making a S-shaped maneuver. According to the majority opinion, under the totality of the circumstances, we are presented not only with a vehicle in a wide single lane drifting, but also a vehicle traveling in an S-type pattern and "canting" into the parking area.6 The record is clear, however, that the officer was describing Post's driving in three different *27ways. The officer was not testifying that Post's car performed three different maneuvers.
¶ 53. The majority opinion is correct that nothing is to be gained from parsing "weaving" from "drifting."7 I would add that nothing is to be gained from parsing "drifting," "weaving" "canting," and an "S-shaped movement" in the present case. The issue here is whether "the vehicle's movements, considered with the totality of the circumstances, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Post was driving while intoxicated."8
¶ 54. So what is the totality of circumstances upon which the majority relies? Here are the circumstances: The officer estimated the single lane as approximately 22-24 feet wide because it also included an unmarked parking lane (in which no cars were parked and in which Post could lawfully drive); Post's car, according to the officer's testimony, drifted no more than 5 feet within this wide single lane (although the majority opinion calculates the drift could have been up to 9 feet); and it was 9:30 p.m.
¶ 55. The majority opinion concedes that 9:30 p.m. is not as significant as bar closing time, but still concludes that "it does lend some further credence to [the officer's] suspicion that Post was driving while intoxicated." Majority op., ¶ 36. Not surprisingly, the majority opinion is unable to explain how or why driving at 9:30 p.m. (in contrast to any other time) lends any credence to the suspicion of drunk driving.
¶ 56. In contrast, the majority opinion ignores, without explanation, other salient factors in examining the totality of the circumstances: Post maintained the legal speed limit. There was no indication that Post was *28traveling at an unsafe or unusual speed or was traveling either too fast or too slow for conditions. Post never came close to striking another vehicle. Post properly signaled before making a left turn at an intersection. Post successfully navigated a left-hand turn even though the car immediately in front of him turned too sharply, into the oncoming traffic lane. Post did not commit any violation of any traffic law.
¶ 57. When considering whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must consider all the circumstances. Yet, the majority opinion omits many factors under its application of the totality of the circumstances standard.
¶ 58. This case, like all stops for reasonable suspicion, turns on the details. Yet the parties did not create a careful record of the facts at the suppression hearing. They were too focused on the legal issue whether, as a matter of law, deviation within a single lane of traffic justifies a traffic stop. Judge Richard Posner's comment in a recent case in which the parties failed to present concrete facts to support their respective positions fits the present case: "This case illustrates the curious and deplorable aversion of many lawyers to visual evidence and exact measurements (feet, inches, pounds, etc.) even when vastly more informative than a verbal description."9
¶ 59. The majority opinion concedes that this is a close case.10 Because the parties and circuit court did not view this case from the perspective of the totality of the circumstances and did not provide the circuit court or this court with an adequate record to determine the *29totality of the circumstances, I would remand the case so that the parties can make an appropriate record.
h-H HH h — i
¶ 60. We are all relieved that the officer stopped Post before his drunk driving could harm anyone, and all of us rely on law enforcement officers to stop drunk drivers. A person who drives under the influence.places not just his or her life at risk but also the life of any person who is in the same place at the same time as the intoxicated driver.
¶ 61. This case is a hard case because it is difficult for a court to declare a stop unconstitutional when the stop revealed that the driver was, in fact, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. It is especially hard to cut Post any slack because this was the fifth time (not counting any times Post drove while intoxicated but evaded detection) that Post drank his alcoholic beverages, picked up his car keys, and brazenly and illegally got into the driver's seat.
¶ 62. But as United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has wisely explained: "[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all."11
¶ 63. For the reasons set forth, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary suppression hearing to determine the facts surrounding the stop and to determine whether they justified an investigative stop.

 Thus the majority and I agree with the court of appeals that the movement of a car in a single lane, without more, does not give a law enforcement officer reasonable suspicion that the driver was violating a law that would justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for further, proceedings.

 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979).

 Id. at 653.

 Id. at 657.

 When asked at the suppression hearing, 'What do you mean by that [word "cant"]?", the officer explained he meant that Post's vehicle "[w]asn't traveling in the designated traveling lane, traveling closer into the parking lane."

 Majority op., ¶ 37.

 Majority op., ¶ 22 n.7.

 Id.

 Coffey v. N.E. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 479 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2007).

 Majority op., ¶ 27.

 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).