Court Opinion

ID: 9630951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:25:16.413622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:55.396342
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Justice ABRAMSON.
I agree with the majority but write separately to emphasize that neither American Continental Ins. Co. v. Weber & Rose. P.S.C., 997 S.W.2d 12 (Ky.App.1998) nor Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540 (Ky.2001) really addresses the issue before this Court. Consequently, we are confronted with an issue of first impression, the disposition of which has far-reaching consequences for the conduct of litigation in the Commonwealth.
In Weber & Rose, an excess insurance carrier filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured, seeking to avoid coverage of a jury verdict on the grounds that the particular event was not covered and the insured had failed to give timely notice. When the insurance carrier suggested that the law firm which had defended the insured in the underlying litigation had mishandled the case, the law firm intervened seeking a declaration that, as a matter of law, it owed no duty to the excess *214insurance carrier. At least two factors distinguish that case from the one before this Court. First, the case began as a declaratory judgment action filed by a carrier for purposes of determining -coverage, a common basis for declaratory relief. Second, when the law firm intervened to assert its own declaratory judgment claim, it was proceeding in the forum that had already been chosen by the party who would be seeking affirmative relief against it in the form of damages for past conduct.
A federal declaratory judgment action was at issue in Bank One, supra. In dismissing a request for a declaration that Bank One was not liable to an employee for sexual harassment, the federal district court criticized the bank for rushing to the federal courthouse to preempt the employee from choosing when and where to file her lawsuit. The Kentucky Supreme Court did not address the propriety of the preemptive filing but simply considered whether initiating the federal declaratory judgment action constituted retaliatory conduct by the bank in violation of KRS 344.280.
Murphy contends that filing a suit while settlement negotiations were ongoing amounts to a violation of KRS 344.280 and is retaliatory in nature. We disagree. While it may amount to bad manners or may appear to some to be unprofessional, such conduct does not constitute a violation of the statute nor is it tortious. Declaratory judgment actions are widely utilized to establish certain fundamental rights in ongoing disputes. KRS 418.045 contains an extensive list of subjects and transactions upon which declaratory relief is available. It would be unwise for this Court to introduce limitations upon the rights of parties to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the trial court s deni•al of Murphy’s motion to amend her complaint to add a retaliation claim was proper.
52 S.W.3d at 546. The language employed by the Court, while indicative of a generally expansive approach to the availability of declaratory judgment relief, is clearly dicta for any issue beyond the one that was immediately before the Court, i.e. whether the federal action constituted retaliation under KRS 344.280.
The issue of the availability of the Kentucky declaratory judgment statute as a vehicle for asserting non-liability for allegedly negligent conduct is squarely before us for the first time in this case. Neither the remedial nature of KRS Chapter 418 nor the last sentence of KRS 418.045 regarding the use of declaratory judgments in “other instances” not specifically enumerated renders our declaratory judgment statute fundamentally different from its federal counterpart or from other states’ statutes. Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that a declaratory judgment action is unavailable in these circumstances and the orderly administration of justice supports issuance of the requested writ.
VENTERS, J., joins.