Court Opinion

ID: 9778990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:31:29.993279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:18.640835
License: Public Domain

HYDE, J.
(concurring). — I concur in the opinion of Bennick, J. herein and the rulings made in the last paragraph thereof. I think that the repeal of Sec. 29; Art. VI of the Constitution of 1875 and the adoption of Sections 6 and 15 of Art. V of the 1945 Constitution constituted a repeal by implication of the provisions of Section 508.140 RSMo., V.A.M.S., applicable where there is interest, prejudice or *933other objection to the judge only. The 1945 Constitution provided: “All laws inconsistent with this Constitution, unless sooner repealed or amended to conform with this' Constitution, shall remain in full force and effect until July 1, 1946.” Therefore, this section and others supplementing it, in so far as inconsistent, were repealed in whole or in part as of July 1, 1946 and the new provisions of the Constitution covering the same subject matter, which were self-enforcing became effective on that date. (Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S. W. (2d) 647.)
The principal reason why the part of Section 508.140 applicable here is inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution and therefore was repealed by implication by its adoption, is that these two sections of the 1945- Constitution provide an all inclusive plan for holding court “in any ease where the judge cannot preside”, for which Section 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution authorized the General Assembly to provide. Furthermore,- this previous authorization or mandate of Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution to the General Assembly was withdrawn and repealed by leaving it out of the 1945 Constitution. It undoubtedly was eliminated because the makers of the Constitution felt that the plan provided by Sec’s. 6 and 15, Art. V of the 1945 Constitution made ample provisions for holding court “in any ease where the judge cannot preside” or in any of the other contingencies stated in Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution. In State ex rel. Dunlap v. Higbee, 328 Mo. 1066, 43 S. W. (2d) 825, l.c. 828, we said the General Assembly had obeyed the mandate of Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution “by providing that, whenever the judge is unable to hold a term or part of term and fails to procure another judge, a member of the bar may be elected to serve as judge. Section 1943, Rev. St. 1929 ’ ’; and “by providing for a change of venue, or, in lieu thereof, the selection of a special judge by the parties, or the election of a special judge in the manner provided by law, by consent of the parties (sections 908, 1943 to 1950, Rev. St. 1929); and by authorizing a disqualified judge in a criminal case to call another judge (section 3651, Rev. St. 1929.) ” These cumbersome statutory methods of providing for holding court in eases in which the judge cannot preside, because he is disqualified either by interest or affidavit of prejudice or otherwise, were replaced by the simple, direct, flexible methods provided by the 1945 Constitution, applicable to all eases (civil or criminal) of either requesting another circuit judge to preside in the case or notifying the Supreme Coprt so that it could make a temporary transfer of a judge for that purpose. We have already said that the carefully considered purpose of these provisions was to completely do away with the technical limitations, imposed under the 1875 Constitution, stated in State ex rel. Dunlap v. Higbee, supra, and other cases construing it. (See Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 363 Mo. 988, 255 S. W. (2d) 785.) This intent seems clear both from these new provisions of the *9341945 Constitution, the elimination of the provisions of the 1875 Constitution for legislative action, and the conditions that developed under the 1875 Constitution which they sought to remedy.
It is true of course “ ‘that a State Constitution is not a grant of power as is the Constitution of the United States but, as to legislative power, it is only a limitation; and, therefore, except for the limitations imposed thereby, the power of the State Legislature is unlimited and practically absolute.’ ” (Hickey v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 1039, 256 S. W. (2d) 775, l.c. 778.) However, the provisions of Article V of the 1945 Constitution are themselves limitations on legislative power and, in so far as they provide for the organization and operation of the Judicial Department of the State, the Legislature cannot change them. (See Annotation L.R.A. 1916E 834.) The Legislature may supplement them but cannot enact measures inconsistent with them. (See State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 357 Mo. 167, 206 S. W. (2d) 979.) Because of these well established principles, the authorization of Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution was deemed necessary to authorize the General Assembly to make the provisions it did for holding court “in any case where the judge cannot preside” which are now contained in Section 508.140. As pointed out in one of the first cases construing this authority given.by Sec. 29, Art. VI, Constitution of 1875, it previously had been held in Harper v. Jacobs, 51 Mo. 296, that.“the Legislature had no power to authorize the appointment of an attorney to sit in the trial of a particular case in the circuit court.” (State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357, l.c. 365.) It was also therein stated: “This decision was before the convention which framed the present (1875) constitution, and before the people of the State, who adopted it, and furnishes a reason for the additional clause to the section conferring the power, in words hampered by no limitations, upon the Legislature to provide for holding circuit court in any case when the judge could not preside.” On the basis of the authority given by Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1875 Constitution, one of the first statutes on this subject was held constitutional in State v. Able, supra.
Although Section 508.140 was thus in part repealed by implication, this does not mean that the Legislature has nó authority over the subject of change of venue or that the statutes stating grounds for change of venue or disqualification of judges have been repealed. The question here is not the power of the Legislature to provide for change of venue or disqualification of a judge and the grounds therefor. Instead, the question is the operation of the Judicial Department to try cases in which disqualification of a judge is required by statute. That is the matter now regulated by the all inclusive plan of the 1945 Constitution for transfer of judges, applicable for holding court “in any case where the judge cannot preside ’ ’, which replaced the former provision of the 1875 Constitution (Sec. 29, Art. VI) authorizing the *935General Assembly to make necessary provisions for holding court under such circumstances. It should further be said that this does not mean that judgments in eases which have been tried without objection under the former procedure are void, because as held in State ex rel. Dunlap v. Higbee, supra, (43 S. W. (2d), l.c. 826) this does not present a question of jurisdiction, but only a question of error. (See also In re Liquidation of Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Bank (Winchell v. Gaskill), 356 Mo. 61, 201 S. W. (2d) 274 and cases cited; Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778, l.c. 795, 117 S. W. (2d) 308, l.c. 318.) Our preliminary rule in prohibition should be discharged.
Hollingsworth, Dalton, Leedy, JJ., and Colliding, C.J., concur.