Court Opinion

ID: 9661797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:50:28.82445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:33.798482
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In its motion for rehearing the appellant for the first time contends that Bell Aerospace Corporation, through its division, Bell Helicopter Company, is an indispensable party to this suit and cause of action and that since it is not a party to the suit this Court is therefore without jurisdiction to render judgment in this cause.
The jurisdiction of the Court over indispensable parties to a cause of ac*191tion is essential to the court’s right, power or authority to proceed to judgment. Proceeding in the absence of an indispensable party, being fundamental error, may be raised for the first time by the complaining party in its motion for rehearing.
The facts in each case determine whether or not an indispensable party has not been joined as plaintiff or defendant in a suit. This determination is made in conformity with the provisions of Rule 39, T. R.C.P., and the authorities cited in connection therewith.
The record reflects that the appellees as plaintiffs did in their first amended original petition name the appellant, City of Arlington, and the Bell Aerospace Corporation, through its division, Bell Helicopter Corporation, hereinafter called “Bell,” as defendants.
Bell filed its original answer to plaintiff’s first amended original petition which consisted of a general denial.
By written order signed on July 22, 1968, the court granted plaintiffs’ (appellees) motion for non-suit as to the defendant, “Bell Aerospace Corporation, through its division, Bell Helicopter Company.” The motion and order were not opposed by the appellant.
Bell was not named as a defendant in the plaintiffs’ (appellees) second amended original petition which was filed on July 25, 1968.
The record reflects that the appellant did not at any time in its pleadings, including its cross-action or amended cross-action, make any attempt to bring Bell into the case.
We find and hold that under Rule 39, Bell Helicopter is not an indispensable party because it does not have a “joint interest” in the title to the land in question and no judgment was sought against it by the parties to this suit. It therefore was not error to proceed to judgment in its absence as a party. Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.Sup., 1966); Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, Oak Park, Ill. v. O’Byrne, 457 S.W. 2d 277 (Tex.Sup., 1970).
Another point urged by the appellant in its motion for rehearing is that it is unable to specifically perform under the terms of the contract involved in this suit because it does not have good or full title to the property in question. This assertion is based on the undisputed fact that the property in question is subject to a valid lease and therefore because of this the appellant is unable to execute a warranty deed.
This is not a viable complaint. At the time suit was filed against the appellant the title to the land in question was vested in it. The fact that such land was encumbered by the lease to Bell does not lessen or nullify the title which was vested in appellant. It, therefore, is able to transfer such title.
Because the other matters raised by the appellant in its motion for rehearing were fully discussed in our original opinion we will forego further discussion at this time.
The appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.