Court Opinion

ID: 9891287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 06:09:19.094196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.019040
License: Public Domain

VACATE AND REMAND; Opinion Filed October 16, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01090-CV

                       TERRY H. HANCOCK, Appellant
                                   V.
                        SHERRY HANCOCK, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 196th District Court
                             Hunt County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 89418

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Terry H. Hancock (Husband) appeals the trial court’s order appointing a

receiver over the marital residence. The dispositive issue is whether the order

improperly modified the division of property in a final decree of divorce. We

conclude that it did. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s October 10, 2022 order

on motion for appointment of receiver. Further, we strike the findings of the October

13, 2022 order of enforcement and request for receiver that refer to the appointment

of a receiver. We remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum

opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.

                                   BACKGROUND

         Husband married Sherry Hancock (Wife) in 2009, and they ceased to live

together as spouses in October 2020. In November 2020, Wife filed a petition for

divorce, and the following month, Husband filed a counterpetition. On February 22,

2022, after conducting a bench trial on the case, the trial judge sent a written ruling

to the parties, which included division of the marital property and indicated that the

martial residence (“the Residence”) was to be sold and the proceeds divided equally.

The written ruling further stated that, “Husband may remain in the house until it is

sold.”

         On May 19, 2022, the trial judge signed the final decree of divorce, which

included a division of the marital estate, awarding, among other things, one half of

the net proceeds from the sale of the Residence to Wife and the remaining half to

Husband. The decree further provided for the “Sale of Residence” by requiring the

parties to list the Residence with the Tarpley Agency and ordering that in the event

the parties were unable to agree on the sale price, “the Tarpley Agency shall

determine the reasonable price for the sale of the [Residence] after consulting with

and considering each party’s opinion of a reasonable price along with any

independent appraisals a party may or may not have.” Additionally, the decree

                                         –2–
ordered that Husband “shall have the exclusive right to enjoy the use and possession

of the premises until closing.”1

          On July 20, 2022, Wife filed an amended petition2 for enforcement of property

division and appointment of a receiver, in which she alleged Husband “failed to

cooperate with the realtor appointed by the Court to list the [Residence] as Ordered

by this Court” and “refused to execute the listing agreement presented by the

realtor.” In that petition, Wife also sought an order appointing the realtor Randy

Tarpley as a receiver of the Residence and further requested Husband be ordered to

vacate the marital residence property “so as . . . to prevent and minimize any further

deterioration or damage to the [Residence].” Husband answered, denying that he

    1
        The specific language of the decree is quoted below:
                   1. The parties shall list the [Residence] with the Tarpley Agency. Either party shall
          not be prohibited from making a good faith effort to purchase the [Residence], but the sale
          shall be a commercially reasonable, arm’s length transaction with no special consideration
          to be given to the parties.
                   2. The [Residence] shall be sold for a price that is mutually agreeable to Petitioner
          and Respondent. If the parties are unable to agree on the sale price the Tarpley Agency
          shall determine the reasonable price for the sale of the [Residence] after consulting with
          and considering each party’s opinion of a reasonable price along with any independent
          appraisals a party may or may not have.
                   3. Respondent shall continue to make all payments of principal, interest, taxes, and
          insurance on the [Residence] during the pendency of the sale, and Respondent shall have
          the exclusive right to enjoy the use and possession of the premises until closing. All
          maintenance and repairs necessary to keep the [Residence] in its present condition shall be
          paid by Respondent. Real property taxes for the tax year 2020 will be the equal
          responsibility of the parties and shall be withheld from any sale proceeds if not paid before
          the time of sale/closing.
                   4. The net sales proceeds (defined as the gross sales price less cost of sale and full
          payment of any mortgage indebtedness or liens on the [Residence] shall be distributed as
          follows: One half (½) of the net proceeds shall be awarded to each of the parties.
    2
     In her original petition for enforcement of property division, Wife complained Husband had failed to
provide her with personal property awarded to her and had failed properly care for other personal property
awarded to her. In her amended petition, Wife alleged Husband had yet to provide her with specified
personal property awarded to her.
                                                       –3–
had refused to sign the listing agreement and instead asserted the presented listing

agreement contained numerous errors and material facts and that he had corrected

the listing agreement and signed it and returned it to the realtor and Wife’s counsel.

      On September 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on Wife’s petition,

at which Tarpley, Wife, and Husband testified.             Tarpley testified as to the

contentious nature of the relationship between Wife and Husband, as well as the

difficulties he experienced in communicating with Husband and his opinion that

Husband would not be cooperative with the sale of the Residence. Wife testified as

to items of personal property awarded to her that she had not yet received from

Husband, as well as her opinion that Husband did not want to sell the Residence and

that he was “using his efforts to the best of his ability to not facilitate a sale of the

[Residence].” In his testimony, Husband denied intentionally delaying the process

of listing the Residence and voiced his objection to appointing Tarpley as receiver

of the Residence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge announced, among

other things, that Tarpley would be appointed as receiver and that Husband would

be required to move out within thirty days from the date of the hearing “so that the

receiver can make sure the [Residence] is prepared, maintained, and taken care of.”

      On October 10, 2022, the trial judge signed an order on motion for

appointment of receiver, appointing Tarpley as receiver of the Residence, that

Tarpley was “authorized to manage, control, and dispose of the [Residence] as he

sees fit in his sole discretion,” and that “the parties fully cooperate with the Receiver,

                                          –4–
including, . . . vacating the premises.” On October 13, the trial judge signed an order

of enforcement and request for receiver, which, among other things, ordered

Husband to surrender specific items of personal property. Husband moved to

reconsider the order of enforcement and request for receiver, but the trial court did

not rule on that motion. This appeal followed.

                                     DISCUSSION

      In his sole issue on appeal, Husband urges the trial court erred by entering the

order on motion for appointment of receiver because that order modifies the division

of property in the final decree of divorce. We review a trial court’s order appointing

a receiver for an abuse of discretion. Shultz v. Shultz, No. 05-18-00876-CV, 2019

WL 2511245, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Spiritas v. Davidoff, 459 S.W.3d 224, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).

Similarly, we review the trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce motion for

enforcement or clarification for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Pyrtle,

433 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (citations omitted). “It

is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to rule arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without

regard to guiding legal principles, or to rule without supporting evidence.” Spiritas,

459 S.W.3d at 231 (quoting Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998)).

      Under the Texas Family Code, the trial court that renders a divorce decree

retains jurisdiction to clarify and to enforce the decree’s property division. Shultz,

2019 WL 2511245, at *2 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 9.002, .008; Pearson v.

                                          –5–
Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). However, after its plenary

power expires, the trial court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the substantive

division of property in the decree. See id. (citing FAM. § 9.007(a), (b); Shanks v.

Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003); Harleaux v. Harleaux, 154 S.W.3d

925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). “The court may render further orders

to enforce the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce . . . to

assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order . . . [and] may specify

more precisely the manner of effecting the property division previously made or

approved . . . .” FAM. § 9.006 (a), (b). “An order . . . that amends, modifies, alters,

or changes the actual, substantive division of property made or approved in a final

decree of divorce . . . is beyond the power of the divorce court and is unenforceable.”

FAM. § 9.007(b).

      Section 7.001 of the family code grants a trial court broad authority to divide

marital property in a manner that it deems just and right upon the dissolution of

marriage. See Shultz, 2019 WL 2511245, at *2 (citing FAM. § 7.001; Rusk v. Rusk,

5 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)). That

broad authority sometimes includes the power to enlist the aid of a receiver to

effectuate the trial court’s orders and judgments. See id. (citing Rusk, 5 S.W.3d at

306–07).

      We interpret a divorce decree like any other judgment, reading the decree as

a whole and “effectuat[ing] the order in light of the literal language used” if that

                                         –6–
language is unambiguous. Id. at *3 (citing Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Tex.

2003); Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex. 1997)). If, when read as a

whole, the divorce decree’s terms are unambiguous, we must give effect to the order

in light of the actual language used. Id. (citing Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899,

901 (Tex. 2009)). On the other hand, if the divorce decree’s terms are ambiguous,

that is, subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must review the record

along with the decree to aid in interpreting the judgment. Id. Mere disagreement

over the meaning of a provision does not make it ambiguous. Id. (citing Treadway

v. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. granted), aff’d, 110

S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003)).                 “Neither conflicting interpretations nor conflicting

expectations are sufficient to create an ambiguity.” Id. (quoting Treadway, 110

S.W.3d at 6). Whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. (citing

Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901–02).                     Husband urges the decree’s terms are

unambiguous,3 and we agree.

         Here, the decree set forth clear requirements for sale of the Residence. First,

Husband and Wife would list the Residence with the Tarpley Agency. Second, the

Residence would be sold for a price mutually agreeable to Husband and Wife, but

where, as there was evidence here, they were unable to agree on the sale price, “the

Tarpley Agency shall determine the reasonable price for the sale of the [Residence]

   3
       Wife did not file any appellate brief.
                                                  –7–
after consulting with and considering each party’s opinion of a reasonable price

along with any independent appraisals a party may or may not have.” Third, “during

the pendency of the sale, . . . [Husband] shall have the exclusive right to enjoy the

use and possession of the premises until closing.” Fourth, one half of the net sales

proceeds would be awarded to each of the parties.

      Husband points out that the decree did not provide for the appointment of a

receiver, but rather than objecting to the appointment of a receiver, he argues the

terms of the order appointing the receiver improperly modify the terms of the decree

such that the order is void and unenforceable. In particular, Husband points to the

term in the order on motion for appointment of receiver that provides: “Tarpley is

authorized to manage, control, and dispose of the [Residence] as he sees fit in his

sole discretion.”

      In Shultz v. Shultz, this Court examined whether a trial court improperly

modified the final decree of divorce by allowing the sale of the formal marital

residence to one of the former spouses without a mutual agreement on the price. See

Shultz, 2019 WL 2511245, at *1. There, the decree unambiguously required the

property be sold for a price mutually agreeable to the former spouses, but the

receivership order did not provide for mutual agreement on price, and the

confirmation order allowed the receiver to set the price. See id. at *3. We noted that

the provision requiring mutual agreement on the price was relevant to the division

of property and that an order’s failure to adhere to the value imposed on property in

                                         –8–
the decree improperly modifies the division of the property. See id. (citing Perry v.

Perry, 512 S.W.3d 523, 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)).

Accordingly, we concluded the receivership order improperly modified the decree.

See id.

        The instant decree is similar to the decree in Shultz in that its provisions

mandate that the Residence “shall be sold for a price that is mutually agreeable” to

Husband and Wife. The instant decree further provides that if the parties are unable

to agree on the sale price, the Tarpley Agency shall determine the reasonable price,

but only “after consulting with and considering each party’s opinion of a reasonable

price along with any independent appraisals a party may or may not have.” The

order on motion for appointment of receiver, however, permits Tarpley as receiver

to “dispose of the [Residence] as he sees fit in his sole discretion.” Thus, the order

does not require Tarpley to consult with either former spouse or consider either

former spouse’s opinion of a reasonable price or any independent appraisals a former

spouse may have and therefore does not adhere to the value imposed on the

Residence in the decree. See Shultz, 2019 WL 2511245, at *3 (citing Perry, 512

S.W.3d at 528–29). Accordingly, we conclude the receivership order improperly

modified the decree.4

    4
      Husband also notes in his brief that the order appointing the receiver provides that Husband and Wife
“fully cooperate with Receiver, including, without limitation, . . . vacating premises, if necessary in the
opinion of Receiver” conflicts with the decree’s term providing that, “during the pendency of the sale, . . .
[Husband] shall have the exclusive right to enjoy the use and possession of the premises until closing.”
However, Husband does not mention this conflict in the argument or analysis portion of his brief or

                                                    –9–
        We sustain Husband’s sole issue.

                                           CONCLUSION

        We vacate the trial court’s October 10, 2022 order on motion for appointment

of receiver. Further, we strike the findings of the October 13, 2022 order of

enforcement and request for receiver that refer to the appointment of a receiver. We

remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     /Nancy Kennedy/
                                                     NANCY KENNEDY
221090F.P05                                          JUSTICE

otherwise argue how the inclusion of such a term is reversible error. Accordingly, we express no opinion
on that conflict between the order appointing the receiver and the decree. Cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
                                                –10–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

TERRY H. HANCOCK, Appellant                  On Appeal from the 196th District
                                             Court, Hunt County, Texas
No. 05-22-01090-CV         V.                Trial Court Cause No. 89418.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
SHERRY HANCOCK, Appellee                     Kennedy. Justices Carlyle and Smith
                                             participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial
court’s October 10, 2022 order on motion for appointment of receiver. Further, we
STRIKE the findings of the October 13, 2022 order of enforcement and request
for receiver that refer to the appointment of a receiver. We REMAND this cause
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       It is ORDERED that appellant TERRY H. HANCOCK recover his costs of
this appeal from appellee SHERRY HANCOCK.

Judgment entered this 16th day of October 2023.

                                      –11–