Court Opinion

ID: 9494220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:32:22.980428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:17.323083
License: Public Domain

O’MALLEY, District Judge,
concurring.
CONCURRENCE
I concur with most of the reasoning in the majority opinion, and with the result reached. For the reasons stated below, however, I cannot agree with the reasoning contained in Part III of that opinion, where the majority concludes that “the district court erred by failing to comply literally with Article IV(c)” of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“LAD”). Op. at 512-513.
In my view, this case is clearly controlled by New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000), and, as such, Burton’s counsel’s affirmative request for a continuance did constitute a *521waiver of the IAD’s time limits. In Hill, counsel for the defendant “agree[d] to a specified delay in trial.” Id. at 115, 120 S.Ct. 659. This agreed-to delay caused the defendant’s trial to begin after the speedy trial time limit set out in the IAD. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to the late trial date bound his client, because “[scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls.” Id. The high Court expressly rejected the view that a defendant’s waiver of IAD speedy trial rights must be done “explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights,” id. at 118, 120 S.Ct. 659, holding instead that mere “assent to delay” is sufficient, id. at 114, 120 S.Ct. 659. Justice Scalia’s reasoning applies squarely to this case:
We agree with the State that this [a requirement that a defendant must explicitly ask for treatment inconsistent with his rights under the IAD before waiver may be found] makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hyperteehnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to.

Id.

Notably, in Hill, it was the prosecutor who asked for a continuance; the trial court then asked defense counsel if he objected, and defense counsel said “that will be fine.” Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. 659. This case presents facts supporting Justice Scalia’s reasoning even more strongly— defendant Burton’s counsel asked for the continuance himself. Burton’s counsel made this request, moreover, close to the trial date and relatively close to the running. of the IAD’s 120-day time clock. Now, having received what he asked for, Burton argues the trial court erred by failing to comply with the IAD, and the majority agrees with him. I cannot join that reasoning, concluding that to do so would be contrary to the letter and spirit of HillSee also United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir.1979) (“the substantive rights accorded to a prisoner under Article IV [of the IAD] may be waived, even though the prisoner is not aware of those rights, where there is an affirmative request to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed in Article IV(c) or (e)”).
I believe, moreover, that the majority opinion has the effect of setting a potential trap for district court judges who respond sympathetically to a defendant’s request for a continuance. If a defendant seeking a continuance does not want to waive his IAD speedy trial rights, the onus should be on the defendant to make this clear, not on the district court to ensure that the continuance is only for that narrow window of time after the originally scheduled trial date and before the 120-day period expires. Indeed, the ultimate effect of the majority opinion is to urge district court judges to deny even the most well-taken motion for continuance filed by any defendant whose presence is procured via de-tainer.
The majority opinion is correct, of course, that Hill addresses Article III of the IAD, and not Article IV, which controls this case. But, as the majority notes, “the procedural requirements are the same.” Op. at [515 n. 4]. Thus, the majority’s assessment of whether the request for continuance by Burton’s counsel meets the five requirements iterated in Birdivell v. *522Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir.1993), see op. at [514 - 515], is essentially irrelevant, in light of the Supreme Court’s unanimous statement that the IAD’s “ ‘necessary or reasonable’ continuance provision is ... directed primarily, if not exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 116, 120 S.Ct. 659 (emphasis added). That is not what happened in this ease. On this point, moreover, I also must disagree with the conclusions reached by the majority regarding the meaning of footnote one in Hill. This footnote left open the question of whether, when the procedural requirements for a continuance under the IAD apply — such as when the prosecution requests the continuance — those requirements can be satisfied by an agreement in open court to a trial date outside the IAD’s time limits. The language in this footnote did not reject, implicitly or otherwise, the conclusion that such an agreement would constitute a waiver where the prosecution has made no request for a continuance. Indeed, the very holding of Hill is that a waiver does occur in precisely those circumstances.
In sum, I believe Burton affirmatively and knowingly waived his right to a speedy trial within the time limits set out in the IAD when he asked for a continuance. Accordingly, I can agree only with the result reached by the majority in Part III of its opinion, and not with their reasoning.