Court Opinion

ID: 9558681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:15:22.345839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:30.821167
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
specially concurring and dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.
Although I concur in the majority’s affir-mance of Ryan’s conviction, I disagree with its treatment of the issue entitled “Separation Violence — The Bratton Testimony.” The majority holds that two short objectionable answers in Bratton’s testimony pertaining to separation violence were inadmissible and the trial court’s ruling to the contrary was error, albeit harmless. The majority apparently finds that these two short answers in Bratton’s “separation violence” testimony tended to establish that Ryan fit a particular profile, e.g., spouse batterer. And, apparently, the majority holds that such “profile evidence” violates W.R.E. 404(a) which proscribes admissibility of evidence of a person’s character trait for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.
In my judgment, on this record, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied trial defense counsel’s motion in li-mine and allowed Bratton’s testimony. As -I read the record, trial defense counsel was only concerned that Bratton’s testimony would be in the form of opinions “concerning what the defendant might have done or might not have done....” In particular, at the motion hearing on February 19, 1998, trial defense counsel objected to “opinions concerning how Roy Ryan would have acted under the circumstances that existed at the *65time of the shooting, ... that [Bratton] may well say that because he was [an abuser] ... and this was an abused spousal syndrome ease, that he would become more frantic when his wife left, ... that things got out of control would have propelled him towards violence, and in fact, that’s exactly what happened. He shot his wife as a result of this whole spousal syndrome issue.... ”
Responding to trial defense counsel’s concern, the prosecutor assured him and the trial judge that Bratton would not express opinions that either Ryan or his wife would behave a certain way. Instead, the prosecutor stated that he was relying on that part of W.R.E. 702 that permits an expert’s testimony to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.” He explained that Bratton would testify in general terms about her area of expertise, including the actions of an abused spousal victim and the reactions of the abuser. He explained that Bratton’s testimony providing general context or framework would assist the jury to understand the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence which the trial court had ruled admissible. In passing, it must be noted that Ryan has not raised any W.R.E. 404(b) issue on appeal. Referring to Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s evidence treatise, Section 351, pages 632-634, 637-639 (1994), which treats the admissibility of expert testimony describing social frameworks, the prosecutor made a strong ease for the admissibility of Bratton’s general context or framework testimony. According to Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, expert testimony relating to social frameworks describes “patterns of human behavior and mental attitudes, typically in persons who have experienced various kinds of psychological stress arising out of particular experiences, usually relating to sexual or physical abuse.... ” 3 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 351, at 632 (2d ed.1994). They explain that “[t]he term ‘framework’ ... relates to social or familial settings similar to those in which the events in suit occurred but rests largely on case studies unrelated to those events. In other criminal settings, something very like framework evidence has been admitted for years.” Id. For example, experienced law enforcement agents often describe patterns of organizational behavior, bookkeeping, and jargon in trials for crimes such as drug trafficking, gambling, and interstate prostitution. Id. at 632 n. 2. Refuting the claim that framework evidence is inadmissible character evidence, they explain
Despite the obvious affinity with character evidence, the argument seems powerful that the veiy qualities that separate expert framework and syndrome testimony from conventional character evidence mean that such evidence, properly handled, need not be classified wholesale as proof of character. Instead it can be viewed as evidence of psychological condition or capacity and as a general account of human dynamics. After all, much of the explanatory force comes from models or studies of human behavior, rather than appraising personal qualities innate in the subject. The indicated conclusion is that such evidence, properly handled, is dissimilar enough from character evidence to remove it from control of FRE 404, FRE 405, and FRE 608.
Id. at 636.
The prosecutors here properly handled Bratton’s framework testimony. They specifically avoided having Bratton testify whether Roy Ryan was a battering spouse and his wife a battered spouse; they specifically avoided having Bratton testify about what she thought happened, or that either Roy Ryan or his wife behaved a certain way. Bratton offered no such opinions or conclusions. In my judgment, the trial judge and the prosecutor handled the Bratton testimony correctly. There was no error.