Court Opinion

ID: 9862651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:38:27.29783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:38:31.500258
License: Public Domain

HAERLE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do so because the majority essentially overlooks the relevant standards for our review of a fact-based decision such as that rendered by the trial court in this matter and, additionally, disregards the substantial evidence—both testimonial and photographic—supporting the trial court’s ruling that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. The majority effectively ignores the relevant standard of review
To me, the most notable feature of the majority’s opinion is that it effectively gives only lip service, rather than adherence, to the applicable substantial evidence standard of review. That standard in a case such as this is whether—after our 2008 remand to the Lake County Superior Court—that court correctly ruled, after two days of receiving evidence in 2009,1 that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel in the course of its prior hearings on appellant’s motion to suppress. As abundant authority makes clear, such a ruling must be affirmed by an appellate court if the factual bases are supported by substantial evidence.
There are two parallel lines of authority regarding an appellate court’s review of a lower court’s finding of no ineffective assistance of counsel. The *246first—although perhaps the least important for present purposes—is the principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court that “a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 [152 L.Ed.2d 291, 122 S.Ct. 1237], quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)
Our Supreme Court has consistently articulated the law similarly, holding that in evaluating a defendant’s claim of deficient performance by counsel, there is a “ ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ [(quoting Strickland)], and we accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions. [Citation.] Were it otherwise, appellate courts would be required to engage in the ‘ “perilous process” ’ of second-guessing counsel’s trial strategy. [Citation.] Accordingly, a reviewing court will reverse a conviction on the ground of inadequate counsel ‘only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 979-980 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183], and cases cited therein, overruled on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) It is, as that court has noted several times, a defendant’s burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373]; see also People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252].)
However, this principle addresses only the general standard of review, i.e., is there enough on the record to require sending the case back for a hearing regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel? We decided there was here, did so, and Judge Mann conducted such a hearing in 2009. Thus, more important here than the authorities just noted is our standard of review regarding this trial court’s ruling after those two days of hearing.
Our Supreme Court summarized that standard of review in In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 710 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017] (Avena). In that case, the court had earlier issued a writ directing a specially appointed trial court to review the record in the first degree murder/death penalty case, and determine if there had been ineffective assistance of counsel in the petitioner’s first counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of diminished capacity. The trial court did so, and found none. The Supreme Court affirmed based on its determination that the trial court’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. It stated in that regard: “As a general matter, ‘ “[t]he referee’s conclusions of law are subject to independent review, as is his resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. [Citations.] . . . The referee’s findings of fact, though not binding on the court, are *247given great weight when supported by substantial evidence. The deference accorded factual findings derives from the fact that the referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.” [Citations.]’ [Citations, including two stressing that referees can observe demeanor of witnesses.] [][] We emphasize that, because petitioner seeks to overturn a final judgment in a collateral attack, he bears the burden of proof. [Citation.]”2
In Avena, the court cited numerous of its prior holdings to the same effect. (See, in particular, In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109-110 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466]; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 585 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371], disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527]; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435].) And subsequently, it has ruled similarly to Avena and, in so doing, specifically cited that decision. (See In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351-352 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 926 P.2d 987] ,)3
I regret that none of this authority is effectively considered in the majority’s opinion which finds, contrary to the trial court, ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Thomas Quinn. Contrary to the majority, I would affirm the trial court because I believe the factual bases for its ruling are clearly supported by substantial evidence, specifically the two types of evidence I will discuss in the following part.
Before doing so, however, I think it appropriate to address the majority’s obvious unhappiness with what it labels as a “conflict of interest” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 241) involving the apparent inadequate provision of investigators in both Lake County and elsewhere in the nation where there are “attempts to address such systematic deficiencies in public defender programs.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 240.) I agree that, as this court discussed in In re Edward S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 387, 412-415 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 725], such a problem exists and that appropriate steps need to be taken at all governmental levels to attempt to correct it. However, those appropriate steps do not include *248reversing a trial court which, after a two-day hearing which included numerous witnesses and exhibits, determines that a preponderance of evidence was not produced showing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Put another way, the majority’s reversal of a substantially fact-based ruling by a very experienced trial judge that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel four years ago in a hearing on a motion to suppress is, in my opinion, an entirely inappropriate remedy to the “conflict of interest” of “systematic deficiencies” problem the majority laments.
Now to the evidence I believe clearly meets our standard of review.
B. Substantial evidence clearly supports the trial court’s ruling
The two most significant items of “substantial evidence” are (1) Attorney Quinn’s own statements and testimony4 regarding what he did with respect to the suppression motion in 2006 and (2) the pictures near and of the relevant intersection which were introduced into evidence at the 2009 hearing by appellant Jones, the import of which is totally ignored by the majority.
First, regarding Quinn’s prehearing declaration and testimony; In an initial declaration submitted with the suppression motion, Quinn related that he served as counsel for Jones from March 2006 until he was replaced a year later by Steve Tulanian, when he turned his case files over to Tulanian. With a lapse of three years since the events in question (i.e., the period that had elapsed between the 2006 suppression hearing and the 2009 hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue), and because it had been two years since he had seen the relevant files,5 his recollection was “somewhat limited,” but he was aware from the appellate opinion in this case that his performance was challenged for his not calling witnesses at the suppression hearing. He recalled filing the motion and preparing by interviewing his “clients,”6 *249visiting the stop scene, taking photographs, and attaching some, plus others provided by the codefendant girlfriend, as exhibits to the motion. He recalled Jones giving him at least one name, Samantha Sutch, but was unsure whether this was before the motion. He distinctly recalled asking Jones at the hearing whether he had brought any witnesses with him, and Jones saying he had not.
Quinn declared that eyewitness testimony about the stop certainly would have been “powerful evidence,” combined with his defense argument that an officer could not have seen Jones’s vehicle, and he “surely should have” noted and investigated any such witnesses he knew about before the hearing. But the only recrimination from Jones that Quinn recalled at or after the 2006 hearing was for not using color copies of the photographs to cross-examine an officer.
Specifically, Quinn recalled no complaints, or even comments from Jones, about uncalled witnesses. Jones was out of custody after that, on a time waiver, and Quinn’s best recollection was that Jones made no issue about uncalled witnesses until early 2007, as the prospect of going to trial grew imminent. Quinn could not say whether Jones gave him information about Sutch then or earlier, but Quinn did contact Sutch by phone at that point. She told him that she and another person were behind Jones’s vehicle and saw Jones make a complete stop. Quinn did not intentionally fail to contact or call witnesses. Nevertheless, he considered it “entirely possible” that he neglected to timely do so, given the press of business and his limited experience with suppression motions.
On the first day of the 2009 hearing, Quinn elaborated on that issue. When he got the case in early 2006, he had been a contract public defender for Lake County since 2003, and had some prior criminal practice experience as well. He obtained discovery in this case and realized that suppression could be “the linchpin in both cases,” for fruits of the traffic stop in the first case had contributed to a warrant search of Jones’s residence that produced the charges in the second case. He interviewed Jones and also Westphal, who was motivated to help out in both cases. He discussed the police report with Jones, who apprised him of the odd configuration of the intersection and that he felt the traffic stop was a pretext to catch him with contraband.
Since Quinn lived in that specific area of the county and was familiar with it, he determined to investigate himself rather than use the single investigator then available to the office. He walked the scene himself, took photographs, and observed the terrain and configuration of the intersection. He realized that, while differences in the time of year, amount of foliage, and other *250matters could affect the argument, there was an issue of whether an officer could see whether a vehicle rolled through the stop sign, particularly from the vantage point mentioned in the police report.
Westphal did “an excellent job herself’ and took good photographs of the area. Between them, they had two or three dozen pictures and, regarding checking the intersection and the circumstances of the stop of Jones’s vehicle, Quinn felt that he and Westphal had investigated “thoroughly.” He attached about nine color photographs as exhibits to the suppression motion, which he filed after unsuccessful efforts to get a “decent offer” and after difficulty in getting Jones free on bail. Quinn did not remember anyone named Marty Franceschi testifying at a bail hearing (Pen. Code, § 1275),7 or Jones giving him the name or phone number of a witness at the arraignment.
Quinn felt sure there were observers at the suppression hearing, but none that were remarkable. When he asked Jones whether he “brought his witnesses,” Jones said “no.” He asked because he recalled Jones mentioning having a couple of witnesses and he and his wife bringing them. Quinn did not recall knowing the names or any contact information for witnesses; nor did he recall seeking a continuance. Jones did not chide him then for not calling witnesses. The first such complaint came months later, as the trial loomed. Again, Jones’s only criticism of Quinn at the 2006 hearing was that the latter had not used a color copier to copy the photographs he used to cross-examine the officer.
Several of the numerous photographs Quinn and Westphal took were marked and offered and admitted into evidence without objection at the 2006 hearing, and then used by Quinn in his cross-examination of Officer Greg Piccinini.
At the 2009 hearing, the court took judicial notice of the transcript of the 2006 hearing. It shows that Quinn used the photographs to—very effectively, I believe—cross-examine Officer Piccinini on Piccinini’s testimony that he saw Jones’s vehicle go through the stop sign at about five miles an hour. Specifically, Quinn got Piccinini to admit, among other things, that (1) he was in his police car in the area because he wanted “to see where [Jones’s] vehicle was going”; (2) Sergeant Celli just happened to arrive -“a minute or two after . . . [he] had stopped [Jones]”; (3) he nowhere included in his report anything regarding Jones appearing to be under the influence of drugs (“being *25111550”8); and (4) he did not stop Jones’s car until it was “a hundred, a hundred and fifty yards” beyond the critical stop sign.9
Quinn also cross-examined the People’s second witness, Officer Timothy Hobbs, who arrived on the scene only after the arrest and search. Quinn did not call Jones or other witnesses; he explained that he was generally reluctant to call a defendant at a suppression hearing, for reasons of self-incrimination.
Despite noting some lack of memory because of the passage of three years, Quinn did rely on the customs of his practice of law. He recalled communicating often with Jones and, when the latter was out of custody, following a usual practice of speaking with him, Westphal, or Jones’s mother, before each hearing. Had there been percipient witnesses present at the suppression hearing, for example, “surely, I mean—and they’re right there in the courtroom, I would have called them, . . . absolutely.” “I mean, there’s just no reason whatsoever I would not do that.” As for the idea that Jones complained about his not calling witnesses, Quinn stated: “You know, if somebody keeps raising an issue or keeps calling me about something, it’s going to tend to stick in your mind more than, you know, say, something somebody tells you at a court appearance and then you don’t hear from them for a month .. ..” Upon learning from Sutch in 2007 that she claimed to have been with someone right behind Jones at the stop sign, Quinn was troubled and explored ways to correct the omission. However, he was soon replaced by new counsel, Tulanian.
Quinn testified on the first of the two days of testimony at the remand hearing, but at that point in time he had been unable to review the files he had already turned over to Tulanian. He expected to find Sutch’s name in the file, for he recalled writing it down when he finally spoke with her; however, he did not expect this to illuminate when he became aware of the information.
Quinn got access to his file later and filed a supplemental declaration that was placed in evidence at the second hearing date.10 In it, he explained that *252he found “the phrase ‘Samantha Sutch & Marty’ written at the top of a page containing notes from before the time of the hearing on the suppression motion in July 2006, although a description of the substance of their projected testimony is part of an entity dated from March 2007[,] well after that hearing was held.” I think it is totally logical to assume that the (very experienced) trial judge assumed that Quinn did, indeed, have a duty to investigate thoroughly, but also assumed that he never learned about these people from his interviews with Jones and Westphal. Further, nothing in this record suggests that Quinn could have learned about them any other way. Thus, I submit that there was and is no legal basis to justify a finding of an inadequate investigation because of Quinn’s failure to locate and interview Sutch and “Marty.”
On this specific subject, the trial court stated: “The issue seems to then revolve around whether or not [Quinn] knew about and failed to call the defense witnesses that—the name’s [sz'c] came up, Samantha Su[t]ch, and Marty Francesky. [][] The evidence that I’ve heard preponderates in favor of Mr. Quinn that he did not know of these witnesses. Fm struck by the fact that Mr. Quinn testified that there would have been no reason for him not to call them if they were there and he knew about them. And I think that’s a correct statement. I’m sure that he would have called them. I believe that portion of the testimony that he did not know about them.” (Italics added.)
My appellate court colleagues who, like me, saw neither Quinn nor Jones on the witness stand, opt to interpret—indeed, find—that the facts are 180 degrees in the opposite direction. They hold that: “The conflicting testimony of Jones and Quinn as to when[11] the former told the latter about the percipient witnesses, which the trial court considered the dispositive fact, is really beside the point. Quinn had a duty to inquire whether Jones’s testimony could be supported by others regardless of whether Jones came forward with this information.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 239, original italics.)
This statement strikes me as a most unfair dismissal of a very pertinent factual finding of the trial court. That finding, quoted above, is both crucial and fully supported by substantial evidence, i.e., Quinn’s testimony. The evidence before the trial court included Quinn’s declaration stating that he did interview his clients in preparation for the suppression hearing. The trial judge must have both believed him and then concluded that (1) in fact those clients said nothing to him about any percipient witnesses (because there were none), (2) there was thus no need for an investigator regarding such *253witnesses because Quinn’s clients would have been the only logical source for any information on that subject, and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, the dearth of investigative resources is “not a major issue.”
Finally regarding the testimonial substantial evidence, I disagree with the majority that ineffective assistance is established by Quinn’s failure to use an investigator so as to better challenge the officer’s ability to see Jones run the stop sign. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 238 et seq.) Jones’s own expert, Faultier, conceded that it was not necessary to use an investigator in every case, and Quinn thoroughly explained why he deemed his own investigation, plus employing some of Westphal’s work, produced a thorough result. Faultier also argued, and the majority apparently agrees, that, in a case of this sort, it is unwise to have defense counsel act as his or her own witness. However, whatever those risks might entail in theory, several of the numerous photographs that Quinn and Westphal took—and, again, took without the aid or assistance of any investigators—were admitted into evidence by Jones’s then counsel without objection as to foundation or on any other ground that might have required Quinn’s testimony.
It is correct that Quinn presented his “visibility challenge” through those photographs without an investigator’s testimony, but the majority identifies neither any flaws nor shortcomings in the photographs admitted into evidence that required amplification or explanation by a witness. The decision to use them alone as the impeachment vehicle was evidently tactical. “Since ‘[tjhere are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,’ [citation], unless consideration is given to counsel’s overall performance . . . , it will be ‘all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 386 [91 L.Ed.2d 305, 106 S.Ct. 2574].) Thus, I perceive neither deficient performance nor apparent prejudice in the way Quinn used these photographs at the 2006 hearing.
But it is an entirely different series of photographs, offered by appellant Jones at the 2009 hearing and received by tire trial court, which provides even more substantial evidence requiring this court to affirm the trial court’s decision. Appellant’s witness Biggs, an investigator (and also a bail bondsman), also took many photographs of the intersection at issue in 2007; no fewer than 14 of these were offered into evidence by appellant’s counsel and received at the 2009 hearing.12 I respectfully submit that these photographs *254clearly constitute additional substantial evidence upon which the trial court could rely in finding, as it did, no ineffective assistance of counsel by Quinn, specifically evidence that Jones could very well have been seen by Officer Piccinini not stopping at the stop sign at the corner of Park and Arrowhead.
As the first witness in the 2009 hearing, Jones testified that the February 26, 2006, stop by Officer Piccinini was improper because “the limit line is so far back that once you stop at that stop sign, you can’t see to go forward, so you [íz'c] got to stop at the stop sign. You [sz'c] got to roll forward a little bit to look down Park Street to make sure it’s clear before you can go.”13 But, and rather remarkably, the multitude of pictures taken by appellant’s witness Biggs of the approach to the stop sign on Arrowhead show absolutely no limit line—not even a trace of one. In and of itself, this could have allowed the trial court to discredit Jones’s 2009 version of how and why he was improperly stopped by Officer Piccinini. Rather curiously, in my view, the majority nowhere even mentions this fact.
Also ignored by the majority is the fact that none of these 14 photographs shows even the slightest hint of a crosswalk, a rather understandable fact when one sees, via these photographs, what is clearly a very rural intersection. I assume—and wish my colleagues would also—that the trial court focused on this key (and separate) sentence in the Vehicle Code section the trial court found justified Officer Piccinini’s stop of Jones’s vehicle: “If there is no limit line or crosswalk, the driver shall stop at the entrance to the intersecting roadway. ” (Veh. Code, § 22450, subd. (a).)
And there are several of Biggs’s photographs which strongly suggest that, particularly at 9:30 p.m. on a February evening, it would have been very easy for Officer Piccinini to have observed, from his location a mere 30 yards14 from the intersection of Park and Arrowhead, the headlights of a vehicle approaching that intersection but not stopping there.15 This is particularly illustrated by another part of the evidence before the trial court but also ignored by the majority, exhibits I and K, especially the latter. Judge Mann *255had these photographs in the record before him when, after the close of the two days of testimony, he “rereviewed” that record in preparation to rule on August 31, 2009. I respectfully submit that Biggs’s numerous photographs, combined with the testimony of Attorney Quinn and Officer Piccinini, constitute substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel by Quinn at the 2006 hearing.

 The trial court heard testimony for only two of the three days noted in the majority’s opinion. At the close of the second day, July 27, it recessed the hearing so it could “rereview some of the transcripts” of the testimony it had received over those two days. It then announced its decision on August 31, 2009.

 The point regarding the ability of a referee (or, here, the trial court) to observe the demeanor of witnesses, a point repeated often in our Supreme Court’s rulings regarding the standard of review, is particularly relevant here. Judge Mann observed not only Attorney Quinn, but his former client Charles Thomas Jones, the latter’s girlfriend, Westphal, and the other witnesses, including Jones’s friend, Sutch. Perhaps he believed Quinn’s version of the 2006 events not only because of the substance of his testimony, but also because of the comparative demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.

 The Attorney General’s brief to us relies on both of these standards of review.

 Even if not all of Quinn’s testimony provided support for the trial court’s ruling (as the trial court possibly implied by its reference to “that portion of [Quinn’s] testimony”), such is not the standard. Substantial evidence may be found in “only part of a witness’s testimony.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 876]; see also People v. Hrisoulas (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 791, 796 [60 Cal.Rptr. 80]; In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th. 28, 36 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 246].)

 From his testimony at the 2009 hearing and a supplemental declaration filed thereafter, it appears clear that Quinn did not have access to these files until after that hearing had concluded.

 “[C]lients” included Westphal, who was apparently a codefendant in the second case.

 The name is variously spelled in the transcripts as Francheski, Franceschi, or Francesky.

 The reference is, of course, to the violation specified in Health and Safety Code section 11550.

 As the foregoing commentary suggests, I disagree with the majority’s labeling of these photographs as “poorly authenticated and inadequately interpreted” photographic evidence produced by Quinn at the 2006 suppression hearing. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 239.) In the first place, there was no objection to the introduction of the three photographs and thus no need for “authentication.” Secondly, Quinn apparently got the answers he wanted from Piccinini regarding them.

 Tulanian, who had the files, remained Jones’s trial counsel through the first day of the remand hearing. He died unexpectedly before the second hearing date, but Quinn reviewed the file about a week before Tulanian died.

11 I assume my colleagues mean “if and when.”

 The record shows that the trial court admitted 14 photographs into evidence during the second day of hearing, July 27, 2009. They were marked exhibits A through Q, except that exhibit J was not a photograph but, rather, a poster, and exhibits L and N were not received into evidence.

 Regarding the definition and function of a “limit line” before a stop sign, see Vehicle Code section 22450, subdivision (a).

 I.e. (just in case my colleagues have forgotten such relatively youthful items of interest), precisely the distance from home plate to first base.

 This is—and very significantly I think'—confirmed by Piccinini’s 2006 testimony that he was so close to the intersection that his “headlights actually illuminated the vehicle as it went through the intersection.” I suggest to the majority that a legitimate conclusion for the trial court to draw from that statement was (and still is) that if Officer Piccinini was that close to appellant’s car, he was also close enough to see that car not stop at the either the stop sign or the intersection itself.