Court Opinion

ID: 9518456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:53:15.055118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:06.619291
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
It is undisputed that at the hearings before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission and in the district court there was no evidence presented by any party demonstrating a necessity for the issuance of a certificate to respondent, Newton G. Hahne. However, the majority opinion takes the position that without reference to the testimony before the commission its order is final because appellants failed to submit to the trial court clear and convincing evidence that the order was invalid.
In reviewing decisions of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, it is our duty to examine the commission’s orders in the light of all of the evidence presented at the hearings before both the commission and the district court. No Minnesota case holds that the commission may arrive at its findings arbitrarily and capriciously. Neither may it, by invoking Minn. St. 216.25, pull itself up by its own bootstraps. If there is no evidence on which to base its conclusions, the commission may not constitutionally justify its decision by arguing that the statute treats the order itself as evidence on which to find its own support. None of the cases cited in the majority opinion so hold. In the event the order has no evidentiary basis, the statute should have no application whatever. It is only where the testimony and the inferences from it reasonably support a finding of the commission that § 216.25 is pertinent. If the evidence is conflicting or the undisputed facts admit of more than one inference, the findings of the commission under the statute are prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated, and the order is prima facie reasonable. In all other situations it is either unnecessary to apply the statute because the evidence already preponderates in favor of the commission’s conclusions, or it is futile to invoke it because the facts presented in the record do not on their face permit the commission’s order to stand.
*228Minn. St. 216.25, above quoted, does not compel the courts to abdicate their judicial function of requiring a determination of the commission to be based on the facts. We held in State ex rel. R. & W. Comm. v. G. N. Ry. Co. 123 Minn. 463, 467, 144 N. W. 155, 157:
“* * * the courts can interfere with the action of the body entrusted with the power and duty to determine such questions only when such action oversteps the limitations, constitutional or otherwise, placed upon the exercise of such power.”
We further stated that if the order of the commission is unlawful or unreasonable it must be vacated and set aside.
In State and Port Authority of St. Paul v. N. P. Ry. Co. 229 Minn. 312, 319, 39 N. W. (2d) 752, 757, we called attention to the necessity for findings “reasonably supported by the evidence.” The basic rule was restated in State v. Duluth, M. & I. R. Ry. Co. 246 Minn. 383, 394, 75 N. W. (2d) 398, 406, where we reiterated that the commission’s order must be vacated if there is no evidence to support it. In Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 61, 86 N. W. (2d) 657, 670, we stated:
“The function of the district court is to determine whether, in light of all the evidence presented before the commission and district court, the commission’s order was lawful and reasonable; and upon appeal to this court the question is not whether the evidence reasonably sustains the district court’s findings, but whether all the evidence presented reasonably sustains the district court’s finding on whether the commission’s order was lawful and reasonable; * * (Italics supplied.)
Hence, neither the trial court nor this court is limited to an examination of the evidence or lack of evidence presented at the district court hearing, but may consider the testimony before the commission as well.
While no Minnesota case deals specifically with the impact of our statute on an order of the commission entered without sufficient evidence, similar questions have been dealt with elsewhere. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 92, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 L. ed. 431, 434, involved the validity of a statute which the government argued made a determination of the In*229terstate Commerce Commission conclusive. The United States Supreme Court held that a finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless, and observed:
“* * * A finding without evidence is beyond the power of the Commission. An order based thereon is contrary to law and must, in the language of the statute, ‘be set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ”
The principles of law here involved were presented to the Maryland court in Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 187 A. 887, 107 A. L. R. 924. There a workmen’s compensation claim was disallowed by the commission, which found, however, that the decedent was not a casual employee. The Maryland statute provided that the decision of the commission was prima facie correct, and the burden of proof was on the party attacking it. On the issue of whether the decedent was a casual employee, the claimant invoked the statute even though the undisputed facts were contrary to the commission’s findings. In construing the effect of the statute and the validity of the commission’s orders under it, the Maryland Court of Appeals held as follows (171 Md. 45, 187 A. 890, 107 A. L. R. 928):
“It nowhere appears in the statute that the Legislature intended that any party to a proceeding before the Commission could secure a right through the Commission’s error, but, on the contrary, the clear intention of the statute is that no rights shall accrue under it except upon facts proved or otherwise established sufficient to support the right asserted. The provision that the decision of the Commission shall be ‘prima facie correct’ and that the burden of proof is upon the party attacking the same does not mean, therefore, that if no facts are established before the Commission sufficient to support its decision, that there is any burden of factual proof on the person attacking it, for the decision of the Commission cannot itself be accepted as the equivalent of facts which do not exist, and in all cases, whether there is evidence legally sufficient to support the decision of the Commission is necessarily a matter of law to be decided by the court as any other question of lav/ would be. On the other hand, where the decision of the Commission involves the consideration of conflicting evidence as *230to essential facts or the deduction of permissible but diverse inferences therefrom, its solution of such conflict is presumed to be correct, and the burden of proof is upon the party attacking it to show that it was erroneous. But even there the burden may be one of persuasion rather than proof, for the appellant to overcome it need not produce additional evidence, but may rely upon the identical evidence before the Commission; it is enough if he can convince the court or jury that the Commission erred in interpreting the facts or the inferences deducible therefrom, or in construing the law applicable thereto.
“Where the facts are undisputed, and permit no inferences consistent with the existence of a supposed or asserted right, the existence of such right, wherever it arises, whether before the Commission, the trial court, or this court, is an unmixed question of law. If it were otherwise the rights of parties to proceedings under the statute would depend not upon the law but upon the unguided and unrestrained discretion of men.” (Italics supplied.)
The Oklahoma court came to a similar conclusion in a telephone rate case in Pioneer T. & T. Co. v. Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429, 449, 118 P. 354, 361, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1209. It stated:
“* * * With no evidence in the record supporting the estimate of the Commission upon this item, and with all the evidence, some of which is from the state’s witnesses, supporting the contention of the appellant, this finding of the Commission cannot stand. Findings of fact made by the Commission upon competent evidence from witnesses is prima facie presumed to be correct, but this presumption does not follow when there is no evidence supporting the findings, and there is strong evidence to the contrary.”
More recently the Illinois court reached the same result in a school district annexation case. Welch v. County Board of School Trustees, 22 Ill. App. (2d) 231, 236, 160 N. E. (2d) 505, 507. In reversing the board the court summarized the law on this subject thus:
“The findings, conclusions and decisions of an administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct, and the court will not disturb the findings of fact made by an ad*231ministrative agency unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence. It is also the established law in Illinois that the findings of an administrative agency must be based on facts established by evidence which is introduced as .such, and the administrative agency cannot rely on its own information to support its findings. * * * In Wallace v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 172, 103 N. E. 2d 467, it was held that the findings of an administrative agency must be supported by substantial evidence, and that the court has power to review all questions of law and fact presented by the record. Where it is found that the order of an administrative agency is without substantial foundation in the evidence, it is the duty of the courts to set it aside.”
The legislature of this state has enacted Minn. St. 221.071 making public convenience and necessity a prerequisite to an applicant’s obtaining a certificate of authority to operate as a regular route petroleum carrier. It was certainly not the intention of the legislature that this law be circumvented by permitting an administrative body to enter an order having no support in the evidence, yet insulated from judicial attack by § 216.25. Constitutionally an administrative agency cannot by asserting the existence of a fact prevent the courts from scrutinizing the actualities of the situation.
In the light of all the evidence before us, the record compels a conclusion that appellants have proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was no necessity for the issuance of the certificate here in question. Having sustained their burden before the commission, it was unnecessary for the appellants to adduce further evidence in the district court, and the order of the commission should have been reversed.