Court Opinion

ID: 9965106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:13:02.90585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.677221
License: Public Domain

J-A09002-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 JAMES P. PERRY                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant               :
                                            :
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 MOOSE VENTURES, LLC AND J'S                :   No. 859 WDA 2023
 PLACE INCORPORATED                         :

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Civil Division at No(s):
                                28-CD-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                        FILED: May 1, 2024

      Appellant, James P. Perry, appeals from the July 11, 2023 order entered

in the McKean County Court of Common Pleas granting the motions for

summary judgment filed by Appellees, Moose Ventures, LLC (“Moose

Ventures) and J’s Place Incorporated (“J’s Place”) (collectively, “Appellees”).

After careful review, we affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On February

22, 2019, Appellant was injured when he slipped and fell on snow and ice

while traversing an alley located between a building owned by Moose Ventures

and one owned by J’s Place (the “Alley”).

      On January 19, 2021, Appellant filed a two-count complaint alleging

claims of negligence against Appellees. Appellees filed answers, new matter,

and cross-claims.
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       After the completion of discovery, on September 28, 2022, and

November 23, 2022, Moose Ventures and J’s Place, respectively, filed motions

for summary judgment.           Appellees alleged that, as a threshold matter,

Appellant failed to adduce any evidence that Appellees owned the Alley in

which Appellant fell or that, as landowners of property adjacent to the Alley,

Appellees had any duty to maintain it, or had any duty to ensure or make safe

its condition.1

       Moose Ventures attached as an exhibit to its motion the deed by which

it acquired title to its property, which established that the northern boundary

of the Alley formed the southern boundary of Moose Ventures’ parcel. In other

words, the Alley is adjacent to Moose Ventures’ property. Moose Ventures

also attached a July 18, 2019 survey of the property clearly depicting the Alley

as not part of Moose Venture’s parcel. Similarly, J’s Place also attached to its

motion for summary judgment its deed to the property, as well as a portion

of real estate assessment map showing that J’s Place’s property is separate

and distinct from the Alley.

____________________________________________

1 J’s Place also argued that, even if J’s Place owed a duty to Appellant by virtue

of owning or possessing the Alley, the doctrine of “hills and ridges” precluded
Appellant’s recovery. The “hills and ridges” doctrine protects an owner or
occupier from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from ice and
snow if the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to accumulate
unreasonably into ridges or elevations. See generally Harmotta v. Bender,
601 A.2d 837, 841-42 (Pa. Super. 1992) (reviewing the “hills and ridges”
doctrine). Since the record is clear that neither Moose Ventures nor J’s Place
owned or possessed the Alley, we need not address this issue.

                                           -2-
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      Appellant filed responses to both motions for summary judgment. With

respect to Moose Ventures, Appellant asserted that a genuine issue of material

fact existed as to whether Moose Ventures owned, possessed, and/or

controlled the portion of the Alley where Appellant fell. Appellant based its

claim that Moose Ventures “possessed” the Alley on a January 22, 2021 letter

from Moose Ventures in which Moose Ventures advised Appellant that he had

no right to be in or on the Alley and that Moose Ventures would pursue legal

action against Appellant for trespass if he entered the Alley. Appellant argued

that this demonstrated that Moose Ventures owned or possessed the Alley.

Appellant also claimed that Moose Ventures “unreasonably and unnecessarily

increased water runoff [into the Alley] which resulted in a risk of harm when

the water froze.”   Brief in Opposition to [] Moose Ventures[’] Motion for

Summary Judgment, 10/24/22, at 4 (unpaginated).

      In further support of his claim that a genuine issue of material fact

existed, Appellant also cited his own deposition testimony that: (1) Moose

Ventures knew or should have known to maintain its premises because “lots

of individuals use the [A]lley as it is a shortcut[;]” (2) he recalls someone

maintaining the [A]lley by Moose Ventures; and (3) someone told him that

Moose Ventures was responsible for the [A]lley. Id.at 4-5.

      In response to J’s Place’s motion for summary judgment, Appellant

claimed that the facts showed that J’s Place possessed, occupied, and/or

exercised control over the Alley on a constant and consistent basis. Appellant

pointed to J’s Place’s discovery responses, which indicated that J’s Place

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provided maintenance to the Alley during the winter months by inspecting for

and clearing snow and ice if it accumulated and that J’s Place never contracted

with anyone to perform snow removal in the Alley. Appellant asserted that

J’s Place’s use of the Alley was more than “mere use,” because J’s Place

undertook the above maintenance and the only way to travel between its

building and its garage was by way of the Alley. Appellant, thus, concluded

that J’s Place was a possessor of the Alley and, as such, knew or should have

known of the dangerous conditions in the Alley on the day of Appellant’s fall

and that Appellant would not discover or realize the danger of walking in the

Alley.2

       Following consideration of the motions for summary judgment and

Appellant’s responses thereto, the trial court found that the competent

evidence of record clearly demonstrated that neither Moose Ventures nor J’s

Place had any ownership or possessory interest in the Alley in general or the

area where Appellant fell in particular. The court also concluded that neither

Moose Ventures nor J’s Place had any duty to maintain the Alley and,

therefore, could not have breached any duty owed to Appellant. Accordingly,

the trial court entered an order granting Appellees’ motions for summary

judgment.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also challenged J’s Place’s contention that the doctrine of “hills and

ridges” precluded Appellant’s recovery.

                                           -4-
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       This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3

       Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

       Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion when it granted
       [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment when the record
       contains sufficient evidence that Appellees[]:

       a. owned or possessed the [A]lley where [Appellant] fell;

       b. owed a duty to [Appellant] to maintain the [A]lley in a safe
          condition or to warn [Appellant] of any dangerous condition in
          the [A]lley; and

       c. had constructive or actual notice of the conditions in the [A]lley
          over which [Appellant] walked or unreasonably permitted an
          accumulation of snow or ice to exist?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

                                               A.

       Appellant challenges the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ motions

for summary judgment.          Our Supreme Court has clarified our role as the

appellate court as follows:

       On appellate review [ ], an appellate court may reverse a grant of
       summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse
       of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine
       issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and
       therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This
       means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower
       tribunals. To the extent that this Court must resolve a question
       of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
       context of the entire record.

____________________________________________

3 On October 2, 2023, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion in which it

directed this Court to its July 11, 2023 opinion for an explanation of its reasons
for granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment.

                                           -5-
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Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citations

and quotation omitted).

      A trial court may grant summary judgment “only in those cases where

the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(citation and quotation omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1).             “When

considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts

of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159. “In so doing, the trial

court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact against the moving party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment

where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.”             Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

                                            B.

      Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellees because genuine issues of material fact exist

as to whether Appellees owned or possessed the Alley in which Appellant fell,

what duty, if any, they owed to Appellant, and the applicability of the “hills

and ridges” doctrine. Appellant’s Brief at 13-20.

      To prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the

defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that duty was breached, the

breach resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss

                                       -6-
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or damages.”      Merlini v. Gallitzin Water Auth., 980 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa.

2009).

        An owner or possessor of land owes a duty to invitees onto his land to

maintain the land in a reasonably safe condition. Brown v. City of Oil City,

294 A.3d 413, 434 (Pa. 2023). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342

(explaining that “[a] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm

caused to licensees by a condition on the land if” certain conditions are met.)

(emphasis added). Simply, ownership or possession of land is a prerequisite

to the imposition of liability for physical harm arising from a condition on the

land.

        With respect to the trial court’s determination that Appellees did not own

or possess the Alley, Appellant argues, without citation to any authority, that

the trial court’s “extreme and/or complete reliance on the deed and map

provided by [Moose Ventures] was improper/incorrect.” Appellant’s Brief at

13.     Appellant also argues that, in relying on documents submitted by

Appellees that showed the boundaries of their parcels and the Alley, the court

“failed to consider that all parcels of land exist in relation to the parcels

surrounding them, and based on deed descriptions, may have overlaps or gaps

between parcels.” Id. at 13-14. We highlight, however, that Appellant failed

to provide any legal authority to support its contention that these facts

establish that Moose Ventures possessed the Alley and, thus, had a duty to

Appellant.

                                       -7-
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      With respect to J’s Place, and again without citation to any case law,

Appellant asserts that by J’s Place’s alleged use and maintenance of the Alley,

specifically during winter months, J’s Place clearly showed its intent to control

and/or possess the Alley. Id. at 15. Appellant, thus, concludes that J’s Place’s

actions gave rise to a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the area safe

or to warn Appellant about dangerous conditions in the Alley. Id.

      The Honorable Richard A. Masson has authored a comprehensive,

thorough, and well-reasoned opinion, including a discussion of relevant case

law, to explain why the trial court concluded that Appellees did not own or

possess the Alley and, thus, neither Appellee owed Appellant any legal duty.

See Trial Ct. Op., 7/11/23, at 7-8 (concluding that: (1) based on the recorded

property deeds, property surveys, and real estate assessment maps, that

Appellant “adduced no competent evidence to establish either [Appellant]

possessed any record title to the [A]lley”; and (2) that the February 22, 2019

“no trespass” letter “does not remotely suffice in terms of proof of an

ownership interest in or maintenance responsibility for the [A]lley.”). After a

thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the trial court’s

opinion, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the court’s

conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact “exist in the record that would

                                      -8-
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permit this case to move forward[.]” Id. at 10.4 We, thus, affirm on the basis

of this portion of the trial court’s July 11, 2023 opinion.

       Order affirmed. Appellant is directed to annex a copy of the trial court’s

July 11, 2023 opinion to any future filings.

5/1/2024

____________________________________________

4 In light of our conclusion that the trial court properly found that Appellees

were not the owners or possessors of the Alley, we need not address
Appellant’s argument pertaining to the “hills and ridges” doctrine, which, as
explained above, protects an owner or occupier from liability for generally
slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow if the owner has not permitted
the ice and snow to accumulate unreasonably into ridges or elevations.

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