Court Opinion

ID: 9383663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:03:34.237125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.349248
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                               D079706

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                (Super. Ct. No. SCS318145)

 ERIC COOKS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael J. Popkins, Judge. Appeal dismissed. Request for judicial notice
denied.
       Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Steve Oetting and Anthony DaSilva,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      At sentencing, counsel stated that her client, defendant Eric Cooks,
waived his right to appear at any future restitution hearing. The court noted
the waiver orally and in its sentencing minute order. Cooks appeals,
claiming he never validly waived his right to be present at a future
restitution hearing. That may be true. Nonetheless, until a restitution
hearing takes place in Cooks’s absence, any error from an invalid waiver is
hypothetical and not concrete. Concluding the claim is not yet ripe for
appellate review, we therefore dismiss the appeal.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      After stabbing his wife’s teenage son, Cooks pleaded guilty to assault

with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted that he
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court
sentenced Cooks to a seven year stipulated prison term—a four year upper
term plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. Cooks was
ordered to pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a suspended
parole revocation fine in the same amount (§ 1202.45), along with various
mandatory fees.
      Thereafter, the court reserved jurisdiction over victim restitution under
section 1202.4, subdivision (f), with the following exchange:
         “[The court:] And restitution is reserved for victim
         Treshaun P. in an amount to be determined. [¶] The court
         will reserve jurisdiction for any future restitution reviews
         or hearings. [¶] Will there be a [section] 977 waiver, Ms.
         Basic?

         “[Ms. Basic:] Yes, your Honor.

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                       2
         “[The court:] All right. [Section] 977 waiver is noted for
         the record for any future restitution reviews or hearings.”2

Cooks did not object to his counsel’s representation of a waiver. The
sentencing minute order reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of
victim restitution. Under the heading, “Future Hearings,” it stated, “PC 977
waiver taken for any future restitution hearing.” The record does not reflect
that any restitution hearing has taken place.
      Cooks appealed the judgment. The People moved to dismiss the appeal
on ripeness grounds. In response, Cooks sought judicial notice of a recent
unpublished decision from this court, claiming guidance to the lower courts is
needed to illustrate how a valid section 977 waiver should be executed.
(People v. Turner (Aug. 31, 2020, D075569).)

                                 DISCUSSION

      A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be
present at critical stages of a prosecution, including the imposition of victim
restitution. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves).) This right
may be waived if the waiver “ ‘is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531 (Davis).) Defense
counsel may waive the defendant’s presence, “but only if there is evidence
that defendant consented to the waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there
must be some evidence that defendant understood the right he was waiving
and the consequences of doing so.” (Davis, at p. 532.)

2      Section 977, subdivision (b)(1) requires defendants to be present at
critical junctures in their cases “unless they waive their right to be physically
or remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by defendant’s
counsel.”
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      Cooks may have a point that the record does not demonstrate he validly
waived his right to be present at a future restitution hearing. (See Davis,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532; Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508.) With no
discussion of what a “977 waiver” was, it is hard to see how Cooks impliedly
waived his right to be present at a future hearing by failing to object or
contradict his counsel.
      Nevertheless, as the People argue, Cooks’s claim is not ripe for
appellate review. “The ripeness requirement . . . ‘prevents courts from
issuing purely advisory opinions, or considering a hypothetical state of facts
in order to give general guidance rather than to resolve a specific legal
dispute.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316, 328.) A controversy
is not ripe until “ ‘ “the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an
intelligent and useful decision to be made.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      Courts addressing this type of claimed error typically evaluate whether
a defendant’s nonappearance following an invalid waiver resulted in
prejudice. (See Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 508−509 [it was harmless
error to hold a victim restitution hearing outside defendant’s presence
without a valid waiver].) Here, no restitution hearing has been held outside
Cooks’s presence, nor is it clear that one will ever occur. Now that Cooks has
raised the issue, his counsel can notify him and seek to secure his presence at
any future restitution hearing that occurs. Thus, there remains the distinct
possibility that any error in finding a waiver can be remedied by the trial
court before the actual hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 695, 713−714; In re Annis (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1199.)
Until the court holds a hearing outside Cooks’s presence, any hypothetical

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error has yet to occur. Faced with only the potential for future error, we

conclude Cooks’s claim is not ripe for appellate review.3

                                 DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed.

                                                                      DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

3     Because we dismiss the appeal, we likewise deny Cooks’s request for
judicial notice of an unpublished opinion in a case raising a similar claim.
(See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418.)
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