Court Opinion

ID: 9722184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:19:39.179971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:31.420566
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Sullivan, J.
I am in total agreement with the following language contained in the unanimous decision of our Supreme *430Court in Taylor v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 92, 267 N. E. 2d 383, 385:
“The statute sets out three elements to be proved and it does not permit conviction merely upon a showing of the possession of adapted instruments. To permit such a conviction would be in effect to amend the statute. We assume the Legislature did not do a useless act in including the element of intent; if they had intended to punish the mere possession of adapted instruments they would not have included that element. The fact that the Legislature included the requirement that intent be proved necessarily implies that they recognized that there could be cases of possession of adapted instruments which would not be punishable under the statute. This is one of those cases.”
and were it not for decisions by that same court beginning with Von Hauger v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 666, 266 N. E. 2d 197 and continuing beyond Taylor v. State, supra, through Stevens v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 386, 275 N. E. 2d 12 and Dabner v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 179, 279 N. E. 2d 797, 1 would vote with my colleagues to reverse.
Recognizing that the case before us involves possession of narcotic paraphernalia, coupled only with flight as distinguished from the particular indicia of unlawful intent presented by the three cases last above cited, the interpretation of the facts by the court in the latter cases nevertheless compels me to the reluctant conclusion that the case before us falls within their ambit.
I would affirm.
Note. — Reported in 287 N. E. 2d 759.