Court Opinion

ID: 9538235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:32:59.011033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:41.380546
License: Public Domain

WINDES, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority-in the decision of this case. In the former-appeal we decided after thorough and competent briefs and argument that there was. sufficient evidence to take to the jury the-question of whether plaintiff-appellee Jeffreys had possession of the property in dispute at the time defendants-appellants Sibley took possession. The general rule of law applicable herein and admittedly heretofore followed in this jurisdiction is. clearly set forth in 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, section 985, as follows:
“It may be stated generally that a court of review is precluded from agitating questions which were propounded, considered, and decided on a previous review. The decisions agree that as a general rule, when an appellate court passes upon a question and remands the cause for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the ‘law of the case’ upon a. subsequent appeal, provided the same-facts and issues which were determined in the previous appeal are involved, in the second appeal.”
*279It is not stated and could not possibly be stated that there was any substantial difference in the evidence presented at the first and second trials. If there be any difference there is'" stronger evidence in Jeffreys’ favor on the issue of possession than in the first trial. For instance, as appears from the opinion on the first appeal he had cleared the brush from 15 or 20 acres, while as appears from the majority opinion herein, at the time of the second trial he showed he had cleared the brush from 30 or 40 acres.
There is no dispute in this court between the parties litigant that the “law of the ■case” doctrine as. it has until now existed in this jurisdiction would require submitting the question of possession to the jury unless changes in the evidence at the second trial would prevent. Appellants in their brief say:
“If the evidence in this trial were the same as that in the first trial, then it would follow that the Court should submit the question of possession to the jury.”
Notwithstanding this situation the majority have assumed to say that both appellants and appellee are wrong and in the middle of the litigation proceed to upset all the former pronouncements of this court on the subject. The appellee will justifiably be shocked by being blasted out of court on a matter that was never debated nor briefed by either side.
No one asked this court to re-examine and change the law and I do not believe a supreme court on its own motion should surprise litigant? by upsetting the well established law as heretofore announced. This is especially true when all interested parties are apparently content that the law be not changed. The basis for changing this law is that the former decision is manifestly erroneous. I cannot even agree with this proposition. The question was thoroughly briefed and argued on the first appeal and while there is room for disagreement as to whether the first opinion is or is not correct, it certainly is not manifestly erroneous.
This case should be decided on other assignments of error with the question of the right to have the jury pass upon appellee’s possession established by the former decision.
PHELPS, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent of WINDES, J.