Court Opinion

ID: 9697243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:09:20.52266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:30.074821
License: Public Domain

Bandstra, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in parts i, m, and iv of Judge Batzer’s opinion, but dissent from part n.
Defendant requested a jury instruction with respect to the offense of accessory after the fact. The trial court denied this request, reasoning that, under People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34; 324 NW2d 526 (1982), no accessory after the fact instruction was required because defendant had not been separately charged with that offense. The trial court also concluded that accessory after the fact was not a cognate lesser included offense.
*547As Judge Batzer notes, analysis under Karst was completely inappropriate. Ante, p 532, n 1. Under the correct legal analysis, accessory after the fact is not a necessarily included lesser offense, because evidence showing that defendant participated in the arson murders either as a principal or an aider and abettor would not necessarily also show that he participated in later attempts to conceal those offenses. People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 460-464; 418 NW2d 861 (1988). However, the trial court should have considered accessory after the fact as a cognate lesser included offense under the facts of this case because that offense is related to the arson murder offenses and of the same class or category as those offenses, while containing elements not necessarily found in the higher offenses. Id.; People v Usher, 196 Mich App 228, 232-234; 492 NW2d 786 (1992).1 When an instruction relative to this cognate lesser included offense was requested, the trial court should have examined the evidence to determine whether it would support a conviction of accessory after the fact. People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 442-444; 521 NW2d 546(1994); People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 387; 471 NW2d 346 (1991); Beach, supra at 464.
The defense theory in this case was that Jacinto (Jason) Ricco was the arsonist who caused the three *548deaths. Defendant’s trial counsel cross-examined the prosecutor’s witnesses from the neighborhood to emphasize their testimony that Jason Ricco was a well-known neighborhood troublemaker and bully. Two witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony that, before the arson, they had refused Jason Ricco’s request that they assist him in blowing up a house or in throwing a firebomb into a neighborhood backyard. One of Jason’s friends testified that Jason had told him, on the day immediately preceding the arson, that he had thrown gasoline-filled pop bottles at another building on the street.
There was also testimony showing that Jason Ricco’s hostility was directed in particular against the victims of the arson, the Rollie family. Both Willie Rollie and Cynthia Rollie, the father and mother of the children who died in the fire, testified that Jason Ricco had repeatedly insulted their family with racial slurs, made threats against them, and thrown things at their house. Jason’s continuing feud with the Rollies had resulted in the police being called on a number of occasions. Sometime before the arson, neighbors overheard Jason Ricco yelling from the street toward the Rollies’ home, “I will kill you.” Ryan Rollie, the victims’ brother, testified that Jason Ricco was angry with him because of an incident that occurred the day before the fire.
During closing argument, defense counsel contended that the prosecutor had failed to overcome the presumption of innocence regarding defendant’s participation in the arson, especially in light of all this evidence showing that Jason Ricco, not defendant, had the history and motivation that might likely result in that kind of crime against the Rollies. Defense *549counsel argued that, in contrast to Jason Ricco, defendant had no history of animosity toward the Rollies or experience with firebombs. Defense counsel stressed that the testimony suggesting that defendant directly participated in the crime was either that of Jason Ricco, who had an obvious incentive to saddle defendant with the blame, or that of other witnesses who also had an incentive to protect Jason or assist the prosecution and who, in any event, had to rely solely on Jason’s account of what occurred at the scene of the arson.
On the other hand, a number of witnesses did testify from firsthand observation that defendant engaged in activities to cover up the crime after he and Jason Ricco returned to the Ricco house. A number of witnesses testified that they overheard defendant and Jason Ricco in the Riccos’ bathroom immediately after the fire started, flushing the toilet repeatedly and speaking about getting rid of evidence. These accounts were corroborated by a subsequent investigation showing that there was residue from a flammable substance in the toilet bowl. There was evidence that Jason Ricco had asked defendant to conceal a gasoline can in one of the bedrooms and that defendant had done so. Finally, witnesses testified that Jason Ricco and defendant worked together to prevent Jason Ricco’s older sister, Yolanda, from immediately calling the fire department or police concerning the fire.
During closing argument, defendant’s counsel acknowledged this evidence showing that defendant had, with Jason Ricco, attempted to conceal the crime after it occurred. However, he cautioned the jury that the court would instruct them that, even if *550they believed that evidence, it would not constitute aiding and abetting the arson. Instead, to find aiding and abetting, defense counsel argued that “any participation has to be done . . . before or during the commission of the crime.” Consistent with that argument, defense counsel requested an accessory after the fact instruction, reasoning that the jury could
have a reasonable doubt about whether or not the defendant participated in the burning of the house, but could find that he took certain actions back at the Ricco house by moving the gas can and participating in the disposal of flammable liquid in the toilet, knowing that the fire had been set, and therefore, be an accessory after the fact as a lesser offense.
A review of the trial transcript, as outlined above, convinces me that a factual question was presented for the jury regarding whether defendant assisted the commission of the arson before, during, or after it was completed. The jury had the right “to believe or disbelieve any or all” of the testimony presented by the prosecution. People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408, 420; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).2 The jury could have concluded that the prosecution failed to overcome *551defendant’s presumption of innocence relative to the greater offenses for which instructions were provided (felony murder, arson, second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter) because of a reasonable doubt regarding defendant’s actual involvement at the scene of the arson. The jury could have also, quite consistently, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant as an accessory after the fact on the basis of the more compelling evidence of defendant’s participation in efforts to conceal the crime following the firebombing. It was not necessary for defendant to present a “rebuttal or impeachment of the people’s evidence” with regard to the greater offenses as a prerequisite to requesting the accessory after the fact instruction. Id. at 422. Instead of looking at whether there is evidence to refute the greater charge, the analysis properly centers on whether the evidence would support the lesser charge for which an instruction has been requested.3
In determining whether the instruction should be given, the trial court should consider whether, if the defendant had been originally charged only on the lesser offense, the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a guilty verdict on that charge. If it would have, the requested instruction must be given. [Id. at 423.]
If defendant had been originally charged as an accessory after the fact in this case, the evidence adduced at trial would clearly have supported a guilty verdict with regard to that charge. Defendant was entitled to *552the requested instruction regarding accessory after the fact, and the trial court erred in failing to grant that request.
Apparently anticipating the possibility of this conclusion, the prosecution argues that this was harmless error not warranting reversal. Michigan law does recognize a harmless-error doctrine in some cases where instructions concerning lesser included offenses are improperly denied, as explained by our Supreme Court in People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332 (1980), and Beach, supra 4 The majority would conclude the doctrine applies here; I disagree.
In Richardson, a defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury had also been instructed with respect to second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but the trial court had denied a defense request for instructions concerning the additional lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm causing death or injury. Richardson, supra at 134. The Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support convictions of involuntary manslaughter or reckless use of a firearm causing death or injury and that, accordingly, the trial court had erred in denying the requested instructions. Id. at 135-138. The Court further determined that this error could not be considered harmless merely because of “the jury’s verdict of guilty on a higher offense where the option was available to *553convict on some lesser offense.” Id. at 139. The Court reasoned that the three offenses of which the jury had been instructed all involved activity that included an intent to do great bodily harm or cause death. Id. at 140. In contrast, the two offenses of which the defendant’s request for instructions had been denied involved conduct that was careless, reckless, or criminally negligent. Id. at 140-141. “Thus, the effect of the trial judge’s refusal to instruct on the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm was to foreclose the jury’s option to convict the defendant in accordance with his own testimony, evidence, and theory.” Id. at 141. Because the jury was “deprived of any option to convict consistently with the defendant’s testimony, evidence and theory,” the trial court’s refusal to give the lesser offense instructions was prejudicial error requiring reversal. Id.
In Beach, supra at 491, the Supreme Court again concluded that “[t]he existence of an intermediate charge that was rejected by the jury does not, of course, automatically result in an application of the [harmless-error doctrine].” Instead, the harmless-error doctrine applies only if “the intermediate charge rejected by the jury would necessarily have to indicate a lack of likelihood that the jury would have adopted the lesser requested charge.” Id. Defendant Beach had been convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, but was denied an instruction concerning conspiracy to commit larceny in a building. The jury had been instructed with respect to the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, but rejected that charge. The Court reasoned that, in these circumstances, the trial court’s *554failure to give the instruction concerning conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was harmless error:
If the jury had doubts about her guilt of the charged offense or if it concluded that the defendant was not planning to use force, it could have and undoubtedly would have, found her guilty of the instructed lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, which would represent a lesser use of force. Because it did not do so, we can conclude that it had no reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We believe that the jury’s decision is a reasonable indication that the failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was not prejudicial to the defendant. [Id. at 490-491.]
In other words, the issue Beach tried to place before the jury through the requested charge, i.e., whether less force than in an armed robbery had been used, had already been placed in issue by the instruction provided to the jury with regard to unarmed robbery. The jury had thus had an opportunity to consider the amount of force issue under the instructions given and, by rejecting the unarmed robbery option, indicated that it had decided against the defendant with regard to that issue. Thus, “the intermediate charge rejected by the jury . . . indicate[d] a lack of likelihood that the jury would have adopted the lesser requested charge.” Id. at 491.
Under either the Richardson or the Beach analysis,5 I would conclude that the trial court’s failure to pro*555vide in this case the requested instruction concerning the offense of accessory after the fact was not harmless error. As discussed earlier, defendant’s theory was that there was insufficient evidence to show he was involved with the arson murders as a principal or as an aider and abettor and that, even if the jury believed he had assisted in covering up the crime, that did not make him guilty of the arson murders. The failure to provide the requested instruction with respect to accessory after the fact thus improperly “foreclose[d] the jury’s option to convict the defendant in accordance with his own” theory of defense. Richardson, supra at 141.
In contrast to Beach, the jury’s failure to convict defendant of second-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, of which it had been instructed, does not suggest in any way that the jury would have also failed to convict defendant of being an accessory after the fact had it been instructed with respect to that offense, as requested by defendant. By requesting this instruction, defendant attempted to place at issue the time at which he became criminally involved with the arson. That issue was not presented to the jury in its consideration of the charges for which instructions were provided. The differences between first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter have to do with whether a felony (arson) was the act by which the victims had died, whether the requisite intent was negated (because of *556defendant’s intoxication), and defendant’s degree of culpability (for example, whether he caused the victim’s death through gross negligence instead of an intentional act). These were separate questions, completely different from whether defendant became criminally involved with the arson murders only after they occurred. The jury’s rejection of the intermediate charges of which instructions had been provided presents no indication whatsoever that the jury would have also rejected the lesser requested charge of accessory after the fact.
Our Supreme Court has recently noted the crucial importance of providing instructions with respect to lesser included offenses when they are warranted:
“The absence of a lesser included offense instruction increases the risk that the jury will convict, not because it is persuaded that the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but simply to avoid setting the defendant free. . . . The goal ... , in other words, is to eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process . . . .” [Hendricks, supra at 447, quoting Spaziano v Florida, 468 US 447, 455; 104 S Ct 3154; 82 L Ed 2d 340 (1984).]
To illustrate this principle, the jury in the instant case may well have concluded that the lesser charges for which instructions were provided were not supported by the evidence, there being little to show defendant was intoxicated and nothing to suggest that the firebombing was the result of negligence. At the same time, the jury could also have concluded that defendant was guilty of assisting Jason Ricco by attempts to conceal the arson, though not guilty of the arson itself. If these were the jury’s conclusions, the instructions provided required a choice between two wrong alternatives: setting defendant free or convicting him *557of the intentional arson of which there was clear proof. To avoid this “distortion of the fact-finding process,” defendant was entitled to an accessory after the fact instruction. The trial court erred requiring reversal in failing to so charge the jury.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial..

 Citing People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 447; 521 NW2d 546 (1994), the majority concludes that accessory after the fact is not in the “same class or category” as the underlying offense because it does not “protect the same societal interests as” the underlying offense. Ante, p 536, n 3. I disagree. The purpose of making accessory activities a crime is to prevent the underlying crime itself by facilitating its detection and prosecution. Prohibitions against both accessory activities and underlying crimes fulfill the same social objective, i.e., preventing the underlying criminal activity, and accessory offenses are properly considered cognate lesser offenses under the language from Hendricks that the majority relies upon.

 Chamblis thus refutes the prosecution’s argument on appeal that “if the testimony of the witnesses linking Defendant to this horrible crime is to be believed at all... , it clearly links Defendant as a direct participant and not as someone merely helping someone else to cover up his criminal activities after the fact.” Chamblis also undermines the prosecution’s complaint, adopted by the majority, that defendant’s argument “would mean that an accessory after the fact instruction would be required in virtually every case in which there is any evidence that the accused tried to cover his or her tracks.” Chamblis apparently adopted the view expressed in Comment, Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses, 57 NW UL Rev 62, 67 (1962), that the rule announced would mean that “ ‘virtually every case will involve possible convictions on lesser offenses,’ ” thereby necessitating instructions with regard to those offenses. Chamblis, supra at 422.

 This rule in Michigan is “more protective of defendants” than the approach used in a number of states and the federal system where “the evidence must permit a jury rationally to . . . acquit of the offense charged.” Beach, supra at 464 (emphasis in original); see also Hendricks, supra at 448, n 18.

 The Supreme Court also considered this issue in People v Rochowiak, 416 Mich 235; 330 NW2d 669 (1982). However, analysis is appropriately limited to Richardson and Beach because no majority of the justices participating in Rochowiak agreed with respect to the reasoning and it is not “an authoritative interpretation” binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. Beach, supra at 475, n 10.

 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s suggestion that Richardson might be “inconsistent” with Beach, Beach, supra at 470, n 9, I conclude that Richardson and Beach are consistent and that both are applicable under the facts of this case. As explained more fully below, under Beach, nothing in the jury’s rejection of the intermediate charges for which instructions had been provided indicated that the jury would have *555rejected defendant’s theory of the case, i.e., that any involvement he had was limited to attempts to conceal the arson murders after they had occurred. In other words, to use the Richardson approach, defendant’s theory was not presented to the jury for consideration through the instructions that were provided, and, accordingly, the jury’s decision cannot be construed as a rejection of the defense theory.