Court Opinion

ID: 9657193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:17:14.307069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:42.059134
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
I would reverse on King’s third contention because there was a clear violation of both SDCL §§ 23A-7-2 and 23A-7-14.
SDCL 23A-7-2 provides in part:
... The court may not enter a judgment unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for any plea except a plea of nolo contendere.
SDCL 23A-7-14 provides in full:
(Rule 11 (f)) Factual basis required before acceptance of plea other than nolo contendere. The court shall defer acceptance of any plea except a plea of nolo contendere until it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the offense charged or to which the defendant pleads.
In Gregory v. State, 325 N.W.2d 297 (S.D.1982) we held that the factual basis required by these two sections must be established on the record. This can be done by questioning the defendant or by admitting transcripts of testimony, oral testimony, other sworn statements, or tangible evidence. Id. at 298-299. None of this was done here. In fact, the only attempt at establishing a factual basis resulted in inaccuracy and nonproof. The prosecutor *884indicated King’s blood alcohol content was 0.18%, but the arrest report shows no test was even taken. King’s response, “All I know is I was over ten percent. But I really wasn’t that drunk,” raises a factual question instead of satisfying a factual basis.
I would not sidestep these clear statutory violations when this matter was within the issues before the trial court, especially when that claim was not raised by the State. In fact, a substantial part of the State’s brief is devoted to its claim that the record supports a factual basis for the plea.
Accordingly, I would reverse.