Court Opinion

ID: 9558614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:13:46.646275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:27.872879
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
concurring:
I agree with some of the views expressed by Mr. Justice Collins, but not all of them. Therefore, I shall state my views separately.
By motion pursuant to NRS 125.180, Frances Day, the former wife of Fairfield Day, sought an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of arrears claimed to be due for her support under a Nevada divorce judg-*325xnent entered on April 7, 1949.1 A threshold issue as to whether their written property settlement and support agreement were merged into the divorce judgment, and the support provisions thereof susceptible to an NRS 125.180 proceeding, was the subject of our opinion in Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 395 P.2d 321 (1964). There we held the proceeding permissible and remanded the matter for resolution of the motion to fix arrears. This appeal by Fairfield and cross-appeal by Frances is from the district court’s determination of that motion. That court found that Frances was entitled to judgment in the sum of $12,535.17, plus interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from January 1960, plus costs and attorney fees. The court refused to allow interest on arrearages prior to January 1960.
Fairfield’s appeal assigns three errors. First, that the lower court mistakenly failed to allow him credit for $3,534.20 in ascertaining arrearages. That money was paid directly to his son, Fairfield, Jr., for tuition and living expenses while attending Harvard. Second, that the court should have recognized the marriage of his daughter, Estella, as terminating his obligation to make further payments on her account. Finally, that the court lacked power to award counsel fees absent a showing that Frances, his former wife, was in “necessitous circumstances.” The cross-appeal of Frances claims that error occurred when the court refused to allow interest in the amount of $7,644.17 on arrearages between January 1, 1950 and January 1, 1960.
Before deciding these issues, one should first note the *326support provisions of the Day agreement which was merged into the divorce decree and, thereby, became a judgment for support. The agreement expressed three purposes: to settle property rights, to provide for the support of the wife, and to provide for the custody, education and support of the two minor children, Fair-field, Jr. and Estella. The mother was given custody, the father visitation rights, and they were te consult on major decisions affecting the welfare of the children. The relevant provisions regarding support obligated Fairfield to pay Frances “for her maintenance and support” a base sum of $9,000 yearly in equal monthly installments of $750. That sum represented 50 percent of his estimated annual future income. A provision for increase or decrease on the basis of Fairfield’s income above or below $18,000 per year was inserted. Fairfield was to furnish a sworn statement of his income each year.
The amounts payable by Fairfield were to be automatically reduced by 50 percent should Frances remarry, and by 25 percent when either child became 21 years old, except that if such child was in college the reduction would not occur until the child became 25 years old, graduated from college or ceased attending, whichever first happened. In an effort to insure tax deductibility to Fairfield, all payments were to be made to- Frances and she was obliged to support and educate the children.
Frances remarried in 1956. The daughter, Estella married in June 1962, became 21 years old in 1964, but continued her schooling. The son, Fairfield, Jr., became 21 years old in March 1960, and continued college for a while thereafter.
The main contention of Frances is that the payments ordered are alimony because specifically made for “her support and maintenance,” to allow Fairfield a maximum income tax deduction. Since NR.S 125.170 precludes modification of accrued alimony installments, and as Fair-field’s request is, in realty, to modify the judgment, he must fail.2 On the other hand, Fairfield argues that a *327fair construction of the payment provisions compels the conclusion that the payments were for alimony and child support. To rule otherwise would exalt form over substance. Therefore, he contends that NRS 125.170 does not bar his request for credits, and, that equitable considerations should have persuaded the lower court to allow his request. As I view this matter, we need not decide whether the payments required by the judgment are alimony, or alimony and child support, for, assuming the latter, the lower court acted within permissible limits of discretion in refusing credits for the sums paid by Fairfield directly to his son, and in ruling that his daughter’s marriage did not affect his obligation to pay.
1. Direct payments to son. There is abundant authority for the proposition that accrued payments for alimony or child support may not be modified, since modification generally looks to the future and does not act retroactively. See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 160 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1947) and other authorities cited by Justice Collins; also, Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1277. However, I do not consider those authorities controlling on the issue of credits. The father does not here seek to modify the judgment. He states simply that he has paid $3,543.20 directly to his son for college expenses and should be allowed credit therefor. Special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting payments made directly to a child rather than to the former wife for the child. Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore. 193, 165 P.2d 772 (1946); Mooty v. Mooty, 131 Fla. 151, 179 So. 155 (1938); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 831. The issue is one addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the task on review is to decide whether that discretion was exercised within permissible limits.
No one particularly favors a double payment. On the other hand, there is merit in the notion that the method *328of payment directed by the judgment be followed. The seeds of further controversy may be sown when that method is unilaterally departed from. Here, the father was in arrears at the time he made direct payments to his son. Furthermore, the father and mother were not in accord as to the advisability of college for Fairfield, Jr. The lad’s school record had been poor. Indeed, the conflicting information presented to the trial court may reasonably be read as indicating that Fairfield, Jr., attended Harvard only to please his father and for no other purpose. In these circumstances, we cannot rule that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing credit. Cf. Goodman v. Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 236 P.2d 305 (1951).
2. The daughter’s marriage. The father urges that the trial court should have treated his daughter’s marriage as automatically reducing his support obligation by 25 percent. The merged agreement for support did not so provide, nor did the father ever seek to modify the judgment following Estella’s marriage. Each case cited to support his claim was a modification proceeding [Crook v. Crook, 80 Ariz. 275, 296 P.2d 951 (1956); Peters v. Peters, 14 App.Div.2d 778, 219 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1961); Hayes v. Hayes, 156 S.W.2d 34 (Mo.App. 1941); Davis v. Davis, 96 F.2d 512 (D.C. App. 1938)], and may be read to stand for the proposition that the marriage of a minor daughter may sometimes persuade a court to exercise its discretion in favor of modification upon appropriate application therefor. Such an application was not made in this case. The only motion before the court was the mother’s motion to fix arrears. In this context, I think that the lower court made the correct ruling.
3. Counsel fees. Fairfield contends that the district court lacked power to award fees to counsel for his former wife for services rendered in the proceeding below. His contention is bottomed on the admitted fact that Frances was not shown to be in necessitous circumstances. Unlike a suit money motion under NRS 125.040, where need is a prerequisite, (Allis v. Allis, 81 Nev. 653, 408 P.2d 916 (1965)), counsel fees may be allowed in an *329NRS 125.180 proceeding whether the judgment creditor is in need or not. That statute authorizes “a reasonable attorney’s fee” when an order is made directing the entry of judgment for arrears. The apparent legislative purpose is to permit a court to require the judgment debtor to pay costs and fees, since his failure to honor his judgment obligations caused the NRS 125.180 proceeding to take place.
4. Interest. The parties agree that interest on arrears which accrued between January 1, 1950 and January 1, 1960 amounts to $7,644.17. The lower court refused Frances that additional amount. I agree with Mr. Justice Collins that the doctrines of estoppel, laches, and election do not preclude her claim to interest, but wish to add a comment.
Fairfield does not challenge the principal amount found to be due as arrears for that period. A fortiori, he may not challenge interest absent an understanding between the parties that arrears would not carry interest, or a waiver of interest. Neither appears in this record. The statute directs that interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum upon money from the time it becomes due shall be allowed “upon judgments rendered by a court of this state.” NRS 99.040(3). A judgment directing installment support payments falls within the statute. See also: Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1455.

 NRS 125.180 provides: “1. Where the husband, in an action for divorce, makes default in paying any sum of money as required by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the district court may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of such arrears, together with costs and disbursements not to exceed $10 and a reasonable attorney’s fee.
“2. The application for such order shall be upon such notice to the husband as the court may direct.
“3. The judgment may be enforced by execution or in any other manner provided by law for the collection of money judgments.
“4. The relief herein provided for is in addition to any and every other remedy to which the wife may be entitled under the law.”

 NRS 125.170 provides: “1. In divorce actions, installment judgments for alimony and support of the wife shall not be subject to modification as to accrued installments. Installments not *327accrued at the time a motion for modification is filed shall not be modified unless the court expressly retained jurisdiction for such modification at the final hearing. The provisions of this subsection apply to all such installment judgments whether granted before or after July 1,1961.
“2. The provisions of this section shall not preclude the parties from entering into a stipulation as to accrued installments prior to the time a motion for modification is filed.”