Court Opinion

ID: 9715710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:12:36.311424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.368869
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion concludes that Dina Ashburn became a culpable' wrong-doer when, in March 1993, she and her child moved from California to Oregon. The fact is, however, that Bryan Ashburn left his wife and child in January 1993 and removed to Indiana. Subsequently, by misrepresentation, Bryan obtained the child, presumably for a one-month visit, and returned to Indiana where within two weeks, he thereupon filed the dissolution petition and the request for custody. Bryan admitted that he never intended to return the child to the mother and that he did in fact misrepresent his intentions to Dina.
The child did not live in Indiana with his father for at least six months prior to the filing of the petition. To the contrary, under the circumstances of his removal from Oregon to Indiana, the former state must be considered to have remained the child’s home state under the UCCJA. The Act specifically provides that mere physical presence within a state is not sufficient to confer custody jurisdiction. More importantly it dictates a conclusion that Oregon was the appropriate jurisdiction because it had been the child’s home state within six months prior to the commencement of the proceeding and the child was only absent from Oregon because of his removal by a person claiming custody. I.C. 31-1-11.6-3.
Given the undeniable fact that Oregon was an appropriate forum, if not the appropriate forum, for an initial custody determination, Indiana might be considered to have exercisable jurisdiction only if it fell within *43the purview of the UCCJA. Examination of the' statute shows that this case does not fall within the statute. Although it could be argued that Indiana might exercise jurisdiction in “the best interest of the child” because the child and the father “have a significant connection with” Indiana, the fact remains that the trial court did not make such determination.2 Furthermore, even if it had done so, the “significant connection” test is only applicable when “the ‘home state’ test does hot apply to the facts.” Horlander v. Horlander (1991) Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d 91, 97, trans. denied. Because Oregon was the child’s home state and because Dina remained in Oregon, it would not be appropriate to use the “significant connection” test to justify an Indiana custody determination. Horlander, supra; In re Marriage of Hudson (1982) Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 107.
The majority seems to premise its decision, in large measure, upon the principle that because Indiana had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage it necessarily had jurisdiction to determine custody. I disagree. Neither ease cited by the majority supports the principle. Stambolija v. Stambolija (1994) Ind.App., 643 N.E.2d 5, involved a modification of a custody decree originally entered in an Indiana dissolution with all parties being Indiana residents. The father was granted custody and thereafter moved with the child to Michigan. The court observed that Indiana has continuing jurisdiction to modify a custody order, but that the visitation petition of the grandparents should not have been determined in Indiana because although there was some connection with the child in Indiana, Michigan was the “most appropriate forum”, and that therefore the Indiana trial court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction. In Smith v. Smith (1992) Ind.App., 594 N.E.2d 825, the Indiana parties obtained a 1981 dissolution and an order awarding custody to the mother. She thereafter moved to Florida but the father remained in Indiana. This court held that Indiana had continuing jurisdiction to modify custody. The two cases do not concern an initial custody determination involving an interstate dispute.
Be that as it may, I take issue with the majority’s unsupported statement that when there is a dispute with a court’s custody jurisdiction, failure to attack jurisdiction over the dissolution itself precludes a separate attack upon the custody jurisdiction or bifurcation of the proceedings. Although there may be a degree of inconvenience and/or duplication, given the purposes of the UC-CJA, there is nothing questionable about such a procedure. Horlander v. Horlander, supra, (Sullivan, J., dissenting) 579 N.E.2d at 99; In re Marriage of Cline (1982) Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 51.
Because at the time this proceeding was brought Oregon was the home state of the child, I would reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the custody award.

. The trial court did make several findings which reflected that Dina's residential circumstances were far less stable than those of Bryan; that she had not maintained steady employment although Bryan had done so; and that Dina had a criminal history. Although these factors might well lead to a conclusion that custody by Bryan would be in the best interest of the child, such does not justify the exercise of jurisdiction.