Court Opinion

ID: 9367721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 19:00:42.600097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.909411
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60120         Document: 00516631002             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                 February 1, 2023
                                        No. 21-60120                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   Juana M. Ixcoy Herrera,

                                                                                Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.

                          Petition for Review of an Order of the
                              Board of Immigration Appeals
                                       A209 983 153

   Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Petitioner seeks review of a final order of removal by the Board of
   Immigration Appeals (BIA). She alleges that the BIA and Immigration Judge
   (IJ) improperly shifted the burden of proof onto her and that their
   conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and
   deny her petition for review.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-60120      Document: 00516631002           Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                     No. 21-60120

                                          I.
          Petitioner Juana M. Ixcoy Herrera is a native and citizen of Guatemala
   and member of the Quiche-Mayan ethnic/indigenous group. Members of
   this group have experienced prejudice and violence in that country.
          A native of the municipality of Ixcán, Petitioner obtained a degree and
   a job as a secretary, subsequently enrolling in university seeking a legal
   education. During her employment and studies, Petitioner met and in 2012
   married a Ladino man—a non-indigenous Guatemalan of European or mixed
   descent. Upon her marriage, Petitioner left her studies and moved in with
   her husband and his parents and two sisters. Petitioner’s sisters-in-law
   displayed significant hostility toward Petitioner, directing their vitriol toward
   her on numerous fronts: her ethnicity, her inability to have children, her
   cooking, and their belief that their brother would be better matched with
   either of two other women with whom he had fathered children. In light of
   this conflict, Petitioner pressed her husband to find another living situation,
   and he responded by building them a home of their own a mere ten meters
   away from the family home. In 2015, Petitioner’s husband left Guatemala for
   the United States.
          In 2017, Petitioner was walking outside after work when she saw a man
   whom she recognized as a relative of her sister-in-law’s friend. He was
   staring at Petitioner and speaking on the phone. As she began driving home,
   a masked man riding a motorcycle cornered her vehicle and shot at her
   repeatedly at close range, hitting her hand and multiple places within her car
   before she managed to speed away. Moments later, Petitioner saw her sister-
   in-law standing on the side of the road. Petitioner remains convinced that the
   attempted murder was commissioned by her sister-in-law.
          Petitioner reported the incident to the police but did not tell them that
   she suspected her sister-in-law’s involvement, an omission she attributes to

                                          2
Case: 21-60120      Document: 00516631002           Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                     No. 21-60120

   fear.   The police accompanied Petitioner to the hospital, alerted the
   prosecutor’s office, and conducted an investigation of the crime scene and an
   examination of the vehicle. With very little to inform their investigation, the
   police examined Petitioner’s vehicle, but they do not appear to have
   investigated further and never followed-up or returned her calls.
           Immediately following the incident, Petitioner fled to her parents’
   home located in a rural indigenous community approximately two hours
   away. She hid there for two months, quitting her job and rarely leaving the
   house. When she did venture outside, it was always in the company of her
   father or brother. Petitioner’s sister-in-law knew where she was staying
   following the incident and telephoned Petitioner to offer her sympathy and
   inquire as to the status of the investigation.
           One week after arriving at her parents’ home, she received a phone
   call from an anonymous male caller. He told her “he was going to finish
   [her]” “when [she] least expect[ed] it” and demanded money. Petitioner
   hung up, removed the SIM card, and changed her phone number. She and
   her parents then traveled to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City to seek a
   U.S. visa for her to leave Guatemala. When her visa application was
   denied—and she was informed that she could not reapply for six months—
   the family traveled together by car and by foot to the Mexican border, and
   from there she traveled with her brother to the Texan border, where she
   requested asylum relief.
           At the U.S. border, Petitioner was found to have a credible fear of
   persecution if she returned to Guatemala. In 2018, the IJ granted her asylum
   relief on the basis that she experienced past persecution due to her
   membership in the Quiche-Mayan ethnic/indigenous group.              The BIA
   remanded the case for further consideration of whether the Guatemalan
   government would be unable or unwilling to protect Petitioner from future

                                           3
Case: 21-60120       Document: 00516631002           Page: 4     Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                      No. 21-60120

   persecution and whether it was unreasonable for her to relocate within
   Guatemala.
          On remand, the IJ reiterated that Petitioner had indeed experienced
   past persecution due to her membership in a particular social group. But he
   held that she was ultimately ineligible for asylum relief because she could
   avoid future persecution by relocating internally. He did not reach the BIA’s
   second question of whether the local government could protect her from
   future harm. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s holding and dismissed
   Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned this court for review.
                                           II.
          As a general matter, we “only have authority to review the BIA’s
   decision, although we may also review the IJ’s decision when it has some
   impact on the BIA’s decision, as when the BIA has adopted all or part of the
   IJ’s reasoning.” Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir.
   2010). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). See also Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th
   Cir. 2006) (“Under the substantial evidence standard, reversal is improper
   unless . . . . [t]he applicant . . . show[s] that the evidence is so compelling that
   no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.”) (citation and
   quotations omitted). Whether the BIA and IJ properly applied the burden of
   proof is a question of law reviewed de novo. Mikhael v. I.N.S., 115 F.3d 299,
   305 (5th Cir. 1997).
          To be granted asylum in the United States, “[t]he burden of proof is
   on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C.
   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The definition of “refugee” includes “any person who is
   outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or
   unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of

                                            4
Case: 21-60120      Document: 00516631002          Page: 5   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                    No. 21-60120

   the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
   of persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular social group.” 8
   U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). “An applicant who has been found to have established
   such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of
   persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
          Nevertheless, “[t]hat presumption may be rebutted,” and “an
   immigration judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, shall deny the
   asylum application of an alien found to be a refugee on the basis of past
   persecution if [the IJ] f[inds] by a preponderance of the evidence” that “[t]he
   applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the
   applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all the circumstances, it
   would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Id. “In cases in which
   an applicant has demonstrated past persecution,” the government “shall
   bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the
   requirements of” internal relocation. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
          For purposes of determining the reasonableness of internal relocation,
   “adjudicators should consider the totality of the relevant circumstances
   regarding an applicant’s prospects for relocation, including the size of the
   country of nationality or last habitual residence, the geographic locus of the
   alleged persecution, the size, numerosity, and reach of the alleged
   persecutor, and the applicant’s demonstrated ability to relocate to the United
   States in order to apply for asylum.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).
                                        III.
          Petitioner challenges the decision on two grounds. First, she alleges
   that the BIA and IJ improperly placed the burden of proof on her, rather than
   on the government. Second, she asserts that their decision was not supported
   by substantial evidence. Neither is persuasive.

                                         5
Case: 21-60120     Document: 00516631002           Page: 6   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                    No. 21-60120

          Petitioner claims that the IJ improperly placed the burden of proof on
   her, rather than the government, by pointing out how she was unable to
   demonstrate that internal relocation was not feasible. She cites decisions of
   our sister circuits holding that the burden of proof was improperly shifted by
   asking an asylum applicant to prove a negative. See Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959
   F.3d 778, 796 (6th Cir. 2020); Ortez-Cruz v. Barr, 951 F.3d 190, 201 (4th Cir.
   2020); Qui Rong Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 195 F. App’x 16, 18 (2nd Cir.
   2006); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Bace v.
   Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 2003), as modified on denial of
   reh’g (Apr. 9, 2004).
          But that’s not what happened here. The IJ in this case specifically
   concluded that the government had “met its burden to show that internal
   relocation is reasonable for the respondent and has rebutted the presumption
   that internal relocation is not reasonable.” And for good reason. The IJ
   found that, according to Petitioner’s own testimony, (1) Petitioner moved
   just two hours away from where she was attacked; (2) Petitioner stayed there
   for sixty days without harm to her person; (3) during that time, the purported
   orchestrator of the attack knew where Petitioner was; and (4) Petitioner even
   continued to speak on the telephone with the purported orchestrator.
          We have held before that the government can meet its burden by
   relying on an applicant’s testimony alone. See Singh v. Barr, 920 F.3d 255,
   260 (5th Cir. 2019) (establishing that “the argument that the [government]
   must affirmatively submit its own documentary evidence or summon its own
   witnesses is belied by the text of the regulation, which simply requires the
   [government] to rebut the presumption by the preponderance of the
   evidence, not by its evidence”). Moreover, the IJ here relied not only on
   Petitioner’s own statements, but also on reports and other evidence
   submitted by the government.

                                         6
Case: 21-60120     Document: 00516631002          Page: 7   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                   No. 21-60120

          In sum, the IJ considered “the totality of the relevant circumstances
   regarding [Petitioner’s] prospects for relocation,” as is required under 8
   C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(3). Petitioner is wrong to suggest that the conclusions of
   the IJ and the BIA were not supported by substantial evidence such that “any
   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
                                       ***
          For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.

                                         7