Court Opinion

ID: 9514449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:33.358946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:17.563209
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 28.] I concur in result but write specially to disavow the majority’s application of the improper, extra-statutory protections of the implied consent law (SDCL 32-23-10) to a charge of vehicular homicide.
[¶ 29.] By its own terms, the implied consent law specifically exempts felony conduct from the statutory protections. SDCL 32-23-10(1). A driver arrested for a felony DUI violation is not entitled to refuse law enforcement’s request for a blood sample. Id.7 The right to refuse is reserved for misdemeanor offenses. See SDCL 32-23-2 and -3. The majority, however, contends that the statutory protections provided by the implied consent statute are also available to a driver arrested for vehicular homicide, a felony.8 Such a strained interpretation creates an absurd result. It results in the denial of the right to refuse a request for a blood sample to a driver who has committed a third offense DUI (Class 6 felony) without injury to persons or property, but at the same time *126affords a driver arrested for vehicular homicide (Class 4 felony), which has resulted in the death of another human being, all the protections and benefits of the implied consent statute. See State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131, 138 (S.D.1977) (Porter, J., concurring specially).
[¶ 30.] The legislature surely did not intend to extend the statutory protections of the implied consent law to a felony more severe than those specifically exempted from the statute. See State v. Washington, 537 N.W.2d 380, 382 (S.D.1995) (quoting “[I]n construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” (citation omitted)). A plain, commonsense reading of the implied consent law reveals that SDCL 32-23-10 applies only to misdemeanor driving under the influence offenses, not felonies. See Delano v. Petteys, 520 N.W.2d 606, 608 (S.D.1994) (noting statutes are to be accorded their plain meaning and effect).
[¶ 31.] The implied consent statute, found in SDCL ch 32-23, applies to the offense of driving under the influence. Vehicular homicide is defined and governed by SDCL ch 22-16. When the legislature intended Chapter 32-23 to apply to a crime other than driving under the influence, it expressly included the crime in the statutory language. See SDCL 32-23-7 (expressly including SDCL 22-16-41 (vehicular homicide) in statute listing presumptions for intoxication). The implied consent statute does not reference any crime other than driving under the influence.9 This omission by the legislature evidences its clear intent to apply the statutory rights of the implied consent law only to driving under the influence offenses, not vehicular homicide.
[¶ 32.] The proper analysis for reviewing challenges to law enforcement’s obtaining a blood sample from a driver charged with a vehicular felony is under the well-established factors set forth in Sehmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919-20 (1966). Under these factors, law enforcement may require a blood sample so long as the sample is taken (1) incident to a lawful arrest, (2) by a reliable and accepted method for obtaining such a sample, (3) in a reasonable, medically approved manner, and (4) where there is probable cause to believe the evidence sought exists. Id. Blood samples collected pursuant to these factors are not subject to the exclusionary rule. Id.
[¶ 33.] In this case, the blood draw from Nyugen was requested by law enforcement pursuant to a lawful arrest; drawn by a hospital nurse in a medically appropriate manner; and with the knowledge that a death resulted from the collision, the defendant’s breath and person smelled of alcohol at the scene, and alcohol was found in the defendant’s vehicle. The Sehmerber factors were met. Based on law enforcement’s compliance with the constitutional requirements, the blood sample was not subject to the exclusionary rule and was properly admitted into evidence.

. A third-offense DUI conviction is a Class 6 felony. SDCL 32-23-4. A subsequent offense is a Class 5 felony. SDCL 32-23-4.6.

. Vehicular homicide is a Class 4 felony. SDCL 22-16-41.

. Legislative history supports the interpretation that the legislature did not intend the implied consent statute to apply to vehicular homicide. The implied consent statute was established in 1959. 1959 SDSessL ch 264, § 1. The vehicular homicide statute was not enacted until 1983. 1983 SDSessL ch 176, § 1. "[W]e must assume that the legislature, in enacting a provision, had in mind previously enacted statutes relating to the same subject.” Meyerink v. Northwestern Public Seivice Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 184 (S.D.1986). When the legislature enacted the implied consent statute, it could not have contemplated its application to a statute not yet in existence. However, when the legislature enacted the vehicular homicide statute, it was aware of SDCL 32-23-10 and chose to not apply it to vehicular homicide.