Court Opinion

ID: 9528838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:37.055861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:23.272480
License: Public Domain

MOISE, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I find myself in disagreement with the disposition in the opinion of the majority of cross-appellants’ second point to the effect that § 59-13-2(B),.N.M.S.A.1953, does . not. apply to the unions. ' '. 5 As stated by the majority,'rules of statutory construction, require that statutes are • to be read and given effect as written. Al- ■ so, ’words used in statutes should be given ■their ordinary and usual meaning unless something different is clearly intended. ■ After stating the rules, I do not understand ■ the facility with which the majority con- - eludes that the “usual and ordinary” meaning of “persons” includes “labor organizations,” The fact that “person” was held to ■ include “natural and artificial persons, such :’as corporations” in the statute being inter- - preted in State ex rel. Northwestern Colonization & Improvement Co. of Chihuahua v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168 P. 528, 1 A.L.R. 170, is to my mind extremely feeble and .shaky support for the conclusion here an- ^ nounced. . . “ When § 59-13-2(B), N.M.S.A.1953, which makes it unlawful for “any person individually or in concert with others” to do certain acts, is read with § 59-13-2(A), N.M.S.A.1953, which makes unlawful certain acts' of “labor organizations or- its rep-ares entatiy.es,” and with § 59-13-2(D), N.MS.A.1953, which refers to “person or. per- : sons,” it.seems amply clear to me that the legislature did not intend to include “labor ,. organizations” within the term “person.” v ¡I£-¡iti;fiad intended to do so, .how simple • 5it -should 'have been to have made § 59-13-?.’'2(>R-M'sup’’rá; íéa'd: “It shall be unlawful in connection with any labor-,disputé for any labor organization or its representative or for any person individually or in concert .with others to hinder * * *.” Having . failed to do so under the circumstances here present, it is quite evident that “labor organizations” were purposely omitted from § 59-13-2(B), supra. The omission was not through oversight or inadvertence. Neither ■ was it because they were intended to be included under the general term “person.” Oft-repeated rules of statutory construction dictate a. result contrary to that announced by the majority. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §§ 4907 to 4911, inclusive; 50 Am.Jur. 261, Statutes, § 274; Sandack v. Tamme (C.A. 10), 182 F.2d 759; and a particularly lucid statement and application of the rule in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, 786. This court has also recognized and applied the rule. See Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 402, 405 P.2d 405; Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 269, 365 P.2d 912; State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 270, 317 P.2d 317. I agree with, the treatment and, disposition of the appeal and cross-appeal, except as set forth above. I would reverse the trial court except as to its ruling that the claim ■ against the unions based upon alleged violation by them of § 59-13-2(B), N.M-S-A-1953, and as to that, the dismissal should fog affirmed.'- -I respectfully dissent from the-opinion- of-the court insofar :as it :reverses the trial court on this.point.. ■