Court Opinion

ID: 9527980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:58.959648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:20.958304
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring.
I join the court’s opinion. I write separately to make clear that the court today affirms an exercise of trial court discretion to admit Dr. Bays’ testimony that her “diagnosis was that [child] had been sexually abused.” Defendant objected on the ground that that would be a comment on the child’s credibility. The court correctly addresses only that issue'.
Oregon authority on the issue is limited. For example, in State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427, 436 n 8, 657 P2d 1215 (1983), the court said:
“Testimony concerning ‘rape trauma syndrome,’ a syndrome well described in the dissent in Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa 15, 428 A2d 126, 138-143 (1981), was admitted in State v. Marks, 231 Kan 645, 647 P2d 1292 (1982), when the issue in a rape trial was consent. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Saldana, 324 NW2d 227 (Minn 1982) and State v. McGee, 324 NW2d 232 (Minn 1982), reversed convictions for rape where the issue was consent, because of improperly admitted testimony concerning ‘rape trauma syndrome.’ In these cases, the expert described the syndrome, testified whether the witness fit the description of the typical victim, and gave an opinion that the victim had actually been raped. The court noted that this type of testimony could be admissible in an ‘unusual’ case. The court said that a sexual assault on a child or mentally retarded victim would be examples of such unusual cases. State v. Saldana, supra, 324 NW2d at 231.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*472That comment and the court’s general observation that “there is no bright line separating issues within the comprehension of the jurors from those that are not,” 294 Or at 437, provide at least oblique support for the court’s ruling here. The issue was raised again in State v. Keller, 315 Or 273, 844 P2d 195 (1993), but was not resolved.1
According to one commentator, the issue of the admissibility of an expert’s diagnosis that a child has been. sexually abused, has evenly divided the courts that have addressed it. McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 Or L Rev 19, 42 (1987) (hereinafter cited as McCord). The difficulty of the issue is more pronounced where, as here, the record lacks physical evidence of abuse. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P2d 388, 399-403 (Utah 1989) (collecting cases and other authorities).
Courts should not discriminate against valid psychological evidence because the field of study is of recent origin. Expert evidence of a child’s emotional condition involves an assessment of subjective symptoms that is not unlike medical opinion testimony about the presence of soft tissue injuries that courts admit routinely. On the other hand, the tests for admission of scientific evidence are complex and not easily satisfied. See State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 417 and n 15, 687 P2d 751 (1984); McCord, supra, at 94 (discussing the necessity, reliability, understandability and importance of nontraditional psychological evidence, and how the court should balance those factors). State v. Middleton says:
‘ ‘ [T] he trial court must first find that the witness is indeed an expert and is testifying to a subject that is a proper one for expert testimony. The court must also find the offered testimony is relevant.” 294 Or at 437.
A proper foundation for testimony confirming a diagnosis of child abuse is essential because the evidence goes to the heart of the issue that the jury must decide. Our opinion *473confirms that the admissibility of that evidence is committed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial court, and does not attempt to influence the exercise of discretion on that question in future cases. I concur.

 In Keller, the trial court, over the defendant’s objection, allowed Dr. Bays to testify about her child abuse diagnosis, but her answer, according to the Supreme Court, amounted “to testimony that the child was credible.” 315 Or at 285. The court was not called upon to address other aspects of the defendant’s objection, such as lack of foundation. See State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 687 P2d 751 (1984).