Court Opinion

ID: 9569486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:16.923491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:00:38.043870
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—In State v. White, 60 Wn. (2d) 551, 374 P. (2d) 942, I agreed with the dissenting views expressed by Hunter, J. Subsequently, in the matter of In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn. (2d) 15, 390 P. (2d) 535, an application for habeas corpus, I dissented along with two other members of the court, and I expressed the view that a new trial should be granted.
The present application for habeas corpus raises substantial criminal due process questions not previously presented or passed upon by this court. The petitioner’s counsel assert that they did not learn of the facts surrounding his interrogation and repeated confessions until April 1, 1964, in spite of thorough investigation before and during trial. Counsel assert that the discovery of these facts was delayed to that date because up to that point the petitioner’s mental condition had prevented full communication on these circumstances.
The state counters these statements with the argument that these defenses were probably waived at trial. However. the state does seem willing to hold a factual hearing *736to determine whether these defenses were discussed and knowingly waived by the petitioner. The applicable law seems clear:
“. . . The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464—‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’— furnishes the controlling standard. If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits—though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant’s default. Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 291. At all events we wish it clearly understood that the standard here put forth depends on the considered choice of the petitioner. Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-517; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 162-165. A choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief. . . .” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 439, 9 L. Ed. (2d) 837 (1963).
While Noia was directed to the federal district courts, its summation of waiver principles applies with equal force in the state courts.
The concurring opinion herein by Hale, J., in effect assumes that these questions have been or would be resolved against the petitioner, and that ultimately it may be said that he waived the right to raise these questions in view of the theory of the defense and the manner in which the defense was conducted in the trial court. This is to me unacceptable. I believe that we are faced with a new issue, i.e., whether there was “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” which has been newly discovered by conscientious counsel. These issues should not now be glossed over or resolved categorically against the petitioner, or simply left to review and determination in the federal courts. The questions raised by peti*737tioner are properly before us by reason of the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and I believe this court should now evaluate and pass upon the questions raised. I refer to the questions raised in paragraphs VI and VII of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which read as follows:
“VI. Petitioner was denied due process of law and the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in the following particulars, to-wit:
“1. Petitioner was arrested by the police on December 28, 1959, and there held in custody without advice or aid of counsel, or any other competent advice, until counsel was appointed for him on January 8, 1960.
“2. Petitioner, following arrest, was not taken before a magistrate as required by RCW 10.16.010.
“3. Prior to and during the time of confinement of your petitioner he was afflicted with a disease of mind, magnified by alcohol and drug, which weakened and diluted his resistance to the suggestions and questioning of the police to the extent that he was incapable, because of his physical and mental condition to intelligently and competently give any statement or confession that was voluntary or trustworthy.
“4. Petitioner was held in police custody, and questioned over a period of eleven days before he was provided with counsel; and because of his weakened mental and physical condition during such custody, without counsel, and without having had a hearing before a magistrate, the entire circumstance of the police procedure was intimidating and coercive.
“5. Because of the above and foregoing, all of the statements and purported confessions of petitioner while in custody, particularly statements made on December 28, 1959, and on January 6, 1960, which were admitted in evidence at trial, were involuntary and untrustworthy and therefore inadmissible.
“VII. Petitioner was denied due process and the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because he was not provided counsel when needed, and because his physical and mental condition was so debilitated and diseased that he could not intelligently or competently waive the right to counsel, about which he was not informed and which the record discloses, he knew nothing about. The admissions and confessions of peti*738tioner, made without advice of counsel, and introduced at trial, violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.
“1. The record discloses that petitioner was at no time advised that he did not have to give a statement, or to submit to interrogation, and there are no facts from which any inference can be drawn that petitioner knew or understood that he had a right to remain silent.”
I cannot agree with the views of the majority herein, as expressed by Donworth, J., that exclusive jurisdiction has been vested in the United States Court for the Western District of Washington because of the filing therein of petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus on March 25, 1964. It may well be, as Donworth, J., points out, that, under the authority of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, et seq., and pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the United States District Court in the final analysis may disagree with and in effect void any or all determinations reached by the Washington State Supreme Court respecting the questions raised in the petition presently on file in this court. However, it is my belief (a) that our jurisdiction is at least a concurrent one with that of the United States District Court in the present instance; (b) that as a state court of last resort we have a responsibility, indeed a duty, to function on the petition now filed in this court; and (c) that such judicial responsibility and duty is not met by passing the matter to the United States District Court for any reason I can think of or for the reasons stated by the majority and the dissenting opinions.
Apropos of the foregoing, it seems to me we should first consider and pass upon the question of whether there has been an effective waiver of the petitioner’s due process rights now claimed in the present petition before this court. Our action as to an order of reference to the trial court could abide the foregoing determination. However, it seems to me that the taking of evidence relative to the claims asserted by petitioner may not only be desirable but vitally necessary for any appropriate judicial evaluation and disposition of the new matters or issues raised in the petition for habeas corpus filed here in relation to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington *739in such matters. To avoid further delay, to afford an appropriate, fair and just consideration and disposition of this petition, to meet and comply with our responsibility as a state court of last resort without deferring and passing this responsibility to the United States District Court, I would strongly favor the issuance forthwith of an order of reference for a prompt and full evidentiary hearing in the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for King County. In my best judgment, it is only in this way that we can have before us an appropriate record for a disposition of the present petition, either for or against the petitioner. On the basis indicated and for the reasons set out, I must dissent as strongly as I know how.
Hunter, J., concurs with Finley, J.