Court Opinion

ID: 9633842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:03:12.099774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:43.438522
License: Public Domain

PHELPS, Justice
(specially concurring in result).
I concur in the end result reached by the majority but do not agree that section 56-1310, 1954 Supp. A.C.A. 1939 (A.R.S. section 23-1322) is unconstitutional, nor that the right to picket is guaranteed under the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. I agree that it is universally conceded that state courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in its interpretations of the Federal Constitution and the amendments thereto. However, when that Court gives to its language an interpretation in itself unconstitutional, and designed to expand the powers of the Federal Government to include control over special groups in the various states of the union, by a process of pure sophistry, as a member of this Court, I shall protest such invasion whenever the occasion arises.
In the case of Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, the court held a statute of that state to be unconstitutional upon the ground that it violated the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The statute reads as follows:
“Loitering or picketing forbidden — ■ Any person or persons, who, without a just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any other person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose, or with intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing herein shall prevent any person from solicit*398ing trade or business for a competitive business.” Code Ala.1923, § 3448.
The court stated, and properly so, that the word “liberty” encompasses “freedom of speech” guaranteed under the 1st Amendment to the Constitution.
In reaching the conclusion that the Alabama statute was unconstitutional, the court misinterpreted a quoted excerpt from the opinion of Justice Brandeis in the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, at page 478, 57 S.Ct. 857, at page 862, 81 L.Ed. 1229, which reads as follows:
“ * * * Members ■ of a union might; without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”
It will be observed that Justice Brandéis didn’t say in the Senn case that picketing was justified under the “freedom of speech” clause of the 1st Amendment to the Federal Constitution. He merely stated that members of a union could make known the facts of a labor dispute as a matter of free speech as guaranteed under the Constitution. He did not pretend to say how this information was to be communicated to come within the free speech clause. It is pretty generally conceded now that the statement of Justice Brandéis above quoted, is pure dictum, yet, it forms the basis in the Thornhill case which Justice Murphy used as a grapevine swing to reach the conclusion that, the right to peacefully picket for a lawful purpose is guaranteed under the “freedom of speech” clause of the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The conclusion reached by the court has nothing more solid as a foundation upon which to rest than the mere assertion of the court (without precedent), and is wholly without logic to support it. It is the result of a philosophy alien to the atmosphere encompassing the deliberations of the constitutional convention and the legal concepts upon which this government is founded. It is a philosophy designed to invest the central government at Washington with authority to control, in minute detail, the acts and conduct of the citizens of the sovereign states of the union, both as, individuals and as groups, concerning matters which had heretofore been considered as of local concern. It seeks to delete the 10th Amendment from the Constitution providing that: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
It is a philosophy based upon the assumption that it (The United States Supreme Court) is vested with both the legislative and policy making power of the states of the union and of the nation, which has heretofore been considered to be the func*399tion of the legislatures of the sovereign states, and of the Congress of the United States. It recognizes no limitations upon its own power. It distinguishes between twiddlededee and twiddlededum in determining what constitutes “advocating the overthrow of this Government” by its enemies. It asumes to it self, under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, the power to pass upon the character and moral qualifications of lawyers seeking admission to practice law in a sovereign state of the union, and to order that they be permitted to take the bar examination, thereby setting aside the mandate of the highest court of that state declaring the applicant morally unfit to become a member of that honorable profession. This was contrary to the holding in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 60 U.S. 9, 15 L.Ed. 565, an excerpt of which was quoted in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379, 71 U.S. 333, 366, 18 L.Ed. 366, cited by Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the court.
It has assumed to deny an American citizen the legal power to dispose of his own property by will in the manner he desired, even though recognized as valid for over a hundred years. It has assumed to dictate the business policy of a street railway system in a southern city wholly unrelated to interstate commerce, and to control the administration of public schools in southern states. It is a philosophy I shall never sanction by the approval of any portion of it.
Although the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution has been by some strange alchemic process of transmutation, transformed by that court into a ninety per cent rubber content, it appears to not have had sufficient elasticity to encompass the picket line. And resort is now had to the 1st and 14th Amendments in order to invest the central government with complete control, not only over all legitimate labor disputes between employer and employee but, it now has firmly established the picket line on the very threshold of the employer’s business. It has vested it with the constitutional right to maintain such line under the guise of “freedom of speech” where neither a labor dispute nor the relation of employer and employee exists, even though its result is to damage or destroy the owners’ business. See A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855.
As was said by Chief Justice Qua in Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12, 14, 2 A.L.R.2d 1190:
“If picketing is speech it is certainly also much more. However peacefully it may be carried on, it possesses elements of compulsion upon the person picketed which bear little relation to the communication to any one of information or of ideas. And resort is *400commonly had to it precisely because of these elements, which, much more than any force of argument contained in it, give it the power it possesses. * * * ”
Professor Charles O. Gregory of the University of Virginia, who is reputed to be a most eminent authority on labor law, denies that the right to picket is guaranteed under the “freedom of speech” clause and, states that it is a method of coercion used by unions to obtain some economic advantage, and Mr. Ludwig Teller in an article in Vol. 56, Harvard Law Review, p. 180 et seq., takes the view that instead of picketing being a form of “free speech” it is a form of economic pressure. He asserts that it does not invoke discussion but, is rather a physical activity more in the nature of a parade which the United States Supreme Court had held in Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049, could be prohibited by statute, and declared a statute in New Hampshire to be valid which prohibited unlicensed parades and processions in that state.
That the establishment of a picket line, although peaceful, is far more coercive than persuasive there can be no doubt. It is a means of intimidation and carries with it the implication of a reserved force available for use if deemed necessary by the union. No one likes to cross a picket line who believes in the right of labor to bargain collectively, and • to strike where there exists a labor dispute between the employer and employee as to conditions of employment under which employees are required to work, or as to the adequacy of the wages paid, etc. The belief is practically universal that labor does and should enjoy these rights under such circumstances, and to maintain a picket line to enforce such rights.
I heartily subscribe to this view but, I do not subscribe to the doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court that such right is guaranteed under the “freedom of speech” clause in the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Very frequently but little information is disseminated by the placards displayed. In many instances there is nothing communicated upon which a sound judgment as to the merits of the controversy can be based, or even the nature of the controversy or what relation, if any, exists between the picketers and the picketed. Placards displayed state only conclusions. The very nature of the picket line makes it impractical and impossible to apprise the public of the facts.
Where the relation of employer and employee does not exist and no labor dispute is present, it is my view that the right to picket under such circumstances, should be left to the wisdom of the various states of the union to provide, through legislative enactment, standards by which its lawfulness can be determined. In any event, *401it cannot logically be held to be a violation of the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution. To so hold gives the Federal Government, by judicial legislation, the exclusive power to control matters that are and should be of purely local concern. It simply constitutes another of the many encroachments by the Supreme Court upon the sovereign rights of the states.
The coercion or implied force of the picket line in its impact upon the citizenry of the area overshadows any thought that picketing manifests in any considerable degree, the element of “freedom of speech” as used in the 1st and 14th Amendments. This is now so considered to be true even by the Supreme Court itself.
Since the Thornhill and Swing cases, supra, Justice Douglas, speaking for himself and Justices Black and Murphy, said in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local, etc. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 819, 86 L.Ed. 1178, that “ * * * picketing might have a coercive effect. * * * ” and that
“Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. * * * ”
And in the case of Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, etc. v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143, wherein Ritter operated a cafe fully unionized, engaged a contractor employing nonunion labor to build a residence for him about one mile distant from his restaurant. The carpenters threw a picket line around his restaurant. The Supreme Court of Texas enjoined the picketing upon the ground that it violated a Texas antitrust statute. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Texas Supreme Court, holding that the state of Texas had the right to confine picketing to the area directly related to the dispute. It appears to me that if the right to picket is guaranteed under the “freedom of speech” clause there is no sound reason for confining it to the area where the nonunion labor is being employed and denying it at the restaurant of Ritter, where the speech would be far more articulate than in the area where Ritter is building a house with nonunion labor. The court’s decision in the Ritter case appears to me to be contradictory to the doctrine laid down in the Swing case which held unconstitutional an injunction against peaceful picketing, based upon a state’s common law policy prohibiting picketing when there was no immediate dispute between employer and employees.
In the case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695, A. F. L. v. Vogt, Inc., 77 S.Ct. 1166, 1167 authored by Justice *402Frankfurter, the court passed upon the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute which made it an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others to “coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights * * (Emphasis ours.) The Supreme Court of Wisconsin on rehearing, 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W.2d 749, reversed its former opinion, 270 Wis. 315, 71 N.W.2d 359, and enjoined picketing by union employees who were carrying placards reading: “The men on this job are not 100% affiliated with the A. F. L.” The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was based upon the ground that the picketers were engaged in an unfair labor practice in picketing their employer, in that, they were doing so to coerce the employer to interfere with its employees in their right to join or refuse to join the union. Justice Frankfurter held the statute to be constitutional and affirmed the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in upholding an injunction prohibiting the picketing under such circumstances. He sought desperately to dispel the confusion that has grown out of the Thornhill case by saying in the nature of an apology that: “It is inherent in the concept embodied in the Due Process Clause that its scope be determined by a ‘gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion’. * * * ”
It is now clear that the concept pronounced in the Thornhill case was half-baked when it' was introduced into the body of the law of the nation, and in its present condition cannot even be said to have any definitive limits or contents. It is certainly not sufficiently plain to enable those skilled in the law to understand it or to define it so others can understand it.
Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black concurred, dissented and stated:
“The Court has now come full circle.
In Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093, we struck down a state ban on picketing on the ground that ‘the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area, of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.’ * * *” [77 S.Ct. 1172]
He then proceeded to point out the various cases since decided that had the effect of departure from the Thornhill decision. The court, in one breath, declares picketing to be a form of “Free Speech”, and in the next breath it declares it to be more than “Free Speech”.
It is my view that if picketing cannot be said to be synonymous with “Free Speech” or that it is at least free from the elements of compulsion or implied threat, such con*403cept is unsound and should not be injected into the law. It is vicious in its consequences. If it is not capable of being clearly-defined, either in its content or its limits, it should not be given the dignity of a legal concept by the highest tribunal in the nation, and by it embodied in the law of the land as a rule of conduct for employers and employees.
As I stated in the outset, I cannot agree that section 56-1310, 1954 Supp. A.C.A1939 (A.R.S. section 23-1322), set out haec verba in the majority opinion, is unconstitutional. As I understand the majority opinion, it holds that this section is unconstitutional, for the reason that it violates the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution guaranteeing “freedom of speech” to the citizens of the United States, and that it applies both to minority groups in a union occupying the relation of employer and employees with the business picketed, and also, to total strangers to such business employer.
Under our form of government public officials are selected, and all laws, both state and federal, governing the conduct of citizens in this country, are enacted by maj ority rule. Business conducted by corporations and other groups is controlled by majority rule. In collective bargaining between employer and employees it is the concensus of the majority of employees that determines the primary terms of the contract, and when a strike is called for a violation of such contract or other legitimate reason, it must obtain a majority of its members to call such strike. It is the majority of the members of courts that develops the body of the law of the states and of the nation.
But, the majority rule is ignored under the law now being pronounced by this Court in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States simply because that Court, when it approached the sanctuary of the picket line, required no majority to establish it. In this area of human action a minority may picket the business of an employer although the majority of the employees have no grievance whatever, but, under the established principles of the Union Code of Ethics, I presume the majority cannot, in good conscience, cross the picket line. For example, if 49% of the employees of a business may picket their employer against the wishes of 51% thereof, under the guise of freedom of speech 20% or even 5% of the employees may do so. This philosophy appears to me to be unrealistic in a country committed to majority rule. It is unsound. It is unAmerican.
I was a member of a union. I went out on a strike in an effort to get a higher wage. I, with others, picketed the business of the employer but, there existed the relation of employer and employee between us. There was a labor dispute between us which could not be resolved otherwise. But I cannot subscribe to the view that persons whom an *404employer has never known and with whom the relation of employer and employee has never existed, have the right to picket and perhaps to damage or destroy his business in order to force him to adopt a policy concerning his property rights which he believes to be disadvantageous, both to himself and to his employees, and in many and perhaps most instances his employees are in full accord. Such action cannot be logically justified under the “freedom of speech” clause of the Federal Constitution any more than it would give them the right to slander him by word of mouth, and to damage or destroy his reputation.
It is my view that the sovereign state of Arizona had the right, under the powers reserved to it in the 10th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to enact section 56-1310, supra (now section 23-1322), and that it violates no provision of the Federal Constitution. This Court should so hold.