Court Opinion

ID: 9366668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 18:00:41.346709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.232000
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _______________

                                      No. 21-2481
                                    _______________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                   JOSE MARTINEZ,
                                                        Appellant
                                    _______________

                     On appeal from the United States District Court
                                for the District of Delaware
                               (D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00016-01)
                    Chief District Judge: Honorable Colm F. Connolly
                                     _______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on January 26, 2023

              Before: BIBAS, NYGAARD, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed: January 27, 2023)
                                     _______________

                                       OPINION *
                                    _______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

    Disappointment with a new sentence does not make the sentence unreasonable. Jose

Martinez was originally sentenced to 276 months but later resentenced to 240 months. He

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
had hoped for a bigger reduction, particularly because he had rehabilitated himself in

prison. Yet the District Court weighed the right factors, followed the proper procedures,

and reached a reasonable result. So we will affirm.

                             I. MARTINEZ IS RESENTENCED

   In 2010, Martinez and another man robbed a restaurant and a convenience store at gun-

point. Martinez was charged with two counts each of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to

commit Hobbs Act robbery, and using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence.

In 2013, he reached a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement with federal prosecutors, stipulating

to 216 months’ incarceration. Eight months later, to let Martinez serve a state homicide

sentence at the same time, they revised that agreement to 276 months. The parties carefully

crafted the plea agreement to reach that number: Martinez pleaded guilty to two counts of

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, with concurrent 156-month sentences on each

count. He also pleaded guilty to one count of using a gun in a violent crime, for which he

got a consecutive 120-month sentence. In return, prosecutors dropped the other gun charge.

   Then, in 2019, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319

(2019). Davis invalidated part of the gun-use statute, requiring the District Court to vacate

Martinez’s gun conviction. 139 S. Ct. at 2336. The court vacated his whole sentence and

resentenced him to 240 months, the statutory maximum for all his remaining convictions.

On appeal, Martinez challenges his new sentence’s reasonableness and the District Court’s

refusal to seal sentencing documents. Both claims fail.

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   II. THE NEW SENTENCE IS PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY REASONABLE

   Martinez’s chief claim is that the District Court erred by starting its sentencing with the

old plea agreement (276 months) rather than the new Guidelines range (92–115 months).

Because he never objected to the sentence’s procedural reasonableness, we review for plain

error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).

   The District Court made no procedural error, let alone a plain one. Contrary to Mar-

tinez’s claim, the court carefully started with the Guidelines range and varied upward from

there. E.g., App. 143 (“I want to start the sentencing process or the determination, calcula-

tion from the guidelines, because that’s what the law said we should do, and we’ve got an

agreement that under the guidelines, the defendant is looking at a range of 92 to

115 months.”), 164–65 (“The guidelines call for a range of 92 to 115 months. I do think

grounds would exist, or do exist, I should say, to vary upward.”). Martinez likewise argues

that the District Court “failed to do any calculation of whether any level of an upward

variance was appropriate.” Appellant’s Br. 21. Again, he is mistaken. The court weighed

the appropriate variance at length, considering all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. So its

sentence was procedurally sound.

   Substantively, Martinez argues that no reasonable court could have sentenced him to

twenty years considering his impressive rehabilitation. We review the sentence’s substan-

tive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d

Cir. 2009) (en banc).

   The District Court acted well within its discretion. The court considered Martinez’s

rehabilitation and many other factors carefully. It noted how impressed it was with his steps

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to improve himself. Yet it weighed this against his high statistical risk of recidivism. The

court also gave proper weight to the parties’ stipulated sentence, which they reached after

complex bargaining. Under the sentencing-package doctrine, the court could take that sen-

tence into account. See United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 121–23 (3d Cir. 1997). Fi-

nally, the court noted that Martinez was lucky: He was eligible for resentencing only be-

cause the government had agreed to let him plead to conspiracy (rather than to substantive

robbery, to which Davis would not apply). And because he was resentenced, the new stat-

utory maximum lopped years off his sentence. In sum, the District Court reached a sub-

stantively reasonable sentence that carefully balanced the original sentencing package

against his new situation.

 III. THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED MARTINEZ’S MOTION TO SEAL

   Martinez also argues that the District Court violated due process when it denied his

motion to seal sentencing documents. We review for abuse of discretion. In re Cendant

Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2001). Court records are presumptively open to the

public, and the party who seeks to seal them bears the burden of overcoming that “strong

presumption.” Id. at 193–94. Yet Martinez’s motion gave no specific reasons to seal, sug-

gested no alternatives, offered no supporting facts, and cited no law. And “specificity is

essential. Broad allegations of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning,

are insufficient.” Id. at 194. So the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

such a cursory motion.

                                             4
                                         *****

   We commend Martinez for the remarkable steps that he has taken in prison to better

himself. But resentencing courts can and must consider other factors too. Because the Dis-

trict Court followed the right procedure and reached a reasonable sentence, we will affirm.

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