Court Opinion

ID: 9383807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 13:00:39.538944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.998400
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10162    Document: 32-1      Date Filed: 03/31/2023    Page: 1 of 14

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10162
                           ____________________

        VANESSA SUTTON,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80646-DMM
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10162

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and
        MIZELLE,* District Judge.
        MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
               Vanessa Sutton slipped in a Wal-Mart, fell to the ground, and
        injured her back and shoulder. While lying on the floor, she saw
        the culprit: a squished grape, accompanied by juice, a track mark,
        and footprints. No witnesses saw the grape before her fall, and a
        video in the record does not offer a clear picture of when the grape
        might have landed there. Sutton sued Wal-Mart Stores East, LP,
        for her injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in
        Wal-Mart’s favor, determining that there was no genuine dispute
        of material fact that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive
        knowledge of the grape before the accident, as required by Florida
        law. After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold
        that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about Wal-Mart’s
        constructive knowledge. We therefore reverse and remand for
        proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                           I.
              On August 23, 2018, Vanessa Sutton was shopping at a Wal-
        Mart in West Palm Beach, when she slipped on a grape and fell
        onto her back and left side. A nearby employee, Judith Roberts,
        helped her get up, but Sutton told Roberts that she felt dizzy.

        * Honorable Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, United States District Judge for the
        Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10162                Opinion of the Court                         3

        Sutton then filled out a Customer Incident Report, and later went
        to Palm Beach Gardens Hospital, where she received treatment.
                Roberts had walked through and inspected the produce sec-
        tion by the grapes twice before the fall: once around an hour be-
        fore, and again around thirty minutes before. She did not see a
        grape either time. Another employee, Dunois Orilus, walked
        through the produce section around ten minutes before the acci-
        dent, and he didn’t see anything either. A two-hour video pulled
        from Wal-Mart’s surveillance cameras confirms that these employ-
        ees walked by at those times, but, otherwise, it does not conclu-
        sively establish much. The ground where the grape was located
        isn’t visible, and nobody who walked by during the recording ob-
        viously knocked over or dropped a grape.
                For her part, Sutton testified that she slipped on one
        squished grape, which she first saw “[w]hen [she] was on the floor.”
        From the floor, Sutton “could see that grape . . . and juice,” and she
        saw that “the grape was dirty.” She also noticed one track mark
        “[a] few inches” away that “was close enough to it to go through
        it” and “footprints but [she] didn’t know whose footprints they
        were.” At one point, she said that the footprints “must have been
        [hers], ‘cause [she’s] the one that slipped and fell” and she “[didn’t]
        know who else had went through” the grape.
               Sutton sued Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, for negligence in
        state court. Wal-Mart removed the case to the United States Dis-
        trict Court for the Southern District of Florida based on diversity
        jurisdiction. After discovery, Wal-Mart moved for summary
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10162

        judgment, arguing that Sutton failed to offer sufficient evidence
        that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive knowledge of the grape,
        as required by Florida statute. The district court granted the mo-
        tion. It concluded that Sutton failed to raise a genuine dispute of
        material fact that Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge of the
        grape, and thus she could not succeed on a negligence claim under
        Florida law.
              This timely appeal followed.
                                         II.
               “We review a district court’s decision on summary judg-
        ment de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district
        court, drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
        moving party and recognizing that summary judgment is appropri-
        ate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Smith
        v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017). The only question for
        us to decide is whether the record evidence, when viewed in a light
        most favorable to Sutton, contains a genuine dispute of material
        fact over Wal-Mart’s constructive knowledge of the grape that
        caused her fall.
              This negligence case arose in Florida and arrived in federal
        court by way of diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), so
        we are required to apply Florida’s substantive law, see Erie R.R.
        Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). “Where the Supreme
        Court of Florida has not addressed a particular issue, federal courts
        are then bound by the decisions of the Florida district courts of
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        22-10162                Opinion of the Court                          5

        appeal that address the disputed issue, unless there is an indication
        that the supreme court would not adhere to the district court’s de-
        cision.” Geary Distrib. Co. v. All Brand Imps., Inc., 931 F.2d 1431,
        1434 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
               Under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish four elements
        to sustain a negligence claim: (1) “the defendant owed a ‘duty, or
        obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the [defendant] to con-
        form to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
        against unreasonable risks’”; (2) “the defendant failed to conform
        to that duty”; (3) there is “‘[a] reasonably close causal connection
        between the [nonconforming] conduct and the resulting injury’ to
        the claimant”; and (4) “some actual harm.” Williams v. Davis, 974
        So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2007) (alterations in original) (citation omit-
        ted). Additionally, under Florida statutory law,
               [i]f a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign sub-
               stance in a business establishment, the injured person
               must prove that the business establishment had actual
               or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condi-
               tion and should have taken action to remedy it. Con-
               structive knowledge may be proven by circumstantial
               evidence showing that:
                      (a) The dangerous condition existed for such a
                      length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary
                      care, the business establishment should have
                      known of the condition; or
                      (b) The condition occurred with regularity and
                      was therefore foreseeable.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10162

        Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1); see also Lago v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
        233 So. 3d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[I]n Florida Statutes sec-
        tion 768.0755 the legislature modified a business’s duties when its
        invitees are injured by ‘transitory foreign substances.’”). We need
        only consider the first form of proof -- evidence of the length of
        time that the dangerous condition existed -- to resolve this case.
               “When considering whether there is an issue of fact for sub-
        mission to a jury in transitory foreign substance cases, courts look
        to the length of time the condition existed before the accident oc-
        curred.” Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1275
        (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Florida’s courts have found “at least fifteen to
        twenty minutes . . . to be sufficient for defendants to be charged
        with knowledge of the condition and a reasonable time in which to
        correct it.” Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862, 864
        (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); 1 accord Lynch v. Target Stores, Div. of Dayton
        Hudson Corp., 790 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (per cu-
        riam). Other decisions in Florida have determined that thirteen

        1 Although the statute codifying the actual or constructive knowledge require-
        ment was enacted in 2010, Florida’s courts have long recognized the require-
        ment at common law. See Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d
        315, 320 (Fla. 2001). In 2002, the Florida legislature revoked that knowledge
        requirement in Florida Statute § 768.0710, but in 2010 it reinstated the require-
        ment in Florida Statute § 768.0755. See Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v.
        McGruder, 137 So. 3d 418, 423–26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Florida case law drawn
        from before § 768.0710’s effective date and after § 768.0755’s codification
        guides our analysis.
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        22-10162                Opinion of the Court                         7

        minutes or less is not enough time. See Oliver v. Winn-Dixie
        Stores, Inc., 291 So. 3d 126, 127–30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); see also
        Walker v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 160 So. 3d 909, 912 (Fla. 1st
        DCA 2014) (holding “less than four minutes” to be insufficient).
               It is rare, however, that there will be direct evidence of how
        long a substance was on the ground, and “the mere presence” of
        the substance “is not enough to establish constructive notice.” Del-
        gado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).
        So, in the absence of direct evidence, Florida law requires that the
        plaintiff introduce circumstantial evidence of “additional facts”
        showing that that the substance had been on the ground for an ex-
        tended period before the slip-and-fall to survive summary judg-
        ment. Id. Here, two pieces of circumstantial evidence -- when
        considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party -- cre-
        ate a genuine dispute over the length of time that the grape was on
        the floor before Sutton fell.
                First, and primarily, Sutton’s own testimony created a jury
        issue on constructive notice. Sutton did not see the grape before
        she fell. After the fall, however, she testified that she saw a “dirty”
        grape with “track marks going through the grape and liquids,” as
        well as “footprints.” Time and again, Florida’s appellate “courts
        have found constructive notice” when “the offending liquid was
        dirty, scuffed, or had grocery-cart track marks running through it,”
        or if there was “[o]ther evidence such as ‘footprints, prior track
        marks, changes in consistency, [or] drying of the liquid.’” Norman
        v. DCI Biologicals Dunedin, LLC, 301 So. 3d 425, 429–30 (Fla. 2d
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10162

        DCA 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting Palavicini v.
        Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 787 F. App’x 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (per curiam)); see also Welch v. CHLN, Inc., --- So. 3d ----,
        No. 5D22-357, 2023 WL 2542275, at *2–3 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 17,
        2023); Mashni v. Lasalle Partners Mgmt. Ltd., 842 So. 2d 1035,
        1037–38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Cisneros v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
        754 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Colon v. Outback Steak-
        house of Fla., Inc., 721 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Woods
        v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 711–12 (Fla. 3d DCA
        1993) (per curiam); Zayre Corp. v. Bryant, 528 So. 2d 516, 516 (Fla.
        3d DCA 1988) (per curiam); Camina v. Parliament Ins. Co., 417 So.
        2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (per curiam); Winn-Dixie Stores,
        Inc. v. Guenther, 395 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
                In sharp contrast, when there is “nothing about the descrip-
        tion of the substance that would indicate the length of time it was
        on the floor, courts have precluded the jury from deciding the issue
        of negligence.” Owens, 802 So. 2d at 321–22; see also De Los An-
        geles v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 326 So. 3d 811, 812 (Fla. 3d DCA
        2021); Lago, 233 So. 3d at 1251–52; Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps.
        of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Delgado, 65 So. 3d
        at 1090; Silver Springs Moose Lodge No. 1199 v. Orman, 631 So. 2d
        1119, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 592
        So. 2d 705, 705–07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Wilson v. Winn-Dixie
        Stores, Inc., 559 So. 2d 263, 263–64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990);� Winn-Dixie
        Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214–15 (Fla. 5th DCA
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        22-10162               Opinion of the Court                        9

        1989); Broz v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 546 So. 2d 83, 83 (Fla. 3d
        DCA 1989) (per curiam).
                The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Welch offers
        the most recent examination of this issue. See 2023 WL 2542275,
        at *1–3. In Welch, the trial court had granted summary judgment
        for the defendant in a slip-and-fall case where the evidence included
        dirty liquid and “footprints in the puddle that were going in differ-
        ent directions” and that the plaintiff testified, with “certainty,”
        “were not hers.” Id. at *1. The appellate court reversed, empha-
        sizing that “[i]n trying to assess how long a substance has been sit-
        ting on a floor, courts look to several factors, including ‘evidence
        of footprints, prior track marks, changes in consistency, [or] drying
        of the liquid.’” Id. at *2 (second alteration in original) (emphasis
        and citation omitted). It stressed that “footprints are a common
        feature of analogous slip and fall cases that survive summary judg-
        ment because they allow a jury to find that the substance was on
        the ground long enough for the defendant to discover it before the
        plaintiff’s fall.” Id. The court observed that while the “dirty,
        murky, and slimy” liquid was “not enough -- by itself -- to create a
        jury question on constructive knowledge,” the additional testi-
        mony of “footprints in the puddle -- not belonging to” the plaintiff
        “raise[d] a fact question about [the defendant’s] constructive
        knowledge.” Id. As a result, the Fifth District Court of Appeal re-
        versed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for
        trial. Id. at *3.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-10162

               Here, Sutton unambiguously testified that there was a track
        mark and footprints through the grape. Thus, this case falls cleanly
        into the set of Florida cases that require a jury to decide whether
        the substance sat on the floor long enough to establish constructive
        notice. See Woods, 621 So. 2d at 711 (“Testimony of dirt, scuffing,
        or tracks in a substance generates sufficient inferences of construc-
        tive notice.”); Guenther, 395 So. 2d at 246 (“Here, testimony that
        the liquid was dirty and scuffed and had several tracks running
        through it was, in our opinion, adequate to impute constructive
        notice of the hazardous condition to the store manager.”). Unlike
        in Welch, there is no definitive testimony here about whether the
        footprints were made by Sutton or someone else. Although a jury
        might eventually decide that the footprints belonged to Sutton, “an
        equally compelling inference from the dirty appearance of the
        [grape] is that it had gone undetected on the floor for a sufficient
        period of time to place [Wal-Mart] on constructive notice.” Colon,
        721 So. 2d at 771. Additionally, however, Sutton’s testimony is
        clear that she saw a track mark only a few inches away, and that
        also afforded the reasonable inference that the grape had been on
        the ground for a sufficient period of time to establish constructive
        notice. All told, a jury must decide the case.
               Wal-Mart contends, however, that this case has “striking
        similarities” to Oliver, where Florida’s Fourth District Court of Ap-
        peal affirmed an order granting summary judgment for a Winn-
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        22-10162                   Opinion of the Court                                11

        Dixie after a woman slipped and fell on a grape in the store. 2 291
        So. 3d at 127, 130. But, on closer examination, Oliver reinforces
        the principle that a track mark or footprints provide the “additional
        facts” necessary to create a genuine dispute over constructive
        knowledge. See Delgado, 65 So. 3d at 1090.

        2 Wal-Mart also relies on Berbridge v. Sam’s East, Inc., 728 F. App’x 929 (11th
        Cir. 2018) (per curiam), and a slew of federal district court cases, claiming that
        in addition to evidence of a track mark or footprints a plaintiff must offer
        something more to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Unlike the large
        body of Florida case law we have cited, these cases are not binding on this
        Court. Rather, we are obliged to follow Florida’s appellate courts in discern-
        ing Florida law. But, in any event, Wal-Mart misapprehends some of their
        holdings -- which actually support reversal here. In Berbridge, for instance,
        “the fact of a ‘dirty’ liquid substance” without additional evidence was not
        enough to survive summary judgment, but a panel of this Court observed that
        additional “circumstances . . . could support an inference of constructive
        knowledge.” Id. at 933. Likewise, in one district court case, Ayers v. Wal-
        Mart Stores, East, L.P., “[i]t [was] undisputed that the water was clean with no
        footprints, track marks, or smudges,” so there were no additional facts estab-
        lishing constructive notice. No. 15-24663-CIV, 2017 WL 747541, at *1–3 (S.D.
        Fla. Feb. 27, 2017).
                 Three other district court cases cited by Wal-Mart suggest that a plain-
        tiff needs something more than a track mark or footprints to reach a jury. See
        Hernandez v. Sam’s E., Inc., No. 20-CV-61648, 2021 WL 1647887, at *5 (S.D.
        Fla. Apr. 26, 2021); Granela v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 19-cv-23726, 2021
        WL 768271, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2021); Rubiano v. Costco Wholesale
        Corp., No. 15-cv-24291, 2016 WL 7540571, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2016). Again,
        these cases are not binding, and they do not accurately recount Florida law.
        See Woods, 621 So. 2d at 711 (“[T]racks in a substance generate[] [a] sufficient
        inference[] of constructive notice.”).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10162

                In Oliver, the defendant Winn-Dixie presented evidence
        that an employee inspected the area and did not see any grape only
        thirteen minutes before the accident. 291 So. 3d at 127. After the
        fall, the only evidence offered was “a squished grape that ‘appeared
        to have been stepped on’ and ‘a small amount’ of clear liquid in the
        area, with ‘one slip mark’ leading to the grape.” Id. at 128. Nota-
        bly, employees testified “that ‘there were no cart tracks or foot-
        prints in the area’” and that they “did not know how long the grape
        was on the floor or how it got there.” Id. In affirming the entry of
        summary judgment for Winn-Dixie, the court stressed that “[t]here
        was . . . no testimony of wheel tracks through the liquid” and “[i]n
        fact, the testimony showed that no wheel tracks were present.” Id.
        at 129. The remaining body of evidence “hardly establish[ed] that
        the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that in
        the exercise of reasonable care the condition would have been
        known to the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omit-
        ted).
                This case includes the very evidence that was absent from
        Oliver. While Wal-Mart employee Orilus inspected the area
        shortly before the fall and did not see the grape, Sutton rebutted
        this with a proffer about a track mark and footprints. When taken
        in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, this corpus of
        evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See
        Woods, 621 So. 2d at 711.
              In the second place, the video evidence presented also cre-
        ates a material issue of fact in dispute about constructive
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        22-10162               Opinion of the Court                       13

        notice. See Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kemp, 324 So. 3d 14, 16
        (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (per curiam) (noting that a plaintiff “may use
        circumstantial evidence -- like the video evidence here -- to prove
        her case”). The video spans an hour and fifteen minutes before
        Sutton’s fall; and it runs two hours in all. The video never shows
        anyone dropping a grape on the floor. As Wal-Mart admits, “the
        video does not show the alleged condition, how it got on the floor,
        or when.” A reasonable jury could infer from the absence of a clear
        moment when the grape fell to the floor in the video that the grape
        had been on the floor for more than one hour -- far exceeding the
        time required for constructive knowledge. See Williams, 264 So.
        2d at 864.
                Nevertheless, Wal-Mart insists that the affidavits of Roberts
        and Orilus establish not only that they walked by a total of three
        times over the course of an hour (and one time ten minutes) before
        the fall, but that they never saw a grape. That testimony is under-
        mined by the account offered by Sutton and the video itself. So a
        jury must settle the score. Wal-Mart also argues that Sutton did not
        present evidence of where the grape came from, how it landed on
        the floor, or when it got there. All of that is true. But Florida law
        does not demand direct evidence about who or what caused the
        dangerous substance and when exactly it happened. Instead, cir-
        cumstantial evidence that sufficiently establishes the dangerous
        condition was present for a long enough period of time is enough.
        See Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1)(a). Taken in a light most favorable to
        the plaintiff, Sutton offered ample evidence.
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        14                   Opinion of the Court              22-10162

               Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order grant-
        ing final summary judgment for Wal-Mart and REMAND this case
        to the district court for a jury trial.