Court Opinion

ID: 9370104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 20:02:36.533457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.480141
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/10/23 P. v. Silva CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084578
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. VCF131491C)
                    v.

    MARIANO SILVA,                                                                        OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Antonio A.
Reyes, Judge.
         Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and
Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Detjen, J.
       Defendant Mariano Silva pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted
an arming allegation and a street gang allegation. He petitioned the superior court,
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) of the Penal Code,1 for resentencing
on his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The superior court summarily denied the
petition at the prima facie stage, without appointing counsel.
       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to appoint
counsel and in denying the petition at the prima facie stage. Specifically, he argues that
he pled a prima facie case for relief and his convictions did not render him ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. The People agree. We reverse.
                              PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2
       On March 21, 2005, the Tulare County District Attorney charged defendant and
three codefendants in an information alleging defendant committed the murder of
Bruce Owen (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), premeditated attempted murder of M.J. and D.W.
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2 & 3), two counts of discharging a firearm at an inhabited
dwelling (§ 246; counts 4 & 5), discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a person
(§ 12034, subd. (c); count 6), and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2); counts 7 & 8). As to count 1, the information alleged a “drive by” murder
special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and an “active participant in a
criminal street gang” special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). As to
counts 1 through 6, the information alleged that a principal in the offense intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). As to

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former section 1170.95
recently was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) We will refer to the current section 1172.6 in this opinion.
2     We summarize only the procedural history relevant to our review of the order
denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.

                                             2.
each count, the information alleged defendant committed the offense for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).3
       On November 15, 2005, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled
no contest to voluntary manslaughter on count 1, and admitted a gang allegation and an
allegation that he or a principal in the offense was armed with a firearm during the
commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In exchange for his plea, the trial
court indicated that it would impose a 22-year term of imprisonment.
       On December 1, 2005, the trial court imposed the indicated sentence of 22 years as
follows: on count 1, 11 years (the upper term), plus a 10-year gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), plus a one-year firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
       On June 2, 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition seeking resentencing
and requesting appointment of counsel.
       On June 6, 2022, without first appointing counsel, the trial court summarily denied
the petition as follows: “Petition denied. Defendant was driver of car involved in gang
shooting which resulted in the death of a victim.”
       On June 27, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
       The record on appeal does not contain the factual basis for defendant’s no contest
plea. The following summary is drawn from the probation officer’s report, summarizing
the Visalia police officers’ reports:4 On August 1, 2004, at approximately 9:29 p.m.,

3      As to each count other than count 6, the information also alleged that each
codefendant other than defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the
offenses (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). No similar allegation was
made as to defendant.
4      Neither this factual summary nor the probation report upon which we rely may be
considered in resolving any eventual prima facie inquiry into the sufficiency of
defendant’s petition or evidentiary hearing on the petition—they do not constitute
evidence contained in defendant’s record of conviction. In resolving the prima facie
inquiry in light of the record of conviction or holding an evidentiary hearing after the

                                             3.
Visalia police officers were dispatched in response to a call regarding a shooting. When
they arrived, they found Owen had been shot. He died as a result of gunshot wound s.
M.J. told officers that he, his brother, and Owen were standing outside his residence
when he heard a car come around the corner, “ ‘peeling out.’ ” He heard approximately
12 shots fired from the vehicle. When the shooting was over, he saw Owen on the
ground, gasping and bleeding.
       Officers learned that a red sedan may have been involved in the shooting.
Assisting officers followed a red sedan of the same make and model until it came to a
stop in a cul-de-sac. Four Hispanic men exited the vehicle and ran. Officers located and
detained defendant and two others who fled the vehicle—Edgar Rodriguez and
Bernabe Rayo. Rayo told officers that there had been four people in the vehicle;
defendant was the driver. Rayo denied that anyone shot from the vehicle. Rodriguez
said he was picked up by defendant and two other men in the red sedan. He was told they
were looking for a fight. As they turned onto the street where the shooting occurred,
Marcos Moran, who sat in the right front passenger seat, and Rayo, who sat behind
defendant, each fired four to five rounds from handguns.

prima facie determination, the trial court cannot consider prior appellate opinions in the
matter (except the procedural history recited in any such opinions) or otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)
[precluding consideration of such evidence at any order to cause hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6]; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292, citing Sen. Bill
No. 775 [(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)], Stats. 2021, ch. 551; see People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“[i]f such evidence may not be considered at an evidentiary
hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see how
such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage”]) or contained in a probation report (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1026).

                                             4.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine … to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see § 189, subd. (e); accord, People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.)
       Senate Bill 1437 accomplished this task by adding three separate provisions to the
Penal Code. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).) First, to amend
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the bill added section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), which requires a principal to act with malice aforethought before he or
she may be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); accord, Gentile, at pp. 842–843.)
Second, to amend the felony-murder rule, the bill added section 189, subdivision (e):

       “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying
       felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
       following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
       person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
       counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
       killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person
       was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
       indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
       [s]ection 190.2.”5 (§ 189, subd. (e); accord, Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
       p. 842.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) to provide a
procedure for those convicted of a qualifying offense “to seek relief under the

5      Additionally, section 189 was amended to allow for felony-murder liability where
the victim is a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); accord, People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 672.)

                                              5.
two ameliorative provisions above.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) This
procedure is available to persons convicted of “felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter ….” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       “Section [1172.6] lays out a process” for a person convicted of one of the
aforementioned offenses “to seek vacatur of his or her conviction and resentencing.”
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.) First, an offender must file a petition in the
sentencing court averring that:

       “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
       that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
       murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
       theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
       person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
       probable consequences doctrine[;]

       “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
       manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
       which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
       murder[; and]

       “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
       murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
       January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also § 1172.6,
       subd. (b)(1)(A); accord, People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960
       (Lewis).)
       Additionally, the petition shall state “[w]hether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
       If a petition fails to contain the required information and the information cannot be
“readily ascertained” by the court, the petition may be denied without prejudice to the
filing of another petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(2).) Otherwise, the court must conclude
that the defendant has filed a facially sufficient petition and counsel must be appointed, if
requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966 [“a complying

                                              6.
petition is filed; the court appoints counsel, if requested; the issue is briefed; and then the
court makes [a] prima facie determination” in consideration of the record of conviction].)
       Only after counsel is appointed to represent a defendant who filed a facially
sufficient petition does the trial court determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–963, 966–967; see People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) In making the prima facie determination, the court may rely on “ ‘the record [of
conviction], including [its] own documents, “contain[ing] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition ….” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–971, 972.) However,
the prima facie inquiry is limited and, at this stage of the proceedings, the court “should
not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971–972.) If, in light of the record of conviction, defendant’s
petition fails as a matter of law, the trial court may summarily deny it. (Id. at p. 974.)
       If the sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie showing,
the court must issue an order to show cause6 and hold a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At this evidentiary hearing,
“the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the petitioner is guilty of murder … under California law as amended by the changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       Prejudice is not presumed when a defendant’s facially sufficient petition is denied
prior to appointment of counsel. Instead, a defendant “ ‘whose petition is denied before
an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if
[he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have

6       “If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement
fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

                                              7.
been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 974; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.)
II.    Appointment of Counsel
       Petitioner contends the trial court erred by summarily denying his facially
sufficient petition rather than appointing counsel, allowing briefing to state a prima facie
case, issuing an order to show cause, and otherwise following the procedures of
section 1172.6, subdivisions (b)(3) and (c). The People agree that the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s petition without appointing counsel.
       Our Supreme Court has resolved any ambiguity regarding whether section 1172.6
requires the appointment of counsel or further briefing immediately upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition; it does. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–967.)
Counsel must be appointed if requested, and briefing must proceed, so long as the
petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1) and (2).
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); accord, Lewis, at pp. 962–963, 967.) Here, the People agree, as
do we, that defendant’s petition met the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b).
Defendant filed a form petition that complied completely with the requirements of
section 1172.6, subdivision (b).
       Appointment of counsel and a full opportunity for briefing were required by
section 1172.6, subdivisions (b)(3) and (c). (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–963,
967.) The court erred in disposing of the petition without following these procedures.
       The People do not argue, and the limited record before us does not support a
finding, that the denial of appointment of counsel was without prejudice (i.e., that
defendant’s petition would appropriately have been denied without an evidentiary
hearing). The parties agree, as do we, that nothing in the record before us indicates that
defendant’s claim would fail as a matter of law. The trial court denied relief based on the
factual finding that “defendant was [the] driver of [a] car involved in [a] gang shooting

                                             8.
which resulted in the death of a victim.”7 That finding does not exclude defendant from
relief as a matter of law—defendant, as the driver of a vehicle involved in a drive-by
gang shooting, could have been prosecuted for felony murder or indirect aiding and
abetting under a natural and probable consequences theory of murder. 8 Because
defendant could have been prosecuted under at least two theories for which relief is
available under section 1172.6, there is a reasonable probability that appointment of
counsel prior to the denial of defendant’s petition would have resulted in an outcome
other than summary denial of his petition without an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 974.)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The order is reversed. The trial court is directed to appoint counsel for defendant
and conduct further proceedings required by section 1172.6.

7      Because we reverse and because the record before us is incomplete—for instance,
the record does not contain any admitted factual basis supporting the plea agreement—we
do not consider whether the facts of defendant’s conviction were properly before the trial
court or whether the trial court’s order constituted improper factfinding.
8       For example, if defendant intended only to start a fist fight as a portion of the
probation report suggests, he may have been prosecuted under the indirect theory of
aiding and abetting—where the offense that “the perpetrator actually commits is different
from the originally intended crime [and] the natural and probable consequences doctrine
limits liability to those offenses that are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act
originally aided and abetted.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 108.)

                                            9.