Court Opinion

ID: 9587740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:48.887903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:00.787619
License: Public Domain

Benton, J., joined by Koontz, C.J., and Duff, J.,
dissenting.
Rule 5A:8(a) states as follows:
The transcript of any proceeding is a part of the record when it is filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court within 60 days after entry of judgment. The judge of the trial court may extend this time for good cause shown.
Within sixty days after entry of the conviction order against Frederick Williams, Jr., the trial judge entered an order stating, in part, that “[t]he Clerk is ordered to have the record transcribed free of charge and such transcript is hereby made a part of the record.” A circuit court employee transcribed the electronic record but failed to file the transcript until October 7, 1987, more than sixty days after entry of the conviction order.
The Commonwealth did not move to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds. This Court sua sponte raised the question concerning the timeliness of the filing of the transcript after the Commonwealth filed a substantive response to Williams’ petition for appeal. Indeed, after filing a memorandum in support of dismissal on procedural grounds as directed by this Court, the Commonwealth joined Williams in moving the trial court to enter a nunc pro tunc order extending the time for filing the transcript. Thus, it appears that the injustice of dismissing this appeal due to the trial judge’s flawed order is not lost upon the Commonwealth.
Because the problem that occurred in this case finds its genesis, in whole or in part, in the trial judge’s order, I believe that the general rule concerning filing the transcript should not be rigidly applied. Rule 5A:8(a) gives the trial judge discretion to extend the time for filing the transcript. It is not illogical to suggest that Rule 5A:8(a) permits the trial judge to enter in advance of the due date an open-ended extension order making the transcript a part of the record; however, it is a practice which should not be encouraged and may be violative of the spirit of the rule. Though the trial judge’s order in this case apparently represents a misguided attempt to satisfy former Rule 5:9(a) (governing transcripts of records on appeal to the Supreme Court), it undoubtedly misled *521Williams’ counsel into believing that the order was sufficient to “[make] such transcript... a part of the record” for purposes of this appeal. Where, as here, the trial judge has innocently confused the applicable rules and counsel has acted upon a not totally illogical interpretation of the order, the rule must be tempered, particularly when the Commonwealth has not been prejudiced.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the transcript in this case was not prepared for Williams by a privately retained reporting service, but rather by an employee of the circuit court. The circuit court’s employee was responsible for transcribing and placing the transcript in the record in a timely manner. The employee failed to do so. The actions and omissions of the employees of the Commonwealth are so inexorably tied to the circumstances that led to this procedural morass that the refusal of this Court to consider Williams’ appeal on its merits constitutes a due process violation.
The majority erroneously concludes that the trial judge could not extend nunc pro tunc the time for filing the transcript. The trial judge’s order of July 6, 1987, specifically directed the clerk of the circuit court to transcribe the record and, by necessary implication, ordered that it be timely filed so as to be “made a part of the record.” The circuit court employee’s failure to timely file the transcript was purely a clerical error that was properly corrected by a nunc pro tunc order extending the time for filing the transcript and thus making it a part of the record in conformity with the July 6, 1987, order. “A court has the power to correct . . . ministerial omissions nunc pro tunc when the record clearly supports such corrections.” Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1979); see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 205, 210, 279 S.E.2d 395, 398-99 (1981)(untimely entry of order, caused by. prosecutor’s failure to submit a sketch of an order at judge’s direction, together with defense counsel’s failure to sign and return the order either to the prosecutor or to the judge, was appropriately cured by a nunc pro tunc entry, since errors leading to the nonentry of the order were “ ‘clerical error [s]’ within the meaning of the rule allowing a nunc pro tunc entry”).
Moreover, Rule 5A:8(a) explicitly states that “[t]he judge of the trial court may extend [the filing] time for good cause shown.” Without citing any controlling precedent, a panel of this Court held in Jordan v. Price, 3 Va. App. 672, 673, 353 S.E.2d 168, 168 (1987), that leave to extend the date for filing a transcript must *522be granted before the deadline occurs. I find no precedent for such a rigid rule. No general rule of law prohibits a trial court from exercising its discretion to extend the time for filing a transcript when the failure to act within the time prescribed was the result of excusable neglect or when other good cause is shown. Cf. Rule 1:9 (“The time for filing pleadings may be extended by the court in its discretion and such extension may be granted although the time fixed already has expired . . .”). As we stated in Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99, 341 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1986): “We find nothing in the Rules which makes timely filing of the transcript mandatory; rather, the clear objective of these Rules is to ensure that an accurate record, complete to the degree necessary to adjudicate the appeal, is transmitted to this Court.”
Finally, it should be noted that the type of order causing the Court such consternation in this case is neither isolated or unique. The Rules of Court contain procedures for perfecting appeals to this Court which differ from the procedures for perfecting appeals to the Supreme Court. Trial judges across the Commonwealth have entered similar orders in other cases routinely and apparently without regard for the differences in the Rules governing appeals to this Court and to the Supreme Court. Although I believe that this Court should, by an appropriate order, inform the bench and the bar that the Rules of Court must be observed and will be enforced, such an announcement should initially be prospective in nature. Certainly, under the circumstances of this case, no purpose is served by denying a merits review of this appeal.
It is for these reasons that I dissent from the order dismissing this appeal.