Court Opinion

ID: 9633490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:49:18.090224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:02.286665
License: Public Domain

*404CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
PADGETT, ACTING CJ.,
JOINED BY HAYASHI, J.
I concur in part II. A. of the opinion but dissent with respect to part II. B. Part I. is a recital of the evidence which is accurate, except in one respect noted below.
The majority in part I. summarizes the evidence in the record as follows:
Before the flight to Kauai, Phelps and the employees drank beer. It was common for the crew to drink beer together. Phelps was aware that both Hughes and McLean were heavy drinkers. Phelps also believed that McLean drank 990 out of 1,000 days and considered McLean to be an alcoholic.
The crew arrived on Kauai on the day before the accident, and drove the rental cars to two condominium units in Poipu that Professional Coatings had rented for their use during the painting job. Several of the employees then used one of the rental cars, with Phelps’s permission, to drive to the north shore of Kauai. The employees took turns driving. While Hughes was driving the car, it had a flat tire and the car became muddy or sandy. Phelps later reprimanded Hughes for this.
On the day of the accident, Phelps gave permission to McLean to use one of the rental cars so McLean could visit a friend in Princeville. Phelps did not accompany the group on their outing. However, Phelps knew that Hughes and two other employees would be going with McLean and that they would be drinking and partying.
If the last sentence of the above quotation is meant to imply that there is no evidence that Phelps knew or should have known *405that McLean would be drinking and partying, then it is simply not correct. There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether, when McLean borrowed the automobile from Phelps, it was merely to go buy groceries or to go to a party. But the depositions of Hughes and McLean make it clear that their evidentiary position was that the automobile was borrowed for the purpose, known to Phelps, of going to the week-end party.
There is evidence in the record which, although contradicted, would, if believed by a jury, establish that when Phelps entrusted the automobile to McLean on the day of the accident, Phelps knew (1) that all of the workers drank together; (2) that all of the workers were authorized to drive the automobile during their stay on Kauai; (3) that the group had gone off to the north shore the previous day and taken turns driving; (4) that Hughes had in fact driven the automobile that day; (5) that McLean was a heavy drinker who drank 990 out of a 1,000 days; (6) that Hughes was also a drinker; (7) that the group including Hughes and McLean were going off in the automobile to a week-end party; and (8) that the automobile would have to be driven back from the party in time for the commencement of work on Monday.
The majority holds that Phelps’s “opinions,” held at the time he loaned the automobile to McLean, that McLean was an alcoholic who drank 990 days out of a 1,000, is inadmissible evidence in a suit against Phelps for negligently entrusting the automobile to McLean, and that therefore those statements made by Phelps in his deposition cannot be used against him on a summary judgment.
This ruling on evidence by the majority is simply wrong. To begin with, HRE 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (2) *406helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
As is noted in the Commentary to that rule, instead of the old rule of strict necessity:
The present rule adopts in its place the more liberal “convenience” test, McCormack, §11, allowing such testimony when it is “helpful” to the trier of fact in determining or clarifying facts in issue.
As is stated in Annotation, Admissibility as against interest of statement or report made out of court regarding accident as affected by the fact that it relates to or includes matters of opinion or conclusion, 118 A.L.R. 1230, 1231 (1939):
[I]n a few cases it has been contended that under the rule as to exclusion of opinion evidence, statements or reports containing an opinion, conclusion, or inference against interest were not admissible. In nearly all cases where such a contention has been raised, it has been held in effect that such a statement or report, being inconsistent with the subsequent assertion of a contrary claim, was admissible in evidence, the court in some cases stating that it was for the jury to give the evidence such weight as it saw fit.
And in 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 604, at 659 (1967), it is stated:
Moreover, there is considerable authority for the rule that an admission or declaration against interest [does] not render[ it] inadmissible by the fact that the statement is in the form of an opinion or conclusion.
(Footnote omitted.) Contrary to the majority’s position, under HRE 701 and under the vast weight of authority, Phelps’s opinions as to McLean’s alcoholism and drinking habits, which were relevant to the question of whether or not Phelps acted as a reasonable *407man in turning the automobile over to McLean, in the circumstances of the case, were admissible against him since Phelps’s state of mind when he entrusted the automobile to McLean was in issue and since his statements could have helped a trier of fact in clarifying that issue.
Phelps and McLean had known each other for a considerable period of time, had worked together, and had drunk together. Phelps had had ample opportunity to observe McLean, and his “opinions” were clearly admissible.
The majority’s opinion lays down, as the law of Hawaii, that turning over an automobile to a known heavy drinker, who the lender believed drank 990 days out of 1,000, to go to a week-end party (from which they would have to return since their work started the next day) with a group of fellow workers, all of whom were known to drink together, and any of whom might drive the automobile, is not evidence of negligence on the part of the person who turned over the automobile.
The majority holds that the automobile lender in such a situation is entitled to summary judgment unless the injured party produces evidence the lender knew that the individual to whom the automobile was lent had not only driven while intoxicated, but that that individual had driven negligently while intoxicated. I cannot agree.
The common sense view would appear to be stated in V.L. Nicholson Construction Co. v. Lane, 177 Tenn. 440, 442-43, 150 S.W.2d 1069, 1070 (1941):
It is insisted for defendant that Johnson had not previously been guilty of drinking at times when he was put in charge of the truck, that his drinking was done at night, and that defendant Construction Company had no reason to believe that he would get drunk on the evening that he *408was directed to take this truck from Merrill’s to the garage.
The officers of the Construction Company, however, were fully advised of Johnson’s propensities, that he did get drunk, that he was addicted to the use of liquor, and they were not justified in assuming that he would remain sober merely because the truck was put in his charge.
The great weight of authority is that an owner who entrusts his automobile to an individual addicted to habits of intoxication is liable for damage caused by such individual becoming intoxicated and operating the automobile negligently while in that condition. This is true although the particular individual happened to be sober when the automobile was turned over to him.
In Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S.E. 576, 582, 50 A.L.R. 1425, the court expressed itself thus:
“Incompetence, recklessness, and accident are so universally the sequel of drinking that an owner of an automobile is put on notice of what is likely to occur if he does not take active steps to prevent any one addicted to drinking from driving it. If he fails in the performance of this duty, he should suffer the consequences of his neglect.”
In Murray v. Pasotex Pipe Line Co., 161 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1947), the court stated:
While the record discloses no evidence that the appellee knew that Chenoweth had previously driven while intoxicated, we think that appellee’s liability could be predicated upon appellee’s reasonable anticipation of Chenoweth’s driving while drunk, for the test is not necessarily what appellee actually knew as to whether or not Chenoweth drove while drunk, but the test is what the appellee, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have *409known. The danger inherent in entrusting a motor vehicle to a drunken driver has been expressed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in these words: “It is a matter of common knowledge and observation, if not experience, that excessive use of intoxicants either benumbs the sensibilities or so stimulates the faculties that in either event it brings about a condition interfering with the normal functioning of volitional and reflex powers, thereby rendering the user incapable of responding in action with a readiness consistent with careful operation of a motor vehicle. It is likewise a matter of common knowledge that a drunken driver is ordinarily reckless, heedless, and indifferent to the consequence of his acts; and the same care and caution that causes people generally to refuse or hesitate to enter an automobile as either a guest or a passenger with such a driver should be exercised in intrusting such vehicle to him.”
In Murray, supra, the facts were that another employee working under the driver Chenoweth had informed Norris, Chenoweth’s superior, that Chenoweth had been dmnk on the job and that on a particular occasion the superior had stated to Chenoweth, “Charley, I know your condition, you was too dmnk.”
As a result of that knowledge, on the part of the employer, the court in Murray stated the law as follows:
“Did [appellee] owe any duty to individuals who might be upon or traveling over highways, to exercise reasonable care to see to it that [he] to whom it intrusted its car(s) for use upon the public highways, [is a] competent sober driver(s)? We think [appellee] did owe such duty, and if, through its failure to discharge same, [Chenoweth] was permitted to [use] its car, and becoming dmnk, by *410reckless abandoned driving * * * [injured plaintiffs wife] * * * [appellee] would be liable. * * * ”
Id. at 7 (Fifth Circuit Court’s alterations).
The general authorities on this subject are in accord. As is stated in 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 646, at 877 (1980):
The test of the owner’s liability is not whether the person to whom he entrusted the motor vehicle was intoxicated at that time but whether he was, to the knowledge of the owner, addicted to habits of intoxication; if so, the owner may become liable for his operation of the motor vehicle while intoxicated, although he was in fact sober when the motor vehicle was turned over to him.
(Footnote omitted.)
Given the above law, if McLean had been driving the automobile while intoxicated when the accident happened, in my view, there would have been sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of Phelps to create a genuine issue of material fact, because taking the facts in the record, in the light most favorable to the appellant, Phelps reasonably should have foreseen that McLean would become intoxicated and would act negligently with respect to the automobile as a result thereof.
But McLean was not driving the automobile. Instead the intoxicated McLean turned over the automobile to the intoxicated Hughes who was driving when the accident occurred.
Nevertheless, on the facts in this case, a reasonable trier of fact might well determine that the negligent act of McLean in turning over the automobile to one of his intoxicated co-workers was reasonably foreseeable by Phelps. As we have pointed out above, Phelps knew that the workers all drank together, he knew that they all drove the automobile, he knew that they all had driven the automobile the day before and had taken turns driving, he knew that *411McLean drank 990 days out of a 1,000, he knew that Hughes also drank, and he knew when he turned the automobile over that the workers were going together, in the automobile driven by McLean, to a week-end party.
The majority says in its opinion:
Phelps’s knowledge of McLean’s drinking habits is irrelevant here because there can be no cause of action for negligent entrustment against Phelps where the entrustee, McLean, did not negligently operate the entrusted vehicle and cause Henderson’s injuries.
The majority cites no authority for this remarkable position. There is however ample authority to the contrary. A plain and simple statement of the rule appears in 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 431(2), at 955 (1969):
If an owner is negligent in permitting a person to use his car because of the user’s intoxication, or the likelihood that the user would become intoxicated, the owner is also liable for every act which contributes to a subsequent accident, including the act of the person intrusted in permitting another person, incompetent because of intoxication, to operate the vehicle.
(Footnotes omitted.) Thus in Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 92-93, 75 N.W.2d 99, 103 (1956), the court stated:
We point out that if Sherlock was negligent in permitting Duffy to use his car because of the latter’s intoxication, or the likelihood that he would become intoxicated, Sherlock is liable for every act of Duffy which contributed to the accident, including the act of Duffy in permitting Hull to drive while he was drunk. [Citations omitted.]
In Richton Tie & Timber Co. v. Smith, 210 Miss. 148, 48 So. 2d 618 (1950), where the employer had entrusted a truck to one *412Johnson, a habitual drunkard, and Johnson and one Turner got drunk and an accident happened with Turner driving, the court said:
The antics of a drunken man are unpredictable, and it might reasonably have been anticipated that Johnson when intoxicated would engage with another equally intoxicated in the reckless operation of the truck.
Id. at 158, 48 So. 2d at 621. See also Connolly v. Bressler, 283 Or. 265, 583 P.2d 540 (1978). The facts as recited by the court were:
Five young men went “road hunting” for grouse in a pickup truck belonging to Bressler’s uncle, who had allowed Bressler to use it. All five, including plaintiff and his brother Mike, got drunk while hunting. Upon returning from hunting, Bressler turned the truck over to Wilt, one of the five, and left to take his girl riding on Wilt’s motorcycle, saying he would meet them later at a designated place.
Plaintiff and his brother Mike wanted to return home for a family dinner for Mike, who was on leave from the Marines. Mike had passed out in the back of the pickup. On the way to the brothers’ home, Wilt stopped at a tavern, leaving the keys to the truck in the ignition. Plaintiff got out of the truck to visit some friends parked nearby. Mike regained consciousness and went to the tavern to get Wilt to take him home, but Wilt said to wait until he finished his beer. Mike then went back to the truck, got in the driver’s seat, and started to drive away. Plaintiff, noticing this, and knowing that Mike was too drunk to drive, ran over, jumped in the bed of the truck, and started pounding on the cab while yelling for his brother to stop. Within a short distance the pickup left the road, turned over, and plaintiff received the injuries for which he recovered from Bressler.
*413Id. at 267, 583 P.2d at 541-42.
The Oregon court stated:
There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that turning over the truck to one who was drunk for his use was contrary to community standards and therefore blameworthy, and that said act was a cause in fact of the accident and of plaintiffs injuries. Even so, there remains the additional question of whether defendant’s actions in turning over the truck fall within the scope of those acts whereby he can be held legally responsible for plaintiff’s injuries. This type of question speaks to “proximate causation,” which this court treats as part of the definition of negligence. Resolution of the question is usually determined by whether the harm was “foreseeable,” i.e., whether the actual harm caused was of the general kind to be anticipated from the blameworthy act. [Citation omitted.] If it was, liability results even though the particular manner of the injury could not be anticipated.
The explanation dictates the answer. If a vehicle is turned over to one of a bunch of drunken youths for their use, the likelihood of a wreck and resultant injuries is sufficiently probable to be “foreseeable.” The bizarre manner of the occurrence does not prevent the accident from falling into the general category of risk reasonably to be anticipated. Therefore, we conclude that Bressler’s action in turning over the vehicle to Wilt was a “proximate cause” of plaintiff’s injuries.
Id. at 268, 583 P.2d at 542 (footnote omitted).
The text and the cases we have cited derive from the general principles of foreseeability. Thus in 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 18.2, at 1020 (1956), it is stated:
*414[FJoreseeability is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modem life that a reasonably thoughtful man would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.
(Footnote omitted.) And in 3 Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts § 11:3, at 390 (1986) (emphasis in original):
The courts, for the most part, have indulged a flexible approach in their ascertainment of foreseeability of an injury (or not, as the case may be.) The cases do stress the consequences that a reasonable and prudent person, in the same or similar circumstances, might anticipate. It is not essential that the (initial) tortfeasor be able to foresee the exact nature and extent of the injuries or the precise manner in which the injuries occur. The test is whether the harm that does occur is within the scope of danger created by the defendant’s negligent conduct.
(Footnote omitted.)
On this motion for summary judgment, we are not dealing simply with a case of an entrustment to one whom the entrustor knew was likely to become intoxicated. We are dealing with a case of an entrustment, by the entmstor, to one whom he knew was likely to become intoxicated, whom he knew was going to a weekend party, whom he knew was going to the party with fellow workers who drank, and whom he knew was going to the party with fellow workers who also traded driving assignments. Moreover, the entrustor in fact knew that Hughes was a drinker, was going to the party, and had driven the automobile the day before.
In these circumstances for the court to say that Phelps, if he were acting reasonably and prudently, could not foresee that McLean would become intoxicated and that an intoxicated *415McLean might well turn the automobile over to an intoxicated fellow worker, flies in the face both of reason and of the law. I would therefore reverse the summary judgment in favor of Phelps on Count VIII of the complaint and remand the case for trial.