Court Opinion

ID: 9685268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:27:36.419368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.847463
License: Public Domain

*907WAHL, Justice
(concurring specially).
The legislative forum has undeniable advantages in the comprehensive reform of archaic rules, but this court has the ultimate responsibility to identify constitutional limits. I disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it upholds the constitutionality of Minn.St. 609.065(3), permitting the use of deadly force to apprehend persons suspected of nonviolent felonies. Because I would give this conclusion prospective effect, however, I concur in the result reached.
Insofar as § 609.065(3) permits a public officer or assistant to intentionally take the life of another “in effecting a lawful arrest for a felony or in preventing an escape of a person held therefor,” the statute is not only “archaic," 1 but gravely implicates the most fundamental of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law. See, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220, 226 (1886); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1465 (1938). At minimum, due process clearly precludes the imposition of summary procedures and summary punishment on the criminally accused. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495, 1505 (1945); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2 Cir.), certiorari denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5 Cir.), certiorari denied sub nom. Nosser v. Bradley, 409 U.S. 848, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972); United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8 Cir. 1956). It does not follow, as the majority suggests, however, that recognition of these due process rights in this context would absolutely preclude the use of deadly force in the apprehension of criminal suspects. Rather, they require that their abrogation — the summary deprivation of human life and liberty — be justified by compelling, competing rights and interests pursuant to a statutory formula narrowly drawn to reflect that balance. Examination of the possible justifications for § 609.065(3) inevitably leads to the conclusion that the use of deadly force to effect an arrest or to prevent escape is constitutionally permissible only when exercised in defense of a substantial and immediate threat to the life and bodily security of other human beings. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8 Cir. 1976), judgment vacated sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977).2 See, *908generally, Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8 Cir. 1978). Therefore, I would so limit the privilege to use deadly force. Consistent with our previous opinions expanding tort liability, however, I would give this opinion prospective effect. See, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (prospective abrogation of inter-spousal tort immunity); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (prospective abrogation of sovereign immunity). See, also, State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907, note 15 (Minn.1977) (adopting the “balancing formula,” found in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 [1967], to determine retroactivity or prospectivity). Thus, Officer McGinn would not be held liable for his earlier action in reasonable reliance upon a statutory privilege now retracted.
I join with the majority opinion in welcoming the recent revision of Minnesota’s deadly force law, L.1978, c. 736, § 2, which incorporates the constitutional standard discussed above. While I reach essentially the same ultimate result in this case as the majority, I differ in one important respect: In upholding the constitutionality of § 609.-065, the majority removes any constitutional barrier to later legislative revision or amendment which would return the deadly force statute to those terms. I would hold that the new statute satisfies the constitutional minimum and that any later statutory revisions would be subject to judicial scrutiny.

. The previous opinion in this matter, Schumann v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446, 240 N.W.2d 525 (1976), discussed in detail the historical derivation for the common-law “fleeing-felon” , rule embodied in Minn.St. 609.065(3). There, we concluded that the original rationale for the rule — the limited number of felonies, generally violent and punishable by death — was no longer persuasive in a state which does not have capital punishment, and classifies as felonies crimes such as theft of property pr services in excess of $100 in value, Minn.St. 609.52, subd. 3; unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, Minn.St. 609.55; and bribing a public officer, Minn.St. 609.42, subd. 1(2).

. In Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8 Cir. 1974), the parents of an 18-year-old boy slain while fleeing arrest brought an action against the police and city under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1988, praying for civil damages and declaratory relief. Reversing a dismissal by the trial court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the “good faith” defense precluded a damage award but held that declaratory relief was available to test the constitutionality of Missouri’s fleeing-felon statute. 502 F.2d 591. The district court on remand upheld the statute. Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F.Supp. 643 (E.D.Mo.1975). The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed, finding the statute an unconstitutional denial of due process because it did not narrowly reflect the asserted state interest in protecting the lives of citizens and police, Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8 Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court, per curiam, vacated the judgment because the absence of a jeopardized present right made declaratory relief wholly hypothetical, not a “case or controversy.” Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977).
After reflection, I have declined to adopt this dispositive option here. The instant action is not a § 1983 action, and we have neither recognized nor developed the “good faith” defense in simple negligence actions such as this. See, e. g., Merritt v. City of St. Paul, 11 Minn. 145 (223) (1866). Moreover, whatever its justifiability in other contexts, its use here sets up a cruel circularity which effectively precludes judicial review: The result under Ashcroñ v. Mattis, supra, is that the court declines to review the validity of the statute because no *908liability would attach; no liability attaches because the police are entitled to rely in “good faith” upon the validity of the statute; and the police will continue to so rely because of the absence of judicial action.