Court Opinion

ID: 9905535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:15.776547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.347729
License: Public Domain

J-A17045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  JOSEPH HENRY CORNELLIER                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2604 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 8, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-52-CR-0000101-2019

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, Joseph Henry Cornellier, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas, following his

negotiated guilty plea to disorderly conduct.1 We affirm Appellant’s conviction

and amend his flat sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment, which is illegal.

       The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

          On December 5, 2019, [Appellant] entered a guilty plea to
          a charge of simple assault. On January 31, 2020, [the trial
          court] entered an order marking [Appellant]’s guilty plea as
          withdrawn and vacating the scheduled sentencing hearing.

          On August 21, 2020, [Appellant] entered a guilty plea to
          [the summary offense] of disorderly conduct. [Appellant]
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a).
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       was represented by Attorney Thomas Sundmaker at the
       guilty plea proceeding. Attorney Sundmaker indicated that
       [Appellant] did not have his glasses and therefore, Attorney
       Sundmaker conducted an oral colloquy on the record.
       [Appellant] indicated that he discussed the guilty plea with
       Attorney Sundmaker, that he was aware of the nature of the
       charges against him and that he was guilty of the charge of
       disorderly conduct, and that his guilty plea was made
       voluntarily. [Appellant] indicated that he was aware of and
       understood that he was pleading guilty to a summary
       offense punishable by a statutory maximum of up to ninety
       (90) days of incarceration.         The transcript of the
       proceedings on August 21, 2020, indicate[s] that an oral
       colloquy was conducted….

       The matter was initially scheduled for a sentencing hearing
       on October 29, 2020. However, as there was no physical
       copy of [a signed, written] guilty plea colloquy conducted on
       August 21, 2020 in the record nor was there a copy scanned
       into the [c]ourt’s electronic record of the case, the
       sentencing hearing was continued to December 10, 2020.

       The sentencing hearing was continued many times over the
       next year. … Attorney Sundmaker … withdrew as counsel
       of record for [Appellant], and Attorney Thomas Mincer
       entered his appearance on behalf of [Appellant] on August
       6, 2021.

       On March 28, 2022, [Appellant] filed a motion to withdraw
       guilty plea. [The] court scheduled a hearing on the motion
       for July [3], 2022. At the hearing, [Appellant] testified that
       he was never made aware that he would receive a period of
       incarceration as his sentence. He testified that he has no
       recollection of entering into a guilty plea or of going through
       the oral guilty plea colloquy with Attorney Sundmaker on
       the record on August 21, 2020. He asserted that he was
       innocent of the charges against him. [Rachel Schuster,
       Appellant’s fiancé, testified that she was not present at the
       plea hearing, but she participated in conversations with
       Attorney Sundmaker both prior to and shortly after the
       hearing and her understanding was that Appellant would
       only have to pay a fine. Ms. Schuster further testified that
       Appellant suffered a stroke shortly after he pled guilty.]

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         The motion to withdraw guilty plea was taken under
         advisement.

         [The] court denied [Appellant]’s motion to withdraw guilty
         plea on July 8, 2022 and sentenced [Appellant] on the same
         date to be incarcerated in the Pike County Jail for a period
         of ninety (90) days. On July 12, 2022, [Appellant] filed a
         motion for reconsideration of sentence and denial of petition
         to vacate plea.      [The] court denied the motion for
         reconsideration on [September] 19, 2022.

         On October 11, 2022, [Appellant timely] filed his notice of
         appeal as to [the] court’s orders dated July 8, 2022 and
         [September] 19, 2022. On October 13, 2022, [the] court
         ordered [Appellant] to file a concise statement of matters
         complained of on appeal. [Appellant] filed his concise
         statement on November 3, 2022.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/18/22, at 1-3).

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

         Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion when it denied
         Appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea?

         Was the oral guilty plea entered in this case defective?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      In his issues combined, Appellant asserts that he demonstrated a fair

and just reason to withdraw his plea. Specifically, Appellant states that he

suffers from post-traumatic stress, depression, anxiety, and other physical

and mental issues which affect his ability to make decisions. Appellant further

avers that he does not recall the August 21, 2020 plea hearing due to short-

term memory loss. Appellant contends that Ms. Schuster, who significantly

assisted him to navigate the criminal process, testified that she was not

present at the plea hearing but her understanding of the plea agreement prior

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to and after the hearing was that Appellant would not face any time in prison.

Appellant argues that Appellant’s disabilities and Ms. Schuster’s testimony

show a fair and just reason to permit him to withdraw the plea. Appellant

further contends that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence to

demonstrate that it would be substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal of the

plea.    Additionally, Appellant asserts that his plea colloquy was deficient

because the court failed to inform Appellant that he is presumed innocent until

proven guilty or that he has the right to file a motion to withdraw the plea.

Appellant concludes that the court erred by denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, and this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence. We

disagree.

        As a general rule, the entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all

defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and

legality of the sentence.      See Commonwealth v. Main, 6 A.3d 1026

(Pa.Super. 2010). This Court reviews the denial of a pre-sentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Gordy,

73 A.3d 620 (Pa.Super. 2013). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (stating: “At

any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion,

permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal

of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not

guilty”).

        “[T]he proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is

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whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote

fairness and justice.” Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, 706,

115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (2015).

         In the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299
         A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973), the Supreme Court set forth the
         standard for determining when a motion to withdraw a guilty
         plea prior to sentencing should be granted. The Court
         stated that “[a]lthough there is no absolute right to
         withdraw a guilty plea, properly received by the trial court,
         it is clear that a request made before sentencing . . . should
         be liberally allowed.” 299 A.2d at 271. The Court then
         outlined the now well-established two[-]prong test for
         determining when to grant a pre-sentence motion to
         withdraw a plea: (1) the defendant has provided a “fair and
         just reason” for withdrawal of his plea; and (2) the
         Commonwealth will not be “substantially prejudiced in
         bringing the case to trial.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382-83 (Pa.Super. 2002).

      Additionally, “a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible

to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence

withdrawal of a plea.”     Carrasqullio, supra at 705, 115 A.3d at 1292

(explaining that court should consider plausibility and sincerity of defendant’s

assertion of innocence, as well as circumstances surrounding pre-sentence

motion to withdraw plea, including motivation and timing of request). “[B]oth

the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship

of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence, are relevant.”

Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1190 (Pa.Super. 2017).                  A

defendant’s failure to establish a plausible claim of innocence renders

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unnecessary a consideration of whether pre-sentence withdrawal of the guilty

plea would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth. Carrasqullio, supra

at 706 n.9, 115 A.3d at 1293 n.9 (declining to address prejudice to

Commonwealth because defendant failed to assert plausible claim of

innocence). See also Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 9, 116 A.3d

1103, 1107 (2015) (holding pre-sentence request to withdraw plea failed

where defendant made only bare assertion of innocence).

        Where a withdrawal request is based on an allegation that the plea

colloquy was inadequate, we look to Rule of Criminal Procedure 590, which

states that when considering a plea agreement: “The judge shall conduct a

separate inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the

defendant understands and voluntarily accepts the terms of the plea

agreement on which the guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere is based.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B)(2). The comment to Rule 590 sets forth the following

information that the judge must ascertain in determining whether to accept a

plea:

          (1)     Does the defendant understand the nature of the
          charges to which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo
          contendere?

          (2)      Is there a factual basis for the plea?

          (3)       Does the defendant understand that he or she has
          the right to trial by jury?

          (4)    Does the defendant understand that he or she is
          presumed innocent until found guilty?

          (5)      Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of

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        sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?

        (6)     Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound
        by the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the
        judge accepts such agreement?

        (7)        Does the defendant understand that the
        Commonwealth has a right to have a jury decide the degree
        of guilt if the defendant pleads guilty to murder generally?

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 (Comment).

     This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the

voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea. See Muhammad, supra.

A guilty plea will be deemed valid if an examination of the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant had a full

understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea such that he

knowingly and intelligently entered the plea of his own accord.             See

Commonwealth        v.   Rush,    909    A.2d   805,   808   (Pa.Super.   2006).

Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware

of what he was doing and the defendant bears the burden of proving

otherwise.    See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522-23

(Pa.Super. 2003).    “A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the

statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later

assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he

made at his plea colloquy.” Id.

     Instantly, the trial court determined that Appellant failed to demonstrate

a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. Specifically, the court decided

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Appellant failed to establish that his physical and mental disabilities rendered

him so incapable of making decisions such that his plea was involuntary. The

court had the opportunity to observe and question Appellant at the plea

hearing on August 21, 2020.      Appellant did not make any statements or

behave in any manner to indicate that Appellant was not knowingly and

intelligently entering a plea of his own accord or suffering from any mental or

physical disabilities that rendered him incapable of understanding the plea.

The only medical issue mentioned at the hearing was that Appellant did not

bring his glasses and was unable to read the written plea colloquy. This issue

was addressed and remedied when Attorney Sundmaker indicated that he

reviewed the written plea colloquy with Appellant and conducted an on-the-

record oral plea colloquy.

       Further, Appellant confirmed on the record that counsel reviewed the

written plea colloquy with him, that he understood everything in the plea

colloquy, and had no questions about anything that counsel reviewed with

him.    Appellant also acknowledged that he understood the rights he

relinquished by pleading guilty, including his right to a trial by judge or jury

and his limited appeal rights.     Appellant stated that he understood the

elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty and admitted that

there was a factual basis to support his guilt. Appellant also stated that he

did not have any mental health issues and affirmed that he was entering the

plea voluntarily. Appellant acknowledged that he understood that he could

face up to 90 days of incarceration and that the court was not bound to accept

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the terms of the plea agreement. Additionally, Appellant did not express any

doubt or indecision about entering the guilty plea at the plea hearing.

Appellant was also before the court on October 29, 2020, at his initially

scheduled sentencing hearing, and did not in any way indicate that he wished

to withdraw his plea. In fact, Appellant did not file a motion to withdraw the

plea until March 28, 2022, which was over 19 months after he entered the

plea.

        Appellant is bound by the statements he made during the oral plea

colloquy.    See Pollard, supra.      On this record, we see no error with the

court’s determination that Appellant failed to establish a fair and just reason

to permit withdrawal of his plea.        See Muhammad, supra.           Regarding

Appellant’s claim that his plea colloquy was inadequate because the court

failed to advise him about the presumption of innocence, Appellant failed to

raise this particular claim in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement.           Thus,

Appellant has waived this claim.        See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating:

“Issues not included in the statement…are waived”). See also Muhammad,

supra at 382 n.9 (holding appellant waived claim that he was not informed of

presumption of innocence during his guilty plea colloquy by failing to include

it in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement).

        Additionally, Appellant has failed to establish that the plea was deficient

because the court did not advise Appellant that he could file a motion to

withdraw the plea.      Appellant cites no legal authority to suggest that the

court’s failure to tell a defendant about the right to withdraw his plea renders

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the plea colloquy so inadequate as to invalidate it. As such, this particular

argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Hakala,

900 A.2d 404 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 737, 909 A.2d 1288

(2006) (stating failure to develop argument on appeal results in waiver). In

any event, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, so the record

confirms he was aware of this right, even if the court failed to specifically

advise him of such. Under the totality of the circumstances, we discern no

error with the court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. See

Gordy, supra; Rush, supra; Muhammad, supra.

     Notwithstanding the propriety of the guilty plea, our review of the record

shows that the court’s July 8, 2022 judgment of sentence is legally infirm.

See Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc)

(explaining challenges to illegal sentence may be raised by this Court sua

sponte). Issues related to the legality of a sentence are questions of law.

Commonwealth v. Diamond, 945 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa.Super 2008), appeal

denied, 598 Pa. 755, 955 A.2d 356 (2008). Our “standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id.

     The sentencing code provides that: “a court shall impose a minimum

sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum

sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b). “[F]or every sentence of total

confinement, the trial court must impose both a maximum and minimum

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Barzyk, 692 A.2d 211, 215 (Pa.Super. 1997)

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(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b)). “While the standard remedy for a trial court's

omission of a minimum sentence is to vacate the judgment and remand for

resentencing, … where the sentencing court clearly intended to impose the

maximum sentence this Court can amend the sentence to include a minimum

term equal to one-half of the maximum.” Commonwealth v. Duda, 831

A.2d 728, 733 (Pa.Super. 2003) (affirming judgment of sentence but

amending flat sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment for summary harassment to

include minimum term equal to one half of maximum sentence or 45 days’

imprisonment, where record confirmed that court clearly intended to impose

maximum sentence).

       Here, the court sentenced Appellant to a flat sentence of 90 days’

imprisonment, which is illegal. See Barzyk, supra. Nevertheless, it is clear

from the record that the court intended to impose the maximum sentence.2

As such, we can amend the sentence to include a minimum sentence equal to

one-half of the maximum.            See Duda, supra.   Accordingly, we affirm

Appellant’s conviction and amend Appellant’s sentence to reflect a term of 45

to 90 days’ imprisonment.

       Judgment of sentence is affirmed as amended.

____________________________________________

2 The maximum sentence for the summary offense of disorderly conduct is 90

days (See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1105), so it is clear the court intended to impose
the maximum sentence.

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Date: 11/28/2023

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