Court Opinion

ID: 9391531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 16:08:16.410043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.964428
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hudson v. Jones, 2023-Ohio-1447.]

                                      COURT OF APPEALS
                                   RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                  FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      JUDGES:
TODD HUDSON                                   :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
                                              :       Hon. Willilam B. Hoffman, J.
                        Plaintiff-Appellant   :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                              :
-vs-                                          :
                                              :       Case No. 2022 CA 0066
CHRISTOPHER JONES                             :
                                              :
                     Defendant-Appellee       :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Civil appeal from the Mansfield Municipal
                                                  Court, Case No. 2022 CVI 0054

JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           May 2, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant                           For Defendant-Appellee

DARIN AVERY                                       CHRISTOPHER JONES PRO SE
105 Sturges Avenue                                354 S. Main Street
Mansfield, OH 44903                               Mansfield, OH 44902
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     2

Gwin, P.J.

       {¶1}    Appellant appeals the August 25, 2022 judgment entry of the Mansfield

Municipal Court adopting the magistrate’s decision and entering judgment in favor of

appellee.

                                    Facts & Procedural History

       {¶2}    Appellant Todd Hudson is a licensed plumber. Appellee Christopher Jones

is the owner of 300 Harker Street in Mansfield, Ohio. On August 14, 2021, the parties

entered into a written contract for appellant to perform plumbing work at 300 Harker.

Appellant filed a police report on September 1, 2021 alleging that some of his tools he left

on the job site at 300 Harker had been stolen.

       {¶3}    On January 11, 2022, appellant filed a pro se breach of contract complaint

against appellee. The complaint alleged, in part, as follows: the parties entered into a

contract on August 21, 2021; appellant agreed to install plumbing for one bathroom and a

kitchen sink for a total of $1,500, plus materials; appellant received a deposit of $500; the

remainder was to be due upon the completion of the work; the balance of the contract was

$3,074.69; equipment owned by appellant was removed from the job site for a total of

$1,784.76; and the parties agreed appellee would pay appellant by December 1, 2021.

Appellant sought money damages from appellee in the amount of $2,434.45, plus interest.

The parties agree that appellee paid appellant $2,500 pursuant to the contract.

       {¶4}    The magistrate conducted a bench trial on June 7, 2022.

       {¶5}    Frank Waddle (“Waddle”) is a plumbing inspector for Richland County.

When it was determined that appellee was not going to reside in the home, the department

sent him a letter stating the work had to be performed by a licensed plumber. Upon
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                    3

examination by the court, Waddle testified he went to do the initial final inspection at 300

Harker Street. There were pipes replaced in the basement where cast iron had been taken

out and plastic was put in its place. The plastic was leaking and was not up to code.

Appellant reported to Waddle that he (appellant) did not have anything to do with that.

       {¶6}   Waddle stated he had no firsthand knowledge of Exhibit A (letter to

appellee) or what is contained in that exhibit. Waddle testified Exhibit B is the original

permit appellee pulled to do the plumbing work for the kitchen and bathroom, and Exhibit

D is the permit that Mr. Rooter pulled to repair the plumbing system where the piping was

leaking when Waddle did his final inspection.

       {¶7}   Trent Dawson (“Dawson”) is the owner of Mr. Rooter Plumbing. Appellee

contacted him to get the plumbing completed at 300 Harker because there were leaks and

a non-code-approved fitting in the basement. Dawson stated appellee never spoke with

him about appellant. Dawson did not do anything upstairs in the bathroom; he was just

hired to fix the leaks. Appellee paid Dawson a total of $2,970.

       {¶8}   At the start of his testimony, appellant submitted multiple documents as

exhibits. Appellant testified that appellee contacted him to do plumbing. Appellee had

initially pulled the permit to do the plumbing himself, but it did not pass inspection.

Appellant drew up a contract (Exhibit F) and he started doing the work. Appellant wrote

the second agreement (Exhibit G) because appellee did not pay appellant the full amount

when appellee gave him the invoice, and appellant felt appellee was not trustworthy.

Appellee gave appellant $500 initially, and then appellee gave appellant $2,000 cash on

December 6.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     4

        {¶9}   Appellant testified that, when he was working on the job, he never left tools

at the Harker home. However, the last day of the job, appellant left some of his tools there.

The next day when he returned, his tools were missing. None of appellee’s equipment

was taken. Appellant filed a police report detailing the equipment he lost.

        {¶10} Appellant cross-examined appellee. Appellee stated he did pull a plumbing

permit himself, but there were things on the permit he did not understand, so he

determined he needed to hire a plumber. Appellee testified that appellant told him if he

assigned the pending permit to appellant, the plumbing inspectors would be more lenient

on the inspection, so appellee signed the permit over to appellant. Appellee stated he

signed Exhibit F, which was a contract between the parties. Appellee stated he gave

appellant $500 up front, even though the contract says $700 up front, because appellant

verbally told appellee that $500 was sufficient pre-payment. Appellee gave appellant a

total of $2,500.

        {¶11} Appellee stated when appellant presented him an invoice with a $574.69

balance remaining, appellee asked appellant if everything was tight, sealed, and working.

When appellant presented appellee with a second invoice with the $574.69 plus $1,172.76

due, appellee became suspicious. Appellee “has a problem” with appellant charging him

for the parts listed at $1,172.76. Appellee requested appellant provide him with an

itemized list because appellee had “no idea” where the numbers came from. Further,

appellee does not believe he owes appellant the additional $1,172.76 because appellee

was not responsible for losing appellant’s tools.

        {¶12} Appellee testified that appellant did not complete the work listed in the

contract because appellant refused to fix a pipe he was supposed to fix under the
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     5

bathroom, and a drain was leaking. Appellee stated he does not owe appellant any more

money because he paid him the amount contained in the contract. Appellee testified that,

per the language of the contract, he believed appellant was going to completely fix

everything that needed to be done, specifically the drains, but that was not what happened

because, after two months of a “fiasco” with appellant, appellee still had to call somebody

else to come in and fix the property. Appellee’s interpretation of the contract was that

plumbing included “flush[ing] the toilet and [having] it go into the sewer and not drain or

leak nowhere else.” Further, appellee believes appellant did not abide by the contract

because he never asked appellee to choose products or materials.

        {¶13} Appellee then testified on direct examination. First, appellee does not

believe the contract is valid because appellant’s company is not legally recognized by the

State of Ohio. Second, if the contract is valid, appellee’s understanding of the contract is

that he hired appellant to fix the drains in the house, which would include “sewage stuff.”

When the amount was higher than listed in the contract, appellee asked appellant for an

itemized list of parts, which he never received. Appellee did not pay appellant because he

felt he was trying to get money by leaving his tools on the property. Appellee does not

believe it is his fault appellant left his tools there and they got stolen. Appellee paid

appellant a total of $2,500, and then paid Mr. Rooter $2,900 to fix the leaks and drain.

        {¶14} When the court stated it would take the matter under advisement, appellant

asked if he “could rebuttal with anything.” The court stated appellant could not testify, but

stated it would discuss the exhibits with the parties.

        {¶15} Exhibit F is the contract between the parties (“Contract”), dated August 12,

2021, a document drafted by appellant. It provides, in part, appellant would do “plumbing
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                      6

work in accordance with [the] Ohio plumbing code to install the drain, waste, and vent for

one-bathroom group consisting of one water closet, one bathtub, one lavatory, also to

include one kitchen sink.” It provided the total cost of the labor was not to exceed $1,500

and “total cost of material to be determined upon customer’s choice of products.” Exhibit

G is a document prepared by appellant entitled “Agreement of payment” (“Agreement”)

that states, “[appellant] has performed all required commitments and contracted plumbing

work on 300 Harker Ave. * * * [appellee] has agreed to pay $574.69 plus any final

expenses.” Further, “during the time this project [appellee] was to keep project secure and

he failed to do this by poor installation of a backdoor. Because of this [appellant] had tools

and equipment stolen from the project totaling $1,784.76 * * * a tentative agreement has

been reached were as [sic] [appellee] will pay $574.69 plus the additional material cost on

December 1,” or appellant will “seek reimbursement” for all items stolen. Exhibits H and I

are invoices appellant generated.

        {¶16} The magistrate issued a decision on June 16, 2022. The magistrate noted

that appellant filed suit to recover damages for labor, materials, and damages for his tools

allegedly stolen or missing from the job site at 300 Harker. The magistrate found as

follows: there was a contract between the parties; appellant performed some plumbing

work pursuant to the contract in order to have been paid $2,500 by appellee; appellant

submitted an agreement of payment and invoices that appellant compiled, but this is the

only evidence submitted to suggest appellant performed work for appellee; appellant never

testified to the contents of the exhibits or supported the contents of the exhibits with

additional evidence; appellant did not testify as to what work he actually performed;

appellant invoiced appellee for materials, but never submitted into evidence what these
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     7

materials were used for and how much each material cost; appellant did not present any

evidence as to how he arrived at the $2,434.45 in damages he requested; and appellant

never presented the court with a calculation of the hourly rate, how many hours were

worked, what materials were used, or the cost of the materials. With regards to the

$1,784.76 in damages for tools that went missing from 300 Harker, the magistrate stated,

“if in fact these tools were stolen from 300 Harker as alleged by Plaintiff, this would be a

criminal offense. As such, said alleged theft would need to be investigated and prosecuted

as such, not litigated in small claims court.” The magistrate concluded that, while appellant

did prove the existence of a contract, appellant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, performance, breach, or damages. The magistrate entered judgment in favor

of appellee.

       {¶17} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on June 30, 2022,

arguing: the magistrate erred in finding appellant failed to establish performance; the

magistrate erred in finding appellant failed to establish breach; and the magistrate erred in

finding appellant failed to establish damages. Appellant filed the following supplemental

objections on August 8, 2022: the magistrate erred in not allowing appellant to present

rebuttal evidence; the magistrate erred in not finding evidence of damages in Exhibit G;

the magistrate erred in not finding that Exhibit G had sufficient terms and consideration to

constitute an independent contract; the magistrate erred in finding no evidence of

performance of the original contract; and the magistrate erred in finding the tool theft was

the subject of criminal proceedings due to Exhibit G.

       {¶18} The trial court issued a judgment entry on August 25, 2022, adopting the

magistrate’s decision. The trial court first noted that Exhibits F and G, which appellant
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                      8

used as support for his objections, are documents that appellant drafted. The court found

appellant did not provide any evidence as to work he actually performed; thus, the court

was unable to determine from the evidence what work appellant performed for the $2,500

amount. Further, even if Exhibit G was an independent contract, appellant did not show

damages from an alleged breach, as appellant never provided any testimony or evidence

to support his request for $574.69 for labor and parts. The trial court cited the clause in

Exhibit F that the, “total cost of material [was] to be determined upon customer’s choice of

products.” The court also found appellant never testified or provided any evidence as to

what the $75.00 for “final expenses” was. The court determined the evidence presented

by both appellant and appellee confirmed the tools were stolen; thus, it is not a civil issue.

The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered judgment in favor of

appellee.

        {¶19} Appellant appeals the August 25, 2022 judgment entry of the Mansfield

Municipal Court and assigns the following as error:

        {¶20} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT HUDSON DID NOT

DEMONSTRATE THE DAMAGES HE REQUESTED.

        {¶21} II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT HUDSON DID NOT

DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAD COMPLETED WORK AND PAID FOR PARTS.

        {¶22} III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO AWARD DAMAGES

TO HUDSON.

        {¶23} IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO AWARD COURT

COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES TO HUDSON.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                      9

        {¶24} V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING HUDSON TO

PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE.”

                                              I., II., III.

        {¶25} In his first three assignments of error, appellant essentially argues the trial

court’s decision regarding performance, breach, and damages was against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

        {¶26} The magistrate conducted a bench trial in this case. In a manifest weight

of the evidence review in a civil case, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record and

determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972

N.E.2d 517. “In a civil case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance

of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each

element (sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of

persuasion (weight).” Id.

        {¶27} As an appellate court we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility

of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and

credible evidence upon which the fact-finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck Equip.

Co. v. Joseph A. Jeffries Co., 5th Dist. Stark No. CA5758, 1982 WL 2911 (Feb. 10, 1982).

Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent and credible evidence going to all

essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight

of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578

(1978). The underlying rationale for giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                      10

with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their

demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the

credibility of the proferred testimony. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,

461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Accordingly, a trial court may believe all, part, or none of the

testimony of any witness who appears before it. Rogers v. Hill, 124 Ohio App.3d 468, 706

N.E.2d 438 (4th Dist. 1998).

        {¶28} The sole count included in appellant’s complaint against appellee is a

breach of contract claim. The elements for a breach of contract are that a plaintiff must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a contract existed, (2) the plaintiff

fulfilled his obligations, (3) the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations, and (4) damages

resulted from this failure. Moore v. Adams, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007AP090066,

2008-Ohio-5953. The magistrate and trial court found appellant did prove the first element

(that a contract existed), but failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the

remaining three elements of a breach of contract claim.

        {¶29} Appellant makes several arguments as to why the trial court’s

determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

        {¶30} First, appellant contends the Agreement purportedly signed by the parties

on October 29, 2021, is a separate, definitive, and final contract that requires appellee to

pay $574.69 for labor and parts and $1,784.76 for tools stolen because he did not pay the

$574.69 by December 1. However, the “Agreement” document that appellant prepared

pro se specifically states, “a tentative agreement has been reached were [sic] as Mr. Jones

will pay $574.69 plus the additional material cost on December 1.” The meaning of the

word “tentative” is “not fully worked out or developed” or uncertain.” Merriam-Webster.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     11

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tentative (accessed April 1, 2023).           The

meaning of the word “tentative” is the “very antonym” of final or definitive. Woodward v.

Claser, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 57 Ohio Law Abs. 180, 93 N.E.2d 785 (1950).

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not commit error in finding the Agreement was not

a separate and independent contract upon which appellant could base his claim for breach

of contract.

        {¶31} Further, appellant argues that, even if the Agreement was not a separate,

independent contract, the Agreement is undisputed evidence that appellant completed the

job per the contract and undisputed evidence that appellee agreed to the amounts of

$574.69, $75.00, and $1,784.76 in damages because appellee purportedly signed the

document. The magistrate and trial court found Exhibit G was insufficient to establish

performance, breach, and damages.

        {¶32} We find this conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence

because appellee disputed the information contained in Exhibit G during his testimony.

Appellee testified upon direct examination that appellant did not fully perform the contract

because the contract states appellant would complete the plumbing work for the “drain,

waste, and vent for one-bathroom group,” and, after appellant completed his work, a pipe

under the bathroom was not fixed and a drain was leaking.            Appellee also testified

appellant did not provide him with a list of the cost of materials, despite multiple requests.

Appellee stated appellant did not abide by the contract because appellant did not allow

him to choose the materials. Appellant also testified he never agreed to pay for appellee’s

tools, and it was not his responsibility to secure appellant’s tools. Upon cross-examination,
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     12

appellee agreed he signed Exhibit F, the original contract. Appellant never asked appellee

about the Agreement (Exhibit G) during cross-examination.

        {¶33} The trier of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of

the witnesses and exhibits, and make a determination upon this disputed evidence.

Further, as to the tools, appellant only makes a breach of contract claim with regards to

the tools, not a tort claim. There is no provision for the securing of the property or payment

for tools in the Contract (Exhibit F).

        {¶34} Appellant contends that, even if performance, breach, and damages are not

stipulated to in the Agreement, the testimony and exhibits submitted by appellant

demonstrate performance, breach, and damages. Appellant cites to the testimony of

Waddle concerning the permit and final inspection, and the invoices submitted by appellant

to appellee.   While appellant is correct that Waddle testified the permit assigned to

appellant passed final inspection and that Mr. Rooter’s repair required a separate permit,

when asked whether the leaks were “outside of what [appellant] was contracted to do,”

Waddle responded, “that I can’t testify to.”      The permit and Contract are separate

documents, and Waddle could not testify to what was contained in the Contract. When

appellant asked Dawson if “his work” (appellant’s work) was in the scope of the work

Dawson fixed, Dawson stated he didn’t know what appellant was supposed to do, and

Dawson just fixed the leaks. Appellant did not testify as to what work he actually did in the

house, or explain what comprised the larger numbers contained in the invoices.

        {¶35} We find the magistrate and trial court’s conclusions are not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. While the magistrate and the trial court may not have

accorded appellant’s exhibits the credibility or weight appellant thought they deserved, the
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                     13

court acted within its discretion to evaluate all of the evidence presented and determine its

significance.

        {¶36} In this case, appellant contends he completed all of the plumbing work as

required by the contract. Appellee contends the plumbing underneath the bathroom and

the drain from the bathroom to the sewer was included in the contract, was not completed

by appellant per the contract, and had to be finished by Dawson at appellee’s additional

expense. The testimony of appellant and appellee is conflicting, and the trier of fact

resolved this conflict. There is some competent and credible evidence, in the form of

appellee’s testimony, upon which the trier of fact could base its decision. Appellant’s first,

second, and third assignments of error are overruled.

                                                 IV.

        {¶37} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court

committed error in declining to award court costs and attorney fees to appellant because

the parties agreed in the Agreement that appellee would pay “legal expenses.” In the

Agreement, the parties stated there was a “tentative agreement” that if appellee did not

pay $574.69 on December 1, appellee agreed to pay for legal expenses. As detailed

above, this “tentative agreement” does not constitute a contract. The Contract (Exhibit F)

does not include any terms concerning court costs or legal expenses.

        {¶38} R.C. 1925.15 governs costs in small claims proceedings and states, “the

actual disbursements of the prevailing party for filing fees, execution fees, and other court

fees may be allowed as costs. No other costs shall be allowed either party except by

special order of the court. Costs allowed under this section may be apportioned between

the parties, or waived, in whole or in part, as the court determines to be equitable.”
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                       14

Because appellant was not the prevailing party, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in not awarding appellant court costs pursuant to R.C. 1925.15.

        {¶39} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                   V.

        {¶40} In appellant’s fifth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court

committed error in not permitting appellant to present rebuttal evidence. At the conclusion

of appellee’s direct testimony, appellant asked the court if “he could rebuttal with anything.”

The trial court stated, “you can’t testify, no,” stating that appellant previously testified and

had cross-examined appellee; however, the trial court permitted appellant to move to admit

his exhibits. It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine what evidence is admissible

as proper rebuttal. State v. Rengert, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAA 10 0056, 2021-Ohio-

2561.

        {¶41} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s

request to provide his own statement in rebuttal. The record demonstrates appellant was

fully able to argue his case. At the beginning of appellant’s testimony, the court went

through each of appellant’s exhibits, and then asked appellant to “tell his side of the story.”

Appellant gave detailed testimony.        Appellant then asked if he could ask appellee

questions. The magistrate permitted appellant to extensively cross-examine appellee.

Appellant asked appellee numerous questions, and asked some of the same questions

repeatedly. Additionally, several times throughout the trial while questioning other

witnesses, appellant did not ask questions of the witnesses, but testified, or attempted to

testify, with his own statements. Appellant was able to thoroughly develop the breach of

contract issue before the magistrate, who was the trier of fact in this case.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                15

      {¶42} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

      {¶43} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                          16

       {¶44} The August 25, 2022 judgment entry of the Mansfield Municipal Court is

affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J., and

Delaney, J., concur;

Hoffman, J., concurs

separately
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0066                                                    17

Hoffman, J., concurring

       {¶45} I concur in the majority's analysis and disposition of Appellant's

assignments of error I, II, III, and IV.

       {¶46} I further concur in the majority's disposition of Appellant's assignment of

error V. I find the magistrate erred in not allowing Appellant to present rebuttal testimony.

However, Appellant fails to identify in his brief or affirm a proffer was made of what his

rebuttal testimony would have been. Accordingly, I find no prejudice resulted.