Court Opinion

ID: 9759131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:06:37.66182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.675831
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although laudably concerned with the needs of the circuit courts in dealing with “the exceptional problems which are the hallmark of complex litigation,” the principal opinion, in its zeal to uphold respondent’s “order,”1 unfortunately confers upon inferior courts far greater authority than permissible under the Constitution or our Rules of Civil Procedure, impedes access to the courts, and overly restricts rela-tors’ standing.
Relators have standing to challenge Paragraph 12(a) of respondent’s “order” as well as the discovery provisions of the “order.” Harrison v. Monroe County, 716 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. banc 1986); Arsenal Credit Union v. Giles, 715 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Mo. banc 1986). Paragraph 12(e) requires relators to serve on all parties the master identification list described in Paragraph 12(a). Paragraph 24 of respondent’s “order” provides:
The Court expects all counsel to cooperate in and respond promptly and in good faith to interrogatories, motions, requests to produce, deposition, procedures adopted in or applicable to these actions, and all orders of the Court. A failure to do so may result in a dismissal of a claim, striking of a defense, denial of the right of use of materials discovered, the assessment of costs, attorneys’ fees, damages, forfeitures, or other sanctions as provided by Supreme Court Rules, Local Rules, and case law. (Emphasis added.)
As with the discovery provisions, relators have a personal stake arising from a threatened or actual injury in their challenge to Paragraph 12(a). Under Paragraph 24, the threatened injury, including dismissal, is the same whether relators fail to comply with Paragraph 12(a) or the discovery requirements.
Thus, recognizing relators standing to challenge Paragraph 12(a) and the discovery provisions of respondent’s “order,” I would prohibit respondent from enforcing those provisions which are inconsistent with our Rules of Civil Procedure and unconstitutionally impede access to the courts.2
First, the challenged provisions are inconsistent with the rules of this Court and therefore void. “The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law.” Mo. Const, art. V, § 5. “The circuit judges of the circuit may make rules for the circuit not inconsistent with the rules of the supreme court.” Mo. Const, art. V, § 15.1. “[Tjrial courts may make rules governing the administration of judicial business if the rules are not inconsistent with the rules of this Court, the Constitution or statutory law in *308force.” Rule 50.01. Rules or orders made in excess of a court’s power are void. State ex rel. Geers v. Lasky, 449 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Mo. banc 1970); Wade v. Wade, 395 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo.App.1965). As conceded by the principal opinion, it is clear from Douglas v. Thompson, 286 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo.1956), that requirements imposed by a trial court which are in addition to requirements imposed under this Court’s rules are invalid if they either: (1) are inconsistent with our rules; or (2) are unreasonable or burdensome.
Paragraph 12(a) of respondent’s “order” is inconsistent with Rule 55.05, which prescribes what must be contained in a pleading setting forth a claim for relief. Our rule requires only that the pleading contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.” Running contrary to the simple requirements of Rule 55.05, Paragraph 12(a) of respondent’s “order” mandates that pleadings must be substantially enlarged and burdened with a “master identification list,” including:
(1) The asbestos-containing PRODUCTS to which the plaintiff contends he, she or the decedent was exposed, identified by brand name, if known, and if unknown, by generic name and specific application;
(2) For each product, the specific DEFENDANT to which the plaintiff attributes said product;
(3) For each product and attributed defendant the specific DATES during which, and specific LOCATIONS at which, the plaintiff contends he, she or the decedent was exposed;
(4) For each product and attributed defendant and corresponding date and location of exposure, the name, address, and telephone number of each PERSON who has knowledge of the use of said product for each date and location.
Clearly these additional pleading requirements found in Paragraph 12(a) are inconsistent with Rule 55.05 and therefore void. Mo. Cont. art. V, § 15.1; Rule 50.01. Assuming arguendo respondent’s “order” is not inconsistent with Rule 55.05, the added requirements of Paragraph 12(a) are “unreasonable, burdensome or difficult to comply with,” Douglas, 286 S.W.2d at 835, especially in view of the circumstances that it is imposed upon asbestos victims, some of whom are dying and many who were exposed to asbestos while working in the building trade industries over a period of years at countless job sites for numerous employers, and that by Paragraph 14(h)(12)(i) of respondent’s “order” an expedited deposition of such plaintiff cannot be held until this onerous requirement is met.
Similarly, the challenged discovery provisions of respondent’s “order” are inconsistent with our rules and therefore void.3 For example, Paragraph 14, regarding depositions, is inconsistent with our Rule 57.-03(b)(1), which requires only that a notice of deposition state “the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs.” However Paragraph 14(f) of respondent’s “order” additionally requires:
The notice of the taking of any deposition of any out-of-state or expert witness shall be accompanied with a statement giving (1) the name and address of the witness; (2) the field in which he or she is being offered as a witness; (3) the substance of the facts to which the proposed witness is expected to testify; (4) *309the substance of the opinions to which the proposed witness is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for such opinion; and (5) a summary of the proposed witness’ qualifications within the field in which he or she is expected to testify.
Such requirements are inconsistent with Rule 57.03(b)(1), as well as Rule 56.01(b)(4) pertaining to the scope of discovery of expert witnesses. Similarly, while Rule 57.-03(a) authorizes the taking of a deposition at any time after commencement of an action, even (by leave of court) prior to the expiration of thirty days after service of the summons and petition upon any defendant, Paragraph 14(h)(12)(i) of respondent’s “order” grants critically ill plaintiffs this right to an expedited deposition only upon terms more onerous than does Rule 57.-03(a). See Puckett v. Swift & Co., 229 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo.App.1950) (“a circuit court does not have the power to adopt a rule of practice which deprives a litigant of a right given it by law, or which grants that right upon terms more onerous than those fixed by law”). Additionally, Paragraph 14(h) of respondent’s “order” provides numerous restrictions and requirements for videotaped depositions directly contrary to or in addition to those found in Rule 57.03(c). Respondent in Paragraph 14(h) expressly purports to modify the Rules of Civil Procedure, and does so without authority.
Paragraphs 21(b) and (d) require a plaintiff to designate which witnesses he intends to call and the exhibits he anticipates offering at trial. In State ex rel. Gray v. Jensen, 395 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. banc 1965), we held that our rules do not permit discovery of the names of persons intended to testify at trial. See also State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Pfitzinger, 569 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Mo.App.1978). The principal opinion places form over substance in distinguishing Jensen based upon the timing of the forced disclosure. The point remains that Paragraphs 21(b) and (d) compel disclosure of nondiscoverable information. Moreover, this “inva[sion of] the work product of counsel and the privileged relationship between attorney and client,” Jensen, 395 S.W.2d at 146, is no less simply because of its timing.
Finally, Paragraph 23 of respondent’s “order” imposes time limitations upon plaintiffs for joinder of additional defendants inconsistent with Rule 52.06. Under Paragraph 23, “after thirty (30) days from the taking of the plaintiff’s deposition, or after one hundred fifty (150) days from the filing of the action, whichever comes first” plaintiff may join additional defendants only upon a showing of good cause; Rule 52.06 imposes no such express burden on plaintiff. Once again, respondent improperly attempts to grant relators a right given them by law only upon terms more onerous than those fixed by law. Puckett, 229 S.W.2d at 717.
In addition to exceeding respondent’s authority under Rule 50.01 as described above, the net effect of the “order” is to impede access to our courts in violation of Mo. Const, art. I, § 14. See, e.g., Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. banc 1979). Unless plaintiffs, including relators, comply with the unreasonable and burdensome requirements of respondent's “order,” their cause may be dismissed.
I only reluctantly concur in the principal opinion’s finding that relators lack standing to challenge Paragraphs 11, 12(b), 12(c), 12(d) and 13 of respondent’s “order.” My reluctance is grounded in several prudential concerns, including: it does not require a broad reading of the “order” to conclude that relators will be required to disclose the information described in those paragraphs; as Judge Welliver proffers in his dissent, we could hold that no standing is required of anyone to trigger our execution of our duty to assure free access to the courts; it seems highly inefficient if not unjust to deny standing, have respondent order the described disclosures, and have relator refile his petition for writ of prohibition, which then will have to again work its way *310through our courts; and, finally, it is troubling that if relators, or future plaintiffs, are ordered to make the required disclosures they may have to risk suffering a dismissal in order to challenge the order. However, if respondent's “order” is strictly read, these paragraphs do not apply to relators and therefore I concur in the finding of no standing as to relators’ challenges of them.
It is not within a trial court’s discretion to modify the Rules of Civil Procedure or to ignore prior case law. As to those portions of the “order” applicable to relators, described above, respondent has acted in excess of his jurisdiction and I would therefore make the preliminary rule absolute insofar as it pertains to those applicable provisions.

. Although the principal opinion finds it unnecessary to decide the issue, there can be little doubt that on its face respondent’s so-called "order" is in fact a rule as it purports to control all future asbestos cases filed in Jackson County-

. It is unnecessary to address relators’ additional challenges to the validity of respondent’s "order.”

. Relators also complain that read together, Paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21(b) are confusing and contradictory, and that Paragraphs 19 and 20 impose arbitrary deadlines upon plaintiffs that are not imposed upon defendants. Paragraph 18 provides inter alia that the discovery period shall be nine months from the filing of the petition. Paragraphs 19 and 20 limit plaintiffs to seven months in which to make certain disclosures, although they also provide for supplemental identification lists up to sixty days in advance of trial. These complaints offer further reason for us to exercise our discretion and make the preliminary rule absolute.