Court Opinion

ID: 9752008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:28:48.679375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:34.121625
License: Public Domain

*431McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting.
The author of the majority opinion has provided a perceptive and persuasive expression of position, but I am obliged to differ somewhat with that view. I do concur in the result of Section 1(A) of the majority opinion, since I believe that this Court is possessed of original jurisdiction to issue orders authorizing the interception of wire and electronic communications. I am constrained, however, to dissent from the holding of the majority on the issue of the constitutionality of the search warrants executed on January 27, 1990, because I would find that the warrants, authorizing the seizure of “all books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, memorandum, written communications, corporate records and/or indicia of ownership or control [of] any business enterprise ... ”, were unconstitutionally overbroad under Pennsylvania law.
The use of a search warrant as a general investigatory tool is prohibited by both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. “A search warrant serves to authorize the seizure of identifiable and existing property. It is not available as a general investigatory tool to be used in place of a grand jury ” In re Casale, 512 Pa. 548, 555, 517 A.2d 1260, 1263 (1986). “[M]ere suspicions do not constitute probable cause to support a search warrant.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 36, 47, 511 A.2d 796, 801 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 643, 93 L.Ed.2d 700 (1986). See also: Commonwealth v. Corleto, 328 Pa.Super. 522, 528-529, 477 A.2d 863, 866 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kanouff, 315 Pa.Super. 392, 394-395, 462 A.2d 251, 252 (1983).
Commonwealth v. Bagley, 408 Pa.Super. 188, 197-198, 596 A.2d 811, 815 (1991) (emphasis added), allo. denied, 531 Pa. 637, 611 A.2d 710 (1992), and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 606, 121 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992). In the instant case, while the investigating officers may have suspected that the defendants were utilizing business entities other than Brandt Oldsmobile in order to invest and launder proceeds from gambling activities, there was no reference of any kind whatsoever in *432the affidavit of probable cause to the use or investment of proceeds from the gambling activities in any such enterprise or business.
“It is a fundamental rule of law that a warrant must name or describe with particularity the property to be seized and the person or place to be searched____ In addition, the search may not go beyond the scope of the warrant.” Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 352 Pa.Super. 507, 513, 508 A.2d 589, 592 (1986), citing Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 8; Pa.R.Crim.P. 2005(b) and (c); and Commonwealth v. Searles, 450 Pa. 384, 302 A.2d 335 (1973). See also: Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 32, 549 A.2d 909, 910 (1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 3237, 111 L.Ed.2d 748 (1990); Commonwealth v. Bleigh, 402 Pa.Super. 169, 174-176, 586 A.2d 450, 453 (1991).
The particularity requirement prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad. These are two separate, though related, issues. A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize. This will result in general “rummaging” banned by the fourth amendment. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195, 48 S.Ct. 74, 75, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). A warrant unconstitutional for its overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation. The officers executing such a warrant will not rummage, but will “cart away all documents.” Application of Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1979). An overbroad warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search and seizure.
Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 69-70 n. 2, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n. 2 (1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3585, 82 L.Ed.2d 883 (1984). In interpreting the particularity requirement set forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court has said:
*433The language of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a warrant describe the items to be seized “as nearly as may be.... ” The clear meaning of the language is that a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible. This requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the description. The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to be as particular as is reasonably possible. See Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 31-32, 549 A.2d 909, 910 (1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (Pennsylvania particularity requirement more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment because Pennsylvania particularity requirement precedes probable cause requirement).
It is settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that a warrant must specifically list the things to be seized. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). “The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). The more rigorous Pennsylvania constitutional provision requires no less.
Although some courts have treated overbreadth and ambiguity as distinct defects in warrants, e.g. Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 68 n. 2, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n. 2 (1982), both doctrines diagnose symptoms of the same disease: a warrant whose description does not describe as nearly as may be those items for which there is probable cause. Consequently, in any assessment of the validity of the description contained in a warrant, a court must initially determine for what items probable cause existed. The sufficiency of the description must then be measured against those items for which there was *434probable cause. Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and the description in the warrant requires suppression. An unreasonable discrepancy reveals that the description was not as specific as was reasonably possible.
Commonwealth v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290, 296-297, 555 A.2d 896, 899-900 (1989) (footnote omitted).
Commonwealth v. Bagley, supra 408 Pa.Super. at 195-197, 596 A.2d at 814-815 (emphasis added). Accord: Commonwealth v. Friedman, 411 Pa.Super. 628, 602 A.2d 371, 379-380 (1992), allo. denied, 532 Pa. 650, 615 A.2d 340 (1992).
The affidavit of probable cause submitted by Officer Tea-garden in support of the application for the search warrants concluded with a request for the issuance of search warrants for “the above described items and/or premises and/or person described in the instant warrant”. However, as counsel for appellants recounted in a compelling presentation, the affidavit never mentioned, much less described, any businesses or bank accounts utilized by any of the co-conspirators other than Brandt Oldsmobile.1 The affidavit contained no information whatsoever concerning the existence of profits derived from the gambling activities or the investment or utilization of any such profits or proceeds. The authorizations, in the search warrants themselves, are similarly deficient since there are no references to money-laundering activities and yet the executing officers are directed to seize the records of any business enterprise pursuant to the command to seize “all books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, memorandum, written communications, corporate records and/or indicia of ownership or control [of] any business enterprise including but not limited to Brandt Oldsmobile”. (Emphasis added). Thus, the warrant was, in my view, fatally defective. See e.g., U.S. v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1509 (9th Cir.1989); U.S. v. LeBron, *435729 F.2d 533, 536-537 (8th Cir.1984); Commonwealth v. Bagley, supra, 408 Pa.Super. 188, 596 A.2d 811; Commonwealth v. Grossman, supra, 521 Pa. 290, 555 A.2d 896.
The Commonwealth argues that, even if the warrant was defective, admission into evidence of the materials produced by the warrants was harmless error and did not compose such error as to require a new trial. Appellate consideration of this contention requires the application of the Story test:
[A]n error may be harmless where the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 412, 383 A.2d 155, 166 (1978). See also: Commonwealth v. Correa, 423 Pa.Super. 57, 70 n. 9, 620 A.2d 497, 504 n. 9 (1993); Commonwealth v. Foy, 531 Pa. 322, 325, 612 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1992); Commonwealth v. Moore, 389 Pa.Super. 473, 480, 567 A.2d 701, 705 (1989), allo. denied, 525 Pa. 597, 575 A.2d 563 (1990). My examination of the record precludes a determination that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.

. The affidavit noted only that the late model maroon Oldsmobile operated by Robert Iannelli was registered to Brandt Oldsmobile, and that two calls to Brandt Oldsmobile, regarding the scheduling of a meeting at Brandt Oldsmobile, had been intercepted via the court-authorized wiretap.