Court Opinion

ID: 9373721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:55.871476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.361086
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ROY NELLIKKATTIL KOSHY,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DA-3443-21-0311-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: May 5, 2022
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Roy Nellikkattil Koshy, Garland, Texas, pro se.

           Bobbi Mihal, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant
     argues the following: (1) the Board has chapter 75 jurisdiction over his appeal;
     (2) the agency discriminated against him; (3) he suffered a compensable injury;
     and (4) his appeal was timely filed.       Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     at 6-12. 2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective December 7, 2019, the agency appointed the appellant to the
     position of Rural Carrier. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 17. Thereafter, the
     appellant applied to and was selected for the position of Postal Support Employee
     Sales and Services Distribution Associate (PSE SSDA). Id. at 24-28; IAF, Tab 1
     at 14, Tab 6 at 4. On September 3, 2020, an agency official stated via email that
     the appellant would need a “mandatory” 5-day break in service between both
     positions and that, accordingly, his last day in his Rural Carrier position would be

     2
       With his petition for review, the appellant provides an annotated computer printout of
     the status of job applications that he has submitted for various positions with the
     agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. This document, however, was part of the record before
     the administrative judge; thus, it does not constitute new evidence. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 9 at 13; see Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980)
     (explaining that the Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new
     evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different
     from that of the initial decision).
                                                                                       3

     September 6, 2020.    IAF, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 6 at 4.     Subsequently, the agency
     processed a Postal Form 50 reflecting that the appellant resigned from his Rural
     Carrier position effective September 6, 2020. IAF, Tab 7 at 18. The record,
     however, does not contain a resignation letter from the appellant. In fact, the
     appellant averred below that he did not resign from this position, consistent with
     advice in the PSE SSDA job offer letter notifying him that he should not resign
     from his current position. IAF, Tab 1 at 32.
¶3         Six days later, on September 12, 2020, the appellant received a temporary
     appointment to the PSE SSDA position.          IAF, Tab 7 at 19.   By letter dated
     September 17, 2020, the agency advised the appellant that, due to eligibility
     reasons, his PSE SSDA offer was being rescinded.         IAF, Tab 1 at 20.     The
     appellant alleged below that he was notified by the agency’s Human Resources
     personnel that the reason for his separation was that he had not been a resident of
     the U.S. for 5 years preceding a National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI)
     background investigation. Id. at 21. The record reflects that the appellant had
     been a permanent resident of the U.S. since December 29, 2015 , and therefore had
     been residing lawfully in the U.S. for approximately 4 years and 9 months prior to
     that time. Id. at 33. Moreover, the record does not contain any official U.S.
     Postal Service, Office of Personnel Management, or Department of Defense rules
     or regulations requiring a 5-year residency requirement to conduct a NACI check,
     nor does it demonstrate why the 5-year waiting period did not preclude the
     appellant from obtaining a background check for his original Rural Carrier
     position.
¶4         According to the appellant, he was instructed by the agency to return to
     work as a Rural Carrier on September 17, 2020, and he continued to perform in
     that position until September 26, 2020. Id. at 31. The appellant averred that, on
     September 28, 2020, his supervisor advised him that he had been removed from
                                                                                       4

     the agency’s payroll system, despite lacking any notice of the same. 3 Id. at 31.
     The agency officially terminated the appellant from the PSE SSDA position on
     December 18, 2020. IAF, Tab 7 at 20.
¶5         On June 21, 2021, approximately 6 months after being terminated from the
     PSE SSDA position, the appellant filed a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1. On his
     initial appeal form, the appellant indicated that he was challenging both an
     involuntary resignation and the agency’s failure to restore/reemploy/reinstate
     him. Id. at 3.
¶6         The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
     and/or on the basis of timeliness.       IAF, Tab 7 at 4-15.        Thereafter, the
     administrative judge issued an order to show cause explaining the circumstances
     under which the Board has jurisdiction over the removal of a U.S. Postal Service
     employee and ordering the appellant to submit evidence and argument regarding
     jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 8 at 2-4. The appellant filed a response contending that
     the Board had chapter 75 jurisdiction over his appeal and that the agency had
     engaged in discrimination and prohibited personnel practices. IAF, Tab 9 at 5 -8.
     He also averred that he had completed his probationary period and reitera ted that
     the agency had mandated the break in service between his two positions with the
     agency, i.e., Rural Carrier and PSE SSDA. Id. at 6-8, 15.
¶7         Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction.     IAF,
     Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 5-6.     In so doing, she reasoned that the
     appellant had seemingly argued that the agency had forced him to resign and then
     failed to reinstate him. ID at 4. She found, however, that the appellant had failed
     to allege that he was a preference eligible, a management or supervisory
     employee, or an employee engaged in personnel work in other than a purely

     3
       It appears that the agency could have returned the appellant to his original Rural
     Carrier position, but it did not do so. The appellant asserted below that the agency
     instead appointed two young individuals as Rural Carriers. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
                                                                                            5

     nonconfidential clerical capacity and, therefore, the Board lacked jurisdiction
     over the matter. ID at 5. She also found that, to the extent the appellant had
     raised claims of discrimination, prohibited personnel practices, or retaliation, his
     claims did not confer jurisdiction on the Board insofar as such claims are not an
     independent basis of Board jurisdiction.        Id.   The administrative judge also
     implicitly concluded that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the matter as a
     restoration appeal, explaining that “[a]t no time during the pendency of [the]
     appeal ha[d] the appellant made mention of a compensable injury.” ID at 1 n.1.
     The administrative judge explained that, given her conclusion regarding
     jurisdiction, she did not need to address the timeliness of the appeal. ID at 2 n.2.
¶8         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
     response. PFR File, Tabs 1, 3. In his petition, the appellant argues the following:
     (1) the Board has chapter 75 jurisdiction over his appeal; (2) the agency
     discriminated against him; (3) he has suffered “significant ha rdships and mental
     trauma due to the unlawful decisions” of agency human resources personnel; and
     (4) his appeal was timely filed. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6 -12.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶9         In order for a Postal Service employee to appeal an adverse actio n under
     chapter 75, the employee must (1) be a preference eligible, a management or
     supervisory employee, or an employee engaged in personnel work in other than a
     purely nonconfidential clerical capacity; and (2) have completed 1 year of current
     continuous   service   in   the   same    or   similar positions.    See   5   U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii); 39 U.S.C. § 1005(a)(4)(A)(ii); Clark v. U.S. Postal Service,
     118 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 7 (2012).            Here, we discern no basis to disturb the
     administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed t o make a nonfrivolous
     allegation that he is a preference eligible, a management or supervisory
     employee, or an employee engaged in personnel work in other than a purely
                                                                                              6

      nonconfidential clerical capacity. ID at 5. 4 Thus, we agree that the Board lacks
      chapter 75 jurisdiction over the matter. 5 Similarly, we discern no basis to disturb
      the administrative judge’s conclusion that, absent an otherwise appealable action,
      the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims of discrimination. Id.; see
      Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980) (explaining that
      prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are not an independent
      source of Board jurisdiction), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
¶10         The appellant seemingly argues that he suffered a compensable injury, i.e.,
      “significant hardships and mental trauma due to the unlawful decisions” of
      agency human resources personnel.             PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12.          Federal
      employees,    including    Postal   Service    employees,     who    suffer   on-the-job
      compensable injuries enjoy certain rights to be restored to their pr evious or
      comparable positions.     See Tat v. U.S. Postal Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 562, ¶ 9
      (2008); 5 C.F.R. part 353. To be entitled to any such rights, an employee must
      have been “separated or furloughed from an appointment without time
      limitation . . . as a result of a compensable injury.” 5 C.F.R. § 353.103(b). Here,
      however, the appellant’s vague references to hardships and mental trauma do not
      confer jurisdiction on the Board or otherwise warrant a different outcome.
      Indeed, the appellant does not discernably allege that he suffered an on-the-job
      injury; rather, he ostensibly alleges that he experienced mental hardship and

      4
        Indeed, all of the Postal Service Form 50s in the record contained a veterans’
      preference code of “1,” indicating that the appellant is not a preference eligible. E.g.,
      IAF, Tab 1 at 7; see Hay v. U.S. Postal Service, 103 M.S.P.R. 167, ¶¶ 3-4 (2006)
      (discussing veterans’ preference codes on Postal Service Form 50s).
      5
        The agency’s actions in this case present almost a classic case of the provision of
      misinformation that unfortunately led to the appellant’s involuntary separation. Even if
      the Board were to find that the appellant established that his resignation was
      involuntary, however, the Board would lack jurisdiction over his appeal under
      chapter 75. See Paige v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 11 (2007) (clarifying
      that, to the extent the appellant raised an involuntary resignation claim, it is dismissed
      as an appeal outside the Board’s jurisdiction because the appellant failed to show that
      he was an agency employee with chapter 75 appeal rights).
                                                                                            7

      trauma when agency human resources personnel removed him from his position.
      Thus, we agree that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the matter.
¶11         Accordingly, while we sympathize with the appellant’s situation and,
      specifically, with his assertion that he never intended to resign from his Rural
      Carrier position, we must affirm the initial decision given the Board’s lack of
      jurisdiction over this matter. 6

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
             You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.             5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights , the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
             Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to revi ew your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      6
       Because the appellant’s petition does not meet the Board’s crite ria for review, we do
      not reach the issue of the timeliness of the appeal. Nevertheless, we note that the
      agency never provided the appellant with notice of any appeal rights.
      7
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          8

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                  9

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, co sts, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     10

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’ s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.