Court Opinion

ID: 9406842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-04 12:07:20.760087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.631838
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-22-00177-CR

                                           Kevin DEBNAM,
                                              Appellant

                                                 v.

                                         The STATE of Texas,
                                               Appellee

                     From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2019CR6484
                           Honorable Stephanie R. Boyd, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 28, 2023

AFFIRMED

           This appeal concerns the admission of evidence against Appellant Kevin Debnam at his

trial for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            BACKGROUND

           One evening after dark, Michael Crews discovered Debnam burglarizing his car. Debnam

was inside the car, which was parked in the Crews’ driveway. Michael pulled Debnam out of the

car and began to fight him. While fighting him, Michael heard a loud bang. He realized the bang
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came from Debnam’s gun. Michael continued fighting Debnam, keeping him close to prevent

Debnam from aiming his gun at him. The gun went off again but did not strike Michael.

       Jacqueline Crews, Michael’s wife, came out of the house to investigate the gunshot sounds.

She saw Michael fighting with Debnam. Michael yelled for Jacqueline to get his brother, Drew.

Jacqueline went inside to find Drew. While inside, Jacqueline grabbed her phone to call 911.

       When Drew stepped outside the house, he found Michael fighting with Debnam and joined

in the fight. Then Michael heard Drew scream, “He stabbed me! He stabbed me!” The men

scrambled to take Debnam’s knife, and Debnam bit Drew on the hand.

       Michael’s neighbor, Michael Tovar, heard the gunshots. It took him a moment to figure

out where the sound had originated, but once he collected his flashlight and used it to illuminate

the Crews’ driveway, he saw that Debnam had a gun and that Michael was holding Debnam in a

chokehold. Tovar approached the men and stepped on Debnam’s wrist to remove the gun from

his hand. Michael either asked Tovar for his help or to call the police. Tovar took the gun to his

house and placed it on his porch while he waited for the police. Michael and Drew held Debnam

down until police arrived.

       Debnam was charged with aggravated assault for shooting a deadly weapon at Michael.

At trial, a jury heard the witnesses testify on the altercation in the Crews’ driveway and watched a

video of San Antonio Police Department’s Detective Michael Alvarez’s interview with Debnam

about the assault. The jury convicted Debnam of the aggravated assault, as charged. The trial

court sentenced Debnam to thirteen years in prison. Debnam now appeals the judgment, arguing

that much of the evidence against him was erroneously admitted.

                                      APPELLANT’S ISSUES

       In this appeal, Debnam raises four issues. First, he argues that the trial court erroneously

admitted a 911 call recording because the statements in the recording were testimonial and did not

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properly qualify as excited utterances. Second, he argues that the trial court should not have

admitted testimony regarding a stabbing that occurred during the aggravated assault, because the

allegation amounted to an uncharged and therefore extraneous act under Texas Rule of Evidence

404(b). Third, he argues that the trial court should not have re-admitted or considered evidence of

the stabbing in the punishment phase. Fourth, he argues that the trial court erroneously admitted

and published a recording of his interrogation though he could be heard requesting an attorney.

          In addressing Debnam’s issues on appeal, we will begin with Debnam’s constitutional

claims.

                            INTERROGATION VIDEO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

A.        Parties’ Arguments

          Debnam argues that he requested an attorney during his interrogation by Detective Alvarez,

that this request could be heard in his interrogation video as it was being published to the jury, and

that any statements following his request should not have been published to the jury. He argues

that the continued publication of his interrogation after his request could be heard on the video

violated his constitutional rights.

          The State contends that 1) Debnam waived his argument by failing to identify at trial where

his request for counsel occurs in the interrogation video, 2) he inadequately briefed his complaint

by similarly failing to identify where in the interrogation video his request for counsel occurs, and

3) he failed to establish harm.

B.        Standard of Review

          In general, this court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

See Hernandez v. State, 825 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no pet.). In reviewing a

trial court’s decision to admit confession evidence obtained during a police interrogation, this court

reviews de novo those questions not turning on credibility and demeanor. See Umana v. State,

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447 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Guzman v. State,

955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

C.       Law

         Generally, a coerced confession 1 should not be admitted at trial.2 See Zuliani v. State, 903

S.W.2d 812, 820 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref’d). If a coerced confession is presented at

trial, and the accused properly objects, 3 then the trial court can reasonably be expected to sustain

the objection. See Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Johnson, J.,

dissenting); accord Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 820. This may be true, even if the objection occurs

after admission and during publication of the confession evidence. See Mendoza v. State, No. 08-

17-00230-CR, 2019 WL 6271271, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 25, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (citing Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1992)).

D.       Analysis

         Here, Debnam’s attorney objected to the continued publication of the State’s interrogation

video at trial when he believed he heard Debnam request an attorney. See Mendoza, 2019 WL

6271271, at *4.        The trial court excused the jury to review Debnam’s objection and the

interrogation video. Outside the presence of the jury, the State re-played the portion of the video

1
  A confession may be considered coerced, for example, if it is obtained through continued questioning after a suspect
has requested an attorney. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)).
2
  This rule is not without exceptions, such as “door opening” by the accused. See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713,
716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Lykins v. State, 784 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)).
3
  A proper objection depends on whether 1) the accused objects as soon as the basis for his objection becomes apparent
and 2) the accused states his objection with sufficient specificity (or the grounds for the objection are contextually
apparent). See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); Mendoza v. State, No. 08-17-00230-CR, 2019 WL 6271271, at *4 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Nov. 25, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing London v. State, 490
S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).

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that elicited Debnam’s objection. 4 See Lankston, 827 S.W.2d at 909. The State argued, and the

trial court agreed, that no request for counsel could be heard. Debnam’s attorney maintained his

objection that a request for counsel could be heard. The trial court overruled Debnam’s objection.

         In reviewing the interrogation video de novo, we agree that a request for counsel could not

be heard in the recording. We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Debnam’s

objection. See Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 351. Accordingly, we do not reach the State’s argument

concerning harm. See Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 823.

         Debnam’s fourth issue concerning the interrogation video evidence is overruled. We now

move on to Debnam’s first issue, the admission of 911 call evidence.

                                       911 CALL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

A.       Parties’ Arguments

         Debnam contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the 911 call in this case

because it was testimonial in nature and not qualified to be admitted under the excited utterance

exception to the rule against hearsay.

         The State disagrees and contends the 911 call squarely fell under the excited utterance

exception to the rule against hearsay and was properly admitted.

B.       Standard of Review

         Typically, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination of whether evidence is

admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule only for an abuse of discretion.

See Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at

4
  According to the reporter’s record, the parties and the trial court understood that the objectionable portion of the
interrogation video began at internal timestamp 1:34:24. Therefore, Debnam’s objection met the requirement of Rule
103(a)(1)(B). See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B).

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595‒96). But “we review a constitutional legal ruling, i.e., whether a statement is testimonial or

non-testimonial, de novo.” Id. (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)).

C.     Law

       Out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted are generally

inadmissible at trial. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d), 802; Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595. But there are

several exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including excited utterances. See TEX. R. EVID. 803;

Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595.

       An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while

the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” TEX. R. EVID.

803(2); McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Such an utterance is

considered trustworthy “because it represents an event speaking through the person rather than the

person speaking about the event.” Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595 (citing Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d

387, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)). 911 calls are often an example of this exception. See, e.g.,

Harrell v. State, No. 05-18-01133-CR, 2021 WL 4438150, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 28,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.

813, 827–28 (2006); Gaeta v. State, No. 05-14-01202-CR, 2016 WL 3870665, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Dallas July 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Neal v. State, 186 S.W.3d

690, 693–94 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Kearney v. State, 181 S.W.3d 438, 441–43 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d)).

       Whether a particular 911 call qualifies as an excited utterance can depend on the time

elapsed since the startling event and whether the statement was in response to a question, though

these factors are not necessarily dispositive. See Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595 (citing Salazar v.

State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Najar v. State,

618 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim.

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App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n. 18 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998)).

               The critical determination is “whether the declarant was still
               dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event”
               or condition at the time of the statement. McFarland [v. State], 845
               S.W.2d [824, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled on other
               grounds by Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 263 n.18]. Stated differently, a
               reviewing court must determine whether the statement was made
               “under such circumstances as would reasonably show that it resulted
               from impulse rather than reason and reflection.” Fowler v. State,
               379 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).

Id. (emphasis added).

       Once a court decides that a statement qualifies as an excited utterance, it must also decide

whether a statement is testimonial, i.e., whether the declarant “comprehend[s] the larger

significance of his words” in a legal sense. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (citing United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005)). This inquiry is both separate

and related. Id. Its determination will turn on “whether the declarant knowingly provided the

functional equivalent of testimony to a government agent.” Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 443 (quoting

State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849 (Wash. 2005)). We consider that “[i]n most cases, one who calls

911 for emergency help is not ‘bearing witness,’ whereas calls made to the police simply to report

a crime may conceivably be considered testimonial.” Id.

D.     Analysis

       In the 911 call admitted at trial, Jacquelyn can immediately be heard shouting, “Don’t let

him go!” As soon as the operator begins speaking, Jacquelyn breathlessly exclaims, “Hello—yes!

I need a—I need a police!” As the operator asks for Jacquelyn’s address, Jacquelyn spits out in a

panicked voice that someone was in the driveway; the two voices overlap. Jacquelyn then gives

her address, sounding as though she is hyperventilating. She says “San Antonio” twice at the end

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of it. The operator asks if any weapons are involved, and Jacquelyn answers, “Yes! They shot at

my husband! He shot at my husband!”

       At trial, Jacquelyn testified that she heard two gunshots close to her house and ran outside.

She heard scuffling next to her brother-in-law’s car and saw her husband holding a stranger on the

ground. He screamed at her to get his brother. She ran inside to get her brother-in-law and to grab

her phone. Jacquelyn’s brother-in-law ran outside, and then Jacquelyn called 911.

       Appellant now argues that Jacquelyn was “presumably . . . repeating what [her husband]

told her.” But there is no testimony that Jacquelyn received information from her husband to recite

during the 911 call. In this respect, Debnam’s characterization of the evidence is imprecise.

       Considering the factors described in Zuliani, we note, first, that no time elapsed between

the startling event and Jacquelyn’s 911 call. See Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595. Rather, the record

shows that the conflict in the Crews’ driveway was continuing to develop while she was on the

911 call. Next, Jacquelyn was answering questions posed by the 911 operator, but the questions

did not “bear any of the official, formal qualities of the police interactions the Confrontation Clause

was intended to protect against.” Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442 (citing People v. Corella, 18 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). Instead, Jacquelyn’s answers were explicitly given to

obtain police assistance. See id. In deciding whether Jacquelyn “‘was still dominated by the

emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event’ or condition at the time of the statement,” we

consider that Jacquelyn sounded breathless and panicked and that she was describing an event that

epitomizes the type expected to elicit an excited utterance. See id. We conclude that the

circumstances described in the record led to a reasonable inference that Jacquelyn’s statements

during the 911 call “resulted from impulse rather than reason and reflection.” See Zuliani, 903

S.W.2d at 595. Therefore, Jacquelyn’s 911 call reasonably qualified as an excited utterance as

defined in Rule 803(2). See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).

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         In considering whether Jacquelyn’s 911 call was testimonial, we conclude that it was not.

There is no indication in the record that Jacquelyn comprehended the larger legal significance of

her statements while she called for police assistance. See Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742.

         Based on the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 911 call

recording at trial. See Zuliani, 903 S.W.2d at 595; Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742. Debnam’s first issue

is overruled.

                                    UNCHARGED ACTS AT TRIAL

A.       Parties’ Arguments

         In his second issue, Debnam argues that the trial court allowed stabbing evidence in a gun

assault case in violation of Rule 404(b), which prohibits admitting evidence of uncharged acts to

prove that a defendant acted in conformity with his character. Debnam also complains that the

State filed no pretrial notice of its intent to introduce the uncharged stabbing act. The State argues

that 1) Debnam waived this argument at trial, and 2) if he did not waive it, the stabbing evidence

was admissible as inextricably interwoven with the charged gun assault crime.              As “same

transaction context evidence,” the stabbing evidence would require no advance notice of intent to

admit.

B.       Standard of Review

         “The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under rules

403 and 404(b), and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of

discretion.” McDonald v. State, 829 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no pet.)

(citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

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C.        Law

          1. Other Acts Evidence Under Rule 404(b)

          Under Rule 404(b), evidence of an accused’s extraneous acts is inadmissible to prove an

accused’s character and actions in conformity. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); Redmond v. State,

629 S.W.3d 534, 542 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d). But “other acts” evidence may

be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Valdesgalvan v. State, 664

S.W.3d 407, 413 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet. h.). If an accused makes a pretrial request

for disclosure of “other acts” evidence, then the State must file a notice of intent—unless the

evidence arises from the same transaction as the charged offense and provides context. See TEX.

R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.); Worthy v. State, 312 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

          2. Same Transaction Contextual Evidence

          “Same transaction contextual evidence” is information that is “essential to understanding

the context and circumstances of events which, although legally separate offenses, are blended or

interwoven.” Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Mayes v.

State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 86 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). It requires no notice of intent. Worthy,

312 S.W.3d at 37 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)). “[A] jury [simply] has a right to hear what

occurred immediately before and after the offense in order to realistically evaluate the evidence,”

because events do not occur in a vacuum. McDonald v. State, 148 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (citing Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000)).     But the contextual evidence must nevertheless be necessary to assist the jurors’

understanding, “either because: (1) several offenses are so intermixed or connected as to form a

single, indivisible criminal transaction, such that in narrating the one, it is impracticable to avoid

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describing the other; or (2) the same transaction contextual evidence tends to establish some

evidentiary fact, such as motive or intent.” Id. (citing Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 33‒34 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993); Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

       3. Waiver

       If, however, an accused fails to lodge an objection against Rule 404(b) evidence, then the

testimony or exhibit will not be subject to evaluation under this rubric on appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a); Webb v. State, 557 S.W.3d 690, 698 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing

Conrad v. State, 10 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d)). “A party waives

error regarding the erroneous admission of evidence if the same or substantially similar evidence

has been previously admitted in the proceeding without objection.” Webb, 557 S.W.3d at 698

(citing Conrad, 10 S.W.3d at 46).

D.     Analysis

       At trial, Michael testified that Debnam stabbed his brother:

Q:     What happened next after you and Drew were on top of—

A:     I was holding him down. Next thing I know, I heard my brother scream, “He stabbed me!

       He stabbed me!” So then, I guess, we figured he had a knife, too. And we had—we got

       that from him, too.

Q:     Did you see the knife in his hand?

A      I didn’t see the knife in his hand until after the—after everything was done, the scuffle was

       over.

Q:     Okay. And so where did he stab your brother?

A:     The leg and then the hand.

Debnam did not object.

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       Later, when Drew testified, Debnam objected to photographs of the knife used to stab Drew

as irrelevant, since the charged crime did not include “this alleged knife incident.” The State

responded that the evidence belonged to the same transaction as the shooting and provided context.

The trial court overruled Debnam’s objection and admitted the photographs. We now conclude

that Debnam waived any error as to his relevance objection because substantially similar evidence

was admitted during Michael’s testimony without objection. See Webb, 557 S.W.3d at 698.

       We now turn to Debnam’s third issue.

                         UNCHARGED ACTS IN THE PUNISHMENT PHASE

A.     Parties’ Arguments

       Debnam argues that evidence relating to the stabbing of Michael’s brother, Drew, was

unadjudicated and irrelevant as to Debnam’s aggravated assault against Michael. Debnam argues

that stabbing evidence should not have been admitted or considered during the punishment phase

of his aggravated assault trial relating to Michael.

       The State argues that the trial court acted within its discretion to admit and consider

evidence of Drew’s stabbing during the punishment phase of Debnam’s aggravated assault trial

relating to Michael.

B.     Standard of Review

       Like guilt-innocence phase rulings, we review a trial court’s punishment phase rulings as

to the admissibility of extraneous offense evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See

Lamb v. State, 186 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Roberts

v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d)). But at this phase,

evidence that may not have been deemed admissible during the guilt-innocence phase may be

deemed admissible if relevant to punishment. Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07,

§ 3(a)(1); Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.

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ref’d)). The trial court “is the authority on the threshold issue of the admissibility of relevant

evidence during the punishment phase.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996)). “As long as the trial court’s ruling was within the ‘zone of reasonable

disagreement,’ there is no abuse of discretion, and we must uphold the ruling.” Id. (citing Roberts,

29 S.W.3d at 600).

C.      Law

        As noted, under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court could deem relevant

and admissible a broad range of evidence in the punishment trial phase, including evidence of an

unadjudicated act:

                 [E]vidence may be offered by the [S]tate and the defendant as to any
                 matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not
                 limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general
                 reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the
                 circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and,
                 notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Criminal
                 Evidence, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that
                 is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been
                 committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally
                 responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged
                 with or finally convicted of the crime or act.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1); accord Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004). “Same transaction contextual evidence” 5 is generally considered admissible at

punishment. See Ramos v. State, No. 01-14-00831-CR, 2015 WL 6486647, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Bluitt,

137 S.W.3d at 54).

5
  As stated in the previous section, “[s]ame-transaction contextual evidence is evidence of another crime that is so
‘intermixed, blended, or connected with’ the charged crime that it forms an indivisible criminal transaction.” Ramos
v. State, No. 01-14-00831-CR, 2015 WL 6486647, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Lamb v. State, 186 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).

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        But more importantly, “[a] reoffer of guilt-innocence evidence at the punishment phase has

‘no effect on the use of that evidence in the punishment phase of trial,’ as the jury is free to consider

guilt-innocence evidence during the punishment phase.” See Ramos, 2015 WL 6486647, at *3

(citing Rayme v. State, 178 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)).

D.      Analysis

        In the last section, we concluded that Debnam waived his complaint regarding stabbing

evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. Notwithstanding the trial court’s broad

discretion to admit evidence it deems relevant at sentencing, our conclusion regarding Debnam’s

waiver remains the same and similarly applies: Debnam waived his trial objection to stabbing

evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Rayme, 178 S.W.3d at 27. Given that evidence admitted

during the guilt-innocence phase may be considered during the punishment phase of trial, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Debnam’s objection to stabbing evidence in the

punishment phase. His third issue is overruled.

                                             CONCLUSION

        Based on the evidence, we conclude (1) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to

continue publishing its interrogation video after Debnam’s Fifth Amendment Miranda objection,

(2) the trial court did not err by admitting the State’s recording of Jacqueline Crews’ 911 call, (3)

Debnam waived any objection regarding the admission of stabbing evidence during the guilt-

innocence phase of his trial, and (4) Debnam waived any objection regarding the admission of

stabbing evidence during the punishment phase of his trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                     Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Do Not Publish

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