Court Opinion

ID: 9702495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:14:03.047364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.030083
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
with whom DANA, J. joins, dissenting.
[¶ 11] The language of 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(10) (Supp.1996) is clear on its face, limiting its application to “divorces ordered after January 1,1990.” The Court, however, concludes that the meaning of this phrase has been altered or nullified by the subsequent codification to the Child Support Guidelines. In my view, this conclusion is not supported by the statutory language, is speculative, and is at odds with principles of statutory construction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 12] When we interpret a statute, our only goal is to determine the expressed intention of the Legislature. As a first step in that exercise, we examine, as we must, the language that the Legislature used in order to ascertain the meaning of the statute. We have said that
[t]he Legislative intent in a statute must primarily be ascertained from the language thereof and not from conjecture. In other words, the Court will first seek to find the Legislative intention from words, phrases and sentences which make up the subject matter of the statute. If the meaning of the language is plain the Court will look no further; it is interpreted to mean exactly what it says.
Sweeney v. Dahl, 140 Me. 133, 140, 34 A.2d 673, 676 (1943) (citation omitted). We have repeated that admonition consistently over time.8 We can give effect to statutes “only to the extent, to which they may be made operative by a fair and liberal construction of the language used. [Our] province [is not] to supply defective enactments by an attempt to carry out fully the purposes, which may be supposed to have occasioned those enactments. This would be but an assumption by the judicial of the duties of the legislative department.” Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285, 286 (1847).
[¶ 13] The express language of section 752(10) authorizes the court to extend child support until a child’s high school graduation or until the child is nineteen for divorce decrees ordered after January 1, 1990. That language clearly limits the authority of the court to extend child support in pre-1990 divorces. The Legislature could have added language to section 752(10) to grant authority to the courts to extend the support when the divorce occurred before January 1, 1990, but it did not do so. Because the divorce that was the subject of this appeal occurred prior to January 1, 1990, the trial court correctly concluded that it had no authority to extend the child support obligations.
*497Extending the court’s authority to alter pre-1990 divorce decrees in this way should require language as clear as the originally enacted language limiting that authority. The Court suggests that it is an “oversight” that section 752(10) does not apply to pre-1990 divorces, and that the “oversight” was corrected when the Legislature subsequently codified the Child Support Guidelines. See 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320 (Supp.l996)(enacted by P.L.1989, ch. 834 (effective Apr. 17, 1990)). I disagree for two reasons. First, by P.L.1989, ch. 834, the Legislature not only codified the Child Support Guidelines, it also amended section 752(10) to note that a “determination or modification of child support under this section must comply with chapter 7, subchapter I-A [The Child Support Guidelines].” It chose, however, not to delete the clearly limiting language present in section 752(10). Second, the Child Support Guidelines provides a definition for age categories for children “for whom an obligation of support is established or deemed to remain in force pursuant to Public Law 1989,Chapter 156.” 19 M.R.S.A. § 311(11) (Supp.1996). Thus, section 311(11) expressly refers to the statute imposing the date restriction of January 1,1990. Section 311(11) gives the court no new authority because it incorporates that date restriction in section 752(10). Accordingly, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the codification of the Child Support Guidelines altered the clear meaning of section 752(10).
[¶ 15] The Court goes on to conclude that if the child’s parents are divorced after January 1, 1990, the court must follow the new guidelines, but that “[i]f the child’s parents were divorced prior to January 1990, and a support order is already in place ... the custodial parent must file a motion seeking a modification of the support order for that purpose.” In my view, this construction is strained. It is contrary to the clear language of section 752(10) and is not supported by any legislative debate or statement of fact. I would conclude that the Legislature has not altered the meaning of section 752(10)9 and would affirm the judgment.

. See City of Lewiston v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., 671 A.2d 955, 956 (Me.1996) ("The first source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself [, and we] 'will not look beyond clear and unambiguous statutory language.’ ”) (citation omitted); State v. Millett, 392 A.2d 521, 525 (Me.1978) ("we must not lose sight of the overall principle that, where the language of a statute i[s] plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation") (citation omitted); Chase v. Edgar, 259 A.2d 30, 32 (Me.1969) ("Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.”) (citation omitted).

. The Court suggests in footnote 4 that the "Legislature may have established the January 1, 1990 threshold for the application of provisions allowing such extensions of child support because it wanted to avoid retroactively amending all divorce judgments without notice and a hearing....” In my view, if the Legislature, after debate and thoughtful reflection, made that policy judgment, it would have said so when it codified the Child Support Guidelines.