Court Opinion

ID: 9516701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:49:24.991185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:53.465689
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court and that part of the opinion which holds that a judge should not initiate or invite an ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceeding.
Although the majority opinion does not hold that a judge may not consider an ex parte communication concerning a proceeding pending before him, the opinion appears to rely to some extent upon authorities to that effect.
I think it is important to remember that presentence reports consist largely of hearsay and ex parte statements, all of which are proper for consideration by the court. In State v. Rose, 183 Neb. 809, 164 N.W.2d 646 (1969), we noted that a trial judge has a broad discretion in the source and type of evidence he may *855use to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed.
Highly relevant, if not essential, to his determination of an appropriate sentence is the gaining of knowledge concerning defendant’s life, character, and previous conduct. In gaining this information, the trial court may consider reports of probation officers, police reports, affidavits, and other information including his own observations of the defendant. A presentence investigation has nothing to do with the issue of guilt. The rules governing due process with respect to the admissibility of evidence are not the same in a presentence hearing as in a trial in which guilt or innocence is the issue. The latitude allowed a sentencing judge at a presentence hearing to determine the nature and length of punishment, other than in recidivist cases, is almost without limitation as long as it is relevant to the issue.
(Citations omitted.)Id. at811,164 N.W.2d at 648-49.
The rules of evidence and the right of confrontation do not apply to sentencing proceedings. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949):
Tribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations. But both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. Out-of-court affidavits have been used frequently, and of course in the smaller communities sentencing judges naturally have in mind their knowledge of the personalities and backgrounds of convicted offenders____ ... A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant — if not essential — to his selection of an *856appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.
Colwell, D. J., Retired, joins in this concurrence.