Court Opinion

ID: 9733861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:19:11.315602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:36.399988
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I join Chief Justice Williams’ opinion in Smith, Wallace, and Shoup, and in most of that opinion in Thompson, I do not join the dictum with respect to the issue of ex parte communications between trial judges and probation officers.
The communication between the judge and the probation officer in Thompson involved merely the correction of a technical error, about the statutorily permitted maximum sentence, a correction which could have been performed even without the communication simply by referring to the statute. As Justice Williams recognizes, this communication was clearly not improper. Consequently, the extended discussion of other kinds of communications between trial judges and probation officers, and about whether the right to counsel attaches to such communications, is unnecessary and clearly dictum.
Moreover, were the discussion of this issue not dictum, I would be constrained to disagree.
The probation officer "is an aide to the court. He is a resource person available for consultation, and to . . . prohibit discussion between the court and the officer would certainly diminish the effectiveness of the liaison.” People v Beal, 104 Mich App 159, 167; 304 NW2d 513 (1981). Thus, "when the [probation] officer is preparing a presentence report he is acting as an arm of the court and this permits ex parte communication” between the court and the probation officer. United States v Gonzales, 765 F2d 1393, 1398 (CA 9, 1985).
*461As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, "both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 246; 69 S Ct 1079; 93 L Ed 1337 (1949). As the Court pointed out,
Modern changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes .... In general, these modern changes have not resulted in making the lot of offenders harder. On the contrary a strong motivating force for the changes has been the belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship. . . .
Under the practice of individualizing punishments, investigational techniques have been given an important role. Probation workers[’] ... reports of their investigations . . . have been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on guesswork .... [Id. at 248-249.]
These considerations make it all the more important that the relationship between the sentencing judge and the probation officer not be undermined by the prohibition of such communications.
Research has shown that an "arms-length” relationship between judge and [probation] officer is unsuited for the development of an accurate appraisal of the defendant. The presentence process is effective only if the relationship is characterized *462by informality and mutual respect for the other’s ability. To facilitate this relationship, most [federal] judges hold a presentence conference in chambers to discuss the presentence investigation and sentencing alternatives with the probation officer. [Fennell & Hall, Due process at sentencing: An empirical and legal analysis of the disclosure of presentence reports in federal courts, 93 Harv LR 1615, 1668 (1980). Seventy-five percent of federal district courts studied held such presentencing conferences. Id. at 1677.]
There is simply no basis for the assertion that a right to counsel attaches to communications between sentencing judges and probation officers. Indeed, a number of federal courts confronted with constitutional challenges to such communications between a sentencing judge and probation officers have held that "[i]t is not improper for the [sentencing] court to hold presentence conferences with the probation staff.” United States v Houston, 745 F2d 333, 334 (CA 5, 1984). Accord United States v Story, 716 F2d 1088, 1090 (CA 6, 1983); Tasby v United States, 551 F2d 1139 (CA 8, 1977); United States v Davis, 527 F2d 1110, 1112 (CA 9, 1975); United States v Hone, 456 F2d 495 (CA 6, 1972). These courts are clearly correct.
First, the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him provides no basis for a right to counsel at these conferences. The probation officer is not a "witness against” the defendant. See Williams v New York, supra.
Second, such communications between judges and probation officers are not "ex parte” communications. The term "ex parte” means "[o]n one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application of, one party only.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 517. As the majority acknowledges, probation officers are not agents of *463the prosecutor; consequently, a trial judge’s communication with a probation officer is not a communication with "one party only” in the absence of the other party. Because the probation officer is not an adverse party to the defendant, but instead an "arm of the court,” there is no basis for concluding that a Fifth or Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to such communications.
Third, while there is a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information, Townsend v Burke, 334 US 736, 741; 68 S Ct 1252; 92 L Ed 1690 (1948); Dorszynski v United States, 418 US 424, 431, n 7, 443; 94 S Ct 3042; 41 L Ed 2d 855 (1974); Gardner v Florida, 430 US 349, 358; 97 S Ct 1197; 51 L Ed 2d 393 (1977), this right in no way implies that there is a concomitant right to counsel at such conferences. In Michigan, factual information upon which sentence is based must either be disclosed to the defendant and counsel, or the trial judge must inform them on the record that such information has been withheld for articulated reasons which conform with the statutory exceptions to the disclosure requirement. MCL 771.14; MSA 28.1144. Furthermore, the trial court must articulate the reasons for the sentence imposed on the record. People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983). These procedures adequately ensure that the sentence is based on accurate factual information. Consequently, the presence of defense counsel at conferences between sentencing judges and probation officers is unnecessary to ensure the vindication of defendant’s due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.
I also disagree with the analysis of the status of probation officers in this state. The MCL 791.229; MSA 28.2299 "relation of confidence between the probation officer and probationer or defendant *464under investigation” is to be "inviolate” vis-á-vis the public, but not as against the court, as the language preceding this clause makes clear.
All records and reports of investigations made by a probation officer, and all case histories of probationers shall be privileged or conñdential communications not open to public inspection. Judges and probation officers shall have access to the records, reports, and case histories. [MCL 791.229; MSA 28.2299. Emphasis added.]
Furthermore, that 1979 PA 89 changed the status of probation officers from county employees to state employees, MCL 791.223a; MSA 28.2293(1), certainly does not imply that the Legislature intended to alter the long-established relationship between probation officers and trial judges in the state.
There is thus no basis for the claim that the right to counsel attaches to communications between a probation officer and a sentencing judge. On the other hand, there are compelling reasons not to interfere with the long-established relationship between trial judges and probation officers. Consequently, I disagree on this issue.
Ryan, Brickley, and Riley, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.