Court Opinion

ID: 9545880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:21:29.916127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:40.622966
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, C. J.,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s analysis of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the decision that punitive damages are not awardable. However, I dissent from the majority decision that whether the defendant committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was a question for the jury. I would affirm the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that it was not, as a matter of law.
The cause of action frequently referred to as “outrageous conduct” is a most amorphous tort. The issue on which I disagree with the majority is stated by the majority to be “whether the acts alleged against the defendant, if proved, qualify as extraordinary conduct which a reasonable jury could find beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior.” This is obviously a very ethereal standard.
The indefiniteness of the tort is illustrated by the instruction of the trial court: “Plaintiff can recover here if Plaintiff establishes the following: First, extreme and outrageous conduct by the Defendants.” I have no suggestions for a more precise instruction, but it is apparent that an instruction such as this practically submits the case without guidelines. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that in case of doubt whether the question is one for the jury, the court should rule that it should not be submitted to the jury.
There is another reason why this case does not present a jury question. The objective of the defendant was not only completely lawful, it was commendable. We are told by the media that “white collar” crime, particularly employe theft, is a national problem which costs consumers *152billions of dollars because the cost is passed on to the consumers. However, employers who exceed the legitimate bounds of criminal detection are liable to pay damages pursuant to reasonably well defined existing remedies such as false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation. Cribbs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 202 Or 8, 272 P2d 978 (1954); Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 220 Or 230, 315 P2d 559, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1 (1960). (The plaintiff in this case alleged a count of defamation; however, the jury found against her on that count.) I know of no policy reason to expand an employe’s remedies in a case such as this.
The majority relies upon the following evidence to support its premise that the question should go to the jury. Rummell accused plaintiff of stealing, told her he would get a warrant for her arrest for a crime for which she could serve years in jail, “yelled at her,” and said he had “proof’ she had stolen. The facts were that he had charts which indicated shortages at the register when plaintiff was working and responsible for the register; however, the charts were not conclusive proof that plaintiff committed any crime. In the past, employes confronted with similar charts had usually confessed. In addition, according to plaintiff, Rummell asked plaintiff whether she “thought somebody might be setting you up?” Plaintiff did not believe so.
Our past decisions, cited in the majority opinion, do not require a holding that this evidence presents a jury question. Perhaps the closest on point is Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 279 Or 443, 568 P2d 1382 (1977). Closest, because, as in the present case, the defendant initially was pursuing a legitimate objective, bill collecting. In that case, however, after plaintiff had made satisfactory arrangements to pay the bill and the defendant no longer had a legitimate objective, the defendant continued its abrasive tactics.
As the majority states, Professor Prosser was the “synthesizer” of this tort and the reporter for the Restatement of Torts (Second). The comment to section 46 of the Restatement, the section concerning “Outrageous Conduct,” states, in part:
*153“* * * It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. * * 1 Restatement (Second) Torts & 46, p 73.
In my opinion this case does not present a jury question. If the plaintiff had in fact embezzled funds from the register and confessed, according to the logic of the majority it nevertheless would be a jury question whether the defendant had committed the tort.