Court Opinion

ID: 9551081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:32.340053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:02.736639
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.
This cause is before us upon a motion made by the plaintiff s-respondents
“* * * for' an order striking or declaring null and void the papers filed by Palma J. Whitney Guthrie and Viola W. Whitney on or about January 22,1963, entitled ‘Renunciation’ on the grounds and for the reasons that no application was made and no order entered authorizing Palma J. Whitney Guthrie and Viola W. Whitney to renounce their obligations under the undertaking filed on this appeal.
“Alternatively and in the event this foregoing motion is denied, plaintiffs move for dismissal of this appeal on the grounds that the defendants have not filed a sufficient undertaking with two or more sureties as required by statute.”
The document entitled “Renunciation,” signed by Palma J. Whitney Guthrie, to which plaintiffs’ motion refers, reads:
“Be it remembered that I, Palma J. Whitney Guthrie, whose name is subscribed to that certain *561■undertaking filed in the within cause on the 27th day of September, 1957, at the hour of 4:25 p.m. which undertaking purports to create joint and several liability with defendants and Viola W. Whitney and Kenneth J. Guthrie, to which undertaking exceptions to the sureties were filed by plaintiff on the 31st day of December, 1962, do hereby renounce and rescind said undertaking and any and all liability thereon, on the grounds and for the reason that the extent of my liability thereon was not fully explained, nor accurately represented to me at the time of the subscription thereof.”
Concurrently with the filing of that document there was filed another, likewise entitled “Renunciation,” which bore the signature of Viola W. Whitney. It was couched in the exact language of the above with the exception of the needed change in the name of the co-surety.
The proceeding out of which the two “renunciations” and the motion to strike them arose was an action which the circuit court construed as a Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Proceeding. The defendants in it were Mr. Ben F. Forbes and his wife. The subject matter of the action was a city lot and a dwelling house which the Forbes occupied as tenants. Upon the trial of the action judgment was entered for the plaintiffs. Thereupon, the defendants (Forbes) gave notice of appeal and in so doing filed the undertaking on appeal which bore the signatures of Palma J. Whitney Guthrie, Viola W. Whitney, and a third individual as sureties.
There has been filed in this court the abstract of record together with the appellant’s (Forbes’) brief and the brief of the respondents (the owners). The case is ready for oral argument. The question now occurs as to whether a surety on an appeal under*562taking may rescind his liability at his pleasure. If he may, then his principal (the appellant) may, while the undertaking is in effect, dispose of his assets and after he has done so, the surety may rescind the undertaking.
 The statutes which we will now quote provide the conditions and covenants of the appeal bond. They are binding upon the surety, appellant and respondent. It is no misstatement to say that they are a part— an inseparable part — of every undertaking on appeal.
OES 19.040 (1) provides:
“The undertaMng of the appellant shall be given with one or more sureties, to the effect that the appellant will pay all damages, costs and disbursements which may be awarded against him on the appeal; but such undertaMng does not stay the proceedings, unless the undertaMng further provides to the effect following:
# #
“(b) If the judgment or decree appealed from is for the recovery of the possession of real property * * * that during the possession of such property by the appellant he will not commit, or suffer to be committed, any waste thereon, and that if such judgment or decree or any part thereof is affirmed, the appellant will pay the value of the use and occupation of such property, so far as affirmed, from the time of the appeal until the delivery of the possession thereof, not exceeding the sum therein specified, to be ascertained and tried by the court or judge thereof.”
OES 105.160, which is a part of our Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer statute, states:
“If judgment is rendered against the defendant for the restitution of the real property described in the complaint, or any part thereof, no appeal shall be taken by the defendant from the judgment until *563he gives, in addition to the undertaking now required by law upon appeal, an undertaking to the adverse party, with two sureties, who shall justify in like manner as bail upon arrest, for the payment to the plaintiff if the judgment is affirmed on appeal of twice the rental value of the real property of which restitution is adjudged from the commencement of the action in which the judgment was rendered until final judgment in the action.”
Eeferring to undertakings on appeal, 5B CJS, § 2004, page 655, Appeal and Error, says:
“In general the rights, liabilities, and obligations of a surety or a bond on appeal are fixed by statute.”
The consideration for the undertaking was plain and ample. It was the prevention of the dismissal of the suit. And since the undertaking which the sureties signed was a stay bond, its further consideration was the inhibition of the enforcement of the judgment.
We quote the following from Corbin on Contracts, §139:
“One of the most common kinds of forbearances that are bargained for by a promisor is forbearance to bring suit or forbearance to make use of somé legal remedy. This is also one of the most common kinds of action in reliance on a promise, even though the promisor did not bargain for it. Of course, such forbearance as this is sufficient consideration, if the claim on which suit or other legal action was threatened was valid and enforceable. Such forbearance as this is sufficiént consideration for a promise of a third person, even though the claim is not one that was asserted against him and the forbearance was of no advantage to him.
í? ^
“It makes no difference in what court the suit was to be brought or had been brought. The for*564bearanee at request to bring a suit, or to proceed further with a suit already brought, may be a sufficient consideration whether the suit was for some legal remedy or was in equity or probate or other court.”
Execution by the plaintiffs was stayed when the undertaking was filed. Therefore, the desired result was accomplished: the undertaking and its stay went into effect. Moreover, when the sureties saw that the execution was stayed and that the defendants (Forbes) remained in possession of the property, a promissory estoppel was created. See Schafer et al v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or 446, 280 P2d 190, 284 P2d 609.
4, 5. We are satisfied that no surety upon an appeal undertaking is at liberty at his pleasure or whim to renounce his liability and, in that manner, rescind the obligation. In the present case each surety states in her renunciation as the reasons for her act “the extent of my liability thereto was not fully explained, nor accurately represented to me at the time of the subscription thereto.” It will be observed that the statement does not claim that the surety was unaware of “the extent of my liability” when she signed the undertaking. No averment is made that anyone who requested the surety’s signature to the undertaking deceived her or acted out of deceitful motives. It may be that no one spoke to the sureties about the undertaking’s terms. In fact, Mr. Forbes states that such was actually the case. If, in truth, neither surety was aware of “the extent of my liability,” she does not so indicate nor does she say that she requested information.
Rogers v. Day, 232 Or 185, 375 P2d 63, is not similar to this case. In that appeal one Richard Gr. Harper, after signing as surety a stay bond, failed to appear at the time set by the court for him to justify. The *565decision held that at that juncture of events the appeal was subject to dismissal upon the respondent’s motion and that, therefore, the surety was released from liability.
We do not believe that the sureties in the case at bar are at liberty to withdraw upon their own whim or pleasure from the undertaking which they signed. There are ways in which a person who has sufficient reason may secure his release from an instrument which he has signed; but the route chosen by these sureties is not such a method. The motion to expunge from the record the renunciations is sustained.