Court Opinion

ID: 9763527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:48:25.74158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:20.028403
License: Public Domain

*756BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting to denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing.
On original submission, a majority of this Court held the sufficiency of the evidence may not be challenged by pretrial writ of habeas corpus following the granting of a motion for a new trial on non-sufficiency grounds. Ex parte Queen, 877 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). Accordingly, appellant’s retrial was not jeopardy barred regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at his first trial. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 754, 755. Because the opinion on original submission was based on Lofton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), a case I believe to have been wrongly decided, I respectfully dissent to the denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing.
I.
A.
The opinion on original submission demonstrates a confusion with the labyrinthine jurisprudence underpinning the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “[NJor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...” U.S. Const., art. V. Consequently, “a State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 829, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)).1 This Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy finds it basis in the common law and exists because
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), the Supreme Court further explained:
The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against placing a defendant “twice in jeopardy” represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit in ... criminal proceedings. A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.
Jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2160-61, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1034, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and, McElwee v. State, 589 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and continues until a verdict has been reached. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830; Green, 355 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. at 223-224. As a general rule, the prohibition against double jeopardy will prevent a retrial following a conviction,2 Washington, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830, even if that conviction is later reversed for insufficient evidence. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18-19, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).3
*757B.
Burks was convicted of armed robbery and filed a motion for a new trial alleging insufficiency of the evidence. Id., 437 U.S. at 3, 98 S.Ct. at 2143. The trial judge denied the motion and Burks appealed. The Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient and reversed the conviction with instructions for the trial judge to balance the “equities” between entering a directed verdict of acquittal or granting a new trial. Burks, 437 U.S. at 4, 98 S.Ct. at 2143.
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals’ decision and distinguished reversals resulting from trial error and reversals because the evidence was insufficient. Retrial following a reversal for trial error does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because trial errors are unrelated to the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. Instead, a reversal for trial error relates to defects in the judicial process, such as the improper admission of evidence. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15-16, 98 U.S. at 2149. Consequently, the retrial furthers the interest of both the defendant and society in promoting the fair administration of the judicial process.
However, retrial following a reversal for insufficient evidence relates directly to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. A ruling that the evidence is insufficient “means that the government’s ease was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.” Burks, 437 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2149-2150 (emphasis in original). Thus, a finding of insufficient evidence is the functional equivalent of an acquittal and retrial is jeopardy barred. The Court concluded:
In our view it makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as one of his remedies, or even as the sole remedy. It cannot be meaningfully said that a person “waives” his right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new trial_ Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only “just” remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal. To the extent that our prior decisions suggest that by moving for a new trial, a defendant waives his right to a judgment of aoquittal on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency, those cases are overruled,4
Burks, 437 U.S. at 17-18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150-2151.
II.
A.
In the instant case, appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the Burks Court explicitly held that a defendant who files a motion for new trial does not waive his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, Burks, 437 U.S. at 17-18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150-2151, a majority of this Court, on original submission, held just the opposite. Queen, 877 S.W.2d at 755. The majority relied on Lofton, 777 S.W.2d 96, to support its holding. However, that reliance was misplaced because Lofton was wrongly decided.
Following his conviction by a jury and subsequent grant of a new trial on unspecified grounds,5 Lofton sought a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus to bar his retrial on the basis of double jeopardy arising from insufficient evidence in his first trial. The trial judge denied relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed. While acknowledging Lofton’s claim was cognizable by a habeas court, we explained:
The principle reason applicant is not entitled to relief is that under the facts of this cause he is not being threatened with exposure to “double” jeopardy. Although it attached in the first trial, jeopardy was not terminated by an acquittal or convic*758tion. After hearing, the trial judge did not order an acquittal for insufficient evidence; rather, the court set aside the verdict and vacated its judgment by granting a new trial on motion of applicant, thereby restoring the case “to its position before the former trial,” Tex.R.App.P. 32. Therefore, as with a new trial after a mistrial, initial jeopardy continues.... Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984).
Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 97.
B.
The Lofton Court relied on Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). However, that reliance was sorely misplaced because Richardson involved a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 318, 104 S.Ct. at 3082. After the mistrial, Richardson contended retrial would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the evidence at the first trial was insufficient. In support of his contention Richardson cited Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141. However, the Richardson Court declined to follow Burks and, instead, distinguished the two cases: viz, Burks concerned a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following conviction while Richardson concerned a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following a mistrial. A mistrial following a jury’s inability to reach a verdict is justified based upon manifest necessity, and, therefore, retrial is not jeopardy barred.6 Richardson, 468 U.S. at 323-324, 104 S.Ct. at 3085 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. at 832); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-298, 12 5.Ct. 617, 628, 36 L.Ed. 429 (1892), and, United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). Concluding Richardson could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court stated:
We think that the principles governing our decision in Burks, and the principles governing our decisions in the hung jury cases, are readily reconciled when we recognize that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.... Since jeopardy attached here when the jury was sworn ... petitioner’s argument necessarily assumes that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which allowed him to assert a valid claim of double jeopardy.
But this proposition is irreconcilable with cases such as Perez and Logan, and we hold on the authority of these eases that the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. Our holding in Burks established only that an appellate court’s finding of insufficient evidence to convict on appeal from a judgment of conviction is for double jeopardy purposes, the equivalent of an acquittal; it obviously did not establish, consistently with such cases as Perez, that a hung jury is the equivalent of an acquittal.
Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325, 104 S.Ct. at 3086 (footnote omitted).
C.
It is readily apparent that Lofton and Richardson implicate different rules of double jeopardy. Richardson, which concerned a mistrial resulting from a hung jury, was governed by the manifest necessity exception *759to the prohibition against double jeopardy. By contrast, Lofton, which concerned a chai-lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following a conviction7’ and the granting of a new trial should have been controlled by Burks8. Consequently, our decision in Lof-ton was erroneous and should be overruled.
III.
On original submission, the majority held “a motion for new trial must be granted on insufficiency of the evidence before questions of jeopardy and sufficiency can be reviewed on appeal via a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus.” Queen, 877 S.W.2d at 755. This holding is inexplicable in light of Burks; the granting of a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence following a conviction. Burks, 487 U.S. at 17-18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150-2151.9 Retrial is automatically jeopardy barred when a motion for new trial has been granted on insufficiency grounds. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 42-43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Consequently, a defendant need never pursue a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus following a finding of insufficient evidence. On the other hand, where a motion for new trial has been granted on non-sufficiency grounds, a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is the only vehicle for preserving the defendant’s right against double jeopardy in the face of a retrial on insufficient evidence. See, Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and, Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
Consequently, I would grant appellant’s motion for rehearing and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Because the majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.
MILLER, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-795, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the Supreme Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

. An acquittal will always terminate jeopardy and prevent retrial. Washington, 434 U.S. at 503, 98 S.Ct. at 829.

. However, jeopardy does not bar a retrial when the conviction is reversed for trial error. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 285, 289, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2078, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); United States v. Tateo, *757377 U.S. 463, 465, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1589, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964), and, United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896).

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Lofton apparently urged both newly discovered evidence and insufficient evidence in his motion for new trial. While the record is unclear, it appears that Lofton’s motion for new trial was granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 96.

. As a general rule, a retrial following a mistrial without the defendant’s consent is jeopardy barred. Green, 355 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. at 244 (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974), and, Alvarez v. State, 864 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). However, if the mistrial was based on “manifest necessity,” retrial will not be jeopardy barred. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), and, State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
The Supreme Court has long held that a mistrial resulting from a hung jury falls within the manifest necessity exception to the prohibition against double jeopardy. Perez, supra, and, Logan, supra. The policy supporting this exception is rooted in society's interest in permitting the State to complete a prosecution against alleged violators where "unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial [make] its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.” Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324-325, 104 S.Ct. at 3085-3086 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 836-837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)).

. In deciding Lofton, we erroneously stated: "the principle reason [Lofton] is not entitled to relief ... is that jeopardy was not terminated by an acquittal or conviction.” Id., 777 S.W.2d at 97. However, it is clear from the Court of Appeals’ opinion that Lofton had been convicted. Lfton v. State, 765 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1989). Moreover, we took no issue with the accuracy of the procedural facts traced by the Court of Appeals. Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 96.

. Despite the similar procedural facts in Burks, and Lofton, e.g. following conviction, both filed motions for a new trial alleging insufficiency of the evidence, in Lofton, this Court inexplicably distinguished Burks, stating:
Burks v. United States ... is inapposite here; it did not lay down some overriding principle of double jeopardy law that was applicable across the board to situations totally different from the facts out of which it arose [and] did not extend beyond the procedural setting in which it arose.
Lofton, 777 S.W.2d at 97-98 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

.On original submission, the majority failed to mention Burks and, therefore, fails to address the double jeopardy principles expressed therein. Nonetheless, it is clear in light of the discussion above that the holding on original submission cannot be reconciled with Burks.