Court Opinion

ID: 9423950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:09:43.390441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:47.334520
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins,
dissenting.
I concur in much of my Brother Black’s opinion, and agree with his conclusion that 28 U. S. C. § 2255 should be available to contest the admission of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment only under limited and special circumstances of the sort suggested in Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966). I must, however, disassociate myself from any implications, see, e. g., ante, at 232-233, 234-236, that the availability of this collateral remedy turns on a petitioner’s assertion that he was in fact innocent, or on the substantiality of such an allegation.
I think it appropriate to add that the main roots of the situation against which my Brother Black so rightly *243inveighs are to be found in the Court’s decisions in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), which have opened wide the gates to collateral re-examination of both state and federal criminal convictions. Be that as it may, the present case offers an opportunity to narrow the entrance in a fair and practicable manner. In rejecting the opportunity, the Court once again* this Term imposes a burden on the judiciary and on society at large, which results in no legitimate benefit to the petitioner and does nothing to serve the interests of justice.
I therefore dissent from the opinion of the Court.

See my dissent in Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 371 (1969).