Court Opinion

ID: 9688016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:57:18.480837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.203702
License: Public Domain

MASON, Justice
(dissenting)..
I dissent from division II.
The majority chooses to uphold the seizure of marijuana as a legitimate application of principles first announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, where the Supreme Court held valid a warrantless search of an *107automobile . when exigent circumstances and probable cause to suspect concealed contraband goods were shown to exist.
The majority has sought to find sufficient evidence of the two ingredients essential to the application of Carroll — exigent circumstances and probable cause. The court reasons the heart of exigency, as per Carroll, is mobility, the potential for flight, and thereby properly deduces an aircraft readying for take-off is like a moving vehicle and presents exigent circumstances. I believe the greater argument here, however, is the existence and timing of probable cause.
The court finds support for its discussion of probable cause in Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151, and quotes from it extensively. As in the case before us, defendant in Scher in response to direct and immediate inquiry admitted possession of contraband. Yet on a full reading of the Scher case, it is apparent there existed probable cause to search Scher’s automobile before the colloquy between Scher and the law officer transpired. Besides a reliable tip, officers had observed the activities of defendant for a significant period of time before the encounter was made. It is in this respect the Supreme Court said: “* * * [I]t seems plain enough that just before he entered the garage the following officers properly could have stopped petitioner’s car, made search and placed him under arrest. * * * ” 305 U.S. at 255, 59 S.Ct. at 176, 83 L.Ed. at 154. That is to say, there was probable cause to stop and search defendant Scher’s automobile on the strength of the Carroll decision.
The distinction is a significant one. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153—154, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551-552, has this statement:
“ * * * It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary, because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. * *
As the majority has drawn the parallel between McReynolds’ aircraft and a moving vehicle, Justice Taft’s admonition would seem apropos to the circumstances here.
As the majority concedes, Sergeant Mc-Elroy did not have probable cause for search and seizure at the time he mounted the airplane and effectively precluded its free passage. Only after his conversation with defendant did McElroy’s suspicions harden into probable cause, enabling him to proceed with search and seizure. This situation is factually very similar to Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879.
In Brinegar, an investigator of the Alcohol Tax Unit, and a special investigator were parked beside a highway in Oklahoma about five miles west of the Missouri-Oklahoma line. Defendant drove past the investigators in his car. One of the investigators had arrested defendant five months earlier for illegally transporting liquor; had seen defendant loading liquor into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two occasions during the preceding six months; and knew defendant to have a reputation for hauling liquor. As defendant passed, the investigator recognized both him and the automobile. Both agents later testified that the car appeared to be “heavily loaded” and “weighted down” with something. Defendant in*108creased his speed as he passed the officers; the officers gave chase. After pursuing him for about a mile at top speed, they gained on him as his car skidded in a curve. The officers sounded their siren, overtook defendant, and crowded his car to the side of the road.
The agent who recognized Brinegar got out of his car, walked back to him and said, “Hello, Brinegar, how much liquor have you got in the car?” or “How much liquor have you got in the car this time?” Defendant replied, “Not too much,” or “Not so much.” Several cases were found behind and under the front seat. Brinegar was placed under arrest and the liquor was seized.
The district court, on hearing defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, opined the fact the agents knew defendant was engaged in hauling whiskey, even coupled with the statement the car appeared to be weighted, did not constitute probable cause for a search of the car. It held, however, defendant’s voluntary admission after the chase presented probable cause for a search, regardless of the legality of the detention and subsequent arrest.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but it made very clear its disapproval of trial court’s theory of how and when probable cause to search and seize may arise. After a thoroughly exhaustive and painstaking recitation of facts attendant to the situation, leading up to but not including Brinegar's admission, the court expressed its views in this language, 338 U.S. at 170-171, 69 S.Ct. at 1308, 93 L.Ed. at 1887-1888:
“All these facts are undisputed. Wholly apart from * * * [the investigator’s] knowledge that Brinegar bore the general reputation of being engaged in liquor running, they constitute positive and convincing evidence that Brinegar was engaged in that activity, no less convincing than the evidence in Carroll that the defendants had offered to sell liquor to the officers. * * *
“Notwithstanding the variations in detail, therefore, we think the proof in this case furnishes support quite as strong as that made in the Carroll case, indeed stronger in some respects, to sustain the ultimate facts there held in the aggregate to constitute probable cause for a search identical in all substantial and material respects with the one made here. * * *
“This is true, although the trial court and the Court of Appeals, including the dissenting judge, were of the opinion, as stated by the latter court, ‘that the facts within the knowledge of the investigators and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information prior to the time the incriminating statements were made by Brinegar were not sufficient to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the coupe, and did not constitute probable cause for a search.’ * * * [citation] If, as we think, the Carroll case is indistinguishable from this one on the material facts, and that decision is to continue in force, it necessarily follows that the quoted ‘finding’ or ‘conclusion’ was erroneous.”
The Court in Brinegar chose to ignore the effect of the “voluntary admission” of the defendant. Rather, it held the material facts were so similar in substance to the facts in Carroll, that by application of law probable cause for search of defendant’s car existed as the chase began. Therefore, instead of permitting carte blanche detention of vehicles on the chance subsequent inquiry will produce probable cause for search, the court chose to overturn the low courts’ conclusions and found sufficient probable cause at the outset.
The vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson advocated (a) acceptance of the trial court’s conclusion the officers acted without probable cause before Brinegar’s admission, and (b) reversal of conviction for reason of unconstitutional search and seizure by rejecting the notion probable *109cause can be gained after the intrusion has already begun.
As in Brinegar, the facts in our case are undisputed. Unlike Brinegar, no probable cause exists preceding detention and defendant's voluntary admission; the majority concedes as much. Probable cause “has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves' to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175-176, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-1311, 93 L.Ed. at 1890. See also State v. Baych, 169 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Iowa 1969); State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650, 653, (Iowa 1971).
Nor does the majority cite any authority lending credence to the theory defendant’s admission could be legitimately considered with the foregoing events to sustain evidence of probable cause. None of the cited cases were intended to afford officers the privilege of stopping mobile vehicles in order to collect evidence which hopefully would lead to sufficient probable cause to search. In each case there existed either an arrest or sufficient probable cause upon which to predicate initiation of action. See State v. King, supra; State v. Baych, supra; State v. Hollingshead, 191 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1971); Carroll v. United States, supra; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419; Scher v. United States, supra; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629. See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538; Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777.
The Supreme Court has often repeated its preference for search with warrant. In the most recent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 453, 91 S.Ct. at 2031-2032, 29 L.Ed.2d at 575, Mr. Justice Stewart in speaking for the Court said:
“* * * [W]e must not lose sight of the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental guarantee. Mr. Justice Bradley’s admonition in his opinion for the Court almost a century ago in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.Ct. 524, 535, 29 L.Ed. 746, is worth repeating here:
‘It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to the gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.’
“Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment' — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption * * * that the exigencies of the situation made the course imperative.’ ‘[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and *110the values it represents may appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our own, they won — by legal and constitutional means in England, and by revolution on this continent — a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times have changed, reducing every man’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.” (Emphasis in the original.)
I would hold the evidence was unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and reverse.
RAWLINGS, J., joins in this dissent.