Court Opinion

ID: 9399346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 17:09:39.517497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.638692
License: Public Domain

J-S12002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                             :
                                               :
    DAVID JUNIOR SEECHARRAN                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1215 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022,
                 in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002594-2019.

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                             FILED: JUNE 2, 2023

        After a jury convicted him of murder of the third degree, drug delivery

resulting in death, possession of illicit drugs with intent to deliver, corrupt

organizations, and criminal conspiracy,1 David Junior Seecharran appeals from

the judgment of sentence imposing an aggregate incarceration period of 30

to 60 years. We affirm.

        In 2017 and 2018, Seecharan and David Taylor trafficked heroin and

fentanyl throughout York County. On the night of June 2, 2018, Seecharan

sold heroin and fentanyl to Taylor, who took the drugs to James Connelly’s

home. Taylor and Connelly did the drugs; Connelly overdosed and died.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a)(1); 911(b)(3),(4); 2502(c); and 2506(a); see
also 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(30).
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      The police arrested Seecharan and Taylor. A jury convicted Seecharan,

and the trial court sentenced him as described above. The court denied post-

sentence motions, and this timely appeal followed.

      Seecharan raises one appellate issue. He asks:

      Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying [him] a
      new trial when the jury verdicts for [murder of the third degree,]
      drug delivery resulting in death, and criminal conspiracy to
      commit [murder of the third degree] were against the weight of
      the evidence.

Seecharan’s Brief at 4.

      At the outset of his brief, Seecharan correctly acknowledges, “Claims

that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence will be overturned only

if the trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for a new trial

. . . .” Id. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939 (2004)). Further, Seecharan correctly

defines an abuse of discretion as “not merely an error of judgment; rather,

discretion is abused when [(1)] the law is overridden or misapplied; [(2)] or

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable; or [(3) the decision is]

the result of partially, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of

record.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Busanet, 817 A.2d 1060, 1076 (Pa.

2002)). In addition, he reiterates our deferential standard of review in the

argument portion of his brief. See id. at 16.

      However, Seecharan never indicates which of the three types of abuse

of discretion he believes the trial court supposedly committed by denying his

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request for a new trial based on a weight-of-the-evidence claim. Instead of

identifying an abuse of discretion, Seecharan argues that the guilty verdicts

should shock the conscience of this Court, as if our standard of review were

de novo. See id. at 16-21 (repeatedly claiming “the jury’s verdict shocks the

conscience”).

      When reviewing a weight claim, we do not ask whether the verdicts

shock the conscience of this Court.      The issue is whether the trial court’s

decision that the verdicts did not shock its conscience overrode the law; was

manifestly unreasonable; or the result of bias, prejudice, or ill will.

      As this Court has often reminded appellants, our “standard of review

when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the

standard of review applied by the trial court.            Appellate review of a

weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(emphasis added).

      We recently re-emphasized this point in Commonwealth v. Rogers,

259 A.3d 539 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2022).

There, Rogers was convicted of multiple rapes, and he made the same briefing

error on appeal as Seecharan makes here.

      The Rogers Court explained:

         Rogers disregards the distinction between the two standards
         of review . . . By failing to recognize the correct, appellate

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         standard of review in his brief, Rogers’ argument misses the
         mark.

                In his evidentiary-weight argument, Rogers overlooks
         that “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
         judgment but is rather the overriding or misapplication of
         the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly
         unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
         partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
         Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super.
         2017). To mount an abuse-of-discretion attack against the
         trial court’s determination that [the] guilty verdicts were not
         so against the weight of the evidence as to shock that
         court’s own conscience, Rogers needed to demonstrate how
         the trial court’s ruling overrode the law; was manifestly
         unreasonable; or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
         partiality.

               He makes no such contentions on appeal. See Rogers
         Brief at 47-49. Rather than claim an abuse of discretion,
         Rogers argues to us de novo that the verdicts were against
         the weight of the evidence, i.e., that the witnesses lacked
         credibility, and that the trial court’s verdicts were “highly
         speculative.” Id. at 48. Accordingly, Rogers does not
         contend, much less persuade us, that the trial court
         overrode the law; made a manifestly unreasonable decision;
         or was motivated by bias, prejudice, or ill will.

Id. at 541–42.

      Like Rogers, Seecharan reargues his weight-of-the-evidence claim de

novo. He would have us substitute our view of the evidence and reweigh the

credibility of Taylor and other witnesses, in light of other evidence that

Seecharan believes is exculpatory.

      However, we did not hear or see the witnesses testify. See Santos,

supra. Thus, it is impossible for us to make the determinations Seecharan

requests. This renders a trial court’s disposition of an evidentiary-weight claim

“one of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial” on

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appeal.   Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (2013) (emphasis

added).

     In sum, Seecharan makes no claim that the trial court misapplied the

law; made a manifestly unreasonable decision; or acted with prejudice, bias,

or ill will. Hence, he does not truly contend – much less persuades us – that

an abuse of discretion occurred.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/02/2023

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