Court Opinion

ID: 9673225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:41.211453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.945192
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
The history of this case is convoluted and confusing. The business of defendant Cramer which is the source of this controversy is described by Judge O’Hair in his findings following a hearing on December 18, 1972.
"In May, 1972, defendants Graham and Gordon *123formed a partnership to conduct a business that consisted of the sale of so-called 'divorce kits.’ Later in August they expanded their firm to include the defendant Cramer as a partner. Their business is known as Gordon-Graham & Cramer Associates, and its officés are located at 15800 W. McNichols, Detroit, Michigan.
"Defendants, who admittedly are not attorneys, have solicited over 400 customers or clients by advertising 'DIVORCE’ in daily newspapers having a general circulation throughout the State of Michigan. A 'Do-It-Yourself Divorce Plan,’ as defendants characterize it, is made available to members of the public for a fee óf $75 or $100, plus $30 to $50 costs.
"When a person is interested in purchasing defendants’ 'Do-It-Your seif Divorce Plan,’ he has a conference at the defendants’ place of business. At the conference the client is advised that defendants are not lawyers, but that they do provide the forms and service which enables one to obtain his own legal divorce. A 'Questionnaire-Agreement’ is completed before the termination of the conference.
"From the information set forth in the client’s completed questionnaire, the complaint and summons are prepared by the defendants. Thereafter, all documents incident to the divorce proceedings are prepared for the client’s or the court’s signature. The completed documents are filed with the court and served upon the adverse party, if necessary, by the defendants or by the clients pursuant to the defendants’ instructions. Clients are not given a so-called kit of divorce forms, but each form is completed and executed at defendants’ office as needed at each appropriate step of the divorce proceedings.
"Before the evidentiary hearing for the entry of judgment, the defendants provide their clients with a statement setting forth suggested testimony to be offered by the client to the court and a list of suggested questions to be asked by the client of a corroborating witness.
"At all stages of the divorce proceedings the defendants, expressly or inferentially, advise the clients as to the legal procedures involved, provide all legal forms incident to the divorce proceedings, provide the service *124to complete the aforesaid forms and provide optional assistance in filing and serving all documents.
"Defendants state that at present they are primarily interested in making their 'Do-It-Yourself Divorce Plan’ available to persons who anticipate divorce proceedings that are uncontested and do not involve questions relative to children, alimony or marital property. In the past they have not been so selective.” (Footnotes omitted.)
The State Bar of Michigan, alleging that it constituted the unauthorized practice of law, sought to enjoin defendant from engaging in this business. On January 5, 1973 Judge O’Hair of the Wayne Circuit Court entered an order permanently enjoining the defendants from:
"(1) Holding themselves out to the public as qualified to render advice and service to persons interested in obtaining a divorce in the courts of Michigan;
"(2) Rendering counsel and service to persons seeking to dissolve a marital relationship by obtaining a judgment of divorce in the courts of the State of Michigan; and,
"(3) Furnishing or offering to furnish kits, forms or documents with assistance in their completion or execution, to persons seeking to dissolve a marital relationship by obtaining a judgment of divorce in the courts of the State of Michigan.”
The defendant continued in the business despite several orders finding her in contempt. We finally agreed to consider the matter and at oral argument the defendant frankly admitted she intended to keep on with it.
I
May defendant constitutionally be enjoined from providing divorce forms, assisting in the comple*125tion of these forms, and counseling persons seeking a no-fault divorce in Michigan on the grounds that she was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, contrary to MCLA 600.916; MSA 27A.916?
Plaintiff asserts that whether or not defendant was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, she is guilty of contempt for violating the injunction of the Wayne Circuit Court. It is a general rule that
"all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly. If a person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but absent a stay, to comply promptly with the order pending appeal. Persons who make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect. Howat v Kansas, 258 US 181, 189-190 [42 S Ct 277; 66 L Ed 550] (1922); Worden v Searls, 121 US 14 [7 S Ct 814; 30 L Ed 853] (1887). The orderly and expeditious administration of justice by the courts requires that 'an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.’ United States v [United] Mine Workers, 330 US 258, 293 [67 S Ct 677; 91 L Ed 884] (1947).” Maness v Meyers, 419 US 449, 458-459; 95 S Ct 584; 42 L Ed 2d 574 (1975).
"[I]n one important respect the violation of a court order generally is treated differently from the violation of a criminal statute: If the statute is invalid, the invalidity will require the defendant’s acquittal. If a court order is invalid, its violation may nonetheless be treated as contempt, except where the court lacks jurisdiction to issue the order or, perhaps, where the defendant has no opportunity to contest the validity of the order.” Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles For the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73 Mich L Rev 484, 504 (1975).
The reasons for this principle were set forth by *126the United States Supreme Court in Walker v City of Birmingham, 388 US 307, 320-321; 87 S Ct 1824; 18 L Ed 2d 1210 (1967), upholding convictions for criminal contempt of civil rights marchers who were in violation of an injunction: "[I]n the fair administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives * * * . [RJespect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom.”
In the judgment and injunctive order of January 5, 1973, defendant was enjoined from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, and specific instances of prohibited conduct were listed.
There is no doubt that defendant continued to violate the January 5 order, and, indeed is still doing so. Judge O’Hair adjudged defendant "guilty of civil contempt” on April 23, 1973, and ordered her jailed until she purged herself "by demonstrating that she will discharge her statutory and judicially imposed duty to cease permanently from engaging in the conduct proscribed by the court’s judgment and injunctive order of January 5, 1973”.
Defendant was jailed April 30, 1973, and on May 1, 1973 appeared before Judge O’Hair and made certain representations to purge herself of contempt, and was released.
On August 6, 1973, Judge O’Hair found that defendant "has violated her purgation of contempt and has broken her promise given in connection with said purgation of contempt to this Court on May 1, 1973 wherein she promised to abstain from the proscribed activities”, and again adjudged her in contempt and sentenced her to five days in jail and assessed a fine and costs.
*127On December 19, 1973, Judge O’Hair again adjudged defendant guilty of contempt and sentenced her to five days in jail.
On October 15, 1974, Judge O’Hair found: "Defendant’s * * * conduct from February 14, 1974 through June 27, 1974, has been in violation of the court’s judgment and injunctive order of January 5, 1973. The contemptuous conduct has been willful, flagrant, and in absolute defiance of the Wayne County Circuit Court.” Defendant was adjudged "guilty of civil contempt * * * as a result of her willful conduct * * * [and] as punishment * * * is to be sentenced to the Wayne County Jail for a period of 30 days, and, in addition thereto, is fined $250.”
There is disagreement over the nature of these contempt proceedings, i.e., whether defendant was found guilty of civil or criminal contempt.
"Essentially, the difference between civil and criminal contempt is that the former seeks to change respondent’s conduct by threatening him with a penalty if he does not change it, while the latter seeks to punish him for past misdoings which affront the dignity of the court. Criminal contempt being for past misconduct, there is no way for one so convicted to purge himself of the contempt.” Jaikins v Jaikins, 12 Mich App 115, 120; 162 NW2d 325 (1968).
There is no doubt that the April 23, 1973 finding was that defendant was guilty of civil contempt. Judge O’Hair specifically told the defendant that she would be jailed until she purged herself. She therefore was able to "carry the ’keys of [the] prison in [her] own pocket’ [and] the action is essentially civil”. People v Goodman, 17 Mich App 175, 177; 169 NW2d 120 (1969). In fact, the following day Judge O’Hair released her after she prom*128ised to obey his order. We affirm that finding. The other convictions however, on December 19, 1973 and October 15, 1974, despite the characterizations by the trial judge, were for criminal contempt. The jail sentences and fines were to punish defendant for past conduct.
"If [contempt citation] is to punish the offender for his disobedience or contumacious behavior, then it is criminal contempt. If, however, the purpose is to compel obedience to an order of the court, then it is civil contempt.” Spalter v Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich App 156, 160-161; 192 NW2d 347 (1971).
As we said in People v Johns, 384 Mich 325, 333; 183 NW2d 216 (1971):
"When the hearing was instituted by a show cause order and placed on the civil docket, when the proceedings lacked any semblance of a criminal trial and when the sentence had elements of both civil and criminal contempt the defendant could have reasonably expected that he indeed was being held in civil contempt.
"We therefore hold that under the procedure followed here, the defendant could not have been found guilty of criminal contempt and his sentence for such must be vacated.”
Judge O’Hair did not make these sentences "conditional”. He did not tell defendant she would be able to purge herself of the contempt as he did during the April 23 proceeding. This sentence was "one of punishment for behavior already committed in violation of the decree, and the contempt action, being unconditional as to result, is criminal”. People v Goodman, supra, at 178.
Accordingly, we hold defendant’s criminal contempt convictions and resulting sentences must be vacated.
*129II
Does defendant’s conduct constitute the unauthorized practice of law?
MCLA 600.916; MSA 27A.916 provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to practice law, or to engage in the law business, or in any manner whatsoever to lead others to believe that he is authorized to practice law or to engage in the law business, or in any manner whatsoever to represent or designate himself as an attorney and counselor, attorney at law, or lawyer, unless the person so doing is regularly licensed and authorized to practice law in this state. Any person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of contempt of the supreme court and of the circuit court of the county in which the violation occurred, and upon conviction is punishable as provided by law. This section does not apply to a person who is duly licensed and authorized to practice law in another state while temporarily in this state and engaged in a particular matter.”
Plaintiff contends that defendant has been in violation of this statute since 1972 as a result of selling legal forms and providing advice and counsel necessary to obtaining a divorce.
Defendant responds that all persons have a constitutional right to represent themselves in Michigan courts, and that all she is doing is assisting them in exercising that right. She also contends that the unauthorized practice statute is unconstitutionally vague, that her actions do not constitute the practice of law and that the statute and injunctive order deprive her of her first amendment rights. Amici Curiae, Michigan Clinical Law Program and Michigan Legal Services, agree with defendant’s contentions, and also argue that the statute is overbroad, infringes on the right to privacy, and denies equal protection of the law.
*130To obtain a perspective on the particular problems presented by this case, it is helpful to recall in outline the historical development of the "practice of law”.
"The first lawyers were personal friends of the litigant, brought into court by him so that he might 'take "counsel” with them’ before pleading. 1 Pollack & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed 1909) p 211. Similarly, the first 'attorneys’ were personal agents, often lacking any professional training, who were appointed by those litigants who had secured royal permission to carry on their affairs through a representative, rather than personally. Id., at 212-213.” Faretta v California, 422 US 806, fn 16; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975).
In England, the "practice of law” began to develop in 1178 when Henry II created a central court and appointed five clerks to serve as justices in litigation. By 1292, Edward I was forced to limit the number of practitioners due to the increasing number of unskilled persons practicing around the king’s courts, Thus, the Court of Common Pleas was vested with the power to appoint attorneys and limit the practice of law to such persons.
The bar arose, therefore, from a need to protect the public from unskilled persons practicing law.
Pound traces four stages in the colonial development of the legal profession: (1) the attempt to function without lawyers; (2) the irresponsible filling out of writs by court officials; (3) the era of admitted practitioners in permanent judicial organizations; and (4) the era of trained lawyers and development of the organized bar. R Pound, The Lawyer Prom Antiquity To Modern Times (West, 1953) pp 135-163,
*131The development of the organized bar was sporadic until the early 1900’s. In 1933 the American Bar Association appointed a Committee on Unauthorized Practice,
"Coexistent with the drive to prohibit unauthorized practice of law, there began a revival of the professional nature of the practice of law. Emphasis was increasingly placed upon the responsibilities of the legal profession to the administration of justice in a spirit of public service with the earning of a livelihood deemed 'incidental.’ Justice Cardozo observed: '[One is] received into that ancient fellowship [the bar] for something more than private gain. [The lawyer becomes] an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.’ As the concept of public service returned to the legal profession, the courts resumed the role begun in 1292, assuming the responsibility of determining qualifications and imposing discipline upon those members of the profession who violated this spirit of public service as embodied in the Canons of Ethics. As public service became paramount to the profession, efforts to combat the unauthorized practice of law, both within and without the bar, became imperative. In the words of Samuel Tilden, speaking to a group which that night became the Association of the Bar of New York City in an effort to correct the appalling conditions which prevailed throughout the legal system, '[T]he Bar, if it is to continue to exist — if it would restore itself to the dignity and honor which it once possessed — must be bold in defense, and, if need be, bold in aggression,’ In attempting to cope with the continuing problem of the unauthorized practice of law, the bar sought to inform the public of the dangers inherent in condoning such practice and to develop coercive remedies to alleviate the problem.” Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law —The Full Service Bank That Was: Bank Cashier Enjoined From Preparing Real Estate Mortgages to Secure Bank Loans, 61 Ky L J 300, 303-304 (1972). (Footnotes omitted.)
*132Michigan, as all other states, regulates the practice of law by statute.
1915 PA 314, ch I, §61 did not prohibit the "unauthorized practice of law”, but rather prohibited any person not licensed from "representing] himself as an attorney at law * * * ”.
1919 PA 314, § 61, amended the prior statute by adding that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who is not a regularly licensed attorney and counselor of this State * * * to practice law or to engage in the law business * * * ”.
Prior to 1931 PA 51, violation of this statute was a misdemeanor. 1931 PA 51 made violation punishable as contempt of court.
This statutory scheme recognizes this inherent authority of the courts to control participants in the courts of the state. E.g., Ayres v Hadaway 303 Mich 589; 6 NW2d 905 (1942).
The Michigan statute also provides that "[n]o person is authorized to practice law in this state unless he complies with the requirements of the supreme court with regard thereto”. MCLA 600.901; MSA 27A.901.
These requirements include educational, character and fitness, and examination components. MCLA 600.934, 600.937, 600.940; MSA 27A.934, 27A.937, 27A.940. Additionally, licensed attorneys are subject to discipline, including loss of license, for unprofessional conduct. MCLA 600.904; MSA 27A.904.
While all those not licensed to practice law are prohibited from doing so, the Legislature has not seen fit to define what constitutes the "practice of law”, and, accordingly, "[t]he formidable task of constructing a definition of the practice of law has largely been left to the judiciary”. Comment, Lay *133Divorce Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 6 J L Reform 423, 426 (1973).
We are still of the mind that any attempt to formulate a lasting, all-encompassing definition of "practice of law” is doomed to failure "for the reason that under our system of jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with the everchanging business and social order”. Grand Rapids Bar Association v Denkema, 290 Mich 56, 64; 287 NW 377 (1939).
No essential definition of the practice of law has been articulated and the descriptive definitions which have been agreed upon from time to time have only permitted disposition of specific questions. These definitions have been relatively helpful in counseling conduct but have provided no sure guide for the public’s protection.
A broad definition of the "practice of law” embraces virtually all commercial areas of human endeavor. This, of course, will not do.
"It cannot be urged, with reason, that a lawyer must preside over every transaction where written legal forms must be selected and used by an agent for one of the parties. Such a restriction would so paralyze business activities that very few transactions could be expeditiously consummated.” State ex rel Indiana State Bar Association v Indiana Real Estate Association, 244 Ind 214, 221-222; 191 NE2d 711 (1963).
The result of this inability to fashion a definition of "practice of law” to fit every situation "has been a line of decisions consistent only in their inconsistency as the courts have sought to accommodate the need for public protection through restricting the practice of law to members of the bar with the economic and practical realities of modern society”. Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law—The *134Full Service Bank That Was: Bank Cashier Enjoined From Preparing Real Estate Mortgages to Secure Bank Loans, 61 Ky L J 300, 311 (1972).
"Laymen are excluded from law practice, whatever law practice may be, solely to protect the public.” Oregon State Bar v Security Escrows, Inc, 233 Or 80, 87; 377 P2d 334, 338 (1962).
It is this purpose of public protection which must dictate the construction we put on the term "unauthorized practice of law”.
There is no doubt that this unauthorized practice statute affects constitutional rights. It certainly affects the first amendment rights of defendant; it affects the right to privacy inherent in the marital relationship. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 152-153; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973); Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371; 91 S Ct 780; 28 L Ed 2d 113 (1971). It affects the litigants’ right to self-representation. Const 1963, art 1, § 13.
Of course, the fact that the statute affects constitutional rights does not make it invalid. However, where a statute does impinge on constitutional rights, it must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake”. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 155; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973).
"The power of the states to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights.” Johnson v Avery, 393 US 483, 490, fn 11; 89 S Ct 747; 21 L Ed 2d 718 (1969).
"[I]n regulating the practice of law a state cannot ignore the rights of individuals secured by the constitution.” Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1, 6; 84 S Ct 1113; 12 L Ed 2d 89 (1964). With these principles in mind, we must consider the unautho*135rized practice statute in light of the divorce laws of Michigan and defendant’s activities.
Effective January 1, 1972, this state adopted a no-fault divorce law. MCLA 552.6; MSA 25.86. We agree with one suggestion that this revision in the divorce law was made in the belief that "when the marriage relationship has terminated, granting of the divorce should flow as an inalienable legal right”. Honigman, What ’’No-Fault” Means to Divorce, 51 Mich St B J 16, 17 (1972). Because divorce procedures in Michigan are now limited to pleading on statutory grounds and a response either admitting or denying the assertions, divorce procedures have been simplified considerably. Downs, Family Law, 1972 Ann Survey of Michigan Law, 19 Wayne Law Rev 479, 498 (1973). The question becomes whether the apparent relative ease with which a divorce can be obtained should enable persons untrained in the law to purport to provide individualized counsel and professional guidance to one seeking a divorce.
There are no Michigan cases which have addressed this issue. However, we are mindful of the opinion of jurisdictions which have considered questions similar to those now presented which have held such practices to be the unauthorized practice of law. In The Florida Bar v Stupica, 300 So 2d 683 (Fla, 1974), the mere furnishing of "divorce kits” to the general public was held to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Contained in these kits were forms which included petition for dissolution, answer, summons, sworn statement of constructive service, default motions, joint stipulations for motion for final hearing, orders setting final hearing, and final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Accompanying these forms were several pages of explanatory data concerning *136the forms as well as specific information and advice regarding the use and application of the forms so as to comply with the laws governing the dissolution of marriage. This information was viewed as providing direct legal advice without benefit of legal training and interpretive statutory annotations which would minimize the possibility that the interests of the person seeking assistance on divorce matters were not properly represented. See, also, The Florida Bar v American Legal & Business Forms, Inc, 274 So 2d 225 (Fla, 1973).
Concern for the quality of legal representation available to persons seeking a divorce was also expressed in Oregon State Bar v Gilchrist, 272 Or 552, 563; 538 P2d 913 (1975). The Court did not consider the advertisement and sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits containing the necessary forms together with an explanatory manual as constituting the unauthorized practice of law. However, the Court specifically distinguished this course of conduct from personal contact between defendants and their "customers” in the nature of "consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice or other assistance in selecting particular forms, in filling out any part of the form, or suggesting or advising how the forms should be used in solving the particular customer’s marital problems”. The latter was enjoined because the relationship which developed between the parties was tantamount to that of attorney and client.
We also believe this to be a significant distinction. The advertisement and distribution to the general public of forms and documents utilized to obtain a divorce together with any related textual instructions does not constitute the practice of law. There can be no serious challenge raised to this or any enterprise which is otherwise in compliance *137with those regulations applicable to products placed in the stream of commerce. Were defendant to limit her activity to providing forms and instructions regarding divorce, her undertaking would be analogous to that set forth in New York County Lawyers Ass’n v Dacey, 21 NY2d 694; 234 NE2d 459 (1967), a case involving the publication and distribution of the book, How to Avoid Probate. The Court adopted the dissenting opinion below which stated:
"There [was] no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice — the representation and the advising of a particular person in a particular situation.
* * *
"At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.” 28 App Div 2d 161, 171, 174; 283 NYS2d 984 (1967).
But defendant goes well beyond merely making available those materials necessary to effect a legal divorce. She advertises "professional guidance” to her "clients”.1 A personal conference is arranged between defendant and her client to discuss the divorce. The complaint and summons are prepared by defendant. Once completed, all documents incident to the divorce proceedings are prepared .for the client’s or the court’s signature. Defendant occasionally files the completed forms in court. And, in most cases, she personally advises her clients as to the proper testimony to provide.
*138The interests involved in divorce matters are considerable. Those persons offering advice on legal matters regarding child custody, contract and property rights, inheritance, separate property, and support, to name the more significant, must possess a measure of competency and judgment to insure proper representation. Because defendant offers counsel in the form of professional guidance to persons seeking to extricate themselves from a legal relationship, the party represented, as well as the public in general, has a right to be assured that these interests are properly represented by members of the bar. To the extent that defendant provides personal advice peculiar to the dissolution of a specific marriage, she is engaged in the "unauthorized practice of law” contrary to MCLA 600.916; MSA 27A.916.
We affirm the finding of civil contempt of April 23, 1973 and reverse the contempt convictions of December 19, 1973 and October 15, 1974. The injunctive order entered January 5, 1973 by the trial court is affirmed.
No costs, a public question.
Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred.

 Though defendant objects to the use of the word "client”, the advertisements specifically refer to those persons dealing with her as clients.