Court Opinion

ID: 9940119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:12:43.144421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:05.984774
License: Public Domain

J-A29008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 JOSE AJIATAS                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :     No. 1411 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 22, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0002830-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED: FEBRUARY 13, 2024

      Jose Ajiatas appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of six to

twelve years of imprisonment followed by five years of probation for his

conviction for, inter alia, rape of a child. We affirm.

      The trial court set forth the pertinent facts:

      On November 30, 2020, Detective Brian Sellers of the City of
      Pittsburgh Police Department’s Special Victims Unit received a
      ChildLine report concerning an eleven-year-old female, L.C. The
      report initiated by L.C.’s primary care physician indicated that the
      minor was [twenty-one] weeks pregnant.             A procedure to
      terminate the pregnancy was scheduled on December 2, 2020,
      and in anticipation of this event, Detective Sellers sought and
      obtained a search warrant for the “genetic material (DNA) from
      fetal tissue retrieved from an eleven-year old female, [L.C.] from
      UPMC Magee Women’s Hospital.”

      L.C. initially claimed that the father of the unborn child was a male
      minor between the age of ten and eleven years old. As indicated
      in the accompanying Affidavit of Probable Cause for the search
      warrant, Dr. Jennifer Clarke, a pediatrician at UPMC Children’s
      Hospital, informed [Detective Sellers] that it was “highly unlikely”
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     that an eleven-year-old male could produce fertile sperm that
     would result in pregnancy. Additionally, he learned from L.C.’s
     brother or sister that she had been attending school remotely and
     that they were unaware of her being involved with a boy of similar
     age. As L.C. is below the legal age of consent, and with the
     possibility of a sexual criminal act, Detective Sellers sought a
     sample of the fetal tissue from the termination procedure with the
     intent to determine paternity through DNA comparison. On
     December 2, 2020, Detective Sellers executed the warrant and
     obtained the fetal tissue sample.

     As part of his investigation, forensic and other interviews were
     conducted. On December 24, 2020, Detective Sellers had a
     telephone conversation with L.C.’s brother, B.A. Detective Sellers
     explained to B.A., and his father, [Appellant], that as part of his
     investigation into L.C.’s pregnancy, he would like both of them to
     come to police headquarters to provide a DNA sample. After
     Detective Sellers became aware that [Appellant] spoke little to no
     English, he asked if B.A., who was [seventeen] years old, would
     be willing to interpret for [Appellant]. He agreed, and around 4:00
     p.m. that same day, [Appellant] and B.A. arrived voluntarily at
     the police station. Detective Sellers communicated to [Appellant]
     that he was not a suspect, and at no time was [Appellant]
     handcuffed or told that he was not free to leave. Detective Sellers
     brought B.A. and [Appellant] into a room to obtain the DNA
     sample. The door remained closed and unlocked, and no other
     law enforcement officers were present.

     It was established during the suppression hearing that the
     Pittsburgh Police Department employs Spanish-speaking
     interpreters, but they are not on-call [twenty-four] hours a day
     and Detective Sellers did not call one to assist in translation on
     this day.    Moreover, [Detective] Sellers testified that he is
     unaware of, and has never seen, a departmental Consent to
     Search form written in Spanish. The English-language Consent to
     Search form was provided to B.A. and it was also read aloud by
     Detective Sellers and translated simultaneously to [Appellant].
     The form read as follows: “(1) That I may require a search warrant
     to be obtained prior to any search being made; (2) That I may
     refuse to consent to any search; (3) That anything which may be
     found as a result of this search which is subject to search and
     seizure can and will be used against me in a criminal prosecution;
     (4) That I may revoke my consent to search at any time; and (5)

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      That I may consult with anyone of my choosing before I make a
      decision to waive my rights in consenting to this search.”

      Upon translation of these five statements by B.A. to [Appellant],
      Detective Sellers described that [Appellant] responded with a
      head shake or head nod, but was unsure if he responded verbally
      with “yes” or “si.” Thereafter, it was signed by [Appellant] on
      December 24, 2020 at 4:23 PM. Detective Sellers observed during
      the translation by B.A. that [Appellant] appeared friendly,
      observant, and responded in a positive manner. After [Appellant]
      consented to providing a sample, Detective Sellers explained the
      collection process. He informed [Appellant], through B.A., that he
      will need to open his mouth, whereafter the inside of both cheeks
      will be swabbed three times before placing the swab in a transport
      pouch. [Appellant] complied without any issue.

      Detective Sellers testified that the entire interaction with
      [Appellant] was no more than [ten] to [fifteen] minutes long, and
      B.A. never communicated any questions from [Appellant] to
      Detective Sellers.

      [Appellant] also testified at the evidentiary hearing [with the aid
      of an interpreter]. [Appellant] stated that he knows very little
      English. He explained that he went to the police station with his
      son, B.A., and it was explained to him after he arrived that the
      police wanted a DNA sample. . . . Appellant testified that he had
      “no choice” other than to sign the consent form because the
      detective was present. Furthermore, he stated that he did not
      understand that by signing the form police could obtain a DNA
      sample.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6/23/22, at 3-6 (cleaned up).

      Appellant was charged with multiple criminal offenses, including rape of

a child.   He subsequently filed a motion to suppress based upon the

voluntariness of his consent, and the trial court held a hearing on this issue.

The court denied the motion, holding that Appellant’s consent to the search

was given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The parties proceeded to

a stipulated bench trial. Appellant was convicted of rape of a child and other

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related offenses and was later sentenced as indicated above.       This timely

appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement

of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and

Appellant complied. Thereafter, the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Appellant proffers the following question for our review: “Whether the

trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress where his consent

to the DNA swab was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given to the

detective?” Appellant’s brief at 8.

      We begin with a review of the germane legal principles. Preliminarily,

      [a]n appellate court’s standard of reviewing the denial of a
      suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
      suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
      and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
      correct. Thus, our review of questions of law is de novo. Our
      scope of review is to consider [the evidence offered by the
      Commonwealth] only and the evidence for the defense as remains
      uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record
      as a whole.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 968-69 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted). When a motion to suppress has been filed, the Commonwealth has

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged

evidence was not unlawfully obtained. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42

A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012).

      Where the voluntariness of consent to search is at issue, the following

tenets guide our review:

      A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be
      unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless
      an established exception applies. One such exception is consent,

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      voluntarily given. The central Fourth Amendment inquiries in
      consent cases entail assessment of the constitutional validity of
      the citizen/police encounter giving rise to the consent; and,
      ultimately, the voluntariness of consent. Where the underlying
      encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the
      exclusive focus.

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888–89 (Pa. 2000) (citations

and footnotes omitted).      The voluntariness standard for consent is less

stringent than the tests governing waiver of other constitutional rights. Id.

at 889 n.3 (“[W]hile the waiver analysis appropriately applies to safeguard

constitutional guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial of criminal

defendants, it does not pertain to the wholly different protections of the Fourth

Amendment[.]” (citations omitted)).      The test is objective in nature, with

some subjective considerations.      Id. at 901 (“Additionally, although the

inquiry is an objective one, the maturity, sophistication and mental or

emotional state of the defendant (including age, intelligence and capacity to

exercise free will), are to be taken into account.” (citations omitted)).

      Appellant concedes that his encounter with the detective was lawful and,

therefore, challenges only the voluntariness of the consent given to conduct

the DNA swab. See Appellant’s brief at 22. In so doing, he avers that the

Commonwealth did not prove that B.A. translated everything that Detective

Sellers said to Appellant fully and accurately, as a certified interpreter was not

utilized in obtaining Appellant’s consent. Id. at 31. Thus, Appellant contends

that, because of the language barrier, he did not fully comprehend the consent

to search form, and therefore any consent was improperly obtained. Id.

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       Appellant analogizes his case to Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266

A.3d 1117 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc). Therein, Carmenates’s vehicle was

pulled over for a traffic stop. Carmenates, whose first language was Spanish,

spoke little English, while the trooper could not speak any Spanish.        To

communicate with Carmenates, the trooper used the Google Translate

application on his cell phone. However, it was adduced at the suppression

hearing that the translation from Google Translate was sometimes inaccurate.

Furthermore, the suppression court found that the trooper deliberately used

vague and imprecise words to confuse Carmenates in order to obtain his

consent to search the vehicle and items in it. The trooper additionally had a

Spanish-language consent to search form in his vehicle but neglected to use

it.   Hence, the court determined that Carmenates’s consent to search the

vehicle was not given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and this Court

affirmed.

       Appellant avers that the substantial language barrier he faced is

analogous to that in Carmenates and, thus, argues that the consent obtained

by Detective Sellers was similarly invalid.     See Appellant’s brief at 31.

However, the trial court rejected this claim, finding that Carmenates was

distinguishable. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6/23/22, at 11-

12. Unlike in Carmenates, B.A.’s translation in the matter sub judice was

never proven to be an inaccurate representation of Detective Sellers’s

questions. Moreover, whereas the trooper in Carmenates had a prepared

consent form in Spanish in his vehicle but chose not to use it, such was not

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the case herein.   There was no evidence presented that Detective Sellers

attempted to trick Appellant into providing his consent or failed to act in good

faith. Instead, he asked Appellant’s son, B.A., to translate what was written

on the form.    Based on these distinctions, we agree with the court that

Appellant’s reliance on Carmenates is inapt.

      The trial court concluded that the Commonwealth proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that Appellant’s consent was voluntary and not

obtained in violation of his rights. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, 6/23/22, at 13. It noted that Appellant’s body language indicated that

he understood what B.A. was saying as he nodded and gave positive verbal

affirmations while listening to B.A.’s translation of Detective Sellers’s

statements. Id. at 5, 13. Furthermore, Appellant was cooperative while B.A.

translated the form and Detective Sellers took the DNA sample. Id. at 5-6.

Indeed, while undergoing the DNA swab, Appellant acted in accordance with

what the detective instructed him to do, demonstrating that it was an accurate

translation. Id. at 13. The court also decided that the use of B.A., a family

member, to translate was not unreasonable in these circumstances. Id. at.

12-13. Thus, the trial court found that Appellant understood what was being

asked of him, including his right to refuse consent. Id.

      On review, we determine that the certified record confirms the trial

court’s findings that suppression was not warranted under the circumstances

of this case. Appellant acknowledged that he went to the police station to

provide a DNA swab and that he had signed the consent form to that extent.

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Id. at 31-32. When asked through an interpreter whether he was aware that

Detective Sellers wanted his DNA, Appellant responded, “when I got there, I

found out.”   Id. at 31.    This belied Appellant’s contention that he did not

comprehend the translation given by B.A., since Appellant conceded that he

understood the detective wished to collect a DNA sample.              Moreover,

according to Detective Sellers’s testimony, Appellant was cooperative

throughout the entire interaction. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/5/21, at

10. When the detective explained to Appellant the process of conducting a

DNA swab, he encountered no inquiries or resistance from Appellant. Id. at

12-13. Appellant was compliant and never questioned or tried to stop the

proceeding in any way, instead nodding and expressing affirmance as B.A.

translated.   Id. at 10-11.     Finally, Detective Sellers also testified that he

frequently used bilingual family members such as B.A. to translate, as he

found that people are often more comfortable around individuals with whom

they are well-acquainted. Id. at 26-27.

      As the court’s factual findings that Appellant knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily consented to the swab are supported by the record, the trial

court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.        Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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FILED: 2/13/2024

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