Court Opinion

ID: 9496437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:26:52.877391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:35.082192
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Hakeem Abdul Malik (Malik) of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2000). Malik appeals the admission of evidence that an unidentified male told police officers Malik possessed a firearm and expressed a willingness to use the firearm on police officers. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of June 24, 2001, at about 2:15 a.m., an unidentified male informant, approximately 35 to 40 years old, approached police officers and reported he overheard a young black male say he had a gun and would be willing to use it against the police department if anything happened. The informant identified Malik to the officers. At the time, the officers were on foot patrol of a Kansas City, Missouri entertainment area called Westport. Westport, which attracts 2000 to 3000 people on Friday and Saturday nights, has a history of assaults, robberies, and police officers being the victims of crime.
Two officers waited for Malik to leave a crowd and then approached him from behind. Malik looked over his shoulder and saw one of the officers. The officers asked Malik to show his hands. Malik flinched and the officers grabbed his arms. Malik struggled, pulled away and ran. The officers chased Malik several blocks before stopping and arresting him. One officer testified that, during the chase, he saw Malik hold his pants in the crotch area while he ran. The second officer cut off Malik, and as Malik approached him, the officer saw Malik reach with both hands into the waistband of his pants and remove a silver gun. Malik lost his grip on the gun and tried to catch it, but the gun landed in the street. That officer recovered a Raven Arms MP .25 caliber semiautomatic lying in the street. The gun *1001was loaded and did not have a trigger lock. The officers later found a second weapon, a semi-automatic handgun, where they initially confronted Malik. However, the officers had not seen this second weapon on Malik before finding it on the ground.
Malik called a witness who testified she met Malik the night he was arrested, and she hugged and talked with him before the chase. She testified she felt Malik’s chest down to his groin area, and did not feel or see a weapon. Malik did not tell her he had a weapon, nor did she see him drop or throw a weapon. However, the witness admitted she did not see the officers take Malik to the ground to effect the arrest.
On the morning of trial, Malik’s counsel argued to exclude the informant’s statements to police officers reporting Malik had a gun and was willing to use it on police officers. The district court2 denied the motion in limine. Malik’s counsel did not make any objections to the testimony at trial, but did request an instruction, which the district court included in the final instructions, informing the jury the testimony about the informant’s statement could only be used as it related to the officers’ subsequent actions, not to prove Malik possessed a gun. At the conclusion of the one-day trial, a jury convicted Malik of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Malik to 262 months imprisonment. Malik challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing the district court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude the informant’s statements.
II. DISCUSSION
“Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection ... to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R.Evid. 108(a) (2000). Here, the ruling on the motion in limine occurred immediately before the start of trial. The context of the ruling included directions to the witnesses. There is no doubt the ruling was definitive.
We review the district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Walrath, 324 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir.2003) (standard of review). However, Malik appeals, not the admission of the evidence, but the denial of his motion in limine. Malik claims his right to cross-examination was impeded, a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. His argument does not change our standard of review.
Malik contends the statements of the informant relayed to the jury through the testimony of the police officers were hearsay, highly prejudicial and not relevant. “When the out-of-court statement has relevance when we only consider the effect it had on those who heard (or read) it-not whether the statement was true or not, but just its effect on those who heard it-then the statement is not hearsay.” G. Michael Fenner, The Heaesay Rule 31 (2003); see Fed.R.Evid. 801. For example, “[a]n out-of-court statement is ... not hearsay if it is offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead to explain the reasons for or propriety of a police investigation.” United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir.1998). ‘We have held, however, that evidence may not be admitted for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining an investigation where the propriety of the investigation is not a relevant issue at trial.” Id. Malik argues the *1002propriety of the investigation was not an issue. We disagree. The testimony of Malik’s witness, that she did not see or feel a gun on Malik nor did she see him drop or throw a weapon, placed the officers’ credibility at issue, suggesting the officers planted or lied about the weapon dropped by Malik. See United States v. Watson, 952 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1991) (affirming admission of an informant’s tip containing an alleged hearsay accusation, because, “[although the brothers insist the reasons behind the investigation were not in issue, their defense relied extensively on the claim that Detective Williams was fabricating or distorting the evidence against them”).
Inclusion of the informant’s entire statement was relevant and warranted to explain the police conduct and to bolster the officers’ credibility. An individual’s possession of a weapon is not necessarily a crime. The unidentified male informant did not indicate Malik was a felon or was otherwise illegally in possession of the gun. The full statement, including that Malik said he would be willing to use his gun against the police, provided the probable cause for the specific investigatory inquiry and the pursuit. The officers had information Malik could be dangerous, specifically to police. A redacted statement, that Ma-lik possessed a gun, would not adequately or truthfully explain why the officers approached, confronted, grabbed and chased Malik. When Malik made the strategic decision to call a witness to challenge the officers’ credibility about Malik’s gun possession, the informant’s entire statement became relevant and not unduly prejudicial.
Because we find the informant’s statements admissible, there was no violation of Malik’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. See id. The court also instructed the jury on the limited nature of the evidence. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting the informant’s complete statement to explain the officers’ actions and corroborate the officers’ testimony.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we find no abuse of discretion we affirm.

. The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.