Court Opinion

ID: 9898316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:54.104372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:02.327638
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Parental Rights to
                                                    No. 83166-6-I
 D.J.P., C.-S.J.P., J.J.P., A.J.P., N.V.P.,         (consolidated with
 and T.J.C.J.P.,                                    Nos. 83167-4-I, 83168-2-I,
                                                    83169-1-I, 83190-9-I, 83191-7-I)
               Minor children.
                                                    DIVISION ONE

                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION

       BIRK, J. — The trial court terminated J.P.’s parental rights to his six children

following a seven day trial. J.P. appeals. At issue is whether the Department of

Children, Youth, and Families (Department) satisfied its burden under several

provisions of RCW 13.34.180(1), whether several challenged findings of fact (FFs)

are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the trial court abused its

discretion in qualifying an interpreter of J.P.’s language, Kosraean. We affirm.

                                              I

                                           A

       J.P. is the biological father of D.J.P., C.-S.J.P., J.J.P., A.J.P., N.V.P., and

T.J.C.J.P. The family has a history of child protective services (CPS) involvement

and documented domestic violence, predominantly directed at T.J.C.J.P., J.J.P.,

and K.P., the children’s biological mother.          The family experienced two

dependencies: the first was filed in 2010 and the second in 2017. The allegations

in the dependencies included domestic violence, alcohol use, and neglect. In
No. 83166-6-I/2

November 2010, Kent police arrested J.P. for fourth degree assault, domestic

violence. J.P. was convicted of attempted assault of K.P. On May 4, 2011, a court

entered an agreed order of dependency and disposition as to J.P. and found

A.J.P., N.V.P., and T.J.C.J.P., all of J.P.’s children at the time, dependent. This

dependency was dismissed.1 In 2017, the Department removed all six children

from J.P.’s care.

       At a shelter care hearing on December 21, 2017, a court found it was

contrary to the welfare of the children to remain or return home and there was

reasonable cause to believe the children had no parent to provide supervision or

care for them. The court granted J.P. supervised visitation twice per week for two

hours at a minimum. On April 23, 2018, the court entered an agreed order of

dependency as to J.P. for all six children. The court ordered J.P. to complete

random urinalysis once per week for 90 days, adding the Department may request

an additional random urinalysis up to six times per month upon suspicion of use

and a drug/alcohol evaluation, and to follow treatment recommendations. The

court ordered J.P. to complete a domestic violence batterer’s assessment and a

parenting assessment, and to follow all recommendations resulting from both.

       In July 2018, J.P. began a drug and alcohol assessment, the first service in

which J.P. participated. In October 2018, J.P. pleaded guilty to two counts of

domestic violence assault against T.J.C.J.P. and J.J.P. The court in the assault

case issued a no-contact order protecting T.J.C.J.P. and J.J.P., which remained in

       1 Although it was not admitted into evidence in the dependency trial under

review, the record includes an order dated September 14, 2011 dismissing the
earlier dependency.

                                        2
No. 83166-6-I/3

effect until May 2022. J.P. participated in inpatient treatment for his substance use

at Sea Mar in 2018 and completed a substance use assessment at Social

Treatment Opportunity Programs (STOP) in 2019. On October 23, 2019, J.P.

began an intensive outpatient program. J.P. completed a parenting assessment

and started urinalysis testing in 2019. J.P. visited and communicated with his

children for the last time in 2019. At the time of trial, J.P. had been clean and sober

since July 15, 2019. J.P. completed a domestic violence evaluation at STOP in

March 2020 and, at some point, completed STOP’s domestic violence program.

       On June 3, 2020, the court granted the court appointed special advocate’s

(CASA) motion to suspend J.P.’s visitation, finding J.P. had not completed

domestic violence services required by a court order and the children had been

out-of-home for 30 months, were currently in stable and loving homes, and had

regular and safe contact with one another.

       In July 2020, J.P. completed a psychosocial parenting assessment with

Carmela Washington-Harvey, PhD. Dr. Washington-Harvey recommended in her

report services including family/reconciliation therapy, trauma focused therapy for

J.P. that focuses on childhood trauma, age appropriate parent education, and the

completion of substance abuse and domestic violence programs. J.P. did not

complete family/reconciliation therapy or trauma focused therapy.

                                          3
No. 83166-6-I/4

                                         B

       On August 14, 2020, the Department filed a petition for termination of J.P.’s

parent-child relationship with all six children.2 The termination trial lasted seven

days, from July 20, 2021 through July 29, 2021.

                                          1

       At the time of trial, the children lived in two separate homes, but were

provided the opportunity to see one another in visits at least twice a month. All six

siblings “enjoy their time together,” and CASA Jeanne Dembeck characterized the

visits as “a highlight of their month.” When speaking about all the children,

Dembeck noted the settings they are being raised in are the most positive settings

for them to continue to be raised in, and it was best for all of the children to be

adopted.

       The trial court’s relevant unchallenged findings of fact3 and trial testimony

as to each individual child are summarized as follows:

                                     T.J.C.J.P.

       T.J.C.J.P. was 14 years old. Dembeck testified T.J.C.J.P. did not want to

talk about J.P. and rarely talked about him. Dembeck reported T.J.C.J.P. was

fearful of J.P. Dembeck recounted an instance when T.J.C.J.P. told her that he

wrestled in 2019 and had to quit because T.J.C.J.P. could not “stand having the

holds on him that wrestling requires; like, totally freaked him out.” T.J.C.J.P.

attributed this reaction to J.P. who used to hold him down. T.J.C.J.P. indicated to

       2 K.P.’s rights as to the children had been terminated before trial.
       3 Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true on appeal.        In re Det.
of L.S., 23 Wn. App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022).

                                          4
No. 83166-6-I/5

Dembeck that he is not ready in any way to engage in any kind of therapy with J.P.

Dembeck testified T.J.C.J.P. repeatedly told her he does not want to see J.P. until

he’s a “full-grown man” to be able to defend himself against J.P.

      T.J.C.J.P.’s therapist Aldon Schwimmer testified T.J.C.J.P. reported J.P. is

abusive and hit people. Schwimmer testified T.J.C.J.P. looked forward to being in

a stable and loving home permanently. T.J.C.J.P. reported feeling “nurtured and

well-loved and cared for” by his foster parents in their home. Schwimmer denied

any indication during T.J.C.J.P.’s therapy sessions that T.J.C.J.P. is emotionally

ready to have contact with J.P.     Schwimmer believed it still was difficult for

T.J.C.J.P. to address his trauma.

                                      N.V.P.

      N.V.P. was 12 years old. Dembeck testified N.V.P. talked a lot “in the

beginning” about J.P., things she had seen him do, and how they scared her.

Dembeck reported N.V.P. is not particularly open with her about discussing J.P.

While N.V.P. would talk about J.P., she preferred not to. N.V.P. recalled one

instance to Dembeck where A.J.P. did something that made J.P. angry, and A.J.P.

ran and hid under a bed in response. J.P. told N.V.P. to grab A.J.P. and drag her

out by her hair if needed, which upset N.V.P. The last time N.V.P. recounted an

incident to Dembeck was three to four months before trial. Dembeck testified

N.V.P. said she did not want to see J.P.

                                      A.J.P.

      A.J.P. was 10 years old. Dembeck testified when first attempting to speak

with A.J.P. about J.P., A.J.P. would cry nonstop for about 45 minutes and then

                                           5
No. 83166-6-I/6

went to her foster father, because A.J.P. said she could not talk about J.P. This

went on for a few months. By the time of the termination trial, Dembeck reported

A.J.P. as being “good” and very bonded to her foster parents, especially her foster

mother. Dembeck described one instance A.J.P. reported when J.P. was going to

visit his three youngest children, and A.J.P. said through tears she would go on

the visit to protect them from J.P. Dembeck testified A.J.P. expressed on many

occasions that she does not wish to see J.P.

       A.J.P.’s mental health counselor Pepper Snider testified that when she first

started working with A.J.P., A.J.P. “presented as worried.” Snider explained A.J.P.

worried about the uncertainty and possible change of her living arrangement.

A.J.P. expressed concern to Snider about the termination trial because A.J.P.

worried she would have to return to living with J.P.

                                       J.J.P.

       J.J.P. was 9 years old. When asked whether J.J.P. ever brought up J.P.,

Dembeck testified J.J.P. is “very angry” and has been for “probably the last six or

seven months.” In contrast to some of her siblings, J.J.P. is always angry instead

of sad when discussing J.P. Dembeck reported J.J.P. said she does not want to

be with J.P. or ever see him again. Dembeck testified J.J.P. expressed she wants

to be adopted and thinks J.P. should “just allow her to be adopted.”

                                     C.-S.J.P.

       C.-S.J.P. was 8 years old. Dembeck reported C.-S.J.P. had a lot of anger

issues they are trying to work out and still has frequent nightmares. Dembeck

                                         6
No. 83166-6-I/7

testified some of those nightmares come from the “Chucky” movies 4 J.P. and C.-

S.J.P. watched that scared C.-S.J.P. C.-S.J.P. expressed a desire to be adopted.

       C.-S.J.P.’s youth therapist Kathy Opie testified C.-S.J.P. presents with

recurrent nightmares and tantrums. Opie noted C.-S.J.P. has anger problems,

anxiety, low self-esteem, guilt, shame, fear, attachment issues, and difficulty

adjusting.   As Opie began working with C.-S.J.P., C.-S.J.P. reported many

instances of past abuse and trauma. Opie testified she had to make four separate

CPS calls based on C.-S.J.P.’s reports of past trauma abuse, noting those actions

alone constituted cause to diagnose C.-S.J.P. with posttraumatic stress disorder.

C.-S.J.P. reported to Opie that she had been repeatedly exposed directly and

indirectly to physical abuse, emotional abuse, and domestic violence.

       Opie testified about several specific incidents of trauma C.-S.J.P. reported

to her. C.-S.J.P. said, “ ‘My father put my head in a toilet . . . and made my mom’s

eye purple.’ ” C.-S.J.P. reported J.P. hit “ ‘us a lot’ ” and “ ‘the police knew about

it.’ ” Opie testified C.-S.J.P. told her she had to watch “Chucky” movies with her

family, and C.-S.J.P. has recurring nightmares “from this imagery.” During a family

therapy session with her foster mom, Opie testified C.-S.J.P. broke down in tears

and said she was afraid of J.P. before sobbing uncontrollably.

       4 The “Chucky” movies are a series of horror films, originally franchised

under the name of Child’s Play before incorporating “Chucky” into the titles of
various sequels. See, e.g., CHILD’S PLAY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists
1988); BRIDE OF CHUCKY (Universal Pictures 1998).

                                          7
No. 83166-6-I/8

                                       D.J.P.

       D.J.P. was 5 years old. Dembeck testified D.J.P. came into care when she

was just over one year old and, at the time of trial, was anticipated to be starting

kindergarten in fall 2021.5

                                         2

       The Department assigned social worker Marissa McGee to J.P. and his

family in July 2018.    McGee testified her responsibilities included reminding

parents of their obligations, usually in the form of a “service letter.” She stated a

service letter lists a parent’s obligations based on a court order. McGee referred

J.P. to court-ordered services and urinalysis testing in September 2018. McGee

testified she accommodated J.P.’s vision issues by enlarging pictures and text to

assist J.P. in seeing them better. McGee provided translated copies of court

documents to J.P. McGee testified Dr. Washington-Harvey recommended J.P.

complete trauma therapy, focusing on childhood trauma. McGee called several

providers, including Sea Mar, Valley Cities, Sound Mental Health, Northwest

Family Life, and Catholic Community Services, to find an available trauma therapy

program for J.P. McGee referred J.P. to “Consejo” on February 28, 2021 for

trauma therapy. McGee testified J.P. did not complete trauma therapy:

       Q Did Dr. Washington-Harvey also recommend [J.P.] complete
         trauma therapy, focusing on childhood trauma?
       A Yes.
       Q Did [J.P.] complete that service?
       A No.

       5 In her testimony, Dembeck testified “I don’t believe [D.J.P.] remembers

her dad,” and the trial court sustained an objection to this statement based on
foundation and nonresponsiveness.

                                         8
No. 83166-6-I/9

      Q Did you refer that service?
      A Yes.
      Q And who did you refer [J.P.] to complete that service with?
      A Consejo.

McGee testified that based on Consejo’s representations, J.P. could start or

complete the service on his own. McGee testified she could not find an available

program earlier because of difficulties in finding a provider who would offer trauma

therapy without the children present.

      McGee reported she referred J.P. to a reconciliation therapy service around

February 2021 also at Consejo. McGee searched for family therapy or family

reconciliation therapy programs through other providers, including Valley Cities,

Sea Mar, Sound Mental Health, and Catholic Community Services.              McGee

testified she expected J.P. to take both family therapy and trauma-focused therapy

at Consejo consecutively.

      McGee testified J.P. did not complete either trauma therapy or reconciliation

therapy. McGee noted she asked J.P. to complete trauma therapy several times

but he did not want to do the service because “if his children weren’t going to

participate, then he did not want to do that service.” McGee sent service letters to

J.P. in April 2021, May 2021, and June 2021. According to McGee, J.P. also failed

to complete reconciliation therapy because his children were not going to be

involved. J.P. informed McGee seeing his children “was the only reason why he

wanted to take the therapy.”

                                         C

      On August 3, 2021, the trial court issued its oral findings, and on August 13,

2021, the court filed its “Hearings, Findings, and Order Regarding Termination of

                                         9
No. 83166-6-I/10

Parent-Child Relationship of [J.P.].” The court terminated J.P.’s parental rights for

all six children. J.P. appeals.

       During this appeal’s pendency, the Department conceded there was an

inadequate record at trial to establish that Kosraean interpreter Driskell Jack met

the RCW 2.43.030(2) requirements and requested this case be remanded for a

reference hearing under RAP 9.11. On June 1, 2022, a court commissioner

remanded for that limited purpose and stayed the appeal during the remand. The

trial court held the reference hearing on August 26, 2022.

                                           II

       J.P. argues the trial court erred in appointing Jack without ensuring he was

an appropriately qualified interpreter. J.P. concedes that there was good cause

not to use a certified interpreter because there are not certified interpreters of

Kosraean but argues the trial court failed to make the findings necessary to ensure

Jack was otherwise qualified and competent.           Based on the supplemental

information provided during the reference hearing, we disagree.

       Chapter 2.43 RCW details statutory requirements for interpreters for non-

English-speaking persons.         If the trial court finds good cause for using an

interpreter who is not certified, the court must make a preliminary determination,

on the basis of testimony or stated needs of the non-English person, that the

proposed interpreter is able to interpret accurately all communications to and from

such person in that particular proceeding. RCW 2.43.030(2). The trial court must

satisfy itself on the record that the proposed interpreter “(a) Is capable of

communicating effectively with the court or agency and the person for whom the

                                          10
No. 83166-6-I/11

interpreter would interpret; and (b) Has read, understands, and will abide by the

code of ethics for language interpreters established by court rules.”           RCW

2.43.030(2). Appellate courts review the appointment of an interpreter for an

abuse of discretion. Mason v. Mason, 19 Wn. App. 2d 803, 823, 497 P.3d 431

(2021), rev. denied, 199 Wn.2d 1005, 506 P.3d 638 (2022).

                                          A

       At the start of trial, in response to the court’s inquiry, Jack stated that

Kosraean is not a certifiable language.6 The trial court asked that Jack “solemnly

swear that you will faithfully to your best abilities translate Kosraean?” and “will

faithfully and to your best abilities translate from Kosraean to English and English

to Kosraean?” Jack answered both inquiries affirmatively. None of the parties

raised any issues with Jack serving as interpreter (then or at any time during trial),

but the court did not inquire further into Jack’s qualifications to do so.

       During J.P.’s testimony, the following exchange took place:

       Q How many times have you hit—how many times have you hit
         [N.V.P.]?
       A Yeah. If I have—I don’t count, but if I have to spank them, I cannot
         tell you the exact time or how many.
              [Department]: Sorry, Mr. Interpreter, you cut out in the
         middle. Can you repeat that answer?
       A I cannot—I cannot count the number of times when I—when I
         spank.

       Later during J.P.’s testimony, the following exchange took place:

       6  Under RCW 2.43.030, a court may appoint an interpreter who is not
certified for “good cause,” which includes, relevant here, that “[t]he current list of
certified interpreters maintained by the administrative office of the courts does not
include an interpreter certified in the language spoken by the non-English-speaking
person.” RCW 2.43.030(1)(b)(ii).

                                          11
No. 83166-6-I/12

       Q So, if I can clarify you would spank your children, all of them, every
          day?
       A Not every day, not every time.
       Q Was it most days?
       A I don’t have to say that most days.
              [Department]: I’m sorry, Mr. Interpreter, could you repeat
       that? A I’m not saying that I hit the kids on most days.

       During his cross-examination by the CASA, J.P. objected to acknowledging

that a court order required him to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and

follow treatment recommendations unless Jack read him the sections to which the

CASA was referring.

       At least twice during the proceedings, J.P. and his attorney sought Jack’s

assistance to interpret attorney-client consultations.         First, J.P. objected to

testimony during his cross-examination when asked about whether he sent gifts to

all the children in 2019 or 2020 “[o]ther than [J.J.P.] and T.J.[C.J.P.]” The trial court

placed J.P., his attorney, and Jack in a Zoom7 breakout room where J.P.’s attorney

gave him the option to wait to speak to a criminal lawyer, and J.P. invoked his Fifth

Amendment privilege as it related to any discussions regarding J.J.P. and

T.J.C.J.P. Second, J.P.’s attorney requested time to speak with J.P. and Jack in

a breakout room to discuss whether J.P. should be called in his case in chief. The

trial court granted this request. At no time during either of these instances, or at

any other time, did J.P. raise any issues with Jack’s interpretation.

       At one point during J.P.’s direct examination, Jack had difficulty hearing

J.P.’s response to a question due to a noise interference. Jack stated, “I cannot

       7  “Zoom” is a cloud-based, peer-to-peer videoconferencing software
platform that is used for teleconferencing, telecommuting, distance education, and
social relations.

                                           12
No. 83166-6-I/13

pretend to translate what is said after [J.J.P.’s name]. I will be doing a disservice.

I want to be very clear what he’s saying so I can interpret it. Still not clear.”

         Following this court’s limited remand, the trial court held a reference hearing

to inquire further into Jack’s qualifications and interpreting services provided at

trial.   Testimony at the reference hearing showed Jack is a native Kosraean

speaker who learned English in Micronesia while in school.             Jack had been

interpreting in Washington since 2003. From 2003 through the 2022 reference

hearing, Jack estimated he interpreted over a hundred cases in Washington. For

this case, Jack estimated he interpreted approximately 10 proceedings. The trial

court asked whether Jack had any difficulty in interpreting for J.P. at any of the

proceedings. Jack responded, “Everything that was translated—usually, there is

this thing that you understand it, because with translation, meaning could be lost,

but this is the thing. We always explain it. Explain to the proximation of what was

being said, because English and Kosraean are not the same language.” Jack

noted, “I translate to the best of my ability and ask if it’s being understood.” Jack

testified at the reference hearing that he could understand J.P. and J.P. could

understand him as well.

         When asked whether he is familiar with the GR 11.2 interpreter code of

ethics, Jack replied, “I’m not sure about—what 11.2 is saying, but I went to Seattle

Municipal Court. That had ethic class there. I took a RCW course at Highline

College and a few other classes, Introduction to Criminal Justice at Highline

College.” Jack understood as an interpreter, everything must be interpreted, even

if it seems nonresponsive, obscene, rambling, or incoherent. Jack also understood

                                           13
No. 83166-6-I/14

that interpreters are prohibited from knowingly accepting an assignment beyond

their skill level.

        When asked whether he had read the manual “The Code of Ethics for

Interpreters,” Jack testified he read the “one provided at the Seattle Municipal

Court and the courts that I interpret for.” Jack recalled a pamphlet he had read 10

years prior about how interpreters are supposed to interpret from one language to

another and the code of guidelines.           Jack’s one day class consisted of a

demonstration, and the instructor distributed written materials. When a person

Jack interprets for says they do not understand a question, Jack either repeats the

question or finds out what was not clear about it. Jack reported if a client had some

confusion and Jack felt it necessary to do so, many times he would ask the court

or attorney to repeat the question or statement. The trial court found Jack complied

with the GR 11.2 requirements and possessed the skills necessary to interpret in

Washington.

                                          B

        The Department argues J.P. failed to object to Jack serving as the

termination trial interpreter and accordingly forfeited his right to challenge Jack’s

appointment. We decline to resolve this claim of error on the basis of waiver.

        In In re Dependency of J.E.D.A., Jr., 2 Wn. App. 2d 764, 768-69, 413 P.3d

574 (2018), the trial court erred in dismissing a party from a dependency because

the trial court “did not satisfy itself on the record as to the interpreter’s

qualifications.” The State conceded error “[e]ven though [the party] did not object

at the hearing to the interpreter’s qualifications.” Id. at 769. In State v. Aljaffar,

                                         14
No. 83166-6-I/15

198 Wn. App. 75, 82-83, 392 P.3d 1070 (2017), in reference to the criminal

defendant’s Sixth Amendment and state constitutional rights, we stated, “Non-

English speakers involved in court proceedings are entitled to the assistance of a

court-appointed interpreter.” The purpose of chapter 2.43 RCW is to uphold the

constitutional rights of non-English-speaking persons. State v. Gonzales-Morales,

138 Wn.2d 374, 381, 979 P.2d 826 (1999).

       The parties have not cited and we have found no Washington case law

clearly addressing the requirement of an objection in the trial court to preserve a

challenge to an interpreter’s lacking minimum qualifications.8 J.P. never objected

to Jack’s role as interpreter or asked the court to inquire further into Jack’s

background at any time during the seven day trial. Under RAP 2.5(a), this court

has discretion to reach an asserted error raised for the first time on review

amounting to manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Assuming, without

deciding, that an interpreter’s lacking minimum qualifications resulting in a

complete failure of interpretation would fall within RAP 2.5(a), and given that we

are presented with a ruling by the trial court that Jack was qualified to interpret a

language for which certified interpreters are not available, we review Jack’s

qualifications as disclosed in the record to determine whether they are sufficient to

support the trial court’s ruling. We conclude they are. We do not reach any issue

concerning when a trial court may rely on an interpreter who is not certified under

RCW 2.43.030 for languages for which interpreters have been certified, and we do

       8 The Department cites State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182

(1985), but that case discusses merely the requirement of a timely objection to
evidentiary error in general.

                                         15
No. 83166-6-I/16

not reach any issue concerning whether errors in appointing interpreters may be

waived in general.

                                          C

       First, J.P. claims the trial court did not make a preliminary determination,

adequately informed by J.P.’s representations, that Jack was able to accurately

interpret communications to J.P. as required under RCW 2.43.030(2)(a). Br. of

Appellant, 56. Second, J.P. claims the record does not establish Jack read and

understood the code of ethics for judicial interpreters that was in effect at the time

of the termination hearing as required under RCW 2.43.030(2)(b). We disagree

with both claims.

       The need to rely on the posttrial, postappeal reference hearing is an unusual

circumstance, and not one that can readily stand in for fully qualifying an interpreter

in the first instance. In this case, it is important to our analysis that J.P. made no

objection to Jack’s interpreting services at any time during trial, the record shows

instances when Jack sought clarification indicating his attentiveness to the risk of

misinterpretation, Jack had served as interpreter on several occasions already in

this matter, and, especially, J.P. relied on Jack’s interpreting services for his own

confidential consultations with counsel again without raising any concerns. J.P.

did not seek to develop a record challenging Jack’s qualifications or services

during this trial even at the reference hearing. Although, for reasons discussed

further below, we conclude Jack was qualified in this case, we do not conclude it

                                          16
No. 83166-6-I/17

is necessarily true that an after-the-fact reference hearing can support an

interpreter’s qualification in a matter.9

       GR 11.2 serves as the code of professional responsibility for judiciary

interpreters. Interpreters must adhere to five canons of interpretation: accuracy,

competence, honesty and integrity, impartiality and neutrality, and confidentiality.

GR 11.2(f)(1)-(5). Under “accuracy,” interpreters “must reproduce in the target

language the closest natural equivalent of the source language message without

altering it by means of addition, omission, or explanation.” GR 11.2(f)(1). Under

“competence,” interpreters “must not knowingly accept any assignment beyond

their skill level.” GR 11.2(f)(2). Any doubts an interpreter has about their ability to

       9 The current bench card available to Washington judges suggests a more

comprehensive inquiry when seeking to qualify a noncertified interpreter at the
commencement of a proceeding. It suggests inquiry as follows:

       •   What language will you be interpreting?
       •   Please summarize your qualifications as an Interpreter.
       •   What is your experience interpreting in court?
       •   Do you believe you can communicate effectively for the court and
           the LEP individual?
       •   Do you have any interest in the outcome of this matter?
       •   Have you read the Code of Professional Responsibility for
           Judiciary Interpreters? GR 11.2
       •   Do you promise to abide by this Code, interpreting accurately,
           honestly, impartially and maintaining confidentiality?
       •   Will you be interpreting simultaneously or consecutively?

       I find you qualified/I do not find you qualified to interpret for this proceeding.
       ....
       Do you swear (affirm) that you will make a true interpretation to the
       best of your skill and judgment?

WASH. CT. INTERPRETER COMM’N, BENCH CARD: COURTROOM INTERPRETING (SPOKEN
LANGUAGES) 3 (Jan. 2021), (boldface omitted), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/
publicUpload/Interpreters/BenchCard.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YLZ-T76M].

                                            17
No. 83166-6-I/18

satisfy an assignment competently must be immediately disclosed to all parties

and the court, if applicable. Id. Interpreters are prohibited from giving legal or

other advice or engaging “in any activity that may be construed as a service other

than interpreting or translating.” Id. Under “honesty and integrity,” interpreters

“have an inviolable duty to provide honest services in which their behavior upholds

the values outlined in this code. They must accurately represent their credentials,

training, and relevant experience.”       GR 11.2(f)(3).     Under “impartiality and

neutrality,” interpreters “must faithfully render the source message without allowing

their own views to interfere. They must refrain from conduct that may give an

appearance of bias and must disclose any real or potential conflict of interest to all

parties and the court, if applicable, as soon as they become aware of it.” GR

11.2(f)(4). Under “confidentiality,” interpreters “must not divulge privileged or other

confidential information obtained in their professional capacity. They must refrain

from making any public statement on matters in which they serve.” GR 11.2(f)(5).

       The trial court was not required to base its preliminary determination only

on J.P.’s representations, testimony, or stated needs. Although the majority of

information came from the reference hearing, the trial court relied on sufficient

evidence, including Jack’s testimony, to conclude under RCW 2.43.030(2)(a) that

Jack was capable of communicating effectively with both the court and J.P.

       The trial spanned seven days and produced more than 600 pages of

transcript, yet J.P. identifies only two instances he contends demonstrate

inadequate interpreting. J.P. points to the two instances during his own testimony

where the Department requested Jack to repeat the answers. J.P. argues Jack’s

                                          18
No. 83166-6-I/19

repeated answers materially changed the initial response, and the exchanges do

“not instill confidence that the interpreter was qualified and able to meet his ethical

obligations.” We disagree that these instances establish inadequate interpreting

by Jack. The answers, which were repeated on these occasions, were capable of

suggesting slightly different nuances about the frequency of J.P.’s physical

behaviors towards the children, but the answers are also capable of being viewed

as essentially consistent.     The Department independently showed that J.P.

exhibited consistent, frequent, and a high level of physical behavior toward the

children escalating to criminal behavior and leaving them lastingly fearful of him.

Nor do the different nuances that J.P. argues on appeal bear on the central errors

he advances, concerning whether the Department showed it understandably

offered all court ordered services and whether substantial evidence supports the

trial court’s conclusions as to each child.

       J.P.’s confidence in Jack’s interpretation skills is evidenced by J.P.’s own

actions. J.P.’s attorney explicitly requested Jack’s services to assist interpreting

attorney-client communications. J.P.’s attorney requested Jack sight interpret

several written passages of English-language documents during trial. Certain

portions of admitted documents were interpreted for the purposes of refreshing

J.P.’s recollection. At no point during the trial did J.P. or his attorney raise concerns

about the accuracy of Jack’s interpretations. Even at the reference hearing, at no

time did J.P. make a record that any inadequate interpreting occurred despite the

reference hearing offering another opportunity to do so.

                                           19
No. 83166-6-I/20

       Through his testimony at the reference hearing, Jack demonstrated he

understood and complied with the first four canons of the ethics code. Although

neither the trial court nor counsel asked Jack if he was familiar with and understood

the “confidentiality” canon, the record of Jack’s providing confidential interpreting

services at J.P.’s request for conferences with counsel supports the conclusion

that Jack respected his confidentiality obligations. The record does not support

and no party alleges on appeal that Jack failed to understand or violated that canon

of the code of professional responsibility. We conclude the trial court did not err

when it found Jack had read, understands, and would abide by the code of ethics

for language interpreters established by court rules under RCW 2.43.030(2)(b).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Jack satisfied the

requirements under RCW 2.43.030(2).

                                         III

       Parents have a fundamental liberty and privacy interest in the care and

custody of their children. In re Dependency of M.-A.F.-S., 4 Wn. App. 2d 425, 445,

421 P.3d 482 (2018). However, when parental actions or decisions seriously

conflict with the physical or mental health of the child, the State has a parens

patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect the child. Id. at 445-46. In

an action to terminate parental rights, the State must prove six statutory elements

under RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. M.-A.F.-S, 4

Wn. App. 2d at 446. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists when the

ultimate fact in issue is shown by the evidence to be “ ‘highly probable.’ ” In re

Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995) (quoting In re

                                         20
No. 83166-6-I/21

Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). “ ‘This burden [of

proof] is so substantial that, when properly applied, it will be met in only

extraordinary circumstances.’ ” In re Custody of A.L.D., 191 Wn. App. 474, 501,

363 P.3d 604 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Custody of C.C.M., 149

Wn. App. 184, 204, 202 P.3d 971 (2009)). The burden of proof in a termination

trial is on the Department. In re Termination of Parental Rts. M.A.S.C., 197 Wn.2d

685, 698, 486 P.3d 886 (2021).

      We give the trial court’s decision great deference and will uphold its findings

of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Dependency of G.G.,

Jr., 185 Wn. App. 813, 828, 344 P.3d 234 (2015). Substantial evidence is evidence

in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared

premise. In re Adoption of M.J.W., 8 Wn. App. 2d 906, 925, 438 P.3d 1244 (2019).

We do not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. In re Dependency of

T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 161, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).

                                         A

                                         1

      J.P. argues the Department failed to meet its statutory burden under RCW

13.34.180(1)(d) because it did not show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

that the Department expressly and understandably offered trauma-focused

therapy. We disagree.

      RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to show that court ordered

services “have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all

necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental

                                        21
No. 83166-6-I/22

deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably

offered or provided.” FF 16(d) states, in part, “The Department expressly and

understandably offered and provided [J.P.] with all necessary services, reasonably

available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable

future.” The court found, “This included court ordered services.”

      The record supports the trial court’s finding. J.P. testified he called Consejo

in about May 2021 and was told he did not qualify for trauma therapy and they did

not know who McGee is. McGee testified she referred J.P. to Consejo, she asked

J.P. several times to complete the therapy, and Consejo said J.P. could start or

complete trauma therapy on his own.10 The trial court found McGee offered J.P.

services through service letters and discussed provider services in meetings with

J.P. Although J.P.’s testimony contradicts McGee’s, determining the credibility of

witnesses and weighing evidence remains wholly in the domain of the trial court.

See T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 161. J.P. focuses on FF 16(e), which states that J.P.

did not want to participate in reconciliation therapy, without referencing trauma

therapy. J.P. argues that trauma therapy was an independent court ordered

service that was required to be offered under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d)—because it

was listed as a recommended service by Dr. Washington-Harvey and therefore

was a court ordered service under court orders requiring J.P. to follow treatment

recommendations.11     But McGee’s testimony makes clear that she explicitly

      10 In the context of the trial evidence, “on his own” here refers to J.P.’s

starting therapy without the children, who were unwilling to participate.
       11 See Wash. Court of Appeals Oral Argument, In re Dependency of D.J.P.,

No. 83166-6-I (Mar. 14, 2023), at 0 min., 53 sec. to 2 min., 29 sec., https://
tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023031387/?eventID=2023031387.

                                        22
No. 83166-6-I/23

offered trauma therapy in addition to family/reconciliation therapy, and that the

procedures she followed in finding and scheduling the services and advising J.P.

about them remained consistent across both programs. The trial court was entitled

to rely on McGee’s testimony and substantial evidence exists to support the trial

court’s finding that the Department offered services including court ordered

services under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

                                           2

       J.P. challenges the trial court’s findings of fact 16(d) and 16(e), disputing

the trial court’s statement that further services would be futile. He argues the trial

court could not have simultaneously found the Department offered all court-

ordered services and the Department was excused from offering family

reconciliation therapy under the futility doctrine. J.P. contends the record does not

support a futility finding as it rests on unsupported and irrelevant facts.

       The futility doctrine may excuse the Department from providing services if

the services would have been futile or would not remedy the parental deficiencies

within the child’s foreseeable future. In re Dependency of G.J.A., 197 Wn.2d 868,

903, 489 P.3d 631 (2021). However, the State contends, and substantial evidence

supports, that the State offered the disputed trauma-focused and family

reconciliation services. In defending the trial court’s futility finding, the State does

not rely on an argument that it should have been excused from offering any court-

ordered or necessary services, because McGee’s testimony was that she did offer

those services.    The State argues the trial court’s futility finding reflects that

                                          23
No. 83166-6-I/24

services “did not need to be offered further” because of J.P.’s unwillingness to

participate.12 (Emphasis added.)

       McGee assisted J.P. with obtaining reconciliation and trauma therapy

services.    Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the

Department offered and provided those necessary services. McGee testified J.P.

refused to attend those services without the joint participation of his children.

McGee advised J.P. several times to start therapy services, but he declined.

Accordingly, to the extent services were necessary, reasonably available, and

capable of correcting J.P.’s parental deficiencies, substantial evidence exists to

support the trial court’s finding that the Department offered those services and did

not need to make a further offer of them. Contrary to J.P.’s argument, these two

findings are not “internally inconsistent,” because FF 16(d) acknowledges the

Department made trauma therapy and reconciliation services readily available to

J.P., while FF 16(e) acknowledges J.P.’s repeated refusals to participate in those

services rendered further efforts futile.

                                            B

       FF 13 states, “Despite [J.P.’s] hard work, he cannot have a safe relationship

with his children. The testimony was consistent through the witnesses, the children

remain afraid of their father despite four years of Department supervision. The

Children refuse to engage in services with him.”           FF 14 states, “T.J.[C.J.P.],

       12 In context, it appears that the trial court’s finding of futility with respect to

offering further services is not addressed to the issue of whether the Department
offered all services, but the likelihood that conditions would be remedied so as to
allow the children’s return under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), given J.P.’s unwillingness
to engage in the services the Department offered.

                                            24
No. 83166-6-I/25

through his counsel, represented that he has no relationship with his father.

Notwithstanding the current no contact order, T.J.[C.J.P.] does not want visits with

and remains fearful of his father.” FF 16(e) states,

       [T]he Department does not have an obligation to offer futile services
       that would not remedy the parental deficiencies in the foreseeable
       future. In this regard [J.P.] did not want to participate in reconciliation
       therapy. [J.P.] testified he did not want to participate because his
       children would not participate with him. The testimony from
       providers, [the] CASA, and the social worker made clear that the
       children in fact did not want to participate in this treatment. . . .
       There is little likelihood that conditions would be remedied such that
       the children could be returned to [J.P.] in the near future. . . . Based
       on [McGee’s] testimony, the Court finds that it is not likely that [J.P.]
       is capable of providing care to his children because his children do
       not have a relationship with him and do not want to see him.

In FF 16(f), the trial court found continuation of the parent child relationship

“diminishes all the children’s prospects of integration into a stable and permanent

home.” For the older children, the trial court based this on their voicing that fact

themselves, and for the younger children the trial court relied on the therapists’

testimony about their behaviors and their experiencing damaging and destabilizing

effects of J.P.’s “treatment of the family.”      J.P. argues there was insufficient

evidence to support FF 13 that D.J.P., J.J.P., A.J.P, and N.V.P. remain afraid of

him and do not want to engage in reconciliation therapy.              J.P. also argues

insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions under RCW

13.34.180(1)(e) and (f) for those four children. J.P. does not challenge these

findings for T.J.C.J.P. or C.-S.J.P.

       Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), the Department must establish “[t]hat there is

little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to

                                           25
No. 83166-6-I/26

the parent in the near future.” Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), the Department must

establish “that continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes

the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.”

       The Department can meet its burden to prove RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) in two

ways. In re Welfare of R.H., 176 Wn. App. 419, 428, 309 P.3d 620 (2013); In re

Dependency of K.D.S., 176 Wn.2d 644, 658, 294 P.3d 695 (2013). First, it can

prove that prospects for a permanent home exist, but the parent-child relationship

prevents the child from obtaining that placement. R.H., 176 Wn. App. at 428.

Alternately, it can prove that the relationship has a damaging and destabilizing

effect on the child that would negatively affect the child’s integration into any

permanent and stable placement. Id. RCW 13.34.180(f) “ ‘is mainly concerned

with the continued effect of the legal relationship between parent and child, as an

obstacle to adoption.’ ” M.-A.F.-S., 4 Wn. App. 2d 425, 421 P.3d 482 (2018)

(quoting In re Dependency of A. C., 123 Wn. App. 244, 250, 98 P.3d 89 (2004)).

For instance, the Department is not required to prove the child has a specific

prospect for adoptive placement in a stable and permanent home to satisfy RCW

13.34.180(f). See In re Dependency of Esgate, 99 Wn.2d 210, 214, 660 P.2d 758

(1983) (terminating parental rights over a severally mentally and emotionally

disabled child, despite the fact that it was unlikely that the child would ever be

adopted). Esgate focused on the overarching goal of protecting the best interests

of the child and upheld termination of parental rights because continuation of the

parent-child relationship created feelings of insecurity and instability in the child.

Id.

                                         26
No. 83166-6-I/27

       In K.D.S., the court rejected the State’s proposition that presenting evidence

sufficient to prove RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) necessarily proves RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

176 Wn.2d at 646-47. K.D.S. had neuro-behavior disorders that caused her to

exhibit extremes in behavior, such as physical outbursts against her caretakers.

Id. at 647. The State’s witnesses testified that her father’s interactions with K.D.S.

caused her great distress. Id. at 649. The K.D.S. court noted facts supporting a

conclusion under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) may, but do not necessarily, also support

a conclusion under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Id. at 655. The existence of overlapping

facts between the two elements does not relieve the State of its burden of proving

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) independently of RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Id. at 656. The

record nevertheless contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding

that the continued parent-child relationship harmed K.D.S.’s well-being.

                                        J.J.P.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s FFs 13 and 16(e) as to J.J.P.

Dembeck testified whenever J.J.P. brings up J.P. to her, J.J.P. gets very angry.

Dembeck reported J.J.P. does not want to ever see J.P. Dembeck testified J.J.P.

expressed a desire to be adopted as an outcome for the dependency case. When

asked why she filed her motion to stop visitation of J.P. and the children, Dembeck

stated the children expressed they did not want to visit with him and were afraid.

       The record also supports FF 16(f) as to J.J.P.         Dembeck’s testimony

suggested a continued parent-child relationship between J.P. and J.J.P. would

create feelings of insecurity and instability in J.J.P. J.J.P.’s fear of and anger at

J.P. bolsters her strong desire to never see J.P. again, and J.J.P. refuses to have

                                         27
No. 83166-6-I/28

a relationship with J.P. J.J.P. expressed a desire to be adopted and Dembeck

testified J.J.P. said J.P. should just let her be adopted. The trial court reasonably

concluded maintaining the parent-child relationship has a damaging and

destabilizing effect on J.J.P. that would negatively affect her integration into any

permanent and stable placement.

                                       A.J.P.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s FFs 13 and 16(e) as to A.J.P.

Dembeck testified that when first visiting A.J.P., A.J.P. would cry nonstop and

could not talk about J.P. Dembeck reported A.J.P. expressed “on many occasions”

that she does not want to see J.P. When asked why she filed her motion to stop

visitation of J.P. and the children, Dembeck stated the children expressed they did

not want to visit with him and were afraid. More recently, A.J.P. has “been good”

and very bonded to her foster parents. Snider testified A.J.P. “was doing very well”

by the time of trial. Snider reported A.J.P. remained worried about returning to

J.P.’s care. Snider did not know whether A.J.P. is fearful of J.P. Dembeck’s and

Snider’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s

findings.

       The record also supports FF 16(f) as to A.J.P. Evidence at trial suggests a

continued parent-child relationship between A.J.P. and J.P. would create feelings

of insecurity and instability in A.J.P. A.J.P. expressed fear of J.P. and stated

numerous times that she does not want to communicate with or see him again. At

the beginning of her time working with A.J.P., Snider testified A.J.P. presented as

worried because of the possible change in placement. Although Snider reported

                                         28
No. 83166-6-I/29

A.J.P. worried about returning to live with J.P., Snider did not know why this worried

A.J.P. Because A.J.P. is “very bonded” to her foster parents and A.J.P. worried

about returning to live with J.P., maintaining the parent-child relationship has a

damaging and destabilizing effect on A.J.P. that would negatively affect her

integration into any permanent and stable placement.

                                       N.V.P.

       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s FFs 13 and 16(e) as to N.V.P.

Dembeck testified when first meeting with N.V.P., N.V.P. talked a lot about J.P.

and the things N.V.P. saw him do and how they scared her. N.V.P. was not

particularly open about discussing J.P. with Dembeck, preferring not to talk about

him. Dembeck also testified N.V.P. does not want to see J.P. When asked why

she filed her motion to stop visitation of J.P. and the children, Dembeck stated the

children expressed they did not want to visit with him and were afraid. Johnson

could not opine on how N.V.P. felt about J.P. Johnson also had no opinion on

whether N.V.P. sought a relationship with J.P. Dembeck’s testimony constitutes

substantial evidence for the trial court to conclude N.V.P. fears J.P., does not want

to see him, and does not want to have a relationship with him.

       The record also supports FF 16(f) as to N.V.P. Dembeck reported, “[N.V.P.]

doesn’t believe that [J.P.] could handle [the children], and that they would,

therefore, be neglected in some ways.”          Dembeck’s testimony suggested a

continued parent-child relationship between J.P. and J.J.P. would create feelings

of insecurity and instability in N.V.P. N.V.P. fears J.P. and refuses to communicate

with or see him. The trial court reasonably concluded maintaining the parent-child

                                         29
No. 83166-6-I/30

relationship has a damaging and destabilizing effect on N.V.P. that would

negatively affect her integration into any permanent and stable placement.

Substantial evidence exists to support FF 16(f) as to N.V.P.

                                       D.J.P.

       While the Department concedes Dembeck’s testimony does not support a

finding that D.J.P. is afraid of J.P., the testimony shows reunification efforts for

D.J.P. would be unsuccessful.13 Dembeck testified D.J.P. was only one year old

when placed out of J.P.’s care. Dembeck testified D.J.P. is doing well in her

placement. Combined with the consistent fear all her older siblings express of J.P.,

the little likelihood conditions would be remedied such that any of her siblings could

be returned to J.P. in the near future, and D.J.P.’s strong bond with her siblings,

there is evidence that there is little likelihood J.P. could remedy conditions

permitting D.J.P. to be returned to him. In addition, substantial evidence supported

the trial court’s finding that the near future for D.J.P. was “less than a few weeks”

given her young age. The Department put on evidence showing there is little

likelihood conditions will be remedied so that D.J.P.’s five older siblings, all with

longer “near future” determinations, can return to J.P.’s care in a “near future”

meaningful to them. In context, this supports an inference that the same is true for

D.J.P. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s FFs 13 and 16(e) as to D.J.P.

       13 This concession is logically based on the lack of direct evidence that

D.J.P. fears J.P. D.J.P. is the youngest child and was one year old when the
children were removed from D.J.’s custody. We note that Dembeck testified that
“the children” were afraid of J.P.

                                         30
No. 83166-6-I/31

       The record supports FF 16(f) as to D.J.P. Dembeck testified adoption was

in all the children’s interests, and her testimony suggested a continued parent-child

relationship between J.P. and D.J.P. would create feelings of insecurity and

instability in D.J.P. Although Dembeck did not always refer to D.J.P. specifically,

the living arrangement D.J.P. maintains with her siblings in two separate homes

but with frequent visits, together with the evidence of J.P.’s behavior towards all

the children, provides substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion

that continuation of the parent child relationship diminished D.J.P.’s prospects for

integration into a stable and permanent home.

                                         C

       J.P. challenges FF 14, arguing the trial court impermissibly “treated

[T.J.C.J.P.]’s counsel as a fact-witness through which T.J.C.J.P.’s out-of-court

statements were admitted and used for substantive purposes.”

       Substantial evidence exists to support the findings that T.J.C.J.P. has no

relationship with J.P., does not want visits with him, and remains fearful of him.

Dembeck testified T.J.C.J.P. was fearful of J.P., as evidenced by the traumatic

reaction he had to wrestling since T.J.C.J.P. reported J.P. used to hold him down.

Dembeck reported T.J.C.J.P. refused engaging in joint therapy with J.P. and did

not want to see J.P. until he is a “full-grown man” so he is capable of defending

himself against J.P. Schwimmer testified T.J.C.J.P. reported J.P. is abusive and

hit people, and denied any indication that T.J.C.J.P. is emotionally ready to have

contact with J.P. This testimony is not challenged on appeal. It supports the trial

court’s FF 14.

                                         31
No. 83166-6-I/32

       We hold substantial evidence supports FF 16(d) as to all children, FFs 13,

16(e), and 16(f) as to D.J.P., J.J.P., A.J.P, and N.V.P., and FF 14 as to T.J.C.J.P.

                                        IV

       J.P. argues the trial court made several evidentiary errors that materially

affected its findings under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) and the court’s unfitness

determination.

       A juvenile court has broad discretion in dependency and termination

proceedings to receive and evaluate evidence in light of a child’s best interest. In

re Welfare of X.T., 174 Wn. App. 733, 738, 300 P.3d 824 (2013). However, such

discretion does not permit courts to disregard the rules of evidence, especially

where the deprivation of parental rights is involved. Id. This court reviews the

decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of M.R., 200

Wn.2d 363, 376, 518 P.3d 214 (2022). An abuse of discretion occurs if a judge’s

decision was “ ‘manifestly unreasonable,’ ” meaning no reasonable person would

reach the same conclusion, or it “ ‘rests on untenable grounds,’ ” meaning it relied

on facts not supported by the record or on an incorrect legal standard. Id. (quoting

State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467, 473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012)). “The admission of

evidence which is merely cumulative is not prejudicial error.” State v. Todd, 78

Wn.2d 362, 372, 474 P.2d 542 (1970).

       J.P.’s arguments on this issue focus on statements offered by McGee

admitted over hearsay and foundation objections.          Although the trial court

overruled most of J.P.’s objections to the testimony of Dembeck and the children’s

counselors on similar grounds, J.P. does not challenge those rulings on appeal.

                                        32
No. 83166-6-I/33

As we discussed above, substantial evidence exists to support FF 16(e) for the

four children J.P. challenges based on Dembeck’s testimony and the testimony of

the children’s counselors. To the extent J.P. asserts the trial court erred in relying

on some of McGee’s testimony for its RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) determination, the

challenged testimony is cumulative with other witnesses’ testimony and, under

Todd, cannot amount to prejudicial error requiring reversal. Further, we note the

trial court sustained many of J.P.’s objections to McGee’s testimony and limited

her testimony at J.P.’s request in several respects.

                                          V

       J.P. argues cumulative error resulted in him being denied a fair trial.

       The cumulative error doctrine applies where a combination of trial errors

denies the accused a fair trial even where any one of the errors, taken individually,

may not justify reversal. In re Det. of Coe, 175 Wn.2d 482, 515, 286 P.3d 29

(2012). J.P. does not establish error by the trial court affecting the fairness or the

outcome of the proceedings, singly or in combination.         The cumulative error

doctrine does not apply.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                         33