Court Opinion

ID: 9951086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 16:04:43.576661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:12.236380
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                         Cameron Banks,                  FILED
                                        Appellant-Defendant          Mar 15 2024, 8:55 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                    v.                  Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 15, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-898
                            Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                            The Honorable Marc Rothenberg, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       49D29-2002-MR-6883

                               Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024       Page 1 of 28
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Three defendants were tried together and convicted of four counts of murder

      and four counts of robbery for a February 2020 quadruple murder in

      Indianapolis. All three defendants appealed, and this Court has issued opinions

      for two of the defendants.

[1]   In this appeal, Cameron Banks first argues the trial court erred in admitting

      incriminating evidence found during the search of his cell phone because the

      warrant was not supported by probable cause and violated the Fourth

      Amendment’s particularity requirement. We find the search warrant was

      supported by probable cause as the affidavit presents facts, together with

      reasonable inferences, demonstrating a sufficient nexus between Cameron’s cell

      phone and the shootings and robbery. We further find that the warrant was

      specific enough as it allowed the police to look for items that were related to the

      February 2020 shootings and robbery.

[2]   Cameron also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial

      based on police officers approaching and standing behind him as the jurors filed

      out of the courtroom at the end of trial one day. As we did in a co-defendant’s

      appeal, we find no error here.

[3]   Finally, Cameron argues the evidence is insufficient to support four separate

      robbery convictions because he did not take property from each victim. We find

      that Cameron was entitled to have three of his Level 2 felony robbery
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 2 of 28
      convictions vacated. We also reduce the remaining Level 2 felony robbery

      conviction to a Level 5 felony based on double jeopardy.

      Facts and Procedural History
[4]   In February 2020, nineteen-year-old Jalen Roberts and twenty-year-old Marcel

      Wills lived at Carriage House East Apartments at 42nd Street and Mitthoeffer

      Road on the east side of Indianapolis. Marcel owned guns and sold marijuana.

      On the night of February 5, twenty-one-year-old Braxton Ford and twenty-one-

      year-old Kimari Hunt, who was Marcel’s girlfriend, were at the apartment with

      Jalen and Marcel.

[5]   Shortly after 10 p.m., the police started receiving 911 calls about shots fired at

      Carriage House East. Officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police

      Department responded to Jalen and Marcel’s apartment and found the bodies

      of Jalen, Marcel, Braxton, and Kimari inside. Jalen had been shot twenty-nine

      times, Marcel and Braxton had been shot seven times each, and Kimari had

      been shot five times. It looked like the apartment had been “ransacked,” and

      Marcel’s guns and marijuana were missing. Tr. Vol. IV p. 182.

[6]   About thirty minutes before the shootings, Anton Wilson and his younger

      brother, Mikalus Hervey, drove to Jalen and Marcel’s apartment. Anton and

      Mikalus have another brother, Malique Hervey, who knew the victims and

      frequently stayed at Jalen and Marcel’s apartment, but Malique was not with

      them at the time. Anton went inside while Mikalus, who was on the phone,

      stayed in the car. Anton was inside the apartment when three males entered.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024          Page 3 of 28
      Anton didn’t know who they were, but he could tell that Jalen and Marcel did.

      Anton noticed that one of the males had a rose tattoo on his hand and a gun at

      his waist. The male was acting “jittery” and pacing around. Tr. Vol. III p. 171.

      Marcel asked the male why he was acting that way, but the male didn’t

      respond. Marcel also asked the male if he wanted him to buy back the gun he

      had sold him, and the male responded that it would cost more because he had

      modified it. The situation made Anton feel “uncomfortable,” so he told Marcel

      that he was leaving and would see him later. Id. at 172.

[7]   Anton walked out of the apartment around 10 p.m. When Anton got back to

      his car, he saw that the male with the rose tattoo had left the apartment, walked

      over to a gold car in the parking lot that had its engine running, spoke to the

      person sitting in the driver’s seat, and then returned to the apartment. Anton

      and his brother left.

[8]   Later that night, Anton heard that there had been a shooting at Carriage House

      East. He called the police and spoke to the detective assigned to the case,

      Detective David Miller. Anton told Detective Miller about the three males he

      had seen at the apartment earlier that night but that he didn’t know their names.

      After talking to Detective Miller, Anton went on Facebook to try to identify the

      three males.

[9]   Meanwhile, Detective Miller obtained surveillance footage from Carriage

      House East and was able to determine the license-plate number of the gold car

      (an Oldsmobile), which was registered to nineteen-year-old Rodreice Anderson.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024        Page 4 of 28
       Detective Miller met with Anton on February 10, and Anton showed him what

       he had found on Facebook. Detective Miller then had three photo arrays

       prepared and showed them to Anton. Anton identified the three males he had

       seen at the apartment as nineteen-year-old Lasean Watkins, nineteen-year-old

       Cameron Banks, and sixteen-year-old Desmond Banks (Cameron’s brother).

[10]   The police picked up Rodreice on February 13 and brought him in for

       questioning. At first, Rodreice didn’t tell the truth about where he was on

       February 5. Detective Miller showed Rodreice photos from Rodreice’s public

       Facebook page, one of which was of him and Cameron. Rodreice eventually

       admitted that he was with Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond on the night of the

       shootings and that Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond went inside the apartment.

       Rodreice was arrested, and his cell phone was secured until a search warrant

       could be obtained.

[11]   On February 14, the police picked up Cameron and Desmond and brought

       them in for questioning. Cameron had a black iPhone on his person, and the

       police secured it until a search warrant could be obtained. The next day,

       Detective Miller filed a twenty-one-page affidavit seeking a warrant to search

       Cameron’s phone. This was one of thirty-seven search warrants that Detective

       Miller applied for in connection with this case. Tr. Vol. V p. 158. The affidavit

       detailed the course of the investigation up to that point. The affidavit also

       contained boilerplate language about the types of information that can be found

       on cell phones, such as Contacts, Call Logs, Web Browser Data, Messages,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 5 of 28
       Email, Location Information, Photos, and Videos. Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp.

       111-13. At the end of the affidavit, Detective Miller made the following request:

               This affiant respectfully requests that this court issue a search
               warrant authorizing the forensic examination of the above listed
               mobile device(s), and any identity modules and/or removable
               media contained therein, using the above described mobile
               device forensic methods, for the following:

                        All data which is relevant to and/or evidence of the crimes
                        of murder and robbery specific to the above described
                        investigation.

       Id. at 114. The trial court issued a warrant to search Cameron’s phone. Id. at

       115-16.

[12]   A forensic examination of Cameron’s cell phone revealed that about four hours

       after the shootings, the phone was used to search the internet for “carriage

       house indianapolis surveillance.” Tr. Vol. VI pp. 190-93; Ex. 447. A couple of

       hours later, the phone was used to search the internet for terms related to guns

       and ammunition. Tr. Vol. VI pp. 193-95; Ex. 447. Cameron’s phone also

       contained several photographs and videos of him, Desmond, and Lasean

       posing and dancing with guns and drugs. Ex. 449. One of the photos was taken

       less than thirty minutes after the shootings. Tr. Vol. VI p. 203; Ex. 449.

[13]   The State charged Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond each with four counts of

       murder, four counts of felony murder, and four counts of Level 2 felony robbery

       (enhanced from a Level 5 felony due to serious bodily injury). The State also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024            Page 6 of 28
       charged Rodreice with four counts of felony murder and four counts of Level 2

       felony robbery. Rodreice and the State entered into a plea agreement, under

       which Rodreice would plead guilty to the four counts of Level 2 felony robbery

       and the State would dismiss the four counts of felony murder. Rodreice, who

       agreed to testify against Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond, was sentenced to

       thirty-five years, with five years suspended to probation.

[14]   In October 2022, Cameron moved to suppress the evidence found during the

       search of his cell phone. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 69. Cameron argued the

       search warrant was not supported by probable cause and “lacked

       constitutionally required particularity.” Id. at 80. The court denied the motion

       to suppress in January 2023. Tr. Vol. II p. 89.

[15]   A five-day jury trial was held in February and March 2023. Lasean, Cameron,

       and Desmond were tried together. A firearms expert testified that three different

       guns were used in the shootings. Anton testified as detailed above. Rodreice

       testified that Lasean called him on February 5 and asked for a ride. When

       Rodreice arrived at Lasean’s house, Cameron and Desmond were with Lasean.

       The three got into Rodreice’s gold Oldsmobile, and Lasean instructed Rodreice

       to drive them to Jalen and Marcel’s apartment so they could buy marijuana.

       During the drive to Carriage House East, Lasean used Rodreice’s phone to

       contact Jalen. When the group arrived at Carriage House East shortly before 10

       p.m., Rodreice stayed in his car, which was running, while the other three went

       inside. Rodreice testified that at some point, Lasean left the apartment and

       walked over to him in his car. Lasean asked Rodreice if he had change for a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024        Page 7 of 28
       $20, and he said no. According to Rodreice, Lasean told him there were “four

       people in the house” and he was “about to rob them.” Tr. Vol. V p. 38.

       Rodreice stayed in his car. Rodreice testified that soon after Lasean went back

       inside the apartment, he heard gunshots and moved his car in the parking lot so

       that it was closer to the street. About five minutes later, Cameron got in the car

       shortly followed by Desmond and Lasean. Each carried a gun and a duffel bag.

       Rodreice drove them to Cameron and Desmond’s house, and Cameron gave

       Rodreice a jar of marijuana.

[16]   At the end of the second day of trial, the trial court was giving the jurors

       instructions for the night when it appeared that a spectator in the gallery started

       talking to the defendants or the attorneys. Ex. 3. Cameron and Desmond turned

       around, and a Marion County Sheriff’s Office deputy walked toward the gallery

       and directed the spectator to exit the courtroom. Id. After the trial court said

       “all rise” and as the jurors started filing out of the courtroom, three members of

       the Marion County Sheriff’s Office Critical Emergency Response Team

       (CERT), who had been stationed in the courtroom during the trial, approached

       Cameron and Desmond and stood behind them.1 Id. The CERT members, who

       were wearing special uniforms that resembled SWAT uniforms, told Desmond

       and Cameron to face forward. Desmond’s attorney moved for a mistrial:

       1
        In his brief, Cameron says one of the CERT members tapped his chair to get him to stand up. But the video
       of the incident (Exhibit 3) appears to show that Cameron and Desmond stood up before the CERT members
       approached them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024                             Page 8 of 28
        I’m moving for a mistrial. While the jury was in the room and
        standing up and proceeding towards the door, members of the
        CERT Team came and stood behind our clients, which gives the
        impression that our clients are in custody and essentially
        supervised by the Sheriff’s Office. The jurors could, and very
        likely would, have seen that. And that’s completely inappropriate
        and prejudicial to our clients.

        And earlier I may have said removing. They -- they not
        necessarily were taking them out the door, but they were
        standing behind them in order to take them back into the lockup,
        and the jurors would’ve seen them standing behind them like
        that. And I think that’s just unduly prejudicial, and the jurors
        shouldn’t have seen that, and so we should have a mistrial.

Tr. Vol. IV pp. 105-06. Cameron’s attorney joined in the motion, adding that

the CERT members’ presence behind Cameron and Desmond “g[ave] the

impression that they [were] dangerous.” Id. at 106. After reviewing a video of

the incident and speaking at length with the parties, the court denied the motion

for mistrial. The court detailed that the video showed that the CERT members

stood behind Cameron and Desmond as the jurors filed out of the courtroom.

The court explained that had the CERT members led Cameron and Desmond

out of the courtroom while the jurors were still present, “that would be a much

different situation.” Id. at 111. The court emphasized that the situation was

precipitated by the spectator in the gallery who tried to communicate with

someone at the front of the courtroom. Nevertheless, it instructed the CERT

members not to approach Cameron and Desmond anymore “until the jury is

out of the room.” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024       Page 9 of 28
[17]   After the trial, the jury found Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond guilty as

       charged. Cameron and Desmond had a joint sentencing hearing, which was

       held before Lasean’s. As to Cameron and Desmond, the trial court entered

       judgment of conviction for the four murder counts, vacated the four felony-

       murder counts, and entered judgment of conviction for the four counts of Level

       2 felony robbery. The trial court sentenced them to fifty-five years for each

       murder conviction, to be served consecutively, and seventeen-and-a-half years

       for each robbery conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total of 220 years.

[18]   At Lasean’s sentencing hearing, the trial court similarly entered judgment of

       conviction for the four murder counts and vacated the four felony-murder

       counts. However, the court entered judgment of conviction for four counts of

       robbery as a Level 5 felony, which were reduced from a Level 2 felony due to

       double jeopardy. The court sentenced Watkins to sixty years for each murder

       conviction, to be served consecutively, and four years for each robbery

       conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total of 240 years.

[19]   All three defendants appealed to this Court. We decided Lasean’s and

       Desmond’s appeals first. In his appeal, Lasean raised one issue, that is, whether

       the evidence was sufficient to prove that he was one of the participants. See

       Watkins v. State, No. 23A-CR-1109 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2023) (mem.), trans.

       not sought. We found the evidence was sufficient and affirmed. Desmond raised

       four issues, including two of the issues that Cameron now raises: (1) the trial

       court erred in denying the motion for mistrial based on the CERT members

       approaching and standing behind him as the jurors filed out of the courtroom

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024       Page 10 of 28
       and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support four separate convictions for

       Level 2 felony robbery because he did not take property from each victim.

       Desmond Banks v. State, No. 23A-CR-896, 2024 WL 561388 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb.

       13, 2024). We found no error in the denial of the motion for mistrial but that

       Desmond was entitled to have three of his Level 2 felony robbery convictions

       vacated. We also reduced the remaining Level 2 felony robbery conviction to a

       Level 5 felony based on double jeopardy.

[20]   Cameron’s appeal is now before us.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. The search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment
[21]   Cameron contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence found during

       the search of his cell phone because the warrant was obtained in violation of the

       Fourth Amendment.2 While rulings on the admissibility of evidence are

       generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, when a challenge to such a ruling

       is based on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, our review is de novo.

       Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2007).

       2
        Although Cameron cites Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, he does not present a separate
       analysis under it. We therefore address the Fourth Amendment only.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024                              Page 11 of 28
       A. The search warrant was supported by probable cause

[22]   Cameron argues the search warrant was invalid because it wasn’t supported by

       probable cause. According to the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall

       issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” Probable

       cause is a fluid concept incapable of precise definition and is to be decided

       based on the facts of each case. Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1127 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2018), trans. denied. In determining whether a police officer’s affidavit sets

       forth probable cause to issue a search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate

       is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

       circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that

       contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at

       1127-28. “Put differently, the central question in a probable cause

       determination is whether the affidavit presents facts, together with reasonable

       inferences, demonstrating a sufficient nexus between the suspected criminal

       activity and the specific place to be searched.” Id. at 1128. “In determining

       whether an affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search

       warrant, doubtful cases are to be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.”

       State v. Stone, 151 N.E.3d 815, 818-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quotations

       omitted), trans. denied.

[23]   When a search warrant is sought for a cell phone, the affidavit must allege more

       than just the fact that the person who is suspected of criminal activity has a cell

       phone. As other courts have explained, affidavits that rely on the ubiquitous

       presence of cell phones and text messaging in daily life are insufficient to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024            Page 12 of 28
       establish the required nexus. See Commonwealth v. Henley, 171 N.E.3d 1085,

       1109 (Mass. 2021). Instead, “there must be specific, not speculative, evidence

       linking the device in question to the criminal conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[24]   Cameron asserts that “Detective Miller’s affidavit makes no effort to

       demonstrate a nexus between the offenses [he] had been arrested for and his cell

       phone” and that he just listed “the scope and variety of information that cell

       phones contain generally.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 23-24. It is true that Detective

       Miller’s affidavit contains several pages of boilerplate language about the

       categories of information that are generally found on cell phones, such as the

       following:

               Web Browser Data -- This includes bookmarks and web browser
               history. Bookmarks are websites that are sometimes saved by
               default or entered by a user to provide[] easier access to their
               bookmarked websites. Web browser history is documentation of
               Websites visited.

               Messages -- This includes Short Message Service (SMS)
               messages, commonly referred to as “text messages”, Multimedia
               Messages (MMS), instant messages, and chat messages. Through
               a mobile device’s native messaging applications, as well as third-
               party applications, a user has the ability to send and receive
               messages containing text, audio, video, and photos. Most smart
               phones also have the ability to capture screenshots of what is
               displayed on the screen and save it as an image. It is common to
               find screenshot images of messages stored on mobile devices.

                                             *        *        *       *

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024       Page 13 of 28
               Location information -- This includes Global Positioning System
               (GPS) data associated with metadata in photo and video files,
               and databases from applications that use GPS data in their
               operation. This location information can also come from cellular
               towers and Wi-Fi networks with which the device has interacted.

               Photos -- Images stored on the mobile device or external storage.
               This includes images captured by the device, sent and received in
               messages, downloaded, transferred from other devices,
               screenshots captured of the device’s display, and other images
               created on the device through the user’s device usage. In addition
               to photos related to criminal activity, it is common to find photos
               commonly referred to as “selfies” in which the user takes an
               image of themselves. These images can assist in identifying the
               user of the device.

               Videos -- Video movie files captured by the device or received
               from other sources. Like photos, these can often assist in
               identifying the user of the device.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 111-12. Such boilerplate language, by itself, is not

       sufficient to establish probable cause. See State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 123

       (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“We hold that boilerplate language may be used in an

       affidavit for the search of a cell phone, but to support probable cause, the

       language must be coupled with other facts and reasonable inferences that

       establish a nexus between the device and the offense.”), reh’g denied, cert. denied.

       Here, however, the boilerplate language is coupled with other facts potentially

       linking Cameron’s cell phone to the crimes.

[25]   The affidavit begins by stating that when the police arrived at the apartment,

       four victims were dead, the house had been ransacked, and guns and drugs

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 14 of 28
       were missing. The affidavit sets forth a timeline of events constructed from

       video footage from Carriage House East’s surveillance system, including when

       a gold Oldsmobile arrived and left the apartment and when three males got out

       of and then back in the car. The affidavit also details what Anton told Detective

       Miller, including what he found on Facebook to help him identify the three

       males he had seen at the apartment and that he eventually identified them in

       photo arrays as Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond. Anton also told Detective

       Miller that one of them had been texting his brother, Malique, since the

       shootings.

[26]   According to the affidavit, Detective Miller then interviewed Malique, who

       confirmed that he and Lasean had been texting each other. Malique explained

       that it was common for Lasean to use other people’s cell phones as well as other

       people’s hotspots so he could send messages from his own phone. According to

       the text messages provided by Malique, a couple of hours after the shootings

       Malique texted Lasean and asked him if he was at the apartment around the

       time of the shootings. Lasean said he was there earlier that evening but not at

       the time of the shootings. In addition, Lasean said he used a friend’s phone to

       call Jalen around 8:45 p.m., but Jalen didn’t answer. He provided a screenshot

       showing the call to Jalen. Lasean also asked Malique what the police were

       asking him about the shootings. Eventually, Lasean texted Malique that his

       friend was turning off his hotspot so if Malique needed to get a hold of him he

       should call his friend’s phone. Finally, Malique gave Detective Miller a photo

       from Facebook of Rodreice, Cameron, and Desmond.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024      Page 15 of 28
[27]   The affidavit also details what Detective Miller learned during his investigation

       of Rodreice. On Rodreice’s public Facebook page, Detective Miller found a

       photo of Rodreice and Cameron as well as photos of Rodreice and his friends

       with firearms. Lasean’s Facebook profile “liked” several of Rodreice’s photos.

       When Rodreice was brought in for questioning, he ultimately admitted his

       involvement in the shootings and explained that the group had discussed

       committing a robbery as they pulled into the parking lot at Carriage House

       East, his role was the getaway driver, and Lasean had used his phone to contact

       Jalen. According to the affidavit, a search warrant was obtained for Rodreice’s

       cell phone, and the records showed that Jalen’s phone called Rodreice’s phone

       twice and Rodreice’s phone texted Jalen’s phone once shortly before the

       shootings. In addition, location data from Rodreice’s phone showed that he was

       in the immediate vicinity of Carriage House East at the time of the shootings

       and at Cameron and Desmond’s house at 10:30 p.m., less than thirty minutes

       after the shootings. A search warrant was obtained for Rodreice’s house, and

       jars of marijuana and a loaded handgun magazine were found in his bedroom.

[28]   Finally, the affidavit details that Cameron and Desmond were brought in for

       questioning on February 14, and each of them talked separately with Detective

       Miller. When Cameron was asked where he was on February 5 around 10 p.m.,

       he responded at home with his brother and mother. And when Desmond was

       asked where he was on February 5 around 10 p.m., he initially said he was at

       home but then said he was with Cameron smoking marijuana with someone

       named Phillip. After setting forth these and other facts in the affidavit,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024            Page 16 of 28
       Detective Miller asked for a warrant to search Cameron’s cell phone for “All

       data which is relevant to and/or evidence of the crimes of murder and robbery

       specific to the above described investigation.”

[29]   We find that the affidavit presents facts, together with reasonable inferences,

       demonstrating a sufficient nexus between Cameron’s cell phone and the

       shootings and robbery. First, the affidavit provides that Rodreice said the four

       of them discussed committing a robbery on their way to Carriage House East

       and that at least one of them contacted Jalen by phone right before the

       shootings. In addition, after the shootings Lasean texted Anton’s brother,

       Malique, about the shootings and used someone else’s phone and hotspot to do

       so. Because four people were involved in the planning and execution of the

       crimes and the police knew that phone communications related to the crimes

       had been occurring by some members of the group both before and after the

       shootings, it was reasonable to infer that Cameron’s cell phone would unveil

       such communications as well. See Henley, 171 N.E.3d at 1109-10 (“It was

       reasonable to infer that [the defendant] was coordinating with a coconspirator

       to murder the victim for several reasons. . . . . The reasonable inference that [the

       defendant] used his cell phone to coordinate the murder follows logically. This

       evidence of likely coordination was sufficient to establish a nexus between the

       murder and [the defendant’s] cell phone.”).

[30]   Second, the affidavit states that the police had some photos from Facebook that

       connected Rodreice, Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond to each other. On

       Rodreice’s public Facebook page, Detective Miller found a photo of Rodreice

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024        Page 17 of 28
       and Cameron as well as photos of Rodreice and his friends with firearms.

       Lasean’s Facebook profile “liked” several of Rodreice’s photos. In addition,

       Malique gave Detective Miller a photo from Facebook of Rodreice, Cameron,

       and Desmond. Based on these photos—at least two of which depicted Cameron

       with another member of the group—it was reasonable to infer that Cameron’s

       cell phone would contain photos or videos linking him to the others or to the

       shootings and robbery.

[31]   Lastly, the affidavit provides that when Detective Miller asked Cameron where

       he was on February 5 around 10 p.m., he responded at home with his brother

       and mother. Location data from Rodreice’s phone showed that he was in the

       immediate vicinity of Carriage House East at the time of the shootings and at

       Cameron and Desmond’s house at 10:30 p.m., less than thirty minutes after the

       shootings. It was reasonable to infer that Cameron’s cell phone would likewise

       contain location data of his whereabouts at the time of the shootings.

[32]   Even assuming the issue of probable cause was a close call, as noted above,

       doubtful cases are to be resolved in favor of upholding warrants. Stone, 151

       N.E.3d at 818-19. Accordingly, we find that the search warrant was supported

       by probable cause.3

       3
         Cameron cites three cases to support his argument that the search warrant wasn’t supported by probable
       cause. See Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1 (Del. 2010); Baldwin, 664 S.W.2d 122; United States v. Oglesby, 2019
       WL 1877228 (S.D. Tex. 2019). Again, probable cause is based on the facts of each case. Because of the facts
       detailed above that potentially link Cameron’s cell phone to the shootings and robbery, which are not present
       in those cases, we find they do not control the outcome here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024                               Page 18 of 28
       B. The search warrant satisfied the particularity requirement

[33]   Cameron also argues the search warrant, which allowed the police to search his

       cell phone for “[a]ll data which is relevant to and/or evidence of the crimes of

       murder and robbery specific to the above described investigation,” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. III p. 115, was invalid because it was “an impermissible general

       warrant,” Appellant’s Br. p. 30. According to the Fourth Amendment, search

       warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons

       or things to be seized.” “Although the warrant must describe ‘with some

       specificity’ where officers are to search and what they are to seize, there is no

       requirement that there be an exact description.” Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1129

       (quotation omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant must be specific enough so that

       officers can, with reasonable effort, ascertain the place to be searched and the

       items to be seized.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Ultimately, the description in a

       search warrant should be as particular as circumstances permit.” Price v. State,

       119 N.E.3d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[34]   Cell phones are, of course, unique because of their immense storage capacity

       and the variety of information they can contain. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

       373 (2014). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

       addressed whether a warrant to search a cell phone violated the Fourth

       Amendment’s particularity requirement in United States v. Bishop, 910 F.3d 335

       (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied. There, the defendant was charged with discharging

       a firearm during a drug transaction, and a warrant was issued authorizing the

       search of his cell phone for the following:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 19 of 28
        [A]ny evidence (including all photos, videos, and/or any other
        digital files, including removable memory cards) of suspect
        identity, motive, scheme/plan along with DNA evidence of the
        crime of Criminal Recklessness with a deadly weapon which is
        hidden or secreted [in the cellphone or] related to the offense of
        Dealing illegal drugs.

Id. at 336 (emphases added). The defendant argued the search warrant was too

general “because it authorized the police to rummage through every application

and file on the phone and left to the officers’ judgment the decision which files

met the description.” Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed:

        [The defendant] is right about the facts. This warrant does permit
        the police to look at every file on his phone and decide which
        files satisfy the description. But he is wrong to think that this
        makes a warrant too general. Criminals don’t advertise where
        they keep evidence. A warrant authorizing a search of a house
        for drugs permits the police to search everywhere in the house,
        because “everywhere” is where the contraband may be hidden.
        And a warrant authorizing a search for documents that will prove
        a crime may authorize a search of every document the suspect
        has, because any of them might supply evidence.

                                      *        *        *       *

        Just so with this warrant. It permits the search of every document
        on the cell phone, which (like a computer) serves the same
        function as . . . filing cabinets . . . . See Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
        373 (2014). And as with filing cabinets, the incriminating
        evidence may be in any file or folder. That’s why courts routinely
        conclude that warrants with wording similar to the one at issue
        here are valid. See, e.g., Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 616 (7th
        Cir. 2017); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996-97 (7th Cir.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024                Page 20 of 28
               1998); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 4.6(d) (5th ed. 2012
               & Supp. 2018) (citing many other cases). It is enough, these
               decisions hold, if the warrant cabins the things being looked
               for by stating what crime is under investigation.

       Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

[35]   The court explained that “specificity” is a “relative matter” and that a warrant

       is “too general” “only if some more-specific alternative would have done better

       at protecting privacy while still permitting legitimate investigation.” Id. at 337.

       As an example, the court posited that if the police were looking for a particular

       paper and they knew what filing cabinet it was in, the failure to identify that

       cabinet in the warrant would violate the particularity requirement. Id. at 337-38.

       But if the police didn’t know where the paper was, then broad language would

       suffice, as “a warrant need not be more specific than knowledge allows.” Id. at

       338. The court concluded that because the police didn’t know where on his

       phone the defendant “kept his drug ledgers and gun videos,” the warrant was as

       specific as circumstances allowed. Id.; see also Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1130

       (finding that a warrant specifically described the place to be searched—the cell

       phone recovered from the defendant—and what the police could search for—

       “any information relating to calls, messages, including Facebook messages and

       accounts” in connection to the defendant’s drug dealing as set forth in the

       probable-cause affidavit); Price v. State, 119 N.E.3d 212, 225-26 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2019) (finding that a warrant specifically described the place to be searched—

       the defendant’s cell phone—and what the police could search for—“electronic

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 21 of 28
       data and intellectual content” related to the suspicious death of the defendant’s

       five-year-old child as testified to at the probable-cause hearing), trans. denied.

[36]   Cameron cites Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758 (D.C. 2020). There, the

       defendant was charged with murdering his friend. The police sought a warrant

       to search the defendant’s two cell phones. In the supporting affidavit, the police

       detailed that the defendant said during an interview that he and the victim had

       exchanged text messages throughout the day of the shooting until 7:30 p.m.,

       when the defendant left his apartment and didn’t return until the next day (at

       which point he found the victim dead inside). The affidavit also detailed that

       the defendant’s cousin claimed to have spoken with the defendant on the phone

       the night of the shooting. Warrants were issued to search the defendant’s cell

       phones for “any evidence related to the aforementioned homicide” and “any

       information recording the owner/possessor’s schedule or travel or location”

       between two specific dates. Id. at 769. The court found that the warrants were

       overbroad:

               We conclude as a matter of law that the search warrants for [the
               defendant’s] cell phones did not satisfy the requirements of the
               Warrant Clause. The facts set forth in the warrants’ supporting
               affidavits established probable cause to believe the phones
               contained text messages between [the defendant] and [the victim]
               on November 14, 2015 and a log showing the precise time of the
               telephone call [the defendant] reportedly made to his cousin . . .
               that night. The facts alleged in the affidavits also supplied
               probable cause to support a search of the GPS tracking features
               on the phones to determine [the defendant’s] whereabouts at
               pertinent times on November 14 and 15, 2015. But beyond those
               discrete items, the affidavits stated no facts that even arguably

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024          Page 22 of 28
               provided a reason to believe that any other information or data
               on the phones had any nexus to the investigation of [the victim’s]
               death.

       Id. at 774.

[37]   The court acknowledged the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Bishop but found that

       it was distinguishable. Specifically, the court highlighted that Bishop (and other

       cases cited by the government) “arose in circumstances in which the affidavits

       submitted in support of the warrants made robust showings of probable cause

       for a range of relevant evidence likely to be contained within the phones’ data,

       without a way of knowing in advance precisely where within that data the

       evidence would be found.” Id. at 776.

[38]   This case is more like Bishop. As in Bishop, the police didn’t know a specific area

       of Cameron’s cell phone to search. At that early stage of the investigation, the

       police had four suspects—Rodreice, Lasean, Cameron, and Desmond—and

       were looking for evidence connecting Cameron to the other suspects and to the

       shootings and robbery. They knew that at least one of the suspects had been

       communicating with a victim right before the shootings and with another

       person shortly after the shootings and that there were Facebook photos showing

       some of the suspects together. The police also knew that Cameron claimed he

       was home at the time of the shootings but that Rodreice’s phone records

       showed he was at Carriage House East. Because the warrant was as specific as

       the circumstances allowed and “cabined” the things to be looked for to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024        Page 23 of 28
       evidence of the February 5 shootings and robbery, the warrant did not violate

       the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

[39]   Because the search warrant was supported by probable cause and not an

       impermissible general warrant, the trial court did not err in admitting the

       evidence found during the search of Cameron’s cell phone.

       II. The trial court properly denied Cameron’s motion for
       mistrial based on the CERT members approaching and
       standing behind him as the jurors filed out of the courtroom
[40]   Cameron contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based

       on the CERT members approaching and standing behind him as the jurors filed

       out of the courtroom. “[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified

       when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation.” Mickens

       v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001). Because the trial court is in the best

       position to gauge the circumstances surrounding an event and its impact on the

       jury, we afford great deference to its decision on appeal. Id.

[41]   Cameron says a mistrial was warranted because the CERT members’ actions

       “created an unacceptable risk that the jurors would view [him] as being

       dangerous.” Appellant’s Br. p. 43. According to the Sixth and Fourteenth

       Amendments to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant “is

       entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the

       evidence introduced at trial, and not on the grounds of official suspicion,

       indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024        Page 24 of 28
       trial.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (quotation omitted). That

       does not mean, however, that “every practice tending to single out the accused

       from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down.” Id. Whenever a

       courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, the question is

       “not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial

       effect, but rather whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible

       factors coming into play.” Id. at 569 (quotation omitted). “[T]he presence of

       armed personnel in a courtroom is not a practice that is inherently prejudicial

       and must be examined on a case-by-case basis.” Holifield v. State, 572 N.E.2d

       490, 496 (Ind. 1991) (citing Holbrook, 475 U.S. 560), reh’g denied; see also

       Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]hile several

       challenges have been made to uniformed officer presence in a courtroom, few

       cases have reached the conclusion that such police presence has resulted in an

       unacceptable risk to the defendant.”), trans. denied.

[42]   We first note that the trial court found, and Cameron does not challenge on

       appeal, that the CERT members’ presence was required during trial. As we

       noted in Desmond’s appeal, the CERT members were likely there for Lasean,

       who was facing another murder charge for killing an inmate while he was in jail

       awaiting trial. See Cause No. 49D31-2106-MR-17274.4 Regardless, Cameron

       4
        After Lasean was convicted in connection with the shootings and robbery, he pled guilty to Level 3 felony
       aggravated battery for killing the inmate and was sentenced to five years.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024                             Page 25 of 28
       only challenges that the CERT members approached him and stood behind him

       as the jurors filed out of the courtroom.

[43]   The CERT members’ presence behind Cameron for a few moments did not

       result in an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play. As the

       trial court explained, the CERT members approached and stood behind

       Desmond and Cameron because of a unique sequence of events—one that

       evidently did not repeat itself. As Exhibit 3 shows, shortly before the CERT

       members approached Desmond and Cameron, a spectator in the gallery started

       talking to the defendants or the attorneys, and Desmond and Cameron turned

       around. As a sheriff’s deputy removed the spectator from the courtroom, the

       CERT members approached Desmond and Cameron, stood behind them, and

       told them to face forward. The trial judge, who was present during this incident

       and reviewed the video, found that the CERT members approached and stood

       behind Desmond and Cameron as the jurors filed out of the courtroom but that

       Desmond and Cameron were not removed from the courtroom until after the

       last juror had left. Given our great deference to trial courts in ruling on requests

       for mistrial, see Mickens, 742 N.E.2d at 929, we cannot say the trial court abused

       its discretion here.

       III. The State concedes that three of the four robbery
       convictions should be vacated
[44]   Cameron next contends the evidence is insufficient to support four separate

       convictions for Level 2 felony robbery because he did not take property from

       each victim. The State concedes that only one conviction for robbery is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 26 of 28
       appropriate (Count XII relating to Marcel) and that the other three convictions

       (Counts IX, X, and XI) should be vacated. We therefore reverse Cameron’s

       convictions for Counts IX, X, and XI.

       IV. Cameron’s convictions for the murder and Level 2 felony
       robbery of Marcel constitute double jeopardy, so we reduce
       the robbery to a Level 5 felony
[45]   Although Cameron does not raise a double-jeopardy issue on appeal, we can

       raise double-jeopardy issues sua sponte. See Koziski v. State, 172 N.E.3d 338, 341

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. It is especially appropriate to do so here

       because both of Cameron’s co-defendants had their robbery convictions

       reduced to Level 5 felonies based on double jeopardy. In Lasean’s case, his

       sentencing hearing was held after Desmond and Cameron’s sentencing hearing.

       At that hearing, Lasean’s attorney asked the trial court to enter judgment of

       conviction on robbery as a Level 5 felony due to double jeopardy. The court

       agreed and did so. In Desmond’s case, he argued on appeal that his convictions

       for the murder and Level 2 felony robbery of Marcel constituted double

       jeopardy under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), because the robbery

       was enhanced to a Level 2 felony due to the same serious bodily injury that

       formed the basis of the murder. The State responded that there was no double-

       jeopardy violation under Wadle. We noted, however, that the offenses occurred

       in February 2020, before Wadle was decided, and that under pre-Wadle law this

       was a clear double-jeopardy violation. Desmond Banks, 2024 WL 561388, at *5.

       Because Desmond was entitled to the benefit of the law that was in effect when

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024         Page 27 of 28
       he committed the offenses, we reduced his Level 2 felony robbery conviction to

       a Level 5 felony. Id.

[46]   We therefore reverse Cameron’s conviction for the Level 2 felony robbery of

       Marcel (Count XII) and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter

       conviction for Level 5 felony robbery instead.

[47]   Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

       Altice, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Victoria Bailey Casanova
       Casanova Legal Services, LLC
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General
       Courtney Staton
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-898 | March 15, 2024     Page 28 of 28