Court Opinion

ID: 9667547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:48:47.721703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:38.807528
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with much that is said in the majority opinion, particularly in Parts I, II and V, and I believe that there may be considerable merit in the Governor’s desire to utilize the talents of the Lieutenant Governor, I think that under the North Dakota Constitution as it stands today, the State of North Dakota is entitled to a remedial writ in this case even though perhaps not in the form suggested by the State Auditor and the State Treasurer. “This Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may frame its process as the exigencies require.” State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 268 (N.D.1979).
Parts III and IV of Justice Paulson’s opinion clearly set up straw men and then proceed to knock them down. Pronouncements that provisions in the Constitution are ambiguous or in conflict with each other do not make it so. There are many canons of construction that this court has used over the years when interpreting our Constitu*538tion, our statutes, or anything that is written — and basic to all these rules is the cardinal rule that words will be reconciled or harmonized if possible. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D.1979); Cardiff v. Bismarck Public School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D.1978).
If there are statutes or executive orders that conflict with constitutional provisions, no reconciliation is necessary and the statute or executive order must yield. As I perceive the question before this court, we should initially address the several applicable provisions of the Executive Article of the North Dakota Constitution and we should not disregard their clear and unambiguous language under the pretext of pursuing their spirit (§ 1-02-05, NDCC).
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 2, of the North Dakota Constitution, if the governor dies, is impeached, resigns, fails to qualify, is absent from the state, is removed from office, or is disabled, the lieutenant governor assumes all powers and duties of the office of governor. Article V, Section 7, after describing the lieutenant governor’s powers and duties in the legislative assembly, states that “additional duties shall be prescribed by the governor.”
I have no difficulty harmonizing those provisions. Obviously the assignment of additional duties by the governor under Section 7 must not interfere with the lieutenant governor’s constitutional duties to act as governor when the occasion requires, as outlined in Section 2, nor with the lieutenant governor’s duties to preside over the senate during meetings of the legislative assembly, as specified in Section 7.
Using the same rationale, I find no disharmony between Sections 2 and 7, on the one hand, and Section 14 of Article V on the other hand. Section 14 provides in pertinent part that “salaries of ... [public officers, including the lieutenant governor] shall not be increased or diminished during the period for which they shall have been elected.” The salary of the lieutenant governor may not be increased when he is assigned additional duties by the governor any more than it may be increased when the governor is absent from the state a few days, or when he presides over the senate.
The prohibition against salary increases or decreases during an elected officer’s term has existed since the adoption of this State’s original constitution in 1889. The same is true of the constitutional assignment to the lieutenant governor of legislative duties and executive duties when the governor is not eligible or able to perform. The authority of the governor to assign “additional duties” to the lieutenant governor, however, was only added to the Constitution in 1974. (See S.L. 1973, Ch. 531, and S.L. 1975, Ch. 605.) A number of efforts have been made seeking the repeal of the prohibition against salary increases. (See, e. g., Article V, Section 4, Proposed 1972 Constitution, disapproved April 28, 1972— S.L. 1973, Ch. 529, “The compensation of elected officials shall be as provided by law, but shall not be diminished during the term for which they were elected.”)
This court held in Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D.1965), at syllabus 7:
“The sole object sought in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the framers and of the people who adopted it, and all rules of construction are subservient to and intended to effectuate such objects. Primarily such intention and purpose are to be found in and deduced from the language of the Constitution itself but, if the language is ambiguous or the answer doubtful, then the field of inquiry is widened and the rules applicable to the construction of statutes are to be resorted to, and the court may look to the history of the times and examine the state of being existing when the question was framed and adopted by the people in order to ascertain the prior law, the mischief, and the remedy.”
Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is any convincing analysis justifying the conclusion apparently reached — to wit, that the object of the framers of the amendment (the legislative assembly) and of the people who voted for the amendment of Article V, Section 7, in 1974, to authorize *539the governor to assign additional duties to the lieutenant governor, Article V, Section 14, would be amended or repealed by implication so as to abolish the prohibition against salary increases for elected officials during the term for which they were elected. In my view, the language used by the legislative assembly in proposing the constitutional amendment, its conduct before and after making the proposal, as well as anything discernable from the history of the times and the mischief to be remedied, all militate against any thought that the people of this State have had any intention to eliminate the long-standing prohibition against salary increases in any form or for any reason for an elected state official during the term for which he was elected.
In Walker v. Omdahl, 242 N.W.2d 649, 658 (N.D.1976), the majority of this court said:
“... we must conclude that expenses beyond. the allowances for expenses in the previous session of the Legislature which exceed amounts reasonably necessary to cover increases in the cost of living are salary, and thus violative of Section 84 of the Constitution.” [The reference to Section 84 relates to the prohibition which is now Article V, Section 14.]
In a special concurring opinion in Walker v. Omdahl, supra, I expressed the view that this court was leaving the doori open to manipulations to evade a constitutional prohibition. The teeth that were left in the bar to salary increases by the majority in Walker v. Omdahl are completely removed by the majority in this case.
Although all of the present justices did not participate in State ex rel. Link v. Olson, supra, the decision was unanimous. Two conclusions most readers reach when studying that opinion are that (1) there was doubt as to the constitutionality of the additional salary for the lieutenant governor when he performed the additional duties of federal aid coordinator pursuant to assignment by the governor, and (2) there was doubt as to the constitutionality of a change in the nature of the position of lieutenant governor pursuant to assignment by the governor. This court refrained from attempting to settle those two questions because they were not appropriately raised. See State ex rel. Link v. Olson, supra, 286 N.W.2d at 273-274.
The best illustration of the intent of the legislative assembly and its understanding of the prohibition against salary increases for the lieutenant governor, even though his duties are expanded, is found in Section 7 of Chapter 539, S.L. 1979. That section proposed to amend § 54-08-03, NDCC; as follows:
“54-08-03. SALARY OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR. The lieutenant governor shall receive an annual salary ef eight thousand dollars for all services performed by him of eight thousand dollars effective January 1.1981: eight thousand four hundred dollars effective January 1. 1982: eight thousand eight hundred twenty dollars effective January 1. 1983: nine thousand two hundred sixty dollars effective January 1. 1984: and nine thousand seven hundred thirty dollars effective January 1. 1985. If the duties of the lieutenant governor are expanded prior to January 1. 1981. pursuant to the Constitution, statute, or appropriate executive order, so as to require substantially full-time service from the lieutenant governor to carry out those duties, then the annual salary of the lieutenant governor shall be as follows: effective January 1, 1981. thirty-three thousand five hundred dollars: thirty-five thousand one hundred seventy-five dollars effective January 1.1982: thirtv-six thousand nine hundred thirtv-three dollars effective January 1. 1983: thirty-eight thousand seven hundred eighty dollars effective January 1.1984: and forty thousand seven hundred twenty dollars effective January 1.1985.”
[Dashes indicate deleted material; underlined portion indicates new language in the Bill. All contained in the original.]
The significant part of Chapter 539, S.L. 1979, which clearly spells out the legislative assembly’s understanding of the constitutional prohibition, is found in § 13, which states:
*540“The provisions of this Act shall become effective ten days after the effective date of the proposed repeal of section 39 of the Constitution of North Dakota as contained in Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 4061 [Ch. 707, S.L. 1979] as adopted by the forty-sixth legislative assembly. If the proposed repeal of section 39 of the Constitution is rejected by the electorate at the primary election in 1980, then this Act shall be of no force and effect.”
Why the drafters of Chapter 539 (the Senate Committee on Appropriations) thought that salary increases for elected officials should be contingent on eliminating the prohibitions in former § 39 (now Article IV, § 17) is a mystery. It is apparent that confusion existed as to the relationship between the prohibition in former § 84 (now Article V, § 14) against salary increases and the prohibition in former § 39 (now Article IV, § 17) against legislators serving in a position, the emoluments of which shall have been increased during their term as legislators.
The proposed repeal of former § 39 barring members of the legislature from serving in offices which have had salary increases was rejected by the people of North Dakota in the primary election on September 2,1980, thus the salary increases provided for in Chapter 539, S.L. 1979, never became effective. See also, footnote 2 in State ex rel. Link v. Olson, supra, 286 N.W.2d at 264.
It appears to me that the majority opinion rests on thin ice when it finds an exception to the bar against salary increases for duties that are assigned to the lieutenant governor which are not germane to the office of lieutenant governor. If that can support a salary increase for the lieutenant governor when the governor assigns him non-germane duties, what would prevent a legislative assembly that wishes to grant a salary increase to other elected officials from supporting the salary raise with an assigned non-germane duty? The answer from the majority opinion is obvious — all obstacles to salary increases for elected officials have been effectively eliminated and Article V, § 14, is, in effect, stricken from the constitution — repealed by implication.
Another serious question arises when the duties assigned by the governor to the lieutenant governor are labeled “non-germane.” We have held that the common law rule of incompatibility is the law of this state. Tarpo v. Bowman Public Sch. Dist. No. 1, 232 N.W.2d 67 (N.D.1975). For the governor to assign duties to the lieutenant governor which are beyond the scope of the office to which the lieutenant governor was elected, in effect creates a new, separate, and distinct office with obligations and loyalties which may very well conflict with the constitutional obligations of the lieutenant governor. If, on the other hand, it be contended that the constitutional obligations of the lieutenant governor include those additional duties that may be, from time to time, assigned by the governor, then, of course, those duties are germane to the office of lieutenant governor and on which no salary increase can be based.
To further illustrate the faulty conclusion of the majority, imagine for a moment the situation should a lieutenant governor decline to perform non-germane assignments for the governor, or should a future legislative assembly decline to appropriate funds to make additional salary payments to a lieutenant governor who has been assigned additional duties. Are we now saying that a lieutenant governor cannot do as some candidates said before the primary — that they were seeking a part-time position only? Is this court prepared to require a legislative appropriation of additional salary to the lieutenant governor on the theory that neither the people nor the legislative assembly can, without a constitutional amendment, refuse to fund a constitutionally mandated function? See State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823 (N.D.1975). Potentially, the future is a Pandora’s box which I would not care to open.
Part IV of the majority opinion clearly illustrates a faulty syllogism. Merely because the legislative assembly has made the same mistake before, as pointed out by Jus*541tice Paulson in footnote 4, should not make it correct. And to even think that the legislative assembly, by exempting all requirements to keep a record, intended to turn an appropriation into an unaccountable slush fund, is wholly unacceptable, and no amount of rules of construction would make it so. Certainly, neither the legislative assembly nor the majority opinion use the label “slush fund,” but even the most casual reading of the provisions of §§ 54-27-10 and 54-27-11, which were excepted for application to the funds in question, leaves the inference that the expenditure of those funds can be totally irresponsible. That is so absurd that this court should declare the entire Act invalid as violative of Article X, § 18, which prohibits donations except for the reasonable support of the poor.
I would design an appropriate writ that would accomplish these purposes, and I commend the State Auditor, the State Treasurer, and the Attorney General for their integrity in instituting this application.