Court Opinion

ID: 9756908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:08:08.949293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:00.636842
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with and join the majority opinion in reversing the judgment and order of the Superior Court and remanding this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County for trial. I write separately, however, to express my view that in the interest of judicial economy, our order should direct that the *205appellant be granted a reasonable time to file a reply, nunc pro tunc, to appellee’s new matter.
One of the questions raised by the appellant in this appeal, not reached by the majority, is whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because of appellant’s failure to file a reply to appellee’s new matter. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in that no responsive pleading to appellee’s new matter is required for two reasons. First, the averments contained in appellee’s new matter are conclusions of law which do not require a reply, rather than allegations of facts which require a responsive pleading. For example, the appellee’s new matter avers as follows:
2. As a result of her comparative negligence, the Plaintiff is barred in whole or in part from recovering for the damages and injuries set forth in her complaint.
3. For the reasons set forth in Paragraph 1 of this New Matter, it is averred that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries and damages set forth in her Complaint and is therefore barred in whole or in part from recovery.
4. The Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations.
The trial court considered the above averments to be averments of fact which required a reply from the appellant. Because the appellant failed to make a reply, the trial court deemed that these averments were admitted, including the averment that the action was barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations — whichever one it may be.
[TRIAL COURT]: “What about the Statute of Limitations? Was there ever any answer filed as to why — the fact that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations?”
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: “No, there was no answer to new matter filed, apparently, Your Honor.”
[APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: “And then obviously that in and of itself would be a complete bar to the action.”
[TRIAL COURT]: “Obviously.”
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: “Statute of Limitations had not run at the time that the plaintiffs were on — ”
*206[TRIAL COURT]: “Well, whether it had or had not, the fact that you haven’t answered the new matter does constitute as admission.”
(Rep.Rec., pps. 157a-158a). I have trouble with the trial court’s ruling that the above unanswered averments are constitute admissions. Each of those averments sets forth a conclusion of law, namely: (a) that recovery by the appellant is barred in whole or in part by appellant’s comparative negligence — a conclusion of law; (b) that recovery by the appellant is barred in whole or in part by appellant’s assumption of the risk — a conclusion of law; and (c) that appellant’s entire cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations— a conclusion of law. The failure to file a responsive pleading when a responsive pleading is required by the rules results only in the admission of factual averments, not legal conclusions. Landis v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa.Super. 514, 369 A.2d 746 (1976). “Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required shall be deemed to be denied.” Pa.R.C.P. 1029.
Second, the factual averments which are set forth in appellee’s new matter merely contradict averments contained in appellant’s complaint. For example, the appellee, in the final averment of his new matter, avers:
6. “It is believed and therefore averred that the Plaintiff did not have authorization or permission to be in the area of the stairway where her fall allegedly occurred, and the Plaintiff was therefore trespassing at the time of this accident.”
The appellee’s allegation that the appellant was a trespasser contradicts the appellant’s averment in her complaint that she, the appellant, was a social guest in the home of the appellee’s decedent and was requested by the appellee’s decedent to accompany her down the stairs to the cellar of the home. It was while the appellant was descending the stairs that appellant allegedly fell and sustained the injuries and damages of which appellant now complains. Where a factual averment in new matter merely sets forth facts which directly contradict a factual averment contained in plaintiffs complaint, the plaintiff *207is not required to reiterate the contradiction which was already pleaded in the complaint or be deemed to have admitted the opposing facts. The appellee’s allegation that the appellant was a trespasser, along with appellee’s specific allegations of contributory and/or comparative negligence on the part of the appellant1, do not appear to constitute averments which require the appellant to reply or suffer the consequences of being deemed to have admitted those averments and the further consequences of an adverse judgment.
Rule 126 of the Pa.R.C.P. provides for the liberal construction and application of the rules of procedure. Rule 126 provides:
The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Assuming, without deciding, that there are factual averments contained in appellee’s new matter which require a responsive pleading, the appellant should be permitted to file a reply nunc pro tunc. The substantial rights of the appellee will not be prejudiced by permitting the appellant to file a nunc pro tunc reply to the appellee’s new matter. The appellee’s *208averments, which are not purely conclusions of law, are contradicted by the averments contained in appellant’s complaint and therefore, appellant’s reply could not surprise appellee or prejudice appellee in his defense. On the other hand, if the appellant is denied permission to file a nunc pro tunc reply to appellee’s new matter and the averments in appellee’s new matter are deemed admitted, obvious prejudice will result to the appellant. Based upon the record in this case, fairness and judicial economy dictate that, on remand, the appellant be granted a reasonable time to file a reply to appellee’s new matter.

. Paragraph 1 of appellee's new matter avers:
It is believed and therefore averred that the Plaintiff was negligent, careless or reckless in the following manner in causing or contributing to the accident and subsequent injuries averred in her Complaint:
(a) failing to watch where she was walking;
(b) failing to walk down the steps in a careful and cautious manner;
(c) failing to keep a proper look-out;
(d) proceeding down the stairs in spite of a known or obvious danger;
(e) continuing down the stairs after becoming aware of the allegedly dangerous condition of the stairs;
(0 proceeding down the stairs in spite of her knowledge of the allegedly inadequate lighting;
(g) failing to take note of the condition of the steps prior to and during her descent;
(h) being otherwise negligent under the Common Law of Pennsylvania.