Court Opinion

ID: 9654020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:02:16.239392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:04.718432
License: Public Domain

WESTHUES, Justice
(concurring in result; adopting opinion of COIL, C).
I agree that plaintiffs’ evidence shows that defendant could not have effectively acted to have prevented injury to plaintiffs from a collision with the bridge after plaintiffs were in imminent peril of such injury — and, therefore, I agree that the court erred in submitting the case to the jury under the humanitarian doctrine. I also agree that plaintiffs should have an opportunity to a jury decision on defendant’s primary negligence; Consequently, I concur in result. But—
I do not agree with the statement on page 7, line 8 of the opinion [304 S.W.2d 810], viz., “Consequently, it would seem she was not theretofore in imminent peril of injury” or with the apparent reason for that statement which immediately follows, viz., “By swerving or turning her car — we repeat; — she avoided whatever danger inhered in the situation at the intersection.” That is because: there was substantial evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found that plaintiffs were in a position of imminent peril of injury from a collision of the two automobiles at the intersection. True, plaintiff by evasive action (swerving) extricated herself from that position of imminent peril. .The fact that she "avoided whatever danger inhered in the situation at the intersection,” (which I assume means essentially that she avoided a collision with *812defendant’s automobile) did not eliminate or change the fact that plaintiffs theretofore were in a position of imminent peril. According to the opinion, a position of imminent peril cannot exist unless injury actually occurs — I do not agree.
As I see the instant case, the situation is simply this: Plaintiff was not in a position of imminent peril of injury from a collision of her automobile with the bridge until after she had to swerve in order to extricate herself from her prior and separate position of imminent peril which a jury reasonably could have found existed at the intersection. It is apparent that defendant could not have prevented plaintiff’s injury after plaintiff was in the second or subsequent position of imminent peril, i. e., after the time when it became necessary for plaintiff to swerve to avoid an intersection collision with defendants’ automobile.