Court Opinion

ID: 2964690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:45.503123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.320140
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                              _________________________
          No. 96-1856
                                    CRAIG MARTIN,
                               Petitioner, Appellant,
                                         v.
                              LYNN BISSONETTE, ET AL.,
                               Respondents, Appellees.
                              _________________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                  [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                              _________________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                       Aldrich and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                              _________________________
               Carol A. Donovan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
          appellant.
               James S. Liebman, Elaine R. Jones, George H. Kendall, and L.
          Song Richardson on combined brief for James S. Liebman and  NAACP
          Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., amici curiae.
               Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth  of
          Massachusetts, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, was
          on brief, for appellees.
                              _________________________
                                    July 11, 1997
                              _________________________
                                   REVISED OPINION
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, 
                          Circuit 
                                 Judge
                                      .
                                        
                                         
                                         Petitioner-appellant Craig Martin,
          a state prisoner, sought habeas relief based on a claim that  the
          state court's exclusion  of his mother from the courtroom  during
          part 
              of 
                 the 
                     testimony of a key prosecution witness deprived him of
          his Sixth Amendment right to  a public trial.  The United  States
          District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the writ.
          Martin appeals.
                    As a preliminary matter, we must explore, for the first
          time  in  this  circuit,  the  interrelationship  between  habeas
          petitions and the  newly enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act  of
          1996 (PLRA).   Once that expedition  is finished, we address  the
          merits of Martin's claim.  In the end, we affirm the judgment  of
          the district court.
          I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                    On 
                      May 
                          7, 
                            1991, 
                                  a 
                                    Barnstable County (Massachusetts) grand
          jury indicted  Martin on charges of  breaking and entering.   See
          Mass. Gen.  Laws ch. 266, S 18 (1990).  Later that year, a  petit
          jury 
              found 
                    the petitioner guilty as charged, and the court imposed
          a substantial prison sentence.   Martin's subsequent attempts  to
          gain surcease in the  state court system proved unavailing.   See
          Commonwealth v. Martin, 653 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. App. Ct.),  further
          rev. denied, 654 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass. 1995).
                    On March 12, 1996, the petitioner applied for a writ of
          habeas corpus in the federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. S 2254
          (1994), naming as respondents  various state officials (who,  for
          ease in reference, we call "the Commonwealth").  He premised  the
                                          2

          application on  a claim that the  trial court's exclusion of  his
          mother from the courtroom during  part of the testimony of a  key
          prosecution 
                     witness deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a
          public trial.   The district  court, without much  in the way  of
          independent 
                     elaboration, turned a deaf ear and thereafter denied a
          certificate  of  probable  cause.    We  nonetheless  granted   a
          certificate of appealability.  See 28 U.S.C.A. S 2253(c)(1) (West
          Supp. 1997).
          II.  THE COURSE OF TRIAL
                    To understand the petitioner's claim, we must  rehearse
          his trial  in the  Barnstable Superior Court.   We  offer only  a
          synopsis, confident  that the reader  who thirsts for  additional
          detail can find it elsewhere.  See Martin, 653 N.E.2d at 604-06.
                    The 
                       Commonwealth alleged that Martin and Niles Hinckley,
          his half-brother, broke into the office of the Yarmouth town dump
          and 
             stole 
                   a 
                     safe.  After removing the safe from the building, they
          told 
              a 
                friend, Thomas Violette, that they needed help to transport
          "something 
                    big." 
                          
                          Violette obliged.  As the three men left the dump
          in Hinckley's car, with  the safe aboard, they came across  Linda
          Rose, 
               whose 
                    automobile 
                               had failed her.  She joined them.  The group
          proceeded to Rose's home.   Once there, the men dragged the  safe
          into the house and tried to open it.  Unsettled by this endeavor,
          Rose 
              departed with her children.  Violette also grew anxious about
          his involvement; he left the premises a few minutes after  Martin
          and Hinckley began working on the safe, pondered his predicament,
          and  then made  a beeline  for  the police.   The  culprits  were
                                          3

          apprehended and charged in short order.
                    Martin  and  Hinckley   were  tried   together.     The
          Commonwealth called Rose as a witness in its case in chief.   She
          stated repeatedly that she did  not see (or, at least, could  not
          recall) much of what  had transpired on the evening in  question.
          The 
             prosecutor told the judge at sidebar that Rose was nervous and
          scared and  suggested that her  professed lapses  of memory  were
          disingenuous.  The trial adjourned in the midst of Rose's  cross-
          examination.
                    On the  next trial day,  the prosecutor voiced  concern
          about 
               possible witness intimidation and the judge conducted a voir
          dire outside the presence  of the jury.  During that  proceeding,
          Rose 
              admitted 
                      that 
                           portions of her previous testimony had been less
          than truthful.  She also  stated that she had been frightened  by
          James 
               Martin 
                      (the petitioner's brother, who, she said, had pointed
          at her  from the  back  of the  courtroom), by  the  petitioner's
          girlfriend, 
                     and by an unidentified woman (who, she said, had given
          her 
             dirty 
                  looks, 
                         "scaring [her] from testifying").  Rose went on to
          recount 
                 that 
                     the 
                         petitioner's girlfriend had signalled her to "come
          over and talk" outside the courtroom; that the petitioner himself
          had accosted her shortly  after his arrest and instructed her  to
          testify (falsely) that Hinckley had acted alone in  expropriating
          the  safe; and  that, on  another occasion,  the Martin  brothers
          ordered her to deny the petitioner's role in the burglary.
                    Based 
                         on 
                            Rose's statements, the court determined that it
          was 
             "in 
                 the 
                     interest of justice that the Commonwealth be permitted
                                          4

          to reopen and redirect  on Miss Rose."   In so ruling, the  judge
          witnesses (including Rose) and that the petitioner had been found
           uilty 
                of 
                   intimidating Rose.  The judge then ordered the courtroom
          c
          noted 
               that 
                    James Martin already had pleaded guilty to intimidating
          glosed 
                during 
                      the 
                          remainder of Rose's testimony and refused to make
          an exception for  the petitioner's mother.1  During her  reopened
          testimony, Rose described the petitioner's attempts to intimidate
          her, 
              but 
                 her 
                     recollection of the evening in question did not differ
          materially from her original testimony.
          III.  THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
                    We begin with the PLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII,
          110 
             Stat. 
                   1321, 1366 (1996), which, among other things, amended 28
          U.S.C. S 1915 to require convicts  to pay the full amount of  the
          filing 
                fees 
                     in civil actions.  See PLRA, S 804, 110 Stat. at 1373-
          1375.  The petitioner  did not pay a  filing fee to the  district
          court  and  has not  paid  any  other fees  associated  with  the
          maintenance 
                     of his suit.2  Thus, the threshold question is whether
          the PLRA applies to habeas petitions brought in federal court  by
          state prisoners.
                    Though 
                          habeas proceedings are technically civil actions,
          see
             
             Ex 
                parte 
                      Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883), the Supreme Court
          has long recognized that the label is ill-fitting and that habeas
               1Although the closure order exempted the press,  there is no
          evidence 
                  in 
                     the 
                        record 
                               that any reporters were in attendance during
          Rose's reopened testimony.  See Martin, 653 N.E.2d at 605.
                 2The  petitioner did  file a  motion to  proceed in  forma
          pauperis,  and although  the district  court did  not grant  that
          motion, he appears eligible for such a dispensation.
                                          5

          is 
            in 
               fact 
                   a 
                     unique 
                            creature of the law.  See Harris v. Nelson, 394
          U.S. 286,  293-94  (1969).   Here, despite  the  undiscriminating
          reference 
                   to 
                     "civil 
                            actions," no fewer than four pieces of evidence
          indicate 
                  that Congress did not intend the PLRA to intrude into the
          habeas 
                realm. 
                        
                       First, 
                              Congress, in enacting the PLRA, took dead aim
          at suits  challenging conditions of  confinement, and nothing  in
          either the PLRA's  text or its legislative history suggests  that
          habeas cases were perceived  to comprise a part of this  problem.
          Second, Congress specifically addressed  what it perceived to  be
          habeas 
                abuses in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
          of 1996  (AEDPA), Pub.  L. No. 104-132,  tit. I,  110 Stat.  1216
          (1996), 
                 which it enacted contemporaneous with passage of the PLRA,
          and the abuses it  enumerated did not include the non-payment  of
          filing 
                fees. 
                       See Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996).
          Third, 
                extending the PLRA to habeas cases would deny habeas review
          to any prisoner  proceeding in forma pauperis who had  previously
          filed  three groundless  (though  unrelated)  civil  suits  while
          incarcerated,
                       see 28 U.S.C.A. S 1915(g) (West Supp. 1997), thereby
          frustrating a  storied tradition of  reasonable access to  habeas
          review. 
                  
                  See
                      
                      Martin
                            
                            v. 
                               Un
                                 ited States, 96 F.3d 853, 855-56 (7th Cir.
          1996).  We seriously  doubt that Congress would have purposed  to
          narrow the habeas gateway in so restrictive a manner without some
          explicit  reference to that  effect.  Last,  but not least,  this
          drastic 
                 curtailment 
                            is 
                               largely unnecessary because the AEDPA itself
          effectively curbs frivolous  habeas litigation through limits  on
          successive petitions.  See 28 U.S.C.A. S 2244 (West Supp. 1997).
                                          6

                    We are not alone  in finding these indicia  persuasive.
              the circuits that  have addressed this question to date  hav
                                  not apply to habeas petitions.      Smith
          v
          All                                                             e
          agreed 
                that 
                     the 
                        PLRA 
                             does                                 See
           . 
            Angelone
                    , 
                      111 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
          Levi
             , 
               111 
                   F.3d 955, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Anderson v.
          Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997); United States  v.
          Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997); Naddi v. Hill,  106
          F.3d 275, 277  (9th Cir. 1997); United  States v. Cole, 101  F.3d
          1076, 
               1077 
                    (5th Cir. 1996); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752,
          756 
             (3d 
                 Cir. 
                      1996); Martin, 96 F.3d at 855; Reyes, 90 F.3d at 678.
          We  concur  with  these  courts  and  endorse  their   reasoning.
          Accordingly, we  hold that  the  PLRA does  not apply  to  habeas
          petitions prosecuted in federal courts by state prisoners.
          IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                    On April 24, 1996   over a month after Martin filed his
          petition    the  President  signed the  AEDPA into  law,  thereby
          altering 
                  the 
                      legal framework which governs federal judicial review
          of habeas corpus applications.  See Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit.  I,
          110 
             Stat. 
                   1216 (1996).  The Supreme Court has now decided that the
          AEDPA 
               does 
                    not apply to habeas petitions which were pending at the
          time the new law took effect.  See Lindh v. Murphy, No.  96-6298,
          1997 WL 338568, at *8 (U.S.  June 23, 1997).3  The petitioner  is
            
            
             
              
              3
               Prior 
                     to 
                       the 
                           Court's resolution of the question by a five-to-
          four margin in  Lindh, the circuits had  divided on the issue  of
          retroactivity.  Compare  Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d  1565,
          1573 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.  denied, 117 S. Ct. 1695 (1997)  and
          Drinkard v.  Johnson, 97  F.3d 751,  766 (5th  Cir. 1996),  cert.
          denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997) and Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d  856,
          867  (7th  Cir.  1996) (all  holding  that  the  judicial  review
                                          7

          therefore entitled to plenary review of his claim that the  stat
                                                   See           Dubois
                 ,  9  (1st Cir.  1994)  (explaining  that  federal  court
                                                                          e
          court 
               abridged 
                       his 
                           constitutional rights.      Scarpa v.       , 38
          F.3d  1                                                         s
          traditionally
                       afford de novo review in respect to habeas petitions
          brought by state prisoners), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995);
          Siegfriedt v.  Fair, 982 F.2d 14,  16 (1st Cir. 1992)  (similar);
          Chakouian v. Moran, 975 F.2d 931, 934 (1st Cir. 1992) (similar).
          V.  THE MERITS
                    Refined 
                           to 
                              bare essence, the petitioner's constitutional
          claim is  that his Sixth  Amendment right to  a public trial  was
          offended by the exclusion of his mother from the courtroom during
          Rose's reopened testimony.
                                         A.
                    This  claim   rests  primarily   on  the   petitioner's
          interpretation of  Waller v.  Georgia, 467  U.S. 39  (1984).   In
          Waller,
                 
                 the 
                     Supreme Court set forth a quadripartite test that must
          be passed to justify closing a courtroom in a criminal case:
                    [T]he party seeking to close the hearing must
                    advance an overriding interest that is likely
                    to  be prejudiced,  the  closure must  be  no
                    broader  than   necessary  to  protect   that
                    interest,  the  trial  court  must   consider
                    reasonable  alternatives   to   closing   the
          provisions 
                    of the AEDPA applied to habeas petitions pending on its
          effective  date) with  Jeffries v.  Wood, No.  95-99003, 1997  WL
          253326, at *11 (9th Cir. May  12, 1997) (en banc) and Burkett  v.
          Love, 89 F.3d 135, 138 (3d  Cir. 1996) and Edens v. Hannigan,  87
          F.3d 
              1109, 
                    1112 
                        n.1 
                            (10th Cir. 1996) (all holding to the contrary).
          We had  chosen the former  path in an  earlier iteration of  this
          opinion.  Because Martin's case was still pending before us on  a
          petition for rehearing  when Lindh was  decided, we withdrew  our
          earlier opinion and now reevaluate Martin's claims under the pre-
          AEDPA standard.
                                          8

                    proceeding, 
                               and it must make findings adequate
                    to support the closure.
          Id.
             
             at 
                48. 
                    
                    The 
                        petitioner does not challenge the judge's authority
          to exclude  from  the  courtroom those  whose  presence  actually
          intimidates 
                     a witness.  Rather, emphasizing Waller's second prong,
          he posits  that the  exclusion  of his  mother was  broader  than
          necessary to  protect  the overriding  interest of  ensuring  the
          integrity of the ongoing trial.
                    We 
                      do 
                         not 
                             agree.  Nothing in Waller or in any other case
          cited 
               by 
                  the 
                     petitioner 
                                suggests that a trial judge, presented with
          evidence of repeated attempts at witness intimidation and a  live
          witness  who  harbors  a  plausible  fear  of  testifying  before
          spectators known and unknown to her, must undertake an assessment
          of the  exact  level of  affrightment  created by  each  specific
          spectator, one by one, before closing a courtroom to the public.4
          Rose 
              already 
                      had 
                         been 
                              frightened and intimidated by the petitioner,
          the  petitioner's brother,  the petitioner's  girlfriend, and  an
          unidentified woman.  The trial court's closure order was  neither
          broader  nor longer  than was  reasonably necessary  to end  this
            
            
             
              
              4
               On 
                  direct review, the Massachusetts Appeals Court summarized
          the matter as follows:
                    While 
                         we 
                            think the judge should have expressly
                    rather than implicitly determined whether the
                    witness would have had difficulty  testifying
                    with the defendant's  mother present, it  was
                    not 
                       constitutional error requiring a new trial
                    not to do so in the particular  circumstances
                    of 
                      recent 
                             intimidation by other family members
                    and persons sympathetic to the defendant.
          Martin, 653 N.E.2d  at 606.   We believe that  this is a  correct
          synthesis of applicable constitutional principles.
                                          9

          widespread reign of harassment and secure the witness's  accurate
          testimony.
                    Our judgment that the trial court's closure order  does
          not run  afoul of  Waller is buttressed  by the Second  Circuit's
          decision 
                  in 
                     W
                      oods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1992).  In
          Woods, a prosecutor informed the judge that one or two members of
          the  defendant's family had  visited a witness  at her house  and
          warned her not to testify, and the judge then excluded all family
          members from the  courtroom during the witness's testimony.   The
          Woods
               
               defendant 
                        argued, 
                                as does the petitioner here, that the trial
          court's order swept too  broadly.  The court of appeals  rejected
          this argument, concurring with the trial judge that "the  closure
          order 
               was 
                   no 
                      broader than was necessary to enable [the witness] to
          testify" and that a narrower closure would have been ineffective.
          Id.
             
             at 
                77. 
                     
                    In 
                       short, 
                              Woo
                                 ds strongly supports the result reached by
          the district court in this case.
                                         B.
                    The petitioner  has one  last string  to his  bow.   He
          insists that we should consider the exclusion of his mother  from
          the 
             courtroom under a "heightened" standard which presumably would
          be applicable  whenever a court excluded  a family member from  a
          criminal 
                  defendant's 
                             trial.  The short, entirely dispositive answer
          to this  plaint is that  the Supreme Court  opinion on which  the
          petitioner relies,  In re Oliver, 333  U.S. 257 (1948), does  not
                                         10

          contain any  such requirement.5  Nothing  in Oliver or, for  that
          matter, 
                 in 
                    Vidal
                         
                         v. 
                            Willi
                                 ams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting
          "a 
            special 
                    concern 
                           for 
                               assuring the attendance of family members of
          the  accused"), suggests that  a trial court  need go beyond  the
          already  stringent  requirements  of  Waller  before  removing  a
          defendant's 
                     family members from the courtroom.  Those requirements
            
           including 
                     the existence of an overriding interest that is likely
          to be prejudiced in the  absence of closure and that the  closure
          must be no more expansive than necessary to protect that interest
            adequately  safeguard a defendant's interest in permitting  his
          family to be present in the courtroom.
                    In 
                      sum, 
                           we 
                              not only reject the petitioner's assertion of
          a 
           heightened 
                      standard for the exclusion of family members from the
          courtroom, but we also note the exquisite irony of Martin raising
          the argument where, as here, his relatives played prominent roles
          in  menacing  a witness.    On  these peculiar  facts,  it  seems
          especially reasonable for the trial court to have concluded  that
          the 
             witness's founded fears would only be quelled if the courtroom
          were cleared  of  spectators associated  with those  persons  who
          already had threatened her.
          VII.  CONCLUSION
                    We 
                      need 
                           go 
                              no further.  Since the PLRA does not apply in
          the habeas context, Martin's application was properly before  the
                5Oliver  dealt with an entirely  secret trial in which  the
          defendant was denied both counsel and proper notice.  See Oliver,
          333 
             U.S. 
                  at 
                     258-59.  It is altogether dissimilar to this case, and
          cannot 
                begin 
                      to 
                        bear 
                             the 
                                 load that the petitioner so casually piles
          upon it.
                                         11

          district court notwithstanding  his failure to pay a filing  fee.
          Accordingly, 
                      we reach the merits.  Once there, however, we discern
          no constitutional error  in the state  trial court's decision  to
          close the courtroom during the testimony of Linda Rose.
          Affirmed.
                                         12