Court Opinion

ID: 9618580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:13:55.431112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:52.882303
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
This is the case involving the conviction of Governor Guy Hunt for violating the Alabama Code of Ethics for Public Officials, § 36-25-5, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Ethics Act”). When the majority of this Court released its opinion on April 21, 1994, affirming the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, I was not listed as having participated in the consideration of the opinion. The purpose of this opinion is to state, in general, why my name was not listed on the opinion when it was initially released, and in addressing that question I will answer, generally, the questions raised by Governor Hunt on his application for rehearing that relate to that issue.
I also write for the further purpose of stating why I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion affirming Hunt’s judgment of conviction and its denial of his application for rehearing, and the reasons why I think that the conviction should be overturned.
I
First, let me state that I agree with petitioner’s counsel who states in his application for rehearing that “[tjhis case was and is of extreme importance to the people of Alabama, not just present citizens, but future citizens as well____”
Although my vote on original deliverance would not have affected the outcome of the case, because there were six Justices who *1537either concurred with the opinion or concurred in the result of the opinion, and although my vote now does not change the result reached by a majority of this Court, I never entertained any thought of not expressing my views on the applicable law in this case. I now take this opportunity to express my views on the applicable law as I understand that law to be, believing generally, as Thomas Jefferson did, that a judge, especially in a ease like this, should write an opinion so as to “throw himself in each case on God and country; both will excuse him for error and value him for honesty.”1 In a case of this nature, I clearly believe that Jefferson’s thoughts are applicable.
Because this case involved a sitting Governor, and because it involved a Governor who was a member of one party, and the prosecutor was the member of another, there were charges and countercharges of partisan polities, and some of those charges persist. This has been a case that has attracted a great deal of public interest to be sure, but it must be decided on the principles of law- that are applicable to it without regard to who the parties are, who represents them, or what the issues are.2
As I view the law of this case, the determinative question is not whether the State proved that the petitioner violated the Ethics Act; it appears to me that the State probably carried its burden in that respect. I think the determinative question is whether the State began the prosecution within three years after the offense was completed, as the law requires. Even assuming, however, that I am wrong on that issue, and that the prosecution was timely begun, there are other serious legal questions presented relating to the fairness of the trial, and of those questions I believe one with particular merit is whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law relating to the use of excess campaign funds for personal use. Although I believe personally that no public official should ever use campaign funds for personal financial benefit, I think that the law applicable at the time the alleged offense was committed in this case did permit it, but that the law has now been amended to forbid it.
II
Having stated generally what compels me to write, I now address the petitioner’s assertion, in his application for rehearing, that his constitutional rights were violated because my name was not listed as participating in the original opinion in this ease. He states in his application for rehearing:
“Under Amendment 828, Section 6.02(a) to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, the Supreme Court is to consist of one chief justice and such other justices as prescribed by law. Ala.Code, § 12-2-1, provides that the Supreme Court shall consist of one chief justice and eight associate justices. Canon 3 of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that, ‘The judicial activities of a judge take precedence over his other activities.’ Canon 3C likewise provides for specific grounds for disqualification, none of which apply here. Petitioner was denied his right to due process under Article I, Section 6 to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America in that the Supreme Court failed to follow the law of the State of Alabama and sit as a deliberative body as required by law, in that three justices failed to sit without recusing themselves, and without any legitimate basis for absence or disqualification. The judicial process has been so prejudiced that the entire court should recuse *1538itself and an independent court be appointed to rehear this cause.”
In his brief in support of the application for rehearing, the petitioner argues his legal position, in part, as follows:
“Under Amendment 328, § 6.02(a) to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, the Supreme Court is to consist of one Chief Justice and such other Justices as prescribed by law. Ala.Code, § 12-2-1, provides that the Supreme Court shall consist of one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices. Canon 3 of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that, ‘The judicial activities of a judge shall take precedence over his other activities.’ Canon 3C provides for specific grounds for disqualification of judges, none of which apply here with the exception of the Chief Justice. This Court held in Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 355 (Ala.1984), that the Canons of Judicial Ethics ‘are not merely guidelines for proper judicial conduct. It is well-settled that the Canons of Judicial Ethics have the force and effect of law.’
“This case was and is of extreme importance to the people of Alabama, not just present citizens, but future citizens as well because it will be looked at to determine whether our judicial system really works. Can our judicial system be above politics? Emotion? Can it be free of predilection?
“Ala.Code 1975, § 12-3-17, provides that in the absence or disqualification of a judge a majority can hold court. However, the Legislature clearly contemplated legitimate absences and not ones for personal reasons. That a Justice simply does not want to sit, whether because of some other personal activity, or because he is a candidate for re-election, or because he does not feel like sitting on a particular case would not be a proper ground for failing to sit. In the absence of a legitimate ground for disqualification or some serious illness or family tragedy, a judge has a duty to sit. See, Ex parte Hill, 508 So.2d 269, 271 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). While the Court of [Civil] Appeals stated that the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics have affected the obligation of a judge to sit in a particular case, the duty to sit has not been eliminated in the absence of some ethical consideration justifying recusal.
“In this case, three justices for unexplained reasons chose to not participate in the decision of this case. Justice Houston simply did not appear for oral argument and is listed in the opinion as having not sat, Justice Kennedy was present for oral argument, but nevertheless is listed in the opinion as ‘not sitting,’ and Justice Maddox, who did sit for the oral argument and in fact vigorously participated, is not even listed on the opinion. While it is well-settled that a State has no obligation to provide for an appeal of a defendant in a criminal case, it is equally settled that where a State establishes an appellate process, it must follow that process. Here, Guy Hunt has been denied his right to due process under Article I, Section 6 to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Petitioner had a right to have this Court sit as a deliberative body to decide his case unless there were legitimate grounds for absence or disqualification. With the exception of the Chief Justice, there appear to have been none. The judicial process has been so prejudiced, the entire Court should recuse itself and an independent Court appointed to rehear this case.”
First, let me state that I had never intended not to participate in the decision in this case, but there were many facts and circumstances surrounding the release of the opinion that affected my decision to tell the clerk to leave my name off the original opinion in this case, and to allow me to file my opinion at a later date. Suffice it to say that I had legitimate and just reasons to support my decision not to be listed as participating in the original decision in this case at that time, but this is not the time, nor is this opinion the place, for me to list those reasons generally or specifically, except to say that at the time the opinion was released, I had not had sufficient time to research the law and prepare an opinion that I would want to have published.
*1539III
I have carefully read the lengthy opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I have also studied carefully the briefs of the parties, including an amicus brief filed by several state legislators. I participated in the oral arguments of this case and asked several questions during those arguments on the two legal issues that compel me to disagree with my fellow Justices. My decision to file my dissenting views did not come easily, because there are 11 Judges and Justices who disagree with my views of the law, but I must respectfully disagree with them. Even if my dissenting views are not accepted by a tribunal with the power to modify the majority’s decision in this ease, I believe that dissenting opinions have their place. I have noted on other occasions that “[a] dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”3 I believe that the opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and of this Court are erroneous. That is why I write.
I asked several questions during oral argument, most of them directed at the specific acts of misconduct that the State claimed that the petitioner did, when he did them, and why an instruction on the Fair Campaign Practices Act was given when the State contended from the beginning that the “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts made the subject of the indictment were “bogus” or “money laundering” accounts and not “campaign accounts.” Other questions I asked were directed to when the evidence showed the elements of the Ethics Act offense were completed so that the statutory limitations period would have begun to run.
Although the petitioner made forceful arguments on several other legal issues, including arguments that he was selectively prosecuted and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of violating the Ethics Act, I address only the two issues presented by the petitioner that appealed to me as having such merit that I was convinced that the conviction should be reversed. The issues I address are: (1) the running of the limitations period on the charge laid in the indictment, and (2) the instruction of the trial court on the personal use of campaign funds. In addressing only these two issues, I do not address whether the petitioner was guilty or not guilty of the charges laid against him. A jury found him guilty, and the evidence appears to be sufficient to support that finding. I write only to say that I believe that the State did not prosecute the offense within three years of the date when the offense occurred and that I think the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury on the use of campaign funds, so that the petitioner would be entitled to a new trial even if the prosecution were not barred by the statute of limitations. Naturally, I express no view on whether excess campaign funds should or should not be used for personal purposes, that is a political question. I express only my view that at the time of the alleged offense, the law permitted such use, although the law has now been amended.
IV
The petitioner was charged, in Count I of the indictment, with a violation of the Ethics Act, § 36-25-5, Ala.Code 1975, which prohibits a public official from using his or her office for “direct personal financial gain.” In Counts II through XIII, he was charged alternatively with theft, receiving stolen property, and conspiracy, but those charges were dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the statute of limitations barred prosecution of those charges. I note that each charge in the indictment seems to be based upon the same alleged wrongful acts or conduct.
At oral argument, when I asked the State’s attorney to state the specific acts of misconduct that formed the basis of the charge, he said, in substance, that the petitioner solicited funds from contributors to be sent to a nonprofit corporation, that some of the solicited funds were not deposited into the account set up for the receipt of the inaugural *1540funds but were deposited instead into an account at Union Bank and Trust Company styled “Friends of Guy Hunt,” and that those funds in the Union Bank “Friends of Guy Hunt” account were later transferred to three separate “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts in various other banks. The State’s attorney, when questioned about the nature of the several “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts, variously described them as “bogus” accounts or “money laundering” accounts. As I understand the state’s position, it was that the petitioner solicited funds for a nonprofit agency, caused them to be transferred into “bogus” accounts, and received a “direct personal financial gain as a result.”
The petitioner did not deny the fact that the office of Governor, to which he had just been elected, was used to raise funds and that the various accounts were established, but he argued before the trial court, before the Court of Criminal Appeals, and before this Court, that the funds that he used, and which were the subject of the indictment upon which he was convicted, were “campaign funds” and that the Fair Campaign Practices Act, § 17-22A-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, as it existed at the time the funds were used, allowed campaign funds to be used for any lawful purpose, including a personal purpose, that is, he argued that campaign funds were available for personal use.
Much of the evidence and many of the arguments before the trial court and before the appellate courts were built around the characterization of the several “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts. Were they, in fact, “campaign accounts,” as contended by the petitioner, or were they “bogus” or “money laundering” accounts as contended by the State? The jury, insofar as I can determine, was never asked to make a decision about that issue, even though there was a lot of evidence, and several legal arguments made, regarding the question.
Although I cannot find that the jury made a factual determination as to whether the funds were inaugural funds or campaign funds, the State’s attorney, during oral argument, said that he did not believe the jury ever thought the funds were campaign funds.4 The Court of Criminal Appeals spe*1541cifically determined that the funds were not campaign funds. That Court stated that “the trial court’s instruction on the Fair Campaign Practices Act was a correct statement of the law,” because, the Court said, “we find that the funds in question in this case were solicited on behalf of a non-profit corporation, after Hunt had been elected, and so were not ‘excess campaign funds.’ ” Hunt v. State, 642 So.2d 999, 1014 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).
Similarly, the majority of this Court found that the funds involved were not “campaign funds.” In addressing the petitioner’s argument on the selective prosecution issue, the majority said:
“The essence of Hunt’s arguments on these issues is that the funds he used for his direct personal financial gain were campaign funds. Hunt argues that his prosecution was selective because numerous other public officials had used excess campaign funds for direct personal financial gain and were not prosecuted. Hunt argues that his prosecution should have been barred by principles of equitable estoppel and that his prosecution amounts to an ex post facto application of the law because, he says, for years the Ethics Commission and the attorney general had told people that spending campaign funds for personal use was not illegal so long as the one using the funds treated them as income and paid taxes on that income. This argument might have some force if the funds involved were, in fact, campaign funds. However, the facts show that the funds used by Hunt were not campaign funds, but that they were, instead, funds solicited by and contributed to a nonprofit charitable corporation.”
(Emphasis added.)
It appears, therefore, that both a majority of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have determined, as a matter of law, that the funds involved here were not “campaign funds.” If that is true, as both Courts have held, and if the wrongful conduct made the subject of the indictment was the diversion of funds that were solicited for a nonprofit corporation, then it would appear that the wrongful act occurred, and the offense was complete, when the funds were deposited into the “Friends of Guy Hunt” account at Union Bank and Trust Company. In other words, if as both appellate courts have determined, the funds involved were not campaign funds, then the offense for which the petitioner was convicted occurred at the time he gained such control over the funds that he had received a “direct personal financial gain” as a result, and if the petitioner used the funds that were diverted to what the State’s attorney describes as “bogus” or “money laundering” accounts, then an offense occurred and was complete when the petitioner had such control and power over the funds that he had a benefit. As I view it, the question is: when did the petitioner use his office for “direct personal financial gain?”
The State seems to argue inconsistently. In arguing the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, the State says that the petitioner solicited the funds, caused them to be transferred into “bogus” accounts, and he used them. The State argues that the signatories to the “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts were hired by the petitioner, and were under his direction and control, and that each of the alleged wrongful acts was committed by him or by those two agents. Consequently, the State argues that the petitioner committed the alleged wrongful acts and was guilty. On the other hand, the State, in arguing against the application of the statute of limitations defense, says that the petitioner did not have a “direct personal financial gain” until he actually withdrew funds in December 1989, although they had been diverted into the “bogus” or “money laundering” accounts much earlier. In effect, says the State, the petitioner had sufficient control over the funds to have them transferred into “bogus” accounts, but once they were transferred did not have such control that he received a *1542“direct personal financial gain.” The State argues, therefore, that the offense was not complete until the later date, which was within the period of limitations.5
The trial court recognized that the limitations period had run on the theft and related charges because the offenses were complete when the petitioner had such control of funds that he could be said, in law, to have appropriated them to his own use. The trial court stated in dismissing the theft and theft-related charges:
“It’s the Court’s opinion that due to the elements of the offense of theft that any control or gain, based on the Defense’s proof of a 1988 change of the account was done, takes it outside the statute of limitations and I hereby grant your motion to dismiss on that.”
(Emphasis added.)
Did the State not use the same evidence to prove “control or gain” on the ethics charge that it had used to show the petitioner’s guilt on the other charges? It appears to me that it did. If the petitioner had such “control or gain” over the funds in November 1988 that the theft and related offenses would have occurred by that time, why did that same evidence not prove sufficient “control or gain” to amount to a “direct personal financial gain” to the petitioner in regard to the ethics charge? The answer, of course, is that it would be sufficient. The trial court seemed to rule inconsistently on this point, and either wittingly or unwittingly used the words “control or gain” in dismissing the theft and related charges, but refused to dismiss the ethics charge on the same ground. He seemed to think that the provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act somehow required him to handle the ethics charge differently. I think the State, by its argument, led the learned trial judge into error. If, as contended by the State, the funds were not “campaign funds,” then there was no need to be concerned, for statute of limitations purposes, with the provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. In any event, I believe that the words “control or gain” are synonymous with the words “direct personal financial gain” contained in the Ethics Act, § 36-25-5, Ala.Code 1975, and I conclude that if the theft and related offenses were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, so was the ethics charge.
The majority, relying on Lambert v. Wilcox County Comm’n, 623 So.2d 727, 730 (Ala. 1993), holds that “[t]he crime was not complete when Hunt became the sole signatory on the account containing funds raised for his inauguration” because “[although Hunt was in control of the funds at that time, he had not received an improper ‘direct personal financial gain.’ ” The majority, therefore, holds that gaining exclusive control over funds is not a “direct personal financial gain” under § 36-25-5, Ala.Code 1975. I think that the majority grievously errs in this interpretation of the holding in Lambert and in applying the “direct personal financial gain” provisions of the Ethics Act.
In Lambert, the plaintiffs sought to disqualify one of the county commissioners from voting on a sales tax increase that would benefit the Wilcox County Board of Education, because the Board employed the commissioner as a bus driver. The commissioner’s benefit from action he took as an officeholder was held not to be “direct personal financial gain,” but I think a tax increase that benefits the school board that employs the officeholder who voted for the tax cannot be compared to the placing of funds solicited by the officeholder on behalf of a non-profit corporation into a personal bank account over which the officeholder is the sole signatory. Lambert involves an interpretation of the word “direct” as opposed to the word “indirect.” The line between direct and indirect personal financial gain might not be so distinct in many cases, but, with all due respect to my colleagues, I cannot see how a person can have sole possession of a fund and sole control of the disposition of that fund and still not have realized a “direct personal financial gain” in the process, unless the funds were held in some capacity as a trustee agent or custodian.
*1543Based on that conclusion, I would hold that when the petitioner became the sole signatory of the “Cullman Friends” bank account on November 12,1988, he, at least at that point, if not earlier, received a “direct personal financial gain” as defined by the statute. Consequently, I believe that the statutory limitations period had began to run at least as of November 12, 1988, because on that date the petitioner had such “gain” and “control” over the funds that the elements of the Ethics Act were then complete. I would reverse the conviction and render a judgment for the petitioner, not because he was innocent of violating the Ethics Act, but because the prosecution was not commenced within the time set out by law, and because the petitioner timely raised the defense of the statute of limitations.
V
Although I believe that the conviction should be reversed and a judgment rendered for the petitioner, I also address one other point, the giving of the instruction on the taking of excess campaign funds for personal use, because the holding in this case on that issue, I must respectfully say, is incorrect. The trial court stated in its instruction that “[t]he use of excess campaign funds for direct personal financial gain is, therefore, not a lawful purpose as that phrase is used in the Fair Campaign Practices Act.”
The giving of that instruction, in my opinion, was reversible error. The petitioner contended before trial, during trial, and during the charge conference that he was entitled to have the jury find him not guilty if the jury found that the funds were campaign funds. While it would not have been improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the petitioner’s theory of the case and to have the jury decide whether the “Friends of Guy Hunt” accounts were “campaign” accounts, it was very prejudicial for the trial court to incorrectly instruct the jury. At the time the petitioner used the funds that were made the subject of his prosecution, the Fan-Campaign Practices Act, §§ 17-22A-1 through 17-22A-23, Ala.Code 1975, did not prohibit the taking or spending of excess campaign funds for personal use.6 The majority’s conclusion to the contrary, I believe, is erroneous.
The Alabama Fair Campaign Practices Act became effective July 1,1988. It was the law in effect when the petitioner became the sole signatory of the “Cullman Friends” account. Section 17-22A-7, Ala.Code 1975, was modeled almost verbatim after the comparable federal statute found at 2 U.S.C. § 439(a). Both the Alabama statute and the federal statute specified certain uses to which excess campaign funds may be put and concluded by stating that they may also be used “for any other lawful purpose.” The federal statute was amended in 1989 so as to qualify the “any other lawful purpose” language by specifically providing that “no such amounts may be converted by any person to any personal use, other than to defray any ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with his or her duties as a holder of federal office.” In May 1993, the Alabama legislature followed this same path, by amending § 17-22A-7 to add the following:
“Contributions to an office holder shall not be converted to personal use. For purposes of this section, personal use shall not include room, telephones, office expenses and equipment, housing rental, meals, and travel expenses incurred in connection with the duties as a holder of office.”
By amending the two statutes, both the United States Congress and the Alabama Legislature tacitly admitted that the previous law did not forbid the personal use of excess campaign funds. Two attorney general opinions support the petitioner’s interpretation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act in a manner that would allow personal use of campaign funds from the effective date of the Act until it was amended. In a 1990 opinion, the *1544attorney general, after quoting the language of § 17-22A-7 as it then read, stated:
“This provision specifically sets forth three ways in which excess funds may be lawfully used by a candidate and acknowledges that there may be other lawful ways in which the funds could be used.
“At present we are aware of one other way that funds may be used. The excess funds might be used as personal income by a candidate, but he should consult the Alabama Revenue Department and the Internal Revenue Service. There may be other lawful purposes that we are unaware of; however, they must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis as they are presented.”
Opinion of the attorney general for the State of Alabama, 90-00134, to Perry A. Hand, secretary of state, April 16, 1990. In a 1991 opinion, Attorney General Jimmy Evans, who prosecuted this case, stated:
“In a prior Opinion, this office stated that this provision [§ 17-22A-7, Ala.Code 1975] specifically sets forth three ways that excess political contributions may lawfully be used and acknowledged that there may be other lawful purposes. Opinion to Hon. Perry A. Hand, Secretary of State, under date of April 16,1990. We also stated that one of those lawful purposes may include using excess funds as personal income by a candidate, assuming that the candidate complies with all state and federal tax laws. If the Legislature did not intend for candidates to use campaign funds as personal income that could have been prohibited by specific language in the Act. Accordingly, while we do not condone a candidate’s personal use of excess campaign funds, the Legislature has not made such use unlawful.”
Opinion of the attorney general for the State of Alabama, 91-00196, to Melvin G. Cooper, March 20, 1991.
Although I do not agree with the petitioner that those two opinions should estop the State, I do believe that both opinions are legally correct and properly state the intent of the Legislature.
Several legislators have filed an amicus brief in which they argue for a construction of the language of § 17-22A-7 that would permit the personal use of excess campaign funds. They contend, as does the petitioner, that the Fair Campaign Practices Act, until it was amended in 1993, did not prohibit the personal use of excess campaign funds.
Based on the foregoing facts and especially based on (1) the fact that the Alabama Fair Campaign Practices Act was modeled after a federal statute that allowed personal use of campaign funds, (2) the fact that the Legislature later amended this section to specifically prohibit personal use of excess campaign funds, and (3) the interpretations in the attorney general opinions, I conclude that the Fair Campaign Practices Act did not prohibit the personal use of excess campaign funds and, therefore, that the trial court’s instruction on the Fair Campaign Practices Act was reversible error. If the funds the petitioner used were not campaign funds, and the two appellate courts have found that they were not,7 then the instruction regarding that Act amounted to an instruction to the jury to return a directed verdict.
Was the giving of the instruction harmless error? The State argues, and the majority of this Court states, that “Hunt should not be allowed to insert the issue of campaign funds into the trial and then complain that the trial judge instructed the jury on the law as it relates to that issue.” 642 So.2d at 1066. Of course, the petitioner could not complain if the trial court had given the instruction that he requested, but does the fact that a defendant interjects a defense in a case mean he or she waives the right to object to an instruction on the defensive matter that is an incorrect statement of the law? I would think not. In fact, had the trial judge instructed the jury on the use of campaign funds as requested by the petitioner, even *1545the State’s attorney recognizes what effect it might have had. In answer to one of my questions at oral argument relating to the instruction, he said:
“An instruction that he asked for, Judge; he just didn’t get the one he wanted. He wanted the court to pardon him by giving an improper construction of that act. What Judge Thomas did and what the Court of Criminal Appeals did was they read the Fair Campaign Practices Act and the Alabama Ethics Act in pari materia.”
(Emphasis added.) The State says that the petitioner did not get the instruction he wanted and suggests that he cannot claim error in the giving of an instruction on a defense he interjected into the case. I cannot accept the State’s argument. The petitioner objected to the giving of the instruction and did all he could to prevent the jury from being improperly instructed, and, in view of the holding by the two appellate courts that, as a matter of law, the funds the petitioner used were not campaign funds, the giving of the incorrect instruction was even more harmful. Consequently, I cannot agree with the majority that the giving of the instruction, even if erroneous, was harmless under Rule 45, Ala.RApp.P.
Based on the foregoing, I must respectfully disagree • with the majority on the two issues relating to the statute of limitations and the jury instruction on the Fair Campaign Practices Act. I hope that this belated opinion answers sufficiently the arguments made by the petitioner in his application for rehearing.

. William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 104, 106 (1948).

. When I took my first oath of office in October, 1969, I made the following pledge to those attending my investiture ceremony, and I have used this pledge in political campaign materials when I have had opposition:
“On the bench, I shall faithfully and diligently discharge my duty by handling the people's business with dispatch and justice — according to the laws and constitution which we, the people, have adopted' — and not according to any particular philosophy which might appear more expedient or more desirable.”

. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 547 So.2d 467, 469 (Ala. 1989) (Maddox, J., dissenting) (quoting Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, as quoted by William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J.Am.Judicature Soc'y 104, 106 (1948)).

. The following occurred during oral argument, when I questioned the State’s attorney:
“Q. You don't believe that you could have prosecuted the defendant for misuse of campaign funds had you brought a prosecution within the time — within the three years— with regard to violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act?
“A. Your Honor, I'm not sure I understood your question. It would be difficult to bring an ethics violation under the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
“Q. The judge charged that it was illegal to use campaign funds for personal use. You're telling me the reason why the attorney general didn't try and get an indictment on the Fair Campaign Practices Act is because those were not campaign funds, is that what you're telling me?
"A. Well, no, sir, that's not the reason that we didn't bring it under the Fair Campaign Practices Act. The reason that we proceeded the way we are — now you're getting into some thoughts, but I don't mind telling you, Judge — is that because we didn't view this as anything other than a use of office by the defendant to obtain direct personal financial gain. We never have viewed this money as campaign money. He wants this Court to conclude it is even though there is no evidence whatsoever that it is. It's just not.
“Q. The reason I’m asking these questions is the biggest point I see that the defendant makes in this case is that an instruction to the jury with regard to the use of campaign funds for personal use as affecting the outcome of the case—
"A. An instruction that he asked for, Judge; he just didn't get the one he wanted. He wanted the court to pardon him by giving an improper construction of that act. What Judge Thomas did and what the Court of Criminal Appeals did was they read the Fair Campaign Practices Act and the Alabama Ethics Act in pari materia.
"Q. Did he object to it?
"A. Pardon me, sir.
"Q. Did he object to it?
"A. He objected to the one he got, yes, sir, but he asked for an instruction.
"Q. You don't think that raised it?
"A. Oh, I understand clearly, Your Honor, that whether or not Judge Thomas's instruction was proper is a matter that is before this Court. We just argue that it was a proper instruction, and, consistent with the facts adduced at trial, he had to give it, because of the way the defense defended this case, not because of anything that the State did. They needed an instruction at the point in time that they had injected the issue into the case, through argument, Judge, not through fact, that this was campaign funds. And they *1541argued it at the open, and they argued it at the end. But I don’t believe, if you're asking me for my personal opinion, Judge, that the jury ever thought for one second that this was campaign money, because it wasn't campaign money coming in and it wasn't used for any campaign purpose and because there was • an existent real campaign account open....”
(Emphasis added).

. Although some of the initial transfers of funds occurred during January and February 1987, when the old Corrupt Practices Act, §§ 17-22-1 through 17-22-15, Ala.Code 1975, was still in effect that may have prohibited personal use, the statute of limitations would certainly bar any application of that Act in this case. The old Corrupt Practices Act had specific categories of things for which campaign funds could be spent.

. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that “the funds in question in this case were solicited on behalf of a non-profit corporation, after Hunt had been elected, and so were not 'excess campaign funds.'" Hunt v. State, 642 So.2d 999, 1014 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Likewise, the majority of this Court stated that “the facts show that the funds used by Hunt were not campaign funds, but that they were, instead, funds solicited by and contributed to a nonprofit charitable corporation.” 642 So.2d at 1064.