Court Opinion

ID: 9540845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:16.909588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:11.649242
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of the convictions upon all eight counts and the sentence imposed upon each count. However, I write to voice reservations with respect to Issues One and Seven as treated in the majority opinion.
ISSUE ONE
DECORATION OF COURTROOM INIT ATED BY TRIAL JUDGE AND IN PARTICIPATION WITH PROSECUTING WITNESSES
One or more of the victims who were to testify during the trial assisted the trial judge in decorating the courtroom in an apparent effort to make all of the children who would testify more comfortable and at ease in the presentation of their testimony against defendant. This joint effort, initiated by the trial judge was wholly improper. The trial judge has a duty to remain impartial. He should not take it upon himself to determine that witnesses need protection nor should he fashion such protection. See Wagner v. State (1985) Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476, 489.1
*225To be sure, the judicial system has recognized the disability, in terms of trauma and intimidation, visited upon children of tender years called upon to appear in an austere courtroom before and with adults to speak about "unspeakable" things. Various measures, such as anatomically correct dolls, reliable out-of-court statements, etcetera, have been devised to make that occasion promotive of factual accuracy. The judicial system wishes to foster an accurate gathering of the evidence without undue intimidation or trauma to the child. The atmosphere, however, must remain as neutral as it can possibly be made. The court itself is a vital aspect of that neutrality. The judge himself must remain neutral. He should not allow the surroundings, or the system, or the trial participants to intimidate or be ingratiating. Certainly, he should not do so himself. The activities of the judge in this instance severely compromised the appearance, if not the fact, of his neutrality.
Even though the extent of the judge's activity and the pre-trial participation of one or more of the witnesses were not known to the jury, the accoutrements may have done more than merely place the children at ease. As proffered by appellant, the environment may well have encouraged the jurors to react in a particularly favorable, parental, and protective way toward the young female complainants.
At least two of the cases from foreign jurisdictions mentioned in the majority opinion acknowledge the strong potential for prejudice and observe that practices of this kind are not to be encouraged. State v. Bolton (1981) La., 408 So.2d 250; Brooks v. State (1975) 24 Md.App. 334, 330 A.2d 670.
I do not believe that the jury admonishment served to cure any prejudice which may have been created in the minds of the jury. To the contrary, it specifically advised that the posters were designed to render the testimony of the children more free and to remove their anxiety. Such advisement was susceptible to an interpretation that the testimony was more credible than it might otherwise have been.
The invitation to extraneous considerations by the jury is too likely to be accepted and the resulting prejudice to a defendant too possible. In my view, the decorative state of the courtroom, coupled with the manner in which it was achieved and with the "admonishment" constituted clear error.
However, I must concur with my colleagues that under the circumstances, the error is not cause for reversal. Even absent the extraneous influences no reasonable trier of fact would have reached a contrary result upon any one or more of the charges.
ISSUE SEVEN
LACK OF REMORSE AS AGGRAVATING FACTOR FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES
When a defendant has consistently maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings, it is inappropriate to use this "lack of remorse" as a consideration in enhancing the sentence or in imposing consecutive sentences. To do so is tantamount to requiring a defendant to admit guilt after trial and before sentencing. It seems to me that such state of affairs gives rise to a virtual assurance of affirmance upon appeal unless the defendant-appellant sue-cessfully claims fundamental due process error. An admission of guilt renders it difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate prejudice.
To be sure, a clear showing of lack of remorse may greatly exceed a continued claim of innocence. When that takes place, it is no doubt appropriate to view the disdain or recalcitrance as indicative of the need for greater corrective treatment and/or of the likelihood that defendant will commit other crimes in the future. Coleman v. State (1980) 2d Dist. Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 647.
In Brooks v. State (1986) Ind., 497 N.E.2d 210, our Supreme Court noted that the manner in which the defendant demonstrated his "lack of remorse" was particu*226larly hostile and in the words of the trial judge showed "disdain for authority." To the same effect is Mahla v. State (1986) Ind., 496 N.E.2d 568.
Standing alone, "lack of remorse" as here involved, i.e., as a euphemism for a claim of innocence, is not sufficient basis for imposition of consecutive sentences totaling thirty years. Dockery v. State (1987) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 504 N.E.2d 291. But see Mullens v. State (1983) Ind., 456 N.E.2d 411, in which the only clear demonstration of "lack of remorse" was defendant's failure to testify in his own defense or in explanation of his acts but in which our Supreme Court opined that the trial judge might have discerned a lack of remorse from "other" unspecified circumstances.
In Pope v. State (1983) Fla., 441 So.2d 1073, 1078, the Florida Supreme Court well characterized the danger:
"Unfortunately, remorse is an active emotion and its absence, therefore, can be measured or inferred only from negative evidence. This invites the sort of mistake which occurred in the case now before us-inferring lack of remorse from the exercise of constitutional rights. This sort of mistake may, in an extreme case, raise a question as to whether the defendant has been denied some measure of due process, thus mandating a remand for reconsideration of the sentence. For these reasons, we hold that henceforth lack of remorse should have no place in the consideration of aggravating factors."
Other jurisdictions recognize the problem and likewise preclude consideration of "lack of remorse" in the sense of guilt denial as a sole or determinative factor. See e.g. State v. Carriger (1984) 148 Ariz, 142, 692 P.2d 991, cert. denied 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L,Ed.2d 864; People v. Key (1984) 4th Dist., 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 203 Cal.Rptr. 144; Colesanti v. State (1984) 60 Md.App. 185, 481 A.2d 1143, cert. denied 302 Md. 570, 489 A.2d 1129; and Thomas v. State (1983) 99 Nev. 757, 670 P.2d 111.
My position in this regard is not modified by the three most recent Indiana decisions which I have found upon the issue. In Seeley v. State (1987) 1st Dist. Ind.App., 504 N.E.2d 309, the court seriously questioned whether the "unequivocal stance of innocence" could constitute lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance but noted other aggravating circumstances set forth by the sentencing judge. Similarly, in Hughes v. State (1987) 1st Dist. Ind.App., 508 N.E.2d 1289, trans. denied, other aggravating factors were present in addition to "lack of remorse." Finally, in Linger v. State (1987) 4th Dist. Ind. App., 508 N.E.2d 56, the court held that denial of guilt may not be considered as an aggravating factor.
Be that as it may, the trial court here recited other aggravating factors in support of the consecutive sentences. The sentences do not, therefore, rest solely upon the "lack of remorse." For this reason I concur with the majority in refusing to reverse for sentencing error.
Subject to the above observations, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.

. The lack of impartiality was also arguably demonstrated, albeit outside the presence of the jury, when in recantation of a witness separation order, the trial judge permitted some of the children who had earlier testified to be present in the courtroom "to lend some support to PJ" *225(Record at 416), one of the victims then being called to the witness stand.