Court Opinion

ID: 9947750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 16:06:59.348813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:31.550630
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 232503

                                                                                SECOND DIVISION
                                                                                     March 5, 2024

                                            No. 1-23-2503B

                                      IN THE
                         APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT
  ______________________________________________________________________________

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                 )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Cook County.
                                                                 )
      v.                                                         )   No. 23 MC 1115108
                                                                 )
  KESHAUN VANCE,                                                 )   Honorable
                                                                 )   Barbara Dawkins,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge, presiding.

       JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                             OPINION

¶1     Defendant Keyshaun Vance filed an appeal under what is commonly known as the

Pretrial Fairness Act pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023),

challenging the circuit court’s order denying him pretrial release. He claims the court’s findings

were flawed, and the court violated the requirement that its findings be reduced to writing. We

find no error in the court’s findings and conclude that the trial court’s uniquely detailed oral

findings regarding the inadequacy of pretrial release conditions satisfied the purpose of the

written-findings requirement.
No. 1-23-2503B

¶2     The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a machine gun and unlawful

use of a weapon by a felon, both Class X felonies, as well as a misdemeanor charge of criminal

trespass to motor vehicle. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(i), 24-1.1(a), 21-2(a) (West 2022).

¶3     On December 14, 2023, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial

release based on the grounds that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person,

persons, or the community based on the specific and articulable facts of the case, and that no set

of conditions would mitigate that danger.

¶4     The State provided the following proffer: on December 13, 2023, Chicago police officers

had a license plate reader hit for a black 2023 Hyundai Sonata that had been reported stolen.

Officers contacted Police Helicopter One for assistance, and the helicopter followed the vehicle

from Cermak Road to Loomis Street, then from Loomis to Cullerton Street. The stolen car pulled

into an alley between Cullerton Street and Throop Street. Officers arrived on both sides of the

alley, blocking the stolen car.

¶5     The car then began driving in reverse, striking a parked vehicle. After hitting the parked

car, defendant got out of the driver’s seat and attempted to flee on foot. One of defendant’s

codefendants got out of the front passenger seat and attempted to flee as well. The second

codefendant remained seated in the rear driver’s side seat and surrendered as defendant and the

other codefendant fled. The fleeing codefendant did not get far before falling and was quickly

apprehended by police. Defendant, on the other hand, ran through an adjacent gangway and was

about a block from the scene when he was apprehended.

¶6     Officers obtained a key to the stolen car from defendant. During an inventory search of

the car, officers found three guns. Located on the floorboard by the driver’s seat was a loaded,

black Glock 21 semiautomatic handgun with five live rounds and one in the chamber; it was

altered with a “switch” that allowed it to function as a fully automatic weapon. Located on the

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rear driver’s-side floorboard was a loaded, black semiautomatic handgun. Located under the

front passenger’s seat was a black Glock 19 semiautomatic handgun with an extended magazine.

¶7      The State argued that defendant was a danger in that he stole a vehicle, he was in

possession of a fully automatic handgun, he hit another car while driving in reverse to avoid the

police, and that he then fled on foot. The State argued that no set of conditions could mitigate his

threat to the community.

¶8      Defendant argued that the proof was not evident and the presumption not great that he

committed the charged offenses because he was not seen “possessing, holding, touching,

gesturing toward the firearm at all.” Defendant argued that there was no fingerprint evidence at

this stage, and his only connection to the gun was that it was located below his seat while driving

the (stolen) car.

¶9      Defendant also emphasized the lack of any violence in his criminal history. He had one

felony conviction for retail theft for which he received probation. As a juvenile, he had three

arrests for retail theft and one for criminal trespass to property; but he had no priors regarding

firearms. Defendant also noted that he was age 22, he had obtained his GED from Thornton High

School, he works with his girlfriend managing short-term rentals, he has a two-year-old daughter

whom he takes to daycare every day, and he has obtained two professional licenses—one a realty

license and the other, according to the transcript, a “breading license,” which may well mean a

“beading license.” He also stated that he has strong ties to the community and family.

¶ 10    The trial court found that there was proof evident and a presumption great that defendant

committed the charged offenses. As that finding is not contested on appeal, we need say nothing

more on that topic.

¶ 11    In its written order, the court found that defendant was a threat to the community based

on the fact that defendant “was found with a machine gun. He attempted to elude police and hit a

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No. 1-23-2503B

car. He was in a stolen car with two other men with guns. He is 22 years old.” In its oral ruling,

the trial court stated that defendant’s criminal background was not concerning, but

       “[w]hat is concerning to me is the type of gun that was recovered in this case and the

       circumstances of this arrest. So I’m looking at the fact that you were alleged to have been

       in a vehicle with two other people all armed to the tooth with firearms, that when police

       came into contact or were brought to the attention of you in this stolen car—let’s also

       point that out that the car was stolen—that you [eluded] or alleged to have [eluded]

       authorities hitting parked cars leading police on a chase.”

¶ 12   Though the court acknowledged that defendant’s mitigation was “significant,” the court

nevertheless found that “the State has established by clear and convincing evidence that you pose

a real and present threat to the community based upon the fact that we have got you as the driver

in a stolen car, you [are] armed with, alleged to have been armed with a machine gun, two other

people armed to the tooth evading police, hitting parked cars.”

¶ 13   On the issue of whether any set of conditions were sufficient to mitigate defendant’s

threat to the community, the court inquired of the representative of pretrial services to understand

the effectiveness of home confinement. After talking through the details of home confinement, in

which the system sends a “ping” to pretrial services if the defendant leaves his permitted area,

the court stated:

               “THE COURT: Part of my concern with home confinement is always that there is

       at least the perception that we are not notified as judges until the next court date if there

       has been a violation, so that has been at least part of my hesitancy on placing people on

       home confinement. I want to know if that is the case or not.

               PRETRIAL REPRESENTATIVE: Yes, that’s correct, your Honor. The

       technician—it will ping if they are out of the zone, and then their post release officer will

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No. 1-23-2503B

       receive an e-mail saying that they are out of the zone, and then that officer will write up a

       noncompliance report to notify the judge.

              THE COURT: Then the judge doesn’t find out until the next court date?

              PRETRIAL REPRESENTATIVE: Correct because post release is not 24 hours so

       that officer would not have knowledge of the violation until the working hours.

              THE COURT: Okay, so if I am on home confinement and I violate today, and my

       next court date is not until January 10, then my judge doesn’t find out until January 10, so

       I can be noncompliant for that entire time, and the judge wouldn’t know? I mean, that is

       at least my perception. I just want to make sure my perception isn’t—

              PRETRIAL REPRESENTATIVE: *** Pretty much, your Honor, yes.”

¶ 14   The court then addressed whether any set of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by

defendant:

       “So this is where I was having the issue because of what I said, because you have

       significant mitigation, and because of the lack of—there is no violence in your

       background, and I’m troubled by this case, and I’m troubled by the fact this is a machine

       gun. So these are my options. My option is electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring

       still gives you the two days of access to the world, all right, but the good thing about

       electronic monitoring is that the Court knows almost well, within a relatively short period

       of time that there has been a violation. So then my next consideration is home

       confinement. That is why I was asking the questions about home confinement because I

       do feel that there needs to be something beyond just a pretrial supervision. Pretrial

       supervision where you are calling a pretrial officer. I feel based upon these facts and

       circumstances, the defendant’s young tender age of 22 that there needs to be something

       beyond just reporting to a pretrial officer even if it is once a week. Home confinement,

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No. 1-23-2503B

       I’m troubled by there being such a lapse of time between a potential violation and the

       court notification. That doesn’t suffice in this Court’s opinion, so there [are] few options

       that I have. So I can only deal with the options I have. I have electronic monitoring. I

       have home confinement. I have pretrial supervision, pretrial monitoring, and I have

       detention. As such I find that there is nothing short of pretrial detention that could

       mitigate the real and present threat that he poses to the community based on the specific

       articulable facts of this case. These are the options that this Court has. That is my finding

       based upon the specific articulable facts of this case for the reasons I have stated.”

¶ 15   In its written order on the subject of conditions, the court was far less detailed and

individualized, writing that no set of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by defendant

because “[d]efendant was found with a machine gun. He led police on a helicopter chase. He hit

a car. He was in a stolen car with 2 other men with guns.”

¶ 16   The court thus ordered defendant detained.

¶ 17   Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Defendant did not file a supplemental

memorandum before this Court, electing to stand on the notice of appeal. The State filed a

supplemental memorandum in response to the notice of appeal.

¶ 18   Under the new pretrial-release provisions in state law, defendants are presumed eligible

for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). The State may detain an

accused if it establishes that the charged offense is eligible for detention and then proves, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the

defendant committed an offense which qualifies them for pretrial detention; (2) the defendant

poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on

the specific articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can

mitigate that real and present threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e).

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No. 1-23-2503B

¶ 19   In his notice of appeal, defendant does not deny that he was charged with a detention-

eligible offense and does not challenge the first prong of evident proof. Defendant advances

three arguments: (1) the court erred in finding defendant to be a threat to the community; (2) the

court erred in finding that no set of conditions could mitigate that threat; and (3) the court

violated the requirement that the court set out its findings in a detailed written order.

¶ 20   Though the appellate courts have been split on the standard of review of detention orders,

and our supreme court has not settled that split, we need not resolve that issue here, as our

conclusion would be the same under any standard of review.

¶ 21   As to whether he posed a threat to the community, defendant argues that there is no

evidence that he “threatened any person with the firearm, pointed the firearm at any person, or

brandished the firearm in any way.” Nor is it alleged that he ever physically held the firearm.

And finally, defendant points to the lack of violence in his criminal history, his employment, his

strong family ties, his obtaining of two professional licenses, and his GED.

¶ 22   We uphold the court’s finding that the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence,

that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community. We agree with the trial court

that the most troubling aspect of this crime as alleged is that defendant was in (constructive)

possession of a loaded, fully automatic weapon, along with two other men likewise armed, while

defendant drove a stolen automobile. The combination of those two crimes is startling; while it is

bad enough to possess a weapon that has been rigged to be fully automatic—meaning one press

of the trigger unleashes a tirade of bullets in rapid succession—it is even more disturbing that

defendant was possessing this highly destructive weapon while driving an automobile that could

not be traced to him. However nonviolent defendant’s criminal record may be, it does not stretch

the imagination at all to believe that, in stopping that car and arresting the three individuals when

they did, the police may have prevented a violent crime from imminently taking place.

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No. 1-23-2503B

¶ 23   We emphasize here that these are only allegations; we are in no way commenting on the

strength of the proof against defendant, who is entitled to the presumption of innocence at trial.

We are only commenting on the conduct as alleged in the State’s proffer, as we are charged to

do. See id. § 110-6.1(f)(2) (parties may proceed by way of proffer). But based on that proffer, the

highly destructive nature of the firearm defendant possessed, as well as those possessed by his

two passengers, and in the context of traveling in a stolen vehicle, takes this case far beyond an

ordinary case of gun possession.

¶ 24   We likewise uphold the finding that no set of conditions could mitigate the risk defendant

posed. The court clearly considered several options, including electronic monitoring and home

confinement, as alternatives to detention and found them wanting. The court took the step of

questioning the representative from pretrial services and concluded that those lesser alternatives

would not be sufficiently effective to promptly bring any violation of those conditions to the

court’s attention. We find no error in that reasoning.

¶ 25   Finally, defendant argues that the court violated the requirement in section 110-6.1(h)(1)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which requires

       “a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant

       should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not

       avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

       based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 26   Defendant argues that the court did not explain in writing why no set of conditions could

mitigate the threat he posed.

¶ 27   True, as we quoted above and reprint here, the written findings themselves regarding

conditions were little more than a reiteration of the findings that went into the determination of

dangerousness: “Defendant was found with a machine gun. He led police on a helicopter chase.

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No. 1-23-2503B

He hit a car. He was in a stolen car with 2 other men with guns.” That does not speak at all to the

question of conditions. Dangerousness and conditions are different factors and deserve separate

consideration. See, e.g., People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 32; People v. Turner,

2024 IL App (1st) 232082-U, ¶ 21; People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 23. We

cannot emphasize enough here, as we have in the other cited cases, that merely reciting the threat

that a defendant poses is not enough, by itself, to demonstrate why not set of conditions would

suffice to mitigate that threat. Trial courts must address those factors separately on pain of

reversal if they do not.

¶ 28   But we do not find a violation of the written-findings requirement here for a different

reason. As we quoted above (see supra ¶¶ 13-14), the trial court orally explained in considerable

detail why alternatives to detention would be unsatisfactory, after taking the unusual step of

questioning the pretrial services representative about those alternatives. And that oral ruling, of

course, was reduced to writing in the report of proceedings.

¶ 29   A recent line of case law has indicated that the court’s oral ruling, if reduced to writing in

a transcript of proceedings (as is typical), should be considered along with the written order and

may suffice, by itself, to satisfy the written-findings requirement as long as the oral findings are

explicit and individualized, thus explaining to defendant the basis for detention and providing

sufficient detail for meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., People v. Andino-Acosta 2024 IL

App (2d) 230463, ¶ 22 (written-findings requirement was satisfied in that “[t]he oral ruling was

explicit and individualized and, read together with its written findings, was sufficient to apprise

the defendant of the reasons for its ruling and to accommodate review under the Act. ***

Remanding this cause so that the trial court could transcribe its oral findings into a written order

would not serve the interests of justice.”); People v. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543, ¶ 11 (no

violation of writing-findings requirement, as transcribed oral ruling was sufficient to permit

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No. 1-23-2503B

meaningful appellate review); Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 31 (written-findings

requirement was violated; “While we agree with the court in Andino-Acosta, a circuit court must

still provide an explanation of its consideration of less restrictive conditions in its verbal ruling

as transcribed or in its written order.” (Emphasis added.)); People v. Staake, 2024 IL App (4th)

231420-U, ¶ 20 (agreeing that transcribed oral findings may be considered with written order but

finding violation of written-findings requirement, as “the court did not make any findings, either

in its oral pronouncement or its written order, as to why conditions of pretrial release could not

mitigate the threat it found defendant posed to the safety of the community”).

¶ 30    Many of these recent appellate decisions have relied on decisions from our supreme

court, which has found that other statutes requiring written findings were satisfied by transcribed

oral rulings that notified the parties of its reasoning and allowed for meaningful appellate review.

In the decision of In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), a juvenile-neglect case, the statute

required the circuit court to make written findings regarding neglect. The supreme court found

that “[e]xplicit oral findings stated during a dispositional hearing advise the parties of the basis

for the removal of the minor and, once transcribed, provide an equal opportunity to review the

validity of the findings on appeal as well as written findings contained in an order.” Id. at 374-

75. To hold otherwise and vacate for lack of a written order “unnecessarily elevates form over

substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not

prejudice the parties.” Id. at 375.

¶ 31   The supreme court reaffirmed this point three years later in the context of a statute

requiring written findings in a termination-of-parental-rights case. See In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d

439, 458-59 (2008) (explaining that, in Madison H., the court noted “that the purpose of the

writing requirement was to give the parties notice of the reasons forming the court’s decision and

to preserve the reasoning for appellate review” and “concluded that those purposes would be

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No. 1-23-2503B

served just as well by explicit oral findings stated during the hearing and then transcribed and

made part of the record. [Citation.] Accordingly, we concluded that where an oral

pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to advise the parties of the court’s reasoning, the

statutory requirement of a written explanation will be satisfied. [Citation.] We believe that

rationale applies with equal force here.”); see also People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 82-83 (1988)

(purpose of written-findings requirement in summarily dismissing postconviction petition is to

facilitate appellate review).

¶ 32   We emphasize that it is only due to the specificity and thoroughness of the trial court’s

oral findings regarding alternatives to detention, later transcribed, that the written-order

requirement of the statute was satisfied here. The oral findings on conditions were more detailed

than what we often see in these cases. We strongly encourage trial courts to provide extensive

written findings, the lack of which will typically result in reversal. See, e.g., People v. Rivas,

2024 IL App (1st) 232364-U, ¶ 25 (trial court gave no written finding whatsoever and record did

not disclose oral findings regarding conditions, either); Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 32

(though agreeing that transcript of extensive oral findings could satisfy written-findings

requirement, reversing detention order because trial court provided neither extensive written nor

oral findings); Staake, 2024 IL App (4th) 231420-U, ¶ 20 (same).

¶ 33   The trial court here clearly considered alternatives to detention and discussed them at

length at the hearing. The transcribed oral ruling provided a more than sufficient basis for

appellate review and explained to defendant the court’s reasoning. It would not serve the ends of

justice to remand this matter simply so the trial court could produce a written motion that

mirrored its thorough oral ruling.

¶ 34   Finding no error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

¶ 35   Affirmed.

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No. 1-23-2503B

                         People v. Vance, 2024 IL App (1st) 232503

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 23-MC-
                              1115108; the Hon. Barbara Dawkins, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Jeffe Yang,
for                           Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                     Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Joseph
for                           Alexander, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Appellee:

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