Court Opinion

ID: 9661322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:35:23.413332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:41.468648
License: Public Domain

ROBERT W. HANSEN, J.
(dissenting). Under the law in this state, one found guilty of first-degree murder “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”1 Under the law in this state, one found guilty of driving an automobile after revocation of license “shall be imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more than one year.”2
*32The one who drives his automobile without a license, the majority would agree, must go to jail. However, the majority holds, the one convicted of first-degree murder need not go to jail. As to the licenseless driver, the trial court may not, under the probation statute,3 stay the jail sentence and place the defendant on probation. However, as to the first-degree murderer, the majority holds that the trial court may, under the same probation statute,4 stay the sentence of life imprisonment and place the defendant on probation for not less than one year.
That the driver must go to jail, but the murderer need not, results, the majority reasons, from a difference in wording as to the mandated penalty as to each crime involved. The driving-without-a-license law provides that the defendant, upon conviction, “shall be imprisoned.” The first-degree murder statute provides that the defendant, upon conviction, “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”
*33Under the driving-without-a-lieense law, it is clear that the sentencing court has no option to stay sentence and place the defendant on probation.5 Under the first-degree murder law, the majority contends the trial court is constrained to impose sentence, but can stay it and place the convicted murderer on probation for a year or more. Thus a sharp distinction is drawn between the meaning of “shall be imprisoned” and “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”
Until the revision of the state criminal code in 1955, the first-degree murder statute provided that one convicted of first-degree murder “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison during the life of the person so convicted.”6 The majority opinion concedes that if it still read that way, a trial judge could not stay sentence and place a convicted first-degree murderer on probation.7 The majority is thus contending that the 1955 change from “shall be punished by imprisonment” to “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment” resulted in giving trial judges the option, heretofore denied them, to stay sentence and place the convicted first-degree murderer on probation for at least a year.
This is one construction as to the change made and its consequences. It is based on a complete separation be*34tween the imposition of sentence, and the staying thereof to put a defendant on probation. This construction completely equates “sentenced to life imprisonment” with the imposition of the sentence, not with the sentencing process, with a stay for probation purposes no part of being “sentenced.” As the majority puts it, under the changed statute, “Sentence is mandated, but not imprisonment.” That is one construction of the change effected, but the writer submits it is only one.
Equally reasonable is the construction of the phrase “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment” as referring to the sentencing process — consideration of the probation alternative as an integral part of the sentencing phase— rather than as something a judge reaches after imposing sentence. This unitary approach to consideration of probation or incarceration as part of a single process is evident in the case of Anderson v. State8 recently decided by this court.
There our court was asked to establish or recognize a criteria for the withholding of sentence or staying of sentence to grant probation different than that for the period of incarceration deemed appropriate by the trial court. We rejected any separation between the sentence imposed and a finding that probation is appropriate, or any different criteria to be met as to either, holding: “Rejection of probation is a necessary predicate to a determination that incarceration is required in a particular case.”9 As to the intertwining of considerations of probation and incarceration as sentencing alternatives, this court said:
“It.would not make sense to have one standard fpr the-exercise of discretion as to the granting of probation and another and different standard for the exercise of judicial discretion as to the appropriate period of incarceration. *35These are not two sides of a single coin. They are part of the same side of the same coin — the determination of the appropriate disposition.”10
It ought not be considered an unreasonable construction of the changed 1955 first-degree murder statute that the legislature, in the exercise of legislative discretion, considered rejection of probation as “a necessary predicate” to requiring that convicted first-degree murderers “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” The legislature, as did this court, could consider rejecting probation and fixing an appropriate period of confinement as “part of the same side of the same coin — the determination of the appropriate disposition.” The change made in the 1955 revision is capable of being understood in either of two senses, and this being so, “. . . resort to matters outside the face of the statute is permitted to determine the meaning thereof, primarily for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent.”11
Since there are two reasonable constructions of the substituted phrase, “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment,” we thus go to the legislative history to determine the legislative intent. Here that is a brief trip. The majority opinion correctly states: “Both the state and the defendant agree that on the issue presented here the draftsmen of C. 696, Laws of 1955, the Criminal Code, intended no change from prior law.” At least for the purpose of argument, defendant accepted “the first conclusion which the State draws from the 1955 Legislation, that is, the Legislature did not intend to change the *36penalty for first degree murder or the operation of that penalty.”12
The position of the state, stated in its brief, is that the legislature . . did not intend to change either the penalty or the operation of that penalty in the revision.”13 The legislative history makes clear that, as to the penalty for life imprisonment, “No change intended.”14 The major change effected by the 1955 revision was the elimination of minimum sentences, changing “shall” to “may,” as to most crimes, but not as to first-degree murder. An early draft of proposed revisions did suggest the substitution of “may” for “shall,” but this was rejected long before the proposal reached the legislature. Actually, only two statutes, first-degree murder and kidnapping for ransom,15 retained the “shall” mandate, both involving mandatory sentencing to life imprisonment. 16
*37Thus there is no basis in the legislative history of the 1955 revision for even contending that the legislature intended any change in the penalty as to nonavailability of probation when it substituted “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment” for “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison during the life of the person so convicted.” Neither party on this appeal contends that any change was intended, and there is no basis in the legislative history for so contending.
Having established the relevant legislative intent in making the 1955 substitution of phraseology, i.e., “no change intended,” it follows that the substitute phrase “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment,” is to be construed as having the same meaning as its predecessor phrase “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison during the life of the person so convicted.”
This construction is further supported by the rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be construed so as to work absurd or unreasonable results.17 If not absurd, the result under the majority opinion is at least unreasonable that a trial judge has two alternatives in the determination of an appropriate penalty for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder: (1) Incarceration for life, or (2) sentence stayed, and defendant placed on probation for at least a year.
*38The 1955 Criminal Code revision reflects in considerable measure the thinking of advocates of indeterminate sentencing. Except as to first-degree murder, second-degree murder and kidnapping for ransom, minimum sentences were abolished and “shall” changed to “may” to give trial courts a broad area of discretion in the selection of an appropriate sentencing disposition. However even the most fervent advocate of indeterminate sentencing must blanch at the result of limiting alternative dispositions of a case to life imprisonment on the one hand, or probation for a year or more, on the other, with intermediate alternative dispositions excluded. Placing two alternatives as to disposition at opposite ends of the severity spectrum makes little sense, whether one believes in the concept of indeterminate sentencing or the idea of determinate penalties for transgressions.
Having construed the 1955 revision that “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment” has the same meaning as its predecessor, “shall be punished by imprisonment,” the holding of this court in Duffy18 applies and controls. There the court considered the general probation statute providing that when a defendant is convicted of any misdemeanor, the court may, by order, “. . . impose sentence and stay its execution, and . . . place him on probation. . . .”19 Despite this general provision the court in Duffy held that the mandatory penalty “shall be imprisoned” made imposition of sentence and stay inappropriate, and required that the defendant convicted of driving-without-a-license be sentenced to confinement in the county jail for the minimum period of incarceration statutorily mandated.
In the case before us, the general probation statute similarly provides that when a defendant is convicted of any felony, the court may, by order “. . . impose sentence and stay its execution and . . . place him on probation. *39. . .” Despite such general provision, since “shall he sentenced to life imprisonment” is construed to mean “shall be punished by imprisonment,” the first-degree murder statute here requires that one convicted of first-degree murder be sentenced, without stay of execution and granting of probation, to life imprisonment.
What is held in Duffy as to misdemeanors applies to felonies as well. The reason in both situations is the same. As stated in the Duffy decision, “. . . a specific statutory provision will prevail over a general provision in the penal code relating to the same subject matter.”20 The general provisions of the probation statute do not control where “. . . express language of the penalty provisions of the present statute requires that a person convicted under this section be subject to imprisonment.”21 To hold in a first-degree murder case that the trial court may nevertheless “. . . withhold the sentence or impose the sentence and stay its execution pursuant to sec. 973.09” would, exactly as Duffy held as to driving-without-a-license, “. . . do violence to principles of statutory construction and would contravene the intent of the legislature.”22
Accordingly, the trial court orders appealed from should be reversed and the stayed sentence and grant of probation set aside. The writer would then remand the *40case for imposition of the statutorily mandated sentence —life imprisonment.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice LEO B. HANLEY joins in this dissent.

 See. 343.44, Stats., providing: “Driving after license revoked or suspended. . . .
“(2) Any person violating this section may be fined not less than $100 nor more than $400 and shall be imprisoned not less *32than 10 days nor more than one year in the county jail, except that if a person violates this section after having had his operating privilege revoked because of a conviction of any of the offenses mentioned in s. 343.31, he shall be imprisoned not less than 10 days nor more than one year in the county jail for the first violation of this section and shall be imprisoned not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail for the 2nd such violation and shall be imprisoned for one year in the county jail for the 3rd and each subsequent violation. . . .”

 See. 973.09, Stats., providing in part: “Probation. (1) When a person is convicted of a crime, the court may, by order, withhold sentence or impose sentence and stay its execution, and in either case place him on probation to the department for a stated period. . . .
“(2) The original term of probation shall be:
“(a) For misdemeanors, not less than 6 months, nor more than 2 years; . . .”

 Sec. 973.09(2) (b), Stats., continuing: “(b) For felonies, not less than one year nor more than either the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for the crime or 3 years whichever is greater.” [In the instant case, the probation term was fifteen years. It could have been one year under the rationale of the majority opinion.]

 See: State v. Duffy, 54 Wis.2d 61, 65, 194 N.W.2d 624 (1972), holding that the driving-without-a-lieense law “. . . left the trial court with no alternative but to impose a sentence of not less than five days upon a person convicted of a violation of this section of the statutes.” See also: State v. Sittig, 75 Wis.2d 497, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977).

 Sec. 340.02, Stats., the predecessor statute, reads: “Murder, first degree. Such killing, when perpetrated from premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any human being, shall be murder in the first degree; and the person who shall be convicted of the same shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison during the life of the person so convicted.”

 See: Majority opinion, distinguishing State v. Duffy, supra, n. 5: “The first-degree murder statute does not say ‘shall be imprisoned’ but rather ‘shall be sentenced.’ For this reason, Duffy and the instant case are distinguishable.”

 76 Wis.2d 361, 251 N.W.2d 768 (1977).

 Id. at 366.

 Id. at 366. See also: Prue v. State, 63 Wis.2d 109, 116, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974), holding: “. . . it is true that the word ‘sentence’ or ‘sentencing’ may be and often is used in a more general sense than we have concluded it is used in secs. 53.43 and 973.09.

 Edelman v. State, 62 Wis.2d 613, 619, 215 N.W.2d 386 (1974).

 Defendant in Error-Respondent Brief, page 15.

 Plaintiff in Error-Appellant Brief, page 15.

 Legislative Council Technical Staff, in 1954 compilation stating:
“340.02 (first-degree murder statute number in early draft before renumbered to 340.01) No change intended. Present 340.02 is restated in sec. 340.01 of the proposed code .... [Emphasis supplied.]
“ ‘No change intended’ is used to indicate that the purpose of the code draft is not to effect a change in the scope of criminal liability and that the new section is a substantial restatement of the present law.” [Emphasis supplied.] (Digest of chs. 340 and 343, Stats. 1951, prepared by the Legislative Council Technical Staff for the Criminal Code Advisory Committee, January 29, 1954.)

 See. 940.31(2), Stats., providing: “(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) [kidnapping by force or threat of imminent force] with intent to cause another to transfer property in order to obtain the release of the victim shall be sentenced to life imprisonment; but if his victim is released without permanent physical injury prior to the time the first witness is sworn at the trial the defendant may be imprisoned not more than 30 years.”

 Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 355, the author stating: “The second objective is accomplished principally *37by eliminating nearly all minimum penalties. (The only exceptions in the code are first-degree murder and kidnapping for ransom (minimum of life) and second-degree murder (minimum of 5 years). Code §§940.01, 940.02, 940.31 (2).) ”
And at 382, 383: “It will be observed that penalty provisions in the code invariably say the offender ‘may be fined . . . ,’ except where the penalty is life imprisonment. The permissive ‘may’ was used instead of the mandatory ‘shall’ because of the probation law which makes it inaccurate to say the offender ‘shall’ be fined or imprisoned or both.”

 Estate of Evans, 28 Wis.2d 97, 101, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965), citing Isaksen v. Chesapeake Instrument Corp., 19 Wis.2d 282, 120 N.W.2d 151 (1963); Teamsters Union Local 695 v. Waukesha County, 57 Wis.2d 62, 69, 203 N.W.2d 707 (1973).

 State v. Duffy, supra, n. 5.

 Id. at 64, quoting relevant portions of sec. 973.09, Stats.

 Id. at 64, citing State ex rel. Gutbrod v. Wolke, 49 Wis.2d 736, 183 N.W.2d 161 (1971).

 Id. at 64, the court adding at 65: “The legislature has enacted but few statutory provisions comparable to the one in the instant ease, which expressly provide that a person convicted thereunder ‘shall be imprisoned.’ If probation were to be available in either case, the legislature would have no purpose in employing the word ‘may’ in some cases, and the word ‘shall’ in others.”

 Id. at 64, the court concluding at 65, that: “We arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the legislature left the trial court with no alternative but to impose a sentence of not less than five days upon a person convicted of a violation of this section of the statutes.” (Referring to sec. 343.44(2), Stats.)