Court Opinion

ID: 9850748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:21.060773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.766997
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority holds that a criminal defense attorney’s misinformation regarding the effect of a guilty plea on a defendant’s civil remedies may be ineffective assistance of counsel requiring the withdrawal of the defendant’s plea. I believe the majority’s opinion is an expansion of People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo.1987) (attorney’s failure to advise a client of potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel), sig-nalling an open invitation for defendants to challenge guilty pleas based on any number of collateral consequences. In my view, the majority elevates the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the sixth amendment beyond its intended purpose and will result in an impossible burden. Accordingly, I dissent.
The defendant was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and two counts of committing a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty to a charge of accessory to commit first degree assault in exchange for dismissal of the other counts. In so pleading, the defendant signed a written acknowledgement that his attorney had advised him of his rights, that he understood by pleading guilty he waived certain constitutional rights, that he understood the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty, that he understood the possible penalties applicable to his plea, and that his plea was voluntary. The defendant later filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c), alleging that, in response to his inquiries, defense counsel had misinformed him that a guilty plea would not jeopardize his ability to bring a civil claim related to his arrest and criminal prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant had not established that he had been prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether defense counsel’s conduct “fell below acceptable standards” and whether the defendant was prejudiced. People v. Garcia, 799 P.2d 413, 415 (Colo.App.1990).
When a conviction is attacked by means of a Crim.P. 35(c) motion, “the legality of the judgment and the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the judgment are presumed. The burden is upon the defendant to establish by at least the preponderance of the evidence the allegations” of the motion. Lamb v. People, 174 Colo. 441, *945446, 484 P.2d 798, 800 (1971) (citations omitted). The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea was made voluntarily and knowingly. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391, 393 (Colo.1985). Thus, the defendant in the present case must show that defense counsel’s performance was constitutionally inadequate so as to render his plea involuntary. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established the standards for determining whether “[defense] counsel’s assistance was so defective” as to constitute a denial of the defendant’s sixth amendment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the Court held that the two-part test applied to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
In its explanation of this test, the Strickland Court made several critical statements regarding the sixth amendment guarantee that bear on the case presented to this court. Throughout the opinion, the Court reiterated that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is deemed necessary to ensure that fairness predominates in the adversarial system so that just results are attained. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. at 2063. Hence, “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. In deciding the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct, the court should be mindful that it is counsel’s function “to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case,” and “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In advising that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, the Court cautioned that
[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.... Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.
Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Thus, “[c]ourts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.” Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.
In my view, by opening the Pandora’s box of collateral consequences with today’s opinion, the majority of this court ignores Strickland’s caution by imposing an unreasonable burden on defense counsel to the detriment of our criminal justice system. Moreover, the majority’s holding to include advice on the collateral consequences of guilty pleas among the constitutional guarantees of an accused contradicts “the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370.
In his dissent to Pozo, Chief Justice Rovi-ra noted that the purpose served by a Crim.P. 11 proceeding is to ensure that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty to the crime for which he is charged, and an ineffectiveness of counsel challenge to a guilty plea is relevant only in relation to the defendant’s voluntariness and understanding in pleading guilty. Pozo, 746 P.2d at 531 (Rovira, J., dissenting). A plea is knowing and voluntary, and thus devoid of constitutional infirmity, when the defendant is fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea; that is, those having a “ ‘definite, immediate, and *946largely automatic effect on the range of [a defendant’s] punishment.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 106, 589 P.2d 931, 933 (1979) (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973))). Indeed, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the United States Supreme Court explicitly stated that “[a] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences” is valid, id. at 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1472 (emphasis added), regardless of whether counsel failed to advise the defendant of the numerous collateral consequences of pleading guilty.
Direct consequences relate strictly to sentencing, whereas collateral consequences are many and conceivably beyond the legitimate sphere of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise. They may include the loss of civil service employment, the right to vote, the ability to travel freely abroad, exclusion from military service, as well as adverse social consequences. See generally J. Bond, Plea Bargaining & Guilty Pleas §§ 3.38-49 (2d ed. 1983). While each of these results may have a harsh impact on a defendant, I agree with those jurisdictions denying that defendants have a constitutional right to be informed of such collateral consequences. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C.Cir.1990); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir.1976); Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir.1971); Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C.Cir.1963); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So.2d 990, 990-91 (Ala.Crim.App.1989); State v. Casseus, 513 So.2d 1045, 1045 (Fla.1987); Clark v. State, 736 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Mo.App.1987); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 553, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (1989); State v. Santos, 136 Wis.2d 528, 530, 401 N.W.2d 856, 858 (App.1987). In my view, a defendant’s constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel is fulfilled when that defendant is made fully aware of the direct consequences of pleading guilty. Thus, a voluntary and knowing plea does not require knowledge of collateral consequences, for “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation,” but simply to ensure that fairness prevails in criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Accordingly, in the present case, the trial court was only required to determine if the defendant was fully aware of the direct consequences of pleading guilty to the charge of accessory to commit first degree assault. That he understood and voluntarily agreed to those consequences is evidenced by his signing the written acknowl-edgement. The defendant does not attack his counsel’s advice on the direct effect of his guilty plea. Instead, the defendant’s sole ground for vacating his conviction was his attorney’s advice on the collateral consequence of a guilty plea on his civil case. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice ERICKSON join in this dissent.