Court Opinion

ID: 9898185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:01.687243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:11.527311
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        No. 84763-5-I

                            Respondent,      DIVISION ONE

               v.
                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 ROBERT R D CALLIOUX,

                            Appellant.

       SMITH, C.J. — Robert Callioux appeals his convictions of one count of

rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first

degree for abusing his daughter, M.R.Y. He argues the trial court committed

evidentiary error and deprived him of his right to present a defense by ruling in

limine that the State could cross-examine one of Callioux’s potential witnesses,

D.C., about specific instances of dishonesty if she were to testify. He also

argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling D.C. to testify.

       Because D.C. did not testify, Callioux’s claim of evidentiary error is not

reviewable. Also, Callioux fails to establish that the trial court’s in limine ruling

deprived him of his right to present his defense or that his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                         FACTS

       In July 2019, M.R.Y., who was then 16 years old, disclosed that her father,

Callioux, had sexually abused her when she was a child. M.R.Y. later testified
No. 84763-5-I/2

that the abuse began when she was four or five years old and stopped when she

was about nine-and-a-half years old. M.R.Y., who resided primarily with her

mother, recalled that the abuse would occur at night in Callioux’s bedroom during

M.R.Y.’s alternating weekend visitations to Callioux’s apartment.

       The State charged Callioux with one count of rape of a child in the first

degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree. It later moved in

limine to cross-examine one of Callioux’s potential witnesses, D.C., about

specific instances of dishonesty, which were the subject of pending charges for

theft, false statements, and false reporting, if D.C. were to testify. According to

the State’s motion, D.C., who is M.R.Y.’s cousin and Callioux’s niece,

“purport[ed] to have been at [Callioux’s] home every weekend [M.R.Y.] was

there” and “state[d] that because she was present every weekend [M.R.Y.] was

present that [Callioux] could not possibly have sexually abused [M.R.Y.]” It

asserted that D.C.’s credibility was “important and at issue,” that the State should

be allowed to cross-examine her “about her instances of dishonesty pending

currently in the courts,” and that those instances were “highly relevant . . . and

more probative than prejudicial.”

       Callioux objected, arguing through counsel that “on pending cases that

have not been adjudicated, we would suggest that they’re not appropriate for

specific instances and use by the State.” The trial court disagreed and granted

the State’s motion, stating, “I think these are examples of instances of evidence

that would fall under [ER] 608.”

                                             2
No. 84763-5-I/3

       At trial, Callioux did not call D.C. to testify. M.R.Y. testified that although

her cousins would come over to Callioux’s apartment occasionally during the

years that he was abusing her, they did not come over every weekend that she

visited Callioux. Meanwhile, one of Callioux’s sisters testified that she could

verify that M.R.Y. was never alone with Callioux during any of the times M.R.Y.

visited him. Another of his sisters—D.C.’s mother—testified that D.C. was with

M.R.Y. every weekend, including overnights, that M.R.Y. visited Callioux.

       The jury found Callioux guilty as charged. Callioux appeals.

                                      ANALYSIS

                                    ER 608 Ruling

       ER 608 provides, as relevant here, that specific instances of a witness’s

conduct “may . . . in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or

untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness . . .

concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” ER 608(b).

ER 608 is subject to the overriding protections of ER 403, which gives the trial

court discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Wilson, 60 Wn. App. 887, 893, 808 P.2d 754

(1991). Callioux contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that if

D.C. testified, the State could cross-examine her about her pending criminal

charges for theft, false statements, and false reporting. We hold that because

D.C. did not testify, the trial court’s ruling is not reviewable.

       State v. Kimp, 87 Wn. App. 281, 941 P.2d 714 (1997), is instructive. In

Kimp, the State moved under ER 608(b) to cross-examine a witness—there, the

                                                3
No. 84763-5-I/4

defendant—about her alleged unauthorized use of a credit card if she testified.

87 Wn. App. at 282. The trial court ruled in limine that the prosecutor could

question the defendant about whether she told the police about the incident,

wherein she allegedly took her supervisor’s credit card without permission and

used it in several stores, signing her supervisor’s name. Id. The defendant

stated that she was not going to testify because of the trial court’s ruling. Id. She

also made an offer of proof claiming that she would have testified, with regard to

the assaults that were the subject of her trial, that she did not hit one of the

victims and that she struck the other in self defense. Id. at 282-83.

       The defendant was convicted of assault, and on appeal, she challenged

the trial court’s ER 608 ruling. Id. at 283. We held that because the defendant

did not testify, the trial court’s ruling was not reviewable. Id. at 284-85. We

observed that, as noted above, “in order to admit ER 608 evidence, the court

must balance the probative value of the conduct against the danger of undue

prejudice.” Id. at 284. And “[t]o evaluate the danger of undue prejudice posed by

prior misconduct evidence, the trial court needs to consider the substance of the

witness’ testimony.” Id. “Similarly, to evaluate the trial court’s decision, the

appellate court needs to review both the witness’ testimony and the impeaching

evidence,” and “there cannot be any meaningful review of a[n] ER 608(b) claim

unless the witness has testified.” Id. We noted, additionally, that “the failure of

the defendant to testify renders any harm flowing from the ruling totally

speculative because it would be uncertain whether the impeaching evidence

                                              4
No. 84763-5-I/5

would even be offered.” Id. (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 105 S.

Ct. 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984)).

       Here, as in Kimp, the fact that D.C. did not testify renders any harm

flowing from the trial court’s in limine ruling entirely speculative. Without D.C.’s

testimony, we cannot know how her cross-examination would have played out.

For example, and as the parties’ disagreement on this point highlights, the record

is unclear about whether the State intended to ask D.C. whether she had been

charged with certain offenses, as distinct from inquiring about the underlying

conduct. To this end, the State suggested below that the precise nature of its

cross-examination could be discussed at a later time “in terms of what’s

appropriate and doesn’t make it more prejudicial than necessary.” It is entirely

possible that, depending on the State’s actual line of questioning, Callioux would

have renewed his objection and the trial court would have revised its ruling or

directed the State to ask only specific questions after balancing the probative

value of D.C.’s alleged conduct against the potential for unfair prejudice. Cf.

Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 457, 466, 232 P.3d

591 (2010) (observing that motions in limine “often are tentative and subject to

change at trial”). It is also possible that the State would elect not to question

D.C. about her pending charges and instead rely solely on two prior theft

convictions, which Callioux agreed were admissible, to call D.C.’s credibility into

question. As in Kimp, we cannot meaningfully evaluate the trial court’s ruling in

view of D.C.’s actual testimony. Thus, as in Kimp, we do not review Callioux’s

claim of evidentiary error.

                                              5
No. 84763-5-I/6

       Callioux contends Kimp was wrongly decided because it failed to consider

State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991). Ray involved a trial court

ruling excluding exculpatory evidence. 116 Wn.2d at 543. Under ER 103(a)(2),

to preserve error predicated on such a ruling, “the substance of the evidence

[must be] made known to the court by offer or [be] apparent from the context

within which questions were asked.” The Ray court held that although the

defendant did not make a formal offer of proof about the witness’s anticipated

testimony, no formal offer was necessary “because the colloquy of the parties

and the court, on the record, revealed the substance of the proposed testimony.”

116 Wn.2d at 539. Callioux argues that similarly, here, D.C.’s testimony that she

was at Callioux’s home each weekend that M.R.Y. was there “was known to both

parties, and to the trial court to a degree sufficient to allow review.”

       But Callioux focuses on the wrong aspect of D.C.’s would-be testimony.

The trial court here did not, as the trial court did in Ray, exclude any of D.C.’s

anticipated exculpatory testimony. Instead, it ruled that if Callioux were to elicit

that testimony, the State would be allowed to cross-examine D.C. about her

character for truthfulness by asking her about specific instances of conduct. It is

the unknown nature of that cross-examination—not of D.C.’s testimony about her

presence at Callioux’s home—that makes Callioux’s claim of error unreviewable.

Ray does not control.1

       1 In his reply brief, Callioux urges us to adopt the reasoning of a North

Carolina case, State v. Lamb, wherein the trial court denied the defendant’s
motion in a murder trial to prevent the prosecutor from questioning her about her
alleged involvement in other killings. 321 N.C. 633, 636, 365 S.E.2d 600 (1988).
But the Lamb court “express[ed] no opinion” on whether the defendant’s decision

                                               6
No. 84763-5-I/7

                             Right to Present a Defense

       Callioux also argues that the trial court’s ruling in limine deprived him of

his right to present a defense. In support, Callioux relies on State v. Broussard,

25 Wn. App. 2d 781, 525 P.3d 615 (2023), State v. Chicas Carballo, 17 Wn. App.

2d 337, 486 P.3d 142 (2021), State v. Cox, 17 Wn. App. 2d 178, 484 P.3d 529

(2021), State v. Orn, 197 Wn.2d 343, 482 P.3d 913 (2021), State v. Cayetano-

Jaimes, 190 Wn. App. 286, 359 P.3d 919 (2015), and State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d

713, 230 P.3d 576 (2010). But each of these cases involved a ruling that

excluded or prevented the defense from eliciting certain testimony. See

Broussard, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 785; Chicas Carballo, 17 Wn. App. 2d 345; Cox,

17 Wn. App. 2d at 185; Orn, 197 Wn.2d at 351-52; Cayetano-Jaimes, 190 Wn.

App. at 303-04; Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 717-18. Here, by contrast, the trial court’s

ruling did not exclude any of D.C.’s testimony or prevent Callioux from eliciting

that D.C. was with M.R.Y. every weekend that M.R.Y. was with Callioux. As

much as Callioux urges us to treat the trial court’s ruling here as a “constructive”

exclusion of D.C.’s testimony, it was not. Cf. Cayetano-Jaimes, 190 Wn. App. at

302, 304 (characterizing as exclusionary the denial of a motion to allow

not to testify rendered the trial court’s ruling unreviewable, instead granting the
defendant a new trial where it was “abundantly clear from the record . . . that
defendant intended to testify unless her motion in limine was denied” and the
evidence at issue was inadmissible under ER 608(b) because it “show[ed]
specific instances of conduct relating to violence against other persons” and,
thus, was “irrelevant to defendant’s veracity.” Lamb, 321 N.C. at 646-48. Here,
Callioux does not point to anything in the record to show that D.C. would have
testified if not for the trial court’s ruling, and it is undisputed that D.C.’s at-issue
conduct was probative of her veracity. Not only is Lamb not binding, it is readily
distinguishable.

                                               7
No. 84763-5-I/8

telephonic testimony where there was no dispute about the witness’s

unavailability to appear in court). Callioux fails to show that the trial court’s ruling

deprived him of his right to present a defense.

                          Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Finally, Callioux argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. We

disagree.

       The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1,

section 22 of the Washington State Constitution guarantee the right to effective

assistance of counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868, 873, 16

P.3d 601 (2001). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant

must establish that (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) the

deficiency prejudiced him. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177

(2009). “Because both prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test must

be met, the failure to demonstrate either prong will end our inquiry.” State v.

Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 2d 201, 210, 460 P.3d 1091 (2020).

       Here, Callioux argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling

D.C. as a witness. “To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a

defendant . . . must overcome ‘a strong presumption that counsel’s performance

was reasonable.’ ” State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)

(quoting Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862). “A decision not to call a witness is a matter of

trial tactics that generally will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” State v. Krause, 82 Wn. App. 688, 697-98, 919 P.2d 123 (1996). But

“a criminal defendant can rebut the presumption of reasonable performance by

                                               8
No. 84763-5-I/9

demonstrating that ‘there is no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel’s

performance.’ ” Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33 (quoting State v. Reichenbach, 153

Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004)).

       Callioux does not rebut the presumption that counsel’s decision not to call

D.C. as a witness was a reasonable one. As Callioux himself acknowledges, the

record does not reveal why defense counsel did not call D.C. to the stand. And

“we will not presume deficient performance from a silent record.” State v. Heng,

22 Wn. App. 2d 717, 744, 512 P.3d 942 (2022), review granted in part, 200

Wn.2d 1025 (2023). Although Callioux asserts that “[t]here was no downside to

presenting [D.C.’s] testimony,” we cannot know that from this record. As the

State points out, it is conceivable that counsel reasonably determined that D.C.

would not present as credible. It is also conceivable that defense counsel had

reason to believe D.C.’s recollection about her weekends with M.R.Y. was not as

unwavering as Callioux represents it would have been.2 In either case, it is

further conceivable that defense counsel reasonably believed putting D.C. on the

stand would undermine D.C.’s mother’s and aunt’s testimony in that regard. On

this record, Callioux does not rule out conceivable tactical reasons to explain

counsel’s decision. Consequently, his ineffective assistance claim fails. Cf.

State v. Linville, 191 Wn.2d 513, 525, 423 P.3d 842 (2018) (ineffective

assistance claim failed where record was silent as to counsel’s reasons for not

       2 We note that the record does not include a sworn statement or
testimony from D.C., and that according to the certification of probable cause,
D.C. stated during her interview that “she would pretty much spend the night with
[M.R.Y.] almost every other weekend when [M.R.Y.] was with [Callioux].”
(Emphasis added.)

                                            9
No. 84763-5-I/10

objecting and, thus, it was impossible to tell whether any hypothesis as to

counsel’s reasons was correct).

       Callioux cites a number of cases in support of reversal but they each

involved counsel’s uninformed decision not to call a witness or, in one case, a

decision that was unreasonable because it was based on an actual conflict of

interest. See State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 345, 352 P.3d 776 (2015) (counsel

failed to interview clearly identified and accessible witnesses); State v. Robinson,

79 Wn. App. 386, 399, 902 P.2d 652 (1995) (counsel decided not to call a

witness, whom he also represented, due to an actual conflict of interest); State v.

Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 230-31, 743 P.2d 816 (1987) (counsel failed to

investigate his own expert’s qualifications, which investigation would have

revealed were lacking); State v. Byrd, 30 Wn. App. 794, 799, 638 P.2d 601

(1981) (counsel failed to interview a witness); State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256,

264, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978) (counsel “made virtually no factual investigation” and

“admit[ted] he was unprepared for trial”). Callioux does not show that counsel’s

decision not to call D.C. was uninformed or the result of a conflict of interest.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

                                             10