Court Opinion

ID: 9401198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 09:09:57.080905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.267556
License: Public Domain

In the
          Court of Appeals
  Second Appellate District of Texas
           at Fort Worth
       ___________________________
            No. 02-20-00051-CV
       ___________________________

BUILDER RECOVERY SERVICES LLC, Appellant

                      V.

 THE TOWN OF WESTLAKE, TEXAS, Appellee

    On Appeal from the 236th District Court
            Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 236-304811-18

    Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion on Remand by Justice Bassel
                  MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

                                   I. Introduction

      This appeal involves ordinances enacted by Appellee The Town of Westlake,

Texas, that imposed on commercial solid waste operators, such as Appellant Builder

Recovery Services LLC (BRS), a license requirement and a license fee calculated on a

percentage of the licensee’s gross revenue. This is our second opinion in this matter.

In our prior opinion, we held that the Town was empowered to require a license of

commercial solid waste operators and that the power to require a license was not

preempted by state law. See Builder Recovery Servs. LLC v. Town of Westlake (BRS I), 640

S.W.3d 543, 560–69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021) (mem. op.), overruled by Builder

Recovery Servs., LLC v. Town of Westlake (BRS II), 650 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2022). We held

that the issue of the propriety of the license fee was moot. Id. at 570–72. The Texas

Supreme Court granted review of our judgment and held that the issue of the

propriety of the license fee was not moot and then held that the Town lacked the

power to impose a license fee calculated on the basis of BRS’s gross revenues. BRS

II, 650 S.W.3d at 503–04. The Texas Supreme Court remanded the appeal to us to

determine whether the licensing provisions in the Town’s ordinances were severable

from the invalidated license fee and thus whether the licensing provisions survived the

Texas Supreme Court’s holding. Id. at 507–08.

      We ordered rebriefing on remand, and BRS raised five issues.            The first

contends that one of the Town’s ordinances should be invalidated in its entirety as

                                           2
well as portions of another. We hold that certain provisions of the ordinances

requiring a license that are challenged by BRS are not severable from the license-fee

provisions and thus do not survive the Texas Supreme Court’s invalidation of the

license fee. The disposition of the first issue obviates the need to reach BRS’s second,

third, and fourth issues. 1 We also sustain BRS’s fifth issue that seeks a remand to the

trial court on the issue of attorney’s fees; the parties agree that events that have

occurred since the trial court’s initial fee award require a remand to address how those

events have impacted the trial court’s original fee award.

                      II. Factual and Procedural Background

      Our prior opinion and that of the Texas Supreme Court thoroughly outline the

facts of the controversy. We will not rehash those prior writings and will only give a

bullet-point description of the underlying facts. In addition, and to give context to

the evolution of the issues and our holding in this opinion, we will summarize the

holdings of our prior opinion in this matter and that of the Texas Supreme Court.

      A.     We set forth the underlying facts relevant to this opinion on
             remand from the Texas Supreme Court.

      The underlying facts relevant to the question of severability between the

licensing provisions of the Town’s ordinances and the license fee contained in those

ordinances are as follows:

      1
        The Texas Supreme Court indicated that the matters raised in the second,
third, and fourth issues would need to be addressed only if we concluded that the
provisions of the ordinances were severable. See BRS II, 650 S.W.3d at 507–08.

                                           3
•   BRS is in the business of hauling away construction waste from

    homebuilders’ work sites.

•   BRS raised an issue with the Town regarding whether Republic Services,

    the franchised waste hauler for the Town, would have the exclusive right

    to remove the construction waste that BRS was also in the business of

    hauling and whether “the Town ha[d] the authority to mandate private

    contracts of construction waste hauling on private property.”

•   BRS had a workshop with the Town council about providing

    construction waste services to builders, and the council directed Town

    staff to discuss possible amendments to solid waste ordinances to

    address the issues raised by BRS. Discussions ensued, and Town staff

    indicated that if BRS would acquiesce to voluntary license participation,

    the staff would recommend a 3% license fee. When BRS did not agree

    to the fee, BRS’s representative stated, “[Town staff] were going to pass

    the ordinance as drafted in that form at the time with a fee that would be

    higher than Republic’s, which ended up being 15 percent.”

•   BRS claimed that it had objected to both the Town’s indication that it

    would accord BRS special treatment and the Town’s assertion that it had

    the authority to charge a license fee based on a percentage of gross

    revenue.

                                 4
      •      The Town eventually enacted Ordinance No. 851 that amended the

             Town’s solid waste ordinances, which are found in Chapter 74 of its

             Code of Ordinances. See Westlake, Tex., Ordinance 851 (Apr. 30, 2018);

             Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, §§ 74-41–74-48, 74-

             50 (2002), https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_

             ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWARE

             MAOP.2 This ordinance contained a license fee calculated at 15% of the

             waste hauler’s gross revenue for waste collected within the Town.

      •      In our prior opinion, we described the other operative features of

             Ordinance No. 851 that were incorporated into Chapter 74 as follows:

                   The ordinance not only contained the license fee but also
                   regulated several aspects of how the companies that
                   obtained a commercial solid waste operator license were to
                   conduct their business and to provide information to the
                   Town. See generally id. § 74-46. The various other features
                   of the ordinance included the following:

                          • “[I]t shall be the mandatory duty of any person
                          owning or having control over any property where
                          construction requiring a building permit is taking
                          place and where the construction is being performed
                          in relation to a residential structure . . . , prior to the
                          start of construction, to place upon the property a
                          dumpster, provided by the [T]own’s franchised or
                          licensed waste collector” and to place various items
                          of waste in it. Id. § 74-5(a).

      2
       The electronic version of the Town’s ordinances states that it is current as of
January 19, 2023.

                                           5
                 • The dumpster should be placed in a location where
                 it is screened from public view and “removed from
                 the building site immediately upon the completion of
                 construction.” Id.

                 • Licensees are to label their vehicles and containers
                 with the license number issued by the Town, to
                 maintain their vehicles and containers, to prevent
                 spills or leaks, to clean up spills or leaks, and to
                 maintain insurance. See id. § 74-46(a), (c), (d), (e), (g).

                 • Licensees are required to maintain their Town
                 licenses, maintain certain records, permit the Town
                 to examine their records, and to submit reports
                 detailing the amount of waste collected, where it was
                 disposed of, and the amount disposed of; the
                 revenue generated; and the names of customers and
                 the services provided to them. See id. § 74-46 (i), (j),
                 (k), (l).

    BRS I, 640 S.W.3d at 549–50.

•   Once the ordinance was implemented, BRS challenged the Town’s

    authority to require a license and to charge a license fee. The Town

    defended the fee as being a recoupment of administrative expenses—a

    claim that BRS also challenged. BRS’s representative claimed that when

    he had asked Town staff what the basis was for coming up with the

    license fee, he was told that there was none. And both before and after

    enactment of the ordinance, the Town prepared no estimate of the cost

    to administer the licensing provisions of the ordinance.

                                  6
•   The Town’s representative later testified that the license fee for

    temporary construction waste haulers was designed to cover the

    administrative and oversight costs of solid waste services. In addition,

    the fee was designed to address damage to the Town’s streets. The

    representative acknowledged that the Town had done no investigation

    with respect to BRS’s on-site activities. Indeed, the following occurred

    in an exchange between BRS’s counsel and the representative:

          Q. And the -- there’s really no administrative cost per se,
          right, because it’s really that -- other than accepting money
          through checks, there’s no real administration at this point,
          right?

                 A. No.

    The representative testified that if there were a spill from a BRS

    dumpster, the Town would investigate the spill, but the representative

    was unaware of any spills by a BRS vehicle.

•   BRS’s counsel also examined the Town’s representative at trial about

    information contained on         the Town’s     website   regarding the

    requirements for a construction waste license and how that website

    referred to the Town’s contractor registration page.      BRS’s counsel

    noted that other contractors were charged a flat $250 registration fee,

    which the Town’s representative believed was the cost to administer the

                                 7
    registration process.     The representative testified that it took

    approximately ten minutes to process a construction waste license.

•   After BRS refused to obtain a license, the Town first notified BRS that it

    needed to come into compliance with the ordinance and then cited BRS

    for violating the ordinance. In response, BRS sued the Town seeking

    declarations that the ordinance was invalid and that the license fee

    constituted an unconstitutional occupation tax and requesting a

    temporary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.

•   After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the license fee was

    “unlawful and invalid under Section 361.0961 of the Texas Health and

    Safety Code.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961.

•   Before the rendition of judgment, the trial court conducted a hearing on

    attorney’s fees. At that hearing, the Town announced that it had passed

    a new ordinance—Ordinance No. 901—that reduced the license fee to

    3% of the construction waste hauler’s gross revenue but left the other

    operative features of the licensing scheme intact. See Westlake, Tex.,

    Ordinance 901 (Dec. 2, 2019) (amending § 74-47(a)). The trial court

    concluded on the record at the attorney’s fee hearing that the 3% fee was

    “fair.”

                                 8
      •      The trial court then entered a judgment that contained the following

             declarations:

                                           Count 1

             Regarding the claims in Count 1 of [BRS’s] First Amended
             Petition, the [c]ourt rules as follows:

             1. As to [BRS’s] request for declaratory judgment that “the Town
             has no authority under Section 364.034, Tex. Health & Safety
             Code,[3] or other statute or Texas constitution to require a private
             operator to obtain a franchise[ or a] license[] or [to] pay fees to
             provide temporary solid waste collection services to a
             construction site within the Town’s limits and any such
             requirement is invalid,” the [c]ourt RENDERS judgment in favor
             of [the Town] and hereby orders that [BRS] take nothing as to
             that claim.

             2. As to [BRS’s] request for declaratory judgment that “Section
             74-4, et seq., is invalid under Section 364.034, Tex. Health &
             Safety Code, to the extent the Town restricts the collection of
             temporary solid waste from construction sites to the Town’s
             franchisees and licensees,” the [c]ourt RENDERS judgment in
             favor of [the Town] and hereby orders that [BRS] take nothing as
             to that claim.

             3. As to [BRS’s] request for declaratory judgment that “Section
             74-4, et seq., is preempted by and invalid under Section 361.0961,
             Tex. Health & Safety Code[,]”[4] the [c]ourt RENDERS judgment

      3
        Section 364.034 “deals with the franchising of waste services, the ability to
force citizens to use those services, and the exceptions to this franchising power,” and
our prior opinion described the statute’s various sections in detail. Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 364.034; see BRS I, 640 S.W.3d at 560.
      4
       Section 361.0961 provides that

      (a) A local government or other political subdivision may not adopt an
      ordinance, rule, or regulation to:

                                           9
            in favor of [the Town] and hereby orders that [BRS] take nothing
            as to that claim.

            4. As to [BRS’s] request for declaratory judgment that “the 15%
            license fee under Section 74-44, et seq., is unlawful and invalid
            under Section 361.0961(a)(3), Tex. Health & Safety Code,” the
            [c]ourt RENDERS judgment in favor of [BRS] and hereby
            declares that a 15% license fee as set forth by Ordinance No. 851
            is unreasonable[,] null[,] and void. On this sole count[,] [BRS] is
            awarded reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 37.[009,]
            Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code[,] in the sum of $8,523[,] which the
            [c]ourt finds reasonable and necessary and just and equitable.
            [BRS] shall have post-judgment interest on such amount at the
            maximum allowable rate of interest.

                  (1) prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management
            purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner
            not authorized by state law;

                   (2) prohibit or restrict the processing of solid waste by a
            solid waste facility, except for a solid waste facility owned by the
            local government, permitted by the commission for that purpose
            in a manner not authorized by state law; or

                  (3) assess a fee or deposit on the sale or use of a container
            or package.

             (b) This section does not prevent a local government or other
      political subdivision from complying with federal or state law or
      regulation. A local government or other political subdivision may take
      any action otherwise prohibited by this section in order to comply with
      federal requirements or to avoid federal or state penalties or fines.

            (c) This section does not limit the authority of a local government
      to enact zoning ordinances.

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961.

                                         10
                                          Count 2

              Regarding the claim in Count 2 of [BRS’s] First Amended
              Petition, as to [BRS’s] request for declaratory judgment that
              “Section 74-44, et seq., of Ordinance [N]o. 851 establishing the
              15% license fee[] is an unconstitutional occupation tax and is
              invalid,” the [c]ourt RENDERS judgment in favor of [the Town]
              and thereby orders that [BRS] take nothing as to that claim.

       •      The trial court awarded BRS ten percent of the trial attorney’s fees that it

              had sought and no appellate fees.

       B.     We set forth the holdings of our prior opinion in this matter.

       BRS appealed the trial court’s judgment to this court. We summarized the

issues raised by the parties in the prior appeal as follows:

       In four issues, BRS argues that (1) the Town lacks the statutory authority
       to require a license or to impose a license fee on commercial solid waste
       operators who are the subject of the ordinance, (2) any right the Town
       has to require a license or to impose a fee is preempted by another Texas
       statute, (3) the license fee is an invalid occupation tax, and (4) the trial
       court erred in the amount of attorney’s fees that it awarded BRS. In its
       appeal, the Town raises two points challenging (1) the trial court’s
       declaration that the license fee is invalid and (2) the trial court’s award of
       attorney’s fees to BRS.

BRS I, 640 S.W.3d at 547.

       In turn, we resolved those issues with the following holdings:

       1.     The Town has statutory powers that carry with them the right to
              license commercial solid waste operators, and another statute
              dealing with the franchise of waste disposal operators does not
              deprive the Town of the power to license those operators.

       2.     The Town’s act of licensing a commercial solid waste operator
              does not fall within the ambit of a Texas statute that restricts the

                                            11
                use of containers, and that statute does not preempt the Town’s
                ability to require a license or to impose a license fee.

       3.       The Town repealed the 15% license fee that BRS challenged, and
                this action moots BRS’s challenge to the fee’s validity as BRS’s
                challenge is predicated on the amount of the fee.

       4.       Our disposition of the various issues raised by the parties requires
                that we reverse and remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the trial
                court.

Id. at 548.

       C.       We set forth the holdings of the Texas Supreme Court in its
                opinion in this matter.

       BRS sought review of our judgment, which the supreme court granted. The

supreme court reversed our judgment by writing on a legal question that had not been

raised in the trial court or in the issues that were presented to this court. BRS II, 650

S.W.3d at 501. The primary thrust of the supreme court’s opinion examined what

powers the Town was accorded under Section 363.111 of the Health and Safety Code,

which permits general-law municipalities to “adopt rules for regulating solid waste

collection, handling, transportation, storage, processing, and disposal.” Id. at 504.

The issue was whether this statute supported the Town’s argument that “its statutory

authority to regulate must include both the power to require regulated companies to

obtain a license and the power to charge a regulatory fee to recover the cost to the

Town of administering the regulations.” Id.; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§ 363.111(a).

                                             12
      As a starting point, the supreme court assumed, but did not decide, that the

Town could require a construction trash hauler, such as BRS, to obtain a license. BRS

II, 650 S.W.3d at 505. Then, the supreme court concluded that “the dispositive issue

before [it was] whether the Town ha[d] authority to charge the kind of licensing fees it

ha[d] charged.” Id. (emphasis added).

      The supreme court resolved the issue it posed in the negative and supported its

resolution with the following rationale:

      •      The supreme court assumed that “the express power to regulate

             include[d] an implied power to charge regulatory fees.” Id. But that

             power would only support a fee calculated “to cover regulatory costs”—

             only for a fee calculated on that basis “can there be any argument that

             the power to charge the fee is ‘indispensable’ to the power to regulate.”

             Id.

      •      After discussing the possibility that a fee based on the volume of trash

             hauled by BRS might meet its regulatory cost standard, the supreme

             court concluded that “a floating, percentage-of-revenue fee will fluctuate

             based on economic forces having nothing to do with the Town’s internal

             costs” and was not permissible. Id. The power to charge a percentage-

             of-revenue licensing fee could not be implied from the power to

                                           13
             regulate, and such a fee also smacked of being an unconstitutional

             occupation tax. Id. at 505–06.

The supreme court summarized its holding as follows: “the Town’s express power

under [S]ection 363.111 to regulate trash hauling does not include an implied power to

charge percentage-of-revenue licensing fees.” Id. at 506.

      After rejecting the argument that another provision of the Health and Safety

Code authorized a percentage-of-revenue fee, the supreme court turned to what it

viewed as an open question that impacted the overall viability of the Town’s licensing

scheme for “trash haulers’ activities,” i.e., “what remains of the Town’s regulatory

scheme in the absence of the fee.”        Id.   That question turned on whether the

remainder of the ordinance that created the license scheme was “severable from the

fee.” Id. at 507. The Court set out the general rule of severability by stating that

      the invalid portion of an ordinance or statute should be severed from the
      rest of the enactment, which remains in effect without the severed
      portion, “unless all the provisions are connected in subject[ ]matter,
      dependent on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or
      otherwise so connected in meaning that it cannot be presumed the
      legislature would have passed the one without the other.”

Id. (first quoting Rose v. Drs. Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g);

then quoting W. Union Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630, 634 (1884)).

      After stating the general rule of severability, the supreme court offered its view

that “the prospect that the licensing requirement remains viable in the absence of its

accompanying fee seems remote.” Id. It seemed apparent to the supreme court that

                                           14
the fee and the “regulatory scheme” were a package deal. Id. But the opinion also

noted that the Court’s view might be impacted by the presence of a severability clause

in the ordinances. Id.

      On remand to this court, the supreme court tasked us with sorting out the

severability question. Id. at 507–08. The supreme court noted that a conclusion that

the licensing provisions of the ordinances were severable would implicate additional

questions regarding the Town’s power “to require trash haulers to obtain a license”

and whether the ordinances were preempted by another provision of the Health and

Safety Code. Id. 5

                                    III. Analysis

      In its first issue on remand, BRS argues that Ordinance No. 901 should be

struck in its entirety, as well as certain provisions of Ordinance No. 851 that contain

the requirement that BRS obtain a license to perform its waste hauling business in the

Town. What follows dissects primarily various sections of Ordinance No. 851 based

on the challenges actually made by BRS, the concessions it makes in its brief, and our

conclusions about which specific licensing provisions are not severable from the

invalidated sections of Ordinance No. 851 containing the license-fee requirement and

how those conclusions impact Ordinance No. 901. Overall, we agree with BRS that

      As the description of our prior opinion noted above, we have already
      5

answered these subsidiary questions.

                                          15
the provisions containing the licensing requirements are not severable from those

containing the license fee.

       A.     We set forth our view regarding which provisions of the Town’s
              ordinances are actually in controversy.

       Initially, we note that the Town engages in a strenuous defense of portions of

its ordinances that BRS does not appear to attack. As set forth above, we deal

primarily with Ordinance No. 851, which regulates “solid waste.” The ordinance has

four articles titled as follows:

       Article I      General Requirements

       Article II     Residential

       Article III    Commercial Solid Waste, Liquid Waste, and Recyclable Materials
                      Operators

       Article IV     Penalty

See Westlake, Tex., Ordinance 851 (Apr. 30, 2018).

       Thus, Ordinance No. 851 covers a host of types of solid waste other than the

commercial solid waste that BRS is in the business of hauling; however, Article III of

the ordinance focuses on regulating commercial solid waste. The Town spends much

of its brief arguing that the provisions of Articles I, II, and IV are severable from the

license fee provisions invalidated by the supreme court and thus survive. The Town

then devotes only two pages of specific discussion to the provisions of Article III that

contain the offending license-fee provision and the other aspects of the Town’s

regulation of commercial solid waste. Why the Town engages in this broad-ranging

                                           16
defense is unclear; BRS’s brief focuses its attack solely on Article III. Specifically,

BRS’s brief states, “Ordinance No. 851 contains provisions impacting all different

types of solid waste collection within the [Town].             Article III contains the

requirements for commercial solid waste, liquid waste[,] and recyclable materials

collection operators. BRS is only challenging those provisions in Article III that apply to

residential construction waste haulers.” [Emphasis added.]

       Further, the focus of the supreme court’s hypothetical about how its

invalidation of the license fee impacted other provisions of the ordinance also focused

on Article III. That opinion noted,

       Having held the licensing fee invalid because it exceeds the Town’s
       statutory authority, we must assess what remains of the Town’s
       regulatory scheme in the absence of the fee. As described above, Article
       III of the [o]rdinance included the licensing requirement, the percentage-
       of-revenue licensing fee, and various regulations governing trash haulers’
       activities. BRS challenges all three elements of Article III, and we hold
       that the percentage-of-revenue licensing fee exceeds the Town’s
       authority.

BRS II, 650 S.W.3d at 506.

       Thus, we will focus our severability analysis using the same focus as BRS and

the supreme court. We will decide which provisions of Article III are severable from

those invalidated by the supreme court and whether those Article III provisions

survive in the face of the Court’s holding, which invalidated the license fee that the

Town had enacted for commercial solid waste operators.

                                              17
      B.     We set forth the test that applies to determine whether the
             licensing provisions of the Town’s ordinances are severable from
             the license-fee provisions.

      As we noted above, the supreme court stated its initial view of the

interconnectedness of the license fee and the licensing regulations of construction

trash hauling and how that interconnectedness led the Court to surmise that the

license provisos were not severable. But the supreme court counterbalanced its

statements about the interrelatedness of the fee and the licensing regulations by

noting that the ordinances also contained a severability clause. Id. at 507. In the

supreme court’s words, “[n]evertheless, the [o]rdinance contains a severability clause,

and ‘[w]hen an ordinance contains an express severability clause, the severability

clause prevails when interpreting the ordinance.’” Id. (quoting City of Houston v. Bates,

406 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex. 2013)).

      Pivoting off the supreme court’s mention of the severability clause, the Town

emphasizes various provisions of the Government Code that speak to the guidance

that should be drawn from the presence of a severability clause and also notes the

general and long-standing test for severability. In essence, we conclude that though

the Government Code does accord the existence of a severability clause some weight,

the basic test of severability remains focused on whether the provisions that remain

after striking an invalidated provision are complete in themselves and capable of being

executed in accordance with legislative intent.

                                           18
       We begin by quoting the provisions of the Code Construction Act and the

construction rules for civil statutes dealing with severability.         The severability

provision of the Code Construction Act provides,

       (a) If any statute contains a provision for severability, that provision
       prevails in interpreting that statute.

              (b) If any statute contains a provision for nonseverability, that
       provision prevails in interpreting that statute.

              (c) In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability
       or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or its application to any
       person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect
       other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect
       without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
       provisions of the statute are severable.

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.032.

       The construction rules for civil statutes provide,

       (a) Unless expressly provided otherwise, if any provision of a statute or
       its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
       invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute
       that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and
       to this end the provisions of the statute are severable.

              (b) This section does not affect the power or duty of a court to
       ascertain and give effect to legislative intent concerning severability of a
       statute.

Id. § 312.013.

       To say that these rules present a mixed bag is an understatement. For example,

Section 311.032(a) states that “[i]f any statute contains a provision for severability,

that provision prevails in interpreting that statute.” Id. § 311.032(a). But that does

                                            19
not tell us what it prevails over. In turn, Section 312.013(a) presents a general test for

severability “[u]nless expressly provided otherwise.” Id. § 312.013(a). We conclude

that the presence of a severability clause is not conclusive on the question of whether

provisions impacted by the invalidation of another provision remain viable.

Practically, giving a severability clause veto power over the question of whether other

provisions were unseverable would permit provisions clearly tied together by language

and legislative intent to survive even though the basis for that interrelated package of

provisions no longer existed and the apparent intent that one would not have been

enacted without the other. In that circumstance, a severability clause would be

allowed to preserve provisions that would never have been enacted had the enacting

body known that an integral part of what it had enacted was invalid. To give the

severability clause the final say in such a circumstance elevates form over substance.

      The Town appears to acknowledge that a severability clause provision does not

carry a veto power. Indeed, the Town describes Section 311.032(a) and other sections

of the Code Construction Act that it cites as creating presumptions. We agree with

this characterization. We do not view the presence of a severability clause as being a

mandate that prevents us from assessing the severability question based on whether

other provisions of Article III of the ordinance can function without the invalidated

provision or if the Town would have enacted Article III if it had understood that it

could not assess a license fee based on a percentage of BRS’s revenue.

                                           20
      To support this view, we note that one of the most often cited Texas Supreme

Court opinions dealing with severability in a statutory context is the Rose case

mentioned above. 801 S.W.2d at 847. Rose involved a question regarding whether the

Court’s prior holding—that invalidated damage limitations in the Medical Liability Act

(MLA) on common law medical-malpractice claims—also invalidated the limitations

when applied to statutory wrongful-death claims. Id. at 842–43. The supreme court

conducted a severability analysis and first noted that the MLA contained a severability

clause stating “in part that if the application of the statute to any person or

circumstance is held unconstitutional, then the effect of the invalidation shall be

confined to the portion of the statute adjudged to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 844.

      But the Court did not give conclusive effect to the clause and stated that its

presence only prompted a more involved analysis applying the Court’s long-standing

rules for determining severability:

      The goal of this severability clause, to retain valid portions and
      applications of the statute whenever possible, reflects the case law’s
      reminder that “[i]n the construction of statutes, if it can be lawfully done,
      it is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to render it valid.”
      Sharber v. Florence, . . . 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 ([Tex.] 1938). In Western
      Union Telegraph . . . , we acknowledged that some statutes are severable
      while others are not and stated the test for determining when a finding
      of unconstitutionality of one portion of a statute invalidates the whole
      statute:

             When, therefore, a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that
             fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder
             void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-
             matter, dependent on each other, operating together for the
             same purpose, or otherwise so connected in meaning that it

                                           21
              cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the
              one without the other.            The constitutional and
              unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the
              same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so
              that the first may stand though the last fall. The point is
              not whether they are contained in the same section, for the
              distribution into sections is purely artificial[,] but whether
              they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.
              If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that
              which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being
              executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent,
              wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must
              stand.

       [62 Tex.] at 634.

Id. at 844.

       Chief Justice Phillips’s dissent in Rose also highlighted that a severability clause

is not conclusive on the question of severability:

       In embarking upon a severability analysis, the primary focus must be on
       the intention of the legislature. See N. Sanger, Sutherland Statutory
       Construction § 44.03 (Sands 4th ed. 1986 rev.). Indeed, it is the “duty of a
       court to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent concerning
       severability of a statute.” Tex. Gov’t[] Code Ann. § 312.013 . . . . “The
       test for severability in the absence of an express severability clause is one
       of legislative intent.” . . . Ass[’n] of Tex[.] Prof[’l] Educators v. . . . State
       Comm[’r] of Educ[.], 788 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. 1990). Conversely, the
       existence of a severability clause is an aid to finding such a legislative
       intent. It is not, however, conclusive. As Justice Brandeis said in Dorchy
       v. . . . Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S. Ct. 323, 324–25 . . . (1924), a
       savings clause provides a rule of construction [that] may aid in
       determining legislative intent, but “it is an aid merely; not an inexorable
       command.”

              ....

             The inquiry, therefore, is whether “the invalid part is so intermingled
       with all parts of the act as to make it impossible to separate them, and so

                                              22
       preclude the presumption that the [Texas] Legislature would have passed the
       act anyhow.” Sharber, . . . 115 S.W.2d [at] 606 . . . .

Id. at 850 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).6

       The San Antonio Court of Appeals recently reached a similar conclusion to

Rose. In analyzing a City of San Antonio ordinance mandating that private employers

provide paid sick leave to their employees, the San Antonio court concluded that the

existence of a severability clause did not have conclusive effect on the severance issue.

Washington v. Associated Builders & Contractors of S. Tex. Inc., 621 S.W.3d 305, 322 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). The City of San Antonio’s ordinance had a

severance provision substantially similar to the one included in the Town’s

ordinances. 7 Citing the Code Construction Act section that we have quoted and the

       6
        Admittedly, the Texas Supreme Court at times seems to accord a severability
clause controlling force in resolving a severability question. For example, when
dealing with a City of Houston ordinance, the supreme court noted that the ordinance
contained a severability clause and held that “[b]ased on the severability clause, the
invalidity of provisions that limit the availability of premium pay when calculating
termination pay do not affect the validity of any of the remaining portions of the
ordinances or any other ordinances.” Bates, 406 S.W.3d at 549. Even in light of such
a broad holding in Bates, we view the guidance of Rose and the Court’s statements in
its opinion remanding the present appeal to us as meaning that a severance clause
does not have controlling force when there is the close interrelationship described in
Western Union.
       7
        The severability provision in the San Antonio ordinance provided,

       It is hereby declared to be the intention of the city council that the
       sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses[,] and phrases of this chapter are
       severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph[,] or section of
       this chapter shall be declared unconstitutional by the valid judgment or
       decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality

                                            23
same case that the supreme court quoted in BRS II, the San Antonio court held that

the clause evinced an intent to preserve the part of the statute that was not

constitutional:

       The provision makes clear the City[ of San Antonio]’s intent, in the
       event any portion of the Amended Ordinance is determined to be
       unconstitutional, that the remainder of the ordinance continue in effect,
       and the Amended Ordinance’s specific provision controls over a general
       severability rubric. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.032(a) (“If any
       statute contains a provision for severability, that provision prevails in
       interpreting that statute.”); . . . Bates, 406 S.W.3d [at] 549 . . . (“When an
       ordinance contains an express severability clause, the severability clause
       prevails when interpreting the ordinance.”).

      shall not affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences,
      paragraphs[,] and sections of this chapter[] since the same would have
      been enacted by the city council without the incorporation in this
      chapter of any such unconstitutional phrase, clause, sentence,
      paragraph[,] or section.

Washington, 621 S.W.3d at 320.

      The severability provision in Ordinance No. 851 provides,

      It is hereby declared to be the intention of the Town Council of the
      Town of Westlake, Texas, that sections, paragraphs, clauses[,] and
      phrases of this Ordinance are severable, and if any phrase, clause,
      sentence, paragraph[,] or section of this Ordinance shall be declared
      legally invalid or unconstitutional by the valid judgment or decree of any
      court of competent jurisdiction, such legal invalidity or
      unconstitutionality shall not affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses,
      sentences, paragraphs[,] or sections of this Ordinance since the same
      would have been enacted by the Town Council of the Town of Westlake
      without the incorporation in this Ordinance of any such legally invalid or
      unconstitutional, phrase, sentence, paragraph[,] or section.

Westlake, Tex., Ordinance 851 (Apr. 30, 2018). Ordinance No. 901 has an identical
provision. See Westlake, Tex., Ordinance 901 (Dec. 2, 2019).

                                            24
Id. at 320.

       The San Antonio court, however, went on to quote Rose and other supreme

court authority for how it would resolve the severability question even in view of the

presence of the severability clause:

       However, if the statute and ordinance conflict, and a portion of the
       ordinance is unconstitutional, severing the remaining provisions may be
       proper “[i]f, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that
       which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed in
       accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of
       that which was rejected.” Rose . . . , 801 S.W.2d [at] 844 . . . (quoting W.
       Union Tel. . . . , 62 Tex. [at] 634 . . . ). But if “all the provisions are
       connected in subject[ ]matter, dependent on each other, [and] operating
       together for the same purpose . . . [or] they are essentially and
       inseparably connected in substance,” then severance is not proper. Id.;
       cf. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 902 (Tex. 2000)
       (citing Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845).

Id. at 320–21.

       Applying its pronounced standard, Washington concluded that once the

provision of the ordinance mandating paid leave was voided because it was preempted

by state law, that holding affected virtually every section of the ordinance. In the San

Antonio court’s view, the remaining “provisions, which do not expressly address paid

sick and safe leave, are ancillary provisions whose purpose is to provide the reporting

and enforcement provisions for paid sick and safe leave.” Id. at 322. The San

Antonio court offered the following rationale regarding why the doctrine of severance

did not save the remainder of the ordinance:

       After the trial court determined that the Amended Ordinance established
       a wage, it necessarily found that the central purpose of the Amended

                                           25
      Ordinance was likely preempted and unconstitutional, and virtually “all
      the provisions are connected in subject[ ]matter, dependent on each
      other, [and] operating together for the same purpose.” See [Rose, 801
      S.W.2d at 844]. The trial court could not have severed the few
      remaining provisions because, without the trial court[’s] adding words to
      rewrite the provisions, see Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, 255 S.W.3d 786,
      799 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (recognizing courts may not
      “write words into [a] statute”), “that which remain[ed was not] complete
      in itself, and [was not] capable of being executed in accordance with the
      apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was
      rejected.” See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 844 (quoting W. Union Tel. Co., 62 Tex.
      at 634).

Id.

      Here, even though Ordinance Nos. 851 and 901 contain severability clauses, we

will apply the Western Union test to the severability question and ask the following:

when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out of Ordinance Nos. 851 and 901, is

that which remains complete in itself, and is it capable of being executed in accordance

with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected?8

      C.     We conclude that the licensing requirements in the ordinances are
             not severable from the invalid license-fee provisions.

             1.     We set forth the structure of Article III of Ordinance
                    No. 851.

      We begin by setting out the title of Article III of Ordinance No. 851 and listing

its internal section numbers and the headings associated with the sections:9

      8
       We will explain later why the limited provisions of Ordinance No. 901 do not
survive the severability analysis.
      For the reader’s reference, we cite to the online version of the Westlake Code
      9

of Ordinances, but our list of the section headings contains the inconsistencies in

                                           26
      ARTICLE III. - COMMERCIAL SOLID WASTE, LIQUID WASTE,
      AND RECYCLABLE MATERIALS OPERATORS

             Sec. 74-41    Requirements of Other Ordinances Not Waived

             Sec. 74-42. – Commercial solid waste requirements.

             Sec. 74-43. – Fees.

             Sec. 74-44. – License or franchise required.

             Sec. 74-45. – License application requirements.

             Sec. 74-46. – License regulations.

             Sec. 74-47. – Solid waste license fee.

             Sec. 74-48    Revocation

             74-50 Failure to Obtain a License – Offense

See Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, §§ 74-41–74-48, 74-50 (2002),

https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO

OR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP.

             2.     We set forth the points of agreement between the parties.

      One apparent point of overall agreement between BRS and the Town is the

view that Sections 74-43 and 74-47 of Ordinance No. 851 do not survive the supreme

court’s opinion. These sections specify that a commercial solid waste operator must

pay a fee and set forth the mechanisms to calculate and administer the fee.

punctuation and capitalization of the headings that are reflected in the text of the
ordinance as it appears in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 in the appellate record. Neither the
online version nor the exhibit contains a Section 74-49.

                                           27
      In addition, BRS’s brief does not mention Section 74-41 of Ordinance No. 851

that merely provides, “Nothing in this Article shall be considered a waiver of the

requirements of Chapter 36 and other Town requirements in regard to waste.” See

Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, § 74-41 (2002),

https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COO

R_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP_S74-41REOTORNOWA. Thus,

we conclude that this provision is severable and survives.

      Further, Section 74-42 provides a number of regulations dealing with solid

waste, such as waste must be placed in an approved container; the waste must be

contained to prevent the escape of odors and the container’s contents; the area

surrounding the container must be kept clear of obstructions; the container cannot be

modified to be used for any other purpose than the collection of commercial solid

waste; and the container must be in a safe, accessible location. See Westlake, Tex.,

Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, § 74-42 (2002), https://library.municode.com/tx/

westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSO

WALIWAREMAOP_S74-42COSOWARE. BRS addresses Section 74-42 in a single

paragraph:

      An example of regulation compliance without need of licensure can be
      found in § 74[-]42 of Ordinance No. 851. This section contains
      common[-]sense requirements such as placing waste in a designated
      container. It appears to be more applicable to the Town’s trash
      customers who are served by Republic. Subsection (c) is inapplicable
      because it refers only to the Town’s franchisee Republic. BRS owns its
      containers[,] so there is no possibility that it will alter or damage its

                                          28
       private asset for any purpose other than running its business pursuant to
       subsection (d). Similarly, BRS’[s] dumpsters are always located in safe,
       accessible locations as required by subsection (e). Again these provisions
       appear to be aimed at household and commercial customers of Republic.
       BRS complies with these common[-]sense requirements as a matter of
       course. These provisions can be applied to BRS independent of licensure oversight by
       the Town. [Emphasis added.] [Record references and citation omitted.]

We read BRS’s statement as a concession that Section 74-42 survives a severability

analysis.

              3.      We explain why we conclude that several sections of
                      Article III of Ordinance No. 851 do not survive a severability
                      analysis.

       Moving beyond the apparent agreement and concessions of the parties, we are

left with the basic question of whether Section 74-44 (License or franchise required),

Section 74-45 (License application requirements), and Section 74-46 (License

regulations) survive a severability analysis.         In essence, the Town’s severability

argument relies on the contention that the licensing requirements are freestanding

provisions directed at protecting the safety and welfare of the Town’s citizens. At this

point, such a contention is revisionist history. The record supports the supreme

court’s view that the licensing and fee provisions are not severable.

       We begin our analysis by quoting the supreme court’s view that it is unlikely

that the licensing provisions will survive a severability analysis:

       Here, the percentage-of-revenue fee was, by all accounts, an integral part
       of the Town’s attempt to regulate construction trash hauling. From the
       beginning, the fee was a key issue in discussions between BRS and the
       Town about enactment of the [o]rdinance. The Town makes no
       argument that the other provisions of Article III should remain

                                               29
      operative if the fee is declared invalid. Indeed, the Town’s primary
      defense of the fee is that its power to charge a fee is indispensable to its
      ability to regulate trash hauling at all. Every indication in the record is
      that the fee and the regulatory scheme were negotiated and enacted as a
      package deal. It therefore appears unlikely that the Town—contrary to
      its protestations of the fee’s indispensability—would have enacted the
      other provisions of Article III in the absence of the fee. In particular,
      the prospect that the licensing requirement remains viable in the absence
      of its accompanying fee seems remote.

BRS II, 650 S.W.3d at 507. The record bears out the supreme court’s surmise. Stated

in terms of the traditional severability analysis, we conclude that after the invalidation

of the fee provisions, the licensing provisions do not remain complete in themselves,

are not capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent,

and are not wholly independent of that which was rejected.

      We rely on the following broad points to support our conclusion:

      •      The Town conceded the close interrelation between the fee and the

             license provisions; the fee was justified by the need to administer and

             engage in oversight of the commercial solid waste operator.             Thus,

             administration of the license was the justification for charging the fee,

             and it cannot be said that one is wholly independent of the other. In the

             supreme court’s words, the fee provision was an “integral” and

             “indispensable” part of the Town’s regulatory scheme. Id.

                    Indeed, the Town’s own witness tied the fee to enforcement of its

             ordinances. As the Town’s representative testified on direct examination:

                                           30
      Q. The license fee imposed in Ordinance [No.] 851 for
      temporary construction waste haulers, what is your
      understanding of what that license fee is designed to cover?

             ....

                A. The administrative and oversight of the solid
      waste services that would include -- one of the things is
      construction waste much like the oversight for Republic
      Services. It would include investigation on any issue
      regarding damage to [the Town’s] streets, damage to any
      public or other private properties, any issues with blowing
      debris, discarded debris as a result of transportation of
      containers through the Town.                It would also include
      investigation to identify the status of containers, the status of the
      licenses.

             ....

               Q. Based on your understanding of the amounts
      collected under the Town’s franchise and licensing fees, has
      the Town of Westlake been made whole as a result of the
      collection of those fees when compared to the cost to administer and
      enforce the ordinances?

             A. No. [Emphases added.]

That the Town was attempting to recoup its cost for administering the

ordinances was a theme that carried over into cross-examination of the

Town’s representative:

      Q. With respect to BRS’s activities, what specific expenses
      has the [Town] incurred?

             A. In addition to legal fees?

             Q. Sure.

                               31
             A. The administrative and oversight that I provide
      over this, the cost for enacting the ordinance -- Ordinance
      [No.] 851 to accommodate [BRS’s] opportunity to provide
      services in Westlake.

              Q. Okay. So I heard two things: The cost to
      enforce the ordinance on BRS [is] administrative oversight;
      is that right?

              A. The cost to administer the ordinance itself.

              Q. Okay. So let’s focus --

            A. Investigation, driving, actually going around
      inspecting construction sites for compliance with the
      ordinance.

              Q. Anything else?

            A.  The creation of the ordinance itself to
      accommodate [BRS’s owners’] desire to operate within
      Westlake.

             Q. I know the Town doesn’t like that, but I don’t
      think that’s a cost of administering the license. That’s what
      I’m trying to get to.

              A. Okay.

             Q. I heard there’s administrative oversight is one
      item, correct?

              A. Yes, which would include numerous items.

Thus, the fee and license operated hand in glove—the fee paid the cost

of administering and enforcing the ordinances that contain the licensing

provisions.

                             32
•   Also, the Town’s own documents demonstrate a view that the license fee

    was incident to the Town’s ownership of the waste stream generated in

    the Town and tied both the regulation and the fee to that ownership. A

    workshop-discussion item from a Town council meeting sets out this

    view:

            It is important to remember that municipalities are in the
            solid waste business. The Town owns the solid waste
            stream and has a responsibility to ensure its proper
            disposal. In Westlake, much like most communities in
            North Central Texas, we outsource this service delivery to
            the private sector and “franchise” a provider.

                   Two vendors have contacted Town staff requesting
            permission to operate within the Town. The Town’s
            current Solid Waste Ordinance was drafted to address a
            single provider of solid waste services. The proposed
            ordinance      includes   some    housekeeping/updates[;]
            provide[s] for the ability of solid waste provider
            alternatives, who would have to operate within established
            parameters to ensure the public health and safety of
            Westlake citizens[;] and includes a license fee of 15% to
            operate.

    The legislative findings of Ordinance No. 851 carried forward the view

    that the waste stream was owned by the Town: “WHEREAS, the Town

    has the ownership of and responsibility for the waste stream and

    appropriate regulations are required under state and federal law[.]” As

    the supreme court made clear in its opinion, the Town’s relationship to

    its franchised trash hauler is governed by a different statutory scheme

    than that defining the relationship between the Town and BRS, and the

                                 33
    Court indicated that nothing in its opinion should be construed to

    comment on the franchise relationship. Id. at 504. The Court did

    assume that Section 363.111 of the Health and Safety Code, which

    authorizes the Town to regulate solid waste, would permit the Town to

    charge “a regulatory fee.” Id. But the Court also made clear that “[e]ven

    if that is the case, such fees would have to be tethered to the Town’s

    costs of administering the regulation.” Id. at 505. The Court would not

    countenance a fee based on the percentage-of-revenue measure that the

    Town imposed on a franchisee:

          A more conventional, volume-based fee under which the
          Town charged fixed amounts per license application or per
          construction site, for instance, could be calibrated to offset
          staffing or paperwork expenses incurred by the Town
          because of the regulation. But a floating, percentage-of-
          revenue fee will fluctuate based on economic forces having
          nothing to do with the Town’s internal costs.

    Id. (footnote omitted).

•   The discussion item quoted above and the legislative finding set forth

    above support the view that the Town was attempting to impose the

    same type of regulation on BRS that it imposed on its franchisee and to

    replace the loss in its revenue stream that would occur when its

    franchised waste hauler was replaced by private entities such as BRS. In

    essence, the Town was imposing a regulatory scheme similar to that

    imposed on a franchisee as a means to justify the same revenue-

                                34
    generating mechanism as that imposed on the franchisee.            Thus,

    imposing a type of regulation in the form of the license as proxy for the

    regulations that could be imposed on a franchisee was a justification for

    the charging of the fee that replaced the revenue lost by a commercial

    solid waste operator’s performing the service rather than the franchisee.

    This shows the integrated nature of the license and fee provisions but

    also suggests a negative implication with respect to the Town’s intent—

    the Town would not have implemented the licensing scheme had it

    known the limited amount of the fee that it could impose.

•   The supreme court also noted how integral the discussion of the fee was

    to that of the license: “From the beginning, the fee was a key issue in

    discussions between BRS and the Town about enactment of the

    [o]rdinance.”     Id. at 507.    The record bears this out.   As BRS’s

    representative testified, the Town offered a lower percentage of revenue

    fee if BRS would accept the licensing scheme.               The Town’s

    representative confirmed that relationship:

          Q. And if he had acquiesced to a voluntary licensure
          participation, you and the City manager would have
          recommended the 3 percent fee to the [Town] council,
          correct?

                    A. Yes.

                  Q. And [BRS’s owner] objected to participating in
          the licensure program, correct?

                                    35
                 A. Yes.

                Q. And the fee that was enacted as part of
          [Ordinance No.] 851 was -- instead of 3 percent was 15
          percent of gross revenues; is that correct?

                 A. Yes.

•   Finally, it appears that the Town used the licensing provisions as a

    stalking horse to justify the fee. As BRS emphasizes, many of the

    regulations imposed on BRS are duplicative of its existing duties under

    law or are not imposed on other types of large vehicles that use the

    Town’s rights of way or on other contractors that present no greater

    risks to the public than those posed by BRS’s business. Next, the Town

    allowed other contractors to register with the Town by paying a flat

    registration fee. Further, though the Town relied on administration of

    the license to justify the fee, when challenged, it could not correlate the

    two. Nor had it apparently done any on-site investigations to determine

    whether BRS was conforming to the licensing provisions. It appears

    that the Town attempted to justify the fee by claiming that it could often

    not identify the culprit in waste spills.    In essence, the relationship

    between the licensing provisions and the fee is shown by the fact that

    the Town selectively imposed licensing requirements on commercial

    solid waste operators, used the cost of administering those ordinance

                                 36
             provisions to justify the fee, could not correlate the amount of

             administrative costs to the fee, and then could cite no efforts to ensure

             that the licensing regulations were being followed. Thus, the licensing

             provisions were not actually an effort to protect the safety and welfare of

             the Town’s citizens but instead were a vehicle to justify the license fee.

       With our overview conclusions in place, we briefly discuss the specific

provisions that do not survive because they are not severable from the invalidated

license-fee requirement.

       Section 74-44(a) of Ordinance No. 851 states the requirement for a license as

follows: “Commercial solid waste operators collecting, transporting, or disposing of

commercial solid waste or temporary construction and demolition waste within the

Town’s corporate limits for compensation must obtain a license from the Town under

this article.” See Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, § 74-44(a) (2002),

https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO

OR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP_S74-44LIFRRE. This section

also deals with the term of the license and its renewal. Obviously, our conclusion that

the licensing requirement is not severable from the fee invalidates the requirement of

a license.

       Section 74-45 of Ordinance No. 851 mandates the form of the application for a

license. See Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, § 74-45 (2002),

https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COO

                                           37
R_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP_S74-45LIAPRE.                           This section

requires that an application include the following information:

      (a) State the name under which the operator conducts business, the
      business address, and the telephone number;

             (b) State the make, model, and body style of each motor vehicle
      to be used in the Town;

            (c) Submit legally binding proof of liability insurance for the
      motor vehicles in the amounts required by law;

            (d) Submit legally binding proof of insurance for the types of
      insurance and amounts of insurance required for Franchisee;

             (e) Current customers, routes[,] and end destination;[10]

              (f) Agree to abide by and be bound by the provisions of this
      article and to comply with all other federal and state laws applicable to
      the licensee’s activities; and

           (g) Submit any other information reasonably required by the
      Town to administer this article.

Id. Again, if the license requirement is not severable from the invalidated license fee,

the application for the license does not survive. And as BRS points out, with the

exception of describing the make and model of the vehicles that BRS uses and the

undertaking to abide by “this article” and to submit unspecified additional

information, the Town already obtains the required information via its contractor

registration form.   The duplication of the information required by the license

application and the contractor registration form reinforces a view that the Town used

      10
        This subsection does not contain a verb denoting what action the applicant is
required to do, e.g., “list.”

                                          38
the license as a justification for the fee, and that, in turn, reinforces how the two are

interrelated and how each is not severable from the other.

      Section 74-46 breaks down into two categories: various acts of compliance

required of licensees and acts that the licensee must perform to maintain their licenses

or to provide information to the Town. See Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances

ch. 74, art. III, § 74-46 (2002), https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/

code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMA

OP_S74-46LIRE. We will examine the latter type of regulations first because they

clearly involve the invalidated license fee. Such regulations include the following:

      (j) The [T]own [M]anager or designee may examine the books, papers,
      records, financial reports, equipment, and other facilities of a licensee to
      verify compliance with this article.

             (k) Each commercial solid waste operator must keep for two
      consecutive calendar years all scale house tickets, receipts, invoices,
      manifests, and other documents evidencing the collection within the
      Town of commercial solid waste and the facility where the commercial
      solid waste was delivered.

             (l) Each commercial solid waste operator must submit monthly
      reports to the Town within 30 days following the end of each month.
      Said reports shall contain:

                   (1) Detailed by month showing the total commercial solid
             waste tonnage collected by the commercial solid waste operator
             during each month of the previous quarter;

                   (2) That includes the list of names and addresses of the
             disposal location(s) of the commercial solid waste collected within
             the Town during the previous quarter;

                                           39
                   (3) That includes the total amount of commercial solid
             waste delivered at each disposal location each month of the
             previous quarter;

                    (4) That show the gross revenues earned each month
             within the Town during the previous quarter;

                    (5) That includes, in table format, the customer’s name,
             address, number of containers serviced, container type, size, and
             service schedule or on-call service; and

                   (6) That includes any additional reports reasonably
             requested by the Town for the time period requested.

See id. § 74-46(j)–(l). These subsections primarily deal with information that the

licensee is to maintain and to provide the Town to ensure that the license fee based

on gross revenue is properly calculated. The interrelatedness of these provisions and

the invalidated license fee—calculated on the basis of gross revenue—is obvious.11

      The remaining provisions of Section 74-46 are as follows:

      (a) All licensees must prominently place clearly legible letters not less
      than five inches in height on both sides of the vehicles, containers[,] and

      11
        Provisions (h) and (i) of Section 74-46 provide,

      (h) All licensees must notify the Town of any change in the information
      submitted in an application for a license, including a change in the name,
      address[,] or telephone number of the licensee.

              (i) All licensees must maintain their licenses issued under this
      article in compliance with the Town’s ordinances.

Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, § 74-46(h)–(i) (2002),
https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO
OR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP_S74-46LIRE. Again, if the
requirement for a license is invalidated, provisions requiring the updating of the
information about the licensee and maintaining the license are swept away.

                                          40
       equipment that the licensee operates within the Town that identify the
       assigned number of each vehicle and the name and telephone number of
       the licensee.

               ....

              (c) All licensees’ vehicles, containers and equipment must be well-
       maintained, in good repair, clean, sanitary, and free from leaks and
       excessive emissions.

              (d) All licensees must contain, enclose[,] or tie all commercial solid
       waste and recyclable materials in a manner that prevents spilling,
       leaking[,] or blowing.

             (e) All licensees must immediately clean up all leakage, spillage[,]
       and blown debris resulting from the licensees’ vehicles or equipment.

              (f) All licensees must maintain all vehicles, containers[,] and
       equipment in compliance with the laws and manufacturers’
       specifications.

             (g) All licensees must maintain all required insurance during the
       term of the license[] and provide legally binding proof of said insurance
       upon request of Town Manager or designee[.][12]

See id. § 74-46 (a), (c)–(g).

       It appears that these provisions form the crux of the Town’s argument

regarding why the licensing provisions of Ordinance No. 851 (carried forward into

Ordinance No. 901) should survive a severability analysis. The Town defends the

survival of the licensing provisions, shorn of the invalid fee, by arguing that they serve

the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community. In

        Subsection (b) is excluded from the quotation because it deals with types of
       12

waste other than BRS hauls. Specifically, that subsection deals with recyclable
materials.

                                            41
essence, the Town argues that the presence of a legitimate purpose of the licensing

provisions is borne out by the legislative findings in Ordinance Nos. 851 and 901.

Specifically, the Town argues that

      [a]side from the sections creating the percentage-of-revenue license fee,
      all remaining provisions in Ordinance [No.] 851 are necessary for the
      Town’s regulation of solid waste, which is necessary to promote the
      health, safety, and welfare of its community. The percentage-of-
      revenue-based fee notwithstanding, the remaining provisions provide for
      the collection and disposal of waste, and those provisions are fully
      capable of being executed without the percentage-of-revenue license fee.

      We assume that the Town could require a license. That was our holding in our

prior opinion, and our disposition of the issues on remand does not require us to

revisit that holding. See BRS I, 640 S.W.3d at 560–64. But the view that the Town

could require a license begs the question of whether the licensing provisions of the

present ordinance—though they contain what appear to be health and safety

regulations—survive the severability analysis. In essence, the Town is asking to roll

back the clock and ignore the history of the licensing scheme and the apparent

legislative intent tying the licensing provisions and the fee together. The Town also

asks us to ignore that the health and safety regulations appear to have been designed

to justify the fee, that the regulations are not imposed on others, and that the Town

had not taken steps to monitor their enforcement. Thus, a clean slate might produce

a different result, but the slate with the history of the ordinances and the intent tying

                                           42
the license fee and license provisions together presents a different picture—one which

does not warrant the severance of the licensing and fee provisions.13

                4.      We explain why Ordinance No. 901 does not survive a
                        severability analysis.

        At this point in our analysis, only Ordinance No. 901 remains unaddressed. In

Ordinance No. 901, the Town made several legislative findings but substantively

amended Ordinance No. 851 by reducing the license fee from 15% to 3% of the

hauler’s gross revenue. 14 The basis of the fee remains invalid because it is calculated

on the basis of the operator’s revenue. We see nothing in Ordinance No. 901 that

impacts our preceding analysis that the licensing provisions of Ordinance No. 851 are

not severable from the fee provisions. Indeed, Section 74-43 of Ordinance No. 901

confirms the relationship: “Each commercial solid waste transporter must pay a

monthly fee to the town for use of streets, roadways[,] and rights-of-way. Such fee is

imposed with the objective of recovering the administrative costs of regulation, enforcement, monitoring,

and the associated impact to infrastructure resulting from solid waste transport services[.]”

Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III § 74-43 (2002),

        The remaining parts of Article III are Sections 74-48 and 74-50 (again, there is
        13

no Section 74-49). Westlake, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 74, art. III, §§ 74-48,
74-50 (2002), https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances
?nodeId=COOR_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP. The remaining
sections deal with revocation of a license and an offer for failure to obtain a license.
As the requirement for a license has not survived a severability analysis, these
provisions also fail as they are intimately tied to the licensing process.

       Ordinance No. 901 also reduced the late penalty for failing to pay the fee
        14

from 12% to 10%. See Westlake, Tex., Ordinance 901 (Dec. 2, 2019).

                                                  43
https://library.municode.com/tx/westlake/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR

_CH74SOWA_ARTIIICOSOWALIWAREMAOP_S74-43FEPU (emphasis added).

This provision explicitly ties the fee to the regulation of solid waste transporters, an

aspect of which is the licensing provision. Again, the Town argues that the legislative

findings of Ordinance No. 901 should survive and that they justify the licensing

provisions of the solid waste ordinance. As we have noted above, the legislative

findings do not persuade us to alter our severability analysis that invalidates the

licensing provisions.

      We sustain BRS’s challenge to the ordinances’ licensing provisions presented in

its first issue because they cannot be severed from the invalidated license-fee

provisions.15

      15
        BRS’s second, third, and fourth issues are as follows:

                                      ISSUE II

             Whether the remaining severable sections of the Town’s
      residential construction waste hauling ordinance should be deemed void
      as a result of the [s]upreme [c]ourt[’s] striking down the percentage of
      revenue license fee provisions.

                                      ISSUE III

             If the answer to Issue II is “No[,”] whether the remaining
      provisions of the waste hauling ordinance should be struck down
      pursuant to § 361.0961 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.

                                          44
             5.     We remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the trial court.

      In its judgment, the trial court awarded BRS only ten percent of the attorney’s

fees that it had sought through trial and no fees for appeal. In our first opinion, we

remanded the fee issue to the trial court so that it could “reassess its award of

attorney’s fees in the light of our ruling.” BRS I, 640 S.W.3d at 573 (citing Tex. Cent.

R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Miles, 635 S.W.3d 684, 690–91 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2020) (mem. op.) (remanding matter to trial court to redetermine

equitable and just fee award under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section

37.009 in light of appellate court’s decision), aff’d, 647 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2022)). In

view of the changed landscape created by our original opinion, that of the supreme

court’s opinion, and this opinion, the need for a reassessment has only increased.

Further, the Texas Supreme Court instructed us to determine whether a remand was

                                       ISSUE IV

            If the answers to Issues II and III are “No[,”] whether the Town’s
      general authority for regulating trash collection and hauling includes the
      power to adopt rules to require BRS to obtain an operating license.

It is difficult to correlate BRS’s issues to its arguments as its brief does not note which
of its arguments correspond to its four issues. With respect to the second issue, we
cannot locate an argument addressing it. With respect to its third and fourth issues,
they are in essence an effort to have us revisit our prior opinion. For the reasons we
have stated, we will not do so. Further, as we read the supreme court’s opinion,
review of these issues on remand was contingent on a conclusion that the licensing
provisions were severable from the license fee. BRS II, 650 S.W.3d at 507–08. We
have concluded that the license provisions are not severable. Thus, we do not reach
BRS’s additional issues.

                                            45
warranted to reassess the fee award in light of the subsequent events, and the parties

agree that it is. See BRS II, 650 S.W.3d at 508 n.10.

      Accordingly, we sustain BRS’s fifth issue and remand this case to the trial court

for a redetermination of the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to BRS for trial

and appeal.

                                    IV. Conclusion

      As the basis for sustaining BRS’s first issue, we hold that certain provisions of

Article III of Ordinance No. 851 (which we referenced in Section III.C.3) are not

severable from the license-fee provisions found in Sections 74-43 and 74-47 of

Article III. Specifically, we invalidate Sections 74-43, 74-44, 74-45, 74-46 (except

subsection (b)), 74-47, 74-48, and 74-50 of Article III. Our severability analysis also

invalidates Ordinance No. 901. We do not reach BRS’s second, third, and fourth

issues. We sustain BRS’s fifth issue and reverse and remand this matter to the trial

court solely for a redetermination of both trial and appellate attorney’s fees that BRS

may be awarded.

                                                        /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                        Dabney Bassel
                                                        Justice

Delivered: June 8, 2023

                                           46