Court Opinion

ID: 9353587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 02:01:36.587444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:19.277999
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which KAUTZ, J., joins. [¶39] I concur with the majority opinion’s adoption of the McHajfie Rule and the opinion’s disposition of Mr. Bogdanski’s negligent training claim against FedEx. I disagree, however, that triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment on Mr. Bogdanski’s vicarious liability claim against FedEx, and I therefore respectfully dissent from the reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment. [¶40] My disagreement with the majority opinion stems from my view of how a movant must meet its initial summary judgment burden in a case such as this where the nonmov-ant will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. I would interpret Rule 56(c) in keeping with federal precedent, which, dating back to Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), has defined the parties’ respective burdens as follows: The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In so doing, a movant that will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant’s claim. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Such a movant may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out t(j the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim. Id. If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that would bear the burden of persuasion at trial may not simply rest upon its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. FecLR.Civ.P. 56(e). Thorn v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2016). [¶41] I will begin by explaining why I would follow the Celotex line of cases in reviewing the district court's summary judgment ruling. I will then turn to the result that follows when we apply what I believe is fundamentally the most sound assignment of summary judgment burdens in a case like this. A. Celotex Interpretation of Rule 56(c) [¶42] In Celotex, the Supreme Court held: Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s ease, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. [¶43] Our Court has twice recognized the basic premise underlying Celotex, holding: The entry of a summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a 'showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which' that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588, 593 (Wyo. 1999); see also Harper v. Fidelity and Guar. Life Ins. Co., 2010 WY 89, ¶30, 234 P.3d 1211, 1221 (Wyo. 2010) (citing the same Celotex holding). [¶44] This Court has not, however, been presented with the opportunity to address whether our recognition of the Celotex holding affects a summary judgment movant’s burden in a ease where the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion. I believe this case presents that opportunity.16  ■ [¶45] Because of the similarities between Wyoming’s rules of civil procedure and the federal, rules, we have- traditionally looked to federal precedent to interpret our rules. See, e.g, Windham v. Windham, 2015 WY 61, ¶ 20, 348 P.3d 836, 842 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Lamar Outdoor Adver. v. Farmers Co-Op Oil Co., 2009 WY 112, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d 296, 301 (Wyo.2009)) (“Because the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal court interpretations of their rules are highly persuasive in our interpretation of the corresponding-'Wyoming rules.”). I see no reason to change course .here, [¶46], First, I do not see the Celotex holding as a significant., departure from our own precedent defining summary judgment burdens. We have held: The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 66(c); Throckmartin v. Century 21 Top Realty, 2010 WY 23, ¶ 12, 226 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo.2010). Until the movant has made a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmovant has no obligation to respond to the motion with materials beyond the pleadings. Id. Amos v. Lincoln Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 2016 WY 116, ¶ 15, 359 P.3d 954, 958-59 (Wyo. 2015). [¶47] Celotex maintains this same order of summary judgment burdens, placing the initial burden on the movant to make the prima facie showing required by Rule 56(c), but clarifies how the movant’s initial burden is met when it is the nonmovant who bears the burden of persuasion at trial. As one authority, has explained: , Finally, it is important to note that} as established in Celotex, it is not necessary for the movant to introduce any evidence in order to prevail on. summary judgment, at least 'in ■ cases in which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. The movant can seek summary judgment by establishing that the opposing party has insufficient evidence to prevail as a matter of law, thereby forcing the opposing party to come forward with some evidence or risk having judgment-entered against him. On the other hand, the party moving for summary judgment cannot sustain its burden merely by denying the allegations in the opponent’s pleadings, or merely by asserting that the nonmovant lacks evidence to support its claim. The movant must show why the opponent’s allegations of fact are insufficient to support the claim for relief as a matter of law or why the court should conclude that its opponent lacks sufficient evidence. 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Civil Procedure § 2727.1 (2016 4th ed.) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). [¶48] In addition to being in keeping with our general allocation of summary judgment burdens, the Celotex approach is supported by sound policy justifications. As the Supreme Court explained: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost'50 years authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of eveiy action.” Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1; see Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984). Before the shift to “notice pleading” .accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to- trial with the attendant unwarranted .consumption of public and private resources. But with the advent of “notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 must be construed with due regai-d not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55. [¶49] Por the reasons stated above, I would join the majority of other state jurisdictions and interpret Rule 56(c) in keeping with the Celótex line of federal precedent.17 When that is done in this ease, and the summary judgment burdens are properly defined, it is impossible to find a triable issue of fact. B. Application of the Celotex Rule [¶50] Mr. Bogdanski asserted that Mr. Budzik was negligent in his: (1) failure to put chains on the truck’s drive wheels when approaching steep grades in a heavy snowstorm; (2) failure to use proper driving methods to regain traction oh the slippery road, and: (3) failure to immediately put out reflective emergency triangles. On summary judgment, FedEx pointed out that Mr. Bogdanski had not designated an accident reconstruc-tionist or human factors expert to provide testimony concerning these alleged failings and how they contributed to Mr. Bogdanski’s injuries and that the record was otherwise devoid of evidence to support Mr. Bogdan-ski’s claims. In opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Bogdanski relied solely on the opinions of his motor fleet safety expert, Michael Williams. [¶51] The difficulty‘with Mr. Bogdanski’s sole reliance on Mr. Williams’ opinions was that those opinions, as I will discuss below, were largely speculative and unsupported by foundational facts.' As' such, the opinions would not be admissible at trial and were insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Rivers v. Moore, Myers & Garland, LLC, 2010 WY 102, ¶¶ 23-24, 236 P.3d 284, 293 (Wyo. 2010) (expert’s bald assertion of an opinion, unsupported by foundational facts, is inadmissible and will not serve to show a material issue of fact); RB, Jr. v. Big Horn Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 2017 WY 13, ¶ 30, 388 P.3d 542, 551 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2005)) (“Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.”). 1. Failure to Use Snow Chains [¶52] On the question of snow chain use, Mr. Williams opined that based on the recorded weather conditions on the date of the accident: 1) it “was good weather to expect ice and slippery conditions on the road;” 2) “Mr. Budzik knew or should have known that tire chains were needed to maintain traction on the highway;” and 3) "Damian Budzick was negligent by not installing chains on his vehicle and recklessly operated his vehicle in severely hazardous weather conditions.” On examination, though, Mr; Williams conceded he had no factual support for his opinion. He testified: Q. Okay. Do you know if any of the other vehicles in — on the highway were chained Up? A. I have no idea. Q. Is there any evidence in the record that Damian Budzik had any trouble keeping his vehicle on the road prior to coming to a stop? A. No.' Q. * * * Is there any evidence in the record to suggest that Damian Budzik was unable to bring his vehicle to a safe stop and not run into the vehicles in front of him? A. No. * if? ⅛ q. # * * I meanj y0U (jon’t have any basis in fact to say that Damian Budzik should have been chained up prior to the time he came to a stop; isn’t that trae? A. That’s my opinion, that he should have, but I don’t have any basic facts to support that. [¶53] In addition to Mr. Williams’ admitted lack of foundation for his opinion, FedEx pointed out in its summary judgment reply that Mr. Williams’ assumed facts were contrary to the evidence of record. Mr. Budzik testified: he had no difficulty controlling the truck at any time as he drove through Wyoming; there were other trucks on the road, none of which were using chains; and he had traction when he came to a stop before the accident. Mr. Williams’ inadmissible opinion was insufficient to refute Mr. Budzik’s uncon-troverted testimony and was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 2. Failure to Regain Traction [¶54] Mr. Bogdanski’s sole evidence on Mr. Budzik’s alleged breach of duty in failing to regain traction was again the opinion of Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams opined: Mr. Budzik displayed a lack of experience by his failure to execute basic maneuvers in attempting to move his vehicle off the road and prevent an emergency situation. Truck driving schools teach a simple technique to use to move a commercial motor vehicle on icy roads in the absence of sand or gravel. By placing the transmission in 3rd gear, locking the power divider then slowly depressing the accelerator. This will lock both rear axles so that they are pulling together and reduces the force to the wheels, helping to keep them from spinning. [¶55] As the majority opinion recognizes at ¶ 36, the record contains no evidence that the truck Mr. Budzik was driving had the axel interlock device required to perform Mr. Williams’ recommended maneuver. Moreover, Mr. Williams testified: Q. And let me ask you. I mean, what information do you have about what Damian Budzik did or didn’t do to try to get himself going? A, Well, the only thing that I had information was that he had tried to get out of there, spinning the wheels enough that it got them nice and slick so he couldn’t get out. And then he did not put the triangles out, which is— Q. Okay. All right. But the truth, though, is that you don’t know what he actually did physically to get the truck moving? A. No. Q. What I just said is a correct statement? A. Correct. [¶56] Mr. Williams’ opinion is again one without foundation. Rather than investigating the actions Mr. Budzik took to regain traction and then evaluating those actions, Mr. Williams offers a maneuver “that would be a way he could get that truck out.” There is of course no way to know whether that maneuver would have worked to free the truck in this case, but even if we were to indulge Mr. Williams’ speculation and assume it would work, the record contains no evidence that the truck Mr. Budzik was operating had the equipment required to perform the maneuver. Mr. Williams’ speculative opinion is simply not admissible evidence that Mr. Budzik breached a duty of care, and Mr. Bogdanski has otherwise failed to identify any evidence to support this claim. 3. Failure to Place Warning Triangles [¶57] I agree with the majority opinion that a genuine issue of fact exists on the question of whether Mr. Budzik breached a duty of care by failing to immediately place warning triangles outside the tractor-trailer. I disagree, however, that Mr. Bogdanski presented evidence sufficient to show an issue of fact on causation — that is, whether that alleged breach of duty was a proximate cause of Mr. Bogdanski’s injuries. [¶58] On the question of proximate cause, Mr. Bogdanski’s sole evidence was again the opinion of Mr. Williams. On this question, Mr. Williams opined: “The failure of Mr. Budzik to initiate emergency procedures immediately resulted in an accident resulting in the severe injury to Mr. Bo[g]danski.” When questioned on this opinion, however, Mr. Williams testified: Q. All right. Now, Budzik didn’t hit anybody, but Vi[k]tor Marinov, he hit somebody, right? A. Yes. Q. Who did he hit? A. Well, he hit Budzik. But Mr. Marinov was — what was he doing, 60 miles an hour? Q. Right. A. So he had nothing to do with what Budzik did or didn’t do. I mean, he had the accident. But I can’t go back and say Mari-nov you were wrong, because he has nothing to do with what I say, and I don’t care if he was going 60. If he put the triangles out and he would have seen them, maybe there’s a chance he would move over and not have had the accident. Drivers do that. I mean I can’t explain why. I can’t go into a big scenario why Marinov was going 60 and everybody else — don’t know. Q. Well, what you just said, Mike, you will agree that that is speculation on your part, you don’t have any facts? A. Absolutely. Q. All right. But one of the facts we do know is that Marinov was going 60 miles an hour, correct? A. Correct. Q. And Marinov could not bring his vehicle to a safe stop? A. That’s correct. Q. And you agree with me that as a professional truck driver, whether it’s the Smith’s program or any defensive truck driving lesson, you are required to maintain your speed such that you can bring your vehicle to a safe spot — stop? A. Absolutely. Q. Did Vi[k]tor Marinov on that day do that? A. From the evidence that I see, no, he did not. Q. * * * You will agree with me that the Wyoming Highway Patrol Investigation determined that Viktor Marinov was driving at a speed too fast for conditions? A. Well, now you’re getting into an area that I have never gone into, because I know nothing about Vi[k]tor Marinov or his-^-what happened to him, or the lawsuit or anything else. I have — the only thing I have on Vi[k]tor Marinov is I have his bill of lading. Q. Okay. A. And that’s it. I have no knowledge of him. Q. Never crossed your mind that when you were analyzing this ease, and that it’s brought because Mr. Bogdanski claims significant injury, it never crossed your mind that you should analyze how it was that the vehicle and Mr. Bogdanski potentially was struck by Vi[k]tor Marinov and why that happened? [Objection] THE WITNESS: Again, I have nothing [to do] with that. My — my opinion and what I looked ’at, Marinov hit him. I don’t know why he was doing 60, can’t say what caused him to hit the back of the Bogdan-ski vehicle. But what I can say is, Budzik did not put out the triangles as he should have, and there’s a chance that Marinov could have moved over to the other lane. [¶59] To qualify as a legal cause of a plaintiffs injuries, the alleged conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs injuries. Amos, ¶ 27, 369 P.3d at 961 (quoting Foote v. Simek, 2006 WY 96, ¶ 22, 139 P.3d 455, 464 (Wyo. 2006)). We have said: A person, no doubt, could create many “what if’ scenarios that, in hindsight, might have prevented this tragic incident. But, negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of liability. Vasquez v. Wal-Mart, 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo.1996); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo.1994); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo.1986); Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo.1976). Guesswork is not a substitute for evidence or inference, and inference cannot be based on mere possibility. Forbes Co. v. MacNeel, 382 P.2 [P.2d] 56, 57 (Wyo.1963); Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 242 P. 1107, 1111 (1926). General or conclusory allegations cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact. Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2 [P.2d] 1322, 1324-26 (Wyo.1995). Jones, ¶ 23, 113 P.3d at 39-40 (quoting with approval the lower court’s ruling). [¶60] On the question of causation, Mr. Williams offered, by his own admission, only conjecture and speculation. The record is otherwise devoid of evidence that the failure to immediately place warning triangles played any part in this accident, and Mr, Bogdanski thus failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this question. ' [¶61] Assuming this matter goes to trial, Mr. Bogdanski will have the burden to prove all elements of his negligence claims. Based on Mr. Bogdanski’s evidence, or lack thereof, I have no doubt that FedEx, will move for and be granted a directed verdict. In my view, the majority ruling thus fails to accom-. plish the goal of giving truly-disputed issues of; fact to a jury for resolution, which .should be our reason for rejecting summary judgment and requiring a trial. By sending this case back for trial, we have instead done little more than add unnecessary cost, delay, and expenditure of judicial resources to the resolution of this case. [¶62] Our result would be different were we to use a Celotex analysis, which illustrates the wisdom of Celotex. The Celotex analysis recognizes there is little to be gained by a trial if a plaintiff has had a full opportunity for discovery and is still unable to produce evidence sufficient to meet his burden of proof, or even to show a genuine issue of material fact. That is the case here, and I would therefore use the Celotex analysis and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to FedEx.  . I understand the parties did not cite Celotex in their summary judgment arguments and the district court did not apply a Celotex analysis in its ruling. Still, this Court may affirm summary judgment on any legal basis supported by the record, Williams v. Matheny, 2017 WY 85, ¶9, 398 P.3d 521, 524 (Wyo. 2017), and the record in this case supports the application of Celotex and affirming on that basis. Additionally, while the parties did not cite Celotex in their summary judgment arguments, they argued summary judgment very much as if Celotex were the governing standard. FedEx, the movant, cited Rule 56(c) and argued that based on the record before the court, Mr. Bogdanski had no evidence to support his claims. Mr. Bogdanski opposed the motion, not by arguing that FedEx failed to come forward with evidence sufficient shift the summary judgment burden, but by submitting evidence he contended was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, X note that FedEx filed its summary judgment motion twenty months after Mr. Bogdanski filed his complaint, just over three months before the scheduled jury trial, and Mr. Bogdanski made no suggestion he needed additional time for discovery. In other words, if Mr. Bogdanski had evidence to support his claims against FedEx, he could have and no doubt would have, submitted that evidence in opposition to FedEx's summary judgment motion. I therefore see no undue surprise or unfairness to the parties in affirming summary judgment using a Celotex-based analysis.   . See Waste Conversion Tech., Inc. v. Midstate Recovery, LLC, 2008 WL 5481231, * 26, n.19 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (noting “Celotex has been adopted by rule or court decision in a majority of states,” and citing cases).