Court Opinion

ID: 9770884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:24:10.506405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:21.566986
License: Public Domain

*85ON REHEARING.
Mr. Justice Calvert
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In his motion for rehearing defendant Ortiz calls our attention to the fact that the deed under which he claims title was executed by the officials of Hidalgo County pursuant to the provisions of Art. 7345b, sec. 9, V.A.S. He contends that his status should not be determined by the general rules governing the status of purchasers under quitclaim deeds but should be determined with particular reference to the provisions of that article.
Section 9 of Art. 7345b provides that if property sold under foreclosure of a tax lien “be sold to any taxing unit which is a party to the judgment * * * the taxing unit may sell and convey the property so purchased by it * * * and the purchaser of the property at any such sale shall receive all of the right, title and interest in said property as was acquired and is then held by said taxing unit * * It also provides: “Any taxing unit * * * making any sale under provisions hereof shall execute and deliver to the purchaser at such sale a deed of conveyance, conveying all right, title' and interest of all the taxing units interested in the tax foreclosure judgment in and to the property so sold * *
The language of the deed to Ortiz is substantially in keeping with the wording of the statute. This does not make it operate to convey the land. The deed plainly purports to convey only such interest as the taxing units had in the land. Such deeds are construed by our courts to be mere quitclaims. To cite a few cases in which deeds of similar wording were held to be quitclaims, see Hill v. Foster et al., 181 S.W. 2d 299; affirmed, 143 Texas 482, 186 S.W. 2d 343; Houston Oil Co. et al v. Niles et al., 255 S.W. 604 (Com. App.) Hunter et al v. Eastham et al., 95 Texas 648, 69 S.W. 66. Article 7345b was enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the construction our courts have given such deeds. It must be presumed that the legislature acted in the light of that knowledge and knew the legal effect of the language it used in directing the type and form of deed to be executed by taxing units. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Texas 369, 221 S.W. 880, 886; 39 Tex. Jur. 248, sec. 132.
Surely the legislature had the power to direct that taxing units — political subdivisions of the state — should bind themselves to a purchaser no further than to convey to him only such *86interest in property as they might acquire as purchasers at a foreclosure sale. Indeed, it may well have regarded any other direction as most unwise. The fact that the deed to Ortiz was in the form prescribed by the statute did not place him in any better or more favorable position than any other purchaser under a quitclaim deed. He cannot be regarded in law as an innocent purchaser.
We have considered all the grounds for a rehearing urged by Ortiz in his motion, as well also as those urged by the other defendants in their separate motion. Both motions are overruled.
Opinion delivered March 7, 1951.
Second motion for rehearing overruled April 4, 1951.