Court Opinion

ID: 9586198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:10.040331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:15.921648
License: Public Domain

STUBBLEFIELD, J.
(sitting by designation), concurring in result.
*95¶ 1 I agree with the result reached by the majority, although I do so based on a far different analysis of the issues of this case.
¶ 2 First, I cannot assent to the insinuation that the statute of limitations might also bar Plaintiffs’ claim. I see no reason that the rule espoused by the court in Stephens v. General Motors Corp., 1995 OK 114, 905 P.2d 797, would not apply, as Plaintiffs assert. Under the Stephens rationale, this ease was timely filed where it was brought within two years of certiorari being denied after another division of this court rendered its decision on appeal of the judgment that forms the underpinnings of this malpractice action.
¶ 3 I also reject the conclusion that the affirmance of the lower court is dictated by application of a public policy rule. I note that there is little discoverable authority purporting to determine such cases on the basis of public policy.
¶ 4 The Saks case, cited by the majority, is inapposite. Saks involves criminal defendants, who had been convicted of bank fraud. In that instance, a “client who contends that his willful criminal act or criminal conviction directly resulted from an attorney’s negligent services, [cannot] sue that attorney for legal malpractice.” 880 S.W.2d at 469.
¶ 5 The other case cited by the majority, Mettes v. Quinn, 89 Ill.App.3d 77, 44 Ill.Dec. 427, 411 N.E.2d 549 (1980), does stand for the proposition that the courts will not aid a party in benefitting from her fraud. However, my cursory search has not resulted in discovery of the application of such a rule in Oklahoma.
¶ 6 Oklahoma has long held to the rule that equity will not aid one who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct. Camp v. Camp, 196 Okla. 199, 163 P.2d 970 (1945). However, such a rule generally would not impede a quest for legal relief, such as a claim based on alleged professional negligence.
¶ 7 My analysis of the issues leads me to conclude that the question presented is not one of a public policy bar or mandate but, instead, a classic causation analysis. The issue is whether Plaintiffs state a cognizable claim for relief in light of the given fact that they have been judicially determined to have engaged in fraud. In that regard, I do not believe that a plaintiffs fraud alone would, as a matter of law, relieve a defendant of potential liability for professional negligence, unless, without factual dispute, the fraud was the sole cause of a plaintiffs damages.2
¶ 8 Thus, I have reviewed the record to determine whether the uncontroverted facts dictate that Plaintiffs’ actions resulted in the judgments against them or whether the alleged negligence of Defendants could have been a causative factor. I conclude that the district court verdict and judgment in the underlying civil action and the judgment on appeal to Division 3 of this court dictate a conclusion that it was Plaintiffs’ fraud that resulted in both the fraud and breach of contract judgments against them.
¶ 9 From examination of the jury instructions, the verdicts, the lower court’s judgment and the decision in appeal No. 86,132, the sole conclusion that can be reached is that the fraud alleged against these Plaintiffs was promissory fraud. Thus, although there were separate claims of fraud and breach of contract made against these Plaintiffs in the earlier lawsuit, the breach of contract also was based on allegations of Plaintiffs’ original fraudulent intent not to abide by the contract. The district court verdict and judgment impliedly represent a finding of such specific fraudulent intent.3
¶ 10 Based on this analysis, the purported negligence of Defendants in drafting the contract would have been of no consequence, because Plaintiffs had no intention to honor the contract. Thus, I agree with the affir-mance of the lower court’s judgment.

. Hyden v. McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 848 P.2d 1086 (App.1993).

. In Case No. 86,132 our sister court clearly found evidence supporting the implied jury finding of a deceitful intent of these Plaintiffs in making the "standstill agreement.”