Court Opinion

ID: 9703193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:44:36.390435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:46.446763
License: Public Domain

Loiselle, J.
(dissenting). Although my colleagues in the majority disagree, I see this case as one in which the plaintiff, because of the equities, and because of the intent reasonably inferred in two of the three statutes involved in this case, seeks from this court legislation by judicial fiat.
There are three statutes which must be considered in the determination of the present appeal. General Statutes § 52-361 is quite lengthy and somewhat complicated, but the provisions pertinent to the present case may be summarized as follows: After a court has made an order of payment to the clerk of the court or otherwise and the defendant fails to obey the order, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order directing that an execution issue against the defendant. When so ordered, the execution shall be presented to the individual person or corporation from whom a debt accruing by reason of personal services is due and owing and the execution shall become a continuing levy upon the debt until the execution is satisfied. The formula for the amount to be paid on the execution is spelled out and in the present case the parties hereto have agreed that the sum recoverable each week under this section is no more than $50.
*685General Statutes §52-362 (Rev. to 1975), which specifically provides for orders of execution for alimony and child support payments, was first enacted in 1955 to allow a wage execution “against such amount of any debt accruing by reason of personal services due and owing to such [debtor] as exceeds twenty-five dollars [of disposable earnings] per week, or against such lesser amount ... as said court deems equitable.” In 1976; Public Acts 1976, No. 76-66; “fifty dollars” was substituted for “twenty-five dollars.” In 1978, after the trial court rendered its decision in this case, the statute was amended; Public Acts 1978, No. 78-217, § 1; to substitute “seventy dollars” for “fifty dollars.” Other amendments were made but are not pertinent to the issue in this case.
If only these two statutes were applicable, there is no question but that the plaintiff’s claim would qualify under General Statutes § 52-362. The debt is for support and the pension payments would be included as a “debt accruing by reason of personal services due and owing.” Further, as stated in the majority opinion, the intent of the act was to allow wage executions under this act in addition to those specified in General Statutes § 52-361.
In 1977, however, what is now General Statutes §§ 52-352a through 52-352c were enacted.1 In *686§ 52-352a (c), “exempt” is defined as “not subject to any form of process or court order for the purpose of debt collection.” In § 52-352c (d), pensions, such as the defendant’s from Pitney Bowes, are exempt “to the extent that wages are exempt from execution under section 52-361.” It is noteworthy that the next subsection relating to alimony and support is exempt to the extent that execution is limited by § 52-361.
*687The purpose of including all of the provisions of General Statutes §§ 52-352a through 52-352c in the previous footnote is to make evident that those provisions are plain and their language is unambiguous. Its unequivocal meaning is not subject to modification by way of construction. Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 450, 364 A.2d 167; General Tires, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corporation, 143 Conn. 191, 195, 120 A.2d 426. The exemption in General Statutes § 52-352c (d) limits the execution to the provision of § 52-361 as was ordered by the trial court.
“[I]t is basic law that when a later general statute covers the whole subject to which it relates it will be held to repeal by implication all prior statutes on the subject matter, whether general or special.” East Haven v. New Haven, 159 Conn. 453, 467, 271 A.2d 110. At the time of the enactment of §§ 52-352a through 52-352c, the legislature was presumed to know of the existence of § 52-362 and any conflict among the sections would be resolved in favor of the latest enactment. Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 206, 355 A.2d 21. In some instances, a statute, general in its terms, may be construed to admit implied exceptions. New Haven Savings Bank v. Warner, 128 Conn. 662, 669, 25 A.2d 50; Kelley v. Killourey, 81 Conn. 320, 321, 70 A. 1031. However, this interpretation is made only when the intent of the legislature is clear notwithstanding the literal sense and precise letter of the statute. Busko v. DeFilippo, 162 Conn. 462, 471, 294 A.2d 510; State ex rel. Gray v. Quintilian, 121 Conn. 300, 304, 184 A. 382. This rule of construction applies to General Statutes §§ 52-352a through 52-352c.
*688The májority opinion implies an exemption in General Statutes § 52-352c (d) to include General Statutes § 52-362 in addition to General Statutes § 52-361 where there is none. The basis of their opinion is that since “the legislature should be deemed to have recognized the preferred position among judgment creditors that it itself has assigned to those relying on court orders for support,” this court will imply an additional exception. Whether the legislature omitted the exemption to General Statutes § 52-362 in the general exemption statute General Statutes § 52-352c (d) by design or by inadvertanee cannot be determined through examining its legislative history or referring to the wording of the statute. I read the majority opinion as stating that because it is felt that the legislature should have made an additional exemption because of the preferred position of those who are entitled to support, and it did not, this court will. In my opinion, this is legislation by the judiciary which is forbidden by our state constitution.
As I read General Statutes §§ 52-352a through 52-352c, the intent is clear and the exemptions are specific and detailed. “If it- be true, however, that the statute in its present form is apt to work an injustice, that is something for the legislature to cure. It does not require modification of the terms of the statute by the courts for the sake of accomplishing what might appear to be justice.” General Tires, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corporation, supra, 196.
In this opinion Longo, J., concurred.

 “[General Statutes] Sec. 52-352a. definitions. For the purposes of this section and sections 52-352b and 52-352c, the following terms shall have the following meanings: (a) ‘Value’ means fair market value of the exemptioner’s equity or unencumbered interest in the property; (b) ‘Necessary’ means reasonably required to meet the needs of the exemptioner and his or her dependents including any special needs by reason of health or physical infirmity; (e) ‘Exempt’ means, unless otherwise specified, not subject to any form of process or court order for the purpose of debt collection; (d) ‘Exemptioner’ *686means the natural person entitled to an exemption under this section or section 52-352b or 52-352c.
Sec. 52-352b. property exempt. The following property shall be exempt: (a) Necessary apparel, bedding, foodstuffs, household furniture and appliances; (b) Tools, books, instruments and farm animals which are necessary to the exemptioner in the course of his or her occupation or profession; (c) Burial plot for exemptioner and his or her immediate family; (d) Public assistance payments and any wages earned by a publie assistance recipient under an incentive earnings or similar program; (e) Health and disability insurance payments; (f) Health aids necessary to enable the exemptioner to work or to sustain health; (g) Workman’s compensation, social security, veterans and unemployment benefits; (h) Court approved payments for child support; (i) Arms and military equipment, uniforms or musical instruments owned by any member of the militia or armed forces of the United States.
Sec. 52-352c. additional exempt property. The following property shall be allowed as exempt in addition to any property allowed as exempt under section 52-352b: (a) One motor vehicle to the value of one thousand five hundred dollars. Por the purposes of this subsection value shall be determined as the fair market value of the motor vehicle less the amount of all liens and security interests which encumber it; (b) Wedding and engagement rings; (e) Residential utility deposits for one residence, and one residential security deposit; (d) Payments received by the exemptioner wader a profit sharing, pension, stock bonus, annuity or similar plan which is established for the primary purpose of providing benefits upon retirement by reason of age, health, or length of service and which is either (1) qualified under Sections 401, 403, 404 or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, or any successor thereto, or (3) established by federal or state statute, but only to the extent that wages are exempt from execution under section SB-361; (e) Alimony and support, other than child support, but only to the extent that wages are exempt from execution under section 52-361; and (f) An award under a crime reparations act.” (Emphasis added.)