Court Opinion

ID: 9728716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:14:54.378073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:51.306582
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(concurring). I concur in the opinion of Judge R. B. Burns, but write separately to state my reasoning.
At issue in this case is the meaning of the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy.1 Double jeopardy has three different aspects: it bars a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, it bars a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and it protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969).2
*684It is the last protection — that against multiple punishment — with which we are here concerned.
My research has revealed that much of the discussion of the constitutional prohibition on multiple punishment fails to satisfactorily explicate the underpinnings of that protection. See Note: Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale LJ 262 (1965). The courts have failed to address the vital question: why is it wrong to cumulate punishment? Id. at 301.3
The protection against multiple punishment is a restraint on courts and prosecutors. Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977).4 Note, supra, at 304-308. This is because the Legislature is the proper institution to define offenses and provide for their punishment. The Legislature often provides for different statutory offenses which could apply to the same act. In such a case, the prohibition on multiple punishment prevents courts from cumulating punishment where it ap*685pears that the Legislature did not intend that the defendant be cumulatively punished. See Gore v United States, 357 US 386; 78 S Ct 1280; 2 L Ed 2d 1405 (1958). As an aid to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent, courts have applied certain rules of construction. For example, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to punish cumulatively a greater and necessarily included offense. Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale LJ 513 (1949); Note, supra, at 318-319. In short, a "rule of lenity” prohibits multiple punishment where the legislative intent is unclear or doubtful. See People v Nelson, 79 Mich App 303; 261 NW2d 299 (1977).
Where the legislative intent regarding punishment is clear, however, there is no multiple punishment problem. Cf. People v Nelson, supra. The danger against which the constitutional prohibition is directed is not present; the court is not multiplying punishment.
In the case at bar, the Legislature has provided, in clear and unmistakable terms, for two convictions and a minimum two-year sentence where a person commits or attempts to commit a felony while in possession of a firearm. Because the legislative intent is clear, there can be no multiple punishment problem; there is no possibility of the court cumulating punishment. Vacating a conviction in this case would undermine the acknowledged function of the Legislature: to define and set the punishment for offenses. It cannot be contended that an individual needs constitutional double jeopardy protection against the Legislature’s clear exercise of its proper penological function.5
*686This is not, as the dissent asserts, a case of the court abdicating its proper constitutional function. Rather, the problem is one of defining the constitutional protection against multiple punishment. I believe that protection only prevents the courts and prosecutors from multiplying punishment absent a clear legislative directive prescribing punishment. Where the statutory scheme evidences a clear legislative intent that a defendant be punished under separate statutes, there is no multiple punishment problem. Thus, it is illogical to speak of the court abandoning its function by deferring to the Legislature where the Legislature’s intent is manifest.
Thus, I agree that both convictions should be affirmed in the case at bar.
I also believe that two aspects of the dissent deserve comment.
First, the dissent, applying the Blockburger6 test, finds that armed robbery and felony-firearm are the "same offense”. I disagree.
Under Blockburger, two statutory provisions define different offenses if: "each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not”. 284 US at 304 (emphasis added). Clearly, felony-firearm requires proof of a fact not required to convict of armed robbery: possession of a firearm. Armed robbery also requires the proof of facts not required for conviction of felony-firearm, e.g., a robbery. A robbery need not be proved to establish a felony-firearm violation; any felony will *687suffice. Therefore, I would find that armed robbery and felony-firearm are not the "same offense” under Federal constitutional law.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540; 256 NW2d 31 (1977), and People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), held that a defendant may not be convicted, of two crimes where, on the facts of the particular case, the trier of fact must necessarily find him guilty of one in order to find him guilty of the other. People v Terry Alexander, 82 Mich App 621; 267 NW2d 466 (1978). However, those cases were decided in the context of convictions for possession and sale or delivery of heroin. As there was no contention that the Legislature intended two convictions for these offenses, the Court’s omission of reference to legislative intent is understandable. Martin and Stewart thus apply to cases in which there is no express legislative intent to allow multiple conviction. Those cases do not apply to the case at bar, where that intent is explicit.
Second, the dissent hints that Michigan courts interpret the Michigan constitutional protection against multiple punishment more restrictively than its substantially similar Federal counterpart. I agree that Martin and Stewart appear to go beyond the Blockburger rule. However, where the intent of the Legislature is clear, I can ascertain no identifiable state policy mandating a more restrictive interpretation of the double jeopardy clause.

 US Const Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.

 The multiple punishment protection of the double jeopardy clause was recognized very early in American jurisprudence. See Ex parte Lange, 85 US (18 Wall) 163; 21 L Ed 872 (1874), North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969).
The context in which the multiple punishment issue arose in Lange was that Lange was sentenced to a statutory maximum term of one year in prison without being allowed credit for time served under a previous invalid sentence for the same conviction. This was held to be unconstitutional multiple punishment. In Pearce, the Court held that the constitutional multiple punishment protection requires that punishment already exacted be fully credited in imposing sentence after a new conviction for the same offense.
*684eases involving multiple punishment issues similar to that in the case at bar have found no constitutional violation. See Kowalski v Parratt, 533 F2d 1071 (CA 8, 1976), cert den 429 US 844; 97 S Ct 125; 50 L Ed 2d 115 (1976), State v Saxon, 193 Neb 278; 226 NW2d 765 (1975), Jones v Commonwealth, 218 Va 18; 235 SE2d 313 (1977).

 Part of the problem is that courts have seized upon the United States Supreme Court’s language in cases not involving the instant issue. For example, the dissent quotes Simpson v United States, 435 US 6; 98 S Ct 909; 55 L Ed 2d 70 (1978), which simply declined to reach a double punishment issue where it found that Congress did not intend separate punishment for a single transaction, for the proposition that Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), applies even where Congress clearly intended cumulative punishment. I find the dicta in Simpson unpersuasive authority for that proposition.

 "[T]he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.” Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 165; 97 S Ct 2221, 2225; 53 L Ed 2d 187, 193-194 (1977).

 The constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, US Const, Am VIII, and the due process guarantee, US Const, Am V, and their state constitutional counterparts, provide adequate re*686straints on the Legislature’s exercise of its power to define offenses and prescribe punishments.
I also note that, under the dissent’s analysis, a sentence enhancement statute which did not provide for a second conviction would pose no double jeopardy problem.

 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932).