Court Opinion

ID: 9707589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:14.07929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.510993
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). I am unable to *373agree with the majority that the Supreme Court’s decision, Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982), should be given limited retroactive effect to cases which were pending on appeal when Hardy was issued. While this Court has previously applied the Hardy decision to a case which was pending on appeal at the time Hardy was issued, Thon v Saginaw Paint Mfg Co, 120 Mich App 745, 748; 327 NW2d 551 (1982), no reasoning was offered for giving Hardy such limited retroactive effect.1 Likewise, the majority summarily states that Hardy should be given limited retroactive effect.
In Chevron Oil Co v Huson, 404 US 97; 92 S Ct 349; 30 L Ed 2d 296 (1971), the Supreme Court stated a criterion for determining whether a civil case should be given retroactive effect:
"First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, * * * or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed * * *. Second, it has been stressed that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ * * * Finally, we have waived the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for '[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the "injustice or hardship” by a holding of nonretroactivity.’ ” 404 US 106-107, quoting Cipriano v City of Houma, 395 US 701, 706; 89 S Ct 1897; 23 L Ed 2d 647 (1969), and Linkletter *374v Walker, 381 US 618, 629; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965).
Considering these factors, I feel that Hardy should be given prospective effect only. Applying Hardy prospectively would "[p]romote not only sound jurisprudence, through respect for stare decisis and confidence in the stability and certainty of judicial decisionmaking, but also growth and development in the law, in that it allows the court to make necessary and fundamental changes without creating havoc in the judicial system”. Moody, Retroactive Application of Law-Changing Decisions in Michigan, 28 Wayne L Rev 439, 495-496 (1982). Regarding these arguments, the late Justice Moody further noted, "if courts expect people to live under the law, judges cannot require them to guess beforehand as to what it might be”. Id., 496.
In Hardy, supra, the Supreme Court effectively overruled Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Div of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615; 281 NW2d 291 (1979), and Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974). The trial court properly applied Tulkku and Funk at the time of the trial. I believe that giving Hardy limited retroactive effect would neither further the purposes underlying Hardy nor promote sound jurisprudence and growth and development in the law.
I would affirm the trial court.

 I do not feel that Phardel v Michigan, 120 Mich App 806, 814; 328 NW2d 108 (1982), applied Hardy to a case pending on appeal on the date Hardy was issued. The Court in Phardel merely discussed Hardy, noting that the trial court in that case correctly applied comparative negligence. 120 Mich App 814-815. In fact, a safety device was not even involved in Phardel.