Court Opinion

ID: 9543498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:58.319794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:27.396687
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice:
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that this case should be remanded for a hearing and a determination as to whether one or more jurors based their vote in this case on what they thought was a divine indication of defendant’s guilt.
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury that determines guilt or innocence based on the evidence and the law presented to it. Verdicts decided on some other basis make the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury a nullity. Indeed, a verdict that is rendered on the basis of supposed divine intervention is a throwback to the primitive days of trial by ordeal where, for example, the manner of healing of a severe bum inflicted on a party was deemed to be an indication of God’s judgment.
Of course, a juror may seek divine guidance through prayer in reaching a decision, and courts have so recognized. See State v. Rocco, 119 Ariz. 27, 679 P.2d 65 (Ct.App.1978); State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 950, 103 S.Ct. 2419, 77 L.Ed.2d 1309 (1983). But jurors are duty-bound to decide a case on the basis of the evidence presented at trial. See Falls City v. Sperry, 68 Neb. 420, 94 N.W. 529 (1903). See also Murphy v. Graves, 294 S.W.2d 29 (Mo.1956). See generally 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial, § 90 (1971); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial, § 1015 (1974).
However, here it is alleged that something other than the evidence was the basis of the verdict for at least one juror. In support of his motion for a new trial, defendant submitted the affidavit of a juror which stated:
5. Said juror, [juror’s name], further stated to the affiant and the other jurors in said jury room during said deliberations, that while the defendant’s attorney was giving his closing argument, she, [the juror], prayed, "... that if said attorney made eye contact with her she would know he was telling the truth, but if he did not she would know he was not telling the truth about defendant; that he did not make eye contact with her, so she knew said attorney was not telling the truth,” concerning the defendant.
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7. Said juror, [name of juror], was one of the leaders, during the deliberations by the jury, of the faction seeking a speedy and early determination of guilt of the defendant.
Thus, the affidavit alleges that the juror received a divine indication of the right result, not divine guidance in assessing the evidence.
Sound reasons support the general policy against allowing impeachment of jury verdicts by attacking the mental processes used by jurors to arrive at a verdict. As long as the jurors purport to act on the basis of the facts and the law, no challenge is permissible, even if jurors may have acted on the basis of some alleged error or misunderstanding. But certainly verdicts are not absolutely inviolate. Verdicts based on chance or bribery, for example, have long been subject to challenge, since they do not even purport to be based on the law and the evidence. See Utah R.Civ.P. *8659(a) (1987) (applicable to criminal proceedings by virtue of Rule 81(e)). Thus, if jurors were to agree that a verdict would be based on a “divine sign,” a Ouija board answer, or some fortuitous event, such a verdict, in my judgment, would constitute a denial of due process and the right to trial by jury.
The trial judge ruled that Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1987) prohibited him from considering the allegations in the affidavit submitted by defendant.1 Rule 606(b) governs the admissibility of juror testimony and affidavits for purposes of impeaching a jury verdict. The majority sustains that ruling, holding that “prayer and supposed responses to prayer are not included within the meaning of the words ‘outside influence’ ” as used in Rule 606(b).
I believe the majority fails to draw a critical distinction between the legitimacy of jurors’ seeking divine assistance in accurately and dispassionately weighing the evidence and the illegitimacy of jurors’ abdicating their sworn duty to decide the case on the evidence and instead relying on some supposedly divine sign. Although “[a] juror is fit to serve if he or she can impartially weigh the evidence and apply the law to the facts as he or she finds them,” as the majority observes, the fact appears to be that the juror in question did not impartially weigh the evidence and apply the law to the facts, but disregarded the evidence and the law and ruled on the basis of an “outside influence.” Accordingly, the trial court could have relied on the affidavit under Rule 606(b) for the purpose of deciding that a hearing on the allegations should have been held. It is of particular significance that the juror in question is alleged to have been “one of the leaders” during the jury deliberations.
In my view, a verdict based on chance, like a verdict based on a supposed divine sign, falls within the meaning of the terms “extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influence,” as those terms are used in Rule 606(b) of the Rules of Evidence. If, therefore, the allegations of the affidavit are true, defendant would be entitled to a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
I would remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jurors decided the case on the evidence or whether there was reliance on factors outside the record.

. Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1987) states:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental pro-
cesses in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
(Emphasis added.)