Court Opinion

ID: 9660527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:15:12.292912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.263101
License: Public Domain

Christianson, J.
(dissenting). I agree with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the syllabus and with those parts of the opinion prepared by Judge Morris to which those paragraphs relate; but I do not agree with the remainder of the opinion or with the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice. I am of the view that the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk were for the jury, and that the verdict of the jury is supported by the evidence.
The plaintiff is a train dispatcher for the Great Northern Railway Company at Grand Forks. The defendant is a fraternal corporation organized under the laws of this state. On July 10, 1947, plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries as a result of falling from a ladder while he was working for the defendant decorating a pavilion at the fair grounds. The pavilion had a “dance floor” some hundred feet in length and sixty feet in width. It had a high arched ceiling with timbers across. There were wires running lengthwise the entire length of the building. The wires were used for placement of decorations when ceremonies, dances, or festivities were held therein. There was a stage about the middle of the floor on which the orchestra was seated. The wire was approximately fifteen feet from the floor at each end and approximately sixteen feet at the center. The Imperial Potentate of the' Mystic Shrine was scheduled to visit Kem Temple on July 10, 1947, and the officers of the defendant were making arrangements for his reception and festivities incident thereto at the pavilion.
Pierce and Mclver were officers of the defendant corporation. Pierce was the Potentate, (the chief officer) and Mclver was the stage director. Shortly before July 10, 1947, Mclver, the stage director of the defendant, contacted the plaintiff and asked him to do some work at the pavilion in preparation for the festivities. The plaintiff agreed to come and work. He testified that he was told there would be a ladder at the pavilion. In the early morning of July 10, 1947, the plaintiff and four other men drove out to the pavilion to engage in the work which had *374been assigned to them. These men were Cloyd Steenerson, Ben Grove, Clarence Misner, Jake Hoffman and the plaintiff, Frank Olson. They found that certain equipment, including- a long-step ladder, had been delivered. They first conferred with respect to the work to be done and the division of the work. Steenerson had decorated the stage on previous occasions. It was agreed that he and Grove should work at that and that in decorating the main hall the plaintiff Olson should fasten the streamers on the wire and that Misner and Hoffman should place the ends of the streamers at the sides as they hung from the wire. The plan for decorating the main hall was to create a tent-like appearance with paper streamers coming from the wire and fastened at the sides.
Plaintiff testified that only one ladder had been brought and left at the pavilion for use of the men in their work; that it was a wooden ladder about fourteen feet high; that he had never used the ladder but had seen it standing in the cloak room or property room in the Temple in Grand Forks; that the ladder tapered so that it was narrower at the top than at the bottom; that there were two back legs which folded when the ladder was taken down and that when these were extended the ladder had four legs and that there was a brace at the top to be pushed down which would lock the ladder and make it solid; that when he was ready for work he took the ladder and pushed down the brace at the top so as to make the' ladder solid ; that when he set the ladder up for use he shook it to be sure it was balanced on all four legs on the floor; that he did not make a personal inspection of each of the steps but that he looked and did not see anything to indicate that it was unsafe. He said, “When I set it up for using it, I made sure the center part was down, and I shook it to be sure it was balanced on all four legs on the floor there. I saw that the ladder was level on all four legs, and the ladder appeared safe to use. I didn’t see anything that would cause me to think that the ladder was unsafe.” He testified that he had used the ladder for about an hour when the accident occurred; that he did not notice that any of the steps in the ladder were weak or weakening; that the floor was clean and dry and that there was no rubbish on it; that in work*375ing he climbed just high enough so he could reach the wire; that he did not have to reach up to put the streamers over the wire; that he ascended the ladder only high enough so that his shoulders would be opposite the wire; that the operation was to slip a streamer over the wire and then staple it; that immediately before he fell he had reached a point where the wire was higher and it became necessary for him to take one step higher than he had before; that the step on which he then stepped was probably about six or seven feet from the floor; that the step tilted and he started to fall; that he did not lose his balance, that it was the tilt that caused him to fall; that at the place the accident occurred the wire was approximately sixteen feet above the floor; that he did not see the ladder after the accident and did not know personally whether the step broke.
It is undisputed that plaintiff sustained • severe personal injuries as a result of the fall.
Pierce testified that in July 1947 he was acting Potentate (chief officer) of the defendant corporation and that one Mclver was stage director; that as acting Potentate he instructed Mclver, the stage director, to make the necessary arrangements to have the pavilion at the State fair grounds prepared and decorated for the festivities to be had incident to the reception of the Imperial Potentate. Pierce further testified that he was quite familiar with the ladder from which the plaintiff Olson fell and had been'so for some sixteen years.- He said the ladder was a flimsy, rickety ladder and was wobbly. He stated that he saw the ladder at the pavilion the evening before the accident occurred, but made no inspection of it. In answer to a question whether there was anything wrong with the ladder other than he had stated he answered “no.” He further testified that he was acquainted with Olson, the plaintiff; that after the accident he visited him at the hospital several times and that on one or two of these occasions he told him the ladder was so unsafe it should never have been sent out to the pavilion at all.
Mclver testified that in July 1947 he was stage director of the defendant corporation; that the stage director is appointed by the Potentate and an active member of the appointive divan; that as stage director he had a crew of twenty-four men work*376ing under Ms direction; that he was instructed by the Potentate to have the pavilion at the fair grounds decorated and put in proper shape for the reception of the Imperial Potentate. That the defendant had a lot of equipment to be used for occasions of that kind and that he made arrangements with men to decorate the pavilion, that plaintiff Olson was one of the men; that such arrangements were made about July 7th or 8th; that-he arranged with one Hiler of the Hiler Transfer Company to take certain equipment out to the pavilion, including a ladder to be used in putting up the decorations “especially the paper streamers.” He testified that he was out at the pavilion the evening before the accident and observed the various articles that he had arranged to send out; that the stepladder was approximately fourteen feet high; that he saw it there that evening; that the ladder was usually kept in the property room off the stage and sometimes in the cloak room in the Temple. He testified that he had been familiar with this ladder for about fifteen years; that the ladder was rickety, that the joints.of the ladder Were loose; that they squeaked and wiggled when you walked on it and that the ladder would wiggle a little when you got near the top.
Hiler testified that he served as stage director of Kem Temple from 1932 to 1943; that he is in the transfer business in Grand Porks and hauled the .equipment referred to in the previous testimony to the pavilion; that among such equipment there was a long stepladder which he (Hiler) had donated to the defendant about 1931 and that it has been retained by the defendant since that time; that he purchased the ladder from a customer who was moving away and found that the ladder was too long to get into the moving van; that during the time he served as stage director he repaired the ladder, that he laid the ladder down on the side and tightened the nails and screws in it so as to make it more rigid; that the steps in the ladder were fitted into grooves; that he was familiar with the condition of the ladder shortly before it was taken to the pavilion. When asked “What was its condition?” he answered: “It wasn’t too bad. I wouldn’t want to get up on the top of it and stand on it without somebody steadying it. But it was rickety as *377Mclver said a while ago. If you got up and moved' around it would sway. If somebody was there to steady it, it was all right. And if you got up and stood perfectly still it was all right. But it wasn’t good to get up to the top and reach over three or four feet to calcimine or paint or anything of that sort.” The ladder was unsafe for such use. It was high and of light construction and made of soft wood; that the ladder had flat steps instead of rungs; and that he knew the ladder had been renailed at times but did not know when it was last re-nailed before the accident.
Grove testified that he was one of the men who went to the fair grounds with Steenerson and the plaintiff; that after the men reached the pavilion they discussed the work to be done and how it should be divided. It was decided that Steenerson and Grove should decorate the stage and that the plaintiff Olson should put up the decorations, that is, the streamers that were to be placed on the wire, that in doing this work Olson used the ladder to enable him to fasten the paper streamers to the wire; that the ladder was in the pavilion when they arrived that morning; that at the time the accident occurred the plaintiff was nearing the center of the pavilion, — the place where Grove and Steenerson were working, that he (Grove) happened to turn around and saw the plaintiff falling; that the plaintiff had left the ladder and was between the step on which he had been. standing and the floor when Grove noticed him; that after the plaintiff fell Grove and Steenerson rushed to where he was and took him off the floor and later to the hospital; that they later came back and went on with their work; that after they were through with their work he kicked out the last step of the ladder so that people might know it was not fit to be used again.
Steenerson testified that he was one of the. men who went to the pavilion on the morning of July 10, 1947, to assist in preparing the pavilion for the reception of the Imperial Potentate; that he brought the plaintiff Olson and Grove out in his car; that they arrived at the pavilion about 6 o’clock in the morning and that Misnef and Hoffman came later; that he worked at decorating the platform or stage where the orchestra sitsthat *378the plaintiff went to work decorating the main pavilion and hanging streamers on the wire that ran lengthwise through the pavilion; that in the performance .of such work he was using the step ladder; that he fastened the streamers to the wire with a stapler; that he (Steenerson) heard a noise and as he looked around noticed that the ladder had tipped over on the floor and that the plaintiff was lying on the floor close by; that he helped take him to the hospital; that later he came back to the pavilion and went on with the work; that they wanted to use the ladder and when asked what, if anything, he observed, he said: “I found in picking up the ladder — I grabbed ahold of it or something — by one step up toward the top — I found it was loose. I wouldn’t say it was so loose you could shake it, but it was loose so you could tilt it back and forth.” He further 'testified that the step to which he referred was up towards the top; that he would not say it was definitely the second or third step from the top but it was thereabout. When asked to show the jury what he meant by the step tilting he said: “The step goes in from the side, and it moved this way (indicating with hand).” The steps were in grooves on the side supports of the ladder. When asked what he would say as to the condition of the ladder from what he saw he answered: “I know it wouldn’t be safe enough to have around my home. It was that unsafe.” He testified that after they were through using the ladder he broke it so that it could not be used again by anyone; that he took a two by four and knocked out some of the steps so that if anyone else found the ladder around they could know it should not be used. He said: “I wasn’t going to let anybody else get hurt on it. If the ladder was unsafe, which we assumed it was, we weren’t going to let it lay around for somebody else to come along and climb up and have something happen to them.”
It will be noted that the evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of a fall from a step ladder while he was performing certain work for the defendant in decorating a pavilion; that the step ladder which plaintiff was using and from which he fell had been furnished by the defendant for use in performing the particular work plaintiff was performing at the time he fell; that the plaintiff *379had no part in selecting the step ladder;' that it was the only-appliance made available, to the plaintiff by the defendant for nse in performing his work; that the fall was occasioned by a defect in the ladder, namely, by a step that tilted or tipped when the plaintiff in the nse of the ladder stepped upon it and that this resulted in plaintiff’s fall and injuries. Plaintiff’s cause of action is predicated upon the proposition that the defendant was negligent in failing to furnish a safe appliance or tool and is liable in damages for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendant’s negligence-. The defendant denies that it was negligent and asserts that if it were the plaintiff assumed the risk and was guilty of contributory negligence. The issues -thus framed were submitted to the jury under instructions quite favorable to the defendant. The jury determined all questions in favor of the plaintiff' and returned a verdict in his favor.
The laws of this state provide:
“An employer, in all cases, shall indemnify his employee for losses caused by the former’s want of ordinary care.” NDRC 1943, 34-0203.
An employer owes to his employees “a duty to exercise reasonable care to furnish employees with safe tools and appliances with which to do their work, and an employer may be held liable to an employee or his representatives for injury or death resulting from the employer’s failure to comply with such duties.” 35 Am Jur, Master and Servant, p 569, Sec 138; CL 1913, Sec 6108; NDRC 1943, 34-0203; Cameron v. G. N. Ry. Co. 8 ND 124, 130, 77 NW 1016; Meehan v. G. N. Ry. Co. 13 ND 432, 101 NW 183; Prefontaine v. G. N. Ry. Co. 51 ND 158, 199 NW 480; 56 CJS pp 900, 912.
Corpus Juris Secundum says:
“Broadly stated, it is the positive duty of a master to furnish his servant with suitable and safe instrumentalities wherewith and places wherein, to do his work.” 56 CJS p 900.
“It is actionable negligence on the part of a master to fail to furnish, or to fail to .exercise ordinary or reasonable care to furnish, his servant with such proper tools and appliances as *380may be required for. the reasonably safe prosecution of the work.” 56 CJS p 912.
There is no denial of the existence of these general rules but it is said in the principal opinion that these rules are subject to an exception in the case of simple or common tools; that the step ladder in question here was a simple tool and that consequently there was no breach of duty on the' part of the defendant even though the step ladder was not a safe tool and a defect therein resulted in plaintiff’s injury.
The “so-called simple tool doctrine” is not a rule having a definite or settled meaning. It is true as said in the principal opinion the authorities disclose there has been “varied and extensive application of” this doctrine, but an examination of the adjudicated cases discloses that even in the same jurisdiction the adjudicated cases are not always in harmony. The application of the so-called doctrine by the courts and the results have been summarized by Labatt in his work on Master and Servant as follows: ■
“In many cases, undoubtedly, where the injury was caused by defects in simple tools, the ordinary rules in regard to the master’s duty to use ordinary care to furnish reasonably safe appliances have been applied without reference to the fact that the alleged defective appliance was in fact a simple tool; but in many cases of this character the courts have made a distinction between injuries caused by the so-called simple tools and those caused by more complicated and dangerous appliances. In view of the large number of decisions involving cases of this character, it has been considered desirable to bring the cases together in one section, although many of them would more logically be placed in various other parts of the treatise.
“In some cases the courts have gone to the length of stating that the rule requiring the master to use ordinary care to furnish reasonably safe appliances does not apply where the injury was caused' by a simple tool. In other cases it is said that the master is not required to anticipate that injuries may result from the use of defective simple tools. Again, some cases say simply that the master is not liable for injuries caused by simple tools, without specifying the particular ground of the nonliabil*381ity. The most frequent application of the so-called simple-tools doctrine is found in those cases which hold that the duty of the master in respect to simple tools is not continuous, and he is under no obligation to inspect simple tools which he has placed in the hands of his servants for use. . . .
“It does not seem entirely logical to say that the master is under no obligation to exercise ordinary care to furnish reasonably safe appliances, simply because those appliances chance to be of a simple character. The more reasonable view would seem to be to place the nonliability of the master upon the ground that any defect in a simple tool must be obvious to the servant, and any risk of danger therefrom must be held to be assumed by him; and this, indeed, is the view taken very frequently.
“Other cases dismiss the allegations of negligence on the part of the master by the statement that the defect was obvious, or was as obvious to the servant as it could have been to the master, without directly invoking the rule of assumption of risk. ...
“Other eases take the rather extreme view that if a servant is injured by reason of defective simple tools, he must necessarily be guilty of contributory negligence. . . .
“In some jurisdictions the simple-tool rule has been repudiated, or at least restricted in some cases.
“It is submitted that, as has been indicated above, it is illogical and unreasonable to say that the master is free from the obligation of using ordinary care merely because the appliance to be furnished is a simple tool, but the better view is that the appliance being a simple tool, and entirely understood by the servant, the latter’s obligations to his master and to himself are increased; and cases involving injuries from simple tools furnish a broader scope for the application of the various affirmative defenses which are ordinarily available to the master.” 3 Labatt’s Master and Servant, 2d Ed., Sec. 924a, pp. 2476-2484.
The “so-called simple tool doctrine” is not applicable to actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for injuries sustained by an employee through a defect, due to employer’s negligence, in its appliances and equipment; simple as well as complex tools are within such act. Pitt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 66 *382F Supp 443; 161 F2d 733; Cole v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 199 NC 389, 154 SE 682; Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Cole, 282 US 898, 75 L ed 791; Gekas v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 75 Ore 243, 146 P 970; Jacob v. City of New York, 315 US 752, 86 L ed 1166. In Jacob v. City of New York, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the so-called simple tool doctrine is not applicable to cases arising under the Jones Act (46 USCA Sec 688), which made the provisions of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act relating to cases of personal injuries of railway employees applicable to cases of personal injuries of seamen.
In Jacob v. City of New York, supra, an employee engaged as a water tender on a ferry boat sustained an injury while he was using an ordinary S-shaped open end wrench to tighten a nut on the manifold head when the wrench slipped because its jaws had become worn by use causing the employee to lose his balance and fall. The trial judge in taking the case from the jury relied on the simple tool doctrine. The Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion affirming the trial court also referred to the so-called simple tool doctrine and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover “because the master has been guilty of no negligence with respect to the' tool used by the employee.” 119 F2d 800, 802. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Circuit Court of Appeals was in error in so holding. In the course of its opinion the court made the following-pertinent observations concerning the so-called simple tool doctrine :
“The simple tool doctrine, used by the courts below to bolster their belief that the evidence was insufficient, does not affect our conclusion. In the first place, the contrariety of opinion as to the reasons for and the scope of the simple tool doctrine, and the uncertainty of its application, suggest that it should not apply to cases arising under legislation, such as the Jones Act, designed to enlarge in some measure the rights and remedies of injured employees.” 315 US at pp 756-757, 86 L ed at p 1170
“The efnployer does not fully and finally discharge himself from liability to his ' employees by furnishing suitable tools, *383machinery, and appliances; he is bound to see that his instrumentalities are maintained in a safe condition.” 1 35 Am Jur, Master and Servant, Sec 140, pp 570-571; 56 CJS pp 988-989; Cameron v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra; Meehan v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra. In short the employer’s duty is twofold: (1) to furnish his employee with reasonably safe tools, and (2) to see that such tools are maintained in a safe condition.
In Meehan v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra, it was held that the employer had performeed the duty it owed its employee to furnish suitable and safe appliances and that the ground for. liability of the defendant, if any, was for breach of its duty to maintain the appliances in safe condition.
As is pointed out by Labatt in the above quoted statement from his work on Master and Servant, the most frequent application of the so-called simple tool doctrine is found in cases involving-the question whether the employer had been negligent in failing to keep the tools which he had furnished to the employee in safe condition. In most of such cases the employer had furnished reasonably safe tools and placed the same in the hands, of the servant for use and the defect or disrepair had arisen while the tools were in the possession of the employee. This caséis predicated upon the failure of the employer to furnish safe-tools to his employee, and is not predicated upon the failure-of the employer to see that tools which he had furnished were-maintained in safe condition.
Obviously the character of a tool is an important matter for consideration in determining whether the employer has exercised due care in furnishing a reasonably safe and suitable tool to the employee for the performance of his work. But it is one-thing to say that the character of the tool is a- matter to be-considered in determining whether the employer exercised due-care in the performance of his duty to furnish his employee with a safe tool and quite another to say that because a tool is simple-the employer has no obligation to furnish a safe tool, as has been held in some of the cases in applying the so-called simple-tool doctrine. Such holdings are in effect an abrogation of the fundamental rule in force in this jurisdiction throughout its entire history that it is the duty of the employer to furnish his. *384employee with safe and suitable tools. As has been well said by Labatt: “It is illogical and unreasonable to say that the master is free from the obligation of using ordinary care merely, because the appliance to be furnished is a simple tool” and many courts reject any such theory and hold that the fundamental duty of the employer to furnish safe tools and appliances to an employee applies alike to simple and' complicated tools. Gekas v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 75 Ore 243, 146 P 970; Mercer v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 154 NC 399, 404, 70 SE 742; Buchanan & Gilder v. Blanchard, Tex CA, 127 SW 1153; Fishburn v. International Harvester Co., 157 Kan 43, 138 P2d 471; Neely v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., et al., Mo CA, 14 SW2d 972; Hines v Flinn, Tex CA, 222 SW 670; Cole v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., supra; Jacob v. City of New York, supra. “In furnishing a tool of any kind, the master is bound to use ordinary care for the safety of the servant who uses it.” Drake v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 99 Tex 240, 89 SW 407. In Gekas v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., supra, the court said:
“It is the duty of the master to use ordinary care to provide his servant with reasonably safe tools and appliances, and this is a general rule of law which regulates the master’s duty without relating to the specific character of the tools and appliances in question. The term 'ordinary care’ implies such care as the probable danger of injury would suggest to a reasonably prudent man. It applies to all men in all .walks of life in which they come in contact with others. Ordinary care is required in the furnishing of either simple or complex tools. The only difference is that, in the case of complex and dangerous tools, an ordinarily prudent man would use a greater degree of care.”
No case has been presented to this court for determination wherein the so-called simple tool doctrine was invoked or considered. The court, however, has had presented to it for determination at least one case wherein recovery was sought and had for injuries caused by defects in what has been denominated a simple tool. Thus, in Prefontaine v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra, an employee of the railway company brought suit to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of a defec*385tive handle on a pick used by the employee in the performance of his work. The employee used the pick for the purpose of breaking chunks of coal into pieces. He testified that he worked for several days with a pick having a split handle, that he complained to the foreman and that the foreman told him that no extra pick handles were on hand but promised to supply a new handle as soon as possible. The handle was not supplied. The plaintiff quit work because of the pain and injury to his hand. He brought action against the railway company for injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the company in failing to furnish reasonably safe and proper tools and appliances with which to perform his work. The railway company denied negligence and the case was submitted to a jury which returned the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to this court contending that the evidence did not establish actionable negligence on the part of the defendant. This court held that the verdict was supported by the evidence and affirmed the judgment.
The plaintiff in this case had ho part in selecting the step ladder. He was given ho right to select a tool or appliance for the work. The ladder was furnished by the defendant to be used by the plaintiff in hanging the decorations from the wire, and no other tool was made available for such work. It was not a short step ladder such as is generally used around dwellings and offices. It was considerably longer. Indeed, it was so long that the former owner was unable to place it in the van in which certain articles were moved from Hiler’s warehouse. It had been in the possession of the defendant and used by it for many years. During such time it had been found necessary to repair it from time to time by renailing the steps or fastening them' with screws. How many times this occurred the evidence does not disclose nor does it disclose the last time it was done. The ladder was furnished for the purpose of being used in doing the particular work for which plaintiff was using it at the time the accident occurred. Mclver (the stage- director) testified that the ladder was sent to the pavilion to be used in putting up the decorations especially the paper streamers. The defendant’s *386representatives knew that it would be necessary for the plaintiff: in performing his work to ascend the ladder to such height as to enable him to fasten the paper streamers to the wire at a point where the wire was some sixteen feet above the floor. When the stage director asked the plaintiff to do the work the plaintiff was informed that a ladder would be furnished for use in performing the work. When the plaintiff arrived at the pavilion for work in the early morning of July 10th.he found the ladder .among the equipment that had been delivered there for use of the workers in preparing the pavilion for the reception. There was only this one ladder. The plaintiff had never used it and knew nothing about it except that he had seen it in the property room or cloak room in the Temple. Nothing was said to him about the condition of the ladder or anything to indicate there was any defect in it. The testimony of the officers of the defendant, however, indicate that they were familiar with the general characteristics of the ladder gathered from their experience throughout the years and had formed judgment as to its fitness for the work for which it was to be used and was being-used by the plaintiff at the time of the accident. Pierce, the Potentate, testified that the ladder was “flimsy, rickety, and wobbly,” and that after the accident he told the plaintiff on one or two occasions that the ladder was so unsafe it should never have been sent out to the pavilion at all. Mclver, the stage •director, testified that the ladder was rickety, that the joints were loose and that it would “wiggle when you got near the top.” Pliler who had donated the ladder to the defendant and who at •one time served as stage director testified that he found it- necessary to repair the ladder by renailing the steps, that is, fastening them with nails or screws; that the ladder was of light construction and made of soft wood; that he did not know when the steps in the ladder were renailed last before the accident. He testified that if you got up on the ladder and moved around it would sway; that it “wasn’t good to get up to the top and reach over three or four feet to calcimine or paint or anything of that sort that the ladder .was unsafe for any such work. The testimony does not indicate that there was anything in the appearance of *387the ladder which from ordinary observation or visual inspection would indicate any particular weakness. The characteristics which the officers (and a former officer) of the defendant mentioned in the testimony were not such as would appear by an ordinary visual observation. Thus, they would hardly have ascertained by merely looking at the ladder that it was wobbly; that the joints were loose and squeaked when you walked on it, and the ladder would wiggle when you got near the top. Such statements indicate that the information of the witnesses had been obtained either through use of the ladder or at least by observance of the ladder while it was being used by others. The testimony of these witnesses show that there was a likelihood, or at least a strong possibility, that there might be some defect in the ladder which would make it dangerous to attempt to use it in its then condition to ascend to the higher steps which would be necessary to enable the worker to place decorations on the wire. The testimony shows that some of the witnesses considered the ladder unsafe. Yet there was no examination or inspection by the representatives of the defendant or any attempt to check up on the condition of the ladder before it was furnished to the plaintiff for use at the pavilion. The plaintiff had never used the ladder. He recognized it as a. ladder belonging to the defendant and he knew that they had kept it in the Temple for the use of the defendant. He naturally would assume that it was safe and that the defendant would not have furnished a ladder which it had any reason to believe to be unsafe. The plaintiff was not charged with the duty of inspecting the ladder for the purpose of finding hidden or latent defects. This was the duty of the employer. 56 C. J. S. p 1188; 4 Labatt’s Master and Servant, 2d ed., Sec 1331, p 3800 et seq. The plaintiff had the right to assume that the defendant and its officers had used due care to furnish him with a reasonably safe ladder and that they would not furnish him with a ladder about the safety of which they had any reasonable doubt. He had a right to enter upon the labor which he had promised to perform in full reliance that the defendant and its executives had exercised due care for his safety and that the ladder belonging to the defendant which they had furnished for his use was a safe and *388proper tool. Fishburn v. International Harvester Co., supra; 35 Am Jur, Master and Servant, pp 604-605; 56 CJS p 1187, et seq.; 4 Labatt’s Master and Servant, 2d ed p 3802 et seq.; DeMoss v. G. N. Ry. Co., 67 ND 412, 422, 272 NW 506, 510.
The risks which an employee assumes are the usual and ordinary risks of the particular employment, but not risks which are due to the employer’s negligence. DeMoss v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra; 56 CJS pp 1161, 1165. “It is a general rule that a servant does not assume risks arising from the negligence of the master.” 56 CJS p 1161, Sec 362. “Generally a servant does not assume the risk of injury from the negligent failure of the master to furnish him with reasonably safe machinery, tools, or appliances for the prosecution of the work he is employed to do.” 56 CJS p 1165, Sec 364.
In DeMoss v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra, this court said:
“The risks which the employee assumes are merely the usual and ordinary risks of his particular employment, those risks which are incident to the employment when they are not due to the master’s negligence. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wright, 202 Ala 255, 80 So 93. They are such dangers as ordinarily, commonly, and usually pertain to or are incident to the employment which a reasonably prudent person might anticipate and do not include danger by acts of negligence on the part of the employer. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex Civ App) 197 SW 614, affirmed in (Tex Com App) 222 SW 1099. He has the right to assume that his employer will exercise proper care. Fox v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 292 Pa 321, 141 A 157. He is not to be treated as assuming a risk that is attributable to the employer’s negligence until he becomes aware of it, or it is so plainly observable that he must be presumed to have known of it, and he continues to work without complaint. . . .
“ ‘Extraordinary risks created by the-master’s negligence will not defeat a recovery even if the servant knows of them, unless the danger is so obvious and imminent that he cannot help seeing and understanding it, and he fails under the circumstances to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent man.’ Strunke v. Payne, 184 NC 582, 114 SE 840.” 67 ND at p 423, 272 NW at p 510.
*389The defects in the ladder which caused plaintiff’s injury were not obvious and were not ascertainable by ordinary observation. The witnesses who observed the ladder do not claim that from their observation they could or did see or ascertain that the step was defective or that it was loose and “turned in the groove.” The plaintiff did not fall because the step broke but because it tilted. The witness Steenerson testified that when he picked up the ladder after the accident had happened he grabbed ahold of it “by one step up towards the top” and that he found it was loose; that he “wouldn’t say it was so loose you could shake it” but it was loose so you could tilt it back and forth (and he demonstrated to the jury what he meant by this). The step was still in place and it was only after he took ahold of it that he found it would tip, but that it was not loose so that the looseness would become apparent by shaking the ladder. The plaintiff, however, did more than merely look at the ladder. After fastening the brace at the top so as to lock the ladder, he raised it and placed it on its four legs and then shook it to see that it was solid. After examination and observation so made the plaintiff concluded that the ladder was safe and proceeded to use it and found it to be safe for the work he was doing, until he found it necessary to ascend to the height where the defective step was encountered.
In my opinion there was ample evidence in this case from which the jury could find that plaintiff’s injuries were the direct result of defendant’s negligence; that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and- did not assume the risk of injury. In short, I believe that the verdict is well sustained by evidence.