Court Opinion

ID: 9942491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:01:14.857625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:09.333978
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11064     Document: 45-1       Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 23

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 23-11064
                            ____________________

        GENERAL STAR NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MDLV LLC,
        d.b.a. One Sotheby's International Realty,
        HELIAC, INC.,
        GLEB KLIONER,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11064

                        D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-24284-FAM
                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This duty-to-defend action arises from an underlying lawsuit
        involving a real-estate transaction. Heliac, Inc., a real-estate hold-
        ing company, owned a condominium property in South Florida. It
        enlisted MDLV, LLC, d/b/a One Sotheby’s International Realty
        (“One Sotheby’s”) and its agent Gleb Klioner to help it sell the prop-
        erty. Heliac sued One Sotheby’s and Klioner. It alleged that
        Klioner made misrepresentations to induce Heliac to sell its prop-
        erty so Klioner could earn a commission and that he later con-
        verted the sale proceeds for his own use.
               One Sotheby’s, insured by General Star National Insurance
        Company, sought coverage for its defense against the Heliac law-
        suit. In the action before us, General Star sought a declaratory
        judgment that various exceptions in One Sotheby’s insurance pol-
        icy preclude coverage. Two of those exceptions are at issue on ap-
        peal: the conversion exclusion (which precludes coverage for
        claims arising out of any disputes involving conversion) and the fu-
        ture-value exclusion (which precludes coverage for claims arising
        out of any guarantee or promise of future status, performance, or
        valuation).
               Florida law requires General Star to defend One Sotheby’s
        in the Heliac action if any of Heliac’s claims, as alleged, fall partially
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                         3

        or potentially within the scope of the policy’s coverage and outside
        an exception. The district court concluded that at least two counts
        in the Heliac lawsuit come within One Sotheby’s policy’s coverage
        and lie outside the two exceptions at issue on appeal. We agree.
        Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision.
                                          I.
                General Star issued a Real Estate Errors and Omissions Lia-
        bility Insurance Policy to One Sotheby’s, eﬀective from November
        30, 2020, through November 30, 2021 (the “Policy”). The Policy
        provides professional liability coverage for the real-estate broker-
        age as follows:
              The Company will pay on behalf of the Insured all
              sums which the Insured shall become legally obli-
              gated to pay as Damages for Claims ﬁrst made against
              the Insured during the Policy Period and ﬁrst re-
              ported to the Company in writing during the Policy
              Period or applicable Extended Reporting Period, aris-
              ing out of any act, error, omission or Personal Injury
              in the rendering of or failure to render Professional
              Services by an Insured[.]
                But the Policy also contains several exclusions, including, as
        relevant here, one for damages arising out of disputes involving
        conversion and one for damages arising from guarantees or prom-
        ises of future performance or valuation:
              The Company has no obligation under this Policy to
              pay Damages or Claims Expenses or to provide a de-
              fense, in connection with any Claim(s):
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11064

              A. Under any part of this Policy if based on or arising
              out of the following: . . .
                     2. Any disputes involving any Insured’s fees,
                     commissions or charges, the failure to pay or
                     collect premium, escrow or tax money, or the
                     conversion, misappropriation, commingling or
                     embezzlement of funds or other property.
                     However, in the event a Claim is made against
                     an Insured seeking both the return of escrow
                     money and alleging an act, error, omission or
                     Personal Injury in the performance of Profes-
                     sional Services covered under this Policy, the
                     Company will defend such Claim without any
                     obligation to reimburse the Insured for the
                     payment of monies held as escrow: . . .
                     16. Any guarantee or promise of future status,
                     performance or valuation in the course of per-
                     forming Professional Services by the Insured.
               Heliac ﬁled a lawsuit against One Sotheby’s and Klioner for
        actions they allegedly undertook or omitted while the Policy was
        in eﬀect. In its relevant pleading, Heliac alleged that the following
        actions took place. Heliac was a real-estate holding company
        whose only principals were two Russian citizens who reside in Rus-
        sia. Heliac bought a condominium at 9701 Collins Avenue, Unit
        502S, Bal Harbour, Florida, in the St. Regis building. To manage
        their property, Heliac retained Gleb Klioner, a real-estate agent
        well-known in South Florida’s Russian-speaking community. To
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                        5

        facilitate his management of the condominium, Heliac gave
        Klioner access to Heliac’s operating account.
               Later, One Sotheby’s hired Klioner. Once Klioner worked
        for One Sotheby’s, Heliac entered into a listing agreement with
        One Sotheby’s. Under that agreement, One Sotheby’s listed the
        condominium for almost six-million dollars. Nothing relevant to
        this case happened for some time after that.
              But according to Heliac’s allegations, several years later, be-
        tween December 2020 and February 2021, Klioner “continuously
        advised” Heliac to sell the condominium “immediately” because of
        what Klioner described the relevant market conditions to be. More
        speciﬁcally, Klioner made these statements to Heliac:
        • The real estate market in Miami Beach, Florida, was on the
          verge of crashing;
        • The drop in the condominium’s value by as much as 60 to 70%
          was imminent;
        • It would be nearly impossible to sell the condominium beyond
          mid-March 2021;
        • The U.S. economy was on the verge of crashing at any moment;
        • The U.S. stock market was on the verge of crashing at any mo-
          ment;
        • Heliac had to sell the condominium urgently, or it would lose
          money because it would become unable to sell the property.
        Heliac alleges that Klioner made these statements “while having
        superior knowledge of the real estate market,” and knowing that
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11064

        Heliac’s principals were generally underinformed about the real-
        estate market in this country.
               In December 2020, Klioner presented Heliac with a $3.8 mil-
        lion oﬀer on the condominium. But that oﬀer fell “signiﬁcantly”
        below the unit’s list price and, as Heliac alleged, below market price
        as well. So despite pressure from Klioner, Heliac refused to sell for
        $3.8 million.
               Heliac asserts that after it declined to sell, on January 27,
        2021, Klioner converted $20,000 from Heliac’s operating account
        to his personal account. This was the ﬁrst time Klioner allegedly
        converted Heliac’s funds.
               The next month, in February 2021, Klioner presented an-
        other oﬀer for the condominium to Heliac, this time for $4.2 mil-
        lion. This oﬀer still fell below the price Heliac wanted to accept for
        the unit. But after enduring what it characterized as “merciless[]”
        pressure from Klioner for over two months, Heliac’s principals ac-
        quiesced to the sale on February 8, 2021.
               From that date, Heliac instructed Klioner to deposit the pro-
        ceeds into its bank account in Switzerland. But Klioner said that he
        could only deposit the proceeds into Heliac’s operating account in
        Florida, which only Klioner could access in person. Klioner also
        advised that the sale could be completed in a timely matter only if
        Heliac executed a corporate resolution granting him full authority
        to sign all closing documents on Heliac’s behalf. Klioner never in-
        formed Heliac that the closing documents could be executed
        through an online notary.
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        23-11064              Opinion of the Court                        7

               Heliac went through with the sale on March 10, 2021. In
        reliance on Klioner’s disbursement instructions, Heliac arranged
        for $3,885,023.02 to be wired from the closing agent’s escrow ac-
        count into Heliac’s operating account. A week later, on March 17,
        2021, Heliac alleged, Klioner secretly wired nearly all the pro-
        ceeds—$3,734,277.21—from Heliac’s operating account to his per-
        sonal account without Heliac’s knowledge or permission. This was
        the second time Klioner allegedly converted Heliac’s funds.
               About nine days after that, on March 26, 2021, Heliac pro-
        vided Klioner with wire-transfer instructions to send the condo-
        minium sale proceeds to Heliac’s principals’ account at the Swiss
        bank. Klioner did not do so. Instead, for the next two-and-a-half
        months—until June 7, 2021, Klioner gave Heliac’s principals vari-
        ous false reasons for the bank’s inability or refusal to approve the
        transfer of the sale proceeds. Eventually, though, Klioner admitted
        to Heliac that he had converted the sale proceeds for his own use.
        Klioner still has not returned the converted proceeds.
               Heliac’s First Amended Complaint asserted ﬁve counts
        against One Sotheby’s, two of which are relevant on appeal: negli-
        gent misrepresentation (Count I) and negligent employee training
        (Count III). In Count I, Heliac alleged that Klioner apparently be-
        lieved the alleged misrepresentations of material fact he made to
        Heliac about the then-current state of the real-estate market were
        true, even though he and One Sotheby’s “should have known” they
        were false. According to the complaint, One Sotheby’s and Klioner
        “intended and expected Heliac to rely on Klioner’s
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11064

        misrepresentations to induce Heliac to sell the St. Regis Condo and,
        consequently, collect a commission from the sale of the St. Regis
        Condo as soon as possible.” Count I sought to recover the con-
        verted sale proceeds and the diﬀerence between the market price
        of the condominium and its actual sale price (“market-value dam-
        ages”). This Count did not seek any damages related to the ﬁrst
        alleged conversion.
                Count III alleged that One Sotheby’s owed Heliac a duty to
        adequately train its associates and that it breached this duty. In He-
        liac’s view, this duty included ensuring that associates like Klioner
        properly advised clients of market value and market conditions, re-
        frained from pressuring clients, informed clients of applicable clos-
        ing procedures, followed client instructions, and did not “overstep”
        by taking unauthorized action in real-estate transactions. Heliac
        asserted that Klioner’s handling of the condominium sale made it
        “evident” that One Sotheby’s had failed to adequately train him in
        these alleged obligations. As a direct result of One Sotheby’s failure
        to train Klioner, Heliac said, it suﬀered market-value damages “and
        the loss of the St. Regis Condo sale proceeds.” Like Count I, Count
        III did not seek recovery of the ﬁrst set of funds converted.
               General Star initially denied coverage for the Heliac lawsuit.
        But later, it agreed to defend One Sotheby’s under a reservation of
        rights. After that agreement, General Star ﬁled this coverage action
        seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify
        One Sotheby’s in the Heliac litigation.
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                        9

               In response, One Sotheby’s ﬁled a motion for judgment on
        the pleadings in this action. The district court adopted the magis-
        trate judge’s report and recommendation agreeing with One So-
        theby’s that Counts I and III of the Heliac complaint fell within the
        Policy’s scope of coverage and outside the exclusions. Gen. Star
        Nat’l Ins. Co. v. MDLV, LLC, No. 21-24284-CIV, 2023 WL 2436148, at
        *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2023), R&R adopted, No. 21-24284-CIV, 2023 WL
        2388518 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2023). As to the conversion exclusion, the
        court concluded that the complaint could be fairly read to allege
        that Klioner did not decide to convert the sale proceeds until after
        the sale had already occurred. Id. at *5. So, the court reasoned,
        “the preceding actions—and the damages caused by the market dif-
        ferences—could not have arisen from the conversion[,]” and the
        counts did not fall under the conversion exception to coverage. Id.
        at *5. As to the future-value exclusion, the court construed the
        plain meanings of “guarantee” and “promise” narrowly and rea-
        soned that the allegations in the complaint did not come “solely
        and entirely within the policy exclusion.” Id. at *6.
               For its part, General Star ﬁled a motion for partial summary
        judgment on issues identical to those in One Sotheby’s motion for
        judgment on the pleadings. Again adopting the magistrate judge’s
        separate report and recommendation, the district court denied
        General Star’s motion. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. MDLV, LLC, No. 21-
        24284-CIV, 2023 WL 449385, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2023), R&R
        adopted, No. 21-24284-CIV, 2023 WL 418873 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023).
        It explained that it had already decided the issues General Star
        raised in One Sotheby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-11064

        applying a standard of review that was more favorable to General
        Star than the one applicable under General Star’s motion for partial
        summary judgment. Id.
              The district court later entered ﬁnal judgment, declaring
        that General Star had a duty to defend One Sotheby’s in the Heliac
        lawsuit for claims against One Sotheby’s.1
                                               II.
                We review de novo an order granting judgment on the plead-
        ings. Perez v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Ass’n, 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir.
        2014). Judgment on the pleadings should be granted when no ma-
        terial facts are in dispute “and the moving party is entitled to judg-
        ment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d
        1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). In assessing a motion for judgment on
        the pleadings, we accept as true all material facts that the non-mov-
        ing party’s pleading alleges, and we view those facts in the light
        most favorable to the non-moving party. Perez, 774 F.3d at 1335.
               We review de novo the interpretation of an insurance con-
        tract. Chalfonte Condo. Apartment Ass’n Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 561 F.3d
        1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Because this action arises under our
        diversity jurisdiction and the Policy was delivered to One Sotheby’s
        in Florida, substantive Florida law governs our interpretation of the
        insurance contract. Fioretti v. Massachusetts Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d

        1 As for Heliac’s claims against Klioner, the district court entered default judg-

        ment for General Star against Klioner for failure to answer or otherwise plead
        to the summons and complaint that General Star served on him.
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        23-11064                Opinion of the Court                         11

        1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that Florida follows the doc-
        trine of lex loci contractus, which, in the absence of a choice-of-law
        provision in the contract, directs the court to follow the law of the
        state in which the contract was made).
               Florida has several rules we must apply in determining
        whether the Policy provides any coverage for Sotheby’s One. We
        set them forth below.
                Under Florida law, “the duty to defend is broader than the
        issue of coverage.” Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Royal Crane, LLC, 169
        So. 3d 174, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). Florida applies the “eight
        corners” rule, looking only to the underlying complaint for which
        coverage is sought and the policy when deciding whether a duty to
        defend exists. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Richard Mckenzie &
        Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2021). When a complaint,
        fairly read, “alleges facts that are partially within and partially out-
        side the coverage of an insured’s policy,” the insurer must defend
        that entire suit. Sunshine Birds & Supplies, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
        Co., 696 So. 2d 907, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). And “[i]f the
        allegations of the complaint leave any doubt as to the duty to de-
        fend,” we must resolve that doubt in the insured’s favor. Mid-Con-
        tinent Cas. Co., 169 So. 3d at 181 (citing Lime Tree Vill. Cmty. Club
        Ass’n v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir.1993)).
               When, as here, an insurer relies on an exclusion to deny cov-
        erage, the insurer bears the burden to show that the complaint’s
        allegations fall “solely and entirely within the policy exclusion and
        are subject to no other reasonable interpretation.” Deshazior v.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   23-11064

        Safepoint Ins. Co., 305 So. 3d 752, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020). If a
        policy’s text is “plain and unambiguous,” we must give that lan-
        guage “the meaning it clearly expresses.” N. Pointe Cas. Ins. Co. v. M
        & S Tractor Servs., Inc., 62 So. 3d 1281, 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
        (citation omitted). But if an exclusionary provision is “ambiguous
        or otherwise susceptible to more than one meaning,” we construe
        that provision in the insured’s favor because, generally, the insurer
        drafts the policy. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 169 So. 3d at 182.
                                           A.
                 With these standards and rules of construction in mind, we
        turn to the Policy. We begin by noting that the parties do not dis-
        pute that, without consideration of the Policy’s exceptions, He-
        liac’s allegations are subject to coverage under the Policy. That is,
        Heliac’s allegations involve “Damages for Claims ﬁrst made against
        the Insured during the Policy Period . . . arising out of any
        act . . . in the rendering of or failure to render Professional Services
        by an Insured[,]” subject to the parties’ disputes about applicable
        exceptions.
                  We therefore consider whether the conversion exclusion re-
        moves Heliac’s allegations from coverage. The relevant provision
        states that General Star has no obligation “to pay Damages or
        Claims Expenses or to provide a defense in connection with any
        Claim(s)[] [u]nder any part of this Policy if based on or arising out
        of . . . [a]ny disputes involving any Insured’s . . . conversion . . . of
        funds[.]” (Emphasis omitted from original). Although the district
        court described this language as “written broadly,” it concluded
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                         13

        that the Heliac lawsuit could be fairly read to allege that Klioner did
        not decide to convert the funds until after the sale of the condo-
        minium. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2436148, at *4–5. Under
        that interpretation, the court said, Klioner’s actions through the
        time of sale “could not have arisen from the conversion.” General
        Star argues that in reaching this conclusion, the district court ig-
        nored the word “involving” in the conversion exclusion’s text; be-
        cause part of the lawsuit “involve[es]” conversion, Heliac’s claims
        are excluded from policy coverage.
                We disagree. As we’ve mentioned, under Florida law, we
        construe insurance contracts in accordance with their “plain mean-
        ing.” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528,
        532 (Fla. 2005). And to be sure, Florida courts have broadly inter-
        preted language like “arising out of,” “based on,” and “involving.”
        Id. at 539–40 (interpreting “arising out of ” as “originating from,”
        “having its origin in,” growing out of,” “ﬂowing from,” incident
        to,” or “having connection with”); Houston Specialty Ins. Co. v. Fen-
        stersheib, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (ﬁnding that
        “based on” “ﬁt[s] snugly” with the deﬁnition of “arising out of ”);
        State v. Elder, 975 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (deﬁning
        “involve” as “to draw in as a participant,” to “implicate,” “to relate
        closely,” to “connect,” “to have an eﬀect on,” to “concern directly,”
        to “aﬀect”).
              But even when we read the term “involving” broadly, it must
        be read in tandem with the phrase “arising from.” As a result, we
        cannot say that the claims in Counts I and III necessarily
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                    23-11064

        “originat[ed] from,” “gr[e]w out of,” or “ﬂow[ed] from” a dispute
        “connect[ed]” to conversion. The complaint can be fairly read to
        allege that Klioner negligently made the misrepresentations at the
        root of each claim for the purpose of inducing a sale and earning a
        commission, not as part and parcel of a conversion scheme. So a
        jury could ﬁnd One Sotheby’s liable for market-value damages re-
        lated to Klioner’s negligent misrepresentations and One Sotheby’s
        negligent training of Klioner, without also necessarily also ﬁnding
        it liable for conversion and the lost sale-proceeds damages.
                And that is the whole ballgame. Because a jury could hold
        One Sotheby’s liable without also ﬁnding conversion, the claims at
        issue in this case do not necessarily “aris[e] from” a dispute “involv-
        ing” conversion, and General Star has a duty to defend.
                To hold otherwise would unravel Florida’s jurisprudence re-
        quiring coverage for the insured when a complaint even partially
        falls under coverage and outside of exclusions. Sunshine Birds &
        Supplies, Inc., 696 So. 2d at 910. Florida law commands that we
        parse a single lawsuit for diﬀerent bases of liability, so “[i]f the facts
        alleged show any basis for imposing liability upon the insured that
        falls within policy coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend.” Lime
        Tree Vill. Cmty. Club Ass’n, Inc., 980 F.2d at 1405–06 (emphasis added)
        (ﬁnding a duty to defend where the complaint “set forth grounds,”
        other than intentional acts excluded from policy coverage, “upon
        which Lime Tree could be held liable”).
              And when a complaint alleges multiple causes of action and
        multiple types of damages, with some based on acts that the policy
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        23-11064                Opinion of the Court                         15

        does not exclude, we must parse each basis of liability separately.
        Id. at 1405 (distinguishing “a single cause of action based wholly on
        acts expressly excluded by the policy” from a complaint setting
        forth multiple grounds for liability). Therefore, we consider
        whether each basis of liability, rather than the lawsuit as a whole,
        is “based on or arising out of . . . [a]ny disputes involving . . . con-
        version.” And if a basis exists for establishing liability that does not
        involve conversion at all, General Star has a duty to defend.
               Before we delve into the allegations of the Heliac complaint
        to show why it alleges a dispute that does not “involv[e]” conver-
        sion, we pause brieﬂy to discuss the meaning of “dispute” in the
        Policy. The Policy does not expressly deﬁne the term. Still, though,
        its terms otherwise inform the meaning of the word.
               We start with the ordinary meaning of the term “dispute.”
        Deutsch v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 284 So. 3d 1074, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
        App. 2019) (“When a term in an insurance policy is undeﬁned, it
        should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may
        look to legal and non-legal dictionary deﬁnitions to determine such
        a meaning.”). Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁnes “dispute” to mean “[a]
        conﬂict or controversy, esp. one that has given rise to a particular
        lawsuit.” (11th ed. 2019). Here, as we’ve noted, the conversion ex-
        clusion relieves General Star of the “obligation under this Policy to
        pay Damages or Claims Expenses or to provide a defense, in con-
        nection with any Claim(s) . . . [u]nder any part of this Policy if
        based      on     or     arising     out    of . . . [a]ny   disputes
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    23-11064

        involving . . . conversion . . . .” (Emphasis added). That is, the Pol-
        icy employs the plural of “dispute”—“disputes.”
                We think that has signiﬁcance. First, a lawsuit is not neces-
        sarily a single “dispute.” Rather, it can involve multiple “disputes,”
        meaning multiple “conﬂict[s] or controvers[ies].” Because that is
        so, that one particular “dispute” within a lawsuit “involv[es]” con-
        version does not necessarily mean that all “disputes” within the
        case necessarily “involv[e]” conversion. And that is precisely the
        case here.
                Counts I and III allege facts and seek damages that do not
        necessarily arise from any dispute involving conversion. Count I
        expressly avers that One Sotheby’s and Klioner, “as its sales associ-
        ate, intended and expected Heliac to rely on Klioner’s misrepresen-
        tations to induce Heliac to sell the St. Regis Condo and, conse-
        quently, collect a commission from the sale of the St. Regis Condo as soon
        as possible.” (Emphasis added). One fair reading of the complaint
        alleges that Klioner made the misrepresentations to secure a com-
        mission, not to further a conversion scheme. True, Count I also
        asserts at a diﬀerent point that without the sale, “Heliac’s funds
        could not have been converted.” But these allegations can be fairly
        read to suggest that the dispute involving the conversion of the sale
        proceeds “ar[ose] out of ” Klioner’s misrepresentations made in an
        eﬀort to procure a commission, not the other way around.
               Count III turns to the misrepresentations as evidence of a
        failure to train Klioner, but it similarly ﬂows from a theory of neg-
        ligence and Klioner’s desire to earn a commission, not for the
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        23-11064                Opinion of the Court                         17

        purpose of furthering a conversion scheme. See Mactown, Inc. v.
        Cont’l Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (ﬁnding
        that a negligent retention claim did not fall under a coverage exclu-
        sion for battery where the plaintiﬀs in the underlying suit brought
        claims for respondeat superior liability for battery and negligent re-
        tention).
               Heliac, the master of its complaint, could have alleged that
        Klioner made the misrepresentations with the goal of persuading
        Heliac to sell so that he could eventually convert the funds, but it
        did not. Hill v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th
        Cir. 2004). Rather, Heliac set out distinct grounds for liability in its
        complaint: negligence (negligent misrepresentations and negligent
        employee training) and intentional acts (conversion). Lime Tree Vill.
        Cmty. Club Ass’n, Inc., 980 F.2d at 1405. And negligent misrepresen-
        tations made for the purpose of securing a quick commission and
        the resulting market-value damages are not merely incidental to a
        conversion that happened post-sale. Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old
        Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (ﬁnding it “diﬃcult to categorize a multi-crime episode, which in-
        cluded a kidnapping, an assault and battery, and a robbery, as simply
        incident to a rape,” which was excluded from coverage). Nor can
        we say that the negligent acts would not have occurred “but for”
        the conversion, because the negligent misrepresentations were mo-
        tivated by the desire to secure a commission, not enable conver-
        sion. Id.
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11064

               Whether One Sotheby’s is eventually found liable under a
        negligence or conversion scheme theory does not matter to
        whether General Star as a duty to defend under the Policy: “[T]he
        duty to defend arises even where ‘there has been a suggestion made
        that the purported negligent allegations are really allegations of in-
        tentional acts in disguise.’” Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Beaver, 466
        F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006). “[S]o long as the complaint can
        reasonably be read as alleging that the [plaintiﬀs’] injuries were neg-
        ligently caused, even if it also may arguably be read as alleging that
        the injuries were intentionally caused, the doubt must be resolved
        in favor of ﬁnding a duty to defend.” Id. Here, as we’ve explained,
        should Heliac’s complaint proceed to trial, a jury could ﬁnd One
        Sotheby’s liable for negligent misrepresentation and negligent
        training, and not conversion. As a result, the negligent-misrepre-
        sentation and negligent-training claims do not necessarily arise
        from a dispute involving conversion.
                The damages alleged are also distinct: the market-value
        damages and the lost-sale proceeds. General Star argues that the
        market-value damages are necessarily connected to conversion.
        Again, we disagree. Counts I and III allege that as a result of
        Klioner’s misrepresentations and One Sotheby’s failure to ade-
        quately train Klioner, Heliac was damaged to the extent of “the dif-
        ference between the market price of the St. Regis Condo and its sale price,
        and the loss of the St. Regis Condo sale proceeds.” (Emphasis
        added). As we’ve noted, though, the complaint ties the market-
        value damages to Klioner’s alleged misrepresentations that Heliac
        said induced it to sell its condominium for signiﬁcantly less than it
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                         19

        was worth. And that brings us back to the purpose Heliac alleges
        for Klioner’s alleged misrepresentations: to secure a commission.
                So the market-value damages Heliac sought did not “arise
        out of ” the conversion, but rather, out of the allegedly pressured
        sale of the condominium, which, in turn, Heliac asserts resulted
        from Klioner’s desire to earn a commission. And while General
        Star may suggest that market-value damages are a novel theory of
        recovery, we must resolve any uncertainty about coverage in favor
        of One Sotheby’s. Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 782 F.3d 1240,
        1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the insurer “was required to of-
        fer a defense in the underlying action unless it was certain that there
        was no coverage for the damages sought” where there was an un-
        resolved split amongst courts as to whether the underlying theory
        for damages was viable). Where a jury could ﬁnd One Sotheby’s
        liable for negligent misrepresentation and negligent training but
        not conversion, it could also make One Sotheby’s pay the market-
        value damages but not the lost sale-proceeds damages. Under the
        Policy, then, One Sotheby’s could be made to pay the market-value
        damages because they are not “in connection” with a claim “arising
        out of . . . [a]ny dispute involving” conversion.
                In short, Florida law commands us to consider whether “the
        facts alleged show any basis for imposing liability upon the insured
        that falls within policy coverage.” Lime Tree Vill. Cmty. Club Ass’n,
        Inc., 980 F.2d at 1406 (emphasis added). When we ﬁnd such basis,
        “the insurer has a duty to defend.” Id. Here, it’s true that conver-
        sion certainly “punctuates” the allegations in the Heliac complaint.
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11064

        But “it [i]s but one of the many” injuries (such as market-value
        damages) Heliac’s complaint alleges. Guideone Elite Ins. Co., 420 F.3d
        at 1328. A jury could ﬁnd One Sotheby’s guilty of negligent mis-
        representation and negligent training while also ﬁnding that no
        conversion occurred. That theory of liability would involve no
        conversion whatsoever, in the claims or the market-value damages
        paid on those claims. As a result, at least one basis for liability—
        negligent misrepresentation or negligent training, and the resulting
        market-value damages—exists that does not arise out of a dispute
        involving conversion. Because Counts I and III can fairly be read
        to at least partially fall under coverage and outside of exceptions,
        the conversion exception does not absolve General Star of its duty
        to defend One Sotheby’s from the Heliac Lawsuit. 2
                                               B.
               The future-value exclusion similarly fails to apply to at least
        some of the allegations in the Heliac complaint, so it also does not
        relieve General Star of the duty to defend.
                  We again begin with the text of the exclusion. The future-
        value exclusion bars coverage for claims “based on or arising out
        of . . . [a]ny guarantee or promise of future status, performance or
        valuation in the course of performing Professional Services by the

        2 General Star has forfeited its argument, raised for the first time in its reply
        brief on appeal, that the Policy’s exclusion for damages that arise out of “[a]ny
        disputes involving any Insured’s fees, commissions or charges” also precludes
        coverage for the market-value damages. United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d
        1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002).
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        23-11064               Opinion of the Court                       21

        Insured.” The Policy does not deﬁne “Guarantee” and “promise,”
        so we give the words their “plain and ordinary meaning” by look-
        ing to legal and nonlegal dictionary deﬁnitions. Deutsch, 284 So. 3d
        at 1076.
               “Promise” and “guarantee” have varying deﬁnitions. But
        both terms suggest that the speaker binds herself to some future
        action or responsibility. Merriam Webster’s deﬁnes “promise” as “a
        declaration that one will do or refrain from doing something spec-
        iﬁed,” or “a legally binding declaration that gives the person to
        whom it is made a right to expect or to claim the performance or
        forbearance of a speciﬁed act.” Promise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
        ONLINE DICTIONARY (last visited Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.mer-
        riam-webster.com/dictionary/promise [https://perma.cc/Z48N-
        V4QJ]; Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2436148, at *6 (giving addi-
        tional deﬁnitions for promise: “reason to expect something;” “to
        pledge to do, bring about, or provide”; “warrant, assure”; or “to
        give ground for expectation.”).
               Reasonable deﬁnitions of “guarantee” also evoke the impo-
        sition of an obligation, conditional on some future happening or
        nonhappening.         Guarantee, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE
        DICTIONARY, (last visited Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.merriam-
        webster.com/dictionary/guarantee         [https://perma.cc/GZ9A-
        N25B] (deﬁning “guarantee” as “an assurance for the fulﬁllment of
        a condition” such as securing another’s possession or assuring the
        quality or length of use of a product with a promise of reimburse-
        ment); Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2436148, at *6 (citing the
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        22                          Opinion of the Court                        23-11064

        same deﬁnition); see also condition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE
        DICTIONARY (last visited Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.merriam-web-
        ster.com/dictionary/condition [https://perma.cc/VV9F-6CEF]
        (deﬁning “condition” as “a premise upon which the fulﬁllment of
        an agreement depends[,]” “a provision making the eﬀect of a legal
        instrument contingent upon an uncertain event[,]” and “something
        essential to the appearance or occurrence of something else[,]”
        such as a prerequisite). 3
               Under a reasonable, plain reading of either word, none of
        the statements Klioner made to induce the sale of the condomin-
        ium qualify as “promises” or “guarantees.” The statements pre-
        dicted future happenings (the crash of the market, the drop in
        value of the condo, the inability to sell in the future, the loss of

        3 Some definitions of “promise” and “guarantee” overlap. E.g., promise,
        OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (last visited Feb. 7, 2024)
        https://www.oed.com/dictionary/promise_n?tab=mean-
        ing_and_use#28177403 [https://perma.cc/JN33-ZNB2] (defining “promise”
        as “guaranteeing that a specified thing will or will not happen.”). But under
        Florida law, we must “give meaning to each and every word” in a contract.
        Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Fla. Mowing and Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d
        1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009). So to the extent possible, we avoid treating “prom-
        ise” and “guarantee” as redundant of each other, giving each word an inde-
        pendent meaning. Id. Read distinctly, a “promise” involves the assurance to
        act to bring about a condition or to be responsible for that condition; but a
        “guarantee,” under at least one reasonable interpretation, is the assurance that
        an obligation will be triggered if (and only if) a condition occurs. In other
        words, one reasonable way of distinguishing between “promises” and “guar-
        antees” is that “guarantees” are conditional, but “promises” are not.
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        23-11064              Opinion of the Court                       23

        Heliac’s money), but they did not bind or commit Klioner or One
        Sotheby’s to performance or forbearance of a speciﬁc act.
                Klioner did not promise to sell the condominium at a speciﬁc
        price; he merely predicted that Heliac would lose money in the fu-
        ture, which required no action or obligation on his part. He also
        did not promise to forbear from selling the condominium in the
        future; rather, Klioner stated that the market—not Klioner—would
        prevent Heliac from selling the unit. Nor did Klioner suggest that
        he or One Sotheby’s would become responsible for the eﬀects of
        the happenings he predicted. He did not promise to continue
        working with Heliac even if the market dropped, or guarantee that
        Heliac would make more on a sale at the time of his statements
        than it would have in several months, or Klioner or One Sotheby’s
        would cover the diﬀerence. These statements were predictions of
        future value, and they may or may not have been “material” in
        terms of how they aﬀected Heliac’s behavior. But Klioner did not
        commit to performing or taking on an obligation related to these
        predictions, so they were not “promises” or “guarantees.” As a re-
        sult, the future-value exclusion does not apply and does not relieve
        General Star of its duty to defend.
                                        III.
               For the foregoing reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s or-
        ders granting One Sotheby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
        and denying General Star’s motion for summary judgment.
              AFFIRMED.