Court Opinion

ID: 9884860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:18:33.779712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:41.395866
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Hospital had a duty to Malia to refuse to discharge her to the care of her husband. In imposing this astonishingly broad duty upon medical caregivers, the majority essentially relies upon two rationales — the endangered adult statute and common law tort cases.11 I find both rationales to be fundamentally flawed.
I. The Endangered Adult Statute
In concluding that the Hospital may have had a duty to prevent Malia from leaving its facility, the majority relies in part upon Indiana Code section 35-^16-1-13, which is a criminal statute providing that a person who believes or has reason to believe an endangered adult is the victim of, among other things, battery, but knowingly fails to report his or her suspi*257cions to the appropriate social services or law enforcement entities, commits a class B misdemeanor. An “endangered adult” is someone who is at least eighteen years old, is unable by reason of a physical or mental incapacity of providing or directing the provision of self-care, and harmed or threatened with harm as a result of, among other things, battery of the individual’s personal services or property. Ind. Code § 12-10-3-2.
The majority finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Malia’s mental acuity at the time of her discharge from the Hospital. It bases this conclusion on the fact that she received a number of pain medications and other drugs during her time as a patient in the Hospital. The majority, however, conveniently ignores the fact that the undisputed testimony in the record establishes that at the time of her discharge, Malia was coherent, competent, and in no way incapacitated.
The undisputed testimony establishes that after Malia’s surgery, she quickly regained consciousness and became alert and coherent. Brian Guzik, the nurse who was assigned to care for Malia following her surgery and who spent the vast majority of her post-surgery time in her room, testified that Malia was “alert and oriented. I mean she was ... very aware [of] what was going on.... I mean she followed commands very well. Ask her a question, she’d answer appropriately.” Appellant’s App. p. 120.
Malia’s surgeon, after explaining that different anesthetic medications wear off of different people at differing rates, testified that following the surgery, Malia “was alert, oriented, demanding things, requesting that doctors be called. This was a person in my opinion that probably was very capable of making her own decisions.” Id. at 263. The surgeon acknowledged that she was not with Malia at this time but was confident of her opinion based on descriptions she had received from other Hospital employees and the fact that Malia had demanded that she receive Oxycontin rather than Darvoeet, the pain medication normally prescribed following surgery, resulting in a phone call to the surgeon at home. Id. at 257.
After Malia was discharged, she was pushed in a wheelchair out of the Hospital. She was accompanied by, among others, her husband, her mother, two nurses, and security personnel. As the group walked through the halls and reached the door, Malia’s mother begged her daughter not to go home with Monty. It is evident and undisputed that Malia had possession of her faculties, inasmuch as she got into a screaming match with her mother. According to Guzik,
the mother was telling the patient don’t go home with him, don’t go home with him. And then ... [Malia] went ballistic on her mom.... I remember her going ballistic. Dropping a lot of F bombs .... she was telling her mom to f*ck off. I remember her saying that she was in her business too much. I think she said something to her mom that she is [as] dead to her as her dad, as being the patient’s dad. She, actually she used the F word quite a bit.
Id. at 126. Another nurse who accompanied the group out of the Hospital agreed with Guzik’s description, testifying that in response to her mother’s pleas, Malia “told [her mother] to stay out of their business” and used “quite a bit of profanity” in the process. Id. at 378.
The security officers also agreed. Ronald Harris testified that he “heard the daughter say ... tell the mom to stay the f*ck out of my life, and leave me alone, I’m going with him.” Id. at 507. Ronald Keene testified that if Malia “freely wants to go with him, I can’t stop her. She’s an *258adult, and she obviously knows what she’s saying.... [S]he seemed to have all of her faculties and everything.” Id. at 536. Keene also stated that in response to her mother’s pleas not to go with her husband, “she said, leave me the f*ck alone. And something like, get the f*ck out of my life.” Id. at 539. Keene told McSwane that “as long as [Malia] wishes to leave with him and she’s aware of what she’s doing, and the doctor has released her, then ... she can leave.” Id.
Thus, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that, notwithstanding the anesthesia and pain medications Malia had received while in the Hospital, she was alert, competent, coherent, and fully capable of making her own decisions at the time she was discharged. At that time, she had an entirely coherent — albeit profane — conversation with her mother in which she made it perfectly clear that she wanted to go home with her husband. There is simply no support in the record for the majority’s conclusion that there is a question of fact regarding Malia’s mental faculties at the time she was discharged from the Hospital. Given that the record definitively establishes that Malia was not incapacitated, to hold that she could be considered an endangered adult merely because she wanted to leave with her abusive husband is insulting, demeaning, chauvinistic, and paternalistic. I strongly believe this holding to be erroneous.
II. Common Law
The majority relies on two cases from other jurisdictions in arriving at the conclusion that the Hospital’s duty of care to Malia extended to a point of preventing her from leaving the facility with her husband. I find these cases to be distinguishable. In N.X., the patient was assaulted in the hospital by one of the hospital’s surgical residents. 739 N.Y.S.2d 348, 765 N.E.2d at 846-47. And in Bree.se, the patient committed suicide while in the hospital under the direct care of hospital personnel. 449 N.E.2d at 1102. Here, in contrast, Malia’s death occurred at the hand of a third party after she had already exited the Hospital and driven away. I simply cannot conclude that the Hospital’s duty of reasonable medical care to its patients extends to such lengths — protection from a person not under the Hospital’s control while not physically located on Hospital grounds.
It may be that, as the majority insists, these cases were premised in part on whether there was information known to or readily perceivable by hospital staff that there was a risk of harm to a patient. Op. p. 252 n. 7. I disagree, however, with the implication that the presence of information is the only salient fact contained in those opinions. I believe that the fact that the harm occurred to the patients while they were under the direct control of the medical caregivers at issue is implicitly significant and, as stated above, I believe that this fact suffices to distinguish those cases from the circumstances herein.
Here, the evidence establishes that the Hospital gave Malia every chance, while in the Hospital’s care, to report Monty’s abuse. Malia was given the chance to remain at the Hospital rather than leave in Monty’s care. Hospital security employees responded to all calls from staff that Malia might have been a victim of domestic violence and assessed Monty for weapons and inebriation before he left the premises.
I have seen no authority persuading me that the Hospital’s duty of reasonable medical care to Malia extends to a point of forcibly detaining her against her will. To require the Hospital to guarantee the safety of its patients after they walk out of its doors is to raise a host of impossible questions — should the Hospital have forced *259Malia into a locked room? Placed her in restraints? Drugged her? How far does this duty extend — if Monty had killed Ma-lia a week after her Hospital visit, would that still fall in the scope of the Hospital’s duty of care? What if, rather than killing her, he had slapped her? Could she have sued the Hospital for damages? This rule is untenable and poor public policy, and I believe that, as a matter of law, the Hospital did not have a medical duty to refuse to discharge Malia to Monty’s care.
The majority insists that we need not decide how far the duty extends. My response is simply that before we impose a duty on any person or entity, we must determine that the duty can, in fact, be performed in a reasonable manner. To hold otherwise — to impose a duty that cannot be fulfilled — is to place our tort system in a kangaroo court. Malia’s mother begged and pleaded with her daughter to refrain from leaving with Monty. Malia responded with profanities. The police told Malia’s mother that they would not come to the Hospital because “there was nothing they could do.... [T]hey couldn’t charge him with anything at that point.” Appellant’s App. p. 471. The security officer testified that he told Malia’s mother that
if she’s been released from the hospital, and she wishes to go with him, there’s ... and he’s showing no threat of any kind, there’s nothing I can do if she wants to go. I cannot hold her. Unless there’s any evidence that ... of her endangerment, there’s nothing I can do. If she wants to leave, she can leave.
Id. at 536. As noted above, there was no evidence of Malia’s endangerment. If Ma-lia’s own mother was unsuccessful and there was nothing that Hospital security officers or the police could or would do, I simply do not believe that there is any evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that the Hospital could have prevented Malia from leaving with her husband short of physically restraining her — possibly unlawfully. Under these circumstances, it would be unfair, unjust, and unreasonable to say that the Hospital faces potential liability for its actions.
As a final matter, I note that the State of Indiana offers many protections to victims of domestic violence and many punishments for the perpetrators of such violence. Depending on the factual circumstances, a person who commits an act of domestic violence can be convicted of, among other things:
• Battery. Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1 (increasing the crime to a class D felony if committed by an adult against a child less than 14 years of age, to a class B felony if the act caused serious bodily injury, and to a class D felony if committed by a person who has been previously convicted of battery against the same victim).
• Domestic Battery. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3 (increasing the crime to a class D felony if committed by a person who has a prior conviction for that crime).
• Aggravated Battery. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
• Invasion of Privacy. Ind.Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (increasing the crime to a class D felony if committed by a person with a prior unrelated conviction for invasion of privacy).
• Criminal Trespass. Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2.
• Intimidation. Ind.Code § 35-45-2-1 (increasing the crime to a class D felony if it involves a witness or spouse or child of a witness in any pending criminal case against the person making the threat).
• Harassment. I.C. § 35-45-2-2.
*260• Stalking. I.C. § 35 — 45-10-5 (increasing the crime to a class C felony if it involves a threat placing the victim in fear of sexual battery, serious bodily injury, or death, is in disregard of a protective order, or occurs while a criminal case of stalking against the same victim is pending in court; increasing the crime to a class B felony if it occurs while the offender is armed with a deadly weapon or if the offender has a previous conviction of stalking the same victim).
• Kidnapping. I.C. § 35-42-3-2.
• Criminal Confinement. I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (increasing the crime to a class C felony if the confinement involves a child less than 14 years of age who is not the child of the offender).
• Interference with Custody. I.C. § 35-42-3-4.
• Rape. I.C. 35-42-4-1.
• Interference with Reporting of a Crime. I.C. § 35-45-2-5.
• If law enforcement officers have probable cause, they can make an on-scene, warrantless arrest for battery, domestic battery, or invasion of privacy. Ind.Code § 35-33-1-1. Victims are not required to sign an affidavit for an arrest to be made and an officer does not have to witness the suspect violating a protective order for the arrest to occur.
Indiana takes acts of domestic violence very seriously, as evidenced by the myriad ways in which offenders can be punished. In arriving at my conclusion herein, I neither intend to diminish the seriousness of this type of offense nor, of course, to condone Monty’s heinous and unforgiveable actions. But there is nothing in the record or in Indiana law that leads me to conclude as a matter of law that the Hospital had a duty to prevent Malia from leaving with her husband. I believe that the majority’s holding herein will discourage medical caregivers from adopting domestic violence policies and result in higher health insurance costs and longer waits for patients seeking treatment and hoping to be discharged following treatment. Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Hospital.

. It is not entirely evident from the majority's opinion whether it also relies on the Hospital’s policy to protect abuse victims in arriving at its conclusion. To the extent that it does, I vehemently disagree that such a policy can or should give rise to liability. We should encourage entities such as hospitals to adopt policies regarding domestic violence victims and to train their employees to handle such situations. To impose liability based on an entity’s alleged failure to follow its policy would be to discourage the adoption of such policies in the future. I do not believe that to be in anyone’s best interest, least of all the victims of domestic violence.