Court Opinion

ID: 9919090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 15:09:41.566096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:27.098005
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Smith Land & Improvement               :
Corporation,                           :
                Appellant              :
                                       :
      v.                               : No. 174 C.D. 2023
                                       :
Swatara Township Zoning Hearing        :
Board                                  : Argued: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                          FILED: January 17, 2024

      Currently before us is Appellant Smith Land & Improvement Corporation’s
(Smith Land) appeal of an order issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County (Common Pleas) on February 16, 2023. Therein, Common Pleas affirmed
Appellee Swatara Township (Township) Zoning Hearing Board’s (ZHB) August 9,
2022 decision (Decision), through which the ZHB denied Smith Land’s appeal of
the Township zoning officer’s denial of a conditional use application. After thorough
review, we vacate Common Pleas’ order and remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                  I. Background
      This matter pertains to three contiguous properties situated along Route 322
in the Township, each of which are owned by Smith Land. Decision, Findings of
Fact (F.F.) ¶1. Portions of these properties are zoned as C-G General Commercial.
Id., F.F. ¶ 2. In 2017, the Township’s Board of Commissioners (Commissioners)
enacted Ordinance No. 2017-7,1 which amended the Township’s Zoning Ordinance2
to permit warehousing as a conditional use for properties in the C-G district,
including those owned by Smith Land. Id., F.F. ¶¶5, 9; Reproduced Record (R.R.)
at 29a.
      Roughly five years later, the Commissioners had a collective change of heart
and took several steps that ultimately resulted in warehousing being removed from
the Zoning Ordinance’s list of authorized conditional uses for this district. First, on
February 2, 2022, the Commissioners approved a motion that called for considering
whether to repeal Ordinance No. 2017-7 and, in addition, scheduled a public hearing
for March 9, 2022, at which the issue would be debated. Decision, F.F. ¶8; R.R. at
4a-5a. Second, on March 9, 2022, the Commissioners passed a resolution, which
purported “to approve the pending ordinance doctrine and thereby mak[e]
immediately effective an ordinance repealing and replacing Ordinance [No.] 2017-
7[.]” Decision, F.F. ¶9; R.R. at 9a. Finally, on April 6, 2022, the Commissioners
enacted Ordinance No. 2022-02,3 which formally repealed Ordinance No. 2017-7
and expressly designated warehousing as a use that was not permitted in the C-G
district. Decision, F.F. ¶10; R.R. at 25a, 29a.
      The Commissioners’ adoption of Ordinance No. 2022-02 was preceded, if
only just barely, by Smith Land’s filing of a conditional use application
(Application), through which Smith Land sought authorization from the Township

      1
          Swatara Township, Dauphin County, Pa., Ordinance No. 2017-7 (2017).

      2
          Swatara Township Zoning Ordinance of 2010, Dauphin County, Pa., as amended (2010).

      3
          Swatara Township, Dauphin County, Pa., Ordinance No. 2022-02 (2022).

                                              2
to build four warehouses on its properties along Route 322.4 R.R. at 12a-23a. Smith
Land submitted its Application to Robert Ihlen, the Township’s code
enforcement/zoning officer, at approximately 11 a.m. on April 6, 2022, roughly
eight-and-one-half hours before the Ordinance No. 2022-02 became law. Decision,
F.F. ¶¶4, 6; R.R. at 25a. On May 10, 2022, Ihlen notified Smith Land that he had
denied its Application, due to the fact that, under Ordinance No. 2022-02,
warehousing is not a permitted primary use in the Township’s C-G district. R.R. at
38a.
       Smith Land responded by taking successive actions that eventually produced
the matter that is currently before us. First, Smith Land appealed Ihlen’s
determination to the ZHB on June 8, 2022, which then held a hearing and
unanimously voted to deny Smith Land’s appeal on July 14, 2022, before issuing its
formal Decision memorializing that denial on August 9, 2022. Smith Land then
appealed the ZHB’s Decision to Common Pleas on September 2, 2022, which took
no additional evidence and, on February 16, 2023, affirmed the ZHB, in full. Having
thus failed to secure relief below, Smith Land then elected to file the instant appeal
with our Court.
                                        II. Discussion
       Smith Land offers three arguments for our consideration, which we reorder
and summarize as follows.5 First, the ZHB erred as a matter of law when it concluded

       4
         Per the Application, three of the proposed warehouses would be erected within the C-G-
zoned portions of the properties, while the remaining warehouse would be situated in a section of
the properties that is zoned as M-L light manufacturing. R.R. at 15a.

       5
        As Common Pleas took no additional evidence, our standard of review is restricted to
determining whether the ZHB committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law in this matter.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                               3
that Ihlen, as the Township’s zoning officer, had authority under the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)6 and the Township’s Zoning Ordinance to
deny the Application. Smith Land’s Br. at 11-18. Second, even if Ihlen did have such
authority, the ZHB nevertheless erred by denying Smith Land’s appeal, because (1)
the pending ordinance doctrine does not apply in the context of conditional use
applications, and (2) warehousing was an authorized conditional use in the
Township’s C-G district at the time of the Application’s filing. Id. at 18-26. Finally,
Common Pleas erred by ruling that the ZHB’s March 9, 2022 resolution
“effectively” made warehousing an unauthorized use in the C-G district from that
date forward. Id. at 8-11.
       We agree with Smith Land that Ihlen, acting as the Township’s zoning officer,
had no authority to deny (or, for that matter, grant) the Application. As set forth in
the MPC, a municipality is allowed to include in its zoning ordinance “provisions
for conditional uses to be allowed or denied by the governing body after
recommendations by the planning agency and hearing, pursuant to express standards
and criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance.” Section 603(c)(2) of the MPC, 53 P.S.
§ 10603(c)(2).7

Penn St., L.P. v. E. Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114, 1119 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2014).

       6
           Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.

       7
         “Governing body” is defined in Section 107 of the MPC as “the council in cities, boroughs
and incorporated towns; the board of commissioners in townships of the first class; the board of
supervisors in townships of the second class; the board of commissioners in counties of the second
class through eighth class or as may be designated in the law providing for the form of
government.” 53 P.S. § 10107. Thus, the Commissioners constitute the Township’s “governing
body” for purposes of the MPC.

                                                4
            The governing body or . . . the planning agency, if
            designated, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
            render final adjudications [regarding]:
                   ....
                   (3) Applications for conditional use under the
                   express provisions of the zoning ordinance pursuant
                   to [S]ection 603(c)(2) [of the MPC].
Section 909.1 of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10909.1.8
            Where the governing body, in the [municipality’s] zoning
            ordinance[], has stated conditional uses to be granted or
            denied by the governing body pursuant to express
            standards and criteria, the governing body shall hold
            hearings on and decide requests for such conditional uses
            in accordance with such standards and criteria.
Section 913.2(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10913.2(a).9 The Township has availed itself
of this delegated authority by tasking the Commissioners with exclusive
responsibility for adjudicating conditional use applications. As explained in Section
295-19.A. of the Zoning Ordinance, “[t]he [Township’s] conditional use approval
process is designed to allow the . . . Commissioners to review and approve certain
uses that could have significant impacts upon the community and the environment.”
Zoning Ordinance § 295-19.A. In keeping with this purpose, Section 295-19.B
through .D of the Zoning Ordinance mandates that such applications be handled as
follows:
               B. Procedure. The . . . Commissioners shall consider the
               conditional use application and render its decision in
               accordance with the requirements of the [MPC].
                     ....
                     (2) Reviews.
                           (a) The Zoning Officer shall provide a review
                           to the . . . Commissioners regarding the
      8
          Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.

      9
          Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.

                                              5
                         compliance of the [conditional use]
                         application with this chapter.
                         (b) The Township shall submit a conditional
                         use application to the Township Planning
                         Commission for review. However, the . . .
                         Commissioners shall meet the time limits for
                         a decision, regardless of whether the
                         Planning Commission has provided
                         comments.
                    ....
                    (4) Time limit. The . . . Commissioners shall render
                    a written decision on each conditional use
                    application within 45 days after the last hearing on
                    the application or as may be provided otherwise in
                    Section 913.2 of the [MPC], as amended, or such
                    successor provisions. . . .
            C. Consideration of conditional use application. The . . .
            Commissioners shall determine whether the proposed
            conditional use would meet the applicable requirements of
            this chapter. . . .
            D. Conditions. In approving conditional use applications,
            the . . . Commissioners may attach conditions it considers
            necessary to protect the public welfare and meet the
            standards of this chapter. These conditions shall be
            enforceable by the Zoning Officer, and failure to comply
            with such conditions shall constitute a violation of this
            chapter and shall be subject to the penalties described in
            this chapter.
Zoning Ordinance § 295-19.B.-.D. It is therefore unmistakably clear that the
Commissioners possess sole jurisdictional authority in the Township over
conditional use applications and, thus, that they, rather than Ihlen and/or the ZHB,
should have adjudicated Smith Land’s Application. As a result, the ZHB committed
an error of law by concluding otherwise.
      Though our disposition of Smith Land’s first argument establishes, in itself, a
basis for vacating Common Pleas’ February 16, 2023 order and remanding this

                                           6
matter to that lower tribunal, in the name of judicial economy, we elect to address
Smith Land’s second argument regarding the applicability of the pending ordinance
doctrine to this matter. This doctrine emanated from the pre-MPC landscape and
“permitted municipalities to deny applications for building permits if, at the time of
the application, there was a pending ordinance amendment that would prohibit the
use sought in the application.” In re Jaindl Land Co., 284 A.3d 1314, 1318 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2022). The breadth of the doctrine’s applicability was subsequently
expanded after its creation, and now encompasses a range of challenges to zoning
ordinance provisions. See Piper Grp., Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Bd. of Supervisors,
30 A.3d 1083, 1094-97 (Pa. 2011). Despite this expansion, it is nevertheless well
settled that the pending ordinance doctrine must yield where statutory language in
the MPC creates an exception that renders the doctrine inapplicable to a given
situation. Jaindl, 284 A.3d at 1318-21; see Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770,
776 (Pa. 2001) (recognizing that “[t]he pending ordinance rule does not apply to
applications for subdivision or land development as they are controlled by section
508(4) of the MPC, [53 P.S. § 10508(4),]” as well as that “Section 508(4) essentially
provides that applications for approval of a subdivision plat are governed by
ordinances in effect at the time the applications were filed”).
      Such a situation exists here. Per Section 917 of the MPC:
             When an application for . . . a conditional use has been filed
             with . . . the . . . governing body, . . . and the subject matter
             of such application would ultimately constitute either a
             land development as defined in [S]ection 107 [of the MPC]
             or a subdivision as defined in [S]ection 107, no change or
             amendment of the zoning, subdivision or other governing
             ordinance or plans shall affect the decision on such
             application adversely to the applicant, and the applicant
             shall be entitled to a decision in accordance with the
             provisions of the governing ordinances or plans as they
             stood at the time the application was duly filed.

                                            7
53 P.S. § 10917.10 In other words, as long as a conditional use application was filed
prior to a pending ordinance’s enactment, and the application’s subject matter, if
turned from proposal into tangible reality, would qualify as an MPC-defined land
development or subdivision, then the governing body is prohibited from applying
the pending ordinance to the application.
      It is indisputable that Smith Land submitted its Application after the
Commissioners had begun to actively consider amending the Zoning Ordinance to
remove warehousing as a permitted conditional use in the C-G District, but before
the Commissioners formally passed Ordinance No. 2022-02 into law. Thus, the
question becomes whether the Application’s subject matter “would ultimately
constitute either a land development as defined in [S]ection 107 [of the MPC] or a
subdivision as defined in [S]ection 107[.]” Id. The former, land development, is
expressly described, in relevant part, as any of the following activities:
                       (1) The improvement of one lot or two or more
                       contiguous lots, tracts or parcels of land for any
                       purpose involving:
                             (i) a group of two or more residential or
                             nonresidential buildings, whether proposed
                             initially or cumulatively, or a single
                             nonresidential building on a lot or lots
                             regardless of the number of occupants or
                             tenure; or
                             (ii) the division or allocation of land or space,
                             whether initially or cumulatively, between or
                             among two or more existing or prospective
                             occupants by means of, or for the purpose of
                             streets,     common        areas,     leaseholds,
                             condominiums, building groups or other
                             features.
                       (2) A subdivision of land.

      10
           Added by the Act of June 23, 2000, P.L. 495.

                                                8
Id. § 10107. The latter, subdivision, constitutes:
               [T]he division or redivision of a lot, tract or parcel of land
               by any means into two or more lots, tracts, parcels or other
               divisions of land including changes in existing lot lines for
               the purpose, whether immediate or future, of lease,
               partition by the court for distribution to heirs or devisees,
               transfer of ownership or building or lot development:
               Provided, however, That the subdivision by lease of land
               for agricultural purposes into parcels of more than ten
               acres, not involving any new street or easement of access
               or any residential dwelling, shall be exempted.
Id. As already mentioned, the Application called for the construction of four
warehouses on Smith Land’s properties. R.R. at 15a. The Application’s subject
matter “would [therefore] ultimately constitute . . . a land development as defined in
[S]ection 107 [of the MPC,]” because, if followed to completion, it would produce
at least one nonresidential building. Id. § 10917. As such, the pending ordinance
doctrine is inapplicable here, such that the amendments made through Ordinance
No. 2022-02 to the Township’s Zoning Ordinance cannot be applied to the
Application.11

       11
          We note that the Township argues that the pending ordinance doctrine is applicable here,
due to the fact that Smith Land did not file a land development plan along with, or subsequent to
submitting, the Application. Township’s Br. at 21-31. However, this argument is completely
vitiated by the language used in Section 917 of the MPC, which provides, in relevant part:
               [S]hould [a conditional use] application be approved by . . . the . . .
               governing body, [the] applicant shall be entitled to proceed with the
               submission of either land development or subdivision plans within
               a period of six months or longer as may be approved by . . . the
               governing body following the date of such approval in accordance
               with the provisions of the governing ordinances or plans as they
               stood at the time the application was duly filed before . . . the . . .
               governing body[.]
53 P.S. § 10917. In other words, a conditional use applicant does not have to submit a land
development plan in order to trigger Section 917’s exception to the pending ordinance doctrine
and need only make such a submission in the event the application is approved.

                                                 9
                                       III. Conclusion
       In light of the foregoing, we vacate Common Pleas’ February 16, 2023 order
and remand this matter to the lower tribunal. We further direct Common Pleas to
then issue an order within 20 days of this remand that vacates the ZHB’s Decision
and further remands this matter to the ZHB.12

                                             __________________________________
                                             ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       12
           As for Smith Land’s final argument, “given that Common Pleas did not take additional
evidence in this zoning appeal, [our role here] is limited to reviewing the [ZHB’s] decision, not
that of Common Pleas.” Dowds v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 242 A.3d 683, 695 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2020). Thus, the question of whether Common Pleas’ interpretation of the Commissioners’ March
9, 2022 resolution was correct is immaterial to the disposition of this appeal.
        We nevertheless observe that Smith Land’s final argument is based upon a
mischaracterization of Common Pleas’ legal analysis. Smith Land asserts that Common Pleas erred
by determining that the Commissioners barred warehousing as a use in the C-G district via the
March 9, 2022 resolution, because the MPC mandates a specific, formal process for amending a
zoning ordinance. Smith Land’s Br. at 8-11. We, however, read Common Pleas’ statement that
this resolution “effectively disallowed warehousing as a conditional use in the [C-G district] from
that date forward[,]” Common Pleas Order, 2/16/23, at 2, as an awkwardly worded determination
that the pending ordinance doctrine was applicable to Smith Land’s Application. As we have
already addressed that issue supra, we need not do so again.

                                                10
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Smith Land & Improvement            :
Corporation,                        :
                Appellant           :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 174 C.D. 2023
                                    :
Swatara Township Zoning Hearing     :
Board                               :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 17th day of January, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County’s (Common Pleas) February 16, 2023
order is VACATED, as well as that this matter shall be REMANDED to Common
Pleas. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Common Pleas shall issue an order within
20 days of this remand that vacates Appellee Swatara Township (Township) Zoning
Hearing Board’s (ZHB) August 9, 2022 Decision and further remands this matter to
the ZHB.
      Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                    __________________________________
                                    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge