Court Opinion

ID: 9831445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:06:46.916225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.866865
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Amended Motion for ■ Rehearing.
In his amended motion for rehearing, ap-pellee insists, among other things, that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to submit the issues set forth in our opinion herein, for the reason that issue “C” inquired only whether the • construction of the highway and bridge “contributed” to appellee’s damages; whereas, the City •could escape liability only by showing that the construction of the road and bridge independently caused' the damage or a part thereof. Manifestly where the acts of two tort-feasors, acting wholly independent of each other, combine to cause a greater •damage than would have resulted had only one of them acted, the acts of each must necessarily contribute in some degree to the total injury resulting from the separate acts of both. The test as laid down in both the Bradshaw and Robicheaux cases •cited in the opinion ■ is whether the tort-feasors acted independently, and if so whether the portion of the whole damage attributable to, or contributed by, the inde•pendent acts of each can reasonably and separately be ascertained. If they can, then each is liable only for the injuries •caused by his own acts.
It is also urged that if we adhere to our •original opinion herein, under Rule 434, Rules of Civil Procedure, the cause should be reversed for trial only on the issue of damages. That is tó determine whether the Montopolis bridge and the highway embankment caused a portion of appellee’s damage; and the amount of the damage caused by the acts of the City.
 Rule' 434 is but a re-enactment of old Rule 62a; and consequently carries with it the interpretation and application of that rule by the courts. Without discussing the matter here it seems clear that in view of the errors pointed out in our opinion we would not be authorized to reverse only in part the judgment appealed from. The judgment is manifestly not severable' in the respects urged. 3 Tex.Jur., § 810, p. 1150.'
The amended motion is in all things overruled.
Overruled.