Court Opinion

ID: 9777817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:25:07.393428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.829136
License: Public Domain

W.C. DAVIS, Judge,
dissenting.
Article 32A.02, § 4(10) states:
Sec. 4. In computing the time by which the State must be ready for trial, the following period shall be excluded ...
(10) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances.
*334Even though, as is pointed out in Lloyd v. State, 665 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), most cases dealing with § 4(10) have fallen into the category of court delays, i.e., overcrowded dockets, absence of a material witness due to hospitalization, etc., surely some prosecutorial delays will constitute . exceptional circumstances. Article 32A.02 clearly addresses itself to prosecutorial delays rather than those occasioned by the judicial process as a whole. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The language in § 4(10) does not indicate such a limitation, but seems to be a general catch-all designed to prevent dismissals like the one given today.
The record reflects that during the week that appellant’s case was originally set for trial there were 47 other criminal cases pending in two district courts. Further, the prosecutor’s office had two vacancies facing her while trying to prepare for criminal trials. Based on these circumstances the State’s motion for continuance was granted. The majority has determined such circumstances are not “exceptional” under the statute. Prosecutors beware! If the circumstances evidenced by the instant case are not “exceptional,” it will be the rare case indeed where they are held to be. For this reason I dissent from the majority opinion.
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.