Court Opinion

ID: 9851802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:01.798592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:15.698631
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(dissenting) — The majority reverses a conviction for possession of cocaine on the grounds that the stop of the defendant's vehicle for a routine driver's license and vehicle registration check, which led to the discovery of the cocaine, was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. I dissent. Routine safety checks are permissible under the Fourth Amendment where, as here, the method utilized for spot checks does not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
The majority is correct in stating that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Prouse, at 654. However, in weighing these interests, the majority failed to take into account the minimal intrusion involved here. Unlike the roving patrols condemned in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975), the State Patrol procedures which implement RCW 46.64.070 allow only stationary roadblocks in the daylight hours utilizing marked patrol cars. Furthermore, the officer's discretion is *442limited by procedures which require him to detain the very next car after completion of the check in progress. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, supra. This type of checkpoint stop generates considerably less concern on the part of motorists than do roving patrols. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
Weighed against this minimal intrusion is the State's "vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles [and] that these vehicles are fit for safe operation". Prouse, at 658. Prevention of highway accidents through the timely discovery of safety risks such as worn tire tread or nonfunctioning brake lights is a legitimate state interest due deference by this court. While this interest could not justify arbitrary spot checks authorized at the whim of individual State Patrol officers, it is sufficient to authorize spot checks responsibly administered under predetermined neutral criteria such as that established here by the State Patrol. Numerous other courts have validated similar safety spot check procedures. People v. Lust, 119 Ill. App. 3d 509, 456 N.E.2d 980 (1983); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1979). Contra, State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
Finally, I do not share the majority's reluctance to rely on agency procedures to circumscribe the agency's discretion under a statute. Agency procedures may of course be modified or ignored. However, we are not asked here, as we were in Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 148, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984), to approve an unspecified procedure for implementing RCW 46.64.070. Our consideration is limited to the legitimacy of spot checks performed under authorization of Washington State Patrol Memo A-24-78 Rev., issued Mar. 1, 1981. I would find such spot checks to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The time to review potential changes in this procedure is when/if they are actually implemented.
*443I would affirm the conviction, holding that the stop was permissible under the standards established in Delaware v. Prouse, supra.
Dolliver, C.J., and Andersen, J., concur with Durham, J.