Court Opinion

ID: 9448766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:44:34.305738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:32.913722
License: Public Domain

O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The question is whether plaintiff’s complaint (its allegations taken as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss) discloses an actual controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, § 2201, Title 28, U.S.C.A., and a civil cause of action arising under the Patent Laws of the United States, § 1338(a), Title 28, U.S.C.A. I think it does.
The District Judge found that the complaint stated a cause of action and that it alleged a justiciable controversy. The complaint was dismissed, however, because its admitted cause of action and statement of actual justiciable controversy was held not to arise under the Patent Laws of the United States.
The core of the complaint is, as I read it, that defendant charges that plaintiff’s patent is invalid. Defendant Olsen says he was the inventor of the disclosure of plaintiff’s patent. Such a charge is equivalent to a claim of invalidity. If defendant was the inventor and the original patentee was not, plaintiff’s patent is invalid. Section 102(f), Title 35 U.S.C.A., provides that a person will not be entitled to a patent if “he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” No stronger charge of invalidity of a patent could be made than to assert that the applicant therefor was not the inventor.
“The patent law makes it essential to the validity of a patent, that it shall be granted on the application * * * of the original and first inventor * * *. A patent which is not supported by the oath of the inventor, but applied for by one who is not the inventor, is unauthorized by law, and void * * Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 9 S.Ct. 202, 32 L.Ed. 576, 578.
The position taken by the defendant and that expressed in the opinion of the District Judge is that defendant may assert that he is the true inventor of the patented device without challenging the *90validity of the patent in question. That position is not tenable.
“It is essential to the validity of a patent that it be issued upon the application of the one who is the original inventor.” Cummings v. Moore, 202 F.2d 145, 147 (C.A.10, 1953).
Respectfully, I submit that the position taken by defendant has led my brothers here to say, “ * * * there is no claim that the patent is invalid for lack of invention.” Whatever is intended by such observation, the conduct of defendant and his assertion that he, not the applicant for the patent, was the true inventor, clearly charges invalidity of the patent.
Much reliance is placed on American Well Works v. Layne, 241 U.S. 257, 259, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987. Aside from the fact that such case is not factually or procedurally identical with the one at bar, we point out that it was decided (1916) prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act (1934). That Act, as construed, has been liberally employed to obtain federal court adjudications of the questions presented in the American Well Works case.
“Prior to the passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act the patentee was the only one in a position to initiate a suit against the alleged infringer or his dealers. An alleged infringer could not sue the patentee for a declaration that the plaintiff was not infringing or that the patent was invalid. Today the alleged infringer, once he is threatened by a patentee, has a remedy by a complaint for a declaratory judgment. Now the controversy between the parties as to whether infringement exists is in either instance essentially one arising under the Patent Laws.” Aralac Inc. v. Hat Corporation of America, 3 Cir., 166 F.2d 286, 291, 292, and cases cited.
In Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F.2d 814, 815 (C.A.7, 1941), the 7th Circuit said:
“Now, ‘ * * * the controversy between the parties as to whether a patent is valid, and whether infringement exists is in either instance essentially one arising under the patent laws of the United States.’ ”
If one threatened with a charge of infringement may, by employment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, test the validity of a patent, I see no reason why the owner of a patent which is charged with invalidity should not make equal use of such remedy. See Talbot v. Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 104 F.2d 967, 968 (C.A.3, 1939).
The thrust of plaintiff’s complaint, admittedly disclosing a justiciable controversy, is to have resolved the question of the validity of the patent. The complaint avers that it relies on Section 102, Title 35 U.S.C.A. (Patent Statute) for its invoking the remedy provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Its prayer for relief asks, in substance, that the conflicting claims as to the validity of its patent be resolved. Defendant’s motion admits that he claims that he invented the disclosure of plaintiff’s patent (thereby charging invalidity); that he is disparaging plaintiff’s patent and that he is threatening plaintiff’s customers with liability in large amounts if they continue using rings embodying plaintiff’s patent, and he threatens to sue plaintiff at common law. He asserts, however, that the matter is not ripe for decision because defendants are not manufacturing any piston rings now, and “do not contemplate doing so until the patent issue is resolved.” It is my opinion that plaintiff’s complaint discloses a justi-ciable controversy in which “the patent issue” can be resolved and that the cause of action arises out of the Patent Laws.
My brothers’ opinion in this case sets forth one of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act in quoting *91from Davis v. American Foundry Equipment Co., 94 F.2d 441 (C.A.7, 1938), which says that the purpose of the Act was the “intent to avoid delay and accrual of damages against one uncertain of his rights and to promote an early adjudication of the controversy between the parties without waiting until one of them should see fit to begin suit for coercive relief after damages had accrued.”
In my opinion, the plaintiff is put in jeopardy whether it is exposed to suit for damages in the State Courts or in the Federal Courts. That Muskegon has been placed in jeopardy by the claims of Olsen is shown by the fact that Olsen has already commenced action for damages in the State Court of Muskegon County, claiming damages against Mus-kegon for appropriating the invention disclosed to Muskegon’s assignor. I recognize that until a patent for his claimed invention is obtained, Olsen could not bring an action for infringement. However, Olsen claims that Muskegon is using his invention in breach of a confidential disclosure allegedly made by Olsen to Muskegon’s assignor. It has been held that, under such circumstances, Olsen could bring an action for damages for breach of confidential disclosure and in such action make Muskegon liable for profits and damages resulting from such use of the invention, not under the patent statutes, but upon the principle that equity will not permit one to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 922-923 (C.A.4, 1936).
Any damages which Muskegon may become liable to pay to Olsen for a breach of confidential disclosure will continue to accrue with the passage of time. Thus, delay in adjudicating the validity of Muskegon’s patent will cause the threat to Muskegon to become greater rather than to diminish it. It is to avoid such consequences that the Declaratory Judgment Act permits a speedy determination of the rights of the parties. Because of the increased jeopardy in which Muskegon will be placed if the dispute here is not quickly resolved, Mus-kegon is entitled to employ the declaratory judgment remedy.
I would reverse the order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss.