Court Opinion

ID: 9624349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:59:18.755105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:57.584227
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I join fully in Chief Judge Barnes’s dissent. I write separately, however, to emphasize that the majority opinion represents a significant modification of Georgia bad faith insurance law. Given that this change will, under some circumstances, relieve insurers of their obligation to make a good faith effort to settle claims within an insured’s policy limits, I cannot agree with it.
I acknowledge that the jury instruction at issue represents an accurate statement of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683 (580 SE2d 519) (2003). In this case, however, that “statement of the law” operated to prevent the jury from deciding the critical, factual issue in a bad-faith failure to settle claim: whether the insurer, in view of the existing circumstances, acted reasonably in responding to a settlement demand. See id. at 685 (1); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268-269 (1) (416 SE2d 274) (1992). Notably, the majority opinion gives little, if any, consideration to this central issue. Instead, it summarily concludes, without analysis, that the holding in Bright-man applies here even though the circumstances of this case are markedly different.
Brightman involved two separate insureds: the driver of the van causing the plaintiffs injuries and the owner of that van. The driver and the owner were each insured under separate insurance policies. The plaintiffs attorney made a joint settlement offer, demanding the policy limits of both policies. Neither insurance company responded, and the jury returned a joint verdict against the driver and the owner that was approximately $1.4 million in excess of their combined policy limits. The owner brought a bad-faith failure to settle claim against her insurer, Cotton States, who defended on the grounds that, because the settlement was conditioned on the driver’s insurer tendering its policy limits, the settlement was contingent upon conditions over which Cotton States had no control. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected this argument, noting that Cotton States could have offered its policy limits in exchange for a release of its insured from liability, leaving the plaintiff to pursue his claim against the driver and the driver’s insurer.
If Cotton States had tendered its policy limits while the plaintiffs offer was pending, it would have done everything within its control to accept the plaintiffs offer and thus protect its policyholder from an excess verdict. In that situation, the insurance company would have given equal *677consideration to its insured’s financial interests and fulfilled its duty to her.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 686 (1).
Thus, the jury instruction at issue represents a correct statement of law as to those cases involving facts similar to those found in Brightman. Those cases would involve two or more insureds, each of whom is insured under a separate policy, and circumstances which would allow an insurer to settle the claims against its insured without impacting the plaintiffs ability to recover against other defendants or under other insurance policies. Such circumstances do not exist here.
Admittedly, the current case resembles Brightman in that it also involves two insurance policies. Unlike Brightman, however, this case arguably involves only one insured; it is unclear how one would separate Arnsdorff s personal liability from the vicarious liability of his plumbing business. Grange apparently gave no consideration as to how its demands for a release and indemnification agreement and for Fortner to dismiss his claims against Arnsdorff with prejudice would impact Fortner’s claims against Arnsdorff s plumbing business. Nor did Grange appear to consider whether or how these demands might affect Fortner’s ability to recover the $1 million in coverage available under the Auto Owners’ policy covering the plumbing business. Thus, Grange conditioned payment of its $50,000 policy limits on the requirement that Fortner possibly relinquish a $7 million claim and forfeit an additional $1 million in otherwise available insurance proceeds.
The demands on which Grange conditioned settlement, and the potential legal impact a release and indemnification agreement and dismissal with prejudice could have, both on Fortner’s claims against Arnsdorff s plumbing company and the coverage available under the Auto Owners’ policy, were circumstances that the jury should have been allowed to consider in determining whether Grange’s conduct was reasonable. Similarly, the jury should have been allowed to consider the reasonableness of Grange’s conduct in light of the existence of OCGA § 33-24-41.1, under which Grange could have attempted to negotiate a settlement that relieved its insured, Arns-dorff, from liability in excess of any applicable insurance coverage. That statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) In any instance where a claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident is covered by two or more insurance carriers, one such carrier may tender, and the claimant may accept, the limits of such policy. . . . Such claimant. . . may *678execute a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. . . .
(b) The limited release provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall:
(1) Release the settling carrier from all liability from any claims of the claimant . . . based on injuries to such claimant. . . ; and
(2) Release the insured tort-feasor covered by the policy of the settling carrier from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims. . . .
(d) The limited release of the settling carrier provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall not:
(1) Bar a claimant’s recovery . . . under any other policy of insurance or release any other insurance carrier providing applicable coverage unless specifically provided for in such release; . . .
(4) Release the tort-feasor from personal liability to the extent that there is other insurance in effect which covers the said claim or claims, but only to the extent of such other insurance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court, however, prevented the jury from considering any of the foregoing circumstances when it instructed the jurors that, if they found that Grange had offered its policy limits, they were obligated to return a verdict for Grange.
By summarily concluding that the holding in Brightman applies to this case, the majority announces a significant modification to the law of insurance bad faith. Specifically, the majority offers insurers a court-sanctioned method of circumventing the requirement that, in deciding whether to settle within policy limits, an insurer must afford the interests of its insured “the same faithful consideration it gives its own interest.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holt, supra, 262 Ga. at 269 (1). See also Brightman, supra, 276 Ga. at 685 (1) (noting that “the interests of the insurer and insured diverge when a plaintiff offers to settle a claim for the limits of the insurance policy”). Under the majority holding, any time two or more insurers are defending a claim, any one of them may avoid a bad faith failure to settle by offering its policy limits, even though it makes such an offer contingent on conditions that a plaintiff is guaranteed to reject. In other words, insurers in such cases no longer have a duty to make a good faith effort to settle claims within policy limits.
*679Decided September 24, 2008
Reconsideration denied November 19, 2008
Savage, Turner, Pinson & Karsman, Robert B. Turner, Kathryn H. Pinckney, Parks, Chesin & Walbert, David F. Walbert, Marion T. Pope, Jr., for appellant.
Martin Snow, Robert R. Gunn II, Thomas P Allen III, John S. Edwards, Oliver & Maner, Inman G. Hodges, for appellee.
Daugherty, Crawford, Fuller & Brown, Jason L. Crawford, amicus curiae.