Court Opinion

ID: 9953298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 19:04:04.629015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:54.465730
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/24 P. v. Hall CA1/2
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                 A168888
 v.
 ELIJAH MATTHEW HALL,                                            (Sonoma County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. SCR 6020801)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        Defendant Elijah Matthew Hall appeals from postconviction orders
denying his motion for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75
(former section 1171.1), as well as his motion under section 1465.9 to vacate
fines and fees included in his judgment of conviction.2 His appellate counsel
filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo),
requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently review the record.
Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, and has done
so, raising various arguments unrelated to the rulings from which he has

        1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code.

In June 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered as section 1172.75 without
substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) We refer to the statute by its
current designation.
        2 Defendant filed two notices of appeal designating the orders denying

his two motions. Our disposition covers both appeals.

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appealed.
      Because neither the order denying defendant’s section 1172.75 motion,
nor the order denying his section 1465.9 motion is appealable, we dismiss the
appeals taken from those orders.
                               BACKGROUND3
      In 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree
robbery (§ 211; counts I and II) and battery resulting in serious bodily injury
(§ 243, subd. (d); count III). It also found true that defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count II (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). After a bifurcated trial, the jury found true the allegations that
defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), including an attempted robbery in 1996, and had served a prior
prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). (People v. Hall, supra, A139691.)
      Defendant was sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law to a prison
term of 25 years to life for counts I and II, plus 13 years for the great bodily
injury enhancement and the two prior convictions. The trial court imposed
but stayed execution of the sentence on count III, as well as a one-year prior
prison term enhancement. (People v. Hall, supra, A139691.)
      The trial court also imposed the following fines and assessments: a
$1,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a second $1,000 restitution fine to
be suspended unless parole was revoked (§ 1202.45); a $380.59 victim
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)); a $120 court operations assessment
(§ 1465.8); and a $90 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).

      3 We granted defendant’s request to take judicial notice of our prior

opinion in People v. Hall (Mar. 27, 2018, A139691) (nonpub. opn.), the
California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for review (People v. Hall,
S248548, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 11, 2018), and this court’s remittitur
issued on July 11, 2018.

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      In March 2018, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hall,
supra, A139691.) And in July 2018, our Supreme Court denied defendant’s
petition for review. (People v. Hall, supra, S248548.)
      On July 24, 2023, years after his judgment became final, defendant in
propria persona filed two motions. In one motion, he asked the trial court to
“to vacate all of the court-imposed costs (Fines/Restitution)” pursuant to
section 1465.9—a provision enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.), and amended by Assembly Bill No. 177 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
and Assembly Bill No. 199 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 62;
Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 35; Stats. 2022, ch. 57, § 21.) Section 1465.9 provides
that the balance of any of the enumerated court-imposed costs or fines is
unenforceable and uncollectible, and that the portions of any judgment
imposing such costs or fines must be vacated. (§ 1465.9, subds. (a)–(c).)
      Defendant’s other motion was brought under section 1172.75. Effective
January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b) to eliminate sentence enhancements for prison
priors unless the prior term was for a sexually violent offense. (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), added what is now section 1172.75, which makes Senate Bill No. 136’s
changes retroactive to all persons currently incarcerated in jail or prison.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) In his motion, defendant asked the court to strike
his prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)), great bodily
injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and enhancements based on his
two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
      On August 15, 2023, the trial court denied both motions in separate
orders. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s
request for resentencing under section 1172.75. (See People v. Burgess (2022)

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86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess); accord, People v. Escobedo (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449; People v. Newell (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265,
268.) The court added that defendant’s challenges to the great bodily injury
and prior conviction enhancements that were included in the section 1172.25
motion were not properly before it, as section 1172.75 does not provide for
relief for either of those enhancements.
      As for defendant’s motion under section 1465.9, the trial court assumed
for purposes of the motion “that a defendant subject to one of the enumerated
court-imposed costs/civil assessments may file a motion for an order vacating
the portion of a judgment which includes such costs/civil assessments.” The
court found, however, that defendant “fail[ed] to demonstrate that his
judgment includes any court-imposed costs/civil assessments enumerated
in . . . section 1465.9.” The court thus denied the motion.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues in an appeal
from the denial of a postconviction request for relief, rather than a first
appeal as of right from a conviction, we are not required to conduct an
independent review of the record in the manner prescribed in People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–228.) We
give the defendant the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief
and we then evaluate any specific arguments raised. (Id. at pp. 231–232.)
      Defendant has filed a four-page, handwritten supplemental brief,
raising various arguments unrelated to the August 15, 2023 orders
designated in his notices of appeal. As now explained, we conclude that those
orders are not appealable, and even if they were, we would lack jurisdiction
to consider the arguments raised in his supplemental brief.
      We start with the denial of the motion for resentencing under

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section 1172.75. As noted, section 1172.75 declares that certain one-year
sentence enhancements based on prior prison terms served for offenses other
than a sexually violent offense became legally invalid. (Burgess, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 379–380.) Section 1172.75 also provides a mechanism
for resentencing individuals serving judgments that includes such
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(d).) It directs the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify affected
defendants and provide their information to the sentencing court. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b).) The trial court is, thereafter, instructed to review the information
and, where warranted, “recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
      Like the trial court, we lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s request
to strike his prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 1172.75. A
defendant may appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).) “A trial court order
denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a
defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable . . . .”
(People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 639 (King).) Generally, subject to
certain statutory exceptions, “ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of
the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) Section 1172.75 is an exception to that
general rule, permitting notification from the CDCR to vest the trial court
with jurisdiction to review the judgment and recall and resentence defendant.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) However, a defendant who files a motion without
statutory permission does not vest the sentencing court with jurisdiction to
resentence him. (See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382.)
Accordingly, the trial court here correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to

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entertain defendant’s resentencing motion. (Ibid.) It follows that its order
denying defendant’s request to strike his prior prison term enhancement
under section 1172.75 is not appealable, in turn leaving us without
jurisdiction to consider the appeal from that ruling. (Burgess, at pp. 381–382;
accord, People v. Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 448–449; People v.
Newell, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.)
      To the extent defendant, in his section 1172.75 motion, additionally
asked the trial court to strike the great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and the two prior conviction enhancements (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on those requests as
well. As it noted, section 1172.75 “only pertains to Penal Code
section 667.5(b) enhancements and provides no relief from other types of
enhancements.” Because the trial court could not have granted those
requests, its denial of those requests could not have affected defendant’s
substantial rights. Thus, that aspect of its order is also not appealable.
(King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.)
      Nor is the order denying the section 1465.9 motion to vacate fines and
fees appealable. A defendant may appeal “[f]rom any order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party” (§ 1237, subd. (b)), but
it is long established that this does not include the right to appeal the denial
of a motion that “merely asked the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling
on the same facts.” (People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 412.) Here, as
the trial court observed, there is no indication that the law has changed in a
way that would allow defendant to seek a reduction or reversal of any of the
fines and fees imposed on him.
      Section 1465.9, upon which defendant’s motion is based, provides relief
from certain costs and fees imposed on criminal defendants (see People v.

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Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 259–260), but does not abolish parole
revocation fines (§ 1202.45); victim restitution fines (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)); court
operations assessments (§ 1465.8); or criminal conviction assessments
(Gov. Code, § 70373).
      Section 1465.9 also does not render invalid restitution fines under
section 1202.4. Assembly Bill No. 177 amended section 1465.9 to provide
that “[o]n and after January 1, 2022 the balance of any court-imposed costs
pursuant to [s]ection . . . 1202.4 . . . as [that] section[ ] read[s] on December
31, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a
judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (b).)
Section 1202.4 was repealed and re-enacted by Assembly Bill No. 177. It
eliminated former subdivision (l), which authorized imposing “a fee to cover
the actual administrative cost of collecting the restitution fine.” (Stats. 2021,
ch. 257, § 2.) This repeal, however, left the rest of section 1202.4 intact.
Consequently, there is no indication the Legislature meant to provide relief
from defendant’s restitution fine.
      In short, the legislative enactments did not allow the trial to strike any
of the financial obligations imposed on defendant. Because the trial court
could not have granted defendant’s section 1465.9 motion, its order denying
the motion is not appealable, and we must dismiss the appeal from that
order. (See King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.) As a result, none of the
trial court’s August 15, 2023 rulings is properly before us.
      But even if we had jurisdiction to review any of those rulings, we would
still lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s supplemental brief arguments.
      Defendant argues that he “never went to prison at all for attempted
robbery and that should not be called a prison prior whatsoever,”—an
argument apparently challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support

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the jury’s finding he had served a prior prison term. Defendant also argues
he was not “granted a fair trial because a lot was not allowed in to prove the
fact of the matter . . . .”
       These arguments are unrelated to the section 1465.9 motion or the
section 1172.75 motion that are the subject of this appeal. Defendant’s claim
regarding his prior prison enhancement, in particular, is essentially an
attack on a prior factual finding. But section 1172.75 does not contain
language suggesting it was intended to provide redress for erroneous prior
factfinding or the possibility of proving contrary facts if given a second
chance. A section 1172.75 motion is not the appropriate avenue for defendant
to raise new claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting prior factual findings. (Cf. People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
862, 867–868 [“The problem Burns raises in his petition [for resentencing
under section 1172.6] . . . has nothing to do with the legislative changes to
California’s murder law” and “[h]is remedy [for the alleged error] was his
appeal from the judgment of conviction,” not in an appeal from the denial of
his section 1172.6 petition].)
       This case is akin to People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856 (Moore).
In Moore, the defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes in 1997
and was sentenced to 107 years to life in prison. He filed a petition in 2020 to
be considered for a youth offender evidence preservation proceeding under
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). (Moore, at pp. 860–861.)
The request was denied. (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant claimed that a
five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) was unauthorized
because the prosecution allegedly failed to comply with the pleading and
proof requirements of section 1170.1, subdivision (e). (Moore, at p. 865.) The
Moore court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim, even though it

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had jurisdiction over an appeal from an unrelated postjudgment order. (Id.
at p. 866.)
      Moore noted the rule that an unauthorized sentence can be corrected at
any time is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine, but not to the rule that the
court must first have jurisdiction. (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 865,
citing In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129.) It then held: “Not only is
appellant attempting to challenge his sentence more than 20 years after his
judgment of conviction became final, but he is doing so for the first time on
appeal from the denial of his request for a Franklin proceeding. A Franklin
proceeding, however, ‘is unrelated to the validity of the defendant’s
sentence. . . .’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition
for a Franklin proceeding and his appeal from that denial did not confer
jurisdiction on this court over the judgment. The unauthorized sentence
doctrine has no application here, and we have no jurisdiction to consider
appellant’s challenge to his sentence in this appeal.” (Moore, at p. 866.)
      Likewise here. As discussed, defendant’s claims are wholly unrelated
to the rulings from which he appealed. His claims could and should have
been, but were not, raised years ago in his direct appeal. Thus, while we
would typically evaluate the merits of arguments presented in a
supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232), we lack
jurisdiction to consider the arguments raised in the supplemental brief filed
by defendant here. (See Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865–866.)
                                  DISPOSITION
      The appeal from the order denying defendant’s motion for resentencing
under section 1172.75 is dismissed. The appeal from the order denying
defendant’s motion under section 1465.9 to vacate fines and fees is also
dismissed.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Richman, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Miller, J.

_________________________
Mayfield, J.*

A168888 (People v. Hall)

      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, Mendocino County,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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