Court Opinion

ID: 9945594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 22:05:34.199708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:34.082644
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION SEVEN

 MAGNUS SUNDHOLM,                   B324842

         Plaintiff and Appellant,   (Los Angeles County
                                    Super. Ct. No.
         v.                         21STCV44898)

 HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN
 PRESS ASSOCIATION et al.,

        Defendants and
        Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Wendy W. Y. Chang, Judge. Reversed.
      One LLP, David W. Quinto and Joanna Ardalan for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Latham & Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Robert J. Ellison
and Chandler S. Howell for Defendants and Respondents.
               _________________________________

      After he was expelled from membership in the Hollywood
Foreign Press Association (HFPA), Magnus Sundholm sued
HFPA, alleging breach of contract and other claims. HFPA
moved to disqualify One LLP and its attorneys from representing
Sundholm in this litigation based on the review by David W.
Quinto, an attorney at One LLP, of at least two documents HFPA
claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial
court granted the motion, and Sundholm appealed.
       We agree with the trial court that Quinto improperly
refused to produce documents in response to a subpoena from
HFPA seeking HFPA documents in Quinto’s possession that were
privileged or to provide a privilege log. But disqualification of an
attorney affects a party’s right to counsel of choice, and it should
not be used to punish an attorney for improper conduct. Quinto’s
conduct could have been addressed by an award of sanctions or, if
appropriate, reporting the conduct to the State Bar of California.
The drastic remedy of disqualification of counsel is appropriate
only where the attorney improperly or inadvertently received
information protected by the opposing party’s attorney-client
privilege, the information is material to the proceeding, and its
use would prejudice the opposing party in the proceeding. Here,
there was no showing the HFPA documents would prejudice
HFPA in the proceeding. We reverse.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Sundholm’s Lawsuit
      HFPA is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation whose
members are entertainment journalists living in the United
States who publish their work in media outlets outside the
United States. Sundholm became a member of HFPA in 2008.
On October 19, 2021, after Sundholm filed a complaint with the
Internal Revenue Service regarding HFPA’s tax-exempt status,
Sundholm was expelled from the organization.

                                 2
       In December 2021 Sundholm filed a complaint, and in
June 2022 an amended complaint, against HFPA and
14 members of its board of directors.1 Sundholm asserted claims
for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, violation of the common law right to fair
procedure,2 and wrongful discharge, all arising from his expulsion
from HFPA membership.
       In support of his breach of contract cause of action,
Sundholm alleged HFPA’s bylaws constituted “a contract among
HFPA’s members,” which set forth the obligations of membership
and the grounds for the board to remove and impose sanctions on
members. Sundholm alleged HFPA breached its bylaws by
revoking his membership because the bylaws allowed the board
to expel a member only for violation of an express obligation in

1      Judgment was entered in favor of the individual defendants
after the trial court sustained their demurrer to the amended
complaint without leave to amend. The individual defendants
are not parties to the appeal of the disqualification order.
2      “[A] private organization’s decisionmaking process can,
under certain circumstances, be subject to a common law right of
fair procedure which includes judicial review.” (Yari v. Producers
Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 174.) This
common law right is typically applied in cases concerning the
“exclusion or expulsion from membership in a gatekeeper
organization, such as a labor union, [which] hold that ‘the right to
practice a lawful trade or profession is sufficiently “fundamental”
to require substantial protection against arbitrary administrative
interference, either by government [citations] or by a private
entity.’” (Id. at p. 176; see Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1066 [“[W]hen the right to fair procedure
applies, the decisionmaking ‘must be both substantively rational
and procedurally fair.’”].)

                                 3
the bylaws, and Sundholm had not violated any rules,
regulations, or policies of the HFPA. The amended complaint
quoted four sections of the bylaws and attached as an exhibit a
draft copy of the bylaws dated July 1, 2021 (draft bylaws).3

B.    The Motion To Strike
      Two days after the amended complaint was filed, counsel
for HFPA, Robert Ellison, realized the version of the bylaws
attached to the amended complaint was a draft copy that had
been prepared by HFPA’s outside counsel.4 Each page of the
draft was labelled in the upper right corner with the words
“Privileged & Confidential Attorney-Client Communication” and
included the name of HFPA’s outside counsel and the date of the
draft. The draft also contained a note from HFPA’s outside
counsel purportedly containing legal advice.
      On June 17, 2022 Ellison sent a letter to Quinto asserting
the draft bylaws were privileged and requesting Quinto remove
the exhibit from all public filings. Ellison also demanded Quinto
provide an accounting of all privileged HFPA documents in his
possession and “cease all review” of those documents. In
response, Quinto asserted the draft bylaws were not protected by
any privilege and the note from counsel was “ministerial.”

3      The version of the bylaws in the appellate record is dated
August 4, 2021. Sundholm replaced the original exhibit (with the
July 1, 2021 version of the bylaws) with the August version after
the trial court granted HFPA’s motion to strike.
4     According to Ellison, after he learned the July 1, 2021 draft
bylaws had been publicly filed, he reviewed prior filings in the
case and found Sundholm had attached the same version of the
draft bylaws to another filing six weeks earlier.

                                 4
Nonetheless, Quinto offered to re-file the draft bylaws with the
note from counsel redacted.
       On June 20, 2022 HFPA filed an ex parte application to
strike the draft bylaws from the record. HFPA explained the
draft bylaws had been drafted by outside counsel in June 2021
and included legal advice. Because HFPA members were
required to approve any amended bylaws, the draft had been
“shared confidentially with HFPA members for their feedback
and approval.” Sundholm was a member of HFPA at the time.
The HFPA members adopted amended bylaws in August 2021.
       In opposition to the motion to strike Sundholm argued any
privilege attached to the draft bylaws had been waived when the
draft was sent to HFPA members and the media. In an
accompanying declaration, Sundholm stated he had received the
draft bylaws on July 20, 2021 from a member of the HFPA board
of directors. The cover letter accompanying the bylaws was
addressed to all HFPA members and explained “the proposed
new Bylaws are the result of many months of input from you and
work by our lawyers.” The letter urged members to approve the
draft bylaws as written. Sundholm added that the draft bylaws
were marked “‘Privileged & Confidential,’” but the cover letter
did not advise the members not to share them with third parties
or that they should be treated as privileged or confidential.
       On June 21, 2022, after hearing argument from counsel,
the trial court granted the motion to strike and ordered the two
filed copies of the draft bylaws (one attached to the amended
complaint and another attached to Sundholm’s declaration
opposing a motion to quash) be stricken and removed from the
court’s docket. The next day Sundholm filed a corrected amended

                               5
complaint that attached HFPA’s then-current bylaws as adopted
in August 2021.

C.     The Motion To Disqualify One LLP
       After the trial court’s ruling on the motion to strike, Ellison
informed Sundholm’s attorneys he intended to move for
disqualification of One LLP. Ellison also sent an email to Quinto
demanding that he destroy any copies of the draft bylaws and
provide to Ellison copies of all HFPA documents or
communications that appeared to be privileged. In response, on
June 22, 2022 Quinto emailed Ellison, explaining that, in
addition to the draft bylaws, “[l]ast year I received from another
source a very similar document—identical contents, slightly
different cover page. I have not received any other documents
marked as privileged and have no reason to believe any
documents I have received are reasonably subject to a claim of
privilege.”
       On June 29, 2022 HFPA served a deposition subpoena on
One LLP seeking all documents in the law firm’s possession that
HFPA had created or disseminated, including the document
described by Quinto in his June 22, 2022 email. One LLP
objected to the subpoena, asserting among other grounds that the
requested documents were not relevant to the lawsuit and
requested information protected by the attorney work-product
doctrine.5 The objection stated further that “to the extent [One
LLP] has responsive documents, it will not produce them.”

5      Quinto argued at a later hearing that disclosure of HFPA
documents in his possession would disclose work product in
another lawsuit in which Quinto represented Sundholm’s
girlfriend.

                                  6
       On July 19, 2022 HFPA moved to disqualify One LLP.
HFPA asserted that, by reviewing the draft bylaws despite the
fact they were clearly marked as privileged, attorneys at One
LLP had violated their ethical obligations as set forth in State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644 (“State
Fund”).6 HFPA also disputed Quinto’s characterization of the
note from counsel in the draft as “ministerial,” arguing it was
advice relating to “conditions under which a non-profit is
required to obtain certain approval from the California Attorney
General.” Further, Sundholm and his attorney had a history of
using “precisely [this] type of information” in “frivolous lawsuits”
and “leaks to the press.” HFPA also argued that given One LLP’s

6      Pursuant to State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at
pages 656 to 657, “When a lawyer who receives materials that
obviously appear to be subject to an attorney-client privilege or
otherwise clearly appear to be confidential and privileged and
where it is reasonably apparent that the materials were provided
or made available through inadvertence, the lawyer receiving
such materials should refrain from examining the materials any
more than is essential to ascertain if the materials are privileged,
and shall immediately notify the sender that he or she possesses
material that appears to be privileged. The parties may then
proceed to resolve the situation by agreement or may resort to
the court for guidance with the benefit of protective orders and
other judicial intervention as may be justified. We do, however,
hold that whenever a lawyer ascertains that he or she may have
privileged attorney-client material that was inadvertently
provided by another, that lawyer must notify the party entitled to
the privilege of that fact.” (See Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817-818 [adopting the State Fund holding
and extending it to material protected by the work product
doctrine].)

                                 7
refusal to produce documents in response to the subpoena, HFPA
was unable to assess “the scope of One LLP’s invasion into the
HFPA’s protected information.” Accordingly, HFPA concluded,
“[t]here can be no serious dispute that Mr. Quinto has reviewed
other privileged information that he and his client will continue
to use against the HFPA.”7
       In his opposition to the motion to disqualify, Sundholm
argued, as he had in opposition to the motion to strike, that
although the initial draft of the bylaws created by HFPA’s
lawyers was subject to the attorney-client privilege, HFPA
waived any privilege by intentionally sending the draft to its
members and the media. Thus, Sundholm’s attorneys’ ethical
duties pursuant to State Fund were not implicated.

D.    The Demurrer, Motion To Compel, and Request for
      Dismissal
      While the motion to disqualify was pending, HFPA and the
individual defendants demurred to the amended complaint.
HFPA also moved to compel compliance with the document
subpoena served on One LLP. As it did in the disqualification
motion, HFPA argued Sundholm and Quinto “have spent the last
several years exploiting the HFPA’s privileged and confidential
information” through frivolous lawsuits and leaks to the press.
Thus, “HFPA will continue to be prejudiced, and the fairness of
these proceedings significantly questioned, without a full

7     HFPA’s motion also argued Quinto should be disqualified
because he was a necessary fact witness regarding Sundholm’s
expulsion from HFPA membership. HFPA does not assert this
argument on appeal.

                                8
accounting of all the HFPA’s privileged and confidential
information in One LLP’s possession.”
         On October 20, 2022, after a hearing, the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on all causes of
action as to the individual defendants. The court sustained the
demurrer as to HFPA on all causes of action except wrongful
discharge.
         At the same hearing, the trial court heard argument on the
motion to disqualify. The court stated the issue “comes down
to . . . whether or not there’s a continuing unfair advantage. . . .
A simple violation of an ethical rule does not in and of itself
warrant disqualification.” After reviewing Quinto’s email to
HFPA’s counsel in which he stated he had another document
similar to the bylaws, the court observed, “It appears to me that
you might have documents that are privileged . . . . But I cannot
say for certain.”
         Quinto responded that the subpoena was directed to
documents that were not attorney-client communications, but
rather, were his attorney work product. Further, he did not have
any “other documents that [were] labelled as attorney-client
privilege [or] that were labelled as confidential.” Nor did he have
“any other communication between a lawyer and the HFPA.”
However, Quinto continued, “I have one document that I have
previously attached to pleadings in [another] case that seems to
refer to advice that might have come from a lawyer.” At the end
of the hearing, the trial court asked Quinto to confirm he only
had one document that could be privileged, to which Quinto
responded, “Yes.” The court followed up, “Then I’m going to give
you a chance to do the right thing with those. Please don’t make
me issue sanctions against you.” The court then continued the

                                 9
hearing on the motion to disqualify to be heard simultaneously
with the motion to compel.
      On November 9, 2022, the day before the scheduled hearing
on the motions to compel and disqualify, Sundholm submitted a
request for dismissal without prejudice of the one remaining
cause of action against HFPA. Rather than enter the dismissal
immediately, the trial court continued the hearing and requested
the parties brief the issue of whether the court retained
jurisdiction to rule on the motions given the request for
dismissal.

E.     The Ruling on the Motion To Disqualify Counsel
       At the continued hearing on November 18, 2022, the trial
court found the request for dismissal divested it of jurisdiction to
decide the motion to compel, but the court retained jurisdiction to
decide the ancillary matter of disqualification. The court
announced it intended to grant the disqualification motion
because Quinto admitted he had “at least one” privileged
document, while claiming he had no others, but One LLP refused
to produce any documents, privilege logs, or sworn discovery
responses to confirm that no other privileged documents were in
its possession. The court further opined Sundholm had dismissed
the remaining cause of action in an effort to avoid a ruling on the
motion to compel. Thus, HFPA’s concern that One LLP possessed
additional privileged documents was “well-taken” and
“potentially impact[ed] future issues between these parties.”
       Quinto responded by explaining that, in addition to the
draft bylaws, he had been in possession of a one-page document
authored by a non-lawyer that appeared to include speculation
about an attorney’s opinion. Quinto said he had destroyed the
document six months earlier. Quinto offered that if HFPA

                                10
provided a list of documents it had sent to Sundholm, Quinto
would confirm or deny whether he had any of the documents, and
he would be happy to “disgorge” any documents identified as
attorney-client communications. Quinto also argued that HFPA
had failed to show that any privileged information he allegedly
had in his possession was likely to have a substantial continuing
effect on the proceedings (meaning this appeal).
       The trial court found there was a discrepancy in Quinto’s
representations concerning the potentially privileged document
he claimed he had destroyed in that Quinto at a later hearing
told the court he still had a copy. Nonetheless, the court stated
that Quinto’s argument there was no continuing effect on the
proceeding “would have actually probably worked if you had
responded to the discovery that was propounded on you.”
However, “because you’re refusing to respond to the request that
would have confirmed your statements under oath that you are
not in possession of any remaining privileged documents and,
instead, you are choosing to dismiss this case in an effort to avoid
the effect of [an order to compel], I find that the defendant’s
concern that you continue to be in possession of privileged and
confidential material belonging to the defendant, . . . combined
with your misunderstanding of what the privilege is and what
your [ethical] obligations . . . are, I think that results in, I think,
a real significant potential that you are in continued possession of
privileged materials . . . that may affect future judicial
proceedings.” The court granted the motion to disqualify counsel
and issued a written decision the same day.

                                  11
      The court entered the dismissal of the remaining cause of
action on January 10, 2023. Sundholm filed a timely notice of
appeal from the order disqualifying counsel.8

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       “The trial court’s power to disqualify counsel is derived
from the court’s inherent power ‘[t]o control in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers.’ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 128, subd. (a)(5); [citation].) Disqualification motions implicate
several important interests, among them are the clients’ right to
counsel of their choice, the attorney’s interest in representing a
client, the financial burden of replacing a disqualified attorney,
and tactical abuse that may underlie the motion.” (Roush v.
Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 210, 218-219
(Roush); accord, People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee
Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145 (SpeeDee
Oil).) “Although disqualification necessarily impinges on a
litigant’s right to counsel of his or her choice, the decision on a
disqualification motion ‘involves more than just the interests of
the parties.’ [Citation.] When ruling on a disqualification
motion, ‘[t]he paramount concern must be to preserve public trust
in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of
the bar. The important right to counsel of one’s choice must yield

8     Sundholm’s notice of appeal also seeks review of the trial
court’s November 17, 2022 judgment dismissing the individual
defendants after sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend. In April 2023 this court granted the parties’ request to
delay briefing on the appeal from the dismissal order pending the
outcome of the appeal as to the disqualification order.

                                12
to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of
our judicial process.’” (Clark v. Superior Court (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 37, 47-48.) “It must be remembered, however,
that disqualification is a drastic course of action that should not
be taken simply out of hypersensitivity to ethical nuances or the
appearance of impropriety.” (Roush, at p. 219; see City of San
Diego v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 457, 470 (San
Diego) [“We do not disqualify a lawyer from representing a client
to punish the lawyer’s mistakes or even bad behavior.”].)
       “Protecting the confidentiality of communications between
attorney and client is a fundamental principle of our judicial
process and an opposing attorney who breaches that principle
may be disqualified from further participation in the litigation.”
(McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1119-1120; accord, SpeeDee Oil, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 1146.) However, “mere exposure to the
confidences of an adversary does not, standing alone, warrant
disqualification.” (Roush, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 219;
accord, State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 657; Rico v.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 819.) When an
attorney has improperly or inadvertently received documents or
information protected by an opposing party’s attorney-client
privilege, disqualification may be a proper “‘prophylactic measure
to prevent future prejudice to the opposing party from
information the attorney should not have possessed.’”
(McDermott, at p. 1120; see Wu v. O’Gara Coach Co., LLC (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1083 [disqualification warranted only when
privileged information possessed by attorney is “found to be
directly at issue in, or have some critical importance to” the
current litigation]; San Diego, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 472

                                13
[disqualification proper only when there is “a ‘genuine likelihood’
that the attorney’s status or misconduct ‘will affect the outcome
of the proceedings before the court’”].)
       When a party moves to disqualify opposing counsel based
on allegedly improper receipt of privileged or confidential
information, the party seeking disqualification has the initial
burden to show its adversary possesses confidential information
materially related to the proceedings before the court. (See
DeLuca v. State Fish Co., Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 671, 686;
Roush, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.) The moving party need
not disclose the actual information asserted to be confidential but
must provide the court with the nature of the information and its
material relationship to the proceeding. (Roush, at p. 220.)
       A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
disqualify counsel is generally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1038; In re
Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159; SpeeDee Oil, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) “As to disputed factual issues, a reviewing
court’s role is simply to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact . . . . As to the trial
court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a
disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” (Charlisse C., at p. 159; see Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) While the trial court’s
“‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious’” (Charlisse C., at p. 159), “where there are no
material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the
trial court’s determination as a question of law.” (SpeeDee Oil, at
p. 1144; accord, California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund v.

                                 14
Superior Court (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1071; Castaneda v.
Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1443.)

B.    The Trial Court Erred in Disqualifying Sundholm’s
      Attorneys Because There Was No Evidence Sundholm’s
      Attorneys Possessed Privileged Information That Would
      Prejudice HFPA in the Pending Litigation
      As discussed, the trial court found One LLP had been in
possession of at least two privileged or potentially privileged
documents: the draft bylaws and a document that appeared to
contain a non-lawyer’s speculation about attorney advice (that
Quinto claimed he had destroyed six months earlier). The court
further found Quinto was in violation of his ethical obligations
under State Fund because he failed to cease reviewing these
documents when he realized they were potentially privileged.9

9      Because we find HFPA failed to establish prejudice, we
need not address the trial court’s finding Quinto violated his
ethical duties pursuant to State Fund. However, we note the
cases cited by HFPA in support of State Fund’s application
involve situations where counsel received privileged or
confidential documents as a result of inadvertence or
impropriety. (See, e.g., Militello v. VFARM 1509 (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 602, 622 [State Fund applied to emails attorney
received from a client that the client had improperly obtained in
violation of adversary’s right to privacy]; McDermott Will &
Emery LLP v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112
[State Fund applied where client gave his attorney copy of
privileged email that had been inadvertently forwarded to him];
Clark v. Superior Court, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 53 [State
Fund applied where client gave attorney documents that the
client had obtained from his employer in violation of
nondisclosure agreement].)

                                15
While the court stated the circumstances (principally that One
LLP refused to respond to the subpoena and provide a privilege
log) “strongly suggest[] that [Sundholm] has other HFPA
materials in [his] possession [and] that [he] will freely use them
disadvantageously against [HFPA],” the court failed to explain
how Sundholm would use the privileged information to HFPA’s
disadvantage in this lawsuit—the required material link between
the privileged information and the issues presented in this
lawsuit.
       HFPA did not present any evidence to support a finding of
prejudice. Other than HFPA’s conclusory references to
Sundholm’s prior use of private information to disparage HFPA,
there is no indication in the record how the asserted privileged

       These cases do not address situations where, as here, a
document is intentionally sent to a party for a proper purpose
and the party shares it with the party’s counsel. It is not clear
the procedures outlined in State Fund would apply to such a
situation. (See, e.g., Roush, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 219
[“where the attorney’s client is the attorney’s source of privileged
information relating to the litigation, courts typically refuse to
allow the disqualification, concluding that clients do not act
inappropriately in providing information to their own attorney”];
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
294, 310 [“in-house counsel may disclose ostensible employer-
client confidences to her own attorneys to the extent they may be
relevant to the preparation and prosecution of her wrongful
termination action against her former client-employer”]; In re
Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 591 [“If
the disclosure is made by the attorney’s own client,
disqualification is neither justified nor an effective remedy. A
party cannot ‘improperly’ disclose information to its own counsel
in the prosecution of its own lawsuit.”].)

                                 16
documents contained information directly relevant to this case or
could be used to HFPA’s disadvantage. Indeed, HFPA does not
argue the portions of the draft bylaws quoted in the amended
complaint are privileged, and further, the quoted language
appears to be identical to that in the August 2021 version of the
bylaws that is part of the appellate record. Likewise, HFPA
provides no explanation for how the note from counsel contained
in the draft bylaws could affect the outcome of this case.
       We are sympathetic to HFPA’s position that it cannot know
the extent of the detriment caused by One LLP’s possession of
privileged documents because One LLP refused to respond to the
discovery subpoena seeking to obtain that information. However,
the disqualification issue arose because Sundholm shared the
draft bylaws with Quinto. HFPA had knowledge of what
documents it provided to its members that it claimed were
confidential (as acknowledged by its general counsel in his
declaration), yet it never asserted that Quinto had possession of
any of those documents. Nor did HFPA explain how Quinto’s
possible possession of one of those confidential documents would
have prejudiced HFPA in this litigation. Moreover, the
appropriate mechanism to address Quinto’s failure to respond to
the subpoena is not disqualification of the law firm, but rather,
an order compelling discovery responses, imposing sanctions, or
referring Quinto to the State Bar. (See San Diego, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 471-472 [disqualification is not appropriate
“‘to punish dereliction that will likely have no substantial
continuing effect on future judicial proceedings,’” but rather,
“‘[t]here are other sanctions which in that situation must suffice,
including imposition of attorneys fees and costs incurred by the
other side as a result of the misconduct . . . and reporting of the

                                17
misconduct to the State Bar of California so that it may
determine whether disciplinary action is appropriate’”].)10
       Sundholm’s dismissal of the case before the trial court
could enter an order compelling production, even if motivated by
gamesmanship as the trial court found, does not support
disqualification. In the absence of any reasonable probability the
privileged information would have provided Sundholm with an
unfair advantage or otherwise affected the outcome of the
proceeding, disqualification was improper.11 (See Wu v. O’Gara
Coach Co., LLC, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 [reversing
disqualification order where moving party failed to show
privileged information was “directly at issue in, or has some
unusual value or critical importance” to the litigation]; San
Diego, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 473 [reversing disqualification
order where there was no “‘reasonable probability’ or ‘genuine
likelihood’ that [party’s] misconduct will provide it with an unfair
advantage”]; DeLuca v. State Fish Co., Inc., supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 692 [reversing disqualification order where
defendant “failed in its burden of establishing that . . .

10    The trial court retained power, for example, to sanction
Sundholm by awarding reasonable expenses, including attorneys’
fees. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a) [“A trial court may
order a party, the party’s attorney, or both to pay any reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as
a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay.”].)
11     Even if on appeal we were to reverse the judgment in favor
of the individual defendants, those defendants would need to file
a separate motion for disqualification showing how they are
prejudiced in the litigation by Quinto’s possession of the
documents.

                                 18
confidential information materially related to the proceedings
before the court was conveyed to [adverse party]”]; cf. McDermott
Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1125 [substantial evidence supported disqualification where
attorneys had demonstrated willingness to use privileged
document in formulating strategy and order would prevent future
prejudice from exploitation of document’s contents]; Clark v.
Superior Court, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 55 [same].)

                        DISPOSITION

      The order disqualifying One LLP and its attorneys is
reversed. Sundholm is to recover his costs on appeal.

                                         FEUER, J.

We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P.J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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