Court Opinion

ID: 9402019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 20:04:59.598899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.961887
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                 2023 IL App (4th) 220937-U
This Order was filed under                                                            FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                         June 14, 2023
not precedent except in the                NO. 4-22-0937                             Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                    4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).              IN THE APPELLATE COURT                               Court, IL

                                           OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                                  )      Logan County
DEANDRE L. ROGERS,                                             )      No. 19CF130
           Defendant-Appellant.                                )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Jonathan C. Wright,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1      Held: The circuit court erred by dismissing defendant’s pro se postconviction
              petition at the first stage of the proceedings.

¶2               Defendant, Deandre L. Rogers, appeals the Logan County circuit court’s order

summarily dismissing his pro se postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

Defendant contends the court’s denial was erroneous because the petition stated the gist of a

constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a

motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea after being instructed to do so. We reverse and

remand with directions.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4               In July 2019, a grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of drug-induced

homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2018)) for the death of John Beck. The parties entered
into a plea agreement, under which defendant would plead guilty to one count of drug-induced

homicide and the State’s sentencing recommendation would be capped at 23 years’

imprisonment. The State would request dismissal of the other charge in this case and all of the

charges in the following Logan County cases: (1) No. 18-CF-163, (2) No. 17-TR-3383, (3) No.

17-TR-3306, (4) No. 18-TR-850, (5) No. 18-TR-1707, (6) No. 19-TR-1488, and (7) No.

19-TR-1902.

¶5              On July 16, 2021, the circuit court held defendant’s guilty plea hearing.

Following the court’s admonitions, defendant pleaded guilty. Once it was determined defendant

was extended-term eligible, the court again admonished defendant of the minimum and

maximum sentence, and defendant confirmed his guilty plea. The State gave the following

factual basis for the plea:

                “Witnesses would testify that on May 18, 2019, this defendant, who would be

                identified in open court, conducted a drug transaction with John Beck. That this

                defendant gave John Beck heroin in exchange for $100; that thereinafter John

                Beck used a portion of that heroin. The next morning on May 19, 2019, John

                Beck was discovered deceased. That law enforcement responded to the scene,

                [sic] began investigation. And John Beck’s body was taken to the coroner’s

                office for an autopsy. And thereinafter an autopsy was conducted and it was

                discovered that John Beck died as a result of ingesting that heroin.”

After hearing the factual basis, the court found defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea

and the factual basis supported the plea. The court entered a judgment of conviction. After a

September 15, 2021, hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment for

drug-induced homicide.

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¶6             Defendant filed neither a postplea motion nor a direct appeal from his conviction

and sentence. On May 18, 2022, defendant filed pro se a petition for relief under the

Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)).

Defendant asserted he was denied his constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance

of trial counsel because counsel (1) used “scare tactics” to force him to plead guilty by stating no

judge or jury would acquit him if he went to trial, (2) incorrectly told him he would receive a

six-year prison term if he pleaded guilty, (3) failed to provide assistance in considering the

State’s plea offer, and (4) failed to file a motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant

also asserted he was innocent of the charge. Defendant attached his own affidavit and a

document listing the cause of Beck’s death.

¶7             On August 11, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order summarily

dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition. As to defendant’s claim related to counsel’s

failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court found no arguable basis to support

an assertion of prejudice. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied

on September 26, 2022.

¶8             On October 14, 2022, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(d)

(eff. July 1, 2017) (providing the supreme court rules governing criminal appeals apply to

appeals in postconviction proceedings). Thus, this court has jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶9                                        II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10           The Postconviction Act “provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to

challenge their convictions or sentences based on a substantial violation of their rights under the

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federal or state constitutions.” People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75

(2010). A proceeding under the Postconviction Act is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal

from the defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21, 987

N.E.2d 371. The defendant must show he or she suffered a substantial deprivation of his or her

federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 83, 885 N.E.2d 1044,

1046 (2008).

¶ 11           The Postconviction Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a

postconviction petition. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. Here, defendant’s petition was

dismissed at the first stage. At the first stage, the circuit court must review the postconviction

petition and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction

petition “need only present the gist of a constitutional claim,” which is “a low threshold” that

requires the petition to contain only “a limited amount of detail.” People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d

410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996). Our supreme court has held “a pro se petition seeking

postconviction relief under the [Postconviction] Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be

summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209

(2009). A petition lacks an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory, such as one that is completely contradicted by the record. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16,

912 N.E.2d at 1212. A petition lacks an arguable factual basis when it is based on a fanciful

factual allegation, such as one that is clearly baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Hodges, 234 Ill.

2d at 16-17, 912 N.E.2d at 1212. “In considering a petition pursuant to [section 122-2.1 of the

Postconviction Act], the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the

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petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any

transcripts of such proceeding.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(c) (West 2020); see also People v. Brown,

236 Ill. 2d 175, 184, 923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010). Our review of the first-stage dismissal of a

postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Dunlap, 2011 IL App (4th) 100595, ¶ 20, 963

N.E.2d 394.

¶ 12           Here, defendant asserts he stated the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to withdraw defendant’s

guilty plea. This court analyzes ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708

N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999). To obtain reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove

(1) counsel’s performance failed to meet an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel’s

deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708

N.E.2d at 1163-64. To satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, the defendant must

demonstrate counsel made errors so serious and counsel’s performance was so deficient that

counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d

at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163. Further, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption the

challenged action or inaction could have been the product of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill.

2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must prove a

reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s result

would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64.

¶ 13           The circuit court recognized defendant had an arguable legal and factual basis for

the deficiency prong of the Strickland test. Thus, we examine whether an arguable legal and

factual basis existed for the prejudice prong of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel

                                                -5-
claim. Defendant contends this case is similar to People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 257, 757

N.E.2d 442, 452 (2001), where our supreme court held the circuit court erred in dismissing the

defendant’s postconviction petition at the first stage of the proceedings. There, the defendant

asserted, after the entry of his guilty plea, his attorney was unavailable and refused his request to

file an appeal. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 240-41, 757 N.E.2d at 443. Citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega,

528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000), the supreme court held, at the first stage of postconviction

proceedings, prejudice under Strickland is presumed from trial counsel’s failure to file a

requested motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 252-53, 757

N.E.2d at 450. The court explained, “a pro se defendant, even if he pled guilty, cannot be

required to demonstrate how his appeal would have been successful in order to establish that he

was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to pursue a requested appeal.” (Emphasis in original.)

Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 253, 757 N.E.2d at 450. It also noted the following:

               “Whether, in the circumstances of this case, defense counsel’s decision not to file

               a motion to withdraw the guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel

               requires the appointment of an attorney who will be able to consult with

               defendant regarding his claim and explore in more detail the factual and legal

               ramifications of defendant’s claim.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 257, 757 N.E.2d at

               452-53.

“At this juncture, it would be inappropriate to conclude that [the] defendant’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is so completely lacking in substance that it is frivolous or

patently without merit.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 257, 757 N.E.2d at 453. However, to merit an

evidentiary hearing on the claim, a substantial showing will necessarily entail some explanation

of the grounds which could have been presented in the motion to withdraw the plea. Edwards,

                                                -6-
197 Ill. 2d at 258, 757 N.E.2d at 453.

¶ 14           The State asserts Edwards is distinguishable because the record positively rebuts

a claim of prejudice and a required presumption of prejudice in such a case undermines the

purpose of first-stage review. Specifically, it asserts the record rebuts any possibility defendant

entered the plea as a misapprehension of fact, law, or any authority. The State insists defendant

lacked a legitimate basis for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. However, as the supreme court in

Edwards recognized, defendant’s claim necessitates the appointment of counsel who can consult

with defendant regarding it. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 257, 757 N.E.2d at 452-53. The State not

finding a claim of error on the face of the record does not rule out all possible claims related to

the plea proceedings. As in Edwards, nothing in the record establishes defendant’s trial counsel

ever reviewed the plea proceedings for error, and thus, at this juncture, defendant has not yet had

counsel to explore any potential claims related to the plea. Based on Edwards, we find

defendant’s petition did state an arguable legal and factual basis for ineffective assistance of

counsel due to counsel’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the circuit court

erred when it summarily dismissed defendant’s petition. Our holding is in no way intended to

express an opinion as to whether defendant will ultimately prevail on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

¶ 15                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16           For the reasons stated, we reverse the Logan County circuit court’s summary

dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition and remand the cause for second-stage

postconviction proceedings.

¶ 17           Reversed and remanded with directions.

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