Court Opinion

ID: 9867461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 16:13:57.942084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:24.980412
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             September 26, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                               SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA
                               STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re L.B., K.S., and J.N.

No. 22-663 (Jackson County 20-JA-91, 20-JA-92, 20-JA-93)

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner mother J.H. 1 appeals the Circuit Court of Jackson County’s July 11, 2022, order
terminating her parental rights to L.B., K.S., and J.N. 2 Upon our review, we determine that oral
argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is
appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        On November 6, 2020, the DHHR filed a petition alleging that petitioner physically and
emotionally abused her children, L.B., K.S., and J.N. Specifically, the petition alleged that L.B.
and K.S. disclosed that petitioner kicked, bit, choked, and threatened them repeatedly, including
threatening to kill them. On February 5, 2021, the court took in camera testimony of L.B. and K.S.
Prior to the in camera testimony, the parties were given an opportunity to submit questions for
purposes of cross-examination. Petitioner did not submit any questions. Following the in camera
testimony, the court entered an order, pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, where the court “elect[ed] not to make the
transcripts available to the attorneys based on exceptional circumstances existing.” 3 Following
petitioner’s oral motion to obtain access to the transcripts, the court entered an additional order
denying this motion, finding that, under Rule 8(b), “exceptional circumstances exist[ed] such that

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Roger L. Lambert. The West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and
Assistant Attorney General Lee Niezgoda. Counsel Ryan M. Ruth appears as the children’s
guardian ad litem.
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
       3
         As more fully set forth below, the circuit court’s order also provided that it was
“excluding” the testimony under Rule 8(a) and “sealing” the testimony under Rule 8(c). However,
the ruling directly relevant to petitioner’s assignment of error is that electing not to make the
transcript of the testimony available to the parties.

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the [c]ourt shall not make the recording available to [c]ounsel,” including evidence of long-term
physical abuse, disclosures of threats to kill the children, and petitioner’s forensic psychological
evaluation which indicated that the examiner was “very concerned about [petitioner’s] possible
retaliation against the children.”

        Because petitioner challenges only the court’s rulings concerning the children’s in camera
testimony, it is unnecessary to belabor the procedural history below. After an adjudicatory hearing,
the court adjudicated petitioner as an abusive mother to L.B., K.S., and J.N. Following a
disposition hearing held on June 6, 2022, the court terminated petitioner’s parental and custodial
rights by order entered on July 11, 2022, finding that there was no reasonable likelihood the
conditions of abuse could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination of
petitioner’s parental rights was consistent with “the general welfare and best interest” of the
children. 4 The court took judicial notice of the children’s in camera testimony at both the
adjudicatory hearing and dispositional hearing. It is from the circuit court’s final dispositional
order that petitioner appeals.

        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). First, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred
when it excluded the children’s in camera testimony but continued to take judicial notice of the
testimony. Specifically, petitioner argues that the circuit court conflated Rules 8(a) and (b) of the
Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings by taking the testimony, excluding
the testimony, and then taking judicial notice of the testimony. Second, petitioner argues that the
circuit court erred in failing to provide transcripts of the testimony to her attorney. Upon our
review, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief. 5

        Petitioner is correct in arguing that the court conflated Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b) when ruling
on testimony it had already taken. Rule 8(a) details restrictions on whether a child should testify,
stating that “there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the potential psychological harm to the
child outweighs the necessity of the child’s testimony” and that “the court shall exclude this
testimony if the potential psychological harm to the child outweighs the necessity of the child’s
testimony.” (Emphasis added). Rule 8(b), however, assumes that the threshold determination as to
whether to take a child’s testimony has been resolved and outlines the procedure for taking that

       4
           The permanency plan for the children is to remain in the custody of their respective fathers.
       5
         On appeal, petitioner also challenges the circuit court’s ruling “sealing” the testimony
under Rule 8(c). However, Rule 8(c) provides for sealing of testimony where the “interview was
recorded and disclosed to the attorneys.” (Emphasis added). Because the testimony in this case
was never disclosed to the attorneys, we find it unnecessary to address any rulings on the circuit
court’s sealing under Rule 8(c). Further, petitioner takes issue not with the circuit court’s “sealing”
of the testimony as provided for in Rule 8(c), but with the circuit court’s decision to withhold the
transcripts from the attorneys under Rule 8(b). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address any ruling
concerning “sealing” testimony under Rule 8(c) in order to resolve petitioner’s lone assignment of
error before this Court.
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testimony. Rule 8(b) also sets forth restrictions on the release of that testimony, in exceptional
circumstances.

        Although the circuit court’s order stated that the court was excluding the testimony of the
children under Rule 8(a), a plain reading of the rule makes it clear that section (a) guides the court’s
decision in whether or not the child should testify, not whether or not the child’s testimony, already
taken, should be “excluded from the case.” Where a circuit court finds, under Rule 8(a), that the
potential psychological harm to the child outweighs the necessity of the child’s testimony, the
court should exclude the child from providing testimony at all. Thus, although the court’s order
stated that the testimony was excluded, the testimony, in effect, was not excluded pursuant to Rule
8(a), because the court already heard the testimony.

         However, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the court’s misapplication of
Rule 8(a) resulted in prejudice to the petitioner. Before this Court, petitioner argues that if the
circuit court had excluded the testimony before taking it, “there would have been no such testimony
for use . . . throughout the proceedings.” However, this argument ignores the fact that Rule 8(a)
permits the exclusion of such testimony only where, among other requirements, “the equivalent
evidence can be procured through other reasonable efforts.” As such, petitioner’s argument that
there would have been no evidence on these points is without merit because the testimony could
only be excluded where equivalent evidence is available. Further, petitioner did not object to the
taking of in camera testimony of the children and, although given the opportunity to submit
questions for cross-examination purposes, failed to do so. We have previously recognized “that
the circuit court’s failure to strictly comply with [Rule 8] does not constitute a substantial
frustration or disregard of the applicable rules and statutes such that vacation of the circuit court’s
final order is warranted.” In re K.R. and J.R., No. 17-1012, 2018 WL 1709713, at *5 (W. Va. Apr.
9, 2018)(memorandum decision). Accordingly, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief.

        Next, petitioner argues that she was prejudiced by the court’s decision not to release the
recorded interviews which “depriv[ed] her of the opportunity to respond to the allegations made
therein.” However, Rule 8(b) provides for circumstances in which the circuit court is permitted to
not release the transcript or recording to parties in the case. Specifically, Rule 8(b) states that
“[u]nder exceptional circumstances, the court may elect not to make the recording available to the
attorneys but must place the basis for the finding of exceptional circumstances on the record.” A
plain reading of Rule 8(b) makes it clear that the circuit court has discretion to withhold the
recording where exceptional circumstances exist.

        In the initial order to withhold transcripts of the in camera testimony, the court clearly
stated, “[p]ursuant to Rule 8(b) of Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, the [c]ourt does elect not
to make the transcripts available to the attorneys based on exceptional circumstances existing.”
The circuit court’s subsequent order denying petitioner’s oral motion to obtain access to the
transcripts of the testimony expands on this ruling. In the order, the court highlighted evidence
from the CAC interviews of the children, noting that the children gave firsthand accounts of severe
physical abuse over a period of years. Additionally, the court considered petitioner’s psychological
evaluation, where the examiner made specific findings that the petitioner “openly accused her
children of lying about the abuse they experienced” and that “the examiner is very concerned about
[petitioner’s] possible retaliation against the children.”

                                                   3
        We have previously found that withholding in camera testimony from counsel where the
record showed that the children feared the parent did not constitute a substantial disregard or
frustration of the applicable rules such that vacation was warranted, even where the circuit court
did not specifically make a finding of “exceptional circumstances.” In re B.C., M.E.-1, and N.E.,
No. 18-1095, 2019 WL 2453279 (W. Va. June 12, 2019)(memorandum decision). Here, the circuit
court entered two orders specifically finding that exceptional circumstances existed. Accordingly,
petitioner is entitled to no relief.

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its July
11, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 26, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice C. Haley Bunn

DISSENTING:

Justice William R. Wooton

WOOTON, J., dissenting:

        Petitioner mother appeals termination of her parental rights upon allegations of severe
emotional and physical abuse. Prior to the adjudication, the circuit court elected to take in camera
testimony of the children, without the presence of the attorneys. Petitioner’s counsel was invited
to provide written questions in advance but did not do so. Subsequently, the court entered an order
“excluding” their testimony, “sealing” their testimony, and finding “exceptional circumstances”
to avoid releasing the transcript to petitioner. Despite “excluding” the testimony, it then took
“judicial notice” of their testimony and adjudicated petitioner abusive and neglectful.

        Rule of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings 8(b) provides that in camera
interviews, without the presence of attorneys, may be taken as long as the transcript is provided. It
further provides, however, that in “exceptional circumstances” the transcript may be withheld from
the attorneys:

               The court may conduct in camera interviews of a minor child,
               outside the presence of the parent(s). The parties’ attorneys shall be
               allowed to attend such interviews, except when the court determines

                                                 4
               that the presence of attorneys will be especially intimidating to the
               child witness. When attorneys are not allowed to be present for in
               camera interviews of a child, the court shall, unless otherwise agreed
               by the parties, have the interview electronically or stenographically
               recorded and make the recording available to the attorneys before
               the evidentiary hearing resumes. Under exceptional circumstances,
               the court may elect not to make the recording available to the
               attorneys but must place the basis for a finding of exceptional
               circumstances on the record. Under these exceptional
               circumstances, the recording only will be available for review by the
               Supreme Court of Appeals.

Id. (emphasis added).

        I find this problematic; it is unclear to me how a parent is to defend against such allegations
without knowing the details of the children’s testimony. I recognize the Rule allows for this, but it
appears the Constitutional implications of this Rule (which is a Court-created Rule) have not been
evaluated by this Court. Further, the Rule makes clear that “exceptional circumstances” must
exist: here, the court merely indicated that petitioner had previously accused the children of lying
and a psychological examiner (not the children) “feared retaliation” by petitioner. That does not
seem particularly “extraordinary” nor necessarily well-founded; certainly the specter of retaliation
is present in any case involving allegations of abuse and the fact that petitioner maintains the abuse
allegations are false only underscores petitioner’s need for this information. Further, the fact that
petitioner elected not to submit questions is of no moment: how would petitioner have any idea
what questions to ask? Inconsistencies, impeachable details, and exculpatory information can only
be adduced by an accused parent if the “judicially noticed” testimony is made available.

        Finally, in other cases that have dealt with this Rule the attorneys have either been present
or been provided the transcript. This Court has not yet carefully examined a factually similar case;
in the memo decision cited in support of affirming there was evidence the children “feared” the
petitioner, there was substantial other evidence, and a psychological evaluation of the child
outlining the allegations was provided. Here, the court took judicial notice of the children’s
testimony, but the memo decision does not indicate the extent and substance of the other evidence
available to petitioner.

       For these reasons I believe this case warrants closer review and would place it on the Rule
20 argument docket. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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