Court Opinion

ID: 9711939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:42:34.883655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.549219
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and, therefore, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. Basically, I disagree with the result reached by the majority after application of Commonwealth v. Anderson, 253 Pa. Super. 334, 385 A.2d 365 (1975) (setting forth guidelines for determining whether an interrogation was custodial in nature).
Consider the facts: The police arrived after 9:00 p.m. to question appellant about the murder of Ms brother-in-law. Appellant was the sole suspect in the case. Lt. Holmberg testified that he explained to appellant that he was not under arrest, appellant did not have to answer any questions and he could ask the officers to leave at any time. However, standing outside appellant’s front door were two officers awaiting their opportunity to execute a search warrant for appellant’s home and vehicles.
Rather than complete their “non-custodial” quesfion-andanswer session at appellant’s home, the officers, after asking for and receiving appellant’s .357 caliber handgun, requested appellant to accompany them to the police station. Prior to leaving appellant’s home, Corporal Watson, in the presence of appellant, informed the officers who were going to perform the search, “this is the revolver we’re looking for.”1
Appellant went with the police. He left on an extremely cold winter night in nothing but pants and a T-shirt. Before entering the police ear, he was frisked, and, once *236inside, he was accompanied in the back seat by a police officer. Appellant was not permitted to drive his own vehicle to the police barracks because, according to the police, it had to remain at appellant’s home to be searched. Consequently, if appellant had wanted to leave the police station, he would have been forced to rely upon the police for transportation home.
Upon arrival at the police barracks, appellant signed the “Notification of Non-arrest.”2 The officers testified that throughout their conversation with appellant, the interrogation room door was open and that they repeatedly informed him that he was not under arrest.3 Astoundingly, even after appellant admitted to the murder, the police told appellant he could to go home and return in the morning to turn himself in to the authorities! However, officers were positioned outside the barracks to prevent any attempt at escape.
To me, this case was clearly one of custodial interrogation. Despite the officers’ self-serving testimony concerning their repeated assurances of “non-arrest”, I am convinced that appellant reasonably believed he was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Appellant was the sole suspect; appellant knew the police believed his gun was the murder weapon; he knew the police had a search warrant for his house; appellant was not permitted to drive himself to the police station; appellant was frisked before entering the police cruiser; after arriving at the police station, he had no way to leave other than by police transport; although the door to the interrogation room was open, appellant was nonetheless inside the police barracks. On those *237facts, I have no doubt that appellant believed he was not free to leave.
It is ironic that the actions by the police which are most demonstrative of the custodial nature of this interrogation are those by which the officers attempted to minimize the custodial appearance of the interrogation. Never in my seventeen years as a jurist have I heard of a “Notification of Non-arrest,” and neither have I ever heard of police offering to release an admitted murderer from custody so that he could go home for the evening and turn himself in for prosecution later. I believe such actions reveal that the officers knew that the interrogation was custodial, and that, upon being surprised by appellants’ sudden confession, they undertook to clothe an otherwise custodial interrogation into a cloak of false volition.
I, for one, am convinced appellant’s constitutional rights were violated, Miranda warnings should have been issued, appellant’s pre and post-arrest statements to the police should have been suppressed, and a new trial is warranted.

. Appellant’s wife testified that the officers informed appellant that if he did not come with them they would secure an arrest warrant. In response, the police denied making such a statement. However, we should remember that at the time this statement was alleged to have been made, the police investigation had focused on appellant, and the police possessed appellant’s revolver which, by their own admission, they believed to be the murder weapon.

. The “Notification of Non-arrest”, typed on a blank piece of stationary, informed appellant he was not under arrest, was free to leave at any time, was not being threatened and could stop answering questions at any time.

. From the officers’ testimony regarding the number of times they informed appellant that he was free to go, one must wonder how, in the midst of insuring appellant knew he was not in custody, the officers found time to ask appellant any questions concerning the murder.