Court Opinion

ID: 9947784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:47.391219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:34.504046
License: Public Domain

J-A26028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RAHEEM JOHNSON                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 78 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007442-2010

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                            FILED MARCH 5, 2024

       Raheem Johnson appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He claims the court

erred in concluding that his petition was untimely. We affirm.

       In 2011, a jury found Johnson guilty of third-degree murder and

carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia. 1

Johnson’s convictions stem from the murder of a victim that Johnson shot

multiple times. The court sentenced Johnson to concurrent terms of 20 to 40

years’ incarceration for third-degree murder and two and a half to five years’

incarceration for the firearms charge. We affirmed the judgment of sentence

in 2013. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 517 EDA 2012, 2013 WL

11255623 (Pa.Super. filed Sept. 24, 2013) (unpublished mem.).

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 6108, respectively.
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     In June 2021, Johnson filed the instant PCRA petition, his second,

asserting the “new fact” exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). He

alleged that his former girlfriend, Andrea Brewington, witnessed the murder

and claimed that Johnson acted in self-defense. The PCRA court scheduled an

evidentiary hearing and aptly summarized the evidence presented:

           Andrea Brewington, [Johnson’s] former girlfriend,
        testified that she was present with [Johnson] on November
        13, 2009, and witnessed the shooting. Brewington did not
        appear to testify at trial as she had ended her relationship
        with [Johnson] and started a new life. Brewington changed
        her phone number, moved to a new address, and broke off
        contact with [Johnson] and his family. Brewington was not
        aware of [Johnson’s] trial in 2011.

           Brewington grew up with [Johnson] in the Olney
        neighborhood of Philadelphia. [Johnson] and Brewington’s
        brother were best friends and attended grade school and
        high school together. Their families were close.
        Brewington’s brother was murdered a few months prior to
        this incident. Brewington and [Johnson] were dating for a
        few months prior to her brother’s murder.

            Brewington swore out an affidavit stating that [Johnson]
        shot the decedent in self-defense after wrestling the gun
        from the decedent, who was attempting to shoot [Johnson].
        Brewington did not speak to police at the scene, but instead
        left before they arrived. [Johnson] secreted himself in North
        Carolina and Brewington went there for a few weeks but
        returned to Philadelphia prior to [Johnson’s] arrest. After
        returning to Philadelphia, Brewington was emotionally
        drained from her brother’s death and the incident with
        [Johnson] so she decided to move on and put everything
        behind her. She relocated by moving to a different area in
        Philadelphia. She changed her phone number and did not
        give it to anyone.

           In 2021, Brewington received a call from a friend,
        Kasheef Jones, who had been released from prison after
        serving a ten-year sentence. Jones was also friends with

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         [Johnson] and Brewington’s late brother. Brewington and
         Jones discussed [Johnson’s] situation and Brewington
         stated that she regretted not coming forward and that she
         was willing to “right the wrong.”

            On cross-examination, Brewington testified that she did
         not want to come forward because she was on state parole
         at the time of the incident which did not expire until 2014.
         She knew there was a warrant for [Johnson] for murder
         when she went to stay with him in North Carolina. Although
         Brewington cut ties with [Johnson], she remained at the
         same place of employment at Khepera Charter School where
         her son attended school. [Johnson] was aware of where she
         worked and that she was on state parole. Notes of
         Testimony[,] 10/28/2022, 5-58.

            [Johnson] testified that Brewington was with him on the
         day of the murder. After Brewington left [Johnson] in North
         Carolina, he attempted to find her prior to his trial but was
         unsuccessful. He related this information to trial counsel one
         week prior to trial and requested counsel to locate her to
         testify, but counsel was unsuccessful. [Johnson] made no
         attempts to locate Brewington after trial. [Johnson]
         conceded that he knew Brewington was on state parole prior
         to the incident and that he did not ask anyone to contact
         her parole officer to find her. Id., 59-74.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 3/13/23, at 2-4.

      The court concluded that Johnson failed to plead and prove the new fact

exception. It determined that the facts presented were not “new facts”

because Johnson knew that Brewington was present the night of the murder.

N.T., PCRA Hearing, 10/28/22, at 84, 85. It further concluded that Johnson

failed to prove due diligence. The court stated that Brewington “was a person

who [Johnson] was quite aware of and could have, if he was duly diligent,

found out or secured within the nine years that it took for this hearing to

occur.” Id. at 87. Following the hearing, the court issued notice of its intent

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to dismiss the petition. See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 907, filed 10/28/22; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The court dismissed

Johnson’s PCRA petition, and this timely appeal followed. See Order, filed

12/1/22.

      Johnson raises the following question:

           Did the PCRA Court err in denying post-conviction relief
           under the PCRA because [Johnson] proved the
           unavailability, at the time of Trial, exculpatory evidence,
           that subsequently became available after Trial, and would
           have changed the outcome of the Trial if it had been
           introduced,     where    [Johnson]    established    by    a
           preponderance of the evidence at the PCRA Hearing, that
           facts    known     to   Andrea     Brewington    concerning
           circumstances how the decedent was killed, could not have
           been obtained earlier through reasonable diligence; nor was
           the evidence cumulative; nor was the evidence being used
           solely to impeach credibility; and the evidence would likely
           have compelled a different verdict?

Johnson’s Br. at 7 (answer of PCRA court omitted).

      “When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine

whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 737 (Pa.Super. 2020).

(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2018)).

      We do not reach the merits of Johnson’s substantive claim because we

agree with the PCRA court that his petition was untimely. The PCRA’s time

limits are jurisdictional. See id. A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within

one year after the petitioner’s judgment of sentence has become final unless

the petitioner pleads and proves an exception to the one-year deadline. See

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final for PCRA purposes

“at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). The

exceptions to the one-year time-bar are:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation
         of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). If the petitioner claims an exception, the petitioner

must file the petition within one year of the date the claim could have been

raised. See id. at § 9545(b)(2).

      Here, Johnson’s judgment of sentence became final on October 24,

2013, at the end of the time to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for

allowance of appeal. See id. at § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing

30 days to petition for allowance of appeal). The instant petition filed in June

2021 was patently untimely. Johnson claims that his petition was timely under

the new fact exception, alleging that he “would not have known or ha[ve]

reason to believe Brewington had witnessed the decedent actually pulling a

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gun on Johnson, because Johnson would not have been able to see

Brewington, who said she was behind Johnson.” Johnson’s Br. at 33. He also

claims   that   he   exercised   due   diligence   considering   that   Brewington

purposefully made herself “unlocatable.” Id. at 37.

     A petitioner satisfies the new fact exception when the petitioner pleads

and proves that “(1) the facts upon which the claim [is] predicated were

unknown and (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)) (emphasis omitted). “Due diligence

demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect [their] own

interests.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 659 (Pa.Super.

2022). “The focus of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a

newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”

Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (internal

quotation marks, citation, brackets, and emphasis omitted).

     Johnson did not meet the new fact exception. He knew at the time of

the killing whether he acted in self-defense and knew that Brewington

witnessed the shooting. Brewington’s account that Johnson was defending

himself thus did not alert him to any “unknown” facts. We affirm the order of

the PCRA court.

     Order affirmed.

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Date: 3/5/2024

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