Court Opinion

ID: 9929836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 15:05:34.383831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:55:49.344708
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1035

                             9 CLEMENT STREET LLC

                                       vs.

                                JANAYA LOWERY.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       This summary process matter is before the court on the

 defendant tenant's appeal from an order dated May 2, 2022.                That

 order provided in relevant part:

       "At the hearing, the Defendant provided documents
       indicating that she was approved for RAFT rental assistance
       and the RAFT administrator sent the Plaintiff the payment.
       Plaintiff's counsel affirmed her client received a check
       but will not accept the funds so as to not compromise their
       ability to proceed with obtaining possession. . . .

       "Where the Defendant's rental assistance application is no
       longer pending, I find that Chapter 257 of the Acts of 2020
       as extended by Chapter 42 of the Acts of 2022 no longer
       applies and the Plaintiff is entitled to proceed with the
       levy. Further, I find Chapter 257 does not require the
       Plaintiff to accept rental assistance funds with conditions
       compromising their ability to seek possession. See also
       G[. ]L. c. 239, [§] 3.[1]"

 1 The substance of § 2 of Chapter 257 was codified in G. L.
 c. 239, § 15, on August 9, 2023.
The order allowed the plaintiff landlord to levy on the

execution on May 13, 2022, allowing a brief stay to afford the

tenant the opportunity to seek review from a single justice of

this court.    On May 24, 2022, a single justice of this court

entered a stay pending appeal.    Because the plaintiff landlord

subsequently accepted the RAFT funds, we dismiss the appeal as

moot.

    "It is the general rule that courts decide only actual

controversies.    We follow that rule, and normally do not decide

moot cases."   Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dep't of the

Trial Court, 421 Mass. 502, 504 (1995).    "Litigation is

considered moot when the party who claimed to be aggrieved

ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome[,] . . . [and] a

court can order no further effective relief" (quotations and

citations omitted).    Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations

Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 816-817 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858

(2020).   See Mullholland v. State Racing Comm'n, 295 Mass. 286,

289 (1936) (when "a decision by the court will not be applicable

to existing rights, no decision will be rendered" because "[t]he

questions originally involved have become moot").

                                  2
     Here, because the landlord accepted the RAFT funds and

reinstated the defendant's tenancy, there is no remaining case

in controversy.2

     The matter is remanded to the Housing Court with the

direction that the summary process action be dismissed because

it is moot.

                                    So ordered.

                                    By the Court (Henry,
                                      D'Angelo & Hodgens, JJ.3),

                                    Assistant Clerk

Entered:   February 5, 2024.

2 The tenant includes a heading in her brief questioning whether
the court erred in granting the plaintiff leave to file a motion
to amend the judgment to include the levy cancellation fee in
the amount of $550. Passing over whether this is adequate
appellate argument, we need not reach the issue because the
landlord did not move to amend the judgment. If the landlord
imposed that charge on the tenant's account, the propriety of
such a charge is a matter for the parties to resolve in a
separate proceeding. The parties have represented that there is
a subsequent summary process matter currently pending. That
matter is not before us.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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