Court Opinion

ID: 9449947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:28:50.795667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:03.952256
License: Public Domain

BROWNING, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I
Under federal regulation primary responsibility for program content is imposed upon individual television broadcast licensees.1 The purpose of the present investigation is to determine whether control of program content has in fact passed into the hands of others, and, if so, what administrative action should be taken, or legislative action recommended, in response to the shift in power.2 The authority of the Commission to conduct such an inquiry is not questioned.3 The public interest in its thoroughness and effectiveness is obviously great.
*529Mr. Schreiber is Vice President of MCA, Inc. The Commission has found, without challenge, that MCA “engages on a large scale, in all facets of television program production,” and that “failure fully to explore the policies, practices and activities of MCA, Inc. * * * would seriously impair, if not render nugatory,” the Commission’s inquiry.
Schreiber and MCA do not question the validity of the Commission’s subpoenas and orders requiring the testimony of Schreiber and the production of the records of MCA described in Annex B.4 They contend only that the Commission erred in declining to receive the testimony and documents in confidence.
The order initiating the inquiry directed that the proceedings be public, except where the public interest, the proper dispatch of business, and the ends of justice would be served by non-public sessions. The exception, as the Commission later made clear, was intended to permit the presiding officer to order nondisclosure of particular evidence “where disclosure would irreparably damage private, competitive interests and where such interests could be found * * * to outweigh the paramount interest of the public and the Commission in full public disclosure.” 5
The adoption of this rule of procedure was well within the Commission’s power. Section 4(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.A. § 154(j)) provides that the Commission “may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” Congress by this grant of authority to the Commission “left largely to its judgment the determination of the manner of conducting its business * * *." FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 282, 69 S.Ct. 1097, 1106, 93 L.Ed. 1353 (1949).6
Grants of authority comparable in scope have been held sufficient to authorize an agency to require public production of information,7 or to receive data in confidence,8 in investigative inquiries, *530as the agency may determine to be proper on a balancing of public interest and private rights in the particular instance. The choice cannot be arbitrary or an abuse of the agency’s discretion, and judicial relief is available if it is.9 But the decision in the first instance belongs to the administrative authority, and its decision is not to be disturbed unless these limits are transgressed.10
The reasons for the Commission’s decision to require public disclosure in the present inquiry appear fully in the rec*531ord.11 The inquiry is purely investigative; its sole purpose is to secure information to aid the Commission in the discharge of its functions; it is not intended to and cannot adjudicate the rights of any person.12 The subject matter of the inquiry is complex and generally unknown, and involves many-sided transactions” among “networks, advertising agencies, program producers, program packagers, talent agencies” and others. Therefore, in order “to obtain a full and rounded picture of such transactions, it is highly desirable” that the information supplied by each group or individual be disclosed so that the others “may verify, refute, explain, amplify or supplement the record from their own diverse points of view.” Moreover, through public hearings the industry may be made aware of the factual basis supporting any administrative action ultimately taken, a practical inducement to industry acceptance of the inquiry s results.13 These factors, it may be noted are largely of a kind falling within the special competency of the administrative agency to perceive and to evaluate.
Having determined that the public interest required public disclosure, the Commission properly placed the burden of justification upon those who asked that the evidence sought from them be received in confidence.14
T, , , ., ... ,, , ,, It cannot be said with reason that the r, . . . . Commission acted arbitrarily or m abuse „ .. ,. ... . . of discretion m determining that Schrei-ber and MCA failed to discharge their , , , burden of justifying nondisclosure,
A. Annex B
Schreiber testified that the information sought by Annex B would disclose MCA’s agency relationship with clients, and that under a contract between the Screen Actors Guild and Artists & Managers Guild such relationships were not to be disclosed without the clients’ consent. He further stated that the disclosure “would be possibly advantageous to our competitors.” No more was shown.
, . , ... Obviously, a private agreement not to .. . „ ’ disclose facts without consent could not , affect the Commission m the discharge . ., ... •, .. ,, of its public duties.15 And there was no actual showing, but only the naked as-sertion, that the disclosure sought by Annex B would injure either MCA or its clients.
Annex B called only for the production of a list of Programs as to which MCA served “ Packager or had a financial interest,16 and MCAs competitors had *532furnished the same information on the public record without objection.17 The presiding officer had in the past protected from disclosure detailed information regarding financial matters and contractual arrangements which might in fact harm private interests without sufficient compensatory benefit to the public, and had offered to take the same action if information produced by MCA justified such treatment. He declined only, on the record made, to receive the information under a binding condition preventing disclosure, imposed in advance of production.
On this record, affirmance by the Commission of the presiding officer’s action as to the material sought by Annex B was clearly proper.
B. Blanket Nondisclosure
On remand to the presiding officer a broader contention developed. Schreiber and MCA then argued that all testimony and documentary evidence to be elicited from them should be received in nonpublic sessions, and disclosed only if a court, in subsequent litigation, should order its release.
They made no factual showing before the presiding officer in support of this sweeping demand, but only an argument.
Schreiber and MCA contended that in view of the announced scope of the inquiry the Commission’s order to produce “all * * * relevant” material might require MCA “to set forth in a public record every facet of its business” relating to television programing, and that such a disclosure, if demanded, would necessarily expose confidential business secrets to MCA’s competitors.
The presiding officer did not know what information would actually be sought. Obviously he could not strike a balance between the public benefit which would result from public disclosure of unidentified information and the injury which MCA would suffer by the revelation of the unspecified data to its competitors. If and when information was requested which if disclosed might injure MCA’s competitive interests, there would be ample opportunity to request that it be received in confidence, and to seek judicial protection if the request were denied. Blanket nondisclosure would have been appropriate only on the assumption that no testimony could be elicited from Schreiber and no documents could be obtained from MCA which could be publicly disclosed. There was no warrant for such an assumption.
The presiding officer18 acted well within his discretion in refusing to order blanket nondisclosure upon such a record.
In the District Court, as in this court, Schreiber and MCA conceded that no one knew what information Schreiber and MCA might be asked to produce. They asserted that an order requiring in camera hearings was nonetheless reasonable because the District Court could properly “assume” from questions asked of prior witnesses, and financial and corporate data from public sources introduced in the record, that the Commission intended “to probe deeply into the business affairs of MCA,” and therefore could properly find, “that the testimony to be given might result in disclosure *533of trade-secrets, of which competitors might take advantage.” 201 F.Supp. at 425.
Obviously this “showing” added nothing of substance to that made before the presiding officer, and the District Court’s “finding” was no more than conjecture. It remained wholly speculative whether the Commission would seek data which if disclosed to competitors would injure MCA, and whether, if such data were sought, the presiding officer would require disclosure even though a balancing of public and private rights required nondisclosure. At best, the District Court’s order was premature, and possibly wholly unnecessary. Moreover, it permitted Schreiber and MCA to avoid submitting to the presiding officer the issue of whether particular evidence should be received in camera, and violated the rule that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). Further, the District Court’s order necessarily assumed that if the issue were presented to the presiding officer he would decide it improperly, although an administrative agency, no less than a court, is entitled to a presumption that it will act properly and according to law.19
It is no answer to say that the District Court did not finally decide that the evidence must be kept confidential, but only deferred that determination until the taking of the evidence was completed and the record again submitted to judicial review.
As the Commission points out, there was at least a final determination that there should be no disclosure in the interim. During this period at least the Commission could not make the evidence available to Congress20 and others outside the agency having a continuing, legitimate interest in the problems involved; and the Commission would be denied the benefit of evidence from others in the industry, stimulated by the testimony of these witnesses, and serving to verify, amplify or contradict it. And the period of concealment would inevitably be long — Schreiber and MCA appeared before the presiding officer in response to subpoena on October 21, 1960, and the issues then raised are not yet resolved.
Moreover, the court’s order required the Commission ultimately to establish the specific need for publication,21 thus shifting the burden of justification away from the person seeking concealment, where it properly rests.22
Analogies23 drawn from authorities under Rules 30(b) and 45(b) and (d) of *534the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate the soundness of the presiding officer’s decision, and the error in the District Court’s contrary ruling.
Under these authorities, a person seeking a protective order in discovery proceedings has the burden of justifying it; and a general assertion that business secrets may be disclosed is not enough.24 Ordinarily, the questioning of witnesses and production of documents will not be limited in advance on the ground that disclosure of privileged material may be sought. The court will not speculate as to what data may actually be requested. The privilege must be asserted when specific demands are made.25 And discovery should not be interrupted while application is made for a protective order as to each demand; it should be completed, and all questions of privilege submitted to the court in a single application which can then be evaluated in light of the full record.26
As a whole, these rules suggest the wisdom of restraint in the issuance of anticipatory protective orders to avoid premature and probably needless interference with the process of discovery. This, underlying premise applies with special force to the present case for here the-District Court was not dealing with an application for a protective order by a party subjected to unsupervised discovery, but rather with review of a determination made by a neutral presiding officer in a specialized administrative proceeding. Application for orders protecting trade secrets under Rules 30(b) and 45(b) and (d) are directed largely to-the discretion of the trial judge,27 but it. was the presiding officer (by analogy) who stood in this position, not the District Court.
The discretion vested in the presiding-officer was not abused by the denial, on this record, of the demand for blanket, nondisclosure.
II
It may be conceded that witnesses before purely investigative bodies have no-constitutional right to the aid of an attorney.28
*535However, the language and legislative history of Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act indicate that Congress intended to grant to witnesses29 compelled to appear in agency investigations 30 “the right to he accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel.” This view is supported by all of the decided cases31 and by the leading cornmentaries on the Act.32 Schreiber and *536MCA were therefore entitled to whatever assistance of counsel Section 6(a) conferred, and, in this court, the Commission has not contended to the contrary.33
It is unnecessary, in this case, to spell out all that “the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel” may comprehend. The District Court held that in a purely investigatory proceeding of the type involved here, Section 6(a) did not confer the right to cross-examine other witnesses, and Schreiber and MCA have not appealed from this determination. On the other side, the Commission allowed counsel for Sehrei-ber and MCA to present and argue motions in advance of public hearings and to accompany Schreiber while the latter testified; and on this appeal the Commission has stated that it does not challenge the District Court’s determination that counsel must also be permitted to “initiate advice to his client with respect to the propriety or legality of any question asked of his client and to advise his client not to answer any such question deemed improper.” 34
Thus the only issue presented on this aspect of the appeal is the validity of that portion of the District Court’s order holding that Section 6(a) confers the right to have counsel object to questions put to his client, and state on the record concise grounds for such objections.
The ordinary meaning 35 of the phrase “represented * * * by counsel” would seem to imply this much. Indeed, to object to questions asked of a witness-client, and articulate the legal basis for the objections, is the function the witness-client is most likely to expect his attorney to perform, for it is within the attorney’s exclusive competence.
The word “represented” was a deliberate addition to Section 6(a), and there is some evidence that it was added to enable counsel to communicate his advice to the presiding officer as well as to his client. A comment upon the insertion of the word, appearing in a Senate Judiciary Committee Print, suggests that “even where the party must be personally present * * * the representation by counsel may be helpful both to the agency concerned and the party.” 36 And the statement in the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) at page 61 that persons compelled to appear before an agency “are also entitled to have counsel act as their spokesmen in argument and where otherwise appropriate,” conveys the same notion. In the course of the Congressional debate the right to counsel conferred by *537Section 6(a) was stated in the broadest terms.37
The Administrative Conference of the United States recently addressed itself to the precise question raised here. The Conference concluded: 38
“The right to be ‘represented’ by counsel means as a minimum that counsel for any person compelled to appear in person shall be permitted to make objections on the record and to argue briefly the basis for such objections in connection with any examination of his client.”
The Supreme Court’s “approval” in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), of Rule 1.40 of the Federal Trade Commission’s Rules of Practice (which allowed counsel for ■a subpoenaed witness to accompany and advise his client but “not, as a matter of right, otherwise participate in the investigation”) is not inconsistent with this reading of Section 6 (a). In Hannah the Supreme Court was commenting only upon whether Rule 1.40 met constitutional standards, not whether it satisfied Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.39 The Court referred with .equal “approval” to the practice of the ■'Securities and Exchange Commission limiting counsel for witnesses in investigative inquiries to advising the witness and “making objections to questions which assertedly exceed the scope of the order of investigation.” 363 U.S. at 447 n. 26, 80 S.Ct. at 1517, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307.
The Commission contends that since “representation” is not defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, the participation by counsel which is to be permitted should be left to the discretion vested in the Commission by Section 4(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, and that the determination which the Commission has made in the present case is reasonable in the light of the type of inquiry involved.
Unquestionably a large measure of discretion over its procedures is vested in the Commission, as has been noted.40 But the authority conferred upon the Commission by Section 4(j) of the Act of 1934 is limited by Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act41 The latter “is a statement of statutory and mandatory right.” H.R.Rep.No.1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1946), reprinted in S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263-64 (1946). Precisely what the right to be “represented * * * *538by counsel” comprehends may depend to some extent upon the nature of the inquiry, and other surrounding circumstances, but it cannot reasonably import less, as to a witness in an investigative proceeding, than the right to have counsel object to questions put to the witness and state his reasons in the record.42

. As the Commission stated in its order of Nov. 10, 1959, 24 Fed.Reg. 9275:
“ * * * under the Communications Act and the policies promulgated by the Commission thereunder, the selection, supervision and broadcast to the public of programs and other material including advertising is the primary responsibility of the licensed broadcaster subject to the duty of such broadcaster so to exercise that responsibility as to serve the public interest in terms of the needs and interests of the community which such broadcaster is licensed to serve. * * * ”

. The purpose and scope of the inquiry are detailed in the Commission’s orders of Feb. 26, 1959, 24 Fed.Reg. 1605, and Nov. 10, 1959, 24 Fed.Reg. 9275.

. Congress granted the Commission “full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry * * * as to any matter s * * concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions” of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C.A. § 403.

. The District Court held that, “the Commission has authority to issue the subpoena and orders sought to be enforced in this proceeding”; that “the information requested in ‘Annex B’ of the Commission’s subpoena is reasonably relevant to the inquiry being conducted by the Commission”; and that “the subpoena and order duly served upon respondents in this proceeding are in. all respects valid, and respondents are in disobedience of the same.” Schreiber and MCA have not challenged these findings and conclusions on their cross-appeal.

. See note 3 of this court’s opinion.

. The Commission’s own statement of its authority in this regard is similarly broad. Section 1.10 of the Commission’s General Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that procedures to be followed in investigative proceedings shall “be such as in the opinion of the Commission will best serve the purposes of such proceeding.” 47 C.F.R. § 1.10 (1958).

. See, e. g., Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 57 S.Ct. 407, 81 L.Ed. 562 (1937) ; E. Griffiths Hughes Inc. v. FTC, 61 App.D.C. 386, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C.Cir. 1933).
It is “the fundamental policy of free societies that justice is usually promoted by disclosure rather than secrecy.” Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 108 U.S. App.D.C. 106, 280 F.2d 654, 662 (1960). “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Brandeis, Other People’s Money (1914), quoted in In re Util. Employees Sec. Co., 3 S.E.C. 1087, 1094 (1938). See also In re H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., No. 7709, FTC, March 14, 1961, 11 Pike & Fischer, Admin.Law (2d) 116 (1962) ; Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 29461 (FTC 1961), Comment, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 647 (1961-1962).
Of course public exposure may also be an instrument of abuse. See generally Rourke, Law Enforcement through Publicity, 24 U.Chi.L.Rev. 225 (1956-1957) ; Newman, Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 735, 755-58 (1961) ; Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law 666-75 (4th ed. 1960) ; Note, 72 Yale L.J. 1227 (1963).

. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796, 321-22 (1933) ; Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1938). “Agencies themselves, of course, may make investigative proceedings private, excluding the public.” *530Davis, Administrative Law 229 (1958). Section 6(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contemplates “a nonpublic investigatory proceeding.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(b). See Newman, Federal Agency Investigations : Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 69 Mich.L. Rev. 169, 172 (1961-1962).

. See, e. g., Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Douglas, 70 App.D.C. 221, 105 F.2d 100, 102, 123 A.L.R. 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; FCC v. Cohn, 154 F.Supp. 899, 912-913 (S.D.N.Y.1957) ; FTC v. Bowman, 149 F.Supp. 624, 630 (N.D.Ill. 1957), aff’d 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957) ; 1 Davis, Administrative Law 229 (1958), See also Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1957).

. The following comments regarding agency discretion to choose between public and private disclosure were made in the light of statutory provisions which granted the agencies concerned no greater power over the conduct of hearings than is vested in the Commission by 47 U.S.C.A. § 154 (j) :
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 68 App.D.C. 77, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (1937), 71 App.D.C. 259, 110 F.2d 117, 120-121 (1940) :
“For unquestionably Congress * * * imposed on the Commission the duty of considering the claimed danger of loss and damage and of weighing it in the scale of public interest. And this, at least, is what the Commission has attempted to do and, if the conclusion reached is just as likely to be correct as incorrect, it is our duty to let it stand.
“ * * * [T]he question is primarily not for us but for the Commission, and Congress unquestionably intended that the Commission should bring to bear upon the decision of this and like questions, what has been called in cases within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the knowledge and experience of experts. This does not by any means set up an inquisition destructive of the rights of the individual. The delegated power is not to be exercised arbitrarily or to be considered an unfettered discretion over the property of the citizen. Its exercise is subject to review. But so long as the Commission’s decision rests on substantial evidence and on inferences which are not arbitrary and capricious, it should be sustained. * * * ”
E. Griffiths Hughes Inc. v. FTC, 61 App.D.C. 386, 63 F.2d 362, 363 (1933) : “Doubtless Congress considered that there might be occasions when it would he unjust to a person or corporation proceeded against to require public hearings and left the decision in such eases to the board.” And at 364 of 63 F.2d: “Doubtless on such a hearing as is here provided the Commission has discretion, on a showing that such a hearing would disclose trade secrets or other data in itself destructive of the business under investigation, to do whatever is proper and necessary to avoid these consequences * *
SEC v. Harrison, 80 F.Supp. 226, 229 (D.D.C.1948) : “ * * * it must rest in the sound discretion of the agency created by the Congress, and not with the courts, to determine when investigations are to be conducted by open or closed hearings.”
See also Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321-322, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933).
The same rule should apply whether the question is raised in a proceeding brought by the agency to compel testimony or production of documents, or in a suit brought by a proposed witness or custodian of documents to restrain the inquiry. The standard applied in the former [that is, whether the administrative officer has acted “arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority,” Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216, 66 S.Ct. 494, 509, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946), or whether the inquiry is authorized by law, the materials relevant, and the disclosure reasonable, Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations : Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 187 (1961— 1962)] is in substance the same as that applied in the latter [that is, whether the process is “authorized by law,” APA § 6(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(b), the evidence sought is of “general relevance and reasonable scope,” APA § 6(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(e), or whether the agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” APA § 10(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1009(e)].

. See note 3 of this court's opinion.

. For a development of the argument that the need for nonpublic hearings is greater where investigatory hearings are preliminary to enforcement proceedings, rather than, as here, for the purpose of gathering information for rule-making or legislation, see Note, The Distinction between Informing and Prosecutorial Investigations: A Functional Justification for “Star Chamber” Proceedings, 72 Yale L.J. 1227 (1963).

. “In such investigations a primary function of the process is to reach an external audience which includes the Congress, those segments of the public which are primarily affected by the agency’s regulatory policies, and the body politic itself. While the use of public hearings is not strictly necessary for the dissemination of the information produced, the publicity generated by the gathering of raw rata may contribute substantially to the effectiveness of the informing process." Note, 72 Yale L.J. 1227, 1236 (1963).

. See, e.g., Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, C.A.D.C., 223 F.Supp 1020 (1963): “Of course, the public interest in open hearings places the burden on the the plaintiffs to show that their documents should be received in confidence." Section 3(c) of APA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002(c) provides: "Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.’’ (Emphasis added.) Cf. authorities cited note 24 infra.

. 8 Wigmore Evidence § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

. Customer lists are not entitled to protection per se, but only when the circumstances establish that disclosure would result in competitive injury. See, e. g., *532Ellis, Trade Secrets § 72 (1953) ; Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U.Cinc.L.Rev. 507, 526-29 (1939) ; In re H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., No. 7709, FTC, March 15, 1961, 11 Pike & Fischer, Admin.Law (2d) 116 (1962). See also Schenley Industries v. Institutional Products Corp., 16 F.R.D. 13, 15 (S.D. N.Y.1954).

. Schreiber also provided, without objection, a list of programs as to which MCA had acted as producer rather than as packagers, called for by Annex A.

. On review of the presiding officer’s first order, the Commission, although dealing with the merits of that order, held “that orders and directions of the Presiding Officer as to relevance and public disclosure of evidence, information and data are interlocutory in nature, do not of themselves ‘aggrieve’ any person, and are not, as of right, appealable to the Commission.” This holding precluded an application to the Commission for review of the presiding officer’s second order.

. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 336. 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

. The Commission is required to report annually to Congress “such information and data collected by the Commission as may be considered of value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of * * * radio communication * * 47 U.S.C.A. § 154 (k) (1).

. The court’s order provided, “the Commission . . . may move the court upon the conclusion of such interrogation and production for an order, should good cause exist therefor, permitting such testimony and documents to be made public * *

. See note 14 supra.

. Rule 81(a) (3) provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply “to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States * * *." It was held in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 280 F.2d 654 (1960), that because of this provision of Rule 81(a) (3) the limitations found in Rules 30(b) and 45(b) and (d) are directly applicable to administrative subpoenas. This result, however, fails “to observe the important distinction between the administrative proceeding * * * and the court action to enforce the summons * * * Rule 81(a) (3) makes the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable * * * to the court action to enforce the summons * * *. *534To contend that the proceeding itself before the Commissioner * * * is also a civil case subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure * * * would be going too far.” Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953). See also 7 Moore’s Federal Practice § 81.06 [1] (2d ed. 1955) ; 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 45.01 [2] (2d ed. 1951) ; 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 281-82 (Rules ed. 1961). It therefore appears that decisions under Rules 30(b) and 45(b) and (d) are applicable to protective orders with respect to administrative subpoenas only by way of analogy. This would be true whether the protective order is sought from the agency or the court.

. See, e. g., Sacks v. Frank H. Lee Co., 18 F.R.D. 500 (S.D.N.Y.1955); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y.1955); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice 2024, 2034 n. 1a (2d ed. 1963); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 235-36 (Rules ed. 1961). See also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2212 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

. See, e. g., Alexander’s Dep’t Stores Inc. v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 198 F.Supp. 28, 29 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Brockway Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 36 F.Supp. 470, 472 (W.D.N.Y.1941); Nekrasoff v. United States Rubber Co., 27 F.Supp. 953, 956 (S.D.N.Y.1939); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 279 (S.D.N.Y.1958), and 28 F.R.D. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Shiner v. American Stock Exch., 28 F.R.D. 34 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Continental Distilling Corp. v. Humphrey, 17 F.R.D. 237, 241 (D.D.C.1955); United States v. Lustig, 16 F.R.D. 138 (S.D.N.Y.1954); Folley Amusement Holding Corp. v. Randforce-Amusement Corp., 1 F.R.D. 496, 498 (S.D.N.Y.1940); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice 1294.

. See, e. g., Young v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 2, 5-7 (D.D.C.1961); Smith v. Crown Publishers Inc., 14 F.R.D. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Jacobowitz v. Kremer, 7 F.R.D. 110, 111 (S.D.N.Y.1946).

. See A. H. Robins Co. v. Fadley, 299 F.2d 557, 561-562 (5th Cir. 1962).

. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333, 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376 (1957). See-also Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 79 S.Ct. 1157, 3 L.Ed.2d; 1234 (1959).

. The first sentence of § 6(a) (5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(a)) applies to “any person compelled to appear” as distinguished, in the second sentence, from “Every party.” The distinction is carefully preserved in comments on § 6(a) in the House Committee Report, H.R.Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1946), reprinted in S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263-64 (1946), and by Senator McCarran on the floor of the Senate. 92 Cong.Rec. 2156 (1946).

. The provisions of § 6 apply broadly “except as otherwise provided” in the Act, and the § 6(a) right to counsel is accorded whenever a person is “compelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof,” without qualification as to the type of agency proceeding which may be involved, in contrast, for example, with § 7 which by its terms is limited to rule-making and adjudicatory proceedings under §§ 4 and 5. The House Committee Report stated that § 6(a) “is a statement of statutory and mandatory right of interested persons to appear themselves or through or with counsel before any agency in connection with any function, matter, or process whether formal, informal, public, or private.” H.R.Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1946), reprinted in S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 263-64 (1946).

. See Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960); Wanderer v. Kaplan, D.D.C., Civil No. 2819-62, Oct. 30, 1962, 1962 CCH Trade Cases ¶¶ 70462 and 70535; Hall v. Lemke, N.D.Ill., Civil No. 62C942, May 7, 1962, 1962 CCH Trade Cases ¶ 70338 (restraining order), see Comment, 72 Yale L.J. 1227 (1963); In re Neil, 209 F.Supp. 76 (S.D.W.Va. 1962); United States v. Fancher, 195 F.Supp. 448, 457 n. 18 (D.Conn.1961); Application of Levine, 149 F.Supp. 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y.1956); and United States v. Smith, 87 F.Supp. 293, 294 (D.Conn. 1949). See also In re Mead Corp., No. 571-0656, FTC, Jan. 3, 1963, 13 Pike & Fischer, Admin.Law (2d) 117 (1963). Cf. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F.Supp. 737, 739 (N.D.Ga.1951).
In context the statement in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, at 445, 80 S.Ct. 1502 at 1516, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960) that agencies when making quasi-judicial determinations are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, does not mean that the Court thought the Act as a whole was inapplicable to investigative hearings. When at 452-453 of 363 U.S., at 1520 of 80 S.Ct., 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 the Court rejected the argument that § 7 of the Act applied to the investigative hearings of the Civil Rights Commission, it did not do so on the ground that the Act as a whole was inapplicable to such hearings, but rather upon the narrow ground that § 7 by its terms applied only to rule-making and adjudication.

. The Administrative Conference of the United States (created pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10934, Apr. 13, 1961) recently indicated that in its view § 6(a) was applicable “in all agency actions and proceedings, including both public and nonpublic investigations.” Bull. No. 7, Administrative Conference of the United States, July 2, 1962, titled “Report of the Fourth Plenary Session, June 29, 1962,” p. 4.
The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) states (61-62) that § 6(a):
“ * * * restates existing law and practice that persons compelled to appear in person before an agency or its representatives must be accorded the right to be accompanied by counsel and to consult with or be advised by such counsel. Such persons are also entitled to have counsel act as their spokesmen in argument and where otherwise appropriate. Senate Comparative Print of June 1945, p. 10 (Sen.Doc. p. 26). It is clear, of course, that this provision relates only to persons whose appearance is compelled or commanded, and does not extend to persons who appear voluntarily or in response to mere request by an agency. Where appearance is compelled, whether as a party or as a witness, the right to counsel exists.”
The Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Task Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure (1955) states (287-288):
“This [Section 6(a)] right was to be accorded in connection with any function, matter, or process, whether formal, informal, public, or private.
* * * * *
“Agency restrictions upon the freedom of a witness or a party to be represented *536by an attorney in good standing or other duly qualified person in administrative proceedings, whether investigatory or adjudicatory, not only contravene an important purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act, but also derogate from due process of law in the administrative process.”
The pertinent portions of 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 8.10 (1958) are set out in this court’s opinion.
See also Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational Hearings, 62 Mich.L.Rev. 485, 492-93 (1964); 26 Albany L.Rev. 276, 277-78 (1962); Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 169, 170-71 n. 12 (1961-1962); Newman, What Agencies Are Exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act, 36 Notre Dame Law 320 (1960-1961); Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law 595 (4th ed. 1960); 58 Colum.L.Rev. 395, 403-04 (1958).

. At the oral argument the court asked, “You do not argue that it [§ 6(a)] is inapplicable to investigative proceedings?” Counsel for the Commission replied, “We do not, your Honor, we do not.”

. Paragraph 3(c) of the order, gee note 4 of this court’s opinion. This concession seems required by the literal language of § 6 (a); the right to be “advised by counsel” must mean at least this.

. “When Congress used the terms ‘right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel,’ it must have used the language in the regularly accepted connotation * * Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1960).

. Senate Judiciary Committee Print, issued May 1945, reprinted in S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1946).

. Congressman Francis Walters stated on the floor of the House (92 Cong.Rec. 5652 (1946)):
“Section 6(a) deals with the right of parties to have the advice or representation of counsel or, to the extent that agencies lawfully permit it, representation by nonlawyers. The representation of counsel contemplated by the bill means full representation as the term is understood in the courts of law. Counsel may thus receive notices, decisions, and awards. Agencies are not authorized in any manner to ignore or bypass legal representatives that parties have selected for themselves pursuant to this section.”

. Bull. No. 7, Administrative Conference of the United States, July 2, 1962, titled “Report of the Fourth Plenary Session, June 29, 1962,” p. 4. See Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational Hearings, 62 Mich.L.Rev. 485, 496 (1964).

. Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency In-vestigational Hearings, 62 Mich.L.Rev. 485, 493 (1964). After Hannah the Federal Trade Commission modified its rules to permit counsel, in public investigatory proceedings, to object to questions asked of his witness-client, to advise his client not to answer, and to state his reasons on the record. The Commission broadened witnesses’ rights to the assistance of counsel in other respects, and indicated that it did not act wholly under the compulsion of § 6(a). It stated, however, “We are convinced that these rules effectuate the policy of Congress, and will not contribute to any ‘regulatory lag’ or delay investigational hearings.” In re Mead Corp., No. 571-0656, FTC, Jan. 3, 1963, 13 Pike & Fischer, Admin.Law (2d) 117, 122 (1963). See 16 C.F.R. § 1.40.

. Judge Yankwich’s decision to this effect was followed by Judge McLaughlin in Wanderer v. Kaplan, D.D.C., Civil No. 2819-62, Oct. 30, 1962, 1962 CCH Trade-Cases ¶ 70535, the only other reported decision in point.

. Notes 6 and 10, supra, and related text.

. American Communications Ass’n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1962).