Court Opinion

ID: 9642874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:11:19.653255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:53.753027
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is a suit on a written lease agreement. The majority opinion states the facts of the case and the evidence before the trial court.
I believe that Sun Oil Company (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.1981), is controlling in this case. Sun Oil involved the construction of an oil and gas lease. The issue before the court was “are the lessors entitled to one-half the proceeds from the ⅞ working interest gas?” For the more than forty years of production, Sun Oil had paid to lessors, in addition to other sums, one-half the working interest gas. Then, gas wells were completed, and Sun claimed these payments were not required by the lease. Lessors filed an action for a declaratory judgment.
In Sun Oil, as in the case at bar, there was no claim that the lease was ambiguous. The disagreement was over the interpretation of the lease and what circumstances could be considered in interpreting the lease. “(M)ere disagreement over the interpretation of the lease does not make it ambiguous...” Sun Oil at 727.
“The courts will enforce an unambiguous instrument as written; and in the ordinary case, the writing alone will be deemed to express the intention of the parties.” Sun Oil at 728. See also: Cherokee Water Company v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.1982); Aetna Life and Casualty Company v. Gunn, 628 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.1982); City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.1968); Fritz v. Tejas Gas Corp., 644 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.); Aztec Services, Inc. v. Quintana-Howell Joint Venture, 632 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
The majority opinion in the case at bar looks beyond the lease in question to extrinsic evidence. It says:
“The facts conclusively show that, upon appellants’ failure to pay rent when due, appellee did not deliver written notice of such default to appellants, as set out in the lease as a condition precedent to an action for anticipatory breach. Appellee did not give notice of termination of the lease and demand that appellants surrender the premises, as the anticipatory breach provision provided. Appellee, as landlord, waited until the lease had expired at least four months after the initial breach and then initiated this action on the contract.”
In reviewing a trial court’s judgment where findings of fact and conclusions of law are not filed, as here, we must uphold the judgment on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence.” However, in Sun Oil, the Texas Supreme Court tells us “Where the meaning of the contract is plain and unambiguous, a party’s construction is immaterial.” In that case, the Court refused to consider extrinsic evidence that Sun Oil had paid the one-half working gas interest to the lessors for forty years. “Only where a contract is first found to be ambiguous may the courts consider the party’s interpretation.” Sun Oil at 732. Since the lease before us is undisputedly unambiguous, we should consider only the wording of the lease and the circumstances surrounding its execution and not subsequent extrinsic evidence of the party’s interpretation. Sun Oil at 732.
Turning now to the lease agreement itself, the majority opinion bases its interpretation on the language “the landlord shall have the option to pursue any one or more of the following remedies without any notice or demand whatsoever: ” The majority contends that the above language preserves the common law remedy of the landlord. I disagree.
Written or typewritten contract provisions are to be given effect over printed matter in a form contract. Alba Tool and Supply Co. v. Industrial Contractors, *543Inc., 585 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1979); Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.1964); McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957). When the parties to the lease agreement deleted options 20B and 20C and the paragraph providing that the remedies were non-exclusive, they expressed the intention that the remedy should be exclusive. This express intention should prevail over the printed form. I would hold that the remedy expressed in 20A is the exclusive remedy available to appellee.
The majority opinion also holds that appellant’s have waived their exclusive remedy because 1) appellants did not object or except to appellee’s pleadings, 2) appellants’ pleadings did not raise the issue of exclusive remedy, and 3) after appellants’ motion for directed verdict was overruled appellant did not pursue the exclusive remedy argument on motion for new trial.
To preserve error for appellant, it is not necessary to raise the point of error in a motion for new trial if the error is otherwise disclosed in the record. Tex.R.Civ.P. 324. City of Plano v. Acker, 601 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brown v. Brown, 590 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1979, no writ).
Appellant need not plead his interpretation of the contract as an affirmative defense. “The burden is of course on plaintiffs to plead and prove a contract the terms of which will support the recovery sought in their pleadings.” Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, 217 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1949, no writ); See also, Warden v. Thornburg, 564 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The purpose of pleadings is to put one’s opponent on notice as to the parameters of the forthcoming battle. Defects are not waived if challenged by special exception, objection to evidence, motion for instructed verdict or objection to the charge. Sherrod v. Bailey, 580 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); 2 McDonald Texas Civil Practice 49, Pleading: General § 5.78 (1970). Rule 90 only requires that the defect be “pointed out by motion or exception in writing and brought to the attention of the judge in the trial court before the instruction or charge to the jury_” Tex.R.Civ.P. 90.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
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