Court Opinion

ID: 9409443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 14:01:14.719338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.657073
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12873   Document: 30-1    Date Filed: 07/18/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-12873
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       ROBERT L. REHBERGER,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA,
       STATE OF GEORGIA,
       STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12873      Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 07/18/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12873

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:22-mi-00030-JPB
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Robert Rehberger, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s order (1) sua sponte dismissing his petition as frivolous, pur-
       suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and (2) advising him that he
       remained subject to an earlier order that required court preap-
       proval of any future filings. On appeal, Rehberger reiterates at
       length his contentions from his “Amended Petition” regarding the
       underlying state court criminal judgment against him being void,
       the fact that various courts have failed to exercise their proper ju-
       risdiction, and the fact that he has never been able to properly pre-
       sent evidence. He also asserts, in passing, that restrictions on filing
       or heightened pleading requirements are normally disfavored,
       should be strictly construed, and cannot be used to deny funda-
       mental rights such as adequate, effective, meaningful access to the
       courts. He further contends that frivolity reviews under § 1915 ap-
       ply only to incarcerated people or prisoners.
              We review a district court’s dismissal of a claim as frivolous
       under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251
       F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2001). When a district court reviews
       a complaint for frivolity under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), it not only has
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       22-12873                Opinion of the Court                          3

       “the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
       legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
       complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose fac-
       tual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
       319, 327 (1989) (discussing § 1915(d), now recodiﬁed at § 1915(e)).
              Section 1915 authorizes federal courts to allow civil and
       criminal litigation to proceed without prepayment of fees. 28
       U.S.C. § 1915; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. Both prisoners and non-pris-
       oners may ﬁle for in forma pauperis status pursuant to § 1915 and
       can have their complaints screened for dismissal under § 1915(e).
       28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (e); see also Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347
       (11th Cir. 2004).
              The federal IFP statute is intended to provide indigent liti-
       gants with “meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke, 490
       U.S. at 324. But “meaningful access” does not mean unlimited ac-
       cess, and federal courts are required to dismiss complaints ﬁled IFP
       if the plaintiﬀ’s poverty allegations are untrue, or if the plaintiﬀ’s
       complaint is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
       which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
       a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915(e)(2). Federal courts may sua sponte dismiss on these
       grounds prior to issuance of process. See id. (stating that the case
       should be dismissed “at any time”); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324.
             A district court will consider a claim to be frivolous “if it is
       without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349.
       In other words, the complaint will be properly dismissed as
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12873

       frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success.” Carroll v. Gross,
       984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
               Rehberger has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of
       his petition because, even liberally construed, his appellate brief
       makes at most passing references to § 1915. An appellant abandons
       a claim where he presents it only in “passing references” or “in a
       perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and author-
       ity.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir.
       2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,” without providing rea-
       soning and citation to authority that the appellant relies on, “con-
       stitutes abandonment of that issue.” Id. (quoting Singh v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)). Simply stating, as Re-
       hberger does, that § 1915 does not apply to him—without any fur-
       ther reasoning or argument—is insuﬃcient. Regardless, the district
       court’s earlier order requiring preapproval of ﬁlings is valid. “Con-
       siderable discretion necessarily is reposed in the district court”
       when it drafts such orders. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074
       (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). One of the only restrictions
       that we have placed on pre-ﬁling injunctions is that litigants cannot
       be “completely foreclosed from any access to the courts.” Mar-
       tin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1385–87 (11th Cir. 1993).
              The district court’s pre-ﬁling instructions here left Re-
       hberger with suﬃcient access to the courts. In Coﬁeld v. Alabama
       Public Services Commission, we considered a similar order requiring
       an “overly litigious” prisoner, who had brought 105 suits against
       various prison oﬃcials and companies, to pay full ﬁling fees and
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       22-12873              Opinion of the Court                        5

       seek pre-ﬁling approval of any complaints or papers. 936 F.2d 512,
       513–14 (11th Cir. 1991). We determined that the pre-ﬁling screen-
       ing of claims left suﬃcient access to the courts, as arguable claims
       could still move forward, and the procedure was not an excessive
       response to Coﬁeld’s clear abuse of the system, as he still had some
       access to the courts. Id. at 518. The same is true here. Because
       Rehberger still had access to the courts, the district court’s order
       was not an excessive response to his vexatious litigation.
             AFFIRMED.