Court Opinion

ID: 9898493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:04.654057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.208299
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        JUNE 13, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )
                                             )           No. 38785-2-III
                     Respondent,             )
                                             )
       v.                                    )           UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                             )
EDUARDO IBARRA VALENCIA,                     )
                                             )
                     Appellant.              )

       FEARING, C.J. — After a bench trial, the superior court adjudged Eduardo Ibarra

Valencia guilty of one count of first degree murder and one count of first degree

attempted murder. On appeal, he assigns error to the superior court’s rejection of his

insanity defense. He insists he proved by a preponderance of evidence that he could not

tell right from wrong when he committed the crimes. Because a reasonable trier of fact

could have concluded that Valencia knew right from wrong or at least knew that his

shootings were illegal, we affirm the two convictions.

                                         FACTS

       Eduardo Ibarra Valencia concedes he killed one man and tried to kill another man

at his place of employment on November 20, 2015. The appeal centers around
No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

Valencia’s defense of insanity. We refer to the appellant with the surname of Valencia,

his chosen last name in his brief.

          Eduardo Ibarra Valencia struggled with anxiety, depression, and paranoia. He

often believed his girlfriend, Alma Mireles, and their three children were in danger of

being murdered or abducted. After learning about his brother’s murder in 2013 in

Mexico, Valencia’s anxiety, depression, and paranoia worsened, and his belief of danger

intensified.

          Eduardo Valencia worked as a welder at Callahan Manufacturing in Royal City.

He thought the Michoacan cartel murdered his brother and believed his coworkers at

Callahan Manufacturing, because of a purported connection to the cartel, threatened his

safety.

          In February 2015, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia hung a rope from the roof of his

home’s garage for the purpose of hanging himself. Alma Mireles successfully talked him

out of his plan by reminding him that the couple enjoyed a wonderful life with their three

children. The next day, Valencia exhibited strange behavior, which caused Mireles to

call the police. Valencia underwent a mental health evaluation at the Quincy Medical

Clinic. A physician at the clinic prescribed him medications. Valencia ceased taking the

medications in August 2015, due to a belief that they did not help.

          Beginning in July 2015, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s coworkers at Callahan

Manufacturing noticed a deterioration in his behavior. Valencia, previously a friend to

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coworkers, was now “distant,” “angry,” “acting crazy,” and “always upset.” Report of

Proceedings (RP) at 465, 482, 690, 750. He daily threatened and yelled at coworkers.

One time, when a few of his coworkers conversed, he snapped and told them to cease

speaking about him or else he would “beat the shit out of [them].” RP at 483. He told

coworker Agustin Verduzco:

             You’re an ungrateful old man because I helped you get work here
       and now you’re talking about me. Why don’t you tell me to my face what
       you want to say?

RP at 464. Valencia’s behavior frightened his coworkers. Valencia often complained

about problems he was having with his coworkers to Alma Mireles, but did not identify

reasons for these problems.

       In October 2015, Alma Mireles discovered a disassembled semi-automatic pistol

in one of Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s dresser drawers. She wrapped the gun in a shirt to

conceal it from their children. When she asked Valencia his reason for having the

firearm, he replied that he acquired it to protect their family because of the many others

wishing to harm them. In the middle of November 2015, Valencia showed the gun to

Miguel Abarca, a coworker with whom he had a friendship, but did not inform him of his

reason for purchasing it.

       On November 19, 2015, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia approached coworkers Gustavo

Lopez and Agustin Verduzco at work. He asked Lopez why they laughed at him. Lopez

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State v. Valencia

denied that the two laughed at Valencia and explained that the two lacked any ill will

toward Valencia.

       According to Alma Mireles, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s paranoia increased to an

extreme level on November 19. During that evening, Valencia told Christopher, the

couple’s oldest child, that “no matter what, he loves [Christopher and his] three siblings

so much and that [they] mean the world to him.” RP at 343. Valencia further told

Christopher to care for his siblings and help his mother. Valencia drank coffee all night

and slept at most two hours.

       Around 5:00 on the morning of November 20, 2015, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia

asked Alma Mireles for his gun. He did not volunteer his reason for desiring the gun.

Mireles complied and gave him the disassembled gun. Valencia showered, dressed, and

went to work. Valencia returned home around 7:00 a.m. and requested to speak with the

children. Mireles denied his request because Valencia looked like he had been crying.

She left the room they were in to grab a sweater for one of the children, and, when she

returned, Valencia was gone from the home.

       Eduardo Ibarra Valencia returned to work but did not punch the time clock. When

coworker Frederico Rodriguez (Frederico) arrived at work, Valencia approached his

truck, insulted him, showed him the pistol, and said “I got something here to kill all you

fuckers.” RP at 725. Valencia declared that he “had enough there for all of [them].” RP

at 730. Irvin Dean Callahan, the owner of Callahan Manufacturing, arrived to work and

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

saw Frederico, Frederico’s brother Joel Rodriguez (Joel), and Valencia conversing

outside. Joel also worked at Callahan Manufacturing. Frederico waved Callahan over to

join the conversation and reported to Callahan that Valencia possessed a pistol and had

threatened Frederico. Valencia three times told Frederico and Joel to “‘[t]ell the truth.’”

Valencia grew more agitated each time he repeated the words. RP 350. Because much of

the conversation was in Spanish, Callahan told the men to separate, and he walked to an

adjacent car wash to retrieve his bi-lingual son-in-law, Paul, to translate.

       After distancing himself from Eduardo Ibarra Valencia, Frederico Rodriguez

asked coworker Juan Silva to take him to city hall to report Valencia’s threats. As Silva

and Frederico left, Valencia walked toward them. Valencia suddenly changed course,

walked away from Silva and Frederico, and proceeded toward the shop wherein Joel

Rodriguez had entered. When Valencia located Joel, he, from behind a truck, repeatedly

shot at Joel until Joel fell to the ground by the truck. After shooting Joel, Valencia

walked to Joel’s side of the truck and shot toward coworker Agustin Verduzco.

Verduzco ran from Valencia, who chased him, shot at him at least twice, and yelled

“‘[n]ow you too.’” RP at 456. More than one bullet struck Verduzco. After shooting

Joel and Verduzco, Valencia stowed the gun in his jacket pocket and left the shop.

       One hour after committing the shootings, Eduardo Ibarra Valencia returned home.

He told Alma Mireles to call the police because he “messed up” and had killed someone.

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

RP at 292. Mireles removed their daughter from the house and returned to hear Valencia

on the phone with law enforcement. Valencia also pled with Mireles:

              Tell the children that I love them very much. . . . Because I had no
      choice. They wouldn’t leave me alone.
              . . . Because, dear, they wouldn’t leave me alone, everything I told
      you is true, it’s true, it’s true, I swear to you, it’s true, and everything I’m
      telling, all of it happened, it’s true, it’s not a lie.

RP at 889.

      Agustin Verduzco was treated for the multiple gunshot wounds and underwent

life-saving surgery. Joel Rodriguez died immediately from gun wounds.

                                       PROCEDURE

      The State of Washington charged Eduardo Ibarra Valencia with one count of first

degree premeditated murder with a deadly weapon and one count of attempted first

degree premeditated murder with a deadly weapon.

      Eduardo Ibarra Valencia hired forensic neuropsychologist Kenneth Muscatel to

assist in his defense. Dr. Muscatel examined Valencia twice in 2016. Through these

examinations, Muscatel concluded that Valencia suffered from acute paranoia, a mood

disorder, and a delusional disorder. Valencia saw threats where there were no threats.

According to Muscatel, Valencia believed that his coworkers sought to kill him and his

family.

      During a bench trial, Dr. Kenneth Muscatel testified to the description of events

shared with him by Eduardo Ibarra Valencia:

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

              A. Well, it goes back a ways. So he felt that he was—other people
      were—there were threats being made to him by people at work. You have
      to go back and his brother had been killed in Michoacan, and this seemed
      to cause a change in his thinking and behavior.
              Q. Why do you say that?
              A. Well, because he described that he started to feel like people—
      felt like he was being watched and monitored. It seems to have been dated
      in time largely to his brother’s death. This is just information that he
      provided to me and a sense that I got. But he felt like there were people in
      this area that were connected to folks in Michoacan. He specifically related
      to the cartel, the drug cartel where he came from, and that this was
      connected with his brother’s death, and this is also somehow connected
      with people up here.
              Q. Did he describe feelings of paranoia to you? I mean you touched
      on it before, but I didn’t quite ask you in that way. And paranoia from his
      co-workers?
              A. He felt threatened and he seemingly would impute potentially
      violent motives to statements that might otherwise seem fairly innocent or
      innocuous, like he’s going to be gone as opposed to I’m going to kill this
      guy, a direct threat. So this is an invocation, but this is what he described
      to me.
              Q. Did he tell you that he felt that those threats arose to a level
      where he thought that others would kill him?
              A. He expressed feeling very threatened and that when they made
      those threats, they meant that they were going to kill him. That’s what he
      communicated to me.
              ....
              Q. Now, I want you to assume—we’re here on the second week of
      trial—that there has been testimony that there have been no threats to him
      or made to him in a manner that would suggest any harm.
              A. That’s a question or—
              Q. Well, yes, I’d like you to assume that for the purposes of this
      question.
              A. Okay.
              Q. If that is such the case, how does—does that affect your opinion
      with respect to his paranoia?
              A. Yeah. Paranoia is misperceiving or misreading or mis-
      appreciating stimuli in the environment. So you see threat where there’s no
      threat. That is what the definition of what paranoia is. It rises to a more

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

      fixed set of beliefs, that of a threatening nature, sometimes not threatening,
      but usually threatening, that’s a delusional system, that’s a fixed set of
      beliefs that are not in touch with reality, but the person believes them.
              That is the part of a delusional disorder, it’s also part of an acute
      paranoid state. And so the key is are these beliefs based in reality? I mean
      this is as the old joke goes, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean
      they’re not out to hurt you. Okay?
              So you have to determine, first, was there any threatening behavior,
      was there any harm done, was there anything that a rational person would
      understand and accept as threatening behavior? And the answer is no, then
      that raises the hypothesis that it’s paranoia at work.
              Q. And in this case you have reviewed a number of interviews from
      individuals that were co-workers, correct?
              A. Correct. And those interviews were provided after I authored my
      report and my two addendums.
              Q. Right. And in your review of those reports, did anybody indicate
      from Callahan Manufacturing, Joel Rodriguez, Agustin Verduzco, Gustavo,
      was there anybody that said Mr. Ibarra Valencia was being threatened in a
      manner which he relayed to you?
              A. No, not at all. He described feeling like he was being bullied and
      that people were making threats to him, that he’s fearful. He described very
      specific things being done to him that were unwarranted, but also somehow
      connected to his brother’s death, in his mind. And this is what he described
      to me as being believed, would be believed by him and motivating his
      behavior, and none of these other records indicate any such behavior was
      being done to him.
              Q. Do you have an opinion based off of the information that you
      reviewed whether Mr. Ibarra Valencia’s perceptions of threats from his co-
      workers were delusional or not?
              A. They were certainly paranoia and potentially delusional; that is,
      that he would hear things and interpret statements and looks and gestures
      that were derisive—he was feeling bad, this is all, by the way, the rational
      and irrational are not necessarily separate. So things can be mixed together.
      So he believed that he was—they are discounting him. He also believed
      that people were making more money than he was and he was working
      harder than them.
              Q. But you would agree that at least his perceptions, based off the
      information that you’ve reviewed, his perceptions of the threats themselves,
      those were delusional in nature?

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

               A. Yes, I would agree with that.
               ....
               Q. All right. We’ll get to your diagnosis in a bit. We’ll talk about
      that some more. But did you ask him why he brought the gun to work or
      why he brought a gun to work?
               A. He said that he felt threatened, but also that he felt safer with a
      gun. So my understanding, that was the implication. But he also had
      maybe some expectation that things were going to go badly.
               ....
               A. . . . He said that he took the gun to work because they said—
      because they said that they were going to kill him or wanted to kill him. He
      said that they were always bragging that they had weapons and one guy
      even had a permit for a weapon. This is stuff that he said to me
      specifically. And that the individual had a weapon, one individual had a
      weapon in his car, and always talking about fire power. In other words, he
      was describing this, the work environment, as a threatening environment, is
      what he said to me.
               Q. Did he indicate to you that on November 20th, 2015, he was
      perceiving those same types of threats from co-workers?
               A. Yeah.
               Q. And if you could explain that to the court, because we’re getting
      a little bit more fact specific here.
               A. The level of threats that he was describing [to] me were ongoing.
      They didn’t seem to ebb and flow. I’m not a witness to it, but this is what
      he described to me.
               Q. Okay. Now, the victim in this case—the deceased in this case is
      Joel Rodriguez.
               A. Yes.
               Q. And one of the victims of the shooting is Agustin Verduzco.
               A. Yes.
               Q. Did you inquire of him and did he explain to you specific
      paranoia with respect to Joel Rodriguez or Agustin Verduzco?
               A. He talked about feeling threatened by the people in general. He
      didn’t name so and so did this and so and so did that. Again, you may be
      referring to something—I didn’t put the names in my report.
               Q. Right.
               ....
               Q. . . . Did he explain to you what caused him to begin shooting that
      day? And if you would like—

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

               ....
               A. Yeah, we talked—you know, I asked him that. Yeah, he did say
       that he shot the individual because they were threatening him and he was
       saying, here I am, come for me. Again, he said they were afraid of him
       because they realized he was no longer afraid of them in terms of like I’m
       not going to be bullied, that was my interpretation.
               Q. Was there anything to suggest that in your interview with Mr.
       Ibarra Valencia that his shooting, the act of shooting began spontaneously
       for him?
               A. Yeah, he did actually call it all of a sudden he got very upset and
       everything, all the bullying and all the abuse came up for him, and that’s
       when he started to pull out the gun and started shooting.
               Q. All right. So from a psychological standpoint, how do you
       interpret that?
               A. His, it was an impulsive act by his description. In other words,
       he’s saying, I didn’t bring the gun, that I had a plan in mind, but rather that
       he pulled the gun out when he got— all of a sudden he got upset by all of
       the history of abuse and acted impulsively, that’s what it suggested.

RP at 807-16.

       During trial, Dr. Kenneth Muscatel relayed that Eduardo Ibarra Valencia explained

to him that he did not report the alleged workplace threats and bullying to his boss or to

police because “he was not a snitch.” RP at 848.

       During trial testimony, neuropsychologist Kenneth Muscatel explained the

relationship between Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s mood and delusional disorders and the

shootings of Agustin Verduzco and Joel Rodriguez:

              Q. Right. So on a more probable than not basis, do you believe that
       Mr. Ibarra Valencia’s delusional disorder affected his ability to appreciate
       wrong from right on the day of the shooting on November 20—November
       20th, 2015?
              A. Yeah, I do. But this was a very difficult—this was a very
       difficult determination.

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

              Q. Well, why do you say that you do believe that it did affect his
      ability to appreciate right from wrong?
              A. Because he felt—he apparently believed that he was not only
      being harassed and being ridiculed and being treated badly by his co-
      workers, but that they were—they represented a threat to his life, and
      perhaps to his family, as well. And therefore, he acted based upon that
      belief.
              Now, I also say in my report, he did not indicate that there was an
      imminent threat. In other words, that he saw no weapon, he saw no
      imminent threat to him at that time. That’s why I struggled so much with
      this.
              ....
              A. But it’s still very difficult. He didn’t believe that these
      individuals presented an immediate risk to him, but more of a generalized
      risk. And that’s what I’ve been struggling with. And that’s why it took—I
      had three or four iterations on this record to try and hone my findings.
              Q. Yes.
              Do you believe at the time of the shooting there is evidence in the
      records that you have reviewed to suggest that he was psychotic at the time
      of the shooting?
              A. That he was in the midst of a delusional disorder?
              Yes.

RP at 821-23.

      The trial court asked Dr. Kenneth Muscatel to address Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s

ability to distinguish between right and wrong on the day of the shootings. Muscatel

responded:

              [Ibarra Valencia] knew that [shooting his coworkers] was not legal,
      first off. That’s very clear. In fact, I think he calls 911. He understood
      that.

RP at 827.

                                           11
No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

       The State called no expert to contradict the testimony of Kenneth Muscatel. The

trial court concluded, in a written opinion, that Eduardo Ibarra Valencia:

              was able to tell right from wrong regarding his acts of shooting Joel
       and Agustin. Even though his paranoid and delusional beliefs convinced
       him his coworkers were a threat, he knew the threat was not imminent.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 241. The trial court also concluded that Valencia:

             knew shooting his coworkers was wrong and would have legal
       consequences. He knew shooting them would cause him to be separated
       from his family and that he would be arrested and put in jail.

CP at 241.

                                  LAW AND ANALYSIS

       Eduardo Ibarra Valencia assigns error solely to the trial court’s rejection of his

insanity defense. He contends the trial court ignored overwhelming evidence of insanity.

He argues that the evidence he submitted at trial contradicts the trial court’s finding that

he “knew shooting his coworkers was wrong and would have legal consequences” when

he committed the crimes. CP at 241. He emphasizes that the State failed to present any

expert testimony rebutting the opinions of Dr. Kenneth Muscatel.

       When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant bears the

burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, we assess

whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier

of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove the defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 17, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996).

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

Whether the evidence is credible and whether it amounts to proof by a preponderance lies

with the trier of fact. State v. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356, 372, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). The

trier of fact, not the appellate court, weighs the evidence. State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d

282, 297, 505 P.3d 529 (2022).

      Washington recognizes a presumption that a defendant is sane. State v. Matthews,

132 Wn. App. 936, 938, 135 P.3d 495 (2006). Nevertheless, the law does not wish to

punish someone whose loss of reality places him beyond the influence of the criminal

law. State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 590, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).

      “Insanity is a defense which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of

the evidence.” RCW 10.77.030(2); See RCW 9A.12.010(2). Insanity is a defense that

completely absolves a defendant of criminal liability. State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789,

793, 659 P.2d 488 (1983).

      To demonstrate insanity, the M’Naghten test, codified at RCW 9A.12.010,

provides that a defendant must show the following:

             [a]t the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental
      disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an extent that:
             (a) He or she was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act
      with which he or she is charged; or
             (b) He or she was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to
      the particular act charged.

RCW 9A.12.010(1); State v. Wheaton, 121 Wn.2d 347, 354, 850 P.2d 507 (1993).

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

       Under the M’Naghten test, an individual is unable to tell right from wrong with

reference to the particular act charged, if, at the time of commission of the offense, he is

unable to tell that his act is one which he “ought not to do.” State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn.

App. 326, 338, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980), aff’d, 98 Wn.2d 789, 659 P.2d 288 (1983);

M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). The

accused cannot be excused, under the insanity defense, if he or she knew his or her act

was either legally or morally wrong. State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn. App. 326, 338-39

(1980).

       Dr. Kenneth Muscatel determined Eduardo Ibarra Valencia suffered from a mood

disorder and a delusional disorder. Muscatel opined that Valencia was delusional at the

time of the shooting and thereby unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Still

Muscatel conceded that Valencia did not consider his coworkers an immediate threat to

his life or to his family members’ lives. More importantly, he admitted difficulty in

reaching his opinion.

       The superior court was not bound by the opinion of Kenneth Muscatel. The

weight to be given an expert’s conclusion is left to the trier of fact. State v. Lord, 117

Wn.2d 829, 854, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v.

Schierman, 192 Wn.2d 577, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018). An expert’s opinion on a defendant’s

sanity is not dispositive. State v. Mitchell, 102 Wn. App. 21, 27, 997 P.2d 373 (2000).

                                             14
No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

       The State presented sufficient evidence to refute Dr. Kenneth Muscatel’s opinion

that Eduardo Ibarra Valencia could not distinguish between right and wrong at the time

he committed the crimes. Muscatel averred that Valencia told him that Valencia

addressed the threats and workplace bullying himself instead of reporting it to his boss or

to law enforcement because “he was not a snitch.” RP at 848. Alma Mirales testified

that Valencia requested to speak to their children before the shooting, told her to call the

police because he killed someone when he arrived home after the shooting, and

eventually called 911 himself. The State also elicited testimony from Christopher, who

declared that his father told him “no matter what, he loves [Christopher and his] three

siblings so much and that [they] mean the world to him” the day before the shootings.

RP at 343. All of this testimony confirmed that Valencia knew right from wrong at the

time of the shootings.

       Just as important, trial testimony showed that Eduardo Ibarra Valencia knew he

engaged in legally wrong conduct. In response to questioning from the court, Dr.

Kenneth Muscatel responded that “[Ibarra Valencia] knew that [shooting his coworkers]

was not legal, first off. That’s very clear.” RP at 827.

       Eduardo Ibarra Valencia argues that the trial court wrongly concluded that he

needed to deem his coworkers an imminent threat in order to qualify for the insanity

defense. We agree with Valencia that a belief in an imminent threat lacks relevance to

the question of insanity. Imminence is a factor to be considered when analyzing the

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No. 38785-2-III
State v. Valencia

affirmative defense of self-defense, but imminence is typically not considered when

analyzing the sufficiency of an insanity defense. State v. Kelly, 102 Wn.2d 188, 198, 685

P.2d 564 (1984). Nevertheless, the trial court never ruled that an immediate threat was

essential to its finding. Instead, the trial court mentioned the lack of an immediate threat

to address Valencia’s argument that he believed a threat to him and his family was

imminent.

                                      CONCLUSION

       We affirm Eduardo Ibarra Valencia’s convictions.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              _________________________________
                                              Fearing, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________
Pennell, J.

______________________________
Staab, J.

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