Court Opinion

ID: 9930632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 15:02:32.81854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:44.081057
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 86
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION I
                                       No. E-22-627

                                               Opinion Delivered   February 7, 2024

                                               APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
 STEPHANIE STARK                               BOARD OF REVIEW
                               APPELLANT

                                               [NO. 2022-BR-00385]
 V.

 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
 WORKFORCE SERVICES                            AFFIRMED
                                 APPELLEE

                         WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

       Stephanie Stark appeals the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review (Board)

denying her unemployment benefits upon finding that she was discharged for misconduct

in connection with her work. On appeal, Stark contends that the Board’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding

of misconduct, we affirm.

       Stark began working for the Piggott Community Hospital as a housekeeper on

February 23, 2021. She was discharged on June 22, 2021, and her claim for unemployment

benefits was denied by the Division of Workforce Services upon finding that she was

discharged for misconduct in connection with her work—specifically, insubordination. Stark

appealed to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal), which affirmed the denial of benefits. Stark
appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board, which also affirmed the denial of benefits

based on misconduct.1

       At the Tribunal hearing, Tracy Spinks, the housekeeping supervisor, represented the

employer. She testified that Stark’s employment ended on June 22, 2021, when Stark refused

to attend a disciplinary meeting. Spinks explained that she was trying to issue a written

reprimand to Stark and that Margrette Crawford was in the office with her. Spinks said that

Stark refused to come into the office and requested Tonya Jordan, the human-resources

manager, to participate. Spinks testified that Jordan was called and reported immediately,

but Stark stated that she felt uncomfortable participating in the meeting with the three

participants and left for a short period of time. Spinks stated that when Stark returned, she

informed Jordan that she wanted a neutral party to be present. According to Spinks, Jordan

informed Stark that she was a neutral party and that no one else would be called to

participate. Spinks added that Jordan told Stark to come into the office for the meeting and

listen to what Spinks had to say, but Stark continued to refuse, at which point Jordan told

Stark that if she did not attend the meeting, she no longer had a job there.

       1
         In her appeal to the Board, Stark requested and was granted an additional hearing
to address evidentiary objections raised at the Tribunal hearing, including the denial of her
request to subpoena witnesses and the Tribunal’s reliance on hearsay evidence contained in
written documents without Stark having the opportunity to cross-examine the declarants.
The Board agreed with Stark and concluded that “considering this [documentary] evidence
as substantive would violate the claimant’s due process rights” and that because “the hearsay
testimony in question concerned events outside of the relevant incidents which led to
[Stark’s] discharge, the Board will not be considering the testimony regardless of whether it
is hearsay.” Stark makes no argument that the Board improperly considered excluded
evidence, and our review is limited to the evidence considered by the Board.

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       Spinks testified that Stark was fired for insubordination because she did not attend

the meeting and sign a reprimand. Spinks stated that the reprimand related to a text message

she sent Stark about a telemetry machine, tagged as having been cleaned by Stark, that was

dirty and needed to be cleaned. During the text exchange, Stark denied that she left the

machine dirty and told Spinks to “watch her tone.” Spinks also said that Stark repeatedly

demanded to know who told Spinks that the machine was dirty but did comply with the

request to clean the machine.

       Margrette Crawford, an administrative assistant, testified that she was inside Spinks’s

office when Stark was called for the disciplinary meeting. Crawford stated that Stark was in

the hallway and was asked several times to come inside. She confirmed that Stark requested

Jordan; that Stark still refused to come inside after Jordan had arrived; that Stark asked for

a neutral party; that Jordan informed Stark that she, as the human-resources manager, was a

neutral party; and that Jordan discharged Stark when she continued to refuse to come inside

the office.

       Stark testified that on her last day of work, she was told that Spinks needed to speak

with her. Stark said that when she got to the office, she told Spinks and Crawford that she

was not comfortable meeting with them and wanted a neutral party. Stark denied asking for

Jordan. Stark testified that Jordan was called to the office, but she did not feel like Jordan

was a neutral party because Stark had reported Spinks to Jordan for disclosing the results of

Stark’s pre-employment drug test to coworkers and felt like Jordan had not acted on the

report. Stark stated that Spinks’s attitude toward her changed after she made the report,

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explaining that Spinks would critique her work daily, give her extra work, and not schedule

her correctly. Stark denied that Jordan told her that she would be fired if she did not attend

the meeting.

       In regard to the text exchange involving the telemetry machine, Stark said that she

thought Spinks was “yelling” at her because Spinks used exclamation points after she texted

Stark that the machine needed to be cleaned. Stark said that she did not want to be in trouble

for the telemetry machine being cleaned incorrectly, explaining that the nurse who used it

must have forgotten to take the tag off. Stark also testified that her discharge was not handled

according to company policy because she was not suspended prior to being discharged until

a full investigation was conducted, and a review of a dismissal recommendation was not

conducted prior to her discharge.

        When questioned by the hearing officer, Stark admitted she had sent the text

message telling Spinks to watch her tone. Stark said she did not believe that requesting a

neutral party was “too much to ask for.” She claimed that the meeting was not the issue, but

she did not trust the people in the meeting. Stark said that she was unaware of a policy that

allowed her to have a neutral party but that no one ever said it was not allowed. Stark denied

that anyone told her that Jordan was the neutral party and no one else would be allowed.

Stark said she wanted a neutral party who could “vouch” for what happened in the meeting.

       Hunter Samples, a housekeeper and Stark’s coworker, testified that she learned of

Stark’s failed drug test from Spinks. Samples said that Spinks treated Stark worse after she

reported Spinks to Jordan for disclosing the test results, but Samples did not believe that

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Stark was given extra work. Samples said that Stark was nervous about the disciplinary

meeting and asked Samples to stand in the hallway. Samples testified that Stark asked for a

neutral party but did not hear Stark request Jordan. Samples said that she was nervous

because she was not supposed to be there and left when Jordan arrived.

       In addition to the testimony, the documentary evidence introduced at the hearing

included Stark’s June 25 “Discharge General-Claimant Statement.” In her explanation of

the final incident leading to discharge, Stark wrote:

       I was told to attend a meeting with my supervisor [Spinks] and her assistant
       [Crawford] I made them aware that I was uncomfortable and wanted a third party.
       My supervisor chose Tanya [Jordan] and I let them know I was not comfortable with
       her and I asked for someone else and was fired on the spot.

She also explained in her written statement why she was no longer working:

       I have had some very serious issues with my supervisor [Spinks] involving violations
       of policy and there was an ongoing investigation prior to this meeting. I went to
       [Jordan]/HR with the issues and I felt like she was not neutral and did not do her job
       as HR because of her friendship between her and my supervisor. I was told I had a
       meeting with my supervisor and her assistant [Crawford] and I told them I was
       uncomfortable being in a room with them that I would like a third party. My
       supervisor chose to go get [Jordan]. I told them again I was uncomfortable with
       [Jordan] and would like a third party. [Jordan] then stated that if I don’t want to have
       the meeting I could leave then I stated again that I don’t mind to have the meeting I
       just want a third party in the room someone other than [Jordan] that’s when I was
       told I was no longer employed there and I needed to leave.

       The Board found that the evidence demonstrated that Stark was given an ultimatum

to either attend the meeting or be discharged. Recognizing that the evidence was conflicting,

the Board specifically found Stark’s evidence to be noncredible and the employer’s evidence

to be more credible. Further, the Board found that Stark did not believe she had a right to

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a neutral party given her account that she was not told that she could not have one, and that

even if she initially believed she could have a neutral party, Stark would not have continued

to believe she had that right after being told that no one else would be called and that she

would be discharged if she did not attend the meeting. The Board also noted that Stark did

not suggest there was a policy to support her belief that she was entitled to have a neutral

party present and that her belief was based only on the fact that she was not told she could

not have one. In finding that Stark was discharged for misconduct in connection with her

work on account of insubordination, the Board stated that the employer has an interest in

its employees attending disciplinary meetings, the employer had the right to expect that Stark

would comply with a supervisor’s or human-resources manager’s reasonable instructions,

Stark refused to attend the meeting despite being warned, and Stark was insubordinate when

she refused to comply with reasonable instructions. Finally, in response to Stark’s argument

that her discharge was retaliatory in nature, the Board found that there was insufficient

evidence that her employer was motivated by anything other than Stark’s behavior the day

of her discharge. This appeal followed.

       The standard of review is well settled. We review the Board’s findings in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party and affirm if the Board’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Follett v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 505, at 2, 530 S.W.3d 884, 885.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 2, 530 S.W.3d 885–86. Even when there is evidence

upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of our review is

                                              6
limited to a determination of whether the Board reasonably could have reached the decision

it did based on the evidence before it. Id. at 2, 530 S.W.3d 886. The credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board. Bright

v. Dir., 2021 Ark. App. 217, at 2, 625 S.W.3d 720, 722.

       A claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if the claimant is

discharged from his or her last work for misconduct in connection with the work. Ark. Code

Ann. § 11-10-514(a) (Supp. 2023). Misconduct, for purposes of unemployment

compensation, involves disregard of the employer’s interest, violation of the employer’s rules,

disregard of the standards of behavior the employer has a right to expect of its employees,

and disregard of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer. Follett, 2017 Ark.

App. 505, at 2–3, 530 S.W.3d at 886.

       There is an element of intent associated with a determination of misconduct. Id. at 3,

530 S.W.3d at 886. Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance

as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated

instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion do not constitute misconduct. Id.

at 3, 530 S.W.3d at 886. There must be an intentional or deliberate violation, a willful or

wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest

wrongful intent or evil design. Id. at 3, 530 S.W.3d at 886. It is the employer’s burden to

establish misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 3, 530 S.W.3d at 886.

Whether an employee’s behavior is misconduct that justifies the denial of unemployment

                                              7
benefits is a question of fact for the Board to decide. Hopkins v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 84, at

3, 571 S.W.3d 524, 527.

       For her sole point on appeal, Stark contends that the Board lacked substantial

evidence to conclude that she committed misconduct in connection with her work. Stark’s

first three arguments focus on the intent element of the Board’s misconduct finding.

Specifically, Stark contends that “the Board lacked substantial evidence to support its finding

that [she] was issued an ultimatum and, therefore, was not credible where the employer’s

representative recanted the only admissible evidence of an ultimatum”; “[a]bsent the fictive

finding of an ultimatum, the Board lacked substantial evidence to conclude that the

employer met its burden to prove that [she] intended to disregard her employer’s interests

because she held an uncontested subjective belief that she had a right to a neutral, third party

witness”; and “[b]ecause the hospital did not follow its termination policy and can point to

no policy violated by [her] request for a third party, the Board lacked substantial evidence to

conclude that [she] willfully disregarded the hospital’s interests, and therefore committed

misconduct.”

       We find no merit to Stark’s arguments and hold that substantial evidence supports

the Board’s finding of misconduct. Stark was called to Spinks’s office to attend a disciplinary

meeting. The evidence is undisputed that she refused to attend the meeting. There was

conflicting evidence about whether Stark requested that Jordan attend the meeting, whether

Jordan informed Stark that she was a neutral party, whether anyone else would be called to

the meeting, and whether Stark was told that she would be fired if she did not attend the

                                               8
meeting. However, the Board resolved these matters in favor of the employer, finding that

Stark was not credible and the employer was more credible. Substantial evidence supports

these findings.

       Spinks testified that Stark was told that Jordan was the neutral party and no other

party would be called and that Stark was told that she would be fired if she did not attend

the meeting. Crawford also testified that Stark was told that Jordan was the neutral party.

And while Stark denied being given an ultimatum, in her written statement she admitted

that Jordan told her that “if I don’t want to have the meeting I could leave.” The Board

acknowledged that Stark’s wording was “somewhat different than what the employer’s

witnesses asserted” but that Stark’s written statement was inconsistent with her hearing

testimony.

       Inconsistencies in the testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and the drawing of

inferences from the testimony are matters for the Board, and not this court. Ramirez v. Dir.,

2013 Ark. App. 453, at 6. Here, there was evidence presented that Stark refused to attend

the meeting after she was told no one else would else would be attending and that she would

be discharged if she did not attend. This evidence was sufficient for reasonable minds to

conclude that Stark’s conduct exhibited “an intentional or deliberate violation, a willful or

wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest

wrongful intent or evil design.”

       Stark further challenges the intent element of the misconduct findings on the basis

of her “uncontested subjective belief” that she had a right to a neutral party. Stark cites two

                                              9
cases in support of her argument that she lacked the intent sufficient for a finding of

misconduct on the basis of her belief that she was entitled to a neutral party. See Milner v.

Daniels, 269 Ark. 762, 600 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. App. 1980); Carraro v. Dir., 54 Ark. App. 210,

924 S.W.2d 819 (1996). Both Milner and Carraro are distinguishable. Milner’s belief as to his

conduct was based on his “undisputed understanding of his union’s contract with the

Company.” Milner, 269 Ark. at 764, 431 S.W.2d at 431. Carraro’s belief as to his conduct

was based on his reliance on bad advice from a union representative. Carraro, 54 Ark. App.

at 215, 924 S.W.2d at 822. Here, Stark’s belief was based only on her claim that no one told

her she was not entitled to have a neutral party present.

       Although Stark contends that the hospital’s termination policy gives credence to her

belief that she was entitled to a neutral party, there was no evidence to indicate she was aware

of such a policy at the time of her discharge. Stark testified that she believed she could have

a neutral person because no one told her she could not have one. Giving her the benefit of

the doubt, the Board further reasoned that even if Stark initially believed she was entitled to

a neutral party, she would not have continued to believe so after being told no one else would

be called.

       Finally, Stark challenges the intent element of misconduct by arguing that because

the hospital did not follow its termination policy and did not point to any policy she violated

by her request for a neutral party, the Board lacked substantial evidence to conclude that she

willfully disregarded the employer’s interest. Citing Whitmer v. Director, 2017 Ark. App 367,

525 S.W.3d 45, Stark contends that where an employer fails to follow its written policy in

                                              10
terminating an employee, the employer must prove that it terminated the employee for a

“willful disregard of the employer’s interest” to establish sufficient intent for misconduct.

       Whitmer was discharged for failing to give proper notice of her absence, and the

company had no written attendance policy. We stated, “When the employer has no written

policy, such as in the case at bar, or fails to follow its written policy, then the facts must be

evaluated to determine whether the employee’s behavior was a willful disregard of the

employer’s interest.” Whitmer, 2017 Ark. App 367, at 4, 525 S.W.3d at 48. Stark’s reliance

on Witmer is misplaced because Stark is substituting the employer’s termination policy with

a policy or absence of a policy addressing the situation at issue—attendance at the disciplinary

meeting.

       Stark further argues that when there is no written policy forbidding an action and the

employee had not been previously disciplined for taking that action, our court has “made

the necessary inference that there is simply no evidence of a willful disregard of the employer’s

interest sufficient for intent.” She cites Sandy v. Director, 2018 Ark. App. 20, 542 S.W.3d

870, and Follett, supra. In Follett, we reversed a finding of misconduct for refusal to sign a

reprimand where there was no policy against refusing to sign a reprimand, and the employee

was never warned that her refusal would result in a disciplinary action. Follett, 2017 Ark.

App. 505, at 4, 530 S.W.3d at 886. In Sandy, we reversed a finding of misconduct where the

employee failed to provide a password to an internal auditor and failed to timely process a

fuel request. The evidence relied on by the Board in Sandy merely showed that two tasks were

not completed to the employer’s satisfaction. Sandy, 2018 Ark. App. 20, at 4, 542 S.W.3d

                                               11
at 872. We concluded that the employer had not presented evidence that the employee

intended to disregard his employer’s interest where he knew of no policy prohibiting his

actions, and he had not been previously disciplined. Id. at 5, 542 S.W.3d at 873.

       Here, if there were a policy to be reviewed, it would not be the termination policy but

would be a policy involving disciplinary meetings. Stark also states that, like Follett, there was

no policy stating that an employee could not request a neutral party for a disciplinary

meeting. Again, Stark was not discharged for requesting a neutral party, it was her refusal to

attend the meeting once she was told that no one else would be called. Moreover, as

previously discussed, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that

Stark was given an ultimatum, which did not occur in Follett.

       Stark’s case more closely resembles Tate v. Director, 100 Ark. App. 394, 396, 269

S.W.3d 402, 403 (2007), where the employee was fired for insubordination after repeatedly

asking the employer to allow her to use her break time to make up for her tardiness after she

was told she could not do so but instead had to use her leave time. In affirming the denial

of benefits, we stated:

       Asking questions about an employer’s policy is not insubordination. Asking the
       employer to change or interpret the policy is not insubordination. But after the
       questions are asked and the requested accommodation is rejected, then an employee
       who refuses to accept the employer’s decision about the rules for the workplace is
       insubordinate.

Tate, 100 Ark. App. at 396, 269 S.W.3d at 403.

       In the case at bar, the Board found that the employer had an interest in its employees

attending disciplinary meetings and a right to expect that Stark would comply with a

                                               12
supervisor’s or human-resources manager’s reasonable instructions. In light of these findings,

the Board found that Stark “intentionally and repeatedly disregarded the employer’s interest

and expectation when she refused to attend the meeting despite being warned, and she was

insubordinate when she failed to comply with reasonable instructions.” Considering the

evidence before the Board, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding

of misconduct.

       In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Board’s

decision, Stark appears to raise two public-policy arguments. She asserts that “[b]ecause it

would be against public policy to conclude that an employer has an interest in refusing to

provide fair discipline during a retaliation investigation, the Board lacked substantial

evidence to conclude that [she] willfully disregarded the employer’s legitimate interest.” The

Board did not find that an employer has an interest in refusing to provide fair discipline

during a retaliation investigation. Inasmuch as Stark contends that the employer did not

have a “legitimate” interest in conducting a disciplinary meeting, this argument is not well

taken. Clearly, an employer has a legitimate interest in its employees attending disciplinary

meetings.

       Citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 250, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988),

Stark further asserts that public policy prohibits termination in retaliation for the employee

reporting an employer’s violation of federal or state law. This present case, however, is not a

wrongful-termination case. Moreover, Stark acknowledges that she is not arguing that her

termination itself was retaliatory but suggests that it was a termination for her actions taken

                                              13
in fear of retaliation. Because the issue regarding Stark’s belief that she was entitled to a

neutral party has already been addressed, we do not address it again. Last, we note that the

Board specifically found that there was insufficient evidence showing that the employer was

motivated by anything other than the events that occurred on the day of discharge, and Stark

makes no argument that the Board improperly considered excluded evidence.

       In conclusion, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings, we hold that substantial

evidence supports the Boards’s decision and affirm the denial of unemployment benefits.

       Affirmed.

       VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

       Abigail Weiss, Legal Aid of Arkansas, for appellant.

       Dawn R. Kelliher, for appellee.

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