Court Opinion

ID: 9847690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:15.519317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:26.939944
License: Public Domain

*652CONNOR, Judge
(Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Where the same judge who accepted the plea increases the sentence the day after the plea, I believe precedent requires a finding that there is a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.1
As stated in the lead opinion, Smith limited the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness to circumstances “in which there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 800, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (overruling Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (companion case to North Carolina v. Pearce)) (citation omitted). The Court determined whether a “reasonable likelihood” of vindictiveness existed by asking if the increase in sentence was “more likely than not” attributable to the vindictiveness of the sentencing judge. Id at 801-02, 109 S.Ct. 2201. Here the defendant moved for reconsideration of sentencing before the same judge. The defendant did not appear at the hearing, and the judge had no new information presented to him. The judge increased the sentence without explanation. Under these facts, prior case law requires a finding that the sentence increase was “more likely than not” attributable to vindictiveness.
*653In Smith, the Court concluded a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness did not exist when a defendant attacked his guilty plea and receives a harsher sentence after retrial by the same judge who accepted the original guilty plea. Id. at 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201. It is particularly important, in light of the lead opinion, to explain the factors that led the Supreme Court to its decision in Smith.
The decision in Smith focused on the sentencing judge’s access to a “greater amount of sentencing information that a trial generally affords as compared to a guilty plea.” Id. at 803, 109 S.Ct. 2201. The Court explained that “in the course of tiie proof at trial the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged.” Id. at 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201. Furthermore, “[t]he defendant’s conduct during trial may give the judge insights into his moral character and suitability for rehabilitation.” Id. This additional information is generally not before the judge when sentencing after a guilty plea. It is only available for the judge’s consideration after trial. Because the judge in Smith could have based the increased sentence on the information available to him during trial, the Supreme Court held there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness and the presumption of Pearce should not apply.
In the case at bar, the judge sentenced Higgenbottom after an Alford guilty plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The next day Higgenbottom’s attorney made a motion for reconsideration of the sentence. The following exchange occurred:
[COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have one brief matter; It’s a motion to reconsider on Jeffrey Higgenbottom____ At his request I am waiving his presence and asking for the Court ... to reconsider the probationary sentence specifically and reduce that to twelve months.
COURT: [Counsel], Mr. Higgenbottom is lucky. Maybe I ought to reconsider his sentence completely.
[COUNSEL]: I discussed that with him before I came.
COURT: It takes a lot of courage for a lawyer to come back to ask for a reconsideration like that. Since this term of court has not expired and since he is asking for a reconsideration maybe I ought to just reconsider it on my own and *654extend his sentence ... have his [sic] picked up to do jail time.
[COUNSEL]: I understand that, Your Honor. I discussed it with him before he asked for this.
COURT: He just about talked himself into jail as it was. No, sir; I’m going to give him twenty-four months probation. We’re going to see if he can do probation. Maybe he’ll be cleaning up his lot again. Since you made the motion to reconsider, I’m denying that motion and I’m reconsidering my sentence and extending his probation to twenty-four months. (Emphasis added).
None of the things the Court considered in Smith in determining there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness were present here. The sentencing judge did not “gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged” through any evidence that was not before him the previous day because no new evidence was presented at the motion hearing. Smith, 490 U.S. at 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201. Nor could the defendant’s conduct at the motion hearing have given the judge “insights into his moral character and suitability for rehabilitation” because he did not appear at the motion hearing. Id. One day after the original sentencing, the only thing that was different about Higgenbottom’s case was his motion to reconsider.
In Smith, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished its holding from cases in which the same sentencing judge presides over both the initial trial and the second trial. The Court held, “There, the sentencing judge who presides at both trials can be expected to operate in the context of roughly the same sentencing considerations after the second trial as he does after the first; any unexplained change in the sentence is therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness.” Id. at 802, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (emphasis added). In those cases the Court found the Pearce presumption would apply. Where, as here, no new evidence is before the court on a motion for reconsideration, the sentencing judge should be similarly constrained. The unexplained increase in the sentence makes the facts of this case likewise subject to the presumption of vindictiveness.
*655The lead opinion states the sentencing judge increased the sentence after reconsidering Higgenbottom’s account of how the cocaine-laced spoon got into his pocket. However, that same information was before the judge when the original sentence was imposed. To avoid the presumption of vindictiveness new evidence must be presented to the sentencing judge. See Wasman v. United, States, 468 U.S. 559, 572, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (“[A] sentencing authority may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings.”); see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) (The presumption of vindictiveness “may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence.”). Allowing an increased sentence based on a reconsideration of the same evidence would effectively eliminate the protection the United States Supreme Court attempted to provide in Pearce.
Each of the cases the majority cites where the presumption of vindictiveness did not apply involve procedural and factual distinctions from the instant case. In those cases, either the second sentencer was different or additional facts were presented.2
In Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986), the defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty years by a jury. The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and the defendant elected to be sentenced by the judge after the second trial. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to fifty years. The United States Supreme Court held there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness because: (1) the trial judge granted the new trial; (2) the jury and the judge were different sentencers; and (3) new evidence was presented at the second trial. Id. at 138-43,106 S.Ct 976.
*656In Colorado v. Williams, 916 P.2d 624 (Colo.Ct.App.1996), after the defendant successfully appealed his conviction, the trial court allowed the district attorney to add five new counts charging the defendant as an habitual criminal. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, and he received an increased sentence. The Court of Appeals of Colorado held the presumption of vindictiveness did not apply when new evidence of the defendant’s criminal record under an alias was presented to the court at the second trial. Id. at 626-27.
In State v. Hilton, 291 S.C. 276, 353 S.E.2d 282 (1987), the defendant was convicted of assault and battery with intent to Mil and sentenced to fifteen years. The Court of Appeals reversed. On retrial, a different trial judge sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the same offense. The South Carolina Supreme Court followed Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986), and held “the Pearce presumption is inapplicable when the second sentencing judge is someone other than the original judge.” Hilton, 291 S.C. at 279, 353 S.E.2d at 284.
A recent Louisiana decision is factually similar to this case. In Louisiana v. Hidalgo, 684 So.2d 26 (La.Ct.App.1996), the defendant was sentenced by the judge after entering a guilty plea. He thereafter filed a motion to withdraw or set aside the guilty plea and a motion to reconsider his sentence. The judge denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but increased the sentence with no new evidence.
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana discussed the due process requirement that a sentencing judge provide justification in the record for an increased sentence. It held “the increased sentence failed to satisfy the dictates of due process as set forth in Pearce.'” Id. The court also stated, “[T]he court not only failed to provide adequate justification on the record for its decision to increase the defendant’s sentence [as required by Pearce] but also apparently increased his sentence because he chose to exercise his right to attack his guilty plea.” Id.
The lead opinion distinguishes Hidalgo by claiming that the Court of Appeal of Louisiana “specifically nexed the resentencing activity to the exercise of constitutional rights.” However, when a judge increases a sentence in contravention of Pearce, that alone violates the constitutional right that Pearce *657was intended to protect, specifically the right to due process. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana held the sentencing judge violated Pearce by increasing the sentence after the defendant’s motion for reconsideration without providing adequate justification on the record. I believe Hidalgo is exactly like the case at hand. As in the instant case, the increased sentence followed the defendant’s motion to reconsider and the same judge did not consider any new evidence.
According to precedent, the presumption of vindictiveness applies under the facts of this case. Because the sentencing judge failed to put adequate justification for the increase on the record to rebut that presumption, I would vacate the increased sentence and reinstate the original sentence.

. Although the words "vindictive” and "vindictiveness” are used in Pearce and its progeny to describe the improper motivation for increased sentences, the words "retaliation” and “retaliatory” are also used and in the case at bar are more accurate. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969) (stating "due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge”); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) ("Because the court believed that the circumstances surrounding the felony indictment gave rise to a genuine risk of retaliation, it adopted a legal presumption____"); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) ("The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.” (citations omitted)); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) ("A person convicted of an offense is entitled to ■ pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate____").

. The lead opinion also cites: United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.1991); and State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 471 S.E.2d 702 (Ct.App.1996). However, the foregoing cases involve prosecutorial vindictiveness rather than vindictiveness in sentencing and are only relevant insofar as they generally discuss the Pearce presumption.