Court Opinion

ID: 9956541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 15:15:48.94167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:35.857326
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-23-00104-CR

                                     Ishmael Jabari DEBROW,
                                             Appellant

                                                 v.

                                       The STATE of Texas,
                                             Appellee

                   From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 22-1142-CR-B
                             Honorable Gary L. Steel, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 27, 2024

AFFIRMED

           A jury convicted appellant Ishmael Debrow for murdering Rand Vanwert, and it assessed

punishment at seventy-seven years imprisonment. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b). The trial

court signed a final judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. In two issues, Debrow

complains that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) omitting particular language from the

jury charge; and (2) sustaining the State’s relevancy and reliability objections to the expert

testimony of Kevin Beaver, Ph.D., a sociologist. We affirm.
                                                                                         04-23-00104-CR

                                         I. CHARGE ERROR

       At trial, Debrow maintained that Vanwert — whom Debrow alleged used steroids — was

the initial aggressor and that he had no choice but to defend himself against Vanwert’s assault.

Specifically, Debrow testified that Vanwert assaulted him with a knife, and he initially responded

by kicking Debrow in the chest. As the altercation escalated, Debrow “started swinging [a] knife”

and he “didn’t stop until Rand fell.” Satish Chundru, M.D., a forensic pathologist, testified that

Vanwert died from “[m]ultiple stab wounds.”

       At the charge conference, Debrow objected:

       Other offenses [sic] would be, I think, just to the absence of the application
       paragraph on the presumption . . .

                                                  ...

       So I’ll just start now. Defense’s first objection is the absence of the application
       paragraph in the presumption. The application paragraph contains a provision that
       limits the findings of the presumption deliberation to just the presumption.

       Now, this is a common issue that comes up with attorneys where they assume that
       if there is criminal activity going on, that that vitiates the right of self-defense for a
       defendant. That merely removes the presumption; and, therefore, the application
       paragraph is critical in order for the jury’s deliberation. The absence of the
       application paragraph may be interpreted by the jury as vitiating the right to self-
       defense, and that’s what the defense is concerned about, and that’s why we object
       to the removal of that application paragraph.

The trial court denied Debrow’s objections.

       The jury charge that was submitted to the jury instructed, among other things, that:

       To decide the issue of self-defense, you must determine whether the State has
       proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the following two elements. The
       elements are that —

               1.      the defendant did not believe his conduct was immediately
                       necessary to protect himself against Rand Vanwert’s use of unlawful
                       deadly force; or

               2.      the defendant’s belief was not reasonable.

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       You must all agree that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
       element 1 or element 2 listed above. You do not need to agree on which of these
       elements the State has proved.

       If you find that the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
       element 1 or element 2 listed above, then you will find the defendant “not guilty.”

       If you all agree the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the offense of
       Murder, and you all agree the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
       element l or element 2 listed above, then you shall find the defendant “Guilty.”

Notably, this instruction substantially comports with the “Application of Law to Facts” provision

in the pattern jury charge. See State Bar of Tex., TEXAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES—

CRIMINAL DEFENSES, PJC 9.23 (2024).

       In Debrow’s first issue, he complains that “the absence of an application paragraph, when

properly preserved (as it was in the instant case), constitutes a reversible error.” Debrow

extensively quotes arguments made in his motion for new trial. Specifically, Debrow argues that

“abstract paragraphs that lack a proper application paragraph have been found erroneous by the

appellate courts.” The State responds by piecing together Debrow’s appellate arguments with

those in his motion for new trial. According to the State, although Debrow references the

“application paragraph,” his true argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling

his objection to include an instruction that the Texas Pattern Jury Charge suggests should

accompany the presumption paragraph.

       The presumption provisions in the jury charge that was submitted to the jury instructed:

       Under certain circumstances, the law creates a presumption that the defendant’s
       belief that the deadly force he used was immediately necessary, was reasonable. A
       presumption is a conclusion the law requires you to reach if certain other facts exist.

       Therefore, you must find the defendant’s belief, that the deadly force he used was
       immediately necessary, was reasonable unless you find the state has proved, beyond
       a reasonable doubt, at least one of the following elements. The elements are that:

               1.      The defendant neither knew nor had reason to believe that Rand
                       Vanwert was committing or attempting to commit murder; or

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               2.        The defendant provoked Rand Vanwert; or
               3.        The defendant, at the time the deadly force was used, was engaged
                         in criminal activity.

This paragraph largely comports with the “Presumption” provision in the pattern jury charge, see

id., with one exception. That exception being:

       If you find the [S]tate has proved element 1, 2, or 3 listed above, the presumption
       does not apply and you are not required to find that the defendant’s belief was
       reasonable.

       Whether or not the presumption applies, the [S]tate must prove, beyond a
       reasonable doubt, that self-defense does not apply to this case.

Id. The State references Tuft v. State, No. 14-22-00066-CR, 2023 WL 5622868, at *6–7 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, pet. ref’d), for its holding that such an omission “was

not error.”

A.     Standard of Review

       A claim of jury-charge error is reviewed in two steps. See Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593,

598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We first determine whether there is error in the charge. Ngo v. State,

175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If we find error, then we analyze that error for

harm. Id. If a defendant does not properly preserve error by objection, any error in the charge

“should be reviewed only for ‘egregious harm’ under Almanza.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d

504, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App.

1985) (op. on reh’g)).

       Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 provides that the trial court “shall . . .

deliver to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case[.]”

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. “The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of

the applicable law and guide them in its application to the case.” Beltran De La Torre v. State,

583 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex.

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                                                                                     04-23-00104-CR

Crim. App. 1996)). A proper jury charge therefore consists of an abstract statement of the law and

the application paragraph(s). See Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366–67 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012). The abstract paragraphs of a jury charge serve as a glossary to help the jury understand the

meaning of concepts and terms used in the application paragraphs of the charge. Crenshaw v.

State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Each statutory definition that affects the

meaning of an element of the offense must be communicated to the jury. Villarreal v. State, 286

S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The application paragraphs then apply the relevant law,

the definitions found in the abstract portion of the charge, and general legal principles to the

particular facts of the case. Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366.

B.     Applicable Law & Analysis

       We find Tuft, 2023 WL 5622868, at *6–7, instructive. In Tuft, the appellant argued that

“the jury charge was erroneous because it did not instruct the jury that the State had the burden of

persuasion to disprove self-defense regardless of whether the statutory presumption of

reasonableness applied.” Id. at *6. This is the argument that Debrow makes when he complains

that the self-defense portion of the jury charge lacks an “application” paragraph — but it appears

his actual complaint is a missing presumption paragraph. The court in Tuft noted that “[a]lthough

an instruction of this type may have been preferable, it was not necessary based on the remaining

instructions in the charge.” Id. at *7 (citation omitted). It then provides:

       The jury charge given contains the various elements required to establish a claim
       of self-defense. The reasonableness of the actor’s belief that force or deadly force
       was immediately necessary is only one element of the self-defense claim. And the
       presumption of reasonableness is just one method for establishing the
       reasonableness of a defendant’s belief. The jury charge specifically states that “if
       you have any reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant was acting in
       self-defense or in defense of [another] on said occasion and under the
       circumstances, then you should give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and say
       by your verdict, not guilty.”

Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

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        The jury charge in the instant case includes all the provisions highlighted by Tuft. In an

earlier portion of the jury charge, it instructs:

        The defendant is not required to prove self-defense. Rather, the State must prove,
        beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense does not apply to the defendant’s
        conduct.

        “Reasonable belief” means a belief that an ordinary and prudent person would have
        held in the same circumstances as the defendant.

        “Deadly force” means force that is intended or known by the person using it to
        cause death or serious bodily injury or force that in the manner of its use or intended
        use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

        If you find that the State has proved the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you
        must next decide whether the State has proved that the defendant’s conduct was not
        justified by self-defense.

        To decide the issue of self-defense, you must determine whether the State has
        proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the following two elements. The
        elements are that —

                1.      the defendant did not believe his conduct was immediately
                        necessary to protect himself against Rand Vanwert’s use of unlawful
                        deadly force; or
                2.      the defendant’s belief was not reasonable.

        You must all agree that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
        element 1 or element 2 listed above. You do not need to agree on which of these
        elements the State has proved.

        If you find that the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
        element 1 or element 2 listed above, then you will find the defendant “not guilty.”

        If you all agree the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the offense of
        Murder, and you all agree the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either
        element l or element 2 listed above, then you shall find the defendant “Guilty.”

(Emphasis added). The emphasized portions in Tuft and the instant jury charge are similar.

Accordingly, as in Tuft, “[r]eading the self-defense section of the charge as whole, the charge

cannot be said to have placed the burden on [Debrow] for proving that he had acted in self-

defense.” Id. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling

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Debrow’s objection to the omission of the presumption provision. Debrow’s first issue is

overruled.

                                     II. EXPERT TESTIMONY

       In support of his defensive theory that Vanwert was the initial aggressor, Debrow called

Megan Guerra, Vanwert’s girlfriend at the time of his death, and Rebekah Roth, who dated

Vanwert in 2012 and 2013, to testify about Vanwert’s past steroid use. Guerra testified that she

had seen Vanwert inject himself with steroids “only a couple of times.” Additionally, Guerra

characterized Vanwert’s steroid use as “sporadic and inconsistent.” Roth testified that she

witnessed Vanwert using steroids in the bathroom. Roth recalled that she “[a]sked [Vanwert] what

he was doing. He was open and honest about it, and I requested that he no longer did that in my

home. I didn’t want it around my daughter, and he stopped immediately.”

       Debrow sought to reinforce his initial aggressor theory by calling Dr. Beaver to opine that

“individuals who use steroids are more likely to engage in violence.” On voir dire examination

outside of the jury’s presence, Dr. Beaver testified that he utilized a national data set to study

whether there was a correlation between steroid use and violence and aggression. The data set

surveyed 6,823 males who were in middle or high school. The participants were asked, inter alia,

whether they had used anabolic-androgenic steroids or other performance enhancing drugs

(collectively referred to as “substances”) (1) during the previous twelve months; and (2) during

their lifetime. Dr. Beaver acknowledged that the survey combined steroids and other performance

enhancing drugs, did not define “other performance enhancing drugs,” did not differentiate

between legally prescribed and illegally obtained substances, and did not differentiate between

frequent and infrequent users of substances. Dr. Beaver also acknowledged that the study’s results

did not separate the effects of steroids from those of other performance enhancing drugs, and it did

not differentiate between “aggression” and “violence.” Dr. Beaver conceded that he was not a

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medical professional, that he had no experience or expertise about the effects of steroids on the

human body, and that he could not testify as to how he developed the violence analysis.

       The State objected to the admissibility of Dr. Beaver’s opinion that steroid use in the past

year increases the likelihood of violence on relevancy and reliability grounds. The trial court

sustained the State’s objection, and it prohibited him from testifying. In Debrow’s second issue,

he complains that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the State’s objections to the Dr.

Beaver’s opinion. Generally, Debrow argues that this testimony supported his self-defense theory

that Vanwert was prone to violence because of his past steroid use.

       Under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, we will uphold the trial court’s decision

as long as it was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474,

478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We will affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct under

any applicable theory of law and is reasonably supported by the record. Winegarner v. State, 235

S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

       Texas Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. TEX. R.

EVID. 702. It allows a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training or education” to “testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue.” Id. Under Rule 702, three conditions must be met before expert

testimony is admissible: (1) the expert must be qualified; (2) the evidence must be reliable; and (3)

the evidence must be relevant. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

       To establish relevance, the expert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact and be sufficiently

tied to the case’s facts. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Even

when the general subject matter is within the average juror’s comprehension, a trial court need not

exclude expert testimony so long as the witness has some specialized knowledge on the topic that

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will “assist” the jury. Id. at 441 (citing Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 288 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010)). In other words, the question under Rule 702 is not whether the jurors know something

about the subject but whether the expert can expand their understanding in a relevant way. Id.

Rule 702 only requires that expert testimony meet the simple requirement of being “helpful” to

the jury on an issue in dispute, by either validating or calling into question the jurors’ own

inclinations, including prompting the jurors to reconsider their preconceived notions. Jordan v.

State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). And the relevance, or “fit,” of the expert’s

testimony about principles and theories can be addressed by the expert’s discussion of

hypotheticals mirroring the case’s facts. Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 441.

       In this case, the trial court may have found that Dr. Beaver’s testimony was irrelevant

because it did not “fit” the facts of the case. Guerra testified that she had seen Vanwert inject

himself with steroids “only a couple of times,” and she characterized his steroid use as “sporadic

and inconsistent.” Guerra’s testimony comports with Roth’s recollection that she had witnessed

Vanwert use steroids on only one occasion and that “he no longer did that in my home.” The trial

court may have found that Dr. Beaver’s concession that the study did not differentiate between

frequent and infrequent users of substances means that it did not “fit” Vanwert’s “sporadic and

inconsistent” steroid use, and therefore, it would not assist the jury in assessing Debrow’s self-

defense theory. Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 438. Moreover, Debrow does not highlight any evidence

that Vanwert used performance enhancing drugs — with or without steroids — or whether

Vanwert used legally prescribed or illegally obtained steroids on the times that he used steroids.

These distinguishing factors may have reinforced the trial court’s finding that Dr. Beaver’s opinion

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did not fit the facts of the case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining

the State’s relevancy objection. 1 Debrow’s second issue is overruled.

                                                  III. CONCLUSION

         We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                             Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1
 In light of this holding, we need not address Debrow’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining
the State’s reliability objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion
that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”);
see also Winegarner, 235 S.W.3d at 790 (providing that we must affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is
correct under any applicable theory of law and is reasonably supported by the record).

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