Court Opinion

ID: 9717593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:06:39.584134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.190394
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN, dissenting: The majority’s opinion sets aside a judgment in the amount of $400,000 entered in favor of the plaintiff on a jury verdict, and remands the matter for a new trial on the sole ground that there was apparent prejudice on the part of two jurors, namely Ellen M. Bowers and Edward Benning. In his order denying defendant’s post-trial motion, the trial court specifically rejected the defendant’s contention that juror prejudice merited the granting of a new trial. As the majority opinion points out, the supreme court has established a two-part standard for granting a new trial due to jurors’ false testimony dining voir dire. A motion for a new trial should be denied unless it is established (1) that a juror answered falsely on voir dire and (2) that prejudice resulted therefrom. (Pekelder v. Edgewater Automotive Co. (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 136, 139.) Implicit in the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s denial of the post-trial motion is a determination by this court that the trial judge’s denial of the motion was an abuse of his discretion. I find no such abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Defendant did not raise the issue of juror prejudice in its original post-trial motion, but did charge prejudice on the part of juror, Ellen M. Bowers, in its first supplement to its post-trial motion, and charged prejudice on the part of juror, Edward Benning, in its second supplement to its post-trial motion. In the two supplements, the defendant asserts, in substance, that Ellen M. Bowers and Edward Benning testified falsely during voir dire in that they falsely denied any connection with Rockwell International Corporation or involvement in any lawsuits with Rockwell International or its subsidiaries. On appeal, the defendant has failed to file a transcript, a factual stipulation, or a bystanders report of the voir dire proceedings as required by Supreme Court Rule 323 (73 Ill. 2d R. 323). Defendant has instead attempted to establish a right to a new trial by a set of affidavits. With reference to the juror, Ellen M. Bowers, defendant submitted a single affidavit in support of its motion. It established that in 1977 the husband of Ellen M. Bowers had applied for employment at MGD Graphic Systems Group, that the rejection of his application prompted him to file a lawsuit against MGD Graphic Systems, a division of Rockwell International. No affidavit or other evidence was submitted to the trial court concerning the nature of any questions put to this juror or of her answers to any questions during the voir dire. Other affidavits established that the other juror, Edward Benning, commenced working for MGD Graphic Systems in 1960; that North American Rockwell, now known as Rockwell International Corporation, took over MGD Graphic Systems in late 1968 or early 1969; and that Edward Benning’s employment terminated with MGD Graphic Systems in February 1970 because of his attitude and lack of respect toward fellow workers. The affidavits also asserted that Benning was aware of the acquisition of MGD Graphic Systems by Rockwell International. An affidavit of Charles Banks, president of Rockwell International Corporation Credit Corporation, established that Banks had interviewed several jurors in the case, including Benning. In the affidavit, Banks stated that during the interview, Benning indicated that he did not like Rockwell tools; that he had formerly worked for Rockwell as a foreman; that he questioned the credibility of Rockwell witnesses; and that he thought the verdict was too low. According to the affidavits, Edward Benning’s last contact with MGD Graphic Systems was some 11 years prior to the trial in question. The defendant filed one more affidavit in support of its contention that Edward Benning answered falsely in voir dire. This fourth affidavit of a fellow juror, Maria A. Mayfield, was taken on February 13, 1981, three months after the trial. In her affidavit, Maria Mayfield stated that during the voir dire examination of the four jurors in her group, which included Edward Benning, the attorney for Rockwell International asked each of these four prospective jurors if any of them had ever worked for Rockwell International Corporation or if they ever had any contacts or connection with Rockwell International Corporation and that all of the jurors in that group answered in the negative. The affidavit of Maria Mayfield also indicated that during jury deliberations, Benning had offered the opinion that plaintiff should be compensated in excess of $2 million and that if plaintiff were to lose his job, his disability would make it very difficult to obtain other employment. Only one affidavit, that of Maria Mayfield, refers to the voir dire examination. Other than this affidavit this court of review has no other record of the proceedings at the voir dire or during jury deliberations. It is a basic principle of appellate practice that a party who prosecutes on appeal has the duty of presenting to the reviewing court everything necessary to decide the issue on appeal. Marshall E. Winokur, Ltd. v. Shane (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 551, 552; Angel v. Angelos (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907. While this court has not had an opportunity to examine a report of the voir dire proceedings, the trial judge conducted and supervised the voir dire of Benning and Bowers. When ruling on the motion for the new trial, he may well have remembered the questions put to the jurors on this subject matter and their answers thereto. Because he was personally present during the voir dire, he would not have to accept the affidavit of the juror Mayfield as the unrebutted truth, particularly in view of the fact that it was taken some three months after trial and following an ex parte communication with the defendant’s representatives. See Chalmers v. City of Chicago (1982), 88 Ill. 2d 532, 540-41. The defendant’s failure to present a proper record of the voir dire makes it relatively impossible for this court to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion, and where the record is lacking, a reviewing court will indulge every presumption favorable to the judgment or order from which the party appeals. Schranz v. I. L. Grossman, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 507, 511. Furthermore, even assuming that the defendant’s affidavits were true and accurate, the defendant has still failed to present sufficient evidence upon which it can be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s post-trial motion. Edward Benning never did work directly for Rockwell International Corporation. Therefore, when defendant’s counsel asked Benning whether he had any contact with Rockwell International, Benning may not have realized that his employment by MGD Graphic Systems some 11 years earlier might be considered as sufficient contact to require an affirmative response. Additionally, Benning’s opinion, given during jury deliberations, concerning the size of the verdict that should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and his statement that in view of the plaintiff’s injury, plaintiff would have difficulty securing employment if he lost his job, could not be considered as any real indication of prejudice which may have affected the verdict reached by the jury. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have properly concluded that Benning did not give false testimony at the voir dire, and secondly, that even if the answer could be considered false, no prejudice resulted therefrom. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff.