Court Opinion

ID: 9736235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:48:17.177854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:31.185458
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice.
This wrongful death action against a tavern owner-operator was brought in several divisions. Two divisions were based on the claim that a tavern operator is liable on a common-law theory for acts falling outside the parameters of Iowa Code section 123.-92. This was the question on which this court was equally divided in Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984). The trial court sustained defendant’s motion to dismiss these two divisions. We granted plaintiffs’ application to bring this interlocutory appeal from that ruling which wé now affirm.
Plaintiffs’ decedent was killed in a single motor vehicle accident after he and another youth were served intoxicating liquor or beer by defendant. According to the petition, which of course we assume here to be true, defendant knew the youths were minors and the sale was wanton, reckless, and malicious.
In dismissing, the trial court determined the dram shop act “is the exclusive method of recovery in civil damages against liquor licensees.” Plaintiffs challenge this ruling, arguing that the dram-shop statute, section 123.92, provides but does not limit recoveries. They contend the section does not preempt all dram-shop theories of recovery so that there should remain a common-law right of action against licensees for their *833acts which fall outside the parameters of section 123.92. More specifically, they urge that the statute addresses only sales or gifts of intoxicants to intoxicated persons or the serving of such persons to the point of intoxication, leaving unaffected a common-law action for the illegal sale of intoxicants to minors.
We agree with the trial court in rejecting these contentions. It would be repetitious to again trace the history of our views on statutory and common-law recoveries in dram-shop claims. See Golden v. O’Neill, 366 N.W.2d 178, 179-80 (Iowa 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 228-31 (Iowa 1985); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d at 388; Nelson v. Restaurants of Iowa, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 881, 883-85 (Iowa 1983); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 373, 92 N.W.2d 682, 690 (1958).
The narrow question here has only to do with licensees and permittees. Section 123.92 makes them strictly liable and, for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinions in Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 390-92, we think the act preempts the tort field as to them. A revision of our statutory dram-shop law was traced in Nelson, 338 N.W.2d at 883-84. Under that revision, the legislature expressly kept licensees and permittees under the dram shop act. In doing so, it struck for them a balance: They would remain strictly liable under the act and would continue to be compelled to post financial responsibility. But, under the scheme, their liability was limited to serving persons “while he or she is intoxicated” or “to the point where he or she is intoxicated.” The liability ended there.
Social policies might support the expanded liability suggested by the plaintiffs. But the legislature was not persuaded by them, and we are bound to adhere to the limitations of the legislative plan.
The trial court was correct in dismissing claims against the defendant which were grounded on common-law theories of negligence in providing intoxicants to a minor. AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except REYNOLD-SON, C.J., and SCHULTZ, McCORMICK and LARSON, JJ., who dissent.