Court Opinion

ID: 9717939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:13:16.251047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.192480
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Majority cere-ates an ambiguity in the insurance policy by reading the limitations in paragraphs D(2) and D(3) in conjunction with each other. To do so is impermissible. As our supreme court has stated:
[Exclusions] are limitations or restrictions on the insuring clause.... [Ejach exclusion is meant to be read with the insuring agreement, independently of every other exclusion. If any one exclusion applies there should be no coverage, regardless of the inferences that might be argued on the basis of exceptions or qualifications contained in other exclusions.
Indiana Insurance Co. v. DeZutti (1980), Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1275, 1278. When considered independently of any other limitation, and in the context of the insuring agreement, the meaning of paragraph DG) is clear: it excludes from the "limit of insurance" amounts paid or payable to a policyholder under the worker's compensation law.
Because the language of the limitation contained in Paragraph D(@) of Allen's policy is unambiguous, the trial court's entry of summary judgment in Allen's favor should be reversed, and this case remanded with instructions to grant Insurer's summary judgment motion.