Court Opinion

ID: 9520483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:40:47.665831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:18.771928
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: The facts surrounding the attorney fee award at issue here are neither complicated nor in dispute. Plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently drove her vehicle into a building owned by plaintiff’s insured, causing property damage. The driver had purchased automobile insurance coverage for property damage, and was defended in the lawsuit by her insurer. Counsel for the driver’s insurer relied upon a legal technicality to justify their misstatement of the insured’s response to a written interrogatory regarding a material fact in plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff learned of the alteration in a subsequent deposition of the insured driver. Plaintiff then requested summary judgment and reasonable attorney fees incurred as a result of the defense attorneys’ misstatement of the response to the written interrogatory. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. It also entered judgment in the amount of $5,000 for attorney fees, twice the amount requested by plaintiffs attorneys, over defense counsel’s objection that plaintiff failed to present proof that any of those alleged fees were reasonable or actually incurred. The majority concludes that the trial court acted within its discretion when it awarded to the plaintiff twice the amount plaintiff requested in attorney fees. In the majority’s view, this award was proper, not as reimbursement for the reasonable attorney fees incurred by plaintiff as a result of the discovery violation, but solely as a “penalty” for defense counsel’s discovery violation. To reach this conclusion, the majority relies upon the broad proposition that a trial court has the authority to order “just” sanctions for discovery violations, thereby ensuring the integrity of the discovery process itself. (87 Ill. 2d R. 219; Buehler v. Whalen (1978), 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460.) From this general principle, the majority reasons that an award of plaintiff’s attorney fees in the amount requested would not “have a sufficient salutary effect” given the circumstances of this case. (164 Ill. App. 3d at 950.) Consequently, the majority determines, the court’s award of double the amount of plaintiff’s attorney fees was “a moderate penalty” and a “measured response to defense attorneys’ cavalier attitude toward the judicial process.” 164 Ill. App. 3d at 950. I respectfully dissent. Illinois Supreme Court 219 states that “the court, on motion, may enter *** such orders as are just.” (87 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).) In the instant case, the plaintiff did not motion for a penalty or any other “orders as are just,” but moved solely for attorney fees and summary judgment. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it imposed a $5,000 “penalty” upon defense counsel for a discovery violation and awarded that “penalty” gratuitously to the plaintiff. Also, assuming that the trial court’s award was one for attorney fees rather than a penalty, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of those fees without a showing that any of the requested sum was reasonably incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the discovery violation. I I cannot agree that the court properly awarded $5,000 to plaintiff on the broad proposition that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) authorizes a trial court to impose “just” discovery sanctions. Rule 219(c) permits the court to enter “such orders as are just” and “order that the offending party or his attorney pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees incurred by any party as a result of the misconduct,” for failure to comply with, or abuse of discovery procedures. (Emphasis added.) (87 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).) The purpose of a “just” sanction under Rule 219(c) is “to accomplish discovery rather than inflict punishment. [Citation.]” Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 531, 504 N.E.2d 772, 777; Jones v. Healy (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 255, 422 N.E.2d 904. In spite of this well-established precedent, the majority attempts, under the guise of Rule 219(c), to condone a sanction whose sole purpose is, as the majority admits, to punish defense counsel’s discovery violation. It appears that the majority believes an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 219(c) is not sufficient to “penalize” the defense attorneys’ misconduct. To remedy this perceived deficiency in the nature of sanctions listed in Rule 219(c), the majority essentially approves a trial court order that sub silentio fines defense counsel for contempt of court. However, no attempt was made here to follow the proper procedure for imposing a fine on defense counsel for contempt, and it is beyond question that the award of the $5,000 “penalty” to plaintiff is not sustainable on this basis. See e.g., People v. Waldron (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 295, 500 N.E.2d 17; Sunset Travel, Inc. v. Lovecchio (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 669, 447 N.E.2d 891; Anderson v. St. Mary’s Hospital (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 596, 428 N.E.2d 528; Smith v. Thompson (1945), 327 Ill. App. 59, 63 N.E.2d 613. I also cannot agree that in the context of this case an award of fees and expenses would not “have a sufficient salutary effect.” (164 Ill. App. 3d at 950.) There is no basis in the record for the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s violation, sanctioned only by the payment of fees and costs, might be viewed as a “cost-effective measure to be tried in future cases.” (164 Ill. App. 3d at 949-50.) There is also nothing in the record to indicate that the majority’s determination that an award of incurred reasonable attorney fees and expenses for the violation may impede “the burden on the courts struggling to handle the massive amount of pending litigation.” (164 Ill. App. 3d at 950.) The stated or proposed justification for the majority’s conclusion that such an award was “just” is speculative and without foundation. By awarding the plaintiff twice the amount of her attorney fees, the majority heaps upon the plaintiff a wholly unwarranted windfall. It is the plaintiff alone who benefits from the award of the $5,000 “penalty.” Awarding the penalty to the plaintiff, who did not motion the court for any sanction other than attorney fees and who has been fully compensated for all expenses without that penalty, is justified by no more equity than the coincidence of fortuitous circumstance. This is not a punitive damage case, and the penalty awarded to plaintiff is not “just.” The plaintiff is not entitled to a free bonus of $5,000. If, for punishment or deterrent purposes, the trial court should have the authority to impose a punitive sanction of the nature ordered here, it would be more equitable to direct this “windfall” to a charitable legal organization or association that, for example, provides pro bono legal representation. The award of such a penalty to a charitable organization is no less justified under Illinois law than is the majority’s award of the penalty to the plaintiff here. Because the majority’s position is without precedent, statutory authority, or supreme court rule support, I cannot concur that the penalty is appropriate, and, for the reasons stated, I do not think the penalty is “just.” II Although the trial court characterized its award as one for attorney fees, the majority concludes that the $5,000 award here was a penalty and not for plaintiff’s reasonably incurred attorney fees resulting from defense counsel’s discovery violation. Assuming arguendo that the judgment was an award for fees, entry of the award without any evidence to establish the reasonableness of that award was an abuse of discretion. The record shows that the trial court’s $5,000 award was based on nothing more than the bare assertion of plaintiff’s counsel that $2,500 in fees had been expended as a result of the defense attorneys’ discovery violation. The award was entered without an evidentiary hearing and over the objection of defendant’s counsel that the fees were not reasonably incurred. The trial court had before it no affidavit or testimony from plaintiff’s lawyer to support his opinion that attorney fees in the amount of $2,500 were incurred as a result of the discovery violation. There was no showing that the fees had been actually incurred or that the fees and hours expended were reasonable and necessary. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff. Supreme Court Rule 219(c) specifically provides that the award of attorney fees must be “reasonable” and “incurred by [the innocent] party as a result of the misconduct.” (Emphasis added.) (87 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).) The record in this case did not show the extent to which plaintiff was prejudiced by defendant’s incorrect answer to an interrogatory at the time the court entered its judgment. Given this lack of proof of the reasonably incurred attorney fees in the record itself, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing in which both parties would have been provided an opportunity to introduce evidence of the reasonableness of the fees allegedly incurred as a result of defense counsel’s discovery violation. (See, e.g., Wach v. Martin Varnish Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 954, 422 N.E.2d 172; see also Tamari v. Bache & Co. (7th Cir. 1984), 729 F.2d 469.) The nature of defense counsel’s discovery violation did not dispense with the requirement that plaintiff’s attorneys prove the amounts of reasonable fees actually incurred as a result of that violation. The award itself is confiscatory and the manner in which it was imposed was inadequate to satisfy due process requirements. I would reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter for further proceedings wherein counsel for both parties would be permitted to submit evidence of the reasonableness of the attorney fees actually incurred by plaintiff because of the discovery violation, in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219.