Court Opinion

ID: 9925526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-20 18:10:44.595823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:59.399874
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00303-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DANIEL GARCIA,                                                             Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 24th District Court
                          of DeWitt County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

      Appellant Daniel Garcia appeals his convictions of assault on a public servant and

retaliation, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 36.06, both third-degree felonies

enhanced by appellant’s prior felony convictions. See id. § 12.42(d). By five issues

appellant argues (1)–(2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions;
(3) the trial court improperly denied his request to strike four venire members for cause;

(4) “[t]he trial court improperly denied [appellant’s] request for a mistrial after the jury

contravened its instructions”; and (5) the judgment is void as it does not comport with the

sentence assessed by the trial court. We affirm as modified.

                                    I.      BACKGROUND

       Appellant was indicted on one count of assault on a public servant and one count

of retaliation. He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.

       At trial, appellant’s sister Oralia Garcia testified that she called the police in the

early morning hours of July 24, 2020, after appellant showed up at her doorstep around

2 or 3 a.m., barefoot and shirtless, refusing to leave. Oralia stated that when she greeted

appellant at the door, he demanded that she bring him something to drink. She retreated

inside the home while he remained on the porch “praying and singing.” Oralia testified

that she returned with a glass of water, and appellant then requested another drink. Upon

returning with the second drink, appellant took the drink and then picked up a planter off

the porch and threw it towards Oralia. Oralia quickly shut the front door to avoid getting

hit with the planter. According to Oralia, there was nothing she had said or done prior to

escalate the situation. Because appellant “kept hitting the door” and refused to leave,

Oralia called the police.

       Oralia clarified that, at the time, appellant resided in a small trailer on her property,

situated behind her home, where she supports him financially. Oralia explained that it was

not unusual for appellant to appear on her doorstep demanding food or something to

drink, but appellant’s timing and destructive behavior on this particular evening was

                                               2
unusual. Oralia testified she briefly left the front porch area when officers arrived, and she

returned several minutes later to find appellant on the ground getting arrested. On cross-

examination, Oralia recalled hearing an officer instruct appellant to return to his trailer,

and then later, Oralia heard appellant say, “Please don’t hurt me.” Oralia denied

witnessing the officer draw his weapon or taser.

       DeWitt County Sheriff’s Officer Juan Julian Ruiz Jr. testified that he was on patrol

on July 24, 2020, when he was dispatched to the residence. Deputy Ruiz stated he arrived

to find appellant sitting on a porch swing shirtless and with only one shoe on. Deputy Ruiz

identified himself as law enforcement. “As I was walking up, he told me not to take another

step further. . . . He was going to f[-]ck me up,” testified Deputy Ruiz. Deputy Ruiz, who

was familiar with appellant, testified that appellant appeared more aggravated than usual

and “just wasn’t himself,” noting appellant’s “pinprick”-sized pupils and suspecting

appellant to be “under the influence of some kind of narcotics or alcoholic beverage.”

       After speaking with Oralia, Deputy Ruiz instructed appellant “several times that he

need[ed] to go home” and warned appellant that he would be arrested if he did not leave

the premises. Deputy Ruiz stated that appellant refused and told him that he would have

to “kill him to take him.” Appellant then walked toward Deputy Ruiz and told him, “[Y]ou

don’t scare me, bitch. I’ll f[-]ck you up.” At that point, Deputy Ruiz notified appellant that

he was going to be handcuffed and instructed appellant to turn around. Deputy Ruiz said

appellant pushed “off” him, inadvertently fell to the ground, and began kicking Deputy

Ruiz. As Deputy Ruiz radioed for backup, appellant struck Deputy Ruiz’s legs “multiple

times.” Deputy Ruiz testified, “[Appellant] was cursing at me the whole time. He told me,

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[‘]I told y’all I was going to hurt you[’] or [‘]I was going to f[-]ck you up if you touched me.[’]”

Deputy Ruiz testified that he drew his taser after appellant attempted to grab a nearby

object off the ground. At the sight of the taser, appellant “stopped fighting right there on

the spot” and said, “Don’t hurt me.” Appellant was taken into custody.

        The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, and the case proceeded to

punishment, where the State presented evidence of appellant’s prior felony convictions.

The jury assessed punishment at thirty-five years’ imprisonment for each count. The trial

court ordered the sentences to run concurrent. This appeal followed.

                               II.      SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        By his first and second issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support his convictions for assault on a public servant and

retaliation. 1

A.      Standard of Review

        In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and determine whether,

based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State,

635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)); see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (adopting the standard of review for a

        1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that only one standard should be used to evaluate

whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt: legal
sufficiency. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 905–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); see also
Longoria v. State, No. 13-22-00222-CR, 2023 WL 6631728, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Oct. 12, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we only apply the legal-
sufficiency standard when addressing appellant’s sufficiency arguments.

                                                     4
sufficiency challenge as set out by Jackson). “This familiar standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edward,

635 S.W.3d at 655; see Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“If

the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must presume that the

factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to the jury’s factual

determinations.”) (cleaned up). We remain mindful that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as

probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can

be sufficient to establish guilt.” Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the

evidence produced at trial against “the essential elements of the offense as defined by

the hypothetically correct jury charge.” Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021) (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

B.     Assault of a Public Servant

       1.     Applicable Law

       Assault of a public servant requires proof of misdemeanor assault and that
       (1) the complainant was a public servant; (2) the actor knew that the
       complainant was a public servant; (3) the complainant was discharging an
       official duty when he was assaulted; and (4) the official duty was being
       discharged lawfully.

Cuevas v. State, 576 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1). Under the Texas Penal Code, a person acts intentionally when it is

his conscious objective or desire to cause the result of his action. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

                                              5
§ 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably

certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly when he is aware of but

consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. Id.

§ 6.03(c). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a

gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under

all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint. Id. The definition of “bodily

injury” is purposefully broad, see id. § 1.07(a)(8), and includes physical pain “however

minor.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Cabello v.

State, No. 13-19-00341-CR, 2022 WL 3451368, at *25 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Aug. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The

existence of a cut, bruise, or scrape on the body is sufficient evidence of physical pain

necessary to establish ‘bodily injury’ within the meaning of the statute.” (quoting Arzaga

v. State, 86 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.))).

       2.     Analysis

       Appellant argues the State failed to produce evidence that Deputy Ruiz was

lawfully discharging an official duty at the time of the assault because appellant “was not

engaged in public intoxication, as he was not in a public place.” We find Cuevas, a recent

Texas Criminal Court of Appeals case, to be instructive here. 576 S.W.3d at 400.

       In Cuevas, a peace officer was off duty, working as a security guard and enforcing

a “house rule,” when appellant assaulted him. Id. at 399. The court of criminal appeals

held that it was “immaterial” that the officer was enforcing a house rule, “that he was not

trying to arrest Appellant, and that Appellant was not subject to prosecution for

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violating . . . any other law,” because “[a] peace officer may discharge an official duty even

if it is also a private duty, and a person may be liable for assault on a public servant even

if he is not subject to arrest for some other crime when he commits the assault.” Id. at

400. The court upheld appellant’s conviction of assault on a public servant. Id.

       Here, Deputy Ruiz testified that he was at Oralia’s residence in response to a call

about a domestic disturbance involving appellant, discharging his duties. After Deputy

Ruiz identified himself, appellant threatened to “f[-]ck [him] up,” and then kicked him

following Deputy Ruiz’s attempts to get appellant to voluntarily leave the premises.

Deputy Ruiz also sought to prevent further destruction of Oralia’s property, noting the

broken planter that Oralia had attributed to appellant. “It is the duty of every peace officer

to preserve the peace within the officer’s jurisdiction.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 2.13(a); see also id. art. 6.06 (“Whenever, in the presence of a peace officer, or within

his view, one person is about to commit an offense against the person or property of

another, including the person or property of his spouse, or injure himself, it is his duty to

prevent it . . . .”). As was the case in Cuevas, it is of no consequence that appellant may

not have been “subject to arrest for some other crime when he commit[ted] the assault.”

See Cuevas, 576 S.W.3d at 400. Because Deputy Ruiz, at the time of appellant’s actions,

was performing his peace officer duties, the factfinder could reasonably infer that, in

harming Deputy Ruiz when and in the manner in which he did, appellant had the intent to

harm a public servant. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Cuevas, 576 S.W.3d at 400. We

overrule appellant’s first issue.

C.     Retaliation

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       1.     Applicable Law

       “A person commits the felony offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly

harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for the service or

status of another as a public servant.” Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 770 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1)(A). Whether a particular statement

constitutes a threat is governed by an objective standard—“whether a reasonable person

would foresee that the statement would be interpreted” as a serious expression of intent

to harm or assault by those to whom the maker made the statement. Brock v. State, 495

S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. ref’d). “Comments can be evaluated as threats

based, not just on the language used, but also the context within which they are uttered,

even veiled threats.” Id. “The test is whether a threat would justify apprehension by an

ordinary hearer, not whether the threat communicated . . . caused a particular recipient

to actually become apprehensive.” See id.

       2.     Analysis

       As with his sufficiency challenge to the offense of assault on a public servant,

appellant argues that he could not act in retaliation for or on the account of the service or

status of a public servant when Deputy Ruiz was not “lawfully discharging his official duty

by arresting [appellant] for a crime he was not committing.” As we observed in Dodds v.

State, No. 13-13-00288-CR, 2014 WL 6676774, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Nov. 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), this Court—

as well as numerous sister courts—have held that a retaliatory act need not be

contemporaneous with the public servant’s performance of the public servant’s official

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duties. That is, evidence of appellant’s aggressive response to a self-identified peace

officer is sufficient to prove retaliatory intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Nandin v.

State, 402 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence was

sufficient to prove retaliatory intent because it showed defendant using an “aggressive

posture, putting up his fists, and advancing towards the deputy who then pepper-sprayed

him in the face,” which prompted defendant to charge the deputy and try to hit him).

       Appellant does not dispute that Deputy Ruiz was a public servant, that he

threatened Deputy Ruiz, or that he kicked Deputy Ruiz after threatening him. See Cada,

334 S.W.3d at 770. The jury was further entitled to believe Deputy Ruiz’s testimony—

namely, that he was a public servant, appellant threatened to “f[-]ck” him up if he took a

step further onto the property, and appellant kicked him repeatedly, during which

appellant reiterated his prior threats to harm Deputy Ruiz—which were consistent in all

important respects. Based on this evidence, a rational factfinder could have found that

appellant’s statement was a threat to harm Deputy Ruiz, in retaliation for, or on account,

of Deputy Ruiz’s status as a public servant. See id.; see also Trejo v. State, No. 13-16-

00432-CR, 2018 WL 5534107, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 25, 2018,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was sufficient

to support retaliation charge where officer arrived at appellant’s home in response to a

call for assistance, and upon meeting appellant, appellant threatened that if the officer did

not leave, “he was going to call his buddies to have him killed or he would kill [the officer]

himself”). We overrule appellant’s second issue.

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                                     III.   VOIR DIRE

       Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

challenges for cause to four venire members: 10, 11, 41, and 58—each with law

enforcement ties.

A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       The purpose of voir dire is in part to elicit information that would establish a basis

for a challenge for cause because the venire member is legally disqualified from serving

or is biased or prejudiced for or against one of the parties or some aspect of the relevant

law. Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “A juror who

states that he cannot consider the minimum punishment for a particular statutory offense

is subject to a challenge for cause.” Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a) (“A challenge for cause is an

objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders the juror incapable

or unfit to serve on the jury.”). “Where a party wishes to exclude a juror because of bias,

it is the party seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the

potential juror lacks impartiality.” Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 84 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016); see Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “The opposing

party or trial judge may then examine the juror further to ensure that he fully understands

and appreciates the position that he is taking, but unless there is further clarification or

vacillation by the juror, the trial judge must grant a challenge for cause.” Cardenas, 325

S.W.3d at 185. “A trial judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause may be reversed only for a

                                             10
clear abuse of discretion.” Tracy, 597 S.W.3d at 512; see Jacobs v. State, 560 S.W.3d

205, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

       To preserve an objection to the denial of a challenge for cause, a defendant must

have: (1) used all his peremptory strikes, (2) asked for and was denied additional

peremptory strikes, and (3) accepted an identified objectionable juror whom defendant

would not otherwise have accepted had the trial court granted the defendant’s challenge

for cause (or granted him additional peremptory strikes so that he might strike the juror).

Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 83; Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);

see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.15 (b) (“In non-capital felony cases . . . , the State

and defendant shall each be entitled to ten peremptory challenges.”). To establish harm

for an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, the defendant must show on the record

that he used a peremptory strike to remove the venireperson and thereafter suffered a

detriment from the loss of the strike. Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014); Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 23.

B.     Analysis

       The record demonstrates that appellant: (1) failed to use a peremptory strike on

two of the four complained-of venire members; (2) failed to exhaust all of his peremptory

strikes; (3) failed to request more peremptory strikes; and (4) failed to identify

objectionable venire members who sat on the jury and on whom appellant would have

removed had the trial court allowed for more peremptory strikes. The jury was

subsequently empaneled without objection from appellant, and none of the objected-to

venire members served on the panel. Cf. Dukes v. State, 486 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex.

                                             11
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (providing that the defendant preserved error by

objecting “to the empanelment of several jurors on whom he claimed he would have used

peremptory challenges had his challenges for cause been granted or had he received the

additional strikes that he had requested”); see also Tillman v. State, No. 14-98-01233-

CR, 2001 WL 543666, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 24, 2001, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant preserved error when he requested

and was denied ten additional peremptory strikes after the clerk called the names of the

jurors but before they were sworn). Thus, appellant has failed to preserve error for our

review. See Comeaux, 445 S.W.3d at 750 (“The steps to preserve error and establish

harm are intended to allow the trial judge every opportunity to correct error and to allow

the defendant to demonstrate that he did not have the benefit of using his peremptory

challenges in the way that he desired.”); Chambers, 866 S.W.2d at 23. We overrule

appellant’s third issue.

                                 IV.    DENIAL OF MISTRIAL

       Appellant argues by his fourth issue that “[t]he trial court improperly denied [his]

request for a mistrial after the jury contravened its instructions.”

A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       A trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,

and we uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “‘[We] view[] the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, considering only those arguments

before the court at the time of the ruling.’” Gonzalez v. State, 608 S.W.3d 98, 107 (Tex.

                                              12
App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d) (quoting Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009)). A mistrial is appropriate only in extreme cases of highly prejudicial

error when spending any further time or effort on trial “would be wasteful and futile.”

Gonzalez, 608 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884). Because mistrial is an

extreme remedy, less drastic alternatives may suffice, such as instructing the jury to

consider as evidence only the testimony and exhibits admitted through witnesses on the

stand or questioning the jury about the extent of any prejudice. Jenkins v. State, 493

S.W.3d 583, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Ordinarily, we assume that a jury follows the

instruction given, and we will not reverse in the absence of evidence that the jury was

actually confused by the charge. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 490 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996). The movant has the burden of proving the allegation of juror misconduct.

Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

B.    Analysis

      Here, appellant moved for a mistrial after the attorneys received a jury note during

jury guilt/innocence deliberations. The following colloquy ensued:

      THE COURT:              What we have is a question from the jury that says
                              [‘C]an we do the punishment phase today[?’][ 2] I don’t
                              know exactly if there’s anything implicit in that or not,
                              but my proposal is to send them a note back that simply
                              says before I can address your question you must
                              render a verdict on—you must render a verdict on the
                              issue of innocence or guilt.

      [STATE]:                That makes sense.

      THE COURT:              Is there an objection from that response to the
                              Defense?

      2 The jury note contained a file stamp of June 14, 2022, at 5:06 p.m.

                                                 13
       [DEFENDANT]:         Judge, I object. First, I move for a mistrial. The jury has
                            wholly disregarded your instructions of the Jury Charge
                            by even talking about punishment. And, second, I think
                            you should be a little more adamant in your response
                            to them. You know, something along the lines of, you
                            know, it’s not appropriate for you at this time to be
                            discussing punishment or something along those lines.
                            I’ll let you be the author of that. But I think yours is
                            just—I think you’re letting them off the hook. It’s not
                            right what they’re doing, and I re-urge my mistrial.
                            That’s just not right. They have already made a
                            decision and they haven’t told you what the decision is.

       THE COURT:           Right. They haven’t even told me if they have a
                            decision. Yes. I understand.

       [DEFENDANT]:         Right. Exactly. If they don’t have a decision then this is
                            wholly inappropriate.

       THE COURT:           It may be that they have reached a decision. They’re
                            just not understanding the process. And so what I’m
                            going to do, I’ll write it out and then I’ll tell you on the
                            record what I’m going to do.

       [DEFENDANT]:         Okay.

       THE COURT:           So what I need to do, Ms. Ruiz, if you will file this. You
                            can tape it to a larger sheet if you want to. And if you
                            will file stamp this and I will send that to them. You are
                            allowed to let them read it and then tell them you want
                            that note back. If they have any other notes or if they
                            have a verdict or whatever, they can do that. But what
                            you want to do is let them read it and then tell them that
                            you need that note back.

       The trial court’s written response to the jury, containing a file stamp of June 14,

2022, at 5:10 p.m. read as follows: “Ladies and [g]entlemen of the jury: It is not appropriate

to address any procedural issue at this time. At this time, the only issue which may be

addressed is the issue of innocence or guilt as presented to you in the Court[’]s Charge.”

                                             14
The jury thereafter indicated it had reached a verdict and returned a guilty verdict form

containing a file stamp of June 14, 2022, at 5:15 p.m.

       Although the record shows that appellant initially moved for a mistrial based on

jury confusion or impropriety, neither was in fact later established. Indeed, it is not clear

under these facts that the jury had not yet reached its verdict regarding innocence at the

time it sent out the note at 5:05 p.m. inquiring about when punishment would occur

because within five minutes of receiving the trial court’s instruction to focus only on

guilt/innocence—not punishment, it returned a guilty verdict. See Gamboa v. State, 296

S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005); see also Wood v. State, No. 02-22-00197-CR, 2023 WL 7037617, at *9 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding the denial of motion for mistrial was appropriate where the trial court

responded to the alleged impropriety by instructing the jurors they “were permitted to

receive evidence ‘only in open court’” and that “no juror is permitted to communicate to

any other juror anything he or she may have heard regarding the case or any witness

therein, from any other source than open court”); Guerra v. State, No. 08-22-00183-CR,

2023 WL 5508829, at *10 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“[B]ecause the record does not support the factual predicate

of her claim, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for

a mistrial during the guilt/innocence phase of trial.”). This record does not reflect that any

juror “engaged in such misconduct that the defendant did not receive a fair and impartial

trial.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3(g). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse

                                             15
its discretion in denying appellant’s request for mistrial based on the jury note. We

overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

                              V.     JUDGMENT MODIFICATION

       By his fifth issue, appellant argues that the judgment does not reflect that his

sentence for assault on a public servant is to run concurrently with his sentence for

retaliation, rendering the judgment void. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

has already expressly concluded otherwise. See Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344, 347

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “An improper cumulation order may be remedied by reformation

on appeal or, in the proper circumstance, a judgment nunc pro tunc. Because the

improper cumulation order is subject to such remedies, the sentences cannot properly be

declared void.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Schorre v. State, No. 13-23-00142-

CR, 2023 WL 7860784, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 16, 2023, no

pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). (concluding modification of the

judgment to show concurrence is permissible on appeal). An appellate court has the

power to correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak

the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any

appropriate order as the law and the nature of the case may require. Bigley v. State, 865

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Simmons v. State, 672 S.W.3d 821, 829 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.); see TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (permitting the

intermediate courts of appeals to “modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as

modified”).

       The State agrees that the trial court orally ordered the sentences to run

                                             16
concurrently when it sentenced appellant, and an oral pronouncement can be found in

the record of the adjudication hearing. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect the

sentences are to run concurrently. We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

                                   VI.    CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

                                                              CLARISSA SILVA
                                                              Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of January, 2024.

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