Court Opinion

ID: 9812845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:50:17.891747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:55.102352
License: Public Domain

Cook, J.,
dissenting. The decision of the Court is made to turn upon the “Fellow Servant” act of 1897, which is quoted in full in the opinion. The construction placed upon that act, in my opinion, is not warranted by its text or the remedy intended to be provided by the Legislature which passed it. So I will first peruse and consider the act in respect of- the remedy intended.
The rule for construing a remedial statute, as taught by Mr. Blackstone, is that there are three points to be considered ; the old law, the mischief and the remedy'; that is, how the law stood at the making of the act; what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide; and what remedy, is provided to cure the mischief. To illustrate his meaning, he instances the restraining statute of 13 Elizabeth, Chap. 10. “By the common law,” he says, “ecclesiastical corporations might let as long leases as they thought proper; the mischief was, that they let long and unreasonable leases to the impoverishment of their successors; the remedy .applied by the *417statute was by making void all leases by ecclesiastical bodies for longer terms than three lives or twenty-one years.”
Applying this rule in construing the act, we find the law (made by judicial construction) to have been, first, that where an employee of a railroad company was injured by the negligence of a fellow servant, the common employer was not responsible for the injury; and, second, that there was no statute or judicial ruling in this State by which an employee could be prevented from contracting with a.railroad company to waive his right of action for injuries resulting from-defects in the machinery.
The mischief to be remedied was to release a fellow servant from his responsibility for the negligence of a fellow servant; and, second, to secure to the employee the right of action for injuries inflicted on account of defects in the machinery.
The remedy applied by the statute is to create a liability upon the railroad company in favor of an employee for injury inflicted by the negligence of a fellow servant, and to declare null and void any such contract or agreement, express or implied, made for the purpose of waiving the right to maintain an action, (1) from injury resulting from the negligence of a fellow servant, and (2) from injuries resulting from defects in the machinery. An analysis of the statute shows two propositions:
1. To change the relationship existing between fellow servants and make them vice-principal as to each other with respect to injuries resulting on account of their negligence, carelessness or incompetency, and to prevent them from forfeiting their right of action by contract.
2. To prevent an employee from waiving his right of action for injuries received on account of defects in the machinery, ways or appliances; or, in other words, a right of action accrues to-a fellow servant, and the right to waive either action by an employee is forbidden.
*418These relations being established by the statute, the liability of the railroad company as to furnishing safe and suitable machinery, ways and appliances, and the relationship of the employee and his assumption of risks in the performance of his work remain unchanged. So, I do not understand that it is within the purview of the statute to exempt employee from responsibility for negligence in the use of safe machinery or to license him to voluntarily assume unnecessary risk or hazard at the expense or upon the responsibility of the railroad company. Eor, if danger or peril exists in the performance of a service, it becomes obvious first to the em-. ployee, and frequently arises suddenly and unexpectedly, and he is under no obligation to the railroad company to incur it. Nor is the railroad company under a legal obligation to be ever present with its employee, and to exercise for him that good judgment and common sense in avoiding hazard while performing service, which he assumed to have in accepting employment in a service' which he knew to be accompanied with much danger, and liable to various accidents. The railroad company necessarily sees through the eyes of its employees, and a proper performance of its service and duties is dependent upon their eyes, good sense and judgment. Whether machinery, ways and appliances are sound or defective depends upon the knowledge and skill of its officers and employees, upon whom there Hiust rest an obligation to make known and have remedied such defects when discovered, ■ as well as to inspect them before and during use for the security of themselves as well as those using them; when once placed in the hands and under the control of an employee, it is through his eyes, above all others, that the company must rely for the detection of defects, and from whom information of the same should be obtained.
Nor do I understand that it is within the purview of the statute, either by expression or. intendment, to abrogate the doctrine of assumption of risk — volenti non. fit injuria — from *419the nature of tbe employer corporation, it is compelled to operate through and depend upon its officers and employees'; each employee becomes a vice-principal as to the service under his absolute control; and if defects exist in the machinery entrusted to him, or become apparent thereafter, it is his duty to his employer, as well as to himself, to malee it known and to use his best offices to have them remedied; his failure to give information of such defects leads the employer to assume that none exist, to the great hazard of its property and service. But should he continue in the use of such, knowing the defects, and failing to give the employer an opportunity of making the remedy, then he does so knowingly and willingly, and must be considered to have undertaken to run the risks incident thereto.
Defendant company exhibited to the .Court, as a part of the case on appeal, a photograph of the engine and tender upon which the accident occurred. It appears therefrom, as explained by the evidence recited in the record (the tender when backing being in front, I shall speak of the rear end of the tender as the “front”), that there was a platform upon the “front” of the tender, six inches wide, extending the width of the tender across the railroad track, and being about a foot or sixteen inches from the ground or sills upon the track. This was a safe place for plaintiff, and was provided with a hand-hold; but it was not a comfortable place to stay and signal the engineer, as he would have to stoop over to see him, or by peeping around the corner. Above this platform, or step, was a tool-box, and, with the lid shut dorm, was about two feet wide, and was a safe place to stand, and perfectly convenient in signalling the engineer- The way provided for getting up on this tool-box was a step on the side of the tender, about two feet four inches from the ground; there was no.grab-iron there on the tender, and, it was, on that .corner, of the tender where the drain-pipe extended put. *420The drain-pipe was not used for, and was known to be nnüt to be used as, a grab-iron; but plaintiff had used the one on the opposite side three hundred times, and this one not so often— two or three times — and had never examined it to see if it was sound or securely fastened, but, if it were, it would' hold 1,000 pounds.
Plaintiff, when injured, was not getting upon the tool-box from the side of the tender, where the grab-iron should have been for that purpose, but was getting up from the platform (provided for his use, and in “front” of the tender) upon the tool-box, and in doing so used for his support the drainpipe, which broke out, and he fell backwards upon the track in “front” of the moving tender, and was injured before he could get outside of the rails by one of the wheels running over his arm and otherwise doing him harm. Plaintiff was the yard conductor, having under his control the engineer and another employee. He was experienced in the rail t oad service, and for over two years had occupied the same position, and well knew the safe and unsafe methods of performing his service.
Now, then, with this understanding of the statute, and the burden of plaintiff’s case resting upon the fact that there was no grab-iron on the side of the tender, and that his injury resulted from the lade of such at' that place, I shall briefly consider what I take to be the main question presented in this case:
-Was defendant company negligent in not putting a grab-iron on the side of the tender before delivering the engine and tender to plaintiff for his use in its service ?
Plaintiff says his injuries resulted from the breaking of a defective drain-pipe (used as a substitute for the grab-iron) while he was undertaking to mount upon the tool-box. He was not mounting from the side of the tender where the grab-iron was necessary for that purpose, for had he chosen that *421mode,- which, was the proper one, and used the drain-pipe and fallen, his fall would have been outside of the track, and the wheels could not have injured him. But he was mounting from the platform (or step) in “front,” with his back to the middle of the track, and undertaking to get upon the tool-box from that direction, and in doing so used the drainpipe for his support, which broke out and he fell in “front” in the middle of the track, and was injured by the moving train before he could get out of the track. Had he undertaken to mount from the side of the tender, this injury could not have occurred; but having undertaken to mount fivm the “front,” from which position no appliances were required to be fixed for mounting, and in a way not contemplated-or suggested by the structure of the machine or the provisions made, his injuries did not result from the neglect of the defendant in failing to put grab-irons on the engine, and(.I think his Honor erred in not instructing the jury as prayed by defendant, “that upon the whole evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no sufficient evidence to go to the jury of any defective appliance, so far as the want of a grab-iron is concerned, except that of which the plaintiff accepted the risk of continuing in the service of the defendant after full knowledge of such defect,” to which defendant excepted and assigned as error. ,
When this case was last before the Court (128 N. C., 534), I simply entered my dissent, because the opinion of the Court was filed so late that I did not have time thereafter to complete my opinion, which I was preparing, and was unwilling to delay the case on that account. And now, again, I find myself, in the press of other business before the Court, similarly situated. .