Court Opinion

ID: 9621730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:04:45.45687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:07.986143
License: Public Domain

Judge BRIGGS
dissenting.
I agree that a defendant has the right to request permission to withdraw an Alford plea when the alleged victim of domestic sexual abuse recants. However, I disagree with the additional position the majority takes that when, as here, a court finds only that there are “no obvious flaws” in either the initial accusations or the later recantation, the convicted sex abuser is entitled to a new trial. Because recantations by victims of domestic sexual abuse are inherently unreliable, I would require, before permitting a defendant to withdraw an Alford plea, that the court must be reasonably satisfied that the earlier accusations were actually false.
Here, it cannot be determined from the order permitting defendant to withdraw his Alford plea whether he satisfied this burden of persuasion. I would therefore vacate the *300court’s order and remand for further findings.
I.
Crim. P. 32(d) provides that a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. The rule is the counterpart of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d). However, when adopting the state rule, the supreme court intentionally deleted that part of the federal rule providing that a guilty plea can be withdrawn after sentencing, if necessary to correct manifest injustice. Glaser v. People, 155 Colo. 504, 395 P.2d 461 (1964); see also People v. Miller, 685 P.2d 233 (Colo.App.1984). Thus, in Colorado, so long as a guilty plea is entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the plea may not be set aside after sentencing. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo.1987).
The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the finality of a guilty plea:
Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment....
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A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s ease_
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 1473, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756, 761 (1970).
Nevertheless, as the majority notes, a division of this court recently concluded in People v. Tomey, 969 P.2d 785 (Colo.App.1998), that a defendant who enters an Alford plea of no contest does not waive the right to seek post-conviction review, at least when the request is based on newly discovered evidence. The decision in Tomey rested on the division’s construction of Crim. P. 35(c)(2). The rule provides, in pertinent part, that every person convicted of a crime is entitled to seek post-conviction review when facts exist that have not previously been presented and heard; that by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known before the conviction; and that require vacation of the conviction “in the interest of justice.” The decision in Tomey also implicitly reflects that an Alford plea differs sufficiently from a plea based on an admission of guilt that post-conviction review should be available, at least in the limited circumstances of newly discovered evidence.
However, the focus in Tomey was not on the actual criteria that, “in the interest of justice,” must be satisfied for a defendant to be entitled to withdraw an Alford plea. Further, the case did not involve a recantation by an asserted victim of a domestic sexual assault.
The trial court here determined that it would apply the test articulated in People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547 (Colo.1981). However, Gutierrez involved a motion for new trial and a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, not a request to withdraw an Alford plea after sentencing. Equally important, the “newly discovered” evidence in Gutierrez, as in Tomey, was not a recantation by an asserted victim of a domestic sexual assault.
We are therefore presented with an issue of first impression and, in the circumstances presented here, neither Tomey nor Gutierrez necessarily supplies the appropriate criteria for granting a motion to withdraw an Alford plea. Instead, we must independently determine those criteria. This requires that we strike a balance among the interests of the defendant, the recanting victim, and the state.
II.
As the majority notes, few courts have addressed the criteria that must be satisfied to entitle a defendant to withdraw an Alford plea based on a victim’s recantation. However, many have addressed the related question of the criteria for granting a new trial based on recanted testimony. Most have applied a test that, in at least one significant way, is more stringent than the Gutierrez test.
*301A.
In the seminal case of Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928), the Seventh Circuit concluded that a new trial should be granted when: 1) the court is reasonably satisfied that the initial testimony of a material witness was false; 2) without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and 3) the party seeking a new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet or did not know its falsity. Courts have generally applied this test, or some derivative of it, to recanted testimony. See generally T. Thomas, Annotation, Standard For Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal Case on Basis Of Recanted Testimony-Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1990).
The most common modifications to the Larrison test involve its second and third criteria. As to the second, which looks to the materiality of the evidence, the typical modification is to require more than a mere “possibility” that a jury might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, the more stringent standard of “probability” is applied. See United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir.1997); see generally T. Thomas, supra.
The other common modification is to delete surprise as a separate criterion. See United States v. Sinclair, supra. This is particularly appropriate in circumstances in which, as here, the victim who accused the defendant recants. See generally T. Thomas, supra.
The one constant criterion under virtually every formulation of a test is that the trial court must itself be reasonably satisfied the challenged testimony or statements were actually false. See United States v. Leibowitz, 919 F.2d 482 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Carbone, 880 F.2d 1500 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078, 110 S.Ct. 1131, 107 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1990)(threshold for granting a new trial is that the trial judge be satisfied that the testimony was perjured); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.1976); United States ex rel. Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841, 96 S.Ct. 72, 46 L.Ed.2d 60 (1975); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.1973); Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935, 70 S.Ct. 664, 94 L.Ed. 1353 (1950); Johnson v. State, 36 Conn.App. 59, 647 A.2d 373 (1994); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428 (Del.Supr.1982); State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 617 P.2d 820 (1980); State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995); State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1980); State v. Erdman, 422 N.W.2d 511 (Minn.1988); State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 360 S.E.2d 660 (1987); Marshall v. State, 305 N.W.2d 838 (S.D.1981); State v. Briggs, 152 Vt. 531, 568 A.2d 779 (1989); see also United States v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 883, 114 S.Ct. 230, 126 L.Ed.2d 185 (1993)(applying different standard but noting that the trial court must first be satisfied that the challenged testimony was actually false).
Courts have added this criterion to the test for a new trial in the circumstances of a recantation, for an important reason: recantations are “exceedingly unreliable” and are thus viewed with “suspicion.” See Mollica v. State, 374 So.2d 1022, 1025 (Fla.App.1979); see generally T. Thomas, supra.
Traditional skepticism about recanted testimony increases when the witness who recants is the alleged victim of a domestic sexual assault. The victim is often subject to pressure from the defendant and other family members to recant. In these cases, recantation is a recurring phenomenon. See United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617 (8th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Earles, 983 F.Supp. 1236 (N.D.Iowa 1997); see generally W. Habeeb, Annotation, Recantation By Prosecuting Witness In Sex Crime As Ground For New Trial, 51 A.L.R.3d 907 (1973).
B.
When the alleged victim of domestic sexual abuse recants, courts should be at least as reluctant to set aside an Alford plea as they are to grant a new trial. “While a defendant who enters an Alford plea has neither been found guilty nor admitted guilt, the defendant has nevertheless undertaken a risk-benefit analysis that considers the weight and quality of the evidence before entering the *302plea. See Duran v. Superior Court, 162 Ariz. 206, 782 P.2d 324 (Ariz.App.1989); State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash.App. 216, 896 P.2d 108 (1995).
When that evidence includes an accusation by an alleged victim of domestic sexual abuse, the defendant is aware of and can evaluate not only the accusation, but also the relationship with the victim and the possibility of a recantation. Thus, when the alleged victim recants, the evidence does not present the same “surprise” as does newly discovered evidence that a defendant did not even know existed. See generally T. Thomas, supra.
C.
I therefore conclude that, when a defendant seeks to withdraw an Alford plea based on a recantation by an alleged victim of a domestic sexual assault, the court must be reasonably satisfied that the initial accusations were actually false. I further conclude, consistent with Gutierrez, that the court must also be reasonably satisfied that the testimony of the recanting witness in a new trial would probably bring about a verdict of acquittal. See State v. Miller, 253 Mont. 395, 833 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1992)(reaffirming adoption of the “prevailing judicial attitude that recanting testimony is to be viewed with great suspicion,” and determining that a court hearing a request to withdraw an Alford plea should grant the request “only when the court is satisfied that the recantation is true”); cf. State v. McCollum, 208 Wis.2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997); but cf. People v. De Jesus, 606 N.Y.S.2d 255, 199 A.D.2d 529 (N.Y.App.Div.1993).
While I generally agree with the approach taken in State v. Miller, supra, I would require that the court must be reasonably satisfied, not that the testimony at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing is true, but that the initial accusations of the witness were false. This is because the witness may have been lying in at least some respects on both occasions. See United States v. Provost, supra.
The first prong of the test I would adopt— that the court be reasonably satisfied that the initial accusations were actually false— concerns falsity. The second prong — that the court also be reasonably satisfied that the testimony of the recanting witness in a new trial would probably bring about a verdict of acquittal — concerns materiality.
For example, a court may be reasonably satisfied that an earlier statement or testimony was false. However, because the statement or testimony concerned a tangential matter or was cumulative, the court may determine that a jury in a new trial would probably still find the defendant guilty. Conversely, a court may determine that a jury would probably return a verdict of acquittal based on a recantation, if believed, but not be reasonably satisfied that the earlier statement or testimony was false. See generally T. Thomas, supra. In either case, the defendant would not be entitled to withdraw an Alford plea.
1.
The focus of this test is on whether the earlier accusation was false rather than whether the recantation was true. Nevertheless, a court hearing the post-conviction request in fact cannot avoid considering the credibility of the recanting witness at the Crim. P. 35(e) hearing:
The real question [as to credibility], we suppose, is not whether the district judge believed the recantation, but how likely the district judge thought a jury at a second trial would be to believe it. The finding that the witness is not credible, however, at least in the context of this case, appears to us to cover both these bases. Indeed, if a district court does not believe a witness, it seems most unlikely that the same court would find the witness sufficiently persuasive to enable the court to say the witness’s testimony would probably produce an acquittal at a new trial.
See United States v. Earles, supra, 983 F.Supp. at 1250; see also United States v. Grey Bear, 116 F.3d 349 (8th Cir.1997). Thus, the credibility of the recanting witness is a key to determining both whether the court is reasonably satisfied that the earlier accusations were actually false and whether the testimony of the witness at a trial would probably bring about a verdict of acquittal. See United States v. Earles, supra; see also *303United States v. Provost, supra (probability that a recantation would lead to acquittal rests in large part on the credibility of the recantation); United States v. Chatman, supra (the trial court must ordinarily hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the credibility and effect of the recantation).
In reaching this conclusion, I need not determine whether I agree with the conclusion reached in People v. Estep, 799 P.2d 405 (Colo.App.1990). In that case, a division of this court applied the Gutierrez test to determine whether a defendant convicted after trial was entitled to a new trial based on a later confession by an inmate on death row. The trial court denied the motion, based on its assessment that the witness who confessed was not credible.
The Estep division, in reversing the court’s denial of a new trial, concluded that “the determination of the character of the new evidence to probably produce an acquittal in a new trial is not to be based on the court’s experience in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.” See People v. Estep, supra, 799 P.2d at 407. However, the evidence in question in Estep was not a victim’s recantation. As already discussed, recantations are different from other forms of newly discovered evidence. I conclude here only that, in applying the appropriate test in the unique circumstances of a victim’s recantation, the trial court must necessarily consider the credibility of the recanting witness at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing. To the extent this conclusion is contrary to the holding in People v. Tomey, supra, I would decline to follow it.
2.
Finally, I recognize that, when the judgment of conviction results from an Alford plea, the trial court may not be able to make a comparison of the credibility of the witness at trial and at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing. This is because the recanting witness, as here, may not have earlier testified under oath, at least not at trial. The same problem is presented even with a motion for new trial, when a different judge presides at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing than presided at the initial trial.
In such circumstances, the court still must determine whether it is reasonably satisfied the earlier accusations were false, based on the totality of the circumstances. In addition to considering the credibility of the witness when recanting under oath, the trial court may consider the circumstances surrounding the earlier accusations. For example, the court may consider any motive to fabricate the initial accusation; observations by witnesses of the recanting witness when making the accusations; the nature and detail of both the accusations and the recantation; and whether the accusations were made under oath.
In sum, I would require that, before granting a motion to withdraw an Alford plea based on a recantation by the alleged victim of domestic sexual abuse, the court must be reasonably satisfied that the initial accusation was actually false and that a trial would probably result in a verdict of acquittal. In making its determination, the trial court must necessarily take into consideration the victim’s credibility at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing.
III.
The trial court here did not have the benefit of what I consider the appropriate test in reaching its conclusion that a new trial was required. If this test were to be applied to the trial court’s findings, further findings would be necessary.
As earlier noted, the trial court found “no obvious flaw” in either version of the story provided by the alleged victim. In applying the Gutierrez test, the court determined that the recantation was sufficient to cause a reasonable jury to conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt of the crime to which he entered his Alford plea.
However, because it applied the Gutierrez test, the court made no finding that it was reasonably satisfied the earlier statements by the recanting witness were actually false. Further, it is not clear from the trial court’s order whether it made its own evaluation of the credibility of the recanting witness at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing or, instead, merely *304determined that the testimony would cause a reasonable jury to conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt, if believed by the jury.
This presents a greater concern here because the court’s order nowhere even mentions the substantial testimony presented at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing. This included testimony by the witnesses to the victim’s earlier accusations, in which they described the detailed nature of the victim’s accusations and, without objection, their observations concerning the victim’s credibility. It also included testimony, again without objection, that defendant had failed a lie detector test before entering his plea. Finally, it included the testimony of an investigating officer that defendant had said he “didn’t think” he had committed the crimes charged but, if proved, he would “get help.” Defendant had also admitted having “extreme” marital difficulties, and he had discussed with the officer some of his “sexual fantasies” about both daughters.
In sum, it can equally be inferred from the court’s order that it found a new trial would probably result in an acquittal, if a jury believed the victim’s recantation. Such a finding should be insufficient to permit withdrawal of an Alford plea based on a recantation by an alleged victim of domestic sexual abuse.
I would therefore remand for further findings and application of what I consider the appropriate test for permitting such an Alford plea to be withdrawn. See United States v. Chatman, supra (appellate court must be able to discern from the record whether and how the trial court evaluated the credibility of the recanting witness).
It is a miscarriage of justice for an innocent family member to be wrongly accused and convicted of abusing a child. It is no less a miscarriage of justice for an innocent child to be subjected to domestic abuse and then coerced, however subtly, into recanting. For such a child, the abuse has never stopped.