Court Opinion

ID: 9672021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:47:22.727815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.720792
License: Public Domain

HABHAB, Chief Judge,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur with Division I of the majority opinion, but dissent as to Division II. As to that division, I agree with the majority’s discussion of the law on specific performance relating to undisclosed principals, and only disagree as to the result reached.
Specific performance is not granted as a matter of right, but rests within our sound discretion. Breitbach v. Christenson, 541 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Iowa 1995). Our review is de novo. Id. After careful review of the record, I would affirm the trial court.
A general statement of the law relating to undisclosed principals is found at 71 Am. Jur.2d Specific Performance § 51, at 77 (1973):
There are numerous decisions which support the general proposition that mere nondisclosure of the fact that one of the parties to a land contract was acting for a third person as the real purchaser of the land is not sufficient for the denial of specific performance of the contract by or on behalf of such third person, at least where it does not appear that the personality of the party dealt with was of importance to the other party, or that he suffered any loss or injury by reason of such nondisclosure, assuming, of course, that no fraud was involved_ But where the nondisclosure is more than mere concealment and amounts to affirmative misrepresenta-tive, equity has refused specific performance of such contracts.
The eases in Iowa that have touched on the issue before us are cited in the majority opinion. In New York Brokerage Co. v. Wharton, 143 Iowa 61, 119 N.W. 969 (Iowa 1909), the trial court decreed specific performance. However, on appeal the supreme court reversed. It determined the plaintiff intentionally deceived the defendant in a number of respects including misrepresentation by the plaintiff as to the quality and pricing of goods included in the sale, the terms of the contract itself, and the negotiating seller’s representation that he owned the quantity of goods included in the sale.
In Wharton the conduct of the plaintiff throughout the sale proceedings led to its own downfall. It is clear that specific performance could not be granted. The supreme court stated:
The foregoing discussion will suffice to disclose our view of the general merits of the case. The evidence is somewhat voluminous, and it would extend this opinion too much to discuss it in greater detail. Specific performance is, at most, a matter of large and just discretion of the court. It is not a matter of strict right to a plaintiff. It is an extraordinary remedy, and will never be awarded unless the court can give the approval of its conscience to the contract presented.
Id., 143 Iowa at 69, 119 N.W. at 972 (citations omitted).
The same reasoning as employed in Wharton exists in Vermeulen v. Meyer, 238 Iowa 1033, 29 N.W.2d 232 (1947). Like in Wharton, the facts in Vermeulen indicate various instances of fraud and misrepresentation. The defendant relied on the representations of her real estate agent. The realtor could have received more for the defendant’s property than he represented. The realtor’s brother-in-law then purchased the property for an amount less than another offer the realtor’s firm had before it. In denying specific performance, the supreme court held that to enforce the contract for the sale of the property would work a hardship and injustice upon the defendant. The supreme court reached the same conclusion in Ellsworth v. Randall, 78 Iowa 141, 42 N.W. 629 (1889), cited by the majority.
From my review of the cases relied upon by the majority, each contains language to the effect that a seller has the right to know his or her buyer. However, none of those cases were resolved on that ground. The supreme court considered all of the facts and circumstances of each case, including the factor of undisclosed principal.
*447Thus, in the case before us, even after taking into consideration the fact that the true identity of the buyer was not disclosed to the seller, I believe the trial court appropriately granted specific performance. The seller listed the property for sale with the real estate agent. The offer was subject to a zoning change for commercial use. The seller accepted the offer subject to this condition. As the majority found under Division I of its opinion, the seller’s sole interest was to sell the property. There were no affirmative misrepresentations nor was the personality of the party dealt with of importance. In addition, I am unable to find that the seller suffered any loss or injury by reason of such nondisclosure.1
I would affirm the trial court.
STREIT, J., joins this partial dissent.

. From my review of the record, I do not find the seller is asserting that the realtor she listed her property with knew the true identity of the buyer and that the realtor could have negotiated a higher selling price. If that were the case, it certainly would be a meaningful factor in determining whether specific performance should be granted.