Court Opinion

ID: 9898034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:58.28118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:27.157549
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

           SEATTLE BULK SHIPPING, INC.,
                                                             No. 83782-6-I
                                Appellant,
                                                             DIVISION ONE
                 v.
                                                             PUBLISHED OPINION
           DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
           INDUSTRIES,

                                Respondent.

                 COBURN, J. — This is a Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act

          (WISHA) case. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) issued

          citations for multiple willful, serious, and general violations and penalties against

          Seattle Bulk Shipping, Inc. (SBS). SBS contends that the Department improperly

          issued citations under chapter WAC 296-56 because SBS’s facility is not a

          “marine terminal” under WAC 296-56-099. SBS also contends that grain-

          handling standards under WAC 296-00-005 do not apply because SBS did not

          store grain. Lastly, SBS argues that the decisions upholding the willful or failure

          to abate citations should be reversed because the investigating compliance

          officer did not follow the Department’s internal compliance manual. Because the

          Department improperly cited SBS as a marine terminal, we reverse the violations

          under chapter WAC 296-56. We otherwise affirm.

          Citations and pincites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material
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          No. 83782-6-I/2

                                                 FACTS

                 SBS is a bulk transfer business that leases property from the City of

          Seattle on Harbor Island. The facility handles transloading commodities, mostly

          grain and ethanol transfers. Workers transfer grain from railroad cars to shipping

          containers and from shipping containers to railroad cars using a yard hostler. 1

          The transfer is made through the use of a pit, storage towers, and conveyor

          belts. Workers also transfer ethanol and sometimes diesel fuel from railroad cars

          to petroleum trucks through connections to a pump with hoses. SBS is

          responsible for transloading cargo at its facilities for its customers and arranging

          for truck operators to transport the cargo between the SBS facility and a marine

          terminal. SBS is not involved in transferring cargo onto or off of a vessel. Port of

          Seattle terminals are not SBS’s clients or customers. SBS’s clients are the ones

          who are responsible for exporting or importing the cargo before or after it passes

          through SBS’s facility. About 90 percent of the cargo SBS handles travels

          through Terminal 18, which is a few blocks away from SBS’s facility.

                 In December 2014, an SBS employee fell into a grain pit and broke three

          ribs. After the accident, the Department initiated a safety inspection at SBS,

          resulting in citation and notice number 317617686 issued in June 2015. The

          citation alleged 4 willful, 11 serious, and 1 general WISHA violations, and

          assessed a total penalty of $218,450. The citation included 9 violations under

          chapter WAC 296-56. This chapter directs employers to “protect employees from

          hazards associated with marine terminals.” WAC 296-56-600.

                 1 A powered industrial truck used for moving heavy material, such as grain.

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          No. 83782-6-I/3

                 In January 2015, the Department decided it was appropriate for the

          marine and dock division to also conduct an industrial hygiene inspection. That

          inspection resulted in a second citation, number 317934962, also issued on June

          2015. This citation alleged 2 willful, 2 failure to abate, 30 serious, and 18 general

          WISHA violations with a total penalty of $206,400. This citation included 5

          violations under chapter WAC 296-56.

                 One serious violation derived from SBS’s failure to have an eyewash

          station on site under WAC 296-800-15030. 2 The Department advised that the

          deadline for SBS to correct this violation was July 1, 2015. After the abatement

          deadline passed, SBS requested to stay its abatement pending appeal on August

          6. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) denied the request to stay

          the abatement on September 22 and reminded SBS that it was obligated to

          correct the violation in accordance with WAC 296-900-150. That rule addresses

          certifying violation corrections and lists “comply with correction due dates” as an

          employer responsibility. WAC 296-900-150(3).

                 The Department was under the impression that SBS had ceased

          operations, but when the Department learned that SBS had not, the Department

          conducted a follow-up inspection in January 2016. That citation alleged two

          serious failure to abate violations and four serious violations resulting in a

                 2
                     Specifically, the citation stated the “employer did not provide an emergency
          eyewash station for employees performing ethanol transfer operations where there is
          potential for an employee’s eyes to be exposed to a strong irritant (ethanol). Strong
          irritants can cause serious eye injuries.”

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          No. 83782-6-I/4

          $448,200 penalty. One failure to abate violation concerned SBS’s failure to

          ensure an approved emergency eyewash onsite under WAC 296-800-15030.

                   SBS appealed all three citations to the Board. The Board held an

          administrative hearing, and SBS argued below as it does now on appeal that it

          did not fall within the WISHA rule’s definition of “marine terminal,” so it should not

          have been cited for violations under the marine terminal standard. The Board’s

          industrial appeals judge (IAJ) rejected that argument and issued a proposed

          decision and order affirming but modifying nearly all of the cited violations and

          their respective penalties. SBS filed a petition for review from the proposed

          decision that the Board granted. In January 2021, the Board issued its final

          decision, rejecting SBS’s argument that its facility did not qualify as a marine

          terminal and affirming a majority of the violations. The Board also rejected the

          argument and affirmed the citations as modified. In finding of fact 15, the Board

          found,

                   From December 17, 2014, to June 17, 2016, Seattle Bulk
                   Shipping’s bulk material handling facility on Harbor Island was
                   contiguous with wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks, and other
                   berthing locations, and it included areas and structures associated
                   with the primary movement of cargo or materials from vessel to
                   shore or from shore to vessel, and which were devoted to receiving,
                   handling, consolidating, and loading or delivery of waterborne
                   shipments.

          The Board cited to the definition of “marine terminal” under WAC 296-56 and

          explained,

                            SBS provides bulk material transfer services from its facility
                   on Harbor Island in Seattle. The facility is in close proximity to
                   commercial wharves on Harbor Island although the site does not,
                   itself, abut upon Puget Sound or include wharves or berths to which
                   ships may tie up. The bulk materials for which transfer services are

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          No. 83782-6-I/5

                provided include grains, which arrive by railroad car or in containers
                delivered by over-the-road semi-trucks, and ethanol, which arrives
                by railroad car.

                ....

                        It is clear from the nature of SBS grain transfer operations . .
                . that the bulk of SBS business involves import and export of grain,
                and the associated onloading and offloading of grain between
                railroad cars and ocean containers. Moreover, SBS operates areas
                and structures associated with the primary movement of cargo or
                materials from vessel to shore or shore to vessel. These operations
                occur at [the SBS facility]. Cargos are received, handled, held, and
                loaded in these facilities. These activities take place in areas that
                are contiguous with the wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks,
                and other berthing locations. Although SBS’s site does not abut
                Puget Sound, it is situated in close proximity to the waterfront and
                wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks, and other berthing
                locations on Harbor Island. As the term “contiguous” is not, itself,
                defined in the rule, it takes its ordinary meaning, which may be
                discerned by reference to a dictionary. Dictionary definitions of
                “contiguous” include “in close proximity, without actually touching,"
                and cite, as an example, the “48 contiguous states.” We conclude
                that SBS's bulk material transfer activities occur on a marine
                terminal, and that Ch. 296-56 WAC applies to those activities.

          The Board upheld a total penalty of $410,600. SBS then appealed to King

          County Superior Court, which adopted all of the Board’s findings and conclusions

          and affirmed. SBS appeals.

                                            DISCUSSION

                In a WISHA appeal, the court directly reviews the Board’s decision based

          on the record before that agency. Shimmick Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. &

          Indus., 12 Wn. App. 2d 770, 778, 460 P.3d 192 (2020) (citing Erection Co. v.

          Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 160 Wn. App. 194, 201, 248 P.3d 1085 (2011)). The

          Board’s findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial

          evidence. RCW 49.17.150; Shimmick Constr. Co., 12 Wn. App. 2d at 778.

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          No. 83782-6-I/6

          Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince a fair-minded person of the

          truth of the stated premise. Shimmick Constr. Co., 12 Wn. App. 2d at 778 (citing

          Mowat Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 148 Wn. App. 920, 925, 201 P.3d

          407 (2009)). This court does not reweigh evidence on appeal, but it construes

          the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that has prevailed in the

          administrative proceeding—here, the Department. Id. (citing Potelco, Inc. v.

          Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 194 Wn. App. 428, 434, 377 P.3d 251 (2016); Frank

          Coluccio Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 181 Wn. App. 25, 35, 329 P.3d 91

          (2014).

                 We review questions of law de novo and interpret agency regulations as if

          they were statutes. Shimmick Constr. Co., 12 Wn. App. 2d at 778 (citing Wash.

          Cedar & Supply Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 137 Wn. App. 592, 598, 154 P.3d

          287 (2007)). We first examine the plain language of the regulation, and if that

          language is unambiguous, it controls. Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,

          159 Wn.2d 868, 881, 154 P.3d 891 (2007). Language is unambiguous if it has

          only one reasonable interpretation. Lopez Demetrio v. Sakuma Bros. Farms, Inc.,

          183 Wn.2d 649, 655, 355 P.3d 258 (2015) (citing Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d

          194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006)).

                 We give a high level of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its

          regulations because the agency has expertise and insight gained from

          administering the regulation that the reviewing court does not possess. Litchfield

          v. KPMG, LLP, 170 Wn. App. 431, 441 n.26, 285 P.3d 172 (2012) (citing

          Silverstreak, 159 Wn.2d at 884).

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          No. 83782-6-I/7

                Finally, when we interpret WISHA, we may look to federal decisions under

          the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). Shimmick Constr. Co.,

          12 Wn. App. 2d at 778 (citing Express Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 151

          Wn. App. 589, 599 n.8, 215 P.3d 951 (2009)).

                                           Marine Terminal

                As a preliminary matter, the Department contends that SBS waived its

          argument that SBS is not a “marine terminal.” However, SBS did not waive that

          argument. SBS submits that

                [m]any of the violations cited have been pursuant to codes that
                govern marine terminals and the Board has ignored the situs and
                status tests. In this case, the federal law that defines a marine
                terminal, and whether employees may be construed to work at or
                for a marine terminal has been ignored. Not only has the law been
                ignored, but the related facts have been ignored. The fact that
                Seattle Bulk Shipping does not load or unload vessels has been
                ignored. The fact that the location of the facility is not adjacent to a
                functional wharf, pier, berthing location, or dock. The fact that no
                employees set foot on a marine terminal, but are in fact removed
                from the process. These are all relevant facts to determining if the
                business is a marine terminal.

          The Department argues that SBS failed to cite to the record to support its

          argument, but SBS is not disputing facts in the record and its argument is based

          on what is not in the record–evidence of SBS loading or unloading vessels. This

          issue was heavily litigated below and SBS has sufficiently maintained its position

          on appeal for review.

                Our legislature passed WISHA in 1973 to ensure worker safety and to

          supplement the federal OSHA. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 460, 470, 296

          P.3d 800 (2013) (citing ch. 49.17 RCW; SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Lab. &

          Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 425, 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)). WISHA directs the

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          No. 83782-6-I/8

          Department to promulgate regulations that equal or exceed standards

          promulgated under OSHA. Afoa, 176 Wn. at 470 (citing RCW 49.17.010, .040).

                OSHA’s definition of marine terminal is nearly identical to former WAC

          296-56-099 (1984). The Department defines “marine terminal” as:

                wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks and other berthing
                locations and adjacent storage or contiguous areas and structures
                associated with the primary movements of cargo or materials from
                vessel to shore or shore to vessel including structures which are
                devoted to receiving, handling, holding, consolidation, and loading
                or delivery of waterborne shipments and passengers, including
                areas devoted to the maintenance of the terminal or equipment.
                The term does not include production or manufacturing areas
                having their own docking facilities and located at a marine terminal
                nor does the term include storage facilities directly associated with
                those production or manufacturing areas.

          Former WAC 296-56-099 (1984). OSHA defines “marine terminal” as:

                wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks and other berthing
                locations and adjacent storage or adjacent areas and structures
                associated with the primary movement of cargo or materials from
                vessel to shore or shore to vessel including structures which are
                devoted to receiving, handling, holding, consolidating and loading
                or delivery of waterborne shipments or passengers, including areas
                devoted to the maintenance of the terminal or equipment. The term
                does not include production or manufacturing areas nor does the
                term include storage facilities directly associated with those
                production or manufacturing areas.

          C.F.R. § 1917.2.

                While no Washington court has previously interpreted the definition of

          “marine terminal” under former WAC 296-56-099, at least one federal court

          addressed a similar issue to the one before us now. Empire Co., Inc. v.

          Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 136 F.3d 873 (1st Cir. 1998).

                In Empire, the court analyzed whether an employer was considered a

          marine terminal under OSHA’s former version of the definition, which was

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          No. 83782-6-I/9

          identical to former WAC 296-56-099. Empire Co., 136 F.3d at 876 (analyzing

          former C.F.R. § 1917.1(u) (1996)).

                 Empire operated a worksite that engaged in the maintenance, repair, and

          rental of equipment such as marine shipping containers and lifts to move heavy

          loads and chassis upon which containers are placed for ground transportation.

          Empire Co., 136 F.3d at 875. The maritime industry provided about 80 percent

          of Empire’s rental business and 85 percent of its maintenance and repair

          business. Id. Empire also supplied diesel fuel to a stevedoring company and to

          the local port authority, which operated a wharf and berth facility for the handling

          of maritime cargo. Id. The worksite was approximately one-half mile north of the

          port authority’s wharves, and the area between the worksite and the shore was

          entirely devoted to maritime activity. Id. Empire contended that its worksite was

          outside of OSHA’s enforcement jurisdiction because Empire’s worksite did not

          fall within the scope of OSHA’s marine terminal standard. Id. at 874-75.

                 In the court’s analysis of OSHA’s definition of “marine terminal,” it

          concluded it reached two categories of worksites. The first are sites that are per

          se elements of a marine terminal, including “‘wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers,

          docks, and other berthing locations and adjacent storage . . . .’” Id. at 877 (citing

          Former C.F.R. § 1917.2(u)). The second category are those “‘contiguous areas

          and structures’ serving functions ‘associated with the primary movement of cargo

          or materials from vessel to shore or shore to vessel . . . including areas devoted

          to the maintenance of the terminal or equipment.’” Id. (alteration in original)

          (citing Former C.F.R. § 1917.2(u)).

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                 The Empire court rejected the Occupational Safety and Health Review

          Commission’s interpretation “that a contiguous area is considered a marine

          terminal without regard to whether it is associated with the primary movement of

          cargo or materials from vessel to shore or shore to vessel.” Empire, 136 F.3d at

          877 (emphasis added). By doing so “all but did away with a functional dimension

          to the term “‘marine terminal.’” Id. The court reasoned that by making the

          definition “applicable to contiguous areas without regard to the activities

          performed therein, the Commission’s interpretation cuts the marine terminal

          standard loose from certain articulated purposes identified by the agency in

          promulgating its standard. ‘This proposed rule is a vertical standard, i.e., one

          which applies to this industry exclusively and is designed specifically to address

          the hazards associated with marine cargo-handling shore.’” Id. (quoting 46 Fed.

          Reg. 4182, 4182 (1981)).

                 Instead, the court interpreted the definition “with emphasis on its functional

          purpose.” Id. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court observed,

          though in a different context, that “‘maintaining or repairing equipment essential

          to the loading or unloading process’ is not only associated with primary marine

          activity, but ‘is an integral part of and essential to those overall processes.’” Id.

          (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 47, 110 S. Ct.

          381, 385, 107 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1989)). The Empire court noted that the

          administrative law judge found, and Empire did not dispute, that “Empire’s

          business at the location in question is maintenance and repair of equipment used

          in marine terminal operations.” Id. at 878. The court noted that “the regulation

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          No. 83782-6-I/11

          itself plainly states that the areas covered by virtue of function include those

          ‘devoted to the maintenance of the terminal or equipment.’” Id.

                 In the court’s analysis of the geographic test determining whether Empire

          met the “contiguous” requirement, it concluded that it was not unreasonable to

          interpret the definition to reach areas “nearby” and not just those “touching” the

          wharf, but noted that the “farther activities are from adjacent areas of direct cargo

          handling, the more remote are the unique dangers of marine terminals.” Id. at

          879. The court found the “contiguous” test met because of a finding, and

          supporting evidence, that Empire’s worksite and the wharf were only separated

          by an area about one-half mile long. The court reasoned that the presence of a

          road, fences, and a gate along the wharf were not sufficient to separate out

          Empire’s worksite and prevent it from being considered part of a marine terminal.

          Id. at 879.

                 In Empire, the main function of Empire’s business was not just its use of

          shipping containers—the key to its functionality was that its business involved

          maintenance and repair of equipment used in marine terminal operations and the

          worksite was within a half mile of the wharf. Those circumstances are unlike the

          circumstances in the instant case.

                  Though the Board found that SBS’s “areas and structures associated with

          the primary movement of cargo or materials from vessel to shore or from shore to

          vessel,” the evidence does not support this finding. The Board also found that

          the bulk material for which SBS provides transfer services arrive by railroad car

          or in containers delivered by yard hostlers. Even though the court found that the

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          No. 83782-6-I/12

          areas were “devoted to receiving, handling, consolidating, and loading or delivery

          of waterborne shipments,” these are not areas “devoted to the maintenance of

          the terminal or equipment” as defined in the former WAC 296-56-099.

                 The evidence does not support that SBS’s areas or structures were

          associated with “the primary movement of cargo or material from vessel to shore

          or from shore to vessel.” At most, SBS’s areas and structure were associated

          with the primary movement of cargo from inland to shore and shore to inland.

          SBS’s functionality is not performing maintenance on shipping containers or

          equipment for a marine terminal. SBS’s functionality is participating in the supply

          chain of distributing a commodity that happens to be exported and imported. If

          that was sufficient to qualify as a marine terminal, then any business that

          happens to load or unload a commodity to or from a shipping container on a truck

          or train also would be a marine terminal as long as they were within close

          proximity to a wharf, bulkhead, quays, piers, docks and other berthing locations.

          Indeed, at oral argument, the Department conceded as much and maintained

          that such businesses could also be considered marine terminals. Wash. Court of

          Appeals oral argument, Seattle Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., No.

          83782-6-I (Jan. 26, 2023), at 17 min., 17 sec., video recording by TVW,

          Washington State’s Public Affairs Network,

          https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2023011365.

                 However, we start with the plain language of the definition of “marine

          terminal.” The contiguous areas and structures must be associated with the

          “primary movements of cargo or materials from vessel to shore or shore to

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          No. 83782-6-I/13

          vessel.” Former WAC 296-56-099 (1984) (emphasis added). By the statute’s

          own plain language, it does not extend to activities along the supply chain whose

          primary movements of cargo and materials are from shore to inland or inland to

          shore and nothing to do with vessel to shore or shore to vessel. While we give a

          high level of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations, the

          regulation defining a marine terminal is not vague requiring interpretation. The

          Department’s wish to extend the reach of chapter WAC 296-56 all but does away

          with the functional aspect of the term “marine terminal.”

                 Substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding of fact 15, and

          therefore the finding does not support the Board’s conclusion that the SBS

          worksite met the plain language definition of a marine terminal. Accordingly, we

          reverse the Board’s decision with respect to the corresponding violations affirmed

          under chapter WAC 296-56. 3

                                              Grain Handling

                 SBS next contends that the Board should not have applied grain handling

          standards to its business. We disagree.

                 3
                   Because we reverse the citations under chapter WAC 296.56, we need not
          consider SBS’s additional argument that the Longshore and Harbor Workers
          Compensation Act of 1927 (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 preempts WAC 296-56.
                 SBS also argues that the SBS facility is “not adjacent to a functional wharf, pier,
          berthing location, or dock.” The Board found that the SBS facility was “contiguous” to
          wharves, bulkheads, quays, piers, docks and other berthing locations. SBS fails to
          make any argument as to whether its facility satisfied the “contiguous” requirement
          under former WAC 296-56-099. “We will not consider an inadequately briefed
          argument.” Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254
          P.3d 835 (2011).

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          No. 83782-6-I/14

                 SBS asserts that there are no structures where SBS stored grain,

          claiming, without citing to the record, that “[u]nrefuted testimony showed that

          grain was never stored at the facility.”

                 The Board affirmed multiple violations against SBS regarding the grain

          handling rules under WAC 296-99.

                 The grain handling rules apply to:

                 •   Dry grinding operations of soycake;
                 •   Dry corn mills;
                 •   Dust pelletizing plants;
                 •   Feed mills;
                 •   Flour mills;
                 •   Flat storage structures;
                 •   Grain elevators;
                 •   Rice mills; and
                 •   Soybean flaking operations.

                 WAC 296-99-015(1). 4 A “flat storage structure” is a “grain storage

          structure” that:

                 •   Cannot empty by gravity alone;
                 •   Can be entered through an opening at ground level; and
                 •   Must be entered to remove leftover grain.

                 WAC 296-99-005. 5 A “grain elevator” is a “facility in which bulk raw grains

          are stored by means of elevating machinery for later shipment.” Id.

                 The Board made multiple findings regarding the structures at SBS and

          concluded that they fell under the grain handling standard. It found that the SBS

          facility stored grain, and that the pit “cannot be emptied by gravity alone, can be

                 4
                    We cite to the current version of the WAC because the relevant subsection is
          identical to the applicable former WAC 296-99-015(1) (1984).
                  5
                    We cite to the current version of the WAC because the language is identical to
          the applicable former WAC 296-99-020 (1997).

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          No. 83782-6-I/15

          entered through an opening at ground level, and must be entered to clean and

          remove leftover grain. The Board also found that “[t]he Normal Grain Operation

          consists of a tower into which grain is transferred from railroad cars by means of

          a conveyor system, and in which the grain is stored for later transfer . . .” And it

          concluded that at the time of inspection, the pit was a grain structure within the

          meaning of WAC 296-99.

                 Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that SBS stored grain

          at its Harbor Island facility. One inspector testified that during a site visit he saw

          a grain elevator and storage structure. Another inspector testified that the grain

          railcars open from the bottom, dropping the grain into the pits where the grain is

          then moved by a conveyer into a storage silo on the property. A conveyer moves

          the grain from the silo into shipping containers. SBS does not cite to anything in

          the record to support its contention that grain was not stored in the silo structure.

                 We determine, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

          Department, that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding,

          which supports its conclusion that the grain handling standard applies to SBS’s

          business operations.

                                            Willful Violations

                 SBS next contends that the Department failed to satisfy the willful violation

          standard. We disagree.

                 The Board determined SBS committed five willful violations.

                 Willful violations carry enhanced penalties because of the “particularly

          improper ‘state of mind’ with which the standard is violated.” Elder Demolition,

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          Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 149 Wn. App. 799, 808, 207 P.3d 453 (2009)

          (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v.

          Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 607 F.2d 311, 315 (9th Cir.

          1979)). However, an employer does not need to harbor malicious motives or

          possess a specific intent to commit a willful violation. Id. “Instead, a plain

          indifference to safety requirements is sufficient by itself to establish a willful

          violation.” Id.

                 SBS does not argue that the willful violation findings are not supported by

          substantial evidence. Instead, SBS argues that the Department’s internal

          compliance manual provides that compliance officers “must normally obtain

          written statements. . . [w]hen there is a potential repeated or willful violation.”

          Additionally, the procedure for written statements should normally be written in

          the first person and in the words of the individual interviewed, and the statement

          must be read to the individual and an attempt made to obtain agreement. SBS

          claims the Department did not attempt to procure a signed written statement from

          any SBS personnel, and that based on the failure to follow its policy, the Board

          should have found the Department’s evidence insufficient to prove willful

          violations.

                 SBS does not even attempt to show that the inspector’s actions prejudiced

          SBS as to the violations it challenges. SBS cites to no authority to support that

          noncompliance with an internal policy requires reversal. Where no authorities

          are cited in support of a proposition, we are not required to search out

          authorities, but may assume that counsel, after a diligent search, has found

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          none. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193

          (1962). The compliance manual is not binding law. It is an internal set of

          guidelines for the Department to follow. The manual itself states that “[t]he

          contents of this manual are not enforceable by any person or entity against the

          Department of Labor and Industries. . .” We find this argument unpersuasive.

                                             Failure to Abate

                 SBS contends that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s

          conclusion that SBS failed to abate its violations. We disagree.

                 In the second citation and notice number 31793462 issued in June 2015,

          SBS was cited for failing to have an eyewash station, noting a deadline to abate

          of July 1, 2015. After the abatement deadline passed, SBS requested to stay its

          abatement pending appeal on August 6. On September 22, the Board denied

          the request to stay and instructed SBS that it was obligated to correct the

          violation in accordance with WAC 296-900-150, 6 which further instructed the

          employer to comply with correction due dates.

                 SBS cites to the Department’s compliance manual, which provides that

          “[w]hen a stay request is denied at the Board, the DOSH appeals staff will notify

          the employer of the required abatement date.” SBS does not cite to RCW

          49.17.140(5)(f) which provides that an employer’s abatement obligation is stayed

          “[a]s long as a motion to stay abatement is pending.” Even if it could be argued

          that SBS assumed its requirement to abate was stayed while its motion to stay

                 6
                   We cite to the current version of the WAC because the language is identical to
          the applicable former WAC 296-900-150 (2013).

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          was pending, SBS learned near the end of September that the stay was denied

          and was instructed to correct the violation and comply with correction due dates.

          Knowing that SBS had already missed the July 1 deadline before even

          requesting a stay, it should have understood that it was required to install the

          approved emergency eyewash onsite as soon as possible if SBS continued to

          operate. Regardless, it was not until January 2016 that the Department, after

          realizing that SBS was still in operation, returned for another inspection and

          discovered the absence of an approved emergency eyewash onsite. Under

          these circumstances, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s

          conclusion that SBS failed to abate its violation related to the eyewash onsite.

          Because SBS fails to cite to the record or make any argument as to other failure

          to abate violations, we do not consider those assignments of error. RAP

          10.3(a)(6); Cowiche, 118 Wn.2d at 809 (argument unsupported by reference to

          the record or citation to authority will not be considered).

                                             CONCLUSION

                 We reverse the superior court and the Board’s decision with respect to the

          corresponding violations affirmed under chapter WAC 296-56 and remand to

          vacate those violations and recalculate the penalties owed under the remaining

          violations. We otherwise affirm.

          WE CONCUR:

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