Court Opinion

ID: 9910660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-16 19:00:52.725326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:43.101788
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    SMARTMATIC USA CORP., et al,

             Plaintiffs,
                                                                    Civil Action No.
        v.
                                                               1:21-cv-02900-CJN-MAU
    HERRING NETWORKS, INC.

             Defendant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1

        Plaintiffs Smartmatic USA Corp., Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and SGO

Corporation Limited (collectively, “Smartmatic” or “Plaintiffs”) sue Defendant Herring Networks,

Inc., d/b/a One America News Network (“OANN” or “Defendant”) alleging injury arising from

OANN’s coverage of Smartmatic’s role in the 2020 U.S. election. See generally ECF No. 1.

Before the Court is OANN’s Motion for Recusal. (ECF Nos. 78 & 79). Plaintiffs oppose the

Motion. For the following reasons, OANN’s Motion is denied.

                                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND

                                               Parties

        Smartmatic is an election technology and software company. See ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF

No. 36 at 5. According to Smartmatic, it provided election technology and software for Los

Angeles County, California in the 2020 U.S. election. See ECF No. 1 at 3. Smartmatic claims no

other state or county used Smartmatic’s technology or software in the 2020 election, and that

1
        On December 8, 2023, the Court issued this Memorandum Opinion under seal in light of
the fact that certain materials referenced in the Parties’ respective briefs were filed under seal. See
ECF Nos. 133 & 134. The Parties have met and conferred and represented to the Court that no
redactions to this Memorandum Opinion are necessary. See ECF No. 148.

                                                  1
Smartmatic played no part in counting or tabulating votes in Los Angeles County in the 2020

election cycle. See id.

       OANN operates a cable news channel, website (OANN.com), and social media accounts

on Facebook, Instagram, and X, the platform formerly known as Twitter. See ECF No. 1 at 4;

ECF No. 36 at 7–8. OANN’s content is also available on YouTube, Rumble, and KlowdTV. See

ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 36 at 7–8. Smartmatic alleges that, despite knowing that Joe Biden won

the 2020 U.S. presidential election, OANN falsely reported to its viewers that the election had

been stolen from Donald Trump and that Smartmatic voting machines had switched votes cast

from Trump to Biden. See ECF No. 1 at 1–2. Smartmatic alleges that OANN has damaged

Smartmatic’s reputation and brand by casting it as a corrupt company whose technology and

software were used to steal the 2020 U.S. election. See id. at 3. Smartmatic claims defamation

(Count I) and injurious falsehood (Count II) based on OANN’s alleged false statements. See id.

at 187, 189.

       OANN argues that Smartmatic was already “suffering reputational problems globally and

in the United States” for more than a decade before the 2020 U.S. election. ECF No. 36 at 278–

79. OANN also asserts that it diligently and ethically reported on issues of significant public

concern. See id. at 296–97. OANN denies that it caused any harm to Smartmatic’s reputation and

disputes Smartmatic’s claim to any damages. See id. at 5, 272.

                              Referral to this Court for Discovery

       On May 31, 2023, the District Judge referred this case to me for the resolution of all

discovery disputes. See May 31, 2023 docket entry. On June 5, 2023, OANN submitted a letter

to my Chambers, purporting to informally raise the issue of my potential recusal in this matter. So

as to allow the public access to any discussion regarding OANN’s request for my recusal, I placed

                                                2
OANN’s letter on the docket, invited Smartmatic to respond, and set a public hearing on the matter.

ECF No. 75. On June 30, 2023, Smartmatic filed a statement in opposition to OANN’s letter.

ECF No. 77. Thereafter, on July 6, 2023, OANN filed a formal Motion for Recusal. ECF Nos.

78 & 79. Smartmatic filed a Motion to Strike and Opposition to OANN’s Motion on July 17,

2023.2 ECF Nos. 83 & 84. On July 18, 2023, I held a hearing on OANN’s Motion. ECF No. 91.

OANN submitted a supplement on July 19, 2023, to which Smartmatic replied on July 21, 2023.

ECF No. 87; ECF No. 88.

                                    The Rusoro Mining Case

       OANN seeks my recusal based on my appearance in a case when I was in private practice

at the law firm of Venable LLP (“Venable”): Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela, USCA Case No. 18-7044 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2019) (“Rusoro Mining”). Rusoro Mining

was a commercial arbitration case in which Plaintiff, a Canadian mining company, sought

confirmation of an arbitral award against the government of Venezuela for the expropriation of

plaintiff’s mining assets. See Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 300 F.

Supp. 3d 137, 141 (D.D.C. 2018). After the District Court granted plaintiff’s petition to confirm

the award, Venezuela appealed. Neither Venable nor I was involved in the underlying arbitration

or District Court proceedings.

2
        In its Opposition to OANN’s Motion for Recusal, Smartmatic seeks to strike OANN’s
Motion as purportedly violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and LCvR 5.4(c)(3). ECF No. 83 at 4–5.
Smartmatic argues that the Motion impermissibly “expands” on the letter OANN sent to Chambers
and somehow makes “an end run around the Federal Rules.” Id.
        Smartmatic’s Motion is denied. There is nothing in the Rules or the Scheduling Order
which prevents OANN from filing a formal Motion for Recusal. In fact, the Court does not
disagree with OANN that there is a benefit to having a more fulsome articulation of the arguments
in support of OANN’s recusal request. Any alleged prejudice that Smartmatic may have suffered
is cured because Smartmatic had the opportunity to file an Opposition to OANN’s Motion (and
subsequent supplemental brief) and be fully heard during the hearing on the Motion.
                                                3
       The law firm of Arnold & Porter (which represented Venezuela in the District Court)

entered its appearance on behalf of Venezuela in the D.C. Circuit on May 21, 2018 on instruction

from the administration of Nicolas Maduro. See ECF No. 1732031 in Rusoro Mining (USCA Case

No. 18-7044). Arnold & Porter represented Venezuela for approximately 10 months in the D.C.

Circuit on instruction from the Maduro government. According to Arnold & Porter, it began to

take instruction from the Guaidó government in January 2019 when former President Trump

recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela. Arnold & Porter argued that, because

the U.S. president had recognized Juan Guaidó as the rightful representative of Venezuela, only

Guaidó could assert Venezuela’s interests in U.S. courts. See ECF No. 1773036 in Rusoro Mining

(18-7044).

       On February 22, 2019, Venable entered its appearance in the Circuit on behalf of the

government of Venezuela. See ECF No. 1774483 in Rusoro Mining (18-7044). Although OANN

surmises that I was the “lead” attorney on this matter, some clarification is necessary. I was

designated as “lead” attorney as required on the electronic docket because I was an attorney in the

D.C. office credentialed to electronically file documents in the D.C. Circuit. See ECF No. 91 at

6:9–16.

       The upshot of the February 22, 2019 filing was to raise objections to Arnold & Porter’s

position as to which firm—Venable or Arnold & Porter—was the proper counsel to speak on

behalf of the government of Venezuela in the appeal when there were two competing factions

within that foreign government. See ECF No. 1774487 in Rusoro Mining (18-7044). The filing

also included Maduro’s position that he “vigorously disputes that Mr. Guaidó is the President of

the Republic, and asserts that he [Maduro] remains the rightful leader of the Republic.” Id. at 2. I

was counsel on two filings after the February 22 filing: (1) a March 6, 2019 motion for extension

                                                 4
of time; and (2) the March 11, 2019 notice of Venable’s withdrawal. See ECF Nos. 1776418 &

1776958 in Rusoro Mining (18-7044). The latter two filings did not contain any substantive legal

or factual arguments. Ultimately, the question of which firm would represent Venezuela in the

appeal from the arbitration confirmation award became moot when Venable filed its notice of

withdrawal on March 11, 2019.

                                    Allegations in This Case

       I assume the Parties are sufficiently familiar with the factual allegations in this case and,

accordingly, will not repeat them at length here except where relevant to resolve the Motion. In

support of its Motion, OANN generally argues that the Rusoro Mining case is “inextricably

connected to OAN’s challenged broadcasts that concern the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime

and reports of election irregularity in Venezuela.” ECF No. 79 at 19. OANN cites to a number of

allegations by Smartmatic, including that OANN spread “disinformation” themes such as: (i)

“Smartmatic is a Venezuelan company that was founded and funded by corrupt dictators from

socialist and communist countries”; and (ii) “Smartmatic’s election technology and software were

designed to rig and fix elections and have been used to fix, rig and steal elections before.” ECF

No. 79 at 5 (citing ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 107).3 OANN also relies on several claims in Smartmatic’s

Complaint that are specific to Venezuela: “(i) ‘Smartmatic is partially owned by the Maduro

regime’; (ii) ‘the technology is controlled by allies of Venezuela’s Maduro regime’; (iii) ‘reports

3
        The Court presumes OANN meant to cite Paragraph 170, which is the only paragraph with
this precise quote. These allegations are in the context of Smartmatic’s overall allegations that
OANN falsely stated and implied that: Smartmatic’s election technology and software were widely
used in the 2020 election; Smartmatic “fixed, rigged, and stole the 2020 U.S. election for Joe Biden
and Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party”; Smartmatic’s election technology and software
“were compromised or hacked during the 2020 U.S. election and sent votes to foreign countries to
be compromised or hacked”; Smartmatic was “founded and funded by corrupt dictators from
socialist and communist countries”; and Smartmatic’s “election technology and software were
designed to and have fixed, rigged, and stolen elections before.” See ECF No. 1 at 84–115.
                                                 5
found Maduro allies were meddling in the latest U.S. election through a company called

Smartmatic’; (iv) ‘The [Organization of American States] says any election that involves Maduro

is a sham and must not be recognized by any civilized country’; and (v) ‘Smartmatic has faced

controversy in the past with allegations of rigging the 2013 election in Venezuela to favor socialist

President Nicolas Maduro.’” Id. (citing ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 218). OANN also generally

references Smartmatic’s claims that OANN “aired broadcasts that referenced its connections to

Venezuela, prior election irregularities, and the Maduro regime.” Id. (citing ECF No. 1, Compl.

¶¶ 95–98, 101–03, 106–08, 119–21, 131–32, 171, 184, 196, 218, 227).

       OANN also points to discovery requests that reference Venezuela, Maduro, and

Smartmatic’s role in non-U.S. elections. These include Smartmatic’s requests for “evidence of

deleted, lost, changed, or compromised votes for … ‘any other election’”; documents to show

OANN’s statements were “substantially true, accurate, and not misleading”; and search terms that

include “Venezuela” and “Maduro.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 1, C. Butzer Decl. at 1, 2, referencing Pls.’

RFP Nos. 52, 38). OANN requested any communications concerning “Nicholas Maduro or

anyone working for him” and other requests about Smartmatic’s involvement in Venezuelan

elections. Id. at 6–7. OANN reports there are several pending discovery disputes related to

“foreign elections in which Smartmatic software or equipment was used.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1,

C. Butzer Decl., referencing Def’s RFP Nos. 380, 18, 26–28, 37, 40, 80).

       Smartmatic agrees with OANN that “Maduro is a subject of discovery” and claims it will

prove “OANN’s statements about Smartmatic having a relationship with Maduro were factually

inaccurate. Smartmatic is not owned by the Maduro regime. Its technology is not controlled by

allies of the Maduro regime. Maduro’s allies did not meddle in the 2020 U.S. election through

Smartmatic. Smartmatic did not rig the 2013 election in Venezuela for Maduro.” ECF No. 83 at

                                                 6
19.   Smartmatic argues, however, that its defamation claims against OANN focus on the

“defendant’s publication and republication of the false accusation that Smartmatic rigged the 2020

U.S. election.” ECF No. 77 at 1. Smartmatic clarifies that none of the allegedly defamatory

statements involve the 2018 Venezuelan election and argues that OANN’s attempt to show

“Smartmatic participated in the 2018 Election is both riddled with factual inaccuracies and a

complete red herring.” Id. at 16. OANN now claims Smartmatic was “heavily involved” in the

2018 Venezuelan election, ECF No. 79 at 9, even though it previously claimed Smartmatic “ceased

operations in Venezuela” following issues in Venezuela’s 2017 election, ECF No. 36 at 290–91.4

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       OANN seeks recusal under three sections of the statute: 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), (b)(1), and

(b)(2). Section 455(a) mandates “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States

shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Section 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse “[w]here he has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.” Section 455(b)(2) requires a judge to recuse “[w]here in private practice he served

as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served

4
        In its Motion for Recusal, OANN argues that Smartmatic subsidiaries maintained a
presence in Venezuela through “at least, 2020” and that “Smartmatic machines were used in the
2018 election.” ECF No. 79 at 2–3 (“As we shall see, there is substantial evidence that Smartmatic
was involved in that fraudulent election.”). Yet OANN’s Amended Answer alleges: “[o]ne or
more Smartmatic entities continued to operate in Venezuela for another decade after the
controversial Chávez elections in 2004 and 2005. And in 2017, one or more Smartmatic entities
found themselves embroiled in yet another controversy, and the Miami Herald reported that
Smartmatic founder Mr. Mugica admitted that the 2017 election had been ‘tampered with.’
Smartmatic has since ceased operations in Venezuela, reporting in its 2017 financial statements
that the Venezuelan government had ‘abrupt[ly] call[ed] off of the Venezuela project.’” ECF No.
36 at 290–91 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
                                                7
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a

material witness concerning it.”

       As both parties acknowledged at the hearing on this Motion, and as the D.C. Circuit has

held, recusal must be limited to “truly extraordinary cases.” See Doe v. Rogers, 498 F. Supp. 3d

59, 77 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “The

D.C. Circuit has recognized that a motion to recuse should not be ‘lightly granted.’” United States

v. Nixon, 267 F. Supp. 3d 140, 146 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d

1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

       Judges are presumed to be capable of carrying out their sworn duties faithfully and

impartially. See e.g., Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 156 F. Supp.

3d 36, 43, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2016). Because judges are presumed to be impartial, the Court must

begin its analysis of a recusal request with a presumption against disqualification. See SEC v.

Bilzerian, 729 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th

Cir. 2015) (“A party introducing a motion to recuse carries a heavy burden of proof; a judge is

presumed to be impartial and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of

proving otherwise.”) (citation omitted). To overcome this presumption, the moving party must

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a judge has conducted herself in a manner

supporting disqualification. See Walsh v. FBI, 952 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2013); Nixon, 267

F. Supp. at 147. “[T]he grounds asserted in a recusal motion must be scrutinized with care, and

judges should not recuse themselves solely because a party claims an appearance of partiality.” In

re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001).

       “To deter unhappy litigants from abusing the recusal statute and to promote faith in the

judicial system, courts have emphasized that a judge has as much an obligation not to recuse

                                                8
himself where there is no reason to do so as he does to recuse himself when proper.” Bilzerian,

729 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1005 (10th Cir. 1994))

(emphasis added); see also Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 23-cv-00015 (CJN), 2023 WL

5321727, at *1 (July 3, 2023). “The burden this presumption places on parties seeking recusal is

necessary in light of the grave threats that potential abuses of this potent statutory tool pose to the

judicial system. One of those threats is . . . to manufacture recusal to delay proceedings.”

Bilzerian, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Even when there is “no specific fear that the moving party is

attempting to manipulate the court,” judges must safeguard the proper use of § 455 so that “the

recusal process itself does not become a tool to undermine the legitimacy of the judicial system.”

Nixon, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 146.

                                            ANALYSIS

       OANN does not claim that I have any actual bias in this case and does not question my

impartiality, integrity or commitment to fairness in this case or generally. ECF No. 79 at 1, n.1,

20. Rather, OANN argues that my prior representation in Rusoro Mining created an appearance

of impartiality under § 455(a) which requires recusal. Id. Although OANN concedes that its

arguments under §§ 455(b)(1) and (b)(2) are weaker, it does not withdraw them. ECF No. 91 at

17:15–22. As such, the Court will address all three bases for OANN’s Motion, beginning with

those grounds which OANN admits are the weakest.

       I. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)

       Under § 455(b)(1), a judge must recuse where “he has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).

                                                  9
       OANN does not claim bias, but asserts in a three-paragraph argument that I “likely ha[ve]

personal knowledge of disputed facts at issue in this litigation” based upon my involvement in the

appeal in the Rusoro Mining case. ECF No. 79 at 19 (emphasis added). OANN also speculates,

with no support to this or any other record, that my alleged “personal knowledge regarding the

disputed evidentiary facts—including Venezuela’s elections, their legitimacy, or the technology

used—is another independent basis requiring recusal.” ECF No. 79 at 20. OANN’s arguments

are without merit.

       I have confirmed on the record that I have no personal knowledge about any of the

allegations or disputed evidentiary facts in this case. OANN argues that, because the sole

substantive filing in which I relayed legal arguments on behalf of Venable’s client in the Rusoro

Mining case cited a New York Times article that discussed the 2018 election in Venezuela, I must

have personal knowledge of disputed facts at issue in this litigation. Not only is this inaccurate (as

stated above), this unsupported statement is insufficient to meet OANN’s high burden. None of

the statements in the February 22, 2019 Response to Motion to Stay discuss OANN, voting

technology used in any election, or the Venezuelan government’s connection (or lack thereof) with

any voting machine company. Nor does OANN cite any authority to support its claim that §

455(b)(1) requires my recusal in this circumstance. As such, recusal is not warranted under §

455(b)(1). See Nixon, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 147 (holding that a “judge should not grant a motion for

recusal that is ‘based upon conclusory, unsupported or tenuous allegations’”) (quoting In re

Kaminski, 960 F.2d 1062, 1065 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).

       II. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)

       Section 455(b)(2) requires a judge to recuse “[w]here in private practice he served as

lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served

                                                 10
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a

material witness concerning it.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).

       In another conclusory argument, OANN claims that § 455(b)(2) requires my recusal

because I ‘“served as [a] lawyer in the issues in controversy’ while in private practice.” See ECF

No. 79 at 18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)) (alteration in original). Apparently referring to

OANN’s “challenged broadcasts that concern the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime and reports

of election regularity,” OANN claims without any support that I “likely had privileged

conversations” concerning “these issues . . . ” ECF No. 79 at 19. Again, OANN fails to offer any

factual support for its arguments, and none exists. None of the issues in the Rusoro Mining appeal

during my representation had anything to do with OANN’s (or any) broadcasts. Moreover, the

factual “issues in controversy” in this case are not the same as the legal issue raised during my

representation in the Rusoro Mining appeal—namely, which law firm was the rightful

representative of Venezuela in the D.C. Circuit.

       The only legal authority upon which OANN relies for its argument under § 455(b)(2) is

inapposite. See ECF No. 79 at 18 (discussing In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1198 (4th Cir. 1976)).

In that case, the judge’s former law partner represented a client that sought to purchase a particular

racetrack and supported a bill to consolidate one-mile racetracks in Maryland. See id. at 1197–

98. The petitioners who sought the judge’s recusal attempted to acquire the same racetrack and

were charged with using unlawful means to secure passage of the same bill. See id. at 1198. The

Fourth Circuit found that the judge’s former law partner and one of his clients “will undoubtedly

testify” before the judge “about the events that took place before the judge withdrew from his law

firm.” Id. The court held that the judge should have recused under § 455(b)(2).

                                                 11
       In Rodgers, there was no question that the judge would have been called upon to adjudicate

the same issues that arose while he was in private practice. There is no such connection here.

OANN argues that my former representation in Rusoro Mining is “inextricably connected” to the

issues in this case – “the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime and reports of election integrity in

Venezuela.” ECF No. 79 at 19. This is incorrect. The matters in controversy in this case are

OANN’s alleged statements about Smartmatic related to the 2020 U.S. election. The portion of

the Complaint to which OANN cites to support its assertion, ECF No. 1 ¶ 218, has no mention of

the 2018 election in Venezuela. Further, the only substantive Rusoro Mining filing during my

representation contains no reference to Smartmatic and its role in election administration, either in

the United States or in Venezuela.

       Because my prior representation in Rusoro Mining does not constitute the same matter in

controversy, Section 455(b)(2) does not require my recusal. See Philip Morris, 156 F. Supp. 3d at

46–49 (finding an attenuated connection, and even substantial overlap in subject matters,

insufficient to mandate recusal).

       III. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

       28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.”

       As stated above, OANN does not base its request for recusal on any claim of actual bias

on my part. See e.g., ECF No. 79 at 16 (“. . . OAN has no reason to believe that Judge Upadhyaya’s

[sic] is actually biased against it (or Plaintiffs).”); id. at 20 (“OAN does not question Judge

Upadhyaya’s integrity or commitment to impartially ruling on matters brought before her.”).

Rather, OANN claims that I should recuse under § 455(a) because of two factors which might

                                                 12
create the appearance of partiality: 1) my involvement in the Rusoro Mining appeal; and 2) the fact

that one of my former law partners represented a party in Venezuela which OANN alleges

somehow contributed to the Maduro administration. ECF No. 79 at 13 (internal citations omitted).

       When considering whether recusal is required under Section 455(a), the Court must

determine whether a “‘reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s

impartiality.’” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Sao Paulo State of

the Federative Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 232–33 (2002) (per

curiam) (holding that the perspective must be from a reasonable person knowing all the

circumstances); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860–61 (1988). This

analysis requires an objective assessment of the appearance, not just the reality, of bias or

prejudice. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Although OANN seeks to have

the Court apply a more relaxed standard,5 the reasonable person in this context is a “fully informed

third-party observer who ‘understand[s] all the relevant facts’ and has ‘examined the record and

the law.’” United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States

v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in

original). “The Court must consider how the facts would appear to a well-informed, thoughtful

5
        OANN claims the analysis under Section 455(a) must be from the perspective of an
“average citizen” who is not fully informed. ECF No. 87 (citing In re Hawsawi, 955 F.3d 152,
157 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). Without citing any authority, OANN claims that that average citizen “is
not someone who is knowledgeable about the law or dives into the nuances of the record.” ECF
No. 87.
        OANN is wrong. As stated above, the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have held that
the analysis centers on a reasonable person who is informed and knows all the relevant facts
circumstances. See, e.g., Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 847, 848 (1988) (holding that a § 455(a) violation
“is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a judge
knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality…”) (emphasis added). The Court
rejects OANN’s attempt to create a new, less stringent standard.
                                                13
and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Nixon, 267

F. Supp. 3d at 148 (internal quotations omitted). This third-party observer is to presume judges

are ordinarily able to set aside their interests and faithfully and impartially perform their duties.

See Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91 (D.D.C. 2011).

“Thus, as Justice Kennedy has observed, ‘under 455(a), a judge should be disqualified only if it

appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility or disposition of a kind that a fair-minded

person could not set aside when judging the dispute.”’ Philip Morris, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 49–50

(quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

       Applying this standard, I find that a reasonable and fully-informed observer would not

question my impartiality in this case based on my involvement in the Rusoro Mining appeal. I was

counsel in the Rusoro Mining appeal for approximately 17 days, from February 22, 2019 through

March 11, 2019. See generally Rusoro Mining (18-7044) docket; ECF No. 91 at 6:17–7:1. My

representation in the Rusoro Mining case was brief and limited to that period of time. See id.

During my involvement in that case, there was no litigation or adjudication about any voting

technology used in the 2020 U.S. election (which had not yet occurred), Smartmatic or otherwise;

OANN; any voting technology used in the Venezuelan 2018 election; or the Maduro

administration’s alleged involvement in any voting company or technology.

       Moreover, during the representation, there was no development of facts or evidentiary

issues on appeal. See ECF No. 91 at 7:2–9. I was not involved in any discovery or fact

development at any time. See id. I was not involved in this case after Venable withdrew on March

11, 2019. See id. I have no personal knowledge of any facts in this case. See id. at 7:10–15. I

have no personal knowledge of any facts relating in any way to any elections in Venezuela at any

time, any voting machines used in those elections, or the ownership of any voting technology

                                                 14
companies. Apart from my involvement in Rusoro Mining as stated, I have no connection past or

present, personal or professional, to Venezuela. See id. I have no connection to any party or

lawyer in this case. See id.

       When examined closely, OANN’s argument for recusal boils down to an argument that I

should recuse because both cases have something to do with Venezuela and Maduro. It is

insufficient, however, for OANN to simply assert that I must recuse because my prior

representation asserted a position on behalf of Venezuela and some of the statements in this case

also relate to Venezuela.

       Despite OANN’s attempt to create a meaningful overlap between the two cases, that

connection does not exist. During the time I was involved in Rusoro Mining, one legal issue was

raised: which firm—Venable or Arnold & Porter—spoke on behalf of the government following

the 2018 Venezuelan election given both Maduro and Guaido’s claims of victory? The legal issue

had nothing to do with Smartmatic, OANN, OANN’s allegedly defamatory statements, or the 2020

U.S. election. The crux of this case is Smartmatic’s challenge to statements OANN made

regarding Smartmatic’s alleged involvement in the 2020 U.S. election. Significantly, the actual

outcome of the 20186 Venezuelan election is not a disputed issue at trial. I will not be asked to

rule upon the outcome of or any disputed issues relating to the 2018 Venezuelan election, and

neither party has claimed as much. Neither the Maduro government nor any other entity acting on

6
        The Parties dispute whether Smartmatic was even operating in Venezuela after 2017. First,
OANN claimed Smartmatic ceased to be involved in Venezuelan elections post-2017, see ECF
No. 36 at 290–91, but now it claims Smartmatic was involved in the 2018 Venezuelan election,
see ECF No. 79 at 8–11. See supra note 4. As far as the Court is aware, OANN has not sought to
amend its Answer and change or clarify its prior assertion. Even assuming Smartmatic was
operating in Venezuela in 2018, however, this premise alone does not require recusal because the
issues in the two cases are not the same.

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behalf of the government of Venezuela is a party to this suit, and no party has alleged that he or

anyone acting on his behalf would be a witness in this case. The question at issue during the time

I was involved in the Rusoro Mining appeal is not a legal issue in this case, and this case is not a

proxy dispute over the legitimacy of the Venezuelan government. It is also noteworthy that, in all

of the pleadings and discovery requests OANN cites, there is no specific mention of the 2018

Venezuelan election. Other courts looking at circumstances closer than this one have held that

recusal was unwarranted under Section 455. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d at 49–

54 (denying request for recusal where, among other things, judge’s former law firm represented

party that advocated for the administrative action in dispute); United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d

279, 286-88 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of recusal motion where judge and his former law

firm had represented creditor in Chapter 11 case underlying charge of bankruptcy fraud against

defendant); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th

Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of recusal motion where judge owned a tract of land in the disputed

area and had previously represented defendant in unrelated matter).

       Accordingly, despite OANN’s assertion, it is not likely that my “prior representation . . .

takes a position that itself is in contention in this very litigation.” See ECF No. 79 at 13.

Considering this tenuous connection, if any, between the two matters, a reasonable and informed

observer would not doubt my ability to continue exercising my duties with fairness and

impartiality. See e.g., Armenian Assembly of America, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (collecting cases

holding 455(a) did not require recusal even when a judge previously represented a witness or party

in an unrelated matter; the case involved a judge’s alma mater; or the judge previously belonged

to organizations that advocated for positions advanced by a party to the instant case).

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       Finally, OANN makes a half-hearted argument for recusal because one of my former law

partners represented companies which allegedly were a “high-level” contributor to Maduro. As

OANN correctly points out, I was not involved in any of these cases. OANN also concedes that

this basis alone would not warrant my recusal. See ECF No. 91 at 12:14 (“But that’s surely not

the central focus of our argument here.”), 36:13–17 (“And as I’ve said before, if it was only about

your partner’s representation, we wouldn’t be here…”).

       Section 455(a) does not warrant recusal here. This client of my former law firm partner is

not a party to this case. Nor is he alleged to have an interest in the outcome of this case. There is

no overlap in any way between the two cases. This alleged connection does not come close to

what is required under § 455(a). See Philip Morris USA Inc., 156 Supp. 3d at 51 (finding § 455(a)

did not mandate recusal when a judge’s former law firm represented an anti-tobacco campaign and

the plaintiffs before the court were tobacco companies).

       After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, and guided by the principle that

judges have as much a duty to deny a recusal request when it is not required as to grant it when

the law demands, OANN’s motion is DENIED.

       SO ORDERED.

Date: December 16, 2023

                                                   ______________________________________
                                                   MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA
                                                   United States Magistrate Judge

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