Court Opinion

ID: 9626450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:12:32.432991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:34.126126
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
“In order for bail to be revoked, accused must have notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 8 CJS 105, Bail, § 84. Thus, I agree with the majority that the revocation of Hood’s bail must be predicated upon procedures which comport with due process. I also agree that, under the facts of this case, a reversible violation of Hood’s due process rights occurred when he was incarcerated pursuant to the trial court’s ex parte revocation order of March 11, 1996. As the majority notes, however, until such time as rules, regulations and procedures are promulgated pursuant to the authority of Uniform Superior Court Rule 27.1, there are no existing guidelines governing the revocation of bail. For that reason, I write separately to express my opinion as to how the issue of the revocation of Hood’s bail could have been handled consistent with due process requirements. I believe that the revocation of Hood’s bail is properly analogized to the revocation of probation based upon the alleged commission of another criminal act.
A defendant commits the offense of “stalking” when he or she “contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a). “To ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘(t)o get in touch with; communicate with.’ [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994). Where the grand jury returns an indictment for “stalking,” the trial court is authorized to impose special conditions upon the grant of bail, which conditions are designed to proscribe the defendant’s further contact with the alleged victim. OCGA § 17-6-1 (b) (3) (A). The public policy of this state clearly demands adherence to these conditions, since the General Assembly has defined the offense of “aggravated stalking” as the defendant’s *584commission of a subsequent proscribed act of stalking “in violation of” a “condition” of his or her “pretrial release. . . .” OCGA § 16-5-91 (a). Therefore, where the grand jury returns an indictment for “stalking” and the trial court imposes as a special condition of bail a prohibition upon any further contact with the victim, the defendant may not thereafter contact the victim without running the risk of being arrested and charged with an entirely separate count of “aggravated stalking.”
Accordingly, if the assistant district attorney in this case had probable cause to believe that Hood contacted the victim in violation of the conditions of his bail on the original “stalking” charge, she could have sought a warrant for Hood’s immediate arrest on the separate charge of “aggravated stalking.” Pursuant to Hood’s arrest for this separate charge, the issue of his bail would be exclusively for the superior court. OCGA § 17-6-1 (a) (12). At the hearing on Hood’s bail, the superior court would be authorized to deny relief if it found one of the following factors: Hood posed a significant risk of fleeing or failing to appear as required; he posed a significant threat or danger to the victim; he posed a significant risk of committing another felony; or, he posed a significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing justice. OCGA § 17-6-1 (e); Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1) (425 SE2d 282) (1993). If the superior court found one or more of these factors and denied bail for the separate subsequent “aggravated stalking” offense, Hood would be entitled to file an application for an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals. See Howard v. State, 194 Ga. App. 857 (392 SE2d 562) (1990).
With regard to the revocation of Hood’s bail on the original “stalking” charge, the assistant district attorney could have filed a motion seeking such revocation. Unlike a warrant for Hood’s arrest on a separate “aggravated stalking” charge, however, such a revocation motion would have to be served on Hood in accordance with OCGA § 17-1-1, since there is no authority for an ex parte bail revocation hearing. Here, the trial court erroneously granted the ex parte motion to revoke Hood’s bail, rather than correctly setting a hearing on the motion at which Hood would have the opportunity to contest the revocation of his bail. See Riggins v. State, 134 Ga. App. 941 (216 SE2d 723) (1975).
According to the majority at 583, it does not hold or intimate in its opinion
that a court is precluded from ordering the arrest of a defendant believed to have violated a condition of [bail] where the arrest order is supported by the personal knowledge of the judge or by affidavit or testimony establishing a *585reasonable belief that a violation of a condition of [bail] has occurred.
Decided March 7, 1997.
I agree, but only if the violation of the condition of bail is itself an entirely separate criminal offense. The violation of a condition oí probation is, in and of itself, an entirely separate crime for which the probationer can be arrested on probable cause. OCGA § 42-8-38; Battle v. State, 254 Ga. 666, 671 (3) (333 SE2d 599) (1985). There is, however, no comparable authority making the violation of a condition of bail an entirely separate criminal offense. OCGA § 17-17-7 certainly authorizes the trial court to revoke bail if the defendant commits or threatens to commit acts of physical violence against the victim or the victim’s immediate family. However, there is nothing in that statute which authorizes the immediate arrest of a defendant pending the revocation of his bail. A probationer has been previously convicted and sentenced, but a defendant who is at liberty on pretrial bail still retains the presumption of innocence. The Constitutions of the United States and of Georgia forbid an arrest except on probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. Accordingly, unless and until the General Assembly enacts a statute comparable to OCGA § 42-8-38 making the violation of a condition of bail, in and of itself, a crime, the defendant cannot be arrested pending revocation of his bail unless his alleged violation constitutes the commission of an entirely separate crime. Thus, the majority opinion should not be read as holding or intimating that a trial court is authorized to order the arrest of a defendant believed to have violated a condition of bail, unless the trial court is presented probable cause to believe that, by such violation, the defendant committed an entirely separate crime.
As is true when a probationer allegedly commits another separate criminal offense, the State could have arrested Hood for the subsequent alleged “aggravated stalking” or sought the revocation of his bail for the original “stalking” offense or pursued both courses simultaneously. Because the State pursued neither course, but sought and obtained instead the revocation of bail by means of an ex parte order which was violative of due process, I concur in the majority’s reversal of the denial of Hood’s petition for pre-trial habeas corpus. However, upon filing of the remittitur in the trial court, the State may move for an immediate hearing to revoke Hood’s bail, or it may seek the immediate arrest of Hood for “aggravated stalking.” I agree with the majority that the State may “pursue both courses simultaneously.”
*586Ramon J. Fajardo, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Nancy J. Dupree, Phil Wiley, George F. Hutchinson III, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Wayne M. Purdom, amicus curiae.