Court Opinion

ID: 9906456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 18:11:05.921699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:25.037391
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00176-CV

                     COURT OF APPEALS

              THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

               CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

HYUNDAM INDUSTRIAL
COMPANY, LTD.,                                            Appellant,

                                  v.

PAUL SWACINA, AS SUCCESSOR
GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND
ESTATE OF JOHARI KIBIBI POWELL,
AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, AND
PAUL SWACINA AS NEXT FRIEND OF
D.A.P., D.A.C., AND D.A.C., MINOR CHILDREN,               Appellees.

           On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
                    of Nueces County, Texas.

                            OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
                    Opinion by Justice Longoria
        Appellant Hyundam Industrial Co., Ltd. (Hyundam) appeals the trial court’s order

denying its second amended special appearance. Appellees Paul Swacina, as successor

guardian of the person and estate of Johari Kibibi Powell, an incapacitated adult, and

Paul Swacina as next friend of D.A.P., D.A.C., and D.A.C., minor children (collectively

Swacina), sued Hyundam and others, alleging various causes of action after Powell was

injured in an accident while driving a 2009 Hyundai Elantra. Hyundam argues that the trial

court erred in denying its special appearance because: (1) Swacina’s pleadings failed to

allege jurisdictional facts sufficient to support general or specific jurisdiction, (2) the

evidence was insufficient to support a finding of either general or specific jurisdiction, and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction over Hyundam would offend traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice. We affirm.

                                           I.        BACKGROUND 1

        According to Swacina’s fifth amended petition, Powell was driving a 2009 Hyundai

Elantra in Nueces County, Texas, which stalled in the center lane of traffic due to a fuel

pump failure. Another vehicle collided into the rear of the Elantra, causing Powell to suffer

serious, permanent, and disabling physical and psychological injuries, and causing

Powell’s children to suffer a loss of parental consortium. Swacina, on behalf of Powell

and her children, sued Hyundam in Texas, alleging theories of negligence, gross

negligence, misrepresentation, as well as design, manufacturing, and marketing defects,

among other claims. Specifically, Swacina claimed that the fuel pump in the Elantra was

designed, manufactured, marketed, assembled, and tested by Hyundam, and that failure

        1 As this case involves numerous and voluminous filings by the parties, we summarize only the

facts pertinent to the disposition of this appeal.
                                                       2
of the fuel pump was a proximate cause of Powell and her children’s injuries. 2

       In its second amended special appearance, Hyundam argued that it was not

subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. Hyundam attached an

affidavit by Jinwook Chang, a managing director of the “Technical R&D Center” at

Hyundam. Chang’s affidavit established that Hyundam is a South Korean automobile

component part manufacturer headquartered in Asan, South Korea, that designed and

manufactured fuel pumps for the 2009 Hyundai Elantra for Hyundai Motor Company

(Hyundai), a South Korean automobile manufacturer. According to Chang, Hyundam has

no    offices,   manufacturing        facilities,   officers,    directors,     employees,       agents,

representatives, salespeople, distributers, or customers in Texas. Hyundam also has no

registered agent for service of process in Texas. Hyundam’s fuel pumps were designed

and manufactured at its facilities in South Korea. Donghee Industries, Co. (Donghee), a

South Korean fuel tank system manufacturer, purchased more than ninety-nine percent

of Hyundam’s fuel pumps. Donghee incorporated Hyundam’s fuel pumps into its fuel tank

systems, which were then sold and delivered to Hyundai in South Korea. Hyundam sold

less than one percent of its fuel pumps to Hyundai Mobis Co. Ltd. (Mobis), a wholesaler

and distributor of service parts to Hyundai dealers, globally.

       According to Chang, once the fuel pumps left the manufacturing facility, Hyundam

had no further involvement in the design, manufacture, installation, or assembly of the

fuel tank system or any other component of the 2009 Hyundai Elantra. Chang attested

that Hyundam had no say or involvement in Mobis’s determination of where any service

       2 Swacina’s petition also named nine other defendants in the suit, two of which are Texas residents.

None of these nine other named defendants are a party to this appeal.
                                                    3
parts were distributed. Chang further attested that Hyundam had no control over where

any vehicle containing its fuel pumps were “shipped, distributed, sold, and/or re-sold,”

and that Hyundam did not advertise, design, market, export, sell, or supply any products

in Texas.

        Hyundam also attached evidence demonstrating that the 2009 Hyundai Elantra

involved in this case was originally purchased and registered in Louisiana in 2009, and

was subsequently registered in Texas in 2015. In its special appearance, Hyundam

argued, among other things, that the fact that the vehicle “made its way to a Texas owner”

in this case was an attenuated contact with Texas and did not support personal

jurisdiction. Hyundam also maintained that it “did not direct any component part or take

any action specifically toward Texas at any time,” “never purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of transacting business in Texas,” and “never attempted to serve the Texas

market, specifically or generally, either directly or indirectly through agents or

representatives.”

        Swacina filed a response to Hyundam’s special appearance, arguing that the trial

court had specific jurisdiction over Hyundam because its contacts with Texas

demonstrated “purposeful availment” of the privilege of doing business in the state. See

Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). 3 Swacina

argued that Hyundam placed the fuel pumps into the stream of commerce directly and

indirectly through Hyundai, and that Hyundam engaged in additional conduct indicating it

        3 Swacina did not argue that Hyundam’s contacts with Texas were continuous and systematic so

as to constitute general jurisdiction. See M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 512
S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. 2017) (noting that general jurisdiction is established when a defendant’s contacts
with the state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State”).
                                                      4
intended to serve the Texas market. Swacina attached evidence to his response which

he claimed established that: (1) Hyundam had an English language website accessible

in Texas; (2) Hyundam knew that Hyundai vehicles containing their fuel pumps were sold

in the United States, including Texas; (3) Hyundam had a business relationship with and

sold its fuel pumps to Mobis, which provided Hyundam’s fuel pumps to Hyundai dealers

globally, including Texas, as after-sale service parts; (4) Hyundai sold over 97,000

Elantras containing Hyundam’s fuel pumps in the United States in 2009; (5) Hyundam’s

fuel pumps for a 2009 Hyundai Elantra are readily available for purchase through Hyundai

dealerships in Texas; and (6) Hyundam was a “settling defendant” in a national class

action lawsuit concerning its parts pricing.

       On the same day, Swacina also filed a motion raising various objections to Chang’s

affidavit and requesting the trial court to strike it. Among other things, Swacina argued

that Chang’s affidavit was not based on personal knowledge. Hyundam later filed a

response to Swacina’s motion, and the trial court signed an order overruling Swacina’s

objections to Chang’s affidavit and denying Swacina’s request to strike. Hyundam then

filed its reply to Swacina’s response to its special appearance.

       The trial court held a hearing on Hyundam’s special appearance on March 1, 2022.

After arguments from the parties, the trial court pronounced that it was going to deny the

special appearance. The trial court signed an order denying Hyundam’s special

appearance on March 28, 2022. This interlocutory appeal ensued. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7).

                                               5
                              II.    PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a

question of law that we review de novo.” Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d

550, 558 (Tex. 2018) (cleaned up). When, as here, a trial court does not issue findings of

fact and conclusions of law with its ruling on a special appearance, we imply all relevant

facts necessary to support the judgment that are supported by evidence. Id.

       Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if:

(1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise

of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due-process guarantees.

Id. The Texas long-arm statute is satisfied if the nonresident defendant “does business”

in this State. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex.

2007); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042. The statute’s “broad language”

extends Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction “as far as the federal constitutional

requirements of due process will permit.” PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 166. Therefore,

“the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied if the exercise of personal

jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations.” CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d

591, 594 (Tex. 1996). The Texas long-arm statute is also satisfied if, “[i]n addition to other

acts that may constitute doing business,” a nonresident “commits a tort in whole or in part

in this state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042. “However, allegations that a

tort was committed in Texas do not necessarily satisfy the United States Constitution.”

Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559.

                                              6
       “[F]ederal due process requires that the nonresident must have ‘certain minimum

contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A nonresident establishes minimum contacts

with a forum when it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Moki Mac,

221 S.W.3d at 575 (first citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); and then

citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005)).

“[T]he defendant’s in-state activities ‘must justify a conclusion that the defendant could

reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court.’” Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559 (cleaned

up). “This minimum contacts inquiry is a forum-by-forum or sovereign-by-sovereign

analysis that examines the nature and extent of the defendant’s relationship to the forum

to determine whether the defendant is amenable to general or specific jurisdiction.” State

v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Tex. 2023) (cleaned up)

(footnotes omitted).

       When determining whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in Texas, we consider three factors:

       First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the
       unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the contacts
       relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or
       attenuated. . . . Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage
       or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.

Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559 (quoting Moncrief Oil, Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 SW.3d

142, 151 (Tex. 2013); see also TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Tex. 2016) (stating

                                             7
that defendant’s contacts must be “purposefully directed” towards Texas and “must result

from the defendant’s own efforts to avail itself of the forum”). A nonresident may

purposefully avoid a jurisdiction “by structuring its transactions so as neither to profit from

the forum’s laws nor be subject to its jurisdiction.” Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. “We

assess the quality and the nature of the contacts, not the quantity.” TV Azteca, 490

S.W.3d at 38.

       A defendant’s contacts may give rise to general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.

Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559. As relevant here, the minimum contacts necessary for specific

jurisdiction are established if (1) the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum state, and (2) the suit arises out of or relates to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625

S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. 2021).

       “In cases involving products liability, [the Supreme] Court [of Texas] has adopted

the ‘stream-of-commerce-plus’ standard to establish whether this purposeful availment

exists.” LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. 2023).

       Under a stream-of-commerce-plus framework, a nonresident who places
       products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
       sold in the forum state may be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum.
       In contrast, mere foreseeability that a product might ultimately end up in a
       particular forum does not alone constitute purposeful availment. When the
       stream of commerce only fortuitously deposits a product in the forum state,
       a nonresident manufacturer will be subject to the forum’s jurisdiction only if
       additional conduct—often referred to as a “plus factor”—evinces the
       manufacturer’s intent to serve that market. This analytical construct is
       frequently used in products-liability cases to determine whether specific
       jurisdiction exists. When a nonresident manufacturer has no knowledge,
       care, or control over where a product ends up, this and other courts require
       some “plus factor” to establish purposeful availment. Examples include
       marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the

                                               8
      sales agent in the forum state or creating, controlling, or employing the
      distribution system that brought the product into the forum state.

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 417 (cleaned up) (footnotes omitted). Other examples of

additional conduct include: (1) designing the product for the market in the forum state,

(2) advertising in the forum state, and (3) establishing channels for providing regular

advice to customers in the forum state. Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873

(Tex. 2010).

      Because personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum analysis, we look only to

Hyundam’s behavior directed toward Texas, not its behavior directed elsewhere. See

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 420 (first citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.

873, 884 (2011) (plurality op.); and then citing Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 10). The logical

consequence is that the lack of differentiation in the nature and kind of conduct directed

at other jurisdictions does not negate Hyundam’s purposeful availment of this one. See

id.

      The defendant need not single Texas out in some unique way to satisfy
      constitutional dictates. To hold that a nonresident who has directed activity
      to every state is not amenable to jurisdiction in any state would unduly
      constrain the authority of state courts to hold nonresidents accountable for
      their in-state conduct and would convert the specific-personal-jurisdiction
      analysis into a wholly subjective inquiry into the defendants’ state of mind.

      ....

             Neither the federal nor the state constitution requires us to adopt a
      rule insulating nonresident defendants from personal jurisdiction arising
      from or related to their Texas-based contacts merely because the defendant
      has targeted other states in a similar manner. Rather, the critical inquiry is
      whether a nonresident defendant has established sufficient contacts with
      Texas—not whether those contacts are materially different from its contacts
      with other states.

                                            9
Id. at 420–21.

       The “arises from or relates to” element of specific jurisdiction requires a nexus

between the nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum state. Luciano, 625

S.W.3d at 14. The Texas Supreme Court has held that this “relatedness” requirement is

satisfied by a substantial connection between the nonresident defendant’s contacts and

the operative facts of the litigation. Id. Operative facts are those facts that “will be the

focus of the trial, will consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention, and the

overwhelming majority of the evidence will be directed to that question.” Moki Mac, 221

S.W.3d at 585.

       When personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff and the nonresident

defendant bear shifting burdens of proof. Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559. The plaintiff bears the

initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident defendant within the

scope of Texas’s long-arm statute. Id.; see also Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301

S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010) (“Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the

lawsuit, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the

allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.”). The trial court may consider the plaintiff’s original

pleadings as well as his response to the defendant’s special appearance in determining

whether the plaintiff satisfied his initial burden. Touradji v. Beach Cap. P’ship, L.P., 316

S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citation omitted). “In

conducting our review, we accept as true the allegations in the petition.” Id. at 23. If the

plaintiff fails to plead facts bringing the defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute,

“the defendant need only prove that it does not live in Texas to negate jurisdiction.” Kelly,

301 S.W.3d at 658–59.
                                               10
         If the plaintiff meets his initial pleading burden, the burden shifts to the nonresident

defendant to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Bell, 549

S.W.3d at 559. The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or a legal basis.

Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659. “Factually, the defendant can present evidence that it has no

contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. The plaintiff can

then respond with his own evidence affirming his allegations, and if he does not present

evidence establishing personal jurisdiction, he risks dismissal of his suit. Id. Legally, the

defendant can show that even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the evidence is legally

insufficient to establish jurisdiction; that the defendant’s contacts with Texas do not

constitute purposeful availment; for specific jurisdiction, that the claims do not arise from

the contacts with Texas; or that the exercise of jurisdiction offends traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice. Id.

B.       Objections to Chang’s Affidavit

         In a cross-issue, which we address first, Swacina argues that Chang’s affidavit

was not based on personal knowledge as required under the rules of civil procedure, and

therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to Chang’s

affidavit and denying his motion to strike.

         We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, such as its ruling on a motion to strike

an affidavit, for an abuse of discretion. Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491

S.W.3d 699, 727 (Tex. 2016). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without regard

for guiding rules or principles. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex.

2012).

                                               11
       Under Rule 120a, any party may file a special appearance “for the purpose of

objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person . . . on the ground that such

party . . . is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

120a(1). Rule 120a further states

       The court shall determine the special appearance on the basis of the
       pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits
       and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of discovery
       processes, and any oral testimony. The affidavits, if any, shall be served at
       least seven days before the hearing, shall be made on personal knowledge,
       shall set forth specific facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
       show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify.

Id. § 120a(3). An affiant’s acknowledgment of the sources from which he gathered his

knowledge does not violate the personal knowledge requirement. See In re E.I. DuPont

de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. 2004).

       Here, Chang’s affidavit states the facts in his affidavit are true and correct and

based on his personal knowledge. Swacina characterizes this assertion as conclusory,

and “insufficient as it contains nothing about the time, place, or exact nature of his position

nor the steps, if any, he took to obtain any personal knowledge.” But, in his affidavit,

Chang attests that the basis of his personal knowledge is derived from his seventeen

years of experience and employment with Hyundam, during which he served as a

technician, officer, and director. Chang further details the relevant time period he was

active in each role, the duties and responsibilities in his capacity as to each role, and the

different knowledge he gained in each role. Chang also states that he “reviewed

Hyundam[’s ]documents maintained in the ordinary course of business regarding the

design and manufacture of the fuel pumps by Hyundam[ ]for Donghee[ ], to be supplied

                                              12
to Hyundai[ ]in South Korea for the 2009 year model Hyundai Elantra.” In other words,

Chang set forth specific facts showing affirmatively that he is competent to testify as

required by Rule 120a(3). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1); see also M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc.

v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.) (“[A]

corporate officer may testify that information concerning the corporation’s contacts with a

given state is within his personal knowledge without showing with particularity how he

acquired that knowledge.”). We conclude Chang’s affidavit made a sufficient showing of

personal knowledge. See id.

       Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Swacina’s

objection to Chang’s affidavit. See Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 132. We overrule Swacina’s

sole cross-issue.

C.     Special Appearance

       1.      Jurisdictional Facts

       In its first issue, Hyundam argues that Swacina’s petition did not meet his initial

burden in “properly pleading jurisdictional facts—including those that would implicate

‘personal jurisdiction’ over a foreign entity . . . .”

       As the plaintiff, Swacina bore the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to

bring Hyundum, the nonresident defendant, within the scope of Texas’s long-arm statute.

See Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559. “This notice-pleading requirement is ‘minimal’ and ‘can be

satisfied with an allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or

committed tortious acts in Texas.’” Copeland v. Mayers, 657 S.W.3d 599, 609–10 (Tex.

App.—El Paso, 2022 pet. denied) (quoting Gaddy v. Fenenbock, 652 S.W.3d 860, 871

                                                13
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.)); see also Steward Health Care System LLC v.

Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.) (“A plaintiff’s petition

satifies the long-arm statute when it alleges the defendant did business, which includes

committing a tort in whole or in part in Texas.”); Lombardo v. Bhattacharyya, 437 S.W.3d

658, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2014 pet. denied) (holding that the appellee’s allegations

that appellant committed torts in Texas was sufficient to satisfy appellee’s initial burden

of alleging a cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm

statute); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042.

       In his fifth amended petition, Swacina alleged that on or about March 15, 2018,

Powell operated a 2009 Hyundai Elantra in Nueces County, Texas, which “became

disabled in the center lane of traffic due to a fuel pump failure.” Subsequently, another

vehicle “collided with the rear of the disabled [Elantra] operated by [Powell]”, causing

Powell to suffer serious, permanent, and disabling physical and psychological injuries,

and causing Powell’s children to suffer a loss of parental consortium. Swacina also

alleged that Hyundam “is a foreign corporation doing business th[r]ough out the United

States, including Texas, for profit” and that “the fuel pump of the subject vehicle” was

“designed,” “manufactured”, “marketed”, and “assembled and tested” by Hyundam.

Swacina further alleged that “[Hyundam is] subject to the Texas long-arm statute by

committing torts where one or more elements of the tort or one of more of the tortious

acts occurred in Texas,” and detailed Hyundam’s role as a party to Swacina’s various

causes of action. Finally, Swacina alleged that the “acts and omissions” of Hyundam

“constitutes the direct, proximate, producing and/or substantial cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries

                                             14
and damages.” Liberally construing Swacina’s pleading, we conclude that Swacina’s

allegations that Hyundam does business in Texas and that the plaintiffs suffered injuries

in Texas due to a defective fuel pump designed, manufactured, marketed, and assembled

and tested by Hyundam are sufficient to bring Hyundam under the long-arm statute. 4 See

Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559; Copeland, 657 S.W.3d at 609–10; Steward Health Care Sys.

LLC, 633 S.W.3d at 129; Lombardo, 437 S.W.3d at 679; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 17.042. We overrule Hyundam’s first issue.

        2.       Purposeful Availment

        In its second issue, Hyundam argues the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding of specific jurisdiction. 5

        In support of its special appearance, Hyundam attached Chang’s affidavit which

admitted that Hyundam designed and manufactured fuel pumps for the 2009 Hyundai

Elantra in South Korea. Chang explained that ninety-nine percent of these fuel pumps

were sold and delivered to Donghee in South Korea, which incorporated Hyundam’s fuel

pumps into Donghee’s fuel tank systems; Donghee, in turn, assembled, sold, and

delivered its fuel tank systems to Hyundai in South Korea. According to Chang, Hyundam

         4 We note that although we have concluded that Swacina pleaded sufficient allegations under the

long-arm statute, the mere allegation that a tort occurred in Texas does not support jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant under the Due Process Clause, which requires that the nonresident defendant
purposefully avail itself of the forum state’s jurisdiction. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 788, 791–92
(“Allegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy the Texas Long–Arm Statute, but not necessarily
the U.S. Constitution; the broad language of the former extends only as far as the latter will permit. . . .[W]e
disapprove of those opinions holding that . . . specific jurisdiction turns on whether a defendant’s contacts
were tortious rather than the contacts themselves.”).
        5 Hyundam also argues by its second issue that the evidence was insufficient to support general

jurisdiction. However, as noted, Swacina did not argue general jurisdiction at the trial court, and he does
not do so on appeal. Cf. Dodd v. Savino, 426 S.W.3d 275, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (“A defendant challenging a Texas court’s personal jurisdiction must negate every jurisdictional basis
that is alleged.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we confine our analysis to specific jurisdiction.
                                                      15
had no control over where any vehicle containing its fuel pumps were “shipped,

distributed, sold, and/or re-sold.” Chang also denied that Hyundam advertised, designed,

marketed, exported, sold, or supplied any products in Texas. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at

659 (stating defendant can negate jurisdiction on factual basis by “present[ing] evidence

that it has no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff’s allegations”).

       Chang averred in his affidavit that the 2009 Hyundai Elantra involved in this case

was assembled in South Korea in November 2008. We note that Chang’s affidavit did not

deny that the 2009 Hyundai Elantra involved in this case contained a fuel pump

manufactured by Hyundam. Hyundam also attached to its special appearance a history

report of the particular vehicle involved in this case, which demonstrated that it was

originally shipped by Hyundai from South Korea to Louisiana, where it was sold and

registered in 2009. The report also showed that the vehicle was subsequently registered

in Texas in 2015.

       The parties do not dispute that Hyundam is a nonresident corporation

headquartered in South Korea, or that Hyundam placed its fuel pumps into the stream of

commerce. Swacina argues in his brief that Hyundam “knowingly and intentional[ly]

designed the fuel pumps to be compliant with U.S. specifications so that they could be

sold in all fifty states,” pointing to the following deposition testimony that Swacina attached

to his response to Hyundam’s special appearance:

       [Counsel for Swacina]:       And, to your knowledge, Hyundam at least—
                                    and farther back than 2009, Hyundam sold
                                    vehicles that—excuse me—Hyundai sold
                                    vehicles that contained Hyundam fuel module
                                    pumps that were destined for sale in the United
                                    States.·Correct?

                                              16
                                    ....

       [Chang]:                     Yes.

       [Counsel for Swacina]:       And it’d be—it would be an accurate statement
                                    that Hyundam certainly had knowledge that its
                                    fuel pumps were being put into Hyundai vehicles
                                    and those vehicles were being sold in the United
                                    States. Correct?

       [Chang]:                     So the information that we knew about is that we
                                    developed and delivered our products to satisfy
                                    specification for North America. Now, as U.S. is
                                    included in [the] North American region, it will be
                                    expected or assumed that they would also go to
                                    the U.S. . . . [W]hat we delivered is based on
                                    specification for the [sic] North America.

       [Counsel for Swacina]:       So, yes, Hyundam knew that Hyundai was
                                    selling vehicles with fuel modules built by
                                    Hyundam and they were being sold in North
                                    America, which included the United States.
                                    Correct?

                                    ....

       [Chang]:                     Yes, that’s correct.

       [Counsel for Swacina]:       And Texas is in the United States of America.
                                    Correct?

       [Chang]:                     Yes, Texas is within the United States.

Swacina argues that “designing the product for sale in every state is the same thing as

designing it for sale in each individual state and the character of that purposeful act is not

altered by the fact that the manufacturer anticipat[es] benefiting from national sales

throughout the U.S.”

                                             17
      Swacina also argues, among other things, that Hyundam directly served the Texas

market by “selling after-market OEM replacement fuel pumps, placing them in the hands

of Texas dealerships who could retail them directly to Texas customers who needed a

new fuel pump for their Hyundai vehicles.” In his response to Hyundam’s special

appearance, Swacina provided an affidavit by Peter Sullivan, who testified that on July

21, 2020 his “general manager” purchased an “exemplar, replacement part, fuel[ pump]”

manufactured by Hyundam, which “was exported out of South Korea, imported into the

United States, and ultimately retailed in the State of Texas by Hub Hyundai, a franchised

Hyundai dealership in the Houston, Texas area.” Swacina also attached photos provided

by Sullivan depicting the “exemplar, replacement part, fuel[ pump]” he purchased from

Hub Hyundai.

      In response, Hyundam argues that it did not “design a product for the Texas

consumer in particular”; that Chang’s affidavit demonstrates that “Mobis was not hired by

Hyundam[ ]to distribute its parts in Texas, nor is even Mobis itself alleged to have any

representatives in Texas”; and that “[Mobis] chooses of its own accord to distribute the

fuel pumps, along with other parts, to various Hyundai dealers in the United States and

around the world.” (Emphasis added).

      In Spir Star, a products liability case, the Texas Supreme Court found that a foreign

manufacturer was amenable to specific jurisdiction in Texas because it had marketed its

product through an independent distributor who “agreed to serve as the sales agent” in

Texas. 310 S.W.3d at 875. Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court held in Luciano that an

out-of-state manufacturer was subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas because it

                                           18
employed an independent-contractor sales agent who served as the manufacturer’s

“boots on the ground” in marketing and selling its products in Texas. 625 S.W.3d at 12.

       Chang’s affidavit explained that Hyundam sold less than one percent of its fuel

pumps to Mobis, a South Korean company and global wholesaler and distributor of

service parts to Hyundai dealers. According to Chang, Hyundam sold the fuel pumps to

Mobis in South Korea, and it did not direct where Mobis distributed the fuel pumps as

service parts. We observe that Sullivan’s affidavit does not provide information regarding

how the Houston dealership obtained the “exemplar, replacement part, fuel[ pump]”—i.e.,

whether the fuel pump was shipped directly to the dealership from Hyundai, Hyundam,

Mobis, or some other distributor. Nor does Sullivan’s affidavit demonstrate that Hyundam

has a sales-distribution agreement with the Houston dealership, or any other Hyundai

dealership in Texas. Though Swacina has provided evidence through Sullivan’s affidavit

that Hyundam’s fuel pumps are available for purchase from at least one Hyundai

dealership in Texas, that same evidence does not show directly that Hyundam acted

through a “distributor-intermediary” or an agent with “boots on the ground” to intentionally

target Texas as the marketplace for its fuel pumps. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 875;

Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 12; see also Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559 (holding that, in determining

purposeful availment, “only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the

unilateral activity of another party or a third person”).

       “It is less clear whether a nonresident ‘purposefully avails’ itself of a forum when it

benefits from a major market without doing any of the marketing.” Michiana, 168 S.W.3d

at 786. However, Texas courts have held that “additional conduct,” such as “designing

                                              19
the product for . . . the forum State,” is required to establish purposeful availment. Id.

Under Spir Star, designing a product for the market in the forum state constitutes

‘additional conduct’ demonstrating an intent to serve the market of the forum state. Spir

Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873. Chang’s deposition testimony demonstrates that Hyundam

developed its fuel pumps “to satisfy specification for North America,” that the “U.S. is

included in [the] North American region,” and that “Texas is within the United States.” This

testimony indicates that Hyundam did not just have “mere foreseeability” that its fuel

pumps might ultimately end up in Texas. See Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 417. Instead,

Chang’s deposition testimony demonstrates that the fuel pump was also designed for

Texas consumers as part of the “North American region.” See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at

873. Texas is part of the “North American region.” The fact that the “North American

region” also includes markets other than Texas is of no consequence because Hyundam

need not “single Texas out in some unique way to satisfy constitutional dictates.” See

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 420 (“To hold that a nonresident who has directed activity to

every state is not amenable to jurisdiction in any state would unduly constrain the authority

of state courts to hold nonresidents accountable for their in-state conduct and would

convert the specific-personal-jurisdiction analysis into a wholly subjective inquiry into the

defendants’ state of mind.”). We hold that Hyundam purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of doing business in Texas.

       3.     “Relatedness” Requirement

       Hyundam also argues that specific jurisdiction is not established because Swacina

did not demonstrate that his claims arose from Hyundam’s contacts with Texas.

                                             20
Hyundam’s argument is predicated on the assumption that there was no “additional

conduct” establishing purposeful availment, which we rejected in the previous section.

We look to the relation between Hyundam’s contacts with Texas and the plaintiff’s claims.

See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14.

      In Luciano, the Texas Supreme Court recently discussed the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,

592 U.S. ____, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021), which involved two consolidated products

liability cases stemming from car accidents involving Ford vehicles. See Luciano, 625

S.W.3d at 15. Though Ford conceded purposeful availment, it nevertheless “contended

that specific jurisdiction was lacking because the particular cars involved were originally

sold outside the forum state and were neither designed nor manufactured there.” Id.

(citing Ford Motor Co., 141 S.Ct. at 1022–23). The Texas Supreme Court summarized

Ford Motor Co. as follows:

      Ford argued that a state court would have jurisdiction only if the company’s
      conduct in the state “gave rise to” the plaintiff’s claims, a causal link that
      exists only if the company designs, manufactures, or sells the particular
      vehicle involved in an accident in the forum state. [Ford Motor Co., 141 S.C
      ]at 1023, 1026. The place of accident or injury becomes immaterial. See id.
      at 1023.

             The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that “when a
      company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that product
      causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State’s courts may
      entertain the resulting suit.” Id. at 1022. A “causation-only approach finds
      no support in [the] Court’s requirement of a ‘connection’ between a plaintiff’s
      suit and a defendant’s activities.” Id. at 1026 (citing Bristol-Myers[ Squibb
      Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776 (2017)]). Instead, due
      process demands that a suit “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s
      contacts with the forum. Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780).

                                            21
Id. Here, the fuel pump which Hyundam designed for use in Texas was the very same

type of fuel pump that Swacina alleged failed and proximately caused the plaintiffs’

injuries in Texas. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1022. Under these operative facts,

“there is a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’—the

‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.” Id. at 1028; see Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14.

We conclude that the trial court properly determined that it had personal jurisdiction over

Hyundam in this case. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8–9. We overrule Hyundam’s second

issue.

                        III.   FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

         In its third issue, Hyundam argues that the exercise of jurisdiction over Hyundam

would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

         “Once minimum contacts have been established, we must still consider whether,

for other reasons, exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would

nevertheless run afoul of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 432. “While this catchphrase is ‘well known to appellate

courts,’ it is nonetheless ‘imprecise.’” Id. (quoting Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872). “When a

nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum, ‘rarely will the exercise of

jurisdiction over the nonresident not comport with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 154–55). “To avoid

jurisdiction, the defendant would have to present “a compelling case that the presence of

some consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Guardian Royal

Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng. China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. 1991)).

                                             22
We undertake this evaluation in light of the following factors, when appropriate: (1) the

burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the international judicial

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the

shared interest of the several nations in furthering fundamental substantive social

policies. Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 155 (citing Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 878).

       Hyundam’s argument is premised on its earlier contentions regarding the lack of

evidence showing that Hyundam purposefully availed itself to Texas or that Swacina’s

claims related to Hyundam’s contacts with Texas, which we have already rejected.

Hyundam also argues that its “headquarters and all of its employees are located in South

Korea. It has no employees or representatives in the state of Texas and the suit would

require any relevant witnesses to travel halfway across the globe.” We find this

unpersuasive because the same or similar could be said of virtually all nonresident

defendants being hauled into state court. “Distance alone cannot ordinarily defeat

jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 879).

       The fact that Hyundam may be burdened by litigation in Texas is somewhat

mitigated by the convenience to appellees, Texas residents, in litigating in the forum

where the alleged fuel pump failure and subsequent car accident occurred. See id.

Moreover, the allegations that Hyundam committed torts in Texas against a resident

implicate a serious state interest in adjudicating the dispute. See id. (citing Keeton v.

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“A state has an especial interest in

exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory.”)). Finally,

                                               23
because these claims will be litigated alongside two other named defendants, also Texas

residents, in a Texas court, it promotes judicial economy to litigate the claims as to all

parties in one court. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 879 (“[B]ecause the claims against [the

resident defendant] will be heard in Texas, it would be more efficient to adjudicate the

entire case in the same place.”).

      On balance, the burden on Hyundam to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction is minimal

and outweighed by Texas’s interests in adjudicating the dispute. See id. at 879–80. We

conclude that asserting personal jurisdiction over Hyundam comports with traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice. We overrule Hyundam’s final issue.

                                    IV.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                              NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                              Justice

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of November, 2023.

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