Court Opinion

ID: 9787026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:09:01.377108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.488625
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice.
[¶ 1] The district court entered its "Order on Permanency Hearing" on December 12, 2008. The process of handling the neglect complaint against the Mother (LW) in this case, which process eventuated in the order cited above, was managed by the Department of Family Services (DFS), the State of Wyoming acting through the District Attorney for the Seventh Judicial District, the Guardian ad Litem for the children affected (GAL), and a Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) created under the child protection statutes and rules and regulations promulgated by DFS. An attorney was appointed to represent Mother. The persons directly affected by that order will be identified by the use of generic terms/titles in order to maintain the confidentiality of all persons involved, but most especially the identities of the affected children. The person most directly affected by the order will be referred to as Mother. Although the long-term consequences may be equally as great for the children affected by the order, we mention them second because they are minors and their destiny lies in the hands of the adults involved in this case, which of course includes this Court. We will refer to the children individually as the Daughter and Son of Mother (and when the reference is to both, "the children"). Each child had a different father, but neither is involved in this appeal.
[¶ 2] The principal effect of the order at issue here was to permanently place the children with the Foster Parents, who had cared for the children for over one year, with the further intent that Mother's parental rights be terminated and the children adopted by the Foster Parents. A secondary effect was to eliminate Mother's brother and his wife, who we will refer to as Uncle and Aunt, as the alternative, "kinship" placement for the children as provided for under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-8-208(a)(if) (LexisNexis 2009), as well as applicable federal statutes and rules and regulations of DFS. Eventually Uncle and Aunt retained counsel to represent them during the permanency hearing.
[¶ 3] It is Mother's contention that governing statutes and applicable rules and regulations enunciate a strong preference for "kinship/relative" placement in cireumstances such as those that arose in this case and that the district court erred in permanently placing the children with the Foster Parents for adoption, rather than with the Uncle and *875Aunt. Although termination of Mother's parental rights had not yet been achieved when the appeal herein was perfected, it was a "given" that Mother's parental rights were to be terminated whether the children were placed with the Aunt and Uncle, or with the Foster Parents. We reverse the district court's order and remand to the district court with directions that the children be placed with their Uncle and Aunt, this to be accomplished with all deliberate speed consistent with the children's well-being and under the supervision of qualified professionals in both Wyoming and Montana, the costs of that process to be borne by DFS and Natrona County.
ISSUES
[¶ 4] Mother raises these issues:
1. Whether the district court erred in ignoring the recognized fundamental right of association of family by ordering permanent placement of the minor children outside the biological family.
2. Whether the district court erred in ordering permanent placement of the minor children outside the home despite a clear Department of Family Services policy and Supreme Court preference that makes relative [kinship/family] placement a priority.
DFS posits these as the issues:
I. Does a mother whose children are in the custody of the Department of Family Services have standing to argue that the familial rights of her brother and sister-in-law have been violated by the court's permanency plan of adoption by the children's foster parents?
II. Did the court properly consider the best interests of the minor children when conducting a permanency hearing?
The GAL states these issues:
A. [Mother] does not have standing to raise on behalf of [Uncle and Aunt] alleged violations of Department of Family Services policies or violations of fundamental rights.
B. The district court correctly ruled that the best interests of the minor children would best be served by placement with and adoption by the Foster Parents.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[¶ 5] This appeal presents extraordinarily weighty issues concerning the imminent termination of Mother's parental rights and, thereafter, the permanent placement of Mother's children with the Foster Parents. Mother was essentially a single parent who was raising her two children on her own. The identity of the children's respective fathers was known to the Department of Family Services (DFS), but neither participated meaningfully in the proceedings nor are any issues raised with respect to their parental rights.
[¶ 6] On May 9, 2007, Mother's Daughter was a few months shy of her seventh birthday. Mother's Son was just a few days old. On that date, a petition was filed in the juvenile court asserting that the children had been neglected by their Mother. The children were taken into DFS's care and each was placed with a different foster parent. Among many other things, the petition asked Mother to provide the names of relatives who might be considered as placement options, and she provided the names of Uncle and Aunt. A shelter care hearing also was held on May 9, 2007, and in an order entered on May 28, 2007, the juvenile court placed the children in DFS custody with a primary goal to ascertain if the matter was a "IV-E case," a reference to a provision of the Social Security Act. The GAL was appointed for the children on May 10, 2007, and Mother was appointed counsel on May 30, 2007.
[¶ 7] A June 18, 2007 report of the MDT indicated that the children were returned to the physical custody of Mother and the father of the Son, with DFS retaining legal custody. In a document entitled "Family Service Plan," Mother identified as a part of "Cultural/Ethnic and Family Traditions," going to Montana every other summer to visit Uncle Levi. That same document identified "relative placement with [Unele Levil" as a concurrent plan for the children. The "Family Service Plan" assigns many responsibilities to the caseworker (as well as to the *876parent(s)), including identifying "cultural, ethnic and family traditions." Mother was assigned the responsibility to "[pJrovide any and all information on an absent parent, relative, or kinship adult." Mother identified Uncle and Aunt in fulfillment of that responsibility.
[¶ 8] The record reveals that four or five successive caseworkers had responsibility for this case over the relatively short time period from intake to permanency hearing, and that the "kinship placement" ball appears to have been dropped by DFS workers during the process. This appears to have occurred in part due to oversight, and in part because Uncle and Aunt lived in Miles City, Montana, a city 800 miles away from Casper. After an Initial Hearing on June 1, 2007, the juvenile court issued an order directing that DFS retain temporary legal custody of the children, with Mother to have physical custody. A Predisposition Report was filed of record on June 28, 2007, and Uncle Levi is mentioned twice in this document. In a letter filed of record on July 3, 2007, it is noted that the children were placed back in foster care with the Foster Parents. The children have remained in that placement until the present time, and they are the Foster Parents identified in the opening paragraph of this opinion.
[¶ 9] On July 18, 2007, the children's grandmother's home was assessed as a potential interim placement for the children, and a recommendation was made that grandmother's home was a suitable home to be considered as a placement for the children. That appears to have been abandoned despite a positive report in a DFS home study, because Mother objected on the basis that her mother was a "drunk" (although she later recanted that characterization).
[¶ 10] The parties to this matter entered into a consent decree that was filed of record on August 8, 2007. Mother admitted the neglect allegations, and the proceedings were held in abeyance while DFS continued to work with Mother to reunite her with her children. Mother's interest in the possibility of placement of the children with their Uncle and Aunt was conveyed to the MDT at its August 30, 2007 meeting. The Foster Parents stressed to Mother that the placement of the children with them was temporary and it was everyone's goal for Mother to get better and resume custody.
[¶ 11] Progress in this matter appeared to be very slow, in significant part because Mother was undergoing in-patient treatment for her drinking problems. The Quarterly Progress Report dated November 8-9, 2007, indicated that the permanency plan was to reunite the children with their Mother and that the contingent permanency plan was to be with "Family Relations." A hearing was held to continue the family reunification plan on February 5, 2008. An order detailing the results of that hearing was entered of record on February 28, 2008. A stipulated order extending the consent decree was entered on March 24, 2008.
[¶ 12] On April 8, 2008, the State and DFS sought to reinstate the original petition and to reinstate proceedings to terminate Mother's parental rights. This change of course was based upon evidence that she had resumed drinking alcoholic beverages and had violated the terms of the contract she had entered into for purposes of reunifying her family in other ways as well. A MDT report filed of record on April 18, 2008, discussed Mother's situation in detail and concluded that efforts to reunify Mother with her children be waived and the "concurrent plan of other relative placement be adopted." In an order entered of record on July 22, 2008, the district court accepted the recommendations of the MDT and directed that the matter proceed to a permanency hearing.
[¶ 13] In a report entered of record on August 1, 2008, the MDT recommended that the parental rights of Mother be terminated (as well as those of the two respective fathers) and that the Foster Parents be granted guardianship of the children. It is in this report that we discover that initial efforts to certify Uncle and Aunt as a family placement had been initiated. On September 5, 2008, Uncle and Aunt filed an affidavit detailing their association with the children, including that Daughter had been in their care for almost 4 years prior to her move to Casper with her Mother, and attesting to the many telephonic and personal efforts they had made to make it clear to DFS that they *877wanted to be made responsible for the children. At Mother's request, on October 14, 2008, the district court ordered a "bonding study" to be completed to ascertain the potential for the children to bond with Uncle and Aunt. By report entered of record on October 24, 2008, a MDT report indicated a recommendation that the Foster Parents adopt the children. By order entered on November 14, 2008, Uncle and Aunt were permitted to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of participating in the permanency hearing. It must be noted that the GAL and the attorney for the State resisted each and every effort that Uncle and Aunt made to become included in the proceedings that affected the children.
[¶ 14] Eventually the Uncle and Aunt hired their own attorney and he advocated for them at the permanency hearing. The permanency hearing was conducted on December 1, 2008. That hearing lasted all day and well into the evening hours, and we commend the district court for its efforts to let all parties speak their piece, despite numerous objections and interruption made by the GAL and the attorney for the State. Those objections were directed at limiting the information Uncle and Aunt could bring to the attention of the district court and otherwise to delay, protract, and minimize the amount of information the district court was able to hear. To its credit, the district court overruled almost all objections and allowed Uncle and Aunt to present their plea . that the permanency placement for the children be with them.
[¶ 15] The bonding study is a key doeument in this case because it concluded that it was readily possible that the children could bond with Uncle and Aunt, even though they had also bonded with the Foster Parents. Mother's Son was a focus of much of the study because he had spent very little time with his Mother and even less time with Uncle and Aunt. However, the bonding study bore out that Uncle and Aunt had the skills and the motivation to effectuate a transition for the children from the Foster Parents' home to their home in Montana. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children Request, completed by a professional in Montana, further attested to the skills and abilities of Uncle and Aunt to parent their niece and nephew, as they had done for Aunt's brother in the past, and as they were doing for their own infant child.
DISCUSSION
[¶ 16] At the outset we take note that the record establishes that there are two suitable, stable and loving families who want to be the permanent placement for the children. One of those families is the Foster Family with whom the children have bonded during the process described above. The other family is that of the Uncle and Aunt who have been available as a placement since the outset of these proceedings. However, they lived in Montana and the reunification process Mother sought to pursue was done in Casper. Thus, the bonds between Uncle and Aunt and Daughter had been interrupted for almost two years, and there was little bond at all with Son. Against this background, the district court had to make an almost literally Solomonic decision as to where the children would be placed, with the Foster Parents or with the Unele and Aunt. Although we conclude the district court's order was ultimately erroneous, we commend the district court's thoroughness and thoughtfulness, because without it our effort to give meaningful appellate review to this case would have been gravely diminished.
Mother's Standing
[117] Both the State and the GAL contend Mother does not have standing to bring this appeal:
"Standing" is short for "standing to sue," which requires a "legally protectible and tangible interest at stake in the litigation." Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 599 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed. 1990)). The phrase "tangible interest" has been equated with the phrase "personal stake in the outcome." Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Wyo. State Bd. of Control, 926 P.2d 948, 947 (Wyo.1996); State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo.1995). The person alleging standing *878must show a "perceptible," rather than a "speculative" harm from the action; a remote possibility of injury is not sufficient to confer standing. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. PSC, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 18, 63 P.3d 887, 894-95 (Wyo.2003)
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 11, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo.2007).
[¶ 18] Insofar as this appeal is concerned, Mother is on the brink of having her parental rights terminated, but that has not been accomplished yet. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-8-402(a){xvi) (LexisNexis 2009) provides:
§ 14-3-402. Definitions.
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(xvi) "Residual parental rights and duties" means those rights and duties remaining with the parents after legal custody, guardianship of the person or both have been vested in another person, agency or institution. Residual parental rights and duties include but are not limited to:
(A) The duty to support and provide necessities of life;
(B) The right to consent to adoption;
(C) The right to reasonable visitation unless restricted or prohibited by court order;
(D) The right to determine the minor's religious affiliation; and
(E) The right to petition on behalf of the minor.
We conclude Mother has standing in this appeal.
Standard of Review
{119] It is difficult to pinpoint the standard of review that should be applied here because we have a convergence of several issues of constitutional magnitude, as well as clear expressions of legislative intent. The activities of DFS in the arena at hand are guided in part by federal statutes that are a part of the Social Security Act. Of particular importance here is 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(19) ' (LexisNexis 2008) which provides:
§ 671. State plan for foster care and adoption assistance
(a) Requisite features of State plan. In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part [42 USCA §§ 670 et seq.] it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which
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(19)provides that the State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection standards.
[¶ 20] The district court found that the only Wyoming statute that discusses relative placement is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(b)(Hii) (LexisNexis 2009), and the GAL agreed with that proposition. That statute provides:
§ 14-3-429. Decree where child adjudged neglected; dispositions; terms and conditions; legal custody.
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(b) If the child is found to be neglected the court may:
(i) Permit the child to remain in the legal custody of his parents, guardian or custodian without protective supervision, subject to terms and conditions pre-seribed by the court;
®) Place the child under protective supervision;
(ii) Transfer temporary legal custody to a relative or other suitable adult the court finds qualified to receive and care for the child, with or without supervision, subject to terms and conditions prescribed by the court; ... [Emphasis added.]
[¶ 21] However, § 14-8-481(m)0) (Lexis-Nexis 2009) provides:
§ 14-38-4831. Duration of orders of disposition; termination of permanency hearings; petition for termination of parental rights.
(m) When a child has been placed in foster care under the responsibility of the state for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months the state shall file a petition to terminate parental rights or seek to be joined as a party to the petition *879if a petition has been filed by another party, unless:
(1) The child is in the care of a relative; [Emphasis added.]
Also see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440 (Lexis-Nexis 2009) (reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify the family); Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 14-8-427(d)(iv) and (f) (Lexis-Nexis 2009) (court may appoint a relative to MDT; MDT shall give consideration to best interests of family); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-201 (LexisNexis 2009) articulates that a primary purpose of child protective services is to "... preserve family life whenever possible ...."; finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-8-208(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) provides:
§ 14-3-208. Temporary protective custody, order, time limitation; remedial health care.
(a) When a child is taken into temporary protective custody pursuant to W.S. 14-3-405(a) and (b), the person taking custody shall immediately notify the local department of family services office and place or transfer temporary protective custody to the local department of family services office as soon as practicable. The local department of family services office shall:
(i) Accept physical custody of the child;
(ii) Make reasonable efforts to inform the parent, noncustodial parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare that the child has been taken into temporary protective custody, unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(iii) Arrange for care and supervision of the child in the most appropriate and least restrictive setting necessary to meet the child's needs, including foster homes or other child care facilities certified by the department or approved by the court. When it is in the best interest of the child, the department 'shall place the child with the child's nonecusto-dial birth parent or with the child's extended family, including adult siblings, grandparents, great-grandparents, aunts or uncles. Prior to approving placement with the child's noncustodial birth pdrent or extended family, the department shall determine whether anyone living in the home has been convicted of a crime involving serious harm to children or has a substantiated case listed on the central registry established pursuant to W.S. 14-8-218. The department may leave the child in the care of a physician or hospital when necessary to ensure the chald receives proper care. A meglected child shall not be placed in a jail or detention facility other than for a delinquent act;
[¶ 22] The Family Services Manual, Chapter 7 Section B (RELATIVE/KINSHIP CARE AND DILIGENT SEARCH), p. 7-B-5 (2008) articulates a series of guiding principles that stress the importance of kinship care, and item "F" "[rJeflects a priority for placing children, siblings together, with kin whenever out-of-home placement is necessary." It goes on to say that:
By law, relative/kinship families are the placement of preference for children. The Wyoming Program Improvement Plan makes relative and kinship placements high priority for children placed in out of home care ... DFS shall consider relative/kinship families as the placement of preferencel[.]
DFS is required to make a diligent search for such kinship placements. Throughout this Chapter, the importance of kinship placements is stressed. DFS Policy 5.7 (2008) states that its purpose recognizes:
Relative and kinship placements are less restrictive and therefore preferable to other types of out-of-home care. The DFS caseworker is responsible for conducting an ongoing diligent search for relatives and kin for any child in DFS eustody until permanency is achieved. DFS shall consider relative/kinship families as both temporary and permanent resources for children who are unable to live safely with a parent. DFS recognizes that relative/kinship families are important to a child's sense of identity, belonging, and long term connections.
[¶ 23] When an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children study was finally done, Uncle and Aunt were given extremely *880high marks for their ability to take in Mother's children. The Bonding Study done for the permanency hearing also attested to Uncle's and Aunt's ability to bond with Daughter especially, but also with Son (especially when the two children are placed in the same home environment).
[¶ 24] We have repeatedly held that family relations such as those at issue here are fundamental and are protected by principles of constitutional proportions:
In applying our standard of review, we keep in mind that the right to associate with one's family is fundamental and strictly serutinize petitions to terminate a parent's rights to his or her children. C.L. [v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 2007 WY 23], ¶ 9, 151 P.3d [1102] at 1105; SLB [v. JEO, 2006 WY 74], 17, 136 P.3d [797] at 799-800; TF v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2005 WY 118, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 992, 1000 (Wyo.2005). DFS has the obligation to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate. SLJ [v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2005 WY 3], 119, 104 P.3d [74] at 79-80. "'Clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable." " Id., quoting MN v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 284 (Wyo.2003).
RLA. v. State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, 2009 WY 109, ¶ 13, 215 P.3d 266, 268 (Wyo.2009).
[¶ 25] In DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo.1980) we held:
In addition, we are helped in our task by a large body of state and federal constitutional law defining the interests individuals have in their family associations The right to associate with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal constitutions. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (integrity of the family unit protected by the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (implication that liberties guaranteed by the federal constitution are fundamental). See, also, State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980). Analysis of the Wyoming Constitution and case law also leads to the conclusion that the right to associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty. Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 7 and 86, Wyoming Constitution; Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980); Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); and In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).
[¶ 26] In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 97, S.Ct. 1932, 1938-89, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (also see concurrence 1989-42) (1977) the United States Supreme Court held:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of the family. Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. Decisions concerning child rearing, which [Wisconsin v.] Yoder [406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)], Meyer [v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 890, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1928)], Pierce [v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)] and other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same household indeed who may take on major *881responsibility for the rearing of the children. Especially in times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life. This is apparently what happened here.
Also see 2 Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse, and Adoption Cases, §§ 12:81(Kinship care) and 12:82 (Finding an alternative caregiver) (West 2009).
[¶ 27] Based on these authorities we conclude that, as a matter of ageless tradition, as a matter of federal law, and as a matter of Wyoming law, there exists a compelling preference that what is "best" for a child in cireumstances such as those presented here, is placement with nuclear or extended family members.
Placement with Foster Parents v. Uncle and Aunt
[¶ 28] The State and the GAL characterize the kinship care policies articulated by the Social Security Act and DFS as merely precatory, le., they are "recommended" and should be "considered." In this case the GAL and DFS claim that they did consider them and determined that they were not feasible because of the geography separating Casper, Wyoming, and Miles City, Montana. We are unable to accept these characterizations given the high stakes in play here. Tools, resources, and an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children are available to achieve just the result that was "preferred." 2 Haralambie, supra at § 12:29 (Interstate Placement and the ICPC). The district court concluded that the outcome of this case was fixed early on in the proceedings when Mother chose to do her "reunification" work in Casper, during which time the children were placed with the Foster Parents. By the time that concluded in failure, the district court found that it was too late to go back and consider the kinship placement. We are unable to agree with those conclusions, although we once again emphasize that the district court was remarkably professional, thorough, and patient in creating a complete record, despite the resistance to the flow of information shown by the GAL and DFS, and other factors. For these reasons we are compelled to reverse the district court order.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 29] The order of the district court is reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions that the children be placed with their Uncle and Aunt, this to be accomplished with all deliberate speed consistent with the children's well-being/best interests and under the supervision of qualified professionals in both Wyoming and Montana, the costs of that process to be borne by DFS and Natrona County.