Court Opinion

ID: 9897467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:26.704843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.907158
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   3g
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 IN THE MATTER OF THE                                     No. 84274
                 GUARDIANSHIP OF D.M.F., A
                 PROTECTED MINOR.

                 D.M.F.,                                                        LEO
                 Appellant,
                 VS.                                                       SEP 28 202")
                 YALONDA F.; ALEXIS M.; AND                                ELI"TH A. aR
                                                                        CLER.    SU          RT
                 ANTONIO B.,                                                      •
                                                                       BY
                 Respondents.                                             C CEF DEPUTY CLERK

                              Appeal from a district court order removing a minor's guardian
                and terminating the guardianship. Eighth Judicial District Court. Family
                Division, Clark County; Denise L. Gentile, Judge.
                              Reversed and rernanded with instructions.

                Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Marina F. Dalia-Hunt and
                Kerri J. Maxey, Las Vegas,
                for Appellant.

                Alexis M., North Las Vegas,
                Pro Se.

                Antonio B., North Las Vegas,
                Pro Se.

                Yalonda F., North Las Vegas,
                Pro Se.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

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                                 OPINION

By the Court, CADISH, J.:
            In this appeal, we consider whether a district court's sua sponte
decision to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate that
protected minor's guardianship based on an ex parte communication was
within the court's power.    We also consider whether the court's actions
violated procedural due process protections and whether the court abused
its discretion by failing to comply with the pertinent statutory requirements
related to guardianship proceedings.     Further, we consider whether the
district court exceeded its authority in directing Child Protective Services
(CPS) to take certain actions regarding the placement of the protected
minor.

            Regarding the district court's authority to sua sponte remove a
guardia.n and terminate a guardianship, we conclude that the district court
has such authority even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and
termination. As to the due process question, we conclude the proceedings
and resultant order did not comport with due process, as the court did not
give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination such
that the parties had a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue. We
further conclude the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply
the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination, and it alšo
made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in
reaching its decision. Finally, we hold that while portions of the district
court order stated what CPS should do going forward, its ultimate order in
this regard was simply to refer the matter to CPS for "action as they deem
fit," which is not an abuse of discretion.    Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                     2
                             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                lnuestigations into the protected minor's safety
                            At birth, D.M.F. and A.F., his twin, tested positive for opiates
                and amphetamines. Respondent Alexis M., the mother, and respondent
                Antonio B., the father, admitted to methamphetamine use during the
                pregnancy. As a result, CPS began an investigation into possible abuse or
                neglect. The parents then agreed to allow respondent Yalonda F., the twins'
                paternal grandmother, to serve as a temporary guardian via a notarized
                temporary-guardianship appointment while the parents sought treatment.
                            As noted in the CPS records, Yalonda allowed the parents to
                stay at her home; however, if the parents' drug-use treatment ceased or they
                relapsed, Yalonda promised both to make them move out and to seek a
                court-ordered general legal guardianship over the twins. CPS noted that
                Yalonda provided for the twins' needs and that Yalonda had been assessed
                "appropriate and aligned with the twins." Ultimately, CPS permitted the
                hospital to release the twins to Yalonda.
                            A CPS specialist discussed with Yalonda and the parents the
                expectations for the newborns' care, including that the parents could
                support Yalonda in the care of the twins, but they could not sleep in the
                same room as the twins. Yalonda confirmed that she had placed the twins'
                bassinets in her room. In subsequent follow-ups, CPS observed that the
                twins appeared in "good physical health with no obvious signs •of abuse or
                neglect." While CPS observed that the parents helped Yalonda care for the
                twins, it was noted that Yalonda was the primary caregiver and managed
                mainly on her own. Yalonda also described herself as very strict regarding
                the parents' drug treatment, and CPS confirmed that both parents had been
                participating in drug treatment services.

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                            Before CPS closed its investigation, A.F. died in a co-sleeping
                incident with the parents. Police and CPS investigated the death. The
                investigations revealed that the twins, three months old at that time, had
                been fussy, prompting Antonio to help Yalonda care for them by taking A.F.
                to another room to calm him. Meanwhile, Yalonda calmed D.M.F. and put
                him to sleep in the bassinet in her room, at which time she also fell asleep.
                Antonio placed A.F. to sleep on a pillow in the bed he shared with Alexis.
                Eventually, Antonio and Alexis fell asleep with A.F. on the bed. When
                Antonio woke up in the morning, he found A.F. face down on the pillow and
                unresponsive. Yalonda unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate A.F.
                            As part of the investigations, CPS documented that D.M.F.
                appeared healthy and showed no obvious signs of abuse or neglect. Yalonda
                also told CPS that the parents had, up to that point, followed her rules
                prohibiting the parents from sleeping with the twins in their room.
                Ultimately, police reported no concerns of abuse or neglect related to A.F.'s
                death and described A.F., based on physical observations, as a well-cared-
                for baby. The coroner ruled the cause of death positional asphyxia due to
                co-sleeping. The investigations ultimately concluded that A.F.'s death did
                not result from abuse or neglect. Accordingly, no charges were brought.
                            However, the CPS investigation also revealed that Alexis and
                Antonio had relapsed with methamphetamine. CPS described that the
                testing, which was done the day after A.F. died, appeared to confirm Alexis's
                statement of a one-time relapse; however, the testing also appeared to show
                that Antonio had used more than one time. When Yalonda learned of the
                relapse, she expressed her plan to seek general legal guardianship over
                D .M. F.

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                                 CPS reported that Yalonda exhibited adequate caregiver skills
                       and met D.M.F.'s basic needs. While CPS found reasonable cause to believe
                       that the parents presented a physical risk to D.M.F. because of the drug
                       relapse and the incident of co-sleeping with A.F., two specialists ultimately
                       deemed D.M.F. safe in Yalonda's care, closed the investigation, and issued
                       final approval of Yalonda as caregiver for D.M.F.
                       Petition for appointment of guardianship
                                    About one month after A.F1's death, Yalonda petitioned the
                       district court for appointment of guardianship over D.M.F.1 D.M.F. was a
                       little over four months old at that time. In the petition, Yalonda indicated
                       that she had been D.M.F.'s temporary guardian since his birth because of
                       the parents' drug use. She noted the agreement between her and the
                       parents for her to serve as D.M.F.'s temporary guardian after he had been
                       born substance exposed. She further stated, "Our agreement was that if
                       they relapsed I would file for legal guardianship." She explained in the
                       petition that both parents were unable to presently care for D.M.F. because
                       they were active drug users.
                                   Notarized consents from the parents and documentation of the
                       temporary guardianship were attached to the petition •for legal.
                       guardianship. The petition listed the same address for Yalonda, D.M.F.,
                       and the parents.    Finally, Yalonda checked a box indicating that the

                              'Although the CPS case was officially closed .after Yalonda petitioned
                       the court for appointment as legal guardian, the records indicate that the
                       investigation was concluded before Yalonda 'sought legal guardianship. The
                       initial assessment report concluding that D.M.F. was safe in Yalonda's -care
                       was also pending final approval by a supervisor in early March before
                       Yalonda sought legal guardianship. The records note that she asked CPS
                       for advice on how to obtain guardianship and kept. CPS up-dated on her
                       efforts to do so.
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                guardianship was "NOT requested because of an investigation of abuse or
                neglect conducted by . . . [CPS] or law enforcement." Following a short
                hearing, the district court granted the petition and appointed Yalonda as
                guardian. D.M.F., who was represented by counsel at the hearing, did not
                object to the guardianship.
                Receipt of ex parte communication
                            Six months later, the district court issued an order stating that
                it had reviewed, under the Nevada Statewide Rules for Guardianship
                (NSRG), an ex parte communication from another judge suggesting that
                there were possible misrepresentations made in Yalonda's petition.2 Citing
                NSRG 5 and NRS 159.046,3 the district court appointed a guardianship-
                compliance investigator, set a hearing on the ex parte communication, and
                ordered a response from Yalonda concerning the communication, including
                the failure to inform the district court of A.F.'s death. and CPS's subsequent
                investigation thereof.
                            With respect to the guardianship-compliance investigator, the
                district court directed the investigator to examine D.M.F.'s placement,
                health, welfare, education, and financial status. The court also instructed
                the investigator to determine Yalonda's suitability as guardian and to
                explore her failure to inform the court of A.F.'s death or CPS's ensuing

                      2 The other judge obtained information about A.F.'s death from CPS
                records in an unrelated matter regarding D.M.F.'s half-sibling, who was in
                the care of a different paternal grandmother, nonparty Jane Morales.

                      3Although the district court cited NRS 159.046, that provision applies
                to adult guardianships. Authority to appoint an investigator in minor
                guardianships is set forth in NRS 159A.046. Additionally, NSRG 5, which
                governs appointing an investigator in response to ex parte communications,
                appears to contain a typographical error in cross-referencing NRS 159.146,
                rather than NRS 159A.046.
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                investigation. The district court further requested that the investigator
                determine who resided in the horne, whether CPS had any open
                investigations concerning D.M.F., and whether any unsupervised contact
                between the parents and D.M.F. occurred.
                Guardianship-compliance investigator's report
                               The investigator filed a report with the district court. Even
                though the district court had tasked the investigator with determining
                Yalonda's suitability and D.M.F.'s status, the report did not contain any
                conclusions in that regard.        The investigator noted the existence of
                established sleeping arrangements for the children at the time of A.F.'s
                death but did not describe those arrangements. There was no indication in
                the investigator's report that Yalonda or the parents had previously co-slept
                with the twins.
                               The report provided that Yalonda had informed the investigator
                that D.M.F. was safe, immunized, treated by a cardiologist for a heart
                murmur, and enrolled in early intervention services. Yalonda also told the
                investigator that she did not permit the parents to have unsupervised
                contact with D.M.F. and established back-up care for D.M.F. if she needed
                someone to watch him. She stated that both parents were sober again. The
                report did not reveal any effort to independently verify the information
                provided by Yalonda.
                               As to Yalonda's failure to inform the court of A.F.'s death and
                the ensuing investigation, the investigator stated that Yalonda had worked
                with a nonprofit organization to finish the guardianship paperwork, which
                had told her to submit the paperwork as completed.          Additionally. the
                investigator noted that Yalonda did not believe she needed to inform the
                court of A.F.'s passing because, so she thought, the CPS investigation had

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                Hearing on the ex parte corn munication
                            At the hearing to address the ex parte communication

                regarding A.F.'s death, the district court questioned Yalonda's judgment as
                a caregiver and expressed concern for D.M.F.'s safety, because Yalonda's
                "decision . . . put [A.F.] in the position that he was in, in the first place,
                despite that the "parents were on drugs and the children were born . . . with
                d.rugs in their system." The district court then discussed, hypothetically,
                the options that were available in the event it deemed Yalonda an
                inappropriate guardian, including allowing CPS to make a placement
                determination. The court observed that "grandma can get the guardianship
                through [an NRS Chapter 432B] case," if CPS deems a guardianship
                appropriate, and purported to "just really weigh[ ] what this [c]ourt should
                do in terms of . . . whether this person is an appropriate -person." Despite
                stating that    no   "disqualifying factors" existed,     the   district   court

                nevertheless listed what it viewed as concerning issues regarding Yalonda's
                suitability as guardian: (1) allowing the parents to remain in the home,
                (2) decidin.g to leave a child with "those people who were obviously very
                careless," and (3) permitting the parents continued access to D.M.F. The
                district court acknowledged that Yalonda was not allowing the parents to
                watch D.M.F. without supervision, but the court questioned its ability to
                prevent unsupervised contact between the 'parents and D.M.F.
                            D.M.F.'s counsel argued "[D.M.F.] deserves somebody who's
                gonna take care of him; somebody who's gonna provide him with the basic
                necessities and keep him safe       And that is what Ms. [Ya]onda] ie doing
                And that's what our statutes concentrate on." D.M.F.'s attorney proposed
                that the court order quarterly, rather than yearly, reports from Yalonda,
                require the parents to leave the home, or preclude the parents from
                unsupervised contact. Moreover, D.M.F.'s attorney suggested that the court
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                       could refer the rnatter to CPS but that CPS would likely abide by its
                       decision. Lastly, D.M.F.'s counsel argued that Yalonda's failure to inform
                       the court of A.F.'s death was not intentional.
                                  At the hearing, Yalonda asserted that "everything is . . . about
                       keeping [D.M.F.] safe." She noted that she never missed D.M.F.'s doctor
                       appointments, kept him clean, and put him to sleep in a pack-and-play in
                       her room. Yalonda also stated that she never left him alone with the
                       parents and had back-up care if necessary, and she volunteered to make the
                       parents leave her home. She inentioned that Alexis was sober and employed
                       at Amazon, which tested for drugs. She also told the court that she did not
                       intentionally omit A.F.'s death or the investigation, explaining that she had
                       sent a copy of the guardianship petition to a nonprofit organization, who
                       reviewed it for her and noted no concerns.
                                   The district court stated that it believed the omission was
                       unintentional. The court also remarked that Yalonda "had no ill intentions"
                       and that she was "overly protective of this one." However, the distri.ct court
                       expressed concerns regarding D.M.F.'s environment because the parents
                       continued to live there. The court considered whether it could order that
                       the parents no longer live with Yalonda, as it concluded that the parents
                       are the issue. Yet the court indicated that it was reluctant to do so without
                       an. independent person in the home who could monitor the family on a day-
                       to-day basis. Ultimately, the court stated that it would either set another
                       hearing or issue an order. The district c,ourt barred the parents from any
                       unsupervised contact with D.M.F. in the interim.
                       Rernoual of the guardian and termination of the guardianship
                                   Thereafter, the district court entered an order removing
                       Yalonda as guardian and terminating D.M.F.'s guardianship. The order

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                       cited only NSRG 5 as authority. The district court found that Yalonda had
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                failed to reveal prior history with the parents of the children, citing three
                incidents in the CPS records that occurred before D.M.F.'s birth.
                            The district court then discussed the CPS investigations into
                the parents' drug use and A.F.'s death. Noting that the investigations were
                ultimately closed, the district court found that "this guardianship was
                granted under false pretenses" based on the following:
                            ['Ti]he Petition for Appointment was filed just
                            shortly after the twin died in the care of
                            grandmother, and she chose not to reveal this
                            information, and unilaterally deemed that this
                            information was not necessary. .. . At the hearing
                            on this matter, .. this [c]ourt queried [Yalonda]
                            for the reason to conceal this information. She
                            indicated that she did not intentionally conceal the
                            information, but yet, this tragedy happened only
                            days prior to the filing of the petition.
                Further, the court expressed that Yalonda's
                            judgment relating to her responsibility to care for
                            the child is not adequate, given that she was
                            handed the twin children by CPS after an
                            investigation of the parents, and within a few days,
                            one of the twins was deceased due to her choice to
                            allow the parents to care for the child because both
                            of them were fussy.
                The district court acknowledged that Yalonda was willing to require the
                parents move out to maintain the guardianship over D.M.F., but it claimed
                that it was unable to have the oversight necessary.to prevent any contin.ued -
                exposure to the parents.
                            Thus, the district court found removal of Yalonda as guardian
                in D.M.F.'s best interests and referred the matter to CPS for further
                investigation. The court reasoned that this was necessary based Upon
                            the lack of judgment displayed when the children
                            were placed in the care of the paternal
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                            grandmother by CPS, the lack of candor to the
                            [c]ourt of the surrounding circumstances and the
                            death of [D.M.F.'s] twin brother, the fact that the
                            troubled parents remain in the household with
                            [Yalonda and D.M.F1, and said fact was concealed
                            from this court, that the parents were found to have
                            been under the influence of methamphetamine at
                            the time they were in charge of their child who died
                            and this fact was concealed from the [c]ourt, [and]
                            the need for this family to have oversight by
                            Department of Family Services.
                            In discussing the referral to CPS, the court stated it "FINDS"
                that even if CPS assessed Yalonda as an appropriate caregiver of D.M.F.,
                 a case should be opened with [the] Juvenile Court, so that placement can
                be made through the Juvenile Court" and "the family can obtain the
                resources available to them through that process." In the end, however, the
                court simply ordered "that this matter shall be referred to Child Protective
                Services again for further investigation and action as they deem fit." D.M.F.
                appeals.
                                               DISCUSSION
                Standard of review
                           We do not disturb a guardianship determination absent an
                abuse of discretion. Jason S. v. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr. (In re Guardianship
                of L.S. & H.S.), 120 Nev. 157, 163, 87 P.3d 521, 525 (2004). An abum of
                discretion occurs where the district-court fails to supply appropriate reasOns
                to support the determination, see id., "exceeds the bound.s of law or reason,"
                or makes an "arbitrary or capricious" decision, State v. Eric A.L. (In. re Eric
                A.L.), 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36-37 (2007). And the district court also
                abuses its discretion when it "bases its decision on a clearly erroneous
                factual determination" or "disregard.s controlling law." MB Am., Inc. v.
                Alaska Pac: Leasing co., 132 Nev. 78, 88, 367 P.M 1286, 1292 (2016).
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                However, questions of law within a guardianship determination are
                reviewed de novo.     See Tahja L. v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re
                Parental Rights as to L.L.S.), 137 Nev. 241, 245, 487 P.3d 791, 796 (2021)
                (reviewing "cOnstitutional issues such as a parent's right to due process in
                a termination proceeding de novo"); Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 616, 119
                P.3d 1246, 1248 (2005) (reviewing questions of statutory interpretation de
                novo).
                The district court has authority to remove a guardian and terminate a
                guardianship, even absent a petition
                            D.M.F. contends that even though NSRG 5 gives the district
                court "numerous options" to respond to an ex parte communication, it does
                not "empower[]" the court "to unilaterally remove a guardian." D.M.F.
                .further argues that the absence of the district court as a party who may
                petition for the removal of a guardian under NRS 159A.1853 means that
                the provision "does not include the district court, especially on a sua sponte
                basis." D.M.F. thus contends that the d.istrict court lacked any power to act
                because no petition for removal had been filed. Similarly, he asserts that
                no provision allows a court to sua sponte terminate a guardianship.4
                            This court recently held, in the context of an adult guardianship
                proceeding under NRS Chapter 159, that "separate from an individual
                formally petitioning the court, the district court has •its own ability to
                remove a guardian if it determines that one or more ofihe conditions set
                forth in NRS 159.185 have been satisfied."       Jones v. Friedman (In re
                Guardianship of Jones), 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 17, at 4, 53 P.3d 1236, 1.243

                     4 Respondents, who are all pro se a.nd who were in favor of the
                guardianship during the district court proceedings, did not file answering
                briefs.                                                               •

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                (2023). NRS Chapter 159A governs guardianship proceedings concerning
                minors, including the instant case, and NRS 159A.185 contains provisions
                analogous to those we relied on in Jones. Specifically, NRS 159A.185(1)
                outlines conditions for removal of a guardian and states that the district
                court "rnay remove a guardian if the court determines" one or more of those
                conditions exists. Looking to our prior caselaw and that of other states, we
                held in Jones that while various statutory provisions contemplate the filing
                of a petition for removal of a guardian by a party, "inherent in the district
                court's jurisdiction over the guardianship is the power to appoint and
                remove guardians." Id. at 1242-43. We see no reason to hold differently in
                a minor guardianship proceeding and thus conclude that the district court
                has the authority to sua sponte remove a minor's guardian if one or more of
                the conditions set forth in NRS 1.59A.185 is satisfied and all other applicable
                requirements are met.5
                The district court denied D.M.F. due process of law when it removed D.M.F.'s
                guardian and terminated the guardianship after the NSRG 5 hearing
                             D.M.F. argues that the district court violated his due process
                rights and abused its discretion, as he and other interested persons did not

                      5We note also that     under NSRG 5(A), "[i]n order to carry out the
                court's oversight and enforcement of compliance in guardianship
                proceedings," the court may receive and review ex parte communications
                ordinarily prohibited by the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, "if such
                coMmunications raise a significant concern about a guardian's compliance
                with his or her statutory duties and responsibilities, or the protected
                person's welfare." In response to such communications, the court may take
                numerous steps, including taking any action supported by the record,
                notifying any appropriate government agency, appointing an investigatOr
                (as it is authorized to do "at any time" under NRS 159A.046(1)), and setting
                a hearing. NSRG 5(B). It would be anomalous to allow the court to receive
                and follow up on such comm.unications if the court were powerless to
                thereafter act to protect the welfare of the protected person.
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                receive notice regarding the prospect of removal or termination, and the
                district court did not hold a hearing regarding the same. D.M.F. contends
                that the NSR.G 5 order failed to indicate that the district court was
                considering removal and termination, particularly where "no one requested
                that Yalonda be removed as guardian or the guardianship terminated." We
                agree.
                            The district court's actions implicate D.M.F.'s procedural due
                process right's to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See .
                Callie v.. Bowlin,g, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007); see alsb NR.S
                159A.1855(1) (requiring the court to issue and petitioner to serve. a citation
                oh the guardian and all interested parties when a petition to remove the
                guardian has been filed). Beth the United States Constitution and the
                Nevada Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of' a protected
                life, liberty, or property interest without due process of law. U.S. Const.
                amend. XIV, § 1; Nev. Const. art.. 1, § 8(2).
                            The district court!s decision here affects several protected
                interests'. This court has held when a court sua sponte removes a guardian,
                without the formal filing of a petition, the court "[risks] depriv[ing] a
                protected person of their autonomy and iniping[ing] on the protected
                person's rights." Jones, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 17, at •12, 531 P.3d at 1243.
                Other courts have concluded that, a minor possesses a constitutionally
                protected liberty interest in "familial companionship." See, e.g., Smith v.
                City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing.
                a child's "interest in the continued companionship" of a parent in the context
                of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).          The premature termination of the
                gitardianship may also jeopard.ize D.M.F.'s relationship with his parents,
                who consented to the guardianship and still retain pa.rental rights in the

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                upbringing of their child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59
                (1982) ("[A] natural parent's 'desire for and right to the companionship,
                care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an interest far more
                precious than any property right." (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
                of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981))).
                            Moreover, the relationship between D.M.F. and his guardian,
                who is also his grandmother, fits into the protected parent-child paradigm
                because Yalonda has served as his primary caretaker since birth.         See
                Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that
                "custodial relatives" enjoy "due process protections when the state decides
                to remove a dependent relative from the family environrnent"). And finally,
                the district court's decision bears on the protection Yalonda affords to
                D.M.F. Indeed, a guardian has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and
                management of a child under their protection akin to, but not entirely
                coextensive with, the rights of a parent. See, e.g., Simuro v. Shedd, 176 F.
                Supp. 3d 358, 384 (D. Vt. 2016) ("[P]arents and guardians of minor children
                have protected interests in the care, control, and custody of thoSe
                children."). Thus,. due process requires D.M.F., and those others holding
                protected interests, be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard with
                respect to the removal of his guardian and termination of the guardianship.6
                            "The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to
                be heard." Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217, 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998)
                (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). "This right has little

                      6 We note that while D.M.F.'s due process rights are at issue in this
                appeal, Yalonda and D.M.F.'s parents' due process rights are also impacted
                by the district court's decision, as• they all have liberty interests in- the
                guardianship and care of D.M.F.
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                         reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
                         choose for [themself] whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
                         Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949). Notice
                         is sufficient to satisfy due process where it is "reasonably calculated, under
                         all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
                         action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id.;
                         compare Jones, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 17, at 13-14, 531 P.3d at 1244
                         (concluding that .various requests for removal, both oral and written,
                         sufficiently put a protected person on notice of the potential rernoval of their
                         guardian despite no formal petition being filed), with Micone v. Micon.e, 132
                         Nev. 156, 159, 368 P.3d 1195, 1197 (2016) (holding that the district court's
                         sua sponte award of physical custody to nonparty paternal grandparents
                         violated parents' right to due process because the parties' briefs and
                         arguments concerned which parent should have custody and did not
                         address the paternal grandparents). Generally, notice must be given before
                         a party's substantive rights are affected. See Wiese v. Granata, 110 Nev.
                         1410, 1412, 887 P.2d 744, 745-46 (1994) (concluding notice of a hearing that
                         failed to mention or even hint at child custody as a subject of the hearing
                         violated the appellant's due process rights when custody was changed as a
                         result of the hearing).
                                     D.M.F. proposes that the district court should have issued a
                         citation to the guardian and any other interested person to show cause why
                         the district court should not remove the guardian or terminate the
                         guardianship, as required by NRS 159A.1855 and NRS. 159A.1905 when a
                         petition for removal or termination has been filed. See NRS 159A.1855(1)
                         (requiring a citation to issue regarding a petition for removal of a guardian);
                         NRS 159A.1905(4) (providing the same as to a petition for termination of a

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                guardianship). Had the district court issued such citations, D.M.F. and all
                other interested parties, namely Yalonda and D.M.F.'s parents, weuld have
                been apprised of the possibility of removal. of Yalonda as D.M.F.'s guardian
                and termination of the guardianship. However, no such citations were
                issued: thus we turn to the other actions of the district court to d.etermine
                whether sufficient notice was provided.
                            We conclude that the notice provided by the district court was
                ina.deqUate and did 41.ot afford D.M.F. dile•process. of law. First•none of the
                district court'S orders provided a clear indication that reinoval and
                termination would be at issue at the hearing or in the court's su.bsequent
                order. For example, the NSRG 5 order set a hearing on the issues raised by
                the ex parte communication, which were identified as misrepresentations
                made to the district court regarding D.M.F. and the ad.equacy of the petition
                to appoint a guardian, given Yalonda's failure to inform of A.F.'s death and
                CPS's investigation. Nothing within the order indicated that the significant
                actions of removal and termination were on the table; instead the order
                indicated an investigator would be appointed and a hearing Would be held
                where Yalonda could respond regarding the. issues raised.
                            Likewise, a second order, issued simultaneously with the first.
                appointed an investigator to prepare a report on Yalonda's suitability and
                her omission to the court, as well as on D.M.F.'s health and welfare.
                Although the order raised concerns regarding the guardian's suitability and
                the protected minor's welfare, it did not indicate the potential for the drastic
                step of removal and terminatio.n. such as directions to investigate potential.
                substitute guardians or the necessi.ty for the 'guardianship. Had the order
                unambiguously notified the interested parties of the prospect of rernoval
                and termination, as a. citation would h.ave, then those interested parties
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                could have meaningfully addressed these issues. By failing to clearly notify
                the parties of the significance of the interests at stake, the district court's
                notice failed "to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
                afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339. U.S.
                at 314.
                            Furthermore, even if D.M.F. received notice that guardianship

                was to be determined at the hearing on the ex-parte communication, the
                hearing D.M.F. actually received cannot be construed as having provided
                D.M.F. with due process of law. In the context of child custody eases, eVen
                when proper notice is provided, this court has held that "litigants . . . have
                the right to a full and fair hearing concerning the ultimate disposition of a
                child." Moser v. Moser, 108 Nev. 572, 576, 836 P.2d 63, 66 (1992). A full
                and fair hearing requires that the change in custody be supported by factual

                evidence and the party threatened with the loss of parental rights must be
                given the opportunity to rebut the evidence presented against them. Id. at
                577, 836 P.2d at 66.
                            This court's opinion in Wiese v. Granata illustrates the
                requirements of a full and fair hearing regarding custody issues. 110 Nev.
                1410, 887 P.2d 744 (1994). There, the father had full custody of the parties'
                child. Id. at 1410, 887 P.2d at 745. The mother obtained a temporary
                protective order against the father and sought to extend the order. Id. at
                1411, 887 P.2d at 745. The father was served with the motion, an order to
                show cause, and the notice of hearing, wherein the mother sought
                modification of her visitation. Id. The notice indicated the •district court
                would consider whether to extend, modify, or dissolve the temporary
                protective order and whether the father had violated the terms thereof. Id.
                The father did riot appear at the hearing to extend the temporary prOtective

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                order upon the advice of counsel, and the district court subsequently
                entered an order granting the mother physical custody of the child. Id. In
                response, the father filed an emergency motion to stay the order granting
                the mother physical custody and requested a hearing. Id. The hearing on
                the emergency motion to stay was limited to 30 minutes, and the mother
                did not present any evidence concerning custody. Id. at 1411-13, 887 P.2d
                at 745-46. The district court denied the father's requ.est and affirmed its
                order granting the mother custody: Id. at 1411, 887 P.2d at 745. On appeal,
                this court concluded the notice was inadequate because nothing in the
                notice or the order to show cause could be fairly read as notice that custody
                determinations were to be made at this hearing. Id. at 1411-12, 887 P.2d
                at 745-46.   Furthermore, this court held that even had the notice been
                sufficient, the hearing on the emergency motion - to stay could not be
                construed as a full and fair hearing on the change of custody because the
                mother did not present any evidence supporting the change in custody and
                therefore the father was not given a meaningful opPortunity •to respond
                without being provided the information on. which the district court relied.
                Id. at 1412-13, 887 P.2d at 745-46.
                             Here,   the investigator filed a    report   that provided    no

                recommendations or conclusions regarding Yalonda's suitability or D.M.F.'s
                health and welfare, thus giving no indication of the case (i.e., the facts and
                arguments) regarding the need to• remove Yalonda as guardian and
                terminate D.M.F.'s guardianship. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
                348 (1976) (noting that due process requires `riotice of the case against [a
                person] and opportunity to meet it" (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
                Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
                concurring))). Because the report lacked specificity iegarding the type of

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                evidence a.massed against the guardian and the guardianship, yet the
                district court relied. on it, D.M.F. and Yalonda lacked the ability to
                ad.equately address these concerns at the hearing.
                              Furthermore, the district court held a hearing during which no
                testimony under oath was presented or considered. Moreover, because no
                party petitioned for Yalonda's removal or termination of the guardianship
                and the court did not clearly indicate it was sua sponte considering doing
                so, it was unclear that snob serious actions .were under consideration. The
                district court was also unclear throughout the hearing as to the purpose of
                .the hearing and the actions that it intended to take. Because of the lack Of
                clarity regarding the purpose of the hearing, the. parties 'could not
                appropriately address the issues of removal and termination.           As a

                -consequence, -they were not given a meaningful opportunity. to be heard- on
                the issues. See Matheivs, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement
                of tlue process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
                meaningful manner." (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 TJ.S. 545, 552
                (1965))).
                              Thus, we conclude that the notice provided to D.M.F. in thiS
                case was inadequate because it did not fairly apprise him. that Yalonda's
                removal as guardian was being considered or that the guardianship Was at
                risk of termination during the heating. Furthermore,             not receive

                a full and fair hearing because D.M.F. Nxas not presented with -the case for
                such actions and thus did not have a meaningful opPortunity to be heard on
                the issues.
                              While the procedural due process violation requi.res reversal,

                D.M.F'. also contends that the district court abused its discretion in its
                application of controlling law governing removal . of guardians and

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                        termination of guardianships and exceeded its authority in referring the
                        matter to CPS. Because these issues may persist on remand, we address
                        them here.
                        The district court abused its discretion in removing Yalonda as guardian
                        and terminating D.M.F.'s guardianship, but did not abuse its discretion in
                        referring the matter to CPS
                                     D.M.F. argues that the district court failed to apply clearly
                        controlling Nevada law that governs the removal and termination of
                        guardianships. As removal and termination involve separate inquiries, we
                        discuss each in turn below.
                              Removal of Yalonda as guardian
                                  D.M.F. argues that the district court's removal determination
                        constituted an abuse of discretion because it did not consider whether
                        Yalonda met any of the conditions for removal beyond. a conclusory
                        reference to D.M.F.'s "best interest" and relied on incorrect findings
                        regarding Yalonda's perceived dishonesty to the court and the parents'
                        intoxication while caring for A.F. Moreover, D.M.F. contends that the
                        district court reached its determination without applying the mandatory
                        best-interest factors laid out in NRS •159A.186.
                                     As noted, a district court rnay remove a guardian if i.t
                        determines that one or rnore of several disqualifying factors exist, in.clUdin.g
                        the guardian's negligence in performing their duties, resulting in injury or
                        a likelihood of injury to the protected minor. NRS 159A.185(1). Yet the
                        existence of a condition of removal and the court's election tO exercise its
                        discretion   regarding    such    condition    do   not   end    the   matter.
                        "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . the court shall n,ot remove
                        the guardian or appoint another person as guardian unless the court finds
                        that removal of the griardian or appointment of another person as guardian
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                       is in the best interests of the protected minor." NRS 159A.186(1) (emphasis
                       added); see also NRS 159A.186(2) (providing factors that the court must
                       consider regarding the minor's best interests).    The use of "shall" here

                       makes the best-interests-of-the-child analysis mandatory. See Nev. Pub.
                       Emps. Ret. Bd. v. Srnith, 129 Nev. 618, 627, 310 P.3d 560, 566 (2013).
                       Therefore, a finding that removal serves the best interests of the protected
                       rninor does not by itself provide a basis for or trigger removal; instead, it
                       overcomes NRS 159A.186(1)'s functional presumption against reinoval.
                       Reading the removal provisions in harmony, the district court must first
                       determine whether one of the enumerated conditions for removal under
                       NRS 159A.185(1) exists and, if so, conduct a best-interests-of-the-child
                       analysis. Relatedly, while NSRG 5's language is broad enough to include
                       possible removal of a guardian in response to an ex parte communication
                       that raises a "significant concern" about the guardian's compliance with
                       their duties or the protected minor's welfare, removal initiated under NSRG
                       5 still needs to satisfy one of the conditions under NRS 159A.185(1) and
                       serve the best interests of the minor under NRS 159A.186(2).
                                  Applying these princiPles here, the district coUrt abused its
                       discretion when it removed Yalonda as guardian. The district court cited
                       no law other than NSRG 5, simply concluding that concerns remained about
                       Yalonda's compliance with her duties and that removal was in the best
                       interests of D.M.F. The court did not identify which of the enumerated
                       conditions for removal under NRS 159A.185(1) it found or even
                       acknowledge the need for such a finding, nor did it address the mandatory
                       best-interest factors under NRS 159A.186(2). The district court justified
                       removal based on its finding that Yalonda lied to the coUrt to obtain the
                       appointment. The district court also found that Yalonda had concealed "the

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                fact that the troubled. parents remain in household." However, Yalonda's
                petition listed the same address for herself and the parents. The peti.tion
                also clearly stated the parents were active drug users. The basis for the
                court's findings about Yalonda's purported lying and concealment seems to
                stem from its misunderstanding that the time frame of the pertinent events
                was more compressed than it actually was, finding that A.F.'s death
                "happened only days prior to the filing of the petition," when Yalonda
                petitioned the court. a. mOnth after A.F.'s death.       Similarly, the court
                erroneou.sly • stated that .A.F.'s death happened within a few days after
                Yalenda obtained temporary guardianship, when Yalonda had been 'caring
                for D.M.F. and A.F. for three month.s without incident. The court also seems
                to'disagree with the conclusions of the police and CPS that A:F.'s death was
                not the result of abuse or neglect but rather a tragic accident,. While the
                court's initial concerns are understandable., the record lacks any evidentiary
                support for a different conclusion.
                            As the dist.rict court failed to• apply t he mandatory best-interest
                factors in NRS 159A.1.86(2), failed to find a predicate condition for removal
                under NR.S 159A.185(1), and relied on 'unsupported and clearly erroneous
                factual determinations, we agree with D.M.F. that the distriet coUrt abused
                its discretion in removing Yalonda as guardian.
                      Termination of the guardianship
                            D.M.F. contends that the district court abused its discretion in
                terminating his guardianship because it did not apply any of the provisions
                concerning the termination of a guardianship .and. failed to make explicit
                findings explaining how terminatin.g the guardianship was in D.M.F.'s best
                interests. He also argues that the district court failed to. follow NSRG. 1.0
                because it removed a sole guardian from a child who still needed a guardian

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                 without either appointing a successor guardian or finding th.at D.M.F. no
                 longer needed a guardian.
                             Under NSRG 10(A), "the court shall not terminate the
                 guardianship . . . without making specific findings" regarding three things:
                 (1) the protected minor's "current health and welfare," (2) the "reasons a
                 guardianship does or does not remain necessary, including identifying the
                 existence of less-restrictive alternatives." and (3) "[w]hether maintaining
                 the guardianship would serve the protected person's best interests." The
                 order here falls short of the NSRG 10 requirements. To the extent the
                 district court's order considered D.M.F.'s current health or welfare, it
                 focused on the supervised. contact with "the troubled parents" and A.F.'s
                 death. The order did not address how termination of the guardianship
                 would improve or maintain his health and welfare, given that it would place
                 him back in the care and custody of those parents. The district court also
                 did not identify any reason why the guardianship no longer remains
                 necessary. Further, it summarily dismissed less-restrictive alternatiVes as
                 impossible to implement. And its best-interests analysis looked at only one
                 factor out of many and relied on unsupported and clearly erroneous
                 findings, as discussed above. For these reasons, the district court abused
                 its discretion in failing to make specific, supportable findings regarding the
                 NSRG 10 factors before it terminated D.M.F.'s guardianship.
                       CPS referral
                             As noted, D.M.F. argues that the district court exceeded its
                 authority in. attempting to direct CPS to remove D.M.F. from. his parents'
                 and Yalonda's care and to institute a dependency proceeding under NRS
                 Chapter 432B. While CPS may determine whether grounds exist for an
                 investigation into possible abuse or neglect, the district court May not

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                warrants initiation of an investigation. Similarly, the district court does
                not possess the authority to direct CPS to open a case under NRS Chapter
                432B regarding D.M.F.'s placement and make the• placement through court
                order. But this did not occur here. While the district court did express its
                disagreement with CPS's actions and conclusions, finding that if CPS felt
                placement with Yalonda was appropriate then a case should be opened with
                the juvenile court and expressing concern that CPS had not previously
                proceeded with a dependency case, in th.e end it simply ordered the- matter
                "referred to Child Protective Services again for further investigatiOn and.
                action as they deem fit." This order does not inappropriately direct the
                action CPS must take and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
                                              CONCLUSION
                             If it receives information causing concern regarding the
                propriety of a minor's guardianship, a district court may sua spOnte initiate
                the process for removing a euardian and terminating a guardianship. In
                doing so, the court must protect the procedural due process rights of the
                protected rninor, parents, and guardian by, at a minimum, giving notice of
                the contemplated action and holding a hearing on the prospect of removal
                and termination so that the parties have a meaningful opportunity to be
                heard. All the while, the court must adhere to the applicable statutes and
                rules under NRS Chapter 159A and the NSRG in• d.eterrnining whether
                removal of the guardian and termination of the guardiansh.ip are
                appropriate, making the required findings to support those decisions.
                            Here, the.district court did not give notice to D.M.F., Yalonda,
                or D.M.F.'s parents regarding the prospect, of removal or termination; nõr
                did the court hold a hearing regarding the same. The court, therefore,
                violated the due process rights of D.M.F. and failed to -comply with the

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Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instruCtions to reinstate the
guardianship and reappoint Yalonda, provided she is willing and able, as
guardian. If the district court determines that it should proceed with a
hearing to consider removal of the guardian or termination of the
guardianship, it must provide notice to D.M.F., Yalonda, and the parents
that expressly advises of these potential consequences and h.old a full
hearing on the same. Should the district court, after the hearing, conclude
that removal or termination is appropriate, the court muSt make the
necessary findings and address the mandatory factors set forth in the
applicable statutes and rules.

                                                              , J.
                                   Cadish

We concur:

                          , C.J.                   pi
Stiglich                                    Pickering

                           J.
                                            Lee

Parraguirre

                                    26