Court Opinion

ID: 9962006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 14:06:32.726983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:39.278553
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0950-22

D.Q.,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

F.Q.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided April 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FV-12-2404-21.

                   D.Q., appellant pro se.

                   F.Q., respondent pro se, has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1
   We use initials to refer to the parties and the minor child to protect their
privacy and preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-
3(d)(13).
      Plaintiff D.Q. appeals from a September 28, 2022 amended final

restraining order (AFRO), which denied her application for sole custody and

termination of defendant F.Q.'s parenting time, finding no change in

circumstances.   Following our review of the record and applicable legal

standards, we affirm.

                                       I.

      The parties were married and share a daughter, G.Q., born in 2016. The

parties thereafter separated. Plaintiff has maintained that, in 2020, defendant's

girlfriend sexually and physically assaulted G.Q. during defendant's parenting

time. Defendant has continuously refuted the allegations.

      After plaintiff filed a non-dissolution application, on August 24, 2020,

the court held a telephonic conference due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The

parties resolved the disputed issues of custody, parenting time, and child

support.   The memorializing order provided the parties agreed to:          joint

custody of G.Q.; designation of plaintiff as the parent of primary residence;

defendant's alternating weekend parenting time without his girlfriend present;

follow "all recommendations made by the [Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (DCPP)]"; and child support. In November, after plaintiff filed an

application for child support and custody, the court ordered:        defendant's

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payment of child support arrears; continued "joint legal custody" of G.Q.; and

defendant to have parenting time "every other Saturday and Sunday from

[10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.]"

         In April 2021, after a hearing, the court denied plaintiff's application to

modify custody and "suspend all parenting time and/or modify custody,"

finding plaintiff had not shown a substantial change in circumstances. The

court had reviewed the submitted DCPP report regarding the sexual and

physical assault allegations against G.Q. and found the "allegations of abuse

were unfounded or not established."          The parties were ordered to provide

updated financial information for a child support modification and "work

[-]related [childcare] costs."      In June, the court reviewed the financial

information submitted and imputed income to defendant, ordering him to pay

slightly increased child support and 36% toward extracurricular expenses.

         On June 22, plaintiff filed a complaint under the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, and obtained a temporary restraining

order.      Thereafter, a final restraining order (FRO) was entered against

defendant for plaintiff's protection.        On July 15, 2022, the court heard

plaintiff's AFRO application, ordering defendant to timely pay child support,

and denying plaintiff's request for the court's recusal.         The court further

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ordered the parties not to disparage each other, referencing plaintiff's prior

AFRO that limited the parties' communication.

      On August 26, plaintiff again moved for an AFRO, seeking "full

custody" of G.Q., child support enforcement, and a plenary hearing.

Specifically, plaintiff sought enforcement of the child support ordered but did

not request a child support modification. On September 28, the court held a

hearing with the parties appearing self-represented. At the hearing, plaintiff

withdrew her request to address child support and argued to terminate

defendant's custody and parenting time.2 In clarifying plaintiff's requested

relief, the court had the following exchange:

            THE COURT: Okay. So . . . , this is your application
            for a couple different things; one . . . that you had
            requested for was child support. So I ran the child
            support arrears.    The child support arrears are
            $123.00.

                  ....

            PLAINTIFF: Your Honor, he paid me $553 and $250
            so it was not $123.

            THE COURT: Okay. But it is now.

2
   It appears a later order was issued on October 7, 2022 addressing child
support arrears, but documents regarding this action were not provided.

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            PLAINTIFF: I understand that. When I tried reaching
            the courts and left a message to let them know that I
            don't need child support[,] I never got a call back.

            THE COURT: What do you mean that you don't need
            child support?

            PLAINTIFF: I didn't need . . . to address . . . child
            support.

                  ....

            THE COURT: . . . I just wanted to make sure that
            there wasn't something we were missing.

                  ....

            PLAINTIFF: We were able to agree on that.

                  ....

            THE COURT: Now, you also have an application that
            you want to be named sole legal custodian.

                  ....

            THE COURT: Okay. And what's the basis -- because
            remember, when we have an application for a
            modification of custody which is what this is, it's
            considered a modification. You have the burden of
            proof to show that it's in the best interest[s] of the
            child and that there has been changed circumstances
            since the legal custodial order was entered as to why it
            should be changed.

The court provided plaintiff the opportunity to clarify her requested relief.

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      While defendant had telephone conversations with his daughter, he had

not seen her for approximately one-and-a-half years prior to the hearing.

Throughout the hearing, plaintiff maintained she continually facilitated a

relationship between defendant and G.Q., stating, "I've never denied him, our

daughter . . . I would be wrong for that," and "I try to get her to communicate

with him because I said, 'Your dad loves you.'"

      The court found plaintiff had not demonstrated a change in

circumstances to modify custody and parenting time, reasoning "the [DCPP]

ha[d] not found [plaintiff]'s allegations of abuse of [G.Q.] to be valid" and

"[t]he prosecutor's office ha[d]n't done anything" regarding the allegations.

Further, the court found plaintiff did not "have a basis to terminate

[defendant's] parental rights." The court ordered supervised parenting time to

occur in the courthouse on Saturdays, which previously was not possible

because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

      On appeal, D.Q. contends:      the child support order is unreasonable

because a modification was warranted; and the court failed to analyze the child

custody statutory factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) and make the requisite

factual findings.

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                                      II.

      "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special

jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462

N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare

v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Our scope of review of Family Part

orders is limited. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411. A judge's findings "are binding on

appeal so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence.'" Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting Cesare, 154

N.J. at 411-12). We review orders concerning modification of child support or

parenting time under an abuse of discretion standard. See J.B. v. W.B., 215

N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013); see also Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116

(App. Div. 2012).    An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's

decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."    Flagg v. Essex

Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v.

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

However, while "a family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable

deference, we do not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law."

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Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016) (quoting D.W. v. R.W.,

212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)).

      "Where there is already an agreement affecting custody and parenting

time in place, it is presumed it 'embodies a best interests determination.'" A.J.

v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 182 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Todd v. Sheridan,

268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993)). "In custody cases, it is well

settled that the court's primary consideration is the best interests of the

children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007). The

focus is on the "safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare of the

child[ren]." Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J. 62, 82 (2003) (quoting Fantony

v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)).

      "A custody arrangement adopted by the trial court, whether based on the

parties' agreement or imposed by the court, is subject to modification based on a

showing of changed circumstances, with the court determining custody in

accordance with the [child's] best interests." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322

(2017).   The moving party must first show "a change of circumstances

warranting modification" of the extant custody and parenting time order.

Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting R.K. v. F.K.,

437 N.J. Super. 58, 63 (App. Div. 2014)). After a change in circumstances is

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demonstrated, "the party is 'entitled to a plenary hearing as to disputed material

facts regarding the child's best interests, and whether those best interests are

served by modification of the existing custody order.'" Ibid. (quoting R.K.,

437 N.J. Super. at 62-63); see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980).

Courts evaluate changed circumstances based on facts existing at the time the prior

agreement or order was entered. See Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App.

Div. 1990); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127-29 (App. Div.

2009).

                                        III.

      We first address plaintiff's contention that the court erred in failing to

address defendant's child support obligation and "that a modification is

warranted."    A review of the record demonstrates plaintiff withdrew her

request to address child support at the hearing by stating, "I d[o]n't need . . . to

address the child support," "I tried reaching the courts and left a message to let

them know that I don't need child support," the child support "was brought

current," and "[w]e actually worked some of [G.Q.'s] childcare out." At no

time during the hearing did plaintiff request the court address any child

support issues. Also, plaintiff had only requested enforcement of child support

in her FRO modification application.

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      During the hearing, the court sought clarification from plaintiff

regarding the relief requested by asking, "what do you want me to order for

you?" and "what [is it] that you want the [c]ourt to order to happen[?]" The

record reflects the court copiously requested the parties' positions, offering

ample opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff maintained her request to terminate

defendant's parental rights based on allegations that defendant's girlfriend

abused G.Q. Plaintiff also reiterated she wanted defendant "to be no part of"

and "removed from [their] daughter's life."

      For these reasons, we conclude plaintiff clearly withdrew her child

support enforcement request and did not seek a modification; thus, her

argument that the court erred is procedurally defective and not properly before

us. We generally decline to consider questions or issues not presented below

when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions

raised on appeal concern jurisdiction or matters of great public interest. See

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 186 (App. Div.

2005) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). We

only comment that plaintiff is not foreclosed from seeking to enforce or

modify child support if a warranted change in circumstances is presented. See

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116.

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      We next reject plaintiff's contention that the court failed to provide

adequate factual findings and an analysis of the child custody statutory factors

set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).      The record reflects plaintiff repeatedly

requested sole custody and to prevent defendant from having any contact with

G.Q. On appeal, plaintiff frames her requested relief below as a "modification

of parenting time . . . and visitation." As the court correctly stated, when

addressing any modification of custody or parenting time, plaintiff had "the

burden of proof to show that [it is] in the best interest[s] of the child and that

there has been changed circumstances since the legal custodial order was

entered as to why it should be changed."

      In determining whether plaintiff made a prima facie showing of changed

circumstances to modify custody, the court listened extensively to plaintiff's

assertions that the DCPP and the prosecutor's office failed to properly

investigate allegations of abuse against G.Q.         The court found it was

unsubstantiated that defendant "physically abuse[d] [their] daughter" as the

agencies charged with investigating the allegations made no findings of abuse.

Additionally, the court found, even accepting as true all of plaintiff's

allegations and all hearsay statements, there was no basis for a hearing to

address plaintiff's request "to terminate [defendant's] parental rights."     The

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court ordered supervised parenting time and declined to modify custody,

finding plaintiff had not established a "basis . . . to terminate parental rights or

to not allow [defendant] have a supervised parenting session." We discern no

reason to disturb the court's well-reasoned decision, which is amply supported

by the record.

      To the extent that we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining

arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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