Court Opinion

ID: 9493555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:11:28.060799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:54.073275
License: Public Domain

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in most of Judge Wardlaw’s excellent opinion, but respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis of the harmfulness of the jury misconduct. The question is whether the petitioner has carried his burden of proving that the phone call incident had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. It is not enough to shotv that it may have had some incidental effect. I agree with the district judge that the petitioner has not met the burden imposed by Brecht.
For starters, as Judge Byrne pointed out, the alleged phone call did not mention the petitioner at all. It is not altogether clear exactly what the jurors heard about the call, but the majority quotes the testimony of juror Dylane Rankins, who said, “Well, one of the jurors mentioned that there was a phone call made to the Turkish Consulate concerning a threatening call and said why there would be other reasons, assuming the call.” Juror Kennelly testified “... that there had been a phone call for publicity. I don’t know who they phoned.... But it was something to do with publicity.”
That’s it. That is all the record shows that the jurors heard about the call to the Turkish Consulate. The insinuation that the jurors must have overheard a sidebar summary of the proposed testimony of a UPI reporter is utter speculation wholly unsupported by the jurors themselves.
This case is not like those, for example, in which a jury was improperly informed of the defendant’s own prior criminal record, Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1491 (9th Cir.1997), or told that the defendant himself has a history of violence, Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995). As Judge Byrne found, at most
*1113[t]he alleged phone call relates only to facts that were not in dispute at trial. The phone call purported to be either a threat about a future assassination, or the taking of responsibility for the assassination after the fact. It did not purport to say why the assassination would or did occur, nor who participated in the actual assassination. The fact that Ari-kan was assassinated was not in dispute, nor was the fact that he was a Turkish national and the Consul General. The call did not in any way relate to whether the petitioner participated in the assassination and if so, what his motive might have been. The call had no connection to the petitioner. Thus, the reference to the alleged phone call is similar to juror misconduct that has not resulted in the granting of the habeas petition.
Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion, September 8, 1998 at 33 (citations omitted).
In determining whether the momentaneous mention of the phone call likely had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 'verdict as required by Brecht, it is essential to view it in the context of the entirety of the case. The majority says that the evidence concerning the special circumstance was less than overwhelming. With all due respect, I suggest that there was a mountain of mostly undisputed evidence that Arikan was killed because of his nationality:
• Petitioner previously expressed his hatred for the Turkish people.
• Arikan was a Turkish national and diplomat.
• Arikan drove a car bearing the distinctive “Consul Corps” license plate.
• The two assailants pre-positioned themselves on either side of an intersection in Arikan’s usual course of travel and awaited his arrival.
• When Arikan’s car arrived at the intersection, he immediately was ambushed by the two men, assassination style.
• There was no evidence of a personal relationship between Arikan and petitioner, no attempt to rob or kidnap, and no evidence of any other motive.
When this compelling evidence is stacked up against the fleeting mention of a cryptic phone call, the conclusion is clear: The phone call incident cannot be found to have had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict as required by Brecht This case was a whodunit, not a whydunit. The petition was, in my view, correctly denied in all particulars, and therefore, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s decision granting relief with respect to the finding of special circumstances.