Court Opinion

ID: 9593554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:06.847276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:30.865561
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully with the dissent because the evidence fit the requested jury charge on OCGA § 16-3-4 as it related to the alleged violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (2).
There are two parts to the defense, and as recognized by appellant, the absence of evidence of either part would render intoxication no defense. Defendant’s position at trial, backed up by at least some evidence, was as follows:
1. I did not know that the drug could intoxicate me, and that ignorance is excusable because a) the doctor who prescribed it, upon whom I relied, did not tell me it would intoxicate me and b) the prescription bottle gave me no such warning, and c) I had no previous experience with this drug or knowledge of its intoxicating quality. That is to say, I did not know the Valium could, by its properties, render me incapable of safely driving under the circumstances I took it, and this lack of knowledge (ignorance) was not my fault. Thus there was consumption through excusable ignorance, fulfilling the requirement of OCGA § 16-3-4 (b) (1).
Although it is undisputed that defendant knew that the substance he voluntarily ingested was Valium, he testified with supporting evidence that he did not know its properties in relation to the circumstances under which he took it. The comments to the Code “offer the explanation that involuntary intoxication may be ‘due to excusable ignorance such as reliance on a physician’s prescription. . .’ Committee Notes, Code Ann. Ch. 26-7, § 26-704 (p. 67).” Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 489 (1) (220 SE2d 448) (1975).
2. I did not know while I was driving that the drug did have an intoxicating influence on me so as to render me incapable of safely driving. That is to say, I did not realize that because of its actual effect on me when I took it, it did affect my driving capability and I should not then drive. To be specific, because of its influence on me, I could not then distinguish between right (that it was permissible to drive) and wrong (that it was not permissible to drive). Thus there was a lack of mental capacity at the time to make the distinction, “in relation to [the] act” of driving under the influence, fulfilling the requirement of OCGA § 16-3-4 (a) and eliminating criminal intent.
The evidence of this latter part is defendant’s testimony that he did not have any reason to believe that he was driving any differently than he did any other day, and that he did not while driving believe his driving was impaired.
*102Decided July 15, 1988
Rehearing denied July 28, 1988.
Dorine E. Preis, for appellant.
Ralph T. Bowden, Jr., Solicitor, N. Jackson Cotney, Jr., Judith C. Emken, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.