Court Opinion

ID: 9598001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:22.286432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:40.376063
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion which holds that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty brought during the same term of court is a critical stage of the proceedings at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Notwithstanding that ruling, I respectfully dissent to Division 2 because the absence of counsel at the withdrawal proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this case.
This case illustrates the absolute necessity that a trial court conduct a full inquiry on the record at a plea hearing. The fully developed record in this case establishes conclusively that all constitutional protections were afforded the defendant, thus obviating the need for a remand.5
“[Ain appellate court, using the appropriate standard, may find in a particular case that error committed by the trial court was constitutionally harmless, without remanding the case for further proceedings.” State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 61 (222 SE2d 333) (1976). “A federal constitutional error can be held harmless only if the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 60, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967). See United States v. Crowley, 529 F2d 1066, 1070 (3rd Cir. 1976) (finding harmless error as to the denial of counsel at a plea-withdrawal hearing where innocence was not asserted and record shows no basis for allowing withdrawal of the plea); Randall v. State, 861 P2d 314, 316 (Okl. Cr. App. 1993) (adopting the harmless error doctrine stated in Crowley, but refusing to apply it where there was no formal record of the guilty plea proceeding).
In his pro se motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to felony murder and weapons possession, Fortson claims he did not know*462ingly participate in the plea bargaining process and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney misrepresented the terms of the plea. However, the transcript of the plea hearing belies those contentions and conclusively confirms that Fort-son’s pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The prosecutor provided a detailed recitation of the facts, which Fortson verified. The trial court scrupulously followed the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969) and the Uniform Superior Court Rules in ascertaining that the pleas were constitutionally valid.6 In so doing, the court specifically questioned Fortson concerning his satisfaction with counsel. Fortson acknowledged that he had ample opportunity to discuss any questions he may have had with his lawyer; that counsel reviewed each question on the waiver of rights form with him before obtaining his signature; that there was nothing more he wanted counsel to do for him; and that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea, the trial court sentenced Fortson to life imprisonment plus five consecutive years to be served on probation. Both Fortson and his attorney acknowledged that the sentence was consistent with the State’s recommendation. Accordingly, I see absolutely no basis upon which Fortson would be entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas. Even now, with the assistance of counsel on appeal, defendant has failed to advance any new support for his claim that his pleas were invalid or to demonstrate how the absence of counsel harmed him. Under the circumstances, an attorney’s assistance would not have changed the outcome of the withdrawal hearing.
In addition, Fortson’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was rejected by the court in the order denying the motion to withdraw.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (106 SC 366, 88 LE2d 203) (1985), established the following test for ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea: 1) the performance of counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687-[688] (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)); and 2) “. . . defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U. S. at 59.
Tarwater v. State, 259 Ga. 516, 517 (383 SE2d 883) (1989). Since Fortson failed to establish either prong of this test, the trial court *463properly exercised its discretion in rejecting the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See generally England v. State, 232 Ga. App. 842 (502 SE2d 770) (1998). Significantly, this ruling is not even challenged on appeal.
Decided June 12, 2000.
James E. Millsaps, for appellant.
Alan A. Cook, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Thus, I would hold that the absence of counsel at the plea withdrawal proceedings was constitutionally harmless under the circumstances shown by this record.

 Had the record been incomplete, a remand would be necessary.

 See specifically USCR 33.7 to 33.9 and 33.11.