Court Opinion

ID: 9704514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:50.972471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.616127
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). Crampton, Hudgins and Allen were arrested for traffic offenses. Jones was arrested for being in a blind pig, an offense related to the enforcement of the liquor laws. As a result of such arrests, the police discovered other law violations. In Crampton’s case, a less serious offense was discovered: failure to display a valid *510motor vehicle registration on demand.1 In the other cases, more serious offenses were discovered:2 in Hudgins, carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle without a license;3 in Jones, possession of heroin4 and marijuana;5 in Allen, carrying a concealed weapon6 and felonious assault7 committed on the driver of another vehicle.
In each case the defendant was convicted of the less serious offense (either on his plea of guilty or following a trial) and sought dismissal of the more serious charge on the ground that both offenses were part of the same transaction [People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973)] and, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, further prosecution is barred. Crampton was refused but the other defendants obtained the relief requested.
We granted by-pass.
We conclude in each case that the more serious charge was not part of the same transaction and, hence, prosecution is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
I
In People v White, supra, the defendant was *511charged and convicted in circuit court of kidnapping a woman. He was separately charged and convicted in Detroit Recorder’s Court of the offenses of rape and felonious assault of the woman.
In adopting the same transaction test, this Court said that both charges arose "out of the same criminal episode”.
"There can be no doubt that the three crimes committed by defendant were all part of a single criminal transaction. The crimes were committed in a continuous time sequence and display a single intent and goal —sexual intercourse with the complainant.” People v White, supra, p 259.
In a footnote, this Court said that the holding in White was limited "to the facts of the present case and to similar factual situations. * * * We emphasize that our primary objective in adopting the same transaction test is to insure that a criminal defendant receives meaningful protection under the double jeopardy clause. If actual situations should arise in which application of the same transaction test would not serve that objective, we will, in such a case, consider the adoption of limited exceptions to the same transaction test.” People v White, supra, p 258, fn 6.
The Court of Appeals has applied the White rationale.
In People v Rolston, 51 Mich App 146; 214 NW2d 894 (1974), it was claimed that the defendant had robbed a bar and kidnapped, raped and murdered a barmaid. The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s "acquittal of murder for the events arising out of this single, criminal episode of robbery, kidnapping, rape and murder bars further prosecution by the state”. Similarly, in People v Joines (On Remand), 55 Mich App 334; 222 NW2d *512230 (1974), where the defendant was acquitted on a charge of kidnapping in Genesee County, the Court of Appeals reversed his subsequent Livingston County conviction of assault with intent to rape the victim of the kidnapping.
In People v Davenport (On Remand), 51 Mich App 484; 215 NW2d 702 (1974), and People v West, 54 Mich App 527, 530; 221 NW2d 179 (1974), following trial for disorderly conduct,* 8 the defendants were convicted in circuit court of resisting arrest9 (Davenport) and resisting and obstructing an officer in discharge of his duty10 (West). In West the Court of Appeals said:
"As in People v White, supra, and Davenport, the two crimes with which defendant was charged were committed in a continuous time sequence, and plaintiff conceded in its brief and at oral argument that both charges arose out of the same transaction. * * * As in Davenport, the continuousness of the time sequence was obvious, and the unity of intent was also apparent —the defendant’s refusal to submit to the police officers’ authority.”
In People v Martinez, 58 Mich App 693, 695; 228 NW2d 523 (1975), the defendant was convicted in one proceeding of possession of heroin on February 20, 1973 and in a separate proceeding of possession of heroin on March 1, 1973 as the result of transactions with the same police undercover agent. In affirming defendant’s second conviction, the Court of Appeals said that while the deliveries of heroin were "to the same agent during the course of a continuous undercover investigation * * * these facts alone do not relate the events intimately *513enough so as to characterize them as being a part of a single transaction under the test adopted in People v White. * * * [T]he record does not disclose any connection between [the two sales], such as an agreement after the first delivery to return for another sale.”
In People v Goans, 59 Mich App 294, 297; 229 NW2d 422 (1975), the defendant was charged with felonious driving11 and pled guilty to an added charge of failure to stop at a motor vehicle accident involving property damage.12 The Court of Appeals held that a plea of guilty to one of two counts of a multi-count information does not preclude proceeding on other counts where the defendant enters a plea "with the full awareness that the prosecutor intends to proceed to trial on the other charge.”13 See Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974).
In People v Williams, 61 Mich App 642, 646; 233 NW2d 122 (1975), the defendant entered a plea of guilty to breaking and entering an occupied dwelling. Subsequently a person the defendant assaulted in the dwelling died of his injuries. The Court of Appeals, referring to an exception noted in footnote 6 of White, held "that since the crime with which defendant was here charged was not complete at the time of his earlier plea, his conviction is not barred by double jeopardy”.
In People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 342; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), the defendant was arrested when *514he sought to use a credit card stolen, during the course of an attempt to rob a bar, from a person in the bar. This Court held that defendant’s plea of guilty to the offense of attempted unlawful possession of a credit card14 did not bar prosecution for assault with intent to rob being armed.15 While the credit card charge was related to the attempted robbery charge in the sense that the credit card was stolen during that attempt, these were separate transactions:
"The Double Jeopardy Clause does not license subsequent offenses growing out of a theft or excuse the theft upon trial for one or another offense.”
The Jackson analysis was adopted in People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240, 249; 233 NW2d 246 (1975), where, following a prison escape, the defendant forced a woman at knifepoint to accompany him while they drove in her automobile. The defendant was convicted of prison escape16 and subsequently was convicted of assault with intent to commit a felony.17 The Court of Appeals declared that "the double jeopardy clause does not license subsequent offenses growing out of a prison escape or excuse the escape upon trial of one or another offense”.
II
In White, Joines, Davenport and West, there were both a continuous time sequence and a com*515mon goal or intent — sexual intercourse with the victim (White and Joines) or refusal to submit to the police officers’ authority (Davenport and West). In Rolston, a common goal or intent did not appear, but there was a substantial connection in criminality between the offenses committed. Robbery of the bar escalated to kidnapping of the barmaid and culminated in her rape and murder. There was but one criminal episode and all the offenses were part of the same criminal transaction.18
In contrast, in Martinez, the two sales of heroin were nine days apart and there was no connection between the sales. There were two criminal episodes, two separate criminal transactions. In Jackson, while the attempt to use the credit card was made possible by its theft during the attempt to rob the bar, the chain of criminality was broken when Jackson secured his departure from the bar; there was no substantial connection in criminality between the credit card offense and the offenses committed in the bar. Similarly, in Johnson, the defendant had made good his escape from Jackson State Prison and had traveled a considerable distance before he encountered the woman in Livingston County. While Johnson was still fleeing and the subsequent offense against "the woman was made possible by the prison escape, the chain of criminality was broken some time between escape from the prison and his encounter with the woman; the police were not in hot pursuit, there was no continuing course of criminality such as victimization of a hostage which might connect the prison escape with the assault.
In the instant cases it does not appear there is a *516substantial connection in criminality between the traffic or liquor law offenses of which the defendants were convicted and the other offenses they seek to have dismissed.19
Crampton’s arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was but the occasion for discovering his inability to display a valid registration,20 as Hudgins’ arrest for making an improper U-turn and excessive smoke emission was the occasion for discovering that he was carrying a pistol in a motor vehicle without a license, and Allen’s arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was the occasion for discovering that he was carrying a concealed weapon. Similarly, Jones’ arrest for being in a blind pig was but the occasion for discovering his possession of heroin and marijuana; it does not appear that Jones acquired the heroin or the marijuana in the blind pig. There is no substantial connection in criminality between offenses where the only factor connecting one offense with the other is that one was discovered in consequence of apprehension for the other; each is a separate transaction.
Criminal intent is not an element of traffic or liquor law violation. However, conscious wrongdoing, mens rea, must be shown to establish the offenses of carrying a concealed weapon, possession of prohibited substances or felonious assault.21 *517While safety and revenue measures are sometimes enforced with penal sanctions, the interests thereby secured, the harm caused by their violation, is of a nature significantly different than in the case of laws designed to protect persons and property from predatory behavior. We need not attempt to anticipate the myriad situations that may arise or fill in the ground between the two broad groups of offenses. In Allen, there is no substantial connection in criminality between drunk driving and felonious assault with a handgun; each is a separate transaction.
Ill
In the necessary accommodation of the constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense and the provisions of statutory and local law22 establishing the jurisdiction of the district court23 and the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit, Traffic and Ordinance Division,24 preservation of the constitutional right without impairment of full enforcement of the laws requires thát we hold that where necessary to accommodate those objectives a prosecutor may file an informar tion in circuit court or recorder’s court for all offenses, whether arising under state or local law *518and whether misdemeanors or felonies, which are part of the same transaction.25
In Crampton the district court is. affirmed. In Hudgins, Allen and Jones, the recorder’s court is reversed and those cases are remanded for trial.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Levin, J.

 MCLA 257.223; MSA 9.1923.

 In Crampton, the more serious offense was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. MCLA 257.625; MSA 9.2325. In Allen, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was the less serious offense. In both Crampton and Allen, all the charges were for state law violations. In Hudgins and Jones, the less serious offenses were for violation of local ordinances: in Hudgins, making an improper U-turn and driving an automobile emitting excessive smoke (Detroit ordinances, §38-5-7; 38-10-11); in Jones, for disorderly conduct in being in a blind pig. Detroit ordinance, § 39-1-10.

 MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.

 MCLA 335.341(4)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(a).

 MCLA 335.341(4)(d); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(d).

 MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.

 MCLA 750.82; MSA 28.277.

 Davenport was acquitted and West was convicted.

 MCLA 750.479; MSA 28.747.

 MCLA 750.479; MSA 28.747.

 MCLA 752.191; MSA 28.661.

 MCLA 257.618; MSA 9.2318.

 "We emphasize that the plea in this gase was not a negotiated plea. A case where the defendant had pled guilty in the expectation that the other charge would be dismissed would present different considerations.” People v Goans, 59 Mich App 294, 298; 229 NW2d 422 (1975).

 Jackson was arrested when he sought to use the credit card. He pled guilty to the reduced charge of attempted unlawful possession of a credit card.

 MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284.

 MCLA 750.193; MSA 28.390.

 MCLA 750.87; MSA 28.282.

 The felony-murder statute MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548 recognizes a substantial connection in criminality between certain offenses against property and against persons.

 A defendant is in jeopardy whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony and, accordingly, a distinction cannot properly be drawn on the basis of characterization as a misdemeanor or a felony or on the basis of the length of potential imprisonment. See Waller v Florida, 397 US 387; 90 S Ct 1184; 25 L Ed 2d 435 (1970), reh den 398 US 914; 90 S Ct 1684; 26 L Ed 2d 79 (1970).

 Failure to produce a valid registration may reflect either an omission to register the vehicle or merely the failure to carry proof of registration. In either event the omission almost always precedes the driving. It is likely that one will drive carefully and in a state of sobriety without regard to whether in possession of evidence of registration.

 See Morissette v United States, 342 US 246; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed *517288 (1952).

 “A procedural rule allocating jurisdiction to try offenses between the several courts of the state must be subordinated to the defendant’s constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Cf Gouled v United States, 255 US 298, 313; 41 S Ct 261, 266; 65 L Ed 647, 654 (1921). This state’s judicial power is, under our Constitution, vested in 'one court of justice’. Const 1963, art 6, § 1. While that power is divided among several courts, all the courts are parts-of the same unified judicial system.”' People v White, 41 Mich App 370, 380; 200 NW2d 326 (1972).

 MCLA 600.8311; MSA 27A.8311.

 MCLA 725.18; MSA 27.3958.

 In People v Davenport (On Remand), 51 Mich App 484, 487; 215 NW2d 702 (1974), the Court said:
"The conflict between the protection against double jeopardy and the allocation of jurisdiction among the district and circuit courts can be resolved by authorizing one of those courts, probably the circuit court, to try all charges, misdemeanors and felonies, in cases such as the instant one. However, a grant of such authority may be made only by the Legislature or the Supreme Court. Const 1963, art 6, § 13. Until either or both of those bodies act, prosecutors must, when confronted with a case such as this one, elect which charge to pursue.”