Court Opinion

ID: 9667381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:44:04.449239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.472694
License: Public Domain

MARTIN, Justice
(dissenting).
This dissent is based on the opinion that there is no evidence in this record showing any change of conditions of such nature as to authorize setting aside the original judgment dividing custody of the child of appellant and appellee and that appellant’s points two, three and four should have been sustained as a matter of law.
The court is only authorized to change the custody of the minor child from the manner in which such custody was decreed in the prior final judgment under the following rule: “ * * * the evidence must show that since the original decree conditions have so changed that it can reasonably be said that it would be injurious to the welfare of the minors to leave their custody as originally adjudicated.” Amend v. Amend, Tex.Civ.App., 268 S.W.2d 206, 210 [1] and cases there cited. In this cause of action, appellee must predicate her right to a change of custody upon the alleged elements of changed conditions as discussed in paragraph six of the majority opinion. Since the judgment on appeal awarding appellee full custody of the minor child must be based solely upon such alleged elements of changed conditions, the same will be briefly discussed herein.
First, appellee could not have regarded ihe OPA violation as material as she filed no pleading as to the OPA violation discussed in paragraph six of the majority opinion. Further, the undisputed evidence reveals that such alleged violation and punishment thereof occurred long prior to the rendition of the original judgment dividing custody of the child between the parties and even prior to the birth of the child. Such OPA violation occurred in 1947 and clearly was not admissible in a suit as to custody alleging that conditions as to custody had changed since the rendition of the original decree in August, 1951. With reference to this element as discussed in the majority opinion there is no evidence in the record that the violation of the OPA regulation or any penalty thereunder “ * * * must have influenced his [appellant’s] life and may have had some bearing on his life later.” Nor is there any evidence that “Such may have helped to cause his failure later to discharge his responsibilities of child support * * * ” which alleged failure is also not revealed by the record. Nor is there any evidence that such conviction “probably contributed negatively or positively to his other conduct [what “his other conduct” may have been is also not revealed by the record] which helped to broaden the breach between him and the child’s mother.” In fact, the positive evidence of the appellee herself on this very subject reveals without dispute the following testimony: “Q. But, as far as his moral fitness is concerned to have the child around him, you know it does not have a thing to do with it at this time, does it? A. No.” This OPA violation was injected by appellee solely for the purpose of prejudice and has no legal bearing on the issue of change of custody.
The next element presented by appellee and incorporated in the majority opinion is that the child was permitted to visit her father at a time when she was supposed to return to Lubbock to attend an outing with the Campfire Girls. It is further stated in the majority opinion that the father prohibited the child from talking to the mother about such matter until the mother called the police at Hobbs, New Mexico, who intervened. This minor incident could not have been grounds for changing custody at the time of the filing of appellee’s suit as such suit was filed prior to the occurrence of this incident. Further, appellant had *514been compelled by the trial court to post a bond in the cause as a condition to taking the child with him to New Mexico for a two week’s visit. Appellee testified that appellant stated that he would bring the child back within three days. The appellant testified that no such agreement was made. Despite such testimony, pro and con, it is an undisputed fact that appellant was authorized by a valid court order to keep the custody of the child for a period of two weeks and had made bond for such custody as required by the court. Therefore, at the time appellee was placing telephone calls to Hobbs every few minutes seeking to compel appellant to return the child to her it is an undisputed fact that appellant held the custody of the child by an order of the trial court. The record reveals without dispute that this one immaterial incident occurred not only after appellee had filed her unwarranted suit for change of custody but also at a time when the appellant was holding custody of the child by order of the court and under a bond therefor.
One other minor incident as to custody was presented by the evidence of appellee but was not mentioned in the original draft of the majority opinion. Appellee testified that appellant took the child away on one occasion for three days and that appellee did not know where the child was located. Since this incident likewise was not important enough for appellee to plead the same and occurred approximately three years before the filing of appellee’s suit for change of custody it is apparent that such element was originally correctly ignored by the majority opinion as a basis for change of custody.
The record reveals without dispute that although appellee was awarded the sum of $2,500 in cash at the time of the original decree as to divorce and custody and was thereafter employed in Lubbock, Texas, at a salary of $170 per month, she saw fit to leave the child with the appellant for more than eleven months, nine months of such period being during the time appellee was entitled to legal custody of the child. Further, there has been no friction and no evidence of changed conditions since the granting of the original decree as will warrant a change of custody in the subsequent judgment. For a period of several years appellant has had the custody of the child during the time such custody was awarded to him the original decree. Appellant has always returned the child to her mother when she was entitled to custody of the child. Appel-lee even testified that she did not believe the appellant would insist on the child’s going with him if the child did not want to go. The record further reveals that during a period of several years prior to filing of ap-pellee’s suit, she had permitted the child to spend weekends with appellant in Hobbs, New Mexico. This custody was in addition to the summer vacation period of custody as decreed to appellant. The appellee also testified that she did not know of any reason why the home that appellant maintained was not suitable for a young girl and that there was not anything wrong with appellant’s morals that would render him unfit to have the child around him.
An examination of the record merely reveals that appellant married another woman and that shortly thereafter appellee filed her suit for change of custody. The undisputed evidence reveals that the woman who married appellant was of good reputation and loved appellant’s child and that she and the appellant maintained a proper home for the child during the three summer months when appellant was entitled to the child’s custody under the original decree. Appellant’s marriage to another woman and even changes in the home surroundings are not evidence of changed conditions affecting the welfare and best interest of the minor. Amend v. Amend, supra, Syl. 4. Nor is the sole fact that appellant resided in the state of New Mexico a sufficient basis to predicate a change of custody under the record in this case.
It is elementary that no authority exists in this court at this date to set aside, either directly or indirectly, the original decree as to custody as rendered on August 31, 1951, *515and from which there was no appeal to this court. The correctness of the original trial court’s judgment in dividing custody of the child is of no concern to this court in the present appeal. However, the soundness of the original trial court’s judgment dividing custody of the child has been fully attested by the fact that the status between all parties affected by the judgment has been entirely satisfactory to the date of the filing of appellee’s petition seeking a change in such original judgment as to custody and even as to the trial thereof.
There being no evidence of any change of conditions since the original decree was entered dividing custody of the minor child between the appellant and appellee, appellant’s points two, three and four should be sustained. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment rendered that appellee take nothing by her suit for change of custody.