Court Opinion

ID: 9392329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:03:51.810821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.618681
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                      IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0286
                                FILED 5-4-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD42295
                    The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Emily M. Stokes
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Vice Chief Judge:
                    IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.
                          Decision of the Court

¶1            Father appeals the superior court’s dependency adjudication
and placement of G.B., his biological child. G.B.’s mother is not a party to
this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             In August 2022, mother, an enrolled member of the San Carlos
Apache Tribe, gave birth to G.B., a child she shares with father. Because
G.B. was born substance-exposed to methamphetamine, she spent her first
25 days of life in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).

¶3            A few days after G.B. was born, The Department of Child
Safety (DCS) interviewed mother and father. Though father suspected he
could be G.B.’s biological parent, he refused to engage in services until DCS
confirmed his paternity. And he only sporadically visited G.B. in the NICU.
Nevertheless, father completed a drug test at the end of August, and DCS
informed him he tested positive for methamphetamines. Father denied any
substance use but had engaged in services through Terros in 2016 and had
tested positive for amphetamine four times between February and June
2016.

¶4            On September 8, 2022, DCS took G.B. into custody because it
could not identify “services or supports” to allow G.B. to live safely with
mother or father. And DCS did not find—nor did mother or father
suggest—any other kinship placement options. Because G.B. is an Indian
child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), DCS also
contacted the San Carlos Apache Tribe regarding their jurisdiction over the
case. In response, the Tribe only asked for notification when DCS had filed
the dependency petition.

¶5            On September 9, 2022, DCS filed a dependency petition. Later
that month, DCS called father to inform him the paternity test results
confirmed he is the biological parent of G.B. But father continued to refuse
to participate in services until he saw the DNA report itself, stating that he
wanted to know parentage “for sure.” Later, at the dependency hearing, a
DCS case manager testified she called father in November 2022 and talked
about drug testing and services with Terros. Father, though, denied being
aware of DCS’s request for him to drug test.

¶6            Father asked DCS to place G.B. with G.B.’s paternal
grandmother because father lived with her, and she was the primary
caregiver for two of father’s other children for the last three years. DCS
interviewed paternal grandmother, who expressed concerns about caring
for G.B. because father had not been very involved with parenting his other

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                     IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.
                           Decision of the Court

children. Paternal grandmother also did not know about father’s substance
use or his recent positive test and had no experience caring for a child born
substance-exposed.

¶7            In December 2022, the superior court held a dependency
adjudication hearing. The superior court heard testimony from father,
paternal grandmother, a DCS child safety specialist, and the Tribe’s ICWA
coordinator. DCS also presented its preliminary protective hearing report
and father’s drug-testing records.

¶8            During the hearing, father testified he received the physical
copy of the DNA report a few weeks before the hearing and would
participate in services. At the time of the hearing, father had been working
for about three weeks and was not sure of his monthly income. Paternal
grandmother also testified she was willing to “assist” with G.B.’s care in her
home. And father said paternal grandmother’s house has a room for G.B.,
even though he had not yet filled it with supplies.

¶9            The DCS child safety specialist and the ICWA coordinator,
however, both testified they had reservations about placing G.B. in paternal
grandmother’s home before father had shown sobriety, a safe and stable
home, reliable income, and more parental engagement. The ICWA
coordinator also testified he believed good cause existed to deviate from
ICWA’s placement preferences, but he supported a family reunification
case plan. The superior court shared the same concerns and found father’s
recent drug use and his delay in participating in services caused a barrier
to G.B.’s placement with him.

¶10           On that basis, the superior court found G.B. dependent as to
father and “continued custody of the child by the father is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical danger to the child.” Additionally, the
superior court found DCS made “active efforts . . . to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family, and that the efforts have proven unsuccessful.” Lastly, the
superior court ordered DCS to evaluate paternal grandmother for possible
placement and complete expedited background checks on all adult
members of her home.

¶11             This court has jurisdiction over father’s timely appeal under
article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1
and -2101.A.1.

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                     IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.
                           Decision of the Court

                                 ANALYSIS

I.     Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s dependency
       finding.

¶12          Father argues the superior court abused its discretion because
reasonable evidence did not support finding G.B. dependent.

¶13            This court reviews a dependency finding for an abuse of
discretion and will affirm the order unless no reasonable evidence supports
the factual findings upon which it is based. Louis C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
237 Ariz. 484, 488 ¶ 12 (App. 2015). The superior court is in the “best
position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of
witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234 ¶ 13 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). This court,
thus, views the facts and draws reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to affirming the superior court. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew
L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶14            “Dependent child” includes a child “who has no parent or
guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising [proper and effective
parental] care and control.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i). The superior court must
consider “the circumstances existing at the time of the adjudication
hearing[,]” and not just past circumstances. Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 249 Ariz. 289, 300 ¶ 35 (App. 2020) (citation omitted). And the
superior court must support a dependency adjudication with at least one
specific factual finding. Id. at 295 ¶ 12. But the superior court need not
“detail each fact that supports its ruling.” Id. at 296 ¶ 14.

¶15            The superior court found G.B. dependent because father had
recently used methamphetamines and then delayed participating in
services until he had “legal confirmation” he was G.B.’s father. At trial, DCS
presented evidence of father’s recent and past drug-use, and the superior
court considered that evidence in its dependency finding. The superior
court explained—though father had the right to wait to participate in
services until he had “legal confirmation” of his paternity—“[t]he barrier to
in-home [placement] with [father] is demonstrating sobriety, and that is a
barrier we can overcome fairly quickly.”

¶16           Father argues DCS failed to “effectively communicate[]” its
desire to have him participate in drug testing between August and
November 2022, and he could not test until December 2022. He also argues
there was no evidence his drug use resulted in a “substantial risk of harm”
to G.B. nor affected his ability to parent G.B.

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                     IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.
                           Decision of the Court

¶17             Though father was willing to participate in services at the
time of trial, he had not yet participated. Additionally, father argues he had
sufficient income and housing to support G.B. But at the time of trial, he
had worked at his current job for only three weeks and could not provide
his estimated monthly salary. On this record, the superior court acted
within its discretion to find father needed to show sobriety before placing
G.B. in his home.

¶18          Father also argues there was no evidence of abuse or neglect.
But DCS did not allege any abuse or neglect, and the superior court did not
rely on abuse or neglect in its dependency finding. This court, thus, need
not address those arguments.

II.    The superior court did not violate ICWA by placing G.B. in foster
       care.

¶19           Father argues the superior court erred by failing to make a
finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences and
because no evidence established good cause. DCS claims:
(1) father waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the superior court’s
good-cause findings; (2) the superior court did not deviate from ICWA’s
placement preferences; and (3) if the placement did deviate, the superior
court had good cause for the deviation.

¶20           Father argues 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) requires the superior court
find good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement priorities. Unless good
cause provides otherwise, ICWA requires a superior court prioritize
placement with “a member of the Indian child’s extended family” before a
foster home. Id. Before foster-home placement, the superior court must also
find DCS made “active efforts . . . to provide remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

¶21           ICWA does not require the superior court to make good-cause
findings on the record. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Arizona law, however, does.
In dependency cases subject to ICWA, the superior court must “make
findings pursuant to the standards and burdens of proof required under
ICWA and the Regulations, including . . . whether there is good cause to
deviate from the preferences.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(h)(6). But if a party
believes the superior court “did not enter sufficient findings of fact or legal
conclusions as required by law,” the party must move to alter or amend the
order “no later than 12 days after the entry of the final order.” Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 317(a)(2), (b)(1).

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                    IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO G.B.
                          Decision of the Court

¶22            We need not reach the waiver issue because the superior court
made sufficient findings under ICWA to place G.B. in foster care. The
superior court found: (1) “continued custody of the child by father is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical danger to the child”; and (2) DCS
made “active efforts . . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.” The
record supports these findings.

¶23          But father argues the record does not support those findings
because “no reasonable evidence” established G.B. dependent as to father.
As discussed above, reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s
dependency finding because father used methamphetamines and had only
recently engaged in rehabilitation services. Because father asserts no other
reasoning, we do not discuss the issue further and find no error.

                              CONCLUSION

¶24          We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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