Court Opinion

ID: 9783707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:02:35.600153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:33.617520
License: Public Domain

JEFFREY W. BATES, Judge,
concurring in result.
The provisions of § 452.377 impose certain procedural obligations upon a parent seeking to relocate the principal residence of a child and upon a parent who objects to such relocation. In a perfect world, all parties would comply with their statutory obligations, and this Court would review the decision on the merits to determine whether the parent seeking relocation met his or her burden of proof on the two issues set out in § 452.377.9. See, e.g., Mantonya v. Mantonya, 311 S.W.3d 392, 400-02 (Mo.App.2010); Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Mo.App.2003). Unfortunately, noncompliance with the requirements of § 452.377 is all too common, and appellate courts are required to decide what effect, if any, such noncompliance has on the outcome of the case.
Here, the trial court reached the merits of the action and concluded that Mother failed to meet her burden of proof that relocation was in the best interest of the minor child. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court never should have reached the merits because Father’s motion to prohibit relocation was untimely. Mother’s argument is based upon Baxley, which held that a parent had the absolute right to relocate if the other parent failed to timely file a motion objecting to the relocation. Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 205 (Mo.App.2002). Because I believe Baxley incorrectly decided this issue, I am not persuaded by Mother’s argument.
My review of the procedural requirements in § 452.377 leads me to the conclusion that the requirements for the initial notice, a motion and affidavit opposing relocation and required response merely provide a mechanism for promptly framing the merits of the relocation issue for the parties and the trial court.1 As explained by our Supreme Court in Heintz v. Woodson, 758 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. banc 1988):
Procedural rules are but the means through which we seek to ensure the fair and orderly resolution of disputes and to attain just results. They are not ends in themselves. For this reason, we do not generally consider noncompliance with rules or statutory procedures to warrant reversal in the absence of prejudice.
Id. at 454.
In two cases decided before Baxley, this prejudice principle was applied to deter*623mine the effect of noncompliance with the notice provision of § 452.377.2.
In Kell v. Kell, 53 S.W.3d 203 (Mo.App.2001), the mother failed to send the notice to the father by certified mail, as required by § 452.377.2. Instead, she filed a notice of proposed relocation which was served upon the father’s counsel and sent by regular mail to the father. The father’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss based upon the mother’s noncompliance with the statute’s notice provisions. The trial court denied the motion and ruled for the mother on the merits. On appeal, the father argued that the trial court erred by not dismissing the action because of the mother’s noncompliance. Id. at 205-09. On appeal, the eastern district of this Court denied relief because “[the father] had a full hearing on the issue of the proposed relocation prior to the relocation. [He] has not demonstrated he was prejudiced or was unable to prepare for the relocation hearing.” Id. at 209.
In Weaver v. Kelling, 53 S.W.3d 610 (Mo.App.2001), the mother also failed to send the notice by certified mail as required by § 452.377.2. The father filed a motion to dismiss based upon the deficient notice. The trial court denied the motion and ruled for the mother on the merits. On appeal, the father argued that the trial court erred in allowing relocation because the mother’s notice was deficient. Id. at 616. The western district of this Court denied relief:
Because Father received actual notice of Mother’s intent to relocate to Texas with the children and had the opportunity to challenge the relocation, and did, Father did not suffer any prejudice as a result of Mother’s failure to follow the technical requirements of the notice statute. Father may not, therefore, complain of the technical noncompliance of the statute.
Id. at 617.
In Baxley, the father received written notice by regular mail on February 29, 2000, that the mother intended to relocate. Because the letter was not sent by certified mail, it did not comply with the notice provisions of § 452.377.2. Baxley, 91 S.W.3d at 195. On March 13, 2000, the father sent a letter to the mother stating that he opposed the relocation. Id. at 205. Thus, the mother had actual notice that the father intended to object to the relocation. The father’s motion to relocate, however, was not filed until May 2, 2000. Id. at 206. The trial court ruled in favor of the father and denied permission to relocate. Id. at 196. In assessing the effect of the mother’s noncompliance with the notice requirements in § 452.377.2, the western district continued to use a prejudice-based analysis. The mother’s noncompliance was excused because the father was not prejudiced, in that he had actual notice of the proposed relocation of the child. Id. at 205. When dealing with the father’s noncompliance with the timing requirements in § 452.377.7, however, the western district inexplicably abandoned a prejudice-based analysis and instead relied upon a waiver-based theory to overturn the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 204-05. Thus, two similarly situated litigants, each of whom failed to comply with the same statute in a different way, were treated very dissimilarly. The mother’s noncompliance was excused, but the father’s noncompliance meant that he waived the right to contest the relocation issue on the merits.
I disagree with that approach. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. If waiver is implied from conduct, the conduct must clearly and unequivocally show a purpose to relinquish *624the right.” O’Connell v. School Dist. of Springfield, R-12, 830 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Mo. banc 1992). In Baxley, it was undisputed that the mother had actual notice of the father’s objection to the proposed relocation. Thus, the father’s conduct did not clearly and unequivocally show a purpose to relinquish his right to object to the child’s relocation. Nevertheless, the western district purportedly applied a waiver-based theory to preclude both the father and the trial court from reaching the merits of the relocation issue. In so holding, the western district dispensed with the usual fact-based determination of waiver and instead utilized an implied-in-law waiver, based solely upon the untimeliness of the father’s motion. After Baxley was decided, the eastern district adopted this waiver-based analysis as well. See, e.g., Dent v. Dent, 248 S.W.3d 646, 648 (Mo.App.2008).
I agree with the majority opinion that Baxley was wrongly decided and that our decision to affirm creates a conflict among the districts. I disagree, however, with the proposition that a parent seeking to relocate must strictly comply with the notice provisions in § 452.377.2. In my view, the effect of noncompliance with the statutory procedures in § 425.377 by either parent should be determined using a prejudice-based analysis.
For the reasons expressed in the majority opinion, I agree that Mother’s notice did not comply with the requirements of § 452.377.2 concerning the specific address of the intended new residence. I also do not find Mother’s statement that she intended “to relocate [the minor child’s] address from 60-90 days within the date of this notice” to comply with the requirement in § 452.377.2(3) that Mother’s notice include “[t]he date of the intended move or proposed relocation[.]” Mother’s noncompliance, however, caused no prejudice to Father because he was fully prepared to litigate the relocation issue on the merits and did so. Likewise, Father’s motion did not comply with the requirements of § 452.377.7 because it was filed 38 days after Father received Mother’s notice. Nevertheless, Mother had actual notice that Father objected to the relocation, and his noncompliance caused no prejudice to Mother. She was fully prepared to litigate the relocation issue on the merits and did so. At the conclusion of the trial, the commissioner stated:
Let me say this while I have you on the record still. These types of cases are the most difficult cases that I have to deal with. They’re also the most difficult cases that your attorneys have to deal with. You should both be very pleased with the representation you’ve had today. Oftentimes when these cases are over my job is easy because one side or the other didn’t give me what I needed. That’s not the case today. In fact, their good work has my decision even more difficult, so you should both be pleased with that today.
Because neither party was prejudiced by the other party’s noncompliance with the various provisions of § 452.377, I believe the judgment should be affirmed. Therefore, I concur in the result.
DANIEL E. SCOTT, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result and in Judge Bates’ opinion. I do not know what Baxley, et al, mean by an “absolute right” to relocate, or why it should be so.1
*625There is no “absolute right” to judgment by default in actions for money or other relief, and no “absolute right” to keep such a judgment, if obtained.' To the contrary, the law’s distaste for default judgments is beyond cavil, and is even greater when child custody is involved, because the welfare of the child is paramount. Dozier v. Dozier, 222 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo.App.2007).
Assume for Baxley purposes that Mom gets a 60-day (or maybe a 180-day) relocation notice. It warns nothing about “30 days” or Baxley’s rule bécause no case or statute requires this. In good faith, Mom spends 30 days trying to work something out with Dad. Failing this, she goes to a lawyer, who files a motion within the week.
• Does Dad have an “absolute right” to relocate the child cross-country?
• Is there, or should there be, any room for considerations such as these:
• Length of delay?
• Reason for delay? 2
• Prejudice, if any?
• The child’s best interests?

. Cases expressly citing this "absolute right” come from all three appellate districts. In order of decision, they include Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 205 (Mo.App.2002); Heslop v. Sanderson, 123 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Mo.App.2003) (citing Baxley); Wright ex rel. McBath v. Wright, 129 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Mo.App.2004) (following Baxley); Melton v. Col*625lins, 134 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Mo.App.2004) (citing Baxley); Dent v. Dent, 248 S.W.3d 646, 648 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) (citing Melton); Cortez v. Cortez, 317 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Mo.App. S.D.2010) (citing Dent).

. Perhaps Mom was delayed a few days while her attorney was on vacation, or she was strapped for money to hire a lawyer, or she was hospitalized, or she was showing sensitivity to a sudden tragedy in Dad’s life, or her town got hit by a tornado.