Court Opinion

ID: 9963445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:00:58.183927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.151464
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JULIO C. NUNEZ,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
               Appellant,                       AT-0752-17-0702-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 24, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Julio C. Nunez , Miami Beach, Florida, pro se.

      Joved Gonzalez-Rivera , Esquire, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
analyze the appellant’s allegation of discrimination under Pridgen v. Office of
Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                  BACKGROUND
         The appellant was a Licensed Practical Nurse at an agency medical center
serving under an excepted-service appointment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5
at 67.      The agency proposed his removal based on the following charges:
(1) inappropriate conduct; (2) failure to timely renew his agency Privacy and
Information Security Awareness and Rules of Behavior certification; and
(3) failure to timely renew his Basic Life Support (BLS) certification.          Id.
at 36-41.     The appellant provided oral and written replies to his proposed
removal, and the agency sustained all the charges as specified and imposed his
removal effective August 7, 2017. Id. at 27-32.
         The appellant filed a timely appeal with the Board challenging his removal
and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1. After conducting the hearing, the
administrative judge sustained his removal. IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID).
She found that the agency proved all three charges and their specifications, that
the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of race or national origin
discrimination, that there was a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the
efficiency of the service, and that the penalty of removal was reasonable. ID
                                                                                  3

at 2-17. The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has responded
in opposition to his petition, and the appellant has replied. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4-5.

The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved the charges.
      In the first charge, the agency specified that the appellant engaged in
inappropriate conduct when he had a loud personal conversation in a waiting
room for clients of the Disabled American Veterans (DAV) office on June 2,
2017, and he became argumentative with a DAV representative when she asked
him to leave. IAF, Tab 5 at 36. The DAV office was located within the agency
facility at which the appellant worked. Id. at 36, 43. The agency also specified
that the appellant screamed at his manager for opening his office door on May 25,
2017, refused his manager’s request to lower his voice, and continued screaming
that there were going to be problems. Id. at 36. The administrative judge found
that the agency proved by preponderant evidence that the appellant engaged in
inappropriate conduct on May 25, 2017, and on June 2, 2017, as specified. ID
at 5, 8. On review, the appellant does not challenge these findings. We find no
basis for reaching a different conclusion.
      In the second charge, the agency specified that the appellant failed to renew
his agency Privacy and Information Security Awareness and Rules of Behavior
certification (cybersecurity training) prior to the expiration of his prior
certification on May 8, 2017.     IAF, Tab 5 at 37.     The administrative judge
considered the appellant’s argument that he took the cybersecurity training twice,
and his failure to provide evidence of completion, and found that the agency
proved the charge by preponderant evidence. ID at 9. On review, the appellant
appears to assert that he took cybersecurity training in November 2016, including
on November 9, 2016, and also argues that his May 9, 2017 training was within
the 6-month retraining period. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. We are not persuaded by the
appellant’s argument on review.
                                                                                  4

      Even assuming the retraining period is 6 months, as the appellant claims,
6 months from November 8, 2016, is May 8, 2017, the day prior to when the
appellant completed his training. As a result of his delay, his user account was
disabled on May 8, 2017, and he was unable to see patients that day. IAF, Tab 5
at 37, 53.    In sustaining this charge, the administrative judge thoroughly
addressed the record evidence, including the hearing testimony concerning the
material issues on appeal, and provided a detailed explanation for why he found
the agency witnesses’ versions of events more credible.         ID at 8 -9.     The
administrative judge did not make an explicit finding that the appellant did not
take the training, as he claimed, in November 2016.              Nonetheless, the
administrative judge’s determination that the agency proved the charge implicitly
discredits the appellant’s claim. Id. Because the administrative judge made his
findings after holding a hearing and observing the testimony of the appellant and
other witnesses, we defer to it. See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board must defer to an
administrative judge’s determinations when they are “necessarily intertwined”
with an analysis of a witness’s demeanor). The appellant’s vague arguments on
review generally challenging the credibility of the agency’s witnesses are
insufficient to cause us to disturb the administrative judge’s well -reasoned
findings. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (finding
no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions
on the issue of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
      In the third charge, the agency specified that the appellant failed to timely
renew his BLS certification. IAF, Tab 5 at 37. The administrative judge found
that the agency proved this charge by preponderant evidence.        ID at 11.    In
reaching this decision, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s
argument that he asked his supervisors for help completing the training required
                                                                                  5

to renew his certification but they would not help him. Id. The administrative
judge also considered the appellant’s supervisor’s testimony: BLS is mandatory
for anyone who works with patients; he had sent the appellant an email reminding
him of the requirement; and employees can take the training in the hospital at no
charge or with an outside provider.     ID at 10; Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)
(testimony of the appellant’s supervisor).    On review, the appellant does not
challenge the administrative judge’s findings. We find no basis for reaching a
different conclusion. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the Board must defer to an administrative
judge’s credibility findings when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
doing so). We therefore affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
proved all three charges and all underlying specifications.

The administrative judge properly denied the appellant’s affirmative defense of
race and national origin discrimination.
        Applying the burden-shifting standard set forth in cases such as Savage v.
Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612 (2015), the administrative judge
found that the appellant failed to establish that his race or national origin was a
motivating factor in the agency’s removal action, ID at 14. We therefore need not
analyze whether the appellant could prove that the removal was a but-for cause of
the action, as that standard is a higher burden than motivating factor. Pridgen,
2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 48; Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2023 MSPB 6,
¶ 31.
        Here, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s argument that
Cuban-American employees were treated less favorably than African-American
and Caribbean employees in hiring and in attendance-related disciplinary actions,
and that only Latinos (especially Cubans) were fired. ID at 13. However, she
found the appellant’s allegations unsubstantiated. Id. In reaching her decision,
                                                                                  6

the administrative judge implicitly credited the agency’s witnesses’ testimony and
explanation of nondiscriminatory bases for removing the appellant and found that
the appellant’s version of events was not credible.     ID at 3-11, 13-14.     The
administrative judge also found that the evidence showed that he engaged in the
charged misconduct. ID at 29.
      The appellant appears to suggest on review that the timing of the agency’s
actions was suspicious. PFR File, Tab 1 at 41-43. In particular, he points to the
closeness in time between the conduct that underlies his removal, beginning with
his failure to take his cybersecurity training on May 8, 2017, and the removal
itself, effective August 7, 2017.    Id.   We disagree that the timing here is
suspicious. Instead, it reflects the agency’s diligence in taking prompt corrective
action. We find that the administrative judge properly considered the witnesses’
testimony and the evidence as a whole in finding that the appellant failed to show
that discrimination based on race or national origin was a motivating factor in his
removal. ID at 14.

The appellant’s additional evidence and arguments on review do not provide a
reason to disturb the administrative judge’s decision to sustain his removal.
      For the first time on review, the appellant asserts that the removal decision
was not in accordance with the law. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The Board generally
will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review
absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously
available despite the party’s due diligence. Clay, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6; Banks v.
Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Here, the appellant
has not explained why this argument could not have been raised before the
                                                                                       7

administrative judge, and thus we need not consider it. 2                 See 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115(d).
      On review, the appellant further claims that the agency’s action was based
on harmful error and reprisal for filing a Veterans Employment Opportunities Act
of 1998 complaint and whistleblowing.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 1 -2, 4.       He also
submits a list of alleged retaliatory actions taken against him, including but not
limited to his removal.     Id. at 2.   The appellant similarly did not make these
arguments before the administrative judge or explain his failure to do so;
therefore, we need not consider them either. 3 See Clay, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6;
Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271. Although unclear, the appellant appears to suggest that
his supervisors were, like him, late in taking cybersecurity training. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 4. However, he does provide any specific cites to the record or explain
his argument in a way that we can determine whether he raised it below and how
it factors into our decision here. Thus, we decline to consider it.
      Moreover, at the beginning of the hearing, the administrative judge asked
the appellant if he wanted to make any additions, corrections, or objections to her
prehearing conference order, which summarized the material issues on appeal “ to
the exclusion of all others ” (emphasis in original), but he did not take advantage
2
  On review, the appellant also reasserts his claim that he is appealing a negative
suitability determination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The administrative
judge’s failure to consider this issue on appeal did not prejudice the appellant’s
substantive rights and does not require reversing the initial decision. Assuming that the
Board has jurisdiction to review a suitability action taken against the appellant, he
would be entitled to, at most, the same review he received here. See Odoh v. Office of
Personnel Management, 2022 MSPB 5, ¶¶ 15-16 (explaining that, at most, an employee
has the right to appeal a suitability determination as if it were a removal action, but
noting that the newly enacted 5 U.S.C. § 7512(F) prevented the Board from modifying a
suitability action taken by the Office of Personnel Management).
3
  As proof that the agency’s action was based on harmful error, the appellant makes the
following assertions: that he was falsely accused of terrorism and someone broke into
his car on agency property; that the agency withheld evidence against him to win, such
as videos and email; that he was subjected to punishment without union representation;
that the agency lied to the unemployment office and denied his right to unemployment;
and that the agency locked up his computer so that he could not get paid. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 1, 4.
                                                                                       8

of that opportunity to raise these additional claims. IAF, Tab 15 at 6; Tab 20,
HCD (opening statement of the administrative judge). The appellant’s failure to
object and to make timely additions or corrections to the administrative judge’s
order setting forth the exclusive list of material issues on appeal precludes him
from doing so on review.        See Miller v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R.
557, ¶ 7 (2012).
       The appellant refers to himself on review as a whistleblower, seemingly
based on his complaint about his manager’s alleged discriminatory hiring
practices. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. Here, the pro se appellant may have raised a
nonspecific claim of reprisal for complaining that his manager was hiring only
Haitian and/or African-American nurses illegally. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. We construe
the appellant’s argument as a claim of equal employment opportunity (EEO)
reprisal not whistleblower reprisal.          Edwards v. Department of Labor,
2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 21-23, aff’d, No. 2022-1967, 2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir.
July 7, 2023). 4
       To the extent that the appellant may have attempted to raise an affirmative
defense of EEO reprisal on appeal, which the administrative judge did not
identify or address below, we find that he has effectively waived or abandoned
this claim. In Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18, we
articulated relevant factors in determining whether a previously raised affirmative
defense has been effectively waived or abandoned by the appellant. These factors
include the clarity with which an appellant raised his affirmative defense,
4
  During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of Title 5
of the U.S. Code, including section 2302(b)(9)(C) to provide that, in addition to the
Inspector General of an agency or the Special Counsel, a disclosure to “any other
component responsible for internal investigation or review” is also a protected activity.
Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 29. However, all of the events relevant to this appeal
occurred prior to the enactment of the NDAA. The change to section 2302(b)(9)(C)
does not apply to cases arising prior to the enactment of the NDAA. Edwards,
2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 30-34. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the appellant
engaged in protected activity under the amendment to section 2302(b)(9)(C).
                                                                                     9

continued to pursue it, objected to orders that failed to identify it, and may have
been confused by misleading or incorrect information. Id., ¶ 18. The appellant’s
only reference to this reprisal claim on appeal was in a one-page submission
attached to his appeal form. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. Although he reasserts his claim of
EEO reprisal on review, he did not make a timely addition or correction to the
administrative judge’s order setting forth the exclusive list of material issues on
appeal when given the opportunity to do so at the commencement of the hearing.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 29.       The appellant does not argue on review that he
mistakenly believed that his EEO reprisal claim was part of what the
administrative judge identified as his discrimination claim in the prehearing
conference summary. IAF, Tab 15 at 3-6. We therefore find no reason to believe
that the apparent abandonment of this claim was the result of confusion or
misleading or incorrect information. IAF, Tab 19 at 29. Accordingly, we find
that the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim was effectively waived or abandoned.
      The appellant also submits numerous documents with his petition for
review, including undated handwritten notes and documents ranging in date from
November 2016 to October 2017. 5          PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-28, 31-39.         The
appellant has not shown that the evidence in his submissions is new and material
or that the documents were not available prior to the close of the record despite
his due diligence. Therefore, we will not consider them. See Avansino v. U.S.
Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (finding that, under 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with
the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record
was closed despite the party’s due diligence).

5
  The appellant also submits several documents on review, including the Table of
Contents for the Agency’s Response to his appeal, pages from his performance
appraisals in 2015 and 2016, and a two-page statement that he submitted on appeal.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-19, 29-30, 41-43; IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8, 15-20, 24, Tab 5 at 4-6.
These documents are already part of the record and not new. See Easterling v. U.S.
Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 10 (2008) (explaining that the Board will not
consider evidence that is already part of the record because such evidence is not new).
                                                                                   10

The administrative judge properly addressed the agency’s chosen penalty.
      When, as here, all of the charges have been sustained, the Board will
review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all
of the relevant Douglas factors, and exercised management discretion within
tolerable limits of reasonableness.    See Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5
M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to
penalty determinations). In making this determination, the Board must give due
weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and
efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s
responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been properly
exercised. Campbell v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 25 (2016);
Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. The Board will modify the agency’s chosen penalty
only if it finds that the agency’s judgment clearly exceeded the limits of
reasonableness. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306.
      On review, the appellant asserts that the agency did not properly apply the
Douglas factors in determining the penalty. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. For example,
he submits evidence and argument that his performance appraisal was fully
successful, and he claims that the agency asserted the opposite. PFR File, Tab 1
at 6-17. Contrary to the appellant’s argument on review, the record reflects that
the deciding official in the removal action considered the appellant’s successful
job performance in his Douglas factor penalty analysis.          IAF, Tab 5 at 30.
Moreover, the administrative judge explicitly found that the appellant’s
acceptable work performance was a mitigating factor but agreed with the deciding
official that removal was warranted because the appellant’s acceptable job
performance and other mitigating factors did not outweigh the seriousness of his
misconduct and his lack of rehabilitative potential, considering his past
disciplinary record. 6 IAF, Tab 5 at 30; ID at 16-17.
6
  In applying the Douglas factors, both the administrative judge and the deciding
official also considered as a mitigating factor the appellant’s allegation that he was
harassed by his supervisor but concluded that it did not excuse his behavior. ID
                                                                                    11

      Here, the removal decision letter shows that the deciding official
considered the relevant factors including the seriousness of the appellant’s
repeated misconduct, which he found unprofessional and disruptive to his work
and his coworkers. IAF, Tab 5 at 30-36. The deciding official considered that
the appellant’s misconduct was contrary to the behavior expected of a Licensed
Practical Nurse in a position of trust. Id. at 30-31. He further considered the
appellant’s prior discipline: a 7-day suspension in December 2016 for failure to
safeguard confidential patient information, and a reprimand in October 2016 for
loafing, willful idleness, failure to safeguard confidential patient information, and
unauthorized absence.     Id. at 30.    The deciding official determined that the
appellant’s supervisors had lost trust and confidence in him and his ability to be
rehabilitated. Id. at 30-32. He also determined that the proposed removal penalty
fell within the acceptable range of the agency’s table of penalties. Id. at 31.
      The administrative judge found that the deciding official thoroughly
considered the relevant Douglas factors and exercised his discretion within the
tolerable limits of reasonableness in deciding to remove the appellant.             ID
at 15-17.   Recognizing that the Board must accord proper deference to the
agency’s primary discretion in managing its workforce, we see no reason to
disturb this finding. 7 See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306.

The appellant did not prove his claim of bias by the administrative judge.
      The appellant also appears to allege bias by the administrative judge based
on his statement that he had the right to a fair hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. We
decline to grant review on this basis. The appellant submits no examples of the

at 16-17. In weighing this factor, the deciding official noted that the appellant’s
harassment claim was investigated by Patient Care Services and found to be
unsubstantiated. ID at 16; IAF, Tab 5 at 27, 32.
7
  The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
proved nexus and we find no reason to disturb this finding on review. ID at 14; see
Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb
the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew
appropriate inferences and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility).
                                                                                  12

alleged bias for the Board to consider, and his conclusory argument on review
does not show that the administrative judge’s conduct during the course of the
proceeding evidenced “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible.”     See Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994)).

We deny the appellant’s motion requesting proof that the agency lied and asking
the Board to open an investigation and interview various individuals to determine
the validity of his claims.
        In reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review, the appellant
has filed a motion requesting proof that the agency lied to Federal investigators
and withheld proof to prevail in the removal action. PFR File, Tab 5 at 2-4. He
asks the Board to investigate his claims of misconduct at work, and he lists the
people that he would like the Board to question during the investigation. Id. In
addition, he asks for a copy of the Final Agency Decision (FAD) on his EEO
complaint, which he claims that he never received although he submits what
appears to be the first page of the FAD on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 32, Tab 5
at 2.   He argues for the first time that the administrative judge erred in her
credibility determinations. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5.
        To the extent that the appellant’s reply raises new allegations of error, we
will not consider them. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4) (stating that a reply is
limited to the factual and legal issues raised by another party in the response to
the petition for review and may not raise new allegations of error). Moreover, to
the extent he is alleging that the agency refused to voluntarily make pertinent
evidence reasonably available prior to the hearing on his appeal, his failure to file
a motion to compel precludes him from raising this issue for the first time on
petition for review. See Szejner v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R.
275, ¶ 5 (2005) (declining to consider the appellant’s argument on review that the
agency failed to respond to his discovery requests because he did not file a
                                                                                     13

motion to compel below), aff’d, 167 F. App’x. 217 (Fed. Cir. 2006).                 We
therefore deny his motion requesting an investigation and additional documents
from the agency on review.           Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision
as modified.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   14

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.           5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                15

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     16

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             17

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.