Court Opinion

ID: 9908682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:09:34.674536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:28.512948
License: Public Domain

J-S25033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 STOBBA RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATES,          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 L.P. AND STOBBA ASSOCIATES, L.P.        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                   Appellants            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 487 EDA 2023
 FS RIALTO 2019-FL 1 HOLDER, LLC         :
 AND RIALTO CAPITAL ADVISORS,            :
 LLC                                     :

              Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 210602543

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                  FILED DECEMBER 11, 2023

     Stobba Residential Associates, L.P. and Stobba Associates, L.P.

(collectively Borrower) appeal from the order entered in the Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of FS

Rialto 2019-FL 1 Holder, LLC and Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC (collectively

Lender), in this action seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of contract in

connection with a mortgage loan. On appeal, Borrower argues the trial court

erred or abused its discretion in granting summary judgment to Lender when

there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Lender breached

a duty of good faith by failing to respond to Borrower’s forbearance request,

whether Lender committed a material breach of the Loan Agreement by

instituting a money judgment action, and whether Lender tortiously interfered
J-S25033-23

with Borrower’s contract with a third-party lessee. Borrower also contends

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its declaratory

judgment claim, which was contingent on the other claims. For the reasons

below, we affirm.

      The relevant facts underlying this appeal are aptly summarized by the

trial court as follows:

            On August 2, 2019, Lender’s predecessor in interest FS Creit
      Originator LLC made a loan to Borrower in the amount of
      $24,250,000. The Loan is evidenced by a Loan Agreement (“The
      Loan Agreement”) and a Promissory Note (the “Note”) and is
      secured by an Open-End Mortgage, Assignment of Leases and
      Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (“Mortgage”).
      Borrower also executed a Deposit Account Control Agreement (the
      “DACA”).

            The Loan Agreement requires Borrower to make monthly
      payment to Lender on each payment date. The Loan Agreement
      provides that an “Event of Default” occurs if, “any portion of the
      Debt is not paid on or before the date the same is due and
      payable.”

            Borrower granted Lender a security interest in the Property
      defined to include specific units within Headhouse Flats and
      Abbots Square developments in Philadelphia, and all Leases and
      Rents in connection with the Property. To protect the security
      interest in the Property, Borrower is required to have all tenants
      deposit rents into the DACA Account at Wells Fargo. The contents
      of DACA are to be disbursed into the Cash Management Account
      at Wells Fargo daily.

            Borrower has not made any payments on the Loan since
      December 2020. Additionally, the Loan matured on August 9,
      2022[,] and Borrower has not paid the Loan in full. Borrower
      contends its performance under the Loan Agreement is excused
      due to Lender’s pre occurring breaches.

                                    -2-
J-S25033-23

       Pending Lawsuits

            On May 21, 2021, Lender commenced an action alleging
       breach of contract against Borrower. Lender alleges that Borrower
       breached the Loan Agreement by failing to make the required
       monthly payments, failing to provide financial reporting and
       misrepresenting the status of tenant leases at the Property.
       Borrower filed an Answer with New Matter and Counterclaims.

             In June 2021, Lender filed a Petition to Appoint a Receiver.
       The [trial c]ourt denied the Petition to Appoint a Receiver but
       ordered Borrower to provide Lender and the Court with certain
       records and required that Borrower instruct the tenants to pay
       rent as required by the Loan Agreement. The Order has been
       appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court by Borrower and
       Lender.[1]

             Lender also filed an action to Confess Judgment against the
       Guarantor Eric Blumenfeld, which is currently stayed pending the
       resolution of the Lender Action and this action. Additionally,
       Lender filed a Mortgage Foreclosure action against Borrower.

       The Giant Lease

             On March 9, 2016, Fresh Formats, LLC (“Fresh Formats”)
       entered into a Lease with Borrower for commercial space at
       Abbotts Square to operate a “Bfresh” Market. The Fresh Formats’
       Lease was assigned to Giant Food Stores, LLC (“Giant”) on
       December 31, 2017. Giant agreed to accept the premises “as is”
       and began paying rent to Borrower.

____________________________________________

1 Both Lender and Borrower appealed, and on March 1, 2023, a panel of this

Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
See SKW-B Acquisitions Seller C, LLC v. Stobba Residential Assocs.,
L.P., 73 EDA 2022 & 101 EDA 2022 (unpub. memo. at 2) (Pa. Super. Mar. 1,
2023). First, the panel vacated the trial court’s decision to grant alternate
relief to Lender because Lender only requested “an order for a receivership[;]”
thus, the panel concluded there was “no proper foundation in the record for
alternative relief.” Id. at 12. With regard to Lender’s request for the
appointment of a receiver, the panel determined the trial court did not
properly consider “whether appointment of a receiver is warranted under
common law.” Id. at 17. Accordingly, the panel remanded the matter for
further proceedings. See id.

                                           -3-
J-S25033-23

           In December 2019, Giant began to fit the space for use as
     a grocery store and discovered the leased space was not serviced
     by 277/480-volt, 800 amp electric, the electric service Giant
     required for its purposes. In March 2020, due to the COVID 19
     Pandemic, the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of
     Pennsylvania issued orders shutting down Giant’s fitting out of the
     space. Additionally, construction stalled because PECO required
     the entire building be converted to High Tension Service to
     accommodate Giant’s electric needs.

           On August 31, 2020, Giant issued a notice of default to
     Borrower because Borrower failed to provide Giant with 277/480-
     volt, 800 amp electric service. On November 20, 2020, Giant
     stopped paying rent to Borrower and on December 23, 2020,
     Giant filed a lawsuit against Borrower in the Eastern District of
     Pennsylvania alleging breach of the Lease.

           On February 18, 2021, during an email exchange between
     Borrower and Lender, Borrower provided an update to Lender
     regarding the Giant electric issue including the lawsuit filed by
     Giant against Borrower. At Lender’s request, Borrower provided
     Lender with documents including its engineering report, Giant’s
     default letter, engineering drawings and the Lease. Thereafter,
     the following emails were exchanged between Lender and
     Borrower regarding the Giant issue:

        ─ On March 1, 2021, Lender emailed Borrower as follows:
        “we [Lender] have some contacts at Giant that we have
        worked with a lot in the past. Do you mind if we [Lender]
        reach out to them to discuss their thoughts on what’s going
        on here?[”]

        ─ On March 1, 2021, Borrower responded, “. . . if you feel
        that a conversation between Rialto [Lender] and Giant will
        be helpful then please do so . . . I hope the conversation is
        fruitful.”

        ─ On March 2, 2021, Lender sent an email to Giant stating
        in part, “. . . We [Lender] are involved in this deal as the
        lender and understand that there is a little bit of a
        disconnect regarding the delivery of the specific electrical
        service that you require, so we wanted to quickly touch
        base[ ] with you on this. Might you have some time this
        week for a quick call?”

                                    -4-
J-S25033-23

        ─ On March 4, 2021[,] 10:36 a.m., after having received no
        response from Giant to the March 2, 2021 email, Lender
        sent a follow up email.

        ─ On March 4, 2021, 10:35 a.m., Borrower emailed Lender
        stating that after speaking with Blumenfeld, “and apologies
        for the reversal but Blumenfeld did not want lender/tenant
        communications. We have an opportunity to right size our
        process and he feels your involvement might skew our
        process.”

        ─ On March 4, 2021, at 10:51 a.m., Lender emailed Giant
        and asked them to “. . . please disregard the request for the
        call . . . .”

        ─ On March 4, 2021[,] at 11:33 a.m., Giant emailed Lender
        and apologized for the delayed response and stated “. . .
        After talking with counsel I’ve been advised not to comment
        because of pending litigation. I would suggest you seek a
        copy of the pleadings.”

        Kimley-Horn, an engineering firm hired by Lender regarding
     the electric issue, conducted an onsite investigation of the Giant
     space on March 12, 2021[,] and issued a report to Lender on April
     12, 2021.

       On May 20, 2021, Borrower emailed Lender with the following
     update:

        Borrower provided Lender with correspondence from Giant’s
        Chief engineer outlining the additional requirements from
        PECO over and above the cost of installing the HT service at
        Abbots Square.          We [Borrower] believe that the
        approximate cost of these 2 components will be in the range
        of $500k. We are currently working with the local code
        officials to see if some concessions can be made to address
        Giant’s concerns as outlined in the letter. It is our intention
        to resolve these issues and then agree to split these costs
        with Giant to move forward. Eric [the Guarantor] has asked
        that I keep you advised as to the progress on a regular
        basis.

           On July 1, 2021, Giant voluntarily dismissed the action filed
     against Borrower without prejudice and entered into a consensual
     Stay and Tolling Agreement to attempt resolution of their dispute
     consensually.

                                     -5-
J-S25033-23

       Forbearance Requests

             The Borrower submitted two requests to Lender for loan
       forbearance, [on] April 27, 2020[,] and September 3, 2020.
       Lender received the requests, requested information to support
       the requests but, Lender never presented Borrower with a
       forbearance agreement.

       This Action

              On July 1, 2021, Borrower filed this action against Lender
       (“Borrower Action”). Lender filed Preliminary Objections to the
       Complaint which were overruled by the [trial c]ourt. On January
       18, 2022, Borrower filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended
       Complaint alleges causes of action for breach of contract/breach
       of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (count I), tortious
       interference     with    contract    (count     II),   promissory
       estoppel/detrimental reliance (count III), and seeks a declaratory
       judgment (count IV). Lender filed Preliminary Objections to the
       Amended Complaint which were overruled . . . on March 8, 2022.
       On March 23, 2022, Lender filed an Answer with New Matter to
       the Amended Complaint. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 2/7/23, at 1-7 (footnotes & record citations omitted).

       Lender filed a motion for summary judgment and accompanying

memorandum of law on October 17, 2022. Borrower responded on November

17th with an answer and memorandum of law. On February 6, 2023, the trial

court filed an order and concomitant opinion granting Lender’s motion and

entered judgment in favor of Lender and against Borrower on all claims. See

Order, 2/7/23. This timely appeal follows.2

____________________________________________

2 The trial court did not direct Borrower to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Further, on March 7, 2023, the
trial court filed an opinion which “adopted and incorporated . . . by reference”
its February 7th opinion as support for its decision. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/7/23,
at 1 (unpaginated).

                                           -6-
J-S25033-23

       Borrower presents the following four issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion by granting summary judgment in [Lender’s] favor on
       [Borrower’s] claim for breach of contract/breach of the duty of
       good faith and fair dealing where there is a genuine issue of
       material fact for a fact finder as to whether [Lender] reasonably
       exercised its discretion to approve or deny loan forbearance
       requests?

       2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion by granting summary judgment in [Lender’s] favor on
       [Borrower’s] claim for breach of contract where: (1) the trial court
       incorrectly interpreting the Exculpation Clause in the Loan
       Agreement; and (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact for a
       fact finder as to whether [Lender’s] breaches of the Loan
       Agreement are material?

       3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion by granting summary judgment in [Lender’s] favor on
       [Borrower’s] claim for tortious interference with contract where
       genuine issues of material fact exist relating to the claim?

       4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion by granting summary judgment in [Lender’s] favor on
       [Borrower’s] claim for a declaratory judgment that, inter alia,
       [Lender’s] first-occurring material breaches of the loan documents
       . . . excused and/or discharged [Borrower’s] performance under
       the loan based upon the trial court’s erroneous reasons for
       denying [Borrower’s] other claims?

Borrower’s Brief at 2-3 (some capitalization omitted).3

       When considering an order granting summary judgment, our “standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Khalil v. Williams,

____________________________________________

3 Borrower does not challenge that portion of the trial court’s order dismissing

its claim for promissory estoppel. See Borrower’s Brief at 21 n.4.

                                           -7-
J-S25033-23

278 A.3d 859, 871 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted).          We are guided by the

following:

      [A] trial court should grant summary judgment only in cases
      where the record contains no genuine issue of material fact, and
      the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is
      the moving party’s burden to demonstrate the absence of any
      issue of material fact, and the trial court must evaluate all the
      facts and make reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
      the non-moving party. The trial court must also resolve any
      doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
      against the moving party and “may grant summary judgment only
      where the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt.”

            [Thus, a]n appellate court may reverse a grant of summary
      judgment only if the trial court erred in its application of the law
      or abused its discretion. . . .

Id. (citation omitted & paragraph break added).

      In its first issue, Borrower contends the trial court erred when it granted

summary judgment on its claim that Lender breached its duty of good faith

and fair dealing by refusing to respond to its two requests for forbearance

relief. See Borrower’s Brief at 21. While Borrower acknowledges Lender had

the discretion to grant or deny its requests for forbearance relief, it insists the

fact that Lender “never reasonably considered the requests or, at bare

minimum, communicated to [Borrower] that its requests were going to be

denied is indicative of a breach of good faith and fair dealing[.]” See id. at

22-23. Moreover, Borrower contends the trial court erred by failing to consider

whether Lender “reasonably exercised its discretion” when, in fact, at the time

of its requests, Borrower was “routinely granting forbearance to [other]

borrowers” due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 24.

                                       -8-
J-S25033-23

      We have recognized that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a

duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”

Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Tr. Co., 560 A.2d

151, 153 (Pa. Super. 1989), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205.

However, “[s]uch an inherent duty of good faith does not extend to the

lender-borrower relationship.” Cable & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Com.

Nat. Bank of Pa., 875 A.2d 361, 364 (Pa. Super. 2005). Rather:

             It seems reasonably clear from the decided cases that a
      lending institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith
      by adhering to its agreement with the borrower or by enforcing its
      legal and contractual rights as a creditor. The duty of good faith
      imposed upon contracting parties does not compel a lender
      to surrender rights which it has been given by statute or by
      the terms of its contract. Similarly, it cannot be said that a
      lender has violated a duty of good faith merely because it has
      negotiated terms of a loan which are favorable to itself. As such,
      a lender generally is not liable for harm caused to a borrower by
      refusing to advance additional funds, release collateral, or assist
      in obtaining additional loans from third persons. A lending
      institution also is not required to delay attempts to recover from
      a guarantor after the principal debtor has defaulted. . . .

Creeger, 560 A.2d at 154 (emphasis added).

      In Creeger, this Court concluded a borrower could not state a cause of

action against its lender based upon the lender’s purported “failure to deal

with its borrower in good faith” when the lender did not breach any specific

provision of the loan agreement, but instead allegedly failed to modify the

terms of the agreement to permit the borrower to obtain supplemental

funding. See Creeger, 560 A.2d at 153, 155. Similarly, in Cable, this Court

determined that a lender’s refusal to “surrender its security interest on [the

                                     -9-
J-S25033-23

borrower’s] property (accounts receivable) so that [the borrower] could sell

or transfer the property” could not “as a matter of law, . . . constitute a breach

of contractual good faith.” See Cable, 875 A.2d at 364.

      Here, the trial court found that, pursuant to Section 9.2 of the parties’

Loan Agreement, Lender had the absolute discretion to grant or deny a

request for forbearance, and its refusal to grant forbearance did not “excuse

Borrower’s performance” under the agreement. See Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13.

We agree.

      Section 9.2 provides, in relevant part:

             Section 9.2 Lender’s Discretion. Whenever pursuant to this
      Agreement Lender exercises any right given to it to approve or
      disapprove any matter, or any arrangement or term is to be
      satisfactory to Lender, the decision of Lender to approve or
      disapprove such matter or to decide whether arrangements or
      terms are satisfactory or not satisfactory shall (except as is
      otherwise specifically herein provided) be in the sole and absolute
      discretion of Lender and shall be final and conclusive. . . .

Borrower’s Amended Complaint, 1/18/22, Exhibit A, Loan Agreement, 8/2/19

(Loan Agreement) at § 9.2 (emphasis added). Pursuant to the explicit terms

of the Agreement, Lender’s refusal to grant Borrower’s requests for

forbearance is a “final and conclusive” decision, not subject to review on

appeal. See id.

      Nevertheless, Borrower asserts that the determination of whether

Lender “reasonably exercised its discretion” by either refusing to consider or

outright denying its requests for forbearance constitutes “a genuine issue of

material fact” for the jury. See Borrower’s Brief at 24. We disagree. As

                                     - 10 -
J-S25033-23

explained in Creeger and Cable, the implied contractual duty of good faith

does not “compel a lender to surrender rights . . . conferred to the lender by

the terms of the loan contract” ─ such as the timely payment of funds due.

See Cable, 875 A.2d at 364; Creeger, 560 A.2d at 154. Thus, contrary to

Borrower’s argument, Lender had no obligation to even consider its

forbearance request, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment

to Lender on Borrower’s breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim.

      Next, Borrower insists the trial court misinterpreted the Exculpation

Clause in the Loan Agreement, and, therefore, “robbed the finder of fact of

the opportunity to consider” whether Lender committed a material breach of

the Agreement which excused Borrower’s performance. See Borrower’s Brief

at   28.    Borrower    contends   the   Exculpation   Clause    “clear[ly]   and

unambiguous[ly]” prohibits Lender from recovering any money damages for

the “Debt of the Loan.” Id. at 26. Instead, Lender’s only option is to “institute

a foreclosure or other action [seeking] an in rem judgment against

[Borrower’s] interests in the Property, the Rents, and any other collateral.”

Id. It insists that Lender breached this clause by instituting the May 2021

breach of contract action seeking a monetary judgment, and that Lender’s

breach excuses its own non-performance. See id. at 25. Thus, Borrower

maintains a question of fact remains as to whether Lender’s breach constituted

a “material breach . . . excusing [its own] performance[.]” Id. at 28.

      The Exculpation Clause in the parties Loan Agreement provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

                                     - 11 -
J-S25033-23

           Section 8.6 Exculpation. Subject to the qualifications
     below, Lender shall not enforce the liability and obligation of
     Borrower to perform and observe the obligations contained in this
     Agreement, the Note or the Security Instrument by any action or
     proceeding wherein a money judgment shall be sought against
     Borrower, except that Lender may bring a foreclosure action,
     action for specific performance or other appropriate action or
     proceeding to enable Lender to enforce and realize upon the Note,
     the Security Instrument, the other Loan Documents, and the
     interest in the Property, the Rents and any other collateral given
     to Lender created by this Agreement, the Note, the Security
     Instrument and the other Loan Documents; provided, however,
     that any judgment in any such action or proceeding shall be
     enforceable against Borrower only to the extent of Borrower's
     interest in the Property, in the Rents and in any other collateral
     given to Lender. Lender, by accepting this Agreement, the Note
     and the Security Instrument, agrees that it shall not, except as
     otherwise provided in the Security Instrument, sue for, seek or
     demand any deficiency judgment against Borrower in any such
     action or proceeding, under or by reason of or under or in
     connection with this Agreement, the Note, the other Loan
     Documents or the Security Instrument. The provisions of this
     Section 8.6 shall not, however, . . . (g) constitute a waiver of the
     right of Lender to enforce the liability and obligation of Borrower,
     by money judgment or otherwise, to the extent of any Losses
     arising out of or in connection with the following:

           (i) fraud or intentional or material misrepresentation by
     Borrower, Guarantor or any of their respective Affiliates or agents
     in connection with the Loan;

          (ii) the gross negligence or willful misconduct by or on behalf
     of Borrower, Guarantor or any of their respective Affiliates or
     agents in connection with the Loan;

                                 *     *      *

           (iv) the misappropriation, misapplication or conversion by
     Borrower of (A) any Insurance Proceeds paid by reason of any
     Casualty, (B) any Awards or other amounts received in connection
     with a Condemnation of all or a portion of the Property, or (C) any
     Rents; . . . .

Loan Agmt at § 8.6.

                                     - 12 -
J-S25033-23

       In its opinion, the trial court explained it “already ruled that the Loan

Agreement does permit Lender to bring a money judgment action against

Borrower under the Exculpation Clause” in its January 24, 2023, order denying

Borrower’s motion for summary judgment in the money judgment action

brought by Lender. See Trial Ct. Op. 11 (emphasis added). In that action,

Borrowers argued, inter alia, that “Lender’s [c]omplaint improperly seeks a

monetary judgment for the “Debt” of the Loan in violation of the Exculpation

Clause contained in § 8.6 of the Loan Agreement.” See SKW-B Acquisitions

Seller C, LLC v. Stobba Residential Assocs., L.P., May Term 2021 No.

1951, Order, 1/24/23, at 1 n.1.4 The court ruled against Borrower for two

reasons: (1) the Exculpation Clause permitted Lender to “recover monetary

damages . . . but only to the extent of Borrower[’s] interest in the Property,

the Rents and any other collateral given to Lender in this action[;]” and (2)

the Exculpation Clause permitted Lender to recover “Losses” independent

from the debt “arising out of or in connection with[, inter alia,] fraud or

intentional or material misrepresentations, gross or willful misconduct,

misappropriation or misapplication of rents[.]” Id. at 2 n.1.

       We need not determine whether the trial court’s ruling in Lender’s action

was correct as we conclude that, even assuming arguendo Lender breached

the Exculpation Clause by instituting the other action, such a breach would

____________________________________________

4 The trial court’s January 24, 2023, Order in the other action is included in

the Appendix of Borrower’s brief.

                                          - 13 -
J-S25033-23

not excuse Borrower’s non-payment of its loan obligations.         Rather, the

remedy for Lender’s breach of the Exculpation Clause would be dismissal of

Lender’s money judgment action ─ not excusal of Borrower’s non-payment of

the loan. Moreover, Lender alleged that Borrower failed to pay its “Monthly

Debt Service Payment Amount” beginning in December of 2020, and

continuing through November of 2021. See Lender’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, 10/17/22, at ¶ 24.5 Therefore, Borrower breached its obligations

under the Loan Agreement before Lender filed the May 2021 money judgment

action. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in determining there was

no genuine issue of material fact concerning a potential breach of the

Exculpation Clause.

       In its third issue, Borrower contends the trial court erred in concluding

it “failed to adduce sufficient evidence” to support a claim of tortious

interference with a contract based upon Lender’s purported interference with

Borrower’s contractual relationship with Giant.    See Borrower’s Brief at 28

(citation & quotation marks omitted). Borrower insists it demonstrated the

following:    (1) Lender had an existing relationship with Giant; (2) Lender

purposely communicated with Giant regarding the alleged electrical issue

when Borrower instructed it not to do so; (3) Lender’s actions were not

privileged and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to its motivation; and

____________________________________________

5 The only exception was in February of 2021, when Borrower apparently made

the required payment. See Lender’s Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 24.

                                          - 14 -
J-S25033-23

(4) the “escalation of the dispute” due to Lender’s interference “resulted in

legal damages . . . vis-à-vis the related costs of litigation” from Giant’s lawsuit

against Borrower. See id. at 29-30.

      In order to establish a cause of action for intentional interference with a

contractual relationship, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

      (1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the
      complainant and a third party; (2) an intent on the part of the
      defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual
      relationship; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the
      part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage
      as a result of defendant’s conduct.

Walnut St. Assocs., Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 982 A.2d 94, 98

(Pa. Super. 2009), aff’d, 20 A.3d 468 (Pa. 2011).

      In concluding Borrower did not present sufficient evidence to support its

claim, the trial court opined:

      [W]hile a contractual relationship existed between Borrower and
      Giant, there is no evidence that Lender caused any harm to
      Borrower by interfering with that relationship. Lender, with
      Borrower’s consent, did email Giant to schedule a time to discuss
      the electrical service at the leased space, but the record clearly
      shows that Lender and Giant never spoke about the electrical
      issue. Even before Giant responded to Lender’s request for a call,
      Borrower reversed course, and asked Lender not to discuss the
      matter with Giant. This [c]ourt could not find any evidence and
      Borrower did not direct this [c]ourt to any evidence that Lender
      disregarded Borrower’s email and engaged in any discussions with
      Giant to harm Borrower’s relationship with Giant. The record is
      clear that Lender honored Borrower’s request and emailed Giant
      telling them to disregard the request for the call.

            Additionally, not only does the record show that Lender
      honored Borrower’s request, but it also shows that Giant did not
      wish to engage in any such discussions with Lender and was
      instructed by its legal counsel not to speak to Lender about the

                                      - 15 -
J-S25033-23

      issue due to the pending lawsuit. At best, the evidence shows
      that Lender attempted to “interfere[,”] but the attempted
      “interference” was with the consent of Borrower.

             [Moreover], there is no evidence that Lender’s
      “interference” caused Borrower actual damage. Borrower alleges
      and argues that as a result of Lender’s “interference[,”] Giant
      stopped paying rent and filed a lawsuit. However, Lender’s
      “interference” in March 2021 could not have caused Giant to stop
      paying rent in November of 2020 and to file the lawsuit in
      December 2020 as Lender’s “interference” occurred after the
      harm which Borrower attributes to Lender. [Further, after the
      alleged interference, Giant voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit
      against Borrower without prejudice in July of 2021.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9 (footnotes & record citations omitted; paragraph break

added).

      We detect no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.

Put simply, Borrower presented no evidence to support its assertion that

Lender intentionally interfered with its contract with Giant in an attempt to

harm Borrower or that Borrower suffered any actual damages resulting from

Lender’s purported interference. The evidence Borrower cites in its brief does

not support its claim. See Borrower’s Brief at 29-30.

      First, the relevant emails demonstrate that while Lender did attempt to

reach out to Giant in March of 2021 ─ with Borrower’s permission ─ it never

actually discussed the electrical issue with Giant.   See Lender’s Motion for

Summary Judgment at Exh. M, Emails dated 3/1/21 (Lender informing

Borrower it had “some contacts at Giant” and asking, “Do you mind if we reach

out to them to discuss their thoughts on what’s going on here?” to which

Borrower responds, “if you feel that a conversation between [Lender] and

Giant will be helpful then please do so.”); Exh. N, Emails dated 3/2/21 and

                                    - 16 -
J-S25033-23

3/4/21 (Lender emailing Giant on March 2, 2021, to “touch base” on the issue,

and then, on March 4th, informing Giant to “disregard [its] request for a

call[,]” after which Giant responded to Lender that it had been advised by

counsel “not to comment because of pending litigation”). See also id. at Exh.

O, Email dated 3/4/21 (Borrower sending “apologies” to Lender on March 4th

“for   the   reversal”     but   explaining    it   did   not   want   “lender/tenant

communication”).

       Second, although Lender did commission an engineering firm, Kimley-

Horn, to investigate the electrical issue, the report issued by the firm was

never shared with Giant. See Lender’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Exh.

H, N.T., 11/12/21, at 80.6 We fail to see how the commissioning of the report,

in and of itself, establishes that Lender interfered with Borrower’s contractual

relationship with Giant.

       Third, although Borrower’s representative ─ Eric Blumenfeld ─ testified

that one of Lender’s employees told him “they were in touch with Giant[,]” he

admitted the employee provided no specifics as to what was said.                 See

Lender’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Exh. L, N.T., 11/18/21, at 15, 31.7

Thus, this testimony does not establish any more alleged “interference” than

the email exchanges cited above.

____________________________________________

6This hearing was conducted in Lender’s money judgment action against
Borrower.

7 This hearing was also conducted in Lender’s action.

                                          - 17 -
J-S25033-23

      Fourth, Borrower cites no evidence supporting its bald assertion that

“[i]t was only after [Lender] meddled in the situation that Giant began

insisting on [an] upgrade [for] the electrical service” of the property. See

Borrower’s Brief at 30.     Indeed, the letter from Giant to Borrower that

Borrower references ─ in which Giant informed Borrower the electric load of

the building is insufficient ─ is dated August 31, 2020, six months before

Lender requested permission to contact Giant in an attempt to help resolve

the issue.     See Borrower’s Response to Lender’s Motion for Summary

Judgment & Counterstatement of Facts, 11/17/22, at Exh. 17 (Letter from

Giant to Borrower dated 8/31/20). Accordingly, Borrower’s third issue fails.

      Lastly, Borrower contends the trial court erred in granting Lender

summary judgment on its declaratory judgment cause of action.            See

Borrower’s Brief at 31. However, as Borrower acknowledges, its request for

a declaratory judgment is based upon its other claims ─ namely, that Lender

breached its duty of good faith by refusing to consider Borrower’s forbearance

requests and breached the Loan Agreement by instituting the money

judgment action, both of which would excuse Borrower’s own non-

performance and void the purported default. See id. Accordingly, Borrower

asserts:     “Because the [t]rial [c]ourt’s decision to dismiss the claim for

declaratory relief is based on its decisions denying [the] other causes of

action,” the court’s decision is “erroneous for the reasons discussed above.”

Id.

                                     - 18 -
J-S25033-23

     However, as explained supra, we conclude the trial court did not err in

granting summary judgment to Lender on Borrower’s other claims. Thus, we

agree Borrower’s claim for declaratory judgment fails as well. See Trial Ct.

Op. at 14.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 12/11/2023

                                   - 19 -