Court Opinion

ID: 9626458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:12:54.501492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:27.084889
License: Public Domain

WILLIS, J., pro tem., Concurring.
I concur.
The complaint herein consists of three causes of action: First, for the recovery of money after rescission of a contract for sale of real property on the ground of false representations of the seller's agents; second, a cause of action for damages for fraud and deceit in the making of such false representations; third, the common count for money had and received predicated on the implied contract arising as a result of rescission.
*179The contract in evidence shows that it contained a cautionary clause relieving the principal of liability because of any representations made by any selling agent or other person other than is contained in the contract, and the evidence shows that the representations alleged to be fraudulent were made by agents and codefendants of the seller, the respondent bank, that the bank was innocent of any participation in or knowledge of the alleged false representations, and that the bank executed the contract of sale to appellants. Under the recent decision in the case of Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal. (2d) 625 [36 Pac. (2d) 618, 95 A. L. R. 760], it is held that under such circumstances, no cause of action against the innocent principal may lie for damages for fraud, but that the sole remedy is by timely rescission and an action to recover moneys paid upon the contract. It therefore appears that the motion for a nonsuit was properly granted on the second cause of action under this authority.  As to the statute of limitations pleaded to the first and third causes of action, it is sufficient to say that the evidence clearly reveals that discovery, as a matter of law, was made by the plaintiffs of the alleged fraud prior to the three years before the commencement of this action. Therefore the motion for a nonsuit as to the first and third causes of action was properly granted, it being patent that the third cause or common count is nothing but a repetition of the cause of action set forth in the first count.
Stephens, P. J., concurred in both opinions.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1935.