Court Opinion

ID: 9927281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 18:01:04.421993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.600572
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 21-10109

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
                                                 1:19-cr-00015-
    v.                                           DAD-BAM-3

CONRADO VIRGEN-MENDOZA,
AKA Mendoza,                                        OPINION

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Eastern District of California
          Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted December 8, 2022
                 San Francisco, California

                     Filed January 26, 2024

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Gabriel P. Sanchez,
    Circuit Judges, and Stephen R. Bough, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Sanchez

*
 The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
2                    USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed Conrado Virgen-Mendoza’s
conviction on one count of conspiracy to aid and abet his
brother Paulo Virgen-Mendoza’s flight to Mexico to avoid
prosecution for the murder of a police officer, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1073.
    Conrado argued that the district court committed
reversible error by permitting the Government to argue in
closing that it was not necessary to prove that each co-
conspirator knew about Paulo’s intention to travel to
Mexico. The element that confers federal jurisdiction under
§ 1073 is movement or travel in interstate or foreign
commerce. The panel explained that because the substantive
§ 1073 offense of flight to avoid prosecution never occurred,
the Government was required to prove that the conspirators
knew of the fact giving rise to federal jurisdiction: that they
were aiding Paulo’s flight into Mexico to avoid
prosecution. The panel held that the Government was
therefore required to prove that Conrado knew about the plan
and specifically intended to help Paulo cross the border to
Mexico avoid prosecution. The panel concluded, however,
that any misstatement of the law by the Government did not
materially affect the verdict, as the brief misstatement in
rebuttal factored very little into the parties’ closing
arguments and was neutralized by the district court’s
instructions to the jury.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                  USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                    3

    The panel held that the evidence is sufficient, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, that
Conrado knew about and specifically intended to help Paulo
cross the border to Mexico to avoid prosecution.
    Conrado argued that the district court abused its
discretion by permitting the Government to read transcripts
of his interviews with law enforcement to the jury without
also playing or admitting into evidence the Spanish-
language interview recordings. The panel did not need to
decide whether the best evidence rule required admission of
the recordings because even assuming error, the exclusion of
the recordings did not materially affect the verdict.

                        COUNSEL

Peggy Sasso (argued), Assistant Federal Defender; Heather
E. Williams, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public
Defender’s Office, Fresno, California; for Defendant-
Appellant.
Michael G. Tierney (argued) and Karen A. Escobar,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Camil A. Skipper,
Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Chief; Phillip A.
Talbert, United States Attorney; United States Department
of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, Fresno,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                  USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

                         OPINION

SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge:

    A jury convicted Conrado Virgen-Mendoza (“Conrado”)
on one count of conspiracy to aid and abet his brother Paulo
Virgen-Mendoza’s (“Paulo”) flight to Mexico to avoid
prosecution for the murder of a Newman, California police
officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073. In this appeal,
Conrado challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction, arguing the Government failed to
establish that he knew about and specifically intended to
further the object of the conspiracy—helping Paulo cross the
border into Mexico to avoid prosecution. Conrado also
contends he was prejudiced by the Government’s closing
argument suggesting it was not necessary to prove each co-
conspirator’s knowledge of a plan to assist Paulo’s flight to
Mexico. Finally, Conrado asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by permitting English translations of his
interviews with law enforcement to be read to the jury
without admitting into evidence the underlying Spanish-
language interview recordings. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

                             I.
    In the early morning hours of December 26, 2018, Paulo
Virgen-Mendoza shot and killed Police Corporal Ronil
Singh during a traffic stop. Around 2:30 a.m., Paulo placed
a call to his brother Conrado. An hour later, Conrado left his
home in Chowchilla and picked up the brothers’ friend Erik
Quiroz Razo (“Erik”) in Merced before arriving to Paulo’s
                   USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                    5

home in Newman, California. 1 Paulo’s girlfriend informed
Conrado that Paulo shot an officer. Paulo asked Conrado
and Erik to help him put plywood at the entrance of his
carport to obscure his truck. They then left in Conrado’s car
and headed in the direction of Patterson, California.
    Around 7:30 a.m., law enforcement broadcast the first of
several Blue Alerts about the shooting of Corporal Singh.
Minutes later, Conrado’s wife called Conrado to tell him
about the Blue Alert and Paulo’s involvement in the shooting
of an officer. She told Conrado to drop his brother off and
return home. At 7:40 a.m., Adrian Virgen-Mendoza
(“Adrian”), Conrado and Paulo’s brother, called Paulo after
learning about the Blue Alert. They spoke for almost two
minutes. Paulo then asked Conrado to take him to their
uncle’s ranch in Stockton. When Conrado, Paulo, and Erik
arrived at the ranch, Paulo asked if he could hide out for a
few days. His uncle refused.
    At 8:19 a.m., law enforcement broadcast a second Blue
Alert conveying the news that Corporal Singh had passed
away. Conrado’s uncle testified that Paulo stated he was
going “to leave” and that he understood this statement to
mean leave for Mexico. Conrado’s aunt testified that Paulo
said he wanted to go to Mexico. According to the aunt,
Paulo wanted to stay at their home for three days because he
“didn’t have any plans. All he wanted to do was go to
Mexico.” Paulo said he needed to find someone who could
get him out. She later testified that when Paulo stated he
wanted to “get out,” she assumed this meant getting back to
Mexico. Conrado, Erik, and Paulo left the ranch. At Paulo’s

1
  Conrado testified that he, Paulo, and Erik planned to work a
construction job in Fairfield that morning.
6                     USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

request, Erik threw a plastic bag containing the firearm used
in the shooting into a dumpster.
    Conrado started driving Paulo and Erik to Fairfield.
Paulo told Conrado to pull over because he needed to think
about what he was going to do and where he was going to
go. Paulo decided they should drive to Erik’s house in
Merced. After dropping them off, Conrado returned home
where his wife called the police. California Highway Patrol
Lieutenant Mayolo Banuelos responded to the call and
interviewed Conrado in his native Spanish, recording the
interview. Lieutenant Banuelos testified that Conrado was
very emotional, upset, in tears, and in shock. 2
    That afternoon, Adrian contacted an acquaintance on
Facebook, Deeby Duran, who was known to smuggle
individuals across the U.S.-Mexico border.       Adrian
conveyed to Deeby that he needed to get someone out to
Mexico. Deeby responded that she would need an initial
payment of $400 and another $200 payment when Paulo was
picked up.
    That evening, Conrado went to the police station for
more questioning. Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Jesse
Tovar conducted the interview in Spanish and recorded a
video of the interview. The next morning, Adrian sent $400
to Deeby. Adrian drove Paulo to a relative’s home in
Bakersfield where Paulo spent the night. Law enforcement
arrested Paulo the following morning.

2
 At 11:17 a.m., Adrian called Conrado on his cell phone while the police
were present at Conrado’s house. Adrian testified that they did not have
any discussion about helping Paulo flee to Mexico. That was the last call
Conrado received before he voluntarily turned his phone over to police.
                      USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                           7

    These events resulted in a multi-count indictment against
seven defendants, including Erik Quiroz, Adrian and
Conrado Virgen-Mendoza, and several others. Three
defendants, including Adrian, pled guilty before trial. A
thirteen-day jury trial resulted in guilty verdicts against Erik
and Conrado on count three for conspiracy to aid and abet a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073, flight to avoid prosecution
across state lines. 3 The four defendants at trial were
acquitted on all remaining counts.

                                II.
    Conrado argues that the district court committed
reversible error by permitting the Government to argue in
closing that it was not necessary to prove that each co-
conspirator knew about Paulo’s intention to travel to
Mexico. To determine whether the Government misstated
the law, we first address whether conspiracy to aid and abet
a violation of § 1073 requires proof that each co-conspirator
have actual knowledge of the fact giving rise to federal
jurisdiction—that they were helping Paulo cross state lines
to avoid prosecution.
                                  A.
    As the district court observed, the Government charged
the defendants with a very unusual conspiracy: to aid and
abet the commission of a federal offense that is rarely
prosecuted and, in this case, never occurred. To find the
defendants guilty under count three, the jury was instructed

3
 We affirmed Erik Quiroz’s conviction in an unpublished disposition.
See United States v. Quiroz, 860 Fed. App’x 477, 478–79 (9th Cir. 2021).
8                     USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

that the Government must prove each of the following
elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt:

        First, beginning on or about December 26,
        2018 and ending on or about December 28,
        2018, there was an agreement between two or
        more persons to aid and abet Paulo Virgen
        Mendoza’s flight to avoid prosecution;
        Second, the defendant became a member of
        the conspiracy knowing of its object and
        intending to help accomplish it;
        Third, one of the members of the conspiracy
        performed at least one overt act on or
        between December 26, 2018 and December
        28, 2018 for the purpose of carrying out the
        conspiracy.

The district court further instructed that the object of the
conspiracy was “to aid and abet Paulo Virgen-Mendoza’s
flight to avoid prosecution” and that to “aid and abet” means
“intentionally to help someone else commit a crime.” 4 The

4
 The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting as follows: “The crime
of aiding and abetting another individual’s flight to avoid prosecution
has four elements:
        First, someone else committed the crime of flight to
        avoid prosecution in violation of Section 1073 of Title
        18 of the United States Code;
        Second, the defendant aided, counseled, commanded,
        induced, or procured that person with respect to at least
        one element of flight to avoid prosecution;
                    USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                        9

jury was also instructed that “[a] defendant acts with intent
to facilitate the crime when the defendant actively
participates in a criminal venture with advance knowledge
of the crime and having acquired that knowledge when the
defendant still had a realistic opportunity to withdraw from
the crime.”
    Finally, the district court instructed that the substantive
offense of flight to avoid prosecution under § 1073 requires
proof that “Paulo Virgen Mendoza moved or traveled
between one state and another or between one state and a
foreign country” and that he did so with the intent to avoid
prosecution for a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction
from which he was fleeing, in this case murder under the
State of California.
    Prior to closing arguments, the Government advanced
the position that it was not necessary to prove that each co-
conspirator had actual knowledge that Paulo intended to flee
to Mexico. Rather, the Government sought permission to
argue that the jury could convict so long as one of the co-
conspirators knew Paulo was going to Mexico. The defense
argued that this was a misstatement of law and that the object
of the conspiracy, moving someone across state or
international lines, has to be known to the conspirators at the
time they join in the conspiracy. The district court found the
Government’s argument “about as thin of a reed as you can
possibly dance on,” but ultimately agreed with the

       Third, the defendant acted with an intent to facilitate
       the crime of flight to avoid prosecution; and
       Fourth, the defendant acted before the crime was
       completed.”
10                 USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

Government over defense counsel’s objections. The jury
was not present for this colloquy.
    The Government subsequently backed away from this
position in closing, arguing instead that the conspirators all
knew Paulo intended to make his way to Mexico. See infra
Section II.B. On appeal, the Government continues to assert
that conspiracy to violate a federal criminal statute does not
require proof that each co-conspirator have knowledge of the
statute’s jurisdictional element, citing United States v.
Chang Ru Meng Backman, 817 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2016)
and United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975).
While that may be true as a general matter, we explain why
the Government is incorrect under the circumstances of this
case.
    Backman involved a criminal prosecution for sex
trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The statute requires
proof that a defendant “knowingly—(1) in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains,
patronizes, or solicits by any means a person.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a). We rejected the defendant’s contention that the
term “knowingly” modified not only the unlawful act of
recruiting or transporting a person but also the jurisdictional
element “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”
Backman, 817 F.3d at 667. Such a construction, we
concluded, was not apparent from a plain reading of the
statute, nor did it accord with “[t]he longstanding
presumption . . . that the jurisdictional element of a criminal
statute has no mens rea.” Id. (citing Feola, 420 U.S. at 676
n.9). Our holding in Backman does not support the
Government’s position because it did not involve, as here, a
conspiracy to commit a federal offense that never
materialized. Under these circumstances, Feola requires us
                    USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                      11

to ask whether the actual knowledge of the parties to an
unlawful agreement suffices to establish the existence of
federal jurisdiction. Feola, 420 U.S. at 695–96.
    In Feola, the Supreme Court examined whether
conspiracy to assault a federal officer in the performance of
his official duties required that each defendant know the
intended victim was a federal officer. Id. at 672–73.
Defendants conspired to assault potential drug buyers who,
unbeknownst to them, were undercover federal narcotics
agents. Id. at 674–75. Had the attack on the federal agents
occurred, it would not have been necessary to prove that the
conspirators were aware of the official status of their victims.
Id. at 692; see also id. at 695 (“Federal jurisdiction always
exists where the substantive offense is committed in the
manner therein described, that is, when a federal officer is
attacked.”).
    Because one of the undercover agents thwarted the
attack, however, the Court considered whether the
“unfulfilled agreement to assault, . . . standing alone,
constituted a sufficient threat to the safety of a federal officer
so as to give rise to federal jurisdiction.” Id. The Court
explained that if the conspirators agreed on the specific
identity of the individuals to be attacked and those
individuals were in fact federal officers—in other words, if
there was agreement on the facts triggering federal
jurisdiction—that would satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement. Id. But if the object of the intended attack was
not identified “with sufficient specificity” to make it likely
the attack would be carried out on a federal officer, it would
be “impossible to assert that the mere act of agreement to
assault poses a sufficient threat to federal personnel and
functions so as to give rise to federal jurisdiction.” Id. at
695–96. In short, “the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied
12                  USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

by the existence of facts tying the proscribed conduct to the
area of federal concern delineated by the statute.” Id. at 695.
    The element that confers federal jurisdiction under
§ 1073 is “move[ment] or travel[] in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1073. Because violation of § 1073
never occurred here, the Government was required to prove
that the conspirators knew of the fact giving rise to federal
jurisdiction: that they were aiding Paulo’s flight into Mexico
to avoid prosecution. See Feola, 420 U.S. at 696. Without
advance knowledge of this unfulfilled plan, there would not
be “a sufficient threat” to federal interests “so as to give rise
to federal jurisdiction” against Conrado. Id.
   We therefore hold that to convict on count three, the
Government was required to prove that Conrado knew about
and specifically intended to help Paulo cross the border to
Mexico to avoid prosecution.
                              B.
    In light of our conclusion, we consider next whether the
Government misstated the knowledge requirement in
closing argument and, if so, whether the misstatement of law
prejudiced the defendant. “A prosecutor’s misstatements of
law during closing argument provide grounds for reversal.”
United States v. Velazquez, 1 F.4th 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
2021). “We will not reverse a conviction, however, unless
the prosecutor's statements during closing argument ‘are so
gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the
prejudice has not been neutralized by the trial judge.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th Cir.
1984)). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant “must
show that it is more probable than not that the misconduct
materially affected the verdict.” United States v. Tucker, 641
F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The
                   USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                   13

record discloses that any misstatement by the Government
did not materially affect the verdict.
    As noted above, the Government retreated from its
earlier position and argued that Conrado and the other
members of the conspiracy knew of Paulo’s intention to get
to Mexico. The Government pointed to evidence of the
many phone calls on the morning of December 26 between
the co-conspirators, as well as Conrado transporting Paulo,
hiding him, changing vehicles, moving him to various
locations, and giving false statements to law enforcement to
protect Paulo. The Government emphasized that Paulo was
from Mexico, had family there, and was running around
asking for help to hide him and get him out. As Conrado’s
aunt testified, “where else was he going to go?” The jury
“didn’t need to hear the word ‘Mexico’ for each of these
defendants to know where Paulo was going.”
    Defense counsel argued that to convict Conrado as a
member of the conspiracy, the jury had to find that Conrado
knew about and agreed to help Paulo flee to Mexico.
Defense counsel argued there was no evidence Conrado
knew about any such plan because Paulo’s plans were
formed long after Conrado had returned home and was no
longer in contact with his brothers.           The evidence
established, at best, an assumption by the aunt and uncle, and
an assumption is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Conrado entered into an agreement with someone else to get
Paulo to Mexico.
    While the Government briefly stated in rebuttal that
“actual knowledge was not required” and that a co-
conspirator’s “belief”—rather than knowledge—was
sufficient to prove this conspiracy, the Government
immediately returned to its prevailing point that Conrado
14                 USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

and the other defendants “knew” that Paulo was headed to
Mexico. In the context of all the facts in evidence, the
Government maintained, it was reasonable for the jury to
infer that Paulo intended to leave for Mexico.
    The record establishes that the brief misstatement of law
in rebuttal factored very little into the parties’ closing
arguments. Defense counsel reiterated several times that the
conspiracy charge required proof that Conrado had actual
knowledge of the plan to get his brother to Mexico, and
counsel emphasized the absence of evidence supporting
Conrado’s knowledge of or agreement to help Paulo flee
across state lines. And the gravamen of the Government’s
closing argument was that Conrado knew Paulo intended to
head to Mexico when Paulo sought help from others.
    In addition, any prejudice by the misstatement was
neutralized by the jury instructions.            As Conrado
acknowledges on appeal, the district court’s jury instructions
adequately stated the knowledge requirements for the
charged conspiracy. The jury was instructed on the
substantive elements of flight to avoid prosecution,
including the crossing of state or international lines to avoid
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1073. The jury was instructed
that aiding and abetting required proof the defendant
“actively participate[d] in a criminal venture with advance
knowledge of the crime and having acquired that knowledge
when the defendant still had a realistic opportunity to
withdraw from the crime.” See id. § 2. And the jury was
instructed that a conspiracy requires “an agreement between
two or more persons” to accomplish its object and that the
defendant entered into an agreement knowing of its object
and intending to help accomplish it. See id. § 371. Taken
together, these instructions required the Government to
prove that Conrado knew Paulo was planning to go to
                   USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                    15

Mexico and that any assistance Conrado provided to his
brother was done with the intent of aiding his flight out of
the country. See Feola, 420 U.S. at 695. We have no trouble
concluding that the district court’s instructions to the jury
“neutralized” any misstatement of law in rebuttal. See
Birges, 723 F.2d at 672.

                           III.
    Conrado next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his knowledge of the charged conspiracy. We
review de novo claims of insufficient evidence to support a
jury conviction. United States v. Charley, 1 F.4th 637, 643
(9th Cir. 2021). “Evidence supporting a conviction is
sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We reverse if the evidence is “such that all rational fact
finders would have to conclude that the evidence of guilt
fails to establish every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158,
1165 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The evidence is sufficient, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Government, that Conrado knew about and
specifically intended to help Paulo cross the border to
Mexico to avoid prosecution. The evidence at trial included
the many phone calls on the morning of December 26
between Conrado and Paulo, Conrado and Erik, Adrian and
Paulo, and Adrian and Conrado, discussing Paulo’s shooting
of Corporal Singh and what to do next. There was evidence
of Conrado transporting Paulo, hiding him, changing
vehicles, moving him to various locations, and giving false
statements to law enforcement to protect his brother. There
16                 USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

was testimony from Conrado’s aunt and uncle that Paulo
stated in Conrado’s presence Paulo wanted to “get out” or
“leave” the area, and that “[a]ll he wanted to do was go to
Mexico.” And the jury heard testimony that Paulo was from
Mexico, that his parents lived in Mexico, that he was looking
for someone to help him get out.
     As the Government emphasizes, Paulo’s statements at
the ranch are the “central evidence” that Conrado knew
“Paulo’s destination” was Mexico. A rational factfinder can
infer from the evidence that Conrado knew Paulo intended
to flee to Mexico and was assisting his brother in that effort.
A rational factfinder could also infer from Conrado’s failure
to disclose to law enforcement what he knew of Paulo’s
whereabouts that he was buying time for his brother to flee
and acting in furtherance of the plan to cross into Mexico to
evade prosecution. The evidence is more than sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict.

                           IV.
    Conrado’s final argument is that the district court abused
its discretion by permitting the Government, over repeated
objections, to read transcripts of his interviews with law
enforcement to the jury without also playing or admitting
into evidence the Spanish-language interview recordings.
Conrado argues that the best evidence rule required
admission of the underlying Spanish recordings themselves,
relying on out-of-circuit authority. Fed. R. Evid. 1002; see
United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2020).
    Where, as here, there is no dispute as to the accuracy of
the English-language translations of the interview
transcripts, we review for abuse of discretion the district
court’s decision to allow the use of transcripts during trial.
                   USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA                   17

United States v. Pena-Espinoza, 47 F.3d 356, 359 (9th Cir.
1995). A “nonconstitutional evidentiary error will be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only if the court’s ruling
more likely than not affected the verdict.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1991)).
    We need not decide whether the best evidence rule
required admission of the underlying Spanish-language
recordings because even assuming error, the exclusion of the
Spanish recordings did not materially affect the verdict.
Conrado claims he was prejudiced because the guilty verdict
rested on his misstatements to law enforcement, and in
particular why he made those misstatements in his emotional
state. Without the jury viewing the videos, he argues, the
jury could not make such an assessment because
communication is based not only on words but also verbal
and non-verbal behavior.
    During trial, however, the jury received ample evidence
from which to assess Conrado’s mental state during his
videotaped interviews with law enforcement. The jury heard
testimony from Lieutenant Banuelos that Conrado was
emotionally upset during the first interview at his home on
December 26. Deputy Sheriff Tovar likewise testified that
Conrado was tired, distraught, and cried at times during the
second interview at the police station. The jury also heard
from Conrado’s psychological expert that Conrado’s state of
mind during his police interviews could be characterized as
a “lizard brain,” gut-level reaction incapable of deliberate
thought. The district court also permitted defense counsel to
play two excerpts of videos—taken when Conrado was alone
during breaks in the police station interview room—to show
his emotional state. Finally, Conrado testified and was given
the opportunity to explain his own mental state during the
police interviews. On this record, Conrado fails to
18               USA V. VIRGEN-MENDOZA

demonstrate that the exclusion of the Spanish-language
recordings resulted in any prejudice.
     AFFIRMED.