Court Opinion

ID: 9730876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:55.378545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.388405
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant here contends that it was error to instruct on the “sudden emergency” rule, not only because neither of *348the parties requested the instruction, but also because the evidence did not justify the charge. I agree that there is no evidence in the record warranting this unrequested charge.
According to the defendant’s testimony, R. 191a-95a, he was travelling 35 to 40 miles per hour in the westbound lane of a road 20 feet wide, which was straight at this part. About 200 feet away he saw a car facing him in the eastbound lane, parked. The car pulled away and then the defendant saw Mrs. Rosato in the middle of the eastbound lane, about 70 to 80 feet away. She was looking straight ahead and running across the road. The defendant locked his brakes, but continued to skid for the rest of the distance, and struck Mrs. Rosato when she was a foot or two in the westbound lane, which defendant’s car never left.
It was error to charge the “sudden emergency” rule on these facts because there was no sudden emergency. A sudden emergency occurs only when a moving instrumentality is suddenly and unexpectedly thrust into the path of travel. Sullivan v. Wolson, 262 Pa.Super. 397, 396 A.2d 1230 (1978); Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468, 386 A.2d 45 (1978). Here, defendant had an opportunity from 200 feet away to observe the plaintiff traverse ten feet of open, straightaway road into his lane, and he saw her in fact when he was still 70 to 80 feet away from her. To hold that this is a “sudden emergency” situation is an unwarranted relaxation of the standard of care demanded of motorists who see pedestrians in the road.1
Here the parties requested, and the lower court properly gave, an assured clear distance charge. In a given factual situation, the assured clear distance rule and sudden emergency rule are mutually exclusive. Sullivan v. Wolson, supra, 262 Pa.Super. at 408 n. 4, 396 A.2d at 1236 n. 4. See also our unanimous en banc decision in Brown v. Schriver, supra. In some cases, the facts may be so disputed as to require both charges, but this is not such a case. The *349defendant’s own testimony disproved the existence of any sudden emergency. I am not saying that Mrs. Rosato was free of contributory negligence as a matter of law. A jury could well find negligence in running across a street without looking for oncoming traffic, if the facts were so found. However, appellant is entitled to a new trial because of the erroneous and prejudicial “sudden emergency” charge here given.

. Obviously, neither did defendant’s counsel think that defendant’s testimony was sufficient to trigger a sudden emergency instruction, since he did not request such a charge.