Court Opinion

ID: 9397647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 19:11:22.853971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.498428
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 220071-U

                                   Order filed May 25, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Du Page County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0071
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 19-CF-1512
                                                        )
      DONNA L. MESSINA,                                 )       Honorable
                                                        )       Michael W. Reidy,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s pro se
                  posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2          Defendant, Donna L. Messina, appeals her conviction for aggravated driving under the

     influence (DUI), arguing that the Du Page County circuit court failed to conduct an adequate

     inquiry into her posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand with instructions.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND
¶4          Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2),

     (a)(1), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B) (West 2018)). Prior to trial, the State observed that defendant had

     disclosed an expert witness, James Thomas O’Donnell, with his curriculum vitae, but had not

     disclosed the field in which O’Donnell would be qualified as an expert. The State asked for an

     order requiring defendant to disclose all statements, reports, notes, and memoranda of, or relied

     upon by O’Donnell regarding defendant, as well as direct results and data of all examinations and

     tests administered by or relied upon by O’Donnell. The week before trial, the State filed a motion

     in limine claiming that defendant had not asserted any affirmative defenses. Therefore, the State

     requested that defendant be prevented from presenting any evidence or undisclosed testimony,

     except for her own testimony. After argument, the court deferred ruling on the motion.

¶5          The case proceeded to trial before a six-person jury. Pertinent to this appeal, defendant

     called O’Donnell to testify on her behalf. He was qualified as an expert in toxicology,

     pharmacology, and nutrition. O’Donnell testified that he had reviewed the police reports,

     laboratory reports, defendant’s medical records, and the video of the arrest; had examined

     defendant; and had read literature on the absorption of alcohol in the body. He stated that, through

     this preparation, he had learned that defendant had ulcerative colitis. The State objected. After a

     discussion outside the presence of the jury, the court sustained the State’s objection to statements

     regarding yeast in the gut and the medical diagnosis that had been made by someone else because

     it was hearsay and because the doctor’s notes and the medical evidence relied on had not been

     tendered to the State. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of both counts.

¶6          Before sentencing, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The PSI included

     a statement from defendant, which stated, in part:

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“I had been seen by three different doctors to diagnose my condition

because the symptoms I was having were foreign to me. I informed each of

doctors of the DUI, accident, how much I had to drink, as well as the gut

yeast infection that I was taking antifungal supplements to kill the yeast,

along with a no carbohydrate and no sugar diet. They decided to treat me

for anxiety, but the symptoms I was having are what was causing me

anxiety. The medication they were prescribing only made those symptoms

worse and I stopped take them. I was finally diagnosed accurately by Dr.

James O’Donnell Pharm.D, M.S, FCP, ABCP, FACN, R.PH. Dr.

O’Donnell diagnosed me with Auto-brewery Syndrome. Unknow to me, the

type of gut yeast that I had was producing alcohol. I was completely

unaware that this could happen.

       Dr. O’Donnell appeared in court for my trial and had planned to

testify on my behalf and discuss/explain the condition that I had, but the

prosecution objected, and he was not allowed to speak of this during my

trial because my lawyer did not meet the demand for disclosure that was

requested. My lawyer referred to a previous case, concerning the lack of

disclosure, which was from 1981, but the judge did not accept it. My lawyer,

decided to move forward with my case without my doctor’s testimony and

did not want to have the case continued to obtain documents. Reasons for

this are not known to me. I am sure that if my doctor would have been able

to present his diagnosis, findings, reports from previous doctor visits, and

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                       explain the condition that I had at that time, the outcome of this would have

                       been different.”

       At the sentencing hearing, the State discussed the PSI and indicated that defendant was not taking

       responsibility for her actions, instead blaming her intoxication on her body’s production of alcohol.

¶7             In reaching its decision, the court noted that it considered the PSI and discussed defendant’s

       alleged auto-brewery syndrome. The court did not mention defendant’s comments regarding her

       trial counsel. The two counts merged, and defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail and 24

       months’ probation.

¶8                                                 II. ANALYSIS

¶9             On appeal, defendant solely contends that the court erred by failing to conduct a

       preliminary inquiry into her posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as required by

       People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). Specifically, defendant points to her comments in the

       PSI mentioning trial counsel’s performance.

¶ 10           The need to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry is triggered when a defendant raises a

       pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071,

       ¶ 11. A pro se defendant is not required to do anything more than bring his or her ineffective

       assistance of counsel claim to the circuit court’s attention. Id. (a pro se defendant is not required

       to file a written motion but may raise the ineffective assistance claim orally or through a letter or

       a note to the circuit court). “[W]hen a defendant brings a clear claim asserting ineffective assistance

       of counsel, either orally or in writing, this is sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a

       Krankel inquiry.” Id. ¶ 18. “If the court fails to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as

       to the factual basis of the defendant’s allegations, the case must be remanded for the limited

       purpose of allowing the court to do so.” People v. Remsik-Miller, 2012 IL App (2d) 100921, ¶ 9.

                                                           4
       We consider de novo a circuit court’s alleged failure to inquire into a claim of ineffective assistance

       of counsel. People v. Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 14.

¶ 11             Here, defendant’s statement in the PSI clearly referred “to counsel’s failure to do

       something.” See People v. Craig, 2020 IL App (2d) 170679, ¶ 17. Defendant stated, “my lawyer

       did not meet the demand for disclosure that was requested.” Further, defendant noted that, “My

       lawyer, decided to move forward with my case without my doctor’s testimony and did not want to

       have the case continued to obtain documents. Reasons for this are not known to me.” It is clear

       from these statements that defendant was complaining about counsel’s performance. It was not

       necessary for defendant to use the specific term “ineffective assistance” in order to raise this claim.

       See id.

¶ 12             Further, defendant’s claims were properly presented to the court for purposes of Krankel.

       The Second District considered this issue in Craig and stated:

                        “To be sure, the PSI was prepared by court services, but the statements at

                        issue were unquestionably those of defendant and, as noted, made a clear

                        claim of ineffectiveness. Moreover, a PSI is prepared for the court, and the

                        court is required to consider it. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(2) (West 2016). The

                        record makes clear that the trial court read the PSI. Given that the court read

                        the allegations of ineffectiveness, which were made by defendant to a court

                        employee for inclusion in a report prepared specifically for the court, an

                        inquiry under Krankel was warranted. (Emphasis in original.)” Id. ¶ 18.

       We adopt this reasoning. Therefore, we find that the court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary

       Krankel inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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¶ 13          In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s contention that such an error was

       harmless as it is rebutted by the record. While the issue of O’Donnell’s testimony was considered

       prior to and during trial, it is not clear whether the court’s decision to bar the testimony was based

       in any way on trial counsel’s failures to disclose the evidence to the State prior to trial or whether

       any action on the part of counsel could have cured the defects barring O’Donnell’s testimony.

¶ 14          Thus, we remand the cause for the limited purpose of allowing the circuit court to inquire

       into the factual basis of defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. If defendant’s allegations show

       possible incompetent representation of the case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue

       defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. However, if the court concludes that defendant’s claim

       lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, the court may deny the claim.

¶ 15                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is remanded with instructions.

¶ 17          Remanded with instructions.

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