Court Opinion

ID: 9370312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 00:12:15.471051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.028683
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                     OF TEXAS

                                        NO. WR-93,137-01

                             In re CITY OF LUBBOCK, Relator

                ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
                           CAUSE NO. 2020-421,049
            IN THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY
                         CAUSE NO. 07-21-00070-CV
                    IN THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

               K ELLER, P.J., filed a concurring opinion in which K EEL, J., joined.

                                    CONCURRING OPINION

       Quoting approvingly from the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Walker v. Packer, the

Court seems to adopt the following standard for mandamus in criminal cases:

       [A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute
       an abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.1

But mandamus jurisprudence in civil cases differs from mandamus jurisprudence in criminal cases,

so the Court’s reliance on Walker is misplaced.

       1
         See 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (also saying, “A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in
determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.”).
                                                    CITY OF LUBBOCK CONCURRENCE — 2

        The “abuse of discretion” standard announced over thirty years ago in Walker is still the law

in civil cases.2 It applies even when the law is unsettled.3 That standard differs dramatically from

the standard in criminal cases.

        In most criminal cases, the extraordinary mechanism of mandamus (or prohibition) will not

be available to resolve unsettled law.4 Issues of first impression can be addressed on mandamus in

criminal cases only under limited circumstances, such as when an unambiguous statute is involved

or when the combined weight of our precedents clearly establishes the proposition of law on which

relief is predicated.5 We have also indicated that mandamus will be available if the law deprives a

        2
           In re Auburn Creek Limited Partnership, 655 S.W.3d 837, 840 (Tex. 2022) (“When a trial
court fails ‘to analyze or apply the law correctly,’ it has clearly abused its discretion. Essentially,
the trial court has no discretion in determining the law or applying the law to the facts.”) (citing
Walker, citation to Walker omitted).
        3
          In re Gonzales, 619 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Tex. 2021) (“A trial court that fails to properly apply
a statutory requirement abuses its discretion because courts have “no ‘discretion’ in determining
what the law is or applying the law to the facts,” even when the law is unsettled.”) (citing Walker).
        4
           In re Smith, ___ S.W.3d ___, ____, No. WR-93,354-02, slip op. at 5, 2022 WL 17480102,
*2 (Tex. Crim. App. December 7, 2022) (“Even when the facts are undisputed, the extraordinary
mechanism of a writ of prohibition or mandamus will not lie to resolve a hotly contested unsettled
question of law.”); In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (mandamus
inappropriate because of “unsettled legal questions”); In re State ex rel. Wice v. Fifth Judicial Dist.
Court of Appeals, 581 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Mandamus relief is
inappropriate if the law surrounding the court’s action is unclear. . . . When the statutory terms at
issue are ambiguous, mandamus relief is inappropriate.”); In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d 291, 305 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015) (“[T]he extraordinary remedy of mandamus or prohibition is not a substitute for
and cannot be used to perform the office of appeal. . . . A writ of prohibition is not the proper vehicle
to settle unsettled law.”).
        5
           Smith, supra; In re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Meza,
supra at 389. See also Wice, supra at 194 (“when the principle of law is so plainly prescribed as to
be free from doubt” such as when “the terms of a statute are clear”); Medina, supra at 298 (“an issue
of first impression can sometimes qualify for mandamus relief when the factual scenario has never
been precisely addressed but the principle of law has been clearly established” but “only if the
principle of law he relies upon is positively commanded and so plainly prescribed under the law as
                                                  CITY OF LUBBOCK CONCURRENCE — 3

court of jurisdiction or authority in a certain area by default and requires any exception to be

expressly provided by some legal source.6

       If the Court intends to relax our standard for mandamus, one would expect an explicit

acknowledgment of that intent, along with reasons for making the change. The Court’s opinion

includes neither. And there is no need to change our mandamus jurisprudence in this case. As the

Court correctly explains, there is a default rule that ex parte communications are impermissible, and

any exception to that rule must be expressly provided by some legal source. With no legal source

providing an exception in the circumstances here, the trial judge’s conduct of holding an ex parte

hearing was indisputably impermissible.

       I join the Court’s opinion, except for its citation to and reliance on Walker.

Filed: February 8, 2023
Publish

to be free from doubt”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
       6
           State v. Patrick, 86 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (plurality op.) (“The dissent
contends that the trial court’s action was not so clearly wrong as to be beyond dispute. In support
of this contention, the dissent cites the maxim ‘whatever is not forbidden is permitted.’ Whatever
validity that maxim may have as a general matter, it does not apply here. Without jurisdiction, the
trial court has no power to act. Consequently, a source of jurisdiction must be found to authorize
the trial court’s orders.”). See Medina, 475 S.W.3d at 298 & n.4 (quoting 43B GEORGE E. DIX &
JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY , TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 61.29 (3d
ed. 2011) for proposition that mandamus is available when a trial judge lacks jurisdiction or
authority to take a certain action and citing Patrick among other cases).