Court Opinion

ID: 5460336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-09 19:34:03.778054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:41.758579
License: Public Domain

*598By the Court,
E. Darwin Smith, J.
The judgments rendered in the actions of Denison v. Merrills, and Garlic v. Merrills, declaring the deed from Miles Merrill to James E. Merrill fraudulent and void as against the plaintiffs in those suits, simply removed that deed from the way of the plaintiffs, and entitled them to proceed to sell the premises in payment of their debts. The plaintiffs might have had a' receiver appointed, to take a conveyance of said land from the judgment debtor, by whom, under the directions of the court, such premises might have been sold and a title obtained through the receiver’s deed; or they might have issued new executions and sold the land thereupon. The provision in the decree directing the sheriff to sell said land in the manner prescribed by law, and that he execute to the purchaser a certificate and deed in the manner required in the code in respect to sales upon executions, it seems to me, was entirely unauthorized. It is not a mode of conveying or transferring title to real estate prescribed or authorized by any statute. In Jackson v. Edwards, (7 Paige, 404,) the chancellor said that, “independent of the statutory provisions in aid of the power of the court, the ordinary mode in which courts of equity transferred the legal title upon a sale under a decree, was by operating upon the parties themselves, and compelling them to join in a conveyance to a purchaser.”
In Chautauque County Bank v. White, (6 Barb. 589,) it was held that the court of chancery, upon a creditor’s bill, had no power to order the sale of real estate. The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the purchaser would get a good title under the receiver’s deed; the judgment debtor having conveyed the title to the receiver. (S. C., 2 Seld. 236.)
In this case Judge Gardiner says that, in all cases of fraudulent trusts, the court may in its discretion direct a sale by a master, and compel the debtor and trustee to unite in a conveyance to the purchaser, or the fraudulent conveyance may be annulled and the creditor permitted to proceed to *599sale on his execution. This same question was again before the court of appeals, in respect to the same receivership and the force of his deeds, in Chautauque County Bank v. Risley, (19 N. Y. Rep. 369.) In that case the doctrine was affirmed that courts of equity could transfer the title to real estate by requiring a conveyance to a receiver, and by a sale and conveyance by him. Judge Comstock says as follows : “ The fraudulent conveyance being annulled by the decree, the receiver, under an assignment to him, takes the title, which he can convey to a purchaser. But the title of the receiver, and of the purchaser from him, rests upon the debtors own conveyance made under the directions of the court, and has no relation to the judgment.” The title in such cases must be passed by deed, and by the debtor’s deed, The court of equity acts upon the person and not upon the estate. I cannot see, therefore, how the plaintiff can get any title to the premises under the sale mentioned in this complaint. The right of redemption claimed by the defendant fails for the same reason. The lien of the original judgments remained undischarged, and the plaintiffs may issue new executions and sell the land, or they may still apply to the court for the appointment of a receiver to take a conveyance thereof from the judgment debtor. In this view of the rights of the parties, the judgment should be reversed and the complaint dismissed. And as the parties have been in a common error in respect to their rights, it shall be without costs to either party.
[Monroe General Term,
December 2, 1861.
Johnson, Welles aid Smith, Justices.]