Court Opinion

ID: 8912008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 03:22:45.005774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:36.660498
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
While I thoroughly share all of the views of my Sister Hufstedler, my conscience impels that I set forth a few comments of my own. I do this reluctantly, even sorrowfully-
When our full court originally reviewed this appeal, all the judges then involved applied their dedicated efforts to the end that the difficult issues be correctly and justly resolved. The majority concluded that the district judge had not made critical findings, and had not reached critical conclusions, with required specificity. I disagreed, believing that the facts then before us proved, indubitably, that the challenged incriminatory evidence should have been suppressed. I repeat a portion of that which I wrote in dissenting from the majority’s original unpublished en banc decision that the cause should be remanded:
As I see it, the fact of the Government’s active participation [in the destruction of critical evidence] is beyond doubt. I say this for the following reasons:
1. The original apprehension of the vehicles was made by Oregon police upon notification by federal agents, pursuant to a federal warrant.
2. Federal agents attended the search for, and the removal of, the dynamite from one of the vehicles.
3. The instruction to destroy the material was issued by a state officer, one McCollum, and McCollum was not produced as a witness at the suppression hearing. From this the district judge could fairly draw the inference that McCollum had received his directions from federal officers.
4. At least one federal authority was present when the alleged explosive was destroyed, and there was no evidence whatsoever that he gave instructions, or made any request, that any samples be retained for analysis by the accuseds.
The last point, above enumerated, is of particular significance because of the defense contention that the substance had been extensively exposed to moisture and could not be detonated without the utilization of additional explosive material. We do not know whether such was necessary or utilized, and this failure of proof most certainly cannot be attributed to the appellees. In the circumstances therefore, I submit that the critical finding of active federal participation, uncontested, was supported by substantial evidence and, in fact, could not properly have been *1161otherwise. I should add that warrants were executed by federal officers and that no state charges were instituted.
In any event, the majority’s original decision to remand the cause so as to allow the district judge to engage in a more intricate exploration and issue the required determinations indicates to me that the majority then felt that, from the evidence relating to the issue of suppression, the ultimate conclusions could be either in favor of the appellants or in favor of the prosecution.
The district judge, after further review, supplied us with the guidance the majority originally thought to be desired. Now before us is a finding of fact which reads:
Federal agents were present and aware of [Oregon State] Trooper Fettig’s intended destruction of the dynamite and neither encouraged nor discouraged such action.
Another critical finding is as follows: John O’Rourke, Special Agent in Charge of Oregon, was in Ontario before the dynamite was destroyed. He new that Beverly Axelrod, counsel for defendants was also in Ontario before the destruction of the dynamite. O’Rourke made no effort to inform Axelrod of the impending destruction of the dynamite, of which he was aware. Axelrod never asked O’Rourke to be allowed to witness the destruction of the dynamite. No representative of defendants witnessed the destruction.
And, of what ought to be of paramount significance, we now have the district judge’s critical legal conclusion that:
Defendants were prejudiced to the extent that their inability to observe the destruction of the dynamite or to analyze samples of it deprived them of the opportunity to contest the government’s conclusion that the substance destroyed was indeed explosive. Defendants’ only argument on this point is now limited to analysis of the photographs of the destruction of the dynamite. The testimony of witness McCreary concerning the photographs of the destruction of the dynamite cast substantial doubt on the assertion that the photographs showed the detonation of dynamite. The fact that defendants were denied the opportunity to witness the destruction or to examine samples of the dynamite therefore appears to have prejudiced defendants substantially on the issue of the nature of the substance destroyed.
Defendants were also prejudiced by the destruction of the cartons and plastic bag which contained the dynamite in that they were deprived of the opportunity to determine by fingerprinting who might have handled these items.
And now, what happens? Not only does the majority disregard the critical determinations of the district judge, but also it holds that the judge was clearly wrong in making a determination based upon conflicting testimony. In sum, the majority now does no more in affirming the convictions that it might have done upon the record before us in the original en banc proceedings. In fact it does less, for it accords absolutely no weight or deference to the careful review of the district judge upon remand and the guidance with which the district judge has now favored us, and which, in the first en banc disposition, the majority wrote that it wanted. I do not asperse the good faith or the motives of any of my colleagues. All of them know that I hold each in the highest esteem. Notwithstanding, I record my belief that the proceedings in this appeal, with two hearings before the full court, and all the deliberations that followed, reflect a futile exercise.