Court Opinion

ID: 9929533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 21:04:46.677108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:27:16.307664
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2024 IL App (4th) 230800-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                               February 1, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is               NO. 4-23-0800
not precedent except in the                                                      Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                4th District Appellate
                                   IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF                              )     Appeal from the
(JOSEPH J.,                                    )     Circuit Court of
            Petitioner-Appellant,              )     Sangamon County
            and                                )     No. 17D626
JESSICA D.,                                    )
            Respondent-Appellee).              )     Honorable
                                               )     Jennifer M. Ascher,
                                               )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

                 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Justices Steigmann and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1      Held: (1) Respondent’s claims of a lack of appellate jurisdiction are without merit.

                 (2) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed where petitioner’s failure to present a
                 sufficiently complete record on appeal prevents effective review of his claims.

¶2               Petitioner, Joseph J., appeals the trial court’s ruling that he and his former wife,

Jessica D., had reached an agreement in their dissolution of marriage case that modified the terms

of their previously entered parenting plan. We affirm.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4               The parties were married in August 2015 and had one child, born the same year. In

September 2017, Joseph filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In August 2018, the trial court

entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage, which incorporated a joint parenting plan entered

into by the parties.
¶5             In December 2021, Jessica filed a motion to modify the parties’ parenting plan and

allocation of parental responsibilities. In February 2022, Joseph filed a similar motion. Thereafter,

a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed in the case, and the matter was continued several times,

in part due to ongoing settlement negotiations. Eventually, the matter was set for a bench trial in

April 2023.

¶6             Although the appellate record does not contain a transcript of any hearing in the

case, docket entries show the parties appeared in person before the trial court on April 24, 2023,

and that a settlement conference was conducted on that day. The matter was then continued to

April 27, 2023, “for status hearing by telephone.” An April 27 docket entry states the parties were

present “via telephone” and that the case was “continued for settlement negotiations and status

hearing by telephone to May 10, 2023.” A docket entry made on May 10 noted the parties’

appearances and states as follows: “Cause continued for further hearing in person to June 29, 2023

*** and to June 30, 2023 ***. Final pre-trial memoranda, updated financial affidavits and marked

trial exhibits to be exchanged between counsel by fourteen days prior to hearing.”

¶7             On May 19, 2023, Jessica filed a motion to enforce the agreement and for other

relief. She alleged that on April 24, 2023, the parties participated in a settlement conference with

the trial court and “reached an agreement on all pending issues, except for weekly parenting time

and child support.” Jessica maintained that both (1) the parties’ agreement and (2) the issues that

remained unresolved were pronounced in open court. She alleged that her counsel drafted an

“Agreed Order,” which was presented to Joseph’s counsel on April 24. Further, Jessica alleged

that on April 26, her attorney received an e-mail, which she attached to her motion, from Joseph’s

counsel “outlining the agreements reached and noting the items that [were] in dispute.”

Nevertheless, on May 10, 2023, the parties appeared before the court at a status hearing and

                                                -2-
Joseph’s counsel advised the court that Joseph “was no longer in agreement with the terms of the

agreement reached at the April 24, 2023 settlement conference.”

¶8               In her motion, Jessica argued the agreement reached by the parties on April 24 was

binding and enforceable under Illinois law. She asked the trial court to enter an order requiring

Joseph “to execute an Order consistent with the terms of the parties’ [April 24] agreement.”

¶9               On June 9, 2023, Joseph filed a response to Jessica’s motion. He agreed that on

April 24, 2023, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing on pending matters and,

“prior to any hearing, counsel and the GAL participated in a settlement conference with the Court

in chambers.” Joseph asserted the parties were “unable to reach a full settlement” and that

“negotiations continued with proposals going back and forth between counsel through the

beginning of May.” He stated that on May 10, 2023, he advised the court that negotiations were

unfruitful and that he was requesting a trial on all issues.

¶ 10             Joseph maintained the parties had not reached an agreement at the time of the April

2023 settlement conference, stating no definite and certain terms were agreed upon; there was no

meeting of the minds as to all material terms; and many terms were left open for negotiation,

including parenting time, child support, “issues with the winter break,” and childcare

reimbursement. Further, he asserted that although Jessica’s counsel “recited the terms of the

settlement negotiations” to the trial court, neither party stated his or her agreement with those terms

in open court.

¶ 11             On June 13, 2023, the parties and the GAL appeared before the trial court and

presented arguments on Jessica’s motion. The court took the matter under advisement. On June

21, 2023, the court entered a written order granting the motion. It found “no dispute that

agreements were reached on April 24, 2023[,] in the presence of the court” and that those

                                                 -3-
agreements were outlined in open court. The court also noted that two issues remained to be

litigated, the issue of parenting time during the school year and child support. The court further

stated as follows:

               “The court finds that an agreement can be final when the terms are definite and

               certain. The agreement terms reached by the parties on April 24, 2023[,] were

               definite and certain as the agreement outlined certain modifications to the current

               Parenting Plan and outlined the remaining issues for trial. The agreement as to the

               agreed modifications were not identified as contingent upon an agreement to the

               unresolved issues.”

According to the court, the parties confirmed in open court that final agreements in the matter were

reached and that the two remaining issues would be set for trial. In setting forth its order, the court

identified the agreed-upon modifications to the parties’ parenting plan and held that the issue of

parenting time during the school year was reserved for trial.

¶ 12           On June 28, 2023, Joseph filed a notice of interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). He stated he was appealing the trial court’s June

2023 order, “which *** enforced provisions from a Settlement Conference conducted on April 24,

2023.” On July 12, 2023, this court denied Joseph leave to appeal. In re Marriage of Joseph J.,

No. 4-23-0584 (2023) (order denying petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5)).

¶ 13           On July 21, 2023, Joseph filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s June 2023

order. On August 10, 2023, the court conducted a hearing, and a docket entry showed it denied the

motion.

¶ 14           On August 21, 2023, the parties appeared before the trial court for a bench trial. A

docket entry showed an agreed order “regarding parenting time issues” was entered. The order

                                                 -4-
stated Joseph “select[ed] to maintain the regular school parenting time schedule” that was set forth

in the parties’ August 2018 joint parenting plan. The court also heard evidence on the remaining

unresolved issues in the case involving “child support and financial matters.” On August 22, 2023,

the court entered its final written order, denying Jessica’s request for an increase in Joseph’s child

support obligation and ordering that all financial obligations of the parties as outlined in the August

2018 dissolution judgment would remain in full force and effect.

¶ 15           On September 15, 2023, Joseph filed a pro se notice of appeal, listing the trial

court’s June 21 and August 22, 2023, orders as the orders being appealed.

¶ 16                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17           On appeal, Joseph argues the trial court erred by ruling that the parties entered into

“a final and binding oral settlement agreement” in April 2023. He contends (1) there had been no

meeting of the minds between the parties as to any settlement terms, (2) no agreement was set

forth in open court and acknowledged and confirmed by the parties, (3) his counsel made a

settlement offer without authority and against his explicit instructions, (4) the terms of the

purported settlement agreement were not clear and definite, and (5) the settlement enforced by the

court was unconscionable.

¶ 18                                       A. Jurisdiction

¶ 19           Initially, we note Jessica argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Joseph’s

appeal. She points out that Joseph challenges only the trial court’s June 21, 2023, ruling that the

parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement in April 2023. She contends that

ruling was immediately appealable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), (b)(6) (eff. March

8, 2016). Jessica argues that because Joseph’s notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the

denial of his motion to reconsider the court’s June 2023 ruling, Joseph’s appeal was untimely. For

                                                 -5-
the reasons that follow, we disagree.

¶ 20           “The Illinois Constitution confers on the appellate court jurisdiction to hear appeals

from all final judgments entered in the circuit court.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 22,

69 N.E.3d 834 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1,

2017) provides for appeals from final judgments in civil cases and requires that a notice of appeal

must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment appealed from or within 30 days

after the entry of an order disposing of the last pending timely postjudgment motion. “A judgment

or order is considered ‘final’ when it terminates the litigation and fixes absolutely the parties’

rights, leaving only enforcement of the judgment.” A & R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction Co.,

2018 IL 123220, ¶ 17, 124 N.E.3d 962.

¶ 21           Additionally, Rule 304 provides for appeals from a final judgment or order that

does not dispose of an entire proceeding. Rule 304(a) states that “an appeal may be taken from a

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims *** if the trial court

has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or

appeal or both.” For purposes of Rule 304(a), an order “must be final in the sense that it disposes

of the rights of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate

part thereof.” Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 25. Further, under Rule 304(b), certain types of final

judgments and orders may be appealed even without a special finding, including “[a] custody or

allocation of parental responsibilities judgment or modification of such judgment.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

304(b)(6) (eff. March 8, 2016).

¶ 22           Jessica argues the trial court’s June 2023 ruling was effectively a declaratory

judgment that had the full force and effect of a final judgment and was appealable under Rule

304(a). See Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Judge & James, Ltd., 372 Ill. App. 3d 372,

                                               -6-
380, 865 N.E.2d 531, 540 (2007) (“[A] declaratory judgment has the force of a final judgment

with respect to the rights of the parties subject to that judgment.”). Although she acknowledges

that the court did not enter a Rule 304(a) special finding in connection with its June 2023 order,

she contends the parties, nevertheless, treated the order “as final and enforceable.” Additionally,

Jessica argues the court’s order was immediately appealable under Rule 304(b)(6) because it

“decided on a final basis, certain issues of the parties’ parental roles and responsibilities.”

¶ 23           Here, the trial court’s June 2023 order provided that the parties had entered into an

enforceable oral agreement in April 2023. However, even if we assume that the resolution of the

contract issue constituted a separate “claim” under Rule 304(a), there was no “express written

finding” made by the court to make it appealable on an interlocutory basis. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a)

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Accordingly, the June 2023 order was not subject to appeal under Rule 304(a).

¶ 24           Further, the trial court’s June 2023 order was not a final order with respect to the

modification of the allocation of parental responsibilities, which would have made it appealable

under Rule 304(b)(6) even without a special finding. The oral settlement agreement that the court

found was entered into by the parties only partially resolved their controversy as to the allocation

of parental responsibilities. In fact, after the June 2023 order was entered, the issue of parenting

time during the school year remained, and it was not finally resolved until August 21, 2023, when

an agreed order was entered addressing that issue.

¶ 25           The record shows Joseph filed his notice of appeal on September 15, 2023, within

30 days of both the entry of the trial court’s August 21, 2023, order, which fully resolved the

parties’ claims regarding the allocation of parental responsibilities, and the court’s August 22,

2023, order, which addressed child support and financial issues and disposed of the parties’ entire

controversy. Under the circumstances presented, we find Joseph’s appeal was timely filed and that

                                                 -7-
there is no merit to Jessica’s claims of a lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶ 26                                      B. Incomplete Record

¶ 27            On appeal, Jessica also argues that Joseph has failed to provide a sufficiently

complete record to allow for meaningful review of his claimed errors. She contends Joseph’s

presentation of an incomplete record warrants the dismissal of his appeal.

¶ 28            In an appeal, the appellant must “present a sufficiently complete record of the

proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record ***, it will be

presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient

factual basis.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). “Any

doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the

appellant.” Id. at 392. Additionally, when a hearing transcript is unavailable, an appellant may

present a bystander’s report, or the parties may submit an agreed-upon statement of facts. Ill. S.

Ct. R. 323(c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 29            Here, Joseph challenges the trial court’s finding that the parties entered into an

enforceable oral settlement agreement on April 24, 2023. Although he attempts to characterize the

issues he raises on appeal as involving questions of law that are subject to de novo review, it is

clear that they, instead, involve questions of fact regarding what occurred before the trial court on

April 24, 2023, after the parties’ settlement conference. See People v. Banks, 2020 IL App (2d)

180509, ¶ 25, 146 N.E.3d 882 (“The trial court’s factual findings regarding the existence of an oral

agreement, as well as its terms and conditions, will not be disturbed unless those findings are

against the manifest weight of the evidence.”); In re Marriage of Haller, 2012 IL App (5th)

110478, ¶ 29, 980 N.E.2d 261 (“Whether a contract exists, the terms of the contract, and the intent

of the parties are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, and this court will not

                                                  -8-
reverse the trial court’s judgment unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”).

¶ 30           In this instance, a key issue both below and as presented by Joseph on appeal is

whether the terms of a settlement were set forth in open court on April 24, 2023, and acknowledged

and agreed to by the parties. Significantly, however, Joseph has failed to present transcripts of

either (1) the April 24, 2023, proceedings or (2) the hearing on Jessica’s motion to enforce the

alleged oral settlement agreement. He has also not offered any acceptable alternative to the

presentation of transcripts, such as a bystander’s report or an agreed-upon statement of facts. Under

the circumstances presented, we elect not to dismiss Joseph’s appeal based upon the

incompleteness of the record. However, consistent with the supreme court’s decision in Foutch,

99 Ill. 2d at 391-92, we presume the trial court’s June 2023 order “was in conformity with law and

had a sufficient factual basis.” Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 31                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 33           Affirmed.

                                                -9-