Court Opinion

ID: 9613599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:18:21.733738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:25.135898
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I, too, dissent from the disposition of this case, and I join in the able, logical, and clear dissent of Justice Golden. One must grudgingly admire the creative effort of the majority and concurring opinions to justify and excuse the conduct of Jane Ellen Black and to castigate the law enforcement officers who were responsible for pursuing the investigation which led to her conviction. In my opinion, anyone who sells controlled substances of any nature is marketing death! It is remarkable to suggest that someone who has been convicted of a felony because she sold drugs has not been treated fairly by the system. There can’t be any question about Black having been treated fairly by the system.
A more accurate perspective would certainly include the fact that the husband of Black’s customer collapsed after using the *974methamphetamine that Black supplied. That is a slightly different scenario from the claim in the concurring opinion that Black “was a working mother waitress with three small children who was given $25 by a friend and used the $25 to purchase a small quantity of methamphetamine which was given to the friend.” at 970. Assuredly, it would be naive to assume that this was the only instance in which Black had participated as a purveyor of controlled substances. The customer’s husband could have died, as others have after using illegal drugs. I would assume that then the friend would have been “upset and crying.”
For me, the clear fallacy in the disposition of this case is that the pertinent constitutional provisions are ignored. The issue of voluntariness with respect to admissions or confessions until today has been addressed under the provisions of Article 1, Section 11, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that protect the individual from being compelled to testify or be a witness against himself in any criminal proceeding. I perceive it to be a confession on the part of the majority that the traditional authority in the area cannot be invoked to justify the result that is reached. That is why the shift is made to the due process clause found in Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, and the thrust of that provision is applied to grant Black more rights under the Wyoming Constitution than she would enjoy under the Constitution of the United States. Indeed, she has been granted broader rights than she would enjoy anywhere else in the world. That is demonstrated by the failure to invoke any authority from any jurisdiction other than the citation to Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo.1986), which clearly is distinguishable from this case.
I do have a sincere concern about the omniscience that the majority manifests by its decision. The trial court ruled as a matter of fact that Black's confession was voluntary. That judge saw the witnesses and heard the testimony. Our rule for appellate review is that we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party when reviewing an issue of fact such as this. Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251 (Wyo.1985). We do not redecide factual issues so long as they are supported by evidence in the record. In fact, we depart from our proper role as a reviewing court when we substitute our views on a question of fact for those of the trial court.
In this instance, the trial judge’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence. Yet, this court feels free, having heard no testimony and without ever having seen the witnesses who testified on the issue, to conclude that the questioning of Black was coercive. A speculation that the fact that Black was “upset and crying” because her misdeeds had been discovered and she would have to face the consequences is equally valid. Or, perhaps Black was trying to con the law enforcement officers as she has this court. The conclusion of the majority can only be reached by reweighing the evidence that the trial judge received. When we invoke subjective factors to reach our own conclusion as to the question of duress or coercion, superarrogation again becomes manifest. I submit that the majority is wrong. This decision not only is bad law, but it is bad jurisprudence.
Because I disagree with the majority about the voluntariness of the confession, it is appropriate to address Black’s claim that she was entitled to have her statement suppressed because of the provisions of Section 7-6-105(a), W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.), providing that:
“A needy person who is being interrogated by law enforcement personnel for a serious crime, ... shall be informed of his right to be represented by an attorney at public expense. If the person being interrogated does not have an attorney and wishes to have the services of an attorney, he shall be provided the opportunity to contact the nearest public defender.”
The State correctly points out that, read in context of the other statutes that were in effect when Black committed the crime, the context was that of being formally charged or being detained by a law enforcement *975officer for a serious crime. Those factors were not operative in this situation and, therefore, Black’s statement did not come within the provisions of this statute so as to justify its suppression.
It appears that the rule of law to be derived from this case is that law enforcement officers should not question a pregnant subject, particularly if she cries or becomes upset, because the statement will be suppressed as a matter of law. When so summarized, it hardly seems to possess either reason or logic. Instead, it becomes clear that the case has been used by the court only for the purpose of criticizing the work of law enforcement officers. Probably, those officers won’t work so diligently in the future to interfere with unlawful trafficking in drugs. At least they will let pregnant women sell those drugs as much as they want.