Court Opinion

ID: 9477497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:25:06.968964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:54.365012
License: Public Domain

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Judge Russell’s opinion. I believe his analysis of the relevant statutes, instructions, and evidentiary rulings is both careful and correct.
Morison’s constitutional challenge is specifically phrased in terms of notice, statutory vagueness, and overbreadth. Yet much of the argument in this case has been cast in broader terms. Amici, The Washington Post, et al., warn that this case “will affect, and perhaps dramatically al*1081ter, the way in which government officials deal with the press, the way in which the press gathers and reports the news, and the way in which the public learns about its government.” The news organizations are necessarily raising their concerns as amici, not as parties. No member of the press is being searched, subpoenaed, or excluded, as in a typical right of access case. Morison as a source would raise newsgathering rights on behalf of press organizations that are not being, and probably could not be, , prosecuted under the espionage statute.
Perhaps because these press rights of access are not personal to Morison, we have thus been asked to import a weighty assortment of First Amendment values into Morison’s notice, vagueness, and over-breadth claims. Although this is more freight than the Supreme Court has lately allowed these doctrines to carry, I would assume for purposes of this discussion that Morison is entitled to raise the serious claims urged by the press amici. Indeed, I cannot fully express my own view of this case without addressing these claims, not as unspoken aspects of a vagueness and overbreadth analysis, but directly and on their own terms.
I.
I do not think the First Amendment interests here are insignificant. Criminal restraints on the disclosure of information threaten the ability of the press to scrutinize and report on government activity. There exists the tendency, even in a constitutional democracy, for government to withhold reports of disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to itself. Public debate, however, is diminished without access to unfiltered facts. As James Madison put it in 1822: “A popular Government, without popular information, or a means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.” 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). We have placed our faith in knowledge, not in ignorance, and for most, this means reliance on the press. Few Americans are acquainted with those who make policy, fewer still participate in making it. For this reason, the press provides the “means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to effective self-government.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 2821, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The First Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the invocation of the words “national security.” National security is public security, not government security from informed criticism. No decisions are more serious than those touching on peace and war; none are more certain to affect every member of society. Elections turn on the conduct of foreign affairs and strategies of national defense, and the dangers of secretive government have been well documented. Morison claims he released satellite photographs revealing construction of the first Soviet nuclear carrier in order to alert the public to the dimensions of a Soviet naval buildup. Although this claim is open to serious question, the undeniable effect of the disclosure was to enhance public knowledge and interest in the projection of Soviet sea power such as that revealed in the satellite photos.
The way in which those photographs were released, however, threatens a public interest that is no less important — the security of sensitive government operations. In an ideal world, governments would not need to keep secrets from their own people, but in this world much hinges on events that take place outside of public view. Intelligence gathering is critical to the formation of sound policy, and becomes more so every year with the refinement of technology and the growing threat of terrorism. Electronic surveillance prevents surprise attacks by hostile forces and facilitates international peacekeeping and arms control efforts. Confidential diplomatic exchanges are the essence of international relations.
None of these activities can go forward without secrecy. When the identities of our intelligence agents are known, they may be killed. When our electronic surveillance capabilities are revealed, countermea*1082sures can be taken to circumvent them. When other nations fear that confidences exchanged at the bargaining table will only become embarrassments in the press, our diplomats are left helpless. When terrorists are advised of our intelligence, they can avoid apprehension and escape retribution. See generally Note, 71 Ya.L.Rev. 801, 801-03 (1985) (citing numerous leaks that have compromised a major covert salvage operation, exposed the development of the secret Stealth aircraft, and stymied progress on an international treaty). The type of information leaked by Morison may cause widespread damage by hampering the effectiveness of expensive surveillance systems which would otherwise be expected to provide years of reliable information not obtainable by any other means.
Public security can thus be compromised in two ways: by attempts to choke off the information needed for democracy to function, and by leaks that imperil the environment of physical security which a functioning democracy requires. The tension between these two interests is not going to abate, and the question is how a responsible balance may be achieved.
II.
Courts have long performed the balancing task where First Amendment rights are implicated. The Supreme Court has often had to balance the value of unrestricted newsgathering against other public interests. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (access to judicial proceedings); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (search of newspaper office); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1971) (disclosure of press sources to grand jury). “[A] fair reading of the majority’s analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not implicated.” Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 859-60, 94 S.Ct. at 2819 (Powell, J., dissenting). In these cases the courts have taken an “aggressive” balancing role, directly comparing the interest served by restraints on the press with the interest in unhindered newsgath-ering.
Although aggressive balancing may have characterized the judicial role in other contexts, I am not persuaded that it should do so here. In the national security field, the judiciary has performed its traditional balancing role with deference to the decisions of the political branches of government. Presented with First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and other constitutional claims, the Court has held that government restrictions that would otherwise be impermissible may be sustained where national security and foreign policy are implicated. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980). In the terminology associated with a balancing analysis, “the Government has a compelling interest in protecting ... the secrecy of information important to our national security.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 2782, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (quoting Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at 765 n. 3). Recognition of such a compelling state interest reflects an understanding of the institutional limitations of the judiciary and a regard for the separation of powers.
The aggressive balancing that courts have undertaken in other contexts is different from what would be required here. The government’s interest in the security of judicial proceedings, searches by law enforcement officers, and grand jury operations presented in Richmond Newspapers, Zurcher, and Branzburg are readily scrutinized by courts. Indeed, they pertain to the judiciary’s own systems of evidence. Evaluation of the government’s interest here, on the other hand, would require the judiciary to draw conclusions about the operation of the most sophisticated electronic systems and the potential effects of their disclosure. An intelligent inquiry of this sort would require access to the most sensitive technical information, and background knowledge of the range of intelligence operations that cannot easily be presented in the single “case or controversy” to which *1083courts are confined. Even with sufficient information, courts obviously lack the expertise needed for its evaluation. Judges can understand the operation of a subpoena more readily than that of a satellite. In short, questions of national security and foreign affairs are “of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948); see Agee, 453 U.S. at 292, 101 S.Ct. at 2774.
The balancing process must thus accord Congress latitude to control access to national security secrets by statute and the executive some latitude to do so through the classification scheme. I do not come to this conclusion solely because the enumerated powers for the conduct of foreign affairs are lodged in the executive and legislative branches. The First Amendment presupposes that the enumerated powers — the raising of armies no less than the raising of revenue — will be executed in an atmosphere of public debate. I also recognize that the democratic accountability of the legislature and executive is not a wholly satisfactory explanation for deference in the area of national security secrets. Years may pass before the basis of portentous decisions becomes known. The public cannot call officials to account on the basis of material of whose existence and content it is unaware. What is more, classification decisions may well have been made by bureaucrats far down the line, whose public accountability may be quite indirect.
Rather, the judicial role must be a deferential one because the alternative would be grave. To reverse Morison’s conviction on the general ground that it chills press access would be tantamount to a judicial declaration that the government may never use criminal penalties to secure the confidentiality óf intelligence information. Rather than enhancing the operation of democracy, as Morison suggests, this-course would install every government worker with access to classified information as a veritable satrap. Vital decisions and expensive programs set into motion by elected representatives would be subject to summary derailment at the pleasure of one disgruntled employee. The question, however, is not one of motives as much as who, finally, must decide. The answer has to be the Congress and those accountable to the Chief Executive. While periods of profound disillusionment with government have brought intense demands for increased scrutiny, those elected still remain the repositories of a public trust. Where matters of exquisite sensitivity are in question, we cannot invariably install, as the ultimate arbiter of disclosure, even the conscience of the well-meaning employee.
III.
The remaining question, then, is whether the application of this particular law to this particular defendant took place in accordance with constitutional requirements. For the reasons so carefully analyzed in Judge Russell’s opinion, I am persuaded that it did. Neither Morison’s due process claims concerning notice and vagueness nor his First Amendment overbreadth argument supports reversal of his convictions.
Morison’s claim that he was not on notice that his conduct might lead to prosecution is unpersuasive. Morison was a trained national intelligence officer with a Top Secret security clearance. He signed a disclosure agreement specifically stating that criminal prosecution could result from mishandling of secret information, and he clipped explicit classification warnings from the borders of the satellite photographs before sending them to Jane’s. Morison cannot use the fact that prosecutions under the espionage statute have not been frequent to shield himself from the notice provided by these facts and the clear language of the statute.
The careful limiting instructions given by the district court suffice to cure any vagueness in sections 793(d) and (e). The district court’s definition of “relating to the national defense” and of the scienter requirement in the statute are consistent with our hold*1084ings in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1980), and United States v. Dedeyan, 684 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.1978). The district court’s definition of “entitled to receive” by reference to the classification scheme is both logical and supported by precedent. See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d at 919 n. 10. Vagueness that might exist around the edges of these statutes does not absolve conduct at the core of the statutory proscription. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2561, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974).
Morison’s contention that potential future applications of the espionage statute to other sources render it invalid as to him is not, ultimately, persuasive. Amici, The Washington Post, et al., describe various press reports of illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, design defects of the Abrams M-l tank, Soviet arms control violations, and military procurement cost overruns. Amici contend that if the sources of such reports face prosecution under hypothetical applications of the statute, then “corruption, scandal, and incompetence in the defense establishment would be protected from scrutiny.”
As the above examples indicate, investigative reporting is a critical component of the First Amendment’s goal of accountability in government. To stifle it might leave the public interest prey to the manifold abuses of unexamined power. It is far from clear, however, that an affirmance here would ever lead to that result. The Supreme Court has cautioned that to reverse a conviction on the basis of other purely hypothetical applications of a statute, the overbreadth must “not only be real, but substantial as well.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). I question whether the spectre presented by the above examples is in any sense real or whether they have much in common with Morison’s conduct. Even if juries could ever be found that would convict those who truly expose governmental waste and misconduct, the political firestorm that would follow prosecution of one who exposed an administration’s own ineptitude would make such prosecutions a rare and unrealistic prospect. Because the potential over-breadth of the espionage statute is not real or substantial in comparison to its plainly legitimate sweep, “whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through ease-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.” Id. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2918. On the facts of Morison’s case, I agree with Judge Russell’s conclusion that the limiting instructions given by the district court were sufficient.
It is through notice, vagueness, and over-breadth analysis that the judiciary effectuates the interests of the First Amendment in cases where classical balancing does not take place. The notice requirement insures that speakers will not be stifled by the fear they might commit a violation of which they could not have known. The district court’s limiting instructions properly confine prosecution under the statute to disclosures of classified information potentially damaging to the military security of the United States. In this way the requirements of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines restrain the possibility that the broad language of this statute would ever be used as a means of punishing mere criticism of incompetence and corruption in the government. Without undertaking the detailed examination of the government’s interest in secrecy that would be required for a traditional balancing analysis, the strictures of these limiting instructions confine prosecution to cases of serious consequence to our national security. I recognize that application of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines is not free of difficulty, and that limiting instructions at some point can reconstruct a statute. In this case, however, the district court’s instructions served to guarantee important constitutional safeguards without undermining the legitimate operation of the statute.
IV.
It may well be, as the government contends, that Morison released the satellite photos and weekly wires in order to receive cash and ingratiate himself with Jane’s to *1085gain future employment. But I do not think that Morison’s motives are what is crucial here. Morison’s conduct has raised questions of considerable importance. At the same time, it is important to emphasize what is not before us today. This prosecution was not an attempt to apply the espionage statute to the press for either the receipt or publication of classified materials. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-63, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141-66, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (separate opinions expressing the views of the Justices on such applications of the espionage statute). Neither does this case involve any prior restraint on publication. Id. Such questions are not presented in this case, and I do not read Judge Russell’s opinion to express any view on them.
The parties and amici have presented to us the broader implications of this case. We have been told that even high officials routinely divulge classified public secrets, that alternative sanctions may be imposed on such behavior, and that an affirmance here presents a vital threat to newsgather-ing and the democratic process. On the other side of the argument lies the commonsense observation that those in government have their own motives, political and otherwise, that ensure the continuing availability of press sources. “The relationship of many informants to the press is a symbiotic one.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694, 92 S.Ct. at 2663. Problems of source identification and the increased security risks involved in discovery and trial make proceedings against press sources difficult. Moreover, the espionage statute has no applicability to the multitude of leaks that pose no conceivable threat to national security, but threaten only to embarrass one or another high government official.
What Justice Potter Stewart once said in an address to the Yale Law School has meaning here:
So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can.
But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy....
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.
Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975).
What is at issue in this case is the constitutionality of a particular conviction. As to that, I am prepared to concur with Judge Russell that the First Amendment imposes no blanket prohibition on prosecutions for unauthorized leaks of damaging national security information, and that this particular prosecution comported with constitutional guarantees.