Court Opinion

ID: 9736416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:55:32.915201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:14.583432
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with respect to Parts I and II of the majority opinion. I concur in result as to Part III but write separately to express my views concerning the validity and effect of the parties' stipulation.
It is true that a stipulation of fact constitutes a waiver by a party as to the existence of that fact. The party may not thereafter contest the fact or maintain a contrary position as to an issue which is resolved by the stipulation. Woods v. Woods, 788 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Such is true, however, only with respect to matters of fact.
It has long been established that parties to litigation may not stipulate as to the law and force a legal conclusion according to their understanding or agreement. App v. Class, 225 Ind. 387, 396, 75 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1947). In Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), the principle was stated as follows:
"Neither parties, nor their attorneys, may enter into a stipulation which purports to bind the trial court with respect to a question of law; and any such stipulation is a nullity. A trial court commits reversible error when it enforces a stipulation, entered into by parties through their attorneys, which runs contrary to statutory provisions." (citations omitted).
Here, the parties purported to stipulate that husband's inheritance was not a marital asset. Such attempted stipulation is contrary to law and does not serve to remove the asset from the marital pot. See Ind.Code § 31-15-7-5 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.2003) (providing that in distributing the marital assets, specifically enumerating property obtained by inheritance, the court may deviate from the presumptive equal division of the property); Hyde v. Hyde, 751 N.E.2d 761 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (stating that an inheritance is, as a matter of law, a marital asset, but a court is within its discretion in setting aside that asset to the inheriting person).
Conversely, our case precedent permits treatment of non-marital assets as if they were marital assets if the parties so agree. In Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E.2d 458, 462-63 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), the court held that although a pending tort claim was not a marital asset, a property settlement agreement between the parties to divide that contingent claim was binding upon them as if it were a marital asset.
A holding consistent with that of Dusenberry is found in Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). There, the parties stipulated that the husband's 20% interest in the assets of a trust were to be distributed equally between the parties. The court rejected husband's assertion on appeal that the trust was not a marital asset and held the parties to the stipulation with regard to the distribution of the trust asset. Id. at 353.
Although, at first blush, the Adler decision could be construed as recognizing a stipulation that the trust was a marital asset, a more careful reading of the opinion reflects a holding that the parties were bound to an agreed division of certain property rather than a binding agreement by the parties as to a question of law, Le., whether or not the assets of the trust were or were not marital property.
Be that as it may, the parties here were free to agree that whether or not husband's inheritance was or was not a marital asset, it was to be set over to him as his sole property. This was the effect of the Agreed Entry on Property Distribution filed by the parties and approved and entered by the trial court. It furthermore validated the trial court's decree insofar as *1154the decree of distribution did not set over to Eugenia any portion of John's $100,000 inheritance nor did it increase her share of the other marital assets in order to take the inheritance into consideration.
Subject to the views expressed in this separate opinion, I concur.