Court Opinion

ID: 9845849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:29:30.049303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:23.664138
License: Public Domain

IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wade, 208 Okl. 573, 257 P.2d 1064, we said:
“A contract of insurance consists of an agreement between the insured and the insurer, including the following elements: (1) The subject-matter; (2) the risk insured against; (3) the amount; (4) the period of risk; and (5) the premium; and there is no contract until the minds of the parties meet in these respects. * * * ”
In my opinion, there was not a meeting of the minds between plaintiff and the insurance agent Chapman concerning the period of risk. Plaintiff argues that the period of risk began March 6, 1957, and ended March 6, 1960; and defendant contends the period of risk began June 8, 1956, and ended August 29, 1959, the alleged effective date of the cancellation of the renewed policy of insurance. In my judgment, the record conclusively discloses there was no subsisting contract of insurance in force when the plaintiff sustained his loss, and that plaintiff had knowledge, beyond doubt, that his insurance had either expired or had been cancelled. My views are based on the following facts disclosed, in the record.
(1) On June 8, 1956, Policy No. 7621 was issued, which had an expiration date of June 8, 1959. No premiums were paid on this policy when it was issued and the premiums were $30.00. This policy covered plaintiff’s dwelling and by virtue of a mortgage executed by plaintiff, plaintiff was obligated to have insurance coverage.
(2) On March 3, 1957, plaintiff paid the insurance agent, Chapman the sum of $5.00, which constituted the first premium paid by *235plaintiff. Plaintiff’s position is that this was payment for the partial premium for a new policy beginning on said date for a period of three years. Defendant applied the premium to Policy No. 7621, which had been issued June 8, 1956, and throughout all the transactions between the parties, as will he hereinafter shown, continued to treat the same as a premium on Policy No. 7621.
(3) In June, 1957, plaintiff received $11.-45 for a claim filed for a loss sustained on May 27, 1957. The receipt number set forth Policy No. 7621.
(4) On August 6, 1957, the insurance agency, by letter, advised plaintiff there was a balance due of $25.00 and the premium had been outstanding since June 8, 1956. It is to he noted in this letter that plaintiff’s attention was called to the fact that the premiums on his insurance policy dated hack to June 8, 1956, when Policy No. 7621 was issued, and not from March 6, 1957, when plaintiff contends his insurance policy became effective.
(5) On October 1, 1957, plaintiff’s wife paid the sum of $25.00 and this receipt reflected there was no unpaid balance on Policy No. 7621.
(6) On June 1, 1959, plaintiff signed a sworn statement for a loss sustained in May, 1959. This statement specifically sets forth Policy No. 7621, and that the same was issued on June 8, 1956, and would expire on June 8, 1959. The check set forth Policy No. 7621.
(7) In May, 1959, Policy No. 7621, which was to expire June 8, 1959, was renewed under Policy No. 7703, which was to become effective June 8, 1959, for a period of three years with a premium of $26.46.
(8) On August 5, 1959, plaintiff was advised that “on June 8, 1959, we renewed the $2000.00 insurance on your dwelling and sent you a bill for the premium of $26.46.” The letter also stated that unless the premium payment was made, the policy would be cancelled. Plaintiff failed to respond to this notice in any manner.
'(9) On August 18, 1959, plaintiff was mailed a notice of cancellation of ■ Policy, 7703, to be effective August 29, 1959.
The record does not reflect any correspondence between the insurance agent and plaintiff after the notice of cancellation was mailed to plaintiff. i
If plaintiff believed on March 6, 1957, the date he first paid the premium of $5.'00, that he had a contract of insurance for three years from that date, the letter from the insurance agent on August 6, 1957, notified him that he was paying premiums on a policy dated June 8, 1956, and as far as the' insurance agent was concerned, no new contract of insurance was negotiated. In settling the two claims, plaintiff recognized that he claimed payments for and received payments under the policy issued in June, 1956. -¡
In August, 1959, plaintiff was advised a new policy had been issued to him, effective June 8, 1959, and there was due and owing the sum of $26.46 in premiums. Plaintiff failed to pay the premiums and on August 18, 1959, pursuant to an earlier notice, plaintiff was advised his policy of insurance had been cancelled effective August 29, 1959.
Plaintiff relies on an oral contract to insure, entered into on March 6, 1957. The first time that the insurance agent was apprised of this was subsequent to plaintiff’s loss in 1960, although as early as August, 1957, plaintiff was advised that his policy was dated June 8, 1956, and his renewal policy was dated June 8, 1959, which was cancelled for failure to pay the premiums due.
In my judgment there was sufficient notice to plaintiff that the insurance agent did not apply the $5.00 premium paid by plaintiff on March 6, 1957, as a premium payment for a new policy to become effective on that date, and there was sufficient notice to plaintiff that the agent did not understand or even consider that plaintiff was negotiating for a new policy. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff made any attempt to clarify any misunderstand*236ing that may have existed as tó the terms of the policy, if any existed, but the record conclusively discloses the manner in which the insurance agent treated the $5.00 premium payment and the subsequent premium payment.
If the correspondence addressed to and received by plaintiff did not put him on actual notice that a new policy was not put in force and effect on March 6, 1957, but that the policy issued on June 8, 1956, was still effective, such correspondence was sufficient to constitute constructive notice to plaintiff and upon further inquiry he could have ascertained such fact. Under these circumstances, plaintiff was charged with notice that a new policy of insurance did not become effective on March 6, 1957. See Title 25 O.S.1961, § 13, and Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Gray, 65 Okl. 181, 165 P. 157.
In my opinion, the trial court erred in not sustaining defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence. I therefore respectfully dissent to the opinion promulgated by a majority of my associates.
I am authorized to state that BERRY, J., concurs in the views herein expressed.