Court Opinion

ID: 9896026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:13.010364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.908453
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1386-MR

SCOTT EDWARD BITTER                                                    APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE MARY K. MOLLOY, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CR-01250-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Scott Edward Bitter appeals his convictions for trafficking

in a controlled substance in the first degree and being a persistent felony offender

in the first degree (PFO I). We affirm.

             A Covington police officer observed Robert Roberts hand money to

Bitter in return for an unknown object. According to the officer, Bitter swallowed

something when he saw the officer approach. The officer believed Roberts and

Bitter had engaged in a drug transaction.
               Officers found methamphetamine inside a wallet dropped by Roberts

and nearly $500.00 in cash on Bitter’s person. Thus, in late 2019 Bitter was

indicted for one count of trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine)

in the first degree, one count of tampering with physical evidence and being a PFO

I. Roberts was indicted for first degree possession of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine) in the same indictment. The case was continually continued,

at least partly due to the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic.

               At a pretrial conference held in June 2021, Bitter’s counsel orally

asked the court to prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing into evidence

recordings of two calls Bitter made from jail because their probative value was

outweighed by their prejudicial value. Bitter did not argue that the Commonwealth

illegally obtained the recordings. Accordingly, though the trial court and the

parties treated Bitter’s oral motion as one to suppress, it was actually a motion in

limine. Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 217, 228-29 (Ky. 2023)

(defining a motion to suppress as one “seeking to exclude the introduction of

evidence on grounds that the evidence was obtained unlawfully”).1

1
  See also, e.g., 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 38 (2023) (“While the motion in limine resembles the
more familiar motion to suppress, an important distinction exists between them, in that the
motion to suppress asserts that items of evidence or confessions were illegally obtained and is
grounded in constitutional right, mandating that an evidentiary hearing be held, while the motion
in limine requests only a ruling that the characteristics of a particular piece of evidence give it
potentially inflammatory aspects which appear to outweigh whatever materiality it could have at
trial and is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Suppression of evidence is not the

                                                -2-
               Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 103(d), titled “Motions in

limine[,]” provides that a party can “move the court for a ruling in advance of trial

on the admission or exclusion of evidence” and the court may rule on the motion

“in advance of trial or may defer a decision on admissibility until the evidence is

offered at trial.” Crucially, a pretrial ruling on a motion in limine is interlocutory

because KRE 103(d) further states that “[n]othing in this rule precludes the court

from reconsidering at trial any ruling made on a motion in limine.”

               The trial court granted Bitter’s motion in limine to exclude the jail

phone calls, holding they were “highly prejudicial and not probative . . . .” The

case eventually went to trial in July 2022, by which point the circuit judge who had

issued the order granting Bitter’s motion in limine had retired.

               In opening argument, Bitter’s counsel expressed an intent to call

Roberts as a witness. Roberts had pleaded guilty, and his plea required him to

testify truthfully at Bitter’s trial. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth apparently had

no intention of calling Roberts as a witness.

               On the second, and final, day of trial, the Commonwealth told the new

circuit judge presiding over the trial that it wished to play a fifteen-second snippet

from one of the calls because Bitter had indicated in opening argument that he

appropriate remedy for a nonconstitutional violation; rather, the appropriate remedy is the grant
of a motion in limine . . . .”) (footnotes and citations omitted).

                                               -3-
intended to call Roberts as a witness.2 The Commonwealth argued the clip was an

admission by Bitter and went to Roberts’ credibility. The Commonwealth stated it

had not brought up the issue before because it learned in Bitter’s opening argument

that he intended to call Roberts as a witness.3

               Unsurprisingly, Bitter’s counsel objected, stressing the prior judge’s

decision that the calls were inadmissible. Bitter’s counsel also expressed

astonishment that the Commonwealth did not know Roberts would testify. The

court deferred ruling until after Roberts had testified.

               During his testimony, Roberts admitted he and Bitter had been friends

for years. Roberts also admitted his memory of the precise events surrounding his

and Bitter’s arrest was hazy because he had been high at that time. However,

Roberts unequivocally testified that he had not purchased the methamphetamine in

question from Bitter. By contrast, in its cross-examination, the Commonwealth

2
  Because Bitter’s pretrial motion regarding the phone calls was a motion in limine, not a motion
to suppress, we reject Bitter’s arguments that he is entitled to relief because the Commonwealth
at trial failed to comply with the specialized provisions of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 8.27, which governs motions to suppress. First, Bitter’s argument is facially peculiar
because the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence at trial, not suppress it. The
Commonwealth at trial sought a reconsideration by the court of its pretrial ruling on a motion in
limine, an action expressly permitted by KRE 103(d). Second, and in any event, RCr 8.27
applies to “only motions to suppress, i.e., only requests for an exclusion of evidence on grounds
it was acquired by unlawful means.” Hernandez, 671 S.W.3d at 229. Because no party in this
action filed an actual motion to suppress, RCr 8.27 does not apply.
3
 The record does not contain a subpoena for Roberts for the date Bitter’s trial actually occurred,
but it does contain a subpoena for Roberts for a June 2021 trial date. Of course, the trial did not
occur for over a year thereafter.

                                                -4-
played body camera footage from the arresting officer in which Roberts said he

had “just bought some dope” and wondered if Bitter had placed something in his

(Roberts’) wallet – where the methamphetamine was discovered. The defense then

rested, having called Roberts as its only witness.

             In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called a records custodian to testify

that he downloaded and preserved a phone call from jail involving Bitter. The

Commonwealth then recalled the arresting officer and began to ask him to identify

Bitter’s voice on the recording of the call. The court overruled Bitter’s objection

without comment. In other words, the new judge reversed her predecessor’s order

prohibiting introduction of the jail phone calls without explanation.

             The snippet from the call was then played for the jury. A female –

who was not named with particularity by the records custodian or the arresting

officer – described Roberts as a “rat”; Bitter disputed that characterization and said

that Roberts “kept it 100% real” and had told “them” that Roberts “didn’t get a . . .

thing from me . . . .” Despite lasting only roughly ten seconds, the snippet

contained multiple profanities uttered by the female and one by Bitter.

             The jury acquitted Bitter of the tampering with physical evidence

charge but found him guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance and being a

PFO I. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced

Bitter to an enhanced eighteen-year sentence. Bitter then filed this appeal.

                                         -5-
             Though Bitter breaks it up into several interrelated questions, the

overarching issue before us is whether the trial court erred by permitting the

Commonwealth to play the clip of the phone call.

             Under KRE 402, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible [unless

otherwise prohibited by law] . . . . Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.” And evidence is relevant under KRE 401 if it has “any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In

the context of criminal law, evidence is considered relevant if it “tends to prove or

disprove an element of the offense.” Little v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 180,

187 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

             However, under KRE 403, even relevant evidence “may be excluded

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice

. . . .” See also, e.g., St. Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Ky.

2011). When “evaluating a trial court’s balancing under KRE 403, [we] must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving the

evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum prejudicial

value.” Yates v. Commonwealth, 430 S.W.3d 883, 897 (Ky. 2014).

             We review a trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of

evidence under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Mulazim v.

                                         -6-
Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Ky. 2020). Similarly, KRE 103(a)

provides in relevant part that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which

admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .”

             If we determine the trial court erred by admitting the evidence, we

must determine whether the error was harmless. See, e.g., Douglas v.

Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 345, 352 (Ky. App. 2012); RCr 9.24. An error

regarding the admission of evidence, as with other non-constitutional errors, “will

be deemed harmless . . . if we can say with fair assurance that the judgment was

not substantially swayed by the error.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577,

595 (Ky. 2010).

             Though it should be done with “the greatest restraint and caution[,]” a

successor judge may reverse the interlocutory decisions of his or her predecessor.

Herring v. Moore, 561 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Ky. App. 1977). “The court is an entity, not

a person, and when one judge is replaced by another . . . the new judge is

empowered to carry on the business of the court to the same extent as [her]

predecessor, had [she] remained on the bench.” Id. at 98. Of course, since the

same judge may “change his mind and enter new findings, conclusions, or

                                          -7-
judgment directly opposite to those first entered” then a successor judge generally

may reconsider a decision made by his or her predecessor.4 Id.

               Moreover, KRE 103(d) expressly provides that a court may

“reconsider[] at trial any ruling made on a motion in limine.” See also 75 Am. Jur.

2d Trial § 38 (2023) (“A trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine, as opposed to a

motion to suppress, is tentative and precautionary in nature, and the trial court is at

liberty to change its ruling on disputed evidence in its actual context at trial . . . .”)

(footnote and citations omitted). That is what occurred here, even though Bitter’s

oral pretrial motion was treated as a motion to suppress and even though the

Commonwealth did not file a pretrial motion to reconsider.

               We empathize with Bitter’s counsel’s displeasure and understand the

new evidentiary decision forced Bitter’s counsel to change her strategy on the fly.

And counsel did so, gamely encouraging the jury in closing argument to construe

the snippet as being consistent with the defense’s theory that Roberts had not

acquired the methamphetamine in question from Bitter. KRE 103(d) expressly

allows this exact scenario to occur, even though a reversal at trial of a pretrial

evidentiary decision inevitably requires counsel to amend his or her strategy on-

4
  We agree with Bitter that the Commonwealth should have asked the trial court if it could play
the snippet instead of peremptorily stating its intent to do so. However, the trial court seemed to
treat the Commonwealth’s statement as an oral motion to reconsider the ruling on the motion in
limine. Thus, the bottom line from a practical standpoint is that the Commonwealth eventually
obtained a ruling from the trial court permitting the snippet to be played. We decline to exalt
form over substance by reversing due to the Commonwealth’s improper procedural approach.

                                                -8-
the-spot. Thus, a court changing at trial its pretrial decision on a motion in limine

does not inherently create either an impermissible “trial by ambush” or a due

process violation, despite Bitter’s arguments to the contrary.

             Moreover, we reject Bitter’s argument that reversal is required

because the Commonwealth did not provide the new judge adequate reasons to

overturn the former judge’s decision on the admissibility of the call. KRE 103

does not contain language requiring a party seeking at trial to revisit a pretrial

ruling on a motion in limine to provide new justifications for its request, nor has

Bitter cited to precedent mandating such a requirement. In short, we must reject

Bitter’s argument that the new judge was irrevocably bound by the evidentiary

rulings of her predecessor.

             We now address whether the probative value of the snippet was

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Our Supreme Court has held

that “[t]he ‘probative value’ or ‘probative worth’ of evidence is a measure of how

much the evidence tends to make the fact it is introduced to prove more or less

probable. The probative force of a particular item of evidence is, therefore,

inherently dependent upon the overall probativeness of other available evidence on

that point.” Hall v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 814, 823-24 (Ky. 2015). Under

that standard, the snippet had little to no probative value.

                                          -9-
              In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts the snippet was relevant to

show that “Bitter believed that Roberts was not a ‘rat’ and would not testify against

him at trial.” It is difficult to grasp readily how playing the snippet served to

further that purpose. Stated differently, the snippet was played in rebuttal – but

what did it materially help to rebut? Showing that Bitter expected Roberts to

testify in basic accordance with his pretrial denials (such as on the day of his arrest,

at the scene and at the hospital, and when he pleaded guilty) of having received the

methamphetamine from Bitter helped the Commonwealth rebut nothing material.

What element of the offense did the snippet help prove? Nothing in the snippet

helped show that Bitter tampered with physical evidence or sold methamphetamine

to Roberts.

              The Commonwealth, by contrast, had played body camera footage

during its cross-examination of Roberts in which Roberts had mused whether

Bitter had placed something in his (Roberts’) wallet – the location where the

methamphetamine was discovered. And it is undisputed that Roberts and Bitter

were longtime acquaintances, so the jury already had a permissible basis from

which it could have concluded that Roberts was biased in favor of Bitter. In short,

we agree with the original trial judge, and Bitter, that the snippet had little to no

probative value as it did not help prove any element of the charged offenses.

                                          -10-
             On the other hand, we disagree with Bitter that the call was

significantly prejudicial. Bitter cites to no authority deeming evidence

inadmissible or unduly prejudicial solely because the evidence contains profanity.

Although the language in the snippet perhaps did not endear Bitter to the jury, he

has not shown it materially prejudiced him. The majority of the profanities were

uttered by the female and the profanity uttered by Bitter did not demonstrate any

direct animus towards Roberts or the police. We cannot accept Bitter’s argument

that the profanities in the clip meant it was highly prejudicial. After all, the jury

acquitted Bitter of the tampering charge, despite having heard the profanities.

             Similarly, Bitter argues the fact that the call was made while he was in

jail, several weeks after his arrest, was prejudicial. But Bitter did not ask the trial

court for any type of admonition that it could not consider as evidence of his guilt

the fact that he was in jail prior to trial, including when the phone call in question

occurred. Nor does Bitter point to where the Commonwealth stressed to the jury

the fact that the call showed Bitter had remained in jail awaiting trial. And, again,

the jury could not have been inflamed against Bitter because he spent time in jail

prior to trial because it acquitted him of the tampering charge. At most, the fact

that the phone call occurred while Bitter was in jail was minimally prejudicial.

             In sum, the call had little to no probative value but Bitter has also not

shown that it was significantly prejudicial. “The task of weighing the probative

                                          -11-
value and undue prejudice of proffered evidence is inherently factual and,

therefore, within the discretion of the trial court.” Burdette v. Commonwealth, 664

S.W.3d 605, 617 (Ky. 2023). From this distant appellate vantage point, it frankly

is difficult to understand fully the Commonwealth’s zeal in seeking to play the

snippet to the jury. Regardless, Bitter has not shown that the snippet’s low

prejudicial impact substantially outweighed its low probative value. In such a state

of relative evidentiary equipoise and affording the snippet its maximum probative

value and minimizing its prejudicial impact, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in its admission. Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the

clip occupied only a few seconds of a two-day trial. In sum, Bitter has not shown

how playing the snippet materially impacted his substantial rights.5 KRE 103(a);

RCr 9.24.

               At most, the admission of the snippet was a harmless error. Bitter has

not shown that it “would be inconsistent with substantial justice” for the jury’s

verdict to remain undisturbed. RCr 9.24. Indeed, although factually

distinguishable, our Supreme Court has deemed admission of evidence depicting a

criminal defendant’s usage of profanity to be, at most, a harmless error. Baumia v.

5
 Although unpublished, and therefore not binding, our Supreme Court recently reached a similar
conclusion when asked to assess the propriety of playing a brief clip to a jury. Sar v.
Commonwealth, 2021-SC-0548-MR, 2023 WL 2622032, at *4 (Ky. Mar. 23, 2023) (“In sum, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the five-second clip
showing Phan’s face and upper torso . . . . The miniscule quality of the clip only underscores our
determination that the five-second clip could not have been unduly prejudicial.”).

                                              -12-
Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 543-44 (Ky. 2013). Given the other evidence,

both favorable to and damning of Bitter, and the extremely brief nature of the

snippet, Bitter has not demonstrated that the admission of the clip “substantially

swayed” the judgment. Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 595.

             We have examined the parties’ briefs and deem any argument not

discussed herein to be irrelevant, redundant, or otherwise without merit.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer Wade                              Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -13-