Court Opinion

ID: 9719165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:44:21.448803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:07.452866
License: Public Domain

SIMKINS, J., dissenting: I dissent. I read Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills, 62 Ill.App.2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626, to hold that a school district, absent specific legislative grant, is without authority to engage in litigation relating to zoning. Counsel presented no other opinions of any reviewing court which bear directly on the point nor has our research yielded additional authority. The trial judge, under the mandate of U.M.W. Union Hospital v. District No. 50, U.M.W., 52 Ill.2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455, was bound to follow Dato, and this court is similarly obliged to affirm even though we might be in disagreement with Dato. Even if the trial judge and this court were not bound by Dato I would affirm. The majority interprets section 10 — 2 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 10 — 2), as a general, unrestricted grant of authority to school districts to engage in litigation concerning zoning, yet this opens the door for a school district to intervene in any zoning matter which concerns property lying within its boundaries. The majority opinion states, “We agree with the trial court in its determination that the nature and extent of the interest here involved are worthy of concern to and protection by the school board. * * * The interests that the school board seeks to vindicate were, as the trial court found, direct and substantial and necessarily relate directly to the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Education.” My difficulty with this statement is that I find it impossible to discern from a reading of the complaint, what interests the school district is seeking to vindicate and precisely what duties and responsibilities are involved. Count I of the complaint simply alleges that Peoria Concrete Products, during a meeting of the Board of Supervisors, offered to, and subsequently did through their attorney, pay to the county treasurer the costs of a special meeting of the Board held February 28, 1972. Count I further alleges that the meeting, under these circumstances, constituted “* * * a procedure not recognized or called for in any rule or regulation of the County Board, but contrary to all motions of public policy, the said ordinance granting the Special Use is void and illegal as against public policy.” Count II of the complaint alleges that application for the special use was insufficient under the provisions of the County Zoning Ordinance; that the Board of Supervisors, at the time of granting the special use failed to make certain findings as required by the ordinance; and that other requirements of the ordinance were not met and that the Board of Supervisors was consequently without jurisdiction to consider the application for special use or to grant the same. In neither count is there a single reference to any interest, duty or responsibility of the school district. There is not a single allegation that the school district is affected in any way whatsoever by the granting of the special use. I am consequently unable to determine the nature of the direct, substantial interest which “necessarily” relates to the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Education which the majority somehow discerns. It also states, “We can perceive of no distinction with reference to the authority to sue between the interest here sought to be protected and the usual interest that would be protected by way of a contract action against a supplier of goods or services to the school board.” I see no similarity. To analogize the right of the school district to sue for breach of a contract to which it is a party, to a right to seek declaratory judgment in a zoning case employs a logic which escapes me. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial cohrt.