Court Opinion

ID: 9456992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:08:56.292962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:10.522185
License: Public Domain

*1332GIBSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Appellant Stidham has been accorded many hearings and with the aid of extremely able and expert counsel has raised just about every objection and defense available in the well stocked arsenal of defense tactics —this he has a right to do, but I do not think the never-ending search for error, fancied or otherwise, serves the cause of criminal justice. The Courts rather than spending limited judicial resources in open and legal proceedings should give heed to the many evils engendered in the law’s delay and give adherence to the constitutional mandate for speedy trials. Only by unclogging the dockets can this be done. Much has been said and written about the inordinate delays, both at the trial and appellate levels, that have burdened and made ineffective to a large extent our system of criminal justice.
I would affirm on the basis that the Missouri Supreme Court has correctly enunciated the Missouri law applied in this case at the original trial and that Court’s holding that the procedure in this case was compatible with Jackson v. Denno. State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.1970). A State Supreme Court is the best interpreter of its own laws. In addition, a review of the entire record of the original conviction, the record in the plenary hearing in the state post-conviction review, together with the federal post-conviction review in the federal District Court does not affirmatively demonstrate any ground for upsetting the jury verdict of 1954.
First as to the law, the preliminary inquiry into the voluntariness of the confession during the original trial of this case held by the trial judge out of the presence of the jury, I think, adequately satisfied the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1963). The failure of the trial judge to use the word “voluntary” instead of “not involuntary” is a matter of semantics and too technical a basis upon which to upset a conviction affirmed by the highest state court. The jury is the ultimate trier of fact on the voluntariness issue if the confession is not involuntary as a matter of law. Jackson v. Denno required a preliminary examination outside of the hearing of the jury on the issue of voluntariness. This was done.
The trial judge at the plenary preliminary hearing could only do one of two things; hold the confession involuntary as a matter of law and thus not admit it, or view it as not involuntary as a matter of law and admit it in evidence together with any evidence on the voluntariness issue that the accused wished to present. After all, the jury is the sole and only arbiter of the facts and only has to give the confession such weight as it deems merited. The trial judge could not say the confession is voluntary and instruct the jury that it must accept the confession and act accordingly.1 The judge here made the only finding he could legally make to have the confession admitted into evidence for the jury’s consideration; that is, it was admissible on the ground that it was not involuntary as a matter of law. This was a far cry from the limited and incomplete procedure condemned in Jackson v. Denno.
The argument here appears to be more a matter of semantics or technicalities than a substantial procedural defect in trial proceedings. The trial court’s decision in admitting the confession was based on conflicting evidence, the same evidence that is now urged to upset the verdict and judgment of the state court. No new evidence has been adduced and we are in effect now being asked to review this same evidence and hold the procedure bad because the judge did not use the magic rubric “voluntary” but said in effect, as is clearly shown by the record, that the confession was admissi*1333ble and not involuntary as a matter law.2 By refusing to hold that the confession and statements were involuntary, the Court in the context of this hearing would be holding that the confession and statements were voluntary. This particular preliminary hearing on the confession and statements was not held just to see if there was conflicting evidence, as under the New York rule held defective in Jackson v. Denno. of
Second as to the facts, I agree with the majority that Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.Ed.2d 524, is not applicable to this case as the appellant would clearly be entitled to have the confession ruled inadmissible if his version of the facts is correct and, in addition, his conviction would be a travesty on justice if his version of the facts in the case is correct. The conflict of the evidence in this case carries throughout the confession and the other evidence adduced at the trial. The decision on the admissibility of the confession is solely predicated on credibility factors. The only evidence of a forced or involuntary confession comes from the mouth of the accused. All of the other evidence, including that of four St. Louis, Missouri, policemen and two State Highway Patrolmen are in direct conflict with the testimony of the accused in regard to the confession. Further, testimony of the accused regarding his nonparticipation in the killing of Donnell is rather persuasively refuted by prison guard Dietzel and inmates Creighton and Trout, all of whose statements are consistent with the State’s version of the group assault and killing of inmate Donnell.
In other words for Stidham to be innocent as claimed all of the other testimony in the case, except as to formal matters and some neutral medical testimony from the Springfield Medical Center, would have to be out and out perjury. As noted by the Missouri Supreme court in Stidham’s original appeal, State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957), the accused Stidham while taking the stand failed to controvert essential elements of the State’s case and failed to adduce any corroboration for his version of the facts.3
The trial lasted several days and the jury after being out 1% hours rendered a unanimous verdict of guilty. Certainly no material error affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process has been disclosed.
I would affirm Judge Collinson and his view that the action of the original trial judge “clearly indicates a finding *1334of voluntariness and is sufficient under the teachings of Jackson v. Denno, supra, and Sims v. Georgia, supra.” Furthermore issues of credibility and issues of fact decided long ago should not be upset by technicalities or semantics. There appears to be no constitutional defect in the fact-finding process utilized in this case and the issue of credibility after full hearing was decided adversely to Stidham both in the original trial and at a plenary State post-conviction hearing, affirmed in 449 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. 1970). I would affirm the District Court’s denial of relief.

. The trial judge could not tell the jury the confession was voluntary; that would constitute error in a Missouri state trial, be considered a fatal comment on the evidence and as invading the province of the jury.

. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing on the issue of the admissibility of the confession (and it would not be admissible if involuntary), the trial judge said,
“It is the Court’s opinion that the matters concerning the statement should be offered in the presence of the Jury, * * * The defendant has of course the right to proceed to challenge the voluntariness of the statement and confession, even before the Jury, but it is the Court’s opinion that upon the evidence * * * that the statement is and should be admissible in evidence, subject to further examinations of the witnesses * * *»
And in response to appellant’s counsel’s question of whether he was overruling the motion and request “to hold as a matter of law that those statements were involuntary”, replied “That is right.”

. A reading of the record of the original trial shows the rioters made a particular effort to break through three doors to get into Death Row where Stidham was being held in solitary confinement (for infraction of prison rules — escape) for the particular purpose of releasing Stidham and then presenting him to the group as their leader. Stidham’s version that he left the Death Row area immediately and went upstairs to another cell and listened on the radio while drinking coffee during all of the period of the tumultuous riot does not appear credible. Also no corroboration has been produced by Stidham either at the time of trial or since. While on the other hand three witnesses, guard Dietzel and inmates Creighton and Trout, directly controverted Stidham’s version of his actions at that time and place Stidham at the scene of the crime with the other six defendants who were accused of this brutal and sadistic killing. Without detailing all of the evidence, the evidence presented aside from the confession was persuasive.