Court Opinion

ID: 9372856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:09.102388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.110329
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ALEXANDER FLEMING, III,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          SF-0714-22-0218-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                           DATE: February 13, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *

           Pauletta Johnson, Seattle, Washington, for the appellant.

           Mandeev Singh Brar, Esquire, Portland, Oregon, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     which dismissed his appeal as untimely filed by approximately 2 years. For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     *
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions.             In contrast,
     a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        On February 10, 2022, the appellant filed an appeal challenging his
     February 3, 2020 removal, taken under the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 714.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. He alleged in his initial appeal, among other
     things, that the agency failed to accommodate his disability.           Id. at 6.
     The administrative judge issued an acknowledgment order, which advised the
     appellant that the Board may lack jurisdiction over the appeal beca use
     he appeared to have elected his remedy to file a grievance concerning the appeal
     and, further, that the appeal appeared to be untimely pursuant to the
     10-business-day      deadline     contained      in     38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(4)(B).
     IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. The order directed the appellant to file argument and evidence
     establishing that the appeal was timely filed or that equitable tolling should
     apply. Id. at 3-6. It further directed the appellant to file argument and evidence
     regarding the jurisdictional question.   Id. at 2-3. The appellant did not file a
     response. After the agency moved to dismiss the appeal on timeliness grounds,
     the administrative judge issued a second order giving the appellant additional
     time to file a response addressing jurisdiction and timeliness. IAF, Tabs 5-6.
     The appellant filed a reply asserting that he did not respond to the
     acknowledgment order because he was on a jobsite and lacked reliable internet
     access. IAF, Tab 7 at 3. He made arguments related to the merits of his removal
     but he did not address the timeliness of his initial appeal and he did not provide
     additional information relating to his grievance. Id. The administrative judge
     then issued a third order affording the appellant an opportunity to file evidence
     related to the timeliness of his appeal. IAF, Tab 8. The appellant did not file a
     response.
                                                                                         3

¶3         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal as
     untimely filed by 2 years. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision at 3-5. The administrative
     judge explained that the filing deadline for appealing actions taken pursuant to
     38 U.S.C. § 714 is 10 business days, that the statutory filing deadline c ould not be
     waived for good cause, and that, even if equitable tolling could apply to the
     deadline, the appellant failed to establish that it should apply because he provided
     no justification for his delayed filing. Id. The appellant has filed a petition for
     review, wherein he again argues the merits of the removal action. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5. The agency has filed a response in opposition.
     PFR File, Tab 3.
¶4         Since the issuance of the initial decision in this case, the Board has clarified
     the filing deadlines in connection with 38 U.S.C. § 714 actions, particularly in
     cases such as this, wherein the appellant has raised a claim of discrimination .
     The 10-business-day time limit set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 714 does not apply if
     an appellant alleges that the appealable action was taken as the result of unlawful
     discrimination, i.e., a mixed case. If an individual covered by 38 U.S.C. § 714
     files a mixed-case appeal after filing a formal discrimination complaint with the
     agency, the time limits are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 7702 and the Board’s
     implementing    regulations.     Wilson    v.   Department    of   Veterans   Affairs,
     2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 25.       If the appellant has not filed a formal discrimination
     complaint with the agency and raises his discrimination claim for the first time
     with the Board, an appeal is due 30 days after the effective date of the agency’s
     action or 30 days after the date of the appellant’s receipt of the agency’s decision,
     whichever is later.   Davis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 45,
     ¶¶ 17-19; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a). These deadlines may be waived for good cause
     shown.    5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(c); see Moorman v. Department of the Army,
     68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995) (setting forth the factors to be considered by the
     Board in determining whether the appellant established good cause for a delayed
     filing), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).
                                                                                        4

¶5        There is insufficient information in the record to determine which deadline
     should apply to this appeal.     Although the administrative judge advised the
     appellant that his appeal appeared to be untimely pursuant to the 10-business-day
     deadline set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 714, she does not appear to have acknowledged
     his discrimination claim and she did not identify the deadlines set forth in Wilson
     and Davis, as those decisions had not yet been issued.           IAF, Tabs 2, 6, 8.
     The administrative judge’s statement that the filing deadline could not be waived
     for good cause shown is incorrect in light of Wilson and Davis. IAF, Tab 2 at 4.
     We therefore find that the appellant has not been put on clear notice of the precise
     timeliness issue and the standard to waive an untimely filing, and we must
     remand this appeal for the administrative judge to provide the required notice.
     See Schorr v. Department of the Navy, 79 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶¶ 12-13 (1998) (stating
     that the appellant “cannot be expected to fight a fog of generality” and that
     he must be put on clear notice of the timeliness issue and given a full opportunity
     to litigate it) (quoting Hamilton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 75 F.3d 639,
     646 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
¶6        We note that the record is not developed as to the question of whether the
     Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal based on the appellant’s filing of a
     grievance.   IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 2 at 2-3.         Specifically, the record contains
     insufficient information as to the precise subject of the grievance. Accordingly,
     we do not reach the jurisdictional question here.
                                                                                   5

                                         ORDER
¶7        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
     for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                             Jennifer Everling
                                             Acting Clerk of the Board
     Washington, D.C.