Court Opinion

ID: 9766313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:40:58.749159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.285593
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice (dissenting). For two reasons, explained hereafter, I would affirm the trial court. 1. The majority say “there is an abundance of proof from which the jury might have found Gilbert to have been negligent”, yet the fact is the jury did not do so. If there was an abundance of proof it would have been immaterial whether Larry was seven or seventy-seven years old. I think there is no substantial proof, but merely conjecture of appellee’s negligence. The majority appear to think the skid marks are evidence, of negligenc while I think they show positively Gilbert was .keeping a lookout and that he responded alertly. I wonder what the majority would think had there been no skidmarks. If driving on the streets with the sun in one’s face is evidence of negligence, then none can escape. Contrary to what the majority say, I think Gilbert gave a convincing explanation for not “swerving either to the right or the left”. He explained that if he turned right he would have hit the car stopped on Crutcher Street and he couldn’t turn left because the bicycle was going at an angle. There is no evidence Gilbert was speeding as he drove east on a non-stop street. By conjecture alone could I conclude Gilbert was negligent, but conjecture is not proof. In the case of Russell v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, 113 Ark. 353 (p. 359), 168 S. W. 135, 136, the Court said: “But conjecture and speculation, however plausible, cannot be permitted to supply the place of proof.” Also, in my opinion the physical facts present in this case are indicative of a high degree of care on the part of Gilbert rather than of negligence. This Court has often recognized the high probative value of physical facts. In St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Ellenwood, 123 Ark. 428 (p. 436) we said: “Appellate courts take notice of the unquestioned laws of nature, of mathematics, of mechanics and of physics. So where ther are undisputed facts shown in the evidence, and by applying to them the well known laws of nature, of mathematics and the like, it is demonstrated beyond controversy that the verdict is based upon what is untrue and what cannot be true, this court will declare as a matter of law that the testimony is not legally sufficient to warrant the verdict.” As previously stated, this case should also be affirmed because of our decision in the Harrelson case. Any material distinction between that case and this case is not apparent to me. In affirming the trial court in the Harrelson case we relied upon certain sections of Ark. Stat. Ann., (all of these sections being a part of Act No. 300 of 1937) to conclude there is no distinction between a minor and an adult as to the degree of care to be exercised while riding a motorcycle on the public highway. However, the majority say the case now under consideration is different because the minor was riding a bicycle and because he was only seven years old. Yet the same Act (No. 300 of 1937) which applies to a minor on a motorcycle also, by virtue of § 24 of said Act (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-424 [Kepi. 1957], applies to a minor on a bicycle. It reads, in pertinent parts: “Every person riding a bicycle . . . upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act. ...” There is nothing in Act No. 300 that makes any distinction between a minor seven years old and one fifteen years old. The important thing is ,the Act recognizes that a minor (regardless of age) presents a threat to his own welfare and to the welfare of the public when he undertakes to ride a bicycle or a motorcycle on a street or highway.