Court Opinion

ID: 9915993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:09:44.473376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:22.064873
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sharon Auxier,                                   :
                       Petitioner                :
                                                 :
       v.                                        :   No. 228 C.D. 2023
                                                 :
Trinity Health Corporation (Workers’             :
Compensation Appeal Board),                      :
                   Respondent                    :   Argued: November 9, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                               FILED: January 9, 2024

       Sharon Auxier (Claimant) petitions this Court for review of a February 13,
2023 decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed
an order by workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) Tina Marie Rago following a Board
remand. In a previous order, dated February 22, 2021, WCJ Geoffrey Lawrence
granted Claimant’s claim petition and awarded costs and fees pursuant to Section
440(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 The Board reversed in part on the
ground that the award of full costs and fees was unwarranted, and remanded for a
recalculation of the amount owed by Trinity Health Corporation (Employer).
Claimant argues that the Board’s remand decision improperly encroached on WCJ

       1
         Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L.
25, 77 P.S. § 996(a). Section 440(a) of the Act provides that when an employer unreasonably
contests a claim, the employee or his dependent, in whose favor the matter at issue has been finally
determined, shall be awarded “a reasonable sum for costs incurred for attorney's fee, witnesses,
necessary medical examination, and the value of unreimbursed lost time to attend the
proceedings.”
Lawrence’s discretion over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight. After
review, we reverse the Board and reinstate WCJ Lawrence’s order.

                                      I. Background
       On February 27, 2019, Claimant filed a Claim Petition seeking disability
benefits pursuant to the Act.2 See Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 2. Therein,
Claimant alleged that she sustained an injury on October 10, 2017, in the course of
her employment with Employer, as the result of an Employer-provided desk chair
that was allegedly ill-suited for sustained sitting. Id. The Claim Petition further
alleged that one of Employer’s own doctors administered “an injection into
[Claimant’s] spine [that] greatly increased the pain and is causing radicular pain
down the leg.” Id. The remedy sought was compensation from November 1, 2017,
onward. Id.
       Employer had issued a medical-only Temporary Notice of Compensation
Payable on November 30, 2017, but, on December 15, 2017, followed with a Notice
Stopping Temporary Compensation, asserting that the injury was not work-related.
C.R., Item No. 8, WCJ Decision, 5/1/2020, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 3-4.
       In support of her Claim Petition, Claimant presented the expert testimony of
Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Martin Pieretti, as well as her own fact testimony. In its
defense, Employer presented the expert testimony of Dr. John Donahue, who
performed an independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant, and the fact
testimony of Tracy Tyler, Claimant’s former supervisor.

       2
          Claimant had previously filed a Claim Petition on January 27, 2018, which WCJ
Lawrence allowed to be withdrawn, without prejudice, at the request of Claimant’s counsel. See
C.R., Item No. 35.

                                              2
                              A. Claimant’s Evidence
      At an April 24, 2019 deposition, Claimant testified that she began working in
February 2017, as a home health liaison at Mercy Philadelphia Hospital, which is
owned and managed by Employer. C.R., Item No. 21, Auxier Dep., 4/24/2019, at 5.
Claimant’s workday typically lasted 10 hours, of which 7 or 8 were spent sitting at
a computer. Id. at 11. The chair in which Claimant sat was “old [and] very worn,”
and lacked cushioning.       Id.   Beginning in October, 2017, Claimant began
experiencing pain on the left side of her lower back. Id. Immediately suspecting the
chair as a cause due to her lack of prior back pain history, Claimant reported the
issue to her then-supervisor. Id. at 14. Dr. Pieretti, who also worked for Employer,
ordered a computerized tomography (CT) scan of Claimant’s back. Id. at 20. Based
on the scan’s results, Dr. Pieretti referred Claimant to a Dr. Menachem Meller, an
orthopedist. Id. at 24. Viewing the results of the CT scan with Claimant, Dr. Meller
opined that Claimant was afflicted with Bertolotti’s Syndrome, a rare, congenital
condition affecting the spine. Id. at 24.
      Dr. Meller also referred Claimant to Dr. Gerald Berry, a radiologist, who
administered a pain relief injection into Claimant’s lumbar spine on November 27,
2017. Id. at 27. Rather than alleviate Claimant’s pain symptoms, the injection
inaugurated a period of “horrific” experiences for her, which included episodes of
“excruciating” pain, numbness, immobility, and incontinence. Id. at 27-29. Though
they became less severe, the symptoms persisted at the time of Claimant’s testimony.
Id. at 29. Unable to work, Claimant remained at home and received a prescription
for Vicodin to alleviate her pain. Id. at 30.
      On December 15, 2017, Employer notified Claimant that it was denying her
workers’ compensation claim on the ground that her Bertolotti’s Syndrome, not the

                                            3
work chair, was the cause of her disability. Id. at 32. Consequently, Claimant briefly
relied on short-term disability payments, for which she paid, followed by long-term
disability benefits funded by Employer. Id. at 39-40. Also because of the claim
denial, Claimant stopped her appointments with Dr. Pieretti and began visiting Dr.
Purewal, whose treatment was more affordable. Id. at 36.
       Claimant returned to work in July 2018, and was promoted to case manager
on December 3, 2018. Id. at 40-41. In that position, Claimant did considerably more
walking around the hospital, and considerably less sitting, than previously. Id. at 41.
Due to repeated absences caused by various medical issues, Claimant had been
reprimanded for poor attendance, and, at the time of her testimony, feared that her
employment would soon be terminated as a result.3 Id. at 43.
       Dr. Pieretti first testified at a June 14, 2019 deposition taken by Claimant. See
C.R., Item No. 22, Pieretti Dep., 6/14/2019.               In his testimony, Dr. Pieretti
acknowledged that he had worked as Employer’s “Medical Director of Employee
Health” since August 2017. Id. at 6. After a brief voir dire, Dr. Pieretti refused to
answer almost all questions posed by Claimant’s counsel; rather, Employer’s
counsel repeatedly interrupted to state that Employer objected to the question,
without providing a basis for its objections. See generally id. at 10-26. Dr. Pieretti
then repeatedly stated that he was only present at the deposition to authenticate
documents that he had generated, not to appear as a medical expert. Id.
       In response to Dr. Pieretti’s near-complete refusal to answer questions during
his deposition testimony, WCJ Lawrence issued a July 26, 2019 interlocutory order

       3
         Claimant testified a second time at an October 22, 2019 hearing before the WCJ. See
C.R. Item No. 20, Hr’g Tr., 10/22/2019, at 51-65. Claimant stated that she began working for
Southeastern Home Health on June 3, 2019, as a home health liaison. Id. at 61. In that position,
Claimant earned a higher salary than she had earned from Employer. Id. at 62.

                                               4
compelling Dr. Pieretti to testify again at a hearing before WCJ Lawrence as “to all
aspects of his treatment and care of [C]laimant, including any conclusions or
opinions he reached as to diagnosis, causation, treatment and the like.” C.R., Item
No. 6. Noting the potential conflict of interest arising from Dr. Pieretti’s role as both
treating physician and employee of Employer, WCJ Lawrence also prohibited the
doctor from engaging in any ex parte communications with Employer’s counsel. Id.
      Following the interlocutory order, Dr. Pieretti testified at a hearing before
WCJ Lawrence on October 22, 2019. See C.R., Item No. 20, Hr’g Tr., 10/22/2019.
Dr. Pieretti recalled that his first appointment with Claimant occurred on November
1, 2017. Id. at 10. Following the examination, Dr. Pieretti diagnosed Claimant with
sacral pain, and ordered an ergonomic evaluation of her workspace. Id. at 10-11.
Following complaints of increased pain as well as incontinence at a December 4,
2017 appointment, Dr. Pieretti ordered Claimant out of work. Id. at 14-15. Dr.
Pieretti’s last appointment with Claimant occurred on December 13, 2017, at the
conclusion of which Dr. Pieretti again recommended that she remain off work. Id.
at 15. Dr. Pieretti acknowledged never indicating in his treatment notes that
Claimant’s symptoms were caused by anything other than a work injury. Id. In
addition, Dr. Pieretti acknowledged that he recommended the purchase of a new
work chair, following the ergonomic evaluation that he ordered. Id. at 38.
      Notwithstanding his earlier opinion, Dr. Pieretti testified that he later
conducted some “additional research” on Claimant’s case, and formed an opinion
that her injury was not work-related. Id. at 19-20. Thus, Dr. Pieretti was unable to
state within a degree of reasonable medical certainty that Claimant’s work chair was
the cause of her pain symptoms, rather than Bertolotti’s Syndrome. Id. at 28. On
redirect, Dr. Pieretti acknowledged that he had reviewed the matter privately with

                                           5
Employer’s counsel in preparation for his testimony, in direct violation of the July
26, 2019 interlocutory order. Id. at 37.
      Testifying at a July 2, 2019 deposition, Dr. Purewal recalled that he first saw
Claimant on January 9, 2018. C.R., Item No. 23, Purewal Dep., 7/2/2019, at 10. Dr.
Purewal testified that he has since treated Claimant on at least a dozen occasions.
Id. On direct, Dr. Purewal agreed that Claimant suffers from Bertolotti’s Syndrome.
Id. at 11. Dr. Purewal dismissed the suggestion that Claimant’s work chair was
unrelated to her pain symptoms, and explained that the work chair was an
aggravation of the preexisting Bertolotti’s Syndrome. Id. Dr. Purewal opined that
Claimant’s condition was further aggravated by the injections she received from Dr.
Berry. Id. at 32.
                              B. Employer’s Evidence
      Testifying at a September 15, 2019 deposition, Dr. Donahue recalled that he
performed an IME of Claimant on May 28, 2019, at Employer’s request. See C.R.,
Item No. 30, Donahue Dep., 5/28/2019. Following his evaluation, Dr. Donahue
opined that there was “no evidence of any work-related injury, because there is no
evidence of any injury.” Id. at 21. Asked to list any treatments or restrictions
required by Claimant’s condition, Dr. Donahue responded that “she does not require
any treatment,” and reiterated his belief that “[t]here is no injury.” Id. Rather, Dr.
Donahue attributed Claimant’s pain symptoms to Bertolotti’s Syndrome, which, he
explained, “frequently becomes symptomatic . . . early in life, like latter 20s or early
30s.” Id. However, Dr. Donahue acknowledged on cross-examination that the
disability would be work-related if Claimant’s symptoms began while she sat for
long periods in a hard chair at work. Id. at 47. Dr. Donahue explained that he did

                                           6
not reach that conclusion because he was not given documentation indicating a work
injury. Id.
       At a September 5, 2019 deposition, Ms. Tyler stated that she was the Manager
of Care Coordination at Mercy Philadelphia Hospital. C.R., Item No. 29, Tyler Dep.,
9/5/2019, at 5. In that capacity, Ms. Tyler was Claimant’s direct supervisor when
Claimant began working in her new position on December 3, 2018. Id. at 7. Upon
her hiring, Claimant was subject to a 90-day introductory period, which, Ms. Tyler
recalled, was extended by 60 days on February 22, 2019, due to several instances of
lateness. Id. Ultimately, Ms. Tyler notified Claimant in an April 25, 2019 letter that
Claimant’s employment was terminated for failure to complete her introductory
period satisfactorily.4 Id. at 6.
              C. The WCJ’s Decision and Subsequent Developments
       In a May 1, 2020 decision, WCJ Lawrence granted the Claim Petition, finding
that “Claimant has met her burden of proof . . . that she sustained a disabling work-
related injury.” C.R., Item No. 8, WCJ Decision, 5/1/2020, Conclusion of Law
(C.L.) No. 2. Finding Dr. Donahue’s opinion not credible, WCJ Lawrence explained
that the record contradicted Dr. Donahue’s assertion that he was never provided with
documentation of a work-related injury. Id., F.F. No. 20(k). In addition, WCJ
Lawrence noted Dr. Donahue’s “grudging concession” that Claimant would have

       4
          In addition to the above testimony, Employer submitted records from the Whitpain
Township Police Department, which indicated that Claimant was arrested on July 14, 2019. See
C.R., Item No. 31. The police report explained that Claimant was involved in an altercation with
a female companion of Claimant’s ex-husband. Id. Claimant was subsequently charged with
simple assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct. Id.

                                               7
suffered a work-related injury if her pain symptoms began after long periods of being
seated in the chair at work.5 Id., F.F. No. 20(n).
       WCJ Lawrence credited Dr. Purewal’s “clear and logical” testimony, noting
that Dr. Purewal’s opinions were corroborated by Dr. Pieretti’s contemporaneous
records indicating a work-related injury. Id., F.F. No. 20(a)-(b). WCJ Lawrence
also found Ms. Tyler’s testimony credible, but remained unconvinced that Claimant
was terminated due to misconduct.6 Id., F.F. No. 21. Thus, WCJ Lawrence ordered
temporary total disability benefits to commence as of October 10, 2017. Id., Order.
Said benefits were suspended as of June 3, 2019, the date when Claimant began her
new employment.7 Id.
       Finally, WCJ Lawrence determined that Employer failed to meet its burden
of proof that its contest was reasonable. Id., C.L. No. 4. Pursuant to Section 440 of
the Act, WCJ ordered Employer to pay a quantum meruit fee of $12,025.00 to
Claimant’s counsel. Id., Order.

       5
          WCJ Lawrence also explained that Employer submitted Claimant’s arrest records to
support its allegation that Claimant’s criminal activity “is inconsistent with her claim of ongoing
physical disability related to her back.” C.R., Item No. 8, WCJ Decision, 5/1/2020, F.F. No. 23.
WCJ Lawrence “accorded little weight” to that evidence, rejecting the contention that
“momentarily assaulting someone in a fit of rage disproves the evidence of a painful back
condition.” Id., F.F. No. 23(a). At any rate, WCJ Lawrence noted, the incident occurred more
than a month after Claimant obtained new employment with Southeastern Home Health, placing
it well outside the period of alleged disability. Id., F.F. No. 23(c).

       6
          The circumstances surrounding Claimant’s dismissal are significant because workers’
compensation benefits are forfeited if a claimant’s employment is shown to have been terminated
for bad faith or misconduct. Vista Int’l Hotel v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal (Daniels), 742 A.2d 649,
658 (Pa. 2010).

       7
         WCJ Lawrence explained that Claimant was not constantly disabled during the period in
question, but sustained “periods of total and partial disability with periods of suspension,” in
accordance with wage records submitted by Employer. C.R., Item No. 8, WCJ decision, F.F. No.
24(b).

                                                8
      Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ in part, and vacated
and remanded in part. C.R., Item No. 11, Board Op., 2/22/2021, at 10. The Board
affirmed with specific regard to the Claim Petition, concluding that WCJ Lawrence’s
credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence.           Id. at 8.
However, the Board also concluded that WCJ Lawrence erred in awarding counsel
fees “as though [Employer’s] contest was wholly unreasonable.” Id. The Board
explained that, at the outset of Claimant’s symptoms, there was a genuine issue as
to the etiology of Claimant’s injury and the duration of her disability. Id. Thus, the
Board determined that Employer’s contest was only unreasonable from November
27, 2017, the date of the pain injection by Dr. Berry, until July 2018, when Claimant
returned to work for Employer. Board Op. at 10. The Board explained that when
an employer “unreasonably contests a particular issue but presents a reasonable
contest as to other aspects of the litigation, attorney’s fees are to be assessed in an
amount attributable to litigation of that issue, not the entire case.” C.R., Item No.
11, Board Op., 2/22/2021 (citing Pa. State Univ. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Sox), 83 A.3d 1081, 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
      Finding that Employer’s contest was partially unreasonable (in that Claimant
unquestionably suffered a work-related injury as a result of her prolonged sitting in
the Employer-provided work chair) and partially reasonable (in that Claimant’s
Bertolotti’s Syndrome raised a genuine question as to the cause of her disabling back
pain), the Board vacated the $12,025.00 award of quantum meruit counsel fees. Id.
at 9. The Board remanded with the instruction that a WCJ was to recalculate fees in
accordance with its opinion. Id.
      On September 9, 2022, the parties signed a stipulation of facts. C.R., Item
No. 33. Therein, the parties agreed that, under the instructions given in the Board’s

                                          9
decision, Claimant’s counsel was entitled to $1,525.00, a $10,500.00 reduction from
the $12,025.00 awarded by WCJ Lawrence. Id. ¶ 4. The stipulation of facts also
acknowledged that Claimant retained the right to file an appeal of the Board’s
decision. Id. ¶ 6.
       Sometime after issuing his decision in this case, WCJ Lawrence retired.
Employer’s Br. at 8. The case was reassigned on remand to WCJ Tina Marie Rago,
who adopted the parties’ stipulation as her own factual finding. C.R., Item No. 13,
WCJ Decision, 9/14/2022, F.F. No. 1. Accordingly, WCJ Rago found that Claimant
was entitled to just $1,525.00, the figure agreed upon in the stipulation of facts. Id.,
C.L. No. 1. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed and finalized its prior
ruling. See C.R., Item No. 16. This appeal followed.8
                                          II. Issues
       Claimant maintains on appeal that the Board overstepped its authority when
it partially reversed WCJ Lawrence’s award of counsel fees on the basis that
Employer’s contest was entirely unreasonable. Claimant submits two arguments in
support of that contention. First, Claimant contends that the Board improperly
encroached on the WCJ’s exclusive province over questions of credibility and
evidentiary weight. Second, Claimant argues that the Board’s attempt to apportion
the reasonableness of the contest using different periods of time “does not make
sense” and “is not supported in the record.” Claimant’s Br. at 19.

       8
        This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence, constitutional rights were violated, or errors of law were
committed. Borough of Heidelberg v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Selva), 928 A.2d 1006, 1009
(Pa. 2007). Where the issue presented involves a question of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id.

                                               10
                                  III. Discussion
      In “plain and unambiguous” language, Section 440(a) of the Act provides that
when an employer unreasonably contests a claim, the employee or his dependent, in
whose favor the matter at issue has been finally determined, shall be awarded a
reasonable sum for costs incurred for attorney’s fees. Ramich v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Schatz Elec., Inc.), 770 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 2001) (citing Section 440(a)
of the Act, 77 P.S. § 996(a)). The reasonableness of the employer’s contest raises a
question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Essroc Materials v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Braho), 741 A.2d 826 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). However, the question of
whether a reasonable basis exists to contest liability depends on both the facts and
legal issues involved. Hansen v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stout Rd. Assocs.),
957 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The burden of proving a reasonable contest
is on the employer, and unless the employer establishes that its contest was prompted
to resolve a genuinely disputed issue, the court will presume that the contest was
unreasonable. Essroc Materials, 741 A.2d at 826-27.
      Instantly, WCJ Lawrence found that Employer failed to meet its proof of a
reasonable contest, as it had “no basis to deny that a work-related injury occurred
when it stopped temporary compensation and issued a denial on December 15,
2017.” C.R., Item No. 8, WCJ Decision, 5/1/2020, F.F. No. 24(h). Despite Dr.
Pieretti’s consistent indications that Claimant was suffering from a work-related
injury, WCJ Lawrence explained, the person responsible for payment of the claim
“injected [his or her] own medical conclusions into the process,” and unreasonably
denied the claim.    Id.   When Employer engaged in an unreasonable contest,
according to WCJ Lawrence, Claimant was forced to retain counsel and “suffer the
expense and delay of litigation.” Id. WCJ Lawrence ruled that the opinions later

                                         11
formed by Drs. Donahue and Pieretti regarding Bertolotti’s Syndrome did not
retroactively make the contest reasonable. Id.
      On appeal, Claimant maintains that the Board “should never have substituted
[its] [j]udgment in place of the Decision reached by the WCJ that [Employer’s]
contest was entirely unreasonable throughout the course of the litigation.”
Claimant’s Br. at 21. While acknowledging that the reasonableness of an employer’s
contest raises a question of law, Claimant argues that “the underlying princip[le]
established by years of case law[] provides that the WCJ has complete authority over
questions of credibility” and evidentiary weight. Id. (emphasis in original). Since
the WCJ’s conclusions regarding Employer’s unreasonable contest sprang directly
from his factual findings, the Board’s disturbance of the WCJ’s conclusions
represents an incursion into the WCJ’s credibility determinations, according to
Claimant. Furthermore, Claimant argues, it is not reasonable to suppose that
Employer’s unreasonable contest “suddenly turned reasonable” in June 2018, when
Claimant returned to work. Id. at 26.
      Claimant’s arguments are persuasive. The Board’s sole basis for determining
that Employer had any reasonable contest is that Claimant’s Bertolotti’s Syndrome
was preexisting to the work injury. However, it is well settled that an employer is
liable for an employee’s disability when that disability is caused by a combination
of work-related and non-work-related factors, so long as the work-related cause is a
substantial contributing factor to the disability. Gumm v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Steel), 942 A.2d 222, 230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis added). As explained
by WCJ Lawrence in his decision, Employer was immediately aware that work
conditions were causing or, at a minimum, substantially contributing to, Claimant’s
lower back pain. Thus, the Board’s conclusion that there was a “genuine[ly]

                                        12
disputed issue as to the etiology of the injury,” C.R., Item No. 11, Board Op.,
2/22/2021, at 9, is without adequate support.
       For similar reasons, we agree with Claimant that the Board’s effort to
reapportion the award of counsel fees on a pro rata basis was arbitrary and without
foundation. Contrary to the Board’s determination that Employer’s contest became
unreasonable on the day that Dr. Berry administered the pain-relief injection,
Employer had known for several weeks already of the work-relatedness of
Claimant’s injury. By the same token, there is no legitimate basis to conclude that
Employer’s contest became reasonable once again in July 2018, when Claimant
temporarily returned to work.9 Since Employer engaged in an unreasonable contest
from the outset, and continued to engage in one until Claimant was forced to pursue
the present litigation, we conclude that the Board’s prorated reduction of counsel
fees was unwarranted.
                                        IV. Conclusion
       While the issue of a contest’s reasonableness raises a question of law, our case
law instructs that the question is a fact-dependent one. WCJ Lawrence’s conclusion
that Employer engaged in an unreasonable contest follows logically from his factual

       9
         We note that WCJ Lawrence awarded wage loss benefits from October 10, 2017 (the
deemed date of Claimant’s injury) to June, 2, 2019 (the start date of her new employment with
Southeastern Home Health). This appears from the record to be an extraordinarily long period,
given that Claimant was only out of work for two portions thereof: from Dr. Pieretti’s December
4, 2017 off-work order until her July, 2018 return, and again for approximately six weeks following
her April 25, 2019 termination until her start at Southeastern Home Health.
       In its Brief to this Court, Employer correctly points out that questions may be raised as to
the duration of Claimant’s disability. Employer’s Br. at 15-16. Yet, the sole issue raised by
Employer on appeal from WCJ Lawrence’s decision was whether counsel fees should have been
awarded. See C.R., Item No. 9. It is well settled that issues not raised before the Board are waived
on appeal to this Court. Mushow v. Doyle and Roth Mfg. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 279 A.3d
633, 639 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Accordingly, any argument that Employer could have made as to
the accuracy of the long disability period determined by WCJ Lawrence has been waived.

                                                13
finding that Employer was aware of its causal role in Claimant’s injury just days
after it occurred. Since that finding is firmly supported by substantial evidence in
the record, we reverse the Board’s order and reinstate WCJ Lawrence’s decision.

                                      __________________________________
                                      ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                        14
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sharon Auxier,                          :
                  Petitioner            :
                                        :
      v.                                :   No. 228 C.D. 2023
                                        :
Trinity Health Corporation (Workers’    :
Compensation Appeal Board),             :
                   Respondent           :

                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 9th day of January, 2024, the order of the Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter, dated February 13,
2023, is REVERSED. The previous order of the workers’ compensation judge in
this matter, dated July 26, 2019, is REINSTATED.

                                       __________________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge