Court Opinion

ID: 9582679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:13.763752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:14.212757
License: Public Domain

*566Legge, Justice
(dissenting).
All that the pleadings disclose concerning the bond in question is contained in the allegation in the complaint, admitted by the answer, that it was given “for the faithful performance of said contract (i. e. the contract between State Highway Department and Sloan Construction Company), including the payment of all lawful claims by reason of injuries received in and about said construction.” I think that the motion to strike should have been refused because the pleadings do not sufficiently disclose the terms and conditions of the bond to enable the court to determine the issue here presented. In addition, it would appear from the quoted allegation that this was an ordinary performance bond. If so, the liability of the surety is no greater than that of the principal. 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, Section 88, p. 57; 50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, Section 2, p. 904, Section 30, p. 921; Greenville Airport Commission v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of Baltimore, Md., 226 S. C. 553, 86 S. E. (2d) 249. Also, upon payment of any loss, the surety is entitled to reimbursement from the principal. 43 Am. Jur., Public Works and Contracts, Section 143, p. 884; 50 Am. Jur., Subrogation, Section 49, p. 714; and cf. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Donaldson, 225 S. C. 476, 83 S. E. (2d) 159.
The leading opinion assumes, as did the order of the circuit court, that the bond involved here is similar to that which was construed in Cantey v. Newell Contracting Co., 175 S. C. 74, 178 S. E. 342, 343. In that case this court said that “it was the intention and purpose of the highway department to see that all people who had legal claims against the contractor were properly and promptly paid.” This language would seem clearly to imply that the surety should have no liability beyond that of the principal.
I can see no sound basis for the holding, in the circuit coui't order, that Miller “was in effect the principal on the bond executed by the defendant.” If, as appears to be conceded, this is an ordinary performance bond, liability of the *567principal contractor or of the subcontractor is essential to liability of the surety. Certainly, liability of either the principal contractor or of the subcontractor for the acts of Miller must be founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. But the leading opinion holds, in effect, that the judgment obtained against appellant is not dependent upon liability of either the subcontractor or the principal contractor; and it would logically follow that had either or both been made parties to the cause and absolved from liability, appellant would nevertheless be liable for payment of a judgment against Miller alone. Such a proposition does not, in my opinion, accord with the principles of suretyship.
Oxner, J., concurs.