Court Opinion

ID: 9677638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:30.223631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:20.948045
License: Public Domain

R. M. Daniels, J.
(dissenting). In spite of the majority’s opinions and the decision in People v Wagner, 104 Mich App 169; 304 NW2d 517 (1981), which dealt with the exact question at issue in this case, I must respectfully dissent. The majority has made a knowledgeable and careful analysis of the law of search and seizure, and I recognize that this is perhaps the current status of the law. I do, however, submit by way of the following analysis what I would hope the law is now and expect it to be in the future.
The seizure of the evidence from the attic of the home not owned by the defendant made under the consent of a party with apparent authority to give consent was not an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United *576States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 11. "The basic purpose of this amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of (the United States Supreme Court), is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 528; 87 S Ct 1727; 18 L Ed 2d 930 (1967). This purpose is not undermined by admitting the evidence seized by the police officers in this case. By looking at the totality of the circumstances it is readily apparent that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged.
There are two major concerns of the Fourth Amendment, neither of which are threatened in the present case: 1) concern for the privacy of the individual and 2) concern for arbitrary invasions by government officials.
To justify a search without a warrant by proof of consent, the prosecution may show that permission to search was given by a third party who had a sufficient relationship to the effects inspected. United States v Matlock, 415 US 164; 94 S Ct 988; 39 L Ed 2d 242 (1974). In this case, Mr. Hartranft had spent the previous night in the house, had access to the attic and had used some of the seized property in the robbery in which he had participated. The same is true of the defendant. While it may be true that the defendant lived in the house, he had no legal interest in the house and could be forced to leave upon the request of Ms. Whiting at any time. He was, in effect, a guest in the home, as was Mr. Hartranft. Even if a constitutional right to privacy in the attic did exist — which I deny— both defendant and Hartranft possessed that right equally and, thus, either could consent to a search of the attic. Defendant, by sharing the hiding place in the attic with Mr. Hartranft, assumed the risk *577that Mr. Hartranft would consent to a search. United States v Matlock, supra.
The exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a warrant provides that if an officer has probable cause to believe that a search of a certain place will produce specific evidence of a crime there is no need for a warrant if a search without a warrant is necessary to protect the officers, prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, or prevent the escape of the accused. All three circumstances were present when the officers in this case made their search and seizure of the guns and other evidence.
If Mr. Hartranft had gone alone into the house to get the guns there would have been no Fourth Amendment issue, but since the officers accompanied him the issue was raised. Hartranft had admitted committing the robberies before the officers entered the house. The officers had a responsibility to keep him in custody. They could not let him go into the house alone without taking the risk he would escape out a window or the back door. Nor could they reasonably allow him to reach into the attic for guns which could be used against them. Nor would it have been feasible to take the men to the police station, get a warrant, and return for the guns. It would have been a simple matter for some other person to remove the guns in the interim. It must also be remembered that Mr. Hartranft volunteered to get the guns for the officers and, when he was refused permission, he volunteered to show the officers where the guns were. These are certainly sufficient exigent circumstances to validate the search without a warrant.
Another significant factor which should be noted in determining whether the guns should have been admitted as evidence is the threat the items posed *578to the community. It is informative in this connection to consider the anti-exclusionary provision of Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Although it has been struck down as incompatible with the federal constitution, and although it would not have applied here where guns were seized from within the curtilage of a dwelling house, the policy behind this provision is that the violent potential of the evidence seized renders the police officers’ actions more reasonable than if the items were not so dangerous.
In reviewing this case it is apparent that defendant was not denied his Fourth Amendment rights. He did not possess a sufficient interest in the area searched to give him a legitimate expectation of privacy. While he may have had a right to privacy in more personal areas, the attic was not so personal as to warrant the expectation of protection from a search. This factor, coupled with proof that the police entered under the authority of Hartranft, shows that the Fourth Amendment was not undermined. The two major concerns of that provision, i.e., the right to privacy and the prevention of abuse of power by government officials, were adequately protected. Furthermore, the threat that dangerous items, such as the guns in this case, pose to the community cannot be taken lightly, and they should not be excluded as evidence when they are secured by police officers in an orderly manner for the purpose of protecting the public. Accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted by the trial court.
Since there was no illegal search or seizure, the defendant’s statements or confessions were not tainted, and the majority’s discussion regarding inadmissibility of these statements or confessions is inapplicable.
*579I agree with the majority’s analysis affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his waiver of right to a jury trial.
I would affirm.