Court Opinion

ID: 9564960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:24.721131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:17.370526
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
I write separately to address the appellant’s contention that the trial court’s instructions defining “culpable negligence” were inadequate. The trial court used Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction No. 463, which is consistent with the definition approved by two members of this Court in Thompson v. State, 554 P.2d 105, 108 (Okla.Crim.App.1976). While this writer believes that culpable or criminal negligence should be specifically defined to require something more than mere ordinary or tort negligence, the Legislature has defined criminal negligence as “a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns.” 21 O.S.1981, § 93. Consequently, I do not believe that this Court can redefine criminal negligence without improperly encroaching on the province of the Legislature. See Matthews v. Powers, 425 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Okla.Crim.App.1967). An analysis of the cases which attempt to apply the concept of culpable negligence reveals the frustration that pri- or members of this Court have experienced in attempting to devélop a working definition, and is evidenced by the Commission Comment to OUJI-CR 463 that “[although the definition merely articulates the tort standard concerning duty of care, the cases evince a more pronounced degree of culpability where a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree is affirmed.” Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruetions-Criminal 105 (1981). Although this writer would strongly urge the Legislature to reconsider the current statutory definition of criminal negligence, which was originally adopted in 1910, and enact a standard which specifically provides that the standard of care for criminal negligence is higher than mere tort negligence, I feel compelled to defer to the wisdom of the Legislature, and therefore concur in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction for the foregoing reasons.