Court Opinion

ID: 4220186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-11-14 16:18:31.35357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:15:21.534823
License: Public Domain

iiith
N@VEMBER ida 2915

in the Uitice of the £lerlc of Conrt
WA Sta€e Court of Ap§)eals, Hivision lii

lN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 34846-6-111
Respondent, §
y. § UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DUSTIN HAWK CHAN£BERS, §
Appellant. §

LAWRENCE~BERREY, J. _ Dustin H. Charnbers appeais his conviction for failure
to register as a sex offender. We affirm. `
BACKGROUND
The State set forth the following allegations in the amended inforlnation:

On or between February 9, 2016 and March 15, 2016 in the County of
Oi195 P.3d
98 (2008). l

An alternative means crime is one in which the proscribed criminal conduct can be
proved in various ways Sta)fe v. Peterson, 168 Wn.2d 763, 769, 230 _P.3d 588 (20l0).
“‘ [D]efinition statutes do not create additional alternative means of committing an
offense.ljj Id. at 770 (quoting Sta.te v. Linehan, l47 Wn.Zd 638, 646, 56 P.3d 542
(2002)).

ln Peterson, our Suprerne Court held that failure to register is not an alternative
means crime ]d. at 771. Peterson noted, “[l]t is not necessary to draw a distinction
between alternatives and definitions of alternatives where the crime at issue is not an
alternative means crime at all.” n ]a’. Accordingly, the various definitions by which a
“i<;idnapping offense” or a “sex offense” become a predicate offense are not essential
elements of the crime of failure to register as a sex offender Because this is,the only
aspect that l\/lr. Chambers asserts was not proved, we need not discuss whether other

elements were sufiiciently proved

No. 34846~6-lll
Stute v. Cham/;)ers

APPELLATE COSTS

i\/lr. Chambers requests that should he not substantially prevail on appeal, no
appellate costs be awarded under RAP 14.2. The State takes no position The State has g
substantially prevailed on appeal The trial court properly made a determination of
indigency and Mr. Chambers’s likely future inability to pay.

RAP l4.2 governs the award of appellate costs. The rule generally requires an
award of appellate costs to the party that substantially prevails RAP 14.2. The rule
permits an appellate court, in its decision, to decline an award of appellate costs, or to
direct a commissioner or clerk to decide the issue. Id, A commissioner or clerk is
precluded from awarding appellate costs if he or she finds that the defendant lacks the
current or likely future ability to pay such costs. Icz’. lf a trial court earlier found that the
defendant was indigent for purposes of appeal, that finding continues unless the
commissioner or clerlId.

llere, in the event the State requests appellate costs, we defer the issue to our

commissioner Because the trial court found that Mr. Chambers was indigent for

purposes of appeal, that finding continues unless the commissioner finds by a

N@. santee-in
Srate v, Chnmbers
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Chambers’s financial circumstances have
significantly improved.
Aft`irmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

 

RCW 2.06.040.
g m \_._:¢"“"?.F-r-<' § ~§:§ LMQ\; §
Lawrenee~Berrey, l. l l
at

Wl""£ CONCUR:

  

 

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Fearing, C.J. `b Pennell, .l.

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