Court Opinion

ID: 9623794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:43:22.248283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:34.864456
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Review of the transcript in a light most favorable to the verdict reveals that a peace officer dispatched to the scene of a reported mo*589tor vehicle accident found no vehicle there. There was some indication that a wreck had occurred, a mailbox and a culvert had been hit and it appeared that a vehicle had rolled a couple of times. Witnesses directed the officer to a nearby residence, where he found defendant and his extensively damaged vehicle. Defendant was placed under arrest for leaving the scene of an accident and for driving under the influence of alcohol. After defendant was read the implied consent warning, he agreed to the officer’s request that he permit the taking of blood and urine samples. Defendant’s blood sample contained .07 grams percent alcohol and his urine sample tested positive for both methamphetamine and marijuana.
Contending that his arrest was illegal because not based on probable cause, defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the arrest. Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence contended that he “was arrested in Banks County, Georgia at the residence of Terry O’Kelly on or about March 11, 1989, and charged with the offenses of driving under the influence and leaving the scene of the accident.
“That the arrest of defendant was without sufficient probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that defendant was violating the provisions of Section 40-6-391 as charged by the arresting officer.
“That the arrest of defendant was illegal, in violation of defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights, and all evidence seized as a result of said arrest should be suppressed by this Court.” In my view, defendant’s motion to suppress, albeit skeletal, sufficiently presented the facts and constitutional principle upon which it was predicated.
Prior to arresting defendant, the arresting officer did not conduct any sobriety test, nor did the. officer, after speaking with defendant, have any indication that defendant was intoxicated other than the smell of alcohol on defendant’s breath and his bloodshot eyes. There is no evidence that defendant displayed any physical or mental impairment. The smell of alcohol on one’s breath is an indication that one has been drinking, but does not independently indicate intoxication such as would render one a less safe driver. Clay v. State, 193 Ga. App. 377, 379 (2) (387 SE2d 644). Nor does involvement in a motor vehicle wreck after consuming alcohol (and other drugs) alone provide proof that one was driving while intoxicated to such an extent as would render one a less safe driver. Groom v. State, 187 Ga. App. 398, 400 (370 SE2d 643). At the time of the arrest in the case sub judice, the arresting officer lacked any information which would reasonably lead him to a conclusion that defendant was a less safe driver due to the consumption of alcohol or other drugs. Clay v. State, 193 Ga. App. 377, 379 (2), supra. Therefore, in my view, the officer lacked probable cause for the arrest of defendant for driving under the influence.
*590Decided June 17, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 23, 1991
Darryl R. Vandeford, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Jeffrey G. Morrow, As*591sistant District Attorney, for appellee.
*590I would also hold that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for “leaving the scene of an accident.” This phrase is usually used to refer to OCGA § 40-6-270 which is clearly inapplicable to the case sub judice since there was no injury to a person or damage to a vehicle such as would invoke this statute. It is apparent from his testimony that the officer, although referring to defendant’s leaving the scene of an accident, may have actually intended to arrest defendant for violation of OCGA § 40-6-273 which requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a fixture legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of such fact and of his name and address and of the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall, upon request and if available, exhibit his. operator’s license.” However, at . the time of defendant’s arrest the officer had no knowledge of whether or not defendant had complied with this statute. Therefore, whichever statute the officer had in mind, he lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for “leaving the scene of an accident.”
As the officer lacked any probable cause for the arrest of defendant, the evidence obtained following and as a result of the arrest of defendant was therefore illegally obtained. I would hold that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Bishop, 188 Ga. App. 881, 882-883 (374 SE2d 808); Moore v. State, 155 Ga. App. 299, 300 (3) (270.SE2d 713).
There was no evidence presented at trial which would authorize a trier of fact to conclude that defendant was a less safe driver due to consumption of alcohol, another drug, or a combination thereof. Also, defendant’s blood alcohol content was not shown to be at or in excess of .12 grams. Indeed, under the statutory scheme no presumption as to whether or not defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent that he was a less safe driver arose from the concentration of alcohol in his blood of .07 grams. OCGA § 40-6-392 (b) (2). In my view, a rational trier of fact was not authorized under these circumstances to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving under the influence. Clay v. State, 193 Ga. App. 377, 379 (2), supra; Groom v. State, 187 Ga. App. 398, 400, supra.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.