Court Opinion

ID: 9598066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:59.487601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:12.780591
License: Public Domain

CAPLAN, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. W.Va.Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, prohibiting deputy sheriffs from engaging in any political activity of any kind, character, or nature whatsoever except voting is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and should therefore be voided in its entirety.
The governmental interest in restricting political activities of classified employees has been well recognized. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Such restrictions are designed to insure meritorious performance of government service and to protect employees from improper political influence. Mitchell, supra. However permissible such restrictions may be, they must give adequate warning of what activity is proscribed, set forth specific standards for those who must apply it, e.g.: Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and must not be so vague that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). It is undisputed that legislation must fall if its promotion of valid governmental interests is outweighed by its damage to expressive and associational interests. Statutes attempting to restrict the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn, representing a considered legislative judgment that particular expression must give way to other compelling needs of society. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066 (1937); Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra. Legislative prohibitions may not be too broad in their sweep and must distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. Over-breadth and vagueness in the First Amendment area must be strictly curtailed because ambiguity and the broad sweep of a statute may inhibit citizens from exercising *115their fundamental constitutional rights. When a statute or regulation impinges on the rights covered by the First Amendment, a greater degree of specificity is demanded. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).
To guard against the “chilling effect” overbroad legislation may have upon freedom of expression and association, the United States Supreme Court has developed certain standards that are exclusively or primarily applicable in First Amendment litigation. Generally, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not have standing to challenge the statute on grounds of unconstitutional application to others in situations not before the court. See e.g. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508 (1930). The “as applied” method involves a judgment as to the constitutionality of a challenged statute based on the harm caused to the litigating party. It vindicates a claimant whose conduct is within the First Amendment but invalidates the challenged statute only to the extent of the impermissible application. But in the area of First Amendment rights, the court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit “attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity, [cites omitted].” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, at 486, 85 S.Ct. 1116, at 1121, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, at 28 (1965). This departure from the traditional method of judging the constitutionality of statutes is justified by the favored status of right to expression and association. The statutes very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. The doctrine emphasizes the need to eliminate an overbroad law’s “chilling effect” by insisting on legislative judgment precisely drafted to express a definite policy thought sufficient to override expressive interests. Note, the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844 (1970). Thus, “facial” overbreadth analysis proceeds without regard to the constitutional status of the litigant’s conduct. Under this approach, a statute prohibiting substantial activity protected by the First Amendment is voided entirely. The United States Supreme Court has noted its reluctance to apply the facial overbreadth test. The test set forth in Broadrick, supra, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917, is “... where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Likewise, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) there was an apparent narrowing of standing to assert vagueness when one is clearly within a valid proscription, the law’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not “both real and substantial”, and the law is “readily subject to narrowing construction by the state courts.”
It is noted in Broadrick, supra, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, that:
Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S., at 491 [85 S.Ct. at 1123]; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 [61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049] (1941); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 [91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822] (1971); cg. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 [71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233] (1951).
The Court here is not merely involved in interpreting or construing the statute. The majority clearly has undertaken the task of judicial legislating.
In Broadrick and Letter Carriers, the statutes proscribing certain political activity were much more narrowly drawn than the statute before this Court. In determining that the political activity proscriptions were not impermissibly broad, the court, in those cases, looked not only to the specific language of the acts, but also to authoritative administrative pronouncements. Broadrick and Letter Carriers herald only narrow, carefully drawn exceptions. *116W.Va.Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, is not drawn with such narrow specificity. We recognize a significant government interest in regulating political activity of deputy sheriffs to promote efficiency, foster loyalty to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public confidence in the law enforcement institution. To achieve these ends, regulations may be promulgated, but their restrictive effect may extend only as far as is necessary to accomplish a legitimate government interest. The narrowest means consistent with the furtherance of that interest must be employed. W.Va. Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, regulates political activity in a much broader sweep and with less specificity than the Acts construed in Broadrick and Letter Carriers. If the Supreme Court can characterize the Broadrick statute, § 818 as “slightly overbroad,” then Code 7-14-15(a) is clearly substantially overbroad. It prohibits the universe of a deputy sheriffs conceivable political activities except voting. None of the factors mentioned in Broadrick or Letter Carriers providing limitations or guidelines are found here. There are no limiting regulations; there is no body of doctrine; there is no office for interpretive guidance; and, most importantly, no judicial construction of the section can eliminate its overbreadth and also provide the requisite degree of clarity without transgressing into the legislative function. For these reasons, contrary to the expression of the majority, the section is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and cannot be saved by judicial construction. See Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916 (5th Cir., 1979); Phillips v. City of Flint, 57 Mich.App. 394, 225 N.W.2d 780 (1975); and Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 496 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1974).
It is very clear that the legislature intended to strictly regulate the political activities of deputy sheriffs. Mitchell makes it clear that this is a valid exercise of legislative authority. The legislature, not this Court, is entrusted with the duty of balancing the extent of the guarantees of freedom against the need for orderly management, integrity and competency of classified employees. A wholesale ban on all political activity does not meet the standards of precision necessary in drafting restrictions on First Amendment rights. There is no apparent attempt by the legislature to balance a deputy sheriffs right to participate in political expression against the government’s interest in maintaining non-political law enforcement. The proper inquiry is a balancing of government needs and private rights. A rewriting of W.Va. Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, must be based on a detailed determination of what dangers the State seeks to control and of what rights it must guarantee. Such task is a valid exercise of legislative, not judicial, authority.
W.Va.Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, prohibiting deputy sheriffs from engaging in any political activity of any kind, character, or nature whatsoever except voting is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and should therefore be voided in its entirety.