Court Opinion

ID: 9600286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:25:43.269498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:48.410425
License: Public Domain

KIKER, Justice (dissenting in part). It is impossible for me to agree that plaintiffs suffered no serious injury on account of the peremptory challenges allowed. I concur in the opinion except as to peremptory challenges. The opinion of the majority makes the following clear: Defendants named Southern Union Gas Co. as third party defendant after having answered plaintiffs’ complaint: Plaintiffs charged that defendants, Foutz and Bursum, a partnership, the individual members-of-which were joined as defendants, were negligent and proximately caused the injury suffered by plaintiffs: Defendants in the third party complaint charged that the negligence of Southern Union Gas Co. was the proximate cause of the injury: No pleading or claim of any kind was asserted by either the plaintiffs or the third party defendants against the other: The defendants were third party plaintiffs and could not be considered co-defendants with the third party defendants: The sole controversy with which the third party defendant was connected was between defendants and itself: The third party defendant “was making no claim against or even interested in any controversy with plaintiffs”: In this situation as to the parties, the trial court allowed five peremptory challenges to the original defendants and the same number to the third party defendant while the plaintiffs were allowed five challenges only. The plaintiffs’ attorney objected to allowing five challenges to the third party defendant and after having exercised the five challenges allowed to clients, submitted a challenge to the twenty-seventh juror called to the box for voir dire examination. This challenge was denied. At that time the original defendants and the third party defendant had each exercised four peremptory challenges. If there had been no third party defendant, and if the selection of the jurors had proceeded between the plaintiffs and defendants, no more than twenty-four jurors would have been called to the box. This appears from the fact that when the-twenty-seventh juror was called and accepted by defendants and third party defendant the jury was immediately sworn and the trial proceeded. When there were eleven jurors in the box thirteen peremptory challenges had been exercised as above shown. This requires that two challenges for cause had been exercised before the twenty-seventh juror was called. With eleven in the box and fifteen challenges all told having been made, the twenty-seventh juror was called. This juror, whom plaintiffs wished to exclude, a fact made known to the court by a request for additional challenges, was sworn with the other eleven and plaintiffs' case tried to him. If there had been no third party defendant, a stranger to any interest or cause of action stated or attempted to be stated by plaintiffs, that juror never would have sat in this trial. Injury to plaintiffs appears to me to be fully established. Our rule as to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to a party to an action, that is to the plaintiffs or the defendants, is correctly quoted in the majority opinion. Plaintiffs, however many, are allowed five peremptory challenges; and defendants however many, are allowed five peremptory challenges, and no more. The rule reads: “In all civil cases each party may challenge peremptorily five (5) jurors and no more, whether the plaintiffs or defendants shall be single or joined.". 1953 Corp. § 19-1-36. (Emphasis supplied.) The majority opinion, Mr. Justice SAD-LER writing, finds its justification for the holding as to peremptory challenges announced in this case in decisions from two courts only, Texas and New Jersey. The Texas case cited is Ralston v. Toomey, Tex.Civ.App.1952, 246 S.W.2d 308. Of this case it is said by the majority that it “is so nearly the same as this one on its facts that it should be deemed decisive.” In that case R. H. Ralston and Virgil Wilbanks were riding in an automobile which collided with a truck owned by Everett Toomey being driven by Floyd Crume. Toomey was in no way involved in the accident. Ralston and Wilbanks, in cause 1218, sued Toomey, the owner of the truck, for damages resulting from the wreck but 'did not sue'.Crume. In another suit, cause 1220, Crume and Toomey sued Ralston and Wilbanks for damages done to the truck and for personal injuries sustained by Crume. After this second suit was filed Toomey filed an amended answer in cause 1218 in which he alleged a cross-action against Ralston and Wilbanks. His amended answer also contained a third party complaint against the driver of his truck, Crume. Crume’s answer contained a cross-action against Ralston and Wilbanks, the original plaintiffs. The issues joined and the facts stated by the various parties in this Texas case were, in my opinion, ijuite unlike the iisu.es joined here. There all persons were antagonistic to plaintiffs. 1 Trial in this Texas case resulted in judgment in favor of the truck owner, Toomey for eight hundred and fifty dollars and for Crume, the driver, in the sum- of thirty-six dollars. '' From this judgment an appeal was taken by Ralston and Wilbanks. The first complaint made by appellants, the plaintiffs, to the action of the trial court was in granting to each of the appellees six peremptory challenges. Before further discussion of this case it would be well, I think, to have in mind the Texas rule and something of its history and that which has, occurred in the state of Texas as to peremptory challenges. In 1871 the Texas legislature passed a statute Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 2148, reading: “Each party to a- civil suit will be entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case trie<j in district court and to three in a county court.” It- is to be observed that the words “and no more” do not appear in the act.' In 1939 the Texas legislature took such action as had the effect of repealing the statute just quoted. Then the court rules were adopted ; Rule No. 233 of the fiules’of Civil Procedure is in the identical language of the section of the‘statute just above quoted. .Texas-has had the-matter of peremptory challenges under consideration many times. In 1902 the case of Waggoner v. Dodson, 96 Tex. 6, 68 S.W., 813, 69 S.W. 993, was before the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. In that case Waggoner sued James, Henderson, Kemp and M. and A. F. Dodson, that is, plaintiff sued five defendants.- The controversy involved three hundred and twenty acres of land. James filed no answer to plaintiff’s complaint and judgment was for Waggoner. The two Dodsons were defendants in possession and in addition to pleading in defense of the action they sought a recovery over from Kemp and from Henderson. Kemp adopted the answer'of the Dodsons and in addition asked recovery against Henderson in the event of a victory by Dodson against himself. Henderson in addition to pleading not guilty in answer to the petition of Waggoner and a plea over against James on the warranty, replied to the cross-action of Kemp with a general denial and with a special answer claiming that he was merely serving Kemp in his purchase of property for Kemp from Henderson though he conveyed directly to Kemp. 'He claimed that he had received no consideration for the conveyance to Kemp. The defendants named by plaintiff made claim that they were entitled to twelve peremptory challenges between them. The plaintiff objected to the request for additional challenges and the court denied the protest and twelve peremptory challenges were allowed.. That is Ke-mp and Dodson together were allowed six. peremptory challenges and -Henderson was allowed six. From the opinion I'.quote: “To this action the first error is assigned, and the assignment, we think, must be sustained.' At common law peremptory challenges were riot allowed in civil cases at all, and in criminal cases the right was confined to' the main issue, and did not extend to the trial of collateral issues.' 1 Thomp. Trials, §§ 43, 44, 46; Prof. Jury; §§ 162, 163 ; 4 Bl.Comm. 353, 396; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio, N.Y., 9, 47 Am.Dec. 216; People v. Hamilton, 39 N.Y. 107; Brooks v. Com., 2 Rob., Va., 845. Unless, therefore, the right is given by statute, it does not exist, from which it results that, if a case arises to which a statute on the -.subject is not applicable, it must be treated as casus omissus. Our statute gives each party to a civil suit in the district court six peremptory challenges, and no more, and in line with the construction imiformly given similar statutes elsewhere the word ‘party’ has been construed to include the several plaintiffs or defendants, and does not mean ‘person.’ Where, however, distinct causes of action against different defendants are tried together, such joinder, by consolidation or otherwise, does not deprive either of them, without his consent, of the right of peremptory challenge to which he would have been entitled had the causes been separately tried. [Texas & P.] Railway Co. v. Stell, Tex.Civ.App., 61 S.W. 980; [Mutual Life] Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706. The same ruling has been made where the defendants interpose distinct and antagonistic defenses to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Rogers v. Armstrong Co., Tex.Civ.App., 30 S.W. 848. It has even been suggested that, where several defendants cannot agree among themselves as to the division of the challenges to which they may together be entitled, the court should give each an equal number, though we hardly see how this could well be done in the county court, where only three peremptory challenges are allowed. Bruce v. [First Nat.] Bank, [25 Tex.Civ.App.295] 60 S.W. 1006, and cases cited. But we know of no case in which it has been held that several defendants making a common fight against the plaintiff on the main issue in the case, as in this instance, were entitled to double the number of peremptory challenges allowed the plaintiff. Here the issue between the. defendants was secondary and collateral merely, and the plaintiff had-no interest in it. Little or no importance was attached to it on the trial. Its solution did not depend upon conflicting evidence, as did the issues between the plaintiff and the defendants. It would not do to hold that the legislature, in giving to each opposing party to a suit six peremptory challenges, meant to place the plaintiff at such a disadvantage in the selection of the jury to try the main issue. A more reasonable and better view would be that the legislature either overlooked such cases, and thus failed to provide for them, or else deemed them too exceptional to require treatment. The defendants demanded a right to which they were not entitled, and for the unfair advantage thus gained must submit to a reversal of the judgment.” It seems to me that much of the language used in the above quotation is especially pertinent to the situation in the case at bar. Not only do plaintiffs in our case object to the allowance of five peremptory challenges to the stranger to his suit, called the third party defendant, but after the attention of the court had been particularly drawn to the matter, made demand for additional challenges so that he would not have to try his case to the twenty-seventh juror. After verdict, plaintiffs filed motion in which the same proposition was raised, for a verdict non obstante veredicto, or in the alternative for a new trial.. The case went into the Supreme Court from the Court of Civil Appeals because of a dissenting opinion. The Supreme Court of Texas considered the matter and announced the same rule, as in our Morris v. Cartwright, 57 N.M. 328, 258 P.2d 719, for cases where the contentions of the defendants are not antagonistic one with another and when all have made common cause against the plaintiff; but quoted what had been said by that court in earlier cases as to the possibility of granting a greater number of peremptory challenges in case of antagonism between co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. The lower Texas court was reversed, the holding being that the additional challenges were properly allowed. It is clearly pointed out in Morris v. Cartwright, supra, that in New Mexico the right to peremptory challenges is not a right to select but to reject jurors and that we must look to the statute of the state for our guide in the matter of peremptory challenges. The words “no more” in our statute were emphasized in that opinion as we have emphasized them in quoting the statute above. The Supreme Court of Texas said, at 69 S.W. 994: “In the case before us one of the defendants impleaded his codefendant upon his warranty of title, and prayed a judgment against him. His codefendant denied liability on the ground-that he had recovered no consideration for the land. Thus we have two cases, —one suit by the plaintiff against all the defendants for the recovery of land, and another by a defendant warrantee against his warrantor a codefendant for a recovery upon the warranty. In the main case all the defendants were alike interested in defeating the action, and it was to their interest to make common cause upon the trial. In the subsidiary case, that of the warantee against the warrantor, the plaintiff had no interest, but there was an issue of fact made by the pleadings of two of the defendants as against each other, which in the event the plaintiff had recovered would have required a determination by the jury. If this latter action had been an independent one, each party — the warrantee as plaintiff and the warrantor as defendant— would have been entitled to six peremptory challenges, and it is clear that that right was as important to each of them in the subsidiary action as it would have been in an original suit. They were parties to this suit, and, though they had ei common interest to defeat the main action, there was a separate controversy as between themselves, and, in our opinion, each should be deemed a separate party in the case, and not as two defendants interested solely in defeating the plaintiff’s action, and;,coíistituting. but- one party, .within the- meaning- i>f the-statute as construed by the-- decisions above recited. We conclude, therefore, that there was no error in allowing the two defendants’ each-Mx peremptory challenges.” Except 'f:or the antagonism between the deféndants,'they with the other defendants would have been entitled to exercise only six peremptory challenges under the Texas rulé and únáer our rule as announced in Morris v. Cartwright, supra. But Texas had no Statute denying the court the right to increase the number of peremptory challenges' to any' defendant. In that Texas case in the Supreme Court, that which was done could not have been done, in my opinion, under a statute such as ours. A statute which' says that the defendant is limited to five challenges and no more cannot be said properly, by this court to permit the defendant to bring in a stranger to plaintiff’s causé "with allowance to him of five additional challenges to the disadvantage of the plaintiff; and such disadvantage is shown in this case. There are many cases in Texas in which the question of the number of peremptory challenges is raised in different factual situations, but the rule has persisted in Texa.s as .established in the case just quoted from. In the Texas case of Ralston v. Toomey, supra, it is -found that all defendants were persons in 'some way connected with plaintiffs’ action. Plaintiffs did not sue Crume, but Crume not only joined-in a separate suit against the plaintiffs which was consolidated with the suit brought by plaintiffs for trial but in the cause filed by plaintiffs, filed an answer to the cross-action of Toomey against him together with a cross action against plaintiffs Ralston and Wilbanks. So Crume, before the issues were all made up, became a party to the suit brought by plaintiffs. "It is interesting to note in this case that because Toomey and Crume recovered against the plaintiffs, “the suit between Toomey and Crume proceeded no furthér than the pleadings.” [246 S.W.2d 309.] The plaintiffs, as appellants, insisted in the Court of Civil Appeals that the action by Toomey, the truck owner, against his driver was fictitious and for two purposes: One, to obtain twelve peremptory challenges, and Two, to get the benefit of a front in which Toomey appeared to be asking judgment against Crume. Since both Toomey and Crume became so thoroughly satisfied with the small verdicts they received that nothing more was done by way of an attempt by Toomey to recover of his servant or agent Crume, there would seem to be some merit in the contention of appellants as to the action by Toomey against Crume. In any event Crume could not have had six peremptory challenges under our statute unless he got them, as might be possible, by filing a cross-complaint and thereby becoming a party against the plaintiffs. In the case we are considering- nothing of that kind occurred. It may be further observed with reference to Ralston v. Toomey, supra, that the court took final refuge for its order in the following: “As a rule a judgment will not be reversed for a trial court’s error in allowing or refusing additional peremptory challenges unless the complaining-party shows that he has suffered material injury by the court’s action. He must show that an objectionable juror sat on the case as a result of the court’s action.” (Citing cases.) In many of the Texas cases which permit -the allowance of more than six peremptory challenges to the parties to the suit, the rule just mentioned has been relied upon as the ultimate basis for decision. To that rule I would have no objection under a statute (now rule) like that of Texas but it has no application in our case because in it the plaintiff did everything, through his attorney, that could be done to prevent the allowance- of additional peremptory challenges and, later, as has been said, by motion, gave the court an opportunity to correct-what in my thinking was a grievous error.-' The opinion of the majority, quotes, from Ralston v. Toomey, supra,.sortie! statements made in Lofland v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App.1951, 237 S.W.2d 785, 792. ¡ Jn the case just cited one Buna Lofland, a-single, woman, filed suit against R. E.,.Jackson and Avalanche Gen. Publishing Co., a corporation, to recover damages for personal, injuries suffered at a street intersection in Lubbock, Texas, claiming that an automobile struck her. It was being driven by Jackson who was an employee of the Publishing Company. The publishing company filed a cross-action against Jackson seeking recovery from him for any .amount which might be obtained against it and in favor of appellant because of any, acts of negligence of Jackson. Jackson joined issue with the publishing company . by , filing a general denial. The trial court permitted, both the publishing- company and Jackson,, -who w.ere named as defendants, to'have six peremptory challenges, each, thereby giving to. defendants -twelve challenges . while plaintiff was allowed six only. Our courts, cannot allow more than five challenges' to defendants who make common-.cause! ¿gainst the plaintiff under any circumstances -without positive violation of the - statute1 o'f the state which says that opposing parties shall have five challenges each and -no. mqr.e-. ; This court properly interpreted' that'¡statute in Morris v. Cartwright, supra [57.N.M. 328, 258 P.2d 721], Mr. Justice Compton writing before he became Chief Justice, as follows: “We think the court erred in arbitrarily extending the statute. The term ‘each party’ means the two opposing sides to a controversy. Each side or party constitutes one party and is limited to five peremptory challenges. By employing the term ‘whether * * * single or joined’ the opposite parties, though plural, are required to join in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The view expressed here finds accord generally in the cases. Mullery v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 50 Mont. 408, 148 P. 323; Mourison v. Hansen, 128 Conn. 62, 20 A.2d 84, 136 A.L.R. 413; Ferron v. Intermountain Transp. Co., 115 Mont. 388, 143 P.2d 893.” I again assert that the Texas rule cannot be followed in this state by this Court without judicial amendment of our state statute. When the statute says that the parties to an action, whether single or joined, shall each have five peremptory challenges and no more I take that to mean exactly what it says. No defendant or group of defendants should in any event be allowed to have more challenges than the statute allows without a legislative change in the provision. In Bergeron v. City of Port Arthur, Tex.Civ.App.1954, 264 S.W.2d 769, the suit was .against the .city of Port Arthur, a municipality, Bert Davis and W. O. Menshaw, each an employee of the police department, for damages sustained by Bergeron for the death of his wife and for personal injury to himself caused by a collision of a car he was driving and a police car owned by the City and operated by Menshaw, a night captain in the city of Port Arthur. The city of Port Arthur filed a cross action against Davis and Menshaw, its employees, in the event of judgment against it. A cross action was also filed by Davis and Menshaw against the appellant Bergeron. The case was submitted to a jury upon special issues and the jury made answer to fifty-six such propositions. Among other things they found for plaintiff, appellant, and fixed an amount of damages because of the loss of his wife and another amount for his personal injuries and another amount for medical treatment and another amount for damage to his car, but the jury also found that the plaintiff failed to yield the right of way when and where he should and that such failure was the proximate cause of the collision. The jury also found certain other failures on plaintiff’s part which contributed proximately to the cause of the injuries sustained. The court sustained a motion for judgment for defendants on the ground that the jury found plaintiff guilty of various acts of contributory negligence which caused the collision and judgment was entered directing that plaintiff take nothing. Plaintiff appealed. One of the grounds for reversal was that defendants were allowed twelve peremptory challenges when they should have been allowed only six. The court having allowed six peremptory challenges to plaintiff and six challenges each to defendants Davis and Menshaw by reason of the cross-action brought by the city. Now these parties were made defendants by plaintiff and under our statute could not have been'allowed the additional challenges. The Texas rule, which coincides with the New Mexico rule only where a group of defendants make common cause against the plaintiff and have no antagonistic interests one against another, should not be controlling or even persuasive in New Mexico, ■our statute being so different from the former Texas statute, now one of the •state’s rules of civil procedure. The other reliance of the majority as to ■peremptory challenges is Roberts v. Saunters, 118 N.J.L. 548, 194 A. 1, 4. In that case the plaintiff Roberts was injured while walking along a street in Atlantic City, New Jersey. He had just crossed an intersecting avenue when an automobile owned and operated by one Rashti ran upon the sidewalk and struck him immedi.ately following a collision between Rashti’s •car and the automobile owned by Joseph Saunders but then driven by the defendant Harry Saunders. Roberts sued Rashti, Harry Saunders, and Joseph Saunders. All of these defendants joined issue with plaintiff. The defendant Rashti filed a counterclaim for property damages against the defendant Harry Saunders and the defendants Harry Saunders and Joseph Saunders each filed counter-claims against the defendant Rashti. Several grounds tor reversal were presented and argued by the defendants against whom judgment was entered. The Court held that there were several reversible errors and reversed the judgment. One of the matters to which the court gave attention was that of peremptory challenges. The trial court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to six challenges and all defendants taken together were entitled to six challenges. The court of errors and appeals of New Jersey quoted the statute of that state, Laws 1911, p. 220, as follows: “ ‘Upon the trial of any issue in any civil suit or action in any court in this . state, each party shall be entitled to challenge peremptorily six of the general panel of jurors summoned and returned by the sheriff or other officer.’ ” Considering the statute the court held that the defendant Rashti was entitled to six peremptory challenges and the defendants Harry and Joseph Saunders were entitled to six peremptory challenges between them, .the interests of the latter two persons not being, antagonistic. It would sétem to require no argument whatever to .show that the New Jersqy court mi^ht place an interpretation, upon the statute of, that state entirely different from any possible .construction of our statute. At the trial of any issue made up in New Jersey, each of the contesting parties is entitled to six peremptory challenges under the'.'New Jersey statute. Our statute allows' peremptory challenges to plaintiffs and- defendants only, and in equal number, regardless of the number of plaintiffs or defendants.' ' In my opinion the' New Jersey case just discussed is' Of no value whatever' in determining how many peremptory challenges should be allowed to the parties in our case. Our statute was passed long before a third-party defendant was known in New Mexico and if the legislature has failed to make provision for peremptory challenges for third-party defendants or for any others who might in any way come into suits at law, that failure is not to be corrected by the courts. Section 2, chapter 2 of the Session Laws of 1875^6 provides, as follows: ."In-all the courts in this state the common, law- as- recognized in the ■United .States- of America, shall be the -rule of practice and decision.” § 21-3-3, N.M.S.A;1953. It has been shown in the Texas cases, quoted from that at common law no. peremptory challenges in civil cases were permitted. That declaration is found in many Texas cases; it is found in Roberts v. Saunders (N.J.), supra; .it is found in our Morris v. Cartwright, supra. . It necessarily follows in this state that unless a statute, provides for peremptory challenges in civil cases for third party defendants or others who may be contesting any issue collateral to .issues joined with plaintiff, there is no-such right. Third party defendants brought into á case such as this, may call for separate trial. Having no interest in plaintiff’s cause of action, such a person would probably appeal favorably to a trial court in requesting that the court exercise its power under Rule 42(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, as to the trial of the collateral issue. I quote the rule: ■ . ■ “The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party, •claim, or of any separate issue or of -any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.” ■I can not concur in allowing -additional peremptory challenges, so I express my dissent. . ,,