Court Opinion

ID: 9845731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:03.182545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:20.425760
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the reversal of summary judgment for W.H. Moore, Inc. However, I dissent from the reversal of summary judgment for the defendants Security Investments and Security Police. Under I.R. C.P. 56(c) summary judgment should be affirmed when “the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The plaintiff has not shown any breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by either Security Investments or Security Police and, accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of these two defendants should be affirmed.
Since the analysis of the right to summary judgment differs among the various defendants, a separate analysis of the claims against each of the defendants is necessary.
I. CLAIM AGAINST W.H. MOORE, INC.
As owner and landlord of Forest River Plaza # 1 building (the plaza), W.H. Moore, Inc. (Moore), owed certain duties to its tenants including the Jess Swan Insurance Agency (Swan) and to its tenants’ employees, including plaintiff Sharp. Owner/landlord Moore owed a duty to tenant Swan “to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances.” Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). Under our decision in Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), an owner/landlord must also “exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances” to a tenants’ employees (1) “for protection [from a dangerous condition] even though the dangerous condition is known and obvious to the employee,” and under Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988), (2) “to provide safe conditions for employment upon the premises.”
*304Reviewing the entire record most favorably to the party opposing the summary judgment motion, the record reflects that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding (1) whether the defendant Moore breached a duty to Sharp; (2) whether that breach was the actual cause of Sharp’s injury; and (3) was that breach the proximate cause of Sharp’s injury. Accordingly, I agree that the summary judgment for Moore should be reversed.
II. CLAIMS AGAINST SECURITY INVESTMENTS AND SECURITY POLICE
Sharp also alleges that the defendants Security Investments and Security Police breached duties owed to her. Depending on the relationship of the parties, there can be duties owed in tort and/or in contract. See Just’s v. Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978) (“[Negligent conduct and breach of contract are two distinct theories of recovery.”). Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion today fails to distinguish between those “two distinct theories of recovery.” The Court’s opinion recognizes the contractual relationship between Moore and Security Investments (the property manager) and between Security Investments and Security Police (who provided the periodic daily inspections). However, the Court makes no analysis of how Security Investments and Security Police breached any tort duties owed to Sharp or, for that matter, contractual duties to the plaintiff Sharp. While indeed Security Investments may have breached its contractual duties to Moore, and Security Police may have breached its contractual duties to Security Investments, neither Security Investments nor Security Police breached either a contractual or a tort duty to the plaintiff Sharp, and accordingly summary judgment was appropriate in favor of those two defendants.

A. Tort Duties

“A tort requires the wrongful invasion of an interest protected by the law____” Just’s v. Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978).
The elements of common law negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage.
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980).
The law recognizes that owner/landlords owe duties to their tenants and their tenants’ employees to exercise reasonable care (1) “in light of all the circumstances,” Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984), (2) “for protection [from a dangerous condition] even though the dangerous condition is known and obvious to the employee,” Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), and (3) “to provide safe conditions for employment upon the premises.” Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988). These duties of the owner/landlord are based on the landlord/tenant relationship with the tenant and the tenant’s employees. Because an owner/landlord exercises control of his building, he also bears responsibility for foreseeable injuries to the tenants and their employees resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care. Id. However, Security Investments and Security Police were not the owner/landlord, nor did they have any recognized legal relationship with the tenants of the owner/landlord or the tenants’ employees such as plaintiff Sharp. They do not become the owner/landlord merely by contracting to perform services, even security services, for the landlord. While their contracts may have imposed some contractual duties upon them, there can be no recovery in tort by Sharp from Security Investments or Security Police because they owed no duty to Sharp. Strangely, the majority opinion does not make a tort analysis with regard to Security Investments and Security Police. The majority opinion does not point out any duty owed by Security Investments or Security Police to Sharp the breach of which could result in a negligence claim by Sharp against them. The Court’s opinion merely *305states that, “If Security Police was negligent for not checking the door through which the rapist may have gained entry, Security Police itself is susceptible to liability, which in turn may be imputed to Security Investments and to Moore. An agent is liable for its own negligence.” Ante at 303, 796 P.2d at 512. However, the Court does not go on and determine whether or not Security Police breached any duty to Sharp, which could be the basis for its negligence. Rather, the Court concludes that, “Thus the negligence, if any, of the sub-agent, Security Police, renders it potentially liable to Sharp, and its liability may be imputed to the agent, Security Investments, and to the principal, Moore.” Ante at 303, 796 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added). All the Court has said is that if there was any negligence on the part of Security Police, it could be imputed to Security Investments and Moore. The Court may be correct in concluding that if there was negligence on the part of Security Police it would be imputed to Security Investments and to Moore. That would depend on whether Security Police was an agent rather than an independent contractor. However, the Court has not made any analysis establishing that there was a triable issue of fact concerning whether Security Police had breached a duty toward Sharp which could result in a claim of negligence by Sharp against Security Police. The Court has merely said that if there was any negligence on the part of Security Police it would be imputed to the others. The Court has not demonstrated how this record establishes any negligence on the part of either Security Investments or Security Police, i.e., breach of a duty owed by either to Sharp. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that no such tort duty was owed, and accordingly the summary judgment granted in favor of those two defendants should be affirmed.

B. Contract Duties

Because Sharp was not in privity of contract with either Security Investments or Security Police, the only possible contractual duty owed to her by these two defendants would be under a third party beneficiary theory. Here, Sharp alleges, and the majority opinion by reversing apparently assumes, that the contracts between (1) Moore and Security Investments, and (2) Security Investments and Security Police were intended to benefit her as an employee of Moore’s tenant, Swan. However, a review of our prior cases clearly demonstrates that plaintiff Sharp was not a third party beneficiary of those contracts between (1) Moore and Security Investments, and (2) Security Investments and Security Police.
We have previously set forth requirements for recovery under third party beneficiary theory:
[Bjefore recovery can be had by a third party beneficiary, it must be shown that the contract was made for his direct benefit, or as sometimes stated primarily for his benefit, and that it is not sufficient that he be a mere incidental beneficiary.
... [T]he contract itself must express an intent to benefit the third party. ‘This intent must be gleaned from the contract itself unless that document is ambiguous, whereupon the circumstances surrounding its formation may be considered.’ [Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532, 446 P.2d 895, 901 (1968)]. Adkison Corp. v. American Building Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341, 344 (1984). A third party may only enforce a contract “if he can show he is a member of a limited class for whose benefit it was made.” Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 532, 446 P.2d at 901; Just’s, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464, 583 P.2d 997, 999 (1978).
Here, in order for Sharp to recover from Security Investments under a third party beneficiary theory, the contract between Security Investments and Moore must express an intent to benefit her as a third party. However, the contract does not express such an intent. In its “Management Agreement” with Moore, Security Investments agreed to manage the plaza and to “provide for the smooth and efficient physical operation of the [plaza ] by making *306appropriate arrangements for and supervising the delivery of utilities, security, emergency response, inspection and other services incidental to the operation of the {plaza ]____” In the contract, Security Investments undertook no duty with reference to the safety of the tenants’ employees. It only agreed “to promote a harmonious relationship with Tenants on behalf of Owner, and in furtherance thereof shall visit all tenants at their premises on a regular basis to express the owner’s appreciation of their tenancy and to solicit their suggestions and comments and shall provide prompt and courteous response to tenant inquiries and problems.” Such a provision is insufficient to demonstrate that the parties intended that employees of a tenant would be able to exercise rights under the contract. At most the tenants’ employees were only incidental beneficiaries of Security Investments’ contractual duty to manage the plaza. Under our prior cases such an incidental beneficiary may not maintain a third party beneficiary action. Just’s, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978); Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968).
It follows that if Security Investments’ contract with W.H. Moore did not undertake an express contractual duty to intentionally benefit Sharp, then it could not further pass on such a duty in its contract with Security Police. Even if it could, Security Investments in fact did not contract expressly with Security Police to provide safe conditions for employees working in the plaza. Rather, in its “Service Agreement” with Security Investments, Security Police merely agreed to (1) “furnish night patrol services to [the plaza] intermittently during the hours of 8:00 o’clock PM and 7:00 o’clock AM seven nights per week ... doors to be locked at 7-8:00 o’clock PM and unlocked at 7:00 o’clock AM on weekdays only”; (2) “check the above named premises for Forcible Entry, Unauthorized Persons, Unlocked Doors, Broken Windows, Fire ...”; (3) “[c]heck three front doors and fire escape on third floor, East end at opening, regular rounds and closing”; and (4) “protect the above premises from Prowlers, Vandals or Unauthorized Intruders.” The contract makes no mention of providing personal security for either tenants or tenants’ employees. Again, while tenants’ employees may have derived some incidental benefits from the Security Investments-Security Police contract, the contract itself was not expressly intended to benefit them, and there is no indication that the contracting parties intended that third parties, such as Sharp, would be entitled to exercise rights under the contract as third party beneficiaries. The only arguable third party beneficiary from the Security Investments-Security Police contract was Moore, the plaza’s owner.
Even if the contracts of the defendants Security Investments and Security Police had been worded so as to express an intention that tenants or their employees were to be third party beneficiaries who could exercise rights under those contracts, violation of such a third party beneficiary provision would not have been a tort, but would merely have provided Sharp with contract damages. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971) (“Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort.”). Sharp’s claim against Security Investments and Security Police alleged a tort, not a breach of contract. Therefore, even if those two contracts had clearly provided that the tenants and their employees were intended to be direct third party beneficiaries, not merely incidental beneficiaries, Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968), the mere breach of the contract would not constitute a tort. “To found an action in tort, there must be a breach of duty apart from the non-performance of a contract.” Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138, 483 P.2d at 669.
Accordingly, because Security Investments and Security Police did not owe any contractual duty to Sharp, the summary judgment entered in favor of Security Investments and Security Police should be affirmed.