Court Opinion

ID: 9537594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:20:17.752632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:49.289927
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, C.J.,
dissenting and concurring: I must respectfully dissent from Syllabi 6, 7, and 8, and the corresponding portions of the opinion written for the court.
This appeal presents a case of first impression on the construction of the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, K.S.A. 75-4321 et seq. (PEER Act). However, both the trial court and this court on appeal have abdicated their responsibility to analyze the accuracy of the Public Employee Relations Board’s (PERB) construction of the PEER Act and deferred the *829matter to PERB, an administrative agency in the Executive Branch of government.
While the law presumes that administrative agencies develop expertise in resolving factual disputes in the area of their assigned responsibility, it does not credit such agencies with any particular expertise in giving proper interpretation to the legislative will behind a statutory enactment. “The final word on interpretation of law and its applicability, whether constitutional or statutory, resides in the courts, which may substitute their judgment on questions of law for that of the agency on a virtually carte blanche basis.” 5 Mezines, Stein, Gruff, Administrative Law § 51.01, p. 51-2 (1983).
The Constitution of Kansas, art. 3, § 1, provides in part: “The judicial power of this state shall be vested exclusively in one court of justice, which shall be divided into one supreme court, district courts, and such other courts as are provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)
“In reviewing questions of law, the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency, although ordinarily the court will give deference to the agency’s interpretation of the law.” Richardson v. St. Mary Hospital, 6 Kan. App. 2d 238, 242, 627 P.2d 1143, rev. denied 229 Kan. 671 (1981). See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Employment Security Board of Review, 189 Kan. 600, 371 P.2d 134 (1962).
In Rydd v. State Board of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 728-29, 451 P.2d 239 (1969), the Supreme Court was confronted with the review of action taken by an administrative agency and said:
“It is true the appeal statute here ([K.S.A.] 65-504) provides for trial de novo; however, as in [Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828], the statute is to be construed in the light of the constitutional inhibition prescribed by the separation of powers doctrine. This means the legislature may not impose upon the judiciary the function of a trial de novo of action of an administrative agency in the sense of authorizing the court to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency in matters other than law or essentially judicial matters.
“65-504 authorizes the court to act if it finds the board’s order arbitrary, unlawful or unreasonable. The issue, then, before the district court upon appeal is the reasonableness and legality of the order appealed from. Upon that issue the trial is de novo, but that does not mean the district court is at liberty to make an independent finding on the right to a license. Hearing before a district court upon appeal is thus not the equivalent of the initial hearing before the licensing agency which has the responsibility of weighing controverted evidence and arriving at an independent judgment, on the merits, as to entitlement to a license.” (Emphasis added.)
*830The record here does not present factual disputes. In the words of PERB’s hearing examiner for Cases 20 and 21:
“There appears to be little disagreement of factual matters surrounding the meet-and-confer sessions. Rather, respondent argues that the preceding memorandum of agreement dictated the parties* rights and obligations for meeting and conferring during the life of the existing agreement.”
Case 75-CAEO-1-1982, by agreement of the parties, was submitted entirely on the briefs addressing the negotiability of KNEA’s proposals.
The standard of review applied by the trial court as it appears in the record reads:
“There is no issue that this is an appeal from an administrative board and therefore this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board and that the Court’s determination must be limited to whether the findings of the Board were arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.”
How the district court applied the traditional test stated in Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); and Behrmann v. Public Employees Relations Board, 225 Kan. 435, 591 P.2d 173 (1979), is not clear. Whether PERB acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously was not an issue in these cases.
That the Supreme Court has abdicated its responsibility to construe the PEER Act, as did the trial court, is clearly indicated by its attempt to distinguish Chee-Craw Teachers Ass’n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 225 Kan. 561, 593 P.2d 406 (1979), and similar cases, on the ground that the teachers’ contract cases were all actions filed directly in the district court, while “[t]he case now before [the court] comes as an administrative appeal.” 233 Kan. at 822. In construing the PEER Act as a matter of law the Supreme Court in this case should make no distinction between these cases. The constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court to interpret the law in each situation is identical.
PERB’s legal analysis of the PEER Act is so far afield in these cases that a real need exists for a correct and sensible interpretation and application of the PEER Act. This court should now correct PERB’s improper legal analysis of the PEER Act which is squarely here for construction.
Abuse of regulatory authority, even in the context of factual determinations, has been consistently curbed and corrected by judicial intervention, lest administrative agencies become the *831uncontrolled and uncontrollable fourth branch of government. Missouri Pacific Rld. Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 205 Kan. 610, 625, 470 P.2d 767 (1970). See also Missouri Pacific Rld. Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 192 Kan. 575, 389 P.2d 813 (1964).
The majority opinion sanctions the use of the “significantly related” test by PERB in determining what is or is not negotiable between public employers and employees under the Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, K.S.A. 75-4321 et seq., although there is little in the Act itself or the history of the Act to suggest the legislature intended or envisioned that such a test be utilized. The definition of “conditions of employment” included in the Act evidences a legislative intent to specify those areas which are mandatorily negotiable and dictates that the Act be so construed. In construing this intent the court should look to the history of the Act as well as the parallel history of the Professional Negotiations Act, K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq. (P N Act). While the majority opinion attempts to discredit the applicability of the legislative history of the P N Act in construing the PEER Act, it cannot be overlooked that both acts involve employee-employer negotiations, although the PEER Act applies to a much broader group of employees. Also, the two acts use strikingly similar terminology in outlining the procedures for and scope of negotiations, the prime example being “terms and conditions of professional service” in the P N Act and “conditions of employment” in the PEER Act. It is often recognized that other statutes dealing with the same subject as the one being construed comprise a form of extrinsic aid deemed relevant as a source from which conclusions as to how the statute should be interpreted and applied can be drawn. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 50.01 (4th ed. 1973).
The majority opinion sets forth the pertinent legislative history of the two acts. At the time the P N Act was amended in 1977 to add a definition of “terms and conditions of professional service” which enumerated mandatory subjects of negotiation and incorporated the “impact” test from the court’s decision in National Education Association v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973) (Shawnee Mission), the PEER Act was amended to add “prepaid legal service benefits” to the laundry list of subjects enumerated in the definition of conditions of employ*832ment in K.S.A. 75-4322(i). Based on this the majority opinion rejects the appellants’ challenge to PERB’s use of the “significantly related” test, concluding:
“Doubtless [PERB] has faced prior challenges as to what is or is not negotiable between public employers and public employee representatives, and has resolved such challenges by using the ‘significantly related’ test. If the legislature in 1977 had desired to curtail the use of such a test, or to have made clearer the restrictions on negotiability urged by appellants, it could have done so.”
This statement implies the legislature should have expressly stated in the Act that only those items in 75-4322(i) were mandatorily negotiable, similar to that done in the 1980 amendment to the P N Act where the “impact” test included in 1977 was expressly rejected. It cannot be assumed the legislature has been made aware of the interpretation given to the Act by PERB. The failure of the legislature to amend the Act to restrict the use of the “significantly related” test in determining which subjects are mandatorily negotiable is of little significance where there is no evidence indicating the agency’s interpretation was brought to the attention of the legislature. See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 49.10 (4th ed. 1973).
Had the legislature intended or envisioned that a balancing or “significantly related” test would be utilized by PERB in determining which subjects are or are not negotiable, there would have been no purpose for the inclusion of the detailed list of negotiable conditions of employment in the statute, nor the 1977 amendment adding to that list. It would have been sufficient for the legislature to have merely used the undefined term “conditions of employment” as it did in 1970 when it enacted the P N Act. The use of such a broad term necessarily would have indicated legislative intent that the term be construed by courts or boards in determining which items were or were not negotiable on a case-by-case basis. Conversely, however, a detailed definition of the term “conditions of employment” designating those items intended by the legislature to be negotiable under the Act leaves no room for judicial construction expanding the areas of negotiability beyond those subjects specifically enumerated in the Act.
The decision reached by the majority, that the statutory definition of conditions of employment in K.S.A. 75-4322(f) does not contain the exclusive list of mandatorily negotiable subjects, is *833based largely upon the phrase “relating to conditions of employment” which is found in two places in the Act. K.S.A. 75-4321(fo) provides that the purpose of the Act is to obligate public agencies and their employees to enter into discussions to resolve grievances and disputes “relating to conditions of employment.” K.S.A. 75-4330 provides in part:
“{a) The scope of a memorandum of agreement may extend to all matters relating to conditions of employment, except proposals relating to . . . (3) public employer rights defined in K.S.A. 75-4326 . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The majority isolates the phrase “relating to conditions of employment” contained in those sections and extrapolates from that a legislative intent that the subjects enumerated in 75-4322(i), defining “conditions of employment,” was meant to be merely illustrative, rather than exclusive. However, a reading of the Act as a whole does not lend itself to this interpretation. The phrase “conditions of employment” is used several times elsewhere in the Act, and in particular in K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 75-4327(b) and K.S.A. 75-4322(m). 75-4327(b) provides that the appropriate employer shall meet and confer in good fáith with the public employee association “in the determination of conditions of employment of the public employees as provided in this act, and may enter into a memorandum of agreement with such recognized employee organization.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 75-4322(m) defines “[m]eet and confer in good faith” as:
“[T]he process whereby the representative of a public agency and representatives of recognized employee organizations have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer in order to exchange freely information, opinions and proposals to endeavor to reach agreement on conditions of employment.” (Emphasis added.)
The more reasonable construction of the Act is that the legislature intended only for those items delineated in 75-4322(i) to be conditions of employment which are mandatorily negotiable between the public employee and employer. Under 75-4330 other subjects relating to conditions of employment are permissibly negotiable between the employee and employer, if they should agree to enter into negotiations in those areas, and may be included in a memorandum of agreement. Subjects enumerated in 75-4326, however, are reserved to the exclusive control of the public employer, which cannot abdicate its management and *834control responsibilities by entering into negotiations and agreement on these subjects.
There is no language contained in the Act from which either this court or PERB can extrapolate a legislative intent to apply a “significantly related” test to determine that subjects other than those enumerated in 75-4322(f) are mandatorily negotiable. The Act states that the employer and employee shall meet and confer “in the determination of conditions of employment.” K.S.A. 75-4322(i) defines specifically and exclusively what these conditions of employment are. The Act further provides that the employer and employee may negotiate and enter into a memorandum of agreement on other subjects relating to conditions of employment, should they choose to do so. The parties cannot, however, agree to negotiate on subjects expressly reserved for management control and discretion in 75-4326.
This interpretation does not in any way nullify the operation and purpose of the Act, as the majority opinion suggests. The declaration of legislative intention in 75-4326 to not abrogate existing rights of management in certain areas does not alter the mandatory negotiability of the subjects listed in 75-4322(i). It also does not infer that the legislature intended those areas of management control were to be balanced against the enumerated conditions of employment in 75-4322(f) by PERB to determine which subjects are negotiable under the Act. At most the provision serves to clearly express the legislative intent to preserve certain designated areas for exclusive management control and limit the area of permissive negotiations under 75-4330.
It is the responsibility of this court to discern the intent of the legislature from the enacted legislation and construe the statutes accordingly. The majority opinion abdicates this court’s responsibility by deferring to PERB the interpretation of these statutes on this matter of law. The proposition cannot be seriously entertained that the legislature intended for PERB to have a free hand in construing the provisions of this Act. This is the first time the Act has come before the court for interpretation. By enacting 75-4322(i) the legislature clearly designated an area which was appropriate for public employee-employer negotiations.. It is impossible to discern a legislative intent that the subjects of mandatory negotiation under the Act extend beyond those specifically enumerated in the definition of conditions of employment in 75-4322(i). If there is any such purpose it should be *835legislatively expressed in clear and distinct language in the statute.
It is also noteworthy that the “significantly related” test applied by PERB has been criticized by others because of its inherent bias toward mandatory negotiability.
“This standard [‘significant relation’ standard] is inadequate because it does not properly recognize the competing interests at stake where there is an overlap between conditions of employment on the one hand and management prerogatives on the other. By focusing on only one-half of the overlap problem, this standard gives undue weight to conditions of employment.” Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector 81, 92 (Knapp, ed. 1977).
A balancing test, as used by this court in the Shawnee Mission case, is the proper test to apply in resolving case-by-case determinations of negotiability because it does not begin with a bias. See Clark, pp. 92-95; CMU Faculty v. CMU, 404 Mich. 268, 291-93, 273 N.W.2d 21 (1978) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
The inherent bias in PERB’s “significant relation” test toward negotiability cannot be better illustrated than by the subject of retrenchment involved in the- present case. In applying the Shawnee Mission “impact” test in NEA-Parsons v. U.S.D. No. 503, 225 Kan. 581, 586, 593 P.2d 414 (1979), this court held retrenchment was not a mandatorily negotiable subject because it would have a serious effect on basic policy decisions of the school board. Using the “significant relation” test, however, PERB finds that retrenchment significantly relates to salaries, wages or hours of work and other “conditions of employment” and is thus mandatorily negotiable. This finding was made by PERB even though this court interpreted essentially the same phrase — “terms and conditions of professional service” — otherwise in NEA-Parsons.
In support of its decision the majority opinion points to cases from other states which have approved the use of tests similar to the “significantly related” test in determining which subjects are mandatorily negotiable under various state public employee relations acts. In all those cases, however, the statutes involved are significantly different from the Kansas Act. None of those statutes set forth a long and detailed list of negotiable items in defining what constitutes conditions of employment as the Kansas Act does. It is only logical to assume that where a legislature chooses not to define what constitutes terms and conditions of *836employment it intends to encompass a broad range of topics which should be construed accordingly by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis to accommodate the various needs of the parties involved. It has been recognized, however, that a legislative intent to limit negotiable subjects is evidenced where a list of specific subjects which are negotiable is set forth in a statute which restricts the court’s authority to determine on a case-by-case basis what are conditions of employment within the meaning of the relevant statute. See West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581-82, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Dunellen Bd. of Ed. v. Dunellen Ed. Assn., 64 N.J. 17, 31, 311 A.2d 737 (1973).
There is a further reason for the above-controlled construction and application of the Act in this case. As recognized in the majority opinion the Act broadly applies to the entire spectrum of state employees, from professionals to manual laborers. In its application to employment negotiations between the Kansas Board of Regents and employees of state colleges and universities, however, the Act must be construed in light of constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the Board of Regents to control and supervise the state colleges and universities.
Art. 6, § 2, of the Kansas Constitution explicitly mandates that the legislature provide for the control and supervision of public institutions of higher learning by the Board of Regents. In fulfillment of this mandate, K.S.A. 76-712 provides:
“The state educational institutions are state agencies and state institutions and shall be controlled by, and operated and managed under the supervision of the board of regents. For such control, operation, management or supervision, the board of regents may make contracts and adopt orders, policies or rules and regulations and do or perform such other acts as are authorized by law or are appropriate for such purposes.”
While the majority opinion recognizes these constitutional and statutory provisions in discussing the public employer issue, it ignores these directives when considering the subjects which are mandatorily negotiable under the Act. The Act itself provides that the scope of negotiations are limited by statute's and constitutional provisions which govern in some matters. K.S.A. 75-4322(t), following the enumerated list of conditions of employment, provides that “nothing in this act shall authorize the adjustment or change of such matters which have been fixed by statute or by the constitution of this state.” (Emphasis added.)
*837The format of the PEER Act presents difficulty in application to public institutions of higher education such as this, where other statutory and constitutional provisions determine the scope of control and supervision by the employer. The prerogatives and autonomy of the Board of Regents to control and supervise institutions of higher education in this state must be recognized and given effect in determining the scope of negotiations under this Act. The Act itself makes it clear that its terms are not to be viewed so expansively as to negáte the Board’s overall supervisory responsibilities as set forth in Art. 6, § 2, of the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 76-711 et seq. (K.S.A. 75-4322[i].) For other cases limiting the scope of negotiations under similar provisions see Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 242 § 5[b].
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and on the posture of these cases here for review, the Supreme Court should assert its mandatory obligation to construe the PEER Act.