Court Opinion

ID: 9710013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:59:33.745834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.436985
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MURRAY, specially concurring in the majority’s well-reasoned opinion: This case and other cases following Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, present a forceful argument for eliminating peremptory challenges in criminal and civil cases based on judicial economy. A return to the common law would save the taxpayers millions in relitigation expenses. At the common law the sole criteria of a jury was “impartiality.” The cardinal rule was that juries should stand indifferent before the law. There were two types of challenges at the common law. One was called a “principal challenge,” the other a “challenge to the favor.” A principal challenge was grounded on a presumption that a prospective juror was biased because of a kinship by blood, affinity or other relationship. A godfather or blood relative to the ninth degree or business association to one of the parties would be subject to such a challenge. A challenge “to the favor” was similar to our present challenge for cause. In the case of that type of challenge the conclusion to disqualify or not to disqualify was made by the trial judge after hearing evidence in the case as to whether the prospective juror had formed an irrevocable conclusion on the ultimate issue in the case. The evidence was taken on this subject during the “voir dire” prior to jury being finally selected. Lord Bacon defines such a challenge as “a juror who has delivered an opinion touching on the matter.” (5 Bacon Abridgement 353.) A protection was built into the common law system by an appeal on the issue of whether the trial court arbitrarily overruled a challenge to the favor. Coughlin v. People (1893), 144 Ill. 140, 33 N.E. 1.