Court Opinion

ID: 9568960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:05.366386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:23.642707
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
1. The problem here is that there was not a clear distinction *530made between an admission of negligence and an admission of liability. Admitting negligence means that defendant admits there was a legal duty and a breach, the first two elements of a tort; admitting liability goes one step further and admits there was proximate cause, i.e., that defendant is liable for damages, whatever they are. Defendant admits duty, breach, and proximate cause. Harrison v. Feather, 211 Ga. App. 468 (1) (439 SE2d 706) (1993).
An admission of liability would make Wigley’s intoxication irrelevant because the jury would not have to decide whether his condition caused or contributed to the collision rather than its occurring due to some other form of negligence. The whole scenario and course of the event could be explained to the jury, absent the evidence of intoxication, without jeopardizing their understanding of what happened. Why it happened, which examines the cause of defendant driver’s actions and his vehicle, is not related to damages, which examines the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries and what amount is necessary to compensate for them.
In Bryant’s case, Shelter admitted “liability” and said only the question of damages remained. Plaintiff’s counsel misunderstood and took it to mean only an admission of negligence. The court agreed that the case was to be tried only on the question of damages. That assumes an admission of proximate cause. Defendant made that distinction regarding the other two cases, where there was “at least an argument that at least a portion of the injury that was claimed did not relate to the automobile accident.” The court ruled that, since the jury would need to know the way the defendant driver’s car was swerving over the road from one side to the other and the crash occurred, i.e., what happened, the evidence of intoxication could be admitted to explain “why” these events occurred.
At the conclusion of the evidence presentation, the court instructed the jury: “I have directed a verdict against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff establishing fault and responsibility as against both of the defendants. In other words, fault and responsibility will not be a concern in your deliberations and as such, I charge you that it will be your sole duty in your deliberations to determine the amount of damages, if any, proximately caused to the plaintiff as a result of her injury suffered in the motor vehicle collision in question . . . the question of damages [is] really the only issue that you have to decide in this case.” Defendant Shelter does not challenge the court’s charge.
The same general course transpired in Goolsby’s case.
Although the evidence of intoxication was not a necessary ingredient for the jury’s deliberation on the sole issue it had to decide in each case (damages), and it may have been better to omit it as irrelevant and arguably inflammatory due to the general public apprecia*531tion of the dangers of driving with one’s ability impaired by alcohol, I agree that it was not an abuse of discretion such as to require a new trial. OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) expressly authorizes the admission of alcohol tests as evidence in civil and criminal actions, although the authorization relates only to instances in which the evidence is relevant to a determination of an issue in the case. Here it was of marginal utility.
Decided March 8, 1996.
Karsman, Brooks & Callaway, D. Campbell Bowman, Jr., for appellant.
Jones, Boykin & Associates, Noble L. Boykin, Jr., Gilbert L. Stacy, for appellees.
2. I do not read Beal v. Braunecker, 185 Ga. App. 429, 430 (1) (364 SE2d 308) (1987), as supporting the proposition that evidence of alcohol consumption is admissible in cases in which punitive damages are not sought. Although I agree with the proposition, such evidence being admissible whenever it is relevant, the plaintiff in Beal did seek punitive damages, which were in issue.