Court Opinion

ID: 9500064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 18:10:10.864497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:50:46.874560
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00216-CV

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

OSCAR GONZALEZ,                                                        Appellant,

                                            v.

SANTIAGO LOPEZ D/B/A
LOPEZ CARPETS,                                                           Appellee.

                  On appeal from the 430th District Court
                        of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

      Appellant Oscar Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of appellee Santiago Lopez d/b/a Lopez Carpets (Lopez), dismissing Gonzalez’s

claims of negligence and gross negligence against Lopez. By his sole issue on appeal,

Gonzalez contends that a genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary
judgment. We affirm.

                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       Gonzalez asserted in his original petition that he was “an on-duty employee” of

Lopez’s and was injured on business premises. While working, Gonzalez fell from a

ladder and fractured his left heel bone and injured his left knee and ankle. As a result of

his injury, Gonzalez filed suit against Lopez for negligence and gross negligence, stating

that Lopez failed to provide a safe workplace or safe tools for the employees. Gonzalez

sought damages “exceeding [t]wo [h]undred [t]housand dollars but less than [o]ne million

dollars.”

       Lopez filed its plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Gonzalez’s claims were before

the Texas Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) and that the DWC had exclusive

jurisdiction to determine Gonzalez’s employment status at the time of his injury. Lopez

argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction until such time as the administrative

proceeding before the DWC was completed. The trial court subsequently abated the

matter pending the DWC’s determination of Gonzalez’s employment status.

       After a contested hearing between Texas Mutual Insurance Company (Lopez’s

workers’ compensation insurer) and Gonzalez, an administrative law judge (ALJ)

determined that Gonzalez was an employee of Lopez. Gonzalez then filed his second

amended petition against Lopez, again asserting negligence and gross negligence

claims. In the second amended petition, Gonzalez argued that he was a contracted

worker, not an employee, and “seeks judicial review, after exhausting administrative

remedies, of [the] ALJ Decision and Order.” Lopez responded by filing a combined motion

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to dismiss and summary judgment motion. Lopez’s motion asserted that Gonzalez’s

second amended petition seeking judicial review of the ALJ decision improperly named

Lopez as the defendant because Lopez was not a party to the DWC proceedings. Lopez’s

motion argued that Gonzalez’s suit for judicial review should have named the insurance

carrier, Texas Mutual Insurance Company, not Lopez. Original and supplemental

responses were filed, and a hearing was held on Lopez’s motion. Subsequently, the trial

court granted Lopez’s motion and Gonzalez’s judicial review suit on January 10, 2022.

Gonzalez filed a motion to reconsider the ruling, Lopez responded, and the trial court held

another hearing. Ultimately, the trial court denied Gonzalez’s motion to reconsider.

       After being dismissed from the judicial review complaint, Lopez sought summary

judgment as to the remainder of Gonzalez’s claims against it. Lopez’s argument was

essentially that, because Gonzalez did not properly challenge the ALJ’s determination

that he was an employee, Gonzalez was bound by that decision and could not bring suit

against Lopez for his injuries as workers’ compensation was his exclusive remedy.

Gonzalez responded that summary judgment was improper because a fact issue

remained as to whether he was an employee or an independent contractor at the time of

his alleged injury. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Lopez’s motion

and disposing of all remaining claims. Gonzalez filed a motion to reconsider which was

denied by operation of law. This appeal ensued.

                                    II.     DISCUSSION

       Gonzalez argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment

because Lopez failed to establish that: (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed, and

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(2) Lopez was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 1 Lopez contends that the trial court

properly dismissed the suit because Gonzalez’s filing against it was a mistake of parties.

A.      Standard of Review

        We review summary judgments de novo. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619

S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant

and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.

Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Tex. 2020). A summary judgment

motion may be brought on traditional or no-evidence grounds. See TEX. R. CIV. P.166a.

We construe Lopez’s motions as raising only traditional grounds for summary judgment.

        To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a movant must establish there is

no genuine issue of material fact so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id. R. 166a(c); Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018).

If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine

issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d

79, 84 (Tex. 2018). The nonmovant can meet its burden if it presents more than a scintilla

of evidence to support each element of its claims, i.e., the evidence “rises to a level that

would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford Motor

Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). “Evidence is less than a scintilla . . . if

it is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion that the fact

exists.’” Subsea 7 Port Isabel, LLC v. Port Isabel Logistical Offshore Terminal, Inc., 593

        1 Gonzalez does not set forth which of the trial court’s orders he is challenging, but rather appears

to make a blanket challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of his claims. As such, we address both orders
herein.
                                                     4
S.W.3d 859, 873 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, pet. denied) (quoting Regal

Fin. Co. v. Tex Star Motors, Inc., 355 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tex. 2010)). “[W]e must affirm

the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for

appellate review are meritorious.” Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,

216 (Tex. 2003); see Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. 2015).

B.     Judicial Review

       Gonzalez asserts that there was a genuine dispute about whether he was an

employee or an independent contractor of Lopez, a question that he argues should be

tried to a jury. As to the claim for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, Gonzalez’s

assertion is misplaced. Gonzalez’s contentions assume that the trial court, in granting

Lopez’s motions for summary judgment and to dismiss, decided that there was no dispute

about his employment status. That is not the case here. Instead the trial court was tasked

only with determining whether Gonzalez’s petition for judicial review in his second

amended petition was brought against the proper party. We agree that Lopez was not the

proper party.

       Under § 410.252(a) of the Texas Labor Code, “[a] party may seek judicial review

by filing suit not later than the 45th day after the date on which the division mailed the

party the decision of the appeals panel.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.252(a). An “employee

and the insurance carrier are the only parties with an interest in the outcome of any further

litigation” following the exhaustion of administrative remedies in a worker’s compensation

case. Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 36 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet.

denied), overruled on other grounds by Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284,

                                             5
291 (Tex. 2019). 2 Here, after the ALJ determined Gonzalez was an employee, a decision

upheld by administrative appeal, Gonzalez’s sole option for challenging that

determination was to seek a judicial review, naming the insurance carrier as the

defendant. See id. (affirming dismissal of employee’s worker’s compensation appeal for

want of jurisdiction when employee filed suit against his employer instead of the

employer’s insurance carrier). Because Gonzalez added his judicial review claim to his

second amended petition and did not name the insurance carrier as the defendant, but

rather brought the claim against Lopez, the trial court did not err in dismissing the judicial

review claim.

        Gonzalez argues that the insurance carrier is not the proper party unless there is

a final determination that he is an employee made by the jury. This argument, however,

is misguided. The ALJ determined that Gonzalez was an employee at the time of his

accident. After that determination, Gonzalez could either accept the decision or challenge

it. Because the decision was made at a contested hearing between Gonzalez and the

insurance carrier, the proper parties to dispute that holding are Gonzalez and the

insurance carrier, not Gonzalez’s employer. See id. Accordingly, to the extent that

Gonzalez challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his judicial review claim, we overrule

that issue.

        2 At the trial court level, Gonzalez challenged the validity of Johnson v. United Parcel Services, 36

S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied), arguing that it had been overruled in full by Texas
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284 (Tex. 2019). While Gonzalez does not discuss this case
on appeal, we note that Johnson was overruled by Chicas only to the extent that Johnson held the then
statutory 40-day deadline was jurisdictional. See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 291. Accordingly, as it relates to
the determination of proper parties in a judicial review claim, the holding in Johnson still stands.
                                                     6
C.     Personal Injury Claims

       To the extent that Gonzalez challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his personal

injury claims against Lopez, we find the trial court did not err. After the ALJ rendered its

decision that that he was an employee, Gonzalez did not timely file a judicial review claim

against the proper party; therefore, he is bound by the ALJ’s decision. See TEX. LAB. CODE

ANN. § 410.205(a) (“A decision of the appeals panel regarding benefits is final in the

absence of a timely appeal for judicial review.”).

       As an employee, Gonzalez’s exclusive remedy for his personal injury claim is not

against his employer, Lopez, but against the insurance carrier. See id. § 408.001(a)

(“Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee

covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the

employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury

sustained by the employee.”). Thus, if an employer subscribes to workers’ compensation

insurance benefits, and is then sued by a covered employee, the employer may “assert

the statutory exclusive remedy defense against the tort claims of its employees for job

related injuries” and generally cannot be held liable in tort for those injuries. HCBeck, Ltd.

v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. 2009); see also Mariscal v. McCarthy Bldg. Cos., Inc.,

No. 13-19-00211-CV, 2021 WL 1133608, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar.

25, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Gonzalez, therefore, was stautorily precluded from

bringing his tort claims against Lopez, and the trial court properly dismissed those claims.

See HCBeck, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d at 350.

       We overrule Gonzalez’s sole issue.

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                                   III.   CONCLUSION

      The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                       NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                       Justice

Delivered and filed on the
3rd day of August, 2023.

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