Court Opinion

ID: 9704438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:35:30.592571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.464361
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P. J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
*416I
Both the workmen’s compensation referee and the appeal board found that the plaintiff was an employee of Frank Handler who was an employee of Robert Edwards who was an independent contractor hired by the defendant to deliver its papers.
Michigan Const 1963, art 6, § 28 provides that, "[findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law”.
Not providing otherwise, legislative mandate requires that "findings of fact made by the board acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive”. MCLA 418.861; MSA 17.237(861).
Moreover, case law requires that this Court affirm findings of fact by the appeal board if there is "any evidence” in the record to support the findings. Hawley v General Motors Corp, 67 Mich App 114; 240 NW2d 290 (1976).
Finding that the plaintiff was promised consideration for his assistance in delivering newspapers, the appeal board concluded that a contract of employment existed which qualified the plaintiff for compensation benefits. I find the appeal board’s legal conclusion to be a simple application of, rather than a questionable interpretation of, the clear language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Under the act, an "employee” is defined as "Every person in the service of another, under any contract of hire, express or implied, including * * * minors, who shall be considered the same as and have the same power to contract as adult employees.” MCLA 418.161(l)(b); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(b). (Emphasis added.)
*417Accepting the appeal board’s findings of fact, a fair reading of the workmen’s compensation statute compels affirmance of the decision below. I do not find the appeal board’s decision to be clearly contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the act. On the contrary, the wording of § 161 compels the conclusion that its application was intended to be very broad.
II
Defendant argues that, assuming the regular paperboy was an independent contractor and that Handler was an employee of the regular newsboy and that the plaintiff was Handler’s employee, MCLA 418.171; MSA 17.237(171) should not be read as extending compensation benefits to the plaintiff. The argument is that the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide for the compensation of subemployees.
Again, a fair reading of the act compels agreement with the appeal board. Application of § 171 to the facts of this case requires a finding that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant since the plaintiff was a subemployee of the regular paperboy. It is clearly a reasonable interpretation of the act to conclude that § 171 was intended to cover second-level employees of independent contractors.
Ill
The hearing referee found that because the plaintiff was too young to secure a work permit his employment had been illegal and defendant, therefore, was liable for double compensation under MCLA 418.161(l)(b); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(b). The appeal board, however, found that plaintiff’s em*418ployment had not been illegal and reversed that part of the referee’s decision.
The appeal board reasoned that MCLA 409.14; MSA 17.714 and MCLA 409.28; MSA 17.728 create a "street trade” exemption for newspaper distribution from the general rule that it is illegal to employ a minor who is too young to obtain a work permit. The appeal board was correct.
Any minor whose employment was illegal at the time of his injury is entitled to double compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.1 If the minor has not procured a work permit, his employment (unless exempted) is illegal.2 With one irrelevant exception, persons under the age of 14 cannot obtain work permits.3 However, the employment of minors in "street trades” is not illegal, and the distribution of newspapers is a "street trade”.4 Since newspaper distribution is expressly exempted, neither the minimum age nor the work permit requirements apply to paperboys.
Plaintiff argues, however, that this exemption unconstitutionally denies him equal protection of the laws as it denies him the protection otherwise afforded minors. I don’t agree.
Legislation is invalid on equal protection grounds if it creates classifications which are without reasonable bases and are purely arbitrary. Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d 636 (1975). It is clear to me that there are rational bases for permitting children under the age of 14 to work as paperboys while generally prohibiting their employment in other occupations. The working hours and conditions of *419children who deliver newspapers are sufficiently distinct from those in other industries in which children were historically employed, and the perceived benefit of this type of work experience for children properly supports its encouragement. It is also reasonable to assume that the health risks and employment abuses which existed in other areas of child labor were considerably different in both kind and degree from that of newspaper distribution.
The legislative decision to permit children to deliver newspapers while generally prohibiting their employment in other businesses is reasonably related to the legislative goal of preventing child labor abuses. It was certainly not unreasonable for the Legislature to effectuate the distinction by making it an exception to a general rule of prohibition. MCLA 409.14; MSA 17.714 is valid.
Since plaintiff’s employment was not illegal, the claim for double compensation is not supportable.
IV
The only remaining issue warranting discussion —concerning the applicability of MCLA 418.359; MSA 17.237(359) to this case — is not properly raised or briefed. I would, however, agree with the hearing referee that § 359 would not become applicable until the plaintiff reached the age of majority.
I would affirm the decision of the appeal board.

 MCLA 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).

 MCLA 409.3; MSA 17.703.

 Id.

 MCLA 409.14, 409.28; MSA 17.714, 17.728.