Court Opinion

ID: 9855062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:18:57.412836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.670133
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
Slip and fall matters constitute a never ending line of cases for appellate review. It is obvious from the sheer volume of slip and fall appeals that our past decisions have not provided the clarity necessary for lawyers, litigants and trial courts to dispose of the issues at the trial level. I do not see how this case, in which the majority concludes that summary judgment was proper, is any different from the numerous recent cases where we have concluded that triable issues of fact remained. See, e.g., Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga. *17App. 164 (460 SE2d 849) (1995) (factual issue remained concerning plaintiff’s knowledge of foreign substance on floor); Sacker v. Perry Realty Svcs., 217 Ga. App. 300 (457 SE2d 208) (1995) (factual issue remained concerning plaintiff’s knowledge of dangerous condition); and Flood v. Camp Oil Co., 201 Ga. App. 451 (411 SE2d 348) (1991) (factual issue remained concerning defendant’s inspection procedures).
Perhaps it is the fiction that judges can decide from the bench the factually intensive question of “reasonableness” that leads to the confusion. The point is, that except in clear, palpable and undisputed cases, questions of reasonableness should properly be left for the jury to decide. Flood, supra. Because this is not a clear, palpable and undisputed case, the facts should be left for a jury to decide.
I agree with the majority and Presiding Judge McMurray that the inquiry is whether the Hospital had constructive knowledge of the puddle on the floor. The majority concludes however, that the Hospital demonstrated, as a matter of law, that it had a reasonable inspection program in place and that the Hospital implemented that program on the day of Sheriff’s fall. I must also infer from the majority’s decision that Sheriff utterly failed to show any facts concerning the length of time the puddle remained on the floor. Under the facts recited by the majority, there are factual issues that should have been left for the jury to decide.
In determining whether a triable issue of fact remains, we must give the non-moving party the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Martin v. Dunwoody-Shallowford Partners, 217 Ga. App. 559 (458 SE2d 388) (1995). The Hospital showed that all hospital employees were responsible for reporting any spills to its environmental director. Is there not a factual issue concerning the reasonableness of such an inspection plan where no one was specifically delegated the responsibility to locate and report hazardous conditions? Could not the jury find that a responsibility given to everyone is a responsibility given to no one? According to the majority, the Hospital also showed that a nurse who took a patient through the area immediately before the fall did not notice the puddle. The receptionist who was on duty for five hours before the incident and sitting twelve feet away from the puddle averred that she had continuously monitored the waiting area. If she continuously monitored the area from 12 feet away, could she, or could she not, have observed the puddle’s source at that time the puddle formed on the floor? All we really know is that the last time anyone inspected the area was earlier that morning. Giving the benefit .of all reasonable doubts to Sheriff, are we to conclude that the puddle was not there immediately before the incident when the nurse passed by with her patient, or should we properly infer for summary judgment purposes that the puddle was on the floor earlier *18that morning and was not detected by Hospital’s employees? Considering that the incident occurred in an emergency room waiting area, where visitors are legitimately preoccupied with emergency health care matters, is not it reasonable to expect the hospital to exercise heightened inspection procedures?
Decided March 6, 1996
Reconsideration denied March 29, 1996.
Carl A. Veline, Jr., for appellant.
Jones, Cork & Miller, Thomas C. Alexander, James E. Messer, Jr., for appellee.
I dissent.