Court Opinion

ID: 9539583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:06:18.056227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:58.622065
License: Public Domain

CAMERON,
Justice, dissenting.
I write separately to express my opinion that the majority does not go far enough in protecting this petitioner’s right of privacy.
The majority would proscribe the forceful administration of dangerous drugs only in non-emergency situations. Such drugs could be forcefully administered if done pursuant to professional judgment evidenced by a written treatment plan in compliance with legislative or department regulations governing such a forced use of drugs for medical treatment.
I fully agree with the statement of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that it “seems to us to be an intuitively obvious proposition: a person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir.1980) (footnote omitted), vacated and remanded Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982).
Although some courts have considered this problem a due process (liberty interest) question, Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (1983), and others, a cruel and unusual punishment question Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.1973), I believe it is primarily a matter of right to privacy. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated:
“[A] person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Rogers II, supra at 653. The source of this right according to Rogers II, supra, lies in the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ..., most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal security.” Id. Other courts have discussed in individual’s First Amendment right to maintain the integrity of his mental processes. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir.1976); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir.1973); Rogers I, supra at 1366-1367. We ground this right firmly in the constitutional right to privacy, which we have previously described as “an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life.” Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 433 n. 9, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 n. 9 (1981).
In Arizona, the right to privacy is expressly given in the constitution. Ariz. Const, art. 2 § 8. It is my opinion, that the right to privacy contained in the Arizona Constitution must include the right to bodily integrity and personal security, thus allowing a person to refuse the ingestion or injection of dangerous drugs. See Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 583, 663 P.2d 570, 575 (App.1982) (state law requires more than minimal federal constitutional requirements).
These drugs are conceded by the state to be very powerful and dangerous. The side effects are well known,
such as dysfunction of the central nervous system called extra pyramidal symptoms; blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, constipation or diarrhea, palpitation, skin rashes, low blood pressure, faintness, fatigue; also sometimes permanent states such as akinesia, akathesia and tardive dyskinesia characterized by rhythmical, repetitive involuntary *241movements of the tongue, face, mouth or jaw sometimes accompanied by other bizarre muscular activity. Also they may be responsible for a condition wherein white blood cells disappear called agranulocytosis which is fatal in 30% of the cases.
In Re K.K.B. 609 P.2d 747, 748 n. 3. (Okla. 1980) Other possible side effects include: drowsiness, fainting, loss of sexual desire, skin rashes, skin discoloration, cardiovascular changes and occasionally sudden death. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. at 438, 421 N.E.2d at 53.
The state seeks to justify the use of these mind-altering drugs based on security reasons and as a necessary manner of treatment. While these are valid state interests they do not rise to the level of overriding a person’s right to privacy. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated,
[Fjorcible anti-psychotic medication of a patient in a state hospital is not necessary to protect the general public. The public is protected by commitment. If there is no emergency, hospital personnel are in no danger; the only purpose of forcible medication in these circumstances would be to help the patient. But the basic premise of the right to privacy is the freedom to decide whether we prefer to be helped, or to be left alone.
In Re K.K.B., 609 P.2d at 751 (original emphasis). Any individual, even a state prisoner, should have the right to determine whether he wishes to undergo a method of treatment involving these dangerous drugs. While his refusal to take such drugs may impede his treatment and be a negative factor in such determinations as parole and sentence reduction, nevertheless his right to refuse should be absolute.
I note in conclusion that Mr. Large has never been legally declared incompetent, but merely in need of more extensive treatment than is possible at the state prison. A.R.S. § 31-226. It is frightening to even think that the state may be able to forcibly administer dangerous, mind-altering drugs to a mentally competent person. As noted by Chief Justice Hennessey in Guardianship of Roe, supra, if these drugs were mistakenly administered to a nonpsychotic individual, that person might develop a “toxic psychosis” causing him to suffer symptoms of psychosis. 383 Mass. at 437, 421 N.E.2d at 53. These symptoms assumedly could then justify continued treatment with the drugs. Such a scenario is shockingly repugnant to a free society. For these reasons, I am convinced that an individual’s right to privacy must allow him the absolute right to refuse the forcible administration of dangerous drugs as a form of treatment.