Court Opinion

ID: 9429096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:38.652912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:17.025088
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
The Court’s opinion, and especially its unquestioning application of Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 597 (1963), do not show why this case presents “‘the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of workers’ compensation law.’” Ante, at 193, n. 3. Because I believe the balance tips in the opposite direction, I respectfully dissent.
In Weyerhaeuser, the Court found that the plaintiff’s right to recover outweighed the limitation of liability provision of the statute. This is not surprising, since the plaintiff’s right to recover was based on the ancient admiralty rule of divided damages.1 The divided-damages rule is basic to admiralty and to the relationships of vessels at sea. Under this rule, Weyerhaeuser had a direct right of action against the United States for the injuries it sustained in the collision. Thus the only issue was whether one item of damage, the recovery of the federal employee against Weyerhaeuser, could be included in Weyerhaeuser’s action against the Govern*200ment. The Court stated that it had long since “held that the full scope of the divided damages rule must prevail over a statutory provision which . . . limited the liability of one of the shipowners with respect to an element of damages incurred by the other in a mutual fault collision. The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540.” 372 U. S., at 603. We thought that Congress, in enacting § 8116(c), did not show “any purpose to disturb settled doctrines of admiralty law affecting the mutual rights and liabilities of private shipowners in collision cases.” Id., at 601 (footnote omitted).
It is true that the Weyerhaeuser opinion states that § 8116(c) does not bear on “the rights of unrelated third parties.” Ibid. This view is not controlling. The Court’s finding on the primacy of the divided-damages rule shows that that rule was adequate to overcome § 8116(c) and that the comments on congressional intent were dictum. Weyerhaeuser holds that the divided-damages rule is more important than the limitation of liability provision of the statute, and that therefore the latter must yield.
In other cases involving a “‘nearly identical,’” ante, at 195, quoting Weyerhaeuser, supra, at 602, statute, the Court has found that the limitation of liability aspects of a workers’ compensation scheme outweigh an unrelated third party’s right to recover. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Carp., 342 U. S. 282 (1952), and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 406 U. S. 340 (1972) (per curiam), we refused to allow unrelated third-party tortfeasors to obtain contribution from employers who were covered by the limitation of liability provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§901-950. In each case we thought there was no competing principle as strong as the divided-damages rule that would overcome the limitation of liability aspect of the statute.2
*201There can be no doubt that a principal purpose of § 8116(c) was to limit the amount that the Government would have to pay on account of injuries to its employees. See S. Rep. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 23, 30 (1949) (Section 8116(c) will lead to “savings to the United States, both in the damages recovered and in the expense of handling the lawsuits”). As the Court pointed out in Bradford, Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 159 (1932), any workers’ compensation statute exists in part to provide “for employers a liability which is limited and determinate.” The balance that must be drawn, then, is between the doctrine that gives Lockheed a right to recover and the limitation on liability provided in § 8116(c). We know that in Weyerhaeuser the right was found to be more important and that in Halcyon and Atlantic the limitation was found to be more important.
In this case we are presented with a tort indemnity claim presented pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, particularly 28 U. S. C. §2674. The Court states, without explanation, that this claim is “as well established as the divided damages rule.” Ante, at 198. However well established Lockheed’s claim may be,3 it is not the same kind of claim that we approved in Weyerhaeuser and Ryan. Those cases turned on the special relationship between the third party and the employer created by ancient maritime law or by voluntary agreement. The only relationship Lockheed can *202claim in this case comes from the Government’s breach of a duty of care owed to Bottorff. In this respect, Lockheed’s claim is like the claims for contribution the Court rejected in Halcyon and Atlantic; it is an indirect sharing of responsibility among wrongdoers and not a breach of a direct duty to Lockheed.
We considered a similar indemnity claim in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977). The underlying injury in Stencel was caused when the ejection seat of a jet fighter malfunctioned during a midair emergency, and the Air National Guard pilot was permanently injured. The pilot sued Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system, for negligence. Stencel cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. Its claim, like Lockheed’s claim in this case, was that it was at most passively negligent, while the Government’s active negligence caused the injuries. Both claims were brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The pilot, like Bottorff, was entitled to statutory payments, in that case under the Veterans’ Benefits Act.
We affirmed the dismissal of Stencel’s cross-claim, even though no limitation of liability statute applied to the case, because we found that the limitation of liability principle of Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), precluded Stencel’s indemnity claim. We did not consider whether the result would be different if Stencel had relied upon a more direct theory of liability, but Stencel does stand for the proposition that an indemnity claim of this kind is not sufficient to overcome a limitation on the liability of the United States.4
*203The Court’s opinion today does more than permit a new and, in my view, inappropriate kind of claim to defeat the limitation of liability principle. It also greatly expands the liability to which the Government may be subjected on account of injuries to its employees. Both the divided-damages rule and contribution require joint tortfeasors to share liability. An indemnitor, however, is required to pay the full amount of the judgment against the indemnitee.5 W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 51, p. 310 (4th ed. 1971). This increased liability weighs on the side of refusing to permit recovery in this case.
For these reasons, I am convinced that we should retain the balance our earlier decisions would require. Where a third party has a direct action against the Government that fits into the same category as the claims we have allowed in the past, it may include a claim for damages it has paid to a Government employee. But where the third party’s claim is an indirect action based on contribution or indemnity, Congress’ clear intent to limit the liability of the United States should prevail. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 “In The North Star, 106 U. S. 17 (1882), Mr. Justice Bradley traced the doctrine back to the Laws of Oléron which date from the 12th century, and its roots no doubt go much deeper.” Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 110 (1974).

 In Kopke, supra, we reaffirmed Halcyon and Atlantic. We permitted contribution in Kopke because the limitation of liability provision did not *201apply to the defendant, so the injured plaintiff could have sued him directly. In another LHWCA case, however, we upheld the .third party’s right to recover. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956), “relied on the existence of a contractual relationship between the [third-party] shipowner and the employer.” Ante, at 196. The holding of Ryan is that a contract that provides for employer liability, like the divided-damages rule, is a sufficiently compelling basis of liability to overcome the limitation of liability principle.

 The parties seek to show the status of indemnity actions in 1949, when the statute was enacted. What is important is not whether indemnity actions existed, but whether permitting such actions would be consistent with the limitation of liability principle Congress has enacted.

 The Court is mistaken when it states that Stencel was decided “without regard to any exclusive-liability provision.” Ante, at 197, n. 8. Stencel pointed out that a factor in Feres was the compensation paid to servicemen without regard to the Government’s negligence. 431 U. S., at 671. It then characterized Feres as establishing that the veterans’ benefits statute “provides an upper limit of liability for the Government as to service-connected injuries, ” id., at 673, thus establishing a limitation of liability principle similar to that enacted in § 8116(c). The Court in Stencel balanced this *203principle against Stencel’s right to recover, 431U. S., at 672-673, just as a limitation of liability provision is balanced against a third party’s right to recover when this question is faced under any other workers’ compensation scheme.

 In this case, the parties have agreed that the Government will pay only a part of Lockheed’s settlement with Bottorff. See App. 106-106; Brief for United States 4, and n. 4. The agreement establishing the proportion the Government will pay was filed under seal in the District Court. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, however, the Government’s liability is determined under state law. There is no reason to believe that future claimants will make similar agreements, and no way for the Court to oblige them to do so.