Court Opinion

ID: 9782723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:07:44.619051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:08.574675
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(dissenting):
119 Defendant's actions in this case fall short of an attempt to commit sodomy. What he did seems more like a pre-attempt, a testing of the waters to see if attempting an act of sodomy would likely be worthwhile. *187Upon being rebuffed, Defendant went his way without so much as having touched D.B. I believe that more is required to constitute a "substantial step" toward committing the crime, such as pulling the victim from his skateboard, trying to undo the victim's belt buckle, making the victim take the $20, or leading the victim into some bushes or toward Defendant's house. I disagree that a mere statement of an interest in committing a crime, without more, could possibly constitute a substantial step toward commission of the crime.
20 In any of these scenarios, even if the victim then ran away and nothing more happened, I would conclude that Defendant attempted sodomy because any of those overt acts would be a substantial step toward commission of the crime. Here, regardless of what Defendant had been thinking about for however long, all he did was ask the vietim-in a public place-if he could perform sexual acts on him for $20.1 When D.B. declined the offer, Defendant apologized and they went their separate ways.
121 As noted in the lead opinion, Arave does not quibble about the intent element of attempted sodomy and only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the "substantial step" element. He claims that his mere request to perform oral sex on D.B. did not constitute a substantial step towards sodomy because it was only a preparatory act, a mere testing of the waters to see if an attempt would likely be successful. The State, on the other hand, argues that Arave's fantasizing about D.B. for a month, supposedly blocking D.B.'s way with his bike, trying to persuade D.B. with twenty dollars, and the actual request, are all facts supporting the conclusion that Arave took a substantial step towards commission of sodomy on a child.2
*188122 It is clear that Arave's actions fall short of an attempt to commit sodomy because he did not take a "substantial step" as contemplated by our jurisprudence. Our case law recognizes that a substantial step is a tangible, meaningful, or significant step towards commission of a crime that "transcends intent," State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 658 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, " '[iln establishing the nexus between intent and act it must be borne in mind that an attempt transcends intent, yet fails to culminate in its planned accomplishment.'" Id. (quoting State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). " 'When we say that a man attempted to do a given wrong, we mean that he intended to do specifically it, and proceeded a certain way in the doing. The intent in the mind covers the thing in full; the act covers it only in part'" Castonguay, 663 P.2d at 1326 (citation omitted).3
123 Thus, in State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), our Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for attempted burglary and robbery-not of someone who was merely driving toward the crime scene with larceny on his mind-but rather of someone riding in a car on his way to a home where he intended to commit such crimes, accompanied by cohorts he recruited, duct tape and gloves he furnished, and a cap pistol he provided. See id. at 407-08. Also instructive is the case of Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that an aggravating cireumstance of attempted aggravated arson existed with regard to the defendant's first degree murder conviction. See id. at 219-20. The court held the lighting of a mattress on fire "constituted a substantial step in the commission of aggravated arson" when the evidence supported that the defendant lit the mattress with the intent to light the entire habitable structure on fire. Id. at 220.
T 24 State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991),4 is particularly illustrative of the difficulty with the majority's analysis. In that case a wife "was charged with three separate counts of attempted first degree murder of her husband" when she tried to kill him by overdosing him with various illicit substances. Id. at 1153. On one count, the Johnson court determined that the purchase of counterfeit "'crank'-a street name for methamphetamine," id. at 1154-did not constitute a substantial step towards committing the murder, because it did not go beyond "mere preparation." Id. at 1157. The Court *189went on to determine, however, that administering oxalic acid and heroin to her husband were substantial steps for purposes of the other two attempted murder counts. See id. at 1158, 1160. And a number of other Utah cases show the need for more than just talk to establish an attempt crime. See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 671-72 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (refusing to set aside guilty pleas to aggravated robbery because the "Idlefendants' entry into the home of the victims with sawed-off shotguns constituted the attempt, since it was a substantial step towards the commission of the offense") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593-94 (Utah 1988) (determining that evidence supported an aggravated robbery conviction when it showed the "defendant accosted the victim with a knife and club and demanded to know where she kept her silver and gold," and such action "was a substantial step toward commission of the offense") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 & n. 8 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (declining to reach the merits of the issue due to a failure to marshal but stating that even if the court had considered the merits, "[blased on [a witness's] testimony that defendant aimed the shotgun for five to seven seconds before firing at [the victim,] a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant took a substantial step toward intentionally causing the death of [the victim}"), cert. denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). In all these cases, the defendants' acts clearly transcended their mere intent to commit the crimes and their actions were in substantial furtherance of consummating the crimes.
125 Arave approached D.B. and asked if D.B. would allow Arave to perform oral sex on him in exchange for some money, but Arave never threatened D.B., never moved to lay a hand on him, and never tried to restrain him. Upon being rebuffed by D.B., Arave went his way without so much as having touched or attempting to restrain D.B., and even apologized for making his request. When compared to the substantial steps treated in our case law, Arave's actions seem more like a pre-attempt, or a testing of the waters,5 to see if attempting an act of sodomy would likely be worthwhile. Under our attempt jurisprudence, more is required to show there was a substantial step towards attempting sodomy on a child, such as pulling a victim from his skateboard, trying to undo the victim's belt buckle, making the victim take the twenty dollars, leading the victim into some bushes or toward a defendant's house, threatening the victim if he did not agree to submit to the act, manipulating the victim into compliance, actually trapping the victim,6 or aggressively trying to persuade the victim.
*190T26 In any of these scenarios, even if the victim was able to run away, or a third party interrupted the perpetration of the crime, it would seem like a defendant actually attempted sodomy because any of those overt acts would be a substantial step towards commission of the crime. Here, in contrast, all Arave did was ask. When the victim refused, Arave apologized, and D.B. went home without any hindrance from Arave. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Arave's motion to dismiss because the evidence did not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Arave took a substantial step towards commission of the crime of sodomy on a child. See generally State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 41, 70 P.3d 111.7
127 After reviewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, it is clear that Arave's request that D.B. allow Arave to sodomize D.B. in exchange for twenty dollars did not, under the cireumstances of this case, constitute attempted sodomy on a child. The request was simply not a substantial step towards commission of the crime. As Arave acknowledges his actions were criminal, and he specifically requests the case be remanded for the trial court to enter a conviction of solicitation to commit sodomy on a child, that request should be granted and the case remanded for that purpose.8

. The lead opinion claims that defendant '"block[ed] [D.B.'s]l path on the street" and "trapp[ed] him in a physical space on the street." While this phraseology appears in the State's brief, there is no support for either claim in the record.

. The State relies on several cases from other jurisdictions, which cases the State argues stand for the point that a request to commit a sexual act plus a slight act, or in some instances a request alone, are actions that constitute a substantial step towards commission of the sexual act. These cases are not persuasive, however, in light of Utah's own jurisprudence concerning what constitutes an attempt. Moreover, the facts in the cases relied on by the State involve more in the way of a substantial step than the facts of this case because those cases involved multiple incidents, multiple requests, or more aggressive efforts at persuasion on the part of the defendants. See Arizona v. McMillen, 154 Ariz. 322, 742 P.2d 823, 823-24 (Ct.App.1987) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support an attempted kidnaping charge when it showed the defendant, wearing a ski mask, asked a child to enter his truck; for two days the defendant had been following and taking pictures of children from the truck; and the defendant told an officer that his actions were not illegal and " 'turned him on' "), overruled on other grounds by Rainwater v. Arizona, 189 Ariz. 367, 943 P.2d 727, 727, 729 (1997) (resolving conflict between Arizona's appellate courts on what class of felony attempted kiduaping is); Arizona v. Fristoe, 135 Ariz. 25, 658 P.2d 825, 827, 830-31 (Ct.App.1982) (holding evidence supported attempted oral sex with minors when it showed that, on the same day, the defendant asked a fifteen-year-old girl if he could kiss her between the legs in exchange for five dollars; then in a second instance, repeated the same request to two eleven-year-old girls and then returned to the eleven-year-old girls offering twenty dollars instead; and in a third instance, asking another eleven-year-old girl if he could "put his head between [the girl's] legs and take a picture"); Ward v. Indiana, 528 N.E.2d 52, 52-53, 55 (Ind.1988) (holding evidence supported attempted molestation of a child when it showed the defendant followed a boy on a street; asked the boy three times if he could "perform fellatio on him"; told the boy "the Sheriff would get [the boy] in trouble and that the Sheriff was a 'pervert'"; and the defendant urged that the act take place immediately); Van Bell v. Nevada, 105 Nev. 352, 775 P.2d 1273, 1274-76 (1989) (per curiam) (determining evidence supported attempted sexual assault when it showed the defendant "paid a woman a $100 finder's fee to procure a young girl for sexual intercourse; negotiated with an undercover officer for the purchase of a young girl; offered the undercover officer $150 to have a child furnished to him; chose a young girl, represented to be five or six years of age, from a collection of photographs supplied by the undercover officer; and prepared for sexual intercourse with the young girl by arranging for a room and purchasing [Vaseline to use as a lubricant'); New Jersey v. Perez, 177 N.J. 540, 832 A.2d 303, 306-07, 311-12 (2003) (holding the evidence supported attempted child endangerment when it showed that the defendant, in one incident, drove next to a girl walking to school and offered her a ride twice; when in a second incident, the defendant stopped his car as the same girl approached on a bicycle, asked if the girl remembered him and motioned for her to come towards him; and when the defendant had fantasized about a date and become obsessed *188with the girl); Oregon v. Walters, 311 Or. 80, 804 P.2d 1164, 1165-68 (1991) (en banc) (concluding the evidence supported that a substantial step was taken to kidnap, rape, and sodomize a thirteen-year-old girl, when it showed that the defendant asked the girl to help him find his dog; offered her money in increasing amounts; of fered the girl a ride home; and then followed the girl, who rode her bicycle home, where he stayed to browse items at her family's garage sale and blurted out to the girl's mother that he had a girlfriend), modified by Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (9th Cir.1995) (determining evidence did not support attempted rape and sodomy charges, but did support attempted kidnap-ing charge); Oregon v. Rinkin, 141 Or.App. 355, 917 P.2d 1035, 1037, 1041-42 (1996) (holding evidence supported a substantial step towards sodomy on a child when it showed that the defendant and the victim had four or five encounters, where defendant encouraged the boy to skip school and do things his parents would not allow, on one occasion stating he would give the boy free karate lessons at his apartment if the boy came by himself, and on another offering the boy "a Playboy [magazine] if he would come to defendant's apartment"); Tennessee v. Fowler, 3 S.W.3d 910, 910-12 (Tenn.1999) (determining evidence supported attempted statutory rape when it showed the defendant approached an undercover officer at a rest area, stating that he wanted "a young boy who was willing to run away from home and live with him"; the officer returned with a nineteen-year-old dressed as a fourteen-year-old boy; the defendant indicated he wanted sex with the boy; and the defendant made out a check for a finder's fee).

. State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983), was decided under essentially the same statutory requirements that are applicable in this case. Compare id. at 1325 with Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (2008).

. The State takes issue with the holding in Johnson because the Johnson court used "preparation" analysis and cited a common law attempt case. See generally State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Utah 1991). The State, however, stated in its brief that it "does not dispute that conduct exhibiting mere preparation, as it might pertain to [the instant] case, cannot effectively constitute an attempt."

. The opinion in State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, 100 P.3d 231, evaluated the "differences between Internet enticement and other inchoate crimes." Id. ¶ 17. Although not squarely on point, its discussion supports that there is a distinction between a "testing of the waters" and an actual attempt:
[The crime of Internet enticement would be more appropriate in a case where, as here, a defendant solicits sex from an undercover police officer on the Internet believing he is communicating with a minor. In such a case, attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation may be difficult to prove because the State must establish the defendant's actions are "strongly corroborative" of an intent to commit a felony or involve an "overt act." The charge of Internet enticement would be more appropriate because it does not require "strong corroboration" of intent.
In contrast, the defendant may contact a minor via the Internet, meet the minor, and be on the verge of consummating a felonious sexual act with the minor before being stopped by police. In that case, the higher crime of attempt, for example, would be appropriate because the State could probably prove "strong corroboration" of an intent to commit the underlying felony.
In sum, we conclude that although Internet enticement and other inchoate crimes may interlock, they do so in a way that allows the State to prosecute efforts to seduce children at different stages. If the predator is caught early in his effort, the State may charge Internet enticement, and if caught after the crime had developed, the State may have evidence to charge the greater crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation.
Id. ¶¶ 19-21 (citations omitted).

. The State makes much of the fact that Arave "blocked" D.B.'s path and claims that Arave essentially "trapped" D.B. However, even though Arave stopped his bike in front of D.B., this action did not prevent D.B. from running away in any other direction, as he soon did, and the evidence does not show that Arave tried to prevent D.B. from leaving. The State also focuses on Arave's offer of twenty dollars as an at*190tempt to persuade D.B. to comply. In my view, Arave's efforts at verbal persuasion, including offering a financial incentive, clearly did not constitute a substantial step toward sodomy.

. Sound policy considerations further bolster my position that a substantial step toward commission of the crime, beyond the mere hope or intention to commit it, is required for attempt. There is little incentive for perverts and pedophiles to exercise a measure of self-control, as Arave did in this case, if someone who asks about the possibility of sodomy for hire and then goes his way when he is rebuffed will be guilty of precisely the same crime as someone who grabs a child, holds the child's arms with one hand, lowers the child's pants with the other, and gets his open mouth within an inch of the child's private parts before losing his nerve or being interrupted.

. The State concurs in the propriety of such a remand for this purpose, in the event it is determined the evidence does not establish there was an actual attempt. It should be pointed out that the difference between the two statutes permitting this resolution would not be available to Arave had he committed his crime more recently. After 2006, when Arave committed his crime, the solicitation statute was amended to make solicitation of sodomy on a child a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-204(1)(d)Gii) (2008), instead of a second degree felony as it was at the time of Arave's actions, see id. § 76-4-204(2) (2003). Arave's argument and request to reduce his conviction to a second degree felony for solicitation of sodomy on a child is plausible only because of the differences that existed in the statutes at the time of his actions. Under the current statutes, both attempted sodomy on a child, see id. § 76-4-102(1)(d)(iii) (2008), and solicitation of sodomy on a child, see id. § 76-4-204(1)(d)(iii), are first degree felonies.