Court Opinion

ID: 9807083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:46:48.475532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:11.464424
License: Public Domain

COMBS, V.C.J.,
with whom WINCHESTER, J., joins, concurring specially:
1 1 While I agree with the majority's decision that Petitioner's appeal should be dismissed, I write separately to emphasize the problems inherent in dismissing Petitioner's appeal while allowing Respondent's own appeal to proceed. The majority applies what has long been the general rule in Oklahoma: a party to an action who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a judgment waives the right to appeal. Adams v. Unterkircher, 1985 OK 96, ¶ 7, 714 P.2d 193; United Engines, Inc. v. McConnell Const., Inc., 1980 OK 139, ¶ 14, 641 P.2d 1101. As this Court pointed out in McMillian v. Holcomb, the appellate doe-trine of barring an appeal due to accepting the benefits of a judgment is a type of estop-pel born in equity. 1995 OK 117, 117, 907 P.2d 1084; Associated Classroom Teachers of Oklahoma City, Inc. v. Bd. of Ed. of Indep. School Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma County, 1978 OK 35, ¶¶ 13-18, 576 P.2d 1157.
T2 Historically, this rule also applied to a party paying or complying with a judgment. However, in Grand River Dam Authority v. Eaton, this Court altered the rule, determining:
. [wle now reject any rule that we have previously espoused that would require dismissal of an appeal merely on the basis that a judgment debtor pays a final and appealable judgment that could subject his property to execution and ultimate sale. Our rejection applies whether or not execution has issued.... unless the payment of a final judgment by a judgment debtor is shown to be made with the intent to compromise or settle the matter and, thus, to abandon the right to appeal or the payment in some way, not involved here, makes relief impossible in case of reversal, the payment will not be deemed to either waive the right to appeal or moot the controversy.
1990 OK 133, 1 14, 803 P.2d 705.
13 However, this Court later clarified the rule set out in Grand River Dam Authority and highlighted the importance of involuntary payment of the judgment as a necessary element to preserve the right to appeal. In Stites v. DUIT Constr. Co., this Court noted:
Oklahoma's jurisprudence holds that a voluntarily satisfied judgment moots both an appeal that is lodged against it and all nisi prius vacation process. This is so because any errors in its entry become hypothetical or academic and hence no longer available for the exercise of judicial cognizance. Within the meaning of this rule, loss of Jurisdiction takes place because nothing else remains to be done in the cause before the court. This is not to say that the trial court automatically loses cognizance after release and satisfaction is filed. Its jurisdiction continues over fraudulent releases of judgment or over post-satisfaction disputes about the legitimacy of satisfaction. In short, the ultimate power to determine (at the post-satisfaction stage) whether -a judgment has been voluntarily satisfied rests in the trial court. Coerced satisfaction of judgment through garnishment process (as in this case) raises no bar to (a) a timely attack upon the judgment, (b) its vacation, on timely motion or petition upon tenable legal grounds, or (c) the restitution of funds paid towards its satisfaction.
1995 OK 69, 115, 908 P.2d 298 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
T4 This cause involved no garnishment proceedings, such as those in Stites. Nor did this cause involve any threat of execution. Instead, Respondent conveyed all court-ordered alimony in lieu of property to the *127Petitioner considerably earlier than the trial court required. It is fundamentally unfair to bar Petitioner from proceeding with her appeal challenging the trial court's property division because she accepted the benefits of it, while allowing Respondent to proceed in his own appeal attacking the property division when he satisfied the judgment voluntarily and arguably, as "bait".
T5 Respondent's counter-appeal seeks review of all the trial court's rulings, including its division of marital assets. An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's property division absent a finding of abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. Colclasure v. Colclasure, 2012 OK 97, ¶ 16, 295 P.3d 1123; Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, 17, 766 P.2d 994. Respondent's necessary assertion in his counter-appeal that the award is either an abuse of discretion or contrary to the weight of the evidence is somewhat at odds with his assertion that the award is fair and equitable as to Petitioner. Respondent is seeking to dismiss Petitioner's challenge to the very same property division that he in turn is challenging.
T6 Respondent voluntarily complied with the trial court's division, without any threat of coercion, and as the majority correctly states: "[tlhe parties acceded to the district court judgment and now have the benefits flowing from that judgment. The judgment is now satisfied." Memorandum Opinion, 1 6. If Petitioner's appeal is to be dismissed because she accepted the benefits of the trial court's division, Respondent's counter appeal should be dismissed as well.1

. It must be noted that at this point Respondent's counter appeal is not the subject of any pending motion to dismiss.