Court Opinion

ID: 9382329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 07:09:00.437801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.557757
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 21, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                         First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00293-CV
                           ———————————
       GARY SHEPHERD, LINDA SHEPHERD, AND ALL OTHER
                   OCCUPANTS, Appellants
                                        V.
                   MWS ACQUISITIONS, LLC, Appellee

                      On Appeal from the County Court
                            Llano County, Texas1
                         Trial Court Case No. 03015

2
     Per the Texas Supreme Court’s docket-equalization powers, this appeal was
     transferred from the Third Court of Appeals to this court on March 29, 2022. See
     TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001; Order Regarding Transfer of Cases from Courts of
     Appeals, Misc. Docket No. 22-9025 (Tex. Mar. 29, 2022). We are unaware of any
     relevant conflict between the Third Court’s precedent and ours. See TEX. R. APP.
     P. 41.3.
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Gary and Linda Shepherd appeal from a forcible-detainer suit in which the

trial court awarded possession of the property at issue to MWS Acquisitions, LLC.

The Shepherds contend there was not sufficient evidence that they received the

statutorily required notice to vacate. Because we conclude the record contains both

legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the

Shepherds received notice, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                 BACKGROUND

      MWS purchased the property where the Shepherds’ home is located at a

foreclosure sale. On October 6, 2021, MWS sent the Shepherds a notice to vacate

the property within three days. MWS sent the notice by three different methods:

(1) certified mail, return receipt requested; (2) regular mail; and (3) posting notice

to the outside of the Shepherds’ front door. MWS used the Shepherds’ home address

for the notices sent by certified mail and regular mail. Several days later, after the

court clerk advised MWS to give the Shepherds a 30-day notice to vacate instead of

the three-day notice MWS had given with the first notice to vacate, MWS sent an

amended notice using the same three methods: (1) certified mail, return receipt

requested to the Shepherds’ home address; (2) regular mail to the Shepherds’ home

address; and (3) posting notice to the outside of the Shepherds’ front door. The

Shepherds contend that they never received any of these notices. Specifically, they

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claim they never received the mailed notices because they do not receive mail at

their home address; all of their mail goes to a separate P.O. Box with a different

address.

      MWS filed a forcible-detainer suit against the Shepherds in November, after

the 30-day period to vacate the property had expired and the Shepherds did not

vacate the property. The case was tried to the bench in a justice of the peace court

and then de novo in county court. The county court ruled in favor of MWS and

awarded it possession of the property. The Shepherds now appeal the county court’s

judgment.

                                  DISCUSSION

      In three points of error, the Shepherds argue the trial court erred in awarding

possession to MWS because MWS did not prove that the Shepherds received the

notice to vacate, an element that MWS was required to prove to succeed in its

forcible-detainer suit.

A.    Trial court did not err in excluding mortgage statements

      We first consider the Shepherds’ claim that the trial court erred in excluding

the mortgage statements they sought to introduce into evidence. The mortgage

statements, the Shepherds argue, would have supported Gary Shepherd’s testimony

that he and his wife did not receive mail at their house because the mortgage

statements were addressed to the Shepherds’ P.O. Box.

                                         3
      1.    Standard of review and applicable law

      We review the trial court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. JBS

Carriers, Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex. 2018). A trial court abuses

its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or when

its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701

S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). Even if evidence is erroneously excluded, we may

not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the error is harmful, meaning that it

“probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1);

see Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 666 (Tex. 2018) (to reverse trial court’s

judgment based on exclusion of evidence, appellate court must conclude trial court

committed error and that error was harmful). We will uphold a trial court’s

evidentiary ruling as long as there is any legitimate basis for the ruling. Owens-

Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998).

      2.    Analysis

      The Shepherds sought to introduce several mortgage statements into evidence.

Each mortgage statement was addressed to Gary Shepherd and listed the Shepherds’

P.O. Box as the mailing address. The Shepherds intended to use the mortgage

statements to show they were receiving mail at their P.O. Box and not their home

address.

                                         4
      The Shepherds argue on appeal that these mortgage statements would have

helped prove their claim that the notice to vacate was never delivered because it was

sent to the wrong address, their home address, instead of their P.O. Box where they

received mail. We disagree that the mortgage statements could prove the notice to

vacate was not delivered; at most, the mortgage statements would prove the

Shepherds received mail at a P.O. Box. But receiving mail at a P.O. Box does not

prove the Shepherds did not receive mail at their home address or that the notice to

vacate was never delivered. See Carroll v. Bank of N.Y., No. 10-03-00319-CV, 2005

WL 241224, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 2, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence

that appellant had P.O. Box did not speak to whether she received mail at home

address or prove she did not receive notice).

      The Shepherds further argue that the mortgage statements would have

substantiated Gary’s testimony that he never received the notice to vacate. Again,

we disagree that the mortgage statements would have proved anything regarding the

notice to vacate, and at most, would have proved that the Shepherds received mail

at their P.O. Box.

      On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excluding

the mortgage statements. See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242–43 (trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or when its

ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable). Further, the Shepherds have not shown how the

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exclusion of the mortgage statements “probably caused the rendition of an improper

judgment.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Shepherds’

mortgage statements. Therefore, we overrule the Shepherds’ second point of error.

B.    Evidence of notice is legally and factually sufficient

      Next, the Shepherds argue there was legally and factually insufficient

evidence to prove the notice to vacate was delivered to them; instead, they argue, the

evidence conclusively established they never received notice.

      1.     Standard of review

      In a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact carry the same weight as a

jury’s verdict. Yazdani-Beioky v. Sharifan, 550 S.W.3d 808, 821 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). The trial court, as factfinder, judges the

credibility of the witnesses, determines the weight of their testimony, and resolves

conflicts in the evidence. Id. When challenged, a trial court’s findings of fact are not

conclusive if, as here, there is a complete reporter’s record on appeal. DeClaire v.

G & B McIntosh Fam. Ltd. P’ship, 260 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2008, no pet.). We apply the same legal- and factual-sufficiency of the

evidence standards in reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact that we use in

reviewing jury findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).

                                           6
      We consider the legal-sufficiency challenge first when both legal- and factual-

sufficiency challenges are raised on appeal. See Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indem. Co., 619

S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam). When a party challenges the legal

sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adverse finding on which it did not have

the burden of proof at trial, that party must demonstrate there is no evidence to

support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348

S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We will sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge if: (1)

the record shows a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) rules of law or

evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a

vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or

(4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). We review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, crediting favorable evidence if a

reasonable factfinder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable

factfinder could not. See id. at 807. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to

support the challenged finding, we must uphold it. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v.

Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998).

      When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence on an adverse

finding on which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, we review all of the

evidence in a neutral light and set aside the finding only if it is so contrary to the

                                            7
overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Reliant Energy

Servs., Inc. v. Cotton Valley Compression, L.L.C., 336 S.W.3d 764, 782 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). We may not substitute our judgment for

that of the factfinder. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757,

761 (Tex. 2003).

      2.     Applicable law

      A tenant commits a forcible detainer if the tenant refuses to surrender

possession of real property after the landlord makes a written demand for possession.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002. The landlord must give the written demand for

possession, or notice to vacate, at least three days before filing a forcible-detainer

suit. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(b).

      There are three ways a landlord may provide the notice to vacate: (1) in

person, either by personal delivery to the tenant or by personal delivery to the

premises by affixing the notice to the inside of the main entry door; (2) by mail “to

the premises in question,” including regular mail, registered mail, or certified mail

with return receipt requested; and (3) in some circumstances, by affixing the notice

to the outside of the main entry door and, not later than 5 p.m. of the same day,

mailing a copy of the notice to the tenant. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(f), (f-1).

                                          8
      To prevail in a forcible-detainer suit, a landlord must establish that it gave

proper notice to vacate to the tenants. Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516

S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

      We presume a letter that is properly addressed and mailed with prepaid

postage was received by the addressee. Id. at 31 (citing Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d

237, 238 (Tex. 1994)). In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption has

the force of a rule of law. Id. The addressee may rebut this presumption by offering

evidence that the letter was not delivered. Khalilnia v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.

Corp., No. 01-12-00573-CV, 2013 WL 1183311, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Denying the letter was received is

sufficient to rebut the presumption, but denial is “not conclusive and merely presents

a fact issue for the factfinder.” Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

      3.     Analysis

      The Shepherds argue there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that notice to vacate was delivered to them. We

conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the presumption that the mailed

notice was delivered to them, and the trial court did not err in resolving the

conflicting evidence against the Shepherds. Thus, there was legally and factually

                                          9
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that notice was delivered to

the Shepherds.

              a.   The mailed notices

      The Shepherds argue that although MWS provided evidence that it mailed the

notice to vacate, MWS did not offer any evidence that the Shepherds actually

received the notice to vacate. They argue that because the three-days’ required notice

to vacate is calculated from the day the notice is delivered, see TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 24.005(g), MWS was required to prove the day on which the notice was delivered

to prove its compliance with the statute.

      But the Shepherds’ argument misunderstands the effect of the applicable

presumption. We presume a letter that is properly addressed and mailed with prepaid

postage was received by the addressee. Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 31. When the sender

has offered evidence to show the letter was properly mailed so that the presumption

applies, then the sender does not need to prove the letter was actually received by

the addressee. That is the purpose of the presumption. The addressee is, of course,

free to rebut the presumption by offering proof that the letter was not delivered.

Phan, 137 S.W.3d at 767 (denying receipt of letter rebuts presumption that it was

delivered).

      Here, MWS offered evidence to show the presumption applies. Rheannon

Piercy, MWS’s director of property management, testified that she sent the notice to

                                            10
vacate by certified mail and by regular mail. She introduced into evidence her receipt

from the post office showing paid postage for both a first-class letter and certified

mail with return receipt, and she introduced a certified mail receipt addressed to the

Shepherds’ home address. Thus, MWS presented evidence that the notice to vacate

was properly addressed and mailed with prepaid postage, so the factfinder was

entitled to presume the notice was received by the Shepherds. See Trimble, 516

S.W.3d at 31. There is more than a scintilla of evidence to show the notice to vacate

was properly mailed and thus received by the Shepherds, which is legally sufficient

evidence. See Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 48 (more than scintilla of evidence

supporting challenged finding is legally sufficient evidence to support finding).

      The Shepherds offered evidence to rebut the presumption, and they argue their

evidence conclusively established that they never received the notice to vacate. At

trial, Gary Shepherd testified that he and his wife receive all of their mail at a P.O.

Box instead of their home address. He explained that there is a mailbox down the

road from their house, but it is “locked down” and “wired shut” with “a big X on it”

so that no mail can be delivered there. He further testified that he never received any

of the notices MWS mailed or posted to the front door. Gary’s testimony rebuts the

presumption that the Shepherds received the notice to vacate, but it does not

conclusively establish that the notice was not delivered. See Phan, 137 S.W.3d at

767 (denying receipt of letter rebuts presumption that it was delivered but is not

                                          11
conclusive). Rather, the conflicting testimony presents a fact issue for the factfinder

to resolve. Id.

       Because MWS and the Shepherds offered conflicting evidence regarding

whether the notice to vacate was delivered to the Shepherds by mail, the trial court

was required to resolve this fact issue. See Yazdani-Beioky, 550 S.W.3d at 821. The

trial court, as factfinder, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and

the weight to be given their testimony. Id. On a factual-sufficiency challenge, we

may only set aside the trial court’s finding if it is so contrary to the overwhelming

weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Cain, 709

S.W.2d at 176; Reliant Energy Servs., 336 S.W.3d at 782. On this record, we cannot

say the trial court’s finding that notice was delivered to the Shepherds was clearly

wrong or manifestly unjust.

       A tenant’s denial of receipt of a notice to vacate that was properly mailed,

without additional evidence that the notice was not delivered, is rarely enough to

overturn a finding that the tenant received the notice. E.g., Smith v. Deutsche Bank

Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for New Century Home Equity Loan Tr. 2005-4, No. 05-17-

01022-CV, 2019 WL 211174, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 16, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (landlord sent notice to vacate by regular mail and there was no evidence

letter was returned, so even though tenant testified she never received notice,

evidence was sufficient to conclude tenant received notice by regular mail); Trimble,

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516 S.W.3d at 31–32 (landlord sent notice to vacate by regular mail, and there was

no evidence in record that notice was not delivered, so even though tenant testified

he never received notice, he failed to raise fact question on summary judgment to

rebut presumption that notice was delivered); Kaldis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No.

14-11-00607-CV, 2012 WL 3229135, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug.

9, 2012, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (landlord sent notice to vacate by certified

mail and regular mail, and even though tenant testified he did not receive notice, trial

court as factfinder was not required to accept his testimony). Notably, none of these

cases involve a tenant’s testimony that he could not receive mail at the property in

question. But the trial court was in the position to judge credibility and weigh the

testimony, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Golden

Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761; Yazdani-Beioky, 550 S.W.3d at 821. The

Shepherds did not present any additional evidence to support their claim that they

could not receive mail at their home address—as discussed above, the mortgage

statements mailed to the Shepherds’ P.O. Box, even if they had been admitted into

evidence, would not have supported their claim. Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s

finding that the Shepherds received notice to vacate by mail was so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

See Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Reliant Energy Servs., 336 S.W.3d at 782. The

evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Shepherds

                                          13
received the notice to vacate by mail. See Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Reliant Energy

Servs., 336 S.W.3d at 782.

      Because we have concluded the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that the Shepherds received the notice to vacate by

mail, we overrule the Shepherds’ first point of error.

             b.    The posted notices

      The Shepherds argue there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding

that MWS gave them written notice in compliance with Section 24.005(f-1) of the

Property Code, the statute authorizing a landlord to post a notice to vacate on the

outside of a tenant’s front door in certain circumstances. But we need not decide this

issue because we have already concluded there is legally and factually sufficient

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Shepherds received the notice

to vacate. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (written opinion of appellate court need not

address issues unnecessary to final disposition of appeal).

C.    Notice was sufficiently specific

      In their third issue, the Shepherds argue that even assuming the notices had

been delivered, the trial court erred in finding MWS gave proper notice to vacate

because the two separate notices are confusing and contradictory.

                                         14
      1.     Applicable law

      The Shepherds acknowledge that the Property Code does not contain specific

requirements for the content of a notice to vacate. The Property Code only requires

that a landlord give a tenant at least three days’ written notice to vacate, and it

specifies the methods by which notice may be given, including personal delivery and

delivery by mail. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(b), (f), (f-1).

      The Shepherds have not identified any authority explaining the required

content for a notice to vacate. They cite Miller v. Vineyard, a case involving an

anticipatory breach of a commercial lease, for the general proposition that a demand

must contain the assertion of a contractual right and a request for compliance. 765

S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied). The Shepherds also assert

that a notice to vacate must be clear, unequivocal, and leave no room for

disagreement about the date the tenant must vacate; however, they cite only cases

involving nonresidential leases for this proposition: Vinson Minerals, Ltd. v. XTO

Energy, Inc., 335 S.W.3d 344, 357–58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied)

(holding letter was insufficiently specific to constitute written notice describing

default in royalty payments as required by oil and gas lease); Outdoor Systems, Inc.

v. BBE, L.L.C., 105 S.W.3d 66, 70–73 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. denied)

(holding letter requesting additional payment information insufficient as notice of

default required by billboard rental lease).

                                          15
      2.     Analysis

      Even assuming the Shepherds’ proposition that a notice to vacate must be

clear, unequivocal, and leave no room for disagreement about the date the tenant

must vacate is supported by authority and applicable here, the Shepherds have not

demonstrated that the notice to vacate violates this requirement.

      The first notice to vacate makes a demand that the Shepherds vacate the

property within three days. The document is titled, “NOTICE TO VACATE” and

states, “[T]his is your notice to vacate the Property as required by Section 24.005 of

the Texas Property Code. Demand is hereby made that you surrender possession of

the Property within three days.”2 The notice is dated October 6, 2021. The notice

further states, “If you do not surrender possession of the Property within the required

timeframe, we will take legal action against you, including, but not limited to, a

forcible detainer lawsuit under Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code.” The notice

is clear, unequivocal, and leaves no room for disagreement about the date the

Shepherds must vacate.

2
      In the next sentence, the document also states, “If you have a lease for the Property,
      demand is hereby made that you surrender possession of the Property within thirty
      days,” as opposed to the demand to vacate within three days in the previous
      sentence. Because this language clearly only applies to a tenant with a lease, and the
      Shepherds never contended they had a lease, this statement does not make the date
      to vacate less clear.
                                            16
      The second notice to vacate also clearly states a demand to vacate the property

by a certain date. The document is also titled, “NOTICE TO VACATE” and states,

“You along with all other occupants are HEREBY commanded to vacate and remove

all personal belongings from the premises . . . within 529 hours from the

posting/delivery of this notice.” At the bottom of the page, there is a handwritten

note adding: “Original notice to vacate amended to 30 days from 10/6/21. Vacate by

11/5/21.” The notice also states, “Failure to vacate the above premises within 529

hours will result in the filing of an Eviction suit . . . .” This notice is also clear,

unequivocal, and leaves no room for disagreement about the date the Shepherds must

vacate.

      The Shepherds argue that these notices do not constitute an adequate,

unambiguous demand for possession, but we disagree. The Shepherds argue we must

focus on whether the notices are sufficiently clear to put them on notice that they

must vacate or face a forcible-detainer suit, but we conclude the notices are

sufficiently clear in that regard. The Shepherds have not demonstrated that the trial

court erred in finding MWS gave proper notice to vacate. We overrule their third

point of error.

                                  CONCLUSION

      Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the

Shepherds’ mortgage statements, that there is legally and factually sufficient

                                          17
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Shepherds received the notice

to vacate, and that the notices to vacate are sufficiently clear, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                              Gordon Goodman
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Guerra.

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