Court Opinion

ID: 9756373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:26:03.161734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:20.687053
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, C.J.
In this case, the police, without probable cause or even reasonable articulable suspicion, approached the petitioner’s motel room and, using deception, was able to get him to open the door. Immediately thereafter, they identified themselves and requested permission to enter and talk to the petitioner, why or about what, he was not told, and, the trial court found, the petitioner consented. The petitioner challenges the finding of consent, contending that it was not voluntarily given. Rejecting that challenge, the majority holds that “[t]he earlier deception that induced appellant to open the door had no erosive effect on the consent to enter or the consent to search.” 378 Md. 355, 365, 835 A.2d 1208, 1213 (2003). I do not agree. This holding broadens an already suspect policy of “knock and talk,” see Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862 (2001), to the point where a police officer, at his or her own discretion, is allowed to circumvent, without a warrant, probable cause or even a reasonable articulable suspicion, the expectation of privacy in his or her residence1 that an individual is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. This gives too much discretion to police officers and, more important, invites its selective, vague and disproportional misuse, to the detriment of the citizens of Maryland. I dissent.
I.
There was no deception in Scott. Under the “knock and talk” technique this Court endorsed in Scott, police officers, *367having no basis for suspecting that criminal activity is occurring, are permitted to “approach the dwelling, knock on the door, identify themselves as law enforcement officers, request entry in order to ask questions concerning unlawful activity in the area and, upon entry, eventually ask permission to search the premises.” 366 Md. at 129, 782 A.2d at 867. Affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in that case by use of the technique, the majority held that there was no seizure-that a police officer merely approaches someone and asks a few questions does not a seizure make, id. at 138, 782 A.2d at 872, citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991) and Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 374-75, 735 A.2d 491, 500-01 (1999), and that actual consent could be found to have been given even when the defendant is not advised of the right to refuse entry. Id. at 141, 782 A.2d at 874. Thus, at all times, the defendant in Scott knew with whom he was dealing. Not to denigrate the notion that a seizure could have, and did occur, under the circumstances in Scott,2 but it is clear that there is a significant difference between knowing from the beginning of an encounter that the police are involved and having that fact sprung upon you in the middle of the encounter, there is a difference — and it makes the latter scenario much worse than the former — between knowingly deciding to open the door for the police and opening the door believing *368that the person asking for entry is a maintenance man. That difference is not simply worthy of note, but it is critical and worthy of being given some, perhaps dispositive, weight.
The case upon which the petitioner relies, Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 350, 574 A.2d 356, 360 (1990), is like Scott in one respect and like this case in another. Like Scott, deception was not used by the police, during this early morning encounter, to obtain the opening of the defendant’s motel room door; the police identified themselves as “police,” even as they “pounded” on the door. Id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359-360.3 Perkins is like the present case in that the police used deception, albeit to enter the room, the door having already been opened. The officer testified that he told the defendant that he was there to investigate a noise complaint, although there had not been one, and asked to come in to talk about it, to which, the court found, the defendant consented. The Court of Special Appeals noted the skepticism to which that use of deception gave rise: “If consent to entry was obtained pursuant to a deliberate misstatement, it does call into question the knowing and voluntary quality of the consent.” Id. at 349-50, 574 A.2d at 360, citing Smith v. State, 72 Md.App. 450, 466-467, 531 A.2d 302 (1987), dealing with the related subject of warrantless doorway arrests. Noting that, in those cases, “[t]he use of deception to obtain the opening of a door erodes the consensual quality of that opening,” the intermediate appellate court concluded: “By parity of reasoning, the use of deception to obtain entry into a residence following the open*369ing of a door would also erode the consensual quality of that entry.” Id. at 350, 574 A.2d at 360.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions due to the Fourth Amendment violations. Its reasoning is instructive as to the proper disposition of the case sub judice. Of course, it started with the proposition that the State has the burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the consent, to establish that it was “freely and voluntarily” given. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968). See Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 655 A.2d 370 (1995). Applying the Schneckloth test, “examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced,” 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 864, the court was sensitive to the fact, and clear, that “[t]o approve [consent] searches without the most careful scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion,” Perkins, 83 Md.App. at 345, 574 A.2d. at 358, and that “[i]n assessing voluntariness, it is necessary to be alert not only to heavy-handed and overtly coercive investigative techniques but also to ‘subtly coercive police questions’ and to ‘the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consented.’ ” Id. at 345, 574 A.2d. at 358, quoting Schneck-loth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 864. Finally, while extending “great deference to the fact finding of the suppression hearing judge with respect to determining the credibilities of contradicting witnesses and to weighing and determining first-level facts,” it made its “own independent, reflective constitutional judgment” with respect to the ultimate, conclusionary fact of whether the act of consent was truly voluntary. Id. at 345, 574 A.2d at 359. This is consistent with our cases. See White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 241, 821 A.2d, 459, 464 (2003); Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788 A.2d 646, 651 (2002); Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001); Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 489, 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-1241 (1990).
*370In determining the question of the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, the intermediate appellate court considered all of the surrounding circumstances. These included how the police came to focus on the defendant, id. at 347-48, 574 A.2d at 359, the nature and circumstances of the initial approach, id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359-360, and how the initial encounter developed and expanded. Of interest in that regard is the court’s consideration of the rationality of the reason for the initial approach, its focus on the officers’ preparation for the encounter — getting a passkey, perhaps just in case, id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359 — and its continuing concern about the rationality of what occurred following the defendant’s opening of the door. Id. at 348-49, 574 A.2d at 360. Thus, although the court drew a sharp distinction between the opening of the door and the entry into the room, see id. at 349, 574 A.2d at 360, it never lost sight of the need to consider all of the circumstances as a whole, rather than just some in isolation.
Although aware of the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Perkins and its admonishment that,
“The use of deception to obtain the opening of a door erodes the consensual quality of that opening. By parity of reasoning, the use of deception to obtain entry into a residence following the opening of a door would also erode the consensual quality of that entry[,]”
83 Md.App. at 350, 574 A.2d at 360, the majority merely observes that that decision, the correctness of which is not at issue in this case, pre-dated our opinion in Scott and, in any case, it is not inconsistent with [the] conclusion in this case that the search was lawful. 378 Md. at 361-62, 835 A.2d at 1211-12. The latter conclusion is based on parsing, in an unnatural and unrealistic manner, a single event, an unwarranted entry, effected by deception, into two, consisting of (1) the opening of the door, admittedly obtained by use of deception, and (2) the entry into the room, ostensibly the product of the petitioner’s consent. The majority purports to apply the totality of the circumstances test, enunciated in Ohio v. Robi-nette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246, 93 S.Ct. 2041, *3712057, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); in truth, it does nothing more than pay lip service to that test, asserting simply that “[t]he deception practiced by Trooper Wooden in this case — representing himself as a maintenance person desirous of checking the thermostat induced nothing more than the opening of the door.” 378 Md. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213. Reading the majority opinion one gets the impression that the opening of the door and the entry into the petitioner’s motel room were two separate and distinct events, that the first, admittedly the product of deception, ended abruptly with the opening of the door, and the second began, as a completely separate matter, immediately thereafter. I do not agree.
It is well settled that “ ‘a search is a functional, not merely a physical process’ ... [which] begins with the planning of the invasion, and continues ‘until the effective appropriation’ of the fruits of the search ‘for subsequent proof of an offense.’ ” United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir.1973), quoting Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 1374, 93 L.Ed. 1819, 1823 (1949). The trooper misrepresented his identity as a part of that process and expressly to advance his, and his fellow officers,’ plan to enter the petitioner’s residence. Thus, in this case, the deceptive act is an inseparable part of the entire event. Moreover, the quality of the consent of a person who opens his or her door in response to a deceptive representation, in this case, believing the person at the door to be a maintenance person, must be considered; the confusion and surprise that necessarily surrounds the realization that one has been duped can not be disregarded, and that taints, and undermines the voluntariness of what follows. That is particularly the case where, as here, the smell of burning marijuana was apparent to the officers immediately upon the door being opened, a fact that must also have been apparent to the petitioner as well. It is highly unlikely that a person would open the door with such a potent and obvious smell of marijuana present, if he or she knew the person at the door was a police officer. In short, and therefore, the trooper’s use of trickery, which first revealed and starkly so— *372the smell of the burning marijuana as soon as the door was opened — , can not be confined simply to the opening of the door. The totality of the circumstances, to include the erosive effect of such trickery on the petitioner’s consent must be considered. In my view, that cuts against a finding of the consent being voluntary. Thus, I would hold that this situation falls squarely within Perkins.
II.
The majority correctly points out that the “use of deception or ruses by the police to obtain access to a residential area is [not] something new, startling, and untested.” 378 Md. at 361-62, 835 A.2d at 1211-12. It notes that “[t]he Supreme Court has long and consistently recognized that deception is a proper tool in crime detection, and that its use to obtain entry into Fourth Amendment-protected areas for the purpose of observation does not necessarily contravene any Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 362-63, 835 A.2d at 1212. Pointing to Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 53 S.Ct. 210, 212, 77 L.Ed. 413, 416-17 (1932), the majority emphasizes that “[t]he appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.” Id. The majority reasons further:
“ ‘[A]n officer may legitimately obtain an invitation into a house by misrepresenting his identity ... If he is invited inside ... he does not need a warrant, and, quite obviously, he does not need to announce his authority and purpose. Once inside the house, he cannot exceed the scope of his invitation by ransacking the house generally, but he may seize anything in plain view.’ ”
Id. at 363, 835 A.2d at 1212, quoting United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S.Ct. 1945, 40 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974).
*373I agree that the use of deception is not a new phenomenon and has been endorsed, even by this Court, see, e.g. Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 721-22, 404 A.2d 1073, 1082 (1979); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 562, 132 A.2d 494, 498 (1957). I agree as well that where probable cause, or, at least, articulable suspicion exists, it may well be appropriate; it would certainly further the above identified objective. In the case sub judice, the officers had no basis whatever — not even an articulable suspicion4 — for believing that the petitioner, the sanctity of whose motel room the officer sought to invade, was engaged in crime.
“The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ ” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, 100 (2001), quoting the Fourth Amendment. Courts have been less tolerant of, or deferential to, governmental discretion when what is at issue is the search of a person’s dwelling, noting that “at the very core of Fourth Amendment, ‘stands the right of a [person] to retreat into [her] own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Id., quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 739 (1961).
There is a real tension between the use of deception and the Fourth Amendment’s provision and this State’s comparable provision, Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights,5 at the core *374of both of which are the fundamental tenets that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her residence and “that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650-651 (1980). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-475, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (“a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’ ”). See also Dunnuck v. State, 367 Md. 198, 204-205, 786 A.2d 695, 698-699 (2001); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191, 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994); Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 397, 545 A.2d 1281, 1287-1288 (1988). The problem, and a difficult one it is, is defining the limits to be set on the use of police deception, Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378, 1386 (1980) (Spaeth, J. Concurring), striking the proper balance.6
*375To aid in trying to strike this balance, some courts have routinely required some showing of probable cause or, at the very least, reasonable suspicion, before permitting the police to use deception to breach the sanctity of an individual’s residence. E.g. State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982) (“consent given to a warrantless entry to a private home is invalid if the police, absent a show of cause, obtain entry by ruse.”); Kansas v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 356, 856 P.2d 134, 140 (1993) (“A prerequisite to a valid ruse entry is that officers must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the residence. If an officer has a justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity in a residence, a ruse entry is permissible. This permission is to be construed narrowly.”); People v. Ramirez, 193 Misc.2d 181, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (S.Ct. N.Y.2002) (“It cannot be doubted that the police may not arbitrarily ask a person to open the door of his residence any more than they could ask someone chosen randomly to open up the sealed packages he is carrying on the street in the hope of finding stolen goods. That they could lawfully use a subterfuge to trick him into opening the door of his residence when they did not have an articulable reason to intrude upon his privacy is an even more startling proposition”); United States v. Tibbs, 49 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Mass.1999); United States v. Montoya, 760 F.Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (“It seems clear that when the officers do not have at least reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in crime, there can be no justification for resorting to false statements to get into a dwelling”); United States v. Maldonado Garcia, 655 F.Supp. 1363, 1367 (D.Puerto Rico 1987) (“Officers cannot use a ruse to gain access unless they have more than mere conjecture that criminal activity is underway. To hold otherwise would be to give police a blanket license to enter homes *376randomly in the hope of uncovering incriminating evidence and information.”).
In Ahart, two officers stopped their car in front of the defendant’s home and pretended to have engine problems. One officer knocked on the defendant’s door and told the person who opened the door that his car had broken down and that he needed to make a call. The officer was allowed to enter and he pretended to place a call. While using the phone the officer saw marijuana in plain view. Without taking any action on the drugs, the officer returned to the car, got it started, and left the area and, based on the officer’s observations, obtained a search warrant. The defendant’s motion to suppress the marijuana seized pursuant to the warrant was denied. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed. It explained, 324 N.W.2d at 319,:
While we recognize that a warrantless entry effected by ruse must often be allowed if the government is to ferret out “those organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings,” Lewis [v. United States], 385 U.S.[206,] 210-11, 87 S.Ct. [424,] 427, 17 L.Ed.2d [312,] 316 [ (1966) ], we are equally cognizant that the security of one’s home against arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the fourth amendment and basic to our society. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 [ (1967) ]; 68 Am.Jur.2d Search and Seizure §§ 2 (1973) and cases therein cited. Consequently, not all warrantless entries gained by ruse are valid. Certainly, such an entry is not allowable if it is arbitrary.
It is our conclusion that consent given to a warrantless entry to a private home is invalid if the police, absent a show of cause, obtain entry by ruse. As noted previously, this cause may be based on the officer’s participation with the consentor in an illegal transaction or it may be grounded on a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot. The consent is clearly invalid, however, when there is no reason shown for selecting a particular home to enter. We hold that a search is patently unreasonable as an arbitrary intrusion when it is based upon consent obtained by decep*377tion unless there is a justifiable and reasonable basis for the deception.
In this case, however, we are unable to determine whether the police had any reason whatsoever to believe that criminal activity was afoot in the Ahart home. The officers failed to articulate any cause for the ruse and the record is devoid of any indicia of logical connection between the ruse and legitimate law enforcement. We are forced to conclude that the intrusion was based on mere conjecture or idle curiosity. Police intrusion into a home based on mere conjecture suggests that officers are entering homes randomly in hope of discovering incriminating evidence. The officers’ actions violate both the United States and the Iowa Constitutions which have as a purpose the prevention of such unreasonable intrusion. Thus, we hold that the warrantless entry into the Ahart home violates both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution. Since the subsequent warrant was obtained by the use of this illegal search, the evidence seized as a result of the warranted search must also be suppressed.
More recently, in Ramirez, the police gained entry to the defendants’ hotel room by identifying themselves as “housekeeping,” after knocking on the door. 747 N.Y.S.2d at 712. Rejecting, as not credible, their testimony that they smelled heroin outside the closed door, the court concluded that there was no evidence presented, and therefore the police had no basis, to induce the defendants to open the door of their room under a false representation. Id. at 714. The court held that “in every aspect of Fourth Amendment law the police are required to show some predicate before they can intrude upon a person’s privacy” and, thus, may not use a “a ruse to gain access unless they have more than mere conjecture that criminal activity is underway.” Id. at 715.
I agree with these decisions, both the result they reach and the rationale by which they do so. In ruling against the petitioner, this court leaves the citizens of Maryland susceptible to the often selective, vague and disproportionate actions by the police. It sanctions actions that undermine their *378expectation of privacy and, indeed, their right to be secure in their home. I would hold, therefore, that when a person opens the door under these circumstances, as a result of a deception practiced by the police, when they have neither probable cause or reasonable suspicion to focus on that person as a wrong-doer, the quality of that person’s consent is eroded. The petitioner’s convictions ought to be reversed.
Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.

. It is well settled that a motel room can be protected against unreasonable search and seizure as much as a home or an office. Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 402, 813 A.2d 231, 240 (2002). This is because, for the period of its use and occupancy, a hotel or motel room is, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the equivalent of the occupant's home. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59, (1951). See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949).

. The "knock and talk" encounter in Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862 (2001), occurred late at night and was preceded by the police not only knocking, but pounding on the defendant’s door. Id. at 126 n. 1, 782 A.2d at 865 n. 1. Therefore, I believed then, and believe now, what Judge Raker wrote in dissent:
"I do not believe that a reasonable person in the shoes of appellant, given the place, time, and circumstances of the encounter, would terminate the encounter at the door and feel free to decline the officers' request to search his motel room. There was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support any seizure and, therefore, the seizure was unlawful. Given that the initial seizure of appellant’s person by the police was unlawful, in order for any consent given by appellant to be voluntary, rather than a mere acquiescence to a show of authority, such consent would be valid only if the court found it to be sufficiently purged of the primary taint of the illegal seizure.”
Id. at 147, 782 A.2d at 877-78.

. The encounter occurred at 2:30 A.M. and was initiated by the police rapping on the defendant’s motel room door "not with his knuckles but with a metal flashlight." Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 348, 574 A.2d 356, 359-360 (1990). As to the latter fact, the intermediate appellate court commented, appropriately, I think, "There is at least a flavor of peremptoriness in the choice of instrumentality.” Id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359.
That was confirmed by what followed: "When a male voice from the inside inquired, ‘Who is it?,’ the response was, according to the consensus recollection ... ‘Howard County Police, open the door.’ ” Id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359-360.

. It is conceded that, although Trooper Wooden received anonymous information about possible drug activity in the petitioner’s room, there is no claim by the State that the quality or quantity of that information approached probable cause or even reasonable articulable suspicion.

. Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
"That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the *374place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted."

. Because some criminals cannot be caught, or convicted, unless the police are permitted to resort to deception, the question that ultimately must be posed, and answered, is: is the cost to society and the personal liberty rights of its citizens worth it? One answer, in my view, a most appropriate and well considered one, is the following:
"The problem of defining the limits to be set on the use of police deception is one of the most difficult problems of the criminal law. It may well be that certain sorts of criminals cannot be convicted unless the police are permitted to resort to deception. The question is then presented: Is it worth convicting them? For when the police are permitted to resort to deception, there are losses as well as gains. The gains may be considerable-for example, the detection and elimination of a carefully organized traffic in drugs. But the losses may also be considerable. The law of search and seizure is not concerned with protecting the criminal's right of privacy but the honest citizen's right. If we are to be able to enjoy liberty and pursue happiness, we must know what part of our world is real and what part is illusion-that our home is our castle, and not a broadcasting center for hidden police transmission devices; that a repairman is a repairman, a business associate a business associate, and not a police agent. Permit the police to make our world illusion, and no one, neither criminal nor honest citizen, will be free. Thus in every case involving police deception the court must balance the gains and losses incident to permitting the deception. Given the difficulty and importance of *375striking the proper balance, the court should bend every effort to decide each case only on its facts, never going further than it must, and never indulging in broad language that may be misunderstood and so encourage unwholesome practices.”
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378, 1386-87 (1980) (Spaeth, J. Concurring) (footnote omitted).