Court Opinion

ID: 9894173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 18:04:07.284399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:12.470854
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 Children Solution v. Altman CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 CHILDREN SOLUTION, LLC, et al.                                           B317816

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                          Super. Ct. No. 19STCV25128)
           v.

 BRYAN ALTMAN, et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents;

 A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI,

           Claimant and Appellant.

      Appeal from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Monica Bachner, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
      A. Douglas Mastroianni, in pro. per., for Claimant and
Appellant.
      Sina Law Group and Reza Sina for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
      Klinedinst and Gregor A. Hensrude for Defendants and
Respondents.
       This appeal arises out of a yearslong dispute over an indoor
children’s play structure.
       In September 2013, Children Solution, LLC, Natalia Teaca
(Teaca), and Kristina Kutsina (Kutsina) (collectively, Children
Solution) paid approximately $200,000 to purchase the assets
of Kids World,1 a children’s entertainment business. The assets
included a leasehold, and Children Solution believed the assets
also included a large indoor play structure.
       After a flood damaged the play structure, the landlord at the
Kids World business location allegedly asserted that he owned the
structure. As a result, Children Solution believed that Kids World’s
prior owners had committed fraud by representing that they owned
the play structure and had authority to sell it.
       Children Solution therefore retained Bryan Altman of The
Altman Law Group (collectively, Altman) to sue Kids World’s prior
owners. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of
Kids World’s prior owners and awarded them approximately
$500,000 in prevailing party attorney fees against Children
Solution.
       Children Solution then sued Altman for malpractice. They
eventually reached a $250,000 settlement of the malpractice action
at a private mediation, and the trial court approved the settlement.
       Appellant A. Douglas Mastroianni (Mastroianni)—a now-
disbarred attorney—represented two of Kids World’s prior owners
in the underlying action concerning the indoor play structure.
Mastroianni’s clients subsequently assigned their $345,000 share

     1 Although the record indicates that the name of the
children’s entertainment business changed over time, we refer
to the business as “Kids World” throughout this opinion for
convenience.

                                    2
of the total $500,000 prevailing party fee award to Mastroianni.
Mastroianni then filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 708.4102
lien for the $345,000 plus interest, against Children Solution’s
malpractice action. On the basis of that lien, Mastroianni
intervened in the malpractice action and unsuccessfully opposed
Altman and Children Solution’s motion for settlement approval.
       Mastroianni now asks us to reverse the trial court’s order
approving the settlement, urging the court erred by (1) approving
the $250,000 total settlement amount, (2) approving the
settlement’s terms allocating $113,500 of the $250,000 to pay
Children Solution’s attorney fees in the malpractice action, and
(3) refusing to order that Altman pay the settlement proceeds
directly to Mastroianni in satisfaction of his judgment lien.
       Mastroianni’s first two arguments fail because we conclude
the trial court acted within its discretion in approving the total
settlement amount and the attorney fee award. The record
demonstrates that the court properly considered and weighed
the relevant factors in approving these aspects of the settlement.
Moreover, the attorney fee lien held by Children Solution’s lawyer

      2 All subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

       Section 708.410 permits “[a] judgment creditor who has a
money judgment against a judgment debtor who is a party to a
pending action . . . [to] obtain a lien . . . , to the extent required
to satisfy the judgment creditor’s money judgment, on both of the
following: [¶] (1) Any cause of action of such judgment debtor for
money or property that is the subject of the action or proceeding[;]
[¶] (2) The rights of such judgment debtor to money or property
under any judgment subsequently procured in the action or
proceeding.” (§ 708.410, subd. (a).)

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in the malpractice action has priority over Mastroianni’s judgment
creditor lien.
       We agree, however, that the court abused its discretion in
failing to order payment of the remaining $136,500 in settlement
proceeds directly to Mastroianni. A trial court may not “ ‘deprive[ ]
any party of the legal rights to which it is entitled in terms of
the priority of its lien . . . in the absence of appropriate equitable
considerations’ ” (Casa Eva I Homeowners Assn. v. Ani Construction
& Tile, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 771, 778 (Casa Eva)), and here
the court failed to identify any such equitable considerations in
rejecting Mastroianni’s request for payment nor do we find any.
       Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment denying
Mastroianni’s request that $136,500 of the settlement proceeds be
paid to him. In all other respects, we affirm the order approving
the settlement.

   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
      A.    A Flood Damages the Indoor Play Structure
      In January 2003, Oak Park Center, LLC, as landlord,
executed a lease with tenant Oak Park Bright Child, Inc. (Bright
Child), a company owned by Jamie Riese (Riese). In connection
with the lease, the landlord agreed to pay for the construction of
a large indoor play structure for Bright Child’s use in operating
the Kids World children’s entertainment business. Bright Child
assigned the Kids World business lease to Joseph MacFarlane
(MacFarlane) in June 2008. The landlord approved the transaction.
MacFarlane ultimately assigned the lease to his affiliated company,
A&A Entertainment (A&A).

      3 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

                                      4
      Five years later, in September 2013, MacFarlane and
A&A sold Kids World’s assets to Teaca and Kutsina, who formed
Children Solution, LLC to hold the assets. The landlord again
approved the sale. The asset purchase agreement governing the
transaction provides a $200,000 purchase price, but Teaca testified
that the purchase price was in fact $295,000. The agreement
identified the indoor play structure as one asset being transferred
to Children Solution as part of the sale.
      Only three months later, a major flood damaged the indoor
play structure. Both the landlord and Children Solution made
insurance claims in connection with the structure. The landlord’s
insurer determined that the landlord owned the structure and
paid a claim. Children Solution also received an approximately
$650,000 insurance payout based on damage to the play structure,
as well as its representations that it had invested over $200,000
in other physical improvements to the Kids World business in the
approximately three months between its purchase of Kids World’s
assets and the flood.

     B.    Children Solution Retains Altman to Sue Kids
           World’s Prior Owners
      Following the flood, Children Solution grew concerned that—
notwithstanding the terms of the asset purchase agreement—it
might not, in fact, own the play structure. Its concern stemmed
from statements allegedly made by the landlord and from the
determination by the landlord’s insurer that the landlord owned
the play structure. Children Solution therefore retained Altman,
who sued A&A and MacFarlane for allegedly misrepresenting their
ownership of the play structure in connection with the sale of the
Kids World business (the MacFarlane action). The suit included as
named plaintiffs not only the Children Solution, LLC entity,
but Teaca and Kutsina individually. The suit also named Riese

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and Bright Child as defendants. Mastroianni, then a practicing
attorney, represented Riese and Bright Child in the MacFarlane
action.

      C.    Children Solution Loses at Trial, and the Court
            Awards Prevailing Party Attorney Fees to Bright
            Child and Riese, Mastroianni’s Clients
      The parties litigated the MacFarlane action for several years.
The trial court dismissed Teaca and Kutsina’s individual claims
against Riese and Bright Child at the summary judgment stage.
The court then conducted a bench trial on the remaining claims,
ultimately concluding that Children Solution, LLC had failed to
prove that Kids World’s prior owners did not possess and pass title
to the play structure.
      The court subsequently awarded $158,000 in prevailing party
attorney fees to MacFarlane and A&A, adjudging Children Solution,
LLC, Teaca, and Kutsina jointly and severally liable for the full
amount. The court also awarded $345,000 in fees to Mastroianni’s
clients, Riese and Bright Child. The court ordered Teaca and
Kutsina, in their individual capacities, jointly and severally liable
for one half (i.e., $172,500) of that amount.
      Riese and Bright Child assigned the $345,000 fee award
to Mastroianni, and he initiated collection proceedings against
Children Solution. Prior to the assignment, the State Bar of
California suspended Mastroianni from the practice of law. The
California Supreme Court later issued an order disbarring him.

      D.    Children Solution Sues Altman for Malpractice
      On July 16, 2019, Children Solution sued Altman for
malpractice (the malpractice action). The complaint alleged,
inter alia, that Altman had committed professional negligence
by naming Teaca and Kutsina as individual plaintiffs, thereby

                                    6
exposing them to an adverse attorney fee award. Altman filed
a cross-complaint alleging that Children Solution owed him
approximately $100,000 in attorney fees. Mastroianni filed a
section 708.410 lien in the malpractice action.

      E.    The Trial Court Approves the Malpractice Action
            Settlement, Over Mastroianni’s Objection
       In April 2021, Children Solution and Altman successfully
negotiated a resolution of the malpractice action at mediation.
Under the terms of the settlement, Altman Law, via its insurer,
Imperium Insurance, agreed to pay $250,000 in total to settle the
case. The settlement allocated $113,500 of the $250,000 amount to
pay for Children Solution’s attorney fees in the malpractice action.
       The agreement provided further that the remaining $136,500
should be “made payable to [Children Solution], the client trust
account of Reza Sina [(Children Solution’s attorney in the
malpractice action)], and any judgment creditor that has filed a
lien in the case, . . . or in any such other way as the court may
direct.” (Capitalization omitted.) Children Solution, in return,
agreed to pay Altman $15,000 in his individual capacity.
       On May 12, 2021, Children Solution and Altman moved
ex parte for approval of the settlement. They argued the
settlement was reasonable because, among other reasons, the
“insurance windfall” paid to Children Solution would have harmed
its credibility before a jury. In addition, respondents noted that
the primary theory of malpractice liability was that Altman acted
negligently in exposing Teaca and Kutsina to $330,500 in attorney
fees judgments in their individual capacities, and the $250,000

                                    7
settlement represented more than half the amount of those
judgments. Mastroianni opposed the ex parte application.4
       The trial court denied ex parte relief and instead set a
briefing schedule for a motion to approve the settlement. Over
the next five months, the court solicited multiple rounds of
briefing, permitting Mastroianni to file hundreds of pages of
materials in opposition to the motion to approve the settlement.
The court also heard argument on the motion. Finally, on
November 22, 2021, the court granted the motion to approve the
settlement, over Mastroianni’s objection. The court also declined
Mastroianni’s request that it order Altman to pay the $136,500
settlement amount due to Children Solution directly to him, citing
Mastroianni’s purported failure to provide any relevant authority
in support of his request.
       Mastroianni timely appealed.5

      4 Mastroianni also filed a separate action for fraudulent
conveyance against Children Solution, Sina (Children Solution’s
malpractice attorney), and Altman. (See Mastroianni v. Kutsina,
et al. (Sup. Ct. L.A. County, 2021, No. 21STCV14930).) Altman
contends that Mastroianni did so to block the settlement. The
docket in that case indicates the trial court dismissed the action
on December 8, 2021.
      5 Previously, we provisionally granted Mastroianni’s request
that we take judicial notice of certain materials in connection with
this appeal. We now grant his request in full.

                                     8
                           DISCUSSION
      A.    Mastroianni’s Suspension and Subsequent
            Disbarment Do Not Prohibit His Appeal
      Before we turn to the merits of Mastroianni’s appeal, we first
must address—and reject—respondents’ contention that Business
and Professions Code section 6130 prohibits Mastroianni from
pursuing his appeal.
      That section provides: “No person, who has been an attorney,
shall while a judgment of disbarment or suspension is in force
appear on his own behalf as plaintiff in the prosecution of any
action where the subject of the action has been assigned to
him subsequent to the entry of the judgment or disbarment or
suspension and solely for purpose of collection.” (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6130.)
      On November 12, 2019, the State Bar of California issued an
order suspending Mastroianni’s ability to practice law, to take effect
three calendar days after service of the order. The State Bar served
the order the same day it issued, and the order therefore took effect
on November 15, 2019. Then, on August 19, 2020, the California
Supreme Court issued an order disbarring Mastroianni.
      On March 5, 2020—after his suspension, but before his
disbarment—MacFarlane and A&A assigned to Mastroianni the
entirety of the judgment entered in their favor in the MacFarlane
action. Children Solution and Altman urge that, because
Mastroianni’s former clients assigned the judgment to him only
after his suspension, Business and Professions Code section 6130
prohibits his pursuit of this appeal.
      The terms of the assignment, however, indicate that
it rendered Mastroianni “the actual bona fide owner of the
judgment[,] and that it was not ‘assigned to him for collection,’ ”
as required to trigger Business and Professions Code section 6130’s

                                     9
application. (Wilde v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d
168, 173.) The assignment provides that Mastroianni’s former
clients transferred to him “all rights arising out of and incident
to the judgment and the underlying contracts on which it is based,
including but not limited to the right to collect the judgment
and receive payments in satisfaction of the judgment and all
other rights arising out of and incident to the judgment.” (Italics
added.) Children Solution and Altman point to no evidence that
the assignment was merely a sham intended to permit Mastroianni
to continue representing his former clients following his suspension
and disbarment.
       Accordingly, we conclude that Business and Professions Code
section 6130 does not prohibit Mastroianni from pursuing this
appeal relating to the judgment, notwithstanding his suspension
and subsequent disbarment.

      B.    The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
            Approving the Settlement and Attorney Fees
            Amounts, But Erred in Failing To Direct a
            Portion of the Settlement Funds to Mastroianni
      Mastroianni contends that the trial court erred by
(1) approving the $250,000 total settlement amount, (2) approving
the settlement’s terms allocating $113,500 of the $250,000 to pay
Children Solution’s attorney fees in connection with the malpractice
action, and (3) failing to order Altman to pay the settlement
proceeds directly to Mastroianni in satisfaction of his judgment lien.

            1.    $250,000 settlement amount
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving the
$250,000 settlement amount over Mastroianni’s objection.
      Section 708.440 permits a trial court to approve a settlement
over a judgment creditor’s objection, subject to “such terms and

                                    10
conditions as the court deems necessary.” (§ 708.440, subd. (b); see
id., subd. (a).) “ ‘Generally speaking, a trial court’s approval of a
settlement subject to certain conditions related to a judgment lien
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.’ ”6 (Casa Eva,
supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 778.)
       A court abuses its discretion in approving a settlement
pursuant to section 708.440 “when it fails to consider relevant
factors” (Oldham v. California Capital Fund, Inc. (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 421, 430), including a recognition that a settlor should
pay less in settlement than following a trial, the financial condition
of the settling parties, and whether the settlement is structured in
a manner designed to evade a judgment creditor’s lien. (See Tech-
Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488,
499–500 (Tech-Bilt); Oldham, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 430.)
       Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court had
sufficient information to evaluate the settlement amount and
considered the relevant factors in doing so. The court solicited
multiple rounds of briefing from the parties—including more
than 500 pages of materials from Mastroianni—concerning the
propriety of the settlement. The briefing submitted by Children
Solution and Altman detailed the weaknesses in Children
Solution’s malpractice action, including that the “insurance
windfall” it received could have damaged its credibility at a trial.
And Mastroianni’s briefing highlighted his concern that the parties
intended to evade his lien via the settlement.

      6 Mastroianni urges that we must review his challenge
to the settlement de novo because the trial court did not have
“sufficient information on which to make a reasoned judgment”
about whether to approve the settlement. Because we conclude
the trial court did have sufficient information to evaluate the
settlement, we necessarily reject this argument.

                                     11
       In its written ruling approving the settlement, the trial court
stated expressly that it had considered the parties’ “supplemental
briefing and declarations.” It then concluded that the $250,000
settlement amount was reasonable in light of Children Solution’s
weak financial condition and the litigation risks faced by both
Children Solution and Altman. The court also found persuasive
that the proposed settlement amount “represent[ed] more than
50 [percent]” of the individual attorney fee judgments for which
Teaca and Kutsina were liable.
       The record thus confirms that the trial court engaged in a
balanced, reasoned analysis of the relevant factors in considering
the settlement. We therefore conclude that the court acted within
its discretion in approving the $250,000 settlement amount.
       None of Mastroianni’s arguments in opposition persuades us
otherwise. First, he contends that Children Solution and Altman
improperly excluded him from the mediation. But he points to no
authority demonstrating his entitlement to attend the mediation,
and he does not dispute that the mediator reached out to him
to obtain his views. Indeed, Mastroianni’s responsive email to
the mediator indicates that he refused to participate because the
mediator had not invited his participation earlier and because he
questioned the mediator’s neutrality.
       Second, Mastroianni argues that Children Solution and
Altman failed to disclose several categories of purportedly material
facts to the trial court, including facts allegedly demonstrating
(1) Altman had no viable defenses to Children Solution’s
malpractice action, (2) Sina, Children Solution’s attorney,
mishandled the malpractice action, (3) Altman carried at least
$1 million in malpractice insurance, and (4) Altman coerced
Children Solution into settling the malpractice action by

                                     12
threatening to disclose Kutsina’s alleged involvement in insurance
fraud.
       As an initial matter, we note that many of the “facts”
Mastroianni identifies—the veracity of which Children Solution
and Altman dispute—amount merely to arguments or allegations.
Such assertions do not demonstrate the impropriety of the
settlement. (See Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499 [cautioning
against “convert[ing] the pretrial settlement approval procedure
into a full-scale minitrial”].) Moreover, Mastroianni highlighted
the purported facts in the materials he submitted to the trial
court. The court therefore was aware of these alleged facts when
it considered and approved the settlement amount.
       Third, and finally, Mastroianni argues that the trial
court’s order approving the settlement improperly relies on facts
from outside the record, including that Children Solution was
considering filing for bankruptcy. But Mastroianni himself
introduced evidence that he had discussions with Kutsina’s
bankruptcy lawyer and submitted evidence of those conversations
to the trial court.
       Accordingly, we conclude the court acted within its discretion
in approving the $250,000 settlement amount.

            2.    Children Solution’s attorney fees
       We conclude further that the court acted within its discretion
in approving the settlement’s terms allocating $113,500 of the total
$250,000 amount to pay Children Solution’s attorney fees in the
malpractice action.
       As an initial matter, the lien for attorney fees held by
Sina, Children Solution’s lawyer, takes priority over Mastroianni’s
lien. “The general rule, all things being equal, is that liens have
priority among themselves according to the date of their creation.”

                                    13
(Pangborn Plumbing Corp. v. Carruthers & Skiffington (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 1039, 1049.) “Under certain circumstances,” however,
“priority may not be based upon which lien was created first, but
may depend upon which lienholder first gave notice to the person
in possession of property subject to competing lien claims.” (Id.
at p. 1050, italics omitted.) “While the priority of certain kinds
of statutory liens, for example, judgment liens, is dependent on the
timing of the giving of proper notice [citation], no notice is required
before a contractual lien for attorney’s fees is valid and protected
against a levy by a judgment creditor.” (Id. at pp. 1050–1051.)
       Here, attorney Sina entered into a retainer agreement with
Children Solution—which entitled him to a contingent 45 percent
fee of any gross recovery obtained in the malpractice action—on
January 8, 2019. Mastroianni did not file his notice of judgment
lien against the malpractice action until over a year later, on
March 6, 2020. Sina’s attorney fee lien therefore takes priority over
Mastroianni’s judgment lien, and the court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in approving a settlement that provided for the
payment of Sina’s attorney fees.
       Further, the court acted within its discretion in approving
the amount of attorney fees awarded to Sina pursuant to the
settlement. The court carefully scrutinized Sina’s billing records,
disallowed charges for approximately 117 of the 347 hours Sina
recorded, and performed a lodestar calculation in determining that
the settlement’s $113,500 attorney fee award was reasonable:
“[E]ven 230 hours at Sina’s 2014 hourly rate of $550 would still
result in a total lodestar amount of $126,500, which is greater than
the $113,500 attorneys’ fees award to Sina via the settlement.”
       We are not persuaded otherwise by Mastroianni’s contention
that the $113,500 fee award violated the terms of Sina’s retainer
agreement with Children Solution because the award exceeded

                                     14
(by $1,000) 45 percent of the $250,000 settlement amount.
Although the agreement provides for a 45 percent contingent
attorney fee of any “ ‘gross recovery’ obtained,” the agreement
also provides that “[i]f [Sina] is awarded or settled any attorneys’
fees in the matter, then attorney’s fee herein shall be at the election
of attorney of the following: (i) attorney’s applicable percentage
of the ‘gross recovery,’ or (ii) the attorney fees awarded or settled.”
(Capitalization omitted & italics added.)
       The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
approving the settlement’s $113,500 attorney fee award.

            3.     Payment to Mastroianni
       We conclude that the trial court did err, however, in
failing to direct payment of the remaining $136,500 in settlement
funds to Mastroianni. In approving a settlement pursuant to
section 708.440, a court abuses its discretion where it “ ‘make[s]
an order that deprives any party of the legal rights to which it
is entitled in terms of the priority of its lien, in the absence of
appropriate equitable considerations.’ ” (Casa Eva, supra, 134
Cal.App.4th at p. 778.)
       Here, the trial court’s order did not identify any equitable
considerations counseling against using the remaining $136,500
to satisfy a portion of Mastroianni’s judgment lien. Instead, the
court denied Mastroianni’s request that Altman pay the settlement
funds to him directly because it determined that Mastroianni
provided “[n]o authority . . . for [his] request.” But section 708.440
itself provides such authority. (See § 708.440, subd. (b) [authorizing
a trial court to include in its order approving a settlement under
section 708.440, subdivision (a) “such terms and conditions as the
court deems necessary”].) Nor has Children Solution identified any
equitable basis for depriving Mastroianni of the $136,500.

                                      15
      Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion
in refusing to order payment of the $136,500 amount to
Mastroianni.

      C.    We Decline Mastroianni’s Remaining Requests
      Finally, we are not persuaded by Mastroianni’s arguments
that Children Solution and Altman acted in contempt of court
orders by transferring certain settlement proceeds to attorney
Sina’s client trust account. Mastroianni urges that Altman’s
transfer of the settlement proceeds violated (1) the automatic stay
that applies to certain underlying actions once a party files a notice
of appeal, (2) the trial court’s July 11, 2022 order staying the
malpractice action pending the appeal, and (3) section 708.440.
      As an initial matter, Mastroianni fails to cite any authority
that might exempt him from section 917.1’s requirement that,
to stay enforcement of a judgment or order for “[m]oney or the
payment of money” during the pendency of an appeal, he must
post an undertaking. (§ 917.1, subd. (a)(1).) Nor does Mastroianni
dispute that he failed to post any such undertaking.7
      Next, crediting the Altman respondents’ representation that
Altman paid the settlement proceeds within 30 days of settlement
approval—a representation Mastroianni does not contest—Altman’s
payment took place months before the trial court issued its July 11,
2022 order staying the malpractice action. We therefore fail to see
how the payment could have violated the court’s order.
      Finally, Mastroianni points to no authority in support of
his contention that a party violates section 708.440 by making
payments pursuant to a court-approved settlement.

      7 We note further that we denied Mastroianni’s motion for a
stay from this court.

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      Accordingly, we decline Mastroianni’s request that we issue
an order to show cause regarding contempt directed to Children
Solution and its counsel, Altman and his counsel, and the Imperium
Insurance Company. We also reject Mastroianni’s related requests
that we impose sanctions and report this matter to the State Bar.

                         DISPOSITION
       The portion of the November 22, 2021 order denying
Mastroianni’s request for $136,500 of the available settlement
proceeds is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to
order payment of the $136,500 directly to Mastroianni within a
reasonable time frame to be determined by the court. In all other
respects, the November 22, 2021 order approving the settlement
is affirmed. Mastroianni’s requests that we issue an order to show
cause regarding contempt, impose sanctions, and make referrals
to the State Bar are denied. Mastroianni is awarded his costs on
appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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