Court Opinion

ID: 9908298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:32.366587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.205746
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1488-MR

DILLIAN FORD                                                         APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM CARLISLE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 21-CR-00057

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Dillian Ford (“Appellant”) appeals from a

judgment and sentence of the Carlisle Circuit Court resulting from a guilty plea to

amended charges of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first

degree.1 Appellant argues that the circuit court committed reversible error in

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 510.070 and 510.110.
denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea and in ordering him to pay jail fees.

After careful review, we find no error and affirm the judgment on appeal.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             In 2021, Appellant was charged with various sex crimes involving a

victim under the age of twelve years old, and to whom Appellant was related. The

Commonwealth subsequently made a plea offer on amended charges, which

Appellant accepted and signed. Prior to filing the guilty plea with the circuit court,

Appellant changed his mind and wanted to take the matter to trial. Shortly before

trial was to commence on July 13, 2022, Appellant signed another guilty plea

which he submitted to the court. Pursuant to this plea offer, the Commonwealth

recommended a total sentence of fifteen years in prison on the amended charges of

sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree.

             Sentencing was scheduled for September 15, 2022. In August 2022,

Appellant sent a letter to the circuit court requesting to withdraw his guilty plea.

Counsel was appointed, who filed a motion to withdraw the plea, and a hearing on

the motion was conducted on October 20, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the circuit court denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. On

November 17, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison per the

Commonwealth’s recommendation. Appellant was ordered to pay jail fees. This

appeal followed.

                                          -2-
                         STANDARDS OF REVIEW

                           Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

                  Under the terms of Kentucky Rules of Criminal
           Procedure (RCr) 8.10, a criminal defendant who has
           pleaded guilty may withdraw the plea under certain
           conditions. “If the plea was involuntary, the motion to
           withdraw it must be granted. However, if it was
           voluntary, the trial court may, within its discretion, either
           grant or deny the motion.” Rigdon v. Commonwealth,
           144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (internal citations
           omitted). The trial court’s determination on whether the
           plea was voluntarily entered is reviewed under the clearly
           erroneous standard. Id. A decision that is supported by
           substantial evidence is not clearly erroneous. Id. If,
           however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea
           was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the
           motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion. This
           decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
           standard. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
           renders a decision that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
           or unsupported by legal principles. Id.

                  The test for determining the validity of a guilty
           plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and
           intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
           open to the defendant. Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721
           S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986) (citing North Carolina
           v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d
           162 (1970)). There must be an affirmative showing in
           the record that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily
           made. Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242,
           89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969)).

Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Ky. App. 2017).

                                        -3-
                                Imposition of Jail Fees

             [I]n order to impose jail fees against a criminal defendant
             during sentencing, there must be some evidence
             presented that a jail fee reimbursement policy has been
             adopted by the county jailer with approval of the
             county’s governing body in accordance with KRS
             441.265(2)(a).

Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148, 161-62 (Ky. 2022) (footnote

omitted).

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant, through counsel, first argues that the Carlisle Circuit Court

erred in failing to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserts that he

felt coerced by his defense counsel and investigator to accept the plea agreement

because they told him that if he did not plead guilty, he would serve the rest of his

life in prison. Appellant also argues that the circuit court did not carry out its duty

to inform him of the rights he was giving up if he entered a guilty plea. He directs

our attention to RCr 8.10, which provides that at any time before judgment the

court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. Appellant argues that the

circuit court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea because a proper

Boykin colloquy was not made due to Appellant not being informed of all of the

consequences of the plea. Appellant contends that while the court informed him

that he was giving up the right to a trial, at which point the Commonwealth would

have to prove guilt, he was not informed that he was giving up the right not to

                                          -4-
testify against himself; the right to confront witnesses; the right to produce

evidence and witnesses; and the right to appeal. Per Boykin, Appellant contends

that waiver of rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. He seeks an opinion

reversing the circuit court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and

remanding the matter for trial.

             On July 7, 2022, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s

motion to enter a guilty plea. At the hearing, the court engaged in the Boykin plea

colloquy with Appellant. The court asked Appellant if he wanted to change his

plea to guilty, if he graduated from high school, and, if he could read and write.

Appellant responded in the affirmative to these questions. The court referenced

Appellant’s motion to enter a guilty plea and asked Appellant if he discussed the

agreement and motion with his counsel. The court then asked if he read and

understood the agreement, and if the signature on the motion was made by his

hand. Again, Appellant responded affirmatively.

             The court went on to state that the documents in question expressly set

forth Appellant’s rights and that no one could take those rights away from

Appellant; however, that those rights could be voluntarily waived by Appellant if

he so chose in order to plead guilty. The court stated that those rights included, but

were not limited to, the requirement that the Commonwealth prove guilt if the

matter went to trial. Appellant responded “yes, sir” to each inquiry by the court.

                                          -5-
             The colloquy continued with the court asking Appellant the following:

if he were free of all intoxicants; if he understood what he was doing; if he had all

of the time he needed to discuss the matter with counsel; and if he was satisfied

with counsel’s representation. Appellant responded affirmatively to each question.

Appellant agreed that no one had threatened him or made promises to him to

induce the plea. The court offered more time if Appellant needed further

discussions with his counsel, which Appellant declined. The court then addressed

the terms of the plea and again asked Appellant if he felt rushed or needed more

time. Appellant answered, “no, sir.”

             Based on the totality of the record, we conclude that the plea

represented “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of

action open to the defendant.” Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727. Further, there is an

“affirmative showing in the record that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily

made.” Id. (citation omitted). Since the plea was intelligently and voluntarily

made, the question then becomes whether the circuit court abused its discretion in

denying the motion. Rigdon, supra. Abuse of discretion is found only where the

decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles. Id.

             The circuit court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion to withdraw

his guilty plea did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Appellant had previously

executed another guilty plea, but withdrew it before it was filed with the court.

                                         -6-
More important, the record refutes Appellant’s contention that he was coerced into

the plea and was not informed of the rights he was waiving by entering the guilty

plea. Appellant was expressly informed of his rights, and the effect his guilty plea

would have in waiving those rights. Appellant stated in open court that he

understood the guilty plea and the waiver of his rights. He stated that he had

thoroughly discussed the matter with counsel, and he declined the opportunity to

discuss it with her further before entering the plea. The circuit court had discretion

in adjudicating Appellant’s motion to withdraw the plea. Id. We find no basis for

concluding that the circuit court abused this discretion, as the record amply

demonstrates that Appellant’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered into.

Thus, we find no error on this issue.

             Appellant acknowledges that his argument relating to jail fees is not

preserved for appellant review. He argues, though, that because the imposition of

jail fees is part of the sentencing process, it may be raised for the first time on

appeal per Capstraw, supra. In the alternative, Appellant requests palpable error

review.

             The focus of Appellant’s argument on this issue is that per Capstraw,

supra, jail fees cannot be imposed unless some showing is made that the jail had

adopted a jail reimbursement policy. He argues that no such showing was made at

his sentencing; therefore, the imposition of jail fees was improper.

                                           -7-
             In response, the Commonwealth directs our attention to the October

20, 2022 hearing, wherein Appellant’s counsel discussed the Carlisle County jail

fee and its reimbursement policy with another county jail. We believe this satisfies

the “some evidence” requirement of Capstraw. Thus, assuming arguendo that this

matter is properly raised for the first time on appeal, we conclude that the circuit

court did not err in ordering Appellant to pay jail fees.

                                   CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Carlisle Circuit Court.

             ECKERLE, JUDGE, CONCURS.

         TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART,
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I

concur with the majority’s thorough analysis regarding the plea agreement in

affirming the Appellant’s conviction. However, I must respectfully dissent

regarding the order for payment of jail fees by Appellant, as no evidence exists in

the record that a fee reimbursement policy had been adopted by the Carlisle

County jailer and approved by the fiscal court in accordance with KRS 441.265(2).

At minimum, at least “some evidence” must have been presented on this issue

during sentencing which did not occur in this case. Alderson v. Commonwealth,

670 S.W.3d 884, 903 (Ky. 2023). Accordingly, I would vacate and remand this

                                          -8-
part of Appellant’s conviction to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether a reimbursement policy exists. At the hearing, Appellant would

also be given the opportunity to present evidence showing “good cause” why he

should not be required to pay the fees pursuant to KRS 441.265(1).

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Karen Shuff Maurer                         Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Bryan D. Morrow
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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