Court Opinion

ID: 9905819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:05:14.11681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:59.444885
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                 SUMMARY
                                                          November 30, 2023

                               2023COA113

No. 22CA0914, People v. Cooper — Criminal Procedure —
Postconviction Remedies — Retroactive Application of Changed
Legal Standard

     After a division of the court of appeals affirmed the defendant’s

conviction on direct appeal, the defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(c)

motion arguing that, because Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, which

abolished the res gestae doctrine, established a new rule of criminal

procedure, it should be applied retroactively pursuant to Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The postconviction court denied relief

under Rule 35(c), concluding that Rojas “did not amount to” a

watershed rule of criminal procedure that applied retroactively

under Teague.

     This division affirms, albeit on different grounds. The division

concludes that Teague does not apply because Rojas did not
announce a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure. Instead,

section 18-1-410(1)(f)(II), C.R.S. 2023, and Rule 35(c)(1) bar any

postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of a significant

nonconstitutional change in the law once the conviction has

become final.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                   2023COA113

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0914
Montrose County District Court No. 15CR20
Honorable Keri A. Yoder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Clinton Cooper,

Defendant-Appellant.

                              ORDER AFFIRMED

                                  Division V
                           Opinion by JUDGE YUN
                         Freyre and Kuhn, JJ., concur

                        Announced November 30, 2023

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1    Clinton Cooper appeals the postconviction court’s order

 denying his supplemental Crim. P. 35(c) motion. The

 postconviction court denied the supplemental motion after

 concluding that Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, which eliminated res

 gestae as an independent theory of evidentiary relevance, “did not

 amount to” a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applied

 retroactively to postconviction proceedings under Teague v. Lane,

 489 U.S. 288 (1989). We affirm the order but for a slightly different

 reason. We conclude that Teague does not apply because Rojas did

 not announce a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure.

                           I.   Background

¶2    Cooper was charged with one count of sexual assault on a

 child by one in a position of trust based on allegations that he had

 assaulted his stepdaughter. The stepdaughter’s sister witnessed

 the alleged assault but delayed reporting it because she had told

 the stepdaughter she would not tell anyone. To help explain the

 delayed disclosure, the prosecution sought to introduce as res

                                   1
 gestae evidence1 that, almost a year after the alleged assault, the

 sister saw Cooper “approach her bedroom window and attempt to

 look at her while she was changing,” which prompted her to come

 forward. At a motions hearing, Cooper’s attorney conceded that

 this evidence could be introduced as res gestae.

¶3    After a second trial,2 Cooper was convicted as charged. A

 division of this court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal, and

 his conviction became final when our supreme court denied his

 petition for a writ of certiorari. See People v. Cooper (Colo. App. No.

 17CA0410, Apr. 18, 2019) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e))

 (cert. denied Sept. 23, 2019). Approximately one year later, Cooper

 filed a timely Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief, in

 which he argued that both his trial and appellate attorneys

 provided ineffective assistance. After reviewing the petition, the

 court set an evidentiary hearing on Cooper’s claims. However, on

 1 The prosecution filed a notice of intent to admit this evidence

 under either res gestae or CRE 404(b), and also under section
 16-10-301(3), C.R.S. 2023, which articulates additional
 circumstances when evidence of other acts may be admitted during
 a sex assault trial.

 2 The court declared a mistrial after the first jury could not reach a

 unanimous verdict.

                                    2
 February 22, 2022, and several days before the evidentiary hearing,

 Rojas announced a new rule abolishing res gestae as a theory of

 relevance in criminal cases. Thus, during the hearing, the court

 granted Cooper’s request to file supplemental briefing to address

 Rojas.

¶4    In his supplemental motion, Cooper argued, as relevant here,

 that, if Rojas announced a new rule abandoning the res gestae

 doctrine, then it should be applied retroactively to his case, and his

 conviction should be reversed because “inadmissible res gestae

 testimony tainted his trial.” In a detailed written order, the court

 denied the postconviction motion in its entirety, including the

 supplemental motion. In denying the supplemental motion, the

 postconviction court concluded that, although Rojas established a

 new rule, it did not “amount to one of the rare and small watershed

 core rules that call into question [Cooper’s] underlying conviction”

 and, therefore, did not apply retroactively to Cooper’s case.

¶5    Cooper now appeals.

                             II.   Analysis

¶6    Cooper argues that the postconviction court erred by

 concluding that Rojas did not announce a watershed rule of

                                    3
 criminal procedure that should be applied retroactively to his case.

 We disagree that the postconviction court erred.

                        A.    Standard of Review

¶7    Whether Rojas applies retroactively on collateral review is a

 question of law that we review de novo. See Howard-Walker v.

 People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 22 (“We review questions of law de novo.”).

 We may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any ground

 supported by the record, whether or not the postconviction court

 relied on or considered that ground. People v. Hamm, 2019 COA

 90, ¶ 23.

                             B.   Discussion

¶8    Colorado has adopted the test established in Teague to

 determine whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure

 applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Crim. P.

 35(c). Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 983 (Colo. 2006). Under

 Teague, Colorado courts apply a three-part test that considers

 (1) whether the defendant’s conviction is final; (2) whether the rule

 in question is in fact new; and (3) if the rule is new, whether it

 meets either of the two Teague exceptions to the general bar on

 retroactivity. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. These two Teague

                                    4
 exceptions are that (1) the new rule is substantive in nature

 because it forbids criminal punishment of certain kinds of conduct

 or (2) the new rule is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates

 the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

 People v. McDonald, 2023 COA 23, ¶¶ 13-14 (cert. granted Nov. 14,

 2023).

¶9    But Teague applies only to “new constitutional rules of criminal

 procedure.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 274 (2008)

 (emphasis added) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (plurality

 opinion)). “If the new rule is not founded on constitutional

 concerns, it does not implicate Teague.” Reina-Rodriguez v. United

 States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011). This requirement is

 consistent with Colorado case law, which has applied the Teague

 test only to new rules of criminal procedure involving constitutional

 rights. See, e.g., People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 61 (concluding that

 the new constitutional rule announced in Miller v. Alabama,

 567 U.S. 460 (2012), was not a watershed rule of procedure and

 therefore did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review);

 People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d 722, 728 (Colo. 2006) (concluding that

 the new constitutional rule announced in Blakely v. Washington,

                                    5
  542 U.S. 296 (2004), was not a watershed rule of criminal

  procedure and thus did not apply retroactively to the defendant’s

  conviction); Edwards, 129 P.3d at 988 (holding that the new

  constitutional rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

  36 (2004), was not a “watershed rule of criminal procedure and

  therefore does not apply retroactively to cases involving

  postconviction proceedings”); McDonald, ¶ 24 (holding that, to the

  extent Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, announced new rules of

  constitutional law for criminal cases, the rules were procedural and

  thus did not apply retroactively); People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d 332,

  337-38 (Colo. App. 2009) (concluding that Missouri v. Seibert,

  542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004), which held unconstitutional the

  “two-step Miranda” process, was not a watershed rule of criminal

  procedure and thus did not apply retroactively to the defendant’s

  conviction); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. App. 2002)

  (concluding that the new constitutional rule announced in

  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), was not a watershed

  rule of criminal procedure to be applied retroactively).

¶ 10   We now turn to whether Rojas announced a new

  constitutional rule of criminal procedure. In Rojas, our supreme

                                     6
court abolished the common law res gestae doctrine, at least in

criminal cases. Rojas, ¶¶ 4 n.1, 41. In its place, the supreme court

adopted an intrinsic-extrinsic framework to determine whether the

admission of uncharged misconduct evidence must be analyzed

under CRE 404(b). Id. at ¶ 52. The court explained as follows:

          Intrinsic acts are those (1) that directly prove
          the charged offense or (2) that occurred
          contemporaneously with the charged offense
          and facilitated the commission of it. Evidence
          of acts that are intrinsic to the charged offense
          are exempt from Rule 404(b) because they are
          not “other” crimes, wrongs, or acts.
          Accordingly, courts should evaluate the
          admissibility of intrinsic evidence under [CRE]
          401-403. If extrinsic evidence suggests bad
          character (and thus a propensity to commit
          the charged offense), it is admissible only as
          provided by Rule 404(b) and after [an analysis
          as set forth in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314
          (Colo. 1990)]. Conversely, if extrinsic evidence
          does not suggest bad character, Rule 404(b)
          does not apply and admissibility is governed
          by Rules 401-403.

Rojas, ¶ 52. Rojas, however, did not announce a new constitutional

rule. See Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 469 n.16 (Colo. 2009)

(The “[e]rroneous admission of CRE 404(b) evidence is not error of

constitutional dimension.”); see also People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63,

¶ 10 (same); People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 60 (same).

                                  7
¶ 11   Thus, because Rojas did not implicate a constitutional rule,

  Teague does not apply. See, e.g., Reina-Rodriguez, 655 F.3d at

  1188 (explaining that a new rule announced in a case limiting the

  definition of burglary “is not a new constitutional rule, since it does

  not implicate constitutional rights,” and “[a]s a result, Teague’s

  retroactivity bar does not apply”); United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d

  1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that retroactive application

  of a decision was not barred by Teague because the decision was

  “neither new nor constitutional”), abrogated on other grounds as

  recognized in United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th

  Cir. 2004).

¶ 12   Our conclusion that Rojas is not a “new constitutional rule” is

  fatal to Cooper’s claim. Under section 18-1-410(1)(f)(II), C.R.S.

  2023, and Crim. P. 35(c)(1), a defendant is barred from seeking

  retroactive application of a “significant change in the law” to a

  conviction or sentence when the defendant “has not sought appeal

  of a conviction within the time prescribed” or the “judgment of

  conviction has been affirmed upon appeal.” Hamm, ¶¶ 12-14

  (quoting § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II)); People v. Banks, 924 P.2d 1161, 1163

  (Colo. App. 1996) (“[R]elitigation of a claim based on a change of law

                                     8
  is specifically prohibited in a post-conviction proceeding once a

  judgment of conviction has been affirmed upon appeal.”).

¶ 13      There is an exception for a defendant to seek review outside

  these timeframes for an alleged constitutional violation. Crim. P.

  35(c)(2). But this exception is available only for (1) “[a]ny claim

  based on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously

  unavailable, if that rule has been applied retroactively by the United

  States Supreme Court or Colorado appellate courts”; or (2) “[a]ny

  claim based on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously

  unavailable, if that rule should be applied retroactively to cases on

  collateral review.” Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)(b), (c)(3)(VII)(c) (emphases

  added). Given our conclusion above, that exception does not apply

  here.

¶ 14      Thus, section 18-1-410(1)(f)(II) and Rule 35(c)(1) bar any

  postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of a significant

  nonconstitutional change in the law once the conviction has

  become final. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶¶ 20-24.

¶ 15      For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s

  order denying Cooper’s supplemental motion, albeit on different

  grounds. See Hamm, ¶ 23.

                                       9
                            III.   Disposition

¶ 16   The order is affirmed.

       JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE KUHN concur.

                                    10