Court Opinion

ID: 9650031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:20:46.714814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:17.310425
License: Public Domain

Justice TODD,
concurring.
I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that an establishment which sells malt or brewed beverages for takeout, but prohibits the consumption of such beverages on its premises, does not qualify as a “retail dispenser” under Section 102 of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 1-102 (the “Code”). I write separately because I disagree with one aspect of the Majority’s analysis concerning administrative deference to the interpretation of the Code by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (“PLCB”).
It is well established that the courts of this Commonwealth, in interpreting statutory language, afford great deference to the interpretation rendered by the administrative agency overseeing the implementation of such legislation. See Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Maryland Ins. Group, 561 Pa. 629, 636, 752 A.2d 878, 881 (2000). The Majority declines to afford administrative deference to the PLCB’s interpretation of the Code for two reasons.
*468First, citing Seeton v. Pennsylvania Game Comm’n, 594 Pa. 563, 581, 937 A.2d 1028, 1039 (2007) (holding Commonwealth Court erred in deferring to Pennsylvania Game Commission’s interpretation of Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code because “those interpretations are patently at odds with the enabling Game and Wildlife Code”), the Majority concludes the PLCB’s construction of “retail dispenser” is contrary to the clear legislative scheme regarding beer distribution, and, therefore, is not entitled to deference. I agree with the Majority’s determination in this regard.
As an additional basis for declining to give deference to the PLCB’s interpretation of the Code, the Majority, again citing, inter alia, Seeton, notes that this Court has warned “against the dangers of deferring to an agency’s interpretation when such position was developed in anticipation of litigation,” Majority Op. at 466, 974 A.2d at 1154, and notes that, at least according to the Malt Beverages Distributors Association, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the PLCB had considered the instant issue prior to the instant litigation. However, while this Court has cited, in dicta, the potential problems with deferring to administrative interpretations made in the context of litigation, we have yet to thoroughly consider, let alone adopt, such an exception to our general rule of administrative deference. See Seeton, 594 Pa. at 578 n. 12, 937 A.2d at 1037 n. 12. Thus, I distance myself from the Majority’s reliance on this undeveloped exception. Moreover, I find no indication that the subject licensing decision was, in fact, made in the context of litigation. Rather, it appears to have resulted from a routine administrative review process.
In sum, the fact that the PLCB’s interpretation of the meaning of “retail dispenser” is contrary to the clear legislative scheme for beer distribution is a sufficient basis for declining to give deference to the PLCB’s interpretation. Accordingly, I believe it is unnecessary to consider whether the PLCB’s interpretation was developed in the context of litigation, and, to the extent the Majority does so, I do not join that portion of the Majority’s opinion.