Court Opinion

ID: 9774200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:06.477132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.365863
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot see the rationale for allowing a child under the age of 10 to testify without a preliminary screening in some criminal prosecutions but not in others.
The principal opinion states that "... offenders, who have chosen a young child as their victim, often avoid conviction when the child’s testimony is unavailable.” I respectfully doubt this undocumented assertion, and question even more whether a child’s unavailability is often brought about because the trial judge excludes the testimony. Trial judges, in my experience, almost always allow a child who is capable of giving coherent answers to questions to testify.
The principal opinion finds rationale for the statutory distinction because the child may testify without restriction “where the child’s testimony is critical to the prosecution,” whereas there is a preliminary screening “where the child’s testimony is not the only direct link between the accused and the crime.” Thus the child is subject to preliminary scrutiny when the testimony is relatively unimportant, but not when the testimony is vital.
The purpose of the revised statute, then, is to facilitate the conviction of persons charged with child abuse, by reducing the protection afforded the accused. Less process of law is apparently due an accused molester than other defendants enjoy.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), a state statute provided for the sterilization of persons convicted of a limited group of criminal offenses. The Supreme Court of the United States struck the statute down on equal protection grounds, finding no rational basis for distinguishing between persons convicted of larceny, who were subject to sterilization, and those convicted of embez*203zlement, who were not. The present statute likewise demonstrates no rational basis for the distinction drawn.
I do not have to express an opinion as to whether the legislature could completely abolish the provisions for preliminary scrutiny of a child witness. I note the arguments of the learned commentators, but would wonder whether a trial judge does not have the inherent power and duty to determine threshold questions of testimonial capacity, and to exclude evidence which is inherently unreliable. Cf. Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. banc 1985). If so, there may be a due process problem if the statute before us is read as prohibiting any such scrutiny.
Sometimes I believe that the repulsion with which we view child abusers makes us less vigilant in ensuring that child abuse defendants have a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. In State v. Taylor, 726 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. banc 1987) we held that the defendant’s reputation for truth and veracity was not material in a child molester’s case, yet in State v. Brown, 718 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1986), we would not allow a defendant charged with abusing a stepchild to show that there was a good family relationship. Do we rather assume that charges of child abuse are probably true, instead of applying a presumption of innocence?
I am confident that prosecutors can obtain convictions in the great majority of meritorious child abuse prosecutions under the rules which apply generally to criminal cases. I fail to perceive any “modern trend” simply because three other states have statutes similar to ours.
The judgment should be reversed. The error cannot be cured without a new trial, because the child witness is now older and the trial court could not make a reliable determination of her capacity to testify several years ago. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).