Court Opinion

ID: 9834244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:26:38.815736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:13.247550
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In a motion for rehearing, savoring somewhat' of the intemperate, appellees’ counsel has assailed the opinion of this court with ■great vigor and directness; but the writer, recognizing to the fullest extent the ancient ■and inalienable privilege of the lawyers to '‘cuss” the court, has not permitted the animadversions of counsel to shake his judicial poise in the least. On the contrary, in an ■earnest endeavor to get right on this case, we have been led to re-examine with greater ■care the questions in the record, and will state our conclusions.
In their motion, appellees first complain of certain statements made in the concluding portion of the opinion, explaining our holding that appellants’ petition did not show a good causé of action for either actual or exemplary damages, and that the trial court properly ¡sustained appellees’ demurrers. The language objected to is as follows:
“However, we would not be understood as intimating that appellants might not have ah leged damages to their property rights arising out of the alleged unlawful issuance and levy of the execution, or a sale thereunder, if such should be made. Neither are we to be understood as holding that attorney’s fees may not be properly considered by the jury or court in estimating or ascertaining exemplary damages in a ■case where actual damages recoverable by law are shown.”
It is insisted by appellees’ counsel that these expressions were not called for by the facts of the case, and are obiter dicta. We are unable to agree with this contention. These statements were made merely to indicate the scope and extent of our holding, upon the question of damages, and to prevent a misapprehension thereon; and, seeing how ■easily an opinion may be misconceived, we think our precaution was not unwise.
The appellants had cited authorities in which it was held that attorney’s fees in certain instances were recoverable as damages, and it was to indicate our view that the cases were not in point, because such recovery was limited to cases of exemplary damages, and in an effort to distinguish those cases, that we used the expressions objected to. Appellants had also cited other cases where damages had been allowed for injury to property rights, in the levy of illegal process upon void judgments, and for a similar reason we tried to make it clear that our holding did not extend to include such damages in a proper case. We might add that appellees’ counsel in his brief made the broad contention that attorney’s fees were not proper elements of damage, and for this additional reason we added the precautionary language above quoted; and it will be allowed to stand as written.
Appellees next contend that this court erred in holding that the district court of Milam county had jurisdiction to issue the injunction or to entertain the suit for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement of the judgment rendered in the justice’s court of Crockett county, for the reason that the statute applicable to this cause is mandatory and fixes the venue and jurisdiction in the district court of Crockett county.
With what would ordinarily be an admirable display of candor, counsel for appellees takes upon himself the blame for not directing this court’s attention to section 17 of article 1830, Vernon’s Sayles’ Statutes, which it is contended is imperative and controls this case.
We exonerate counsel from any culpability whatever, especially as appellants’ counsel did not fail to call our attention to the statute, and more especially because we considered and discussed the statute in our original opinion, and held that it was inapplicable, because its benefits had been waived by appel-lees.
However, we will again consider the question. The statute now so strongly relied upon by appellees, section 17 of article 1S30, Vernon’s Sayles’ Statutes, is one of the exceptions to the general venue article, which provides that no person who is an inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile. This exception reads as follows;
“When the suit is brought to enjoin the execution of a judgment, or to stay proceedings in any suit, in which case the suit shall be brought in the county in which judgment was rendered, or in which such suit is ponding.”
This provision is a venue statute, is a mere personal privilege, and may be waived as any other matter of privilege. In the present case it appears from the record that appellees, whose residence and domicile were in Milam county where the suit was brought and the temporary injunction obtained, filed their *954original answer to the petition, in which they answered by general demurrer and general denial only. At the second term of court, and nearly a year after they had thus answered to the merits, they filed an amended answer, in which by special exceptions they for the first time raised the question of venue and jurisdiction, claimed to be in. the district court of Crockett county. No plea of personal privilege, invoking the benefits of section 17 af article 1830, was ever filed by ap-pellees, and the special exceptions filed by them did not specifically mention said provision. However, we will treat the special exceptions as raising that issue.
[9] In, order to obtain the benefits of the venue provision of section 17, it is necessary that the privilege must be claimed seasonably and in due order of pleading. It is well settled. that this may be done either by plea or by special exception. In the instant case no plea of privilege was ever filed, and the special exceptions were not filed until long after answer to the merits. Under these circumstances, we were of the opinion, and still believe, that the, special exceptions came too late, and that the privilege was waived.
[10] However, it is contended by counsel that the general demurrer raised the question, and in legal effect entitled appellees to the benefits of the venue statute cited. We think this contention entirely inadmissible. The office of a general demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a petition or answer to state a cause of action, and it may be conceded will suffice to raise a question purely of jurisdiction; but we have been cited to no authority, and know of none, which recognizes that a general demurrer is sufficient to claim a mere matter of personal privilege.
Appellees’ counsel seeks to distinguish the case of Foust v. Warren, 72 S. W. 404, cited in our original opinion, on the ground that the trial court himself raised the question of venue, and defendants’ counsel made no objection to the venue, but proceeded to trial, which resulted in a mistrial, and thereafter a plea of privilege was filed. It is conceded by counsel for appellees that, if this statute be regarded strictly as a venue provision, the decision in the ‘Foust Case was correct, and that the privilege there was waived.
We fail to see the distinction between that case and the present one. Wherein it is material that the trial court suggested the question of venue is not made to appear, and it is also not shown how the fact that there was a trial, resulting in a mistrial, would distinguish that case from this. There having been a mistrial, it was the same thing as if there was no intervening trial at all, and it was the failure to file the plea of privilege until after answer to the merits that constituted a waiver of the privilege.
■ It is also sought to distinguish the case of Osborne v. Gatewood, 74 S. W. 72; but we are convinced that .this case, as well as the Foust Case, sustains our original holding.
Appellees argue at great length that section 17 of article 1830 is mandatory, because of. the imperative nature of the language used therein. We think there can be no question that this statute is mandatory, when its benefits are properly and legally invoked, and there is nothing in our opinion to the contrary. The whole question is: Uid appellees waive their right to insist upon the provisions of section 17? If they did, no matter how mandatory its character, the statute is inapplicable.
In support of his contention, counsel cites two cases — 'Mitchell v. Porter, 194 8. W. 981, and Mitchell v. Hancock, 196 S. W. 694. We regard neither of these decisions as in point. They simply hold that article 2147, Yernon’s Sayles’ Statutes, providing that actions “may” be brought against receivers of a corporation in the county where the principal-office of the corporation is located, is a merely permissive statute, and must yield to subdivision 14 of article 1830, providing that suits for the recovery of lands “must” be brought in-the county in which the land or apart thereof may lie. In each of the cases cited a plea of personal privilege, invoking the benefits of subdivision 14 of the General. Venue Statute, was seasonably filed, and it was held that the suit must be brought, where the land was situated. We see nothing, in these decisions in conflict with our opinion-There was no waiver in either of those cases, as in the instant case.
Adhering to the view that our original opinion is correct, the motion for rehearing is-overruled.
Motion overruled.