Court Opinion

ID: 9550893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:44:26.034491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:39.462619
License: Public Domain

LUJAN, Chief Justice (dissenting). I am unable to concur in the foregoing opinion so far as it holds that because of excessive use of intoxicating liquors the defendant was irresponsible and helpless in the transaction of business; and that it was not his intention to convey to his wife his- interest in the property conveyed. The court found that the defendant was a chronic alcoholic; and because of excessive drinking and habitual condition of drunkenness, he was irresponsible and helpless in the transaction of business; but I look, in vain in this record ■for evidence to sustain that part of the finding “that the defendant was irresponsible and helpless in the transaction of business.” The defendant had been addicted, for years, to the use of intoxicating liquors; but, I cannot say, as a rule of law, that because a man is a drunkard, therefore, he is of unsound mind. The Court had no evidence whatever before it as to the effect his intemperate habits had upon his mental capacity to transact business. In 26 C.J.S. § 54(f), under Deeds the rule is laid down thusly: “The fact that a grantor is an habitual drunkard will not render him incompetent to execute a deed as matter of law, and, in the absence of proof of mental incapacity resulting from his intemperate habits, the deed of an habitual drunkard may be upheld where it was executed during a sober interval; * * *. However, where the grantor was not under the influence of liquor when he executed the deed, evidence of frequent use of alcohol by him does not invalidate the deed, unless his mind was weakened so as to render him incapable of intelligently entering into the contract.” (Emphasis mine.) Also, see, 18 C.J. page 223, note 97(a). The test is: Did the defendant have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the particular transaction, and with such understanding voluntarily enter into and consummate the same ? Answered in the affirmative, mental capacity is established so far as this particular contention is concerned. There was evidence of the frequent use of intoxicating liquors by the defendant during a period of two years. There was no evidence whatever in the record tending to show that the mind of the defendant was weakened by his use of intoxicating liquors so as tO' render him incapable of intelligently transacting business. The defendant testified positively that he was sober on the day he signed the deed conveying his interest in the property to his wife. In 17 Am. & Eng.Ency.Law, page 401, we find this language: “Where a person seeks to avoid responsibility for a contract on the ground of intoxication alone, it must appear that the drunkenness was so excessive that he was utterly deprived of the use of his reason and understanding and was altogether incapable of knowing the effect what he was doing. Any degree of intoxication which falls short of this will furnish no ground for release in the absence of fraud on the 'part of the other contracting party.” Tested by the general principles above laid down I am strongly inclined to the view that the facts do not bring the defendant within its application. Considering everything that was done and said by him at the time he executed the deed and his condition prior thereto, I should hesitate before deciding that he was in such mental condition that he did not understand the effect of the deed of that day. Defendant drank no intoxicating liquors during that day. Nothing is shown in his conduct or by his words indicating that degree of incapacity that will avoid the deed. He did not show in any way that he was not in his normal mental condition. There is absolutely nothing in the record to show that defendant was dethroned of his reason, or that his understanding was so impaired as to render him mentally unsound when the deed was signed. If he was competent, this court cannot concern itself whether he made a good or bad deal, or what he did or had done with his property. The court also found “That the quit claim deed executed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff was not a gift; but that the deed was made and delivered for the protection of both parties and to prevent the defendant from disposing of or encumbering his interest in the premises when he might be irresponsible by reason of his habitual intoxication.” (Emphasis mine.) At the time the deed was prepared, in the law office of reputable attorneys, nothing whatever was said or intimated as to defendant’s secret intention and apparently no one in the world knew or heard of it. It would have been very easy for the attorneys to draw a deed incorporating his so-called intention had he so advised them. He told no one of this intention until approximately eleven months after the deed was signed and delivered to the plaintiff. The intention must be gathered from the language used in the deed and not from what the grantor may have intended to do. In Westover v. Harris, 47 N.M. 112, 137 P.2d 771, 774, this court said: “Deeds are clothed with too much solemnity and finality to be lightly interpreted contrary to the clear language thereof upon conflicting evidence as to the intention with which they were executed.” (Emphasis mine.) And in Antley v. Antley, 132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31, 32, the court said: “One of the first canons of construction is that the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated if no settled rule of law be contravened. But intention is a term of art, signifying the meaning of the writing. Sandford v. Sandford, 106 S.C. [304] 306, 91 S.E. 294. Intention does not mean the purpose of the grantor apart from the writing. As has been said, the intention of the grantor must be found within the ‘four corners’ of the deed.” (Emphasis mine.) The majority say that it was not the intention of either party to the deed that it should convey to the wife the husband’s beneficial interest in the property conveyed, or to alter the actual ownership of the undivided interest of each theretofore existing in the property; that on the contrary, the parties well understood that the purpose o'f the deed was to protect both of them in the continued ownership of the property. However, this contention is not supported by the evidence. On this point the evidence ■of the plaintiff and defendant was diametrically opposed. The defendant said, it was his intention to convey, the property to the plaintiff so that he could not sell, mortgage ■or dispose 'of the same. That he and the plaintiff talked the matter over but he does not remember who suggested the transfer. The plaintiff says in relation to the conversation: “Well, the subject was talked but I would not say I told him I wanted it; when it was discussed I said it was a matter of choice with him, it was up to him .and made no difference to me, and he said ‘that is what he wanted to do.’ Well, when we talked about remodeling and repairing the house, it had not been papered or ■cleaned up since we had been there and sometime before, and when I tried to discuss the matter with him about getting his •opinion about fixing it, and he said ‘I have no interest in that, it is yours, and go fix it like you want to, it will be all right with me.’ ” She was corroborated by Mr. G. P. Mc-Crary, a carpenter and builder who testified that he remodeled the house. Then he said “I asked him (defendant) several times what he wanted to do about this and he said ‘well, go see my wife, she is the one that lives there and it belongs to her.’ ” In Carberry v. Carberry, 137 N.J.Eq. 9, 43 A.2d 215, 216, the court said: “Perhaps the suggestion might be put forth that the complainant in executing the deed of conveyance relinquished his inchoate expectancy of an estate by the curtesy in the premises. The evidence, however, does not satisfactorily disclose a bargain achieved by any such a consideration. In undertaking to buy the property, the defendant Richardson first interviewed the complainant, who stated: ‘See my zvife, its her property, its not mine.’ The complainant appears to have graciously signed the deed without any intimation to anyone that any portion of the proceeds of the sale or other consideration was to be payable or forthcoming to him. When it became evident that the parties could not set at ease their matrimonial agitations, the complainant resolved to organize his present claim.” (Emphasis mine.) The placing of the title in the name of the plaintiff, was, I believe intended by the defendant as a gift to his wife. Such is the presumption of law and in absence of clear, definite, trustworthy and convincing proof of a contrary intention the presumption prevails. The testimony of the defendant that he did not intend to make a gift to the plaintiff does not meet the required standard of proof. In Trigg v. Trigg, 37 N.M. 296, 300, 22 P.2d 119, 121, we said: “* * * When, however, the conveyance is from a husband to his wife, there is a presumption that it was intended for the wife’s support, and is valid in equity, unless it was made in violation of the rights ■of creditors.” In Andreas v. Andreas, 84 N.J.Eq. 375, 94 A. 415, 416, the court said: “It is the well-settled rule in this state that where a husband transfers either real or personal property to his wife, it will be presumed that the conveyance and transfer were intended to be by way of voluntary settlement upon her. This, however, is a rebuttable presumption, and the deed having once been made and delivered by which title is vested in her, the burden of proof is on him to establish a different result. And it may be said at this point that where there is conflicting evidence as to a' husband’s object ■in making a conveyance of lands to his ■wife, the ordinary presumption that it is intended as a provision or settlement for .her benefit is not rebutted. Linker v. Linker, 32 N.J.Eq., 174. Therefore if on a balancing of the testimony it should be found that the husband has not met the burden of proof, his application to the court must fail. 'The proceeding must be judged by what took place at the time of the execution and ■ delivery of the deeds, and not by circumstances which occurred afterwards.” (Emphasis mine.) And in Strong v. Strong, 134 N.J.Eq. 513, 36 A.2d 410, 413, the court said: “ * * * Assuredly there are transactions between strangers in which the payment of the consideration for the conveyance draws to it a presumption of the bene-, ficial ownership, but where the parties are' attached by the relationship of husband and wife and the husband pays the consideration of the purchase of lands and has the conveyance made to his wife, the presumption is that a gift or settlement was intended. The presumption does not command conclusive effectiveness. It may be demolished by definite, trustworthy and convincing proof of a contrary intention. Yet, where the wife’s title is evidenced by a duly executed and recorded deed made at the express request of the husband which declares by its terms that she is to hold the premises for her own exclusive use, public policy concerned with the stability of titles also recommends that the apparent authenticity and efficiency of the deed should not be diversified except upon satisfactory and explicit proof of a contemperaneous intention inconsistent with the grant manifestly exhibited by the deed. “ * * * He sought to tranquilize her apprehensions by providing her with a comfortable home and the title to the property. Other inducements of a gratifying character were probably also considered. The presumption that it was the intention of Mr. Strong to voluntarily bestow the absolute and beneficial title to the premises upon his wife has not been repulsed by contradictory proof of the requisite degree of clarity and persuasiveness. Hence, the deed to her cannot justifiably be qualified as desired by the defendant Strong.” The requisite proof, as described by the cases, must in quality and character be, clear, definite, reliable, trustworthy and convincing, leaving no reasonable doubt of the intention of the parties. I am constrained to conclude that the testimony of the defendant, scrutinized in the light of the surrounding factual circumstances and in view of his own conduct, does not rise to the required standard of clear, definite, reliable, trustworthy and convincing proof. In my opinion, the evidence offered by the defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of a gift or settlement. Much as I may be inclined to yield to the above findings of the learned district Judge in a case of this character, I feel urged, after a careful examination of all the facts, to not only question the correctness of the above findings, but to hold that the facts proved do not possess sufficient probative force to sustain the judgment. For the reasons cited, in my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed in this particular. The majority having concluded otherwise, I dissent. COMPTON, J., concurs.