Court Opinion

ID: 9696290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:43:58.942194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:20.904813
License: Public Domain

*237Prescott, C. J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
I regret that I am unable to concur in the result reached by my colleagues. We are in full agreement that the able and learned trial judge committed error in refusing to strike out certain testimony given before the jury, and that the jury’s award was $27,000 in excess of the value placed upon appellees’ property by appellees’ own expert real estate appraiser, and $36,000 in excess of the highest estimate placed thereon by the Commission’s experts. We are, likewise, in complete agreement on the principles of law involved; our only disagreement is as to whether the judge’s refusal to strike the admittedly inadmissible testimony was “trivial, or formal, or merely academic, and not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no way affected the final outcome of the case” (State v. Britton, 178 P. 2d 341, 344 [Wash.]), or whether it was “reasonably calculated to erroneously affect the jury in reaching its verdict.” Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Hillman, 111 S. W. 2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.1) See also, McGaw v. M. C. C. Balto., 131 Md. 430, and Brack v. M. C. C. Balto., 125 Md. 378, in both of which cases, this Court reversed for errors regarding evidence, where the possible amount of money involved in the errors was only a fractional part of that involved in the case at bar. In the latter case, the opinion quoted with approval Chief Justice Rugg’s statement in Smith v. Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, as follows: “Witnesses and jurors should not be permitted to enter the realm of speculation and swell damages beyond a present cash value under fair conditions of sale by fantastic visions as to future exigencies of growing communities.”
To me, it is difficult to conceive a clearer example of harmful error than that presented here. The majority opinion correctly states: “He [the owner] was asked if he had an opinion as to the fair value of his property. He replied that it was worth *238approximately $6,000 per acre. No objection was made to the question or answer [and none is made here on appeal], but when counsel asked him why it was worth that much, the owner replied ‘because this here, that was the offer.’ Counsel for the Commission promptly moved that the answer be stricken, but the motion was denied.”
When the court made this ruling in the presence of the jury, it was tantamount to informing them that the answer was relevant, admissible testimony, and the “offer” was a proper factor for them to consider in estimating the value of the subject-property; a factor, which the entire membership of this Court agrees could not lawfully be taken into consideration.
Of course, if its ruling were “trivial” and not calculated to affect the result, the error was harmless. But let’s discuss this aspect of the ruling. No one at this time, with the exception, perhaps, of the jurors themselves, can state definitely the factors that actuated their award. However, an examination of the adjudicated cases and those encountered in actual experience (the author remembers back to when eminent domain proceedings in this State were conducted by Sheriffs’ juries) will disclose that the occasions when a jury’s award exceeds the largest value placed on the property by the condemnee’s own expert real estate appraiser or appraisers are so singularly rare and infrequent that they may be considered as almost negligible. (The writer recalls no such occasion, although there must be some.) As a matter of practicality, the juries almost universally arrive at an award somewhere between the estimates made by the condemnor’s and the condemnee’s experts.
What then caused the award of $27,000 above the highest estimate of condemnee’s own expert? The simple answer seems to be the jury felt that if the owner had been offered $6,000 per acre (the reasons why evidence of offers is not admissible as being unreliable are stated in the cases cited in the majority opinion), he probably was suffering a severe loss by the State taking his property, when, in reality, his own appraiser based his estimate of value largely upon the increase in value of the subject and adjacent properties caused by the public improvement for which the subject-property was being taken, and so testified (without objection being made thereto).
*239It scarcely can be seriously argued that the sum of $27,000, or, indeed, any substantial fraction thereof, is not a sizeable sum of money; it is more than the total amount involved in most appeals to this Court. The majority say that the error was harmless because, percentage-wise, the excess over the owner’s appraiser’s largest estimate did not exceed some 10%. No precedent has been found in which harmless error has been tested by any such standard. Carried one step further, it would mean that a $100,000 error would be “harmless” in a $1,000,000 judgment.
The fact that the State has to pay for the error committed should play no part in the determination of the matter; the case should be, and has been, treated as though individual parties were involved. I think the probability the State is being required to pay more than the fair market value of the property as a result of the error has been clearly established; hence, I would reverse and have a jury pass upon the question of value without the taint of inadmissible testimony. Such a course would not seriously inconvenience anyone, and everyone could feel that justice has been fairly administered.

. For additional versions of harmless and prejudicial errors, see State v. Reddington, 125 N. W. 2d 58, 62 (S. D.); Merchants’ Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Globe Brewing Co., 177 P. 2d 963, 967 (Cal. App.); Ashby v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 122 S. E. 104, 110 (Va.); Black, Law Dictionary, “Error.”