Court Opinion

ID: 9663675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:47:18.048657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:54.765067
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I concur in the result.
I concede that Division I is proper under our present rule 177, R. C. P., which has been declared constitutional by prior pronouncements of this court, but I cannot concur in continued *425use of a Rule of Procedure that seems to me to be so clearly wrong. I realize that essentially the same arguments made here were made in Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp, 237 Iowa 279, 21 N.W.2d 457, and there rejected. The court held rule 177 to be constitutional. I also realize that essentially the same rule is contained in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38(b) (sans the separate sheet of paper requirement). Nevertheless, I must still protest. The constitutional mandates were made neither by nor for lawyers or judges. This rule 177 and the Federal rule are solely for judicial administrative purposes. As such they should be subject to both the letter and the spirit of the constitutional provisions under which they are promulgated.
The pieayunish detail of the rule regulating demands for jury trial requires not only a demand for jury trial in writing, but that it be made on a separate sheet of paper. This apparently stems from judicial exasperation occasioned by the practice of attorneys who fail to demand a jury trial in easily located unequivocal terms. This exasperation in turn stems from a complete reversal of judicial attitude from what I think it should be, to what it is. Rule 177 is based on a philosophy which, as far as I am concerned, is 180 degrees out of phase.
It should be taken for granted that people do want to assert their constitutional rights. The rules should provide that they are at all times able to do so until they have clearly, knowingly and affirmatively waived those rights, in this case either in writing or in open court by act or word.
On the contrary, our rule requires that before the substantial and important right to a jury trial (where jury trials have historically been accorded) will be preserved, such right must be demanded in writing on a separate sheet of paper within 10 days of filing the last pleading. Otherwise the right is lost. It seems to me that the requirement of a written demand for a jury trial was met by the framers of the constitution on behalf of the people when they penned that document. Loss of the right thus created should not depend on the oversight of counsel.
It may be more efficient in terms of jury assignments to make counsel indicate a desire for a jury trial, but efficiency is .not the sole (or even the chief) aim of the administration of *426justice. If additional notice that the litigant wants his constitutional rights preserved is required by the judiciary, the sanction for failure to provide that notice should fall on the lawyer, not on the litigant.
Paragraph (d) of rule 177 which allows the trial court in its discretion to grant a jury trial even though jury trial has not been demanded in writing on a separate sheet of paper is an unacceptable poultice for those whose views correspond to mine. The ability to assert a constitutional right should not depend on the discretion of the trial court — or this court. If it does so depend, it is no longer a right but a mere privilege. Nor should the right to jury trial depend on the degree of exasperation felt by the judiciary at having its well laid plans set awry, or on the philosophy of the individual judge as to desirability of jury trials as compared to trial by the court.
The incongruity of the law is best illustrated by this paragraph (d). We make bold to say that if a jury trial is not demanded in writing on a separate sheet of paper as by rule provided, then the court may, for good cause shown, grant a jury trial upon application and hearing. Since when do we have to show good cause for the court to grant a right which is constitutionally protected in the first place t I suppose that the answer is “Since this rule was passed!”
It is to be noted that rule 177 was held to be constitutional before the 1961 amendment requiring the demand for jury trial to be put on a separate sheet of paper. This facet of the rule has not been approved or disapproved by this court, but the constitutional question is not here raised.
Here the jury demand in writing was timely. The sole and only basis for denial of trial by jury was that demand therefor was not made on a separate sheet of paper.
I believe that rules of orderly procedure are important, but they are not as important as substantive constitutional rights.
I cannot concur in a division of an opinion which approves a rule which to me is so clearly and so fundamentally wrong. Therefore, as to Division I, I dissent. In view of the fact that the majority opinion allows full recoupment (all that plaintiff could be allowed by the jury under the pleadings), I concur in the result.