Court Opinion

ID: 9853428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:48:40.532691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:47.586356
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the result reached in this case and with much that is said by the majority in support of that result. I concur specially because I prefer to address more fully the appellant’s contentions that (1) when the trial court failed to charge the § b (7) circumstance at the first trial, the court in effect acquitted the appellant of this statutory aggravating circumstance, and (2) when the state failed to assert the presence of the § b (7) aggravating circumstance at the first trial, the state waived its right to contend its existence at any future retrial of the case. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-24.
If, in fact, the trial judge passed on the sufficiency of the evidence as to the § b (7) circumstance at the first trial, and determined that the evidence did not support it, such a determination might very well preclude the state’s reliance on the § b (7) circumstance in any subsequent retrial of the case, theories of nullification and clean slates notwithstanding. Cf. Young v. Kemp, 760 F2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1985).
A review of the record of the original trial shows that the state did not request a charge on the § b (7) circumstance. Record, Case No. 32605, Transcript of Hearing of February 25, 1977, pp. 2-3, and Trial Transcript pp. 159-160. The question, then, is whether the mere fact that § b (7) was not charged in the first trial is tantamount to a ruling by the trial court on the sufficiency of the evidence as to § b (7). This, in turn, depends upon whether the trial court is required to examine for evidentiary sufficiency all possible statutory aggravating circumstances, or only those asserted by the state.
Appellant contends the trial judge must review every aggravating circumstance listed in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) and must charge all that are warranted by the evidence. The statute, however, does not clearly require such a review,1 and this court has never held that the trial *205court has that duty.2
Decided November 8, 1985 —
Reconsideration denied November 27, 1985.
Michael Kennedy McIntyre, Martin & Young, John R. Martin, for appellant.
Typically, a trial judge in our adversary system addresses only issues that are raised by the parties.3 In the first trial of this case, the applicability of the § b (7) circumstance was not raised by the parties. Thus, the mere fact that the trial court did not instruct the jury as to the § b (7) circumstance did not, in my view, involve a determination by the trial court that § b (7) was not supported by the evidence.
Nor can I agree with appellant’s assertion that by failing to assert the § b (7) circumstance at the first trial, the state waived its right to pursue this circumstance at any subsequent retrial of the case.
If the state had travelled only upon a § b (2) theory and the jury had recommended a life sentence, the state could not thereafter have sought a death sentence (for the same crime) on a § b (7) theory. Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205 (236 SE2d 365) (1977). And, if the jury had imposed a death sentence, but a reviewing court had determined that the only statutory circumstance presented was not supported by the evidence, the state probably could not then re-seek a death sentence by asserting additional circumstances not presented in the first trial. Young v. Kemp, supra.
However, when a case is reversed for reasons other than an insufficiency of the evidence, the state is not restricted to presenting at the retrial only that evidence presented in the first instance. At the guilt-innocence phase or at the sentencing phase of a retrial, the state (and the defense as well) may add to or subtract from its previous presentation, may rely upon new theories in support of the desired verdict, or may continue to rely upon previous theories, may present new evidence (whether or not newly discovered) or may delete old evidence.
In short, the slate is wiped clean. In this case, the state is not precluded from alleging the existence of both § b (2) and § b (7) simply because § b (7) was not asserted at the first trial.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hill joins in this special concurrence.
*206Arthur E. Mallory III, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 See OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) and (c). Although the word “any” can mean every one, it more commonly means at least one, or possibly more. Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd Edition 1970.

 There is dicta to this effect. See Williams v. State, 237 Ga. 399, 400 (228 SE2d 806) (1976). It should not be followed.

 At the guilt-innocence phase of a trial, a trial court may charge lesser included offenses of the crimes set forth in the indictment, even if neither party requests such a charge. Charging statutory aggravating circumstances not timely asserted by the state, however, presents constitutional notice problems. Cf. McCrary v. State, 252 Ga. 521 (314 SE2d 662) (1984).