Court Opinion

ID: 9405596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 20:04:21.927391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.871800
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                          )
                                            )
      v.                                    )
                                            )     I.D. No. 2211007276
DAQUAN WATSON,                              )
                                            )
                  Defendant.                )

                                    ORDER

                            Submitted: May 18, 2023
                             Decided: June 27, 2023

                     Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
                                 DENIED

Lindsay A. Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Regina E. Gray, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for
Defendant.

Primos, J.

                                        1
       Before the Court is a motion to suppress filed by Defendant Daquan Watson
(hereinafter “Defendant”) seeking suppression of evidence obtained in the course of
two warrantless administrative searches conducted by probation officers. The Court
held a suppression hearing on May 18, 2023, at which the State presented testimony
from Probation and Parole Officers Ricky Porter (hereinafter “Officer Porter”) and
Eric Larsen (hereinafter “Officer Larsen”) and Probation Supervisor Joel Duquette
(hereinafter “Officer Duquette”). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion
to suppress is DENIED.
                                    FINDINGS OF FACT1
       1.      In November 2022, Officer Porter received tips from two confidential
informants2 alleging that Defendant, while serving a sentence of probation, was in
possession of a firearm and dealing drugs.3 Specifically, the informants indicated
that Defendant was carrying a black semi-automatic pistol and that he was selling
cocaine and heroin in downtown Dover.4 The informants also said that Defendant
was packaging heroin and cocaine at an unspecified residence in downtown Dover.5
Based on his years of experience as a probation officer involved in Operation Safe
Streets, Officer Porter understood “downtown Dover” to refer to a specific three-to-
four block area which he described as “high-drug.”6

1
  “At a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the
witnesses.” State v. Brown, 287 A.3d 1222, 1230 (Del. Super. 2023).
2
  The incident report, written by Officer Larsen, mentions only one informant. See Def. Ex. 1.
Officer Larsen testified that he personally dealt directly only with one informant. Tr. of
Suppression H’rg [hereinafter “H’rg Tr.”] at 38:4–5. Officer Porter testified that he spoke with two
informants and did not know why Officer Larsen only mentioned one in the report. Id. at 22:12–
13, 18.
3
  Hr’g Tr. at 7:17–21.
4
  Id. at 8:21–9:5.
5
  Id.
6
  Id. at 11:7–10.
                                                  2
       2.      The informants identified Defendant by a DELJIS photograph,
provided his phone number, and stated that he drove a gray Infiniti.7 Officer Porter
considered both informants to be past-proven reliable because they had previously
provided tips that led to arrests related to drug and firearm offenses.8 The informants
received monetary payment for information that was proven accurate or led to
arrests.9
       3.      The officers corroborated the tips in several ways. They verified that
the phone number provided matched Defendant’s phone number on file in the
Delaware Automated Correction System (DACS) probation database.10 In addition,
Defendant’s supervising probation officer was familiar with Defendant’s gray
Infiniti, and Officer Porter had seen Defendant driving it several days earlier.11 The
vehicle was especially recognizable because it had bullet holes in the door.12 Finally,
the officers checked the license plate number with Dover’s License Plate Reader
system and confirmed that the gray Infiniti had been driven in the downtown Dover
area multiple times daily over the course of the month of November.13
       4.      On November 17, 2022, an undercover police officer spotted
Defendant’s gray Infiniti parked in downtown Dover.14 An Operation Safe Streets
unit, including Officers Porter and Larsen, responded. Before officers contacted
him, however, Defendant “went mobile” and was followed to his residence.15
Officers Porter and Larsen believed that Defendant was driving on a suspended

7
  Id.
8
  Id. at 8:3–5; 27:3–6.
9
  Id. at 8:10–11, 27:9–12.
10
   Id. at 9:4–7.
11
   Id. at 9:12–16.
12
   Id. at 9:18–20.
13
   See Def. Ex. 1; Hr’g Tr. at 37:3–7.
14
   Hr.’g Tr. at 11:21–23.
15
   Id. at 12:11–21.
                                           3
license, and Officer Larsen confirmed this fact via DELJIS on the way to the
residence.16
        5.      While en route to the residence, Officer Porter called Officer Duquette
and obtained permission for an administrative search of Defendant’s vehicle (the
Infiniti) and his person.17 Officer Porter and Officer Duquette reviewed the four
decision factors provided for in Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 (hereinafter
“Procedure 7.19”) and went over a pre-search checklist.18 Officer Porter told Officer
Duquette the substance of the tips and that Defendant was on probation for a firearms
offense.19 He explained that the tips were corroborated by the phone number and
DELJIS identification, the accurate description of Defendant’s vehicle, and the
observation of Defendant in downtown Dover,20 but may have omitted that the
officers had used the Dover License Plate Reader to verify Defendant’s daily trips
to downtown Dover.21
        6.      Defendant was stopped outside of the residence and officers searched
his vehicle and his person. In the vehicle, they found two mason jars with marijuana
residue, plastic bags, and a digital scale,22 which in Officer Porter’s experience are
all indicative of drug dealing.23 The search of Defendant’s person also yielded 17
bags of suspected heroin (which later turned out to be fentanyl upon testing).24

16
   Id. at 38:15–22.
17
   Officer Larsen wrote in his report only that permission was obtained to search the vehicle. Def.
Ex. 1. Officer Porter’s unrebutted testimony, however, was that he obtained permission to search
both the vehicle and Defendant’s person. Hr’g Tr. at 18:23–19:2 (“I received approval from my
supervisor to search Daquan Watson and the vehicle he was operating . . . .”).
18
   Hr’g Tr. at 13:12–22; State Ex. 1.
19
   Hr’g Tr. at 16:10–17:2, 17:6–7.
20
   Id. at 18:8–12.
21
   Officer Porter testified that he could not recall if the license plate reader results were specifically
discussed on the call. Id. at 18:16–18.
22
   Id. at 19:3–6.
23
   Id. at 19:16–20.
24
   Id. at 19:9–12, 39:17–18.
                                                    4
       7.       Officer Porter called Officer Duquette again and told him what was
found in the initial search, and Officer Duquette granted permission to conduct a
second administrative search, this time of Defendant’s bedroom.25 Officer Duquette
based his decision both on the evidence discussed in the first call and the new
information provided about the results of the initial search.26
                                  LEGAL STANDARD
       8.       At a suppression hearing challenging a warrantless search, the State
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it complied with
the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and any applicable
statutes.27
       9.       “By agreeing to probation, individuals sacrifice some of their privacy
rights in exchange for freedom from incarceration.”28 A probation officer needs only
“a reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds to justify an administrative search of
a residence or car.”29 Delaware courts consider probation officers “to have acted
reasonably so long as they substantially comply with Delaware Department of
Corrections [sic] regulations.”30
       10.      Under Procedure 7.19, a probation officer must hold a case conference
with the officer’s supervisor and review the following four decision factors in order
to obtain permission to conduct an administrative search:
       (1) Whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the offender possesses
              contraband;

25
   Id. at 21:3–9; 21:15–17. Officer Porter had already spoken with Defendant’s aunt, the owner of
the residence, and she had given him permission to enter and had told him which room was
Defendant’s. Id. at 20:1–16.
26
   Id. at 32:18–20.
27
   Brown, 287 A.3d 1229–30.
28
   Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 832 (Del. 2008) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874
(1987)).
29
   Murray v. State, 45 A.3d 670, 678 (Del. 2012).
30
   Id.
                                               5
        (2) Whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the offender is in
              violation of probation or parole;
        (3) Whether there is information from a reliable informant indicating that the
              offender possesses contraband or is violating the law; and
        (4) Whether the information from the informant has been corroborated.31
In considering the reliability of an informant, the probation officer must also
consider (1) the detail and consistency of the information; (2) the reliability of the
informant in the past; and (3) any reasons why the informant would supply the
information.32
        11.      Procedure 7.19 was promulgated pursuant to the Department of
Correction’s statutory authority under 11 Del. C. § 4321, and lack of substantial
compliance with the regulation is a statutory violation warranting exclusion of
evidence.33 “Administrative searches must be supported by reasonable suspicion to
be in compliance with Procedure 7.19.”34
                                             ANALYSIS
        12.      At the suppression hearing, Defendant clarified that his primary
argument is that the informants’ tips were not sufficiently corroborated under the
fourth prong of the Procedure 7.19 analysis.35

31
   Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008); Gibson v. State, 135 A.3d 78, 2016 WL 943842, at
*2 (Del. 2016) (TABLE); Sierra, 958 A.2d at 829.
32
   Gibson, 2016 WL 943842, at *2; Culver, 956 A.2d at 11.
33
   See Culver, 956 A.2d at 7 n.1 (“Because we find that probation officers violated their clear
statutory mandate, we do not reach any constitutional questions.”); see also Walker v. State, 205
A.3d 823, 826 (Del. 2019) (explaining that failure to determine reasonable suspicion in accordance
with Procedure 7.19 is a statutory violation apart from the constitutional argument warranting
suppression at a violation of probation hearing); Lloyd v. State, 292 A.3d 100, 105 (Del. 2023)
(“Delaware statutory law governs the exercise of the power of probation officers to search and
arrest probationers without a warrant.”).
34
   Lloyd, 292 A.3d at 106.
35
   See H’rg Tr. at 4:17–5:4. It is indisputable that the facts alleged in the tips, if true, were sufficient
to support the first two decision factors, i.e., (1) that Defendant possessed contraband (illegal
narcotics and a firearm as a person prohibited) and (2) that he was in violation of his probation.
                                                     6
       13.     While the third prong of Procedure 7.19 is not the primary focus of
Defendant’s argument, the Court finds first that the tips provided to Officer Porter
were reliable. “An informant is ‘past proven reliable,’ if the informant has given
reliable information in the past.”36 Officer Porter had personal knowledge that both
informants had supplied information leading to arrests in the past and that they each
had a financial incentive to provide accurate information. Moreover, the two tips
were consistent with one another and detailed in most respects (save for not
identifying the specific residence that Defendant used to package heroin).
       14.     Turning to the fourth prong, prior to obtaining permission for the first
administrative search, the officers corroborated both the personal and vehicle
information relayed by the informants. They also confirmed that Defendant’s
vehicle was regularly frequenting downtown Dover.                        Given Officer Porter’s
knowledge of the area’s reputation for drug activity and the informants’ tips, this
information was sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that contraband or
evidence would be found in the vehicle and on Defendant’s person.37 Officer Porter
relayed and discussed most of this information with Officer Duquette through a
phone call before the search was approved, thus substantially complying with
Procedure 7.19.38 Even if he was unaware of the license plate reader results, Officer
Duquette knew that the informants were past-proven reliable, that the personal

36
   Shepeard v. State, 133 A.3d 204, 2016 WL 690544, at *2 (Del. 2016) (TABLE).
37
    See Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 292–93 (Del. 2004) (“Officer DuPont had received
information from a past proven reliable informant that a probationer of a certain description was
selling drugs in a particular area and driving a vehicle of a certain description. . . . When he located
a vehicle and its driver matching the description in the general area described in the tip, and then
confirmed that the car was registered to a probationer, the informant’s tip was corroborated.”); see
also Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Del. 2001) (explaining that an area’s “high crime
nature” is a “‘relevant contextual consideration’ in a reasonable suspicion analysis” (quoting
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000))).
38
   Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 2010) (explaining that a telephonic case conference
in which the decision factors are discussed and rationally assessed substantially complies with
Procedure 7.19).
                                                   7
information was corroborated, and that Defendant was seen driving the same vehicle
described by the informants in downtown Dover prior to granting approval for the
search.
       15.     The second administrative search (the search of Defendant’s bedroom
inside the residence) occurred only after the officers found suspected heroin and
other indicia of drug dealing in the first search. That first search occurred just
outside of Defendant’s residence, further corroborating the allegation that Defendant
was packaging heroin in a residence in downtown Dover. Thus, by the time the
officers acted on the less detailed portion of the tip (regarding drug packaging at a
residence), it had been corroborated with specific evidence supporting the
allegations of criminal activity.39 In accordance with Procedure 7.19, Officer Porter
discussed this new information with Officer Duquette via phone and obtained
permission to conduct a second administrative search.
       16.     Defendant relies primarily on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in Gibson v. State to argue for suppression.40              Gibson, however, supports the
opposite conclusion. In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial
of a probationer’s motion to suppress on facts closely analogous to this case. In
Gibson, the source of the tip was a “past, reliable CI” whose previous tips had led to
arrests.41 The informant in Gibson alleged that the probationer possessed a firearm
and drugs.42 He “relayed specific personal details about Gibson including Gibson’s
full name, probation level, curfew, and the reason why he was on probation.”43 By
way of corroboration, the probation officer confirmed that “the personal information

39
   Cf. Lloyd, 292 A.3d at 110 (holding that reasonable suspicion existed to search a probationer’s
home after heroin was found during a search of his person).
40
   135 A.3d 78, 2016 WL 943842 (Del. 2016) (TABLE).
41
   Id. at *2.
42
   Id.
43
   Id.
                                                8
was accurate.”44       Notably, there is no indication in Gibson that the officers
independently corroborated the firearm or drug allegations, including the specific
allegation that Gibson was stashing the contraband in his car just prior to his 8:00
p.m. curfew.45 Likewise, in this case, probation officers acted on information from
past-proven reliable informants, whose tips had led to prior arrests, and corroborated
the probationer’s personal information prior to conducting any search.
                                     CONCLUSION
           As explained above, the tips from these two past-proven reliable informants
were sufficiently corroborated to justify the initial search of Defendant’s vehicle and
person, and the fruits of the first search provided sufficient corroboration to justify
the search of Defendant’s home.          Officer Porter substantially complied with
Procedure 7.19 by conducting a telephonic conference and discussing the decision
factors with his supervisor prior to each search.
           Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to suppress is
DENIED.
           IT IS SO ORDERED.

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44
     Id.
45
     Id.
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