Court Opinion

ID: 9576892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:29:53.036343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:42.268348
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree that summary judgment was not warranted in this case, I write separately to address paragraph (a) of the majority opinion because the issue of strict liability is not properly before this Court since the Pertons’ response to Motel Properties’ memorandum of law withdrew this cause of action from their complaint: “2. Strict Liability — Count III. Plaintiff withdraws this Count as a cause of action.” Therefore, the trial court was without authority to rule on the validity of strict liability as a cause of action in this case, and review of the trial court’s order shows that it did not rule on that issue: The lower court merely stated that, “[i]n its motion, the defendant showed the Court that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to this case [cit.], and that Georgia law does not provide for strict liability in a case such as this. [Cit.]” This statement is a narrative of the posture of the case, and examination of the entire *546order shows it did not constitute a ruling on the merits of strict liability as a cause of action. Consequently, as this issue was not ruled upon by the trial court, it is not ripe for appellate review. Devins v. Leafmore Forest Condo. Assn. &c., 200 Ga. App. 158, 159 (3) (407 SE2d 76). “[T]his court does not render advisory opinions.” Chambers v. State, 204 Ga. App. 396 (420 SE2d 393).
Decided February 11, 1998.
Zipperer & Lorberbaum, Steven L. Beauvais, Eric R. Gotwalt, for appellants.
Woodall & Mackenzie, John T. Woodall, Peter A. Giusti, for appellee.
Further, the Pertons enumerated as error only that the trial court erred by deciding as a matter of law that Mrs. Perton had superior knowledge of the defective condition of the bicycle and that the trial court erred by deciding as a matter of law that she assumed the risk. Thus, no issue concerning strict liability is properly before this Court. This Court’s function is to correct errors of law of which the parties complain, and our responsibility does not reach reviewing the record and sua sponte raising and deciding issues not raised by the parties. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III; Tandy Corp. v. McCrimmon, 183 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) (360 SE2d 70). Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on the matters discussed in paragraph (a) of the majority opinion.
Nevertheless, as I agree that the evidence is not conclusive that Mrs. Perton had actual knowledge of the danger associated with continuing to ride the bicycle and understood and appreciated the risks associated with the danger (see Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862 (471 SE2d 866)), I concur with reversing the grant of summary judgment to Motel Properties.