Court Opinion

ID: 9845501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:23:09.72305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.456524
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.
dissenting
The majority approves the extension of the “fireman’s rule” to afford immunity to a negligent actor for an injury occurring away from the premises on which the negligence took place. I would not make that extension, and I therefore dissent.
Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or 359, 467 P2d 429 (1970), which first recognized the rule in Oregon, is expressly reasoned in terms of the liability of owners or possessors of premises for injuries incurred in emergency situations on or in proximity to the premises. Cullivan v. Leston, 43 Or App 361, 602 P2d 1121 (1980), extended the immunity created by Spencer to the defendant in a claim by a policeman injured in attempting to break up a barroom brawl. It is also, at least implicitly, based on ideas about the liability of owners or occupiers of premises.
In retrospect, I am doubtful whether the rule ought to have been extended as it was in Cullivan. This case is another, and I think considerably more far reaching, expansion of the scope of the immunity. Logic neither compels nor frustrates that extension. It appears to be a pure policy choice. Believing that immunity from the consequences of one’s dangerous acts should be granted only where there is a compelling policy reason to do so, I would not grant the immunity here.