Court Opinion

ID: 9624929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:22:02.431843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:02.252154
License: Public Domain

DENNIS R. KNAPP, Chief District Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached by the majority in denying the relief sought by plaintiff and intervening plaintiffs herein. I would grant the injunction. Inasmuch as the majority, in a well-articulated opinion, have thoroughly presented the history of the litigation, the factual matters and issues of law raised thereby, together with citations of authority in support of their conclusions, I shall proceed directly to a consideration of the basis for my disagreement with the majority.
Succinctly stated, and with all deference to the majority, I believe they have misapplied the principles of law they enunciate to the particular facts and circumstances of this case. It is of utmost significance to keep in proper perspective the objects and purposes of 49 U.S. C.A. § 13(4), and the fact that the duties and responsibilities of the federal and state regulatory bodies are so interrelated that mutual cooperation of the agencies is contemplated. I am convinced that the provisions of the aforesaid section require a searching and intensive investigation by the federal agency as a prerequisite to the ICC’s report and orders. In view of the fact that the defendants made absolutely no attempt to justify its tariffs in a proceeding before the Public Service Commission of West Virginia, I say they failed in a duty imposed by the implied, if not the express, terms of the statute. Indeed, the fact that the order of the ICC contains a provision for modification of specific intrastate rates found unrelated to interstate rates lends credence to the thesis that the investigation, report and consequent orders of the ICC were made without the required degree of factual development contemplated by the Act. It is to be noted also that the Commission reversed the findings of the Administrative Law Judge who heard the evidence; and did so without any effort to explain or distinguish its findings and conclusions from that of its fact finder.
While conceding that the question of the weight of the evidence is one for the Commission and not the Court, State of Florida v. U. S., 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077, nevertheless, the ICC must base its order on evidence which is substantial. State of South Carolina v. United States, D.C., 136 F.Supp. 897, aff’d 351 U.S. 944, 76 S.Ct. 845, 100 L. *18Ed. 1470; Mississippi Public Service Comm. v. United States, D.C., 124 F. Supp. 809, aff’d 349 U.S. 908, 75 S.Ct. 599, 99 L.Ed. 1244. And that requirement contemplates evidence that is relevant to every factor involved in rate making. The failure of the ICC to comply with that requirement of substantial evidence results in a dilution of the standards of administrative due process and should not go unchallenged. A rate thus contrived and put into effect is not a fair and just rate and imposes an unfair burden on the consuming public, not to mention the economic dislocation created thereby. Moreover, it should be noted that-different conditions, circumstances and statutory requirements in different states require and justify different results in fixing intrastate freight rates; and the findings of a state regulatory body which is familiar with such conditions in the state, when its opinion differs from the Commission’s findings, weighs heavily against the conclusions of that agency. Mississippi Public Service Commission v. U. S., supra.
I do not agree that under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, as above related, the orders of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence.
Adopting the premise hereinabove set out, particularly in that the ICC chose apparently to ignore the state agency involved, and failed to conduct an inquiry of the depth and magnitude I believe was contemplated by the statute and dictated by the circumstances, I am of the firm opinion that the ICC abused its powers. I conclude, therefore, that its actions in the premises were unwarranted and without support in law, and that consequent orders exceeded the limits of its authority under the statute by the terms of which it purported to act.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.