Court Opinion

ID: 9891909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 19:01:12.190717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:01:13.576782
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12770   Document: 29-1    Date Filed: 10/19/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-12770
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       MAMBERTO REAL,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       JUDITH MORAN,
       FRANK DIAZ GINES,
       PRESBYTERIAN HOMES & HOUSING
       FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12770     Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 10/19/2023    Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12770

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00926-JLB-KCD
                           ____________________

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Mamberto Real, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, his claims of national
       origin discrimination pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42
       U.S.C. § 3604; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. §
       2000d; and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. He asserts
       the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint
       as a shotgun pleading. He maintains the dismissal was improper
       due to an earlier grant of leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)
       that he asserts creates a conflict of interpretation between a
       magistrate judge and the district court. After review, we affirm the
       district court.
              Shotgun pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources,
       inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on
       appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the
       courts.” Vibe Micro Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
       2008) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Shotgun
       pleadings include complaints that: (1) contain multiple counts
       where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2)
       are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
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       22-12770               Opinion of the Court                        3

       obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) do not
       separate each cause of action or claim for relief into separate
       counts; or (4) assert multiple claims against multiple defendants
       without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
       which acts or omissions. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriﬀ’s Oﬀ., 792
       F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). All these types of shotgun
       pleadings are characterized by their failure “to give the defendants
       adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon
       which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
              The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
       Real’s complaint as a shotgun pleading. See id. at 1320 (reviewing
       the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on shotgun pleading
       grounds for abuse of discretion). As the district court found, Real’s
       complaint has aspects of the first and second forms of shotgun
       pleadings as each count adopts allegations of the preceding counts
       and the complaint contains vague and conclusory allegations.
              The complaint contained seven counts, each
       reincorporating by reference the allegations set out in paragraphs
       1 through 36. While the reincorporations appear to be limited to
       the “factual allegations” portion of his complaint, the last five
       paragraphs (paragraphs 32 through 36) of Real’s factual allegations
       are legal conclusions, and Real merges the same legal claims into
       each of the seven counts. Thus, by realleging paragraphs 32
       through 36 into each count of the complaint, Real cumulatively
       restates allegations of retaliation and discrimination throughout his
       complaint, making it “virtually impossible to know which
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12770

       allegations . . . are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”
       See Anderson v. District Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d
       364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996).
              Real’s complaint also contained conclusory and vague
       language and facts that could not be clearly attributed to any
       particular cause of action. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. Real
       alleged retaliation during the rental process throughout his
       complaint. Stating a claim for retaliatory housing discrimination
       requires a plaintiff to allege the defendants coerced, intimidated,
       threatened, or interfered with his exercise of rights under the FHA.
       42 U.S.C. § 3617. Real pleads the elements of a claim under § 3617
       without explaining how the facts of his case correlate to the
       elements of the cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
       678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
       action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
       Additionally, the many unsupported assertions within the
       complaint fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
       against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests. See
       Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
              The district court did not err by dismissing Real’s complaint
       and exercising its inherent authority to control its dockets. See Vibe
       Micro Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295 (“A district court has the inherent
       authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of
       lawsuits, which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on
       shotgun pleading grounds.” (quotation marks omitted)). The
       instant complaint represents Real’s fourth attempt to cure his
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       22-12770               Opinion of the Court                          5

       defective complaint, taking into account three complaints he ﬁled
       in an earlier, almost identical proceeding, followed by the present
       suit. The record supports that Real received ample guidance from
       both the magistrate judge and the district court as to how to
       organize his pleadings.
               Moreover, Real does not argue on appeal that the district
       court should not have dismissed the complaint without ﬁrst
       granting him leave to amend it, so any issue in that respect is
       forfeited. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-72 (11th
       Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022) (explaining issues
       not raised in a brief are forfeited). Likewise, Real asked the district
       court to dismiss his instant complaint with prejudice if it deemed
       the ﬁling a shotgun pleading, so he could seek review from this
       Court. In any event, his litigation history suggests that any further
       attempt to amend would have been futile. Finally, the magistrate
       judge’s determination that Real could proceed IFP did not preclude
       a later determination to dismiss the complaint. See Coﬁeld v. Ala.
       Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
       that despite the fact a court may have reviewed a complaint and
       granted IFP status when the complaint was initially ﬁled, the court
       may dismiss the complaint at a later date if the court determines
       the action is frivolous). Accordingly, we aﬃrm. 1
              AFFIRMED.

       1 We DENY Real’s Motion to Expedite Appeal as moot.