Court Opinion

ID: 9960154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:17.695379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.632331
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    DOMENIQUE THOMAS WILSON AKA                 :
    DONMONIC THOMAS WILSON                      :
                                                :   No. 1184 MDA 2023
                       Appellant                :

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 18, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-18-CR-0000148-2009

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 15, 2024

       Domenique       Thomas      Wilson,     a.k.a.   Donmonic   Thomas   Wilson

(Appellant), appeals from the order denying his fifth petition for relief filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and

a Turner/Finley1 “no-merit” letter. We grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw

and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

       In 2009, Appellant broke into an apartment occupied by three women,

raped two of the women, and stole their debit cards, credit cards, and cell

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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phones. Appellant fled the scene. He later withdrew money from one victim’s

bank account and attempted to make purchases with one of the stolen credit

cards.    On February 13, 2009, shortly after 2:00 p.m., police arrested

Appellant pursuant to a bench warrant.2 Thereafter, Appellant was taken to

the police station. Police requested three search warrants, which were issued

between approximately 8:50 and 9:00 p.m. the same day. After executing

the search warrants, police obtained, inter alia, DNA linking Appellant to the

above-described crimes. The Commonwealth charged Appellant, via a 37-

count criminal information, with various sexual and theft-related offenses.

       A jury convicted Appellant of all 37 charged offenses. On June 7, 2010,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 70 to 196 years in prison.

This Court subsequently affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.        See

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 38 A.3d 911, 1116 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed

Nov. 3, 2011) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek allowance

of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

       Over the next decade, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated four PCRA

petitions.

____________________________________________

2 Included with the February 13, 2009, search warrants are bench warrants

issued at two 2007 magisterial district court dockets. At MD-0000089-07, the
magisterial district court issued a bench warrant based on Appellant’s failure
to appear as a subpoenaed witness in his co-defendant’s summary trial. “It
is this [w]arrant that was executed … on February 13, 2009.” PCRA Court
Opinion, 10/7/22, at 6.

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       On October 21, 2022, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition.

Appellant alleged, as he had in his fourth PCRA petition, that he had never

received a copy of the bench warrant underlying his arrest.             Appellant

additionally argued that officers conducted an illegal search of his person at

the police station before issuance of the search warrants. See PCRA Petition,

10/21/22, at 3-4; see also id. at 3 (stating the search included taking “nude

photographs of my naked body” without a search warrant or probable cause)).

Appellant also asserted his first PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to

obtain a copy of the bench warrant.3

       The PCRA court appointed Counsel to represent Appellant and directed

Counsel to file an amended PCRA petition. The Commonwealth filed a motion

to dismiss Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition as untimely filed. In lieu of filing an

amended PCRA petition, Counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw from

representation and a Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter. On May 2, 2023, the

PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s

PCRA petition without a hearing. The PCRA court also directed Counsel to

____________________________________________

3 Appellant purported to challenge first PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness under

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley,
261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021) (holding “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA
court denies relief and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise
claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even
if on appeal.” (footnote omitted)).

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provide Appellant with the Turner/Finley letter and Rule 907 notice.4

Counsel complied.

       On May 19, 2023, Appellant filed a lengthy pro se petition for writ of

habeas corpus, arguing that evidence obtained by police during the initial

illegal search was referenced in the affidavits of probable cause submitted with

the bench warrant applications.          See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

5/19/23, at 11 (unnumbered).5 Appellant also argued, in part, that all prior

counsel were ineffective.          Appellant alleged that Counsel made false

statements in his Turner/Finley letter. As directed by the PCRA court, the

parties filed supplemental responses to certain portions of Appellant’s pro se

habeas corpus petition.6

       The PCRA court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition. The

PCRA court ultimately denied the petition on July 18, 2023. Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court did not grant Counsel’s request to withdraw.

5 In its disposition of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition, the court explained that

the affidavits of probable cause included a statement that Appellant “is
circumcised and had very short, trimmed pubic hair.” PCRA Court Opinion,
10/7/22, at 6.

6 The PCRA court addressed Appellant’s pro se habeas corpus petition
simultaneously with his fifth PCRA petition.

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      On December 15, 2023, Counsel filed in this Court a petition to withdraw

as counsel and accompanying Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter.

      Before reviewing the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must examine

Counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451,

454 (Pa. Super. 2012).        “Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA

representation … must review the case zealously.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The necessary independent review requires counsel to file a “no-
      merit” letter detailing the nature and extent of his review and list
      each issue the petitioner wishes to have examined, explaining why
      those issues are meritless. The PCRA court, or an appellate court
      if the no-merit letter is filed before it, … then must conduct its own
      independent evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that
      the petition is without merit….

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).   Additionally, counsel must serve his client with the petition to

withdraw and no-merit letter, and he must inform his client of his right to

proceed pro se or retain private counsel. See id.

      Here, the record confirms that Counsel served Appellant with a copy of

the petition to withdraw and no-merit letter.        The letter properly details

Counsel’s review of the record and concludes that all possible issues would be

frivolous to raise on appeal.    Counsel further provided an explanation of

Appellant’s right to raise additional claims by proceeding pro se or by retaining

private counsel.   Therefore, we conclude that Counsel complied with the

dictates of Turner/Finley.

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       In the Turner/Finley letter, Counsel raised the issue of whether the

search warrant relied on illegally obtained evidence (i.e., police conducted the

search before the warrants were issued) and should have been suppressed.

See Turner/Finley Letter at 13.7

       We review the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition to determine “whether

the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported in the record, and whether its

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

       Prior to reaching the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must consider the

timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d

988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).             The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional, and courts lack jurisdiction to address claims raised in untimely

petitions.   See Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40, 45 (Pa.

Super. 2006). A PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the

____________________________________________

7 Appellant did not retain private counsel or file a pro se appellate brief.
However, Appellant submitted additional pro se documents. In a letter to the
PCRA court (which was forwarded to this Court and received on March 1,
2024), Appellant identifies evidence which, he believes, establishes a witness
was in Texas at the time of the offenses. The witness did not testify at trial.
Rather, the witness identified Appellant from a photograph displayed on the
local news. Appellant also mailed a letter to this Court inquiring about the
status of this case. Neither pro se document identifies additional claims
Appellant wishes to pursue on appeal.

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judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes

final, for purposes of PCRA review, “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the … Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at

the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3).

      It is undisputed that Appellant’s PCRA petition is patently untimely, as

his judgment of sentence became final in December 2011, when the time for

seeking allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P.

1113(a) (providing a petition for allowance of appeal must be filed within 30

days after the entry the Superior Court’s order). A court may consider an

untimely petition if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three

exceptions set forth under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).      Any petition

invoking an exception “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “The PCRA petitioner

bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of the exceptions.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017).

      Appellant attempts to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception set

forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant claims the bench warrant

issued at MD-0000089-07 constitutes a newly-discovered fact, because he did

not obtain a copy of it until after the hearing on his fourth PCRA petition. PCRA

Petition, 10/21/22, at 3.

      The newly-discovered fact exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a “petitioner to allege and prove that there were ‘facts’

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that were ‘unknown’ to him and that he exercised ‘due diligence.’”

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa. 2007); see also 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).    “The focus of this exception is on the newly

discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, despite Appellant’s focus on the bench warrant, the crux of

his argument is that police illegally searched him prior to the issuance of the

search warrants.   See N.T., 7/12/23, at 10 (Appellant asking whether the

bench warrant gave police authority “to do what they had done to me under

the bench warrant status?”); see also PCRA Petition, 10/21/22, at 4 (arguing

Appellant could not establish the search was illegal without the bench

warrant). Appellant acknowledged he told “every attorney” about the search,

including his trial and first PCRA counsel. N.T., 7/12/23, at 11. Thus, the fact

that police performed a search prior to issuance of the search warrants is not

a newly discovered fact. Further, Appellant has not established that the bench

warrant issued at MD-0000089-07 was necessary to support an illegal search

claim. See generally Turner/Finley Letter at 17-18 (stating Appellant “is

mistaken as to which warrant [] he should have challenged in that the bench

warrant … was not the correct warrant to attack to establish that his

constitutional rights were violated.” (some capitalization modified)).

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      Moreover, to the extent Appellant wishes to collaterally attack his first

PCRA counsel’s failure to raise an issue concerning the search via Bradley,

this claim is unavailing.    This Court has explained that “Bradley does not

provide an exception to the PCRA’s time bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Stahl,

292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023); see also Commonwealth v.

Pridgen, 305 A.3d 97, 102 (Pa. Super. 2023) (reviewing unpublished

memoranda declining to extend Bradley to cases involving untimely PCRA

petition).

      Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition is facially untimely, and Appellant failed

to establish a statutory exception to the timeliness requirement. As the PCRA

court properly applied the law to these facts, we discern no abuse of

discretion. Further, our independent review of the certified record does not

reveal any other meritorious issues. See Reed, 107 A.3d at 140. Accordingly,

we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order denying

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/15/2024

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