Court Opinion

ID: 9397732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 05:06:48.410192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.896541
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,                                         UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    May 25, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 360079
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
DOMINIQUE JAMIA JOHNSON,                                            LC No. 20-009080-NF

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O’BRIEN, JJ.

O’BRIEN, J. (dissenting)

       I respectfully dissent.

        Melvin Jackson testified that, on the day of the accident, he went out to dinner with his
wife (Joi Jackson), his son (Eric Jackson), and his son’s girlfriend (defendant). According to
Melvin, after dinner, Eric “said that [Melvin] could take the car” that belonged to defendant.
Melvin never received permission from defendant to use the car. Melvin nevertheless took the
car, then got into an accident.

        The majority reasons that, under these facts, MCL 500.3113(a) may preclude Melvin from
receiving no-fault benefits. That subsection provides:

              A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for
       accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following
       circumstances existed:

              (a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle
       or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have
       known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. [MCL
       500.3113.]

This subsection has two requirements: (1) the person willingly operated or used a motor vehicle
that was taken unlawfully and (2) the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle
was taken unlawfully. As used in the statute, “taken unlawfully” means to “take[] a vehicle without

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the authority of the owner, regardless of whether that person intended to steal it.” Spectrum Health
Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 492 Mich 503, 518; 821 NW2d 117 (2012).

        Here, Melvin neither knew nor should he have known that he had taken defendant’s vehicle
without her authorization. After Melvin went to dinner with Eric and defendant, Eric gave Melvin
permission to use defendant’s car. While defendant did not expressly give Melvin permission to
use the car, Melvin subjectively believed that he was taking the car lawfully, as demonstrated by
his deposition testimony:

               Q. So [defendant] herself did not actually tell you you could take the car?

               A. My son, her man, that’s her man, told me we could take the car.

               Q. Did he own the car?

               A. I don’t know what they—how they situation is.

        Nothing in the record suggests that Melvin should have known that his subjective belief
was mistaken. Again, Eric gave Melvin permission to use defendant’s car after Melvin, Eric, and
defendant all had dinner together. Defendant did not object or voice any concerns to Melvin about
his use of her car. The bare fact that defendant’s boyfriend, rather than defendant, told Melvin that
he could use defendant’s car after all three had dinner together would not alert a reasonable person
to the possibility that defendant did not authorize Melvin’s use of the car. To the contrary, a
reasonable person in Melvin’s position would believe that defendant had no issue with Melvin’s
use of the vehicle. There is simply nothing in the record to support concluding that Melvin should
have known that he was using defendant’s motor vehicle without her authorization.

        Accordingly, on this record, I would conclude that defendant has presented insufficient
evidence to create a question of fact about whether Melvin knew or should have known that he
was using defendant’s car without her authorization. It follows that MCL 500.3113(a) does not
apply, and any amendment to defendant’s pleadings would be futile. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent.

                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

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