Court Opinion

ID: 9601211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:39:44.531686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:56.040980
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in the result)—I think the rule as presently stated under our decisions, making it discretionary with the trial court as to whether evidence will be admitted relative to, (a) specific acts of misconduct, or (b) general reputation for chastity as bearing upon credibility, should be adhered to in the instant case. The policy inherent in such a rule seems to me to be much more sound as a practical matter than the rule excluding such evidence entirely. While it may be theorized—and possibly, fairly convincingly—that any relationship between chastity and credibility is remote; and while instances may be cited wherein prostitutes have been known to be quite truthful and somewhat reliable individuals; nevertheless, as a practical matter or general proposition, it seems to me that a strong sense of morality, or the impulse to comply with recognized moral standards, constitutes the common base for, (a) truthfulness or credibility, and (b) chastity.
If such a common base has been weakened or is missing in the case of chastity, it seems to me, as a general proposition, quite likely that such a base may be weakened or missing in connection with other moral aspects of human relationships. I cannot agree that reputation for chastity and credibility are completely unrelated. It appears to- me that the contrary would be nearer the truth, and that a basis or justification exists for the rule allowing evidence of the former to be admitted in the discretion of a trial court as *656proof respecting the latter. The majority opinion refers to the early Washington case of State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 106, 28 Pac. 28, wherein the court said:
“She could not have ruthlessly destroyed that quality upon which most other good qualities are dependent, and for which, above all others, a woman is reverenced and respected, and yet retain her credit for truthfulness unsmirched.”
The good common horse sense in the above quotation seems quite convincing to me. I accept its down-to-earth practicality.
An element of safety or tolerance may possibly be brought into play in seduction and rape cases by adhering to the rule of admissibility in the discretion of the trial court. I am convinced that the element of safety or tolerance as it may inhere in the exercise of discretion by the trial court judge would be highly desirable. The evidence admitted under such circumstances should not be regarded as a defense. Its significance should be restricted and the jury carefully instructed to consider it solely in connection with the question of the credibility of the prosecutrix. Discretionary admissibility can be restricted to cases of seduction and rape. Admission of evidence as to specific acts of misconduct as a matter of right, under the older Washington cases, seems to have been limited to cases involving seduction, statutory rape and gambling. State v. Jones, 80 Wash. 588, 142 Pac. 35; State v. Godwin, 131 Wash. 591, 230 Pac. 831; State v. Smith, 145 Wash. 250, 259 Pac. 711. In connection with the rule of discretionary admissibility, the fear of extending the rule or of throwing the door wide open in all cases involving a woman litigant or witness, as theorized in People v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431, 96 N. E. 268, seems like nothing more or less than putting up a straw man. That argument is not convincing to me.
Admission of evidence of specific acts of misconduct as a matter of right was abandoned in favor of a rule of admission at the discretion of the trial court in State v. Linton, 36 Wn. (2d) 67, 216 P. (2d) 761. Admission of evidence *657respecting general reputation for chastity is no longer a matter of right. Its admission is discretionary under existing decisions. State v. Elder, 130 Wash. 612, 228 Pac. 1016; State v. Hoggatt, 38 Wn. (2d) 932, 234 P. (2d) 495.
In 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) 447 through 468, there is a clear and noteworthy discussion of the problem of admissibility of evidence concerning reputation for chastity, and evidence respecting social and mental history, as bearing upon veracity or credibility of a prosecutrix in cases involving charges of' sex offences. The discussion is too lengthy to be quoted in full; however, it is too well reasoned and pertinent to be overlooked entirely in disposing of the instant case. Since it would be difficult to improve upon Wigmore’s language, I quote verbatim some noteworthy paragraphs from his discussion (3 Wigmore on Evidence (3d) 459-469, § 924a):
“The modern realist movement having insisted on removing the veil of romance which enveloped all womanhood since the days of chivalry, it is now allowable for judges to look at the facts. The facts are that there exist occasionally female types of excessive or perverted sexuality, just as there are such male types; and that these are often accompanied by a testimonial plausibility which should not be taken at its face value. Only an inquiry into the social and mental history will reveal the degree of credibility. This inquiry the law of Evidence ought to permit to the fullest extent, rejecting the hindrance of rules that were framed without an understanding of these facts.

“No judge should ever let a sex-offence charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.

“It is time that the Courts awakened to the sinister possibilities of injustice that lurk in believing such a witness without careful psychiatric scrutiny.”
Significantly, Wigmore further elaborates on the problem, as follows (p. 459, § 924a):
“There is, however, at least one situation in which chastity may have a direct connection with veracity, viz. when a woman or young girl testifies as complainant against a man charged with a sexual crime,—rape, rape under age, *658seduction, assault. Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased . derangements' or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One' form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offences by men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentally finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex-incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
“No doubt any judge oí a criminal Court and any prosecuting attorney can corroborate this with instances from his own observation. But the lamentable thing is that the orthodox rules of Evidence in most instances prevent adequate probing of the testimonial mentality of a woman-witness, so as to reveal the possible falsity of such charges. Judging merely from the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one must infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity could not be exposed. And the situation of injustice has become the more extreme, because in some States the so-called age of consent has been raised to 16 or 18 years (thus making consent immaterial below that age) and in a few States even life imprisonment may be imposed; so that a plausible tale by an attractive, innocent-looking girl may lead to a life-sentence for the accused, because the rules of Evidence (and the judge’s unacquaintance with modern psychiatry) permit no adequate probing of the witness’ veracity.”
There are serious questions concerning the social desirability of the rule of admissibility of evidence respecting reputation for chastity as a matter of right. That rule has been abandoned in this state, and I think wisely so. Under it, the possibilities of unnecessary embarrassment, damage to character of a prosecutrix, are too great. These negative values inherent in that rule appear to overbalance the socially desirable ones. Under such a rule, too much free play is given to possible motives of revenge and spite, and callow *659disregard or unawareness of social responsibilities by the defending side. But discretionary admissibility—currently the rule in this state—is a different matter. Under it, dangers to a prosecutrix are minimized by the exercise of discretionary power or control of the situation by the trial court, and a careful and somewhat scientific examination of reputation for chastity and social and mental history of the prosecutrix may be accomplished. Such an examination, restricted by and subject to the careful scrutiny and discretion of the trial judge, affords protection to a defendant without denying it to a prosecutrix. Motives of revenge and spite, and callow indifference or unawareness of social results, may be kept within reasonable bounds by the trial court.
In disposing of the problem at hand, we are working in a highly specialized and somewhat experimental field of human knowledge—that of sex psychology, as the above quotations from Wigmore indicate. Despite taboos, there has been considerable research in this field in comparatively recent years, and the knowledge gained is significant. Admittedly, many of .the findings and conclusions in this new science of human relationships are more or less tentative. But those referred to by Wigmore appear to me to sustain a significant correlation between chastity and the matter of veracity of alleged female victims in cases involving sex offenses. However that may be, for the present at least, it appears to me that the experience and knowledge of several generations of judges regarding the problem at hand should not be discarded by overruling the dispositions of the problem as made in State v. Elder, supra, State v. Linton, 36 Wn. (2d) 67, 216 P. (2d) 761, and State v. Hoggatt, supra, wherein the rule of discretionary admissibility was approved and followed. In State v. Elder, supra, at p. 618, we said:
“The next complaint is that the court unduly limited the evidence on the part of the defendant. The state introduced a physician, who testified to an examination he made of the prosecuting witness shortly after the offense charged was alleged to have been committed, in which he found a rup*660tured hymen. He did not say that the hymen bore evidence of having been freshly ruptured, and frankly stated that he had no means of knowing what caused the rupture. To combat this, and as evidence affecting the credibility of the prosecuting witness, the court permitted the appellant to show a purported admission that she had had sexual intercourse with another man, that she was an incorrigible and had been sent to a reformatory institution as such, and to show her general character and habits prior to the time of the alleged offense. The court only checked counsel when he thought he was going too far in this latter direction. How far a litigant will be permitted to go in showing facts affecting the credibility of a party or witness is largely within the discretion of the trial court, to be reviewed for an abuse of the right only. Here, we think, the court allowed the appellant all of the latitude the case required.”
In State v. Linton, supra, at p. 91, we said:
“We have reached the conclusion that the rule enunciated in State v. Godwin, 131 Wash. 591, 230 Pac. 831, and restated as dicta in State v. Pierson, 175 Wash. 650, 27 P. (2d) 1068, State v. Gaffney, 151 Wash. 599, 276 Pac. 873, 65 A. L. R. 405, and in several other opinions heretofore handed down by this court, to the effect that it is reversible error to deny the defendant, in a statutory rape case, the ‘right,’ as it is called in the Godwin case, of questioning the prosecuting witness as to her prior chastity, is illogical and contrary to the weight of authority in the courts of last resort of the United States. In other words, we now hold that the defendant, in a statutory rape case, has no such right. Whether or not such questioning of the prosecuting witness should he permitted should, in each individual case, he within the discretion of the trial judge.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We have not heretofore negatived or withdrawn the approval of the rule of discretionary admissibility, so positively implicit in our decisions in the Linton, Hoggatt and Elder cases. I do not agree that we should do so now.
In my judgment, a review of the record in the instant case indicates that the trial judge might properly have exercised discretion in excluding the questionable evidence. It follows that complete abandonment of the discretionary rule of admissibility of such evidence is not essential to the disposition of this case and affirmance of the trial court. *661As already indicated, I would disfavor abandonment of the rule in any event. Consequently, I must register disagreement with the reasoning of the majority, and can concur only in the result.
Mallery and Grady, JJ., concur with Finley, J.