Court Opinion

ID: 9368900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 14:02:24.418728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.549603
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
      Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
      opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
      prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
      official text of the opinion.

      In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                Decided: February 7, 2023

                        S22A1266. HUFF v. THE STATE

      COLVIN, Justice.

      Appellant Jazzy Huff was convicted of felony murder and

related offenses in connection with the August 2019 shooting death

of Zenas Lee Davis. 1                 On appeal, Appellant contends that (1)

insufficient evidence supported his convictions; (2) the trial court

      1 Davis died on August 21, 2019. On September 4, 2019, a Dougherty
County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count
3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). A
jury trial was held from March 9 to 12, 2020. Appellant was acquitted of malice
murder (Count 1) but was found guilty of the remaining counts. On August
19, 2020, the trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison with the possibility
of parole for felony murder (Count 2) and a consecutive sentence of five years’
probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
4). The aggravated assault count (Count 3) merged into the felony murder
count (Count 2) for sentencing purposes. On September 15, 2020, Appellant’s
trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through
new counsel on October 1, 2021. The trial court denied the amended motion
on June 13, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was
docketed to our August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
erred in admitting irrelevant, improper, and prejudicial character

evidence that Appellant held a firearm “gangster style” prior to

firing the gun; (3) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant,

improper, and prejudicial character evidence that Appellant held

the firearm the way an armed robber might hold a firearm; (4) he

was deprived of an impartial jury because jurors had improper,

unsupervised contact with the victim’s family during deliberations;

(5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to irrelevant,

improper, and prejudicial character evidence; and (6) the cumulative

effect of the trial court’s evidentiary errors and trial counsel’s

ineffective assistance unfairly prejudiced Appellant and deprived

him of his right to due process and a fair trial. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm.

     1. Appellant first asserts that the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to sustain

his convictions because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Appellant was not justified in using self-defense. We

disagree.

                                  2
     The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the

morning of August 21, 2019, Appellant, who owned Jazzy Movers,

met to discuss an upcoming job opportunity with a group of

independent contractors, including Davis, outside Jazzy Movers’

headquarters in Albany, Georgia. During this meeting, Appellant

informed the contractors that the job entailed packing and moving

furniture at a location in Moultrie, Georgia.    Appellant further

informed the contractors that they would be paid for their services

on Friday, August 23. The contractors were then transported to the

job site, which was approximately 30 minutes away.

     Two hours after the contractors began packing furniture,

Appellant observed Davis sitting on the back of the moving truck.

When Appellant asked Davis why he was not working, Davis told

Appellant that “he was tired” because he had been “working all day.”

Davis then requested that Appellant pay him $20 for the two hours

he had worked. Appellant reiterated that Davis would be paid on

Friday, at which point a disagreement ensued. Davis demanded

that Appellant drive him back to Albany so that he could discuss

                                 3
receiving    his   payment   with Appellant’s business     partners.

Appellant then drove Davis and one other contractor, Jay Barron,

back to Jazzy Movers’ headquarters. Barron testified that, during

the car ride, Davis was angry and cursing but did not threaten

Appellant.

     When Appellant parked the car in front of Jazzy Movers’

headquarters, Davis refused to get out before Appellant because “he

didn’t want [Appellant] to drive off.” Appellant and Barron then got

out of the car, walked into the building, and proceeded onto the

elevator toward the second floor. Davis entered the building behind

them but took the stairs. While on the elevator, Appellant told

Barron to “pull out [his] phone and [start] record[ing], just in case

something happened.” Appellant testified that he had asked Barron

to begin recording because he was concerned that Davis might file a

worker’s compensation claim. Although Appellant believed at the

time that Barron was recording only audio, Barron in fact recorded

a video, which was later played for the jury at trial.

     The video showed the following. Appellant walked across a

                                  4
large room into an adjoining smaller room with Davis following him.

After Davis entered the smaller room, Appellant turned around to

face him and said, “You will get your check on Friday, man.” For the

next minute, Appellant and Davis argued back and forth, with Davis

cursing and Appellant threatening to call security. Appellant then

walked out into the larger adjoining room with his back facing

Davis.

     Davis immediately followed him out while stating, “What if I

f***ing swing on you?” As Davis continued walking in a straight

line toward the exit, Appellant took two small steps to the right

while quickly turning to face Davis, pulling out a .40-caliber pistol,

and racking the slide. Appellant then pointed the pistol at Davis’s

chest, holding the pistol with the handgrip horizontal to the ground

and said, “Let’s go then, man.”       In response, Davis turned and

started walking toward Appellant while repeatedly saying, “F***ing

shoot me, bro.” Meanwhile, Appellant lowered the firearm to his

side and held out his other hand toward Davis while telling him

several times to “back up.”

                                  5
     Davis stopped walking toward Appellant but continued

arguing.   As Davis briefly turned to look at Barron, he asked

Appellant, “Did you just pull your f***ing gun on me?” Appellant

then said Davis’s name, at which point Davis turned back toward

Appellant, took a half step in Appellant’s direction with his arms

lowered and his chest puffed up, and asked again, “Did you just pull

your f***ing . . . ?” Before Davis could finish his question, Appellant

opened fire on Davis, shooting multiple rounds in quick succession

as Davis grabbed his chest, turned away, and fell to the floor.

     After falling to the ground, Davis dropped from his hand a

small, yellow object, which was later identified as a lighter.

Stepping out of view of the camera, Appellant can be heard on the

recording calling 9-1-1 and telling the operator, “Sir, I just shot

somebody.”      Following   the   operator’s   directions,   Appellant

performed chest compressions on Davis for several minutes, but

Davis was unresponsive. When officers arrived on the scene and

asked who shot Davis, Appellant responded, “I did.” Appellant then

complied with officers’ instructions to turn around and be

                                  6
handcuffed. Appellant was taken into custody and interviewed by

Sergeant Chris Hutcherson.

     Sergeant Hutcherson testified that during the interview

Appellant stated that Davis “had some authority problems” because

Appellant was younger than Davis and that Appellant “felt

threatened” by Davis because “he knew [Davis] had a record.”

Sergeant Hutcherson further testified that at no point during the

interview did Appellant indicate that he believed Davis had some

sort of weapon in his hand.

     Taking the stand in his own defense, Appellant testified that

he had shot Davis in self-defense. Appellant explained that he felt

threatened when Davis said, “What if I f***ing swing on you,” since

Appellant’s back was turned when Davis made the comment and

Appellant knew Davis had a criminal record. Appellant explained

that, in response to the threat, he pulled out his firearm, “racked a

round,” and turned toward Davis. But Appellant testified that he

“never had any intent to use [the firearm].”      Appellant further

testified that, because Davis was “confidently pursuing” him despite

                                 7
seeing the firearm, Appellant believed Davis had some sort of

weapon. Appellant explained that he then saw a “flicker of yellow

and black” in Davis’s hand and assumed it was a box cutter that the

workers sometimes used to unpack furniture, although the evidence

later showed that the item in Davis’s hand was actually a lighter.

Appellant testified that he shot Davis because he was “terrified” that

Davis would use the box cutter as a weapon against him. However,

on cross-examination, Appellant stated that, prior to pulling out the

firearm, he “was not looking at [Davis’s] hands.”

     When the prosecutor asked Appellant why he did not mention

to Sergeant Hutcherson at any point during his post-arrest

interview that he believed Davis had a box cutter, Appellant

responded, “I don’t believe I was in the right state of mind.” The

prosecutor also questioned Barron about whether Jazzy Movers had

supplied box cutters for the moving job that morning.         Barron

testified that the company did not provide box cutters and that he

did not observe Davis or “anybody using box cutters that morning.”

     The medical examiner who performed Davis’s autopsy testified

                                  8
that Davis’s “cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds” and that

a “total of eight gunshot wounds” were found in Davis’s body, the

majority of which struck Davis from behind. The medical examiner

further testified that Davis’s wounds indicated that he had likely

“turn[ed] to the right to get out of the way of being shot” and that

five of the gun shots “could have been lethal” on their own.

     On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial evidence

established that he acted in self-defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a),

which provides in relevant part that a person is justified in using

deadly force “if he or she reasonably believes that such force is

necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself . . . or to

prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” According to Appellant,

the trial evidence showed that he reasonably employed “non-lethal”

force by drawing his firearm in response to Davis’s threat to “swing”

on him and then reasonably employed deadly force when Davis

continued to pursue him. Therefore, Appellant argues, the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not

justified in defending himself. We disagree.

                                   9
     When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, the proper

standard of review is whether a rational trier of fact could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). This Court will uphold the jury’s verdict “[a]s long as there

is some competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each

fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga.

764, 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020) (citation and punctuation

omitted). “When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified

in using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the

defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 50

(1) (823 SE2d 736) (2019). However, it is the role of the jury to

evaluate the evidence and decide whether the defendant was

justified in using deadly force in self-defense. See Howard v. State,

298 Ga. 396, 398 (1) (782 SE2d 255) (2016).          In evaluating the

evidence, “[the] jury is free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted

in self-defense.” Id.

     Here, the trial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to

                                   10
conclude that Appellant did not reasonably believe that deadly force

was necessary to defend himself during the encounter with Davis

and thus to reject Appellant’s self-defense claim. Specifically, the

video recording of the incident authorized a jury to find that

Appellant did not reasonably fear that Davis posed a threat of death

or great bodily injury either when Davis commented about

“swinging” at Appellant or when Davis approached him. Instead,

the jury could have reasonably concluded from the video recording

that Appellant did not shoot Davis in self-defense because Appellant

invited a physical encounter with Davis by pulling a gun, pointing it

at him, and saying, “Let’s go then, man,” and Davis’s conduct in

approaching Appellant with his arms down and asking if Appellant

had really pulled a gun on him did not give rise to a reasonable belief

that Davis was threatening to physically harm Appellant.

     Moreover, a rational jury could have disbelieved Appellant’s

claim of self-defense based on his own trial testimony. See Walker

v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235 (1) (862 SE2d 285) (2021) (noting that “the

jury was entitled to disbelieve [the defendant’s] testimony” in which

                                  11
he claimed that he fired in self-defense). See also Mims v. State, 310

Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (“[T]he defendant’s testimony,

in which he claimed he was justified or provoked into acting, may

itself be considered substantive evidence of guilt when disbelieved

by the jury, as long as some corroborative evidence exists for the

charged offense.”). This is particularly true here, where Appellant’s

testimony at trial and his statements during his interview

immediately after the shooting were inconsistent. Appellant

testified at trial that he shot Davis because he believed Davis had a

box cutter in his hand that he intended to use as a weapon against

Appellant. However, in his post-arrest statement to police he never

mentioned the box cutter. Thus, the jury was authorized to reject

Appellant’s claim that he shot Davis in self-defense and to find him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and the other

crimes for which he was convicted. See State v. Newman, 305 Ga.

792, 795 (1) (827 SE2d 678) (2019) (“[T]he evidence presented at trial

was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject [the defendant’s]

claim[] of . . . self-defense and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable

                                  12
doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.”).

      2. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in

permitting the prosecutor to refer to Appellant’s manner of holding

the firearm as “gangster style.” The prosecutor first used the phrase

“gangster style” during his opening statement, when he told the jury

that it would see a video in which Davis “turns around and sees a

gun in his chest, gangster style. Gangster style, turned to the side.

And then [Appellant] says let’s go then.” Then, during its direct

examination of Barron, the prosecutor used the phrase “gangster

style” again. Specifically, after playing Barron’s video for the jury,

the prosecutor asked Barron, “And you saw a gun pointed gangster

style in [Davis’s] chest, just like we saw in this video, didn’t you?”

Barron replied, “Correct.” Defense counsel did not timely object

during either the State’s opening statement or Barron’s testimony. 2

      2 The day after Barron testified, defense counsel moved “for the Court to
direct the District Attorney’s Office to stop using any word affiliated with the
word gang,” arguing that the phrase “gangster style” erroneously implied that
Appellant was “somehow gang-related.” Although the court noted that, when
it heard the prosecutor use the phrase “gangster style,” it initially understood
the phrase as “a descriptor” of how Appellant was holding the gun, the court

                                      13
      On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

permitting the prosecutor to use the phrase “gangster style” because

the phrase was improper character evidence in violation of OCGA §

24-4-404 (a)3, not relevant and therefore inadmissible under OCGA

§ 24-4-4024, and should have been excluded pursuant to OCGA § 24-

4-4035 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice. This enumeration of error fails.

      As an initial matter, opening statements are not considered

evidence, and failure to timely object to a remark in opening

statements waives the issue on appeal. See Phillips v. State, 285

ultimately sustained Appellant’s motion in part. Specifically, the court ruled
that the State could no longer use the phrase while examining witnesses but
could use it as a descriptor during closing arguments. However, following the
court’s ruling, the prosecutor did not use the phrase again either with
witnesses or in closing arguments.

      3 OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) provides, in pertinent part, “[e]vidence of a
person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”

      4OCGA § 24-4-402 provides, in pertinent part, “[e]vidence which is not
relevant shall not be admissible.”

      5OCGA § 24-4-403 provides, in pertinent part, “[r]elevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.”
                                       14
Ga. 213, 217 (3) (675 SE2d 1) (2009) (“The failure to object to the

remark [made during the opening statement] . . . constitutes a

waiver of the issue on appeal.”). Here, because defense counsel

failed to timely object to the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “gangster

style” during opening statements, Appellant’s challenge to the

State’s opening statement was not preserved for review, and plain

error review does not apply to comments made by lawyers during

opening statements. See Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. 370, 372-373 (2)

(788 SE2d 494) (2016).

     Although Appellant did not timely object when the prosecutor

elicited witness testimony that Appellant held the firearm “gangster

style,” we may review his claim that the trial court erred in

admitting such testimony for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).

See also Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (1) (829 SE2d 126) (2019)

(noting that plain error review is available under OCGA § 24-1-103

(d) for unpreserved challenges to evidentiary rulings). To establish

plain error, Appellant

     must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived,

                                  15
     the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
     dispute, the error must have affected his substantial
     rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
     fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
     proceedings.

Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 397-398 (3) (810 SE2d 515) (2018)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, assuming without deciding that the trial court clearly

erred in admitting into evidence Barron’s testimony that Appellant

held the gun “gangster style,” Appellant cannot satisfy the third

prong of plain error review, which requires him to demonstrate that

“the outcome of the trial court proceedings likely was affected.”

Hightower v. State, 304 Ga. 755, 759 (2) (b) (822 SE2d 273) (2018)

(citation and punctuation omitted). To the extent that the phrase

caused any prejudice, it was unlikely to affect the outcome of the

trial. The prosecutor only briefly used the phrase “gangster style”

while examining Barron, and nothing introduced into evidence or

presented in the record suggests that the phrase was used to suggest

that Appellant was a gang member, that the shooting was gang

related, or that Appellant had a propensity to commit violence.

                                16
Additionally, the jury viewed for itself the video recording of the

entire incident and heard testimony that Appellant had changed his

story about why he believed deadly force was necessary. In light of

the evidence presented, we cannot say that any error in admitting

into evidence the “gangster style” reference likely affected the

verdict. See Harris v. State, 302 Ga. 832, 835 (2) (809 SE2d 723)

(2018) (“[The defendant] has failed to establish that the error

affected his substantial rights, given the strong evidence of guilt

against him.”). Accordingly, Appellant has not shown plain error.

     3. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in permitting

a witness to testify that the manner in which Appellant held the

firearm was akin to the manner in which armed robbers hold a

firearm. This claim fails.

     During his direct examination, Sergeant Hutcherson testified

that he had “several years of experience in firearms,” was “on SWAT

Team,” and was currently “in a firearms instructor course.” The

prosecutor then asked him why a person may “cant” (that is, tilt) a

firearm sideways, as Appellant had done. Sergeant Hutcherson

                                  17
responded, “Most people who pull a firearm in that manner are

either pulling it out to intimidate the other person [or] punk the

other person.” Sergeant Hutcherson further explained, “You may

see people pull that firearm in that manner in an armed robbery,

when they’re trying to rob someone, they’ll cant the firearm in that

manner.”

     Neither the State nor any witnesses referenced armed robbery

again and defense counsel objected to Sergeant Hutcherson’s

testimony only on the ground that the State was improperly

bolstering the testimony of a previous witness. Because defense

counsel did not object on any other ground, Appellant did not

preserve for ordinary appellate review the contentions raised here,

namely, that the testimony was improper character evidence,

irrelevant, and inadmissible under Rule 403. See Payne v. State,

313 Ga. 218, 221 (1) (869 SE2d 395) (2022) (noting that a defendant’s

evidentiary objection at trial failed to preserve for ordinary

appellate review a different evidentiary challenge to the same

testimony). See also Harris v. State, 307 Ga. 657, 663-664 (2) (a)

                                 18
(837 SE2d 777) (2020) (“[B]ecause [the defendant] did not make a

specific objection at trial to the admission of his statements on the

ground now asserted in his appeal, we review these claims only for

plain error.”). Accordingly, we review Appellant’s contentions only

for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). Even assuming that the

armed-robbery reference was improper, Appellant has failed to

demonstrate that any error in admitting the evidence likely affected

the outcome of his trial. As explained in Division 2, the evidence

against Appellant was strong, and the reference to armed robbery

was brief. Because Appellant has not shown that the armed-robbery

reference affected his substantial rights by likely affecting the

outcome of the trial court proceedings, Appellant has not

demonstrated plain error. See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758 (814

SE2d 396) (2018) (no plain error where it was “not probable that the

jury would have reached a different verdict had it not heard [the

challenged evidence]”).

     4. Appellant also asserts that he was deprived of his right to an

impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

                                 19
Constitution because the jury had improper, unsupervised contact

with the victim’s family during deliberations. The record shows

that, during jury deliberations, defense counsel reported to the trial

court that a group of jurors had been standing “very close” to some

of Davis’s family members during a break and that deputies, who

also observed the parties in close proximity, reported that “there was

no communication” between the parties and that “it appeared to be

purely innocent.” The court indicated that it would take measures

to prevent the possibility of future interactions between the jury and

family members, and defense counsel did not request any further

relief. Because defense counsel did not assert a Sixth Amendment

claim or seek any relief from the trial court when he discovered the

allegedly improper jury contact, this Sixth Amendment claim is not

preserved for appellate review. See Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 450, 451

(2) (754 SE2d 333) (2014) (concluding that the defendant’s failure to

“make a contemporaneous motion for a mistrial when it was

discovered that” three jurors had seen an unredacted reference to

the defendant’s prior guilty plea “waived review of th[e] issue on

                                 20
appeal”).

     5. Appellant next asserts that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to

object to evidence that Appellant held the firearm “gangster style”

and that canting the firearm sideways was an intimidation tactic

commonly used by armed robbers. We disagree.

     To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show both “that his counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”

Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022)

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80

LE2d 674) (1984)). To prevail on the deficiency prong, the appellant

“must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties in an

objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances in

light of the prevailing professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga.

180, 182-183 (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016).        “To prove prejudice,

Appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have

                                 21
been different.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3). A defendant’s

failure “to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to

defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon

this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731,

733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).

     Here, Appellant has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test. As explained in Divisions 2 and 3, because of the

strong evidence against him, Appellant is unable to demonstrate a

reasonable probability of a different result if trial counsel had

objected to the “gangster style” and “armed robbery” references. See

Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400, 407 (4) (a) (845 SE2d 643)

(2020) (“[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain

error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly,

Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

     6. Finally, Appellant claims that the cumulative effect of the

asserted trial court errors and ineffective assistance of counsel

violated his right to due process and a fair trial. We disagree.

                                  22
     To establish cumulative error a defendant must demonstrate

that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial”

and “considered together along with the entire record, the multiple

errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the

petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21

(4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). When

considering the “cumulative effect of presumed errors by trial

counsel and the trial court,” this Court “consider[s] collectively the

prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the

prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” Patterson

v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 181 (5) (875 SE2d 771) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted).      Here, Appellant’s claim fails because

Appellant has not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of the

assumed trial court errors and ineffective assistance denied him a

fundamentally fair trial, given the strong evidence against him,

including the recorded video of the incident and Appellant’s

inconsistent explanations of the shooting.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 23