Court Opinion

ID: 9845015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:13:48.529175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.274401
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring and
dissenting:
I concur in all but Parts 11(A), III, and V of the Court’s opinion, from which I dissent.
A.
The Court errs in Part III when it overturns portions of the trial court’s order granting a new trial. The issue for this Court on appeal is whether the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. The majority concludes that certain portions of the trial court’s holding did amount to a manifest abuse of discretion. The majority correctly recognizes that the issue for this Court is whether the trial court has abused its discretion. However, the majority essentially renders its own interpretation of the facts and of the witnesses’ credibility, rather than deferring to the trial court’s evaluation.
Our cases have consistently held that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a new trial and its decision is entitled to great deference. As we stated in Ryals v. Broadbent Development Co., 98 Idaho 392, 565 P.2d 982 (1977), “The trial judge is possessed of extremely broad discretion in acting as a ‘thirteenth juror’ who is entitled to override the verdict if he conceives that justice has not been done.” 98 Idaho at 394, 565 P.2d at 984. In Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986), we provided trial courts with the following guidance when ruling on a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
[T]he trial court is to weigh the evidence to determine if the jury’s verdict is supportable by the evidence and when it thinks not, it should grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6).
112 Idaho at 615, 733 P.2d at 1240. In Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986), we stated that in weighing all the evidence the trial judge should make “his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses.”
Here, the trial court, after weighing the evidence and making his own evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility, concluded that the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. Having made that evaluation, the trial court followed the directive of our decision in Sanchez v. Galey that “it [the trial court] should grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)” when it determines that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The *820trial court here did exactly what our Sanchez v. Galey decision directed that it should do. The trial court should be affirmed.
In contrast to the function of the trial court in ruling on motions for new trial, our task on appeal is much more circumscribed. As we stated in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986), “Appellate review is necessarily more limited. While we must review the evidence, we are not in a position to ‘weigh’ it as the trial court can.” 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198. The rationale behind the rule is plain. As we explained in Quick v. Crane, “The trial judge is sitting at the heart of our trial process, a position we on the appellate level cannot duplicate.” 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. Thus, we concluded in Quick v. Crane that, “The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence.” 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198.
The foregoing cases leave no doubt concerning the distribution of power between trial courts and appellate courts when considering new trial motions and orders. The trial court is required to independently review and weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses; we may not. The trial court, by virtue of its position in the heart of the trial process, is in the best position to judge the weight of the evidence and to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of witnesses; we, by virtue of our remote position, are not. Thus our prior cases have consistently held that the trial court decision is accorded great deference and will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Sanchez v. Galey, supra; Quick v. Crane, supra.
Furthermore, our prior cases have outlined the analysis which appellate courts must make in determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in granting or denying a motion for new trial. In Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1990) (petition for rehearing denied), we set out that analysis as follows: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. As we spelled out in Sun Valley, our task is to focus on the process the trial court used in reaching its decision, not to duplicate the trial court’s function to see if we come up with the same result. Otherwise, we are engaging in what the Court in Quick v. Crane described as “result-oriented appellate review of such discretion.” 111 Idaho at 773, 727 P.2d at 1201.
In ruling on the motion for new trial, the trial court followed the directives of this Court and “weigh[ed] the evidence to determine if the jury’s verdict is supportable by the evidence____,” and because he did not think so, he granted a new trial as this Court directed in Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 615, 733 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1986). The trial court based that determination upon his evaluation of the evidence which to him demonstrated that O’Dell harbored such animosity toward the personnel of the Land & Livestock Division that “Mr. O’Dell’s actions made it unworkable for him to return to the Land & Livestock Division____” Based upon the trial court’s own evaluation of the evidence, he concluded that, as a result of O’Dell’s hostility, he “caused his own future damage by making return to the Land & Livestock Division unworkable,” and therefore the trial court granted a new trial on the issue of liability and damages for loss of future wages. While the Court’s opinion affirms the grant of a new trial with regard to damages for loss of future wages, it reverses the trial court’s grant of a new trial on the issue of liability for loss of future wages. However, there was evidence that O’Dell retained feelings of hostility toward the management of the Land & Livestock Division and had doubts about the integrity of Basabe and others with whom he had worked. The Court’s opinion nevertheless concludes that, “O’Dell repeatedly qualified those statements, testifying that they were *821made in relation to specific incidents, and that those relationships would heal with time.” Ante at 814, 810 P.2d at 1100. By unqualifiedly accepting O’Dell’s opinion that things would work out, and “that those relationships would heal with time,” this Court is making its own determination of the credibility of O’Dell’s testimony, directly contrary to the credibility determination made by the trial court. By so doing, this Court has abandoned the abuse of discretion analysis which this Court said in the Sun Valley Shopping Center case that we should apply. It has supplanted the trial court’s credibility determination with its own. In doing so the Court errs.
An examination of pertinent parts of the majority opinion points out clearly how the Court is substituting its view on the credibility and weight of the evidence for that of the trial court. The majority states that, “A review of the record does not disclose any evidence which would have made the performance of the contract so unworkable as to justify its breach.” Ante at 814, 810 P.2d at 1100. However, there was abundant evidence to support the trial court’s finding, in granting the new trial, that it was O’Dell’s conduct which made continued employment with the Land & Livestock Division unworkable. For example, in his deposition taken in the Seibel case, O’Dell was highly critical of and bitter toward management personnel with whom he necessarily would have had a close association had he returned to the Land & Livestock Division. In addition, O’Dell’s testimony demonstrated an animosity toward Gary Wallace, the company’s corporate human resources officer. Moreover, there was the fact that, even after being offered reinstatement, O’Dell filed a claim with the Human Rights Commission, which Simplot testified was a factor in their decision to withdraw the offer of reinstatement. The filing of that claim would merely add to what would otherwise be a highly volatile situation had O’Dell resumed his activities in the Land & Livestock Division. These are, among other reasons, the primary factors that motivated the trial court, in evaluating the evidence, to grant a new trial.
For the majority to say that there wasn t any evidence that “would have made the contract so unworkable as to justify its breach,” and thus reverse the trial court’s contrary finding, the majority, of necessity, had to weigh the evidence. The majority accepts O’Dell’s testimony that he would have gone back to Land & Livestock and that he, O’Dell, felt he could overcome his feelings of animosity and “weather” the situation. By focusing on O’Dell’s testimony, as the majority does, and comparing that with the reasons for not reinstating O’Dell to the Land & Livestock Division, it is obvious that the majority is weighing the evidence and supplanting its evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court.
The majority states:
However, during the trial of his own case he [O’Dell] related those statements to specific incidents, and statefd] that they were not broad and irrevocable attitudes. Despite defense counsel’s efforts on cross examination to characterize those responses as evidence of a vitriolic hatred on O’Dell’s part against most of the managers of the Land & Livestock Division, O’Dell repeatedly qualified those statements, testifying that they were made in relation to specific incidents, and that those relationships would heal with time.
Ante at 814, 810 P.2d at 1100. This excerpt demonstrates that the majority is accepting and relying on O’Dell’s opinion “that those relationships would heal with time.” However, the trial court, after independently reviewing and weighing all the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, did not give credence to O’Dell’s protestations that his feelings of hostility toward the management of the Land & Livestock Division could be overcome and that he could “weather” the situation. The credibility determination was the trial court’s call, not this Court’s. As we have repeatedly emphasized:
The trial judge [is] in a position to see and hear the witnesses speak. He could observe their demeanor on the witness stand, and consequently [is] in a better position to judge their credibility and to *822weigh their testimony than is this Court____
Rosenberg v. Toetly, 93 Idaho 135, 138-139, 456 P.2d 779, 782-783 (1969). Accord, Mendenhall v. MacGregor Triangle Co., 83 Idaho 145, 358 P.2d 860 (1961); Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967); Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979); Quick v. Crane, supra.
The majority, in an attempt to discredit the trial court’s evaluation, looks at O’Dell’s testimony, evaluates that testimony, weighs that testimony and determines on its own that O’Dell’s feelings were really not that hostile and that the situation could have been workable. The majority has supplanted its evaluation of O’Dell’s testimony for that of the trial court.
At the outset of Part III, the majority acknowledges that appellate courts “may not weigh the evidence,” but then qualifies the acknowledgment by stating, “If appellate review is to mean anything at all, this Court must have the power to review the record and evaluate whether the trial court’s decisions are supported to any extent by the record.” Ante at 814, 810 P.2d at 1100. The majority’s avowed concerns about the “meaningfulness” of appellate review is, in actuality, either a manifestation of its dissatisfaction with the present distribution of power between appellate courts vis-a-vis trial courts, or a dissatisfaction with the result of the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial. If appellate courts are going to engage in the type of evidentiary comparisons and witness credibility evaluations as the majority does today, then it is the trial court’s function in evaluating a new trial motion that will have become meaningless.
B.
In Part V of its opinion, the majority reverses that part of the trial court’s rationale in granting the new trial on the issue of O’Dell’s duty to mitigate damages. The majority reasons that “although a plaintiff claiming breach of a contract of employment is required to mitigate damages, ... mitigation does not require a party to a contract to enter into a new contract proffered as an alternative by the breaching party where there is a finding that bad faith surrounds the breach of the original contract.” Ante at 816, 810 P.2d at 1102. Several points deserve mention with respect to this “bad faith” exception to the requirement to mitigate damages.
First, the cases cited by the majority do not support its position. The majority cites two federal cases, claiming that they stand for the “bad faith” proposition: Food Hanler’s Local 425 v. Valmac Indus., 528 F.2d 217 (8th Cir.1975), and Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. United States, 603 F.2d 171, 221 Ct.Cl. 37 (1979). However, a close reading of those cases reveals no general rule regarding a bad faith exception to mitigate, as the majority represents. In each case, the court found that the plaintiff had not failed to mitigate damages under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In each case, the defendants had exhibited sharp practice, chicanery, and deception, and in one case the conduct was described as “bad faith.” But the holding of those cases is that the plaintiff did not fail to mitigate, not that there is a generally recognized bad faith exception to the duty to mitigate. Significantly, neither federal case even takes place in the context of wrongful termination in the employment setting and are thus even less persuasive.
Following the citation to the federal cases, the majority states that, “Where there is no finding of bad faith, the issue becomes the reasonableness of the non-breaching party’s efforts to mitigate losses caused by the breach.” Ante at 816, 810 P.2d at 1102. This statement is followed by a citation to two Idaho cases, Casey v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 85 Idaho 299, 379 P.2d 409 (1963), and Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988). Those cases, however, do not as the majority implies, hold that “where there is no bad faith, the issue is one of reasonableness.” Those cases do discuss the general doctrine of mitigation, but say nothing about bad faith whatsoever. Thus, no Idaho case has adopted or even recognized a bad faith exception to the duty to mitigate.
*823The court goes on to state: “Having considered the issues of bad faith and reasonableness, the jury found that the conduct surrounding the breach of the employment contract involved a violation by Simplot ...” and “imposed punitive damages against Simplot for willful violations ...” of the Human Eights Act, and concludes that, “Under these circumstances a bad faith breach was established____” Ante at 816, 810 P.2d at 1102 (emphasis added). In effect, this Court has made its own finding of fact on appeal that the defendant was guilty of “bad faith” and therefore the plaintiff was not obligated to mitigate his damages.
Aside from the fact that there is no authority to support such a “bad faith” exception to the duty-to-mitigate rule, as noted above, there are several procedural problems with such a holding. First, if that is the law, the jury should have been instructed on such a bad faith exception, and the instruction should have defined what is “bad faith.” The failure to give such an instruction would itself be grounds for reversing for a new trial. Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1989) (failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the definition of proximate cause required the setting aside of the jury’s verdict and granting a new trial).
Secondly, if there is such a bad faith exception to the rule that the plaintiff must mitigate his damages, it would be for the trial court, ruling on a motion for new trial, to make such a review of a jury’s finding on bad faith, not this Court on appeal. Again, repeating what we said in Quick v. Crane, supra, because it bears repeating:
The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Appellate review is necessarily more limited. While we must review the evidence we are not in a position to ‘weigh’ it as a trial court can.
111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198.
The trial court in this case “weighed” the evidence and concluded that a new trial should be granted in this case because, in his view, the evidence as he viewed and weighed it, did not support the jury’s verdict on the mitigation of damages issue. For this Court to make an after the fact rule that “bad faith” precludes the duty to mitigate, and then make an appellate finding of fact that “bad faith” existed because the jury imposed punitive damages against Simplot, violates all known standards of appellate review. If there is such a “bad faith” exception to the duty to mitigate, then there was error at trial in failing to instruct the jury on that issue which would require the judgment to be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial to a jury properly instructed on this new found bad faith exception to the duty-to-mitigate rule. Robertson v. Richards, supra. I believe this Court commits serious error when it adopts such a bad faith rule after the fact, and then makes its own appellate finding of fact that Simplot was guilty of “bad faith.” We are an appellate court, not a jury or a trial court. I believe the majority has lost track of that distinction.
Additionally, in Part V, the majority refers to the jury’s finding of “constructive discharge” and states that “the issue is whether this finding by the jury is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” Ante at 817, 810 P.2d at 1103. However, the issue before us is not whether the jury’s findings are against the clear weight of the evidence; that was the issue before the trial court, and he made the decision that it was. On appeal, our task is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion when, after weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, it found that the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. The two standards are dramatically different: the trial judge is at the heart of the process; he has observed the demeanor of the witnesses and judged their credibility; he must weigh the evidence, we may not; his holdings are supposed to be given great deference. Quick v. Crane, supra. I believe the trial court’s evaluation has not been given that deference. For a graphic comparison of this Court’s previous action in deferring to a trial court’s ruling on a *824new trial motion, see Black v. Reynolds, 109 Idaho 277, 707 P.2d 388 (1985).
Finally, if the trial court committed any legal error in ruling on the motions for new trial, the appropriate action for this Court to take would be to point out the correct law and remand those issues to the trial court to make new findings based upon the proper law, as the Court does on the issue of punitive damages. Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d 188 (1990).
C.
In Part II(A), the majority holds that front pay is a permissible element of damages under the Idaho Human Rights Act. In making that determination, the majority relies primarily upon (1) the language of the statute, (2) upon “guidance” found in federal case law interpreting the Civil Rights and Age Discrimination Acts and, (3) the policy argument that front pay effectuates the goal of fully compensating injured plaintiffs.
In terms of the policy argument, I would readily agree that as a general matter, full compensation of those victimized by discrimination is a desired goal. However, general policy considerations must always yield in the face of statutory language to the contrary. In my opinion, the Idaho Human Rights Act does not by its terms allow for recovery of front pay, and for good reasons described below.
I.C. § 67-5908(3), is the crucial provision at issue. That section states in pertinent part: “An order for actual damages including lost wages and benefits, provided that such back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two (2) years prior to the filing of the complaint____” (Emphasis added.) The majority explains that the phrase “such back pay,” is included only as a “limitation of the amount of back pay that maybe awarded when compensating a plaintiff for lost wages ...,” but does “not limit the entire award of lost wages to back pay alone.” Ante at 811, 810 P.2d at 1097.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority has eclipsed the word “such” from the statute. If, as the majority claims, the phrase “such back pay” was only intended to limit the amount of back pay recoverable, the legislature would not have used the word “such.” As written, the word “such” refers to the preceding phrase, “lost wages and benefits.” The only interpretation of the phrase, “such back pay,” which makes grammatical sense is that lost wages are limited to back pay, which under the statute is in turn limited to two years prior to filing the complaint.
The primary thrust of the Human Rights Act is to obtain reinstatement for those who have had their employment terminated in violation of the Act, and to recover their lost wages during the period it takes the Human Rights Commission to obtain their reinstatement. However, to expand the scope of the Human Rights Act into the issue of future damages, such as diminution in future earning capacity, would thrust the Commission into difficult damage and evidentiary issues which in the past have been the exclusive province of a properly instructed jury based upon evidence determined to be admissible by a law-trained judge. The rules of law which have developed surrounding the area of damages for proving loss or diminution of future wage earning capacity, and the rules dealing with the duty of the terminated employee to mitigate damages are quite complex (made more complicated by the Court’s “bad faith” exception to the mitigation rule established in today’s opinion), and amply demonstrate that it is good policy to leave the question of future damages to a court and jury, and not to the Human Rights Commission, whose members are not necessarily trained in the law and who would not necessarily reflect the same community values as a jury of the peers of the litigants. The legislature could reasonably have concluded, and I believe a clear reading of the statute suggests that they did conclude, that the Human Rights Commission should focus primarily upon reinstatement and collection of back wages, and leave the difficult and complicated factual and legal questions of loss of future earnings and earning capacity, together with concomitant mitigation requirements, ex*825clusively to the courts and the jury system. In I.C. § 67-5908 the legislature mandated, for good reason, that the Commission focus on reinstatement and recovery of lost wages which they limited to two years back pay. That, I believe, is what the statute says. It is good public policy. But even if it were not, that is a decision for the legislature, not for this Court.
With respect to the federal cases invoked by the majority for “guidance,” it is important to note that the relevant language of the Idaho statute differs in crucial respects to the federal statutes upon which our act is based. The following excerpt from Title VII of 42 USC 2000e-5(g), is the forerunner of the language in the Idaho statute at issue. The federal statute states: “The court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge ...” (Emphasis added.) The federal statute, in striking contrast to the Idaho statute, does not use the phrase, “such back pay.” The federal statute is thus distinguishable from the Idaho statute, as are those federal cases that interpret Title VII as allowing front pay.
Finding no abuse of discretion, judged by the standard of our earlier cases of Sanchez v. Galey, supra, Quick v. Crane, supra; Black v. Reynolds, supra; and Dinneen v. Finch, supra, I would affirm the order of the trial court on the new trial motions.