Court Opinion

ID: 9792954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:40:01.605759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:02.027505
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in declining to give defendant’s requested jury instruction on Miller’s character and that, therefore, the case must be reversed. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court on remand must allow testimony of specific prior acts of Miller’s misconduct.
Defendant sought to have witnesses testify about specific instances of Miller’s violence, and he sought to testify on his own behalf that a few days earlier Miller had hit him with the cast on her arm and knocked him to the floor. The purpose of that testimony was to bolster defendant’s theory of self defense by establishing his “reasonable belief’ that he needed to defend himself against Miller. According to the majority, defendant’s belief that he needed to defend himself placed Miller’s character “in issue.”
OEC 404(1) provides that, “[ejvidence of a person’s character or trait of character is admissible when it is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense.” The legislative commentary to OEC 404(1) explains that, “[i]f a person’s possession of a character trait determines the legal rights and liabilities of the parties, and if that trait has been put in issue by the pleadings, then the fact of character must be open to proof.” Legislative Commentary to OEC 404(1), reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 135 (2d ed 1989). Both the rule *437and the commentary make clear that evidence of character is admissible only when character is the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. In this case, the issue to be decided by the jury is whether defendant was acting in self defense when he assaulted Miller. “[A] person is justified in using physical force upon another * * * from what the person reasonably believes to he the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 161.209. It is not Miller’s character that will determine “the rights and liabilities of the parties,” but whether defendant had a “reasonable belief,” when he struck Miller, that he was acting in self defense. Defendant’s theory of self defense did not put Miller’s character “in issue,” and, therefore, evidence of her character should not be admitted under OEC 404(1).
The remainder of OEC 404 lays out the so-called propensity rule. That rule prohibits the use of character evidence to prove conforming conduct.1 The analytical difficulty in this case arises because OEC 404 is an exclusionary rule, rather than a rule of admissibility. Here, the inferential connection is between the character of the victim and the reasonable belief of the defendant. Therefore, if relevant, evidence of the victim’s character may be admissible in any form, because it does not fall within the forbidden inference of OEC 404. See generally Weissenberger, Federal Rules of Evidence 85 n 28, § 404.9 (1987); 1A Wigmore, Evidence 1149, § 54 (4th ed 1983); Weissenberger, “Character Evidence and the Federal Rules: A Puzzle with Missing Pieces,” 48 U Cin L Rev 1 (1979).
Although I conclude, like the majority, that evidence of specific instances of Miller’s conduct is not precluded by the propensity rule in OEC 404,1 do not conclude that it would be *438error for the trial court to exclude it. The trial judge has discretion whether to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” OEC 403. Therefore, I would leave to the trial judge the decision on whether to admit into evidence specific instances of Miller’s conduct.
Even if OEC 404(3) were construed to allow admissibility of specific instances of Miller’s conduct for the purposes of this case, as proof of her character from which defendant’s reasonable belief may be inferred, my conclusion regarding the trial judge’s discretion would remain unchanged. OEC 404(3) prohibits evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” for the forbidden inference of conforming conduct under the propensity rule, but allows that such evidence “may, however, be admissible for other purposes” and provides an illustrative list. The legislative commentary makes clear that the trial court is not required to admit the evidence and may exclude it under OEC 403. Legislative Commentary to OEC 404(3), reprinted in Kirkpatrick, supra, at 138.1, therefore, disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it was error to exclude defendant’s testimony of the specific incident.

 OEC 404(2) states the general propensity rule:
“Evidence of a person’s character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion
OEC 404(3) restates that rule:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”
Two exceptions to the propensity rule, which are not relevant to this discussion, allow character evidence but limit it to reputation and opinion evidence. OEC 404(2); OEC 405.