Court Opinion

ID: 9737631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:30:57.514272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.946160
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion regarding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 *137issue. However, I dissent from its analysis and conclusion regarding the Open Meetings Act (OMA).2
I. THE CITY MANAGER IS A “PUBLIC BODY”
The majority holds that a person in his individual capacity cannot be a “public body” as defined under the OMA, distinguishing Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). Ante, pp 128-135.
In Booth, the eight-member University of Michigan Board of Regents designated itself as the Presidential Selection Committee and embarked on the task of choosing a new university president. The committee made Regent Paul W. Brown chairman and also formed three advisory subcommittees. In all, five candidate-reduction decisions were made. Id. at 215. In the first, second, and fourth “cuts,” the candidate field was reduced from 250 to 70, 70 to 30, and 12 to 5, respectively. Regent Brown made the reduction decisions, although in doing so he consulted with the other regents, either by telephone or, in the case of the fourth cut, in a closed session. Id. at 216-218.
This Court found that the OMA applied to the Presidential Selection Committee’s procedures. It rejected the defendant’s argument that the chairman did not act as a committee, that he was not a “public body,” and was, thus, outside the purview of the OMA. This Court found that the board’s argument elevated form over substance:
[Delegating the task of choosing a public university president to a one-man committee, such as Regent Brown, *138would warrant the finding that this one-man task force was in fact a public body. . . . “We do not find the question of whether a multi-member panel or a single person presides to be dispositive. Such a distinction carries with it the potential for undermining the Open Meetings Act . . . .”
[T]he selection of a public university president constitutes the exercise of governmental authority, regardless of whether such authority was exercised by Regent Brown, the nominating committee, the full board, or even subcommittees. Accordingly, this individual or these entities must be deemed “public bodies” within the scope of the oma. [Id. at 226, quoting Goode v Dep’t of Social Services, 143 Mich App 756, 759; 373 NW2d 210 (1985) (internal citation omitted).]
The majority notes that in Booth, the Board of Regents, clearly a “public body” subject to the OMA, sought to evade the oma by delegating its authority to the chairman of the Presidential Selection Committee. In the present case, however, the city commission did not delegate its authority to the city manager. The city manager was empowered by the city charter to recommend someone for the fire chief position. The city manager remained an individual executive throughout the selection process, and there is “no basis in the OMA to combine . . . two separate entities where each entity is performing its own independent function as designated in the city charter.” Ante, pp 132-133. Thus, the majority holds Booth inapposite.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Booth from the present case is unpersuasive. Although the Booth decision involved a delegation of power, it did not limit itself to situations where a delegation had taken place. Rather, the Booth Court was concerned that form not prevail over substance and that the OMA’s legislative purpose “to promote a new era in govern*139mental accountability” not be defeated.3 Booth, supra at 222.
Regardless of the validity of the grounds on which the majority distinguishes Booth from the present case, I would hold that the city manager was a public body for purposes of the OMA.
The OMA defines “public body” as:
[A]ny state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, which is empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function .... [MCL 15.262(a); MSA 4.1800(12)(a) (emphasis added).]
The OMA does not define the term “authority” and, as the word has no unique meaning at law, it is appropriate to consult a lay dictionary for its definition. People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999); Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 (1998); MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). The relevant definition of “authority” from Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 92, is “a person or body of persons in whom authority is vested, as a governmental agency.” Thus, the language of the OMA, itself, permits an individual to be considered a “public body.”4
*140n. BY MEANS OF HIS DECISIONS, THE CITY MANAGER EXERCISED GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND PERFORMED A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
I also find that reduction of the candidate pool by the city manager through interviews was a “decision” that must be made at an open meeting by mandate of the oma.5 The majority does not refute Booth's holdings (1) that decisions under the OMA encompass *141more than formal votes, (2) that “reduction decisions” must be made in public and are not protected by the “specific contents” exception of the oma,6 and (3) that interviews are “meetings” that must be held in public.7 Booth, supra at 230; ante, pp 133-135.
Finally, the city charter provides:
The city commission shall appoint ... on the recommendation of the city manager . . . [the] fire chief .... [Bay City Charter, art VII, § 1 (emphasis added).]
This Court has consistently held that the word “shall” imposes a mandatory duty. See State Hwy Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 Mich 159, 181; 220 NW2d 416 (1974). This language compels the city commission to appoint a candidate that the manager recommends.
The majority states that the only reasonable interpretation of the charter’s language permits the city commission to reject a candidate recommended by the city manager. However, the candidate who is ulti*142mately appointed, if any, must have been recommended by the city manager. I agree. What is relevant, here, is that the city commission cannot appoint absent the separate prior action of the city manager. Both must act before a fire chief can be appointed. Therefore, the city manager is a public body in his own right and exercises governmental authority in conducting interviews and making reduction decisions.8 The majority’s finding that the actions of the city manager are not subject to the oma allows any city to circumvent the act by adopting similar charter language. Goode, supra at 759.
m. CONCLUSION
I would affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the defendants acted in violation of the OMA. As with the chairman in Booth, the city manager here is subject to the OMA. A contrary finding places form over substance and undermines the act. The city manager is a “public body” because that individual is an “authority.” The city manager, in interviewing candidates and reducing the field of candidates made decisions, performed governmental functions, and exercised governmental authority. Under the city charter, the manager is one of two public bodies that, working together, determine who will be the Bay City Fire Chief. Therefore, the city manager’s actions were subject to the oma and should have been undertaken at a public meeting.

 MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq.

 MCL 15.261 et seq.; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq.

 “ ‘Open government is believed to serve as both a light and disinfectant in exposing potential abuse and misuse of power. The deliberation of public policy in the public forum is an important check and balance on self-government.’ ” Id. at 223, quoting Osmon, Sunshine or shadow: One state’s decision, 1977 Det Col L R 613, 617. The Booth Court also noted that, historically, the oma has been interpreted as broadly applicable, while its exemptions are construed strictly. Id.

 While the majority recites the term “authority” in the oma’s definition of “public body,” it omits to note the plain meaning and common usage of *140that term. Also, it consults a lay dictionary for a definition of the word “body,” when the term “public body” is expressly defined in the statute itself. Ante, p 129. Furthermore, the majority cites those definitions indicating a “body” is “a group,” yet glosses over the definition stating that a “body” is “a person,” e.g., somebody, anybody, what’s a body to do?, a public body. Id. The majority is mistaken in interpreting me as including in the definition any reference to the human body. Ante, p 129, n 10.
The majority argues that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis precludes individuals from the definition of authority, because the other specifically enumerated examples of a public body “are necessarily multimember bodies.” Ante, p 130, n 10. In response, I reiterate that in Booth this Court found that an individual could constitute a “committee.” Other illustrative entities constituting public bodies under the oma, besides an authority, are not uniformly multimember bodies. Booth, supra at 226.
The Legislature states that a “public body” under the foia can be a state officer, employee, governor, or lieutenant governor. It does not so state in the oma. The majority asserts that that omission reflects an intent to preclude individuals from its scope. Ante, p 130, n 11.1 disagree. Determining legislative intent regarding the oma by examining the foia violates several cardinal rules of statutory construction. A court must consider the object of the statute, together with the harm it is designed to remedy, and then apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes its purpose. People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 479-480; 550 NW2d 505 (1996). Nothing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the act itself. In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998). The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, should govern. In re Wirsing, 456 Mich 467, 474; 573 NW2d 51 (1998). The broad, inclusive language employed in the oma attests to its prodisclosure nature and its purpose to promote government accountability. Booth, supra at 222-224 and 230. Thus, the exceptions to disclosure should be strictly construed. Id. at 223, n 13. And the term “authority” should be read, according to its plain meaning, to include individuals.

 “ ‘Decision’ means a determination, action, vote, or disposition upon a motion, proposal, recommendation, resolution, order, ordinance, bill, or measure on which a vote by members of a public body is required and by *141which a public body effectuates or formulates public policy.” MCL 15.262(d); MSA 4.1800(12)(d).

 A public body may meet in a closed session only for the following purposes:
(f) To review and consider the contents of an application for employment or appointment to a public office if the candidate requests that the application remain confidential. However, except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, all interviews by a public body for employment or appointment to a public office shall be held in an open meeting pursuant to this act. [MCL 15.268; MSA 4.1800(18) (emphasis added).]
After Booth, the Legislature amended the contents exception to the oma so that it does not apply in the process of searching for and selecting a president of certain institutions. 1996 PA 464, § 1; MCL 15.268(f) and Q); MSA 4.1800(18)(f) and ©•

 “ ‘Meeting’ means the convening of a public body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public policy.” [MCL 15.262(b); MSA 4.1800(12)(b).]

 In forming a committee to assist him in interviews and candidate reduction, the city manager delegated some of his authority. The authority delegated was derived from the city charter. Its exercise was subject to the oma, which requires that the exercise of authority be done at a public meeting. The situation is directly analogous to the Board of Regents’ delegation of its authority to Chairman Brown in Booth. Booth, supra at 226.