Court Opinion

ID: 9733051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:51:37.812818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.035531
License: Public Domain

ANDREASEN, Justice
(dissenting).
Because I believe the term “failure to yield” is a commonly used descriptive phrase with ordinary meaning, which does not necessarily imply a legal conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
Fifty years ago, we decided that an expert witness’ opinion testimony upon the ultimate fact or controlling issue in a case was not an invasion of the province of the jury and was thus admissible. See Grismore v. Consolidated Prods., Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1942). However, in that same case we also held that an expert witness may not give opinion testimony on matters of domestic law or mixed questions of facts and law as that was an invasion of the province of the court as law *431giver. Id. 5 N.W.2d at 663. See also McCormick Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 Drake L.Rev. 245, 259 (1970).
The second Grismore proposition has been applied in this state to exclude testimony relating to violations of the rules of the road. See, e.g., Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1983) (testimony to effect that party violated the law by passing in a no-passing zone); Schlichte v. Franklin Troy Trucks, 265 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1978) (testimony that skid marks indicated a violation of the speed laws); Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa App.1987) (testimony that party failed to yield).
I believe that under Iowa Rule of Evidence 704 we should move away from such a strict application of the “conclusion of law” restriction in cases where the testimony is used for a descriptive purpose.
There are certain terms which, although they describe a violation of the law, are the simplest way to describe the happening of an event. These terms are ordinary and of such common usage and understanding that, although they may imply a violation of a rule of the road, there is no better descriptive term to aid the jury in understanding what, in the opinion of the witness, happened.
In my opinion, “failed to yield” or “failure to yield” are examples of terms for which there is no better way to state what happened. It is the simplest way to describe that a person entered a highway or intersection at the wrong time when there was another vehicle in the immediate vicinity who at the time the person entered the intersection or highway, had the proper right of way.
The statements I make today find support in some of the recognized treatises on evidence:
Sometimes the court fears confusion; the conclusion may convey different information to jurors than to lawyers, a danger which does not exist when there is no conflict between the expert’s definition and the legal definition.
Weinstein’s Evidence 11704[02] (1991) (emphasis added).
In short, where a legal standard has ordinary meaning, or can be made clear to the witness by specific questions, then the witness should be allowed to testify ... the testimony should be disallowed where the standard does not carry ordinary meaning, and has not been so clarified.
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 395 (1979) (emphasis added) (predicating admissibility on rule 704). See also 7 J. Adams & K. Kincaid, Iowa Practice: Evidence § 704.2 n. 7 (1988).
A court which does not ban opinion on the ultimate issue as such may nevertheless condemn a question phrased in terms of a legal criterion not adequately defined by the questioner so as to be correctly understood by laymen, the question being interpreted by the court as calling for a legal opinion. But it is often convenient or desirable to use questions that are not intended to call forth any legal conclusion but are phrased in terms of some legal standard familiar to lawyers. There is thus a problem of interpretation of the questions.... On the whole, it is thought that the danger that these questions phrased in terms of “legal conclusions” will be understood as calling for a conclusion or opinion of law will be very slight, since they will seldom be asked except when the popular meaning is the same as the legal meaning.
McCormick on Evidence § 12 at 32 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
The testimony in this case is similar to that allowed in State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 1982). There, we allowed expert reconstruction testimony to the effect that one of the vehicles involved in a crash was traveling at least seventy miles per hour. Id. at 64-65. The manner in which the question was asked and answered was for a descriptive purpose about the speed at the time of the impact, even though the testimony clearly rendered a legal conclusion that the vehicle was speeding.
I also see the testimony in this case as similar to that permitted in State v. Mur*432phy, 451 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1990). There, we allowed an expert witness to state his opinion that the defendant “was under the influence and impaired.” Id. at 155.
It is my opinion that we have previously allowed testimony when it was descriptive, even though it implied a violation of the law or a legal conclusion. It is my opinion we have already approved of the propositions I urge today and we now have an opportunity to make a clear statement on this issue.
Finally, since this case presents almost identical testimony to that presented in Bornn, I would vote to overrule that portion of Bornn, approving of the exclusion of such evidence.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.