Court Opinion

ID: 2963558
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:02.717027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:40.952675
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          July 26, 1995

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  _________________

          No. 94-1879

                               UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   EDGAR GRACIANI,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                  _________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of  this  Court issued  on  July 24,  1995,  is
          amended as follows:

               On page 18, line 4, "Trial" should be "trial".
                                                      _____

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-1879

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   EDGAR GRACIANI,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              __________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              __________________________

               Harry  R.  Segarra, by  appointment  of  the court,  Benicio
               __________________                                   _______
          Sanchez  Rivera,  Federal  Public  Defender,  and  Miguel  A.  A.
          _______________                                    ______________
          Nogueras-Castro,  Assistant Federal  Public Defender,  on various
          _______________
          briefs for appellant.
               Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco
               _____________                          _____________________
          and Edwin O. Vazquez, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief
              ________________
          for the United States.

                              _________________________

                                    July 24, 1995
                              _________________________
                

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.     Defendant-appellant   Edgar
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Graciani  challenges  the  sentence   imposed  below  on  several

          grounds.  He also belatedly moves to remand on the basis of newly

          discovered evidence   an  initiative that requires us to  set out

          for  the first time the  procedural framework that  pertains to a

          motion brought under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 while a criminal case is

          pending  on  direct  appeal,   and,  relatedly,  to  examine  the

          interplay between Rule 33 and a  defendant's guilty plea.  In the

          end, we affirm the sentence and deny the motion.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    Because appellant's conviction and sentence stem from a

          guilty  plea rather than a verdict, we derive the pertinent facts

          from  the presentence  investigation  report  (PSI  Report),  the

          government's  statement   served  pursuant  to  D.P.R.   Loc.  R.

          418.2(a),1  and   the  transcripts  of  the   change-of-plea  and

          disposition hearings.   See  United States v.  Tejada-Beltran, 50
                                  ___  _____________     ______________

          F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir.  1995); United States v. Dietz,  950 F.2d
                                          _____________    _____

          50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991).

                              
          ____________________

               1The local rule provides:

                    In    all    cases   where    a   Presentence
                    Investigation Report is ordered . . . counsel
                    for the government shall  file with the Court
                    and  serve  upon the  defendant's  counsel, a
                    statement  setting   forth  the  government's
                    version  of   the   facts  leading   to   the
                    acceptance of criminal responsibility.

          D.P.R. Loc.  R. 418.2(a).   In this case,  the defendant did  not
          object to the statement submitted by the government.

                                          3

                    On  or about  January 14,  1992, appellant  arranged to

          sell  one-eighth of a kilogram of crack  cocaine (125 grams) to a

          customer who was,  in reality,  a government operative.   On  the

          evening of January 15,  appellant's courier, Carlos Delgado Rojas

          (Delgado),  told the agent  that appellant  could not  supply the

          full  125 grams of crack then  and there; instead, he proposed to

          deliver  approximately  80  grams of  crack  and  45-50 grams  of

          powdered cocaine.  Once the agent agreed to the substitution, the

          parties  consummated  the  transaction.   Subsequent  measurement

          revealed  that Delgado had delivered 85.3 grams of crack and 54.4

          grams of cocaine powder.

                    The agent  expressed an interest  in future  purchases.

          Appellant  agreed to  sell him  a half-kilogram  of crack,  to be

          delivered  on January 24.  At the appointed time, Delgado, armed,

          appeared  at the  delivery site  accompanied by  Juan Encarnacion

          Castro  (Encarnacion)  and a  juvenile  (G.R.M.).   The  men were

          apprehended and  the arresting  officers seized a  loaded pistol.

          The officers also  seized three plastic bags  containing a white,

          powdery  substance  later  determined  to  be  sugar.2    Further

          investigation revealed that appellant  gave the seized firearm to

                              
          ____________________

               2Appellant eventually admitted that  he had agreed to purvey
          the half-kilogram of crack,  and stated that he had  prepared for
          the transaction by  "cooking" that  amount of cocaine.   He  then
          substituted sugar  for crack, claiming that he  had a premonition
          that  he might  be apprehended.   The circumstances  suggest that
          something more sinister might have been afoot.  Cf. United States
                                                          ___ _____________
          v.  Dray,  901 F.2d  1132, 1134  (1st  Cir.) ("Honor,  even among
              ____
          thieves,  may all  too often be,  in the  bard's phrase,  `a mere
          scutcheon.'") (quoting William Shakespeare,  Henry IV Part I, act
                                                       _______________
          V, sc. 1 (1598)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).
                            _____ ______

                                          4

          Delgado for protection during the drug transaction.

                    The   grand  jury   indicted  Graciani,   Delgado,  and

          Encarnacion on a medley of charges.  Appellant was named in seven

          counts of the  superseding indictment.   He eventually agreed  to

          plead guilty to count 1 (which charged  the unlawful distribution

          of 85.3 grams  of crack cocaine on January 15  in violation of 21

          U.S.C.     841(a)(1)) and  count  7 (which  charged  the unlawful

          carriage   of  a  firearm  during  and  in  relation  to  a  drug

          trafficking offense in  violation of  18 U.S.C.    924(c)).   The

          plea  agreement  left  the  sentence in  the  court's  discretion

          (subject, of course, to the constraints imposed by the sentencing

          guidelines).

                    The   district  court   took   appellant's   plea   and

          commissioned  a  PSI  Report.   The  court  originally  sentenced

          appellant on  July 7, 1992,3  but then reconsidered.   We do  not

          concern ourselves with the withdrawn sentence, but focus upon the

          second disposition hearing (held  on August 2, 1994).   The court

          attributed  to appellant  (a)  the weight  of  the crack  cocaine

          actually supplied on January  15, (b) the weight of  the powdered

          cocaine actually supplied on that date, and (c) the weight of the

          crack cocaine promised for  delivery on January 24.   Then, using

          the  Drug Quantity Table, the  court set appellant's base offense

          level (BOL)  at  36.   See U.S.S.G.   2D1.1(c)(4) (Drug  Quantity
                                 ___

          Table) (specifying a BOL of 36 for offenses involving "[a]t least
                              
          ____________________

               3The court dismissed the remaining five counts at  that time
          as  per the plea agreement.   The ensuing  reconsideration of the
          sentence did not implicate the dismissed counts.

                                          5

          500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Cocaine Base").

                    The  court  added six  levels     four for  appellant's

          aggravating role in the  offense, see id.  3B1.1(a), and  two for
                                            ___ ___

          obstruction of  justice, see  id.  3C1.1    and subtracted  three
                                   ___  ___

          levels for acceptance of responsibility, see id.  3E1.1, bringing
                                                   ___ ___

          the total offense level (TOL) to 39.  Given appellant's status as

          a  first  offender,  these   computations  yielded  a   guideline

          sentencing  range (GSR) of 262-327  months.  The  court imposed a

          280-month incarcerative sentence on count 1, and added a 60-month

          consecutive  sentence  on  count  7 to  accommodate  a  mandatory

          minimum.  See 18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1).  This appeal ensued.
                    ___

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                    Appellant advances a myriad  of arguments in support of

          the  appeal and  the  concomitant motion.    We deal  with  these

          arguments seriatim.
                    ________

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                                   Relevant Conduct
                                   Relevant Conduct
                                   ________________

                    The  method  of  the  sentencing  guidelines  makes the

          quantity of narcotics attributable to a convicted drug trafficker

          a key datum in constructing his  sentence.  See United States  v.
                                                      ___ _____________

          Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114
          _________                                       _____ ______

          S. Ct. 2714 (1995); United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 15 (1st
                              _____________    ______

          Cir. 1992); United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir.
                      _____________    _______

          1990).  In this case, appellant castigates the district court for

          attributing to  him a drug  quantity in excess  of the amount  of

                                          6

          crack cocaine  involved in the count of  conviction.  Appellant's

          fusillade lands well wide of the target.

                    Under   the  guidelines,   the   aggregate  amount   of

          attributed drugs  is to  be derived  from  the sum  total of  all

          relevant  conduct.    The  proper figure  can  only  be computed,

          therefore, by careful consideration  of all acts "that were  part

          of the same  course of conduct  or common scheme  or plan as  the

          offense  of  conviction."    U.S.S.G.   1B1.3(a)(2).    "Relevant

          conduct is not limited  to the counts of conviction";  rather, it

          includes both the charged conduct to which a defendant pleads and

          also any other conduct that qualifies under the relevancy rubric.

          Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 110; see also Garcia, 954 F.2d at  15;
          ______________                  ___ ____ ______

          Bradley, 917  F.2d at  605; U.S.S.G.  1B1.3,  comment. (backg'd).
          _______

          Specifically     and  in  direct contradiction  to  the  position

          asserted  by  appellant     relevant  conduct  may  include  both

          uncharged conduct and conduct  underbracing counts that have been

          charged  and then dropped.   See Tejada-Beltran, 50  F.3d at 110;
                                       ___ ______________

          Garcia, 954 F.2d at 15.
          ______

                    That ends the  matter.  In the usual case,  we review a

          sentencing court's  drug quantity  determination  only for  clear

          error.  See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1196; Bradley, 917 F.2d at 605.
                  ___ _________                   _______

          Here,  the district court supportably  found that the delivery of

          the crack and powdered  cocaine on January 15, and  the agreement

          to sell additional crack  cocaine on January 24, were all part of

          the  same  course  of  criminal  activity,  and,  thus,  relevant

          conduct.  We see no error.

                                          7

                    By  like token,  the  fact that  the government  seized

          sugar,  and  never  recovered  the half-kilogram  of  crack  that

          appellant  promised to supply on January 24, does not sweeten the

          bottom line by precluding reference to the agreed quantity in the

          sentencing determination.   Indeed, "every court  to consider the

          issue,  including this one, has concluded that an amount of drugs

          which  a  defendant  negotiates  to  sell may  be  considered  as

          relevant  conduct for  base offense  level  purposes even  if the

          drugs are never produced." Bradley, 917 F.2d at 604.4
                                     _______

                    For these  reasons, we conclude that  the lower court's

          drug quantity calculation cannot be faulted.

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                                   Drug Equivalency
                                   Drug Equivalency
                                   ________________

                    Appellant's next  protestation, now familiar in all the

          circuits,   criticizes  the   fact  that   the  guidelines,   and

          specifically  U.S.S.G.   2D1.1,  equate  one  kilogram  of  crack

          cocaine  to  one  hundred   kilograms  of  powdered  cocaine  for

          sentencing purposes.5  We have  squarely rejected claims that the
                              
          ____________________

               4To be sure, there  are exceptions to this rule,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          U.S.S.G.    2D1.1,  comment.   (n.12)  (requiring   exclusion  of
          negotiated  amount if "the court finds that the defendant did not
          intend to  produce and was  not reasonably  capable of  producing
          [it]"); United States v. Muniz, 49 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1995)
                  _____________    _____
          (discussing application of  note 12); United States v. Gessa, 971
                                                _____________    _____
          F.2d  1257, 1265  (6th Cir.  1991) (remanding  for findings  with
          respect to defendant's intent  and capability), but appellant has
          not brought  his situation within the confines  of any recognized
          exception.

               5The  Sentencing  Commission  recently   submitted  proposed
          guideline   amendments  that   would  substantially   reduce  the
          equivalency  ratio between  crack  cocaine and  powdered cocaine.
          See  60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,075-76 (1995).  The proposed changes
          ___

                                          8

          conversion  formula has  a greater  impact on  African-Americans,

          and, thus, transgresses the Equal  Protection Clause of the Fifth

          Amendment.   See United States  v. Singleterry, 29  F.3d 733 (1st
                       ___ _____________     ___________

          Cir.),  cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 647  (1994).  There, we held the
                  _____ ______

          sentencing distinction  between crack  and powered cocaine  to be

          constitutional, finding no  significantly probative evidence that

          either Congress  or the  Sentencing Commission harbored  a racial

          animus or  discriminatory intent.  Id.  at 741.  We  also found a
                                             ___

          sufficient  rational basis  for  the conversion  formula and  the

          resultant sentencing scheme.  See id. at 740.
                                        ___ ___

                    It is  axiomatic  that, "[i]n  a  multi-panel  circuit,

          newly constituted panels are,  for the most part, bound  by prior

          panel decisions  closely on  point."   Williams v. Ashland  Eng'g
                                                 ________    ______________

          Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995),  petition for cert. filed,
          ___                                     ________ ___ _____ _____

          63  U.S.L.W. 3819  (U.S. May  2, 1995)  (No. 94-1804-CFX).   This

          principle applies in criminal as well as civil cases.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United States v.  Wogan, 938  F.2d 1446, 1449  (1st Cir.),  cert.
          _____________     _____                                     _____

          denied, 502 U.S. 969 (1991);  see also Lacy v. Gardino,  791 F.2d
          ______                        ___ ____ ____    _______

          980,  985  (1st  Cir.)   (applying  principle  in  habeas  corpus

                              
          ____________________

          will become  effective on November 1,  1995, absent congressional
          action to  the contrary.   See 28  U.S.C.   994(p)  (1988).   The
                                     ___
          Commission  has  not yet  decided  whether the  changes,  if they
          become  law, should apply retrospectively.   See 60  Fed. Reg. at
                                                       ___
          25,074.  If the amendments  are eventually determined to  warrant
          retroactive application,  appellant may then be in  a position to
          seek appropriate relief in the district court.  See United States
                                                          ___ _____________
          v. Saccoccia,  ___ F.3d ___,  ___ n.27  (1st Cir. 1995)  [No. 93-
             _________
          1618,  slip op. at  65 n.27]; United States  v. Connell, 960 F.2d
                                        _____________     _______
          191, 197  n.10 (1st  Cir. 1992).   We express  no opinion  on the
          subject,  but merely  note  the possibility  and proceed  without
          further reference to what the future may bring.

                                          9

          context), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986).  Because Singleterry
                    _____ ______                                ___________

          is controlling on this issue, we dismiss  appellant's claim.6

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                                  Other Adjustments
                                  Other Adjustments
                                  _________________

                    Appellant complains  of two upward  adjustments to  his

          BOL,  one for  role  in the  offense and  one for  obstruction of

          justice.  Neither of these complaints need occupy us for long.

                    1.  Role  in the Offense.  U.S.S.G.   3B1.1(a) provides
                    1.  Role  in the Offense.
                        ____________________

          for  elevating a defendant's BOL  by four levels  if the district

          court makes  both a status determination (that  the defendant was

          "an  organizer or  leader of  a criminal  activity") and  a scope

          determination ("that  the defendant's criminal  activity involved

          five  or more participants or was otherwise extensive").  We have

          explicated this  proviso  in a  series  of opinions,  see,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          United  States v. Rostoff, 53  F.3d 398, 413-14  (1st Cir. 1995);
          ______________    _______

          Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 110-12; United States v. McDowell, 918
          ______________                     _____________    ________

          F.2d 1004, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1990), and it would be pleonastic to

          rehearse that jurisprudence here.  Two comments should suffice.

                    First, the  determination of  a defendant's role  in an
                              
          ____________________

               6In any event,  every other circuit  that has grappled  with
          this claim has rejected  the arguments necessary to find    2D1.1
          in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
          See, e.g., United  States v. Moore,  ___ F.3d  ___, ___ (2d  Cir.
          ___  ____  ______________    _____
          1995) [No. 94-1330, slip op. at 4-7]; United States v. Cherry, 50
                                                _____________    ______
          F.3d 338, 342-44 (5th  Cir. 1995); United States v.  Williams, 45
                                             _____________     ________
          F.3d  1481, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Butler, 41
                                                _____________    ______
          F.3d  1435, 1442  (11th  Cir.), cert.  denied,  115 S.  Ct.  1987
                                          _____  ______
          (1995);  United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 439-41 (D.C. Cir.
                   _____________    _______
          1994), cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 1412 (1995);  United States  v.
                 _____ ______                             _____________
          McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405,  1413 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.  denied, 115
          ________                                       _____  ______
          S. Ct. 1164 (1995); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d
                              _____________    _______
          Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1661 (1993).
                      _____ ______

                                          10

          offense is  necessarily fact-specific.   Appellate  courts review

          such determinations only for  clear error.  See Garcia,  954 F.2d
                                                      ___ ______

          at 18; Dietz,  950 F.2d at  52.  Thus,  absent a mistake of  law,
                 _____

          battles  over  a defendant's  status and  over  the scope  of the

          criminal  enterprise will  almost always  be won  or lost  in the

          district court.   See McDowell,  918 F.2d at  1011 (urging  "that
                            ___ ________

          considerable  respect  be paid  to the  views  of the  nisi prius

          court" in  connection with such findings)  (quoting United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st  Cir. 1990)).  In this case, we
             ______

          see no hint  of clear  error in the  trial court's  determination

          that appellant was the  leader of an enterprise of  the requisite

          size.

                    Appellant   strives  to  avoid  clear-error  review  by

          isolating  a supposed mistake  of law.   He  says that  the court

          erred  in making  its scope  determination; there could  not have

          been  "five   or  more   participants"  because   only  convicted

          individuals can be counted, and, here, the government indicted no

          more than  three  persons (Graciani,  Delgado, and  Encarnacion).

          The argument cannot withstand  the mildest scrutiny.  The  law is

          pellucid that a scope  determination under section 3B1.1(a) turns

          not on  the number  of people  convicted, but  on  the number  of

          persons  involved  in  the  criminal  activity,  whether  or  not

          indicted (let alone convicted).  See Dietz, 950 F.2d at 53.  That
                                           ___ _____

          is, the  defendant's BOL may  be elevated under  section 3B1.1(a)

          "as  long as the  record permits the sentencing  court to make `a

          specific finding, based on a preponderance of the evidence, which

                                          11

          pinpoints [the  participants] with  enough particularity  to give

          credence to the upward adjustment.'"   Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at
                                                 ______________

          113 (quoting McDowell, 918 F.2d at 1011).
                       ________

                    The record before  us clears this  hurdle with room  to

          spare.    In  addition   to  Delgado,  Encarnacion,  G.R.M.,  and

          appellant  himself, the  PSI Report states  without contradiction

          that appellant was  the leader  and organizer of  a band,  mostly

          comprised  of juveniles, that  was involved, inter  alia, in drug
                                                       _____  ____

          trafficking   activities.     The  numerosity   requirement  was,

          therefore,  satisfied.7    See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Diaz-
                                     ___   ____   ______________      _____

          Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.) (approving similar role-in-
          _________

          the-offense adjustment despite lack of express identification  of

          all co-participants), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
                                _____ ______

                    2.    Obstruction  of  Justice.    The  district  court
                    2.    Obstruction  of  Justice.
                          ________________________

          increased appellant's  BOL by  two levels under  U.S.S.G.  3C1.1.

          The court predicated the enhancement on  a finding that appellant

          threatened  both  a  confidential  informant  and  a  cooperating

          codefendant  in an  effort to  influence their  testimony against

          him.  Appellant now  challenges the adjustment on the  basis that

                              
          ____________________

               7To trigger   3B1.1(a), a  scope determination must  yield a
          supportable finding  that the criminal activity  meets either the
          numerosity   requirement   or   the   guideline's   extensiveness
                                     __
          requirement.   See Rostoff,  53 F.3d  at 413;  Tejada-Beltran, 50
                         ___ _______                     ______________
          F.3d at 110.  Here, the record shows not only numerosity but also
          extensiveness.   DEA  agents seized a  ledger that  established a
          wide-ranging pattern of drug  trafficking activities, and a trash
          bag containing  thousands of  empty vials  used to  package crack
          cocaine.    On  this  basis,  the  extensiveness  requirement  is
          satisfied.    See,  e.g.,  Dietz,  950  F.2d  at 53  (emphasizing
                        ___   ____   _____
          importance of "width, breadth,  scope, complexity and duration of
          the scheme" in connection with an extensiveness determination).

                                          12

          he was not charged with obstruction of justice and did not  admit

          to committing the underlying conduct.

                    This  challenge is  too  little, too  late.   Appellant

          never  advanced this objection in  the court below.   It is black

          letter law  that,  "in connection  with  sentencing as  in  other

          contexts, . . .  arguments not seasonably addressed to  the trial

          court may  not be  raised  for the  first  time in  an  appellate

          venue."  Dietz, 950 F.2d at 55; accord United States v. Piper, 35
                   _____                  ______ _____________    _____

          F.3d 611, 620 n.6 (1st Cir.  1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118
                                              _____ ______

          (1995); Sepulveda,  15 F.3d  at 1202.   Consequently, appellant's
                  _________

          challenge is foreclosed.

                                          D.
                                          D.
                                          __

                                 The Eighth Amendment
                                 The Eighth Amendment
                                 ____________________

                    Appellant contends  that a  280-month sentence for  the

          distribution of  so paltry an amount of crack cocaine constitutes

          cruel  and  unusual  punishment   in  derogation  of  the  Eighth

          Amendment.  We do not agree.

                    The  Eighth  Amendment  does  not  require   a  precise

          calibration  of crime  and punishment in  noncapital cases.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v.  Saccoccia, ___  F.3d ___, ___  (1st Cir.  1995)
          _____________     _________

          [No. 93-1618,  slip op.  at 72].   At most, the  Eighth Amendment

          gives rise  to a "narrow proportionality  principle," Harmelin v.
                                                                ________

          Michigan, 501  U.S.  957, 997  (1991) (opinion  of Kennedy,  J.),
          ________

          forbidding   only  extreme   sentences  that   are  significantly

          disproportionate to the underlying  crime.  See id. at  1001; see
                                                      ___ ___           ___

          also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983); Saccoccia, ___ F.3d
          ____ _____    ____                            _________

                                          13

          at ___  [slip op. at 72];  United States v. Munoz,  36 F.3d 1229,
                                     _____________    _____

          1239 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995).
                                _____ ______

                    It is, therefore, unsurprising that,  with a regularity

          bordering on the echolalic, courts have repulsed Eighth Amendment

          challenges to lengthy incarcerative sentences in drug cases.  For

          example, in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982), the Supreme
                      _____    _____

          Court upheld a 40-year prison sentence for possessing nine ounces

          of  marijuana with distributive  intent.  More  recently, a clear

          majority  of the  Justices in  Harmelin, while  differing on  the
                                         ________

          constitutional   status   of   proportionality    review,   found

          insufficient disproportionality to forestall a mandatory sentence

          of  life without  parole  for possession  of  over 650  grams  of

          cocaine.  Recent opinions  of the courts of  appeals are to  like

          effect.  See, e.g., Munoz,  36 F.3d at 1239 (holding that  a 240-
                   ___  ____  _____

          month  sentence meted  out for  participation in  a crack-selling

          conspiracy involving less than 900 grams of cocaine base accorded

          with  the Harmelin standard);  United States v.  Wesley, 990 F.2d
                    ________             _____________     ______

          360, 367 (8th. Cir. 1993) (holding that 100-to-1 sentencing ratio

          between  cocaine and  crack cocaine does  not violate  the Eighth

          Amendment).  With  these cases as a  reference point, appellant's

          sentence  cannot  successfully  be attacked  on  Eighth Amendment

          grounds.

                                          E.
                                          E.
                                          __

                                 The Motion To Remand
                                 The Motion To Remand
                                 ____________________

                    Following  the submission  of  the  parties'  appellate

          briefs,  appellant's new  counsel filed  a  motion in  this court

                                          14

          asking  us  to  withhold decision  and  remand  the  case to  the

          district court for  a hearing on "newly  discovered evidence" and

          for a new trial.8  The  motion was accompanied by an affidavit of

          G.R.M.  (now identified as German  R. Maldonado) that purports to

          absolve  appellant   of  responsibility  for   the  offenses   of

          conviction.    The motion  asserts  that  this "newly  discovered

          evidence" warrants the relief requested.  We think not.

                    In  the first place, appellant puts the cart before the

          horse.   Concededly, a  motion  for a  new trial  based on  newly

          discovered  evidence  can be  brought  while a  criminal  case is

          pending on  direct  appeal.   See  Fed. R.  Crim.  P. 33.9    The
                                        ___

          question remains,  however, whether the  court of appeals  is the

          appropriate  forum in  which  a criminal  defendant may  initiate

          review of a Rule 33 motion by the district court, and, relatedly,

          whether  a remand  is  necessary before  the  district court  can

                              
          ____________________

               8In  point of fact, counsel filed two motions, both of which
          rely on the same affidavit.  To the extent that the second motion
          can be  read as  requesting different  relief   a  hearing as  to
          whether  the plea agreement  is null  and void  (and, presumably,
          whether the appellant should be permitted to withdraw his plea)  
          we deny it without prejudice  to the filing of a proper  petition
          under  28 U.S.C.   2255 (1988).  The plea-withdrawal argument was
          not raised below and, in the absence of essential factfinding, we
          decline to entertain it on direct appeal.

               9The rule states in pertinent part:

                    A motion for a new trial based  on the ground
                    of newly discovered evidence may be made only
                    before  or  within   two  years  after  final
                    judgment,  but if  an appeal  is  pending the
                    court may grant the  motion only on remand of
                    the case.

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.

                                          15

          entertain  a Rule  33 motion.    In general,  both parts  of this

          inquiry evoke a negative response.

                    A  criminal defendant  who  aspires to  employ Rule  33

          while his conviction is  pending on direct appeal is  not obliged

          either to file a motion  for remand in the court of appeals or to

          seek any  type of leave  from that court.   To the  contrary, the

          proper procedure  under such circumstances is  for the defendant,

          without further ado,  to file his Rule 33 motion  in the district

          court.  See  United States v.  Phillips, 558 F.2d  363, 363  (6th
                  ___  _____________     ________

          Cir. 1977) (per curiam).  Once  the motion has been so  docketed,

          the   district   court   has   jurisdiction   to   entertain   it

          notwithstanding  the pendency of the appeal,  and may either deny

          it  on the  merits or  indicate an  intention to  grant it.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Fuentes-Lozano, 580  F.2d 724, 725-26 (5th  Cir.
          _____________    ______________

          1978) (per curiam); United  States v. Frame, 454 F.2d  1136, 1138
                              ______________    _____

          (9th Cir.) (per curiam),  cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925  (1972); see
                                    _____ ______                        ___

          also  United  States v.  Cronic, 466  U.S.  648, 666  n.42 (1984)
          ____  ______________     ______

          (noting correct  procedural progression).  If  the district court

          denies the motion, the  defendant may take a further  appeal; and

          if the court  proposes to  grant the motion,  it ordinarily  will

          issue a written statement  to that effect so that  the defendant,

          armed with the advisory, may then request an order of remand from

          the appellate court.  See Frame, 454 F.2d at 1138.
                                ___ _____

                    We adopt this protocol,  requiring a Rule 33 motion  to

          be filed initially in the district court when  a direct appeal of

          a  criminal conviction is pending, for four main reasons.  First,

                                          16

          the  protocol accords with the  weight of authority.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Phillips,  supra; Frame,  supra.   Second, it  comports with  the
          ________   _____  _____   _____

          discernible  intention of the drafters of  the 1944 amendments to

          Rule 33.   See, e.g.,  Frame, 454 F.2d  at 1138 (discussing  1944
                     ___  ____   _____

          amendments).   Third, it coheres with  our established procedural

          paradigm for handling parallel situations on the civil side.  See
                                                                        ___

          Toscano  v.  Chandris,  934   F.2d  383,  386  (1st   Cir.  1991)
          _______      ________

          (explaining  that "if an appeal  is pending, a  Rule 60(b) motion

          should first be filed in the trial court, and the district judge,

          if inclined to allow it, may then request remand");  Commonwealth
                                                               ____________

          of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir.
          ______________    ____________________

          1979) (ordaining  comparable procedure when,  during the pendency

          of  an  appeal from  a final  judgment,  a party  claims  to have

          discovered an exogenous basis for relief from the judgment).

                    Last  but  not  least,  principles  of  sound  judicial

          administration counsel that the  district court should be allowed

          to  exercise its  discretion  to the  fullest extent  permissible

          under Rule 33 before  the court of appeals becomes  enmeshed. See
                                                                        ___

          Frame, 454 F.2d at 1138.  The protocol we adopt  today meets this
          _____

          objective.   It takes advantage  of the district  court's greater

          familiarity with  the case; it husbands  judicial resources, thus

          eliminating  the  need  for  a  time-consuming  remand  in  those

          situations  in  which  the  trial  court  discerns no  basis  for

          granting a new trial; and, finally, it ensures that the merits of

          the motion for new trial will be heard rapidly, while at the same

                                          17

          time keeping the earlier appeal on track.10

                    Since appellant did not  follow this protocol in moving

          to remand, his motion must in all events be denied for procedural

          reasons.   But, there is an  added wrinkle.  If  the problem were

          purely procedural,  we  would simply  deny the  motion to  remand

          without prejudice to appellant's pursuit of redress under Rule 33

          in  the district  court.  See  United States v.  Boberg, 565 F.2d
                                    ___  _____________     ______

          1059,  1063 (8th  Cir. 1977)  (affirming conviction  in analogous

          circumstances "without  prejudice to  any motion to  the district

          court  for a  new  trial  on  the  grounds  of  newly  discovered

          evidence").  Here, however, the vice is more profound; the motion

          is also substantively infirm.  We explain briefly.

                    By  its express  terms, Rule  33 is  confined  to those

          situations in  which a trial has  been had.  In  the court below,

          appellant  admitted his guilt, abjuring a trial.  A defendant who
                     ________

          enters a guilty plea cannot thereafter use Rule 33 as  a wedge to

          undo  his acknowledgement  that he  committed  the offense.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States  v. Collins, 898 F.2d 103, 104 (9th Cir. 1989) (per
          _____________     _______

          curiam); United States v.  Lambert, 603 F.2d 808, 809  (10th Cir.
                   _____________     _______

          1979); Williams v.  United States,  290 F.2d 217,  218 (5th  Cir.
                 ________     _____________

          1961)  (per curiam); see also  United States v.  Prince, 533 F.2d
                               ___ ____  _____________     ______

                              
          ____________________

               10The Fifth Circuit has suggested  in dictum that "to  avoid
          delay" a criminal defendant may, alternatively, ask the court  of
          appeals  to  remand  before  initiating  proceedings  to  in  the
          district court.  See Fuentes-Lozano, 580 F.2d at 726.  If such an
                           ___ ______________
          alternative exists at all   a question on which we  need not pass
             it is  available  only in  cases characterized  by exceptional
          circumstances   (including  the   looming  prospect   of  unusual
          hardship).

                                          18

          205,  208  (5th Cir.  1976) (applying  same  principle in  bar of

          proffered Rule 33 motion following  plea of nolo contendere); see
                                                                        ___

          generally  3 Charles A. Wright, Federal  Practice and Procedure  
          _________                       _______________________________

          556, at 313 (2d ed. 1982); cf. United States v.  Cordero, 42 F.3d
                                     ___ _____________     _______

          697, 698 (1st Cir.  1994) (holding that a defendant,  by entering

          an unconditional  plea of guilty,  waives any right  to challenge

          his  conviction  on  the  basis  of  earlier,  non-jurisdictional

          rulings).   In fine,  Rule 33 "applies  only to cases  in which a

          trial,  either  to the  court  or to  a  jury, has  taken place."

          Lambert, 603 F.2d at 809.
          _______

                    We need go  no further.   Because Fed.  R. Crim. P.  33

          cannot be  invoked to undermine  a conviction  predicated upon  a

          guilty  plea,  we  deny appellant's  motion  to  remand.   To  do

          otherwise would promote an exercise in futility.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          19