Court Opinion

ID: 9714390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:36:27.605155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.719148
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join in the majority’s disposition of the issue involving probable cause, and concur in the disposition of the narrow issue presented in appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, that is *64to say, that finding counsel ineffective for failure to raise a Sessoms argument in this case when Sessoms had not yet been decided would be inappropriate since we cannot hold attorneys responsible for predicting changes in the law. However, because my analysis of the sentencing issue differs from that of the majority, I write separately to clarify my position on the broader concerns implicated by appellant’s ineffectiveness argument. I must also express my dissent from the majority’s analysis of appellant’s claim that the sentence imposed upon him was excessive.
With respect to appellant’s claim that counsel should have questioned the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines, I must point out that even if the claim of unconstitutionality had been raised by counsel at every point in the appellate process, that mere claim is not a password to appellate review of the merits of the case. I am of the opinion that merely stating that the Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional, without more, cannot raise a substantial question under Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). The Sentencing Guidelines were never more than guidelines for the sentencing courts to follow; an abuse of discretion cannot be implied from the fact that a sentence was imposed under the guidelines before their invalidation. For this reason, I would find that failure to preserve the unconstitutionality argument here was not grounds for an ineffectiveness claim. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Arthur, 488 Pa. 262, 265, 412 A.2d 498, 500 (1980); Commonwealth v. Jones, 365 Pa.Super. 57, 62, 528 A.2d 1360, 1363 (1987).
I dissent from the majority’s consideration of Bells’ claim that his sentence was excessive. I disagree with the majority decision in Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987) (en banc), which held that an appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 2119(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tuladziecki, if not objected to by the appellee, is a waivable procedural violation. In my opinion, the majority in Krum has misinterpreted the *65supreme court’s decision in Tuladziecki. See Krum, 367 Pa.Super. at 523-524, 533 A.2d at 140 (Brosky, J., dissenting). In Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), the supreme court has specified the manner in which an appellant seeking review of the discretionary aspects of sentence must petition our court for an allowance of appeal under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b):
An appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence. The statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence.
This was reiterated in Tuladziecki: “It is only where a party can articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that this scheme as a whole has been compromised that the appellate court should review the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion.” Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 515, 522 A.2d at 20 (emphasis added). If a party does not first articulate those reasons, we cannot, according to the decision in Tuladziecki, go rummaging through the record and the merits of the issue raised to discover some substantial question. I therefore take issue with the decision in Krum, and would find appellant’s claim waived for failure to supply a 2119(f) statement of reasons relied on for appeal.
Further, had I, like the majority, been able to reach the merits of Bells’ claim, I would not have analyzed it by resorting to discussions of offense gravity scores. Given Sessoms, the only analysis needed to dispose of the abuse of discretion claim was the majority’s consideration of the appellant’s history of criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes for which he was sentenced, and its statement that the sentence was less than the statutory maximum. Discussion of the offense gravity scores was unnecessary, although not necessarily incorrect. Even though the sentencing guidelines were declared to be void ab initio, they were never more than recommendations to *66the sentencing court to aid in its determination of the appropriate sentence. The mention of them in connection with the analysis of a possible abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing court is not fatal. I would only caution that whether or not a sentencing court has abused its discretion cannot be decided solely from an examination of the now-defunct guidelines.