Court Opinion

ID: 9402767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 19:03:32.987723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.453207
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/16/23 P. v. Kendrick CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 Ca l ifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 o p inions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 o p inion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B317126

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                             Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MA073204
        v.

 TONY KENDRICK, Jr.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                           INTRODUCTION

       Tony Kendrick, Jr. (Kendrick) was convicted of first degree
burglary, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury, and dissuading a witness. The trial court sentenced
Kendrick to 24 years in prison, selecting the upper terms for the
burglary and assault convictions. In Kendrick’s first appeal, we
struck three one-year enhancements imposed under Penal Code1
section 667.5, subdivision (b) (prison priors), vacated Kendrick’s
sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. We also
noted that on remand, Kendrick could challenge the court’s
imposition of fines and fees. We otherwise affirmed the judgment
and denied Kendrick’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
       On remand, the court resentenced Kendrick—without him
or any defense counsel present—to 21 years in prison, choosing
the same terms as Kendrick’s original sentence but without the
three prison priors. After Kendrick was resentenced, the
California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (S.B. 567),
which amended section 1170, former subdivision (b) by making
the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of
punishment. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, adding § 1170, subd.
(b)(1) & (2).)
       Kendrick appeals, arguing the court prejudicially erred
when it held the new sentencing hearing without him or his
counsel present. We agree and remand the matter for a new
sentencing hearing at which Kendrick is entitled to be present,
unless he chooses to waive that right. On remand, the court shall
reconsider Kendrick’s sentence in light of S.B. 567.

1   All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                     2
                          BACKGROUND2

       The People charged Kendrick with first degree residential
burglary (§ 459; count 1) and assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2). The People
further alleged that Kendrick suffered two prior serious felony
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d))
and served five prior prison terms. The prosecution later
amended the information to add count 3, dissuading a witness (§
136.1, subd. (b)).
       Following a jury trial, Kendrick was found guilty as
charged. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true one
strike allegation, one prior serious felony allegation, and three
prison prior allegations.
       On February 26, 2019, the court held the sentencing
hearing, at which Kendrick appeared in pro. per. The court
sentenced Kendrick to 24 years in prison as follows: (1) the high
term of 6 years for count 1, doubled to 12 years under the Three
Strikes Law, plus 5 years for the prior strike and 3 years for the
prison priors; (2) the high term of 4 years for count 2, doubled to
8 years under the Three Strikes Law, to run concurrently with
count 1; and (3) the middle term of 2 years for count 3, doubled to
4 years under the Three Strikes Law, to run consecutively to
count 1. As for fines and fees, the court imposed a $7,200
restitution fine, a $30 criminal conviction fee, and a $40 court
security fee, and it imposed but stayed a $7,200 parole revocation
restitution fine.

2 A summary of the facts underlying Kendrick’s convictions can be
found in our prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Kendrick (Feb. 17,
2021, B296061).

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       In Kendrick’s first appeal, we struck the three prison
priors, vacated Kendrick’s sentence, and remanded the matter for
resentencing. We declined to reach Kendrick’s claim that he was
entitled to an ability to pay hearing, noting that Kendrick “may
raise any challenge to the fees or fines at the resentencing
hearing.” In all other respects, we affirmed the judgment.
       The court held a new sentencing hearing on June 16, 2021.
A prosecutor appeared but neither Kendrick nor defense counsel
was present. According to the court, Kendrick was ordered out of
custody, but “[h]e was not transported.” The court decided to
proceed without any representative for the defense because
“[t]here is no discretion, [the court’s] simply following a
remittitur.” The court sentenced Kendrick to 21 years in prison,
imposing the same terms as Kendrick’s original sentence without
the three prison priors. The court also imposed “all other
conditions” from the original judgment.3
       Kendrick appeals.

                           DISCUSSION

       A criminal defendant has a federal and state constitutional
right to appear at “all critical stages of a criminal prosecution,”
including at sentencing and resentencing proceedings. (People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417, 453; People v. Rodriguez (1998)

3 The court awarded Kendrick 1,222 actual custody credits, while
Kendrick’s abstract of judgment reflects he is entitled to only 1,221
custody credits. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect
that Kendrick is entitled to 1,222 actual custody credits. (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“ ‘a court has the inherent power
to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records
reflect the true facts’ ”].)

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17 Cal.4th 253, 260.) A defendant also has a statutory right to
appear at such hearings. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404,
508.) A defendant may waive the right to personally appear if his
waiver is “ ‘voluntary, knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Ibid.) To
constitute a valid waiver, there must be at least “some evidence
that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the
consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510,
531.)
       The People contend the court did not violate Kendrick’s
right to appear at the June 16, 2021 resentencing hearing
because the record indicates Kendrick was present at that
hearing or, at the very least, he waived his right to appear at the
hearing. This argument is not well-taken.
       The People point to two-minute orders included in the
record, both of which are dated June 16, 2021. The first minute
order, which has an 8:30 a.m. timestamp, states that “[d]efendant
is not present in court, and not represented by counsel.” That
order also states that “defendant waived his personal appearance
for this hearing.” The order then sets out Kendrick’s new
sentence imposed at the June 16, 2021 resentencing hearing.
       The second minute order, which has a 9:00 a.m. timestamp,
states that “[d]efendant is present in court, and not represented
by counsel[.] [¶] Defendant appears in pro per.” The second
minute order also states that it is modifying, nunc pro tunc, the
minute order from February 26, 2019—i.e., the date of Kendrick’s
original sentencing hearing. The 9:00 a.m. minute order includes
the same description of Kendrick’s new sentence that appears in
the 8:30 a.m. minute order.
       As for the 9:00 a.m. minute order, the People argue we can
infer it establishes Kendrick appeared at the June 16, 2021

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resentencing hearing. We disagree. In the reporter’s transcript
from that hearing, the court noted that it had ordered Kendrick
out of custody for resentencing, but he was not transported to the
courthouse. The court explained that it was proceeding with
resentencing without Kendrick present because it believed it had
no sentencing discretion. Nothing in the reporter’s transcript
from that hearing otherwise suggests Kendrick appeared at the
resentencing hearing.
       Since the reporter’s transcript, and not the clerk’s
transcript, reflects the court’s pronouncement of judgment, we
must resolve the discrepancy between the 9:00 a.m. minute order
and the reporter’s transcript from the June 16, 2021 resentencing
hearing in favor of the reporter’s transcript.4 (People v. Mesa
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; see also In re P.A. (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 23, 30, fn. 4 [“ ‘[c]onflicts between the reporter’s and
clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be clerical in nature
and resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript unless the
particular circumstances dictate otherwise’ ”].) Thus, we cannot
infer from the 9:00 a.m. minute order that Kendrick appeared at
the resentencing hearing.
       Nor can we infer from the 8:30 a.m. minute order that
Kendrick waived his personal appearance at the June 16, 2021
resentencing hearing. Nothing in the reporter’s transcript

4Indeed, the notation in the 9:00 a.m. minute order that Kendrick
appeared in pro. per. appears to be a holdover from the February 26,
2019 minute order, which the 9:00 a.m. minute order modified “nunc
pro tunc.” The February 26, 2019 minute order includes the exact same
notation that the People rely on here—i.e., “[d]efendant is present in
court, and not represented by counsel[.] [¶] Defendant appears in pro
per.”

                                  6
indicates Kendrick waived his presence at that hearing. As we
just explained, the court noted only that Kendrick had been
ordered out of custody, but he was not transported to the
courthouse. No defense counsel appeared to communicate any
waiver on Kendrick’s behalf, and the court did not address any
waiver executed by Kendrick. Nor does a waiver appear
anywhere else in the record. (See People v. Davis, supra, 36
Cal.4th at p. 531 [there must be evidence that the defendant
understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of
doing so].) For the same reasons discussed above, we must
presume the reporter’s transcript, which contains no indication
that Kendrick waived his right to personally appear at
resentencing, controls over the conflicting 8:30 a.m. minute order.
(In re P.A., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 30, fn. 4.)
       Because Kendrick was not present at the June 16, 2021
resentencing hearing, and nothing in the record establishes he
waived his right to appear at that hearing, the court violated
Kendrick’s right to be present at resentencing. (People v. Cutting
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348 (Cutting).) We therefore must
determine whether Kendrick’s absence from resentencing was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid., citing Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23.) Under that standard, the
People must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Kendrick’s
absence did not affect the outcome of resentencing. (People v.
Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661.)
       Kendrick’s absence from the resentencing hearing was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As our Supreme Court has
explained, where, as here, “part of a sentence is stricken on
review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its

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sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) In exercising its
discretion on remand, a court may consider “ ‘ “any pertinent
circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed.” ’ ” (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 350, quoting
Buycks, at p. 893.) For instance, a court may consider mitigating
factors that arose after the defendant’s original sentencing, such
as the defendant’s expressions of remorse or pleas for leniency.
(Cutting, at p. 350; see also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53
Cal.3d 442, 460 [“it is well settled that when a case is remanded
for resentencing after an appeal, the defendant is entitled to ‘all
the normal rights and procedures available at his original
sentencing’ [citations], including consideration of any pertinent
circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed”].)
       In our prior opinion, we noted that Kendrick could raise on
remand any challenges to the court’s imposition of fines and fees.5
But by conducting the resentencing hearing without Kendrick, let
alone a representative for him, present, the court deprived
Kendrick of the opportunity to present evidence or argument
about his ability to pay the restitution fine or other fees imposed
by the court. (See People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380,
388–389 [“When a restitution fine is imposed in the absence of

5Curiously, the People assert Kendrick forfeited any challenge to the
court’s imposition of fines and fees because he did not raise that issue
at the original sentencing hearing. We reject this argument because we
expressly authorized Kendrick to raise the issue on remand. (See
People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023 [courts may exercise
discretion to reach sentencing issues that were not raised in the trial
court].)

                                   8
the defendant, the defendant has no opportunity to address the
propriety of imposing the fine or its amount”]; see also People v.
Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508 [restitution is “ ‘a significant
aspect of a criminal sentence’ ” at which a criminal defendant has
a right to appear].) Additionally, without being present, Kendrick
was unable to advocate for the court, in exercising its discretion
to reconsider his entire sentence, to impose more lenient terms of
imprisonment. (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 350.)
       For the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the
court’s decision to resentence Kendrick in his absence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cutting, supra, 42
Cal.App.5th at p. 350 [defendant’s absence from resentencing was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant “may
have offered mitigating factors that arose after his original
sentencing; he may have expressed remorse; [or] he may have
made a plea for leniency”].) Thus, the matter must be remanded
for a new sentencing hearing at which Kendrick is entitled to
appear, unless he waives that right.6 At resentencing, the court
shall reconsider Kendrick’s sentence in light of S.B. 567. (See
People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 [S.B. 567’s
“ameliorative amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply
retroactively to all cases not yet final as of January 1, 2022”].)
Kendrick may raise, and the court shall consider, challenges to
the fees or fines at the resentencing hearing.

6Because we are vacating Kendrick’s sentence and remanding the
matter for a new sentencing hearing, we need not address the other
arguments Kendrick raises on appeal.

                                  9
                            DISPOSITION

      The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of
judgment to reflect the award of 1,222 days of actual custody
credits and forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

       EGERTON, J.

       HEIDEL, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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