Court Opinion

ID: 9949550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 20:17:10.338498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:47.357944
License: Public Domain

2024 UT App 16

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                       JOSEPH EARL LAMB,
                           Appellee,
                               v.
                     SONYA ELIZABETH LAMB,
                           Appellant.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20210787-CA
                      Filed February 8, 2024

           Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
                 The Honorable Robert P. Faust
                          No. 174904728

            Mary Deiss Brown, Attorney for Appellant
        Gregory G. Skordas, Gabriela Mena, and Allison R.
                 Librett, Attorneys for Appellee

  JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1     Joseph Earl and Sonya Elizabeth Lamb’s divorce was
decided at a bench trial. 1 As relevant here, Joseph was awarded
custody of their children, ownership of a family business, and half
the equity of the marital home. Sonya now challenges the court’s
custody determination and the award of the business. She also
challenges the manner in which the court determined the equity
in the marital home. We affirm the district court’s rulings in all
aspects.

1. Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their
given names.
                           Lamb v. Lamb

                         BACKGROUND 2

¶2    Joseph and Sonya married in 2007 and separated in July
2017. We address separately each of the district court’s
determinations with which Sonya takes issue.

                    The Custody of the Children

¶3     Joseph and Sonya have three children, all of whom
were minors when they divorced in August 2021. In
November 2017, at a hearing for temporary orders, Sonya’s
counsel told the court that Sonya had been the children’s primary
caregiver “until recently.” Sonya also admitted that she was
arrested in July 2017 and was facing charges for possession and
use of drugs, but she asserted that she had “taken responsibility,”
had “stopped using drugs,” was “sober and more than capable of
caring for the children and continuing on as their primary
caregiver,” and had “been attending Narcotics Anonymous and
Al-Anon meetings.” Sonya asserted that Joseph had a “serious
drug addiction problem.” Joseph claimed that Sonya had
vacated the marital home shortly before her arrest, and he
revealed that he obtained a protective order against her. The court
acknowledged the allegations both sides made against the
other but noted that Joseph currently had the children in his care
and was living in the marital home. The court then determined
that Joseph should maintain “custody of the children on a
temporary basis.”

2. As addressed below, neither party’s briefs included sufficient
citations to the record. This shortcoming has necessitated us
combing the record to establish some semblance of a background,
something we are not obligated to do. See State v. Wright, 2019 UT
App 66, ¶ 47 n.6, 442 P.3d 1185 (explaining the parties’ duty to cite
the record in appellate briefs), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 391 (Utah
2019). Accordingly, our recitation of the facts is necessarily
minimal as we limit it to what is essential to resolve the issues on
appeal.

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                          Lamb v. Lamb

¶4     Apparently, the children remained in the temporary
custody of Joseph until the parties’ divorce trial, where the court
received the testimony of a “reunification therapist” (Family
Therapist), who had been hired by the parties after the custody
evaluator had been “unable to perform an evaluation due to the
children spending less than minimum time” with Sonya.

¶5     Based on the testimony of Family Therapist, which we
recount when relevant in our analysis below, the court found that
“unification” between Sonya and the two older children was
“lacking” because of acrimonious relationships. The court noted
that Family Therapist had testified that progress in reunification
therapy would “influence what possible custody” Sonya might
have in the future relative to the older children. The court
determined that it was “in the best interest of the children that
reunification therapy” continue to allow Sonya the opportunity
“to reunify her relationship with the children.”

¶6     Accordingly, the court found that it was in the children’s
best interest that Joseph be “awarded sole physical custody and
final decision making authority,” with both parties being
awarded joint legal custody. With regard to the youngest child,
the court awarded supervised parent-time to Sonya one night a
week. The court awarded Sonya no parent-time with the older
two children. The court noted that supervised parent-time for
Sonya would “be flexible” and might “increase after the current
reunification issues” and Sonya’s “medical issues” were
addressed. The court also stated that Sonya’s “non-use of
cannabis” needed to be verified because marijuana use was “a
contributing factor” that brought on her mental health episodes.

                           The Business

¶7     During their union, the parties were financially supported,
at least in part, by a business that distributed supplies to gas
stations. During the divorce proceedings, Joseph maintained that
he was in the process of purchasing the business from his father
but that he did not have the money to pay for it. Joseph explained

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                          Lamb v. Lamb

that he drew a salary for his work with the business. In contrast,
Sonya maintained that she and Joseph agreed to buy the business
in 2010 and that they completed paying off the business in 2016.
Sonya claimed that she and Joseph signed a document “to take
over the business” but that she did “not have the document.”
Sonya did produce a different document that explicitly stated the
business was being sold only to Joseph.

¶8    The district court awarded the business to Joseph, along
with all its debts and obligations. In addition, the court,
apparently recognizing that the business was possibly still owned
by Joseph’s father, ordered that any money Joseph borrowed
against the marital home to purchase the business would “not be
used to reduce the total equity in the home” so as to reduce
Sonya’s share of the home’s value. In making this award to
Joseph, the court was clear that it was basing its decision “on the
testimony” provided by Joseph.

                        The Marital Home

¶9     Based on a Zillow estimate 3 provided by Sonya, the court
determined the value of the marital home to be $998,659, but the
equity in the home was reduced by mortgages and liens on the
property. Joseph testified that three mortgages, totaling $402,000,

3. Neither party produced an appraisal of the home or an
appraisal witness at trial, leading the court to ask the parties,
“Does anybody have any valuation [of the home] at all?” Sonya’s
counsel answered, “Well, we could do it [with] Zillow.” At this
point, while in court, Sonya’s counsel looked up the value and
reported, “According to Zillow as of today, the estimated value is
$998,659.” No objection was lodged at trial to the court receiving
this information. “Zillow is a commercial website that provides,
among other things, an estimated market value for many
residential properties.” Chaudry v. Chaudry, No. 1794, 2021 WL
2910977, at *9 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 12, 2021).

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

were on the property. 4 And the home was additionally
encumbered by eleven liens. Two of these liens, totaling $2,414,
were attributed to Sonya and Joseph. The remaining nine, totaling
$256,521, were tax liens and civil judgments incurred by the
previous owner of the home. 5

¶10 The court received evidence that when Joseph and Sonya
purchased the home in November 2009, it was subject to some
existing debt. Joseph testified as follows:

       Counsel: “Was there anything particular about that
          purchase [of the home]?”

       Joseph: “We didn’t have the credit or the means to get into
           a home at the time, so my brother is a real estate agent
           and he’s good friends with [the previous owner] and
           said, ‘Hey, this house is available. If you like it, I can
           probably get you into it.’ And so we took him up on
           that and (inaudible) that we had to take on (inaudible).”

       Counsel: “So there were other debts on that house when
          you purchased it?”

       Joseph: “Yes. . . . . I didn’t know about all of them at the time,
           but yes.”

       Counsel: “What are those debts?”

4. This number reflected the amount owing at the time of
separation. At the bench trial, Joseph testified that the amount was
currently about $298,000.

5. Joseph’s counsel provided a LexisNexis report as evidence of
the liens on the home. This report was admitted as evidence with
no objection.

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

       Joseph: “There’s a lot of tax liens from [the previous owner]
           throughout the years. There’s a couple of (inaudible)
           from Sonya and I, medical bills that weren’t paid. . . .”

       Counsel: “And have you paid off the tax liens? The liens on
          the house?”

       Joseph: “No.”

Thus, in a somewhat unusual arrangement, the parties appear to
have purchased the home subject to certain liabilities, even if they
did not know the precise extent of those liabilities. Presumably,
these liabilities would have been offset by a reduction in the
purchase price, making the home more affordable.

¶11 Adding the mortgages and liens together for an amount of
$660,935, the court determined that equity in the home was
$337,724. The court ordered Joseph to pay Sonya $168,862 as her
share of that equity.

¶12    Sonya appeals.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 Sonya identifies multiple ways in which she believes the
district court erred. But “[f]or the sake of brevity,” we
“consolidate these grounds” and “set out in the opinion only so
much . . . as we deem necessary to a decision of the questions
involved herein.” Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 145
P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1944), overruled on other grounds by Timpanogos
Plan. & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy
Dist., 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984).

¶14 Sonya first contends that the district court abused its
discretion in making custody and parent-time decisions because
it lacked sufficient information to make those decisions. “We
review custody determinations deferentially, and so long as the
district court’s discretion is exercised within the confines of the

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

legal standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the
decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions, we will not disturb the resulting award.” Kingston v.
Kingston, 2022 UT 43, ¶ 20, 532 P.3d 958 (cleaned up).

¶15 Sonya next contends that the district court’s findings were
“entirely inadequate to explain” its reasoning for awarding
ownership of the business to Joseph. “We review the legal
sufficiency of factual findings—that is, whether the trial court’s
factual findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions—
under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular
deference to the trial court.” Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161,
¶ 5, 353 P.3d 1262 (cleaned up).

¶16 Lastly, Sonya argues that the district court’s “procedures
and decisions regarding the division of equity in the marital home
were illogical and manifestly unjust.” “Determining and
assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court,
and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations
absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Mintz v. Mintz,
2023 UT App 17, ¶ 12, 525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531
P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

                            ANALYSIS

                       I. A Note on Briefing

¶17 Sonya’s briefing is plagued by significant deficiencies and
does not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for
appropriate briefing. First, excluding the cases cited for the
standards of review, Sonya cites only a single case in her opening
brief, and she does so in a perfunctory fashion—making only a
shallow attempt to explain its relevance to the issues. Sonya
continues this trend in her reply brief, where she cites no cases at
all. In this regard, she falls far short of appellate expectations. “A
party may not simply point toward a pile of sand and expect the
court to build a castle. In both district and appellate courts, the
development of an argument is a party’s responsibility, not a

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

judicial duty.” Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35, 435 P.3d 248;
see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain,
with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority
and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”); id. R.
24(b)(3).

¶18 Second, in her statement of the case, Sonya fails to include
a single citation to the record. This is in contravention of our
clearly stated rule. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) (“The statement of
the case must include, with citations to the record: (A) the facts of
the case, to the extent necessary to understand the issues
presented for review; (B) the procedural history of the case, to the
extent necessary to understand the issues presented for review;
and (C) the disposition in the court or agency whose judgment or
order is under review.” (emphasis added)). We note that Sonya
somewhat more adequately cites the record in the argument
section of her brief, but that is not what the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure require, and by ignoring the rules to suit her
briefing preferences, she does little to bolster judicial efficiency. 6

¶19 We point out these deficiencies not to ridicule, disparage,
or shame counsel, but to provide warning that future briefing of
this nature will likely be deemed inadequate and that any
arguments on the merits may not be substantively considered by
this court. This court receives hundreds of briefs each year. They
vary in quality and in their adherence to the rules. We recognize
that members of the bar have a lot on their plates and occasionally
miss a typo or overlook a citation. But wholesale disregard of
briefing rules is quite beyond the pale and can have unwelcome

6. Nor did Joseph’s counsel provide a single citation to the record
in his brief. This shortcoming is most unhelpful. While an appellee
is not required to file a brief, see, e.g., AL-IN Partners, LLC v.
LifeVantage Corp., 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76, we observe that if
a brief is filed, it would behoove counsel to provide record
citations. After all, and at the risk of stating the obvious, record
citations are required because in their absence it’s difficult, and at
times impossible, to figure out what the parties are referencing.

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

consequences for attorneys (and their clients) who choose this
risky path. See Ostler v. Department of Public Safety, 2022 UT App
6, ¶ 27, 505 P.3d 1119 (“We . . . retain discretion to not address an
argument that is inadequately briefed.” (cleaned up)); accord State
v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354U, para. 2; State v. Garner, 2002 UT
App 234, ¶¶ 8–13, 52 P.3d 467. And we hasten to point out that
the risk of ignoring briefing requirements should come as no
surprise to any attorney in Utah owing to our multiple references
to the issue over the years. See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612–13
(Utah 1987) (stating that the merits of a dispute need not be
reached if an appellant “has not supported the facts set forth in [a]
brief with citations to the record” as required by rule 24(a)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure); State v. Price, 827 P.2d
247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (“We have routinely refused to
consider arguments which do not include a statement of the facts
properly supported by citations to the record.”); Koulis v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“If a party
fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation of the
pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will
assume the correctness of the judgment below.”). That we have
exercised our discretion to address the merits of the issues on
appeal here should not be taken as an imprimatur sanctioning
inadequate briefing but as a conduit to raise awareness of the risk
of ignoring the rules.

¶20 We take this occasion to recall the advice offered by our
supreme court several decades ago:

       If the questions involved in a case are of sufficient
       importance to justify asking this court to decide
       them, they are worthy of the careful consideration
       of counsel presenting them. It is the duty of
       attorneys practicing in this court to present to the
       court the authorities supporting their views and to
       assist the court in reaching a correct conclusion.

State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ¶ 13, 974 P.2d 269 (cleaned up). With
that, we remind counsel of their responsibility to assist the

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

judiciary in advancing jurisprudence through diligent advocacy,
adherence to our rules, and competent representation.

                    II. Custody and Parent-Time

A.     Disclosure

¶21 Sonya argues that the district court erred in admitting
Family Therapist’s testimony when Joseph had not timely
disclosed him as an expert witness pursuant to rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires disclosure “within 14
days after the close of fact discovery.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(4)(C)(i).
Sonya’s briefing on this point leaves much to be desired. She
entirely ignores what happened at trial, instead substituting her
own retrospective take on what she believes should have
happened without attempting to explain why her timeliness
argument should now be considered. Providing some persuasive
caselaw—which may or may not exist—would have gone far to
support her argument. But like the rest of her briefing, this part is
inadequate.

¶22 A review of the record shows that Sonya did not object to
Family Therapist’s testimony on the grounds of untimely
disclosure. Instead, Sonya argued that Family Therapist had “far
exceeded any kind of mandate,” that he had not signed
confidentiality waivers, and that allowing his testimony created
patient privacy and ethical violations. In her objection at trial, rule
26 was mentioned only in passing and not in a way that would
suggest she was objecting on timeliness grounds. It certainly
would not have been clear to opposing counsel that a rule 26
timeliness issue was being raised such that he would have known
to argue a harmlessness or good-cause defense for the failure to
disclose, which would have been an easy argument to make given
that both Joseph and Sonya had jointly retained Family Therapist
and Sonya knew about Family Therapist several years before trial.
And it would not have been clear to the district court that it was
being asked to rule on a timeliness-based objection. For these
reasons, Sonya did not preserve any such objection for appellate

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

review. See State v. Centeno, 2023 UT 22, ¶ 57, 537 P.3d 232 (“It is
well established that we will not address the merits of an
unpreserved issue absent a showing that an exception to the
preservation rule applies.”).

B.     Hearsay

¶23 Sonya additionally argues that Family Therapist’s
testimony, insofar as he testified as a fact witness, “was
inadmissible hearsay and based entirely on his conversations with
the parties and their children as their reunification therapist.”
Sonya’s hearsay argument is difficult to follow and poorly
briefed. Instead of analysis in support of her hearsay argument,
she provides scant and unsupported assertions.

¶24 Sonya objected below to Family Therapist’s testimony on
the grounds that it was hearsay. But the court ruled that it was not
hearsay, concluding that Family Therapist’s testimony was not
offered “for the truth of the matter asserted.” Rather, the court
ruled that the “focus of [the] questioning” was, first, to allow the
court “to find out how [the children were] doing, if they’re
capable of going forward” and, second, to identify the present
“obstacles” to “structuring visitation with [Sonya].” On appeal,
Sonya makes no attempt to engage with the court’s reasoning,
instead limiting her analysis to a blanket assertion that “it [was]
evident” Family Therapist was “allowed to testify as an expert,
offering hearsay, opinions and recommendations in [a] manner
that simply is not permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Such superficial and undeveloped argument is simply not
persuasive, most especially because it does not address the
alleged error in the court’s reasoning. It is well settled that
appellants who fail to “address the district court’s reasoning” also
fail to carry their “burden of persuasion on appeal.” See Federated
Cap. Corp. v. Shaw, 2018 UT App 120, ¶ 20, 428 P.3d 12; see also
Spencer v. Spencer, 2023 UT App 1, ¶ 27, 524 P.3d 165; Bad Ass Coffee
Co. of Haw. v. Royal Aloha Int’l LLC, 2020 UT App 122, ¶ 48, 473
P.3d 624.

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                             Lamb v. Lamb

C.     Custody Factors

¶25 Sonya next argues that the court did not address the
custody factors outlined in section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code,
making its custody findings insufficient. More specifically, Sonya
argues that the court’s factual findings were deficient due to the
court’s reliance on the testimony of Family Therapist in making
those findings.

¶26 Section 30-3-10 states that in “determining any form of
custody and parent-time . . . , the court shall consider the best
interest of the child and may consider . . . other factors the court
finds relevant,” including factors for each parent articulated in the
code. Utah Code § 30-3-10(2) (emphasis added). These factors a
court may consider are “not on equal footing.” Hudema v.
Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491. Instead, “it is
within the trial court’s discretion to determine, based on the facts
before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where
a particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance
and to accord each factor its appropriate weight.” Id. (emphasis
added). “And where significant evidence concerning a particular
factor is presented to the district court, findings that omit all
discussion of that evidence must be deemed inadequate.”
Twitchell v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 21, 509 P.3d 806. Thus, to
“ensure that the trial court’s custody determination, discretionary
as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in
its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better
person to care for the child, but also the basic facts which show
why that ultimate conclusion is justified.” Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

¶27 Here, the factors about which the court received significant
evidence concerned Sonya’s ability to function as a parent, which
the court received as testimony from Family Therapist. As we
have explained above, Sonya’s challenges to the admissibility of
Family Therapist’s testimony fail, and we accordingly conclude
that the district court acted well within its discretion in relying on
his testimony.

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

¶28 Regarding Sonya’s ability to parent the two older children,
Family Therapist testified that they were “very angry” with Sonya
and “announced that they would never see or talk to her again.”
Their anger was due to their religious sensibilities and Sonya’s
announcement that she was pregnant by a man other than their
father during the pendency of the divorce.

¶29 With regard to Sonya’s parenting, Family Therapist stated
that the youngest child was very frightened after “his last visit
with [Sonya] when she was struggling psychiatrically.”
Moreover, Family Therapist also testified the youngest child was
beginning to see himself as Sonya’s “partner,” resulting in the
child “becoming parentified.” 7

¶30 Family Therapist further indicated that while he was
unaware of Sonya’s “current condition or functioning,” Sonya
had been “hospitalized and diagnosed with some issues.” He
asserted that “safety” needed to be addressed, meaning that
Sonya required a psychiatric evaluation to demonstrate that her
“situation” was “under control.” He also indicated that Sonya
needed to work on “being forthright with medications.” Sonya,
by her own admission, had “suffered an isolated manic episode”
related to bipolar disorder and “called the police for assistance”
because she was suffering from “visual and auditory
hallucinations.”

¶31 Sonya’s briefing on this point misses the mark because it
entirely relies on the assumption that Family Therapist’s
testimony was inadmissible, an assumption we conclude is

7. “Parentification is often referred to as growing up too fast.
Typically, it occurs when a child takes on parental responsibility
for their siblings or even their parents, taking care of a sibling or
parent physically, mentally, or emotionally. This can damage a
child’s mental well-being and lead to long-term mental health
conditions such as depression and anxiety.” Amber Felton, What
Is Parentification, Web MD, https://www.webmd.com/parenting
/what-is-parentification [https://perma.cc/N6TT-Y7QN].

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                          Lamb v. Lamb

without foundation. See supra ¶¶ 21–24. She does not explain why,
in light of Family Therapist’s admissible testimony, the court’s
consideration of the statutory custody factors was insufficient.
Sonya’s briefing makes no attempt to explain why the court is not
allowed to rely on the evidence it receives when making custody
decisions.

¶32 Moreover, Sonya does not identify any “significant
evidence,” see Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 21, as to the other
factors in section 30-3-10 that the court received but left
unaddressed. Instead, her briefing advances an argument that is
entirely conclusory and unsupported by record citation or legal
authority:

      Although § 30-3-10 gives broad discretion to the
      court as to the relevance and appropriate weight to
      give each factor, the district court in this case simply
      did not have any information that would allow it to
      make findings as to most of the statutory factors. For
      instance, the district court did not know who the
      primary caretaker of the children during the
      marriage was. The district court did not know
      anything about the marriage. The district court
      would not permit any testimony relevant to
      Joseph’s moral character or his history of drug
      abuse and sexual proclivities. The Court would not
      allow any testimony as to Joseph’s inability and
      unwillingness to co-parent with Sonya. At the end
      of the day, the Court simply sidestepped its
      responsibility as an independent factfinder and
      deferred to [Family Therapist].

This might be a good argument if Sonya had supported it with
citations to the record and to legal authority. As this argument
stands before us, we are unable to verify what it asserts. But we
suspect that Sonya might be indulging in hyperbole here. Indeed,
Sonya’s assertion that “the district court did not know anything

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

about the marriage” is patently false. Our review of the record
indicates that the court, in fact, knew quite a bit about the
marriage, such as its financial situation, issues related to the
children, and the problems that led to its demise, to name just a
few topics within its familiarity. And with regard to Joseph’s
alleged use of illegal drugs, we found only one instance
(subsequently echoed by Sonya’s attorney) in the record where
Sonya asserted before the district court that Joseph had a “cocaine
habit.” But the district court was free to “disregard such testimony
if it [found] the evidence self-serving and not credible,” since the
factfinder “is in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses.” See Clark v. Clark, 2023 UT App 111, ¶ 37, 537 P.3d 633
(cleaned up). An isolated allegation made in passing certainly
does not amount to “significant evidence,” see Twitchell, 2022 UT
App 49, ¶ 21, especially given the district court’s role as the
factfinder to judge the credibility of witnesses, see Ouk v. Ouk, 2015
UT App 104, ¶ 14, 348 P.3d 751. And as to the other statutory
custody factors that Sonya asserts the court left unaddressed, she
has not pointed us to any significant evidence that the court
received with respect to those factors.

¶33 Thus, unlike the situation in Twitchell, where we concluded
“that the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to include
in its findings any discussion of the evidence relating to the abuse
allegations against [the mother], her alleged neglect of [the child,]
and her moral character, as well as the effect that evidence had on
its best-interest analysis,” see 2022 UT 49, ¶¶ 22–23, 25, here there
simply wasn’t significant evidence presented regarding section
30-3-10’s other custody factors. This lack of evidence—insofar as
there was a lack—was not the court’s fault; it was Sonya’s fault
for not presenting it. After all, a court cannot be faulted for failing
to consider evidence that was not presented to it. In contrast,
given the substantial evidence the court did receive about the
serious mental health issues Sonya faced, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the
statutory factors when determining that awarding physical
custody to Joseph was in the best interest of the children.

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

¶34 In sum, Sonya has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion in accepting and relying on the testimony of
Family Therapist in making custody determinations or that the
district court did not properly address the statutory factors in
determining custody of the children.

                  III. Ownership of the Business

¶35 Both parties agree that the district court concluded that the
business was not a joint marital asset. The district court awarded
the business to Joseph “[b]ased on [Joseph’s] testimony.” Along
with awarding the business to Joseph, the court stated that Joseph
was “responsible for payment of the purchase price of the
business.”

¶36 Sonya’s briefing on this point is challenging because it
consists largely of recounting financial matters pertaining to the
marriage but unrelated to the ownership of the business. She then
asserts, with no discernible effort to explain why, that the
“findings/conclusions were entirely inadequate to explain the
Court’s reasoning for giving ownership” of the business to
Joseph. Her argument is difficult to follow, but its essence, insofar
as we can tell, appears to be that the court erred in believing
Joseph’s testimony over hers.

¶37 We disagree with Sonya that the court erred in crediting
Joseph’s testimony regarding the ownership of the business over
Sonya’s. Again, the court stated in its factual findings that its
award of the business to Joseph was “[b]ased on [his] testimony.”
In making this credibility determination, the court acted well
within its discretion. “[W]here there exists evidence sufficient to
support a court’s rulings regarding a divorcing couple’s finances,
that ruling will be upheld on appeal, even if evidence was
presented that might have cut the other way.” Clarke v. Clarke,
2023 UT App 160, ¶ 27. This is because “the fact-finder is in the
best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and is free to
disbelieve their testimony. Even where testimony is
uncontroverted, a trial court is free to disregard such testimony if

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

it finds the evidence self-serving and not credible.” Ouk v. Ouk,
2015 UT App 104, ¶ 14, 348 P.3d 751 (cleaned up); see also Kimball
v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733 (“[I]t is the trial
court’s singularly important mission to consider and weigh all the
conflicting evidence and find the facts.”).

¶38 Here, the district court was in the best position to judge the
credibility of the parties. It clearly found Joseph’s testimony
regarding the ownership of the business to be more credible.
Sonya has provided no reasoned argument—apart from her
assertion that she disagrees with it—as to why the district court’s
conclusion that the business was not marital property was
erroneous. Accordingly, Sonya has failed to meet her “burden on
appeal to show that no reasonable person would take the view
adopted” by the district court, and we therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in awarding the business, along with its
liabilities, to Joseph. See Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 14. 8

                  IV. Equity in the Marital Home

¶39 Sonya’s final claim is that the district court abused its
discretion in dividing equity in the marital home. “In divorce

8. Sonya also argues that the district court violated her
constitutional due process rights by its “ongoing interference”
with her counsel’s presentation of her case. Quite frankly, apart
from a litany of complaints about the court requiring counsel to
keep her questioning relevant, the contours of her argument on
appeal are difficult to discern, and she fails to cite a single case in
support of the argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider her
due process argument because it is inadequately briefed. See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with reasoned
analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record,
why the party should prevail on appeal.”); see also Orlando
Millenia, LC v. United Title Services of Utah, Inc., 2015 UT 55, ¶ 30
n.3, 355 P.3d 965 (“The briefing on this claim . . . is inadequate.
[The appellant’s] briefing on this issue fails to cite any authority
and makes no attempt to connect the law to the facts of this case.”).

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

actions, a district court is permitted considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Gardner v.
Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). Thus, in
such proceedings,

       we will reverse only if (1) there was a
       misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
       resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the
       factual findings upon which the award was based
       are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party challenging
       the award shows that such a serious inequity has
       resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
       Because we can properly find abuse only if no
       reasonable person would take the view adopted by
       the trial court, appellants have a heavy burden to
       show that an alleged error falls into any of these
       three categories.

Id. (cleaned up).

¶40 Sonya’s claim focuses on three aspects of the court’s
valuation of the home: (1) the mortgage amount, (2) the use of the
Zillow estimate, and (3) the amount of the liens on the home. We
address each in turn.

¶41 The Mortgage Amount. Sonya complains that the district
court, based on Joseph’s testimony, should have used $298,000 as
the amount owing on the mortgages rather than $402,000, an
adjustment that would have benefitted her by increasing the
equity she would have received. “Generally, the marital estate is
valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial. However, in the
exercise of its equitable powers, a trial court has broad discretion
to use a different date, such as the date of separation, when
circumstances warrant. If the trial court uses a date other than the
date of the divorce decree, it must support its decision with
sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation from
the general rule.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 39, 531

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                           Lamb v. Lamb

P.3d 225 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah 2023). In
response to Sonya’s motion for amended findings, the court
explained, “[Joseph’s] statement of the mortgage balance of
$298,000 was referring to the total amount of all three (3)
mortgages. The Court also took that into evidence taking into
account that it was [Joseph’s] best estimate according to what his
monthly mortgage payments are and how much was deducted
from the principal each month.” We understand this to mean that
the court took into consideration that it was through Joseph’s
extraordinary post-separation payment efforts that the mortgage
amount had been reduced. Moreover, Sonya concedes in her reply
brief that it was within the district court’s discretion to use the
earlier mortgage total. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion
in the court’s use of the date of the separation to determine the
amount of the mortgages.

¶42 The Zillow Estimate. Sonya next complains that the home
should have been valued at about $260,000 more than was
indicated by the Zillow estimate the court used. The glaring
problem with this aspect of Sonya’s complaint is that it was her
counsel’s idea to use the Zillow estimate. In open court, her
counsel looked up the estimate and announced it to the court. And
the court proceeded to base its calculations on the very data
Sonya’s counsel supplied. We simply will not countenance
Sonya’s assertion that the district court erred in proceeding to use
the estimate that Sonya herself, through counsel, provided. Sonya
invited any error in this regard. See Somer v. Somer, 2020 UT App
93, ¶ 14, 467 P.3d 924 (“Where a party makes an affirmative
representation encouraging the court to proceed without further
consideration of an issue, an appellate court does not consider the
party’s objection to that action on appeal.” (cleaned up)). In her
briefing on appeal, Sonya points to nothing in the record that
would have allowed the court to value the home using anything
other than the Zillow estimate. Sonya does not challenge that the
court acted on the only information it had and that Sonya herself
provided. Accordingly, “given the absence of any expert financial
testimony, . . . the paucity of assistance the parties offered the
court,” and the representations made by Sonya’s counsel

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                            Lamb v. Lamb

regarding the marital home’s value, we conclude that “the court
in this instance made findings within its discretion and supported
by the evidence it was given.” Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160,
¶ 55.

¶43 The Liens. Sonya argues that the district court abused its
discretion in counting third-party liens against the equity in the
home. Given the evidence the court received, we see no error on
the part of the court in this regard. Indeed, there was evidence to
support the court’s determination that the third-party liens
should be included in the calculation of the home’s equity. Joseph
testified that when he and Sonya purchased the home, they did so
knowing that they were assuming responsibility for some of the
previous owner’s debts. This is an admittedly odd arrangement,
but Joseph testified that they were willing to accept it because they
were not in a financial position to purchase the home otherwise.
Sonya offered no testimony or other evidence to contradict
Joseph’s assertion, and she still points to nothing presented at trial
that contradicted this evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the
factual findings that included the liability associated with the
third-party liens were not clearly erroneous and that the court did
not abuse its discretion in calculating the home’s equity.

                          CONCLUSION

¶44 Sonya has not demonstrated that the district court abused
its discretion in its custody determination, in awarding the
business to Joseph, or in its division of equity in the marital home.
Affirmed.

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