Court Opinion

ID: 9819542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:20.983931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.184327
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Section 5 — 125 of the Act states: “Concurrent Jurisdiction. Any minor alleged to have violated a traffic, boating, or fish and game law, or a municipal or county ordinance, may be prosecuted for the violation and if found guilty punished under any statute or ordinance relating to the violation, without reference to the procedures set out in this [a]rticle, except that any detention[ ] must be in compliance with this \a\rticle.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 — 125 (West 2000). In this case, and in Andrew N.B., cited by the majority, the juvenile defendants were prosecuted for ordinance violations without reference to the procedure set out in the Act. The juvenile defendants were cited for indirect criminal contempt. The indirect criminal contempt proceedings were a continuation of the ordinance violation cases. See Andrew N.B., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 188-89, (rejecting defendant’s argument that the indirect criminal contempt proceeding was a separate case). Section 5 — 125 allows juveniles to be prosecuted for municipal violations without reference to the procedure set out in the Act, “except that any detention[ ] must be in compliance with this \a]rticle.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 — 125 (West 2000). The detentions of the juvenile defendants in this case and in Andrew N.B. were not in compliance with the procedures set forth in the Act. As such, the detentions plainly violated the clear requirement of section 5 — 125 that “any detention[ ] must be in compliance with this [ajrticle.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 — 125 (West 2000). Therefore, the order incarcerating defendant must be reversed. It makes sense that a minor can be prosecuted for a minor municipal ordinance violation just like anyone else, without the necessity of commencing a Juvenile Court Act proceeding. The juvenile defendants in these cases, however, were not prosecuted just like anyone else. The court did not employ indirect criminal contempt as a method to collect the fine, but as a substitute juvenile court, as a means of guiding the actions of the juvenile defendants. The court’s actions seem well-intentioned but the court should not have evaded the provisions of the Act. An indirect criminal contempt proceeding is essentially a misdemeanor criminal proceeding. In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 44, 558 N.E.2d 404, 416 (1990). The Act must be followed if a juvenile is prosecuted for a criminal misdemeanor. Even more basically, how can an ordinance violation with a maximum punishment of a $75 fine be transformed, by going the indirect criminal contempt route, into an offense carrying at least 8 days of jail time and perhaps 180 days of jail time? The court is entitled to take reasonable steps for the collection of the $75 fine but that was not its goal in these cases. Andrew N.B. suggests that “because the remaining 172 days were subject to remission, it was entirely within [the juvenile’s] power to avoid serving them.” Andrew N.B., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 188. That is generally not true of criminal contempt. There is a coercive purpose, an “arm-twisting” purpose, for civil contempt sanctions, but the result of an indirect criminal contempt is punishment, “much the same as the rationale for punishing other types of misdemeanor criminal conduct.” Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 44, 558 N.E.2d at 416.