Court Opinion

ID: 9491422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:34.814325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.662669
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the court’s opinion, but would affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, insofar as the challenge to probable cause, on narrower grounds. Although the affidavit repeatedly utilized the term “child pornography,” it gave no further description such as “sexually explicit conduct involving a minor” that would be encompassed by the Oklahoma statute that prohibited the possession of such material.1 Given this omission, I agree with the district court that the failure to attach the e-mail conversations between Agent Rehman and Mr. Simpson to the affidavit, which clearly indicated the nature and content of the material, “created a close question as to whether the affidavit 'created adequate probable cause that the evidence sought was child pornography and that the Defendant possessed such material.” I Aplt.App., doc. 5 at 5-6 n. 2.
The cases relied upon by the court to support the use of the generic term “child pornography” are particularity cases where the issue is whether the warrant adequately limits the discretion of the officer executing it, not whether the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157, 116 S.Ct. 1547, 134 L.Ed.2d 650 (1996); United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132-33 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 1722, 131 L.Ed.2d 580 (1995); United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 821-22 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Hurt, 808 F.2d 707, 708 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816, 108 S.Ct. 69, 98 L.Ed.2d 33 (1987). The particularity requirement insures that a search supported by probable cause will be adequately confined to specific areas and things, and not become a general search. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). Be that as it may, the warrants in three of the eases relied upon by the court contained more than the term “child pornography.” See Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 727 (“a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct”); Koelling, 992 F.2d at 820 (“ ‘minors engaged in sexually explicit con*1253duct’ ”); Hurt, 808 F.2d at 708 (“ ‘minors ... engaged in sexually explicit activity1 ”). While I agree with the court that a judicial officer is not required to view obscene films, Ct. Op. at 12 n. 2 (quoting New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986)), in the interest of completeness, the Supreme Court thereafter said “we think that a reasonably specific affidavit describing the content of a film generally provides an adequate basis for the magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the film is obscene, and whether a warrant ... should issue.” P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 874 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1610.
It is not enough that the law enforcement officer be satisfied that “child pornography” is involved.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). Some brief explanation of the content allows the judicial officer to draw the necessary inferences necessary to conclude whether “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
We view the affidavit and warrant against a backdrop of applicable state law, and here the warrant was for “possession of child pornography,” an offense detailed in Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1021.2. Several factors suggest probable cause to believe that the statute had been violated. The affidavit provided a detailed description of the agreement and repeated contacts between Agent Rehman and Mr. Simpson, whereby Mr. Simpson was to send a computer diskette “containing numerous scenes of prepubescent children under the age of thirteen” and $30.00 in exchange for the videotape. This suggests that Mr. Simpson had a present ability to deliver the images, and distinguishes this case from United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.1990), where the defendant merely ordered the offending material and the affidavit contained boilerplate about the characteristics of offenders. See id. at 1344-46. The venue of the negotiation in this case was “#sexpicshare #%%kidsexpics” which suggests trafficking in the sexual images of minors.
Other factors indicate that Mr. Simpson had guilty knowledge. Most importantly, he had “gotten scared” about the agreement and backed out because “he was afraid to use the U.S. Mail Service to send the ... diskette.” The videotape that was to be sent to him “was to be labeled IRC Demo,” so its true nature would be disguised.
Our review of a finding of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, and after according the necessary deference to the state judge’s finding, I agree with the court that the necessary substantial basis exists for the state judge’s finding, despite the lack of specificity concerning the term “child pornography.” See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317.

. In March 1996, Olda. Slat. tit. 21, § 1021.2 provided:
Any person who shall procure or cause the participation of any minor under the age of eighteen (18) years in any film, motion picture, videotape, photograph, negative, slide, drawing, painting, play, or performance wherein the minor is engaged in or portrayed, depicted, or represented as engaging in any act of sexual intercourse, in any act of fellatio or cunnilingus, in any act of excretion in the context of sexual activity, in any lewd exhibition of the uncovered genitals in the context of masturbation or other sexual activity, or in any other exhibition of the uncovered genitals having the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer, or who knowingly possesses, procures, or manufactures, or causes to be sold or distributed any said materials involving the participation of any minor under the age of eighteen (18) shall be guilty, upon conviction, of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years or by the imposition of a fine of not more than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) or by both said fine and imprisonment. The consent of the minor, or of the mother, father, legal guardian, or custodian of the minor to the activity prohibited by this section shall not constitute a defense.
1986 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 87, § 2. See generally Shultz v. State, 811 P.2d 1322 (Okla.Crim.App.1991).