Court Opinion

ID: 9846338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:35.139962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.189203
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
I.
Finding the search warrant insufficient to establish probable cause, the trial judge ruled without specifying his reasoning “that the good faith exception would apply in this situation.” Because “[t]he Virginia warrant statute does not codify ‘good faith’ as an exception to the probable cause requirement,” Tart v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 384, 397, 437 S.E.2d 219, 227 (1993) (Benton, J., dissenting), I would reverse the trial judge’s refusal to suppress the fruits of the search warrant. “Searches that are conducted in the absence of probable cause are precisely the type of ‘unlawful search or seizure’ that is contemplated by our statute.” Id. at 398, 437 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Code § 19.2-60).
II.
Even if the strictures of state law are ignored, I believe that federal law requires that we reverse the trial judge’s refusal to suppress the evidence. The federally enacted good faith exception to the suppression rule does not apply (i) when “a warrant. . . [is] so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid” or (ii) when a warrant application is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (citation omitted).
III.
When we examine, as we must, “the affidavit, looking to see what it did, and did not, establish regarding [appellant’s] activities,” United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988), the conclusion inexorably follows that no reasonable police officer could have believed that the warrant application was valid or that *649it established probable cause. The informant merely reported that he observed appellant at a motel and “in possession of a large amount of U.S. currency.” The informant’s assertions that appellant was at a motel and was seen with a large amount of currency “carry no inherent indicia of illegality,” Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730, 733, 187 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1972). The affidavit did not allege as a fact that the informant, the affiant, or anyone else observed appellant possessing narcotics or in the presence of narcotics at the motel. Indeed, the affidavit did not even allege as a fact that appellant was observed engaging in criminal conduct. Despite the absence of those significant facts, the affiant stated as a conclusion his belief “that there is now being stored a quantity of illegal drugs.” No facts alleged in the affidavit support that conclusion.
“Without a specific allegation of criminal activity to color the noncriminal behavior described in the affidavit, there is no information from which to conclude that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the time of the search.” State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1993). As the Supreme Court observed:
[I]t is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressure, will fail to perform as a magistrate should. We find it reasonable to require the officer applying for the warrant to minimize this danger by exercising reasonable professional judgment.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986) (footnote omitted).
In the absence of a specific factual allegation of criminal activity, the affidavit cannot be said to be the product of a police officer “exercising reasonable professional judgment.” Id. Furthermore, there are established “limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). An affidavit based upon descriptions of activities that objectively do not demonstrate criminal behavior is so facially deficient that it cannot support the issuance of a search warrant. See Diamond, 628 A.2d at 1034. See also State v. Probst, 795 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1990).
*650IV.
In the absence of any allegation of observed criminal conduct, the affiant attempted to put flesh on the “bare bones” affidavit by describing a vast quantity of “unusual” facts upon which another officer concluded that the conduct was consistent with criminal activity. From that conclusion, the affiant then drew another conclusion that he articulated as a belief that drugs were stored in the room. This process by which police officers draw conclusions from non-criminal conduct, and in the absence of factual allegations of criminal conduct, has never been sufficient to provide an indicia of probable cause. “The essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 [,13-14] (1948), is in ‘requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 240.
Furthermore, to support the police officer’s conclusions, which were merely suppositions, the affiant provided a series of inane minutia and innuendo. The affiant first inserted in the affidavit information to bolster the reliability of his informant. The veracity of the informant is irrelevant, however, because the informant alleged no criminal activity. Moreover, the informant’s conclusory report that the appellant had a large amount of money is meaningless because it lacks specificity as to the amount and fails to connect it to a factual allegation of criminal conduct.
That appellant paid cash for a two day stay in a low budget motel signifies nothing regarding criminal activity. Furthermore, even if appellant was required to request maid service and, as the affidavit reported, did not do so, that circumstance is not shown to be of any significance because appellant was in the room less than a full day. No facts in the affidavit shed any light on the reason for the room change.
That appellant used a public telephone rather than the telephone in his room is also meaningless. Indeed, many motel users opt to spend twenty-five cents to use a public telephone rather than pay the motel an exorbitant surcharge for the convenience of using the room telephone. Furthermore, the averment of “a very high volume of incoming calls and phone use” has little signifi*651canee because of the lack of specificity of the volume or content of the telephone calls.
The affidavit contained no allegations of frequent or an unusual number of visitors. Indeed, the affidavit contains no allegation of any visitors or any personal contact between appellant and another person. The affiant’s report that “upon check-in [appellant] displayed no luggage” does not equate to an averment that appellant had no luggage. Other factual minutia such as “looking out the room window on a frequent basis” raises the spectre of furtiveness but does not alone or in combination with other facts give rise to probable cause to believe appellant was committing a crime.
These factual recitations of appellant’s activities amount only to suspicion of his purpose. It bears repeating that no fact asserted in the affidavit directly or indirectly leads to the conclusion that appellant was in possession of drugs at the motel. The length of the affidavit does not rectify the meagerness of its substance. “Quality of information, not quantity, is what establishes probable cause.” State v. Huft, 720 P.2d 838, 841 (1986). Because the affidavit contained no factual statement that appellant was engaged in criminal activity, the warrant is “facially deficient,” and the facts in the search warrant affidavit lack any connection to “indicia of probable cause.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. An affidavit of this type is described as “bare bones” because it does not support a claim of “objective good faith.” Craig, 861 F.2d at 821. A police officer can have no reasonable grounds for believing that a warrant was properly issued when it is based, as it was in this case, on “a ‘bare bones’ affidavit.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24.
Furthermore, the four corners of the affidavit manifest the affiant’s lack of belief that criminal conduct was occurring. The affidavit states that the affiant relayed to Investigator Riani the facts reported by the informant and the activities observed by another police officer. The affiant sought to rely upon the conclusions drawn by Investigator Riani to remedy the failure to allege as a fact the occurrence of a crime. The affiant then presented to the magistrate his bare conclusion based upon the conclusions drawn by Investigator Riani. The conclusions of Investigator Riani are deficient precisely because they are only his conclusions and contain no substantial factual allegation for their foundation. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 240.
*652Simply put, the affidavit is wholly conclusory. “An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and . . . wholly conclusory statement^] . . . fail[ ] to meet this requirement.” Id. at 239. The only basis for the assertion that a crime has occurred is the conclusion of the affiant based on the conclusion of Investigator Riani. However, the magistrate’s “action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Id. No facts in the affidavit provide a basis upon which the magistrate could have concluded that a crime had occurred.
“[A]n officer cannot manifest objective good faith if the affidavit is ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Diamond, 628 A.2d at 1034 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). The objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions must be judged as of the time the warrant was sought and without regard to the magistrate’s finding that the affidavit established probable cause. See Briggs, 475 U.S. at 345. Thus, when an affidavit is “so conclusory with regard to its probable cause information as to render it a ‘bare bones’ affidavit,” it cannot be rehabilitated by the Leon exception. State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762, 775 (W. Va. 1986). “The officer . . . cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.” Briggs, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9.
The affidavit that the officer prepared in this case did not support the issuance of a warrant because the affidavit contained no factual assertion of a crime, and it was so facially deficient that it manifestly negated objective reasonableness. Therefore, I dissent.