Court Opinion

ID: 9629169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:38:27.979838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:16.388172
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OE
WONG, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
The key question in this case that must be answered is whether a search was conducted in the first instance. If the answer is in the negative, we simply do not reach the issue formulated by the majority as to whether a search can be waived by consent of one other than the defendant.
The facts material to this question are as stated in the majority opinion. Because of their brevity, and for the sake of convenience, they are restated:
. . four police officers converged upon the apartment, rang the bell and obtained permission to enter the apartment from the tenant. The police seized, among other items, a coat lying on a bed in a bedroom occupied with the permission of the tenant, by another and defendant, and subsequently used that coat in a pre-arrest identification procedure. At trial, the court admitted the coat to which defendant claimed no ownership, over his objections that his constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated.”
In addition, the following facts may be pertinent: The apartment was leased by Mayor Wright Housing to a Mrs. Parado and her five daughters. Immediately prior to their entry, the police officers were given admission not only to the apartment, but more specifically, to the bedroom in question. According to Mrs. Ponce, the former Mrs. Parado, the defendant without her knowledge had come to her apartment early in the morning (“I think I *70heard him talking about 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning”). It was also her recollection that this occasion marked only the second time that the defendant had “stayed there.”
The additional facts are not cited to suggest the possible denial of the defendant’s right to privacy from a search. Under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the defendant clearly has a standing to object to an unreasonable search and seizure.
The facts do indicate, however, that the officers were legally in the apartment and in the bedroom thereof, their admission having been consented to by the legal tenant thereof. The defendant was not entitled to possession of the bedroom to the exclusion of Mrs. Ponce. The officer who entered the bedroom with her consent was therefore lawfully on such premises. Under the open view doctrine, if an officer is legally in a position to observe something in plain view, there is no question of search. People v. Kamhout, 227 Mich. 172, 198 N.W. 831 (1924); State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639, 150 N.W.2d 129 (1967); see Reisig, “Searches and Seizures Handbook” 18 (Pract. Law Inst. 1968). Since the jacket was lying on the bed in full view of the officer, it was not discovered by search.
Thus, where officers had probable cause for making an arrest, obtained a passkey and entered an apartment for the purpose of arresting an occupant, “discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view.” Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963), citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); and People v. West, 144 Cal. App.2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956).
Nor has the open view doctrine been emasculated by any of the cases cited in the majority opinion. These cases do not even inquire into what constitutes a search (except *71for Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which holds that wiretapping of a telephone booth constitutes a search and seizure per se). Instead, they define the constitutional rights of a defendant who has been aggrieved by an unreasonable search and seizure.
Katz and Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S. Ct. 2120 (1968), for example, were cited by the majority to support its conclusion that the defendant had standing to object to an unreasonable search and seizure. Stoner v. United States, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), was cited for the proposition that “consent” to a search cannot be given by a third party. A distinction must be made, however, between consent to enter and consent to search.1
The significance of the Katz case is that it further extended the protection of the Fourth Amendment2 against invasion of privacy by the uninvited ear, just as the Fourth had always shielded a person’s privacy against the “intruding eye.” Katz did not derogate against the open view doctrine, as espoused by Ker.
In De Forte, state officials conducted a search and seized union records from an office shared by De Forte and several other union officials. The parties had stipulated that De Forte spent “a considerable amount of time” in the office, and had custody of the papers at the moment of their seizure. With three justices dissenting, the United States Supreme Court concluded that De Forte *72had standing to object to the admission of the papers at his trial. It found that even though De Forte shared an office with other union officers, he still
“. . . could reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business guests would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups. This expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials, their conduct of a general search, and their removal of records which were in De Forte’s custody. It is, of course, irrelevant that the Union or some of its officials might validly have consented to a search of the area where the records were kept, regardless of De Forte’s wishes, for it is not claimed that any such consent was given, either expressly or by implication.”3
In the instant case, the jacket was lying on the bed, fully exposed to view to the officer entering the bedroom. No search was necessary to discover the jacket. The defendant, who had entered the premises unbeknownst to Mrs. Ponce, spent only a few hours on the premises, on this his second visit, and was not given possession of the bedroom to the exclusion of Mrs. Ponce. Whatever “privacy” he was entitled to was subject to physical intrusion by Mrs. Ponce and any of her other invitees. He therefore had no standing to object to the entry by the police officer pursuant to Mrs. Ponce’s consent. This is not the type of privacy protected by the constitution.
The privacy to which defendant was entitled to constitutional protection was the privacy against an unreasonable search and seizure. Since the facts of the case place it squarely Avithin the open view doctrine, no search was conducted, and defendant’s constitutional privacy against an unreasonable search and seizure was not vio*73lated. The cases spelling ont defendant’s further rights after a search has been conducted are therefore inapropos.
In Stoner, the court held that the night clerk of a hotel could not consent to a search of the hotel room rented to a guest without the latter’s consent. The teaching of this case is merely that an owner or landlord who has granted exclusive possession of the premises to another is without right to give valid consent to a search of such premises without authority of the tenant. It is even questionable as to whether such landlord has authority to consent to entry solely to view the premises, let alone search it, in view of the fact that he himself would ordinarily have no right to entry to the premises. Applying Stoner to this case simply means that no agent of Mayor Wright Housing could validly consent to a search of Mrs. Ponce’s apartment Avithout her authority.
This is to be clearly distinguished from the situation where the tenant himself authorizes entry. While such approved entry cannot constitute a valid waiver of a third party’s right against a search, it Avill nevertheless permit the open view doctrine to become operative. Stoner would be analogous if the hotel guest had permitted an unregistered guest to share his room and had himself consented to entry into the room by police officers, who upon entry, take possession of an article in full view. Although such unregistered guest would have standing to object to an unreasonable search, unless a search has occurred, he certainly has no cause for complaint under the Fourth Amendment.
I respectfully dissent.

 Cf. De Forte at Footnote 3 where the question of the validity of a consent to a search of the area was not resolved by the court since consent was not claimed.

 Article I, sec. 5 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii is parallel to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, except for the addition to the former, in 1968, of the words “invasions of privacy.” Query whether this addition should be construed as extending the scope of the protection of the State constitution beyond that of the Federal constitution, or was made merely to conform the language of the former with the coverage of the Fourth Amendment as the same was extended by the United States Supreme Court to include invasion of privacy by electronic devices. See Const. Conv. Comm. Whole Rep. No. 55 (1968).

 See footnote 2.