Court Opinion

ID: 9725103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:30:24.870338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:37.549615
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting: In this case, I would find the trial court did not err in granting Illini Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, Young’s partial disclosure of plaintiff’s medical record was not of the kind she was employed to perform and did not occur while she was working as a phlebotomist. 363 Ill. App. 3d at 923. The majority, however, contends a question exists as to whether Young’s conduct was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. I would find Young’s conduct was not moved by a purpose to serve Illini Hospital. In the case sub judice, no purpose was served when Young told plaintiffs sister about plaintiffs pregnancy. The evidence indicated Young signed confidentiality agreements and had been taught by hospital personnel about the importance of maintaining patient privacy. Young testified she knew she made a mistake as soon as she made mention of the confidential medical information to plaintiffs sister. Plaintiff makes much of Young’s troubles in school and minimum-wage work as a problematic phlebotomist, and yet on appeal, plaintiff attempts to portray Young as a medical provider checking on patients during off hours and acting as a public-relations officer for the hospital. No such evidence of the latter was presented to the trial court. Young’s testimony did not indicate part of her job description included venturing out into the community to check on the status of patients in hopes of serving the purposes of the hospital. Based on the record, no reasonable person could draw such a conclusion. Here, nothing in the record supports an inference that Young was attempting to benefit or serve her employer when she divulged plaintiff’s medical records. In fact, such disclosure was in direct contravention to the confidentiality agreements and did nothing to further the business of Illini Hospital. The majority claims this case offers a “unique” employment environment and “unique” duties that make the concepts concerning the scope of the master-servant relationship difficult to apply. 363 Ill. App. 3d at 923. The majority contends “Young was on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week” for purposes of patient confidentiality. 363 Ill. App. 3d at 923. However, the majority fails to state how Young’s inappropriate disclosure of confidential information could be found to have been actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve Illini Hospital. The majority has not done so because nothing in the record allows for such a conclusion. The majority also fires a blank in attempting to liken the facts before us with cases involving off-duty police officers. Young was not employed to use the confidential information for the purpose of idle chitchat in a tavern; in contrast to a police officer who might use a gun in an emergency while “off shift.” At the tavern, Young did not identify herself as working for Illini Hospital or representing her employer’s interests. The fact that she was committing a serious breach of confidentiality, for which she later resigned, indicates the act was not one that falls within the scope of employment. No reasonable jury could find Young’s actions were even partly motivated by a purpose to serve Illini Hospital. As Young’s conduct was not within her scope of employment, went far beyond the authorized time and space limits, and was not motivated by a purpose to serve her employer, Illini Hospital cannot be held vicariously liable in this case. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.