Court Opinion

ID: 9856028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:36:43.173922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:55.595043
License: Public Domain

Berry, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority in this case, because I am of the opinion that even if the remarks of counsel for the defendant to the jury in the closing argument were improper, the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant should not be set aside.
The reason for this position is based on the fact that the attorney for the plaintiff objected to such remarks, the trial court sustained the objection, after which the attorney for the plaintiff moved the court to instruct the jury to disregard such remarks, which was promptly done by the trial court. The attorney for the plaintiff has obtained all the relief he asked for in connection with this alleged error. Notwithstanding this fact, after the jury returned the verdict in favor of the defendant, he then moved the court to set aside the verdict because of this same alleged error.
Other errors were assiged by the plaintiff to set aside the verdict, but apparently were found to be without merit by the trial court. However, the trial court set the verdict aside solely on the ground of improper remarks of counsel to the jury. Upon appeal to this Court, the trial court, by the majority opinion, has been affirmed in its action of setting aside the verdict solely on the ground of improper remarks made, by counsel in the closing argument to the jury. In other words, the plaintiff has been given the full relief requested for the same alleged error on two different occasions by the courts.
Under the rules of appellate procedure, only errors properly preserved by objections or motions contained in the record will be considered by this Court. In this case, if the remarks of defendant’s counsel to the jury were error, such error was corrected by sustain*509ing the objection and granting the motion, to instruct the jury not to consider such remarks, made by the attorney for the plaintiff during the trial of tbe case. Therefore, with respect to the ruling of the trial court during the trial of this case, there is no error present for this Court to correct, except the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
Not only was the objection and motion made by the attorney for the plaintiff sustained and granted, affording all the relief asked for at the time the remarks were made, but it is usually, held in connection with such matters that a new trial will not be granted in eases where improper questions are asked by counsel or improper remarks made by counsel during the trial, and opposing counsel did not then ask for a mistrial at a convenient time during the trial of the case. McCullough v. Clark, 88 W. Va. 22, 106 S. E. 61; Moorefield v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564; Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, 114 W. Va. 352, 171 S. E. 902; Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 W. Va. 828, 169 S. E. 447.
In the recent case of Leftwich v. Wesco Corporation, 146 W. Va. 196, 119 8. E. 2d 410, it was contended that because an objection was not made promptly by the attorney for the defendant, although a motion for a mistrial was made by the attorney, the matter was not preserved for appellate, review. It was held in that case that a motion for a mistrial was the proper method in order to obtain proper disposition of such matter.
It is true that this Court stated in the Leftwich case that an anlysis of the cases which have been reversed by this Court where insurance was mentioned, indicates the procedural method of raising such matter was relatively unimportant, so long as it was brought to the attention of the trial court, because of the prejudicial nature of such matter. Wilkins v. Schwartz, 101 W. Va. 337, 132 S. E. 887; Atkins v. Bartlett, 101 W. Va. *510263, 132 S. E. 885; Fleming v. Hartrick, 105 W. Va. 135, 141 S. E. 628.
In the instant ease insurance was not mentioned by the attorney for the defendant in his argument to the jury. He merely stated, in effect, that if the jury found a verdict for the defendant he would have to pay it, and this was done after the jury had been apprized of insurance by a witness in answer to a question by plaintiff’s attorney. A proper motion for a mistrial was made by the attorney for the defendant and overruled by the trial court.
Under the decided cases, if the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant, having followed the proper procedure, could have had the verdict set aside, but the defendant, nothwithstanding the mention of insurance, prevailed, and this Court would affirm the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict. If the action of one counsel provokes the remarks of the other, the verdict will not ordinarily be set aside. Leftwich v. Wesco Corporation, supra.
In considering this matter, the trial court and this Court have taken the position that the remarks made to the jury by counsel for the defendant, that if the jury returned a verdict against the defendant he would have to pay it, were tantamount to telling the jury that the defendant did not have insurance, although they had already in effect been apprized that he did carry insurance. After arriving at this conclusion, the majority of this Court hold that such remarks are the same as apprizing the jury on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant carried insurance. I do not agree with this position, because I do not think the remarks of defendant’s counsel were prejudicial to the plaintiff ; but I believe that a proper verdict was returned, considering all the evidence in the case, and that the plaintiff has received a fair trial. See Moorefield v. Lewis, supra.
I am also of the opinion that in order to avoid confusion a uniform rule should be adopted in this State *511to cover all sncli remarks, including remarks with, regard to insurance, and that such rule should require a motion for a mistrial to he made by the party desiring the relief before a verdict of the jury will be set aside and a new trial granted in such cases. There is ample authority for such course to be followed. Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, supra; Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., supra; Allen v. Garibaldi, 187 N. C. 798, 123 S. E. 66.
In the case of Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, supra, it was held that where an improper question was asked, objection interposed and sustained by the trial court, the verdict would not be set aside unless a motion for a mistrial was made and overruled. The North Carolina case of Allen v. Garibaldi, supra, was cited by this Court in the ease of Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, supra, as authority for the ruling on this matter. In the Garibaldi case an objection made to a question with regard to insurance was sustained by the court, but no motion for a mistrial was made because of the alleged improper question and the ap-pelate court refused to reverse the case and grant a new trial because proper motion for a mistrial was not made in the trial court.
For the reasons stated in this dissent, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant, reinstate the verdict and render judgment for the defendant.