Court Opinion

ID: 9682995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:20:19.857849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.791760
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
concurring on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
I write separately to suggest that the majority opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals (“the majority opinion”) seems to have overlooked something crucial to its decision. The majority opinion asserted, “We have never stated a rationale for the second prong of the Rousseau [v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)]-Aguilar [v. State, 682 *375S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)]-Royster test, perhaps because we thought the rationale was obvious.” Arevalo v. State, 948 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Overlooked is the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals had stated the rationale for the second prong in Eldred v. State:
The reasoning is clear when one considers the dilemma facing a jury in the absence of a charge on theft [the lesser included offense] in a Campbell [v. State, 571 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)] fact situation. If the jury believes the defendant, they necessarily believe that the offense committed was theft. If no charge on theft is given, then the jury has two options which are equally distasteful. The first option is to vote not guilty in a situation where they believe the defendant committed a theft. The other option is to vote guilty of aggravated robbery, an offense they believe the defendant did not commit.
578 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Eldred is the only authority cited for the two-pronged test in Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (op. on reh’g).
The decision of the majority opinion is based on a new and different statement of a rationale for the second prong of Royster. The authorities cited by the majority opinion for its newfound rationale are: (1) Am. Jur.2d; (2) the Model Penal Code; and (3) an opinion from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Arevalo, 943 S.W.2d at 889. The effect of the decision of the majority is, as argued by appellant in his original brief in this Court, to establish a “right to require the jury [to] choose only those options [guilty of the greater offenses or not guilty], and not reach a ‘compromise’ verdict on a lessor [sic] included offense.” In other words, the majority opinion establishes a defendant’s “right” to put the jury in the dilemma against which the second prong of Royster was designed to guard.
I respectfully urge the Court of Criminal Appeals to correct what appears to be an obvious oversight.