Court Opinion

ID: 9547970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:55:24.196553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:18.768218
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
MARUMOTO, J.
I dissent. The decision of the court is based on the construction placed by the majority of the justices on article III, section 6, of the State constitution, which reads: “Any vacancy in the legislature shall be filled for the unexpired term in such manner as may be prescribed by law, or, if no provision be made by law, by appointment by the governor for the unexpired term.”
The position of the majority is that the death of Senator Kuriyama created a “vacancy”, within the meaning of that word as used in article III, section 6; that no provision has been made by law to fill such a vacancy; and that, in the circumstance, the clause “by appointment by the governor for the unexpired term” applies.
I agree with the majority that there is no statute which is applicable to the existing situation. HRS § 17-3 applies only to a situation where a senatorial seat had once been occupied and the incumbent senator became unavailable for service because of death or for some other reason. Here, the senatorial seat to be filled had no prior incumbent. Senator Kuriyama was a candidate for, and not an incumbent of, that seat.
My disagreement, with the majority is on the meaning to be given to the word “vacancy”, which is a multifaceted word without any technical meaning. As applied to a legislative seat, it may mean a situation where a seat has been unoccupied from the very beginning because no one was elected to fill it; or, it may mean a situation where a seat was once filled but later became unoccupied. I *417think that in the context of article III, section 6, it means the latter.
One of the rules applicable to the construction of a language used in the constitution, as in the case of a statutory language, is that the word be construed in the light of the context in which it is used. In article III, section 6, the word “vacancy” is tied up with the words “for the unexpired term.” If the framers of the constitution intended to grant to the governor the power to fill an office left vacant from the very beginning, there was no reason for limiting the power of appointment to any unexpired term.
Another applicable rule of construction is that where a constitutional language has been construed “contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention.” 1 T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 144 (8th ed. 1927). Since the adoption of the State constitution, the legislature has acted on three occasions to implement article III, section 6. S.L.H. 1959 (1st sp.), c. 11; S.L.H. 1963, c. 100; S.L.H. 1970, c. 26. In every one of those occasions, the legislature dealt only with a situation where a legislative seat became vacant after it had once been filled, a clear indication that it did not construe article III, section 6, as covering a situation where a legislative seat remained unfilled from the beginning because of vacancy in candidacy. Particularly significant is the action of the Fifth Legislature in unanimously enacting S.L.H. 1970, c. 26, which contains the current version of HBS § 17-3. In that legislature were 32 members of the Constitutional Convention of 1968, of whom 10 were senators and 22 were representatives, including the chairman of the respective house and senate *418judiciary committees which recommended the passage of the bill.
There is also the rule that “the effect and consequence of a particular construction is to be examined, because, if a literal meaning would involve a manifest absurdity, it ought not to be adopted.” 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 295 (1873).- The following will illustrate a possible absurd consequence of this court’s construction of article III, section 6: Suppose, in a future election, there is a vacancy in candidacy for a senate seat, and suppose, also, at the same election á new governor is elected because the incumbent governor did not stand for reelection or was defeated. Under article IV, section 1, the new governor does not take office until the first Monday in December following the election. In the meantime, the incumbent governor, who may belong to a different party, can appoint his friend to the senate for as long as one day short of four years. He may not make the appointment for the full four years because that will not be “for the unexpired term.”
The court’s construction of article III, section 6, harbors another anomalous consequence. If a senatorial candidate dies within ten days of a general election and the chief election officer declares the candidacy vacant under HRS § 11-118, the governor is empowered to appoint a senator for a term ending on the day of the second general election after the general election at which the candidacy was declared vacant. But if the candidate is successful and dies the day after the general election, the governor may appoint a successor only for a term ending on the day of the next general election, a period two years shorter, by reason of the operation of HRS § 17-3.
I think the fact is that the framers of the constitution never gave any thought to the situation where any legislative seat would be left unfilled at the general election, *419and thereby left a gap. In such a ease, the court has two alternatives, either let the matter ride without any action on the principle that it may not supply a casus omissus, or it may fill the gap in the exercise of its acknowledged power of interstitial judicial legislation.
It is my understanding that the majority position is based partly on the view that a contrary construction of article III, section 6, will embark the court on judicial lawmaking. But I think that a construction of a constitutional language not warranted by applicable rules of construction is in essence a form of judicial legislation.
I think that in the existing situation, this court should not stand idle, but provide a solution within the “walls of the interstices.” Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 129 (1921). The walls of the interstices indicated in the constitution are that the senators are originally to be elected at general election. The next general election is two years, away, and so the best alternative is special election.
This is a case where frank acknowledgment and exercise of the power of judicial legislation does less harm than a strained construction to avoid the exercise of such power. In this connection, the following statement of Sir Frederick Pollock is pertinent: “The Court should be even valiant to override the merely technical difficulties of professional thinking, and also current opinions having some show of authority, in the search for a solution which will be acceptable and in a general way intelligible to reasonable citizens, or the class of them whom the decision concerns.” Pollock, “Judicial Caution and Valor,” in Jurisprudence in Action, Legal Essays Selected by The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 373 (1953). In quoting the foregoing, I am acutely conscious of the self-restraint that the judiciary must exercise.
Another point made in the opinion of the court is that *420the chief election officer has no power to call a special election. I agree. But this is a case equitable in nature, although it has been submitted under HRS § 631-1, for it requests injunctive relief. I think that in the exercise of its equity power, this court may authorize the chief election officer to hold a special election in the manner he proposed in his proclamation. This is akin to the power the various courts exercised in reapportionment cases under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.