Court Opinion

ID: 9727812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:42.116795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:43.231430
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the third party’s testimony concerning the prior photographic identification should have been limited in its evidential use to impeachment purposes under the facts of this case. I take issue with the unwarrantedly broad, and in my judgment erroneous proposition, *400that prior identification testimony can never be admitted as substantive evidence.
In a recent decision the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cogently explained the distinction between the facts presented in this case, where the declarant attempts to deny the alleged previous identification, and the general use of prior identification as substantive evidence notwithstanding their hearsay qualities. Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984).
Prior identifications are admissible as probative evidence notwithstanding their hearsay attributes because of the superior probative worth of an identification made closer in time to the events in question. Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 71, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (1983); id. at 87, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Liacos, J., dissenting). Where, however, the extrajudicial identification is established not by the identifying witness but by a person who observed the identification, we believe that probative worth is outweighed by “the hazard of error or falsity in the reporting.” McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous statements as substantive evidence, 25 Tex.L.Rev. 573, 588 (1947). Where there is a dispute not only as to the accuracy of a pretrial identification, but also as to whether the identification was in fact made, “the evidential value of the prior identification is almost completely dissipated.” Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 273 n. 3, 331 N.E.2d 893 (1975). Thus, a police officer’s attribution to a witness of a positive identification denied by the witness at trial is not admissible to prove the identification. Its effect is limited to impeachment. See Commonwealth v. Furtick, 386 Mass. 477, 481 n. 2, 436 N.E.2d 396 (1982); Commonwealth v. Swenson, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass 179, 186, 439 N.E.2d 257 (1982).
Id., at 61, 469 N.E.2d at 488 (footnote omitted).
See also Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 161-62 (1965); Mauet, Prior Identifications in Criminal Cases: Hearsay and Confrontation Issues, 24 *401Ariz.L.Rev. 29, 49-50 (1982); cf. In re L.D.O., 400 A.2d 1055 (D.C.1979) (prior identification inadmissible where disavowed by identifying witness); State v. Jacobs, 344 So.2d 659 (La.1977) (prior identification of which identifying witness has no recollection inadmissible to bolster in-court identification).
The leading case on the substantive admissibility of prior identifications is People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960). In Gould the California Supreme Court held that a police officer’s testimony that an eyewitness, who had chosen the defendant’s picture from a photographic array but was unable to make an in-court identification, had been sure of her identification at the time it was made, was properly admitted into evidence. Speaking for a unanimous court Mr. Justice Traynor explained their rationale:
Evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification made at the trial (People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal.2d 555, 560 [191 P.2d 1]), but as independent evidence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached (People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal.2d 345, 351 [309 P.2d 424]; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 753-754 [104 P.2d 794]), evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind. (People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal.2d 555, 559-560 [191 P.2d 1]; United States v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687, 689; see People v. Hood, 140 Cal.App.2d 585, 588 [295 P.2d 525]; People v. Bennett, 119 Cal.App.2d 224, 226 [259 P.2d 476]; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 1130, p. 208.) The failure of the witness to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may *402be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extrajudicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination. (See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-175 [146 A.2d 29, 32-33]; McCormick, Evidence, § 39, p. 74; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State v. Wilson, 38 Wn.2d 593, 617-618 [231 P.2d 288, 300-301]; People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202 [101 N.E.2d 457, 460-461].).
Id. at 626-27, 7 Cal.Rptr. at 275, 354 P.2d at 867.
The use of third party testimony concerning extrajudicial identifications as substantive evidence where the witness who made the prior identification is present in court and available for cross-examination has been sanctioned in the case law of numerous states. See, e.g., State v. Kevil, 111 Ariz. 240, 527 P.2d 285 (1974); State v. Jackson, 24 Ariz. App. 7, 535 P.2d 35 (1975); Martin v. State, 272 Ark. 376, 614 S.W.2d 512 (1981); People v. Trujillo, 189 Colo. 206, 539 P.2d 1234 (1975); Kurtz v. People, 177 Colo. 306, 494 P.2d 97 (1972); Harley v. United States, 471 A.2d 1013 (D.C.1984); Rice v. United States, 437 A.2d 582 (D.C.1981); Morris v. United States, 389 A.2d 1346 (D.C.1978); State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla.1978); Henry v. State, 383 So.2d 320 (Fla.App.1980); Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. 616, 225 S.E.2d 14 (1976); Barriner v. State, 161 Ga.App. 59, 289 S.E.2d 289 (1982); State v. Naeole, 62 Hawaii 563, 617 P.2d 820 (1980); People v. Warren, 32 Ill.App.3d 218, 336 N.E.2d 557 (1975); Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 443 A.2d 78 (1982); Mouzon v. State, 9 Md.App. 57, 262 A.2d 588 (1970); Gross v. State, 8 Md.App. 341, 259 A.2d 570 (1969); Commonwealth v. Torres, 367 Mass. 737, 327 N.E.2d 871 (1975); State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967); State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009, 88 S.Ct. 572; 19 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967); State v. Norwood, 303 N.C. 473, 279 S.E.2d 550 (1981); State v. Fennell, *4037 Or.App. 256, 489 P.2d 964 (1971); State v. Long, — R.I. —, 488 A.2d 427 (1985); State v. Nordstrom, 104 R.I. 480, 244 A.2d 842 (1968); Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 225 S.E.2d 391 (1976); State v. Simmons, 63 Wash.2d 17, 385 P.2d 389 (1963); State v. Carter, 282 S.E.2d 277 (W.Va.1981); see also C. McCormick, Evidence § 251(c) (3d ed. 1984); Mauet, supra; Annot., 29 A.L.R. 4th 104 (1984). Perhaps the most important circumstance in which this hearsay exception comes into play is when the eyewitness is unable to identify the defendant at trial. See e.g., State v. Kevil, supra; State v. Jackson, supra People v. Gould, supra; People v. Trujillo, supra; Barriner v. State, supra; State v. Fennell, supra; Niblett v. Commonwealth, supra; State v. Simmons, supra.
In the federal court system, moreover, the admissibility of prior statements of identification is explicitly provided for by Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay A statement is not hearsay if—
(1) Prior statements by witness The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.
Fed.R.Evid. Rule 801(d)(1)(C).
Prior photographic identifications are encompassed by the Rule, see United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Hudson, 564 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 732, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978); United States v. Dawson, 556 F.Supp. 418 (E.D.Pa.1982) aff'd mem., 727 F.2d 1101 (3d Cir.1984); and the Rule has been consistently held to apply to testimony by third parties, see United States v. Baker, 722 F.2d 343 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Medina-Martinez, 12 Fed.R.Evid.Serv. 417 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Hinnant, 9 Fed.Evid.Rptr. 1504 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Elemy, *404656 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Cueto, supra; United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1977). While at least one commentator has argued that the language of the Rule requires the identifying witness to testify concerning his prior identification, see Mauet, supra at 162, it appears that third party identification testimony may be admissible under the federal Rule even where the identifying witness denies having made the prior identification, see United States v. Elemy, supra; D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 34.04, at 419 (2d ed. 1984).
The federal rule has, in turn, been adopted in a large number of states. Alaska R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C); Ariz.R. Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C); Ark. Uniform R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(l)(iii); Colo.R.EvkLRule 801(d)(1)(C); Del. Uniform R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C); 6C Fla.Stat.Ann.Evid.Code § 90.-801 (West 1979); Hawaii R.Evid.Rule 802.1(3); Iowa R.Evid. Rule 801(d)(1)(C); Mich.R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(1); Minn.R.Evid. Rule 801(d)(1)(C); MontR.Evid. § 26-l-801(d)(l)(C); Nev. Rev.Stat. tit. 4 § 51.035(2)(c); N.M.R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C); N.D.R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(l)(iii); Ohio R.Evid.Rule 801(D)(a), (c); Or.Evid.Code § 40.450(4)(a)(c); S.D.R.Evid. § 19-16-2(3); Tex.R.Evid.Rule 801(e)(1)(C); Utah R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C); Vt.R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(l)(iii); Wash.R.Evid.Rule 801(d)(l)(iii); 40L Wis.Stat.Ann. § 908.01(4)(a)(3); Wyo.R. Evid.Rule 801(d)(1)(C). Other states have promulgated comparable rules. Cal.Evid.Code § 1238; Kan.Civ.Proc.Stat. Ann. § 60-460(a); NJ.Evid.R.Rule 63(l)(c); N.Y.Crim. Proc.Law § 60.25 (McKinney 1981).
I find this authority persuasive and I am therefore distressed that the majority in its effort to distinguish Commonwealth v. Ballard, 501 Pa. 230, 460 A.2d 1091 (1983), which was totally unnecessary under the facts presented in this appeal, ignored the clear language of that opinion embracing the admissibility of prior identification as substantive evidence.
Testimony by a police officer concerning acts of pretrial identification is admiss[i]ble, where the identifying wit*405ness is present in court and subject to cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Dean, 300 Pa.Super. 86, 445 A.2d 1311 (1982).
Id., 501 Pa. at 233, 460 A.2d at 1092.
The majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 394 A.2d 453 (1978), is misplaced. That case did not squarely address the issue of third party identification testimony. In Slaughter two police officers testified generally as to the fact of prior identifications of the accused. The first officer stated during cross-examination that he had not been present during the identifications but that the information had been relayed to him by others. On redirect examination that officer named the two identifying witnesses. The latter testimony was clearly double hearsay: the officer merely related that he had been told that two individuals had identified the defendant. The second officer stated that a witness who was not present in court and could not be located had identified the defendant. This, too, was hearsay not subject to any cognizable exception to the hearsay rule.
Similarly, Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d 653 (1982), which I authored, lends no support to the majority’s thesis. In Waller the appellant challenged the Commonwealth’s use of a prior inconsistent statement of one of its own witnesses as impeachment evidence, asserting that the prior statement was not inconsistent with the witness’ in-court testimony. That claim was rejected. The question of third party identification testimony was not before the Court. Thus neither case on which the majority relies in any way compels the majority’s unduly restrictive reading of Ballard.