Court Opinion

ID: 9778007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:59.774722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.072070
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
“No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, and no law shall be revised, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and published at length.”
*449This section contains two important restrictions that relate to the transaction of the business of the General Assembly in an orderly and intelligent fashion. The provisions relating to title and the provisions relating to republication in full of amended statutes preserve the significant purpose of preventing confusion in the minds of legislators as to the effect of proposed legislation.
Our court, some time ago, expressed the purpose of this amendment. In Talbott v. Laffoon, 257 Ky. 773, 79 S.W.2d 244 (1935), we said:
“Section 51 of our Constitution, and like provisions in Constitutions of other states, is of comparatively modern origin, and the purpose of the people in incorporating it as a part of their fundamental law was to prevent the evil that had grown up of legislating in one act upon as many distinct and wholly disconnected subjects as the legislative body saw fit, without any indication in the title of the act as to what its contents might be. Prior to the adoption of such a provision, the title to an act might clearly indicate that it related to a specifically named subject, or to a number of named subjects, with the body of it containing provisions for a wholly distinct and unconnected subject or subjects than what was mentioned in the title. It was then competent for the Legislature to legislate upon a multiplicity of unrelated subjects which were neither remotely germane to, or in any wise connected with, the one or ones named in the title, and which, as we are advised, is yet true with reference to congressional legislation. To circumvent such deceptive practices resulting in deceitful, selfish, and other baleful consequences, the provision was inserted in the Constitution requiring, inter alia, that no statute ‘shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.’ ”
Id. at 246.
In Board of Education v. Mescher, 310 Ky. 453, 220 S.W.2d 1016 (1949), we said:
“ ‘The purpose of the provision have been stated many times. Among them is the important purpose to prevent surprise or fraud, and the enactment of vicious legislation under an innocent and misleading title. Therefore, the title must give fair and reasonable notice of the nature and provisions of the Act so that a member of the legislature or any other interested person reading the title may obtain a general notice or knowledge of the contents of the Act or what it proposes to do. The title must be a true although not a detailed index of the contents. ' If it is restrictive, then the Act must not exceed the specification or include what is not reasonably and properly connected with or germane to it.’ ”
Id. at 220 S.W.2d 1019.
In Board of Penitentiary Com’rs v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255, 166 S.W. 1016 (1914), this court considered the requirements of Section 51 of the constitution and its purposes as it regards the republication of amended statutes. After discussing some of the practices attempted before the adoption of Section 51 of the present constitution, we said:
“It can readily be seen that, under this practice, no person, by reading an act the provisions of which had been extended or conferred in the manner indicated, could obtain any idea of the meaning or effect of it, without reading it in connection with the old law the provisions of which had been carried into the new law, by reference to the title of the old law; nor could any person, by reading an old law that had been revised or amended, by adding to it certain words or taking from it certain words, understand the meaning and effect of the old law without reading it in connection with the new one that amended or revised it in this manner. And it was largely to prevent this deceptive and misleading manner of legislating, which afforded so many opportunities for fraud, as well as to make the laws more convenient and accessible, that this section was adopted. As aptly said on this subject by Mr. Spalding, the chairman of the legislative committee, in *450volume 3, p. 3792, of the Debates of the Constitutional Convention: ‘The members of the General Assembly did not know what they were voting for half the time, and this section in the report provides when an act is amended it shall not be amended in that way, but that the act, as amended, shall be set out in full, so every man will understand what it is when voting on it, and the people will know what change has been made when they see it.’
“This was the whole purpose of this provision in the Constitution, and that it is a wise provision is not open to doubt. When any person, lawyer or layman, takes up an act of the Legislature, to read and understand what changes have been made in an old law, he ought to have before him in the act that he is reading the whole of the law as it appears when amended or revised by the new act, and so the convenient and the proper way to revise or amend an old law, by either adding to it or taking from it, or extending its provisions, is to set forth in the new act the law as it will read when revised, amended, or extended.”
Id. at 166 S.W. 1023-1024.
In Board of Penitentiary Com’rs v. Spencer, supra, the court also established guidelines concerning the republication of amended statutes as follows:
“(a) That it is not necessary, when the body of the new act repeals, or has the effect of repealing, all or part of an existing act, to republish or set forth the parts repealed, although the title of the repealing act may purport to be an amendment to the existing act.
“(b) That when it is proposed to revise or amend one or more sections of the Kentucky Statutes, or an act, the body of the new act should contain the section or sections as they will read when revised or amended, if it is proposed to re-enact or leave in force any part of the section or sections that are amended or revised. If, however, it is intended to repeal one or more sections, then it is not necessary to set forth in the body of the act the section or sections repealed.
“(c) That when the act does not purport to be an amendment to an existing law, but a new act, it is not necessary to set out or republish any part of any old law that may be changed or repealed by the new law.
“(d) When the new act purports to amend an existing act by extending, revising, or amending it, and no particular section or part of it is specified, then the body of the new act must set forth the whole of the existing act as it will appear when extended, revised, or amended; but, if only a section or several sections of an act are extended, revised, or amended, it is only necessary to specify and republish the section or sections that are extended, revised, or amended.
“(e) That, when it is desired to confer or carry into a new law provisions of an old law, then so much of the old law as is thus conferred or carried into the new law must be published at length.”
Id. at 166 S.W. at 1022-1023.
It seems to me that the purposes which impelled the framers of the constitution to place the limitations imposed upon the General Assembly by Section 61 of the constitution were inherently sound and ought not to be eroded to the vanishing point by judicial interpretation.
Let us examine the legislation in question. Senate Bill 294 is entitled “AN ACT relating to the relationship of the budget bill to the Kentucky Revised Statutes, and declaring an emergency.” This innocuous title would scarcely inform an unsuspecting legislator that it is really an act providing for the amendment, repeal, suspension, or modification of existing statutes through various provisions to be included in a separate budget bill. In my view, the title of the bill is misleading.
Even worse is the test. Section 6 of Senate Bill 294 provides:
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 48 IS CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
“(1) The general assembly may provide in a budget bill for the transfer to *451the general fund for the purpose of the general fund all or part of the agency funds, special funds, or other funds established under the provisions of KRS 15.430; 16.565; 21.347; 21.540; 21.560; 42.500; 47.010; 48.010(g); 56.100; 61.-470; 61.580; 64.345; 64.350; 64.355; 78.-650; 95A.220; 136.392; 138.510; 150.150; 154.150; 161.420; 161.430; 164A.110; 164A.020; 164A.800; ' 164A.810; 216A.110; 230.218; 230.398; 230.400; 230.770; 235.330; 248.540; 248.550; 278.-130; 278.150; 287.485; 304.35-030; 311.-450; 311.610; 312.019; 313.350; 314.161; 315.195; 316.210; 317.530; 317A.080; 319.131; 320.360; 321.320; 322.290; 322.-330; 322.420; 323.080; 323.190; 323.210; 323A.060; 323A.190; 323A.210; 324.286; 324.410; 325.250; 326.120; 327.080; 330.-050; 344.160; 334A.120; 335.140; 342.-122; 342.480, etc.
“(2) The transfer of monies from the agency funds, special funds, or other funds to the general fund provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall be for the period of time specified in the budget bill.
“(3) Any provisions of any statute in conflict with the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section are hereby suspended or modified. Such suspension or modification shall not extend beyond the duration of the budget bill.”
Section 7 of Senate Bill 294 provides:
SECTION 7. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 48 IS CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
“To the extent that the provisions of a budget bill are in conflict with any provisions of KRS Chapters 12, 42, 56, 152, 177, or 341, the provisions of those chapters are hereby suspended or modified. Such suspension or modification shall not extend beyond the duration of the budget bill.”
No member of the General Assembly could possibly have any idea by reading the language of Senate Bill 294 what agency funds were created by the 70 enumerated statutes and could not possibly know what funds were subject to transfer upon the passage of Senate Bill 294. The inclusion of “etc.” at the end of the string of enumerated statute numbers would seem to make even more uncertain what transfers were to be authorized. Such uncertainty with regard to the effect of legislation is precisely the evil that Section 51 of our constitution was designed to prevent.
An entirely separate bill, House Bill 474, the budget bill, enacted into law the transfers authorized by Senate Bill 294. House Bill 474 was entitled “AN ACT relating to appropriations for the operation, maintenance, support, and functioning of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its various officers, cabinets, departments, boards, commissions, institutions, subdivisions, agencies, and other state supported activities.”
With respect to the transfers of funds, it provided for a transfer from the agency and special funds to the general fund certain enumerated dollar amounts from certain enumerated agencies. In most cases, the agency from which funds were transferred was designated by an existing K.R.S. number which identified the agency and which designated the fees and monies which were appropriated to the agency by the existing statute, and the purposes and the manner in which those fees and funds were to be used.
No legislator could tell from a reading of House Bill 474 the purposes for which the transferred funds were required to be used by the existing statute. In a session limited to 60 days each biennium, in which hundreds of bills are introduced, it is not realistic to expect that an individual legislator could research each of the statutes enumerated in House Bill 474 to determine for himself the advisability of transferring funds away from that particular agency. In one instance, House Bill 474 purports to transfer $3,980,000.00 from the “Reinsurance Association” to the general fund, but no reference is made to the statute which created the association or to the purpose and manner in which its funds are to be used.
*452Of necessity, the individual legislators would find it impossible to determine the full import of House Bill 474 from a reading of its express language, and could not, therefore, know the full import of their action in either voting for or against the bill. It is just such uncertainties that Section 51 of our constitution was designed to prevent.
Furthermore, under only the loosest interpretation does the transfer to the general fund of funds appropriated to an agency by an existing statute have anything to do with the subject of appropriation. These transfers do not appropriate money. They rescind appropriations under existing statutes by transferring money which was previously made available to an agency by a statute which still exists on the statute books of this state. In doing so, the existing statutes, in my opinion, were amended by the budget bill and were therefore required by Section 51 of the constitution to be republished as amended.
The majority opinion states that these were not amendments, but only suspensions or modifications of the existing statutes. The General Assembly, in Senate Bill 294, divested itself of the power to repeal or amend an existing statute by a budget bill, but granted unto itself the power to suspend or modify existing statutes.
It seems to me beyond question that repeal and amendment of statutes relate to permanent actions of the General Assembly, whereas a suspension of a statute for the duration of the biennium of the budget bill is in effect a temporary repeal. A modification of a statute, limited to the biennium of the budget bill is a temporary amendment.
If an amendment is not valid unless republished as amended, it follows that a temporary amendment must also be published in full.
The transfer of various agency funds to the general fund conflicts in many instances with the express purpose and manner in which existing law requires those funds to be used, and the transfer in the budget bill does not suspend the existing statute. The existing statute is left intact, except to the extent that a portion of the funds for the use of the agency has been siphoned off for a different purpose. This does not suspend the existing statute but modifies it temporarily. Because a modification is in effect an amendment, albeit temporary, the full text of the existing law as modified is required to be published.
I do not doubt that the General Assembly has the power to control appropriations and expenditures, nor that it has the power to repeal or to amend statutes which appropriate money and provide the manner in which it shall be used.
It can, as an example, abolish the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission by repeal of the statute which created it. It has the power to direct that money derived from licenses issued by the commission be used for a different purpose than that provided by K.R.S. 150.150, but it must be done by amending K.R.S. 150.150 and republishing it in full as amended.
K.R.S. 150.150 provides:
“(1) Except as provided in this chapter, all moneys derived from the sale of licenses or from any other source connected with the administration of this chapter shall be promptly paid over to the state treasurer, who shall deposit such moneys in a special fund, known as the game and fish fund. The game and fish fund shall be used to carry out the purposes of this chapter and any law or regulation for the protection of wild animals, birds or fish, and for no other purpose.
“(2) All funds received under KRS 150.110, 150.510 and 150.520 shall be used by the department for the purpose of enforcing those sections and for the protection and propagation of mussel beds. Any surplus remaining in the fund at the close of each calendar year shall be turned into the general fund of the department. (1954d-10, 1954d-48: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 68, § 15; 1952, ch. 200, § 22; 1968, ch. 38, § 6; 1978, ch. 384, § 33, effective June 17, 1978.)”
*453This statute provides that the game and fish fund be used for purposes specified in the statute and for no other purpose. The budget bill purports to transfer $225,000.00 of the funds of the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission to the general fund with no limitation on the manner of spending. The budget bill does not repeal K.R.S. 150.150 because, except for the funds transferred, the statute will continue to be operative. The budget bill does, however, amend K.R.S. 150.150 because it takes away funds which were designated for a specific purpose and diverts them to another purpose. Because K.R.S. 150.150 was so amended, but its text was not republished or amended as required by the constitution, Section 51, a legislator would not know the effect that the budget bill would have upon the operation of the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission. The same thing is true of all other cases where the transfer of funds from commissions and agencies by the budget bill contravenes the express provisions of existing statutes.
I remain convinced that the intent and purpose of Section 51 of the constitution is sound, and that erosion of its effectiveness by judicial interpretation will in the long run lead to unfortunate consequences.
Recent events teach us the danger of circumventing the constitution. Sections 49 and 50 of our constitution prohibit the creation of public debt in excess of $500,-000.00 except upon the vote of a bonded indebtedness by the people, accompanied by the enactment of a tax for the specific purpose of liquidating the principal and interest on the indebtedness. Notwithstanding this salutary economic principle, the state has issued millions of dollars of revenue bonds without a vote of the people and without enactment of a specific tax to retire the bonds. The bonds have been upheld by the courts upon the theory that they are to be retired from revenues derived from projects financed by the bonds and that such bonds do not constitute an indebtedness of the state. Many of the projects financed by these bonds produce no revenue at all apart from money taken from current state revenues. Revenue bonds are used to finance road construction projects, and the transportation department then leases the roads, and the lease payments are used to retire the principal and interest on the bonds.
Although not technically an indebtedness of the state, these bonds have created an obligation which must, as a practical matter, be satisfied out of current revenues because a default would ruin the credit of the state. The expenditure of current funds to pay for the leases necessary to retire interest and principal on revenue bonds is substantially responsible for a current critical shortage of funds available to the transportation department for other purposes.
One purpose of Sections 49 and 50 of our constitution is to prevent a current administration from obligating the tax revenues of a future administration. What has happened is that Sections 49 and 50 of the constitution have been circumvented, and as a practical matter, past administrations have been permitted to obligate the tax revenues of the present and of future administrations. We now begin to feel the consequences. I mention this as an example because it is easy to become impatient with restrictions imposed by our constitution. Section 51 serves a sound and prudent purpose, and in my view, it is important that we interpret it to prevent the very abuses it was designed to prohibit.
I would hold all of the contested sections of Senate Bill 294 and House Bill 474 unconstitutional to the extent they violate Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution in the manner expressed in this dissent.