Court Opinion

ID: 9780710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:29:53.890343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:11.344065
License: Public Domain

KESSLER, Judge,
specially concurring.
¶ 38 I concur with the majority on the issue of summary judgment. I also concur with the result the majority reaches on the denial of the motion to amend to assert the family purpose doctrine. However, I reach that same result through different reasoning. The majority opinion can be read as limiting the family purpose doctrine to relationships between parents and their children living in the same household. Supra, ¶¶ 23-29. I do not agree with that categorical limitation, but rely on the traditional fact-based elements of the family purpose doctrine — control and head of household — to find that the doctrine does not apply here.
¶ 39 The majority correctly points out that except for one Arizona ease based on outdated community property principles, Arizona cases have not applied the family purpose doctrine to any case beyond a parent furnishing a family vehicle to a live-in child. Supra, ¶ 26. However, at least two Arizona cases have declined to categorically limit the doctrine to the parental-child relationship. Jacobson v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 430, 431, 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (“The doctrine holds the owner, or person with control of the vehicle, or head of the family, liable for the negligent driving of a minor child or the spouse using the vehicle with the parent’s or owner-spouse’s permission, but for the driver’s own pleasure or business.”) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 480, 441 P.2d 73, 77 (1968) (noting that the supreme court in Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325, 305 P.2d 463 (1956), relied on a Georgia ease that held the doctrine could apply when a spouse furnishes the other spouse with the family vehicle and citing with approval a broad definition of household to include parents, children, servants, and boarders if they are sharing a common dwelling and table).
¶ 40 Indeed, it appears that many jurisdictions do not limit the doctrine to parental relationships; rather, the doctrine applies when the persons are living in the same household and the person “furnishing” the vehicle has some control over the vehicle. See, e.g., R.E. Barber, Annot., Modem Status of Family Purpose Doctrine With Respect to Motor Vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191, §§ 8-9 (1966 & Cum.Supp.); Robinson v. Lunsford, 330 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Ky.1959) (stating doctrine would not apply to visiting son-in-law’s use of car when parents-in-law had no moral or legal obligation to furnish support); Hermosillo v. Leadingham, 129 N.M. 721, 13 P.3d 79, 84-85 (App.2006) (holding doctrine did not apply to husband of estranged wife when they were not part of same household and husband had no control over vehicle); French v. Barrett, 84 Or.App. 52, 733 P.2d 89, 92 (1987) (jury question was presented whether doctrine could apply to daughter’s fiancé who lived in household), rejected on other grounds, Madrid v. Robinson, 931 P.2d 791 (Or.1997); Wiebe v. Seely, 215 Or. 331, 335 P.2d 379, 387 (1959) (finding doctrine could apply to spouse).
¶ 41 In most cases involving adults living together as a couple, the doctrine would seemingly not apply because they are equal partners in using the family car. But that does not mean all couples are equal partners at all times. There may be cases in which limiting the doctrine to a parental figure allowing a live-in child to use the family vehicle would bar liability that would otherwise seem to call for application of the doctrine. As our supreme court has recently reiterated, the doctrine’s “practical purpose [is] providing reparation for an injured party from the closest financially responsible party.” Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1, 6, ¶ 19, 251 P.3d 380, 385 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This purpose would be undermined if we limited the doctrine only to children living in the household, rather than others living in the household who rely on the “head of household” to furnish the car.
¶ 42 For example, if eighty-seven-year-old Uncle Joe was living with his son and his *457son’s family, the son and his wife let Joe use the family car, Joe had no history of unsafe driving but his reaction time was slower with age and he negligently drove the ear, killing a third party, the son and his wife could never, under a categorical limitation, be liable under the family purpose doctrine simply because Joe was not their child.2 Conversely, such a categorical limitation might unduly expand the doctrine simply based on familial relationships. Thus, if a thirty-year-old-son of a couple came back to live in the family household and was allowed to generally use the couple’s car, but had his own car too, the couple would be liable for any accident the son caused, provided the other elements of the doctrine were met.
¶ 43 Limiting the doctrine to absolute categories is inappropriately rigid and does not serve the practical purpose of the doctrine. While in most cases that primary purpose will involve use of the family vehicle by a child and not by a spouse, there is no reason to limit application of the doctrine based on absolute categories. Compare Young, id. (referring to a wrongdoing minor) with Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411 (stating that the doctrine can apply where the negligent driver is the spouse of the family head).
¶44 The appropriate breadth of the doctrine can be premised on its traditional elements. Under the doctrine “a head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the use, pleasure, and convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of family members who have the general authority to drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.” Young, 227 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 8, 251 P.3d at 383 (quoting Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 410, ¶ 8, 231 P.3d 940, 942 (App.2010)). Thus, the doctrine consists of three elements: “(1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who maintains or furnishes a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family, and (3) a family member uses the vehicle with the family head’s express or implied permission for a family purpose.” Id., 227 Ariz. at 8, ¶ 28, 251 P.3d at 387.
¶ 45 The key issue here is not whether Fuller was Hewitt’s child, wife, or live-in girlfriend. Rather, the issue is whether Hewitt was the “head of household,” that is, the “financially responsible person ... deemed most able to control to whom the car is made available.” Id. at 6, ¶ 23, 251 P.3d at 385; accord Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411 (holding the doctrine requires that a person to be held liable is the person with control of the vehicle or the “head of the family”); Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 480, 441 P.2d at 77 (identifying the head of the family as the one on whom other members are wholly or partly dependant for support).
¶ 46 Thus, the element of “head of household” is not always governed by a person’s relationship to other members of the household (e.g., father, husband, or wife), but governed by the fact of control. That element of control is not present here.
¶47 The facts are relatively undisputed. Fuller lived in both Denver and Carefree in homes owned by Hewitt. On the day of the accident, she was in Carefree living at Hewitt’s home and her car was parked in Denver. While Hewitt testified in deposition that he allowed anyone on the insurance policy to drive the car, Hewitt and Fuller both regularly drove the car, both of them had keys for the car and it was understood that she could use it for business and personal purposes. On the day in question, Fuller did not feel she needed to ask and Hewitt did not give permission to her to use the car. Rather, Hewitt merely asked her to run some personal and business errands and given her general access to the car, she did not feel any need to ask him for permission to use any of the ears.
¶ 48 This is not the kind of case in which Hewitt or anyone else was the head of household, i.e., “the financially responsible person ... deemed most able to control to whom the car [was] made available.” Young, 227 Ariz. at 6, ¶ 23, 251 P.3d at 385 (emphasis added). Rather, it was simply two members of the same household with equal access and ability to regularly use the vehicles. Effectively, for *458the family purpose doctrine, this scenario is indistinguishable from a married couple owning separate cars and regularly using either car to run errands. The two members of the family are co-equal partners in using the cars; neither control the ear for purposes of the doctrine. The fact that the cars were owned by one member of the couple or his or her company is irrelevant to the doctrine. See Young, id. at 5, ¶ 15, 251 P.3d at 384 (noting that agency and not ownership is the test of liability); Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411 (stating doctrine is based imperfectly on agency principles). But cf. Jackson v. Reed, 229 Ga.App. 433, 494 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (G1997) (doctrine did not apply to 36-year-old stepdaughter who was house sitting and who lived elsewhere, whose own car was having maintenance problems, and who used the family truck to run an errand because she was not part of household).
¶ 49 Accordingly, based on the traditional test for the family purpose doctrine, I concur with the majority that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend the complaint.

. The majority correctly does not address liability under a negligent entrustment theory. The family purpose doctrine is premised on vicarious liability. Young, 227 Ariz. at 5-6, ¶ 19, 251 P.3d at 384-85. In contrast, negligent entrustment is based on direct liability of the person authorizing use of the vehicle to a person she knew or should have known was a risky driver. Acuna v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104, 109, ¶ 17, 128 P.3d 221, 226 (App.2006).