Court Opinion

ID: 9761879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:57:44.86142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.189330
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part.
I agree with the majority that the defendant did not properly preserve his claim under the Colorado Constitution and therefore join part II.A. of the opinion. However, I disagree with the majority's holding that, in order to make a tailoring argument, a prosecutor must point out to the jury specific instances in which the defendant tailored his testimony. Maj. op. at 142-48. In support of its position, the majority relies on the dissent in Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 76, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Maj. op. at 141. But the Portuondo dissent does not require the prosecutor to point out specific instances of tailoring to the jury. On the contrary, it endorses the "decision below [which] would rein in a prosecutor solely in situations where there is no particular reason to believe that tailoring has occurred...." 529 U.S. at 78, 120 S.Ct. 1119. Here, as the majority concedes, there were a number of instances during defendant's testimony in which there was "particular reason" to believe he engaged in tailoring. Maj. op. at 142 (noting that defendant "mimicked one witness, im*144plied that same witness was lying, and explicitly accused another witness of lying"). Because the jury heard those specific instances of defendant's tailoring, it was not necessary for the prosecutor specifically to draw its attention to them in order to make a tailoring argument. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment with respect to part ILB. of the majority's opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice COATS joins in this opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part.