Court Opinion

ID: 9929337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:05:13.631249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:01.474448
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-0485
                  LT Case No. 2020-CF-002169
                 _____________________________

ANTWAN STAFFORD,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Howard Sohn, of Law Office of Howard Sohn, Boynton Beach, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren Shippy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                        February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    Antwan Stafford appeals the judgment and sentence entered
against him following a jury trial. We find no error in the trial
court’s admission of Williams 1 rule evidence, nor do we find that

    1 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
the court erred in denying Stafford’s motion for judgment of
acquittal. Stafford’s remaining argument on appeal is that the
State made numerous improper comments throughout the
proceedings below which deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
We agree.

     In 2020, Richard Giglio and Joseph Licandro, assistant state
attorneys in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Stafford for
trafficking in eutylone as well as several other related drug
offenses. The record in this case is replete with instances where
these prosecutors made highly improper comments to the jury—
starting with opening statement and continuing in closing
argument. These comments included improperly personalizing the
case and interjecting their personal opinions as to Stafford’s guilt; 2
improperly bolstering the State’s evidence by reference to the
police and judge; 3 disparaging and mocking the defense; 4 and

    2 The State told the jury, “[W]e see this stuff all the time. We

see how these houses are run. We see how the defendants try to
outschool the police. Now you see it.” See D’Ambrosio v. State, 736
So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding it is improper for
prosecutor to give personal opinion as to guilt of accused); see also
United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2009)
(explaining prosecutor’s interjection of personal belief is improper
when it suggests government has special knowledge of evidence
not presented to jury, carries implied guarantee of truthfulness, or
expresses personal opinion about credibility).
    3 “It did not take the police long to figure it out. It should not

take us very long to figure it out either.” See Gonzalez v. State, 136
So. 3d 1125, 1141 (Fla. 2014) (“Improper bolstering occurs when
the State places the prestige of the government behind the witness
or indicates that information not presented to the jury supports
the witness’s testimony.” (quoting Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d
1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008))).
    4 “I guarantee if there was a print on that bag, the defense

would be telling you, it just means he touched the bag at one point.
Maybe he made a sandwich. Maybe he brought along some cold
cuts and some pulled pork. He touched the bag and then someone
else filled it with drugs. There is an explanation for everything.”

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insinuating that Stafford committed the unrelated and uncharged
felony offense of money laundering. 5 But as we will explain, the
most egregious of the State’s improper comments was a blatant
misuse of the otherwise properly admitted Williams rule evidence.

     The case against Stafford began in 2020 when law
enforcement executed a search warrant at a home where Stafford
resided. Drugs and related paraphernalia were found throughout
the residence, the majority of which was located in hidden
containers and cut-outs throughout the house. In 2019, less than a
year earlier, law enforcement executed another search warrant on
the same residence. Again, Stafford was found in the residence and
drugs were found hidden throughout. The State declined to file
charges against Stafford following the first warrant; however, they
successfully argued to the trial court that evidence from that initial
search should be admissible as Williams rule evidence relevant to
show that Stafford had knowledge of the drugs found in 2020 and
control of the house in which they were found. This Williams rule
evidence was utilized by the State numerous times during trial,
and each time the court instructed the jury that it should only
consider the evidence from the 2019 search for the limited purpose
of considering Stafford’s knowledge of the drugs, a material
element of each charge for which Stafford was ultimately
convicted.

    Despite the trial court’s directive, the prosecutors made
repeated improper references to the 2019 case during closing
argument, not to show knowledge but rather to convince the jury
that Stafford was guilty of the same crime a year earlier. These
improper comments included the statements that: (1) Stafford

See D’Ambrosio, 736 So. 2d at 48 (holding prosecutor’s remarks
that defense theory was a “sea of confusion” that defense counsel
“prays you will get lost in” was improper attack of defense and
defense counsel).
    5 See Brooks v. State, 868 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)

(holding it was improper for prosecutor to suggest defendant
committed uncharged crime of unlawful possession of firearm by
convicted felon).

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went to jail following the 2019 search but the arrest “changed
nothing,” had “no effect on him” and that his drug trafficking was
an “ongoing operation;” (2) the evidence from the 2019 search was
admitted by the judge because it proved Stafford’s knowledge,
suggesting an endorsement of the evidence by the judge; and
perhaps most egregious, the very last thing the jury heard from
the State before retiring to deliberate was (3) Stafford “got away
with it in 2019. Don’t let him get away with it in 2020.”

     The State correctly points out that these comments, even if
improper, were not objected to by defense counsel. 6 It is true that
where a defendant does not object to improper comments made by
the prosecutor during opening and closing arguments, any
objection to those comments is unpreserved. Braddy v. State, 111
So. 3d 810, 846 (Fla. 2012). “The general rule is that the failure to
raise a contemporaneous objection to those comments constitutes
a waiver of the right to claim error on appeal.” Davis v. State, 937
So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “The sole exception to the
general rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level
of fundamental error, which has been defined as error that ‘reaches
down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict
of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of
the alleged error.’” Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898–99 (Fla.
2000) (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1999)
(additional citations omitted)). “[W]here prejudicial conduct in its
collective import is so extensive as to pervade the trial, a new trial
should be awarded regardless of the want of an objection.” Silva v.
Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (citation omitted).

     Having determined that most, if not all, of the complained of
comments were in fact improper and impermissible, we next must
determine whether they rise to the level of fundamental error.
“Fundamental error in closing argument occurs when the
prejudicial conduct, in its collective import, is so extensive that its
influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm and
dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the
jury.” Capron v. State, 948 So. 2d 954, 956–57 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

    6 Stafford’s appellate counsel was not his attorney in the trial

proceedings.

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Appellate courts are cautioned to exercise “very guardedly” our
discretion when determining whether fundamental error has
occurred, applying the doctrine only in rare cases. Fike v. State, 4
So. 3d 734, 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The improper comments in
this case, considered collectively, and in light of both the evidence
presented and the elements of each charge, pervaded the trial and
undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict, leading us to
conclude that the error is fundamental and that a new trial is
warranted. We find the State’s reliance on the strength of the
evidence presented at trial unpersuasive because the most
egregious statements in closing argument inexcusably distorted
the State’s most powerful evidence of guilt—the Williams rule
evidence.

     While defense counsel’s failure to object to any of these
statements is incomprehensible, prosecutors are nevertheless
required to “refrain from engaging in inflammatory and abusive
arguments, to maintain their objectivity, and to behave in a
professional manner.” Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756 (Fla.
5th DCA 2017) (quoting Cardona v. State, 185 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla.
2016)). These prosecutors failed to meet that standard.

    REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

EISNAUGLE, HARRIS, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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