Court Opinion

ID: 9890091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 15:01:41.770921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:10.244988
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2279   Document: 70     Page: 1    Filed: 10/12/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

            SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL,
                 Plaintiff-Appellee

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                  Defendant-Appellant
                 ______________________

                       2021-2279
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:21-cv-01138-MMS, Senior Judge Margaret M.
 Sweeney.
                 ______________________

                Decided: October 12, 2023
                 ______________________

    THOMAS ANDREW COULTER, Norton Rose Fulbright US
 LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee.

     WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant.
 Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY, DOUGLAS K. MICKLE.
                 ______________________
Case: 21-2279    Document: 70     Page: 2    Filed: 10/12/2023

 2                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

     Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
                         Judges.
 PROST, Circuit Judge.
     In this bid protest action, the Department of State
 (“State” or the “agency”) appeals a decision by the Court of
 Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) holding that State’s deci-
 sion to cancel and resolicit a procurement contract lacked
 a rational basis. After making an award to Torres-SAS Se-
 curity LLC Joint Venture (“Torres”), State discovered that
 it had violated the Procurement Integrity Act (“PIA”) dur-
 ing its initial evaluation of proposals by sharing infor-
 mation from the proposal of SAGAM Securite Senegal
 (“SAGAM”) with competitor Torres. State therefore deter-
 mined cancellation and resolicitation was warranted.
 SAGAM protested that decision. The Claims Court
 granted SAGAM’s motion for judgment on the administra-
 tive record and entered a permanent injunction. SAGAM
 Securite Senegal v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 653 (2021)
 (“Decision”). Based on the unusual facts at hand, we af-
 firm.
                         BACKGROUND
                              I
     On April 19, 2019, State issued a solicitation seeking
 local guard services for the U.S. embassy in Dakar, Sene-
 gal. The solicitation anticipated one base year of perfor-
 mance with the possibility of four additional one-year
 option periods to be exercised at the sole discretion of the
 government. The solicitation provided that State would
 make an award to the responsible offeror with the “Lowest
 Price Technically Acceptable.” J.A. 495. As part of their
 proposals, the solicitation required offerors to explain
 whether their “proposed wages and benefits comply with
 host-country Government or other official wage and benefit
 levels, such as union agreements, and common practices
 that might not be mandated by local law.” J.A. 479–80.
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                3

 The agency would also evaluate whether the offeror’s pro-
 posed employee compensation plan “is reasonable and re-
 alistic for the work being performed.” J.A. 491.
      The agency received proposals from three offerors:
 SAGAM (the thirty-five-year incumbent provider of guard
 services for the U.S. embassy in Dakar); Torres; and a third
 offeror, SAKOM Services WI LLC (“SAKOM”). Decision,
 154 Fed. Cl. at 659. The agency deemed none of the pro-
 posals acceptable as submitted. Because the agency deter-
 mined that only SAGAM and Torres could improve their
 proposals through discussions, it eliminated SAKOM from
 competition and established a competitive range with both
 SAGAM and Torres. Id. On August 23, 2019, the agency
 initiated round one of discussions and sent letters to both
 SAGAM and Torres. SAGAM and Torres each submitted
 revised proposals as part of these discussions. With these
 revisions, the agency considered both SAGAM and Torres
 to have submitted acceptable proposals. Id.
     The procurement entered troubled waters during
 round two of discussions. On December 3, 2019, State sent
 discussion letters to both offerors asking each to elaborate
 on certain proposal aspects and to provide a best and final
 offer by December 13. Id. It is undisputed that the discus-
 sion letter sent by the contracting officer to Torres included
 information taken from charts and footnotes in SAGAM’s
 proposal, including proprietary information. Id. In re-
 sponse to the questions and information shared in the
 agency’s second round of discussions, both offerors submit-
 ted final, revised proposals. Id.
      In early March 2020, State awarded the contract to
 Torres as the lower priced, technically acceptable offeror.
 Id.; J.A. 2161. The award prompted a protest by SAGAM
 at the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) arguing
 that Torres proposed an “unreasonably low and unrealis-
 tic” price and employee compensation plan. J.A. 2165.
 State agreed to take corrective action (“initial corrective
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 4                              SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 action”) to resolve SAGAM’s allegations and planned to re-
 evaluate the offerors’ employee compensation plans, con-
 duct discussions (if necessary), evaluate final proposal re-
 visions, and make a new award decision. Decision, 154
 Fed. Cl. at 659.
     During the initial corrective action, the contracting of-
 ficer recognized the agency had potentially violated the
 PIA through its December 2019 discussion letters. The
 contracting officer issued a memorandum explaining that
 she “took information from SAGAM’s compensation plan to
 request additional clarifications regarding [Torres’s] com-
 pensation plan” during discussions, including sharing a
 “proprietary benefit.” J.A. 2194. She explained that “the
 record does not clearly demonstrate that Torres’ compen-
 sation plan was acceptable prior to Round 2” and that after
 Round 2 discussions, Torres revised its proposal to add “ref-
 erences to several of the mandatory benefits to its compen-
 sation plan for the first time.” J.A. 2194–95. The
 contracting officer recognized the risk that “the disclosure
 of SAGAM’s proposal information induced Torres to make
 material price proposal changes.” J.A. 2195. Therefore,
 she “concluded that there is an impact on the procure-
 ment.” J.A. 2195. As the Claims Court explained, “[a]t the
 conclusion of the [contracting officer’s] memorandum, a box
 was checked to indicate that the agency’s Head of Contract-
 ing Activity (‘HCA’) concurred with her assessment that a
 procurement integrity violation had an impact on the pro-
 curement, and further stated that ‘the contracting officer
 must cancel the solicitation.’” Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 659.
 The contracting officer concluded that because State “can-
 not mitigate the PIA violation, therefore, we will need to
 cancel and re-solicit the requirement.” J.A. 2219.
      On December 2, 2020, State announced to both offerors
 its intention to cancel the solicitation and issue a new so-
 licitation (“corrective action”). J.A. 3012–13 (“Notice of So-
 licitation Cancellation”). The notice advised:
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                 5

     [T]he above referenced solicitation is being can-
     celled following a determination by the Depart-
     ment of State HCA that the Department violated
     the Procurement Integrity Act and that the viola-
     tion impacted the procurement. The Department
     of State will be issuing a new solicitation in support
     of U.S. mission Senegal in the near future.
 Id. Both the letter to SAGAM and to Torres advised that
 “[y]our company is welcome to submit a response to that
 future solicitation.” Id.
                               II
     On March 30, 2021, SAGAM filed a pre-award protest
 at the Claims Court arguing that State’s decision to cancel
 and subsequently issue a new solicitation was arbitrary
 and capricious. 1 J.A. 3017–28. The parties filed cross-mo-
 tions for judgment on the administrative record. On June
 25, 2021, the Claims Court granted SAGAM’s cross-motion,
 denied the government’s cross-motion, and entered a per-
 manent injunction. Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 658.
      First, the Claims Court concluded that SAGAM’s chal-
 lenge to the corrective action was ripe. The court reasoned
 that “State’s issuance of a new solicitation is part and par-
 cel of its cancellation of the tainted solicitation,” so SAGAM
 did not have to wait until issuance of a new solicitation to
 lodge its protest. Id. at 662. Further, the court determined
 that State forfeited a ripeness argument because the gov-
 ernment argued “for the first time in its reply brief that
 SAGAM’s challenge to the issuance of a new solicitation is
 not ripe.” Id.
     Second, the court found the contracting officer’s disclo-
 sure of SAGAM’s proposal information violated the PIA.

     1  SAGAM first filed a protest at GAO, which was dis-
 missed as untimely filed. J.A. 2212.
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 6                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 Id. at 663 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 2101(2), 2102(a); Federal Ac-
 quisition Regulation (“FAR”) 3.104-3). The court reasoned
 that SAGAM’s proposal information “related to the exigen-
 cies of complying with local labor laws and labor agree-
 ments in Senegal and set forth SAGAM’s understanding of
 those local conditions,” which was “essential to SAGAM’s
 plan for the compensation and benefits that would be pro-
 vided to its guard force.” Id. The court held that the infor-
 mation disclosed to Torres was “[c]ost or pricing data”
 prohibited from disclosure under the PIA and additionally
 held that the disclosure violated fundamental fairness pro-
 visions of the FAR. Id. at 663–64 (citing FAR 1.102-2, FAR
 1.602-2, and FAR 3.101-1).
      Third, the court held that the agency’s cancellation and
 resolicitation decision lacked a rational basis because it
 “merely perpetuates the agency’s procurement error so
 that Torres can continue to benefit from the [contracting
 officer’s] unfairness to SAGAM and her violation of the
 PIA.” Id. at 664. Beyond the fact that the FAR permits
 cancellation, State had not shown “that the cancellation de-
 cision was reasonable,” nor that its decision considered the
 interests of SAGAM, the victim of the PIA violation. Id. at
 666.
     Fourth, because cancellation and resolicitation did “not
 reasonably address the [contracting officer’s] inequitable
 conduct,” the court concluded that disqualification of
 Torres from competition was the only appropriate remedy.
 Id. at 669. Although the court observed that “disqualifica-
 tion may seem like a severe sanction,” it reasoned that “at
 times it is the only remedy that can reasonably address a
 PIA violation.” Id. at 670.
     Finally, the court held SAGAM had established entitle-
 ment to injunctive relief. It held (1) SAGAM had succeeded
 on the merits, (2) SAGAM would suffer irreparable harm
 without injunctive relief, (3) the balance of hardships fa-
 vored SAGAM, including because “State is responsible for
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                7

 the hardships” State would face, and (4) it was in the public
 interest to grant injunctive relief to preserve the integrity
 of the procurement process. Id. at 671–673. In doing so,
 the court rejected the government’s request for a remand.
 Id. at 674. It entered an injunction that
     directs State to restore this competition to its sta-
     tus precancellation, enjoins State from cancelling
     Solicitation No. 19AQMM18R0332 and from reso-
     liciting the contract requirement, directs State to
     disqualify Torres as the beneficiary of improperly
     disclosed information taken from SAGAM’s pro-
     posal, and directs State to proceed to award the
     contract to the remaining offeror in the competitive
     range if that offeror is determined to be responsi-
     ble.
 Id. at 675 (capitalization normalized).
     The government appeals. 2 Though not a part of the
 record, answers to questions posed at oral argument reflect
 that following the Claims Court’s injunction, the agency
 awarded the contract to SAGAM; SAGAM performed the
 base year of the contract; the agency has exercised an op-
 tion year; and the contract terminates in 2027. 3

     2    Torres did not seek to intervene in the Claims
 Court proceedings until after the court had entered judg-
 ment and three weeks after the government filed a notice
 of appeal. The Claims Court denied Torres’s motion to in-
 tervene. SAGAM Securite Senegal v. United States, 156
 Fed. Cl. 124 (2021). We similarly denied Torres’s motion
 to intervene in this appellate proceeding because it had not
 intervened at the Claims Court. Order (Nov. 1, 2021), ECF
 No. 14.
      3   Oral     Arg.    at     1:50–2:00,    50:48–52:10,
 https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21
 -2279_08072023.mp3.
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 8                              SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

                         DISCUSSION
     We review the Claims Court’s assessment of the
 agency’s cancellation and resolicitation decision de novo,
 evaluating the agency’s action under the Administrative
 Procedure Act (“APA”) “arbitrary and capricious” standard.
 See WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United States, 953 F.3d
 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Under that standard, an
 agency action must be set aside if it is ‘arbitrary, capri-
 cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
 with law.’” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). We review
 the decision of the Claims Court to grant or deny injunctive
 relief for an abuse of discretion. PGBA, LLC v. United
 States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An abuse of
 discretion is established if the court “made a clear error of
 judgment in weighing the relevant factors or exercised its
 discretion based on an error of law or clearly erroneous fact
 finding.” Id. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(3).
      We first analyze whether the agency had a rational ba-
 sis for its cancellation and resolicitation decision. Conclud-
 ing that it was irrational, we next consider the appropriate
 remedy, including an injunction or a remand to the agency.
 We hold that given the unusual circumstances in this case,
 the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an
 injunction.
                               I
     We begin by reviewing the agency’s cancellation and
 resolicitation decision. “[C]orrective action only requires a
 rational basis for its implementation.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P.
 v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Under
 the “highly deferential” APA standard, the “rational basis
 test asks ‘whether the contracting agency provided a coher-
 ent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discre-
 tion.’” Id. at 992 (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v.
 United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We
 accordingly inquire whether the agency had a rational
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                9

 basis for its corrective action decision and whether it rea-
 sonably explained its exercise of discretion.
                               A
     At the outset, we affirm the Claims Court’s conclusion
 that the contracting officer’s disclosure of SAGAM’s pro-
 posal information to Torres violated the PIA.
     The PIA provides that “a present or former official of
 the Federal Government” “shall not knowingly disclose
 contractor bid or proposal information or source selection
 information before the award of a Federal agency procure-
 ment contract to which the information relates.” 41 U.S.C.
 § 2102(a). Contractor bid or proposal information refers to
 information “submitted to a Federal agency as part of, or
 in connection with, a bid or proposal to enter into a Federal
 agency procurement contract, if that information previ-
 ously has not been made available to the public or disclosed
 publicly,” and includes cost or pricing data and “[i]ndirect
 costs and direct labor rates.” Id. § 2101(2). “Cost or pricing
 data” means “all facts that . . . a prudent buyer or seller
 would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations signif-
 icantly.” Id. § 3501(a)(1).
     Here, the solicitation advised offerors that they would
 be required to compensate employees pursuant to local la-
 bor law and that “[t]he rates/prices in Section B shall in-
 clude the applicable costs necessary to comply with local
 labor laws.” J.A. 478 (Solicitation Section L.11.1.3). The
 agency’s evaluation would “consider whether the employee
 compensation plan proposed is reasonable and realistic for
 the work being performed,” and “[f]ailure of the compensa-
 tion plan to demonstrate that the fixed hourly rates contain
 proposed wages, salaries, and other benefits that are in
 compliance with local law, other union/labor agreements
 and decrees, or are below the salaries of the incumbent
 guard force may be sufficient cause for the Government to
 reject the proposal.” J.A. 491 (Solicitation Section M.2.1.5).
 Thus, the solicitation required offerors to not only know
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 10                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 local labor laws but also to apply that knowledge to demon-
 strate that their hourly rates and compensation plan were
 in compliance with local law. J.A. 478.
     Because the application of local law was an express as-
 pect of the agency’s evaluation, each offeror’s efforts to as-
 certain local law and structure its labor rates thereupon
 constituted sensitive proposal information related to that
 offeror’s strategy for pricing its proposal. As the Claims
 Court reasoned: “The information conveyed by the [con-
 tracting officer] to Torres was not simply a general refer-
 ence to publicly available laws and labor agreements—
 each of SAGAM’s citations to these laws and agreements
 was linked to specific aspects of contract performance and
 contract costs.” Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 663. The SAGAM
 proposal information shared with Torres is readily charac-
 terized as “cost or pricing data” within the meaning estab-
 lished by the PIA.          Therefore, disclosure of such
 information implicates the PIA.
     Our conclusion is consistent with the contracting of-
 ficer’s own investigation. She expressed a concern that
 “the disclosure of SAGAM’s proposal information induced
 Torres to make material price proposal changes that could
 have impacted the acceptability of its price proposal,” and
 she found “that there is an impact on the procurement.”
 J.A. 2195. State concluded that a PIA violation occurred.
 J.A. 2196, 3012–14. In light of the agency’s own finding,
 State’s litigation position—that the disclosure was not
 problematic because the information disclosed constitutes
 only public laws—is indeed puzzling. Reply Br. 19
 (“[N]early all of the information from SAGAM’s proposal
 that was disclosed to Torres was descriptions of Senegalese
 statutes and public labor agreements.”); Appellant’s Br.
 32–33 (arguing “SAGAM’s descriptions of public infor-
 mation in its August proposal were not the kind of infor-
 mation demanding extraordinary protection from
 disclosure,” reflecting no “clear prejudice to SAGAM”). On
 the contrary, as the Claims Court found, the information
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                              11

 disclosed was “lifted directly” from footnotes to a detailed
 chart in SAGAM’s proposal that used “citations to provi-
 sions of laws and labor agreements to explain specific cost
 categories in SAGAM’s proposal.” Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at
 663. The court noted that the agency never argued that
 these explanatory footnotes had ever been disclosed pub-
 licly. Id. at 663 n.6.
     State’s argument is also belied by State’s own admis-
 sion that the disclosure included SAGAM’s application of a
 labor agreement. Reply Br. 20 n.3. We credit the contract-
 ing officer and HCA’s contemporaneous findings over post-
 hoc litigation arguments. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
 Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020)
 (explaining that “[c]onsidering only contemporaneous ex-
 planations for agency action” instills confidence that later
 explanations are not mere convenient litigating positions).
      We agree with the Claims Court that the contracting
 officer’s disclosure of information taken from SAGAM’s
 proposal constitutes a PIA violation that impacted the pro-
 curement.
                              B
     We next consider State’s response to its PIA violation.
 Although the agency is not required to consider and explain
 every potential remedy, it must provide “a reasonable cor-
 rective action and adequately explain its reasoning for do-
 ing so.” Dell Fed., 906 F.3d at 998. We conclude that
 State’s decision to cancel and resolicit the contract (which
 included Torres as a prospective bidder) lacks a rational
 basis.
     As an initial matter, we agree with the Claims Court
 that cancellation and resolicitation must be considered to-
 gether, since “State’s issuance of a new solicitation is part
 and parcel of its cancellation of the tainted solicitation.”
 Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 662. The agency has not chal-
 lenged the Claims Court’s consideration of cancellation and
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 12                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 resolicitation as a single agency decision. We see no reason
 to consider the two actions separately; cancellation and
 resolicitation were two components of a single agency deci-
 sion announced in one breath. See J.A. 2219 (“[W]e will
 need to cancel and re-solicit the requirement.”). For that
 reason, although cancellation may have been a reasonable
 initial remedy to extinguish the tainted procurement, it
 cannot be divorced from the agency’s resolicitation.
     The problem with the agency’s resolicitation is that it
 does nothing to address the fact that Torres has errone-
 ously received information on how to improve its proposal
 that was taken directly from another offeror’s own efforts
 to understand and apply local laws—and, yet, the agency
 invited Torres to participate in a new solicitation. J.A.
 3013. As the Claims Court explained, “any reasonable cor-
 rective action was required to address, in some substantive
 way, the fact that Torres now possesses competition-sensi-
 tive information that it has no right to possess.” Decision,
 154 Fed. Cl. at 667. A mere redo of the procurement cannot
 erase the knowledge that Torres now has regarding how to
 comply with solicitation requirements, nor does it remedy
 SAGAM’s loss of its duly-earned competitive advantage.
     While a new solicitation could be an appropriate rem-
 edy with proper mitigation measures in place, the record is
 devoid of any evidence that the agency considered how to
 mitigate Torres’s knowledge and the harm to SAGAM in a
 new procurement, as discussed more fully in Section II.B,
 infra. On appeal, State focuses entirely on the fact that it
 cancelled the contract, arguing that the cancellation “ra-
 tionally resolved [the] defect in the 2019 procurement” be-
 cause that tainted procurement no longer exists.
 Appellant’s Br. 25. The agency expressly disavowed any
 concern for a future procurement: “State’s corrective action
 does not specifically address any defect in any future solic-
 itation for the same requirement. This is appropriate be-
 cause there is no future solicitation yet.” Appellant’s Br.
 26.
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                             13

     The agency’s position—that it need not address how a
 new solicitation could fairly proceed—fails to “adequately
 explain its reasoning” for its corrective action decision.
 Dell Fed., 906 F.3d at 998. Because the agency made a
 combined decision to cancel and resolicit the guard services
 contract, it was required to provide an explanation that ad-
 dressed not only cancellation, but resolicitation as well.
 And, the agency has not shown that resolicitation is rea-
 sonable. The record includes only the contracting officer’s
 memorandum identifying the PIA violation and an email
 from the contracting officer to the HCA stating the need to
 cancel and resolicit the effort. The record contains no con-
 temporaneous explanation of the corrective action by the
 contracting officer explaining why the agency considered
 resolicitation to be a suitable remedy or what mitigation
 measures would safeguard the parties’ interests in a new
 procurement. Providing no explanation at all discussing
 both the harm caused by the PIA violation and the agency’s
 solution to it fails to demonstrate a rational basis for the
 decision and in the end frustrates the court’s review. We
 therefore agree with the Claims Court’s conclusion that the
 agency has not provided “any substantive argument as to
 the reasonableness of the corrective action chosen.” Deci-
 sion, 154 Fed. Cl. at 665.
     In sum, we conclude that the agency’s decision lacked
 a rational basis and is unsupported by the administrative
 record. The agency’s corrective action is therefore arbi-
 trary and capricious under the APA.
                              II
     Second, we consider the practical next step: if the
 agency’s corrective action lacked a rational basis, what is
 the proper remedy?
     The agency argues that the Claims Court should have
 resolved the issue through either a remand to the agency
 or a narrow, flexible injunction: “If State failed to ade-
 quately justify why cancellation was an appropriate
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 14                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 remedy for the PIA violation, then the trial court should
 have remanded for further explanation or restored the sta-
 tus quo ante by setting aside the cancellation while permit-
 ting State to re-cancel for any rational reason.” Reply Br.
 4–5. It stresses the discretion afforded to agencies and ar-
 gues that the Claims Court erred by ruling that disqualify-
 ing Torres was the only rational corrective action.
 Appellant’s Br. 27. Further, it emphasizes that “courts
 have often recognized that it is possible to reasonably mit-
 igate the effect of [an earlier PIA violation]” and that
 “[t]here are obvious and plausible mitigation efforts that
 could be taken to reduce the impact of the disclosure of
 SAGAM’s proposal information upon any future procure-
 ment.” Id. at 23. The agency thus urges this court to find
 the Claims Court’s injunction constituted an abuse of dis-
 cretion by “improperly stepping into the shoes of the HCA
 and the contracting officer to disqualify Torres and to
 award a contract to SAGAM.” Id. at 24.
     SAGAM seeks affirmance of the Claims Court’s deci-
 sion and injunction because State “failed to take steps to
 properly address the impact of the [PIA] violation and re-
 store fairness to the procurement.” Appellee’s Br. 22. Ac-
 cording to SAGAM, the Claims Court correctly “concluded
 that the only effective solution that cures the PIA violation
 and does not penalize SAGAM for the [contracting officer’s]
 improper behavior was to return the procurement to the
 status quo precancellation and disqualify Torres” through
 an injunction. Id. at 23.
     Given the parties’ arguments, we analyze (A) the avail-
 able remedies the Claims Court may afford bid protest lit-
 igants—namely, as relevant here, injunctive relief versus
 a remand to the agency; and (B) the appropriateness of the
 court’s injunction here.
                              A
     The Claims Court has authority to issue an injunction
 in relation to a bid protest. It has jurisdiction over bid
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                15

 protests pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).
 “To afford relief in such an action, the courts may award
 any relief that the court considers proper, including declar-
 atory and injunctive relief except that any monetary relief
 shall be limited to bid preparation and proposal costs.” 28
 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (emphasis added).
     To be sure, injunctions are to be used sparingly. As the
 Supreme Court has cautioned, “[a]n injunction is a drastic
 and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as
 a matter of course,” and “[i]f a less drastic remedy” is suffi-
 cient to address the relevant injury, “no recourse to the ad-
 ditional and extraordinary relief of an injunction [is]
 warranted.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561
 U.S. 139, 165–66 (2010). To that end, “injunctive relief
 should be narrowly tailored to fit the specific legal viola-
 tions.” Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 800 F.2d
 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
       Nevertheless, when an injunction is appropriate, “the
 Court of Federal Claims has broad equitable powers to
 fashion an appropriate remedy.” Turner Constr. Co. v.
 United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2011); PGBA,
 389 F.3d at 1226 (“[T]he language of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2)
 . . . provides the Court of Federal Claims with discretion in
 fashioning relief.”). Under the APA standard, the court
 may, but is not obligated to, enjoin arbitrary and capricious
 action in relation to a bid protest. PGBA, 389 F.3d at
 1225–26 (“[S]ection 1491(b)(4) only incorporates the stand-
 ard of review of section 706(2)(A) and therefore does not
 deprive a court of its equitable discretion in deciding
 whether injunctive relief is appropriate.”).
     The Claims Court may also remand to the relevant
 agency to resolve matters. The Tucker Act provides: “In
 any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the
 power to remand appropriate matters to any administra-
 tive or executive body or official with such direction as it
 may deem proper and just.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). Prior
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 16                              SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 decisions of the Claims Court have considered this provi-
 sion applicable to bid protests. See, e.g., IAP Worldwide
 Servs., Inc. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 57, 81 (2022)
 (staying case and remanding to agency); Macaulay-Brown,
 Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 591, 607 (2016) (finding
 agency cancellation and resolicitation decision unreasona-
 ble, granting injunctive relief to set aside the proposed cor-
 rective action and maintain the status quo, and remanding
 to the agency).
     “A remand ‘is the proper remedy where the court
 doubts that the agency has properly exercised its discretion
 but recognizes that it is the agency which should exercise
 that discretion and not the court.’” IAP Worldwide Servs.,
 160 Fed. Cl. at 74 (quoting 3 Charles H. Koch & Richard
 Murphy, Administrative Law and Practice § 8:31 (3d ed.
 2010 & Supp. 2022)). As the Supreme Court noted in Flor-
 ida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion:
      If the record before the agency does not support the
      agency action, if the agency has not considered all
      relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply
      cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on
      the basis of the record before it, the proper course,
      except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the
      agency for additional investigation or explanation.
      The reviewing court is not generally empowered to
      conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being re-
      viewed and to reach its own conclusions based on
      such an inquiry.
 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). A remand may be particularly
 apt in instances where the contracting officer is the appro-
 priate authority to make a decision on a matter in the first
 instance. See, e.g., IAP Worldwide Servs., 160 Fed. Cl. at
 82 (“[R]emand is most useful when an agency retains some
 discretion with regard to the action it took in violation of
 the APA.” (internal citation omitted)).
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                                17

     In sum, the Claims Court has the authority to either
 issue an injunction or remand to the agency, and determin-
 ing the appropriate course may depend on the facts at
 hand.
                               B
     To resolve this case, the Claims Court chose an injunc-
 tion. The court’s injunction
     directs State to restore this competition to its sta-
     tus precancellation, enjoins State from cancelling
     Solicitation No. 19AQMM18R0332 and from reso-
     liciting the contract requirement, directs State to
     disqualify Torres as the beneficiary of improperly
     disclosed information taken from SAGAM’s pro-
     posal, and directs State to proceed to award the
     contract to the remaining offeror in the competitive
     range if that offeror is determined to be responsi-
     ble.
 Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 675 (capitalization normalized).
 We consider whether the court abused its discretion in is-
 suing its injunction. PGBA, 389 F.3d at 1223.
                               1
     We turn first to the disqualification of Torres. Alt-
 hough we ultimately conclude that the court’s injunction
 disqualifying Torres was not an abuse of discretion, we
 note that several points weighed in favor of a remand to
 the agency to consider in the first instance whether Torres
 should be disqualified. As discussed above, Florida Power
 and related cases contemplate a remand to the agency “for
 additional investigation or explanation” in instances where
 agency action is unexplained. 470 U.S. at 744. Addition-
 ally, the FAR vests disqualification decisions with the
 agency. FAR 3.104-7(d) (“If the HCA concludes that 41
 U.S.C. chapter 21 has been violated, the HCA may direct
 the contracting officer to . . . [d]isqualify an offeror.” (em-
 phasis added)); NKF Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.2d
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 18                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 372, 377 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that a contracting of-
 ficer may “cause the disqualification of a bidder”).
     Leaving the disqualification decision to the agency,
 which often has expertise on procurement matters and is
 closest to the facts, is in many cases apt because disquali-
 fication is a severe remedy—and perhaps more extreme
 here because this case involves disqualification of an inno-
 cent offeror. IGIT, Inc., B-271823, 96-2 CPD ¶ 51 (Comp.
 Gen. Aug. 1, 1996) (“Exclusion of an offeror is a more rea-
 sonable sanction if the offeror’s conduct in obtaining a com-
 petitive advantage was improper.”). 4             Thus, the
 government has some basis for its argument that ordinar-
 ily such an important decision should remain within the
 discretion of the contracting officer—and here, the record
 reflects that the agency did not want or plan to disqualify
 Torres. See J.A. 3013 (State invited Torres to participate
 in the new solicitation); J.A. 3043 (explaining in a declara-
 tion of the contracting officer before the Claims Court that
 she “concluded that excluding [Torres] from the competi-
 tion and making an award to SAGAM would unfairly pun-
 ish [Torres] for my mistake”).
     However, due to the unusual facts and litigation his-
 tory of this case, we cannot say that the court’s decision to
 order disqualification of Torres rather than remand to the
 agency constitutes an abuse of discretion.
     Crucially, State presented little to no evidence before
 the Claims Court suggesting that on remand it could re-
 solve or mitigate its PIA violation in a future procurement.
 Indeed, it suggested the opposite. The contracting officer
 admitted that she could not mitigate the PIA violation.

      4 Although GAO decisions are not controlling, we
 have recognized GAO’s expertise in government contract
 matters. Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 649 F.3d
 1320, 1331 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                               19

 J.A. 2219 (“We found that we cannot mitigate the PIA vio-
 lation.”). The agency did not contend in briefing its motion
 for judgment on the administrative record that it could mit-
 igate its PIA violation. SAGAM Securite Senegal v. United
 States, 156 Fed. Cl. 319, 326 (2021) (explaining that the
 government did not argue that it “might mitigate the [con-
 tracting officer’s] improper disclosure to Torres in a new
 procurement . . . either in its motion for judgment on the
 administrative record or in its reply brief”). In fact, before
 the Claims Court, State did not raise mitigation measures
 until after its merits briefing, during subsequent briefing
 on injunctive relief. Id. at 326 & n.4. 5 The court therefore
 determined that State’s mitigation argument was un-
 timely. Id. Because State did not show that it could miti-
 gate the harm from its PIA violation in a future
 procurement, it provided little assurance to the court that
 a remand would resolve the matter.
     Even if State had not forfeited its argument that it
 could mitigate the harm to SAGAM in a future procure-
 ment, the mitigation measures that State raised late in the
 Claims Court proceedings and again on appeal are ques-
 tionable at best, leaving the Claims Court to reasonably
 doubt whether State’s mitigation efforts would lead to a
 satisfactory conclusion. State “suggested to the trial court
 that the future solicitation might reasonably mitigate the
 harm of the PIA violation by either listing the Senegalese
 statutes and labor agreements in the new solicitation, or

     5    The Claims Court explained that its supplemental
 briefing order “specifically instructed that these briefs did
 not provide an opportunity for the parties to present addi-
 tional argument on the merits.” SAGAM Securite Senegal,
 156 Fed. Cl. at 326 n.4. The court noted that State did not
 argue on the merits that “a mitigation plan could poten-
 tially permit Torres to fairly compete against SAGAM in a
 new procurement.” Id. at 326.
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 20                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 by requiring all offerors to list applicable Senegalese stat-
 utes and labor agreements in their proposals.” Appellant’s
 Br. 30 (citing Court of Federal Claims Case No. 21-1138,
 ECF No. 36 at 5 n.2). While this could level the playing
 field in favor of other offerors, State’s solution ignores that
 SAGAM presented a stronger understanding of local labor
 laws in its proposal premised on its thirty-five years of ex-
 perience but lost that competitive advantage due to State’s
 mistake. Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 672 (recognizing
 SAGAM as the “long-term incumbent contractor” who lost
 the “opportunity to fairly compete”). State’s proposed mit-
 igation measures further ignore that the contracting officer
 disclosed more than public laws alone. The Claims Court
 found that the disclosed information constitutes SAGAM’s
 own cost and pricing data, concluding that “each of
 SAGAM’s citations to these laws and agreements was
 linked to specific aspects of contract performance and con-
 tract costs.” Id. at 663. The disclosed information “related
 to the exigencies of complying with local labor laws and la-
 bor agreements in Senegal and set forth SAGAM’s under-
 standing of those local conditions. This understanding was
 essential to SAGAM’s plan for the compensation and bene-
 fits that would be provided to its guard force.” Id.; see also
 Reply Br. 20 n.3 (acknowledging the disclosure included
 SAGAM’s application of a labor agreement). For these rea-
 sons, State’s solution does nothing to address the unique
 harm to SAGAM from the disclosure of its proposal infor-
 mation.
     State’s arguments fare no better on appeal and fail to
 persuade us that the Claims Court abused its discretion by
 issuing an injunction rather than remanding to the agency.
 We recognize that, in the normal course, the proper remedy
 under Florida Power and its progeny might have been to
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                              21

 remand to the agency. 6 Florida Power, 470 U.S. at 744.
 However, the Supreme Court recognized that a remand
 might not be the “proper course . . . in rare circumstances.”
 Id. The Claims Court acknowledged here that “this type of
 PIA violation appears to be rare.” Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at
 669 n.10. The court found that “the [contracting officer’s]
 actions, which were contrary to law, were highly unusual
 and egregious,” and noted that “protests involving actual
 procurement integrity violations are relatively rare, as are
 injunctions issued in the context of corrective actions fo-
 cused on such violations.” SAGAM Securite Senegal, 156
 Fed. Cl. at 327.
     Thus, considering the unique circumstances presented
 by the contracting officer’s PIA violation, the undisputed
 prejudice to SAGAM, State’s admission of its inability to
 mitigate the harm, State’s failure to suggest reasonable
 mitigation measures even on appeal, and State’s continued
 insistence that no PIA violation even occurred (contrary to
 both the HCA’s and contracting officer’s findings), State’s
 actions have created a situation that warrants an injunc-
 tion. There are few remaining remedies other than dis-
 qualification. While a remand to the agency to disqualify
 Torres in the first instance provides due recognition of the
 contracting officer’s discretion and may be preferable in
 most cases, the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion
 in concluding an injunction would efficiently resolve this

     6    Notably, State made no mention of Florida Power
 and its progeny—in other words, cases suggesting that we
 must vacate and remand to allow the agency to better ex-
 plain its corrective action—at the Claims Court, and did
 not do so on appeal until its reply brief and at oral argu-
 ment. Reply Br. 25; see also Citations of Supplemental Au-
 thority (Aug. 24, 2023) at 1, ECF No. 67 (conceding it “did
 not cite to Florida Power to support these [remand] conten-
 tions at the trial court”).
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 22                             SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US

 dispute. The Claims Court is empowered to do so. 28
 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2). And, the court is afforded discretion in
 crafting its injunctive relief. Turner Constr. Co., 645 F.3d
 at 1388. Accordingly, we conclude the Claims Court did not
 abuse its discretion in disqualifying Torres from competi-
 tion.
                               2
     Second, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s or-
 der to restore competition to its status pre-cancellation and
 make an award to the remaining competitive-range offeror.
      In Parcel 49C Ltd. Partnership v. United States, this
 court affirmed a decision of the Claims Court that enjoined
 cancellation of a solicitation by the General Services Ad-
 ministration (“GSA”) after GSA had already made award
 to Parcel 49C. 31 F.3d 1147, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Be-
 cause GSA’s cancellation decision lacked a rational basis,
 the court’s injunction “required GSA to proceed with award
 of the solicitation.” Id. at 1149. We recognized the limited
 “role the court should play in the procurement process—
 leaving the choice of contractor up to the Government”—
 but nevertheless determined the court had “properly uti-
 lized its power to grant injunctive relief in pre-award bid
 protests,” id. at 1153, finding the injunction “consistent
 with the Court of Federal Claims’ limited role,” id. at 1154.
 We noted that “[t]he injunction will remove the taint of il-
 legality from this procurement process without interfering
 with the Government’s discretion to select its own contrac-
 tors.” Id. And, in terms of requiring GSA to proceed with
 its award, we explained “the injunction does not direct the
 contract award to a particular bidder. This injunctive rem-
 edy merely restores the status quo ante the illegal cancel-
 lation.” Id.
     Like in Parcel 49C, the injunction here did not direct
 an award to SAGAM. Rather, the injunction specifically
 directed State “to restore this competition to its status pre-
 cancellation”; in other words, to the pre-cancellation status
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 SAGAM SECURITE SENEGAL v. US                               23

 where the agency had established a competitive range with
 Torres and SAGAM. Decision, 154 Fed. Cl. at 675. Because
 the court found it necessary to disqualify Torres, it directed
 “State to proceed to award the contract to the remaining
 offeror in the competitive range if that offeror is deter-
 mined to be responsible.” Id. In many ways, the court’s
 order is a product of the limited size of the competitive
 range. State has recognized that had there been additional
 offerors in the competitive range, its argument that the
 court directed award to SAGAM might shift. 7 We find no
 abuse of discretion in the Claims Court’s instruction to re-
 turn competition to its status pre-cancellation, notwith-
 standing that in this particular situation there was only
 one remaining eligible offeror. See Turner Constr. Co., 645
 F.3d at 1388 (“Injunctive relief is appropriate if it enjoins
 the illegal action and returns the contract award process to
 the status quo ante.” (cleaned up)); Parcel 49C, 31 F.3d at
 1154.
     The Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in issu-
 ing a permanent injunction disqualifying Torres and di-
 recting an award to a responsible remaining offeror in light
 of the unusual facts of this case and the court’s authority
 to award equitable relief.
                         CONCLUSION
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
 agency’s cancellation and resolicitation decision lacked a
 rational basis. The Claims Court did not abuse its discre-
 tion in issuing a permanent injunction to remedy the arbi-
 trary and capricious agency action. We affirm.
                         AFFIRMED

     7   Oral Arg. at 1:03:48–1:04:18.