Court Opinion

ID: 9554367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 19:01:28.939171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:52.344076
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12956    Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 08/08/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                 No. 22-12956
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JOEL G. AUDAIN,
        a.k.a. New Chief,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:97-cr-06007-RNS-16
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-12956

                            ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Defendant Joel Audain, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
        appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
        release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). We discern no error in the
        district court’s order, and thus affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND
               Defendant was indicted in 1998 on multiple counts involv-
        ing conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a)
        and 963, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in
        violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, conspiracy to commit
        money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and substan-
        tive money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957, 2. The
        indictment stemmed from a cocaine smuggling operation Defend-
        ant participated in while he was employed as an inspector with the
        Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) assigned to the Mi-
        ami International Airport. Using his position as an INS inspector,
        Defendant enabled smugglers to escape detection and searches as
        they entered the United States from Haiti aboard commercial air-
        craft. Over the course of approximately ten years, smugglers affil-
        iated with the operation brought thousands of kilograms of cocaine
        into the United States.
              A jury convicted Defendant of all four counts asserted
        against him, and he was sentenced to concurrent life sentences as
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        22-12956              Opinion of the Court                        3

        to each count to be followed by a five-year term of supervised re-
        lease. The sentence was based on the large quantity of drugs in-
        volved, which resulted in a base offense level of 38 for Defendant’s
        offense, and several enhancements based in part on Defendant’s
        abuse of his position as an INS inspector to commit the offense.
        This Court vacated the judgment against Defendant in part be-
        cause his life sentences on the money laundering counts exceeded
        the statutory maximum. See United States v. Audain, 254 F.3d 1286,
        1290 (11th Cir. 2001). On remand, the district court reduced De-
        fendant’s sentence for those counts to ten and twenty years respec-
        tively, to run concurrently with each other and with Defendant’s
        remaining two concurrent life sentences.
               The Sentencing Commission subsequently passed Amend-
        ment 782, a retroactively applicable amendment to the sentencing
        guidelines that “reduced the base offense level by two levels for
        most drug offenses.” Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
        (2018). Defendant filed a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant
        to Amendment 782, but the district court denied the motion. This
        Court vacated that ruling on appeal, holding that the district court
        abused its discretion by declining to reduce Defendant’s sentence
        based on his purported obstruction of justice after concluding at
        Defendant’s original sentencing that the obstruction of justice en-
        hancement did not apply. United States v. Audain, 743 F. App’x 318,
        321 (11th Cir. 2018). On remand, the district court reduced De-
        fendant’s two remaining life sentences to concurrent thirty-year
        sentences.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12956

               Defendant was furloughed and moved to home confine-
        ment in Miami in 2019. He currently remains on home confine-
        ment under certain conditions, including a monitoring device. Ac-
        cording to the BOP website, Defendant is located at “Miami RRM,”
        an entity responsible for overseeing prisoners under home confine-
        ment. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/in-
        mateloc/ (last visited August 2, 2023). Defendant is scheduled to
        be released on November 13, 2023. Id.
               In July 2022, Defendant filed the present motion for compas-
        sionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As amended
        by the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), that statute au-
        thorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the re-
        duction is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
        and if it is consistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable Guidelines policy statements.
        See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 1 Defendant asserted two grounds
        to establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence
        reduction in his case. First, he argued that his adult daughter’s can-
        cer independently satisfied the statutory criteria for compassionate
        release. Second, he relied on his “complete rehabilitation” in sup-
        port of his release.

        1 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also authorizes a sentence reduction under certain cir-

        cumstances if “the defendant is at least 70 years of age” but Defendant does
        not argue that he qualifies for an age-based sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C.
        § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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        22-12956                 Opinion of the Court                            5

                As to the first ground, Defendant stated that his 30-year-old
        daughter, who lives on her own in Georgia, had been diagnosed
        with breast cancer. According to Defendant, his daughter had no
        family living nearby to help her, although her mother and sister
        visited when they could. Defendant advised the court that his
        daughter had considered moving to Florida if Defendant could as-
        sist with her needs, including being accompanied to and taken care
        of during her chemotherapy treatments. 2 Defendant implied that
        he was not able to do that under the current conditions of his sen-
        tence, which required him to wear a monitoring device and pre-
        sumably limited his movements.
               Regarding the second ground, Defendant conceded that re-
        habilitation alone is not a ground for compassionate release. Nev-
        ertheless, he claimed his rehabilitation could be considered to-
        gether with his daughter’s illness to support his motion. According
        to Defendant, he proved he had been completely rehabilitated be-
        cause he had no reported incidents during his imprisonment or
        since being furloughed. In addition, Defendant noted that he had
        completed multiple certificates and been continuously employed
        since being furloughed. Finally, Defendant presented evidence of
        rehabilitation from family and community members, who advised
        the court that he had restored the family home almost entirely by
        himself and that he volunteered with Haiti Health and Restoration.

        2  Alternatively, Defendant stated he would request that his supervision be
        transferred to Georgia if best for his daughter’s treatment and well-being.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12956

               The district court denied Defendant’s motion in a paperless
        order. First, it held that Defendant failed to exhaust his administra-
        tive remedies as required to obtain relief under § 3582(c). The
        court acknowledged that Defendant had attached to his motion a
        copy of an email he purportedly sent to a general email address at
        info@bop.gov, but concluded the email was insufficient to estab-
        lish exhaustion because there was no correspondence to show that
        the BOP, the warden at Defendant’s prison, or Defendant’s super-
        vising official through his residential reentry program received his
        request for compassionate release. Second, the court concluded
        that Defendant failed to establish a statutorily recognized circum-
        stance warranting compassionate release. The court did not con-
        sider whether the § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of releasing
        Defendant or whether he would be a danger to the community if
        released.
               Defendant appeals the denial of his motion for compassion-
        ate release, arguing that the district court abused its discretion be-
        cause it did not consider the combination of circumstances—his
        adult daughter’s medical condition and his own rehabilitation—he
        presented in support of his motion. He argues further that the
        court erred when it concluded he failed to exhaust administrative
        remedies with respect to his motion. We assume without deciding
        that Defendant properly exhausted his administrative remedies.
        Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that Defendant failed
        to establish his eligibility for compassionate release under § 3582(c).
        Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Defendant’s § 3582(c)
        motion.
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        22-12956                Opinion of the Court                           7

                                    DISCUSSION
                We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for com-
        passionate release under § 3582(c). United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th
        1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). Once eligibility is established, we re-
        view the denial of a defendant’s motion for compassionate release
        under § 3582(c) for an abuse of discretion. See id. “A district court
        abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows
        improper procedures in making the determination, or makes find-
        ings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Harris, 989
        F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC,
        942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted)).
        The abuse of discretion standard allows the district court a “range
        of choice” that we will not reverse “just because we might have
        come to a different conclusion had it been our call to make.” See
        id. at 912 (quotation marks omitted).
                As amended by the First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes
        the district court to grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate
        release if the court finds that: (1) “extraordinary and compelling
        reasons warrant” such relief and (2) the defendant’s early release is
        consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) and the “appli-
        cable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18
        U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The relevant policy statement, found in
        USSG § 1B1.13, echoes the statutory requirements, stating that a
        district court may grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate
        release “if, after considering the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a),”
        the court determines that: (1) “[e]xtraordinary and compelling rea-
        sons warrant” the defendant’s release and (2) “[t]the defendant is
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12956

        not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community,
        as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” USSG § 1B1.13. See also United
        States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that
        “1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all [§ 3582(c)] mo-
        tions” and that district courts do not have discretion “to develop
        other reasons that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sen-
        tence” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th
        1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (listing three conditions for a sentence
        reduction under § 3582(c): support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraor-
        dinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to USSG § 1B1.13’s
        policy statement).
               The applicable Guidelines policy statement, cited above,
        identifies three extraordinary and compelling reasons that can au-
        thorize a court to grant a motion for compassionate release under
        § 3582(c). See USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)-(C)). First, a de-
        fendant’s medical condition can constitute an extraordinary and
        compelling reason for release if the defendant can show he is suf-
        fering either from a “terminal illness” or a “serious physical or med-
        ical condition” that “substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to pro-
        vide self-care” in prison and “from which he . . . is not expected to
        recover.” USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)). Second, release is
        permitted under certain circumstances if the defendant is at least
        65 years old. See USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(B)). And finally, a
        defendant’s family circumstances can create an extraordinary and
        compelling reason for release based on the “death or incapacitation
        of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child” or the “incapacita-
        tion of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the
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        22-12956               Opinion of the Court                        9

        defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or
        registered partner.” USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(C)). The pol-
        icy statement also contains a catch-all provision that allows the Bu-
        reau of Prisons (“BOP”) to determine there are other extraordinary
        and compelling reasons for a particular defendant’s release, but this
        Court has held that only the BOP—as opposed to the court—has
        the authority to determine release is warranted under that provi-
        sion. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1263 (“We cannot replace the phrase
        ‘[a]s determined by the Director of the [BOP]’ with ‘as determined
        by a district court.’”).
               The district court correctly determined that Defendant does
        not meet the standard for compassionate release set out in any of
        the above provisions. Defendant does not allege a qualifying med-
        ical condition or an age-related basis for his release. Defendant’s
        sole argument is, instead, that he qualifies for compassionate re-
        lease under the family circumstances provision because of his adult
        daughter’s cancer diagnosis. Based on the plain language of that
        provision, however, it only applies in a case involving the “death
        or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child.”
        USSG § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(C)) (emphasis added). It is thus un-
        available to Defendant here.
               Defendant argues the district court should have granted his
        motion under the “catch-all” provision of USSG § 1B1.13, com-
        ment. (n.1(D)) based on the special circumstances in his case—
        namely, his adult daughter’s illness and his demonstrated rehabili-
        tation. But as noted above, this Court has held that relief can only
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12956

        be granted under § 3582(c) based on one of the reasons expressly
        set out in the applicable Guidelines policy statement—that is, a
        qualifying medical condition, advanced age, or family circum-
        stances requiring the defendant to act as a caretaker to a minor
        child, spouse, or registered partner. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1265
        (“Because [the defendant’s] motion does not fall within any of the
        reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as extraordinary and compelling, the
        district court correctly denied his motion for a reduction of his sen-
        tence.” (quotation marks omitted)). Defendant’s “catch-all” argu-
        ment is thus unavailing.
                                  CONCLUSION
               As the movant, Defendant had the burden of establishing his
        entitlement to early release under § 3582(c). See United States v.
        Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court cor-
        rectly held that Defendant failed to meet that burden here. The
        court’s order denying Defendant’s § 3582(c) motion is thus
        AFFIRMED.