Court Opinion

ID: 9942554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:02:12.077133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:14.402320
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1400     Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          February 21, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1400
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00024-RBJ-1)
  DAVID VARGAS,                                                (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before ROSSMAN, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant David Houston Vargas was convicted after a jury trial of

 two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,

 1951(a); two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.

 § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person,

 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 2 R. 9. The district court sentenced Mr. Vargas to 318

 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. 1 R. 169–70. On appeal,

 Mr. Vargas claims the district court erred in applying physical-restraint

 enhancements to the robbery convictions, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Aplt. Br. at

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024      Page: 2

 13. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we

 affirm.

                                      Background

       Mr. Vargas and an accomplice entered a Foot Locker store and began

 removing merchandise from shelves. 2 R. 10. According to one of the store

 employees, when a co-worker tried to interfere, Mr. Vargas displayed a revolver,

 which was pointed downward. The employee heard a “click” which he believed to be

 the revolver’s chamber1 clicking into place. 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 504, 787. Mr. Vargas

 then told the employee, “You’re going to have to let us take everything[.]” Id. at

 787. In response, the employee asked, “What do you need me to do?” Id. at 797.

 Mr. Vargas, mistaking the employee’s scanner for a cellphone, stated, “Put down the

 phone.” Id. at 788–89, 797. The employee placed the scanner and a shoe on the

 ground, backed away, and raised his hands above his head. Id. at 789. His co-worker

 did the same. Aplee. Br. at 15 (citing Gov. Ex. 1B at 01:55). The employee further

 testified that a few moments later, Mr. Vargas “was just kind of telling me, you

 know, like, Don’t call the cops. Don’t do anything. . . . Go stand back there with

       1
         The store employee testified, “It just sounded like he opens the casing of the
 revolver and just swung it and then clicked it in.” 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 504.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341        Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 3

 your hands up[.]” 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 798. Mr. Vargas and his accomplice continued to

 grab merchandise before leaving the store. Id. at 790, 801.

       After the Foot Locker robbery, Mr. Vargas and his accomplice drove to

 Designer Shoe Warehouse (DSW). At the checkout counter, the cashier processed

 the sale of several pairs of shoes. Gov. Ex. 4C (DSW robbery video). Surveillance

 footage shows Mr. Vargas removing the large, silver revolver from his hip pack and

 placing it on the counter with the barrel facing the cashier. Id. at 03:16–03:18. The

 cashier heard “a big slam on the counter” and saw the gun from her peripheral vision.

 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 577. Mr. Vargas did not grab the pistol by its grip but placed his

 hand over the chamber, with his fingertips covering the trigger guard. Gov. Ex. 4C at

 03:18. The barrel remained fixed on the clerk for most of the robbery. When a shoe

 box fell behind the counter, Mr. Vargas made a gesture with the gun, telling the

 cashier to pick it up. Id. at 03:21–03:28; 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 578. After the cashier

 returned the fallen box to the counter, Mr. Vargas and his accomplice left with the

 stolen merchandise. 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 579.

       Later that night, police officers observed a car driven by Mr. Vargas cut across

 traffic and make an illegal turn. 2 Aplt. Supp. R. 656–57. Officers engaged in a

 high-speed chase, during which a passenger fired several shots at officers and the

 pursuing officer returned fire. Id. at 658–675, 697, 701. Eventually, the car crashed

 into another vehicle, and the suspects fled on foot, firing more shots at officers. Id.

 at 703–07. Mr. Vargas and his accomplice escaped that night, id. at 208–13, but Mr.

 Vargas was apprehended a few weeks later, id. at 70.

                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 4

       A jury convicted Mr. Vargas on all charged counts but one. In calculating Mr.

 Vargas’s offense level, the presentence report (PSR) applied two, two-level

 enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B): one for physically restraining Foot

 Locker employees and one for physically restraining the DSW cashier. 2 R. 14.

 Probation indicated that they “applied both enhancements for restricting movement.”

 3 Aplt. Supp. R. 25. The adjusted offense level for the Foot Locker robbery post-

 enhancement was 22, and the adjusted offense level for the DSW robbery and

 subsequent flight post-enhancement was 30. 2 R. 14–15. The Sentencing Guidelines

 require that the greater adjusted offense level applies — in this case, 30 for the DSW

 robbery — but they also require an adjustment for multiple counts depending on the

 number of units assigned to each count. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Here, the PSR

 assigned one unit to the DSW robbery and flight and one-half unit for the Foot

 Locker robbery. 2 R. 15. The combined 1.5 units resulted in a one-point increase to

 the adjusted offense level from 30 to 31. Id. at 16.

       Combined with a criminal history category of VI, 2 R. 25, the guideline range

 for the robberies was 188 to 235 months, id. at 29. Mr. Vargas objected to the

 application of the physical-restraint enhancements on the grounds “that he only

 displayed [or showed] the firearm to store employees[.]” 1 R. 148; 3 Aplt. Supp. R.

 22–23. The district court found that physical restraint was clearer in the DSW

 robbery but nonetheless overruled the objection. 3 Aplt. Supp. R. 27–28. The

 district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation but varied downward to 150 months

                                            4
Appellate Case: 22-1400     Document: 010111003341         Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 5

 for the robberies and imposed additional sentences for the remaining convictions

 resulting in a total sentence of 318 months. Id. at 58.

                                        Discussion

        In reviewing the district court’s application of an enhancement under the

 guidelines, we review its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Walker, 74

 F.4th 1163, 1195 (10th Cir. 2023). We review de novo the district court’s

 interpretation of the guidelines and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

 enhancement. Id. Here, Mr. Vargas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

 supporting the enhancement and the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines.

 He argues that he merely brandished a weapon during the robberies, which is

 insufficient to support application of the enhancement. Aplt. Br. at 13. The

 government, acknowledging that the enhancement requires something more than

 merely displaying or brandishing the gun, responds that Mr. Vargas’s actions were

 sufficient to apply the enhancement. Aplee. Br. at 12–13. Although Mr. Vargas

 argues that the government equates brandishing and placing the victims in fear with

 physical restraint, that is a mischaracterization.

        U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) requires a two-point enhancement to the

 defendant’s offense level “if any person was physically restrained to facilitate

 commission of the offense[.]” The guidelines commentary defines “[p]hysically

 restrained” as “the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or

 locked up.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). However, we have concluded that the

                                             5
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024     Page: 6

 enhancement applies “when the defendant uses force, including force by gun point, to

 impede others from interfering with commission of the offense.” United States v.

 Pearson, 211 F.3d 524, 525–26 (10th Cir. 2000). “Physical restraint is not limited to

 physical touching of the victim.” United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th

 Cir. 1997).2 Rather, “the defendant’s conduct must hold the victim back from some

 action, procedure, or course, prevent the victim from doing something, or otherwise

 keep the victim within bounds or under control.” United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d

 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1999).

       Of course, mere brandishing, display, or possession of a gun, however, does

 not “automatically create a situation where physical restraint of an individual

 occurs.” Pearson, 211 F.3d at 526. “Instead, something more must be done with the

 gun” to apply the enhancement. Id. at 526–27. We found something more in United

 States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2008). There, two men entered a bank, one

 instructed the occupants to “put their hands up” and “don’t move” and pointed a gun

 around the room while the other demanded cash. Id. at 1233. We affirmed the

 district court’s application of the physical-restraint enhancement, providing three

 reasons in support: “[A] firearm was pointed about the bank, presumably taking in all

 those present within its ambit; individuals were commanded not to move; and the

       2
         At oral argument, Mr. Vargas urged us “to return to the physicality that the
 guidelines offer as examples, in terms of being bound up, in terms of being tied, in
 terms of being physically restrained.” Oral Argument at 06:56–07:07. But we
 already rejected that approach in Fisher and reiterated that physical touching is
 unnecessary in United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
                                            6
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024    Page: 7

 bank’s customer exit was effectively blocked.” Id. at 1236. Consistent with prior

 cases, we reiterated that “[k]eeping someone from doing something is inherent within

 the concept of restraint.” Id. at 1235–36 (quoting Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1330) (ellipses

 and emphasis omitted).

       1. Foot Locker robbery

       There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to warrant application of the

 enhancement to the Foot Locker robbery. Mr. Vargas did something more than

 brandish the weapon: Mr. Vargas (1) clicked the revolver’s chamber into place, while

 simultaneously telling Foot Locker employees, (2) “You’re going to have to let us

 take everything” and, later, (3) “Put down the phone.” “Don’t call the cops. Don’t

 do anything.” And, “Go stand back there with your hands up[.]” These directives

 had the same effect as the defendants’ actions in Miera — they kept employees from

 doing something, that is, interfering with the commission of the robbery. Foot

 Locker employees likely and reasonably concluded that failure to comply would

 result in grave consequences. This much is clear from security camera footage

 showing the employees frozen with their hands in the air.

       That Mr. Vargas never pointed the gun at an employee does not change our

 conclusion. We have never held that individual targeting is necessary for application

 of the enhancement. Miera, 539 F.3d at 1235. In Miera, for instance, we concluded

 that the act of pointing the gun around the room likely “had the effect of physically

 restraining everyone in [the gunman’s] presence[,]” even assuming the gunman

 “somehow avoided targeting any particular individual with the firearm[.]” Id. By

                                            7
Appellate Case: 22-1400     Document: 010111003341       Date Filed: 02/21/2024    Page: 8

 brandishing the gun, clicking the chamber into place, and issuing demands that

 restricted the employees’ movement and actions, Mr. Vargas’s conduct was sufficient

 to trigger the enhancement.

       2. DSW robbery

       We likewise find Mr. Vargas’s behavior in DSW sufficient to warrant

 application of the enhancement. In Pearson, we held “the conduct of holding and

 pointing a gun directly on someone to physically restrain them [was] even more

 egregious than the ‘otherwise use,’ brandishing, displaying or possessing a gun

 during the course of the robbery.” 211 F.3d at 527. Here, Mr. Vargas placed a large

 revolver on the counter, pointed the barrel at the cashier, ordered her to pick up a

 fallen shoe box, and she complied. For most of the robbery, the weapon’s barrel

 remained fixed on the cashier. Consistent with our holding in Pearson, there is no

 question that Mr. Vargas did something more than merely brandish the revolver. As

 a result, he physically restrained the cashier.

       In an effort to persuade us otherwise, Mr. Vargas argues that he “could not

 have fired the gun” because he was “grabbing the gun around the casing[.]” Aplt. Br.

 at 28. We are not persuaded. Mr. Vargas could have fired the revolver in a split-

                                             8
Appellate Case: 22-1400    Document: 010111003341         Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 9

 second by simply shifting his grip and pulling the trigger. The district court did not

 err in applying the enhancement.

       AFFIRMED.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                             Circuit Judge

                                            9