Court Opinion

ID: 8933339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 07:17:24.81188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:33.868422
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge.
Maintenance by the City of Norfolk, Virginia, of an at-large election procedure covering members of the City Council has led to a suit by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black Norfolk voters contending that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 1 had been violated. The suit also claimed infringement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through adoption in 1918 of the at-large election as a means to promote racially discriminatory objectives.
The relief sought was replacement with a plan establishing seven single member districts, each with one representative in the City Council, together with a declaration of the illegality of and an injunction prohibiting the at-large system due to an unlawful dilution of black voting strength.
A bench trial lasting ten days and producing over 2100 pages of transcript and more than 590 exhibits resulted in a judgment in favor of the City of Norfolk and its officials joined as defendants, 605 F.Supp. 377. The issues raised, though sporting various guises, were essentially factual and, in the end, amounted to the assertion that the district judge, in his findings, was clearly erroneous. Manifestly, a heavy burden has been assumed on appeal by the parties who were unsuccessful in the district court. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, North Carolina, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).2 Accordingly, we must examine the factual record “in light of the appropriately deferential standard” afforded the district court’s findings. Id. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 1514.
Historically, in 1918, provision was made for a five-member City Council, each to be elected at-large. Each was to have a term of four years, with terms to be staggered, presumably to minimize the possible ill-effects of a 100% turnover, all at the same time. Between 1949 and 1952, the number of councilmen rose to seven. In 1968 a nine-member Advisory Study Commission, one of whose members was black, was created by the City Council to study and evaluate the 1918 Charter. Its report and recommendations appeared in 1971. It unanimously recommended retention of staggered terms and at-large elections, agreeing that “councilmen should be elected by and be responsive to the entire community rather than a portion of it.” The Commission also expressed a wish to avoid parochialism, which is another way of saying the same thing.
Since 1968, one member of the City Council has been black, Joseph A. Jordan, Jr. from 1968 to 1977, and Joseph Green *574from 1977 to the present. Jordan was vice mayor during his terms beginning in 1972 and 1976. Green has been vice mayor since 1982. In 1984, John Foster, another black, was elected to the City Council.3
Plurality voting governs in Norfolk. Single-shot voting is not prohibited, ie., casting votes for a full slate is not required.4 The Norfolk rules impose no numbered place or residency requirements.5 Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the black voter registration rate and turnout rate, based on a percentage of the black voting age population, have increased to the point that today they exceed those of Norfolk’s white population. White registration is 51.2% of the white voting age population as against 52.9% for the black voting age population. Those figures developed by regression analysis are comparable to 53.1% white and 55.3% black on the homogeneous precinct analysis. Black voter turnout exceeded *575white voter turnout in the 1984 election. The black turnout rate was 11% higher.6
Norfolk’s efforts to increase voter registration have been exemplary. In the 1984 election, six staff positions were equally divided, three and three in the main registration office. Of the 371 election officers, 102 were black.
The Concerned Citizens of Norfolk, a black political organization, endorses both black and white candidates and wields considerable clout. From 1972 through 1984, it had endorsed twenty-one candidates for the City Council. Thirteen (62%) have been elected, of whom five were black and eight white.
The municipal work force was 36.16% black in 1973, 41.31% black in 1983. Representation on major boards and commissions appointed by the City Council has been reasonably good. The parties stipulated that programs and services of the fire department, the library department and the Department of Human Resources did not discriminate against blacks and have been responsive to their needs.
There are other statistics which generally show improvement in the status and circumstances of blacks in Norfolk. The median income disparity ($17,548 for whites, $10,250 for blacks), an endemic problem for the entire United States, has not been demonstrated to be related in any way to the procedures for election to the Norfolk City Council.
In amending in 1982 the Voting Rights Act, Congress called for consideration, in probing the totality of the circumstances, of the following factors:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction;
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 177, 206-207. Those factors, while generally the most probative, are not exclusive. Congress, through the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, has made clear that at-large elections need not be eliminated. Id. p. 211. The test established by the 1982 amendments merely codified pre-existing law. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc), aff'd sub *576nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976).
Looking at the facts, as established by the record as a whole, and measuring the question presented by “the totality of the circumstances,” we simply are not left with a firm conviction that an error has been committed by the district judge. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Perhaps, in such detailed and lengthy findings as the district judge made here it is inevitable that a phrase sprinkled here or there might occasion regret,7 but the question is not whether we could have done better — a matter necessarily of some uncertainty — but whether the district judge to whom the resolution of factual disputes is finally allocated was clearly erroneous. We cannot say that he was. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in Section 1973b(f)(2) as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represent-
atives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
(Emphasis added).

. If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous....
. — U.S. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

. A point pressed by the appellants was the asserted existence of a conspiracy to orchestrate Foster’s election through the decision, after the institution of this suit, of a white candidate to abandon efforts to obtain reelection. Such interference with the election process would no doubt have been of immense significance to the ultimate outcome of the case, if proven. However, it was obliterated by the district judge’s findings, which were not clearly erroneous, that the white candidate's withdrawal was for personal reasons and that his support for election of a second black antedated the filing of the suit. The district judge went on to find that "[t]here is no evidence that the election of Rev. Foster was orchestrated by white city officials, or community leaders in an attempt to moot this action.”
The dissent contends that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that city officials did not attempt to moot the instant lawsuit. To support its contention, the dissent highlights a newspaper article in which the Mayor of Norfolk was quoted as saying, "After the election, the issue of black representation may become a moot point.” Whether that published statement which, on its face, amounts to no more than the expression of an opinion by no means necessarily inaccurate, constituted a subtle and improper racial appeal pivoted largely on the credibility of the Mayor’s defense of that statement as well as a close factual examination of the general political mood in Norfolk at the time of the City Council election. Thus, we in the panel majority are hardpressed to upset the district judge’s conclusion that Foster’s election was not promoted for an improper purpose. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, supra, at -, 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

. Although staggered terms can have the effect of frustrating single-shot voting, the district court found that the City of Norfolk adduced sufficient evidence at trial to prove that the staggered terms of the City Council members did not promote "head to head contests between [Blacks] and whites and [did not] deprive [Blacks] of the opportunity to elect a candidate by single-shot voting.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 185, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1566, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980). The district court noted that, if staggered terms were to have a discriminatory effect upon Norfolk’s City Council elections, it would be likely that the elections for the fewest number of seats would not yield any black candidates. Yet the evidence demonstrated that in those elections in which the fewest number of seats — i.e., three — were open for election, a black had always been victorious. In light of such evidence, the district court’s findings with respect to staggered terms cannot be deemed clearly erroneous.

. There is disagreement over whether residency requirements minimize the voting strength of racial minorities. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) (Without residency requirement all residents could reside in "'lily-white’ neighborhoods”). Compare Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 212 (8th Cir.1982), aff’d, 459 U.S. 801, 103 S.Ct. 33, 74 L.Ed.2d 47 (1982) (Ward residency requirement, inter alia, effectively prohibited single-shot voting and “enhance[d] the possibility that [City’s] election scheme [was] being maintained for a discriminatory purpose”). The lesson to be derived is that any particular aspect of the voting process need not be absolutely good or bad. Rather the application in the particular case should control, and we should eschew generalities. Determining whether residency requirements, or the lack thereof, hinder the position of racial minorities within the electoral process requires a careful factual and statistical analysis of the specific political community under scrutiny.
In the instant case, the district court, after considering all of the evidence, concluded that the lack of a ward residency requirement did not enhance the opportunity for discrimination in elections for Norfolk City Council members. That conclusion was amply supported by the record. For example, the record demonstrated that the lack of a residency requirement did not water down the ability of black voters successfully to utilize single-shot voting nor did it result in "lily-white” representation.

. Those statistics came from studies introduced in evidence by the appellants. They did not cover the predominantly white residents of naval bases and ships. Had they been included, the statistics would have been even more striking as to black predominance.

. For example, the dissent contends that the district court, evidenced by his remarks throughout trial, "equated ‘proportional political representation’ with the institution of a ward system in which some wards will have a majority of black voters.” However, the district judge’s remarks must be read in the context of a rather long and difficult trial in which he was attempting to comply with the proviso in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”). Thus, the district court, in contrast to the dissent’s assertion, did not conclude, as a matter of law, that ward systems would be violations of that proviso but rather merely attempted to grapple with the interplay between the appellants’ desired relief and a statutory prohibition.