Court Opinion

ID: 9893505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 15:00:41.384769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:22.017755
License: Public Domain

21-6542
   Castillo Maradiaga v. Garland
                                                                                 BIA
                                                                         A095 487 963

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
   Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of October, two thousand
   twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
              JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
              MYRNA PÉREZ,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   JAVIER CASTILLO MARADIAGA,
                 Petitioner,

                    v.                                         21-6542
                                                               NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                    Respondent.
   _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                    Rebecca R. Press, Esq., UnLocal, New York,
                                   NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                   Attorney General; Dawen S. Conrad, Senior
                                   Litigation Counsel; Rachel P. Berman-Vaporis,
                                   Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                   Litigation, United States Department of
                                   Justice, Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Javier Arnoldo Castillo Maradiaga, a native and citizen of

Honduras, seeks review of a September 29, 2021 decision of the BIA denying his

January 28, 2021 motion to reopen. In re Javier Arnoldo Castillo-Maradiaga, No. A

095 487 963 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2021). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

      Our review is limited to the BIA’s September 29, 2021 decision denying

Castillo Maradiaga’s January 28, 2021 motion to reopen. See Nwogu v. Gonzales,

491 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion

to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Singh v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir.

2008). “An abuse of discretion may be found . . . where the Board’s decision

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provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies,

is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements;

that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”

Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

We review the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under

the substantial evidence standard, “which requires that they be supported by

‘reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record when considered as

a whole.’” Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iouri v. Ashcroft,

487 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2007)).     We review claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel de novo. See Esposito v. INS, 987 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

(“A reviewing court uses its own judgment as to whether counsel was

effective . . . .”).

        A noncitizen may file one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), and

“[t]he motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to

be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material,” id. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (2). A

motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of a final order of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Castillo Maradiaga

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does not dispute that, unless an exception applies, his motion is time- and number-

barred.     The BIA did not err in concluding that Castillo Maradiaga was not

entitled to equitable tolling due to ineffective assistance of counsel and the BIA did

not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to establish material, changed

country conditions since his final order of removal. Accordingly, no exception

applied to the time and number bars on Castillo Maradiaga’s January 28, 2021

motion to reopen.

       I.     Changed Country Conditions

       The time limit on motions to reopen does not apply if the movant applies

for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of

nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is

material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented

at the previous proceeding.”        8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   A movant also must demonstrate “prima facie eligibility for

asylum, which means []he must show a realistic chance that []he will be able to

obtain such relief.” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports

the BIA’s decision that Castillo Maradiaga did not establish a material change in

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country conditions that would allow him a realistic possibility of relief.

       Castillo Maradiaga argued that conditions had worsened in Honduras since

his removal order became final in 2003 and that he would be persecuted as an

outsider and a proponent of migrant rights.             While Castillo Maradiaga does

present some evidence that conditions in Honduras have changed, substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Castillo Maradiaga did not show that any

potential changes were material because his evidence does not bear on his specific

claim of persecution as an “outsider or migrant rights advocate.” See Tanusantoso

v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2020) (country conditions evidence must

“materially bear on [petitioner’s] claim” (citation omitted)).           The reports that

Mr. Castillo    Maradiaga      submitted     from    the   Carnegie     Endowment        for

International Peace and Human Rights Watch do not speak of “outsiders.” The

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights press release and Human Rights

Watch report that he submitted discuss risks for human rights defenders, but focus

on defenders of indigenous, land, and LGBTQ rights, not migrant rights, and on

individuals who fought for such rights in Honduras, not the United States. 1

1Castillo Maradiaga asserts that the BIA “committed an error of law by presuming that a
worsening of conditions cannot support a finding of changed conditions.” Pet. Br. at 29. Such

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          Castillo Maradiaga also did not establish that anyone would identify him as

a human rights advocate, and, consequently, he did not establish eligibility for

relief. News articles describe his arrival in the United States as a child, his long

detention, and rallies led by his sister to secure his release from detention, but do

not identify him as a human rights advocate, and he conceded in a written

statement that it was speculative that he would be considered one. Further, as

the BIA found, his fear of gangs was a generalized fear of crime and did not

constitute a basis for asylum or withholding of removal on a protected ground.

See Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2022) (requiring more than

general criminal incentives to show a nexus between gang violence and a

protected ground).          Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

conclusion that Castillo Maradiaga did not establish a change in conditions

material to the bases for his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

relief.

a presumption would have been error. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“When an applicant moves to reopen his case based on worsened country conditions, and
introduces previously unavailable reports that materially support his original application, the BIA
has a duty to consider these reports and issue a reasoned decision based thereon, whether or not
these reports are clearly determinative.”). However, the BIA did not make that presumption,
instead finding that Castillo Maradiaga’s proffered worsening of conditions was not material.
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      II.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      Ineffective assistance of counsel can relieve a petitioner from the time and

number bars on a motion to reopen if (1) the petitioner’s “counsel’s performance

was so ineffective that it impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing,”

Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (alterations adopted) (quoting

Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1994)), and (2) the petitioner exercised due

diligence in pursuing his claim, id. at 131. To meet the first prong, the noncitizen

“must allege facts sufficient to show 1) that competent counsel would have acted

otherwise, and 2) that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.” Rabiu,

41 F.3d at 882 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And under the

second prong, the noncitizen “’will not be entitled to equitable tolling unless he

can affirmatively demonstrate that he exercised reasonable due diligence’ in

pursuing his claim.” Rashid, 533 F.3d at 131 (quoting Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167,

171 (2d Cir. 2006)).

      Castillo Maradiaga challenges only the BIA’s conclusion under the first

prong, but not the second, which is independently dispositive of his argument for

equitable tolling due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 131 (“‘[B]oth

prongs . . . must be met. Thus, no matter how egregiously ineffective counsel’s

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assistance may have been, [the noncitizen must] affirmatively demonstrate that he

exercised reasonable due diligence’ in pursuing his claim.” (first alteration in

original) (quoting Cekic, 435 F.3d at 170)). Thus, Castillo Maradiaga failed to

establish—before us or the BIA—that he “pass[ed] with reasonable diligence

through the period [he] seeks to have tolled.” See Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 134

(2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED, and all stays are VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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