Court Opinion

ID: 9583137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:10.031403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:21.535695
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Today the court holds that in a denied workers’ compensation claim for respiratory injury to which the Guides’1 1984 version applies, the medical expert’s evaluation upon which a “zero impairment” rating is based need not include the “carbon monoxide diffusing capacity” test (or Dco). While I embrace today’s pronouncement as a correct interpretation of the applicable Guides’ requirements,2 I concur in sustaining the claim’s denial for the reasons expressed in Part I of my dissenting opinion in Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Market*593ing.3 For the reasons to be stated I am unable to join in the dissent which suggests that we invalidate legislation requiring physicians’ use of the AMA Guides.
I
In Gaines, as in this case, the claimant relied solely on the contention that the zero impairment rating given by the employer’s doctor stems from an unexplained, and hence impermissible, deviation from the Guides. In neither case did the claimant question the trial judge’s finding that no job-related injury had occurred. “This alone makes a discussion of a claimed deviation from the Guides purely academic and dehors the scope of issues tendered for review.”4 Indeed, “an assessment of permanent disability presupposes the existence of some on-the-job injury.”5
II
While I stand by my views in Branstetter,6 where I expressed doubt about the constitutionality of the legislature’s open-ended delegation to a private entity — the American Medical Association — of its standards-setting responsibility for evaluation of compensable physical impairment, I cannot today join the dissent calling for invalidation of the AMA Guides. A sua sponte review of a constitutional question which was neither advanced by the briefs nor preserved in the record goes beyond the limits of the Reynolds v. Special Indemnity Fund7 exception. Reynolds teaches that if in a public-law controversy the aggrieved party’s brief advances the wrong reason for reversal, the reviewing court is free to grant corrective relief from the urged error on an applicable theory chosen sua sponte — i.e., a theory that supports the assigned error but was neither advanced below nor on appeal and is dis-positive of the issue raised by the aggrieved party. Reynolds is inapposite here. The reversible error of a constitutional dimension isolated by the dissent sua sponte was neither (a) assigned and argued by the aggrieved party, either here or below, nor does it (b) rest on a predicate clearly laid by the trial tribunal’s record.8 Our Reynolds freedom to choose sua sponte the disposi-tive public-law theory when a wrong one is advanced does not extend to identifying a constitutional flaw9 not urged by the aggrieved party either here or below, nor to supplying a deficiency for the trial tribunal’s record.10 Unlike jurisdictional infirmities, into whose presence we must examine even when they are not urged upon us by the parties,11 constitutional flaws may not be corrected in the appellate process sua sponte. The prudential rule of necessity, adhered to by all state and feder*594al courts, commands that constitutional issues not be resolved in advance of strict necessity.12
SUMMARY
In sum, though I stand by my views in Branstetter,13 I concur in today’s decision to sustain the order denying this claim “[b]ecause the employer’s medical evidence supports the trial tribunal’s finding that the claimant’s injuries do not result from harm incurred in and about the working environment.”14

. The term “Guides” refers to the American Medical Association’s "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment," whose second edition (or 1984 version) applies to this claim.

. "The single breath Dco should be performed when a patient has respiratory complaints that are of greater severity than the observed spiro-metry results would indicate.” AMA Guides (2d ed. 1984) at 97. The employer's medical report appears to contain no indication that this test was necessary. The physician had determined that the claimant’s spirometry test results are consistent with the absence of complaints regarding shortness of breath with normal activities. This determination lies "within an area of medical expertise... not generally subject to second guessing by a court.” Orrell v. B.F. Goodrich, Okl., 787 P.2d 848, 854 (1990).

. Okl., 790 P.2d 1073, 1082-1083 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).

. Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing, supra note 3 at 1083 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).

. Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing, supra note 3 at 1083 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).

. Branstetter v. TRW/Reda Pump, Okl., 809 P.2d 1305, 1308 (1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring in result).

. Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 199 Okl. 570, 188 P.2d 841, 842 (1948). See Reynolds v. Special Indem. Fund, Okl., 725 P.2d 1265, 1270 (1986), for application of the Reynolds public-law issue exception.

. Lewis Drilling Company v. Brooks, Okl., 451 P.2d 956, 960 (1969); Bostick Tank Truck Service v. Nix, Okl., 764 P.2d 1344, 1349 (1988); see Johnston Food Co. v. Monday, Okl.App., 702 P.2d 62, 64 (1985); Edwards v. AMOCO, Okl.App., 776 P.2d 566, 569 (1989).

. Extant case authority permitting review in a public-law controversy of a constitutional issue which was not dealt with below lends no support to the dissenting view. The constitutional flaw reached in those cases, though not urged in the trial tribunal, was clearly assigned as error before the appellate court. See e.g. Simons v. Brashears Transfer and Storage, Okl., 344 P.2d 1107, 1113 (1959); First Nat'l Bank v. Southland Prod Co., 189 Okl. 9, 112 P.2d 1087 (1941), citing Magnolia Pet. Co. v. State, 175 Okl. 11, 52 P.2d 81 (1935), Shaffer Oil & Refining Co. v. County Treasurer, 175 Okl. 6, 52 P.2d 76 (1935).

. See Muncrief v. Memorial Hosp. of So. Okl., Okl., 767 P.2d 400, 402 (1988); Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, Okl., 720 P.2d 721, 723-724 (1986).

. This court must inquire sua sponte into its jurisdiction. Cate v. Archon Oil Co., Inc., Okl., 695 P.2d 1352, 1356 (1985); Pointer v. Hill, Okl., 536 P.2d 358, 361 (1975).

. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2776, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); In Re Initiative Petition No. 347 State Question No. 639, Okl., 813 P.2d 1019, 1037 (1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring); Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Okl., 732 P.2d 466, 467 n. 3 (1987); Schwartz v. Diehl, Okl., 568 P.2d 280, 283 (1977); Dablemont v. State, Department of Public Safety, Okl., 543 P.2d 563, 564-565 (1975); see also In re Initiative Petition No. 348, Okl., 820 P.2d 772, 781, 782 n. 4 (1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring in result); Johnson v. Walters, Okl., 819 P.2d 694, 708, 712 n. 26 (1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Lobaugh, Okl., 781 P.2d 806, 813 (1988) (Opala, J., dissenting); In Re Initiative Petition No. 341, Okl., 796 P.2d 267, 275 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in result).

. Supra note 6.

. Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing, supra note 3 at 1083 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).