Court Opinion

ID: 9586231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:30.982081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:43.425398
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
¶ 24 I dissent. The trial court erred in allowing Tabish to testify that J.J. told him that the defendant had abused her. It was *1243hearsay and could have been admitted only in compliance with section 76-5^411 or some other valid ground.
¶ 25 The trial court admitted the hearsay statements of Tabish on the ground that they were not hearsay because
[T]he State is offering them not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, but to provide a framework. The statements are essential for the jury to understand how these allegations against the Defendant arose. There is a significant amount of time between the dates of the alleged offenses and the date the Defendant was charged with the crimes. Allowing Mr. Tabish to explain how he became aware of the alleged abuse through the therapy sessions for other problems the victim experience[d] is important in allowing the State to present a cohesive case.
¶ 26 I do not agree that hearsay evidence can be admitted to “provide a framework” and that the evidence then becomes non-hearsay. No authority is cited for that proposition by the trial court or the majority opinion. While hearsay can be admitted in limited situations where it is not admitted to provide the truth of the matter asserted, the situation in the instant case does not qualify for that exception. It clearly came into evidence as proof that the defendant abused J.J. The jury was not instructed that it could not consider the disclosure to Tabish as evidence of abuse.
¶ 27 The majority opines that even if the admission of Tabish’s testimony as to what J.J. related to him was erroneous, it was harmless error, relying on State v. Seale. In Seale, there was physical evidence of abuse and the testimony of a corroborating witness. In the instant case, there is no physical evidence of abuse and no corroborating witness. J.J. admitted that not everything she wrote in the 1997 letter was true, and following the trial she recanted her testimony in another letter. Thus this case is very much “her word against his.” I cannot agree that any error was harmless under this state of the evidence. I would reverse the conviction and grant a new trial.
¶ 28 I concur in the observations of Judge Anderson in his concurring opinion regarding the recantation of testimony.
¶ 29 Having disqualified himself, Justice STEWART does not participate herein; District Judge LYLE R. ANDERSON sat.