Court Opinion

ID: 9906046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:28.991781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.876645
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 In re Steven G. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re STEVEN G., a Person                                    B323133
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law.                                                   Ct. No. 22CCJP01778A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

LAURA G.,

         Defendant and Appellant.
     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.

      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
       The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
11-year-old Steven G. and ordered him removed from his father.
His mother sought to have Steven placed with her. Because
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that placing
Steven with mother would cause him physical and emotional
detriment, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The Family
       Eliseo G. (father) and Laura G. (mother) married in
December 2012, and initially lived in El Salvador. They had two
children together—Steven (born May 2012) and Josue (born
2015).
       In 2016, father and Steven immigrated to the United
States. In 2018, father met Dolores M., and they started dating.
Thereafter, Dolores and her then-eight-year-old daughter Kenia
moved in with father and Steven. Father and Dolores then had a
child together—Victoria (born December 2021). Although not
biologically related, Steven came to view Dolores as his mother
and Kenia as his sister. Since Steven left El Salvador in 2016,

                               2
mother’s sole contact with him has been through occasional
telephone calls. These calls became more infrequent over the
years, and finally ceased completely.
II.   Domestic Violence Incident
       On Sunday, April 24, 2022, Dolores entrusted father with
caring for Steven, Kenia, and Victoria while she went to work,
but found the kids unattended when she returned home at 8 p.m.
that evening. When father came home at midnight “under the
influence of something,” he and Dolores argued. The verbal
argument escalated into physical violence when father grabbed
Dolores by the hair and threw her to the ground; she was holding
Victoria at that time. Kenia attempted to call the police, but
father gruffly grabbed the phone, causing bruising to Kenia’s
arm. Father then fled the scene. Both Dolores and Victoria
suffered injuries and needed medical treatment.
III. The Petition
      On May 9, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over
Steven on the grounds that (1) the “history of . . . violent
altercations” between father and Dolores “in [Steven’s] presence”
places him “at risk of serious physical harm” (thereby rendering
jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1));1 and (2) father’s
“history of substance abuse” “renders [him] incapable of providing
regular care of” Steven, placing him at substantial risk of serious

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                3
physical harm (thereby rendering jurisdiction appropriate
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)).2
      The juvenile court ordered Steven detained from his home;
ordered monitored visits for Steven with Dolores, Kenia, and
Victoria; and directed the Department to assess whether Steven
could be placed with Dolores.
IV. Events Prior to Adjudication
      After being notified of the pending proceedings, mother told
the Department that she wanted Steven to be placed with her in
El Salvador. Mother was employed and had a strong support
system that could help Steven.
      Steven had overnight visits at Dolores’s home every week
from Wednesday through Friday. The visits generally went well,
but Steven sometimes seemed frustrated and angry. A therapist
with a multidisciplinary assessment team stated Steven was sad
because he was forced to live apart from Dolores, Kenia, and
Victoria. Steven did not remember mother; said Dolores had
raised him for the last four years; and expressed his desire to live
with Dolores because she was the one who protected him and took
care of him. He refused to go to El Salvador; he did not want to
see father and felt abandoned because father had called him only
one time on his birthday; and he did not want to speak to mother
when she called. He would only speak with Dolores when she
called him.
V.    Adjudication and Disposition Hearing
      The juvenile court held a combined adjudication and
disposition hearing on August 24, 2022. The court sustained the

2     The Department also alleged that father allowed Dolores to
abuse alcohol in the home; this count was dismissed by the court
and is not relevant to this appeal.

                                 4
counts regarding father’s domestic violence and substance abuse,
and found mother to be nonoffending.3 As to disposition, the
court found it would be detrimental to Steven’s physical and
emotional well-being for him to return to mother in El Salvador
as he had not seen mother since he was four years old; he had
since that time been cared for by father and Dolores; and he was
bonded to Kenia and Victoria as his siblings, both of whom
resided in the United States. The court declared Steven a
dependent of the court, ordered him removed from father’s
custody, and ordered family reunification services for father and
mother. Mother’s case plan included conjoint counseling with
Steven if deemed appropriate, monitored visits in California, and
unmonitored telephonic and video visits.
VI. Appeal
      Mother filed this timely appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in not placing
Steven in her custody.
      Where, as here, a juvenile court removes a child from the
custody of one parent, section 361.2 requires the court to place
the child with the other, noncustodial parent if (1) the parent so
requests; and (2) “placement with th[e noncustodial] parent”
would not be “detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Assessing
whether placement with the noncustodial parent would be

3     On August 3, 2022, the Department had filed a first-
amended section 300 petition adding the allegation that father
and mother had a history of domestic violence relating to
incidents in El Salvador when Steven was seven months old, but
the juvenile court did not sustain this allegation.

                                 5
detrimental to the child “requires [a] court [to] weigh” a variety of
factors, including (1) the dependent child’s own wishes, (2) the
child’s relationship (or lack thereof) with the noncustodial parent
seeking custody, and (3) the existence and quality of the child’s
bond with other family members. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425, 1427 (Luke M.); In re A.C. (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 38, 43 (A.C.); In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
1394, 1402 (C.M.).) Because section 361.2 both “evinces [a]
legislative preference for placement with the noncustodial parent
when safe for the child” (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
1254, 1262), and implements the “constitutionally protected
interest” that “[a] nonoffending parent has . . . in assuming
physical custody” of her child (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
597, 605), the Department bears the burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, that placement with the noncustodial
parent would be detrimental to the child (C.M., at pp. 1401-1402).
We review a juvenile court’s finding that placing a child with the
noncustodial parent will be detrimental under section 361.2 for
substantial evidence, and do so by asking whether the record
viewed in the light most favorable to the finding is sufficient for a
reasonable trier of fact to find detriment by clear and convincing
evidence. (A.C., at pp. 42-43; In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
147, 154-155.)
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that placing Steven with mother would be detrimental to his
emotional well-being. Although his wishes are not dispositive,
Steven expressed a clear preference not to be placed with mother
in El Salvador. Steven also had essentially no relationship with
mother, which is hardly surprising given that he had practically
no contact with her for approximately seven years. Steven also

                                 6
has a very strong attachment to Dolores, whom he viewed as his
mother, as well as the two other children in the household whom
Steven regards as his siblings. Indeed, he was emotionally upset
and saddened being away from them, notwithstanding the
regular visits. Ripping Steven from these familiar and
comfortable surroundings in order to place him with mother (a
stranger, to him) in El Salvador (a strange land, to him) would
only exacerbate his emotional distress and cause him emotional
harm. (Accord, A.C., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 44,
40 [finding detriment where the child “ha[d] many friends,
enjoy[ed] school, and [was] excelling academically” and did “not
want to leave this life” in California to live with a noncustodial
parent in the state of Washington]; Luke M., supra, 107
Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 [affirming emotional detriment finding
where placing the child with a noncustodial parent in Ohio would
disrupt a strong sibling bond].)
       Mother raises three arguments in response.
       First, mother argues this case is factually similar to In re
Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236 (Karla C.). It is not.
There, the juvenile court found no detriment in placing a five-
year-old child with her noncustodial and nonoffending father in
Peru after her mother had allowed her stepfather to sexually
abuse her and planned to continue a relationship with him
notwithstanding the sexual abuse. The child in Karla C. did not
have any of the bonds to siblings or a surrogate mother that
Steven has. More fundamentally, Karla C. affirmed a finding of
no detriment, which merely required the appellate court to find
substantial evidence to support that ruling when construing the
record in the light most favorable to that ruling; mother here is
asking us to reverse a finding of detriment, which obligates

                                 7
mother to shoulder the far more onerous burden of showing that
the record contains no substantial evidence to support that
finding. As explained above, mother has not carried that burden.
       Second, mother argues that she is a responsible,
hardworking parent who had “regular telephone contact” with
Steven “prior to juvenile court involvement,” and who as yet to
visit with Steven solely because she is unable to obtain a visa to
travel to the United States. This makes her a better option than
father or Dolores, mother continues, because father is able to
visit Steven but has declined to do so and because Dolores has yet
to make “active efforts to be an approved placement” for Steven.
The first portion of this argument is contradicted by the record,
which shows mother did not maintain regular phone contact with
Steven. In any event, mother is essentially asking us to reweigh
the facts in order to come to a different decision than the juvenile
court. This is beyond our power where, as here, we are reviewing
solely for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773 [“‘“We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment”’”].)
       Third, mother argues that the Department did not produce
any evidence from a therapist (regarding her home or other
issues) or discuss which services are available to Steven in El
Salvador. The absence of a therapist’s report is beside the point,
as our task under substantial evidence review is to assess the
sufficiency of the evidence that is in the record rather than grade
the Department on what more it might have placed in the record.
And the availability of services for Steven in El Salvador does not
affect the assessment of whether he would suffer emotional
detriment by having to leave what he views as his family.

                                 8
                       DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                    ______________________, J.
                                    HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, Acting P.J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

                                9