Court Opinion

ID: 9905973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:15.881425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:01.955555
License: Public Domain

J-S22043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARCUS COX                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 342 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 17, 2020
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013269-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

       Marcus Cox (“Cox”) appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The PCRA court summarized the evidence presented at Cox’s jury trial

as follows:

       [O]n October 6, 2012, at approximately 6:45p.m., [Cox]
       approached the complainant, Glenn Gibson [(“Gibson”)], who was
       out walking his dog near 6500 Paschall Avenue. After approaching
       [Gibson], [Cox] said, “[Y]ou took my young boy’s bike[.]”
       [Gibson] replied, “[N]o[,] I did not[. W]hat bike?” [Gibson] was
       known for fixing bikes in the neighborhood. [Gibson] testified that
       he had never seen [Cox] before this incident and did not know
       what [Cox] was talking about regarding [Cox]’s “young boy’s
       bike[.]”

             [Gibson] testified that he had only one bike at home at the
       time, which was his own that he bought at Frankford Bikes. He

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       described it as a Redline make,[2] “colored blue, red, and black[.]”
       [Gibson] also described the bike as having red pedals and a red
       seat post. He testified that he customized the bicycle himself after
       purchasing it, explaining, “I replaced the rims, the tires, the seat
       post, the seat, the pedals, the neck of the bike . . . the bars . . .
       which are Redline, off another brown Redline, and new brake pads
       . . .[.]”

             While still at Paschall Avenue, [Cox] threatened to shoot
       [Gibson] and his dog if [Gibson] did not give [Cox] the bike.
       [Gibson] said that he could “see a bulge on [Cox’s] waist” and “it
       looked like a handgun[.]”

             [Cox] then followed [Gibson] home. [Gibson] entered his
       apartment from the side door . . .. [Gibson] described his
       apartment as having a metal door, followed by a wooden door that
       must be opened in order to enter the apartment. After entering
       his apartment, [Gibson] attempted to shut the door but [Cox] put
       his foot in the way to stop [Gibson] from doing so[.]

                                         ****

             [Gibson] also explained that [Cox] was “pulling on the
       handle on the metal door” while [Gibson] was trying to shut it.
       [Cox’s] foot and calf made it inside the apartment. [Cox] asked
       [Gibson] where the bike was and [Gibson] retrieved his own
       Redline bicycle from inside his apartment and brought it outside
       to where [Cox] was waiting. [Gibson] grabbed the seat of the
       bike and said[, “T]his isn’t your bike[.]”

             Next, [Cox] said, “I’m going to ride it for a second, see if it’s
       the bike[.]” [Cox] then “snatched” [Gibson]’s phone out of the
       [Gibson]’s hoodie pocket and took the bike from [Gibson]. [Cox]
       rode the bike around in a circle a couple of times and then took
       off.

             [Gibson] called 911 as he saw [Cox] ride away. [Gibson]
       then flagged down police as they drove past his home. [Gibson]
       entered Officer Lisa Keleman’s police cruiser and they drove to
       6600 Woodland Avenue where other officers had stopped a man
____________________________________________

2 Gibson described a Redline bicycle as a “professional BMX bike.”       See N.T.,
1/21/15, at 42.

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       who was riding a bike. [Gibson] did not identify that man as the
       perpetrator, however. [Gibson] and Officer Keleman then went to
       6400 Paschall Avenue, where Officer Anthony Davis had stopped
       a man, [Cox], matching the flash description of—a black man with
       a “blue hooded sweatshirt and blue pants, riding a blue bicycle
       with reds [sic] pedals[.]” At 6400 Paschall Avenue, [Gibson]
       identified [Cox], and also confirmed to police that the bicycle
       [Cox] was riding was as [Gibson’s] own.

             Officer Davis recovered the bicycle and prepared a property
       receipt for it. The property receipt included the bike’s description
       and noted the serial number for the bike as “3SFY2482[.]”
       Officers did not recover [Gibson]’s cell phone or a gun from [Cox].
       At trial, during Officer Anthony Davis’s direct examination, the
       Commonwealth introduced a photograph of a “blue BMX Redline
       bike, with red pedals,” which Officer Davis identified as the bicycle
       at issue.     [Gibson] also identified his bike from the same
       photograph as “My Redline[.”3]           The Commonwealth also
       introduced an arrest memo that Officer Davis prepared, detailing
       why police stopped [Cox], the flash information provided by
       [Gibson], and the bike’s description. This arrest memo indicated
       that the bike’s serial number was “3SFY24582,” which was one
       number different from the serial number for the bicycle that was
       recorded on the property receipt.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 3-5 (citations to record omitted) (emphasis

added). A jury found Cox guilty of robbery,4 and the trial court sentenced him

to ten to twenty years of imprisonment.

       A convoluted procedural history followed.          Cox, who had been

represented by trial counsel, filed a pro se post-sentence motion. After the

trial court denied Cox’s post-sentence motion, Cox did not file an appeal. Cox
____________________________________________

3 The photograph used at trial was marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8.
Although the copy of the exhibit is a grainy black and white reproduction, it
clearly shows that the bicycle had Redline logos on its frame.          See
Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8.

4 The jury found Cox not guilty of burglary.  The trial court separately found
Cox not guilty of persons not to possess firearms.

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then filed a PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights,

which the court granted.5         Cox filed a notice of appeal through the direct

appeal counsel appointed to represent him. This Court dismissed Cox’s appeal

in January 2019 due to counsel’s failure to file a brief.

       Cox then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in July 2019,

and a timely pro se PCRA petition in December 2019.6 The court appointed

new PCRA counsel (“PCRA counsel”), who filed an amended PCRA petition,

technically Cox’s first. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1286

(Pa. Super. 2013) (explaining that “when a PCRA petitioner’s direct appeal

rights are reinstated nunc pro tunc in his first PCRA petition, a subsequent

PCRA petition will be considered a first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes”).

Therein, Cox asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate the discrepancies concerning the bicycle’s serial number and failing

to discover that the manufacturer and distributors of the bicycle could not

locate either of the bike’s purported serial numbers in their databases.7 The

PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as meritless,

____________________________________________

5 The order granting reinstatement of Cox’s direct appeal rights is not
contained in the certified record.

6 Cox’s pro se petition of writ of habeas corpus and PCRA petition sought relief

asserting the existence of “new evidence” based on various documents
purporting to indicate that there were no Redline bicycles associated with the
serial number of the bicycle in Cox’s possession at the time of his arrest.

7 Cox’s PCRA counsel attached to the amended PCRA petition documents
similar to those Cox had attached to his pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus and PCRA petition.

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see Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and Cox did not respond. The PCRA court dismissed

the amended PCRA petition in December 2020, and Cox, who was still

represented by PCRA counsel, filed a pro se notice of appeal. Because PCRA

counsel was still Cox’s attorney of record, this Court remanded the matter to

determine if PCRA counsel had abandoned Cox and to appoint new counsel if

necessary.

      Upon remand, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel leave to withdraw

and appointed new appellate counsel (“prior appellate counsel”). The PCRA

court issued an order directing Cox to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Prior

appellate counsel, based on his mistaken belief that the PCRA court had

reinstated Cox’s direct appeal rights, filed a Rule 1925(b) statement

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and raising a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct. The PCRA court prepared a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the

direct appeal issues on their merits. Subsequently, this Court concluded that

prior appellate counsel was ineffective per se for waiving any PCRA-related

arguments in the appeal, and we remanded the matter for the appointment

of new counsel, the filing of a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc, and the

preparation of a new Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth v. Cox,

290 A.3d 686, 342 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum

at 6-7). Upon remand, the PCRA court appointed present counsel, and both

counsel and the court have complied with our remand instructions.

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       Cox raises the following issue for review:

       The PCRA court erred when it denied, as a matter of law,[8] Mr.
       Cox’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
       investigate the serial number of the bike allegedly stolen in the
       robbery (the serial number was provided by the Commonwealth
       during discovery), and for failing to present exculpatory evidence
       at trial about this serial number.

Cox’s Brief at 6.

       This Court’s standard for reviewing the dismissal of PCRA relief is well

settled:

              Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
       whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
       record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
       error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
       prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any
       credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
       supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s
       legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner

must establish that: (1) the underlying issue has arguable merit, (2) counsel’s

actions or inactions lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) counsel’s actions or

inactions resulted in actual prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30

A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011). Prejudice requires proof that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, a reasonable probability exists that the trial result

____________________________________________

8 In conjunction with his claim that the PCRA court erred   when denying his
PCRA petition as a matter of law, Cox argues he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. See Cox’s Brief at 11.

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would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523,

533 (Pa. 2009).    “Failure to establish any prong of the test will defeat an

ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143, 1151 (Pa.

2010) (internal citation omitted).

      A PCRA petitioner has “no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a

. . . petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no

genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal

citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). We review a PCRA court’s

decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 192-93 (Pa. 2018)

(internal citation omitted).

      Cox claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the

serial number of the bicycle the Commonwealth introduced into evidence.

Cox argues trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the

serial numbers associated with the bicycle found in Cox’s possession. Cox

contends that if trial counsel discovered and informed the jury that the serial

number on the bicycle was not associated with a Redline bicycle, the jury could

have found reason to doubt the Commonwealth’s evidence that Cox stole the

bicycle from Gibson. Cox thus asserts he raised issues of material fact to

warrant a new PCRA evidentiary hearing or a new trial.

      The PCRA court explained it dismissed Cox’s petition because Cox failed

to establish the discrepant serial numbers on the police paperwork had a

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material impact on the trial. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 6. The

court reasoned the existence of the stolen bicycle was not in question, because

both Gibson and Officer Davis identified the bicycle at trial, and the serial

number was not used to establish Gibson’s ownership of the bicycle. See id.

at 7.

        We conclude the PCRA court properly dismissed Cox’s claims without an

evidentiary hearing. To the extent Cox asserts he established doubt that the

bicycle shown to the jury was Gibson’s bicycle, that claim, as discussed by the

PCRA court, is frivolous.       Gibson identified the bicycle depicted in

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8, as the bicycle that Cox took from him, and Officer

Davis testified Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8 showed the bicycle he saw Cox

riding before he detained Cox. See N.T., 1/21/15, at 42 (indicating Gibson’s

identification of his Redline bicycle), 103-04 (indicating Officer Davis’s

identification of the Redline bicycle he saw Cox riding); see also

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8.

        To the extent Cox contends that the bicycle shown in Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 8 was not, as Gibson testified, a Redline bicycle or a search of the

serial numbers would have cast doubt on the evidence that Cox stole the

bicycle, we discern no record support for Cox’s claim of prejudice.     Gibson

and Officer Davis described the bicycle as a Redline. See N.T., 1/21/15, at

42, 104. Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8 showed the bicycle had Redline logos on

its frame. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8. Gibson noted he purchased the

bicycle at a “Goodwill/flea market type thing” and then customized it with

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spare parts, including the rims, tires, seat post, seat, pedals, neck, and bars.

See id. at 43. Gibson testified without hesitation that Cox was the person

who threatened to shoot him and his dog and then entered his home and took

the bicycle. See id. at 24, 43, 45, 103. Thus, any value in using the serial

numbers to show the bicycle was not a Redline or impeach Gibson’s testimony

that Cox stole the bicycle was de minimis and would not have affected the

outcome of the trial.

      In sum, having reviewed the record, Cox’s issue in this appeal, and the

PCRA court’s reasons for dismissing Cox’s PCRA petition, we agree with the

PCRA court that Cox did not raise a genuine issue of material fact meriting a

PCRA evidentiary hearing or a new trial.     See Smith, 995 A.2d at 1151;

Jones, 942 A.2d at 906.      Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order

dismissing Cox’s petition. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 11/30/2023

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