Court Opinion

ID: 9528685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:07.259365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:12.888918
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I certainly concur in the result reached in this instance by the majority. Unfortunately I find I have an entirely different perception of the issues posed than my brethren on the court. The appellants do not contend that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the execution sale on the judgment. I quote from the appellants’ brief:
“* * * Although there was a motion to set aside the April 7, 1982 sale on the grounds that the value received for the federal judgment was so disproportionate as to actual worth as to shock the conscience of the court, no evidence was presented at the time of hearing upon the motion to set aside execution sale as to the actual value of said judgment, and the court entered an order overruling the objections to the sale on June 15, 1982. The court’s order overruling objections to the execution sale was not appealed and the appellants are barred by res judicata from asserting that such ruling was error at this late juncture. “This does not mean that the District Court is without power to act to grant Appellants relief from further execution upon the judgment by the Appellee. * *” (Emphasis added.)
It is my understanding that the thrust of the appeal is that the district court should have interfered with the sale of the leasehold interest because the appellees already had been paid in full on their judgment. I quote again from the appellants’ brief:
“CONCLUSION
“Based upon the foregoing argument and principles, appellants respectfully request that this court enter an order reversing the District Court’s order of January 2, 1985, and remanding the matter to the District Court for entry of an order setting aside the execution sale of the leasehold interest and requiring the appellee to enter satisfaction of judgment in the above entitled matter.”
It is clear that the appellants no longer own any part of the alluded-to leasehold interest. As the majority opinion notes, the trial court found that the appellants had sold and assigned their leasehold interest to a third party, and they have no further interest in that leasehold. Under the circumstances I cannot perceive how the appellants have standing to prosecute this appeal. In Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 317 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980), this court said:
“Standing is a concept used to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court. 67A C.J.S. Parties § 12, p. 662. It is a necessary and useful tool to be used by courts in ferreting out those cases which ask the courts to render advisory opinions or decide an artificial or academic controversy without there being a palpable injury to be remedied. * * *”
Although the court determined that standing was present in that case, it seems to me that an application of those propositions to this case discloses with convincing clarity that standing does not exist with respect to these appellants.
Under the circumstances I think the appropriate disposition by this court is to dismiss the appeal because of lack of standing on the part of the appellants. The end result, of course, is that the judgment of the district court would stand, which is the same as the result espoused by the majority.