Court Opinion

ID: 9514617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:45.628062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.404803
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 22.] Belle Fourche concedes that § 9-47-28 and § 9-48-53 compel Verry to hook up to the city’s water and sewer systems. Thus, the city couches its appeal on whether it can require Verry to petition for annexation as a condition to connecting these systems. I agree that, assuming the statutes compel these connections, the city cannot force Verry to submit an annexation petition. Although Belle Fourche may be bound by its concession, whether cities are compelled to 'provide such services to nonresidents should remain open for future determination. In my view, the majority goes further than necessary in stating that these statutes require cities to hook up nonresidents to city services. To conserve water supplies, the Legislature simply required buildings with plumbing fixtures to be connected to existing city systems. It did not compel cities to provide water and sewer services to nonresidents. If we read § 9-47-28 and § 9^8-53 together with their companion statutes, we see that only city residents are entitled to such services.
[¶ 23.] First, the statutory scheme makes it obvious that only city residents must connect to .city systems. For example, § 9-47-28 mandates that every building in which plumbing is installed shall be coupled to a public water supply if within 200 feet of such system. The same statute states that “[a] municipality may purchase ... or otherwise acquire from the owners thereof, any preexisting private wells located within the municipality.” SDCL 9-47-28 (emphasis added). Likewise, § 9-48-53 provides that “[a] municipality may purchase ... or otherwise acquire ... or condemn pursuant to subdivision 9-12-1(2), any preexisting private sewers locat*549ed within the municipality.” (emphasis added).
[¶ 24.] Second, further examination of other statutes reveals the Legislature’s intent to limit the application of these statutes to those residing within municipalities. SDCL 9-48-5 and SDCL 9-47-17 govern the acquisition of sewer and water mains “in newly annexed areas.” SDCL 9^47 — 9 allows a city to purchase privately owned pipes and mains “within any street or alley, within the limits of the municipality.”
[¶ 25.] Finally, other statutes provide for the assessment of levies and taxes on those connected to the municipal water system. For example, SDCL 9-47-19 states: “The governing body of every municipality at the time of making its annual tax levy for other purposes may levy a special assessment for the purpose of maintaining its system of waterworks.” (emphasis added). Initially, a municipality would not and could not annually tax, “for other purposes,” those residing outside its boundaries. An interpretation of our statutes that would provide for such assessment may violate our constitution. See SD Const, art. XI, § 10 (assessments “shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same”). Because the city would not have jurisdiction over either the person or the property it was trying to tax, it would be unable to require a nonresident to pay taxes on the water system. Also, as a practical matter, it would not be equitable to tax the municipal residents for upgrades and upkeep of the water system, and allow nonresidents to benefit without being burdened with payment for maintenance and improvements. Giving plain meaning to the words of the statutes, the language clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated that these enactments would apply to residents of municipalities, not to those living outside city boundaries.
[¶ 26.] Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that the statutes only apply to systems inside city limits. SDCL 9-47-28 and § 9-48-53 were passed in 1989 pursuant to a bill entitled: “An Act to authorize a municipality to acquire private wells and sewer systems.” Act of March 14, 1989, ch. 80, 1989 SD Laws 214. A bill amending chapter 9-45, which was introduced immediately preceding the aforementioned was entitled: “An Act to permit a municipality to construct streets, sewers and water improvements and assess owners of adjoining property if they benefit from the improvements.” Act of March 1, 1989, ch. 79, 1989 SD Laws 214. These two enactments are from a series of bills regarding the powers and rights of municipalities. See 1989 SD Laws 210-15. We can see, then, that these bills were enacted to authorize municipalities to act within then-boundaries. Any other interpretation would render meaningless the other provisions in the statutory scheme. See, e.g., SDCL 9-47-22 (requests for rural water system service from persons residing within three miles of municipalities may be granted; if denied, however, rural water system may provide service to the individual).
[¶ 27.] When construing legislative enactments, the primary objective is to determine legislative intent. Moss, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d at 17 (citation omitted); see also Lewis v. Maryland, 348 Md. 648, 705 A.2d 1128, 1130-31 (1998) (citations omitted). We give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649, 657 (S.D.1988)(noting that a “long-standing principal of statutory construction [is] that the Legislature said what it meant and meant what it said”). A statute must be construed with its intent in mind, and intent is determined from examining the statute as a whole and any enactments similar in subject. Dahn, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d at 539 (citation omitted). We presume that an “absurd result” was not contemplated by the Legislature. Id. (citation omitted); see Zoss v. Dakota Truck Underwriters, 1998 SD 23, ¶ 9, 575 N.W.2d 258, 261 (citation omitted)(when statutes appear to conflict, *550a reasonable construction gives meaning to all provisions under scrutiny, making them “harmonious and workable”); see also Lewis, 705 A.2d at 1131 (citation omitted)(“Such an interpretation must be reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.”)- Also, at times, consideration of other evidence with regard to the intent of a statute is appropriate; a bill’s title, function paragraphs, amendments, and its relationship to earlier and later enactments are all properly examined when ascertaining the intent. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
[¶ 28.] When read in conjunction with contemporaneous statutes it is apparent that the laws at issue in this case were meant to apply only to residents of municipalities.
[¶ 29.] GILBERTSON, Justice, joins this special writing.