Court Opinion

ID: 9377742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:05:57.410371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.132644
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mets, 2023-Ohio-710.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                      JUDGES:
                                                   Hon. John W. Wise P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                         Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                                   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs-
                                                   Case No. 2022 CA 21
TAYLOR G. METS

        Defendant-Appellant                        OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                        Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court,
                                                Case No. TRC 2107886

JUDGMENT:                                       Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         March 8, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant

DAVID KLEMP                                     AARON CONRAD
CITY OF LANCASTER LAW DIRECTOR                  CONRAD/WOOD
136 West Main Street                            120 East Main Street, Suite 200
Lancaster, Ohio 43130                           Lancaster, Ohio 43130
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                    2

Wise, P. J.

       {¶1}   Appellant Taylor G. Mets appeals his conviction and sentence entered in

the Fairfield County Municipal Court. Appellee is State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading

to this appeal are as follows.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   On November 27, 2021, Appellant was charged with Driving While Under

the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, in violation of R.C. §4911.19(A)(1)(a).

       {¶3}   On December 10, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence as

the State failed to show that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test and remaining field

sobriety tests were administered in compliance with National Highway Traffic and Safety

Administration (“NHTSA”) standards.

       {¶4}   On March 4, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s Motion to

Suppress. At the hearing, Trooper Tawanna Young testified she was on patrol on

November 27, 2021. On that evening, Trooper Young stopped a vehicle driven by

Appellant for failing to use his turn signal in Fairfield County.

       {¶5}   As Trooper Young introduced herself, she smelled an odor of alcohol

coming from inside the vehicle. When asked, Appellant denied drinking alcohol. Appellant

had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and his speech was slurred. She then removed Appellant

from the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests.

       {¶6}   First, Trooper Young administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. For

the lack of smooth pursuit portion of the test, Trooper Young testified that she checked to

see whether the subject’s eyes roll smoothly. She brought the stimulus out and held for

two seconds then brought it back. For the onset of nystagmus before 45 degrees portion
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                       3

of the test, Trooper Young testified she observed Appellant’s eyes involuntarily jerk prior

to 45 degrees. Trooper Young observed six out of six clues of intoxication during the

Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test.

       {¶7}   Next, Trooper Young proceeded to the walk and turn test. The

administration of the walk and turn test was not conducted on a flat surface, but it was

slightly slanted. She did not observe anything in the street which would have impaired

Appellant’s ability to complete the test properly. She did not instruct Appellant to keep his

arms at his side while he was walking, to watch his feet at all times, and not to stop walking

until the test was completed. Appellant exhibited three out of eight clues of impairment.

       {¶8}   Finally, Trooper Young administered the one leg stand test. This test was

conducted on a slightly slanted area. Trooper Young noted three out of four clues of

impairment.

       {¶9}   On April 28, 2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

       {¶10} On May 5, 2022, the matter proceeded to trial. After the presentation of

evidence, a jury found Appellant guilty.

       {¶11} On May 25, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in jail, with

170 days suspended.

                                   ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶12} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He herein raises the following four

Assignments of Error:

       {¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                      4

       {¶14} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING EVIDENCE THAT

DEFENDANT REQUESTED A BLOOD TEST.

       {¶15} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO

QUESTION TROOPER YOUNG ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF HER EMPLOYMENT

HISTORY.

       {¶16} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO

QUESTION TROOPER YOUNG ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE FIELD SOBRIETY

TESTS SHE ADMINISTERED.”

                                                 I.

       {¶17} In Appellant’s first Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court erred

in failing to suppress evidence as Trooper Young impermissibly extended the traffic stop

to conduct field sobriety tests, that the field sobriety tests were not conducted in

substantial compliance with NHTSA, and lacked probable cause to arrest Appellant. We

disagree.

       {¶18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable

searches and seizures of persons or their property. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S.

1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d

1271 (1991).

       {¶19} Appellate review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and

fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8. During

a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in

the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. State v.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                        5

Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 1996-Ohio-134, 661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is

bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,

credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,145, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th

Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must independently

determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusions, whether

the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio

App.3d 37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other grounds, State v.

Gunther, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 04CA25, 2005-Ohio-3492, ¶16.

       {¶20} Three methods exist to challenge a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s findings of facts. State v.

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “A reviewing court is bound to

accept those findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Curry,

95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641 N.E.2d 1172 (8th Dist.1994). Second, an appellant may argue

the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In

that case, the appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law.

Williams at 41. Third, an appellant may argue the trial court incorrectly decided the

ultimate issue raised in the motion to suppress. When addressing the third type of

challenge, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial

court’s conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in the given

case (Citation omitted). Curry at 96.

                              Impermissible Delay of Traffic Stop

       {¶21} First, Appellant argues the trial court erred by not finding Trooper Young

impermissibly extended the traffic stop to administer Field Sobriety Tests to Appellant.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                      6

       {¶22} A request made of a validly detained motorist to perform field sobriety tests

is generally outside the scope of the original stop, and must be separately justified by

other specific and articulable facts showing a reasonable basis for the request. State v.

Albaugh, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2014 AP 11 0049, 2015-Ohio-3536, ¶18, quoting State

v. Anez (2000), 108 Ohio Misc.2d 18, 26-27, 738 N.E.2d 491. Although requiring a driver

to submit to a field sobriety test constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, courts have generally held that the intrusion on the driver’s liberty resulting

from a field sobriety test is minor, and the officer therefore need only have reasonable

suspicion that the driver is under the influence of alcohol in order to conduct a field

sobriety test. See State v. Bright, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 2009-CA-28, 2010-Ohio-1111,

¶17, citing State v. Knox 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-74, 2006-Ohio-3039. In reviewing

this issue, we apply a “totality of the circumstances” approach. See, e.g., City of Fairfield

v. Lucking, Butler App. No. CA2002-12-303, 2004-Ohio-90, ¶8, citing State v. Freeman,

64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044. “Where a non-investigatory stop is initiated and the

odor of alcohol is combined with glassy or bloodshot eyes and further indicia of

intoxication, such as an admission of having consumed alcohol, reasonable suspicion

exists.” State v. Hall, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015 CA 00213, 2016-Ohio-5787, 70 N.E.3d

1154, ¶24.

       {¶23} In the case sub judice Appellant was stopped for turning without using a

turn signal during Trooper Young’s 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift. Trooper Young also

observed Appellant’s vehicle stop past the stop bar. Upon approaching Appellant’s

vehicle, Trooper Young smelled a strong odor of alcohol from his vehicle. Appellant’s

speech was slow and slurred, and his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. After denying he
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                        7

had been drinking, Appellant said he was driving home, but would not state from where

he was coming.

       {¶24} Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find Trooper Young “relied

upon specific, articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion Appellant was driving

under the influence, that an extension of the initial detention for the performance of field

sobriety testing was justified, and the ruling of the trial court was correct.” State v. Reece,

5th Dist. Delaware No. 17 CAC 03 0019, 2018-Ohio-150, ¶17.

     Substantial Compliance with NHTSA Guidelines when Administering the
                        Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test

       {¶25} R.C. §4511.19(D)(4)(b) provides:

              In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of

       this section * * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety

       test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown

       by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in

       substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible,

       and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the

       tests were administered, including, but not limited to any testing standards

       then in effect that were set by the national highway safety administration,

       all of the following apply:

              (i)     The officer may testify concerning the results of the field

       sobriety test so administered.

              (ii)    The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety

       test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal

       prosecution.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                        8

             ***

             (iii)   ***[I]f the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules

      of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of

      fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

      {¶26} In order for the results of the field sobriety tests to be admissible at trial, the

state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test

in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines. State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d

165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶11. Part of the state’s burden “includes

demonstrating what the NHTSA requirements are, through competent testimony and/or

by introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual.” State v. Vales, 5th Dist. No.

2019CA00061, 2020-Ohio-245, 143 N.E.3d 577, ¶29; quoting State v. Djisheff, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No 2005-T-0001, 2006-Ohio-6201.

      {¶27} Trooper Young testified she conducts the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test

based off the training she received from the NHTSA manual, how to conduct the test

within the NHTSA standards, and how she conducted the test on Appellant. Trooper

Young conducts this test every night.

      {¶28} Appellant argues Trooper Young did not substantially comply with the

NHTSA manual because while checking for smooth pursuit she held the stimulus at the

same spot for a couple of seconds instead of taking the stimulus slowly out and back,

during the maximum deviation she only held the stimulus still for two seconds instead of

four seconds, and while checking for nystagmus prior to 45 degrees, Trooper Young took

the stimulus out to Appellant’s shoulder and held for four seconds instead of measuring

out 45 degrees.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                     9

       {¶29} With regard to Trooper Young checking for smooth pursuit, she testified she

conducts the test in substantial compliance with NHTSA manual standards, she brings

the stimulus out for two seconds, held it out for two seconds, and then brought it back in

for two seconds. “[T]he timing required to complete the various elements with respect to

both eyes of the HGN test as set forth in the NHTSA manual are approximate.” State v.

Scott, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2020 CA 00015, 2021-Ohio-156, ¶28. Finally, Appellant does

not support the claim that the manner in which the test was performed was not in

substantial compliance with NHTSA standards with case law.

       {¶30} With regard to the maximum deviation test, Appellant does not cite to the

suppression hearing transcript with regards to his suggestion of non-substantial

compliance with the NHTSA manual. Trooper Young testified at the suppression hearing

she takes the stimulus out, holds for four seconds, and brings the stimulus back in. Then

repeats for the other eye.

       {¶31} With regard to the onset of nystagmus before 45 degrees portion of the test

substantial compliance with NHTSA standards with case law, Trooper Young testified she

was trained to take the stimulus out to subject’s shoulder and hold it for four seconds. The

manual states that officers should observe jerking prior to 45 degrees. Trooper Young

testified that she observed Appellant’s eyes jerking prior to the 45-degree mark. In fact,

the involuntary jerking was such a good example, Trooper Young called her supervisor

to bring a cadet trainee to the scene to observe.

       {¶32} Accordingly, we find Appellee satisfied its burden of showing substantial

compliance with the NHTSA standards, and the trial court’s ruling with respect to the

Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test was supported by the record.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                       10

        Substantial Compliance with NHTSA Guidelines when Administering the
                                 Walk and Turn Test

      {¶33} Again, R.C. ¶4511.19(D)(4)(b) provides:

             In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of

      this section * * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety

      test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown

      by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in

      substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible,

      and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the

      tests were administered, including, but not limited to any testing standards

      then in effect that were set by the national highway safety administration,

      all of the following apply:

             (i)     The officer may testify concerning the results of the field

      sobriety test so administered.

             (ii)    The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety

      test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal

      prosecution.

             ***

             (iii)   ***[I]f the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules

      of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of

      fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

      {¶34} In order for the results of the field sobriety tests to be admissible at trial, the

state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test

in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines. Codeluppi at ¶11. Part of the state’s
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                      11

burden “includes demonstrating what the NHTSA requirements are, through competent

testimony and/or by introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual.” Vales at

¶29.

       {¶35} Trooper Young testified that before the test, she asked Appellant if he had

any medical problems with his legs, back, or feet that would affect his ability to perform

the test. Appellant did not indicate and Trooper Young did not observe any issues.

Trooper Young administered the test on a mostly level surface, which Trooper Young

believed would not hinder Appellant’s ability to complete the test. Trooper Young was

able to complete the test without problem and did not observe anything on the street

which would impair Appellant’s ability. While Trooper Young did not instruct Appellant to

keep his arms at his side, eyes on his feet, and not to stop walking once he started,

Trooper Young did not indicate any indicia of impairment related to any of these

instructions. As such, Trooper Young administered the walk and turn test in substantial

compliance with NHTSA standards.

                   Substantial Compliance with NHTSA Guidelines when
                          Administering the One Leg Stand test

       {¶36} Again, R.C. §4511.19(D)(4)(b) provides:

             In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of

       this section * * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety

       test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown

       by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in

       substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible,

       and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the

       tests were administered, including, but not limited to any testing standards
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                        12

       then in effect that were set by the national highway safety administration,

       all of the following apply:

             (i)      The officer may testify concerning the results of the field

       sobriety test so administered.

             (ii)     The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety

       test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal

       prosecution.

             ***

             (iii)    ***[I]f the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules

       of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of

       fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

       {¶37} In order for the results of the field sobriety tests to be admissible at trial, the

state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test

in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines. Codeluppi at ¶11. Part of the state’s

burden “includes demonstrating what the NHTSA requirements are, through competent

testimony and/or by introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual.” Vales at

¶29.

       {¶38} Trooper Young testified that before the test, she asked Appellant if he had

any medical problems with his legs, back, or feet that would affect his ability to perform

the test. Appellant did not indicate and Trooper Young did not observe any issues.

Trooper Young administered the one leg stand test on a mostly level surface, which

Trooper Young believed would not hinder Appellant’s ability to complete the one leg stand
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                   13

test. However, Trooper Young did not instruct Appellant to keep his arms at his side, and

she marked this as indicium of intoxication.

       {¶39} However, Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error as “[a]ny defect, irregularity,

or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Before error

can be considered harmless, we must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17

L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Where no reasonable possibility exists that the unlawful testimony

contributed to a conviction, the error is harmless and therefore will not be grounds for

reversal. State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), paragraph three of

the syllabus, vacated on other grounds in Lytle v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57

L.Ed.2d 1154 (1978).

       {¶40} Therefore, even if the trial court erred in suppressing this specific indicium

of intoxication from the one leg stand test, it was harmless as Trooper Young substantially

complied with NHTSA standards for the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test and walk and

turn test, Trooper Young observed the odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle,

Appellant had glassy/bloodshot eyes, and Appellant’s speech was slow and slurred,

giving Trooper Young probable cause to arrest Appellant.

         Whether Trooper Young had Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant

       {¶41} Appellant argues if this Court were to suppress the results of the HGN, Walk

and Turn test, and One Leg Stand test, not enough evidence was presented to show

probable cause for the Arrest of Appellant. However, we have found the trial court did not

err in admitting the results of the HGN test and Walk and Turn test into evidence.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                    14

       {¶42} A police officer has probable cause for an arrest if the facts and

circumstances within her knowledge are sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person

to believe that the defendant has committed the offense. State v. Cummings, 5th Dist.

Stark No. 2005-CA-00295, 2006-Ohio-2431, ¶15, citing State v. Heston, 29 Ohio St.2d

152, 280 N.E.2d 376 (1972). In making this determination, the trial court must examine

the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest. See State v. Miller, 117

Ohio App.3d 750, 761, 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist.1997); State v. Brandenburg, 41 Ohio

App.3d 109, 111, 534 N.E.2d 906 (2nd Dist.1987).

       {¶43} In the case sub judice, Trooper Young testified Appellant was stopped for

turning his vehicle without engaging his turn signal, a strong odor of alcohol was

emanating from within the vehicle, of which he was the only person therein, his eyes were

bloodshot and glassy, and his speech was slow and slurred. Appellant showed six out of

six obvious clues of intoxication on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, three out of eight

clues on the Walk and Turn test, and failed to recite the alphabet correctly when instructed

by Trooper Young.

       {¶44} Accordingly, Appellant’s first Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                II.

       {¶45} In Appellant’s second Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court

erred by not admitting evidence that Defendant requested a blood test. We disagree.

       {¶46} “Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in

line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake County, 58 Ohio St.3d 269,

271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). The appellate court must limit its review of the trial court’s
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                     15

admission or exclusion of evidence to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. The

abuse of discretion standard is more than an error of judgment; it implies the court ruled

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,

450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶47} Evid.R. 401 states, “ ‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

       {¶48} R.C. §4511.191(A)(3), in pertinent part, states, “[t]he law enforcement

agency by which the officer is employed shall designate which of the tests shall be

administered.”

       {¶49} R.C. §4511.19(D)(1)(c)(3), in pertinent part, states, “the person tested may

have a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist

of the person’s own choosing administer a chemical test or tests, at the persons expense,

in addition to any administered at the request of law enforcement[.]”

       {¶50} Appellant does not have a right to choose the type of chemical test

available. Mt. Vernon v. Seng, 5th Dist. Knox No. 04CA000012, 2005-Ohio-2915, ¶46.

“He could refuse to take the breathalyzer test and face possible suspension of his license

or take such test and have his blood also tested subsequently at his expense. Id.

       {¶51} In the case sub judice, Appellant refused to take the breathalyzer test, but

instead offered to be driven to the hospital to take a blood test. A refusal by a defendant

by requesting the use of a different test “constitutes a refusal to take the designated test.

Raine v. Curry, 45 Ohio App.2d 155, 160-161, 341 N.E.2d 606 (10th Dist.1975). Therefore,
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                      16

the fact that he offered to take a different test is not relevant to whether or not he refused

the test offered by law enforcement.

       {¶52} Appellant’s second Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                              III.

       {¶53} In Appellant’s third Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court

erred by not allowing Appellant to question Trooper Young about certain aspects of her

employment. We disagree.

       {¶54} Again, “Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining

the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised

in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake County, 58 Ohio St.3d

269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). The appellate court must limit its review of the trial

court’s admission or exclusion of evidence to whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Id. The abuse of discretion standard is more than an error of judgment; it implies the court

ruled arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶55} Evid.R. 608(B) states:

              Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct

       of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s

       character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in

       Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,

       in the discretion of the court, if clearly probative of truthfulness, be inquired

       into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’s

       character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                        17

       for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character

       the witness being cross-examined has testified.

       {¶56} Appellant was prevented from questioning Trooper Young regarding her

sanctions for being discourteous during a traffic stop and making an inappropriate

comment in the workplace. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated, “The meaning of this rule

is very clear. * * *[A] witness’ credibility may not be impeached by extrinsic proof of specific

instances of his conduct. Such conduct may be inquired into only by the intrinsic means

of cross-examination within the guidelines set forth in Evid.R. 608(B).” State v. Kamel, 12

Ohio St.3d 306, 311, 466 N.E.2d 860, 865 (1984). As neither of the incidents were

probative of Trooper Young’s truthfulness or untruthfulness, the trial court appropriately

disallowed Appellant’s questions.

       {¶57} Appellant’s third Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                              IV.

       {¶58} In Appellant’s fourth Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court

erred by not allowing Appellant to question Trooper Young on the reliability of the field

sobriety tests. We disagree.

       {¶59} Again, “Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining

the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised

in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake County, 58 Ohio St.3d

269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). The appellate court must limit its review of the trial

court’s admission or exclusion of evidence to whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Id. The abuse of discretion standard is more than an error of judgment; it implies the court
Fairfield County, Case No. 2022 CA 21                                                     18

ruled arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶60} Appellant argues the trial court erred by not allowing Appellant to question

Trooper Young as to the reliability of the field sobriety tests. Appellant cites to the Trial

Transcript on pages 188 and 189. However, upon our review the transcript reveals the

trial court would not allow Appellant to argue Trooper Young’s administration of the field

sobriety tests must be in strict compliance with the NHTSA manual. The trial court said,

“You cannot argue strict compliance because that’s not the law in Ohio. I’m not saying

you can’t ask her about how she performed her tests[.]” Trial Transcript p. 189. The law

in Ohio is law enforcement must administer the field sobriety tests in substantial

compliance with the NHTSA manual. Codeluppi at ¶11.

       {¶61} Appellant’s fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.

       {¶62} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Municipal Court of Fairfield

County, Ohio, is hereby, affirmed.

By: Wise, P. J.

Delaney, J., and

Baldwin, J., concur.

JWW/br 0301