Court Opinion

ID: 9449054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:53:50.765807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:39.924264
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from the order denying the petition for a rehearing in banc. In view of the anomalies of our in banc procedure, illustrated in an increasing number of cases of which this is a crowning example, it seems desirable, if not necessary, to point out where we seem to have arrived or to be tending. And I believe our cases show a clear trend toward a denial of in banc for, and of prejudicial discrimination against, inter alios, Jones Act plaintiffs which is increasing as our *897cases multiply. The situation assumes more urgency when we note that here a minimum of four judges has shown discontent with the decision and that the number so feeling may well be more, since only two judges are on record as approving it. Thus a minority decision, of doubtful character as pointed out below, becomes frozen in as the law of the Circuit.
In theory, proceedings in banc should be a handy means whereby a multi-judge court resolves differences of theory to present a united front to the bar and lower courts.1 In our practice it just does not work out that way. In view of the load of business we have, it is entirely impracticable to hear every case in banc where anyone desires that course. Hence there comes an inevitable question of choice. It is here that on the record our increasingly discriminatory attitude appears. To generalize, it is clear that prosecutors and prison officials have traditionally had first call,2 and important property issues are given careful consideration.3 On the other hand, seamen’s claims have practically no chance at all *898of in banc hearing,4 though these cases are now the most debated of all issues within the court.5
The area of Jones Act litigation is one where for a number of reasons we ought to be particularly responsive to requests for full court review. First, these are cases of great importance, often involving serious limitations on the right of trial by jury, and of course of serious moment to the parties, including usually a seriously injured plaintiff and his dependents. In point of fact, further review of these cases by the Supreme Court is unusual, and certiorari for the most part is not even sought.6 It is well known that there is a widely held professional view, apparently shared by a minority of *899the Court, that it ought not to spend time to hear personal injury cases. But this should make us even more assiduous in seeing that full review is had in our court.
Second, in banc procedure is particularly desirable here because in the cases which the Supreme Court has reviewed and reversed, my brothers are showing a surprising reluctance to accept the meaning of the decisions as applied to any case except the single one in which it is rendered. An unusual example flows from the reversal in Salem v. U. S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313, of our reversal of a jury award in Salem v. U. S. Lines Co., 2 Cir., 293 F.2d 121, a holding that the plaintiff was not required to produce expert evidence as to the need for certain rigging of the ship. We accepted this result and restored the verdict in Salem v. U. S. Lines Co., 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 672. But even though I asked for an in banc hearing at least to consider the bearing of this Supreme Court decision, such rehearing of our just rendered decision upsetting findings of fact and an award below was denied in Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, Stockholm, Sweden, 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 506, 511. I am at a loss to understand why the Supreme Court decision was not controlling in the Nuzzo case or what the grounds of distinction could possibly be. This seems an extreme example of our practice to consider each case as an isolated happening, so that reversals of our reversals below are held without significance.7 So as a matter of cold statistics it follows that no matter how erroneous a ruling of ours on the debated issue of seaworthiness may be, its chances of review and reversal are slight, probably well under 5 per cent.
A final powerful reason for full review — a reason which each one of my colleagues has found adequate justification from time to time for in banc in cases of special interest to him — is that the panel decision seems to me clearly in error. This is but another instance where this court has shown itself unwilling to adjust to the modern conception of unseaworthiness as defined by the Supreme Court.8 It should always be borne in mind that we are not now dealing with the plaintiff’s recovery; instead we are concerned with the right of trial by jury and how far an issue of fact can be taken from the jury. Here the asserted limitation surely presents a jury issue. If an assault by one seaman on another with a knife or brandy bottle presents a jury issue, I am at a loss to see how an equally deadly attack accomplished by the skillful use of the bare hand or hands as a matter of law cannot show the ship unseaworthy. I am in hearty accord with Judge Friendly’s persuasive dissent, 2 Cir., 309 F.2d 191, 195, 197 — except for his gratuitous urging of a Congressional “revision of the law in this area that is so long overdue,” an issue outside our province where we ought not to be taking sides.
1 am glad that Chief Judge LOMBARD has now taken occasion to examine this situation with care in his accompanying opinion; the more light we may have upon it, the higher probability that we shall arrive at a correct or at least an operable procedure. But the classification selected by the Chief Judge is uninformative, if not misleading. He concentrates entirely upon the nature of the issue in each case, overlooking the human element, the actual litigants affected by the result. Classification according to the nature of the issue gets us nowhere, since we have reached no agreement as to which issues are important; note, for example, my brothers’ reaction to my view that the problem of unseaworthiness in Jones Act cases is presently the most important one before this court. It seems *900to me that we must regard as important every issue so viewed by one or more of the active judges. (Throughout I am omitting as not in point all reference to those numerous cases where counsel have sought in banc proceedings without obtaining the affirmative vote of a single active judge.9) But in viewing the impact of our practice it is of great importance to observe — as the Chief Judge does not — (a) who is able to secure in banc hearings and (b) who is not. Thus it seems informative to learn that a public prosecutor has an excellent chance of securing this form of review, while a seaman has almost none. This information appears in my footnotes 2, 3, and 4 supra. In fact denial of in banc tells more than its grant in these cases, for it shows that even where the issue is controversial and important (as it surely is where the court so sharply divides, notwithstanding the Chief Judge’s implication to the contrary) nonetheless in banc will be denied to disfavored applicants. Thus upon what basis can we support denial of a state prisoner’s application seeking full-court review of the overturning of a careful and reasoned district court finding of trial unfairness, as in the Brown case, while it is quickly granted to reverse such a finding by an experienced trial judge, now our colleague, in the Reid case, or to overturn a panel’s reversal of a conviction as based on an improper admission of a confession in the Coppola case — all set forth in my note 2 supra ? These and other diverse rulings hardly grant the litigants before us the benefit of that “evenhanded administration of justice” to which the Chief Judge alludes and which we all wish to afford.
The present case on the debated issue of unseaworthiness presents the problem acutely. Although it appears to satisfy all the criteria even hinted at by the Chief Judge, such as number and importance of the cases coming to us, our distinguished colleague evinces an intent to veto all in banc hearings in seamen’s cases, since “The simple fact is that most seamen’s cases present no issue of legal principle; the controlling questions usually involve the application of accepted principles to the facts.” Surely this is quite in error. The question is one of law — and indeed quite important law— where there has been a refusal to follow “accepted principles” as to trial by jury or the respect to be accorded a trial judge’s findings. If the case were actually one involving only the resolution of facts in a single case I should not be trying so desperately to secure full court review of our handling of this issue. But the cases appearing in my notes 4, 5, and 7 supra show a denial of trial rights accorded by Supreme Court precedents, even a refusal to consider or discuss pertinent decisions, as in the Nuzzo case stated above, Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Walletico, Stockholm, Sweden, 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 506, 511. Naturally I do not enjoy dissenting, but I do not see any other way to bring to the surface these cases actually making the law of the Circuit contrary to what seemingly a majority of the court really believes. I could contemplate with some equanimity a return to our old practice of never granting in banc procedure if such a course can be held legal under the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). But I do feel a responsibility to oppose as I can the present discriminatory selection of cases for favored treatment which results in such a distortion of the law of this Circuit.
I would grant the petition.

. For discussion of the problems that are faced by the bar of a court -which sits in panels, see Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 813-317 (1960). See Note, En Banc Procedure in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 111 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 220 (1962); Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91.

. In the following cases a panel decision reversing a criminal conviction was vacated, and the original judgment below restored. United States v. Coppola, 2 Cir., 281 F.2d 340, affirmed Coppola v. United States, 365 U.S. 762, 81 S.Ct. 884, 6 L.Ed.2d 79; United States v. Gori, 2 Cir., 282 F.2d 43, affirmed Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901; United States v. Santore, 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 51 (in part only), cert. denied Santore v. United States, 365 U.S. 834, 81 S.Ct. 745, 5 L.Ed.2d 743. In U. S. ex rel. Reid v. Richmond, 2 Cir., 295 F.2d 83, cert. denied 368 U.S. 948, 82 S.Ct. 390, 7 L.Ed.2d 344, the court ordered in bane hearing and reversed a grant of habeas corpus. See also U. S. ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 2 Cir., 313 F.2d 364. In Winston v. United States, 2 Cir., 305 F.2d 253, and Muniz v. United States, 2 Cir., 305 F.2d 285, cert. granted United States v. Muniz, 371 U.S. 919, 83 S.Ct. 292, 9 L.Ed.2d 229, in banc hearings were granted on the government’s application, though the panel decisions were finally reaffirmed. There are no cases of grant on application of the accused. In the following cases in banc hearings were granted on the initiative of the court or a majority of the active judges: United States v. Apuzzo, 2 Cir., 245 F.2d 416, cert. denied Apuzzo v. United States, 355 U.S. 831, 78 S.Ct. 45, 2 L.Ed.2d 43 (conviction' affirmed); U. S. ex rel. Roosa v. Martin, 2 Cir., 247 F.2d 659 (denial of habeas corpus affirmed); U. S. ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 2 Cir., 247 F.2d 662, cert. denied Fay v. U. S. ex rel. Marcial, 355 U.S. 915, 78 S.Ct. 342, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (denial of habeas corpus reversed for hearing below) ; United States v. Jones, 2 Cir., 308 F.2d 26 (conviction reversed) ; Pugach v. Dollinger, 2 Cir., 277 F.2d 739, affirmed 365 U.S. 458, 81 S.Ct. 650, 5 L.Ed.2d 678, and O’Rourke v. Levine, 2 Cir., 277 F.2d 739 (each affirming the trial court’s denial of injunction against use of wiretap evidence in state criminal trials, cf. earlier panel decision. granting a stay, Pugach v. Dollinger, 2 Cir., 275 F.2d 503). In U. S. ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 2 Cir., 306 F.2d 596, 608, application of the relator was denied by divided vote. In Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2 Cir., 308 F.2d 779, cert. granted 371 U.S. 947, 83 S.Ct. 503, 9 L.Ed.2d 496, and Ng Yen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2 Cir., 308 F.2d 796, the court ordered hearing in banc and then by divided vote dismissed petitions for review by aliens on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

. In the following important property eases applications for in banc hearings were granted, though the decisions were ultimately affirmed in substance: In re Lake Tankers Corp., 2 Cir., 235 F.2d 783, affirmed Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 77 S.Ct. 1269, 1 L.Ed.2d 1246; American-Foreign S. S. Corp. v. United States, 2 Cir., 265 F.2d 136, vacated and remanded United States v. American-Foreign S. S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 80 S.Ct. 1336, 4 L.Ed.2d 1491, affirmed (in major part), American-Foreign S. S. Corp. v. United States, 2 Cir., 291 F.2d 598, cert. denied 368 U.S. 895, 82 S.Ct. 171, 7 L.Ed.2d 92; Mueller v. Rayon *898Consultants, Inc., 2 Cir., 271 F.2d 591 (interlocutory appeal denied); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 2 Cir., 272 F.2d 29 (interlocutory appeal denied); McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 2 Cir., 282 F.2d 34, cert. denied New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. McWeeney, 364 U.S. 870, 81 S.Ct. 115, 5 L.Ed.2d 93; Brown v. Bullock, 2 Cir., 294 F.2d 415; Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 2 Cir., 312 F.2d 236. See also Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., - F.2d -, ordered Nov. 30, 1962, and now pending; Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 2 Cir., 309 F.2d 553 (plaintiff’s application for in lane granted and decision below restored), Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Pearson, 83 S.Ct. 726; S. E. C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 2 Cir., 306 F.2d 606 (hearing in lane granted on application of S. E. C., but original decision reaffirmed), cert. granted 371 U. S. 967, 83 S.Ct. 550, 9 L.Ed.2d 538; Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International, AFL-CIO, 2 Cir., 294 F.2d 399 (hearing in lane granted on application of the union, panel decision vacated, and decision below affirmed), affirmed 370 U.S. 254, 82 S.Ct. 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 474; The F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 889 (heard in lane on court order and appeal dismissed), reversed United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d 721. Hearings in lane were denied by divided courts in Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 271 F.2d 740, cert. denied 361 U.S. 982, 80 S.Ct. 591, 4 L.Ed.2d 554; Glenmore v. Ahern, 2 Cir., 276 F.2d 525, 549, cert. denied Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Glenmore, 362 U.S. 964, 80 S.Ct. 877, 4 L.Ed.2d 878; and Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 2 Cir., 280 F.2d 800, 804, as well as in Carrier Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Cir., 311 F.2d 135 (on the applications of the N. L. R. B. and a union).

. Applications by Jones Act plaintiffs for rehearing in lane of panel decisions overturning awards in their favor were denied in Salem v. U. S. Lines Co., 2 Cir., 293 F.2d 121, reversed on this issue 370 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313, verdict reinstated 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 672; Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, Stockholm, Sweden, 2 Cir., 304 F.2d 506, 514; and the present case. A like application was denied to affirm a defendant’s decision below in Pinto v. States Marine Corp. of Del., 2 Cir., 298 F.2d 1, 8, cert. denied 309 U.S. 843, 82 S.Ct. 874, 7 L.Ed.2d 847. Our only grants of in lane in seamen’s cases are Reardon v. California Tanker Co., 2 Cir., 280 F.2d 369, 375, cert. denied California Tanker Co. v. Reardon, 359 U.S. 926, 79 S.Ct. 609, 3 L.Ed.2d 628; and Fitzgerald v. U. S. Lines Co., 2 Cir., 306 F.2d 461, cert. granted 371 U.S. 932, 83 S.Ct. 307, 9 L.Ed.2d 269, both involving special problems as to maintenance and cure only; also Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 303 F.2d 752, cert. denied 371 U.S. 840, 83 S.Ct. 67, 9 L.Ed.2d 75 where in lane was voted after published dissent protesting the initial denial, but the majority reaffirmed without reviewing the evidence on the issue of unseaworthiness. Bor other cases see notes 5 and 7 infra.

. For other cases during the last judicial term denying seamen’s recovery — in addition to those cited in note 4 supra— see Ezekiel v. Volusia S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 297 F.2d 215; Richter v. Mathiasen’s Tanker Industries, Inc., 2 Cir., 297 F.2d 494; Hooper v. Terminal S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 296 F.2d 281. Cases which went against this trend were Van Carpals v. S. S. American Harvester, 2 Cir., 297 F.2d 9, cert. denied U. S. Lines Co. v. Van Carpals, 369 U.S. 865, 82 S.Ct. 1031, 8 L.Ed.2d 84; Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 2 Cir., 298 F.2d 239; Usiak v. New York Tank Barge Co., 2 Cir., 299 F.2d 808; DeLima v. Trinidad Corp., 2 Cir., 302 F.2d 585.

. Compare cases cited in notes 4, 5 supra. It is not clear why certiorari is not sought in more of these cases; the cases may have been settled, and in any event the expense of litigation may be a bar to further action by needy litigants.

. Other reversals might include Palermo v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 355 U.S. 20, 78 S.Ct. 1, 2 L.Ed.2d 3, reversing 2 Cir., 246 F.2d 557; Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 459, 1 L.Ed.2d 515, reversing 2 Cir., 228 F.2d 891; and Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, vacating 2 Cir., 245 F.2d 175.

. See my dissents in cases cited in notes 4 and 5 supra.

. Hence nearly all the decisions cited in notes 2, 3, and 4 supra were rendered by sharply divided courts.