Court Opinion

ID: 9762034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:08:42.080662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.562503
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the judgment that the convictions should be affirmed. However, I dissent from that portion of the opinion which reverses the judgment setting the sentence and remands this case to the trial court for resen-tencing. The majority has expressed its dissatisfaction with the use of the enhancement factor, that the crime involved a victim and was committed to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7), in rape cases. I also do not agree with the concurring opinion or the cases cited therein, which seek to limit the use of this enhancement factor in rape cases.
As the writer of the majority points out, the appellant alleges that this factor should never apply because every rape is implicitly committed for the purpose of pleasure or excitement. Like the majority, I do not accept that as being a universal truth. However, at the same time, I do not believe that the sentencing court “must scrutinize this enhancement factor very closely before applying it to cases of rape.” I do not believe this factor should be any more closely scrutinized than any other enhancement or mitigating factor.
In cases of rape, as in all cases, the trial judge should look to the facts and circumstances of the offense. Some acts of rape apparently are committed for the pleasure that results from sexual intercourse. Others are pure acts of brutality, apparently resulting from a desire to abuse another human being. Rapes are not fungibles. All are different, just as all bank robberies and murders are different. Trial judges see those differences and sentence accordingly.
In this case the appellant, who was the victim’s supervisor, stalked the victim as she performed cleaning duties at Memorial Hospital. When she arrived at a deserted floor, he used the opportunity to rape her. It is clear from the facts that this offense was clearly committed to gratify the appellant’s desire for pleasure or excitement. The trial judge properly so found and applied that enhancement factor. I would affirm the judgment.