Court Opinion

ID: 9752098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:35:49.571868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:07.363767
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
dissenting. I dissent because the majority opinion fails to address defendant’s primary objection to the jury instruction on self-defense. Defendant argues that the court *313erred when it instructed the jury to measure the reasonableness of defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force against the standard of the hypothetical reasonable person. I agree with defendant because the instruction is contrary to our cases on the law of self-defense. I write also to state my disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of V.R.Cr.P. 30.
I.
It is unclear whether the majority is holding that the self-defense instruction in this case was a proper statement of the law or was harmless error. I believe it was neither. The charge both incorrectly stated the law and tended to mislead and confuse the jury.
The majority fails to address defendant’s primary objection because it assumes that defendant’s two distinct objections to the charge on self-defense are really one objection. Defendant objected to the proposed instructions by stating that “there is no reasonable person standard in Vermont in terms of self-defense. And that’s our primary objection I would say.” He requested the court to instruct the jury that one may use self-defense “if it reasonably appeared to the accused that it was necessary.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant also said, “there’s a secondary problem here that I think we need to discuss. ... I think . . . you are saying [the jury] can’t consider someone’s state of intoxication in determining the reasonableness of their expectation.” These separate concerns are apparently misunderstood by the majority, which writes that “[d]efendant’s apparent concern with the ... instruction was that the jury might find his claim of self-defense unreasonable because he had been intoxicated at the time and his memory of the killing was poor.” (Emphasis added.) Because defendant expressly stated two distinct objections, there is no need to search for his apparent concern.
While I agree with the majority that the court did not err when it instructed the jury to disregard defendant’s intoxication when assessing the reasonableness of his belief in the need to use deadly force, I believe that the court did err when it instructed on the “hypothetical reasonable person” standard. Defendant was entitled-to have the jury receive a clear and correct statement of the law that was neither confusing nor mis*314leading. See State v. Gokey, 136 Vt. 33, 36, 383 A.2d 601, 602-03 (1978) (incorrect statement of law in jury instruction that tends to mislead and confuse the jury warrants reversal); State v. Hanson, 134 Vt. 227, 232, 356 A.2d 517, 520 (1976) (instruction that is apt to confuse or mislead the jury is erroneous); State v. Audette, 128 Vt. 374, 378, 264 A.2d 786, 789 (1970) (court has primary duty to instruct clearly on applicable law).
The court called upon the jury to “measure the expectation of harm by a standard of what a hypothetical reasonable ordinary person might expect in the same situation as you find existed and which the defendant was in.” The court also instructed the jury to consider the “reasonable person” as if “in the defendant’s shoes.” Later, the court stated that “[y]ou should measure the expectation by what a non-impaired — that is a reasonable person — might expect, not, however, by what such a person in the defendant’s shoes and position might expect.” Twice, then, the court asked the jury to place the hypothetical reasonable person in defendant’s situation or “shoes.” Later, it instructed that they not consider his “shoes and position.”
The “hypothetical reasonable ordinary person” has no place in the law of self-defense in Vermont. Dating back to State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 48 A. 658 (1900), this Court consistently has made clear that a legal right to use deadly force rests on the reasonableness of the accused’s, not a hypothetical reasonable person’s, apprehension of danger. The Court wrote:
[Although it might not have been necessary to have killed [the victim], if in view of his fear, fright, nervousness, or cowardice, it reasonably seemed to him, he could not be convicted of murder. ... It is not whether the necessity actually existed, but whether in fact it reasonably seemed so to the respondent, under all the circumstances of the case ....
Id. at 396-97, 48 A. at 663 (emphases added). The rule that a defendant’s belief must be reasonable to him, rather than to a reasonable person, has been often repeated. See State v. Rounds, 104 Vt. 442, 451, 160 A. 249, 251 (1932) (justification depends on whether jury finds that necessity reasonably appeared to defendant); State v. Tubbs, 101 Vt. 5, 23, 139 A. 769, 776 (1928) (defendant may lawfully take a life if it “reasonably appear[s] to him” to be necessary); McQuiggan v. Ladd, 79 Vt. *31590, 105, 64 A. 503, 507 (1906) (proper inquiry for jury is whether necessity “reasonably appeared to [defendant]”).
The trial court, when it instructed the jury to “measure the expectation of harm by a standard of what a hypothetical reasonable ordinary person might expect in the same situation,” committed reversible error because it did not clearly and accurately state the law of self-defense. The jury should have been instructed to consider the physical and mental traits of defendant, as well as the attendant circumstances. “[T]he jury’s consideration of the unique physical and psychological characteristics of an accused allows the jury to judge the reasonableness of the accused’s actions against the accused’s subjective impressions . . . rather than against those impressions . . . that a hypothetical reasonably cautious person would have under similar circumstances.” State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983). Whether defendant differed from the hypothetical reasonable person, and to what degree, are matters for the jury and do not diminish his entitlement to a proper statement of the law.
Inconsistent statements within the instruction concerning whether the jury should consider defendant’s situation compound the error. Although the final statement — instructing the jury not to place the “reasonable person” in defendant’s shoes or position — apparently addressed defendant’s intoxication, its broad language and direct contradiction of earlier instructions serve to confuse and mislead. How could the jury not be confused by directly contradictory statements? In conclusion, the self-defense instruction in this case both failed to accurately state the law and tended to confuse and mislead the jury. Cf. State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (no error where charge as a whole breathes “the true spirit and doctrine of the law,” and there is no reasonable basis to find that the jury was misled by it).
II.
The majority cautions that failure to specifically renew objections after the charge, even where the trial judge states that objections made prior to the charge would be preserved, could result in waiver under V.R.Cr.P. 30. Specific objections after the charge, the majority argues, will “aid our review.” This *316cramped interpretation of Rule 30 creates a trap for unwary counsel and is not supported by either the language of the rule or case law.
Rule 30 requires parties to object to “any portion of the charge or omission therefrom .... before the jury retires to consider its verdict.” The rule does not specify, however, that the objection be made immediately before the jury retires. Indeed, the purpose of the rule — to permit the court to correct its errors — is better served by proper objection at the charge conference. Moreover, I cannot imagine how an objection on the record after the charge aids our review better than a precise objection on the record before the charge where, as here, counsel was fully aware of the text of the instruction when the objection was made.
Neither case relied upon by the majority supports the proposition for which it is advanced. State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 72, 574 A.2d 1248, 1253-54 (1990), does not involve the proper timing of objection under V.R.Cr.P. 30 but rather considers the issue of assertion of new grounds for objection on appeal. In that case, we merely recognized that the rule serves to “afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any error or oversight.” Id. This opportunity is better provided by precharge objections. State v. Hoadley, 147 Vt. 49, 52-53, 512 A.2d 879, 881 (1986), involves the failure to specifically state the grounds for objection and the failure to object at all. It does not address the proper timing of objections.
The better approach is to provide opportunity for appropriate objections at the precharge conference and then, after the charge, permit counsel to note for the record that earlier objections are renewed. Any new objections, of course, would have to be fully stated. The federal circuit courts of appeals which have confronted the issue under the identical federal rule have adopted this approach. The court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit praised it as saving time. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass’n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 1954). The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the language of the rule did not prohibit the practice and concluded that it “clearly enables the trial judge, in advance of instructing the jury, to have erroneous aspects pointed out to him.” United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535, 542 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis *317in original). The court of appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently aligned itself with the advocated approach: “We note parenthetically that [our earlier case addressing Rule 30] does not require objection to the court’s instructions to be taken after the instructions are given to the jury. To the extent that it has been so read it has been persuasively criticized.” United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1369 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining Dunn v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 370 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1966)) (emphasis in original). The court of appeals for the Second Circuit has noted that Rule 30 “does not require a lawyer to become a chattering magpie.” United States v. Kelinson, 205 F.2d 600, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1953) (reversing trial court for failing to give instruction that it told counsel it would give, although no objection made at the conclusion of charge). I agree with the approach adopted by these federal circuits.
I am authorized to say that Justice Gibson joins in this dissent.