Court Opinion

ID: 9644656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:01:33.627381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:16.407012
License: Public Domain

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee, the First Methodist Church of Marlin, Texas, bases its motion for rehearing upon the ground of nonjoinder of the Attorney General of Texas, asserting that the Attorney General is a necessary and indispensable party to this cause under the provisions of Article 4412a, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes. Appellee contends that since the Attorney General was never served with process as prescribed by Section 3 of Article 4412a, nor in any other manner joined as a party herein, that the judgment of the trial court is void and unenforceable, and should be set aside.
Moreover, the Attorney General has filed a motion in this court reciting that he has not been joined as a party either in the trial court or on appeal, and requests that the judgment of the trial court be vacated and set aside.
We sustain and grant both motions. This was and is a suit for declaratory judgment to construe the provisions of testamentary instruments creating and affecting a “charitable trust”, as that term is defined in Art. 4412a, and as such falls squarely within the provisions of said Article. Section 2 of the Article makes the Attorney General of Texas a necessary party to an action to construe any instrument, testamentary or otherwise, affecting a charitable trust. Section 4 declares that a judgment rendered in a suit of this nature is void and unenforceable “without service or process upon the Attorney General”, and further provides that “any such judgment shall be set aside upon motion of the Attorney General filed at any time thereafter.”
In the case at bar, failure to join the Attorney General is fundamental error and thereby renders void the trial court’s judgment. See Akin Foundation v. Trustees for *452the Preston Road Church of Christ (Texarkana, Tex.Civ.App., 1963) 367 S.W.2d 351, no writ; In Re Estate of Bourland v. Hanes (Corpus Christi, Tex.Civ.App., 1975) 526 S.W.2d 156, NRE.
Under these circumstances, this court has jurisdiction to declare the invalidity of the trial court’s judgment and to set it aside. Williams v. Steele (1908) 101 Tex. 382, 108 S.W. 155, 157; Henn v. City of Amarillo (1957) 157 Tex. 129, 301 S.W.2d 71, 73.
Moreover, as we understand the pronouncements of our Supreme Court, the proper disposition of this matter in this state of the record is to reverse and remand the cause to the trial court with direction that the original plaintiffs have a reasonable time to effect the joinder of the Attorney General of Texas as a party to the suit. See Adams v. Bankers Life Co. (Comm.App. 1931) 36 S.W.2d 182, opinion approved; Sharpe v. Landowners Oil Assn. (1936) 127 Tex. 147, 92 S.W.2d 435, opinion adopted; Mason v. Mason (Tex.1963) 366 S.W.2d 552. In this connection also see Akin Foundation v. Trustees for Preston Road Church of Christ (Texarkana, Tex.Civ.App., 1963) 367 S.W.2d 351, no writ. It is so ordered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.