Court Opinion

ID: 9648476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:23:09.423034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:00.977377
License: Public Domain

*30Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by
Mb. Justice Bell :
Justice Chidsey-'s opinion is excellent as far as it goes, but in two respects it does not go far enough.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree; the jury rejected defendant’s defense of insanity and fixed the penalty at death. A motion was made by defendant for a new trial but before that motion' was disposed of and before sentence, a petition was presented to the Court for the appointment of a Sanity Commission under §8J¡1¡. of the Mental Health Act of June 12, 1951, P. L. 533, as amended.. Commitment was denied by the lower Court and the defendant took this appeal.
In Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 100 A. 2d 472, where the appeal sur the petition for commitment was taken after conviction of murder and sentence thereon, we said (page 375) :
“The Mental Health Act of 1951 is silent on the question of appellate review where commitment is denied. The law is now well settled that ‘where the statute is silent on the question of appeal a review by certiorari may be had “in the broadest sense” and the court may consider the record, including the testimony, to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law erroneously made.’: Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 519, 55 A. 2d 534; Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 474, 475, 9 A. 2d 408, 411; Bureau of Highway Safety v. Wright, 355 Pa. 307, 49 A. 2d 783; Bangor Electric Co.’s Petition, 295 Pa. 228, 232, 145 A. 128; Clarke’s Case, 301 Pa. 321, 326, 152 A. 92, 94.
“If a commission is appointed its findings are advisory and not mandatory upon the Court — under the Act it is the Court and not the psychiatrist or the *31Sanity Commission which must he satisfied that the petitioner is insane or mentally ill. (Subsection (d) of §345.)”
Four important questions arise: (1) Is the appeal interlocutory; (2) What was the applicable test prior to The Mental Health Act of 1951; (3) What is the meaning of The Mental Health Act, as amended January 14,1951 (1952), P. L. 2053, so far as it is applicable to persons convicted or sentenced for murder; and (4) Is this section of the Act valid?
The Court below after reviewing the evidence taken before the Sanity Commission and its report, as well as the evidence taken at the trial of the murder indictment, found that the defendant was at the time of the petition legally sane, refused the commitment, and ordered the proceedings in the criminal trial to continue.
All of the members of this Court are in accord: (1) That we will never knowingly permit an insane man to be tried or sentenced or executed: Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa., supra (p. 377); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 116, 71 A. 2d 107; Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 A. 611; Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book IV, §24, page 1440; 3 Coke’s Inst. 4; (2) That when insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal trial the M’Naghten Buie (the right or wrong test) applies, i.e., did the defendant know the nature and consequences of his act and the difference between.right and wrong: M’Naghten’s Case, TO Cl. & Fin. 200 (1843) ; Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A. 2d 287; Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A. 2d 276; and (3) the test applicable for a continuance because of alleged insanity or mental incapacity is not the right , or wrong test, but the ability of the accused to comprehend the existing situation and to make or aid his counsel in making a proper de*32fense: Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 124, 176 A. 454; Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 A. 611. The humanitarian reason for this test is likewise the basic reason for The Mental Health Acts.
The petition for commitment under The Mental Health Act was an inseparable part of the case of Commonwealth v. Moon sur the indictment and trial for murder. The evidence taken at the murder trial was, as we have seen, relevant in the consideration and determination of the petition for commitment. The first question that arises therefore is:
When, in the preservation of Justice for all, and in the orderly administration of Law, should an appeal to this Court be allowed where the sanity or mental illness of a person convicted of murder (or voluntary manslaughter), but not yet sentenced, is raised?
The general rule is long and well established that a defendant has no standing to appeal, even after conviction, where no sentence or other final judgment has been entered against him: Commonwealth v. Hall, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 285, 98 A. 2d 386; Commonwealth v. Hicks, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 395, 98 A. 2d 478; Commonwealth v. Trufley, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 200, 85 A. 2d 622; Commonwealth v. Graham, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 343, 85 A. 2d 632; Commonwealth v. Feldman, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 3, 46 A. 2d 332; Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211, 82 A. 2d 244.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 218) : “ ‘appeals may not be taken in criminal proceedings where judgment of sentence has not been passed.’ ”
In Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A. 2d 854, the Court said: “Even with the consent of all interested pallies, appellate jurisdiction of an interlocutory order or decree may not he assumed: Stadler v. Mt. Oliver Borough [373 Pa. 316, 95 A. 2d 776], The *33evident policy of the law in such regard is to preclude piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.”
Especially in those cases where insanity or mental inability to properly defend himself is offered as a reason (for acquittal or) for a stay or a continuance of further proceedings, Pennsylvania has been very liberal in sustaining the rights of any person accused of crime. For example, in Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa., supra, the defendant, subsequent to conviction and sentence for murder and after affirmation thereof by this Court, petitioned for commitment under The Mental Health Act. This Court allowed an appeal since the Order of the Court below which dismissed the petition was a final Order; and on the basis of a broad certiorari we reviewed the entire record in that hearing and in the criminal case. But that case does not justify an appeal before sentence from an Order refusing commitment or from any other interlocutory Order.* Under similar circumstances, Courts of our *34sister States have refused review of any nature: Bingham v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 305, 169 P. 2d 311; Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 P. 800; Darnell v. State, 24 Texas C. App. 6, 5 S.W. 522; State ex rel. Lyons v. Chretien, 114 La. 81, 38 So. 27; Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87.
In People v. Ross, 344 Ill. App. 407, 101 N.E. 2d 112; in People v. Cornelius, 332 Ill. App. 271, 74 N.E. 2d 900; and in Crocker v. State, 60 Wis. 553, 19 N.W. 435, the defendant was found to be insane by the trial Court before or during the trial; nevertheless an appeal from an Order of Commitment was dismissed on the ground that the Order was interlocutory and therefore non-appealable.
This appeal should a fortiori be quashed (1) because it is clearly interlocutory; and (2) because of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427,'§57; and (3) because of §347 of The Mental Health Act of 1951, as amended, supra; and (4) because the allowance of an appeal, if a commitment be ordered before the motion for new trial is disposed of, may result in injustice to the law-abiding people of Pennsylvania.
The Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §57, which governs appeals in homicide cases, reads as follows:"Upon the trial of any indictment for murder* or voluntary manslaughter, it shall and may be lawful for the defendant or defendants to except to any decision of the court upon any point of evidence or law, which exception- shall be noted by the court, and filed of record as in civil cases, and a writ of error to the supreme court may be taken by the defendant or defendants, after conviction and sentence.” This section of the Act is clear; it has never been amended, and it should be *35construed by the Courts in accordance with its clear meaning and intent.
Section 347 of The Mental Health Act of 1951, as amended, supra, provides (page 2067) :
“Section 347. Effect of Commitment on Pending Criminal Proceedings. If any person is committed while awaiting indictment or trial, or has been arraigned or is being tried, proceedings a,gainst him shall be stayed until his recovery or sufficient improvement of condition. Upon his recovery or sufficient improvement of condition, if he was previously confined in a penal or correctional institution, he shall be returned upon proper order of the court to the penal ,or correctional institution from which he was transferred, for the disposition of the charges against him. If he was committed before trial, he shall be returned to the court having jurisdiction of him, for trial or such other disposition of such charges as the court may make.”
Criminal proceedings against a defendant are to be stayed only if he is mentally ill and then only if he was committed while awaiting indictment or trial, or while he was being tried. Defendant obviously does not fall within this section.
Equally clarifying and analogous,. §343 (d) of The Mental Health Act of 1951, supra, provides (page 555) : “(d) When a defendant is committed to an institution, an appeal shall lie in the same manner and with like, effect as if sentence to a penal or correctional institution had been imposed, and may be taken by defendant or his counsel.” This defendant was never committed and therefore an appeal is not authorized.
Moreover, if this defendant is committed before his motion for a new trial is disposed of, it may be many many years before he appears in Court for a re-determination of his sanity or mental condition. In the meantime the Court may forget what happened at the *36trial when it comes to passing upon some alleged trial errors and other trial matters particularly within the knowledge of the trial Judge, or the trial Judge may die; also there will likely be a loss of witnesses or at least a dimming of their recollection. Dilatory or delaying tactics are well known devices employed by criminals to obstruct or defeat justice and such tactics or motions should be rejected by the Courts whenever reasonably possible.
On the other hand, if the lower Court first disposes of defendant’s motion for new trial and then imposes a sentence upon the verdict and orders or refuses commitment, this Court can still preserve to defendant all his legal rights, including the question of his sanity or mental illness and his ability to aid counsel in properly defending him and/or in preparing a motion and reasons for a new trial. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that these questions can be determined by this Court within a period of a few months.
In the light of all the cases hereinabove cited and of the said Acts, and for the additional reasons hereinabove set forth, it is clear that the appeal in this case is untimely, premature, and interlocutory and should be quashed.
Three cases are relied on to sustain this appeal; all of them are so extraordinary in their facts as to stand alone and furnish no precedent for a case such as the instant one. In Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 A. 454, defendant was convicted of murder with the penalty of life imprisonment. Although the time was ripe for sentence the trial Judge refused to sentence the defendant, but instead committed him. The Court wisely allowed defendant’s appeal and said: “It is true that the rule is that There must be a final judgment or something in the nature of a final judgment before it is ripe for review in this court.’ But *37this rule has, in exceptional cases and to safeguard basic human rights, been construed as not being one of unyielding flexibility.” Moreover, in that case all of the experts for the Commonwealth and for the defendant agreed before the trial that defendant was insane at the time of the killing and also at the time of the trial, and even the District Attorney protested to the trial Judge against the trial of a man whom they all agreed was insane.
In Commonwealth v. Trunk et al., 311 Pa. 555, 167 A. 333, several defendants were tried together on a number of indictments charging offenses all of which were part of a continuous series of events, and the Court felt it was an injustice to the defendants to sentence them on certain indictments and suspend sentence on others. Under these peculiar circumstances the Court allowed an appeal from the indictments upon which sentence was suspended, as well as from the judgments of sentence. This Court recognized the general rule but held that under the exceptional facts there present, there was an abuse of judicial discretion in suspending sentence upon the bills upon which the Court below did not act.
In Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A. 2d 780, this Court allowed an appeal from the refusal of a motion to quash criminal indictments because the nature of the charges vitally affected the public interest and the defendant’s constitutional rights were palpably violated, and the exceptional circumstances justified us in entertaining the appeal.
Obviously there is nothing so exceptional about the present status of the defendant as to bring him within the exceptional cases above set forth or require a departure from the well established rule. This long established principle of non-appealability of interlocutory orders, especially in criminal cases, prevents piece*38meal determination of such cases and thus enables the Court to more wisely and justly determine the questions involved in the light of all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence and the entire record. Equally important, it eliminates costly and time-consuming delays in the orderly and speedy administration of justice and places a needed restriction upon the well known practice of criminals to obstruct or defeat justice by resorting to every conceivable technicality, dilatory motions, and delaying tactics.
For all these reasons I would, I repeat, quash this appeal.
If the appeal is not quashed, we should affirm the judgment of the lower Court.

The Mental Health Act of 1951

The basic purpose of the Mental Health Acts is worthy i.e., to protect by hospitalization and medical care those who are really mentally ill. The Acts should be read in the light of that purpose and should not be used as a device to allow dangerous criminals to escape just punishment for their crimes, viz., life imprisonment in jail or execution in murder cases. The main purpose of such punishment, it is often forgotten, is to deter crime and protect society.
An Act or a section of an Act will be declared invalid and void when it is so indefinite or uncertain or so vague or ambiguous or confusing or its provisions are so inconsistent or conflicting or incomplete that the Courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the Legislature actually intended: Panther Valley Television v. Summit Hill, 376 Pa. 375, 102 A. 2d 699; Miller v. Belmont Co., 268 Pa. 51, 63, 110 A. 802; Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A. 2d 649; Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A. 2d 280; Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578, 73 A. 2d 381; Sablosky v. Messner, 372 Pa. 47, 92 A. 2d *39411; Commonwealth v. Hallberg, 374 Pa. 554, 97 A. 2d 849. Moreover, it should likewise be declared inoperative and void if the only meaning which can reasonably be given it will produce a result which is absurd, since there is a presumption that the Legislature never intended an unreasonable and absurd result. Cf. Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, §52, 46 PS 552.
As so often happens in a very long Act, some provisions thereof are uncertain or confusing or inconsistent or conflicting.
Section considered and construed with §343 and §102 of The Mental Health Act of 1951, P. L. 533, as amended 1951, January 14 (1952), P. L. 2053, is indefinite and uncertain and its provisions construed with others are conflicting, inconsistent and absurd.
Section 344 (a) (1), (2) and (c) (pages 2065-2066) reads as follows:
“(a) Petition for commitment of—
“(1) Any person detained in any penal or correctional institution who is thought to be mentally ill or in such condition that he requires care in a mental hospital, or who is thought to be a mental defective [or epileptic].
“(2) Any person charged with a crime and released on bail pending trial who is. thought to be mentally ill or a mental defective [or epileptic] may be made to the court under the order of which such person is detained or which has jurisdiction of the charge.
“(c) No application shall be made for the commitment of any mental defective convicted of first degree murder
Section 344 says that a person who is mentally ill or a mental defective who is detained in jail may be committed to a mental hospital unless he is a mental defective who has been convicted of first degree mur*40der. In other words, a mental defective who is in jail and indicted for murder can be put in a mental hospital and never tried for murder, but if he has been convicted of first degree murder he cannot be committed to a mental hospital. This is so absurd that it could not have been the intent of the Legislature and cannot be sustained.
“Section 343. Commitment of Convicted Person in Lieu of Sentence After Eeport of Psychiatrist.— (a) Whenever any person is convicted of a crime punishable by sentence to a penal or correctional institution, the trial court may defer sentence and order a mental examination of the defendant to guide it in determining his disposition. Such action may be taken on the court’s initiative, or on the application of the district attorney, the defendant, or his counsel or other person acting in his interest.” This all-embracing section makes no exceptions. It pertains just as much to every mental defective who is convicted of first degree murder as does §344. Section 344(c) is inconsistent with and conflicting with (a) §343 as well as (b) Art. VII, §701, Murder, etc., Penal Code of 1939, P. L. 872, which authorizes the jury or the Court to fix the penalty at life imprisonment or death, and with (c) prior decisions of this Court which hold that a mental defective can be tried and convicted of murder and executed pursuant to sentence thereon.
Section 102 (9), page 2055, defines a mental defective as “a person who is not mentally ill but whose mental development is so retarded that he has not acquired enough self-control, judgment and discretion to manage himself and his affairs, and for whose welfare or that of others care is necessary or advisable. The term shall include ‘feeble-minded,’ ‘moron,’ ‘idiot’ and ‘imbecile,’ but shall not include ‘mental illness,’ ‘inebriate’ and ‘senile.’ ”
*41Section 102 (11), page 2055, defines mental illness as “an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to nse his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care. The term shall include ‘insanity,’ ‘unsoundness of mind,’ ‘lunacy,’ ‘mental disease,’ ‘mental disorder,’ and all other types of mental cases, but the term shall not include ‘mental [defectiveness] deficiency,’ ‘epilepsy,’ ‘inebriety,’ or ‘senility,’ unless mental illness is superimposed.”
Section 102 (9) and section 102 (11) apply equally to and equally govern a person who has not enough self-control, judgment and discretion to manage his own affairs and who for his own welfare or that of others needs care. A mental defective (a feeble minded person or moron) never possessed the above characteristics, to wit, such self-control, judgment and discretion; the lunatic, the insane and all persons suffering from any other mental illness, possessed them but lost them. The care, treatment and punishment for each mental class is equal except as to persons who may be convicted of first degree murder, in which case the mentally ill person who is otherwise sane, but has a delusion that he is Babe Ruth or Caruso or Napoleon or President of the United States, or has some other mental disorder or mental illness less severe than insanity, goes to a hospital and the mental defective, who is less able to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion, goes (as under our cases and under §344(c) he must) to the death chair or imprisonment in jail for life. There is no legal or humanitarian justification for such a distinction. It is contrary to the decided cases and if the Legislature wishes to permit a convicted murderer who is neither insane nor a mental defective to escape execution or life imprisonment in *42jail, it is not asking too much to require it to amend the Penal Code and to clearly and unequivocally say so.*
To summarize: I would quash this appeal as interlocutory for the reasons hereinabove set forth. If the appeal is considered on its merits, I would hold that §344 of The Mental Health Act, purportedly relating to persons detained in jail or convicted of murder, is, when considered with other sections of The Mental Health Act and with the Act of March 31, 1860, so confusing, conflicting, uncertain and absurd, as to be void. I would therefore sustain the insanity test applied by the Court below and would remand the case to the lower Court for disposition of defendant’s motion for a new trial and a sentence on the verdict or such other decision as it deems proper not inconsistent with this opinion.

 This Court has consistently quashed as premature or interlocutory, appeals from orders, judgments or decrees which did not constitute a final disposition of the case, even though such “quashing” (a) necessitated trials or proceedings which often proved unnecessary and at times were obviously so, and (b) unnecessarily cost the party-appellant large sums of money, as weU as waste of time and effort and considerable mental strain. See: McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 114 A. 2d 141; Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa., supra; Epstein v. Kramer, 374 Pa. 112, 96 A. 2d 912; Stadler v. Mt. Oliver Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A. 2d 776; O’Hara Township Election Case, 370 Pa. 250, 87 A. 2d 788; Mackowain v. Gulf Oil Corp., 369 Pa. 581, 87 A. 2d 314; Marsh v. Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 319; Bingham v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 305, 169 P. 2d 311; Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 P. 800; Darnell v. State, 24 Texas C. App. 6, 5 S.W. 522; State ex rel. Lyons v. Chretien, 114 La. 81, 38 So. 27; Ex parte Chesser, 93 Pla. 590, 112 So. 87. Even though I believe some of these decisions were unwise, they represent the law of Pennsylvania.

Italics throughout, ours.

 See also §342 of The Mental Health Act, which provides: “Whenever any person charged with crime, upon production or appearance before the court, appears to be mentally ill or in need of care in a mental hospital, the court shall designate a responsible person to apply for his commitment . . .”. The mental defective is not provided for by this section or any similar section of the Act even though, by definition, he is suffering from the same loss of self-control, judgment and discretion as the person suffering from mental illness, and both are equally dangerous to society.