Court Opinion

ID: 9849189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:56.276224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:05.917991
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
I fully concur in the majority holding “that individuals who do not themselves qualify as employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged discriminatory acts.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 663.) I write separately with respect to plaintiff’s Tameny cause of action {Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314]) to reiterate my view that under no circumstances should the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) serve as the predicate public policy for the common law tort of wrongful discharge. {Stevenson v. *666Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 911-925 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157] (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) “FÉHA is a comprehensive statute that carefully balances complementary administrative and judicial remedies not only to make whole victims of discrimination in the workplace, but also to penalize these unlawful business practices and prevent their recurrence. Permitting a parallel common law tort claim puts courts in the untenable position of using a legislative declaration of public policy as a touchstone to justify duplicative remedies that ultimately can serve only to frustrate legislative intent. In addition, recognizing a FEHA-based cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy contradicts the rationale of this exception to the at-will employment doctrine. When the Legislature has provided an adequate statutory remedy to fully protect the interests of both the employee and the public, the courts have neither reason nor need to intercede.” (Id. at p. 912.)
Baxter, J., concurred.