Court Opinion

ID: 9699148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:11:36.915449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.893387
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, C.J.,
in which MURPHY, J. joins.
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, I would affirm the conclusion of the State Board of Law Examiners that Gregory John Strzempek, the petitioner, possesses the requisite moral character and fitness for the practice of law, required for admission to the Maryland bar, and, in deference to its recommendation that we do so, admit him to practice in Maryland.
To be sure, character matters proceed in this Court on the “records made before Character Committee and the [State] Board [of Law Examiners,]” Rule 5(d)(3) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland, and this Court “make[s] its own independent evaluation of the applicant’s present moral character based upon testimony and evidence submitted before the Character Committee and the State Board [of Law Examiners].” In re Stern, 403 Md. 615, 630, 943 A.2d 1247, 1255 (2008); In re Application of Brown, 392 Md. 44, 55, 895 A.2d 1050, 1056 (2006). Nevertheless, it is also true that the conclusion of the Board that an applicant does or, does not, possess the requisite moral character fitness, is entitled to great weight by this Court. See In re Application of Stern, 403 Md. 615, 943 A.2d 1247 (2008); In re Application of Hyland, 339 Md. 521, 663 A.2d 1309 (1995); In re Application of Charles M., 313 Md. 168, 545 A.2d 7 (1988); In re Application of Maria C, 294 Md. 538, 451 A.2d 655 (1982); In re Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 434 A.2d 541 (1981); In re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 408 A.2d 1023 (1979); In re Application of David H., 283 Md. 632, 392 A.2d 83 (1978); In re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 387 A.2d 271 (1978); Character Committee v. Mandras, 233 Md. 285, 196 *117A.2d 630 (1964). Indeed, as I pointed out in In re Application of Brown, 392 Md. 44, 65-66, 895 A.2d 1050, 1062-63 (2006), in dissent:
“that this Court accepts the recommendation of the Board is the rule and the failure to do so, the exception. See In the Matter of the Application of William H. Hyland, 339 Md. 521, 536, 663 A.2d 1309, 1316 (1995); In the Matter of the Application of Charles M., 313 Md. 168, 178, 545 A.2d 7, 12 (1988); In re Application of Maria C., 294 Md. 538, 451 A.2d 655 (1982); In re Application of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 (1982); In the Matter of the Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 515, 408 A.2d 1023, 1028 (1979). See also In re Sanderson, 387 Md. 352, 875 A.2d 702 (2005); In re Costanzo, 385 Md. 122, 867 A.2d 1039 (2005); In re Lawson, 380 Md. 194, 844 A.2d 405 (2004); In re Application of Rosendale, 372 Md. 691, 816 A.2d 68 (2003); In re Application of Alonso, 372 Md. 136, 812 A.2d 291 (2002); In re Gardner, 368 Md. 505, 796 A.2d 90 (2002); In re Levenson, 356 Md. 1, 736 A.2d 1056 (1999); In re Alexander, 355 Md. 284, 734 A.2d 241 (1999).”
It is true, of course, that this Court has refused to accept the Board’s recommendation, but, as I noted in Brown, 392 Md. at 66, 895 A.2d at 1063, in the last thirty years, only nine times out of an approximate sixty-five cases. See In re Application of Boccone, 373 Md. 358, 818 A.2d 1077 (2003)(or-der only); In re Hersh, 354 Md. 329, 731 A.2d 438 (1999)(order only); Application of Vann, 349 Md. 101, 707 A.2d 87 (1998)(order only); Application of Dortch, 344 Md. 376, 687 A.2d 245 (1997)(order only); Application of J.L.L., 304 Md. 394, 499 A.2d 935 (1985)(order only); Application of George B., 297 Md. 421, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983); Application of K.B., 291 Md. 170, 434 A.2d 541 (1981); Application of David H., 283 Md. 632, 392 A.2d 83 (1978); Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 387 A.2d 271 (1978). More significantly, I pointed out, id.,
“In those instances in which we declined to follow the Board’s recommendation with respect to the grant or denial of an applicant’s application for admission, factual determi*118nations were not dispositive or even in conflict. In fact, the facts in those cases were clear and undisputed and there were no credibility issues to be resolved.”
As in Brown, there are factual determinations that were required to be made and that were made in this case. To be sure, those determinations largely related to motive and intent, but they were, here as in Brown, factual determinations nevertheless. And they depend on an assessment of the petitioner’s credibility. In this case, the Board held a hearing at which the petitioner appeared and testified. Having seen and heard him, the Board, unanimously, concluded that Mr. Strzempek had “no intention of being admitted under what he characterized as ‘false pretenses.’ ” Necessarily, the Board had to have found the petitioner credible. The majority did not defer to that finding when it said, regarding Mr. Strzempek’s failure to disclose his arrest, convictions, and sentence to the Character Committee, despite being aware of his duty to disclose, “[h]is choice not to disclose in the face of these known obligations, however, impinges upon his character and fitness to practice law, irrespective of any purported ultimate intent.” Strzempek, [at 114, 962 A.2d at 995]. On the contrary, it in effect, made its own credibility finding; certainly, rather than defer to the Board, it all but disregarded the Board’s finding.
The Board also concluded that Mr. Strzempek’s “arrest, conviction and late disclosure were aberrations and there is no reason to believe the conduct will be repeated” and that it was “unanimously satisfied that the Applicant has met his burden of proving that he currently possesses good moral character and fitness for membership in the Bar of Maryland and recommends his admission.” These conclusions, too, necessarily were undergirded by the Board’s credibility determination, its having believed the petitioner. Again, the majority refuses to afford that determination any deference. Instead, inappropriately and erroneously, it makes its own credibility determination.1
*119The record of the proceedings before the Board is clear and unanimous. The Board had an opportunity to see and hear the petitioner when he testified and, accordingly, assess his credibility. I continue in the views expressed in Brown:
“That the proceedings in this Court are to be on the records made before the Committee and the Board does not mean, and cannot mean, that the Court may pick and choose the fact-findings to credit. It may, of course, determine whether any factual finding is clearly erroneous, but that does not equate to its being permitted to choose between conflicting findings____ Otherwise, the Board’s recommendations would be reduced to simple suggestions and its role would be essentially meaningless. Certainly this is not the intent of Rule 5(d)(3) or of our jurisprudence on the subject.”
In re Brown, 392 Md. at 73, 895 A.2d at 1067.
I would admit Mr. Strzempek to the practice of law in Maryland.
Judge MURPHY joins in the views expressed herein.

. It must be acknowledged that the Character Committee reached the same conclusion as the majority with regard to the petitioner’s credibil*119ity. That does not explain or make the majority’s disregard of the Board's finding any more acceptable. It is the Board’s decision that is reviewed, even though the record is that before both the Character Committee and the Board. The question is whether the Board got it right, not whether the Character Committee did. See e.g., Maryland Code (2004 Replacement Volume), § 10-209(e)(2) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article ("The Board shall report to the Court of Appeals ... recommendations about the character and reputation of each applicant who passes the examination.”).