Court Opinion

ID: 9410075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 13:01:30.430643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.255300
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1575    Document: 54     Page: 1   Filed: 07/06/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                JACQUANA WILLIAMS,
                     Petitioner

                             v.

          FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                        2022-1575
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of an arbitrator’s decision in No.
 210604-07363 by Stephen Douglas Bonney.
                  ______________________

                   Decided: July 6, 2023
                  ______________________

    JACK K. WHITEHEAD, JR., Whitehead Law Firm, Baton
 Rouge, LA, argued for petitioner. Also represented by
 JOHN-ED LONG BISHOP.

     EBONIE I. BRANCH, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

  Before MOORE, Chief Judge, MAYER and HUGHES, Circuit
                        Judges.
Case: 22-1575    Document: 54     Page: 2   Filed: 07/06/2023

 2                                          WILLIAMS   v. BOP

 MOORE, Chief Judge.
     Jacquana Williams appeals an arbitrator’s final deci-
 sion upholding her removal from the Federal Bureau of
 Prisons (BOP). Because the arbitrator failed to properly
 analyze the Douglas factors, we vacate and remand.
                       BACKGROUND
     Ms. Williams was employed as a correctional officer
 with the BOP at the Federal Correctional Complex in
 Beaumont, Texas (FCC-Beaumont) beginning March 4,
 2018. Around January 2016, Ms. Williams met Alex
 Hayes. The two were engaged in July 2018 and had a child
 in September 2018. Mr. Hayes had been in BOP custody
 from June 2005 until July 2013, including as an inmate at
 FCC-Beaumont from June 2005 to October 2006. He was
 on supervised release until July 15, 2018. Although Ms.
 Williams knew Mr. Hayes had previously been incarcer-
 ated, she was unaware he had been in federal custody.
     In May 2019, after learning of Ms. Williams’ relation-
 ship with Mr. Hayes, the BOP placed Ms. Williams on ad-
 ministrative reassignment, and Internal Affairs launched
 an investigation into whether Ms. Williams maintained im-
 proper contact with a former inmate and failed to report
 such contact. Under the Standards of Employee Conduct,
 employees may not “show partiality toward, or become
 emotionally, physically, sexually, or financially involved
 with inmates, [or] former inmates.” Appx. 73. 1 If employ-
 ees engage in improper contact with inmates or former in-
 mates, then they must report the contact in writing to the
 BOP. Appx. 74. The Standards define “former inmate” as
 “[a]n inmate for whom less than one year has elapsed since
 his/her release from [BOP] custody or supervision of a

     1  “Appx.” refers to the appendix filed by the BOP.
 “S. Appx.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed by Ms.
 Williams.
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 WILLIAMS   v. BOP                                          3

 Federal court[,] . . . whichever is later.” Appx. 72. Mr.
 Hayes met this definition of “former inmate” until July 15,
 2019, one year after his supervised release ended.
      While Internal Affairs’ investigation was pending, Ms.
 Williams heard rumors about why she was reassigned, in-
 cluding that she was in a relationship with a former in-
 mate. After questioning Mr. Hayes, she learned for the
 first time, on June 3, 2019, that he had been incarcerated
 in federal prison. She reported her relationship to the BOP
 the next day.
     Internal Affairs concluded its investigation on July 8,
 2019, finding Ms. Williams had engaged in improper con-
 tact with a former inmate and failed to timely report the
 contact. On February 5, 2020, the BOP issued a notice of
 proposed removal based on two charges: (1) improper con-
 tact with a former inmate; and (2) failure to timely report.
 The warden sustained the charges and removed Ms. Wil-
 liams effective April 22, 2021.
     Ms. Williams challenged her removal with an arbitra-
 tor through the negotiated grievance procedure. After a
 hearing, the arbitrator sustained the charge of improper
 contact with a former inmate. He found Ms. Williams vio-
 lated the BOP’s anti-fraternization rule from March 5,
 2018 until July 15, 2019. The arbitrator, however, did not
 sustain the BOP’s charge of failure to report. He found Ms.
 Williams did not learn Mr. Hayes was a former federal in-
 mate until June 3, 2019 and reported it immediately. The
 arbitrator nevertheless upheld the BOP’s penalty of re-
 moval because he determined the warden considered the
 relevant Douglas factors and exercised his discretion
 “within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” Appx. 26–31.
 Ms. Williams appeals. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C.
 §§ 7121(f), 7703(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
Case: 22-1575     Document: 54      Page: 4    Filed: 07/06/2023

 4                                             WILLIAMS   v. BOP

                          DISCUSSION
      A federal employee seeking to challenge disciplinary
 action by her employing agency may either appeal her
 claim to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or
 take her claim to an arbitrator through a negotiated griev-
 ance procedure created by collective bargaining agreement.
 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1); Buffkin v. Dep’t of Def., 957 F.3d
 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We review the arbitrator’s de-
 cision under the same standard of review that applies to
 appeals from the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f). We must af-
 firm the arbitrator’s decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, ca-
 pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
 accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”            5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c).
      To take adverse action against an employee, an agency
 must show the charged conduct occurred, it affected the ef-
 ficiency of service, and “the penalty imposed was reasona-
 ble in light of the relevant factors set forth in Douglas.”
 Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 578 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
 2009) (citing Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313
 (1981)). Ms. Williams does not challenge the sustained
 charge on appeal; she only challenges the penalty of re-
 moval. Specifically, she argues the arbitrator failed to per-
 form the proper analysis of the Douglas factors in
 upholding her removal. We agree.
     When an arbitrator sustains fewer than all of the
 agency’s charges, the arbitrator “may mitigate to the max-
 imum reasonable penalty” for the sustained charges unless
 the agency has indicated it desires a lesser penalty be im-
 posed on fewer charges. Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246,
 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, the BOP did not indicate it
 desired a lesser penalty than removal if the arbitrator only
 sustained the improper contact charge. Accordingly, be-
 cause the arbitrator only sustained one of the BOP’s two
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 WILLIAMS   v. BOP                                           5

 charges, he was required to independently determine the
 maximum reasonable penalty to be imposed upon Ms. Wil-
 liams. In such circumstances, the arbitrator must inde-
 pendently analyze and balance the relevant Douglas
 factors. Tartaglia v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 858 F.3d 1405,
 1408 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
     The arbitrator failed to conduct the independent anal-
 ysis required under Lachance and Tartaglia. Rather, he
 simply deferred to the warden’s analysis of the relevant
 Douglas factors. See Appx. 26–31. In upholding the pen-
 alty of removal, the arbitrator stated:
     On these facts, the just and fair thing to do would
     be to set aside the removal in favor of a long sus-
     pension, reinstate [Ms. Williams] to her position as
     a federal corrections officer, and order a back pay
     remedy. If this were a private sector case, I would
     do the just and fair thing, and I would have rea-
     sonable confidence that the courts would not over-
     turn my decision. But the controlling law requires
     me to sustain the Agency’s chosen penalty “if the
     Agency considered all of the relevant [Douglas] fac-
     tors and exercised management discretion within
     tolerable limits of reasonableness.” Thus, in my
     judgment, I am constrained to uphold the removal
     because management considered – perhaps by rote
     – the relevant Douglas factors and exercised its dis-
     cretion – by only the narrowest of possible margins
     – within tolerable limits of reasonableness.
 Appx. 31 (second alteration in original) (italics added) (in-
 ternal citation omitted). It is clear from this passage the
 arbitrator misunderstood the relevant legal standard. In-
 deed, in summarizing the relevant law, he stated, “an
 agency’s decision with respect to penalty is entitled to def-
 erence.” Appx. 27. While this is generally the case, the
 arbitrator failed to appreciate that when he sustains fewer
 than all of the agency’s charges, he is the one who must
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 6                                             WILLIAMS   v. BOP

 determine the maximum reasonable penalty.           See Tar-
 taglia, 858 F.3d at 1408.
     Despite this, the BOP argues the arbitrator conducted
 the proper analysis simply because he discussed specific
 Douglas factors. See Appx. 26–29. The arbitrator’s discus-
 sion of the Douglas factors, however, amounted to nothing
 more than a deferential review of the warden’s analysis of
 the factors. For example, with respect to the final Douglas
 factor, the arbitrator simply found “the Warden enter-
 tained the possibility of lesser sanctions but rejected that
 possibility in favor of removal” because “the Warden testi-
 fied that his loss of confidence in [Ms. Williams] took all
 options other than removal off the table.” Appx. 29. Such
 reasoning only speaks to whether the warden considered
 the effectiveness of alternative sanctions, not whether the
 arbitrator himself believed alternative sanctions would be
 effective to deter similar misconduct.
      Not only did the arbitrator fail to independently ana-
 lyze the appropriateness of alternative sanctions, he ac-
 cepted for sanctions purposes the warden’s fact findings
 which the arbitrator himself had rejected. The warden tes-
 tified that he found Ms. Williams untrustworthy because
 she failed to timely report her relationship with Mr. Hayes.
 See S. Appx. 62 (“[W]ithholding the information about her
 relationship with Mr. Hayes is obviously unacceptable. . . .
 So a failure to report is a serious offense.”); S. Appx. 84–86
 (“[H]aving not been truthful in that sense and having not
 been forthright with what transpired between her and Mr.
 Hayes is just too much of a chance that I’m not willing to –
 to overlook.”). The failure to report charge—which clearly
 drove the warden’s decision for removal—was not sus-
 tained by the arbitrator. Rather, the arbitrator found Ms.
 Williams immediately reported her relationship with Mr.
 Hayes as soon as she learned he had been in federal cus-
 tody. Appx. 19–20 (finding Ms. Williams’ testimony to be
 “entirely credible”). The arbitrator erred by deferring to
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 WILLIAMS   v. BOP                                           7

 the warden’s determination that Ms. Williams was un-
 trustworthy because of her alleged failure to timely report.
     We vacate the penalty of removal and remand for the
 arbitrator to independently analyze the relevant Douglas
 factors and determine the maximum reasonable penalty in
 light of the only sustained charge. On remand, the arbitra-
 tor should pay close attention to the adequacy of lesser
 sanctions in light of his finding that Ms. Williams immedi-
 ately reported her relationship once she discovered Mr.
 Hayes was a former inmate.
                          CONCLUSION
     For the reasons given above, we vacate and remand the
 arbitrator’s final decision.
                VACATED AND REMANDED
                             COSTS
 Costs awarded to Ms. Williams.