Court Opinion

ID: 9374925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:04:22.11519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.350982
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                               COURT OF APPEAL

                                  FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  2022 CA 0953

L                                  R. T. TALLEY

                                      VERSUS

    LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
                                 DEVELOPMENT

                                           JUDGMENT RENDERED:        FEB 2 4 2023

                                  Appealed from the
                           Nineteenth Judicial District Court
                   Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
                               Docket Number 554579

                  The Honorable Trudy M. White, Presiding Judge

    Thomas Gibbs                                      COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                            PLAINTIFF—   R. T. Talley

    Daniel J. Phillips                                COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
    Lawrence E. Marino                                DEFENDANT— Louisiana
    Lafayette, Louisiana                              Department of Transportation and
                                                      Development
    Andrew G. Barry
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana

               BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
WELCH, J.

        In this mandamus proceeding, the Louisiana Department of Transportation

and Development (" DOTD")             appeals an amended judgment in favor of R.T.

Talley, ordering DOTD to produce the detailed invoices of its attorneys and

experts,   which were withheld from Mr.              Talley in response to a public records

request.   For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

                                      BACKGROUND

        Mr. Talley represented Restructure Partners, L.L.C. ("             Restructure") in an

expropriation proceeding brought by DOTD against Restructure,                       which bore

docket number 489, 640 in the 19t' Judicial District Court for the Parish of East

Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana.         That expropriation proceeding was the subject of

the appeal in State, Department of Transp. and Development v. Restructure

Partners, L.L.C., 2007- 1745 ( La.          App.     1St Cir. 3/ 26/ 08), 985 So.2d 212,     writ

denied, 2008- 1269 ( La. 9119108), 992 So. 2d 937 (" Restructure").                 One of the

issues in the expropriation proceeding and on appeal was Restructure' s entitlement

to attorney fees, as the amount of just compensation that was ultimately awarded

by the judgment exceeded the amount of just compensation that DOTD had

deposited into the registry of the court.           See Restructure, 985 So. 2d at 231- 232;

see also La. R.S. 48: 453( E).      In regards to the issue of attorney fees, Restructure

sought, but was denied by the trial court, access to DOTD' s time logs, billing

statements, and related records.
                                      Restructure challenged that ruling of the trial court

on appeal,'
              but the issue was pretermitted because the judgment on attorney fees

was amended to provide for an award of the maximum amount allowed by law.

Restructure, 985 So. 2d at 231- 232.

  Prior to the Restructure appeal, Restructure filed an application for supervisory writs, seeking
a review of this ruling by the trial court; however, this Court denied the writ application. See
State, through Department of Transportation v. Restructure Partners, L.L.C., 2006- 2449
La. App. 1St Cir. 12128106)( unpublished writ action).

                                                2
       Following the conclusion of the expropriation proceedings in the trial court

 April 11, 2007),    but prior to the signing of the judgment that formed the basis of

the appeal in Restructure (May 23, 2007), Mr. Talley, individually, sent a public

records request to DOTD on April 17, 2007, pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S.

44: 31, et seq. Therein, Mr. Talley sought the following:

       Any record of payment or request for payment, including all
       supporting documentation, of all legal fee charges or related expenses
       including, but not limited to, expert charges, deposition costs, court
       costs, sheriff' s and service fees, Federal Express or other delivery
       charges, postage, facsimile costs, photocopying costs, telephone costs,
       transportation/travel expenses, lodging, meals, investigation fees,
       paralegal/ secretarial      expenses,       exhibit          costs,        legal
       research/ LexisNexis charges, or any other charge reflected in matter
       No.      080- 100- 31974/ 2001000037    entitled "   State    of      Louisiana,
       Department of Transportation and Development versus Restructure
       Partners, LLC, et al,"    bearing Suit No. 489,640 of the 191 Judicial
       District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana.

       In response to this request, DOTD maintained that the documents requested

were exempt from disclosure pursuant to La. R. S. 44: 4. 1( C),       which provides that

  t] he provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to any writings, records, or other

accounts that reflect the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of

an attorney or an expert, obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in

preparation for trial."

      Therefore, on April 23, 2007, Mr. Talley commenced these proceedings by

filing a petition for writ of mandamus, seeking therein the issuance of a writ of

mandamus against DOTD compelling access to the requested records,                   an order

compelling an in camera review of the requested documents, and attorney fees,

damages, and costs.       In opposition to the petition for writ of mandamus, DOTD

again maintained that the requested records were exempt from disclosure pursuant

                                           3
to La. R.S. 44: 4. 1( C). DOTD also maintained that the records were protected from

disclosure by the attorney- client privilege.2

        The matter was set for hearing on May 7, 2007, but was later continued to

May 14, 2007. Just prior to the hearing, DOTD provided Mr. Talley with copies of

cancelled checks and the payment vouchers that ordered the checks.                     However,

DOTD refused to provide the detailed invoices from the attorneys and experts,

maintaining that those invoices revealed the matters that were worked on,                      the

documents and statutes that were researched, and the theories              of the case.   In other

words, DOTD claimed that the invoices reflected the opinions, conclusions, and

theories of the attorneys and experts in the then ongoing litigation.

        At the hearing, DOTD offered the testimony of Charles R. Albright, II, a

senior attorney in the legal section for DOTD, who was the supervising attorney

for the Restructure proceeding. Mr. Albright explained that DOTD produced

documentation of payment to Mr. Talley, including the vouchers attached to the

checks, but it did not produce the original invoices from the attorneys and experts

retained by DOTD in the Restructure proceeding.                   Mr. Albright explained that

DOTD requested narrative invoices from its attorneys and experts because DOTD

 want[ ed] to know what you did, not just your time and date, but what you did,

whom you met with, what was discussed, conclusions that were reached, research

that was done"       such   that "   anyone reading those invoices or billings by the

attorneys or the experts would be able to infer or, in fact, determine trial strategies

or anything else."       Mr.   Albright confirmed that the invoices prepared by the

2 We note that DOTD, in opposition to the writ of mandamus, asserted that when Restructure
sought production of the records at issue through discovery in the Restructure suit, DOTD
objected on the basis of the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege and that the
presiding judge therein denied Restructure' s motion to compel and granted DOTD' s motion for
protective order in relation to those documents. Notably, documents that are subject to a
protective order issued under the authority of La. C. C. P. art. 1426 are exempt from disclosure
under the Public Records Law. See La. R.S. 44: 4. 1( B)( 37).   However, the record before us does
not contain a copy of that purported protective order, nor does our opinion in Restructure reflect
that a protective order as to those documents was issued. Therefore, we are unable to determine
or address whether that exception is also applicable herein.

                                                 4
attorneys and experts in the case and obtained by DOTD were either in anticipation

of litigation or in preparation of trial.        In addition, Mr. Albright took the position

that the attorney invoices should not be divulged to third parties because the

documents pertained to the attorney/ client relationship between DOTD and its

attorneys.      When Mr. Albright was questioned about whether the purpose of the

invoices was for the attorneys and experts to get paid pursuant to their contracts

with DOTD, Mr. Albright emphasized that the detailed information in the invoices

was    a    means    of " making   sure [ the attorneys and experts]          were following the

instructions of their client and that we were all on the same page,"                    and was not

 just for the purpose of getting paid."

           After the hearing, the trial court rendered and signed a judgment on June b,

2007, 3     that: ( 1)   granted the petition for writ of mandamus as to the checks and

payment vouchers for DOTD' s attorneys and experts, which DOTD had already

produced to Mr. Talley; ( 2) denied the petition for writ of mandamus as to all other

requested      materials,    namely, the     detailed invoices of DOTD' s attorneys and

experts; and ( 3) ordered DOTD to pay attorney fees to Mr. Talley in the amount of

  1, 500. 00 and court costs of the proceeding.               The trial court also denied Mr.

Talley' s request that the court conduct an in camera inspection of the records.'

Mr. Talley filed a supervisory writ application with this Court seeking review of

the trial court' s judgment, as well as a motion for new trial.'

        On August 9, 2007, this Court issued the following action:

3 Judge A.J. Kling, ad hoc presided over the May 14, 2007 hearing, and he rendered and signed
the June b, 2007 judgment.

4 Although the denial of Mr. Talley' s request for an in camera was not specifically set forth in
the judgment, the trial court, in its oral reasons, denied Mr. Talley' s request and the trial court' s
minute entry reflects this ruling. Furthermore, in general, silence in a judgment as to any issue,
claim, or demand placed before the trial court is deemed a rejection of the claim and the relief
sought is presumed to be denied.      Alost v, Lawler, 2018- 1271 ( La. App. I"     Cir. 5/$/ 19), 277
So. 3d 329, 333 n. 3.

S We note that the hearing on Mr. Talley' s motion for new trial was continued several times
during the pendency of Mr. Talley' s supervisory writ application to this Court, as well as
DOTD' s application for a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court.

                                                   5
        STAY DENIED.            WRIT GRANTED AND REMANDED WITH
        ORDER.        The portion of the trial court' s May 14, 2007 judgment
        denying [ Mr.] Talley' s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is reversed. In
        accordance with La. R.S. 44: 35( B), we hereby remand this matter for
        a hearing to evaluate the legality of the disclosure of all information
        contained in the invoices at issue, in light of the statutory and
        constitutional    exemptions      prohibiting    the   disclosure    of   certain

        confidential and/ or exempt information.[']

See R.T.     Talley v. State of Louisiana, DOTD, 2007- 1135 ( La. App.                   I"   Cir.

8/ 9107)( unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2007- 1757 ( La. 1119107), 967 So. 2d

504.

       Following this Court' s remand, a hearing was held by the trial court on

March 14, 2008, concerning Mr. Talley' s motion for new trial.              DOTD re -offered

the testimony of Mr. Albright, and both parties submitted documentary evidence.

In addition, the copies of the requested detailed invoices were submitted to the trial

court under seal for an in camera inspection and a determination of whether those

documents were exempt from production to Mr. Talley in accordance with La. R.S.

44: 4. 1( 0) and/ or the attorney- client privilege.    Thereafter, the trial court took the

matter under advisement.

       On August 26, 2008, the trial court signed a judgment,' wherein it found,

after conducting an in camera inspection, that " the documents withheld from [ Mr.

Talley] [ did] not consist of any writings, records, or other accounts that reflect the

mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of an attorney or an expert,

obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial."               In

addition, the trial court found " that     the Attorney -Client Privilege [ did] not apply."

Accordingly, the trial court ordered DOTD to produce to Mr. Talley the invoices of

6 We note that two judges dissented as to " the merits of the application, finding that the writ
should be denied" because "( tlhe public records law should not be allowed as a substitute for
discovery, which is subject to judicial supervision by the trial court." See R.T. Talley v. State
of Louisiana, DOTD, 2007- 1135 (       La. App. I" Cir. 819107)( unpublished writ action), writ
denied, 2007- 1757( La. 1119107), 967 So. 2d 504.

 Judge Donald R. Johnson presided over the March 14, 2008 hearing, and he rendered and
signed the August 26, 2008 judgment.

                                                    6
DOTD' s attorneys and experts that were initially withheld, with the exception that

the document Bates stamped 207 would have a redaction for the entry dated 1- 13-

02. The trial court ordered that the documents would remain under seal until such

time as a decision from this Court was received in response to any application for

supervisory writs.        The trial court further ordered that DOTD would have thirty

days from the signing of the judgment to apply for a supervisory writ to this Court

and that in the event DOTD did not make such an application, the documents

would have to be produced to Mr. Talley upon the expiration of that time delay.
        DOTD appealed the August 26, 2008 judgment.$ Meanwhile, Mr. Talley

subsequently filed a pleading in the trial court that was entitled " Memorandum."

Therein, he noted that the trial court failed to assess costs and attorney fees, and

requested the trial court to render judgment for costs and attorney fees.               However,

the record contains no ruling with respect to that pleading.                   Thereafter in the

appeal, this Court, following a rule to show cause, dismissed the appeal on May

28, 2009, stating:

        APPEAL DISMISSED.                  The judgment of the trial court signed
        August 8, 2008 [     sic]
                                      ordering [ DOTD] to produce the documents at
        issue IF it did not file a writ with this Court, but stating that it did not
       have to produce the documents if it did seek writs is a conditional
       judgment and not a final judgment subject to appeal. Moreover,
       pursuant to La. C. C.P. art. 2083C, it is not an interlocutory judgment
       for which an appeal is expressly provided by law. Therefore, the rule
       to show cause is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

       Moreover, we note that the judgment does not state that [ Mr.] Talley' s
       claim for costs and attorney' s fees was denied or was granted with a
       specific award.   If the trial [ court] intended to deny or grant this

       request for relief as to the documents most recently ordered produced,
       the judgment should state such; otherwise it is a partial final judgment
       subject to appeal only if certified as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.
        1915B.  A final appealable judgment must contain decretal language
              Moreover, if the trial [ court] did not intend to issue a final

       judgment, then the interlocutory ruling is not subject to a motion for
       new trial. ... [   Internal citations omitted.]

8 DOTD also filed a notice of intent to file a supervisory writ application; however, it never filed
a writ application with this Court.

                                                 7
R.T.    Talley v. State of Louisiana,              DOTD, 2009- 0059 ( La.                   1St   Cir.
                                                                                    App.

5/ 28/ 09)( unpublished action).

        DOTD filed an application for rehearing, which this Court denied on July

 15, 2009, stating:

        APPLICATION FOR REHEARING DENIED. We note that the
        judgment of August 26, 2008 is interlocutory and nonappealable;
        therefore, the delays for filing a motion and order for appeal do not
        apply to this judgment. Once a valid final judgment is signed, i.e.,
        one which is not conditional, which resolves all of the remaining
        claims in the litigation, and which contains proper decretal language,
        appellant may timely file a motion and order for a suspensive appeal.

R.T.    Talley v. State of Louisiana, DOTD,                   2009- 0059 ( La.              1st Cir.
                                                                                    App,

7115109)(   unpublished action).

        On May 3, 2022,9 the trial court signed an amended judgment, again finding
that after an in camera inspection of the documents withheld from Mr. Talley, the

records withheld did not consist of any writings, records, or other accounts that

reflected the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of an attorney

or expert, obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation of trial.

In addition, the trial court again found that the attorney-client privilege did not

apply. Therefore, the trial court, in accordance with this Court' s "            order of remand

and instructions," amended its August 26, 2008 judgment as follows: DOTD was

ordered to produce to Mr. Talley the invoices of DOTD' s attorneys and experts

that were initially withheld by DOTD, with the exception that the document Bates

stamped 207 would have a redaction for the entry dated 1- 13- 02; the documents at

issue were ordered to remain under seal until such time as the trial court received a

final decision from this Court with respect to an appeal or application for

9 We note that there was a lengthy delay between the dismissal of the appeal regarding the
August 26, 2008 judgment and the signing of an amended judgment by the trial court to cure the
deficiencies noted by this Court in the order of dismissal. We also note that during this time
delay, an order of abandonment was signed by the trial court and subsequently set aside. DOTD
filed an application for supervisory writs, seeking review of the trial court' s ruling setting aside
the order of abandonment, which this Court denied. See R.T. Talley v. State of Louisiana,
DOTD, 2022- 0548 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 617122)( unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2022- 01065
La. 11/ l/ 22), 349 So. 3d 13.
supervisory writs filed by DOTD; DOTD was granted the right to appeal and/ or to

file an application for supervisory writs in accordance with law; and, in the event

DOTD did not do so, the documents were ordered to be produced to Mr. Talley

upon the expiration of those time delays.                        In addition, Mr. Talley' s motion for

attorney fees and costs was granted, but no amount was set forth therein.                     The trial

court also designated the judgment as " a final and appealable partial judgment as to

                                                   10
the production of documents issue[.]"

          From this judgment, DOTD appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in: ( 1)

granting Mr. Talley access to the detailed invoices under the Public Records law

because those records are exempt from disclosure, as they consist of the mental

impressions, conclusions, opinions, and theories of DOTD' s attorneys and experts

and were prepared in anticipation of and in preparation for trial of the Restructure

suit; (   2)   determining that the attorney-client privilege did not apply; ( 3) finding

that only a single page of the invoices should be redacted; and ( 4) granting Mr.

Talley' s request for attorney fees because he litigated the matter pro se, and thus

incurred no attorney fees.

                                    LAW AND DISCUSSION

          Louisiana Revised Statutes 44: 1 ( A)( 2)(             a) provides:

          All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, maps,
          drawings,    photographs,       cards,        tapes,    recordings,   memoranda,   and

          papers, and all copies, duplicates, photographs, including microfilm,
          or other reproductions thereof, or any other documentary materials, ...
          having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for
          use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business,
          transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted,
          or performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of
          this state, or by or under the authority of any ordinance, regulation,

10 We note that the trial court designated the judgment as a final and appealable partial judgment
 in accordance with [ La. C. C. P.] arts. 1911( B), 1915( A)( 3), and La. R. S. 13: 4231"    rather than
La. C. C. P. art. 1915( B).   Despite this mis-citation or error, the judgment unequivocally provides
that it is " a final and appealable partial judgment as to the production of documents issue."       As
this Court' s appellate jurisdiction extends to " final judgments," which are judgments that

 determine the merits of a controversy in whole or in part, see La. C.C. P. arts. 1841 and 2083( A)
and because the judgment, by its unequivocal terms, meets this jurisdictional requirement, we
find the trial court' s error of no consequence.

                                                         0
       mandate,
                or order of any public body or concerning the receipt or
       payment of any money received or paid by or under the authority of
       the constitution or the laws of this state, are "      public records",   except

       as otherwise provided in this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana.

       Any person may obtain a copy of any public record, in accordance with the

Public Records Law, except as otherwise provided in the Public Records Law or

other specific law.    La. R. S. 44: 31( B).        The right of access to public records is

guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution and the Public Records Law.                  See La.

Const. Art. XII, §3;   La. R.S. 44: 1, et seq. These constitutional and statutory rights

of access to public records should be construed liberally, and any doubt must be

resolved in favor of the public' s right to see. Shane v. Parish of Jefferson, 2014-

2225 ( La. 1218115),    209 So. 3d 726, 735.          Furthermore,   public records requests

must be analyzed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the record.

Hilliard v. Litchfield, 2001- 1987 ( La. App.         1St Cir. 6121102), 822 So. 2d 743, 746.

       However, the Public Records Law contains exceptions, exemptions, and/ or

limitations.   La. R.S. 44:4. 1;    see also La. R. S. 44: 31( B).    The exceptions to the

Public Records Law must be narrowly construed, with any doubt resolved in favor

of the public' s right of access.     See Landis v. Moreau, 2000- 1157 ( La. 2121101),

779 So. 2d 691, 694.

       As set forth in La. R. S. 44: 4. 1( C), "[ t] he provisions of [the Public Records

Law] shall not apply to any writings, records, or other accounts that reflect the

mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of an attorney or an expert,

obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial."          The

purpose of this exception is not merely to assist the client in obtaining complete

legal advice, but also to afford the attorney a "       zone of privacy" within which he is

free to evaluate and prepare his case without adversarial scrutiny.           Trenticosta v.

Mamoulides, 93- 621 (    La. App.     5th Cir. 2123194), 633 So. 2d 786, 788, writ denied,

94- 1295 ( La. 9/ 2194), 643 So. 2d 147.

                                               10
          Further,   under   this   provision, " attorney- client   communications        are    an

exception to the Public Records [ L] aw and are not a public record."                  Council of

City of New Orleans v. Washington, 2009- 0389 ( La. App.                 4rh Cir. 5/ 12/ 09), 13

So. 3d 662, 664 n.4, vacated on other gounds, 2009- 1067 ( La. 5/ 29/ 09), 9 So. 3d

854; compare Alliance for Affordable Energy v. Frick, 96- 1763 ( La. App. 0

Cir. 5/ 28/ 97), 695 So.2d 1126, 1134- 1135 ( absent an allegation that the records at

issue contained the " mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of an

attorney or an expert, obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in

preparation for trial," there was no basis to hold that the records requested were

exempt from disclosure by the attorney- client privilege).

          Records that contain privileged information, by definition, are not a public

record.
           See Council of City of New Orleans, 13 So. 3d at 664.           A " privilege" is a

 restriction imposed by law."            Louisiana Department of Insurance,              ex.    rel.

Donelon v. Theriot, 2010- 0069 ( La. App. V Cir. 513111),            64 So. 3d 854, 861, writ

denied, 2011- 1139 ( La. 9/ 30/ 11), 71 So. 3d 286. As such, a privilege may serve as

the basis for refusing a person the right to examine, inspect, copy, reproduce, or

obtain a copy or reproduction of public documents. See La. Const. Art. XII, §3

providing that "[ n] o person shall be denied the right to ...       examine public records,

except in cases established by law");                and La. R.S.   44: 31( B)( providing that

 e] xcept as otherwise provided in [ the Public Records Law]                 or   as   otherwise

specifically provided by law," any person of the age of majority may inspect, copy,

reproduce, or obtain a copy or reproduction of any public record); see also Texaco,

Inc. v. Louisiana Land &            Exploration Co.,      805 F.Supp.   385, 389 ( M.D. La.

1992) (    holding that the Louisiana Public Records Law does not compel the

disclosure of documents that are shielded by the federal attorney-client privilege);

Louisiana Department of Insurance,               ex.   rel.   Donelon, 64 Said at 860- 863

providing that although the legislative auditor has broad access to public and

                                                11
private records -- confidential or otherwise --               this broad access to information does

not extend to privileged information,                  including information protected by the

attorney-client privilege set forth in La. C.E. art. 506).

        The attorney-client privilege is set forth in La.                   C. E.   art.     506( B)( 1)    and

provides a privilege against the disclosure of " a                    confidential         communication,

whether     oral,     written,    or    otherwise,
                                                     made for the purpose of facilitating the

rendition       of    professional        legal    services    to   the   client[ "], ...        when       the

communication is ... [ b] etween the client or a representative of the client and the

client' s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer."

        The Public Records Law is enforced through the procedure set forth in La.

R.S. 44: 35.         Under this statute, "[       a] ny person who has been denied the right to

inspect, copy, reproduce, or obtain a copy or reproduction of a record under the

provisions of [the Public Records Law] either by a determination of the custodian

or by the passage of five days ...                  from the date of his in-person,              written,    or

electronic      request ...      may institute proceedings for the issuance of a writ of

                                                                                     12] ...."
mandamus, ...          together with attorney fees, costs and damages[                              La. R.S.

44: 3 5 (A). In such a suit, " the court has jurisdiction to ... issue a writ of mandamus

ordering the production of any records improperly withheld from the person

seeking disclosure,"          and "[   t] he court shall determine the matter de novo." La. R.S.

44: 35( B). "   The burden of proving that a public record is not subject to inspection,

copying, or reproduction shall rest with the custodian."                   La. R.S. 44: 31( B)( 3);         see

11 Louisiana Code of Evidence article 506( A)( 1) defines a " fclient" to include an " entity, public
or private, to whom professional legal services are rendered by a lawyer ...."

12 See La. R.S. 44: 35( D)( 1)( providing that "[ i] f a person seeking the right to inspect, copy, or
reproduce a record or to receive or obtain a copy or reproduction of a public record prevails in
such suit, he shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation ...); La. R. S.
44:35( E)( 1)( providing that "[ i]f the court finds that the custodian arbitrarily or capriciously
withheld the requested record or unreasonably or arbitrarily failed to respond to the request ... it
may award the requestor any actual damages proven by him to have resulted from the actions of
the custodian ..." and that " if the court finds that the custodian unreasonably or arbitrarily failed
to respond to the request ... it may award the requestor civil penalties ...."

                                                      12
also La. R.S. 44: 35( B).    The court may view the documents in controversy in

camera before reaching a decision.      La. R.S. 44: 35( B).

       Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court' s judgment on a writ of

mandamus seeking the production of public records under an abuse of discretion

standard.    Odoms v. Gammon, 2021- 0828 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 3/ 3/ 22)( unpublished),

2022 WL 620773 * 3, writ denied, 2022- 00560 ( La. 5/ 24122), 338 So. 3d 1186.               In

addition, a trial court' s factual findings in such a mandamus proceeding are subject

to a manifest error standard of review.          Id.   See also Roper v. City of Baton

Rouge/ Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2016- 1025 (              La. App, I" Cir. 3115118),    244

So. 3d 450, 460, writ denied, 2018- 0854 ( La. 9128118),         252 So. 3d 926; Beasley v.

Cannizzaro, 2018- 0520 (     La. App.    4th Cir. 11121118),      259 So. 3d 633, 636, writ

denied, 2018- 2085 ( La. 2118119), 265 So.3d 774. However, questions of law in a

mandamus proceeding,        such as the proper interpretation of a statute or the

applicability of a particular exception, exemption or limitation to the Public

Records Law,     are reviewed by appellate courts under the de novo standard of

review.   See Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *          3 and City of Baton RougelParish of

East Baton Rouge v. Capital City Press, L.L.C.,               2007- 1088 (   La. App.   1st Cir.

10110108),   4 So. 3d 807, 816, writ dismissed, 2008- 2057 ( La. 1116109), 998 So. 2d

100.

       In this case, the trial court, after conducting an in camera inspection of the

records withheld—    the detailed invoices from DOTD' s attorneys and expertsthe

trial court concluded that the exception set forth in La. R.S. 44: 4. 1( 0)         was not

applicable and that the attorney-client privilege did not apply.         These conclusions

by the trial court raise questions of law,         i.e.,   the applicability of a particular

exception to the Public Records Law.             Therefore, we review the trial court' s

judgment under the de novo standard of review.             See City of Baton Rouge/Parish

of East Baton Rouge, 4 So. 3d at 816.

                                            13
       Based on our de novo review of the testimony of Mr.                      Albright and the

documents produced by DOTD for in camera inspection by the trial court, we find

that the trial court erred in concluding that the exception set forth in La. R.S.

44:4. 1( C) and/ or the attorney-client privilege were not applicable.               The detailed

invoices sent to DOTD from its attorneys and experts are written communications

to DOTD setting forth the exact tasks that the attorneys and the experts performed

in regards to their representation of DOTD in the Restructure suit— both prior to

and after the filing of suit— as well as how much time was spent on those

respective tasks.     The information detailed on the invoices includes, but is not

limited to, task specific correspondence that was both drafted and reviewed to/ from

identified individuals; strategy recommendations that were made;                      conferences

 both in person and on the telephone) and meetings that were held and the matters

that were   discussed therein;       specific    legal      issues that were researched and

discussed; pleadings that were drafted and reviewed; expenses that were incurred;

travel that occurred and the reasons therefor; preparations that were made for

depositions; discussions on topics and strategies for trial; and work performed and

preparations made for trial.        We find such detailed information constitutes the

mental impressions,      conclusions,      opinions,     and   theories   of the   attorneys    and

experts.    Furthermore,      we    also     find    that    this   detailed    information     was

communicated by the attorneys to their client with the intent of keeping the
communication       confidential,   as confirmed by Mr.             Albright.      Therefore,   the

documents are also protected by the attorney-client privilege under La. C.E. art.

506.

       Having concluded that the detailed invoices requested by Mr. Talley from

DOTD were not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Law pursuant to

the exception set forth in La. R.S. 44: 4. 1( C) and the attorney- client privilege, we

find that the trial court erred in ordering DOTD to produce to Mr. Talley the

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detailed invoices that were withheld and in granting Mr. Talley' s request for

attorney fees and costs, Therefore, May 3,     2022 amended judgment of the trial

court is reversed.

                                   CONCLUSION

      For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the May 3,         2022 amended

judgment of the trial court is reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the

plaintiff/appellee, R.T. Talley.

REVERSED.

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