Court Opinion

ID: 9698163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:43:46.749311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:38.972621
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
In my view the prosecutor’s closing argument was inflammatory, and impermissibly expressed his belief that appellant was guilty. Here the district attorney told the jury, “This man has just committed murder.” This certainly is not an argument that the evidence establishes guilt. Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 316 Pa. 129, 173 A. 653 (1934). Such a positive statement of guilt is unprofessional conduct. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 5.8 (Approved Draft, 1971) ;1 *583ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106 (C)(4) (1969).
This Court has often condemned a prosecutor’s injection of unsworn and inflammatory evidence. Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Toth, 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d 275 (1974); Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 295 A.2d 300 (1972); Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971).2 Most recently we granted a new trial because of the prosecutor’s references to the victim of a homicide as the “best witness” and his “testifying” what this “best witness” would have said had he been in court. We further concluded that the prosecutor’s description of the defendant and his associates as “hoodlums” and “animals” amounted to a prejudicial expression by the prosecutor of his personal belief in the guilt of the accused. Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Potter, supra, we concluded that the prosecutor’s branding of defendant’s testimony as a “malicious lie” was prejudicial error requiring a *584new trial. As in Lipscomb, we found that the attempt to introduce into evidence the district attorney’s personal opinion constituted impermissible prosecutorial conduct.
Is not the prosecutor’s conduct here more prejudicial than characterizing the defendant as a liar or a hoodlum? The declaration “This man has just committed murder,” goes not just to the accused’s credibility or character, but, if accepted by the jury, decides the ultimate issue — guilt or innocence. Expression of the prosecuting attorney’s belief in the accused’s guilt deprived appellant of a fair trial.
It has long been the law in this Commonwealth that “no man on trial for murder can be officially characterized as a murderer or as ‘a cold-blooded killer,’ until he is adjudged guilty of murder or pleads guilty to that charge.” Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 204, 185 A. 203, 205 (1936).3 Characterization of the accused as a murderer is precisely what the prosecutor did here and no amount of sophistry can change this impermissible remark into a proper closing argument.
The trial court’s instruction to the jury did not dispel the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s remark. See Commonwealth v. Toth, 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d 275 (1974). A proper cautionary instruction requires more than the simple admonition that if you believe an opinion has been expressed, you should disregard it. The instruction should preferably be given immediately after the prejudicial event and repeated in the charge to the jury. It should be specifically tied to the facts, and, it should clearly and firmly advise the jury that the prejudicial event must be disregarded. *585See Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974).
Tbe prosecutor’s remark was a gross indiscretion. Tbe trial judge was bound to negate, by an immediate direction and in Ms charge, the prejudicial impact of the statement. The effect of the prosecutor’s inflammatory and conclusory statement, and the trial court’s ineffectual instruction was to permit the prosecution in its closing argument to put before the jury “unsworn unchecked testimony” offered by an officer of the court —the district attorney. I cannot agree that on this record appellant received a fair trial. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 5.10 (Approved Draft, 1972).
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Manderino joins in this dissent.

 See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 5.8(b), Commentary at 128 (Approved Draft, 1971).
“Such expressions by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony and tend to exploit the influence of his office *583and undermine the objective detachment which should separate a lawyer from the cause for which he argues. Such argument is expressly forbidden. ABA Code DR 7-106(C) (4) ; Drinker, Legal Ethics 147 (1953). Many courts have recognized the impropriety of such statements. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 766 (1956). This kind of argument is easily avoided by insisting that lawyers restrict themselves to statements which take the form, ‘The evidence shows . . .’ or some similar form. The experienced American and British advocate will say, for example, T leave it to you whether this evidence does not suggest . . .’ etc. Harris v. United States, 402 F.2d 656, 657-59 (D.C. Cir. 1968).” See also ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 1.1 (Approved Draft, 1971).

 See Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa. 573, 139 A. 374 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492, 128 A. 446 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Bubnis, 197 Pa. 542, 47 A. 748 (1901) ; Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 18 A. 737 (1889).

 We followed Capaila in onr most recent prosecutorial misconduct case, Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974). See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935).