Court Opinion

ID: 9742485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:14:46.663189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:45.869064
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority decision. I regard the objections of the petitioner as technical omissions rather than substantial errors. The petitioner says there was no finding of wardship. It is true that the word “wardship” was not mentioned in the Juvenile Court’s order, but the substantive findings which were made pursuant to the State’s petition asking that the minors be adjudged wards of the court, that is, that the minors were dependent and the mother unable for other than financial reasons to take care of them and that it was in the best interest of the minors and the State that they be taken from the mother and placed under the guardianship of some suitable person appointed by the court, followed by the appointment of the probation officer as their guardian, so substantially complied with the spirit and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act as to render the lack of a precise wording as to wardship quite insignificant in the total picture. The same remarks apply to the validity of the consent. A form is suggested in the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 4, par. 9.1 — 10) to be followed in giving consent to adoption. This form was substantially the one used; however, the acknowledgement portion omitted the statement: “I have fully explained that by signing such (consent) (surrender) (she) (he) is irrevocably relinquishing all parental rights to such child or adult and (she) (he) has stated that such is (her) (his) intention and desire.” However, the acknowledgement did state in the body thereof that the mother was thereby giving consent to the adoption of said child and granting the power to consent to such adoption to any person appointed by the court and that “such action shall be binding upon me without any further notice to me as fully as if I was present at the proceeding and consented in person to the entry of a decree of adoption.” The acknowledgement was taken in open court before the circuit judge who held the adjudicatory hearing and acknowledged by him, and it recited that the mother signed such instrument as her own free and voluntary act for the purposes and uses therein set forth. It is not to be assumed that the judge did not admonish her as to the finality of this act as is the custom in consents to adoption, and the lack of the printed words of the suggested form of acknowledgement is not so significant as to render the consent void. The majority opinion gives the petitioner the right to an evidentiary hearing, by that phrase, apparently intending to give her all the rights of a party at an adjudicatory hearing. There is no question but that the petitioner has a right to file a petition for change of guardianship since she is a person interested in the minors and the statute gives such right to any person interested in the minors (Juvenile Court Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 705 — 8). However section 1 — 20 of the same act entitled “Rights of Parties to Proceedings” makes it very clear that the right “to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records, * * *” and “the right to be represented by counsel" at such proceedings is limited to “the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent.” While the language refers to an adjudicatory hearing it is indicative of the intent of the Act to limit the persons who may have the standing of parties in juvenile proceedings. Section 5 — 8 makes no reference to parties or to standing; it merely gives any person interested in the minor the right to file a petition for a change of guardianship. To interpret this as giving any member of the public who asserts he is interested in the minor the adversary rights of a party, including discovery, subpoena, right to present witnesses and right of cross-examination, would obviously be mischievious and contrary to the best interests of the minors. The contentions raised in the petitioner’s brief as to the regularity of the adjudicatory hearing and the findings of the Juvenile Court at that hearing and the validity of the mother’s consent to the adoption of the minors, posed jurisdictional questions which the majority opinion does not comment on. However, the issue of jurisdiction cannot be avoided. It is not contended that the petitioner was a party to the adjudicatory hearing with the right to appeal its findings; nor was she a guardian or responsible relative (since the minors had a living parent) who would have standing to challenge the validity to a consent to adoption. The petitioner has done both in this appeal, and I do not see how the court can consider either point except on the theory that the judgment of the Juvenile Court at the adjudicatory hearing was a void judgment subject to collateral attack and that the consent to adoption of the minors given by the mother was invalid. In that case there is neither wardship nor a valid consent to adoption, therefore an evidentiary hearing on the petition for change of custody was not necessary since the status of the children is in that case no different from that of any other children whose mother is living and whose status is not that of dependent or neglected minors. By the same token, of course, the petitioner’s application for custody of the minors is thereby rendered improper and meaningless since the court in that case would have no wardship and therefore no power to confer custodianship on the petitioner. The petitioner here cannot attack the wardship as void and at the same time apply to the State for appointment as custodian of the children. In my opinion, therefore, while the petitioner had the right to file tire petition for change of guardianship, she was not a party to the adjudicatory hearing and not a party for the purpose of challenging the consent to the adoption. The adjudicatory hearing and the consent to adoption were not so significantly irregular as to render them void; therefore these aspects of the proceedings were not subject to collateral attack. Since the petitioner was not a party who could directly appeal either of these points they should not be considered by the court on appeal. The petitioner has had her petition for change of custodianship considered by tire court, but since there was no allegation of unfitness of the guardian the only consideration which she could raise was that the appointment was void. In that case the petition itself would not be in order since custody in that case would revert to the mother and a new adjudicatory hearing would be required to establish wardship in the State. Since the majority opinion fails to consider these issues I respectfully dissent from that opinion and would affirm the trial court.