Court Opinion

ID: 9900373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:49.74872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.940662
License: Public Domain

640                  August 30, 2023                No. 433

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                      Kelly MAYES,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
                             v.
                    Anthony RAMOS,
                  Defendant-Respondent.
             Clackamas County Circuit Court
                  18CV25192; A172429

  Kathie F. Steele, Judge.
  Argued and submitted June 6, 2023.
   Jesse A. Buss argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
briefs was Willamette Law Group.
   James B. Rich argued the cause for respondent. Also on
the brief was Harris, Wyatt & Amala, LLC.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Supplemental judgment reversed and remanded.
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                             641

         TOOKEY, P. J.
         Plaintiff appeals a supplemental judgment denying
her request for attorney “fees-on-fees”—i.e., “fees incurred
in litigating the amount of an attorney fee award.” Peabody
v. SAIF, 326 Or App 132, 136, 531 P3d 188 (2023). The trial
court denied plaintiff’s fee request on four separate bases:
that the fee request was (1) barred by entry and satisfaction
of a prior general judgment; (2) barred by claim preclusion
principles; (3) “excessive and without merit”; and (4) “frivo-
lous.” In a single assignment of error, plaintiff challenges
each of those bases, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying her fee request. The parties also dispute whether
we have appellate jurisdiction and whether plaintiff’s argu-
ments are preserved.
          As explained below, we conclude that we have juris-
diction to review the supplemental judgment and that plain-
tiff’s arguments are adequately preserved. We further con-
clude that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s request
for fees-on-fees, and we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
                    I. BACKGROUND
         The relevant facts are largely procedural and per-
tain to three stages of the case: the initial arbitration, the
subsequent dispute about fees-on-fees, and plaintiff’s appeal
to this court.
A.   The Initial Arbitration
         Following an automobile collision, plaintiff brought
a personal injury suit against defendant, and the case
went into mandatory arbitration pursuant to ORS 36.400.
Plaintiff prevailed, and the arbitrator filed an award in favor
of plaintiff that included $15,000 in attorney fees, which was
only part of the roughly $25,000 fee award that plaintiff
had requested under ORS 20.080 (authorizing attorney fees
“where the amount pleaded is $10,000 or less”).
        Pursuant to ORS 36.425(6), plaintiff filed “excep-
tions” in the trial court, challenging the arbitrator’s
attorney-fee award and seeking the total fee that she had
requested. Briefly, ORS 36.425(6) provides that a party may
642                                                       Mayes v. Ramos

file in the trial court “exceptions” as to “the legal grounds
for” or “the amount of” an arbitrator’s attorney-fee award,
and the trial court must enter a decision as to those excep-
tions within 20 days after the exceptions are filed, otherwise
the arbitrator’s fee award “shall be considered affirmed.”
In opposition to plaintiff’s exceptions, defendant filed a
response, arguing that plaintiff’s fee request was unreason-
able and that the arbitrator’s fee award should be affirmed.
         On June 3, 2019—one day before the 20-day period
under ORS 36.425(6) was to elapse—the trial court held
a hearing on plaintiff’s exceptions. At that hearing, the
trial court acknowledged that it would not have enough
time to enter a decision before the 20-day period elapsed.
Consequently, the trial court orally stated that it would sign
an order to abate the case until June 24, 2019, to provide
more time to make a decision as to plaintiff’s exceptions;
however, that abatement order was not ultimately entered
until after the 20-day period under ORS 36.425(6) had
already elapsed.1 Nonetheless, on June 18, 2019, the trial
court issued an opinion letter concluding that the arbitrator
had abused his discretion in reducing plaintiff’s attorney-fee
award and that plaintiff was entitled to her requested fees
of roughly $25,000.
          Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved for, and the trial
court entered, an order nunc pro tunc backdating the abate-
ment order to June 3, 2019—that way, the case would be
abated one day before the 20-day period elapsed, so the arbi-
trator’s award would not be considered affirmed by operation
of ORS 36.425(6). On July 11, 2019, the trial court entered a
“General Judgment and Money Award,” which reflected the
arbitrator’s damages award to plaintiff, plus the increased
attorney-fee award to plaintiff outlined in the trial court’s
June 18 letter opinion. Defendant then promptly paid that
judgment amount, and on July 17, 2019, a “satisfaction judg-
ment” was entered, reflecting that defendant had paid the
judgment against him in the underlying auto injury case.
     1
       ORS 36.425(6) was recently amended to omit the requirement that the trial
court enter a decision as to exceptions within 20 days after the exceptions are
filed. See Or Laws 2023, ch 16, § 1. The amendments to ORS 36.425(6) do not
apply in this case. See Or Laws 2023, ch 16, § 2 (providing that amendments to
ORS 36.425(6) apply to arbitrations commenced on or after January 1, 2024).
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                                                     643

B.    The Dispute About Fees-on-Fees
         On July 26, 2019, plaintiff filed a new attorney-fee
statement, requesting supplemental fees-on-fees of roughly
$8,000 for the work that plaintiff’s attorney had performed
since May 15, 2019, in “successfully prosecuting the origi-
nal fee request over defendant’s vigorous opposition.” In that
statement, plaintiff argued that she was entitled to such
fees under Trimet v. Aizawa, 362 Or 1, 403 P3d 753 (2017)
and ORCP 68. Defendant filed a memo in opposition to that
request, arguing that plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees was
(1) barred by entry and satisfaction of the general judgment;
(2) barred by claim preclusion principles; (3) “excessive and
without merit”; and (4) “frivolous.”
          After additional briefing was filed by both parties,
the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s request for fees-
on-fees and subsequently entered an order denying plain-
tiff’s request. The order stated that the trial court was deny-
ing plaintiff’s fee request “[b]ased on each and every reason
set forth in” defendant’s memo opposing plaintiff’s request
for fees-on-fees.
C. Plaintiff’s Appeal to This Court
         Plaintiff timely appealed the trial court order deny-
ing her request for fees-on-fees. Thereafter, defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that that order
was not an appealable judgment under ORS 19.205. The
Appellate Commissioner issued an order agreeing that the
trial court’s order was not appealable under ORS 19.205 but
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that
“the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment”;
accordingly, the Commissioner gave the trial court leave to
enter an appealable supplemental judgment pursuant to
ORS 19.270(4).2
         On January 14, 2021, the trial court entered a sup-
plemental judgment denying plaintiff’s request for fees-on-
fees. In that supplemental judgment, the trial court again

    2
       ORS 19.270(4) provides, in part: “[T]he trial court has jurisdiction, with
leave of the appellate court, to enter an appealable judgment or order if the appel-
late court determines that * * * [a]t the time of the filing of the notice of appeal the
trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment or order[.]”
644                                                            Mayes v. Ramos

explained—exactly as it had in the previous non-appeal-
able order—that its denial was “[b]ased on each and every
reason set forth in” defendant’s memo objecting to plain-
tiff’s request for fees-on-fees. Plaintiff then timely filed an
amended notice of appeal as to that supplemental judgment.
                              II. DISCUSSION
         As noted above, plaintiff argues on appeal that the
trial court erred in denying her request for fees-on-fees.
As also noted above, the parties dispute whether we have
appellate jurisdiction and whether plaintiff’s arguments are
preserved. We begin by addressing the jurisdictional and
preservation issues before turning to the merits.3
A.    This court has appellate jurisdiction.
          Defendant contends that we do not have appellate
jurisdiction in this case, because the judgment is not appeal-
able. He argues that, although ORS 19.205(1) ordinarily
allows appeal of a supplemental judgment, that is only true
“unless otherwise provided by law,” and that, in this case, “the
law of ORS 36.400 et seq [concerning arbitration] provides for
no appeal.” More specifically, defendant argues that the trial
court’s judgment was based on the arbitration award and res-
olution of plaintiff’s attorney-fee exceptions and, therefore, is
“non-appealable” as provided in ORS 36.425(3).
        Plaintiff counters that we do have jurisdiction. She
argues that, although the general judgment as to the arbi-
tration award was entered pursuant to ORS chapter 36,
and that the provisions of that chapter bar the appeal of a
judgment based on an arbitrator’s decision in some cases,
here, the supplemental judgment as to fees-on-fees “was not
issued under ORS Chapter 36 at all” but was instead issued
pursuant to ORCP 68, which authorizes supplemental judg-
ments awarding or denying attorney fees.

    3
      Additional briefing in this case was filed by amicus curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyer’s Association (OTLA). OTLA argues that plaintiff was entitled to recover
fees-on-fees under established case law and urges this court to reverse. OTLA
also argues that, “[i]f it is difficult to apply for fees-on-fees, * * * [that] will, in
turn, make it more difficult for clients to find competent attorneys to represent
them” and “will encourage opposing attorneys to contest fee disputes more vig-
orously,” which “will also require more time and attention for trial and appellate
courts.”
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                              645

        We agree with plaintiff that we have jurisdiction to
review the supplemental judgment at issue in this case. To
be sure, ORS 19.205(1) provides that “a limited judgment,
general judgment or supplemental judgment * * * may be
appealed” “[u]nless otherwise provided by law.” And, under
ORS 36.425(3), when a judgment is entered that is based on
an arbitrator’s decision and award, “[s]uch a judgment ‘may
not be appealed.’ ” Mendoza v. Xtreme Truck Sales, LLC, 314
Or App 87, 94, 497 P3d 755 (2021) (quoting ORS 36.425(3)).
         In this case, however, no party has appealed such a
judgment. Rather, it is the trial court’s supplemental judg-
ment as to fees-on-fees that is challenged on appeal, and
contrary to defendant’s position, the supplemental judgment
as to fees-on-fees was not entered pursuant to ORS chapter
36, nor was it based on any decision of the arbitrator; indeed,
the arbitrator was never presented with the issue relating to
fees-on-fees, as that issue arose only later, after arbitration
had concluded. Thus, the provisions in ORS chapter 36 do
not affect this court’s authority under ORS 19.205 to review
the supplemental judgment. We therefore conclude that we
have jurisdiction to review the supplemental judgment.
B.   Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of fees-on-fees is
     preserved.
         As noted above, the parties also dispute whether
plaintiff preserved her challenge to the denial of fees-on-
fees. As we understand it, defendant’s position is essentially
that, because plaintiff could have, but did not, apprise the
trial court before entry of the general judgment that she
would seek fees-on-fees, the trial court therefore lacked an
opportunity to consider that issue, so the issue is not pre-
served. Plaintiff’s position is that her challenge to the denial
of fees-on-fees is preserved because she argued in her brief-
ing to the trial court that it should “overrule the defense’s
objections” to plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees and award
plaintiff those fees.
        Having reviewed the record, we reject the conten-
tion that the requirements for preservation have not been
met. As noted, plaintiff filed a statement in the trial court
requesting an additional award of $8,057.50 for fees-on-fees;
defendant objected to that request; plaintiff filed a reply,
646                                           Mayes v. Ramos

urging the court to reject defendant’s objections and award
the requested fees-on-fees; and the trial court held a hearing
on the issue. That is sufficient to “demonstrate that the ques-
tion or issue presented by the assignment of error timely and
properly was raised and preserved in the lower court,” ORAP
5.45(4)(a), and to satisfy the “general requirement that an
issue, to be raised and considered on appeal, ordinarily must
first be presented to the trial court,” Peeples v. Lampert, 345
Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008). Likewise, that is sufficient
to show that the trial court “[had] the chance to consider and
rule on [the] contention” and to “permit[ ] the opposing party
to respond to a contention and * * * not tak[e] the other party
by surprise.” Id. (explaining policies underlying the preser-
vation requirement). Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff
adequately preserved the issue raised on appeal.
C. The Trial Court’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Request for
   Fees-on-Fees
         Turning to the merits, as noted above, plaintiff
appeals the supplemental judgment denying her request for
supplemental fees-on-fees pursuant to ORS 20.080. In that
supplemental judgment, the trial court explained that its
denial was “[b]ased on each and every reason set forth in”
defendant’s memo objecting to plaintiff’s request for fees-on-
fees. The reasons set forth in defendant’s memo were that
plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees was (1) barred by satisfac-
tion of the general judgment; (2) barred by claim preclusion
principles; (3) “excessive and without merit”; and (4) “frivo-
lous.” On appeal, plaintiff challenges each of those bases,
arguing that the trial court erred in denying her fee request.
         “We review the trial court’s legal determinations
with respect to entitlement to attorney fees for errors of
law,” and “[w]e review the amount of an attorney fee award
for an abuse of discretion.” Quick Collect, Inc. v. Higgins, 258
Or App 234, 242, 308 P3d 1089 (2013).
      1. Entry and satisfaction of the general judgment did
         not preclude recovery of fees-on-fees in a supplemen-
         tal judgment.
         As noted, the trial court denied plaintiff’s request
for fees-on-fees “[b]ased on each and every reason set forth
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                                647

in” defendant’s memo objecting to that request. The first
reason articulated in defendant’s memo was that, because
defendant had “satisfied all issues pertaining to costs, fees,
and damages” imposed in the general judgment, plaintiff
was thereby precluded from obtaining fees-on-fees. We dis-
agree; that reasoning is not supported by Oregon law.
          To reiterate, “fees-on-fees” refers generally to “attor-
ney fees incurred in determining the amount of the [attor-
ney] fee award.” Aizawa, 362 Or at 3. “[T]he general rule
in Oregon” is that “a party entitled to recover attorney fees
incurred in litigating the merits of a fee-generating claim
also may receive attorney fees incurred in determining the
amount of the [attorney] fee award.” Peabody, 326 Or App at
135 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). That
“normal rule” allowing fees-on-fees applies unless the stat-
ute providing for attorney fees in a particular case indicates
that “ ‘the legislature intended to depart from that accepted
practice.’ ” Id. at 135-36 (quoting Aizawa, 362 Or at 3, 14).
        Further, “ORCP 68 sets out a procedure for recov-
ering attorney fees.” Aizawa, 362 Or at 7. That rule pro-
vides that “ ‘[a]ttorney fees’ are the reasonable value of legal
services related to the prosecution or defense of an action.”
ORCP 68 A(1). That rule also provides that, “[i]f any issue
regarding attorney fees or costs and disbursements is not
decided before entry of a general * * * judgment, any award
or denial of attorney fees or costs and disbursements shall
be made by supplemental judgment.” ORCP 68 C(5)(b)(i)
(emphasis added).
          In particular, we point out that “there is longstand-
ing precedent in Oregon interpreting ORCP 68 that, in addi-
tion to recovering fees incurred in litigating the merits of a
fee-generating claim, a party may recover its attorney fees
incurred as part of the fee application and litigation pro-
cess.” Aizawa, 362 Or at 7 (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted). The rationale for that longstanding prece-
dent is that “the process of recovering attorney fees to which
a party is entitled by statute is related to the prosecution or
defense of the action and thus recoverable under ORCP 68.”
Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted).
648                                         Mayes v. Ramos

         Here, plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees under
ORS 20.080 and filed a statement seeking fees-on-fees for the
work that plaintiff’s attorney had done since May 15, 2019,
in “successfully prosecuting the original fee request over
Defendant’s vigorous opposition.” In that statement, plain-
tiff argued that she was entitled to recover fees-on-fees
under Aizawa, and she requested that the court award
fees-on-fees in a supplemental judgment, which—as noted
above—is the procedure provided in ORCP 68 C(5)(b)(i) for
deciding attorney-fee issues not decided before entry of a
general judgment. As such, pursuant to the “general rule in
Oregon” articulated in Peabody, plaintiff would be entitled
to recovery of fees-on-fees unless there is some indication
that “the legislature intended to depart from that accepted
practice.” Peabody, 326 Or App at 135.
         Defendant’s challenge to plaintiff’s entitlement to
fees-on-fees is not founded on ORS 20.080; rather, defendant
asserts that “either ORS 36.425(6) and related case law or
ORCP 68 and related case law” preclude a party from seek-
ing fees-on-fees where, as here, a general judgment reflect-
ing an arbitration award has already been entered and
satisfied.
         Regarding ORS 36.425(6), defendant contends that,
when a party files exceptions to an arbitrator’s attorney-fee
award, the trial court is limited to reviewing only the legal
basis for that award and the amount, and that the trial
court therefore lacked the authority to award fees-on-fees to
plaintiff as part of that review.
          Defendant’s argument as to a trial court’s review
function under ORS 36.425(6) is unavailing. As noted above,
the trial court’s July 11, 2019, general judgment resolved
the attorney-fee issues raised in plaintiff’s exceptions, and
some two weeks later, on July 26, 2019, plaintiff separately
filed a statement in the trial court requesting an award of
fees-on-fees pursuant to Aizawa and ORCP 68. We have
previously explained that the provisions in ORS 36.425(6)
for filing exceptions and the provisions in ORCP 68 for
seeking attorney fees “unambiguously denote different
processes designed to accomplish different purposes,” and
“[f]iling exceptions to an arbitrator’s award of attorney fees
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                              649

is not the same as filing a statement with the trial court
requesting an award of attorney fees.” Ashley v. Garrison,
162 Or App 585, 591, 986 P2d 654 (1999). Thus, because fil-
ing exceptions and requesting fees-on-fees in the trial court
are distinct processes governed by distinct legal provisions,
the provisions in ORS 36.425(6) did not impose a limitation
on the trial court’s ability to separately award plaintiff fees-
on-fees under Aizawa and ORCP 68.
        Regarding ORCP 68, we understand defendant to
argue that, although parties in other types of civil cases
may seek a supplemental judgment awarding fees-on-fees
through the process outlined in ORCP 68 C, parties in the
context of court-annexed arbitration may not. We disagree;
contrary to defendant’s position, ORCP 68 C explicitly pro-
vides that it “governs the pleading, proof, and award of
attorney fees in all cases,” ORCP 68 C(1) (emphasis added),
and authorizes attorney-fee awards to be “made by supple-
mental judgment,” ORCP 68 C(5)(b)(i). Further, nothing in
ORCP 68 indicates to us that the legislature intended to
exempt cases subject to court-annexed arbitration from the
“longstanding precedent in Oregon interpreting ORCP 68”
that authorizes recovery of fees-on-fees. Aizawa, 362 Or at 7
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
         Relatedly, we also understand defendant to argue
that, under ORCP 68 C, a trial court is authorized to enter
no more than one judgment containing an award of attor-
ney fees—that is, where, as here, a prior judgment reflecting
an initial award of fees has been entered, no supplemen-
tal judgment awarding fees-on-fees is allowed. In support
of that view, defendant points to a passage related to this
court’s discussion of an award of costs in Peterson v. Fielder,
170 Or App 305, 13 P3d 114 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 255
(2003), where we observed that “an award of costs and dis-
bursements is to be included with any award of attorney fees
in a single judgment, one that is either entered [via general
judgment] or, if necessary, as a supplemental judgment.”
Id. at 311. Again, we disagree; understood in context, the
passage cited by defendant concerned the issues of finality
and appealability of a judgment as to an award of costs. See
650                                          Mayes v. Ramos

id. (“The question is whether, in light of ORCP 68 C(5), the
[general] judgment was final as to the award of costs[.]”).
         Briefly, regarding the issue of attorney fees, in
Peterson, the trial court entered a general judgment reflect-
ing an arbitrator’s award to the plaintiffs and specifying
that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees, the amount
of which would “be determined subsequently under ORCP
68 C.” Id. at 307. Thereafter, the trial court entered a sup-
plemental judgment awarding the plaintiffs $9,490 in attor-
ney fees. Id. at 308. The defendants appealed from that sup-
plemental judgment, and the plaintiffs moved to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the defendants should have,
but did not, appeal the general judgment. Ultimately, we
concluded that the defendants had correctly appealed the
supplemental judgment (rather than the general judgment),
because “a trial court declaration that a party is entitled to
attorney fees is not final without a determination of the fee
amount.” Id. at 309 (emphases added); see also Mathews v.
Hutchcraft, 221 Or App 479, 483, 190 P3d 474 (2008) (“Under
Petersen, the general judgment was not final because the
amount of attorney fees * * * remained undetermined until
the entry of the supplemental judgment.” (Emphasis added.)).
So understood, the holding in Peterson does not stand for the
proposition that, under ORCP 68, entry of a prior judgment
awarding attorney fees precludes a subsequent supplemen-
tal judgment awarding fees-on-fees.
         Defendant’s contention that, under ORCP 68, entry
of a prior judgment awarding attorney fees precludes sub-
sequent entry of a supplemental judgment awarding fees-
on-fees is also contradicted by Aizawa. In Aizawa, the trial
court initially entered a judgment awarding the defendant
“$13,796.33 in attorney fees, legal costs, and disbursements
that were incurred” in litigating the underlying condemna-
tion action, then the trial court subsequently entered a “sup-
plemental judgment in [the defendant]’s favor awarding her
$9,537.28 in attorney fees, legal costs, and disbursements that
were incurred as a result of [defendant] litigating her enti-
tlement to * * * attorney fees.” Trimet v. Aizawa, 277 Or App
504, 509, 371 P3d 1250 (2016), aff’d, 362 Or 1 (2017). Thus,
what defendant contends is not allowed under ORCP 68 is
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                             651

just what occurred in Aizawa—the case with the “clearest
articulation” of Oregon’s rule allowing for an award of fees-
on-fees. Peabody, 326 Or App at 138-39.
         In sum, pursuant to the “general rule in Oregon”
regarding fees-on-fees as articulated in Aizawa, plaintiff was
entitled to seek recovery of fees-on-fees, and defendant does
not point to any case law nor any provision in ORS 20.080,
ORS chapter 36, or ORCP 68 that persuades us that “the
legislature intended to depart from that accepted practice”
of allowing recovery of fees-on-fees in this case. Peabody,
326 Or App at 135. Accordingly, the trial court erred in con-
cluding otherwise.
    2. Claim preclusion did not preclude recovery of
       fees-on-fees.
         The second basis on which the trial court denied
plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees was that the request
was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. In so rul-
ing, the court agreed with defendant that the general judg-
ment addressed attorney fees and that plaintiff’s request for
fees-on-fees represented an attempt to “relitigate matters
already ruled upon and resolved.” We disagree.
         “The doctrine of claim preclusion, formerly known
as res judicata, generally prohibits a party from relitigat-
ing the same claim or splitting a claim into multiple actions
against the same opponent.” Bloomfield v. Weakland, 339
Or 504, 510, 123 P3d 275 (2005). Thus, “a plaintiff who has
prosecuted one action against a defendant through to a
final judgment binding on the parties is barred on res judi-
cata grounds from prosecuting another action against the
same defendant where the claim in the second action is one
which is based on the same factual transaction that was at
issue in the first, seeks a remedy additional or alternative
to the one sought earlier, and is of such a nature as could
have been joined in the first action.” Id. (quoting Rennie v.
Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 323, 656 P2d 919 (1982)).
Put simply, claim preclusion operates such that subsequent
litigation is barred where “the earlier litigation proceeded to
final judgment, involved the same parties, and concerned a
claim arising out of the same transaction or series of related
652                                            Mayes v. Ramos

transactions.” Aguirre v. Albertson’s, 201 Or App 31, 47, 117
P3d 1012 (2005).
          Here, although the proceeding involved the same
parties, the other prerequisites for claim preclusion have not
been met. Plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees was not raised
in a second or subsequent action; rather, it was raised as
part of plaintiff’s auto-injury action against defendant. See
Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co., 233 Or App 401, 425, 226 P3d
86 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 350 Or 336, 258 P3d 1199
(2011) (“[T]he process of recovering fees [i]s properly consid-
ered part of the prosecution of an action for purposes of a fee
petition under ORCP 68.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)). Further, plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees did not con-
stitute relitigating the same claim for attorney fees that was
resolved in the general judgment; although that general judg-
ment resolved plaintiff’s exception to the arbitrator’s award
of attorney fees for work performed before May 15, 2019,
it did not resolve the separate matter regarding fees-on-fees
for work performed after May 15, 2019.
          We also observe that defendant’s argument about the
effect of claim preclusion in this case is inconsistent with our
case law regarding a party’s ability to recover fees-on-fees.
As noted above, the court in Aizawa upheld a party’s right
to recover fees-on-fees under ORCP 68, notwithstanding
the fact that that party had already been awarded attorney
fees in a prior judgment in the same litigation. 277 Or App
at 509-11, 514. We therefore conclude that claim preclusion
does not bar plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees, and the trial
court erred in determining otherwise.
      3. The trial court’s determination that plaintiff’s request
         for fees-on-fees was “excessive and without merit”
         and “frivolous.”
         The final bases on which the trial court denied
plaintiff’s request for roughly $8,000 in fees-on-fees were
that the request was “excessive and without merit” and
“frivolous.”
        “In a case in which an award of attorney fees
is required by statute”—as it was in this case under
Cite as 327 Or App 640 (2023)                                653

ORS 20.080—“ORS 20.075(2) provides that the trial court
must consider the factors specified in ORS 20.075(1) in
determining the amount of an award of attorney fees as well
as the factors set out in ORS 20.075(2).” Beaverton School
Dist. 48J v. Ward, 281 Or App 76, 80 n 3, 384 P3d 158 (2016)
(ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted omitted).
Those factors include:
    •   the parties’ conduct giving rise to the litigation
    •   the objective reasonableness of the parties’ claims
        and defenses
    •   the extent to which an award would deter good faith
        claims and defenses in similar cases
    •   the extent to which an award would deter meritless
        claims and defenses
    •   the parties’ objective reasonableness and diligence
        during the proceedings
    •   the parties’ objective reasonableness and diligence
        in pursuing settlement
    •   the amount awarded as a prevailing party fee under
        ORS 20.190
    •   the time and labor required
    •   the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved
    •   the skill needed to perform the legal services
    •   the likelihood that this representation would pre-
        clude the attorney from taking other cases (if appar-
        ent to the client)
    •   the fee customarily charged in the locality for simi-
        lar legal services
    •   the amount involved in the controversy and results
        obtained
    •   the time limitations imposed by the client or cir-
        cumstances of the case
    •   the nature and length of the attorney-client
        relationship
654                                           Mayes v. Ramos

      •   the attorney’s experience and reputation and ability
      •   the fixed or contingent nature of the fee.
Moreau v. Samalin, 295 Or App 534, 537, 435 P3d 794 (2019)
(summarily stating factors in ORS 20.075(1) and (2)).
         “Adequate findings about those matters need not be
complex or lengthy.” McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc.,
327 Or 185, 190, 957 P2d 1200 (1998). However, the court
“must describe the relevant facts and legal criteria for the
court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees in any terms
that are sufficiently clear to permit meaningful appellate
review,” id. at 190-91, and “[a] court would satisfy its obli-
gation to make findings in a case involving ORS 20.075 by
including in its order a brief description or citation to the
factor or factors on which it relies in denying an award of
attorney fees,” id. at 188. Such findings “are necessary to
assist the appellate court in carrying out a meaningful
review of the competing arguments of the parties and the
attorney fee decision below.” Id. at 189.
          But here, the trial court’s references to “excessive
and without merit” and “frivolous” are not sufficient to per-
mit meaningful appellate review, and we can only speculate
as to the relevant facts and legal criteria in ORS 20.075 the
court relied on in making that determination. Accordingly,
we remand for further proceedings to consider the factors in
ORS 20.075 and determine an appropriate award of fees-on-
fees. See McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or 84, 86,
957 P2d 1200 (1998) (remanding “for further proceedings,”
where order as to attorney fees “lack[ed] necessary findings
to explain the legal and factual basis for the award”); see also
Moreau, 295 Or App at 540 (“We regularly follow McCarthy
when we are unable to conduct meaningful appellate review
of a fee award.”).
          Supplemental judgment reversed and remanded.