Court Opinion

ID: 9834075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:16:37.745387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.417466
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
As appears from our former opinion we held that appellants were not “necessary parties” within the meaning of subdivision 29a of the venue act (art. 1995), solely because of our belief that we were required to do so under the authority of First Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 123 Tex. 186, 69 S.W.2d 756. While the definition that is there giv*1090en seems broad enough, when applied to appellants, to exclude them from being “necessary parties” as there defined, we now believe we overlooked the importance of the concluding words of the opinion in that case to the effect that what is there said was intended to relate exclusively to the matter of venue as presented in the certificate there answered, and that that cause was referable to and controlled by subdivision 4 of Article 1995 exclusively. Sufficient authority, when not bound by the Pierce case to hold appellants are not “necessary parties” within the meaning of subdivision 29a, to hold appellants as such “necessary parties”, appears in our former opinion, as well as sufficient reason for so holding. We therefore without citation of further authority or enlarging upon the reasoning of our original opinion grant appel-lee's motion for rehearing, set aside our former judgment, and affirm the action of the trial court refusing appellants’ pleas of privilege. We, of course, refuse appellee’s alternative prayer, in its motion for rehearing, to certify to the Supreme Court.
Motion for rehearing granted, former judgment of reversal and remand set aside, and judgment of the- trial court affirmed..