Court Opinion

ID: 9925683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:02:14.967649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.601003
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Green CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B329632

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA016472)
           v.

 LIFALFA GREEN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                             ____________________________
       Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 (Stats. 2017,
ch. 682, §§ 1–2) amended Penal Code1 sections 12022.5 to give
trial courts discretion to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement
imposed under that section “in the interest of justice pursuant to
Section 1385” in “any resentencing that may occur pursuant to
any other law.” (§ 12022.5, subd. (c).) Appellant Lalifa Green
argues his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to argue at his 2023 resentencing hearing that the trial
court should exercise its discretion to strike the four-year Penal
Code section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. He asks us to
remand this case to the resentencing court to allow it to exercise
that discretion.
       It is undisputed that under his current sentence, Green
was eligible for parole in 2018 and he identifies no prejudice from
his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead,
Green asserts this court cannot “assume that a four-year
sentence has no penal consequences” or assume that a firearm
enhancement sentence “would not influence the parole process.”
Because affirmatively showing prejudice is a prerequisite to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim (In re Avena (1996)
12 Cal.4th 694, 721), Green’s claim fails. We therefore affirm.

                         BACKGROUND
      In 1992, a jury convicted Green of first degree murder,
attempted murder, and robbery. The jury found true a
section 12022.5 firearm enhancement with respect to each count.
The court sentenced Green to 25 years to life for the murder and
a consecutive four-year term for the firearm enhancement. In

      1   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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1992, the trial court sentenced Green to life with the possibility of
parole for the attempted murder and stayed the firearm
allegation. The court sentenced Green to a concurrent three-year
term for the robbery and stayed the firearm allegation. In 1994,
on direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Green (June 3, 1994, B068877) [nonpub. opn.].)
       After the Legislature amended the definition of murder in
2019, Green petitioned for resentencing relief pursuant to
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. After a hearing, the
resentencing court denied the petition and in June 2022, this
court affirmed the denial of resentencing of the murder conviction
and reversed the denial of resentencing for Green’s attempted
murder conviction. We remanded the case for resentencing
“consistent with [our] opinion.” (People v. Green (June 29, 2022,
B313669) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In December 2022, at the request of the prosecutor, the now
second resentencing court dismissed the attempted murder count.
At the March 2023 resentencing hearing, no one argued that the
court should consider exercising its discretion to strike the
section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. Defense counsel indicated,
“I don’t believe there is much discretion involved here. I think
the [appellate] opinion sets out what the court is to do and I think
that’s pretty clear.” The court then resentenced Green to the
same sentence for murder as the original sentencing court, that is
25 years to life and a consecutive four-year term for the firearm
enhancement. The court also imposed a three-year concurrent
sentence for the robbery and stayed the firearm enhancement on
the robbery count.

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                          DISCUSSION
       Green argues the case should be remanded for another
resentencing hearing because the resentencing court was not
aware it had discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancement.
Green argues his defense counsel’s statement that she did not
believe “there is much discretion involved here” supports Green’s
argument on appeal that his defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance. In his opening brief, Green identifies no prejudice
based on this alleged ineffective assistance.
       Respondent argues, and Green does not dispute, that Green
forfeited his contention the resentencing court should have
considered whether to dismiss the firearm enhancement.
Respondent emphasizes that under Green’s current sentence,
Green “has been eligible for parole since April 2018. Accordingly,
dismissing the four-year prison term would neither result in his
release from prison nor would it hasten his parole eligibility.”
Green does not dispute respondent’s assertion that he is eligible
for parole. Instead, in his reply, and as noted previously, Green
contends without any analysis that we “cannot assume that a
four-year sentence has no penal consequences” or that
“imposition of a sentence for the firearm enhancement would not
influence the parole process.”
       Here, it is undisputed Green has not preserved the sole
issue he raises on appeal—the court’s failure to consider striking
the four-year firearm enhancement. (People v. Gonzalez (2003)
31 Cal.4th 745, 755 [defendant cannot raise sentencing issue on
appeal if it was not raised in the trial court].) Accordingly, we
now address Green’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
       “In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is not necessary to determine ‘ “whether counsel’s performance

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was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mesa (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.) The defendant asserting ineffective
assistance must “affirmatively prove” prejudice. (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) The defendant “must prove prejudice
that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241.)
Prejudice requires “a reasonable probability that a more
favorable outcome would have resulted . . . , i.e., a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
       Although Green argues his counsel was ineffective, he fails
affirmatively to show prejudice. He identifies no prejudice
flowing from the alleged error. He offers no theory under which
striking the four-year firearm enhancement would have led to an
outcome more favorable to him. Green’s statement in his reply
brief that this court should not assume the absence of prejudice is
insufficient to meet his burden affirmatively to demonstrate
prejudice.

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                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             WEINGART, J.

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