Court Opinion

ID: 9952571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 07:17:25.309152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:03.639108
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 13, 2024

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00219-CV

                  SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant
                                 V.
                      GARRETT KALLUS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-03261

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Miskel
                            Opinion by Justice Miskel
      In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Superior Industries, Inc. (“Superior”)

appeals the trial court’s order denying Superior’s motion to dismiss for failure of

appellee Garrett Kallus to file a certificate of merit with his original petition,

pursuant to chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Kallus filed

suit against Superior and other defendants to recover damages for personal injuries

sustained while repairing a piece of industrial conveyer equipment manufactured by

Superior. We conclude that Superior has not shown that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying its motion to dismiss and we affirm the order.
                 I.       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In April 2021, Kallus was injured while repairing the hydraulic radial system

of a portable telescopic radial stacking conveyer used to build stockpiles (a

“telestacker”) at the Arcosa Crushed Concrete – McKinney Recycle Yard. Superior

manufactured the telestacker, which was owned by Arcosa, Inc., another defendant

that is not a party to this appeal. Kallus worked for McCourt Equipment, Inc.,

Superior’s distributor.

      On the date of the incident, Kallus was asked to perform troubleshooting and

maintenance work on the telestacker located at the recycling plant in McKinney,

Texas. He contacted a customer service representative employed by Superior to

discuss the repair work and asserts that he followed the customer representative’s

instructions. Kallus alleges that the representative failed to warn him of the dangers

associated with the machine’s braking system. This braking system allegedly failed

while Kallus was working on the telestacker. The machine began rolling and ran

over Kallus’s right leg, causing injuries that required multiple surgeries.

      In March 2022, Kallus filed his original petition against Superior and another

defendant for claims arising from his injuries, and he amended his petition that June

to join additional parties. He did not file a certificate of merit with either petition.

In addition to negligence and gross negligence claims against Superior and the other

defendants, Kallus asserts that Superior manufactured, designed, distributed, or sold

the telestacker with design, manufacturing, or marketing defects that rendered the

                                          –2–
telestacker unreasonably dangerous and caused Kallus’s injuries. More specifically,

Kallus makes the following product liability and negligence claims against Superior

(summarized):

       Superior knew or should have known that there was an unreasonable risk
        in the intended or reasonably foreseeable use of the telestacker and failed
        to adequately warn Kallus of the risks or instruct Kallus how to avoid the
        dangers;

       Superior knew of safer alternative designs that were available and feasible
        at the time of production and that would have prevented or significantly
        reduced such risks;

       Superior manufactured the telestacker and deviated in the quality of
        construction, plan, materials, warnings or specifications;

       Superior is liable under strict product liability theories and expressly
        represented that its telestacker and component parts were safe to use, but
        knew or should have known that the telestacker and its parts were defective
        and dangerous and could not safely be used for the intended purposes, and
        placed them in the stream of commerce in conscious disregard of public
        safety and without adequate warning of the defects and without informing
        the public of the defects;

       Superior had a duty to Kallus to design, manufacture, market, distribute,
        maintain, lease or sell the telestacker in a reasonable manner and to ensure
        that the telestacker was free from defect; Superior breached these duties;
        and its conduct caused Kallus’s injuries and damages.

       Superior engaged in negligent conduct, including the conduct described
        above as well as failing to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training or
        supervising its customer representative, and is vicariously liable for its
        employees and agents; and

       Superior’s conduct was grossly negligent.

      Nine months later, in January 2023, Superior filed its motion to dismiss

Kallus’s claims against Superior with prejudice, arguing that Kallus failed to file a
                                        –3–
certificate of authority pursuant to chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practices and

Remedies Code—applicable to certain lawsuits asserting claims against specified

licensed or registered professionals. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§150.002. After a hearing, the trial judge denied Superior’s motion. This appeal

ensued.

                           II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
      An order denying a motion to dismiss under chapter 150 of the Civil Practice

and Remedies Code is appealable as an interlocutory order. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 150.002(f). We review a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss

under this statute for an abuse of discretion. Lina T. Ramey & Assocs., Inc. v.

Comeaux, No. 05-23-00562-CV, 2023 WL 8183272, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov.

27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an

unreasonable and arbitrary manner without reference to any guiding rules or

principles. Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011); Comeaux, 2023

WL 8183272, at *3.

      “[T]he party that complains of abuse of discretion has the burden to bring

forth a record showing such abuse.” TDIndus. Inc. v. My Three Sons, Ltd., No. 05-

13-00861, 2014 WL 1022453, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 14, 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (quoting Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co. Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795

(Tex. 1987)); see also FAI Eng’rs, Inc. v. Logan, No. 02-20-00255-CV, 2020 WL

7252315, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating

                                        –4–
that the defendant engineering firm had the burden of proof on its motion to dismiss

to demonstrate it met the requisites of Section 150.002(a) of the certificate-of-merit

statute).

       We construe statutory language de novo. Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington

Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2017). A reviewing court’s goal is to

determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. A reviewing court looks to

and relies on the plain meaning of a statute’s words as expressing legislative intent

unless a different meaning is supplied, is apparent from the context, or the plain

meaning of the words leads to absurd or nonsensical results. Id. Courts construe

statutes so that no part is surplusage, but so that each word has meaning. Id.

       Once we construe the statute, we determine whether the trial court abused its

discretion in applying the statute to the facts. Comeaux, 2023 WL 8183272, at *3.

In applying the abuse of discretion standard, reviewing courts defer to the trial court's

factual determinations; a reviewing court does not engage in its own factual review,

but decides whether the record supports the trial court's resolution of factual matters.

State v. $217,590.00 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d 631, 633–34 (Tex. 2000) (citing

Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex.1997)); In re Marriage of Spalding,

No. 05-19-00484-CV, 2021 WL 4057567, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 3, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                          –5–
III.   APPLICABLE LAW – CERTIFICATES OF MERIT IN SUITS AGAINST LICENSED
                        PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
       Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code requires the

filing of an affidavit known as a certificate of merit in certain lawsuits involving

claims against specified licensed or registered professionals. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 150.001–.002. The purpose of the certificate of merit is to

provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the plaintiff’s claims have merit

and are not frivolous. Morrison Seifert Murphy, Inc. v. Zion, 384 S.W.3d 421, 425

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Jennings, Hackler & Partners, Inc. v. N. Tex.

Mun. Water Dist., 471 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

Section 150.002 of the statute, “Certificate of Merit,” provides that:

              (a) In any action . . . for damages arising out of the provision of
       professional services by a licensed or registered professional, a
       claimant shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a
       third-party . . . licensed professional engineer . . . .”

              (b) The affidavit shall set forth specifically for each theory of
       recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or
       other action, error, or omission of the licensed or registered
       professional in providing the professional service, including any error
       or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar
       professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such
       claim . . . .

              (e) A claimant's failure to file the affidavit in accordance with
       this section shall result in dismissal of the complaint against the
       defendant. This dismissal may be with prejudice.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(a), (b), and (e).

                                          –6–
      The threshold questions in determining whether §150.002 applies are

(1) whether the defendant is a covered “licensed or registered professional” and

(2) whether the claimant’s damages arose out of the provision of professional

services by such a professional. See Jennings, 471 S.W.3d at 581.

      Chapter 150 defines a “licensed or registered professional” to include “a

licensed professional engineer . . . or any firm in which such licensed or registered

professional practices,” including a corporation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 150.001(1–c).

      In determining whether claims arise out of the provision of professional

services by a licensed professional engineer, courts review the substance of a

claimant’s pleadings. Comeaux, 2023 WL 8183272, at *4. A claim arises out of the

provision of professional services if the substance of the pleadings implicates a

professional’s education, training, and experience in applying special knowledge or

judgment. Id.; Jennings, 471 S.W.3d at 581. “The question is not whether the

alleged mal-acts themselves constituted the provision of professional services, but

whether the claims arise out of the provision of professional services.” Jennings,

471 S.W.3d at 581. The certificate-of-merit statute applies to any action arising out

of the provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional,

“regardless of the legal theory.” Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. E. Rio Hondo Water Supply

Corp., 520 S.W.3d 887, 894 (Tex. 2017)

                                        –7–
      Courts also look to the definition of “practice of engineering” in the Texas

Occupations Code when conducting this analysis. Comeaux, 2023 WL 8183272, at

*4; Jacobs Eng’g Group, Inc. v. Elsey, 502 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th] Dist. 2016, no pet.); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.001(3)

(“‘Practice of engineering’ has the meaning assigned by Section 1001.003,

Occupations Code.”).       The Texas Occupations Code defines “practice of

engineering” as “the performance of or an offer or attempt to perform any public or

private service or creative work, the adequate performance of which requires

engineering education, training, and experience in applying special knowledge or

judgment of the mathematical, physical, or engineering sciences to that service or

creative work.” TEX. OCC. CODE §1001.003(b). Among other things, this definition

specifically includes:

      (8) engineering for preparation of an operating or maintenance manual;

      ...

      (10) a service, design, analysis, or other work performed for a public or
      private entity in connection with a utility, structure, building, machine,
      equipment, process, system, work, project, or industrial or consumer
      product or equipment of a mechanical, electrical, electronic, chemical,
      hydraulic, pneumatic, geotechnical, or thermal nature;

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §1001.003(c)(8), (10).

      When § 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies, it

requires the plaintiff to obtain an affidavit from a third-party expert attesting to the

defendant’s professional errors or omissions and the factual basis for the claims.

                                          –8–
Melden & Hunt, 520 S.W.3d at 896; See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 150.002. This certificate of merit must be filed with the initiation of a

lawsuit against the licensed professional. Melden & Hunt, 520 S.W.3d at 890; TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 150.001(1-b), 150.002(a). The trial court then

decides “whether the expert’s affidavit sufficiently demonstrates that the complaint

is not frivolous.” Melden & Hunt, 520 S.W.3d at 896. If required, a claimant’s

failure to file a necessary certificate of merit with its complaint must result in the

dismissal of the complaint, and this dismissal “may” be with prejudice. See id. at

889; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(e).

      IV. SUPERIOR DID NOT SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
 DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE DID
                             NOT APPLY

      In one issue on appeal, Superior asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying Superior’s motion to dismiss under this statute. Superior argues that

Kallus was required to file a certificate of merit with his petition because (1) Superior

is a licensed or registered professional as defined in the statute, and (2) Kallus’s

claims against Superior arise out of Superior’s provision of professional services as

a licensed or registered professional.

      Kallus attached exhibits to its response to Superior’s motion to dismiss in

support of his contention that a certificate of merit was not required in this case. The

trial judge sustained Superior’s objections to the exhibits. In response to Kallus’s

reference to certain discovery in its brief, Superior argues that discovery conducted

                                          –9–
in this case should have no bearing on the resolution of the issues presented in this

appeal because the certificate of merit must be filed with the petition prior to

discovery. We do not rely on any discovery in reaching our conclusion.

      A.     The trial court could have concluded that Superior did not prove that
             it was a licensed or registered professional.
      As a threshold issue, Superior has the burden to demonstrate that it is a

“licensed or registered professional” as defined in the certificate-of-merit statute.

See, e.g., TDIndus., 2014 WL 1022453, at *2; Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 795; FAI

Eng’rs, 2020 WL 7252315, at *4.          The definition of “licensed or registered

professional” in the statute includes licensed professional engineers and “any firm

in which such licensed or registered professional practices, including but not limited

to a corporation. . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.001(1–c). Superior

argues that it meets this definition because it is a corporation that employs licensed

professional engineers. Superior’s motion to dismiss included a January 2023

affidavit of its Director of Engineering at Superior (the Director), who attested as

follows:

      2.    By virtue of my duties and responsibilities as of my role as
      Director of Engineering, I am familiar with the work Superior performs
      and the skill sets of the individuals it employs.

      3.    Superior engineers, manufactures, sells, and supports dry bulk
      handling equipment and components. In connection with its work,
      Superior [employs] licensed professional engineers.

      4.    Currently, Superior employs the following licensed professional
      engineers:

                                        –10–
             a. Lafe Grimm (MN License No. 55973);
             b. Paul Schmidgall (MN License No. 55444);
             c. Travis Thooft (MN License No. 56611); and
             d. Austin Schmidgall (MN License No. 54819, CO license
                No. PE.0056654, AZ License No. 70475).

      5.    Superior manufactured telestacker-swing axle model no.
      36x150 TSSA, serial no. 1655767 (the “Telestacker”) in March
      2020. At that time Superior employed the following licensed
      engineers:

             a. Lafe Grimm (MN License No. 55973);
             b. Paul Schmidgall (MN License No. 55444);
             c. Travis Thooft (MN License No. 56611);
             d. Austin Schmidgall (MN License No. 54819, CO license
                 No. PE.0056654, AZ License No. 70475);
             e. Kent Olson (MN. License No. 57155); and
             f. Jarrod Felton (MN License No. 47088, TX License No.
                140968, IA License No. P26350, NV License No.
                022971, PA License No. PEO79589, also currently or
                previously licensed in SD,WI, MD, KS, and MO).

The affidavit contains no additional attestations.

      Superior argues that it met its burden to demonstrate that it is a licensed or

registered professional based on this affidavit and that the trial court abused its

discretion to the extent it did not so find. We disagree. The statutory definition

requires not simply that the firm employ the licensed engineers but that they

“practice” within that firm. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.001(1–

c). The Director states only that he is familiar with the employees’ skill sets and that

Superior employs these engineers “[i]n connection with its work.” The affidavit

does not provide the employees’ job descriptions or job titles (other than the

Director’s) or otherwise provide evidence that their jobs at Superior involve the

                                         –11–
practice of engineering. An employee may hold an engineering license yet not

practice engineering in his role at a corporation, just as a person may maintain a law

license even if his current job does not involve practicing law. The trial court was

within its discretion to weigh Superior’s evidence and conclude that Superior failed

to carry its burden to prove that it was a licensed professional engineering firm under

the statute.

        In its reply to its motion to dismiss, Superior also states that it has multiple

patents related to the telestacker and its components that were obtained through the

licensed professional engineers employed by Superior.                         These patents are not

attested to in the Director’s affidavit nor attached as exhibits thereto. No evidence

of the content of the patents is provided—the reply lists only the title of a patent, a

patent number, a year, and an employee’s name.1                      The trial court was within its

discretion to find that Superior’s list of employees and list of past patents did not

connect Superior to the practice of professional services by a licensed professional

engineer. In other words, in weighing Superior’s evidence, the trial court could have

found that the list failed to prove that Superior was a firm in which these individuals

were licensed professionals who practiced engineering at the time of the occurrence

    1
      The footnote in Superior’s reply to its motion to dismiss in support of this arguments states: “See e.
g., P. Schmidgall, et al, Portable Radial Stacking Conveyer, Patent No. 5,833,043 (Nov. 10, 1998), P.
Schmidgal et. al, Portable Telescoping Radial Stacking Conveyor, Patent No. US 6,360,876 B1 (Mar. 26,
2002); L. Grimm, et. al, Radial Conveyer Undercarriage Apparatus Systems and Methods, Patent No. US
10,829,308 B2 (Nov. 10, 2020) and A. Schmidgall, et al, Road-Portable Conveyor Apparatus Systems and
Methods, Patent No. US 10,919,704 B2 (Feb. 16, 2021).”

                                                  –12–
at issue. See FAI Eng’rs, 2020 WL 7252315, at *3. Superior asks us to find that the

trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules

and principles, but we defer to the trial court’s determination of how to weigh

Superior’s evidence. See $217,590.00 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d at 633–34; In re

Marriage of Spalding, 2021 WL 4057567, at *3.

      Superior argues that its Director’s affidavit is competent evidence that

Superior is a licensed or registered professional for purposes of the statute. Superior

asserts that “Texas courts have repeatedly held that an affidavit, like the affidavit

Superior provided, standing alone, is sufficient to support [this] finding (emphasis

in original).” However, the affidavits in the cases Superior cites were accompanied

by additional evidence or otherwise provided more direct attestations than Superior’s

affidavit that licensed professionals practiced engineering for the firms. See, e.g.,

AMEC Foster Wheeler USA Corp. v. Goats, No. 09-18-00477-CV, 2019 WL

3949466, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(providing affidavit testimony that defendant firm had employed licensed

professional engineers for decades along with a certification showing it was

registered in Texas to offer and perform engineering services as well as a roster from

the Texas Board of Professional Engineers of its employees); Cimarron Eng’g, LLC

v. Miramar Petroleum, Inc., No. 13-14-00163-CV, 2014 WL 2937012, at *1–2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defendant

engineering firm provided affidavit of the owner, president, and employee of the

                                        –13–
firm attesting he had been a licensed engineer in Texas since 1990 and had practiced

as an engineer continually since that time); UOP, L.L.C. v. Kozak, No. 01-08-00896-

CV, 2010 WL 2026037, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] May 20, 2010, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (affidavit included evidence that the defendant firm employed

licensed professional engineers who provided engineering services for refineries and

generated refinery process designs in a case alleging that the defendant acted as the

engineering design service provider and contractor during construction of a

refinery). Kallus argues that most certificate-of-merit cases involve defendants that

are professional firms whose primary business is providing engineering services. In

each of these cases, for example, the business entities provided evidence that they

were firms engaged in the business of providing professional engineering services

to their customers. In contrast, relating to the claims in this suit, Superior did not

sell professional engineering services to its customer—it sold a product.

      Superior further asserts that the fact that it is not registered with the Texas

Board of Professional Engineers is irrelevant for the purposes of determining

whether it is a licensed or registered professional, because registration does not

prove whether a licensed or registered professional practices within a firm. In the

cases Superior cites, courts determined that evidence of a defendant firm’s

registration with the Texas Board of Professional Engineers, by itself, was

inadequate to prove that licensed professionals practiced within the firm. See

TDIndus., 2014 WL 1022453, at *4 (determining that the only purported evidence

                                        –14–
provided—a printout of the Texas Board of Professional Engineers’ Firm Search

results page and the government website address of this search page—showed

nothing respecting the defendant’s asserted status as a licensed or registered

professional pursuant to Chapter 150); FAI Eng’rs, 2020 WL 7252315, at *3

(determining that the defendant’s nonworking hyperlink to the website of the Texas

Board of Professional Engineers did not constitute evidence that a licensed or

registered professional practiced within the firm at the time of the occurrence at

issue); CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc. v. Springer, No. 09-16-00479-CV, 2017 WL

6210837, at * 3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(concluding that the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof because, while the

record contained evidence that the firm was registered with the Texas Board of

Professional Engineers, the record did not contain any evidence that a licensed or

registered professional practiced within the defendant firm). We disagree that these

courts held that registration is irrelevant simply because each defendant’s evidence

was legally insufficient in those cases to show that a licensed professional practiced

within the firm.

       Regardless, in the present case, our conclusion does not turn on whether the

trial court considered that Superior is not registered with the Texas Board of

Professional Engineers. Superior had the burden to bring forth a record showing that

it is a “firm in which [a] licensed or registered professional practices” under the

statute in order to obtain a dismissal for Kallus’s failure to file a certificate of merit.

                                          –15–
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Superior is a

manufacturer and distributor who has not demonstrated that the few licensed

engineers that it employed actually practiced engineering, especially related to the

telestacker at the time of its manufacture.

       We conclude that Superior has not met its burden to show that the trial court

abused its discretion to the extent it found that Superior did not prove it was a

licensed or registered professional within the meaning of the certificate-of-merit

statute.

       B.    The trial court could have concluded that Superior did not prove that
             Kallus’s claims arose out of Superior’s provision of covered
             professional services.
       Even if Superior had adduced legally or factually sufficient evidence to

require the trial court to find that it met the definition of a licensed or registered

professional under the certificate-of-merit statute, the certificate requirement only

applies in an action for damages “arising out of the provision of professional

services” by such a licensed professional. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 150.002(a).

                                        –16–
        Superior asserts that Kallus conceded at the dismissal hearing that his design

defect claim implicates the certificate-of-merit requirement.                        However, Kallus

argues, and we agree, that Kallus did not concede this point.2

        The parties further disagree as to whether the role of Superior’s unlicensed

customer representative who provided repair instructions to Kallus impacts the

applicability of the statute. We need not address this argument. Our conclusion is

independent of the fact that the customer representative was not a licensed

professional engineer.

                   1.       Superior’s evidence fails to prove that its licensed
                            engineers provided engineering services out of which
                            Kallus’s claims arise.
        In its motion to dismiss, Superior argues that Kallus’s claims arise out of

Superior’s provision of professional engineering services because “they relate to

Superior’s design and other work related to the design of the subject telestacker

machine” manufactured by Superior.                     Superior asserts that it conducted the

following activities that constitute the practice of engineering under the Texas

Occupations Code:             “‘consultation, investigation, evaluation, analysis . . .,’

‘engineering for preparation of an operating or maintenance manual,’ ‘engineering .

    2
      At the hearing, Kallus’s attorney explained that, in his experience with asserting the same types of
negligence and product liability claims against many product manufacturers, he had never been met with a
motion to dismiss for lack of a certificate of merit. He further opined that, in thinking about the present
case, the only claim raised “that could potentially even fall under the engineering umbrella that I could see
would be design defect and so I’m going to set that aside for a moment.” This statement is not a concession
of the point. Moreover, the trial judge later returned to the product liability design defect claim, and
Kallus’s counsel reiterated his position that no case law supports Superior’s requested dismissal of the
claims with prejudice, or even a nonsuit of the design defect claim.
                                                   –17–
. . to monitor compliance with drawings or specifications,’ and ‘a service, design,

analysis, or other work performed for a public or private entity in connection with’

the telestacker and its components.”

      The statute applies if the action for damages arises out of the provision of

professional services by a licensed or registered professional. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. §150.002(a). Merely proving that a firm engaged in the practice

of engineering as defined by the Occupations Code does not imply that it is a licensed

professional. TDIndus., 2014 WL 1022453, at *4. Similarly, Superior’s assertion

that it engaged in activities listed in the Occupations Code does not prove that

Kallus’s claims arose out of the provision of professional services by a licensed

professional engineer. As discussed above, the Director’s affidavit merely states

that Superior employs the named engineers “[i]n connection with its work.” He does

not state that any of them actually practice engineering in their jobs at Superior or

that any provided professional engineering services with respect to the telestacker

and its braking system at the relevant times. See, e.g., FAI Eng’rs, 2020 WL

7252315, at *3.

      In its reply to its motion to dismiss, Superior also argued that the listed patents

demonstrate that Kallus’s claims “directly implicate the work performed by the

licensed professional engineers that patented the machine.” A list of purported

patents of varying age with no evidence explaining the relevance of the patents to

the components of the telestacker at issue in this case fails to demonstrate that the

                                         –18–
trial court abused its discretion in finding that Superior did not prove that Kallus’s

claims arose from the provision of professional engineering services by licensed

professional engineers at Superior.

      In its reply brief on appeal, Superior further asserts that “whether Superior

actually provided professional services in connection with its design, manufacturing,

marketing, service, and analysis of the telestacker is irrelevant to the determination

of whether section 150.002(a) required [Kallus’s] complaint to be dismissed as

against Superior.” We reject Superior’s argument that whether Superior actually

provided professional engineering services relating to the telestacker is irrelevant

under the statute. In fact, when a certificate of merit is required, the affidavit of the

third-party professional must set forth, for each theory of recovery, the actions,

errors or omissions “of the licensed or registered professional in providing the

professional service.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(b). In

other words, the statute requires the plaintiff to show, for each claim, how the

licensed professional engineer erred in the professional engineering services that

were provided. In construing statutes, “we endeavor to read statutes contextually to

give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Melden & Hunt, 520 S.W.3d at 893.

The certificate of merit is required when professional services were provided, and

the claims arise out of the professional services provided by the licensed

professional. To hold otherwise would eliminate the statute’s requirement of a link

                                         –19–
between the professional services provided, the claimant’s causes of action, and the

claimed damages that arose from the provision of professional services.

      The pleadings in this case allege product liability and negligence claims

relating to the defective design, marketing, and manufacture of unsafe equipment by

a manufacturer. We conclude that the trial court could have determined that Superior

did not meet its burden to prove that Kallus’s product liability and manufacturer

negligence claims arose out of the provision of professional engineering services by

licensed professional engineers at Superior.

               2.     Superior’s cases involving product liability or other claims
                      are distinguishable.
      Superior cites a few cases where plaintiffs filed certificates of merit in support

of product liability and related negligence or other claims. However, the defendants

in the cases Superior cites were professional engineering firms rather than product

manufacturers, or were licensed, professional engineering firms that also

manufactured products. See T & T Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. Danks, No. 01-21-00139-

CV, 2022 WL 3588718, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (holding plaintiff’s certificate of merit complied with statutory

requirements in a strict product liability and negligence case against professional,

licensed engineering firm that allegedly designed, fabricated or manufactured a

defective oil rig); AMEC, 2020 WL 3579567, at *1 (evaluating whether a certificate

of merit was required in a case alleging product liability, negligence, and breach of

implied warranty of merchantability claims against licensed professional
                                  –20–
engineering firm relating to its engineering design and technology of a filter system

at a refinery).

       In AMEC, one of the primary cases Superior cites, the plaintiffs sued an

engineering firm alleging design, manufacturing, and marketing defect claims,

negligence claims, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability for injuries

caused by hot steam that sprayed from a sour water pump system. AMEC, 2019 WL

3949466, at *1. The engineering firm was registered in Texas to offer and perform

engineering services and had a contract to perform engineering work at the plant.

Id. at *2, 6. The Houston court determined that a certificate of merit was required

because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the provision of professional engineering

services based on their contention that the engineering firm was “negligent in the

design, manufacture, and marketing of the sour water pump (‘system’)” and the

allegation that plaintiffs “relied on [the engineering firm’s] skill and judgment to

furnish a suitable system that was fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was used

(emphasis in original).” Id. at *4. The court concluded, “If the cause of action is

based on a breach of the standard of care by a professional engineering company,

then the claim ‘arose out of the provision of professional [engineering] services[,]’

without regard to how it is labeled.” Id. AMEC is distinguishable from the present

case not only because it involved a registered, professional engineering firm, but

                                        –21–
also because the plaintiff expressly alleged a breach of a professional engineering

standard of care.3

        Under Superior’s broad reading of the statute, a claimant would be required

to obtain a certificate of merit to initiate, for example, a design defect claim against

any product manufacturer that is not in the business of providing engineering

services but that employs even one licensed professional. Claimants would be

expected to ascertain, without discovery, whether a defendant company employs a

licensed engineer. As a result, claimants would have to err on the side of obtaining

and filing a certificate of merit with every complaint alleging any design defect or

other claim against a company that might employ an engineer, or risk dismissal of a

meritorious claim based on a procedural defect. Superior has not cited, and we have

not found, any Texas authority supporting that interpretation. Cf. TIC N. Cent. Dall.

3, L.L.C., 463 S.W.3d at 80 n.5 (holding that claims against an architecture firm were

not based on actions of the firm relating to the practice of architecture, and noting

the overall purpose of the statute to deter meritless claims and the problem with a

        3
           In the present case, Kallus does not assert professional negligence claims or similar claims
invoking a heightened professional duty of care. Although we do not conclude that a professional standard
of care necessarily must be pleaded in order for the certificate-of-merit statute to apply, we note that in
certain cases courts have held the statute inapplicable where the plaintiff’s claims did not implicate a higher
standard of professional care. See TIC N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 71, 79
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (concluding that claims against architecture firm did not arise out of
its provision of professional services and that the plaintiff did not allege that the architecture firm “should
be subject to a higher standard of care because of its professional expertise or otherwise base its claims on
any violation of professional standards.”); Jacobs, 502 S.W.3d at 465 (concluding that a certificate of merit
was not required because the plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence and gross negligence invoked the duties
arising from the employment relationship, “not from any professional relationship giving rise to a
heightened duty of care owed by a professional engineer”).

                                                    –22–
broad reading of the statute that “could forever bar a plaintiff’s suit even if the

plaintiff was not aware of, and had no reason to be aware of, the defendant’s

professional expertise”).

      We conclude that Superior has not shown that it was unreasonable or arbitrary

for the trial court to determine that Superior did not meet its burden to prove that

Kallus’s claims arose out of Superior’s provision of professional engineering

services by a licensed professional engineer under the certificate-of-merit statute.

                                 V.     Conclusion
      Superior has failed to demonstrate that the trial court acted in an unreasonable

or arbitrary manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles when it

applied the certificate-of-merit statute to the facts in this case. Consequently, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Superior’s motion to dismiss. We

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            /Emily Miskel/
230219f.p05                                 EMILY MISKEL
                                            JUSTICE

                                        –23–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES, INC.,                     On Appeal from the 116th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-03261.
No. 05-23-00219-CV           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
                                               Justices Goldstein and Garcia
GARRETT KALLUS, Appellee                       participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee GARRETT KALLUS recover his costs of this
appeal from appellant SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES, INC.

Judgment entered this 13th day of March, 2024.

                                        –24–