Court Opinion

ID: 9891341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:03:33.735113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:02.044201
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 450
                 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION I
                                      No. CR-22-516

                                                  Opinion Delivered October 18, 2023

 JOSEPH CHAPMAN                            APPEAL FROM THE POLK
                                 APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                           [NO. 57CR-20-58]
 V.
                                                  HONORABLE CHARLES A.
 STATE OF ARKANSAS                                YEARGAN, JUDGE
                                    APPELLEE
                                                  AFFIRMED

                       BRANDON J. HARRISON, Chief Judge

        Joseph Chapman appeals his convictions on two counts of rape. Chapman contends

that the evidence supporting the convictions was insufficient and that the circuit court erred

in admitting certain evidence. We affirm Chapman’s convictions.

       In June 2020, the State charged Chapman with two counts of rape. At a jury trial

convened in September 2021, the State presented evidence that Chapman had adopted his

wife’s daughter, MC, and that when MC was approximately twelve years old, Chapman

began sexually abusing her. The abuse progressed to sexual intercourse and continued until

MC was seventeen years old. The jury found Chapman guilty of both counts of rape and

recommended a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment on each count. The court imposed

the recommended sentences to run consecutively. Chapman did not file a timely notice of

appeal from the sentencing order, but on 14 September 2022, this court granted his motion

for belated appeal.
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       For his first point, Chapman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his convictions.    While acknowledging that MC testified to the rape and that the

uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient evidence for a conviction, he

nevertheless asserts that because there was no forensic or physical evidence to support MC’s

allegations, the evidence was insufficient. Chapman also questions MC’s credibility, though

he took the stand at trial and made statements alleging that twelve-year-old MC had been

the aggressor and that she had “forced” or “intimidated” him into having sex with her.

       We will not decide Chapman’s point because it’s not preserved for our review.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1(a) (2023) requires a criminal defendant in a jury

trial to move for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s case and at the close of

all the evidence. The Rule is strictly construed, and a defendant’s failure to adhere to the

requirements of Rule 33.1(a) will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Here, defense

counsel expressly declined to move for a directed verdict (for good reason), stating:

              Your Honor, normally the Defense attorney in a trial such as this or
       any other type of trial would make a motion for directed verdict of acquittal.
       I have heard the testimony that has been presented by the State and I cannot
       find any evidentiary basis for making the motion for directed verdict.

Consequently, Chapman’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him is barred.

See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. 209, 549 S.W.3d 346.

       In his second, third, and fourth points on appeal, Chapman challenges the admission

of statements he made to a police officer, to MC, and to a coworker. He also asserts that

certain physical evidence, namely MC’s underwear containing DNA evidence of

Chapman’s semen, should not have been admitted. Defense counsel raised no objection to

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the admission of this evidence at trial. Because these points are also raised for the first time

on appeal, we won’t reach them either. Id.

       Chapman argues in his reply brief that the failure to raise a particular argument does

not preclude its consideration on appeal. He cites Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68, 641 S.W.3d

628, to support this proposition. In Keesee, the supreme court held that the State’s failure

to raise a specific hearsay exception in response to a hearsay objection did not preclude the

supreme court from affirming the admission of a statement based on that exception in a

capital-murder trial. The supreme court held that in admitting the statement, the circuit

court “thoughtfully considered whether [the] statement should have been excluded as

hearsay and concluded it should not.” Id. at 13, 641 S.W.3d at 638. The appellate court

simply decides whether the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, and

“[t]his standard does not require the circuit court to rule on each hearsay exception.” Id. at

13, 641 S.W.3d at 638. The supreme court held that its decision is consistent with judicial

reasoning and likened it to other cases that have affirmed evidentiary rulings when the circuit

court reached the right result, even if its reason was incorrect. E.g., Harris v. State, 339 Ark.

35, 2 S.W.3d 768 (1999) (affirming admission of prior statement under Ark. R. Evid.

801(d)(1)(ii) after circuit court incorrectly admitted it under Rule 612); Chisum v. State, 273

Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728 (1981) (affirming introduction of statements as impeachment

evidence under Rule 613 after circuit court incorrectly ruled they were admissible under

the recorded-recollections exception in Rule 803(5)).

       We disagree that Keesee supports the proposition that objections and arguments not

raised by a defendant during a jury trial may be considered as a basis for reversal on appeal.

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There is a distinct difference between an appellant raising an argument for the first time on

appeal to obtain a reversal and an appellee seeking an affirmance on a basis neither argued

below nor relied on by the circuit court.1 Again, an appellant is bound by the scope and

nature of the arguments made at trial and may not change or enlarge those grounds on

appeal. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, 571 S.W.3d 469. This proposition has been so often

repeated and applied over the decades that it warrants no further discussion. The judgment

and sentencing order entered by the circuit court is wholly affirmed.

       Affirmed.

       KLAPPENBACH and BROWN, JJ., agree.

       Hancock Law Firm, by: Sharon Kiel, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

       1
        Our courts have affirmed judgments on different bases than those used by circuit
courts regardless of whether appellees have raised the issues at trial, Stokes v. State, 375 Ark.
394, 291 S.W.3d 155 (2009); Ramage v. State, 61 Ark. App. 174, 966 S.W.2d 267 (1998);
and regardless of whether appellees have raised the issues on appeal, Malone v. Malone, 338
Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999); Duckett v. State, 268 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 18 (Ark. App.
1980).

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