Court Opinion

ID: 9862995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:48:06.541979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:01.090764
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S motion for rehearing
DICE, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing appellant insists that his Bill of Exception No. 2, which we did not discuss in our original opinion, presents reversible error because it certifies that he was denied the right to present to the jury evidence in support of his plea of former jeopardy.
The bill of exception must be considered in the light of the following facts shown by the record:
At the former trial Judge Tillman Smith presided.
When the present case was called for trial on May 15, 1961, *217before Judge J. D. Todd, Jr., and the State announced ready, appellant announced that he desired to file a special plea in bar to the prosecution, and to offer evidence in connection with such plea.
No jury had been empaneled.
Evidence was then introduced before Judge Todd, transcript of which is before us, at the conclusion of which the plea of former jeopardy was overruled.
Thereafter, on May 23, 1961, a plea of former jeopardy which appears to be otherwise identical with that upon which the court had heard the evidence and had overruled, was sworn to and filed, and was denied.
On the same day, May 23, 1961, appellant filed a motion renewing his plea of former jeopardy and requesting that the court permit evidence on the plea of former jeopardy and have the jury pass on that question before hearing any evidence in connection with the offense charged in the indictment. He alleged in said motion that any testimony taken in connection with the offense charged in the indictment would have a prejudicial effect upon the jury in considering the plea; and that to permit the jury to hear evidence in connection with the offense charged in the indictment at the same time that evidence was heard on the plea of former jeopardy would violate appellant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing and to due process. Such motion was by the court denied.
We know of no authority which sustains appellant’s contention that he was entitled to have a jury finding on the issue raised by his plea of former jeopardy before any evidence was heard on the charge of murder. To the contrary, it is the rule that the plea of former jeopardy be submitted and tried by the jury together with the plea of “not guilty”. See Art. 525, V.A.C.C.P. and cases listed under Note 1, Art. 526, V.A.C.C.P.
While the cases cited by appellant sustain his contention that he was entitled to introduce evidence before the jury for the purpose of discharging the burden resting upon him of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea was true, there is no showing in this record that appellant tendered evidence before the jury in support of his plea after the court had properly refused to permit such evidence to be offered in advance of a hearing on the merits.
*218We hold that, under the record, appellant waived any right he may have had to a jury finding on whether his plea of former jeopardy was true.
We remain convinced that Judge Todd did not err in overruling the plea of former jeopardy.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the Court.