Court Opinion

ID: 9904754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 19:03:34.027021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.031582
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 Karlan v. City of Los Angeles CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 LISA KARLAN et al.,                                           B315168
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                           Super. Ct. No. BS174454)

           v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel and Robert B. Broadbelt,
Judges. Affirmed.
      Pease Law, Bryan W. Pease and Parisa Ijadi-Maghsoodi;
Law Offices of G. David Tenenbaum and G. David Tenenbaum,
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
      Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, and Timothy Martin, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendants and Respondents.
       This is the second appeal arising from protesting activity
outside an Orthodox Jewish synagogue’s facility during a
Kapparot ritual in which a chicken is killed and the carcass
discarded. (See Animal Protection & Rescue League, Inc. et al. v.
City of Los Angeles (Dec. 13, 2021, B304781) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following their protest of a Kapparot ritual in September 2017,
plaintiffs and appellants Lisa Karlan, Cory Mac A’Ghobhainn,
and Amy Jean Davis filed this lawsuit against defendants and
respondents City of Los Angeles (City) and Los Angeles Police
Captain Paul Vernon, requesting damages, declaratory and
injunctive relief, and a traditional writ of mandate. The
complaint alleged the City abused its discretion and endorsed the
exercise of religion by refusing to enforce Penal Code section 597,
which prohibits the intentional and malicious killing of animals,
against Kapparot practitioners. The complaint also alleged
violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Acts (the Bane Act) and
the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (the Ralph Act) (Civ. Code,
§§ 52.1, 51.7) against Captain Vernon for his threats to arrest
appellants if they used a projector or amplified sound during
their protest.
       On appeal from the judgment of dismissal following an
order sustaining the respondents’ demurrers to the operative
complaint, appellants contend they have adequately pleaded
causes of action against respondents for (1) traditional writ of
mandate and violations of the (2) Bane Act, (3) Ralph Act, and
(4) Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We affirm.

                                 2
                         BACKGROUND
       We recite the factual background from the allegations in
the operative second amended complaint and matters judicially
noticed by the trial court.
       On September 12, 2017, the Board of Commissioners of the
Los Angeles Department of Animal Services (Department) held a
meeting to address a staff report on the City’s “Kapparot
response.” When discussing the report, a commissioner described
Kapparot as a “barbaric ritual [that] is protected by the First
Amendment although the vast majority of Jews do not believe in
the practice.” The commissioner further stated, “The Department
has struggled with how best and effectively to take action to
protect chickens within the framework of the First Amendment,”
and then invited a deputy city attorney to discuss the legal status
of the Kapparot ritual. The attorney stated, “[W]e have a
confluence between the First Amendment protection of religion
and animal humane laws.” She continued, “Since courts have
failed to make any clear decision that this is a violation of law,
without infringing on the actual ceremony, our goal is to make
sure that the animals in transportation, holding, feeding and
watering are humanely taken care of.”
       Department Commissioners held another meeting on
September 26, 2017. During that hearing, an unidentified person
associated with the City Attorney’s Office advised the
Department against enforcing Penal Code section 597 against
Kapparot practitioners. Subject to various statutory exemptions,
Penal Code section 597 prohibits the malicious and intentional
killing of an animal. (§§ 597, subd. (a), 599c.)

                                3
      The following day, appellants protested on a public
sidewalk near a Jewish facility performing the Kapparot ritual.1
During the protest, Davis attempted to use a small projector to
display a message about compassion and how coins could be used
in the place of chickens in the ritual. Captain Vernon responded
to the protest and threatened to arrest appellants, confiscate
Davis’s projector, and shut down the protest. When Karlan
requested to make a private persons arrest of those participating
in the Kapparot ritual, Captain Vernon refused, stating “the
government [did] not have the authority” under the United
States Constitution to effectuate an arrest under Penal Code
section 597 for a recognized religious ritual.

A.    The Operative Complaint
      Appellants initiated this action in July 2018 and filed the
operative complaint on May 29, 2019. The complaint asserted
four causes of action against the City and/or Captain Vernon.

      1.     Traditional Writ of Mandate
      Appellant’s first cause of action against the City is a two-
count claim for traditional writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1085.) The first count requested an order “requiring the City to
exercise its discretion with respect to enforcing . . . [section] 597
against killing and discarding of chickens for Kapparot rituals,
rather than completely abrogating its responsibilities in this
regard simply because religion is involved.” The complaint
alleged the City had abused its discretion by creating “a de facto

1     Those responsible for conducting the Kapparot ritual, the
Hebrew Discovery Center and Netanel Louie, are named defendants
but are not parties to this appeal.

                                  4
exception to animal cruelty laws for killings motivated by religion
that has not been provided for by the Legislature and is not
required by the Constitution.” The complaint further alleged
that because Penal Code section 597 “is a neutral law of general
applicability,” it can be applied to conduct “motivated by religion”
if there is a rational basis to do so. (Citing Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1992) 508 U.S. 520 (Lukumi).)
       The second count challenged the constitutionality of Los
Angeles Municipal Code section 53.67 (section 53.67), a City
ordinance prohibiting the practice of “animal sacrifice” motivated
by religion.2 Under this count, appellants requested an order
requiring the City “to either (a) exercise its discretion to construe
and enforce [section] 53.67 in a constitutionally permissible
manner, (b) repeal [section] 53.67, or (c) amend [section] 53.67 to
cure its constitutional defects.”

      2.      The Bane and Ralph Act
      The fourth and fifth causes of action for violations of the
Ralph and Bane Acts (Civ. Code, §§ 52.1, 51.7) alleged Captain
Vernon had threatened to arrest appellants and confiscate a
projector if they used it during their protest. Both causes of
action were asserted against Captain Vernon directly and against
the City under respondeat superior.

2     As provided in the operative complaint, section 53.67 prohibits
animal sacrifices, defined as “the injuring or killing of any animal in
any religious or cult ritual . . . , wherein the animal has not been
injured or killed primarily for food purposes, . . . .”

                                    5
       3.     Establishment Clause
       The sixth cause of action for violation of the Establishment
Clause under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution alleged that the City, by intentionally
refusing to enforce Penal Code section 597 against those
practicing the Kapparot ritual, “promote[d] criminal acts in the
name of religion.” Appellants alleged they had standing to assert
this claim even though they had not suffered “a concrete and
particular injury separate from that of the general public, unlike
[sic] Article III courts.” They requested a declaration the City
was violating the Establishment Clause “by actively conspiring
with, cooperating with and protecting the criminal acts” of
Kapparot practitioners.3

B.    The Demurrers and Oppositions
      Respondents filed demurrers to the operative complaint.
As to the first cause of action for traditional writ of mandate,
respondents argued appellants had not demonstrated a beneficial
or public interest to establish standing. On the merits,
respondents argued the City had no ministerial duty to enforce
Penal Code section 597 against particular individuals and
instead had considerable discretion when deciding whether to
enforce criminal laws. “There are a number of different issues
that need to be determined in any alleged Penal Code violation
analysis, including whether the conduct was ‘malicious’ as
required by . . . [section] 597, whether an exception applies, the
types of standards that the behavior needs to be scrutinized

3      The remaining causes of action in the operative complaint were
either voluntarily dismissed or sustained without leave to amend and
are unchallenged in this appeal.

                                  6
under, and other laws that might be implicated—all of which
reinforce that the City has full discretion.” In addition,
respondents argued the court had no authority to order the
amendment of section 53.67.
       Regarding the non-writ causes of action, respondents
argued appellants lacked standing to pursue any claim under the
Establishment Clause. Respondents also argued the complaint
failed to plead violations under the Ralph and Bane Acts, both of
which required the infliction of actual violence or a threat of
violence.
       In opposition to the demurrers, appellants contended their
complaint raised “an important public policy” issue, which
conferred them with standing to pursue their causes of action for
traditional writ of mandate and violation of the Establishment
Clause. Appellants challenged the remaining arguments on the
merits.

C.    The Trial Court’s Ruling
      Following hearings on the demurrers, the trial court issued
an order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend. The
court first questioned appellants’ standing under the public
interest doctrine but determined it need not resolve the issue.
The court found, “Even if [appellants] have sufficiently alleged
public interest standing, [they] have not stated a claim for writ of
mandate.” Under the separation of powers doctrine, the court
declined to provide “equitable relief (a writ of mandate) that
would, in effect, require [the] City to enforce a penal law in a
particular way against practitioners of Kapparot, . . . .” In so
ruling, the court found various factors bore upon the City’s
decision to abstain enforcement of Penal Code section 597 against

                                 7
the Kapparot ritual beyond the constitutional question posed in
the operative complaint, such as whether the ritual was
“malicious,” whether an exception to the Penal Code applied, and
whether enforcing the law would expose the City to potential
liability. Turning to section 53.67, the court reasoned that even if
the ordinance was facially unconstitutional, appellants furnished
no authority under which the court could “issue a writ directing
[the] City to amend section 53.67, repeal the ordinance, or enforce
it in a particular manner.”
       Proceeding to the non-writ claims, the court found “a threat
of wrongful arrest is not sufficient to constitute ‘force,
intimidation, or coercion’” under the Bane and Ralph Acts. In
addition, the court found appellants failed to establish standing
to assert an Establishment Clause claim, as the public interest
doctrine did not apply to non-writ claims. After issuing its order
sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, the court
entered judgment in favor of respondents. Appellants timely
appealed.

                          DISCUSSION
      Appellants challenge the court’s order sustaining the
demurrers on all four causes of action against respondents. “A
demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a
complaint.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558.) “When a demurrer is
sustained, appellate courts conduct a de novo review to determine
whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of
action under any possible legal theory.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax
Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1242.)
We consider all material facts properly pleaded and matters

                                 8
subject to judicial notice and presume the judgment of the trial
court is correct; appellants bear the burden of affirmatively
proving error in the trial court’s rulings. (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; Ramirez v. Tulare County Dist.
Attorney’s Office (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 911, 924; Young v. Gannon
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)

A.     Traditional Writ of Mandate (First Cause of Action)
       Appellants’ first cause of action seeks a writ of mandate
compelling the City to enforce Penal Code section 597 against
Kapparot practitioners and rewrite Penal Code section 53.67 so
that it can be enforced against Kapparot practitioners. The cause
of action fails on both counts.

       1.    Governing Law
       To state a cause of action for traditional writ of mandate,
appellants were required to plead facts showing (1) a clear duty
to act by respondents; (2) a beneficial interest in the performance
of that duty; (3) respondents’ ability to perform the duty; (4) the
failure to perform or an abuse of the respondents’ discretion if so
acting; and (5) no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law.
(Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879, 915; see Code
Civ. Proc., § 1085.)
       A writ of mandate is often sought to compel a public body
or public official to perform a ministerial duty—one that is
required by statute to be performed without regard to judgment
or opinion. (Ellena v. Department of Ins. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
198, 205; The H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. Perez
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 37, 46; County of Los Angeles v. City of
Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 653.) In such a case, it

                                 9
is generally argued the duty is clear and the public body or
official lacks discretion not to perform it.
       When a writ of mandate seeks to compel a public body or
official to exercise its discretion in a particular way, such as to
compel a public entity to prosecute (or not prosecute) a criminal
violation, the analysis is different. Public entities have broad
discretionary authority over the investigation and prosecution of
criminal violations. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959,
1013; see Pen. Code, §§ 836, 836.5, 830.9; Gov. Code, §§ 26500,
38630, subd. (b), 41803.5, subds. (a)-(b), 72193, subd. (a).) “It is
well settled that the prosecuting authorities, exercising executive
functions, ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine whom
to charge with public offenses and what charges to bring.
[Citation.] This prosecutorial discretion to choose, for each
particular case, the actual charges from among those potentially
available arises from ‘“the complex considerations necessary for
the effective and efficient administration of law enforcement.”’
[Citations.]” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134; accord,
Tomlinson v. Pierce (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 112, 116 [law
enforcement officers vested with discretion to “arrest or not to
arrest”].)
       Under the separation of powers doctrine, such broad
discretionary acts are generally precluded from judicial review
“even by mandamus.” (People v. Cimarusti (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d
314, 322; see Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1045, 1053; see also Gov. Code, §§ 820.2, 820.4, 820.6,
821.) Indeed, mandate will not lie “to control an exercise of
discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a
particular manner.” (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442.) This principle is statutorily

                                 10
recognized for the enforcement of criminal laws. Civil Code
section 3369, on which the trial court relied below, provides that
“[n]either specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce
a . . . penal law, except in a case of nuisance or as otherwise
provided by law.”
        A public entity’s ability to exercise its discretion is not
completely unfettered, however. “Although mandate will not lie
to control a public agency’s discretion, that is to say, force the
exercise of discretion in a particular manner, it will lie to correct
abuses of discretion” that are arbitrary, capricious, or entirely
without support. (Helena F. v. West Contra Costa Unified School
Dist. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1793, 1799, citing Manjares v.
Newton (1966) 64 Cal.2d 365, 370–371; see CV Amalgamated
LLC v. City of Chula Vista (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 265, 284.) This
includes an abuse of discretion in reaching a decision not to
enforce a particular law. (See Coachella Valley Unified School
Dist. v. State of California (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 93, 116
(Coachella Valley Unified).) A public entity’s decision is
“legislative or quasi-legislative” in nature when it involves a
policy to be applied in future cases. (See Stanford Vina Ranch
Irrigation Co. v. State of California (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 976,
996.) Correcting an abuse of discretion may require setting aside
the policy on which that discretion was exercised. (See Ridgecrest
Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 986, 1003–1007.)

                                 11
      2.      Enforcement of Penal Code Section 597
              a.    Appellants Cannot Compel Enforcement of
                    Section 597
      Appellants have failed to adequately plead a cause of action
for writ of traditional mandate on their first count to enforce
section 597 against Kapparot practitioners. The order appellants
seek in this case—“to compel [the City] ‘to make enforcement
decisions without regard to religion’”—would control the manner
in which the City exercises its discretion to enforce criminal laws.
This type of order is barred under the rule codified in Civil Code
section 3369. (Cf. Acosta v. Brown (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 234,
249 [mandamus actions are controlled by equitable principles];
Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671 [same].)
      This case presents strikingly similar facts and arguments
as those raised in Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New
York City Police Dept. (2017) 152 A.D.3d 113, 119 [55 N.Y.S.3d
31] (Alliance). In that case, the plaintiffs filed a mandamus
action against the City of New York and its police department to
enforce various animal cruelty laws against Kapparot
practitioners. (Id. at pp. 115–116, 119.)4 As in this case, the
parties in Alliance disputed “whether and to what extent the
implicated laws can be enforced without violating constitutional
rights” belonging to Kapparot practitioners. (Id. at p. 118, citing
Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520.)
      The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the action, and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of

4      The laws at issue in Alliance prohibited the unjustified killing of
animals. (Agriculture & Markets Law, §§ 353, 350, subd. 2 [defining
animal “cruelty” as any act “whereby unjustifiable physical pain,
suffering or death is caused or permitted”], discussed in Alliance,
supra, at pp. 115–116, 119.)

                                   12
New York affirmed. (Alliance, supra, 152 A.D.3d at pp. 115, 121.)
Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the court in Alliance
held that “mandamus does not lie where, as here, plaintiffs seek
to compel the enforcement of laws and regulations implicating
discretionary actions . . . .” (Id. at p. 115.) The court cautioned
against “[o]pening up claims of this nature,” which would
unjustifiably intrude into “the everyday affairs of the City
defendants.” (Id. at p. 120.) Citing Lukumi, the court
“recognized animal sacrifice as a religious sacrament” protected
under the Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution. (Id. at p. 118, citing Lukumi, supra, at p. 531.) As
such, the court found it unclear whether the implicated laws
could be enforced without violating the constitutional rights of
religious practitioners. Ultimately, the court declined to interfere
with decisions the City defendants made concerning the proper
enforcement of laws and regulations, which involved “the exercise
of reasoned judgment” on their part. (Id. at p. 119.)
       While Alliance is not binding on this court, we find its
reasoning persuasive and apply it to reach the same conclusion in
this case. Under the separation of powers doctrine, appellants
may not dictate “which laws are enforced and how, or against
whom.” (Alliance, supra, 152 A.D.3d at p. 119.)

             b.    The City Did Not Abuse its Discretion
       Anticipating this result, appellants contend they are not
seeking enforcement of Penal Code section 597 but rather seeking
judicial correction of the City’s abuse of discretion in making a
legislative decision not to enforce Penal Code section 597 against
Kapparot rituals.

                                13
       Initially, we question whether the City’s decision not to
enforce section 597 on September 27, 2017, against particular
individuals constitutes a legislative or “quasi-legislative” act.
(See Dominey v. Department of Personnel Administration (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 729, 737 [“adjudicative facts are ‘“facts
concerning the immediate parties[—]who did what, where, when,
how, and with what motive or intent”’”].) As the City was
applying a rule to an existing sets of facts, its actions were
adjudicative (and not legislative) in nature. (Ibid.; see Save
Civita Because Sudberry Won’t v. City of San Diego (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 957, 984; Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1188.)
       Even if we were to consider the City’s decision not to
enforce section 597 as a legislative or quasi-legislative act,
appellants have failed to demonstrate an abuse of the City’s
discretion. When determining whether the City abused its
discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for the City, “‘and
if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the [City’s]
action, its determination must be upheld.’ [Citation.]”
(California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Alameda
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 800, 805–806.) We may interfere in the
City’s actions only if there is an abuse of discretion “as a matter
of law.” (Coachella Valley Unified, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
p. 113; see AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County
Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 703
[mandamus will lie only “where if the facts lead to only one
choice”].)
       Appellants here fail to demonstrate how the City acted
unreasonably and arbitrarily. Appellants admit their purpose in
filing this action was to obtain a ruling as to whether “religious

                                14
motivation [can lawfully] create[ ] an exemption from
prosecution” under Penal Code section 597.5 Appellants’ pursuit
of a definitive ruling means the issue remained unsettled at the
time the City made its choice not to enforce the law.
       Appellants argue the City should have enforced section 597
against Kapparot practitioners pursuant to Lukumi, supra, 508
U.S. 520. But the high court in Lukumi neither interpreted
Penal Code section 597 nor mandated its enforcement in a
particular manner. The court simply provided a framework for
analyzing constitutional challenges to facially neutral laws of
general applicability. (See Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 531.)
Appellants have furnished no case, and we are aware of none,
upholding the constitutional application of Penal Code
section 597 against Kapparot rituals or mandating the
enforcement of any criminal law against it. Absent any prior
determination, we find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the
City’s own decision on the issue following advice of counsel, and
recognizing the potential for litigation by Kapparot practitioners
if it were to enforce Penal Code section 597 against them. (See
Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 495, 505 [“‘“[t]he contemporaneous administrative
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged
with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great
weight unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized”’”].)

5      Appellants in the trial court argued, “The point of this lawsuit is
to obtain a ruling that purported First Amendment protections for
religious animal sacrifice are nonexistent, and no exception to neutral
laws of general applicability is required by the First Amendment for
otherwise illegal conduct just because it is motivated by religion, . . . .”

                                    15
Appellants have failed to plead an abuse of the City’s
enforcement discretion.6

       3.    Repeal or Amendment to Section 53.67
       Appellants next contend they have adequately pleaded a
claim to compel the City to repeal or amend section 53.67, the
City ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice motivated by religion.
Respondents contend, and we agree, that appellants have
forfeited this challenge.
       “To demonstrate error, appellant[s] must present
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.
[Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and
authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’
[Citations.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408
[“conclusory claims of error will fail”].) “‘This court is not inclined
to act as counsel for . . . any appellant and furnish a legal
argument as to how the trial court’s rulings in this regard
constituted an abuse of discretion’ [citation], or a mistake of law.”
(Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) These
principles apply with equal force to issues subject to de novo
review. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.)
       The trial court sustained the demurrer to this count due to
appellants’ failure to marshal any authority that “the court could
issue a writ directing the City to amend section 53.67, repeal the
ordinance, or enforce it in a particular manner.” In their

6     The parties have not addressed the trial court’s additional
concern regarding appellants’ standing to bring this claim. We do not
consider the issue but echo the trial court’s concern.

                                  16
appellate briefs, appellants make only the conclusory assertion
that it “is undisputed that [section] 53.67 is unconstitutional for
the exact reasons stated in Lukumi.”
       Even if we assume that to be true, appellants furnish no
discussion about the ability of a court to issue an order in the
manner they have requested—requiring that the City, in essence,
rewrite the law and enforce it in a particular manner. (See City
of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 1271, 1310 [courts are generally without power “‘to
interfere with purely legislative action, in the sense that it may
not command or prohibit legislative acts, whether the act
contemplated’” be at the state or local level].)

B.     Bane and Ralph Acts (Fourth and Fifth Cause of
       Action)
       Appellants contend they have adequately pleaded
violations under the Bane and Ralph Acts for Captain Vernon’s
threat to arrest them and confiscate a projector. We disagree.
       The Bane Act provides for liability for the interference or
attempted interference with a person’s rights “by threat,
intimidation, or coercion.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).) To plead
a cause of action under the Bane Act, the plaintiff must show
“(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a
state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the
interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 67 (Allen).) “‘Speech is insufficient to establish
the requisite threat unless it includes the threat of violence.’”
(Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. The Irvine Co., LLC (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 97, 115; accord, Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (k)

                                17
[speech alone is insufficient to support action “except upon a
showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a
specific person or group of persons”].)
       The Ralph Act guarantees all persons have “the right to be
free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence,
committed against their persons or property because of political
affiliation, or on account of any” additional characteristic not
relevant here. (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1).) The elements of a
Ralph Act claim include (1) the defendant committed or
threatened violent acts against the plaintiffs; (2) the defendant
was motivated by his or her perception of the plaintiffs’ political
affiliation; (3) the plaintiffs were harmed; and (4) the defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Austin B.
v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860,
880–881.) As with claims brought under the Bane Act, claims
brought under the Ralph Act require threats of violence, meaning
an “expression of intent to injure or damage [the] plaintiffs or
their property.” (Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1480,
1486 (Ramirez).)
       The operative complaint in this case alleged Captain
Vernon violated appellants’ rights to free speech and political
affiliation by threatening to arrest them and confiscate a
projector. Appellants identify no allegation in which Captain
Vernon threatened them with violence beyond his threats of
arrest. Without more, appellants have failed to plead sufficient
facts to establish violations under the Bane and Ralph Act. (See
Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67 [holding that police
officers’ threats to arrest persons and confiscate their property

                                18
alone do not support a cause of action for violation of the Bane
Act]; Ramirez, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486.)7

C.     Establishment Clause (Sixth Cause of Action)
       Appellants finally contend they have adequately pleaded
their sixth cause of action for violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court sustained the
demurrer to this cause of action after finding appellants lacked
direct standing or standing under the public interest doctrine.
Raised for the first time on appeal, appellants contend they have
taxpayer standing to assert this claim. Appellants’ failure to
present this theory in the trial court and adequately brief the
issue on appeal has forfeited the argument.
       Though appellants alleged the City expended “taxpayer
resources” to further Kapparot rituals, they never alleged
taxpayer standing or a factual basis for taxpayer standing.8 Nor
did their opposition to the demurrer reference taxpayer standing
in any regard.

7      The authorities on which appellants rely are either inapposite
(People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 322 [threat to arrest victim
established “either the force or the fear prong of the kidnapping
statute”]), or are nonbinding and in conflict with state and federal
authorities. (Compare Cuviello v. City & County of San Francisco
(N.D.Cal. 2013) 940 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1102 [“[t]hreat of arrest suffices
to demonstrate ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ under the Bane
Act”], with Gant v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 594 Fed.Appx. 335,
337 [requiring “‘a showing of coercion independent from the coercion
inherent in the wrongful detention itself’”].)

8      The operative complaint alleged appellants resided and/or paid
taxes in the County of Los Angeles, not the City of Los Angeles.

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      The failure of appellants to raise this theory of standing
below forfeits their contention on appeal. “[F]airness is at the
heart of a waiver claim. Appellate courts are loath to reverse a
judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an
opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider. [Citation.] . . . Bait and switch on
appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable expense, but also
wreaks havoc on a judicial system too burdened to retry cases on
theories that could have been raised earlier.” (JRS Products, Inc.
v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
168, 178; see Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
645, 649 [“[t]he critical point for preservation of claims on appeal
is that the asserted error must have been brought to the
attention of the trial court”].) This is particularly true where, as
here, “the new theory depends on controverted factual questions
whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.”
(Bogacki v. Bd. of Supervisors (1971) 5 Cal.3d 771, 780.)
      While we recognize appellants’ ability to “‘advance on
appeal a new legal theory why the allegations of the [complaint]
state a cause of action’” (Dudley v. Department of Transportation
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259), any new theory must be
advanced with relevant legal authority and reasoned analysis.
(Golightly v. Molina (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1519.)
Appellants cite no California cases and furnish no analysis on
their ability as county taxpayers to pursue legal action against a
municipality in which they may or may not reside. (See Torres v.
City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1041–1043
[county residents failed to establish taxpayer standing for claims
against city].)

                                20
      The only authority on which appellants rely, Flast v. Cohen
(1968) 392 U.S. 83, provides “a ‘narrow exception’ to ‘the general
rule against taxpayer standing’” in actions pursued in federal
court. (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn
(2011) 563 U.S. 125, 138.) Appellants purport to invoke Flast
without any discussion of its application to state proceedings. In
addition, appellants provide no discussion of any of the conditions
required for taxpayer standing under Flast. (See Chodosh v.
Commission on Judicial Performance (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 248,
268 [discussing taxpayer standing under state law]; Winn, supra,
at pp. 138–139 [plaintiffs must establish two “conditions” for
Flast standing].) We therefore deem this contention forfeited.

D.     Leave to Amend
       Appellants have neither addressed the court’s denial of
leave to amend, nor suggested how they could amend the
complaint to cure any deficiency. The burden of proving a
reasonable possibility any defect in the complaint can be cured by
amendment is squarely on the plaintiff. (Zelig v. County of Los
Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) Appellants have not met
this burden. (Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636
[plaintiffs must show in what manner they can amend the
complaint “and how that amendment will change the legal effect”
of their pleading].) We therefore affirm the court’s denial of leave
to amend.

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                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

                                        MORI, J.

     We concur:

           CURREY, P. J.

           COLLINS, J.

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