Court Opinion

ID: 9940472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 16:05:18.638638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:53.113057
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                           CRISTIAN POZOS,
                              Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-0248

                           [February 14, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562019CF000587C.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

   Following the defendant’s no contest plea to the third-degree felony of
furnishing a firearm to a minor, as prohibited under section 790.17(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (2018), the circuit court sentenced the defendant to one
year in the county jail, to be followed by two years’ community control
under state supervision, to be followed by two years’ probation under state
supervision.    On appeal, the defendant argues that under section
775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2018), because he qualified for a nonstate
prison sanction, and no jury finding was made that a nonstate prison
sanction could present a danger to the public, any punishment beyond
one year in the county jail would be illegally excessive, and thus his
sentence’s community control and probation portions must be stricken.

   We disagree with the defendant’s argument, and therefore affirm the
defendant’s sentence. However, our affirmance does not apply to certain
circumstances which may yet come to fruition, and thus are not ripe for
our consideration, as we will briefly mention at the end of this opinion.
                           Procedural History

   The defendant pled no contest to the third-degree felony of furnishing
a firearm to a minor, as prohibited under section 790.17(2)(a), Florida
Statutes (2018). At the sentencing hearing, the defendant requested to be
sentenced to probation pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes
(2018):

         If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or
      after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a
      forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and excluding any third
      degree felony violation under chapter 810, and if the total
      sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024 are 22 points or
      fewer, the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate
      prison sanction. However, if the court makes written findings
      that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the
      public, the court may sentence the offender to a state
      correctional facility pursuant to this section.

§ 775.082(10), Fla. Stat. (2018).

    According to the defendant, he qualified for a nonstate prison sanction
under section 775.082(10) because: (1) his third-degree felony offense of
furnishing a firearm to a minor was committed after July 1, 2009, was not
a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and was not a third-degree felony
under chapter 810; and (2) his total sentence points under section
921.0024 were four, thus fewer than twenty-two points.

   The state acknowledged that under section 775.082(10), the defendant
qualified for a nonstate prison sanction, and for the defendant to be
sentenced to a state correctional facility, “a jury must make a … legal
finding that he would pose a danger [to the public].” See Brown v. State,
260 So. 3d 147, 150 (Fla. 2018) (“[W]e hold that subsection (10) violates
the Sixth Amendment in light of Apprendi and Blakely based on its plain
language requiring the court, not the jury, to find the fact of
dangerousness to the public necessary to increase the statutory maximum
nonstate prison sanction.”).

   However, the state did not request the circuit court to empanel a jury
to determine whether sentencing the defendant to a nonstate prison
sanction could present a danger to the public. Instead, the state opted to
argue that a nonstate prison sanction “is all of the mitigation that [the
defendant] should receive.” The state added: “[I]t is absolutely appropriate
that he be sentenced to what is the legal maximum before this Court at

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this time, a year in the county jail to be followed by two years of community
control to be followed by two years of probation.”

   The circuit court pronounced its agreement with the state’s sentencing
recommendation.        In pronouncing the sentence, the circuit court
acknowledged section 775.082(10)’s requirement that without the state
proving a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public,
the defendant could not be sentenced to a state correctional facility. The
circuit court added: “[T]he crime is punishable up to [five] years in prison,
but the Legislature said you have to look at the individual and as the State
said, there’s a certain burden on them that they have to legally assess and
make a determination … in conjunction with that law. … [T]he State …
would’ve gone forward I’m sure if they could’ve met their burden.”

   After the hearing, the circuit court entered a written sentencing order
directing the defendant to be “confined in the County Jail for a term of 365
days with credit for [three] days jail time,” and thereafter, “placed on
Probation for a period of [four] years, with first [two] years of Community
Control under the supervision of the Department of Corrections.”

   The defendant then filed a notice of appeal to this court. While the
notice of appeal was pending, the defendant filed in the circuit court a
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct illegal
sentence. The defendant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion summarized:

          Th[e] [circuit] [c]ourt erred by imposing an aggregate
      sentence against [the defendant] which exceeded 365 days
      county jail incarceration. Although a remedy for imposition
      of an erroneous section 775.082(10) sentence that exceeds
      one year jail is, at the State’s option, the empaneling of a jury
      to determine [the defendant’s] future dangerousness[,] … the
      State waived its option, by failing to initially seek a jury danger
      finding and by failing to elicit legally sufficient evidence upon
      which a jury could properly find [the defendant] posed a future
      danger to the public. Both the crime [which] [the defendant]
      committed, a non-forcible, non-Chapter 810 third degree
      felony, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of
      the crime fail to show he is a future danger to the public. Th[e]
      [circuit] [c]ourt should grant [the defendant’s] motion,
      maintain [the defendant’s] sentence of 365 days [in] county
      jail[,] and strike both the community control and probation
      sanctions.

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   The circuit court did not rule on the defendant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion
within sixty days. Thus, the motion is deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.800(b)(2)(B). Our review of this appeal then commenced.

                                Our Review

   The defendant summarizes his argument as follows:

          The [circuit] court erred in imposing an aggregate sentence
      for [the defendant’s] sole crime of furnishing a firearm to a
      minor, a third degree, level one, non-forcible and non-section-
      810 felony offense, resulting in a total Criminal Punishment
      Code sentencing point total of four points. Four points was
      below the section 775.082(10) threshold to require imposition
      of a non-state prison sanction of 365 days or less
      incarceration, probation or a combination of both. The
      sentence [which] the [circuit] court imposed of one year jail,
      followed by two years[’] community control, and followed by
      two years[’] probation was illegally excessive and all
      community based sentences must be struck.

   The state summarizes its response as follows:

          [The defendant] received a “nonstate prison sanction” in
      this case: 365 days [in] county jail with credit for time served,
      followed by [two] years of community control and [two] years
      of probation. The [circuit] court therefore complied with
      subsection 775.082(10) and imposed a legal sentence.
      Neither the language of subsection 775.082(10), nor any cases
      cited by [the defendant], establishes that the subsection
      restricts a defendant’s total punishment to one year; the
      subsection only affects the type of punishment. The statute
      also clearly provides that a danger finding is only required if a
      defendant is sentenced to a “state correctional facility,” which
      did not occur here.

   Applying de novo review, we disagree with the defendant’s argument,
and agree with the state’s response. See Flowers v. State, 899 So. 2d 1257,
1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“The legality of a sentence is a question of law
and is subject to de novo review.”); State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 123
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“[I]ssues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo.”).

                                     4
   Although section 775.082(10) requires circuit courts to sentence
qualifying third-degree felony offenders to a “nonstate prison sanction”
absent a jury’s finding that such a sentence could present a danger to the
public, section 775.082 does not define what constitutes a “nonstate
prison sanction.” However, “[t]he phrase ‘nonstate prison sanction’ ... is
commonly understood to mean probation, community control, or
imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year.” Ryerson v. State, 189
So. 3d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Jones v. State, 71 So. 3d
173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)); accord Reed v. State, 192 So. 3d 641, 645
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016); see also § 921.00241(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (using
the phrase “nonstate prison sanction” to refer to “a term of probation,
community control, or community supervision with mandatory
participation in a prison diversion program of the Department of
Corrections if such program is funded and exists in the judicial circuit in
which the offender is sentenced”).

    Here, by sentencing the defendant to one year in the county jail, to be
followed by two years’ community control, to be followed by two years’
probation, the circuit court sentenced the defendant to a “nonstate prison
sanction,” and not a “state correctional facility,” as those phrases are
commonly understood. Although a nonstate prison sanction of county jail
incarceration must be limited to one year, nothing in section 775.082(10)
restricts the aggregate duration of all nonstate prison sanctions to one
year.    Rather, the only durational limitation upon the defendant’s
combined five-year sentence of incarceration, community control, and
probation is found in section 772.083(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2018), with
which the defendant’s sentence complies. See § 775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat.
(2018) (“A person who has been convicted of … a felony of the third degree,
[may be punished] by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.”)
(emphasis added); Smith v. State, 584 So. 2d 154, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
(“The law is clear that when a defendant is sentenced to a split sentence
consisting of incarceration and probation ... the combined sanction cannot
exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law.”) (emphasis
added).

   As such, the defendant’s sentence was not illegally excessive as the
defendant argues.

   In deciding this appeal, we are mindful that if the defendant was to
violate his community control or probation, any resulting sentence to a
state correctional facility, beyond the one year which the defendant will
have already served in the county jail, raises the issue of whether such
further incarceration would be illegally excessive under section
775.082(10), given that the state already has opted not to seek a jury

                                    5
finding that sentencing the defendant to a nonstate prison sanction could
present a danger to the public.

   However, that issue is not ripe for consideration. If the defendant
successfully completes his community control and probation, the
defendant’s sentence will terminate.       If the defendant violates his
community control or probation, the circuit court would not be required
to sentence the defendant for such violation to a state correctional facility
beyond the one year which the defendant will serve in the county jail.

    Thus, until such time as the defendant violates his community control
or probation, and is sentenced for such violation to a state correctional
facility beyond the one year which the defendant will serve in the county
jail, the issue which we have identified would have to be raised to the
circuit court in the first instance.

   Based on the foregoing, we affirm the defendant’s sentence.

   Affirmed.

MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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