Court Opinion

ID: 9695827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:30:01.089183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.638634
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur except that I dissent on that part of issue 4 which relates to the disqualification of Candee to bid on a third highway construction project in the Black Hills, entitled project 41. The ruling on this matter by the trial court and the majority is premature. Granting summary judgment on one issue is proper only where that issue is “clearly distinct from the issues on which factual questions [remain].” Stetler v. Fosha, 9 Kan.App.2d 519, 521, 682 P.2d 682, 685 (1984).
Courts in other jurisdictions have found error where summary judgment was granted on an issue which depended for its resolution upon another issue involving unresolved factual questions. For example, in Van Knight Steel Erection, Inc. v. Housing and Redev. Auth. of the City of St. Paul, 430 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.App.1988), a contractor moved for summary judgment on its claim against a developer, seeking final payment for work on the developer’s construction project. The developer claimed summary judgment was inappropriate due to a second contractor’s claim against the developer for increased costs, which the developer asserted were at least partially due to defective work by the first contractor. As a consequence, the developer claimed a right of set off against the payment to the first contractor for any increased liability to the second contractor arising from defective work by the first contractor. Since the developer’s liability to the second contractor was not yet determined, the developer argued that summary judgment was not proper. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, but was overruled by the court of appeals, *347who held that summary judgment was premature since a decision on the first contractor’s claim depended upon the result of the second contractor’s claim. In other words, where resolution of an issue depends upon the outcome of a second issue, summary judgment cannot be granted on the first issue until the second is resolved. See also Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.2d 846, 487 N.Y.S.2d 314, 476 N.E.2d 640 (1985) (Error to enter partial summary judgment declaring that insurer was not required to defend officer of insured on defamation charge until factual questions regarding the making of the defamatory statements were resolved).
Although the reasons given by Department of Transportation Secretary Myers to deny Candee’s request for a proposal and plans on project 41 appear reasonable on their face, a closer examination reveals otherwise. In fact, if Candee Construction Company wins on issue 2 and proves that the Department of Transportation imposed unreasonable construction standards upon Candee, any claims of “unsatisfactory performance on previous work” and failure “to meet the completion dates for projects 48 and 45, causing ‘inconvenience to the travelling public’ and ‘economic loss to businesses dependent upon them’ ” could be the fault of the Department of Transportation and not the fault of Candee Construction Company. In other words, if the delay and construction problems were caused by Department of Transportation, (i.e., wrongful imposition of unreasonable construction standards,) genuine issues of material fact exist and prevent summary judgment. Groseth Int’l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987); Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D.1987). Therefore, any ruling on issue 4 prior to a jury verdict on issue 2, is premature.