Court Opinion

ID: 9798041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:35:27.024579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:37.016005
License: Public Domain

Judge WEBB
specially concurring.
While concurring in the majority’s decision to affirm in part and vacate in part, I write separately because I believe the instructional error discussed in part IV should be reviewed only for plain error, not for constitutional harmless error, based on defendant’s failure either to object to the instruction given or to tender a correct instruction.
Initially, I adopt the majority’s formulation of both standards: plain error review requires reversal “only if the error so undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the conviction”; under constitutional harmless error review, “reversal is required unless we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo.2000). However, the majority then concludes, “[W]e need not decide which standard applies because upon review of the entire record we conclude reversal would not be required under the higher standard of constitutional harmless error.”
Further, I note that, once error has been shown, the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice under plain error review, see, e.g., People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340 (Colo.2001), while the People bear the burden of disproving prejudice under review for constitutional harmless error. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221 (Colo.2002).
In Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505, 509 n. 6 (Colo.1985), the court observed, “The standards for reversal under the plain error and constitutional error doctrines are quite similar in practice.” Nevertheless, these two standards occupy different ends of the appellate review spectrum, and they raise opposite burdens of proof. Hence, I respectfully suggest we should not continue to avoid deciding which standard applies by concluding that the conviction would be affirmed even assuming the constitutional harmless error standard applies. See, e.g., People v. Klausner, 74 P.3d 421 (Colo.App.2003); People v. Auman, 67 P.3d 741 (Colo.App.2002) (cert. granted on other issues Mar. 24, 2003); People v. Jurado, 30 P.3d 769 (Colo.App.2001).
In Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo.2001), the supreme court said that error in an elemental jury instruction is “subject to constitutional harmless or plain error analysis.” 19 P.3d at 8 (emphasis added). In some decisions involving unpreserved constitutional error, the supreme court has applied plain error review. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, supra; People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (Colo.1999); Gann v. People, 736 P.2d 37 (Colo.1987). In other decisions involving such error, it has applied constitutional harmless error review. See, e.g., People v. Harlan, supra; People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo.1990); Graham v. People, supra.
I am aware of no supreme court opinion that expressly recognizes this tension and then resolves which standard should be applied to unpreserved, constitutional error. However, in People v. Petschow, 119 P.3d 495 (Colo.App. No. 01CA1684, 2004 WL 2136945, Sept. 23, 2004), a division of this court analyzed relevant authority and, focusing on the wording of Crim.P. 52(b), concluded that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt review applies to an unpreserved instructional error of constitutional dimension only if that error is both plain and affects substantial rights.
*253For the following reasons, I conclude that unpreserved, constitutional errors should be reviewed using the plain error standard, even if the error is one “affecting substantial rights” under Crim.P. 52(b).
First, the supreme court has never framed the issue as one in which the Colorado Constitution offers greater protection than the United States Constitution. I discern no reason to do so.
Second, and unlike the division in Pet-schow, Crim. P. 52 does not guide me to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Many constitutional errors will be both plain and affecting substantial rights, the criteria for noticing them under Crim.P. 52(b). However, the Rule does not address either scope of review or burden of proof. Indeed, the Rule only informs the appellate court that it “may” notice such errors.
Third, the supreme court cases applying constitutional harmless error review cite pri- or decisions of that court, which in turn rely most frequently on Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). However, in Harrington the constitutional error had been raised below. See People v. Bosby, 256 Cal.App.2d 209, 64 Cal.Rptr. 159 (1967). And Chapman does not say whether the error was preserved in the lower court.
Fourth, application of plain error review would be more consistent with recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that clearly involve unpreserved, constitutional error. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
Fifth, and from my perspective most important, restricting unpreserved errors to plain error review encourages defendants to make their objections below and thus promotes the salutary purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 34, 108 S.Ct. 864, 870, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1991), abrogated by United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1988).
The contemporaneous objection rule conserves judicial resources by ensuring that trial judges will have an opportunity to correct any error which could otherwise lead to a retrial. See People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866, 874 n. 13 (Colo.1995) (“An accused may not withhold his objection until completion of his trial and after conviction, and later complain of matters which, if he had made a timely objection, would have allowed the trial court to take corrective action.”).
A contemporaneous objection also increases the likelihood that a sufficient record will exist for meaningful appellate review. And, if the objection is overruled, the People are forewarned to build a record that can sustain their burden of proof when that ruling is reviewed for constitutional harmless error.
Failure to adhere to this rule allows, and perhaps encourages, defense counsel intentionally to withhold a meritorious objection, permit error to occur, and then, in the event of a conviction, raise the error for the first time on appeal, but nevertheless benefit from the same constitutional harmless error review that would apply if the objection had been raised. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231 (4th Cir.2001); State v. Richthofen, 803 So.2d 171 (La.Ct.App.2001); State v. English-Lancaster, 252 Wis.2d 388, 642 N.W.2d 627 (2002).
Moreover, the risk of intentionally withholding an instructional objection has been reduced because People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo.2002), limits denial of appellate review of instructional errors under the invited error doctrine to circumstances that were clearly strategic, rather than possibly inadvertent. However, the reason why an instructional objection was not raised may often be difficult to glean from the record.
Here, the instructional error illustrates the importance of applying plain error review to foster contemporaneous objections.
*254On appeal, the People do not seriously argue that the instruction was correct. Hence, presumably they would have conceded the point had it been raised at the instruction conference. Regardless of what position the People might have taken, once alerted by an objection or the tender of a proper instruction, the trial court could easily have corrected the instruction.
Accordingly, I would review the instructional issue here for plain error, even if it is of constitutional dimension, which the majority does not decide. However, because this standard is more lenient than the constitutional harmless error review applied by the majority, the result would be the same.