Court Opinion

ID: 9775146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:45:10.124111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.058355
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING CR 96-1099 939 S.W.2d 270 Supplemental Opinion Denying Motion for Rehearing. Ray Thornton, Justice. In his petition for rehearing, Mr. Allen contends that we failed to address his argument that the statute before us did not afford him the equal protection of the laws because county officials were not subject to its provisions. County officials are not covered by Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-108; however, neither are most municipal' officials nor any state officials covered by the provisions of the statute. In response to Mr. Allen’s argument, we pointed out the following in our opinion: . To meet his burden, appellant must show that the disparate statutory treatment of county and city officers is arbitrary and capricious and is completely devoid of any legitimate purpose. Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 22, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994). Allen v. State, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997). Mr. Allen’s argument is answered by the next few paragraphs of our decision. There, we clearly point out that the classification accomplished by the statute must be rationally related to a legitimate objective, and that there must be a nexus with those state objectives so that the “legislation is not the product of utterly arbitrary and capricious government purpose and void of any hint of deliberate and lawful purpose.” Id. at 358, 939 S.W.2d at 274 (quoting Cook p. State, 321 Ark. 641, 648, 906 S.W.2d 681, 685 (1995)). We then found that with the privilege of holding certain offices comes unique statutory responsibilities and power, and Mr. Allen’s convictions reflected an abuse of trust that triggered the statutory exclusion from eligibility to hold municipal office in order to protect “the public from a recurrence of the abuses which led to the convictions.” Like county officials, municipal officials in cities that do not operate utility services are not covered by the statutory architecture that Mr. Allen challenges. Our decision carefully considered the constitutional challenge of disparate treatment, and concluded as follows: The convictions that led to appellant’s removal involved an abuse of power that the public specifically entrusted to [some] municipal officials. There is a nexus between the grant of power and the protection provided to the public. We find that coupling an extraordinary statutory grant of power to a municipal officer with a provision of ineligibility to hold office if that power is abused is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 360, 939 S.W.2d at 275.  It was clear that the statute did not apply to all municipal officers, to county officers, or to officers of the state; however, we fully and completely addressed the issue whether the statute passed constitutional muster on equal protection of the laws. Our decision is unchanged, and the motion for rehearing is denied. Glaze, J., concurs. Newbern, J., dissents.