Court Opinion

ID: 9723648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:24:50.45023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:14.483915
License: Public Domain

*367Dissenting Opinion
Emmeet, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment on a finding that §11-1424, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Supplement) (Acts 1937, ch. 21, §33, p. 64; 1943, ch. 266, §1, p. 757; 1945, ch. 93, §1, p. 209), was constitutional. Appellant’s second amended complaint charged that (1) the act denied appellant equal protection of the law, granted a special privilege and immunity to a certain class of citizens upon a purely arbitrary basis, and deprived him of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) that said section was in conflict with Section 21 of Article I of the Constitution of Indiana, and (3) it contravened Section 23 of Article I of the same Constitution.1
It is regrettable that in the first instance such a grave constitutional issue was decided by an opinion (123 N. E. 2d 452) filed with such expedition that no opportunity was given to submit a dissent to the other members of the court. In my dissent filed December 27, 1954 (123 N. E. 2d 457), attention was called to twenty-two other acts of the General Assembly over which the majority opinion cast a cloud of constitutional doubts. Appellant’s attack endangers every veterans’ enactment of this state, and the reasoning used in deciding this appeal will be a precedent for all courts when the validity of any of these acts comes in question.
When the cause was reargued on the petition for rehearing, appellant sought to escape the logic of the *368majority opinion by taking the position that all other veterans’ legislation was constitutional, and only the act granting veterans free permits to hunt, trap and fish was unconstitutional. In this he seemed to “strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.” I am not impressed with reasoning which grants that pensions, bonuses, land grants, tax exemptions, burial benefits and G. I. Bill of Rights benefits, which in the aggregate have cost the taxpayers millions of dollars, are constitutional, but a free permit, which costs a non-veteran $2.00 a year, is unconstitutional.
If we are to avoid declaring the law by judges rather than by courts, we must unflinchingly adhere to the constitutional requirement that courts do not sit as the General Assembly. Whatever may be the judges’ individual opinions concerning the wisdom, justice or necessity of veterans’ legislation, such considerations have nothing to do with determining whether such an act is constitutional or not. This rule is well settled by the authorities, and deserves more than mere lip service.
“This court is bound by the same Constitution and has no right to curtail legislative authority this side of the expressed limitations in it. Nor has this court power to revolutionize the fundamental law by reading limitations into it. This court has nothing to do with the wisdom or unwisdom of the legislative act. A law may. be repugnant to general principles of justice, liberty and rights not expressed in the Constitution, and yet the courts have no power to strike it down.” Schmitt, Supt. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. (1918), 187 Ind. 623, 626, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270.
“It may be that the act in question is unwise, as a matter of public policy, but as to this we have nothing to do. This was a matter to be determined alone by the members of the legislature. It was *369enacted by the people through their chosen representatives.” Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Fin. of Benton Co. v. Hawkins (1934), 207 Ind. 171, 197, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A. L. R. 271.
“... a legislative enactment is not to be overthrown because the court may be of opinion that it is harsh in its operation, or that it would have been wiser to have allowed a larger freedom to the individual. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Otis v. Parker (1903), 187 U. S. 606, 23 Sup. Ct. 168, 47 L. Ed. 323: ‘While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view, as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus.’ ” United States Express Co. v. State (1905), 164 Ind. 196, 212, 213, 73 N. E. 101.
“The legislative power in this State, where the constitution imposes no limits, must be practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice, or not, in any particular case; for when a law is created by the legislature the executive must enforce it, and is vested with control of the military power of the State to enable him to do it; and, aside from the physical power of the united people of the State, there is no power to arrest the execution except the judiciary, and that department can only do it when the law conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-making power. Herman v. The State, 4 Am. L. Reg. 344.—Beebe v. The State, 6 Ind. R. 501.” The Madison and Indianapolis Raliroad Co. v. Whiteneck (1856), 8 Ind. 217, 222.
*370“If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution.” ' 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.), p. 349.
There has never been any doubt as to the validity of federal pensions. “Power to grant pensions is not controverted, nor can it well be, as it was exercised by the States and by the Continental Congress during the war of the Revolution; and the exercise of the power is coeval with the organization of the government under the present Constitution, and has been continued without interruption or question to the present time.” United States v. Hall (1878), 98 U. S. 343, 346, 25 L. Ed. 180.
Legislative benefits have been the established public policy of this territory since the time Virginia acquired it by conquest during the American Revolution.2 The Commonwealth of Virginia, by an act of its General Assembly on January 2, 1781, set aside 150,000 acres of land located in what is now Clark, Floyd and Scott Counties of this state, to be given the veterans of the Illinois Campaign. Wm. H. English, Conquest of the Country Northwest of the River Ohio and Life of General George Rogers Clark, Vol. 2, Ch. XXI, et seg. Henthorn v. Doe (1822), 1 Blackf. 157. The veterans of other campaigns by Clark in the Northwest Territory were not so compensated.3
*371There is no necessity of making a review of the various legislative acts granting lands to veterans by reason of military service, but we have not been cited to any case nor do we know of any case wherein such a grant has been held the granting of a prohibited special privilege or immunity, or lack of equal protection, or a denial of due process.
Appellant on reargument took the position that fish and game belong to all the people from the time of the Magna Charta and that, therefore, the free permit act was unconstitutional.* **4 “The common law vests the title of game and fish, not reduced to possession or under restraint, in the sovereign power—in Great Britain, in the King; in the United States, the several states, in trust for their inhabitants. No one has any absolute property right in game or fish while in a state of nature and at large, and the right to take them may be restricted or prohibited, and, when granted or exercised, it is a privilege.” State v. Ashman (1910), 123 Tenn. 654, 657, 135 S. W. 325. The Indiana cases are in accord. Smith v. State (1900), 155 Ind. 611, 612, 58 N. E. 6; State v. Lewis (1893), 134 Ind. 250, 253, 33 N. E. 1024.5 See also 27 C. J. 942; 22 Am. Jur. 666; 24 Am. Jur. 374.
*372But the beneficial interest of the people in wild fish and game is no different than the interest of the public in the public lands, for “the public lands of the United States are held by it, not as an ordinary individual or proprietor, but in trust for all the people of all the states.” 42 Am. Jur. 785, Public Lands, §3. Since the sovereign may constitutionally give public lands to veterans in recognition of their military service, where is any constitutional prohibition violated by granting a free permit to hunt, trap and fish, when the beneficial legal status of wild game and fish is the same as the public lands?
Rhetorical paragraph 13 of appellant’s second amended complaint charges that he was denied equal protection of law and his property taken without due process and a special privilege and immunity was granted because Indiana received less federal revenues collected under U. S. C. A. Title 26, Sections 3406, 3407, and Title 16, Section 777, et seq. and 669 et seq. This argument is wholly specious. The two acts are clearly another effort by the federal government to feudalize all the states by preempting tax revenues, thus forcing the vassal states to go to the great overlord in Washington to get back the taxes their citizens have paid, less of course a handling charge, estimated by Senator Byrd to be at least 15%. Naturally our court is not concerned with the legislative policy on this, but it is interesting to note that the 85th session of the General Assembly attracted nationwide attention by a Concurrent Resolution, Ch. 377, Acts 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 1509, 1510, condemning this growth of national .feudalism as follows:
*373“Indiana needs no guardian and intends to have none. We Hoosiers—like the people of our sister states—were fooled for quite a spell with the magician’s trick that a dollar taxed out of our pockets and sent to Washington, will be bigger when it comes back to us. We have taken a good look at said dollar. We find that it lost weight in its journey to Washington and back. The political brokerage of the bureaucrats has been deducted. We have decided that there is no such thing as ‘federal’ aid. We know that there is no wealth to tax that is not already within the boundaries of the 48 states.
“So we propose henceforward to tax ourselves and take care of ourselves. We are fed up with subsidies, doles and paternalism. We are no one’s stepchild. We have grown up. We serve notice that we will resist Washington, D. C., adopting us. . . .”
There is no constitutional mandate in either the Federal or the Indiana Constitution requiring Indiana to get all the federal aid it can. It is the right of the General Assembly to determine as a matter of legislative policy how much federal aid Indiana should accept.
It may as well be argued that the target shooter, the trap and skeet shooter have their constitutional rights to equal treatment invaded when in one afternoon of match shooting they burn more ammunition than is expended in any county during a whole week of open season hunting. They may never hunt game, yet they pay the federal tax on ammunition just the same. Appellant has no property right in any of these federal funds, nor have any of his privileges or immunities been taken away, nor does he have any property right in any potential “fish, frogs, mussels, wild birds, wild animals, or game” not yet in existence.
Section 21 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution has no application to any asserted rights by appellant.
*374“This provision of the Constitution was not intended as a restriction upon the State’s taxing power, but relates only to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. This court at an early day made the distinction clear and unmistakable by the use of the following words: ‘Property may be taken, through the taxing power, for public use, without any other compensation than the common benefit which the appropriation and expenditure of the proceeds of the tax produce. It is only the taking of specific pieces of the property of an individual, by virtue of the right of eminent domain, that is prohibited by the Constitution, without special compensation.’ ”
Hanly v. Sims (1910), 175 Ind. 345, 353, 93 N. E. 228. See also State, ex rel. v. Steinwedel (1932), 203 Ind. 457, 471, 180 N. E. 865.
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Section 23 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution prohibit reasonable classification by the legislature. *375As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527, 537, 51 S. Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 1256, in holding the Indiana Chain Store Tax constitutional, “The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. Ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co., 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, 36 S. Ct. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 56 L. Ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192.” (Italics supplied.)
*374“If the statute in question makes the exemption apply to one citizen and not to another in like situation, it is then an arbitrary or capricious classification. The rule of equal protection of law only requires that persons similarly situated- shall be treated alike, or that the law shall apply to all who are in the same class. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure equality of all rights, and to render unconstitutional all laws which may be construed as applying to persons or property ' arbitrarily and with discrimination, unequally or unjustly. . . .
“. . . The court recognizes that, for legislative purposes, it is within the province of the Legislature in the first instance to determine what classification is just and reasonable in view of the purpose to be attained. The court will not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. A classification made by the Legislature will be sustained unless it is so manifestly and unmistakably arbitrary as to leave no room upon which reasonable minds may differ.” Martin v. Loula (1935), 208 Ind. 346, 352, 354, 355, 194 N. E. 178, 195 N. E. 881.
*375All legislation which applies to two or more people is class legislation, but it does not necessarily follow it is unreasonable or unconstitutional. As was said by this court in holding §10-4219, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, constitutional, although it only prohibited males from frequenting or visiting a house of ill fame or a gambling house,
“Any classification that may be made, necessarily is arbitrary. The most that can be said is that some may be more arbitrary than others. Horack’s Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) §2106— quoted in Perry Twp. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., supra, at page 68.
“The desirability, or need for legislation is entirely for the legislature to determine. The question of its wisdom in adopting a classification is a matter of no concern to the courts. The courts may determine only whether the classification is founded on substantial distinctions in the subject matter, or is so manifestly unjust and unreasonable as to destroy the lawful use of property.” State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 288, 79 N. E. 2d 537.
*376Patriotism is no idle sentiment. If the Legislature chooses to perpetuate its memory or reward patriotic sacrifices by gifts or exemptions, it has the constitutional right to classify veterans for that purpose. The fact that the power might conceivably be abused no more makes it unconstitutional than every tax law would be unconstitutional because the power to tax is the power to destroy. The so-called Vermont rule, deciding that military service is no reasonable basis for classification, State v. Shedroi (1903), 75 Vt. 277, 54 Atl. 1081, 63 L. R. A. 179, wholly ignores the history of veterans’ legislation as well as the realities of modern military service. The fallacy of the Vermont rule was thoroughly exposed in Farley v. Watt (1933), 165 Okla. 6, 7, 8; 23 P. 2d 687, 689:
“We do not agree with this view. In the first place, the soldiers of the late war were selected from a particular class. It was a governmental classification. The government selected male citizens of a particular age. The vast majority of those who served were between the ages of 18 and 31. They were then in the formative stages of their lives. Many of them when discharged did not, as the Vermont court said, become a part of the general mass of mankind. For far too many there was no Armistice, there was no discharge, but simply the padded cell, the hospital cot, the white cross. The war definitely interrupted the studies, the vocations, the businesses of those young men who were making essential preparations for occupational or professional careers. Those who were classified and called away were handicapped not only by an interrupted preparation, but by a tremendous inflation of values which met them upon their return. They were handicapped by physical disability incident to their governmental service and in wealth and opportunity. They constituted a distinct class distinguished from the mass of society—a class created by deprivation of equal opportunity in civil pursuits at home and marked by disability incident to defense of *377their country abroad. Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A. L. R. 1222.”
The court could well have added that time does not cure everything for the veterans. Even those who returned without being wounded or diseased bear the hidden scars in mind and body which will never change. Few escaped a permanent change of personality when suddenly taken from civilian life and necessarily trained to kill by every means of violence permitted by the rules of warfare. Nor will they ever regain the depletion of their reserve of nervous and physical energy, nor can they ever fully recover from the heavy strains of training or battle. Excessive strain, according to modern medical science, may be responsible for much undue shortening of the life span. To hold that military service per se does not furnish an adequate and reasonable basis for classification is to consider modern warfare no different than that waged before the Napoleonic wars, when its practice was more gentlemanly than aggressive.
There is no legal reason or cause for putting a veteran’s preference on a different basis than a pension act. As was stated in State ex rel. State Reclamation Board v. Clausen (1920), 110 Wash. 525, 542, 188 P. 538, 544, 14 A. L. R. 1133:
“Some contention is made that the law is unconstitutional, in that it violates the equal privileges and immunities guaranty of our Constitution, because it contemplates, in the disposition of the lands, the giving of preference rights to soldiers. All arguments that could be made against the law upon this ground could, with equal force, be made against every pension law that was ever enacted by the Congress of the United States, or any of the states. Manifestly this contention is without merit.”
With equal persuasion the same logic applies to a veteran’s exemption, such as involved in the appeal at bar.
*378It is a well-known historical fact that the railroads of the West received millions of acres of the public lands of the United States without consideration other than the stimulation of commerce, industry and the settlement of the West. 50 C. J. 1028; 42 Am. Jur. 823, Public Lands, VIII, Grants in Aid of Railroad Construction. Certainly it had nothing to do with conservation of fish and game, and in fact it hastened the depletion of those natural resources. It is difficult to comprehend how a veterans’ free permit is an unconstitutional special privilege and immunity, or is the result of unreasonable classification, and at the same time these vast grants of the public domain are constitutional.
The reasoning in Larson v. City of Shelton (1950), 37 Wash. 2d 481, 224 P. 2d 1067, is wholly inapplicable to the facts in the appeal at bar. Section 11-1424, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Supplement), does not create any different rules for hunting, fishing or trapping for the veterans, does not excuse them from complying with all criminal laws concerning fish and game, does not authorize them to hunt, fish or trap without a permit, nor does it authorize any veteran to hunt or fish by trespassing upon the lands of another. If this court were to hold the veterans’ permit section unconstitutional, then a fortiori it must hold subsections a, b, and d of §11-1405, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, which authorizes the owner and the tenant to hunt, fish and trap on their lands without a license, and a person under 18 years of age to fish without a license, are unconstitutional and void, since the fish and game belong to the sovereign for the use and benefit of all the people. Section 11-1403, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, also would be unconstitutional because it provides for different license fees for different persons, purposes and uses.
The fact that the regulation of fishing, hunting and *379trapping is done under the exercise of the police power of the state does not per se make the classification bad. This court, by rules, exercises the police power to protect the public in the admission of members to the bar of this state. Rule 3-1 adopts a grandfather’s clause admitting all to practice law who were attorneys in good standing prior to July 1, 1931. Rule 3-17A classifies those in or going to the armed forces, and under this rule it is possible for a graduate of a law school to be admitted to the practice when he could never pass the bar examination. “During the emergency now existing, and until further order of this court, any person who has been graduated from an accredited law school, as described in these rules, and who has not taken a bar examination, who shall receive orders requiring him to commence active duty with the armed forces of the United States on a date prior to the 5th day following the next examination subsequent to his graduation may be admitted without examination upon motion of the State Board of Law Examiners. . . .” Rule 3-17A.
It is error to assume that the public health, morals, order, safety and general welfare can only be protected by the purchase or conservation of “fish, frogs, mussels, wild birds, wild animals, or game.” The public welfare also includes the promotion and appreciation of patriotism. For all we know, the General Assembly may have assumed that it would promote the health and nervous stability of the veterans to be encouraged in outdoor pursuits, and that hunting and fishing would help them forget the hidden scars of war, and improve their general mental health.
I am unable to see where there is any difference between giving a state bonus or payment under the federal G. I. Bill of Rights, Title 38 U. S. C. A. §693, et seq., and a free permit. Under the reasoning urged by the *380appellant, any veteran of the Spanish American War or World War I has been denied equal privileges and immunities because he had no state bonus as had been paid to veterans of World War II. The veterans of the Korean War with equal justice could make the same complaint, because their bonus rights are different than the veterans of World War II.
The statutory price for a yearly license to hunt, trap and fish is $2.00. If the General Assembly, by statute, had provided that each veteran buying such a permit, be reimbursed from the general fund the sum of $2.00 for each license purchased, this lawsuit would never have been commenced. Such reimbursement would not be materially different than a bonus. But the federal aid, which was the motivating cause for this suit, would have been forthcoming. The state gives the veteran a piece of paper in one case, worth $2.00 a year, and in another case, under the Bonus Act, it gives him a piece of paper in the form of a warrant drawn upon the Treasurer of State which may be worth several hundred dollars, according to his service.6 Many of the veterans of World War I obtained and carried the permits not because they were going to use them, but because it was the only thing the State of Indiana had ever given them as a token of its appreciation for their military service. Now the appellant seeks to have this court forget their service to this country in time of national peril.7
*381Nor is there any validity in the suggestion that the purpose of Ch. 21 of the 1937 Acts, as amended, was conservation of “fish, frogs, mussels, wild birds, wild animals, or game,” therefore the act could not reward patriotic service or stimulate patriotism. The title of the Act is “An act concerning fish, frogs, mussels, game, wild birds, and wild animals, and offenses relating thereto.” The generality of the title of an act does not make it unconstitutional.
“The generality of a title is no objection to it so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection. If the title to an act covers a general subject it need not go further and mention all matters that are germane to such subject nor is it necessary that details be mentioned in the title to the act.” Crabbs v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 248, 255, 139 N. E. 180.
“The purpose of §19, Art. 4, supra, was (1) to prevent ‘log rolling’ legislation; (2) to prevent surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and, (3) to apprise the people of the subject of legislation under consideration. Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th ed.) 205; Bright v. McCullough (1866), 27 Ind. 223.” Moore-Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (1913), 179 Ind. 356, 367, 101 N. E. 296.8
“This court has many times called attention to the fact that the purpose of the title of an act under the provisions of the Constitution above referred to is merely to express the general topic of the act, and that anything that is relevant or germane to such topic, and not incongruous thereto, is properly included. In other words, what is naturally to be found under the title is properly contained in the act, but any one examining the title must be able to know that he will not be misled by the *382inclusion in the act of what would not be expected under such title. The title is not expected to be an index to every part of the act itself.” City of Indianapolis v. Buckner (1954), 233 Ind. 32, 116 N. E. 2d 507, 510.
Many examples of dual purposes of an act could be cited. Chapter 80 of the 1933 Acts entitled, “An act concerning alcoholic beverages and declaring an emergency,” was to promote temperance, and provide tax revenues. The Indiana chain store tax act was designed to raise revenues and to prevent monopolies. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs. (1933), 206 Ind. 688, 187 N. E. 882, 191 N. E. 153. Our many federal tariff laws were designed to raise revenues as well as protect American industry and labor. Our graduated or progressive income tax and inheritance tax laws are designed to raise revenues as well as redistribute the wealth. See Marx and Engels “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” Kerr & Company, Chicago, pp. 40-41. The death taxes in England have about accomplished that purpose. Indiana’s graduated inheritance tax could be increased to accomplish the same dual purposes of raising additional revenue and redistributing the wealth. This court is not any Constitutional Convention or any ratifying convention on a constitutional amendment, and we have no judicial right or duty to rewrite §19 of Article 4 by holding that each act could embrace but one purpose when the language used is “Every Act shall embrace but one subject. . . .” There is no reasonable basis for assuming that the many acts of the Congress and the state legislatures granting bonuses, service connected compensation, pensions, G. I. benefits, land grants or tax exemptions can only be sustained on the theory they were to assist the veteran in readjusting himself to civilian life. The appreciation, preservation and stimulation of patriotism *383are always involved as a reason for such legislation, and the particular means the legislature may adopt to express gratitude ought not be upset by the courts except where it specifically contravenes a specific constitutional prohibition, or no reasonable man could say it was valid when it involved a mixed question of law and fact, such as due process.
Therefore I dissent. The petition for the rehearing should have been granted and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Levine, J., joins in this dissent.
Note.—Reported in 123 N. E. 2d 452.
Rehearing denied 126 N. E. 2d 879.

. “No man’s particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No man’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.” Section 21, Article I, Constitution of Indiana.
“The General Assembely shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Section 23, Article I, Constitution of Indiana.

. General George Bogers Clark was not an officer of the Continental Congress. He was on officer of the Virginia Militia.

. The amount of land received by each veteran depended upon his rank. Clark received 8,049 acres. Lt. Col. Mongomery received *3714,851 acres. Majors received 4,312 acres, captains were alloted 3,234 acres, lieutenants were alloted 2,156 acres. Sergeants were alloted 216 acres, while privates received only 108 acres.

. We fail to find anything in the Magna Charta (1215) which declares that all fish and game was held by the Crown for the use of all the people. It did state, “All Forests which have been made in our time, shall be immediately disforested; and it shall be so done with Water-banks, which have been taken or fenced in by us during our reign.” Richard Thomson, an Historical Essay on the Magna Charta of King John, p. 85. The present common law rule came later.

. “It is important to note that American quails are game birds and as such belong to the State in its sovereign capacity as the trustee of the citizens in common.” Smith v. State (1900), 155 Ind. 611, 612, 58 N. E. 1044.
“ ‘Fish are ferae naturae, and as far as any right of property in them can exist, it is in the public, or is common to all. No *372individual property in them exists until they are taken and reduced to actual possession. 2 Black. Com. 392.’ ” State V. Lewis (1893), 134 Ind. 250, 253, 33 N. E. 1024.

. Appellant in this case was not able to offer any evidence at all as to the number of veterans who were using their permits in any one year.

. ■ This too prevalent tendency has been well noted by Kipling when he wrote:
“It’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’
‘Chuck ’im out, the brute!’
But it’s ‘Savior of ’is country,’ when the guns begin to shoot.”

. “Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title.” Section 19, Article 4, Constitution of Indiana.