Court Opinion

ID: 9687297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:22:36.847174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.422334
License: Public Domain

*449On Rehearing.
HAMLIN, Justice.
Rehearing in this matter was limited to a consideration of the third party defendant procedure.
The facts of record show that on September 22, 1956, plaintiff, Kenneth C. Cameron, filed suit against defendant Reserve Insurance Company 1 for damages alleged to have resulted from the demolition of his 1956 Thunderbird Ford Automobile.
On October 19, 1956, Reserve Insurance Company filed a third party demand under LSA-R.S. 13 :3381 2 against Wilbur J. Fabre, praying that if the court decreed plaintiff entitled to judgment against Reserve Insurance Company then in that event Reserve Insurance Company have judgment against Wilbur J. Fabre, driver of the car, supra, at the time of the accident. On December 5, 1956, Wilbur J. Fabre filed an exception to the jurisdiction. There is a notation on the foot of the exception that it was filed on December 5, 1956. There is also a notation to the effect that the exception was refiled in open court on December 6, 1956. Both notations are signed by the deputy clerk of court. Answer was filed on December 5, 1956 by Wilbur J. Fabre and refiled in open court on December 6, 1956. There are no minutes of court for December 5, 1956, but the minutes of December 6, 1956 read as follows:
“Court met this day pursuant to adjournment, present * * *
“Exception to the jurisdiction filed and with full reservation thereto answer filed on behalf of Wilbur J. Fabre, third party defendant.”
The minutes of court of December 21, 1956 read:
“Case previously fixed for trial for today. Plea to the jurisdiction filed on behalf of third party defendant, Wilbur Fabre taken up, tried, submitted and referred to the merits. * * * ”
The note of evidence states:
“(Exception to the Jurisdiction argued by Mr. Simon)
“The Court: If it is agreeable, I will refer the exception to the merits.
“Mr. Simon: It is agreeable to the exceptor.
“Mr. Labbe: I will not object to it, but I don’t waive any legal rights by doing so.
“The Court: I am going to refer it to the merits.”
*451The reasons for judgment of the trial judge state:
******
“Wilbur J. Fabre has excepted to the third party complaint filed against him by Reserve Insurance Company, contending that this Court is without jurisdiction over his person to adjudicate the matter contained in the third party complaint. This exception was referred to the merits by the Court, with full reservation to said Wilbur J. Fabre of all his rights therein. He has denied in his answer any'act of negligence whatever and has prayed that the third party complaint of Reserve Insurance Company be dismissed at its costs.
“The exception of Wilbur J. Fabre is predicated on the provisions of Article 162 of the Code of Practice of Louisiana which in substance provides that in civil matters one must be sued before his own judge, that is, before the Judge having jurisdiction over the place where he has his domicile or residence. .
“The allegations of the third party complaint state that Wilbur J. Fabre is a resident of St. Mary Parish, Louisiana.
“Fabre had a right to have his exception passed upon in limine, and the Court was in error in referring it to the merits, and now sustains the plea to the jurisdiction and dismisses this action insofar as Fabre’s personal 'liability is concerned.
»* * * * * *”
The trial court’s judgement decreed:
“ * * * the Exception to the jurisdiction of the Court filed by Wilbur J. Fabre against the Third Party petition of Reserve Insurance Company be and is hereby sustained and the suit against him is dismissed as of non-suit.
* * * * * * 9i
On appeal to this Court, Reserve Insurance Company contended that since the third party defendant filed his answer on the same day he filed his plea to the jurisdiction, he lost all rights he might have under his original plea. It was argued that:
“ * * * Mr. Fabre had waived his rights to the plea by filing a simultaneous answer and submitting his exception for decision along with the merits of the case. This principle of law is obviously correct and just, otherwise, a defendant, in the situation of Fabre, could have two- shots at the merits of a case. He could go on trial and if all of the evidence were satisfactory and favorable, he could dismiss his plea to the jurisdiction.”
In our original opinion we answered the above contention by . stating:
*453“ * * * we think that his [Fabre’s] exception to the jurisdiction to the court rationae personae (which he timely urged) was correctly sustained. The third party practice act ([LSA-R.S.] LRS 13:3381 et seq.) provides no exception to the general rule that a defendant is entitled to be sued in the court of his domicile.”
Reserve Insurance Company strenuously urged, in its application for a rehearing, that this Court was in error in the above ruling, and a rehearing was granted to consider the correctness of our holding.
As stated supra, there are no minutes of court dated December 5, 1956. We are, therefore, governed by the minutes of court of December 6, 1956, which are prima facie proof of and interpret the court’s proceedings. Dilzell Engineering & Construction Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Lazarus, 39 La.Ann. 142, 1 So. 361; State v. Roshto, 169 La. 251, 125 So. 67. These minutes specifically state that the exception to the jurisdiction was filed with full reservation, and they also recite that an answer was filed on the same day.
“An exception to the jurisdiction of the court is a declinatory exception and is one of the two principal species of exceptions designated as dilatory exceptions. Code of Practice, Article 331; Mann v. Mann, 170 La. 958, 129 So. 543.” State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305, 306. The plea to the jurisdiction ratione personae is declinatory and may be pleaded in answer previous to answering to the merits. Mann v. Mann, supra; Code of Practice, Articles 334-336.3 Act 124 of 1936, Sec. 1 (amending Article 333 of the Code of Practice), provides that all dilatory exceptions must be filed in limine litis. A defendant may, therefore, file several dilatory exceptions at the same time, but in order for an exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae to be effective such exception must be filed in the alternative with full reservation of rights.
“The plaintiff-appellant’s position that the defendant by his mode of pleading waived his exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae, is well taken; the exact point was decided in the case of George W. Garig Transfer Co., Inc. v. Harris, 226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28, 34, in which this Court distinguished State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305, relied on by the defendant here, and in a Per Curiam pointed out that ‘In the Younger case, unlike *455the case at bar, the exceptions were filed “only in the alternative, with full reservation of and without waiving his exception to the jurisdiction of the court, and solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Act No. 124 of 1936 whereas here, the exceptions to the jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae were submitted together, without reservation, * * * ’ See State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102, 171 So. 708; Martel Syndicate v. Block, 154 La. 869, 98 So. 400.” Mitchell v. Gulf States Finance Corporation, 226 La. 1008, 78 So.2d 3, 4. See, also, Standard Indemnity, Inc. v. Albrought, La.App., 81 So.2d 448; Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, La.App., 99 So.2d 522.
Relying on the minutes of the trial court, we conclude that the third party defendant’s filing of an exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae with full reservation of his rights and the filing of his answer at the same time did not constitute a waiver of the jurisdiction of the court.
The last question for our determination is whether the referral of the exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae to the merits of the case constituted a waiver of the plea. An examination of the record in this case discloses that its facts and circumstances are exceptional, which distinguishes it from the cases relied upon by defendant. The defendant Reserve Insurance Company called as a third party defendant, Wilbur J. Fabre. The trial and referral to the merits of the exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae were before evidence was adduced and were separate from the trial on the merits. The note of evidence, supra, reveals that the trial judge informed counsel that if agreeable to them he would refer the exception to the merits; that counsel for the third party defendant informed the court that it was agreeable to the exceptor; that counsel for the defendant Reserve Insurance Company stated, “I will not object to it, but I don’t waive any legal rights by doing so.” It appears that both parties acquiesced in this procedure. Counsel for defendant should not complain now about an action of the trial judge and the third party defendant to which he did not object. The third party defendant had reserved his rights; when the trial judge made the statement, supra, regarding the referral of the exception to the merits, it was then that counsel should have spoken and demanded a ruling upon the exception, if either of them felt that he was aggrieved by its referral to the merits. Neither did so.
After trial in the district court, the learned trial judge was aware of the fact that the exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae should have been *457passed upon by him before trial on the merits. He corrected the mistake, which he realized had been made, by frankly stating, “Fabre had a right to have his exception passed upon in limine, and the Court was in error in referring it to the merits, * * * ” Since the third party defendant had no intention to waive his plea to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae, it would be unjust to penalize him for a corrected error of the trial judge and an action in which the defendant participated and did not object to.
For the reasons assigned, our original decree is reinstated and now made the judgment of this Court.
McCALEB, J., concurs in the decree.

. “In any civil action presently pending or hereafter filed the defendant in a principal action may by petition bring in any person (including a co-defendant) who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand.”

. “Declinatory exceptions may be pleaded in the defendant’s answer, previous to Ms answering to the merits; but, except as relates to the declinatory exceptions, the defendant must plead in his answer all dilatory or peremptory exceptions on wMch he intends to rely, or which he is bound to plead expressly and specially, pursuant to the provisions of this Code.” Art. 336.