Court Opinion

ID: 9827465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:34:54.907905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:31.773126
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees have filed a motion for a rehearing insisting that the crossing involved in this case was shown to be an extrahazardous crossing which required more than ordinary care on the part of appellant.
We have again carefully considered this matter and again arrived at the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact that this crossing was more than an ordinarily hazardous nighttime crossing.
The evidence shows that the crossing, which was occupied by a slow moving train at the time of the collision, was about two miles north of the city of Eagle Pass.' That there was a loading platform, a filling station, and several occupied dwelling houses in the vicinity. The highway was 80 feet wide and free from obstruction. It was straight and almost level for about 900 feet south of the crossing from which direction the ill-fated automobile was approaching. The highway was the Eagle Pass-Del Rio highway, which carried considerable traffic, both day and night, and the railroad track was a spur track, used on an average of once in twenty-four hours. There was evidence that the night was foggy and the visibility bad, and that this was the usual condition at and near This crossing at this time of the year.
Appellees have cited the following cases as supporting their contention that this crossing was an extrahazardous crossing in the nighttime: Tisdale v. Ry. (Tex. Com. App.) 228 S. W. 185; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Long (Tex. Com. App.) 299 S. W. 854; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 310, 50 S.W.(2d) 247, 251.
Each of these cases has reference to railroad crossings in or near cities or towns where there were a number of trains daily, and the approaches were obstructed by buildings and other 'objects.' None of these decisions deal with crossings located more than two miles from a city or town and occupied at the time of the accident by a slow moving train.
Our view that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that this crossing was an extrahazardous nighttime crossing is in accordance with the following- cases: Thompson v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 55 S.W.(2d) 1084, 1085; Robinson v. Houston Belt & Terminal Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S.W.(2d) 894, 895; St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Hill (Tex. Civ. App.) 13 S.W.(2d) 420; Galveston-H. Electric Ry. Co. v. Patella (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 615, 627; Smith v. G.-H. Electric Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 205 S. W. 207; Gillham v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 512; Galveston, II. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Burr (Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 299; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Adams (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.W.(2d) 331, 334; Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Loudermilk (Tex. Civ. App.) 295 S. W. 193.
Neither, do we agree with appellee’s contention that it was the statutory duty of appellant to keep the hell ringing until the train had crossed the highway. Article 0371, R. S. 1925, as amended by Acts 1031, c. 107, § 1 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 6371), provides in part as follows; “A bell of at least thirty (30) pounds weight and a whistle shall be placed on each locomotive engine,, and the whistle shall be blown and the bell rung at a distance of at least eighty (SO) rods from the place where the railroad shall cross any public road or street, and such bell shall be kept ringing until it shall have crossed such public road, or stopped. * ⅜ * ” (Italics ours.)
The pronoun “it” can only refer back to the noun engine, and thus there is no duty on the part of the railroad to keep the bell ringing after the engine has crossed the public road.
In support of our original bolding to the effect that, under the evidence in this case, reasonable minds could come to no4 other conclusion than that the operatives of appellant’s train were not guilty of negligence proximately causing this collision, we wish to cite the following additional authorities: Berry on the Law of Automobiles (4th Ed.) p. 729, § 774, et seq.; Frush v. Waterloo, etc., Co., 185 Iowa, 156, 109 N. W. 300; Gilman v. Central Vt. R. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122, 16 A. L. R. 1102; Gage v. Atchison, T. & S. E. R. Co., 91 Kan. 253, 137 P. 938, Ann. Cas. 1015B, 410; Nadasky v. Public Service R. Co., 97 N. J. Law, 400, 117 A. 478; McGlaullin v. Boston & M. R., 230 Mass. 431, 119 N. *745E. 955, L. R. A. 1918E, 790; Huddy on Automobiles (5th Ed.) p. 725, § 566; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 1 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 247, 114 A. 62, 66, 15 A. L. R. 894.
In the Dillon Case we find the following:
“If his light be such that he can see objects for only a distance of ten feet, then he should so regulate his speed as to be able to stop his machine within that distance and if he fails to do so, and an accident results from such failure, no recovery can be had. This, it seems to us, is the minimum degree of care that should be required. * ⅜ *
“The trainmen of The defendant had a right to assume that a reasonably careful person driving an automobile on that highway at that time would adopt such lights and rate of speed as that he could and would bring his automobile to a standstill within the distance that he could plainly see the train of The defendant, and so avoid running his machine into it, and therefore these employees of the defendant company were not negligent in. failing to give warning by lights, or otherwise, of the presence of the train as an obstruction to the highway.”
If this is a correct statement of the law, and we feel that It is, appellant could not be held liable for damages in this cause.
With reference to the failure of appellant to maintain the crossing sign, the law does not require that two such signs be maintained. Had a crossing sign been maintained on the north side of the track, all requirements of the law wmuld have been met. With the highway blocked by the presence of the train, ■whether or not the railway company maintained a crossing sign on the north side of the highway would become immaterial and could not have been a proximate cause of the collision. The same thing is true if a flagman with a lantern had been on the north side of the track.
With reference to the ringing of the bell and the blowing of the whistle, these signals are required for the purpose of giving warning of the approach of trains and not of the presence of a train. Travelers have no right to rely upon such signals for the purpose of determining whether or not the highway is blocked by the presence of a train. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Hart (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 795; Nadasky v. Public Service R. Co., 97 N. J. Law, 400, 117 A. 478, 479.
In the Nadasky Case the court said: “Assuming, therefore, as we should assume on the proof or lack of proof in this case that the defendant had not occupied the crossing with its car for more than a lawful period, the question is whether it was obliged in the execution of its duty toward the public to light up the car so that travelers upon the highway would see the lights and be warned of its presence at that point. We make nothing of the signals that have been spoken of above; these were manifestly intended for the warning of travelers, when the crossing should be, in fact unobstructed, that a car or train was approaching, and that they were liable to be struck if they attempted to cross; the plaintiff had no right to rely upon them as warning of something which was actually in possession of the crossing in plain sight and visible except for the temporary conditions of darkness. As to an obstruction of this kind, we have the authority of Jacobson v. New York, Susquehanna & Western R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 378, 94 A. 577, where a substantially similar case was presented and in which it was held that there was no duty to warn or to show lights, and this decision, we think, is controlling in the present case.”
With reference to the failure to maintain a stationary light at the crossing it would be unreasonable to require any railroad company to maintain a stationary light at the intersection of a highway and a spur track only used occasionally, located more than two miles from the city and not being an extrahazardous crossing.
It is quite plain, as a matter of law, that appellant was not guilty of a shortage of duty in any way proximately causing the collision, which was the result of the driver of the Stratton car running into the side of appellant’s train.
The motion for a rehearing will be overruled.