Court Opinion

ID: 9474740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:07:31.609627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:18.485210
License: Public Domain

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe that the district court properly suppressed all the physical evidence and Morales’ statements obtained as a result of the initial Miranda violation, I dissent respectfully and vote to affirm.
In my view, Oregon v. Elstad, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), does not govern. In Elstad, the Supreme Court held that an unwarned and un-coerced admission does not taint subsequent admissions made after a suspect has been fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rights. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 1296. Although Miranda requires the suppression of the initial unwarned admission, the admissibility of a subsequent incriminating statement depends upon whether it was made both knowingly and voluntarily. The careful administration of a subsequent Miranda warning cures the taint that rendered the initial unwarned statement inadmissible. “The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect’s choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an act of free will.” Id. at 1294 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).
This case differs from Elstad because of the extension here of the use made by the police of Morales’ initial unwarned statement. He was not given the opportunity to avoid incriminating himself. Without the Miranda warning, he was not given the choice knowingly either to waive his rights or to refuse to waive them. Once he made his first unwarned admission, Morales was irrevocably incriminated inasmuch as the majority holds that the statement furnished the probable cause lawfully to arrest him. That arrest led to the discovery of the physical evidence and to all of Morales’ subsequent incriminating statements. In Elstad only defendant’s second statement, made after the administration of Miranda warnings, was relied upon — and his first unwarned statement was not used to incriminate him.
This case is also distinguishable from Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), in that the unwarned statements taken in violation of Miranda are here, in a sense, being used to prove the prosecution’s case. Without Morales’ initial unwarned admission, the government would have had no case against Morales and would not have uncovered the evidence which proved its case against him. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436, 94 S.Ct. at 2359, probable cause existed to arrest Tucker before any unwarned admissions were made or third party witness’ testimony obtained, as evidenced by the fact that Tucker was already under arrest when he made his incriminatory statements. But here, Morales accused himself and confessed guilt before the police had evidence against him. No third party is involved, and it is precisely because Morales confessed complicity in the crime without Miranda warnings that the police were enabled to arrest him and threaten him with a search of his person.
*888Significantly, in Tucker the Supreme Court noted that it had said in Miranda “that statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution’s case at trial.” Id. at 445, 94 S.Ct. at 2364. Equally important, the Tucker Court continued, “the respondent did not accuse himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party who was subjected to no custodial pressures.” Id. at 449, 94 S.Ct. at 2366.
The majority without reason extends the principles set forth in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1285, and in so doing unnecessarily erodes those protections erected by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) against self-incrimination. In Miranda the Court observed: “A warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.” Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625.
The logic seems irrefutable that Morales’ initial statement cannot have been knowingly made because not preceded by the Miranda litany. I cannot agree with the majority that permits use of a citizen’s initial unwarned admission. Since this first statement was extracted without warning, Morales’ subsequent incriminating statements and actions were properly suppressed.