Court Opinion

ID: 9902790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:23:39.304595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:59.441852
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-0371
                   LT Case No. 19-CA-000542
                 _____________________________

TKH COASTAL PROPERTY
INVESTMENTS, LLC.,

    Appellant,

    v.

TALCOR GROUP, INC.,
   Appellee.
               _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Eric C. Roberson, Judge.

Mary Anne Keshen, of Private Investments, Fernandina Beach,
and Howard T. Sutter, of Sutter Maritime, LLC, Jacksonville for
Appellant.

Lee D. Wedekind, III, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP,
Jacksonville, for Appellee.

                         August 25, 2023

BOATWRIGHT, J.,

      This is an appeal that originated in the First District Court
of Appeal prior to being transferred to this Court pursuant to the
2023 realignment of the boundaries of Florida’s district courts. See
Ch. 2022-163, § 4, Laws of Fla. The basis of this appeal involves
the preclusive effect of the First District’s rulings on Appellee’s fee
motions in a prior appeal. In this appeal, Appellant, TKH Coastal
Property Investments, LLC (“TKH”), appeals the trial court’s order
finding that Appellee, Talcor Group, Inc. (“Talcor”), was entitled to
trial court attorney’s fees pursuant to the “offer of judgment”
statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2020), as well as the
court’s order determining the reasonableness and amounts of
Talcor’s attorney’s fees. TKH asserts the First District’s prior
denial of Talcor’s motions for appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to
section 768.79 constituted the law of the case on the issue of
Talcor’s entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees. We agree and
reverse the trial court’s decision.

                                  I.

       In 2019, TKH filed a multiple count complaint against Talcor
in Nassau County, Florida, regarding issues that had been
previously litigated in California. TKH subsequently amended the
complaint, and then Talcor filed a motion to dismiss TKH’s
amended complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.140. Talcor argued that TKH’s claims were barred by res judicata
because they had been fully litigated in the California action. One
day after Talcor filed the motion to dismiss, it served a proposal
for settlement on TKH pursuant to section 768.79 and Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.442 as a complete settlement for all claims.
The court then entered an order granting the motion to dismiss
and dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice. TKH
then filed a second amended complaint, which Talcor again moved
to dismiss on the ground that the claims were barred by res
judicata. Following a hearing, the court granted Talcor’s motion
and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice.

       TKH appealed the court’s order dismissing its second
amended complaint with prejudice to the First District. The First
District per curiam affirmed the court’s ruling. TKH Coastal Prop.
Invs., LLC v. Talcor Grp., Inc., 333 So. 3d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)
(per curiam). In that appeal, Talcor moved for contingent appellate
attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442. In
particular, Talcor requested that fees and costs only be entered
conditionally upon establishing entitlement to an award of
attorney’s fees and costs at the trial court below. Talcor specifically

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alleged that it had served TKH with a valid proposal for
settlement, that TKH had implicitly rejected the proposal by
failing to accept it within thirty days, and that the suit was
ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, Talcor
contended that it was entitled to its fees and costs from the date
the proposal was served throughout the duration of the appeal.
The First District denied Talcor’s motion without any explanation.

       Talcor then moved for reconsideration of the First District’s
order denying its motion for appellate attorney’s fees, expounding
even further upon its legal argument that it was entitled to a
conditional award of fees under section 768.79. In its motion for
reconsideration, Talcor surmised that the First District’s denial of
appellate attorney’s fees might have been due to its failure to
supply the court with a copy of the settlement proposal;
accordingly, it attached a copy of the settlement proposal as an
appendix to the motion. The First District denied Talcor’s motion
for reconsideration without elaboration.

       After the First District’s mandate was issued, the trial court
held a hearing on Talcor’s pending motion for trial court attorney’s
fees, in which it had asserted entitlement under section 768.79. At
the hearing, TKH argued that the First District’s denial of Talcor’s
motions for appellate fees under section 768.79 operated as the law
of the case on the issue of Talcor’s entitlement to trial court
attorney’s fees because Talcor was seeking fees at the trial court
level on the exact same legal grounds as it had sought in the prior
appeal. The court rejected TKH’s argument that the First District’s
denial of Talcor’s motions for appellate attorney’s fees, without
explanation, could constitute the law of the case on Talcor’s
entitlement to fees at the trial court level. As a result, the court
determined that Talcor was entitled to trial court attorney’s fees
based on the offer of judgment statute. Then, following a
subsequent evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of Talcor’s
fees, the trial court awarded Talcor attorney’s fees and costs.

      TKH subsequently filed this instant appeal, arguing, inter
alia, that the trial court erred when it found that the First
District’s denial of Talcor’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees
under section 768.79 and subsequent motion for reconsideration
did not operate as the law of the case regarding Talcor’s

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entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees merely because the
motions were denied without elaboration. Specifically, TKH
asserts that because the First District denied Talcor’s motions for
appellate attorney’s fees, the trial court was without jurisdiction
to reconsider Talcor’s entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees on
the identical legal grounds as it had argued before the First
District.

                                  II.

       The “law of the case” doctrine requires “that questions of law
actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court
and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the
proceedings.” Spectrum Interiors, Inc. v. Exterior Walls, Inc., 65 So.
3d 543, 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
945 So. 2d 1246, 1266 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano,
801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001)). The law of the case doctrine
additionally “may foreclose subsequent consideration of issues
implicitly addressed or necessarily considered in the prior appeal.”
Id. (citing Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 106). The purpose of the doctrine
is “to lend stability to judicial decisions and the jurisprudence of
the state, as well as to avoid ‘piecemeal’ appeals and to bring
litigation to an end as expeditiously as possible.” Vega v. State, 288
So. 3d 1252, 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (quoting Strazzulla v.
Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965)).

      An appellate court’s fee determination can become the law of
the case on the issue of entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees
where the same legal grounds for fees are argued before both the
appellate and trial court. See, e.g., Stone as Tr. of Patricia K. Stone
Revocable Tr. Dated Jan. 25, 2017 v. Kubasky, 329 So. 3d 804, 804–
05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (finding that an award of appellate
attorney’s fees operated as the law of the case in a determination
for trial court fees because Stone’s prior motion for appellate
attorney’s fees “raised the same grounds for entitlement to
attorney’s fees as did her motion for an award of attorney’s fees in
the trial court”). The preclusive effect of an appellate court’s fee
determination applies not only with respect to an award of
appellate attorney’s fees, but it additionally applies with respect to
an appellate court’s denial of a movant’s request for appellate
attorney’s fees. Langer v. Fels, 93 So. 3d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

                                  4
(holding that a denial of a request for appellate attorney fees on
the merits was the law of the case, which then precluded the trial
court from awarding fees under same legal grounds as were argued
on appeal). Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine can prohibit a
trial court from awarding fees where the record shows that the
appellate court previously denied the movant’s request for
appellate attorney’s fees on the same legal grounds. Id.

       This holds true even where the appellate court has denied
fees without explanation, as long as it is evident that the same
legal grounds were argued before both the trial court and the
appellate court. Id. at 1072. However, in order for a denial of
appellate attorney’s fees without explanation to constitute the law
of the case, it must be clear that the decision was on the merits.
Candyworld, Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 700 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla.
4th DCA 1997). In order for the decision to be on the merits, the
motion for fees must state sufficient grounds that would allow the
appellate court to rule on the merits. Id. (finding the appellate
court’s prior denial of Candyworld’s motion for appellate attorney’s
fees did not operate as the law of the case on the issue of its
entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees on the same grounds,
because the prior motion for fees merely cited to several fee
statutes without offering any explanation as to why Candyworld
would be entitled to attorney's fees under those statutes); 1 see also
Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b) (providing that “a motion for attorneys’ fees
must state the grounds on which recovery is sought”).

      Applying these principles to the instant case, the record
before us is sufficient to demonstrate that the First District denied
Talcor’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees under section 768.79
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on the merits. As a
result, the First District’s ruling operated as the law of the case on
Talcor’s motion for entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees
because Talcor sought fees at the trial court level on the same
grounds as it had argued before the First District. Talcor stated

    1   We further note that the record on appeal must be
sufficiently developed for an appellate court to rule on the merits
of a motion for appellate attorney’s fees. See Horowitz v. Rossdale
CLE, Inc., 357 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

                                  5
sufficient grounds in its motions before the First District and
extensively argued the merits of why it was entitled to provisional
fees under section 768.79. In addition, the First District had the
benefit of reviewing the actual proposal for settlement in making
its determination. Thus, the motions went well beyond merely
stating the statutory provision and the rule of procedure. Cf.
Candyworld, 700 So. 2d at 425. As such, the motions and record
were legally sufficient for the First District to determine an award
of fees.

       Even more compelling is that Talcor sought only a
conditional award of fees based on the trial court determining
entitlement. The First District denied those motions even in the
limited context of the award being conditioned upon the trial
court’s finding of entitlement. If the First District had not
considered the motions on their merits, then it could have very
easily directed the trial court to make a determination. Thus, the
First District’s denial of Talcor’s motion for appellate attorney’s
fees and subsequent motion for reconsideration clearly operated as
an adjudication on the merits of Talcor’s entitlement to trial court
attorney’s fees under section 768.79.

       Furthermore, the position Talcor takes in this appeal with
respect to the sufficiency of its appellate fee motions is entirely
inconsistent with the position it asserted in the prior appeal. After
having argued before the First District that its motions were
sufficient to demonstrate its entitlement to provisional appellate
attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Talcor now takes the exact
opposite position in this appeal, contending that the First District
could not have possibly arrived at a determination on the merits
because its own motions were legally insufficient. This argument
is unavailing.

                                III.

      The record supports a conclusion that the First District’s
denial of Talcor’s motions for appellate attorney’s fees under
section 768.79 operated as an adjudication on the merits. Since
Talcor sought fees before the appellate court and the trial court on
the same grounds, the First District’s denial operated as the law
of the case on the issue of Talcor’s entitlement to trial court

                                 6
attorney’s fees under section 768.79. Therefore, we reverse the
trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand the case.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MAKAR and JAY, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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