Court Opinion

ID: 9592515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:14:48.27156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:40.842131
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied defendant’s demurrer to the indictment. However, because I believe that defendant’s admissions were not induced by implied promises of leniency, I respectfully dissent.
The only point of disagreement here is whether Detective Gossman’s statements “reasonably can be construed as impliedly promising that defendant would get treatment instead of incarceration if he admitted the criminal charges.” State v. Capwell, 64 Or App 710, 715, 669 P2d 808 (1983). (Emphasis supplied.) I believe that Gossman’s statements to defendant regarding the availability of treatment do not amount to the quid pro quo that the majority finds so obvious.
The majority asserts that certain exchanges during the course of the interview “make sense only if Gossman was *550promising treatment of defendant’s abusive propensities in lieu of prosecution.” 132 Or App at 538. (Emphasis in majority.) I disagree. In coming to this conclusion, I am mindful of the distinction between “ ‘mere adjuration’ on the one hand, and adjuration accompanied by inducement on the other.” State v. Linn, 179 Or 499, 510, 173 P2d 305 (1946). (Citation omitted.) A promise of treatment, without more, is not enough to require suppression. State v. Neblock, 75 Or App 587, 590, 706 P2d 1020 (1985). Taking Gossman’s statements in context, there is no indication from the content of the interview itself or Gossman’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he promised defendant treatment in lieu of prosecution. Gossman’s statements to defendant to “get it up front and get on with your life” and offering “help” for defendant if he was “totally honest with [Gossman]” cannot reasonably be read so as to promise or infer that defendant would be immune from future prosecution if he confessed.
The statements Gossman made to defendant are fundamentally different than the implied promises of leniency this court and the Supreme Court have previously held to be unlawful. For instance, in State v. Capwell, supra, the interrogating officer testified that the substance of his conversation with the defendant, which ultimately gave rise to incriminating admissions, “centered around * * * treatment ‘instead of or ‘as opposed to’ being incarcerated.” 64 Or App at 716. The trial court, in suppressing the defendant’s confession, concluded:
“Any confession or admissions made by [defendant were predicated upon the implied promise that treatment, not incarceration, would be the outcome and defendant would not be required to attend Court.” 64 Or App at 714.
Similarly, in State v. Ely, 237 Or 329, 390 P2d 348 (1964), the defendant was questioned by individuals who assured him that if he confessed they would not seek prosecution, but that there was no guarantee that someone else would not prosecute. From those statements the court concluded that “[t]he defendant could have believed that if these three men would not prosecute him no one else was likely to do so.” 237 Or at 334.
Here, Gossman never stated or implied that defendant would avoid prosecution if he confessed. Rather, he *551made assurances that counselling was available. Advice that ‘ ‘treatment is an option, or that confession is a prerequisite to treatment is not the same as promising * * * immunity from prosecution.” 75 Or App at 590. On the basis of all the facts and circumstances, I would conclude that defendant’s statements were voluntarily made, and that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress.
I respectfully dissent.
Richardson, C. J., and Warren and Deits, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.