Court Opinion

ID: 9633075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:33:08.103242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:28.664160
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES
specially concurring.
I write separately to concur with the result. I believe that the merits of defendant’s contention concerning consent need not be examined by us because the record plainly reflects that the defendant was aware of the victim’s non-consent. Shortly after the incident, he told a police officer that the victim “said, ‘No,’ a couple of times_” Notwithstanding her alleged body language thereafter, the record does not reveal to me which part of the “no” defendant did not understand.
Were it not for my view of the record here, however, I would feel the need to express disagreement with the majority opinion concerning what is required instruetionally under our Supreme Court’s opinions in People v. Shields, 822 P.2d 15 (Colo.1991); Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Colo.1984); and People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (Colo.1981).
I believe that the Smith case and the Shields case are distinguishable from this case such that they may not be applied here. Furthermore, Chambers v. People, supra, at 1179 seems to me clearly to indicate that the jury must be advised “specifically that the actor must be aware of the victim’s non-consent. ...”
Under these circumstances, if I were to consider the merits of defendant’s contention, I would hold that, because of the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the sexual assault statutes, the rule of lenity would mandate that the rubric of Chambers v. People, supra, be applied to the defendant’s benefit here. See People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983).