Court Opinion

ID: 9947774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:40.694061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:33.536908
License: Public Domain

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                                   2024 PA Super 38

  STEVEN M. SITLER                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ALEXAS JONES                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :      No. 1402 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered September 11, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County
                    Civil Division at No(s): 2023-MV-22-MV

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                    FILED: MARCH 5, 2024

       Appellant, Steven M. Sitler, appeals from the order entered in the

Columbia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition against

Appellee, Alexas Jones, to establish paternity and for genetic testing of

Appellee’s child, R.G.J. (born in May 2023) (“Child”).1 We affirm.

       In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as

follows:

____________________________________________

1 We use the parties’ names in the caption “as they appeared on the record of

the trial court at the time the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1).
Notably, “upon application of a party and for cause shown, an appellate court
may exercise its discretion to use the initials of the parties in the caption based
upon the sensitive nature of the facts included in the case record and the best
interest of the child.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(2); see also Pa.R.A.P. 907(a).
Neither party has applied to this Court for the use of initials in the caption.
Nevertheless, we will refer to the minor child as “Child” to protect Child’s
identity.
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       [Appellee] had sexual relations with [B.J. (“Appellee’s
       husband”)] and [Appellant] near the time of conception of
       Child. No one has performed DNA testing upon Child and
       [Appellee’s h]usband (or [Appellant] for that matter) to
       determine biological paternity. [Appellant filed a complaint
       to establish paternity and for genetic testing on July 5,
       2023.] A hearing on the Complaint was held on August 21,
       2023.

       [Appellee] married [her husband] on March 25, 2022.
       [Appellee] and [Appellee’s h]usband have an elder child,
       L.J., born [in] January…2021.          Both [Appellee] and
       [Appellee’s h]usband testified that their marriage is intact.
       They have never separated and continue to live together
       with Child and L.J. as a family unit. [Appellee’s h]usband is
       designated on Child’s birth certificate as Child’s father.
       Emotional bonding has occurred between [Appellee’s
       h]usband and Child. [Appellee’s h]usband works first shift
       and cares for Child during [Appellee’s] work during third
       shift, doing all that is necessary such as feeding, changing
       and bathing. [Appellee] and [Appellee’s h]usband hold
       [Appellee’s h]usband out to “everybody” as the father of
       Child, including family, co-workers and friends. [Appellee’s
       h]usband testified that he will love and care for Child as his
       own regardless of the identity of the biological father of
       Child.

       [Appellant] has never seen Child and has no relationship
       with Child. In October of 2022, after [Appellant] was
       advised by [Appellee] that she was pregnant and that the
       then unborn child might be his, [Appellant] told [Appellee]
       that [Appellant] “wanted nothing to do” with the then
       unborn child. One week later, [Appellant] inquired again
       and said he did want to have a relationship with the then
       unborn child. [Appellant] filed a custody action on May 17,
       2023, …[shortly] after Child was born.

       For a time, [Appellee] talked as if [Appellant] was the
       biological father of Child, verbally and in text messages.
       Despite this, [the court] found as fact that [Appellee] had
       sexual relations with both [Appellee’s h]usband and
       [Appellant] near the time of conception and that no test
       result has been obtained which determines inclusion or
       exclusion of either [Appellee’s h]usband or [Appellant] as

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          the biological father of Child. Therefore, [Appellee’s] talk in
          this regard was based only on supposition.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/11/23, at 1-2; R.R. at 5a-6a).

       Following a hearing, the court denied Appellant relief on September 11,

2023. The court decided that the presumption of paternity applied in this case

because Appellee’s marriage to her husband was intact. (See id. at 4; R.R.

at 8a). Moreover, the court held that paternity by estoppel applied to bar

Appellant relief. (Id. at 4-5; R.R. at 8a-9a).2 Appellant timely filed a notice

of appeal on October 9, 2023, along with a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

       Appellant raises three issues for our review:

          Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
          dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
          for genetic testing based on the legal theory of presumption
          of paternity?

          Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
          dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
          for genetic testing based on the legal theory of paternity by
          estoppel?

          Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it
          dismissed [Appellant’s] complaint to establish paternity and
          for genetic testing because public policy behind the
          Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the family unit no
          longer outweighs the child’s right to know his or her
          biological father?

____________________________________________

2 The court reiterated these conclusions in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.   (See Rule
1925(a) Opinion, filed 10/10/23, at 1-2; R.R. at 24a-25a).

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(Appellant’s Brief at 4).3

       In reviewing cases involving a question of paternity, we will not disturb

a trial court order absent an abuse of discretion. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940

A.2d 459, 462 (Pa.Super. 2007).

           An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden
           or misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to
           sustain the order. Moreover, resolution of factual issues is
           for the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the
           trial court’s findings if they are supported by competent
           evidence. It is not enough for reversal that we, if sitting as
           a trial court, may have made a different finding.

Id. (quoting Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

Further:

           “The finder of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence
           presented and assess its credibility.” Smith v. Smith, 904
           A.2d 15, 20 (Pa.Super. 2006). In so doing, the finder of
           fact “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and
           we as an appellate court will not disturb the credibility
           determinations of the court below.” Id. (citation omitted).

Vargo, supra.

       In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly applied

the presumption of paternity here, where Appellee’s extramarital affair with

Appellant “undermines…the policy upon which the presumption of paternity in

this case is built.”     (Appellant’s Brief at 15).   Appellant asserts that the

presumption of paternity applies only where the presumption would advance

the policy upon which it was built—namely, the preservation of marriage.

____________________________________________

3 Appellee has not filed a responsive brief.

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Appellant contends that the extramarital affair in this case, along with

Appellee’s subsequent admissions that Appellant was Child’s biological father,

eliminates the policy for which the presumption was created.           Appellant

maintains that Appellee’s husband gave no indication that the marriage would

be terminated if Appellant was declared the biological father of Child.

Appellant submits that permitting genetic testing “would have no more

deleterious effect on the marriage than the extramarital affair.” (Id. at 16).

Appellant posits that permitting the presumption of paternity to apply in this

case is patently unjust to not only Appellant, but to Child.

      Appellant concedes that there is no evidence that Appellee’s husband

was either sterile, impotent, or without access to Appellee at the time of

conception.   Nevertheless, Appellant emphasizes Appellee’s admission to

Appellant that he is Child’s biological father.   Appellant also acknowledges

Appellee’s testimony that she had sexual intercourse with both Appellant and

her husband during the week of conception. Appellant suggests, however,

that the court “failed to give appropriate weight to the fact that no expecting

mother would inform the man with whom she was having an affair…that the

child belonged to him, instead of her husband, when there was a possibility

the child was husband’s.” (Id. at 16-17). Appellant insists that Appellee’s

admission that Appellant is Child’s biological father is a compelling rebuttal to

the presumption of paternity. Appellant concludes the court erred in applying

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the presumption of paternity in this case, and this Court must grant relief. We

disagree.

       Our Supreme Court has recently revisited the presumption of paternity

in B.C. v. C.P., ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 314097 (Pa. filed Jan.

29, 2024).4 The Court explained:

          The presumption that a child born to a married woman is
          the child of the woman’s husband has been a part of our
          common law for centuries, and has been characterized as
          one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. This
          legal doctrine was originally referred to as the “presumption
          of legitimacy” because it was intended to shield a child from
          the stigma attached in the past to illegitimacy, which
          subjected the child to significant legal and social
          discrimination. After the General Assembly eliminated this
          concern by enacting legislation in 1971 which abolished the
          legal distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate”
          children, the Court referred to the presumption as the
          “presumption of paternity.”

          The presumption of paternity has a second policy
          justification, which remains today and is at issue in this
          appeal, relating to the preservation of the marriage and the
          family unit. …

          Traditionally, the presumption of paternity could only be
          overcome by clear and convincing evidence establishing that
          the husband did not have access to his wife during the
          period of possible conception, or that the husband was
          impotent or sterile. Indeed, the presumption has been held
          to be otherwise irrebuttable when a third party seeks to
          assert his own paternity as against the husband in an intact
          marriage.     However, under certain circumstances, the
          distinct doctrine of paternity by estoppel may apply, and
____________________________________________

4 At the outset, the Court made clear that it would “not address whether the

presumption of paternity…as a general doctrine…should be reconsidered”
where the parties did not expressly challenge the continued viability of the
presumption. Id. at *1.

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       involves a legal determination that, because of a person’s
       conduct, such as holding a child out as his own, the person,
       regardless of his biological relationship with a child, will not
       be permitted to deny parentage, nor will a child’s mother be
       permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the
       third party is the biological father.

                                 *    *    *

       Questioning the wisdom of the presumption’s application
       due to dramatic societal changes that had arisen since the
       presumption was created, concerning not only the nature of
       the relationship between men and women, but also the
       commonality of separation, divorce, and children born out
       of wedlock, [in Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 701 A.2d
       176 (1997) (plurality), the Opinion Announcing the
       Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”)] broke with precedent and
       limited the use of the presumption to cases where the policy
       underlying the presumption is furthered, rendering the
       presumption otherwise inapplicable. The OAJC expressly
       defined the public policy supporting the presumption of
       paternity as “the concern that marriages which function as
       family units should not be destroyed by disputes over the
       parentage of children conceived or born during the
       marriage.”

       … In [Strauser v. Stahr, 556 Pa. 83, 726 A.2d 1052
       (1999)], Timothy Strauser filed a custody complaint,
       asserting that he was the father of the youngest of the three
       children born to April and Steven Stahr, as demonstrated by
       blood tests voluntarily submitted by April, the child, and
       Strauser. April and Steven invoked the presumption of
       paternity to defeat Strauser’s claim. The trial court found
       that: April and Strauser had sex on at least one occasion
       during the time of the child’s conception; April was also
       having sex with Steven during that time; April and Steven
       were married when the child was conceived and born, and
       remained married without ever separating; April had held
       the child out to the community as Strauser’s child, and
       promoted his relationship with the child; and Steven
       exhibited an attitude of indifference toward April and the
       child.

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        The trial court held that April, having held out her child to
        be Strauser’s and having voluntarily submitted to blood
        testing, was equitably estopped from contesting the child’s
        paternity. The court also admitted the blood tests into
        evidence, and concluded that the presumption of paternity
        was overcome. The Superior Court reversed, holding that
        the presumption of paternity applied and was irrebuttable
        because the family had remained intact.          This Court
        affirmed.

        Acknowledging that the presumption of paternity had been
        criticized in Brinkley, the Court found the facts in Strauser
        to be distinct, as “the marriage into which [the child] was
        born continues.” The Court emphasized that, “despite the
        marital difficulties that they have encountered, [April and
        Steven] have never separated,” and, “[i]nstead, they have
        chosen to preserve their marriage and to raise as a family
        the three children born to them,” including the child at issue.
        Accordingly, we held that the case fell within the limited
        circumstances under which, according to the Brinkley
        plurality, the presumption of paternity continued to apply,
        and was, in fact, irrebuttable.

        Notably, in rejecting Strauser’s claims that April and Steven
        Stahr did not enjoy a traditional marriage and family unit
        because, inter alia, the couple had experienced conflict
        caused by adultery, and April represented to others that
        Strauser was the child’s father, the Court found that such
        assertions were “not unique,” as they indicated that the
        Stahrs’ marriage, like many, “encountered serious
        difficulties.” The Court declared that it “is in precisely this
        situation, … that the presumption of paternity serves its
        purpose by allowing husband and wife, despite past
        mistakes, to strengthen and protect their family.” Thus,
        finding that the presumption was applicable and
        irrebuttable, the Court deemed unavailing any reliance upon
        an estoppel theory.

B.C., supra at *6-*9 (some internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes

omitted).   The Court acknowledged that our courts have narrowed the

application of the presumption of paternity over the years “to reflect more

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accurately the societal realities of the time. This Court’s decisions, however,

have held steadfast that there is a single circumstance under which the

presumption of paternity continues to apply, and, indeed, is irrebuttable—

where there is an intact marriage to preserve.” Id. at *11.

      Under the facts of B.C., the trial court found that the biological mother

and her husband were living together with the child as a family, and their

marriage was strong, notwithstanding multiple contentious periods of

separation that the couple had endured. Id. Our High Court confirmed that

the record supported the trial court’s finding of an intact marriage. Thus, the

Court held that the presumption of paternity applied precisely in this situation,

“where the evidence establishes that a marriage and resulting family unit have

overcome the seemingly insurmountable odds and remained together after

marital infidelity.” Id. The Court opined:

         Logic dictates that the presumption offers little protection
         against the heart-wrenching revelations and resulting
         personal devastation, many times public in nature, that may
         arise prior to and during the litigation of a paternity dispute,
         as some, if not all, of these damning events may have
         already occurred by the time the court is examining whether
         the presumption applies.         The presumption, however,
         additionally protects against the potential insertion of a third
         party into the functioning family unit upon resolution of the
         paternity action.       This protection is warranted
         whenever the court finds, and the record supports the
         finding, that an intact marriage exists.

Id. at *11 (emphasis added).       Thus, the Court held that while “a marital

couple’s prior temporary separation is a factor to consider in determining

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whether the marriage is intact at the time of the paternity hearing, … such

factor is not dispositive.” Id. at *12 (internal footnote omitted).

       Instantly, Appellee and Appellee’s husband both confirmed that they live

together and have a marital relationship. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/21/23, at 6;

R.R. at 31a). The trial court expressly found the marriage was intact. (See

id. at 33; R.R. at 58a) (stating: “As a factual finding…, I’m going to find that

this is an intact marriage. I don’t have a choice. Everyone inside it says it’s

intact”).   We see no reason to disturb the trial court’s factual finding that

Appellee’s marriage to her husband is intact. See Vargo, supra.

       Under the facts of this case, where the record supports the trial court’s

determination that Appellee and her husband’s marriage is intact, the

presumption of paternity applies.              See B.C., supra.   Further, because

Appellee and her husband’s marriage is intact, the presumption of paternity

is irrebuttable.     See id.     Therefore, the trial court properly applied the

presumption of paternity in this case, and Appellant’s first issue merits no

relief.5

____________________________________________

5 In his second issue, Appellant complains that the trial court improperly
applied the doctrine of paternity by estoppel. Because that doctrine applies
only in circumstances where the presumption of paternity does not apply, we
agree with Appellant that paternity by estoppel is inapplicable here, and we
need not discuss further Appellant’s second issue on appeal. See Brinkley,
supra at 250, 701 A.2d at 180 (explaining that if presumption of paternity
has been rebutted or is inapplicable, then court examines whether paternity
by estoppel applies, which may operate to bar plaintiff from making claim or
bar defendant from denying paternity).

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      In his third issue, Appellant argues that the public policy behind the

Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the family unit no longer outweighs a

child’s right to know his or her biological father. Appellant stresses that the

genetic testing he seeks can be performed by a simple oral swab and does not

even require a blood draw.          Appellant cites to various concurring and

dissenting opinions in which Supreme Court Justices have advocated for

utilizing genetic testing to rebut the presumption of paternity.

      Appellant submits that this case should serve as one to change the law,

where the Commonwealth’s interest in preserving the marital unit has been

eroded by the societal evolution of marriage. Appellant insists that a child’s

right to know the identify of his/her biological parents should supersede the

Commonwealth’s interest in preserving the family unit in this modern age.

Appellant emphasizes the health and welfare concerns at play regarding

genetics.     Appellant   posits    that   “[b]y   continuing   to   hold   that   the

Commonwealth’s interest in the preservation of marriage is paramount, it is,

in effect, saying that it is more important to preserve an entity that may

dissolve by itself than to protect the health and welfare of a minor child.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 30-31).      Appellant insists such a result is absurd and

cannot continue in our society. Appellant concludes that public policy and the

passage of time require a change in how courts in Pennsylvania address the

presumption of paternity, and this Court must reverse the order denying his

petition. For the following reasons, we cannot grant Appellant relief.

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      In B.C., supra, our Supreme Court clarified its holding as follows:

         In closing, we reiterate that this appeal does not present the
         issue of whether the presumption of paternity has outlived
         its usefulness in light of contemporary standards. Unless
         or until this Court abrogates the presumption of
         paternity in a case where that issue is preserved and
         fully developed, courts in this Commonwealth shall apply
         the presumption of paternity in the limited circumstances
         where its purpose to preserve marriage is advanced.

Id. at *13 (emphasis added).

      Instantly, Appellant invites us to do away with the presumption of

paternity. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has instructed us to continue to

apply the presumption in cases where a marriage is intact, unless or until

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abrogates the presumption.              See id.

Although Appellant advances a compelling argument for a change in our law,

as an error-correcting court, we are simply unable to afford Appellant the relief

he seeks.    See Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 986 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(explaining this Court is bound by decisional and statutory legal authority,

even when equitable considerations may compel contrary result; “We

underscore our role as an intermediate appellate court, recognizing that the

Superior Court is an error correcting court and we are obliged to apply the

decisional law as determined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania”).

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/05/2024

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