Court Opinion

ID: 9387323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 17:06:56.605113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.836687
License: Public Domain

J-S44023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NATHAN KYLE WRYE                           :   No. 753 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 14, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                         No(s): CP-14-CR-0001280-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: APRIL 17, 2023

        The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered following Nathan Kyle Wrye’s guilty plea to driving under

the influence of a controlled substance (“DUI”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i).

Relying on Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa.Super. 2020),

overruled by Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en

banc), the trial court sentenced Wrye as a second-time DUI offender, rather

than a third-time DUI offender. The Commonwealth maintains this was error

because     Wrye     had    previously     accepted   a   DUI-related   Accelerated

Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”), which the trial court should have

considered a second conviction for purposes of imposition of a mandatory

minimum sentence under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804. Pursuant to Moroz, 284 A.3d

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44023-22

at 233, and Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214, 220 (Pa.Super.

2022) (en banc), which overruled Chichkin, we vacate the judgment of

sentence and remand for resentencing.

       In March 2022, Wrye pled guilty to DUI with an agreement that his prior

record included one prior DUI conviction in 2021 and one prior acceptance of

DUI-related ARD in 2015. The Commonwealth preserved an argument related

to the validity of the holding in Chichkin. In Chichkin, this Court held that

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806, which states that the term “prior offense” includes

“acceptance of [ARD],” is unconstitutional to the extent it defines acceptance

of ARD in a DUI case as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. Chichkin,

232 A.3d at 971.The Court held that an ARD acceptance did not qualify as a

prior conviction under the prior conviction exception to Apprendi1 and

Alleyne,2 and therefore was a fact that must be presented to the factfinder

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the court may use it to impose

a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804. Chichkin,

232 A.3d at 968.

____________________________________________

1Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the United
States Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 490.

2 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). In Alleyne, the United
States Supreme Court, held “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for
a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond
a reasonable doubt,” but the Court recognized an exception to the general
rule for a prior conviction. Id. at 103, 111 n.1.

                                           -2-
J-S44023-22

       The trial court applied Chichkin, which was the binding law at the time

of sentencing, and found Wrye to be a second-time offender, rather than a

third-time offender. It sentenced him to 90 days to five years’ imprisonment.3

The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal.4

       The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:

          Whether the [trial court] erred in holding for DUI sentencing
          purposes that [Wrye’s] conviction was a second in ten years
          offense as opposed to a third in ten years based upon the
          defective holding in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232
          A.3d 959 (Pa.Super. 2020)[,] that acceptance of ARD could
          not be treated as a prior offense?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 6.

       The Commonwealth argues that Chichkin was wrongly decided and that

the ARD placement procedure contains adequate due process protections

“sufficient to equate ARD acceptance to a prior DUI conviction for sentencing

enhancement purposes.” Id. at 8.

       The Commonwealth raises a challenge to the legality of Wrye’s

sentence. “A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of the court

to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge to the legality of the

sentence.” Moroz, 284 A.3d at 230 (quoting Commonwealth v. Infante, 63

____________________________________________

3 The mandatory minimum sentence for a third time offense where the
conviction was under Section 3802(d) is one year. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3804(c)(3)(i).

4 The Commonwealth filed an application to stay the appeal because the issue
of the viability of Chichkin was pending before this Court en banc. We granted
the application and stayed the appeal pending the issuance of the decisions in
Moroz and Richards. Order, filed Sept. 1, 2022.

                                           -3-
J-S44023-22

A.3d 358, 363 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “A challenge to the legality of sentence is a

question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528

(Pa.Super. 2019)).

      Section 3804 governs mandatory minimum sentences for individuals

convicted of DUI. It provides for different minimum sentences based on the

crime for which the individual was convicted and whether the offense is the

individual’s first, second, or third or subsequent offense. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804.

Section 3806 defines the term “prior offense” to include the “acceptance of

[ARD]”:

          (a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b),
          the term “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean
          any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been
          imposed, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent
          decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition
          or other form of preliminary disposition before the
          sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:

          (1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
          influence of alcohol or controlled substance);

          (2) an offense under former section 3731;

          (3) an offense substantially similar to an offense under
          paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or

          (4) any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph
          (1), (2) or (3).

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806(a).

      As discussed above, in Chichkin, a panel of this Court held that an ARD

acceptance did not qualify as a prior conviction under the prior conviction

                                      -4-
J-S44023-22

exception to Apprendi and Alleyne. The panel therefore held that it was a

fact that had to be presented to the factfinder and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt before the court may use it to impose a mandatory minimum sentence.

Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 968.

      In Moroz and Richards, this Court issued en banc decisions overruling

Chichkin. We pointed out that the Pennsylvania legislature “has ‘statutorily

construed [ARD] as a conviction for purposes of computing sentences on

subsequent convictions.’” Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233 (citation omitted)

(alteration in original); Richards, 284 A.3d at 220 (citation omitted)

(alteration in original). The Court concluded that a defendant’s acceptance of

ARD is a prior conviction exempt from the holdings of Apprendi and Alleyne.

It reasoned that “[a]lthough the ‘fact’ that a defendant accepted ARD does

not carry the same procedural safeguards of a conviction following a bench or

jury trial,” the safeguards in place are adequate. Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233;

Richards, 284 A.3d at 220. It pointed out that section 3806(a) notifies the

defendant that earlier ARD acceptance will be considered a prior DUI offense

for future sentencing purposes, the defendant voluntarily enters the ARD

program to avoid a prosecution on the first DUI charge, and “he is free to

reject participation in the program if he wishes to avail himself of his full

panoply of constitutional rights.” Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233; Richards, 284

A.3d at 220. The Court concluded that the defendant’s acceptance of ARD “fits

within the limited ‘prior conviction’ exception set forth in Apprendi and

Alleyne.” Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233; Richards, 284 A.3d at 220.

                                    -5-
J-S44023-22

      Therefore, pursuant to Moroz and Richards, trial courts should

consider an acceptance of ARD to be a prior conviction under Section 3806(a)

when determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence under Section

3804 should be applied. Here, the trial court did not do so. We therefore

vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for re-sentencing.

      Judgment     of   sentence   vacated.   Case   remanded.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/17/2023

                                     -6-