Court Opinion

ID: 9722076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:16:24.31469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.440942
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Under SDCL 43-45-3 and SDCL 15-16-7, the trial court was not entitled to hold the proceeds of Michael’s homestead sale in escrow.
I agree that the purpose of the homestead exemption is to provide security of a family against the claims of creditors. Speck v. Anderson, 318 N.W.2d 339, 343 (S.D.1982). Despite the majority’s use of Minnesota authority, In re Application of Jensen, 414 N.W.2d 742 (Minn.App.1987), the ex-wife who maintains her own homestead in Washington is no longer a part of Michael’s family or homestead.
The statutes leave no room for discretion; they have not provided exceptions for any creditor to be favored over another. Fred Winkler, Comment, Creditors and the South Dakota Homestead Exemption, 17 S.D.L.Rev. 483, 495 (1972). The homestead exemption cannot be used to harm the ones it is designed to protect. The law protects Michael’s homestead — a homestead to which Lore has no familial attachment. Thus, she is a creditor like any other creditor.
Here, we have an illiterate, physically disabled man, who suffered a stroke, and whose living results through benefits by the Social Security Administration. He has no savings or investments and, essentially, he has a homestead and monthly disability payments. He sold this home due to financial hardship. An attack on the homestead proceeds struck with fury, and alimony was the sword of battle. She earns in excess of $32,000 a year. She does not need any alimony whatsoever to support herself. There has been a change in circumstances and it justifies a change in alimony payments. Wegner v. Wegner, 391 N.W.2d 690 (S.D.1986).
Under the ruling of this Court today, Michael Gunn’s statutory homestead rights are cast to the wind and. he is forced to move into some dilapidated rental property. Majority opinion cleverly refers to his homestead as a “property.” Property it is, but it was his homestead and the proceeds are absolutely exempt. SDCL 43-31-1; SDCL 43-45-3(2). In the past, the South Dakota Supreme Court has recognized the head of the family, as reflected by our State Constitution.
South Dakota Constitution art. XXI, § 4 provides:
The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws exempting from forced sale a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law, to all heads of families, and a reasonable amount of personal property, the kind and value of which to be fixed by general laws.
See Somers v. Somers, 33 S.D. 551, 558, 146 N.W. 716, 718 (1914); Linander v. Longstaff, 7 S.D. 157, 63 N.W. 775 (1895); Kingman v. O’Callaghan, 4 S.D. 628, 57 N.W. 912 (1894).
“The homestead laws of this state are intended to prevent one spouse, in life or in death, from unilaterally depriving the other spouse of a homestead.” Gross v. Gross, 491 N.W.2d 751 (S.D.1992). This was a unanimous decision in this Court. It is important to note that Michael is not depriving Lore of a place to live, she received one of their two houses in the divorce award. It appears that this Court’s intent is to deprive Michael of his homestead, in contravention of our recent holding in Gross. She is not satisfied with one home, she wants two: Her home and the proceeds of his home. The majority relies upon the 1902 Harding case in this Court. It is inapposite because it is based upon a statute, which is not the law of this state anymore; and under which, the trial court had authority to assign the homestead of the divorcing parties or direct a lien or sale of the homestead to be set over unto the innocent party. Harding concerned a joint homestead of the divorced parties and it was not in the possession of the husband. We have different law and different facts here. We do not have a joint homestead involved in this case because both husband and wife received separate homes. Again, Kerr, cited by the majority, is inapplicable because that case was decided under law existing in 1952 *778whereunder the trial court, in deciding a divorce case, could assign the homestead to the innocent party. Kerr did not hold that a lien could be attached against the homestead of one 'party. We should decide this case on the facts of this particular case and my reading discloses that we have never had a case quite like this one in South Dakota. Here, the homestead and homestead proceeds belong exclusively to Michael Gunn. This Court, in my opinion, has not circumvented an inequity, it has spawned one. It is maddening to the art of logic to note the majority opinion cites to an equitable override, by a Minnesota court, over a homestead exemption and to read a footnote that the Minnesota legislature then revised the statute to exempt-out child support or maintenance arrears.
In all matters, I would reverse the trial court for its denial of Michael Gunn’s motion to modify the judgment and decree of divorce and its decision to apply the proceeds of the sale of homestead to back alimony. Essentially, he is-down and out and she is on the alimony gravy train. He wheezes in the caboose.*

Her brief quotes the Settled Record at 136-137: "Defendant [Michael Gunn] has the same serious health problems, including 'pulmonary vascular disease, manifested by shortness of breath, dysp-nea, on exertion and chronic coughs’.”