Court Opinion

ID: 9677998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:08:31.173983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.083877
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 48. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). This is an intervention case. It has nothing to do with whether the State or municipalities should or should not be required to provide married employee benefits to unmarried employees in life partnerships. Unfortunately, however, the interesting and challenging issues concerning intervention will probably he lost in the desire to portray these opinions as something they are not.
¶ 49. The majority starts with White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 81 N.W.2d 725 (1957), as the keystone for its conclusion that the municipalities are not entitled to intervention as of right. Majority, *926¶ 25. But White House did not interpret Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) (2003-04)1 (Wisconsin's intervening-as-of-right statute). Prior to the adoption of our present rule on January 1, 1976, there was no provision for intervention as of right in Wisconsin. See Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 651.2 When the White House court determined that a cooperative was not entitled to intervention, it was considering permissive intervention under Wis. Stat. § 260.19 (1955). Its standard of review was not de novo, the test we use today for intervention as of right, M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Urquhart Cos., 2005 WI App 225, ¶ 6, 287 Wis. 2d 623, 706 N.W.2d 335, but abuse of discretion, White House, 275 Wis. 2d at 248. The Court said:
Nevertheless, even if it were conceded to be a proper party, the co-operative cannot prevail on this appeal without demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the application for intervention. Schatzman v. Greenfield (1956), 273 Wis. 277, 281, 77 N.W (2d) 511; Fish Creek Park Co. v. Bayside (1956), 273 Wis. 89, 93, 76 N.W. (2d) 557; and Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co. (1928), 196 Wis. 76, 98, 219 N.W 428.
White House, 275 Wis. 2d at 248. We cannot know what the White House court would have done with our present statute using our present standard of review.
*927¶ 50. The reason this matters is that deferential review avoids the question of what an appellate court would do if it were free to do so. We and the supreme court are required to affirm a trial court if the trial court's decision falls within a broad spectrum of possible decisions, even if we disagree with the trial court. Discretion has been described as "a limited right to be wrong." State v. Jeske, 197 Wis. 2d 905, 913, 541 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Thus, we might well affirm a trial court when we are reviewing for erroneous exercise of discretion but reverse if deciding an issue de novo. To me, that is a significant difference.
¶ 51. I recognize the three cases the majority cites for its conclusion that "White House continues to be the law." Majority, ¶ 25 n.16 (citing City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com'n, 2000 WI 39, ¶ 11 nn.8, 11, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 610 N.W.2d 94; North Side Bank v. Gentile, 129 Wis. 2d 208, 215-16, 385 N.W.2d 133 (1986); Bence v. City of Milwaukee, 84 Wis. 2d 224, 234, 267 N.W.2d 25 (1978)). But in City of Madison, the issue was whether a non-party could intervene in an appeal after the time for filing a notice of appeal had passed. Whether the intervention was permissive or as of right was not relevant. The court's remand was: "The court of appeals on remand must determine whether the PFC has the right to intervene in this appeal, or if the PFC may permissively intervene." City of Madison, 234 Wis. 2d 550, ¶ 11. North Side Bank interpreted Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) (1983-84), the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The court did not mention Wis. Stat. § 803.09, the then and present intervention statute. The issue in North-Side Bank was whether a bankruptcy trustee could pursue a declaratory judgment action without all of the bankrupts' creditors being joined in the action. Bence, *928too, involved a joinder issue under § 806.04(11) (1977). As in North Side Bank, the court did not cite § 803.09. None of the three cases the majority relies upon for its conclusion that "White House continues to be the law" support its decision to rely on White House. White House may be precedential for issues not involved here, but it cannot be read to comment on intervention as of right, a provision not adopted in Wisconsin until 1976.
¶ 52. For these reasons, I would not rely on White House. Instead, I would use Wisconsin opinions interpreting our present statute, and, because of the similarity between Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) and Fed. R. Civ. E 24(a)(2), appropriate federal appellate decisions. I begin with a State case, Wolff v. Town of Jamestown, 229 Wis. 2d 738, 601 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999).
¶ 53. In Wolff, the trial court denied the Town of Jamestown's motion to intervene in a lawsuit between Grant County and the Wolffs. Id. at 740. The Town asserted that the County might settle the case in which the Wolffs sought a conditional use permit in a way that might increase costs for the Town. Id. at 747-49. We identified Wolff as an intervention-as-of-right case under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), subject to a de novo review. Wolff, 229 Wis. 2d at 742-43.1 use the same standard of review here because this case is also an intervention-as-of-right case.
¶ 54. In Wolff, we recognized that there was no precise formula for determining whether a potential intervenor meets the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1). Id. at 742. We are to evaluate the motion "practically, not technically, with an eye toward disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process." Id. at 742-43 (citation omitted). We Eire to *929consider the impact on the original parties as a factor in reaching our decision. Id. at 743.
¶ 55. I agree with the majority that at least three of the eight proposed intervenor municipalities have interests that fulfill the first three elements of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1). And I agree that Armada Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 476, 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994), sets out the factors we should use to determine whether the State adequately represents the municipalities. Those factors are: (1) Is there a showing of collusion between the representative and the opposing party? (2) Is the representative's interest adverse to that of the proposed intervenor? (3) Has the representative failed in the fulfillment of his or her duty? Id.
¶ 56. The test for inadequate representation is not precise. Wolff, 229 Wis. 2d at 742. Armada itself relied on Milwaukee Sewerage Comm'n v. DNR, 104 Wis. 2d 182,189, 311 N.W.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1981), which in turn relied on federal precedent. Federal courts have recently explained that the "trilogy of grounds for rebutting the adequate representation presumption is only illustrative." B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 546 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1), like Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should be interpreted as including illustrative examples of the grounds required to rebut the presumption of adequate representation.
¶ 57. Here, the municipalities express a fear that the attorney general, because she has expressed opinions related to the issue on appeal, will not pursue this case with the vigor and enthusiasm they expect of her. They would raise issues that she has not raised or presumably will not raise. The majority writes several pages of explanation in an attempt to convince the *930municipalities that their fears are not reality based. This attempt is doomed to failure because the municipalities know in their municipal hearts that this cannot be true. The municipalities are probably wrong; the attorney general is a professional who hires professional assistants who are not going to compromise their principles by making weak arguments so that they will lose the case. The judges or justices who ultimately decide this case on the merits will be influenced by the wording of statutes, constitutions and by case law, not by artful briefs and carefully crafted oral argument. But the municipalities do not believe that. They believe that only if their attorney is allowed to make their argument will the case be won. There is no way I nor anyone else can change this belief.
¶ 58. The majority claims that only the conduct of a party and not that of the party's attorney may be analyzed to determine whether an original party to the litigation can adequately represent the intervening party's interests. Majority, ¶ 24. Were that true, there would be no need for the majority to spend six paragraphs explaining why the attorney general's comments were not really what they seemed to be. Majority, ¶¶ 25-30. Were that true, the majority would have disposed of the issue by writing that the attorney general is not a party, and therefore her statements are irrelevant. The problem with the majority's criticism is twofold. First, Wis. Stat. § 803.09(l) does not refer only to parties. In relevant part, it reads, "unless the movant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." The operative word is "represented."
¶ 59. Attorneys general only become involved in litigation if they are required to do so or choose to do so. The conduct of the litigation is uniquely in the hands of the attorney general. This is much different from the *931usual attorney-client relationship where the attorney actively seeks the instructions of the client, and pursues the litigation according to the wishes of the client, whether the attorney agrees with those wishes or not. Usually, the person paying the piper calls the tune. But not so in cases like this one. The attorney general is required to defend the statute at issue, but how she does so and what issues she raises or does not raise are up to her. She determines how the case will be defended, for better or worse. She is entitled to send to court the most experienced or least experienced assistant attorney general.3 An attorney general is much more than a hired gun.
¶ 60. The second problem with the majority's assertion that we may not analyze the attorney general's comments is that the test for intervention as of right is broad. As I initially noted, there is no precise formula for analyzing a proposed intervention under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1). We are to make a practical, not technical, analysis, and we favor intervention so that as many apparently concerned persons can participate as possible. The only limits are efficiency and due process. Wolff, 229 Wis. 2d at 742-43.1 see no efficiency or due process problems here. For me, it is practical to allow the municipalities to participate here because it just does not hurt anything. Trying to keep interested parties out of a lawsuit is like trying to teach a pig to sing. All that does is waste your time and annoy the pig.4 If a litigant is able to prevent intervention, all that happens is a request to file a brief amicus, which is *932routinely granted. The parties have already wasted more time arguing about whether the municipalities should be allowed to intervene than they would have expended had the municipalities been allowed to intervene in the first place. At least as to the municipalities, this case would be here on the merits rather than returning to the trial court. The result is that we will be reviewing the merits of this case in 2007 or 2008, not today.
¶ 61. A good way to create mistrust is to deny participation in government. Of course, there is an endpoint to participation; lawsuits cannot be open to whoever wants to participate or only chaos wins. But here, the only factor keeping the municipalities from participation as a party is the majority's conclusion that, despite statements by the State's attorney which at least raise doubts, the statements do not amount to much. Perhaps they do not, but I believe that there is a reasonable perception that the attorney general has taken a position contrary to the one she advocates on the merits of this litigation. Given the de novo standard of review we use in cases like this, the lack of a precise formula to decide cases like this, the supreme court's endorsement of a "minimal showing" by proposed inter-venors, the lack of impact on the existing parties and considering the matter practically and not technically with an eye toward maximizing participation, I conclude that I would allow the municipalities to intervene here. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the majority's opinion which holds otherwise.
¶ 62. But my observation that there must be an endpoint to intervention applies to the legislature's motion to intervene. We are asked to hold that whenever the legislature wishes to advocate a position on legislation, it is entitled to party status as a matter of *933right. While, constitutional considerations aside, that might be how Wis. Stat. Rule 809.03(1) could be written, that is not how it is written. Courts are not in the business of legislating, and legislatures should generally not be litigating. Courts determine the meaning of legislation and constitutions, and legislatures change legislation and initiate constitutional changes if they do not agree with courts' views on these subjects. That system has worked reasonably well for a long time, most of the time, and I, at least, see no need for a change. Accordingly, I concur with the majority's rationale and conclusion that the trial court correctly denied party status to the legislature.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.

 The Judicial Council's Note was referring to Wis. Stat. § 260.205 (1973), which differs from Wis. Stat. § 260.19 (1955). Still, using the clear standard of review the court used in White House, it is apparent that, until 1976, Wisconsin did not recognize intervention as of right.

 This sentence does not refer to any attorney litigating this case. It is just part of an analysis of an issue.

 An admonition commonly attributed to Robert Heinlein in Time Enough For Love.