Court Opinion

ID: 9896034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:22.010709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:21.510320
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1429-MR

ERNEST JOHNSON                                                      APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JOHN T. ALEXANDER, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 22-CR-00130

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: In this criminal case, the Appellant, Ernest Johnson (Johnson),

appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress. After our review, we affirm.

            On March 16, 2022, a Barren County Grand Jury indicted Johnson,

charging him as follows: Count 1 -- Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, 1st

Degree (Methamphetamine), 2 Grams or More, 1st Offense; Count 2 -- Possession

of a Controlled Substance, 1st Degree (Hydrocodone), 1st Offense; Count 3 --
Possession of a Controlled Substance, 2nd Degree (Suboxone); Count 4 -- Drug

Paraphernalia-Buy/Possess; Count 5 -- Possession of Marijuana; Count 6 --

Persistent Felony Offender, 1st Degree.

            On July 11, 2022, Johnson filed a motion to suppress any evidence

allegedly obtained illegally during the search of a vehicle. The motion was heard

on July 27, 2022, and the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. By Order entered

on September 22, 2022, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion as follows:

                   This case involves a warrantless search. On
            January 20, 2022, Officer Andrew Moore with the
            Glasgow Police Department went to a residence . . . in
            Glasgow. He knew that [Johnson] who had four active
            bench warrants, dated a woman who had family at that
            location. Through monitored telephone conversations,
            [Officer] Moore had information that Johnson might be
            at the residence. The homeowner, Jerry Spathe,
            acknowledged that Johnson frequented the home but did
            not confirm that he was there at the time. He [Spathe]
            did, however, give consent to search anywhere on the
            property. In fact, he gave Officer Moore the keys to an
            outbuilding or detached garage behind the home so he
            could enter it to search.

                   Ultimately, officers found and arrested Johnson.
            In the garage, they also located a gray Scion automobile,
            which was registered to Johnson’s ex-wife. When
            officers asked for consent to search the vehicle, Johnson
            declined, stating that he did not own it so they would
            have to ask someone else. The officers searched the
            vehicle and found various illegal drugs and . . .
            paraphernalia. That they lacked a warrant authorizing a
            search of the car is uncontroverted.

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             The trial court explained that as a general rule, warrantless searches

are per se unreasonable, but it noted that there is an exception that applies in the

probation context:

             When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
             probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in
             criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal
             conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
             probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is
             reasonable.

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S. Ct. 587, 593, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497

(2001).

             The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that at the time of the

incident, Johnson was on active probation in two Barren Circuit Court cases and

that the final judgments in each included the following language: “the Defendant

shall consent to the search of his/her person, home, automobile and/or property

upon the request of any peace officer[.]”

             The trial court disagreed with Johnson’s argument that he did not

consent to the search and explained that:

             [T]he United States Supreme Court has specifically
             stated that “[t]he same circumstances that lead us to
             conclude that reasonable suspicion is constitutionally
             sufficient also render a warrant requirement
             unnecessary.” [Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.] Stated more
             simply, when a person is required, as a condition of
             probation, to consent to a search upon reasonable
             suspicion, no search warrant is required. Under those

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             circumstances, there is no constitutional right to object to
             a search.

                     There was more than enough suspicion to justify
             invocation of this rule. Johnson had multiple arrest
             warrants, including warrants for probation violations. At
             least one of the officers was familiar with Johnson and
             had previously arrested him on drug charges. Further,
             officer had listened to telephonic discussions involving
             references to illegal drugs and implicating Johnson. He
             was hiding from officers as they attempted to locate him.
             As noted by the Commonwealth, Johnson refused
             permission to search even though he was on supervised
             probation. This information, considered together,
             provided reasonable suspicion that Johnson was involved
             in illegal activity.

                    Suppression of evidence pursuant to the
             exclusionary rule applies only to searches that were
             carried out in violation of an individual’s constitutional
             rights. Without a constitutional right, underpinning his
             motion to suppress, an accused has no basis to seek
             application of the exclusionary rule. Because Johnson
             had consented to the search, by virtue of his request for
             probation and his acceptance of the terms as set out in the
             Final Judgments, there was no violation of a
             constitutional right.

(Footnotes omitted.)

             The trial court also noted the Commonwealth’s argument that Johnson

lacked standing to claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights since he

acknowledged that he did not own the vehicle. However, the trial court explained

that it was not necessary to address that argument in light of its “determination that

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Johnson had waived his right to refuse consent upon reasonable suspicion of

illegality.”1

                On October 31, 2022, Johnson entered a conditional plea of guilty to

Counts 1 through 5 of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his

motion to suppress. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss Count 6. On November

1, 2022, the trial court entered judgment on a guilty plea and sentenced Johnson to

a total of five-years’ imprisonment. Johnson then filed this appeal.

                We review denial of a motion to suppress under a two-part analysis.

“The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clear-error standard. We

accordingly defer to the trial court’s fact finding if it is supported by substantial

evidence. . . . We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de

1
  In its brief filed in the trial court, the Commonwealth had argued that Johnson did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. For clarification’s sake, we note Warick v.
Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Ky. 2019), in which our Supreme Court reminded the
bench and bar that “a ‘standing’ analysis is improper under Fourth Amendment substantive law.”

                The concept of standing in Fourth Amendment cases can be a
                useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a
                cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched
                before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search; but it should
                not be confused with Article III standing, which is jurisdictional
                and must be assessed before reaching the merits. Because Fourth
                Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth
                Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence
                need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits
                of a Fourth Amendment claim.

Id. at 283 (quoting Byrd v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530-31, 200 L. Ed. 2d
805 (2018)).

                                               -5-
novo.” Cox v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2022) (footnotes

omitted).

             Johnson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because even though he was on probation, “the police had no reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity afoot.” We disagree.

                    As a general rule, warrantless searches are, per se,
             unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically
             established and well-delineated exceptions. . . . But such
             warrantless searches must satisfy the Fourth
             Amendment’s overarching reasonableness requirement.
             To this end, a warrantless search is held to be reasonable
             “[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
             probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in
             criminal activity.”

Helphenstine v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Ky. 2014) (quoting United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, 122 S. Ct. at 593) (cleaned up).

             In the Fourth Amendment context, reasonable suspicion
             exists when a police officer has a reasonable and
             articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The
             basis of reasonable suspicion must be particularized and
             objective, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not
             rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
             considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
             evidence standard.

Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 331 (Ky. 2023) (cleaned up).

“When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion

determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the

circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a

                                         -6-
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002).

             In the case before us, the trial court found that Johnson had multiple

arrest warrants, including warrants for probation violations; that at least one of the

officers was familiar with Johnson and had previously arrested him on drug

charges; that an officer had listened to telephonic discussions involving references

to illegal drugs and implicating Johnson; that Johnson was hiding from officers as

they attempted to locate him; and that Johnson refused permission to search even

though he was on supervised probation.

             We are satisfied from our review of the record that these findings are

supported by substantial evidence, and we conclude that the trial court properly

applied the law to the facts as found. Considering the totality of the circumstances,

we agree that there was more than sufficient evidence to create a reasonable

suspicion that Johnson was engaged in illegal activity.

             Accordingly, we affirm.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Emily Holt Rhorer        Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Courtney J. Hightower
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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