Court Opinion

ID: 9829670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:31:06.878777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.005436
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion defendant in error is insistent that the sense of the article of the statute under consideration forbids the holding made here that an affidavit averring that “the defendant C. H. Smith” did not have sufficient property in the state subject to execution, where there were several defendants charged in the suit with primary liability for the debt sued on, was not a compliance with the statute. If the affidavit had merely used the words “the defendant” without 'the added words “C. H. Smith,” then, applying the statutory rule for construction providing that the singular number may be extended to. several, it is not doubted that the affidavit would have been sufficient. But by adding the words “0. H. Smith” it manifestly limited and confined the averment to this particular defendant, and there was no room to extend it beyond him. Defendant in error contends that the plain meaning of the article is that the plaintiff in the suit for debt need make affidavit only that the particular defendant, where there are several, whose property is sought to be reached by garnishment writ, has not sufficient property subject to be seized under execution. And that under such meaning he has complied with the statute. The plain and evident sense and meaning of the article we still think is to authorize the issuance of the writ only where the affidavit avers in words that would be construed to mean that no one of the several defendants charged primarily with owing the debt has sufficient property subject to execution. And we are still of the opinion that we have given the words “the defendant,” as used in that article, that construction which best accords with the subject-matter to which they relate. The article requires the plaintiff to swear not only that the debt he sues the defendant for is just and due and unpaid, but that “the defendant” has not sufficient property liable to seizure to pay same. “The defendant” here refers to the party of whom the plaintiff is demanding the debt to be paid. It is a general term, including all the parties of whom the demand of payment of the debt is made. If there are several parties being sued and charged with primary liability as makers of the note, then the words i‘the defendant” would necessarily have to be applied to all of them. If they are all “the defendant” because sued as makers of the note, then the meaning and sense of the statute is not accomplished, unless the affidavit avers to the effect that none of the defendants sued as owing the debt have sufficient property to pay same. And, because of this construction, we have followed the case of Willis, supra. In our attachment laws we find the requirement to be that the plaintiff shall swear before he can have attachment issue that “the plaintiff will probably lose his debt unless such attachment is issued.” Why this provision unless it be because none of the several defendants primarily owing the debt, if there be several, have sufficient property otherwise to pay it? If there are several defendants in the suit primarily and severally liable, then so long as one of the defendants in the suit has sufficient property in the state subject to execution, and is not trying to secrete or dispose of it, “the plaintiff” could not swear in truth that he “will probably lose his debt,” though one of the other defendants may be secreting or disposing of his property. This is only for example. The same principle is in the garnishment law when it requires the affidavit to aver “that the defendant has not, within his knowledge, property in his possession, within this state, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy such debt.” It is because under such circumstances the plaintiff will probably lose his debt. The attachment only reaches the property of the debtor, and does not bring strangers into court as parties, as does garnishment.
There is a clear distinguishment between the instant ease and the case of Burge v. Carriage Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 105 S. W. 232, cited. There a note was signed “J. F. *1148Burge per R. T. Burge attorney.” Tlie suit was against J. F. Burge as maker, and, in ttie alternative, against the agent only in the event it was established that he executed the note without authority. Both parties there did not owe the debt according to the pleading, and it was so ruled. In that opinion there appear expressions which defendant in error relies on, but clearly it is dicta.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.