Court Opinion

ID: 9623398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:32:28.135214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:29.356058
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially to point out that because Luce was not a party to this action, we in no way reach any potential third-party claims against Crowley. This case addressed only the action between the Bank and Crowley.
To prevail, the Bank had to establish two distinct claims: (1) that Crowley committed malpractice and (2) that but for Crowley’s negligence, the Bank would not have been harmed. McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 339 (226 SE2d 145) (1976). Although Crowley admitted negligence, the Bank failed to make a showing on the second prong of *534its case. The Bank sought payment from Luce as the loan’s guarantor when Cramer refused to pay the loan due to the failure of the collateral. See OCGA § 10-7-1. Luce consented to the entry of a judgment against him in the aggregate amount of $99,409.43 and the Bank stipulated that Luce was capable of curing the default. Having received the judgment and made this stipulation, the Bank cannot claim that it was harmed by Crowley’s negligence. Therefore, the trial court erred in entering judgment for the Bank.
Decided November 30, 1995
Reconsideration denied December 19, 1995
Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, John T. McGoldrick, Jr., Wallace D. Bonner, Jr., for appellant.
Adams & Adams, Charles R. Adams III, Phillips & Messer, Arthur L. Phillips, for appellee.
I agree that the collateral source rule does not apply to payments received by a creditor from a party who was contractually answerable to it in the same transaction which is the claimed basis for the creditor’s damages. See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 522 (16) (208 SE2d 302) (1974). Because the majority correctly reversed the judgment against Crowley, however, reaching this issue was unnecessary.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this special concurrence.