Court Opinion

ID: 9954065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 17:02:41.400233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:48.339956
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 In re M.G.-L. CA1/4

                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

In re M. G.-L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.                                                                 A166762
D.G. et al.,
                                                                   (San Francisco City & County
         Defendants and Respondents;                               Super. Ct. No. JD22-3199)

M. G.-L., a Minor, etc., Appellant.

In re M. G.-L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.                                                                 A167849
D.G.,
                                                                   (San Francisco City & County
         Defendant and Appellant;                                  Super. Ct. No. JD22-3199)

T.L.,
         Defendant and Respondent.

                                                        1
        After a disposition hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 358,1 the juvenile court ordered M. G.-L. (minor) removed from
the physical custody of D.G. (mother). (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The court also
ordered reunification services for mother, finding that those services were in
minor’s best interest even though the reunification bypass provisions of
section 361.5, subdivision (b) applied. Minor appeals from the portion of the
disposition order providing reunification services, while mother cross-appeals
from the portion removing minor from her custody. In light of the juvenile
court’s subsequent termination of reunification services, we dismiss minor’s
appeal as moot. And because substantial evidence supports the findings
underlying the removal of minor from mother’s custody, we affirm the
disposition order.
                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        On June 9, 2022,2 mother reported that she was assaulted in a
domestic violence incident with minor’s father, Tony L. (father). Minor, then
only three months old, slept nearby in a crib and was unharmed. Mother ran
upstairs to get away and call police. Although this event was the only
domestic violence incident mother reported experiencing with this man, it
arose against a history of domestic violence with previous partners and
mother’s past substance abuse that resulted in over 25 prior child welfare
referrals and dependency cases involving mother’s other children. Given this
history, agency social workers had concerns about the infant minor’s
exposure to violence, potential injury, or emotional harm.

        1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.
        2 All dates refer to the year 2022 unless otherwise noted.

                                         2
        The San Francisco Human Services Agency (agency) filed a section 300
petition seeking to detain minor from father. This became the agency’s
second open case concerning mother’s children; the other active dependency
case had been open for years and related to minor’s older half-sister (sister).
        Two weeks later, after mother failed to engage in services or safety
planning for the minor, and after declining to seek an extension of a
restraining order against father, the agency filed an amended petition
seeking to detain minor and sister from mother. The juvenile court then
detained both children from mother and placed them outside of mother’s
home. In August, mother recanted her allegations that father had physically
abused her during the June 9 incident. She claimed to have made the false
report in response to father’s threats to call her social worker and make
allegations she feared might result in the removal of her children from her
care.
        Combined jurisdiction and disposition hearings were held on October 7,
13, 17, and 20. The juvenile court found that minor suffered or was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of the parents’
failure or inability to supervise or protect the child adequately. It found that
father was arrested following the June 9 altercation that occurred while
minor was present, and on another occasion, the parents engaged in a verbal
argument where sister intervened to protect her mother by attempting to bite
father and hit him with a broom. It also found that mother had been
inconsistent in complying with some of her service requirements. Lastly, the
court found that because mother’s other children had been abused or
neglected, there was also a substantial risk that minor will be abused or
neglected. Mother’s oldest child had been removed from her care and was
adopted after she failed to reunify with him. Sister was removed from

                                        3
mother’s care multiple times related to domestic violence, and — at the time
of the disposition hearing — had a section 366.26 hearing pending.
      At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court removed
minor from mother’s physical custody, finding that returning minor to mother
would pose a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor, that there were no reasonable
means by which the minor’s physical health could be protected without
removal, and that the agency had made reasonable efforts to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal. Although the agency recommended
bypassing mother for services, the court ordered reunification services to
continue in minor’s best interest. In ruling, the court commended mother on
her “follow through” with her therapist but indicated that mother’s
consistency concerning “everything else” was “of true concern to the court.”
      Minor filed a timely notice of appeal from the disposition hearing and
mother subsequently filed a cross-appeal.
                                DISCUSSION
      Minor argues the court erred in finding that the continuation of
reunification services for mother was in minor’s best interest. However, as
the agency notes in its brief, the juvenile court terminated those services on
November 16, 2023. Not only do we lack the power to “rescind services that
have already been received . . . .” (In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759,
761), but also the juvenile court’s subsequent order terminating reunification
services effectively granted minor the relief she seeks in this appeal.
“Because we are unable to fashion an effective remedy, the appeal is moot.”3
(Ibid.)

      3 We take judicial notice of the November 16, 2023, minute order

reflecting the juvenile court’s termination of reunification services. (Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) The appellate “court may examine a suggestion of

                                       4
      Next is the matter of mother’s cross-appeal. As a threshold issue, the
agency contends the cross-appeal is untimely. We disagree. Minor timely
filed notice of the first appeal on December 12 — 53 days after the challenged
October 20 order was filed. The filing of minor’s notice of appeal extended
mother’s time to file a cross-appeal until 20 days after the superior court
clerk sent notification of the first appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(b).)
But because the clerk failed to send mother the requisite notification, that 20-
day period had not even begun — much less expired — by the time mother
filed her notice of cross-appeal on May 18, 2023. Further, we reject the
agency’s argument that mother was sufficiently notified by being served with
minor’s opening brief. (Ibid. [extension to run until 20 days after the superior
court clerk sends notification of the first appeal].) Accordingly, we conclude
that the cross-appeal is timely.
      Mother’s claim, however, fails on its merits. Mother challenges the
juvenile court’s order removing minor from her physical custody. In relevant
part, section 361 precludes removal “unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence” to show that there “is or would be a substantial danger
to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being
of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable
means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . custody.” (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) “[T]he juvenile court must determine whether a child will be in
substantial danger if permitted to remain in the parent’s physical custody,

mootness on its own motion.” (City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 455, 479.) In any event, the agency’s brief raised the specter
of mootness by notifying this court that reunification services had been
terminated, and mother recognized as much in her reply, arguing that the
termination of services did not moot her own cross-appeal of the order
removing minor from her custody.

                                        5
considering not only the parent’s past conduct, but also current
circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to
juvenile court intervention.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520 (I.R.).)
Section 361 also requires the juvenile court to determine “whether reasonable
efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal . . . .”
(§ 361, subd. (e).) According to mother, no substantial evidence supports such
findings here. We disagree.
      In reviewing a finding that must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, we must ascertain “whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) “Consistent with well-established principles governing
review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the
appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.)
      Here, the record discloses substantial evidence that returning minor to
mother’s physical custody would present a substantial danger to the child’s
physical or emotional well-being. As both parties acknowledge, emotional
harm may result from domestic violence. (See In re J.S. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1494, disapproved on another ground in
Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1003, fn. 4.) And, as the
agency’s investigation revealed, mother’s circumstances and history,

                                        6
including violent or potentially violent altercations with father, raised serious
concerns about minor’s welfare.4
      Six days before the June 9 incident, father texted the social worker
supervising sister’s open case. When the social worker reached father by
phone, father complained that mother slashed his tires, was using crystal
methamphetamine, and would scream and try to hit him in front of the
children. Instead of following a safety plan the agency put in place to de-
escalate conflict between the parents, mother would not allow father to walk
away from such conflicts. Father had to jump out of the balcony to escape.
This detail was corroborated by a witness who had seen father jumping out of
the balcony during the couple’s verbal disputes. Thus, even when father
attempted to reduce the intensity of a conflict, she actively thwarted those
attempts, leaving father to choose between potentially violent escalation and
potentially injurious escape.
      Father also disclosed an incident in which sister tried to hit him with a
broom and bite him. Again, the story was corroborated: Sister told the social
worker she wanted “to protect” mother. In other words, sister witnessed a
situation in which she believed mother needed to be defended using physical
violence. This response exemplifies the physical danger and emotional harm
produced by the conflict between the parents.
      The June 9 incident itself is cause for grave concern. According to
mother’s original report to police, father accused mother of stealing the rims
from his truck before grabbing her hair, throwing her to the floor, and
punching her in the head ten times — all in close physical proximity to
minor, who was sleeping. Father reported it differently, claiming he

      4 We grant mother’s unopposed request to strike (and we do not

consider) those parts of the appellate record that were not before the juvenile
court at the time of the hearing.

                                       7
confronted mother after she slashed his tires. She then threatened to damage
his other cars, and in turn, he threatened to call the social worker. In
response, mother called the police and, according to father, fabricated the
report that he assaulted her. Father’s account may be viewed as aligning
more closely with mother’s present claim: that father threatened to contact
the social worker, that mother became upset and retaliated by calling the
police, and that mother’s false allegations of domestic violence resulted in
father’s arrest. Given this state of the evidence, the juvenile court was
entitled to credit mother’s current recantation to conclude that she was the
aggressor — acting deliberately and deceitfully to cause father’s wrongful
arrest. One social worker described this false report as an example of
mother’s failure to control her anger or impulses. Another worker
characterized the “unhealthy” relationship and threatening behaviors of the
parents as indicative of intimate partner violence.
      “[T]he minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re
Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another
ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Father acknowledged that he and mother had verbal arguments in front of
the children. He reported that mother screamed, yelled at him, and tried to
hit him in front of the children. These facts contribute to the juvenile court’s
conclusion that returning minor to mother’s custody would present a
substantial risk of harm.
      Arguing against this conclusion, mother contends there was no
substantial risk of harm at the time of the disposition hearing because her
romantic relationship with father had ended. To this end, she relies on two
cases where the breakup of an abusive relationship contributed to the

                                       8
appellate court’s conclusion that no substantial evidence supported the
removal of a minor from a parent’s custody: I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 510
and In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11. Neither case persuasively
supports her position.
      In re Ma.V. is distinguishable because the parent in that case was not
the abusive aggressor in the relationship. Here, however, a protective
services worker testified that a safety plan was needed for mother and father,
in part because mother had been reported to be the aggressor in conflicts.
Also, unlike the parent in In re Ma.V., mother has not consistently
participated in or benefited from services offered to support her. There, the
parent had not contacted her abuser for ten months and engaged in
parenting, domestic violence, and individual counseling services through the
Veterans Administration. (In re Ma.V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.)
Here, by contrast, mother failed to engage or was slow to respond to multiple
service referrals despite having the ability to do so. Since sister’s first
dependency case opened, mother had received approximately 88 months of
services, off and on, but still showed little progress. Mother’s participation
with her therapist was also inconsistent; the therapist’s most recent report
was that mother was not progressing. The inability to avail herself of
services concerned the agency as it continued a pattern that left unaddressed
the behaviors that brought minor and sister to the agency’s attention.
      The trial court was entitled to “consider [the] parent’s past conduct as
well as present circumstances.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170.)
Here, mother’s domestic violence history transcends any one relationship.
She had been involved in at least two other physically abusive relationships
and, according to sister, had allowed an abusive ex-boyfriend to return home
well after that relationship had ended. The ex-boyfriend then pulled sister’s

                                         9
hair. During that two-year past relationship, mother acknowledged there
had been over 50 unreported domestic violence incidents. Mother also
allowed another past abuser, the father of her oldest son, to reside in her
home as recently as a few months before the disposition hearing. The
violence occurring in that relationship contributed to the son’s removal from
mother’s care. These ongoing associations with ex-partners with whom
mother experienced intimate partner violence also support the trial court’s
conclusion that minor faced a substantial risk of harm at the time of the
disposition hearing.
      Mother’s circumstances are also unlike I.R., where the claim of
potential danger to the child stemmed from father slapping the mother
during an argument. There, after the incident, the father left the family
home, discontinued contact with the mother, started domestic violence
counseling, and — along with the mother — demonstrated a willingness to
remain apart from one another. (I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 521.) On
that record, substantial evidence did not support the removal of the child
from the father’s care. Here, conversely, the June reports of conflict in the
home did not suggest an unprecedented solitary event. They raised an
ongoing pattern of conflict and violence in front of the minor. They also
added to a much longer history of domestic violence that mother experienced
with other partners and that contributed to the removal of her other children.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal order.
      There is also substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s determination
that “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for
removal . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (e).) After the June 9 incident, the agency
scheduled two child and family team (CFT) meetings to create a safety plan
for minor and sister; mother missed both. Mother told a social worker that

                                       10
she would not agree to participate in a CFT meeting concerning the minor.
Based on a referral she had requested well before June 9, mother already had
domestic violence support services available to her. But after failing to
answer or return the service provider’s calls, they closed the case. This
failure to communicate continued a pattern with other service providers the
agency recognized from its work with mother. And as the disposition report
noted, by the time of the June 9 incident, mother was already receiving
family maintenance services as part of sister’s dependency case, in addition
to more than three years of services mother had received in connection with
sister’s previous dependency case.
      In this case, both before and after June 9, the record shows that mother
was offered various services, including domestic violence prevention, Wrap
(family therapy), housing, the Homeless Prenatal Program, drug testing, and
individual counseling. Acknowledging that mother was unorganized and
could become easily overwhelmed, the agency emailed mother her
appointments and informed mother’s support people of the appointments as
well. Additionally, the agency occasionally intervened to stop service
providers from closing referrals due to mother’s lack of engagement. Despite
these resources and supports to address the issues underlying mother’s
dependency case, mother’s inability to follow up and address these
underlying issues remained a primary concern of the agency. Historically,
mother struggled to follow the agency’s case plan. Here, too, mother’s “real
problem was not a lack of services available but a lack of initiative to
consistently take advantage of the services that were offered.” (Angela S. v.
Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) The determination that the
agency made the requisite efforts was therefore supported by substantial
evidence.

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       Finally, the same substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that there were no reasonable alternatives to “remov[e] the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother’s failure to attend
CFT meetings and her failure to avail herself of services, including domestic
violence services she had personally requested, suggest that minor’s safety
could not be protected while she remained in mother’s physical custody. And
the reasonableness of mother’s suggested alternative — that the juvenile
court require her to live separately from any adult male — is undermined by
her previous willingness to allow into her home an abusive ex-boyfriend from
whom she already lived apart.
       In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order to
remove minor from mother’s physical custody.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The appeal in case No. A166762 is dismissed as moot, and the
disposition order challenged in case No. A167849 is affirmed.

                                                  Smiley, J.*

We concur:

Brown, P. J.
Streeter, J.
San Francisco Human Services Agency v. M. G.-L. (A166762, A167849)

       * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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