Court Opinion

ID: 9633683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:56:41.944951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:47.543449
License: Public Domain

*897Callow, J.
The defendant appeals his judgment and sentence for vehicular homicide and felony hit and run for the death of a young bicyclist. He appeals, assigning error to the court's refusal to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on the ground that the evidence was so overwhelming as to render the assumption that evidence had been wrongfully derived from an unlawful Terry1 stop harmless. We affirm the result on other grounds, holding that the stop was a valid arrest rather than an unlawful Terry stop.
In the early morning hours of December 18, 1983, an automobile accident occurred between a vehicle owned by the defendant and a teenage bicyclist who received fatal injuries. The driver of the vehicle left the scene of the accident.
Several hours later, Clark County Deputy Sheriff Michael Evans arrived at the scene of the accident, near the intersection of county roads 42 and 48. He knew that the body of the victim had been knocked into the bushes by the impact of the collision. At the accident scene was a badly damaged bicycle and debris from an automobile which included plastic pieces of automobile grille material, pieces of chrome stripping and several flakes of black paint. The arresting officer was aware that Knighten had contacted the Battle Ground Towing Company early that morning in an effort to retrieve the vehicle. There were indications that Knighten had tried to get the car out of the ditch before the tow truck came, that when he was unsuccessful he had borrowed a 4r-wheel drive vehicle to do this, and that when he returned to the scene the car had been removed. The deputy was informed by other law enforcement officers that Mr. Knighten's automobile, which had been stuck in a roadside ditch near the deceased, had been towed away at the direction of law enforcement officers. Lori Benfit, the town marshal of La Center, Washington, informed Deputy Evans that the defendant Knighten had been driving the *898automobile when it went into the ditch.
While examining the scene of the fatality with Deputy Evans, Marshal Benfit observed and recognized Knighten in a pickup truck which had passed by the investigation area. She informed Deputy Evans, who, in a patrol car with another deputy, pursued Knighten and stopped the vehicle within a short distance.
When Knighten and a companion, John Fehr, were stopped in the pickup truck Deputy Evans knew that Mr. Knighten's vehicle had been ditched at the scene of the fatality, that he had been operating the vehicle the previous evening, that a person had been killed at the scene while bicycling on the highway, and that whoever had struck the victim had not stopped or rendered assistance. Deputy Evans did not believe he had probable cause to arrest the defendant but he ordered the two passengers, John Fehr and Knighten, to exit the truck and kneel on the pavement. We find that the deputy was mistaken in his conclusion that he did not have probable cause to arrest Knighten at that moment. While the second deputy's gun was drawn, the two deputies handcuffed and frisked both individuals. Once secured, the two men were placed in different patrol cars.
Deputy Evans advised Fehr of his Miranda2 rights after which Fehr stated that Knighten had ditched his auto the prior evening and that Knighten and he had unsuccessfully attempted to remove the vehicle in the early morning hours. Deputy Evans then advised Knighten of his Miranda rights. Knighten waived his rights and confessed that during the prior evening he had driven while intoxicated and had accidentally ditched his vehicle. Concluding only then that they had probable cause to arrest Knighten, the deputies released Fehr and transported Knighten to the Clark County Jail. While detained, Deputy Evans readvised Knighten of his Miranda rights. Knighten again agreed to *899discuss the accident and described in more detail how the accident occurred and how much alcohol he had consumed before driving his vehicle that evening. The deputy terminated questioning when Knighten's attorney telephoned and requested that the interview end.
The elements of probable cause to arrest are well settled.
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 426-27, 518 P.2d 703 (1974). This standard was reiterated in State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 398-99, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979), where Justice Horowitz relied and expanded upon State v. Gluck, supra, stating:
The determination will rest on the totality of facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest. The standard of reasonableness to be applied takes into consideration the special experience and expertise of the arresting officer.
(Citations omitted.) See also State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 604 P.2d 943, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); State v. Goodman, 42 Wn. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985).
In the present case, it was clear to Deputy Evans that an offense had been committed. An individual had been struck and killed by a motor vehicle on a public roadway and the vehicle's driver did not remain on the scene, assist the victim or report the accident. In addition, the knowledge that a black vehicle belonging to the suspect Knighten had been removed from the ditch directly across from the body, combined with the statement of another law enforcement officer to the effect that Knighten had been driving the vehicle at the time it went into the ditch, provided sufficient probable cause to believe that Knighten was the driver who struck the deceased and failed to remain on the accident scene or render assistance. Therefore, Deputy Evans' actions in stopping and detaining Knighten were *900justified as a valid arrest under either one or all of the following statutes. RCW 46.61.520 (vehicular homicide) which reads:
(1) When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle is guilty of vehicular homicide.
(2) Vehicular homicide is a class B felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW.
or RCW 46.61.522 (vehicular assault) which reads:
(1) A person is guilty of vehicular assault if he operates or drives any vehicle:
(a) In a reckless manner, and this conduct is the proximate cause of serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, and this conduct is the proximate cause of serious bodily injury to another.
(2) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body.
(3) Vehicular assault is a class C felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW.
or RCW 46.52.020 which reads in part:
(1) A driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to, and in every event remain at, the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (3) of this section', . . .
(3) Unless otherwise provided in subsection (7) of this section the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person or damage to other property shall give his name, address, and vehicle license number and shall exhibit his vehicle *901driver's license to any person struck or injured or the driver or any occupant of, or any person attending, any such vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary . . .
(4) Any driver covered by the provisions of subsection (1) of this section failing to stop or comply with any of the requirements of subsection (3) of this section under said circumstances shall be guilty of a class C felony and, upon conviction, be punished pursuant to RCW 9A.20.020: . . .
(7) If none of the persons specified are in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be entitled under subsection (3) of this section, and no police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such accident after fulfilling all other requirements of subsections (1) and (3) of this section insofar as possible on his part to be performed, shall forthwith report such accident to the nearest office of the duly authorized police authority and submit thereto the information specified in subsection (3) of this section.
(Italics ours.)
It may be that the existence of probable cause to arrest for a violation of RCW 46.61.520 or .522 is tenuous (even though all that is required as an element is the reckless operation of a vehicle which proximately causes death or serious bodily injury of another), but the existence of probable cause to arrest for a violation of RCW 46.52.020, known as felony hit and run, is obvious, clear and patent. It is also clear that the requirement that probable cause must be present before an arrest for a felony can be made exists not as a test of the legal knowledge of the arresting officer or of the acumen of the prosecutor, but as a protection of the civil rights and freedom of the citizen-suspect. If the citizen's rights were not violated, there is no basis for setting aside statements made after a lawful arrest.
The State conceded that no probable cause to arrest *902existed at the time Knighten was detained. However, if the State's determination of probable cause was erroneous, this court is not bound by that determination. This principle was clearly stated in Dettore v. Brighton Township, 91 Mich. App. 526, 534, 284 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1979):
Plaintiff on appeal characterizes defendant's statement as a binding admission in its pleadings. See GCR 1963, 606. On the contrary, it is well established that a party concession or admission concerning a question of law or the legal effect of a statute as opposed to a statement of fact is not binding on the court. 2 Callaghan's Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d Ed), § 21.44, p 43; Thayer v Arnold, 32 Mich 336, 341 (1875). Cf., Michigan Health Care Inc v Flagg Industries, Inc, 67 Mich App 125, 130; 240 NW2d 295 (1976).
(Italics ours.)
This court has relied on the same principle. In reply to an argument that a party had conceded a point of law, we declined to consider whether the point had been conceded on the grounds that an erroneous concession would not be binding on the court. We said in In re Estate of Dunn, 31 Wn.2d 512, 528, 197 P.2d 606 (1948):
Whether or not such a concession was made is unimportant, and, of course, this court is nowise bound thereby, the question being one of law to be determined from admitted facts.
The principle has been applied in a criminal context as well. As stated in People v. Dodson, 96 A.D.2d 1116, 1118 n.*, 467 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (1983):
We reach this conclusion despite the concession by the People in their brief that criminal trespass in the first degree is a lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree since we are not bound by erroneous concessions of legal principles.
(Italics ours.)
The State's concession was erroneous. Deputy Evans had sufficient probable cause to arrest Knighten at the time he was stopped and detained. Knighten's detention was not a *903Terry stop, but a valid arrest. While the overly zealous and rough actions of the officer making the arrest were unnecessary, the arrest was proper. State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) does not require courts to evaluate whether felony arrests were conducted with proper manners and gentility, but only whether the procedures were inappropriate. Here a teenage boy had been killed and the appearances were such that the officer could have believed that the defendant had failed to render assistance and had tried and was trying to avoid arrest. It cannot be said that the arrest was contrary to good police practice and common sense.
The standard for probable cause to arrest has been defined and should not be confused with the higher standard for conviction that the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cox, 94 Wn.2d 170, 615 P.2d 465 (1980); State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wn.2d 290, 340 P.2d 178 (1959); RCW 9A.04.100. The arresting officer needed only to have facts and circumstances within his knowledge sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense had been committed. He did not, at the time of arrest, need to have at his command the evidence to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the detention of Knighten was proper as a lawful arrest, there is no taint of illegality upon any evidence obtained through voluntary statements made by Knighten while in custody. Deputy Evans took all proper precautions to ensure that statements obtained from Knighten were freely and voluntarily given. Before questioning Knighten, Deputy Evans read him the standard Miranda warnings from form 386, which is issued to Washington State law enforcement officers for that purpose. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Evans was questioned by the deputy prosecutor and testified as follows:
Q Very well, could you read into the record the exact language that you read to Mr. Knighten at that time?
*904A Yes, sir. "You have the right to remain silent during any questioning." At this point I asked Knighten if he understood that.
Q Did he respond?
A He said "Yes."
Q Very well.
A Next, I said, "Anything you do say can and will be used against you in a court of law." After that point I asked him if he understood, and he said "Yes." The next point is, "You have the right to talk to an attorney prior to any questioning and to have your attorney with you during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you at public expense prior to any questioning, if you so desire." At that point I asked him if he understood that, and he answered "Yes."
Q Very well.
A The next point was, "If at any time during questioning you indicate a desire not to answer further questions or to consult with or have an attorney present during further questioning, then questioning will cease." I asked him if he understood that point, and he also replied "Yes." On the back side of the card the next statement is, "Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you," and his answer was "Yes." The next point is, "Having in mind and understanding your rights as I have explained them to you, are you willing to talk to me at this time?" And his answer at that point was "Yes."
Report of Proceedings, at 17-18.
At that point, Knighten waived his rights and began telling the officers about the events of the previous night. He admitted that he had been drinking the night before and was probably too intoxicated to drive safely. He said that he had split two or three pitchers of beer with another individual. He stated that he had been traveling too fast, between 50 and 60 miles per hour, when he turned too widely and put his vehicle in the ditch. He also gave information which led to additional witnesses.
That evening while Knighten was being held in custody, Deputy Evans again read Knighten his Miranda rights and Knighten made more detailed statements concerning the *905amount of alcohol he had consumed the night before. He then said that he had consumed two mugs of beer while playing video games at the Podunk Tavern, and thereafter he then went to the La Center Tavern where he consumed six to seven glasses of beer. He and an individual he knew as "Bill" then drove to a liquor store where Knighten purchased a 16-ounce container of Black Velvet from which he drank approximately three shots. They returned to the La Center Tavern where they split a pitcher of beer. The two then went to Bill's house where they continued drinking. Knighten admitted that he did not recall leaving Bill's house and only remembered waking up on the floor of his own home and being told that he had put his car in the ditch.
There is no evidence that any force or coercion was exerted upon Knighten to make the statements that he did. The second interview was interrupted when an attorney retained by Knighten's parents telephoned asking to speak with Knighten. On the advice of the attorney, Knighten informed Deputy Evans that he did not wish to answer any further questions and the interview was terminated.
Knighten's statements to Deputy Evans, both immediately after he was taken into custody and later that evening, were freely and voluntarily given. Indeed, Knighten does not even argue that the statements were involuntarily made, but relies solely on the argument that they were tainted by an unlawful Terry stop. Since Knighten's detention was not a Terry stop but a lawful arrest based upon probable cause, there was no taint upon the statements made to Deputy Evans. The admission of those statements into evidence was entirely proper. The Court of Appeals opinion upheld the convictions based upon the "overwhelming untainted" evidence saying:
The untainted evidence revealed Mr. Knighten operated the vehicle which fatally injured the bicyclist, and that Mr. Knighten was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Mr. Fehr disclosed that Mr. Knighten had ditched the vehicle the prior evening and had unsuccessfully *906attempted to remove the vehicle. Rebecca Kelley, a barmaid in La Center, said she refused to serve Mr. Knigh-ten intoxicants the evening of the accident because he was too intoxicated. Witnesses saw Mr. Knighten at the scene of the accident and one witness, who drove Mr. Knighten home from the accident, observed that Mr. Knighten was intoxicated.
The Court of Appeals need not have based its affirmance on this ground in view of the probable cause to arrest that existed. The plain language of RCW 46.52.020 makes it a felony to leave the scene of an accident without rendering assistance to any victim. This statute is designed to impose responsible action toward others upon drivers. Here it is plain that the defendant shirked that responsibility and that the injured or killed teenager lay for hours at the scene of the accident possibly dying for lack of assistance. The convictions are affirmed.
Andersen, Goodloe, and Durham, JJ., concur.
Brachtenbach, J., concurs in the result.

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).