Court Opinion

ID: 9860699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:29:51.189445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:31.442256
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
Whatever her faults, no matter how strong the evidence was against her, defendant was entitled to a fair trial. Because I am convinced she was denied one, I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms defendant’s conviction by imposing its own limited view of the core of her defense.
I have no disagreement with the majority’s statement of the facts but point out two additional matters. The majority recites it was the State’s theory that defendant and Hood “acted jointly in planning the murder and disposing of the body.” This was only one of the theories of their guilt. Both defendants were also charged with, and had to defend against, lesser included offenses. The jury was instructed accordingly.
The need for separate trials was made apparent before, as well as repeatedly during, trial. There were pretrial objections to a joint trial and a number of motions for severance. I think they should have been sustained when it became obvious both defendants were drawn by the fact of their joint trial into a prosecution net, from which each could escape only by convicting the other.
I accept the standard cited by the majority:
[T]he defense of a defendant reaches a level of antagonism (with respect to the defense of a co-defendant) that compels severance of the defendant, if the jury, in order to believe the core of testimony offered on behalf of that defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of his co-defendant. In such a situation, the co-defendants do indeed become the government’s best witnesses against each other. Where two defendants present defenses that are antagonistic at their core, a substantial possibility exists “ 'that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” [Authorities.] If the essence of one defendant’s defense is contradicted by a codefendant’s defense, then the latter defense can be said to “preempt” the former. [Authority.]
United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir.1981).
The rationale for the antagonistic defenses rule rests on two bases. First, it is inherently prejudicial for a defendant to face multiple prosecutors, or for the State to orchestrate a pit fight in which each defendant’s attorney attempts to destroy the other’s client. See United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir.1973); see also People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 555, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, 841, 842 (1936). Secondly, a defendant should not face the risk that a jury may become so disgruntled or perplexed by the codefendants’ inconsistencies that they will unjustifiably disbelieve both and find both guilty. See Berkowitz, 662 F.2d at 1134; United States v. Halderman, 559 F.2d 31, 71 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1977).
Under this standard severance surely should have been granted. The majority is wrong in suggesting that the two defenses are reconcilable. The prosecutor himself argued that the two defendants could not both be telling the truth. Actually, the core of their defenses was much broader, and more varied, than justification.
Defendant and Hood each presented irreconcilable and mutually exclusive defenses to the specific intent element of both first degree murder and aiding and abetting first degree murder. Aside from the forensic evidence, the testimony of the co-defendants was the only evidence of what actually occurred in the Snodgrass house at the time of the shooting. Defendant testified she was in another room when Hood shot her husband during an argument. Hood contends defendant shot her husband as Hood walked into the house. If either story is believed, a jury could reasonably doubt that one of the defendants possessed the requisite specific intent (willfulness, de*481liberation, and premeditation) for first degree murder, or knew the shooter possessed such intent, required for aiding and abetting first degree murder.
At the heart of each defense were two denials. Each denied an intent to kill. Each denied knowledge of the other’s intent to kill. Defendant and Hood did indeed differ on the question of who pulled the trigger. More importantly, they disagreed also on whether each knew the intent of the person who pulled the trigger. The absence of such knowledge could well reduce the degree of guilt of either defendant.
Of course the jury might have believed neither defendant’s story. It is quite possible that the State sufficiently demonstrated, as it asserted in closing argument, that the defendant and Hood planned the murder in advance. Nevertheless, on the record here, it remains that the jury could have unjustifiably disbelieved both defendants by concluding that their irreconcilable defenses alone demonstrated that both defendants were guilty.
The record amply demonstrates that defendant’s trial was indeed a battle in which the codefendants’ attorneys attempted to destroy each other’s client. Throughout the trial Hood’s attorney repeatedly claimed that defendant was lying and attempted to impugn her character. Defendant’s attorney took the same approach toward Hood. The State attempted to discredit both defendants. Often the State was even spared the trouble — or risk — of objecting to defense evidence or cross-examination. The objections were soon to come from the other defendant’s counsel.
The most damaging unfairness in the situation for both defendants was in the testimony of the other. As the trial progressed it became increasingly urgent for each defendant to waive the fifth amendment privilege and take the stand to testify against the other. And, increasingly, it became more and more crucial for each of them to convince the jury that the other was guilty of firing the fatal shot and was lying by denying it.
It is no answer to argue that the State had a theory that both defendants were guilty, had planned and acted together. Neither is it an answer that there might have been some of the same tensions in separate trials. The tensions were greatly exacerbated by the fact that a circle was drawn around both defendants in the same trial. The circle was then tightened, not only by the prosecution but also by the attempts of each defendant to escape by becoming a star witness against the other.
I recognize that joint trials in criminal cases will often prove to be an efficient way to dispose of multiple prosecutions. In the process, as noted in State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1980), jointly tried defendants must expect to yield some of the advantages they might otherwise enjoy in separate trials. But no defendant can be called upon to yield the right to a fair trial. Defendant here was denied one.
I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the case for a new, separate trial.
MeCORMICK and WOLLE, JJ., join this dissent.