Court Opinion

ID: 9642849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:10:56.727903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:53.558790
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the majority opinion has incorrectly evaluated the law and the facts of this case concerning the application of TEX.BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp.1983). In its opinion, the majority states that, “[t]he legal test applied to determine whether a defendant has a fixed and established place of business under the provision of § 17.56 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is virtually identical for determining whether it had ‘an agency or representative’ under art. 1995, subdivision 27.” I disagree. Had the legislature intended for venue under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act to be the same as in other civil cases, generally, they would not have provided a special venue section to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Courts of Appeals are required to give the Deceptive Trade Practices Act the most liberal construction and comprehensive application possible. First Title Company of Corpus Christi, Inc. v. Cook, 625 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ dism’d).
*550While I agree that the term “fixed and established place of business” has not been defined by the Courts of this state, I do not feel compelled to follow a 1914 United States Supreme Court case and a 1922 U.S. District Court case from Michigan. Other jurisdictions which have defined the term “place of business” have applied the “notoriety test”. This test is that a place of business is where commercial and mercantile transactions are carried on, where products are made and from which they are sold or distributed, the place where work is generally, and not occasionally done. In Re P.S. Products Corp., 7 U.C.C. Reporter 411 (E.D.N.Y.1970) aff'd., 435 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.1970). See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1982); In Re Enark Industries Inc., 86 Misc.2d 985, 383 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1976); J. White and R. Summers Handbook of Law under the Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 23-14 (1972).
The term regular and established place of business for venue purposes in patent infringement cases has been defined as where a systematic regular and continuous course of business activity is carried on from a permanent location. Watsco Inc. v. Henry Valve Company, 232 F.Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Railex Corp. v. White Machine Company, 243 F.Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y.1965).
Giving the term its plain meaning as it is found in § 17.56, I would hold that, for venue purposes under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a fixed and established place of business is one where the regular business of the party is conducted on a continuous basis from a permanent location.
Reviewing the evidence in this cause, I find that the appellant is in the business of producing oil and gas; that appellant has been producing oil and gas in Victoria County for thirty years; that appellant has an elaborate facility located in Victoria County valued at approximately $400,-000.00; and that appellant has had two permanent employees in the county for a number of years. I feel that, under these facts, the appellant has a fixed and established place of business in Victoria County for venue purposes under the provisions of § 17.56.
I would acknowledge that not every instance of oil and gas production in a county would give rise to venue under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Each case must be viewed on its individual facts to determine whether venue is proper under the Act. However, taking the definition given the term by the majority to its logical conclusion, a defendant could have a multi-mil-lion dollar production type facility in a county and not be subject to venue in that county as long as no “business” was done from that facility but only “production”. I do not believe this was the intent of the legislature in promulgating § 17.56. I would uphold the jury findings and hold that venue was proper in Victoria County under § 17.56.