Court Opinion

ID: 9480183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:40:53.883818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:32.357012
License: Public Domain

LASKER, District Judge,
dissenting:
Appellants contend in supplemental briefs that their convictions must be reversed because under Gomez v. United States, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) the magistrate who conducted jury selection in their case had no jurisdiction to preside. Because I agree with appellants’ reading of Gomez, I dissent from the majority on this issue.
The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(3) (West Supp.1989) states that a "magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” In Gomez a unanimous court reversed the decision of a divided Second Circuit panel in United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir.1988) and held that jury selection was not one of “such additional duties” and that, accordingly, “the Federal Magistrates Act does not allow the delegation of jury selection to magistrates”. 109 S.Ct. at 2246 n. 25. The Court in Gomez also rejected the Government’s contention that the appellants’ failure to allege specific prejudice constituted harmless error. The Court stated that “a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside” was a basic *504fair trial right. 109 S.Ct. at 2248. “Thus harmless-error analysis does not apply in a felony case in which, despite the defendant’s objection and without any meaningful review by a district judge, an officer exceeds his jurisdiction by selecting a jury.” Id. The appellants in Gomez had objected to the magistrate conducting voir dire but were overruled. In the case at hand the Government argues that the failure of Gambino or Musacchia to object to jury selection by the magistrate constituted a waiver and renders Gomez inapplicable, because that decision is limited to instances in which the appellants object at the time of the magistrate’s jury selection.
However, I read Gomez not to be limited to cases in which defendants objected, but rather to extend at least to all cases in which no consent has been given to jury selection by a magistrate. The Court stated: “The principal question presented is whether presiding at the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant’s consent is among those ‘additional duties’ ” that can be delegated to magistrates under the Act. 109 S.Ct. at 2239. Moreover, the Garcia court (which reached the constitutional issue as well) framed the issue below as whether the Act or the Constitution “precludes a magistrate from presiding over jury selection in a felony case without the defendant’s consent.” 848 F.2d at 1330. In both Garcia and Gomez the fact that appellants made contemporaneous objections seems incidental; what matters is that they did not expressly consent.
In United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1990) the court denied a post-Gomez petition for rehearing and affirmed its earlier ruling that reversal is not required where “there was not only a failure to object, but explicit consent, to the magistrate’s selection of a jury.” Wong is distinguishable because of the absence of express consent in the case at hand.
However, the majority and the government rely on United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 382-83 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6313 (Dec. 21, 1989), in which the court relied on Wong and held that where there was no objection to the magistrate’s selection of a jury, reversal was not required. The Vanwort court did not recognize or analyze the distinction between the facts before it (failure to object but no express consent) and the facts in Wong (failure to object but express consent).1 The Wong court focused on express consent, which was missing in Van-wort, as it is in the case at hand.
More importantly however, Vanwort is distinguishable because the jury was selected in that case before the Second Circuit’s decision in Garcia, when the law in this Circuit was still unsettled. Because jury selection at appellants’ trial occurred after Garcia, objection would have been fruitless in the face of controlling precedent, and, accordingly, no objection was required to preserve the issue for review. See United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280 n. 7 (2d Cir.1965) (en banc) (“Appellate courts often notice error not objected to below when, under the law existing at the time of the trial, objection would have been futile and when error was asserted on review on the basis of a subsequent appellate decision.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 887, 15 L.Ed.2d 663 (1966).
In United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1989), one of three circuit court decisions to have analyzed the question presented here, a unanimous court held that Gomez applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review and required reversal even where appellants had not objected to jury selection by a magistrate. The France court found “absolutely no indication in the tenor or text of [Gomez] to suggest that the Court relied on, or did more than note — in the interest of providing a full and accurate description of the facts before it — the fact the petitioners had objected to the magistrate’s conducting *505voir dire.” Id. at 227. The France eourt concluded that any objection to the magistrate’s performing voir dire would have been futile and the appeal was thus preserved. The court held that a party does not waive its right to challenge a jury instruction if it fails to object at the time if there is a “solid wall of circuit authority” which would have barred the district court from correcting the alleged error. Id. at 227-28 (citing Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n. 8 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) and United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 57-58 (9th Cir.1970) (en banc)). The court stated:
[I]t seems to us at best unseemly, and at worst irresponsible, to penalize France for following the law as it existed at the time her jury was selected. Finally, it is incongruous to hold that a rule that is “designed to enhance the accuracy of a criminal trial,” [Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1342, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984),] and which must, therefore, be given broad retroactive application, can be waived because a defendant did not guess that the law would change some time after the error was committed.
886 F.2d at 228.2
Most significant is the appellants’ argument that their mere failure to object, absent express consent, cannot constitute waiver because the magistrate had no jurisdiction to preside. Such lack of jurisdiction requires reversal under Gomez. The Gomez Court stated:
A critical limitation on [the] expanded jurisdiction [of magistrates under 1979 Amendments to the Act] is consent. As amended in 1979, the Act states that “neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to a magistrate.” 93 Stat. 643, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). In criminal cases, the Government may petition for trial before a district judge. “Defendants charged with misdemeanors can refuse to consent to a magistrate and thus effect the same removal,” S.Rep. No. 96-74, p. 7 (1979), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1979, p. 1475, for the magistrate’s criminal trial jurisdiction depends on the defendant’s specific, written consent.
109 S.Ct. at 2244-45 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Rubio, 722 F.Supp. 77, 82 n. 3 (D.Del.1989) (“after the Court’s decision in Gomez, it appears that the magistrate may not conduct jury voir dire in a felony trial under the statute regardless of whether the parties consent”).
Appellants argue persuasively that the Act’s strict and explicit requirements of consent for referring misdemeanor trials to magistrates mandate that such consent must also be required to create jurisdiction in a felony case. See United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir.1977) (requiring reversal where Magistrate failed to advise defendant accused of minor offense of right to jury trial, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1988)); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 (11th Cir.1987) (“[ejxplicit, voluntary consent is crucial [to provision of Act authorizing magistrates to conduct civil jury trials]”); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir.1987) (unless party consents to have a magistrate enter a final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l)(3) magistrate lacks jurisdiction). Moreover, I find persuasive Judge Altimari’s dissent in Wong, 884 F.2d at 1546: (“In view of the principles expressed in Gomez, ... a magistrate has no power to seat a jury in a felony case with or without the defendant’s consent.... Jurisdiction to preside at felony trials remains the province of district judges.”). See also Reale Int’l., Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir.1981) (“parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a federal court by consent or stipulation”).
The Government’s response to the jurisdiction argument raised by appellants is *506that nothing in Gomez suggests that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try the case and enter judgment merely because it may have lacked jurisdiction to refer jury selection to the magistrate. See United States v. Lopez-Pena, 890 F.2d at 495 n. 6 (stating in dicta that magistrate conducting voir dire lacked statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction but trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction throughout and describing error as procedural, not jurisdictional). This argument is unpersuasive in light of the Supreme Court’s statement that “a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside” is “basic.” 109 S.Ct. 2248. Moreover, Gomez explicitly held that jury selection by a magistrate was not harmless error “in a felony case in which, despite the defendant’s objection and without any meaningful review by a district judge, an officer exceeds his jurisdiction by selecting a jury.” Id. Gomez is not limited to cases in which the defendant objects, but rather to cases in which no consent is given. In sum, under Gomez, the magistrate who conducted jury selection in this case lacked jurisdiction to preside and the convictions of Gambino and Musacchia must be reversed because they did not give express consent to this procedure.

. The Third Circuit has also equated failure to object with consent in holding that Gomez does not require reversal in a case in which the appellant failed to object. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir.1989).

. In one of three other circuit courts to address this issue. United States v. Lopez-Pena, Nos. 87-2003 through 87-2008 slip op. at 16 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1989) (rehearing en banc filed Dec. 20, 1989) a divided panel concluded that "[b]ecause the precedential wall in this instance was rather porous, there was no valid reason for defense counsel to believe that timely objection to the magistrate’s involvement would be futile,” and that in any event even in circuits in which courts had authorized magistrates’ jury selection the courts had not insisted that the practice be followed.