Court Opinion

ID: 9515275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:55:13.293219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:27.238364
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶ 33.] I concur and write to highlight two points.
[¶ 34.] First, although the dissents spend numerous pages discussing facts that could support a finding of unreasonable noise (a nuisance), Judge Gors listened to the opposing witnesses, found their credibility more persuasive, and ultimately found for Tour Ice on this issue. Therefore, although the dissents’ selection 7 of facts may appear to make a case for a nuisance, this appellate retrial of facts is not permitted under our well-established standard of review. Union County v. Hoffman, 512 N.W.2d 168, 170 (S.D.1994); Hilde v. Flood, 81 S.D. 25, 28-29, 130 N.W.2d 100, 101-02 (1964). See also SDCL 15-6-52(a) (“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”).
[¶ 35.] Second, the dissents disregard our standard of review in their interpretation and application of the dispositive zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs amended complaint is specifically premised on 1970 City of Pierre Ordinance # 845. Plaintiff argues that the 1970 ordinance prohibited this building (including the additions) and its use by Tour Ice from the business’s inception in 1973 until revised ordinances were adopted in 1999. Plaintiff argues (and the dissents agree) that the building and the business use were unlawful nonconforming uses before the 1999 ordinance was adopted, and therefore, the building and its use could not have been lawfully “grandfathered” under the 1999 ordinance now in effect.
[¶ 36.] _ In analyzing this issue, the dissents attempt to interpret and apply the 1970 municipal zoning ordinance differently than the City and the trial court. The problem with their analysis is that there is no evidence of the language of that ordinance in the record. The ordinance is not in the record because Plaintiff failed to introduce it at trial8 despite the trial *801court’s explicit admonition to do so.9 Although we cannot read the 1970 ordinance on appellate review, the dissent divines its language from a question asked by Plaintiffs counsel concerning “restricted use[s].” See infra ¶ 63 n. 19. This does not, however, answer the question concerning conditional, permitted, and grandfathered uses under all of the ordinances. Moreover, the dissent ignores the zoning official’s answer indicating that the City believed “the use was previously permitted.” Infra ¶ 63 n. 19. The zoning official further expressly opined that this business was not prohibited in the central business district.
[¶ 37.] Considering this evidence and Plaintiffs failure to introduce the 1970 ordinance, our standard of appellate review requires us to defer to the interpretation of the City and the trial court. This Court has consistently held that: “Absent statutory authorization, courts of general jurisdiction, such as our circuit courts, may not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances .... An ordinance therefore must be introduced into evidence and be made part of the record. ” Nase v. Christensen, 409 N.W.2d 131, 132 (S.D.1987) (citations omitted). See also Coyote Flats, L.L.C. v. Sanborn County Com’n, 1999 SD 87, ¶ 9 n. 5, 596 N.W.2d 347, 350 n. 5. Because the dispositive 1970 ordinance was not introduced into evidence or made a part of the record, we are required to presume that the circuit court interpreted the ordinances correctly.10 This Court has been unequivocal in holding that “[t]he settled record is the sole evidence of the circuit court’s proceedings and, when confronted with an incomplete record, our presumption is that the circuit court acted properly.” State v. Jones, 416 N.W.2d 875, 878 (S.D.1987). Stated in other words, “[i]f we draw any presumption from an incomplete settled record, the presumption is that the trial court acted properly.” State v. Hall, 212 N.W.2d 308, 311 (S.D.1978).
[IT 38.] Appellate courts are also required to give this deference to the City’s interpretation. For over thirty years, the City has interpreted and applied the 1970 and 1999 ordinances to allow this building, its various additions,11 and its use.
*802“[C]ourts will consider and give weight to the construction of the ordinance by those administering the ordinance.” Wegner Auto Co., Inc. v. Ballard, 353 N.W.2d 57, 58 (S.D.1984). These rules of deference are dispositive in this case because we are being asked to interpret ordinances that we cannot read.
[¶ 39.] Considering Plaintiffs failure to prove the contents of any ordinance, we are required by our standard of review to presume that the City and the trial court interpreted and applied the ordinances correctly. Under those interpretations, this use was either a conforming or permitted use from 1973 until 1999, when it was “grandfathered” by the 1999 ordinance. I find it quite remarkable that the dissents would overrule these interpretations without being able to read the relevant ordinances.

. The dissents do not even acknowledge the witnesses who testified that the noise was not burdensome.

. Plaintiff did not introduce any Pierre City ordinance into evidence. The City only introduced Exhibit C, which is a recent codification of selected ordinances. Although the recent codification’s source notes refer to a number of ordinances adopted in 1970, it is impossible to ascertain from Exhibit C which ordinances were in effect in 1970 and which were in effect in 1999. Moreover, there is no reference to 1970 Ordinance # 845.
Plaintiff also failed to attach a copy of the crucial 1970 ordinance or the 1999 ordinances to her appellate brief. Nevertheless, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations concerning the content of these ordinances, including specific references to “the 1970 ordinance (Ordinance # 845).” Even though we have occasionally considered ordinances that were not introduced but were set forth in the brief, we cannot do so here because plaintiff did neither. See Coyote Flats, L.L.C. v. San-born County Com’n, 1999 SD 87, ¶ 9 n. 5, 596 N.W.2d 347, 350 n. 5.

. Plaintiff's trial counsel, who withdrew for this appeal, was apparently unaware of the well-established rule of law requiring proof of municipal ordinances. When the trial court told Plaintiff's counsel that the ordinances must be offered into evidence, counsel responded by suggesting there was no need to introduce them because the ordinances were “plead (sic) and they are set out verbatim in my trial brief.” The trial court responded, "I understand, but you got to prove them too.” Notwithstanding this admonition, Plaintiff failed to prove the contents of the 1970 Ordinance, the 1999 ordinances, or any other City ordinance that supports her claim.

. As we noted in Coyote Flats, L.L.C., 1999 SD 87, ¶9 n. 5, 596 N.W.2d at 350 n. 5, whether to "take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance is a procedural issue.... Therefore, if it is not objected to on the record, it can be waived upon appeal just as any other procedural issue.” Thus, absent an objection, we have reviewed an ordinance attached to a brief but not admitted into evidence. See id. Here, the 1970 ordinance was apparently attached to Plaintiff’s trial court brief. It also appears that Defendants did not object to the trial court’s consideration of that copy. Therefore, the trial court could, absent an objection, interpret and apply the ordinance that was attached to Plaintiff's brief. However, the trial briefs are not part of our record, and absent any evidence of the content of the ordinance, our standard of appellate review precludes our interpretation of the ordinance and requires that we defer to the City’s and the trial court's interpretation.

.Although expansions of nonconforming uses are generally not permitted, see Brown County v. Meidinger, 271 N.W.2d 15, 18 (S.D. 1978), there is no dispute that the relevant building additions were completed before the 1999 ordinances became effective, and the *802City interpreted the additions to be permitted uses.