Court Opinion

ID: 9768815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:51:41.700383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:46.873831
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion that this Court may choose one of the convictions to affirm and reverse the other two because there is no danger appellant is being punished for more than one offense. I disagree, however, with the method the majority opinion uses to determine which conviction shall survive. I write to summarize the several tests used by this Court in the past and to suggest a test for appellate courts to use when making this determination.
A number of different methods of choosing which conviction to affirm have been utilized but vary with the facts of the individual case. The five predominant methods are as follows:
1 — The most popular method is to choose the offense that the defendant was convicted of first. Ex parte Ellison, 699 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ex parte Siller, 686 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ex parte Prince, 549 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Easley, 490 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
2 — At other times this Court has affirmed the conviction that had the lowest number on the charging instrument. Ex parte Adams, 541 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Price v. State, 475 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
3—In Beaupre v. State, 526 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1037, 96 S.Ct. 573, 46 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975), this Court chose the offense that was alleged first in the indictment.
4—In Jones v. State, 482 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1377, 35 L.Ed.2d 594 (1973), this Court chose the conviction for possession of heroin over the conviction for possession of marijuana because there was “more proof” for possession óf heroin.
5—In Barron v. State, 568 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), no reason was offered to justify affirming a conviction for murder and dismissing a conviction for robbery by assault.
This multiplicity of tests arose because none of the tests works well in all situations. It is often impossible to tell which conviction technically came first. As a practical matter, in a majority of cases all of the convictions are decided together. It makes little sense for an appellate court to place significance on the order the convictions were entered or the order the offenses were alleged in the indictment when the order was arbitrary at the trial level. When each offense is charged in a separate charging instrument it is easy to pick the offense with the lowest number. Unfortunately, in most cases, all of the offenses are joined in one charging instrument. Finally, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to decide which offense was supported by “more evidence”. As long as there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the relative “weight” of the evidence should not be considered.
In order to avoid the arbitrariness that necessarily flows from having a number of different rules, or in some cases no rule at all, I believe that there should be one rule that can be applied every time a defendant is convicted of more than one offense. A rule that is most consistent with the objectives of the Penal Code as articulated in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, sec. 1.02, would be one that mandates affirmance of the conviction for the most serious offense.
This proposed rule, choosing the conviction for the most serious offense, is superi- or in a number of ways to all of the other rules previously used.
First, it will be applicable to all cases where there is misjoinder of offenses.
Second, it does not attempt to make arbitrary distinctions based bn which allegation or conviction preceded the others. The outcome of a case will not depend on the coincidence of the order of offenses in an indictment or jury charge.
Third, it assumes that if the State had been made to elect an offense, it would have chosen the most serious one. This *198will be true in a majority of the cases. It cannot be said that the State would usually pick the first offense.
Last, it is the most consistent with the objective of the Penal Code “to insure the public safety through: (A) the deterrent influence of the penalties hereinafter provided.” Y.T.C.A. Penal Code, sec. 1.02.
The rule then should be that in the absence of harm that vitiates all convictions obtained from one indictment when a defendant is charged with and convicted of more than one offense in violation of Art. 21.24, V.A.C.C.P.,1 the appellate court will affirm the most serious offense (as determined by the sentence and other relevant factors) and dismiss the other convictions.
Applying this new rule to the case sub judice would result in our affirmance of the capital murder conviction and dismissal of the two aggravated robbery convictions. Capital murder is, obviously, a capital felony which carries the ultimate penalty, death by lethal injection, which appellant was assessed as punishment. Aggravated robbery is, by comparison, a less serious offense in that it is only a first degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and $10,000 fine, both of which appellant received in this case. Thus, under this proposed rule, I reach the same result as the majority opinion.
Additionally, as to point of error nineteen, I believe that any error resulting from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s right to impeach Henderson is harmless error under Tex.R.App.Proe. 81(b)(2), so I concur in the result reached on that point.
With these additional comments, I join the remainder of the majority opinion.

. It is important to note that, in this case, appellant was not harmed by the admission of evidence relevant to the two aggravated robbery counts. The evidence offered by the State would still have been admissible at punishment even if the State had elected to pursue conviction on only one offense. In another situation, however, if the State insists on misjoining offenses in a charging instrument and gains an advantage it would not have had if it had followed the law (such as the admission of details of other offenses), reversal may well follow. In this later situation, the rules regulating admission of extraneous offenses will govern, except as in a case such as this one, a capital murder, where evidence of extraneous offenses is admissible.