Court Opinion

ID: 9370463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 19:03:15.012608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.216442
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                      :    ID No. 1908011284
                                       :
                                       :
     v.                                :
                                       :
BRADFORD J. HUSFELT,                   :
                                       :
                      Defendant.       :

                           Submitted: December 15, 2022
                           Decided: February 13, 2023

                                      ORDER

       On this 13th day of February 2023, upon consideration of the Defendant
 Bradford J. Husfelt’s motion for postconviction relief, the Commissioner’s Report
 and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears that:
       1.    Mr. Husfelt pled guilty on September 1, 2021, to one count of
 Manslaughter, 11 Del. C. § 632. In his plea agreement with the State, he accepted
 the State’s recommendation that the Court sentence him to twenty-five years
 incarceration suspended after seven years, two years of which constituted a
 minimum mandatory sentence, to be followed by probation. The Court sentenced
 him consistently with that recommendation.
       2.    Mr. Husfelt then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief
 pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.     The Court referred the matter to a
 Superior Court commissioner for findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to
 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62. She issued her findings
 and recommendations in the Report attached as Exhibit A.            In her Report, she
explained why Mr. Husfelt failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed
ineffectively. To the contrary, she recognized that his attorney acted reasonably.
As a result, she recommended that the Court deny his Rule 61 motion.
      3.    After she issued her Report, neither party filed written objections as
permitted by Superior Court Criminal Rule 62(a)(5)(ii).   Accordingly, the Court
accepts her findings and recommendations.
      NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this matter,
and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation
dated November 17, 2022:
      IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation attached as Exhibit A in its entirety. Accordingly,
Mr. Husfelt’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61 is DENIED.

                                                 /s/Jeffrey J Clark
                                                  Resident Judge

JJC/klc

oc:   Prothonotary
cc:   The Honorable Andrea M. Freud
      Jason Cohee, DAG
      Trial Counsel
      Bradford Husfelt, Pro Se
Exhibit A
     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                     :           I.D. No. 1908011284
                                      :          In and For Kent County
v.                                    :
                                      :
                                      :
BRADFORD J. HUSFELT,                  :   RK-19-090429-01 MANSLAUGHTER
SBI # 00568684                        :
                                      :
                         Defendant.

      COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

              Upon Defendant’s Motion For Postconviction Relief
                Pursuant To Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Department of Justice for State of Delaware

Bradford J. Husflet, pro se

FREUD, Commissioner
November 17, 2022

      The defendant, Bradford J. Husfelt (“Husfelt”) pled guilty on September 1,

2021, to one count of Manslaughter 11 Del.C. § 0632. He had also been charged

with one count of leaving the Scene of a Collision Resulting in Death, one count of

Hindering Prosecution, one count of Driving While Suspended or Revoked, one

count of Reckless Driving, one count of Criminal Mischief, one count of Vehicular

Homicide, in the First Degree, one count of Operating an Unregistered Vehicle, one

count of Driving Off the Roadway, one count of Driving on a Sidewalk or Bike Path
Prohibited, one count of Not Remaining at the Scene of a Fatal Accident, one count

of Failure to Report a Collision, and one count of Following a Motor Vehicle Too

Closely. As part of the plea deal, the State agreed to enter nolle prosequis on the

remaining charges and along with the Defense recommended a sentence of twenty-

five-years’ incarceration, suspended after serving seven years, two years of which

were mandatory minimum, followed by probation. Had Husfelt gone to trial and

been found guilty as charged, he faced many years in jail including seven years of

mandatory minimum time. Additionally, as part of the lengthy plea bargain process,

the State agreed to not indict Husfelt for Murder in the Second Degree. The Court

agreed with the sentence recommendation of the parties and sentenced Husfelt in

accordance with the plea agreement recommendation.

      Husfelt did not appeal his conviction to the State Supreme Court. Instead, he

filed the pending Motion for Postconviction Relief, pursuant to Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61 on November 29, 2021, in which he alleges ineffective assistance

of counsel.

                                     FACTS

      According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, on August 17, 2019, at

approximately 8:30 pm, a Pedestrian, David Rabenold, age 78, was walking on the

northern sidewalk near 25 Front Street, Wyoming, DE.
      While Mr. Rabenold was walking on the northern sidewalk, two vehicles

were approaching his location, both traveling westbound on Front Street toward

North Layton Ave. The first car was a dark blue Honda CR-V driven by Emily

Pummer. She was being closely followed by the second car, a blue Dodge Neon,

which was not registered. The Dodge Neon driven by Bradford J. Husfelt, began to

pass the Honda CR-V on the right, as it was driving straight. Pummer stated that the

Dodge Neon had been intermittently following her very closely from the area of

Caesar Rodney High School to the scene of the crash.

      Front Street is a residential roadway in the town of Wyoming, the posted

speed limit for the roadway is 25 MPH. The roadway is delineated by solid double

yellow centerline, and no fog lines. The travel portion of the roadway is bordered by

sidewalks. Beyond the sidewalks the roadway is bordered by residences to the north

and south. The nearest intersection is North Layton Avenue, and the collision

occurred approximately 417 feet south of North Layton Avenue.

      As Husfelt’s car began to pass Pummer’s car, Husfelt left the roadway, and

went onto the sidewalk and partially into the front yard of 25 Front Street. Husfelt

then completely left the street and had his left side tires on the sidewalk, and its

right-side tires on the yard/grass. Next Husfelt struck and snapped a landscape
timber on Mr. Michael Bakota’s property. Husfelt continued driving westward,

straddling the sidewalk and the landscape on 25 Front Street. All the while, gaining

on Pedestrian/Victim, David Rabenold. While Husfelt was driving on the sidewalk,

his vehicle collided with Rabenold, throwing him onto the windshield of the vehicle,

and causing him to vault off of the vehicle’s roof.

      Husfelt’s car sustained heavy windshield damage, which caused the right side

of the windshield to partially cave into the cabin compartment of the car. Mr.

Rabenold was thrown a distance in the air before sliding on the roadway for a final

rest. Mr. Rabenold was rushed to Kent General Hospital where he died from the

injuries sustained in this collision, later that evening.

      After hitting Rabenold, Husfelt managed to pull his vehicle back on Front

Street, coming to a stop in the roadway, directly in front of Pummer, who saw

Husfelt, lean out of the window, look back at the Rabenold, and then started to

slowly pull his vehicle away from the scene without stopping to assist the elderly

man he had just violently struck with his car while he was illegally driving on the

pedestrian sidewalk.

      Occupants in Pummer’s car began to yell for Husfelt to stop his vehicle, but

he looked back and continued westbound. Neighbors who were outside of the
residences realized partially what had happened. They also yelled for Husfelt to

stop. Husfelt then yelled back at one of them and told them to mind their own

business.

      Shortly after the collision, the State Police received a call at Troop 3

concerning to the whereabouts of the Husfelt’s vehicle. The caller stated the vehicle

was located at 150 Center Street Wyoming, DE. Troopers then responded to that

location.

      Cpl. Christine Bowie was the first to arrive to 150 Center Street. When there,

she saw a green vehicle with no registration parked in front of the residence. The

green vehicle did not have any damage to the front windshield. Cpl. Bowie observed

a white male sitting on the stoop of the residence. Cpl. Bowie asked the man if he

was in a collision earlier in the evening. The man, who later identified himself as

Bradford J. Husfelt, stated, “I was wondering when you would show up.” Husfelt

stated he had driven to Brown’s Tavern and came outside to find his car was

damaged. Husfelt stated he believed the damage occurred at Brown’s Tavern. Cpl.

Bowie asked to see the vehicle, at which time Husfelt walked to the driveway where

additional cars were parked. One of the vehicles was covered in a brown car cover.

Husfelt took off the brown car cover to reveal a blue Dodge Neon with a shattered
front right windshield. When asked about the damage, Husfelt claimed it must have

happened at Brown’s and the reason he did not call was because the car has no

registration, and he has an active capias. Cpl. Bowie observed blood to the upper

right area of the windshield with hair follicles protruding from the glass. Husfelt

again confirmed that he was the driver of that vehicle. He was then taken into

custody. While in the back of Cpl. Bowie’s patrol vehicle, Husfelt spoke briefly

with his wife. At this time, he made spontaneous utterances stating, “I killed a man!

I am so sorry I didn’t mean to kill anyone.” Husfelt’s vehicle was seized and

transported to Troop 3 where it was stored as evidence.

      While on scene, Cpl. Bowie issued Husfelt his Miranda warning and he

agreed to answer questions. Husfelt stated he left his home to drive to Brown’s

Tavern. He claims the damage to the vehicle must have occurred at Brown’s as he

did not recall any accident while on his way to the store. Cpl. Bowie informed him

of the fatal accident at which time he stated what if I killed someone? Due to the

nature of the accident, with a suspicion that Husfelt may have been impaired, Cpl.

Bowie took him to Troop 3 for further testing.

      Cpl. Bowie proceeded to conduct a series of National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration Field Test (NHTSA). Cpl. Bowie noted eye conditions that were
indicative of marijuana impairment. During the walk and turn, Husfelt needed to be

reminded to hold the instructional position of heel to toe. He also began the test

prior to being instructed to do so. During the rest, he stepped offline on step 3 and 7.

For the turn, Husfelt pivoted back into himself, with one large step (not the

instructed manner of a series of small steps). On the return, Husfelt raised his arms

from his side on step 8. Both series of steps were 9 steps. Husfelt, who is missing

the big toe of his left foot, raised his left leg for the one left stand. He performed that

test as instructed. Cpl. Bowie proceeded to perform a Drug Recognition Evaluation.

First, Husfelt acknowledged to smoking marijuana all day everyday but added that

he smoked earlier today, at approximately 4:00 pm. After Cpl. Bowie confronted

Husfelt with the findings of cannabis, Husfelt admitted to smoking marijuana from

his pen immediately after waking up from his nap, which was just prior to him

driving to the store. He also reports when he got back from the store, he took

another hit. Cpl. Bowie added that Husfelt’s overall demeanor was mostly carefree,

at times even joking. With the above listed observations and recordings, Cpl. Bowie

determined that Husfelt was under the influence of Cannabis and unable to operate a

motor vehicle safely.

      Husfelt consented to a blood draw.
        Following his return to Troop 3 from KGH, the investigating officer

interviewed Husfelt concerning to the collision. Husfelt was re-read his Miranda

rights and agreed to answer questions. Husfelt stated that after he woke from his nap

around 7 pm, his roommates asked him to drive to the liquor store. Husfelt left his

house and was on his way to the liquor store when he believes he fell asleep. Husfelt

awoke to someone yelling at him from another car. Husfelt did not see the damage

to his windshield because it was dark and pulled away. Husfelt explained he drove

to Brown’s Tavern and went inside to purchase the requested alcohol. Once he

exited the store, he observed the damage to his windshield and thought someone

must have damaged his vehicle when he was inside of Brown’s Tavern (maybe from

a fight). Husfelt stated that he didn’t know that he had hit anyone. Husfelt, left the

store and observed ambulances and fire trucks and then panicked and drove back

home.

                             HUSFELT’S CONTENTIONS

        Ground One:       Denial of Right to Speedy Trial.
                          Detained in pretrial status for 21-months with no
                          indictment or plea offer.

        Ground Two:       Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
                          Lawyer led Husfelt into taking a pre-indictment plea and
                          one week later excepted (sp.) an indictment, which led to
                          that plea being used three months later to convict Husfelt.
         Ground Three:         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
                               Husfelt was coerced into taking pre-indictment plea by
                               being threatened of being indicted by Murder if Husfelt
                               did not except that pre-indictment plea. “coercion”

         Ground Four:          Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
                               Husfelt was never informed he would be sentenced under
                               T.I.S. which didn’t come to light until Husfelt received his
                               sentencing order in the mail. It was not told to him in
                               Court or by his attorney

                                          DISCUSSION

         Under Delaware law, the Court must first determine whether Husfelt has met

the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may

consider the merits of the postconviction relief claim.1 Under Rule 61,

postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the conviction

becoming final. 2 Husfelt’s motion was filed in a timely fashion, thus the bar of Rule

61(i)(1) does not apply to the Motion. As this is Husfelt’s initial motion for

postconviction relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2), which prevents consideration of any

claim not previously asserted in a postconviction motion, does not apply either.

         None of Husfelt’s claims were raised previously at his plea, sentencing, or on

direct appeal. Consequently, they are barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(i)(3) unless he demonstrates: (1) cause for relief from the procedural default; and

1
    Bailey v. State, 588 A,2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)
2
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)
(2) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s rights.      3
                                                                The bars to relief are

inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or “to a claim that satisfies the pleading

requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule. 4 To

meet the requirements of Rule 61 (d)(2) a defendant must plead with particularity

that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually
                                                                                   5
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted          or

that he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States or Delaware Supreme

Courts, applies to the defendant’s case rendering the conviction invalid. 6 Husfelt’s

motion pleads neither requirement of Rule 61(d)(2).

       Each of Husfelt’s grounds for relief to some extent, are premised on

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Husfelt has alleged

sufficient cause for not having asserted these grounds for relief before accepting the

plea offer and on direct appeal. Husfelt’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are

not subject to the procedural default rule, in part because the Delaware Supreme

Court will not generally hear such claims for the first time on direct appeal. For this

reason, many defendants, including Husfelt, allege ineffective assistance of counsel

3
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
4
  Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(5)
5
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii)
in order to overcome the procedural default. “However, this path creates confusion

if the defendant does not understand that the test for ineffective assistance of

counsel and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”7

The United States Supreme Court has held that:

         [i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of
         counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that the responsibility
         for the default be imputed to the State, which may not ‘conduc[t]
         trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend
         themselves without adequate legal assistance;’ [i]neffective
         assistance of counsel then is cause for a procedural default.8

A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he

can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss

the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v.

Washington9 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.10

       The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so

grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.11

Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of

probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the

7
  State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.).
8
  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
9
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10
    551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
11
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice. 12 In setting forth a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make and substantiate

concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal.13 When

examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong other the

Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

professionally reasonable .14 This standard is highly demanding.15 Strickland

mandates that, when viewing counsel’s representation, this Court must endeavor to

“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight .”16

       Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is abundantly

clear that Husfelt has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claims

that his attorney was ineffective. I find Trial Counsel’s Affidavit, in conjunction

with the record, more credible that Husfelt’s self-serving claims that his Counsel’s

representation was ineffective. Husfelt’s Counsel clearly denied the allegations.

       Husfelt was facing the possibility of many years in jail, including mandatory

minimum time had he been indicted on a Second-Degree Murder Charge and

convicted on all counts. The sentence and plea were very reasonable under all the

12
    Id.
13
     See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL
466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.)).
14
   Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)
15
   Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 383 (1986)).
16
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
circumstances, especially in light of the strong evidence against him. Prior to the

entry of the plea, Husfelt and his attorney discussed the case and the plea. The plea

bargain was clearly advantageous to Husfelt. Counsel was successful in negotiating

a beneficial plea bargain with the State. Counsel’s representation was certainly well

within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Husfelt entered his plea,

he stated he was satisfied with the Defense Counsel’s performance. He is bound by

his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.17

Consequently, Husfelt has failed to establish that his Counsel’s representation was

ineffective under the Strickland test.

       Even assuming, arguendo, that Counsel’s representation of Husfelt was

somehow deficient, Husfelt must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test,

prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk

dismissal. 18 In an attempt to show prejudice, Husfelt simply asserts that his counsel

was ineffective by coercing him into pleading guilty. Husfelt’s Trial Counsel clearly

denied coercing him or being unprepared. My review of the facts of the case leads

met to conclude that Counsel’s representation of Husfelt was well within the

17
   Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-
938 (Del. 1994)).
18
   Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *2(Del.Supr.) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556
(Del. 1990)).
requirements of the Sixth Amendment and no prejudice has been demonstrated. His

statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in light of the evidence

against him. Therefore, I find Husfelt’s grounds for relief are meritless.

         To the extent that Husfelt alleges his plea was involuntary, the record

contradicts such allegations. When addressing the question of whether a plea was

constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a Plea Colloquy to

determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary.19 At the

guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Husfelt whether he understood he would waive

his constitutional rights, if he entered the plea including the right to suppress

evidence; if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-in-

Sentencing Guilty Plea Form (“Guilty Plea Form”); and whether he gave truthful

answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Husfelt if he had

discussed his plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court also asked

Husfelt if he was satisfied with this counsel’s representation. Husfelt answered each

of these questions affirmatively.20 I find Counsel’s representations far more credible

than Husfelt’s self-serving, vague allegations.

         Furthermore, prior to entering his plea, Husfelt signed a Guilty Plea Form and

Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Husfelt’s signature on the forms indicate

19
     Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).
20
     State v. Husfelt, Del. Super. ID No. 1908011284 (September 1, 202) Tr. at TBD
that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty

and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the

Plea Agreement. Husfelt is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty

Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.21 I

confidently find that Husfelt entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that

Husfelt’s grounds for relief are completely meritless.

                                         CONCLUSION

          I find that Husfelt’s Counsel represented him in a competent and effective

manner as required by the standards set in Strickland and that Husfelt has failed to

demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that

Husfelt’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the

Court deny Husfelt’s Motion for Postconviction Relief as procedurally barred and

meritless.

                                                         /s/Andrea M. Freud
                                                           Commissioner

AMF/jan
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Resident Judge Jeffrey J Clark
    Jason C. Cohee, Esq.
    Anthony J. Capone, Esq.
    Bradford J. Husfelt, SCI
21
     Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.1997)