Court Opinion

ID: 9906187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 15:01:41.573955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:09.765542
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 1, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0322
                                _________________________

                                Ex parte Dawn S. Smith

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

    (In re: Latisha Bolden, as mother and next friend of T.B., a
                               minor

                                                  v.

                                  Arnetta Moore et al.)

                    (Macon Circuit Court: CV-16-900099.80)

MENDHEIM, Justice.
SC-2023-0322

     Dawn S. Smith petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus

directing the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its March 24, 2023, order

denying her motion that sought a summary judgment on the claims

brought against her by Latisha Bolden, as mother and next friend of her

son T.B., and to enter a summary judgment in her favor. Smith contends

that she is entitled to immunity from Bolden's claims. We deny the

petition.

                                 I. Facts

     At the time of the incidents that precipitated this litigation, T.B.

was a second-grade student at Deborah Cannon Wolfe Elementary School

("D.C. Wolfe") in the Macon County school system. Smith began working

in the Macon County school system at Tuskegee Public School as a fifth-

grade teacher, and she taught there for 15 years. In February 2016,

Smith transferred to D.C. Wolfe and started teaching second grade. T.B.

was one of the students in Smith's class at D.C. Wolfe.

     All parties agree that T.B. has exhibited behavior problems in

school. Smith testified in her deposition that T.B. would "[d]isrupt[] the

class as far as disrupting other students, getting out of his seat without

permission, walking out of class," and other displays of misbehavior.

                                    2
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Bolden testified in her deposition that T.B. had started seeing counselors

for his emotional issues in second grade and had continued to see

counselors through the fourth grade. She related that T.B. had taken

medication for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and bipolar

disorder. Bolden also testified that D.C. Wolfe Principal Dr. Carolyn

Bradley ("Principal Bradley") had told Bolden that she allowed T.B. to

come sit in Principal Bradley's office or to go across the hall from Smith's

classroom to fourth-grade teacher Arnetta Moore's classroom "when

[T.B.] had problems." In his deposition testimony, T.B. also testified that

he was allowed to go to Principal Bradley's office to "cool down" if he was

upset. T.B. likewise testified that he frequently went to Moore's

classroom.

     In the afternoon on March 17, 2016, shortly before the end of the

school day, T.B. went into Moore's classroom. T.B. testified that he went

to Moore's classroom to look for a birthday present for his grandmother.

According to T.B., he found a deck of playing cards that he thought would

be a good present, and he asked Moore if he could take them. Moore told

T.B. that he could not take the cards, but he took them anyway. T.B.

testified that when he refused to give back the cards, Moore hit the back

                                     3
SC-2023-0322

of the hand that was holding the cards with a paddle and T.B. dropped

the cards. T.B. then got angry and stormed out of Moore's classroom,

slamming the door behind him. Smith testified that she heard the door

slam and heard T.B. yell a curse word at Moore. 1

     Soon thereafter the school day ended. In his deposition, T.B.

testified that the following events then took place. T.B. asked Smith to

walk him to his bus because he did not want to get into trouble, and she

agreed to do so. T.B. held Smith's hand as they walked down the school

hallway toward the buses. As they did so, T.B. heard Moore close her

classroom door as she was leaving her classroom. T.B. then broke loose

from Smith's grip and started running toward Moore. When T.B. got to

Moore, Moore hit T.B. in the face with her right hand and then shoved

T.B. down across the hallway floor with her left hand. As T.B. was lying

on the floor in pain, Moore walked over to him, stood over him, and then

     1T.B. denied yelling a curse word to Moore, but he did admit to

calling her "fat." Smith testified that T.B. came back to her classroom
with the playing cards and that she told him to take them back to Moore's
classroom, which he did, but that T.B.'s second entry into Moore's
classroom was when the door-slam and yelling occurred.

                                   4
SC-2023-0322

hit him in the back of the head with her right hand. Smith then came

over to help T.B. get up.

     Surveillance video of the D.C. Wolfe hallway in which T.B.'s

incident with Moore occurred recorded the incident. In her deposition,

Macon County Superintendent Jacqueline Brooks described what she

saw on the video:

           "A. When I watched the video, I saw a little boy in the
     hallway running toward a teacher, and I saw the teacher put
     her forearm out in a way that caused the student to go up in
     the air and come down on his head.

           "Q. [Bolden's counsel:] Okay.

           "A. And then I saw the teacher appear to just dismiss
     the child and leave him kind of in a -- on the floor."

In her deposition testimony, Smith's description of that incident -- based

on what she said she saw live and after seeing the video -- was as follows:

          "Q. [Bolden's counsel:] … Walk me through what
     happened when you were taking T.B. to the bus.

          "A. As I was walking [T.B.] down the hallway, [T.B.]
     heard Ms. Moore's door close, and then he snatched away from
     me real fast. So fast that I couldn't grab him.

           "Q. Okay.

          "A. And he was going full force towards Ms. Moore, and
     she was kind of startled, what was going on. And he kind of

                                    5
SC-2023-0322

    bumped into her and slid on the floor. And she tried to help
    him up, and he didn't want her help, I guess. And so I tried to
    go back and help him.

         "Q. Okay.

          "A. And, you know, I told him to come on. I didn't want
    him to get … left [by the bus]. I -- you know, told him
    everything was going to be okay. You're going to be okay. And
    he finally got up, and we walked to the bus -- down the hall --

         "Q. All right.

         "A. -- to the bus.

          "Q. So is it your testimony that Ms. Moore did not hit
    [T.B.]?

         "A. No.

         "Q. All right. She did not hit him in the head?

         "A. No.

         "Q. Or throw him to the ground?

         "A. No.

         "Q. Okay. Have you seen the surveillance video?

         "A. Barely.

          "Q. Okay. And when you watched the surveillance video,
    that's what you see is [T.B.] bumping into Ms. Moore and then
    her trying to help him up?

                                  6
SC-2023-0322

           "A. Yes."

     In the March 17, 2016, incident involving Moore and T.B., T.B.

sustained injuries to his head, neck, and back, and his grandmother took

him to the emergency room for treatment. Because of that incident,

Moore was arrested and Superintendent Brooks initiated the process of

terminating Moore's employment with the Macon County school system.

Moore never returned to D.C. Wolfe.

     Bolden alleges that, sometime later in March 2016, T.B. was hurt

as a result of an incident precipitated by Smith. T.B. testified that he had

a history of getting into fights with one of his classmates in Smith's class,

Y.,2 and that, when they fought, Y. was the one who always got hurt. In

his deposition, T.B. testified about what happened later on a day in

March 2016 after he had been in a fight with Y.

          "Q. [Smith's counsel:] Ms. Smith never did anything to
     hurt you, right?

           "A. You're talking about that day [March 17, 2016]?

           "Q. No, any day when you were in second grade.

           "A. Oh yes, she ha[s].

     2T.B. testified that he did not remember Y.'s last name.

                                     7
SC-2023-0322

          "Q. What day do you say that Ms. Smith did anything
    that you feel like hurt you?

         "A. It was after that incident with me and Ms. Moore,
    she held my arm back and told another student to hit me.

         "Q. What student was that?

         "A. Y.

         "Q. And do you remember what day that was?

         "A. No, ma'am.

         "Q. Do you remember what day of the week it was?

         "A. No, ma'am.

         "Q. Was it March?

         "A. Yes, I -- yes, I think.

         "Q. And were you in the classroom when this happened?

         "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. But Y. did not touch you that day?

         "A. You said what?

         "Q. Y. did not touch you that day?

         "A. When she told him to?

                                       8
SC-2023-0322

         "Q. Right.

         "A. He did.

         "Q. Where did he touch you?

         "A. He hit me in the face.

         "….

         "Q. [A]nd was that all that Y. did when you say your
    arms were behind your back?

         "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. He hit his hand to your face?

         "A. No, he punched me in the face.

         "Q. Where?

         "A. In this area (indicating).

         "Q. The right side?

         "A. Yes, sir.

         "Q. Not at your eye, though, down on your cheek?

         "A. Yes, it was in this area (indicating).

         "Q. Is that the first time that you said that Y. had ever
    punched you?

         "A. No.

                                   9
SC-2023-0322

         "Q. Had y'all been in a fight before that day?

         "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. And in those fights with Y. before that day, you had
    hurt him, right?

         "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. Had you ever punched him?

         "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. Ms. Smith did not touch you on the day that you're
    saying that Y. punched you in the face, right?

         "A. No, she didn't hit me.

         "Q. I'm sorry?

         "A. She didn't hit me, no.

         "….

         "Q. Did you have any medical treatment after Y. hit you?

         "A. No ma'am.

         "Q. Did you check out of school that day after that
    happened?

         "A. No, ma'am.

         "Q. You stayed through the rest of the day?

                                 10
SC-2023-0322

            "A. I don't remember.

         "Q. And was that the last time you and Y. ever punched
    each other?

            "A. Yes, ma'am.

          "Q. And after that day where you say Y. punched you
    while y'all were in the classroom, you stayed in Ms. Smith's
    class after that, right?

            "A. No, ma'am.

            "Q. Whose class did you go to after that?

            "A. I went to the [principal's] office.

            "Q. I'm sorry. Did Ms. Smith stay your teacher after
    that?

            "A. Yes, ma'am.

          "Q. So for the rest of the school year, Ms. Smith was still
    your teacher after that day?

            "A. Yes, ma'am.

         "Q. And you had told [Principal] Bradley what you said
    happened, right?

            "A. Yes, ma'am.

            "Q. But you still stayed in Ms. Smith's classroom?

                                      11
SC-2023-0322

           "A. Yes, ma'am."

(Emphasis added.) T.B. further testified:

           "Q. [Smith's counsel:] Do you ever remember meeting
     with the principal?

           "A. About what?

           "Q. About anything.

           "[Bolden's counsel]: Related to Ms. Smith?

           "[Smith's counsel]: Correct.

           "A. No, but my mother has.

          "Q. So when your mom met with the principal, you
     weren't in the room with your mom and the principal?

           "A. No, ma'am.

           "Q. Okay. Where were you when they were meeting?

           "A. In the classroom.

           "Q. Okay. So your mom told you that she met with the
     principal?

           "A. Yes, ma'am.

           "Q. Did your mom tell you what she talked to the
     principal about?

           "A. Yes, ma'am.

                                   12
SC-2023-0322

           "Q. What did she tell you?

          "A. She talked to the principal about the incident when
     Ms. Smith held my arms back and told Y. to hit me.

           "Q. Okay. And did she say that she talked to the
     principal about anything else?

           "A. No, ma'am."

(Emphasis added.)

     In her deposition, Bolden also provided testimony concerning the

alleged incident in which Smith held T.B.'s arms behind his back, told Y.

to hit T.B., and allowed Y. to punch T.B. in the face. Recounting a meeting

Bolden had with Smith and Principal Bradley, Bolden stated:

           "A. When I got there, I mean, [Smith] was saying '[T.B.]
     did this,' and [T.B.] was a bad student, and she didn't want
     [T.B.] in her classroom no more and she wanted him out of her
     classroom. So [Principal] Bradley was like, 'Well, we can't just
     have that.' 'Well, maybe we could have him sit in the
     classroom by himself,' and I said, 'No, you all are not about to
     isolate him like that from everybody else. How could you make
     him sit in one classroom because one teacher is not able to do
     what she's supposed to do?' Then [Smith] went on about how
     [T.B.] called her the B-word. And I said, 'Well, I don't know if
     he did, I don't know if he didn't.' I said, 'Well, you already lost
     his trust in you one time, and you already lied one time, so he
     don't trust you anymore. He don't believe anything you say.'
     Then [Smith] was like, 'Well, what about the time he called
     me a B-word?' I said, 'Well, maybe if you hadn't held his arms
     back to let a student hit him, then he wouldn't have called you

                                     13
SC-2023-0322

     a B-word.' And she said, 'Well, if he was in his seat, then that
     wouldn't have happened to him.'

          "….

         "Q. [Smith's counsel:] Have you ever heard [T.B.] say
     where [Y.] hit him, besides his testimony today?

            "A. [T.B.] told me that the little boy threw something
     and hit him with it, so [T.B.] hit him back. When [T.B.] hit
     him back, that's when Ms. Smith grabbed his arms and told
     [Y.] to come hit him back.

          "Q. And did [T.B.] report to you where [Y.] hit him back?

          "A. In the face.

          "Q. In his face?

          "A. Yes."

(Emphasis added.)

     In her deposition, Smith denied that such an incident occurred:

           "Q. [Bolden's counsel:] Okay. What, if anything, do you
     recall about that incident? And if you're going to say that it
     didn't happen at all, that's a perfectly fine response.

          "A. Yes. I don't know anything about it.

           "Q. Okay. You don't recall any incident where you
     instructed another student -- or you held back [T.B.] and
     allowed another student to hit him?

          "A. No.
                                   14
SC-2023-0322

          "Q. Okay. You just categorically denied that it
     happened?

           "A. It didn't happen."

     On July 28, 2016, Bolden filed a complaint in the Macon Circuit

Court, as mother and next friend of T.B., against Moore, Smith, the

Macon County Board of Education -- Moore's and Smith's employer -- and

Macon County. Bolden asserted claims of assault; battery; the tort of

outrage; intentional, wanton, reckless and/or negligent infliction of

emotional distress; and negligence and wantonness against all the

defendants. In that original complaint, Bolden asserted her claims

against Moore and Smith in both their official and their individual

capacities. On October 6, 2016, Smith answered the complaint, and,

among other defenses, Smith asserted that she was entitled to: (1) State

immunity based on Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14, regarding

Bolden's claims asserted against her in her official capacity, and (2)

State-agent immunity regarding Bolden's claims asserted against her in

her individual capacity. On October 18, 2018, the circuit court dismissed

Bolden's claims against Macon County.

                                    15
SC-2023-0322

     On November 8, 2018, Bolden filed an amended complaint against

the Macon County Board of Education, Moore, and Smith. Bolden

asserted against Moore and Smith claims of assault; battery; the tort of

outrage; malicious prosecution; wanton, reckless and/or negligent

infliction of emotional distress; negligence and wantonness; and

negligent, reckless, willful, and wanton conduct. Unlike in her original

complaint, Bolden asserted those claims against Moore and Smith solely

in their individual capacities. Specifically, as it relates to Smith in that

regard, the amended complaint stated:

           "7. [Bolden] avers that at all times herein, the
     Defendants Arnetta Moore, Dawn Smith were acting
     individually in exceeding their discretion and judgment …
     described herein above within the line and scope of their
     employment but beyond the authority granted to them by
     Defendant Macon County Board of Education. The
     Defendants Moore and Smith were employees or agents of
     Defendant Macon County Board of Education, but the claims
     of [Bolden] against said Defendants Arnetta Moore and/or
     Dawn Smith are maintained against said persons in their
     individual capacity for engaging in actions harmful to [T.B.]
     which were prohibited by the Defendant Macon County Board
     of Education.

           "….

          "10. After March 17, 2016, the minor plaintiff [T.B.] was
     caused to be injured and damaged when the Defendant Dawn
     Smith, acting individually, and as a teacher at Deborah
                                  16
SC-2023-0322

     Cannon Wolfe Elementary School, and thus an employee of
     the Macon County Board of Education, physically assaulted
     [T.B.] by virtue of corporal punishment.

           "….

           "12. The Defendants Arnetta Moore and Dawn Smith
     individually exceeded discretionary judgment and engaged in
     acts that were reckless, malicious, and beyond their authority
     and … outside the scope of the Macon County Board of
     Education's policies and procedures for touching, contacting
     or punishing a student."

     The Macon County Board of Education filed a motion to dismiss the

claims asserted against it in Bolden's amended complaint based on State

immunity. The circuit court granted that motion on January 9, 2019,

leaving only Moore and Smith as defendants in Bolden's action on behalf

of T.B.

     On November 26, 2018, Smith and Moore filed a joint answer to

Bolden's amended complaint in which they again asserted the defense of

State-agent immunity. On December 21, 2018, Smith filed a summary-

judgment motion and a brief in support thereof in which she contended

that she was entitled to: (1) State-agent immunity; (2) parental immunity

because she had stood in loco parentis as T.B.'s teacher; and (3) statutory

immunity under § 16-28A-1, Ala. Code 1975, if the allegations concerned

                                    17
SC-2023-0322

a matter of student discipline. In support of her summary-judgment

motion, Smith submitted, among other exhibits, an affidavit from Smith

in which she categorically stated: "I never held [T.B.'s] arm or arms

behind his back while telling another student to hit [T.B.]. I never

witnessed another student hit [T.B.]. I do not administer corporal

punishment on my students, and I have never corporally punished

[T.B.]."

      On January 7, 2019, Bolden filed a response in opposition to Smith's

summary-judgment motion in which she argued that Smith was not

entitled to State-agent immunity because, she said, Smith had acted

beyond her authority by violating the Macon County Board of Education

Policy Manual's section that addressed the use of corporal punishment.

Bolden further contended that § 16-28A-1 provided Smith no protection

because it only permits a teacher to use corporal punishment "[s]o long

as teachers follow approved policy in the exercise of their responsibility

to maintain discipline in their classroom," but, she said, Smith had not

followed that policy. In support of her response in opposition to Smith's

summary-judgment motion, Bolden submitted, among other exhibits, the

full deposition testimonies from herself, T.B., and Smith, a copy of the

                                   18
SC-2023-0322

D.C. Wolfe Faculty/Staff Handbook, and the section of the Macon County

Board of Education Policy Manual that addressed corporal punishment.

     On January 8, 2019, Smith filed a reply to Bolden's response in

opposition to Smith's summary-judgment motion. In that reply, Smith

noted, among other things, that Bolden had not addressed the claim of

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Smith thus argued that she

was entitled to a summary judgment as to that claim On the same date,

Smith filed several motions to strike exhibits Bolden had submitted in

support of her response to Smith's summary-judgment motion. Relevant

here is Smith's motion to strike portions of Bolden's deposition testimony

concerning the alleged incident with Y. because Bolden had admitted she

was not present at D.C. Wolfe on the day of the alleged incident and that

she had learned what had happened from T.B. Consequently, Smith

argued, the portions of Bolden's testimony that addressed the alleged

incident should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay. The circuit court

never ruled on that motion or any of Smith's other motions to strike

evidence submitted by Bolden in response to Smith's summary-judgment

motion.

                                   19
SC-2023-0322

     On March 8, 2019, Bolden filed a "Sur-Reply to Defendant Dawn

Smith's Motions to Strike." As part of that filing, Bolden again submitted

the full deposition testimonies from herself and T.B., but she also

submitted the deposition testimony from Superintendent Brooks. On

March 11, 2019, Smith filed a motion to strike Bolden's surreply. Smith

contended that the surreply was not permitted under the Alabama Rules

of Civil Procedure without leave of the circuit court. Simultaneously,

Smith also filed a response to Bolden's surreply. The circuit court never

ruled on Smith's motion to strike Bolden's surreply.

     On November 8, 2019, the circuit court entered a default judgment

against Moore, because Moore never showed up for a deposition. On

March 13, 2020, the circuit court entered an order assessing damages

against Moore. The circuit court awarded Bolden, on behalf of T.B.,

compensatory damages in the amount of $1,500,000 and punitive

damages "for [Moore's] intentional misuse of corporal punishment" in the

amount of $500,000.

     The circuit court held a hearing on Smith's summary-judgment

motion on October 6, 2022. On March 24, 2023, the circuit court entered

an order stating: "Defendant Dawn Smith's Motion for Summary

                                   20
SC-2023-0322

Judgment is hereby DENIED. Count IV of [Bolden's] Complaint and

Amended Complaint alleging Intentional, Wanton, Reckless, or

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is hereby DISMISSED."

(Capitalization in original.)

                          II. Standard of Review

           "A writ of mandamus is a

           " 'drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued
           only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the
           petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative
           duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied
           by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
           adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
           jurisdiction of the court.'

     "Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
     1993); Ex parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715, 717
     (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Day, 584 So. 2d 493, 494 (Ala. 1991).
     While the general rule is that denial of a summary-judgment
     motion is not immediately reviewable by an appellate court,
     the exception to the general rule is that a denial of a motion
     for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is
     immediately reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus,
     Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996) ….

          "However, whether review of the denial of a summary-
     judgment motion is by a petition for a writ of mandamus or by
     permissive appeal, the appellate court's standard of review
     remains the same. If there is a genuine issue as to any
     material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled
     to immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to a
     summary judgment. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. In determining
     whether there is [an issue of] material fact on the question
                                    21
SC-2023-0322

     whether the movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial
     and appellate, must view the record in the light most
     favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving
     party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence,
     and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party,
     considering only the evidence before the trial court at the time
     it denied the motion for a summary judgment. Ex parte Rizk,
     791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)."

Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).

                              III. Analysis

     Smith begins the argument portion of her petition by contending

that Bolden's official-capacity claims are barred by State immunity.

However, as we noted in our rendition of the facts, Bolden's amended

complaint did not assert any official-capacity claims against Smith, so

Smith's arguments in that regard are irrelevant.

     Smith begins her argument concerning Bolden's individual-

capacity claims by contending that Smith's alleged conduct occurred in

the course of performing duties that entitle her to State-agent immunity.

                 " '[T]his Court has established a "burden-
           shifting" process when a party raises the defense
           of State-agent immunity. Giambrone v. Douglas,
           874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003). In order to claim
           State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the
           burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims
           arise from a function that would entitle the State
           agent to immunity. Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052;

                                   22
SC-2023-0322

            Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002). If
            the State agent makes such a showing, the burden
            then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State
            agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
            bad faith, or beyond his or her authority.
            Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d
            at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala.
            1998). "A State agent acts beyond authority and is
            therefore not immune when he or she 'fail[s] to
            discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
            regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.' "
            Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte
            Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).'

      "Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
      'State-agent immunity protects agents of the State in their
      exercise of discretion in educating students. We will not
      second-guess their decisions.' Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So.
      2d 1186, 1190 (Ala. 2000). However, '[o]nce it is determined
      that State-agent immunity applies, State-agent immunity is
      withheld upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully,
      maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her
      authority. [Ex parte ] Cranman, 792 So. 2d [392,] at 405 [(Ala.
      2000)].' Ex parte Bitel, 45 So. 3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala. 2010)."

N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561, 566 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis added). More

specifically,

             " '[a] State agent shall be immune from civil
            liability in his or her personal capacity when the
            conduct made the basis of the claim against the
            agent is based upon the agent's

                 " '....

                                    23
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                " '(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
           duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in ...
           educating students.

                 " 'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
           in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State
           agent shall not be immune from civil liability in
           his or her personal capacity

                 " '(1) when the Constitution or laws of the
           United States, or the Constitution of this State, or
           laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
           promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
           activities of a governmental agency require
           otherwise; or

                 " '(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
           maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
           or her authority, or under a mistaken
           interpretation of the law.'

     "Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (plurality
     opinion) (adopted by this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
     173 (Ala. 2000))."

Ex parte Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 48 So. 3d 621, 625 (Ala. 2010). See

also § 36-1-12, Ala. Code 1975.

     Smith contends that she made a prima facie showing that Bolden's

allegations arose from Smith's function as an educator of students. There

is no dispute that the alleged incident with Y. occurred in Smith's

classroom while T.B. was a student in her class. Smith argues that she
                                    24
SC-2023-0322

has discretion to discipline her students to maintain a suitable learning

environment for all students.

     Bolden counters by contending that Smith acted beyond her

authority by using corporal punishment in a manner that clearly violated

the Macon County Board of Education Policy Manual's section

addressing corporal punishment. That section provides:

     "6.16 Corporal Punishment

          "The Board allows reasonable corporal punishment of
     students under the following terms and conditions. Corporal
     punishment will be administered only as a disciplinary
     measure, with due regard for the age and physical condition
     of the student, and without excessive force. Corporal
     punishment will be administered by the school principal or
     his representative in the presence of another adult
     professional school system employee. Corporal punishment
     should not be administered in the presence of another
     student. The Superintendent is authorized to develop and
     implement procedures for administering and documenting
     corporal punishment, consistent with the terms of this policy.

     "[Reference: Ala. Code § 16-28A-2 (1975)]"

(Bold typeface in original.)

     The Macon County Board of Education approved the policy manual

on July 30, 2010. Additionally, the verbatim corporal-punishment policy

is contained in the "Macon County Schools Personnel Manual with

                                   25
SC-2023-0322

Employee Code of Conduct," which Smith admitted in her deposition

applied to her.

     Bolden contends that Smith violated the Macon County Board of

Education's corporal-punishment policy in three ways: (1) the

punishment was not carried out with due regard for T.B.'s age as a second

grader and involved excessive force; (2) the punishment was not

performed by D.C. Wolfe's principal or her representative in the presence

of another adult school-system employee; and (3) the punishment was

administered in the presence of another student. Bolden argues that

because Smith failed to follow the detailed rules provided to Macon

County school-system employees regarding how corporal punishment

should be administered, Smith is not entitled to State-agent immunity

for her actions.

     Smith does not deny that her actions as described by T.B. did not

conform to the Macon County Board of Education's corporal-punishment

policy. Instead, she contends that "[t]he evidence before the circuit court,

… viewed in the light most favorable to [Bolden], does not establish that

Ms. Smith administered corporal punishment. The policy was

                                    26
SC-2023-0322

inapplicable, and the [circuit] court therefore erred in denying State-

agent immunity." Smith's petition, pp. 12-13.

     Smith presents two arguments as to why the alleged incident did

not constitute corporal punishment, neither of which we find persuasive.

First, she contends that "[t]here was no evidence before the circuit court

that this incident, which Ms. Smith denies even occurred, was in

punishment for T.B.'s misbehavior." Smith's petition, p. 13. Smith insists

that the only evidence that indicated that Smith's actions were in

response to T.B.'s misbehavior was Bolden's testimony that "[T.B.] told

me that the little boy threw something and hit him with it, so [T.B.] hit

him back. When [T.B.] hit him back, that's when Ms. Smith grabbed his

arms and told [Y.] to come hit him back." Smith notes, however, that she

filed in the circuit court a motion to strike that portion of Bolden's

deposition testimony as improper hearsay, and she asserts that it cannot

be considered in determining whether the Macon County Board of

Education's corporal-punishment policy applies here. See, e.g., Schroeder

v. Vellianitis, 570 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Ala. 1990) ("Under Rule 56(e), [Ala.

Civ. App.,] 'evidence offered in response to the motion … must present

facts that would be admissible into evidence. ... Hearsay cannot create an

                                    27
SC-2023-0322

issue of fact.' " (quoting Black v. Reynolds, 528 So. 2d 848, 849 (Ala.

1988))). Smith argues that, without Bolden's testimony,

     "[t]here was no evidence properly before the circuit court …
     that Ms. Smith intervened in an altercation between students
     or that she saw or even knew about any altercation between
     Y. and T.B. There is no evidence Ms. Smith administered
     punishment to T.B. or that she used excessive force in holding
     his arm. Nor is there any evidence that [Smith] told Y. to hit
     T.B. 'in the face.' That is purely argument of counsel and is
     not evidence."

Smith's petition, p. 15.

     There are multiple problems with the foregoing argument. First,

assuming -- without deciding -- that Bolden's testimony was inadmissible

hearsay, 3 T.B. still testified that he and Y. previously had been in fights,

and that they had fought earlier that very day. In fact, T.B. admitted that

he had punched Y. in that day's fight, and had hurt Y., but that T.B. had

not been hurt. Consequently, an inference can be made based on T.B.'s

testimony that Smith's alleged actions were meant as a disciplinary

     3We note that although, in the specific testimony cited by Smith,

Bolden explained that T.B. had told her what had precipitated the
incident, elsewhere in her testimony Bolden also stated that she had told
Smith in a meeting: " 'Well, maybe if you hadn't held [T.B.'s] arms back
and let a student hit him, he would not have called you a B-word.' " That
more general testimony would not qualify as hearsay testimony.

                                     28
SC-2023-0322

measure against T.B. for fighting with, and hurting, Y. See, e.g.,

Tanksley v. ProSoft Automation, Inc., 982 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Ala. 2007)

(observing that "we 'accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable

to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor

of the nonmoving party' " (quoting Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 54 (Ala.

2003))).

     Second, T.B. clearly testified that Smith held his arms and told Y.

to hit T.B. 4 We quoted that testimony at length in the rendition of the

facts. Thus, if Smith's alleged actions were not intended to be disciplinary

toward T.B., we are left to wonder: What legitimate reason could justify

those actions? Without some provocation or purpose, Smith's alleged

actions would simply be categorized as assault and battery, and certainly

not protected by State-agent immunity. See, e.g., Gary v. Crouch, 867 So.

2d 310, 313-14 (Ala. 2003) (noting that "State-agent immunity[] does not

provide immunity from liability for the commission of an intentional tort"

(footnote omitted)). Indeed, in her reply brief, Smith seems to backtrack

     4Smith repeatedly and erroneously states that Bolden's allegation

is that Smith held T.B.'s "arm," when, in fact, T.B.'s testimony was that
Smith held both of T.B.'s arms. Smith also repeatedly fails to mention
T.B.'s additional assertions that Smith told Y. to hit T.B. and that Smith
allowed Y. to hit T.B. in the face.
                                    29
SC-2023-0322

from her initial position that her alleged actions had nothing to do with

student discipline.

          "[Smith's] actions on the day of the alleged incident
     amount to using her judgment as part of the education
     process. Part of [Smith's] responsibilities as a teacher are to
     supervise and educate students in her classroom. [Smith]
     used her professional judgment in determining how to
     maintain order in her classroom and how to correct her
     students. Since students have a right to learn in a non-
     disruptive environment, [Smith] used her training,
     experience and judgment in addressing student behavior
     issues, including those which disrupt other students.

          "[Smith] was clearly engaged in the education process
     during the alleged incident. As such, [Smith] is entitled to the
     protection of State-agent immunity. T.B.'s testimony, at most,
     shows that [Smith's] alleged actions were taken to maintain
     order in her classroom, not to administer corporal
     punishment. [Bolden] has not shown that [Smith's] allegedly
     holding T.B.'s arm was not for the purpose of keeping him
     from hitting his classmate again."

Smith's reply brief, pp. 7-8 (citations to evidentiary materials omitted;

emphasis added).

     Once again, there are multiple problems with the foregoing

interpretation of the incident. First, Smith again mischaracterizes T.B.'s

testimony: it was not that Smith held one of T.B.'s arms to keep T.B. from

hitting another classmate -- a possibility Smith presents without any

evidentiary support; it was that Smith held both of T.B.'s arms,

                                   30
SC-2023-0322

instructed Y. to hit T.B., and allowed Y. to punch T.B. in the face.5

Second, if Smith was, as she implies, "addressing student behavior"

through physical force, that would seem to fall under the rubric of

corporal punishment, i.e., physical punishment for misbehavior.

     That brings us to Smith's second argument as to why, she says, the

alleged incident did not constitute corporal punishment. Smith

repeatedly contends that the term "corporal punishment" refers only to

using a paddle on a student, but that there was no such allegation in this

instance, and so, Smith says, she did not administer corporal

punishment. See Smith's reply brief, p. 1 ("[Smith's] alleged actions do

not constitute corporal punishment, making the cited policy inapplicable.

[Smith] did not paddle T.B."); p. 4 ("[Smith] never paddled T.B. [Bolden]

cannot show otherwise. [Bolden] incorrectly categorizes [Smith's] alleged

actions of holding T.B.'s arm as 'corporal or physical punishment.' "

(emphasis in original)); p. 5 ("[Bolden] failed to show that the [Macon

     5Smith posited a similar scenario in her initial brief: "It was clearly

within Ms. Smith's authority to restrain a student if necessary in her
judgment and there is no evidence Ms. Smith restrained T.B. with
excessive force." Smith's petition, p. 17. But again, Smith leaves out
T.B.'s testimony that Smith told Y. to hit T.B. and that Smith allowed Y.
to punch T.B. in the face.
                                   31
SC-2023-0322

County School] Board's corporal punishment policy governed [Smith's]

alleged actions. T.B. does not claim that [Smith] paddled him. T.B. claims

instead that [Smith] held his arm and told another student to hit him.

Such is not corporal punishment.").

     Smith's argument lacks merit for a host of reasons. First, the Macon

County Board of Education's corporal-punishment policy does not define

the term corporal punishment as only involving the use of a paddle on a

student; in fact, it does not provide any specific definition of the term.

Second, in her deposition, Superintendent Brooks testified that corporal

punishment includes more than just paddling.

          "Q. [Bolden's counsel:] All right. What is the board of
     education's policy on corporal punishment?

           "A. The corporal punishment policy is that corporal
     punishment may be administered in Macon County schools by
     the principal or other person in the presence of another adult.

          "Q. All right. And this will probably date me a little bit,
     but what do you mean by corporal punishment?

          "A. Corporal punishment can be physical exercises,
     squats, squats, swats.

           "Q. Paddles?

           "A. (Witness nods head.)

                                   32
SC-2023-0322

          "Q. They still paddle kids? I am for that. I don't have a
     problem with that.

           "Do they?

           "A. You can."

     Third, the portions of Title 16 -- the Alabama Code's title concerning

education -- that reference corporal punishment do not indicate that it is

limited to paddling. Section 16-28A-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in

pertinent part:

           "It is the finding of the Alabama Legislature that the
     people of Alabama have two basic expectations of their public
     schools: (1) that students be allowed to learn in a safe
     classroom setting where order and discipline are maintained;
     and (2) that students learn at the level of their capabilities
     and achieve accordingly. The Legislature finds further that
     every child in Alabama is entitled to have access to a program
     of instruction which gives him or her the right to learn in a
     non-disruptive environment. No student has a right to be
     unruly in his or her classroom to the extent that such
     disruption denies fellow students of their right to learn. The
     teacher in each classroom is expected to maintain order and
     discipline. Teachers are hereby given the authority and
     responsibility to use appropriate means of discipline up to and
     including corporal punishment as may be prescribed by the
     local board of education. So long as teachers follow approved
     policy in the exercise of their responsibility to maintain
     discipline in their classroom, such teacher shall be immune
     from civil or criminal liability."

(Emphasis added.) Section 16-28A-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

                                   33
SC-2023-0322

           "The provisions of Title 26 shall not apply to public
     school teachers in relation to corporal punishment of students
     when the punishment is consistent with established written
     policies of the employing board of education. Neither shall the
     provisions of Title 26 apply to public school teachers or other
     employees while maintaining order and discipline in the
     classroom and on public school property, including school
     buses, consistent with written policies of the employing board
     of education."

(Emphasis added.) Section 16-1-23, Ala. Code 1975, which defines and

prohibits "hazing," provides in part:

           "(a) Hazing is defined as follows:

                 "….

                  "(3) The term hazing as defined in this
           section does not include customary athletic events
           or similar contests or competitions, and is limited
           to those actions taken and situations created in
           connection with initiation into or affiliation with
           any organization. The term hazing does not
           include corporal punishment administered by
           officials or employees of public schools when in
           accordance with policies adopted by local boards of
           education."

(Emphasis added.) 6

     6Smith argues that § 16-28A-1 gave her the "authority to restrain a

student if necessary" and "the responsibility to maintain order and
discipline." Smith's petition, p. 17; Smith's reply brief, p. 14 (emphasis
omitted). But §§ 16-1-23(a)(3), 16-28A-1, 16-28A-2 all make it clear that
the use of corporal punishment is permissible only if it is consistent with
the written policies of the local board of education. Section 16-28A-1
                                     34
SC-2023-0322

       Fourth, in several cases the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has

described punishments of students other than paddling as "corporal

punishment." In Huntsville City Board of Education v. Jacobs, 194 So. 3d

929, 941 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014), an incident of a teacher hitting a student

on the back with her hand was deemed to be a violation of the Huntsville

City Board of Education's policy that "prohibited the use of corporal

punishment in the Huntsville city schools." In Alabama State Tenure

Commission v. Birmingham Board of Education, 500 So. 2d 1155 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1986), a high-school basketball coach's hitting his players with

his fists was deemed a violation of the Birmingham public schools' policy

concerning corporal punishment. In Alabama Department of Youth

Services v. State Personnel Board, 7 So. 3d 380, 382 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008),

which did not involve a school system, an Alabama Department of Youth

Services ("DYS") supervisor described the DYS policy that " '[c]orporal

punishment is strictly prohibited and includes striking a student with

one's fist.' "

offers Smith no protection if she violated the Macon County Board of
Education's corporal-punishment policy.
                                  35
SC-2023-0322

     Fifth, in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-63 (1977), the

United States Supreme Court outlined the history of the use of corporal

punishment in public schools throughout the nation in the course of

concluding that the prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" in

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not apply

to the use of corporal punishment in schools. In the course of

summarizing that history, the Court simply, but generally, defined

corporal punishment as "reasonable but not excessive force to discipline

a child" even though the particular facts in Ingraham did involve a child

who was disciplined with blows from a paddle. 430 U.S. at 661.

     Finally, the general definition of the term "corporal punishment" is

not limited to paddling. The word "corporal" comes from the Latin word

"corpus" which literally means "body." "Corporal" literally means "of the

body." Webster's New World Dictionary of American English, Third

College Edition, 311 (1988). That same dictionary defines "corporal

punishment" as "punishment inflicted directly on the body, as flogging:

now usually distinguished from capital punishment, imprisonment, etc."

Id. The edition of Black's Law Dictionary in use at the time the Macon

                                   36
SC-2023-0322

County Board of Education's corporal-punishment policy was approved

in July 2010 defined "corporal punishment" as:

     "Physical punishment; punishment that is inflicted on the
     body (including imprisonment).

           " 'Past forms of corporal punishment included
           branding, blinding, mutilation, amputation, and
           the use of the pillory and the stocks. It was also an
           element in such violent modes of execution as
           drowning, stoning, burning, hanging, and drawing
           and quartering [….] In most parts of Europe and
           in the United States, such savage penalties were
           replaced by imprisonment during the late
           eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
           although capital punishment itself remained.
           Physical chastisement became less frequent until,
           in the twentieth century, corporal punishment was
           either eliminated as a legal penalty or restricted to
           beating with a birch rod, cane, whip, or other
           scourge. In ordinary usage the term now refers to
           such penal flagellation.' Gordon Hawkins,
           'Corporal Punishment,' in 1 Encyclopedia of Crime
           and Justice 251, 251 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
           1983)."

Black's Law Dictionary 1353 (9th ed. 2009).7

     In short, there is no reason to assume that the Macon County Board

of Education's corporal-punishment policy applies only to instances in

     7That same definition is still used in the current 11th edition of

Black's Law Dictionary published in 2019.
                                  37
SC-2023-0322

which a school employee uses a paddle for physical punishment on a

student as opposed to a situation in which a teacher restrains a student

and tells another student to hit the student she is restraining. As Bolden

notes, "[n]o teacher would be allowed to strike a child in the face with her

own fist, and is not allowed to do so by proxy." Bolden's brief, p. 21

(emphasis omitted).

     Smith's erroneous assumption that corporal punishment must

involve a paddle is the only way she distinguishes two cases Bolden cites

-- Lewis v. Mitchell, 188 So. 3d 698 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), and Ex parte

Monroe County Board of Education, 48 So. 3d 621 (Ala. 2010) -- that

support Bolden's position that Smith acted beyond her authority by

violating the Macon County Board of Education's corporal-punishment

policy. See Smith's reply brief, p. 6 ("Both of these cases involve paddlings

by educators which breached [school] Board policy. Holding a student's

arm does not amount to [a] paddling. [Bolden's] categorization of

[Smith's] alleged actions as corporal punishment does not make it so.").

     In Ex parte Monroe County Board of Education, a fifth-grade

teacher paddled a 12-year-old student "for having repeatedly disrupted

his fifth-grade class." 48 So. 3d at 622. This Court declined to grant the

                                     38
SC-2023-0322

teacher's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a dismissal of the

claims asserted against him by the student's mother based on State-

agent immunity. The Court noted that the Monroe County Board of

Education's corporal-punishment policy "unequivocally … required

witnesses to be present when corporal punishment was administered."

Id. at 627-28. The Court concluded that "[b]ecause [the teacher] did not

administer the corporal punishment in the presence of another employee,

she did not adhere to the [school] Board's policy, she exceeded the scope

of her authority, and she was not entitled to a summary judgment based

on State-agent immunity." Id. at 628.

     In Lewis, a mother argued that a high-school teacher had exceeded

the scope of his authority in administering corporal punishment to her

son and that, therefore, the teacher was not entitled to State-agent

immunity. The Court of Civil Appeals observed that the mother had

presented evidence indicating that the teacher had used corporal

punishment on her son "because he had failed a test" and that both the

superintendent of the school system and the high-school principal had

testified that using corporal punishment on a student for making a bad

grade was a violation of the school system's policies. See Lewis, 188 So.

                                   39
SC-2023-0322

3d at 700-01. The Lewis court further noted that the mother had also

presented evidence indicating that the teacher had not "used 'moderate'

force in accordance with the [school] board's policy." Id. at 701. Following

this Court's lead in Ex parte Monroe County Board of Education, the

Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that

            "[b]ecause [the mother] presented evidence indicating
      that [the teacher] had used corporal punishment in violation
      of the [school] board's policy, we conclude that there was a
      genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [the teacher]
      'exceeded the scope of [his] authority, and [that he, therefore,]
      was not entitled to a summary judgment based on State-agent
      immunity.' Ex parte Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 48 So. 3d at
      628."

Id.

      As in Ex parte Monroe County Board of Education and Lewis,

Bolden presented substantial evidence indicating that Smith had used

corporal punishment on T.B. in violation of the Macon County Board of

Education's corporal-punishment policy. Accordingly, Smith was not

entitled to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity.

      Smith also briefly argues that, even if the alleged incident involved

the use of corporal punishment, she was entitled to "schoolmaster's

immunity." See Smith's petition, pp. 29-30; Smith's reply brief, pp. 12-13.

                                     40
SC-2023-0322

In Hinson v. Holt, 776 So. 2d 804, 810-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), the Court

of Civil Appeals explained:

           "At common law, 'any touching by one person of the
     person of another in rudeness or in anger is an assault and
     battery.' Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 82, 53 So. 753, 754 (1910);
     see also Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So. 2d 1097, 1104 (Ala.
     1986). However, the Alabama Supreme Court has recognized
     a qualified privilege for an educator's discipline of a student.
     In Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954), the court
     affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of a
     schoolmaster on his pupil's assault-and-battery claims
     because evidence in that case justified such a verdict. The
     Suits court noted the following applicable principles of law:

                 " 'A schoolmaster is regarded as standing in
           loco parentis and has the authority to administer
           moderate correction to pupils under his care. To be
           guilty of an assault and battery, the teacher must
           not only inflict on the child immoderate
           chastisement, but he must do so with legal malice
           or wicked motives or he must inflict some
           permanent       injury.   In    determining     the
           reasonableness of the punishment or the extent of
           malice, proper matters for consideration are the
           instrument used and the nature of the offense
           committed by the child, the age and physical
           condition of the child, and the other attendant
           circumstances.'

     "260 Ala. at 450, 71 So. 2d at 50."

     Smith argues that

     "there was no evidence before the circuit court that she
     administered excessive or immoderate discipline to T.B. Nor
     was there any evidence Ms. Smith acted with malice or
                                    41
SC-2023-0322

     improper motive, and it is undisputed that T.B. suffered no
     injury at all. [Therefore, under Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449,
     71 So. 2d 49 (1954), the] circuit court erred in denying Ms.
     Smith's motion for a summary judgment."

Smith's petition, p. 30.

     First, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances under which T.B.'s

allegation that Smith restrained T.B.'s arms, instructed Y. to hit T.B.,

and allowed Y. to punch T.B. in the face would not be considered

excessive or immoderate discipline toward a second grader. Regardless,

Smith appears to misunderstand the scope of the immunity described in

Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954). "In Suits, the Alabama

Supreme Court identified elements a student plaintiff would have to

prove in order to recover on for assault and battery based on corporal

punishment." H.Y. ex rel. K.Y. v. Russell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp.

2d 1174, 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

     "Under Suits, 'a teacher may punish a student unless he
     "inflict[s] on the child immoderate chastisement ... with legal
     malice or wicked motives ... or inflict[s] some permanent
     injury." ' Deal ex rel. Barber v. Hill, 619 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Ala.
     1993) (alterations in original) (quoting Suits, 71 So. 2d at 50)."

Wilcox v. Andalusia City Sch. Bd. of Educ., [No. 2:19-cv-650-RAH, Mar.

8, 2023] __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (M.D. Ala. 2023). See also Smith v. Smith,

922 So. 2d 94, 98 (Ala. 2005) (explaining that "a teacher ' "is regarded as
                                     42
SC-2023-0322

standing in loco parentis" ' and has the authority to administer moderate

corporal punishment to students under his or her care. Deal v. Hill, 619

So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 450,

71 So. 2d 49, 50 (1954))."). Thus, assuming schoolmaster's immunity may

be applicable in this case, it would apply only to Bolden's claims of assault

and battery.

      Even so, we already have concluded that Bolden presented

substantial evidence indicating that Smith acted beyond her authority by

violating the Macon County Board of Education's corporal-punishment

policy.

      "This court, in Hinson v. Holt, held that evidence of a violation
      of a board of education's policy regarding corporal punishment
      was evidence of malice. 776 So. 2d at 812. Similarly, in the
      present case, evidence indicating that [the teacher] had
      violated the [school] board's policy would be evidence of
      malice. Because we have concluded that there is an issue of
      fact regarding whether [the teacher] violated the policy of the
      [school] board, we likewise conclude that there is an issue of
      fact regarding whether there was evidence of malice.
      Therefore, [the teacher] is not entitled to a summary
      judgment in his favor based on schoolmaster immunity."

Lewis, 188 So. 3d at 701-02. As in Hinson and Lewis, evidence indicating

that Smith violated the Macon County Board of Education's corporal-

punishment policy raises an issue of fact as to whether Smith acted with

                                     43
SC-2023-0322

malice. Therefore, Smith was not entitled to a summary judgment based

on schoolmaster's immunity with respect to Bolden's claims of assault

and battery.

                             IV. Conclusion

     As we noted in the standard of review, this Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to Bolden. Under that standard,

T.B.'s testimony established that Smith used a form of corporal

punishment when she held T.B.'s arms behind his back, told Y. to hit

T.B., and allowed Y. to punch T.B. in the face. Bolden also presented

substantial evidence indicating that Smith violated the Macon County

Board of Education's specific corporal-punishment policy, thus indicating

that Smith acted beyond her authority; therefore, Smith is not entitled

to State-agent immunity. Bolden's evidence indicating that Smith

violated the corporal-punishment policy also means that Smith is not

entitled to statutory immunity under § 16-28A-1, and she is not entitled

to schoolmaster's immunity concerning Bolden's claims of assault and

battery. Therefore, Smith's petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be

denied.

     PETITION DENIED.

                                   44
SC-2023-0322

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ.,

concur.

     Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.

                                  45