Court Opinion

ID: 9774919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:14.503172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:31.045592
License: Public Domain

OPINION
HECHT, Justice.
If an individual’s action for personal injuries would have been barred by limitations *344at the time of his death, are actions based upon the same wrongful conduct, brought by his heirs, legal representatives or estate under the Survival Statute, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 71.021, and by his beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Statute, Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 71.001-011, also barred by limitations? Both the district court and the court of appeals answered this question affirmatively. 795 S.W.2d 243. We agree.
I
In 1981, Donnon Russell was diagnosed as suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease caused by exposure to silica during his employment for many years as a sandblaster and painter. In 1982, Russell filed suit to recover damages for his injuries. In amended pleadings, Russell named a total of 14 defendants who he alleged manufactured and distributed products containing silica that he had used in his work. In 1988, before the case could come to trial, Russell died. Five weeks later, Russell’s widow and four children1 filed an amended petition naming themselves as plaintiffs and claiming damages on behalf of Russell’s estate and for his death. Plaintiffs also added seven defendants whom Russell had never sued himself, who are respondents in this Court.2
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred by limitations. In their last amended petition in the trial court plaintiffs asserted claims based on strict liability, negligence, gross negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. Respondents argue that the causes of action against them accrued either in 1981 when Russell’s condition was first diagnosed, or no later than 1982 when he filed suit. Had Russell sued respondents immediately before his death, his claims would have been barred by limitations.3 Respondents contend that plaintiffs’ actions are derivative of Russell’s and are therefore likewise barred.
Plaintiffs argue that while their actions are in some sense derivative of Russell’s, the sole statute of limitations applicable to their claims under the survival and wrongful death statutes is Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(b), which states: “A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.” Based upon this statute, plaintiffs argue that they had two years from Russell's death to file their claims, even if Russell’s own claims for the same injury would have been barred at the time he died.
The district court granted summary judgment for respondents and severed it from plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants which Russell timely sued. The court of appeals affirmed. 795 S.W.2d 243.
II
At common law, an individual’s action for personal injuries did not survive his death. Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex.1990); Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1963). The Legislature has abrogated this rule by Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 71.021, which states:
*345Survival of Cause of Action
(a) A cause of action for personal injury to the health, reputation, or person of an injured person does not abate because of the death of the injured person or because of the death of a person liable for the injury.
(b) A personal injury action survives to and in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the injured person. The action survives against the liable person and the person’s legal representatives.
(c) The suit may be instituted and prosecuted as if the liable person were alive.
By this statute, a decedent’s action survives his death and may be prosecuted in his behalf. The survival action, as it is sometimes called, is wholly derivative of the decedent’s rights. The actionable wrong is that which the decedent suffered before his death. The damages recoverable are those which he himself sustained while he was alive and not any damages claimed independently by the survival action plaintiffs (except that funeral expenses may also be recovered if they w;ere not awarded in a wrongful death action). Landers, 369 S.W.2d at 35. Any recovery obtained flows to those who would have received it had he obtained it immediately prior to his death — that is, his heirs, legal representatives and estate. Id. Defenses that could have been raised against a claim by the injured person may also be raised against the same claim asserted by the person’s heirs and estate. See Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.1981).
It follows from these general principles that if a decedent’s action would have been barred by limitations had it been asserted immediately prior to his death, a survival action based upon the same alleged wrong is likewise barred. If the decedent’s action would not have been barred, the running of the limitations period is tolled by the decedent’s death for up to one year. Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.062.4 Had Russell sued respondents immediately prior to his death, alleging the same causes of action plaintiffs now assert in their survival action, those actions would have been barred by limitations. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs’ survival action against respondents is likewise barred by limitations.
Ill
Wrongful death actions are also derivative of the decedent’s rights. Such actions are creatures of statute abrogating the common law rule that no cause of action may be brought for the death of another person. Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d at 845; Farmers & Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). As initially passed, our Wrongful Death Statute provided in part:
Sec. 1. [Whensoever the death of any person may be caused by wrongful act, neglect, unskilfulness or default, and the act, neglect, unskilfulness or default is such as would (if death had hot ensued) have entitled the party, injured, to maintain an action for such injury, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured....
Sec. 3. The action shall be brought within one year after the death of such deceased.
Act approved Feb. 2, 1860, 8th Leg., R.S., ch. 35, § 1, 1860 Tex.Gen.Laws 32, 4 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1394 (1898). Sections 1 and 3 were amended and separated in 1879. Section 1 was changed to read in part: “The wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, unskillfulness or default mentioned ... must be of such character as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action *346for such injury.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 2900 (1879). Section 3 was moved from the wrongful death provisions to a general limitations provision which prescribed that certain actions be brought within one year, including: “Actions for injuries done to the person of another where death ensued from such injuries”. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 3202(4) (1879). The 1879 provision added: “the cause of action shall be considered as having accrued at the death of the party injured.” Id. In 1897, the limitations period was changed from one to two years. Act approved Mar. 4, 1897, 25th Leg., R.S., ch. 14, 1897 Tex.Gen.Laws 12, 12; 10 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1066, 1066 (1898). The language establishing the cause of action remained in substantially the same form, becoming article 4672 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, and in 1985, section 71.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex.Gen. Laws 3242, 3296, which is in effect today. The two-year limitations period has also remained constant, and is now codified at Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.003(b).
Currently, the Wrongful Death Statute allows an action by a decedent’s beneficiaries “only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived.” Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 71.003(a). As can be seen from the history of the statute recited above, this language is not a recent innovation but merely a recodification of language which has always been part of the Wrongful Death Statute.5 From the earlier language, it could have been argued, and in fact was, that a wrong “such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party, injured, to maintain an action for such injury then” meant only a wrong of an actionable nature, not one for which the injured party could actually have succeeded in recovering damages. In other words, the earlier language may be read to allow a decedent’s beneficiaries to recover for a wrong which caused his death, even if he could not have recovered himself, as long as it was “such as would” have allowed action — that is, the type of wrong for which he could have recovered. We long ago rejected this argument that the statute did not condition allowance of a wrongful death action upon the decedent’s right to maintain suit for his injuries immediately prior to his death. In Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex.Com.App. 1935), we wrote that the statute:
has not been construed literally as having reference only to the character of the wrongful or negligent act, but it has been construed and applied as meaning that the right of action given by the ... article exists only in cases wherein the injured person could himself have maintained an action for damages had he lived.
In [Wilson v. Brown, 154 S.W. 322, 326 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1912, writ ref’d) ], the contention was made that the words “of such character” used in the statute should be construed as descriptive of the act or acts of the defendant in and of themselves and separate and apart from the surrounding circumstances. The court, in holding that such construction was not sound, said: “The authorities show that the reasonable and sound construction to be placed upon that article is that it was the intention of the Legislature to declare that, unless the deceased could, at the time of his death, have maintained an action for the injury, such right of action should not exist in favor of the beneficiaries mentioned in the statute.
In Magnolia we held that parents could not sue for the death of a child from prenatal injuries because the child could not have sued for such injuries had he lived. We later overruled this holding in Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.1967), recognizing for the first time that prenatal injuries were actionable. Even so, however, Leal reaffirmed the reading of the statute upon which Magno*347lia was based, that “[a] right of action exists under the Wrongful Death Statute only where the injured party could have maintained an action for damages had death not ensued.” Id. at 821.
We have never departed from this construction of our Wrongful Death Statute. We have consistently held that the right of statutory beneficiaries to maintain a wrongful death action is entirely derivative of the decedent’s right to have sued for his own injuries immediately prior to his. death, and is subject to the same defenses to which the decedent’s action would have been subject. In short, wrongful death action plaintiffs stand in the legal shoes of the decedent. As we said in Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421, 424 (1961):
It is our opinion that under the express provisions of the Wrongful Death Act, the plaintiff is permitted to assert any basis for recovery that the decedent could have asserted if he were alive, and no other; and that the defendant can assert any defense to that cause of action that it could have asserted if the decedent had survived, and no other. The statutory beneficiaries of a deceased ... have the same substantive rights to recover as the deceased would have had had his injury been less than death.
Accordingly, we have recognized that a wrongful death action is not allowed if the decedent could not, immediately prior to his death, have maintained an action because of: governmental immunity, Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980); in-terspousal immunity, Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.1977), Wilson, 154 S.W. at 326-327; a spouse’s contributory negligence, Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex.1973), Dallas By. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103 S.W.2d 735, 736 (1937); contributory negligence, Vassallo, 344 S.W.2d at 424; absence of a cause of action for prenatal injury, Magnolia, 78 S.W.2d at 945, Leal, 419 S.W.2d at 821; the Texas Guest Statute, Bowman v. Puckett, 188 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex.1945); contractual limitation of liability, Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Watson, 106 Tex. 4, 155 S.W. 179, 180 (1913); release, Thompson v. Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co., 97 Tex. 590, 80 S.W. 990, 991 (1904); a fellow servant’s negligence, Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Berry, 67 Tex. 238, 5 S.W. 817, 818 (Tex.1887). Not all of these defenses remain viable, and thus the rule that a wrongful death claim is derivative of the decedent’s rights would be applied differently in many of these situations today.6 The rule itself, however, remains unassailed. For 132 years, since Texas first created an action for wrongful death, this Court has allowed the action only if the decedent could have maintained suit for his injuries immediately prior to his death. Our intermediate appellate courts have consistently followed this same rule, as have the federal courts constrained to apply Texas law.7
*348Plaintiffs, however, argue that the defense of limitations is an exception to the rule that a wrongful death action is derivative. They base this argument on the second sentence of the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, which states that “[t]he cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.” Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.003(b). Because a wrongful death action does not accrue until the death of the injured person, plaintiffs argue, even if the decedent’s own cause of action is then barred, the wrongful death action is not.
We do not agree that section 16.003(b) must be read as an exception to section 71.003(a). Section 16.003(b) sets the time when a wrongful death action accrues, if it exists. It does not, however, provide that there is always an action to accrue. The Wrongful Death Statute allows an action by a decedent’s beneficiaries “only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived.” Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 71.-003(a). If a wrongful death action exists, it accrues, not when the decedent was injured, but at his death, and the limitations period on that action begins to run at death. But if a wrongful death action does not exist because the decedent could not maintain an action in his own right immediately prior to his death, for whatever reason, then no wrongful death action ever accrues. If a decedent’s own cause of action were barred by governmental immunity, or statute, or release, or res judicata, or any other affirmative defense, there is no wrongful death action to accrue. Thus, if a decedent settles his own cause of action for his injuries and then dies, his statutory beneficiaries never have a wrongful death cause of action. The action does not accrue at decedent’s death, despite section 16.003(b), because decedent already settled his own cause of action. Similarly, if a decedent litigates his own cause of action to a final judgment and then dies, no wrongful death action accrues, despite section 16.003(b), because decedent would have been barred by res judicata from asserting any further claims for his injuries immediately prior to his death. Section 16.003(b) does not create a cause of action, or resurrect one that has expired with the decedent; it only defines the period within which statutory beneficiaries must sue if they have a claim. See also Francis v. Herrin Transp. Co., 432 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex.1968) (wherein the Court stated in a related context: “If by ... law or statute the right to maintain the action and recover damages, although once given, no longer exists, our statute of limitation does not confer the right.”)
Plaintiffs contend that sections 71.003(a) and 16.003(b) must be read in conjunction with one another. These sections, however, do not conflict with each other under our analysis. Sections 71.003(a) and 16.-003(b) must indeed be read together, but they can be so read without reaching a result inconsistent with the derivative nature of wrongful death actions. If a decedent may maintain suit for personal injuries at his death, his statutory beneficiaries may sue for wrongful death, their cause of action accrues at the decedent’s death, and the limitations period begins to run against them from that point. Under section 16.-003(b), the time for suit never begins to run against statutory beneficiaries prior to decedent’s death.8 But if a decedent may not *349maintain suit because of some defense— release, res judicata, limitations, etc.— which may be properly interposed by defendants, there is no wrongful death action to accrue. The action is not barred by limitations before it accrues; it never accrues because the decedent could not maintain an action at his death.9
It is wrong to say, as one of the dissents does, that our decision penalizes the families of people who die lingering deaths. A person whose injuries result in death is entitled, while he is alive, to sue and recover damages from those liable for his injuries. The defendant against whom judgment is rendered is not required to respond again in damages to the family of the injured person after he dies. And the defendant who is exonerated of liability to the injured person is not required to defend against the same claims by the person’s family following his death. The families of injured persons are not penalized in such circumstances. Neither are they penalized when they are precluded from suing because a decedent, in his lifetime, chose not to sue until his own claims were barred by limitations. We have not, as one of the dissent states, placed wrongful death beneficiaries in the impossible situation of being required to file suit before the death of which they complain. We hold only, in the words of section 71.003(a), that they are entitled to sue “only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived.”
To adopt the plaintiffs’ position in this case would greatly relax the statute of limitations for death cases. By their reading of section 16.003(b), statutory beneficiaries are allowed to sue within two years of a death, even if the action which allegedly caused the death occurred five, ten, twenty or more years earlier. This would thwart the very purpose of limitations, which is to require that actions be brought within a reasonable, prescribed period after a wrong occurs.
The dissents would find support for their contrary conclusion in their reading of two of our prior decisions, DeHam v. Mexican Nat’l Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 381 (1893), and Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1990). But these cases do not provide such support. In De-Ham, the decedent was injured in Mexico but died in Texas. Decedent’s beneficiaries argued that because a wrongful death action does not accrue until the decedent’s death, as provided by the precursor of section 16.003(b), their action arose under the law of Texas, where the decedent died. The Court rejected this contention:
But this is merely a statute of limitation, and not a statute defining what shall constitute a cause of action. The reason of the provision is obvious. Since no action could be brought by the relatives of the injured person until death had ensued, and since a great length of time might elapse between the injury and the death, it was reasonable that the time of the death should be taken as the point from which limitation should begin to run. The article which gives an action in this class of cases reads: “An action for actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person may be brought in the following cases,” etc.... Although the right of action does not accrue to the beneficiaries named in the statute unless death ensues, the wrong for which the action is allowed is the injury which causes the death.
23 S.W. at 381-382. In holding that no action arose under Texas law, the Court did not use the limitations statute to create an exception to the general rule that a wrongful death action is derivative of a decedent’s rights. Rather, the Court went on to explain that if a person were injured by a fellow servant in a jurisdiction which barred recovery in such circumstances, his beneficiaries would not be entitled to recover, even if he died in a jurisdiction which did not bar recovery in such circumstances. *350Thus, the Court acknowledged the derivative nature of wrongful death actions.
In Moreno, two infants died of Reye’s syndrome shortly after birth. Not until later did their parents learn that the children had been given aspirin, which might have contributed to the reaction resulting in their deaths. The parents did not bring their wrongful death actions until more than four years after the death of the children. Citing the language quoted from DeHam above, the parents argued that section 16.003(b) sets only the earliest date that a wrongful death action can accrue. We rejected this argument, observing that the statute “was meant solely to prevent the potential anomaly of limitations running before death. Its purpose was not to extend the beginning of the running of the statute beyond the date of death.” 787 S.W.2d at 352. From this context, and from the fact that the injured persons were infants who died shortly after their injuries, the limitations to which we referred was that applicable to beneficiaries’ actions. We did not address the situation in which a decedent’s own action might be barred by limitations. If a decedent’s action is not barred by limitations at the time of his death, section 16.003(b) does not preclude his beneficiaries from suing until two years have elapsed. The time that may have elapsed from injury to death is not subtracted from the two years under section 16.003(b).10 This does not affect the general rule, however, that if the decedent’s action is barred by limitations, no wrongful death action accrues.
To try to show that the defense of limitations is different from other defenses to wrongful death actions, the dissents rely on two commentators, who purport only to state the majority rule in American jurisdictions,11 the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which conflicts with the first Restatement of Torts,12 and a few cases.13 But the more authoritative view, and probably the more prevalent, is that if a decedent's action would be barred by limitations, then so would a wrongful death action.14 Construing a federal statute, the *352United States Supreme Court stated in Michigan Central R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70, 33 S.Ct. 192, 196, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913):
[A]s the foundation of the right of action [for wrongful death] is the original wrongful injury to the decedent, it has been generally held that the new action is a right dependent upon the existence of a right in the decedent immediately before his death to have maintained an action for his wrongful injury.
Settled precedent of this Court and other courts in Texas, representing consistent statutory construction for more than a century, supports our conclusion that there should be no exception for limitations to the general rule providing that our statutory wrongful death claim is essentially derivative in nature. The weight of authority in other jurisdictions, unsurprisingly, reaches the same result. A single exception for limitations is logically inconsistent, in fact, with the principle underlying limitations — that actions should be timely asserted or not at all — since it would permit wrongful death beneficiaries to sue within two years of the death of their family member, regardless of how long before his death he may have been injured.
For all these reasons, we hold that the defense of limitations bars the wrongful death action against the respondents in this case as a matter of law.
* * * * * *
We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Concurring and dissenting opinion by DOGGETT, J., joined by MAUZY, J.
Concurring and dissenting opinion by GAMMAGE, J.

. Russell’s widow is Betty Parr Russell. His four children are Norma Lynn Coker, Gail Lee Harrah, Jeannie Marie Bourgoin and Dennis O'Neal Russell.

. Respondents are Ingersoll-Rand Co., McKenzie Equipment Co., Schramm, Inc., Cooper Industries, Inc., Joy Manufacturing Co., IC Group Inc., and Sullair Corp.

. The statutes of limitations applicable to these causes of actions are two or four years. Tex.Civ. Frac. & Rem.Code §§ 16.003(a), 16.004; TexJBus. & Com.Code § 2.725. Plaintiffs contend that fact issues remain as to when the causes of action against respondents accrued, precluding summary judgment. More specifically, plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule operates to delay accrual of the causes of action against respondents until Russell could reasonably have determined that they were among the parties at fault. Generally, however, "limitations begin to run when the fact of injury is known”, Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990), not when the alleged wrongdoers are identified. There is no question on the record before us that Russell’s actions accrued no later than 1982, when he filed suit.

. “(a) The death of a person against whom or in whose favor there may be a cause of action suspends the running of an applicable statute of limitations for 12 months after the death. "(b) If an executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate qualifies before the expiration of the period provided by this section, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the qualification.”

. The Legislature expressly intended the last re-codification to be without substantive change. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 1.001.

. For example, Bounds abolished interspousal immunity and Schwing abandoned the rule that a person’s negligence precluded recovery by the person’s spouse.

. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir.1991) (beneficiaries wrongful death action related back to filing of decedent’s action): Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir.1986) (wrongful death recovery precluded by Texas comparative negligence statute because decedent's negligence greater than tortfeasor’s, observing that "the Texas courts have, in an undeviating line, characterized the action on behalf of the decedent’s family as a purely derivative one”); Graffagnino v. Fibreboard Corp., 781 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam), on reh’g following 776 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.1985) (release by deceased and beneficiary barred subsequent suit by beneficiary, even where disease was not previously diagnosed); Delesma v. City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (5th Cir.1985) (wrongful death action barred by res judicata), aff’g 588 F.Supp. 35, 36-37 (N.D.Tex.1984) (action barred by limitations); Terry v. Tyler Pipe Indus., 645 F.Supp. 1194, 1196-98 (E.D.Tex.1986) (action barred by limitations); Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 502-04 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (action barred by Texas Smoke Detectors Statute); Maderazo v. Archem Co., 788 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (action against decedent’s employer barred by Workers’ Compensation Act); Davenport v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (action barred by limitations); Pastor v. Champs Restaurant, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (decedent’s negligence a defense); Wa-sham v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. *348App. — Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (action derivative); Velasquez v. Levingston, 598 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (recovery precluded by Texas comparative negligence statute because decedent’s negligence greater than tortfeasor’s); Donsbach v. Offield, 488 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1972, no writ) (action barred by interspousal immunity); Wentzel v. Neurenberg, 314 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1958, no writ) (action barred by contributory negligence of deceased’s spouse); Karling v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 303 S.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1957, writ ref.d n.r.e.) (action barred by governmental immunity); Kelley v. City of Austin, 268 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1954, no writ) (action barred by governmental immunity); Childs v. Childs, 107 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1937, no writ) (action barred by interspousal immunity).

. We do not decide here whether, under other statutes, a limitations period may begin to run against wrongful death beneficiaries prior to decedent’s death. See Wilson v. Rudd, 814 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ pending).

. We do not, contrary to the dissents’ charges, hold that limitations affects the substantive rights of the parties. It is a defense to an action which, like other defenses such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, and release, is waived if not interposed by the defendant in a wrongful death action.

. We do not comment upon the effect of any statute other than section 16.003(b). See note 8, supra.

. W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 957 (5th ed. 1984); William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 127, at 911 (4th ed. 1971); Leon Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 Tex.L.Rev. 461, 461, 463 (1948).

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 cmt. c, at 442 (1979) ("Under most wrongful death statutes, the cause of action is a new and independent one, accruing to the representative or to surviving relatives of the decedent only upon his death; and since the cause of action does not come into existence until the death, it is not barred by prior lapse of time, even though the decedent’s own cause of action for the injuries resulting in death would be barred.”); Restatement of Torts § 899 cmt. c, at 524-26 (1939) ("A cause of action for death is complete when death occurs; since, however, the decedent in his lifetime had a cause of action, the cause of action for death does not come into existence if before the death the action for the tortious conduct has been barred by the lapse of time.’’).

. Fisk v. United States, 657 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir.1981) (applying federal law); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Preston, 254 F. 229, 234 (3rd Cir.1918) (applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 585, 39 S.Ct. 182, 63 L.Ed. 433 (1919); Adams v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 1407, 1414, 1415 (D.Idaho 1984) (listing cases), appealed sub. nom. Waters v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.1985) (certification to Idaho Supreme Court), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 790 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1986) (mem.) (decision after Idaho Court refused certified question), after remand, 664 F.Supp. 463 (D.Idaho 1987), judgment on limitations vacated on other grounds 847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.1988); Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal.3d 646, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 80, 81, 557 P.2d 507, 513, 514 (1976); N.O. Nelson Mfg. Corp. v. Dickson, 114 Ind.App. 668, 53 N.E.2d 640, 641 (1944); Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky.1984); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass’n, 196 So.2d 91, 93 (Miss.1967); Gramlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180, 186 (Mo.Ct.App.1982); Brosse v. Camming, 20 Ohio App.3d 260, 20 OBR 322, 485 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1984); DeHart v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62, 39 O.O. 101, 85 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1948); see also James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 154 Ariz. 594, 744 P.2d 695, 704 (1987); Carroll v. W.R. Grace & Co., 830 P.2d 1253 (Mont.1992); Gilloon v. Humana, Inc., 100 Nev. 518, 687 P.2d 80, 81 (1984); Hoover's Adm’x v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W.Va. 268, 269, 33 S.E. 224, 225 (1899).

. Northington v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 432 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Ala.1983), citing Ellis v. Black Diamond Mining Co., 268 Ala. 576, 109 So.2d 699, 702 (1959); Matthews v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W.2d 485, 488 (1968) (action not barred at time of death), adopting *351the holding in Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 181 F.Supp. 648 (W.D.Ark.1960); Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1060 (Del.1989), citing Milford Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Elliott, 58 Del. 480, 210 A.2d 858, 860-61 (1965); Lambert v. Village of Summit, 104 Ill.App.3d 1034, 60 Ill.Dec. 778, 433 N.E.2d 1016 (1982) (Lambert’s argument was noted but not reached in Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., 131 Ill.2d 403, 137 Ill.Dec. 623, 546 N.E.2d 568, 573-74 (1989), holding that limitations was not triggered by the discovery, a few months before death, of lung cancer and its causation); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 647 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (1982); Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082 (Me.1990); Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.Supp. 611, 613 (D.Md.1982); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 399 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1986); Regie de l' assurance Auto, du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987), citing Rugland v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386, 15 N.W. 676 (1883); DeRogatis v. Mayo Clinic, 390 N.W.2d 773 (Minn.1986) (statute providing that, with certain exceptions, wrongful death actions may be commenced within three years of death and within six years after act or omission); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45, 54-55 (App.1969), aff’d, 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970); Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 251 P.2d 274, 276 (1952); Kelliher v. New York Cent. & H. R.R. Co., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824, 825-26 (1914); Phelps v. Greco, 177 A.D.2d 559, 576 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (N.Y.App.Div.1991); Eldridge v. Eastmoreland Gen. Hosp., 307 Or. 500, 769 P.2d 775 (1989) (under 1967 statute, wrongful death actions are to be brought within three years of occurrence of the injury causing death; court, in holding that discovery rule was inapplicable, noted that legislators observed that action could be barred before death under revised statute); Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Co., 150 Or. 304, 42 P.2d 921, 929-31 (1935) (Oregon Employers’ Liability Act); Howard v. Bell Tel. Co., 306 Pa. 518, 160 A. 613, 615 (1932), relied on in Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 780 F.2d 324, 331 (3rd Cir.1985); Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S.W. 131, 133 (1899) (cause of action accrues at time of injury; injury and death simultaneous); Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Tenn.App.1990) (period began running when decedent’s knowledge of causal connection between his illness and defendants’ chemicals put him on inquiry of sources); Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1946); Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir.1991) (applying Virginia law); Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 170 Wash. 152, 15 P.2d 943, 946 (1932); Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969) (cause of action accrued at time of accident, not at time of product’s sale); but see Fisk v. United States, 657 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir.1981) (applying federal law); Frongillo v. Grimmett, 163 Ariz. 369, 788 P.2d 102 (App.1989) (review denied by Arizona Supreme Court), citing James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 154 Ariz. 594, 744 P.2d 695, 704 (1987); Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal.3d 646, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557 P.2d 507, 511-13 (1976) (under the medical malpractice limitations statute, "injury" occurs at time of death; see discussion of wrongful death limitations); Raushenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo.1987) (noting that Crownover v. Gleichman, 194 Colo. 48, 574 P.2d 497, 498-99 (1977) was legislatively overruled by Act approved June 7, 1979, ch. 134 § 1, 1979 Colo.Sess.Laws 615); Glover v. Savannah Fla. & W. R.R. Co., 107 Ga. 34, 32 S.E. 876 (1899), cited in Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1983) (medical malpractice limitations period unconstitutional as applied to medical practice wrongful death case), Western & Atlantic R.R. Co. v. Bass, 104 Ga. 390, 30 S.E. 874 (1898); Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 673 P.2d 385 (1983); Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 14 S.Ct. 579, 38 L.Ed. 422 (1893) (applying Indiana statute) and Wilson v. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co., 48 Ind.App. 150, 95 N.E. 589 (1911), cited by In re Estate of Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 263 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1970) (interspousal immunity does not bar wrongful death action for father’s killing on behalf of minor children); Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky.1984); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass’n, 196 So.2d 91, 93 (Miss.1967); Gramlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180, 186 (Mo.Ct.App.1982); Carroll v. W.R. Grace & Co., 830 P.2d 1253 (Mont.1992); Gilloon v. Humana, Inc., 100 Nev. 518, 687 P.2d 80, 81 (1984) (under the limitations period for health care claims, "injury” occurs at death); Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857, 860-63 (1981) (wrongful death action did not require that availability of an action to decedent at his death, only a tortious, fatal injury; action not precluded by previous personal injury judgment for damages, although issue-preclusion principles applied to liability and damages that could have recovered in first suit); Silverman v. Lathrop, 168 N.J.Super. 333, 403 A.2d 18, 22-23 (Ct.App.Div.1979); Brosse v. Cumming, 20 Ohio App.3d 260, 20 OBR 322, 485 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1984); Kimberly v. DeWitt, 606 P.2d 612, 616 (Okla.App.1980), citing Hugh Breeding, Inc. v. Daniel, 373 P.2d 75, 76 (Okla.1962), overruled in part on other grounds, Haws v. Luethje, 503 P.2d 871, 875 (Okla.1972) (release); Hoover’s Adm’x v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W.Va. 268, 33 S.E. 224, 225 (1899). See generally W.W. Allen, Annotation, Limitation Applicable to Action for Personal Injury as Affecting Action for Death Resulting From Injury, 167 A.L.R. 894 (1947); M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Time From Which Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Cause of Action for Wrongful Death, 97 A.L.R.2d 1151 (1964); Adams v. Armstrong World Indus., 596 F.Supp. 1407, 1414-15 (D.Idaho 1984) (cases cited), appealed sub nom. Waters v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985) (certification to Idaho Supreme Court), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 790 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1986) (mem.) (decision after Idaho court refused certified question), after remand, 664 F.Supp. 463, judg-*352merit on limitations vacated on other grounds, 847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.1988).