Court Opinion

ID: 9706203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:34:20.006494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.108284
License: Public Domain

STEVE McKEITHEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority asserts that there is “evidence directly pertinent to Brown’s recklessness with his handgun[.]” After an exhaustive search of the record, I can find no such evidence. Brown consistently testified that he was fighting for his life, and that he had no choice but to fire his weapon. That is an intentional act. It is a knowing act. What it is not is a reckless act. The majority relies on the language found in Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) to create a reckless act where none exists. In Thomas, the defendant knew of a substantial risk of harm, and consciously disregarded the risk, resulting in the discharge of a firearm. Id. at 849. There is no evidence in this record that Brown disregarded the risk inherent in pulling the trigger of his firearm while pointing it at the decedent. In fact, all the evidence indicates that Brown consciously (ie. intentionally) shot the decedent. The only evidence of recklessness in this record is the reckless behavior exhibited by the decedent in attacking a man whom the decedent knew was holding a loaded firearm. The majority seems to be saying that, because there is some evidence that Brown did not intend to kill the decedent, that is the functional equivalent of recklessness. This cannot be the law.1
I can find no way for a rational jury to conclude that Brown acted recklessly; therefore, I would sustain Brown’s challenge to the legal sufficiency, and reverse the conviction and render an acquittal.

. One can just hear the testimony: "I didn't mean to kill him. I just wanted to scare him a little.” Or perhaps, "Everybody knows I'm a terrible shot. I was shocked when the bullet actually hit him.”