Court Opinion

ID: 9682255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:28.56889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.449981
License: Public Domain

M. Edward Morgan, Special Justice, dissenting. I disagree with that part of the majority opinion that affirms the trial court’s granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the issue of negligence in failing to timely refile the case after nonsuit was taken. The Appellant entered into a contract with Appellee Griggs on June 21, 1985, to represent her in her claim for damages, wrongful death, and malpractice, resulting in her husband’s death. Appellee Griggs associated with Appellee Crane to assist him in prosecuting this case. During the period of time from July 29, 1987, the date in which the original complaint was filed on behalf of the Appellant and the nonsuit of September 29, 1989, the only discovery the Appellees initiated was a set of Request for Production of Documents, submitted on September 21, 1988. The Appellees took no depositions and propounded no Interrogatories or Requests for Admission to Defendants. The case was set for trial on October 23, 1989, and the Appellant, on advise of Appellees, took a nonsuit. The record reflects that the Appellees waited until September 21, 1990, five days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations to review whether the “notice of intent” requirement to sue in the medical malpractice was applicable when a nonsuit had been taken. The letter states in pertinent part: The last day to file this matter, [Pugh v. Flournoy, et al.] is 28 September 1990. I have not had a chance to check on whether or not we have to give a notice of intent to sue prior to filing or whether or not we simply file a lawsuit after a non-suit. It appears from the record that this issue was not researched until a memo from a staff member on December 20, 1990, was provided as summarized in the majority’s opinion. Summary judgment is an extreme remedy, and should be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact left to be determined and when the case can be decided as a matter of law, Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996). On appellate review, this court determines if granting summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material question of fact unanswered. Knowlton v. Ward, 318 Ark 867, 889 S.W.2d 721 (1994). The letter from Appellee Griggs to Appellee Crane, dated September 21, 1990, a mere five days prior to the statute oflimitations expiring on the nonsuit, demonstrates that no previous effort was made by the Appellees to determine whether the notice of intent to sue was required before the malpractice case could be refilled. This appears to be reaffirmed by the Appellee Griggs’s staff memo of December 20, 1990. The September 21, 1990 letter, memo, and lack of basic discovery by the Appellees leaves a question of fact of whether the Appellees exercised reasonable skills and diligence on behalf of their clients while they were entrusted to prosecute this claim. The standard of review for summary of judgment is whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a question of material fact unanswered, and if not, whether the moving party is entided to a summary judgment as a matter of law. All proof is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and all doubts and inferences are resolved against the moving party. McCaskill v. Fort Smith Pub. Sch. Dist., 324 Ark. 488, 921 S.W.2d 945 (1996). From review of the record, there were no evidentiary items presented in affidavits, discovery, or depositions in support of summary judgment that this area of law was unsettled and reasonable attorneys may differ. In Pugh v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 304, 877 S.W.2d 577 (1994), this court in an unanimous decision, had no difficulty in finding the statute relied on by Appellees was clearly not applicable, and the Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992), change in the law did not apply. Based upon the rules set out in which all proof is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and all doubts and inferences are resolved against the moving party, the Appellant should be given her opportunity to present her cause of action to a jury and have her day in court. I would reverse the majority’s opinion in part and remand the case for further proceedings.