Court Opinion

ID: 9399517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 15:00:28.307273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.565856
License: Public Domain

20-3780
     Ma v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Conroy, IJ
                                                                           A206 064 009

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of June, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              JON O. NEWMAN,
 8              EUNICE C. LEE,
 9              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   YINAN MA,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                   v.                                          20-3780
17
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                      DEHAI ZHANG, Esq., Flushing, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                      ROBERT MICHAEL STALZER, Trial Attorney,
 4                                        Office of Immigration Litigation (Stephen J.
 5                                        Flynn, Assistant Director, on the brief) for
 6                                        Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 7                                        Attorney General, Civil Division, United
 8                                        States Department of Justice, Washington,
 9                                        D.C.
10
11         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

12   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

13   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

14         Petitioner Yinan Ma, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,

15   seeks review of an October 28, 2020, decision of the BIA denying her motion to

16   remand and affirming a July 16, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

17   denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

18   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yinan Ma, No. A206 064 009 (B.I.A.

19   Oct. 28, 2020), aff’g No. A206 064 009 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July 16, 2018). The basis

20   of Ma’s claim is that she was forced to have an abortion in 2013 after removing an

21   intrauterine device (“IUD”) and becoming pregnant with a second child in

22   violation of China’s family planning policy. We assume the parties’ familiarity

23   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

                                              2
 1      I.      Adverse Credibility Determination

 2           We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

 3   Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review an adverse credibility

 4   determination “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

 5   891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are

 6   conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

 7   the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 8           “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 9   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of

10   the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or

11   witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under

12   oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made),

13   the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

14   with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such

15   statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

16   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

17   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

18   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

                                                3
 1   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167

 2   (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

 3         Substantial    evidence    supports     the      agency’s   adverse   credibility

 4   determination. The two reasons Ma gave for removing an IUD could both have

 5   existed at the same time, but when she was asked by the asylum officer and later

 6   the IJ why she removed the IUD, she gave different answers and could not

 7   adequately explain the difference in those answers. This provided one basis for

 8   the agency to question her credibility. The agency also reasonably relied on

 9   inconsistencies in her hearing testimony as to whether she had planned to become

10   pregnant in 2013, what she planned to do when she discovered she was pregnant,

11   and why she had obtained a visa to come to the United States prior to her

12   pregnancy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ was not compelled to credit

13   Ma’s explanations that she had multiple reasons for removing the IUD, that she

14   forgot about her plan to come to the United States to give birth until the hearing,

15   or that there was interpreter error because the explanations did not account for all

16   inconsistencies in her statements. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.

17   2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

18   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable

                                               4
 1   fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

 2   omitted)).

 3         The agency also reasonably concluded that Ma’s documentary evidence did

 4   not rehabilitate her claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)

 5   (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate . . . testimony may bear on credibility,

 6   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

 7   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). The agency

 8   was not required to give weight to a letter from Ma’s husband, an interested

 9   witness unavailable for cross-examination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149

10   (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that IJ acted within her discretion in discounting evidence

11   from interested witnesses who were unavailable for cross-examination). As to the

12   medical records, the IJ erred in declining to give them weight because they were

13   photocopies; the agency’s practice manuals instruct applicants not to file original

14   documents and Ma made the originals available at the hearing. See Yan Rong Zhao

15   v. Holder, 728 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that BIA may not afford

16   diminished weight to a photocopy because “its own Appeals Practice Manual”

17   instructs parties to submit photocopies). However, the BIA did not rely on this

18   basis for the IJ’s decision not to credit the documents, and it did not err in finding

                                               5
 1   that the records—even if considered—did not corroborate that the abortion was

 2   involuntary. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400

 3   (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing State Department reports that abortion certificates were

 4   generally obtained following voluntary abortions to obtain two weeks of sick

 5   leave).

 6            The inconsistencies, implausibility, and lack of reliable corroboration,

 7   constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See 8

 8   U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

 9   The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

10   removal, and CAT relief because all three claims for relief were based on the same

11   factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

12      II.     Motion to Remand

13            We review the BIA’s denial of Ma’s motion to remand for abuse of

14   discretion, see Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2005),

15   but “use [our] own judgment as to whether counsel was effective,” Changxu Jiang

16   v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Ma alleged

17   that her former counsel was ineffective because he refused to amend Ma’s

18   application to include her fear of religious persecution stemming from her practice

                                               6
 1   of Christianity in the United States. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of

 2   counsel claim, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient

 3   and that the deficiency caused prejudice. See Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485

 4   (2d Cir. 2010). In addition, a party must comply with the procedural requirements

 5   in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), which include filing a

 6   disciplinary complaint. A failure to substantially comply with the requirements

 7   forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this Court. See Yi Long Yang v. Gonzales,

 8   478 F.3d 133, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2007).

 9         We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of the motion because Ma,

10   in failing to file a disciplinary complaint, did not substantially comply with the

11   Lozada requirements. Contrary to Ma’s assertion, the letter from her former

12   attorney does not reflect that he admitted the mistake or took responsibility. Ma’s

13   explanation that she did not file a complaint because she did not want to have a

14   negative impact on her former attorney’s career is insufficient because the purpose

15   of the requirement is “to deter meritless claims.” Yi Long Yang, 478 F.3d at 143.

16         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

17   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

18                                          FOR THE COURT:
19                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                              7