Court Opinion

ID: 9851676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:17:34.783616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:12.017235
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
Although I concur with most of the majority opinion, I do not concur with the rationale about “duty.” In Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984) this court retreated from the concept that duty could be defined in terms of specific types of conduct, and the court adopted the broad notion of duty.
Contrary to the position of the majority, I believe that it is good policy whenever possible to define duty in specific terms. There is enough vagueness in the law of negligence, and efforts to define duty in terms that are understandable and easily applied should be encouraged. There is much uncertainty in life, and efforts to give some certainty to what is expected in relationships between citizens and between citizens and their government seem desirable.
The author relied upon by the majority in Cobum notes that the concept of duty and the details of the standard of conduct are “one of convenience only, and ... the two are correlative, and one cannot exist without the other.” W. Prosser & YY Keeton, The Law of Torts #53 at 356 (5th ed. 1984). With such interdependence, it does not appear that our former efforts to define duty in terms of specific conduct were illogical or bad judicial policy.
Subject to the above reservations, I concur in the majority opinion.