Court Opinion

ID: 9586792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:15:08.699256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:51.797124
License: Public Domain

LANGDON, J.
Dissenting. I dissent. The jury’s verdict was that the testator was incompetent, and under the settled rule stated in the majority opinion, this verdict must be tested by examining the evidence in support thereof and disregarding contrary evidence. Upon such examination, the record fully supports the conclusion of incompetency.
*604That insanity was prevalent in the decedent’s family appears from the majority opinion, and it is likewise conceded that he was old and eccentric in his behavior. These eccentricities, however, are considered not so great as to afford evidence of incompetency, in spite of the unnatural will, which ignores relatives and leaves property to strangers, and the peculiar circumstances of its execution, and its safeguarding in the hatband of the decedent. But the brief and inadequate summary of the evidence of the contestants, set forth in the opinion, does not present the real picture.
Many witnesses, in frequent contact with Finkler, testified that in their opinion he was mentally unsound. They further testified to conduct which can hardly permit of any other inference. He was a persistent collector of refuse and junk of no value. He had a habit of acquiring old-fashioned ladies’ hats, which he would offer to his friends. He informed his friends that he was a great inventor, and among his achievements were a perpetual motion machine and a fuel for an internal combustion engine, made of human excreta. He disclosed to another that he had built an airship in the attic of his house, superior to any craft now flying, but that he refused to take the roof off the house and hence would permit the secret to die with him. He instructed visitors to save their urine, which he used for the purpose of sharpening saws. He suffered from fear of persecution and arrest, and possessed a number of loaded guns, which he carried and kept in his house. He claimed possession of supernatural power to wish evil to other persons. He also believed that there was a secret well on his premises which would supply his airplane with fuel, and was of the opinion that he had control over the water supply of San Mateo County, and could turn it off by means of a valve on his land. He described a cave connecting his home, near Redwood City, with the Golden Gate, through which people habitually passed.
On the day the will was executed, the decedent was suffering from toothache and neuralgia. He visited his dentist, who testified at length concerning Finkler’s nervous, irrational condition at the time. In an attempt to extract the tooth, a local anesthetic was injected, and a quieting drug was administered. But the patient was recalcitrant and the dentist recommended a general anesthetic. *605Finkler thereupon left the office and went directly to Purcell’s store, where he executed the will immediately. The dentist testified that in his opinion the decedent was of unsound mind at the time he left the office.
The mere fact that decedent was an employee of this court up to the time of his death is not of particular significance in view of the testimony of respondent Taylor, clerk of the court, that in his opinion Finkler was, during the last few weeks of his life, of unsound mind. The conduct evidencing this mental unsoundness was, as stated above, not of late development, but was manifested over a period of several years, so that the jury might well conclude that the mental unsoundness which respondent Taylor observed at the period just before death was also present at the time the will was executed.
It seems to me that the jury might reasonably determine, as it did, from the recital of these circumstances, that the decedent was not possessed of the requisite testamentary capacity. I am not seriously concerned with the issue of undue influence, although Finkler’s condition at the time the will was made was such that it would have required little persuasion to overcome his will, and an exceptional opportunity for Purcell to exercise such influence was presented.
I think that the recent unanimous decision of this court in Estate of Bishop, 2 Cal. (2d) 132 [39 Pac. (2d) 201], is wholly inconsistent with the present opinion, the evidence of incompetency in the record of that case being far less convincing than that presented in the instant case.
I am further unable to agree with the majority opinion because of its attempt to interpret the two instruments presented for probate. The holding that an holographic will may be changed by cancellation and interlineation in the hand of the testator, without new dating and signing, is sound and supported by authority; but the question whether these changes effected a different disposition of the estate is one of construction which cannot arise upon the probate of the will. It is not an issue before us, and should not be determined at this time. If the will is upheld, the meaning of the dispository clauses should be considered in the court below on petition for distribution. For this court to decide it now when it is not in issue, and thus preclude the proper determination of the matter when it is in issue, is a pro*606cedure for which there is no justification. The result of the majority opinion is to base the judgment upon an instrument which was not the one admitted to probate by the lower court.
I may add that the record is replete with instances of improper exclusion of relevant evidence offered by contestants, similar to that recited above.
The judgment should be reversed.
Rehearing denied.