Court Opinion

ID: 9845396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:20:55.163309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:05.873255
License: Public Domain

Roe, A.C.J.
(dissenting)—The majority admits that there was error on the part of the prosecutor to state to the defendant in a question, "You refused to give a statement of your side of the story to the—", but dismisses it as a "passing comment". It deserves better treatment even though the defendant may well be guilty of the crime charged.
Here, unlike State v. Cosden, 18 Wn. App. 213, 568 P.2d 802 (1977), the defendant did not volunteer a defense to the police and then offer an inconsistent one at trial. Rather, the record suggests that, on advice of counsel, he unequivocally exercised his right to remain silent after the arrest and Miranda warnings were given.
Similarly, in State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979), a burglary case, the prosecutor elicited testimony from both arresting officers concerning the fact that defendant made no statement to them after he was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. In his closing argument, the prosecutor again drew attention to defendant's silence by commenting that defendant had offered no statement when placed under arrest. The court held defendant's right to due process was violated, stating at page 395:
This conduct penalized defendant for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent by implying that his silence was consistent with guilt and inconsistent with the exculpating story given at trial.
Fricks further held the constitutional error was prejudicial since defendant testified on his own behalf and therefore his credibility was at issue. Also, his exculpating story was plausible and, while the State had substantial evidence against him, its case was not overwhelming.
Likewise, here, defendant's credibility was at issue once having taken the stand. Although the prosecution may seek to impeach defendant's credibility, it may not sidestep the *827Fifth Amendment to do so. Here, unlike State v. Vargas, 25 Wn. App. 809, 812, 610 P.2d 1 (1980), the defendant did not specifically testify that he cooperated fully with the authorities and gave a statement to the police. He merely stated he turned himself in to get things cleared up. Thus, the Vargas rule that once defendant brings his cooperation with the police into question, he opens the door to full development of that subject, is not applicable.
This case is factually closer to State v. Modica, 18 Wn. App. 467, 569 P.2d 1161 (1977). There, defendant turned himself in to police after learning his neighbor died from a gunshot wound. Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and waived them in the presence of his attorney; whereupon, a written statement was taken. At trial, the interrogating detective who took the statement and the defendant were both examined concerning defendant's refusal to tell the detective whether or not he had a gun when he went to the victim's apartment. During his closing argument the prosecutor further commented on defendant's refusal to answer the question. Although defense counsel did not object at trial to these references to defendant's postarrest assertion of the right to remain silent, he assigned error to them on appeal. In a per curiam decision, the court held the repeated use by the prosecutor of the defendant's refusal to answer questions about the gun unconstitutionally eroded his claim of self-defense, stating at pages 476-77:
The defendant's silence was "insolubly ambiguous". The reasoning in Doyle v. Ohio, [426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976)] is especially applicable, for in addition to the inference that the defendant was exercising his rights under the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer the policeman's question, there is evidence from which inferences could be drawn that the defendant never refused to answer any question of the detective, and at trial may have been answering a different question than that asked by the prosecutor. We hold that the State's use of this "silence" to impeach the defendant's "credibility" was prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
*828The same reasoning applies here. I would reverse the trial court's denial of a mistrial.
Reconsideration denied June 8, 1982.
Review denied by Supreme Court September 24, 1982.