Court Opinion

ID: 9681035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:42:50.398031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.041196
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, Justice
(dissenting).
The question for decision is whether this Court should issue to Hon. Richard P. Em-met a rule to show cause why he should not reverse his rulings on questions presented to him which had been asked on pre-trial statutory discovery. This question is presented by both plaintiffs and defendants filing petitions for such rule. Neither party questioned either the legal or factual sufficiency of the petition filed by the other party.
Frotn the petitions it appears that suits were filed for the wrongful death of plaintiff’s wife and for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff in a collision at night with an unlighted utility pole situated on the median strip in a street in the City of Montgomery by a car driven by plaintiff. The defendants sought to take the depositions of plaintiff and witness Warren Reese on oral examination under Act No. 375 of the 1955 Legislature. During the course of the proceedings the following, among other questions, were asked the plaintiff:
1. “Q. Well, Judge, there are two suits filed against the Alabama Power Company totaling an addendum of $200,000.00. On what basis are you asking the Alabama Power Company to pay you individually and as Executor- that sum of money ?”
2. “Q. Now, what do you say the Alabama Power Company did was wrong ?”
3. “Q. Judge, in what way did the City of Montgomery injure you?”
4. “Q. Have you ever heard of anybody running an automobile into the power pole which your automobile went into?”
5. <(Q. Have your lawyers, to your knowledge, ever heard of anyone running an automobile into the power pole that your automobile went into on April 15th, 1966?”
6. “Q. All right, sir. Now Judge, payment was made by you, or on your behalf to the Alabama Power Company for the damage done to that pole by your automobile, was it not?”
7. “Q. And the occasion of the damage was on April 15th, 1966, the *598same events that form the basis of these two lawsuits?”
8. “Q. Again, so the record will be clear, from your own knowledge, Judge, and as the Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama and with the legal background that you have described in your testimony, can you testify today as to any acts or omissions on the part of the Alabama Power Company which would make the Alabama Power Company liable to you in the two capacities in which you have claimed damages in these two lawsuits?”
9. “Q. And am I correct that you are relying entirely on the advice of your lawyers, Mr. Hill and Mr. Harris in bringing these two lawsuits against the Alabama Power Company ?”
10.“Q. And am I correct that this entire lawsuit and the allegations in the complaint are based not on any personal knowledge of yours, but on investigations which Mr. Hill and Mr. Harris have made and in which they have reported to you; is that correct?”
Witness Reese was asked the following, among other:
1. “Q. Let me put it this way: It would not be something unusual to see Judge Simpson drinking at a party where liquor was served, would it, Mr. Reese?”
2. “Q. Have you seen him have a drink at anytime since the accident?”
On advice of counsel, the questions set out above were not answered. The failure to answer the questions was brought before Judge Emmet and he ordered plaintiff to answer questions 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 but denied the request as to the other questions and ruled that witness Reese need not answer the questions noted above. Thereupon both parties filed petitions praying the issuance of the rule. Both petitions allege that these rulings by Judge Emmet were erroneous, working injury to the party complaining, and there was no other legal remedy adequate for the correction of the error and prevention of injury. The plaintiffs complained at being required by the Judge to answer any of these questions. The defendants complained at the Judge not requiring all of the questions answered.
The right to a review in this Court in this case was set out in Ex parte Tower Manufacturing Co., 103 Ala. 415, 418, 419, 15 So. 836, 837 by Brickell, C. J.:
“If an order or judgment or decree is made or rendered, which is not the subject of revision by appeal or other revisory remedy, and yet is erroneous, working injury to the party complaining, and there being no other legal remedy, adequate to the correction of the error and the prevention of the injury, mandamus will be awarded.”
This rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See First Nat. Bank of Anniston v. Cheney, 120 Ala. 117, 23 So. 733; Ex parte Merritt, 142 Ala. 115, 38 So. 183; Ex parte Watters, 180 Ala. 523, 61 So. 904; Ex parte Hartwell, 238 Ala. 62, 188 So. 891. See also Ex parte Laurie, 277 Ala. 137, 167 So. 2d 705, and cases cited therein.
In Mallory v. Matlock, 7 Ala. 757, it was held that the action of the trial court in refusing to require answers to interrogatories was not reviewable by writ of error. It was suggested that mandamus was the proper remedy. In Ex parte Elston, 25 Ala. 72, however, it was held that mandamus was not the appropriate remedy to review an order of the trial court suppressing a deposition, since this order was reviewable on appeal. In Ex parte State ex rel. St. Peters M. Baptist Church, 212 Ala. 365, 102 So. 793, it was held that mandamus could be used to review the action of the trial court in refusing to require answers to interrogatories in garnishment proceed*599ings. In Ex parte State ex rel. Tuck, 217 Ala. 143, 115 So. 155, it was held:
“The facts stated in the petition show that a legal right — the right to require his adversary in the pending suit to answer the petitioner’s interrogatories, filed under section 7764 of the Code — has been denied to him for the redress of which the writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy.”
Since that case, there has been no question in this Court but that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to review rulings by the trial court when it has refused to require answers to statutory interrogatories. See Ex parte Nolen, 223 Ala. 213, 135 So. 337; Ex parte Altman, 233 Ala. 475, 172 So. 641; Ex parte Rowell, 248 Ala. 80, 26 So.2d 554; Ex parte Driver, 255 Ala. 118, 50 So.2d 413. See also Ex parte Bahakel, 246 Ala. 527, 21 So.2d 619; Ex parte Wood, 253 Ala. 375, 44 So.2d 560.
On the other hand, when the trial court has ordered the interrogatories to be answered, mandamus has been held to be the appropriate remedy to review such an order. Ex parte Pollard, 233 Ala. 335, 171 So. 628; Ex parte Benson, 243 Ala. 435, 10 So.2d 482.
A distinction between these cases was noted in Ex parte Little, 205 Ala. 517, 88 So. 645, where the trial court ordered interrogatories to be answered. In denying mandamus as appropriate to review this order, it was said:
“Cases should not be tried by piecemeal, and separate and distinct rulings upon the evidence brought to this court pending the progress of the trial * *
This distinction between allowing mandamus when interrogatories were not ordered to be answered, and not allowing it when interrogatories were ordered answered, was followed in Ex parte Farrell, 234 Ala. 498, 175 So. 277. See also Ex parte Benson, supra.
This distinction has not been maintained, however, and the practice now is firmly established that this Court will review by mandamus all questions and answers and their sufficiency, ruled on by the trial court. Ex parte Nolan, supra; Ex parte Altman, supra; Ex parte Bahakel, supra; Ex parte Rowell, supra; Ex parte Driver, supra; Ex parte Markle, 264 Ala. 376, 88 So.2d 363.
When Act No. 375 came before this Court in Ex parte Rice, 265 Ala. 454, 92 So.2d 16, the trial court had refused to stay the taking of pre-trial oral depositions. Mandamus was allowed to review this ruling, since it did not involve “piecemeal review” and an appeal would not be available or adequate. In Ex parte Thackston, 275 Ala. 424, 155 So.2d 526, mandamus was granted to review an order requiring a witness to produce written documents on the taking of an oral deposition. In Smith v. Flynn, 275 Ala. 392, 401, 155 So.2d 497, 505 concerning the review on appeal of an order staying the taking of an oral deposition, it was said:
“Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to review a circuit judge’s rulings granting or refusing a motion to require answers or fuller answers to interrogatories propounded by one party to another * *
In Ex parte Cypress, 275 Ala. 563, 156 So. 2d 916, various questions and answers under Act No. 375 were reviewed on mandamus.
Since both parties have invoked the proper remedy, how is this review accomplished?
The judicial history of the practice for mandamus was set out by Walker, C. J., in Ex parte Garland, 42 Ala. 559. He concluded with observations which are pertinent in this case.
“It would probably be better to adopt some rules of practice governing the proceeding by this court by mandamus but we will not attempt to do so at this time.
*600“We conclude that an opinion upon questions of law adverse to parties not before the court and not notified should not be expressed, unless some extraordinary emergency should arise, in which delay would be highly injurious. If the court can perceive plainly, that the relator is not entitled to the mandamus upon his own showing, it is proper to proceed to judgment against him. I am not able, for myself, to attain the satisfactory conclusion against the relator’s right to the relief he seeks which would justify me in refusing the rule nisi, and I would prefer, without making any authoritative announcement of the law of the case to grant the rule nisi.”
The Legislature sought to supply the rules of practice for these proceedings by enacting what are now sections 1072-1080 of Title 7 of the Code. They call for a petition verified by affidavit, and responsive pleadings, and the return or answer was not to be conclusive as at common law. See Speed v. Cocke, 57 Ala. 209, 214, 215, for the effect of these rules of practice.
Though Walker, C. J., was the dissenting Judge in Ex parte Garland, supra, his view that the rule nisi should be granted unless the petition was wholly without merit has prevailed. Hence, in Bryce v. Burke, 172 Ala. 219, 228, 55 So. 635, 637, it was held:
“In our practice a rule to show cause is treated as a substantial equivalent for the more formal alternative writ, and where the petition shows a prima facie right it has been held proper to issue a rule nisi.”
This holding that the showing of a prima facie right to the writ in the petition makes the issuance of the rule proper, has been followed without exception. Board of Education of Jefferson County v. State, 222 Ala. 70, 74, 131 So. 239; Edge v. Bonner, 257 Ala. 385, 386, 59 So.2d 683.
Hence, the question here is whether or not a prima facie right to the rule has been shown in the petitions. They allege in the words in Ex parte Tower Manufacturing Co., that Judge Emmet’s order is not the subject of revision by appeal and yet is 'erroneous, working injury to the party complaining and there is no other legal remedy adequate to correct the error and prevent the injury. What more is necessary to obtain the issuance of the writ?
The majority says “that the issuance of the writ is limited to those [cases] where an abuse of discretion is shown.” There is not a shred of authority in this State to sustain this position. The citation of Ex parte Cypress, 275 Ala. 563, 156 So.2d 916 is totally inapt. In that case the rule nisi was issued. The question there was on the merits of the ruling by the trial judge in sustaining objections to a question to a witness who was asked “Do you know what that letter is?” To find in that case authority for a limitation on the issuance of the rule in these discovery cases is to find somthing which does not exist.
Nor is the citation of 23 Am.Jur.2d 665, Depositions and Discovery, § 270 appropriate for limiting the issuance of the writ to cases of abuse of judicial discretion. That section is expressly directed to the review on the merits after the matter has been presented to the appellate court.
The discussion of federal cases and texts is also besides the point for the decision here. The doctrine of “piecemeal review” has all been thrashed out in cases in this Court dealing with discovery generally, and to return to that argument at this time is to mistake the judicial function. It is not for us to decide matters of policy in deciding cases. That is for the legislature, except in our promulgating rules of procedure for future guidance in later cases. But we are not so engaged here. Our duty is to decide what the law is for the issuance of a rule nisi in discovery cases. The law is perfectly plain in this regard, and it is not that the issuance of the writ is limited to cases of abuse of judicial discretion. ■
*601In the second place, there is no “judicial •discretion” in this case at this time. Judge Emmet had no discretion in what he did. He had to rule on the objections submitted to him. He may have ruled erroneously, but whatever he did, he had' to do it. Hence, to limit the issuance of the writ in these cases to those showing “an abuse of •discretion” is to turn back the law in this State on the review of rulings on discovery -to a time before Ex parte Garland, for though the writ was not issued in that case 'it was not for a failure to show an abuse •of judicial discretion. (The ruling there •was that on the merits there was no error in the trial judge’s rulings.)
Suppose Judge Emmet had ordered witness Reese to answer the question “Have you seen him [Plaintiff] have a drink at .any time since the accident ?” At first blush this would seem to be beyond the realm of any legitimate discovery. Hence, :such an order to answer this question would iseem to be erroneous. But can it be said that this ruling abused any discretion the Judge had? No Judge, trial, or otherwise, Tías a discretion to commit error. He has a •duty to rule rightly as the law gives him the light. Hence, there can be no justification for the creation of this artificial limitation of review on discovery.
Furthermore, the creation of this new ■policy for the issuance of the alternative writ of mandamus is to pervert the concept •of that writ. Mandamus has never been used to review discretion. Hence, to say in this case that mandamus is available to review an abuse of discretion is to upset law which has been settled otherwise since this Court began.
It is apparent that the majority in this •case has confused abuse of judicial discretion,- — -a slippery concept at best — with judicial error. Of course, if the petition on its face shows no conceivable judicial error by the trial judge, the issuance of the writ need not be granted. But as Chief Justice Walker said in Ex parte Garland, it is preferable to issue the writ before making any authoritative announcement of the law of the case. Are both of the petitions in this case so devoid of merit as to justify dismissing them without a hearing on the merits?
The trial judge ordered plaintiff to answer interrogatories 8, 9 and 10 as to the acts of defendants constituting the basis of plaintiff’s claims, and the results and conclusions of plaintiff’s attorneys. At the same time, the trial judge did not require answers to interrogatories 1, 2 and 3 which seem to cover at least part of the same ground. Was the Judge so plainly right in both of these rulings as to make the efforts of both attorneys to review these rulings practically frivolous? Unless we are prepared to answer this in the affirmative, we should ask the one and the only one who knows why these two rulings are not inconsistent, to tell us in response to the rule how he reconciles these rulings.
Incidentally, while passing on the merits of the rulings on these interrogatories, wrongly in my judgment, there is much discussion by the majority of the “work product” rule not adopting the “silver platter” doctrine. And, of course, this is sound. But why doesn’t the requirement for the answer of interrogatories 9 and 10 sanction the “silver platter” doctrine ?
Even the majority concede that interrogatories 6 and 7, concerning payment for the pole, might lead to relevant evidence, the only test givn by the statute for the scope of examination by this type discovery.
Notwithstanding this prima facie showing of judicial error in these rulings, the majority refuses to review these rulings because “it is not made to appear that the trial judge abused his discretion.” Certainly the majority is not requiring magic words in the petitions, such as reciting “abuse of discretion”, to permit review. They must be saying that no judicial error is shown. But to require a plaintiff to answer what his attorneys advised about the nature and validity of his claim in one *602interrogatory, and then refuse to require it in another interrogatory, is anomalous if not downright erroneous in one instance or the other.
After refusing to issue the writ in this case, the majority opinion then embarks on the task of reviewing the actions of the trial judge based solely on the questions asked, and finding no substantial error, observes that such conclusions can be properly made “without the aid of further pleadings or record”, or any return from the Judge whose actions are being adjudicated. This practice cannot be permitted to pass without comment.
In the first place, we are passing judgment on the actions of a trial judge. Before doing that we should have before us what he had before him, namely, the record. Only recently, we commented on our inability and unwillingness to review actions of a trial judge when we did not have a full record before us. Smith v. State, 280 Ala. 241, 192 So.2d 443.
In the second place, as said in Ex parte Garland, 42 Ala. 559, 562:
“A conclusive adjudication against persons adversely interested is not made until the rule nisi is returned, and the persons adversely interested are notified and have an opportunity to be heard.”
It is true that the trial judge is not “adversely interested” in this proceeding, and his actions are being affirmed in this case, but his actions are being reviewed, and he is given no opportunity to explain his actions. If we may review his actions to affirm without hearing from him, why not review to reverse? Certainly, in the past we have found the return by the trial judge to be of great help in understanding why the Judge ruled as he did. Thus, in Ex parte Bahakel, 246 Ala. 527, 528, 21 So. 2d 619, we said:
“The trial judge has filed a complete answer, giving his reasons for denying the motion, with citation of applicable authorities, all of which has proven helpful in our study of the cause.”
To review even to affirm should not be made without affording the Judge the opportunity to explain. The alternatives should be between reviewing and not reviewing by issuing or withholding the writ; not between reviewing to affirm without a return and not reviewing without a return if to reverse.
Then, the return to the rule nisi is the only opportunity the trial judge has to explain actions which are not of record. Ex parte Green, 221 Ala. 298, 129 So. 72. But all of this is foregone in this case. Of course, the issuance of the rule nisi does not mean that the peremptory writ must be issued. Ex parte Carroll, 272 Ala. 353, 131 So. 676. It merely means that a prima facie showing of error has been made. Both parties believe that a prima facie showing has been made. They so allege in their petitions, and neither contradicts the allegation of judicial error by the other. But the majority has ruled that both parties are wrong and that the action of the trial court was not erroneous, without even seeing the record or hearing how the trial judge explains his actions in this case. Such action is not only injudicious; it is unjudicial.
Therefore, I would grant the rule nisi in this case. But if it is not issued, I am not prepared to pass judgment on what the trial judge did in this case, and I do not believe that the majority should.