Court Opinion

ID: 9363124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:15.565365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:29.027242
License: Public Domain

FILED
                             FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                           NOV 22 2022
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                      No. 20-30193

             Plaintiff-Appellee,               D.C. Nos.
                                               3:17-cr-00180-RRB-DMS-1
 v.                                            3:17-cr-00180-RRB-DMS

FOREST MITCHELL KIRST,
                                               OPINION
             Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Alaska
                   Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted March 17, 2022
                          San Francisco, California

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
Judges.

                         Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;
             Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Collins
                                    SUMMARY *

                                    Criminal Law

   The panel affirmed Forest Kirst’s conviction on two counts of obstructing a
pending proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505, and affirmed the district
court’s assessment of a $5,000 fine, in a case in which the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the crash of a small plane that Kirst piloted and
in which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revoked Kirst’s airman
certificate.

   The plane crashed as Kirst attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range
in Alaska. During both the investigation and Kirst’s appeal of the revocation of his
airman certificate, Kirst claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700
feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data showed
that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than what Kirst
claimed. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The
proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s revocation
of his airman certificate.

    Challenging his conviction on Count One, Kirst argued that the NTSB’s accident
investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505, because
the statute covers only proceedings where an agency has regulatory or adjudicative
authority—authority that the NTSB lacks during an accident investigation. The
panel wrote that even if it were not reviewing for plain error, it would affirm, holding
that the NTSB’s investigation of Kirst’s plane crash was a “proceeding” within the
meaning of § 1505. The panel explained that in the course of conducting its
investigation, the NTSB had both subpoena power and the power to compel
testimony under oath, and that under United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), whose reasoning the panel found persuasive, that is enough.

    Rejecting Kirst’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on both counts, the
panel held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
a reasonable factfinder could have found corrupt intent.

   *
     This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been
prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
   The district court instructed the jury that an act is material under § 1505 “if it has
a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the agency’s decisions
or activities.” Kirst argued that the phrase “or activities” in the instruction was
improper because it allowed the jury to convict based on Kirst’s statements that did
not affect the NTSB’s decisions or decision making process. The panel held that the
district court did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality element. The panel
noted that this court previously rejected the argument that the word “activities”
enabled a jury to find a statement material even if it was incapable of influencing an
agency’s decisions. The panel also noted that the district court made clear that
Kirst’s statements must have been capable of influencing the NTSB investigation or
appeal, not just any activity of the agency.

   The panel held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Kirst
able to pay the $5,000 fine, as there was no evidence before the district court showing
that Kirst was unable to pay the fine, or was likely to become unable to pay it.

    Judge Collins concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Reviewing
for plain error, he would reverse Kirst’s conviction on Count One and remand for
enter of a judgment of acquittal on that count. He wrote that because the NTSB
lacks any regulatory or enforcement authority over the accidents it investigates, there
is no sense in which the NTSB’s investigation into Kirst’s accident involved the
“administration of the law” under which that proceeding was being conducted within
the meaning of § 1505. He wrote that because the proceeding at issue in Count Two
involved Kirst’s appeal of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate, that
proceeding did involve the “administration of the law” under which that proceeding
was being conducted, and it therefore fell within the purview of § 1505. He agreed
with the majority’s opinion to the extent it rejected Kirst’s further challenges to his
conviction and sentence on Count Two.

                                      COUNSEL

Stephen L. Corso (argued) and Charisse Arce, Assistant United States Attorneys; E.
Bryan Wilson, Acting United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney,
Anchorage, Alaska; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Gene D. Vorobyov (argued), San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
W. Fletcher, Circuit Judge:

      On August 24, 2014, defendant Forest M. Kirst piloted a small plane in

Alaska on a charter flight carrying three paying passengers. The plane crashed as

Kirst attempted to fly over Atigun Pass in the Brooks Range. One of the

passengers died a month later from injuries sustained in the crash.

      The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigated the crash,

and the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) revoked Kirst’s airman

certificate. During both the investigation and Kirst’s appeal of the revocation of

his airman certificate, Kirst claimed that the plane was climbing through 5,500 to

5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet as it approached the pass. GPS data

showed that the plane was flying at an altitude more than 1,000 feet lower than

what Kirst claimed.

      The government filed three criminal charges against Kirst. Counts One and

Two charged Kirst with obstructing a pending “proceeding,” in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1505. The proceeding in Count One was the NTSB investigation. The

proceeding in Count Two was the appeal before the NTSB of the FAA’s

revocation of his airman certificate. Count Three charged Kirst with piloting an

aircraft without a valid airman certificate, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(7).

A jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts One and Two and an acquittal on Count

                                           2
Three. The district court sentenced Kirst to 12 months and 1 day in prison on

Counts One and Two, to run concurrently; 3 years of supervised release; and a

$5,000 fine.

       On appeal, Kirst challenges his conviction on Count One, arguing that the

NTSB investigation was not a “proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505.

Further, Kirst challenges his convictions on both Counts One and Two, arguing

that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that a jury

instruction was improper. Finally, Kirst challenges the $5,000 fine, arguing that he

is unable to pay it.

       We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

                                   I. Background

                                A. The Plane Crash

       On August 24, 2014, Kirst piloted a small plane on a charter flight out of

Fairbanks, Alaska, carrying Darrel Spencer, Daphne McCann (Spencer’s sister-in-

law), and Marcene Nason (McCann’s sister). Spencer had an interest in

photography and booked the flight with Kirst for $3,500 to photograph polar bears.

       The weather on the day of the flight was clear, with a light wind. The plane

took off from Fairbanks, stopped at Bettles for a roughly 20-minute break, and

continued north toward Prudhoe Bay. The plan was to fly along the coast to look

                                          3
for polar bears. Spencer sat in the front passenger seat. McCann sat behind Kirst,

and Nason sat behind Spencer.

      As the plane headed north toward Prudhoe Bay, the passengers spotted a

moose and wanted to photograph it. Kirst flew lower and circled the moose for a

few minutes before climbing to a higher altitude.

      About 15 or 20 minutes later, the plane approached Atigun Pass. The

elevation of the pass is 4,400 feet. The elevation of the surrounding peaks is a little

over 6,000 feet. McCann testified at trial that the plane was flying below the peaks

of the mountains as it approached the pass and that she could see the peaks only by

looking up. McCann estimated that the plane was between two-thirds to three-

quarters of the way from the ground to the top of the mountains. McCann noticed

no vibrations, damage to the propeller, or anything else unusual.

      Two witnesses saw the plane as it flew over Chandalar Shelf on the way to

Atigun Pass. One of the witnesses testified at trial that there is a “steep incline”

after the shelf before reaching the pass. That witness estimated that the plane was

flying roughly 500 feet above the shelf. The other witness was driving a gravel

truck on the road leading up to the shelf. That witness estimated that the plane was

flying roughly 100 feet above the shelf when he first saw it. When the witness

                                           4
reached the shelf, he saw the plane again. He estimated that the plane was now

about two miles away and about 1,000 feet above the ground.

       Several pipeline workers saw the crash. One worker testified at trial that the

plane was “flying real low,” that it did not “seem out of control,” and that the

wings were “level.” He testified: “I just saw it coming to a land, and . . . it went to

its right side, and it just kind of like stopped and slid like a little bit down the hill.”

That worker testified that the plane appeared to be flying normally and that it was

staying on a flight path parallel to the ground. A second worker testified that when

he saw the plane it was “between 250 [and] 500 feet” off the ground. He had

previously estimated, in talking to an investigator, that the plane had been “500 to

800 feet” above him. He testified that the engine was “revving,” with the “rpm

picking up.” A third worker described the crash:

       [I]t just kind of shocked me how low it was flying. . . . Four or five
       seconds later, it was on the ground. . . . [I]t was a miracle landing. . . .
       [I]t was countoured to the mountain. . . . [W]hen [it] hit, it just stopped
       and then it just slid downhill a little bit.

Passenger McCann testified:

       We banked to the right while we were looking at the mountains, and I
       felt like an air pocket, like when you’re in a big plane and you go whoop,
       and your stomach goes up, and the next time I opened my eyes, we were
       on the ground.

                                             5
       Several pipeline workers rushed to the plane after the crash. When they

arrived, Kirst asked them to remove the canopy (the cockpit cover) to get him and

the passengers out of the plane. Kirst suffered serious injuries to his back. Despite

his injuries, Kirst was lucid and communicative. He gave clear instructions about

turning off the fuel system and appeared to be aware of what was happening. Kirst

instructed an Alaska Department of Transportation worker to turn off the master

switch and the ignition. That worker noticed that one of the propeller blades was

missing and that the throttle was bent. He testified at trial, “If it was at full throttle,

the throttle would be completely to . . . the panel, and I remember it being out a

little bit and bent down.”

       Kirst made several statements immediately after the crash. One of the

workers testified at trial that as Kirst sat on the rocks after being removed from the

plane, he said, “Well, there goes insurance, there goes my business.” The worker

testified that Kirst repeated to himself, “What the heck happened,” “Did I come in

too low,” and appeared to run through the possibilities of what happened before the

crash. After another worker helped carry Kirst down to an ambulance, that witness

testified that Kirst said that his business was ruined, that he was in a lot of trouble

for the crash, and that a downdraft had partially caused the crash. Kirst told one of

the Department of Transportation workers that he had been 1,000 feet above the

                                             6
mountaintops, that a downdraft caught the plane, and that increasing the power did

not help the plane escape the downdraft. In the ambulance, Kirst told one of the

female passengers, “If I were your husband, I would punch me in the nose.” When

asked why, Kirst responded that it was because they got into the crash. Kirst

explained to a medic that he “ran out of horsepower.”

      Spencer died a month later from injuries suffered in the crash.

                             B. The NTSB Investigation

      State troopers reported the crash to the NTSB and the FAA. The NTSB is an

independent federal agency responsible, inter alia, for investigating transportation

accidents and deciding pilots’ airman certification appeals. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1131,

1133. In its investigatory role, the NTSB is charged with “establish[ing] the facts,

circumstances, and cause or probable cause” of aircraft accidents. Id. § 1131. The

NTSB has no regulatory or enforcement authority. The FAA has enforcement

authority to revoke a pilot’s airman certificate. The NTSB and the FAA exchange

factual information in the course of their investigations of aviation accidents. 49

C.F.R. §§ 831.5(a)(5), 831.21 (2020).

      On the day after the crash, the NTSB launched a limited accident

investigation. A limited investigation involves gathering information from first

                                          7
responders and witnesses without sending an investigator to the crash site. No

NTSB investigator visited the crash site.

      The NTSB concluded that weather was not an issue in the crash. Data from

a weather station 2,500 feet from the accident site indicated no gusty, downdraft-

type winds. A photograph taken from a Department of Transportation building

before the accident showed no cloud pattern typically associated with downdrafts.

Weather data indicated that there were only light winds from the northeast.

      Kirst’s plane was equipped with two GPS devices. One of the devices, a

Garmin 430, was permanently installed on the plane. The Garmin 430 had lost all

its data and was of no value to the investigation. State troopers recovered another

GPS device, a Garmin 196, from the plane and sent it to the NTSB for

examination.

      The Garmin 196 recorded rudimentary flight information, including the

plane’s flight path, ground speed, and over-the-ground altitude. The Garmin 196

also provided a moving map with orientation, and it recorded the plane’s position

once every ten seconds. Garmin 196 devices have not been certified by the FAA

for use in navigation. A government witness testified at trial that he would not use

it to make a landing or to avoid terrain. The witness testified that a Garmin 196 is

accurate within 49 feet at a 95 percent confidence level.

                                            8
      Bradford Sipperley, an aviation safety inspector employed by the FAA,

testified at trial that data from the Garmin 196 indicated that the plane made no

turns immediately before the crash. Sipperley testified that the data showed a rapid

loss of air speed immediately before the crash, indicating a rapid climb in altitude.

He testified that the Garmin 196 GPS record indicated that the plane “entered”

Atigun Pass at “data point 798.” The GPS record shows that at that data point the

plane was at an elevation of 3,633 feet, 674 feet above the ground. The record

indicates that the plane hit the ground roughly two minutes later, at an elevation of

4,510 feet.

      Two FAA safety inspectors visited the site the day after the crash. One of

them, Jason Major, testified that one propeller blade was missing. Based on

physical evidence at the scene, he concluded that the blade had been torn off when

the plane hit the ground. The director of maintenance for Kirst’s plane inspected

the propeller assembly after the crash. He, too, concluded that the blade had come

out “on impact.” An air safety inspector of the propeller’s manufacturer concluded

that the blade broke off when it hit the rocks. The propeller assembly was later

shipped to the manufacturing plant in Ohio for further examination. That

examination confirmed the air safety inspector’s conclusion that ground impact

had caused the damage to the propeller. Testing results from an independent

                                           9
metallurgical lab showed no signs of metal fatigue in the propeller assembly. The

missing blade was never found. The manufacturer’s air safety inspector thought

that the missing blade should be located close to the plane if it had come off upon

impact, but testified at trial that failure to locate the propeller blade was not

unusual due to ricocheting and terrain.

      On September 9, 2014, Clint Johnson, Chief of NTSB’s Alaska Regional

Office, interviewed Kirst in his hospital room after clearing the interview with his

doctors and nurses. Pilots are not required to participate in NTSB interviews, but

most participate. Kirst agreed to the interview but did not allow an FAA

representative to be present. Kirst’s attorney was present at the interview. He had

advised Kirst not to agree to the interview due to his injuries. Johnson testified at

trial that Kirst was coherent and articulate during the interview.

      According to notes taken by an NTSB employee in the hospital room during

the interview, Kirst stated that the flight from Bettles to Atigun Pass took about 20

minutes. Kirst stated that just before the accident “[h]e was climbing through 5500

[to] 5700 feet with a target altitude of 6000 feet around Chandalar Shelf,”

immediately south of Atigun Pass. Kirst stated that Spencer “slumped into the

yoke and blocked the throttle and landing gear controls as they encountered rising

terrain and a downdraft.” Kirst stated that he yelled at the unresponsive Spencer

                                            10
and tried to push him away from the controls. According to Kirst, he was pinned

by Spencer and unable to push Spencer off the controls. Kirst told Johnson that

Spencer’s weight on the controls put the plane in a descent that resulted in the

crash. Kirst characterized McCann and Nason, who were sitting in the back, as

unresponsive during the time Spencer was blocking the controls.

      Johnson testified at trial that he was surprised to hear Kirst say that Spencer

had blocked the controls, and that he saw Kirst’s lawyer raise his eyebrows when

Kirst made that statement. Prior to the interview, NTSB officials had believed that

the accident was due to pilot error; that the plane was climbing in a rising terrain;

and that the plane could not clear the pass. An NTSB investigator testified at trial

that he found Kirst’s statement that Spencer had blocked the controls confusing

because it was inconsistent with Kirst’s previous statement that a downdraft had

caused the crash.

      On November 7, 2014, Kirst submitted a Form 6120 to the NTSB. The form

is an accident report that a pilot must complete after an accident. Kirst indicated in

the report that he had been operating a 135 flight (a flight carrying passengers for

payment). During a 135 flight, a plane is required to maintain a distance of 500

feet from the terrain, both in altitude and in horizontal distance on each side of the

plane. Kirst wrote on the form: “While operating at approximately 5600',

                                          11
encountered abrupt and unexpected aircraft instability. Took steps to correct but

actions were ineffective.” Kirst wrote that a “propeller clamp bolt failure caus[ed]

blade to become unindexed and blade separation in flight.” Kirst wrote in the

section asking for a “Safety Recommendation”: “Check torque on propeller clamp

bolts before further flights on this model propell[e]r, one time fix.”

      The NTSB upgraded the limited investigation to a more serious field

accident investigation as a result of the alleged mechanical failure. A field

accident investigation requires more resources and involves representatives from

the propeller, airframe, and engine manufacturers. The NTSB informed the FAA

of the upgraded investigation in late November 2014.

      On December 9, 2016, Kirst emailed the NTSB, alleging that his attorney’s

office had mistakenly marked the flight as a 135 flight when it was, instead, a 91

aerial photography flight. Kirst’s lawyer testified at trial that by characterizing the

flight as a 91 flight, Kirst wanted to defend flying low when the passengers took

pictures of the moose. Kirst’s lawyer testified that he disagreed and thought that

Kirst operated a 135 flight.

              C. The FAA’s Revocation of Kirst’s Airman Certificate

      The FAA started an investigation in October 2014. The FAA revoked

Kirst’s airman certificate on an emergency basis on December 11, 2015,

                                           12
prohibiting him from flying. Kirst was observed taxiing in his plane (presumably

after a flight) after the revocation, prompting the FAA to issue a second emergency

order of revocation.

      Kirst appealed the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate. The NTSB

reviews appeals of the FAA’s revocations of airman certificates. 49 U.S.C. § 1133.

      During the appeal, the FAA deposed Kirst in March 2016. During the

deposition, Kirst stated that the plane flew at 5500–5600 feet and continued

climbing before the crash. Kirst stated that as his plane approached Atigun Pass,

he could see through the pass, and that the plane “pitched over” badly, falling at

1000 feet per minute. Kirst stated that Spencer flopped forward, and that he (Kirst)

turned the plane 180 degrees. According to Kirst, Spencer bumped the throttle,

and “everything went to hell again,” while he yelled at the other passengers to hold

onto Spencer.

      Kirst testified before an NTSB administrative law judge (“ALJ”) during his

appeal. Kirst testified that he was flying at 5500 feet and aiming to climb to 6000

feet before the crash. According to Kirst, the plane pitched over badly, Spencer

“had gone forward under the controls,” and he yelled for someone to get Spencer

off the controls. Kirst also testified that a proper investigation would have

revealed that the propeller failed and completely disconnected from the plane.

                                          13
Kirst claimed that he made a U-turn when the airplane pitched over, but later

testified that he made a 360-degree turn. Kirst also testified that he lost 1500 feet

of elevation before the crash. The NTSB ALJ upheld the FAA’s revocation of

Kirst’s airman certificate.

         The FAA’s enforcement attorney testified at trial that Kirst’s altitude

statements during his appeal were “very important.” He testified that if the

statements had been accurate, the plane would have been more than 500 feet above

the pass, resulting in no violation.

                          D. Indictment, Trial, and Conviction

         In December 2017, the government filed a three-count indictment against

Kirst.

         Counts One and Two charged Kirst with obstructing the “due and proper

administration of the law” in a “pending proceeding” before an agency, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Section § 1505 provides in relevant part:

         Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to
         influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the
         law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any . . .
         agency of the United States . . . [s]hall be fined under this title,
         imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . , or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added).

                                            14
      Count One charged Kirst with obstructing the NTSB investigation between

about August 24, 2014, and March 9, 2017. Count One alleged that Kirst made the

following false and misleading statements during the investigation, including: (1)

that Kirst’s plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of

6,000 feet just prior to the crash; (2) that Spencer slumped into the yoke and

blocked the throttle and landing gear controls just prior to the crash; and (3) that a

propeller blade failed in flight. Count Two charged Kirst with obstructing the

appeal before the NTSB of the revocation of his airman certificate by the FAA

between about April 1, 2015, and September 2, 2016. Count Two alleged that

Kirst made false and misleading statements during the appeal, including: (1) that

Kirst’s plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of

6,000 feet just prior to the crash; (2) that the plane dropped approximately 1,500

feet just prior to the crash; and (3) that a propeller blade failed in flight. Count

Three charged Kirst with piloting an aircraft without a valid airman certificate in

violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(7).

      At trial, the government presented the evidence summarized above. The

defense presented testimony from, inter alia, Kirst, his attorney, his wife, and a

clinical psychologist.

                                           15
      Kirst testified that he learned to fly in the 1970s, and that he returned to

aviation in 2002 after 15 years of teaching. He opened a flight instruction business

in 2006, and later added sightseeing tours and aerial mapping to the business.

Kirst testified that he is an experienced pilot and that he has done about 1000 hours

of aerial mapping.

      Kirst testified that he was very familiar with the route taken during the

August 24 flight and that he “can almost fly it in [his] sleep.” He testified that he

is familiar with the elevations of the mountains around the crash site. He testified

that he relied on the plane’s built-in altimeter during the flight. He testified that

because of his familiarity with the terrain, he could estimate the altitude by the

distance between the plane and the mountain tops.

      Kirst testified that he encountered no problem flying the plane between

leaving Bettles and entering the mountainous area near Atigun Pass, despite some

winds at about 5000 feet. He planned to go up the valley, turn right toward the

Atigun Pass, and go over the pass. He testified that the plane was at an altitude of

about 4500 feet and was climbing up to 5000 feet as he turned into the valley

leading to the pass. On cross examination, Kirst testified that the plane was

climbing through 5500–5700 feet with a target altitude of 6000 feet as it

approached Atigun Pass after Chandalar Shelf. Kirst testified that Spencer

                                           16
slumped forward, blocking the controls. The plane pitched nose down and became

uncontrollable. Kirst pulled the power to idle and yelled for passengers to get

Spencer off the controls, but there was no response. Kirst made a 180-degree turn

to the left. The plane was losing altitude at over 1000 feet per minute. Kirst aimed

to land the plane on a steep hill, but the plane had no power.

      Kirst acknowledged that the GPS data relied upon by the government, which

the government stated that it had obtained from his plane’s Garmin 196, never

showed the plane flying at more than 1000 feet above the ground. But Kirst was

unwilling to acknowledge that the government’s data came directly from his

Garmin 196. According to Kirst, “It’s [the government’s witness’s] collection of

some data from me, some data from Google Earth, or wherever.” Kirst testified

that he had not used GPS-derived altitude but had relied on the plane’s altimeter.

According to Kirst, his altimeter had shown that the plane was flying between 4700

and 5200 feet as it started through Atigun Pass. Kirst testified that he did not

remember any of his conversations with the pipeline workers who arrived at the

crash site or with the first responders. Kirst also testified that he did not remember

his September 9 interview with Johnson in the hospital.

      Kirst testified that while he was in the hospital, he was taking morphine,

Fentanyl, Methadone, Lyrica, OxyContin, Tylenol, and a blood thinner. He

                                          17
continued to take some of these medications after being released from the hospital.

Kirst testified that he signed the NTSB’s Form 6120 in November 2014 while

under the influence of his medications, and that he could not read any of the

checkmarks or boxes on the form. He testified that during the NTSB appeal in

2016, he received copies of the form, eyewitness reports, and mechanical reports.

Kirst testified that he later reached out to the NTSB to correct mistakes and that the

form had been filled out by people in his attorney’s office.

      Kirst testified that the propeller blade came apart and that “it started in the

air” at around 5,600 feet. Kirst testified that he thought that the propeller was

improperly assembled, and that he had sued the manufacturers of the propeller.

Kirst lost the lawsuit at summary judgment and later lost the appeal.

      Kirst testified that he resumed flying in July 2015 after receiving medical

clearance. He testified that he flew after the FAA issued the first emergency order

revoking his airman certificate because his attorney advised him that he could.

      Kirst’s attorney testified that he likely drafted most of the NTSB Form 6120,

and that “[Kirst] would come into my office, read it, review it, give it his okay, and

sign it.” However, the attorney testified that he had no actual recollection of

Kirst’s coming into the office and signing the form. The attorney testified, further,

                                          18
that he would not have let Kirst sign the document if he had concerns about his

mental state.

      Kirst’s wife testified that when she arrived at the hospital on August 30,

shortly after the crash, Kirst was “heavily drugged” and not conversational. She

testified that a few weeks into his hospital stay, Kirst was occasionally friendly and

cheerful, but was sometimes confused about things. Another witness testified that

when he first saw Kirst in the hospital, he was “five percent Forest [Kirst].” When

Kirst was released from the hospital, he was “around 85 percent the person” the

witness had always known.

      Dr. David Sperbeck, a psychologist, testified about Kirst’s ability to

remember the crash. Dr. Sperbeck had reviewed Kirst’s records but had never

examined him. He testified that Kirst had been too fragile to undergo a thorough

evaluation while in the hospital. In Dr. Sperbeck’s opinion, Kirst had retrograde

amnesia and did not know what had happened before the crash. According to his

testimony, people with retrograde amnesia can recover their memories

spontaneously over time under ideal circumstances, but Kirst was in extreme pain

and heavily sedated. Post-traumatic amnesia creates gaps in a person’s memory

without complete memory loss. Particularly impaired patients may engage in

unintentional misrepresentation of what happened. Patients could suffer from

                                          19
confirmation bias, and “attend[] to” facts that reinforce their beliefs—a process

different from lying. A person suffering from amnesia can appear normal to

others.

      Dr. Sperbeck testified that as a result of his retrograde amnesia, Kirst was

probably speculating, deducing, or trying to recreate what happened before the

crash based on his background and his history. The medications likely interfered

with Kirst’s memory, and Kirst could not give reliable statements for probably

about six months, because recovery from mild traumatic brain injury takes one to

eighteen months. Dr. Sperbeck acknowledged that it would be “suspicious” if an

amnesia patient recalled only facts that excused his conduct, especially if his

baseline is simply that he does not remember anything.

      After the government rested, Kirst moved under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the motion

without prejudice. Kirst filed a renewed Rule 29 motion before closing arguments,

which the district court also denied.

      The jury returned a special verdict finding Kirst guilty of obstructing

proceedings before an agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Counts One and

Two). It found, as to Count One, that Kirst violated § 1505 by falsely stating that

his “plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000

                                          20
feet just prior to the crash.” It found, as to Count Two, that Kirst violated § 1505

by making the false statement just described, and the additional false statement that

“just prior to the crash, [his] plane dropped in altitude approximately 1,500 feet.”

The jury acquitted Kirst of violating 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(7) (Count Three). The

district court sentenced Kirst to 12 months and 1 day in prison on Counts One and

Two, to be served concurrently; 3 years of supervised release; and a $5,000 fine.

                                     II. Analysis

                    A. Count One: “Proceeding” Under § 1505

      Kirst appeals his conviction under Count One, arguing that the NTSB’s

accident investigation was not a pending “proceeding” within the meaning of

§ 1505. Kirst contends that proceedings under § 1505 include only proceedings

where an agency has regulatory or adjudicative authority. He points out that the

NTSB lacks such authority during an accident investigation.

      At trial, Kirst moved for acquittal under Rule 29. He contended that the

government had not presented sufficient evidence that he had knowingly lied to

obstruct an investigation. However, he did not mention in his motion his current

argument based on § 1505. We therefore review for plain error his argument under

§ 1505. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.4th 706, 719 (9th Cir. 2021) (“While Rule

29 motions need not specify grounds for acquittal, it is well established that Rule

                                          21
29 motions raising particular grounds fail to preserve appellate review of other

grounds not raised. We review forfeited challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence for plain error.” (citations omitted)).

      “To establish plain error, the defendant must at least demonstrate an error,

that the error was plain, and that the error prejudiced his substantial rights. We

may overturn a conviction for plain error resulting in insufficient evidence only ‘to

prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and the reputation of the

judicial process.’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Guizar,

160 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1998)). “An error cannot be plain where there is no

controlling authority on point and where the most closely analogous precedent

leads to conflicting results.” United States v. Wijegoonaratna, 922 F.3d 983, 991

(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir.

2003)).

      Even if we were not reviewing for plain error, we would affirm. It is settled

law in this circuit that, as a general matter, an administrative investigation is a

“proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505. In United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d

1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), the defendant appealed from a conviction

under § 1505 for submitting a false document to the Internal Revenue Service,

which was performing an investigation under the Economic Stabilization Act

                                           22
Amendments of 1971. We held, “An administrative investigation is a ‘proceeding’

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. [§] 1505.” Id. at 1278 (citing United States v.

Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1970)).

      In United States v. Technic Services., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir.

2002), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the Environmental Protection Agency investigated

Technic Services, Inc. (“TSI”) for possible violations of the Clean Air Act and

Clean Water Act. Defendant Rushing, an employee of TSI, was convicted under §

1505 of obstructing the investigation. Id. Rushing conceded his “interference with

workers’ air monitoring devices.” Id. at 1044. We upheld the conviction, writing

that “evidence of the EPA proceeding was sufficient to support Rushing’s

conviction for obstructing a federal proceeding by tampering with employees’ air

monitors.” Id.

      In United States v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1078

(N.D. Cal. 2015), defendant Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) moved to dismiss

Count One of an indictment under § 1505 charging obstruction of an NTSB

investigation, similar to the NTSB investigation at issue in the case now before us.

PG&E contended that an NTSB investigation is not a “proceeding” within the

meaning of § 1505, arguing that § 1505 applies only to agencies with adjudicatory

                                         23
or rulemaking authority. Id. at 1078–79. In a careful opinion, the district court

denied the motion. Id. at 1084. The court held that an NTSB investigation is a

proceeding under § 1505, relying heavily on United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118

(D.C. Cir. 1994). The court wrote:

      [U]nder the reasoning in Kelley, the NTSB is unquestionably an agency
      “with the power to enhance [its] investigations through the issuance of
      subpoenas or warrants.” Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1127. Indeed, Congress gave
      the NTSB broad powers: “The [NTSB] . . . may conduct hearings to
      carry out this chapter, administer oaths, and require, by subpena [sic] or
      otherwise, necessary witnesses and evidence.” 49 U.S.C. § 1113(a).

PG&E, 153 F.3d at 1082 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).

      Like the district court in PG&E, we find the reasoning of Kelley persuasive.

In Kelley, Counts Five and Six of the indictment charged the defendant with

obstructing an investigation by the U.S. Agency for International Development

(“AID”), in violation of § 1505. Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1123. The D.C. Circuit held

that a “formal investigation opened by the Office of the Inspector General of AID”

was not a “mere police investigation.” Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Batten,

226 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D.D.C. 1964)). Rather, it was “a ‘proceeding’ within the

meaning of § 1505,” because the agency had the power to issue subpoenas and

compel testimony under oath. Id. The court wrote:

      The Inspector General’s office of AID is charged with the duty of
      supervising investigations relating to the proper operation of the agency.

                                         24
      In addition, the Inspector General is empowered to issue subpoenas and
      to compel sworn testimony in conjunction with an investigation of
      agency activities. Accordingly, the Inspector General’s inquiries, albeit
      preliminary, constitute a “proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505.

Id. (citation omitted).

      So, too, here. In conducting an investigation of an airplane crash, the NTSB

has authority to issue subpoenas and to compel testimony under oath. An NTSB

regulation provides:

      (a) General authority of investigators. To carry out the statutory
      responsibilities of the agency, an NTSB investigator may—
             ...
             (2) Administer oaths;
             (3) Require, by subpoena or otherwise, the production of evidence
             and witnesses[.]
             ...
      (b) Subpoenas. The NTSB may issue a subpoena, enforceable in Federal
      District Court, to obtain testimony or evidence related to an accident,
      including but not limited to personal electronic devices.

49 C.F.R. § 831.9 (2017); see 49 U.S.C. § 1113(a)(1).

      We therefore conclude that the NTSB investigation of Kirst’s plane crash

was a “proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505. In the course of conducting its

investigation, the NTSB had both subpoena power and the power to compel

testimony under oath. Under Kelley, and under our holding today, that is enough.

Kirst was thus properly charged in Count One with obstructing an NTSB

proceeding.

                                         25
      Our dissenting colleague disagrees. He contends that although the NTSB

investigation is a kind of “proceeding,” it is not a proceeding that involves the

“administration of the law” within the meaning of § 1505. Dissent at 12–21. For

the convenience of the reader, we again quote the relevant portion of § 1505:

      Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to
      influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the
      law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any . . .
      agency of the United States . . . [s]hall be fined under this title,
      imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . , or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added).

      Our colleague construes the phrase “administration of the law” narrowly. In

his view, “administration of the law” requires that an agency conducting a

proceeding not only have authority to conduct the proceeding, but also have

authority to enforce any judgment or decision resulting from the proceeding.

Dissent at 16. He writes, “[W]here the ‘proceeding’ at issue is an investigation,

§ 1505 requires proof that the defendant obstructed the agency’s enforcement of

the law at issue in the investigation.” Dissent at 16 (emphasis in original). Our

colleague argues that because it is the FAA rather than the NTSB that has the

authority to enforce the law by revoking Kirst’s airman certificate, the NTSB’s

investigation does not involve the “administration of the law” within the meaning

of § 1505.

                                          26
      To support his argument, our colleague relies on two Supreme Court cases.

Our colleague relies most heavily on United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593

(1995), in which a federal district court judge was convicted under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503 for “uttering false statements to an investigating agent.” Id. at 600. The

Court reversed the conviction, holding that the false statements of the defendant

were not covered by § 1503. Id. Section 1503 does not prohibit obstruction of the

“due and proper administration of law,” as does § 1505. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503,

1505. Rather, in relevant part, § 1503 prohibits “obstruct[ing] . . . the due

administration of justice.” Id. § 1503 (emphasis added).

      The Supreme Court in Aguilar noted that § 1503 was based on a statute that

the Court had interpreted one hundred years earlier, in Pettibone v. United States,

148 U.S. 197 (1893). Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. In Pettibone, the Court had

interpreted the predecessor statute to apply only to obstruction of pending court

proceedings. See id. Later court of appeals decisions had read § 1503 similarly

narrowly, as applying only to pending judicial or grand jury proceedings. Id.

Relying on Pettibone and agreeing with the later court of appeals decisions, the

Court construed “administration of justice” in § 1503 to require that a defendant

obstruct, or intend to obstruct, a “judicial proceeding[].” Id. Given the history and

wording of § 1503, the question at issue in that case, and the narrow conclusion

                                          27
reached by the Court, we fail to see how Aguilar supports our colleague’s

interpretation of § 1505. That is, we fail to see how Aguilar supports the

conclusion that § 1505 applies only to a proceeding where the agency conducting

an investigation has enforcement authority against a party to the investigation.

      Our colleague also relies on Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101

(2018). The defendant in Marinello was criminally charged under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7212(a) with eight tax-related acts, including “failing to maintain corporate

books and records,” “hiding income,” and “paying employees . . . with cash.” Id.

at 1105 (omission in original). Section 7212(a) is part of the Tax Code. It

prohibits “obstruct[ing] . . . the due administration of this title.” 26 U.S.C. §

7212(a). The jury was instructed that it could convict the defendant based on any

of the listed acts. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1105. The Supreme Court reversed his

conviction on the ground that some of the charged acts did not come within the

prohibition of the statute. Id. at 1110.

      The Court recognized that the statutory phrase “due administration” was

susceptible to an extremely broad interpretation, potentially including “every ‘[a]ct

or process of administering.” Id. at 1106 (alteration in original) (quoting

Webster’s New International Dictionary 34 (2d ed. 1954)). But the Court held that,

in context, the phrase had a narrower meaning. Id. The Court wrote:

                                           28
      [T]he whole phrase—the due administration of the Tax Code—is best
      viewed, like the due administration of justice [in Aguilar], as referring
      to only some of those acts or to some separable parts of an institution or
      business. . . . Here statutory context confirms that the text refers to
      specific, targeted acts of administration.

Id. The Court interpreted the phrase as referring to “specific interference with

targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation

or audit.” Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).

      The Court held in Marinello that the government was required under §

7212(a) to “show that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant

engaged in the obstructive conduct or, at the least, was then reasonably foreseeable

by the defendant.” Id. at 1110. There is nothing in Marinello that restricts the

phrase “due administration of the Tax Code” to obstruction of enforcement as

distinct from obstruction of an investigation that might, or might not, lead to

enforcement. It is sufficient under Marinello that a defendant be charged with

obstructing “a particular investigation.” Id. at 1104.

      Neither Aguilar nor Marinello supports our colleague’s conclusion that in

order for obstruction of an investigation to constitute a violation of § 1505, the

investigation must be by an agency that has enforcement authority against a party

to the investigation.

                B. Counts One and Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

                                           29
      Kirst argues that the government presented insufficient evidence that he had

corrupt intent under § 1505 to support a conviction under either Count One or

Count Two. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United States

v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Sullivan,

522 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). “There is sufficient evidence to

support a conviction if, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 1211–12 (quoting Sullivan, 522 F.3d at

974). “[E]vidence is insufficient to support a verdict where mere speculation,

rather than reasonable inference, supports the government’s case, or where there is

a total failure of proof of [a] requisite element.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d

1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

      The government presented sufficient evidence to prove corrupt intent.

“‘[D]irect proof’ of one’s specific wrongful intent is ‘rarely available,’” and

wrongful intent “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v.

Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Marabelles,

724 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1984)). As to Count One, the jury convicted Kirst of

obstructing the NTSB investigation based on his statement that the plane was

                                          30
climbing through 5500–5700 feet prior to the crash. As to Count Two, the jury

convicted Kirst of obstructing the NTSB’s review of the FAA’s revocation of his

airman certificate based on his statements that the plane was climbing through

5500–5700 feet just prior to the crash, and that the plane lost about 1500 feet in

altitude just prior to the crash. At trial, GPS data showed that Kirst was flying

1000 feet below the altitude he claimed, and various eyewitnesses testified that the

plane was flying low. Kirst had a motive to obstruct the NTSB proceedings by

providing false statements during the investigation and appeal because his airman

certificate and his livelihood were at stake. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, a reasonable factfinder could have found corrupt

intent.

                                         C. Materiality

          The district court instructed the jury that “[a]n act is ‘material’ if it has a

natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the agency’s decisions

or activities” (emphasis added). Kirst argues that the phrase “or activities” in the

instruction was improper because it allowed the jury to convict based on Kirst’s

statements that did not affect the NTSB’s decisions or decisionmaking process.

          “We review the district court’s ‘precise formulation’ of jury instructions for

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2016)

                                               31
(quoting United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015)). “We review

. . . whether the jury instructions misstated an element of the crime . . . de novo.”

Id.

      The district court’s instruction accords with Ninth Circuit Model Criminal

Jury Instruction 24.10. We have addressed a similar challenge to a jury instruction

on materiality that contains the phrase, “the agency’s decisions or activities.”

United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2008). We rejected

the argument that the word “activities” enabled the jury to find a statement material

even if it was incapable of influencing an agency’s decisions. Id. Further, the

district court made clear that Kirst’s statements must have been capable of

influencing the NTSB investigation or appeal, not just any activity of the agency.

On Count One, the district court instructed, “The Government must . . . prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged conduct . . . was capable of influencing

the investigation conducted by the NTSB” (emphasis added). On Count Two, the

district court instructed, “The Government must prove . . . beyond a reasonable

doubt that the charged conduct . . . was capable of influencing a pending

proceeding before the NTSB, Office of Administrative Law Judges, which was the

appeal of the revocation by the FAA of defendant’s airman’s certificate” (emphasis

added).

                                           32
      The district court thus did not err in instructing the jury on the materiality

element.

                                      D. The Fine

      Finally, Kirst argues that the district court committed clear error in

determining that he could pay the $5,000 fine.

      “A district court’s finding of whether a defendant is able to pay the fine is

reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.

2009). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without

support in the record.” United States v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010)).

There was no evidence before the district court showing that Kirst was unable to

pay the fine, or was likely to become unable to pay it in the future. The district

court thus did not commit clear error in finding Kirst able to pay the $5,000 fine.

                                      Conclusion

      We hold that it was not error, let alone plain error, to convict Kirst on Count

One, on the ground that the NTSB investigation was a “proceeding” within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. We hold, further, that sufficient evidence supported

Kirst’s conviction, and that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on

                                           33
the materiality element. We hold, finally, that the district court did not commit

clear error in assessing the $5,000 fine.

      AFFIRMED.

                                            34
                                                                           FILED
                                                                           NOV 22 2022

United States v. Kirst, 20-30193                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part:

      After a jury trial, Forest Kirst was convicted of two counts of “obstruct[ing]

. . . the due and proper administration of the law” in connection with agency

proceedings arising from the crash of a small airplane Kirst had been piloting. See

18 U.S.C. § 1505. The proceeding at issue in Count 1 was the investigation

undertaken by the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”). However,

because the NTSB lacks any regulatory or enforcement authority over the

accidents it investigates, there is no sense in which the NTSB’s investigation into

Kirst’s accident involved the “administration of the law under which [that]

proceeding [was] being had” within the meaning of § 1505. Id. (emphasis added).

Reviewing for plain error, I therefore would reverse Kirst’s conviction on Count 1

and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on that count. But because the

proceeding at issue in Count 2 involved Kirst’s appeal of the Federal Aviation

Administration’s revocation of his airman certificate, that proceeding did involve

the “administration of the law” under which that proceeding was being conducted,

and it therefore fell within the purview of § 1505. As to the remaining issues, I

agree with the majority’s opinion to the extent that it rejects Kirst’s further

challenges to his conviction and sentence on Count 2. I therefore dissent as to

Count 1 and concur in the judgment as to Count 2.
                                           I

         I begin with a brief summary of the relevant facts. On August 24, 2014,

Kirst crashed a small plane carrying three tourists on an aerial photography tour.

Kirst and the passengers were severely injured, and one passenger died about a

month later. The NTSB initiated an investigation to determine “the facts,

circumstances, and cause or probable cause” of the accident. See 49 U.S.C.

§§ 1131(a)(1)(A), 1132(a)(1)(A). As the Chief of the NTSB’s Alaska Regional

Office explained at trial, the NTSB’s inquiry was “strictly investigative” and its

“ultimate goal” was to “try and keep the accident from happening again.”

         On September 9, 2014, the NTSB interviewed Kirst “to find out what the

circumstances were that led up to the accident” and “to give [the NTSB] a better

idea of which direction to go” with the investigation. No members of the Federal

Aviation Administration (“FAA”) were present during the interview. Kirst stated,

in relevant part, that “[h]e was climbing through 5500–5700 feet with a target

altitude of 6000 feet” prior to the crash. Kirst later submitted to the NTSB a

written accident report, in which he stated, “While operating at approximately

5600', encountered abrupt and unexpected aircraft instability. Took steps to correct

but actions were ineffective. Made decision to protect passengers and myself in

light of conditions. Aircraft hit the ground nose up and came to rest on side of

hill.”

                                           2
      The FAA visited the crash site shortly after the accident, but the NTSB did

not. In October 2014, the FAA formally notified Kirst about its investigation. The

FAA subsequently concluded that Kirst had violated FAA regulations by “flying

too low for the terrain,” and it revoked Kirst’s airman certificate in 2015. Kirst

appealed the revocation order to an NTSB administrative law judge. See 49 U.S.C.

§ 1133. Kirst stated in a deposition associated with the appeal that prior to the

crash he was flying between 5,500 and 5,600 feet and was heading toward 6,000

feet. Kirst later testified at a hearing associated with the appeal that he “passed

through 5,500. I was aiming for 6,000, probably close to 5,600.” The NTSB

upheld the FAA’s revocation order.

      On December 13, 2017, the Government charged Kirst with two counts of

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and one count of piloting an aircraft without a valid

airman certificate. Count 1 alleged that Kirst obstructed “the due and proper

administration of the law under which a pending proceeding was being held before

the NTSB, to wit, the investigation of the August 24, 2014, crash . . . by making

numerous false and misleading statements,” including that his “plane was climbing

through 5,500 to 5,700 feet with a target altitude of 6,000 feet just prior to the

crash.” Count 2 alleged that Kirst obstructed “the appeal of the revocation by the

FAA of [Kirst’s] airman certificate, by making numerous false and misleading

statements,” including that his “plane was climbing through 5,500 to 5,700 feet

                                           3
with a target altitude of 6,000 feet just prior to the crash.”

      On November 25, 2019, a jury found Kirst guilty on the first two counts and

not guilty on the third count. Kirst was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in

prison, 3 years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine.

                                           II

      On appeal, Kirst contends that the evidence on Count 1 at trial was

insufficient to establish a violation of § 1505, because the statements he made in

connection with the NTSB’s factual investigation had nothing to do with the

“administration of the law” under which a “pending proceeding” was being

conducted. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (requiring, as an element of the offense, that the

defendant obstructed the due “administration of the law under which any pending

proceeding is being had”).

                                            A

      In addressing this contention, we confront a threshold issue as to whether we

may consider this argument and, if so, what is the proper standard of review. I

conclude that we can consider this point, but that our review is only for plain error.

      The Government contends that any review of this issue is barred because

Kirst failed to raise a pretrial challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3). According to the Government, it

was apparent on the face of Kirst’s indictment that the Government’s position was

                                            4
that an NTSB investigation involves a “pending proceeding” involving the

“administration of the law,” and if Kirst objected to that view, he should have filed

a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss the indictment. Because he did not file such a

pretrial motion, the Government argues, he cannot raise this issue at trial or

thereafter unless he first “shows good cause” for his failure to file such a pretrial

motion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3). The Government’s position is deeply

flawed and reflects a basic misunderstanding of the criminal trial process.

      Under the Constitution, a defendant “shall not be held to answer” for a

felony “unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” See U.S. CONST.

amend. V; see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). Thereafter,

the defendant is constitutionally entitled to a “trial” on that charge “by an impartial

jury.” See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. At that

trial, the Government must shoulder the burden of proving “each element” of the

crime “to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.

99, 104 (2013) (citing, inter alia, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).

Within that basic framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth

certain additional details about how the criminal process is to be conducted,

including challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment, challenges to venue,

requests to suppress evidence, requests for particular jury instructions, and requests

for a directed verdict. See FED. R. CRIM P. 12(b)(3), 29, 30.

                                           5
      The particular rule that the Government invokes here is Rule 12(b)(3), which

states that a “defect in the indictment” on grounds of “failure to state an offense”

“must be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably

available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” See

FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v) (emphasis added). Rule 12 further provides that

“[i]f a party does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the

motion is untimely. But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request if

the party shows good cause.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3). This rule has no

application here, because Kirst is not asserting, or seeking relief for, any defect in

the indictment. Rather, he is asserting that, at his criminal trial, the Government

failed to present sufficient evidence to establish each element of the § 1505 charge

for which he was being tried.

      The Government nonetheless contends that, where a defendant’s claim of

innocence of a charge at trial rests on the premise that the Government

misunderstands the applicable law governing the elements of the charged offense,

the defendant cannot assert such an argument if the Government’s legal

misunderstanding was apparent on the face of the indictment and, without good

cause, the defendant failed to raise the legal issue by pretrial motion. Nothing in

the text of the rules supports this position. Rule 12(b)(3) merely states that, by

failing to file a pretrial motion, a defendant forfeits his right to seek relief based on

                                            6
a “defect in the indictment,” i.e., the defendant cannot later be heard to assert that

the Government has violated his right to a proper indictment that, for example,

reflects a grand jury’s finding of probable cause as to each element. See Hamling

v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.

480, 487 (1958). But the loss of that right to challenge a “defect in the indictment”

does not somehow mean that the defendant is deprived of other rights conferred by

the federal rules or the Constitution, such as the right to a properly instructed jury

or the right to have a jury find all of the elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Regardless of whether the indictment was defective and would

have been subject to dismissal, a defendant is still entitled to insist at trial that the

correct law be applied in defining the elements of the charge being tried, see FED.

R. CRIM P. 30(a) (“Any party may request in writing that the court instruct the jury

on the law as specified in the request.”), and that he cannot be convicted unless a

jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements of the offense being

tried, see Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 104.

       Consequently, where the Government’s approach to a prosecution rests on a

fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable law governing the elements of an

offense, the Constitution and the criminal rules unsurprisingly give a defendant

multiple opportunities to contest that misunderstanding, as the Government’s error

successively infects each of the multiple stages of the criminal process. In such a

                                            7
case, Rule 12(b)(3) merely provides that, if a timely pretrial motion is not filed, the

defendant cannot challenge a “defect in the indictment” and insist, for example,

that if the Government wishes to proceed, a new grand jury must make the

necessary findings of probable cause under the correct law. Nothing in the text of

Rule 12 supports the quite different proposition that, if a defendant fails to

challenge such a legal defect when it is apparent on the face of the indictment, he

thereafter cannot contest that underlying legal defect when it reappears in other

forms at trial—meaning, for example, that the jury must be mis-instructed as to the

law and that the defendant must endure a sham trial at which he cannot assert his

actual innocence of the charge under the correct law. Cf. United States v. Zalapa,

509 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a defendant who failed to raise a

Rule 12(b) challenge to a multiplicitous indictment “waived any objection to the

form of the indictment” but “did not . . . waive his right to object to his sentences

and convictions as multiplicitous on appeal”); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d

770, 772 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The argument that one waives his right to object to the

imposition of multiple sentences by his fail(ing) to object to the multiplicious

nature of an indictment is a non sequitur,” because “Rule 12 applies only to

objections with regard to the error in the indictment itself; . . . if sentences are

imposed on each count of that multiplicious indictment the defendant is not forced

to serve the erroneous sentence because of any waiver.” (emphasis added and

                                            8
citation omitted)).

      An example will further reveal the absurdity of the Government’s argument.

Suppose that the defendant is indicted for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113, but the indictment fails to include an allegation that the bank in question

was federally insured or otherwise covered by the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f).

If challenged in a pretrial motion, such a facial defect would require dismissal of

the indictment. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2020) (“In

this circuit an indictment missing an essential element that is properly challenged

before trial must be dismissed.”). But if the defendant does not bother to file such

a motion, that would not mean that, at the later trial, he could not then insist under

Rule 30 that the jury be instructed that, in order to convict, it must find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the bank was federally insured. Nor would it mean that, if

the Government fails at trial to introduce evidence that the victim bank was

federally insured, the defendant could not move for a judgment of acquittal under

Rule 29. Under the Government’s view, however, the failure to assert a Rule 12

challenge to the indictment’s facially defective omission of an element of the

offense would mean that the defendant is thereafter barred from “circumvent[ing]

his failure by framing the issue as a sufficiency of the evidence claim.” The trial

would have to proceed, according to the Government, under the legally defective

framing of the offense contained in the indictment, and the defendant could not

                                           9
assert the separate rights granted to him by Rule 29, Rule 30, and the Constitution

to challenge at trial the Government’s failure to prove every element of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the rules, precedent, or common sense

supports such an astonishing result. Indeed, the Government fails to cite a single

precedent that adopts its extraordinary position.1

      Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(3) poses no categorical bar to challenging the

Government’s construction of § 1505 at trial, either by requesting appropriate jury

instructions under Rule 30 or by seeking a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29.

The fact remains, however, that Kirst at trial did not request any such jury

instructions. And although he did make a Rule 29 motion at trial, it was based

1
  Nor have I found any. In United States v. Ghanem, 993 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
2021), we held that a failure to raise certain objections to venue before trial
precluded the defendant from raising those objections in a subsequent Rule 29
motion challenging the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence of venue at trial.
Id. at 1119–21. But venue is “not an essential fact constituting the offense
charged,” United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1974); it need only
be proved “by a preponderance of the evidence,” United States v. Chi Tong Kuok,
671 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); and a failure to prove venue
results only in dismissal of the indictment and not an “acquittal” that would
implicate the double jeopardy clause, see United States v. Kaytso, 868 F.2d 1020,
1021–22 (9th Cir. 1988). Given these special features of venue, and Rule 12’s
additional language specifically requiring venue challenges to be raised by pretrial
motion if possible, it is unsurprising that in Ghanem we declined to allow a
defendant to seek dismissal of the indictment at trial based on a venue theory
raised for the first time after the Government had rested. 993 F.3d at 1120–21.
But that is a far cry from what the Government asserts here, which is that, by
failing to seek pretrial dismissal of the indictment, Kirst is barred from arguing at
trial that, under the correct view of the law, the Government failed to prove an
essential element of the offense and he is therefore not guilty.

                                         10
only on the ground that “[t]here has been no evidence presented that [Kirst]

knowingly lied to obstruct an investigation, or that he was aware of his revoked

status at the time that he flew the airplane.” Because Kirst failed to argue that the

NTSB investigation did not qualify as a “proceeding” involving the

“administration of the law” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1505, we review

this issue only for plain error. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.4th 706, 719 (9th

Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is well established that Rule 29 motions raising particular grounds

fail to preserve appellate review of other grounds not raised. We review forfeited

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.” (citations omitted));

see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(d) (“A party who objects to any portion of the

instructions . . . must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for

the objection” and “[f]ailure to object in accordance with this rule precludes

appellate review, except as permitted under Rule 52(b)”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)

(“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was

not brought to the court’s attention.”). In my view, we therefore may review

Kirst’s insufficiency argument on appeal, but only for plain error.

                                          B

      “To establish eligibility for plain-error relief, a defendant must satisfy three

threshold requirements. First, there must be an error. Second, the error must be

plain. Third, the error must affect ‘substantial rights,’ which generally means that

                                          11
there must be ‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different.’” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090,

2096 (2021) (citations omitted). “If those three requirements are met, an appellate

court may grant relief if it concludes that the error had a serious effect on ‘the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 2096–97

(citation omitted). Applying these standards, I would hold that the denial of Kirst’s

Rule 29 motion with respect to the § 1505 charge in Count 1 was plain error.

                                           1

      Addressing the first prong of the plain-error test, I conclude that, as a matter

of law, the NTSB investigation undertaken here did not constitute a “proceeding”

involving the “administration of the law” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.

      By its terms, § 1505 imposes criminal punishment on anyone who, inter

alia, “corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,

obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any

pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United

States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added). I agree that an investigation, such as

that conducted by the NTSB here, counts as a “proceeding” in the ordinary sense

of that term. See United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (“An

administrative investigation is a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1505.”); cf. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018) (stating that

                                          12
an “administrative proceeding” includes “an investigation, an audit, or other

targeted administrative action”).

      However, § 1505 requires, not merely obstruction of a “proceeding,” but

obstruction of “the due and proper administration of the law” under which that

“proceeding” is being conducted. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added). That

additional phrase cannot be dismissed as surplusage. See Jones v. United States,

529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (“Judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any

setting as surplusage, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe

an element of a criminal offense.” (simplified)). That is, Congress could have

simplified the wording of § 1505 and made it a crime to obstruct “any pending

proceeding” before an agency, but Congress instead more narrowly required that

the defendant obstruct “the administration of the law” under which the proceeding

is being conducted. The question, then, is whether the NTSB’s investigation

involved the “administration of the law” within the meaning of § 1505. The

answer, in my view, is no.

      Here, the “law” under which the NTSB investigation was conducted is

Chapter 11 of Title 49 of the United States Code. See 49 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

Specifically, § 1131 provides that the NTSB shall “investigate . . . and establish the

facts, circumstances, and cause or probable cause” of any “aircraft accident” the

NTSB “has authority to investigate under section 1132 of this title.” Id.

                                         13
§ 1131(a)(1)(a). Section 1132, in turn, states that the NTSB “shall investigate . . .

each accident involving civil aircraft.” Id. § 1132(a)(1)(A). The specific tools for

carrying out such an investigation are set forth in § 1113, which authorizes the

NTSB to “conduct hearings to carry out this chapter, administer oaths, and require,

by subpoena or otherwise, necessary witnesses and evidence.” Id. § 1113(a)(1).

The NTSB is also granted ancillary authority to enforce the subpoenas or orders it

issues in connection with such an investigation, including the power to bring a civil

action to enforce the subpoena or order, id. § 1113(a)(4), and to impose a civil

penalty for disobedience, id. §§ 1151(a), 1155(a).

      But conspicuously missing from the powers granted to the NTSB in this

regard is any relevant authority for it to take any measures beyond investigation

and reporting. It cannot, for example, decide to impose any liability, penalty, or

sanction on any person it finds at fault for an accident, nor can it issue any

regulations prescribing changes in the conduct of aviation or of pilots. See

Graham v. Teledyne-Con’t Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1986) (“These

investigations are not primarily for the purpose of determining civil liability;

indeed, the [NTSB] has no authority to adjudicate the rights of private parties.”);

see also 49 C.F.R. § 831.4(c) (“NTSB investigations are fact-finding proceedings

with no adverse parties. The investigative proceedings . . . are not conducted for

the purpose of determining the rights, liabilities, or blame of any person or entity,

                                          14
as they are not adjudicatory proceedings.”). The power to revoke airman

certificates, for example, is instead lodged in the FAA, not the NTSB. See 49

U.S.C. §§ 44703, 44709, 44710. To be sure, the NTSB has been granted a

separate authority to hear administrative appeals from such FAA revocations, see

id. § 1133(1), and that distinct authority is the subject of the separate violation of

§ 1505 alleged in Count 2 of Kirst’s indictment. But the obstruction alleged in

Count 1 relates only to the NTSB’s purely investigative authority, and under the

statute, that power to conduct formal investigations is unaccompanied by any

substantive regulatory enforcement authority of the NTSB. Indeed, the

Government’s evidence at trial confirms that the “proceeding” that underlies Count

1 was purely investigative and did not involve the exercise of any enforcement

authority. As the Chief of the NTSB’s Alaska Regional Office testified at trial,

“We’re not any kind of a regulatory agency. We’re strictly accident investigators,

and that’s all we do.” Another NTSB official confirmed that the NTSB “can’t

impose any kind of sanctions” and that “enforcement action[s]” are “done

separately by the FAA.”

      Under these circumstances, I think it is clear that the NTSB’s investigation

of the accident did not involve the “administration of the law.” Although any

action of an executive agency might be thought of as involving “administration,”

see Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1106, the plain language of § 1505 requires that the

                                           15
defendant obstruct, not the administration of an agency or its activities, but the

“administration of the law” under which the proceeding is conducted. See 18

U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added). In ordinary usage, the word “administer” means

“to direct or superintend the execution, use, or conduct of,” Administer,

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981 ed.), which denotes a

substantive authority to carry out the law. Here, the NTSB lacks any substantive

authority to execute any laws in the sense that we ordinarily think of as involving

the “administration” of the law. Accordingly, where the “proceeding” at issue is

an investigation, § 1505 requires proof that the defendant obstructed the agency’s

enforcement of the law at issue in the investigation. See United States v.

Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the “ultimate question”

under § 1505 “is not whether the defendant told the truth but whether the defendant

obstructed or interfered with the process of truthfinding in an investigation in the

process of enforcing the law”) (emphasis added). A “strictly investigative”

proceeding by an agency that lacks relevant enforcement authority—i.e., the power

to prescribe relevant substantive rules or to impose liability or sanctions—cannot

satisfy this requirement.

      This reading of § 1505 accords with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of

similar language in other obstruction statutes. For example, the Court held in

United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), that “uttering false statements to an

                                          16
investigating agent . . . who might or might not testify before a grand jury” does

not “obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice” within the meaning of

18 U.S.C. § 1503. Id. at 598, 600 (emphasis modified). Because the

“administration of justice” refers to the actions of the courts or grand juries in

executing the laws against specific persons, a defendants’ acts of obstruction will

violate § 1503 only if undertaken “with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury

proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary

proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s

authority.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added). Here, the NTSB investigation is, at best,

an “ancillary proceeding” that is “independent” of the FAA’s “authority” to

administer the law by taking enforcement action against Kirst.

      Obstruction of the FAA’s “administration of the law” does not count here,

because the laws concerning the FAA’s authority are not “the law under which”

the relevant “pending proceeding is being had before” the NTSB. 18 U.S.C. § 1505

(emphasis added). Nor did the NTSB investigation serve as the basis for the

FAA’s subsequent enforcement action. The NTSB’s investigative report was not

issued until March 2017, nearly two years after the FAA moved to revoke Kirst’s

airman certificate in early 2015. The decision to take action to revoke Kirst’s

certificate was instead based on an “Enforcement Investigative Report” prepared

by the relevant FAA “Flight Standards District Office.” Thus, while the two

                                          17
agencies collaborate and share information, the FAA undertook a substantial

investigation of its own, including visiting the crash site (which the NTSB did not

do) and performing its “own FAA analysis of the [GPS] device” that was the key

item of evidence in the FAA’s decision to revoke Kirst’s certificate. Indeed, the

record of the hearing before the ALJ that upheld the revocation confirms that the

FAA’s action was based largely on its own investigation by its own officials, and

no NTSB official testified at that hearing. And at trial, both the NTSB witnesses

and the FAA witnesses underscored that the two agencies had separate roles and

independent decision-making authority. As the head of the NTSB’s Alaska

Regional Office testified, “FAA, NTSB have two different lanes, for the most part.

We have a lane that we stay in, as far as accident investigation, and the FAA stays

in their lane. They are more on the regulatory side. We are strictly investigative.”

      The Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello further confirms that the

majority’s reading of § 1505 is wrong. Drawing on Aguilar, the Court in

Marinello specifically rejected the view that every administrative action performed

by the IRS counts as the “due administration of this title”—i.e., the Internal

Revenue Code—within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). See 138 S. Ct. at

1105–06. The IRS possesses ample regulatory and enforcement powers in

carrying out the Internal Revenue Code, and it is notable that Marinello limited

§ 7212(a) to the sort of “targeted acts of administration” by the IRS that could lead

                                         18
the IRS itself to take enforcement action against those being targeted. Id. at 1106.

By contrast, the NTSB—given its lack of any substantive enforcement or

regulatory authority—was not engaged in “administration of the law” in the same

way that the IRS was in Marinello. Given the similarities in language between

§ 1505 and § 7212, Marinello’s holding is “highly instructive for use as a guide

toward a proper resolution of the issue now before us.” 138 S. Ct. at 1109.

Indeed, the Court in Marinello recognized that its interpretation “of § 7212

potentially overlaps with . . . § 1505.” Id. at 1107.

      None of the precedent invoked by the majority supports its position that an

NTSB investigation is a proceeding involving the “administration of the law.”

Contrary to what the majority suggests, see Opin. at 25–26, we have never held

that an agency’s purely factual investigation, unrelated to any enforcement activity

by that agency, qualifies as a “proceeding” involving the “administration of the

law” under § 1505. In Vixie, we upheld a conviction under § 1505 for “submitting

a false document in response to an Internal Revenue Service subpoena” issued

under § 206 of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971. See 532

F.2d at 1278. Under § 206, the authority to issue such subpoenas was granted to

the “head of an agency exercising authority under this title.” See Economic

Stabilization Act of 1970, § 206, as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743,

747 (1971), 12 U.S.C. 1204 note (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). Because the statute

                                          19
at issue in Vixie thus granted the IRS substantive enforcement authority, the IRS’s

targeted investigative activities involved the “administration of the law” in a way

that the NTSB’s here did not. Likewise, we held in United States v. Technic

Services, Inc., 314 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, United

States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), that an

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) “investigation into a possible violation

of the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act . . . is a kind of proceeding” under § 1505.

Id. at 1044. In reaching this conclusion, we expressly noted that the investigation

“could lead to a civil or criminal proceeding” by the EPA itself. Id. (citing 42

U.S.C. § 7413(b), (c); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c)). Technic Services thus also

involved the “administration of the law” in a way that the NTSB investigation at

issue here did not.

      The majority also relies on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v.

Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994), but that decision does not support the

majority’s holding here. Kelley held that, because the Inspector General of the

U.S. Agency for International Development is authorized to “issue subpoenas and

to compel sworn testimony in conjunction with an investigation of agency

activities,” such an investigation has sufficient formality to count as a

“proceeding” for purposes of § 1505. Id. at 1127. In reaching this conclusion,

Kelley rejected the argument that, to qualify as a “proceeding,” the activities in

                                          20
question must themselves be “adjudicatory or rule-making activities.” Id. I agree

with Kelley on these points, as my discussion of Vixie and Technic Services makes

clear. See supra at 19–20. But Kelley did not address the further question that is

presented here, which is whether, for purposes of § 1505, the particular formal

investigation that properly counts as a “proceeding” is one that is being conducted

under “the law” that is being “administ[ered].” See United States v. Corrales-

Vazquez, 931 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Cases are not precedential for

propositions not considered.” (simplified)). Moreover, Kelley distinguishes its

holding from United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Ky. 1981), which it

cites with a “cf.” and describes as standing for the proposition that “because [the]

FBI was not vested with rule making or adjudicative power relating to [the] subject

of [an] indictment, its investigation was not a proceeding under § 1505.” Kelley,

36 F.3d at 1127. The latter proposition, of course, is directly contrary to the

majority’s holding today.

      For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the NTSB was not engaged in the

“administration of the law” within the meaning of § 1505 when it investigated

Kirst’s accident. Consequently, as a matter of law, Kirst’s conduct as charged in

Count 1 did not violate § 1505.

                                          2

      Turning to the second prong of the plain-error test, I believe that the error

                                          21
here was plain. “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that whether an error is

‘plain’ . . . is judged ‘at the time of review’ by the appellate court and not at the

‘time of error.’” United States v. Irons, 31 F.4th 702, 713 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 273 (2013)). Having found an error in

answering the substantive question at step one, I must proceed to “assess, with the

benefit of hindsight, whether [that] analysis reveals the question at issue to have a

‘plain’ answer or whether that analysis confirms that we have instead answered a

close and difficult question.” Id. Under that standard, I conclude that the above

substantive analysis is sufficiently straightforward that the error is “plain.”

                                            3

      Having concluded that the first two prongs of the plain-error test are met, the

remaining requirements are also satisfied because, as a matter of law, Kirst’s

conduct in Count 1 did not violate § 1505. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 736 (1993) (“The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited

error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant.”).

Importantly, the Government does not contend that Kirst’s failure to have raised

his § 1505 argument sooner somehow prevented it from producing additional

evidence at trial that might have cured the failure of proof. On the contrary, as the

Government notes in the course of arguing that Kirst should have raised this

argument before trial, the deficiency is inherent in the underlying facts and law,

                                           22
and no amount of additional opportunity by the Government could have cured it.

      Because all of the requirements for finding plain error have been met, I

would reverse Kirst’s conviction on Count 1.

                                         III

      Because Count 2, by contrast, concerned a statement made in connection

with Kirst’s appeal of the FAA’s revocation of his airman certificate, Count 2 was

based on a distinct proceeding that did involve the “administration of the law” and

that therefore fell within the meaning of § 1505. Moreover, to the extent that it

applies to Count 2, I concur in the majority’s analyses in sections II(B), (C), and

(D) of its opinion, which reject Kirst’s remaining arguments. I therefor concur in

the affirmance of the judgment with respect to Count 2.

                                  *       *       *

      Accordingly, I would reverse Kirst’s conviction under Count 1 and remand

with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on that count. I respectfully

dissent to the extent that the majority concludes otherwise. I concur in the

judgment to the extent that it affirms the conviction and sentence on Count 2.

                                         23