Court Opinion

ID: 9846633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:33.548311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.898025
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting)—On February 22, 1973, Richard McCarter was convicted of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the specified penalty for which is a maximum of 2 years in the county jail. (RCW 13.04.170.) Before sentencing, the prosecuting attorney instituted sexual psychopathy proceedings pursuant to RCW 71.06, and McCarter was sent to Western State Hospital for observation. On September 20, 1973, after a hearing, the court found that McCarter was a sexual psychopath *328and committed him to the hospital for care and treatment, to be returned to the custody of the county sheriff "upon completion of the treatment and hospitalization period."
Two years later, on February 19, 1975, McCarter was brought before the court for a hearing to determine whether he should be released from custody. The court decided that McCarter was still a sexual psychopath, was not safe to be at large, and returned him to Western State Hospital for an indefinite stay. In making this decision, the court found that McCarter had not carried his burden of proving it was "highly probable" or by a "preponderance of the evidence" that he was safe to be at large. McCarter's appeal followed.
There is but one issue, and that is whether the court erred in requiring McCarter to prove that he was safe to be at large. I believe the court did err.
The release procedures of the sexual psychopathy act (RCW 71.06) are wholly inadequate to insure that a person committed as a sexual psychopath will not languish in that status indefinitely. The act provides:
A sexual psychopath committed pursuant to RCW 71.06.060 shall be retained by the superintendent of the institution involved until in the superintendent's opinion he is safe to be at large, or until he has received the maximum benefit of treatment, or is not amenable to treatment, but the superintendent is unable to render an opinion that he is safe to be at large. Thereupon, the superintendent, of the institution involved shall so inform whatever court committed the sexual psychopath. The court then may order such further examination and investigation of such person as seems necessary, and may at its discretion, summon Such person before it for further hearing, together with any witnesses whose testimony may be pertinent, and together with any relevant documents and other evidence. On the basis of such reports, investigation, and possible hearing, the court shall determine whether the person before it shall be released unconditionally from custody as a sexual psychopath, released conditionally, returned to the custody of the institution as a sexual psychopath, or returned to *329the department of institutions to serve the original sentence imposed upon him.
RCW 71.06.091.
Any judicial proceeding which may result in loss of liberty calls for due process standards. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). The continuation of that deprivation also calls for due process. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 32 L. Ed. 2d 719, 92 S. Ct. 2083 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394, 92 S. Ct. 1048 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620, 86 S. Ct. 760 (1966); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); In re Andrews, _Mass__, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
In Washington, deprivation of liberty in a civil proceeding must be on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the counterpart to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In re Levias, 83 Wn.2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973).
The sexual psychopath act, RCW 71.06, with its indefinite commitment and uncertain release procedures, does not afford McCarter the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Two other statutes deal with confinement of mentally disordered persons. One is RCW 10.77 concerning the criminally insane. This statute provides that a person confined as criminally insane may be finally discharged if he proves to the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, sitting with a jury if demanded, that he may
be finally discharged without substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions.
RCW 10.77.200(2).
The statute further provides that the criminally insane person is entitled to a hearing as a matter of right and in no event may the commitment exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for an offense charged but for which he *330was acquitted by reason of insanity. RCW 10.77.020. It should be remembered that a person acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is in confinement because he initially proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane. RCW 10.77.030. Alter v. Morris, 85 Wn.2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975).
The other statute is RCW 71.05 which establishes elaborate procedures for the care, treatment, and confinement of the mentally ill who present a likelihood of serious harm to themselves or others. Under this law, no person may be committed for more than 180 days at a time. Successive 180-day commitments are permissible only on the same grounds and pursuant to the same procedures as specified for the initial commitment. RCW 71.05.320. At each hearing, the need for confinement must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. RCW 71.05.310.
RCW 71.05, the mental illness act, fulfills the requirements of due process admirably. RCW 10.77 for the criminally insane is adequate because confinement must terminate at the expiration of the maximum penal sentence specified for the crime for which the defendant would have been convicted but for his insanity. Alter v. Morris, supra. State v. Blubaugh, 80 Wn.2d 28, 491 P.2d 646 (1971). Of course, if the person is still dangerous at the expiration of the sentence, appropriate measures may be taken under RCW 71.05.
Even though McCarter's penal sentence has expired, I would hesitate to order his release because it may be a disservice to him and the public to do so. Rather, I believe the cause should be remanded for a hearing pursuant to the requirements of RCW 71.05.320 and, if necessary, a further hearing each 180 days thereafter. "Psychopathic personality" in the sexual psychopath act
means the existence in any person of such hereditary, congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional rather than the intellectual field and manifested by anomalies of such character as to render satis*331factory social adjustment of such person difficult or impossible.
RCW 71.06.010. In RCW 71.05.020(2), "mental disorder"
means any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions;
Thus, it appears by statutory definition that a sexual psychopath is suffering a mental disorder and is treatable under the provisions of RCW 71.05. The cause should be remanded for the further proceedings called for herein.
Petition for rehearing denied September 28, 1977.
Review by Supreme Court pending February 3,1978.