Court Opinion

ID: 9488705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:53:35.361457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:03.546672
License: Public Domain

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
I cannot join the majority in its affirmance of Miller’s conviction on the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2). That subsection, as I read it, requires elementally the making of a false or fraudulent pretense, representation or promise. The theory in this case is that Miller, by entering Rolark’s PIN into the ATM, falsely represented that he had the authority to draw funds from Rolark’s account. This theory seems to assume that an act consistent with a supposed set of facts is representing that the supposed set of facts is indeed true; because it is not true, the “implied representation” is a false one. I see no reason why this same theory would not cover such a wide range of imaginable conduct as to criminalize under this and other false representation statutes conduct far beyond what a legislative body, or a citizen contemplating the statute, could conceivably expect these statutes to encompass. For example, a person who puts a key in a lock could be said to impliedly represent that he has the authority to open that lock. If he lacks that authority, he becomes liable not only for the consequences of his illegal entry but also for having made a false representation. As with illegal entry, the same for theft. So, too, in assaults, the person committing the unper-mitted touching could be said to be impliedly and falsely representing himself to have consent to touch the victim. None of these things seems to me to be a representation, let alone a criminally false one.
I do not read United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 62 (D.C.Cir.1992), relied upon by the majority, to compel the contrary result. The discussion of the forgeries in the Sayan case involved the sufficiency of the government’s evidence to support a conviction of bank larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). The gist of the portion quoted by the majority, in context, seems to me to be that the forgeries together with the other check writing behavior committed by the defendant in Sayan together constituted sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that she had unlawfully “takfen] and carr[ied] away with the intent to steal or purloin” bank funds. I do not read Sayan as coming to grips with the question even of whether a forged signature standing alone is sufficient to make out a misrepresentation in violation of § 1344(2), let alone to require that other conduct even farther removed from the making of a representation falls within that statute.
Unlike the majority, I do find persuasive Miller’s reliance on United States v. Briggs, 939 F.2d 222, 226-27 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1016, 122 L.Ed.2d 163 (1993). In that case, as in this one, the government’s evidence would have supported a conclusion that the defendant ordered the transfer of funds by a bank — in that ease by wire transfer order, in this case by ATM operations. The Fifth Circuit held, I believe rightly, that “the bare act of instructing a bank to transfer funds is not a factual representation____” Therefore, that circuit held “it cannot be a misrepresentation, a false representation, or any kind of representation.” Id. at 226 (emphasis in the original). I do not see how ordering by ATM machine is any more a representation than ordering by wire. I would therefore hold consistently with the Fifth Circuit that evi*1358dence of such an order does not make out a violation of § 1344(2).
I would nonetheless join my colleagues in upholding the conviction of Miller. Because I would not convict under § 1344(2), unlike my colleagues, I would reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) and hold the evidence to be sufficient. To convict appellant under this subsection, the government was required to prove “a recognizable scheme formed with the intent to defraud a financial institution.” United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1425 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 584, 130 L.Ed.2d 498 (1995). I see nothing in the statute or in authoritative interpretations of it requiring that the scheme defrauds the institution of funds it owns as opposed to funds in which its interest is as a trustee or bailee. That the fraud is directed at a particular account, as opposed to the general funds and credits of the bank, should not in my view affect the sufficiency of the evidence.
Thus, I would affirm the conviction, but on the basis of section 1344(1) rather than 1344(2).