Court Opinion

ID: 9630643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:16:17.199664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:11.997999
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice CASTILLO.
I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses the trial court’s imposition of sanctions on three grounds: (1) Henry did not receive notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10 of the civil *191practice and remedies code;1 (2) the sanctions order did not detail the sanctionable conduct or explain the basis for the sanction; and (3) Henry’s alternative pleading allegations did not violate chapter 10. I would conclude that Henry first substitutes arguments on appeal for those he did not preserve below, then urges us to substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. I would defer to the trial court’s discretion.
/. PRESERVATION OF ERROR

A. Procedural Background

In September of 2001, Henry requested copies of medical records relevant to this suit. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 4.01(d) (Vernon Supp.2003) (since repealed). He also sent a notice letter, which extended the two-year statute of limitation for filing the suit to February 5, 2002. See id., § 4.01(a), (c). He filed suit against the Doctors, among others, on January 31, 2002.
Also on January 31, 2002, Henry filed a motion to withdraw, stating as good cause for the withdrawal “that a conflict of interest has arisen which prevents the Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry from continuing representation of any of the Plaintiffs [sic] in this case.” On April 24, 2002, the trial court notified Henry that his motion to withdraw was set on May 6, 2002. Henry filed a motion for appointment of an agent for service under rule 103 on April 29, 2002. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 103. That same day, he requested issuance of citation on all of the defendants. The trial court granted the rule 103 motion by order signed April 30, 2002.
On May 6, 2002, the trial court heard Henry’s motion to withdraw. Henry was not present. The plaintiff appeared and stated she had no objection to Henry’s withdrawal. She told the judge she intended to hire another lawyer. The trial court signed an order granting Henry’s motion to withdraw that same day.
The Doctors appeared and answered. On May 28, 2002, they filed the motions for sanctions that are the subject of this appeal. Neither the plaintiff nor Henry filed a written response to the sanctions motions.
On June 10, 2002, Henry prepared, transmitted to the court under the law firm’s letterhead, and filed a notice of non-suit, signed by the plaintiff pro se. On July 2, 2002, the trial court signed an order of nonsuit.
The sanctions proceedings continued. After notice to the parties, the trial court held a sanctions hearing on July 30, 2002. Henry appeared at the hearing by counsel but not in person.

B. Pre-Sanction Preservation of Error of the Notice Issue

On appeal, Henry complains he did not have notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10 of the civil practice and remedies code. He argues that the sanctions motions requested relief only under rule 132 and chapters 93 and 11,4 citing paragraphs VII and VIII of each motion, which referred only to rule 13 and chapters 9 and 11. As a consequence, Henry maintains in a sub-issue of his challenge to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sanctioning him, the trial court *192abused its discretion in basing its sanctions order on evidence of Henry’s filing of other lawsuits. I would overrule this sub-issue for two reasons: (1) Henry had actual notice the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10; and (2) Henry waived his objection to lack of notice under chapter 10 by not objecting on that basis before, during, or after the sanctions hearing.

1. Actual Notice

The introductory paragraphs of both motions stated that the motions were filed pursuant to rule 13 and chapters 9 and 10. Also, the motions seek, among other requested relief, “An Order that Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ former counsel, Thomas J. Henry, pay a monetary penalty into the Court as the Court deems appropriate to punish them for this egregious conduct and to deter them from similar conduct in the future.” Payment of a monetary penalty into the registry of the court is a sanction available only under chapter 10. See Sterling v. Alexander, 99 S.W.3d 793, 799-800 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). I would find that Henry had actual notice the Doctors pursued sanctions under chapter 10. Further, chapter 10 allows imposition of a sanction to deter repetition of the sanctioned conduct. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 10.004(b) (Vernon 2002). I would find that evidence of similar conduct in other cases is relevant to the trial court’s assessment of an appropriate sanction under chapter 10. See Tex.R. Evid. 401, 402, and 405. Accordingly, I would hold that Henry’s actual notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10 also put him on actual notice that the Doctors could introduce evidence of his conduct in similar lawsuits. See Sterling, 99 S.W.3d at 797.
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the Doctors’ sanctions motions did not provide actual notice to Henry that they intended to seek sanctions under chapter 10, Henry’s counsel did not object to the lack of notice before, during, or after the sanctions hearing. He had repeated opportunities to do so.

2. Waiver of Notice

Before the sanctions hearing started, the trial court discussed with the attorneys how long each side would need to present their case:
THE COURT: Ml right. And it’s your motion, [Doctors’ Counsel]?
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: It is, yes, sir.
THE COURT: Counsel?
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: [Henry’s Counsel] for one of the Respondents, the Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry.
THE COURT: Ml right.
And you’re estimating an hour and a half or two hours, [Doctors’ Counsel]?
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr.-[Henry’s Counsel], what is your estimate?
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: My estimate is five to ten minutes.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the reason for the disparity, obviously, is that I have quite a bit of evidence that I believe is relevant and available for the Court, and that is the reason for the row of individuals seated behind me. And I think that under both Rules 9 and 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code evidence on this issue is pertinent.
So, in-in light of that, Your Honor, I’m announcing an hour and a half to two hours.
Henry’s counsel did not object that Henry did not have notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10. The
*193Doctors’ counsel raised chapter 10 a second time:
THE COURT: All right. Did you ask for some sort of relief against the Plaintiff individually and in her representative capacity, [Doctors’ Counsel]?
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I think the motion is couched in terms of asking for sanctions against the law firm of Thomas J. Henry and/or Mrs. White. I will tell you that I have no intention of asking this Court to impose sanctions against Mrs. White, because my arguments in my complaint deal with the actual filing of the suit at a time when she was represented.
And Rule 10 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code specifically states that sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party under that provision....
Henry’s counsel again did not object that Henry did not have notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10. After the close of evidence, the trial court heard the arguments of counsel. The Doctors’ counsel argued:
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Now, I think that under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code wherein it states that the Court can enter a sanction to deter similar conduct and — and by that, require that the offending party pay a penalty into the Court, that it must be a determination that the pleading in White was groundless. It must be followed by a meaningful sanction. And given the wealth of the Thomas J. Henry law firm, as evidenced by the advertising effort that they have put in over the years, including the erection of a wall right outside Driscoll Hospital alerting patients and parents that they take C.P. cases, cerebral palsy-—
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to object. He’s arguing all kinds of facts that he never put in evidence.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Once again, Henry’s counsel did not object that Henry did not have notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10. The Doctors’ counsel then asked the court for relief available only under chapter 10:
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: I would respectfully ask this Court to enter a sanction in this case of $100,000.00 against the Thomas J. Henry law firm. I would ask the Court to Order that they pay that as a penalty into the court, to serve as a deterrent to that law firm and others similar-similarly-situated or so inclined to engage in similar conduct....
Henry’s counsel responded:
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’ll be brief. This hearing has spun into something that I’m sure it didn’t begin to be. This is a case for sanctions under Rule 9 and Rule 13. There is a very high standard that Doctors’ counsel has to go and prove in order to merit those sanctions. The burden is on Mr. Oncken to prove that these-in this particular lawsuit, these two defendants were sued base-lessly and groundlessly....
Henry’s counsel did not object, however, that Henry had no notice under chapter 10 that Henry’s conduct in other lawsuits would be at issue in the sanctions hearing. The Doctors’ counsel countered:
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifically state that the signing of a pleading constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory’s best *194knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading is not groundless and brought in bad faith....
Yet again, Henry’s counsel did not object that Henry did not have notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10. The Doctors’ counsel continued:
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Mr. Henry signed the pleading. Mrs. White came to the Henry firm for legal advice. That’s why Chapter 10 says you can’t seek sanctions for filing a groundless pleading against a party when they’re represented by counsel. It’s because they’re not lawyers. They depend on and rely upon the advice, the instruction, and the actions of their attorneys. Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifically state that the signing of a pleading constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory’s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading is not groundless and brought in bad faith....
For the fifth time, Henry’s counsel did not object to any lack of notice under chapter 10. Finally, Henry’s counsel did not object when the trial court pronounced, from the bench after the hearing, a sanction that was available only under chapter 10. A party waives the right to object to a lack of notice by participating in a hearing without notifying the court of its objection on notice grounds. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; see also Manning v. North, 82 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (dismissal hearing); Wyatt v. Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied) (summary-judgment hearing). Henry did not complain before, during, or after the sanctions hearing that he had no notice the Doctors would proceed under chapter 10. See Negrini v. Beale, 822 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (summary-judgment hearing). He did not seek a recess or continuance when it became apparent from the Doctors’ arguments and presentation of witnesses that his conduct in other lawsuits was at issue. See id. at 823-24. Henry “not only failed to object, but appeared, did not request a continuance, and fully participated in the hearing.” See Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). On this record, I would find that Henry waived his objection that he had no notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10 as well as under rule 13 and chapters 9 and 11. See id.
Further, when the Doctors called Dr. Robert Mastín, one of the witnesses about whose testimony Henry now complains, Henry’s counsel objected as follows:
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we’d object to this witness. He’s not a party to this case and has never been a party to this case. I’m not sure what relevance any testimony that he has has to do with the issues of whether or not a baseless lawsuit was filed in this case.
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Response, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No. Overruled.
Dr. Mastín then testified without further objection until the Doctors offered a copy of a petition and citation in another lawsuit filed by Henry against Dr. Mastín. Henry’s counsel objected to the exhibit on relevancy grounds:
THE COURT: Objection?
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: Same objection, Your Honor, as to relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled. Admitted over objection.
*195Dr. Mastín then testified, without objection, to the particulars of that lawsuit. He said he had never treated the patient involved. He also said he had compared the allegations in that petition with the allegations in the petition Henry filed in this case, and they were “word-for-word” identical except for the names of the parties. Also without objection, Dr. Mastín then testified to the contents of a notice letter sent by Henry to Dr. Mastín in a second case. Henry’s counsel did not object until the Doctors’ counsel offered the notice letter itself into evidence. At that point, Henry’s counsel asked for a running objection:
[HENRYS COUNSEL]: Running objection as to relevance, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I’ll overrule it. You can reassert it later if they’re not — •
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: I’ll tender Exhibit 9 to the Court, Your Honor, and ask that it be admitted.
THE COURT: Exhibit 9 is admitted over objection.
Dr. Mastín then testified, without objection, that after sending the notice letter, Henry filed suit on the claim against the other doctors in his practice group and him. He said that two of the other doctors were not members of the practice group at the time the patient was treated.
Also without objection, Dr. Mastín went on to testify that Henry withdrew from representing the plaintiffs in both of the other two cases, just as he had in this case. The trial court sustained Henry’s counsel’s objection on authenticity grounds to a Nueces County District Clerk docket sheet. However, by the time Henry’s counsel had objected, Dr. Mastín had already testified about the information contained on the docket sheet: Henry had withdrawn from the second case, and it had been dismissed.
The Doctors’ counsel then called Dr. Christine Canterbury. Henry’s counsel again asked for a running objection:
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if this is going to be cumulative, I have a running objection as to relevance. Dr. Canterbury didn’t have anything to do with the White case.
THE COURT: Would you like to stipulate as to what her testimony might be?
[HENRYS COUNSEL]: I have no idea what her testimony is going to be, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Fine. Call your witness.
Dr. Canterbury then confirmed Dr. Mastin’s testimony, without objection, that another doctor and she had been sued by Henry even though they were not members of the practice group at the time the patient was treated. The Doctors then sought to introduce a notice letter in a third suit. Henry’s counsel objected:
THE COURT: Objection?
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: No objection, Your Honor, except for relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled. Admitted over objection.
Dr. Canterbury then testified, without objection, that she had not treated the patients named in the notice letter. When the Doctors offered a letter from Henry that withdrew the notice letter, Henry’s counsel had no objection:
[DOCTORS’ COUNSEL]: Offer Exhibit 12, Your Honor.
[HENRY’S COUNSEL]: No objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Admitted.
A party should object every time inadmissible evidence is offered. Ed Rachal Found, v. D’Unger, 117 S.W.3d 348, 368 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. filed) (en banc). If a party objects to certain *196evidence but later does not object when the same evidence is introduced, the party waives its objection. Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex.1984). Henry’s counsel attempted a running objection, an exception to the general rule that a party must continue to object and get a ruling for each individual instance of inadmissible testimony. See In re A.P., 42 S.W.3d 248, 260-61 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.). However, the trial court overruled Henry’s counsel’s first request for a running objection, and counsel did not pursue the second request to a ruling as required by rule 33.1(a). See id.; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). The same evidence came in elsewhere without objection.
This Court has held that the determination of whether a prior objection is sufficient to cover a subsequent offer of similar evidence requires a case-by-case analysis. Correa v. GMC, 948 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). Considerations in determining the adequacy of the objection are: (1) the proximity of the objection to the subsequent testimony; (2) which party has elicited the subsequent testimony; (3) the nature and similarity of the subsequent testimony as compared to the prior testimony and objection; (4) whether the subsequent testimony has been elicited from the same witness; (5) whether a running objection was requested or granted; and (6) whether any other circumstances suggests that the objection should not have to be re-urged. Id. at 518-19.
Here, Henry did not argue to the trial court that his relevancy objections were based on the Doctors’ allegations of violations of rule 13 and chapters 9 and 11, not chapter 10. Had he done so, application of the Correa factors might lead to the conclusion that Henry adequately preserved his objections to the testimony. See id. However, Henry did not specifically object on that basis, and he did not object to proceeding under chapter 10 even after repeated references by opposing counsel to its provisions. The trial court ruled on Henry’s objections within that context, unaware of Henry’s reason for objecting on relevancy grounds. Thus, on this record, I would conclude that Henry did not preserve error over his objections to Dr. Mastin and Dr. Canterbury’s testimony. See Duperier v. Tex. State Bank, 28 S.W.3d 740, 755-56 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.).

C. Post-Sanctions Preservation Regarding the Specifícitg of the Sanctions Order

On July 31, 2002, the trial court signed an order granting the Doctors’ motions for sanctions. It ordered payment by Henry of $50,000 into the registry of the court, or $25,000 for each of the Doctors’ motions. On August 2, 2002, the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its imposition of sanctions as well as a revised order incorporating its findings and conclusions. On August 26, 2002, Henry filed a post-sanctions motion for new trial and a motion to modify, vacate, or reform the sanctions order (the “First Posi^Sanctions Motions”). See Tex.R. Crv. P. 329b. The First Post-Sanctions Motions cross-reference and incorporate one another.

1. The First Post-Sanctions Motions

Among thirty-nine points urged as grounds for vacating the sanctions order, Henry asserted in the First Post-Sanctions Motions that: (1) the Doctors’ motions for sanctions did not request relief under chapter 10; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing and considering evidence of Henry’s past conduct in other lawsuits or claims; and (3) the alternative pleading allegations against the *197Doctors are legally and factually insufficient to support the imposition of sanctions. Nowhere in the First Post-Sanctions Motions did Henry assert that the findings in the sanctions order did not adequately detail the sanctionable conduct or explain the basis for the sanction.

2.The Supplemental Post-Sanctions Motion

On September 23, 2002, more than thirty days after the trial court signed the modified sanctions order on August 2, 2002, Henry filed his “First Supplemental Motion to Vacate, Modify, Correct or Reform Modified Judgment” (the “Supplemental Post-Sanctions Motion”). Among thirteen grounds, the Supplemental Post-Sanctions Motion asserted for the first time that “This Court’s sanctions order fails to sufficiently set out this Court’s findings of good cause justifying the imposition of sanctions.”

3. The Post-Sanctions Hearing

The trial court heard Henry’s post-sanctions motions on October 15, 2002. Henry appeared for this hearing in person. The trial court sustained the Doctors’ objection to reopening the evidence but permitted Henry to make a bill of exceptions of his testimony. By written orders that same date, the trial court denied the motion for new trial and the supplemental motion to modify. The record does not reflect an order denying the original motion to modify, vacate, or reform the sanctions order.

4. The Reconsideration Motion

On November 5, 2003, Henry filed a motion to either reconsider or modify, correct or reform the modified judgment (the “Reconsideration Motion”). Among nineteen grounds, Henry urged:
(1)“This Court’s sanctions order fails to sufficiently set forth this Court’s findings of good cause justifying the imposition of sanctions.... Furthermore, the order fails to explain the basis for the sanction imposed as required by section 10.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”
(2) “The sanctions order here, however, does not specifically identify the offending allegation or factual contention, but instead states broadly that ‘each and all of the allegations’ were not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for investigation. This vague statement does not satisfy Chapter 10’s specificity requirement.”
(3) “The order does not state, with particularity, good cause for finding that the pleadings in this case were groundless and brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment or that the pleadings did not and could not, after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, have an evidentiary basis. Instead, the order merely recites the rule and the chapter, without including a specific description of the offending conduct or a reason for imposing the sanctions.”
However, the trial court decided that Henry’s specificity objections, filed more than thirty days after the modified sanctions order, came too late to be considered.

5.The Reconsideration Order

By written order dated November 14, 2002, the trial court found that the First Post-Sanctions Motions “were the only timely filed motions on August 22, 2002.” It specifically found: “All new arguments and requests for relief not timely filed within 30 days of the August 2, 2002 order, are DENIED because they were not timely raised.” See Willacy County Appraisal Review Bd. v. S. Padre Land Co., 767 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (“We hold, therefore, that all motions for new trial to be timely filed, *198whether original or amended must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed by the trial court.”).

D. Appellate Preservation Regarding the Specificity of the Sanctions Order

Henry raises forty-four issues and sub-issues on appeal. In none of them does he challenge the trial court’s denials of his post-sanctions motions. Specifically, Henry does not assert on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying as untimely all grounds not raised within thirty days of the sanctions order. Henry raised his complaint regarding the specificity of the sanctions order for the first time on September 23, 2002, which was untimely. I would not consider Henry’s specificity complaint in this appeal. See id. A complaining party’s failure to object to the form of the sanctions order waives the error for appellate review. Alexander v. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied); McCain v. NME Hosp., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Bloom v. Graham, 825 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). I would find that Henry failed to preserve for our review his complaint about the specificity of the sanctions order. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); see also Alexander, 956 S.W.2d at 715.
Thus, given this record, I would hold that Henry waived two of the three grounds the majority finds for reversing the sanctions order: (1) Henry waived his complaint that he did not receive notice that the Doctors sought sanctions under chapter 10 when he failed to object or seek a continuance of the sanctions hearing on that basis; and (2) Henry waived any complaint the sanctions order did not adequately detail the sanctionable conduct or explain the basis for the sanctions when he failed to timely raise the objection in his post-sanctions motions and then failed to challenge the trial court’s untimeliness ruling on appeal. I turn to the third ground on which the majority reverses the sanctions order, that an alternative pleading cannot serve as the basis of sanctions under chapter 10.

II. THE TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETION

A. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Sanctions Motions

Generally, courts presume that pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith. GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex.1993) (orig.proceeding). In determining if sanctions are proper, the trial court must examine the circumstances existing when the litigant filed the pleading. See Griffin Indus. v. Grimes, No. 04-02-00430-CV, 2003 WL 1911993, *4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Apr. 23, 2003, no pet.) (applying good-faith presumption to chapter 10); see also Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (applying good-faith presumption to rule 13). The trial court considers the acts or omissions of the represented party or counsel, not merely the legal merit of a pleading or motion. Grimes, 2003 WL 1911993, *4; N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 194, 205 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ). The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of good faith in the filing of pleadings. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 731.

B. Standard of Review

Imposing an available sanction is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. *199Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.1990); Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). We may not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978). The test for determining if the trial court abused its discretion is whether it acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles to the extent the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985); Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 392 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions only if it bases its order on an incorrect view of the law or an erroneous assessment of the evidence. Randolph v. Jackson Walker, L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). A party attacking a trial court’s decision as an abuse of discretion carries a heavy burden. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding).

C. Analysis

1. The Trial Court’s Discretion to Sanction under Chapter 10

Section 10.001 of chapter 10 provides:
The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory’s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:
(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentia-ry support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention is warranted on the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 10.001 (Vernon 2002). A court may punish violations of chapter 10 by imposing sanctions on the “person, [the] party represented by the person, or both” who “has signed [the] pleading or motion in violation of Section 10.001.” Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 10.004(a) (Vernon 2002).
In two sub-issues, Henry complains the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that a pleading that asserts alternative claims without identifying particular defendants to which each claim applies is sanc-tionable. He maintains that allegations in the petition here asserted claims against the Doctors for negligent acts other than prescribing Propulsid. Henry argues that the Doctors did not meet their burden of overcoming the presumption of good faith that attached to the papers he filed. In a separate sub-issue, he asserts that the only way his subjective bad faith could be proved was through his testimony at the sanctions hearing, which was lacking. However, unlike rule 13, section 10.001 of chapter 10 does not expressly include bad faith as an element of the conduct it prohibits. See id. § 10.001. Further, assum*200ing, without deciding, that section 10.001 of chapter 10 imposes an implied bad-faith element, I would conclude that sanctiona-ble conduct may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. See Schexnider v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 953 S.W.2d 439, 441-42 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ) (holding that imposition of sanctions against attorney who filed medical malpractice claim against twenty-nine physicians and then non-suited all twenty-nine was supported by reasonable inference that attorney joined physicians knowing they only had indirect connection to claim and that mere filing of suit would have coercive effect on claim).
The trial court took judicial notice of the pleadings in this case, and I agree with the majority that allegations in the petition that asserted claims against the Doctors for negligent acts other than prescribing Propulsid is some evidence mitigating against the imposition of sanctions. However, the petition shows that the Doctors had only indirect connections to the claims. Further, Dr. Mastín and Dr. Canterbury testified that Henry had filed a “word-for-word” identical lawsuit against them without a reasonable basis and asserted unfounded claims in two more cases. The witnesses also testified that Henry quickly withdrew from his representation of the claimants in the other cases, which Henry also had pursued without a reasonable basis. Further, I am unpersuaded that the looming statute-of-limitation deadline excuses Henry’s pleading. Henry had represented the plaintiff at least four months before he filed the petition, long enough to obtain the relevant medical records. Moreover, Henry continued to represent the plaintiff after he filed a motion to withdraw as well as after the trial court signed the order of withdrawal.5 I would find that the allegations in the petition and the nonsuit of the claims after the Doctors filed motions for sanctions support an inference that Henry filed suit knowing that the Doctors only had an indirect connection to the claim and that the mere filing of suit would have a coercive effect. See id. I would conclude that some evidence reasonably supports the imposition of sanctions. See Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 255 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“An abuse of discretion does not exist if the trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision.”).
Also as a sub-issue within his first issue, Henry complains of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence Henry offered during the hearing on his post-sanctions motions, evidence he asserts demonstrated his reasonable basis for filing suit against the Doctors. Whether a motion for new trial will be granted or denied is within the trial court’s discretion. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex.1983), overruled on other grounds, Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.2003). Other than arguing that he was not subpoenaed by the Doctors to appear at the sanctions hearing, Henry did not explain his failure to file a written response to the sanctions motions or his failure to appear and present evidence to the court at the sanctions hearing. He did not offer proof that the evidence had come to his attention only after the sanctions hearing. Nor did he maintain he had used due diligence in procuring the evidence or any of the other predicates that would have informed the trial court’s exercise of discretion in considering the evidence after having ruled already on the *201Doctors’ sanctions motions. See Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809-10; see also Dankowski v. Dankowski, 922 S.W.2d 298, 305 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). Finally, Henry does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the evidence Henry offered in support of his post-sanctions motions. See Dankowski, 922 S.W.2d at 305.
I have scrutinized the trial court’s findings and conclusions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. I cannot conclude that the trial court, in sanctioning Henry, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to chapter 10 of the civil practice and remedies code. See Zorilla, 83 S.W.3d at 255. I would overrule Henry’s first issue complaining of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sanctioning him.

2. The Trial Court’s Discretion in Determining the Amount of Sanction

Henry’s second issue claims that the $50,000 sanction is excessive. An imposed sanction must not be excessive. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991); Roberts v. Golden Crest Waters, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). Scrutinizing the imposed sanction under an abuse-of-discretion standard, I cannot conclude that the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles in determining the amount of sanction. See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. I would find that the imposed $50,000 sanction ($25,000 for each of the two Doctors) is not clearly arbitrary and excessive. Compare Skepnek v. Mynatt, 8 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied) (upholding $25,000 sanction to be paid into registry of court pursuant to chapter 10) with Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 53 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (reversing as abuse of discretion rule 13 sanction of $994,000 plus interest). Thus, I also would overrule Henry’s second issue complaining of the amount of the sanction.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s sanctions order.

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 10.001-.005 (Vernon 2002).

. TexR. Civ. P. 13.

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 9.00-.014 (Vernon 2002).

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 11.001-.104 (Vernon 2002).

. The motion to withdraw cited conflict of interest as Henry's basis for withdrawal. In a bill of exceptions of Henry's testimony at the post-sanctions hearing, Henry said he withdrew because he was not interested in pursuing the case.