Court Opinion

ID: 9909038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 15:06:23.293329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:45.839759
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1042-22

ALLEN SATZ,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARION B. SOLOMON and
ARONS & SOLOMON, P.A.,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

                   Submitted December 5, 2023 – Decided December 12, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2373-22.

                   Allen Satz, appellant pro se.

                   Connell Foley, LLP, attorneys for respondents
                   (William T. McGloin, of counsel and on the brief;
                   Nicholas J. Guarino, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
         This is the fourth time plaintiff Allen Satz has been before this court in

connection with his long-running dispute with his former spouse over custody

of, and parenting time with, their four children. In this case, plaintiff filed a

complaint in the Law Division seeking damages against defendant Marion B.

Solomon,1 a court-appointed guardian ad litem in the Family Part proceedings,

because he was unhappy with a June 24, 2021 report Solomon prepared for the

trial court in that proceeding and with other recommendations she made to the

court.

         In this appeal, plaintiff challenges the Law Division's July 28, 2022 order

dismissing his complaint against Solomon on immunity grounds, and his

complaint against her firm for failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e).

Plaintiff also appeals the court's August 26, 2022 order requiring him to pay

defendants' frivolous litigation sanctions, and the court's November 2, 2022

order setting the amount of those sanctions. For the following reasons, we

affirm all three orders.

         The parties are fully familiar with the facts and lengthy procedural history

of this litigation and, therefore, only a brief summary as set forth in our earlier

1
  Plaintiff also named Solomon's firm, Arons & Solomon, P.A., as a defendant,
but he did not raise any allegations concerning that firm in his complaint.
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opinions is necessary here. Plaintiff and his former spouse were married in 2006

and divorced in 2020. Satz v. Satz, (Satz I), No. A-3854-21 (Aug. 18, 2023)

(slip op. at 1-2); Satz v. Satz, (Satz II), 476 N.J. Super. 536, 545 (App. Div.

2023).2 They have four children. Satz I, slip. op. at 1-2.

      During the course of the dissolution proceeding, "a Family Part judge

appointed Solomon as a [guardian ad litem] (GAL) pursuant to Rule 5:8B with

instructions 'to represent the best interests of the parties' minor children' and

with the understanding that 'the services of the [GAL] shall be provided to the

[c]ourt on behalf of the children.'" Ibid. (alterations in original). In their

October 6, 2020 marital settlement agreement, plaintiff and his former spouse

included a provision concerning the continued use of a GAL or a parenting

coordinator. Id. at 2. "The parties agreed to continue utilizing Solomon as [the]

GAL if and when any disputes arose during the one-year period following the

entry of the final judgment." Ibid.

      On June 24, 2021, Solomon submitted a letter to the court detailing her

recommendations concerning the ongoing proceeding on behalf of the parties'

children. Satz v. Siragusa, (Satz III) No. A-3412-21 (Aug. 21, 2023) (slip op.

2
  In Satz II, we affirmed a number of post-judgment Family Part orders that
defendant challenged on appeal. Satz II, slip. op. at 1-2.

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at 2).3 "On June 30, 2021, another Family Part judge reappointed Solomon as

the GAL after receiving information concerning the children." Satz I, slip. op.

at 2.

        On April 26, 2022, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Law Division against

Solomon and her firm. Id. at 3. In his complaint, plaintiff stated that Solomon

"[d]efamed [him] by telling lies to the court" and "hurt [him] and [his] children

by relaying information to the court that had no truth to it." "On May 16, 2022,

Solomon notified the Family Part judge that in light of the lawsuit, she co uld

not continue to serve as the GAL for the children. The judge entered an order

on June 3, 2022 relieving Solomon as GAL." Ibid.4

        In the Law Division action, defendants sent a letter to plaintiff on June 3,

2022 advising him that his claims against defendants were frivolous pursuant to

Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. The letter told plaintiff that if he did not

3
    Acting upon Solomon's recommendations, the Family Part appointed a
psychiatrist to prepare an evaluation of one of the parties. Satz III, slip. op. at
2-3. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against the psychiatrist for breach of
contract and other claims. Id. at 4. The trial court dismissed the complaint after
finding that the psychiatrist "had immunity as a court-appointed expert who was
acting in the scope of his duties . . . ." Id. at 5. Rejecting plaintiff's arguments
on appeal, we affirmed the trial court's determination. Id. at 5-9.
4
  In our August 18, 2023 decision in Satz I, we affirmed the trial court's decision
directing plaintiff to pay his share of Solomon's GAL fees. Satz I, slip. op. at 1.
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dismiss his complaint within twenty-eight days, defendants would file a motion

to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and an application for sanctions.

      Solomon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and

argued that she was entitled to judicial immunity because she served as the GAL

for the parties' children and prepared her recommendations pursuant to the

Family Part's orders. Solomon also contended that she was protected from being

sued by the litigation privilege. Because plaintiff failed to make any allegations

against Solomon's law firm in his complaint, it asked that his complaint against

it be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).

      Following oral argument on July 28, 2022, Judge Rachelle L. Harz

rendered a comprehensive oral opinion granting defendants' motion and

dismissing plaintiff's complaint. In finding that Solomon was cloaked with

judicial immunity for the work she performed as a court-appointed GAL for the

children, Judge Harz primarily relied upon Delbridge v. Office of Public

Defender, 238 N.J. Super. 288, 299 (Law Div. 1989), where the court held that

individuals appointed by the judiciary as guardians "have absolute [judicial]

immunity from suit." In that case, the guardians were deemed to be "officers of

the court, having been appointed by [a judge] to represent the interests of

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[minor] children" in an action involving a complaint filed by the Division of

Youth and Family Services. Id. at 301. As the Delbridge court explained:

            Clearly, the . . . law guardians, in representing the best
            interests of the . . . children, were acting as an integral
            part of the judicial process, and public policy dictates
            that they be free to act independently and vigorously
            without fear of reprisal at the hands of aggrieved
            parents. Thus, [the guardians] are cloaked with
            absolute judicial immunity.

            [Id. at 301-02.]

      Applying Delbridge to the present case, Judge Harz stated:

            The decision in Delbridge and the immunity afforded to
            court[-]appointed guardians has not been disturbed in
            over [thirty] years.

            Here, Miss Solomon was a court[-]appointed guardian
            ad litem performing judicial duties as an officer of the
            court. Similar to Delbridge, Miss Solomon as guardian
            ad litem prepared reports to the [c]ourt with her
            recommendations to the [c]ourt for its consideration
            and review. Any allegedly defamatory comments were
            made in the course of her representation of plaintiff's
            minor children.

            Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds Miss Solomon is entitled
            to absolute judicial immunity from any and all claims
            against her arising therefrom.        Therefore, Miss
            Solomon is entitled to dismissal of the complaint with
            prejudice.

      Judge Harz also found that Solomon was shielded from the threat of

litigation by the litigation privilege. The litigation privilege generally protects

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attorneys and litigants "from civil liability arising from words . . . uttered in the

course of judicial proceedings." Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 185

N.J. 566, 579 (2006). The privilege shields "any communication (1) made in

judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants

authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have

some connection or logical relation to the action." Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J.

207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 369 (1990)).

      The privilege is not confined to the courtroom and "extends to all

statements or communications in connection with the judicial proceeding."

Ruberton v. Gabage, 280 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 1995). It "extends not

only to testimony and documents admitted in evidence but also to documents

utilized in the preparation of judicial proceedings."       Durand Equip. Co. v.

Superior Carbon Prods., Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 581, 584 (App. Div. 1991). See

also DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453, 457 (App. Div. 1988) (litigation

privilege "may be extended to statements made in the course of judicial

proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any

justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party

defamed"). "The only limitation which New Jersey places upon the privilege is

that the statements at issue 'have some relation to the nature of the proceedings.'"

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Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, 406 N.J. Super. 126, 134 (App. Div. 2009)

(quoting Hawkins, 141 N.J. at 215).

      Applying these principles, Judge Harz found that Solomon was protected

from suit by the litigation process. Judge Harz stated:

            The complaint alleges Miss Solomon told lies to the
            [c]ourt and relayed information to the [c]ourt that had
            no truth to it. The alleged statements made by Miss
            Solomon were made in connection with a judicial
            proceeding. Accordingly, the extremely broad absolute
            immunity provided to statements made in judicial and
            quasi-judicial proceedings fits squarely on any
            comments Miss Solomon allegedly made to the [c]ourt
            in or relating to the [F]amily [P]art action, even if
            written or spoken maliciously.

            As such, any statements made in the course of such
            proceeding are protected by the absolute litigation
            privilege and the complaint is dismissed.

      Finally, Judge Harz noted that "[p]laintiff's complaint fail[ed] to assert

any allegations against Arons & Solomon, [P.A.]." As a result, the judge found

that "[t]he factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon

which relief can be granted, and, therefore, a dismissal is mandated."

Accordingly, Judge Harz dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a

claim against Solomon's firm. See R. 4:6-2(e).

      Judge Harz entered a conforming order dismissing the complaint on July

28, 2022. On that same date, defendants filed a motion for an order granting

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them frivolous litigation sanctions against plaintiff.      Rule 1:4-8(a) permits

sanctions for "frivolous" claims. United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J.

Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009). A claim is "frivolous" when "no rational

argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible

evidence, or it is completely untenable." Ibid. (quoting First Atl. Fed. Credit

Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div. 2007)). Rule 1:4-8 allows

sanctions against the party to the action or its attorney. Zahabian, 407 N.J.

Super. at 389; R. 1:4-8(f).

         N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b) provides for sanctions for frivolous litigation if

either

               (1) the complaint . . . was commenced, used or
               continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of
               harassment, delay or malicious injury; or (2) the
               nonprevailing party knew, or should have known that
               the complaint . . . was without any reasonable basis in
               law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith
               argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
               existing law.

               [Ibid.]

         After oral argument on August 26, 2022, Judge Harz granted defendants'

motion. In her thorough oral opinion, the judge found that defendants placed

plaintiff on notice by sending him the June 3, 2022 letter stating that they would

seek sanctions if he did not withdraw his complaint. The letter specifically set

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forth the reasons why defendants considered plaintiff's complaint to be

frivolous, including the fact that they were protected by judicial immunity and

the litigation privilege.

      Under these circumstances, Judge Harz was "satisfied that . . . plaintiff

was made aware that the claims that he filed as against Miss Solomon were

meritless and frivolous, yet he did not withdraw the complaint." Accordingly,

the judge entered an order on August 26, 2022 granting defendants' motion and

directing them to submit a certification of services from their attorney for her

review.

      Defendants submitted documentation seeking $34,590 in counsel fees and

$225 in costs. On November 2, 2022, Judge Harz issued an order directing

plaintiff to pay defendants $12,981.50 in legal fees and $50 for costs. The judge

supplied a detailed written statement of her findings of fact and conclusions of

law supporting her determination of the amount of the frivolous litigation

sanctions she awarded.

      On appeal, plaintiff presents the following contentions:

             1.     THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED ALL CASES
                    THAT SHOWED THERE IS NO IMMUNITY
                    WHEN      THE     COURT[-]APPOINTED
                    OFFICIAL LIES AND ACTS CONTRARY TO
                    THEIR APPOINTED DUTY.

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            2.    THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED ALL CASES
                  AND     REASONING     TO    DISMISS
                  DEFENDANTS['] MOTION FOR FAILURE TO
                  STATE A CLAIM.

            3.    THE JUDGE IGNORED RESPONDEAT
                  SUPERIOR AS IT PERTAINED TO HOLDING
                  THE FIRM ARONS AND SOLOMON LIABLE.

            4.    MARION SOLOMON HAD NO PERMISSION
                  TO [DISCLOSE] ANY INFORMATION TO
                  DR. SIRAGUSA. (Not Raised [Below]).

            5.    THE JUDGE IGNORED ALL FACTS OF
                  WHAT CONSTITUTES A FRIVOLOUS CASE
                  FOR LITIGATION FEES.

      We review a decision on a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal motion "de novo,

without deference to the judge's legal conclusions."       McNellis-Wallace v.

Hoffman, 464 N.J. Super. 409, 415 (App. Div. 2020). Whether a defendant is

entitled to immunity is "a question of law to be decided [as] early in the

proceedings as possible, preferably on a properly supported motion for summary

judgment or dismissal." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387

(2000).

      A trial judge's decision whether to award sanctions under Rule 1:4-8 and

N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 for frivolous litigation is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498 (App. Div. 2011). Reversal

is warranted "only if [the trial judge's decision] 'was not premised upon

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consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant

or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment.'" Ibid. (quoting

Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)).

      We have considered plaintiff's contentions in light of the record and

applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Because Solomon

was a court-appointed GAL, charged by the Family Part with assisting it in

determining the best interests of plaintiff's children, she was obviously cloaked

with judicial immunity against the type of vexatious litigation plaintiff filed

against her in this case. Delbridge, 238 N.J. Super. at 301-02; see also P.T. v.

Richard Hall Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 364 N.J. Super. 546, 560 (Law Div.

2000), aff'd o.b., 364 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2003).

      Solomon's oral and written communications to the court were also clearly

protected by the litigation privilege.      Hawkins, 141 N.J. at 216.     Because

Solomon was shielded by judicial immunity, her firm could not be held liable

for her actions under a respondeat superior theory. Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238

N.J. Super. 323, 336 n.7 (Law Div. 1989). Finally, the trial judge did not abuse

her discretion by awarding frivolous litigation sanctions to defendants under

Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.

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      We are therefore satisfied that Judge Harz properly dismissed plaintiff's

complaint, and we affirm the court's July 28, August 26, and November 2, 2022

orders substantially for the reasons expressed in the judge's thoughtful and well-

reasoned oral and written opinions.

      Affirmed.

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