Court Opinion

ID: 9960008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-14 07:15:37.41053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:04.177883
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 11, 2024

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00610-CR

                      FERDINAND CHIMA, Appellant

                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 400th District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 20-DCR-092050

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Ferdinand Chima appeals his conviction for continuous sexual
abuse of a child younger than fourteen years of age in two issues. See Tex. Penal
Code § 21.02. We affirm.

                                 BACKGROUND

      In 2019, appellant lived with his family in Fort Bend County, Texas.
Chima’s family included his wife Rachel, their two sons, and their two daughters,
“Rebecca Cloud” and “Lana Carson.”1 One night, when appellant’s wife was not
home, appellant called his children together for a “family meeting” to discuss why
his children hated him and treated him with disrespect. Appellant’s older daughter,
Rebecca, informed appellant that she did not respect him “because of something
[appellant] did when [he was] younger.” At that point, appellant’s wife Rachel
came home with her sister, Debbie, and the “family meeting” broke up. Rebecca
and her younger sister, Lana, followed Rachel and Debbie upstairs.

       Once upstairs Lana, who was eleven at the time, told her mother that she had
something she wanted to tell her, but she was going to wait to tell her mother until
Lana was older. After some encouragement, Lana wrote her secret on a piece of
paper and gave it to her mother. The content of Lana’s note is not found in the
record, but after Rachel received Lana’s note, she confronted appellant and
demanded that he leave the house. Appellant left that night. Lana testified during
appellant’s trial that her note explained that appellant had been touching her.

       The Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office began an investigation and they
asked Rachel to take both daughters to the Children’s Advocacy Center of Fort
Bend (CAC) for forensic interviews.          After her forensic interview, the CAC
personnel referred Lana for a sexual assault nurse examination (SANE). Lana
subsequently went for that examination, which was conducted by Sandra Sanchez,
a sexual assault nurse and the director of forensic nursing for Harris Health
System.    Because Lana’s examination occurred several weeks after the last
incident of alleged abuse, it was scheduled as a “non-acute” examination, meaning
that it was not anticipated that evidence would be collected.

       Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to exclude “impermissible bolstering and

       1
          In compliance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we use pseudonyms when
referring to minors, including the complainants. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2), cmt.

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any expert testimony based solely on the personal history of the child absent
physical evidence of sexual assault.” Appellant’s motion also objected to the
admission of the medical records associated with the sexual assault examination.
Appellant argued that any content in the records that violated the hearsay rule
should be excluded because “the information is from someone with no independent
duty to report accurately.” Appellant continued that the medical exception to the
hearsay rule “does not apply in the absence of physical evidence of abuse.”
Appellant argued that the “complainants’ statements would be used as a basis for
the nurse to ‘back door’ hearsay diagnosis or opinion that sexual abuse had
occurred” (emphasis in original). Appellant’s motion concluded by asking the trial
court to “prohibit the State Counsel any testimony or offering any evidence
regarding any personal history of the Complaining Witnesses’ physical evidence of
sexual assault.”

      The trial court held a pretrial hearing on appellant’s motion.         Sandra
Sanchez, the nurse who conducted the SANE exam on Lana, testified during the
hearing. Sanchez initially testified about her qualifications as a SANE nurse. She
then explained that she is the director of forensic nursing at Harris Health System.
Sanchez testified that she had conducted approximately 2,300 SANE exams during
her career and had testified in court on many different occasions.

      Sanchez then testified about what happens during a SANE exam. Sanchez
explained that a SANE exam has four parts. According to Sanchez, the first part of
the SANE exam is “obtaining a history for medical diagnosis and treatment.” The
second part involves a head-to-toe physical examination. The third part of the
exam is a detailed genital examination, the purpose of which is to look for trauma
or abnormalities. The fourth and final part of a SANE exam is evaluating the need
for evidence collection. According to Sanchez, the overall purpose of a SANE

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exam is to determine the appropriate treatment for the person undergoing the exam.
Sanchez testified that she conducted all four parts of the standard SANE exam on
Lana. During the exam, Lana disclosed to Sanchez that appellant had digitally
penetrated Lana’s vagina. Sanchez explained that anything that goes past the labia
majora qualifies as “penetration.”

      Appellant’s counsel argued that Lana’s statements to the SANE nurse should
be excluded because they did not fit the hearsay exception for statements made for
the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. The State responded that Lana’s
statements to Sanchez were admissible because, as Sanchez testified, they were
made during an examination performed for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
treatment and therefore fit within that exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court
overruled appellant’s objections to the admission of Lana’s statements made
during the SANE exam conducted by Sanchez.

      Lana was the first witness to testify during appellant’s trial. Lana was 13
when she testified. Lana testified that she was testifying in court because her “dad
sexually abused me.” Lana testified that appellant sexually abused her when they
lived in two different houses, one on Eton Ridge and the other on Mustang Pointe.
Lana and her family lived on Eton Ridge when she was in second and third grades.
Lana and her family lived on Mustang Pointe when she was in fifth, sixth, seventh,
and eighth grades. Lana testified that appellant sexually abused her in both homes.
Lana described appellant’s actions in detail and testified that the abuse occurred
weekly for several years. Lana did not say anything about the abuse at the time it
occurred because she was afraid. The abuse stopped after Lana disclosed the
abuse, as described above, when she was eleven years old. Lana’s older sister,
Rebecca, later told Lana that appellant had sexually abused her as well.

      Sanchez, the director of the forensic nursing program at the Harris Health

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System, testified about the SANE exam she performed on Lana. Sanchez’s report
of Lana’s SANE exam was admitted into evidence. Sanchez testified that Lana
gave a history of the sexual abuse she suffered which brought her to the SANE
exam.     Lana told Sanchez that appellant had touched her genitalia and that
appellant’s hands touched the outside and inside of her vagina. Sanchez testified
that “penetration” is anything that goes past the labia majora.

        Rebecca was 18 at the time she testified during appellant’s trial. Rebecca
testified that appellant had sexually abused her on numerous occasions when they
lived in three different houses. Rebecca described the details of appellant’s sexual
abuse which included touching her vagina with his hand, and using her hand to
massage appellant’s penis.

        Appellant testified in his own defense. When asked if he sexually assaulted
Lana, appellant responded, “Never. Never. Not once.” Appellant likewise denied
sexually abusing Rebecca.

        During the charge conference, appellant requested lesser-included offense
instructions for “aggravated sexual assault against Lana Carson and indecency by
contact against both girls.” The State opposed appellant’s request. The State
argued that, while the requested lesser-included offenses were lesser-included
offenses of the charged offense, there was no evidence in the record that would
support a rational jury finding that if appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the
lesser-included offense. Appellant’s counsel responded that the State’s caselaw
supporting its argument was distinguishable because appellant testified. At that
point, the trial court asked appellant’s counsel: “So my question regarding his
testimony, he denied everything. So it’s not that he got up and made an admission
to enough elements even to get the lesser. He flat-out denied everything. . . . So[,]
I’m trying to understand how you’re linking in his testimony to satisfy the prong of

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negating the higher offense and establishing the possibility that a jury could find
him guilty of the lesser based on his testimony. He didn’t get up and testify and
admit to a lesser.” Appellant’s counsel responded they did not believe appellant
was required to testify that he committed a lesser offense. They offered no other
argument for how appellant’s testimony supported the inclusion of the lesser-
included offenses and asked for additional time to conduct research. The trial
adjourned for the day at that point.

      The charge conference resumed the next morning. Appellant’s counsel re-
urged their request for lesser-included offense instructions. The State pointed out
to the trial court that the record had to contain “at least a scintilla of evidence that
refutes the greater offense and show the defendant, if guilty, is only guilty of the
lesser.” After continued discussion, the trial court denied appellant’s request for
lesser-included offense instructions.

      Following the conclusion of the charge conference and the making of
various changes to the charge, the court asked the parties whether they had any
objections to the charge. Appellant’s counsel responded that he “had a chance to
review the charge the Court has in its hand; and it’s as we agreed prior to breaking;
and I have no objections with it.” The jury subsequently found appellant guilty of
the charged offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve forty years in
prison. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation
of law. This appeal followed.

                                        ANALYSIS

      Appellant raises two issues on appeal. We address them in order.

I.    The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s request for the
      inclusion of a lesser-included offense instruction in the jury charge.
      In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
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request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of indecency with a
child by contact. Because there was less than a scintilla of evidence that would
permit a rational jury to find that, if appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the
lesser-included offense of indecency with a child by contact, we disagree.

      We apply a two-step process to determine whether a defendant was entitled
to an instruction on a lesser-included offense. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377,
382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, we determine whether the offense qualifies as a
lesser-included offense under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.09.
Sweed v. State, 351 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Tex. Code. Crim.
Proc. art. 37.09. This is a question of law. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Next, we determine whether there is some evidence that
would have permitted the jury to rationally find that if the defendant was guilty, he
was guilty only of the lesser offense. Id. at 536.

      Although the threshold showing for an instruction on a lesser-included
offense is low—more than a scintilla of evidence—the evidence must establish that
the lesser-included offense is a valid and rational alternative to the charged offense.
Id. “[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to
the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser
included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser
included offense is warranted.” Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994). While this “evidence may be weak or contradicted, the evidence must
still be directly germane to the lesser-included offense and must rise to a level that
a rational jury could find that if an appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the
lesser-included offense.     Meeting this threshold requires more than mere
speculation–it requires affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser-included
offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense.” Cavazos, 282

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S.W.3d at 385.

      There is no dispute that the first step of the Hall analysis is met here because
the Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that sexual abuse of a child by
contact is a lesser-included offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. See
Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The acts of sexual
abuse are specifically enumerated and are lesser-included offenses of the offense of
continuous sexual abuse.”) (internal quotations omitted); Soliz v. State, 353 S.W.3d
850, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that a predicate offense listed under
Subsection (c) of the continuous sexual abuse statute will always be a lesser-
included offense of continuous sexual abuse because the latter offense “is, by its
very definition, the commission under certain circumstances of two or more of the
offenses listed in Subsection (c).”). We therefore turn to whether the second step
is met.

      In his first issue, appellant begins his argument by asserting that, for the jury
to find him “only guilty of the offense of indecency with a child by contact, the
jury would have to find that the State could not prove two of the three predicate
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”          Appellant then points out potential
inconsistencies in Rebecca’s testimony about her age and the house where she
lived when the charged offense allegedly occurred.          Appellant continues by
pointing out that Rebecca had made prior outcries against her father that were not
prosecuted and also her mother’s testimony that Rebecca was “capable of lying
without remorse” asserting that her allegations were not credible. When making a
lesser-included offense analysis however, “it is not enough that the jury may
disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense.” Skinner v. State, 956
S.W.2d 532, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Instead, “there must be some evidence
directly germane to a lesser-included offense for the factfinder to consider before

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an instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted.” Id. We conclude this
argument does not establish that appellant was entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction.

      Appellant also points out his own testimony denying that he committed any
sexual offense against Rebecca or Lana. This testimony does not support the
inclusion of a lesser-included offense instruction because if the jury believed it, the
result would be an acquittal, not finding appellant guilty of a lesser offense. See
Cavazos, 282 S.W.3d at 385 (stating that to be entitled to a lesser-included
instruction, there must be “affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser-included
offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense.”).

      Next, appellant argues he was entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction because the State did not prove penetration of Lana’s vagina because
Lana’s testimony about penetration was equivocal. Appellant asserts that “at best,
Lana testified that appellant’s finger went just inside her labia majora, but not to
labia minora.” Here, appellant misapprehends the record because Sanchez, the
SANE nurse who conducted Lana’s SANE exam, testified that “penetration is
anything past this labia majora, the outer lips.” As a result, this evidence does not
rebut the greater charge. Id.

      Finally, appellant asserts that “the State provided affirmative evidence that if
appellant was guilty of any offense it was only indecency with a child when it
questioned appellant about his interview with an investigator.          According to
appellant, the State asked him if he told the investigator that he had admitted to his
wife that he had touched Lana’s vagina. Appellant denied that he had made such a
statement.     Appellant then points out the State’s next question, which asked
appellant that, if the investigator appeared in court and testified that appellant had
told him that, “would that be incorrect?”        Appellant answered “it would be

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incorrect because I told him what happened- -” At that point, the State objected
appellant’s answer was nonresponsive and the trial court sustained the objection.
Appellant asserts that he was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction
because this objection by the State left “the jury with the impression that at some
point, appellant had admitted to touching ‘on’ Lana’s vagina.” Here, the only
evidence in the record is appellant’s denial that he made such a statement to an
investigator. A prosecutor’s question or objection is not evidence. As a result,
appellant has not pointed out “affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser-
included offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense” and
therefore does not establish that the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s
request for a lesser-included offense instruction. Id. We overrule appellant’s first
issue.

II.      The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant’s
         motion to exclude the SANE nurse’s testimony.
         Appellant complains in his second issue about the trial court’s denial of his
pre-trial motion to exclude Sanchez’s testimony about Lana’s SANE exam. In
appellant’s view, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
because Sanchez’s testimony did not meet the requirements of the medical
diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4) (providing that
statements made for or reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment are
not excluded by the rule against hearsay). We disagree.

         We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial
court abuses its discretion only if “the trial judge’s decision was so clearly wrong
as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu
v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).             If the trial court’s

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evidentiary ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, we
must affirm the ruling. Gomez v. State, 380 S.W.3d 830, 836 n.9 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336,
344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

      Hearsay is a statement made outside of court offered into evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).       Although hearsay is
generally inadmissible, Rule 803 provides an exception for admitting hearsay
statements describing sexual abuse that were made for the purpose of facilitating
medical diagnosis or treatment. Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 896 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). “Hearsay statements by a suspected
child victim of abuse regarding causation, source of abuse, or describing abusive
acts are admissible under Rule 803(4) as being pertinent to the medical treatment
of a victim.” Id.

      Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
Sanchez’s testimony because, in appellant’s view, the SANE examination was not
for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment because Lana’s examination did
not lead to any medical or psychological diagnosis, or a therapeutic treatment plan.
Instead, appellant argues, the sole purpose of Lana’s SANE exam was to bolster
Lana’s testimony about the nature of the abuse.”

      In making his argument, appellant ignores Sanchez’s testimony. Sanchez
testified that the purpose of taking a history during a SANE examination is for the
purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Sanchez explained that she relies on
the words of the patient undergoing the SANE examination to determine the
appropriate treatment. Sanchez also explained that it is important for her to know
the different ways in which a child assault victim was sexually abused to determine
whether testing for sexually transmitted diseases needs to be done.         Finally,

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Sanchez testified that knowing the history of the patient’s sexual abuse and the
identity of the abuser are important to evaluate the emotional trauma level the
patient is experiencing. Based on this testimony, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion when it overruled appellant’s hearsay objection and admitted
the challenged evidence pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
See Reed v. State, 497 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.)
(“Given the record, we cannot say that Crawford had no medical purpose in
interviewing R.P. Thus, Crawford’s testimony about R.P.’s statements could have
been properly admitted under evidentiary rule 803(4).”). We overrule appellant’s
second issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Having overruled appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

                                      /s/    Jerry Zimmerer
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain (Spain, J., concurring
without opinion).
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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