Court Opinion

ID: 9852282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:35.556165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.981760
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority, a task such as this regarding rehabilitation of prisoners, is a governmental function of such import and public concern as to preclude interference by a City Planning Commission.
However, I cannot subscribe to the view embraced by the majority in its adoption of the holding of Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956) that the State of Tennessee is not bound by its statutes unless expressly provided otherwise. I believe the dissent correctly reflects a more enlightened view of the concept of sovereign immunity. To hold a state is never subject to local zoning restrictions is to emasculate in perpetuum, the very power the state has granted to municipalities, to zone and regulate its orderly growth.
The two authorities cited by the majority and the dissent, Rutgers State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1971); Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955) set forth certain criteria or standards for the balancing of interests of the governmental body seeking immunity against the welfare of the municipality. Apparently the majority has “balanced the interests” and finds the state’s interests and immunities are paramount in these particular circumstances. I agree. A city’s control of land-use planning must give way to effectuating this legislative goal. In an affective issue such as the location of a pre-release center, to hold otherwise could lead to a substitution of the city’s collective emotionally tainted judgment for that of the wisdom of the Legislature.
I am authorized to state that Justice DAVISON concurs in the views herein expressed.