Court Opinion

ID: 9737013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:12:55.830258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.922592
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE MANNING, specially concurring: While I agree that defendant has established the requisites of ineffective assistance of counsel, and hence, agree with the result reached here today, I believe that we need to address in detail the inappropriateness of the procedures utilized in this particular case. Further, I wish to address the basis for my concurrence in the majority’s finding that defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in light of and in response to the State's assertion that this stipulation was tantamount to a plea of guilty. Under certain circumstances, most of the procedures utilized in the case at bar would be perfectly proper. The State asserts that the defendant’s stipulation was tantamount to a plea of guilty. With that I agree. That, though, is where our agreement ends. Contrary to the State’s assertion, not all stipulations of fact transform a conviction into a guilty plea. (Thornton v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co. (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 365, 372, 418 N.E.2d 744.) Specifically, where a defendant stipulates to facts underlying an offense but the decision of guilt or innocence based on those facts is left to the trier of facts, the stipulation is not the equivalent of a guilty plea. (Thornton, 84 Ill. 2d at 372.) However, our courts have held that where a defense, either factual or legal, is not presented, a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a plea of guilty, and Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402) admonitions are required. (People v. Carlton (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 738, 743, 402 N.E.2d 310; People v. Sampson (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441-42, 473 N.E.2d 1002.) In light of these decisions, it can be concluded that where a defendant does plead guilty or stipulates to the facts without asserting a defense, that defendant is entitled to all of the safeguards afforded by compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402. Mr. Williams did not receive such safeguards. In the instant case, implicit from the record is the fact that defendant’s purpose in stipulating to the facts was twofold, i.e., to escape the death penalty and to preserve any legal defenses set forth in defendant’s pretrial motion for purposes of appeal. Hence, under certain circumstances this partially stipulated bench trial would not be tantamount to a plea, and no Rule 402 admonitions would be required. The problem arises, however, when in examining the record, I find there is no indication that a defense was established or included in the stipulation. While the record suggests that defendant’s intentions were to include a defense, his attorney’s efforts fell far short by his failure to advocate in defendant’s behalf in connection with the motion to suppress. Unlike the case of People v. Carlton, where immediately prior to a stipulated bench trial, the defendant interposed an objection at trial to certain identification testimony which had been the subject of a contested hearing on a motion to quash and suppress evidence, in the case at bar, while a motion to suppress was filed, there was no meaningful hearing due to the lack of cross-examination, no presentation of defense evidence, no objection to the introduction of the evidence referred to in the motion to suppress, in fact a stipulation to it, and most importantly, no ruling on the motion. In People v. Sullivan (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 533, 536-37, 391 N.E.2d 241, citing People v. Russ (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 385, 334 N.E.2d 108, this court held that where the trial court is presented with a defense, either actually established or included in the stipulation, a stipulated bench trial requires no Rule 402 admonitions. (See also People v. Carlton (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 738, 743-44, 402 N.E.2d 310.) In the instant case, while the defense attorney said he was standing on the motion, he actually on behalf of defendant presented no evidence on the motion, did not cross-examine any witnesses, presented no argument to support his theory, and sought no ruling. While the majority finds that defendant did not consent to a stipulated trial, I think such an assertion belies the record, since implicit in his silence after stating that he understood was consent. The court inquired as follows: “THE COURT: Do you understand a lot of this trial is going in on stipulation? You understand on a finding of guilty here, I could sentence you to basically to capital punishment, number one, which is death; or number two, I could sentence you to natural life; or I could give you up to eighty years. Do you understand that? MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I understand.” Based upon the filing of the motion to suppress the evidence, it appears clear that defendant sought to establish a defense. However, the failure of the defense attorney to advocate in connection with the motion and to secure a ruling on the motion to suppress, in my judgment, falls short of establishing a defense or including it in the stipulation. At the very least the defendant was entitled to Rule 402 admonitions. Had such admonitions been given, the defendant could have articulated any displeasure he might have felt with such proceedings, if they were contrary to his desires, and the court would have been informed regarding his exact intentions. For the foregoing reasons, I agree that in this particular instance, defense counsel’s representation fell far short of being effective, defendant was prejudiced thereby, and because it lacked the adversarial qualities upon which our judicial system is predicated, the defendant has easily met the Strickland v. Washington standards.