Court Opinion

ID: 9493594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:12:31.085813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:54.792530
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion is a distressing and total disregard for the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the law of this Circuit. The right to effective assistance of counsel, as assured by the Constitution, “requires that a defendant be represented at every critical stage of his trial.” United States v. Minsky, 963 F.2d 870, 874 (6th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). This constitutional guarantee stands as a near absolute prohibition to ex parte conferences between the government and the district court. In keeping with this fundamental guarantee, I must express my deep disappointment and outrage with the majority’s decision. Condoning ex parte discussions between the trial court and government cannot be tolerated, and I will not be a party to this miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
“The value of a judicial proceeding is substantially diluted where the process is ex parte, because the court does not have available the fundamental instrument for judicial judgment: an adversary proceeding in which both parties may participate.” Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). This statement, articulated by the Supreme Court in 1968, is no less true today. Indeed, this Court adopted the Supreme Court’s very words in espousing our distaste for ex parte proceedings. See Minsky, 963 F.2d at 874 (citing Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183, 89 S.Ct. 347).
In United States v. Minsky, this Court heard Gerald L. Minsky’s (“Minsky”) appeal from his convictions of mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to kill a horse for the insurance proceeds. 963 F.2d at 871. After two government witnesses testified against Minsky, Minsky requested, pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, that the prosecution produce prior state*524ments made by the witnesses. See id. at 872. Specifically, Minsky requested Federal Bureau of Investigation forms containing the witnesses’ statements, but the prosecution objected. See id. In resolving the situation, the district court held an in camera review of the forms, followed by a private conversation with the prosecution. See id. On appeal, Minsky challenged his conviction, arguing that the ex 'parte conference perverted his trial. See id. at 871.
Ultimately, Judge Timbers, speaking on behalf of this Court, held that the district court’s ex parte conference with the prosecution was indeed grounds for reversal. See id. at 873-74. The Court did not soft-pedal the issue. Instead, it railed against the exclusion of a criminal defendant from proceedings crucial to his trial. The Court resolutely declared that “[t]he constitution requires that a defendant be represented at every critical stage of his trial.” Id. at 874. The Court continued, “not only is it a gross breach of the appearance of justice when the defendant’s principal adversary is given private access to the ear of the court, it is a dangerous procedure.” Id. (quoting Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir.1969)).
Indeed, it is a dangerous procedure. Ex parte conferences tear at the very heart of a defendant’s fair trial and severely undermine confidence in our judicial process. As such, this Court only allows for ex parte conferences under the narrowest of circumstances. In Minsky, this Court noted that “[e ]x parte proceedings ‘can only be justified and allowed by compelling state interests.’ ” Id. at 874 (quoting In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d Cir.1977)). The Court stated that “[a]lthough there are circumstances where an ex parte communication might be ‘overlooked,’ ‘the burden of proving lack of prejudice is on the [government], and it is a heavy one.’ ” Id. (quoting Haller, 409 F.2d at 860). To my bewilderment, the majority distorts Sixth Circuit precedent in an effort to circumvent the teachings of Minsky.1 I strongly object.
Initially, the majority correctly demonstrates this Court’s strong preference to discourage ex parte conferences. The majority acknowledges that, “in all but the most exceptional circumstances, ex parte communications with the court are an extraordinarily bad idea.” Furthermore, the majority notes that this Court has held that ex parte communications are “a gross breach of the appearance of justice.” Finally, the majority recognizes that “the government’s burden of demonstrating that the defendant was not prejudiced by an ex parte communication is ‘a heavy one.’ ” After articulating this Court’s profound distaste for ex parte communications and acknowledging the Court’s jurisdiction to consider Carmichael’s Sixth Amendment claim, the majority then engages in cursory analysis before summarily rejecting Carmichael’s claims.
The proper analysis begins with a fair determination of whether a defendant objected to the ex parte communication. When a defendant objects contemporaneously to the ex parte communication, our analysis proceeds directly to a determination of whether the government has demonstrated a compelling state interest and lack of prejudice to the defendant. See Minsky, 963 F.2d at 874. After a careful review of the record, I find that Carmichael sufficiently preserved this issue for review by this Court.
*525During a discussion in open court regarding Carmichael’s request for disclosure of Jencks and Brady material, the district court judge instructed both defense counsel and the government to approach the bench. The government then stated to the district judge that this discussion should be conducted “without them,” i.e., without defense counsel. In response to defense counsel’s suggestion that the trial court was the appropriate authority to determine the propriety of these discussions, the district court permitted the ex parte conference. After private discussions that constitute eight pages of transcripted record, the district court announced its satisfaction with the representations made by the government. In objecting to the district court’s acceptance of the government’s ex parte representations, defense counsel was assured by the district court that his concerns were “sufficient” for the record.
Despite defense counsel’s clear dissatisfaction with the actions of the government and the district court, the majority concludes that “Carmichael’s attorney did not object.” Accordingly, the majority analyzes Carmichael’s claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). However, a thorough reading of the record demonstrates an objection by Defendant rendering this analysis unnecessary. While maintaining that this analysis is unnecessary, I find Carmichael’s claim meets the heightened scrutiny required by Rule 52(b).
Where a defendant fails to object during a federal criminal prosecution, Rule 52(b) vests appellate courts with the discretion to review these claims for plain error. The majority correctly states that this Court can hear Carmichael’s claim regardless of whether it was raised in the district court. In United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 629-30 (6th Cir.1993), this Court outlined the requirements for appellate review for plain error. While “[pjlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court,” Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 52(b), “[t]he Court of Appeals’ power under Rule 52(b) is limited in three significant respects.” Id.
“The first limitation is that the error in question must have occurred in the district court proceedings.” Id. at 629; accord, Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In Thomas, this Court held “that a deviation from a legal rule constitutes an error within the meaning of Rule 52(b) so long as the rule has not been waived by the defendant.” 11 F.3d at 629. The Court noted “that the mere failure of a defendant to make a timely assertion of a right does not constitute a waiver, but rather, constitutes a forfeiture and that in those circumstances an error under Rule 52(b) is not extinguished.” Id. Here, the ex parte communications were a deviation from a well-established legal rule which Carmichael did not waive. Therefore, Defendant has satisfied the first requirement.
“The second limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b) is that the error be ‘plain.’ ” Id. at 630 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770). Because ex parte conferences are generally disallowed under the law of this Circuit, see Minsky, 963 F.2d at 874, the error is “plain.”
“The third limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b) ‘is that the plain error affect[s] substantial rights.’ ” Thomas, 11 F.3d at 630 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770). Generally, “the phrase ‘affect substantial rights’ means ‘prejudicial’ in the sense that the asserted error ‘must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’ ” United States v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770). However, the Supreme Court noted, and this Circuit recognized, that “[tjhere may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of them affect on the outcome” and “errors that should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice.” Olano, 507 *526U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Hayes, 218 F.3d at 622. The Supreme Court listed as examples of these types of errors instances where “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence ...” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). By allowing ex parte conferences before and during trial, the district court demonstrated a willingness to share intimate discourse with the government while excluding Defendant. Once an affinity between the district court and the government has been established, the district court’s ability to serve as a neutral arbiter is suspect. This affinity perverts the adversarial process and creates an intolerable air of partiality. The Supreme Court found that a trial conducted before “a judge who [i]s not impartial” to be a “structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Id. at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246. In light of the foregoing, the majority’s conclusion that the ex parte communications did not affect Carmichael’s substantial rights offends traditional notions of fairness and opens the door for prosecutorial abuse.
Having concluded that Carmichael’s claim is a “[p]lain error[ ] ... affecting [his] substantial rights,” Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 52(b), the analysis turns on whether this Court should exercise its discretion to correct the error. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he court of appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Olano, (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). In this matter, no genuine dispute exists as to whether the ex parte conference below compromised “the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. Therefore, this Court has the authority, and indeed the duty, to review his claim.
Having found that Defendant objected to the ex parte proceeding, and also having found that the claim deserves correction under a “plain error” analysis, the sole question is whether the government has met its burden under Minsky. 963 F.2d at 874. Under Minsky, “[e ]x parte proceedings ‘can only be justified and allowed by compelling state interests.’ ” Id. Moreover, this Court can only “overlook” an ex parte communication if it is not prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
I conclude that the government has failed to present a compelling state interest to justify the ex parte communications. Although the government undoubtedly has a strong interest in protecting the details of its on-going drug investigation, this interest could have been protected through less intrusive measures. In fact, as noted by the majority, a simple representation by the government in open court that the material Defendant sought did not contain Brady material would have satisfied both Minsky and Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 361 (6th Cir.1994). Oddly, while Hernandez allows the district court to rely on statements by prosecutors concerning the absence of Brady material in its possession, the. government opted to engage in unnecessary and protracted ex parte discussions with the district court. The government, having elected to make representations beyond those deemed sufficient by Hernandez, was required to make its representations in open court. The government fails to state a sufficiently compelling reason for excluding Defendant from these discussions. Moreover, any state interest in ex parte discussions between the government and the trial court is outweighed by the resulting prejudice to Carmichael.
As stated previously, “the burden of proving lack of prejudice is on the [government], and it is a heavy one.” Minsky, 963 F.2d at 874 (quoting Haller, 409 F.2d at 860). Carmichael argues that the conference was prejudicial and adversely affected his substantial rights because the government made misstatements during *527the ea: parie communication that, if corrected, would have prompted the district court to review the documents in camera. Putting the veracity of Carmichael’s assertions aside,2 the failure of the district court to afford defense counsel an opportunity to hear and respond to the government’s representations denied Defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel.3 Allowing the government unfettered access to the court’s ear undermines the adversarial process and taints the appearance of judicial impartiality. The district court’s ruling on the Brady material “may well have been due not only to the fact that the prosecutor got in his pitch first, but, even more insidiously, to the very relationship, innocent as it may have been thought to be, that permitted such disclosures.” Hal-ler, 409 F.2d at 859-60. Since the government has not met its substantial burden of proving lack of prejudice to Carmichael, and has failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest, this ex parte communication does not fall within the narrow exceptions outlined in Minsky.
An ex parte communication between the government’s counsel and the trial court denies the defendant his right to due process and effective representation. Further, this Court considers an ex parte conference a “gross breach of the appearance of justice” that deprives a defendant of his right to an impartial jurist and perverts the adversarial process. Minsky, 963 F.2d at 874 (quoting Haller, 409 F.2d at 859). Recognizing the import of this issue, other circuits have emphasized the dangers of allowing ex parte proceedings in criminal cases.
Ex parte communications between the government and the court deprive the defendant of notice of the precise content of the communications and an opportunity to respond. These communications thereby can create both the appearance of impropriety and the possibility of actual misconduct. Even where the government acts in good faith and diligently attempts to present information fairly during an ex parte proceeding, the government’s information is likely to be less reliable and the court’s ultimate findings less accurate than if the defendant had been permitted to participate. However impartial a prosecutor may mean to be, he is an advocate, accustomed to stating only one side of the case. An ex parte proceeding places a substantial burden upon a trial judge to perform what is naturally and properly a function of an advocate.
United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (7th Cir.1987) (citations omitted); accord, In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir.1977); Haller, 409 F.2d at 859-60. Moreover, ex parte communications, such as that below, violate ethical guidelines. Canon 3(A)(4) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge should ... neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceedings.” Further, Canon 2(A) provides that “[a] judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at *528all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” The protection afforded criminal defendants from ex parte communications between the district court and the prosecutor is “not merely a matter of ethics; it is part of a defendant’s right to due process and effective representation.” Haller, 409 F.2d at 861.
Our criminal judicial system is premised upon certain fundamental rights — the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to an impartial judge and jury, the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to due process. The majority opinion vitiates each of these basic guarantees. As judges of this Court we have sworn to serve as protectors of the United States Constitution. The majority desecrates that sacred oath. Consistent with the reasons stated above, I vehemently dissent.

. The majority mischaracterizes and dilutes the requirements of Minsky, concluding that the government need only "articulate” a "reasonable justification” for the ex parte conference. The majority manufactures its own "reasonable justification” standard, and substitutes this standard for the "compelling state interest” standard imposed by Minsky. These standards are legally distinct. The majority’s invented standard improperly lowers the government's "heavy” burden to demonstrate a compelling state interest. Moreover, this standard is wholly unsupported by the law of this Circuit. I respectfully reject the majority's proposed standard.

. The majority asserts that "the dissent ... argues that Carmichael's substantial rights were adversely affected ‘because the government made misstatements during the ex parte communication that, if corrected, would have prompted the district court to review the documents in camera.' " This assertion is a distortion of the truth.

. The majority opinion concludes that there is "no basis to believe that the document in fact would have been of any value to Carmichael.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on the government's assertion that the documents were not of any value to Carmichael. However, Carmichael has presented evidence that the prosecutor made misleading statements to the trial court, undoubtedly to avoid an in camera review and potential relinquishment of the documents in its possession to Carmichael. The prosecutor’s misstatements to the district court constitute "an indication of misconduct,” thus eliminating the presumption of truth bestowed on the government by Hernandez, 31 F.3dat361. Accordingly, the majority's reliance on the government's assurances is misplaced.