Court Opinion

ID: 9857716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:55:56.101196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:24.624970
License: Public Domain

O’TIara, J.
(concurring). I would treat appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea as a granted application for delayed appeal raising the constitutional infirmity of the statute. Thus, I express no view on division I of Mr. Justice BreNNAN’s opinion. I address myself only to the appeal on the merits.. As I see it, the constitutional argument would be the same in principle whether appellant *617were convicted for a first time public drunkenness and sentenced on a misdemeanor ■ charge to tbe county jail. Tbe argument, as I understand it, is: Appellant is an alcoholic. Alcoholism is a disease. A compulsive incident of this disease is drunkenness. Confinement in any penal institution for the drunkenness of an alcoholic is cruel and unusual punishment proscribed both by the State and Federal Constitutions.
In the lexicon of medicine, more particularly psychiatric medicine, there are many conditions besides alcoholism which are denominated “diseases.” A number of these practices have been legislatively declared criminal offenses. Narcotic addiction which often includes the illegal possession of narcotics is one. The affliction of homosexuality when involving a proscribed act is another. Pyromania, surely a mental disorder, when extended to encompass the elements of arson, is yet another. The punishment which society, through the legislature, has decreed for the conviction of any of the foregoing illegal acts is confinement in a penal institution. The conviction, of course, must accord with due process, constitutional guarantees, and is subject to all legally recognized defenses. This may not be an enlightened view but it is presently society’s view as legislatively expressed. "Whether it accommodates to my personal view is not relevant. I must function as a judge under a constitutional government of separation of powers. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Frankfurter, there is not a judicial remedy for every evil in a democracy. If the foregoing situation is an evil, as the proponents of appellant’s position contend, the remedy lies in the legislature and not in the courts. It is not competent for me judicially to decide which of the various schools of medicine or psychiatry has the- more effective curative techniques, or any cure at all.
*618It is within the legislative competence to designate drunkenness in a public place a criminal offense. The punishment decreed for conviction thereof is confinement in a penal institution. That same punishment is decreed for many other acts which certain schools of medicine and psychiatry attribute to environmental factors, hereditary traits, personality disorders or psychological malfunctions. There is no discrimination against alcoholics within the generic classification. Confinement in a penal institution is the norm. Penal confinement is not per se cruel or unusual. In this case it is not discrim-inatorily administered.
I have the utmost sympathy for those members of society who fall within the classification. I earnestly wish legislative study and action would be directed to the problem. As it is, I can find no constitutional infirmity in the punishment legislatively decreed. Perforce, I must agree with Justice BbeN-NAN. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Black, J., concurred with O’Haba, J.