Court Opinion

ID: 9581887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:05.791455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:18.897163
License: Public Domain

Judge John
concurring in part and concurring in part only in the result.
I concur in the majority’s dismissal of defendants’ appeal as to plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, but specifi*52cally disagree with and do not join the majority holding that parent-child immunity may not be afforded to persons standing in loco par-entis. Nonetheless, because I believe the circumstances of the case sub judice raise an issue of fact as to whether defendants stood in loco parentis to the minor child Ambra, I am compelled to concur in the result reversing allowance of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim. However, my vote is to reverse and remand for determination by the trier of fact as to the issue of defendants’ status.
Although defendants neither possessed an official governmental license as foster parents nor received any compensation or reimbursement for their care of the child, I believe the majority properly characterizes their relationship vis-a-vis Ambra as that of foster parents. However, the majority suggests that in view of the terminable nature of defendants’ association with Ambra and the “temporary” nature of foster care in general, see 3 Robert E. Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 238, at 190-91 (4th ed. 1981), neither defendants nor any foster parent could intend permanently to assume parental obligations and thus could never stand in loco parentis. The majority further relies upon the temporary nature of foster parent status to deny parent-child immunity even to a foster parent who may truly stand in loco parentis. In each respect, I must disagree.
First, the very nature of an in loco parentis relationship, contrary to natural parenthood or adoption, affixes “rights and duties temporary [as opposed to permanent] in nature,” Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 162, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (1984) (citing Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (1947) and D. v. D., 56 N.J. Super. 357, 153 A.2d 332 (1959)). Indeed, we have previously specifically recognized this impermanence. See Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 385, 438 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1994) (although an in loco parentis relationship “[tjypically . . . terminates upon divorce,” stepfather held to stand in loco parentis beyond divorce from mother under circumstances of the case). Additionally, the in loco parentis association “exists at the will of the party assuming the obligations of a parent [and] may be abrogated by such party at any time.” 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 154 (1978). Thus, emphasis upon the characteristic impermanence of foster care to support exclusion of foster parents from in loco parentis status, itself impermanent, is circuitous at best.
Further, despite the “temporary” nature of in loco parentis, both the consequent rights and duties are, “as the words imply, substan*53tially the same as between parent and child . . . .” 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 75 (1987) (emphasis added). Because an in loco par-entis relationship arises only “when one is willing to assume all the obligations and to receive all the benefits associated with one standing as a natural parent to a child,” 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 154 (1978) (emphasis added), imposition of every duty of parenthood without affording those protections recognized in the law is neither consistent nor fair. See London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 215, 64 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1954) (stepfather who voluntarily assumed in loco parentis position is entitled to same protections and benefits as a natural parent).
As a natural extension of the foregoing principles, this Court, as the majority correctly concedes, has acknowledged in loco parentis status and application of parental immunity to circumstances involving stepparents, see Mabry v. Bowen, 14 N.C. App. at 647, 188 S.E.2d at 651-52 and Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. at 308, 210 S.E.2d at 504; see also Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N.C. 128, 132, 2 S.E. 453, 453 (1887) (It is “settled law” that the relationship of in loco parentis may exist between grandparent and grandchild.).
In addition, other jurisdictions have rejected automatic exclusion of foster parents from the position of in loco parentis and accorded them parent-child immunity as well. See In re Diana P., 120 N.H. 791, 796, 424 A.2d 178, 181 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964, 69 L.Ed.2d 976 (1981) (“To conclude that foster parents can never stand in loco parentis to a child in their care would be unrealistic”); Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (uncle stood in loco parentis to child who resided with and was cared for by him; to rule otherwise “might have the effect of discouraging the . . . voluntary and unselfish . . . caring for a child in need of parental support and guidance . . . .”); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 317, 342 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1986) (where natural parents’ custodial rights had been “severed” by the juvenile court and child was placed in custody of county department of family and children services, to allow parents to sue foster parents standing in loco parentis for alleged negligence would violate state public policy favoring parental immunity); Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639, 646-47, 259 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1977) (one “who voluntarily assumes parental responsibility and attempts to create a home-like environment for a child should be granted immunity from judicial interference to the same extent as a natural parent”); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d. 801, 804 (Ala. 1992) (“foster parents should be afforded some protection by the parental *54immunity doctrine”); Rutkowski v. Wasko, 286 A.D. 327, 331, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1955) (“[n]o good reason” exists why parent-child immunity should be applied to a natural parent and not in the case of one standing in loco 'parentis).
Moreover, as stated in an early decision of this Court, abolishment of parent-child immunity is “for our Legislature or for our Supreme Court,” Evans v. Evans, 12 N.C. App. 17, 18, 182 S.E.2d 227, 228, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 279 N.C. 394, 183 S.E.2d 242 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 925, 30 L.Ed.2d 797 (1972), and not for this Court, however meritorious we might find such action. Mabry, 14 N.C. App. at 647, 188 S.E.2d at 652; see also Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579, 593, 374 N.W.2d 683, 689 (1985) (“The clear judicial trend is to abolish or limit the availability of the parental immunity defense to both parents and other caretakers alike.”); Lee v. Mowett Sales Company, Inc., 316 N.C. 489, 494, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986) (“If the doctrine is to be abolished ... , it should be done by legislation and not by the Court”); Harlin Ray Dean, Jnr., It’s Time to Abolish North Carolina’s Parent-Child Immunity, But Who’s Going to Do It?—Coffey v. Coffey and North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-539.21, 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1317 (1990).
Absent abolition of parent-child immunity, and bearing in mind we are bound by this Court’s previous decisions involving stepparents, see In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), I submit that foster parents may, under appropriate circumstances, stand in loco parentis, and if so situated are entitled to the rights and benefits of natural parents, including parent-child immunity.
Among factors which have been recognized as applicable to a determination of whether a party stands in loco parentis are “the age of the child; the degree to which thé child is dependent on the person claiming to be standing in loco parentis-, the amount of support, if any, provided; the extent to which duties commonly associated with parenthood are exercised,” Hush, 77 Mich. App. at 649, 259 N.W.2d at 174-75; the amount of time the child has lived with the person and the degree to which a “psychological family” has developed, In re Diana P., 120 N.H. at 796, 424 A.2d at 180.
In the case sub judice, particularly in view of the relatively short period of time the child lived with defendants on a full-time basis, I believe consideration of the foregoing factors raises an issue of fact as to whether defendant foster parents stood in loco parentis to *55Ambra. See State v. Hunter 48 N.C. App. 656, 662, 270 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1980) (evidence, inter alia, that child, his mother, and defendant lived together from September 1978 to January 1979 appropriate for jury determination of whether defendant was a person acting in loco parentis).
Concerning such determination, the majority cites Michigan authority for the proposition that the “[i]ntent to assume parental status can be inferred from [the parties’] acts and declarations,” Hush, 77 Mich. App. at 649, 259 N.W.2d at 174, but follows with a recitation of certain acts and declarations of the child’s natural mother as bearing upon the determination of whether the defendant foster parents stood in loco parentis to Ambra. I agree it is established that the requisite “intention may be shown by the acts and declarations of the persons alleged to stand in [the] relationship [of in loco parentis].” 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 154 (1978) (emphasis added). However, the acts or sentiments of a natural parent do not appear to have been determined relevant either by the Michigan court cited or indeed by any other authority. If so, certain other uncontra-dicted evidence in the case sub judice would be pertinent — for example, Ms. Richardson’s refusal to remove her boyfriend from her home following a child abuse investigation concerning Ambra and her later consent to placing custody of the child in DSS.
In sum, I conclude that under our existing law foster parents and those similarly situated may stand in loco parentis to a minor child and avail themselves of the parent-child immunity doctrine during the duration of that relationship. Further, the evidence of defendants’ status in the case sub judice was not conclusive as a matter of law, and there remains an issue of fact as to whether defendant foster parents stood in loco parentis to Ambra. Accordingly, I concur in the result of reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants, but rather vote to remand for resolution of the in loco parentis issue by the trier of fact.