Court Opinion

ID: 9388736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:07:29.96627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.150221
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Fluker, 2023-Ohio-1295.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                             No. 111678
                 v.                                :

CECIL FLUKER,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 20, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-665403-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Eric Collins, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Susan J. Moran, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Cecil Fluker (“Fluker”) appeals his bench trial

conviction and sentence for two counts of menacing by stalking in violation of

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), fourth-degree felonies.

                   We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.   Facts and Procedural History

               Fluker was convicted of menacing by stalking D.W. (“Mother”) and

her family, more particularly daughter Jane Doe (“Doe”), who was 17 years of age at

the time of the indictments. Count 1 of Fluker’s indictment charged that on or about

August 1, 2021, to October 30, 2021:

      Cecil Flucker [sic], by engaging in a pattern of conduct, did knowingly
      cause [Mother] to believe that Cecil Flucker [sic] will cause physical
      harm to [Mother] or a family member of Mother or cause mental
      distress to [Mother] or a family member of [Mother’s]. Furthermore,
      the offender made a threat of physical harm to or against the victim.

Count 2 of the indictment mirrored Count 1 except for the furthermore clause that

provided “the offender trespassed on the land or premises where the victim lives, is

employed, or attends school.”

              The case was placed on the mental health docket and proceeded to a

bench trial that began on May 24, 2022. Mother and two members of the Cleveland

Police Department (“CPD”) testified for the state. Fluker testified in his defense.

              Mother stated that in February 2020, Doe became very angry with

Mother, “busted” Mother’s windows, and left the residence. (Tr. 39.) Doe later

informed Mother that she was residing at the home of a woman named Belinda

Massey (“Massey”).

              Mother said that Doe would sometimes return to the house “to eat,

get food, get money, you know, stuff like that. So I would make sure she was okay.

But I never knew the exact whereabouts of where she was because she wouldn’t tell

me.” (Tr. 40.) Doe would approach through the field that was adjacent to Mother’s
house. Mother suspected that “somebody dropped her off on the next street.”

(Tr. 40.) During calls with Doe, Mother often heard an unknown male speaking

loudly in the background. She learned that the male was Fluker in August or

September 2021.

               Doe was away for over a year. Mother explained, to establish that Doe

was a member of the household during the relevant period, that Doe graduated from

high school in August or September 2021, “a couple of days * * * prior to her coming

back home.” (Tr. 42.) Mother said that Doe returned home because Fluker was

abusing her and that she observed fingerprints on Doe’s neck and face. Two to three

weeks after Doe’s return, Mother found Doe another place to stay because Mother

observed a male driving by the house and taking photographs of Mother and the

family. The male was driving a silver car that Doe said belonged to Fluker’s brother.

Mother contacted police but did not go to the station as the police advised.

               The state introduced copies of several screen shots of threatening text

messages purportedly sent by Fluker to Doe who sent the screen shots to Mother.

The messages included threats to kill Doe and her family, burn the house down, and

have people shoot into the house if Doe did not return to him. Fluker’s cell phone

number is listed at the top of one of the screen shots.

               Mother said Fluker knew Doe was staying with Mother and that

Fluker called Doe one night and said, “‘I’m in your house.’ When I got up to go [sic]

the stairs, he was going back out the window, upstairs window.” (Tr. 50.) Mother

said she did not see Fluker but heard sounds in the house and arrived downstairs in
time to see “the van that [Fluker] drives with ‘school transportation’ on it. It was

pulling off.”1 (Tr. 51.) Mother did not state whether Doe was at the residence at the

time.

                   On approximately September 12, 2021, Mother was standing on the

porch when she observed a tall male, who she later determined to be Fluker, walking

back and forth in front of the house. The male stopped and asked whether Mother

knew who “Mary” was and said Mary had taken a gun from him. Mother walked

into the house to get her phone to call Doe whose middle name was Mary. She

returned to see the male running through the adjacent field.

                   Mother testified that someone shot into the home later that day and

police were summoned. In addition to the report of a shot being fired, Mother

showed police a first-floor windowpane that had been broken two days earlier. Doe

was not home when the window was broken but Mother said that Doe texted Mother

that “[Fluker] was threatening to break the window. * * * You — all need to get out

of there.” (Tr. 60.)

                   Mother showed police the screen shots of text messages reportedly

sent to Doe by Fluker. Doe was not in the house the day of the September 12, 2021

incident, but she communicated with police by phone. Mother confirmed that the

only time Fluker came to the house and talked with her was on September 12, 2021,

when she was standing on the porch.

        1   Fluker drove the van at the high school that Doe attended.
               Mother called police whenever she saw Fluker’s van in the area and

said that additional threatening texts were sent to Doe after the September 12, 2021

incident. Mother did not think that Doe wanted to be involved with the investigation

and stated that Doe no longer resided with Mother and if Doe was with Fluker again

Doe would not tell Mother. Mother also said the family had relocated because she

did not feel safe.

                CPD Officer Michael Deighan (“Officer Deighan”) responded to the

scene on September 12, 2021. Mother told Officer Deighan that

       a male that was known to her who was, I believe, a teacher or
       security — I can’t recall — but worked at * * * her daughter’s school —
       texted her daughter, came over to the house and shot one round into
       the house and sent her daughter a picture of him inside the house.

(Tr. 73.)

               No bullet casing was recovered but Officer Deighan observed “a bullet

hole [that entered] through the north side of the house into the son’s room, and I do

believe it lodged in his back wall.” (Tr. 74.) A second bullet hole was not related to

the current complaint. Doe was not at the residence at the time the officer arrived,

but the officer talked with Doe telephonically to confirm the content and source of

the text message screenshots. The officer verified that the screenshots presented for

his review at trial were the ones he viewed at Mother’s home.

                CPD Detective Sean Coleman (“Detective Coleman) talked with

Mother several times beginning a few days after the incident. Mother forwarded five
screen shots to Coleman. One of the screenshots contained a telephone number

publicly listed to Fluker.

                 Detective Coleman first interviewed Fluker during a recorded phone

call. Excerpts were played for the jury. Fluker admitted that he went to Mother’s

house around September 9th or September 12th and he knew Mother’s address.

Fluker did not take responsibility for breaking the window or the gunshot. The cell

phone that Fluker used to communicate with the detective was the same number

depicted in the text message screen shot. Fluker turned himself in a few weeks after

the interview.

                 Detective Coleman also monitored jail calls after Fluker’s arrest,

several of which were played for the jury. During the jail calls, Fluker mentioned

going to Mother’s house during the September 9th to September 12th, 2021 time

period, that a gun was kept at the house where he resided, and that he lived in the

city of Garfield Heights. Fluker also asked Doe what her “people” planned to do and

offered to pay for the broken window.

                 Detective Coleman confirmed that other than a bullet hole, there was

no ballistic evidence to indicate a shooting occurred contemporaneous to the report.

Detective Coleman was unable to speak directly with Doe, who stopped responding

to his texts and failed to show up for appointments. The state rested, and Fluker’s

Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was denied.

                 Fluker took the stand and corroborated that he has been in a

relationship with Doe. Fluker did not meet Doe at school but met her at East 152d
and St. Clair Avenue “at a bus stop beat up real bad. And I jumped out and said,

‘What is wrong with you? Where’s your parents, or who are you?’” (Tr. 113.) Doe

responded with a “bunch of lies” but gave Fluker her phone number. Fluker was not

driving the school vehicle at the time. Fluker did not know that Doe was 17 but

realized as time passed that Doe was young because she did “young things and

want[ed] to fight.” (Tr. 113-114.)

               Fluker resided in Garfield Heights with Massey who had taken him in

because he was homeless. Doe later moved into the home and Fluker took care of

Doe. “[A]ll of us was trying to help each other.” (Tr. 115.) Fluker stated Doe had

been living at his house the entire time, was still living there at the time of trial, and

was “pregnant, like, right now again.” (Tr. 101.)

               Fluker denied breaking the window, shooting into the house, and

sending the threatening text messages. Fluker said that he, Doe, and P (“P”), a

female acquaintance of Doe who lived near Doe’s school, were involved in a three-

way relationship. Fluker had an encounter with P without Doe, and P told him she

wanted a one-on-one relationship. Fluker refused, and P angrily responded that her

“peoples were coming.” (Tr. 102.) Fluker ran from P’s house and left some of his

belongings, including his phone. P connected Fluker’s cell phone to an internet

application that provided cell phone location tracking, camera views and access, and

the ability to send texts and make calls that appeared to come from Fluker’s phone.

               Fluker said that P’s family members lived on Mother’s street and

reportedly sent photographs of Mother and the family and the threatening text
messages. Fluker explained that there was a lot of fighting and gunfire on Mother’s

street and that P and her friends often rode by Mother’s house and urged Doe to

come out to fight.

               Fluker admitted that he talked with Mother the day that Mother was

standing on her porch:

      I told her, your daughter stole some stuff. I think she stole a gun.

      And she said, my daughter don’t steal.

      I said, well, I’m the one taking care of your daughter. I’m just trying to
      tell you, I’m not trying to hurt you.

(Tr. 108.)

               Fluker clarified that the gun Doe took from the house was a bb gun

that appeared to be authentic and was kept at Fluker’s residence for security

purposes. Fluker also wanted Mother to know that he was not the one causing

trouble:

      In my mind, because I do have mental issues — you get it. And I’ve
      been through stuff before. So in my mind when I seen [sic] [Mother] I
      wanted to tell her it’s not me, and I was trying to show her. And she
      didn’t want to hear it. Like, she just looked at me like an older guy with
      her young daughter. And I’ll kill you. Like, you know what I’m saying?
      Like it was no trying to talk to her.

(Tr. 119.) Fluker said that Mother went into the house and returned with a real gun.

Fluker ran through the next-door field to the adjacent block. That was the only time

that Fluker encountered Mother.

               Fluker accused Mother of attempting to run him off the road with her

children in the car and said the police told her to stop, though police testified there
were no reports of the event.2 Fluker confirmed that he called Detective Coleman

multiple times to say the allegations were not true and to turn himself in.

               As to the jail calls, Fluker asked Doe what Mother was going to do

regarding the charges because Doe knew that Fluker was innocent and had tried to

tell her Mother. Fluker offered to pay for the window to let Mother know he was

trying to help her so Mother would feel secure that he was not the perpetrator.

Fluker added that he had recently had a nervous breakdown and was taking

medication.

               The trial court found Fluker guilty on both counts and continued the

sentencing hearing due to Mother’s desire to attend. Mother failed to appear at the

June 6, 2022 sentencing. The state informed the trial court that Mother wanted a

restraining order against Fluker and that Mother had become alienated from Doe.

               Defense counsel explained that Fluker’s mental health issues were

complicated by a traumatic brain injury and skull fracture suffered years earlier

when Fluker was accidentally shot in the head by a friend playing with a gun. Fluker

was “scared his mother would worry about [his] getting shot in the head” so he told

her that he jumped off a building. (Tr. 141).

               Fluker admitted he had a history of making poor choices, particularly

with relationships, and had also been homeless, which impeded his ability to receive

proper mental health care. Fluker was tearful and apologetic about the situation

      2   Detective Coleman did state that officers may have been dispatched in response
to a call but if no report was made there would be no record.
with Mother, to the prosecutor because he did not understand the prosecutor was

trying to help him, to his lawyer, and to his mother who was present at the hearing.

                 The trial court admonished Fluker for being involved in an

“inappropriate” relationship as a 44-year-old man that began when Doe was 17 and

was now 19 years of age at the time of trial:

      I’m not — I’m not agreeing to that. You are a 44-year-old man. You’re
      not — I’m not agreeing to this living situation. I don’t agree with it. So
      where are you going to live? * * * And you’re not having — you’re not
      going to be on my probation and have a relationship with a 19-year-old
      girl. * * * That started when she was basically 17. * * * You are 44 years
      old. * * * She’s a troubled girl, and you’re around young girls.

(Tr. 143-144.)

                 The trial court and defense counsel told Fluker that Doe was not good

for him and she was a troubled girl and that working around young girls with his

lack of boundaries and developmental issues was not good.

                 The trial court then admonished:

      Court:      It just burns me up. You’re not here on that kind of case, so I
                  can’t punish you like you are. But I can tell you this, I’m not
                  going to stand for it. If I put you on probation, you’re not
                  living with Belinda [Massey]. Period. And you’re not —
                  you’re not having these relationships.

                  Are you still driving that van?

       Fluker: The van is broke[n]. I was working for the school.

      Court:      I know. You shouldn’t be working for the school. You don’t
                  know boundaries. Do you know what boundaries are? If you
                  don’t know when to stop your behavior. Your record is all
                  about that. Your record is all about you not knowing what the
                  boundaries are in personal relationships.
                  I think a lot of it is because of your developmental issues. I
                  get it. But you’re — you’re really — you are this close to being
                  charged with a rape of some girl you picked up in the van that
                  you were trying to do this. Depending on the age.

                  Maybe he should go to the CBCF. I don’t know.

                  ***

                  You know what, I’m going to remand him for the CBCF. I’m
                  not comfortable with the situation. The living situation is
                  terrible.

                  ***

                  Working around young girls with his lack of boundaries and
                  understanding that.

(Tr. 144-146.)

                 The trial court decided that Fluker “really needs programming on

boundaries and decision-making and appropriate relationships.” (Tr. 146.) Counsel

agreed to inquire about potential programs.

      Court:      Your fines, fees, and costs are waived. You’re going to be on
                  probation for two years starting at the CBCF. Failure to
                  comply with the terms and conditions of probation, you’re
                  facing 18 months on Count [1] and 18 months on Count [2]
                  for a total of 36 months in prison.

                  If you go to prison, you’re looking at up to two years of
                  postrelease control. If you violate, you go back to prison for
                  up to one half of the sentence that you were given, be charged
                  with a felony called escape. They can make your supervision
                  harder for you or longer.

(Tr. 146-147.)

                 Fluker became visibly shaken and unable to sit up. The trial court

summoned medical assistance. While waiting for their arrival, the trial court
reassured Fluker that he was not going to prison, that he would go to CBCF in

Cleveland where he could engage in programming, and that his children could visit.

The jail medical unit arrived and the hearing ended.

                On July 8, 2022, another hearing was held. Fluker was housed in the

psychiatric exclusion jail unit and received medication. Fluker told the trial court

that the jail officers had threatened him and were trying to kill him. The trial court

informed Fluker that CBCF denied placement due to his mental health issues, but

the trial court could inquire again. Fluker was also advised that the Cincinnati

Volunteers of America could also provide services and if those options did not work

out, prison would be the remaining route. The trial court was not willing to release

him into the community unless he had different housing.

                Fluker asked why people wanted him to be incarcerated. Defense

counsel responded that it was because his living situation was not appropriate. The

trial court clarified:

       That’s not the only reason. Your record is terrible. If you really want
       me to be harsh about it, your record is bad, more than bad, and the facts
       of this case are disturbing, so I don’t think that a straight release into
       the community is the appropriate thing. If you don’t like what I’m
       doing, your other choice can be prison, but right now I’m willing to give
       you probation with treatment.

(Tr. 168.)

                The sentencing entry provides in part:

       The court finds that a community control sanction will adequately
       protect the public and will not demean the seriousness of the offense.
       It is therefore ordered that the defendant is sentenced to two years of
       community control on Count 1, Count 2, under the supervision of the
      Adult Probation Department’s Mental Health/Developmental
      Disabilities Unit with the following conditions: 1.) defendant to abide
      by all rules and regulations of the probation department. 2.) report as
      directed by probation officer. 3.) follow recommendations of treatment
      team. 4.) attend all mental health appointments as scheduled. 5.) take
      all medication as prescribed. 6.) attend programming as indicated in
      case plan. 7.) defendant is ordered to pay a monthly supervision fee of
      $20. 8.) random drug testing. 9.) conditions and terms of probation
      are subject to modification by the probation officer and approval of the
      court. * * *

      Defendant is not to live with Belinda upon release from CBCF.
      Probation ordered to find housing for defendant upon release from
      CBCF and court must approve of defendant’s housing.

Journal entry No. 124355986, p. 1, 2 (June 1, 2022).

               Fluker appeals.

II. Assignments of Error

               Fluker presents three assignments of error:

      I.    The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for acquittal
            pursuant to Crim.R. 29 when the state failed to submit sufficient
            evidence of the crimes charged, denying the appellant due process.

      II.   Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
            evidence.

      III. The trial court erred by imposing community control sanctions
           which unnecessarily impinged on appellant’s liberty.

III. Discussion

      A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight

      1. Standard of Review

               “Because a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal questions the sufficiency

of the evidence, ‘[w]e apply the same standard of review to Crim.R. 29 motions as

we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.’” Fairview Park v. Peah, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110128, 2021-Ohio-2685, ¶ 37, quoting State v. Tenace, 109

Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37.

              “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a

question of law.” Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997). “Sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Id. “We construe the evidence

in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id., citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

              While sufficiency tests the adequacy of the evidence to support the

verdict as a matter of law, a manifest weight inquiry asks whose evidence is more

persuasive at inducing belief, “the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Ryan, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108143, 2019-Ohio-5339, ¶ 21, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio

St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. “Although there may be legally

sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the

manifest weight of the evidence.” Id., citing Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson, 88

Ohio St.3d 95, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

               We also recognize that the trial court and not a jury is serving as the

factfinder in our manifest-weight review of a bench trial verdict.

      “Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest
      weight of the evidence claim, this court must review the entire record,
      weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
      credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in
      evidence, the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
      miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed, and a new
      trial ordered.”

State v. Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602, 2009-Ohio-3906, 918 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 25

(8th Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600, 2006-Ohio-6441,

863 N.E.2d 1125 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 390. See also State v. Kessler, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93340, 2010-Ohio-2094, ¶ 13. Only in the most “‘exceptional

cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction, should a

conviction be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence.’” Thompkins

at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st

Dist.1983).

      2. Analysis

              Fluker argues that not only is the evidence insufficient to support the

elements of the convictions, but the evidence is not competent and credible. We

disagree.

              Fluker was convicted of two counts of menacing by stalking under

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) which provides in pertinent part:

      (1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause
      another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to
      the other person or a family or household member of the other person
      or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household
      member of the other person.

“‘Pattern of conduct’ means two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.”

R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). The second count adds that Fluker trespassed on the land or

premises where the victim lives, is employed, or attends school to commit the act.
               R.C. 2903.211(D)(2) defines “mental distress” to mean any of the

following:

      (a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary
      substantial incapacity;

      (b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require
      psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health
      services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric
      treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.

               R.C. 2903.211(D)(11) defines a “family or house hold member” as any

of the following:

      (a) Any of the following who is residing or has resided with the person
      against whom the act prohibited in division (A)(1) of this section is
      committed: * * *

      (ii) A parent, a foster parent, or a child of the person, or another person
      related by consanguinity or affinity to the person.

               R.C. 2901.22(B) defines “knowingly”:

      A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
      aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or
      will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
      circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances
      probably exist.

               In a bench trial under Ohio law, “the trial court is entitled to the

presumption of regularity, that is, the trial court is presumed to know and follow the

law in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.”

State v. Shropshire, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103808, 2016-Ohio-7224, ¶ 37, citing

State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 180, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996), citing State v. Post, 32

Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987). “[I]n an appeal from a bench trial, we
presume that a trial court relies only on relevant, material, and competent evidence

in arriving at its judgment.” Id., citing id. at 180.

               Mother provided testimony as well as exhibits of the threatening text

messages that contained threats to the safety of Mother and her family. Police

testified that Doe confirmed the source of the texts. Mother also testified that she

observed Fluker driving by the house to photograph the family. Both Mother and

Fluker testified that Fluker went to Mother’s house and spoke with Mother on or

about September 12, 2021, though their descriptions of the interaction differed.

                The testimony and evidence further support that a first-floor window

had been broken and that Mother saw a tall male whom she later determined was

Fluker running from the house. Just a few days after the broken window and later

on the day that Fluker visited Mother, a bullet was fired into the house. Fluker

testified on his behalf, denied the allegations, and provided his explanation of the

events.

               This court finds that, if believed, the evidence and testimony

submitted to the trial court would convince the average mind of Fluker’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

convict Fluker of menacing by stalking.

               As to the manifest weight of the evidence, “[d]eterminations of

credibility and weight of the testimony remain within the province of the trier of

fact.” State v. Newman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109182, 2020-Ohio-5087, ¶ 27,

citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of
the syllabus. “[T]he factfinder may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve them

accordingly, ‘believ[ing] all, part or none of a witness’s testimony.’” Id., quoting

State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing

State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). Coupled with the bench

trial presumption that the trial court knows and follows the law, this court finds that

the record does not support that this is the exceptional case where the evidence

weighs heavily against conviction.

               The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

      B. Community Control Sanctions

      1. Standard of review

               An appellate court reviews a trial court’s imposition of community-

control sanctions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cintron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110600, 2022-Ohio-305, ¶ 18, citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-

Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 10. An “abuse of discretion” occurs where “a court

exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it

has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

               “[A] court will not be found to have abused its discretion in fashioning

a community-control sanction as long as the condition is reasonably related to the

probationary goals of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring good

behavior.” State v. Chapman, 163 Ohio St.3d 290, 2020-Ohio-6730, 170 N.E.3d 6,

¶ 8, citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201,
¶ 12. “Further, a condition “‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge

upon the probationer’s liberty.”’” Id., quoting id. at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Jones, 49

Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990).

      2. Analysis

               “R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) governs the authority of the trial court to impose

conditions of community control.” Talty at ¶ 10. The section provides that “the trial

court may impose one or more community sanctions, including residential,

nonresidential, and financial sanctions, and any other conditions that it considers

‘appropriate’.” Id. “The General Assembly has thus granted broad discretion to trial

courts in imposing community-control sanctions.” Id.

               The trial court informed Fluker that the options were CBCF, a similar

facility or prison and cited, among other factors, its disapproval of Fluker’s

relationship with then 19-year-old and expectant Doe, who resided at Massey’s

home. The sentencing entry does not specifically forbid the relationship or ban

contact with Doe, but states that Fluker is not to return to Massey’s home upon

release from CBCF. The entry also provided that the probation department is to find

housing for Fluker upon release and the trial court must approve the housing.

               Fluker argues that the trial court improperly restricted Fluker from

continuing his relationship with a female over the age of 18 and does not meet the

test set forth in Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 52-53, 550 N.E.2d 469. The restriction,

states Fluker, impinges on his constitutional liberty interests.
                 “[A] trial court can impose community-control sanctions that limit

the offender’s fundamental rights, provided that such limitations further the

statutory goals of community control and are not overbroad.” State v. Chapman,

163 Ohio St.3d 290, 2020-Ohio-6730, 170 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 16. This is true “because

convicted criminals serving their sentences enjoy diminished liberty interests when

compared with the general population.” Id.

                 Chapman declared that the three-part test in Jones applies to

determine whether the condition is reasonably related to the community control

goals.

         A court must “consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related
         to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of
         which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is
         criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the
         statutory ends of probation.” Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 53, 550 N.E.2d
         469.

Chapman at ¶ 23.

                 Fluker’s sole focus on the trial court’s somewhat strenuous objection

to Fluker’s relationship with Doe is misplaced because the trial court’s sentence and

substantiation therefor must be considered in toto. The trial court explained that

what Fluker “really needs [is] programming on boundaries and decision-making

and appropriate relationships.” (Tr. 146.) “You don’t know boundaries. Do you

know what boundaries are? If you don’t know when to stop your behavior. Your

record is all about that. Your record is all about you not knowing what the

boundaries are in personal relationships.” (Tr. 145.) The trial court did not order
that Fluker have no contact with Doe but crafted a sentence that would allow him to

receive proper medication and counseling, assist him with decision-making and

help him to maintain appropriate boundaries while honing coping skills. The trial

court was also concerned with Fluker’s criminal history of violating protection

orders, domestic violence, and telecommunications harassment over the prior ten

years.

                 The record supports that the sentence meets the Jones elements.

CBCF was a reasonable alternative to imprisonment under the circumstances.

Fluker’s case was placed on the mental health docket due to his challenges. The trial

court formulated a sentence that would allow Fluker to receive the counseling and

medication that he needed to assist him with making reasonable decisions. The trial

court also directed that Fluker’s CBCF placement be supervised by the mental health

and development disabilities unit of the adult probation department. In crafting the

sentence, the trial court took into consideration Fluker’s history of similar criminal

behavior.      Thus, CBCF placement allowed Fluker to receive counseling for

behavioral modification.

                 The trial court also explained to Fluker that in addition to his poor

reasoning:

         Your record is terrible. If you really want me to be harsh about it, your
         record is bad, more than bad, and the facts of this case are disturbing,
         so I don’t think that a straight release into the community is the
         appropriate thing. If you don’t like what I’m doing, your other choice
         can be prison, but right now I’m willing to give you probation with
         treatment.
(Tr. 168.)

               The record supports that the trial court worked within its discretion

to craft a sentence that was reasonably related to Fluker’s convictions. This court

does not find that the nonstandard community-control conditions in this case

impinges on Fluker’s liberty interests. The trial court opined that Fluker should not

be directly released into the community without boundaries and counseling. We

reiterate that the trial court did not bar Fluker from contact with Doe. To the extent

Fluker complains that the condition that he not return to Belinda Massey’s home,

is not necessarily intrinsic to community control, that condition and the others “are

tailored to the rehabilitation of the offender,” and “are appropriately crafted to meet

a proper rehabilitative purpose.” Chapman, 163 Ohio St.3d 290, 2020-Ohio-6730,

170 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 18, 19.

               The third assignment of error lacks merit.

IV. Conclusion

               The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.            The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

              ______
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR