Court Opinion

ID: 9398100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 14:08:24.04949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:29.979293
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-1777.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. WD-22-056

        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 20220CR0010

v.

Harley Harris                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                Decided: May 26, 2023

                                             *****

        Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.

                                             *****

        SULEK, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Harley D. Harris, appeals from the August 15, 2022 judgment

entered by the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to four years in

prison following his guilty plea to charges of domestic violence, abduction, aggravated

assault, and tampering with evidence. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s

judgment is affirmed.
                       Statement of the Case and Relevant Facts

       {¶ 2} On April 7, 2022, Harris was charged in a ten-count indictment for offenses

alleged to have occurred against the victim throughout the month of December 2021.

Count 1 charged him with aggravated menacing, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

Counts 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 charged him with domestic violence, all misdemeanors of the first

degree, except count 8, which was a felony of the fifth degree. Counts 3, 6, and 9 charged

him with abduction, all felonies of the third degree. And count 10 charged him with

tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree.

       {¶ 3} Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harris pled guilty to all of the charges except

count 1, with count 8 amended to reflect a fourth-degree charge for aggravated assault.

       {¶ 4} At the plea hearing, held on June 7, 2022, the state recited the following

facts underlying the guilty pleas:

              [PROSECUTOR] * * * Your Honor, had the matter proceeded to

       trial, the State would have proven the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

       These events relating to count 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 all occurred on or about

       December 1st through December 24th, 2021. The events occurred in

       Walbridge, Wood County, Ohio at the [victim’s] residence. The State

       would have established its proof through a series of Nest camera videos,

       which is a camera that was depicting the living room at the Walbridge

       residence.

2.
            As it relates to count 2 and 3, the video would have depicted the

     defendant screaming at [the victim], placing her in a full nelson, which was

     restraining her liberty, placing her arms behind her head. She said, you’re

     hurting me. So the restraint and liberty plus the pain, placing her in fear and

     physical harm would constitute the abduction for that, as well as the

     domestic violence charge that the State indicated count 2 and 3 would

     merge at sentencing.

            Count 4 is a separate video and a separate circumstance. That depicts

     the defendant and [the victim] entering the residence, with the defendant

     immediately enraged upon entering the residence. He does push her on to

     the couch and begin screaming at her about bills, stating that bills don’t

     mean anything to her, and slapping her in the face with mail and bills is

     what it appears.

            Count 5, is again, a separate video, a separate time. Again, pinning

     the victim – the defendant pinning the victim onto the couch, slapping her

     in the face, again this is depicted in the video, and screaming to her that she

     should slap him in the face.

            Count 6 and 7 – again, these are one course of conduct. But again,

     count 6 and 7 involve strangulation, separate video, separate time, the

     defendant screaming, I’m going to kill you. During this period, again, [the

3.
     victim] is pinned underneath the defendant, so you have restrained of

     liberty, being the strangulation, and/or placing her in fear and risk of

     physical harm. So that would be both the domestic violence and the

     abduction.

            And again, we would note that all of this during this time frame

     occurred between family and household members. These were two

     individuals that were boyfriend and girlfriend and certainly cohabitating

     with one another in the same home, living together.

            Finally, with respect to counts 8, 9, and 10, each of these offenses

     occurred on a specific date, an identified date of December 30th, 2021.

     Walbridge Police did receive a 911 call from a neighbor that the defendant

     was outside in the victim’s car, alleging that he had tried to strike her with

     the car. The victim was pregnant at this time. The defendant knew she was

     pregnant. Police did come. Police separated the parties. The defendant did

     admit to pushing the victim onto the couch. And then you can see on the

     video the pushing and him dragging her out of the house, dragging her

     across the living room floor toward the doorway. This abduction is indicted

     under a different section. There’s an (A)(1) and (A)(2). This abduction

     would be use of force and removing her from the place she is found. So it’s

     a separate section for the dragging her across the room and out the door.

4.
                Again, there is physical violence that was mentioned with her being

       pushed onto the couch while pregnant. There’s a stipulation as to a factual

       basis for the aggravated assault charge. With respect to serious physical

       harm, we would note that [the victim] did visit the hospital shortly after this

       event.

                And finally, the video shows the defendant ripping the camera down.

       This is the day police were coming. This is the day police were called and

       the defendant did rip the camera down, which the State would have

       indicated would have impaired its ability to be used as evidence in a future

       criminal proceedings [sic].

       {¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, held on August 9, 2022, the trial court heard from

counsel for both sides, the victim, and Harris. The victim stated that the events of

December 2021 were “traumatizing” to her. She further stated that her son was present

during some of those events and that, as a result, he “struggled.” Thereafter, the court

addressed Harris, stating, “I’m hoping you realize, that during the month of December of

2021 you, effectively tortured a person.”

       {¶ 6} Still addressing Harris, the trial court proceeded to sentence him. After

finding that Counts 2 and 3 merged for the purpose of sentencing, the court imposed a

24-month term of imprisonment for the offense of abduction. On counts 4 and 5, the trial

court imposed a term of 180 days, each, with both sentences ordered to be served

5.
concurrently with any “felony time.” For count 6, which merged with count 7, the court

imposed a term of 24 months in prison. The court then stated that all of the terms for

counts 2 through 7 would be served concurrently.

       {¶ 7} Next, the court imposed a term of 18 months in prison on count 8, and a

term of 24 months in prison on counts 9 and 10. It then ordered that the sentences for

counts 8, 9, and 10 would be served concurrently with one another, but consecutively to

the terms imposed for counts 2 through 7. Hall, therefore, received a total sentence of

four years in prison.

       {¶ 8} The trial court articulated the reasons that it was imposing consecutive time,

beginning with the fact that there were multiple offenses demonstrating that Harris would

engage in harm to others. The court found that consecutive sentences were necessary

both to protect the public from future crime and to punish Harris. It further found that

consecutive sentences were not disproportionate due to the seriousness of Harris’ conduct

– “over 30 days of torturing another individual” – and due to the danger that he poses to

the public.

       {¶ 9} The trial court additionally found that the offenses were committed while

Harris was on community control, and that they were committed as part of a course of

conduct whose purpose was “to torture the victim in this case.” The trial also court found

that “the harm caused was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of these

offenses committed as part of the course[] of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness

6.
of [that] conduct.” Finally, the trial court found that Harris’ criminal history

demonstrates the necessity of imposing consecutive sentences. In making this finding, the

trial court erroneously used the term “community control,” instead of “consecutive

sentences.” Immediately after making this finding, the court clarified that it was

imposing the sentences “consecutively.”

       {¶ 10} It is from this judgment entry on sentencing that Harris now appeals.

                                   Assignments of Error

       {¶ 11} Harris asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:

              I. The trial court erred by making findings unsupported by the record

       prior to imposing a consecutive sentence in the ODRC, pursuant to R.C.

       2929.14(C)(4).

              II. The trial court did not impose a sentence on Counts 2 and 7 at the

       time of Appellant’s sentencing hearing.

              III. Appellant’s judgment entry does not include sentences for

       Counts 2 and 7.

                                          Analysis

                                  Consecutive Sentences

       {¶ 12} Harris argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court did not

make the proper findings to impose consecutive sentences.

7.
       {¶ 13} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make certain findings before

imposing consecutive sentences. Specifically, the statute provides that a trial court may

impose consecutive sentences on an offender if it finds “that the consecutive service is

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender,” “that

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,” and that one of the following

circumstances exists:

              (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

       imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

       Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

              (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

              (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

       by the offender.

8.
       {¶ 14} “[W]hen a sentencing court makes the statutory findings under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) for consecutive sentences, it must consider the number of sentences that it

will impose consecutively along with the defendant’s aggregate sentence that will result.”

State v. Gwynne, --- Ohio St. 3d. ---, 2022 Ohio-4607, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 12.1

       {¶ 15} Although the trial court is required to make the requisite findings both at

the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry, it is not obligated to state reasons in

support of its findings. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d

659, ¶ 37. Further, although a “word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is

not required,” a reviewing court must be able to discern that the trial court engaged in the

correct analysis and the record must contain evidence to support the trial court’s findings.

Id. at 29.

       {¶ 16} Where a defendant challenges a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings,

“R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs the appellate court ‘to review the record, including the

findings underlying the sentence’ and to modify or vacate the sentence ‘if it clearly and

convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings

under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * * * of the Revised Code.’” Bonnell at

¶ 28, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).

1
 We will note that a motion for reconsideration was filed on January 3, 2023. That
motion is still pending.

9.
              Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof

       which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the

       extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in

       criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a

       firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.

       State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶

       22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),

       paragraph three of the syllabus.

State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22, quoting

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

       {¶ 17} In State v. Gwynne, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently explained that an

appellate court, when reviewing a trial court’s order of consecutive sentences, is not to

defer to a trial court’s findings, but instead is to act as a second fact-finder. Id., --- Ohio

St. 3d. ---, 2022 Ohio-4607 at ¶ 20. “An appellate court’s review of the record and

findings is de novo with the ultimate inquiry being whether it clearly and convincingly

finds – in other words, has a firm conviction or belief – that the evidence in the record

does not support the consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.” Id. at ¶ 27.

In performing this review, an appellate court is required to focus on both the quantity and

the quality of the evidence in the record that either supports or contradicts the

10.
consecutive-sentence findings.” Id. “An appellate court may not * * * presume that

because the record contains some evidence relevant to and not inconsistent with the

consecutive-sentence findings, that this evidence is enough to fully support the findings.”

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 29. “[I]f, upon review of the record, the [appellate] court is left

with a firm belief or conviction that the findings are not supported by the evidence, the

appellate court must vacate or modify [the order of consecutive sentences.] Id. at ¶ 27.

When modifying a defendant’s consecutive sentences, an appellate court may alter the

number of consecutive sentences imposed. Id. at ¶ 12.

       {¶ 18} In his assignment of error, Harris first mentions that the trial court

mistakenly referred to imposing community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing

when it stated, “Further, your criminal history demonstrates that you’ve – it is necessary

to impose these community control sentences.” From the context, it is clear that the trial

court simply misspoke and meant to say “consecutive” instead of “community control.”

Notably, the trial court correctly stated in its sentencing entry that “Defendant’s criminal

history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from

future crime by the Defendant.” (Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 19} Next, Harris asserts that the trial court’s judgment entry only references

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) in its findings. When imposing consecutive sentences, “the trial

court must make the requisite findings both at the sentencing hearing and in the

sentencing entry.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493,

11.
108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 253, citing Bonnell at ¶ 37. “However, a word-for-word recitation of

the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern

that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record

contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”

Bonnell at ¶ 29. Here, while the trial court’s judgment entry only cites R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(b), the trial court’s findings at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment

entry closely track the language of the statute and demonstrate that the court found R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(a) and (c) to be applicable as well. The trial court was not required to

explicitly reference R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) or (c) in its judgment entry.

       {¶ 20} Furthermore, Harris does not contest the trial court’s findings under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(a) or (c), and the record reveals that those findings are supported by the

evidence. Specifically, the presentence investigation report confirms the trial court’s

determination that Harris was on probation in the state of Michigan at the time the instant

offenses were committed, thereby supporting the trial court’s finding under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(a). The presentence investigation report also makes clear that Harris has a

criminal record that goes back over ten years and includes breaking and entering and

theft. Thus, the record contains support for the trial court’s finding under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c) that Harris’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. Consequently,

we do not have a firm belief or conviction that the record does not support the trial

12.
court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) and (c). Therefore, the trial court did not

err when it imposed consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) and (c).

       {¶ 21} Finally, because only one R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) condition needs to be present

to impose consecutive sentences, it is not necessary to address Harris’s argument that the

record does not support the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). See State

v. Braswell, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1197, 2018-Ohio-3208, ¶ 44 (recognizing that only

one R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) factor needs to be supported by the record to affirm a trial court’s

imposition of consecutive sentences).

       {¶ 22} For all of the foregoing reasons, Harris’s first assignment of error is not

well-taken.

                                 Counts Two and Seven

       {¶ 23} Harris asserts in his second and third assignments of error that the trial

court failed to impose a sentence for counts 2 and 7 that merged with other counts upon

which the state elected to proceed at sentencing.

       {¶ 24} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides: “Where the same conduct by defendant can be

construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted

of only one.”

       {¶ 25} This statute “was enacted to protect a defendant from multiple punishments

or convictions for the same offense, the third protection under the Double Jeopardy

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Clause.” State v. Horn, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-062, 2023-Ohio-138, ¶ 12. “A

conviction, for purposes of the allied-offense statute has been defined as a guilty verdict

combined with imposition of a sentence or penalty.” Id. “It is clear that a defendant may

be found guilty of multiple allied offenses; however, the offenses must merge at

sentencing to prevent a double jeopardy violation caused by the imposition of multiple

sentences for the same crime.” Id. “If the defendant has been found guilty of allied

offenses, the trial court must direct the prosecutor to elect an offense to pursue for

sentencing, and then impose a sentence that is appropriate for the state’s chosen offense.”

(Emphasis added.) State v. Berry, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1275, 2021-Ohio-2249, ¶ 26.

       {¶ 26} At the plea hearing, the state recognized that counts 2 and 7 merged for

purposes of sentencing with counts 3 and 6, respectively. The state elected to proceed to

sentencing on counts 3 and 6. Under R.C. 2941.25(A), therefore, the trial court lacked

authority to impose a sentence on Counts 2 and 7.

       {¶ 27} Accordingly, Harris’s second and third assignments of error are found not

well-taken.

                                        Conclusion

       {¶ 28} The trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences in this case, and it

did not err in failing to sentence Harris for the findings of guilt that merged for purposes

14.
of sentencing. The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

15.