Court Opinion

ID: 9538023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:28:39.298405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:19.007282
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice:
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in parts III and IV, and I concur in the result in part II. However, I do not join in the analysis in part I of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case or in the analysis in part V regarding the plethysmo-graph test.
As to part I, the issue is not whether defendant’s conviction under count I can be supported solely by the boy’s unsworn out-of-court statement. Rather, the issue is whether after reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a manner favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime.1 “So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonable be made, our inquiry stops.”2 Correct application of this established standard assures that we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury-
In light of this standard, a review of the record reveals substantial, admissible, and competent evidence to support the judgment of the jury. Importantly, the boy’s statement to expert witness Harrison is not the only probative evidence which supports the charge and defendant’s conviction under count I. Substantial admissible evidence supports the testimony offered and the conclusion made that the girl had been sexually abused in such manners as were alleged in both count I and count II. Indeed, the girl’s mother testified that the girl’s vaginal area was irritated and inflamed on four different occasions after the girl had spent time with defendant and, on at least the last occasion, after she had spent time with the boy as well. In addition, the four-year-old girl testified at trial that the boy had “touched” her genitalia in defendant’s presence, a declaration supportive of her statements and descriptions of the indecent liberties that defendant had caused the boy to take with her and also, by implication, supportive of the boy’s out-of-court statement that defendant had caused him to take such indecent liberties by specifically teaching him to and watching him perform sexual acts with the girl. Both children further testified that defendant threatened that he would hurt them if they “told on him.”
Also at trial, Harrison testified as to the girl’s expressions of fear of defendant and her statements that defendant had touched her genitals with his hand, that the boy had touched her with his penis, and that while defendant watched, the boy had lain on top of her and inserted his penis into her labial folds, all in a manner in which defendant had taught them. That defendant specifically taught the children to perform sexual intercourse and watched while they attempted the same is clear from the record.
Q [By the prosecutor] What did [the girl] say [the boy] had done, or she had done with [the boy]?
A [By Harrison] She said that [the boy] laid [sic] on top of her and put his wienie in it, and when she was talking about it, she was talking about her vaginal-labial area. And when she was talking about it, we talked about that, and she says this is his wienie, and he puts his wienie — this not any longer being [defendant], this being [the boy], that he puts his wienie in it. And she showed me with the dolls, with [the boy] on top of her trying to insert his penis, and inserting his penis into her labial folds.
Q Do you recall asking why [the boy] did this to her?
A Yes.
Q Did you ask her why [the boy] did this?
*488A Yes. I asked her if anyone else was around. [I] can’t remember asking her why, but I remember asking, was there anyone around, or did someone teach this to you?
Q What did she respond when you asked if anyone was around?
A Yes. She said yes.
Q Who was around?
A She said her daddy Rob [defendant] was around.
Q Did she say where he was?
A She said he was there, and he watched.
Q Can you recall of your own recollection any other conversation you had about sexual activity ... between [the girl] and [defendant]?
A Yes.
Q Same interview?
A Yes.
Q What did you ask?
A I was asking the question regarding that same behavior, and I said, “Now, who touches your peepee?” And she said, “[The boy] does with his wienie, and Daddy Rob does with his finger.”
Q Was there any other conversations that you can recall?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A I can recall asking her if anyone had taught them about this behavior.
Q Was there a response?
A Yes.
Q What was the response?
A She said that Daddy Rob had taught them — how to do this.
(Emphasis added.) The statement that defendant “taught them — how to do this” only reasonably refers to the sexual intercourse behavior, and it also extirpates any significance in the supposition that the boy may have otherwise learned how to take indecent liberties.
Significantly, the girl’s statements were also substantively identical to those the boy made to Harrison, and the girl did not deny at trial having made them or having been subjected to such abuse. While the prosecution questioned her regarding the abuse, she was not specifically asked about the sexual acts or as to the fact that defendant had caused the boy to take indecent liberties with her. The State apparently chose to leave the details regarding the incidents of abuse to Harrison’s testimony, which adequately substantiated the charged offense. Nevertheless, the girl explicitly testified that she had told Harrison the truth, and she did not recant or refute her out-of-court statements despite effective cross-examination. While the door was open for the defense to question the girl concerning the substance of the conversation or to recall her after Harrison had testified, defense counsel made the decision, tactical or otherwise, not to inquire about such information, but to allow the girl’s statements to stand. These facts should not be ignored or summarily set aside.
In addition, Harrison testified both as to the boy’s statements regarding the sexual acts defendant had caused the boy to perform and the fact that Harrison saw the boy demonstrate the abuse that had taken place as the boy placed an anatomically correct doll representing himself on top of a doll representing the girl, spread the female doll’s legs, placed the male doll’s penis near the female doll’s labia, and pushed up and down on the male doll. And finally, the girl’s mother testified as to the girl’s statement that the boy had “touched” her.
This evidence, together with the inferences which reasonably may be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,3 adequately supports defendant’s conviction under count I, belies the claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination in this case, and serves to distinguish the cases concerning uncorroborated hearsay statements as the sole source of support for a verdict.
*489Likewise, it is merely an exercise in semantics to claim that the children’s statements that defendant “taught” them how to perform these sexual acts and “watched” them do so fail to indicate or support the claim that defendant “caused” the same as charged in the information. The jurors could rely upon their common sense, and certainly these statements, together with the physical evidence, the children’s expressed fear of defendant, the tender ages and understanding of the children, and the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence logically satisfy the statutory “causal” requirement, support the convictions, and satisfy our standard of review in this case. Accordingly, Justice Stewart’s analyses and conclusions regarding such issues as due process, hearsay rules, corroborative and substantive evidence, and interpretation of the subject statute are superfluous and, of course, do not command a majority and are not to be considered the view of the Court.
Finally, I do not concur in the analysis as to part V. The issue is whether, without foundational facts sufficient to qualify the reliability of this testing procedure, the court relied upon the results thereof in sentencing defendant. With this issue in mind, a review of the transcript of the sentencing proceeding reveals that the court did not make reference to or indicate that it relied upon these test results. Defendant failed to clarify this issue below and on appeal merely speculates as to the court’s reliance upon the same. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity and appropriateness of the proceeding and the court’s decision below should be presumed on appeal.
Accordingly, I would affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.

. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.

. Id.