Court Opinion

ID: 9748794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:13:16.620622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.436033
License: Public Domain

SILVESTRI, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s recitation of the procedure and facts of the case, but because I disagree with the result, I dissent.
The majority relies on Young v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Weis Markets, Inc.), 113 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 533, 537 A.2d 393 (1988) in reversing the Board’s decision affirming the order of the referee granting the Employer’s petition for modification of benefits. In Young, this Court stated:
The employer must next show that he referred the claimant to a job within the category for which the claimant received medical clearance. Farkaly [v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Baltimore Life Insurance Company) ] 516 Pa. [240] at 259, 532 A.2d [374] at 383 [1987]. As part of this requirement the employer must prove the job referral is “actually available” to the claimant. Kachinski, 516 Pa. at 250, 532 A.2d at 379. Employer’s vocational counselor must procure referrals that are actually available and bring these referrals to the attention of the Claimant or his counsel. Farkaly, 516 Pa. at 259, 532 A.2d at 383.
Employer’s vocational counselor testified that she got the names of her job referrals from the want ads. None of these jobs paid more than $4.00 per hour, most of them paid *622minimum wage. The vocational counselor would then call these employers and tell them she was attempting to locate employment for someone with a foot problem who could not do extensive walking, could not stand all day, or do heavy lifting. (R.R. 77a). She would then ascertain the physical characteristics of the job from the prospective employer and determine if the job was suitable based on the restrictions given to her by Employer’s physician. She did not tell any of the employers that Claimant was a Methadone addict. (R.R. 78-79a). She did not tell any of the employers that Claimant had undergone at least seven back operations in three years and had not worked in six years. (R.R. 75-77a). She did not discuss any of the previous injuries that Claimant had suffered or even give Claimant’s age. Most importantly, none of the employers indicated they would accept an application from Claimant. (R.R. 70-71a)
This court has held that a job is not actually available unless there is evidence that the employer named was willing to accept the claimant as an employee with his current physical limitations. King Fifth Wheel Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Rhodes), 79 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 300, 468 A.2d 1211 (1983). As Employer’s vocational counselor chose not to discuss Claimant’s physical limitations with the prospective employers, the jobs were not available____ 113 Pa.Commonwealth Court at 537, 539, 537 A.2d at 395, 396
Young cites King Fifth Wheel, Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Rhodes), 79 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 300, 468 A.2d 1211 (1983). King Fifth Wheel was decided by this Court prior to Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco), 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987) and Farkaly v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Baltimore Life Insurance Company), 516 Pa. 256, 532 A.2d 382 (1987)1 and it held, inter alia, that there was “no evidence that the employer would hire a person who was severely disabled as is the *623Claimant; ...” 79 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 305, 468 A.2d at 1213.
The majority, citing Young, writes at page 619 of its opinion:
[W]e interpreted the second prong of the Kachinski test to require an employer to prove that a job was “actually available” to the claimant by demonstrating that a prospective employer was willing to accept the claimant as an employee with all his current limitations.
The majority, after setting forth the testimony relating to Claimant’s numerous disabilities, of which some were not related to prospective employers, concludes “that Mr. Yohe did not present a sufficiently accurate picture of Claimant to the prospective employer and find that these four positions, including the Strawbridge & Clothier job, were not actually available to Claimant.”
In Kachinski, the Supreme Court began its opinion by stating:
Allocatur was granted in this case to examine the degree to which an employer must prove the availability of suitable employment for a disabled claimant before a modification of benefits may be effected. 516 Pa. at 243, 532 A.2d at 375.
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the,relevant factual and procedural aspects of the case, stated the issue to be as follows:
The narrow issue presented to us is whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain the employer’s burden to show available work prior to effecting a reduction in benefits. However, this issue bespeaks a larger issue, which is whether an employer can sustain his burden of showing available work by demonstrating the existence of jobs in the marketplace, as' opposed to demonstrating jobs which have actually been made available to the claimant. (Footnote omitted.) 516 Pa. at 244, 532 A.2d at 376.
The Supreme Court, after an analysis of federal court cases construing the Social Security Act, and cases decided by it under the Worker’s Compensation Act, and cases decided by *624this Court following its opinion in Barrett v. Otis Elevator, 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 668 (1968), next observed:
Since Barrett, the bulk of the interpretative work in this area has been done by the Commonwealth Court. In reviewing those decisions there seem to be two streams of thought which have evolved. The first applies an analysis akin to that applied in Social Security cases. For instance, in Halloran v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 49 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 144, 410 A.2d 420 (1980), the court accepted as sufficient the employer’s evidence that certain jobs were available despite the fact that the availability of these jobs was never conveyed to the claimant. The court imposed on the claimant the burden of showing “that such jobs were not in fact available, that he was not qualified in other respects for the employment, or that he was physically unable to perform the work.” Id. at 146-47, 410 A.2d at 421. See also Matrunics v. Ruffsdale Coal Co., 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 420, 295 A.2d 629 (1972).
On the other hand, there are cases which indicate that an employer must go further than merely presenting evidence of jobs which a claimant is physically capable of filling. For instance, in Schafer v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 458, 501 A.2d 708 (1985), and in St. Joseph Hospital v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 265, 415 A.2d 957 (1980), the Commonwealth Court refused to terminate compensation for claimants who were capable of performing available work for which they had applied but were not hired. See also Jessop Steel Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 309 A.2d 86 (1973).
The second approach seems to have culminated in the decision of the Commonwealth Court in this case, wherein the court explicitly stated that “available” means actually available, and that as a threshold requirement the existence of available work must be brought to the attention of the employee by the employer. (Emphasis in original.) 516 Pa. at 249, 532 A.2d at 378.
*625The Supreme Court, although adopting this Court’s interpretation of “available” work to require a showing of “actual availability,” disagreed with our “hypertechnical analysis of the individual jobs at issue” in Kachinski when it was before us.2 The Supreme Court noted our explanation of what we meant by “actually available”3 and then stated:
This definition is consistent with prior statements by this Court. See Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., supra, 377 Pa. [7] at 13, 104 A.2d [104] at 107. However, in applying this definition to the facts of this case the court went beyond its terms and basically imposed on the employer the duty to specify every aspect of every job in question: a cumbersome burden which seems unreasonable in light of the fact that only so much can be known about a job in advance. It is enough that the employer produce medical evidence describing the claimant’s capabilities, and vocational evidence classifying the job, e.g., whether it is light work, sedentary work, etc., along with a basic description of the job in question. From such evidence it will be up to the referee to determine whether the claimant can perform the job in question. See generally, Dissenting Opinion, Doyle J. Kachinski, supra, 91 Pa.Cmwlth. at 550, 498 A.2d at 40. Thereafter, the decision of the referee will be reviewable as a finding of fact. 516 Pa. at 251, 532 A.2d at 379.
With the foregoing as prologue the Supreme Court then set forth the four criteria being the “procedure as governing the return to work of injured employees,” of which only the second is herein relevant, and provides as follows:
2. The employer must then produce evidence of a referral (or referrals) to a then open job (or jobs), which fits in the *626occupational category for which the claimant has been given medical clearance, e.g., light work, sedentary work, etc. Kachinski, 516 Pa. at 252, 532 A.2d at 380.
In Farkaly, the claimant was a debit agent for Baltimore Life Insurance Company, a job which involved visiting clients for purposes of collecting insurance premiums. In the Farkaly opinion, the Supreme Court stated:
Since her job involved extensive driving and some lifting she was ultimately unable to continue in that employment.
The original injury to claimant occurred in August, 1978. She received compensation for this injury up until October, 1978, at which time she returned to work. In March, 1980, she filed a petition for reinstatement of benefits, alleging a recurrence of the symptoms from her original injury. In June, 1980, an interim order was signed awarding benefits. In May, 1981, employer filed a petition for modification, alleging that claimant’s disability had ceased or changed from total to partial, and that work was available which claimant was capable of performing.
After a number of hearings the referee concluded, inter alia, that payment of compensation should be reinstated, and that the amount of payments should be modified from total disability to partial disability because of the availability of suitable work: a decision which was affirmed by the Board. 516 Pa. at 258, 532 A.2d at 382-83.
We reversed the Board.4 In reversing this Court, the Supreme Court said:
The issue in this case is the same as that presented in Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987): whether the employer has shown the availability of suitable employment such that claimant’s benefits can be reduced from total to partial.
In Kachinski we held that a disabled claimant is entitled to a job referral to a position which the evidence proves was within his capabilities; and that the refusal of the claimant *627to' pursue valid job referrals can be a basis for reducing benefits.
The only remaining question is whether the available work was within her capabilities. In considering this question the Commonwealth Court relied on its prior decision in Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 91 Pa. Cmwlth. 543, 498 A.2d 36 (1985), and held that the employer failed to specifically match the duties of the job to her individual capabilities. However, in our decision in Kachinski we held that the threshold burden of an employer is to show that he referred the claimant to a job within the category for which the claimant received medical clearance. Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, supra at 252, 532 A.2d at 380.
Furthermore, in Kachinski we rejected the Commonwealth Court’s approach of requiring the employer to specifically detail every aspect of a job before it can be considered within the capability of the claimant. Farkaly, 516 Pa. at 259-60, 532 A.2d at 383.
Kachinski clearly stated that an employer at the time of injury had no duty to inform the injured employee of every aspect of every job in question. The Supreme Court deemed such a duty to be a cumbersome burden which to it seemed unreasonable in light of the fact that only so much can be known about a job in advance. The Supreme Court then stated: “It is enough that the employer produce medical evidence describing the claimant’s capabilities.” (Emphasis added.) This was reemphasized by the Supreme Court in Farkaly when it stated, “in our decision in Kachinski we held that the threshold burden of an employer is to show that he referred the claimant to a job within the category for which the claimant received medical clearance.” (Emphasis added.) If it is a cumbersome burden to have the employer convey to the injured employee specifically “every aspect of every job in question,” it is equally a cumbersome burden to have the employer of the injured claimant specify to a prospective *628employer every aspect of every physical limitation beyond the medical evidence of the claimant’s capabilities.
The procedure governing the return to work of injured employees fashioned by the Supreme Court in Kachinski, is plain, clear and unambiguous. Nowhere in the procedure is it required, explicitly or impliedly, that the “injury-employer” convey to the “referral-employer” the nature and extent of the physical limitations of the injured employee in order to establish “actual availability” of work with the referral-employer.
Young, as relied on by the majority, requires an injury-employer to demonstrate that a referral-employer was willing to accept the claimant as an employee with all his/her current limitations, which requires the injury-employer to detail the physical limitations of the claimant to establish “actually available” work. Young not only goes beyond the requirements of Kachinski and Farkaly, but in effect adds conditions to those procedures established in Kachinski by the Supreme Court, the effect of which is to negate and vitiate both Kachinski and Farkaly.

. Kachinski and Farkaly were argued the same day, decided the same day, and authored by Justice McDermott.

. Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 91 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 543, 498 A.2d 36 (1985).

. In Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 91 Pa. Cmwlth. 543, 546, 498 A.2d 36, 38-39 (1985), we explained "actually available” as follows:
[A] position may be found to be actually, or within the claimant's reach, only if it can be performed by the claimant, having regard to his physical restrictions and limitations, his age, his intellectual capacity, his education, his previous work experience, and other relevant considerations, such as his place of residence.

. 91 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 571, 498 A.2d 34 (1985).