Court Opinion

ID: 9410553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 19:01:46.01508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.476242
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                 File Name: 23a0333n.06

                                          Case No. 22-4006

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                Jul 21, 2023
                                                           )
MARIE JOSEPH, derivatively on behalf of                                    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                           )
Columbia Oldsmobile Company,
                                                           )
       Plaintiff - Appellant,                              )     ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                           )     UNITED STATES DISTRICT
       v.                                                  )     COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
                                                           )     DISTRICT OF OHIO
POND REALTY COMPANY, et al.,                               )
       Defendants - Appellees.                             )                          OPINION
                                                           )

Before: GIBBONS, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

       DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Marie Joseph (“Marie”) is a minority shareholder in Columbia

Oldsmobile Company (“Columbia”). She brings this derivative action against defendants Pond

Realty Company (“Pond”) and Ned Van Emon alleging that they engaged in corporate misconduct

which harmed Columbia. Notably, Marie recently spent several years litigating similar claims,

involving essentially the same underlying facts and parties, in a different lawsuit. That litigation

culminated in a jury verdict against her on all counts. As a result, the district court dismissed the

complaint in this action on res judicata and judicial estoppel grounds. Finding no error in the

district court’s application of res judicata, we affirm.

                                                   I.

       Marie and her brother, Ronald Joseph (“Ron”), are co-owners of Columbia—a closely-held

family business that deals in cars and real estate. Marie owns a minority stake in the company,
Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

while Ron is Columbia’s majority shareholder and former Chief Executive Officer. Over several

decades, Marie came to believe that Ron used his position in the company to divert business

opportunities away from Columbia and to other businesses owned by Ron and his immediate

family. So, she filed a direct shareholder action against him in April 2016 in her individual

capacity. See Joseph v. Joseph, No. 1:16-cv-465 (S.D. Ohio filed Apr. 12, 2016) (“Joseph I”).

The Joseph I complaint alleged that Ron had “unfairly acquire[d] personal benefits” from

Columbia through “self-dealing and usurpation of [its] corporate opportunities,” and that his

actions proximately caused Marie financial harm. (JI R. 1, Compl., at PageID 6, 9–12).1

         Marie amended her complaint in 2017 to add Gregory Joseph, George Joseph, Richard

Joseph, and Ronald Joseph, Jr. (collectively “Ron’s Sons”) as defendants. The amended complaint

also raised new claims alleging that the defendants facilitated undisclosed, self-dealing

transactions between Columbia and other corporate entities they owned, including Pond. Marie

alleged that Pond received management fees and other miscellaneous payments from Columbia

without the approval of Columbia’s minority shareholders (the “Columbia-Pond transactions”).

She sought the return of any ill-gotten gains that Ron and Ron’s Sons realized through these

transactions.

         The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in 2018. In pertinent part, Ron and

Ron’s Sons argued that Marie lacked standing to bring her claims against them in her individual

capacity, rather than derivatively on Columbia’s behalf. The district court rejected Ron’s standing

arguments because, under Ohio law, minority shareholders may bring claims against majority

shareholders in closely held corporations. But the district court granted Ron’s Sons’ motion for

1
 Record citations to Joseph I, Case No. 1:16-cv-465, are denoted by “JI R.” Citations to the record in Joseph II, Case
No. 1:19-cv-641, refer to “JII R.”

                                                        -2-
Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

summary judgment—concluding that Marie’s claims against them could only be raised

derivatively.

       The trial in Joseph I took place over the course of two weeks in October 2018. Marie

zealously prosecuted her claim for breach of fiduciary duties—featuring her theory that Ron

enriched himself by funneling money from Columbia to Pond under the guise of management fees

and other miscellaneous transactions. The jury considered extensive evidence on this point. For

example, Ron’s Sons each testified about the nature of the Columbia-Pond transactions. And

several other witnesses presented similar testimony. Among them was Ned Van Emon, the former

Chief Financial Officer of both Columbia and Pond until October 2016. Van Emon testified that

Columbia disbursed funds to Pond for legitimate business purposes which ultimately benefitted

Columbia.

       The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ron on all claims. Among other things, it determined

that “all . . . transfers from Columbia and its subsidiaries to [Pond] . . . were fair to Columbia.” (JI

R. 210, Jury Interrog., at PageID 15719). Marie appealed, and this Court affirmed the district

court’s judgment in full. Joseph v. Joseph, No. 19-3350, 2022 WL 3536273 (6th Cir. Aug. 18,

2022), reh’g denied (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2022).

       Following the adverse jury verdict in Joseph I, Marie filed another suit in 2019, the

outcome of which is the subject of this appeal. Marie’s second suit (“Joseph II”) is a derivative

action brought on Columbia’s behalf, naming Pond and Van Emon as defendants. Like the

Joseph I complaint, the Joseph II complaint alleges that Pond participated in and was unjustly

enriched by “undisclosed and unauthorized self-dealing transactions” between Columbia and

Pond. (JII R. 1, Complaint, at PageID 8, 11). It similarly avers that Van Emon “enter[ed] into and

implement[ed] numerous financial relationships and [self-dealing] transactions” between

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

Columbia and Pond. (Id. at PageID 4–7). Marie seeks the return of all profits the defendants have

gained through the Columbia-Pond transactions.

       Pond and Van Emon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted their

motions and dismissed Marie’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Marie’s derivative claims

are barred by res judicata. The court also ruled that Marie was judicially estopped from pursuing

the present litigation. Marie now brings this timely appeal.

                                                 II.

       We review a district court’s application of res judicata and judicial estoppel de novo. Buck

v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (res judicata standard of review);

Audio Technica U.S., Inc. v. United States, 963 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2020) (judicial estoppel

standard of review).

       “[F]or judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied

by the State in which the rendering court sits.” Prod. Sols. Int’l, Inc. v. Aldez Containers, LLC, 46

F.4th 454, 458 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 n.4 (2008)). Marie

filed both of her lawsuits in the Southern District of Ohio under diversity jurisdiction. We

therefore apply Ohio state law to her appeal.

                                                III.

       To begin, Marie argues that the elements of res judicata were not met here—and therefore,

the district court erred in applying the doctrine to dismiss her complaint. After conducting a de

novo review, we disagree.

       Under Ohio law, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of

claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also

known as collateral estoppel.” O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 862 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

2007) (citing Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ohio 1995)). In this case, the parties

use the term “res judicata” in the former sense, referring to claim preclusion. Accordingly, we

address claim preclusion only. Claim preclusion makes “an existing final judgment or decree

between the parties to litigation . . . conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been

litigated in a first lawsuit.” Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Springdale, 558 N.E.2d 1178, 1180

(Ohio 1990) (quoting Rogers v. City of Whitehall, 494 N.E.2d 1387, 1388 (Ohio 1986)). In other

words, it “operates as ‘a complete bar’” to subsequent litigation under certain circumstances. E.g.,

Brown v. City of Dayton, 730 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ohio 2000) (quotation omitted). The doctrine

applies when “(1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a valid, final judgment on the merits

in an earlier action, (2) the second action involves the same parties or their privies, (3) the second

action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action, and (4) the second

action arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the first action.”

State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 154 N.E.3d 75, 77 (Ohio 2020) (citing

Portage Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Akron, 846 N.E.2d 478, 495 (Ohio 2006)); see also, e.g., Bus.

Dev. Corp. of S.C. v. Rutter & Russin, LLC, 37 F.4th 1123, 1129 (6th Cir. 2022). The defendants

bear the burden of proof as to each element. See Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d

516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011).

       There is no dispute that Joseph I resulted in a final, valid decision on the merits by a court

of competent jurisdiction, in satisfaction of the first element. We consider each of the remaining

elements in turn.

                                  1. Same Parties or Their Privies

       Claim preclusion requires all parties to the second action to be identical to, or in privity

with, those in the first action. Armatas, 154 N.E.3d at 77. The parties only dispute whether

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

defendants Pond and Van Emon satisfy this element. Because Pond and Van Emon were not

named in Joseph I, the question turns on whether they were in privity with Ron or Ron’s Sons, the

defendants in that case.

       The Ohio Supreme Court has described the concept of privity as “somewhat

amorphous.” Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962. But we are not without guidance. Privity essentially

concerns whether parties that are “technically distinct” nonetheless “share a ‘close enough’

relationship” for the purposes of claim preclusion. Bus. Dev. Corp., 37 F.4th at 1136 (citing

Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962). Ohio courts apply a “broad” or “relaxed” definition of privity in this

context. Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962; State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 881 N.E.2d 294,

301 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

       As such, a simple “mutuality of interest”—such as an “identity of desired result” in the

original litigation—can support a finding of privity. Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962; Kirkhart v. Keiper,

805 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ohio 2004); see also Stewart v. IHT Ins. Agency Grp. LLC Welfare

Benefits Plan, No. 2:16-cv-210, 2020 WL 3166674, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2020) (finding

privity among parties with the same legal interests in an arbitration). For example, the plaintiffs

in Brown, who each identified as a “resident[] and taxpayer[] within the city of Dayton,” satisfied

this requirement because they shared the same goal through their respective lawsuits, that being

“the general disallowance” of a local ordinance. 730 N.E.2d at 962. And in Kessler v. Totus Tuus,

L.L.C., the parties stood in privity because they sought “the same ultimate result”—a declaration

that a disputed trust estate was valid. 923 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). We have

followed suit in finding privity between litigants who shared an overarching “common interest” in

proving the lawfulness of foreclosure proceedings. Harris v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No.

17-5399, 2017 WL 8791308, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2017) (applying Ohio law in relevant part).

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

       Parties asserting the “same legal right[s]” may also stand in privity. See ABS Indus., Inc.

ex rel. ABS Litig. Tr. v. Fifth Third Bank, 333 F. App’x 994, 999 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted). That was the case in Fender v. Miles, where different litigants faulted the same

individual for an accident. 923 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). Finally, privity may be

shown by an individual’s “active participation in the original lawsuit”—such as when a party

provided testimony during those former proceedings. See State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub.

Emps. Ret. Bd., 905 N.E.2d 1210, 1217 (Ohio 2009); see also Davis, 881 N.E.2d at 301; Darden

v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 3:22-cv-264, 2023 WL 3764272, at *11 (S.D. Ohio

June 1, 2023).

       Ohio courts have also provided helpful limiting principles as to privity. For example, a

mutuality of interest exists only where “the person taking advantage of the judgment would have

been bound by it had the result been the opposite.” O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at 806 (quoting Johnson’s

Island, Inc. v. Bd. of Twp. Trs. of Danbury Twp., 431 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Ohio 1982)); see also

Schachter, 905 N.E.2d at 1217 (explaining that a “stranger to the prior judgment” may not rely on

it for purposes of claim preclusion). And significantly, litigants seeking “individually tailored

results” are not in privity with one another. O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at 806; see also Davis, 881 N.E.2d

at 303–04; Banks v. Toledo, --- N.E.3d ----, 2023 WL 3885860, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 2023).

The facts of O’Nesti help to illustrate this point.        There, defendant-employer DeBartolo

implemented a stock incentive plan through which it allocated “a different number of shares of

stock” to eligible employees by contract. 862 N.E.2d at 805. When DeBartolo refused to distribute

the stock pursuant to the terms of these contracts, a group of employees successfully sued to

enforce their rights (the “Agostinelli” suit). Id. Later, a second group of employees brought their

own action against DeBartolo, similarly demanding payment for stock they never received. Id.

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

Relevant here, the O’Nesti plaintiffs asked the court to apply claim preclusion against DeBartolo.

Id. They argued that the facts, claims, and issues involved in their case were already litigated in

Agostinelli, and that they stood in sufficient privity with the Agostinelli plaintiffs to apply the

doctrine. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 807. It emphasized that the plaintiffs in

O’Nesti and Agostinelli did not seek “a general result, such as the blanket enforcement of the stock

incentive plan.” Id. Instead, each litigant sought relief that was tailored to his individual

circumstances: specifically, payments “for the value of the stock that each [plaintiff] claimed was

due to [him]” in the stock incentive program. Id. (further highlighting that the plaintiffs were all

“entitled to different benefits” under the terms of their contracts). For these reasons, the O’Nesti

plaintiffs did not share “an identity of desired result” with the litigants in Agostinelli, rendering

claim preclusion inapplicable.2 Id. at 806, 808.

         Applying these general rules, we conclude that Pond and Van Emon are in privity with

Ron. The thrust of the relevant allegations in both Joseph I and Joseph II concerns the defendants’

common scheme to conduct unfair dealings between Columbia and Pond. The defendants in both

suits are all broadly motivated by “the same ultimate result,” a determination that the Columbia-

Pond transactions were fair and caused no harm to the plaintiffs. See Kessler, 923 N.E.2d at 1167;

see also Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962; Fender, 923 N.E.2d at 635; Harris, 2017 WL 8791308, at *3.

They do not seek “individually tailored results” based on dissimilar legal rights or interests, as was

the case in O’Nesti, N.E.2d at 807. Finally, the defendants’ mutuality of interest is further

2
  Although the O’Nesti decision involved the plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke the doctrine offensively rather than the
defensively as in this case, its privity analysis remains instructive. 862 N.E.2d at 808 (explaining that offensive claim
preclusion “is generally disfavored”). Importantly, the court’s analysis about limitations on offensive claim preclusion
had no bearing on its finding as to privity. Id. at 807–08.

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

demonstrated by the fact that Pond’s owners (i.e., Ron’s Sons) and Van Emon all favorably

testified for Ron in the original action. See Schachter, 905 N.E.2d at 1217.

       Marie resists this result by asserting two relevant counterarguments, neither of which

carries the day.

       First, Marie contends that Pond and Van Emon lack mutual interests with Ron because no

verdict in Joseph I could have bound the parties in Joseph II. See O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at 806.

Marie bases this argument on the fact that Ron was sued in his individual capacity. However, as

this court recently explained, “the Ohio Supreme Court has applied preclusion against nonparties

to the first suit (and so found them in privity with parties) even when these nonparties would not

have been formally bound by the earlier judgment.” Bus. Dev. Corp., 37 F.4th at 1137 (citing

Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 961) (emphasis added). Similar here, an adverse decision in Joseph I would

not have “formally bound” Pond or Van Emon; after all, they were not named parties to that suit.

But if the jury had determined that the Columbia-Pond transactions were, broadly speaking, unfair

to Columbia, that finding would have binding implications on Pond and Van Emon’s defense in

this case. Cf. Harris, 2017 WL 8791308, at *3 (explaining that a court’s conclusion in one action

that particular foreclosure proceedings were illegal would be binding in a subsequent suit against

other related parties). Marie points to no legal authority for her argument and fails to meaningfully

distinguish this case from the cases cited above. Her argument is thus unavailing.

       Second, Marie makes a cursory argument that privity does not attach “just because Pond

and Van Emon want the same general result as Ron.” (Dkt. 25, Appellant Reply Br., Page: 18).

This simply does not square with the case law. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown

expressly held that “an identity of desired result” is sufficient to create privity. 730 N.E.2d at 962.

Further to the point, the plaintiff-privies in Brown all sought the same “general” result. Id.

                                                 -9-
Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

(emphasis added). Or consider Kessler, where privity was satisfied because the parties desired

“the same ultimate result.” 923 N.E.2d at 1167. Marie makes no attempt to grapple with these

cases in her briefing. The only support she provides for her position is our unpublished decision

in Massengale v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 21-1430, 2022 WL 3585640 (6th Cir. Aug.

22, 2022). But that case does nothing to advance her position here since it applies Michigan, rather

than Ohio, law. Id. at *2.

       In sum, Pond, Van Emon, and Ron are in privity given their “identity of desired result” in

their respective suits. Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962. We note that the parties’ briefing further debates

the merits of this issue on other grounds. We need not address those separate arguments here as

the preceding discussion sets forth an independent, sufficient basis for our finding of privity.

                              2. Claims Available in the First Action

       The next element asks if Marie’s claims in this matter were or could have been asserted in

Joseph I. Armatas, 154 N.E.3d at 77. The Joseph II complaint alleges various derivative

shareholder claims against Pond and Van Emon—none of which were raised in Joseph I. The

question, then, is whether these claims could have been litigated in the first action.

       Ohio courts “require[] a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action, or be

forever barred from asserting it.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Amusements, 558 N.E.2d at 1180). This

element is broadly construed; a litigant need only “have had the ability to assert its causes of action

in the earlier suit through ‘all the proper means within [its] control.’” Bus. Dev. Corp., 37 F.4th at

1135 (quoting Nat’l Amusements, 558 N.E.2d at 1180) (alteration in original). However, plaintiffs

generally are not obligated to supplement their complaints to encompass new instances of

misconduct that occur after filing. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Indian Head Indus., Inc., 941 F.3d 828, 837

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

(6th Cir. 2019); see also Ardary v. Stepien, No. 82950, 2004 WL 253491, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.

Feb. 12, 2004).

       Marie asserts that she should be allowed to proceed on two categories of claims. First, she

argues that this lawsuit addresses misconduct that happened after she filed her amended complaint

in Joseph I. That amended complaint was filed on January 10, 2017. Therefore, Marie must point

to Pond and Van Emon’s alleged misconduct from after that date. Cf. Cont’l Cas. Co., 941 F.3d

at 837. This she fails to do. Van Emon’s service with Columbia ended in 2016. He plainly could

not have breached his fiduciary duties to Columbia (or engage in any of the other wrongdoings

charged against him) once he relinquished his position. And nothing in the complaint appears to

implicate Pond in misconduct during the relevant time period. By contrast, the complaint

specifically challenges Pond and Van Emon’s roles in the Columbia-Pond transactions up until

September 2016. This suggests that if Marie’s claims related to conduct taking place any time

after January 2017, she knew how to make that clear in her pleadings. The fact that she did not

weighs strongly against her on this point.

       Second, Marie refers to a category of claims she now seeks to bring which “the District

Court found could only be pursued derivatively rather than directly.” (Dkt. 19, Appellant Br.,

Page: 15–16). Marie emphasizes that these claims were not tried in Joseph I. But she fails to

explain why they could not have been. The fact is that the district court did not prohibit Marie

from bringing derivative claims alongside her direct claims in the prior action. And she otherwise

identifies no “legal impediment” preventing her from timely raising derivative claims. Bus. Dev.

Corp., 37 F.4th at 1135. To the contrary, under Ohio law, it seems likely that Marie could have

pursued her direct and derivative shareholder claims simultaneously in Joseph I had she availed

herself of that option. See, e.g., Boedeker v. Rogers, 746 N.E.2d 625, 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

(“Shareholders have the right to bring direct and derivative actions simultaneously.” (quoting 12B

Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5908 (2000))); Smith v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,

969 F. Supp. 2d 850, 864 n.13 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2013) (“[I]t is not unusual for a court to allow

[shareholder] claims to proceed [directly] and derivatively at the same time.” (first alteration in

original)); In re Dayco Corp. Deriv. Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 624, 630 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (“[T]he

case law is virtually unanimous in holding that one counsel can represent a stockholder bringing

both an individual and a derivative action.” (emphasis and footnote omitted)). Marie cannot avoid

preclusion simply because she overlooked this alternative legal strategy in the previous

proceedings. Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962; Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 230.

       Marie’s remaining arguments also miss the mark. For example, she claims that she was

unaware of the Columbia-Pond transactions when she filed her initial complaint in Joseph I, and

therefore it would be unfair to penalize her for not including Van Emon in that action. But this

argument ignores the fact that Marie filed an amended complaint which expressly challenged the

Columbia-Pond transactions. She offers no reason for failing to name Pond or Van Emon in her

amended complaint. In any event, her “negligence in failing to discover a claim does not stop

preclusion so long as [she] could have asserted that claim by exercising reasonable diligence.”

Bus. Dev. Corp., 37 F.4th at 1135 (emphasis in original). Marie also suggests that the defendants

ask this court “to create from whole cloth” a rule that “failing to include all possible defendants in

one proceeding would bar any future claims against them in separate proceedings.” (Dkt. 25,

Appellant Reply Br., at Page: 11). But this statement overlooks the well-established role that res

judicata plays in ensuring the finality of judgments for all litigants as well as the judiciary. See,

e.g., Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 230.

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

       Marie’s Joseph II claims could have been litigated in her first lawsuit. Therefore, this

element of claim preclusion is satisfied.

                  3. Action Arising Out of the Same Transaction or Occurrence

       Finally, claim preclusion applies if Joseph II arose out of the same “transaction or

occurrence” involved in Joseph I. Armatas, 154 N.E.3d at 77. In this context, the Ohio Supreme

Court defines a “transaction” as a “common nucleus of operative facts.” Grava, 653 N.E.2d at

229 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). Courts use the “logical relation”

test to determine whether claims arise out of the same transaction. Bus. Dev. Corp., 37 F.4th at

1133 (citing Rettig Enters., Inc. v. Koehler, 626 N.E.2d 99, 103 (Ohio 1994)). Under that test, we

ask whether “litigating each claim separately ‘would involve a substantial duplication of effort and

time by the parties and the courts.’” Id. (quoting Rettig Enters., 626 N.E.2d at 103). This element

is satisfied even where a litigant “present[s] evidence or grounds or theories of the case not

presented in the first action.” Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 229 (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Judgments § 25 (1982) (emphasis omitted)).

       Here, the logical relationship test is satisfied. As already established, Marie’s current

claims involve the same Columbia-Pond transactions that were at issue in Joseph I. Those

transactions were extensively litigated in Joseph I over the course of six years (from filing of the

complaint through appeal) and were subject to a jury’s scrutiny during a two-week trial. Allowing

Marie to proceed with Joseph II would require a gross duplication of effort for all parties involved.

Among other things, witnesses who were deposed and who testified at trial—particularly Van

Emon and Pond’s owners, Ron’s Sons—would inevitably be called again to retread old ground.

And then there is the certain overlap in documentary evidence concerning the Columbia-Pond

transactions. These facts tilt the scales against Marie in our inquiry.

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

        Urging against this conclusion, Marie again argues that her current claims “occurred on

different dates and in different amounts” than those at issue in Joseph I. (Dkt. 25, Appellant Reply

Br., at Page: 8–9). This is a non-starter for the same reasons discussed above; we are unpersuaded

that Marie’s allegations relate to misconduct that occurred after her amended complaint in Joseph

I. Marie also emphasizes that her current claims are in the form of a derivative action. In

particular, she points out that they were not subject to a final judgment on the merits in Joseph I,

and “therefore cannot be the same ‘transactions’” for purposes of claim preclusion. (Id. at Page:

7). But under Ohio’s res judicata doctrine, the fact that several different legal theories may support

a lawsuit does not create multiple “transactions”—even if those legal theories “depend on different

shadings of the facts, or . . . call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.”

Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 229 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). That tenet operates here. Marie’s derivative suit in Joseph II is

ultimately a restyling of her direct shareholder claims raised in Joseph I; her assertion of a different

legal theory in this case does not change the fact that the two actions share a common nucleus of

operative facts.

        The final judgment entered in Joseph I precludes litigation of Marie’s claims in this action.

That is because Pond and Van Emon are in privity with Ron; Marie could have litigated her current

claims in her previous suit; and, ultimately, the allegations in Joseph II arise from the same series

of transactions at issue in Joseph I. Therefore, res judicata applies and we affirm the judgment of

the district court.   Having concluded that dismissal was appropriate, we need not address

(1) defendants’ additional argument that the claims were subject to dismissal for failure to state a

claim or (2) plaintiff’s arguments based on the district court’s application of judicial estoppel.

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Case No. 22-4006, Joseph v. Pond Realty Co., et al.

                                       *       *      *

       The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.

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