Court Opinion

ID: 9730906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:27:38.581572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.706751
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I would reverse and remand for a trial because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the “assignment” was executed by Dallas Laffey as an individual or as “Secretary” of' Bailey-Laffey Asphalt, Inc.
The trial court stated:
As relates to VANTOL SURETY, the Court finds that VANTOL is unsecured as a matter of law. First of all, the assignment that exists does not create a security interest against funds owned by BAILEY-LAFFEY ASPHALT, INC. The Assignor of the Assignment is clearly listed as DALLAS LAFFEY. The court suspects that that was probably a mistake in putting his name as the assignor, but the conclusion is still obvious, the Court cannot do what the parties intended, the Court can only do what the parties did. And in this they did not create a security interest.
The trial court erred in claiming the Assignor of the assignment is “clearly listed” as Dallas Laffey. I am attaching a copy of the assignment which shows Dallas Laffey signed as “Secretary.”
The assignment itself raises questions as to whether the address shown on the assignment is Bailey-Laffey Asphalt, Inc’s business address or Dallas Laffey’s residential address and why Dallas Laffey, an individual, would make payments on behalf of Bailey-Laffey Asphalt, Inc., a business. Even the trial court “suspects that that was probably a mistake in putting his name as the assignor” but claimed the conclusion was still “obvious.”
In doing so, the trial court ignored the affidavit of Thomas L. Raines that he witnessed the execution of the assignment by Dallas Laffey, as Secretary for Bailey-Laf-fey Asphalt, Inc. on 2-14-90 and the affidavit of Dallas Laffey that he signed the assignment as Secretary of Bailey-Laffey Asphalt, Inc. on 2-14-90.
What more does one heed to do to surpass summary judgment in South Dakota? We should reverse and remand for a trial. SDCL 15-6-56(c); State, Dept. of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1989); Wilson v. Great N.R.R. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968).