Court Opinion

ID: 9819314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:22:30.940451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:33.569169
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: Perhaps the majority would impose on Wal-Mart the duty to have stop lights and a crossing guard to protect its patrons from the dangers of traffic in the parking lot. I would not. I agree with the trial court that the danger of traffic in a parking lot is so open and obvious, and the likelihood that a pedestrian will become distracted or forget the danger so small, that it is unreasonable to expect a store owner to anticipate it and that Wal-Mart has no duty to protect its patrons from that traffic. In my opinion, both pedestrians and drivers are so well aware of the dangers involved in crossing a parking lot, or lanes of traffic in a parking lot, that warnings, yield signs, speed bumps, or other protective traffic-control devices would be superfluous and would add nothing to the protection of either pedestrians or drivers. The danger of being struck by traffic while crossing a busy parking lot is such an obvious and known danger, and one faced so regularly by people in our society, that no duty should be imposed on Wal-Mart to protect its patrons from traffic in its parking lot. In Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 149 (1990), our supreme court recognized that in certain situations a landowner owes a duty to protect those lawfully on its premises even from known or open and obvious dangers: “ ‘[I]n any case where the occupier as a reasonable person should anticipate an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee notwithstanding his knowledge, warning, or the obvious nature of the condition, something more in the way of precautions may be required. This is true, for example, where there is reason to expect that the invitee’s attention will be distracted, as by goods on display, or that after a lapse of time he may forget the existence of the condition, even though he has discovered it or been warned; or where the condition is one which would not reasonably be expected, and for some reason such as an arm full of bundles, it may be anticipated that the visitor will not be looking for it.’ ” Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 149, quoting from W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 61, at 427 (5th ed. 1984). It is clear that none of these situations exist in the case at bar. The majority cites to no evidence in the record which indicates that plaintiff, although in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, became distracted or momentarily forgetful of the danger of traffic in the parking lot. Given the facts presented in the case at bar, no reasonable defendant would anticipate an unreasonable risk of harm to a customer crossing a busy parking lot who has knowledge of the obvious danger. This is not a situation where one might reasonably expect the pedestrian to become distracted or to forget the existence of the danger. Nor is the danger one that, though obvious, would not reasonably be expected to be encountered so that it might be anticipated that a pedestrian would not be looking for it. Indeed, a reasonable defendant would anticipate that a customer crossing a busy parking lot and in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety would be thinking of nothing other than the danger of traffic. The danger in the case at bar is precisely the type of danger for which the “open and obvious rule” was invented: “The only sound explanation for the ‘open and obvious’ rule must be either that the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care would not anticipate that the plaintiff would fail to notice the condition, appreciate the risk, and avoid it [citation], or perhaps that reasonable care under the circumstances would not remove the risk of injury in spite of foreseeable consequences to the plaintiff.” Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 147. Neither of these explanations applies in the case at bar, for even a defendant in the exercise of reasonable care would not anticipate that a pedestrian would fail to notice, appreciate, or avoid the danger of traffic in the parking lot, nor would any further precautions on the part of defendant remove the risk of injury to such a pedestrian. Finally, in Ward, our supreme court stated: “Our holding does not impose on defendant the impossible burden of rendering its premises injury-proof. Defendant can still expect that its customers will exercise reasonable care for their own safety. We merely recognize that there may be certain conditions which, although they may be loosely characterized as ‘known’ or ‘obvious’ to customers, may not in themselves satisfy defendant’s duty of reasonable care. If the defendant may reasonably be expected to anticipate that even those customers in the general exercise of ordinary care will fail to avoid the risk because they are distracted or momentarily forgetful, then his duty may extend to the risk posed by the condition.” 136 Ill. 2d at 156. The same cannot be said under the majority’s holding in the case at bar. The holding of the majority now imposes on all store owners or occupiers the impossible burden of rendering their premises, or at least their parking lots, injury-proof. Such store owners or occupiers can no longer rely on the expectation that their customers will exercise reasonable care for their own safety, for the plaintiff’s alleged injuries in the case at bar could result only from her own lack of care and not the lack of care of defendant. The majority has extended the duty recognized in Ward far beyond that intended by the supreme court. I cannot concur. Accordingly, I dissent.