Court Opinion

ID: 9763210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:46.513232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:30.411689
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part, and concurring in the result:
In my view, we have no jurisdiction to hear this claim because the trial judge’s order, given as it was without explanation, was not dispositive of any issue, therefore, was not final, and hence, not appealable. D.C.Code § ll-721(a)(l) (1995). Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth below, I concur in the results reached by Judge Farrell.
I.
I do not quarrel with the facts as set forth in Part I of Judge Farrell’s opinion and I will not repeat them here. Also, I agree with the observation expressed in that opinion that, to be final under § ll-721(a)(l), an order must “dispose! ] of the whole case on its merits so that the court has nothing remaining to do but to execute the judgment or decree already rendered.” Trilon Plaza Co. v. Allstate Leasing Corp., 399 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C. 1979) (quoting McBryde v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 221 A.2d 718, 720 (D.C.1966)). Stated differently, “[t]o be reviewable the judgment or deereé must not only be final but also complete, that is, final not only as to all parties, but as to the whole subject matter and all the causes of action involved.” Trilon, 399 A.2d at 36. The order before this court does not meet that test.
The trial judge denied Camalier and Buckley’s motion to vacate and dismiss without explanation. Judge Farrell says that in taking that action, the trial court “necessarily accepted Sandoz’s contention that Camalier [and Buckley] failed to make some or all of the payments as required by the consent order,” ante at 825. I do not agree for the reasons set forth below.
The motion to vacate asserted that Camalier and Buckley had “fully complied” with all terms and conditions of the consent order, in that all payments had been “timely made.” The motion also justified the lateness of an interest payment required by the consent order, claiming that the consent order provision relating to that payment was confusing to both Camalier and Buckley and Sandoz. Sandoz opposed the motion to vacate on several grounds. Specifically, Sandoz claimed that none of the payments were made on time and that the consent agreement was not in the least bit confusing with respect to when the interest payment should be paid. Further, Sandoz argued that, because the payments were not timely, Camalier and Buckley did not comply with the consent order and therefore “may not be relieved of the agreed upon consequences of that failure, *831which is the payment of rent due which had been waived.”1
The trial judge, without explanation, denied the motion to vacate. In doing so, the court gave no indication that it had decided whether or not: the payments had been timely made; the lateness in the payment of the interest payment could be excused due to confusion engendered by the language of the consent decree; the lateness of payments constituted non-compliance, and, if there has been non-compliance, the amount of additional rents owed. Those issues must be resolved before the order becomes final. See e.g., L.A.W. v. M.E., 606 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.1992) (order not final where amount of support not finally decided); McDiarmid v. McDiarmid, 594 A.2d 79, 82 (D.C.1991) (citing eases where order not final where exact amount of financial obligation not determined).
Judge Farrell maintains that unless Cama-lier and Buckley is permitted to appeal the order denying the motion to vacate, Sandoz is free, pursuant to the terms of the consent order, to terminate the stay by filing an application to do so with the clerk of the Superior Court; “whereupon — “without further order of the Court’ — Sandoz is entitled to issuance of a writ of restitution and eviction of Camalier [and Buckley] from the property,” ante at 825. It is not at all clear that the matter could be resolved as simply as that. For example, paragraph (9) of the consent order requires five calendar days notice to the tenant before the filing of any Motion for Entry of Judgment, and there is no indication whatsoever that Camalier and Buckley would be barred from opposing the lifting of the stay on the ground of substantial compliance with the terms of the consent order. Upon the filing of an opposition to a motion for judgment the court could decide the issues left undecided in the order which are the subject of this appeal, including what is probably the most significant question: is there additional rent due, and if so, how much? Once those determinations have been made, Camalier and Buckley will have its final order. It does not have one now.
In sum, as the order stands, it is not dispositive of either party’s rights, and is thus not ripe for appeal. See Triton, 399 A.2d at 37 (“Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal.”) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). Therefore, I would reconsider the motion to dismiss this appeal filed by Sandoz (and denied by the motions division) and I would grant it. See District of Columbia v. Trustees of Amherst College, 499 A.2d 918, 920 (D.C.1985) (the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction by a motions division is “without prejudice” to reconsideration by a merits division).
II.
Because I am of the view that we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal, I would not ordinarily reach the issues dealt with in Parts III and IV of Judge Farrell’s opinion. My colleagues have concluded, however, that we do have jurisdiction, although they disagree on the resolution of the substantive claims made. Therefore, if I do not address those points this case will never be resolved. Accordingly, although remaining of the view that this court lacks jurisdiction, but having been out-voted by my colleagues with respect to that issue, I will reach the merits of this dispute.
To that end, I join Part III of Judge Farrell’s opinion. I do not agree, however, with Judge Farrell’s conclusion, in Part IV, that the trial judge erred in denying Camalier and Buckley the opportunity to present evidence relating to the timeliness of payments. Without any legitimate explanation, Camalier and Buckley was not prepared to *832present evidence on that issue when it appeared in court the morning its motion was scheduled to he heard by the court; therefore it was well within the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion to resolve the matter at that time without further delay. See Lyons v. Jordan, 524 A.2d 1199, 1203 (D.C.1987). Moreover, it is not in the least bit clear that Camalier and Buckley ever requested a continuance in order to secure the presence of the witness it claims could have provided testimony on that point. Therefore, on the merits, with respect to this issue, I would vote to affirm outright. Doing so, however, would leave the court without a majority on this issue. In short, if I adhere to that view it
would leave us with no judgment of the court concerning future proceedings in this case. Reluctantly, therefore, I join Judge [Farrell’s] proposed disposition remanding the case for further consideration by the trial court.
Multi-Family Management, Inc. v. Hancock, 664 A.2d 1210 (D.C.1995) (separate opinion of Farrell, J.).
APPENDIX
EXHIBIT A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
Landlord and Tenant Branch
Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc., Plaintiff v. Camalier & Buckley, Inc., Defendant
L & T No. 17831-91
Calendar 1 — Judge Salzman

CONSENT ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION

The Clerk of the Court will please enter judgment for possession and for unpaid rent in the amount of $48,598.58 in favor of plaintiff Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc. (hereinafter, “landlord”) by consent and note that the execution of said judgment will be stayed conditioned upon payment of rent and the arrearages by defendant Camalier & Buckley, Inc. (hereinafter, the “tenant”) as follows:
(1) From January 1, 1992 to January 1, 1993, the reduced monthly rent shall be $7,533.75 and shall be due and payable on the first day of each month;
(2) From January 1,1993 through January 31, 2000, the monthly rent shall revert to that amount reserved in the Lease, $10,045.00, as adjusted pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Lease, and shall be due and payable on the first day of each month;
(3) On January 1, 1992, the tenant shall pay $15,931.50 (reflecting credit for payments required and made under order of October 28, 1991) in real estate taxes due under the Lease. Upon payment of this amount, tenant shall be deemed current in all real estate taxes due and payable under the Lease to date.
(4) The tenant shall pay any real estate taxes which become due after January 1, 1992 pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Lease;
(5) The parties agree that the Judgment for the arrearage owed by the Tenant is $48,598.58. The tenant will repay that amount, plus interest running from April 1st, 1991 at an 8% annual rate, compounded monthly as follows:
(a) The amount of $10,000.00 shall be paid on or before January 1, 1992; the amount of $10,000.00 shall be paid on or before February 1, 1992;
(b) The amount of $5,000.00 shall be paid on or before March 1, 1992;
(c) The amount of $5,000.00 shall be paid on or before April 1, 1992;
(d) The amount of $10,000.00 shall be paid on or before November 1, 1992; and
(e) The amount of $8,590.58 plus accrued interest shall be paid on or before December 1, 1992;
(6) The tenant shall pay court costs of $13.75 on January 1, 1992.
*833(7) At all times hereafter during the period provided for payment and satisfaction of this Judgment, Landlord and Tenant shall abide by the terms of the Lease in all respects, except as specifically modified herein. If the tenant makes all payments required under paragraphs (1), (3), (4) and (5) between the time of the entry hereof and December 1, 1992, then upon the final payment due December 1, 1992, this Judgment shall be deemed fully satisfied and shall be of no further force or effect and, upon tenant’s motion, shall be vacated and the case dismissed. Upon such full compliance, the relationship of the parties will be governed by the terms of the Lease, with each party hereby specifically affirming their rights and duties under the Lease.
(8) Upon failure of the tenant to make any payments as hereinabove agreed, through December 1,1992 the landlord, upon filing an Application for Termination of Stay and with 5 days Notice to Defendant of L & T Form 5 and without further order of Court, shall be entitled to have this stay set aside and vacated, to have immediate issuance of a writ of restitution, and to have the right to take any action permitted under law to collect the Judgment herein.
(9) Also, upon failure of the tenant to make any payments as hereinabove agreed, upon filing of a Motion for Entry of Judgment with 5 calendar days notice to Tenant’s counsel of record, Landlord shall be entitled to an additional Judgment for the following amounts:
(a) All unpaid rent and other liquidated Lease obligations accruing after the date of this Consent Order and Judgment for Possession and prior to the filing of the Motion;
(b) The rent reduction of $2,511.25 for each month in which it has been allowed;
(c) All attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the landlord in filing this action and in pursuing a writ of restitution and additional Judgment pursuant to this Consent Order and Judgment for Possession.
The Motion for Judgment shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting out the additional amounts due. The Tenant may challenge the amounts claimed under Paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) only by demonstrating payment of those amounts. The amount due under Paragraph 8(c) shall be awarded additionally in such amount as the Court determines is reasonable.
(10) The Landlord’s rights under the Judgment are without prejudice to Landlord’s right under the Lease in the event of a default by the Tenant and the retaking of possession by the Landlord to relet the demised premises at the risk and cost of the defaulting Tenant, whose default in no instance shall relieve it of liability for the difference between the rent reserved in the Lease and the rent under a bona fide Lease actually received by Landlord during the term remaining after such a default occurs. Any such difference in rental or other damages may, at the option of the Landlord, be recovered by her in separate actions, from time to time, as defendant’s obligation to pay rent would have accrued if the term had continued, or from time to time as said difference and damages shall have been made more easily ascertainable by reletting of said premises, or such action by landlord may, at the option of the Landlord, be deferred until the expiration of the term. In the event of any such recovery of possession by Landlord, however, Landlord shall at Tenant’s expense use her best reasonable efforts to relet the demised premises.
(11) In addition to the foregoing, the Court Registry shall immediately release to the landlord all sums paid into it by the tenant in this case.
/s/ Richard S. Salzman
Judge Richard S. Salzman
Judge Richard S. Salzman
Signed in Chambers
WE ASK FOR THIS:
/s/ John J. Brennan, III
John J. Brennan, III, # 939066
Vernon W. Johnson, III, # 423756
JACKSON & CAMPBELL, P.C.
One Lafayette Centre
1120 — 20th Street, N.W.
Suite 300 South
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Plaintiff
*834/s/ Michael E. Brand
Michael E. Brand, #202085
LOEWINGER, BRAND & KAPPSTAT-TER, CH.
471 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
COPIES TO:
John J. Brennan, III, # 939066
Vernon W. Johnson, III, #423756
JACKSON & CAMPBELL, P.C.
One Lafayette Centre
1120 — 20th Street, N.W.
Suite 300 South
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Plaintiff
Michael E. Brand, #202085
LOEWINGER, BRAND & KAPPSTAT-TER, CH.
471 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

. The consent order is set forth in its entirety as an appendix to this opinion. Paragraph (9) of that order provides that if the tenant fails to make "any payments as hereinabove agreed” the landlord would be entitled, on a Motion for Entry of Judgment, to a judgment for rents which had been waived by it pursuant to the agreement, together with attorney’s fees and costs incurred "in filing this action and in pursuing a writ of restitution and additional Judgment pursuant to this Consent Order....”