Court Opinion

ID: 9778866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:24:05.174083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:14.858923
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J. The principal issue here is whether appellant, a minor, may rescind a contract to purchase a pick-up truck. On the 20th day of March, 1954, L. D. Robertson, a minor, entered into a conditional sales agreement whereby he purchased from Turner King and J. W. Julian, doing business as the Julian Pontiac Company, a pick-up truck for the agreed price of $1,743.85. On the day of the purchase, Robertson was 17 years of age, and did not have his 18th birthday until April 8th. Robertson traded in a passenger car for which he was given a credit of $723.85 on the purchase price, leaving a balance of $1,020.00 payable in 23 monthly installments of $52.66 plus one payment of $52.83. He paid the April installment of $52.66. It appears that Robertson had considerable trouble with the wiring on the truck. He returned it to the automobile dealers for repairs, but the defective condition was not remedied. On May 2nd, the truck caught fire and was practically destroyed. He notified the automobile concern and they stated that they would send the insurance man to see him. It appears that the insurance representative, upon finding out that Robertson was only 17 years of age, refused to deal with him. On June 7th, appellees filed suit to replevy the damaged truck from Robertson. By his father and next friend, Robertson filed a cross-complaint in which he alleged that he is a minor and asked that the contract of purchase be rescinded and sought to recover that part of the purchase price he had paid, which he alleges is the amount of $723.85, allowed by the dealers on the car traded in, plus the one monthly payment of $52.66, totaling $776.51. A jury was waived and the cause was submitted to the court. There was a judgment for King and Julian on the complaint and the cross-complaint. On appeal, Robertson contends that he was 17 years of age at the time of the alleged purchase and that he has a right under the law to rescind the contract and to recover the portion of the purchase price he has paid. Appellees contend that the judgment should be sustained because Robertson did not return the damaged truck to the automobile dealers. However, the judgment of the court states: ‘ ‘ The court further finds the proof to be that the plaintiff has possession of the said GMC pick-up truck. ’ ’ Hence, there is no merit to this contention. Appellees also contend that Act 337 of 1953 applies in that a minor cannot rescind a contract of purchase without reimbursing the seller for any loss that he may have sustained by reason of such rescission. This statute deals with situations where a minor is 18 years of age at the time of making a purchase. The statute is not applicable here because according to the undisputed evidence Robertson was only 17 years of age at the time of entering into the purchase agreement. Appellees further contend that the minor is bound by the contract because the automobile was a necessary. The record does not contain any substantial evidence to support this contention. The only evidence on this issue is that the boy quit school in 1951 and has been earning his own living since that time, and that he has been working for a construction company and traveling around the country to different jobs with his father in his father’s truck. The boy lives at home with his parents and there is no showing whatever that he needed the truck in connection with any work he was doing. One of the witnesses for the appellees testified that the boy stated he ivanted to use the truck in a farming operation. The record contains no evidence that he was engaged in farming at any time. Another witness for the appellees testified that the boy stated that he Avanted to purchase the truck on the “farmer’s plan,” but there is no showing that the car Avas sold to him on a “farmer’s plan.” He was allowed a sum on the car which he traded in, amounting to more than one-third of the purchase price of the new truck, and he was to make substantial monthly payments for the balance. Just what the “farmer’s plan” is does not appear in the record, but it is a matter of common knoAAdedge that the plan under Avhich the boy bought the truck is the usual method of making purchases of automobiles. In a suit by a minor to rescind a contract the burden is on the defendant to show that the article was a necessary. Barnes v. Rebsamen Motors, Inc., 221 Ark. 791, 255 S. W. 2d 961. It is our conclusion that the evidence does not sustain a finding that the truck was a necessary to Robertson. In that respect, this case is distinguishable from Sykes v. Dickerson, 216 Ark. 116, 224 S. W. 2d 360, where the court said: “It was contemplated that he would use the truck in hauling lumber, and for some months he did so, as an aid to self-support. ’ ’ The law is settled in this State that a minor may rescind a contract to purchase where the property involved is not a necessary. Foreman v. Dickerson, 177 Ark. 121, 6 S. W. 2d 829; Arkansas Reo Motor Car Company v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975; Quality Motors, Inc. v. Hays, 216 Ark. 264, 225 S. W. 2d 326. The automobile dealers have disposed of the car they received in the trade, and cannot restore it to the minor. In a situation of this kind, the weight of authority is that the actual value of the property given as part of the purchase price by the minor is the correct measure of damages. Neither side is bound by the agreement reached as to the value of the car at the time the trade was made. This is true because the contract has.been rescinded and there is no contract fixing the value. It is said in 43 C. J. S. 117: “While it is generally held that, where property traded in by the infant as part of the price is beyond reach of the seller, the infant is entitled to the reasonable value of the property at the time of the purchase, rather than the value fixed in the purchase agreement, it has also been held that he is entitled to receive the value fixed in the agreement.” In support of the rule that a reasonable value of the property at the time of purchase governs, C. J. S. cites Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N. C. 659, 150 S. E. 177, where the court said: “Where the infant parts with personal property, he may, upon disaffirmance, recover the value of such property, as of the date of the contract, but he is neither bound by, nor entitled to be awarded, the price fixed by the contract, for its real value may be more or less than the amount so stipulated. ’ ’ However, in Lockhart v. National Cash Register Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 66 S. W. 2d 796, the Court of Civil Appeals in Texas held the fixed trade in value prevailed. In 27 Am. Jur. 790, it is said: “Where, upon an infant’s disaffirmance of a purchase of an automobile in exchange for his note and an old automobile, the old automobile cannot be restored, he is entitled to recover the value thereof, which is presumably the valuation at which the defendant took it.” Cited as authority in Schoenung v. Gallet, 206 Wis. 52, 238 N. W. 852, 78 A. L. R. 387. In that case there was no showing that the automobile traded in by the infant had any value other than that mentioned in the purchase agreement. The court said: “As plaintiff’s former automobile has been wrecked and cannot be restored by defendant, he is liable for the value thereof, which is, presumably, the sum of $50 at which he valued it when he obtained it from plaintiff.” In the case at bar, although the minor was allowed over $700.00 on his car in the trade, there is evidence to the effect that it was actually worth about $350.00. Although there is conflict among the authorities as pointed out above, we believe the better rule holds that the value of an article given in trade by a minor as a part of the purchase price is the reasonable market value of the article at the time of the purchase, and that neither party is bound by the value fixed in the purchase agreement. Young Robertson is a minor; the truck was not a necessary; and Act 337 of 1953 is not applicable. Hence, the court erred in finding for the automobile dealers, and the cause is therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial. Mr. Justice Holt dissents.