Court Opinion

ID: 9620735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:46:50.381514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:53.869936
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur with what Justice Jordan says — the rule stated in Mercer v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 620 (212 SE2d 799) (1975), cannot be sustained. What then is the correct rule as to the appointment of counsel in probation revocation proceedings?
Parole revocation proceedings are not a part of a criminal prosecution but arise after the criminal prosecution has been concluded. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (92 SC 2593, 33 LE2d 484) (1971). Hence the state is not required to provide counsel to an indigent in a parole revocation proceeding as part of the requirement *791that counsel he provided at each critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See Morrissey, supra.
There is no due process distinction between parole revocation and probation revocation where the sentence was previously imposed. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 782 (93 SC 1756, 36 LE2d 656) (1972). Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (88 SC 254, 19 LE2d 336) (1967). Therefore, a probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra), and the state is not required to provide counsel to an indigent in a probation revocation proceeding as part of the requirement that counsel be provided at each critical stage of a criminal proceeding.
In noncriminal proceedings, the state is not required to provide counsel to indigents, even though the state permits others to retain and use counsel in such proceedings; e.g., citation for contempt for nonpayment of alimony.1 Therefore the state is not required to provide counsel to indigents in probation revocation proceedings to afford equal protection. It should be noted in this connection that Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973), was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, 414 U. S. 895 (1973), following Gagnon. As the Cottle dissent points out, 414 U. S. 895, in vacating Cottle the Supreme Court found that the question of counsel at probation revocation hearings is to be decided on due process considerations, not equal protection.
However, Gagnon v. Scarpelli amplified the holding in Morrissey v. Brewer that both a preliminary and a final hearing would generally be necessary to insure that the "conditional liberty” of a parolee or probationer was not taken from him without due process of law.2 In Gagnon, *792the court ruled that although the appointment of counsel will be unnecessary in most revocation hearings, in some circumstances counsel must be provided for parolees and probationers in order to preserve the fairness of the hearings. 411 U. S. at 790. Where fundamental fairness requires, counsel must be provided.
Nonetheless, in all cases a parolee/probationer must be "informed of his right to request [the appointment of] counsel,” Gagnon, supra, at 790 (matter in brackets added), so that it was error in this case that petitioner was not so informed. Gagnon points out two circumstances where, after the parolee/probationer has been informed of his right to request counsel and makes such request, counsel will be presumed to be required "Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.” 411 U. S. at 790-791.
The appellant has not shown that either of these two circumstances exists in his case, nor has he set forth any circumstances which might indicate that assistance of *793counsel was necessary to preserve the fundamental fairness of the hearing. Even now he has not contended that had he been told of his conditional right, the circumstances were such that he would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel; i.e., appellant has not shown any basis upon which a request for counsel should have been granted.
Indeed, appellant’s circumstances indicate that a Gagnon request would not be honored. As seen, Gagnon requires that a request for counsel be based on a colorable claim that the parolee/probationer has not committed the alleged violation or, if the violation is uncontested, that substantial justification or mitigation can be shown. Appellant has not contended that at his probation revocation hearing, or habeas corpus hearing, he denied the truth of the indictments or suggested mitigation or justification. The appellant in this case has not made a colorable claim that he was denied due process of law in the revocation of his probation. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court affirming the return of the appellant to custody.

Although the state is required to provide counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions where the punishment is imprisonment (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (92 SC 2006, 32 LE2d 530) (1971)), the state is not required to provide counsel in all misdemeanor prosecutions on equal protection grounds even though an accused has the right to retain and use counsel.

The reason for the preliminary hearing is to prevent *792a parolee from being held at the parole officer’s direction without probable cause during the time lag until a parole revocation hearing can be held. Morrissey, 408 U. S. at 485-487. Here petitioner was being held under indictments.