Court Opinion

ID: 9860869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:34:54.360363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:47.645819
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from division II and the result. Section 741.1, though in many ways unusual, strikes me as clear and unambiguous. I do not believe section 4.1(3), The Code, is sufficient to do away with a vital element of the offense. Under the interpretation adopted by the majority an accused may be convicted of receiving gratuities even in the absence of evidence connecting the gratuity with a specific transaction. I believe the clear wording of the statute requires such a connection and do not believe the requirement is obviated by section 4.1 (3).
It seems to me more is involved than simply proscribing plural acts in situations where the statute proscribes only a singular act. In the process of the majority interpretation the State is unfairly excused from the necessity of connecting up its case. Our interpretation should not be controlled or influenced by the difficulty of the State’s proof, nor with a view to the improvement of the statute. Neither should a statutory rule of construction, allowing for the singular to stand for the plural, relieve the State from showing a prescribed relationship between a specific gratuity and a specific transaction.
Because I believe an element of proof is involved, I believe the statute falls outside the purview of section 4.1(3) and within those situations it expressly excepts: those “ * * * otherwise specifically provided by law.” I believe the defendant’s acquittal should be affirmed.