Court Opinion

ID: 9519081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:08:26.08212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:27.663336
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY, dissenting: I dissent from the decision to reverse and remand, reached in part III of the majority opinion. The parties to this appeal may have considerable difficulty recognizing the case they presented at trial and argued on appeal from the decision of the majority. While defendants’ insurer may be delighted by the surprising arguments the majority formulates on its behalf, the alterations in the case unjustly deprive plaintiff of the verdict she properly won on the arguments raised at trial. The majority finds that Jennings’ statement implicating plaintiff was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted therein. This finding must surprise defendants, who in closing argument at trial relied on the statement as substantive evidence providing important corroboration for Cruz’ well-impeached testimony. The majority ignores this substantive use of Jennings’ statements to establish the facts most significant for defendants’ case. Even in arguing the motion to exclude Jennings’ letter, defendants never suggested that her statements had not been admitted for the truth of their assertions. Neither party sought any instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the statements, and the trial court accordingly treated them as substantive evidence of the matters asserted therein. Moreover, defendants also introduced Officer Malloy’s testimony concerning statements Jennings made to him. No evidence showed that defendants learned of those statements prior to prosecuting plaintiff, so those statements cannot be admissible as proof of defendants’ probable cause to prosecute. While Malloy’s testimony might have some non-hearsay purpose in a criminal prosecution, in this case they are relevant only for the truth of Jennings’ assertions concerning plaintiff’s alleged acts. Jennings’ statements implicating plaintiff were hearsay statements of an absent declarant, admitted for the truth of the matters stated therein. As the majority now concedes in the modified opinion, such evidence is subject to impeachment by out-of-court statements contradicting the admissible hearsay. "Where a statement of an absent declarant is properly admitted into evidence under one of the hearsay exceptions, the opposing party may impeach such statement with a prior inconsistent statement by the declarant.” People v. Smith, 127 Ill. App. 3d 622, 630, 469 N.E.2d 634 (1984). A subsequent inconsistent statement may also impeach admissible hearsay, and the hearsay so impeached need not qualify as testimony. People v. Johnson, 271 Ill. App. 3d 962, 965, 650 N.E.2d 1 (1995). Illinois law on this issue accords with Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Smith, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 630. As the commentators to that rule observed: "The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified. *** *** [I]n the case of hearsay the inconsistent statement may well be a subsequent one ***.” (Emphasis in original.) Fed. R. Evid. 806, Advisory Committee’s Note. Therefore, Jennings’ letter was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of impeaching her written statement and her statements to Malloy, both of which provided crucial supports for defendants’ case. See Frisch v. International Harvester Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 507, 517, 338 N.E.2d 90 (1975). This issue alone, without reference to plaintiff’s notice argument, provides grounds for affirming the trial court’s decision to admit the letter into evidence. Next the majority finds that plaintiff’s complaint did not adequately place in issue defendants’ conduct after April 7, 1989, in continuing the legal proceedings against plaintiff. In the amended complaint plaintiff alleged that "[a]s a direct result of the acts of Ames *** and its agents, [plaintiff] hired an attorney to represent her on the criminal charges” and she "appeared in court on approximately four (4) separate occasions.” At least three of the four appearances came after April 7, 1989. The parties and the trial court showed that they understood that the complaint adequately placed in issue defendants’ conduct in continuing the prosecution after April II, 1989, when Jennings wrote her letter retracting her prior written statement. Defendants made no mention of the pleadings in their motion in limine to bar the letter from evidence. At argument on the motion the court said it was not hearsay because "it is used as part of the information that the defendants] ha[d] when they decided to go for prosecution.” At this point defendants had the opportunity and the obligation to raise any issue which might form a basis for challenging the court’s ruling. See Hall v. National Freight, Inc., 264 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419-20, 636 N.E.2d 791 (1994). Defendants did not object that the letter came too late, or that the pleadings were inadequate to raise the issue. Any objection to a variance between the pleadings and the proof must be made to the trial court (Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, 245 Ill. App. 3d 71, 76, 614 N.E.2d 412 (1993)) to give the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect (Sundstrom v. Village of Oak Park, 374 Ill. 632, 640, 30 N.E.2d 58 (1940); Janisco v. Kozloski, 261 Ill. App. 3d 963, 966, 634 N.E.2d 1104 (1994)), and thereby save the courts the expense of a retrial or other waste of judicial resources (Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Bertrand Goldberg Associates, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697, 606 N.E.2d 541 (1992)). The majority’s strained construction of defendant’s objection must fail. The hearsay objection to the evidence in no way placed before the court any issue concerning the adequacy of the pleading. Plaintiff could have cured any perceived deficiency in her pleading before trial if defendants ever suggested that she had not properly alleged that they tortiously continued prosecution in the face of evidence of her innocence. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 24-25, 605 N.E.2d 544 (1992). Because the letter showed that when defendants continued prosecution they had notice that the evidence on which they based the decision to prosecute was false, the letter is admissible for a nonhearsay purpose. See Kochan, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 806. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion in limine. The majority, apparently recognizing the weakness of its other arguments, further decides, without citation to authority, that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to redact objectionable statements from the letter and by failing to issue a cautionary instruction concerning use of the letter. Defendants have not raised either argument in the trial court or on appeal. Defendants made a tactical decision not to seek redaction or a limiting instruction after the trial court denied their motion in limine. If the trial court had redacted the document or given the limiting instruction sua sponte, the court would have committed reversible error by becoming an advocate for the defense. See Yetton v. Henderson, 190 Ill. App. 3d 973, 980, 546 N.E.2d 1000 (1989). The court’s failure to commit such an intrusion into the parties’ tactics, and its acceptance of defense counsel’s tactical decision to waive the issue, cannot constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. See Netto v. Goldenberg, 266 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178-79, 640 N.E.2d 948 (1994). Although I agree with the holding that the trial court correctly denied judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the facts stated in the majority opinion do not present the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. For example, plaintiff presented substantial evidence that neither she, nor Jennings, nor Smallwood, committed any violation of Ames’ rules or attempted to take any merchandise without proper payment, and defendants knew, or could easily have discovered, that plaintiff’s actions entirely accorded with store policy. Also, the majority misstates the evidence in asserting that the written statements allegedly taken from Smallwood and Jennings implicated plaintiff in taking cigarettes. The statements pertained solely to the blouses, giving further indication that by the time they took those statements Cruz and Smith were well aware that they had no basis for charging anyone with taking cigarettes or other merchandise. Slight investigation into store policy would have revealed that Jennings could properly have the blouses without a receipt, as a result of an even exchange. The majority’s decision imposes upon the State of Illinois the expense of a second lengthy trial on the basis of the adequacy of the pleadings and the need for instructions limiting the use of the admissible hearsay, although defendants never raised either issue. In the decision, the majority assumes the role of advocate for defendants and the result is nothing less than welfare for the insurer. If the supreme court chooses to review this case, I suggest that there is no need to remand to this court for further consideration of issues the majority refused to decide. The majority opinion should be reversed, and the trial court’s judgment should be reinstated in its entirety. Accordingly, I dissent.