Court Opinion

ID: 9811698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:32.529532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:11.204345
License: Public Domain

GRAY, Justice,
dissenting on rehearing.
Reversal of the summary judgment on the basis that a fact issue was raised would be a much “easier” way to resolve this appeal, for many reasons, not the least of which is avoiding the need to wade through a voluminous record and the ease of “giving the plaintiffs their day in court.” However, my duty is not to take the easy way out, but rather to determine, based upon the applicable law, if Limestone has proven, as a matter of law that it is entitled to judgment. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). Because I believe our original opinion fully addresses the merits of the appeal, discusses the applicable law and properly resolves the matter, I will not elaborate on the legal analysis. Rather, I will deal with the practical analysis of the Opinion on Rehearing and explore its extraordinary ramifications.
Whether the majority will admit it or not, they are extending the rule for application of liability to employers for acts of employees while traveling to and from work. If you take every “fact” set out in the Opinion on Rehearing as true, as we must and as we did in the original opinion, the most that can be said is that Mathis was on his way to work in his personal vehicle, to perform a normal function of his employment. Travel to and from the workplace by the employee is a recognized exception to vicarious liability of the employer. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Lee, 847 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ)(and cases cited therein).
If these facts create an issue of whether Mathis was in the course and scope of his employment, and thus whether Limestone could be liable for damages resulting from his negligence, we have created an entirely new area of liability for every employer in Texas. Anytime that an employee goes to the office, intends to stop by the office, or just decides to stop by the office, to perform a routine function of their job, there will be potential liability for the employer *626if they are carrying anything related to the job with them.
An employee that stops by the office to drop off a time sheet, a project report or any other of the myriad of normal functions of an employee while at work, suddenly turns that trip into a “special mission” on behalf of the employer. With the growth of performing work at home, every employee that is transferring documents (including electronic copies) from work to home will be subjecting the employer to potential liability for the employee’s negligence while traveling to and from work with those documents.
The potential ramifications of this errant decision are enormous. I wonder if Mathis’s automobile insurer knows that he is using his personal mini-van for company business? Does Mathis’s personal automobile insurance policy cover him, his vehicle, his passengers or others injured while he is engaged in utilizing his personal vehicle for Limestone’s business? Will the employer also be subjected to liability for wages, overtime pay, and benefits, for those employees entitled to hourly compensation, for the time during the trip? Additionally, if the employee is engaged in the course and scope of employment, the employee’s injuries, like those of Mathis and the co-worker that was with him, are injuries incurred in the course and scope of employment and thus covered, not by Mathis’s personal insurance carrier, but by Limestone’s workers compensation carrier. Also, federal wage and hour laws, and the ensuing penalties, will be applicable for the uncompensated time of employees while engaged in the course and scope of employment traveling to and from work. And, if Mathis is engaged in the course and scope of employment, the co-worker with him cannot sue Mathis (fellow servant doctrine), but a guest passenger will be able to sue Limestone.
I believe the existing law is clear. If Mathis was an employee, he was engaged in nothing more than a routine trip to his place of employment when he was involved in an automobile/motorcycle collision resulting in the death of Mr. McNamara. It was a tragic event and Mr. McNamara’s family may be entitled to compensation for his death. But the law the majority creates to allow them to recover from Limestone is not supported by existing law, nor should we extend existing law to make Limestone liable on these facts. Because the majority holds that on these facts it could be determined that Mathis was acting in the course and scope of his employment for which Limestone would thus be liable if Mathis was negligent, I respectfully dissent.