Court Opinion

ID: 9555438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-12 00:00:21.028275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:36.515665
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30030     Document: 00516855576        Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                   FILED
                                                                        August 11, 2023
                                No. 23-30030                             Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Bryant Lamont Harris,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 2:20-CR-71-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         Bryant Lamont Harris asserts that he is required by his religious faith
   to abstain from psychiatric medication. Because he is not competent to stand
   trial, though, the government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and
   the district court granted the motion. The district court did not err in
   concluding that the government had satisfied the conditions for involuntary
   medication set out in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003).
   However, the district court should also have analyzed whether any statutory
   religious-freedom protections apply to Harris. We therefore VACATE and
   REMAND for the district court to consider that issue in the first instance.
Case: 23-30030      Document: 00516855576          Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/11/2023

                                    No. 23-30030

                                          I
          Harris was charged for threatening to assault a federal judge in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In February 2020, the FBI received
   information from the United States Marshals regarding threats made via
   telephone toward Judge Susie Morgan and her staff. In response, FBI agents
   were dispatched to Judge Morgan’s Chambers to conduct interviews with
   Judge Morgan and her staff. Based on the interview, the agents determined
   that on that morning, a male who identified himself as Bryant Lamont Harris
   had contacted the Chambers via telephone and complained about the New
   Orleans Police Department.
          Harris asserted that he was an Army veteran and had been expertly
   trained in marksmanship. He then asked Judge Morgan’s staff how many
   security personnel were assigned to Judge Morgan. When asked why he
   needed that information, he replied, “I need to know how many people I need
   to take out to get to the Judge.” He then said, “I’m not hiding” and “I don’t
   give a f---,” and then hung up the phone. Investigation by the FBI revealed
   that Harris had contacted Judge Morgan’s Chambers several times before.
          Harris was subsequently arrested, detained, and charged by an
   indictment with threatening to assault a federal judge in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   § 115(a)(1)(B). Shortly after his arrest, Harris underwent a behavioral health
   evaluation. Among other things, the evaluation noted Harris’s delusional
   belief that he was offered “multiple women and $500k a month contract to
   join the Illuminati” due to his “special gifts.”
          Given his apparent delusions, the district court held a hearing to
   determine whether Harris was competent to stand trial.              The court
   determined that Harris was incompetent and ordered that he be committed
   to the custody of the Attorney General. Specifically, the order stated that the
   Attorney General “shall hospitalize Harris for treatment in a suitable facility

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   for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is
   necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the
   foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go
   forward.” The court also ordered the Attorney General to provide “reports
   on [Harris’s] mental competency” throughout the confinement period.
   Harris appealed the district court’s incompetency determination, and the
   Fifth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Harris, No. 21-30326, 2022 WL
   1044915 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022).
          Toward the end of the confinement period, the district court received
   a report from Forensic Psychologist Brianna Glover. The report noted that
   Harris remained incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, because Harris
   had been refusing medication, the report also recommended that Harris be
   involuntary treated with psychotropic medication.             In light of that
   recommendation, the district court held a status conference and ordered the
   parties to submit briefing on the first Sell factor (i.e., whether the government
   has an important interest to warrant involuntary medication). Sell, 539 U.S.
   at 180. The district court also issued an order directing the Bureau of Prisons
   to prepare an addendum outlining in detail the proposed treatment plan and
   other details pertinent to the Sell factors.
          The court then conducted another hearing once it received the
   addendum. During that hearing, Harris (for the first time) raised a religious
   objection under the First Amendment to being involuntarily medicated.
   Accordingly, the district court granted the parties additional time to submit
   briefing on the First Amendment issue. Having considered the briefs, the
   district court determined that: (1) the government has a compelling interest
   in prosecuting Harris’s crime, which was not outweighed by Harris’s First
   Amendment right to freely exercise his religion; and (2) the government has
   satisfied the other Sell prongs. Thus, the court ordered that Harris “shall be

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   involuntarily medicated, in an attempt to render him competent to stand
   trial.”
                                           II
             “In reviewing a district court’s order to medicate a defendant
   involuntarily, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law
   de novo.” United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2013). “A
   factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the
   record read as a whole.” United States v. Dinh, 920 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir.
   2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
                                           III
             Under Sell, to administer anti-psychotic drugs involuntarily for the
   purpose of restoring a defendant’s competency to stand trial, the government
   must establish that: (A) “important governmental interests are at stake,”
   taking into account that “[s]pecial circumstances may lessen the importance
   of that interest”; (B) “involuntary medication will significantly further those
   . . . interests”; (C) “involuntary medication is necessary to further those
   interests”; and (D) “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.”
   Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81 (2003). Each factor must be proved by clear and
   convincing evidence. United States v. James, 938 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir.
   2019). We approve of the district court’s careful analysis of the Sell factors.
   However, this is not the end of the inquiry.
             In the district court, Harris raised his religious belief as a special
   circumstance that could lessen the government’s interest in involuntarily
   medicating him.       He did not explicitly name any statutes that might
   independently protect his religious freedom, such as the Religious Freedom
   Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, invalidated in
   part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Religious Land

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   Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
   2000cc-5.
          But Harris was not required to name RFRA to invoke any protection
   it might offer him. He needed only to allege facts that, if true, would plausibly
   state a claim under the Act. Cf. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014)
   (plaintiff needed not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in complaint when pleaded facts
   plausibly stated a claim under that statute); Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire
   Dep’t, 819 F.3d 205, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (“A complaint need not cite a
   specific statutory provision or articulate a perfect ‘statement of the legal
   theory supporting the claim asserted.’” (citation omitted)).            This is
   particularly important because Sell requires the government to prove an
   important government interest, while RFRA requires the government to
   prove a compelling government interest when it applies to a protected
   religious belief or practice. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
   682, 726 (2014).
          While we endorse the district court’s Sell analysis, we VACATE and
   REMAND for the district court to consider in the first instance whether
   RFRA or any other statutory religious-freedom protection applies. In the
   discussion below, we review the Sell factors but leave the RFRA issue for the
   district court to address on remand.
                                          A
          The first Sell prong requires the government to show that important
   governmental interests are at stake, while taking into account “[s]pecial
   circumstances” that may lessen the importance of that interest. Sell, 539
   U.S. at 180. We consider: (1) whether the government has an important
   interest in prosecuting Harris’s crime; and whether that interest is
   sufficiently undermined by the special circumstances presented by Harris.

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                                             1
          The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he Government’s interest in
   bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important.” Id.
   Here, Harris contests the application of that holding, asserting that his
   offense is not “serious.” Id. He argues that while courts have held that
   crimes carrying maximum penalties of as low as six months can be considered
   serious, there is no hard fast rule on the maximum sentence required for a
   crime to be considered serious. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238
   (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, rather than relying on his offense’s six-year maximum
   sentence, Harris argues that the district court should have looked at his
   sentencing guideline range in addressing the question of seriousness.
   Because the sentencing guideline indicates that, if convicted, he would likely
   be sentenced to less than 46 months, Harris asserts that the district court
   erred in holding that his offense was serious.
          But our holding in United States v. Palmer squarely rejects his
   argument. 507 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2007). While it is true that the Fourth
   Circuit in United States v. Evans refused to “set forth any rigid rule as to what
   the statutory maximum must be for a crime to be a serious one,” 404 F.3d at
   238, this court has held that “crimes authorizing punishments of over six
   months are ‘serious’” in the context of involuntary medication proceedings,
   Palmer, 507 F.3d at 304 (emphasis added). We have also held that it is
   appropriate for a district court “to consider the maximum penalty, rather
   than the sentencing guidelines range.” Id.
          Harris’s offense carries a maximum sentence of six years, far greater
   than the serious six-month sentence contemplated by Palmer. 18 U.S.C. §
   115 (b)(4). Thus, we agree with the district court that Harris’s offense is
   serious. Consequently, the government has an important interest in bringing
   Harris to trial. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.

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          Having determined that the government has an important interest, we
   now address whether there are special circumstances that sufficiently
   “lessen the importance of that interest.” Id.
                                          2
          Harris argues that several special circumstances are present here: (a)
   his likelihood of civil commitment; (b) his time-served as a pre-trial detainee;
   and (c) his religious belief. We address each in turn.
                                          a
          As to the first special circumstance, Harris argues that because he will
   likely be civilly committed if he does not stand trial, the government’s
   prosecutorial interests “that ordinarily attach to freeing [a criminal] without
   punishment” is diminished. Id. He notes that the Federal Medical Center
   forensic staff has recommended that he should remain committed to the
   Mental Health Department at FMC-Butner.               Even though his civil
   commitment proceeding has been stayed pending the resolution of this case,
   Harris contends that there is no question that the government has taken the
   position that he should be civilly committed. In the alternative, Harris argues
   that at the very least, the district court should have allowed the civil
   commitment proceeding to proceed prior to making a final ruling on the Sell
   hearing. Harris’s argument fails for two independent reasons.
          First, this court has held that “it is not enough that [a defendant]
   could potentially be civilly committed; for the government’s prosecutorial
   interest to be lessened meaningfully, [his] civil commitment would need to
   be certain.” United States v. James, 959 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2020). Here,
   the record does not indicate (nor does Harris argue) that his civil
   commitment is certain. Thus, under James, the district court correctly held
   that the government’s interest in prosecution was not meaningfully lessened
   because Harris has not shown that civil commitment is certain.

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          Second, Harris is judicially estopped from relying on the likelihood of
   his civil commitment. “Judicial estoppel is ‘a common law doctrine by which
   a party who has assumed one position in his pleadings may be estopped from
   assuming an inconsistent position.’” In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197,
   205 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Before applying the doctrine of
   judicial estoppel, three conditions must be satisfied: “(1) the party is
   judicially estopped only if its position is clearly inconsistent with the previous
   one; (2) the court must have accepted the previous position; and (3) the
   [inconsistency] must not have been inadvertent.” In re Superior Crewboats,
   Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004). All three conditions are satisfied here.
          As background, in light of Harris’s alternative request to “allow[] the
   civil commitment proceeding to proceed . . . prior to making a final ruling,”
   this panel stayed this case to allow for the resolution of his civil commitment
   proceeding in North Carolina. Less than a day later, the United States
   District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ordered the parties
   to submit briefs outlining their position as to whether the stay on the civil
   commitment proceeding should be lifted. In contradiction with his plea to
   this panel, however, Harris, who was represented by different counsel in that
   proceeding, asked the North Carolina court to “decline” lifting its stay.
          By doing so, Harris adopted “clearly inconsistent” positions, and so
   the first condition for judicial estoppel is satisfied. Id. The second condition
   is likewise satisfied because in staying this case, this panel relied on Harris’s
   previous assertion. As to the third requirement, there is no indication that
   the inconsistency was inadvertent. Accordingly, because all three conditions
   for judicial estoppel are satisfied here, we hold that Harris is judicial estopped
   from asserting that the likelihood of civil commitment undermines the
   government’s interest. Thus, this special circumstance does not weigh in
   favor of Harris.

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                                          b
          Next, Harris argues that his time served as a pre-trial detainee
   undermines the government’s prosecutorial interest. He notes that as of
   March 2023, he has been detained for more than three years (37 months)
   while awaiting trial. He further asserts that, if he was mandated to undergo
   involuntary medication, it would take another 12 months before he could
   stand trial. Based on the record, however, the psychiatrist indicated that it
   would take 4 to 8 months. Nonetheless, in total, he will be incarcerated for
   41 to 49 months before he can stand trial, which is close to his guideline range
   of 37 to 46 months.        Accordingly, Harris contends that involuntary
   medication and the subsequent trial would likely not lead to any additional
   confinement time.
          However, this court has held that “even assuming [the defendant]
   would serve little or no prison time if tried and convicted, the government’s
   interest in prosecution is not extinguished” because the government has an
   interest not only “in punishing [a defendant] per se but in trying her and
   vindicating the law publicly.” James, 959 F.3d at 664. Consequently, under
   James, the government still has an interest in prosecuting Harris, even if the
   trial may not lead to any additional confinement time.
                                          c
          Finally, Harris asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness
   prevents him from taking medication, and that any such administration of
   medication would violate his First Amendment rights. Thus, he contends
   that his religion creates a special circumstance under Sell that lessens the
   government’s interest in prosecuting in this matter.
          Harris’s religious belief presents an important special circumstance
   that is relevant to the first Sell factor. Cf. United States Navy Seals 1-26 v.
   Biden, 27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2022) (“COVID-19 vaccination requirements

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   substantially burden each Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion.”). But it also
   might be statutorily protected under RFRA. Because Sell and RFRA place
   different burdens on governmental action (proving an important interest as
   compared to proving a compelling interest), it is not proper to analyze
   religious belief just as a special factor under Sell. However, the lack of a
   district court record on the subject counsels against our addressing the issue
   in this opinion. We therefore leave the statutory religious-freedom analysis
   for the district court to address in the first instance on remand.
                                   *        *         *
          Having considered the three special circumstances presented, we hold
   that the government’s prosecutorial interest here is important under Sell,
   and that interest has not been sufficiently lessened. Thus, we agree with the
   district court that the government has satisfied the first Sell prong.
                                            B
          We now turn to the second Sell prong. To establish that involuntary
   medication will significantly further the government’s interest, it has to show
   that the administration of the medication is: (1) substantially likely to render
   the defendant competent to stand trial; and (2) substantially unlikely to have
   side effects that will interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in
   conducting a trial defense. James, 959 F.3d at 664–65.
          Harris contends that the government failed to do so because it relied
   on mere conclusory findings and failed to provide any detailed treatment plan
   that relates specifically to him.       For example, Harris argues that the
   government’s psychiatric report lacked details regarding the impact of the
   medications on his ability to communicate with counsel, and it failed to
   discuss how his medication would impact his sciatica in his right leg.

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          Although the government could have submitted more robust
   evidence, we agree with the district court that the government has provided
   enough evidence to satisfy the second Sell prong. See James, 959 F.3d at 665
   (“To be sure, the government could have submitted more robust evidence
   . . . but the numerous medical opinions do constitute evidence.         And,
   whatever the strength of that evidence, the record provides no reason to
   question its accuracy.”).
          The government provided an individualized treatment plan by its
   psychiatrist, Dr. Cloutier, which stated that involuntary medication is
   substantially likely to render Harris competent to stand trial (70–80%
   chance). The psychiatrist also concluded that medication would make Harris
   “much more likely . . . to work with his counsel” and was “substantially
   unlikely to interfere with his ability to assist his counsel.” Even though the
   recommended medications (haloperidol and risperidone) have known side
   effects, the report noted that “those side effects are relatively less common
   and less severe with medications such as risperidone.”
          We hold that the government psychiatrist’s medical opinion is
   sufficient evidence that that involuntary medication will “significantly
   further” the government’s interest. And “whatever the strength of that
   evidence,” Harris “provides no reason to question its accuracy.” Id. Thus,
   we agree with the district court that the government has provided enough
   evidence to satisfy the second prong.
                                           C
          Next, the third Sell prong requires the government to show that
   involuntary medication is necessary to further the government’s interest.
   Harris contends that the government fails on this prong because it failed to
   provide any statements regarding alternative treatments being offered to him
   or statements regarding whether any such alternative or less intrusive

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   treatments would be beneficial to him. As support, Harris cites his own
   testimony during one of the hearings that he has not been offered alternative
   treatments and that he believed that alternative treatments, such as
   counseling sessions, would be beneficial based on his past experiences.
          But Harris’s contention is inapposite. In addressing the third Sell
   prong, “[t]he question is not whether [the government] has attempted less
   intrusive treatment; instead, it is whether such treatment would be ‘unlikely
   to achieve substantially the same results’ as medication.” James, 959 F.3d at
   667 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181). Here, the psychiatrist’s report explicitly
   stated that “less intrusive treatments are very unlikely to achieve the same
   results.” Despite Harris’s longstanding knowledge of this report, he never
   requested that Dr. Cloutier testify at the hearing or submit to cross-
   examination. Nor did he present any evidence to contradict the medical
   professionals’ findings, other than with his own testimony.
          Given this court’s holding in James and the psychiatrist’s testimony,
   the district court did not err in its determination that the government has
   shown by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary medication is
   necessary to further the government’s interest.
                                         D
          Finally, the fourth Sell prong requires that the involuntary treatment
   is medically appropriate. Harris contends that the government’s report is
   inadequate because “[i]n analyzing this factor, courts must consider the long-
   term medical interests of the individual rather than the short-term institution
   interests of the justice system.” James, 959 F.3d at 668 (citation and
   quotation marks omitted). And so, Harris argues that the government fails
   to satisfy the fourth Sell prong because it presented no evidence related to his
   long-term medical interest.

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          But Harris’s argument fails because the psychiatrist’s report detailed
   Harris’s DSM-5 Diagnosis and provided an individualized treatment plan.
   And the report explicitly stated that “[i]t is clinically appropriate . . . to treat
   [Harris’s] psychotic illness with antipsychotic medication.” Given the lack
   of contrary medical evidence in the record, the district court did not clearly
   err in relying on Dr. Cloutier’s report.
                                    *        *         *
          The district court did not err in its determination that the government
   has satisfied the four conditions for involuntary medication set out in Sell.
   539 U.S. at 180–81. However, because RFRA or other statutory protections
   might apply, we VACATE and REMAND for the district court to
   undertake that analysis.

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