Court Opinion

ID: 9828796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:44:32.335749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.178195
License: Public Domain

On Rebearing.
In a motion for rebearing appellants insist that, since evidence was offered tending to show that $2,500 was less than tbe proposed work would amount to when computed at tbe rate prescribed by statute, tbe injunction should for that reason have been refused, and that we should for tbe same reason reverse tbe trial court’s judgment granting it. Tbe motion for rehearing was submitted, and at a later date we set aside tbe order of submission, and referred back to counsel for argument and citation of authorities whether or not article 113 of our Penal Code, making it a misdemeanor for certain county officials to fail to charge up tbe fees of their office, was applicable to tbe county clerk of Callahan county. Tbe matter is again before us, and tbe proposition again pressed that appellant Surles, as county clerk, bad a perfect right to contract with tbe commissioners’ court of Callahan county to do tbe work which be undertook to do for a, less sum than tbe fees prescribed by statute for such work.
Tbe contention is based upon tbe assumption that tbe officers of Callahan county are not affected by article 38S1 et seq. of tbe Revised Statutes 1011. Those articles purport to prescribe tbe maximum salary of certain officials, including county clerks for every county in tbe state. In order to determine when that maximum is reached, it is prescribed in articles 3894 and 3S95 that certain reports under oath are to be made. Article 113 of our Penal Code provides: “Any official named (in those articles) who shall fail to charge up tbe fees or costs that may be due under existing _ laws, or who shall remit any fees that are due under tbe laws, or who shall fail to make tbe report required by law, or who shall pay bis deputy or assistant a less sum than the amount specified in bis sworn statement or receive back any part of such compensation allowed such deputy or assistant as a rebate, shall be deemed guilty of tbe misdemeanor,” etc. Clearly, tbe county clerk of Callahan county falls within this.article of tbe Penal Code, and is forbidden by it tbe right to remit any part of the fees of office lawfully owing to him, unless article 3898, Revised Statutes 1911, makes tbe Code inapplicable to him. That article reads: “Tbe officers named in articles 3881 and 3886 in those counties having a population of 15,000 or less shall not be required to make a report of tbe fees as provided in article 3895, or to keep a statement provided for in article 3894.” It will be observed, however, that this exemption is only from a compliance with articles 3894 and 3895, and does not purport to exempt any one from those provisions which require officers to charge up tbe fees or costs that may be due under existing .laws and forbids them to remit any fee that may be due under tbe laws. In this connection it is noteworthy that article 3892, Revised Statutes 1911, also declares: “It shall not be legal for any officer to remit any fee that may be due under tbe law fixing fees.” We may assume that Callahan county has less than 15,000 population when determined, as the statute declares it shall be by tbe “vote cast at tbe last preceding presidential election,” and that tbe Legislature conclusively presumed that in such counties tbe amount of all fees and costs collected by county officials would not exceed tbe maximum allowed by article 3881, and for that reason exempted them from making tbe reports required of officers in more populous counties. But it does not follow from this at all that they are to be exempted from tbe other requirements of tbe civil and penal statutes already noticed of which tbe contract under consideration is in violation. A most excellent reason for tbe laws forbidding county officers in any county from remitting their fees or any part of them is apparent. It is unjust that a citizen of any county should be required to pay more for tbe performance of an official act than another citizen in another county is required to pay for precisely tbe same service. Moreover, such a practice, if permitted, might tend to favoritism amongst litigants and residents paying costs and fees even in tbe same county. But whether there is reason for such law or not, if tbe Legislature has clearly prohibited such act, the law is valid. We think tbe statutes cited are plainly capable of no other interpretation, and we adhere to our original conclusion that tbe contract under consideration is void as against tbe statutes of tbe state, and tbe trial court committed no error in ordering an injunction against its execution.
Tbe motion for rehearing is overruled.