Court Opinion

ID: 9691013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:01:13.984443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:08.986099
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in issuance of writ). The proximate cause of this altogether exigent litigation *696was set in motion On 'Wall Street. We are advised, by plaintiffs:
“It is frankly conceded that this is a test case made necessary because one school district in the State of Michigan which sought to issue bonds in accordance with the provisions of section 27, article 10, of the Michigan Constitution (1908), sought to obtain an approving legal opinion thereon from a firm of bond attorneys in the city of New York (Wood, King & Dawson), and said attorneys refused to approve the bonds until the questions specified in the secretary’s letter were passed upon by this Court. This refusal has been generally publicized, and as a result an unmerited and unjustifiable legal cloud has been cast, not only upon the bond issue involved in this case, but upon approximately $200,000,000 of such bonds issued in the 2-year period since the adoption of said: constitutional amendment and upon the many millions of dollars of such bonds proposed to be issued in the near future to meet the vastly expanding needs for new school facilities. The marketability of said bonds has been adversely affected, and will remain so until the questions raised are decided. The great public importance of this case and an early resolving of the questions raised is thus apparent.”
Representations like this bring us to general quarters. We hasten to determine that which, in this truly adversary case involving the Constitution, an-nouncedly stands in doubt.
I subscribe to conclusion that the voted form of question fairly apprised the electors of the substance and purpose of the amendment we know as section 27. I agree also with the attorney general that the, Constitution does not forbid submission of an amendment embracing more than one subject or purpose. But there is more to be said when we arrive on ground occupied by claim that the amendment failed1 of adoption for want of publication, “with any existing provisions of the Constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby,” as required by amend*697ed section 3 of article 17, Const 1908, and I suggest that all 3 of the posed questions may and should he answered by unequivocal statement that the election of April 4, 1955, and the officially certified result thereof, cured once for all the claimed defects in submission of section 27 if, in actuality, such were defects.
Whether section 27 did alter or abrogate then existent provisions is a serious question. As this Court has already seen by experience, we cannot — on record and briefs before us — pronounce categorical negative answer thereto without breeding future trouble. As indicated above, I prefer a more direct, and definitely safer, way to present decision.
School District v. City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338, is cited by my Brother in support of construction of the quoted words “altered or abrogated” as meaning “amended or replaced.” There it was held that the so-called 15-mill amendment “did not specifically and definitely ‘alter or abrogate’ any other provision of the Constitution” (p 345 of report). Nevertheless, when put to the test 13 years later in a case admitting ho room for side step (Thoman v. City of Lansing, 315 Mich 566), our Court was compelled to admit that the 15-mill amendment stood in direct collision with the uniformity clause (article 10, § 3, Const 1908) with result (p 577 of report); “Obviously under the circumstances of this case the 2 noted constitutional provisions are in conflict; and it becomes impossible to literally comply with both.” It was consequently held that the earlier provision must yield to the later (p 579 of report).
I stand against the possibility, nay probability, that we may be compelled in yet unconceived case to admit again, that what we say today does not alter or amend, actually does so. Post-election attacks on voted amendments of our Constitution may and should, in my view, receive consideration without the *698necessity, of determination of such, question, and I turn now to the indicated alternative.
In City of Jackson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 316 Mich 694, thorough, exhaustive and decidedly adversary briefs were submitted for and against doctrine that the requirements of sections 2 and 3 of article 17 appear in juridically different light after election day than before. Admittedly, authorities dealing with this point are divisive. Some States hold with rigidity that procedures established for the amendment of their constitutions are mandatory and must be strictly followed in order to effect a valid result; whereas others with equal force and convincing thought adhere to the view that where, as here, the adjective question or questions are not raised until after the people have voted approval of the questioned amendment of their organic law, the election cures procedural defects. (See texts and annotations 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 32, p 638; 12 CJ, Constitutional Law, § 24, p 688; 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, § 7, p 35.) I think our Court — in City of Jackson v. Commissioner of Revenue, supra, at pages 716-718 of report — intended to adopt the latter view, yet did so in words of such mincing uncertainty as to encourage if not foster post-election litigation. If this be so, it is high time that we declare ourselves in plain and artless words. Why not, say I, follow Florida’s lead, quoted this way from Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla 663, 668, 669 (18 So2d 892) (followed in Pearson v. Taylor, 159 Fla 775 [32 So2d 826]):
“While it is true that the procedure set forth in section 1 of art 17  is mandatory and should be followed (Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla 41 [59 So 963, Ann Cas 1914B, 916]; Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla 816 [156 So 274]), this Court has recognized the almost universal rule that once an amendment is duly proposed and is actually published and submitted to a vote of the people and by them adopted without any *699question having heen raised prior to the election as to the method by which the amendment gets before them, the effect of a favorable vote by the people is to cure defects in the form of the submission.”?
This is what was known, in brief and oral argument of the City of Jackson Case, as the “election-cures-error” doctrine. It originates in the leading authority known as The Constitutional Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan 700. There, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brewer, later a member of the Federal supreme court, the supreme court of Kansas considered post-election objections that the proposed amendment had been incorporated into the legislative journal by reference only (contrary to requirement) and that the legislature had failed to provide required election machinery for submission. The essence of the court’s ruling appears in the report as follows (p 711):
“Again, in constitutional changes, the popular voice is the paramount act. While to guard against undue haste and temporary excitement, to prevent unnecessary and frequent appeals for constitutional amendments, the assent of two-thirds of the legislature is prescribed as a condition precedent, yet after all, that which determines constitutional changes is the popular will. This is a government by the people, and whenever the clear voice of the people is heard, legislatures and courts must obey.”
As the supreme court of Pennsylvania has ruled, a new status arises once the people have approved a properly resolved constitutional amendment (Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa 207 [126 A 263]). That court went on to say (p 217) that such approval “is, in effect, though not technically, a judgment of the electorate, and a collateral attack upon it should not be allowed.” If this be right, and I suggest it is, questions justiciable prior to election day are merged in the political decision of the people, once that decision is duly certified.
*700• To recapitulate: Considering the necessarily variant and altogether numerous amendments we have voted into our Constitution since 1908,1 respectfully suggest that it is quite improvident' to say — until the issue is squarely presented in yet unconceived case— that a given amendment does not alter or abrogate (or, if one pleases, amend or replace) an existing provision or provisions. I prefer to warm the blood of our opinion in City of Jackson by moving for declaration that this Court will not, after the fact of resolved and fairly published submission of an actually ratified amendment, hear claims that the latter is invalid for want of meticulous compliance with the procedural requirements of article 17.. Section 27 thus becomes a valid part of the Constitution .and, under Thoman’s rule, it will prevail if there be conflict — which we need not presently decide — with earlier provisions.
Who is to know, absent such forthright declaration, what apparently mature and sound amendment of our Constitution is due next for litigatory test of its rightful existence? What time limitation ticks against such attacks? Does not the present onslaught, conceived as it was over distant and profound counsel tables, come more than 2 years after the fact of ratification, and uniform acceptance and utilization, of section 27 by Michigan? Is not a relevant rule of certainty in order, that all may know what is and what is not in our Constitution? Such a •rule is available by respectable precedent, and City of Jackson haltingly started us toward acceptance thereof. Its adoption tried in that case,- it is time to grapple Florida’s declaration to our scroll with hoops of legal steel.
For stated reasons, I support issuance of the writ as prayed.
. Smith and V oelker, J J., concurred with. Black, J.