Court Opinion

ID: 9706682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:49:22.59974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.363614
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
In its opinion sustaining defendant’s preliminary objections, the lower court frankly admits that a valid cause of action would exist if the use of lead based paint “constituted a latent dangerous condition of which defendants had or should have had knowledge and plaintiffs did not.” See Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 137 A. 2d 771 (1958); Restatement 2d, Torts, §358(1). This language is then echoed by the majority of this Court which recites that liability would exist if the use of the paint “constituted the creation of a dangerous condition of which appellees had knowledge and of which appellants had no knowledge.” Yet, both opinions conclude that the appellants’ complaint fails to state a cause of action. In my view, this conclusion is belied by the words of the complaint itself.
Paragraph 14 of appellants’ complaint alleges the following: “The aforesaid living room woodwork was in a dangerous and unsafe condition as a result of its decayed, chipped and peeling condition and the fact that it had been painted with a poisonous lead base paint; all of which existed for a sufficient length of time so that the defendants knew or by the exercise of ordinary care should have knoAvn that the said conditions were dangerous and unsafe for persons in the area, . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph 15(e) further recites that one of the defendants-appellees’ negligent acts consisted of their “failure to notify their tenants of the dangerous substance with Avhieh the living room woodwork had been painted,- . . ,”.1
*197I am therefore unable to understand why this Court concludes that no cause of action has been stated. Surely, we cannot, by this decision, be sanctioning a rule that lead based paint, as a matter of law, is not a dangerous substance. Nor is it conceivable that the majority could believe that, as a matter of law, defendants could not know of this dangerous condition. For even if it could be argued that constructive knowledge cannot exist because lead base paint has been so widely used, this would still not vitiate an allegation of actual knowledge. Indeed, no matter how unknown to the public a dangerous condition may be, so long as the pleader alleges that the condition is in fact dangerous and that the defendant had actual knowledge of this condition, this should be sufficient to withstand preliminary objections based upon an alleged failure to state a cause of action.
Since the majority affirms the lower court’s sustaining of preliminary objections, it does not face two remaining issues: Deisher’s status as a party defendant, and the alleged exculpatory clause in the lease. I note, however, that as to Deisher, the complaint alleges that he acted as an agent for an undisclosed principal. It is elementary to the law of agency that such an agent would be just as liable to these appellants as would be the true owner-landlords. See Schelly v. Gribbin, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 20, 53 A. 2d 862 (1947); Laub, Pennsylvania Trial Guide §273.29 (1959). Therefore, in my view, appellants’ complaint is not deficient as to Deisher.
Finally, both Deisher and the true owners contend before this Court that they are exempt from liability *198by virtue of a clause in the lease, paragraph 12, which, inter alia, relieves the landlord from all liability for negligence. If such paragraph is a valid defense,2 then surely it is incumbent upon the defendants, not the plaintiffs, to so allege in their pleadings. Once again, the mere existence of this clause cannot, ipso facto, support a demurrer to appellants’ complaint.
Believing that the preliminary objections in this case should be overruled, and appellees required to answer appellants’ complaint, I dissent.
Mr. Justice Müsmanno joins in this dissenting opinion.

 If the language of §358 of the Restatement could be read to require plaintiff rather than defendant to plead the fact of non-*197knowledge of the dangerous condition by the tenant, I believe that an allegation such' as the one found in this complaint, that the landlord was negligent in failing to notify tenant of the paint, is sufficient to constitute an allegation that the tenants were unaware of this defect.

 Although it is not here necessary to rule on the merits of this defense, I note that the form 50 lease (used by this appellee) in general, and the clause relieving the landlord from liability for his own negligence in particular, have been the subject of recent criticism, it being felt that certain parts of this lease constitute unenforceable contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Comment, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1963).