Court Opinion

ID: 9781609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:54:49.518259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:15.790203
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I concur with the majority but write separately to elucidate my views of State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d 105 (2000), to the extent they differ from those expressed by the majority.
I agree with the majority that Quattlebawm should be limited to its facts. A one-size-fits-all solution is a poor response to prosecutorial misconduct. “The granting of a motion for a mistrial is an extreme measure which should be taken only where an incident is so grievous that prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.” State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 310, 513 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1999) (citing State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 502 S.E.2d 63 (1998)). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, interests beyond the supervision of prosecutorial behavior are implicated by a decision to grant a new trial. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506-507, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Although the *569duty to curb prosecutorial misconduct is compelling, other weighty concerns are also at stake, including the need to conserve judicial resources and to avoid imposing additional burdens on victims. Id. at 509, 103 S.Ct. 1974. The Hasting Court rebuked the court below for failing to “consider the trauma the victims of these particularly heinous crimes would experience in a new trial, forcing them to relive harrowing experiences now long past, or the practical problems of retrying these sensitive issues more than four years after the events.” Id. at 507,103 S.Ct. 1974.
Even where constitutional protections are implicated, a new trial is called for only in situations where the defendant’s right to a fair trial is fundamentally compromised. Id. at 509, 103 S.Ct. 1974 (“[T]he Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations.”). This is so because “the aim of due process ‘is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.’ ” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Likewise, I believe that we should seek to avoid a rule unduly punishing the citizens of this State for the misdeeds of solicitors. A rule that turns on whether the misconduct was intentional would have such an effect in some cases. As the Court notes parenthetically, “[t]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor” (citing 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1644 (Supp.2011)). Thus, fairness should be the touchstone of the inquiry, and only in a limited set of exceptional circumstances should prejudice be presumed.
Direct intrusion into and eavesdropping on the defendant’s confidential communications with counsel, as occurred in Quattlebaum, is the sort of violation that is likely to taint the entire trial, making it fundamentally unfair. But this is an exception, not the general rule. As the majority clarifies, Quattlebaum did not overrule prior case law that, under different facts, mandates an inquiry into whether the prosecutorial misconduct resulted in prejudice before a new trial is granted.
*570With regard to witness intimidation, the established rule in this State is that “in order to obtain relief, a defendant must demonstrate both substantial interference and prejudice.” State v. Williams, 326 S.C. 130, 135, 485 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1997). In the present case, there is no claim that any substantive mitigating testimony was lost. Indeed, there is no claim that any testimony was lost. The defendant’s expert witness investigated appellant’s social background and was able to testify to her opinions regarding it. Appellant claims only that the effectiveness of the expert’s testimony on mitigating factors pertinent to sentencing was diminished by the solicitor’s misconduct.
Even assuming that the effectiveness of the testimony was reduced by the solicitor’s attempts to intimidate the witness, the testimony was given before a judge, not a jury. A judge is presumed to weigh evidence properly. See Ross v. Jones, 58 S.C. 1, 35 S.E. 402, 405-406 (1900). As the majority recognizes, the record shows that the sentencing judge was fully aware of the solicitor’s conduct and related events surrounding the expert’s testimony, even finding that it was prosecutorial misconduct. We must presume that he took them into account in considering the testimony.
The solicitor’s conduct in this case was inexplicable and reprehensible. In light of the aggravated nature of the crime and the fact that the sentencing hearing took place before a judge, it is difficult to comprehend how the solicitor believed that intimidating an expert witness would be more likely to ensure a death sentence than to create a risk of reversal. See United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir.1984) (describing prosecutors’ warnings to defense witnesses of the consequences of perjury as “dangerous and foolish ... because they can violate a defendant’s due process right to present his defense witnesses freely” and thereby risk upsetting a guilty verdict). Despite the behavior of the solicitor, I would not ascribe a uniform “attitude” to the solicitor’s office. I would limit myself to the facts appearing in the record, which do not implicate the entire office. Moreover, I cannot assume without more evidence that the solicitor was responsible for the manner in which Georgia authorities handled the matter. Whatever the appropriate response to the solicitor’s conduct may be, it does not include reversal.
*571Thus, for the reasons set forth above, I concur in the judgment of the majority.
TOAL, C.J. and HEARN, J., concur.