Court Opinion

ID: 9908698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:09:44.745461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:26.873724
License: Public Domain

J-A19005-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  STEVEN KEITH BIRNEY                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2087 EDA 2021

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 8, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0003143-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:

                                                    FILED DECEMBER 11, 2023

       In this appeal, Birney contends that the trial court erred in finding that

he was an SVP because the Commonwealth’s sole witness, the SOAB expert,

relied exclusively upon unproven and inadmissible hearsay in collateral third-

party documents in making that determination. Relying on Commonwealth

v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc), which held that

hearsay alone could serve as the sole basis for the SOAB expert to opine that

the defendant is an SVP, the majority correctly affirms.         I join with the

majority but write separately because, though binding, I disagree with

Aumick.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     It is not surprising that I would disagree with the en banc Aumick

decision because I wrote the initial panel decision that it supplanted. While

the panel decision was withdrawn once the petition for reargument was

granted, it is available at      https://casetext.com/case/commonwealth-v-

aumick.    I incorporate it fully in this concurring memorandum.       The panel

decision held that the use of hearsay testimony alone to determine whether

the defendant is an SVP violates a person’s due process rights because

hearsay alone cannot support a civil or even administrative find, as well as

holding that just because an expert uses hearsay to arrive at an opinion, that

does not magically convert hearsay facts into substantive evidence.

                                       I.

     Rather than addressing the panel’s reasons, the en banc Aumick

decision   held   that   given   the   statutory   factors   set   forth   in   42

Pa.C.S.§ 9799.24(a), the SOAB expert must use in his or her initial

administrative assessment of whether the defendant was an SVP if that

somehow excuses the Commonwealth from proffering competent factual

evidence underlying the expert’s opinion. It then goes on to state:

     In the context of an SVP hearing, the judge is not tasked with
     evaluating the veracity of the facts underlying the expert’s
     testimony. See Prendes, 97 A.3d at 360 (explaining that an SVP
     hearing is not a trial and the primary purpose of the SVP
     registration requirements is to protect the public, not to punish
     the offender). Indeed, the facts presented at an SVP hearing are
     not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, as would be
     the case in a true hearsay scenario. Instead, they constitute
     information, gleaned from records which are reasonably relied on
     in SOAB evaluations, that is presented to the trial court solely to

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      supply the basis for the expert’s opinion in accordance with our
      Rules of Evidence. See Prendes, 97 A.3d at 362; see also Pa.R.E.
      703, 705.      Accordingly, the otherwise inadmissible facts
      reasonably relied upon by [SOAB] to explain the basis of her
      opinion, including the allegations of sexual abuse asserted by
      P.M., do not constitute substantive evidence. See Prendes, 97
      A.3d at 361; see also Pa.R.E. 703, 705 and Cmt.

Id. at 776.

      I do not understand the en banc holding that the trial judge is not tasked

with evaluating the veracity of the underlying facts or that a hearing to

determine whether a person is an SVP is not a “trial.” It seems that decision

requires that all governmental agencies were required to “cooperate by

providing copies of records and information as requested by the board in

connection with the court-ordered assessment ....” and that the SOAB report

in making the initial assessment report somehow converts the hearsay

evidence contained in those records to be treated as substantive evidence. In

arriving at that conclusion, the en banc majority seems to have conflated what

SOAB is supposed to do in making its initial determination of whether the

defendant is an SVP with what the trial court is supposed to do in finding that

the defendant is an SVP.

      Under SORNA, once SOAB has made its administrative determination

based on the factors set forth in Section 9799.24(b)(1)-(4), the trial court,

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e), is required to hold a hearing where the

Commonwealth must proffer competent facts underlying the SOAB expert’s

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opinion that would support the SVP determination. That provision provides

that:

        (1) A hearing to determine whether the individual is a sexually
        violent predator shall be scheduled upon the praecipe filed by the
        district attorney. The district attorney upon filing a praecipe shall
        serve a copy of the praecipe upon defense counsel together with
        a copy of the report of the board.

        (2) The individual and district attorney shall be given notice of the
        hearing and an opportunity to be heard, the right to call witnesses,
        the right to call expert witnesses and the right to cross-examine
        witnesses. In addition, the individual shall have the right to
        counsel and to have an attorney appointed to represent the
        individual if the individual cannot afford one. If the individual
        requests another expert assessment, the individual shall provide
        a copy of the expert assessment to the district attorney prior to
        the hearing.

        (3) At the hearing prior to sentencing, the court shall determine
        whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing
        evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator.
        (emphasis added).

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24 ( e ). (emphasis added).

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court is then required to

evaluate the veracity of those facts and to make a decision whether the SVP

criteria are proven by clear and convincing competent evidence.

        The clear and convincing evidence standard is not met by rank hearsay.

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re B.J.Z., 207

A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Hearsay evidence is not

direct evidence or weighty or convincing because it is not competent evidence

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and it does not become so just because it is laundered through expert

testimony.

      As I pointed out in the panel decision, our Supreme Court in

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020), involving the use

of hearsay at a preliminary hearing, reiterated its holding in Commonwealth

ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413, 581 A.2d 172 (1990), that

hearsay alone is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case, unlike here,

where even there was a post-deprivation hearing – the criminal trial.

Verbonitz cited with approval Justice Flaherty's concurring opinion in

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631,

647 (Pa. 1981), which stated that:

      “f]undamental due process requires that no adjudication be based
      solely on hearsay evidence.” If more than “rank hearsay” is
      required in an administrative context, the standard must be higher
      in a criminal proceeding where a person may be deprived of his
      liberty. The testimony of a witness as to what a third party told
      him about an alleged criminal act is clearly inadmissible hearsay,
      Commonwealth v. Maybee, 429 Pa. 222, 239 A.2d 332 (1968),
      Commonwealth v. Whitner, 444 Pa. 556, 281 A.2d 870 (1971),
      and thus, does not constitute legally competent evidence. In this
      case the Commonwealth has failed to establish prima facie that a
      crime has been committed and that [the defendant] committed
      that crime.

Verbonitz, 581 A.2d at 174.

      Accordingly, the use of rank hearsay to find a person an SVP imposing

civil obligations as well as imposing criminal penalties for those who violate

the SORNA provisions violates the defendant’s rights to a fair hearing and

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does not meet the preponderance of the evidence, let alone the clear and

convincing evidence standard.

                                         II.

      The en banc Aumick decision also holds that the trial judge is not tasked

with evaluating the veracity of the underlying facts used by the expert in

arriving at the determination. It reasons that because the purpose of the SVP

determination is to protect the public and not punish the defendant, that due

process rights of the defendant can be set aside and be deprived of a fair trial.

That is incorrect for several reasons.

      First, that reasoning ignores that a 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e) hearing

requires the defendant receive a full-blown trial-type hearing at which the trial

court makes a determination including the veracity, competency and

credibility of all the evidence adduced before an SVP determination can be

made. In short, due process where obligations are imposed or rights are taken

away requires a judge to act as a judge, not a potted plant.

      Second, just because the purpose of a statute is to protect the public

does not mean that a person somehow loses a right to a fair trial. If that were

so, a right to a fair hearing could be set aside in any civil matter that imposes

penalties in the name of public safety when an administrative agency expert

says the defendant did it or is a danger. Constitutionally, a person is entitled

to a meaningful due process hearing because of the obligations and

impediments    and   possible   criminal       sanctions   flowing   from   an   SVP

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determination. To repeat, due process demands a hearing where the decision

maker – the trial court – based on proven facts, not an unexamined opinion

of an administrative agency employee, the SOAB expert, as the en banc

Aumick majority suggests. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593,(1972); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind

of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975) (outlining 11 hallmarks

of a fair hearing ranging from an unbiased tribunal to judicial review).

      Having said all that, the en banc Aumick decision is binding precedent

and, accordingly, I join with the majority decision in affirming the trial court.

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