Court Opinion

ID: 9628463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:21:13.101153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:05.794840
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the majority opinion except insofar as it holds that a mobilehome park owner may, under section 798.76 of the Civil Code,1 limit residence in the park to any age group he deems appropriate, so that the park may not only exclude children, but may limit the age of adult residents at the whim of the owner. Instead, I view the language of section 798.76 as clearly indicating an intent to limit the owner’s discretion in prescribing age limitations to persons 18 years of age or older. The legislative history offered by the majority does not support a contrary conclusion.
The majority’s holding creates a broad exception to the command of section 51.2 prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, since it would allow a park to discriminate against adults of any age, including senior citizens. Such a construction not only violates the settled principle that exceptions to a statute must be narrowly construed and will not be extended beyond the import of their terms (City of National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635, 636 [204 P.2d 7]; Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 972, 977 [138 Cal.Rptr. 220]), but also it finds no support in either the language of the section nor in its legislative history.
The meaning of “adults” in section 798.76 is set forth in section 25.1, subdivision (b), which defines that term as a person “18 years of age and *392older.” We must presume that when the Legislature enacted section 798.76 it was aware of this definition.
The majority’s reliance on the word “any” in the statute (which allows adoption of “any” rule limiting residents to “adults only”) as calling for a contrary conclusion is unwarranted. According to their holding, a rule limiting residence to persons 25 years or older, or 45 years or older, or between 40 and 50 years only can be viewed as an “adults only” rule as well as one which confines residence to those 18 years of age or older. The problem with this theory is that it disregards the meaning of the word “adults” in section 25.1 as a person 18 years old or older. While persons over that age are undoubtedly adults as well, I do not see how it can be denied that under this definition every person 18 years of age or older is also an adult.
Section 798.76 does not allow a park owner to adopt “any” age restriction on mobilehome park residency, but only “any” restriction that imposes an “adults only” policy, i.e., a policy that confines residents to persons 18 years of age and older.2 The section permits discrimination only between children and those defined as “adults”; it does not authorize a park owner to discriminate against adults between the age of 18 and 25. The interpretation advocated by the majority would render the critical word “adults” surplusage, and substitute for that word a provision allowing any regulation by a park owner relating to age.3
Contrary to the claim of the majority, the legislative history of section 798.76 does not support its construction of the section. They suggest the section cannot be interpreted “narrowly” to restrict a mobilehome park owner’s alternatives in devising age-based rules because as a general matter the owner of such a park has discretion to establish rules to control the character of the park. But section 51.2, the Unruh Act, prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of age, and section 798.76 provides the only exception to this prohibition insofar as mobilehome parks are concerned.4 *393Therefore, any general authorization for an owner to restrict residency on the basis of age is subject to the strictures set forth in section 51.2, unless the limitation comes within section 798.76.
The survey of mobilehome parks referred to by the majority, showing that some owners have adopted age-based discriminatory policies among adults, does not indicate that the Legislature intended to approve such policies. The survey antedated the 1975 enactment of the predecessor to section 798.6 by many years, and there is not a shred of evidence that such age-based rules were in existence in 1975, or even if they were, that the Legislature was aware of them and intended to enshrine the dubious practice into law. It is most unlikely, if it had such an intent, that it would have chosen the language of section 798.76 to achieve that result.
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s construction of section 51.3 in relation to section 51.2 of the Unruh Act. The Unruh Act, in section 51.2, prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of age, except for housing for senior citizens constructed pursuant to section 51.3. The latter section, by its own terms, provides that the definitions set forth therein, including the definition of “housing” as excluding mobilehomes (subd. (c)(4)), apply only “for purposes of this section.” It seems clear to me, therefore, that the discrimination on the basis of age allowed by section 51.2 extends only to the housing units described in section 51.3. Since mobile-homes are expressly excluded from section 51.3, it follows that the general prohibition against age discrimination in section 51.2 prevails, except, of course, to the extent provided by section 798.76.
The majority’s reliance on the legislative history of the 1984 amendments to sections 51.2 and 51.3 is also unpersuasive. They assume that because prior to the 1984 amendment of section 51.2 and the enactment of section 51.3, an amendment to section 798.76 which would have limited enforcement of its “adults only” provision to parks specially designed for senior citizens (and disabled persons) was deleted, the Legislature must have reached a compromise to exclude mobilehomes from the reach of the nondiscrimination provisions of the Unruh Act.
It is well settled that the failure to amend an existing statute is inconclusive and has little interpretive value because conflicting inferences may be drawn from such a failure. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1396 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]; Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, fn. 7 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161]; Burgess v. Board of Education (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 571, 580-581 [116 Cal.Rptr. 183]; Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 *394Cal.App.2d 41, 57-58 [69 Cal.Rptr. 480].) This would be true even if the Legislature as a whole had disapproved the amendment rather than, as here, deletion thereof by a legislative committee.
The wisdom of this rule is pointedly illustrated by the circumstances of this case. In my view, a more reasonable explanation for the deletion of the amendment to section 798.76 is that the committee intended to continue to allow mobilehome parks to exclude children, not that it desired to except parks from the reach of the nondiscrimination provisions of section 51.2. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority’s reasoning that elimination of the amendment supports its interpretation of sections 51.2 and 51.3, in the face of the clear language used in those provisions.
In sum, the language of sections 798.76, 51.2 and 51.3 may not be construed to allow age discrimination in mobilehome parks except to limit residence to those 18 years of age or older. The legislative history relied on by the majority does not support their determination that the Legislature did not really mean what it clearly said, i.e., that it did not sanction age discrimination among adults in such parks.
Broussard, J., concurred.

 All statutory references are to the Civil Code.

 The construction of section 798.76 as prohibiting discrimination against any person over 18 years of age does not render the word “any” surplusage. For example, by employing that word, the Legislature could have intended to allow a park owner to designate some areas for adults only, while allowing minors to reside in other parts of the park, or to maintain an “adults only” designation during some seasons and not in others.

 The opinion of the Attorney General relied on in footnote 5 of the majority opinion does not support its conclusion. While the opinion cited observes that section 798.76 “could embrace a variety of more narrowly defined adults-only rules,” it does not decide the issue. (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 559, 561-562 (1982), italics added.) In contrast, as the majority recognize (fn. 7 at p. 382), the Fair Employment and Housing Commission has held that a park owner may not discriminate against persons 18 years old or older.

 As discussed below, section 51.2 does contain an exception for housing for senior citizens, as specified in section 51.3, but the latter section specifically states that it does not apply to mobilehomes.