Court Opinion

ID: 9373250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:43.812951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.577796
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GLORIA MARIGNY,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-14-0737-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: November 7, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Gloria Marigny, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pro se.

           Lois F. Prince and Bradley Flippin, Esquire, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the in itial decision, which
     dismissed her alleged involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the pet itioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant worked for the agency as a Licensed Practical Nurse.
     Marigny v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Docket No. AT-0752-14-0737-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12, Subtab 4b.         In December 2009, a Nurse
     Manager issued the appellant a written counseling for repeated instances of
     tardiness. IAF, Tab 24 at 50-51. In September 2010, a Chief Nurse placed the
     appellant on a 4-week “orientation review” after the appellant made several
     medication and documentation errors. IAF, Tab 15 at 81, Tab 24 at 48. The
     review period was extended due to her absences and ultimately concluded in
     December 2010. IAF, Tab 24 at 48-49. The agency did not issue any discipline
     to the appellant as a result of her performance during the orientation period,
     although she was resistant to feedback and did not complete required training,
     and her performance during this period was mixed. Id.
¶3         In September 2011, a different Nurse Manager issued the appella nt a written
     admonishment for failing to attend a fact-finding meeting as instructed and for
                                                                                      3

     absence without leave (AWOL).       Id. at 10-12.    Four days later, the appellant
     asked her Assistant Unit Manager to assign her to work with a different
     Registered Nurse for the remainder of her shift. IAF, Tab 14 at 6, Tab 27 at 125.
     According to the appellant, during the course of this discussion, the Assistant
     Unit Manager refused her request and “intentionally bumped into [the appellant],
     using her breasts . . . three times.” IAF, Tab 14 at 6, Tab 27 at 125.
¶4         On an unidentified date, one of the appellant’s coworkers reported to
     management that the appellant had failed to connect an assigned patient to his
     intravenous (IV) medication for almost an hour despite alerts from the IV
     equipment and three reminders from the coworker. Marigny v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-0737-I-2, Refiled Appeal File
     (RAF), Tab 29, May 18, 2016 Hearing Compact Disc (HCD), Track 1
     at 01:11:50-01:15:36 (testimony of the appellant’s coworker). 2          After the
     appellant’s coworker gave her the third reminder, the appellant left the floor and
     another nurse performed this task. Id.
¶5         During April, May, and June 2012, different supervisors instructed the
     appellant to complete mandatory training and request leave for time off that she
     already had taken. IAF, Tab 12, Subtab 4b. As to the training, the appellant
     began taking it at one point in April 2012, but left while it was in progress. IAF,
     Tab 14 at 8, Tab 24 at 34. According to the appellant, the training, which a
     supervisor told the appellant would take 20 to 30 minutes, in fact would take 1 to
     2 hours, and she left to use the restroom. IAF, Tab 14 at 8, Tab 24 at 30. Based
     on her failure to follow instructions, as well as her tardiness on one occasion in
     April 2012, the Chief Nurse proposed the appellant’s removal for failure to
     follow instructions and AWOL in July 2012.          IAF, Tab 12, Subtab 4b.    The
     appellant resigned from her position on September 6, 2012. RAF, Tab 37, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 1. In her resignation letter, she stated that she was resigning
     2
       It appears this incident may have occurred in March 2012. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 14
     at 7.
                                                                                        4

     “due to [a] continued hostile work environment.” IAF, Tab 1 at 4. In 2014, the
     appellant filed an appeal, alleging that she resigned because of a hostile work
     environment, unlawful discrimination, and reprisal for equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) activity. IAF, Tab 14 at 4-12; ID at 3-4. Included among the
     incidents of harassment were the events listed above, as well as alleged
     mistreatment by her coworkers. IAF, Tab 14 at 4-12.
¶6        The administrative judge held the appellant’s requested hearing . ID at 1-2.
     Immediately prior to, during, and after the hearing, the appellant attempted to
     admit exhibits not previously entered in the record, including statements from an
     approved witness who had not appeared at the hearing and from disallowed
     witnesses. RAF, Tab 22 at 2-3, Tab 31, May 25, 2016 HCD, Tab 32 at 9-30. The
     administrative judge rejected many of those additional exhibits and did not
     consider them in making her findings. ID at 2 n.1.
¶7        The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     failure to prove Board jurisdiction.    ID at 1-2, 18-19.      She found that the
     appellant failed to prove that some incidents with management occurred as
     alleged, and that management justified its actions as to other incidents .       ID
     at 4-17. As to the appellant’s allegations that her coworkers subjected her to a
     hostile work environment, the administrative judge found that, even if true, the
     alleged incidents would not have caused a reasonable person to resign.           ID
     at 17-18.
¶8        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
     for Review File (PFR) File, Tab 1. On review, she challenges the administrative
     judge’s credibility findings regarding many of the alleged incidents, reasserts her
     claim that her resignation was involuntary, and claims that the administrative
     judge committed procedural errors that violated her due process rights. PFR File,
                                                                                          5

     Tab 1 at 5-8, Tab 11 at 1-3.      The agency has filed a response, to which the
     appellant has replied. 3 PFR File, Tabs 10-11.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge made appropriate factual findings.
¶9         The administrative judge found that the agency provided the appellant with
     an orientation review because of her medication and documentation errors,
     designated certain of the appellant’s absences as AWOL because she was
     chronically late without obtaining prior approval, disciplined her because of this
     AWOL, and proposed her removal after she failed to follow repeated instructions
     to complete her mandatory training. ID at 4-6, 11-12, 14-17. The administrative
     judge also found that the appellant’s Assistant Unit Manager did not assault the
     appellant and that the appellant failed to connect a patient to his IV as her
     coworker claimed; and that the agency did not demote the appellant, assign her an
     unusually heavy workload, or unnecessarily disrupt her work as she alleged. ID

     3
       The appellant also has filed three motions for leave to submit additio nal documents.
     PFR File, Tabs 8, 13, 20. In letters acknowledging the appellant’s motions, the Office
     of the Clerk of the Board advised her that the Board’s regulations do not provide for
     such pleadings, and that, for the Board to consider the proffered submissions, she must
     describe the nature and need for them and show that the evidence was not readily
     available before the record closed.       PFR File, Tabs 9, 14, 21; see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(a)(5), (k). In her first motion, the appellant moves to submit additional
     evidence to “support[] [her] claim” and “show[] Contradictory Statements.” PFR File,
     Tab 8 at 1. In her second motion, she indicates that she “would like to request Motion
     with leave to submit additional documents.” PFR File, Tab 13 at 1. In her third
     motion, she requests to submit “New documents . . . applicable to the Laws and
     Regulations of MSPB Due Process” and argument challenging an order issued by the
     administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 20 at 2, 4. She attributes any delay in submitting
     this argument and evidence to her attorney’s negligence; how ever, to the extent the
     appellant was represented below, she was responsible for the errors of her chosen
     representative. Gaetos v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 6
     (2014). The appellant does not appear to be represented on review. PFR File, Tab 1,
     Tab 20 at 2, 4. Because the appellant has not shown that the documents she seeks to
     submit were not readily available before the close of the record or described how the
     proffered argument and evidence are relevant to the outcome of her petition for review,
     we DENY her motions. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5), (k).
                                                                                               6

      at 4-13. In addition, she concluded that the appellant failed to provide sufficient
      evidence to meet her burden to prove that other alleged events occurred, such as
      her claim that her coworkers yelled at her or that her time and attendance records
      were changed without explanation. ID at 4-5. Finally, the administrative judge
      concluded that, even if the appellant’s coworkers made comments based on race
      as alleged, the comments were insufficiently severe to cause a reasonable person
      in the appellant’s position to resign. 4 ID at 17-18.
¶10         The appellant disputes these and other factual findings. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 6-7. For example, she argues that she obtained prior approval for leave that
      was designated as AWOL, and that the agency assigned her an unfair workload
      and did not provide sufficient feedback regarding her performance.               Id.   The
      appellant also argues without evidence that the administrative judge altered the
      hearing record. Id. at 5.
¶11         We decline to disturb the administrative judge’s factual findings.                In
      making these findings, she assessed the witnesses’ demeanor and observations of
      the events, the inconsistency of the appellant’s testimony and the record evidence,
      other witnesses’ lack of motive to lie, and the inherent improbability of some of
      the appellant’s assertions. 5 ID at 6, 8-13, 16-17; see Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (listing these and other factors an
      administrative judge must consider in resolving credibility issues).                   The
      appellant’s mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s credibility findings

      4
        In her petition for review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s
      finding that the three or four alleged comments by her coworkers, suggesting that her
      last name and her children’s names were “white” and referring t o her skin tone, were
      not sufficient to establish Board jurisdiction over her appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 ; IAF,
      Tab 14 at 4-5. To the extent that the appellant attempts to challenge this well -reasoned
      finding in her reply to the agency’s response to the peti tion for review, we decline to
      consider it. PFR File, Tab 11 at 3; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4) (limiting a reply to a
      response to a petition for review to the factual and legal issue s raised in the response).
      5
        Although the appellant argues that she was unable to clearly see one witness who was
      testifying via video conference, PFR, Tab 1 at 5, there is no indication that the clarity
      of the picture affected the administrative judge’s ability to observe the witness.
                                                                                       7

      is not a sufficiently sound reason for the Board to overturn those determinations.
      See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
      (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing); Broughton v. Department of
      Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (finding that mere
      reargument of factual issues already raised and properly resolved by the
      administrative judge below do not establish a basis for review ).      Further, we
      decline to grant review based on the appellant’s unsubstantiated claim that the
      record was altered.

      The appellant has not established that her resignation was involuntary.
¶12        A resignation is presumed to be a voluntary act and, therefore, beyond the
      Board’s jurisdiction. Morrison v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 5
      (2015) (discussing this presumption in the context of an alleged coerced
      retirement). The presumption that a resignation is voluntary can be rebutted if the
      employee can establish it was the product of duress or coercion brought on by
      Government action, or of misleading or deceptive information. Id. Jurisdiction is
      established in constructive adverse action appeals by showing: (1) the employee
      lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful
      actions that deprived her of that choice. Id.
¶13        In light of the administrative judge’s factual findings, as discussed above,
      we agree that the agency had a reasonable basis to issue a warning and
      admonishment for the appellant’s AWOL and failure to follow instructions, place
      her on orientation review for a period of time due to medication and
      documentation errors, and propose her removal for failure to follow supervisory
      instructions and AWOL. ID at 3, 5-6, 11-12, 14-17; IAF, Tab 12, Subtab 4b. We
      therefore conclude that the proposed removal and other management actions at
      issue in this appeal were not coercive.     See Morrison, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 6
      (declining to find that a retirement was coerced when the agency had reasonable
                                                                                         8

      grounds for proposing the appellant’s removal); see also Savage v. Department of
      the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 28 n.5 (2015) (stating that, to prove an AWOL
      charge, an agency must show that the employee was absent without authorization
      and, if the employee requested leave, that the request was properly denied),
      overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget , 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 23-25; Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 71 M.S.P.R. 547, 556 (1996) (holding
      that an agency establishes the charge of failure to follow supervisory instructions
      by showing that proper instructions were given to an employee and that he failed
      to follow them). We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant
      failed to show that a reasonable person in her position would have felt that she
      had no realistic alternative but to resign.
¶14         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge should not have
      considered her discrimination claims. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. We disagree. The
      administrative judge appropriately addressed the appellant’s allegations of
      discrimination and reprisal only insofar as they related to the issue of
      voluntariness.     ID at 17-18; Vitale v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20 (2007) (explaining that the Board addresses allegations of
      discrimination and EEO reprisal in connection with an alleged involuntary
      resignation only insofar as those allegations relat e to the issue of voluntariness).
      Although the appellant indicated prior to the hearing that she was not raising
      discrimination claims, she has not shown how the administrative judge’s
      adjudication of those claims affected the outcome of this appeal. RAF, Tab 25
      at 2; Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding
      that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights
      provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). The administrative judge
      did not abuse her discretion with regard to exhibits, witnesses, and scheduling the
      hearing.
¶15         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge improperly rejected
      some of her hearing exhibits, excluded witnesses, limited her testimony and
                                                                                        9

      examination of witnesses, and delayed the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. She
      asserts that these rulings were inconsistent with her due process rights. Id. at 5.
      We find that the appellant’s contentions are without merit.
¶16        On October 5, 2016, the parties agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice
      after each party had a change in representation. IAF, Tab 59, Tab 61, Initial
      Decision. After redocketing the appeal, the administrative judge rescheduled the
      hearing for May 17, 2016, at the request of the agency representative, who
      indicated that she had family obligations that precluded travel on the scheduled
      hearing date of May 5, 2016. RAF, Tab 15 at 4, Tab 17. Although the appellant
      argues that the administrative judge improperly delayed the hearing for the
      agency representative’s “family outings,” there is no evidence that the appellant
      objected to the change in hearing date. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The hearing went
      forward as scheduled on May 17, 2016, and continued to May 25, 2016. RAF,
      Tabs 29, 31.      Under these circumstances, we decline to find that the
      administrative judge abused her discretion in delaying the hearing by less than a
      month.   See Bergstein v. U.S. Postal Service, 28 M.S.P.R. 495, 497 (1985)
      (declining to find that a presiding official abused his discretion when he
      scheduled a hearing without first consulting with the appellant, and observing that
      it is common practice to schedule and reschedule hearin gs for a variety of
      circumstances); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(5)-(6) (reflecting that administrative
      judges have authority to hold and regulate hearings).
¶17        In fact, the appellant herself requested and received two extensions for
      filing her prehearing submissions.    RAF, Tabs 11-12, 16-17.      On review, she
      argues that the administrative judge improperly returned submissions because the
      appellant did not serve the agency, even though these submiss ions were
      accompanied by certificates of service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 7-8; RAF, Tabs 14,
      23, 35-36. She does not provide copies of her certificates of service or any other
      evidence that she mailed these submissions to the agency. PFR File, Tabs 1, 11.
      Nor does she identify the documents that she believes the administrative judge
                                                                                     10

      improperly excluded from evidence at the hearing, or explain why they should
      have been admitted. Id. Under these circumstances, we decline to find that the
      administrative judge abused her broad discretion on these matters.            See
      McCarthy v. International Boundary & Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594,
      ¶ 24 (2011) (declining to find that an administrative judge abused his discretion
      by rejecting the appellant’s proffer of documents on the ground that they were not
      included as exhibits in his prehearing submissions), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed.
      Cir. 2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(3), (8) (discussing the authority of
      administrative judges to, as pertinent here, rule on offers of proof and exhibit
      lists).
¶18             The appellant also appears to argue that she was only permitted four
      witnesses. However, the record reflects that the administrative judge approved
      11 of the appellant’s 21 requested witnesses. RAF, Tab 22 at 2, Tab 25 at 2.
      Seven of these witnesses, plus the appellant, testified at th e hearing. PFR File,
      Tabs 29, 31. The appellant argues that the administrative judge did not approve
      the most relevant witnesses. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. However, she does not explain
      the basis for her disagreement.      Id.   Finally, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge limited her to topics that the agency’s attorney “talked
      about,” and prematurely ended her testimony.      Id.   Because the appellant has
      failed to provide any specific arguments or record citations to substantiate her
      claims, we decline to find that she has shown that the administrative judge
      improperly limited the witnesses or testimony. See Scoggins v. Department of the
      Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 20 (2016) (finding that the administrative judge did
      not abuse her broad discretion in controlling the proceedings by limiting the
      agency’s cross-examination of the appellant); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8) (providing
      that administrative judges have the authority to rule on witnesses). We also find
      that the administrative judge did not violate the appellant’s due process rights.
      See Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.
      Cir. 1999) (observing that the ultimate inquiry in connection with an alleged due
                                                                                           11

      process violation is whether it was “so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice
      that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation of
      property under such circumstances”).
¶19         Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition for review and affirm the
      initial decision dismissing her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of
      jurisdiction.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which case s fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S .
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      6
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       12

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
                                                                                13

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, cost s, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     14

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the Pr esident on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             15

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.