Court Opinion

ID: 9883879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:23:59.342151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.608531
License: Public Domain

OPINION
PAGE, Justice.
On January 19, 1995, Derek Jay Cassidy was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the crime of transporting unstamped packages of cigarettes in violation of Minn.Stat. § 297.11, subd. 5 (1996). Cassidy’s trial1 commenced on January 18, 1995, and was scheduled to last two days. On the morning of the second day, Cassidy failed to appear. He did, however, call the court and indicate that he had been unable to get a ride back to the trial and was stranded on the Roseau River Indian Reservation in Canada, where his home was located. The trial proceeded in his absence and Cassidy was found guilty. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Cassidy’s absence was voluntary, but upheld the conviction on the grounds that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before this court, Cassidy claims that the trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error when it ordered that the trial proceed in his absence. Because the trial record is inadequate for this court, on review, to make a determination as to whether Cassidy’s absence from the trial on the second day was voluntary, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
At Cassidy’s trial, the state presented its entire case on the first day, with Cassidy in attendance. After the prosecution rested, the defense called and completed the testimony of its first witness after which the trial was recessed until 9:00 a.m. the next morning. Cassidy returned to his home in Canada that evening to spend the night and to pick up a witness who was to testify on his behalf the next day. When the trial resumed the next morning, Cassidy was not present. At approximately 9:15 a.m. that morning, *709Cassidy called the courthouse, and a telephone conference was arranged between Cassidy, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. The judge gave Cassidy an opportunity to explain his absence from court, and Cassidy indicated that the car he had borrowed to travel to the trial on the first day and which he had previously arranged to use to return to the trial on the second day was unavailable because of an emergency in the car owner’s family. According to Cassi-dy, he tried until 3 a.m. that morning to arrange other transportation, but was not successful. Further discussion took place and, in the end, Cassidy stated, “[yjour Hon- or, for the record I want to be there for the whole trial.” The trial court ordered that the trial proceed with Cassidy absent, and the jury found him guilty.
The basic principles governing the right of an accused person to be present at trial are well-settled. “[A]n accused has a [constitutional] right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The right to be present during trial is based on the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment2 and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn.1977). The right to be present is also “protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985).
Like any constitutional right, the right to be present at trial may be waived by the accused. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (“The right at issue is the right to be present, and the question becomes whether that right was effectively waived by [defendant’s] voluntary absence.”) “A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends * * * upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case * * State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990). Typically, courts will imply a waiver when a defendant is absent without explanation. See United States v. Mackey, 915 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1990). Courts will also imply a waiver from a defendant’s conduct. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060-61, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). A defendant’s “voluntary absence without compelling justification * * * constitutes a waiver of the right to be present.” United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.1988). However, in determining whether a constitutional right has been waived, “courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. at 1060.
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure also speak directly to the issue before us. Rule 26.03 requires that a defendant must be present at trial. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(1). The right to be present under this rule is broader than those rights guaranteed by either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments. State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn.1993). The rule specifically states that the “defendant shall be present * * * at every stage of the trial * * * except as otherwise provided by these rules.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(1). One of the exceptions found in subdivision 1(2) of the same rule, states:
The further progress of a trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to waive the right to be present whenever:
1. a defendant voluntarily and without justification absents himself or herself after trial has commenced * * *.
Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(2).
We review a decision to proceed with trial in absentia under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless clear*710ly erroneous. See United States v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir.1992); Mackey, 915 F.2d at 72. A trial court has “only a narrow discretion in deciding whether to proceed with a trial when the defendant is [absent] because the right to be present at one’s own trial must be carefully safeguarded.” United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, there must be an adequate record for this court to review. See Local Oil Co., Inc. v. City of Anoka, 303 Minn. 537, 539, 225 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn.1975) (stating that when the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review, interests of justice are best served by remanding case for reconsideration upon facts in record and such additional evidence as the parties may produce).
Clearly, a defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her absence from trial was involuntary. That burden is a heavy one to meet, and rightly so. Our judicial system could not function if defendants were allowed to pick and choose when to- show up for trial. However, when the constitutional right to be present at trial is involved, the trial court must be extremely cautious in determining whether that absence is voluntary and should set forth with specificity its rationale for finding the right waived and the facts supporting that rationale. See, e.g., Mackey, 915 F.2d at 73-74 (finding reversible error where the trial court continued the trial when the defendant’s absence was not clearly voluntary).
To determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Cassidy voluntarily waived his right to be present 'at the entirety of his trial, we must examine the court record. On the limited facts one can glean from the record before us, it is clear that Cassidy’s decision to leave the jurisdiction by going home for the evening and to pick up a witness for the next day’s proceedings was voluntary, but the record is not clear that his failure to return for trial the next morning was voluntary and without justification. Voluntarily leaving the jurisdiction of the court, with plans to return, in order to go home3 during the evening while the trial is in recess and to pick up a witness who is to testify at trial the next day, only to discover that you have lost your transportation back to the trial, is not necessarily the same as voluntarily absenting yourself from the trial.
Here, while the trial court discussed the voluntariness of Cassidy’s return home, it failed to set forth with sufficient specificity its rationale for finding that Cassidy voluntarily and without justification failed to return for the remainder of the trial and therefore waived his right to be present on the second day of his trial. The trial court also failed to set forth sufficient facts to support that finding. Thus, the problem we are faced with in this ease is that the record before us is insufficient to make a determination as to the voluntariness of and lack of justification for Cassidy’s failure to return for the remainder of the trial.4 Absent an adequate record, it is virtually impossible for this court, on review, to determine whether Cassidy voluntarily waived his right to be present or whether the trial court abused its discretion in going forward with the trial.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to condone Cassidy’s failure to be present on the second day of his trial. Nor do we fail to appreciate “the additional burdens, waste and expense inflicted upon .the court, government [and] witnesses * * * and the public’s interest in seeing the accused brought to trial as well as the court’s responsibility to do so speedily.” United States v. *711Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.1977). Rather, our conclusion signifies that when a constitutional right as fundamental as the right to be present at one’s own trial is implicated, the trial court has an obligation to safeguard that right,5 and when a court concludes that the right is voluntarily waived, it must set forth with some specificity its rationale for finding the constitutional right voluntarily, and without justification, waived and the facts supporting the rationale so that its conclusion can be properly reviewed on appeal. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.

. This was Cassidy’s second trial in this matter. At his first trial, Cassidy was arrested for, charged with, tried, and found guilty of transporting unstamped cigarettes in violation of Minn.Stat. § 297.11, subd. 5, and presenting false identification in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.22(3) (1996). The facts underlying Cassi-dy’s arrest and conviction are as follows. On August 6, 1992, the pick-up truck Cassidy was driving in Marshall County pulled off the roadway and stopped on the shoulder. A Minnesota State Patrol trooper observed the truck pull over and stopped to see if he could be of assistance. As he approached the truck, the trooper noticed that neither the driver nor the truck’s passenger were wearing their seat belts and, as a result, the trooper asked Cassidy for his driver’s license. The license Cassidy presented had the name Desmond L. Anderson on it. The passenger presented identification bearing the same name. When pressed, Cassidy explained to the trooper that he did not have a driver’s license in his own name and had presented his passenger's license. Ultimately, the trooper asked Cassidy for permission to search the pick-up truck and Cassidy consented. Under a tarp covering the bed of the pick-up truck the trooper found 20 cases of cigarettes which did not bear the appropriate tax stamps. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on its conclusion that the trial court erred in precluding Cassidy from presenting evidence that the cigarettes were being transported in interstate commerce, which is not a violation of Minn.Stat. § 297.11, subd. 5. This court declined review.

. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to * * * be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const, amend. VI.

. The fact that a defendant's home is located outside the court's jurisdiction should not in and of itself preclude the defendant from going home for the evening. Further, we note that there is nothing in this record which remotely suggests that this defendant was attempting to flee the court’s jurisdiction.

. The dissent makes a compelling argument that the record is more than adequate to support the conclusion that Cassidy voluntarily left the jurisdiction of the court after the first day of trial. The problem with this argument is that the question we must answer is not whether Cassidy voluntarily left the court’s jurisdiction; the question we must answer is whether Cassidy voluntarily and without justification failed to return for the remainder of the trial.

. This is particularly true when, as is the case here, the trial court judge believes that the question of the defendant's guilt is a "close call.”