Court Opinion

ID: 9518737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:00:50.315536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:43.851135
License: Public Domain

¶ 43. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
(concurring). In the present case, the defendant argues that the State violated the circuit court's witness "sequestration" order when the prosecutor communicated with a State's witness during a break in that witness's trial testimony.1 If the attorney violated the court order, the error was harmless.
¶ 44. I write separately to urge that exclusion and separation orders be stated with particularity to avoid misunderstandings.2 Although the practice of limiting a witness's access to other witnesses can be traced to English and Germanic law,3 many open questions remain about the limitations a court may prescribe.
*387¶ 45. Wisconsin Stat. § 906.15 governs both the exclusion and the separation of witnesses. Although the statute uses the words "exclusion" and "separation" to mean different procedures, the two words are often used interchangeably in the cases. Sequestration is also used to refer to exclusion or separation or both.4
¶ 46. "Exclusion" means to remove witnesses from a courtroom and, according to § 906.15(1), is mandatory upon request. Section 906.15(1) provides that upon the request of a party, the judge or the court commissioner "shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses." A judge or court commissioner may also make the order on his or her own motion.5 Section 906.15(1), however, does not authorize excluding certain individuals, such as a party or a victim, among others.6
*388¶ 47. "Separation" means to remove witnesses from a courtroom to separate areas. According to Wis. Stat. § 906.15(3), the judge or court commissioner "may-direct that all excluded and non-excluded witnesses be kept separate until called and may prevent them from communicating with one another until they have been examined or the hearing is ended." The decision to separate witnesses is within the discretion of a court.7
¶ 48. The aim of exclusion and separation orders is to exercise restraint on witnesses tailoring their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; to detect testimony that is less than candid; and, when a witness's testimony is interrupted by a recess, to prevent improper attempts to influence the testimony in light of the testimony already given.8
¶ 49. Courts imposing a separation or exclusion order and parties seeking such an order should specify the scope of the order so as to prevent potential misunderstandings, including whether the order limits communications between witnesses and attorneys. Thus, a circuit court might state, for example, which witnesses the order applies to, how long the order applies with respect to each witness, whether the witnesses should remain physically separate, whether the witnesses should not discuss the case or their testimony *389with another witness, whether the witnesses should not he told directly or indirectly what other witnesses have said, whether the witnesses should not read a transcript of another witness's trial testimony, and whether a witness should not confer with counsel during the witness's testimony, including during a recess.9 Whether an order should limit or prohibit counsel in a criminal case from conferring with the defendant raises special issues.10
*390¶ 50. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 51. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this opinion.

 For discussions of exclusion and separation orders, see 6 Wigmore, Evidence ch. 63 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Daniel Blinka, 7 Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 615.1 at 456 (2d ed. 2001); John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 50 at 206-11 (1999).

 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976).

 See, e.g., Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 409, 249 N.W.2d 524 (1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998).

 Wis. Stat. § 906.15(1).

 According to Wis. Stat. §906.15(2), subsection (1) does not authorize exclusion of any of the following:
(a) A party who is a natural person.
(b) An officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney.
(c) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
(d) A victim, as defined in s. 950.02(4) in a criminal case or a victim, as defined in s. 938.02(20m) in a delinquency proceeding under ch. 938, unless the judge or circuit court commissioner finds that exclusion of the victim is necessary to provide a fair trial for the defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for the juvenile. The presence of a victim during the testimony of other witnesses may not by itself be a basis for a finding that *388exclusion of the victim is necessary to provide a fair trial for the defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for the juvenile.

 Fletcher v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 381, 388, 228 N.W.2d 708 (1975); Abraham v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 44, 54, 176 N.W.2d 349 (1970); Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 79, 82-83, 161 N.W.2d 209 (1968).

 Geders, 425 U.S. at 87; United States v. Strauss, 473 F.2d 1262, 1263 (3d Cir. 1973); Capital Cab Corp. v. Anderson, 85 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. 1949); Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d at 409.

 For a discussion of cases involving some of these orders, see, for example, John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 50, at 209, n.15 (1999).

 Geders, 425 U.S. at 91 (preventing defendant from consulting his counsel about anything during a 17-hour overnight recess in the trial between his direct and cross-examination deprived defendant of his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment); State v. James County, 41 So. 702, 704 (La. 1906) (order keeping witnesses where they could not hear testimony given at trial did not prevent district attorney from communicating with state witnesses); State v. Scott, 56 So.2d 839, 840 (Miss. 1952) (defense counsel allowed to conference with all defendant's witnesses, but not all together as a group); L. Williams v. State, 35 Tex. 355 (Tex. 1871) (placing the state's witnesses under a separation or exclusion order does "not deprive the district attorney of the right to confer with them in a proper manner; this is his privilege, and, moreover, may be regarded as his duty"). See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence ch. 63, § 1840 at 472 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) ("whether an attorney in the cause may consult with a sequestered witness has been the subject of some difference of opinion; the possibilities of abuse by unscrupulous persons ... are certainly great") (reference to footnote omitted).
For cases stating that orders preventing defendants from consulting their attorneys during an overnight recess infringe upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950); People v. Nobble, 248 *390N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1969); Commonwealth v. Werner, 214 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1965). But see People v. Prevost, 189 N.W 92 (Mich. 1922).
For cases discussing orders preventing defendants from consulting their attorneys during a brief routine recess during the trial day, see United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).