Court Opinion

ID: 9695500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:02.44041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.277753
License: Public Domain

Hallows, J.
(dissenting). In my opinion the trial court clearly abused its discretion in allowing Mrs. Whitman to remove the children to Florida for no better reason than that she wanted to be near her parents who contemplated moving from Wisconsin to Florida. When the divorce was granted and the custody of the children was awarded to the mother, she was given the home in Appleton where the children and their father could enjoy at least weekend association. The burden of proof to change this arrangement rests upon Mrs. Whitman to show the well-being of the children will be better served by the removal of the children to Florida. Greenlee v. Greenlee (1964), 23 Wis. (2d) 669, 127 N. W. (2d) 737; Anderson v. Anderson (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 133, 98 N. W. (2d) 434; 27B C. J. S, Divorce, p. 483, sec. 313. This she has failed to do. The most the evidence shows is that in respect to economic and educational matters the interests of the children were not affected, but we think more is required to justify a modification of the divorce judgment respecting the children.
The proof should show that the interests of the children are better served and promoted by the change, not merely *63that their interests are not adversely affected. In Peterson v. Peterson (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 26, 108 N. W. (2d) 126, we allowed a mother to remove a child to Minnesota but it was pointed out that such removal was for the best interests of the child. Likewise, in Anderson v. Anderson (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 133, 98 N. W. (2d) 434, this court required children to be brought back to Wisconsin from Mexico because the health requirements for their being in Mexico no longer existed and their future would be better assured by their return to Wisconsin. In Bennett v. Bennett (1938), 228 Wis. 401, 280 N. W. 363, we allowed the father who had custody of the children to remove them to New York where he had secured a better job with greater opportunities, but this was on the ground that such reasons relating primarily to the parent who had custody indirectly were for the best interests of the children and would result in a benefit to them. To the same effect are Baer v. Baer (Mo. App., 1932), 51 S. W. (2d) 873; King v. King (1931), 61 N. D. 422, 237 N. W. 854; see 15 A. L. R. (2d) 432, Anno.—Custody of Child—Right of Nonresident.
No such case is presented here; the only reason advanced is that an adult woman wants to follow her parents’ removal from Wisconsin. She claims she has a right to live her own life in a place conducive to her happiness and welfare. This reason illustrates one of the tragedies of all divorces — an egocentric attitude and an unwillingness to sacrifice for others. It has been rightly said the real tragedy of a divorce falls upon the helpless children of the ill-starred marriage; they are the ones who can no longer look forward to the love and security of a normal homelife and the guidance and association of both parents. Because of this fact, the law is ever zealous of their rights and requires that the dominant and paramount reason for any change in their custody be their best interests. Greenlee v. Greenlee, supra; Block v. Block (1961), 15 Wis. (2d) 291, 112 N. W. (2d) 923; Bliffert *64v. Bliffert (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 316, 111 N. W. (2d) 188; Subrt v. Subrt (1957), 275 Wis. 628, 83 N. W. (2d) 122; Dodge v. Dodge (1955), 268 Wis. 441, 67 N. W. (2d) 878.
The majority opinion pays little heed to the right of the children to emotional stability, to their rights to the association of both parents. While divorce has severed the marriage, it has not dissolved any bonds of parenthood. True, the law has not yet developed to the point where the rights of the children of divorces are recognized independently from those of the parents. We still determine children’s rights in our adversary system through the enforcement of some right of a warring parent, but such an approach emphasizes too much the form in which the determination is made and tends to treat all children of a divorce as chattel. The majority opinion does not consider the effect on the children of being denied their right to the association and the companionship of their father. It is no answer to say the father is wealthy and can afford to go to Florida and his job is not so time-consuming as to make the trip a hardship. This is viewing the problem solely from the standpoint of the father. Living in Florida is not as convenient or conducive to a normal relationship between the father and his children from the children’s standpoint as living in the same city.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Currie joins in this dissent.