Court Opinion

ID: 9942198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 18:01:32.909431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:48.982591
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           FEB 20 2024
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN ALAN ARNETT,                              No.    23-15432

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00284-JCH

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
PETE BUTTIGIEG, The Honorable Pete
Buttigieg, Secretary of Transportation,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                John Charles Hinderaker, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 8, 2024
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and JOHNSTONE, Circuit
Judges.

      Appellant Brian Arnett appeals the district court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of Pete Buttigieg in his capacity as the Secretary of

Transportation (the “Secretary”). Arnett claims the Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) discriminated against him in violation of the Age

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) when it deemed him ineligible for

three positions for which he applied in 2017 and 2018. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand to the district court for trial.

      We review a “district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Opara v.

Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2023). We “view[] the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party” to “determine whether there are any

genuine issues of material fact.” Id. (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d

1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009)).

      1. The district court found Arnett’s claim was foreclosed by 5 U.S.C.

§ 3307(b). We disagree. The FAA has not shown that the § 3307(b) exception to

the ADEA applies to Arnett’s claim.1

      The maximum entry age statute, 5 U.S.C. § 3307(b), provides that “[t]he

Secretary may . . . determine and fix the maximum limit of age within which an

original appointment to a position as an air traffic controller may be made.” Courts

have held that § 3307 creates a valid exception to the ADEA. See, e.g., Stewart v.

Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The FAA asserts that notwithstanding

the fact that Arnett was not seeking an “original appointment,” this provision

shields its policies from the scope of the ADEA. It argues that it was not asserting

1
 The parties do not dispute that the FAA Maximum Entry Age policy, EMP-1.20,
provides that “[p]ersons who have reached their 31st birthdays may not be
originally appointed to [air traffic control specialist] positions in the FAA.”

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that Arnett sought an “original appointment” in 2017 and 2018. Instead, the FAA

asserts that § 3307(b) implies an authority to conditionally waive the maximum

entry age and that, for Arnett, those conditions included the FAA’s ineligibility

determinations.

      The FAA’s argument reads the words “original appointment” out of the

statute. This violates the fundamental principle of statutory construction that we

should give effect to every word in the statute. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.

19, 31 (2001). Section 3307(b) creates an exception that encompasses only

“original appointment[s].” The FAA asserts that the Retired Military Controller

(“RMC”) program under which it first appointed Arnett was set up in this manner

to avoid any issues with the mandatory retirement age set forth in 5 U.S.C.

§ 8335(a). Notwithstanding this policy argument, we cannot read these statutes so

broadly as to exempt the FAA’s hiring of air traffic controllers from the ADEA if

an individual is not challenging either the maximum entry age for an original

appointment or the mandatory retirement age.2 Accordingly, 5 U.S.C. § 3307(b)

does not provide a defense to the FAA in this case.3

      2. Absent a specific statutory exemption from the ADEA, there remains a

2
  Because the events in this case took place before Congress explicitly authorized
an RMC program, we do not address the scope or limitations of 49 U.S.C.
§ 44506(f)(4).
3
  We do not reach whether, on remand, the FAA may use those policy justifications
as the basis for an affirmative defense under the ADEA.

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genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the FAA’s policies and their

application to Arnett violate 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). That section provides that “[a]ll

personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at

least 40 years of age . . . in executive agencies . . . shall be made free from any

discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).

      Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Arnett, the policies in

question present direct evidence of age discrimination.4 Under 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a),

to obtain damages, a plaintiff “must show that age discrimination was a but-for

cause of the employment outcome.” Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1177–78

(2020). “‘[V]ery little . . . evidence is necessary’ to establish a prima facie case

through direct evidence.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 725 (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia

Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996)).

      Arnett has made a sufficient showing here. The variant of the Maximum

Entry Age Policy that applies to RMC hires, EMP-1.20a, singles out those hires, at

least in part, by their age at initial hiring. The FAA’s human resource Policy

Bulletin #92, which cancelled the RMC program and provided a grandfathering

4
 We decline to apply McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
because that “test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
Similarly, we do not consider whether Arnett has sufficiently pled a disparate
impact claim. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) (“In disparate-
impact cases, . . . the allegedly ‘otherwise prohibited’ activity is not based on
age.”).

                                           4
provision that limited eligibility for certain transfers, applied only to RMC hires.

And those policies treated RMC hires differently from non-RMC hires in

determining their ability to freely move between covered and non-covered

positions after the age of 31. A reasonable fact-finder could find that the policies

are “discriminatory on [their] face.” Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121.

       Because 5 U.S.C. § 3307(b) does not apply here, we reverse and remand to

the district court for trial.

       REVERSED and REMANDED.

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