Court Opinion

ID: 9497654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:56:46.891152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:20.116416
License: Public Domain

BEA, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in all sections of Judge Gould’s opinion except as to Sections II.B and II.C. I write separately, however, because although United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2004), controls here, I see it as wrongly decided, notwithstanding Judge Gould’s faithful attempts to bolster its reasoning.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether Asberry’s prior conviction for statutory rape is a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.2, which governs As-berry’s sentence enhancement. Section 4B1.2(a) provides:
[t]he term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that — (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, in*721volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
The commentary to section 4B1.2 further explains a “crime of violence” includes “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 1 (emphasis added).
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which governs sentence enhancements for an alien’s unlawful reentry into the United States, provides:
“[cjrime of violence” means any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as, an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. l(B)(iii) (2003) (emphasis added).1
In Granbois, we held the defendant’s prior conviction for engaging in sexual contact with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)2 was a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2. 376 F.3d at 996. We did so by incorporating the “crime of violence” definition of section 2L1.2 into section 4B1.2; since section 2L1.2 classifies “sexual abuse of a minor” as a “crime of violence,” we held engaging in sexual contact with a minor was a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 4B1.2. Id.
Granbois observed there was a difference between the “crime of violence” definitions in sections 2L1.2 and 4B1.2, but held it was immaterial:
We acknowledge that different words are used in some other definitions of “crime of violence” in the Guidelines and its notes. It would perhaps be clearer if the Commission used a more consistent definition. But there is no indication that the term is intended to mean something different for this provision than it does elsewhere.
Id. (quoting United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.2003)).
That language was dicta in Pereira-Salmeron because there we considered the section 2L1.2 "crime of violence" definition which contains the "sexual abuse of a minor" term. 337 F.3d at 1153. But Granbois considered the section 4B1.2 "crime of violence" definition, which does not contain the "sexual abuse of a minor" term.3 376 F.3d at 996. Granbois relied on Pereira-Salmeron's dicta to incorporate the section 2L1.2 "crime of violence" definition into the section 4B1.2 definition. Id. Thus, the language is part of Granbois's holding and is binding upon us. See Brand X Internet Serv. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir.2003) (this court's three-judge panels are bound by the holdings of earlier three-judge panels).
*722Here, Asberry has a prior conviction under Oregon’s “Rape in the Third Degree” statute, which defines as a felony “sexual intercourse with another person under 16 years of age” when the perpetrator was at least three years older than the victim. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.345, 163.355 (2003). Applying Granbois, we look to the “crime of violence” definitions in either sections 4B1.2 or 2L1.2 to determine whether the conviction is a “crime of violence.” See Granbois, 376 F.3d at 996. Since section 2L1.2 defines “crime of violence” to include “statutory rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor,” Asberry’s prior conviction of statutory rape is a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2. Cf id. (a prior conviction for sexual contact with another person between the ages of 12 and 16 and at least four years younger than the perpetrator is a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2).
Notwithstanding Granbois's binding effect here, it was wrongly decided for two reasons. First, in holding there is no difference between the "crime of violence" definitions in sections 4B1.2 and 2L1.2, Granbois ignores the inclusion of the "statutory rape" and "sexual abuse of a minor" terms in section 2L1.2, and the exclusion of those terms in section 4B1.2. Given such clear differences in text, to say the two sections mean the same is an approach contrary to basic principles of statutory construction. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, - U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2754, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) ("when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.").4
The intent of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Commission ("Commission") in establishing sentencing criteria for unlawful reentry into the United States is likely different than for sentencing criteria for being a felon in possession of a firearm. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, vol. II at 401-02 (stating Amendment 658 changed the "crime of violence" definition for section 2L1.2 by adding "statutory rape" and "sexual abuse of a minor" so that "[t]he amended definition makes clear that the enumerated offenses are always classified as `crimes of violence,' regardless of whether the prior offense expressly has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."). Indeed, our sister circuits have noted the Guidelines have different "crime of violence" definitions and have called on the Commission for clarification. See United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir.1997) (en banc); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir.1995); cf. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (overruling prior cases which conflated the section 4B1.2(a)(2) "crime of violence" definition (i.e., "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another") with the "crime of violence" definition from 18 U.S.C. § 16 (i.e., a crime that presents "a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense")).
Second, Granbois’s reliance on Pereiro-Salmeron was misplaced because Pereirar-Salmeron considered the broader and more inclusive “crime of violence” definition under section 2L1.2, a definition dif*723ferent from that of section 4B1.2 at issue in Granbois. See Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d at 1153. Pereira-Salmeron’s observation that there is no difference between the two “crime of violence” definitions was dicta, and incorrect dicta at that. See id.5
With respect, Judge Gould’s defense of Granbois in Section II.B of his opinion is beside the point. Section II.B observes that before 2001, the “crime of violence” definitions in sections 2L1.2 and 4B1.2 were, in relevant part, the same {e.g., both sections included the term “forcible sex offenses,” among others). Future amendments to section 2L1.2, however, diverged from section 4B1.2 {e.g., section 2L1.2 was amended to include “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape,” while section 4B1.2 still only included, in relevant part, “forcible sex offenses”). The Commission stated in commentary the amendment to section 2L1.2:
clarifies the meaning of the term “crime of violence” ... [because] [t]he previous definition often led to confusion over whether the specified offenses listed in that definition, particularly sexual abuse of a minor ... also had to include as an element of the offense “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. II at 401-02.
Judge Gould’s Section II.B thus reasons the “amendments to section 2L1.2 merely clarified the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence’ and provided elaboration regarding the offenses that are included within this category; the amendments did not change the definition of ‘crime of violence’ that section 2L1.2 originally borrowed from section 4B1.2.” Although the amendment “clarified” the “crime of violence” definition as to section 2L1.2, it did not clarify the “crime of violence” definition as to section 4B1.2. The Commission has amended the commentary to section 4B1.2 twice since 2001, and has not seen fit to include the terms “sexual abuse of a minor” or “statutory rape” within the commentary to section 4B1.2 by either of those amendments. The Commission has, however, amended the commentary to section 2L1.2, including the terms “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape” under that section’s definition of “crime of violence.” Whether those additions were a clarification to the term “forcible sex offenses” (shared by both sections 2L1.2 and 4B1.2), or were a more substantive change, is irrelevant here. Until the Commission either amends or “clarifies” the language in section 4B1.2, we should apply the text found within section 4B1.2, which governs Asberry’s sentence enhancement, not the text found within section 2L1.2, which does not so govern. It is the role of the Commission, not the courts, to issue amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200-01, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992).
Nevertheless, because Granbois is controlling here, we are bound by it. See Brand X Internet Serv., 345 F.3d at 1130. However, if we had the opportunity to reconsider Granbois as an en banc panel, I would conclude that the record here does *724not support the conclusion that non-forcible statutory rape between a 21-year-old male and a 15-year-old female presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Indeed, the government failed to show the acts leading to the defendant’s prior conviction were more likely than not to present a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See Shannon, 110 F.3d at 385-88 (the district court found the defendant’s prior felony conviction for statutory rape, defined as “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16,” was a crime of violence because it presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another”; the court of appeals affirmed, relying on medical studies detailing risks of injuries to young girls engaging in intercourse and reasoning a 13-year-old cannot appreciate the “disease and fertility risks of intercourse,” and thus the risks and complications of an involuntary pregnancy and an ensuing “quasi-involuntary” abortion were sufficient to present a serious risk of physical injury to the victim); see also United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir.1998) (holding the government did not present sufficient evidence to show pregnancy, by itself, is an injury when the statutory rape victim was 16 years old, and distinguishing Shannon because the risk of sex for the 13-year-old victim there was much greater than the risk to a 16-year-old).6 Here, the government failed to meet its burden by not providing evidence that pregnancy itself, the risks and complications of pregnancy, or the risks of sexually transmitted diseases, presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury” to a 15-year-old victim.7 Accordingly, in the absence of Granbois, I would hold a prior conviction for non-forcible statutory rape between a 21-year-old male and a 15-year-old female, in the absence of evidence the statutory rape presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury” to the victim, is not a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2.
For the reasons expressed above, I separately concur in the judgment and all sections of Judge Gould’s opinion except as to Sections II.B and II.C.

. The 2003 version of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 became effective November 5, 2003, before entry of Asberry's judgment on December 23, 2003. The previous version, discussed below in both United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2004), and United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.2003), did not include the “statutory rape” term.

. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3), it is a crime for a person to have sexual contact with another person who is between the ages of 12 and 16 and is at least four years younger than the perpetrator.

. Nor does U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 contain the "statutory rape” term, while U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 does.

. Asberry argues the panel should not follow Granbois because it conflicts with principles of statutory construction. Principles of statutory construction, however, are not mandatory rules, but only nonconclusive interpretative aids. United States v. Bert, 292 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir.2002).

. During oral argument, Asberry also argued the panel should not follow Granbois because it conflicts with Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), which held the commentary to the Guidelines "is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. at 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913. Granbois does not conflict with Stinson; the court in Granbois did not disregard the commentary as the court of appeals did in Stinson, but instead interpreted the commentary by incorporating one "crime of violence” definition into a similar one.

. Both Shannon and Thomas are consistent with this Court's past decisions (except for Granbois). Before Granbois, the issue whether non-forcible statutory rape is a "crime of violence” under section 4B1.2 was an issue of first impression. United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 1160 n. 11 (9th Cir.1999). Riley did state "the physical risks associated with sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy” are possible risks of injury arising from rape, but that observation was only a factor in the holding and would not necessarily compel the conclusion that non-forcible statutory rape is a "crime of violence.” Id. at 1159; cf. United States v. Carter, 266 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.2001) (holding a prior conviction for transportation of a minor with intent to turn the minor into a prostitute presents a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another” because the minor may contract a sexually transmitted disease).

. There was no medical evidence adduced by the government to show this, or any other, 15-year-old victim of statutory rape would be exposed to any greater risk of pregnancy than an adult woman under the same or similar circumstances. For instance, there was no evidence whether Asberry, his victim, or both, used any contraceptive devices, or if so why such devices would be less effective given their ages, than if they were older. Nor did the government present any evidence that intercourse between this or any other 21-year-old male and a 15-year-old female creates a greater risk of sexually transmitted disease than intercourse between two adults. For instance, there was no evidence as to Asberty's health at the time of the acts which led to the earlier conviction.