Court Opinion

ID: 9914525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 15:11:51.768747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:20.414489
License: Public Domain

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Rutland Unit Docket # 157-3-15 Rdev
IN RE: very pa qoman, ome
SERGIO MENDEZ LED
Petition for Post Conviction Relief ABR é g 2016

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
RUTLAND

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

A hearing on the merits took place on November 17, 2015. Petitioner Sergio
Mendez was represented by Attorney Dawn Matthews, and he participated by Skype.
Attorney John G. D. Waszak represented the Rutland County State’s Attorney. Post trial
memoranda were filed.

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks to have his June 2013
conviction for felony aggravated domestic assault, which was based on a plea and which
resulted in his deportation, vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel on the
grounds that his attorney did not sufficiently explore alternative pleas or sentences that
would have lessened the likelihood of deportation.

On January 11, 2016, the court, having learned from a post-hearing memorandum
that there was a pending appeal related to the conviction, questioned the basis tor
deciding this post conviction relief action prior to the conclusion of the direct appeal. The
Vermont Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the conviction on the direct appeal. See
State v. Mendez, 2016 VT 24. That issue is now moot, and this decision is now issued.

Based on the evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Findings of Fact

Petitioner came to this country from the Dominican Republic with his family in
1992 when he was 12 years old. He was raised in Massachusetts, where he attended
school and grew up with both his immediate and extended family. His immigration status
was as a legal permanent resident. He had one scrape with the law when he was a
teenager resulting in a charge of resisting arrest but the charge was dropped. Most of his
close and extended family members continue to live in Massachusetts, including his
children. Prior to the conviction in this case, he was working in Ayer, Massachusetts.
In May of 2013 he was visiting in Vermont and was arrested after an altercation
with his girlfriend. He was charged with felony aggravated domestic assault and held for
lack of bail in Docket No. 811-5-13 Rder. He was eager to get out of jail and back to
work in Massachusetts. He retained attorney James Valente to represent him. Mr. Valente
did not meet with him in jail, but spoke with him on the telephone. Mr. Valente
understood that he was not a citizen, and that he was eager to get out of jail.

Deputy State’s Attorney Peter Bevere was the prosecutor assigned to the case. Mr.
Valente spoke with Mr. Bevere and learned that Mr. Bevere was committed to obtaining
a plea on the felony aggravated domestic assault charge. Mr. Valente knew that a felony
domestic violence conviction would be grounds for deportation. He wanted to know the
immigration effect of a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction as an alternative. He
made two telephone calls to obtain this information. He first called an immigration
attorney who could not help him with consequences of a criminal matter. He then called a
telephone number in Massachusetts for information about criminal case immigration
matters. He does not recall] whom he called but believes that the telephone number was
sponsored by either Catholic Charities or the Public Defender in Massachusetts. He
learned that any plea to a domestic assault, whether a felony or misdemeanor, would
make a non-citizen deportable. His investigation ended there. He did no further
investigation into possibilities of avoiding or minimizing the chances of deportation
through pleas to other possible amended charges.

Mr. Valente called Mr. Mendez at the jail and told him that the plea proposal of
the State would make him deportable. They “did not get into the weeds of the deportation
issue” even though to Mr. Valente “it seemed that he did not take seriously the threat of
deportation.” Mr. Mendez was focused on getting out of jail.

Mr. Bevere offered an agreement to a sentence of 18-36 months, all suspended,
with a probationary term of two years in exchange for a guilty plea to the felony
aggravated domestic assault. The effect would be Mr. Mendez’s immediate release from
jail on probation, which would allow him to return to Massachusetts. Mr. Valente told
Mr. Mendez of the proposal over the telephone, and told him that the effect would be that
he would be deportable. He did not say that deportation was a certain consequence of
such a plea with no opportunity to avoid it, nor did he propose alternative pleas that
might leave an opening for avoidance of deportation. He told Mr. Mendez that his only
other option was to go to trial and hope for a break in the case. Mr. Mendez wished to
accept the offer. Mr. Valente counseled against it. He did not develop alternative
proposals to present to the prosecutor.

Mr. Bevere testified at the hearing in this case that he might have been open to a
plea agreement to a misdemeanor with a jail term, rather than a felony, but if that were
under consideration he would have pursued further discussion with the complainant and
more analysis of the strength of the case and ramifications of such a proposal. None of
this happened, as Mr. Valente notified Mr. Bevere that Mr. Mendez accepted Mr.

Bevere’s first offer.
On June 23, 2013, Mr. Valente and Mr. Mendez met face-to-face for the first time
in the holding cell at court. They were there to prepare for the change-of-plea hearing that
had been scheduled as a result of Mr. Mendez’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s offer.

Mr. Valente did not think that the resolution was a good one. During the meeting
he tried to counsel Mr. Mendez not to accept the offer, and he did so using rough
language in hopes of persuading him. Mr. Mendez wanted to accept the offer. Mr.
Valente had prepared in advance a typed document entitled a “Waiver” for review by Mr.
Mendez if he wished to proceed with the plea. It identified the terms of the State’s offer.
It then stated:

I wish to accept this plea. Mr. Valente has advised me that should I accept this
plea, it would be grounds for negative immigration consequences including
deportation because the charge is a crime of domestic violence and a felony. I
have further been advised by Mr. Valente that even if the authorities do not
attempt to deport me the consequences of this plea include rendering me ineligible
to attain citizenship.

I have reviewed this waiver with Mr. Valente and it is my wish to go forward with
the proposed plea agreement despite the potential consequences including
deportation or inability to attain citizenship. I have not been pressured by Mr.
Valente to sign this waiver and my signature is not in exchange for any promises.

Mr. Valente went over this document slowly with Mr. Mendez, and also reviewed the
terms of the plea agreement and probation conditions. Mr. Mendez signed this Waiver
and swore or affirmed that it was his free act and deed before a notary public. There is no
evidence that there was any discussion of the deportation issue in any further depth or
detail than as contained in the Waiver document.

At the time of the change of plea, Mr. Valente was anxious because he believed
that despite the fact that they had reviewed the terms of the Waiver together carefully, he
believed that Mr. Mendez did not understand the consequences of the plea deal. Mr.
Mendez’s family members were at the court that day, but Mr. Valente did not talk with
them.

Mr. Mendez pled guilty to the felony aggravated domestic assault charge that day
pursuant to the plea agreement. During the plea colloquy, the Judge asked him: “Do you
understand that if you’re not a United States citizen, this conviction could affect your
ability to remain in the country, obtain your U.S. citizenship or reenter the country?” He
responded, “I understand that.” Other than this question and answer, there was no other
reference to his immigration status or immigration consequences of the plea.

Mr. Mendez returned to Massachusetts and was on probation. Three months later.
he came to Vermont again, and as a result of further contacts with his old girlfriend he
was charged in October of 2013 with a new count of domestic assault in Docket No.
1825-10-13 Rdcr, as well as violation of probation in the prior case. He was dissatisfied

od
with the public defender assigned to him and in March of 2014 he retained Mr. Valente to
represent him again.

Mr. Mendez’s family gave Mr, Valente the name of an immigration attorney in
Massachusetts, whom he called. He learned that ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement) had already placed a detainer on Mr. Mendez, meaning that he was going
to be deported whenever he was released from incarceration. Because of the sentence he
had received as a result of the initial plea to the aggravated felony domestic assault, he
was not only deportable but deportation was inevitable and nothing could be done to
avoid it. Mr. Valente negotiated with Mr. Bevere that Mr. Mendez would plead to the
domestic violence charge as a misdemeanor and admit to violating probation with the
result that the sentence on the original felony domestic assault was changed to 15 months
to serve with a concurrent sentence of 15 months plus one day. Mr. Valente did not
attempt to negotiate with the State to change the initial conviction to avoid immigration
consequences, and because deportation was already guaranteed because of the initial
conviction, he did not attempt to negotiate a plea agreement in the new charge that would
have avoided deportation.

Mr. Mendez served his sentence, and then was placed in the custody of ICE,
where he remained in detention for 10 months while he sought to avoid deportauion to no
avail. He was deported to the Dominican Republic in November of 2015, not long before
the hearing in this case. He participated in the hearing by Skype. He testified that if he
had understood that it was a certainty that the plea agreement would have resulted in him
being deported to a country he did not know and in which he had no family, he would not
have accepted the plea.

Mr. Mendez’s expert witness, Bradley Stetler, is a criminal defense attorney with
over 30 years of experience in Vermont. He testified about the standard of practice to be
met by an attorney under the circumstances of this case. His testimony was that Mr.
Valente had not met that standard of practice, and that the deviation from it affected the
outcome of the case.

He testified that the standard of practice for an attorney representing a non-cilizen
accused of a crime is to acquire a clear understanding of the person’s immigration status;
to consider a variety of potential dispositions of the criminal case and their consequences;
to consult with an immigration attorney to make sure of an accurate understanding of the
likely consequences of each of the various possible dispositions; and to advise the client
of the consequences of potential dispositions. As applied to this case, he testified that Mr.
Valente had a duty to investigate and explore possible alternatives to the State’s plea
offer that did not make Mr. Mendez automatically deportable but either were non-
deportable offenses or else were offenses that left open a window to argue for relief from
deportation before an immigration judge. His opinion is that Mr. Valente failed to do
enough to investigate alternatives or attempt to negotiate a plea that would reduce the

likelihood of deportation.

He testified that in this case, there were four alternatives that were not explored:
1) Amendment of the charge to either simple assault with a reckless mens rea or
reckless endangerment. Convictions of these charges do not render a person
deportable.

2) Pursuit of a sentence that would have preserved the opportunity for Mr. Mendez
to be eligible for deportation relief. The elements of a conviction that guarantee
deportation are (a) a crime of violence, and (b) a sentence of one year or more. If
a sentence could be for less than a year, then the opportunity is available to avoid
deportation. An important goal of the defense attorney is to keep a sentence under
a year so that the person is “deportation relief eligible,” which means that the
opportunity is preserved to argue against deportation to an immigration judge.

3) Amendment of the charge to domestic assault with a reckless mens rea. There is
some case law to support a determination that such a conviction is not for a crime
of violence. With such a conviction, Mr. Mendez would have been able to argue
that case law in seeking to avoid deportation.

4) Entry of a plea to the charge without an agreed-upon sentence. This would have
provided the opportunity to make an argument to the judge to seek a sentence of
less than a year in order to become deportation relief eligible. His lack of a prior
criminal record, legal permanent residency status, extended family ties in the U.S.
including children, and his employment were favorable factors for him in making
such an argument. (These factors could also have been argued to an immigration
judge with a “deportation relief eligible” conviction.)

Mr. Stetler testified that Mr. Valente’s work fell below the standard of practice
when he did not try to identify and negotiate for any of these alternative charges or
sentences that would have had safer deportation consequences. He testified that such
alternatives are viable in that it is common for pleas to be entered on reduced charges. He
provided statistics showing that in Rutland over a seven-year period, it was common for
cases with the same initial charge as Mr. Mendez had (130 such cases) to result in
convictions for reduced charges, and 40% of them resulted in charges for simple assault,
reckless endangerment, or disorderly conduct, all of which can be “deportation safe”
convictions.

He also testified that Mr. Valente fell below the standard of practice when he did
not inform Mr. Mendez adequately about the certainty that the consequence of the plea
deal offered by the State was deportation. Specifically, he testified that while Mr. Valente
spoke of and wrote on the Waiver form about “negative immigration consequences
including deportation” and the “potential” of deportability, he did not make the
consequences clear enough. He should have advised Mr. Mendez that if he came to the
attention of authorities, deportation would be a definite certainty, not just a possibility,
and that if that happened, at that point there would be no arguments that could be made to
any authority avoid it, unlike other scenarios in which arguments can be made to an
immigration judge. There would be nothing that could be done about it.

Finally, he testified that the outcome for Mr. Mendez would most likely have
been different if Mr. Valente had met the required standard of practice. First, because
there were several alternatives, an attorney who pursued them would have had a
reasonable probability of negotiating a plea that would have improved the chances of
avoiding deportation. Second, the evidence at trial showed that the prosecutor would have
been open to considering alternatives to the plea terms that he offered, and specifically to
a misdemeanor with a long jail sentence rather than a felony. Mr. Mendez’s behavior
following ICE detention showed that he was willing to remain incarcerated for a lengthy
period if it entailed the possibility of avoiding deportation. Third, Mr. Mendez testified
that if he had truly understood that deportation would be certain as a result of accepting
the State’s plea offer, he would not have accepted it. Thus, if Mr. Valente had met the
standard of practice identified by Mr. Stetler, it is highly likely Mr. Mendez would not
have entered the plea to the charge that he did.

The State did not offer a witness on the pertinent standard of practice. The only
testimony on the appropriate standard of practice was the testimony of Mr. Stetler. In its
post-hearing memorandum, the State sought to discredit the testimony of both Mr. Stetler
and Mr. Mendez. The State argued that the practice standard is defined by Paclilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010), in which the Court held “that counsel must inform
her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation” (emphasis added).

The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Stetler credible and convincing. The Court
is aware that in the years since changes were made in immigration law affecting the
deportation of persons with convictions, Vermont attorneys such as Mr. Valente have had
no guidance from appellate decisions as to the standard of practice for effective
assistance of counsel under circumstances such as this. Mr. Valente was certainly aware
of the risk of deportation and to his credit he made efforts to verify the risk and make his
client aware of it.

However, the Court finds Mr. Stetler’s testimony as to the level of investigation,
analysis, and negotiation that an attorney should pursue is not just the only such
testimony offered in evidence, but is a reasonable standard to which an attorney should
be held under the circumstances of a case such as this one. It is in line with the attorney’s
role in listening to a client’s statement of his own perception of his own goal, which may
be a short-term goal based on limited understanding of all consequences (e.g., get out of
jail and back to work as quickly as possible and take a chance on deportation risk later),
but then going further to impress very clearly and in detail on the client important risks
that the client may not sufficiently appreciate but which will have a significant impact on
him or her (e.g., the inevitability of deportation to a country the client does not know, far
from family). Mr. Stetler’s opinion and standard shows that the lawyer’s role includes
working within the bounds of the law and legal process to minimize a risk that is
significant and also to communicate with the client in a manner that impresses upon him
the true significance and possible impact on his life of the risk and available alternatives.

The State’s argument that the standard is set by Paciilla, 559 U.S. at 374, is not
persuasive. The State offered no witness to testify that what Mr. Valente did was
sufficient and effective assistance of counsel under the circumstances of this case. and no
witness to testify that Padilla established a standard of practice that applies in all cases
regardless of varying circumstances, nor specifically that minimal information about risk
of deportability is sufficient to meet an attorney’s standard of practice under the
circumstances. The holding in Padilla does not address the specifics of what a lawyer
must do, but only the general principle that it is the lawyer’s duty to address risk of
deportation. Furthermore, the fact that court rules require the judge during a plea
colloquy to flag that there are possible immigration consequences to a plea also does not
mean that the language used by judges in a plea sets the standard for what a lawyer
should tell a client or do on behalf of a client in representing the client.’ There is no
credible evidence of the standard of practice for attorneys under the circumstances of this
case except that offered by Mr. Stetler, which the Court finds to be reasonable and
persuasive.

As to Mr. Mendez’s testimony at hearing, the Court appreciates the State's
argument that his testimony at this point is self-serving and based on hindsight and
should be looked at with skepticism. The Court has done so. Taking all the evidence into
account, however, the Court nonetheless finds from the evidence that if Mr. Valente had
done what Mr. Stetler described as the lawyer’s role prior to June 23, 2013, there is a
reasonable probability that Mr. Mendez would not have accepted the plea agreement
offered by the State or entered the plea he did on that date. Similarly, the plea agreement
in Docket No. 1825-10-13 Rdcr was the result of the inevitable consequences of the plea
agreement in the initial case. Without the outcome in the first case, Mr. Mendez would
not have entered the plea he did in the second case.

Conclusions of Law

Post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland. id.. as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of Vermont, a petitioner must first show by a preponderance of the
evidence that his trial counsel’s assistance “fell below an objective standard of
performance informed by prevailing professional norms.” Jn re Hyde, 2015 VT 106, {17
(citing Jv re Plante, 171 Vt. 310, 313 (2000)). The petitioner must then also prove by
preponderance that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
proceedings would have resulted in a different outcome.” Jd A reasonable probability 1s
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Jn re Allen, 2014 VT S3.
{ 20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Based on the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that Petitioner has met its
burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence..

' The fact that the Judge’s reference to risk of deportation in the plea colloquy was sufficient, as the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled on direct appeal, State v. Mendez, 2016 VT 24 at | 11, does not determine
the appropriate standard of practice for an attorney working with the client as a defense attorney. The roles
are different. As described above, this Court adopts the standard of practice defined by Attorney Stetler as
the standard for the defense attorney.
“os
~~

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4

In addition, Mr, Mendez, in entering his plea to the felony aggravated assault, was
acting on the basis of information given to him by his lawyer that was incomplete as to
what his choices were. Mr. Mendez was unaware of the other options described by Mr.
Stetler because his lawyer had not told him about them. Thus, the result of the ineffective
assistance of counsel was that Mr. Mendez did not have the opportunity to enter a plea
that was voluntarily made on the basis of all the information he should have had.
Similarly, the second plea was entered based on acceptance of the validity of the first
plea.

Neither plea was made voluntarily because each was necessarily based on
inadequate information. Pleas made without voluntariness cannot stand. See /n re
Mossey, 129 Vt. 133, 139 (a conviction based on a guilty plea is valid only when the plea
“represents a voluntary and intelligent choice of the alternative course available to him”);
see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (“The longstanding test for determining
the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.””) (quoting North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).

Thus, Petitioner has met the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that if Petitioner had received the assistance of counsel required under the circumstances
in both cases, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the pleas he
did such that the outcomes in both cases would have been different.

The Petitioner having met the burden of proof on both necessary elements of a
petition for post conviction relief, the petition is granted.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Petitioner’s

convictions for felony aggravated domestic assault in Docket No. 811-5-13 Rder and for
misdemeanor domestic assault in Docket No, 1825-10-13 Rdcr are hereby vacated.

Dated at Rutland, Vermont this 28th day of April, 2016.

Mary M@es Teachout
Superior Court Judge