Court Opinion

ID: 9586013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:20.211039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:18.840831
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
Since the majority decides that the title to the Act in question was insufficient, it necessarily follows that the *505Act was void from its supposed beginning. That being true, the Act was never of any force, and could not have actually violated or affected any constitutional or other right of any person. Nevertheless, the majority proceeds, in violation of universally recognized rules relating to the duties of courts in regard to adjudging solemn Acts of Legislatures void, to decide constitutional questions. The sufficiency iof the title to the Act was logically the first question to have been considered by the Court.
My understanding of the majority opinion, as it relates to the constitutionality of the Fair Trade Act, is that the power of the Legislature in the passage of the Act in question was so arbitrarily exercised as to render the Act itself unconstitutional and, impliedly, at least, that the passage of a Fair Trade Act is within the legitimate reaches of the legislative branch of the State Government. I agree that such legislation is within the police power of the State, and that such power must not be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised. I can not believe that the power of the Legislature as to the Act here involved was arbitrarily exercised.
The only basis for the holding that the power was arbitrarily exercised rests on the inclusion in the Act of the provisions relating to non-signers of contracts, it being contended that such provisions constitute arbitrary interference with the rights of freedom of contract, amounting to denial of due process, and not within the meaning of the general welfare provision.
All pertinent authority, I think, is to the effect that “Private contract rights must yield to the public welfare”. Part Point 9, Syllabus, Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557, 7 A. L. R. 1081. See Public Service Commission of West Virginia v. Harpers Ferry and Potomac Bridge Co., 114 W. Va. 291, 171 S. E. 760, Certiorari denied 292 U. S. 624, 54 S. Ct. 628, 78 L. ed. 1479. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567, 31 S. Ct. 259, 262, 55 L. ed. 328, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for a full Court, said: “* * * But it was recognized in the cases *506cited, as in. many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. [86] at page 89, [11 S. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620]; Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, [25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643], ‘It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts * * *’ ”. This Court has followed the more modern doctrine in holding that the general welfare provision is not to be narrowly limited; that “ ‘Neither the “contract” clause nor the “due process” clause (of Federal and State Constitutions) has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.’ Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558, 58 L. Ed. 721”. Point 3, Syllabus, Public Service Commission of West Virginia, a Corporation v. Harpers Ferry and Potomac Bridge Company, a Corporation, supra. That questions of Fair Trade are of general welfare, of public concern, I can not doubt. The fact that all states of the Union except three have enacted such legislation is, in my opinion, conclusive proof of such general interest and welfare.
It is true that the courts of a few of the states have held such Acts unconstitutional or, for some other reason, invalid or ineffective, but such Acts have been generally upheld, against seemingly every possible point of attack. See Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177; Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P. 2d 936; Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 12 Conn. 596, 24 A. 2d 841; Klein v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 31 Del. Ch. 459, *50764 A. 2d 529; General Electric Co. v. Klein,_Del. 106 A. 2d 206; Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Dist. Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N. E. 2d 940; Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. 2d 929, 104 A. L. R. 1435; Barron Motor, Inc. v. May’s Drug Stores, 227 Iowa 1344, 291 N. W. 152; Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass’n. v. May’s Drug Stores, 229 Iowa 554, 294 N. W. 756; Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176; Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, 209 Md. 610, 122 A. 2d 109; General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, 333 Mass. 665, 132 N. E. 2d 652; W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 So. 2d 838; Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 A. 873; General Electric Co. v. Packard Bamberger & Co., 14 N. J. 209, 102 A. 2d 18; Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N. J. 191, 104 A. 2d 304; Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30, 110 A. L. R. 1411; General Electric Co. v. Masters, 307 N. Y. 229, 120 N. E. 2d 802; Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528, 125 A. L. R. 1308; Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, 58.Ohio O. 145, 130 N. E. 2d 255; Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A. 2d 361; Miles Laboratories v. Oral Drug Co., 67 S. D. 523, 295 N. W. 292; Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S. W. 2d 971; Seagram Distillers Co. v. Corenswet, 198 Tenn. 644, 281 S. W. 2d 657; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756; Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426; Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson, 270 Wis. 21, 70 N. W. 2d 243; Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distrib., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S. W. 2d 455; Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P. 2d 139; Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb’s Cut Rate Drug, 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91; Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp. (Fla.), 40 So. 2d 371; Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc. (Fla.), 54 So. 2d 235; Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd (Fla.), 73 So. 2d 680; Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, 209 Ga. 613, 75 S. E. 2d 161; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co.,_Ind._, 143 N. E. 2d 415; Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting *508Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268; McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N. W. 2d 608; General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P. 2d 635; General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P. 2d 741; Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S. E. 2d 384; Skaggs Drug Center, a Corporation v. General Electric Company (N. M.), 315 P. 2d 967; Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., et al., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N. E. 2d 481. Such Acts have been held valid by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp. (1936), 299 U. S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109.
Sufficient has been said here to indicate my confirmed views. Every question appears to have been discussed and re-discussed in the case cited. No useful purpose could be served by any further discussion in this dissent. Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent.