Court Opinion

ID: 9840550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 13:04:00.340991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:15.737390
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: September 19, 2023

                        S23A0522. CARTER v. THE STATE.

        MCMILLIAN, Justice.

       Appellant Rafael Carter appeals the trial court’s dismissal of

his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea stemming from the

murder of Terrance Fields during an armed robbery.                                                For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

       On June 17, 2014, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Carter

and codefendant Rayshawn Terrell for malice murder (Count 1),

felony murder (Counts 2-5), armed robbery of Fields and Chauncey

Atkins (Counts 6 and 8, respectively), false imprisonment of Atkins

(Count 7), aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9), burglary in the

first degree (Count 10), possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony (Count 11), and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon (Count 12).                       On February 10, 2016, during the
January 2016 term of court,1 Carter, proceeding pro se, entered a

non-negotiated plea of guilty to all the counts of the indictment, and

that same day, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with

the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), 20 years

concurrent for each armed robbery count (Counts 6 and 8), 10 years

concurrent for the false imprisonment of Atkins (Count 7), 20 years

concurrent for the aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9), 20 years

concurrent for burglary (Count 10), and 5 years concurrent for

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 12), as well as a

consecutive suspended sentence of 5 years for possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony (Count 11).             The trial court

purported to merge the felony murder counts for sentencing

purposes, but they were actually vacated by operation of law. See

Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993).

     On March 11, 2016, during the March 2016 term of court,

Carter filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing generally

     1 Terms of court for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit commence on the first

Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November. See OCGA
§ 15-6-3 (3).
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that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter it and that

withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. It does

not appear that the trial court ever ruled on that motion. More than

five years later, on October 11, 2021, Carter filed another motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that Counts 6, 9, 10, and 12 should

have merged into the felony murder counts and that therefore his

sentences on the predicate felonies were null and void. Carter also

argued that his sentence on Count 11 was void because he was not

properly charged with possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony. On March 16, 2022, the trial court modified

Carter’s sentence to merge the conviction for aggravated assault of

Fields (Count 9) into the malice murder conviction (Count 1). The

next day, the trial court dismissed Carter’s second motion to

withdraw his guilty plea for lack of jurisdiction because the motion

was filed outside the term of court in which the guilty plea was

entered. The trial court did not mention or address in its order

Carter’s first motion to withdraw his guilty plea.       Carter, still

proceeding pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal, which he has since

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amended.

     Carter continues to assert that he wants to withdraw his guilty

plea and plead not guilty. However, “[i]t is well settled that, when

the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced

pursuant to a guilty plea, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow

the withdrawal of the plea.” Bonner v. State, 310 Ga. 426, 427 (851

SE2d 578) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also

Bankston v. State, 307 Ga. 656, 657 (2) (837 SE2d 788) (2020).

Carter concedes that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not

filed in the same term of court in which he was originally sentenced.

The January 2016 term of court in which Carter entered his guilty

plea expired on Friday, March 4, 2016, and a new term of court

commenced on Monday, March 7, 2016. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (3). So

both his March 11, 2016 and his October 11, 2021 motions to

withdraw were filed after the expiration of the term of court in which

he entered his plea.

     Nonetheless, Carter maintains that his convictions and

sentences are void and illegal due to merger errors, thus providing

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the trial court with jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of his

guilty plea. See Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 373 (2) n.11 (834 SE2d

769) (2019) (recognizing that although a trial court lacks jurisdiction

to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea after expiration of the term

of court in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to that plea,

“the trial court retains ongoing jurisdiction to correct a void or illegal

sentence”). However, Carter’s sentence is not void because, as noted

above, his felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of

law despite the trial court’s purported merger of those counts; the

trial court has properly merged Carter’s conviction for the

aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9) into his malice murder

conviction (Count 1); no other merger error appears; and each

sentence imposed is within the range that the law allows. See

generally von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2) (748 SE2d 446)

(2013) (“Motions to vacate a void sentence generally are limited to

claims that—even assuming the existence and validity of the

conviction for which the sentence was imposed—the law does not

authorize that sentence, most typically because it exceeds the most

                                    5
severe punishment for which the applicable penal statute

provides.”). Cf. Humphrey v. State, 299 Ga. 197, 199 (1) (787 SE2d

169) (2016) (“Assuming, without deciding, that [the] premise [that

where a sentence entered on a plea as to a certain count is later

adjudged to be void, such that withdrawal of a guilty plea on that

count would be permitted], we find that it is inapplicable here in any

event, because [the earlier appellate decision] invalidated only a

discrete provision of Humphrey’s sentence, expressly leaving all

other provisions of his sentence intact and his plea thereon ineligible

for withdrawal at this late stage.”).

     The trial court thus properly dismissed Carter’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. See Bankston, 307 Ga. at 657 (2); Dupree

v. State, 279 Ga. 613, 614 (619 SE2d 608) (2005).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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