Court Opinion

ID: 9476226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:50:38.985958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:11.434614
License: Public Domain

ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully cannot join in the reversal of Anthony Viera’s conviction, and, accordingly, I file this dissent.1
The majority decides to reverse Viera’s conviction because it finds the prosecutor made a threat against a defense witness, and then, after this threat prevented the witness from testifying, the prosecutor improperly commented during his closing argument on the witness’ failure to testify. The cornerstone of the majority’s decision is its assumption that an improper and unconstitutional threat was made by the prosecutor. I can not join in this assumption for two reasons.
First, the initial decision of whether a prosecutor has made an improper threat against a witness such that it. substantially and thus unconstitutionally interferes with the witness’ choice to testify is best left in the first instance to the district court. See United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 511 (5th Cir.1979). See also United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1439 (9th Cir.1984) (“Whether substantial government interference with defense witness occurred is factual determination to be made by the trial court.”). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 972 & n. 22 (5th Cir.1985) (appeals court decided substantial interference question based on extensive testimony at trial on alleged government misconduct). In this case the district court never developed what was actually said by the prosecutor, the factual context in which the statement was made, the prosecutor’s intentions in making the statement, the effect of the prosecutor’s actions upon the potential witness’ choice to testify nor the effect on Viera’s defense. Both in the district court and now on appeal, varying accounts of what occurred have been presented. Both sides submit affidavits that attest to two different versions of the prosecutor’s conduct. At oral argument the government mentioned several facts not part of the present record that could bear on the issue of what was said, to whom it was said, and why it was said. In light of the serious nature of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the important effect a finding of actual misconduct has on the government’s case and the defendant’s liberty, I believe the best course would be to remand this case to the district court so the allegations can be fully developed and an initial evaluation of the issue can be made.
Second, despite the lack of factual development of the prosecutor’s actual conduct, the majority chooses to adopt the prosecutor’s appellate affidavit as a description of what occurred. The majority then goes on to classify the prosecutor’s asserted “good faith warning” as a constitutional violation based upon Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 353, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). I disagree with this classification because the action described in the prosecutor’s affidavit does not in my opinion rise to the same level of conduct disapproved of in Webb, and therefore I cannot equate the possible conduct in this case with that involved in Webb.
Webb involved a case in which the district court on its own initiative personally admonished the defense’s only witness as he took the stand:
Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant. It is the Court’s duty to admonish you that you don’t have to testify, that anything you say can and will be used against you.
If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the liklihood [sic] is that you would get *506convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against you in the penitentiary when you’re up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly understand the chances you’re taking by getting on the witness stand under oath. You may tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don’t owe anybody anything to testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the hazard you are taking.
Id. at 96, 93 S.Ct. at 352. The Supreme Court held that this lengthy diatribe by the trial court “effectively drove the witness off the stand” and violated the due process clause. Id. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353.
Assuming that this is what occurred in this case, the prosecutor stated to defense counsel that “if the father was called as a witness and provided incriminating evidence against himself, or perjury [sic], that I would take the matter to the next setting [sic] Grand Jury, the following week, and present the matter to them for their consideration and that he could be indicted.”
In comparison I cannot say, as the majority does, that these statements are so similar “that the facts of this case are on all fours with Webb.” In Webb the threat was made by the judge directly to the witness in open court as the witness was taking the stand. The admonition also amounted to the judge’s personal guarantee of a perjury indictment and imminent conviction. In this case the assistant United States attorney states that if perjury occurs he will present the matter to the grand jury. He made no personal guarantees on indictment or conviction. Another distinguishing factor from Webb is that the prosecutor’s remarks were made to defense counsel rather than directly to the potential witness. The statement was also made outside the courtroom, and not in the presence of the jury as in Webb. Furthermore, the court’s statement in Webb leaves little doubt as to its intent to intimidate the potential witness while in this case the prosecutor claims he made the statement in good faith and in the context of communicating new information he had recently received about the father’s involvement in his son’s drug trafficking operation. Such differences it seems to me are worthy of recognition in any evaluation of whether prosecutorial unconstitutional conduct is present in this case.
Not all statements by prosecutors advising prospective witnesses about the penalties for perjury are unconstitutional. See United States v. Binker, 795 F.2d 1218, 1228-19 (5th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1370 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1334 (D.C.Cir.1982). To rise to a constitutional violation the prosecutor’s conduct must amount to an intentional threat that intimidates the witness into not testifying. Whether this case falls into the impermissible range of conduct I believe is still an open question that can be properly resolved only after the district court develops the relevant facts and makes its evaluation of what occurred. All I say at this point is that the prosecutor’s characterization of his statement cannot in my opinion be equated to the misconduct involved in Webb so that the latter controls as a matter of law the former.
Since I do not believe at this point that the alleged prosecutorial threat can serve as a basis for reversal, I could join the majority only if I could say the jury argument by the prosecutor standing alone would support reversal. This I decline to do. I agree with the majority that the prosecutor’s comment about Viera’s father not testifying was uninvited, was not proper rebuttal argument, and therefore was improper. An improper jury argument by a prosecutor is grounds for reversal, however, only if “the prosecutor’s argument taken as a whole in the context of the entire case, prejudicially affected substan*507tial rights of the defendant.” United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir.1977)). In light of the substantial evidence of Viera’s guilt, the singular yet improper comment by the prosecutor cannot be said to have substantially prejudiced Viera’s case.2
For the above reasons3 I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of Viera’s conviction at this point in time.

. I do agree with the majority’s treatment of the confrontation and extraneous offense issues contained in parts II and III of the opinion. In these parts I accordingly concur.

. I express no opinion on the effect of the improper jury argument if it was determined that the prosecutor had actually threatened the witness to the point of substantially interfering with the witness’ free choice to testify.

. I also briefly note the apparent intra-circuit conflict on the issue of whether a defendant must show prejudice as a result of a prosecutor’s misconduct in threatening a witness.
In a long line of cases we have held that once substantial governmental interference with a witness’ choice to testify is established, the defendant gains a reversal without regard to prejudice. See United States v. Binker, 795 F.2d 1218, 1228 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Whittington, 783 F.2d 1210, 1219 (5th Cir.1986); UniteStates v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (5th Cir.) relief modified on reh’g, 605 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.1979).
In a recent opinion, United States v. Weddell, 800 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir.1986), we apparently altered course based upon a review of recent Supreme Court decisions. In Weddell we held that a defendant must show prejudice as a result of the loss of a witness’ testimony because of government intimidation. We concluded that the harmless error rule applies in these prosecu-torial misconduct situations.
This is a substantial conflict in authority and is a problem potentially raised in this case as the majority recognizes. Supra p. 504 note 4. But since I believe the case should be remanded to the district court so that it can be determined whether an unconstitutional threat was actually made, I reserve my opinion of which approach is best for another day when the matter is squarely presented.