Court Opinion

ID: 9714884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:47:58.611915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:29.197221
License: Public Domain

Danhoe, J.
(dissenting). My dissent is not predicated upon any dispute with what the majority has written in regard to the law, but rather because it does not fit the instant case.
An examination of the record discloses that at the time the defendant entered his plea of guilty to *483the charge of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, he was in violation of a previous probation order entered by a court in the state of Wyoming. At the time of his conviction the defendant was attending Eastern Michigan University on an athletic scholarship and undoubtedly this had some influence on the trial court in again granting the defendant probation. The trial judge placed defendant on five years’ probation and stated as one of the conditions of the probation “No varsity or professional basketball during probation unless permitted by the court.” Thereafter upon petition by the defendant the trial judge amended the previous order of probation and allowed the defendant to participate in basketball at Eastern Michigan University. By granting this amendment the trial judge showed more than a passing interest in the rehabilitation of the defendant, but still was trying to impress upon him the seriousness of his past behavior.
The defendant has appealed alleging that the original prohibition against basketball constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Const 1963, art 1, § 16. This argument is so palpably without merit that it does not warrant further discussion.
The legislature has announced as a state policy that probation is a matter of grace, MCLA § 771.4 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1134). The statutory authority granted a sentencing judge in regard to probation is broad, along with his authority to amend the probation order. MCLA § 771.1 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §28.1131), MCLA §771.2 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1132), MCLA § 771.3 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.1133). An appellate court should not interfere in probation matters absent a violation or abuse of statutory authority, or violation of some *484constitutional right of the defendant, People v. Sattler (1969), 20 Mich App 665.
This Court said in City of Detroit v. Del Rio (1968), 10 Mich App 617, 620:
“It would serve no useful purpose to attempt to catalogue what may be 'other lawful conditions of probation.’ The Court is not disposed to attempt what the legislature has avoided, and it is clear that considerable latitude is intended for the trial judge in imposing the conditions he may deem pertinent to the offense and appropriate to the rehabilitation of the offender.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I know of no constitutional right which allows the defendant to play basketball, and there has been no showing on this record that the trial judge abused the statutory authority with which he has been invested by the legislature. It is not for an appellate court to sit in review of matters such as this, nor to try to second-guess the rehabilitation efforts of the trial judge. In fact, from what has been disclosed, the efforts of the trial judge have been successful. The defendant, to the knowledge of this writer, has in fact lived up to all the conditions of probation and may now realize that his former behavior will not lead to the type of career which he hopes to pursue at the end of his educational endeavors.
The claim that the defendant may be prohibited from playing professional basketball is entirely too speculative to discuss at this time. There is no showing in the record that the defendant has received any concrete offers to play professional basketball. In fact by his own admission he has at best had “some feelers.” If and when these feelers *485develop into firm offers, it will be time enough to deal with them on a proper motion made to tbe trial judge or bis successor.
I would affirm.