Court Opinion

ID: 9722224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:21:21.030426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:22.803210
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The typescript of this bench murder trial runs to some 176 pages, modest by any standard. At its heart is the direct and cross-examination of a single eyewitness who positively identified the defendant in a lineup and at trial. The defense attorney conducted a masterful cross-examination, in which it was established that the eyewitness was unable to positively identify the defendant from a photo array presented to him before the lineup was held. But the defense attorney could not dissuade the witness from his positive identification at the lineup or at trial. Nor was he able to find in this witness a lack of credibility or a motive to lie. If we examine the reliability of the identification under the five-part Slim test (People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307-08 (1989)), we find: (1) the witness watched a murder in broad daylight, but did not at all times observe the face of the shooter; (2) his attention was never diverted from the crime that played out before him; (3) his description of the shooter contains some inconsistencies; (4) he positively identified the shooter in a lineup and again at trial; and (5) the crime took place on April 24, 1997, and the lineup identification occurred July 24, exactly three months later. Three of the tests unquestionably meet the reliability requirement. The other two tests are what this trial was about. The trier of fact heard conflicting evidence on both, particularly with respect to how much of the shooter’s face the eyewitness saw and his response to the photo arrays. The majority reminds us of our duty to carefully examine the evidence while giving due consideration to the fact that the court saw and heard the witnesses. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515 (1996). I can find nothing in this opinion that reflects due consideration for what the judge in this case saw and heard at trial. The majority does not cite to the four-page summation of the evidence made by the trial judge. The judge’s assessment of the evidence, his opinion of the credibility of the eyewitness, the comments he made on the conflicting evidence, and his response to the arguments of defense counsel are simply ignored. Each of the issues the majority raises was addressed by the trial judge. I might have a different view of this case if the majority had reviewed the findings of the trial judge, dismantled (or at least criticized) his reasoning, and pointed out where he went wrong. Where inconsistencies and conflicts exist in the evidence, the trier of fact has the responsibility of weighing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving these conflicts and inconsistencies. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299 (1995). Unlike a jury trial, where the reasoning of the trier of fact is forever hidden, we have a trial judge here who explained on the record how he reached his decision to find the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this was a bench trial where the trial judge explained how he weighed the evidence and assessed credibility, the majority has a rare opportunity to show us why the majority reading of the record is to be preferred. A majority that points out our constitutional obligation not to mindlessly rubber-stamp guilty verdicts must be aware that we also have an obligation not to mindlessly ignore the way the judge resolved conflicting evidence and his assessment of credibility when those findings are of record. I welcome the reference in the majority opinion (312 Ill. App. 3d at 1037) to People v. Rodriguez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 920 (2000), where we reversed a murder conviction, after a jury trial, based on the testimony of a single eyewitness. The evidence that went to impeachment and credibility in the two cases is dramatically different. In Rodriguez, the record revealed and the opinion noted that the eyewitness observed the defendant for seven to nine seconds while his hands covered his face. The eyewitness was also subject to “multiple impeachment” at trial. This included prior inconsistent statements, a plea of guilty to a felony charge, the failure to come forward until a $5,000 reward was posted, and the failure of another witness to identify the defendant in a lineup, despite evidence that earlier the other witness may have seen the suspect identified by the primary eyewitness. By contrast, the eyewitness in this case observed a murder in progress for seven to nine minutes in broad daylight and never backed away from his positive identification at the lineup. As for impeachment, the defense attorney here, in his summation to the court, said about the eyewitness in this case: “Mr. Phillips is a hard working guy. He came to court and told you what he saw. I am not suggesting, Judge, for one second that Jerry Phillips got on the stand and lied.” Of course, defense counsel then surveyed the evidence and testimony in the case and attempted to show that the witness, though well meaning, was mistaken. He presented what he believed to be reasonable inferences that could be drawn from conflicting evidence. The trial court in his ruling addressed these inferences and came to a different conclusion. The majority in its analysis of the case has, I believe, paid lip service to the admonition in People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 455 (1990), and little else. I can only conclude that the majority has retried the defendant from the written record and substituted its judgment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witness for that of the trial judge.