Court Opinion

ID: 9569275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:12:15.503967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:36.678362
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
The defendant lessee leased a commercial building as a fast-food restaurant for a period of twenty years at the rate of $4,000 per month, plus taxes and insurance. The lessee failed to make certain lease payments and the lessors instituted dispossessory proceedings. Following eviction, lessors filed an amended “complaint for lien” alleging that the defendant owed rental arrearages in excess of $20,000 and asking for a general lien on property and equipment belonging to the former lessee remaining on the premises and for permission to dispose of it by private sale, the proceeds to satisfy the overdue rental. The parties agreed that the defendant would be enjoined and restrained from removing, damaging, or disposing of its property and equipment pending disposition of the complaint for lien.
The trial court concluded that a paragraph of the lease agreement provided contractually that rent would continue to accrue even after default and repossession and therefore that defendant was in arrears in the amount of $56,742.86 under the lease terms; granted plaintiffs a general lien on defendant’s remaining property and equipment and the right to sell it at public sale in order to discharge the lien and the indebtedness; and provided that it would by order trans*470fer title to the property and equipment sold subject to the rights of any valid perfected security interest.
Lessee’s contention is that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that a paragraph in the lease agreement permitted eviction plus the recovery of rent following eviction.
First of all, I assume that the order appealed from is a final order and directly appealable rather than wanting from a certificate under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).
Turning to the merits, parties to a lease agreement may agree by specific terms that even after eviction the lessee shall be liable for rent for the entire term of the lease, less the amount received if the premises are re-let. Hardin v. Macon Mall, 169 Ga. App. 793 (1) (315 SE2d 4) (1984). Therefore, the propriety of the court’s determination in this case depends upon the language of the lease agreement.
But now there is a roadblock to a decision. Both appellant and appellees purport to quote purported provisions of the lease agreement in their respective appellate briefs, and appellant contends that there is no specific provision for rent after eviction. But no copy of this critical document appears anywhere in the record submitted on appeal. An inquiry to the trial court clerk confirmed that it was not in the record, so this is not a situation which lends itself to our ordering the record to be supplemented per OCGA § 5-6-48 (d). Even if we regarded the quotations as an implied stipulation of fact, we would need the entire lease so as to properly construe the disputed portion in context. OCGA § 13-2-2 (4).
The burden of showing harmful error is appellant’s, which must be done by the record and not by assertions of evidence in the brief or enumerations of error. Gibbs v. Browning, 172 Ga. App. 76, 77 (321 SE2d 813) (1984). See also Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 758 (6) (357 SE2d 113) (1987); Continental Ins. Co. v. Carter, 171 Ga. App. 162, 163 (318 SE2d 770) (1984); York v. Miller, 168 Ga. App. 849, 850 (310 SE2d 577) (1983). The rule is well settled in this State that “the burden is on the party alleging error to show it affirmatively by the record. [Cits.]” Campbell v. Powell, 206 Ga. 768, 770 (3) (58 SE2d 829) (1950). Therefore, even if appellant had provided a copy of the lease in part or in its entirety in its brief rather than ostensible passages from the lease in its argument in brief, this would be inadequate for this Court to consider the substance of the lease and likewise it would not have afforded a basis for reversal of the lower court. Taylor v. Bentley, 166 Ga. App. 887 (2) (305 SE2d 617) (1983). As quoted and applied in Griffith v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, 175 Ga. App. 533, 534 (333 SE2d 647) (1985): “ ‘ “This court is a court for the correction of errors and its decision must be made on the record sent to this court by the clerk of the court below and not upon the briefs of counsel. [Cits.]”’ Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, *471139 (199 SE2d 260) (1973) (on motion for rehearing).”
Decided March 18, 1988.
Michael E. Sumner, for appellant.
H. Parnell Odom, for appellees.
Of course, the burden was on plaintiff-lessor at the trial level to prove its case, but appellant does not raise below or enumerate as error the court’s ruling without the document actually in evidence, so the sufficiency of the evidence is not before us. Harrison v. Lawhorne, 130 Ga. App. 314, 318 (5) (203 SE2d 292) (1973); Long v. Marion, 257 Ga. 431, 432 (1) (360 SE2d 255) (1987).
In order to contest the trial court’s interpretation of the lease agreement, appellant was required to make a copy of the document a part of the record. See Lake v. Hicks, 147 Ga. App. 175 (2) (248 SE2d 236) (1978). In its absence we are constrained to affirm the lower court’s determination.