Court Opinion

ID: 9898557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:29.958698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.175107
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                          May 16, 2023

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                            No. 57167-6-II

                               Respondent,

         v.

    COREY DAMON MONTGOMERY,                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                               Appellant.

        LEE, P.J. — Corey D. Montgomery appeals his sentence for third degree assault against an

intimate partner, which the trial court imposed consecutively to his sentence in a separate case for

offenses committed in King County. Pursuant to RAP 15.2(g),1 Montgomery’s court-appointed

attorney moved to withdraw as appellate counsel. We grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss

Montgomery’s appeal.

                                              FACTS

        The State charged Montgomery in Pierce County with second degree assault against an

intimate partner. While on pre-trial release, Montgomery committed and was convicted of several

offenses in King County, including first degree arson causing danger to life, second degree assault

by strangulation with a domestic violence sentencing enhancement, third degree assault of a child,

third degree assault of a police officer, fourth degree assault with a domestic violence sentencing

enhancement, tampering with a witness, two counts of felony violations of protection orders, and

1
  RAP 15.2 was amended in 2023 changing the numeration of former RAP 15.2(i) (2018) to
15.2(g); therefore, we cite to the current RAP 15.2(g).
No. 57167-6-II

three counts of misdemeanor violations of protection orders. Based on an offender score of nine

plus, King County sentenced Montgomery for the King County convictions. After Montgomery

was sentenced in King County, the State amended the Pierce County charge to third degree assault

against an intimate partner in exchange for Montgomery’s guilty plea.

          At sentencing on the Pierce County conviction, Montgomery asked the trial court to impose

his sentence concurrently with his King County sentence.            The State recommended that

Montgomery’s sentence be imposed consecutively to the King County sentence. The victim in

Montgomery’s Pierce County case testified at sentencing that she was a different person than the

victims in Montgomery’s King County case and stated that imposing concurrent sentences would

rob her of justice.

          Based on an offender score of 18, the trial court sentenced Montgomery to 51 months of

total confinement to run consecutively to the King County sentence. The trial court determined

that imposing concurrent sentences “would completely ignore the impact that [Montgomery’s]

crime has had on another person.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 31. The trial court also imposed nine

months of community custody but did not order Montgomery to serve the community custody term

consecutively to the King County sentence.

          Montgomery appealed the Pierce County judgment and sentence imposing his sentence

consecutively to the King County sentence. Counsel was appointed to represent Montgomery on

appeal.

          Montgomery’s court-appointed attorney moved to withdraw as counsel pursuant to RAP

15.2(g). Montgomery’s court-appointed attorney mailed the motion to withdraw to Montgomery

on December 7, 2022. Montgomery did not respond with any additional legal issues for appellate

review.

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No. 57167-6-II

                                           ANALYSIS

       Montgomery appeals the Pierce County judgment and sentence imposing his sentence

consecutively to the King County sentence. Montgomery’s court-appointed attorney filed a

motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and allow Montgomery to proceed pro se. The State

agrees the motion to withdraw should be granted but seeks dismissal of Montgomery’s appeal.

We grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.

A.     LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

       “Counsel for a defendant in a criminal case may withdraw only with the permission of the

appellate court on a showing of good cause.” RAP 18.3(a)(1). “If counsel appointed to represent

an indigent defendant can find no basis for a good faith argument on review, counsel should file a

motion in the appellate court to withdraw as counsel.” RAP 18.3(a)(2); RAP 15.2(g).

       The motion to withdraw must

       be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
       support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished [to] the indigent
       and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not counsel—
       then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether
       the case is wholly frivolous.

State v. Hairston, 133 Wn.2d 534, 538, 946 P.2d 397 (1997) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967)).

       Here, the procedural requirements have been met, and Montgomery did not choose to raise

any additional points. Thus, we must independently review the entire record before determining

that the appeal is frivolous. Id. at 536. If we determine the appeal is frivolous, we may then

“relieve counsel and either dismiss the appeal or leave the indigent to proceed pro se.” Id. at 537.

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No. 57167-6-II

B.        CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

          The sole potential issue raised by appellate counsel is “[w]hether the sentencing court erred

in ordering [Montgomery’s] sentence to run consecutively to his sentence from King County.”

Mot. to Withdraw & Br. Referring to Matters in R. which Might Arguably Supp. Rev. at 4. An

independent review of the entire record indicates this is the only potential issue for appeal, there

is no good faith basis for review, and the appeal is frivolous. Therefore, we grant appellate

counsel’s motion to withdraw.

          Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, a sentence for two

or more current offenses shall generally be served concurrently. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). The SRA

does not formally define “current offense,” but the term functionally means convictions entered or

sentenced on the same day. In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 507, 301 P.3d 450

(2013).

          Sentencing judges have discretion to impose either a concurrent or consecutive sentence

for a crime the defendant committed before he began to serve a felony sentence for a different

crime. RCW 9.94A.589(3); State v. King, 149 Wn. App. 96, 101, 202 P.3d 351 (2009), review

denied, 166 Wn.2d 1026 (2009). In such a situation, the trial court “‘need only order that the

sentences be served consecutively; no reason for the decision is required.’” King, 149 Wn. App.

at 101 (quoting State v. Mathers, 77 Wn. App. 487, 494, 891 P.2d 738, review denied, 128 Wn.2d

1002 (1995)).

          Here, Montgomery’s King County offenses do not constitute “current offenses” because

they were not entered or sentenced on the same day as the Pierce County offense. Instead,

Montgomery committed the third degree assault in Pierce County before he committed and began

to serve his sentence for the King County crimes. Therefore, the trial court had discretion under

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No. 57167-6-II

RCW 9.94A.589(3) to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence. Id. The trial court properly

exercised its discretion by imposing a consecutive sentence.

        Based on our review of the entire record and the analysis above, Montgomery’s appeal is

wholly frivolous. Montgomery has provided this court with no indication that he desires to proceed

pro se. Therefore, because Montgomery’s appeal is wholly frivolous, we grant appellate counsel’s

motion to withdraw and dismiss Montgomery’s appeal.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    Lee, P.J.
 We concur:

 Price, J.

 Che, J.

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