Court Opinion

ID: 9663882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:54:23.8185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:58.735708
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). If this court were the appropriate body to decide the issue, I would be persuaded that the fair share provision under the collective bargaining agreement was retroactive. I *421dissent because the issue of retroactivity has not been presented to the appropriate decision maker. The county's refusal to give retroactive status to the fair share provision does not, in my opinion, constitute a refusal or failure to implement an arbitration decision under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats. 1989-90, and therefore the issue was not appropriately before WERC.
I conclude that the dispute is governed by the parties' collective bargaining agreement that provides that "any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of a provision of this contract. . . shall be handled [by arbitration]." The court should remand this case to the circuit court, and the circuit court should direct the parties to submit the issue to grievance arbitration.
HH
As an initial matter, I must decide what standard of review to apply to WERC's interpretation of sec. 111.70(3)(a)7. The statutes as well as the cases give guidance.
Section 227.57(5), Stats. 1989-90, provides that "the court shall set aside or modify the agency action if it finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action . . .." This provision is silent about the weight or deference, if any, a court should accord the agency's interpretation of a statute. Section 227.57(10) provides, however, that "due weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." According to these provisions of the statutes, the weight that is due an agency's interpretation of the law depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of *422the court and the administrative agency in deciding the issue.
The cases also provide some guidance, although one commentator observed in 1973 that the Wisconsin Supreme Court defers to agencies in an "inconsistent manner [and] employs different review standards in cases involving similar issues without attempting to resolve the conflict."1 Some attorneys probably think that the same situation still exists today. Professor Davis also cautions about "the formulas to which courts pay lip service." They are, he writes, "guides that leave a good deal of room for judicial discretion, which varies in response to judicial impressions of acts and circumstances of particular cases."2
I find the brief of amicus curiae Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) helpful in stating the following standard of review distilled from our cases. Courts retain the ultimate authority to decide questions of law.3 Courts defer to administrative agencies in specified situations where they believe the administrative agencies can offer the court guidance on the construction of a particular statute, rule, or policy or where deference advances other important objectives. In considering the weight to accord the agency's decision about a question *423of law, a court considers such factors as the agency's actual experience with the precise or similar issue or with a given subject matter or area,4 the need for uniform administration and application of the law, the consistency of the agency's decisions, and the soundness of the agency's legal reasoning and methodology.5
The court has explained this comparative institutional approach to the scope of review as follows: " [Mjerely labeling the question as a question of law and *424labeling the commission's determination as a conclusion of law does not mean that the court should disregard the commission's determination . . .. We have recognized that when the expertise of the administrative agency is significant to the value judgment (to the determination of a legal question), the agency's decision, although not controlling, should be given weight. Milwaukee Co. v. ILHR Dept. 48 Wis. 2d 392, 399, 180 N.W.2d 513 (1970)." Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 116-117, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980).6 If on analysis of the comparative qualifications of the court and the administrative agency the court determines that it should accord great weight to an agency's decision in a particular case, the court will uphold the agency's interpretation of the law when reasonable, even if an alternative view is also reasonable. Environmental Decade v. ILHR Dept., 104 Wis. 2d 640, 644, 312 N.W.2d 749 (1981).
Some of the circumstances of this case point to according WERC's interpretation of sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 great weight. While WERC admits it has not previously ruled on the issue of law in this case, it does administer the Municipal Employee Relations Act and possesses great expertise in working with the statutory scheme. This factor might lead me to give great weight to WERC's interpretation.
Other factors point, however, to giving little if any weight to WERC's interpretation of the statute in this case. First, WERC never decided the merits of this case; it merely adopted the hearing examiner's decision because the county's petition to WERC to review the *425examiner's decision was not timely filed.7 Thus we do not have before us a decision of WERC interpreting the statute in issue. Second, WERC has not decided cases involving the precise question presented in this case or similar questions; it has not even decided numerous cases interpreting sec. 111.70(3)(a)7.8 Third, the hearing examiner did not explain the bases for his statutory interpretation, instead focusing primarily on whether the fair share provisions should apply retroactively.9 I believe that in this case the court is as qualified as or better qualified than the hearing examiner to interpret the statute in issue. Accordingly I conclude that little if any weight should be given to the hearing examiner's decision in this case.
*426The question of law presented to the hearing examiner and to this court is whether the county refused or failed to implement an arbitration decision under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats. To answer this question, we must distinguish between refusing to implement an interest arbitration decision and disputing the meaning of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
The county asserts that it has not refused to implement the arbitration award. It acknowledges that the fair share provision must be incorporated into the parties' agreement. It has not refused to withhold fair share dues in any month following the issuance of the award. The county asserts that it is implementing the award but that the parties disagree about the meaning of the terms of the agreement.
It is important to distinguish refusing to implement an interest arbitration decision and disputing the meaning of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement because they have different consequences. An employer who refuses to implement an interest arbitration award violates sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, faces a prohibited practices hearing before WERC, and may be liable for attorneys' fees under sec. 111.70(7m)(e). By contrast, an employer who disputes the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement faces a grievance arbitration proceeding with its own standard of judicial review. Attorneys' fees awards are not ordinarily available in arbitration proceedings.
If the parties had arrived at the collective bargaining agreement through a voluntary settlement rather than through interest arbitration and the same question of the retroactivity of the fair share provision in the collective bargaining agreement had arisen, this dispute *427would have likely gone before a grievance arbitrator according to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In this case the dispute involves the interpretation of language in the collective bargaining agreement agreed to by both parties prior to the interest arbitration. The dispute does not involve any issue resolved in the arbitrator's decision. The dispute does not involve any language in the arbitrator's decision except the language of the parties which the arbitrator incorporated.
Arbitration is what the parties bargained for when there is a dispute about the meaning of the agreement. The determination of retroactivity turns on the language of the particular agreement and the circumstances of the bargaining. Arbitrators handle retroactivity disputes under the collective bargaining agreement frequently. Why should this dispute be subject to a prohibited practices complaint merely because the parties settled other disputed terms of the collective bargaining agreement through interest arbitration? The majority opinion does not answer this question. The majority turns to defining the word "implement" without examining these policy considerations.
The majority opinion defines the word "implement" in sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 to mean that an employer fails to incorporate specific terms of an arbitrator's award into a resultant collective bargaining agreement. I agree with this definition, but I do not believe that Sauk County has failed to implement the arbitration decision according to this definition.
If this case is to fall within sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, the majority must adopt a broader definition of the word "implement." But the majority cannot give the word "implement" too broad a reading. Unless the majority limits the word "implement" in sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, every dispute involving any part of an agreement reached *428through interest arbitration can be viewed as a failure to implement the arbitration decision, and all grievance arbitration may be supplanted by sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 proceedings.
The majority further defines "implement" to mean that an employer "fails to give retroactive effect to economic items in a retroactive contract." Majority op. at 420. Nothing in the language or legislative history of sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 or in the general usage of the word "implement" supports the majority's interpreting the word "implement" as referring only to economic items retroactively applied. Section 111.70(3)(a)7 simply states:
(3) Prohibited practices and their prevention. (a) It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert with others:
7. To refuse or otherwise fail to implement an arbitration decision lawfully made under sub. (4) (cm).
The majority's interpretation of "implement" as being the failure to "give retroactive effect to economic items" permits the court to resolve the substantive issues in this case. The problem is that this interpretation cannot be derived from sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 or sec. 111.70(4)(cm) and permits prohibited practices complaints in more circumstances than the logic of the statutory scheme allows.
Although I believe an arbitrator would reach the same result as the hearing examiner did about retroac-tivity, I do not think the majority's decision complies with the procedures the legislature established. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

Kenneth Culp Davis, 1982 Supplement to Administrative Law Treatise sec. 29.00, at 562-63, quoted in West Bend Education Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13 n.13, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984). See also Kenneth Culp Davis, 5 Administrative Law Treatise ch. 29 (1984 and 1989 Supp.).

Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 154 Wis. 2d 75, 82, 452 N.W.2d 368 (1990) (quoting West Bend Ed. Ass'n, 121 Wis. 2d at 11).

The Wisconsin Education Association Council asked the court to clarify the standard of review, expressing concern that Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 154 Wis. 2d 75, 452 N.W.2d 368 (1990), was a change in the court's approach to reviewing an agency's decision about a question of law. According to WEAC, in cases prior to Local No. 695 a factor in determining the weight due an agency's decision about a question of law was the agency's prior experience with the general subject matter at issue, as well as the agency's experience with the precise question or a question similar to that presented to the court. According to WEAC, LIRC had considerable experience in the general subject matter of defining "wages" for the purpose of the unemployment compensation system but was accorded no deference in Local No. 695. As a result, WEAC and others read Local No. 695 to suggest that the agency must have considerable experience in the precise question presented, rather than in the general subject matter at issue, for its decision to be granted any weight.
In interpreting Local No. 695, the majority opinion unfortunately appears to confirm WEAC's view that Local No. 695 has ushered in a new rule. The majority opinion looks only to LIRC's experience in "determining whether the refunds in question constituted wages" and not to its experience in determining the meaning of wages under unemployment compensation law in numerous other fact situations. Majority op. at 414.

See, e.g., West Bend Education Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984); Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 117, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980); Berns v. WERC, 99 Wis. 2d 252, 261-62, 299 N.W.2d 248 (1980).

A similar question of deference arises in the context of appellate review of trial court decisions. See Oakley v. Fireman's Fund of Wisconsin, 162 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 470 N.W.2d 882 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (urging analysis of the issue under review rather than the use of boilerplate language).

Sauk County, WERC Dec. No. 23489-B (1987).

Indeed a WERC regulation could be read as contradicting the hearing examiner's decision in this case. The regulation appears to interpret sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 as referring only to the employer's failing to incorporate the award into a written collective bargaining agreement. See Wis. Admin. Code, ERB 32.16 (1986).

The sum total of the hearing examiner's reasoning is as follows: "... it is concluded that where, as here, the alleged violation arises in the context of implementing the new agreement pursuant to the award, as opposed to after the implementation of the award, and the issue goes to whether a provision of the agreement is to be given retroactive effect under the award, a (3)(a)7 charge will lie. This is true even if the provision in question was not directly in issue in the interest arbitration." Sauk County, WERC Dec. No. 23489-A, at 18 (1987).
The hearing examiner cites no authority for his interpretation of the term "implement." Sauk County WERC Dec. No. 23489-A, at 18 (1987).