Court Opinion

ID: 9777160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:00:51.919786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:49.605645
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The indictment alleges Appellant knew the property was stolen from Grace Milli-gan; however, there is no evidence in the record that would show proof of such knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. There was a recorded discussion between Farrell and Appellant concerning the fur coat, but Appellant expressly stated he didn’t know if the coat was Milligan’s. He expressed the belief that Dr. Milligan would buy the coat anyway because it was one of the finest furs Appellant had ever seen. Farrell had no knowledge regarding the true owner of the coat or the person who brought the coat to Appellant. Without proof that Appellant knew the coat belonged to Grace Milligan, he must be found not guilty.
The name of the person from whom property is stolen is not an element of the offense with which Appellant is charged. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.1985). However, when the state makes unnecessary allegations which are descriptive of that which is legally essential to charge a crime, the state is then required to prove the unnecessary allegation along with the essential elements of the crime. Weaver v. State, 551 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Where the accused is charged with knowledge of the name of the person from whom property is stolen and the proof fails to establish that knowledge, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. Matthias v. State, 695 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. pending); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court with instructions to acquit. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).