Court Opinion

ID: 9726829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:10:12.387192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:53.191909
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLS, dissenting: Cox has lost his job and is now denied review — perhaps for no better reason than that someone in the clerk’s office put off until tomorrow what could have been done on the 35th day. Our supreme court has said, “ ‘Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves; they are designed to secure orderly and fair methods of disposing of litigated matters.’ ” (People ex rel. Southfield Apartment Co. v. Jarecki (1951), 408 Ill. 266, 273, 96 N.E.2d 569, 572, quoting People ex rel. Pickerill v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1945), 391 Ill. 377, 63 N.E.2d 405.) The court has also stated that, “A situation within the object, spirit and meaning of [a] statute falls within it, although it may be without the letter of the law.” Department of Revenue v. Joseph Bublick ir Sons, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 568, 575, 369 N.E.2d 1279, 1282. The obvious purpose of a 35-day filing rule is to encourage prompt action by the aggrieved party so that timely dispositions of a matter may be made. This purpose was fulfilled in the present case. There is no apparent purpose for requiring that the filing be made sooner than 35 days after service of a copy of the decision so that the summons can be issued within 35 days. This only serves to punish a plaintiff for less than ideal operations at the clerk’s office. A “trap for the unwary” if ever there was one. With respect to the former Civil Practice Act, Illinois courts have always held a liberal viewpoint when construing the Act. A notable example is Campbell v. Fazio (1959), 23 Ill. App. 2d 106, 110, 161 N.E.2d 579, 581, where the court said: “Our courts in their interpretation of the Practice Act have been reluctant to deny any litigant his day in court and they have avoided any harsh construction of the rules. In keeping with the intent of the Practice Act and the rules adopted thereunder, no attempt has been made to require a ‘strict letter of the law’ compliance with the Act or the rules, but rather there has been a liberal construction and interpretation. Appeals have been dismissed only where there has been an omission or failure that is flagrant in its character.” (Emphasis added.) This is merely a filing rule. It should be clear and straightforward because there will quite often be important rights affected, as in this case. A liberal construction is especially appropriate here because the Act’s subtleties impose a great injustice on the plaintiff, whereas the prejudice to the defendant is nil. The following quotations are from two cases involving section 4 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 267) in which the plaintiffs’ complaints were filed after 35 days. However, the appellate court in both cases indicated that filing on the 35th day would have been sufficient to obtain review. “This 35-day limit is a jurisdictional requirement [citation], and a plaintiff who fails to file a complaint within the specified period is time-barred from seeking review of the agency decision. [Citation.] # # # In short, once plaintiff received notice via certified mail * * * of the director’s suspension order, his only recourse was to file an administrative review action within 35 days.” Hoffman v. Department of Registration 6- Education (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924-25, 410 N.E.2d 291, 293-94. “Under the provisions of that Act, a plaintiff must file a complaint with [in] 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected.” Varnes v. Dougherty (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 476, 479, 350 N.E.2d 6, 9. The import of this language is that if the plaintiffs had filed within 35 days, they would have had their cases reviewed in the circuit court. In the present case, plaintiff filed within 35 days. I believe he is entitled to an appeal. Therefore, I dissent.