Court Opinion

ID: 9376726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:43.467085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.636041
License: Public Domain

J-A26025-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    CAROLYN T. CAMPER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    BRADLEY S. WERNER                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :        No. 2 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 17, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                  Civil Division at No(s): A06-13-60988-D-37

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                  FILED MARCH 3, 2023

        Appellant, Bradley S. Werner (“Husband”), appeals from the order

entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, denying his recusal

motion. We affirm.

        The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

           Husband and [Appellee,] Carolyn Camper (hereinafter
           “Wife”) were married on December 18, 2005 and separated
           on June 19, 2013. This was the second marriage for Wife,
           and the fifth marriage for Husband. This matter was
           commenced when Wife filed a complaint in divorce on May
           24, 2013, seeking equitable distribution of the parties’
           marital assets, alimony, alimony pendente lite (“APL”),
           counsel fees, costs, and expenses. Grounds for divorce
           were approved and, on March 22, 2017, a Master’s hearing
           was held.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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          Husband filed a motion for a hearing de novo on May 5,
          2017, asserting that he took “exceptions to the
          recommendation of” the Master. A three-day equitable
          distribution trial was held on August 25, 2017, February 20,
          2018, and May 24, 2018. Thereafter, on August 20, 2018,
          [the trial c]ourt entered an order granting the parties a
          decree in divorce and resolving all claims of equitable
          distribution concluding, “[c]onsidering all of the factors, an
          equal split of the marital estate is appropriate.” Husband
          appealed the August 20, 2018 order to the Superior Court.
          On December 3, 2019, in a memorandum decision, the
          Superior Court vacated the August 20, 2018 order and
          remanded the matter for further proceedings.             [See
          Camper v. Werner, 225 A.3d 1126 (Pa.Super. 2019)
          (unpublished memorandum) (“Camper I”).]

          On January 22, 2020, Husband filed a motion, and
          memorandum of law in support, to disqualify and recuse the
          [trial judge] (hereinafter “motion for recusal”). Thereafter,
          Wife filed an answer to Husband’s motion and new matter
          request for counsel fees. On June 19, 2020, a hearing was
          held at the conclusion of which Husband’s motion for recusal
          was denied. Before the proceeding was adjourned, both
          parties requested the [trial judge] remain in the case and
          specifically requested the [trial judge] assist the parties to
          reach a settlement agreement. Therefore, a subsequent
          written order was not entered, and the matter was
          continued to June 25, 2020 for a settlement conference.
          Ultimately, the parties were unable to agree upon a
          settlement.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 25, 2022, at 1-2) (internal citations to the

record, footnotes, and some capitalization omitted).

       The court entered a new equitable distribution order, responding to this

Court’s remand instructions, on February 23, 2021.1 On May 17, 2021, the

____________________________________________

1Husband challenges the equitable distribution order in a separate appeal,
which this Court docketed at 3 EDA 2022.

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court entered a formal order denying Husband’s recusal motion. The court

entered a final divorce decree on November 17, 2021.

       Husband timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the denial of the

recusal motion on December 17, 2021.2 That same day, the court ordered

Husband to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. Husband timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on December

28, 2021.

       Husband now presents two questions for this Court’s review:

          Whether the [trial] court’s order on remand … pertaining to
          equitable distribution, and incorporated into its order dated
          November 17, 2021, should be vacated based upon bias,
          lack of impartiality, prejudice and/or unfairness towards
          Husband by the [trial judge].

          Whether the [trial judge] should have been recused from
          presiding over this matter.

(Husband’s Brief at 5).

       On appeal, Husband initially asserts that the trial judge did not follow

this Court’s remand instructions because the new equitable distribution order

failed to address two of the statutory factors that are relevant to the equitable

division of marital property. Moreover, Husband alleges that the new order

addresses “the potential reversal and remand” of the most recent equitable

distribution determination. (Husband’s Brief at 17). Based on the wording of

____________________________________________

2 Issues in divorce are reviewable after entry of the divorce decree and the
resolution of all economic issues. See Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d
211 (1985).

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the new order, Husband argues “[i]t is abundantly clear that [the trial judge]

has predetermined Wife’s award for the marital interest in [two limited liability

corporations operated by the parties], which is erroneous and improper, and

extremely unfair to Husband.” (Husband’s Brief at 17-18). Husband insists

that the purported predetermination of the value of Wife’s interest in these

assets is, on its own, a sufficient reason to require the trial judge’s recusal.

       In the alternative, Husband suggests that the trial judge “has exhibited

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will towards Husband throughout the post-

dissolution proceedings sufficient to establish a basis for recusal[.]” (Id. at

19). Husband emphasizes the trial judge’s comments and actions at: 1) an

August 20, 2018 hearing where the judge first announced his decision

regarding the parties’ economic issues; 2) a January 7, 2019 hearing on Wife’s

first contempt petition; 3) a May 28, 2019 hearing on Wife’s second contempt

petition; and 4) September 2019 hearings on Wife’s third contempt petition.3

Aside from highlighting certain comments from the aforementioned hearings,

Husband also complains that the trial judge failed to address Husband’s

concerns regarding “disclosure of confidential and proprietary business

____________________________________________

3 Husband challenged the contempt orders in a prior appeal. See Camper v.
Werner, 260 A.3d 172 (Pa.Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum)
(“Camper II”). This Court dismissed Husband’s appeal from the first two
contempt orders as moot. Regarding the third order, which held Husband in
contempt and compelled him to pay Wife’s counsel fees, this Court reversed
the order in part. Specifically, this Court determined that the decision in
Camper I vacated the original equitable distribution order, which effectively
extinguished the contempt and counsel fee terms in the third contempt order.

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information” related to the limited liability corporations. (Id. at 37). Husband

maintains that the trial judge’s “lack of impartiality raises, at the least, an

appearance of impropriety” that warranted recusal. (Id. at 41). Husband

concludes that the trial judge erred in denying the recusal motion, and this

Court must vacate the new equitable distribution order on this basis.       We

disagree.

      The following standard of review governs our consideration of this issue:

         Our Supreme Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth
         are honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted
         with a recusal demand, have the ability to determine
         whether they can rule impartially and without prejudice.
         The party who asserts a trial judge must be disqualified
         bears the burden of producing evidence establishing bias,
         prejudice, or unfairness necessitating recusal and the
         decision by a judge against whom a plea of prejudice is
         made will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion.

                                   *    *    *

         As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to
         and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being
         challenged. In considering a recusal request, the jurist must
         first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability
         to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal
         bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then
         consider whether his or her continued involvement in the
         case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would
         tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This
         is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist
         can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and
         dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision
         will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of
         discretion.

2303 Bainbridge, LLC v. Steel River Building Systems, Inc., 239 A.3d

1107, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d

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51, 60 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 627 Pa. 763, 101 A.3d 102 (2014)).

“In practice, ‘[d]iscretion is abused when the course pursued represents not

merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.’” Lewis v. Lewis,

234 A.3d 706, 722 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Goldman,

70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 672, 85 A.3d 482

(2014)).

      “Further, ‘because the integrity of the judiciary is compromised by the

appearance of impropriety, a jurist’s recusal is necessary where [the judge’s]

behavior appears to be biased or prejudicial.” Bowman v. Rand Spear &

Associates, P.C., 234 A.3d 848, 862 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Rohm and

Haas Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1261 (Pa.Super. 1999)).

           However, simply because a judge rules against a [party]
           does not establish bias on the part of the judge against that
           [party]. Along the same lines, a judge’s remark made
           during a hearing in exasperation at a party may be
           characterized as intemperate, but that remark alone does
           not establish bias or partiality.

Lewis, supra at 722 (quoting Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947,

951 (Pa.Super. 2018)). Likewise, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis

of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings

... do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display

a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” Bowman, supra at 862-63 (quoting Kearney, supra at 61).

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      Instantly, the court conducted a hearing on Husband’s recusal motion

on June 19, 2020. In light of the arguments presented in the motion and at

the hearing, the court denied Husband’s recusal request.         The trial court

opinion offered the following explanation in support of this decision:

         Essentially, Husband was complaining that [the trial
         judge’s] conduct in dealing with his multiple instances of
         contempt of the original equitable distribution order,
         rendered [the trial judge] biased against him. [The trial
         judge] found to the contrary subsequent to the hearing on
         the motion. Husband’s failure to follow the order of the
         court, and the court insisting on compliance, is not a
         demonstration of bias or prejudice. [The trial judge] had no
         problem finding that [his] ability to continue to preside was
         reasonable and impartial.

         Additionally, after the ruling, but prior to adjourning the
         June 19, 2020 proceeding, both parties, and their counsel,
         requested the [trial judge] remain in the case and
         specifically requested the [trial judge] assist the parties in
         settlement discussions. At the parties’ joint request, the
         matter was continued to June 25, 2020 for a settlement
         conference. Thereafter, Husband never renewed his motion
         for recusal and instead participated in further proceedings.
         Thus, Husband’s argument lacks merit as both parties
         agreed that the [trial judge] would and should remain on
         the case.

(Trial Court Opinion at 4-5) (some capitalization omitted).

      Our review of the record confirms the court’s analysis. Husband’s brief

identifies a handful of negative comments made by the trial judge during

contempt hearings that occurred while Husband’s appeal of the original

equitable distribution order was pending. Rather than demonstrating bias or

partiality, the trial judge’s comments simply illuminate the jurist’s frustration

over Husband’s non-compliance with certain directives. In the context of a

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contempt hearing, a judge’s use of pointed language with a contemnor is

unremarkable. Thus, the comments at issue are more akin to remarks made

“in exasperation” rather than a “display a deep-seated favoritism.”       See

Lewis, supra; Bowman, supra.

       Regarding Husband’s claim that the trial judge demonstrated his bias

when he “predetermined” the value of Wife’s interest in certain assets, we

disagree with Husband’s interpretation of the new equitable distribution order.

The exact language that Husband complains about is as follows:

          This court determines the marital value of PRAC and WAC[,
          the parties’ limited liability corporations,] to be
          $2,300,000.[4] This is in line with Wife’s expert’s testimony
          which valued the increase of these business interests at
          $2,300,000. This court found Wife’s expert’s testimony
          credible, and Husband’s expert’s testimony not credible.
          While Wife argued that the value of the PRAC and WAC
          should be increased by an additional $110,000 to
          $2,410,000, this court does not adopt this addition to value
          as the overall increase in value accounts for Wife’s
          premarital contribution to this business.

          This court has considered both the possible tax
          consequences of a sale as well as all other possible
          liquidation cost[s]. However, the court does not find it
          appropriate to deduct for those possible costs.          Said
          deductions are not mandatory, and a further reduction of
          the value of this marital asset would not serve to effectuate
          economic justice in this matter. Most importantly the court
____________________________________________

4 In Camper I, this Court reversed the portion of the prior equitable
distribution order that valued the martial portion of PRAC and WAC at
$2,300,000. Upon remand, we instructed the trial court to address tax and
cost of sale consequences and, if necessary, set forth a new valuation. See
Camper I, supra at 10. This Court also emphasized that the trial court should
provide on-the-record statement of reasons to support the chosen valuation.
See id.

                                           -8-
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         finds that a sale of the business is extremely unlikely. The
         business is very profitable. It provides Husband with a
         substantial direct income. In addition, as we previously
         found, the business supports Husband’s expenditure of
         substantial sums for his personal expenses. As noted below,
         the court determines that Wife shall receive 60% of the
         marital assets. Wife’s 60% of this asset is $1,380,000. If
         the court did deduct the theoretically possible
         dispositional costs (taxes, liquidation costs, etc.), the
         court would award Wife substantially more than 60%
         of the asset, as the court finds that awarding Wife
         $1,380,000 of this asset is equitable.

(Order, entered 2/23/21, at 1-2) (emphasis added and some capitalization

omitted).

      Contrary to Husband’s assertions, the above-quoted language does not

demonstrate some type of “predetermination” or bias on the part of the trial

judge. Instead, the trial judge considered specific factors that were relevant

to its decision regarding the valuation of the marital assets. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3502(a) (stating court shall equitably divide marital property between

parties and providing factors relevant to equitable distribution).      The trial

judge also explained the interplay between these factors and the distribution

scheme as a whole, concluding that the award of a specific amount to Wife

was necessary to effectuate economic justice. See Childress v. Bogosian,

12 A.3d 448 (Pa.Super. 2011) (reiterating that courts must consider whole of

distribution scheme in determining propriety of equitable distribution award;

circumstances of case are measured against objective of effectuating

economic justice between parties and achieving just determination of property

rights). Absent more, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in

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denying the recusal motion.   See 2303 Bainbridge, LLC, supra; Lewis,

supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2023

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