Court Opinion

ID: 9787689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:22:05.452191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:59.690791
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s determination to affirm the jury’s guilty verdict and special circumstance findings.
*983I cannot agree, however, that the trial court erred in excusing Prospective Juror H. for cause. I find the record fairly supports—and thus requires deference to—the court’s implicit determination that H.’s views on the death penalty would sufficiently interfere with his duties as a juror to warrant excusal.
In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] (Witt), the United States Supreme Court reconsidered language in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], to the effect that prospective jurors may be excused for cause if they make it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.” (Id. at p. 522, fn. 21.) This standard had tended to be applied in formulaic terms, with “lower courts staffing] that a veniremember may be excluded only if he or she would ‘automatically’ vote against the death penalty, and even then this state of mind must be ‘unambiguous,’ or ‘unmistakably clear.’ [Citation.]” (Witt, at p. 419.)
In Witt, the high court rejected such a narrow and formalistic approach and discarded the Witherspoon formulation. It held instead that a trial court may excuse a prospective juror for cause whenever “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, fn. omitted.) The court further emphasized that “in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to ‘automatic’ decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” (Id. at pp. 424-425, fn. omitted.)
With respect to deference, the court explained: “[T]he question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman’s state of *984mind. . . . [S]uch a finding is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. Such determinations were entitled to deference even on direct review [as well as federal habeas corpus proceedings].” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 428, fn. omitted.) While the trial judge applies a legal standard in resolving challenges for cause, “his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record.” (Id. at p. 429; see also Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 175-178 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 [81 L.Ed.2d 847, 104 S.Ct. 2885].) Indeed, as the court had observed as early as Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 156-157 [25 L.Ed. 244], “ ‘[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case.’ ” (Witt, supra, at p. 428, fn. 9, quoting Reynolds, at pp. 156-157.)
In applying the constitutional standard of Witt, this court has also consistently accorded the same measure of deference in reviewing excusals for cause. (See, e.g., People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 122-123 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 768 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) “On appeal, we will uphold a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause by either party ‘if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court’s determination as to the prospective juror’s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].)
Reviewing the record in light of the foregoing principles, I conclude the trial court did not err in excusing Prospective Juror H. for cause. In making its ruling, the court focused on H.’s views regarding “background conditions.” During voir dire, the court noted that H. had referred in his juror questionnaire to “past psychological experiences” as a basis for imposing life without possibility of parole—which H. considered the more serious punishment—and sought to clarify his views. The following colloquy then ensued:
“THE COURT: . . . Assuming there were past psychological experiences, bad childhood or abuse or something else, I don’t know whether any of that is going to come out, but assuming that thing occurred, would you be automatically in favor of life without possibility of parole as opposed to the death penalty because of those factors?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Well, whatever the law states.
*985“THE COURT: The law is not going to help you a whole lot in weighing the evidence and deciding the penalty. That is, the law is going to give you the two options. And the law is going to tell you that you must consider all the evidence that’s in. And then you must look at the aggravating and mitigating factors.
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Uh-huh.
“THE COURT: And you can only impose death if the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison to the mitigating factors that death is warranted.
“Now that’s pretty much it. You are going to have to decide for yourself what those factors are and decide what penalty is appropriate. So we are not going to tell you how to weigh the psychological factors. We are just not going to. You are going to have to weigh it yourself in your decisions with the other jurors. You feel comfortable doing that?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you think that if there were past psychological factors that they would weigh heavily enough that you probably wouldn’t impose the death penalty?
“[Long period of silence.] Is your answer you just don’t know or what?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Yes, I think they might.
“THE COURT: You think they might auger toward life without possibility of parole?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Are you absolutely committed to that position?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Yes.
“THE COURT: You are saying that if there were psychological factors, without naming what they might be, you would automatically vote for life without possibility of parole?
“PROSPECTIVE JUROR [H.]: Without naming them, I don’t think so.”
*986It thus appears that although H. initially indicated he felt “comfortable” with deliberating the question of penalty, including consideration of psychological factors, the trial court nevertheless perceived a sufficient degree of ambiguity or uncertainty to persist in this line of questioning to clarify his true state of mind. The court also felt constrained to note a long period of silence—during which it plainly would have been focused on H.’s demeanor—before H. responded regarding imposition of the death penalty “if there were past psychological factors.” Despite several more questions, however, he never expressed a clear position. Whether or not his answers were actually inconsistent, they were at least equivocal.
“[A] primary purpose of [the death-qualifying] phase of voir dire is to enable the trial court to ‘assess the juror’s state of mind’ and thereby make a meaningful evaluation of his or her impartiality. [Citation.] [][] As a concomitant principle of review, we generally accord considerable deference to these evaluations, which ‘constitute[] a resolution of what is essentially a question of fact or, perhaps more accurately, a mixed question that is essentially factual. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘If there are conflicting answers to the voir dire, the court may assess the juror’s state of mind and is not bound by statements which, taken in isolation, are unequivocal. When such a prospective juror has both equivocated and taken (at some point) a clear stand, the wisdom of entrusting the ruling on the challenge for cause to the trial court becomes clear.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘where equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror’s ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court’s determination as to his true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.’ [Citations.] ‘In the final analysis, “the question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court’s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record,” and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the trial court’s assessment. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 646-647 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) The portion of the voir dire cited above reflects precisely the circumstance in which we should defer to the conclusions of the trial court, which saw and heard what we can now only review in inscrutable print.
The majority describes the voir dire as “a series of awkward questions” and suggests the court’s perceived deficiencies in H.’s responses “reasonably must be viewed as a product of the trial court’s own unclear inquiries.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 967, fn. omitted.) With all due respect, these criticisms not only unfairly disparage a conscientious bench officer1 but highlight the *987majority’s own failure to impose the self-restraint required of a reviewing court in these circumstances. As the high court in Witt cautioned, this is the very situation in which our “common sense should have realized [what] experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424-426; see id. at pp. 428, fn. 9, 429.) This court did not see or hear Prospective Juror H. It is therefore impossible for us to determine the cause of his vagueness and lack of articulation.
The relevant determination here is not whether a prospective juror would always or automatically vote for one penalty or the other; nor is the question strictly whether the individual is unable to follow the law. While either of these circumstances would be a sufficient basis to excuse for cause, neither is a necessary one. Rather, the trial court must endeavor to assess whether “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, fn. omitted & italics added.) In my view, it is entirely reasonable that, in light of the voir dire—including an evaluation of credibility and demeanor—the court could conclude Prospective Juror H.’s view would substantially impair the discharge of his duties. On this record, that assessment is entitled to our deference.
I likewise find no error in the trial court’s excusal of Prospective Juror Q. Q. initially indicated she would not automatically vote for one punishment or the other in the event of a penalty phase trial. During subsequent questioning, however, she stated she thought life without the possibility of parole was the more serious alternative. The court and both counsel attempted to clarify her state of mind but without real success. At one point, the prosecution asked, *988“Well, can you even conceive of any circumstance under which death would be appropriate?”—to which Q. responded, “I can’t think of [any].” The prosecutor made further efforts to understand the logic of her position, which the trial court finally summarized as follows: “I guess what [the prosecutor] is saying is if Hitler were on trial here and he were convicted, he would get life. And if somebody else were tried who just barely made the first degree murder and special circumstances, he’d get death. [!]...[][]... Is that your position?” In response, Q. affirmed without equivocation that the court had accurately described her views on the death penalty.
The trial court properly excused Prospective Juror Q. for cause. As the court expressed the situation, Q. “has boxed herself into a position that where I don’t know anymore how she stands. I mean, she is literally impossible at this point to evaluate, absent some lengthy, lengthy questions.” The record bears out this determination as well as the reasonable inference Q.’s equivocation and ambivalence would impair her ability to function according to the instructions and her oath if the case proceeded to a penalty phase. Since substantial evidence supports the court’s resolution of these uncertainties, we should not second-guess its evaluation of her state of mind.
Defendant argues that nevertheless the trial court erroneously failed to continue questioning Q. to resolve her apparent confusion and clarify her actual views. It is entirely uncertain what, if any, value additional voir dire would have had; and he cites no constitutional imperative for imposing such an obligation where the court and counsel have all made reasonable efforts to ascertain a prospective juror’s attitude. As with the ultimate determination to excuse for cause, the trial court’s decision whether further questioning would serve any useful purpose should be deferred to on review. (Cf. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 425.)
“The selection of a jury in a capital case includes many judgment calls by trial judges—calls that involve the judge’s intuition about the demeanor of the venireman, the appropriateness of his response, his manner, dress, and his inflection. It is a decision with the usual stuff of trial court decisionmaking, calls more dependent upon intuition, shrewdness, or courtroom savvy than abstract analogical processes. Correspondingly, one need not pause for long to summon up myriad examples of expression whose meaning can only be determined by the inflection and manner of its expression. For example, the simple expressions T reckon so’ and T could hardly do so’ may or may not express doubt. In sum, ruling upon a request to exclude a venireman inevitably involves an interpretation of what was asked and answered. The dynamic trial scene is not easily conformed to a mold judicially shaped to facilitate review or to achieve a targeted level of accuracy, perhaps because few but lawyers and judges talk and think in such a fashion, peculiarly so *989with the interrogation of veniremen in death cases.” (O’Bryan v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 365, 393 (conc. opn. of Higginbotham, J.).)
Thus, while preparation is incumbent, the trial court must bring more intuitive skills to the voir dire process as well. Contrary to the majority’s implication and irrespective of “careful planning” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 966), the actual determination whether to excuse for cause is an on-the-spot assessment of the individual’s credibility as a prospective juror, not the parsing of a cold transcription of questions and answers. As the high court reminded in Witt, “determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question- and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Moreover, once error is found, we have no alternative but to reverse the penalty judgment, with the tremendous toll that implies not only on the victim’s family but the judicial system at large. Given this consequence, it is all the more critical that we observe the greatest circumspection and take care not to reverse “except in a clear case.” (Reynolds v. United States, supra, 98 U.S. at p. 157.)
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Baxter, J., and Chin, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 22, 2003. Brown, J., did not participate therein. Baxter, J., and Chin, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The majority’s characterization of Prospective Juror H.’s voir dire variously as inadequate and “inexplicable and disappointing” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 967) is equally unjustified on this record. A review of H.’s questioning in the context of the entire voir dire demonstrates that the court considered each prospective juror, including H., individually to the extent necessary, or *987possible, to determine his or her actual views regarding the death penalty. Thus, for example, the court inquired further of several prospective jurors who had indicated on their questionnaires they thought life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a more severe punishment than death. At some point, the court also explained to the venire generally the manner in which the jury would make its penalty determination, emphasizing that death would be warranted only if the aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed those in mitigation, meaning the law considered death the more severe punishment. Inferentially, the court concluded in this context that it was unnecessary to pursue the point with those prospective jurors it perceived from their demeanor had no confusion on this point.