Court Opinion

ID: 9714970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:50:22.996296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:30.038910
License: Public Domain

*748SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 25. {concurring). Although I agree that we must reverse, I depart from the majority's analysis and offer a different approach.
¶ 26. In the trial court, the prosecutor argued that the warrantless entry was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The trial court found, however, that the police had reasonable suspicion, which, in combination with exigent circumstances, supported the warrantless entry. Rodriquez argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard. Rodriguez is correct.
¶ 27. Rodriguez maintains that under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and its progeny, reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances are not sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry; probable cause and exigent circumstances are required. The State concedes Rodriquez' legal premise. The State argues, however, that "the trial court's mention of reasonable suspicion may have been a simple misstatement." The State also argues that the officers did have "probable cause to believe that the residence contained evidence of a crime," and that "it was reasonable for the officers to believe there was a fair probability that evidence of drug activity would be found in the residence." (Emphases added.) The State's arguments are flawed in two respects.
¶ 28. First, the record belies the State's contention that the court's reference to reasonable suspicion "may have been a simple misstatement." The prosecutor had argued probable cause, but the trial court's comments were specific and repeated:
If the defendant had .. . essentially walked into the house and closed this door, that... would [have] been the end of the police involvement, but the fact [is] that ... upon the initiation of conversation with the *749police as to "what's up?"[,] his response is to take flight. It is at this time as he takes flight, the Court finds that the police have reasonable suspicion. Although they've testified at this point that there was observable activity which they believed was suspicious, it's the flight in the totality of circumstances which gives reasonable suspicion.
The police at this point in time are doing nothing more than continuing the investigation, and at this time, given the reasonable suspicion of the defendant, they are pursuing the defendant.
(Emphases added.)
¶ 29. Second, at best, the State has offered an argument for facts that could have supported a search warrant for the residence. Probable cause to believe that "evidence of drug activity" was in the residence, however, cannot be superimposed on Rodriquez to establish probable cause for a warrantless entry to arrest him.
¶ 30. In the trial court, the prosecutor, apparently realizing that probable cause was necessary to justify the warrantless entry, argued that the facts established probable cause. The court, however, reasonably rejected her argument and, instead, found that the facts established only reasonable suspicion. To that point, the court was correct. The trial court, however, then erred in failing to recognize that reasonable suspicion could not support a warrantless home entry.
¶ 31. Accordingly, I would summarily reverse and, therefore, I respectfully concur.