Court Opinion

ID: 9697819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:32:10.098998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:08.550510
License: Public Domain

*583Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen :
The problem this case presents disturbs me greatly and compels the following dissent.
I appreciate the vital need for finality in adoption cases. I am heartily in accord with the recommendations of the Governor’s Committee on Child Welfare, referred to in the Majority opinion and the purposes of the resulting 1953 statute. I agree further that all of the statutory requirements were complied with in the instant case. However, much more needs to be considered.
The unwed mother of the child involved became pregnant when she was forty years of age. She lived alone with an aged mother. Upon learning of her condition, appellant, understandingly, became distraught, gave up her employment, and attempted to go to another city to conceal the fact of her pregnancy. When her family gained the news, their reaction was one of hysterical impending disgrace followed by abuse directed toward the appellant. For two months, she was kept a virtual prisoner to hide the situation from the neighbors. Then she was shunted off to a home for aged women and instructed to stay out of sight and in her room. Members of her immediate family during this time vigorously insisted that the expected child be surrendered for adoption, and that the child could not be housed in the family abode. The appellant was financially destitute and the father of the child refused to arrange satisfactory assistance.
The child was born prematurely on September 9, 1959. Just two days later, on September 11, the mother executed a temporary agreement with the agency involved surrendering her rights in the child. The agency took custody of the child on September 14. On October 29, the mother signed the petition for voluntary relinquishment, but only after she had pleaded for an opportunity to see the child and was told that such would be *584arranged only if she went through with her agreement to relinquish.
There isn’t any doubt in my mind that all during this pertinent period, the appellant was so distraught and confused of mind that her written act of relinquishment was anything but free, voluntary and deliberate. This conviction is strongly sustained by the testimony of a physician, who treated her during the period of pregnancy.
I do not think it need be argued that a document of such great import, as the written voluntary relinquishment of a child by his mother, should clearly be an “intelligent, voluntary and deliberate” act. The law fias consistently required that the act of consent to adoption by the natural parents of a child must be of this high character. If the consent is not such, a requested decree of adoption must be refused. See, Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A. 2d 132 (1949). Certainly, a voluntary relinquishment is of equal significance and demands similar considerations and standards.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v. The Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 514, 518, 76 A. 2d 427 (1950), the Court declared invalid an “irrevocable consent to adoption” given by a mother and pointedly stated: “Relatrix testified that she was emotionally disturbed by her predicament and that she signed the agreement placing her child with respondent from necessity. She was distracted and could recognize no alternative. She had no suitable home for herself and the child at the time and was unable then to provide one. On a change of circumstances she moved with reasonable promptness — about three months after the birth of the child — to regain its custody.”
In the instant case, after appellant regained her employment, and satisfactory support and a home for the child was secured, she contacted the agency in order to *585have her child returned. This was early in March, 1960, only four months subsequent to the date of the child’s placement for adoption. Her pleas were ignored, and no effort was made to reconsider or reevaluate the situation. No one questions that, as of that time and since, she is adequately able to provide a proper home. Needless to point out, that with this would go the priceless, tender care of the woman who brought the child into the world, a very important factor in determining the child’s welfare and future best interests.
For these reasons, I feel that the lower court failed to exercise a wise discretion.
I would reverse.