Court Opinion

ID: 9742072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:05.881767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.368721
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I would reverse the trial court’s determination that there is “good cause” to deviate from the adoption placement preferences in the Indian Child Welfare Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
*886The separation of Indian children from them families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of Indian life today. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531.
In addition to the trauma of- separation from their families, most Indian children in placement * * * have to cope with the problems of adjusting to a social and cultural environment much different than their own.
Id. In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
The most important substantive requirement imposed on state courts is that of section 1915(a), which, absent “good cause” to the contrary, mandates that adoptive placements be made preferentially with (1) members of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the same tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36-37, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1602, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989).
The Act is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in Indian children’s best interests that their relationship to the tribe be protected. Id. at 50 n. 24, 109 S.Ct. at 1609 n. 24. Because the removal of Indian children from their cultural setting seriously impacts long-term tribal survival and has a damaging • social and psychological impact upon individual children, it is imperative that the trial court’s findings be carefully scrutinized.
The evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that after a diligent search, there is an unavailability of suitable Indian families meeting the preference criteria. Foremost, only 11 months lapsed between the time parental rights were terminated in December 1991 until the children moved into their present home with A.C. Given the difficulties of placing three children with special needs together, I believe the trial court placed an unfair and unreasonable burden upon the tribe.
A diligent attempt to find a suitable family includes, at a minimum, contact with the child’s social service program, a search of all county or state listings of available Indian homes and contact with nationally known Indian programs with available placement resources. BIA Guidelines, F.3 Commentary, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,595 (1979).
Foster care adoption worker Fred Isham testified that he had an active file of 48 Indian homes available. Although Isham would not speculate on the suitability of one of these homes, the evidence does not show that none of these homes would be an appropriate placement for the children. It is illogical to assume that the tribe could investigate these known homes as well as conduct a search on a national level all within less than a year’s time. Moreover, I cannot agree with the court’s finding that no Indian families will be available in the “foreseeable future.” There is simply no basis to predict what may or may not occur in the near future.
Although the evidence does support the trial court’s finding that the children have “extraordinary” emotional needs, the evidence also supports the court’s finding that the children’s present emotional, cultural, educational and physical needs are being met in A.C.’s home. Since the children’s needs are currently being met, the tribe should not be pressured into finding an adoptive home. The failed placement in the L. home only goes to show that placement in an adoptive home must be carefully planned. Developing an adequate transition plan will necessarily take time. The court’s decision in this ease will only serve to force Indian tribes to move children into Indian homes without adequate planning and -will likely result in more failed placements.
Where the children are in a stable Indian home and their needs are being met, such as in the present case, the children’s tribe must be given sufficient time to find an adoptive home. As the majority states, it is difficult to specify what might be a reasonable length of time to find an adoptive home. That decision will necessarily turn on the facts of each ease. Under the facts of this case, it is apparent to me that the tribe was not given sufficient time to find an adoptive home.
*887Moreover, it is not the role of trial courts or this court to second-guess the social service policies of Indian tribes. Apparently, the tribe has decided that the children are not ready for adoption due to their special needs. This decision should be respected. Contributing to the problem of the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes is the failure of state officials and agencies to take into account the special problems and circumstances of Indian families and the legitimate interest of Indian tribes in preserving and protecting the Indian family. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs has stated that one purpose of the Act is to address problems caused by the failure of state courts to recognize the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities. In re L.A.C., 8 Indian L.Rep. (Am.Indian Law.Training Program) 5021, 5022 (1981). In no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as family relationships. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34, 109 S.Ct. at 1601 (citing Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association)). Nontribal governments often have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Id. at 34-35, 109 S.Ct. at 1601.
Numerous witnesses testified as to the unique culture in Indian communities as well as the difficulty Indian children face when raised in white homes. For example, licensed social worker Penny King, a qualified Indian expert witness, testified that it is vital to the identity of Indian people that they know where they come from and that they have contact with their tribe and Indian people. Licensed social worker Lorraine Patch, an Indian who was raised in a white foster home since age nine, testified the Cs could not provide for the children’s cultural needs except in a very superficial way. Psychotherapist Michelle Gordon, who is Indian and has had extensive experience working with Indian children, testified that the children in this case feel shame because they are Indian and culture is important in raising Indian children.
This court’s decision will take away the tribe’s right to maintain the children in a culturally appropriate environment. Thus, Indian tribes will be forced to choose adoption over foster care. Yet nowhere in the Act is adoption favored over foster care. The trial court decided, and this court has affirmed, that the Cs should be allowed to adopt the children based primarily on the children’s need for permanency.
I would hold that the trial court erroneously construed the Act to favor a permanent home placement over cultural heritage. It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that retaining a child’s cultural heritage is of primary importance. The Act itself , does not mention a need for permanence. This court has effectively created a new standard for finding “good cause” to deviate from the adoption placement preferences in the Act.
Elevating permanence to the level of “good cause” may seriously affect the viability of Indian tribes. I cannot so easily dismiss the concerns of the tribe and of Beltrami County that all children in foster placements will be at risk for adoption in a non-Indian home. Given the limited number of Indian homes available to adopt children, the importance placed on the majority’s concept of permanency may seriously undermine the purposes of the Act. It is likely that more Indian children will be removed from the Indian community and placed in non-Indian homes, exactly the result the Act was intended to prevent.
Even if permanence is a factor in determining the children’s emotional needs as the majority suggests, the concept of permanency has been misapplied in this case. Certainly all children have a need for permanence. The need for permanence, however, must be viewed from the perspective of the Indian family. The standard to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of section 1915(a) are the “prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community.” 25 *888U.S.C. § 1915(d). Ignorance of Indian cultural values and social norms may result in decisions wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life. All too often a white, middle-class standard is applied, which, in many cases, forecloses placement with an Indian family. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (“States * * ⅜ have often failed to recognize * * * the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”).
I believe the trial court erred by concluding that the children’s need for permanence could be met through placement with the Cs. Applying an Indian standard, it is clear that the Cs cannot meet the children’s permanency need because they cannot, on a daily basis, provide for the children’s cultural needs. The children’s cultural heritage can only be maintained by living in an Indian environment and practicing Indian rituals on a daily basis.
Lastly, I note that the proceeding in this case should never have taken place. Although the wishes of the Cs to adopt three special needs children are admirable, the Cs should not have had an expectation that they would be allowed to adopt the children. E.C. testified it was made clear that when the children were placed it was a temporary placement and a search for an Indian family was being conducted. C.C. further testified that Fred Isham had told her they could not adopt the children.
In conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion in finding “good cause” to deviate from the adoption placement preferences in the Act. The court’s finding that there is an unavailability of suitable families after a diligent search meeting the preference criteria is not supported by the evidence. Additionally, the trial court improperly applied the concept of permanency in determining the children’s extraordinary emotional needs. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.