Court Opinion

ID: 9398533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:11:03.764732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.344872
License: Public Domain

J-S16022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
               v.                          :
                                           :
                                           :
 TYREE A. LAWSON                           :
                                           :
                     Appellant             :   No. 2608 EDA 2021

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2021
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
               Criminal Division at CP-46-CR-0000542-2009

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED MAY 31, 2023

        Tyree A. Lawson (Appellant) appeals pro se from the judgment of

sentence imposed after this Court granted post-conviction relief in the form of

resentencing. We affirm.

        On March 9, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of robbery and related

offenses. On June 1, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 18 – 60

years in prison.     This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth

v. Lawson, 60 A.3d 559 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum),

appeal denied, 62 A.3d 379 (Pa. 2013).

        In the intervening years, Appellant filed several unsuccessful petitions

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546.    On June 19, 2018, Appellant filed a PCRA petition alleging he had
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recently discovered that his unrelated federal conviction had been vacated and

nolle prossed, and thus he was “entitled to a new sentencing hearing because

the trial court utilized the now-overturned Federal Conviction to support its

conclusion that Appellant was a violent criminal, and enhanced his sentence

accordingly.” See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 226 A.3d 626 (Pa. Super.

2020) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2). The PCRA court found Appellant

met the newly-discovered facts exception codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1)(ii), but determined Appellant was not entitled to relief. Id. at 2.

      On appeal, this Court agreed Appellant satisfied the applicability of the

newly-discovered facts exception, and concluded “the PCRA court did not err

in denying relief….”   Id. at 2-3.   However, we sua sponte addressed “the

legality of Appellant’s sentence in light of the reversal of the Federal

Conviction.” Id. (observing “[w]here a petitioner has satisfied a timeliness

exception to the PCRA … we have jurisdiction to address a claim regarding

the legality of Appellant’s sentence.”) (emphasis added). We then considered

whether Appellant was entitled to credit for time served, “to the extent

Appellant was serving prison time for the Federal Conviction at the same time

he was serving prison time for the instant case.” Id. We concluded the record

was “inadequate for us to make the determination.            Accordingly, we

remand[ed] this case to the PCRA court to consider this issue.”            Id.

(emphasis added).

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        On remand, the PCRA court appointed counsel for Appellant and held a

conference on September 3, 2021. At the conference, the court stated: “I

have discussed the matter with counsel. [Counsel] does wish to raise some

additional issues and seeks to file an amended petition. I will allow

that.” N.T., 9/3/21, at 2 (emphasis added).

        The court held a hearing on November 30, 2021. The parties stipulated

that to give Appellant proper credit for time served, the effective date of his

state sentence was November 9, 2009, rather than June 1, 2011.            N.T.,

11/30/21, at 4.        After hearing argument, the court denied Appellant’s

amended PCRA petition. Id. at 21-22. The court then awarded credit for

time-served and reimposed the original sentence. Id. at 26-27. It concluded

Appellant would “pay the restitution and the court costs and comply with

special conditions of parole.” Id. at 27.

        On December 9, 2021, although represented by counsel, Appellant filed

a pro se notice of appeal and motion to proceed pro se. On January 28, 2022,

this Court directed the court to conduct a hearing in accordance with

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). On April 18, 2022,

after a hearing, the PCRA court entered an order granting Appellant’s motion

to proceed pro se.1

        On appeal, Appellant asks:

____________________________________________

1   Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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        I.     Whether the [resentencing] court during it’s [sic]
               resentencing hearing abused its discretion, erred and denied
               Appellant of [d]ue [p]rocess of [l]aw by deeming [the]
               Amended        [PCRA]       Petition:   Apprendi-violation;
               Blakely/Apprendi violation and Title 18 Pa. §
               906/Apprendi-violation, and/or [n]onwaivable legality of
               sentencing claim(s) as being “untimely” and outside the
               scope of appellate’ [sic] remand” which proceeding resulted
               Appellate’s [sic] January 10, 2020 vacate & remand (2543
               EDA 2020) from successful pled and proved PCRA time-bar
               exception?

        II.    Whether the resentencing court’s refusal to address
               Appellant’s [a]mended [p]etition’s [l]egality of [s]entence
               claims resulted [in] an unreasonable abuse of discretion,
               judicial-bias and/or vindictiveness that may have, been
               impr[o]perly motivated Appellate’s [sic] (254 EDA 2018)
               January 10, 2020, order vacating the it’s [sic] 2018 final-
               order denying PCRA relief; yet remanding with instructions
               to consider [l]egality of Appellant’s sentence.... now
               necessitating voluntary withdrawal or recusal to ensure
               protection of Appellant’s [d]ue [p]rocess rights?

        III.   [Whether t]he [resentencing] court erred and denied
               Appellant of [sic] [d]ue [p]rocess of [l]aw by again
               sentencing Appellant to a null and void illegal sentence to
               pay fines and costs and non-mandato[r]y restitution without
               inquiring into Appellant’s financial status and/or eligibility to
               pay in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c)?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (renumbered).2

        In his first issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his amended PCRA

petition. We may not consider this issue because the PCRA court on remand

was limited to considering Appellant’s credit for time served. Our Supreme

Court has stated:

____________________________________________

2   Appellant has withdrawn his second issue. See Appellant’s Brief at 4.

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      Following a full and final decision by a PCRA court on a PCRA
      petition, that court no longer has jurisdiction to make any
      determinations related to that petition unless, following appeal,
      the appellate court remands the case for further proceedings in
      the lower court. In such circumstances, the PCRA court may only
      act in accordance with the dictates of the remand order.
      The PCRA court does not have the authority or the
      discretion to permit a petitioner to raise new claims outside
      the scope of the remand order and to treat those new
      claims as an amendment to an adjudicated PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 144 A.3d 1270, 1280 (Pa. 2016) (footnotes

omitted, emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 199 A.3d

365, 388-89 (Pa. 2018) (PCRA petitioner is not entitled to raise new claims on

remand); Commonwealth v. Null, 186 A.3d 424, 429 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(lower court must strictly comply with this Court’s mandate); see also Gocek

v. Gocek, 612 A.2d 1004, 1009 n.7 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“on remand, the scope

of inquiry should not exceed the perimeters set forth herein”).

      Here, remand was limited the issue of whether Appellant was entitled to

credit for time served because his federal conviction had been overturned.

Lawson, supra at 2.        The PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider

Appellant’s amendment to his PCRA petition. See Sepulveda, 144 A.3d at

1280. Thus, Appellant’s issue lacks merit.

      Next, Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the court

sentenced him to pay the court costs and restitution it imposed at his original

sentencing, without holding an ability to pay hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 40-

41. This issue does not merit relief.

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      The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that for costs, the

court “shall, insofar as is just and practicable, consider the burden upon the

defendant by reason of the defendant’s financial means, including the

defendant’s ability to make restitution or reparations.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C).

Certain costs, such as the cost of prosecution, are mandatory. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9728(g) (“other costs associated with the prosecution, shall be borne by

the   defendant”)     (emphasis      added);     42    Pa.C.S.A.    §    9721(c.1)

(“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 9728 . . . the court shall order

the defendant to pay costs”) (emphasis added).

      Section 9721(c.1) does “not require the court to consider the

defendant’s ability to pay prior to the imposition of costs.” Commonwealth

v. Lopez, 280 A.3d 887, 900 (Pa. 2022). Further, “interpreting Rule 706(C)

to require a presentence ability-to-pay inquiry would place the rule directly at

odds with Section[] 9721(c.1)[.]” Id. Thus, Appellant was not entitled to an

ability to pay hearing. See Lopez, supra.

      With respect to restitution, we have explained:

      In criminal proceedings, an order of restitution is not simply an
      award of damages, but is, rather, a sentence. Commonwealth
      v. Holmes, 155 A.3d 69 (Pa. Super. 2017). Section 1106 of the
      Crimes Code specifies that restitution is mandatory and the
      defendant’s financial resources, i.e., his ability to pay, is irrelevant
      unless and until he defaults on the restitution order.
      Commonwealth v. Colon, 708 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Pa. Super.
      1998); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106. Accordingly, it bears
      repeating that this Court has no authority to disregard the plain
      language of the Sentencing Code. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921; see also
      [Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013)] (“The
      plain language of the statute is generally the best indicator of

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      legislative intent ....”). Appellant’s claim ─ that his ability to pay
      was not considered ─ lacks merit because the court was not
      obligated to consider ability to pay when it entered the order. Id.

Commonwealth v. McCabe, 230 A.3d 1199, 1207-08 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(emphasis in original), affirmed, 265 A.3d 1279 (Pa. 2021). Accordingly, the

court did not err in ordering restitution without determining Appellant’s ability

to pay. This issue does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

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