Court Opinion

ID: 9597247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:57:02.374573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:11.484181
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, J.
dissenting.
I must dissent from the opinion and judgment affirming Appellant’s conviction for the offense of failure to stop and render aid. Although I believe that the majority opinion correctly tracks the applicable statutes, it nevertheless conflicts with the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Stevenson.3
The offense of failure to stop and render aid at issue in Stevenson occurred under former article 6701d.4 That article was subsequently repealed and codified in chapter 550 of the Texas Transportation Code, but without substantive changes to the law.5 Former section 38(a) provided,
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.6
Former section 38(b) provided penalties for failing to fulfill these requirements.7 Former section 40 provided,
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and the name of his motor vehicle liability insurer, and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator’s, commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle colliding with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of ar*166rangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person,8
In Stevenson, in which a husband was the driver and his wife was the injured person, the driver remained at the scene as he believed the law required. But the Stevenson court held,
In the present case, the only persons involved in the accident were appellee and his wife. Presumably, appellee and his wife already have the information required by § 40. Because § 38 merely requires a driver to remain at the scene long enough to impart the information required by § W, those statutes did not require appellee to remain at the scene at all since all the injured parties already possessed the requisite information.9
In a footnote, the Stevenson court pointed out that “[e]ven if his wife did not possess some of the information, because she occupied the same vehicle as appellee, the required information could have been conveyed without stopping the vehicle.”10
Clearly, then, the Stevenson court held that a person involved in an accident resulting in personal injury need not remain at the scene after he had provided his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he was driving and the name of his motor vehicle liability insurer.11 If the driver could provide that information without stopping at the scene of the accident, he could lawfully leave the scene of the accident and provide the required information in another manner.12
Despite the fact that the wife was injured, the Stevenson court did not hold that the driver need remain at the scene to secure medical treatment.13 The Stevenson court treated that element of former section 40 as mere surplusage.14
In the case now before this court, Appellant left his automobile at the scene of the accident. He therefore provided a motor vehicle registration number and, even if his name, address, and insurance information were not somewhere within the car, the means of learning his name, address, and insurance information, thus satisfying the statutory requirements pursuant to Stevenson.15
Appellant did not remain at the scene to secure medical treatment. But as the majority notes, a nurse was on the scene, and she provided such aid as she could. Additionally, someone had called an ambulance. Certainly, more assistance was provided in the case before this court than in Stevenson. Yet, the Stevenson court held that Stevenson had done all that was required of him by providing his name, address, and motor registration number, which he lawfully could have done as he fled the scene, and by presumably coming up with a way to provide insurance information later.16
*167By affirming Appellant’s conviction because he did not remain at the scene to provide the injured person reasonable assistance in seeking medical treatment, the majority seems to track the applicable statutes exactly.17 But because the holding of the majority conflicts with the clear mandate in Stevenson, I must respectfully dissent.

. 958 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

. See Act of June 18, 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., ch. 421, §§ 38, 40, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 967, 974 (current version at Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023 (Vernon 1999)).

. See Act of May 23, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 165, §§ 24(a), 25, 27, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1025, 1870-71.

. See Act of June 18, 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., ch. 421, § 38(a), 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws at 974.

. See id. § 38(b), 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws at 974.

. Act of May 27, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 810, § 4, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2029, 2029 (emphasis added) (current version at Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.023).

. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d at 827 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

. Id. at 827 n. 4.

. Id. at 827.

. Id. at 827 & n. 4.

. Id. at 827-28.

. Id.

. Id. at 827 & n. 4; see also Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023.

. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d at 827 & n. 4.

. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023.