Court Opinion

ID: 9624994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:24:22.041586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:35.297430
License: Public Domain

*321JOSEPH, J.,
specially concurring.
The majority (as well as the trial court in a different way) has arrived at a proper result by following a route through the statutes and case law that is erroneous and potentially troublesome for Oregon counties and the expanding cities of the state. I believe it is important to state the legally correct route to the result.
The majority begins to go astray with the first sentence in section I of the opinion with the reference to "authority under section 100-1223(f), OCLA, to widen any road 'by agreement.’ ” In the first place I do not agree that the parties in their so-called "amended stipulation” upon which this case was tried (as an ORS ch 27 controversy submitted without action or suit) or in their briefs depend upon any such "authority.” However that may be, in the second place the referenced subparagraph was not "authority” for a procedure to widen a county road. It merely provided alternative methods by which the county could "procure right of way” under one of the four procedures for widening county roads provided by statute.
Section 100-1203, OCLA, unambiguously provided that "[proceedings for the * * * alteration, * * * of county roads shall be instituted” by petition, by resolution of the county court, by grant by owners of the necessary rights of way or by condemnation proceedings. Sections 100-1206 through 100-1222, OCLA, defined the petition method. Section 100-1223, OCLA, set out the method to be initiated by a resolution of the county court. Apparently §§ 100-1224 through 100-1227, OCLA, encompassed variations of the method involving grants by owners of necessary rights of way. Finally condemnation procedures were defined by §§ 100-1228 through 100-1230, OCLA. Prior to the enactment of Oregon Laws 1927, ch 238, in the event proceedings were initiated by resolution of the county court, title to necessary property for a road widening could only be acquired by the same method title could *322be acquired under the petition method; i.e., by the appointment of a board of county road viewers and the consequent steps under §§ 100-1209 through 100-1220, OCLA. The 1927 Act added subsections (e) and (f) to § 100-1223, OCLA. The latter subparagraph provided for less cumbersome methods for acquisition of necessary rights of way as alternatives to the appointment of viewers. That was its only effect.
As stipulated by the parties, the widening of Barger Drive was initiated by a resolution under § 100-1223, OCLA. The so-called agreement found in the records had nothing more to do with the procedure than what it stated on its face:
"The undersigned property owners abutting on * * * Barger Avenue, hereby agree to give an additional five feet along the front of our property * * *, where necessary to provide a right-of-way for said road 50 feet in width.”
The parties have agreed here that the agreement was made in consideration of the county’s promise to blacktop the center 20 feet of the widened right of way and that that promise by the county was eventually carried out in full. Presumably, had the proceeding been carried out to its final step, once the county had fully completed the resolution proceeding and the blacktopping, it could have required the agreeing landowners to make the necessary conveyances. There is nothing in the record before us to show that the county ever actually acquired the widened right of way by enforcing the agreements, and considering the trouble the parties have gone to to examine the record it is very probable that the county never took that step.
Under § 100-1223, OCLA, once the county court declared its intention to widen Barger Drive, "such notice shall thereupon be given as is provided for upon the filing of a petition for such purposes, and like proceedings shall be had by such county court as in the case of the filing of a petition before it * * * except” as otherwise specifically provided by subparagraphs (a), *323(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of that section. Examination of those subparagraphs reveals that they modified the petition method only with respect to the contents of posted notices, the bond requirement, proceedings on the hearings of objections or remonstrances, the source for payment of damages, the making of the required survey and the acquisition of necessary rights of way. The last included limitations on the duties of the board of road viewers in those instances where such a board would still be appointed.
This brings us to the first of a series of "rubs” in this case. On the record before us we must conclude that the plaintiffs predecessor did not sign one of the agreements. That fact did not deprive the county court of power to widen Barger Drive by the resolution process; but in order for the county to acquire any part of the necessary property not subject to an agreement, the proceedings had to follow the method provided had the widening been undertaken by the petition method.
Without detailing that procedure, suffice it to say that at the very least a hoard of viewers would have had to have been appointed and mailed notice given to each record owner of land who had not signed an agreement. Furthermore, there would have had to have been furnished an opportunity for owners not agreeing to convey to have had damages assessed, and there would have had to have been a final order entered altering the road. Also, under Latourette v. County Court, 121 Or 323, 255 P 330 (1927), the resolution would have had to have contained a statement of "public necessity” as a "jurisdictional” prerequisite for the proceeding.
The record before us (including the resolution of the county court initiating the widening of Barger Drive which does not contain an declaration of public necessity) shows the return on the posting of notices and a docket entry in the records of the county court stating simply, "Now at this time this matter came on *324regularly to be heard and is hereby ordered established as a 50 foot right-of-way.” There is no showing that the procedures for acquiring any land from plaintiffs predecessor were complied with.
The trial judge found the absence from the resolution of a statement of necessity to be a jurisdictional defect rendering the entire action of the county court "void,” relying on the 1927 Latourette case. Keeping in mind that that case was decided prior to the amendment of § 100-1223, OCLA, by the addition of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f), I would have no hesitation in concluding that the trial judge was in error on that issue. After the 1927 case, and after the 1927 amendments, Clackamas County apparently once again tried to establish the road in issue in the 1927 case. The matter came back to the Supreme Court in Latourette v. Clackamas Co., 131 Or 168, 281 P 182 (1929). The court in that case very plainly stated the effect of subparagraph (f):
"[W]hen the title is not acquired by purchase or agreement with the owners of the land the county court is required to appoint a board of road viewers, who shall determine and assess the damages, taking into consideration the benefits of the road as so located.” 131 Or at 173.
Proceeding then to examine the resolution adopted, the court found that it contained a statement of the reason for the change in the course of the road, the points between which the alteration in the old road would be made, the location of the center and exterior lines and a direction to the surveyor to post copies of the resolution "as required by law.” The court also pointed out that the record showed that the county clerk had mailed notices to the landowners to be affected, including the plaintiff Latourette. It is not entirely clear that the court even recognized the rule in the 1927 Latourette case requiring a statement of necessity; but, assuming it did, it apparently found that statement in the reasons given for the straightening of the road. Similarly in this case I would find the *325language in the resolution "All as agreed to by the property owners abutting on the said road” as a sufficient statement of necessity because it can fairly be implied that the court was satisfied that since all of the agreeing owners wanted the road widened that was enough reason to decide that it ought to be done. The fact that plaintiffs predecessor may not have joined in that request for the widening should not be enough to upset the 1952 action on the technical ground relied on by the trial court.
Under § 100-1209, OCLA, the only property owners entitled to mailed notice of the proceeding were those over whose land the road would run who had not signed the petition. Therefore it seems quite clear under § 100-1223, OCLA, that none of the owners who had signed agreements were entitled to mailed notice. Plaintiffs predecessor, having not signed an agreement, was entitled to mailed notice. None was given. Therefore there was a statutory and constitutional defect in the proceeding as to the predecessor. But the entire proceeding undertaken by resolution was not void — at least on the record before us — by reason of any failure by the county court properly to invoke its "jurisdiction” to widen Barger Drive. Section 100-1209, OCLA, as reformulated by Oregon Laws 1929, ch 103, § 1, makes it plain that a petition (of which a resolution is the functional equivalent under § 100-1223, OCLA) when duly posted permits the county court to proceed to acquire the property of petition signers (who are the functional equivalents of owners who have signed agreements) even if there is a failure to notify non-signers.
Furthermore, there was a final order entered by the county court establishing Barger Drive as a 50-foot right-of-way road. None of the signers of the agreements could have challenged that final order "upon appeal or review” (§ 100-1222, OCLA). That nothing appears in the record to indicate that the county ever formally enforced the agreements by taking conveyances from the property owners has nothing to do *326with the validity of the procedure for the widening. Were that title issue now to be raised in some manner, it would be easily disposed of on the basis that the county had fully performed the agreement and was entitled to have the necessary conveyances. If need be, the ancient maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to have been done would take care of the problem.
Not so with respect to plaintiff and her predecessor in interest. Quite simply, the property of the predecessor in interest was not made subject to being taken for the widening of Barger Drive: no mailed notice was ever given, no board of viewers was ever appointed, and no proceedings were ever taken with respect to the property after the county court’s "jurisdiction” was established. Neither did the county in any physical or metaphysical sense ever occupy the property, openly, notoriously or otherwise, until the defendant city began its project.
The question whether the present owner is barred from raising the issue now because of her predecessor’s failure to seek a writ of review is a non-issue. On the record before us, the defendant city simply entered on property which it did not own. It did not own it because the county had never got beyond the stage of simply declaring its intention to take the property by resolution under § 100-1223, OCLA, and posting the notices. There was not a modicum of "like proceedings * * * as in the case of the filing of a petition before it.”
It follows then that plaintiff’s contention "that no actions of Lane County or Defendant City of Eugene have lawfully operated to widen the Barger Drive right-of-way” with respect to her property should have been sustained.
On the adverse possession and laches issues, the majority is correct.
Lee, Richardson and Gillette, judges, join in this specially concurring opinion.