Court Opinion

ID: 9928196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:03:50.976952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:29.604467
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                          2024 IL App (3d) 230640-U

                                 Order filed January 30, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Du Page County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-23-0640
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 22-CF-2452
                                                        )
      JAKOBI A. KINSEY,                                 )       Honorable
                                                        )       Margaret M. O’Connell,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice McDade specially concurred.
            Justice Hettel dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held:    The circuit court’s decision to detain defendant was an abuse of discretion.

¶2          In November 2022 defendant, Jakobi A. Kinsey, was indicted for aggravated battery (720

     ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2022)) and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. §

     24-1.2(a)(2), (b)). His bond was set at $1 million, and he remained in custody. On September 25,

     2023, defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial release. In response, the State filed a verified

     petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a forcible felony, and his
     release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community

     under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-

     6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). After a hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s petition to deny

     pretrial release. We reverse and remand.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4           The factual basis provided at the detention hearing established that the officers were

     dispatched to Yorktown Mall around 3 p.m. for the report of shots fired. Witnesses indicated that

     two individuals, one with a ski mask covering his face and the other with dreadlocks, were seen

     running towards their vehicle. They got into their vehicle and chased after a Ford Escape. The

     individual with the ski mask was on the passenger side and was seen leaning out the window,

     firing several shots towards the Escape. Officers recovered five spent shell casings in the area of

     the shooting.

¶5          Officers later received information from Good Samaritan Hospital of a patient with a

     gunshot wound. Upon arrival at the hospital, officers found the Escape and made contact with

     the occupants. There had been three occupants in the Escape at the time of the shooting, one of

     which was being treated. The other two victims stated that they were in Yorktown Mall when

     they had a confrontation with two unknown men, one wearing a ski mask and one with

     dreadlocks. They stated the one with the ski mask told the one with the dreadlocks to pass me

     that, which the victims interpreted to mean to pass him a gun. The victims left the mall and drove

     away in the Escape. As they were driving away, they saw the individuals from the mall outside

     and saw the two men start running to their vehicle. They then saw the one with the ski mask lean

     out of the window and shoot several shots towards them, hitting the female victim in the arm.

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¶6          Surveillance video from the mall showed the confrontation in the mall as well as the car

     chase. The video showed the man with dreadlocks as the first who began to run towards the

     vehicle to chase after the victims. The man with dreadlocks driving the vehicle was identified as

     defendant. Defendant admitted that he and his co-defendant had a confrontation with the victims

     in the mall, chased after the victims in the car, and that the co-defendant fired several shots

     toward the victims. Defendant had previously received second chance probation in 2019 for

     forgery, which was successfully terminated.

¶7          A hearing was held on the petition on November 6, 2023. The State provided the factual

     basis and noted that the offense happened “in the middle of the day,” “at a very busy mall.” The

     State noted that defendant “is the first one they see sprinting towards his car” and that after the

     incident, defendant and his co-defendant just returned to the mall “almost as if nothing

     happened.” The State also indicated that when defendant chased the Escape in his vehicle, he

     almost hit the victim’s vehicle.

¶8          Defense counsel admitted into evidence four letters speaking to defendant’s character and

     various certificates defendant had earned in the jail, amassing approximately 530 hours. Defense

     counsel called Stephanie Williams to testify, who was a forensic mental health therapist with the

     Du Page County Health Department. She was the primary clinician in the recovery pod at the

     jail. Defendant was accepted into the recovery pod and participated in all programming. She was

     unaware of defendant having any disciplinary problems in the jail. Defendant expressed to her

     that he would like to continue working with a sponsor even if he was released.

¶9          Defendant’s counsel argued that defendant would not pose a danger to anyone if released,

     noting that he did not have a history of violence and was not the shooter. Counsel stated that

     defendant followed the Escape after the verbal altercation to get the license plate number and

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       said he did not know his co-defendant was going to fire shots. Counsel further argued that

       defendant expressed remorse and that defendant would follow any conditions, as evidenced by

       his participation in the recovery pod.

¶ 10             The court granted the State’s petition finding the State met its burden by clear and

       convincing evidence. In doing so, it stated,

                        “So I do believe that the presumption is great that [defendant] committed a

                        qualifying offense. Does he pose a real and present threat to the safety of specific,

                        identifiable persons or the community at large? While [I] respect the hard work

                        that he’s done while he’s been incarcerated, this is an event where, quite honestly,

                        if they had just driven the other way, we wouldn’t be in this situation. His

                        inability to at that point control his desire to have *** some sort of confrontation

                        with the victims in this case shows to me that he is a threat to the safety of the

                        community at large.”

       The court further stated that no conditions would “prevent a situation like this from happening

       again.”

¶ 11                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12             On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the petition

       to detain. Specifically, he contends that there were conditions that would mitigate any

       dangerousness he posed. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence,

       but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered under an

       abuse of discretion standard. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under either

       standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also

       People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19.

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¶ 13          Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be

       denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a

       verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the

       burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great

       that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a “real and present” threat to

       any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate

       this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and

       the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can

       consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.

¶ 14          We find the court abused its discretion in granting the petition. Defendant was not the

       shooter in this case and did not have a violent criminal history. The court found defendant was a

       real and present threat based on one incident that occurred nearly a year prior to the hearing, and

       neither the State nor the court could point to anything else in the record that would indicate

       defendant was a “present” threat to the community as required by the statute. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2).

       In fact, the record indicates the opposite. All the evidence in the record indicated his willingness

       and ability to follow any conditions the court placed on him. He had successfully completed

       probation previously and was working toward bettering himself in the jail by completing several

       programs while in custody. The court’s decision that no conditions were available that would

       mitigate defendant’s dangerousness was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the

       court, thus, erred in granting the State’s petition. We therefore remand the matter for the court to

       release defendant and determine which conditions are necessary for his release.

¶ 15                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed and remanded.

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¶ 17          Reversed and remanded.

¶ 18          PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 19          I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order for abuse of

       discretion. However, I specially concur under the belief that the decision could have been based

       on simpler grounds.

¶ 20          Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states that “[a]ll

       defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . .” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West

       2022). As the majority explains, to rebut this presumption, the State must prove not just one or

       two, but the following three elements, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is

       evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that

       the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the

       community, or is a flight risk; and (3) that no conditions can mitigate this threat or risk of flight.

       Id.

¶ 21          The dissent acknowledges that the State in no way argued the third element of

       ineligibility, regarding whether any conditions of release can mitigate the threat posed by

       defendant. This alone demonstrates that the State failed to meet its burden to rebut the

       presumption of eligibility, and that the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. This

       alone also warrants reversal of the trial court’s order.

¶ 22          Of further note, the State’s failure to make a showing toward the third element of

       ineligibility also deprives us of the ability to review whether the trial court’s factual findings

       under this element were against the manifest weight of the evidence, since there was, in fact, no

       evidence presented. This, in turn, further deprives us of the ability to review whether the trial

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       court abused its discretion by denying defendant pretrial release, again because there was no

       evidence presented on the third element.

¶ 23          For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s order on the above grounds,

       without reaching those discussed by the majority.

¶ 24          JUSTICE HETTEL, dissenting.

¶ 25          I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition.

¶ 26          In this case, defendant’s participation in services and good behavior while in custody are

       certainly admirable. However, the nature and circumstances of the offense support the trial

       court’s finding that defendant still poses a threat if he is released. See id. § 110-5(a)(1) (the

       nature and circumstances of the charged offense is a relevant factor to consider in the trial court’s

       assessment of what, if any, conditions of release will mitigate the threat the defendant poses to

       any other person or the community). The evidence indicated that defendant had an altercation

       with individuals he did not know at a mall in middle of the day. Shortly thereafter, the unknown

       victims left the mall in another vehicle. Defendant then ran to his car, jumped in the driver’s seat,

       and proceeded to chase them. As defendant pursued them, his co-defendant leaned out the

       passenger window and fired several shots at their vehicle, injuring one of the victims.

¶ 27          The factual basis further provided that the victims heard the co-defendant tell defendant

       to “pass him that” which meant pass him a gun, indicating defendant possessed the gun at some

       point. While defense counsel may have argued that defendant did not know that his co-defendant

       was going to shoot the gun at the other vehicle, the evidence suggests otherwise as during his

       police interview, the co-defendant told officers that defendant urged him not to shoot his gun. In

       addition to the circumstances of the offense, defendant’s county jail therapist testified that she

       was not aware of any plans defendant had made to follow-up with services if he is released.

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       Thus, while defendant presented evidence of his commendable efforts of self-improvement in

       jail, the court’s concern as to his dangerousness was not against the manifest weight of the

       evidence. The trial court’s decision, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 28           In reaching my conclusion, I recognize the State did not discuss any conditions of release,

       nor did it argue that “no condition or combination of conditions *** can mitigate” the threat

       posed by defendant. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). Although section 110-6.1(e) requires the State to show

       clear and convincing evidence of all three elements of ineligibility, the statute does not require

       the State to specifically set forth the reasons why conditions would not mitigate any threat at the

       detention hearing. See People v. Madrigal, 2024 IL App (2d) 230438-U, ¶ 19; People v. Perez,

       2024 IL App (2d) 230416-U, ¶ 29 (rejecting defendant’s argument that because the State did not

       argue the third element at the detention hearing, it failed to meet its burden of proving by clear

       and convincing evidence that no conditions can mitigate the threat). The statute directs only that

       the court enter an order of detention “summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the

       defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not

       avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or person or the community, based on

       the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). The trial court

       complied with that directive. I would therefore affirm the court’s order granting the State’s

       petition to deny pretrial release.

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