Court Opinion

ID: 9539637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:07:31.809401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:05.341756
License: Public Domain

Bernes, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The deputy’s pursuit of Bledson had not ended at the time she fled from the scene of the shooting. Hence, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the element of pursuit was met in this case, and there was sufficient evidence to convict Bledson of fleeing from a police officer.
Although Bledson initially stopped her vehicle in response to the pursuing deputy, the pursuit did not end at that point. A violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) can occur if the defendant initially stops his or her vehicle in response to the pursuing officer, but then flees before the stop has ended, because at that point the pursuit has not yet come to an end. See, e.g., Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 777 (1) (631 SE2d 351) (2006); Davidson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 580, 581 (2) (516 SE2d 90) (1999). “[A] traffic stop ends when the officer finishes responding to the . . . violation and releases the motorist.” Hendrix v. State, 273 Ga. App. 792, 794 (1) (616 SE2d 127) (2005). Thus, the pursuit of Bledson’s vehicle would have ended only upon the deputy successfully executing the outstanding arrest warrants upon Quino-nes and releasing Bledson from the scene, neither of which occurred in this case.
The deputy clearly was authorized to stop Bledson’s vehicle and execute the arrest warrants. See Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 292 (1) (653 SE2d 855) (2007). As such, even though Bledson had not committed a traffic violation and was not under arrest, she was not entitled to simply drive away from the scene at will during the deputy’s ongoing investigation. The verdict, therefore, should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Johnson and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.