Court Opinion

ID: 9397569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 16:10:28.968748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.878426
License: Public Domain

J-S01007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DANIEL KEITH HOPKINS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 222 WDA 2022

             Appeal From the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-33-CR-0000573-2017

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                            FILED: May 25, 2023

        Appellant, Daniel Keith Hopkins, appeals pro se from the post-conviction

court’s order denying his timely petition for relief under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

        We previously set forth the basic factual history surrounding Appellant’s

convictions in our memorandum decision affirming his judgment of sentence:
        Between November 8, 2016, and August 2, 2017, Appellant, Larry
        Dean, and others conspired to sell and sold 35 pounds of crystal
        methamphetamine worth $1.6 million throughout central
        Pennsylvania.     Appellant supplied the methamphetamine in
        Altoids mint tins, sent through priority mail packages from
        Arizona, to Dean, who distributed the methamphetamines to a
        circle of drug traffickers in Clarion, Clearfield, Elk, Forest, and
        Jefferson Counties in Pennsylvania.       The Pennsylvania State
        Police, the Office of the Attorney General, several local police
        departments, and the United States Postal Service conducted an
        extensive joint investigation (“Operation Snail Mail”) involving
        controlled purchases, wiretaps, and review of financial documents
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S01007-23

      and wire transfers. Following a grand jury investigation and
      presentment naming 30 co-conspirators, Appellant was arrested
      in Arizona and transferred to Pennsylvania to stand trial. Gary
      Allen Knaresboro, Esq., a Jefferson County public defender,
      represented Appellant at trial.

      A four-day joint trial commenced on March 19, 2018, in which,
      inter alia, a postal inspector, drug traffickers, and the drug
      traffickers’ associates testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. A
      jury convicted Appellant of one count each of Corrupt
      Organizations, Conspiracy to Commit Corrupt Organizations, and
      Conspiracy to Deliver a Controlled Substance, and eighteen counts
      of Delivery of a Controlled Substance.

      On April 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
      aggregate term of 95 to 190 years of imprisonment. Appellant
      filed a Post-Sentence Motion challenging, among other things, the
      court’s exercise of discretion in imposing consecutive terms of
      incarceration that rendered his aggregate sentence excessive.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, No. 779 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 4899223, at *1

(Pa. Super. filed Oct. 4, 2019) (footnotes omitted).

      This is an appeal from the order denying Appellant’s first, timely petition

for collateral relief under the PCRA.     As set forth infra, Appellant raises

eighteen issues, and several of those subsume additional issues. As best we

can discern, each of Appellant’s issues all trace back, to some degree, to his

contention that he had no connection to his co-defendant and that Dean was

the mastermind.     We thus begin by discussing some additional evidence

adduced by the Commonwealth tying Appellant to Dean’s operation.

      This case involved several agencies, almost three dozen co-defendants,

and a jury trial with two dozen witnesses.        Given the sheer volume of

testimony and exhibits, we only discuss the points material to Appellant’s

argument that he was not a participant in Dean’s scheme.

                                      -2-
J-S01007-23

      The initial investigation did not involve Dean or Appellant. It started in

early 2017, when authorities learned from confidential informants that a man

named Dale Hanlin was selling significant amounts of crystal meth. Authorities

performed several controlled buys and eventually learned that Hanlin received

crystal meth through the mail. Investigators ultimately obtained a wiretap on

Hanlin’s phone and recorded several conversations between Hanlin and Dean

discussing the crystal meth operation.

      Hanlin, like many of the co-defendants in this case, accepted a guilty

plea and agreed to testify against Dean and Appellant. He testified that, in

1999, he served time in federal jail for cocaine trafficking. Upon his release,

he worked as a truck driver but broke his back and began buying pain

medications.   Hanlin became reacquainted with Dean in 2015, and Dean

introduced him to crystal meth. Hanlin would do favors for Dean due to Dean’s

declining health, such as driving him to doctor appointments. In exchange,

Dean would give Hanlin some crystal meth. This arrangement ended when

Dean moved to Arizona. Dean then contacted Hanlin from Arizona and told

him to look out for a package, which Dean had sent to Hanlin’s residence.

From that point on, Hanlin would receive crystal meth in the mail through

Dean and sell it. Dean would frequently fly back to Pennsylvania, and Hanlin

would often pick him up at the airport. On at least one occasion, Dean was in

Pennsylvania when a package arrived from Arizona. Dean did not say from

whom he obtained the meth, only that “he was getting it from the Mexican

mob.” N.T., 3/20/18, at 202.

                                     -3-
J-S01007-23

      Hanlin first met Appellant in jail. Appellant told him “that if [Dean] didn’t

keep his mouth shut, somebody would get arrested and come in and cut his

tongue out[.]” Id. at 207. Hanlin took this to mean that, if Dean implicated

someone in the Mexican mob, one of its members would purposely get

arrested to silence Dean, who was also incarcerated. Appellant also asked

Hanlin if Hanlin was snitching. Hanlin said no. Appellant told him, “‘Well, you

should since everybody else is telling on you. You should tell on [Dean]. … If

I was you, I would.’” Id. at 208.

      Hanlin introduced Jeanne Gouldthread to Dean, after Dean asked Hanlin

“if I knew somebody trustworthy he could send out [to Arizona.]” Id. at 194.

Gouldthread testified that she initially helped Dean with tasks like grocery

shopping when he was in Pennsylvania. Eventually, Hanlin asked her to fly to

Arizona.    Dean arranged a flight and itinerary, and forwarded it to

Gouldthread. She provided that material to investigators, which showed that

Dean had used the email address “Danhopkins952@gmail.com” to email the

ticket. Id. at 35. The flight was one way, as Gouldthread was to drive Dean

back to Pennsylvania. When she arrived, Dean offered her a line of meth and

told her that Hanlin got his drugs from Dean. Id. at 39. Dean took her to his

camper, which was parked in a lot that was a few feet from a home. Id. at

41. Gouldthread confirmed that the address of that home was 4150 Bantry

Lane, which was owned by Appellant. Gouldthread testified that she entered

Appellant’s home on one occasion and observed other people using his

computer.

                                      -4-
J-S01007-23

      Another witness tying Appellant to Dean was Tracy Harmon, who

testified that he met Dean sometime in 2013. N.T., 3/22/18, at 203. Harmon

was employed as a contractor, and Dean asked him to paint a home in

Pennsylvania that he planned to sell.    Dean sold the home and afterwards

temporarily stayed with Harmon. Eventually, Dean informed Harmon that he

intended to move to Arizona, and Harmon accompanied him there to find a

home. He met Appellant through Dean in Arizona, and Appellant sold Harmon

some drugs. After living there for a time, Dean moved back to Pennsylvania

and again temporarily resided with Harmon. Dean would occasionally come

home from the post office with a package, and there would be crystal meth

taped to the insides. Dean informed Harmon that Appellant was the supplier.

Id. at 222. Eventually, Dean moved back to Arizona.

      Harmon then became a participant in the crystal meth operation.

Starting in 2016, Harmon would receive packages at his home, followed

shortly thereafter by Dean’s arrival from Arizona. On one occasion in 2017,

Dean arrived and inquired about a package. Harmon stated that he had not

yet received it. Dean told Harmon, “[Appellant] ripped me off.” Id. at 230.

      Appellant also lodges several complaints concerning actions undertaken

in Arizona by other authorities. By way of background, the authorities enlisted

several United States Postal Inspectors to assist in tracking parcels sent from

Arizona to the suspected Pennsylvania sites, as well as packages making the

return trip as Hanlin informed authorities that Dean instructed him to send

cash back to Arizona. Inspector Justin Koble, based out of Pittsburgh, became

                                     -5-
J-S01007-23

involved in November of 2016.     Agent Koble asked Postal Inspector Ethan

Paszko, who was employed in Tucson, Arizona, for assistance with a parcel

shipped from Arizona on March 27, 2017. Agent Paszko visited the originating

post office location, which was inside a store named Do It Yourself Hardware.

The store owners provided Agent Paszko with access to their video surveillance

system. Armed with the package tracking number supplied by Agent Koble,

Agent Paszko was able to narrow down the timeframe. He then took a picture

of the surveillance system’s display with his cellphone, which he then sent to

Agent Koble. The man sending the package was identified as Appellant. Agent

Paszko asked the store owners to inform him if the man from the video visited

their store.

      On May 30, 2017, the owners contacted Agent Paszko and told him that

the same man had mailed two parcels, which were still onsite. Agent Paszko

took possession of the two packages, which he then placed in a separate

package for delivery to Agent Koble.      He also viewed the store’s video

surveillance, which again showed Appellant mailing the parcels.     Inspector

Koble and other agents decided to let one of the two parcels be delivered,

which was ultimately delivered to a PO box. The authorities obtained a search

warrant for the other parcel, which was to be delivered to Tracy Harmon’s

address. The package contained 110.31 grams of crystal meth.

      We now return to the procedural history of this appeal. On May 3, 2021,

Appellant filed a timely petition for relief under the PCRA. George Daghir,

Esq., was appointed and on September 23, 2021, Attorney Daghir filed a “no

                                    -6-
J-S01007-23

merit” letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,

544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

Super. 1988) (en banc).     Attorney Daghir listed the eighteen issues that

Appellant wished to review. Petition to Withdraw/No-Merit, 9/23/21, at 5-7.

Counsel addressed each of Appellant’s claims and concluded, after an

examination of the record, that there were no meritorious claims. Id. at 8–

25. Counsel mailed a copy to Appellant and informed him of his rights.

      The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition without

a hearing on September 29, 2021.       Appellant did not file a response and

instead filed a premature notice of appeal before the PCRA court formally

dismissed the petition.   While this appeal was docketed with the Court of

Common Pleas, it was not transmitted to this Court. On October 29, 2021,

the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant’s petition for relief and

granting counsel’s petition to withdraw. In the order, the PCRA court stated

that it “concurs with [Attorney Daghir’s] analysis and has nothing substantive

to add.” Order, 10/29/21, at 1 (single page order).

      Appellant again filed a timely notice of appeal, but the court failed to

transmit the appeal to this Court. On January 10, 2022, Appellant filed a letter

with this Court requesting a status update. We thereafter directed the trial

court to process the notices of appeal, which were separately docketed. We

quashed one of the appeals as duplicative. Appellant complied with the trial

court’s order to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.

                                     -7-
J-S01007-23

The PCRA court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion in response. Appellant now

raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the Commonwealth had lawful and exclusive
      powers to prosecute Appellant for crimes committed in the
      State of Pennsylvania[.]

      2. Whether the Commonwealth violated the Supremacy
      Clause[.]

      3. Whether the Commonwealth violated Appellant’s 4th
      Amendment … rights, with respect to search and seizure[.]

      4. Whether the Commonwealth deprived Appellant of due
      process and equal protection of the law[.]

      5. Whether the trial court erred in finding … Appellant guilty,
      where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
      reasonable doubt that … Appellant was actively in concert
      with others and possession of drugs with intent to deliver[.]

      6. Whether the trial court [i]mproperly charged the jury[.]

      7. Whether the Commonwealth exercised [f]raud [u]pon the
      [c]ourt[.]

      8. Whether the      Commonwealth        exercised   egregious
      misconduct[.]

      9. Whether the trial court failed to charge the [j]ury with
      impeachment     instructions,    to    where    a    critical
      Commonwealth witness gave prior inconsistent statements,
      and admitted, on-the-record, that he was untruthful[.]

      10. Whether Appellant had constructive possession of
      drugs[.]

      11. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
      hearsay testimony to be injected into Appellant’s trial[.]

      12. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal and excessive
      sentence … [.]

      13. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence,
      where it imposed a term of imprisonment of 95 … years to
      … 190 years[.]

                                      -8-
J-S01007-23

      14. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Commonwealth
      witnesses to provide impermissible and prejudicial opinion
      testimony[.]

      15. Whether the       Commonwealth     violated    the   [f]our
      [c]orners [r]ule[.]

      16. Whether the Commonwealth            withheld    favorable
      exculpatory testimony[.]

      17. Whether the Commonwealth exercised [sic] Double
      Jeopardy[.]

      18. Whether      the     Commonwealth      exercised     [sic]
      [g]overnment [i]nterference, refusing to furnish Appellant
      with [t]ranscription of [n]otes [t]estimony, and [d]iscovery,
      so that Appellant could develop claims for appeal[.]

Appellant’s Brief at xxiii-xxv.

      Our standard of review from an order denying a petition under the PCRA

is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the record and

is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super.

2014).   Here, where appointed counsel filed a “no merit” letter and was

permitted to withdraw, we are not examining PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness

in evaluating whether Appellant’s case presented any arguably meritorious

issues. See Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super.

2012), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d

381 (Pa. 2021) (“Preliminarily, we note that [the a]ppellant’s claim that the

PCRA court erred as a matter of law in permitting counsel to withdraw,

although necessarily discussing PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, is not

an ineffectiveness claim.”). Instead, we review the claims examined by PCRA

counsel and the PCRA court when dismissing the petition.

                                     -9-
J-S01007-23

      The PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a hearing when the court

is satisfied “that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact, the

defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate

purpose would be served by further proceedings.”           Commonwealth v.

Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a

hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which,

if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”          Id. at 604–05

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “A reviewing court on appeal must

examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record in

order to determine whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there

were no genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an

evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1052 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468

(Pa. Super. 2007)).

      We conclude that Appellant’s brief is deficient and noncompliant with

the Rules of Appellate Procedure to a degree that we cannot conduct

meaningful appellate review of the vast majority of Appellant’s claims. As

reflected in counsel’s “no merit” letter and demonstrated by Appellant’s

scattershot approach herein, Appellant raises so many issues it is difficult to

identify, let alone address, any discrete legal argument in support of the

contention that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition. These defects

                                     - 10 -
J-S01007-23

have hampered appellate review to the degree we find that most of Appellant’s

claims have been waived.

      The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the argument section of

the brief “be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued;

and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type

distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”      Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a). A few examples will suffice to illustrate Appellant’s noncompliance

with this fundamental directive. Appellant lists his sixth question presented

as a challenge to jury instructions. Yet, his sixth claim by heading states,

“The Commonwealth exercised structural error.”         Appellant’s Brief at 25.

Similar mismatches pervade the brief.        For instance, Appellant begins his

argument with the heading “layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Id. at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).      This is followed by sixteen

pages of confusing argument, most of which acts as a narrative explaining

Appellant’s view of the evidence.

      Appellant then raises, as his second argument, “a claim of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness.” Id. at 18 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). This claim

is followed by a largely repetitive argument challenging the strength of the

Commonwealth’s evidence.      Appellant then raises as his third argument a

claim that trial counsel ineffectively failed to call Appellant to the stand, a

claim that does not appear in his list of questions presented.       Id. at 22.

Appellant does not discuss the trial court’s colloquy concerning his right to

                                    - 11 -
J-S01007-23

testify. Appellant simply claims that he “would have [offered] testimony that

he was not Larry Dean’s supplier, or involved with mailing methamphetamine

through U.S. mail [on] May 30, 2017[,] or prior to. But for trial counsel’s

deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different.” Id. at 22-23.

      We could overlook these errors if Appellant’s legal arguments were

otherwise decipherable. They are not. His arguments, even when individually

set forth, often incorporate several separate legal principles. Again, a few

examples will suffice. Appellant’s sixth argument contains the heading “The

Commonwealth exercised structural error,” which does not correspond to any

of the questions presented.         We quote verbatim the full argument from

Appellant’s brief for this claim:
      When the trial court allowed 404(b) to be introduced to the jury,
      at trial, it affected the framework of how a trial proceeds rather
      than simply an error in the trial process itself. Arizona v.
      Fulminante 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct, 1246, 1265 113
      L,Ed.2d 302(1991). In connection with the underlying incident,
      the Commonwealth built its foundation of the Complaint/Affidavit
      of Probable Cause premised on the sworn declaration of/from
      Tracy Harmon to Trooper Craddock. The Commonwealth’s key
      witness, Tracy Harmon gave a sworn declaration to Trooper
      Craddock, that he met Appellant for the first time between the
      years 2013-2014, and that he had purchased marijuana from …
      Appellant during that encounter. Tracy Harmon exercised a prior
      inconsistent statement, to where at trial, he placed on— the—
      record that he gave a false statement to Trooper Craddock. (NT
      03/22/2018 pp.224) Ellis v. State, 790 So.2d 813, 815-16
      (Miss.2001) see also Finley v. State, 725 So.2d 226, 231—32
      (Miss.1998). The trial court opined 404(b) to be admissible.
      However, the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth
      v. Thomas 717 A.2d 468, 476 (Pa.1998). In addition, without a
      formal and sufficient indictment or information, a court does not

                                       - 12 -
J-S01007-23

      acquire subject matter jurisdiction and thus an accused may not
      be punished for a crime, Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797,
      797 (S.D. 1983). The false statement given to Trooper Craddock
      of/from the Commonwealth’s key witness gave emphasis to the
      Commonwealth violating the Four Corners Rule. In turn, a
      violation of the Four Corners Rule made the Complaint/Affidavit of
      Probable Cause invalid. Davis v. Andrews, Tex Civil App., 361
      S.W.2d 419, 423. Without a valid complaint any judgment or
      sentence rendered is “void ab initio” Ralph v. Police Court of El
      Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632, 634, 84 Cal. App.2d 257 (1948). Inter
      alia, the Commonwealth misled the jury to believe that Appellant
      (shipped))) the two (2) outbound packages to Pennsylvania on
      May 30, 2017. Inspector Paszko took pictures of the two parcels
      utilizing his “cell phone”, and there is no sworn declaration of/from
      the Do It Yourself Hardware store owner(s) Inspector Paszko could
      have secured a written declaration of/from the Hardware
      store/contracted Postal owner(s) and/or a sworn declaration via
      “video” utilizing his cell phone but failed to do so. The identities
      of the Hardware store owner(s) with respect to the May 30, 2017
      incident is unknown. The 6th Amendment right to be confronted
      with the witness against him “consist of an act of setting the
      witness face to face with the accused, in order that the latter may
      make an objection he has to the witness, or the witness may
      (identify))) the accused. The constitutional privilege to cross
      examine the unnamed hardware store owners)/employee(s) have
      been abridged and denied Appellant a fair trial. Davis v. Alaska
      415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L,Ed.2d 347.                Thus the
      Commonwealth exercised structural error.                Arizona v.
      Fulminante 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct, 1246, 1265 113
      L,Ed.2d 302(1991)

Appellant’s Brief at 26-28 (verbatim).

      Structural error does not apply to straightforward evidentiary issues; it

applies to certain fundamental protections that are not amenable to a

harmless error analysis. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 294-

95 (2017); see also Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 103 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (granting a new trial without a showing of prejudice where trial

court barred the defendant’s family members from attending voir dire). That

                                     - 13 -
J-S01007-23

aside, Appellant’s argument is not a focused argument, but rather a

conglomeration of multiple legal principles packaged together with no

coherent thread linking them. Appellant’s reference to Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 404(b) demonstrates this point.           Immediately prior to trial,

Appellant’s counsel moved to exclude references by Harmon to Appellant’s

selling drugs to him in 2013, when he first traveled to Arizona with Dean. The

trial court determined that the evidence was relevant to the history of the

case. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 326 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(“Our Supreme Court has consistently recognized that admission of distinct

crimes may be proper where it is part of the history or natural development

of the case, i.e., the res gestae exception.”). Appellant does not address how

the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.

       Along these same lines, Appellant’s objection preserved this claim for

review on direct appeal and Appellant makes no attempt to show why this

evidence, even if erroneously admitted, requires a new trial.1            See

Commonwealth v. Miles, 846 A.2d 132, 137-38 (Pa. Super. 2004) (setting

forth the three grounds for finding that an erroneous evidentiary ruling was

____________________________________________

1 We will extend to Appellant the benefit of assuming that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to address the issue on direct appeal, and thus, we
cite the standard for reviewing this claim on direct appeal as it is more
favorable to Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 315
(Pa. 2014) (“As a general and practical matter, it is more difficult for a
defendant to prevail on a claim litigated through the lens of counsel
ineffectiveness, rather than as a preserved claim of trial court error.”).

                                          - 14 -
J-S01007-23

harmless and could not have contributed to the verdict). To the extent that

Appellant attempts to package this subcomponent of his claim as a layered

claim of ineffectiveness, he fails to specifically plead and prove each prong of

that test. Instead, he merely alleges, in conclusory fashion, that counsel was

ineffective, which does not satisfy Appellant’s burden.         “We stress that

boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or

ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel

was ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 443 (Pa. 2011).

      Appellant also appears to incorporate by reference several other

arguments, which are equally confusing.       For instance, his structural error

argument references his “four corners” claim.       According to his questions

presented, that is his fifteenth issue; notwithstanding, Appellant discusses

that legal claim on page five of his brief, as subsumed within the argument

heading addressing trial counsel ineffectiveness, as follows:
      Under the ‘four corners rule[,]’ intentions of parties, especially
      that of grantor, is to be gathered from instrument as a whole and
      not from isolated parts thereof. Davis v. Andrews, Tex Civil
      App., 361 S.W.2d 419, 423.

      What this means, in order to establish Probable Cause to legally
      arrest someone, the Affidavit written by the Police Dept. And/or
      officer (must))) be true and correct as sworn to by the officer from
      start to finish. If an Affidavit and/or Complaint states one thing,
      however (additional evidence))) and/or (statements))) is contrary
      to the facts of the Affidavit of Probable Cause, the Affidavit is
      therefore invalid. The entire case (must))) therefore be dismissed
      on those grounds. Tracy Harmon is alleged to have met Appellant
      between the years 2013-2014, for the (first time))), on (one)))
      occasion. Mr. Harmon strategically engineered and manufactured
      his fraudulent encounter with Appellant. Mr. Harmon drank in

                                     - 15 -
J-S01007-23

        excess of a case of beer, per day, accompanied by a Crystal Meth
        addiction between the years 2013-2014.

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (verbatim).

        In addition to Appellant’s tendency to cite cases from other jurisdictions,

he fails to discuss these legal authorities in any fashion.       In terms of an

affidavit of probable cause, the “four corners” rule refers to the material that

a reviewing court examines when determining whether probable cause

existed. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 830 A.2d 554, 560 (Pa. 2003)

(“In analyzing whether a warrant was supported by probable cause, judicial

review is confined to the four corners of the affidavit.”). Appellant does not

claim that a warrant2 failed to establish probable cause based on the four

corners of the affidavit but, instead, he appears to claim that the affidavit

failed to establish probable cause because he believes that Harmon was not

credible. As legal support, Appellant simply cites a 1962 case from Texas

involving contractual law.          The failure to articulate specific arguments

supported by legal discussion precludes this Court from conducting meaningful

appellate review.

        The defects do not end there. As with the Rule 404(b) issue, Appellant’s

brief overlooks the differing standards that apply to issues which were raised

and those that were not. For example, Appellant argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in ruling against his pre-trial motion to sever his trial

from Dean’s. The trial court addressed this preserved claim in its Pa.R.A.P.

____________________________________________

2   Appellant does not specify which warrant he is addressing.

                                          - 16 -
J-S01007-23

1925(a) opinion prepared for our review on direct appeal. Appellate counsel

did not pursue this claim. Appellant recognizes that this involves a layered

claim of ineffectiveness, but he fails to discuss the pertinent standards. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 471 (Pa. 2016) (discussing

layered claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness and recognizing that

“arguably meritorious claims may be omitted in favor of pursuing claims

which,   in   the   exercise   of   appellate    counsel’s   objectively   reasonable

professional judgment, offer a greater prospect of securing relief”) (citation

omitted). While there was no evidentiary hearing in this matter and we cannot

examine whether counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for not raising these

claims on direct appeal, the problem remains that Appellant would have to

show that the trial court incorrectly ruled on the underlying motion.            See

Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1180 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(recognizing that a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness premised on a claim

that a prior counsel was ineffective can succeed only if prior counsel was

ineffective). He fails to do so.

      We conclude that Appellant’s noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure, combined with his failure to support his claims with pertinent legal

authority and development, has impeded appellate review to the degree that

we deem the majority of Appellant’s claims waived. See Commonwealth v.

Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (“Under Pennsylvania law, pro se

defendants are subject to the same rules of procedure as are represented

                                        - 17 -
J-S01007-23

defendants.”). While we may liberally construe pro se filings, we cannot be

expected to act as Appellant’s counsel. Id.

       We recognize that waiver of all arguments is disfavored, as the interests

of justice dictate that this Court address any arguments that can reasonably

be discerned. In Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2003),

the pro se litigant filed a brief that presented twelve questions which bore “no

relation to the eight sections of the argument or the divisions within the

argument,” and the brief was “rambling, repetitive and often incoherent.” Id.

at 252. Still, “in the interest of justice” we addressed those arguments that

could “reasonably be discerned” from the brief. Id. We shall follow the same

course here.

       In this case, we can reasonably identify five claims: challenges to the

weight of the evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, the discretionary

aspects of the sentence, an assertion that Agent Paszko unlawfully seized the

packages mailed from the Do It Yourself Hardware store, and a claim under

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 839 (1963) (requiring the Commonwealth to

disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense), which this Court found waived

on direct appeal for deficient presentation.3 In assessing these claims, we will

accept, for purposes of our disposition, that Appellant properly preserved

____________________________________________

3We also conclude that Appellant’s “governmental interference” claim is moot.
Appellant claims that he was denied access to transcripts and the certified
record. On May 6, 2022, this Court ordered the trial court, either directly or
via prior counsel, to provide Appellant with the requested material, and
Appellant’s brief cites the transcripts.

                                          - 18 -
J-S01007-23

claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness pursuant to Bradley with respect to

claims not addressed in the PCRA “no merit” letter. But see Bradley, 261

A.3d at 401 n.16 (noting that the case did not “involve the distinct

Turner/Finley scenario” of appointed counsel filing a “no merit” letter at the

PCRA    court   level   and   “sav[ing]   resolution”   of   how   PCRA   counsel

ineffectiveness claims must be raised in that context).

       We can readily dispose of the weight and discretionary aspects of

sentencing claims as this Court addressed them on direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9543(a)(3) (“To be eligible for relief … the petition must plead and prove …

[t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”).

Thus, those claims have been previously litigated. Alternatively, even if we

accept that Appellant properly raised a distinct claim of ineffectiveness in

connection with prior counsel’s pursuit of these claims, see Commonwealth

v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (Pa. 2005) (explaining that a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is analytically distinct), Appellant offers little argument

as to why the outcome would be any different under an ineffectiveness

framework. Instead, he simply relitigates the merits.

       Nonetheless, we recognize that our direct appeal decision addressed

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim only by reference to whether the jury

could properly determine that eighteen total packages contained crystal meth

(as only two packages were opened pursuant to a search warrant). To the

extent that Appellant preserved and presented a separate claim that the

                                      - 19 -
J-S01007-23

evidence failed to establish that he was a conspirator in Dean’s enterprise, we

disagree.4

       The Commonwealth presented significant circumstantial evidence

establishing Appellant’s role in these crimes. The authorities obtained flight

records showing when Dean flew to Pennsylvania. For example, Dean flew

from Arizona to Pittsburgh on November 24, 2016, and did not return until

December 10, 2016. However, on December 5, 2016, a package arrived at

Hanlin’s home, establishing that the operation continued even when Dean was

not present. On March 14, 2017, Dean again flew to Pittsburgh, and Agent

Paszko obtained video surveillance showing Appellant mailing a package from

the Do It Yourself Hardware store on March 27, 2017. The Commonwealth

also produced text messages sent between Appellant’s phone and Dean’s

phone referencing drugs. For example, Appellant’s phone sent Dean’s phone

a message stating, “I’m on way to mountain and my buddy says I can do 6

hats up front if your ready.” N.T., 3/23/18, at 149. The testifying witness

explained that “six hats” was code for six ounces of crystal meth. Id. On July

28, 2017, Appellant’s phone sent a message to Dean’s phone stating, “Get up

and take care of business if it ain’t Gonna make till Monday then western u it

____________________________________________

4 A challenge to the weight of the evidence is analytically distinct from a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000). Appellant does not discuss which
elements of which crimes that he believes the Commonwealth failed to
establish. Indeed, his sufficiency claim is simply an extension of his weight
claim, and we will not separately discuss the elements of each of Appellant’s
crimes.

                                          - 20 -
J-S01007-23

he pay.” Id. at 152. That same day, a package left Pennsylvania to South

Bantry Lane in Arizona. Authorities also obtained evidence from Appellant’s

internet service provider establishing that his computer frequently used the

United States Postal Service’s website to track packages.

      The jury was free to accept Appellant’s insistence that he was duped by

Dean and that he was innocently mailing packages on Dean’s behalf with no

knowledge of the package’s contents. Appellant’s Brief at 19 (arguing that

“Larry Dean was a (tenant) of Appellant in Tucson Arizona who[ ] had a rental

agreement only”). But the jury was equally free to reject that claim, and the

Commonwealth’s evidence suffices to establish Appellant’s guilt.

      The sole claim that has not been previously litigated, and which we can

readily discern, concerns Agent Paszko’s seizing the parcels for investigative

purposes. Again, presuming that Appellant properly presented a Bradley-like

claim concerning PCRA counsel’s failure to address this claim within the “no

merit” letter, Appellant is not entitled to relief. As these types of claims most

often arise in federal court due to federal jurisdiction over the mail, we quote

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the relevant Fourth

Amendment standard:
      A law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion that a
      piece of mail, or a package shipped via a commercial carrier,
      contains contraband to lawfully seize it for investigative purposes.
      United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 601, 603 (8th Cir. 1999).
      Seizure occurs when a package is removed from its ordinary
      progress in the mail and is diverted for further investigation. Id.
      An officer has reasonable suspicion that a package contains
      contraband if she has “a particularized and objective basis” that is
      more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”

                                     - 21 -
J-S01007-23

      Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 … (1968)). The officer
      must be able to explain the basis of her suspicion. Id. at 604.
      The officer may cite as the basis of her belief, however, facts
      which, alone and to an untrained eye, appear innocuous, but
      which, to a trained officer familiar with the methods of drug
      traffickers, are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id.;
      United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir.2002).

United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2004).

      We agree that Agent Paszko seized the parcels shipped from Arizona on

May 30, 2017, from the Do It Yourself Hardware store when he disrupted their

normal progress and mailed them to Pittsburgh for further inspection.

However, we find that reasonable suspicion existed and therefore justified the

warrantless seizure. This seizure occurred approximately eight months into a

large-scale investigation, and Agent Knoble knew that a parcel sent from that

same location on March 27, 2017 was addressed to a location associated with

one of the participants of this drug ring.   He conveyed this information to

Agent Paszko. Thus, when the owners of the hardware store agreed to assist

Agent Paszko and later informed him that Appellant had mailed two parcels,

Agent Paszko had reasonable suspicion that these parcels contained

contraband. Accordingly, any suppression motion on these grounds would

have failed.

      Finally, we address Appellant’s Brady claim. The basis for this claim is

that the Commonwealth had intended to call Nicole Reese, Appellant’s

girlfriend, as a witness. She had previously given an interview in which she

made statements that indicated, according to the prosecutor, that she knew

that Appellant “was mailing bad things in the mail.” N.T., 3/23/18, at 42. The

                                    - 22 -
J-S01007-23

prosecution informed Appellant that Reese refused to appear at trial, and that

she informed a Pennsylvania State Trooper that if she did appear, she would

say that “other people used [Appellant]’s computer and his cell phone.” Id.

This point is significant to Appellant’s theory of the case in that it undercuts

the strength of the circumstantial evidence concerning Appellant’s computer

tracking the crystal meth parcels and his phone messages to Dean, something

testified to by other witnesses.

       The trial court’s opinion prepared on direct review determined that no

Brady violation occurred for several reasons, including the fact that the

Commonwealth did not learn of the information until Reese refused to appear.

The Commonwealth immediately informed Appellant on the morning of March

22, 2018 of what Reese said when the prosecution learned of her refusal to

appear.5 Thus, there was no Brady violation as the Commonwealth did not

withhold the material.        Moreover, the court pointed out that Reese was

Appellant’s own girlfriend, and he could have produced her for trial if he

wished.

       On direct appeal, we deemed the claim waived due to inadequate

development. Hopkins, 2019 WL 4899223, at *2 (“Appellant’s omissions and

his failure to develop this issue not only violate our briefing requirements set

forth in Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(e), but also preclude this Court’s meaningful

____________________________________________

5 The issue came up on March 23, 2018, when Appellant attempted to
introduce what Reese told the trooper on cross-examination.    The
Commonwealth objected on hearsay grounds.

                                          - 23 -
J-S01007-23

review.”). While we conclude that PCRA counsel should have addressed this

claim in his “no merit” letter, the PCRA court correctly explained that its

opinion filed on direct appeal addressed why the underlying Brady claim does

not warrant relief. We agree with the court’s analysis.

      Finally, we note that even if Appellant had properly preserved

arguments to the other claims addressed within the “no merit” letter, the PCRA

court’s dismissal of his petition cogently explains why it agreed with PCRA

counsel’s assessment.     We would adopt the PCRA court’s rationale, had

Appellant preserved those claims herein.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Colins joins this memorandum.

      Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2023

                                    - 24 -