Court Opinion

ID: 9908643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 16:01:04.285243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.270131
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9515    Document: 010110966148        Date Filed: 12/11/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         December 11, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  WILFRIDO ROSALES ESPINOSA,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 23-9515
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Petitioner Wilfrido Rosales Espinosa, a Mexican national, seeks review of a

 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) decision dismissing his appeal of an

 Immigration Judge’s order of removal and denying a motion to remand. Exercising

 jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-9515    Document: 010110966148        Date Filed: 12/11/2023     Page: 2

 I.    BACKGROUND

       In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with being

 removable under the immigration laws as a noncitizen present in the United States

 without having been admitted or paroled. At an August 2019 hearing before an

 Immigration Judge (IJ), Petitioner conceded that he was removable but requested

 cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 1 At the time of the hearing,

 Petitioner was married with two United States citizen children, his daughter Lia and

 stepson Bryan. As his family’s primary earner, Petitioner produced evidence of the

 economic hardship that his children would suffer should he be deported. He also

 explained that due to the custody arrangement between Bryan’s biological parents,

 Bryan would not be able to accompany the rest of the family if they moved to

 Mexico, causing the children to be separated from one another. And if Petitioner’s

 wife stayed in the United States with the children, they would be separated from their

 father. Any family separation, Petitioner argued, would add emotional hardship to

 the financial hardship his children would suffer as a result of his removal. After a

 hearing on the merits, the IJ denied Petitioner’s application, concluding he failed to

 meet the standard for hardship to a qualifying relative under § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

       Petitioner appealed to the BIA. While his appeal was pending, Petitioner and

 his wife had another baby. Petitioner then filed a motion with the BIA requesting

       1
         Section 1229b(b)(1)(D) allows the Attorney General to cancel the removal of
 a noncitizen who, in relevant part, “establishes that removal would result in
 exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child
 who is a citizen of the United States.”
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Appellate Case: 23-9515     Document: 010110966148        Date Filed: 12/11/2023     Page: 3

 that his case be remanded to the IJ for reconsideration in light of new evidence,

 specifically the birth of a third qualifying child. In an opinion dated February 2,

 2023, the BIA denied the motion to remand and dismissed the appeal. The BIA

 agreed with the IJ’s hardship determination relating to Petitioner’s first two children.

 It concluded the IJ had “correctly analyzed and gave appropriate weight to such

 factors as the respondent’s financial concerns, . . . the effects of potential family

 separation, and the absence of medical and educational issues or other special needs

 affecting the qualifying relatives.” R., vol. 1 at 3-4. The BIA acknowledged the

 difficulties that would flow from Petitioner’s removal but held he had failed to show

 that the hardship to his qualifying relatives would be substantially different from or

 beyond that which normally results from an individual’s forced departure from the

 United States.

        The BIA went on to address Petitioner’s motion to remand based on the birth

 of an additional qualifying child. Citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473

 (BIA 1992), the Board explained that a party seeking remand based on new evidence

 must show that the newly proffered evidence would likely change the result in his

 case. The Board concluded that Petitioner had failed to make that showing:

        Although an additional citizen child has been born to the respondent and
        would add to the financial burden on the family, it is not apparent that
        the child has any special needs or that the incremental increase in
        hardship associated with the care of the child would change the
        Immigration Judge’s hardship calculus in this matter. Therefore, we are
        not persuaded that a remand on that basis is warranted.

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 R., vol. 1 at 4. Based on this analysis, the BIA denied the motion to remand and

 dismissed the appeal. Petitioner sought timely review in this court.

       The petition does not challenge the IJ’s original decision denying cancellation

 of removal, nor the BIA’s affirmance of that decision. Rather, Petitioner focuses on

 the BIA’s refusal to remand the case for reconsideration of the hardship factor in

 light of Petitioner’s new evidence. He advances two arguments. First, Petitioner

 claims the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in holding that his additional child

 did not alter the hardship analysis. Specifically, Petitioner claims the BIA required

 that the new child have special needs to satisfy the hardship threshold, thereby

 erroneously imposing a precondition not found in § 1229b(b)(1). Second, Petitioner

 claims the BIA erred by failing to consider the hardship that Petitioner’s newborn

 daughter would suffer in her own right should Petitioner be deported to Mexico.

 Here Petitioner claims the BIA considered only the additional incremental hardship

 that the other family members would experience by adding one more to their number.

 He also takes issue with the level of detail contained in the BIA’s analysis. We

 address each of these arguments below.

 II.   DISCUSSION

       A.     Jurisdiction

       Because this petition challenges the BIA’s decision to deny cancellation of

 removal, we must first assess our jurisdiction. See Galeano-Romero v. Barr,

 968 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020). Ordinarily we lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

 § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to review “the discretionary aspects of a decision concerning

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Appellate Case: 23-9515    Document: 010110966148        Date Filed: 12/11/2023       Page: 5

 cancellation of removal,” including “whether the petitioner’s removal from the

 United States would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a

 qualifying relative under . . . § 1229b(b)(1)(D).” Id. at 1181 (internal quotation

 marks omitted). This limitation on our jurisdiction applies even if the hardship

 determination was made in the context of a motion to remand as it was here.

 Cf. Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 849-50 (10th Cir. 2009) (considering

 jurisdictional limitation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in the context of a motion to reopen).

 We retain jurisdiction under the limited review provision of § 1252(a)(2)(D),

 however, “to review constitutional claims and questions of law, including those that

 arise in the circumstances specified at § 1229b(b)(1).” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d

 at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       To be reviewable, a constitutional claim must be colorable. Id. at 1184.

 “An alien does not present a colorable constitutional claim capable of avoiding the

 jurisdictional bar by arguing that the evidence was incorrectly weighed, insufficiently

 considered, or supports a different outcome.” Id. at 1184-85 (internal quotation

 marks omitted). An allegation of wholesale failure to consider evidence, however,

 plainly implicates due process. Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851. Reviewable legal

 questions must raise a “statutory-construction argument” or contest “the application

 of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d

 at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Petitioner’s first argument invokes the court’s jurisdiction under these

 principles. Although a petition does not raise a legal question “by disputing the

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 Board’s appraisal of the degree of hardship” to a qualifying relative, id. at 1182,

 “we do have jurisdiction to hear some challenges to some Board decisions

 concerning cancellations of removal—those not asking us to reweigh evidence and

 substitute our view in place of the Board’s discretionary decision.” Id. at 1184. In

 Galeano-Romero, we offered examples of legal arguments that satisfy the exception

 to the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in a cancellation-of-removal case.

 Id. at 1184-85. Among them, we explained, is when the petitioner accuses the BIA

 of “impos[ing] additional qualifications for hardship beyond those set by

 § 1229b(b)(1)(D).” Id. at 1184. Under those circumstances, “we [can] review, as a

 question of law, whether the Board did so.” Id. Petitioner is making just such an

 argument here, contending the BIA wrongly predicated its hardship determination on

 the special-needs status of Petitioner’s third qualifying child. We may review, as a

 question of law, whether the BIA did in fact impose such an extra-statutory criterion

 in its hardship analysis. Id.

       Petitioner’s second argument—that the BIA failed to consider the hardship his

 new daughter would experience—implicates due process and is therefore also

 reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 850 (explaining court

 has “limited jurisdiction to review the propriety of the BIA’s failure to consider”

 evidence supporting motion to reopen).

       B.     Standard of Review

       “We review the denial of a motion to remand for an abuse of discretion.”

 Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 978-79 (10th Cir. 2009). The BIA abuses its

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 discretion when its “decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

 from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

 conclusory statements.” Id. at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is also an

 abuse of discretion when the BIA makes an error of law. Zapata-Chacon v. Garland,

 51 F.4th 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2022).

       C.     Analysis

       The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying remand here. To merit

 remand, a petitioner must show that his new evidence—in this case, the birth of an

 additional qualifying child—“would likely change the result in the case.” Maatougui

 v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the denial of a motion to

 reopen) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 979 n.10

 (noting that “[t]he BIA applies the same legal standard to motions to reopen and

 motions to remand”). “Stated another way, if [the BIA] conclude[s] that [its]

 decision on the appeal would be the same even if the proffered evidence were already

 part of the record on appeal, [it] will deny the motion to remand.” Coelho, 20 I. & N.

 Dec. at 473. Moreover, “the BIA has discretion to deny a motion to [remand] though

 the alien has made out a prima facie case for relief.” Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1240

 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

       Applying this standard, the BIA concluded Petitioner’s third qualifying child

 would not change the result of the hardship analysis for purposes of cancellation of

 removal. Although the BIA did not examine the issue at length, its determination

 followed the adoption of the IJ’s more fulsome analysis, which considered many

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 factors, including the effects of family separation as well as “the absence of medical

 and educational issues or other special needs affecting the qualifying relatives.”

 R., vol. 1 at 4. The BIA also acknowledged that Petitioner’s third child would add to

 the family’s overall hardship in the event of Petitioner’s removal. Observing that the

 new child did not appear to have any special needs, however, the BIA concluded that

 this incremental increase in hardship did not change the overall hardship calculation.

 Petitioner contends this observation regarding special needs was tantamount to

 imposing an extra-statutory criterion in the hardship analysis. We disagree.

       The BIA’s decision cannot reasonably be read as recognizing or applying a

 special-needs precondition to cancellation of removal. In observing that the new

 child did not appear to have special needs, the BIA was simply considering this

 factor in the aggregate along with the increased financial burden, Petitioner’s wife’s

 resources, family separation, and the lack of medical and educational issues affecting

 the qualifying relatives. This is precisely what BIA precedent counsels the Board to

 do in considering the question of hardship. It takes into account numerous factors,

 including “the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . . relatives.”

 In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001) (emphasis added).

 Monreal-Aguinaga specifically advises that a “strong applicant might have a

 qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in

 school.” Id. And it instructs that “all hardship factors should be considered in the

 aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. at 64.

 Observing that the child in this case lacked special needs was not tantamount to

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 ignoring all other factors, and there is no indication the Board did so. To the

 contrary, the Board considered the impact of Petitioner’s additional child and

 concluded it was insufficient, under its precedent, to alter the hardship determination.

 Its analysis was brief but that alone does not signify an abuse of discretion. See

 Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1242. “What is required is that [the BIA] consider the issues

 raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to

 perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Id. at 1243 (internal

 quotation marks and brackets omitted). As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the

 BIA’s opinion provided sufficient analysis for meaningful appellate review, and we

 conclude its hardship analysis was free of legal error.

       Petitioner’s second argument likewise misconstrues the BIA’s opinion.

 Petitioner contends the BIA failed to consider the hardship to his third qualifying

 child and focused exclusively on the impact that child would have on the rest of the

 family. As previously indicated, to the extent this argument may be construed as

 alleging a failure to consider new evidence, we have jurisdiction to review the due

 process implications of such a claim. See Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 850. But the new

 evidence in this case—Petitioner’s third qualifying child—was plainly and explicitly

 considered in the BIA’s opinion. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, concerns not

 whether the BIA considered the evidence, but how it considered the evidence. This is

 beyond our purview. While “we can require the agency to fairly consider appropriate

 evidence[,] [w]e have no license to dictate the method such consideration must take.”

 Id.

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  III.   CONCLUSION

         Petitioner has failed to show the BIA abused its discretion in denying his

  motion to remand. The BIA correctly applied the law governing the hardship

  determination underlying cancellation of removal, adhered to its own precedent, and

  produced a reviewable decision containing more than conclusory statements. The

  petition for review is denied.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Nancy L. Moritz
                                             Circuit Judge

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