Court Opinion

ID: 9905966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:12.299986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:01.738880
License: Public Domain

J-S42013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JAMERE WALKER                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 475 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 12, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0002023-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

      Jamere Walker appeals from the order denying as untimely his petition

filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

      By way of background, a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree

murder, possession of an instrument of a crime, and firearms not to be carried

without a license in connection with the shooting of J. Charles Hopkins.

Following an ensuing bench trial, he was also convicted of persons not to

possess a firearm based upon the same incident. The trial court imposed an

aggregate term of thirty to sixty years in prison.

      This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 16, 2019. See

Commonwealth v. Walker, 2019 WL 2070493 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-

precedential decision), appeal denied, 218 A.3d. 849 (Pa. 2019). Appellant

did not seek discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court.
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       On January 22, 2021, Appellant filed the underlying pro se petition.1

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition asserting

that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request a jury

instruction as to manslaughter. The Commonwealth responded, contending

that the petition was untimely since it was filed more than one year from the

date Appellant’s judgment became final, and also because it raised no

exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement.          The court subsequently

issued notice of its intention to dismiss the petition.

       Appellant’s counsel submitted a written response to the court. 2      The

court held a hearing to address the timeliness of the petition, wherein

Appellant conceded that the petition was filed more than a year after his

judgment became final.         See N.T. Hearing, 1/3/23, at 5.   He nonetheless

asserted the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar on

the grounds that he had limited access to the prison library during the COVID-

____________________________________________

1  We note that the petition was stamped by the Delaware County Office of
Judicial Support as being filed on February 3, 2021. However, the PCRA court
found that it was filed on January 22, 2021, since it was executed by Appellant
and mailed from the prison on that date. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/24/23,
at 4 n.2. Accordingly, we utilize January 22, 2021 as the date of filing. See
Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d 1169, 1170 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(“Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a document filed on the day
it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing.”).

2 It does not appear that this response is contained within the certified record,

despite being entered as an exhibit at a PCRA hearing on January 3, 2023.
Nevertheless, because Appellant fails to meaningfully address the timeliness
of his petition, as discussed infra, this omission does not preclude our review.

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19 pandemic.3 See N.T. Hearing, 1/3/23, at 4-5. When the PCRA court asked

Appellant’s counsel why Appellant could not have filed something before the

one-year deadline and requested additional time in which to develop his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel responded by stating “I can’t

answer that question, Your Honor.” Id. at 5. The court ultimately denied the

petition as untimely.

       This timely appeal followed.            Both Appellant and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.           Appellant presents a single issue for our

determination: “Was the trial court in error for denying Appellant’s petition

for post-conviction relief without a hearing as to the issue raised in said

petition alleging effectiveness of trial counsel for failing to request a jury

instruction as to manslaughter?” Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

       Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is

“whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free

of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is

no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Cruz,

223 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

____________________________________________

3 Our High Court declared exceptions to the timely filing requirements from

March 19, 2020 to May 8, 2020 due to the pandemic. See Commonwealth
v. Jones, 281 A.3d 1053, 2022 WL 2048400 at *4 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-
precedential decision) (explaining, when “the PCRA deadline [falls] after the
extended May 11, 2020, deadline for pleadings, the emergency order [does]
not apply.”) (emphasis in original). Since, Appellant filed his petition in 2021,
our Supreme Court’s emergency stay order has no bearing as to the timeliness
of his petition.

                                           -3-
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      We must first address whether the underlying petition was timely filed,

since “[i]t is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the petition and cannot grant relief.” See Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi,

275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted). As to that issue, the

PCRA provides as follows:

      Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

            (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
            result of interference by government officials with the
            presentation of the claim in violation of the
            Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
            Constitution or laws of the United States;

            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
            unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
            ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

            (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
            recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
            or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
            period provided in this section and has been held by
            that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

      The PCRA further states that “[f]or purposes of this subchapter, a

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the

review.”   42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).      When seeking review of a state court

                                       -4-
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judgment with the United States Supreme Court, a petition for a writ of

certiorari “is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of

the order denying discretionary review.” U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1).

       Critically, in his brief to this Court, Appellant neglected to proffer any

discussion whatsoever concerning the timeliness of his PCRA petition. 4 Our

independent review of the record, however, confirms that the petition was

facially untimely.      Since our High Court denied Appellant’s petition for

allowance of appeal on October 16, 2019, and he sought no review with the

United States Supreme Court, his judgment became final ninety days later,

on January 14, 2020. Hence, a timely petition had to be filed on or before

January 14, 2021. Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition on January 22,

2021, which was eight days late.

       Moreover, on appeal, Appellant did not identify or attempt to assert any

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.               To the extent that he invoked the

governmental interference exception during the hearing with the PCRA court,

he simply failed to develop this claim on appeal. As such, Appellant waived

all arguments concerning any exception to the timeliness requirement. See
____________________________________________

4 On the contrary, it appears that Appellant conceded that the petition was

untimely. See Appellant’s brief at 6 (stating, “As further explained, the PCRA
Petition was inter alia untimely.”). It is unclear whether this concession was
intentional, as this statement is nearly identical to one in the PCRA court’s
recitation of the procedural history of the case. See PCRA Court Opinion,
5/24/23, at 2 (“As further explained infra, the PCRA Petition was inter alia
untimely.”). Regardless of whether Appellant’s statement constituted an
admission of untimeliness, for the reasons discussed in the body of this
memorandum, Appellant has not met his burden of proving that his petition
was timely filed or subject to an exception.

                                           -5-
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Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 591 (Pa.Super. 2022) (stating that

“[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, or when the

briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will

not consider the merits thereof” (cleaned up)); see also Commonwealth v.

Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1158 (Pa. 2020) (maintaining that “it is the petitioner’s

burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.”

(citation omitted)).

      Since Appellant’s petition was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to

consider the merits of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We

therefore have no cause to disturb the order dismissing the petition.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 11/30/2023

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