Court Opinion

ID: 9645550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:28:16.810563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:27.766966
License: Public Domain

MAUS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur. However, it is my opinion that the Supplemental Notes on Use referred to in the majority opinion establish the obligation of this court to review the propriety of the instruction in question. Rule 28 does require the use of applicable MAI-CR instructions in accordance with that rule and appropriate Notes on Use. However, nothing in that rule gives an instruction greater finality, or insulation against review by this court, than the order of the Supreme Court approving that instruction. That order by incorporation by reference provides the Supreme Court’s adoption of the instruction was “without judicially deciding or foreclosing any ... instructional issue ... even though the forms and notes *835on use approved by the court are followed and used.” For that reason I think this court must determine the instructional issue raised by the defendant. See also dissenting opinion of Dixon, J., in State v. Singer, 719 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App.1986).
The term “reasonable doubt” carries a basic inherent meaning. See Smith v. Bordenkircher, 718 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976, 104 S.Ct. 2355, 80 L.Ed.2d 828 (1984). The sufficiency of this inherent meaning was recognized by MAI-CR 2.20 and MAI-CR 2d 2.20 (before October 1, 1984). The Notes on Use to each of those instructions provided, “No other instruction may be given elaborating further upon or attempting to define the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt.” The basic inherent meaning of the term must be considered in determining the jury’s understanding of any further definition of the term.
The decisions and statutes contain a host of variations of further definitions of reasonable doubt. A widely used and early definition was substantially as follows. Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p. 52 (1972). Also see, State v. Drake, 298 S.W.2d 374 (Mo.1957); State v. Marshall, 354 Mo. 312, 189 S.W.2d 301 (1945).
A definition widely used in federal courts is as follows:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense — the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
1 Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 11.14 (3rd ed. 1977). From this definition it is argued the instruction in question is erroneous because reasonable doubt must be defined in terms of hesitation to act.
Whether or not an instruction defining reasonable doubt is erroneous is not to be decided by an exercise in semantics. Nor is such an instruction to be condemned because it is determined to be phrased in less than the best possible language. The important factor is the concept conveyed to the jury. “To this end, the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts in issue.’ ” In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970).
The commonly used term “firm” bears the following definition.
la: securely or solidly fixed in place b: not weak or uncertain: vigorous c: having a solid or compact structure that resists stress or pressure 2a(l): not subject to change or revision: set definite [they gave us a price] (2): not subject to price weakness: steady b: not easily moved or disturbed: steadfast c: well-founded 3: indicating firmness or resolution.
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977). The standard of “firmly convinced” demands no less proof than that of “an abiding conviction.” A person who is firmly convinced of a fact does not hesitate to act upon that belief. The definition in the instruction in question is comparable to the definitions used in instructions and statutes in states such as Virginia, Model Jury Instructions in Virginia — Inst. # 2.100 (1985 repl. ed.) and California, CahPenal Code § 1096 (West). It is comparable to definitions that had been approved in this state. State v. Drake, supra. Also see State v. Sanders, 358 S.W.2d 45 (Mo.1962); State v. Velanti, 331 S.W.2d 542 (Mo.1960), and cases cited therein. The instruction in question must be considered as a whole. State v. Brown, 332 S.W.2d 904 (Mo.1960). The instruction tells the jury of the pre*836sumption of innocence. It emphasizes the burden of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant. When the instruction is considered as a whole, I believe the instruction adequately requires a “subjective state of certitude” and is not erroneous.