Court Opinion

ID: 9726423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:21.068702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.967623
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result.
The status of persons coming on the premises of the occupier of land, as it affects liability, is germane to the issues herein considered. Although the matter about to be considered was not raised or argued, it would appear proper to review this subject in light of what was said and done by the Supreme Court of California in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). In that case the court entirely discarded the fictitious common law distinctions based on the injured party’s status as a trespasser, licensee, business invitee, social invitee and the like. I submit we should do likewise.
The Rowland case should be examined in its entirety but for the purpose of this special concurrence it is worthwile to quote four selected paragraphs:
“One of the areas where this court and other courts have departed from the fundamental concept that a man is liable for injuries caused by his carelessness is with regard to the liability of a possessor of land for injuries to persons who have entered upon that land. It has been suggested that the special rules regarding liability of the possessor of land are due to historical considerations stemming from the high place which land has traditionally held in English and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England during the formative period of the rules governing the possessor’s liability, and the heritage of feudalism. (2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, supra, p. 1432.)
“The departure from the fundamental rule of liability for negligence has been accomplished by classifying the plaintiff either as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee and then adopting special rules as to the duty owed by the possessor to each of the *179classifications. Generally speaking a trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land of another without a privilege to do so; a licensee is a person like a social guest who is not an invitee and who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, and an invitee is a business visitor who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on the land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them. (Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221.)
“A man’s life, or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to determine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values. The common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern determination of the question of duty.
“ * * * The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.” (loc.cit. 70 Cal.Rptr. 100, 104, 443 P.2d 564, 568.)
The California Code section merely codifies the general common law and does not create a meaningful distinction between the Iowa and California law. It should be noted that California recognizes the status of the injured party has a bearing on the question of liability. Thus the admissibility of evidence on this question is preserved but the rigid distinctions between parties, dependent on their status, is eliminated. This same enlightened action should be taken now by this court in Iowa.