Court Opinion

ID: 9766305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:40:32.207227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.125487
License: Public Domain

Jim Johnson, Associate Justice, (concurring). I agree with the majority view. This concurrence is written for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that the protection of the constitutional rights of the least deserving of us is in reality the protection of the constitutional rights of all of us. Bitter experience through the ages has taught men desirous of freedom that there could be no freedom without the recognition that free men must possess certain inherent and indefeasible rights, amongest which is the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects. The authors of our Bill of Rights attested to this great truth when they wrote in the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States: ‘ í iji^g 0f fire people to' be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches, and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The framers of the constitutions of all of the states have incorporated similar language with the same import in the constitutions of their respective states. The provision in our constitution is Article 2, Sec. 15, and is almost identical to’ that contained in the Constitution of the United States. For a number of years this court, while frowning upon unlawful searches and seizures, effectively encouraged the practice by permitting the introduction of evidence illegally obtained in cases being tried by persons who had sworn to uphold the very constitution which specifically prohibited the practice. (For example, see Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564, 246 S. W. 860; and Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119, 20 S. W. 2d 185.) I was proud on May 25, 1959, when the majority of this court concluded in the case of Clubb v. State, 230 Ark. 688, 326 S. W. 2d 816, that th„e blindfolds of impartiality should be placed back on the Goddess of Justice. There we said: “The right to be secure against unreasonable searches is guaranteed by Art. 2, Sec. 15 .of our Constitution and also, in essentially the same language, by the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, yet our Court has followed a rule at variance with the Federal rule regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained by search without a warrant. After careful consideration we have concluded that we will re-examine our former decisions in this connection with a view to changing our announced rule when the question is properly presented to us again.” This conclusion was reached not in anticipation of nor to conform with some radical decision of the United States Supreme Court but because it was right, and just and proper and the only way to insure the protection of the constitutional rights of all the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects. Following the Glubb decision but prior to a proper presentation of the question for our further determination, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, held that the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United Staes through the agency of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment governs the subject of searches and seizures in state proceedings. Admittedly these two opinions have imposed the responsibility upon all law enforcement officers of this state to comply with the simple rules requisite of a lawful search and seizure. It should not be discouraging to our dedicated officials to require of them that they obey the very law they are sworn to uphold. Under our constitutional system the general public has the right to expect no less and demand no more. In the case at bar, obviously appellant committed the crime with which he is charged. This would seem to place him in the category of those least deserving. This is not an unusual situation. It frequently becomes our unpopular duty and responsibility as an appellate court when error is demonstrated to reverse cases in which we are convinced beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. If our function was merely that of an appellate jury we would quicldy affirm these cases and who could say that the accused would not deserve the punishment. I am sure that this simple system prevails in some countries in the world but not in the United States. Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The least of us are clothed with every constitutional protection afforded the mighty. The precedent set today by the denial of those rights to the guilty could well be the vehicles through which the innocent are convicted tomorrow. For these reasons and those stated in the majority opinion, I concur.