Court Opinion

ID: 9793778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:52:51.317905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:52.507006
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting): For the following reasons I dissent. The main opinion holds whether the exclusion rule has been violated is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 'and to declare a mistrial the burden is on accused to demonstrate he has been prejudiced.
With these two statements I cannot agree. In support of them, State v. Vaughn, Utah, 554 P.2d 210, is cited in the main opinion. I do not now believe that to be good law. My concurrence in Vaughn notwithstanding, we should overrule that part of Vaughn upon which the main opinion relies.
Whether the exclusion rule has been violated is not within the sound discretion of the trial court. The violation of the rule is not in anyone’s discretion. The rule has either been violated, or it has not. A trial judge may rule a violation of the exclusionary rule to be not prejudicial to defendant, but then such ruling is open to attack, as to its correctness.
To place the burden on defendant of showing prejudice, because of a violation of the exclusion rule, is to deny that his conviction and incarceration are not prejudicial. Where a discussion of the evidence to be put before the court constitutes the violation of the rule, intrinsic to that violation is prejudice. Where, as here, the prosecutor *314discussed the evidence to be put before the court, with his assembled witnesses, he does for them what the court has ordered them not do, viz., compare their testimonies. At the same time it places the state in a position of wrong doing. The main opinion acknowledges this by stating the prosecutor should not have gathered the witnesses together in the hall to talk about the case, after the exclusion rule had been announced.
In State v. Tillman1 our precise situation was encountered. There however, the court reached what, in my view, was the proper determination — a reversal and a remand for a new trial. Among other things, the court said:
The prosecutor’s desire to interview his witnesses does not excuse the violation of the order. That could readily be accomplished by interviewing the witnesses out of the presence of each other.
There are cases where the evidence is sufficient to convict, aside from that tainted by the violation of the exclusion rule. Here, it would appear, the evidence which was used to convict was tainted by violation of the rule. In addition, there was no direct evidence — it was all circumstantial. In this kind of situation I would conclude the matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
WILKINS, J., concurs in result of Justice MAUGHAN’S dissent.
HALL, J., does not participate herein.

. 122 N.J.Super. 137, 299 A.2d 419 (1973).