Court Opinion

ID: 9400451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 15:03:59.723562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:45.380031
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 94
                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                      No.   CV-22-635

                                                 Opinion Delivered:   June 8, 2023
 MONSANTO COMPANY
                              PETITION FOR WRIT OF
                              CERTIORARI OR, IN THE
                   PETITIONER ALTERNATIVE, A WRIT OF
                              PROHIBITION, WRIT OF
 V.                           MANDAMUS, OR OTHER
                              SUPERVISORY WRIT
 CORNELIUS KILGORE AND
 LABOMMIE KILGORE

                                                 PETITION DENIED.
                          RESPONDENTS

                              JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

       Monsanto Company petitions this court for a writ of certiorari or, in the alternative,

a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or other supervisory writ. It argues that the Drew

County Circuit Court misinterpreted the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure in this

discovery matter, abused its discretion, and acted beyond its jurisdiction in allowing the

deposition of Werner Baumann, a citizen and resident of Germany. We deny the petition.

                                            I. Facts

       In October 2021, respondents Cornelius and Labommie Kilgore (the Kilgores) filed

a complaint in the Drew County Circuit Court against Monsanto Company, Walmart, Inc.,

and Walmart Stores Arkansas, LLC, alleging that Mr. Kilgore had been diagnosed with non-

Hodgkin’s lymphoma in November 2018 after two decades of exposure to Monsanto’s

Roundup-branded products, which he had purchased at Walmart. The Kilgores asserted a
design-defect claim against Monsanto, as well as claims against both Monsanto and Walmart

for failure to warn, negligence, breach of implied warranties, violation of the Arkansas

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and loss of consortium.

       On April 27, 2022, the Kilgores served Monsanto with a deposition notice pursuant

to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 30 for Baumann, the chief executive officer of

Bayer AG, Monsanto’s parent corporation.1 The notice identified Baumann as Monsanto’s

“managing agent” and stated that he would be questioned on the following topics:

              Monsanto’s position on the safety of Roundup® Products and their active
       ingredients, the design of Roundup® Products, Monsanto’s plan to redesign
       Roundup® Products, Monsanto’s plan to relabel Roundup® Products, Monsanto’s
       view of the economic value of Roundup® Products cases, and Monsanto’s plan to
       resolve litigation arising out of Roundup® Products, including this lawsuit.

On May 17, Monsanto filed a motion for protective order requesting that the circuit court

strike the notice of deposition. It argued that Baumann could not be deposed under Rule

30 because he was not Monsanto’s managing agent. Instead, Monsanto claimed that the

Kilgores needed to seek a subpoena in order to depose him, and because he resides in

Germany, “any subpoena issued to him under Rule 45 would be outside the Court’s

jurisdiction and instead would be governed by the requirements of the Hague Convention.”

Monsanto also argued that Baumann’s deposition is not permitted under the “apex”

doctrine.

       Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order on August 19 denying

Monsanto’s motion for protective order. It found that “there is certainly enough evidence

       1
       On May 31, 2023, counsel for Monsanto informed this court by letter to our clerk
that “Baumann’s last day with Bayer AG is today, May 31, 2023.”

                                            2
to believe that Plaintiffs have met the threshold burden of establishing that Mr. Baumann is

a managing agent of Monsanto.” The circuit court further noted that the apex doctrine has

not been adopted in Arkansas or in the Eighth Circuit, and it refused to “apply a doctrine

that has not been adopted by the courts above it[.]” On August 25, Monsanto filed a motion

for reconsideration asking that the circuit court (1) modify its order, grant Monsanto’s

request for a protective order, and strike the Kilgores’ notice of deposition of Baumann or,

in the alternative, (2) modify its order to require the Kilgores to proceed in accordance with

the requirements of the Hague Convention and in conformity with German law. On

October 3, the circuit court denied Monsanto’s motion for reconsideration.

       On October 10, Monsanto filed in this court a petition for writ of certiorari or, in

the alternative, a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or other supervisory writ. It argued

that the circuit court abused its discretion and acted in excess of its jurisdiction, thereby

warranting a grant of certiorari in three ways: (1) by finding that Baumann, “the CEO of

Monsanto’s foreign indirect parent corporation (nine tiers removed),” is Monsanto’s

“managing agent” who can be deposed via a Rule 30 deposition notice; (2) by compelling

Baumann’s deposition pursuant to Rule 30, thereby ignoring or circumventing the

procedures set forth in the Hague Convention; and (3) by concluding that Baumann’s

deposition “can proceed under the apex doctrine and/or a conventional Rule 26(c)

analysis.” We took Monsanto’s petition as a case and granted a limited stay of proceedings

pending our review.

                                              3
                                      II. Writ of Certiorari

       A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. Chiodini v. Lock, 373 Ark. 88, 93, 281

S.W.3d 728, 732 (2008). There are two requirements that must be satisfied in order for this

court to grant a writ of certiorari. Ark. Found. for Med. Care v. Saline Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2012

Ark. 372, at 3, 423 S.W.3d 542, 544. First, there can be no other adequate remedy but for

the writ of certiorari. Id., 423 S.W.3d at 544. Second, a writ of certiorari lies only when (1)

it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross

abuse of discretion, or (2) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on

the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record. Id. at 4,

423 S.W.3d at 544. This court has also held that, in determining the applicability of the

writ, we will not look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a

controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of fact, or to reverse a circuit

court’s discretionary authority. Baptist Health v. Cir. Ct. of Pulaski Cnty., 373 Ark. 455, 458,

284 S.W.3d 499, 502 (2008).

       This court has, on several occasions, specifically held that a petition for writ of

certiorari is not an appropriate remedy when a party seeks to reverse a discovery order. Id.

at 458–59, 284 S.W.3d at 502; see also Chiodini, 373 Ark. at 93, 281 S.W.3d at 732 (“Because

a trial court’s discovery ruling is a matter well within the court’s jurisdiction and discretion,

a writ of certiorari will not lie to correct any perceived error in the court’s ruling.” (emphasis

in original)). In Chiodini, for example, we denied a petition for writ of certiorari where the

petitioner challenged the interpretation and application of Rule 36 of the Arkansas Rules of

                                                4
Civil Procedure. Id. at 92–93, 281 S.W.3d at 732. Subsequently, in Baptist Health, this court

stated that

       it is clear that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a discovery order; what is at
       issue is whether the circuit court correctly interpreted a statute and applied its
       interpretation of that statute to the facts before it. Certiorari simply will not lie in these
       circumstances.

373 Ark. at 461, 284 S.W.3d at 504 (emphasis in original).

       Here, in its petition, Monsanto does not assert that the circuit court lacked the ability

to rule on the discovery motion before it. Rather, Monsanto contends that (1) the circuit

court erroneously interpreted Rule 30, resulting in the court ignoring or circumventing the

procedures set forth in the Hague Convention and (2) its erroneous interpretation of Rule

26(c) and refusal to adopt the apex doctrine will subject Baumann and Monsanto to

“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Ark. R. Civ. P.

26(c). These issues of interpretation and application are similar to those presented in Chiodini

and Baptist Health, and we have said certiorari will not lie in these circumstances. “[T]o

decide [these] question[s] would require us to delve into the underlying merits of the

controversy, which this court has frequently held is improper in deciding whether to issue

the writ.” Baptist Health, 373 Ark. at 460, 284 S.W.3d at 503.

       Monsanto argues that its petition is appropriate for certiorari review pursuant to this

court’s holding in Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 2011 Ark. 183,

381 S.W.3d 67. There, this court granted a petition for writ of certiorari “where the issue

was not a ‘mere’ discovery issue but involved another area of law that would be impacted

by the resolution of the discovery matter.” Id. at 6, 381 S.W.3d at 71 (quoting Ark.

Democrat-Gazette, Inc. v. Brantley, 359 Ark. 75, 79, 194 S.W.3d 748, 751 (2004)). Monsanto

                                                 5
asserts that, although the order under review here is nominally a discovery order, the circuit

court’s decision implicates the scope of the Hague Convention and the apex doctrine and

thus reaches far beyond a mere discovery dispute. It contends that this case is similar to

Cooper Tire and appropriate for certiorari review. We disagree.

       In Cooper Tire, the petition for writ of certiorari sought to limit a discovery request

on grounds that it sought protected trade secrets. Id. at 7–8, 381 S.W.3d at 71–72; see also

Brantley, 359 Ark. at 79, 194 S.W.3d at 751 (granting petition for writ of certiorari following

a circuit court’s refusal to quash a subpoena that involved a unique copyright issue and

potential copyright infringement). We have subsequently limited the holdings in Cooper Tire

and Brantley because those cases “dealt specifically with a very narrow issue of intellectual

property law and did not establish a broad exception that would allow for interlocutory

review of any alleged privileged information.” Ark. Found. for Med. Care, 2012 Ark. 372, at

6, 423 S.W.3d at 545.

       We reiterate that a writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. We decline to expand its

scope to address the interpretation and application issues in this discovery matter. To decide

these questions would require us to delve into the underlying merits of the controversy,

which is improper in deciding whether to issue the writ. Baptist Health, 373 Ark. at 460,

284 S.W.3d at 503.

                        III. Writ of Prohibition and Writ of Mandamus

       Finally, Monsanto requests alternative relief in the form of a writ of prohibition or

writ of mandamus. This court has previously held that because issues of discovery are

squarely within a circuit court’s jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition will not lie to solve a

                                              6
discovery problem. Monticello Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Goodman, 2010 Ark. 339, at 17, 373

S.W.3d 256, 268. Further, the purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established

right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Manila Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark.

20, 26, 159 S.W.3d 285, 290 (2004). Here, Monsanto seeks to control the circuit court’s

exercise of its discretion in this discovery matter. Mandamus will not lie for this purpose.

Id., 159 S.W.3d at 290. Accordingly, we deny Monsanto’s alternative requests for a writ of

prohibition and writ of mandamus.

       Petition denied.

       WOOD, WOMACK, and WEBB, JJ., dissent.

       RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, dissenting. The majority states that we must deny

the writ because it involves little more than a routine discovery dispute. I disagree. We have

granted writs that implicate discovery issues, particularly when the resolution intersects with

other significant legal issues.1 Because this case implicates significant legal issues, including

principles of international comity, and the circuit court committed a plain and manifest

abuse of discretion in doing so, we should grant relief.

                                       I. Writ as Remedy

       While a writ of certiorari is not an appropriate remedy in routine discovery disputes,

there are exceptions.2 For example, in Cooper Tire, defendant, a tire manufacturer, moved

       1
           See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Phillips Cnty. Cir. Ct., 2011 Ark. 183, 381 S.W.3d
67.
       2
        Compare, e.g., Baptist Health v. Cir. Ct. of Pulaski Cty., 373 Ark. 455, 284 S.W.3d
499 (2008), with Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 Ark. 183, 381 S.W.3d 67; Ark. Democrat-
Gazette, Inc. v. Brantley, 359 Ark. 75, 194 S.W.3d 748 (2004).

                                               7
for a protective order to limit discovery requests for trade secrets.3 This court recognized

that it would grant a writ of certiorari involving discovery orders only “where the issue is

not merely the resolution of a discovery matter but how that resolution interacts with [other

laws].”4 Applying that rule, the Cooper Tire court granted the writ because the discovery

issue implicated state and federal law protecting trade secrets.5

       This case, like Cooper Tire, raises discovery issues that not only intersect with

important state and federal law but also extend further and implicate international law and

policy. If Cooper Tire justified a writ, certainly this writ is justified. This circuit court entered

an extraordinary order compelling the foreign CEO of a nonparty to appear for a deposition

in another country. The circuit court’s decision implicates foreign discovery and

international comity, particularly how our courts treat discovery on foreign executives and,

in turn, how foreign countries may treat discovery on our citizens. The serious legal and

policy considerations are compelling and require extraordinary relief and thus exercise of an

extraordinary writ. This is no ordinary discovery dispute.

       Once we determine a writ is the appropriate avenue of relief, we must determine

whether the writ lies. It does. On the face of the record, the circuit court committed two

plain, manifest, and gross abuses of discretion. The circuit court first abused its discretion in

denying Monsanto’s motion for protective order, and then it exacerbated that error by

failing to follow federal precedent and consider the Hague Convention.

       3
           Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 Ark. 183, at 2–3, 381 S.W.3d at 69.
       4
           Id. at 6, 381 S.W.3d at 71.
       5
           Id. at 10, 381 S.W.3d at 74.

                                                 8
                                       II. Protective Order

       The circuit court’s first abuse of discretion was its denial of Monsanto’s protective

order. Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Mr. Baumann but did not subpoena him. Under

the plain language of Rule 30(a)-(b)(1), a deposition subpoena is unnecessary only if Mr.

Baumann is a “party.”6 Mr. Baumann is not a party. He is neither a current nor a former

employee of Monsanto. And as the CEO of Monsanto’s indirect parent corporation, Bayer,

he is not under Monsanto’s control.7

       Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Baumann is Monsanto’s managing agent for purpose of this

litigation. Yet under the plain language of Rule 30(b)(6), the designation of a “managing

agent” is left to the discretion of the organization being deposed, not the party seeking to

depose a corporation’s managing agent.

               A party may in his notice and in the subpoena name as the deponent a public
       or private corporation . . . . In that event, the organization so named shall designate
       one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent
       to testify on its behalf and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on
       which he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a non-party organization of its duty to
       make such a designation.8

Instead of applying this rule, the circuit court seemed to rely on Hensley v. Computer Sciences

Corp., 2006 WL 662463, an Arkansas trial court opinion with no precedential value

       6
           Ark. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (2022).
       7
           According to a filing from Monsanto’s counsel, Mr. Baumann is no longer Bayer’s
CEO.
       8
           Ark. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).

                                                9
involving whether the former employee of the defendant qualified as a managing agent.

Baumann is neither.

        Additionally, even when considering whether a person is a managing agent, courts

look to “his or her duties and responsibilities respecting the subject matter of the litigation.”9 On

the face of the record, plaintiffs did not allege Baumann participated in any decisions

involving the design or labeling of Roundup. Indeed, Bayer bought Monsanto after the

decisions pertinent to the design or labeling of the Roundup products occurred and after

plaintiff’s exposure to Roundup. Although the record suggests Baumann has made

statements about the resolution of the Roundup litigation and the redesign of the product,

those statements involve Bayer’s post hoc assessment of the litigation and the parent

company’s actions in response to litigation. And the parent company is not a party to the

case.

                                       III. Hague Convention

        The circuit court committed its second plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion

when it failed to follow binding federal precedent requiring it to directly consider and

analyze whether it should use the Hague Convention10 for Mr. Baumann’s deposition. In

1970, many nations joined the United States in ratifying the Hague Convention. Its purpose

was to establish procedures for taking evidence abroad.11 And although the Supreme Court

        9
            Calderon v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 634 (D. Idaho 2012).
        10
     Fully titled the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
        11
        See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Southern Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987).

                                                 10
in Aérospatiale held that the Hague Convention did not preempt federal or state procedural

rules, it did not sanction an American court ignoring it either.12

       Aérospatiale instructed American courts to “exercise special vigilance to protect

foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome discovery may

place them in . . . .”13 Indeed, in all cases involving international discovery, the court should,

at a minimum, undertake the comity analysis Aérospatiale outlined.14 As many other courts

have recognized, a more stringent standard must be applied when considering international

discovery issues and relevancy.15

       In its motion for protective order, Monsanto argued that plaintiffs’ deposition notice

on Mr. Baumann contravened the Hague Convention. Once the motion for protective

       12
            Id. at 541–47.
       13
            Id. at 546.
       14
         Aérospatiale quoted with approval the 1986 Tentative Draft No. 7 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 437(1)(c) (approved May 14, 1986), stating that
these factors are relevant to any comity analysis:

       (1) the important to the . . . litigation of the documents or other information
       requested;
       (2) the degree of specificity of the request;
       (3) whether the information originated in the United States;
       (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
       (5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important
       interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
       important interests of the state where the information is located.

Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28; see also Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law § 442 [1][c] (1997).
       15
        See Richbell Info. Servs., Inc. v. Juniper Partners L.P., 32 A.D. 3d 150, 156 (2006);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(a) (1997).

                                               11
order was denied, Monsanto sought relief under the Hague Convention. It filed for

alternative relief as part of a reconsideration motion for an “Application of Hague

Convention Procedures” and asked the circuit court that, if the deposition was to proceed,

it be conducted in accordance with the Hague Convention. It also sought a hearing and

offered “to travel to attend a hearing in any of the counties where the Court is presiding

and has availability for a hearing.” Opposing counsel did not oppose the hearing request.

The court, however, did not hold a hearing on the applicability of an international treaty,

but it entered the following order twelve days after the filings:

              On this day, the Court heard Defendant Monsanto Company’s Motion for
       Reconsideration or, In the Alternative, Application of Hague Convention
       Procedures (the “Motion”). After considering the Motion, Plaintiffs’ response and
       all other matters of record, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion is
       unmeritorious and should be DENIED.

       I can’t imagine that denying a hearing and entering an order with no findings was

what the Supreme Court intended when it instructed courts to exercise “special vigilance”

to protect foreign citizens from overburdensome discovery requests when considering the

application of the Hague Convention. The circuit court’s failure to adequately consider the

Hague Convention was clearly a plain, manifest, and gross abuse of discretion.

       Perhaps this was what the dissenting justices in Aérospatiale feared when they stated

that without more guidance, the majority created “a large risk that the case-by-case comity

analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately . . . .”16 I doubt

any members of the Supreme Court contemplated that a trial judge in Arkansas would refuse

       16
         Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

                                              12
a hearing on the application of the international Hague Convention, deny its guidance in

one sentence, call the argument for its application “unmeritorious,” and order that the first

deposition in the case be the foreign CEO of a nonparty multinational corporation in an

ordinary products-liability case. To be clear, Mr. Baumann isn’t asking not to be deposed,

he is simply asking to be deposed according to our rules and the international treaty our

government executed.

       Notably, the majority doesn’t state that the circuit court’s refusal was correct; instead,

it doesn’t seem to think this court should act. Yet this is precisely the circumstance when

we should act and our writ is appropriate. It is an extraordinary circumstance, with no

adequate remedy available on appeal. Today, the majority gives carte blanche to Arkansas

circuit courts in discovery matters with no regard to our rules of civil procedure, federal

precedent, or international treaties. American CEOs should fear similar lack of action and

comity in foreign lawsuits.

       For these reasons, I dissent.

       WOMACK and WEBB, JJ., join.

       SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. I join fully the dissent’s analysis that

the circuit court abused its discretion and that there is no other adequate remedy available

to the Petitioner. Additionally, I would hold that the circuit court acted in excess of its

jurisdiction when it ordered Baumann, a nonparty, to sit for a deposition by notice rather

than issuing a subpoena and by failing to give proper consideration to the application of The

                                              13
Hague Convention process. Therefore, since all the requirements for granting the writ have

been satisfied, I would grant the writ in this case.1

       WEBB, J., joins.

       DLA Piper LLP, by: Lyn P. Pruitt and David F. Koehler, for petitioner.

       Lance Lee; and Forest Weldon Law Group, LLP, by: Bart Rankin, pro hac vice; Jay Utley,

pro hac vice; Joanna Raines McKinney, pro hac vice; and Joshua Richardson, pro hac vice, for

respondents.

       Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, PLLC, by: Graham Talley and Cara D.

Butler, for amici curiae Federation of German Industries (BDI) and German Chamber of

Commerce and Industry (DIHK).

       Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Scott A. Irby and Gary D. Marts, Jr., for amici

curiae United States Chamber of Commerce, American Tort Reform Association, and

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

       1
           See Baptist Health v. Circuit Court of Pulaski Cnty., 373 Ark. 455, 284 S.W.3d 499
(2008).

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