Court Opinion

ID: 9698853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:01:39.304906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:07.409034
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). This prosecution arose out of an incident on January 6, 1978, at about 3 a.m. That evening, Sharon Moore and James Hollis, went to a gambling house on Chene Street in Detroit. When they left at the same time, Hollis found a flat tire on his car. It appeared that someone had removed the cap from the valve stem and let the air out. He testified he "didn’t like the looks of it”. As a result, he asked Sharon Moore for a ride home. Moore and Hollis were driving westbound on 1-94 freeway when she noticed a car *160approximately four car lengths behind her, but not catching up. The next thing she knew, the car was next to her; she heard a gunshot, turned her head and saw defendant (she had known defendant for 14 months) hanging out the passenger side of the car, holding a gun. After the first shot, her car began to leave the road and spun three times. Each time the car spun, she saw defendant hanging out of the other car shooting back — she heard the sound of three shots and saw fire coming from the gun. Her car then violently left the road.
At the first shot, Hollis leaned forward to see around Moore and observed defendant. (he had known defendant for approximately six years) leaning out the window of the passing car, holding a carbine — when the car got about two car lengths ahead, three more shots were fired. Hollis saw fire "jumping from the muzzle of the gun each time Kelly fired * *
Police officers transported Moore, who was wounded, and Hollis to a hospital. Within 20 minutes after the arrival of the police, statements were taken from Moore and Hollis. Both identified "Kelly” as the shooter. The police later observed bullet holes (four entrance and five exit holes) in Moore’s auto. A spent slug was found in her car. When defendant was arrested, a .30-caliber bullet was found on his person. A State Police expert concluded that both bullets were .30-caliber, manufactured by Winchester Western.
Defendant testified that he was at home, asleep, at the time of the alleged incident. He claimed that a man named "Kinslow” had threatened Hollis’ life some time in 1971 or 1972.
James Hollis was called in rebuttal and testified that Kinslow was his friend, never an enemy, and that he had known Kinslow for eight years.
*161I do not believe that the challenged instruction is reversible error. In context, the impact of the instruction is significantly attenuated:
"Any verdict which you reach will have to be unanimous. That means all twelve jurors will have to agree to a verdict of either guilty or not guilty.
"You should enter into your deliberations with an open mind, with a willingness to give serious consideration to the opinions of each other.
"Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement unanimously, if it can be done without sacrifice of individual judgment. Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors.
"No juror should surrender his honest conviction or belief as to what the weight or effect of the evidence is solely because of the opinion of fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. However, in the course of deliberations a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and to change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous.
"Let me remind you that when a jury is unable to reach a verdict, the jury has not accomplished its purpose. A jury unable to agree, therefore, is a jury which has failed in its purpose. Each time such an indecisive jury fails, ammunition is given to those who oppose the jury system as we know it, a system that requires a unanimous vote of all twelve jurors for either conviction or acquittal. As you deliberate, please bear this in mind.”
GCR 1963, 516.2 provides:
"Objections. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider the verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”
*162A similar requirement is contained in MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052.
Defendant did not object to the above instruction even though an opportunity to make objection was granted. This Court has often followed the "no objection, no review” rule unless a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. See, People v Haney, 86 Mich App 311, 318; 272 NW2d 640 (1978), People v Sherman Hall, 77 Mich App 456, 462; 258 NW2d 517 (1977). I do not find a miscarriage of justice present in this case.
The majority relies on People v Sullivan, 392 Mich 324; 220 NW2d 441 (1974), which dealt with supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury. Sullivan adopted ABA standard jury instruction 5.4 as an instruction which would generate discussion toward the resolution of the case but avoid forcing a decision.
The majority feels that even a Sullivan (ABA standard) instruction should not be tolerated before deliberation since no purposes are served by its use.
I believe that such an instruction is more appropriate and less coercive before deliberation (In fact, ABA instruction 5.4 by its terms may be given prior to deliberation. See Sullivan, 392 Mich at 335). The instruction orients a jury to its role and minimizes the potential for juror coercion, for each juror will be told not to sacrifice individual judgment to majority opinion. A post deadlock instruction presents a much greater potential for coercion because the deadlocked jury has come to the trial judge "on the horns of a dilemma” seeking an answer to its problem. Thus, any instruction given by the judge will be taken to heart and, in isolation from the other instructions, will take on greater importance. On the other hand, a pre*163deliberation instruction is only one of many instructions. Since it is not presented as a solution to a deadlock, it will not be given special significance by the jury. It still serves the purposes of judicial economy and of encouraging the give and take of deliberation without doing violence to individual judgment.
Having concluded that a predeliberation instruction should not be tolerated, the majority concludes that the instant instruction was a substantial departure from ABA 5.4. Initially, it is not clear that the Supreme Court intended to apply its "substantial departure” rule to a predeliberation instruction. Sullivan dealt only with a supplemental instruction given after deliberation. Even applying this rule, I do not believe the court’s instruction was a "substantial departure” in the sense of significantly increasing coercion. Prior to the instruction, the jury was told to "deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement unanimously, if it can be done without sacriñce of individual judgment” and that "No juror should surrender his honest conviction or belief as to what the weight or effect of the evidence is solely because of the opinion of fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict”. (Emphasis added.) Read as a whole, I do not believe that the instruction could have caused a juror to abandon his conscientious dissent and defer to the majority solely for the sake of reaching agreement. On the facts of this case, I do not find a "miscarriage of justice” necessitating reversal.
I would affirm.