Court Opinion

ID: 9626245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:06:25.515873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:14.384760
License: Public Domain

LAKE, Chief Justice.
The sole question presented for review in this case is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact in order to survive summary judgment under a law enforcement officer vehicular gross negligence standard.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that plaintiff’s forecast of evidence was insufficient to maintain a claim of *82gross negligence. Furthermore, the court held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The following evidence was before the trial court at the time of its entry of the partial summary judgment order leading to this appeal: On 15 September 2000, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Officer Tracey Fox (“Officer Fox”) was dispatched to investigate a domestic disturbance at 800 North Street in Durham. This residence was familiar to officers, because it had previously been the location of a domestic disturbance involving weapons, and this information was relayed to all officers by Dispatch. Soon after arriving at the scene, Officer Fox determined that she would need assistance and called for backup. Upon receiving her call, Dispatch issued a “signal 20” which indicated a dangerous situation requiring that all other officers give way for Officer Fox’s complete access to the police radio by holding all calls. Officer Joseph M. Kelly (“Officer Kelly” or “defendants” when referred to collectively with the City of Durham) was approximately two and one-half miles from Officer Fox’s location.
In response to the first call by Officer Fox, Officer Kelly and other officers began driving in their separate vehicles towards North Street. Officer Fox then made a second distress call, and stated with a noticeably shaky voice, that she needed more units. Officer Kelly and Officer H.M. Crenshaw independently activated their blue lights and sirens and increased the speed of their vehicles towards North Street.
As Officer Kelly was on his way to assist Officer Fox, Linda Jones (“plaintiff’) was leaving her sister’s apartment complex at the southwest corner of the intersection of Liberty Street and Elizabeth Street (“the intersection”). Plaintiff walked to a point on Liberty Street approximately ninety-five feet west of the intersection. The posted speed limit there was 35 miles per hour. Additionally, Liberty Street had three undivided lanes: two eastbound lanes with the second or middle eastbound lane designated as a turn only lane, and a westbound lane. At the curb, plaintiff observed no vehicles approaching, but heard sirens approaching from an indeterminable direction. Plaintiff began to cross Liberty Street in the middle of the block outside of any designated crosswalk and against the controlling traffic signal. Having reached the double yellow lines after crossing two-thirds of the roadway, plaintiff first saw a police vehicle heading towards her in the westbound lane. At a speed estimated between 45 *83and 60 miles per hour, Officer Kelly’s vehicle went briefly airborne in crossing a railroad track, and he then observed plaintiff at a distance of approximately 300 to 332 feet. In an attempt to avoid striking plaintiff, Officer Kelly turned his vehicle into the eástbound lanes in order to pass behind plaintiff, who apparently was heading across the westbound lane. However, plaintiff did not continue across the westbound lane. Instead, at that moment, she abruptly turned around and began running back in the direction from which she had come, back across the two eastbound lanes. Officer Kelly’s vehicle struck plaintiff on her side as she was retreating to the curb, causing plaintiff severe injuries.
In her initial complaint, plaintiff brought claims against Officer Kelly and the City of Durham for negligence, gross negligence, and obstruction of public justice and spoliation of evidence. Defendants’ answer included a motion to dismiss based on N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) and pled the affirmative defenses of immunity and contributory negligence. Plaintiff responded alleging the doctrine of last clear chance to defendants’ defense of contributory negligence. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, bringing additional claims alleging that defendants’ assertion of immunity in this case violated a number of plaintiff’s rights under the North Carolina Constitution. This matter, with pleadings, exhibits, affidavits, and depositions of forecast evidence, was presented before the trial court in a summary judgment hearing held on 11 December 2003 pursuant to motions brought by both parties.
In an order entered 6 January 2004, the trial court concluded the following: (1) that plaintiff’s ordinary negligence claim was dismissed as a matter of law; (2) that there were issues of fact as to whether Officer Kelly was grossly negligent in his emergency response to assist and apprehend the suspect threatening Officer Fox; (3) that there were issues of fact concerning plaintiff’s obstruction of public justice and spoliation claim; (4) that plaintiff’s claim for violation of the prohibition against exclusive emoluments based on Article I, Section 32 of the North Carolina Constitution was dismissed as a matter of law; and (5) the manner in which defendants have asserted sovereign immunity in this and other cases has been arbitrary and capricious and violates guarantees of due process and equal protection under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution as a matter of law. The trial court certified its order under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) as an entry of final judgment. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
*84In their appeal, defendants assigned error to the trial court’s finding of an issue of fact supported by forecast evidence as to whether defendants were grossly negligent and argued the trial court should have granted summary judgment as a matter of law in their favor. Additionally, defendants alleged the trial court erred when failing to rule in their favor as a matter of law on the spoliation and constitutional claims. Plaintiff’s only issue on appeal to the Court of Appeals submitted that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim of ordinary negligence by finding the standard to be inapplicable as a matter of law in light of the forecast evidence.
Judge Levinson dissented from the majority opinion’s reversal of the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the gross negligence claim. He further dissented from the majority opinion’s holding that plaintiff’s constitutional claim and her claim for obstruction of justice were moot. He státed that he would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendants’ summary judgment motion on the spoliation claim. However, he would have reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for plaintiff on her claim of violation of her rights to due process and equal protection under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Plaintiff filed her appeal of right based on the dissenting opinion in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2). Although plaintiff presented the two issues of gross negligence and obstruction of justice in her notice of appeal, her brief to this Court addressed only the gross negligence issue. Therefore, plaintiff has abandoned her appeal of right as to the obstruction of justice issue, and that assignment of error is dismissed. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
The grant of summary judgment for the moving party is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003); see Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231, 236, 513 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1999). In assessing whether the moving party established the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the evidence presented should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c). If there is any evidence of a. genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 471, 597 S.E.2d 674, 694 (2004).
*85In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in the case at bar, the crux of the allegations of gross negligence on the part of Officer Kelly relate to the speed of his vehicle and his maneuver to avoid hitting plaintiff. As properly stated in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, Officer Kelly’s conduct in the case sub judice is governed by N.C.G.S. § 20-145. Jones v. City of Durham, 168 N.C. App. 433, 437-39, 608 S.E.2d 387, 390-92 (2005). N.C.G.S. § 20-145 provides the following:
The speed limitations set forth in this Article shall not apply to vehicles when operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the police in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or of persons charged with or suspected of any such violation, nor to fire department or fire patrol vehicles when traveling in response to a fire alarm, nor to public or private ambulances and rescue squad emergency service vehicles when traveling in emergencies, nor to vehicles operated by county fire marshals and civil preparedness coordinators when traveling in the performances of their duties. This exemption shall not, however, protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.
N.C.G.S. § 20-145 (2003).
In enacting this statutory exemption to our motor vehicle speed limits, it was clearly the intent of the legislature to extend speed limit exemptions beyond mere police pursuits, to include all emergency service vehicles, including police and even “civil preparedness coordinators,” “when traveling in emergencies ... in the performances of their duties.” Id. This Court has held that the standard of negligence by which a law enforcement officer must be judged when acting within N.C.G.S. § 20-145 is that of “gross negligence” as to the speed and operation of his vehicle. Young v. Woodall, 343 N.C. 459, 462, 471 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996). See also State v. Flaherty, 55 N.C. App. 14, 22, 284 S.E.2d 565, 571 (1981) (focusing on defendant officer’s emergency response and stating that N.C.G.S. § 20-145 applies not only to direct or immediate pursuits but also to police who receive notice of and proceed to the scene to assist in the chase or apprehension; in so doing the court required the gross negligence standard to be applied).
The statute itself states the exemption shall not apply to a driver who operates a covered vehicle in “reckless disregard of the safety of others,” the definition of gross negligence. N.C.G.S. § 20-145. The quoted language is consistent with the definition of gross negligence *86used by this Court. See Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 583, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1998) (defining gross negligence as “wanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others”). However, we note that N.C.G.S. § lD-5(7) defines “willful and wanton conduct” and establishes that such conduct, necessary for the recovery of punitive damages, see N.C.G.S. § 1D-I5(a), is more than gross negligence. In light of this distinction, we conclude that while willful and wanton conduct includes gross negligence, gross negligence may be found even where a party’s conduct does not rise to the level of deliberate or conscious action implied in the combined terms of “willful and wanton.” See Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191, 148 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (1929).
Accordingly, while our previous decisions have conflated actions done with wicked purpose with actions done while manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights and safety of others under the rubric of “gross negligence,” we conclude that the General Assembly intended to distinguish these two types of action. Reading N.C.G.S. § 20-145 and N.C.G.S. § IB-5 together, we conclude that in the context of a response to an emergency by a law enforcement officer or other individuals named in N.C.G.S. § 20-145, gross negligence arises where the responder recklessly disregards the safety of others.
In determining whether a law enforcement officer’s actions rise to the level of gross negligence, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-145, our appellate courts have considered a number of factors to ascertain whether the forecast of the evidence supporting the claim was sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Bray v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 151 N.C. App. 281, 564 S.E.2d 910 (2002). The three factors this Court considers to be dis-positive on the issue of a law enforcement officer’s gross negligence are: (1) the circumstances initiating the event or the reason why the officer became involved in an event of increased speed; (2) when and where the event of increased speed occurred; and (3) what specific conduct or actions the officer undertook during the course of the event of increased speed. Applying these factors to plaintiff’s forecast of evidence and viewing such in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to gross negligence on the part of Officer Kelly, and judgment as a matter of law should have been entered by the trial court denying plaintiff’s gross negligence claim against defendants.
*87Considering first the circumstances which prompted defendant Kelly to become involved, the evidence before the trial court clearly reflected an emergency situation in which the life or the safety of another law enforcement officer was at stake. Officer Kelly was involved in an event of increased speed in response to Officer Fox’s two distress calls for assistance. The residence at which Officer Fox was requesting backup was familiar to the officers as the location of a past domestic disturbance involving weapons. Furthermore, Dispatch’s declaration of a “signal 20” indicated that a fellow officer was in a dangerous situation. Finally, during Officer Fox’s second call, with her voice noticeably shaky and a considerable amount of commotion audible in the background, she made a request to “send more units!” These circumstances reflected an emergency situation all too common in police work when another officer is in peril. Law enforcement officers are trained to respond to such an emergency and Officer Kelly’s justifiably urgent response was in accordance with that training. As such, Officer Kelly’s response refutes any indication that he was acting with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others in becoming involved in an event calling for increased speed in order to reach the location of his fellow officer in distress.
This Court has previously held a law enforcement officer was not grossly negligent for pursuing a suspect who violated a mere safety infraction. Young, 343 N.C. at 460, 463, 471 S.E.2d at 358, 360 (holding no gross negligence when a law enforcement officer drove in the nighttime “at a high rate of speed” to pursue a vehicle with only one operating headlight). Certainly if the pursuit of a vehicle with only one operating headlight is sufficient reason for an officer to become engaged in an event of increased speed without a holding of gross negligence, then Officer Kelly’s response to Officer Fox’s two distress calls in a possible life or death situation was a justifiable event of increased speed.
Turning now to the evidence with respect to when and where defendant officer undertook the event of increased speed, the record reflects that Officer Kelly drove his vehicle at a speed of 45 to 60 miles per hour on a cool, clear, and dry morning, with his siren activated, for a distance of two and one-half miles in light traffic through a residential area. These circumstances surrounding the timing and location of Officer Kelly’s event of increased speed were considerably less dangerous to others than those found in cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals in which gross negligence was held *88not to be present. See Parish, 350 N.C. at 233-34, 246, 513 S.E.2d at 548-49, 556 (holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed for approximately six miles shortly after 2:00 a.m.); Young, 343 N.C. at 460, 463, 471 S.E.2d at 358, 360 (holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed at approximately 2:00 a.m. without activating his blue lights and siren); Bullins, 322 N.C. at 581, 584, 369 S.E.2d at 602, 604 (holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed for eighteen miles shortly after 1:00 a.m.); Bray, 151 N.C. App. at 282, 285, 564 S.E.2d at 911, 913 (holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed at dusk); Norris v. Zambito, 135 N.C. App. 288, 290, 295, 520 S.E.2d 113, 115, 117-18 (1999) (holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed at approximately 1:00 a.m.); Clark v. Burke Cty., 117 N.C. App. 85, 90, 92, 450 S.E.2d 747, 749-50 (1994) (holding no gross negligence when a law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed just after 4:00 a.m. within city limits); and Fowler v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 92 N.C. App. 733, 733-34, 736, 376 S.E.2d 11, 12-13 (holding no gross negligence when a law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed for over eight miles shortly before midnight and delayed activating his blue lights and siren), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 773 (1989). Thus, when comparing the case at bar with the appellate decisions of this state, it is evident that both this Court and the Court of Appeals have found circumstances regarding the timing and location of an event of increased speed which presented substantially greater potential for danger to fall short of constituting gross negligence.
Finally, we consider defendant officer’s specific conduct during the event of increased speed. When viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Officer Kelly was traveling at a speed of 45 to 60 miles per hour between the railroad tracks and the point of impact, where the posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour; his vehicle became airborne when crossing the railroad tracks immediately preceding the intersection; and he performed an evasive maneuver father then applying the brakes upon seeing plaintiff on the double yellow lines. This conduct on the part of the officer boils down to only two actions: his driving speed and the evasive maneuver. The fact that his vehicle went briefly airborne as he went over the railroad tracks is relevant only in the context of his high rate of speed, which is *89acknowledged. This event occurred 300 to 332 feet prior to impact and has no separate relevance.
With regard to driving speed, Officer Kelly was traveling 10 to 25 miles per hour in excess of the 35 mile-per-hour speed limit. Traveling 10 to 25 miles per hour over the speed limit by a law enforcement officer in an emergency situation is not conduct which supports a finding of gross negligence. This Court and the Court of Appeals have examined exceeding the posted speed limit in the context of law enforcement officer gross negligence on numerous occasions and have found speed differentials similar to and far greater than that of Officer Kelly not supportive of gross negligence. See Parish, 350 N.C. at 234, 246, 513 S.E.2d at 549, 556 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling at speeds up to 130 miles per hour); Bullins, 322 N.C. at 582, 584, 369 S.E.2d at 602, 604 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling at speeds up to 100 miles per hour); Bray, 151 N.C. App. at 283-84, 564 S.E.2d at 911-13 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling 80 miles per hour on a curving rural road in a 55 mile-per-hour zone, 25 miles-per-hour differential); Norris, 135 N.C. App. at 291, 295, 520 S.E.2d at 115, 117-18 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone, 30 miles-per-hour differential); Clark, 117 N.C. App. at 90-92, 450 S.E.2d at 749-50 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling 70 to 80 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone, 25 to 35 miles-per-hour differential); Fowler, 92 N.C. App. at 736, 376 S.E.2d at 13 (holding no gross negligence when officer was traveling at approximately 115 miles per hour). Therefore, in light of the considerable precedent of this Court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs contention that Officer Kelly’s conduct, in exceeding the posted speed limit by 10 to 25 miles per hour, constitutes gross negligence must fail.
As to the evasive maneuver, plaintiff has forecast no evidence of “conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others” regarding Officer Kelly’s decision to perform such a maneuver, rather than attempting to stop, upon seeing plaintiff on the double yellow line two-thirds of the way across Liberty Street. Defendants’ forecast of evidence showed that Officer Kelly steered his vehicle into the eastbound lanes of traffic where there was a larger area to avoid hitting plaintiff, in anticipation that she would attempt to get out of the street by continuing forward, which was the shortest distance possible. Furthermore, defendants’ forecast of evidence showed that this evasive maneuver was consistent with the *90Basic Law Enforcement Training Manual published by the North Carolina Justice Academy. The manual provides that one method to avoid a collision is by “[e]vasive steering, or sudden lane change.” This method is “[ujsually performed when the driver’s intended path-of-travel is suddenly blocked by an object, pedestrian, or other vehicle.” N.C. Justice Acad., Basic Law Enforcement Training: Student § 18F, at 48 (Jan. 2006). The North Carolina Administrative Code specifies that the manual is to be used as the curriculum for the basic training course for law enforcement officers as administered by the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission. 12 NCAC 9B .0205(c) (June 2004). By statute, the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission has the power to establish educational and training standards that must be met in order to qualify and be certified or recertified as a sworn law enforcement officer. N.C.G.S. §§ 17C-2(3), -6(a)(2), -6(a)(3) (2003). Officer Kelly’s compliance with this authoritative training standard in this emergency situation fully supports the appropriateness of his decision to perform an evasive maneuver upon viewing plaintiff in the roadway and negates the contention of gross negligence.
In summary, we conclude that plaintiff’s forecast of evidence, and all evidence available to the trial court, of Officer Kelly’s reason for becoming involved, the circumstances surrounding the timing and location, and the conduct he undertook during the event of increased speed reveal the total absence of any material fact reflecting gross negligence. During a justifiable event of increased speed, Officer Kelly made a substantial and reasonable effort to avoid a collision with plaintiff, but was unsuccessful due largely to plaintiff’s sudden change in direction. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to gross negligence and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Any other conclusion would have betrayed this Court’s admonition against blurring the clear distinction between gross negligence and ordinary negligence established by the mature body of case law recognized in Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 57, 550 S.E.2d 155, 160 (2001). The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.