Court Opinion

ID: 9483920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:35:26.947814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:55.023245
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court applies the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sections 145 and 146, in holding that the Indiana statute of repose does not bar the plaintiff’s claim against Deere. I respectfully dissent. Although Sections 145 and 146 are the appropriate provisions to assess choice of law in a products liability case, another provision of the Restatement, Section 142, specifically governs the choice of law for statutes of limitation. The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement approach in conflicts analysis, and Section 142 is a part of the overall Restatement approach. Section 142 states initially that “[w]hether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of limitations is determined under the principle stated in § 6.” 1 Section 142 proceeds to recite the general rule that “unless exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable: (1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim.” Under this general rule the statute of repose of Indiana—the forum—bars the plaintiff’s claim.
Comment (f) to Section 142 gives the reason underlying the provision: “A state has a substantial interest in preventing the *177prosecution in its courts of claims which it deems to be stale.” Because statutes of limitation are meant to bar suits under state law, whether in federal or state court, we assume that a state’s interest in preventing the prosecution of stale claims extends to federal courts sitting in the state applying state law. This case presents a slight twist—it was originally filed in Texas but transferred to Indiana for the convenience of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. As noted in the court’s opinion, this sequence requires that we apply Texas choice of law rules. It does not require, however, that when applying Section 142 we assume Texas to be the forum. Such an application would run contrary to Indiana’s interest in preventing the prosecution of stale claims in its courts, including the federal courts sitting in the state.
Comment (f) proceeds to caution that “it is only in the exceptional case that the forum will entertain a claim that is barred by its own statute of limitations.” This case is not exceptional. At the time of the district court order which is before us on appeal, this was an ordinary products liability case, where a Spanish citizen sued an Indiana company and an Illinois company for injuries sustained in a farm equipment accident in Missouri. The most significant feature of this case is that it is time-barred under an Indiana statute of repose. This does not in itself thrust this case into the category of exceptional; preclusion of claims under statutes of limitation is a common event in litigation.
For whatever reason, the parties do not raise Section 142 in their briefs. As noted by this court on a different matter (p. 173), if the parties generally raise the choice of law issue, a court is free to apply the correct law, even if the specific legal principles are not properly presented. See Yorger v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 733 F.2d 1215, 1223 (7th Cir.1984). Section 142 is the correct law when applying a Restatement approach to determine choice of law for a statute of limitation issue. Section 142 requires that Indiana’s statute of repose be applied to bar plaintiff’s claim.
If as the court posits Texas would not follow Section 142, it would still apply the general rule that because statutes of limitation are procedural, the law of the forum should govern. California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230 (1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958); Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1111 (5th Cir.1981). An exception to that general rule occurs when statutes of limitation are substantive in nature, as when a particular statute “creates a right and also incorporates a limitation upon the time within which the suit is to be brought____” Copus, 309 S.W.2d at 231.2 That exception would not apply in this case; the statute of repose in question does not create a right. Therefore, even under the analysis advanced in Copus, which predates the Restatement approach, Indiana’s statute of repose would bar the plaintiff’s claim.

. "Texas courts have traditionally used the term ‘limitation’ and ‘repose’ interchangeably, since one purpose of a statute of limitation is to permit repose.” Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex.1984).

. In Ellis, the Fifth Circuit determined the statute of limitations to be substantive, and applied Section 145 to determine choice of law. Although the court cites Ellis as support for applying Section 145 to a statute of limitations, the Fifth Circuit limits this application to cases where the statute in question is deemed substantive in nature. Notably, the Fifth Circuit in Ellis recognized Texas’ "general rule that the forum state’s statute of limitations governs.” 646 F.2d at 1111.