Court Opinion

ID: 9679469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:53:43.63822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.880514
License: Public Domain

GARTZKE, P.J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that persons committed under ch. 975, Stats., may be transferred to a correctional institution.
The additional consequence of the majority opinion is that all persons committed under ch. 975, Stats., whether or not they are treatable or have rejected treatment or should never have been committed, must somehow be treated after their transfer to a correctional institution. I do not accept that construction of sec. 975.08.
It is possible that a person committed under ch. 975, Stats., will prove to be untreatable or to have reached the point where further treatment is not possible. Defendants contend that certain plaintiffs have rejected treatment. A person may be committed by mistake. The latter possibility is real. In State v. Machner, 101 Wis. 2d 79, 303 N.W.2d 633 (1981), the department learned after the commitment that the person involved was not sexually deviated and was not a proper candidate for treatment in a sex crimes program, and therefore transferred that person to Waupun Correctional Institute.
We are to reach a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute and reject an unreasonable interpretation. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 248 N.W.2d 885, 890 (1977); Volunteers of America v. Industrial Comm., 30 Wis. 2d 607, 616-17, 141 N.W.2d 890, 894-95 (1966); C. Sands, 2A Sutherland’s Statutory Construction sec. 45.12 at 37 (4th ed. 1973).
It is unreasonable to contemplate treatment of a person who is untreatable. It is absurd to treat a person who should never have been committed in the first place. If a committed person has rejected treatment, that per*377son cannot complain that he has been transferred to a correctional institution where treatment is unavailable. Buchanan v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 460, 472, 164 N.W.2d 253, 259 (1969); see also Burbey v. Burke, 295 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-50 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (petitioner who rejects or fails to attend treatment programs cannot complain of lack of treatment).
Accordingly, I would agree that a person who is treatable and wants treatment is entitled to treatment under ch. 975, Stats. That person cannot be transferred to a correctional institution which does not provide treatment. If the person has rejected treatment, I would hold that the person can be transferred to a correctional institution where treatment is unavailable. If the person is untreatable, I would hold that the fact that no treatment facilities exist at the correctional institution is immaterial. And I certainly would hold that if the person was committed by mistake, it is immaterial that no treatment facilities exist at the correctional institution. I would remand for factual findings as to whether the plaintiffs are treatable or have rejected treatment, as well as whether the correctional institution provides treatment.
The majority suggests that a question of equal protection is involved if a person committed for treatment is transferred to a correctional institution which does not provide treatment. The question arises because a sex deviate who commits a sex crime is classified differently from the nondeviate who has committed a sex crime. The constitutional issue is not directly before us. It may be insubstantial. Section 975.17, Stats., provides that a person committed under ch. 975 may petition the committing court for resentencing and will be given credit for time served pursuant to commitment under ch. 975. Thus, the person who has been committed can voluntarily move from one classification to another and avoid the impact of what may be a disparate classification.