Court Opinion

ID: 9719190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:31.451157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.080987
License: Public Domain

Sawyer, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the majority that the method by which the trial court began the jury selection procedure was improper, I do not believe that reversal is required under the facts of this case.
It is clearly established that the proper method to be employed to select a jury in a criminal trial is that, after each successful challenge, either for cause or peremptorily, the challenged juror is to be replaced before another challenge is exercised. People v Miller, 411 Mich 321, 325-326; 307 NW2d 335 (1987); People v Lewis, 160 Mich App 20; 408 NW2d 94 (1987). Thus, when the trial court required defendant to exercise three peremptory challenges at a time, the trial court clearly violated the dictates of Miller, supra.1 Moreover, I agree with the majority that defendant effectively objected to the procedure once the trial court required that three peremptory challenges be exercised at a time, with the failure to do so constituting a "pass to the jurors in the box.”
Nevertheless, reversal is not required. Since defendant was charged with a capital crime, he was entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. *323MCL 768.13; MSA 28.1036.2 Defendant exercised five peremptory challenges the first day, when the use of multiple peremptories was merely requested. The second day, when multiple peremptories were required, defendant exercised eight additional challenges, in groups of three, three and two, for a total of thirteen challenges. Thereafter, the trial court recognized the error of its ways and announced that counsel would only have to exercise one peremptory at a time and that any juror could be challenged, even after a pass, until both counsel had passed. Under this method, the proper one, defendant exercised three more peremptory challenges, bringing his total to sixteen. At this point, both counsel passed and defense counsel expressed his satisfaction with the jury.
While I recognize that a defendant is not required to show prejudice to obtain a reversal of his conviction under Miller, supra, when an improper jury selection method is utilized, I do not believe that Miller requires reversal in the context of this case. First, this case is not directly analogous to Miller. In Miller, the trial court employed a jury selection method of empaneling seventy-three jurors, questioning them as a group, and then the attorneys were permitted to exercise their challenges until the panel was reduced to eleven jurors. At this point, an additional thirty-seven jurors were empaneled and the process continued. After there were no further challenges, the fourteen remaining jurors with the lowest numbers were selected to hear the case. Miller, supra at 324.3 In this case, an initial panel of fourteen jurors was selected and the struck jurors were *324replaced after each group of peremptories was exercised. Furthermore, according to this Court’s opinion, two of the three codefendants in Miller exercised all of their peremptory challenges, while the third exercised all but one challenge.4
Generally, it is necessary for a defendant to exhaust his peremptory challenges in order to preserve an objection to the jury selection. See People v Holliday, 144 Mich App 560, 575; 376 NW2d 154 (1985). In the case at bar, defendant exercised only eight of his twenty permitted peremptory challenges while operating under the requirement that he exercise three at a time. Moreover, defendant had only exercised thirteen of his twenty challenges when the trial court corrected its mistake and started allowing counsel to exercise one peremptory at a time and to do so with respect to any juror in the box. Under this procedure, defendant exercised three of his remaining seven peremptory challenges.
I acknowledge that, as the majority argues, a requirement to exercise more than one peremptory challenge at a time influences the jury selection process since a defendant might dismiss a juror he was unsure of, and to whom he would otherwise take a "wait and see” attitude, since he would not wish to pass as to that juror and waive the right to peremptorily challenge the juror at a later point. The disadvantage is, as pointed out by the majority, that the defendant must dismiss the second and third jurors without the ability to compare them to the new juror who replaces the first juror *325excused. Thus, the defendant might see the jury panel go from bad to worse very quickly and with little control over the process. This concern cannot be ignored, nor do I do so. Had the process of requiring the exercising of three peremptory challenges at a time continued until defendant exhausted his peremptories, or at least until he was within three challenges of exhausting them, I would agree with the majority that reversal would be required.
However, I believe that the trial court changed the procedure early enough in the process to correct the error. Defendant had seven peremptory challenges left when the trial court relented and allowed the exercise of one challenge at a time. Defendant could have used these challenges to exclude any juror on the panel he viewed as unfavorable. He exercised only three of those challenges, not utilizing four of them. I can think of no tactical reason why defendant would choose to leave four challenges unused. It is clear to me that defendant was satisfied with the jury empaneled. Had defendant exercised all of his peremptories, then it could be maintained that he was dissatisfied with the jury and that the improper selection method employed during jury selection fatally impeded his ability to select a fair and impartial jury. I might even concede this point if defendant had exercised all but one of his challenges.5 Howe*326ver, in the case at bar, defendant did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges, nor even all but one. Rather, defendant left four challenges unused. How then can it be said that defense counsel’s ability to effectively exercise his peremptory challenges was reduced?
I recognize that the Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant need not show harm to have his conviction reversed on the basis of improper jury selection, since it would be realistically impossible for the defendant to do so. Miller, supra at 326. This case, however, does not involve the question whether defendant can show harm by the procedure employed. Rather, defendant has affirmatively demonstrated his satisfaction with the jury empaneled: he failed to use four peremptory challenges and explicitly stated to the trial court that he was satisfied with the jury. In my opinion, this constitutes a waiver of the issue by defendant.
The evidence presented at trial established that defendant had raped his two stepdaughters. Defendant further announced that he was satisfied with the jury which was selected while still having four peremptory challenges unused. I am satisfied that defendant’s guilt was determined by a fair and impartial jury.
I would affirm.

 The trial court’s initial practice of requesting, without requiring, the parties to exercise up to three peremptory challenges at a time is somewhat more problematic. Even this procedure arguably violates Miller, supra; however, MCR 2.511(E)(3)(a) suggests that exercising more than one peremptory challenge at a time is permissible since the rule states that first "the plaintiff and then the defendant may exercise one or more peremptory challenges” until both pass. (Emphasis added.) In any event, since defendant did not object to this procedure, it does not constitute error requiring reversal.

 It- should be noted, however, that the 1989 revisions to the court rules have reduced that number to between seven and twelve peremptory challenges in capital cases, depending on the number of defendants being tried together. See MCR 6.412(E)(1).

 The Supreme Court’s version of the facts differs somewhat from *324those reported in this Court’s opinion. This Court indicated that jurors were excused until fourteen remained, rather than that the fourteen with the lowest numbers were selected from those who remained. See People v Miller, 88 Mich App 210, 217; 276 NW2d 558 (1979). Furthermore, this Court’s opinion indicates that thirty-eight, rather than thirty-seven, additional jurors were seated. Id.

 See Miller, 88 Mich App 217.

 I recognize that it is a common trial tactic not to use one’s last peremptory challenge if at all possible since if one does so, the replacement juror may be worse than the juror replaced with nothing the attorney can do to remedy the situation. Thus, while an improper jury selection method might have impeded the defendant’s ability to wisely use his peremptory challenges, the effect might not have been so great as to warrant defense counsel exercising his last peremptory solely to preserve the issue for appeal. Furthermore, I note that in Miller, supra, the Supreme Court reversed all of the convictions, even though only two of the three codefendants had exhausted their peremptories, with the third codefendant exercising all but one peremptory challenge.