Court Opinion

ID: 8896370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 00:05:45.593458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:31.110605
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result.
This case involves the difficult issue whether a hiring quota based upon race can be legally imposed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the United States Constitution. In the past few years, this *776court has twice held that such quotas may be utilized to correct past discriminatory practices in public employment. Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm’n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (firemen); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3282 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (policemen). We have also permitted such remedial quotas in two cases in which the employment was in the private sector of the economy. Rios v. Enterprise Ass’n Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973).
Nevertheless, I believe a strong note of caution is called for and should be stated. In Rios, Judge Hays wrote a powerful dissent, arguing that section 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(j), bars the use of court-ordered racial hiring quotas.1 He distinguished our decisions in Vulcan Society and Bridgeport Guardians on various grounds, the most persuasive of which was that “there was no other means of affording relief that did not interfere with essential public services” provided by firemen and policemen. 501 F.2d at 638. In both cases, hiring had to continue while new, non-discriminatory employment lists were drawn up. Judge Hays also distinguished Wood, Wiie & Metal Lathers because the union there, in accepting a settlement, waived the benefit of section 703(j). A close analysis of the cases in our circuit thus suggests that Rios is the only decision squarely holding that a court may impose a racial quota in a private employment case in the absence of a settlement.
Emphasizing the status of the authority in this circuit on the issue is worthwhile because, as we have earlier pointed out, quotas should be approached “somewhat gingerly.” Bridgeport Guardians, supra, 482 F.2d at 1340. The reason for this is clear. A racial quota is inherently obnoxious, no matter what the beneficent purpose. Such a quota is demeaning and divisive. At best it is a lesser evil. It is not to be encouraged.
However, this case is not an appropriate one for reexamination of the subject. The past discrimination against minority workers here was made quite clear after a four-week trial to the court. Minorities are conspicuously absent from the ranks of Group I and Regular Situation holders even though there are no special skills required to fill, the jobs involved. The intervenor asks us to upset a settlement agreement that provides benefits for whites as well as for minorities. The quota the principal parties have agreed upon is intended to be of short duration. 384 F.Supp. at 590 — 91. And finally, the intervenor does not direct his main attack against the idea of a hiring quota; he objects to its size and the effect on him and others already in the industry in Group III status.
Under all of these circumstances, I concur in the result.

. Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.