Court Opinion

ID: 9700533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:33:59.42422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.465742
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because I believe that Markell D. Boulis, D.C., has not been “convicted” under Georgia law, I would conclude that the State Board of Chiropractic (Board) erred in suspending Boulis’s chiropractic license under section 506(e) of the Chiropractic Practice Act *650(Chiropractic Act),1 63 P.S. § 625.506(e), based upon his Georgia felony “conviction.”
Section 506(e) provides, in relevant part:
Automatic suspension. — A license issued under this act shall automatically be suspended upon ... conviction of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, which, if committed in Pennsylvania, would be a felony under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. As used in this subsection the term “conviction” shall include a judgment, an admission of guilt or a plea of nolo contendere.
63 P.S. § 625.506(e).2
As argued by Boulis, because 63 P.S. § 625.506(e) states that one’s license shall automatically be suspended upon “conviction of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction,” the Board was required to look to Georgia law to determine whether Boulis had been “convicted.” Boulis then asserts that, because of his first offender status, granted pursuant to Georgia’s Probation for First Offender Act (First Offender Act),3 there was no judgment and, thus, no conviction under Georgia law. Boulis further contends that the Board’s conclusion that he was convicted fails to give effect to an official act of Georgia and, thus, violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1. I would agree.
“The authority of the Commonwealth to regulate those engaging in [the medical] profession is inherent as a sovereign state, and it is a valid exercise of its police power.”4 Tandon v. State Board of Medicine, 705 A.2d 1338, 1348 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 727 A.2d 134 (1998). It is as part of this regulatory power that the legislature has authorized the automatic suspension of a chiropractic license issued in Pennsylvania where the license holder is convicted of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, which, if committed in Pennsylvania, would be a felony under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act).5 63 P.S. § 625.506(e). Further, the legislature provided that the term “conviction” includes “a judgment, an admission of guilt or a plea of nolo contende-re.” 63 P.S. § 625.506(e).
By virtue of the fact that the conviction occurs in another state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1, is necessarily implicated. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1. Accordingly, we must look to Georgia law to determine whether Boulis was, in fact, “convicted.” Unlike the Board and the majority, I conclude that he was not.
In Georgia, “the court may without entering a judgment of guilt ... defer further proceedings and place [the defendant] on probation.” Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-2. Indeed, “judgments of conviction are not *651entered in cases proceeding under the First Offender Act unless the defendant violates the terms of probation.” Tripp v. State, 223 Ga.App. 73, 73-74, 476 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1996). Furthermore, once the defendant fulfills the terms of probation, the “defendant shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction.” Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-62; see Priest v. State, 261 Ga. 651, 409 S.E.2d 657 (1991) (holding that a defendant who is given first offender treatment has not been convicted).
In passing the First Offender Act, it was the Georgia General Assembly’s intention to give trial judges authority to permit certain defendants, whom the judges believed worthy, the opportunity to avoid a record of an adjudication of guilt for a criminal offense by serving a period of probation which, if successfully completed, would result in complete exoneration without an adjudication of guilt. Georgia Opinion Attorney General No. 80-79 (1980); Georgia Opinion Attorney General No. U78-21 (1978).
A person who successfully completes or has his period of probation under the First Offender Act terminated prior to the initial discharge date is completely absolved of any criminal purpose, which means there is no adjudication of guilt. Additionally, since there is no adjudication of guilt, there is no criminal conviction.
Georgia Opinion Attorney General No. U78-21.
Nevertheless, the Board and the majority conclude that Boulis’s statements at his January 21, 1994 re-sentencing hearing constitute an “admission of guilt,” and therefore, Boulis was “convicted.” The Board and majority assert that these statements alone are sufficient to uphold Boulis’s license suspension.
In taking this position, however, the Board and majority view the Georgia Superior Court’s jury verdict and Boulis’s statements at his re-sentencing hearing in a vacuum rather than considering the totality of the circumstances, keeping in mind the purpose of Georgia’s First Offender Act.
I note the importance of the sequence of events here. After the jury verdict of guilty,6 Boulis was sentenced. Then, despite the jury’s verdict and Boulis’s statements, Boulis was re-sentenced and granted first offender status.7 Contrary to the majority, I believe the granting of first offender status has the effect of negating the preceding jury verdict, sentence and statement made at the re-sentencing hearing unless Boulis fails to successfully complete the terms of his probation.8 Indeed, Boulis’s sentence itself illustrates that the granting of first offender status nullifies these preceding events; the sentence states, “it is the judgment of the Court that no judgment of guilt be imposed at this time, but that further proceedings are deferred_” (O.R. Item 11) (emphasis added). See Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-60. Thus, I conclude that, by virtue of his first offender status, Boulis has no “conviction.” See Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-63 (stating that a discharge under this article is not a conviction and may not be used to disqualify a person in any application for employment); cf. Priest (holding that the First *652Offender Act allows one to enter a guilty plea without being deemed to have an adjudication of guilt; thus, a guilty plea under the First Offender Act is not a “conviction” within the usual meaning of that term). Moreover, if Boulis successfully fulfills the terms of his probation, he will never have a conviction.9 Ga.Code Ann. § 42-8-62; cf. Laughlin v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 719 A.2d 850 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (giving full faith and credit to Maryland law which provides that “probation before judgment” is not a conviction and, thus, denying suspension of driver’s license under interstate compact).
Accordingly, because I believe the Board erred in suspending Boulis’s license where Boulis was not “convicted” under Georgia law, I would reverse the Board’s order and reinstate Boulis’s chiropractic license.10

. Act of December 16, 1986, P.L. 1646, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 625.101-625.1106.

. "Under Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is a felony. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(3),(f)(l.l).” (Board’s Findings of Fact, No. 6.)

. Ga.Code Ann. §§ 42-8-60-42-8-66.

. There is perhaps no profession more properly open to such regulation than that which embraces the practitioners of medicine. Dealing, as its followers do, with the lives and health of the people, and requiring for its successful practice general education and technical skill, as well as good character, it is obviously one of those vocations where the power of the State may be exerted....
Tandon v. State Board of Medicine, 705 A.2d 1338, 1348, n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, - Pa. -, 727 A.2d 134 (1998) (quoting Watson v. State of Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176, 30 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910)).

.Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S.§§ 780-101-780-144.

. I note that Boulis did not make the statements, which the Board and majority argue are "admissions of guilt,” until after the jury's verdict.

. Boulis first "admitted guilt” when he appeared at his re-sentencing hearing seeking first offender status; thus, it appears that Boulis may have been required to make these "admissions” to be accepted into the first offender program.

.In concluding otherwise, the majority takes the position that there was a judgment against Boulis, reasoning that Boulis’s conviction, which existed as a judgment prior to his first offender status, remains in effect until Boulis fulfills the terms of his probation. Further, the majority asserts that Boulis’s statements at his re-sentencing hearing constitute admissions of guilt which, by themselves, support the automatic suspension of Boulis’s chiropractic license.

. As the majority noted, because Boulis is licensed in Pennsylvania, it is the conditions set forth in the Pennsylvania statute which control when his license should be granted, suspended or revoked. The Pennsylvania legislature did not include those who fall within a first offender program or a similar type of program within the class of individuals who should be deemed "convicted.” Thus, it is irrelevant that Georgia’s statute governing sanctions against licensed persons for drug offenses defines conviction as including the affording of first offender treatment. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-110(a)(2). Moreover, this provision in the Georgia statutes appears to be an anomaly; indeed, as is apparent from the other statutory provisions and caselaw cited, a person granted first offender status generally is not deemed to be "convicted.”

. Boulis raised numerous other issues concerning due process and double jeopardy violations. However, because of the disposition I would reach, I do not address those issues.