Court Opinion

ID: 9705715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:17:40.59018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:14.220609
License: Public Domain

Duncan, J.
These actions arise out of injuries suffered in Salisbury, Massachusetts on February 4, 1956 by the minor child Brenda, then aged four, when she fell from the rear seat of the defendant’s automobile while being transported from Salisbury to Seabrook, New Hampshire, the domicile of all parties con*71cerned. The plaintiff and a younger brother had been staying with friends in Salisbury, and as a favor to the plaintiff’s mother the defendant, a neighbor, undertook to drive the mother to Salisbury to get the children. The children were placed in the rear seat by the mother, who closed the right rear door of the automobile by “giving it a bang.” The defendant operated the vehicle, while the plaintiff’s mother rode in front, sitting sideways so that she could see the children in the rear. The plaintiff stood behind her, and at some point in Salisbury on the return trip the right rear door was found to be open, and the plaintiff miss - ing from the vehicle.
The plaintiff’s motion that the rights and duties of the parties be determined in accordance with the law of New Hampshire was denied subject to exception, and presents the question of whether the law of this jurisdiction or of Massachusetts is to govern. It has long been the law of this state that the law of the place where the tort occurred and where the plaintiff’s injuries were suffered, in this instance Massachusetts, should control in determining the liability of the defendant. Beacham v. Portsmouth Bridge, 68 N. H. 382. Under Massachusetts law the defendant can be held liable to a guest for gross negligence only. McAllister v. Maltais, 102 N. H. 245; Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N. H. 86, 89.
In the Thompson case, although we held that the interspousal rights and liabilities of husband and wife were to be determined according to the law of their domicile, we stated that the law of Massachusetts where the tort was committed “should continue to determine the applicable standard of care.” Ib., 89. The plaintiffs, relying upon recent cases such as Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N. Y. 2d 473, and Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, urge that proper application of the rule stated by 5. 379 of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (Tent. Draft No. 8) requires that this state rather than Massachusetts be considered the “state of most significant relationship” in determining the rights of the parties, because it is the state “where the relationship ... between the parties is centered.” Ih., s. 379 (2) (d). In this connection we note that in Tentative Draft No. 9 of the same Restatement (April 24, 1964) 5. 379 remains unchanged. We also appreciate that Draft No. 9 first suggested under s. 379, comment d, that the circumstances under which a guest passenger has a right of action against a driver “will be determined by the local law of their common domicil, if at least this is the state from *72which they departed on their trip and that to which they intended to return, rather than by the local law of the state where the accident occurred.” (Emphasis supplied). See also, Guenther, Changing Choice of Law Rules, 7 N. H. B. J. 19, 26-27; Comment, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 357.
In deciding this question, as indicated in our recent decision of Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N. H. 30 (decided January 31, 1966), we are disposed to consider the competing considerations which may constitute “important contacts” involved in the facts presented. Tentative Draft No. 9, supra, s. 379 (2). While New Hampshire was the domicile of the parties to the action, Massachusetts was the place where the injury occurred, and the place where the conduct which gave rise to it occurred. Ib., s. 379 (2) (a), (b). So also, Massachusetts was the place where the relationship of host and guest arose between the minor plaintiff and the defendant, and where that relationship was centered up to the time of the accident. Id., s. 379(2) (d).
As pointed out in comment d to section 379 of the Restatement ( Tentative Draft No. 9): “A state has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there. So, subject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied to determine whether the actor’s conduct was tortious, that is to say, whether the actor’s conduct satisfied required standards of behavior or, on the other hand, was potentially liability-creating, and whether the interest affected by the actor’s conduct was entitled to legal protection. ” See also, s. 379a, comment e.
On the facts in this case, we see no sufficient reason to establish an exception to this commonly accepted principle. In the Thompson and Johnson cases, supra, the relationship of the parties was that of husband and wife. In cases involving intrafamily relationships, domicile may well be a weighty consideration in determining what law shall govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. (Tentative Draft No. 9, supra, s. 390g). Johnson v. Johnson, supra.
The relationship of host and guest however is usually temporary and fleeting, and its incidents of minor consequence as compared with those of marriage or parenthood. It cannot be denied that Massachusetts has an interest in regulating the standards of behavior of persons traveling upon its highways, and the liability which shall result for injuries suffered there in con*73sequence of such behavior. This interest appears to us to be more significantly related to this accident than any interest which this state may have had because the parties who were traveling on Massachusetts highways and entered into a host-guest relationship there were residents of this state. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N. Y. 2d 120. After careful review of the competing considerations we conclude that the plaintiffs’ motion was properly denied.
The question next presented is whether the Trial Court erred in granting the motion for a nonsuit. The plaintiffs’ evidence tended to prove that approximately a month before the accident the defendant had taken her 1946 DeSoto sedan to a garage for repairs to the lock of the right rear door. A garage owner testified that he then “repaired the right rear door, door lock, so that it would close.” There was also evidence that two to three weeks after the accident the same door was ajar, and that the defendant’s daughter “opened the door and then gave a good bang, then she pulled on the door and it came open. Then she banged it again, when she tried it the next time it stayed closed.”
According to the testimony it was the plaintiff’s mother who had closed the door on the day of the accident after placing her children in the rear seat; and the plaintiff stood behind the mother as the vehicle was driven over a “bumpy,” curvy road, known as the True Road. After it reached the Lafayette Highway and had traveled perhaps a half mile, the mother felt cold air on her back, and discovered that the right rear door was open, and that the plaintiff was missing. The door hinged at the back, and could be opened from within by raising the door handle. The mother testified that she did not recall seeing the plaintiff move about in the car and did not know whether or not the child had “pulled up the handle” or “opened the door herself.” There was no evidence to warrant a finding that the door failed to operate properly between the time it was repaired and the date of the accident, or that the defendant was aware that it was defective, and should have warned the plaintiff and her mother, or taken other suitable action to avoid injury in case the door opened.
Considering the record as a whole, the evidence construed most favorably to the plaintiff did not warrant a finding that the accident was caused by the gross negligence of the defendant within the meaning of the law of Massachusetts. McAllister v. Maltais, 102 N. H. 245, supra, and cases cited. See Shepard v. Roussel, 341 Mass. 730; Massachusetts Practice, Martin & Hennessey, *74Automobile Law & Practice, ss. 392-398, 405 ( 1954). The evidence to the exclusion of which the plaintiffs duly excepted was not such as to alter the foregoing conclusion. Accordingly the order is

Judgment for the defendant.

Lampron, J., dissented; the others concurred.