Court Opinion

ID: 9740332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:32:34.745182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.538091
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
(concurring). My disagreement with the majority is limited to the question of whether it is constitutional to require a convicted indigent defendant, as a condition of his probation, to make reimbursement of the cost of attorney’s fees where legal services have been furnished to him because of his indigency and as guaranteed by both state 1 and federal 2 constitutions.
Here, this condition was imposed pursuant to sec. 973.09 (1), Stats., which authorizes the imposition of “any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate” as terms of probation; 3 sec. 973.06 (1) (e), which includes as costs taxable to a criminal defendant “[a]ttorney fees payable to the defense attorney by the county; ” 4 and this court’s decision in State v. Welkos,5 *628which held that the “costs of prosecution” are chargeable under the latter costs statute (then sec. 959.055) as a probationary condition under then sec. 57.01 (1). The majority hold the Wisconsin statutes authorizing this practice constitutional. I would not.
The Wisconsin requirement for providing charged indigent criminal defendants with counsel at public expense, was effectuated by enabling legislation in the late 1850’s,6 and this court was one of the earliest in the United States7 “to recognize the necessity for compensating attorneys who represented indigents in criminal proceedings in order to guarantee the defendant fully adequate representation.” 8 The federal constitutional right to legal counsel under the sixth amendment was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court until Powell v. Alabama.9 That right was made applicable to states by the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright 10 and applied to felonies (crimes with sentences of one year or more). In Argersinger v. Hamlin 11 the right was extended in 1972 to indigent persons charged with misdemeanors (crimes with sentences of less than one year).
Nearly four years ago the Supreme Court of California considered the constitutionality of imposing as a condition of probation the requirement that a convicted indigent criminal defendant reimburse the California county which had furnished him with court-appointed counsel *629in his criminal proceedings.12 The supreme court speaking through Mr. Justice Louis H. Burke in a unanimous decision declared this practice unconstitutional, saying:
“. . . The government is without constitutional authority to impose a predetermined condition on the exercise of a constitutional right or penalize in some manner its use.” 13
There, as here, there was no indication in the record that the defendant was discouraged from exercising her constitutional right to counsel because there, as here, the defendant requested and received counsel. Yet the California Supreme Court declared “[t] he fact that such knowledge might have deterred her, and could well deter others, gives rise to our concern as to the validity of such a condition of probation.” 14
In other words the practice is invalid because of the chilling effect it has upon the exercise of a constitutional right. This is a well-established doctrine that is traceable to the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jackson, wherein the high court invalidated as an unconstitutional infringement of the fifth amendment right to plead not guilty, and the sixth amendment right to demand a jury trial, a federal statute which provided the death penalty under the Federal Kidnaping Act could only be imposed by jury verdict.15 The court stated:
. . If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional.” 16
*630That the motives of Congress may have been to lessen the number of instances wherein capital punishment was imposed was irrelevant. The court stated:
“. . . Whatever might be said of Congress’ objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. . . . The question is not whether the chilling effect is ‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” 17
A further constitutional objection I would find in this practice of imposing payment of defense attorney fees paid by the county as a condition of probation, involves the adequacy of waiver of one’s right to counsel. There was no waiver here since defendant requested and received service of counsel.
In Johnson v. Zerbst 18 it was held:
“The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.”
I seriously question whether there has been a valid waiver of the right to counsel in an attempted waiver by an indigent adult of his right to counsel solely on the grounds that he did not want to be later forced to reimburse the county for such expenses out of already distressed family resources. Indeed, it was recently held by the Supreme Court of California in In re H., that juvenile courts should not permit minors of indigent *631parents to waive their right to appointed counsel “if the circumstances indicate to the court that such extraneous and improper factors are substantially influencing the minor’s decision.” 19
I see other constitutional objections to the practice which the majority approve.
Parolees, as distinguished from probationers, are not required, under pain of parole revocation, to reimburse the county for the costs of providing defense services.20 Since no indigent convicted defendant obviously can start to repay the costs of counsel fees until he is out of prison, on parole or probation, it does not appear that the minimal requirements of the equal protection clause have been met. In State ex rel. Garner v. Gray,21 this court held that where there is a distinction between classes, that distinction must have some reasonable basis in order not to violate the constitutional right of equal protection. I can find no rational basis for requiring probationers to repay the costs of their defense and yet not require such repayment of parolees.
I have spelled out some of the constitutional infirmities with the reimbursement for counsel fees which this court today validates.22 These reasons underlie the *632American Bar Association’s refusal to countenance such practice. The Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Providing Defense Services provide:
“6.4 Reimbursement.
“Reimbursement of counsel or the organization or governmental unit providing counsel should not be required, except on the ground of fraud in obtaining the determination of eligibility.” 23
A similar recommendation was very recently made in Wisconsin by the Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization. As well as pointing to constitutional objections, the report suggests such reimbursement probably hinders rehabilitation. The committee recommendation is as follows:
“Wisconsin Statute Sec. 973.09, permitting the judge to impose any ‘reasonable and appropriate’ conditions as part of probation/should be amended to clearly prohibit the repayment of attorney’s fees as a condition of probation for indigent defendants.” 24
Interestingly, the committee also recommends the repeal of sec. 256.66, Stats., which permits a county to bring civil action against an indigent defendant to recover counsel costs, and also the amending of sec. 973.06, to prohibit the imposition of those costs against qualified indigents.25
I would modify the order appealed from only insofar as the probation revocation was based on the violation of the one condition of defendant’s probation which in*633validly imposed on defendant the obligation to reimburse the county for counsel fees. This condition is severable from and does not affect the other (valid) conditions of the probation.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Hallows and Mr. Justice Heffernan join in this opinion.

 Wis. Const., art. I, sec. 7.

 U. S. Const., sixth amendment, made applicable to states by the fourteenth amendment, see Gideon v. Wainwright, infra, footnote 10.

 Sec. 973.09 (1), Stats., provides: “(1) When a person is convicted of a crime, the court may, by order, withhold sentence or impose sentence and stay its execution, and in either case place him on probation to the department for a stated period, stating in the order the reasons therefor, and may impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate. The period of probation may he made consecutive to a sentence on a different charge, whether imposed at the same time or previously.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 Sec. 973.06 (1) (e), Stats., provides: “(1) The costs taxable against the defendant shall consist of the following items and no others: ... (e) Attorney fees payable to the defense attorney by the county.”

 (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 186, 192, 109 N. W. 2d 889: “We, therefore, determine that there existed no statutory bar to the circuit court’s requiring the defendant to pay as costs of prosecution the expense of the special prosecutor’s fees and the costs of the audit as a condition to the defendant’s probation.”

 Revised Stats. 1858, eh. 163, sec. 2. See also: State v. Beals (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 599, 610, 191 N. W. 2d 221.

 See: Annot. (1941), 130 A. L. R. 1439, 1450; Carpenter v. Dane County (1859), 9 Wis. 249 (*274).

 State v. Beals, supra, footnote 6, at page 610, citing Carpenter v. Dane County, supra, footnote 7.

 (1932), 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158.

 (1963), 372 U. S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799.

 (1972), 407 U. S. 25, 92 Sup. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530.

 In re Allen (1969), 71 Cal. 2d 388, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, 455 Pac. 2d 143.

 Id. at page 391.

 Id.

 (1968), 390 U. S. 570, 88 Sup. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138. See also: 18 U. S. Code, sec. 1201 (a) (1964).

 United States v. Jackson, supra, footnote 15, at page 581.

 Id. at page 582. See also: Strange v. James (D. C. Kansas 1971), 828 Fed. Supp. 1230, 1232, 1233.

 (1938), 304 U. S. 458, 465, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461. See also: Comment, Reimbursement of Defense Costs as a Condition of Probation for Indigents, 67 Mich. L. Rev. (1969), 1404, 1415, 1416.

 (1970), 2 Cal. 3d 513, 525, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 83, 468 Pac. 2d 204.

 Compare see. 57.06, Stats. (Paroles from state prisons and house of correction), with sec. 973.06 (1) (e) (Costs of attorney’s fees), and sec. 973.09 (1) (Probation), along with State v. Welkos, supra, footnote 5 and text.

 (1972), 55 Wis. 2d 574, 586, 587, 201 N. W. 2d 163. See also: Baxstrom v. Herold (1966), 383 U. S. 107, 111, 86 Sup. Ct. 760, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620; Humphrey v. Cady (1972), 405 U. S. 504, 512, 92 Sup. Ct. 1048, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394.

 Whether a violation of the thirteenth amendment (prohibiting imprisonment which is not punishment for a crime) is involved by imprisonment for the nonpayment of defense attorney’s fees in a criminal case has been commented upon recently by one appellate court. In Wright v. Matthews (1968), 209 Va. 246, 163 S. E. 2d 158, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held *632that payment of court costs is not punishment for a crime as is, for example, a fine, and therefore violates the thirteenth amendment.

 American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, sec. 6.4 (Approved draft, 1968).

 Report of Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization, see. 6, at page 167 (1973).

 Id., sec. 5, at pages 166, 167.