Court Opinion

ID: 9694079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:21:08.837102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:35.543947
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The court concludes that Juror 43 was justifiably stricken on a race-neutral basis because he believed that the criminal justice system was unfair to African Americans. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Specifically, the court notes that the district court did not feel that Juror 43 was “forthcoming” because he could not provide evidence to support his belief that the system was unfair. I conclude that when the views expressed by a prospective juror during voir dire are consistent with what this court has found in its own review of whether African Americans are treated unfairly in our judicial system, those views cannot constitute a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that would support the juror’s exclusion.
Juror 43 was African American. We have recognized that minority citizens perceive that the court system is biased against them. Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System, Final Report S-18 (May 1993). The perception is also shared by professionals in the court. Id. More than 75% of the attorneys, judges, and probation officers that responded to the study’s survey felt that bias against people of color exists in the court system. Id. Nearly 90% said bias is subtle and hard to detect. Id. Further, the study found that people of color often choose not to go to trial because of the perception that they will not receive a fair trial and that people of color do have significantly higher incarceration rates. Id. at S-15, 18. While the task force report was issued in 1993, there is no evidence that the facts or the perceptions identified in the report have changed dramatically since that time.
I also note that in reaching the conclusion that the strike of Juror 43 was race-neutral, the court ignores the fact that all prospective jurors who expressed concern about the justice system’s fairness were not treated equally. Juror 14, a white woman, initially responded to the question on the Juror Questionnaire that asked if she had “any specific concerns or complaints about the criminal justice system as it relates to its treatment of persons of color” by indicating, “Yes.” At some point, Juror 14 crossed out the “Yes” response, changed her answer to “No,” and wrote, “I do not have any specific concerns, but I do think it is biased against people of color.” Juror 14 was seated and served on the jury. Despite this fact, the court concludes that the exclusion of Juror 43 was proper.
The court also asserts that Juror 43 was eliminated on a race-neutral basis because he worked with the victim’s uncle. But this limited contact, if anything, would favor the State, and therefore I question why the prosecutor objected. Further, the victim’s aunt notified the court that she *111may have worked with Juror 64. When questioned, Juror 64 stated that she had worked at the same place two years earlier and that there was a possibility that she would be transferred there again. The prosecutor did not object, and Juror 64 served on the jury panel.
In State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.1992), we held that it was improper to strike a prospective African-American juror because of concerns that the juror might overcompensate and sympathize with the African-American defendant. Specifically, we stated:
Batson expressly forbids this type of reasoning to enter into the jury selection process. “[T]he prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption — or his intuitive judgment — that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.”
Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)).
As I read the record here, Juror 43 was stricken for precisely that reason. Because the State has not shown a race-neutral basis for excluding Juror 43, the district court erred when it concluded that Martin did not meet his burden to prove that Juror 43 was stricken on the basis of intentional discrimination. Such errors are not subject to review for harmless error. State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 835 (Minn.2003). Therefore, I would reverse Martin’s conviction and remand for a new trial.