Court Opinion

ID: 9677423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:51:57.324939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:55.607606
License: Public Domain

BARAJAS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the outcome reached in the majority opinion, i.e., that judgment in favor of Appellee against Appellant for attorney’s fees be reversed and rendered, but respectfully register this dissent to the majority opinion which, in my view, misperceives the nature of the judicial authority vested in our courts by the constitution of the State of Texas.
The threshold question presented in the instant case is whether our state trial courts, in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authority, have the power to appoint counsel in civil cases in order to aid in the effective performance of their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, independence, and integrity. The majority answers this question in the negative, explaining that while such power “might be favorable to attorneys ..., [it] would not serve the *63best interests of our judicial system.” I strongly disagree.2
The Texas Constitution explicitly vests the judicial power of the state in the courts. Tex. Const, art. 5, § 1 (Vernon 1993). Both the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have stated that in addition to the express grants of judicial power to each court, there are other powers which courts may exercise though not expressly authorized or described by our constitution or statutes. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.1979); State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). I dissent not in an effort to expand the powers of our courts beyond those granted by our state constitution or statutory authority, but rather to further interpret powers that have repeatedly been categorized by our higher courts as “inherent” powers.
Our higher courts have noted that the inherent power of a court, which is not derived from any legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, may be called upon to aid the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the administration of justice. This power exists to enable a court to effectively perform its judicial function. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 395, 398-99; Public Util. Comm’n of Texas v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.1988); Johnson, 821 S.W.2d at 609, 612-13; see also Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); and Steenbergen v. Ford Motor Co., 814 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied).
“Inherent” powers include the power to change, set aside, or otherwise control the court’s own judgments, A.F. Jones & Sons v. Republic Supply Co., 151 Tex. 90, 246 S.W.2d 853 (1952); the power to summon and compel the attendance of witnesses, Burttschell v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 113, 69 S.W.2d 402 (1934); the power to punish by contempt, Ex parte Browne, 543 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.1976); the power to regulate admission to the bar and the practice of law, Scott v. State, 86 Tex. 321, 24 S.W. 789, 790 (1894) (power to disbar is inherent judicial power); and the power to compel the expenditure of public funds to efficiently fulfill its function, including payments made to personnel the court deems essential. Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex.1988) (Spears, J., concurring); Vondy v. Commissioners Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Tex.1981); see also Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); and Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 109 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.). See generally, Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 395, 398 n. 1.
In sum, in the instant case, I would hold as our higher courts have continuously held, that a court may take a particular action only if that action is authorized by constitutional provision, statute, common law, or the power to take the action arises from an inherent or implied power. I would further find that if a trial court reasonably concludes that appointment of counsel in a civil case is necessary for the proper and effective performance of its judicial functions and to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, then the trial court has the inherent power to make such an appointment of counsel, at least in the absence of a valid statute or court-made rule to the contrary, with compensation for the services of such attorney to be made out of the county general fund and/or the trial court’s operating budget. To hold otherwise would be to endorse a system whereby trial judges, in an effort to effectively perform their judicial functions, can adopt their own version of a mandatory pro bono program, without regard to the manner in which attorneys will be compensated.

. I disagree not only with the majority’s generalization that appointed counsel "would not serve the best interests of our judicial system,” but also with the generalization that appointment of counsel "might be favorable to attorneys.”' The instant case is but one example where an attorney, involuntarily but ethically surrenders her services to the trial court in order to aid in the effective performance of its function. To add insult to injury, the majority orders Appellee to pay costs of court.