Court Opinion

ID: 9542129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:31:20.862265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:03.981223
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(concurring with holding).
I concur with the holding of the majority opinion but add these comments.
This Court since 1960, as noted infra, has at times emphasized as a standard of review concerning the Bar’s findings and recommendations that they should be adopted unless they are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or not supported by substantial *808evidence (or other similar language).1 At other times, however, this Court has emphasized that the recommendations made by the Bar are not . . to be in the same category . . . ” as findings of fact . . because it is our responsibility to discipline an erring attorney, and we cannot delegate that duty to others . ”.2
Even where this Court announced the standard of review as requiring adoption of the Bar’s recommendations unless they were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable (or similar words), it acknowledged that a review of Bar proceedings “. . . is not like an ordinary appeal or administrative review because the order to be made is the responsibility of this court . .”.3 I respectfully suggest that this duality of standards (appearing both within a single case and in cases compared one with the other) creates uncertainties and contradictions which now require reanalysis.
I believe for clarity and guidance, this Court should state unequivocally that the recommendations by the Bar are advisory only as “. . .we cannot delegate that duty [of disciplining attorneys] to others ».4
As noted in the majority and minority opinions, the Bar Commission — by findings —determined, and properly so, that Mr. Hansen was in violation of the disciplinary rules of the Bar. The recommendation of a one year suspension, however, in my opinion, is too severe. The judgment of public censure herein stated is sufficient — there is proportionality between the violations and the sanction imposed by this Court — because dishonesty and flagrant misconduct are not involved here. Violations, serious ones, yes — but not transgressions which compel a sanction of depriving Mr. Hansen of his license to practice law. And I make these observations independently of Mr. Hansen’s status as Attorney General of this State, which I believe, as does Mr. Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion, is not properly before us and is therefore irrelevant to our determination.
One concluding thought. Do these comments and this holding suggest or impel a relaxation of the code of professional responsibility. I think not. I rather prefer to believe that this Court’s judgment constitutes a frontal and unobscure declaration of rebuke — unaccompanied, however, by the punishment of suspension which could be imposed.
Restraint here by this Court is not a flouting of our honored code. It is just that when the measure of punishment is considered, the majority of this Court and members of the Bar Commission view the matter differently. I, of course, respect the views of the Commissioners, not suggesting for a moment a deficiency in them of ability or sensitivity, but I do not here share those views concerning sanction, which, as noted ante, is the responsibility of the Utah Supreme Court.
HALL, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring with holding opinion of WILKINS, J.

. See In re Macfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (1960); In re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, 344 (1965); In re Badger [Badger I], 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1972); and In re Johnston, Utah, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (1974).

. In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Also see In re Badger [Badger II], 28 Utah 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106 (1972), where this Court without discussion, modified its prior order and judgment in Badger I, note 1 supra, by reducing the punishment recommended by the Bar in Badger I. Additionally, see In re Hughes, Utah, 534 P.2d 892 (1975), where the Court stated it was “. . . nor bound to the recommendation of the Bar Commission . .", though it upheld that recommendation to the extent noted therein.

. In re Fullmer, note 1 supra, at 405 P.2d 344.

. In re Bridwell, note 2, supra, 474 P.2d 116.