Court Opinion

ID: 9772345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:05.297474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:51.128414
License: Public Domain

J-S23026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RYDELL MIDDLETON                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2570 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 15, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001913-2018.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                      FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

      Rydell Middleton appeals from the order denying without a hearing his

first timely petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Middleton’s

petition but vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for the trial court to

correct its sentencing order.

      On May 6, 2019, Middleton entered a negotiated guilty plea to robbery

and receiving stolen property. Middleton agreed to the following factual basis:

            [O]n August 8, 2017, shortly before 1:05 a.m. [the
      Complainant] was working for Domino’s Pizza and was making a
      food delivery to 1621 South Newkirk Street in the City and County
      of Philadelphia. The number used to place that order was (267)
      404-3939. Upon arriving [at that address], [the Complainant]
      called the number used to place the order but no one answered.

           As he was going back to his car, he observed a male who
      was about five-nine, medium-build, wearing a black ski mask,
      hooded sweatshirt and jeans walking towards him. The male
J-S23026-23

      reached into his waistband. A struggle ensued between [the
      Complainant] and that individual. [The Complainant] was afraid
      that he didn’t want to get hurt and began to back away, at which
      point the person in the ski mask got into [the Complainant’s]
      vehicle and fled westbound on Tasker.

            Police tried to locate the car via the cell phone that was in
      there. In addition to the car that was taken which was a 2014
      Nissan Sentra with PA tag KDJ8704, there were two iPhones and
      his wallet. A search was conducted for that phone number that
      was used to place the order, (267) 404-3939. It was - - the user
      name associated with it was Rice Bags 247 and an email address
      of ricebags247@gmail.com. A search warrant was issued on
      Google for that account.

            A few days later on the 12th a woman by the name of
      Chelsea Cantwell arranged to buy a 2014 Nissan Sentra with PA
      tags KDJ8704. She came into Philadelphia and agreed to pay
      $900 as well as give over her vehicle in exchange for the Nissan
      Sentra. In order to facilitate that transaction, she had been
      texting with a number of (215) 315-8036. That phone number
      belongs to [Middleton].

            A search warrant was also issued for an Instagram account
      of Rice Bags [247]. From that, Your Honor, there were a number
      of messages that were received in the days in between the 8th and
      12th, which is when the car was sold. A number of messages
      coming from Rice Bags [247] stating: Do you know of any chop
      shops? I got a 2014 Maxima, bro.

            On the 8th of August, there was a message with the - - 2014
      Nissan Sentra with the previously stated PA tag coming from that
      Instagram account as well, as well as a number of other messages
      asking for chop shops, trying to get rid of a hot 2014 Nissan Sentra
      as well as a message coming from Rice Bags stating: Yo, call me
      now. It’s important. (215) 315-8036, which is the number that
      Chelsea Cantwell was communicating with in order to facilitate the
      sale of the vehicle.

          Police later recovered the vehicle and it was returned to [the
      Complainant].

N.T. 5/6/19, at 20-23. This incident occurred while Middleton was on state

parole.

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      After entering his plea, Middleton agreed to proceed directly to

sentencing and the trial court imposed the negotiated aggregate sentence of

three to six years of incarceration. Middleton’s robbery conviction constituted

a second strike pursuant to Section 9714 of the Judicial Code. However, as

part of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth did not seek the mandatory

sentence for that conviction. In addition, the Commonwealth withdrew three

other charges. Middleton filed neither a post-sentence motion nor a direct

appeal.

      On May 18, 2020, Middleton filed a pro se PCRA petition. Although the

PCRA court sought the appointment of counsel for Middleton, privately-

retained counsel filed an amended petition on January 14, 2022.            The

Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on May 18, 2022. On July 19, 2022,

2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

Middleton’s petition without a hearing. Middleton did not file a response. By

order entered August 15, 2022, the PCRA court denied Middleton’s petition.

This timely appeal followed. Both Middleton and the PCRA court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Middleton raises the following issues on appeal, which we have

reordered as follows:

          1. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or
             make a mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of
             law, [Middleton’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was
             ineffective for advising [him] to plead guilty to the
             criminal offense of robbery when the facts placed on the
             record by the Commonwealth did not support a
             conviction for this criminal offense?

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         2. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or
            make a mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of
            law, [Middleton’s] claim that counsel was ineffective for
            advising him that if he entered into a guilty plea, his
            sentence would run concurrent to the time imposed on
            his state parole violation?

Middleton’s Brief at 6.

      This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition

calls for us to “determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s factual findings will

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

record.” Commonwealth v. Webb, 236 A.3d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citing Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

            The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
      a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2).] To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted). Regarding a claim that counsel was ineffective:

             It is well-established that to succeed on a claim asserting
      the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must plead and
      prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1)
      the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
      reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or
      inaction. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (Pa.
      1987). If a petitioner fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of

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      the ineffectiveness inquiry, his claim fails. Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150–51 (Pa. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation

formatting altered).

      With respect to claims that plea counsel was ineffective:

             Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the
      plea-bargaining process are eligible for PCRA review. Allegations
      of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will
      serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the
      defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the
      defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
      voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
      was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
      criminal cases.

          The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
          dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements
          for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea
          counsel, ... under which the defendant must show that
          counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
          injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing,
          involuntary, or unintelligent plea. This standard is
          equivalent to the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to
          all post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea.

      Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super.
      2005) (en banc)[.]

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012–13 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(some citations omitted). Notably, a PCRA petitioner cannot assert grounds

for withdrawing a guilty plea that contradict his statements made under oath

in a guilty plea colloquy. Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super.

2007)).

                                      -5-
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         In his first issue, Middleton essentially challenges the factual basis for

his guilty plea to robbery.      Middleton asserts that there was “no evidence

placed on the record by the Commonwealth that prove[d], beyond a

reasonable doubt, that [he] robbed the complainant.” Middleton’s Brief at 17.

Middleton therefore contends that Commonwealth’s case to support his

robbery conviction was “entirely predicated on circumstantial evidence.” Id.

at 18.

         In addition to providing that a guilty plea be offered in open court and

setting forth the procedure to determine the validity of the plea, Rule 590 of

the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure also requires the trial court to

determine “whether the facts acknowledged by the defendant constitute a

prohibited offense.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Pa.

1984). Here, the PCRA court found no arguable merit to Middleton’s claim:

               A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing
         a theft, he threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear
         of serious bodily injury. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(ii). The facts as
         recited by the Commonwealth and admitted by [Middleton]
         established that on August 8, 2017, at 1:05 a.m., [Middleton]
         wearing a ski mask and reaching into his waistband, approached
         the Complainant . . . who was making a food delivery at 1621
         Newkirk Street. After a struggle between [Middleton] and the
         Complainant, the Complainant backed away because [Middleton]
         was reaching into his waistband and the Complainant “didn’t want
         to get hurt.” [Middleton] then entered the Complainant’s vehicle,
         a 2014 Nissan Sentra with Pennsylvania tags KDJ8704, and drove
         away. These circumstances demonstrate that [Middleton], while
         committing a theft, intentionally put the Complainant in fear of
         immediate serious bodily injury. Therefore, the facts as recited
         were sufficient to establish the offense of Robbery.

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             [Middleton] further claimed that there was no direct
      evidence placed on the record that proved his identity as the
      [r]obber. This claim is also meritless. A search was conducted
      for the telephone number that was used to place the pizza order
      that brought the Complainant to the location of the robbery (267-
      404-3939). The same phone number was associated with a user
      “Rice Bags 247.” A search warrant was issued for the Rice Bags
      [247] Instagram account which revealed the account holder
      inquiring about chop shops to get rid of a “hot Nissan Sentra.”

            Another message sent from the Rice Bags [247] account
      stated, “Yo, call me now. It’s important (215) 315-8036.” That
      phone number belonged to [Middleton]. The same number was
      used to arrange the sale of the Complainant’s 2014 Nissan Sentra
      to Chelsea Cantwell.

                                     ***

             Sufficient evidence of the elements of robbery and the
      identity of [Middleton] were recited at the plea hearing and
      explicitly admitted by [Middleton]. Therefore, [Middleton’s] claim
      that insufficient evidence existed to support a negotiated guilty
      plea was without merit.

PCRA Court’s Opinion, 10/21/22, at 5-6 (footnotes and citations omitted). Our

review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion.

      Middleton’s claims to the contrary are unavailing. He asserts that the

evidence placed on the record by the Commonwealth at the guilty plea hearing

would have been insufficient to prove his identity as the robber had the case

gone to trial. Middleton’s Brief at 21. According to Middleton, at most, the

facts presented by the Commonwealth proved that he received a stolen

vehicle. Id. at 19. We disagree.

      Even though evidence of his identity as the robber was circumstantial,

it was still sufficient to support Middleton’s guilty plea to both charges. As

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succinctly stated by the Commonwealth, “[t]he facts presented established

that [Middleton] called for a pizza delivery with a phone number registered to

his Instagram account and robbed [the Complainant] of his car, then used

that same account to try to sell the stolen car by soliciting potential buyers to

call him on a different phone number registered to himself.” Commonwealth’s

Brief at 5. Thus, Middleton’s first claim of ineffectiveness fails.

      In his second issue, Middleton claims that plea counsel was ineffective

for failing to inform him that the back time he would receive given his parole

violation could not run concurrent to his new sentence. He then cites to a

“discussion [that] took place on the record during the guilty plea hearing” that

left him “with the misimpression that the parole board had the discretion to

run the sentences concurrently.” Middleton’s Brief at 13-14. According to

Middleton, “[r]egardless of whether there were conflicting statements made

in this regard, enough confusion resulted from the [this discussion] that the

plea could not have been knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 14. In making this

argument, Middleton likens his case to the recently decided non-precedential

decision in Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. 913 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super.

October 20, 2020) and requests the same disposition—a remand for an

evidentiary hearing.

      “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware

of what he was doing,” and “[h]e bears the burden of proving otherwise.”

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations

omitted).

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            The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a
        defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that
        he lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel
        induced the lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is bound
        by the statements he makes in open court while under oath
        and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea
        which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.

Id. On appeal, this Court evaluates the adequacy of the plea colloquy and

the voluntariness of the resulting plea by looking at the totality of the

circumstances.   Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.

Super. 2011).

     Section 6138(a)(5)(i) of the Prisons and Parole Code provides:

     (5) If a new sentence is imposed on the [parolee], the service
     of the balance of the term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania
     court shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed
     in the following cases:

           (i) if a person is paroled from a State correctional institution
     and the new sentence imposed on the person is to be served in
     the State correctional institution.

61 Pa.C.S.A. 6138(a)(5)(i). In Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d at 1013-

14, this Court explained that “[i]mposition of a new state sentence concurrent

with the parolee’s new sentence is an illegal sentence under [Section 6138].”

     Here, the PCRA court found no arguable merit to Middleton’s claim, and

explained as follows:

           Section 6138 provides that it is legally impossible to run
     backtime imposed by the Pennsylvania State Parole Board
     concurrently with a sentence imposed on a new matter that
     constitutes a violation of state parole.

                                     ***

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             [Middleton] argued that he was given erroneous information
      by his trial counsel relating to this well settled law. The record
      does not reflect this. [Middleton’s] written and signed plea
      colloquy clearly stated: “the sentence on this guilty plea may not
      run concurrent to (at the same time as) a state (backtime)
      sentence for a parole violation.” During the oral guilty plea
      colloquy, [Middleton] indicated that he and his counsel went over
      his legal rights from the written colloquy line-by-line and that he
      understood everything that was said.

             Furthermore, during the oral guilty plea colloquy, the [court]
      informed [Middleton] that [the] state parole board would have the
      option of imposing further punishment. [Middleton’s] counsel
      stated to the [court] that he informed [Middleton] that it was not
      the practice of the parole board to run any further punishment
      concurrently with his sentence. Therefore, [Middleton] was given
      adequate notice that whether further punishment would run
      concurrently with his aggregate sentence would be at the state
      parole board’s discretion, though that is not the usual practice.
      Consequently, [Middleton’s] contention that counsel was
      ineffective for suggesting a concurrent running of back time with
      his new sentence was meritless, and the [court] did not err when
      in it dismissed his [PCRA petition].

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 7-8 (footnotes and citations omitted).

      Our review of the record supports this conclusion. When compared to

his answers in the written and oral plea colloquies, the only factual issues

presented were created by Middleton’s self-serving statements within his

PCRA petition. Willis, supra.

      Moreover, Middleton’s claim that his case is similar to Robinson, supra,

is unavailing. In that case, Robinson’s written plea colloquy expressly stated

that the Commonwealth was not opposed to Robinson’s state parole violation

sentence running concurrent to the sentence to be imposed as a result of the

guilty plea.   Here, the concurrent sentencing scheme was not part of

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Middleton’s plea agreement, and no such statement was made by the

Commonwealth prior to the court’s acceptance of the plea. Indeed, as noted

above, the written plea colloquy expressly informed Middleton that this

sentencing arrangement was not possible.

       In addition, during the guilty plea hearing in Robinson,1 the

Commonwealth commented that “the other caveat of agreeing to run it

concurrent, that’s up to the Department of Corrections.             It’s simply a

recommendation to them.” Robinson, non-precedential decision at 8.2 Here,

the Commonwealth made no such statement. Rather, after the trial court

imposed sentence and restitution, the court stated, “I think I covered

everything else, so you can give [Middleton] his appellate rights.”             N.T.,

5/6/19, at 34-35. This statement prompted the following exchange:

             [PLEA COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the only thing [Middleton]
       wanted me to raise is - - and I think we touched on it during the
       colloquy - - it will be a violation of parole. He realizes that he has
       not been sentenced on that violation yet. So at this point, even if
       Your Honor says that this sentence can run concurrent to all other
       sentences, it won’t guarantee that happens. We would ask if you
____________________________________________

1 As in this case, it appears that Robinson proceeded immediately to
sentencing following the entry of his guilty plea. There is no indication in the
panel decision when the Commonwealth made these comments.

2 While we agree with the Robinson panel’s further statement that the parole

board does not have discretion to run the new sentence and backtime
concurrently, we note that the parole board does have the discretion when
determining whether parole will be revoked. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(1);
N.T., 5/16/19, at 18 (trial court informs Middleton that the state parole board
“would have the option of imposing further punishment on you”).

                                          - 11 -
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      would state for the record that this is concurrent with any other
      sentences, that way it’ll at least give him - - give the option in the
      future of someone to run it concurrently. I told him the parole
      board, that’s not their practice, but.

            THE COURT: I’ll state it’s concurrently, but obviously, it’s
      the parole board and prison that will determine that.

            [PLEA COUNSEL]: Exactly. If, Your Honor states it - -

            THE COURT: I did state it.

            [PLEA COUNSEL]: - - we appreciate it as well.

N.T., 5/6/19, at 35.      Given the written plea colloquy in this case, and

Middleton’s repeated affirmance that he went over the plea colloquy line by

line with plea counsel, we are not persuaded that the above exchange caused

such confusion that a remand is warranted in this case.

      In sum, given the totality of circumstances surrounding the entry of his

guilty plea, Yeomans, supra, the PCRA court correctly determined that

Middleton’s ineffectiveness claims lacked merit, and that an evidentiary

hearing was not warranted. We therefore affirm the order denying Middleton

post-conviction relief.

      Nevertheless, we note that the trial court’s May 6, 2019, sentencing

order does state that the new sentence it imposed was to run “concurrently

with . . . any other sentence being served.” Order, 5/6/19, at 1. In essence,

the trial court “tethered” his three-to-six-year sentence “to the sentence under

which he was then on parole.” Commonwealth v. Coley, No. 1594 MDA

2022 (Pa. Super., July 25, 2023), non-precedential decision at 9. In doing so,

the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, as that is a violation of Section

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6138, supra. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that we are affirming the PCRA

court’s dismissal of his PCRA petition, Middleton’s “judgment of sentence must

be vacated and this matter remanded to allow for the correction of the [May

6, 2019] sentencing order.” Id. at 11.

      Order affirmed.     Judgment of sentence vacated.    Case remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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