Court Opinion

ID: 9727555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:43:09.011061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:40.165777
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
Officer Sprinkle testified at trial that between 7:00 and 8:00 a. m., on January 26, 1981, armed with a warrant for the arrest of appellant for the Tri-State Pharmacy robbery which had occurred on July 26, 1980, six months prior thereto, he went to a house in Evansville. He knocked on the door and said he was a police officer. He heard shuffling inside, broke the door in, and proceeded inside passing a woman dressed in a nightgown, and found appellant hiding in the crawl space clad in a tee shirt and undershorts. This is the sum total of the evidence serving to justify the giving of Instruction No. 10, which reads as follows:
“The flight, if any, of a person immediately after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, if proved, is not evidence of guilt. It is, however, evidence of consciousness of guilt. However, flight, if any, may be explained by fear, surprise, not wanting to get involved or other reasons compatible with flight, if any, under the circumstances.”
Defense counsel objected to this instruction on the basis that there had been no flight shown during the trial, pointing out the lapse of time from the date of the offense to the date of the arrest.
This Court has sanctioned flight instructions, where, for example the accused is observed running away from the scene of the crime as was the case in Clemons v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 113, or where the accused escapes from jail while awaiting trial as was the case in Porter v. State, (1979) Ind., 391 N.E.2d 801. However, the Court has not dealt with a case like this one. This behavior on the part of appellant comes long after the events constituting the crime. The longer this lapse of time is, the less its probative force becomes. Furthermore, there was no evidence that appellant knew at the time of this behavior that he was being sought by the police for the particular offense charged. The officer did not state at the time he knocked that he was there to arrest for the particular offense, and there is no other evidence supporting his knowledge thereof. I am convinced, under the circumstances present here, that the jury could not reasonably conclude that there was a meaningful connection between appellant’s behavior in hiding from the police and the illegal conduct six months prior thereto at the Tri-State Pharmacy. Cf. opinion of Chief Judge Pell in United States v. Jackson, 572 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1978).
*582While there is much good in the court’s Instruction No. 10, wherein innocent motives for flight are listed, it still informs the jury that it would be permissible for it to infer consciousness of guilt from the evidence. The paucity of evidence of flight demonstrates the error in giving this instruction.
Appellant stands convicted on the identification testimony of the pharmacist. Her testimony, while sufficient to warrant conviction, was nevertheless shaken by pointed cross-examination. Under these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the error in giving this instruction did not impinge upon the substantial rights of appellant. The conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.