Court Opinion

ID: 9550539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:36:50.725123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:45.139340
License: Public Domain

TULLAR, Superior Judge
(dissenting).
Deferentially, I dissent.
I believe that signators to this kind of petition should be permitted to withdraw therefrom at any time prior to the taking of final action by the body to which the petition is addressed. It is conceded in the majority opinion that the greater number of cases hold to this rule, and the reasons in support thereof appeal to me.
The signing of a petition is a free and voluntary act performed by the signer for any one of many reasons. He may have signed capriciously, impulsively, hastily, unthinkingly, ignorantly, mistakenly; his motive may have been good nature or malice; he may have signed because of coercion, undue influence or hope of reward. The person seeking his signature is like a salesman; to secure the signature he must overcome “sales resistance”. The good “salesman” soon returns his filled petitions. The facilitiy with which signatures may be obtained to petitions is proverbial. Idol v. Hanes, 219 N.C. 723, 14 S.E.2d 801.
Second thought is apt to be more deliberate. A withdrawal of a signature is less likely to be secured so easily. Before the signer will change his mind and revoke his former act, it will be natural for him to consider, consult, examine and reflect. Knowledge of this trait has led most courts to consider the right of withdrawal favorably, both as a matter of justice to the individual signer, who should have full opportunity to apply his best judgment to the matter, and also as sound public policy.
In Crocher v. Abel, 348 Ill. 269, 180 N.E. 852, 855, the court said:
“The signers had the right to withdraw their names from the petition at any time before final action thereon. Littell v. Board of Supervisors, 198 Ill. 205, 65 N.E. 78. That rule is a necessary inference from the very nature of the right of petition and applies, not *53merely to the petitions themselves, but to withdrawals. Courts are not justified in placing any restriction upon the free action of a citizen not placed there by law and not required by good morals or propriety.”
No contractual relation is involved; there is no consideration for the signature. One signature is not a consideration for another in a petition of this kind. The petition contains no promise. County Court of DeKalb County v. Pogue, 115 Ill.App. 391, affirmed in Kinsloe v. Pogue, 213 Ill. 302, 72 N.E. 906.
The signer makes commitment to no one by the mere act of signing. In this respect his action has been likened to an offer which stands open until accepted. Idol v. Hanes, supra.
The analogy to a civil action has also frequently been made. If, in a civil action, the •defendant has not sought affirmative relief (or, under our rules, has not served a responsive pleading), the plaintiff may, as a matter of right, dismiss his action without prejudice. “It would be remarkable”, says the court in Idol v. Hanes, supra, “if we attached more importance to a petition than to the summons and complaint in a civil action.” [219 N.C. 723, 14 S.E.2d 803.]
The holding of the majority that withdrawals will not be permitted after affirmative legislative action has commenced would appear more reasonable to me in this case if the procedural steps for the filing, handling, and acting upon the petitions were defined. But there is no time specified for the filing. For all the statute dictates, petitions might be brought in singly, and at any time up^to and including the last moment before the ordinance is voted upon. But the right to petition implies the right to withdraw. In re Mosher, 25 Ariz. 297, 216 P. 242. If a last minute petition be permitted, then the right to a last minute withdrawal should equally be allowed.
The cases restricting the right to withdraw invariably deal with situations where there is express statutory requirement for the filing of the petitions; for the giving of notice of hearings thereon; for the judicial determination by the administrative body concerned of the sufficiency of the petitions; and for the giving of reasonable opportunity to withdraw. None of this exists here.
The majority opinion suggests that the problem is a jurisdictional one; that withdrawals should not be permitted after the wheels are set in motion and jurisdiction has attached. Nothing in law or logic, I believe, ties the question of the right to withdraw to the question of when jurisdiction attaches. See Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 253 Wis. 215, 33 N.W.2d 312, and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fournet in Barbe v. City of Lake Charles, 216 La. 871, 45 So.2d 62.
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should have been reversed.