Court Opinion

ID: 9568591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:27.905881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:19.082545
License: Public Domain

ARDAIZ, J.*
I respectfully dissent.
In Statutes 1993, Chapter 433 (Chapter 433), the California Legislature made factual findings expressly concluding that under certain circumstances, “the use of private consultants to supplement [Caltrans’s] workforce has permitted the department to substantially enhance its project delivery.” (Gov. Code, § 14130, subd. (a)(4), as contained in Ch. 433.)1 In other words, the Legislature concluded it is more efficient and less expensive not to expand state government when certain types of road and bridge engineering services can be performed by private consultants. This case is about whether the state must hire new employees to perform such work or may contract out those services under statutory provisions. Plaintiffs argue that the state must hire additional employees and that the Legislature’s efforts are unconstitutional. The Department of Transportation (Caltrans) argues that the Legislature has complied with the Constitution and that the Legislature’s factual findings supporting Chapter 433 justify private contracting.
*587As a matter of procedural history, the trial court was asked by Caltrans to consider Chapter 433 as changing the basis for its original injunction. The trial court made a determination that the Legislature’s factual findings were unsupported and erroneous based on factual conclusions reached by the trial court in its 1990 judgment and various orders of enforcement. Based on that premise, the trial court found Chapter 433 unconstitutional and concluded, therefore, that Chapter 433 could not then be considered a change in circumstances justifying modification of the 1990 injunction.
I conclude that the trial court erred in rejecting the factual findings of the Legislature, and that neither the trial court nor this court may reject such findings except under very limited circumstances not present here. I further conclude that Chapter 433 does not violate article VII of the California Constitution (article VII) and is constitutional on its face. Since the trial court erred in its determination that Chapter 433 was unconstitutional, the entire basis upon which it refused to modify or dissolve the injunction must be reversed. I believe the majority’s reasoning is contrary to well-established precedent, impairs the ability of the legislative branch of government to perform its constitutional functions, and creates a review process that may well violate the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
I. The Majority Err by Approving the Trial Court’s Reliance on the Truth of its Own 1990 Findings to Reject the Legislature’s Subsequent Factual Findings.
The trial court clearly engaged in its own independent factual analysis to conclude that the findings expressed by the Legislature in support of Chapter 433 were unsubstantiated and wrong; hence, the legislation is unconstitutional. Such a determination is endorsed by the majority opinion; however, I conclude that application or consideration of the trial court’s findings is inappropriate under long-standing and well-regarded case law which the majority opinion fails to acknowledge and has not distinguished by applicable precedent. At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that the appropriate standard of review for legislative findings was expressed in Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990], wherein this court stated: “ ‘[T]he rule is well settled that the legislative determination that the facts exist which make the law necessary, must not be set aside or disregarded by the courts, unless the legislative decision is clearly and palpably wrong and the error appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.)
This statement is an evolution of Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 652-653 [27 P. 1089]: “While the courts have undoubted power to declare a *588statute invalid, when it appears to them in the course of judicial action to be in conflict with the constitution, yet they can only do so when the question arises as a pure question of law, unmixed with matters of fact the existence of which must be determined upon a trial, and as the result of it, it may be, conflicting evidence. When the right to enact a law depends upon the existence of facts, it is the duty of the legislature, before passing the bill, and of the governor before approving it, to become satisfied in some appropriate way that the facts exist, and no authority is conferred upon the courts to hear evidence, and determine, as a question of fact, whether these co-ordinate departments of the state government have properly discharged such duty. The authority and duty to ascertain the facts which ought to control legislative action are, from the necessity of the case, devolved by the constitution upon those to whom it has given the power to legislate, and their decision that the facts exist is conclusive upon the courts, in the absence of an explicit provision in the constitution giving the judiciary the right to review such action. We therefore hold, that in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the court must confine itself to a consideration of those matters which appear upon the face of the law, and those facts of which it can take judicial notice. If the law, when thus considered, does not appear to be unconstitutional, the court will not go behind it, and, by a resort to evidence, undertake to ascertain whether the legislature, in its enactment, observed the restrictions which the constitution imposed upon it as a duty to do, and to the performance of which the members were bound by their oaths of office.” (Italics added.)
The trial court in the instant case was aware of the restrictions placed upon its power to make factual determinations regarding statutes. In this regard, the trial court utilized the correct standard, stating: “The courts may set aside the legislative findings on which the constitutionality of a statute is based only if the legislative findings could not reasonably be true on their face or in light of judicially noticeable facts.” The trial court then took “judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code § 452, subdivision (d), of the findings in the statement of decision underlying the judgment entered April 17, 1990, and the findings in the orders issued after evidentiary hearings to enforce the judgment.”2 In my view, the court erred in its determination of what constituted judicially noticeable facts.
*589We must first look to what was decided. The trial court concluded the 1990 injunction should remain in place because Chapter 433 was unconstitutional and therefore could not and did not impact the injunction. The basis for the trial court’s decision was not that the legislative findings in Chapter 433 may have conflicted with its earlier injunction and findings of fact, thereby creating a possible separation of powers issue.3 Rather, the trial court concluded the Legislature’s findings of fact in Chapter 433 were palpably erroneous and inconsistent with article VII because the court took judicial notice of the truth of its previous factual findings.4
*590It was by judicially noticing the truth of these factual findings that the court fundamentally erred. In effect, the trial court circumvented Lockard and Stevenson by taking judicial notice of the truth of its own findings. It was precisely these findings of fact which the trial court utilized to undermine the legislative findings and to conclude that Chapter 433 was unconstitutional: “In Chapter 433 of the Statutes of 1993, the Legislature has sought to provide defendants with justifications under article VII to implement their administrative and management policies for contracting. The legislative findings and directives comprising the justifications, however, are obviously erroneous, unreasonable and inconsistent with the constitutional civil service mandate.”
Under the rule of Lockard and Stevenson, the trial court’s prior factual findings when made could not properly be the basis upon which to find erroneous the legislative conclusions set forth to support Chapter 433. They cannot, therefore, become the basis through the mechanism of judicial notice. In other words, the trial court cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly. Further, judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true, but, rather, only means that those findings of fact were made. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1565 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 552]; accord, Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1749 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 484]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 14, fn. 6 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 350] [ability to judicially notice truth of statements “seriously doubted”]; Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1485 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 698].)
“[N] either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding ...[;] ‘[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.’ (1 Witkin, Cal. *591Evidence (3d ed. 1986) [Judicial Notice,] § 80[, p. 74].) Taking judicial notice of the truth of a judge’s factual finding [is] tantamount to taking judicial notice that the judge’s factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is therefore infallible.” (Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568.)
The majority note that the trial court’s 1990 injunction has become final, and that Caltrans has never challenged the trial court’s earlier findings and conclusions. While this is true, it is irrelevant in determining whether the trial court properly took judicial notice of those earlier findings and conclusions. “Under the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Judicial Notice, § 80, p. 74, italics added.) “‘[F]acts’ which were in actuality the subject of a reasonable dispute [do not] become, after the dispute has been judicially decided, ‘facts’ which could not reasonably be subject to dispute merely because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, if properly shown to apply, might operate to prevent further litigation of the dispute.” (Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1566.) “Whether a factual finding is true is a different question than whether the truth of that factual finding may or may not be subsequently litigated a second time. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will, when they apply, serve to bar relitigation of a factual dispute even in those instances where the factual dispute was erroneously decided. . . . [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1569.)
Plaintiffs also assert there was no objection to the trial court taking judicial notice. However, the constitutionality of a statute cannot turn on “the vagaries of litigation tactics.” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 14 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].) To hold otherwise would invite chaos. The constitutionality of Chapter 433 is a question of law; hence, “we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court. [Citations.] The propriety of the use of extrinsic materials in determining legislative intent is a question which may properly be considered on appeal regardless of whether the issue was raised in the trial court.” (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].) Accordingly, the propriety of the trial court’s action in taking judicial notice may be considered on appeal despite the lack of objection in the trial court.
Thus, contrary to the majority, I conclude that the trial court’s prior findings of fact should not and cannot properly be utilized to invalidate the legislation in Chapter 433 as unconstitutional. The trial court’s earlier *592findings of fact cannot be used to controvert the Legislature’s later findings. This court must disregard the earlier findings in determining whether Chapter 433 is unconstitutional.
II. The Majority Err by Not Applying the Presumption of Constitutionality.
The majority have, in my view, reversed the standard by which the Legislature’s findings and determinations are reviewed. It would appear the majority sought to find the legislation unconstitutional, whereas long-standing precedent requires just the opposite—that the court attempt to uphold the enactment.
The trial court found Chapter 433 unconstitutional on its face as opposed to unconstitutional as applied. “[A]n as applied challenge assumes that the statute . . . violated is valid and asserts that the manner of enforcement against a particular individual or individuals or the circumstances in which the statute ... is applied is unconstitutional.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1089 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402, 892 P.2d 1145].) Here, the trial court did not assume that Chapter 433 was valid, but instead found it to be unconstitutional because it authorized Caltrans to contract out in a manner which violated article VII.5
In determining whether legislation is facially invalid, it is settled that “[a] facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute . . . considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to . . . particular circumstances. . . .” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) In order to prevail in a facial attack on a legislative enactment, the challenge must establish that under no circumstance can the legislation be applied without violating the Constitution. “[Petitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute. . . . Rather, petitioners must demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 180-181 [172 Cal.Rptr. 487, 624 P.2d 1215], original italics; Tobe, supra, at p. 1084; see also Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 60-61 [51 *593Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 913 P.2d 1046].) In this regard, the burden here is not on Caltrans to validate Chapter 433, but on plaintiffs to invalidate that legislation. (See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 180-181 [“petitioners must demonstrate” facial invalidity of challenged law].) This places a heavy burden on plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 180.)
In reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, it must be remembered that “[cjourts have nothing to do with the wisdom of laws .... and the legislative power must be upheld unless manifestly abused so as to infringe on constitutional guaranties. . . . The only function of the courts is to determine whether the exercise of legislative power has exceeded constitutional limitations.” (Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.2d at pp. 461-462; see also Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) “Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the Legislature. [Citations.]” (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 77 [95 Cal.Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785].) “Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.” (Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963) 372 U.S. 726, 729 [83 S.Ct. 1028, 1030, 10 L.Ed.2d 93, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347].)
There is a “strong presumption of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.” (Delaney v. Lowery (1944) 25 Cal.2d 561, 569 [154 P.2d 674].) Thus, “ ‘[Legislative findings, while not binding on the courts, are given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to be unreasonable and arbitrary. [Citations.]’ ” (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1252 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112] (Amwest), quoting California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 583 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193] (Elliott)-, accord, The Housing Authority v. Dockweiler (1939) 14 Cal.2d 437, 449-450 [94 P.2d 794].) “ ‘In considering the constitutionality of a legislative act we presume its validity, resolving all doubts in favor of the Act. Unless conflict with a provision of the state or federal Constitution is clear and unquestionable, we must uphold the Act. [Citations.]’ ” (Amwest, supra, at p. 1252, quoting Elliott, supra, at p. 594.) As this court stated 60 years ago, “judicial decisions abound with declarations to the effect that all presumptions and intendments favor the validity of statutes; that mere doubt by the judicial branch of the government as to the validity of a statute will not afford a sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of its invalidity, but that statutes must be upheld as constitutional unless their invalidity clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.” (People v. Superior Court (1937) 10 Cal.2d 288, 298 [73 P.2d 1221], italics added.) *594This court has adhered to these principles in numerous cases involving diverse situations.6
As this court stated in Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691 [97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161], “We are guided in our inquiry by well settled rules of constitutional construction. Unlike the federal Constitution, which is a grant of power to Congress, the California Constitution is a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. [Citations.] Two important consequences flow from this fact. First, the entire law-making authority of the state, except the people’s right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the Legislature, and that body may exercise any and all legislative powers which are not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution. [Citations.] In other words, ‘we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.’ [Citation.]
“Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the Legislature’s plenary authority: ‘If there is any doubt as to the Legislature’s power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the Legislature’s action. Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended to include matters not covered by the language used.’ [Citations.]” (Accord, California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171, 175 [148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729]; Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 863, 868 [31 Cal.Rptr. 463, 382 P.2d 583]; Delaney v. Lowery, supra, *59525 Cal.2d at pp. 568-569; Collins v. Riley (1944) 24 Cal.2d 912, 916 [152 P.2d 169]; Martin v. Riley (1942) 20 Cal.2d 28, 39 [123 P.2d 488].)
Notably, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d 168, 180, this court applied the foregoing “fundamental principles of constitutional adjudication” to a challenge to legislation based on article VII. The majority fail to acknowledge this precedent.
Article VII, section 1 states: “(a) The civil service includes every officer and employee of the state except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. [1 (b) In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination.”
The purpose of this article, as disclosed in the ballot argument of its predecessor, California Constitution, former article XXIV, “ ‘is to promote efficiency and economy in state government. The sole aim of the act is to prohibit appointments and promotion in the service except on the basis of merit, efficiency, and fitness ascertained by competitive examination. . . .’ ” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley (1937) 9 Cal.2d 126, 134 [69 P.2d 985, 111 A.L.R. 1503] (Riley).) Article VII has been judicially interpreted as a restriction on contracting out state work to the private sector. (California State Employees’ Assn. v. State of California (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 840, 844 [245 Cal.Rptr. 232] (CSEA).) The restriction on contracting out does not arise from the express language of the Constitution, but rather “from an implicit necessity for protecting the policy of the organic civil service mandate against dissolution and destruction. [Citation.]” (California State Employees’ Assn. v. Williams (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 397 [86 Cal.Rptr. 305] (Williams).)
In Riley, this court stated that the true test of whether contracting outside civil service is permissible, is “whether the services contracted for, whether temporary or permanent, are of such a nature that they could be performed by one selected under the provisions of civil service.” (Riley, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 135.) Literally read, Riley prohibits the contracting out of services in virtually every factual scenario imaginable, regardless of economic considerations. In short, Riley requires that the state hire new employees, as opposed to contracting with the private sector, whenever it is possible to hire someone to perform the services at issue, regardless of any other considerations. Such an interpretation goes well beyond the purpose of article VII and what is necessary to protect the civil service system. It results in an ever-expanding government payroll and exalts the entity of the civil service *596system over considerations of economic responsibility and economic sensibility. To the extent that may be interpreted as the meaning of Riley, it must be rejected.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that Riley and its progeny need not be overruled at this time. I do so not because I agree with the possible consequences of these cases, but because it is not necessary to overturn established precedent in order to uphold the legislation at issue here. The majority acknowledge judicial interpretations of Riley which find exceptions to the expressed rule of that case by permitting the state to contract privately for services that state employees have traditionally performed if those services (1) are of a nature that they could not be performed “adequately and competently,” or more economically, through civil service (Riley, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 135; CSEA, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 851-853), (2) represent a new state function (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 397), or (3) are being withdrawn from state service, or “privatized,” on an experimental basis (Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 585, 592-594 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 599].) It is the economic savings exception which is applicable here to find Chapter 433 constitutional on its face.
The implication of an “economic savings” requirement is inherent in a common-sense reading of Chapter 433. (See County of Los Angeles v. Legg (1936) 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [55 P.2d 206] [sufficient that statute makes limitation, required by Constitution, by necessary inference from its language].) Although not explicitly stated in the act, it is apparent that implicit in Chapter 433 is a provision that contracting out must make economic sense—it must be cheaper than using civil service—and that the discretion of the Director of Transportation (Director) to contract out must be exercised toward that end. (See People v. Globe Grain & Mill Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 121, 128 [294 P. 3] [“It is to be presumed that the commission will exercise its powers in conformity with the statute and Constitution of the state.”].)7
This court has refused to undertake wholesale judicial amendment of legislation. (See, e.g., Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 444-445 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101]; Elliott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 594; Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 282 [96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242, 45 A.L.R.3d 1206].) However, “a reviewing court may, in appropriate circumstances, and consistently with the separation of powers doctrine, *597reform a statute to conform it to constitutional requirements in lieu of simply declaring it unconstitutional and unenforceable.” (Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 615 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248].) “[W]herever possible, [this court] will interpret a statute as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize Constitution and statute. [Citations.]” (Elliott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 594.) This is because this court “[is] bound, if possible, to construe a statute in a fashion that renders it constitutional.” (In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 710.) This court has followed this principle in a wide variety of situations.8 With regard to Chapter 433, implication of an “economic savings” requirement constitutes a fair and reasonable interpretation of the legislation, and is both permissible and appropriate. (See Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
That the Legislature intends to encourage contracting out indicates a finding by that body that contracting out is frequently less expensive than hiring new employees, especially when the costs of short-term hiring and layoffs are taken into account. This reading is supported by the Legislature’s express finding in section 14130, subdivision (a)(3), which recites that contracting out “avoid[s] the costly process of short-time hiring and layoff while still responding in a timely manner to funding opportunities and uncertainties[.]”
Subdivision (d) of section 14130 arguably can be read as contradicting such an implicit provision of economic savings.9 However, when read with a view toward finding the statute constitutional (see Miller v. Municipal Court *598(1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [142 P.2d 297]), a reasonable construction is that Caltrans is not required to hire all the new staff it can use, but can contract out if economically advantageous.10
Thus, Chapter 433, when properly interpreted, does not disregard the constitutional restriction on private contracting, but instead is consistent with the purposes of article VII. It does not prevent the hiring of additional civil service personnel, nor does it require or permit the displacement of existing civil service personnel.11 It simply allows the Director the discretion to contract out where such a move makes economic sense. I fail to see how this threatens the civil service system or runs afoul of article VII, which was never intended to require an ever-expanding government payroll. By enacting article VII, the electorate sought to obtain fiscal responsibility in government. A requirement that the state must expand its work force whenever —and however temporarily—its workload expands, no matter what the cost or how much cheaper the service would be if contracted out, would be the antithesis of such a goal.
In examining Chapter 433, it must be presumed the Legislature intended its act to be valid and to fall within the scope of its constitutional powers. (In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 652 [122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384]; Miller v. Municipal Court, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 828; see San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 2 Cal.4th 571, 581 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 245, 828 P.2d 147].) As this court cogently stated more than 90 years ago, “In determining the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, courts always presume in the first place that the act is constitutional. They also presume that the legislature acted with integrity, and with an honest *599purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid down by the constitution. The legislature is a coordinate department of the government, invested with high and responsible duties, and it must be presumed that it has considered and discussed the constitutionality of all measures passed by it.” (Beach v. Von Detten (1903) 139 Cal. 462, 464-465 [73 P. 187], italics added.)
Neither the passage of time nor intervening authorities have lessened the applicability of these legal principles. In my view, the majority err by presuming not that the Legislature intended its enactment to be consistent with the purposes of article VII, but that it intended its enactment as a way to circumvent the limitations which have been judicially imposed to implement that constitutional mandate.
In this regard, the prohibition against contracting out is not a direct constitutional expression: nowhere does article VII expressly say what Riley and its progeny say it means. Instead, Riley is a judicial interpretation which itself has been judicially interpreted by later cases. Thus, as the majority acknowledge (maj. opn., ante, at p. 565), “we deal with a constitutional provision of a kind, similar to many others, which necessarily and over a period of time will require judicial, legislative and administrative construction." (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 244 [construing Cal. Const., art. XIII A].)
Chapter 433 constitutes a reasonable legislative construction of article VII. In Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor, supra, 5 Cal.3d at page 692, this court held that a “settled principle” is the “strong presumption in favor of the Legislature’s interpretation of a provision of the Constitution.” This court continued: “That presumption has been phrased differently over the years, but its import remains clear. Thus in San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1920) 183 Cal. 273, 279 . . . , the court held that ‘where a constitutional provision may well have either of two meanings, it is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that, if the Legislature has by statute adopted one, its action in this respect is well nigh, if not completely, controlling. When the Legislature has once construed the constitution, for the courts then to place a different construction upon it means that they must declare void the action of the Legislature. It is no small matter for one branch of the government to annul the formal exercise by another and coordinate branch of power committed to the latter, and the courts should not and must not annul, as contrary to the constitution, a statute passed by the Legislature, unless it can be said of the statute that it positively and certainly is opposed to the constitution. This is elementary. But plainly this *600cannot be said of a statute which merely adopts one of two reasonable and possible constructions of the constitution.’
“In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com. (1932) 215 Cal. 461, 464 . . . , the same reasoning led us to the statement that ‘For the purpose of determining constitutionality, we cannot construe a section of the Constitution as if it were a statute, and adopt our own interpretation without regard to the legislative construction. Where more than one reasonable meaning exists, it is our duty to accept that chosen by the legislature.’ (Accord, Lundberg v. County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 652 . . . .) Again, in Delaney v. Lowery (1944) 25 Cal.2d 561, 569 . . . , we referred to the presumption of constitutionality and the rule of strict construction of constitutional limitations on the Legislature, and concluded, ‘Those principles indicate the latitude and effect to be given a legislative construction or interpretation of the Constitution. When the Constitution has a doubtful or obscure meaning or is capable of various interpretations, the construction placed thereon by the Legislature is of very persuasive significance.’ The rule, moreover, remains viable today. (See, e.g., County of Madera v. Gendron (1963) 59 Cal.2d 798, 802 . . . ; Miro v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 99 . . . ; Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Superior Court (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 67, 74 . . . .)” (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 692-693.)
Similarly, in California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci, supra, 22 Cal.3d 171, 177, this court stated: “We ... are very mindful that article XXXIV [concerning local elections on low-rent housing projects] is a direct expression of the People who, alone, have the power to adopt or change the Constitution [citation], and that the judiciary, rather than the Legislature, is principally charged with its construction. Nonetheless, we affirm the Legislature’s interpretive efforts unless they are disclosed to be unreasonable or clearly inconsistent with the express language or clear import of the Constitution.” In Patitucci, this court noted that the constitutional provision was not completely unambiguous; reasonable minds could differ as to whether a particular mixed income development constituted a low-rent housing project. The court concluded: “[T]he Legislature, with its extensive fact-finding powers, is better suited than we are to assess the financial and aesthetic consequences of its policies. When it has made such judgments, we will not disturb them unless they are inherently improbable or unreasonable.” (Id. at p. 179.)
In the case of article VII, it cannot reasonably be said the meaning of the constitutional provision is clear or that its construction is not disputed. *601Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favor of the Legislature’s efforts at interpretation. Moreover, an Assembly Transportation Committee report submitted to the Legislature before it adopted Chapter 433 acknowledged that questions existed concerning the constitutionality of the legislation. As this court has stated in conjunction with legislation alleged to be in violation of article VII, “the presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislative acts is particularly appropriate when the Legislature has enacted a statute with the relevant constitutional prescriptions clearly in mind. [Citation.] In such a case, the statute represents a considered legislative judgment as to the appropriate reach of the constitutional provision. Although the ultimate constitutional interpretation must rest, of course, with the judiciary [citation], a focused legislative judgment on the question enjoys significant weight and deference by the courts.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 180.)
In my view, the findings and statements of intent included in Chapter 433 are not inconsistent on their face with appropriate constitutional interpretation of article VII. There is nothing before me to show the Legislature was “clearly and palpably wrong” in its findings and declarations. (Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 461.)12 The whole purpose of Chapter 433, including its intent and findings, is geared toward a cheaper, more expedient and economic way of doing things. This is consistent with article VII, as interpreted by Riley and its progeny.13
In sum, I submit that the Court of Appeal majority correctly recognized that Chapter 433 is consistent with article VII as furthering the goals of *602efficient, cost-effective government—which is the expressed purpose in the original ballot argument—and that the legislation does not impair the integrity of civil service. I do not find such a conclusion inconsistent with a reasonable application of Riley and its progeny. In fact, I conclude that a contrary interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the ballot argument originally expressed in the predecessor to article VII, “to promote efficiency and economy in state government.”
HI. The Majority Unreasonably Interfere With the Separation of Powers.
Finally, the majority’s determination that Chapter 433 is unconstitutional on its face unreasonably and improperly encroaches upon the prerogative of the legislative branch of government, thereby interfering with the separation of powers.14
The doctrine of separation of powers is a precept which is central to our constitutional form of government. As this court recently explained, “Although the language of California Constitution article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ‘ “does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent” ’ [citation], or that the actions of one branch may not significantly affect those of another branch. Indeed, ... the substantial interrelatedness of the three branches’ actions is apparent and commonplace: the judiciary passes upon the constitutional validity of legislative and executive actions, the Legislature enacts statutes that govern the procedures and evidentiary rules applicable in judicial and executive proceedings, and the Governor appoints judges and participates in the legislative process through the veto power. Such interrelationship, of course, lies at the heart of the constitutional theory of ‘checks and balances’ that the separation of powers doctrine is intended to serve.
“At the same time, this doctrine unquestionably places limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other branches. The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function. [Citation.] The executive branch, in expending public funds, may not disregard legislatively prescribed directives *603and limits pertaining to the use of such funds. [Citation.] And the Legislature may not undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and resolved by final judicial judgment. [Citations.]” (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53.)
Unless a statute’s unconstitutionality “ ‘clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears’ ” (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 814), the judiciary should not interfere. The majority in effect apply a species of “independent review” to the Legislature’s factual findings, which would allow courts to decide for themselves whether the evidence supported the Legislature’s determinations and conclusions or to make sure the Legislature—in the reviewing court’s view—had before it “sufficient” evidence to warrant its enactment of the particular legislation at issue.
The ramifications of such an expansive view of the court’s role vis-á-vis that of a coequal branch of government, are far-reaching and pernicious. In order to enact laws that would be upheld against constitutional challenges, would the Legislature be required to hold extensive evidentiary hearings? Would it be bound by the Evidence Code as to what evidence it could consider? What standard of evidence would the reviewing court require? Would a court passing upon the constitutionality of legislation be permitted to take evidence supporting or opposing the law, as the trial court in effect did here? If so, would the constitutionality of legislation then become a question of which side hired the best attorney? The majority opinion has the strong potential to hamstring the Legislature every time its proposed legislation touches upon a “constitutional mandate.”
The majority’s view is not supported by precedent, but instead presents a sharp and unwarranted departure therefrom. As previously explained, the Legislature’s factual determinations may be set aside or disregarded by the courts only if the fact of error “ ‘appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice.’ [Citations.]” (Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 461.) If the error does not so appear, “ ‘the legislative determination that the facts exist which make the law necessary’ ” (ibid.) is binding on the courts in the sense that the courts cannot then go behind those findings to find factual error or lack of what might be termed evidentiary support. Thus, the requirements that courts presume legislative enactments to be constitutional and that such great weight be given to legislative findings that they will be upheld unless they are palpably erroneous, does not mean those findings are placed totally beyond the power of courts to *604review. Necessarily under the separation of powers doctrine, however, courts are limited in what they can review to determine the propriety of legislative findings of fact and determinations. If the Lockard requirements for disregard of the legislative findings and determinations are not met, a court must then accept the facts as found by the Legislature and determine whether, based on those facts, the legislation comports with the Constitution. (See Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1253-1255.)
The majority cite Amwest as supporting greater judicial latitude regarding legislative findings, noting that even though legislative findings generally will be upheld, “we also must enforce the provisions of our Constitution and ‘may not lightly disregard or blink at... a clear constitutional mandate.’ ” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1252.) However, Amwest is not analogous. There, the initiative measure known as Proposition 103 provided that it could not be amended by the Legislature except to further the purposes of that act. At issue was whether a subsequently enacted statute furthered the purposes of the act. This court had to determine the standard of review applicable to that question. On the one hand, the plaintiff relied on the presumption of constitutionality to argue for a deferential standard, while its opponents argued the question was one of statutory interpretation which the court should consider de novo. (Amwest, supra, at pp. 1247, 1251.) This court stated: “In the present case, ... the construction of article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution is not disputed. The parties agree that the Legislature has the authority to amend Proposition 103 without voter approval, but only to further the purposes of the initiative. In enacting [the statute in question], the Legislature did not purport to interpret the Constitution, but only to amend the statutory provisions enacted by Proposition 103. The issue before us is whether the Legislature exceeded its authority. The ‘rule of deference to legislative interpretation’ of the California Constitution, therefore, has no application in the present case. We do, however, apply the general rule that ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality supports the Legislature’s acts. [Citations.]’ ” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1253, italics added.)
This court explained that when dealing with the question of whether to uphold the Legislature’s determination that an urgency measure is necessary, it applies “the rule that a declaration of urgency by the Legislature will not be declared invalid ‘unless it “appears clearly and affirmatively from the legislature’s statement of facts that a public necessity does not exist.” [Citations.]’ ‘If there is any doubt as to whether the facts do or do not state a case of immediate necessity, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the legislative declaration . . . .’ [Citation.] The reason for this rule is that the *605question whether such necessity exists is one of fact to be determined by the Legislature." (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1253-1254, italics added; accord, Stockburger v. Jordan (1938) 10 Cal.2d 636, 642 [76 P.2d 674] [determination of necessity for urgency measure is purely a legislative question; courts will not interfere with determination “save in those few exceptional cases where it appears clearly and affirmatively from the legislature’s statement of facts that a public necessity does not exist.”].) Where, on the other hand, the question was whether the urgency legislation violated the Constitution by abolishing or changing the duties of an office, “[although this court accorded great deference to the Legislature’s factual determination that urgency legislation was necessary, we went on to consider, as a question of law, whether the urgency measure at issue ‘create[d] any office or change[d] the salary or duties of any officer, or create[d] any vested right or interest.’ [Citation.] In addressing this issue, we simply examined the provisions of the statute and determined that they were not of the type forbidden in urgency legislation. [Citation.]” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th. at p. 1254, italics added.) With regard to the question before it, this court concluded: “Accordingly, starting with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority, we shall uphold the validity of [the statute at issue] if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes of Proposition 103.” (Id. at p. 1256.)
Here, by contrast, Chapter 433 constitutes an interpretation of a constitutional provision, the construction and limits of which are disputed.
There is one area in which it has been said “that the ordinary deference a court owes to any legislative action vanishes,” and that is “when constitutionally protected rights are threatened.” (Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 514 [217 Cal.Rptr. 225, 703 P.2d 1119].) However, I have been unable to find any authority which applies this principle outside the area of legislation being subjected to scrutiny under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The majority cite Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 622 [114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497] for the proposition that the deference afforded to legislative findings does not foreclose a court’s independent judgment of the facts, and that the court is obligated to assure that the legislative body has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. In reality, Turner states: “That Congress’ predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that they are insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether. On the contrary, we *606have stressed in First Amendment cases that the deference afforded to legislative findings does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.’ [Citations.] This obligation to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress’ factual predictions with our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Turner, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 666 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2471] (lead opn. of Kennedy, J.), italics added.)
Thus, when read it context, it is clear that Turner does nothing to undermine the general rule of deference afforded to a legislative body’s factual findings. Nothing in Turner or the cases on which it relies suggests that the standard enunciated in Turner applies outside the First Amendment realm. Where other areas of the law are concerned, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. [Citations.] ‘ “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.” ’ [Citations.]” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 315 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211], italics added.)
The majority’s reliance on Turner is misplaced. Moreover, even assuming that non-First Amendment areas exist in which application of a lesser standard of deference might be appropriate, this is not one of them.15 Article VII does not involve “constitutionally protected rights,” nor does Chapter 433 threaten such rights. Accordingly, there is no basis for the majority’s unacknowledged abandonment of the long line of authorities I have previously discussed.
The judiciary’s review of legislative acts must be circumspect and deferential, reflecting the constraints of the Constitution. Otherwise, the judicial branch may be perceived as assuming the role of arbiter of social and fiscal policy, a role which is properly left to the representative branch of government. It is this fundamental allocation of responsibility that undergirds our *607tripartite system. For the judiciary to litigate and reject the factual conclusions of the legislative branch supporting its policy determinations—and even to come to opposite conclusions—strikes at the heart of this delicate structure. Courts are neither policymakers nor legislative fact finders. It is for the Legislature to find the facts and it falls to us to respect those findings unless they are clearly wrong—wrong without reasoned dispute or the influence of opposing perspectives. That is not to say we are required to acknowledge the emperor’s clothing if he is naked; rather, it is to say that if we cannot by resort to what reasonable people know to be indisputably true reach a contrary finding, we must accept and respect the findings of those who have that responsibility.
For these reasons, I conclude the trial court erroneously found Chapter 433 unconstitutional on its face. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal reversing the trial court.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1997. Werdegar, J., and Brown, J., did not participate therein. Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

 References to undesignated code sections are to provisions of the Government Code as contained in Chapter 433.

 Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) permits judicial notice to be taken of records of “any court of this state.”
The trial court also concluded that many of the facts in those findings (of April 17, 1990, and subsequent enforcement orders) were judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (g) and (h). Those provisions, respectively, permit judicial notice to be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and *589accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” While it theoretically would be possible for the trial court to take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (g) and (h), I have examined the trial court’s statement of decision and can find no facts of consequence that would fall within either of these provisions.

 Although the trial court stated that section 14137 raises a “serious question” about a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, it is clear that the trial court’s decision did not rest on this point. In my view, Chapter 433 is not unconstitutional on its face on the ground that in sections 14130.3 and 14137, the Legislature impinged upon the separation of powers by authorizing contracts which may be inconsistent with a specific trial court judgment. Since the trial court did not base its decision on this ground, however, and given that the contracts at issue no longer appear to be in effect in any event, I see no need to discuss the issue.

 The trial court’s use solely of factual conclusions to undermine legislative findings is best illustrated by its order of April 19, 1994, wherein the court stated: “In section 14130, subdivision (a)(5), the Legislature finds that ‘the use of private consultants to assist in project delivery is a new state function and does not duplicate the existing functions of the department.’ ... [¶] From facts which the Court may properly judicially notice, it is evident that defendants’ contracts with private consultants for the performance of engineering services to deliver highway projects duplicate an existing state function historically performed by civil service staff. The contracts are intended to supplement the work of civil service staff (see § 14130, subd. (a)(4)), and defendants use private consultants interchangeably with civil service staff to provide project design and development, construction inspection, locally funded, seismic retrofitting, and other project delivery services. . . . [N]o new methods of managing, financing, or otherwise performing project delivery work distinguish the work performed by private consultants from that historically and presently performed by civil service staff. [¶] Subdivision (5)(a) [sic] is palpably wrong in finding that defendants’ use of private consultants to perform project delivery services is a new state function, years after civil service staff began performing the function. (See Department of Transportation v. Chavez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 407, 415-416 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].)” (Fn. omitted, italics added.)
Likewise, regarding section 14130, subdivision (a)(4), the court concluded: “In section 14130, subdivision (a)(4), the Legislature finds that ‘[w]ithout the ability to continue a stable contracting out program, ... the department will not be able to perform project delivery adequately, competently, or satisfactorily.’ In support of this finding, subdivision (a)(4) indicates that the use of private consultants has substantially enhanced project delivery; that private consultants recently helped to accelerate nearly one billion dollars worth of state highway projects; and that this increase in project delivery capability must continue for timely project delivery. [¶] ... [¶] The legislative finding in subdivision (a)(4) categorically establishes the inadequacy of defendants’ civil service staff to timely deliver the workload. Without consideration of defendants’ actual workloads in particular fiscal years or the actual *590number of regular and temporary civil service staff who could be obtained to accomplish the workloads in those years, the Legislature determines that defendants’ workload will inevitably exceed the capability of civil service staff and, therefore, a ‘stable contracting out program’ to supplement civil service staff will inevitably be necessary to timely respond to funding opportunities and timely deliver projects. [¶] Such is not the case. As the Court may judicially notice, the inadequacy of civil service staff to timely deliver the workload of highway projects has been traceable, not to a lack of available or obtainable personnel qualified to perform the work, but to defendants’ policy and practice since the 1980s of maintaining civil service staff at a level inadequate to perform the workload and in contracting privately for the portion of the workload exceeding the staff’s capacity. . . . [¶] • • • [¶] The legislative finding in subdivision (a)(4), conclusively establishing the inadequacy of civil service to perform the project delivery workload, is clearly wrong and cannot constitutionally justify defendants’ contracts for project development services.” (Fns. omitted, italics added.)
The trial court used similar factual conclusions elsewhere in its order as well.

The trial court stated: “The Court concludes that Chapter 433 of the Statutes of 1993 is unconstitutional in that it authorizes defendants to contract with private consultants for the performance of project development services without a factual showing that the contracts are permissible under article VII. The enactment of Chapter 433 accordingly, does not warrant the modification or dissolution of the injunction in this action.” At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded the trial court found Chapter 433 unconstitutional on its face.

 See, e.g„ In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 710 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365] (overbreadth and vagueness attacks on hate crimes statute); Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 780 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 814, 884 P.2d 645] (referendum of county employee compensation); People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1219 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 824 P.2d 694] (due process challenge to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i)); McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348, 388-389 [261 Cal.Rptr. 318, 777 P.2d 91] (claim that statute permitted administrative agency to exercise judicial powers); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 814-815 [258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247] (attack on facial validity of initiative measure); Mills v. Superior Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 951, 957 [232 Cal.Rptr. 141, 728 P.2d 211] (statute permitting admission of written statements in lieu of non-eyewitness testimony at preliminary hearings); People v. Superior Court (Engerí) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 812 [183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76] (vagueness challenge to special circumstance statute); In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 519 [86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204] (requirement that minor’s parents reimburse costs of appointed counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings); In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 453 [75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296] (standard of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings); State of California v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 365, 371 [310 P.2d 7] (apportionment of workers’ compensation award); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484 [171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701] (statute prohibiting employer from regulating political activities of employees); Elliott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 594 (local election requirement for low-rent housing projects).

 Although Globe Grain concerned a statute which contained some express limits on the commission’s exercise of discretion, I see no reason why the same presumption should not apply here.

 See, e.g., In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 710 (overbreadth and vagueness attacks on hate crimes statute); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 822, footnote 15 (attack on facial validity of initiative measure); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.3d 180, 186 [185 Cal.Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902] (billboard ordinance); Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 175 [167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836] (involuntary conservatorship provisions); In re Klor (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 821 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791] (anti-obscenity statute); Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 839 [313 P.2d 545] (whether sales tax levy was subject to referendum); Busch v. Turner (1945) 26 Cal.2d 817, 820 [161 P.2d 456, 171 A.L.R. 1063] (applicability of statutory salary increase to incumbent); Collins v. Riley, supra, 24 Cal.2d at page 915 (whether statute reimbursing “traveling expenses” impermissibly increased mileage allotment); County of Los Angeles v. Riley (1936) 6 Cal.2d 625, 627 [59 P.2d 139, 106 A.L.R. 903] (taxation; “[W]hen the general nature of counties is considered and weight is given to the proper rules of construction, we are bound to read this limitation into the statute, in order to sustain, if possible, the constitutionality of the act.”); People v. Globe Grain & Mill Co., supra, 211 Cal. at page 127 (statute justifying what would otherwise have been a nuisance); Burns v. Superior Court (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 7-8 [73 P. 597] (superior court’s power regarding contempt).

 That subdivision provides: “(d) In furtherance of the Legislature’s intent to encourage contracting out by the department, the department shall not be required to utilize state employees to perform all engineering and related services to the maximum extent required to *598meet the goals of this article. The department is not required to staff to an internal level that matches its ability to assimilate and productively use new staff.”

I do not consider the impact, if any, of Government Code section 14101, which states: “The department shall contract with qualified architects and engineers for the performance of work when it is determined by the Director of Transportation, with the approval of the Director of Finance, that the obtainable staff is unable to perform the particular work within the time the public interest requires such to be done.” The existence of this statute is not relevant to a determination as to the facial validity of Chapter 433.

For instance, Government Code section 14131, which is not altered by Chapter 433, provides: “The department may contract for the services of engineers, architects, surveyors, planners, environmental specialists, and materials testing specialists to provide professional and technical services relating to project study reports, project development, surveying, and construction inspection whenever the director determines that the guidelines adopted pursuant to Section 14134 are applicable. Services contracted for shall not cause the displacement of any permanent, temporary, or part-time employee of the department. [¶] For purposes of this section ‘displacement’ means layoff, demotion, involuntary transfer to a new class, or involuntary transfer to a new work location requiring the employee to change his or her place of residence in order to be able to continue in his or her job classification.” (Italics added.)

 The determination, contained in section 14130, subdivision (a)(5), that the use of private consultants to assist in project delivery is a new state function, is not a factual determination. (See Department of Transportation v. Chavez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 407, 414 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) It is a legal conclusion to which courts do not defer. To me, however, the existence of this provision further shows the Legislature was aware of Riley and its progeny and was attempting to enact legislation that would pass constitutional muster. I note, as did the Court of Appeal, the arguable iliogic of a portion of the finding contained in section 14130, subdivision (a)(4), that “Without the ability to continue a stable contracting out program, ... the department will not be able to perform project delivery adequately, competently, or satisfactorily, thereby necessitating the use of private consultants to supplement its in-house staff.” Nevertheless, this declaration does not detract from the overall legislative finding that a stable contracting out program is necessary for adequate project delivery.

 The majority determine that Chapter 433 does not contain findings that would excuse noncompliance with the civil service mandate or afford a legitimate basis for disregarding the constitutional restriction on private contracting. On its face, however, Chapter 433—when properly read and viewed under settled legal principles—does not run afoul of the civil service mandate. As it neither fails to comply with that mandate nor disregards the constitutional restriction on contracting out, I would not expect it to contain findings which would seek to excuse noncompliance with or disregard of article VII.

 ArticIe III, section 3 of the California Constitution states: “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”

 For instance, in Mills v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.3d 951, 957, this court determined that it must “subject to careful scrutiny any legislation restricting the ability of defendants to cross-examine witnesses whose testimony is offered as evidence of probable cause [at a preliminary hearing].” Even when applying “careful scrutiny,” however, this court stated: “At the same time, we are mindful that it is our duty to uphold a statute unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)