Court Opinion

ID: 9720187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:19:29.734362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.073475
License: Public Domain

TEIGEN, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result. However, I do not agree with the broad language of paragraph number 3 of the syllabus. Our holding, as set forth in the opinion, is limited to the principle of law that where a search warrant was based upon an affidavit which does not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, any evidence obtained as a result of the search is inadmissible. The opinion applies the federal constitutional requirements as interpreted by the federal decisions. I agree that the affidavit in this case does not meet the federal standards and, therefore, under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the evidence obtained is not admis*303sible in the state court. Mapp forced upon the states the exclusionary rule of admissibility of evidence where such evidence was obtained in violation of the federal constitution. Mapp, however, does not require the application of the exclusionary rule of admissibility to the states where the evidence is obtained in violation of the state constitution or its statutes. This state, historically, has followed the common-law rule of admissibility. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925); State v. Pauley, 49 N.D. 488, 192 N.W. 91 (1922); State v. Lacy, 55 N.D. 83, 212 N.W. 442 (1927). See also, 50 A.L.R.2d 531-546, and later case service.
I cannot concur in paragraph number 3 of the syllabus as written. I think that this paragraph should be limited to our holding in this case. If it is the intent of the majority to reverse the common-law rule of admissibility of evidence and adopt the exclusionary rule in this state, where the federal requirements are met but the state requirements are not met, they should say so in the opinion.
KNUDSON, J„ concurs.