Court Opinion

ID: 9465233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:39:59.262326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:03.348873
License: Public Domain

*644GIBSON, Chief Judge,
dissenting, in which BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, join.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc. Upon greater reflection it appears that the panel opinion contains two areas of difficulty. First, it finds liability based on supposed warranties contained in a catalog distributed years before the parties contracted for construction of this tower. Second, it refuses to enforce contractual clauses limiting Dresser’s liability to the repair or replacement of the tower, or refund of the purchase price.
In my view, the evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury verdict of liability based on breach of the express warranty contained in the written contract. Since I believe the evidence supported a finding of liability on at least one theory, it would be counterproductive to rehear the question of liability.
Failure to enforce the clause limiting Dresser’s liability, however, presents a serious question of injustice. The parties are two substantial commercial corporate entities, experienced in the technical world of broadcasting. They had dealt with one another before and were aware of the risk that broadcast towers entail and that towers ■ sometimes fall. They also knew that construction costs of towers had been rising from year to year. Despite these facts, the parties entered into an agreement expressly providing that in the event of breach of warranty Dresser would, at Dresser’s “sole option, repair, replace or refund an equitable portion of the purchase price of any product or work which seller determines to have been defective or failed to meet applicable specifications * * *
I cannot imagine any clearer agreement of the parties to limit the extent of liability. Nor can I say that the remedy fails its “essential purpose” or is “unconscionable.” 1 To suppose that the limitation on remedy contained in the contract was intended to apply only to the warranties contained in the written agreement but not to those in the catalog, is to build a fantasy on top of a fiction.2 Under U.C.C. § 2-719(1), S.D. Compiled Laws § 57-8-49, the parties are entitled to limit remedies. To further certainty in commercial relationships and justice between these parties, we ought to enforce the contract as written.

. The requirement that the buyer give notice of any defect within six months of completion stands on a different footing. If applied here it would result in the warranties and remedies failing their essential purposes and would be unconscionable.

. The panel opinion finds the catalog representations to be part of the “bargain.” However, it refuses to acknowledge that in that case they become the “specifications” for the work. They are being applied by this court. In short, the catalog representations became the “applicable specifications” referred to in the written contract. Contra slip op. at 642.