Court Opinion

ID: 9473432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:29:40.927727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:31.599119
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the court but for different reasons. Petitioner in this case was originally charged with voluntary manslaughter. On the advice of his attorney, he agreed to take a polygraph examination and stipulated that the results of the test could be used “in the trial of the above action by either the District Attorney or by counsel for the defendant.” Several days after the exam, petitioner was charged and indicted on the more serious offense of murder. Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the polygraph on the ground that, due to petitioner’s inability to understand English, he did not understand the stipulation he signed or the questions asked during the polygraph exam. The trial court denied the motion, finding that petitioner’s knowledge of English was adequate to understand the stipulation and the questions asked during the exam. Petitioner was convicted of murder.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari. Petitioner moved for post-conviction relief, including an allegation that, even if the stipulation was valid, it pertained only to the manslaughter charge and did not constitute waiver of his rights in the trial on the subsequent murder charge. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied relief. Petitioner then filed this petition for habeas corpus relief, which the district court denied. This court reverses the district court, and in its opinion holds that the district court’s finding that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his fifth amendment rights was clearly erroneous. The court bases its decision on a determination, contrary to the finding of the state trial court, that defendant did not understand English.
The question of petitioner’s ability to understand English is a question of historical fact. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (substance of ex parte communications and effect of those communications on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 848-49, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) (in determining validity of guilty plea, finding that respondent was “an intelligent individual, well versed in the criminal processes and well represented in all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel,” and the inferences fairly deducible from these facts are entitled to presumption of correctness). Such fact findings are to be accorded a “high measure of deference.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). This deference “requires that a federal habeas court more than simply disagree with the factual determinations. Instead, it must conclude that the state court findings lacked even ‘fair support’ in the record.” Marshall, 103 S.Ct. at 850. Since there appears to be fair support in the record for the trial court’s finding, we cannot base our finding that petitioner did not validly waive his *570fifth amendment rights on his inability to understand English.
This does not, however, mean that the district court must be affirmed. The question of whether petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights is “a mixed determination of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the historical facts of this case.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 947 (11th Cir.1983). The trial court’s conclusion on this question is open to collateral attack on review. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 342, 100 S.Ct. at 1714.
The waiver of rights such as the right against self-incrimination “not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Given the ambiguities of the stipulation he signed, petitioner cannot be said to have been fully aware of the possibility that information obtained in the polygraph exam could be used against him in a subsequent murder trial, even if he understands English perfectly.
The stipulation, on its face, is limited to application to the manslaughter charge. It states that:
Defendant Claudio Fernandez has been charged in this case with voluntary man-slaughter____ It is therefore agreed and stipulated between the parties as follows:
* * * * * *
7. That any results of the polygraph exam, and statements or admissions made therein, may be used at the trial of the above action by either the District Attorney or by counsel for the defendant.
(emphasis added). At the time of the stipulation petitioner had not been charged with murder and had no knowledge that he would be. The stipulation cannot be said to constitute knowing and intelligent consent to use of information obtained in the polygraph exam in a later trial for murder.
In addition, the stipulation creates the implication that information obtained in the polygraph exam will only be used to reduce the charges — not to increase them. The stipulation states that “... the State has agreed with counsel for Mr. Fernandez that if the testimony of Mr. Fernandez before the polygraph examiner constitutes evidence of his innocence and if his testimony can be corroborated by credible evidence, that the State will consider reduction or dismissal of the charges herein.” No mention is made anywhere in the stipulation that the information may be used to increase the charges. In light of these ambiguities, the district court erred in finding that petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his rights against self-incrimination for purposes of his murder trial. I therefore concur in the judgment of the court that the judgment must be reversed.