Court Opinion

ID: 9908883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 00:00:51.153234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:34.696165
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1050     Document: 010110966177      Date Filed: 12/11/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       December 11, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  BRIAN ANDERSON,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1050
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-03453-KLM)
  JEFF LONG,                                                  (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Brian Anderson appeals the dismissal of his pro se civil-rights action claiming

 that Jeff Long, the warden of Colorado’s Sterling Correctional Facility, violated his

 Eighth Amendment rights by failing to implement a policy of providing single-person

 prison cells to medically vulnerable inmates to prevent him from contracting

 Covid-19. A magistrate judge acting with the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C.

 § 636(c)(1), ruled that Anderson failed to allege an Eighth Amendment violation and

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1050   Document: 010110966177        Date Filed: 12/11/2023    Page: 2

 Long was entitled to qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291 and affirm.

                                           I

       We summarize the facts alleged in the amended complaint and appropriately

 considered exhibits. 1 Anderson is 63 years old and suffers from an auto-immune

 disease that puts him at heightened risk of complications from Covid-19. In early

 2020, when he was confined at Sterling Correctional Facility, the Colorado

 Department of Corrections (CDOC) took measures to prevent spread of the virus,

 including agreeing to issue medically vulnerable inmates single-person prison cells.

 CDOC’s executive director advised Long to implement the single-cell policy under a

 consent decree entered in a different lawsuit, but Long failed to do so. In August

 2020, correctional officers told inmates that those who were 60 years of age and

 older with medical conditions would be issued single cells to prevent them from

 catching Covid-19. Anderson told an officer identified as Sergeant Johnson that he

 had an auto-immune disease, and he asked if he would be placed in a single cell; but

 Sergeant Johnson replied that Anderson’s name was not on the list of inmates being

 issued single cells. Although some inmates were temporarily granted single cells,

 others were not, and several died of Covid-19. Long’s refusal to implement the

 single-cell policy caused Anderson to contract Covid-19 in November 2020. After

       1
         Although this case was dismissed on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
 Procedure 12(b)(6), we may consider documents attached to the amended complaint
 and those referenced therein that are central to Anderson’s claim. See GFF Corp. v.
 Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997).
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 catching the virus he fainted twice, suffered two strokes, and sustained damage to his

 heart and lungs. He continues to suffer from complications and requires ongoing

 treatment. The complaint sought damages and injunctive relief. 2

        Long moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

 failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge granted the motion, ruling that

 Anderson failed to allege a constitutional violation and Long was entitled to qualified

 immunity. The magistrate judge determined that there were no allegations that Long

 subjectively knew about Anderson’s condition or knew that Anderson faced a

 substantial risk of harm, and thus the allegations were insufficient to support a

 reasonable inference that Long consciously disregarded the risk to Anderson when he

 failed to implement the single-cell policy.

                                               II

        “We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

 dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief.” Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606

 (10th Cir. 2022). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

        2
          Anderson has abandoned his request for injunctive relief by failing to
 advance the issue on appeal. See Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
 2011) (issues omitted from an opening brief are abandoned). He has also waived his
 argument that Long allegedly used the administrative grievance process to deny him
 a single cell. Anderson’s opening brief contains one sentence stating that his
 grievance requesting a single cell was denied because an “administrative regulation
 prohibits filing grievances regarding cells.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 9 (cleaned up).
 Such “scattered statements . . . fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to invoke
 appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
                                               3
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 its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We liberally construe pro se

 pleadings, but we may not craft arguments or otherwise advocate on behalf of a

 pro se litigant. See Garrett Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41

 (10th Cir. 2005). A “broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the

 plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim

 could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

        When a defendant asserts qualified immunity “[o]n a motion to dismiss, it is

 the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for

 constitutionality.” Bledsoe, 53 F.4th at 607 (cleaned up). We evaluate “1) whether

 the plaintiff has alleged facts showing a constitutional violation; and 2) whether that

 constitutional violation was clearly established or obvious at the time of the incident

 in question.” Id. at 601. When, as here, the plaintiff fails on the first test, we need

 not consider the second.

        The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.

 Const. amend. VIII, including a prison official’s “deliberate indifference to serious

 medical needs of prisoners,” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference has two prongs: an

 objective prong that requires an “alleged deprivation . . . sufficiently serious to

 constitute a deprivation of constitutional dimension,” and a subjective prong

 requiring that “the prison official . . . have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

 Self, 439 F.3d at 1230-31 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] prison official

 cannot be liable unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

                                              4
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 inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

 also draw the inference.” Id. at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       The question here is whether the allegations in the amended complaint satisfy

 the subjective prong. Anderson contends they do because he alleged that Long failed

 to implement the single-cell policy to prevent medically vulnerable inmates from

 contracting Covid-19. There are no allegations, however, that Long knew Anderson

 had an auto-immune disease or other risk factors that made him more vulnerable to

 Covid-19. Although he alleged that Sergeant Johnson and other prison staff knew he

 had an auto-immune disease, he did not allege that Long knew of the disease or that

 he had any particular vulnerability to Covid-19.

       Nor did Anderson allege that Long consciously disregarded his particular

 risks. See Self, 439 F.3d at 1231 (“The subjective component is akin to recklessness

 in the criminal law, where, to act recklessly, a person must consciously disregard a

 substantial risk of serious harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Anderson

 simply alleged that Sergeant Johnson told him that his name was not on the list of

 inmates who were issued single cells. Although he also alleged that Long failed to

 implement the single-cell policy, that failure in itself could not establish that Long

 made a conscious decision to disregard Anderson’s particular vulnerabilities and

 deny him an individual cell, which some inmates were granted.

       Anderson maintains that Long’s alleged failure to implement the single-cell

 policy contravened a consent decree entered in another case. He suggests that Long’s

                                             5
Appellate Case: 23-1050    Document: 010110966177         Date Filed: 12/11/2023   Page: 6

 alleged violation of the consent decree supports his assertion of deliberate

 indifference. It does not. The consent decree was issued in another case after

 Anderson contracted Covid-19.

       Anderson made only a conclusory assertion that Long was deliberately

 indifferent. He did not allege that Long knew he had an auto-immune disease, nor

 did he allege that Long made a decision to specifically deny Anderson an individual

 cell. Absent any such allegations, Anderson failed to state a constitutional violation,

 and Long was entitled to qualified immunity.

                                           III

       The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Anderson’s motion to proceed on

 appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is granted.

                                                       Entered for the Court

                                                       Harris L Hartz
                                                       Circuit Judge

                                            6