Court Opinion

ID: 9546378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:28:35.77714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:22.300987
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur except as to that part of the majority opinion which holds that the plaintiff law firm’s delay of sixteen months in filing the compliant could not be actionable. While I agree that plaintiffs were not required to anticipate changes in the law, quite apart from that requirement is the duty of attorneys to pursue their client’s business with reasonable diligence and promptness.
Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Violations of the rule of conduct can constitute evidence of malpractice. Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 163 (D.C.Cir.1990) (citing Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d 683, 690-91 (D.C.1988)). The statute of limitations is not the only measure of reasonable diligence and promptness. An attorney should be anxiously pursuing his client’s case even without the firm hand of an absolute deadline at his back.
Damaging events often occur in the course of litigation. Litigants and material witnesses sometimes die or move away and cannot be found. Assets of defendants are sometimes dissipated or secreted. The longer the delay, the greater the likelihood that some event may occur which will make pursuit of the litigation more difficult or even impossible. In this case, it was a change in the law as to when the statute of limitations commenced running. Had this case been filed only two months earlier, the change in the law would not have affected it.
Plaintiffs and the majority opinion approach this case as if plaintiffs’ only duty was to file by the last allowable day and because plaintiffs researched the law and reasonably determined when that last day would be, plaintiffs cannot possibly be liable. I disagree. As I have explained, plaintiffs’ duty was to proceed with reasonable diligence, not to needlessly delay until what it thought was the last possible day.
The record before us does not contain any evidence as to the reason for the sixteen-month delay. It does reflect that Mr. Williams was concerned about the delay and urged plaintiffs to file the action months earlier. No finding was made by the trial court as to whether the delay was reasonable under the circumstances. However, because it is not clear to me whether defendants’ trial counsel raised and pursued this independent theory of delay, I would remand the case to the trial court to allow defendants to pursue this theory if that court determines that it was adequately raised there.
Having disqualified himself, ZIMMERMAN, C.J., does not participate herein; PAT B. BRIAN, District Judge, sat.
STEWART, Associate C.J., does not participate herein.