Court Opinion

ID: 9855071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:02.212171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.764898
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
(dissenting). At a time when there is so much emphasis on consumer protection, the majority, in effect, revitalizes the old caveat emptor doctrine without specifically mentioning it.
The majority opinion holds that the respondent could not, as a matter of law, have relied on the representation that there was air conditioning in the car since such representation was obviously false.
While the majority concedes that the “statement’s falsity is a question of fact” it states that “this court has decided some such questions as a matter of law.”
The cases cited by the majority to support its conclusion that this matter can be settled as a matter of law are clearly distinguishable on their facts.
In Prime Mfg. Co. v. Allen-Hough Carryola Co.1 the parties involved were of relatively equal bargaining power. Furthermore, the defendant who claimed he was defrauded by representations made by the plaintiff was in a position to know whether the statements were false. The court said:
“The defendant’s representatives, because of their intimate connection with the product and customers of the plaintiff and their familiarity with the business in general, brought to the defendant understanding and knowledge which precluded them from relying on the statement made.” 2
So, too, in Acme Chair and Metal Crafts Co. v. Northern Corrugating Co.,3 the court, in finding that it was against *249the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence for the defendant, Northern Corrugating Company, to have relied on an allegedly false statement made by the plaintiff’s predecessor, said:
“. . . Northern Corrugating Company was negotiating in a field in which it had considerable familiarity and ... it was not the easy victim of fraud and misrepresentation within that field. Its long business experience and its familiarity with patents, patent rights, and the practices of the United States patent office placed it in a position where it was able to deal at arm’s length with Mr. Schmitt.” (Emphasis added.) 4
In the instant case the respondent was an individual bargaining with a large car dealership. There is no evidence to show that the respondent was familiar with auto air-conditioning systems. The false advertisement said that the air-conditioning unit in the car was factory equipment. Thus, it can be inferred that there would be no box-type unit under the dashboard which would be readily apparent upon entering the car. Presumably, a factory equipped unit would be housed under the hood of the car. Similarly, the fact that the car was purchased in March rather than in the midst of a heat wave would tend to reduce the significance of respondent’s failure to test the air conditioning before purchase.
In Plantikow v. Wolk,5 the plaintiff and the makers of a certain note were brought together by the defendant and this court held that a jury issue was not presented as to plaintiff’s right to rely on a representation as to the makers’ responsibility without inquiring as to their property and ability to pay.
In W. H. Hobbs Supply Co. v. Ernst,6 another situation was presented in which the plaintiff extended credit, the defendant representing that he had the financial backing *250of another. Plaintiff made no attempt to determine whether the defendant had such backing.
In both of these cases the plaintiff was induced by a false representation to extend credit. In each case circumstances made it obvious that the plaintiff should have made a suitable inquiry to check the representatives.
Here, I would hold that the falsity of the representation was not so obvious that it could be held as a matter of law that the respondent had no right to rely on it. It was for the finder of fact and by finding reliance the trial court, by implication, found respondent had a right to rely thereon. That finding is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Beilfuss and Mr. Justice Heffernan join in this dissent.

 (1933), 210 Wis. 72, 245 N. W. 70.

 Id. at page 84.

 (1932), 209 Wis. 8, 243 N. W. 415, 244 N. W. 582.

 Id. at page 12.

 (1926), 190 Wis. 218, 208 N. W. 922.

 (1955), 270 Wis. 166, 70 N. W. 2d 615.