Court Opinion

ID: 9728498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:09:31.653862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:49.153309
License: Public Domain

WELCH, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that under this court’s decision in Barnard petitioner was entitled to the appointment of an independent medical examiner to determine if he continued to be subject to involuntary commitment in connection with his petition for discharge. I also concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court properly refused to allow petitioner to waive counsel and that a directed finding for the State was appropriate, as well as its determination that we need not address the issue of counsel’s representation. I write separately because I do not believe that the extension of the Barnard decision by the majority is warranted and that petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether he was entitled to discharge from the Department. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds that he is so entitled. Under section 3 — 802 of the Code, "The respondent is entitled to a jury on the question of whether he is subject to involuntary admission.” (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3—802 (West 1994). The majority concedes that, in interpreting a statute, the objective of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature and that the most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996). Although in Barnard we found that the independent examination provision of article VIII applies "with equal force” to petitions for discharge and petitions for involuntary commitment (Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 616 N.E.2d at 725), it does not necessarily follow that the right to a jury on the question of whether a respondent is subject to involuntary admission contained in that article should be extended to discharge proceedings. Section 3 — 804 states that "[a]ny such physician ***, whether secured by the respondent or appointed by the court, may interview by telephone or in person any witnesses or other persons listed in the petition for involuntary admission.” (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3—804 (West 1994). Logically, an independent examiner for purposes of either an initial involuntary admission or a discharge proceeding would benefit from access to a person who had input to the initial petition for involuntary admission. The language of section 3 — 802, however, cannot be read so broadly. It states without equivocation, ambiguity, or the possibility of other interpretation that a respondent is entitled to a jury on the question of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. The plain language of section 3 — 802 yields the conclusion that the right to a jury trial is afforded to only those respondents who are the subject of involuntary admission to the Department. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an aid to statutory construction, although it may give way if a clearer expression of legislative intent may be found elsewhere (Cremer v. City of Macomb Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 281 Ill. App. 3d 497, 499, 666 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1996)), which I do not find in this instance. Courts are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Klem v. First National Bank, 275 Ill. App. 3d 64, 67, 655 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (1995). A statute that specifies one exception to a general rule excludes other exceptions by implication (In re Application of the County Collector, 281 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473, 667 N.E.2d 109, 114 (1996)), even in the absence of negative words of prohibition. Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 506, 509, 672 N.E.2d 296, 300 (1996), appeal allowed, 171 Ill. 2d 586, 677 N.E.2d 972 (1997). Applying these principles to the case at bar, I believe that the language of section 3 — 802 excludes the provision of a jury trial to determine if a person who files a petition for discharge should be subject to continued involuntary admission by the Department. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the stated intent of the legislature, to which the courts must give effect without considering additional indicia of legislative intent. First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 181, 651 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (1995). The language of section 3 — 901(b) does not preclude this application, given that the references to "the court” contained therein are ones that deal with administrative activities which are within the purview of the court, setting petitions for hearing, directing that notice be given of that hearing, and entering orders. None of these activities are ones that a jury may do in any event. Therefore, I would find that the trial court properly denied petitioner’s request for a jury trial on his petition for discharge. For the reasons indicated, I concur in part and dissent in part.