Court Opinion

ID: 9521590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:08:13.573071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:57.966892
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
(concurring). The result we reach today is ordained by decisions from the United States and Wisconsin Supreme Courts. I write separately to address the significant obligation of trial and appellate courts to carefully scrutinize issues of voluntary consent to search.1
The primary objective of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the protection of *247every citizen's reasonable expectations of privacy against governmental intrusions. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
It is an overriding principle that "searches and seizures conducted without prior judicial approval are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." La Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 66-67, 280 N.W.2d 746, 749 (1979) (quoted source omitted). Consent is one of the rare exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 233, 501 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1993). This exception, as all exceptions, to the Fourth Amendment is "jealously and carefully drawn." See La Fournier, 91 Wis. 2d at 67, 280 N.W.2d at 749 (quoted source omitted).
When the voluntary consent of an individual is contested, it is the obligation of the court to decide whether in such a situation "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officerfs] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). In resolving this issue, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consent to search was the result of a free, intelligent, unequivocal and specific choice without any duress or coercion, actual or implied. See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794, 802 (1998). As is noted in the lead opinion, "voluntariness" requires the court to accommodate complex values: the *248police need to be able to seek the cooperation of and ask questions of individuals in order to preserve the safety and security of the community and the individual needs to be able to enjoy reasonable expectations of privacy in person, possessions and premises. See majority op. at 238-39; State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997).
Any court's analysis must begin with an understanding of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment:
The purpose of the [Fourth Amendment], in other words, is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted — even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion "reasonable."
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
The analysis is made difficult because the volunta-riness of consent is not easily defined. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). It can only be found after the court has carefully examined all of the circumstances surrounding the giving of consent, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the subject of the request is, the officer's training and experience, and what was said and how it was said.
The statements and actions of the individual are subject to dissection in the court's analysis. It is now established that the individual does not have to be told that he or she can refuse to give consent to a search. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). On the other hand, "mere acquiescence on a claim of police authority or submission in the face of a *249show of force, of course, is not enough." George, 557 N.W.2d at 580 (quoted source omitted).
The court must probe the law enforcement officer's statements and behavior. Although the subjective motivations of the officer are not crucial to a determination of constitutional reasonableness, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996), the court must consider the officer's training and experience as one factor in the totality of the circumstances. As we recently noted:
"But the fact that an officer is experienced does not require a court to accept all of his suspicions as reasonable, nor does mere experience mean that an [officer's] perceptions are justified by the objective facts. The 'basis of the police action must be such that it can be reviewed judicially by an objective standard.' [Citations omitted.]" United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 36 (2nd Cir. 1980).
State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 569 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Ct. App. 1997).
A justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court has observed that a citizen who has "consented" to make a purchase as a result of a sales pitch has more protections under consumer protection laws than a citizen who has "consented" to a search as a result of the subtle tactics used by law enforcement. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 581-82 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring).
We are not dealing with vacuum cleaners in this case but with the liberty and privacy interests of all the people . . . and we have an obligation to ourselves and to the Constitution of this State to do what we can, in our limited role ... to provide reasonable protection to those interests.
*250Id. at 582.

 In State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579-80 (Minn. 1997), the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed its "serious concerns" related to traffic stops and subsequent "voluntary consents" to search. Rather than reject "the concept of consent to search in the context of routine traffic stops" the Minnesota court wrote that "courts can and should demand sufficient proof in an individual case that the consent to search was truly express, clear and voluntary." Id. at 580.