Court Opinion

ID: 9792885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:38:45.153598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:22.422617
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. The time has arrived when a majority opinion has presented a collapsible house of cards built with a stacked deck and a joker. My colleagues exercised “superintending control” over the district court on matters not before this Court. A. This Court does not have jurisdiction over a Final Order from which no appeal is taken. Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed “with prejudice.” No appeal was taken from this Order. Plaintiff is not a party to this appeal. The Order of Dismissal “with prejudice” is not an issue in this appeal. The Order was approved by plaintiff and his attorney. Yet, the majority opinion has deleted from the Order the words “with prejudice.” At the hearing on June 18, 1980, Fred M. Calkins, an eminent lawyer, was appointed by the court to consult with plaintiff. Mr. Calkins reported to the court as follows: He [plaintiff] has no objection to the case being dismissed with prejudice and understands that if his condition, back condition * * * should occur in the future that he would be unable to reopen the case for the payment of medical bills, weekly compensation or permanent disability. [Emphasis added.] * >(: THE COURT: Are you asking that it be dismissed? You don’t want it pursued any further? MR. RUMPF: Right. To delete the words “with prejudice” is the exercise of “superintending control” over a non-appealed Order. It allows this Court, in its discretion, to sit as a district judge. Thus, we can affirm a case, yet order the district court to modify matters of reversible error such as erroneous instructions given, admission of improper testimony, and a good pleaded affirmative defense. It has been suggested that a judge should compromise his views and join in the opinion of his colleagues. This I cannot do. B. Stewart was not entitled to attorney fees. On the matter of attorney fees, in every case cited, except Wuenschel v. New Mexico Broadcasting Corp., 84 N.M. 109, 500 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.1972), the Supreme Court has not followed § 52-5-54 (D). In Wuenschel, I said: * * * The plaintiff did not collect compensation and he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees * * *. [84 N.M. 111.] [Emphasis added.] Phelps-Dodge (92 N.M. 47, 52) says: * * * Until there has been an award of compensation * * * an allowance of attorney’s fees is improper. Geeslin (75 N.M. 174, 179) says: * * * Plaintiff’s attorney is not entitled to an attorney fee unless compensation is recovered herein. [Emphasis added.] Perez (54 N.M. 339, 346) says: The recovery of compensation is a prerequisite to the allowance of attorney fees. [Emphasis added.] These and other cases have fixed a rule on an allowance of attorney fees. There must first occur an “award” or “recovery” of compensation. If the Supreme Court intended that “award” and “recovery” meant “collect compensation through court proceedings” as provided by statute, plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Otherwise not. “ ‘Proceedings’ are all steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action.” Ingravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F.Supp. 394 (D.C.N.Y. 1965); State v. McCafferty, 105 P. 992 (Okl. 1909). What the Supreme Court intended “award” or “recovery” to mean must be expressed by the Supreme Court. “Stare Decisis” has set in. In my opinion, all prior cases that use the words “award” and “recovery” should be overruled. The words “collect compensation through court proceedings” should be defined. Until this occurs, plaintiff’s attorney is not entitled to an attorney fee. Plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion for an Order that he be awarded an attorney fee for services rendered plaintiff and for expenses occurred. Some five or six weeks before the Order of Dismissal with prejudice was entered, absent any trial or award of attorney fees to plaintiff, the court entered an Order on the attorney’s motion “that the lawyer fee for plaintiff’s attorney is fixed at $1872.00.” This is erroneous. Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 57, 582 P.2d 1270 (1978) holds that attorney fees are to be awarded to plaintiff and not to his counsel. An attorney has no authority to seek payment of an attorney fee to himself from an employer. The workman must seek this relief. An attorney fee is obtained from a workman. If a workman is not entitled to an attorney fee, the attorney has donated his time. Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff was not awarded an attorney fee in the Order of Dismissal. The attorney, therefore, is denied one. It was the duty of the attorney to have plaintiff seek an attorney fee or have one awarded in the Order of Dismissal with prejudice. This is one case when an employer should not be additionally burdened. Here, the employer was not at fault. The plaintiff or his lawyer was. “As you make your bed, so you must lie on it.” Everyone must bear the consequences of his own acts.