Court Opinion

ID: 2856010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-04 18:54:00.113229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:45.932902
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                         SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                              FORT WORTH

                              NO. 2-08-222-CR

JEFFREY K. PAYNE                                                   APPELLANT

                                       V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE

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     FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

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     After waiving a jury and entering an open plea of guilty, appellant Jeffrey

K. Payne appeals his conviction and thirty-year sentence for possession of

methamphetamine of four or more but less than two hundred grams with the

intent to deliver, enhanced by a prior felony conviction. See Tex. Health &

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         … See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon 2003); Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). We affirm.

      Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Appellant filed a pro

se brief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The State

declined to file a brief.

      Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw

on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of

Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the

record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no

pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

      We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s

pro se brief. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and

without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the

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appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 2, 2009

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