Court Opinion

ID: 9790034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:45:23.295728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.836101
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent and, in so doing, adopt the views expressed by Mr. Justice HENRIOD in his concurring opinion in the recent case of Baine v. Beckstead.1
The instant case is the natural outgrowth of the views expressed in the -prevailing *242opinion in the Baine case. In that case it was held that the petitioner had been afforded a hearing and therefore the judge was justified in failing to grant the petitioner a further stay of execution of the sentence previously imposed. However, the prevailing opinion expounded the proposition that, as a general rule, a convicted defendant who is granted a stay or suspension and placed on a “probationary status” must be afforded notice and a hearing before a judge may, at the expiration of the stay or suspension period, refuse to grant a further stay or suspension. In expounding this proposition, the prevailing opinion relied upon the case of State v. Zolantakis.2
Neither this case nor the Baine case come within the holding of the Zolantakis case. That case involved a suspension of a sentence during good behavior without any limitation as to time. The stay order was revoked. It did not expire as in the instant case and as in the Baine case.
The majority opinion in the Zolantakis case (it was a 3-2 decision) only stands for the proposition that it is a denial of due process to revoke an indefinite stay order without affording the probationer a hearing.
I have my doubts as to the correctness of the majority opinion in the Zolantakis case. I would subscribe to the views of the minority as expressed in Justice Cherry’s dissent, wherein he stated:
“When the execution of a sentence is suspended, it is not vacated. The judgment itself is not impaired or limited. The time for execution is merely deferred. * * * When the suspension is revoked the convict is punished for the crime of which he was convicted, and not for violating the terms of his parole. The suspension of a sentence can never be demanded as a matter of legal right. It is granted at the mere will of the court. When granted, it is not held as a vested right, but as a matter of favor or grace. * * * The suspension of a sentence is not a fixed and final adjustment amounting to a right to be revoked only upon a violation of the condition upon which it is granted, because the statute expressly declares that 'the court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period and may revoke or modify any condition of probation.’ Clearly, this precludes the claim that the judgment is unenforceable until, after due process of law, it is adjudged that the condition of probation has been violated. The power of the court to revoke is not limited to when the conditions have been violated, but extends to the *243modification or revocation of the condition itself.”
While there is a conflict of authority, the view that there is no constitutional basis for notice and hearing as a requisite to revocation of the conditional liberty of a convicted person appears to be the sounder and more logical view.3
In the absence of a statute so providing, a probationer should not be entitled, as a matter of right, to notice and hearing before his probation is revoked. In Escoe v. Zerbst,4 Justice Cardozo said:
“In thus holding we do not accept the petitioner’s contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.”
If the requirement for notice and hearing is desirable, it is a proper subject for
legislative enactment. The provisions of our present statute5 would seem to negative any such requirement.
Under our present statutory law, it is hard for me to rationalize why a judge may, in the first instance, have the sole discretion to grant or deny a stay or suspension of sentence, but be denied the same discretion in revoking or terminating a stay or suspension.
Assuming the Zolantakis case to be the settled law in Utah, it should be confined to its particular circumstances and not extended to those situations where the stay order is not revoked but expires. We should not indulge in the fiction that a judge impliedly promises a convicted person successive stays if he behaves himself.
*244The late Justice Wolfe in the cases of McCoy v. Harris 6 and Christiansen v. Harris 7 expressed his doubts as to the correctness of the majority decision in the Zolan-takis case. In the Christiansen case he also expressed the fear that requirements of notice and formal hearings would go a long way to discourage a judge from granting probation.

. 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554, 561.

. 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 1047, 54 A.L.R. 1463.

. 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1078.

. 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566, 1568.

. 77-35-17, XJ.O.A.1953: “Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may place the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall determine.
“The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on probation, the defendant may be required to pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be required to provide for the support of his wife or others for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears to the court from the report of the probation agent in charge of the defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has complied with the conditions of such probation, the court may if it be compatible with the public interest either upon motion of the district attorney or of its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action and discharge the defendant.”

. 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721.

. 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314.