Court Opinion

ID: 9632658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:21:15.904846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:32.465319
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
concurring in results:
I find that evidence concerning Battered Woman Syndrome was relevant to the jury’s assessment of appellant’s theory of the case — self defense. While I conclude that the syndrome should have been presented to the jury in this case, I disagree with the majority’s decision to radically overhaul the laws pertaining to self defense. The facts asserted by appellant, that the victim made a threatening movement and she shot him, constitute classic self defense and do not necessitate the sweeping changes imposed by the majority. Our inquiry should be limited to an assessment of the syndrome’s reliability and its relevance to the facts presented.
I find that appellant sufficiently demonstrated the syndrome’s acceptance in the concerned scientific community during in camera hearings. Further, I find that evidence pertaining to the syndrome could have assisted the jury in determining whether appellant “reasonably and in good faith believed that she was in danger of loosing her life or receiving great bodily injury at the hands of the deceased.” (Instruction No. 29, O.R. 1045). The syndrome was pertinent to the jury’s determination of whether a reasonable person, from the viewpoint of appellant, would have reacted as appellant did.
Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances from appellant’s viewpoint in assessing reasonableness is not a novel concept and does not require the adoption of the standard of reasonableness set forth by the majority. See Guthrie v. State, 87 Okl.Cr. 112, 194 P.2d 895 (1948) (Jury was correctly instructed that they must place themselves in the defendant’s situation and view the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to defendant); Murphy v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 1, 112 P.2d 438 (1941) (Defendant’s guilt turns upon the circumstances as they appeared to him); Lary v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 111, 296 P. 512 (1931) (The act of the defendant in slaying the deceased is to be viewed from his standpoint, as the circumstances at the time reasonably applied to him); Fulton v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 358, 254 P. 761 (1927) (Self defense requires a reasonable man, situated as the defendant was, seeing what he saw and knowing what he knew, to believe himself in danger). Jamison v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 302, 250 P. 548 (1926) (Circumstances and appearances relied upon as creating an apprehension of danger must be viewed from the defendant’s standpoint and be sufficient to cause the defendant, situated as he was, as a reasonable person, an apprehension of danger); Brown v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 161, 216 P. 944 (1923) (In determining whether homicide was justified, circumstances must be viewed as they appeared to the defendant when he killed the deceased).
Currently, the jury is asked to view the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant and then is asked to determine whether a reasonable person, caught in the dynamics of those identical circumstances, would respond as the defendant did. I find that the syndrome should have been admitted as it sheds light on the circumstances surrounding the altercation as they appeared to the appellant. The facts before us require us to decide nothing more.
I find the majority’s position regarding reasonableness puzzling. After stating . that “we deem it necessary to modify OUJI-CR 743 by striking the words ‘rea*16sonably’ and ‘reasonable’ from such instruction,” {Maj. at 11) the majority nevertheless includes the reasonableness requirement in the modified instruction. (See Maj. at 11). Thus, to the extent that the majority has correctly identified a deficiency in the current instruction, the problem survives the majority’s attempt at a cure.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure of the trial court to give appellant’s requested instruction concerning the burden of proof in self defense cases (OUJI-CR 745) was error. {Maj. at 14). For the sake of clarity, I add that such error, in my view, requires a new trial.
Because of the errors identified above, I concur in the result reached by the majority, that this cause should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.