Court Opinion

ID: 9495904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:13:08.628843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:15.736584
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
During the summer of 1993, Richard Allen Davis, a violent career criminal serving a sixteen-year sentence for kidnaping, was paroled from California State Prison. Three months later, he abducted from her bedroom, sexually assaulted, and eventually strangled to death twelve-year-old Polly Klaas. Richard Allen Davis’s vicious murder of Polly Klaas became the catalyst for Proposition 184, the “fastest qualifying initiative in California history.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Hand in hand with Assembly Bill 971, Proposition 184 established a life sentence for specified felons in California who accumulate over time three felonies of a certain kind. The purpose of the law is “to protect the public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for habitual felons.” Id. at-, 123 S.Ct. 1179. The fact that these “three strikes” criminals are eligible for parole, id., makes Proposition 184 relevant to our understanding of Crawford’s constitutional argument.1
The question in this case is whether it is “unreasonable” in constitutional terms for *724California to subject convicted criminals like Richard Allen Davis while on parole to searches conducted by authorized law enforcement officers, so long as those searches are not “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.” A related question is whether society is prepared to accept as “reasonable” a specific privacy right on the part of parolees against non-arbitrary, non-eapri-cious, and non-harassing searches of their persons and abodes by officers lawfully authorized and commissioned by California to ensure that its parolees do not constitute a risk to public safety as they make the transition from prison to free society.
Because my answer to both questions is emphatically “no,” I respectfully dissent.
I
On January 18, 1989, Raphyal Crawford was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine base. He was sentenced to federal prison for 87 months. While on supervised release from this conviction, he was arrested and charged in state court in San Diego, California, with possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of marijuana for sale. He was convicted of these crimes and sentenced to state prison. In addition, his federal supervised release was revoked. As it turns out, he also committed an armed robbery of a bank while on supervised release, but this crime was not discovered until later. Based on his extensive record, Crawford clearly constitutes a risk to public safety.
Eventually, Crawford became a California state parolee. In this capacity, California law impressed on him a legal status that materially altered his relationship with the Fourth Amendment and its warrant requirement. California law on this subject is clear: “Prisoners on parole shall remain under the legal custody of the department [of corrections] and shall be subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure of the prison.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3056. As the district court correctly understood — before it became distracted by our mistaken decision in United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.2000), since overturned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) — “[U]nder California law, a parolee is in fact in the custody of the Department of Corrections.... ” See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc) (“A California parolee is in a different position from that of an ordinary citizen.” He is still serving his sentence.).
A.
Before continuing to discuss the legal ramifications of parole status in California, however, I must discuss a serious error that Judge Reinhardt has allowed to infect his opinion. It is a conceptual mistake to consider the imposition of conditions on a parolee as a “waiver” of rights. As Crawford’s state parole officer correctly explained when confronted in district court by the federal prosecutor with this misleading characterization, “I do not call them a ‘Fourth waiver’... my understanding of the Fourth waiver applies to probationers in the county.” This single sentence — spoken by the only state official to make an appearance in this case — speaks volumes to anyone familiar with California criminal law and procedure, but it apparently went over the heads of the federal authorities, and the prosecutor’s mistake has fouled up the resolution of this case ever since. In fact, California’s Administrative Code says, “The parole conditions are not a contract but are the specific rules governing all parolees whether or not the parolee has signed the form containing the parole conditions.” Cal.Code. Regs. tit. 15, *725§ 2512(a). As the California Supreme Court has recognized:
The consent exception to the warrant requirement may not be invoked to validate the search of an adult parolee because under the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, parole is not a matter of choice. The Board of Prison Terms must provide a period of parole; the prisoner must accept it. (Pen. Code § 3000 et seq.)
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (1998). What this explanation obviously means is that consent and waiver cannot be used to validate parole conditions, and neither can the lack thereof be used to invalidate them.
This error, of course, did not originate with Judge Reinhardt. As far as I can tell from the record, the federal prosecutors and agents with whom it originated do not fully understand California law and persist to this day in calling parole conditions “Fourth waivers.” To quote Assistant United State’s Attorney Hobson’s exchange in the district court with her witness FBI Agent Bowdich, “Now you called it a Fourth waiver. What are you referring to? What is it?” Bowdich’s answer was, “It’s a common term ... under the state parole or probation system.... Fourth waiver just means they’re waiving their right to search and seizure.” Wrong.
In summary, the consent/waiver doctrine is irrelevant in this context. Thus, I conclude that the majority’s willingness to entertain the Federal Government’s disorientation on this issue is no more than knowingly allowing, tongue-in-cheek, a strawman to walk onto the chopping block so it can be hacked to death. The assertion that the consent argument is being answered in terms of consent jurisprudence “just because the government raises it” is too cute by half. We have no business “adopting the government’s preferred nomenclature” that is wrong and analytically misleading. Scotch tape is not Scotch liquor just because the federal government says it is. Before we start branding anything as unconstitutional, at the very least we should have a clear picture of what we are assessing. So should have the federal prosecutor before attempting to defend it as a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.
B.
California law provides that “The Board of Prison Terms upon granting any parole to any prisoner may also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper.” Cal. PemCode § 3053(a). Consequently, and according to the law, certain conditions were imposed on Crawford in connection with his release on parole in the year 2000. When Crawford was released on parole, whether he liked it or not, and whether he consented to it or not, he became subject to a search and seizure condition of parole that (1) recognized his status as still in custody, and (2) was designed to effectuate supervision of him.
In recognition of Crawford’s status, the Department of Corrections first imposed these standard conditions on him on October 13, 1999. The document memorializing this imposition is entitled “Notice of Conditions of Parole,” and it reads in relevant part:
NOTICE AND CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
You will be released on parole effective 2-17-2000,19_for a period of 3 YEARS.
This parole is subject to the following notice and conditions. Should you violate conditions of this parole, you are subject to arrest, suspension and/or revocation of your parole.
*726You waive extradition to the State of California from any state or territory of the United States or from the District of Columbia. You will not contest any effort to return you to the State of California.
When the Board of Prison Terms determines, based upon psychiatric reasons, that you pose a danger to yourself or others, the Board may, if necessary for psychiatric treatment, order your placement in.a community treatment facility or state prison or may revoke your parole and order your return to prison.
a) You and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.
RC
PAROLEE’S INITIALS
b) You agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.
RC
PAROLEE’S INITIALS
You have been informed and have received in writing the procedure for obtaining a Certificate of Rehabilitation (4852.21 PC).
You have read or have had read to you this notification and the following Conditions of Parole and understand them as they apply to you.
6. You shall sign the parole agreement containing the conditions of parole specified in Board of Prison Terms (BPT) Rules Section 2512 and any special conditions imposed as specified in BPT Rules Section 2513.
I have read or have had read to me and understand the conditions of parole as they apply to me.
[[Image here]]
The record demonstrates that Crawford signed a second copy of this form, this time on April 24, 2000. Once again, the search and seizure provisions were prominently repeated.
There is no doubt that Crawford understood his status as a parolee and how his rights had been affected thereby. As State Parole Agent Berner explained in his testimony, “I — when I have them initial the section (a) and (b) up above, I inform them that their residence and property under their control can be searched by a peace officer at any time.” And, as Crawford told the district court in sworn testimony regarding parole officer Ber-ner’s advice to him that as a parolee he was subject to searches, “I just, you know, just took that for granted that, you know, I’m on parole, that I don’t have no rights *727at all.” Thus, I conclude that Crawford had no subjective expectation of privacy whatsoever. Given the controlling laws, the appearance of the word “agree” under subsection (b) in Crawford’s acknowledgment is essentially no more than acknowledgment of the force of law.
II
In Reyes, the California Supreme Court authoritatively explained the status of a parolee under California law and held that “[w]hen involuntary search conditions are properly imposed, reasonable suspicion is no longer a prerequisite to conducting a search of the subject’s person or property.” 19 Cal.4th at 752, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 739, 968 P.2d at 450 (emphasis added). The court said in justification of its holding that “[t]he state has a duty ... to protect the public, and the importance of [this interest] justifies the imposition of a war-rantless search condition.” Id. at 752, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 739, 968 P.2d at 450. The court held also that “[bjecause of society’s interest both in assuring the parolee corrects his behavior and in protecting its citizens against dangerous criminals, a search pursuant to a parole condition, without reasonable suspicion, does not ‘intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, an expectation that society is willing to recognize as legitimate.’ ” Id. at 751, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 738, 968 P.2d at 449 (citations omitted).
The court made it clear, however, that it was not declaring an unfettered open-season on parolees. In keeping with the principle that the permissible degree of impingement on a parolee’s privacy is “not unlimited,” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Reyes court established as a requirement of a reasonable parole condition search that it must not be “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.” Reyes, 19 Cal.4th at 752, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 749, 968 P.2d at 450. It is equally noteworthy that California “parolees are entitled to the benefit of the rule of announcement necessary to perfect a law enforcement officer’s entry into a house.” Latta, 521 F.2d at 248 (citing People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489 (1968).).
In support of its well-reasoned analysis and logical conclusions, the California Supreme Court drew from and respected relevant federal constitutional law as articulated by the Supreme Court. From Griffin, the California court understood in connection with its own system of parole that a”[s]tates operation of a probation system, like its operation of a ... prison ... presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement.... ” Id. at 748, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 736, 968 P.2d at 447(quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164). It then noted that “although ‘some question of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion’ “ Id. at 751, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d at 738, 968 P.2d at 449 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)).
Finally, the court surveyed the United States Supreme Court’s “special needs” cases. These cases involve hundreds of thousands of American citizens never convicted of a crime, and with respect to whom no suspicion of criminal behavior existed, and who have become subject to carefully targeted and narrowly tailored Fourth Amendment searches because, given the totality of the relevant circumstances, the searches when scrutinized through the lens of the Fourth Amendment are reasonable. With these cases in mind, the court concluded — correctly in my view — that parolees as a class are dif*728ferent, and that they have forfeited any right to challenge a proper parole search conducted by designated law enforcement authorities while still in constructive custody as they serve out their sentences and make the transition back into society under the regulatory control of the Department of Corrections.
Ill
According to Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), the term “special needs” as used in Griffin and applied in Reyes made its first appearance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in T.L.O., which upheld a marijuana-yielding warrantless search by school officials of a high school student’s purse. As originally explained by Justice Blackmun in a passage later adopted by the full Court, the “special needs” category creates an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches conducted under categorical circumstances “beyond the normal need for law enforcement” that make the warrant and probable cause requirement “impracticable.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351, 105 S.Ct. 733 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases give us additional guidance as to how to determine whether a public safety search falls into the “special needs” category. In Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), for example, the Court said in approving warrantless and suspicionless blood and urine testing of railroad employees involved in major train accidents,
[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.... What is reasonable, of course, “depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” ... Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interest.” ...
In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.... Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.... We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ “ ... When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in the particular contest.
Id. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (citations omitted).
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.
Id. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
Both Skinner and its companion case, Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), which permits the war-rantless urine testing of certain Customs employees, point out that specific circumstances, such as public versus private em*729ployment, can diminish and even extinguish any privacy interests that a person not in those circumstances might otherwise expect and enjoy. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of an expectation of privacy ... differ[s] according to context....”).
Finally, we learn from O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), that prison regulations are treated more deferentially under the Fourth Amendment than other measures. Although parole restrictions and conditions strictly speaking are not prison regulations, they are akin to that category.
IV
From my survey of these “special needs” cases, I conclude, as did the California Supreme Court, that they provide the appropriate framework for analyzing the issues in this case.
A.
The threshold question to be answered is whether California’s operation of its prisons and parole system presents “special needs” as defined by the Supreme Court. This question has authoritatively been answered: it does. The source of this answer is Griffin, on which the California Supreme Court relied:
A State’s operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.
483 U.S. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164.
B.
Griffin answers — albeit in the context of probation searches — the next question we must address: whether the supervision itself of parolees is a “ ‘special need’ of the state permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Here, too, the answer is in the affirmative. As in the case of the supervision of probationers, supervision as described in Reyes is designed to assume that parole serves (1) as a period of genuine rehabilitation and reintegration into society, and (2) as a device to see to it that “the community is not harmed by the [parolee’s] being at large .” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Griffin recognized in connection with felons on probation that “[rjecent research suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism....” Id. I see no reason why this observation would fail to apply to parolees. If anything, it has even more force when applied to that class.
Most importantly, however, California’s legislature has definitively come to the same conclusion regarding the need for effective supervision:
The Legislature finds and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship. It is in the interest of public safety for the state to provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees, including the judicious use of revocation actions, and to provide educational, vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition between imprisonment and discharge. A sentence pursuant to Section 1168 or 1170 shall include a period of parole, unless waived, as provided in this section.
Cal. Pen.Code § 3000(a)(1). The legislature then implemented this finding in the *730statutes and regulations previously quoted that govern parole.
The Supreme Court reminded us in Ewing that federal courts have a longstanding tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing important policy decisions relating to criminals and public safety. — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108. The Court said,
When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice. To the contrary, our cases establish that “States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)....
Id. It does not seem to be a stretch at all to apply this reasoning to the rational decision of California’s legislature to subject all parolees to mandatory search conditions.
How daunting is the challenge in California of adequately supervising parolees, and what dangers do parolees present to society from which law abiding people deserve protection? According to the authoritative California Journal, as of August 2000, California had 158,177 inmates in its prisons. Jeremy Travis and Sarah Lawrence, California’s Parole Experiment, Cal. J. (Aug 2002). Of that population, 126, 117 inmates were released on parole during that year. Id. Sadly, of that figure, 90,000 were returned to prison, either following a conviction of a new crime or for a technical violation of parole. Id. According to the California Policy Research Center, “70% of the state’s paroled felons reoffend within 18 months — the highest recidivism rate in the nation.” Joan Petersilia, Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in California, 12 CPRC (June 2000).2 Crawford and Richard Allen Davis are only two of the State’s paroled felons who reoffended.
We find a similar pattern of continuing criminality by parolees when we look at Federal statistics. Between 1986 and 1994, 215,263 prisoners were released on federal parole. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Offenders Returning to Federal Prison, 1986-1987 (Sept.2000). Of this number, 33,855 were returned to prison within three years, almost 13,000 of which were for the commission of new violent offenses. Id. “According to a [more] recent report, approximately 67 percent of former inmates released from state prisons were charged with at least one ‘serious’ new crime within three years of their release.” Ewing, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (referencing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, P. Langan & D. Levin, Special Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, P.1 (June 2002)).
To sum up the size and pressing nature of this problem, I borrow from a report from the Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center:
This year, more than 600,000 individuals will leave state and federal prisons— 1,600 a day, four times as many as left prison 25 years ago. The federal government recently announced the award *731of $100 million in grants to help states design new strategies to improve outcomes for prisoners returning home. A number of corrections administrators have embraced the challenge of engaging community groups in supervising the reentry. Public health professionals, workforce development experts, housing providers, civil rights advocates, and police officials have all focused attention on the challenges and opportunities presented by record numbers of prisoners coming back into free society.
Jeremy Travis and Sarah Lawrence, Beyond the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America, (Nov.2002).
In their multi-volume ground-breaking work, The Criminal Personality, doctors Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow give us a vivid idea of what society is up against in dealing with hardcore criminals and parolees such as Crawford. In this eye-opening work, which resulted from fifteen years of concentrated research, the doctors report on the incidence of crime committed by the subjects they studied. The doctors tell us that each of these men with whom they worked “admits to having committed enough crimes to spend over 1,500 years in jail if he were convicted for all of them.” 1 Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow, The Criminal Personality 221. The doctors continue: “If we were to calculate the total number of crimes committed by all the men with whom we have worked, it would be astronomic. However, that is not represented in crime statistics.... If one were to judge by official police records, he would be totally mislead about the extent of criminal activity.” Id. To make this point, the doctors arrayed the startling criminal activity of their three representative subjects. The first had committed 64,000 crimes, but apprehended only seven times. Id. at 222. The second was responsible for 200,000 crimes. Id. at 223. The third admitted over 600 crimes before he reached the age of twenty. Their report continues:
We can cite many comparable figures from the histories of others with whom we have worked. One man committed approximately 300 rapes before being arrested and charged with rape. Another snatched about 500 purses in one year, more than one a day; he was not arrested for any of these. Another molested about 1,000 children per year when he was between 17 and 22, for a total of at least 5,000 acts, and was apprehended for only one.
Id. at 221-225.
According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ewing, a study by the Sacramento Bee of 223 habitual criminal offenders in California found that they had an aggregate of 1,165 prior felonies, an average of 5 apiece.
The prior convictions included 322 robberies and 262 burglaries. About 84 percent of the 233 three strikes offenders had been convicted of at least one violent crime. In all, they were responsible for 17 homicides, 7 attempted slayings, and 91 sexual assaults and child molestations.
Ewing, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108.
I deduce from this information, as well as from California’s legislative findings, that the control and supervision of parolees as they reintegrate into society involves an arena far different from the needs of “normal” law enforcement. Parolees, like drunk drivers on our highways, are a discrete group that are a demonstrable menace to the safety of the communities into which they are discharged. See Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving *732problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.”). Parolees have demonstrated by their adjudicated criminal conduct a capacity and willingness to commit crimes serious enough to deprive them of liberty. They have not yet finished serving their sentences in connection with which they do not enjoy a presumption of innocence. Moreover, their collective behavior while on parole demonstrates the truth of the axiom that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Thus, I conclude that the supervision of the members of this rationally identified group is a “special need” of California that transcends the scope of normal, everyday law enforcement concerns. Parole is first and foremost about supervising and controlling people who have demonstrated a propensity to break the law and for whom the State still has a responsibility to constrain and to mentor in connection with public safety. Like Alaska’s version of “Megan’s Law” involving the registration of sex offenders and the publication of information about them on the Internet, legislation approved by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the purpose here is not punitive, but to enable state government in the context of a 4135 regulatory scheme to enhance public safety. Id. at -, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (“As the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals acknowledged, the Act has a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of ‘public safety’ which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community.’ ”).
C.
The third question posed by Griffin is whether the “ ‘special needs’ of its parole system justify [California’s] search regulation as it has been interpreted by state corrections officials and state court.” 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. With Reyes in mind as well as the magnitude of the challenge, I think it is clear that the special needs of California’s parole system make the warrant requirement impracticable. I conclude also that given all the relevant facts and circumstances, California’s parolee search conditions are eminently reasonable. The statistics previously described leave no room for doubt that crime by parolees is a huge problem in California that demands government attention and action — one must look no further than Crawford and Richard Allen Davis. As in the case of the probation searches approved in Griffin, a warrant requirement would interfere with the parole system of supervision, “setting up a magistrate rather than [the parole agent] as the judge of how close a supervision [the parolee] requires.” Id. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164. See also Latta, 521 F.2d at 251-52 (dismissing the warrant requirement in this context as unreasonable). In addition, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would (1) hamper quick responses to evidence of misconduct, and (2) reduce the deterrent effect of the conditions. Id. Furthermore, the rules that normally pertain to the quantity and quality of information needed to secure a warrant are at odds with the essence and needs of the parole system. Again, as in the case of probation, “The agency ... must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire experience with [the parolee], and to assess probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, character, and circumstances.” Id. at 879, 107 S.Ct. 3164.
Although the Supreme Court has not reached the question of whether a plenary search condition applicable to a parolee under California law so diminishes that persons expectation of privacy that a proper parole condition search is “reasonable,” its decision in Knights supports the California Supreme Court’s conclusion. The Knights Court reminded us that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is *733reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)). In concluding that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy, the Court relied on the need to “protect[ ] society from future criminal violations.” Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. This observation has even greater force when applied to parolees.
Moreover, Griffin postulates that although a parolee’s right of privacy is definitely diminished as compared to the public at large, the “permissible degree” of such impingement “is not unlimited.” Griffin 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. As I see it, the law in California adequately satisfies this check. When read in the light of Reyes, California’s parole search conditions do not wholly eliminate a parolee’s expectation or right of privacy. To the contrary, they authorize only narrowly tailored searches by a class of authorized officials rationally related to the individual’s parole status. More importantly, according to Reyes, a parolee in California retains a right of privacy against government searches that are arbitrary, a right of privacy against searches that are capricious, and a right of privacy against searches that are harassing. These restrictions are meaningful, and they represent workable standards state and federal courts apply every day in assessing the propriety of a variety of government actions. These qualifications accomplish the constitutional goal of keeping parole searches within the scope of reason demanded by the Constitution by mandating that the search be justifiably within the purpose of parole conditions at issue. See also Latta, 521 F.2d at 252 (“In a given case, what is done may be so unreasonable as to require that the search be held to violate the Fourth Amendment. For example, harassment or intimidation is no part of a parole officer’s job.”).
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause provides additional protection to parolees subject to parole condition searches. Should the manner in which such a search was conducted (1) “shock the conscience” of our community’s sense of “decency and fairness,” or (2) was so “brutal” and “offensive” that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency, then both the exclusionary rule as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would provide both remedy and redress. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Just as the extraction by a physician of a blood sample from an unconscious driver suspected of vehicular manslaughter — or from a railroad worker or a Customs official' — does not' offend these concepts, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), neither does a California parole condition search bridled by Reyes.
This case is a good example of a search that was not arbitrary, not capricious, and not conducted to harass or to intimidate. One of Crawford’s fellow armed bank robbers identified him as an accomplice. The search and the contact with Crawford that followed from that information was carried out well within the scope of that information as well as within the jurisdiction to investigate bank robberies of the authorities who conducted the search with Crawford’s parole officer’s consent. This was excellent police work that put a dangerous criminal where he belonged, not an unreasonable abuse of authority.
MS. HOBSON: You Honor, I could represent that there was going to be a *734witness who was going to identify Ra-phyal Crawford, who was masked and wearing gloves as a gunman in the fifth robbery. He was identified as the gunman holding the lobby down.
MR. McCABE (defense counsel): If that witness is Mr. Juju White, who is doing 32 years in custody, that’s not exactly the best information in the world to mount a criminal prosecution based upon.
THE COURT: Okay. But I will assume for purposes of this that even though they had information that he was the gunman in the fifth robbery, they didn’t have probable cause to arrest him, because he wasn’t arrested. Is that sufficient?
MR. McCABE: Yes, Your Honor.
As this passage demonstrates, defense counsel did not contest the proposition that the FBI’s approach was for legitimate law enforcement purposes. Latta held that all that is required to make a parole condition search lawful is a reasonable belief on the part of law enforcement that the search is necessary. “It may even be based on a ‘hunch,’ arising from what he had learned or observed about the behavior and attitude of the parolee.” Id. 521 F.2d at 250. In my view, the majority’s holding in this case is irreconcilable with our opinion in Latta.
I seriously doubt that anyone not result oriented who looks at the facts of this case would see what occurred here as evidence of “a police state.” To use that inappropriate and unhelpful label only serves to degrade it when it is correctly used elsewhere. Not to have investigated Crawford after one of his fellow bank robbers identified him would have been a dereliction of sworn duty.
D.
Two recent cases require comment: City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 581 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) and Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205. In Edmond, the Supreme Court declined to confer “special needs” status on city-operated vehicle checkpoints established for the purpose of interdicting unlawful drugs. In distinguishing this vehicle checkpoint initiative from others approved in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); and Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412, the Court observed that “the primary purpose” of the checkpoint program under scrutiny “was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 447. Thus, that checkpoint program did not qualify as a “special need” beyond the scope of normal law enforcement. Id. at 47-48, 121 S.Ct. 447. Similarly, in Ferguson, the Court disapproved of a combined hospital, police, and public policy to test pregnant patients for evidence of drug use and to turn over positive results to the police for prosecution. 532 U.S. at 69-73, 85-86, 121 S.Ct. 1281. The basis for the Court’s determination was that the purpose of this program was “indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” Id. at 81, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447). Thus, the particulars of this policy did not satisfy the Court’s test.
Although one of the goals of the parole system certainly is to prevent crime, I see the supervision of parolees as different and distinguishable from the parameters of general law enforcement. First, in both Edmond and Ferguson, the groups at which the flawed initiatives were aimed *735were comprised of ordinary citizens going about their daily business, people cloaked with the presumption of innocence, and people certainly not in custody and serving out prison sentences. This is a cohort at full liberty and not subject to special supervision by the state, and most importantly, a class not in “transition between imprisonment and discharge.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3000(a)(1).
Second, the administration by California of its parole system renders it different from normal law enforcement. As we recognized in Latta,
To the extent that there is a “law enforcement” emphasis, it is to deter the parolee from returning to a life of crime.... “When, as here, a parolee is in violation of his parole, the parole agents’ higher duty is to protect the parole system and to protect the public.” However, this feature of the parole system, important as it is, does not predominate .... The fact that crimes are detected during the administration of the parole system does not convert what is essentially a supervisory and regulatory program into a subterfuge for criminal investigations.
Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Griffin and Knights provide the controlling authority for this case, not Edmond and Ferguson.
E.
Literally hundreds of thousands of suspicion-free, conviction-free citizens of our nation have been made subject to limited “special needs” searches because of a demonstrable need transcending the boundaries of normal law enforcement. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (drug tests for extracurriculars at school); United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir.2002) (searches of employee backpacks to prevent loss of inventory); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (drug tests of athletes at school); Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (highway sobriety checkpoints); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (railroad employees’ drug tests at work); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (Customs employees’ drug tests at work); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (purely administrative search of regulated business); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.1978) (purely administrative search in public buildings); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (fixed checkpoint routine border search). The majority acknowledges but then sidesteps these cases with a false distinction that overlooks a fundamental precept of the Fourth Amendment. Judge Reinhardt claims that none of these cases involve searches of homes. What Judge Reinhardt misses when he proclaims “the protected status of the home” is the long-established principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
In Katz, the Court rejected the idea that there is such a “concept as a ‘constitutionally protected area’ that can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.” Id. at 351, n. 9, 88 S.Ct. 507. In fact, although the Court recognized that a private home has been acknowledged to be a constitutionally protected area, the Court cautioned against a rigid analytical reliance on this principle. Saying that the “effort to decide whether or not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the problem presented in this case.” Id. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507. *736I certainly acknowledge the constitutional protection usually afforded to a person in that person’s home. On the other hand, with the idea in mind that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and given Crawford’s different status, I believe it is appropriate to give his lair far less protection than it would ordinarily attain. It is the status of the person that determines the privacy to which the person is entitled even in that person’s residence. Knights fully supports this idea. Moreover, bodily fluids would seem to be on a par with homes, and the Court has had no problem including bodily fluid searches within the “special needs” category.
What is important also to recognize from these cases is that the classes involved in them did not find their privacy rights “wholly eliminated,” just altered discretely and rationally to accommodate compelling public needs. That is exactly what California has done to parolees vis a vis parole searches.
y
From all of the above, I conclude that Crawford’s statements to law enforcement officials were not the fruit of any illegal search or detention. I conclude also that the conduct of the officers was, as required by Latta, demonstrably reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties). See also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gre-goire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences). The purpose of the encounter, approved by Crawford’s parole agent and well-within the scope of the applicable parole conditions, was not to harass or to annoy, but to investigate an armed robbery where Crawford had been identified by a co-conspirator as a participant who carried a firearm.
Attenuation is irrelevant. In sum, I would affirm Crawford’s conviction.
VI
What the majority opinion in this case does is far more serious than simply freeing a dangerous bank robber from federal prison. The opinion effectively holds unconstitutional a fundamental aspect of California’s statutory parole system and laws. I quote to make this point from the opinion:
Moreover, if the mandatory parole condition were deemed to be a valid blanket consent, any constitutional protection for parolees would be rendered illusory— every state could force its parolees to sign the blanket waiver as a condition of parole, and every parolee’s constitutional rights would thereby instantly vanish. Indeed, under the government’s theory, all parolees could be forced to waive all constitutional rights, including the right to due process in revocation proceedings, or even the right to trial on any new offense allegedly committed during the parole period. We hold that parolees may not generally be forced as a threshold condition of their parole to surrender by blanket waiver their Fourth Amendment rights, including those so recently recognized by Knights.
Even though this passage is hopelessly confused in viewing this issue as one of *737consent and forced waivers, it blows an ill wind for California. We may have just thrown open the habeas gates to a flood of petitions, disabled electronic monitoring, crippled DNA banks, and who knows what else. Only the Richard Allen Davises of the underworld will herald this unsettling result.
Not only is this opinion on the wrong track in its analysis and dead wrong on the merits, but it has accomplished this drastic result in a case where representatives of the California Attorney General have not appeared or been heard from to represent that State’s interests. As far as I can tell, they do not even know of the existence of this case. Instead, we have had to rely on federal prosecutors who inexplicably do not appear to grasp the essence of the relevant California law. At the very least, federal law and respect for California compels us to invite California’s Attorney General to intervene in this case, and, at a minimum, to file an amicus brief pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29 and to augment the record before we inflict such damage on California law and overturn the will of its Legislature as construed by the California Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) reads:
(b) In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality.
Moreover, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contains the same requirement:
(b) Constitutional Challenge to State Statute. If a party questions the constitutionality of a statute of a State in a proceeding in which that State or its agency, officer, or employee is not a party in an official capacity, the questioning party must give written notice to the circuit clerk immediately upon the filing of the record or as soon as the question is raised in the court of appeals. The clerk must then certify that fact to the attorney general of the State.
With all respect to my colleagues, their studied refusal to accede to my request to allow California to appear in this case before we issue our opinion is distressing. We have violated the spirit of the law by excluding the sovereign entity most affected by this decision. As the Supreme Court said in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 74, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997), “the Attorney General had, at a minimum, a right secured by Congress, a right to present argument on appeal’ on the question of constitutionality.’ ”
I would hope that California would get wind of what this panel has done. The United States Attorneys Office should notify its state counterparts of this decision without delay. Thus, I file this dissent with the hope that this is not the end, but the beginning of the proper resolution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
California’s legislative decision to subject prison parolees to stringent supervision including searches was patently reasonable. As limited by the California Supreme Court in Reyes, and the Due Process Clause, these searches conform to the demands of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, California’s decision not to recognize a privacy right on the part of convicted felons to defeat these *738searches is rational and clearly not arbitrary, not capricious, not harassing, and not punitive. Crawford subjectively did not have any expectation of privacy in his residence, and any such objective expectation that any parolee might have had would not be “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979)). The test reiterated by the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) is that “in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation ... is one that has a source ... recognized and permitted by society.” Id. at 83, 119 S.Ct. at 470. Crawford’s case fails this test.
Sirhan Sirhan shot and killed Senator Robert F. Kennedy in 1968 while Senator Kennedy was a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Sirhan was convicted of murder and is serving a life sentence in prison in California. He is eligible for parole. If he is released on parole, it does not seem reasonable to exempt him from parole searches until someone has a suspicion that he has broken the law again. The same holds true for all three strikes felons imprisoned in California.
One would think that if the Constitution permits life sentences for career criminals, see Ewing, and the “Megan’s Law” posting on the Internet of the neighborhood addresses of registered sex offenders, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), it would not be unreasonable for a state to keep a tight rein on parolees.
I would affirm Crawford’s conviction and sentence.3

. Although it is customary and generally appropriate to decide these issues in abstract and legal terms, I find it useful when deciding whether something is "unreasonable” to have a broader understanding of it, as did the voters in California. Otherwise, one loses the human element and all the ramifications of the decision. I apologize to my colleagues if they find this offensive. I freely admit this tendency may come not only from reading Supreme Court opinions, but also from twenty-three years of talking to people whose lives were permanently ruined by violent and heartless felons.

. Justices Scalia and Stevens, although concurring in the result in Skinner, dissented in Von Raab. They did so because they could not find a real problem that would be solved by urine testing of Customs service employees. Here, parole searches are at least a partial solution to the danger, as this case demonstrates. A parole search took an armed bank robber off the streets of San Diego and put him where he belongs.

. Times change. So do our reasonable expectations of privacy. While writing this opinion, I traveled to San Francisco to work. When I arrived at my hotel, I opened my suitcase and found a piece of paper that was not there when I closed my suitcase in Boise. The paper reads:
NOTIFICATION OF BAGGAGE INSPECTION
To protect you and your fellow passenger, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is required by law to inspect all checked baggage. As part of this process, some bags are opened and physically inspected. You bag was among those selected for physical inspection.
During the inspection, your bag and its contents may have been searched for prohibited items. At the completion of the inspection, the contents were returned to your bag, which was resealed with a tamper-evident seal.
If the TSA screener was unable to open your bag for inspection because it was locked, the screener may have been forced to break the locks on your bag. TSA sincerely regrets having to do this, and has taken care to reseal your bag upon completion of inspection. However, TSA is not liable for damage to your locks resulting from this necessary security precaution.
It would appear that post September 11, 2001, all of us who travel by air are now subject to a "special needs” search, even Crawford. Does this mean we have wholly lost our right of privacy? Of course not. It means only that to protect ourselves from real danger, we need to adopt reasonable procedures that will increase our security against crime.