Court Opinion

ID: 9478446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:49:04.410956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:25.869907
License: Public Domain

JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I think the charge of possession with intent to manufacture connotes future action; and, consequently, the government is bound to prove on the date set forth in the indictment the defendant had the specific intent to manufacture and the capacity to manufacture. As a consequence, the “on or about” rule is inapplicable because the date is important.
My conclusion is based upon the plain English meaning of the word “intent.” The word connotes a “purpose” to carry out the intended act in the future. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1176 (unabr. ed. 1981). Thus, the effect of the indictment in this case is to charge the defendant with the possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of manufacturing a controlled substance. With the nature of the charge so framed, it becomes clear that evidence establishing performance of an act in the past, without more, cannot serve as proof that a person intends to perform the same act in the future. I think such an hypothesis is illogical.
The crime charged here required proof that on a specific day the defendant’s purpose was to manufacture; therefore, the government at least had to prove it was possible for him to produce methamphetamine from the substances found in his possession. When, as here, there is no evidence that the quantity of ingredients was sufficient to permit manufacture, there is no basis for inferring an intent to manufacture. One simply cannot intend to do what one is incapable of doing, so a contrary inference is impermissible.
The specific intent to manufacture is a necessary element of the offense charged. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.1977). Evidence that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine prior to the date charged is not sufficient to prove that specific intent. See id. at 670 (to establish a violation of § 841(a)(1), government must prove both “the possessor’s awareness that he is in possession of a controlled substance,” and “his intention to distribute the substance sometime in the future” (emphasis added)).
The reasoning employed by the majority allows the jury to look backward from the date on which the defendant was supposed to have the conjunction of intent and capacity and to reason from his prior acts he was guilty as charged. I must disagree with this view because it refuses to recognize the importance of the date contained in the charge. In my judgment, the verdict in this case is at variance with the crime for which the defendant was indicted.