Court Opinion

ID: 9665930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:00:00.907741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.840075
License: Public Domain

*604BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
This case presents a very narrow issue, namely whether a defendant is per se denied effective assistance of counsel when represented by counsel who has been suspended from the practice of law. Even though this case is limited to attorneys who have been suspended, the majority needlessly expands the scope of this ease to include attorneys who have been disbarred. The majority holds that representation by counsel who has been disbarred is not a per se denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully disagree. For the following reasons, I believe attorneys who have been disbarred are per se ineffective.
I.
It is necessary to briefly recite the facts regarding the disciplinary action taken against appellant’s counsel, Daniel Quirino Longoria.
On May 27, 1993, the District 12-B Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas imposed on Longoria a three year suspension from the practice of law. Longoria was actively suspended for the first 12 months beginning June 1, 1993. The suspension was probated for the remaining 24 months. The grievance committee found Longoria knowingly failed to respond to the grievance committee’s lawful demand for information, and followed a pattern of failing to respond or cooperate with the grievance committee. Longoria was also ordered to pay $1,430 in attorneys’ fees to the State Bar. 56 Tex.B.J. 1066 (Nov. 1993).
Pursuant to Tex.R.Dise.P. 2.19, notice of this suspension was sent by certified mail to Longoria’s home, arriving June 3, 1993. Longoria stated he never opened the letter because he was preparing for appellant’s trial, which took place from June 7, 1993, to June 11, 1993, and did not become aware of his suspension until he was personally served on June 15,1993.
On March 18,1994, the State Bar imposed a three year suspension, with the first year to be actively served after finding Longoria had practiced law while suspended for nonpayment of bar dues,1 and for failing to comply with Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements in violation of Tex.R.Disc. 8.04(a)(10). He was also ordered to pay $1,000 in attorney’s fees and $100 restitution to a former client. 57 Tex.B.J. 1024 (Oct. 1994).2 Also on March 18, 1994, the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County suspended Longoria for three years, with the first year to be actively served. The Court found Longoria was hired to represent a client in a divorce proceeding. Longoria failed to file a petition for divorce and failed to account for the use of the fees which had been paid by the client in violation of Tex. R.Disc. 1.01(b)(1) and 1.03(a). See, n. 2, supra. He was ordered to pay $1,870 in attorneys’ fees to the State Bar and $313 in restitution to his former client. This suspension ran concurrently with the other suspen*605sion imposed on March 18,1994. 57 Tex.B.J. 1241 (Dec. 1994).
On Dec. 12,1995, the Board of Disciplinary Appeals entered an order revoking Longo-ria’s probation and imposing a twenty-four month suspension. The Board found Longo-ria violated a material condition of his May 27,1993 probation in that he had not submitted to a psychological evaluation or executed required releases for medical information. 59 Tex.B.J. 178 (Feb. 1996).
II.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The right to counsel is binding upon the State in all felony prosecutions by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). Furthermore, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Effective counsel is an attorney who represents a defendant’s interests necessary to achieve just results in the adversarial system. Id., 466 U.S. at 685-686,104 S.Ct. at 2063. Actual or constructive denial of counsel is presumed to prejudice the defendant. Id., 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
A member of the bar is presumed to possess the skills necessary to “fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. In McBrayer v. Cravens, Dargan, & Roberts, 265 S.W. 694 (Com.App.1924) (adopted and entered as the judgment of the Supreme Court, per Cure-ton, C.J.), the Court held the suspension of an attorney is merely a temporary deprivation of the right to practice law:
... Suspension does not deprive an attorney of his office, but operates to deprive him temporarily of the right to practice his profession ... He remains a member of the profession, but has no right to engage in the practice during the period of suspen-sion_ (citation omitted) The suspension or disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is intended as a measure of protection to the public and in a certain sense for the protection of the profession.
Id. at 694.
Because a suspended attorney is still a member of the bar, he does not necessarily lose the reasonable competence to effectively represent his clients. See, People v. Pubrat, 451 Mich. 589, 548 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1996). We cannot apply, therefore, a per se rule of ineffectiveness for suspended attorneys because “the justification for a [per se rule] disappears when application of the [rule] will not reach the correct result most of the time.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2558, 115 L.Ed.2d 640, (1991). Instead, the effectiveness of a suspended attorney should be determined under the two prong standard of Strickland. The first prong is whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing social norms. If counsel’s performance fell below the objective standard, the inquiry is whether there is a “reasonable probability” the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient conduct. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.” Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128,131 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). In my view, the fact that counsel was suspended would make a prima facie showing of the first prong.
Thus, I agree with the majority that a suspended attorney is not per se ineffective; instead the determination of a suspended attorney’s effectiveness should be made on a case-by-case basis. However, as explained below, my disagreement springs from the majority making the same holding for attorneys who have been disbarred.
III.
In Erdelyan v. State, 481 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Cr.App.1972), the defendant contended that, at the time of his plea, his attorney was *606ineffective because he had been convicted of a felony in federal court. We held:
At the time [defendant] pled guilty his attorney was not disbarred nor was he subject then or now to compulsory disbarment since his conviction in federal court is on appeal and is not a final conviction. His attorney was duly licensed and qualified at the time of appellant’s plea and the potential ground of disbarment does not render his assistance ineffective as a matter of law.
Id. at 845. Implicit in this holding is that had the attorney been disbarred we would have found counsel per se ineffective counsel.
This implicit holding is consistent with other courts interpretations of Erdelyan. In Ex parte Williams, 870 S.W.2d 343, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994), the Court held:
First, in Texas, a disbarred lawyer is deemed incompetent to represent a criminal defendant as a matter of law. Curry v. Estelle, 412 F.Supp. 198, 200 (S.D.Tex. 1975), aff'd, 531 F.2d 1260 (1976); see also Erdelyan v. State, 481 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) ... As [the attorney] was disbarred prior to trial, he was not the counsel anticipated by our federal and state constitutions ... Representation by a disbarred lawyer is tantamount to no legal representation at all.
Id. at 347-348. Similarly, the trial judge in Curry v. Estelle, 412 F.Supp. 198 (S.D.Tex. 1975), aff'd, 531 F.2d 1260 (1976), held:
... In Texas, a lawyer is deemed incompetent to represent a criminal defendant as a matter of law when he has been finally convicted and disbarred by the State of Texas upon authorization of the Supreme Court of Texas. Until such time, the lawyer is a “practicing attorney” capable of rendering effective assistance. See Erdelyan v. State, 481 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.Cr. App.1972).
Id. at 200.
Moreover, other jurisdictions support a per se rule of ineffectiveness for disbarred attorneys. In People v. Pubrat, 548 N.W.2d at 598, the Michigan Supreme Court determined “[a] person who becomes an attorney remains an attorney until formally disbarred or otherwise permanently separated from the bar. A suspension does not alter the formal status as an attorney.”
Similarly, California holds that an attorney who has formally resigned from the practice of law is incompetent as a matter of law. In re Johnson, 1 Cal.4th 689, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170, 177, 822 P.2d 1317, 1324 (1992). The right to counsel is the right to an attorney admitted to practice before the California Supreme Court. Id., 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 176, 822 P.2d at 1323. Furthermore, in People v. Sanchez, 12 Cal.4th 1, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 869, 906 P.2d 1129, 1155 (1995), the California Supreme Court reiterated its earlier assertion and held an attorney subject to disciplinary proceedings during his representation of defendant was not per se ineffective. - The attorney was not disbarred until after trial, and until that time was competent to practice law. Id., 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 866, 906 P.2d at 1152.
Unlike a suspended attorney, a disbarred attorney has been expelled from the legal profession, and is no longer deemed qualified to practice law. Therefore, representation by a disbarred attorney is a per se denial of counsel.3
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
MANSFIELD, J., joins this opinion.

. Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(ll) provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in the practice of law ... when the lawyer’s right to practice has been suspended or terminated.”

. The Bar Journal states: "In another incident, [Longoria] was found to have violated DRs 1.01(b)(1) and (2), 1.02(a), and Rule 1.03(b) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Conduct.” Although it is not clear, I assume this other incident is the May 27, 1993, suspension.
The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Conduct provide in pertinent part:
RULE 1.01 COMPETENT AND DILIGENT REPRESENTATION
(b) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; or
(2) frequently fail to carry out completely the obligations that the lawyer owes to a client or clients.
RULE 1.02 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF REPRESENTATION
(a) ... a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions:
(1) concerning the objectives and general methods of representation;
RULE 1.03 COMMUNICATION
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding representation.
Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, App. A, Art. 10, § 9.

. This conclusion is supported by our past opinions where we have stated the State Bar is the appropriate forum for allegations of unethical conduct. See, Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 366, n. 5 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); and, Brown v. State, 921 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). It would only serve to undermine our credibility if, after making these statements, the State Bar disbarred an attorney and we permitted that attorney to continue to practice criminal law.