Court Opinion

ID: 9673154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:07:23.935808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.420832
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice, concurring. I can agree that this judgment should and must be affirmed, regardless of the meaning given the word “vagina.” Reading the collective legislative mind is sometimes a difficult task and occasionally the answer seems to lie in the mind of the interpreter, who, as human beings are prone to do, sees what he would like to see in the legislative language. The really basic rule of legislative construction is that, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the words are given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning and there is no resort to rules of construction, the crutches upon which the courts must necessarily lean when language is ambiguous or its meaning uncertain. See McClure v. McClure, 205 Ark. 1032, 172 S.W.2d 243, where we held that the word “cohabit” in a statute meant sexual intercourse, using the popular, rather than the literal or derivative, meaning of the words. Resort to a standard, often used dictionary, Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition, Unabridged, reveals this definition: b. Specif., in female mammals, a canal which leads from the Uterus to the external orifice of the genital canal, or to the cloaca. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary has substantially the same definition, but omits “or to the cloaca.” According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language, vagina means “[t]he passage [leading from the external genital orifice to the uterus in female animals.” Genital means “pertaining to or designating the sexual organs.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition. An orifice is a mouthlike aperture, as of a tube, pipe, etc.; an opening; vent. Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition, Unabridged. External certainly means outward, exterior. Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition. Thus the vagina terminates at the outside opening or vent of the genital canal or the outside or exterior sexual organ opening. In construing any statute, in the absence of any indication of a contrary legislative intent, the courts must give words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning and interpretation in common language, as distinguished from their technical meaning, where the language is plain and unambiguous. City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W. 2d 154; Faull v. Heath, 259 Ark. 145, 532 S.W. 2d 164; Kaiserv. Price-Fewell, Inc., 235 Ark. 295, 359 S.W. 2d 449, cert. den. 371 U.S. 955, 83 S. Ct. 511, 9 L. Ed. 2d 501; Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W. 2d 198; Callv. Wharton, 204 Ark. 544, 162 S.W. 2d 916; Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Ford, 194 Ark. 658, 109 S.W. 2d 151; Berry v. Sale, 184 Ark. 655, 43 S.W. 2d 225. This principle applies in criminal cases. In Hancock v. State, 97 Ark. 38, 133 S.W. 181, we said: *** We must construe the terms according to their ‘usually accepted meaning in common language,’ for that is the sense in which they must be supposed to have been used by the Legislature. *** To me, the most persuasive portion of the Commentary to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (Repl. 1977) is the reference to the statutes of New York and the proposed codes of Michigan and Kentucky. While I think the statement in the Commentary that “sexual intercourse is defined in a fashion that restates the common law doctrine that any penetration suffices to constitute the act” might be consistent with either view of the present statute; because it does not say “penetration of the body,” it could be taken to say “penetration” means the same thing it always has, and not that penetration of the body and penetration of the vagina are the same. Any doubt is eliminated, however, when, by reading the full commentary, we see that the draftsmen of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (Repl. 1977) derived their definitions largely from New York Penal Law § 130.00, and referred to the Proposed Michigan, Kentucky and Texas codes. The definitions in the New York statute included this: “Sexual intercourse” has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight. In the Practice Commentaries following the cited section of the New York Code in McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, Annotated, some of the background history is given. The commentator said: This section sets forth and defines eight terms that are used in Article 130. Subdivision one prescribes that the term “sexual intercourse” is to have its ordinary meaning. The statement that it “occurs upon penetration, however slight,” derives from the former Penal Law (§ 2011). Thus, “sexual intercourse” may occur without orgasm or complete penetration of the penis into the vagina. We do not know the language used in the proposed Michigan Code, but the Michigan statute adopted and published as Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.788 (1), M.C.L.A. Sec. 750.520a (Supp. 1979-80) included the following definition: (h) “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusión, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required. The Kentucky statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.010 has this definition: (8) “Sexual intercourse” means sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense but is limited to sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other. Sexual intercourse occurs upon any penetration, however slight; emission is not required. (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 81) The Texas code, Vernon’s Tex. Code Ann. § 21-.01 has this definition: (3) “Sexual intercourse” means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. The references to McDonald v. State, 225 Ark. 38, 279 S.W.2d 44 and Poe v. State, 95 Ark. 172, 129 S.W. 292, when considered with the definitions of sexual intercourse the draftsmen used as a guide in defining the term are a clear indication that they did not consider the use of the word vagina to change the meaning of the rape statute in the manner the dissent urges. But even if the minority’s definition of vagina is accepted, I cannot accept the premise that there is no slight penetration of the vagina unless the hymen is ruptured. The examining physician testified that there were signs of irritation and reddening and considerable tenderness into the inner surfaces of the labia, but no evidence of penetration past the hymen. He said that there was “slight erythema of the inner labia and introitus, and very tender at the introitus, hymen intact . . .” There was reddening and tenderness, and signs of irritation at the opening of the vagina. The hymen is a mucous membrane, and as such is flexible. The doctor testified that it would require more force to rupture the hymen of a girl of the victim’s age than that of the average adult female. The introitus is the entrance or opening of the vagina by medical definition. 2 Schmidt’s Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine & Word Finder, I-67 (1978). In Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d. Edition, it is defined as “Opening; entrance.” The evidence of irritation at the opening of the vagina, using medical definitions, as the doctor probably did, when considered with the testimony of the little girl, is substantial evidence of slight penetration of her vagina, even though the hymen was not ruptured. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Holt and Mr. Justice Stroud join in this opinion.