Court Opinion

ID: 9492677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:46:59.207217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:25.539559
License: Public Domain

BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case involves a defense attorney who by his questioning introduced impermissible material into a criminal trial. In so doing, he set up a “triple bind” in which his client would potentially benefit (or at least not suffer) no matter the outcome. The court’s opinion today agrees that the material was impermissible as a matter of state law, and that its exclusion would not offend any federal constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, the court’s opinion clangs shut the trap set by the defense attorney, and allows the defendant to go free. In my opinion, this result is contrary to established law, and I respectfully dissent.
I
As the opinion well sets out in its facts section, the underlying events arose out of what is alleged to be a drug deal gone bad. The alleged victim was forced at gun point to enter his house, and some cash was taken from his person before a struggle ensued culminating in a shooting.
At a first trial, the defendant was acquitted of “aggravated robbery” and “aggravated burglary” but the jury hung with respect to kidnapping, assault, and weapons charges. As with all criminal acquittals, the reason for the acquittals does not appear on the record. It could have related to elements included in the definition of “aggravated,” though that is by no means certain.
At the second trial, the prosecuting attorney simply asked the victim to describe what happened. He did so, and in the course of his explanation used the terms “ robbed” and “robbery.” In the cross-examination, the defense attorney (apparently without foundation) began by saying, “You described an aggravated burglary,” (emphasis added) though the victim did not use that term. He then stated: (and introduced an inference into the jury’s mind) “Isn’t it true that a jury found my client not guilty of robbing you?”
At this point, there were three possible results of the impermissible introduction of this information:
1. The jury would be favorably influenced in the defendant’s behalf.
2. A mistrial would be declared and the client would be no worse off, as there was no indication in this particular case that the current jury or trial was particularly favorable to the defendant.
3. A mistrial would be declared and a subsequent appellate court would find that it should not have been declared.
As a result of today’s opinion, the attorney’s tactics (intentional or not) were brilliant. Future defense attorneys will no doubt pay close attention.
II
As the court’s opinion fairly sets forth, the judge’s initial comments may be characterized as vigorous, if not intemperate. *598However, after the recess, and after the prosecutor decided that he wished a mistrial (again, an error in judgment as it has turned out) the judge heard argument by both sides. There is no indication that he cut off the defense attorney’s argument. On this record, I simply cannot agree that the trial judge acted “irrationally or irresponsibly” in the words of Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). Rather, as was the case in Washington, the judge ultimately “gave both defense counsel and the prosecutor full opportunity to explain their positions....” Id. at 515-16, 98 S.Ct. 824.
While the record could conceivably support the court’s harsh and direct statement that the trial judge “failed to act rationally, responsibly or deliberately” (slip op. at 596-97) at some moments in the events, I do not think that a reading of the record as a whole can support that assessment as to his ultimate ruling. In particular, the focus on the judge’s statement that the mistrial would “penalize the side who violates the rules” and his failure to expound on the record about double jeopardy consequences seems to me to create a “magic words” standard. The prosecutor’s legitimate (and again, quite prescient) anguishing over the possible view taken by an appellate court years later, and his specific invocation of the classic argument by those asking for a mistrial based on introduction of impermissible evidence (defense or prosecution) that “you can’t unring that bell” demonstrate to me that the issue was not overlooked.
Finally, the court’s citation, at page 596, of Glover’s invocation of the threat or use of contempt sanctions rings increasingly hollow after cases such as Hanner v. O’Farrell, 1998 WL 136212, 142 F.3d 434 (6th Cir.1998), where this court overturned contempt sanctions lodged against considerably more egregious behavior.
Ill
The primary cases from this circuit cited to support this outcome are quite distinguishable.
In Harpster, our court’s decision was primarily based on the holding that the defense actions that allegedly justified the mistrial were either not erroneous at all, in one case, or, in another, resulted in an “amount of prejudice that could have existed, if any existed at all, [that] was minuscule.” See Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 330 (6th Cir.1997). The portion of Harpster cited at page 596 for the proposition that a “simple corrective instruction” would have been adequate is in the context of this minuscule or nonexistent prejudice.
In Glover, the judge declared a mistrial without any motion or argument, in the midst of a heated cross-examination in which numerous objections had been made, some sustained and some overruled. After an additional question, an objection was made, stating simply that counsel “is trying to badger the witness.” Defense counsel retorted “I’m not badgering anybody,” and the judge immediately declared: “Gentlemen, this is a mistrial.” See Glover v. McMackin, 950 F.2d 1236, 1238 (6th Cir.1991).
With due respect to the court’s interpretation of the events at bar, the judge’s actions in Glover were a far cry from what happened in this case, where argument was permitted, and the judge did not make a final ruling until after a motion had been made.
Rather, I would analogize this case more closely to Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). In the Washington case, the Supreme Court (overturning the judgments of both the district court and the court of appeals) upheld a mistrial granted because of comments by the defense attorney in opening statement that introduced impermissible material. It did so even though the trial court did not even make an explicit finding of “manifest necessity” and did not, in the view of some, explain the decision adequately. The court specifically stated that “[s]ince the record provides sufficient jus*599tification for the state-court ruling, the failure to explain that ruling more completely does not render it constitutionally defective.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. 824.
IV
Thus, I would hold that no error occurred, much less the kind of “unreasonable application of ... clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” that would be necessary to set this defendant free. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). I would affirm the judgment of the district court and therefore respectfully dissent.