Court Opinion

ID: 9683701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:35:29.286934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.747160
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
YOUNG, Justice.
This proceeding relates exclusively to Rule 166-A, Texas Civil Procedure (summary judgment) ; Eunice Blackman, beneficiary in the policy, filing motion therefor, countered by like motion on part of the heirs of assignee. The trial court upon hearing sustained the beneficiary’s motion, with this Court reaching an opposite conclusion—that the blanket assignment made by assured Dora Gottlieb in her lifetime to Sam T. Kaufman constituted a change of beneficiary as a matter of law, with rendition of judgment accordingly.
It is hardly necessary to remark that the office of Rule 166-A is the determination of whether genuine issues of fact are presented in the record, not extending to a final determination concerning the truth of such issues. In consequence, it is our opinion on rehearing of the cause, that, under the instant facts and circumstances, no summary judgment should have been awarded to either side.
Implicit in the sworn pleading of appel-lee Blackman was (1) a denial that any gift was intended by terms of the assignment, and (2) a charge that aforesaid instrument, though absolute in form, was executed merely as collateral security, any debtor-creditor relationship having terminated long prior to death of assured. In her motion for rehearing (not replied to) it is asserted that assignee Kaufman was in nowise related to Dora Gottlieb who, along with the daughter beneficiary (Eunice Blackman) paid premiums on the policy during the entire period; that assured was an uneducated lady, in poor health; assignee Kaufman, an insurance agent, having written policies for her on which premiums were charged; otherwise extending financial assistance, which transactions in all probability involved an assignment of policy as collateral security. These were material facts, which, if believed by the court or jury on final trial, would result in a rejection of the Kauf-man assignment as of no validity and establishment of the named beneficiary in the policy as entitled to the proceeds thereof according to its terms.
Chief Justice Bond in original opinion has proceeded on the theory that no debtor-creditor relationship having been shown, the Kaufman assignment conclusively established a change of beneficiary, —in effect, a gift or sale. We should not thus prejudge the issue or foreclose appel-lee from looking beyond the cloak of assignment on final trial for a determination of whether it was executed, on the other hand, as collateral security for debt. Lewy v. Gillard, 76 Tex. 400, 13 S.W. 304; Cawthorn v. Perry, 76 Tex. 383, 13 S.W. 268. “The majority of courts at the present time * * * are prone to look with reluctance upon absolute assignments and hold that if the assignment, though absolute in form, was intended only as collateral security, it will have only such effect. Thus one having an equitable claim may show by parol that an apparently absolute assignment was intended as security, and such showing, whether demonstrated by written agreement or parol evidence, will be conclusive. And such evidence is admissible though contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the assignment.” Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 2, p. 759, sec. 1312.
All inferences and presumptions apparent on face of the record are consistent with appellee’s theory that the Kaufman paper was not intended by the assured as effectuating a change of beneficiary; for example: (1) The form and method of change as provided by The Praetorians’ Constitution and Laws, also indicated by the policy, was not followed; (2) the form of assignment, on the other hand, was one commonly incident to a commercial transaction and as collateral security for debt; and (3) absent a basis of debtor-creditor relationship between the assured and as-signee, the transaction would appear as an unnatural disposition of property “It *428is historical that in administering summary-judgment practice, the courts have been inclined to be critical of the showing made by the moving party. Customarily he is held strictly to a conclusive showing that no fact issue exists and that he is entitled to judgment without further delay. Conversely, the courts accord the resisting party considerably more indulgence; the motion will be denied if it appears that a substantial fact dispute may exist, regardless of informalities or defects in the resisting party’s papers.” (Emphasis ours.) 22 Texas Law Review, p. 438.1
The underlying purpose of Rule 166-A was elimination of patently unmer-itorious claims or untenable defenses; not being intended to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing on the merits of any real issue of fact. It should be temperately and cautiously applied, “lest abuse reap nullification.” Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 10 Cir., 155 F.2d 568, 571.
Unquestionably, this beneficiary is entitled to a trial on the merits with full opportunity for development of her tender of a genuine issue of fact; and judgment of this Court should be merely one of reversal and remand.
For the reasons stated, our former judgment of rendition is set aside, and the judgment below is reversed and cause remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
CRAMER, J., concurs.
BOND, C. J., dissents.

. This discussion of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. (Summary Judgment Procedure) by Hon. Tom Suggs, formerly Judge, 59th District Court, and lone Stumberg was pri- or to adoption of Rule 56, supra, as 166-A by our Supreme Court. Subsequent Federal decisions however have uniformly followed the rule of construction above quoted. See Purity Cheese Co. v. Frank Ryser Co., 7 Cir., 153 F.2d 88; Magnussen v. Ocean S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 162 F.2d 77.