Court Opinion

ID: 9913467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 22:01:52.575671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:46.799688
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/27/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION EIGHT

 PAGLIA & ASSOCIATES                    B313864
 CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.,
                                        Los Angeles County
        Plaintiffs and Respondents,     Super. Ct. No. 21STCV02725

        v.

 V.J. HAMILTON,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rupert Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed.
      Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Sean C. Rotstan for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Morris & Stone, Aaron P. Morris; Christopher J. Koorstad
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                       ____________________
      Vanessa Hamilton used the internet to censure her
contractor, who sued her for defamation. Hamilton filed a special
motion to strike his lawsuit, claiming the litigation privilege
immunized her. Her comments were akin to press releases,
however, and were unprivileged. We affirm the denial of her
anti-SLAPP motion. Undesignated code citations are to the Code
of Civil Procedure. We use “special motion to strike” and “anti-
SLAPP motion” as synonyms. (See § 425.16.)
                                  I
       Insurer Safeco covered the damage when a tree fell on
Hamilton’s house. For the repair work, Safeco recommended
Vincent T. Paglia and his company, Paglia & Associates
Construction, Inc., doing business as Protech Construction—a
group we refer to collectively as Paglia. Hamilton signed a repair
contract with Paglia in 2016. Paglia said the required repair was
extensive because Hamilton’s 1923 home was in poor condition
and current building codes required extensive reconstruction.
Paglia finished in 2017.
       Unhappy with Paglia’s work, Hamilton reported him to the
Contractors State License Board. This agency’s proceedings are
germane because Hamilton claims they triggered a litigation
privilege for her. Hamilton alleged the Board in 2019 assessed
$4,750 in civil penalties against Paglia and ordered him to pay
Hamilton $20,371. Paglia’s failings were numerous, according to
Hamilton, and included, among many other items, failure to level
the front and back yards, failure to install attic vents, and failure
to provide a proper driveway width.
       Hamilton began posting critiques of Paglia in 2019. She
continued her blog and Yelp attacks through January 2021.
Some, but not all, of Hamilton’s posts mentioned the contractors
board.
       On February 20, 2020, for instance, Hamilton posted to her
blog that Paglia had “turned my life upside down. . . . Paglia
committed ‘hard fraud’ in that he destroyed undamaged
structures. He also submitted a different set of plans to Public

                                  2
Works in order to get a rebuild permit that he misused to build
this piece of junk structure that stands in place of my 1923
Rambler cottage . . . .” This posting did not mention the
contractors board.
      On January 15, 2021, Hamilton posted a lengthy statement
on Yelp. We excerpt its beginning and end, without adding or
changing punctuation.
      “Lesson Learned from Protech Protech is Deceptive and
Threatening Lesson #1 Contractors and Insurance Adjusters
maintain confidential relationships that exclude the consumer. .
. . This structure is all laminate and used goods that came from
other projects Protech was working on in the area. Protech left
me with no owners manuals, warranties, or receipts, but they
took money that I did not authorize[] they be paid. Lesson #4
Never use[] a contractor from Protech.”
      In 2021, Paglia sued Hamilton for libel per se, alleging
Hamilton’s blog and Yelp postings were false and defamatory.
Paglia’s complaint identified more than 20 statements he claimed
were libels.
      Hamilton filed a special motion to strike. Her notice of
motion stated it sought to strike Paglia’s entire complaint. It did
not ask the court to strike particular parts. In opposition to
Hamilton’s motion, Paglia discussed three of her blog posts and
two Yelp reviews. The court denied Hamilton’s motion. The
record offers no account of the court’s reasoning. Hamilton
appealed.
                                  II
      We affirm because Paglia supplied facts that defeated
Hamilton’s anti-SLAPP motion. Hamilton said her attacks on
Paglia were privileged, but the litigation privilege does not cover

                                 3
statements made entirely outside the litigation context. Using
the internet to speak publicly is every American’s right but, if
people wish to defame private figures online, they do so at their
own risk.
                                  A
       Analysis of special motions to strike proceeds in two steps.
Without considering the first step about protected activity, we
focus on step two: whether Paglia met his factual and legal
burden of showing his claims had minimal merit. (See Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
       This second step required Paglia to demonstrate a
probability of success. In this summary-judgment-like process,
courts do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.
Instead they evaluate whether plaintiffs like Paglia have
produced evidence to support legally sufficient claims. Accepting
that evidence as true, courts decide whether the motion defeats
the plaintiff's claims as a matter of law. The motion fails if the
lawsuit has minimal merit. Appellate review is independent.
(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)
       In reviewing Paglia’s evidence, we do not resolve credibility
disputes or evidentiary conflicts. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40
Cal.4th 683, 714.) A court cannot grant a special motion to strike
if the plaintiff has presented evidence that, if believed, would
support a cause of action. (Id. at pp. 729, 736.)
       Paglia sued Hamilton for libel. Libel is a false and
unprivileged written publication tending to injure a victim’s
occupation. (Civ. Code, § 45.) Libel is per se when the words
require no explanation and thus are actionable without a
showing of special damages. (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32
Cal.3d 149, 153.)

                                 4
                                   B
       A customer’s false public statement that her contractor
committed “hard fraud” is libel as a prima facie matter, for that
statement would tend to injure the contractor’s occupation.
Hamilton maintains, however, Paglia failed to establish a case of
minimal merit (1) because the litigation privilege protected her;
(2) because Paglia’s complaint did not allege Hamilton’s
statements were unprivileged; (3) because her statements were
true; and (4) because her statements were merely her opinions,
which are inactionable. This appeal turns on a legal analysis of
these four defenses, which, upon inspection, fail.
       Before proceeding, we note Hamilton’s motion tackled
Paglia’s suit in its entirety. Because Hamilton’s motion did not
target subsets of Paglia’s pleading, Paglia prevails if any of his
claims succeed. We thus will go no further than Paglia’s first
factual allegation.
                                    1
       The litigation privilege is Hamilton’s first defense. She
argues her statements related to a matter under consideration by
the contractors board—a state agency that was adjudicating her
complaints against Paglia. We hold her online postings were not
sufficiently connected to this agency’s proceedings. Instead, they
were like press releases: efforts to communicate with the public
at large. The litigation privilege does not protect press releases.
It did not protect Hamilton.
       California’s litigation privilege springs from Civil Code
section 47. This statute provides that “A privileged publication or
broadcast is one made: (a) In the proper discharge of an official
duty [or] (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial

                                5
proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law,
. . .” (Italics added.)
        The litigation privilege applies to any communication made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings by litigants or other
participants to achieve the objects of the litigation that has some
connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 211–212 (Silberg).)
        The Supreme Court interprets the privilege broadly to
further its salutary purposes. The main purpose is to afford
litigants and witnesses complete access to courts without fear of
later harassment by derivative tort actions. If parties, lawyers,
and witnesses worried their words could be the subject of
retaliatory libel attacks from disgruntled trial losers, their worry
could inhibit open communication in judicial proceedings. Their
fear could dampen the full presentation of evidence. The
litigation privilege thus allows citizens to communicate freely
with public authorities combating wrongdoing. (Silberg, supra,
50 Cal.3d at pp. 212–213.)
        By immunizing litigation participants from tort liability,
the privilege helps litigants during trial expose “the bias of
witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby enhancing the
finality of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of
litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result.”
(Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 214.)
        The litigation privilege thus is the backbone of an effective
and smoothly operating judicial system: it ensures free access to
the courts, promotes complete and truthful testimony, encourages
zealous advocacy, gives finality to judgments, and avoids
unending litigation. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 214–215.)

                                 6
       Yet every privilege has limits. In pursuit of desirable policy
goals, an absolute privilege can create injustice by barring
actions that would vindicate injuries from false and defamatory
statements. At some point, an absolute privilege must give way.
But at what point?
       The decision in Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
1134, 1149 (Rothman) marked one boundary. Rothman held the
litigation privilege does not extend to litigating in the press.
“Such an extension would not serve the purposes of the privilege;
indeed, it would serve no purpose but to provide immunity to
those who would inflict upon our system of justice the damage
which litigating in the press generally causes: poisoning of jury
pools and bringing disrepute upon both the judiciary and the
bar.” (Ibid.)
       Rothman was in the context of a lawsuit in court. The
litigation privilege, however, also covers proceedings before
agencies like the contractors board. (See Civ. Code, § 47, subd.
(b)(3); Hagberg v. Cal. Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 362–
364; Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 965
(Billauer).) In the agency context, Rothman’s principle remains
the same: the litigation privilege does not extend to press
releases or other attempts to communicate with the public that
lack any other connection to the government proceeding at issue.
(Ibid.)
       In short, the litigation privilege must have a substantial
connection to litigation, whether judicial or otherwise. To enjoy
this privilege, the communication—whether it be a document
filed with the adjudicator, a letter between counsel, or some oral
statement—must function as a useful step in the litigation
process and must serve its purposes. “This is a very different

                                 7
thing from saying that the communication’s content need only be
related in some way to the subject matter of the litigation.”
(Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.)
       Hamilton’s postings lacked a substantial connection to
litigation. Her posts were not letters to board officials asking
them to investigate Paglia. They were not filings with the
contractors board. They were not messages between counsel or
parties in the course of litigation.
       Hamilton’s posts were merely public denunciations of
Paglia. Some did not mention the contractors board at all. Those
that did simply aired Hamilton’s dissatisfaction with Paglia.
       Hamilton’s Yelp and blog posts could advance her case
before the contractors board only by rallying public opinion to her
cause and by pressuring the board to bow to that opinion.
Otherwise her statements would have no effect on, and no
relevance to, the board. But Rothman rightly condemned using
this privilege to try matters in the court of public opinion.
       The litigation privilege did not insulate Hamilton from
liability. Hamilton was fully entitled to post about Paglia or any
other topic, but she did not enjoy absolute liberty to write, free
from all obligation to the truth.
       Hamilton’s first defense to Paglia’s factual showing fails.
                                   2
       Hamilton argues Paglia’s complaint failed to plead that
Hamilton’s statements were unprivileged, and this omission
guarantees victory for her special motion to strike. In response,
however, Paglia quotes, with our italics, Morris v. Nat.
Federation of the Blind (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 162, 164:
“privilege is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in the
answer.” Hamilton does not contest the validity, or attempt to

                                 8
argue against, the Morris case. Rather, she cites Whelan v.
Wolford (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 689, 693 for the proposition that,
“[w]hen a complaint alleges facts disclosing the application of a
privilege, the burden rests on the plaintiff to establish that the
statements at issue are unprivileged.”
       The burden indeed rested on plaintiff Paglia to show, in
opposition to the special motion to strike, that Hamilton’s
statements were unprivileged. Paglia discharged this burden, as
the previous section demonstrated: Paglia demonstrated
Hamilton’s statements were unprivileged. Whether Paglia’s
complaint pleaded an affirmative defense is immaterial.
       Hamilton’s second defense fails.
                                 3
       Hamilton asserts her statements were true. Paglia’s
evidence showed otherwise, however, and we accept his evidence
at this stage.
       Hamilton wrote “Paglia committed ‘hard fraud’ in that he
destroyed undamaged structures.” But Paglia’s evidence
established that he committed no fraud and that building codes
required him to do extensive work on Hamilton’s old house
beyond simply fixing the tree damage. Hamilton made no
evidentiary reply to Paglia.
       In sum, the facts showed Paglia did his work, not for a
fraudulent reason, but to comply with building codes. For
purposes of evaluating Hamilton’s special motion to strike, her
posting was untrue.
       Hamilton’s third defense fails.
                                 4
       Hamilton argues her writings were not actionable because
they were merely opinions. On this point, the dispositive

                                9
question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the
statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.
(Edward v. Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780, 790.) A fact finder
could conclude Hamilton’s statement announced a fact. Whether
the destruction of structures was needless and fraudulent, or
whether modern building codes compelled this work, is a matter
that can be proven or disproven. Hamilton asserted facts, not
opinions. Hamilton’s fourth defense fails.
                                  5
       As an alternative to striking Paglia’s whole complaint,
Hamilton asks us to strike individual portions of his complaint
“identified throughout this brief and in the Table of Statements
for which [the Court of Appeal] finds Paglia failed to meet his
burden.”
       Hamilton included a “Table of Statements” in her opening
brief. Her table lists 22 of Hamilton’s statements Paglia attacked
as libels.
       Each of the 22 statements requires a different set of legal
arguments, authorities, facts, and record citations.
       Hamilton’s request in effect is for this court to develop, at
her demand, 22 different, detailed, and individual legal and
factual analyses. Her briefing omits these 22 analyses.
       Appellants may not enlist the court as their legal assistant
to develop arguments they merely suggest. The duty to present
legal analysis belongs to the parties. It would be unfair for one
side to loft an undeveloped legal idea, to rely on the court to work
it out, and to leave the opposing party with nothing concrete to
tackle in the briefing. (Cf. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 565 [failing to develop a reasoned
argument supported by authority improperly forces the court to

                                10
decode a bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is
erroneous]; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [to demonstrate error, an appellant must
supply the court with cogent argument supported by analysis and
record citations].)
      Hamilton’s lack of individualized argumentation on her 22
ideas forfeited these grounds for appeal.
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm the order and award costs to respondents.

                                        WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                               11