Court Opinion

ID: 9857310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:29:19.71968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.897610
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
The insurance carrier has filed herein a sincere, dignified, frank and forceful petition to rehear. We have given this petition very careful consideration and after doing so are forced to the position of our original opinion.
The petition in a way again reargues the proposition that is set forth in the original demurrer; that the one-year statute of limitations applicable in Workmen’s Compensation cases should apply from the date of the accident. The argument along this line is that medical expenses occur then which are not sued for until the action is instituted when the injury is discovered more than a year later. Those medical expenses which occurred more than a year before action'and discovery of injury of course are not applicable and cannot be. taken into *537consideration. It is only such expenses that are incident to and follow the discovery of the injury that come within the statute which are covered.
On the same day we released the original opinion herein we released Bradford v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 199 Tenn. 170, 285 S. W. (2d) 136, 137.
It is now very convincingly and forcibly argued that there is no distinction in the two cases. We considered this apparent conflict and discussed the question before the release of the originals. We were then and are now of the opinion that the cases differ in that in the instant case suit was brought within one year from the discovery of disability which is here • used as synonymous with injury. While in the Bradford case- ‘ ‘ The petitioner knew of his injuries to his back at least within four days after he was injured but waited almost three years before he instituted this suit.” Bradford v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., supra. The word'“injured” in the quoted sentence is used in the sense of “accident.” We think, after re-consideration, that the original opinion herein is the correct rule to follow. Concededly, it is in line with the majority of the States.
The holding of the Court in the original opinion is complained of because it is said that we have in this opinion violated the doctrine of stare decisis. Authority is quoted for this statement.- We do not think that the doctrine has or is here abused. The reason is to a great extent explained by the -original opinion.
In the next place, as this Court understands it, Graham v. Wells Bride Co., (cited and quoted from at length in the original opinion) is not authority contra to the conclusion as reached in the original opinion. The holding in the Graham case, which it is said in the argument of the petitioner now and was said in its original argument *538as the holding of this Court, is in fact dictum. We say this for the reason that o,n page 662 of 150 Tenn., on page 770 of 266 S. W., reporting the Graham case, the following is said:
“It will also he noted that injury and impairment of vision resulted to his eye as soon as the accident happened, and he reported said injury to defendant and was treated by defendant’s physician or surgeon until December, 1922, a period of 13 months. At this time it was discovered by the surgeon that petitioner had totally and permanently lost the sight of the injured eye, but he still did not institute suit for five months thereafter.”
Thus it is obvious that the man or the employee in the Graham case knew of both accident and injury long prior to the running of the statute of limitations. The court there said he did not bring his action until about 18 months after the accident and injury. Obviously under such a situation the statute was applicable and any attempted discussion or definition of the word accident and injury would not be applicable, it would be merely dictum. Thus it is that we do not feel that we have done any violation to the rule of stare decisis. We feel that now we are, for the reasons stated in the original opinion, clearly in line with the overwhelming weight of authority in this country and of what the Workmen’s Compensation Act demands.
For the reasons stated herein the petition to rehear must be denied.