Court Opinion

ID: 9497538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:34.393429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:15.187893
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority’s resolution of Newton’s claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and sentencing, I write separately to express my discomfort with its resolution of Newton’s challenge to the search warrants issued for his properties, and I dissent from the majority’s resolution of Newton’s competency claim.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVIT
In this case, the district court below and the majority opinion today both find probable cause to search properties associated with Newton on the strength of his involvement with the marijuana conspiracy and the blanket statement that evidence is likely to be found where drug dealers live. I believe this comes dangerously close to creating a special rule for drug-related search warrants, inappropriate under Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392-95, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (invalidating Wisconsin state court’s per se *640rule allowing no-knock search warrants in every case of suspected drug trafficking), and to eliding the distinction between probable cause to believe an individual guilty of a crime and probable cause to search property owned by that individual, in contravention of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-559 & n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (emphasizing that the determinant of a proper search warrant is not that the owner of the property is suspected of a crime but that evidence is likely to be found on the premises), and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (disallowing warrantless searches of a suspect’s house when the suspect is arrested in her home). Nonetheless, because I believe earlier circuit precedent controls the outcome today, I reluctantly agree with the majority that we must uphold the search warrant in this case. I write separately to discuss the cases that I believe control, and to emphasize the particular factual circumstances of this case.
This circuit first discussed extensively the propriety of basing probable cause on inferences to be drawn from the type of crime suspected in United States v. Savoca, 739 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.1984). In Savoca, arrest warrants had been issued for Savoca and an accomplice, and they had both been seen entering a motel room rented by the accomplice. A search warrant was authorized based only on that information. The government argued that probable cause existed to search the room because “ ‘known bank robbers’ tend to conceal fruits and instrumentalities of crime in places which are both accessible and private.”1 Id. at 225. The court rejected the government’s argument.
The fact that there is probable cause to arrest a person for a crime does not automatically give police probable cause to search his residence or other area in which he has been observed for evidence of that crime. If the rule were otherwise, “there would be no reason to distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants and cases like Chimel v. California would make little sense.”
Id. at 224-25 (quoting United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.1970)) (internal citations omitted). The search warrant was found to be invalid, but upon a petition for rehearing after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the court found the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable. See United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir.1985).
Cases after Savoca were less concerned about the nexus between the evidence to be found and the location to be searched. See United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 393-94 (6th Cir.2002) (district court erred in finding no probable cause because evidence is likely to be found where dealers live); United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir.1998) (“that ‘in the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live,’ support[s] a finding of probable cause”) (quoting United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, *6411192-93 (6th Cir.1996) (finding probable cause based on affidavit that stated, based on affiant-officer’s extensive experience, that “ ‘many drug traffickers utilize their homes to conduct their illegal narcotics trafficking activities’”); United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir.1991) (“magistrate reasonably inferred that evidence would be found at Davidson’s residence [as] ‘[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is. likely to be found where the dealers live’”) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 399 (6th Cir.1990) (relying on statement of agent that “in his experience a person engaged in the distribution of cocaine frequently keeps at his residence a number of different items”);2 see also United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 297-98 (3d Cir.2000) (collecting cases finding probable cause based on drug-dealer inference from First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, but declining to decide whether to adopt rule, resolving case on other grounds); United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1999) (collecting cases and declining to decide issue). An exception to this general line is United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093, 1097-98 (6th Cir.1994), which found that a search warrant for safe deposit boxes held by the defendant was not supported by probable cause, where the affidavit had contained the statement that, based on the training and experience of the affiant-offi-cer, “ ‘it is not uncommon for the records, etc. of such [drug] distribution to be maintained in bank safe deposit boxes.’ ” Id. at 1097 (alteration in original); see also Nolan, 199 F.3d at 1183 n. 3 (noting conflict between Schultz and Davidson).
While an officer’s “training and experience” may be considered in determining probable cause, see, e.g., [Martin, 920 F.2d at 399], it cannot substitute for the lack of evidentiary nexus in this case, prior to the search, between the safe deposit boxes and any criminal activity. Officer Ideker did not have anything more than a guess that contraband -or evidence of a crime would be found in the boxes, and therefore the first warrant should not have been issued. To find otherwise would be to invite general warrants authorizing searches of any property owned, rented, or otherwise used by a criminal suspect — -just the type of broad warrant the Fourth Amendment was designed to foreclose.
Schultz, 14 F.3d at 1097-98. See also United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 507 (6th Cir.1999) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Simple knowledge that Louis, a co-defendant, owned both properties cannot cure this 'facially defective warrant — permitting search of any property owned by the suspect would be much more akin to the ‘general warrants’ of old than to the particularized requirements set down by the drafters of the Fourth Amendment.”).
To the extent that Schultz is reconcilable with the other cases of this circuit in this line, it is because each of those cases included some additional “plus” that helped form a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. See Miggins, 302 F.3d at 393 (two roommates arrested after receiving delivery of cocaine *642package lived together at residence searched and were previously involved in drug trafficking); Jones, 159 F.3d 969 (confidential informant had been on premises, but outside searched house, in seventy-two hours preceding the affidavit and had there witnessed defendant in possession of cocaine for distribution); Caicedo, 85 F.3d at 1193 (defendant lied about his address to arresting officers); Davidson, 936 F.2d at 857-60 (officers witnessed co-conspirators entering and exiting defendant’s residence in course of conspiracy); Martin, 920 F.2d at 399 (“one of the narcotics sales took place very near the residence and the confidential informant had been inside the residence and provided some information as to what was kept there”). In this case, two of the “plus” factors from these cases are present: as to the Fort Street residence, Newton may have attempted to conceal from officers that this was his true residence, Mot. to Suppress Evidence (R. 26) Ex. A at 5, ¶ 19; see Caicedo, 85 F.3d at 1193, and as to both the Fort Street residence and the Dodge Road residence,3 some evidence existed that Newton and his girlfriend Lori Cool, who had been arrested with Newton for possession of marijuana in 1999, occupied both properties together. Mot. to Suppress Evidence (R. 26), Ex. A at 4-5, ¶¶ 13, 18, 21; see Miggins, 302 F.3d at 393.
Based on these factors, as well as the large amount of marijuana that Newton was found possessing, rather than merely suspected of possessing, and his apparent role as leader of the conspiracy, I reluctantly conclude that the prior law of this circuit dictates that probable cause existed to search the Fort Street and Dodge Road residences. I would emphasize, though, that this permissible inference, often based on an affiant-officer’s years of experience, see Caicedo, 85 F.3d at 1193, should not become the sort of default rule explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Richards: “[I]n each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular [situation] justified” the Fourth Amendment intrusion. 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. “The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.” Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556, 98 S.Ct. 1970. That an individual is suspected of drug trafficking should not give the police carte blanche to search her home, and that this and most of the other courts of appeals have come close to so holding is unfortunate. En banc or Supreme Court consideration of this issue would seem warranted.
II. COMPETENCY
Title 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) requires a district court, if reasonable cause exists to believe that a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, to order sua sponte a hearing to determine the defendant’s competency. When a defendant challenges a district court’s failure to do so, our standard of review is “whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” Pate v. Smith, 637 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 983 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 815, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977)). See also Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. *643916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 287 (1983).4 A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he does not have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I believe that Newton’s defense counsel’s statements on two of the three days of the trial that his client had gone without sleep for days, and his statement on the second day of trial that Newton was “constantly babbling during the course of the trial,” and “not making any sense,” go straight to Newton’s ability to consult with and aid his attorney in his own defense, and therefore to the heart of the ultimate competency determination. While in light of the nature of his condition, and its easy remedy of a few good nights’ sleep, a continuance until Newton was well-rested may have been the best course of action, I am not prepared to say that because Newton’s counsel failed to seek a continuance, Newton’s due process right to be competent at trial was not violated. Nor am I prepared to say that a temporary condition deserves less solicitude than a permanent one; merely because Newton’s condition was easily cured does not mean his inability to consult rationally with his counsel and his “babbling” during trial fail to rise to the level of temporary incompetency. I believe these two comments by Newton’s trial counsel, indicating that Newton had gone without sleep for 72 and later 96 hours straight, and that Newton’s demean- or and ability to follow the trial proceedings and consult with counsel was affected by that sleep deprivation, were such that a reasonable judge should have experienced *644sufficient doubt to inquire sua sponte into Newton’s competency to continue at trial. Finally, because of the temporary nature of Newton’s condition, and the time elapsed since his trial, I believe a nunc pro tunc competency hearing would be inappropriate. See Bowers v. Battles, 568 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir.1977) (adequacy of nunc pro tunc competency hearings dependent upon availability of contemporaneous evidence). Newton was not examined by any mental health professionals, and there is therefore a dearth of medical evidence as to his competency. I therefore would reverse Newton’s conviction, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.

. That the same conclusion is drawn of both bank robbers and drug dealers suggests that there is nothing particular about any crime that tends to suggest where its instrumentalities are kept and that the rule that I am forced to follow today is a judicial fiction borne of expediency rather than reasoned constitutional analysis. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the “knock and announce” rule for drug cases partially because “the reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others,” allowing the exception to swallow the rule).

. The majority additionally cites United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir.2001), for the proposition that “with continuing criminal operations, any issue of staleness, or the lack of a direct known link between the criminal activity and residence, becomes minimal.” Maj. Op. at 635-36. Greene, however, deals exclusively with the issue of staleness, as the affidavit supporting the warrant in that case contained observations by a criminal informant of contraband inside the house searched. Here, staleness is not an issue, only the lack of any direct link between the property and the crime.

. As the majority notes, only evidence seized from those two properties was used at trial.

. Although Pate and Williams are state habeas cases, as are later published cases reaffirming their standard of review, see, e.g., Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399, 413-14 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1087, 121 S.Ct. 804, 148 L.Ed.2d 690 (2001), it stands to reason that our standard of review on direct appeal from a district court would certainly be no more deferential than our review of a state court in a habeas case. See United States v. Colbert, 55 Fed.Appx. 225, 2002 WL 31873484, *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2002) (citing Williams for standard of review in direct appeal), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1211, 123 S.Ct. 1304, 154 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2003); United States v. Cox, 181 F.3d 104, 1999 WL 357828, *2 (6th Cir. May 26, 1999) (same), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1010, 120 S.Ct. 1282, 146 L.Ed.2d 229 (2000); United States v. Knight, 896 F.2d 1369, 1990 WL 18055, *4 (6th Cir. Mar.1, 1990) (same). A handful of prior unpublished cases have applied plain-error review. See United States v. Czubaj, 85 Fed.Appx. 477, 2004 WL 74647, *2 (6th Cir. Jan.6, 2004); United States v. Myles, 70 Fed.Appx. 814, 2003 WL 21698861, *1 (6th Cir. July 17, 2003) (order); see also United States v. McBride, 39 Fed.Appx. 139, 2002 WL 926975, *3 (6th Cir. May 6, 2002) (indicating plain error applies but stating and applying correct standard). Plain-error review, however, based on a failure to object, makes little since where the complained-of error is the district court’s failure to perform its duty under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). That is, no assignment of error depending on the district court’s failure sua sponte to order a hearing will ever have been "objected” to by the complaining party below, as that "objection” would no doubt take the form of a motion for a hearing; there is no objected-to failure to raise competency sua sponte. This problem is acute with regard to competency, where waiver is especially problematic, as a defendant allegedly incompetent to stand trial is also allegedly incompetent to waive his right to a competency determination. See West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir.2001) (Moore, J., dissenting) (" ‘Once [his] competence was put in issue, [the defendant] could not waive his right to have his competence determined.’ ”) (quoting Harper v. Parker, 177 F.3d 567, 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1141, 119 S.Ct. 2015, 143 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1999) (first alteration in original)); Horace v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.) ("[W]aiver cannot occur.”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 235, 93 L.Ed.2d 160 (1986).