Court Opinion

ID: 9893361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 18:03:50.943045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:30.983633
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION FOUR

SNOWBALL WEST INVESTMENTS                   B314750
L.P.,
                                            (Los Angeles County
       Plaintiff and Appellant,             Super. Ct. No. 20STCP00771)

       v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

       Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff and Robert S. Draper,
Judges. Affirmed.
      Gaines & Stacey, Fred Gaines and Lisa A. Weinberg for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Holland & Knight, Daniel R. Golub, William E. Sterling for
California Building Industry Association as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Zacks, Freedman & Patterson, Ryan J. Patterson, Brian
O’Neill for Yes In My Back Yard as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Matthew Gelfand and Allyson Richman for Californians for
Homeownership as Amicus Curiae on behalf Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      June Babiracki Barlow for Californians Association of
Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Michael N. Feuer, Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorneys,
Denise C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Terry P. Kaufmann
Macias, John W. Heath, Assistant City Attorneys, Donna Wong,
Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.

                      I.    INTRODUCTION
      Snowball West Investments, LP applied to build a housing
project consisting of 215 homes in the Sunland/Tujunga area of
the City of Los Angeles. The current zoning for the site is RA and
A1; the project must be rezoned to RD5 and R1 for the project to
move forward. The City denied Snowball’s zone change request,
stating that more information was needed before building homes
in a high wildfire hazard area. Snowball petitioned for a writ of
mandate, which was denied. Snowball appealed.
      Snowball argues that under the rezoning exemption in the
Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Government Code section
65589.5, subdivision (j)(4)1 (section 65589.5(j)(4)), its project is
exempt from the need for a zone change. That subdivision states
that “a proposed housing development project . . . shall not

1    All further statutory references are to the Government
Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
require a rezoning” if the housing development project is
consistent with local requirements “but the zoning for the project
site is inconsistent with the general plan.” Snowball argues that
because the current zones for the project site, RA and A1, are not
expressly listed in the general plan, the zoning for the site is
“inconsistent” with the general plan. Consequently, the rezoning
exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) excuses the need for a zone
change. The City disagrees, asserting that even though zones RA
and A1 are not expressly listed in the general plan, they are
nevertheless incorporated by reference, because the general plan
allows all zones that are “more restrictive” than the ones listed.
The City argues that because zones RA and A1 are more
restrictive than the zones listed in the general plan, they are
therefore “consistent” with the general plan, so the rezoning
exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not apply. We agree with
the City that the zoning is consistent based on the language of
the general plan, and therefore section 65589.5(j)(4) does not
exempt Snowball’s project from the requirement of a zone change.
        Snowball further asserts that when denying the zone
change, the City was required to make findings required by
another subdivision of the HAA, section 65589.5, subdivision
(j)(1) (section 65589.5(j)(1)). However, section 65589.5(j)(1)
applies only when “a proposed housing development project
complies with applicable, objective general plan, zoning, and
subdivision standards and criteria . . . in effect at the time that
the application was deemed complete.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1).)
Snowball’s project did not comply with the zoning in effect
because it required a zone change. Therefore, this subdivision
also does not apply.

                                3
       Finally, Snowball contends the City failed to make findings
required under the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) when
denying the zone change and that any such findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the findings
were sufficient and were supported by substantial evidence. We
therefore affirm the superior court’s denial of Snowball’s writ
petition.
                      II.    BACKGROUND
A.     Factual background
       1.    The proposed project
       Snowball owns eight parcels of land totaling 58 acres at
6433 La Tuna Canyon Road. From the 1960s to 2016, part of the
property was the Verdugo Hills Golf Course. The site is bounded
by a single-family residential development (Tujunga) to the
north, La Tuna Canyon Road and the Foothill Freeway
(Interstate 210) to the south, Tujunga Canyon Boulevard to the
east, and vacant hillside terrain to the west. The site is in a
“very high fire hazard severity zone.” (See §§ 51177, subd. (i),
51178.)
       In 2007, Snowball filed an application with the City
requesting a zone change, site plan review, and project permit
compliance for a development consisting of 229 homes on about
28 acres of the property (the project). Snowball later revised its
application, requested a vesting zone change, and converted its
project to 208 “small lot” units and seven single-family homes, for
a reduced density of 215 homes.
       The zoning for the project area is currently A1 and RA,
which allows for a maximum density of 19 single-family homes.

                                 4
Snowball sought to change the zone to RD5, with a small portion
as R1.2
       The project went through several iterations, and worked its
way through the approval process. In June 2019, the City
Planning Commission (City Planning) issued a determination
letter approving much of the project; a corrected letter was sent
in July 2019. The letters noted that approval was conditioned on
a future zoning change: “Approval of zone change to RD5-1 Zone
and R1-1 Zone is required prior to obtaining clearance from
Zoning Section.” City Planning’s determination letter also stated
that the “approval of the tract map is conditioned upon the
approval of” Snowball’s requested zone change: “In the event [the
zone change] is not approved, the number of dwelling units shall
be limited to that permitted by the existing A1-1 and RA-1 Zones
and a revised tract map shall be submitted for approval.”

2     Zone A1 allows development including one-family
dwellings, parks, playgrounds, community centers, golf courses,
and certain agricultural uses. (LAMC § 12.05.) Zone RA includes
one-family dwellings, parks, playgrounds, community centers,
and golf courses. (LAMC § 12.07.) Zone R1 includes one-family
dwellings, parks, playgrounds, and community centers. (LAMC
§ 12.08.) Zone RD5 typically includes one-family dwellings, two-
family dwellings, group dwellings, apartment houses, parks,
playgrounds, and community centers. (LAMC § 12.09.1.) At the
project site, however, RD5 zoning is restricted to “detached
housing.” The zones are sometimes listed as, A1-1, RA-1, R1-1,
and RD5-1. According to the City, the “‘-1’ is a height district
reference, and does not impact the uses or density in this case[ ].”
Part of the area is designated Minimum Low Residential and
zoned RE40-1. The project designates this area as open space,
and it is not at issue in this appeal.

                                 5
       The corrected determination letter also stated, “Upon
approval of the recommended [RD5 and R1] Zones, the respective
portions of the Project Site will be consistent with the General
Plan land use designations of Low Medium I and Low
Residential.” City Planning recommended that the City Council
approve Snowball’s vesting zone change request.
       The determination letter included a section titled “Fire
Protection,” addressing concerns expressed by the Los Angeles
Fire Department (LAFD). In a memorandum to City Planning in
September 2017, LAFD had stated, “Development of the project
will expose additional people to local fire hazards. The City of Los
Angeles Fire Department considers the existing fire fighting [sic]
facilities in the vicinity inadequate to protect the site. The Fire
Department also believes that the single access route to the site
as proposed presents a potential adverse impact.” LAFD
therefore recommended that the project include certain
mitigation measures to limit potential fire damage, such as
irrigated greenbelts around buildings, noncombustible roofs on
structures, regular brush clearance of the area, and the inclusion
of fire lanes. The LAFD memorandum also stated, “At least two
different ingress/egress roads for each area, which will
accommodate major fire apparatus and provide for major
evacuation during emergency situations, shall be required.” The
memorandum concluded, “The inclusion of the above
recommendations, along with any additional recommendations
made during later reviews of the proposed project[, w]ill reduce
the impacts to an acceptable level.”
       City Planning’s determination letter to Snowball included
the LAFD’s recommended mitigation measures, and stated,
“With implementation of mitigation measures, construction of the

                                 6
Project would not be expected to affect the LAFD’s ability to
respond to emergencies. . . .” City Planning also required that
“[a]t least two different ingress/egress roads shall be provided for
each area that will accommodate major fire apparatus and
provide for major evacuation during emergency situations.”
       City Planning’s findings were not appealed to the City
Council, and therefore became final. The zone change was the
final approval required for the project to move forward.
       2.    The City denies the zone change request
       The City Council’s Planning and Land Use Management
Committee (PLUM) considered Snowball’s zone change request at
a meeting on December 10, 2019. Before the meeting, Snowball
submitted a letter to PLUM asking that PLUM recommend
approval of the zone change request. Snowball also asserted that
under the HAA, it was “entitled to density allowed by the general
plan. (Gov. Code Section § 65589.5(a)(j)(4) [sic].)”
       The record also includes hundreds of pages of written
messages from the public to PLUM regarding the project, some in
favor and many against. Some of the public comments attached
newspaper articles or other information about wildfire hazards,
traffic, housing, and the environment. One attachment showed
more than 2,000 signatures on a change.org petition to “Save
Verdugo Hills Golf Course open space say no to Snowball West
Development.” State Senator Anthony J. Portantino,
representative for the 25th District, in which the project is
located, submitted a statement that he “join[s] the community in
preferring that this entire site be preserved as open space.”
Retired LAFD chief Andrew P. Fox submitted a letter in support
of Snowball, stating that the current undeveloped condition of the
property was itself a fire hazard; the community center portion of

                                 7
the housing project could be used for people to “shelter in place”
during a wildfire; and the project was close to the freeway, which
is good for rapid evacuations.
       City Council member Monica Rodriguez, representative for
City District 7, in which the project is located, submitted a letter
before the meeting recommending that the vesting zone change
be denied. The letter stated, “I do not believe that the requested
zone change is consistent with good zoning practices, and I have
serious concerns regarding the potential public health and safety
risks posed by the increased density being proposed at this site.”
She stated that the zone change “would increase the density by
allowing the construction of 215 units instead of the 19 units that
could be built by-right. Granting the zone change would be
inconsistent with the surrounding density of the subject site, and
is not consistent with good zoning practice. Allowing the
requested zone change will increase density in a manner that is
not to scale and is incompatible with the existing environment.
The proposed density of this development is not appropriate for
the subject site.”
       Rodriguez’s letter continued, “The subject site, only having
two ingress/egress points, is located at a critical access point for
the existing single family residential properties along Tujunga
Canyon Boulevard north of I-210. That fact, in combination with
the subject site’s topography and location within the City’s Very
High Fire Hazard Severity Zone raises real concerns about fire
and life safety that need to be placed paramount.”
       The letter further stated, “Within the last two years, the
foothill communities of my district were center stage to what
were respectively the two largest wildfires in the City’s recent
history—the Creek and La Tuna Fires. Since this item was heard

                                 8
at the City Planning Commission in May, the Seventh District
saw yet another fire erupt within the Very High Fire Hazard
Severity Zone—the Saddle Ridge Fire.” Rodriguez noted that the
City Council had recently assembled a “Wildland-Urban Interface
Hazard Mitigation Task Force to reevaluate several issues,
including additional development, current building codes and
standards within the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.”
       Rodriguez’s letter continued, “The proposed project site’s
absence from the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment
(RHNA) further highlights the project’s inconsistency with good
zoning practice. The City of Los Angeles periodically completes a
RHNA, pursuant to State law. This analysis determines
strategic and desirable areas to allocate the necessary housing to
accommodate projected growth throughout the city. The City’s
RHNA allocation excludes the subject site’s parcels from the
suitable site selection because they are located within a hillside
area subject to the Slope Density Ordinance. As such, a positive
finding cannot be made that the requested zone change is
consistent with good zoning practice.” Rodriguez asked that the
zone change request be denied.
       At the PLUM meeting on December 10, 2019, the president
of the Sunland-Tujunga Neighborhood Council read a community
impact statement opposing the development, citing the very high
fire hazard severity zone, the high wind velocity zone, the
destruction of keystone tree species, and concerns about small
ingress/egress roads being able to support the evacuation of 215
families in the presence of firefighting equipment and other
hazards. Other community members stated that they opposed
the project for similar reasons. Snowball’s counsel also spoke,
stating that all approvals except the zone change were final, and

                                9
arguing that the current zoning was “illegal” but the new zone
would comply with the City’s general plan.
       The PLUM members discussed whether the zone change
was mandatory or discretionary. A person from City Planning
stated that the zone change was discretionary.
       Councilmember Marqueece Harris-Dawson stated, “[B]ased
on the comments made by the Council District 7 representative,
as well as comments made by the public today regarding recent
wildfires, the site’s topography, ingress and regress [sic] traffic
issues, more environmental analysis is needed and so I move that
we deny the request [for a] vesting zone change and adopt the
findings that have been read into the record by the
representatives of Council District 7. There’s no objection.”
Another councilmember seconded the motion, and Harris-Dawson
stated, “If there’s no objection that will be the order. Thank you.”
The meeting concluded. PLUM stated in a report that “the
Committee adopted the findings presented by Council District 7
as the findings of the PLUM Committee recommended that
Council adopt the new PLUM Committee findings and not
present and order filed the Ordinance effectuating the zone
change [sic].”
       The following morning, December 11, 2019, the City
Council considered PLUM’s recommendation at a meeting.
Again, several community members opposed the zone change,
citing concerns about wildfires and evacuation difficulties.
Councilmember Rodriguez stated that at issue was “what
development looks like given our new realities of wildfires and
the types of density that is created in certain locations [sic].” She
recommended that the zone change be denied. The City Council

                                 10
unanimously denied the zone change, stating in its written ruling
that it was adopting PLUM’s report.
       3.    Snowball asks City Planning to clear map conditions
             because no zone change is needed under the HAA
       On January 16, 2020, about a month after City Council
denied Snowball’s zone change request, Snowball sent a letter to
City Planning requesting that City Planning “accept and process
the Project’s approved Vesting Tentative Tract Map for clearance
of conditions required for Final Map approval.” Snowball
asserted that under part of the HAA, section 65589.5(j)(4), no
rezoning of the site was required.3
       Section 65589(j)(4), which became effective on January 1,
2019, limits the circumstances in which a local agency may
require a zone change. That subdivision states, in relevant part,
“For purposes of this section, a proposed housing development
project is not inconsistent with the applicable zoning standards
and criteria, and shall not require a rezoning, if the housing
development project is consistent with the objective general plan
standards and criteria but the zoning for the project site is
inconsistent with the general plan.”
       For context, we note that the City’s general plan includes
multiple community plans.4 One of these plans is the Sunland-

3     Snowball also cited section 65589.5(j)(4) in its letter to the
City Council on December 11, 2019, but it did not assert then
that no zone change was required.

4     A general plan may be “a single document or . . . a group of
documents relating to subjects or geographic segments of the
planning area.” (§ 65302, subd. (b).) Here, the City’s general
plan includes a Framework Element, which is “a guide for

                                 11
Tujunga-Lake View Terrace-Shadow Hills-East La Tuna Canyon
Community Plan (the community plan), which incorporates the
site of Snowball’s proposed project. For purposes of this case,
consistency with the community plan equates to consistency with
the general plan, so these terms are sometimes used
interchangeably.
       General or community plans typically identify “land use
designations,” such as commercial, industrial, or open space,
which are identified on a community plan’s land use map. Here,
the land use designations for the site of Snowball’s proposed
project are Low Residential and Low Medium I.
       For each land use designation in the relevant community
plan, the community plan’s land use map lists “corresponding
zones.” The corresponding zones listed for Low Residential are
RE9, RS, R1, and RU; the corresponding zones listed for Low
Medium I are R2, RD3, RD4, RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1.
These lists include Snowball’s requested new zones of R1, which
allows one-family dwellings (see LAMC § 12.08), and RD5, which
typically allows one-family, two-family, or multiple-family
dwellings. (See LAMC § 12.09.1.) However, the community plan
includes a limitation that development in this hillside area “shall
be detached housing.” Notably, these lists of corresponding zones
do not include the current zones for the site—RA and A1.
       In its letter to City Planning, Snowball argued that the
rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) “authorizes proposed
housing developments like this one to override local zoning codes

communities to implement growth and development,” and a Land
Use Element, consisting of 35 community plans based on
geographic location.

                                12
that are inconsistent with the general plan.” It asserted that
because its project was consistent with the corresponding zones
in the community plan, it did not require rezoning because “the
zoning for the Project site is inconsistent with the general plan.”
       On May 8, 2020, City Planning denied Snowball’s request
in a letter. It noted that Snowball’s project had been approved on
the condition of a zone change, so in the absence of a zone change,
the project could only go forward with “the number of dwelling
units . . . permitted by the existing A1-1 and RA-1 Zones.” City
Planning rejected Snowball’s assertion that the current zones of
RA and A1 were “inconsistent” with the community plan. It
stated that even though zones RA and A1 were not expressly
listed as corresponding zones on the land use map, they were
incorporated into the community plan by Footnote 23 of that
plan, which states that each land use category includes the zones
expressly listed, as well as any “more restrictive” zones not listed.
Because zones RA and A1 are more restrictive than those listed
in the community plan according to the LAMC, those zones were
incorporated by reference through Footnote 23. The City
therefore concluded that section 65589.5(j)(4) did not exempt the
project from a zone change, because the zoning for the project site
was not “inconsistent” with the plan. City Planning therefore
denied Snowball’s request.
B.     Trial court proceedings
       1.     Petition for writ of mandate
       Snowball filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint
for damages on February 24, 2020.5 It asserted five claims: (1)

5     The writ petition was filed before City Planning responded
to Snowball’s January 2020 letter. Snowball alleged in the writ

                                 13
Snowball was entitled to a writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085 due to City Planning’s refusal to process
the map clearances; (2) Snowball was entitled to a writ of
mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 due to City
Council’s denial of the zone change; (3) Snowball was entitled to a
writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5
because City Council violated the HAA in requiring a rezoning;
(4) a cause of action for inverse condemnation; and (5) a cause of
action for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
The two final causes of action are not relevant for purposes of
this appeal.
       Snowball argued that under section 65589.5(j)(4)’s rezoning
exemption no zone change was required for the project, and
therefore City Planning’s refusal to clear the map conditions in
2020 violated the HAA.6 Snowball contended that the project “is
entitled by law to go forward . . . without a zone change.” It
argued that the City had a ministerial duty to clear the map
conditions. Snowball further contended that City Council’s
denial of the zone change “was arbitrary and capricious and

petition that City Planning “continue[s] to refuse to process
clearances for Snowball’s Vesting Map.”

6     Snowball also argued that the City’s actions violated
section 65905.5, which addresses how many hearings a city or
county may hold after a housing project application is deemed
complete. (§ 65905.5, subd. (a).) Snowball cited language in the
statute identical to section 65589.5(j)(4) in defining
circumstances in which a housing project “shall not require a
rezoning.” (Id., subd. (c).) Because the number of hearings after
approval are not at issue in this case, we do not include this
statute in our discussion.

                                14
totally lacking in evidentiary support.” Snowball argued that
City Council’s “action violated State law which requires the City
to bring its zoning into consistency with its general plan.
Government Code §65860 provides that ‘city zoning ordinances
shall be consistent with the general plan of the . . . city . . . .’”
       Snowball also asserted that “the City Council’s actions
constitute abuse of discretion by the City in that the decision of
the City to deny the Vesting Zone Change was not supported by
valid findings required by Los Angeles Municipal Code
§12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii) and the Housing Accountability Act at
Government Code §65589.5(j)(1)(A) and (B).” Snowball sought a
writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and
1094.5, attorney fees, and damages for the two causes of action.
       2.     Snowball’s opening brief
       In its opening brief supporting the writ petition, Snowball
argued there had been a “twelve-year entitlement process for a
housing development project that the City itself stated in express
written findings complies with all applicable, objective general
plan and other land use regulations, policies and standards.”
Snowball noted that section 65589.5(j)(4) states that a project
“shall not require a rezoning” where “the housing development
project is consistent with the objective general plan standards
and criteria but the zoning for the project site is inconsistent with
the general plan.” (§ 65589.5(j)(4).) Snowball argued that
because the current zoning for the project site—RA and A1—was
inconsistent with the community plan, and the proposed new
zoning—RD5 and R1—would be consistent with the community
plan, the project did “not require a rezoning.”
       Snowball relied on the City’s July 2019 corrected
determination letter, which stated, “The existing Plan designates

                                 15
the entire subject site with multiple land use designations
including Low Medium I with corresponding zones of R2, RD3,
RD4, RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1, [and] Low with
corresponding zones of RE9, RS, R1, and RU . . . .” Snowball
argued that because RA and A1 were not listed as corresponding
zones in the community plan, changing the zones to RD5 and R1
would take the property “from a zoning designation inconsistent
with the General Plan to one that is consistent.”
       Snowball also argued that because it was exempt from
rezoning, City Planning’s “refusal to perform its ministerial duty
to process Snowball’s Map clearances” was “in violation of the
law.” Snowball asserted it was entitled to a writ of mandate
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.
       Snowball contended in the alternative that the City
Council’s denial of the zone change request constituted an abuse
of discretion under the HAA and the LAMC because it “was
arbitrary and capricious and totally lacking in evidentiary
support.” Snowball argued that the City was required to make
certain findings under the HAA, relying on section 65589.5(j)(1),
which requires a local agency to support denial of a project with
“written findings” that the project “would have a specific, adverse
impact upon the public health or safety” and “[t]here is no
feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the adverse
impact.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1).) Snowball argued that the City failed
to make these required findings, and the City’s letter
communicating the denial, which relied on the letter from
Councilmember Rodriguez, does not “contain any findings of fact
at all.” Snowball further asserted that the City acted in bad faith
by denying the zone change, and as a result, under the HAA “the
Court is empowered to enter an ‘order or judgment directing the

                                16
[City] to approve the housing development project.’ §
65589.5(k)(1)(A)(ii).”
       Regarding the LAMC, Snowball argued, “LAMC
§12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii) requires that, when denying a vesting zone
change, the City Council must find that ‘the zone change is
denied because it is not in substantial conformance with the
purposes, intent or provisions or the General Plan or is not in
conformance with public necessity, convenience, general welfare
and good zoning practice and the reason for not conforming with
the plan.’” Snowball argued that the only “evidence” cited was
Rodriguez’s letter, which “states only opinion and speculation
without any attempt to cite to evidence in the record, let alone
substantial evidence, in support.” Snowball further argued that
this opinion contradicted evidence in the City’s 2019
determination letter that the required fire mitigation measures
adequately addressed any fire safety concerns.
       3.     The City’s opposing brief
       In its opposing brief, the City argued that Snowball was not
entitled to the relief it requested under the HAA. The City stated
that “Section 65589.5(j)(4) excuses a zone change where the zone
is inconsistent with the General Plan; but no inconsistency exists
here.” The City stated that the rezoning exemption did not apply
to Snowball’s project, because the current zoning for the project
site was consistent with the general plan and community plan.
       As in its May 2020 letter, the City relied on Footnote 23 of
the community plan. Footnote 23 states in full, “Each Plan
category permits all indicated corresponding zones as well as
those zones referenced in the Los Angeles Municipal Code
(LAMC) as permitted by such zones unless further restricted by
adopted Specific Plans, specific conditions and/or limitations of

                                17
project approval, Plan footnotes or other Plan map or text
notations. Zones established in the LAMC subsequent to the
adoption of the Plan shall not be deemed corresponding to any
particular Plan category unless the Plan is amended to so
indicate. It is the intent of the Plan that the entitlements
granted shall be one of the zone designations within the
corresponding zones shown on the Plan, unless accompanied by a
concurrent Plan amendment.”
       The City explained that according to its interpretation of
Footnote 23, a land use category’s full range of corresponding
zones includes not only the zones expressly listed in the
community plan, but also any “more restrictive zones . . .
permitted by the municipal code but not listed” on the map. It
stated that Footnote 23, incorporated into to all community plans
in 1991, “memorialized long-standing interpretation policy that
each plan land use category permits all listed corresponding
zones, as well as those more restrictive zones referenced in the
LAMC.”
       The City stated that therefore even though RA and A1 were
not expressly listed on the land use map, those zones were
nonetheless incorporated by reference because they are “more
restrictive” zones. The City argued that therefore, “Snowball
fails to demonstrate a zone-General Plan inconsistency here, a
prerequisite to the HAA excusing a zone change” under section
65589.5(j)(4). The City continued, “Since the current zones are
consistent with the Community Plan, the HAA . . . does not
excuse the zone change required for Snowball’s project. [¶] Zone-

                               18
plan inconsistency remains an unsatisfied prerequisite to
Snowball’s claim.”7
       Regarding Snowball’s claim that the City failed to make the
requisite findings under the HAA, the City acknowledged that
“Section 65589.5(j)(1) requires specified findings to deny a project
that complies with objective zoning and planning standards.”
However, because Snowball’s project did not comply with zoning
standards in the absence of a zone change, the restrictions of
section 65589.5(j)(1) did not apply.
       The City further argued that even if written findings had
been required under either the HAA or the LAMC, “The City
made findings to deny the zone change on the record at the
December 9, 2019 [sic] PLUM hearing and in the written decision
adopted as the City Council’s findings.” The City argued these
findings complied with all requirements, and the City did not act
in bad faith.
       4.     Snowball’s reply
       In its reply, Snowball argued that the City’s reliance on the
current zoning of RA and A1 violated the HAA. It stated, “[T]he
HAA was amended effective January 1, 2019 to close the exact
‘loophole’ that the City claims exempts it from HAA compliance
in this case. The City has kept the zoning for the Project site
artificially low at RA-1 and A1-1 zones (which restricts density to
19 units [ ]) while the Property is designated in the General Plan

7      The City also argued that because the City conditioned
approval upon a zone change in July 2019 at the latest, and
Snowball did not challenge this requirement until it filed its writ
petition in February 2020, Snowball’s claim was time barred
under the 90-day statute of limitations in section 66499.37. That
argument is not at issue in this appeal.

                                19
as Low Residential Low Medium I Residential (which permits
density up to 244 units [ ]) in order to create a situation in which
Snowball is forced to apply for a re-zoning and the City may use
that opportunity to reject the housing project. The City’s claim
that these restrictive zoning designations are consistent with the
General Plan designation allowing significantly higher density is
exactly what the amendment to the HAA was designed to
prevent.”
      Snowball also argued that throughout the application
process, the City stated that the existing zoning was not
consistent with the general plan. Snowball pointed to several
instances in the record in which the City stated that the zone
change would “bring the zoning into conformance” with the
general or community plan, or would “create consistency with”
the community plan’s land use designations. Snowball
characterized the City’s interpretation of Footnote 23 as
“revisionist,” and “exactly the type of evasion that the 2018
amendment to the HAA was designed to outlaw.”
      5.     The court’s ruling
      Following a two-day hearing in March and April 2021, the
superior court denied Snowball’s petition for a writ of mandamus
in a written ruling. The court first addressed Snowball’s
argument under section 65589.5(j)(4). The court discussed the
parties’ contentions regarding Footnote 23, noting that the City
interpreted Footnote 23 to mean that “[a]pplicable community
plan categories include corresponding zones as well as more
restrictive zones under the City’s municipal code.” The court
stated, “Snowball does not provide any legal justification
supporting any authority for the court to disregard Footnote 23.”
The court rejected Snowball’s arguments about how Footnote 23

                                 20
should be interpreted, and stated, “Snowball has not
demonstrated zoning inconsistency within the City’s Community
Plan. As such, the HAA does not preclude the City from
requiring Snowball to obtain a zone change as a condition of its
approval of the Project.”
       Turning to the City’s denial of Snowball’s requested zone
change, the court agreed with the City that a “zone change
involves a legislative act by a municipality” and therefore judicial
review was limited. The court relied on its conclusion that the
HAA did not apply, and found that the City therefore was not
required to comply with section 65589.5(j)(1).
       The court held that in order for Snowball to succeed on its
claim that the City did not comply with the LAMC, “Snowball
must demonstrate the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying the zone change” under LAMC standards. The court
stated that the “record supports the findings set forth in
[Councilmember Rodriguez’s] letter and adopted by the City
Council.” The court noted that surrounding areas are zoned at a
lower density than RD5, and there were concerns about fire
safety and risks associated with the high-density project. The
court concluded, “Based on the evidence before the City Council,
the court finds Snowball has not demonstrated the City’s denial
of its vested zone change was arbitrary or capricious. . . . [T]here
is a reasonable relationship between the decision denying the
zone change and public necessity, convenience, general welfare
and good zoning practice.”
       The court therefore denied Snowball’s petition for writ of
mandamus, and transferred the matter to address Snowball’s
civil causes of action for damages. The parties stipulated to the

                                21
entry of judgment in favor of the City, the court entered the
judgment, and Snowball timely appealed.
                         III. DISCUSSION
       Snowball asserts three arguments. First, it contends the
HAA’s rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) applied, so its
project was exempt from the requirement of a zone change.
Second, it contends the City failed to make the findings required
by the HAA in section 65589.5(j)(1). Finally, Snowball asserts
that the City failed to make findings required by the LAMC when
denying the zone change. We address each of these contentions
below.
A.     Standard of review
       Snowball contends it is entitled to a writ of mandate under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5. Generally
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, “A writ of mandate
may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the
law specially enjoins.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “The
petitioner must demonstrate the public official or entity had a
ministerial duty to perform, and the petitioner had a clear and
beneficial right to performance.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v.
Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
693, 700.) “Normally, mandate will not lie to control a public
agency’s discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion
in a particular manner. However, it will lie to correct abuses of
discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.)
       In addition, “‘[t]he “rezoning of property, even a single
parcel, is generally considered to be a quasi-legislative act” thus
“subject to review under ordinary mandamus”’” under Code of

                                 22
Civil Procedure section 1085. (Foothill Communities Coalition v.
County of Orange (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1309; see also
Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 570 [“the rezoning of land is
a legislative act”].) Review “is limited to an inquiry into whether
the action was arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support.” (Corona-Norco Unified School Dist. v. City
of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 992.)
       Following a writ proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5, the appellate court “reviews the administrative
record to determine whether substantial evidence in the record
supports the agency’s factual findings. The court also determines
whether the findings support the agency’s decision and whether
the agency committed any legal error.” (Schafer v. City of Los
Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1260-1261.)
       Snowball urges us to apply the standard of review
applicable to certain HAA rulings as articulated in California
Renters Legal Advocacy & Education Fund v. City of San Mateo
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 837 (California Renters): “[I]nstead of
asking, as is common in administrative mandamus actions,
‘whether the City’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence’ [citation], we inquire whether there is ‘substantial
evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that
the housing development project’ complies with pertinent
standards. (§ 65589.5, subd. (f)(4).) As the public entity that
disapproved the project, the City bears the burden of proof that
its decision conformed to the HAA. (§ 65589.6.).” As discussed
below, however, Snowball has not demonstrated that the HAA
applies here, and therefore we do not consider whether this
standard applies. Nevertheless, our conclusion would be the
same under this standard.

                                23
B.     Legal background
       1.     The role of general plans, the community plan, land
              use designations, and zoning
       “Land use regulation in California historically has been a
function of local government under the grant of police power
contained in article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution.”
(Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1139, 1151.) The Legislature has also “recognized that ‘decisions
involving the future growth of the state . . . are made and will
continue to be made at the local level.’ ([§ 65030.1].) To ensure
that localities pursue ‘an effective planning process’ (§ 65030.1),
each city and county must ‘adopt a comprehensive, long-term
general plan’ for its own ‘physical development” . . . . (§ 65300.)”
(Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior Court (2016)
2 Cal.5th 141, 152 (Orange Citizens).) A general plan is required
to set forth “objectives, principles, standards, and plan
proposals.” (§ 65302.)
       The process of adopting a general plan “is structured to
transcend the provincial. Public participation and hearings are
required at every stage, in order to obtain an array of
viewpoints.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 571, citing §§ 65351, 65355.) “‘During the
preparation or amendment of the general plan, the planning
agency shall provide opportunities for the involvement of citizens,
California Native American Indian tribes, public agencies, public
utility companies, and civic, education, and other community
groups, through public hearings and any other means the
planning agency deems appropriate.’ (§ 65351.) A legislative
body must refer its proposal to a number of listed public entities
before adopting or amending a general plan. (§ 65352.) Planning

                                24
commissions must hold at least one public hearing and make a
written recommendation to the legislative body; legislators must
hold at least one public hearing before acting on the
recommendation. (§§ 65353-65356; see § 65354.5 [a planning
agency authorized to approve or amend a general plan must
‘establish procedures for any interested party to file a written
request for a hearing by the legislative body’ and must provide
public notice of any hearings].)” (Orange Citizens, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pp. 152-153.)
       “Because of its broad scope, long-range perspective, and
primacy over subsidiary land use decisions, the ‘general plan has
been aptly described as the ‘constitution for all future
developments’ within the city or county.’” (Orange Citizens,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 152.) Thus, “‘“[t]he propriety of virtually
any local decision affecting land use and development depends
upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its
elements.”’” (Id. at p. 153.) This consistency is also imposed by
statute: “County or city zoning ordinances shall be consistent
with the general plan of the county or city . . . .” (§ 65860, subd.
(a).) Notably, a city’s general plan and its zoning need not be
identical; a zoning ordinance is “consistent with a city or county
general plan” if the “various land uses authorized by the
ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general
land uses, and programs specified in the plan.” (§ 65860, subd.
(a)(2).)
       2.    The HAA
       The HAA, section 65589.5, reflects the Legislature’s
attempts to address California’s “housing supply and
affordability crisis.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(A).) As originally
enacted in 1982, section 65589.5 made clear that it applies

                                 25
“[w]hen a proposed housing development project complies with
the applicable general plan, zoning, and development policies in
effect at the time that the housing development project’s
application is determined to be complete.” (See Honchariw v.
County of Stanislaus (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1074.) This
language was later moved into section 65589.5(j)(1) (ibid.), which
is discussed below.
       In 2018 revisions to the statute, the Legislature stated that
its “intent in enacting [the HAA] in 1982 and in expanding its
provisions since then was to significantly increase the approval
and construction of new housing for all economic segments of
California’s communities by meaningfully and effectively curbing
the capability of local governments to deny, reduce the density
for, or render infeasible housing development projects and
emergency shelters.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(K).) The statute
further states, “It is the policy of the state that this section be
interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest
possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision
of, housing.”8 (Id., subd. (a)(2)(L).)
C.     Section 65589.5(j)(4)
       Snowball’s primary contention under the HAA is that its
housing project was entitled to the rezoning exemption in section
65589.5(j)(4). That subdivision states in relevant part that “a
proposed housing development project is not inconsistent with
the applicable zoning standards and criteria, and shall not
require a rezoning, if the housing development project is

8      Much of the HAA and related statutes focuses on housing
for very low, low-, and moderate-income households. The project
at issue in this case does not involve this type of housing.

                                 26
consistent with the objective general plan standards and criteria
but the zoning for the project site is inconsistent with the general
plan.” (Emphasis added.) The parties agree that aside from the
rezoning issue, Snowball’s proposed project conforms to objective
plan standards and criteria. Thus, the crux of the parties’
disagreement lies with the italicized portion quoted: whether the
current zoning for the project site is “inconsistent” with the
general plan. Snowball argues that the current zoning is
inconsistent with the general plan, and therefore section
65589.5(j)(4) exempts it from any rezoning requirement. The
City disagrees, asserting that the current zoning is consistent
with the general plan, and therefore section 65589.5(j)(4) has no
effect here.
       1.    The community plan and Footnote 23
       As noted above, the relevant portion of the general plan,
the community plan, has various land use designations displayed
on its land use map; the land use designations for Snowball’s
project site are Low Medium I (most of the site) and Low
Residential (a small part of the site). The map includes a list of
corresponding zones for each land use designation. The Low
Medium I designation lists as corresponding zones R2, RD3, RD4,
RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1; the Low Residential
designation lists as corresponding zones RE9, RS, R1, and RU.
       The current zones for the site are A1 and RA. Snowball and
the City agree the community plan does not expressly include
zones A1 and RA in the list of corresponding zones for the
relevant land use areas. Snowball argues this means zones RA
and A1 are inconsistent with the community plan, and that
“[e]xisting zoning that allows no more than 19 homes is not
consistent with the Community Plan designation that allows up

                                27
to 244 homes,” the amount that would be allowed if the area were
developed at maximum density under RD5. The City contends
that even though A1 and RA are not expressly listed as
corresponding zones, those zones are consistent nevertheless
because they have been incorporated by reference through the
text of the community plan and Footnote 23 of the land use map.
       The community plan, under the heading “Plan
Consistency,” states, “For each plan category, the Plan permits
all identified corresponding zones, as well as those zones which
are more restrictive, as referenced in Section 12.23 of the Los
Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC).”9 Footnote 23, according to the
City, also “explains that the RA and A1 zones are corresponding
zones for the Low Medium I and Low Residential land use
categories.”
       As noted above, Footnote 23 states in part, “Each Plan
category permits all indicated corresponding zones as well as
those zones referenced in the Los Angeles Municipal Code
(LAMC) as permitted by such zones unless further restricted by
adopted Specific Plans, specific conditions and/or limitations of
project approval, Plan footnotes or other Plan map or text

9     LAMC 12.23 (B)(7) states, “Change of Use. (a) Any change
of use of a building or a portion of a building must conform to the
current regulations of the zone and other applicable current land
use regulations. (b) However, in the R, C, or M Zones, a
nonconforming use may be changed to any use that is permitted
in a more restrictive zone than the current zone. The sequence of
these zones, the first being the most restrictive and the last being
the least restrictive, is as follows: OS, A1, A2, RA, RE, RS, R1,
RU, RZ, RW1, R2, RD, RMP, RW2, R3, RAS3, R4, RAS4, R5, CR,
C1, C1.5, C4, C2, C5, CM, MR1, M1, MR2, M2, M3 and PF. . . .”

                                28
notations.” The trial court aptly commented in its written ruling
that “Footnote 23 is not a model of clarity.” However, the history
of Footnote 23 offers an explanation as to its intended meaning.
       A version of Footnote 23 was proposed by the City Council
in 1990 to comply with the requirement that the City’s zoning
comply with its general plan. To achieve compliance through
rezoning, zoning for approximately 8,000 parcels in the City
would have to be changed. Rather than achieving consistency by
upzoning these 8,000 parcels to higher intensity zones, the City
effectively amended its community plans to incorporate the
existing zoning.
       City Council’s initial proposal in 1990 was that “a plan
amendment footnote be added to all community plans stating in
effect that: [¶] The plan categories permit all zoning that is more
restrictive (as set forth in Sec. 12.23 of L.A.M.C.) than those
indicated unless otherwise restricted by Zoning Code, specific
conditions of approval or other provision of the community plan.”
       A City Planning memorandum stated that after the
original footnote was proposed, staff rewrote it. The
memorandum stated, “Staff has modified the language contained
in the motion to be more precise,” and “Staff has reviewed the
intent of the Council language and redrafted it to read more
accurately and to take into account various nuances contained in
the Zoning Code.” The recommended revised footnote constituted
the first two paragraphs of what eventually became Footnote 23.
The Planning Department memo noted that the addition of the
footnote would not effect a material change, stating, “The
corresponding zones section [in community plan legends] has not
included all more restrictive zones although the plans have been
interpreted consistently over the years to mean generally that

                                29
the more restrictive zones are consistent with the applicable plan
category.”
      A January 10, 1991 memorandum from the Director of
Planning to City Planning stated that “[t]he Commission, after
some discussion, instructed staff to provide stronger rationale for
the proposed amendment and to modify the language to establish
greater certainty about future zoning.” A bullet point list titled
“Rationale For The Amendment” stated in part, “Zones more
restrictive than those shown in the Plan category are consistent
with [the] plan . . .” and “Except in rare instances . . . [a] property
owner would not apply for downzoning” to a more restrictive
zone. A proposed third paragraph was therefore added to
“supplement” the prior version of the footnote: “It is the intent of
the Plan that the entitlements granted shall be one of the zone
designations within the corresponding zones shown on the Plan,
unless accompanied by a concurrent Plan amendment.”
      In a February 12, 1991 letter, then-mayor Tom Bradley
recommended the City adopt the footnote, which would “clarify
that zones more restrictive than those shown in the legend are
consistent with the plan.” In March 1991, the City adopted the
footnote as recommended.
      Relying on Footnote 23 and its history, the City argues that
the current zoning of the site—RA and A1—is consistent with the
general and community plans. The City points out that LAMC
identifies RA and A1 as “more restrictive” than RD5. (See LAMC
§§ 12.04.A, 12.23.B.7(b).) The community plan categories
therefore include the listed corresponding zones, as well as more
restrictive zones, such as RA and A1. And because the rezoning
exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) applies when “the zoning for

                                  30
the project site is inconsistent with the general plan,” the
rezoning exemption does not apply here.
       Snowball disagrees that Footnote 23 can render “all more
restrictive zones . . . magically consistent.” In essence, Snowball’s
contention comes down to an argument that the City, in drafting
its community plan, was required to expressly list each
corresponding zone for each land use designation, rather than
incorporate other zones by reference. We are not persuaded. The
Legislature provides great deference to cities in developing their
general plans: “The general plan may be adopted in any format
deemed appropriate or convenient by the legislative body.”
(§ 65301, subd. (a); see also Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 157 [“A city may enact a general plan in any form it chooses”].)
Moreover, “[t]he adoption or amendment of a general plan is a
legislative act” which is “presumed valid.” (Federation of Hillside
& Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th
1180, 1195, citing § 65301.5.) Even if we disagreed with the
wisdom or clarity of the City’s choice to incorporate more
restrictive zones by reference into the community plan rather
than explicitly listing them, we cannot substitute our judgment
for the City’s. (See id. at p. 1196 [“the city has broad discretion to
weigh and balance competing interests in formulating
development policies, and a court cannot review the wisdom of
those decisions under the guise of reviewing a general plan’s
internal consistency and correlation”].)
       Snowball also disagrees with the City’s interpretation of
Footnote 23. It argues that the City is relying on a “revisionist”
contention that zones RA and A1 are consistent, and is making a
“post-hoc assertion that the HAA does not apply.” Snowball
argues that “at every stage of the Project’s 14-year entitlement

                                 31
process,” the City took the position that the existing zoning for
the site was inconsistent with the general plan. It points to
numerous documents from the City, such as the Vesting
Tentative Tract Map Findings of Fact and Vesting Zone Change
Findings of Fact, which included statements such as, “The zone
change would bring the zoning into conformance with the
residential land use designation of Low Medium I,” and “The
recommended zone change . . . would create consistency with the
respective land use designations of Low Medium I and Low
Residential.” Snowball argues that the City therefore “made
numerous unappealed, unlitigated, final findings” showing that
“the City itself found that the existing zoning was not consistent
with the general plan designation.”
       Snowball’s complaints about the City’s “revisionist” and
“post-hoc” arguments are not supported by the record. Snowball
requested a zone change in 2007, and section 65589.5(j)(4)
became effective on January 1, 2019. Snowball first asserted it
was entitled to the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4)
after the City Council denied the zone change in December 2019.
Nothing in the record suggests the City had any reason to
express an opinion as to whether the site’s existing zoning was
consistent with the community plan before Snowball asserted
this argument in its letter to City Planning in 2020.
       Snowball also points to the language of the third paragraph
of Footnote 23, which states that “entitlements granted shall be
one of the zone designations within the corresponding zones
shown on the Plan.” It argues that this language “supports
Snowball’s argument that zones more restrictive than the
corresponding zones listed in the plan, such as the existing zones
on the Property, are not consistent with the general plan

                               32
designations, and per Footnote 23’s last paragraph, must be
upzoned to one of the listed corresponding zones to achieve
consistency when, as here, a project is proposed.”
       We disagree with Snowball’s interpretation. The fact that
entitlements, once granted, must be consistent with the general
plan does not speak to whether more restrictive zones—such as
RA and A1, which existed at the time the relevant plans were
adopted—may constitute corresponding zones under the relevant
plans. Moreover, Footnote 23 does not state that zoning must be
changed if a project is simply proposed, as Snowball suggests.
       2.    Case law
       Snowball argues that Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531 (Lesher), supports its
position. In that case, the City of Walnut Creek had a general
plan that was “growth oriented,” which specifically stated that
traffic congestion should not be an impediment to growth. (Id. at
p. 536.) An initiative passed by voters, Measure H, created a
building moratorium linked to certain levels of traffic congestion.
(Id. at pp. 536-537.) The plaintiffs challenged the validity of
Measure H on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the city’s
general plan. (Id. at p. 537.) The Supreme Court held that
“Measure H is an ordinance in the nature of a zoning ordinance,”
and “[a] zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan is
invalid at the time it is passed.” (Id. at p. 544.) The court
concluded, “Since Measure H was inconsistent with the plan in
effect when Measure H was adopted, the measure is invalid.” (Id.
at p. 545.)
       Snowball argues that the reasoning of Lesher applies here,
because the existing zoning of the project site allows 19 homes,
while the land use designation in the community plan allows up

                                33
to 244 homes. However, no conflicting zoning ordinance was
passed after the adoption of the general plan, which was what
rendered Measure H invalid in Lesher. To the contrary, the
project site at issue here apparently was zoned A1 and RA before
the general and community plans were adopted.
       Snowball also relies on a nonpublished case, Warner Ridge
Associates v. City of Los Angeles (Dec. 31, 1991, B052835, ordered
nonpub. Mar. 12, 1992) (Warner Ridge), asserting that it can be
considered for its collateral estoppel10 effect on the City, and that
the reasoning of it should apply here. In Warner Ridge, a 21.5-
acre parcel of real property in the Woodland Hills area of Los
Angeles was zoned RA and A1 in 1969. (Id at p. 308.) In 1984,
the City adopted a district plan designating the property for
commercial development as “neighborhood and office,” with
corresponding zones of CR, C1, C1.5, C4 and P. (Id at p. 309.) A
portion of the district plan addressed Warner Ridge specifically,
and authorized “a Specific Plan for Warner Ridge to provide for
the development of the site with office commercial uses.” (Ibid.)
       Plaintiff WRA purchased the parcel in 1985, proposed a
project, and sought a zone change to C4. (Warner Ridge, supra,
at p. 309.) After several years of WRA working through the
approval process, in 1990 the City rejected WRA’s project and
passed a new zoning ordinance that “designated the property
(T)RS–1 (residential suburban). That zoning allows single family
residences on large estate sized lots (minimum 7,500 square

10     California courts “now refer to ‘claim preclusion’ rather
than ‘res judicata’ [citation], and use ‘issue preclusion’ in place of
‘direct or collateral estoppel.’” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th
322, 326.)

                                 34
feet).” (Id. at p. 310.) WRA filed a petition for writ of mandate,
seeking to compel the City to make the zoning consistent with the
general plan, as required by section 65860. Relying on Lesher,
the Court of Appeal reasoned, “Because residential suburban
zoning prohibits the category of use contemplated in the General
Plan, it is inconsistent with the General Plan and was invalid
when passed.” (Id. at p. 315.) In its conclusion, the court again
stated, “The residential suburban zoning enacted by the City is
not consistent with the General Plan. The ordinance, therefore,
was invalid when passed.” (Id. at p. 317)
       The Warner Ridge court commented on the City’s
“hierarchy theory” regarding zoning, in which all less intensive
land uses are permitted within any zone. (Warner Ridge, supra,
at p. 315.) As Warner Ridge was decided in 1991, the court
acknowledged the recent addition of Footnote 23 and others like
it, stating that the City had “attempted to set its hierarchy theory
in concrete by adding an amendment to each of the 35 District
Plans which make up the land use element of the City’s General
Plan.” (Warner Ridge, supra, at p. 315) The Warner Ridge court
rejected the hierarchy theory, stating, “The hierarchy theory
would grant the City the authority to prohibit an entire category
of land use which is specifically permitted and envisioned by the
General Plan. However, the City cannot pass a zoning ordinance
which is inconsistent with the General Plan. Such zoning is
invalid when enacted. Thus, the hierarchy theory improperly
would allow the City to amend its General Plan through the
enactment of inconsistent zoning ordinances.” (Ibid.)11

11   Notably, the 1990 zoning ordinance in Warner Ridge also
may have violated the third paragraph of Footnote 23, which

                                35
       The Warner Ridge court continued, “A general plan which
designates property for intense development with the
contemplation that designation may thereafter be prohibited
through zoning is, in effect, no general plan . . . . Such a general
plan certainly does not comport with the concept of a charter for
land use which should provide guidance, continuity and stability.
The hierarchy theory, in essence, repeals the consistency
requirement. [¶] In order for zoning to be consistent with the
General Plan, at minimum, it cannot prohibit an entire category
of use which is permitted by the General Plan. Whether a less
intense use is included within a more intense use, or whether
such a use may be permitted is beside the point.” (Warner Ridge,
supra, at pp. 315-316.)
       We disagree that the Warner Ridge holding has a
preclusive effect here. “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and
necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one
who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that
party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
825.) “The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether
‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings,
not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.”
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342.) Thus,
“when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated . . . in a

states that “entitlements granted shall be one of the zone
designations within the corresponding zones shown on the Plan.”
The corresponding zones shown on the district plan were CR, C1,
C1.5, C4 and P, but the new zone was (T)RS—not one of the
zones listed on the plan.

                                 36
future lawsuit.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 249.)
       The case before us presents a different scenario than that
in Warner Ridge. Here, the current zoning for the property
allows single-family residential use at a density of 19 homes for
the site. The community plan also allows only single-family
residential use, but at a density of up to 244 homes. Thus, the
City’s “hierarchy theory” does not “prohibit an entire category of
use which is permitted by the General Plan,” as in Warner
Ridge.12 Instead, it allows the exact same category of use—
single-family residential—but at a lower density. For this reason,
Warner Ridge does not present an identical issue that was
actually litigated in the earlier lawsuit.
       Furthermore, the reasoning of Warner Ridge implicitly
relied on the City’s goals and intentions for the parcel, as
expressed in the general and district plan, which were to allow
the area to be developed for commercial use. Here, by contrast,
there is no suggestion that this area was targeted for growth at a
particular density. A zoning ordinance is consistent with a
general plan when “[t]he various land uses authorized by the
ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general
land uses, and programs specified in the plan.” (§ 65860, subd.

12     Although zone A1 is sometimes referred to as
“agricultural,” chapter 3 of the Framework Element, titled “Land
Use,” notes that “single family residential” includes all zones at
issue here: A1, RA, R1, and RD5. (See General Plan, Framework
Element, p. 3-16.) Over Snowball’s objection, we take judicial
notice of the Framework Element. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b),
(c); 459.) The parties’ remaining requests for judicial notice filed
on July 31, 2023 are denied.

                                 37
(a)(2).) Here, unlike in Warner Ridge, allowing only limited
residential density does not sharply contrast with the objectives,
policies, and land uses specified in the general and community
plans.
       3.    Section 65589.5(j)(4) does not mandate maximum
             density
       Snowball and amici13 assert that limiting density to
anything below the maximum permitted in the community plan
necessarily renders the zoning “inconsistent” or otherwise
triggers the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4).
Snowball asserts that “the existing zones that allow only 19
homes . . . are inconsistent with plan designations allowing up to
244 homes.” Amicus YIMBY argues, “If the general plan specifies
a greater density than allowed by the zoning, the zoning is by
definition inconsistent with the general plan,” so no zone change
is needed under section 65589.5(j)(4). Amici Californians for
Homeownership et al. similarly contend that a city should not be
allowed to “use its zoning to disallow the densities that are
expressly anticipated in the general plan.” And amicus
California Building Industry Association asserts that under
section 65589.5(j)(4), any time a project requires a zone change,
the zoning should be deemed inconsistent: “[R]equiring a
rezoning of a plan-consistent project informs whether ‘the zoning
for the project [site] is inconsistent with the general plan.”

13     We granted requests to file three amicus briefs submitted
by (1) the California Building Industry Association; (2)
Californians for Homeownership and the California Association
of Realtors; and (3) Yes In My Back Yard (YIMBY). The City
filed a response brief.

                                38
       The City counters that these concepts of consistency and
inconsistency are not supported by law. We agree. First, there is
no support for defining “inconsistent” to mean any zoning other
than maximum density. Such a definition would conflict with the
statement in section 65860, subdivision (a)(2) that zoning is
“consistent” with a general plan if the “various land uses
authorized by the ordinance are compatible with the objectives,
policies, general land uses, and programs specified in the plan.”
In addition, the community plan itself states that development
standards “applicable to specific areas and parcels of land” will be
informed by not only “the Zoning Map” but also the applicable
“Zoning Ordinance.”
       Moreover, under the logic of the maximum density
arguments, even expressly listed zones could be considered
“inconsistent” with the community plan. For example, even if the
site for Snowball’s project was zoned RD4—a corresponding zone
expressly listed on the land use map—the site zoning would be
deemed “inconsistent” with the general plan because Snowball’s
project required a zone change to RD5. We do not agree that a
zone expressly listed in the community plan is “inconsistent” with
that same community plan under section 65589.5(j)(4).
       The legislative history of section 65589.5(j)(4) also
contradicts the maximum density arguments.14 In Assembly Bill

14     When the language of a statute is clear, courts must follow
its plain meaning; courts generally resort to other aids, such as
legislative history and public policy, only where the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation. (See,
e.g., Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 14
Cal.5th 758, 768.) We find no ambiguity in the first sentence of

                                39
3194 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 3194), which became section
65589.5(j)(4), the Legislature proposed—and eventually
rejected—language that would have required local authorities to
approve projects if they were within the maximum allowable
density of a general plan. The proposed statute, as introduced on
February 16, 2018, stated, “For purposes of this section, a
housing development project shall not be found inconsistent, not
in compliance, or not in conformity, with the applicable zoning
ordinance, and the project shall not require a rezoning, if the
existing zoning ordinance does not allow the maximum residential
use, density, and intensity allocable on the site by the land use or
housing element of the general plan.” (Emphasis added.)
       Local government organizations opposed the bill. The
Rural County Representatives of California, the Urban Counties
of California, and the California State Association of Counties
(collectively, RCRC) stated in a letter expressing their opposition,
“AB 3194 would prohibit a local government from requiring a
rezoning of a project site if the existing zoning does not allow the
maximum residential use, density, and intensity allocable on the
site by the land use or housing element of the General Plan. The
General Plan and the land use element were never intended to be
as specific as a zoning ordinance – rather, they are designed to
provide the flexibility necessary for coherent long-term planning.”
(Letter from RCRC to Assembly Member Tom Daly, Apr. 18,
2018.) The letter stated that requiring maximum planned
densities in all cases “could drastically increase allowed densities

section 65589.5(j)(4). We refer to its legislative history here only
to address Snowball and amici’s arguments.

                                 40
in areas that are either inappropriate or not planned for more
intensive residential development.” (Ibid.)
       Through a series of amendments, the Legislature changed
the bill to exclude the language requiring maximum allowable
density, replacing it with the language as it exists today—
requiring only consistency with each locality’s general plan.
RCRC then removed their opposition to the bill, reasoning that
the bill as amended “will be limited to circumstances where the
jurisdiction has not brought its zoning ordinance into conformity
with the general plan – which is something that is ultimately
under the jurisdiction’s control.” (Letter from RCRC to Assembly
Member Tom Daly, June 13, 2018.)
       We also disagree with the maximum density arguments
because requiring maximum allowable density at any particular
site would be inconsistent with the City’s general plan. For
example, the Framework Element of the general plan states, “[I]f
all lands were to be developed with the uses at the maximum
densities permitted, an unrealistic jobs/housing relationship
would result and supporting infrastructure and public services
would be unable to support this level of growth.” (General Plan,
Framework Element, p. 2-1.) The general plan also “proposes
incentives to encourage whatever growth that occurs to locate in
neighborhood districts, commercial and mixed-use centers, along
boulevards, industrial districts, and in proximity to
transportation corridors and transit stations.” (General Plan,
Framework Element, p. 3-1.) And as Councilmember Rodriguez
pointed out in her letter to PLUM, the project site is not within
the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment.
       Thus, we do not read section 65589.5(j)(4) to require the
highest allowable density for a given site. That interpretation

                               41
would contradict both the Legislature’s intent and the City’s
general plan.15
       4.     HAA policy and intent
       Snowball and amici further assert that the City is violating
the spirit of the HAA by relying on inconsistent, low-density
zoning to deny this housing project. Again relying on the
legislative history of A.B. 3194, Snowball points to an analysis by
the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community
Development (Apr. 25, 2018), which states that local authorities
“can still avoid the HAA . . . by requiring project-by-project re-
zonings or zoning variances even where a housing project is
consistent with the housing allowed by the general plan, thus
rendering housing projects beyond the scope of the HAA’s
protections because they are technically ‘inconsistent’ with the
zoning for the site.” Amici refer to an analysis of A.B. 3194 by
the Senate Committee on Governance and Finance (June 27,
2018), which noted that “local zoning and other development
standards must generally be consistent with the applicable
general plan,” but “some local agencies intentionally maintain
inconsistencies to gain an additional measure of control over
development. By maintaining low densities or height limits that
are inconsistent with the general plan for the express purpose of
requiring rezoning, even when projects are consistent with

15    For the first time in its reply brief, Snowball argued that
the second sentence of section 65589.5(j)(4) should be interpreted
to mean that the rezoning exemption applies even if the zoning
for the project site is consistent with the general plan. The City
moved to strike the portions of Snowball’s reply brief asserting
new arguments. We granted that motion, and therefore do not
address this contention.

                                42
housing density and other objective standards contained in the
city or county's general plan, local governments can ensure that
they maintain discretionary approval over projects. Locals
sometimes exploit this loophole to evade compliance with the
HAA, on the grounds that projects are technically inconsistent
with the existing zoning standards.”
       Snowball and amici argue that this is exactly what the City
is doing here: Despite the community plan’s higher-density land
use designations and corresponding zones, the City is playing a
“shell game” with zoning requirements in order to skirt the
requirements of the HAA.
       We recognize the HAA’s stated policy that it should be
“interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest
possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision
of, housing.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).) But compliance with
the HAA does not mean that every proposed project must be
approved or that maximum allowable density must be allowed at
every site. These arguments highlight the tensions inherent in
the Legislature’s efforts to solve a statewide problem that lies
within a realm typically controlled by local authorities. As noted
in section III(B)(1), supra, land use decisions have historically
been a function of local government regulation under the
California Constitution (see Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of
Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1151), and as recognized by
statute (see § 65030.1 [“decisions involving the future growth of
the state . . . are made and will continue to be made at the local
level”]). The Legislature has narrowed the criteria local
authorities may rely upon in denying a project. However, local
control has not been abrogated by the HAA. Instead, the HAA
has made clear from its inception in 1982 that it only applies

                               43
“[w]hen a proposed housing development project complies” with
the local “general plan, zoning, and development policies.”
(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) And section 65589.5(j)(4) ties its rezoning
exemption to the general plan, which is developed and updated
by local governments based on local needs.
       When the City was required to bring its zoning into
compliance with the general plan, it did so not by changing the
existing zoning of individual parcels, but by amending its
community plans with a footnote to incorporate the existing
zoning. We might deem it a poor practice to have a community
plan list certain corresponding zones, yet incorporate others by
reference in a footnote so opaque that delving into its 30-year
history is required to parse its meaning. But the question before
us is not whether the construction of the community plan is
poorly phrased or unwise. The adoption or amendment of a
general plan is a legislative act which is presumed valid.
(Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) “[T]he city has broad
discretion to weigh and balance competing interests in
formulating development policies, and a court cannot review the
wisdom of those decisions under the guise of reviewing a general
plan’s internal consistency and correlation.” (Id. at p. 1196.)
       Instead, our task is to determine whether Snowball is
entitled to the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) as the
Legislature has written that subdivision. The current RA and A1
zoning is consistent with the community plan through the
language of that plan, including Footnote 23. Because the
rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) only applies when
“the zoning for the project site is inconsistent” with the applicable
plan, the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not

                                 44
apply here, and Snowball’s project was not exempt from zone
change requirements.
D.     Section 65589.5(j)(1)
       Snowball also contends that when the City denied the zone
change, it failed to make the findings required by section
65589.5(j)(1), which sets out certain findings a local agency must
make when denying a housing project. That subdivision states,
in full,
       “When a proposed housing development project
       complies with applicable, objective general plan,
       zoning, and subdivision standards and criteria,
       including design review standards, in effect at the
       time that the application was deemed complete, but
       the local agency proposes to disapprove the project or
       to impose a condition that the project be developed at
       a lower density, the local agency shall base its
       decision regarding the proposed housing development
       project upon written findings supported by a
       preponderance of the evidence on the record that both
       of the following conditions exist:
      “(A) The housing development project would have a
      specific, adverse impact upon the public health or
      safety unless the project is disapproved or approved
      upon the condition that the project be developed at a
      lower density. As used in this paragraph, a “specific,
      adverse impact” means a significant, quantifiable,
      direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective,
      identified written public health or safety standards,
      policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the
      application was deemed complete.

                                45
       “(B) There is no feasible method to satisfactorily
       mitigate or avoid the adverse impact identified
       pursuant to paragraph (1), other than the
       disapproval of the housing development project or the
       approval of the project upon the condition that it be
       developed at a lower density.”
(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) Snowball argues the City was required to make
the findings in parts (A) and (B), in “written findings supported
by a preponderance of the evidence.”
       The City points out that by its express terms, section
65589.5(j)(1) applies when “a proposed housing development
project complies with applicable, objective general plan, zoning,
and subdivision standards and criteria . . . in effect at the time
that the application was deemed complete.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1),
emphasis added.) The City asserts that because Snowball’s
project did not comply with the current zoning—it required a
zone change—section 65589.5(j)(1) does not apply. Snowball does
not disagree that section 65589.5(j)(1) includes this requirement,
but states that under section 65589.5(j)(4), the project should be
“treated as though it has been rezoned.”
       The plain language of section 65589.5(j)(1) states that a
local agency is required to make written findings only when the
proposed project “complies with applicable . . . zoning . . . in effect
at the time that the application was deemed complete.”
(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) As noted in section III(C), supra, this language
was in section 65589.5 when it was originally enacted; the HAA
has always applied only to projects that comply with local zoning.
Snowball’s project did not meet that criteria because it did not
comply with the applicable zoning; it required a zone change.
And for the reasons discussed in the previous section, we do not

                                  46
agree that the project fell under the rezoning exemption in
section 65589.5(j)(4). Snowball therefore has not demonstrated
that the City was required to comply with section 65589.5(j)(1).
E.    LAMC
      In a very brief argument, Snowball also contends the City
abused its discretion in denying Snowball’s zone change request
“based on invalid findings under its own code which were also
lacking evidentiary support.” Snowball argues that “the City
Council’s action was arbitrary and capricious and totally lacking
in evidentiary support as it was not supported by the valid
findings required by LAMC §12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii), and the
inadequate findings by the City were not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Snowball asserts that record
evidence shows that the planned mitigation measures would
alleviate any fire safety concerns. Snowball contends it is
therefore entitled to a writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1094.5. The City argues that LAMC section
12.32(Q)(3)(a)(2) does not require specific findings to deny a
proposed zone change, and even if it did, the City Council made
such findings on the record.
      LAMC section 12.32(Q)(3)(a)(2) states that “a vesting zone
change may be conditioned or denied if the City Planning
Commission or the City Council determines . . . (ii) the zone
change is denied because it is not in substantial conformance
with the purposes, intent or provisions of the General Plan or is
not in conformance with public necessity, convenience, general
welfare and good zoning practice and the reason for not
conforming with the plan. [¶] If the Council does not adopt the
Commission’s findings and recommendations, the Council shall
make its own findings.”

                               47
       The City points out that the LAMC also requires it to make
affirmative findings to grant a zone change. Under the LAMC
section 12.32(C)(7), the City Council may “approve an ordinance
only after making findings that its action is consistent with the
General Plan and is in conformity with public necessity,
convenience, general welfare and good zoning practice.”
Councilmember Rodriguez cited this subdivision in her letter,
stating, “Pursuant to Section 12.32-C of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code, findings of fact must be made in the affirmative
in order to recommend an action to be consistent with public
health and safety, general welfare, and good zoning practice.” As
discussed above, Rodriguez concluded that such findings could
not be made.
       As noted above, PLUM stated that it “adopted the findings
presented by Council District 7 as the findings of the PLUM
Committee,” and the City Council in its written ruling adopted
PLUM’s report. Snowball argues that the “findings” of the City
Council therefore consisted only of those in Rodriguez’s letter,
which were “opinion and speculation,” and were “not based on
any facts in the record, [so] they are not sufficient to support the
City’s action.”
       We disagree. The evidence before both PLUM and the City
Council included City Planning’s findings, Rodriguez’s letter,
hundreds of pages of written comments and attachments
submitted by members of the public, a letter from a state senator,
a petition signed by more than 2,000 people, oral comments made
by members of the public at the meetings, and written and oral
comments from Snowball’s counsel. Rodriguez’s letter gave
multiple reasons, which are supported by the record, for denying
the zone change. For example, Rodriguez stated that the density

                                48
of 215 units at the site would be “inconsistent with the
surrounding density of the subject site”; the density of the
surrounding area is undisputed. Rodriguez stated that the site is
not within the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment—a fact
that is easily verified. Many citizens expressed concerns about
evacuation in the event of a wildfire following recent evacuation
attempts, and Rodriguez cited wildfire concerns in her letter.
She noted the 2019 Saddle Ridge fire, for example, in which “88
structures were damaged, 19 were destroyed, one person died of a
heart attack, and many schools were closed due to poor air
quality that lingered for weeks. At its peak, more than 100,000
people were under mandatory evacuation.” Again, this is public
information that could easily be verified.
       The information before PLUM and City Council therefore
was not simply “opinion and speculation,” as Snowball asserts.
Substantial evidence is evidence “‘of ponderable legal
significance,’” which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value. (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
1250, 1260.) Snowball offers no authority supporting its
suggestion that City Council was required to rely on certain
evidence in the record regarding fire safety, but disregard other
evidence on the same subject.
       In sum, we find the HAA does not apply, and the City’s
findings were sufficient under the LAMC and supported by
substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial
of Snowball’s petition.

                                 49
                      IV.   DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to recover
its costs on appeal.

              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                      COLLINS, ACTING P.J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

                                50