Court Opinion

ID: 9846272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:38:27.484816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:41.334213
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent to the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, a decision soundly based on well-considered Georgia law. The opinion of the majority in this case abandons clear and workable guidelines for resolving conflicts regarding the custody of children, substituting a vague and undefined overarching principle for specific *449and objective rules of law which have been a useful part of this State’s jurisprudence for many years. The effect of this change in the law will be increased litigation, uncertainty in the area of domestic law, increased cost for the parties attendant to the expansion of litigation, unnecessarily contentious custody proceedings, and inconsistency from circuit to circuit, court to court, and judge to judge. Replacement of concrete standards with an amorphous best-interest-of-the-child standard will leave the trial courts free to consider any circumstance in a child’s life as a potential reason to uproot the child, with no guidance in the form of presumptions such as those which have historically controlled such considerations in this State. Without any guidance for the beginning of a trial court’s consideration, every dissatisfaction a noncustodial parent has with the parenting of the custodial parent becomes a proper basis for re-litigating custody.
Contrary to the majority’s expansive reading of this Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372 (578 SE2d 876) (2003), the presumption that the previous award of custody remains in the best interests of the child provides a valuable starting place for a trial court’s consideration of cases such as this one. The holding in Scott that a self-executing change of custody provision is unenforceable because it does not permit consideration, at the time of the change, of the best interests of the child does not conflict with the retention of rebuttable presumptions as a means of guiding and structuring a trial court’s decision-making. The majority opinion’s expansion of Scott to eliminate all guidelines other than the ultimate principle of the best interests of the child not only leaves the trial court without a meaningful structure for its considerations, but invites the courts into every decision to be made in a family that has been divided by divorce. Such interference by the courts in family life is antithetical to traditional notions that family decisions should be made by families, not courts. *450In re Marriage of Pape, 139 Wash.2d 694, 716 (989 P2d 1120) (2000). The wisdom of that holding has been discarded by the majority’s decision today.
*449Once the decree of dissolution is entered, a trial court’s involvement in decision-making for the family is minimized. The court’s role in a family’s life following dissolution of marriage is not to review every parenting decision to determine if it is in the child’s “best” interests. Once the court has determined the best residential placement of the child, based on the best interests standard set forth in the statute, the important job of the court is finished. The court does not again become significantly involved in parenting decisions, unless the child’s well-being is seriously threatened by parenting decisions. A change in the location of the child’s place of residence, with the primary residential parent, generally does not pose such a serious threat.
*450The majority’s decision to eliminate objective standards in favor of any particular trial judge’s biases regarding what constitutes the best interest of the child is particularly disturbing because it is made in the context of the issue of parental relocation which is commonplace in American life. In an increasingly mobile society with a divorce rate of 50 percent,9 many jurisdictions in this country have dealt with the issues arising from a custodial parent’s need or desire to move away from the location of the former marital residence to change jobs or to start a new family.
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered this subject have adopted approaches which favor the custodial parent’s right to move away from the state with their child. . . . [T]he decisions are generally based on judicial recognition of the post-divorce new family unit, and stability and continuity of the child’s relationship with his primary custodian as the most important factor affecting the child’s welfare. These courts also recognize that the well-being of the child is fundamentally interrelated with the well-being of the custodial parent, and that parent is the best person to make decisions affecting the child and the new family group, such as where they will reside. The courts therefore accord those childrearing decisions deference, and hold that judicial intervention in that decision making process should be limited to only the most extreme circumstances.
Kaiser v. Kaiser, 23 P3d 278, 284-285 (Okla. 2001).
Georgia law on the subject has been, until the decision in this case, in keeping with the majority position stated above. “The fact that the [custodial parent] has remarried, and intends to remove the children to another State . . . , does not constitute or amount to such a change of condition as would authorize modification of the decree.” Mercer v. Foster, 210 Ga. 546 (3) (81 SE2d 458) (1954). The majority opinion’s off-handed overruling of Ormandy v. Odom, 217 Ga. App. 780, 781 (459 SE2d 439) (1995), does not reveal the breadth of the change in Georgia law this decision will produce. Among the cases overruled in the majority opinion as “any other Georgia case [that] presumes the custodial parent has a prima facie right to retain cus*451tody . . .” are the following: Moore v. Wiggins, 230 Ga. 51 (195 SE2d 404) (1973); Grubbs v. Dowse, 226 Ga. 763 (177 SE2d 237) (1970); Mercer v. Foster, supra (cited in Scott, supra); Lewis v. Lewis, 252 Ga. App. 539 (2) (557 SE2d 40) (2001); Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. App. 482 (552 SE2d 479) (2001); Helm v. Graham, 249 Ga. App. 126, 128-129 (547 SE2d 343) (2001); Mahan v. McRae, 241 Ga. App. 109 (522 SE2d 772) (1999); Ofchus v. Isom, 239 Ga. App. 738 (521 SE2d 871) (1999) (cited in Scott, supra); Holt v. Leiter, 232 Ga. App. 376 (4) (501 SE2d 879) (1998). Although they do not involve relocation, this Court’s decisions in Kirkland v. Canty, 122 Ga. 261 (50 SE 90) (1905), and Shields v. Bodenhamer, 180 Ga. 122 (178 SE 294) (1935), will also stand overruled because they recognize the long-standing rule that a parent awarded custody of a child has a prima facie right to continuation of that custody absent a showing of a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.
In addition to protesting the abandonment of meaningful guidelines for trial courts in custody modification cases, I must take issue with the majority opinion’s attempt to cast Dr. Bodne as a villain because his motivation for relocation included a desire to enhance his economic opportunity. Other jurisdictions, in keeping with the recognition expressed in Kaiser v. Kaiser, supra at 285, of “the post-divorce new family unit, and stability and continuity of the child’s relationship with his primary custodian as the most important factor affecting the child’s welfare,” have emphasized the identity of interest between the child and the custodial parent.
Although the best interests of the children always remain the paramount concern, “because the best interests of a child are so interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent, the determination of the child’s best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into account.” [Cit.]
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 710 (481 NE2d 1153) (1985). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in interpreting that state’s statutory provision regarding removal of a child from the state, also recognized the interrelation of the interests of the child and the custodial parent: “Because removal may offer emotional and financial advantages to the custodial parent, removal may also foster the well-being of the child, for the interests of the child and the custodial parent, the primary caretaker, are intricately connected.” Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521, 532 (381 NW2d 350) (1986). For those reasons, improvement in the economic opportunity of the custodial parent should not be viewed as a negative factor as the majority opinion has done in this case, but as an enhancement of the welfare of the chil*452dren involved.
It is apparent from the trial court’s order that the true basis of the ruling below was that Ms. Bodne’s visitation rights would be adversely affected by the relocation. However, Georgia and other jurisdictions have held that a move’s incidental impact on the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights is not sufficient reason to change custody. “In . . . cases [involving one parent with primary physical custody], we held that the move alone was not sufficient to justify removing custody from the custodial parent, even where it severely impacted the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights.” Lewis v. Lewis, 252 Ga. App. 539, 541 (2), supra. In a case in which the trial court’s focus was the same as that of the trial court in the present case, the Court of Appeals reversed with this explanation: “The trial court’s true focus was on the ‘change in condition’ posed by [the] remarriage and planned move, which will separate the children from their father and other family members. As noted above, however, that ‘change’ cannot, standing alone, support a court order transferring physical custody. [Cits.]” Helm v. Graham, supra, 219 Ga. App. at 130. The Court of Appeals had previously recognized the impact of relocation on the noncustodial parent’s access to the children, but did not permit that impact to control the custody question: “Out-of-state moves by the custodial parent necessarily result in increased separation between the children and the non-custodial parent. But, ‘relocating and remarrying are not in and of themselves sufficient changes in condition to authorize a change in custody.’ [Cits.]” Mahan v. McRae, supra at 112. The majority view on this aspect of the relocation problem was well stated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma: “The cases uniformly hold that visitation rights alone are an insufficient basis on which to deny relocation and thereby change custody of a child. A custodial parent’s relocation should not be disallowed solely to ‘maintain the existing visitation patterns.’ [Cits.]” Kaiser v. Kaiser, supra at 286. Supporting rationale for these holdings may be found in the decisions of other jurisdictions. A New York decision connected the importance of considering the new, post-divorce family unit to the impact on visitation:
Like Humpty Dumpty, a family, once broken by divorce, cannot be put back together in precisely the same way. The relationship between the parents and the children is necessarily different after a divorce and, accordingly, it may be unrealistic in some cases to try to preserve the noncustodial parent’s accustomed close involvement in the children’s everyday life at the expense of the custodial parent’s efforts to start a new life or to form a new family unit.
*453Decided November 10, 2003 —
Reconsideration denied December 11,2003.
James M. Allison, Jr., for appellant.
Warner, Mayoue, Bates, Nolen & Collar, John C. Mayoue, Hope C. Allen, for appellee.
Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727, 740 (665 NE2d 145) (1996). In Long v. Long, supra, 127 Wis.2d at 534, the Wisconsin Supreme Court spoke of the proper scope of a trial court’s exercise of discretion in the context of a custodial parent’s decision to move, requiring the trial court
to recognize . . . that the custodial parent has the power and responsibility to make decisions for the family unit, that the custodial parent’s well-being affects the children’s well-being, and that the circuit court has broad latitude in fashioning and modifying visitation arrangements and has limited latitude in changing custody. We conclude that a finding . . . that an out-of-state move will be against the child’s best interests must rest on more than a determination that removal will in some way change the visitation arrangements or change the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent.
In summary, I cannot join the majority opinion in this case because I believe its abandonment of established Georgia law on this subject is unwarranted and leaves this area of the law fraught with uncertainty and instability. The prima facie right of continued custody is a valuable tool which guides the consideration of trial courts in making the difficult decisions presented when divorced parents differ in their beliefs regarding what is in the best interests of their children. Accordingly, I must dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Thompson join this dissent.

 Moon v. Guardian Postacute Svcs., 95 Cal. App. 4th 1005,1021-1022 (116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218) (2002) (Judge Ruvolo dissenting, citing “Time Almanac 2001 (Information Please),” p. 126).