Court Opinion

ID: 9777323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:07:30.386455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:52.522030
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
My views about continued application of the contemporaneous objection rule judicially crafted by the Court in Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977) — after at least four years of entertaining Wither-spoon1 challenges to exclusion of prospective jurors without requiring an objection to be voiced2 — have been recently expressed in Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Without reiterating them, it is enough to observe that the Boul-ware Court seems to have been overly influenced by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to provisions of the federal rule of criminal procedure and federal habeas corpus consideration of claimed deprivation of constitutional rights during the course of a state criminal prosecution. See Boulware, at 679-681. So I disagree with the declaration of the Court in the case at bar that ground of error four was not preserved for review “for no such [Witherspoon] objection was made at trial.”
Further, in reading portions of the voir dire examination of veniremember Grace quoted in the majority opinion to address the fifth ground of error, it seems to me that the objection that was made after the prosecutor renewed his motion3 came in a *709contexual setting that the point of counsel’s objection was clearly understood by all concerned. See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).4 They were then and there in the throes of examining the veniremember for purposes of Witherspoon when matters reached the point that prompted the prosecution to “make a motion” — a motion whose grounds and desired relief were not stated but whose thrust was patently directed toward excusal of Grace as a prospective juror on account of her scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty. Resisting the motion thus understood, appellant’s lawyer sought to question Grace “a little more thoroughly,” and that brought the colloquy in which the trial judge opined that “the statute provides that after she has committed herself” further questions were barred — meaning most assuredly questions about whether she would automatically vote against imposition of capital punishment. And then, only after the statement concerning Section 12.31(b) of the Penal Code, did the trial court excuse the veniremember.
Accordingly, satisfied that all understood exactly the import and impact of the stated objection of appellant, I would not refuse to review the merits of ground of error four. Nevertheless, I agree with the assessment of the Court that the record shows that Grace made “unmistakably clear” a determination that “there are no circumstances .. . that [she] would ever consider the death penalty.” 5
Therefore, except as noted, I join in the opinion and concur in the judgment of the Court.
TEAGUE, J., joins.

. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).

. Indeed, defense counsel in Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 382-383 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) expressly stated, “No objection,” when the State challenged for cause; the Court still reasoned that such “waiver of objection apparently will . not, in itself vitiate an improper challenge,” but is a factor to be considered when the meaning of a response by a venireman is uncertain, id., at 383, n. 2. There was not a contemporaneous objection in Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), still the Court, without even mentioning the possibility of waiver, examined the voir dire and held that several veniremem-ber were improperly excused under Wither-spoon. Accordingly, observing that “a contemporaneous objection rule ... apparently did not even exist” at the time Kenneth Granviel was tried in October 1975, the Fifth Circuit has just now vacated the death sentence imposed on him. Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (CA 5 1981).

.“we object to the prospective juror being excused unless we have the opportunity to question her a little more thoroughly.” Interestingly the Court finds error in not granting the request, but also holds the error is not *709reversible because Grace “unequivocally stated that she would not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances.”

. “Thus, where the correct ground of exclusion was obvious to the judge and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise objection,” 557 S.W.2d, at 517.

. I emphasize that “the record shows” her determination as finally stated to the trial judge. Up to that point she appears to have equivocated somewhat, particularly if what she actually said in one response to whether she would never write a death penalty verdict was “Right now, I have to say no,” rather than, as the reporter transcribed it, “Right. Now, I have to say no.” This exchange demonstrates the utmost importance of accurate reporting which, of course, one must assume was done here.