Court Opinion

ID: 9551857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:00:57.973141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:51.996576
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
For the third time I am compelled to dissent to the admission of hearsay testimony of the class and character approved by the majority of the Court. In my dissent in State v. Finley, 85 Ariz. 327-343, 338 P.2d 790-801, I said:
“The testimony of the officer supplied no missing elements. It was merely used as a vehicle for presenting the story of the prosecutrix to the jury twice, once from her own lips and once from the lips of the interrogating officer.”
*218Under the circumstances of this case, the testimony of the officer was at best cumulative and wholly unnecessary, since the prosecutrix was present in court, able to, and did, testify.
The testimony from the lips of the investigating- officer was erroneous and prejudicial, first because there was ample ■opportunity between the time of the shooting and the relating of the prosecutrix’s story for her to reflect on and polish any rough spots. Her story to the police lacks the ■ necessary guarantee of truthfulness, spontaneity. Second, it is doubly prejudicial because the story related to the jury by the police officer thereby takes on the credibility of the majesty of the law. It cannot be tested for truthfulness because .the facts related are not subject to cross-examination. To say that the testimony is spontaneous after the intervening time is pure, unadulterated nonsense. See also the dissent in State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 385 P.2d 700.