Court Opinion

ID: 9649801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:09:47.787301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:27.727893
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant raises eighteen assignments of error in this appeal from his January 30, 1975 conviction of one count of perjury. The Majority holds that appellant has waived his right to raise these issues because they were not presented to the court below in written post-trial motions. Because I disagree with the Majority’s interpretation of the recent decisions of our Supreme Court concerning waiver, I would reach the merits of those issues which I believe have been properly preserved for our review. Of those issues pre*573served for appeal I believe that only one has merit:1 that appellant was not informed of the impending indictment in sufficient time for him to exercise his right to challenge the array or individual members of the grand jury before the indictment was returned.
Appellant testified before the Special Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County on August 28, and September 6, 1974. The Investigating Grand Jury had been convened to investigate allegations of official misconduct and police corruption. In the course of its investigation, appellant was called to testify about his alleged involvement in the payment of bribes to police officers and public officials to secure “protection” for his illegal gambling operation. On September 16, 1974, an indicting *574grand jury returned two indictments charging four counts of perjury2 and four counts of false swearing.3 These charges were based upon presentments made by the Special Investigating Grand Jury to the indicting grand jury. On October 8, 1974, appellant filed a detailed motion to quash the indictments and an application for pre-trial discovery. On November 20, 1974, the lower court denied the motion to quash the indictments and granted discovery limited to copies of all confessions, all statements of the appellant that the Commonwealth had in its possession, and any recorded conversations between appellant and representatives of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. In all other respects, the appellant’s motion for pre-trial discovery was denied.4 On January 20, 1975, *575appellant pleaded not guilty, and a jury was empanelled. On January 30, 1975, the jury found appellant guilty of the first perjury count, but not guilty of the second, third and fourth counts of perjury.5 Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed on February 6, 1975, on the following grounds:
“1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.
“2. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
“3. The verdict is contrary to the law.
“4. The denial of this court of Defendant’s Petition to Quash Indictments.
“5. Denial by this Court of Defendant’s Motion for Discovery.”
Post-trial motions were denied on April 21, 1975, and the court sentenced appellant to three to twenty-three months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Part I of this opinion sets forth why I believe that some of the issues argued on appeal are properly before us. Part II will address appellant’s sufficiency claim. Part III of this opinion is devoted to appellant’s only meritorious contention.
I
Our Supreme Court has mandated strict adherence to Rule 1123(a), Pa.R.Crim.P. See Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A. 2d 213 (1975). In every criminal case, the trial judge is required to warn the defendant who has been found guilty “. . . . that only the grounds contained in . . . [post-trial] motions may be raised on appeal Rule 1123(c)(3), Pa.R.Crim.P. (Emphasis added). It is now a clearly established policy of Pennsylvania appellate practice that failure to specifically mention any asserted trial errors in post-trial motions *576constitutes a waiver of those issues, and precludes their being considered for the first time by the appellate court. Commonwealth v. Blair, supra; Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634, 331 A. 2d 171 (1975).
There are concededly sound policies for strict application of the waiver doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 464 Pa. 117, 346 A.2d 48 (1975). “Appellate Courts render a disservice to judicial economy and the efficient operation of our court system where they freely accept issues that could have and should have been first presented to the courts below for their consideration.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra at . .., 346 A. 2d at 52, citing Commonwealth v. Reid, 458 Pa. 357, 326 A. 2d 267 (1974). The purpose of Rule 1123 is to avoid unnecessary appeals by ensuring that the trial court is given an opportunity to correct asserted trial errors. Further, application of Rule 1123 ensures the making of a complete record in that testimony and other germane evidence on the issue will be received. An attorney’s diligent preparation is rewarded, and he is precluded from relying on an appellate court to bail out his poor performance at trial. In criminal matters, the defendant may ultimately remedy trial error, which was not properly preserved for appeal because trial counsel was ineffective, either by employing new counsel6 on appeal to raise the ineffectiveness issue or by resorting to Post Conviction Hearing Act relief.7
Although the arguments in favor of strict application of the waiver doctrine are formidable, an appellate court abdicates its historic obligation to do justice if it applies waiver too hastily. The Majority, citing Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, reasons that, because identical grounds for appeal may often be supported by alternative *577theories, appellant fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1123(a) unless the specific theories supporting the grounds for reversal are enunciated in written post-trial motions.8 I believe that this is an unnecessarily narrow reading of Rule 1123 (a).
Rule 1123(a) states: “Within seven (7) days after a finding of guilt, the defendant shall have the right to file written motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. Only those grounds may be considered which were raised in pre-trial proceedings or at trial. .. [0]nly those issues raised and the grounds relied upon in the motions may be argued . . . .” (Emphasis added).
And Rule 1123(c) requires the trial judge to admonish the defendant “... that only the grounds contained in such motions may be raised on appeal.” (Emphasis added). Nowhere in the language of the Rule does it mention theories, only grounds. It is unnecessarily severe to read into Rule 1123 the requirement that an appellant must provide the court below with the theories in writing supporting the grounds in order to preserve his appellate right when it is clear from the record that the legal theories have been previously advanced to the lower court.
*578In the instant case, appellant advanced as grounds for new trial and arrest of judgment, in addition to boilerplate sufficiency claims, the failure of the lower court to grant appellant’s pre-trial motion to quash the indictments and the refusal of the lower court to grant appellant’s pre-trial request for discovery. Appellant presented to the lower court detailed arguments in support of his pre-trial motions. Both the Commonwealth and appellant submitted extensive briefs which amply informed the court of the theories for and against appellant’s pre-trial motions. When appellant renewed his pre-trial motions in written post-trial motions, it was incumbent on the lower court to reconsider its rulings on the pre-trial motion for discovery and motion to quash the indictments and to consider those legal theories, and only those legal theories, presented to the court in the pre-trial motions. The lower court apparently did not do this, but appellant’s rights on appeal should not be circumscribed by this omission. Admittedly, better practice would dictate as much precision as possible in framing the issues and grounds to the lower court. However, I would hold that appellant’s post-trial motions stated grounds with sufficient specificity so that this Court must now consider those issues on appeal. None of the policies in support of waiver is offended by this approach, and little is gained by the formality of requiring specific theories to be reiterated in post-trial motions.
Because appellant did not raise the following grounds for new trial or arrest of judgment in post-trial motions, I would agree with the Majority that they are waived:9
5. Did the trial court err in dividing the jurors into four groups when charging the jury and thereby confusing the jury as to its obligation to return a unanimous verdict?
*5796. Did the trial court err when it recessed the trial for one week, refused appellant’s motion for mistrial on this ground, and then refused appellant’s request for voir dire of the jury when the trial reconvened?
7. Did the trial court err in taking the four counts of false swearing away from the jury and submitting only the four counts of perjury to them?
8. Did the trial court unduly limit cross-examination of Commonwealth witnesses from written reports prepared in the course of their investigation?
9. Was it error for the lower court to deny appellant’s request to hold a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth possessed certain reports or memoranda which might have been exculpatory or which might have aided appellant in the preparation of his defense after testimony at trial alluded to the preparation of said reports by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission?
10. Did the trial court err in not permitting appellant to introduce certain answers to pre-trial discovery prepared by the Commonwealth, which contradicted part of the testimony given by Commonwealth witnesses?
12. Was the charge of the court adequate in respect to the intent element of the crime of perjury?
14. Did the trial court err in submitting counts II and III of the perjury indictment to the jury because there was no evidence to sustain a finding of guilt on these counts and the only possible result of submitting these counts would be jury confusion?
15. Was it error to permit the introduction of appellant’s entire testimony before the Special Investigating Grand Jury?
18. Did the trial court err in permitting the introduction of testimony before the Special Investigating Grand Jury which was irrelevant and which contained evidence of prior crimes? Because these issues are waived, this •court is precluded from reaching the merits. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra; Commonwealth v. Blair, supra.
*580II
Appellant’s fourth contention is that the evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the crime of perjury, i.e. the materiality of the false statement.10
Section 4902(a) of the Crimes Code11 states: “A person is guilty of perjury, a felony of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true.” Section 4902 (b) defines materiality as follows: “Falsification is material, regardless of the admissibility of the statement under rules of evidence, if it could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. It is no defense that the declarant mistakenly believed the falsification to be immaterial. Whether a falsification is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.”
Because it is an element of the offense of perjury, materiality must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship; 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 461 Pa. 709, 337 A.2d 840 (1975). However, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must accept as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom upon which the factfinder could properly have based its verdict. Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 367, 318 A. 2d 327 (1974); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 425, 427, 326 A. 2d 554 (1974).
*581In the instant case, the Commonwealth called the “foreperson” of the Special Investigating Grand Jury, who read into the record selected portions of the charge of the judge who convened the grand jury. The charge to the grand jury defined the scope of the investigation in substantial detail, it included investigation of alleged payment by professional gamblers of “payoff-s” to police officers and other officials to secure “protection” from criminal prosecution. It was established that appellant’s appearance related to one of the instances of criminality that the grand jury had been instructed to investigate. It was further established that the grand jury called appellant in an attempt to discover the relationship between numbers writers and the Philadelphia Police Department. Appellant was convicted for testifying falsely about the fact that he had discontinued all illegal gambling activity after April, 1973. The effect of this testimony was to attempt to mislead the grand jurors into believing that appellant could offer no relevant testimony regarding the practices currently under investigation. At trial, two undercover officers assigned to the Special Prosecutor’s Office testified that they, in fact, had placed wagers with appellant on various occasions after April, 1973. In view of the above evidence, it is clear that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proof in respect to the element of materiality. See Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 140, 50 A. 2d 703, affirmed, 357 Pa. 378, 54 A. 2d 705 (1947); Commonwealth v. Bobanic, 62 Pa. Superior Ct. 40 (1916). Thus, the court properly denied appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment.
1 — 1 1 — 1 f-H
Appellant contends that the lower court should have granted his motion to quash the indictment because he was precluded from exercising his pre-indictment right to challenge the indicting grand jury array and/or in*582dividual members of the indicting grand jury.12 The Commonwealth does not dispute that appellant’s first “notice” that his case was presented to an indicting grand jury was his receipt of the actual indictment. Thus, it must be decided whether this “notice” violated either the Rules of Criminal Procedure or essential elements of due process.
Rule 203, Pa.R.Crim.P., provides a procedure by which one held for court may exercise his constitutional right to challenge the array of the grand jury or an individual grand juror. All challenges must be exercised before the grand jury returns an indictment. In order to safeguard the pre-indictment right to challenge the grand jury, the rule provides that in no event shall a bill of indictment “be submitted to a grand jury for action until 10 days after a defendant is held for court . . .” subject to two limited exceptions. It is implicit in the Rule that there must be sufficient time between the preliminary hearing and the presentment of the bill of indictment to the grand jury in order to permit the accused an opportunity to challenge the grand jury which is about to indict him. In this sense, there is a “notice” provision within Rule 203. Commonwealth v. Sills, 237 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 352 A. 2d 539 (1975).
Our Court, however, has ruled that because the Rules of Criminal Procedure did not contemplate the procedure of investigating grand juries and only concerned the normal scheme of preliminary hearings and arraignments, they are not literally applicable to such situations. Commonwealth v. Sills, supra. Thus, an indictment based upon a presentment from an investigating grand jury should not be quashed “simply because the Commonwealth failed to supply ten days’ ‘actual’ notice to appel-lee or his counsel prior to submitting the bill of indictment to the indicting grand jury.” Commonwealth v. Sills, *583supra at 288, 352 A. 2d at 543. Sills held, however, that it must be determined whether “the notice supplied by the Commonwealth was sufficient to allow appellee the opportunity to challenge the array of the grand jury, or challenge individual grand jurors for cause.” 237 Pa. Superior Ct. at 288, 352 A. 2d at 543.13
In Commonwealth v. Collemacine, 429 Pa. 24, 239 A. 2d 296 (1968), our Supreme Court held that the “. . . failure to notify the accused or his counsel that his case will be presented to a grand jury other than that to which it was handed over violates fundamental notions of due process.” 429 Pa. at 27, 239 A. 2d at 298. In Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177, 224 A. 2d 188 (1966), it was held that a defendant indicted for murder on the same day as his preliminary hearing was deprived of his right to challenge the grand jury.
In Sills, supra, we held that seven days’ notice was sufficient because the appellee was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and because “[g] rand jury challenges to the array or for cause are not difficult nor time consuming to prepare since the bases for successful challenges are very limited. See Pa. R.Crim.P. 203(a).” 237 Pa. Superior Ct. at 290, 352 A. 2d at 544. Furthermore, “. . . no questioning on voir dire need be prepared since an accused is not permitted to subject a grand jury or grand jurors to a voir dire. See Pa. R.Crim.P. 203(b). While the accused must have an opportunity to challenge within a reasonable time the grand jury array or prove by legally competent evidence that one or more of the grand jurors should be disqualified for cause, Rule 203(a) specifically provides ‘. . . in any event, a challenge must be made before the bill of indictment is submitted to the grand jury.’ See Commonwealth *584v. Dessus, supra; Brown v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 319 (1874).” 237 Pa. Superior Ct. at 290, 352 A. 2d at 544. In Sills, the period of “notice” provided the defendant was measured from the date on which notice was received until the date on which the bill of indictment was submitted to the grand jury.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth argues that appellant was provided with an opportunity to frame challenges to the grand jury after the indictment was returned. However, we cannot take cognizance of this assertion because it is not of record. Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 111-112, 317 A. 2d 258 (1974). Furthermore, it is not clear how a successful post-indictment challenge might be framed when there has been no opportunity to investigate the composition of the grand jury and to file timely challenges. Cf., Commonwealth v. Jones, 456 Pa. 270, 273, 318 A. 2d 711 (1974). Thus, even if afforded an opportunity to challenge the method of calling or the composition of the grand jury, there is little guarantee that the opportunity would be meaningful.
Because I would hold that appellant was not provided with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the grand jury array or to challenge individual members of the grand jury, I would reverse his conviction and order the indictment quashed.
Spaeth, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. In addition to the issues discussed in Parts II and III, infra appellant assigns the following theories in support of his contention that the motion to quash the indictments should have been granted (numbered in accordance with the “Questions Presented” in Appellant’s Brief) :
2. It was error to charge appellant with perjury for denying the commission of offenses for which he could have been punished under the penal laws of the state.
3. It was improper for the grand jury to hear evidence and to vote on bills of indictment while an unauthorized person was present, to wit, a member of the staff of the Office of the Special Prosecutor who had not yet been admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
11. The indictment failed to set forth the necessary elements of the crime of perjury, and the Grand Jury failed to disclose the grounds upon which it was making its presentment.
13. The indictment was duplicitous and failed to give appellant an opportunity to formulate a defense.
17. The Commonwealth failed to provide the appellant with a preliminary hearing.
Appellant also contends in his sixteenth assignment of error that the court should have granted broader pre-trial discovery. Because I would hold that the denial of the motion to quash was improper, Part III infra, I need not consider these assignments of error. However, after careful examination of the record, I have also concluded that they are without merit.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1; 18 Pa.C.S. §4902.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1; 18 Pa.C.S. §4903.

. Of the thirteen items of requested discovery, the Office of the Special Prosecutor voluntarily supplied appellant with eight. The court below granted discovery with respect to a ninth item. The following items of discovery were refused because they were beyond the scope of Rule 310, Pa.R.Crim.P.: a copy of the transcript of the prior arrest and conviction mentioned in the fourth counts of perjury and false swearing, the names and addresses of all persons who caused the presentment to be made to the indicting grand jury as well as a copy of the testimony of those persons before the investigating grand jury, the names of all grand jurors present on the dates on which the alleged perjury was committed and the names of those voting in favor of the presentment, and a copy of the testimony of the prospective Commonwealth witnesses which was previously given to the Special Investigating Grand Jury. Appellant argues that his pre-trial application for discovery should have been granted because of “exceptional circumstances and compelling-reasons,” which are required by Rule 310 if expanded discovery is to be granted. The “exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons” which appellant advances consist of the denial by the court of an opportunity to have a preliminary hearing when discovery might be had. I fail to see the logical connection between the items sought by appellant and what might be secured if a preliminary hearing had been held.

. The court below removed four counts of false swearing from the jury.

. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 96, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).

. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, §1 et seq.; 19 P.S. §1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).

. Reliance by this Court on Justice Nix’s opinion in Mitchell may be ill-advised for two reasons. First, Mitchell deals with the issue of waiver within the context of our Supreme Court’s efforts to define the limits of Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). In Mitchell, the Court overrules Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973), which held that by raising the involuntariness of a confession in the court below, an appellant implicitly raises a violation of Futch even though the Futch issue was not specifically argued. Mitchell, therefore, does not suggest that issues raised in the court below are waived on appeal if the written post-trial motions do not contain the theories presented to the court in support of the grounds for new trial and arrest of judgment. Second, the opinion in Mitchell expresses the views of only one member of the Supreme Court. Although Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justices Jones and Eagen, approve the overruling of Wayman, it is not clear that they subscribe to the broad language of the lead opinion.

. The following contentions are numbered in accordance with “Questions Presented” in Appellant’s Brief.

. I believe that appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence is adequately preserved for our review by the boiler-plate post-trial motions. No policy in support of waiver is offended by this holding. Appellant also contends in his fourth assignment of error that the lower court improperly circumscribed cross-examination on the issue of materiality. The fourth contention must, therefore, be split into its sufficiency claim which is preserved for our review and its trial error claim which is waived. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra.

. See Note 2, supra.

. This contention is the first issue listed in “Questions Presented” in Appellant’s Brief.

. Because the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been held not to apply to investigating grand juries, criminal defendants, their counsel and the courts are left in limbo. Elimination of this confusion would best he served by the adoption of rules which would govern these proceedings.