Court Opinion

ID: 9598219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:06:38.658211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:50.814984
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge:
specially concurs:
¶ 1 I agree with the decision to affirm the judgments and sentences but write separately to address further the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the evidentiary hearing on Sixth Amendment grounds, the District Court noted:
Mr. Elliott had a very difficult case to handle. Mr. Elliott had to represent a defendant who had gone to a residence armed with a semi-automatic pistol, to col*1240lect drug/methamphetamine money. - The jury saw the witnesses and heard their testimony. The jury heard that Michael Sauer was shot twice in the back, that the defendant had shot his friend, Steve Ver-ner, in the mouth, and had shot two young girls. One of whom, Lindsey Verner, testified the defendant said “I hope you die bitch” just prior to shooting her in the head. As Mr. Elliott testified this was not a “who done it” case.
¶ 2 In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel’s conduct is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, ¶ 124, 989 P.2d 1017; Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535, 556 (Okl.Cr.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930, 118 S.Ct. 2329, 141 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998); McGregor v. State, 885 P.2d 1366, 1381 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 827, 116 S.Ct. 95, 133 L.Ed.2d 50 (1995). In this case, counsel’s defense was that Appellant did not possess the requisite malice aforethought for first degree murder because he did not know the victim, did not have any dealings with him and had no reason to kill him. This defense rested on Appellant’s credibility and lack of remorse. Any testimony by Dr. Sharp as to Appellant’s level of intoxication was not relevant to this defense. The argument is made by the defense that there are differing levels of intoxication, and that Appellant suffered from a level of intoxication wherein he could remember the details of the offense but he was only acting out of reflex and should’ not be held responsible for his conduct. While support for this theory may be developing, it is not the state of the law at this time. A defense of voluntary intoxication requires that a defendant, first, be intoxicated and, second, be so utterly intoxicated, that his mental powers are overcome, rendering it impossible for a defendant to form the specific criminal intent or special mental element of the crime. Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 892 (Okl.Cr.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1008, 119 S.Ct. 1150, 143. L.Ed.2d 217 (1999). Here, the evidence did not support the defense of voluntary intoxication. In light of Appellant’s detailed memory of the events surrounding the shooting, Dr. Sharp’s testimony concerning any .intoxication would not have supported a voluntary intoxication defense in first stage. Therefore counsel’s decision not to put Dr. Sharp on the witness stand in first stage was a reasonable decision based upon counsel’s professional judgment.
¶ 3 As for second stage, counsel was left with a defendant who had not shown any remorse and would not testify in second stage, and the defendant’s mother who rejected any notion of responsibility. Other potential mitigating witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing or in sworn affidavits that Appellant did not commit the crimes charged or that the Charles Taylor they knew would not have committed the. crimes charged except for the fact that he was under the influence of drugs. ’ The decision not to put on this type of evidence, in the absence of any testimony from Appellant or his mother, was reasoned trial strategy. As the state did not present any new evidence in the second stage, coúnsel’s decision to only put Dr. Sharp on the witness stand and make the jury believe that only expert testimony was appropriate in that part of the trial was a reasonable plea for mercy.
¶ 4 Considering all the circumstances of 'this' case, counsel’s reasons at the time of trial for trying the case in the manner it was done was sound trial strategy which presented as viable a defense as was available to Appellant under the facts of the case and thus fulfilled the function of making the adversarial testing process work. While other strategies might have been equal to or better than the one chosen by trial counsel, that is not the issue. Counsel made reasoned choices at the time of trial. Those choices did not render the trial unfair and the verdict rendered suspect or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).