Court Opinion

ID: 9728269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:03:34.107252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.267789
License: Public Domain

D. F. Walsh, P.J.,
(dissenting). I must dissent. The existence of a defect, attributable to the manufacturer, in an automobile’s exhaust system as well as negligent maintenance of that exhaust system are provable by circumstantial evidence. Holloway v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 403 Mich 614; 271 NW2d 777 (1978), Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401; 231 NW2d 46 (1975). The test is whether the evidence takes the case out of the realm of conjecture and supports legitimate inferences from established facts. Weisenberg v Village of Beulah, 352 Mich 172; 89 NW2d 490 (1958).
In this case it seems to me that there is convincing evidence that a defective exhaust system in the leased 1969 Buick Electra driven by plaintiff, John L. Vanderberg, caused the introduction of carbon monoxide gas into the passenger compartment of the vehicle, and that the presence of the carbon monoxide caused Vanderberg to pass out and lose control of the vehicle with the result that the vehicle left the paved portion of the highway and struck a concrete overpass abutment.1
*692The automobile was only 13 months old, had been driven less than 19,000 miles and had been regularly serviced by Boylan Buick, Inc., under the terms of the leasing agreement. It may be, as the majority points out, that an automobile’s factory installed exhaust system cannot be expected to last for the life of the automobile. A jury could reasonably conclude, however, that an exhaust system which wears out to the point of serious and dangerous malfunction after just 13 months of normal use and in less than 19,000 miles was defective when it was installed at the factory.
Certainly, as the majority also points out, the defective condition of the exhaust system could have been caused by something other than normal use. Someone may have tampered with the system or the car may have been in a previous accident. In this case, however, there is no evidence whatsoever that the exhaust system was subjected to any potentially damaging condition other than normal use. Moreover, the plaintiff did not have the burden of eliminating every other plausible explanation for the defect. As the Supreme Court stated in Holloway v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), supra, 621-622:
"A plaintiff has the burden of establishing that when the product left the manufacturer it was defective. He is not, however, obliged to eliminate all possible causes of the accident consistent with the view that there was no manufacturing defect. He sustains his burden when *693he establishes with direct or circumstantial evidence a reasonable probability that the defect is attributable to the manufacturer.
"On a motion for directed verdict, the question is whether it is reasonable to infer from the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the accident was probably caused by a defect attributable to the manufacturer. Questions of comparative probability are to be resolved by the trier of fact. As stated in Schoepper v Hancock Chemical Co, 113 Mich 582, 586, 589; 71 NW 1081 (1897), and since reaffirmed in Schedlbauer v ChrisCraft Corp, 381 Mich 217, 230-231; 160 NW2d 889 (1968):
" 'It is true that where an injury occurs that cannot be accounted for and where the occasion of it rests wholly in conjecture, the case may fail for want of proof. * * * But such cases are rare, and that rule should never be so extended as to result in a failure of justice, or in denying an injured person a right of action where there is room for balancing the probabilities, and for drawing reasonable inferences better supported upon one side than upon the other. * * * [T]he question of whether the inference suggested by the plaintiff’s theory is the correct one, or whether it was sufficiently rebutted, was for the jury. ’ (Emphasis supplied.)”
Plaintiff Vanderberg testified that during the winter of 1969-1970 he became fatigued during long trips in the leased Buick. From this testimony the jury could find that the defective condition in the exhaust system existed prior to the end of December 1969. Defendant Boylan had the car for inspection and servicing on December 30, 1969, and January 23, 1970. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence, therefore, for the jury to conclude that defendant Boylan was negligent in failing to repair the defective exhaust system.
I would reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial.

 The testimony of plaintiff Vanderberg together with that of the *692medical experts established that the carbon monoxide level in Vanderberg’s blood immediately after the accident was in excess of 30% and possibly as high as 40% to 50% and that Vanderberg’s only exposure to an established source of significant levels of carbon monoxide was the exhaust system of the Buick Electra manufactured by defendant General Motors and leased from and maintained by defendant Boylan Buick, Inc.