Court Opinion

ID: 9554810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 21:00:23.61343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:43.010596
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KATHY MORPHIS,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          SF-0752-20-0516-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: August 9, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Georgia A. Lawrence, Esquire, and Shaun Southworth, Esquire, Atlanta,
             Georgia, for the appellant.

           Heather A. Masten, Esquire, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED
     concerning the appellant’s affirmative defenses of reprisal for equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) activity and whistleblowing, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed by the agency as an Attorney-Advisor in the
     agency’s Judge Advocate Office at Tripler Army Medical Center in Honolulu,
     Hawaii.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 4 at 18.       By letter dated
     March 27, 2020, the agency proposed her removal based on two charges:
     (1) conduct unbecoming a Federal employee; and (2) negligent performance of
     duties. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-20. Each charge was supported by five specifications.
     Id. at 8-9. After affording the appellant an opportunity to respond, the agency
     issued a decision sustaining both charges and removing the appellant, effective
     May 27, 2020. Id. at 44-46. The deciding official sustained specifications 2-5 of
     the conduct unbecoming charge and all five specifications in support of the
     negligent performance charge. Id.
¶3        The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her removal and raising
     affirmative defenses of reprisal for her protected EEO and whistleblowing
                                                                                          3

     activities. 2 Id. at 7, 38-39. After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the appellant’s removal.
     IAF, Tab 64, Initial Decision (ID).      The administrative judge found that the
     agency proved both of its charges, the appellant failed to prove any of her
     affirmative defenses, and the penalty of removal was reasonable. Regarding the
     conduct unbecoming charge, the administrative judge sustained specifications 3-5
     but did not sustain specification 2.      ID at 5-32.      Regarding the negligent
     performance charge, the administrative judge sustained all five specifications. ID
     at 32-49. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that
     her prior EEO activity was a motivating factor in her removal and that, although
     the agency perceived her as a whistleblower, the agency proved by clear and
     convincing evidence that it would have removed her in the absence of such a
     perception. ID at 52-65. Finally, the administrative judge also found that the
     agency did not violate the appellant’s due process rights based on the deciding
     official’s testimony at the hearing that he relied on the EEO materials that the
     appellant   submitted   with   her   written   response   to   support   his   penalty
     determination. ID at 49-52.
¶4        The appellant has filed a petition for review, which the agency has opposed.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved both of its
     charges.
¶5        On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to prove
     any of its specifications in support of its charges.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 7 -13.
     However, she largely fails to cite to specific evidence and explain its relevance or
     how it would alter the outcome of the appeal. For example, regarding charge 1,

     2
       The appellant also initially raised, but later withdrew, affirmative defenses of
     discrimination based on her age, sex, and disability. ID at 53 n.13.
                                                                                      4

     specification 4, the appellant summarily asserts, “this was a mistake and the
     Agency failed to prove it occurred as charged. It was not serious and did not
     ultimately impact the Agency seriously.” Id. at 8. To the extent the appellant
     does not identify specific errors in the administrative judge’s analysis, the Board
     will not embark upon a complete review of the record. See Baney v. Department
     of Justice, 109 M.S.P.R. 242, ¶ 7 (2008); Tines v. Department of the Air Force,
     56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(2) (stating that a petitioner
     who alleges that the administrative judge made erroneous findings of material
     fact must explain why the challenged factual determination is incorrect and
     identify specific evidence in the record that demonstrates the error). Nonetheless,
     we address those issues and findings regarding which the appellant has presented
     specific arguments on review.
¶6        Regarding charge 2, the appellant reiterates her unsupported argument that,
     to prove a charge of negligent performance of duties, the agency was required to
     prove the elements of the tort of legal malpractice, which includes proof that the
     appellant’s actions resulted in damage to the agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. The
     administrative judge, however, properly considered and rejected such an
     argument.    ID at 32-33; see Velez v. Department of Homeland Security,
     101 M.S.P.R. 650, ¶ 11 (2006), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 990 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding
     that culpable negligence in the performance of official duties is a failure to
     exercise the degree of care required under the particular circumstances, which a
     person of ordinary prudence in the same situation and with equal experience
     would not omit).    The appellant also asserts that the agency failed to prove
     charge 2, specifications 3 and 4, because it failed to present evidence that her
     legal advice was wrong. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13. However, the relevant inquiry
     is not whether the agency proved that the appellant provided incorrect legal
     advice but, rather, whether the agency proved that she failed to exercise the
     degree of care required under the particular circumstances.            See Velez,
     101 M.S.P.R. 650, ¶ 11.     The appellant has not established any error in the
                                                                                       5

     administrative judge’s findings that it was negligent for her to “shoot from the
     hip” and provide legal advice based on personal opinions without conducting any
     legal research or providing any legal analysis, particularly given the issues
     involved complex and opaque legal questions that an attorney of the appellant’s
     experience should have known could be open to multiple interpretations and
     would need to be researched further. ID at 43-48.
¶7         Regarding charge 2, specification 5, the appellant summarily asserts that
     this specification “shows charge stacking by the Agency” because the agency
     charged her for the same misconduct twice. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. The record
     reflects that in charge 2, specification 5, the agency charged the appellant with
     negligently failing to perform her duties by refusing to assist or provide discovery
     as ordered by a military judge in a military courts-martial case. IAF, Tab 1 at 9.
     Although related, charge 1, specification 3, charged her with conduct unbecoming
     based on an inflammatory statement she made to the trial counsel in the context
     of refusing to provide the discovery. Id. at 8. Thus, we discern no error in the
     administrative judge’s decision to sustain both specifications.
¶8         Next, the appellant contends that the administrative judge erred in her
     credibility findings. Regarding charge 2, specification 1, the appellant contends
     that she did not testify that she told her supervisor that live testimony was
     required at an adverse action privilege hearing and the administrative judge erred
     in crediting her supervisor’s testimony to the contrary because the supervisor was
     biased against her. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12. Such arguments do not provide a
     sufficiently   sound   reason   for     overturning   the   administrative   judge’s
     demeanor-based credibility findings.       See Haebe v. Department of Justice,
     288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board may overturn an
     administrative judge’s credibility determinations only when it has “sufficiently
     sound” reasons for doing so).         Here, the administrative judge observed the
     appellant and her supervisor testify, and he found that the appellant’s supervisor’s
     testimony was “eminently more credible than the appellant’s” and consistent with
                                                                                     6

     the record, including with his contemporaneous emails and memorandum for the
     record. ID at 39. In contrast, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     testimony was evasive, vague, argumentative, and neither internally consistent
     nor consistent with the record.     ID at 39-40.     We decline to disturb the
     administrative judge’s credibility findings because the record reflects that he
     considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
     reasoned conclusions on the issue of credibility. See, e.g., Crosby v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997); Broughton v. Department of Health and
     Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987).
¶9        Similarly, regarding charge 1, specification 5, the appellant contends that
     the administrative judge erred in crediting Major J.W.’s testimony because he was
     unreliable, biased, and paranoid that the appellant would blame him for
     malpractice. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9. The appellant further contends that Major
     J.W.’s hearing testimony was inconsistent with his written memorandum of the
     incident because he did not specifically use the word “threat” in describing the
     appellant’s alleged actions that he perceived as a threat to change his testimony.
     Id. at 9. Finally, the appellant asserts that Major J.W. knew that any alleged
     threat by her to report him would not have been viable because Major J.W. knew
     he did not have any obligation to report child abuse. Id. at 9-10. However, the
     administrative judge considered and rejected such arguments, which we find
     constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s credibility findings
     and, thus, do not provide a sufficiently sound reason to overturn such findings.
     ID at 19-24.   For example, the administrative judge acknowledged that Major
     J.W. conceded that he was aware that he had no professional responsibility to
     report child abuse, which could suggest that he should have known that the
     alleged threat by the appellant was an empty threat. ID at 22. However, the
     administrative judge credited the testimony of Major J.W. that he viewed the
     appellant as a legal expert on these issues and therefore believed that she might
     have some legitimate basis for making the threat. Id. The administrative judge
                                                                                        7

      further found Major J.W.’s testimony and description of the fear and anxiety he
      experienced as a result of his January 23, 2020 conversation with the appellant to
      be “fully sincere, internally consistent, and consistent with the record.” Id.
¶10         Lastly, the appellant contends that the administrative judge erred in
      sustaining charge 2, specification 2, because to do so would amount to
      disciplining her for being a whistleblower. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. However, as
      discussed below, we disagree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      proposing official perceived the appellant as a whistleblower based on her
      comments that form the basis of this specification.          Thus, the appellant’s
      argument provides no basis for reversing the administrative judge’s decision to
      sustain charge 2, specification 2.

      We vacate the administrative judge’s findings concerning the appellant’s
      affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal.
¶11         The administrative judge found that the appellant’s supervisor, the Center
      Judge Advocate (CJA), who was the proposing official, perceived the appellant as
      a whistleblower based on their June 3, 2019 conversation that formed the basis of
      the agency’s charge 2, specification 2. ID at 60-61. The agency has not filed a
      cross petition for review challenging the administrative judge’s finding that the
      CJA perceived the appellant as a whistleblower. Nonetheless, we exercise our
      discretion to consider the issue to properly address the appellant’s contention on
      review that the administrative judge erred in sustaining cha rge 2, specification 2,
      because it was grounded in her perceived whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12;
      see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(e) (stating that the Board reserves the authority to
      consider any issue in an appeal before it).
¶12         The relevant background facts according to the administrative judge are as
      follows. The parties do not dispute that, during the June 3, 2019 meeting, the
      appellant and the CJA discussed a privileging matter concerning a hospital
      provider who had been accused of engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with
      patients and staff. ID at 2-3, 34, 36. A credentialing committee had previously
                                                                                       8

      convened to discuss the matter, and the committee intended to recommend to the
      Commander, who was the ultimate decision maker, that the provider be reinstated
      with monitoring and evaluation. ID at 33-35. The CJA, whose role was to advise
      the Commander in legal matters, disagreed with the credentialing committee’s
      recommendation, believed there was sufficient evidence to take an adverse
      privileging action, and expressed his concern to the head of the credentialing
      committee about the optics of reinstating the provider under the circumstances.
      ID at 35. However, prior to making his recommendation to the Commander, t he
      CJA wanted to discuss the matter with the appellant, who was the agency’s legal
      expert in privileging matters. ID at 35, 41.
¶13        On June 3, 2019, the CJA met with the appellant, and they discussed the
      matter. ID at 36. The administrative judge credited the testimony of the CJA,
      over the appellant’s denial that, during their meeting, the appellant raised
      concerns that the CJA would be acting unethically and asserting unlawful
      command influence (UCI) if he recommended to the Commander a course of
      action that differed from the credentialing committee’s recommendation.         ID
      at 36-37. The CJA took the appellant’s alleged ethical concerns seriousl y and
      reported them to the legal staff at MEDCOM, the agency’s central medical
      command. ID at 37. MEDCOM issued a memorandum dated September 3, 2019,
      finding that there was no evidence to support the allegation s that the CJA had
      engaged in unethical conduct or UCI. Id.; IAF, Tab 21 at 4-8. Thereafter, the
      CJA proposed the appellant’s removal on March 27, 2020. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-20.
      Charge 2, specification 2 of the proposal alleged that the appellant negligently
      failed to adequately research her legal opinion that it was UCI and unethical for
      the CJA to advise the Commander of a recommendation that differed from the
      credentialing   committee’s   recommendation,    which   is   contrary   to   Army
      Regulations stating that the Commander is not bound by the recommendation of
      the credentialing committee. Id. at 9; IAF, Tab 23 at 246.
                                                                                         9

¶14         The administrative judge found that the CJA perceived the appellant as a
      whistleblower based on the following: (1) the CJA admitted that the appellant
      accused him of unethical conduct and UCI, both of which would be considered a
      violation of law, rule, or regulation; and (2) the CJA took the appellant’s
      accusations seriously and self-reported the issues raised. ID at 61. We disagree
      with the administrative judge’s analysis.       Under a perceived whistleblower
      theory, the relevant inquiry is whether the CJA reasonably believed that the
      appellant made or intended to make disclosures that evidenced a type of
      wrongdoing listed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See King v. Department of the
      Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8 (2011). Here, the record does not support such a
      finding.
¶15         The CJA testified that he was concerned generally that the appellant had a
      perception that he was acting unethically, and he reported the appellant’s
      allegations to dispel any question concerning his credibility or reputation not
      because he viewed the appellant’s allegations “. . . as credible, or even
      understood . . .” the basis for her allegations or how his actions purported to raise
      any ethical concerns or UCI. IAF, Tab 61, Hearing Recording (HR) (testimony of
      the CJA). He further testified that the appellant did not say why his conduct
      would be unethical and, on cross-examination, when asked to explain how the
      situation raised any ethical issues, the CJA indicated that it was the appellant’s
      perception, and you would have to ask her.       Id.   He further testified that the
      appellant made the comments but whether they were proper or feasible was a
      different argument. Id. We find that, given the conclusory and incomplete nature
      of the appellant’s allegations, the CJA could not reasonably have perceived her as
      disclosing a violation of law, rule, or regulation, notwithstanding his report of her
      allegations. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 382 F.
      App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that the relevant management officials
      did not perceive the appellant to be a whistleblower because, although they
      conceded knowledge of the allegations, they did not concede the legitimacy of her
                                                                                           10

      allegations, which they perceived as frivolous) (citing Special Counsel v. Spears,
      75 M.S.P.R. 639, 652-54 (1997) (finding that the doctrine of perceived
      whistleblowing does not apply if a hypothetical observer could not reasonably
      believe that the information disclosed evidenced agency wrongdoing)). 3
¶16         Moreover, at the time he proposed the appellant’s removal on March 27,
      2020, MEDCOM had already exonerated the CJA of any misconduct when, on
      September 3, 2019, it concluded that he had not engaged in unethical conduct or
      exerted UCI. IAF, Tab 21 at 4-8. Significantly, MEDCOM concluded that UCI
      was not applicable to the privileging matter because the CJA was not advising the
      Commander in a court-martial process. Id. at 6-7. It further concluded that there
      were no ethical issues because the Commander was not bound by the
      recommendation of the credentialing committee, it was the CJA’s duty to advise
      the Commander on health law matters, there was sufficient evidence to support a
      recommendation for an adverse privileging action, and MEDCOM had already
      informed the CJA that reinstatement with monitoring and evaluation was not an
      option because the provider no longer possessed a medical license and therefore
      could not practice medicine even if reinstated.       Id. at 5-7. Thus, under these
      facts, the record does not support a conclusion that the CJA perceived the
      appellant as a whistleblower at the time he issued the proposal notice. 4           See

      3
        The Board may rely on unpublished decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
      Federal Circuit if it finds the court’s reasoning persuasive, as we do here. E.g.,
      Johnson v. Office of Personnel Management, 2022 MSPB 19, ¶ 11 n.3.
      4
        On review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s finding that the deciding
      official did not perceive her to be a whistleblower. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant
      contends that the deciding official must have perceived her to be a whistleblower
      because, in her written response to the proposal notice, she alleged that her removal
      constituted reprisal based on the proposing official’s perception of her as a
      whistleblower. Id. The administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant raised
      such an argument in her written response to the proposal notice, but he credited the
      testimony of the deciding official that he was confused about the appellant’s perceived
      whistleblowing claim because he would only consider someone a whistleblower if they
      reported wrongdoing to the Office of Special Counsel or there was evidence that the
                                                                                            11

      Montgomery, 382 F. App’x at 947. Accordingly, we vacate the administrative
      judge’s finding to the contrary. Because we find that the appellant failed to prove
      that she was perceived as a whistleblower, we also vacate the administrative
      judge’s clear and convincing analysis and we do not reach the appellant’s
      arguments regarding the same. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7; see Clarke v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014) (stating that the Board
      may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test unless it has first made
      a finding that the appellant established his prima facie case), aff’d, 623 F. App’x
      1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

      The administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to prove her
      remaining affirmative defenses.
¶17         On review, the appellant reiterates her argument that the agency violated
      her due process rights because the deciding official testified that he considered
      the evidence the appellant submitted in her written response to the proposal
      notice as an aggravating factor. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. The administrative judge
      summarized the issue as follows:           the deciding official testified that, in
      determining the appropriate penalty, he considered the information provided by
      the appellant in her written response, which related to her prior EEO complaints,
      and found that such information further supported his conclusion that removal
      was the appropriate penalty because the appellant demonstrated a pattern of being
      unable or unwilling to see any other perspective than her own and placing the
      blame for her actions on others rather than accepting at least some respo nsibility.
      ID at 49.    The administrative judge found that this did not amount to a due

      agency had launched a whistleblower investigation, neither of which had occurred. ID
      at 61. Because the perceived whistleblower analysis is based on the perception of the
      agency officials and, in light of the administrative judge’s credibility finding that the
      deciding official did not believe that the appellant engaged or intended to engage in
      whistleblowing activity, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s conclusion
      that the deciding official did not perceive the appellant to be a whistleblower. See
      King, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8.
                                                                                        12

      process violation because the notice of proposed removal clearly put the appellant
      on notice that it considered as an aggravating factor the appellant’s apparent
      inability to recognize or accept that she had made errors.         ID at 52.     The
      administrative judge further noted that the appellant failed to cite any precedent
      that would suggest that the deciding official had a duty to notify the appellant that
      he may use her written response to support an aggravating factor. Id.
¶18         We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant
      failed to establish that the agency violated her due process rights . The Board has
      held that an employee is not entitled to know the particular weight that a deciding
      official will attach to her arguments raised in response to the proposed adverse
      action in advance of a final decision.         Grimes v. Department of Justice,
      122 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 13 (2014); Wilson v. Department of Homeland Security,
      120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶¶ 11-12 (2014), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
      Thus, we find unpersuasive the appellant’s contention that the deciding official
      could not draw an adverse inference for penalty purposes based on information
      contained in her written response. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13.
¶19         The appellant also argues that the deciding official’s consideration of the
      EEO materials she submitted amounts to direct evidence that her removal was not
      free from retaliation for her EEO activity.     Id. at 14.   We find her argument
      unavailing.   The deciding official testified that it was not the fact that the
      appellant engaged in EEO activity itself but rather, as the administrative judge
      noted, the content of the appellant’s statements that reflected a pattern in which
      she failed to take accountability or assume responsib ility for her behavior which
      led the deciding official to believe she lacked potential for rehabilitation.     ID
      at 49, 52; HR (testimony of the deciding official). We find no basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s explained findings that none of the appellant’s EEO
      activity was a motivating factor in her removal. ID at 59. The administrative
      judge’s findings demonstrate that he considered the evidence as a whole, drew
                                                                                        13

      appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on the issue of credibility.
      See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06; Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.
¶20         We note that, after the issuance of the initial decision, the Board issued
      Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31.              Among other
      things, Pridgen held that, although         claims of retaliation for opposing
      discrimination in violation of Title VII are analyzed under the same framework
      used for Title VII discrimination claims, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 30, 33, a “but-for”
      standard applies to a claim of retaliation for requesting a reasonable
      accommodation for a disability or opposing disability discrimination, id.,
      ¶¶ 44-47. Here, the appellant’s underlying EEO activity appears to include both
      Title VII claims and disability discrimination claims. ID at 54 -55. Consideration
      of the appellant’s claims under the frameworks set forth in Pridgen does not
      change the result. To the extent that the initial decision analyzed the appellant’s
      claims of reprisal in connection with opposing disability discrimination under the
      lower motivating factor standard, we discern no error in the administrative
      judge’s reasoning. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 48. We also find no reason to
      disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appe llant failed to establish
      that her Title VII-related activity was a motivating factor in the removal decision.
      Having considered the appellant’s arguments and the record in this matter, we
      further find that the appellant has failed to prove her retaliation claims by any
      other method. See id., ¶¶ 23-24.
¶21         Based on the foregoing, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to
      sustain the appellant’s removal.
                                                                                     14

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      15

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                16

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     17

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           18

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.