Court Opinion

ID: 9756389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:26:32.410012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:21.051864
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion deeming all issues waived for Appellant’s failure to file a 1925(b) statement with the lower court.
¶ 2 In this case, it is clear that the trial judge received Douglas’ 1925(b) statement and discussed the issues in his opinion. Moreover, I do not believe that Common*746wealth v. Butler, 571 Pa. 441, 812 A.2d 631 (2002), Bryant v. Glazier Supermarkets Inc., 823 A.2d 154 (Pa.Super.2003), and Everett Cash Mutual Ins. Co. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 804 A.2d 31 (Pa.Super.2002), are dispositive of this case. The cases are not only factually distinguishable, but the allegedly relevant legal holdings are dicta. As a result, we are required to reach the merits of this appeal and not find waiver.
¶ 3 The seminal case interpreting Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998), states:
The absence of a trial court opinion poses a substantial impediment to meaningful and effective appeallte [sic] review. Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process.
Id. at 308. See also Bryant, 823 A.2d at 157 (Klein, J., dissenting). To this end, I am confident that the trial court has fully identified and focused upon the issues raised by Douglas on appeal. Our court was not impeded in any way from addressing those claims and reaching a result on appeal. Accordingly, to find Douglas’ issues waived not only departs from the rationale behind Lord and its progeny, but also does a disservice to appellants whose claims are very clearly reviewable and to justice whose hand is not carried out by resolution of those issues on appeal.
¶4 With regard to Butler, I first note the fact that the holding of Butler was that 1925(b) applied to collateral appeals as well as direct appeals. Unlike Douglas, in Butler (1) there was no 1925(b) statement filed; and, therefore (2) the trial court had to rely on the PCRA petition itself for its opinion. The language saying that merely mailing a Rule 1925(b) petition is not enough is mere dicta, because in Butler, there was absolutely no 1925(b) statement, filed or mailed. That is not the case in Douglas. Moreover, other language in Butler supports my position in this case. The court in Butler quoted Lord, saying, “the purpose of Rule 1925 is ‘to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues that the parties plan to raise on appeal.’ ” Since the judge received and addressed the 1925(b) statement in the opinion, that purpose was met.
¶ 5 Bryant is likewise distinguishable from the instant case. While the appellant’s 1925(b) statement was filed late, the trial judge said that she considered the issues waived. I note that President Judge Del Sole also wrote Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 810 A.2d 668 (Pa.Super.2002), in which he pointed out that although the record did not include the 1925(b) statement, “we conclude that one was submitted based on the language in the Court’s 1925(a) opinion.. .”.4 Therefore, were we to reach the opposite conclusion in this case, we would be in conflict with Hawkins.
*747¶ 6 Finally, in Everett, our court was really focusing on the distinction between the filing requirement and the service requirement of a 1925(b) statement. Unlike the defendant in this case, the appellant in Everett failed to file a 1925(b) statement at all, and, so failed to ensure that the 1925(b) statement was made part of the certified record. The fifing requirement, the court stated, ensures that the statement becomes part of the certified record — which is all that we can consider on appeal. Moreover, unlike the facts in the present case, there is no indication in the Everett decision as to whether the trial court in fact filed a 1925(a) opinion and addressed any issues raised by appellant on appeal.
¶ 7 Presently, Douglas did in fact file a 1925(b) statement, albeit late. Moreover, the trial judge acknowledges this statement, the issues contained therein, and then proceeds to address these issues in a 1925(a) opinion. Under these circumstances, I believe we are being derelict in our duty as a reviewing court to find waiver. If a trial court understands the issues and has provided this Court with an explanation for its order in the 1925(a) opinion, we are able to conduct meaningful appellate review and need not be concerned with the timeliness of the fifing of the statement. To do otherwise undermines the integrity of this Court and confidence in the appellate review process.
¶ 8 A trial court has the option as to whether to request a 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal. Although the trial court may ask for a 1925(b) statement to identify what will be at issue on appeal, we rely on the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion for meaningful appellate review. That is why Rule 1925(b) is permissive, but Rule 1925(a) is mandatory. Compare Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) with 1925(a). It is the 1925(a) opinion that enhances tins Court’s appellate review process. See Lord, supra. Here, where the trial court obviously had the benefit of a 1925(b) statement and the record reflects that because the trial judge discussed those issues, there is no reason to deem them waived. For these compelling reasons, I dissent.

. In Hawkins, the court stated:
We note that Appellant was ordered to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), by Order dated November 5, 2001. While the record does not include Appellant’s 1925(b) statement, we conclude that one was submitted based on the language in the Court’s 1925(a) opinion, filed March 14, 2002, indicating and addressing the issues raised by Appellant in his 1925(b) statement. Thus, we find the issues on appeal are properly before us and as such, we review the merits of the claims.
Id. at 669 n. 1. See also Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 745 A.2d 662 (Pa.Super.2000), app. denied, 568 Pa. 658, 795 A.2d 973 (2000) (although appellant’s 1925(b) statement was untimely, trial court's subsequent opinion discussed issue raised and therefore there was no impediment to meaningful appellate review).