Court Opinion

ID: 9601816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:49:49.70024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:05.920393
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
McNary’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, the 9 mm pistol. In connection therewith McNary also contends error on the part of the trial court in admitting that pistol into evidence over an objection that there was no evidence that it was being carried illegally. Only when and because McNary’s motion was denied did his counsel thereafter attempt to form a requested instruction which hopefully would guide the jury from reaching an improper verdict.
The proceedings at the making of McNary’s motion, and the court’s ruling, sufficiently illustrate what this case is all about:
“MR. POSEY: Your Honor, at this point I would like to move, number one, that the charge of carrying a concealed weapon be dismissed on the grounds that there is no evidence showing that the defendant carried this weapon illegally. I believe it is the law in this country that a person has the right to carry a weapon concealed or otherwise from his motor vehicle parked on his place of residence to the home in which he is living from the car to the house. I don’t think there is any law against him possessing or owning such a weapon and since there is no law against him possessing it I feel there is no law against him transporting this weapon in his vehicle from one point to another and in so doing it becomes necessary for him to remove the weapon from his car *250and take it to his house at some time or another, and doing so on his own premises I don’t believe is a violation of the law, so I don’t feel there is any evidence showing a violation of law on that particular charge.
“THE COURT: Do you wish to respond?
“MR. OSBORN: Your Honor, I would like to respond to defense Counsel motion regarding the concealed weapon. Certainly there is no law against carrying a weapon. When you carry a pistol the Idaho Statutes specifically require that the pistol cannot be carried in a concealed manner. The established law of concealment means putting a weapon or pistol out of the ordinary view, but within easy access and I would say the State has presented a prima facie case in this case that the defendant did in fact carry a concealed weapon.
“MR. POSEY: I think the Court can observe the package which it is in. It is a pistol scabbard and what the prosecution is saying is that every person that carries a weapon inside a scabbard while going hunting or otherwise is guilty of carrying a concealed weapon and I .don’t think that is the purpose of the law. I think the purpose of the law is to keep people from walking down the street with a gun hidden in their clothing or have it hidden in such a way they can react to somebody in an illegal manner. I don’t think there is any illegal conduct shown here in relationship to the gun and I think it is necessary before there is a crime that there be such a showing. It is not illegal for a person to carry a gun and has to transport it if its protective covering is designed and made for that purpose then I see nothing wrong with that.
“THE COURT: Your motion calls for a question ... a decision on the question of fact which is solely the province of the Jury. I am going to overrule the motion on the first issue, that being the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The second motion I am going to grant concerning the striking of any reference to drugs.
“MR. POSEY: May I inquire as to what the question of fact is on that. I do not remember any evidence at all saying that it wasn’t on his own property.
“THE COURT: I don’t think it is for the Court to say what the question of facts are. The question of fact is whether or not the statute, language of the statute is clear. They will be instructed concerning the language of the statute by the Court. There is the evidence concerning the manner which the weapon was carried in the scabbard underneath the seat or the intoxicated condition of the defendant, all questions of fact to be determined whether or not they fit within the statute.
“MR. POSEY: May I present a jury instruction to the Court on that, concerning whether it is illegal to carry it from your vehicle to your house?
“THE COURT: Not at this time.
“MR. POSEY: I mean at some time?
“THE COURT: Certainly.”
McNary’s counsel obviously had expected a dismissal of the concealed weapon charge. On denial of. the motion he fashioned two instructions which he filed on the last day of trial which were, with their authority, and the court’s ruling, as follows:
“DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1
“You are instructed that it is not a crime for a person to carry a pistol, revolver, or gun, concealed or otherwise, from his own automobile parked on the premises where he is living to the house in which he is living even though his premises is located within the city limits.
94 C.J.S. 483, Weapons § 5 n. 41 Maxwell v. State, 38 Tex. 170 Grant v. State, 112 Tex.Crim.[R.] 120[20], 13 S.W.2d 889
Not Given — Covered in part by Instruction No. 16 E J L District Judge”
*251“DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2
“You are further instructed that if the purpose is an innocent one, the carrying of a concealed weapon as a mere incident of its transportation from one place to another is not an offense.
94 C.J.S. 483, Weapons § 5 n. 41 Maxwell v. State, 38 Tex. 170 Grant v. State, 112 Tex.Crim.[R.] 120[20], 13 S.W.2d 889
Covered in Instruction No. 16 —Too broad as stated E J L District Judge”
As indicated by the court’s endorsement, neither instruction was given. Instead the court fashioned and gave this instruction:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 16
“The carrying of a concealed weapon as a mere incident of its transportation from one place to another is not an offense if the purpose of transporting the same is for an innocent reason and does not go beyond the purpose of transporting the same.” (Emphasis added)
McNary’s motion for dismissal and his request for instructions 1 and 2 above both required of the trial court his interpretation of I.C. § 18-3302, as applied to the facts of this case, largely undisputed. Plain and simple, its language criminalizes the concealed carrying of a deadly weapon, which as an early Idaho Supreme Court observed almost eighty years ago “is of itself a pernicious practice.” In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902). As well-stated in one of the texts, “it has been held that the intentional doing of the prohibited act constitutes in itself a complete criminal offense, irrespective of the purpose or motive of the accused, . . . ” See also State v. Hart,1 66 Idaho 217, 223, 157 P.2d 72 (1945) citing 68 C.J. § 13, p. 17. The text, C.J.S., proceeds to add that there are cases holding that:
“[I]t is an offense to have or carry a concealed or other prohibited weapon, even though the purpose in doing so was merely to exhibit it as a curiosity, or with the hope of selling it, to convey it to the buyer, or to one’s home to procure cartridges for it for another’s accommodation, or to return the weapon to the owner after making repairs. It may also constitute an offense to have or use the weapon in conducting a shooting gallery, in hunting or butchering, or in aiding a peace officer, or to have it for the protection of property, or of one’s person, in consequence of threats of violence.”
94 C.J.S. Weapons § 5a, pp. 482, 483. As that text goes on to point out in ensuing § 5b there are, however, different statutes, or varying judicial constructions of statutes, which do say “[that] the purpose or motive for doing the act may be material, and that it is not unlawful to have or carry a prohibited weapon with a harmless or legitimate purpose or motive.” Our § 18-3302, however, is not such a statute. It does not mention intent, motive, or purpose. Nor has there ever been in over seventy years a construction by this Court which makes intent or purpose an element of the offense. The question clearly presenting itself is whether the statute is unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness, that is, does it violate the due process clause by:
“[H]olding a person ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ U. S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). In addition to this notion of ‘fair notice or warning’ the doctrine is said to require reasonably clear guidelines to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminating enforcement’ and to prescribe a precise standard for the adjudication of guilt. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). See also, Amsterdam, supra, at 76. The principle consistently followed is that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires *252the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); State v. Pigge, 79 Idaho 529, 532, 322 P.2d 703, 705 (1957); State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 592, 594, 494 P.2d 1036 (1972).” State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 590, 570 P.2d 259, 268 (1977).
A statute facially vague or overbroad may be “corrected either by amendment or judicial construction.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). It is beyond doubt that § 18-3302 is overly broad, a problem recognized in the trial court, and again in this Court. Prior to the recognition of the void-for-vagueness doctrine by this Court, and the United States Supreme Court, there were indeed judicial constructions of similar statutes which read in intent and purpose, or the other line of cases, which held that such statutes authorized prosecution and-conviction for the concealed carrying of a weapon to exhibit it as a curiosity, or with the thought of selling it, or the like, as stated in the above quotation from C.J.S.
There is, however, nothing whatever in the statute to forewarn a person that he is subject to prosecution and conviction for the doing of such innocuous acts, and equally important and noteworthy here, absolutely “[no] reasonably clear guidelines to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminating enforcement’ and to prescribe a precise standard for the adjudication of guilt.” State v. Lopez, supra, 98 Idaho at 590, 570 P.2d at 268.
Before this court attempts a judicial construction of I.C. § 18-3302, it is well to keep in mind that the making of law is primarily the responsibility not of the courts, but of the legislatures of the various states. As McNary’s counsel stated to the trial court, and as we all know, and know to have been so for many years, the purpose of the statute is simply to prohibit the sneak, the robber, the assassin, and the person given to violence in private quarrels from having concealed on their persons a deadly weapon — more often the firearm or knife mentioned in the statute. Until the present case, the statute appears not to have been used vindictively against a person who obviously was not criminal. It clearly appears that McNary, like many other persons, simply believed it wise to have a pistol hidden away in his motor vehicle. Nothing in the statute warned him that he could not, nor did anything warn him that he could be imprisoned for taking the pistol from his residence to his vehicle, or vice versa. Nor is it possible to differentiate between having a protective weapon hidden away in one’s home for safekeeping, safety and emergencies than hiding one away in one’s vehicle for the same purposes.
It stretches the law beyond the breaking point to urge that a person hiding a gun in his home has it “on or about his person.” Similarly with a motor vehicle. We should accept the statute as written. Short blocks away from this Court there is a Statehouse building where the Idaho legislators convene at least once every year for sixty to ninety days. If it is now deemed to be the will of the people, through that legislature, that hiding a weapon in a motor vehicle should be prohibited, the legislature knows how to enact such legislation — either by amending I.C. § 18-3302, or a new law. Such an amendment is not the business of the courts, other than where a statute as enacted is so overly broad that an authoritative construction is necessary to bring it within constitutional bounds. Goguen, supra.
Section 18-3302 of the Idaho Code was enacted by the legislature in 1909. The statute makes no mention of motor vehicles, but motor vehicles were not then unknown. In the ensuing 70 years, motor vehicles have become very much known. Here in the western part of the United States, and in Idaho in particular, the motor vehicle, *253and in particular the van, the motor home, the pickup camper, and the trailer home pulled by suburban or pickup have become very much a way of life. Yet the legislature, in all the intervening years since 1909, has not amended I.C. § 18-3302, nor enacted any statute interdicting the keeping of firearms (or any weapons of defense) in motor vehicles.
Admittedly, other courts in other states largely in pre-void-for-vagueness days, have seized upon similarly worded statutes, and for various reasons2 have strained the English language to hold that a person cannot legally keep a firearm in his vehicle, especially where it is accessible, where it is then concluded to be a weapon “about the person.” That such has happened in other states in other days does not make it right or judicially sound today.
This Court should be highly mindful that the legislature, the proper forum, in over seventy years has not seen fit to enact such legislation. Legislatures of other states have done so.
The Massachusetts statute governing the carrying of dangerous weapons includes in several places the language “whoever carries on his person, or carries on his person or under his control in a vehicle." Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 269 § 10 (1968) (emphasis added).
The Colorado legislature has enacted the very statute which in my opinion the Idaho legislature would enact if legislation were thought necessary, exempting from a general prohibition against concealed weapons: “[a] person in a private automobile . who carries a weapon for lawful protection of his or another’s person or property while traveling.” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-12-105(2)(b) (1973).3
As early as 1923, California’s statute contained a prohibition against a person carrying certain weapons “concealed upon his person or within any vehicle which is under his control or direction.” 1923 Cal.Stats. ch. 339 § 5 (emphasis added). The current California statute contains two separate prohibitions, one which prohibits a person from having a weapon “concealed within any vehicle which is under his control or direction” and one which prohibits a person from carrying weapons “concealed upon his person.” Cal.Penal Code § 12025(a), (b) (1970).
Kentucky exempts a weapon kept in the glove compartment. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 527.-020(4) (1975). Florida allows for transportation by excepting from the concealed weapon prohibition “any person traveling by private conveyance when the weapon is securely encased.” Fla.Stat. § 790.25(3)(7) (1977).
Without belaboring the point, what little I say above clearly illustrates that it is the legislatures of the many states which have made the determination. It should be so in Idaho as well. Today, however, the Court sustains a conviction which, as Justice McFadden points out, is as likely predicated on a jury finding of guilt because McNary had the gun in his vehicle, as it is on the basis that he was carrying it to his home from his vehicle. Implicit in McNary’s conviction was the trial court’s interpretation that the language “on or about the person” included keeping a gun in a motor vehicle.
In my opinion this Court should also carefully observe the explicit language of the statute, being mindful of conditions that existed in 1909. “On or about” are words of art, and according to Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 1968), constitute a phrase which originally was “used in reciting the date of an occurrence or conveyance, or the location of it, to escape the necessity of being bound by the statement of an exact date, or place.” Black's also points out that the phrase has, in cases *254under weapon-carrying statutes, been given the additional meaning that “about” is more comprehensive than “on.” None should quarrel with that evolvement, for it is prudent that the person mingling with the public, whether in commerce, or in pleasure, or in vice, should not be allowed to escape the prohibitions of the law by concealing the weapon in a topcoat not worn but laid by on a chair, but in any event kept available. The concealed weapon might be one not conveniently kept on the person, such as a shotgun or a submachine gun — in which case a violin case might well be the manner in which it is carried “about” the person. Such are but examples of which there are many more, which may be readily acceptable as being proper prohibitions within the language of the statute. But a weapon kept secreted in one’s own motor vehicle, or being merely moved from the home to the vehicle, or vice versa, is not “on or about” one’s person so as to be within the purview of the statute any more than is a weapon of defense within one’s home.
It is important to take close note of the contentions of the parties upon which the appellate issues have been drawn.
Citing State v. Autheman, 47 Idaho 328, 274 P. 805 (1929) and State v. Bedwell, 77 Idaho 57, 286 P.2d 641 (1955), McNary urges upon us that it is the province of the trial judge, not the jury, to make necessary interpretations of the law. McNary contends that “the only possible time which he could have been carrying a concealed weapon in violation of the law was when the weapon was being carried from the automobile to the house.”
The State challenges that assertion, responding that it is undisputed that the gun was hidden in McNary’s car both when he drove it to town and drove it back “over a public thoroughfare.”
In denying the defense motion to dismiss the concealed weapon charge, the trial court stated as the State candidly sets forth in its brief, that “There is evidence concerning the manner which the weapon was carried in the scabbard underneath the seat . all questions of fact to be decided by the jury.” The State candidly tells us in its brief that “The judge was saying that where the gun was hidden in a case under the seat of Defendant’s car, there was sufficient evidence to give rise to a jury question on the issue of concealment.”
Justice McFadden’s opinion points out that McNary was charged alternatively — allegedly guilty of carrying the concealed weapon in Fruitland, or, on a public highway, or both. Therefore, we must be greatly concerned with the extreme likelihood that McNary was found guilty because, as the State argues to be the case, he drove his car while having a gun which was out of sight and under the seat of his car. In direct relation thereto there is the trial court’s observation that “There is evidence concerning the manner in which the weapon was carried in the scabbard underneath the seat . . ” of the car. Instruction No. 16 effectively advised the jury that McNary’s having a weapon under the seat of his vehicle was an offense unless it was there incidental to be taken from one place to another, and if the purpose of the taking was innocent. Although the instruction was couched in the negative, i. e., that such transportation is not an offense if the purpose is innocent, the instruction required of the jury that it find McNary guilty of so carrying the gun in his car unless an innocent reason or purpose was established. It was not the State, but McNary who had reason to establish that innocent purpose, and, as so viewed, the instruction was impermissible as placing the burden upon McNary to establish his innocence. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
It little matters that the conviction may have resulted from a jury finding that McNary’s “transportation” of the gun was the act of carrying it in his hand as he walked from his car to his residence. There, too, impermissibly placed on McNary was the burden of proving an innocent purpose. A defendant cannot be made to es*255tablish his innocence; the burden of proving guilt lies with the State.
The trial court, faced with the defendant’s motion for a dismissal of the concealed weapon charge, and without any authoritative construction of I.C. § 18-3302 from this Court, was in the unenviable position of having to decide whether McNary’s counsel was correct in this contention that the facts before the court at the close of the State’s case were sufficient to sustain a conviction of criminal violation of that statute. It is apparent from the instructions given by the court, considered in connection with those requested and refused, that the trial court did place his construction on the statute— which did limit its overly broad context by adding innocent purpose and intent as integral parts of the statute, but leaving the burden of proving an innocent purpose on the defendant.
While the trial court is to be commended for attempting to narrow an overly broad statute, nevertheless, the motion to dismiss should have been granted and it should be the judgment of this Court that the conviction for alleged violation of I.C. § 18-3302 be set aside, and direction given that the charge be dismissed. The statute, with no prior authoritative construction, provided absolutely no warning that a person could be convicted for keeping a weapon in his vehicle, and no warning that a person could be convicted for merely walking a concealed weapon from his car to his residence, or from his residence to his car. Even though a majority of the Court were to today adopt the trial court’s construction of the statute (which does not appear to be the case) the statute had not been so construed at the time of the conduct in question, and hence cannot constitutionally be given other than prospective application without violating the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution of Idaho and the United States. In my opinion, however, it is fundamentally wrong for this Court to amend the statute, at least without first abstaining in favor of legislative action. Nor would I vote for adoption of the construction made by the trial court and implicitly approved here which went only so far as to give judicial intimation that a gun could be carried in a motor vehicle, if for an innocent purpose. Such a construction, other than it is constitutionally impermissible, is further questionable. It interjects into what is an outright prohibitory statute, the heretofore missing element of intent. If intent is to be by this Court declared an element, the proof of which is necessary to establish a violation of the statute, why not hold that carrying a concealed weapon while possessed of and to further a felonious intent constitutes the offense under the statute? Such would at least put the burden of proof where it belongs. Mullaney, supra; Winship, supra.
Rather than see peace officers and prosecutors boggled down with being forced to prove intent, always a difficult proposition, it would surely seem better that intent be left alone, and that the statute be so construed that it has never had, nor has now, any applicability to a man’s home, and equally has never had, nor has now, any applicability to his motor vehicle.
I strongly disagree with any conclusion that there exists no justification for reading into the statute an “on-premises” exception to the application of the statute and that there is no justification for a “motor vehicle exception.” The year is 1979, A.D., and motor vehicles are almost as much a part of the western way of life as the home itself. As to the “on-premises” exception, never before have there been times more demanding of armed security in the home than these.
There is also reason to conclude that the erroneous submission of the concealed weapon charge to the jury — which was much intertwined with the charge of driving while intoxicated and the charge of obstructing an officer, may have seriously prejudiced McNary on this latter charge for which he was also convicted. The other members of the Court do not seem interested in this aspect of the case, and hence further discussion would be an exercise in futility.
McFADDEN, J., concurs.

. State v. Hart did not involve a state statute, but a Boise City ordinance — differing from the statute in important aspects.

. The reasons are not indiscernible. The usual cases deal with the criminal element, those who have previously been convicted, or should have been.

. The Boise City ordinance before the Court in State v. Hart, supra, enacted in 1936, specifically exempted from the prohibition against carrying or wearing concealed weapons persons traveling or about to travel. The ordinance also omits the vexatious “about” language found in I.C. § 18-3302.