Court Opinion

ID: 9901349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:15:15.169757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.237919
License: Public Domain

11/20/2023
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                                June 21, 2023 Session

 REGINALD HALL v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY ET AL.

               Appeal from the Chancery Court for Anderson County
                No. 16CH8303      M. Nichole Cantrell, Chancellor
                     ___________________________________

                          No. E2022-01362-COA-R3-CV
                      ___________________________________

In April of 2018, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) conducted a foreclosure sale on a piece
of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. The property was subsequently
sold to a third party. The previous homeowner, Reginald Hall (“Appellant”), initiated
wrongful foreclosure proceedings against BOA, among others, in the Chancery Court for
Anderson County (the “trial court”). BOA filed a motion for summary judgment on July
7, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting BOA’s motion.
Appellant appeals to this Court. Because Appellant’s brief does not comply with the
applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing, the issues purportedly raised
are waived. The trial court is affirmed.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

Reginald Hall, Knoxville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Heather Howell Wright, Erin Alexandra McFall, and Savannah Leigh Kolodziej,
Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bank of America, N.A.

Guy E. Tustin III, Knoxville, Tennessee, and H. Keith Morrison, Fayetteville, Arkansas,
for the appellee, Wilmington Savings Fund Society.

                                       OPINION

       In October of 1998, Appellant obtained a $65,000 home equity line of credit
(“HELOC”) from BOA, which was secured by a deed of trust (the “first deed of trust”)
against real property located at 22 Rivers Run Way in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (the
“Property”). Subsequently, in January of 2002, Appellant executed and delivered a
promissory note (the “note”) in the amount of $278,479.95 and a deed of trust (the “second
deed of trust”) against the Property, also in favor of BOA. Beginning in January of 2015,
Appellant failed to make the monthly payments required by the note on the second deed of
trust. In February of 2016, BOA assigned the note and the second deed of trust to
Wilmington Savings Fund Society (“Wilmington”).

       On September 7, 2016, Wilmington filed an action in the trial court against
Appellant, BOA, and numerous other of Appellant’s creditors,1 seeking a declaration that
Wilmington had the first-priority lien on the Property, as well as foreclosure of the second
deed of trust. While that case was pending, however, Hall defaulted on the HELOC secured
by the first deed of trust, and BOA conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the Property
on April 26, 2018. BOA acquired the Property and paid the debt owed to Wilmington.
Thus, Wilmington executed a release deed on May 29, 2019 and dismissed its case.
Meanwhile, in January of 2021, BOA sold the Property to a third party (“Purchaser”). In
March of 2021, Purchaser filed a detainer action against Appellant in the Anderson County
General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”). General sessions court granted
Purchaser possession of the Property following a hearing on June 28, 2021, and the
judgment indicates that it is based on “Default of Defendant(s).”

        Despite Wilmington dismissing its case, Appellant continued his filings in the trial
court. On January 14, 2021, Appellant filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
Injunctive Relief, and Damages.” The trial court construed this document as a complaint,
stating in an order that Appellant “[sufficiently] complied with applicable rules of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure such as to attempt to state a counterclaim seeking
damages.” In a different order, the trial court explained that Appellant sufficiently “raised
a wrongful action claim challenging the propriety and efficacy of the April 26, 2018 sale
of real property by Plaintiff, Wilmington and Defendant, Bank of America.” Following a
motion to dismiss by Wilmington, however, the trial court entered an order finding that
Appellant stated no claims against Wilmington. Thus, in an order entered April 11, 2022,
the trial court dismissed Wilmington as a defendant. The trial court stated, however, that
it “retain[ed] jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised against Separate Defendant Bank
of America N.A.”2

       On July 7, 2022, BOA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the issue
of wrongful foreclosure was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because of the general

        1
          The only parties at issue in the order appealed from were Appellant, Appellant’s wife, and BOA.
Appellant’s wife is not participating in this appeal, however. While Wilmington did not participate in the
summary judgment proceeding at issue, Appellant named Wilmington as an appellee in his notice of appeal
to this Court. Wilmington thus filed a brief, raising largely the same arguments as BOA.
        2
         Hall also attempted to appeal this ruling, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final
judgment.

                                                   -2-
sessions court action. Hall filed a response in opposition to the motion and his own motion
for summary judgment seeking to vacate the sale of the Property. The trial court heard the
competing motions on August 22, 2022.3

        On August 29, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in
favor of BOA based on the doctrine of res judicata. The order states: “The only remaining
issue for this court to determine is if the foreclosure sale which was conducted on April 26,
2018 was a fraudulent foreclosure as claimed by Reginald Hall and Rhonda Hall.” The
trial court concluded that BOA “is entitled to Summary Judgment based on the doctrine of
res judicata [which BOA had raised as an affirmative defense] as it relates to the [Halls’]
claim that the foreclosure was fraudulent,” given that the general sessions court had already
considered and rejected Hall’s claim of fraudulent foreclosure. The trial court designated
this order as its “full and final order.” Appellant timely appealed to this Court.

                                                   ISSUES

       Appellant does not include in his principal brief a statement of the issues for our
review. As best we can discern, Appellant claims that the foreclosure and sale of the
Property was fraudulent, a conspiracy, theft by deception, and an abuse of power by the
lower courts.

                                                DISCUSSION

       At issue in this case is an order granting summary judgment to BOA. A trial court
may grant summary judgment only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The propriety of a trial court’s summary
judgment decision presents a question of law, which we review de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Kershaw v. Levy, 583 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tenn. 2019).

       “The moving party has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008). As our Supreme
Court has instructed,

       when the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving
       party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating
       an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating

       3
           There is no transcript of the proceedings in the record.

                                                     -3-
       that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is
       insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.

Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). “[I]f the
moving party bears the burden of proof on the challenged claim at trial, that party must
produce at the summary judgment stage evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would
entitle it to a directed verdict.” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879,
888 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986)).

        When a party files and properly supports a motion for summary judgment as
provided in Rule 56, “to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must respond, and by affidavits or
one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, set forth specific facts . . . showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265 (internal quotation marks
and brackets in original omitted). “Whether the nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a
defendant – and whether or not the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on
the challenged claim or defense – at the summary judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party
must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational
trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’” TWB Architects, 578 S.W.3d at 889
(quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265). “This court will affirm the trial court’s summary
judgment if it finds that the trial court reached the correct result, ‘irrespective of the reasons
stated.’” Wood v. Parker, 901 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Clark v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 827 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tenn. App. 1991)).

      Appellant proceeds, as he did in the trial court, pro se. Nonetheless, he “must
comply with the same standards to which lawyers must adhere.” Watson v. City of Jackson,
448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As we have previously explained,

       [p]arties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal
       treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se
       litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system.
       However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness
       to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. Thus, the
       courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same
       substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to
       observe.

Id. at 926–27 (quoting Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011)). Notwithstanding his pro se status,
Appellant must comply with the applicable procedural rules of this Court. The Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appellant’s brief shall contain, inter alia:

                                              -4-
        (4) A statement of the issues presented for review;

        *       *       *

        (7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, setting
        forth:

        (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and
        the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require
        appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to
        the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on; and

        (B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review
        (which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate heading
        placed before the discussion of the issues)[.]

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4), (7). Pursuant to Rule 27(a)(7)(A), “[i]t must be clear that a party
has constructed an argument regarding his or her position on appeal; if not, the matter is
subject to waiver.” Heflin v. Iberiabank Corp., 571 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).
“[C]ompliance with the Rule has not been achieved” when this Court “cannot ascertain
that an issue is supported by adequate argument . . . .” Id.

      There are substantial issues with Appellant’s principal brief that render his
arguments on appeal difficult to discern. For one, Appellant’s principal brief lacks a
statement of the issues.4 Appellate review generally extends only to those issues presented

        4
         While not dispositive, as it is absent from his principal brief, we note that Appellant did include
a statement of the issues in his reply brief, which provides:

        Whether the Chancery Court properly awarded summary judgement under Tennessee law.
        The Appellant chooses in his rebuttal to address the assertions within the Appellee’s
        Response Briefs simply by citing the record, since there are a plethora of intentional
        inaccuracies that veer from the veritable evidence within the record that they make
        mockery of the precedent cases they cite to affirm Appellees’ arguments. Furthermore, the
        official record previously offered by this Court, and the others since 2018 including the
        Chancery, General Sessions, and Circuit Court all of which have dealt with this same
        matter albeit with separate case file numbers, have all cited the questionable wrongful acts
        of the Appellees.

        However, as it relates to the subsequent actions of the Chancery Court, they have all been
        an effort to benefit the Appellees exclusively while circumventing the mandates of this
        Court in its remand order of December 10, 2019, Tennessee Court of Appeals, case number
        E2018-01250-COA-R3-CV, which strongly implied that the matter is incomplete and
        creates a Constitutional challenge by the Chancery Court Judge’s failure to adjudicate all

                                                   -5-
for review, see Tenn. R. App. P. 13, and this omission is not a mere technical violation of
Rule 27. See Owen v. Long Tire, LLC, No. W2011-01227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
6777014, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011) (“The requirement of a statement of the
issues raised on appeal is no mere technicality.”). This Court “may consider an issue
waived where it is argued in the brief but not designated as an issue.” Forbess v. Forbess,
370 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97
S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

        Setting aside the lack of a statement of the issues, however, Appellant’s argument
as to how the order appealed from is in error is, essentially, indiscernible. Appellant alleges
broad injustices by the trial court as opposed to expounding on any particular legal error
made in the ruling at issue. The order appealed from grants summary judgment to BOA
on the theory of res judicata; nonetheless, Appellant does not so much as mention the
hearing on BOA’s motion for summary judgment or the resulting August 29, 2022 order
in his principal brief. Rather, Appellant paints in broad strokes and alleges several “causes
of action.” Appellant states in his “Introduction” that he will “show that the [trial court]
has engaged in a multiplicity of acts over the past five years amounting to a gross abuse of
discretion while permitting parties, Wilmington and [BOA], to circumvent the remand
order of this Appellate Court issued and sent back to the [trial court] on December 10,
2019.” Accordingly, Appellant spends a substantial amount of time in his brief reciting
the procedural history of the case, interposing the occasional legal conclusion. For
example, Appellant claims that “Wilmington lacked Standing at Inception of its original
filing on September 7, 2016 to bring foreclosure action against [Appellant’s] first lien
mortgage[.]” Nonetheless, Wilmington did not participate in the summary judgment
proceeding at issue.

       Appellant also alleges that the trial court has violated various of Appellant’s state
and federal constitutional rights, as well as criminal statutes. Even if these assertions could
be construed as properly raised issues, however, Appellant develops no legal argument as
to how those rights were actually violated. “Our inability to discern whether [Appellant]
ha[s] supported [his] issues with proper argument is not without significance in light of the
directive in Rule 27(a)(7)(A) that the ‘contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require
appellate relief,’ be set forth adequately in the argument.” Heflin, 571 S.W.3d at 734
(quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)). Moreover, none of Appellant’s constitutional or
criminal theories are addressed in the order appealed from. And because there is no
transcript from the summary judgment hearing, it is unclear from the record whether

       issues by refusing to enter a final judgment to protect the due process rights of the
       Appellant.

                                               -6-
Appellant made these arguments in the relevant trial court proceeding. Further
compounding the confusion here is the absence of record citations and citations to legal
authority in many places throughout Appellant’s lengthy brief. See Tenn. R. App. P.
27(a)(7).

       Simply put, Appellant designates no specific issues for review, but opines on a wide
litany of issues and “causes of action” in the argument section of his brief. Although
Appellant clearly takes issue with the disposition of the Property overall, Appellant has
expounded on no issue about the order actually appealed from, save for a few conclusory
statements that genuine disputes of material fact exist. However, “this Court is not charged
with the responsibility of scouring the appellate record for any reversible error the trial
court may have committed.” Owen, 2011 WL 6777014, at *4; see also Hodge v. Craig,
382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012) (noting that issues on appeal “should be framed as
specifically as the nature of the error will permit in order to avoid any potential risk of
waiver” (citing Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 143–44 (Tenn. 2001))). While we are
mindful of Appellant’s pro se status, “we cannot write [Appellant’s] brief for [him], and
we are not able to create arguments or issues where none otherwise are set forth.” Murray
v. Miracle, 457 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). Because Appellant failed to
comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, any issues purportedly raised are
waived. Without opining on the merits of its ruling, we affirm the trial court.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The ruling of the Chancery Court for Anderson County is affirmed. Costs on appeal
are assessed to the appellant, Reginald Hall, for which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                  _________________________________
                                                  KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

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