Court Opinion

ID: 9688684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:00:38.893704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:50.892552
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30061        Document: 00516871002             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/24/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-30061
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                    ____________                               August 24, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   David Reddick,                                                                    Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Medtronic, Incorporated,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:22-CV-2715
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         David Reddick appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint
   on res judicata grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30061         Document: 00516871002               Page: 2       Date Filed: 08/24/2023

                                           No. 23-30061

                                          I. Background

           A. Factual Background
           In 2013, Reddick fainted.            He was subsequently diagnosed with
   syncope and Brugada syndrome, a heart rhythm disorder. He was told that
   he needed a defibrillator. Reddick agreed to the procedure, and had a
   Medtronic defibrillator—along with a Reveal LINQ, Reveal Insertable Loop
   Recorder, and Sprint Quattro Lead (“leads”)—implanted in his chest.
           Shortly after surgery, Reddick allegedly started experiencing shocks
   from the defibrillator and/or fractured leads. Reddick eventually determined
   that he did not have Brugada Syndrome and underwent surgery in 2017 to
   have the defibrillator removed. Reddick claims the allegedly defective
   defibrillator caused him permanent heart damage and scarring and resulted
   in a permanent disability.
           B. Original Lawsuit
           In 2018, Reddick filed his first lawsuit against Medtronic in Louisiana
   state court. 1 Medtronic subsequently removed the case to federal court, and
   Reddick then filed the operative pleading in the first case. As relevant here,
   he asserted four products liability claims under the LPLA—defective
   construction, defective design, failure to warn, and breach of express
   warranty—alleging that the defibrillator and its components/accessories
   were defective thereby causing the unnecessary shocks. In support of these

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           1
             As explained in III.A., Reddick did not argue below that Medtronic could not raise
   res judicata in a motion to dismiss. As such, we, like the district court, take judicial notice
   of the prior judgment and opinion, as well as other matters of public record attached to
   Medtronic’s motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th
   Cir. 2020).

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                                        No. 23-30061

   allegations, Reddick cited to previous FDA recalls and the alleged fracture of
   the Sprint Quattro Lead. Medtronic moved to dismiss, which the district
   court granted, dismissing Reddick’s products liability claims with prejudice.
          A little over a month later, the FDA issued a recall for a certain type
   of Medtronic defibrillator, noting there was an issue with a rapid decrease in
   battery life likely caused by a short circuit.
          C. Second and Current Lawsuit
          Almost a year later, Reddick filed the instant lawsuit in Louisiana state
   court. Medtronic then removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction.
   Reddick asserted the same four products liability claims against Medtronic
   under the LPLA, but this time also alleged (1) the Sprint Quattro Leads
   fractured due to the short circuit cited in the FDA recall and (2) his injuries
   were caused by “the defects that [were a] part of the FDA recall.” 2 The
   district court dismissed Reddick’s complaint on res judicata grounds and also
   denied his request for leave to amend the complaint after discovery. Reddick
   timely appealed.
                        II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          The district court had diversity jurisdiction over this case under 28
   U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1291 because the district court entered a final judgment dismissing
   Reddick’s case.
           We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a suit on the
   basis of res judicata. Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir.

           _____________________
          2
             Reddick also appeared to assert a claim against Medtronic for common law fraud
   as well as a claim styled as “fraud on the FDA.” However, he conceded to the district
   court that he was abandoning these claims, and does not pursue them on appeal.

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                                          No. 23-30061

   2015); see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir.
   2013).
            Likewise, while ordinarily we “review[] the denial of a motion for
   leave to file an amended complaint for abuse of discretion,” the standard of
   review becomes de novo “where, as here, the district court’s denial of leave
   to amend [is] based solely on futility.” City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.,
   632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010).
                                       III. Discussion
            Reddick contends the district court erred by (1) granting Medtronic’s
   motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and (2) denying his request for
   leave to amend the complaint after discovery on the ground that it was futile.
   Neither argument has merit. 3
            A. Res Judicata
            Because this is a diversity case, we assess whether Reddick’s claims
   are barred by res judicata by applying “the preclusion law of the forum
   state”—Louisiana. Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314
   (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
   497, 508 (2001).
            Under Louisiana law, a second action is precluded by res judicata
   when:
            (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the
            parties are the same; (4) the cause . . . of action asserted in the
            second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first
            litigation; and (5) the cause . . . of action asserted in the second

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            3
            Because we affirm the district court’s judgment on the basis of res judicata, we do
   not reach Reddick’s other arguments.

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                                     No. 23-30061

           suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the
           subject matter of the first litigation.

   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 993 So. 2d 187, 194 (La. 2008) (quotation
   omitted). The primary inquiry is whether the actions arise out of the same
   transaction or occurrence. Id.
           It is undisputed that the first three elements are satisfied here. Thus,
   the remaining issues are whether Reddick’s current cause of action
   (1) existed as of the time of the final judgment in the first case, and (2) arose
   out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the
   first case.
           To determine whether the current and prior cases arose out of the
   same transaction or occurrence, we must “examin[e] . . . the facts underlying
   the event[s] in dispute” to resolve this question. Dotson v. Atl. Specialty Ins.
   Co., 24 F.4th 999, 1003–04 (5th Cir.) (alterations in original) (quotation
   omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 102 (2022). We agree with the district court
   that the two actions brought by Reddick involve “the same injuries allegedly
   caused by the same device”—namely, unnecessary shocks allegedly caused
   by a defective defibrillator and its components. We therefore conclude that
   this action arose from the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject
   matter of the first action.
           Moving to the fourth requirement, we conclude this element is
   satisfied too. Reddick’s urges that the second suit turned on the FDA
   recall—which occurred after he filed the first suit. However, this argument
   is unavailing because the fact of the recall is “merely evidence that relates back
   to the same allegations asserted” in the first action, “rather than
   [misconduct] that occurred after the” final judgment in the first action.
   Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, 17 F.4th 563, 573 (5th Cir. 2021). The
   proper vehicle for Reddick’s “newly discovered evidence” would have been

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                                           No. 23-30061

   a Rule 60(b) motion in the first action, not a collateral attack through a new
   case. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000).
   Accordingly, Reddick’s second suit is barred by res judicata. 4
           B. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
           We also agree with Medtronic that the district court properly denied
   Reddick’s motion for leave to amend the complaint after discovery.
           Reddick has conceded—by virtue of his argument that he needs
   discovery to obtain allegedly confidential information for his parallel
   products liability claims—that he is pressing the same claims we now hold to
   be barred by res judicata. Thus, any amendment would have been futile. See
   generally Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding
   denial of a motion for leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion when the
   amendment would have been futile).

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           4
              Reddick further contends the “exceptional circumstances” exception to res
   judicata applies because Medtronic allegedly hid evidence of the FDA recall and failed to
   comply with its duty to supplement its discovery responses during the first action. See
   generally La. Rev. Stat. § 13:4232(A)(1). He also argues that it was procedurally
   improper to apply res judicata at the motion to dismiss stage. Whatever the merits of these
   contentions (the notion that he should have received a recall notice for something he no
   longer had makes little sense), they are not properly before us since Reddick failed to raise
   these arguments below. See Cent. Sw. Tex. Dev., L.L.C. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat.
   Ass’n, 780 F.3d 296, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2015) (deeming an argument abandoned on appeal
   even though appellant tangentially referred to the issue below because it was raised in a
   different context); see also Anderson, 953 F.3d at 314 (explaining Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
   “appropriate if the res judicata bar is apparent from the complaint and judicially noticed
   facts and the plaintiff fails to challenge the defendant’s failure to plead it as an affirmative
   defense”).

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                                   No. 23-30061

                                 IV. Conclusion
         For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   grant of Medtronic’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and denial
   of Reddick’s request for leave to file an amended complaint.

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