Court Opinion

ID: 9421878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:18.678631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:32.952595
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring.
The suggestion that this and related decisions mean that we.have eliminated “all meaningful judicial super-' vision over jury verdicts” in FELA cases prompts me'-to file this opinion and bring up to date the compilation which I made in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 68, 71-73. The Wilkerson case was decided January 31, 1949. The attached Appendix presents a statistical summary1 of our stewardship of these FELA cases from that date to October 19, 1959.
’ Of the. 110 petitions for certiorari filed during this period of more than 10 years, 73 were filéd by employees ' and 37-were filed by employers. Of these, 33 were granted, each at the-instance of an employee who complained of the lower court’s withholdiñg the case from the jury or overturning a jury verdict in his favor. Thirty cases were reversed for usurpation of the jury function;.and in each of three the lower court’s decision was sustained.
Of the 77 petitions denied, 32 were by employees who sought reversal of a lower court’s decision to withhold the case from the jury or to upset a jury’s verdict. Eight *17more employees wanted this Court to overturn jury verdicts rendered in the employers’ favor.
Of the petitions filed by employers, 35 asked this Court to reverse a lower court decision upholding a jury verdict or holding that the case should have been submitted to a jury. Employers in two other petitions complained of the lower court’s action in setting aside a jury verdict and granting a new trial.
It is apparent' from the decisions where we refused to review cases'in which lower courts withheld cases from the jury or set aside jury verdicts (or where, having granted certiorari, we sustained the lower courts in that action) that the system of judicial supervision still exists in this as in other types of cases.
It is suggested that the Court has consumed too -much of its time in reviewing these FELA cases. An examination of the 33 cases in which the Court has granted cer-' tiorari during the period of over 10 years covered by the attached Appendix reveals that 16 of these cases were summarily reversed without'oral argument and without full opinions. Only 17 cases were argued during this-period of more than a decade and, of these, 5 were disposed of by brief per curiam opinions. Only 12 cases in over 10 years were argued, briefed and disposed of with full opinions by the Court. Wé have granted certi-orari in these cases on an average of less than 3 per year and have given plenary consideration to slightly more than 1 per year. Wastage of our-time is therefore a .false issue. ' '
The difference between the majority and minority of the Court in our treatment of FELA cases concerns the degree of vigilance we should exercise in safeguarding the jury triai — guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment and part and parcel of the remedy under this Federal Act when suit is brought in state courts. See Bailey v. Cen*18tral Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 354; Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, 363. Whether that right has been impaired in a particular instance often produces a contrariety of views. Yet the practice of . the Court in allowing four out of nine votes to control the certiorari docket is well established and of long duration.2 Without it, the vast discretion which Congress allowed us in granting or denying certiorari might not be tolerable. Every member of the Court has known instances where he has strongly protested the action of the minority in bringing a case or type of case here for .adjudication. He may then feel that there are more important and pressing matters to which the Court should give its attention. That is, however, a price we pay for keeping our promise to Congress3 to let the vote of four Justices bring up any case here on certiorari.
[Note: For dissenting opinion of Mb. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Whittaker, see post, p. 25.]
*20APPENDIX TO OPINION. OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, CONCURRING.
I. Cases in Which Certiorari Was Granted.
A. Where lower court which withheld the case from the jury or set aside a jury verdict for the employee and ordered a new trial or rendered judgment for the employer was reversed:
Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U. S. 911.
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163.
Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294.
Carter v. Atlantic St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 338 U. S. 430.
Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 344 U. S. 407.
Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 348 U. S. 946.
Smalls et al. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 348 U. S. 946
O’Neill v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,. 348 U. S. 956.
Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77.
Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 350 U. S. 807.
Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 350 U. S. 893.
Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U. S. 898, 351 U. S. 183.
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500.
Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U. S. 512.
Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe R. C.o., 353 U. S. 360.
Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 920.
Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al., 353 U. S. 920.
Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co., 353 U. S. 925.
*21Thomson v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 353 U. S. 926.
McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co., 354 U. S. 517.
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 354 U. S. 901.
Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U. S. 18.
Stinson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 355 U. S. 62.
Honeycutt v. Wabash R. Co., 355 U. S. 424.
Ferguson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 356 U. S. 41.
Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 356 U. S. 326.
Moore v. Terminal R. Assn., 358 U. S. 31.
Baker et al. v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227.
Conner v. Butler, post, p. 29.
Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., ante, p. 15.
B. Where lower court which withheld the case from the jury or set aside a jury verdict for the employee and ordered a new trial or rendered judgment for the employer was sustained:
Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U. S. 207.
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 340 U. S. 573.
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 352 U. S. 518.
II. Cases in Which Certiorari Was Denied.
A. Where lower court withheld case from the jury or overturned a jury verdict for employee and rendered judgment for the employer:
Scocozza et al. v. Erie R. Co., 337 U. S. 907.
Killian v. Pennsylvania R. Co. et al., 338 U. S. 819.
Lavender v. Illinois Central R. Co., 338 U. S. 822.
Roberts v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 340 U. S. 829.
Emmick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 340 U. S. 831.
Roberts v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 340 U. S. 832.
*22Gentry v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 340 U. S. 853.
Moleton v. Union Pacific R. Co., 340 U. S. 932.
Healy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 340 U. S. 935.
Ottley v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 340 U. S. 948.
Craven v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 340 U. S. 952.
Jaroszewski v. Central R. Co., 344 U. S. 839.
Creamer v. Ogden Union R. & Depot Co., 344 U. S. 912.
Frizzell v. Wabash R. Co., 344 U. S. 934.
Gill v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 346 U. S. 816.
Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 346 U. S. 838.
Wetherbee v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 346 U. S. 867.
Shellhammer v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 347 U. S. 990.
Keiper v. Northwestern Pacific R. Co., 350 U. S. 948.
Click v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 350 U. S. 994.
Barnett v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 351 U. S. 953.
Lupo v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 352 U. S. 891.
Collins v Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 352 U. S. 942.
Bennett v. Southern R. Co., 353 U. S. 958.
Kelly v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 355 U. S. 892.
Dessi v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 356 U. S. 967.
Baum v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 358 U. S. 881.
B.. Where lower court sustained a jury verdict for the employer:
Jones v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 347 U. S. 956.
Conser v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 348 U. S. 828.
Metrakos v. Cleveland Union Terminals Co., 348 U. S. 872.
*23Kane v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Corp., 348 U. S. 943.
Daulton v. Southern Pacific Co., 352 U. S. 1005.
Burch v. Reading Co., 353 U. S. 965.
Brinkley v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 358 U. S. 865.
Masterson v. New York Central R. Co., post, p. 832.
C. Where lower court reversed a jury verdict for the employee and directed a new trial:
Banning v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. Co., 338 U. S. 815.
Dixon v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 342 U. S. 830.
Thomas v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 344 U. S. 921.
Milom v. New York Central R. Co., 355 U. S. 953.
Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., post, p. 841.
D. Where lower court sustained a jury verdict for the employee or held that the employee’s case should have gone to the jury:
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Haselden, 338 U. S. 825.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hill, 340 U. S. 814.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Korte, 342 U. S. 868.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. White, 343 U. S. 915.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Donnelly, 344 U. S. 855.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. McGowan, 344 U.S. 918.
Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis v. Barnett, 345 U. S. 956.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Miller, 346 U. S. 909.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co. v. Woodrow, 347 U. S. 935.
*24Fort Worth & Denver R. Co. v. Prine, 348 U. S. 826.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Bonnier,-348 U. S. 830.
Chicago North Western R. Co. v. Margevich, 348 U. S. 861.
Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Johnson, 348 U. S. 875.
Chattanooga Station Co. v. Massey, 348 U. S. 896.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. v. Kifer, 348 U. S. 917.
■ Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Crowley et al:," 348 U. S. 927. '
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. v. Wright, 349 U. S. 905.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chancey, 349 U. S. 916.
Great Northern R. Co. v. Hallada, 350 U. S. 874.
New York Central R. Co. v. Ruddy, 350 U. S. 884.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Cereste, 351 U. S. 951.
Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Moore, 351 U. S. 952.
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Buckles et al., 351 U. S. 984.
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Justis, 352 U. S. 833.
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Scovel, 352 U. S. 835.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Masiglowa, 352 U. S. 1003.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Bowman, 355 U. S. 837.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 897.
Martin v. Tindell, 355 U. S. 959.
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Thomas, 356 U. S. 959.
*25Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Bush, 358 U. S. 827.
Wabash R. Co. v. Wehrli, 358 U. S. 932.
Butler et al. v. Watts, 359 U. S. 926.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Byrne, 359 U. S. 960.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Andre, post, p. 820.
E. Where lower court set aside a jury verdict for the employer because of erroneous instructions and granted a new trial:
Wabash R. Co. v. Byler, 344 U. S. 826.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co. v. Siegrist, 360 U. S. 917.

 Cases in which petitions for certiorari have been granted but which have not yet been decided on the merits have not been included nor have cases been included-which did not present'issues of negligence or causation under the Act. -Moreovér, petitions seeking review of judgments of state courts granting new trials, are not included becausé -we usually treat them as not being “final” judg- . ménts. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18.

 When the Act of February 13, 1$25 (43 Stat. 936), which broadened our certiorari’jurisdiction, was before the Congress, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the Court, made explicit that the “rule of four” governs the grant of petitions for certiorari. He testified before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee as follows:
-. , if there were five'votes against granting the petition and four in favor of granting it, it would be granted, because we proceed upon^the theory that when as many as four members of the court, ...and even three in some instances, are impressed' with the propriety of our taking the case, the petition should be granted. This is the uniform way ini which petitions for writs of certiorari are considered.” Hearings on S. 2060; Feb. 2, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. And see Hearings on H. R: 8206, Dec. 18, 1924, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8.

 The “rule of four” was given as one of the reasons why the Congress thought , that the increase of our discretionary jurisdiction was warranted. The House Report stated:
“Lest it should be thought that the' increase of discretionary jurisdiction might impair the administration of justice and lead' to partial *19hearings and not secure a decision by the whole court, it is proper to call attention to the very thorough and complete system by which discretionary jurisdiction is exercised. In granting or refusing a prayer for a certiorari the petitioner gets the judgment of the whole court. The application is not disposed of by a single justice. The luminous and informing statement of Mr. Justice Van Devanter tells the whole story:
“ ‘While the 'authority of the Supreme Court to take cases on petition for certiorari is spoken of as a discretionary jurisdiction, this does not nfean that the court is authorizéd merely to exercise a will -in the mat.ter but. rather that the petition is to be granted or denied according to a sound judicial discretion. What actually is done may well-be stated here with some particularity. The party aggrieved by the decision of the circuit court of appeals and seeking a further review in the Supreme Court is required to' present to it a petition and accompanying brief, setting forth the nature of the case, what questions are involved,, how they were decided in the circuit court of. appeals, and'why the case should not rest on the decision of that court. The petition and brief are required to be served on the other party, and time is given for the presentation of an opposing brief. When, this has been done copies of the printed record as it came from the circuit court of appeals and of the petition and briefs are distributed among the members of the Supreme Court, and each judge examines them and prepares a memorandum or note indicating his view of what should be done. •
“ ‘In conference these cases are called, each in its turn, and each judge states his views in extenso or briefly as he thinks proper; and when.all have spoken any difference in opinion is discussed and then a vote is taken. I explain this at some length because it seems to be thought outside that the cases are. referred to particular judges, as, for instance, that those coming' from a particular circuit are referred to the justice assigned to that circuit, and that he reports on them, and the others accept his. report. That impression is wholly at variance with what actually occurs.
“‘We do not grant or .deny these petitions merely according to a majority vote. We always grant the petition when as many as four think that it should be granted and sometimes when as many as three think that way. We proceed upon the theory that, 'if that number out of the nine are impressed with the thought that the case is one that ought tó be heard and decided by üs, the petition should be granted.’ ” H. R. Rep. No: 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3.