Court Opinion

ID: 9720905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:44:23.522516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.138402
License: Public Domain

KLINE, P. J., Dissenting.
The majority opinion characterizes In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 [256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967] as, in effect, overruling In re Atiles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 805 [191 Cal.Rptr. 452, 662 P.2d 910], Though our Supreme Court may well adopt that position, it has not heretofore done so. It is not the function of an intermediate appellate court to anticipate Supreme Court action.
*425The present case is materially indistinguishable from In re Atiles. Atiles is still good law. I respectfully dissent because I do not believe we are free to ignore it.
Joyner does not necessarily spell the demise of Atiles because the two cases are factually distinguishable. Joyner involved two unrelated offenses committed in Florida and California. The petitioner was arrested in Florida and kept in jail due to the outstanding warrant in California. In denying credit on the subsequent California sentence for the Florida jail time, the Supreme Court held that “duplicative credits against separately imposed concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses will be granted only on a showing of strict causation,” a showing which Joyner failed to make. (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489, italics added.) The Joyner “strict causation” test is inapplicable in determining credit on the firearm charge in the instant case because that conduct also formed a basis for the parole hold and subsequent revocation proceedings. The offenses were therefore related, not unrelated as in Joyner.
It is true that Joyner disapproved certain sweeping dicta in Atiles suggesting that dual credit should be maximized wherever there are concurrent terms. (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 494.) However, the court did not disagree with the result in Atiles or the analysis it prescribed where the conduct on the two offenses is related. In fact, Joyner expressly acknowledges that Atiles was a “ ‘same conduct’ case” {id., at p. 493), which strongly suggests that Atiles remains applicable in that context.
Neither People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907 [259 Cal.Rptr. 827] nor People v. Huff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100 [273 Cal.Rptr. 44] suggests that Atiles is no longer authoritative and should not be followed in cases presenting factually similar contexts.
In Odom the defendant’s probation was revoked for conduct.predating the offense for which he was arrested and jailed. (Odom, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 909.) Because the time which the defendant served on the second offense was unrelated to the probation revocation, the court applied the strict causation test of Joyner.
Huff simply stands for the unremarkable proposition that in mixed conduct cases the burden is on the defendant to show that the custody for which credit is sought “is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (Pen. Code, § 2900.5, subd. (b).) The majority’s conclusion that defendant in this case has not sustained this burden converts Huff into a far more onerous test than the court in that case, or any other court, has ever contemplated. In effect, the majority is *426rendering Atiles meaningless by unjustifiably imputing to Joyner an evidentiary requirement that can rarely be met.
The evidence in the instant case concerning parole revocation consists of a document entitled “Summary of Parole Adjustment.” This document indicates that petitioner’s parole was revoked based on the following five grounds: (1) absconding; (2) failure to test; (3) possession of controlled substance for sale; (4) manufacturing controlled substances; and (5) possession of a firearm by a felon. The last three grounds were the basis of the new criminal charges pending against petitioner at the time of his parole revocation hearing. The evaluation of the parole officer set forth in the summary emphasized not only that petitioner absconded on two occasions, but that “[h]e continues to be involved in manufacturing drugs . . . .” Thus, the pertinent available evidence demonstrates that the decision to revoke petitioner’s parole was based on the new charges as well as the administrative violations. The People have presented no evidence to the contrary. Thus, I believe petitioner has met his burden of showing that the custody for which credit is sought “is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (Pen. Code, § 2900.5, subd. (b).)
For the foregoing reasons, I would grant the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 5, 1991.