Court Opinion

ID: 9586503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:08.793918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:41.412901
License: Public Domain

HAIRE, Judge
(dissenting) :
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that the award of the Commission was reasonably supported by the evidence. However, I cannot agree with their conclusions that because of the failure of the State Compensation Fund to file a notice of claim status within 14 days after the Commission had notified the Fund of the filing by an employee of a notice of accident, the Fund must pay compensation for the employee’s alleged disability until the entry of an award by the Commission, even though that award held that the employee had not suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
If we assume that A.R.S. § 23-1061, subsec. 11 and § 23-1062, subsec. B contemplate that the State Compensation Fund will either commence payment of compensation or file a written denial of the claim within 14 days after receiving notice of the accident from the Commission, there is no statutory penalty provided for the inadvertent or purposeful violation of these provisions, other than possibly the criminal sanctions imposed by A.R.S. § 23-932. However, the legislature has not left the claimant remediless in such situations, but rather through the provisions of A.R.S. § 23-941 has provided the claimant with ready access to the Commission for a quick hearing if he feels that his rights under the act have been violated by the Fund. It appears to me that the purpose of the legislature in enacting the 14 day provision was to allow a relatively short period within which the Fund must pay compensation or face possible petition by the claimant to-the Commission for hearing.
In my opinion if the legislature had intended the severe consequences which are *79imposed by the majority opinion, it would have enacted appropriate language to that effect. See, for example, A.R.S. § 23-1061, subsec. A. Prior to the time of the adoption of A.R.S. § 23-1061, subsec. I and § 23-1062, subsec. B in their present form, this Court had rendered its opinion in Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ariz.App. 518, 410 P.2d 140 (1966). That decision held that notwithstanding the definitely stated penalty provisions of Industrial Commission Rules 50, 51 and 522 the Industrial Commission could waive these procedural provisions in its rules and proceed to consider the claim on its merits, even though there had been a failure by the insurance carrier to file written notice of denial of the claim within the 14 day period required by the rules. In view of the failure of the legislature to insert statutory penalties when it thereafter amended §§ 23-1061, subsec. I and 23-1062, subsec. B, it appears logical to infer legislative acquiescence in the Bailey approach.
Even if I could find statutory justification for the imposition of some penalty for the State Compensation Fund’s failure to deny this claim within 14 days, I see no logic in the penalty legislated in the majority opinion. If we assume, as the majority holds, that the failure to communicate denial within 14 days requires the payment of compensation, then we are faced with the question of how long must this com•pensation continue. As I see it, logically we have two alternatives. First, we could overrule Bailey v. Industrial Commission, supra, and hold that because of Rule 52, the failure to timely deny is absolute, and that thereafter for all purposes the fact that the injury was by accident arising out of and in the course of employment would be conclusively presumed, leaving only the question of extent of disability for determination, or second, assuming that the purpose of the requirement of timely denial is to enable the claimant to expeditiously initiate proceedings before the Commission to determine the questions involved, we could hold that the claimant was entitled to receive his compensation until such time as he is advised that the State Compensation Fund denies liability. To me, this second approach appears more logical since it puts the claimant back into the position he would have been in if the Fund had timely denied liability. (I leave for determination at the time the question might be presented to us the problem of actual prejudice resulting from failure of a carrier to timely deny liability).
I cannot see any logical basis for holding that the Fund must pay compensation until such time as the Commission gets around to entering an award. The mere fact that the Fund might be one or several days late in filing a denial of a claim should not subject it to liability for several months’ compensation on a claim which is later determined to be non-industrial, especially in the absence of a clearly stated legislative mandate to that effect.
I would affirm the award.

. A careful reading of A.R.S. § 23-1061, subsec. I shows that, taken literally, the “fourteen days” language in that statute refers only to the petition to reopen and not to the “Notice of Accident” referable to the original injury.

. These rules are quoted in full in the majority opinion.