Court Opinion

ID: 9849316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:38:19.128009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:16.815610
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The effect of the majority opinion is to obliterate negligence as a basis of liability in farm accident cases and replace this well-established doctrine and principle with strict or absolute liability. The substantial effect upon the farm employer is to require him to assume liability for all accidents involving his employees. The vehicle through which this far-reaching and questionable effect is achieved is by permitting jury consideration of the issue of negligence solely upon the opinion of a knowledgeable person that a farm operation or procedure is unsafe. In doing so, the majority overlooks completely the consistent holdings of this court that it is not the relative danger involved, but rather negligence, that gives rise to a litigant’s claim for damages. Kregel v. Kann, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 534; Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312.
Although we have recognized many acts and omissions by a farm employer as a breach of his duty to the employee, we have not, until this opinion, extended this duty to charge the farm employer with the knowledge or judgment of an expert in the use and operation of properly-shielded farm implements.
*477The precise issue presented is whether de-fendent failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care in the operation of the connected tractor and wagon involved.
We review the evidence to determine, not whether it proves defendant guilty of negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to provide and maintain reasonably suitable and safe appliances for his employee to use, but whether it makes a sufficient showing so that the trial court was warranted in submitting the question to the jury and the jury in the exercise of its function as the trier of facts was justified in finding defendant negligent. Kregel v. Kann, supra; Kauzlarich v. Fitzwater, 255 Iowa 1067, 1069, 125 N.W.2d 205, 206; Anderson v. Elliott, 244 Iowa 670, 673, 57 N.W.2d 792, 793.
In my judgment, the testimony of plaintiff’s expert and his opinion as to the safety of this connection are not alone sufficient to establish that its use was a breach of the employer’s duty, and are not sufficient to generate a jury question as to his negligence. Kregel v. Kann, supra. I find absolutely no evidence which even inferentially would support plaintiff’s allegation of defendant negligence, and none at all which would support a proximate cause allegation.
With the exception'of plaintiff’s expert, all testimony produced was to the effect that the shields used in this operation were reasonably safe, and there is not one scintilla of evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that the operation was unsafe. Both the plaintiff and his brother thought it was safe. There is no claim that the shields used did not meet the standards established by the American Society of Agricultural Engineers. Plaintiff’s expert admitted that fact. His position was that these shields were not meant to work together, thus making them “incompatible”. He based this opinion upon the fact that “there is an opening between the two shields as they operate which is sufficient for clothing to go between * * * and be caught on the revolving shaft.” There is not a scintilla of evidence revealed under this record to show that defendant was aware of a dangerous situation due to this so-called “opening”, which obviously was necessary for proper operation of such equipment over uneven ground. It is apparent from a brief examination of Exhibits A and B that some clearance between the tractor shield and the revolving knuckle underneath that shield, about six or eight inches, is necessary to allow for verticle and horizontal operation and to permit the disconnecting operation. Apparently it was so designed. The connection appears proper to me, but of course, like the defendant, I am no expert.
However, if it be conceded that this connection was improper and amounted to a latent or hidden defect, we have often stated that unless it is also shown by plaintiff that the defendant knew or should have known about the defect, its use would not amount to negligence. Sample v. Schwenck, 243 Iowa 1189, 1195-1197, 54 N.W.2d 527, 530, 531; Rehard v. Miles, 227 Iowa 1290, 1296, 1298, 290 N.W. 702, 705, 706.
Of course, the standard by which the defendant must be judged is that degree of care which an ordinary prudent farm employer would exercise under the circumstances. Kregel v. Kann, supra. This clearly is not a case of defective equipment known to the employer, or of an inexperienced employee, or of the use of individual machines which were not properly shielded.
I believe that under the evidence it must be concluded as a matter of law that the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man and could not have anticipated or foreseen the accident that occurred. It was simply a freak accident, faulting no one.
As the majority conceded, it was plaintiff’s burden to submit evidence of negligence or breach of defendant’s duty to plaintiff sufficient to warrant the submission of that issue to the jury. It must be shown that defendant failed to use reason*478able care to provide and maintain for his employees reasonably suitable and safe appliances, machinery and tools, with which to work. Kregel v. Kann, supra. It is the reasoning and conclusions reached by the majority which is not supported by the evidence. In its statement of fact it says: “The tractor shield extends over the exposed knuckle mechanism but allows an open space between the tractor shield and the knuckle where clothing or other material can contact the revolving knuckle.” To say the least, this is a misleading statement. It fails to state this is a horizontal, not a verticle, space, reached only by a thrust from outside underneath the tractor shield. The record is clear that the only way clothing or other articles could get caught in the revolving knuckle is for one to extend the clothing or article up under the tractor shield. True, if one would thrust an arm or leg covered with a loose, frayed, or torn piece of clothing under the tractor shield, the cloth could invade the narrow area in which the knuckle was revolving and catch on the release button. Apparently that is what happened here and, as I see it, such an occurrence could not reasonably be anticipated or avoided. That such a knuckle is necessary and such a clearance for this operation is required cannot be disputed. In other words, it is clear that considerable inept carelessness is necessary to involve one’s clothing in that revolving part.
Without setting out the testimony to support its conclusions, the majority states: “The men were using two pieces of equipment, each involving parts moving with considerable force and speed, which, if not adequately shielded, create a high degree of danger.” (Emphasis added.) I can find nothing in this record to support a conclusion that these parts were moving with considerable force and speed, or that they created a “high degree of danger.”
It is stated this evidence would support a conclusion that “The tractor shield is built expressly to be connected to another half-moon type shield which is fastened to it and extends the full length of the PTO extension.” (Emphasis added.) The only testimony that such an extension was even available was given by plaintiff’s expert, and even he did not say the shield on the tractor was expressly built to receive such an attachment. At best, there is only an inference that such an extension was available for use when the connecting power shaft was exposed, which was not the case before us. He said bolt holes were placed in the tractor shield to facilitate that attachment when necessary. This is a far cry from saying this tractor shield was built expressly for another half-moon shield. No other person, including the local tractor dealer, had even seen such an extension, and the evidence indicated none had been used in that vicinity. To a like effect is the majority conclusion that “The additional shield for which the tractor was designed was not used.” (Emphasis added.) For the reason given, such a statement is not justified by this record. The only fair conclusion under this evidence recited by the majority is that “Each piece of equipment had its own shielding devices.” It is the only one the jury could find under this evidence. Since there was no testimony as to the speed or force of the revolving parts, no evidence that the tractor shield was expressly built for an additional shield, or that the tractor was designed for an additional shield to be used in such circumstances, the jury could not find defendant negligent in those respects.
The majority further misstates the testimony of the so-called expert to the effect that “The two types of shields do not cover the moving parts and are therefore incompatible.” (Emphasis added.) His opinion was that the shields were incompatible, but he did not, nor could he, state they did not cover the moving parts. He simply stated he thought the conbination was unsafe because it left an open space underneath the tractor shield which clothing or other material could enter and get caught in the shaft. He testified generally that it is possible in some instances for a revolving part to set up air currents which would *479draw clothing into the parts as well as repel them. He did not say that is what occurred, and the physical evidence would not indicate any such occurrence here. The plaintiff himself said he slipped as he attempted to cross the shielded power shaft and inadvertently stuck his foot up under the tractor shield. Obviously, the force of this kick would propel any loose or frayed ends of his coveralls into the otherwise fullycovered revolving parts. Protecting against such an accident would, of course, be impossible if access to the connection and the necessary maneuverability is considered. It would also have occurred with the additional half-moon shield if the foot had come up underneath the shield into the revolving knuckle.
True, the witness stated in his opinion that it “would be feasible and practical for a farm owner to adequately shield the power take-off” connection, and said he had seen some adaptations which he would consider adequate, that a half-moon extension shield was made to cover the power-driven bar, but he did not explain how they would protect against' one’s foot coming up underneath the shields when one in the vicinity slips and loses his balance, as plaintiff did here.
The ultimate effect of this opinion is that a farmer who buys two properly-shielded pieces of equipment, made to be used as he was using them, can be held liable for damages to an injured employee, even though the experienced employee concedes he did not consider the combination dangerous. The majority does not suggest what the farm employer should have done, except to use an extension shield not made or recommended for this purpose.
I find no actionable defendant negligence revealed by this record, and would reverse.
SNELL, STUART, and MASON, JJ., join in this dissent.