Court Opinion

ID: 9729171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:28:36.511914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:53.987055
License: Public Domain

*1165TERRY, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
With all respect, I cannot join my colleagues in affirming the judgment. I would reverse on the ground that the evidence relating to Gannon’s intoxication was irrelevant, inadmissible, and so inflammatory as to deprive appellant of a fair trial.
I
In addition to defending against the negligence claim on the merits, the District— over appellant’s objection — attempted to establish that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence because he voluntarily rode as a passenger in John Gannon’s car knowing that Gannon was drunk.1 In his opening statement, counsel for the District alerted the jury to this aspect of its case:
The evidence in this case will show that Mr. Weeda, Mr. Langley, and Mr. Gannon spent the evening of October 5th drinking. They visited at least a couple of bars. At around two o’clock on the morning of October 6th; they closed down a bar at 21st and Pennsylvania Avenue. Mr. Gannon had driven Mr. Langley and Mr. Weeda to that bar in a 1974 subcompact automobile. When they left the bar at around two o’clock that morning, the testimony will show that Mr. ... Gannon had drunk at least fifteen beers. He was drunk. And the evidence will further show that Mr. Wee-da knew that he was drunk. He not only knew that he was drunk, but his ability— his ability to drive was seriously impaired.
Thereafter counsel for the District, at every opportunity, elicited testimony to show that Gannon was drunk at the time of the accident and that appellant knew he was drunk. In his cross-examination of appellant, each and every question was related to this point:
Q. Mr. Weeda ... on that night you first went over to John Gannon’s house?
A. Yes.
Q. You had something to drink there? So did Mr. Gannon?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you went to a bar called “Manny’s” on Wisconsin Avenue?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Gannon again had some more drinks there? And then you went to “The 21st Amendment” and you all had some more drinks there?
A. Yes.
Q. You were drinking beer that night, weren’t you?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. When you left “The 21st Amendment” that night, you knew that Mr. Gannon was drunk, didn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that he would change lanes more quickly than usual?
A. Yes.
Q. He would make much sharper turns than normal?
A. Not every turn.
Q. I understand. But he would make the turns more sharply than usual?
A. Yes.
Q. He would also drive a lot faster than when he was not drunk?
A. No, he wouldn’t drive a whole lot faster.
Q. He would drive faster?
A. Right.
* * * * * *
*1166Q. In fact, Mr. Weeda, you thought that Mr. Gannon was a drunken, wild driver, didn’t you?
A. All the time?
Q. Not all the time. But on the occasion of this accident.
A. [Pause] I wouldn’t say “wild.” That is going a bit too far. But he was — he was drunk on the night of the accident.
* * * * * #
Q. You permitted him to drive away from that scene even though you knew that he was drunk?
A. Yes.
The District called John Gannon to the stand and again elicited testimony to support its theory that appellant was contribu-torily negligent. The entire direct examination of Gannon centered on this defense:
Q. Mr. Gannon, you were the driver of the automobile on the night that Mr. Weeda was injured?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. On October 5th, you left your house at about eight o’clock?
A. Around eight o’clock.
Q. Before you left your house, you had some beers to drink?
A. Yes.
Q. When you went out, you went out socializing with your friends, Mr. Langley and Mr. Weeda?
A. Yes.
Q. You were going out drinking with your friends?
A. Well, that was part of it.
Q. You went to “The 21st Amendment.” That is a bar in downtown D.C.?
A. Yes.
* * # # * *
Q. You stayed at “The 21st Amendment” until almost closing time?
A. Yes.
Q. That would have been close to two o’clock?
A. Yes.
Q. While you were at “The 21st Amendment,” you continued to drink beer, did you not?
A. Yes.
* * * % * *
Q. Mr. Gannon, your physical abilities were impaired on the night of the accident because of alcohol, were they not?
A. Yes.
Q. Your reaction time was slowed?
A. Yes.
Q. Your vision was impaired?
A. As far as I remember — it may have been impaired, yes.
Q. In fact, you were too drunk to drive that night, were you not?
A. Yes.
The District also introduced a medical record to show that Gannon’s blood alcohol level was .24 percent at the time of the accident, and presented testimony from a toxicologist to show that after he had drunk approximately fifteen beers, Gan-non’s judgment, reflexes, and vision were impaired.
At the close of all the evidence, the court ruled that appellant’s conduct on the night of the accident was negligent as a matter of law — which appellant never disputed — and that there was no factual issue for the jury to resolve with respect to his negligence. Accordingly, the court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence concerning appellant’s negligence. It also submitted two special interrogatories to the jury and charged it to answer question No. 1 first, and to consider question No. 2 only if it answered question No. 1 in the affirmative.2
After one day of deliberations, the jury informed the court that it had not reached a unanimous decision on the first interrogatory, but that it had, contrary to the court’s instructions, considered the second and unanimously agreed that the “alleged negligent acts or omissions of the employees of the District” did not proximately cause appellant’s quadriplegia. Upon this *1167finding the jury was discharged and judgment entered in favor of the District.
II
Contributory negligence is a valid defense to a personal injury action if, but only if, the plaintiffs injury results from the particular hazard or risk which made his conduct negligent. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 468 (1965); see, e.g., Helsley v. County of Kern, 42 Cal.App.3d 97, 106, 116 Cal.Rptr. 518, 522-523 (1974); Preece v. Harless, 662 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Ky.App.1983); Nesta v. Meyer, 100 N.J.Super. 434, 444-445, 242 A.2d 386, 391 (1968); Kulaga v. State, 37 A.D.2d 58, 61-62, 322 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545-546 (1971), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 756, 290 N.E.2d 437, 338 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1972); Fahringer v. Rinehimer, 283 Pa.Super. 93, 97-98, 423 A.2d 731, 733-734 (1980). In the words of the Restatement:
There is a difference to be noted between negligence and contributory negligence. Where the negligence of a defendant creates a risk of a particular harm, occurring in a particular manner, and the same harm is in fact brought about in another manner, through the operation of some intervening force which was not one of the hazards making up the original risk, the defendant normally is not relieved of responsibility by the intervention of the force, and is liable for the harm_ But where the negligence of the plaintiff creates a risk of a particular harm to him, occurring in a particular manner, and the same harm is in fact brought about by the intervention of a force which was not one of the original hazards, the plaintiff is not barred from recovery_
Restatement, supra at § 468 comment c (emphasis added). This difference between negligence and contributory negligence is due to the “more restrictive attitude of the courts toward contributory negligence, as compared with negligence, and their tendency to confine it within somewhat narrower limits.” Id.
In medical malpractice cases, for example, contributory negligence is a valid defense if the patient’s negligent act concurs with that of the physician and creates an unreasonable risk of improper medical treatment. See, e.g., Rochester v. Katalan, 320 A.2d 704 (Del.1974) (contributory negligence held to be a valid defense when a patient who solicited medication falsely told a physician he was a heroin addict, manifested symptoms of heroin withdrawal, and failed to reveal that he had consumed alcohol and librium earlier that day); Musachia v. Rosman, 190 So.2d 47 (Fla.App.1966) (contributory negligence held to be a valid defense when a patient failed to abide by his physician’s instructions); Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N.E.2d 803 (1944) (contributory negligence held to be a valid defense when a patient submitted to an injection by a physician who was grossly intoxicated). In such cases the defense is allowed because the patient’s injuries directly result from the particular hazard or risk which made his conduct negligent.
On the other hand, if the patient’s negligent act merely precedes that of the physician and provides the occasion for medical treatment, contributory negligence is not a permissible defense. See, e.g., Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480 (Fla.App.1975); Lamoree v. Binghamton General Hospital, 68 Misc.2d 1051, 329 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1972); Sendejar v. Alice Physicians & Surgeons Hospital, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); cf. Whitehead v. Linkous, 404 So.2d 377 (Fla.App.1981). In such a case the physician’s negligent act constitutes an intervening force, and the patient is therefore not barred from recovery.
In the instant case, appellant’s conduct on the night of the accident was negligent because it created an unreasonable risk that he would be injured in an automobile accident. Consequently, if this had been a trial on appellant’s claim against Gannon for injuries sustained in the automobile accident, Gannon could have successfully asserted the defense of contributory negligence. E.g., Todd v. Jackson, 109 U.S. App.D.C. 7, 283 F.2d 371 (1960). This is so because appellant’s injuries resulted from the particular hazard or risk which made his conduct negligent. Appellant’s suit, *1168however, was not against Gannon but against the District of Columbia. He sought damages not for injuries he sustained in the automobile accident but for injuries he sustained after the accident — injuries which he claimed were a direct and proximate result of improper emergency care by his rescuers, the District’s agents. Since these injuries did not result from the particular hazard or risk which made appellant’s conduct negligent, i.e., his riding in a car with a drunken driver, but were allegedly brought about by an intervening cause, i.e., the negligence of the rescuers, contributory negligence was not a valid defense. See Restatement, supra at § 468. Consequently, the evidence that Gannon was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that appellant knew he was intoxicated was irrelevant and inadmissible.
The trial court acted correctly when it instructed the jury to disregard the evidence of appellant’s negligence, but by then it was too late to repair the damage. Ordinarily, this court would presume (and indeed the majority does presume) that the jury obeyed the instruction and ignored the inadmissible evidence. “[Ujnless the contrary appears, or the circumstances are very unusual ... jurors should be presumed to have understood and followed the court’s instructions.” Hall v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 211, 171 F.2d 347, 349 (1948) (citations omitted). I do not believe we can apply the presumption here, however, for two reasons. First, the record affirmatively shows that the jury disregarded another instruction from the court, namely, the specific instruction that it should consider and answer the first interrogatory before moving on to the second. Thus, in the words of Hall, “the contrary appears.” Second, and more significantly, “the circumstances are very unusual.” The evidence of appellant’s negligence was highly inflammatory and quite extensive.3 Appellant’s awareness of Gan-non s intoxication was a major element of the District’s defense, and counsel for the District hammered away at it whenever he could. The District sought to depict appellant and his companions not as three nice young men out on a harmless lark, but as three wild and dangerous drunks. On this record, with such repeated emphasis on inadmissible evidence, no instruction could have cured the prejudice. See Smith v. Executive Club, Ltd., 458 A.2d 32, 42 (D.C.1983); Penwell v. District of Columbia, 31 A.2d 891, 893 (D.C.1943); Rice v. Louisville & N.R.R., 309 F.2d 930, 933-934 (6th Cir.1962); Worcester v. Pure Torpedo Co., 127 F.2d 945, 947-948 (7th Cir.1942).
The evidence of Gannon’s intoxication, and of appellant’s awareness of it, was not relevant to any valid defense in this case.4 In my view it was inflammatory in the extreme, and its admission tainted the entire proceedings. I would reverse the judgment and remand this case for a new trial.

. Appellant conceded at trial that his conduct was negligent but argued — as he does now — that contributory negligence was not a valid defense to his claim against the District of Columbia, and that the evidence to support that defense was therefore irrelevant and inadmissible.

. The instruction and the two special interrogatories are quoted in the majority opinion, ante at 1161-1162.

. I cannot agree with the majority that "the evidence of intoxication was far from the main focus of the District’s defense.” Ante at 1163. While the District also relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Kobrine and its attempt to discredit the testimony of Mr. Podell, the intoxication evidence was a significant part of its case.

. I agree with the majority that the evidence of appellant's intoxication (as opposed to Gan-non’s) had some relevance — not much, but enough to make it admissible. See ante at 1161.