Court Opinion

ID: 9513782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:40:32.099846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:02.131480
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 19] I respectfully dissent. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the addition of subsection 2 to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 in 1999 is a clear indication that the legislature intended to limit a trial court’s authority to order post-minority support.
[¶ 20] In 1998, this Court determined that, under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2, a trial court has the authority to order payment of post-minority support, including college education expenses, under appropriate circumstances. See Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, 581 N.W.2d 130. In the next legislative session following the Do-narski decision, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 was amended to include the current subsection 2 which reads as follows:
A judgment or order may require payment of child support after majority under substantially the circumstances described in subsection 1.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(2).
[¶ 21] The majority argues that the addition of subsection 2 in the first legislative session post-Donarski is indicative of the legislature’s intent to limit post-minority child support to only circumstances substantially similar to that allowed under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(1). I disagree.
[¶ 22] I am of the opinion that if it was the legislature’s intent to limit a trial court’s authority to award post-minority child support in situations other than that described in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(1), the legislature would have amended N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(6) to explicitly reflect that such an award is limited to circumstances where parents have a statutory duty to support adult children or would have eliminated altogether that part of subsection 6 which states “or if the court determines the support to be appropriate.” The amendment would not have been the addition of the new language of subsection 2. At the time Donarski was decided by our Court, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 read:
1. A judgment or order requiring the payment of child support until the child attains majority continues as to the child until the end of the month during which the child is graduated from high school or attains the age of nineteen years, whichever occurs first, if:
a. The child is enrolled and attending high school and is eighteen years of age prior to the date the child is expected to be graduated; and
b. The child resides with the person to whom the duty of support is owed.
2. The person to whom the duty of support is owed shall file an affidavit with the district court stating that *19the requirements of subsection 1 are met. The clerk of court shall serve the affidavit by first-class mail upon the person owing the duty of support. Upon the filing of the affidavit, the child support continues pursuant to subsection 1. If the person owing the duty of support files a motion with the court, within twenty days subsequent to service of the affidavit, requesting a hearing before the district court, the court shall determine if the requirements of subsection 1 are met and shall enter an order accordingly.
3. This section applies to child support orders concerning children described in subsection 1, regardless of the date of entry of the order, provided that the affidavit described in subsection 2 is filed not later than ninety days after the child graduates from high school or reaches age nineteen,'whichever comes first.
4. This section does not preclude the entry of an order for child support which continues after the child reaches age eighteen, if the parties agree or if the court determines the support to be appropriate.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 (1993). Donarski dealt specifically with the interpretation of subsection 4, which became subsection 6 when the legislature amended N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 in 1999. 1999 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 143, § 1. The wording of these two subsections is identical.
[¶ 23] In Donarski, the parties did not agree to an entry of child support which continued after the child turned eighteen. The only authority for the trial court order of an award of college expenses is the language of the statute:
4. This section does not preclude the entry of an order for child support which continues after the child reaches age-eighteen ... if the court determines the support to be appropriate.
Id. at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). A majority of our Court héld in Donarski that this very statutory language granted a trial court authority to extend child support beyond the age of majority for college expenses based upon full consideration of the particular circumstances of each case and described “the factors a court must consider in directing a parent to pay for costs of a child’s college education.” Id. at ¶ 20. We held “a parent cannot be compelled to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses if the parent’s financial resources are lacking.” Id. at ¶ 21. Clearly college expenses will not be awarded in every case nor, if they are awarded, will the same amount be awarded in every case.
[¶ 24] As pointed out earlier, the language interpreted and relied on by our Court in Donarski has not been changed by the legislature despite the fact it met in 1999, 2001, and 2003.
[¶ 25] The majority in the present case, however, relies on the addition of a new subsection 2 to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 in 1999 to conclude that the legislature disagreed with our Court’s decision in Donar-ski and decided to limit a trial court’s authority to enter an order awarding child support beyond graduation from high school or the age of nineteen. The only basis for that interpretation is the timing of the amendment to add the new subsection 2. The majority interprets the new subsection'2 to allow “a court to award child support after majority only under circumstances similar to that of a child who obtains the age of majority before he or she graduates from high school; ...” and not for college expenses. The majority then attempts to explain away the unaltered language of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-*2008.2(6) by incorporating the arguments of the dissenters to the majority opinion of Donarski Donarski 1998 ND 128, ¶ 42, 581 N.W.2d 130 (Sandstrom, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) and (Vande-Walle, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 26] There is, however, another logical interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(2). Subsection 2, which reads, “A judgment or order may require payment of child support after majority under substantially the circumstances described in subsection 1,” can be read to require a judgment or order which requires child support to continue “until the end of the month during which the child is graduated from high school or attains the age of nineteen years, whichever occurs first” is subject to the circumstances (a) and (b) described in subsection 1. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(l)(a) and (b). The requirements of subsection 1 are:
a. The child is enrolled and attending high school and is eighteen years of age prior to the date the child is expected to be graduated; and
b. The child resides with the person to whom the duty of support is owed.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(1).
[¶ 27] “We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which would render part of the statute mere surplusage. When a statute’s language is ambiguous because it is susceptible to differing but rational meanings, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, along with the language of the statute, to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 105; see also N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39.
[¶ 28] Although the available legislative history is limited in this circumstance, there is no indication the legislature enacted N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(2) as a response to our Court’s decision in Donarski In fact, the existing legislative history indicates that it was another reason entirely that prompted the legislature to add subsection 2 to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2. The following testimony was offered by Blaine Nordwall on behalf of the Department of Human Services to explain the proposed changes to the statute:
The department supports Senate Bill 2073.

During discussions with the regional child support enforcement office staff, they raised concerns about the existing administration of section lf-09-08.2.

• Some clerks were charging a filing fee for filing an affidavit that an 18-year old is still in high school.
• It has become common for child support orders to require payment of child support after majority, using language parallel to that found in section lf-09-08.2, but which technically removes those orders from the description in subsection 1 (an “order requiring the payment of child support until the child attains majority’).
• Treatment concerning support during summer vacations remains variable.
• Obligors have complained that they should be permitted to bring a motion to end the child support if an 18-year old drops out of school.
Senate Bill 2073 resolves all of these problems. It would eliminate the possibility of a filing fee (page 1, line 21). It would apply the section to orders that already require payment of support after the child’s majority (page 1, lines If and 15). It would specify treatment during summer vacations (page 2, lines 14 through 16). And it would give the obligor both knowledge of where the *21child is enrolled and an opportunity to ask the court to terminate support if the child leaves high school (pagel, lines 18 and 19, and page 2, lines 2 through 5). For all of these reasons, the Department of Human Services urges this committee to recommend a “do pass” on Senate Bill No. 2073.
Hearing on S.B. 2073 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 56th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 11, 1999) (testimony of Blaine Nord-wall, Director, Legal Advisory Unit, Department of Human Services) (emphasis added). It appears the 1999 amendments were made to clarify the administration of the requirements that the child is enrolled and attending high school and living with the custodial parent in order for the extension of support after a child turns 18.
[¶ 29] The fact that courts were entering judgments that did not end support at the age of majority, but extended support beyond the age of majority took those orders out of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(1) and it was necessary, therefore, to enact subsection 2 to cover those judgments.
[¶ 30] The legislature’s failure to amend N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(6), along with the absence of any discussion related to restricting a trial court’s authority to order post-minority support for college expenses based on Donarski, prior to the 1999 addition of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(2), convinces me that the majority has not correctly ascertained the legislature’s intent in this matter.
[¶ 31] I, therefore, dissent and would remand the case to the trial court to apply the statute and our holding in Donarski, 1998 ND 128, 581 N.W.2d 130.
[¶ 32] Mary Muehlen Maring