Court Opinion

ID: 9741519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:57:14.876325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.504542
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I cannot join the majority in its opinion. In reversing the Court of Appeals deci*432sion, the majority elevates form over substance and achieves an unjust result. I would grant leave to consider whether the notice requirements contained in Michigan’s General Property Tax Act1 satisfy the due process requirements imposed by the state and federal constitutions.
This case presents an important constitutional question that deserves a full hearing. A per curiam opinion is an inadequate vehicle to address it.
The facts presented by this case are troubling. Apparently, the Treasury Department complied with the letter of the notice statute when it mailed tax statements to the address for defendant that appeared on the tax rolls. From a technical standpoint, the General Property Tax Act required nothing more of the department. Yet, its failure, upon getting back undeliverable mailings to defendant, to obtain defendant’s current address from its sister department, the Corporations and Securities Bureau, may well have been unreasonable under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
The mere fact that a statute prescribes detailed steps aimed at ensuring “reasonable notice” does not mean that conforming notice inevitably will be reasonable. The Legislature could not contemplate every conceivable circumstance. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the notice attempted must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of [state] action [against them] and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v Central Hanover *433Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314; 70 S Ct 652; 94 L Ed 865 (1950).
In this case, the department’s actions, while in technical compliance with the statute, did not give defendant notice and may have failed the reasonableness test imposed by Mullane. From the perspective of the corporate defendant, the majority’s decision renders an unjust result. The defendant corporation, like the department, performed every act required of it by law. When it changed its corporate address and agent, it informed the appropriate state office.
The majority resolves the case in a way that deprives defendant of its property without it ever receiving actual notice that it owed taxes or of a tax foreclosure sale. Defendant had reason to believe it had paid all taxes due. It is difficult to reconcile such a result with the spirit of the statute, which strives to ensure reasonable notice and protect the constitutional rights of property owners.
In my view, the notice statute, inasmuch as it seeks to achieve reasonableness, may have required more from the state in this instance. When the department receives notice that its tax bills directed to a corporation are undeliverable at a certain address, reasonableness may require one more step: an inquiry to the Corporations and Securities Bureau to check for a current address. See, e.g., Patrick v Rice, 112 NM 285, 288; 814 P2d 463 (1991) (“Determining that the division complied with applicable notice statutes resolves only half the question on appeal. . . . [T]he notice of such [sale] must comply with minimum due process standards”); O'Brien v Port Lawrence Title & Trust Co, 87 Ohio Misc 2d 10, 16; 688 NE2d 1136 (1997) (holding that, although the applicable statute was sat*434isfied, due process was not); Tracy v Chester Co, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa 288, 296-297; 489 A2d 1334 (1985).
The feasability of requiring this step should be explored during this appeal. It may be revealed that requiring it would not turn the department into a sleuthing operation, nor have a devastating ripple effect on the title insurance industry. A full exploration of it might show that it would ensure reasonable notice under the narrow circumstances presented by this case.
The Court should follow the lead of the Court of Appeals and consider interpreting the statute to require this simple, common-sense step where a corporate change of address is involved. The department’s inaction in this case may have failed to give the constitutionally required reasonable notice despite being in compliance with the statute. Therefore, the Court should grant leave to consider this important constitutional rights and property rights issue.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 MCL 211.1 et seq.; MSA 7.1 et seq.