Court Opinion

ID: 9747899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:41:36.347967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:28.427563
License: Public Domain

ZEL M. FISCHER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion except as to the proportionality analysis. I concur that Davis’ capital sentence is proportional to his crimes. A comparison of similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed shows Davis’ sentence is proportional and not imposed in a freakish or wanton manner. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. banc 2008) (a conviction of first degree murder, rape and armed criminal action); State v. Link, 25 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. banc 2000) (a conviction of first degree murder, kidnapping and forcible rape); State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. banc 1996) (a conviction of first degree murder; the facts showed a sexual assault occurred during the commission of the crime).
For the first time in more than 17 years, in a principal opinion of this Court, proportionality review requires consideration of all “similar” cases including cases that resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment *646without the possibility of probation or parole. This departure from the longstanding precedent of proportionality review requiring the consideration of “similar” cases resulting in a death sentence is in my opinion an inaccurate statutory interpretation. The principal opinion asserts that the requirement that this Court consider both life sentence and death sentence cases in its statutory proportionality review results from a plain reading of § 565.035, RSMo 2000. Although that statute requires this Court to collect information on such cases, the statute’s explicit language, contrary to the inference drawn by the principal opinion, leaves to this Court’s discretion the use to make of that information. The statute explicitly states that the Court shall have “whatever extracted information the [CJourt desires with respect” to the information collected, and that the Court “shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration.” Section 565.035.6, .5 (emphasis added). Nowhere is there “plain language” requiring this Court to consider both life sentence and death sentence cases in conducting its statutory review. See § 565.035.3, .5, .6.
As I noted in the principal opinion in State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 552 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. banc 1993)), the circumstances concerning the appropriateness of capital punishment is a very serious and ongoing public concern. As such, it would be a rare scenario that the legislature would leave the holding in Ramsey — that review is of similar cases where death is imposed — unaddressed for 17 years. At this point, our legislature should readdress this issue to make it clear to the members of this Court what type of statutory proportionality review, if any, should be required.
Statutory proportionality review is not required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Eighth Amendment proportionality as defined by the United States Supreme Court evaluates a particular defendant’s culpability for his crime in relation to the punishment that he has received. Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 305 (6th Cir.2007). It does not require a comparison of the defendant’s sentence to that of similarly situated defendants. Id. Section 565.035.3 is an additional safeguard beyond the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. “By statutorily incorporating a form of comparative proportionality review that compares a defendant’s death sentence to others who have also received a sentence of death, [a] death penalty regime actually adds an additional safeguard beyond the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.” Getsy, 495 F.3d at 306. “ ‘Since proportionality review is not required by the Constitution, states have great latitude in defining the pool of cases used for comparison’; therefore, ‘limiting proportionality review to other cases already decided by the reviewing court in which the death penalty has been imposed’ falls within this wide latitude.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 962-63 (6th Cir.2004)).