Court Opinion

ID: 2963716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:14:13.281651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:45.076656
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1275

                               RONALD C. BROWN, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                    HOT, SEXY AND SAFER PRODUCTIONS, INC., ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           and Dom nguez,* District Judge.
                                           ______________
                                _____________________

               John L. Roberts for appellant.
               _______________
               John  Foskett, with  whom Deutsch  Williams Brooks  DeRensis
               _____________             __________________________________
          Holland & Drachman,  P.C., Paul  F. Degnan, Nancy  Kirk, Kirby  &
          _________________________  _______________  ___________  ________
          Associates, Mary  L. Bonauto,  Bennett H.  Klein,  Gay &  Lesbian
          __________  ________________   _________________
          Advocates & Defenders, Neila  J. Straub and Straub &  Meyers were
                                 ________________     ________________
          on joint  brief for appellees Chelmsford  School Committee, Wendy
          Marcks, Mary  E. Frantz, Richard  H. Moser,  David S.  Troughton,
          George J.  Betses,  Suzanne  Landolphi  and  Hot,  Sexy  &  Safer
          Productions,  Inc.;  Frances  S.   Cohen,  with  whom  Monica  L.
                               ___________________               __________
          Phillips,  Hill &  Barlow, Susan  Wunsch and  Massachusetts Civil
          ________   ______________  _____________
          Liberties Union  Foundation were  on brief for  appellees Michael
          Gilchrist and Judith Hass.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 23, 1995
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   The plaintiffs are two minors
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          and their parents.  The minors allege that they were compelled to

          attend an  indecent AIDS and  sex education program  conducted at

          their  public  high school  by  defendant  Hot,  Sexy  and  Safer

          Productions ("Hot,  Sexy, and Safer").   Plaintiffs allege, inter
                                                                      _____

          alia, that  the compelled attendance deprived the minors of their
          ____

          privacy rights and their right to an educational environment free

          from  sexual   harassment.    The  district   court  granted  the

          defendants'  motion  to  dismiss  under  Federal  Rule  of  Civil

          Procedure 12(b)(6).  We affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    The  plaintiffs  are  Chelmsford High  School  students

          Jason P. Mesiti ("Mesiti") and Shannon Silva ("Silva"), and their

          parents  Ronald and Suzanne  Brown ("the Browns"),  and Carol and

          Richard Dubreuil  ("the Dubreuils").   The  plaintiffs' complaint

          alleges the following facts,  which we take as true  for purposes

          of this  appeal.  On April  8, 1992, Mesiti and  Silva attended a

          mandatory,  school-wide  "assembly"  at Chelmsford  High  School.

          Both students were  fifteen years old at the time.   The assembly

          consisted  of a  ninety-minute presentation characterized  by the

          defendants as  an AIDS awareness  program (the  "Program").   The

          Program  was staged  by defendant  Suzi Landolphi  ("Landolphi"),

          contracting  through  defendant Hot,  Sexy,  and  Safer, Inc.,  a

          corporation wholly owned by Landolphi.

                    Plaintiffs allege that Landolphi gave sexually explicit

          monologues  and participated  in  sexually suggestive  skits with

                                         -2-

          several  minors  chosen from  the  audience.   Specifically,  the

          complaint alleges that Landolphi:  1) told the students that they

          were  going to  have  a "group  sexual experience,  with audience

          participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language to

          describe  body parts  and excretory  functions; 3)  advocated and

          approved  oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and

          condom  use  during  promiscuous  premarital  sex;  4)  simulated

          masturbation;  5) characterized the loose pants worn by one minor

          as "erection wear";  6) referred  to being in  "deep sh--"  after

          anal sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized  condom with her,

          after which  she had a female minor pull it over the male minor's

          entire head and blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display

          his "orgasm face"  with her  for the camera;  9) informed a  male

          minor  that  he  was  not  having  enough  orgasms;  10)  closely

          inspected a minor and told him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made

          eighteen references to orgasms,  six references to male genitals,

          and eight references to female genitals.

                    Plaintiffs maintain  that the sexually  explicit nature

          of  Landolphi's speech  and  behavior humiliated  and intimidated

          Mesiti  and Silva.   Moreover,  many students  copied Landolphi's

          routines and  generally displayed overtly sexual  behavior in the

          weeks following  the Program, allegedly exacerbating  the minors'

          harassment.  The  complaint does  not allege that  either of  the

          minor plaintiffs  actually participated in  any of the  skits, or

          were the direct objects of any of Landolphi's comments.

                    The complaint names eight co-defendants along with Hot,

                                         -3-

          Sexy, and Safer,  and Landolphi, alleging  that each played  some

          role in planning, sponsoring, producing, and compelling the minor

          plaintiffs' attendance at the Program.  In March  1992, defendant

          Judith Hass  ("Hass"), then chairperson of  the Chelmsford Parent

          Teacher Organization  (the  "PTO"), initiated  negotiations  with

          Hot, Sexy,  and Safer.   Hass  and  defendant Michael  Gilchrist,

          M.D., also a member of the PTO, as well as  the school physician,

          viewed a  promotional videotape  of segments of  Landolphi's past

          performances  and  then recommended  the  Program  to the  school

          administration.    On  behalf  of   defendant  Chelmsford  School

          Committee  (the "School Committee"),  Hass executed  an agreement

          with Hot, Sexy, and  Safer, and authorized the release  of $1,000

          of Chelmsford school funds to pay Landolphi's fee.

                    The  complaint  also  names  as  defendants  two  other

          members of the School Committee, Wendy Marcks and Mary E. Frantz,

          as well as the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of the

          Chelmsford  Public  Schools,  Richard  H.  Moser,  and  David  S.

          Troughton, and the Principal of Chelmsford High School, George J.

          Betses.   Plaintiffs allege that all  the defendants participated

          in the decisions to hire Landolphi, and to compel the students to

          attend  the Program.  All the  defendants were physically present

          during the Program.

                    A  school  policy  adopted   by  the  School  Committee

          required   "[p]ositive   subscription,   with  written   parental

          permission"  as   a   prerequisite  to   "instruction  in   human

          sexuality."   The  plaintiffs allege,  however, that  the parents

                                         -4-

          were not given advance notice of the content of the Program or an

          opportunity  to  excuse their  children  from  attendance at  the

          assembly.

                    The   district  court  granted  defendants'  motion  to

          dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, pursuant  to Federal Rule of Civil

          Procedure  12(b)(6), for  failure  to state  a  claim upon  which

          relief  may be granted, and  also dismissed the  state law claims

          under  the supplemental  jurisdiction principles  of 28  U.S.C.  

          1367.1   The  district court  deferred entry  of final  judgment,

          giving plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint curative  of

          the deficiencies by February  10, 1995.  Plaintiffs failed  to do

          so, and final judgment  was entered on March 3,  1995, dismissing

          their claims. 

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    We  exercise de  novo  review over  a district  court's
                                 ________

          dismissal  of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Vartanian v. Monsanto
                                                      _________    ________

          Co., 14  F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1994); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co.
          ___                                     ____    _________________

          of America, 924  F.2d 1161, 1165 (1st Cir. 1991).   We accept the
          __________

          allegations  of the  complaint  as true,  and determine  whether,

          under any theory, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause

          of action in accordance with the law.  Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 700;
                                                 _________

          Knight v. Mills,  836 F.2d 659  (1st Cir.  1987).  Although,  our
          ______    _____

          review is plenary, an appeal is not an opportunity to conjure new

                              
          ____________________

          1   28 U.S.C.   1367(c)  gives a court discretion  to "decline to
          exercise  supplemental  jurisdiction  over a  [state  law]  claim
          [where] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
          has original jurisdiction."

                                         -5-

          arguments  not  raised  before  the  district  court.    McCoy v.
                                                                   _____

          Massachusetts  Inst. of Tech., 950  F.2d 13, 22  (1st Cir. 1991),
          _____________________________

          cert.  denied, 112 S. Ct.  1939 (1992).   In addition, "[b]ecause
          _____________

          only  well pleaded facts are taken as  true, we will not accept a

          complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law."

          Washington  Legal Found.  v. Massachusetts  Bar Found.,  993 F.2d
          ________________________     _________________________

          962, 971 (1st  Cir. 1993)(citations  omitted).  We  may affirm  a

          district   court's  dismissal   order  under   any  independently

          sufficient grounds.  Id.
                               __

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    The  plaintiffs  seek  both  declaratory  and  monetary

          relief, alleging  that the school sponsored  program deprived the

          minor  plaintiffs of:  (1)  their privacy rights  under the First

          and  Fourteenth  Amendments;  (2) their  substantive  due process

          rights  under  the First  and  Fourteenth  Amendments; (3)  their

          procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and

          (4) their First  Amendment rights under the Free  Exercise Clause

          (in  conjunction with  a  deprivation of  the parent  plaintiffs'

          right to direct  and control the  upbringing of their  children).

          Plaintiffs  also  allege  that  the Program  created  a  sexually

          hostile  educational environment in violation of  Title IX of the

          Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.   1681 et seq.2 
                                                         __ ___

                    As an  initial matter,  we briefly  address defendants'

          assertion of  the defense of qualified immunity.  Plaintiffs seek

                              
          ____________________

          2   The complaint also  alleges five state  law claims which  are
          irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.

                                         -6-

          monetary damages  under 42 U.S.C.   1983,3  and defendants assert

          the  affirmative defense  of  qualified  immunity, which  shields

          public   officials   performing   discretionary  functions   from

          liability for civil  damages "insofar as  their conduct does  not

          violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

          which  a   reasonable  person  would  have  known."    Harlow  v.
                                                                 ______

          Fitzgerald,  457 U.S.  800,  818 (1982).    A right  is  "clearly
          __________

          established" if,  at the  time of the  alleged violation,  "[t]he

          contours of the right [are]  sufficiently clear that a reasonable

          official  would understand  that what he  is doing  violates that

          right."  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  "[T]he
                   ________    _________

          relevant  question is  whether a  reasonable official  could have

          believed his actions  were lawful in light of clearly established

          law and the information the official possessed at the time of his

          allegedly unlawful conduct."   Singer v. Maine, 49 F.3d  837, 844
                                         ______    _____

          (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).    The  Supreme  Court   has

          explained that: "A necessary  concomitant to the determination of

          whether  the  constitutional right  asserted  by  a plaintiff  is

          'clearly established'  at the  time  the defendant  acted is  the

          determination of  whether the plaintiff has  asserted a violation

          of a constitutional right at all."   Siegert v. Gilley, 500  U.S.
                                               _______    ______

          226,  232 (1991).    Therefore, "before  even reaching  qualified

          immunity,  a   court  of  appeals  must   ascertain  whether  the

          appellants have asserted a violation of a constitutional right at
                              
          ____________________

          3   Section 1983 provides a remedy  against any person who, under
          color   of  state  law,  deprives   a  citizen  of   his  or  her
          constitutional rights.  42 U.S.C.   1983.

                                         -7-

          all."  Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st  Cir. 1993); Singer,
                 _________    ____                                  ______

          49  F.3d  at  844.    Thus,  as  a  predicate  to  the  objective

          reasonableness  inquiry,  "a  plaintiff  must  establish  that  a

          particular defendant violated the plaintiff's federally protected

          rights."  Singer, 49 F.3d at 844 (citations omitted).
                    ______

                    Accordingly, we first  address each of  the plaintiffs'

          claims to determine  whether it  states a cause  of action  under

          federal   law.    If  any  of  the  claims  meet  this  threshold

          requirement,  we will  then  proceed to  the  issue of  qualified

          immunity.

          I.  Privacy Rights and Substantive Due Process
          I.  Privacy Rights and Substantive Due Process
              __________________________________________

                    The  Fourteenth  Amendment  provides that  "[n]o  State

          shall  .  . .  deprive any  person  of life  liberty  or property

          without due  process  of law."    U.S.  Const. amend  XIV.    The

          substantive component  of due  process protects  against "certain

          government actions  regardless of the fairness  of the procedures

          used to implement them."  Daniels v. Williams, 474  U.S. 327, 331
                                    _______    ________

          (1986).   See also Pittsley  v. Warish, 927  F.2d 3, 6  (1st Cir.
                    ________ ________     ______

          1991)  (comparing  substantive  due  process  to  procedural  due

          process) (citing  Monroe v. Pape,  365 U.S. 167,  171-72 (1961)).
                            ______    ____

          There  are two  theories  under which  a  plaintiff may  bring  a

          substantive due process claim.  Under the first, a plaintiff must

          demonstrate a  deprivation of  an identified liberty  or property

          interest protected  by the  Fourteenth Amendment.   Pittsley, 927
                                                              ________

          F.2d at 6 (citing Meyer  v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399  (1923)).
                            _____     ________

          Under  the second,  a  plaintiff is  not  required to  prove  the

                                         -8-

          deprivation  of a  specific  liberty or  property interest,  but,

          rather,  he  must prove  that  the  state's conduct  "shocks  the

          conscience."   Id. at 6  (quoting Rochin v.  California, 342 U.S.
                         __                 ______     __________

          165, 172 (1952)).  Plaintiffs contend that compelling the minors'

          attendance at  the Program constitutes a  substantive due process

          violation under both tests.

                    A.  Conscience Shocking Behavior
                    A.  Conscience Shocking Behavior
                        ____________________________

                    Plaintiffs'  claim  that  the  defendants   engaged  in

          conscience  shocking  behavior  when  they  compelled  the  minor

          plaintiffs  to attend  the Program.   The  Supreme Court  set the

          standard for analyzing claims  of conscience shocking behavior in

          Rochin.  In  that case, the Court held  that the government could
          ______

          not  use  evidence  obtained  by pumping  a  defendant's  stomach

          against  his  will  because  the  state  actor's conduct  was  so

          egregious that  it "shock[ed]  the conscience" and  offended even

          "hardened  sensibilities."  Rochin, 342  U.S. at 172.   The Court
                                      ______

          explained that the stomach pumping employed by the state was "too

          close  to  the  rack  and   screw  to  permit  of  constitutional

          differentiation."  Id. 
                             __

                    Similarly, we have found "conscience  shocking" conduct

          only  where the  state  actors engaged  in "extreme  or intrusive

          physical conduct."   Souza v. Pina,  53 F.3d  423, 427 (1st  Cir.
                               _____    ____

          1995); Harrington v.  Almy, 977  F.2d 37, 43-44  (1st Cir.  1992)
                 __________     ____

          (reasonable fact-finder could  find "conscience shocking" conduct

          where a police officer  charged with child abuse was  required to

                                         -9-

          take   a   penile  plethysmograph4   as   a   condition  of   his

          reinstatement).   See  also Garc a  v. Meira,  817 F.2d  650, 655
                            _________ ______     _____

          (10th Cir. 1987) (corporal punishment of students may  "shock the

          conscience"   if   it   "caused   injury  so   severe,   was   so

          disproportionate  to the need  presented, and was  so inspired by

          malice or  sadism . . . that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane

          abuse  of official power") (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
                                              ____    ______

          613 (4th Cir. 1980)).

                    Although we  have not  foreclosed the  possibility that

          words or verbal  harassment may  constitute "conscious  shocking"

          behavior  in violation  of  substantive due  process rights,  see
                                                                        ___

          Souza, 53 F.3d at 427; Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6, our review of the
          _____                  ________

          caselaw indicates that  the threshold for alleging such claims is

          high and that the facts alleged here do not rise to that level.

                    In Souza, the plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor had
                       _____

          caused  the suicide of her son by conducting press conferences in

          which he  encouraged the media  to link  the son to  a string  of

          serial  murders.     The  plaintiff  further   alleged  that  the

          prosecutor knew of her son's suicidal tendencies and should  have

          known  that  he would  take  his  own life  as  a  result of  the

          accusations.  Although  we "pause[d] to make clear that we do not

          condone the conduct alleged by Souza," we nevertheless found that

          the conduct was  not "conscience  shocking."  Souza,  53 F.3d  at
                                                        _____

          424-27.
                              
          ____________________

          4   A penile plethysmograph assesses a person's sexual profile by
          the  placement of a gauge  on the subjects'  penis while he views
          various sexually explicit slides of both adults and children. 

                                         -10-

                    In Pittsley, police officers told two young children --
                       ________

          ages  four and ten  -- that  "if we ever  see your  father on the

          street again, you'll never see him again."  Pittsley, 927 F.2d at
                                                      ________

          5.  When  the police subsequently arrested the children's father,

          they  "use[d] vulgar language"  and refused  to let  the children

          give their  father a hug and kiss goodbye.  Id.  In affirming the
                                                      __

          directed verdicts  for defendants, we explained:   "As despicable

          and wrongful as it may  have been, the single threat made  by the

          officers is not sufficient to 'shock the conscience.'"  Id. at 7.
                                                                  __

                    The  facts alleged  at bar are  less severe  than those

          found insufficient in Souza and Pittsley.  The minor teenagers in
                                _____     ________

          this  case were  compelled  to attend  a  sexually explicit  AIDS

          awareness  assembly without  prior  parent approval.   While  the

          defendants'  failure  to  provide  opt-out  procedures  may  have

          displayed a certain callousness  towards the sensibilities of the

          minors, their  acts do  not approach the  mean-spirited brutality

          evinced  by the defendants in Souza and Pittsley.  We accordingly
                                        _____     ________

          hold that the acts alleged here, taken as true, do not constitute

          conscience shocking and thus fail to state a claim under Rochin.
                                                                   ______

                    B.  Protected Liberty Interests
                    B.  Protected Liberty Interests
                        ___________________________

                    The  Supreme  Court  has   held  that  the   Fourteenth

          Amendment  encompasses  a  privacy right  that  protects  against

          significant   government   intrusions   into   certain   personal

          decisions.   See Roe  v. Wade,  410 U.S. 113,  152 (1973).   This
                       ___ ___     ____

          right of privacy  "has some extension  to activities relating  to

          marriage, procreation, contraception,  family relationships,  and

                                         -11-

          child  rearing   and  education."     Id.   (citations  omitted).
                                                __

          Nevertheless,  the Supreme  Court has  explained that  only those

          rights  that "can  be  deemed 'fundamental'  or 'implicit  in the

          concept of  ordered liberty'  are included  in this guarantee  of

          personal privacy."  Id. (quoting  Palko v. Connecticut, 302  U.S.
                              __            _____    ___________

          319,  325  (1937)).    Regulations  limiting  these  "fundamental

          rights" may be justified "only by a 'compelling state interest' .

          . . [and]  must be narrowly drawn to express  only the legitimate

          interests at stake."  Id. (citations omitted).
                                __

                      1.  Right to Rear Children
                      1.  Right to Rear Children
                          ______________________

                    Parent-plaintiffs allege that  the defendants  violated

          their privacy  right to direct  the upbringing of  their children

          and educate  them in  accord with  their own  views.  This,  they

          maintain, is a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" and

          thus  can only be infringed upon a showing of a "compelling state

          interest" that cannot be achieved by any less restrictive means.

                    The genesis of the  right claimed here can be  found in

          Meyer v.  Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of
          _____     ________                           ______    __________

          Sisters, 268  U.S. 510, 535 (1925).   In Meyer, the  Court struck
          _______                                  _____

          down  a  state  law  forbidding instruction  in  certain  foreign

          languages  in part  because  it arbitrarily  interfered with  the

          "right  of  parents"  to   procure  such  instruction  for  their

          children.   Meyer, 262 U.S.  at 400.   In so  holding, the  Court
                      _____

          stated:

                      While  this  Court has  not  attempted to
                      define   with   exactness   the   liberty
                      [guaranteed by the due process  clause of
                      the Fourteenth Amendment],  the term  has

                                         -12-

                      received much consideration  and some  of
                      the included things have  been definitely
                      stated.   Without  doubt, it  denotes not
                      merely freedom from bodily  restraint but
                      also  the  right  of  the  individual  to
                      contract, to  engage in any of the common
                      occupations  of  life, to  acquire useful
                      knowledge, to marry,  to establish a home
                      and bring  up  children, to  worship  God
                      according  to the  dictates  of  his  own
                      conscience, and generally to  enjoy those
                      privileges long recognized at  common law
                      as  essential to  the orderly  pursuit of
                      happiness by free men.

          Id. at 399.
          __

                    Two years later the Court in Pierce struck down a state
                                                 ______

          statute requiring public school attendance -- and thus precluding

          attendance  at  parochial  schools --  because  it  "unreasonably

          interfere[d] with the  liberty of parents or guardians  to direct

          the upbringing  and education  of children under  their control."

          268 U.S. at  534-35.  The  Meyer and Pierce decisions  have since
                                     _____     ______

          been  interpreted by  the Court  as recognizing  that, under  our

          Constitutional  scheme, "the  custody,  care and  nurture of  the

          child reside first in the parents."  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
                                               ______    _____________

          U.S. 158, 166 (1944);  see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-
                                 ___ _________    _____

          33 (1972).

                    Nevertheless, the Meyer  and Pierce cases were  decided
                                      _____      ______

          well  before the  current  "right to  privacy" jurisprudence  was

          developed,  and the Supreme Court  has yet to  decide whether the

          right to direct the upbringing and education of one's children is

          among   those  fundamental   rights  whose   infringement  merits

          heightened scrutiny.  We  need not decide here whether  the right

          to  rear one's children is fundamental because we find that, even

                                         -13-

          if  it  were,  the  plaintiffs  have  failed  to  demonstrate  an

          intrusion of constitutional magnitude on this right.5

                    The  Meyer  and  Pierce  cases, we  think,  evince  the
                         _____       ______

          principle  that the state cannot  prevent parents from choosing a

          specific  educational   program  --  whether   it  be   religious

          instruction  at a  private  school or  instruction  in a  foreign

          language.    That  is,  the state  does  not  have  the power  to

          "standardize  its children"  or "foster  a homogenous  people" by

          completely foreclosing the opportunity  of individuals and groups

          to choose a different path of education.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402,
                                                    _____

          discussed in, Tribe,  supra,   15-6 at  1319.   We do not  think,
          ____________          _____

          however,   that   this    freedom   encompasses   a   fundamental

          constitutional  right to  dictate  the curriculum  at the  public

                              
          ____________________

          5  The  issue is muddled because the Meyer  and Pierce cases were
                                               _____      ______
          decided  on the grounds that the "statute as applied is arbitrary
          and without reasonable relation to any  end within the competency
          of the state."   Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-
                           _____                   ______
          36.  Indeed, the  opinions indicate that something less  than the
          current  "compelling  state  interest"  test  was  then  used  to
          evaluate a substantive due process challenge involving one of the
          listed liberty interests:  "The established doctrine is that this
          liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
          the public  interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or
          without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
          of the  State to effect."   Meyer, 262 U.S. at  399-400; see also
                                      _____                        ________
          Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
          ______

             Moreover,  it should be noted that these cases were decided in
          the 1920's, before the  Bill of Rights was incorporated  into the
          Fourteenth  Amendment, and  would  probably be  decided today  on
          First  Amendment   grounds.     Rotunda  &  Nowak,   Treatise  on
                                                               ____________
          Constitutional Law:   Substance  and Procedure,     21.7 (2d  ed.
          ______________________________________________
          1992); Laurence H. Tribe, American  Constitutional Law,   15-6 at
                                    ____________________________
          1319-20  (1988)   (suggesting   that  they   reflect  the   First
          Amendment's  limit  on  the  state's  ability  to  "contract  the
          spectrum   of   available   knowledge")   (quoting   Griswold  v.
                                                               ________
          Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
          ___________

                                         -14-

          school  to which they  have chosen to  send their children.   See
                                                                        ___

          Rotunda  &  Nowak,  supra,     18.28  n.25.    We  think   it  is
                              _____

          fundamentally  different for the state  to say to  a parent, "You

          can't teach your child German or send him to a parochial school,"

          than for  the parent to  say to  the state, "You  can't teach  my

          child  subjects that  are morally  offensive to  me."   The first

          instance involves  the state  proscribing parents from  educating

          their  children, while  the second  involves parents  prescribing

          what the state shall teach their  children.  If all parents had a

          fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what the

          schools  teach their  children, the  schools would  be forced  to

          cater a  curriculum for each  student whose  parents had  genuine

          moral disagreements  with the school's choice  of subject matter.

          We  cannot see  that the  Constitution imposes  such a  burden on

          state educational  systems, and accordingly find  that the rights

          of parents  as described by Meyer  and Pierce do not  encompass a
                                      _____      ______

          broad-based  right to  restrict the  flow  of information  in the

          public schools.6  

                      2.  Right to be Free from Offensive Speech
                      2.  Right to be Free from Offensive Speech
                          ______________________________________
                              
          ____________________

          6  Plaintiffs claim  that Alfonso v. Fern ndez, 606  N.Y.S.2d 259
                                    _______    _________
          (A.D.2  Dept. 1993),  supports  their position  that they  have a
          fundamental right to preclude  the schools from teaching subjects
          that they find objectionable.  The court in Alfonso did hold that
                                                      _______
          the parental right to direct the upbringing of their children was
          fundamental and that it  was violated by a program  providing for
          condom  distribution at  a  public  high  school.   However,  the
          court's   holding   specifically    distinguished   the    condom
          distribution program from exposure "to  talk or literature on the
          subject of sexual behavior," finding that  the latter claim would
          "falter  in the  face of  the public  school's role  in preparing
          students  for participation in  a world replete  with complex and
          controversial issues."  Id. at 266.
                                  __

                                         -15-

                    The  minor plaintiffs  maintain  that  the  defendants'

          conduct violated their privacy right to be free from "exposure to

          vulgar and offensive language and obnoxiously debasing portrayals

          of human  sexuality."  Plaintiffs  cite no cases  -- and we  have

          found  none -- indicating  that such a  fundamental privacy right

          exists.   Rather, they  attempt to  extract  the claimed  privacy

          right from the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases which uphold

          the state's  limited power  to regulate or  discipline speech  to
              _______

          protect  minors from offensive or vulgar speech.  See Bethel Sch.
                                                            ___ ___________

          Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478  U.S. 675, 685 (1986)(cited for  the
          _____________    ______

          proposition that  "[a] high  school assembly  or classroom  is no

          place  for  a sexually  explicit  monologue  directed towards  an

          unsuspecting  audience  of teenage  students");  FCC v.  Pacifica
                                                           ___     ________

          Found.,  438 U.S. 726  (1978).  We agree  with the district court
          ______

          that these cases "do not create a private cause of action against

          state officials for exposure" to patently offensive language.7

          II.  Procedural Due Process
          II.  Procedural Due Process
               ______________________

                    The   plaintiffs'  third   claim  alleges   that  their

          procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were

          violated when  the defendants  compelled the minor  plaintiffs to

          attend the Program without giving the parents advance  notice and

                              
          ____________________

          7    The Supreme  Court has  explained  that a  special situation
          pertains  where   a  free   exercise  challenge  is   brought  in
          conjunction with a  substantive due  process challenge  involving
          the  right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
          See  Employment  Div.  v. Smith,  494  U.S.  872, 881-82  (1990);
          ___  ________________     _____
          Wisconsin  v. Yoder, 406 U.S.  205, 233-34 (1972).   We therefore
          _________     _____
          analyze  this  "hybrid  right"  along with  their  free  exercise
          challenge.  See infra.
                      ___ _____

                                         -16-

          an opportunity to opt out of attending.

                    "In procedural  due process claims, the  deprivation by

          state action  of a constitutionally protected  interest in 'life,

          liberty, or property'  is not in itself unconstitutional; what is

          unconstitutional is  the deprivation of such  an interest without
                                                                    _______

          due process of law."  Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)
          __________________    ________    _____

          (quoting  Parratt   v.  Taylor,   451  U.S.  527,   537  (1981)).
                    _______       ______

          Application of this prohibition requires a well settled two-stage

          analysis.    We  first  decide whether  the  asserted  individual

          interests  are  encompassed  within  the  Fourteenth  Amendment's

          protection  of  "life,  liberty   or  property."    If  protected

          interests  are implicated,  we then  must decide  what procedures

          constitute  "due process of law."   Ingraham v.  Wright, 430 U.S.
                                              ________     ______

          651, 672 (1977) (citations omitted).  Protected liberty interests

          may arise from two  sources -- the Due Process  Clause itself and

          the  laws  of  the states.    Kentucky  Dept.  of Corrections  v.
                                        _______________________________

          Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).
          ________

                    The  liberty  preserved  from deprivation  without  due

          process includes  the right "generally to  enjoy those privileges

          long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit

          of happiness  by   free  men."   Meyer,  262  U.S.  at 399.    As
                                           _____

          previously  discussed,  however,  the liberty  protected  by  the

          Fourteenth Amendment does not  encompass a right to be  free from

          exposure to speech  which one  regards as offensive.   Thus,  the

          plaintiffs' asserted liberty interest, if one exists, must derive

          from state law.

                                         -17-

                    The plaintiffs  contend that  state law and  the School

          Committee's  policy  on  "Sex   Education"  (the  "Sex  Education

          Policy")  confers  a protected  liberty  interest,  and that  the

          defendants'  actions deprived  them  of it  without due  process.

          Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendants failed to

          follow the school's Sex Education Policy, which provides:

                      The  Committee  believes that  the public
                      schools can best transmit  information on
                      human  sexuality  to   students  in   the
                      context    of   the    health   education
                      continuum.    Therefore, information  and
                      instructional  tools  appropriate to  the
                      age  group  will   be  used  to   include
                      instruction  in  human  sexuality in  the
                      curricular offerings on health.  Positive
                                                       ________
                      subscription,   with   written   parental
                      _________________________________________
                      permission,  will  be  a prerequisite  to
                      _________________________________________
                      enrolling.  
                      _________

          (Emphasis added.)  The complaint further alleges that the parents

          were not  given advance notice of the  contents of the Program or

          an opportunity to opt out.

                    Defendants concede  for the  purposes  of their  motion

          that  the  Sex Education  Policy  confers a  liberty  interest in

          freedom from exposure to  the content of the Program and in being

          afforded an opportunity to  opt out.8  They argue,  however, that

          the  plaintiffs still fail to state a claim because the violation

          of the Sex Education  Policy was a "random and  unauthorized" act

                              
          ____________________

          8  The plaintiffs also maintain that Mass.  Ann. Laws ch. 71,   1
          (1995) confers a protected liberty interest.  That statute grants
          a  right to  opt out  from "instruction  on disease"  to students
          whose  "sincerely  held  religious  beliefs"  conflict with  such
          instruction.   Defendants assume for the  purposes of this appeal
          that Mass. Gen. L.  ch. 71,   1 is an  alternative source for the
          claimed liberty interest.

                                         -18-

          within the confines  of the Parratt-Hudson  doctrine.  Hudson  v.
                                      _______ ______             ______

          Palmer,  468 U.S.  517  (1984);  Parratt,  451  U.S.  527.    The
          ______                           _______

          plaintiffs  maintain that their claim is more akin to that stated

          in  Zinermon, and is thus outside the scope of the Parratt-Hudson
              ________                                       _______ ______

          doctrine.

                    In Parratt,  a state prisoner  brought a    1983 action
                       _______

          because prison  employees had  negligently lost materials  he had

          ordered by mail.   The  Supreme Court ruled  that the  prisoner's

          post-deprivation tort  remedy was  all the  process that  was due

          because  the state  could  not have  provided any  predeprivation

          procedural safeguard to address  the risk of this kind  of random

          and unauthorized deprivation.  Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.  As  the
                                         _______

          Court  explained, "the loss is  not a result  of some established

          state procedure and the State  cannot predict precisely when  the

          loss will  occur.  It is  difficult to conceive of  how the State

          could provide  a meaningful hearing before  the deprivation takes

          place."   Id.    In  Hudson,  the  Supreme  Court  extended  this
                    __         ______

          reasoning  to intentional  deprivations  of property,  explaining

          that  "[t]he  state  can  no  more  anticipate  the  random   and

          unauthorized  intentional conduct  of its  employees than  it can

          similar negligent conduct."  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
                                       ______

                    Parratt  and  Hudson preclude     1983  claims for  the
                    _______       ______

          "random and unauthorized" conduct  of state officials because the

          state cannot "anticipate and  control [such conduct] in advance."

          Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 130.  In addition, the Court has made clear
          ________

          that unauthorized deprivations of  property by state employees do

                                         -19-

          not  constitute  due  process  violations  under  the  Fourteenth

          Amendment  so long  as  meaningful  postdeprivation remedies  are

          available.   Id. at 128-30.   Moreover, the  Court has emphasized
                       __

          that "no matter how significant the private interest at stake and

          the  risk  of  its  erroneous deprivation,  the  State  cannot be

          required constitutionally  to  do  the  impossible  by  providing

          predeprivation  process."     Id.  at  129  (citations  omitted).
                                        __

          Therefore, "the proper inquiry under Parratt is whether the state
                                               _______                _____

          is in a position to provide for predeprivation process."   Id. at
                                                                     __

          130 (quotation omitted).

                    Zinermon involved a due process claim against the state
                    ________

          doctors who admitted the plaintiff Burch as a  "voluntary" mental

          patient.  Burch alleged  that he was incompetent  at the time  of

          his  admission  and should  have  been  afforded the  protections

          provided by  the involuntary  placement procedure.   Although the

          Court found that Parratt-Hudson  doctrine applied to deprivations
                           _______ ______

          of  liberty, it nevertheless  concluded that Burch  had failed to

          state a viable   1983 claim.  Id. at 131-32.
                                        __

                    The court  found that Burch's claim  was not controlled

          by Parratt and Hudson for three basic reasons.  First,  the Court
             _______     ______

          explained  that the timing of Burch's  deprivation of liberty was

          more  predictable than  in  Parratt and  Hudson.   As  the  Court
                                      _______      ______

          explained, "it  is hardly unforeseeable that  a person requesting

          treatment  for  mental illness  might  be  incapable of  informed

          consent."  Id. at  136.  Thus, "[a]ny erroneous  deprivation will
                     __

          occur,  if at  all,  at  a  specific,  predicable  point  in  the

                                         -20-

          admission process."  Id.  Second, the Court found that the  state
                               __

          could   have  provided  meaningful   predeprivation  process  and

          possibly averted the deprivation Burch alleged.  Third, the Court

          found that because the state had delegated the hospital officials

          broad  authority to  "effect the  very deprivation  complained of

          here," their conduct could not be characterized as "unauthorized"

          in the same sense  as the destruction of the  prisoners' property

          in Parratt and Hudson.
             _______     ______

                    The  Parratt-Hudson-Zinermon   trilogy  "requires  that
                         _______ ______ ________

          courts scrutinize carefully the assertion by state officials that

          their conduct is  'random and unauthorized'  . .  . where such  a

          conclusion limits the procedural due process inquiry under   1983

          to  the  question  of   the  adequacy  of  state  postdeprivation

          remedies."   Lowe v.  Scott, 959 F.2d 323,  341 (1st Cir. 1992).9
                       ____     _____

          Our  examination here leads us  to agree with  the district court

          that  the  plaintiffs'  claim  falls  within  the  Parratt-Hudson
                                                             _______ ______

          doctrine.

                    The plaintiffs  have not  alleged any facts  that would

          bring their claim within the scope of Zinermon.  They point to no
                                                ________

          facts  suggesting  that  the   state  could  have  predicted  the

                              
          ____________________

          9  Other circuits  have interpreted the doctrine similarly.   See
                                                                        ___
          Caine v.  Hardy, 943 F.2d  1406, 1413 (5th  Cir. 1991)  (en banc)
          _____     _____
          ("Zinermon thus requires a hard look at  a Parratt/Hudson defense
            ________                                 _______ ______
          to determine whether the state officials' conduct, under all  the
          circumstances, could have been adequately  foreseen and addressed
          by  procedural safeguards.");  Easter House  v. Felder,  910 F.2d
                                         ____________     ______
          1387, 1402 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 783
                                               ____________
          (1991)  (concluding that  "Zinermon holds  only that  predictable
                                     ________
          deprivations of  liberty and property which  flow from authorized
          conduct are compensable under   1983").

                                         -21-

          defendants'  failure  to give  the  required  notice and  opt-out

          opportunity,  nor  do  they  suggest  any  reasonable  additional

          predeprivation procedures  which would have  meaningfully reduced

          the risk of the due process violation alleged.

                    The plaintiffs  contend that the  deprivation cannot be

          characterized   as   "random   and  unauthorized"   because   the

          performance was planned well in advance.  This contention ignores

          both the nature of the deprivation and the relevant caselaw.  The

          deprivation  alleged  here is  not  the  staging of  the  Program

          itself,  but  rather  the   defendants'  failure  to  follow  the

          procedures mandated by  the Sex Education Policy.   Moreover, the

          Supreme Court  has established that  the Parratt-Hudson  doctrine
                                                   _______ ______

          applies to both  negligent and intentional tortious acts of state

          actors, explaining that "it  would be absurd to suggest  that the

          State hold  a hearing  to determine  whether  a [state  official]

          should  engage in such conduct."  Hudson,  468 U.S. at 533.  That
                                            ______

          reasoning  is applicable here.   The plaintiffs  have not alleged

          any  facts from  which a  court could  reasonably infer  that any

          defendant  was vested with "the power and authority to effect the

          very  deprivation complained  of here."   Zinermon,  494 U.S.  at
                                                    ________

          138.10     Rather,   the   Sex  Education   Policy  states   that

          "[p]ositive  subscription, with  parental permission,  will be  a

          prerequisite  to   enrolling,"   and,  accordingly,   vested   no
                              
          ____________________

          10  As the  district court noted, although three  defendants were
          members of the School Committee (which  adopted the Sex Education
          Policy),  the plaintiffs  do  not allege  that these  defendants,
          either  individually or as a group, were authorized to circumvent
          a policy adopted and enacted by the School Committee as a whole.

                                         -22-

          discretion in  school officials.  We therefore  conclude that the

          failure  to follow  the Sex  Education Policy  was a  "random and

          unauthorized"  act  within  the  confines of  the  Parratt-Hudson
                                                             _______ ______

          doctrine.

                    The second stage of  a Parratt-Hudson analysis looks to
                                           _______ ______

          whether the state has provided adequate postdeprivation remedies.

          Lowe, 959  F.2d at 340 (discussing  Parratt, 451 U.S.  527).  The
          ____                                _______

          plaintiffs did not  argue to  the district court  that the  state

          remedies were  inadequate, relying  instead on their  belief that

          Zinermon was controlling.   On appeal, they do no more than state
          ________

          baldly  that  "[n]o  post-deprivation  procedures  can  undo  the

          damaging influences  which were impressed on  the students during

          the performance."   Accordingly,  we deem  this point waived  for

          appellate  review, see United States  v. Zannino, 895  F.2d 1, 17
                             ___ _____________     _______

          (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 494  U.S. 1082 (1990)  (discussing the
                       ____________

          "settled appellate rule that issues adverted  to in a perfunctory

          manner, unaccompanied by some effort  at developed argumentation,

          are deemed waived"), and therefore  find that the plaintiffs have

          failed to state a procedural due process claim.

          III.  Free Exercise Clause
          III.  Free Exercise Clause
                ____________________

                    Plaintiffs'  fourth  claim   seeks  both  monetary  and

          declaratory relief, alleging that the defendants' endorsement and

          encouragement  of  sexual  promiscuity at  a  mandatory  assembly

          "imping[ed] on their  sincerely held  religious values  regarding

          chastity and  morality," and  thereby violated the  Free Exercise

          Clause of the First Amendment.

                                         -23-

                    In Employment Div., Oregon  Dep't of Human Resources v.
                       _________________________________________________

          Smith,  494 U.S. 872 (1990),  the Supreme Court  addressed a free
          _____

          exercise challenge to a facially neutral and generally applicable

          criminal statute.   The Court held  that the compelling  interest

          test did  not  apply to  free exercise  challenges to  "generally

          applicable  prohibitions of  socially harmful  conduct."   Id. at
                                                                     __

          882-85.  The  Court explained  that the First  Amendment was  not

          offended by neutral, generally  applicable laws, unless burdening

          religion was the object of the law.  Id. at 878-82.
                                               __

                    In  1994,  Congress   enacted  the  Religious   Freedom

          Restoration  Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C.   2000bb, in response to the

          Supreme  Court's decision  in  Smith.   RFRA states,  in relevant
                                         _____

          part: 

                      (a)  In General  -- Government  shall not
                      substantially burden  a person's exercise
                      of  religion even  if the  burden results
                      from  a  rule  of general  applicability,
                      except as provided  in subsection (b)  of
                      this section.

                      (b)    Exception   --    Government   may
                      substantially burden  a person's exercise
                      of religion only if it  demonstrates that
                      application of the  burden to the  person
                      -- 
                      (1) is  in  furtherance of  a  compelling
                      governmental interest; and 

                      (2) is  the  least restrictive  means  of
                      furthering  that  compelling governmental
                      interest.

          Id.  RFRA states that it was enacted to bring the law back to its
          __

          pre-Smith state.  Id.
              _____         __

                    The  plaintiffs'  Free  Exercise challenge  raises  two

          complex constitutional  issues.   The threshold issue  is whether

                                         -24-

          the  Free Exercise  Clause  even applies  to public  education.11

          If indeed  the Free  Exercise Clause  applies to  the plaintiffs'

          claim, the  question would then  be whether  their free  exercise

          rights were violated by the compulsory attendance at the Program.

          Because the Program  was staged in 1992, and RFRA  was enacted in

          1994, however,  a cause of  action under RFRA exists  only if the

          statute applies retroactively.  For the  reasons stated below, we

          conclude that  RFRA does  not apply retroactively  to plaintiffs'

          claim for monetary damages.

                    The  Supreme  Court has  explained  that  courts should

          "decline[]  to  give  retroactive  effect  to statutes  burdening

          private  rights unless  Congress  ha[s] made  clear its  intent."

          Landgraf  v. USI  Film Products,  114 S.  Ct. 1483,  1499 (1994).
          ________     __________________

          Such  an intent  will not  be inferred  where the  statute "lacks

          'clear,  strong, and  imperative' language  requiring retroactive

          application."    Id. (citing  United States  v.  Heth, 8  U.S. (3
                           __           _____________      ____

          Cranch)  399, 413  (1806)).   "The presumption  against statutory

          retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the

          unfairness of imposing  new burdens on  persons after the  fact."

          Id. at 1500.
          __

                    RFRA  states that it "applies to  all Federal and State

          law, whether  statutory or otherwise, and  whether adopted before

                              
          ____________________

          11  At least one federal  judge has argued that the Free Exercise
          Clause does not restrict the "prerogative of school boards to set
          curricula," concluding  that  school boards'  authority  in  such
          matters is bounded only  by the Establishment Clause.   Mozert v.
                                                                  ______
          Hawkins  County Board of  Education, 827 F.2d  1058, 1078-81 (6th
          ___________________________________
          Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., concurring).

                                         -25-

          or after the enactment  of this Act."   42 U.S.C.   2000bb.   The

          statute was enacted to "restore the compelling interest test" and

          provide judicial relief to  persons "whose religious exercise has

          been burdened  in violation of  this section."   Id.  While  RFRA
                                                           __

          clearly  provides access  to  declaratory and  injunctive  relief

          against all  laws burdening  the free  exercise  of religion,  we

          think  it  lacks the  "clear,  strong,  and imperative"  language

          necessary  to create a  retroactive cause of  action for monetary

          damages.

                    We  have found  no decisions in  which a  plaintiff was

          awarded  damages  under RFRA  for  conduct  occurring before  the

          statute's enactment.   Rather, the  decisions in  which RFRA  has

          been found retroactive  considered only the  issue of whether  to

          grant injunctive  relief,  as opposed  to  an award  of  monetary

          damages.   See, e.g., Werner  v. McCotter, 49  F.3d 1476, 1479-80
                     ___  ____  ______     ________

          (10th Cir.  1995); Brown-El v. Harris,  26 F.3d 68, 69  (8th Cir.
                             ________    ______

          1994)  (dicta); Boone  v. Commissioner  of Prisons,  No. 93-5074,
                          _____     ________________________

          1994 WL 383590,  1994 U.S.Dist.  LEXIS 10027 (E.D.  Pa. July  21,

          1994);  Rust v.  Clarke,  851  F. Supp.  377, 380  (D. Neb. 1994)
                  ____     ______

          (dicta); Allah v.  Menei, 844 F.  Supp. 1056, 1061 at  n.15 (E.D.
                   _____     _____

          Pa. 1994); Lawson v. Dugger, 844  F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D.  Fla.
                     ______    ______

          1994).   Equitable  relief, however,  is prospective  rather than

          retroactive, even when it applies  to conduct occurring before  a

          statute's  enactment.   See Landgraf,  114 S.  Ct. at  1500.   We
                                  ___ ________

          therefore    find   that   the   cases   purportedly   addressing

          retroactivity  do not support a finding that Congress intended to

                                         -26-

          create a  retroactive cause of action for  monetary damages under

          RFRA.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim must be addressed under

          Smith,  the  law  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  defendants'
          _____

          actions.12  

                    The  Supreme Court has  explained that  a "law  that is

          neutral and of general  applicability need not be justified  by a

          compelling  governmental  interest  even   if  the  law  has  the

          incidental effect of burdening  a particular religious practice."

          Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,  Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
          ______________________________________    _______________

          Ct.  2217,  2226-27 (1993)  (citing Smith,  494  U.S. 872).   The
                                              _____

          plaintiffs  do not allege, nor  is it apparent  from their claim,

          that  the compulsory attendance at the Program was anything but a

          neutral requirement that  applied generally to all students.  Cf.
                                                                        ___
                              
          ____________________

          12  Even assuming that RFRA created a retroactive cause of action
          for monetary  damages, the plaintiffs' free  exercise claim would
          nevertheless be analyzed under  Smith because all the defendants'
                                          _____
          with the possible exception of the School Committee are protected
          by qualified immunity from monetary damages.

             As  we explained  above,  qualified  immunity  shields  public
          officials   from  pecuniary   liability   unless  they   violated
          constitutional or statutory norms that were "clearly established"
          at the  time of the violation.   Anderson v. Creighton,  483 U.S.
                                           ________    _________
          635, 639-40 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
                              ______

             Because the Program was staged in 1992, the standard set forth
          in  Smith (rather than the  less rigorous RFRA  standard) must be
              _____
          employed to  determine whether the defendants  violated a clearly
          established  right  when  they compelled  the  minor  plaintiffs'
          attendance at the Program.  See Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476,
                                      ___ ______    ________
          1481-82  (10th  Cir.),  cert.  denied,  115  S. Ct.  2625  (1995)
                                  _____________
          (holding  that  prison  officials  were  shielded  from  monetary
          damages  because  their  acts  did not  constitute  violation  of
          clearly  established  rights under  the  Smith  standard and  the
                                                   _____
          defendants could not be responsible for violations created by the
          change in  the law); see  also Young v.  Lane, 922 F.2d  370, 378
                               _________ _____     ____
          (7th Cir. 1991) (applying qualified immunity to damage claims for
          alleged free exercise deprivations).

                                         -27-

          Id. (where  city ordinance violated Free  Exercise clause because
          __

          it targeted  the ritual  slaughter of  animals only  by religious

          groups).

                    Rather, plaintiffs allege that their case  falls within

          the "hybrid" exception recognized by Smith for cases that involve
                                               _____

          "the   Free   Exercise   Clause   in   conjunction   with   other

          constitutional protections."   Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 & n.1.  The
                                         _____

          most relevant  of  the so-called  hybrid  cases is  Wisconsin  v.
                                                              _________

          Yoder,  406  U.S.   205,  232-33  (1972),  in   which  the  Court
          _____

          invalidated  a compulsory  school  attendance law  as applied  to

          Amish  parents who  refused on  religious grounds  to send  their

          children to school.  In so holding, the Court explained that 

                      Pierce  stands as a charter of the rights
                      ______
                      of  parents  to   direct  the   religious
                      upbringing of their children.   And, when
                      combined  with a  free exercise  claim of
                      the nature revealed  by this record, more
                      than  merely  a  "reasonable relation  to
                      some purpose within the competency of the
                      State"   is   required  to   sustain  the
                      validity of the State's requirement under
                      the First Amendment.

          Id. at 232 (discussing Pierce,  268 U.S. 510).  We find  that the
          __                     ______

          plaintiffs allegations  do not  bring them  within  the sweep  of

          Yoder for two distinct reasons.
          _____

                    First, as we explained, the plaintiffs'  allegations of

          interference with  family relations and  parental prerogatives do

          not state a privacy or substantive due process claim.  Their free

          exercise challenge  is thus  not conjoined with  an independently

          protected constitutional protection.  Second, their free exercise

          claim  is  qualitatively  distinguishable from  that  alleged  in

                                         -28-

          Yoder.  As the Court in Yoder emphasized: 
          _____                   _____

                      the Amish in this case  have convincingly
                      demonstrated   the  sincerity   of  their
                      religious beliefs,  the interrelationship
                      of belief  with their  mode of life,  the
                      vital  role that belief and daily conduct
                      play  in the  continued  survival of  Old
                      Order   Amish   communities   and   their
                      religious  organization, and  the hazards
                      presented by the State's enforcement of a
                      Statute generally valid as to others.

          Id. at 235.  Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the one-time
          __

          compulsory attendance at the  Program threatened their entire way

          of  life.  Accordingly,  the plaintiffs' free  exercise claim for

          damages was properly dismissed.

                    The  plaintiffs  also   seek  a  declaratory   judgment

          concerning  the  alleged  infringement  of  their  Free  Exercise

          Rights.   The  standing requirement  of Article  III necessitates

          that the claimant "allege personal injury fairly traceable to the

          defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be addressed

          by the requested  relief."  Allen  v. Wright,  468 U.S. 737,  751
                                      _____     ______

          (1984).  The  Supreme Court has made clear  that past exposure to

          harm will not in and of itself confer standing upon a litigant to

          obtain equitable relief "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he

          will again be wronged  in a similar way."  City of Los Angeles v.
                                                     ___________________

          Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 104-06, 111 (1983).  See also American Postal
          _____                                    ________ _______________

          Workers Union v. Frank,  968 F.2d 1373, 1374-76 (1st  Cir. 1992).
          _____________    _____

          Here, the plaintiffs do not allege (nor does it appear) that they

          are  likely  to  again  be  subject  to  school  activities  that

          allegedly  violate their  Free Exercise  Rights.   We accordingly

          lack  jurisdiction  over the  claim  for  declaratory relief  and

                                         -29-

          conclude  that it also was properly dismissed.

          IV.  Sexual Harassment
          IV.  Sexual Harassment
               _________________

                    The plaintiffs' fifth claim alleges that the defendants

          engaged  in  sexual harassment  by  creating  a sexually  hostile

          environment, in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments

          of 1972.  Title IX provides in relevant part:

                      No person  in the United States shall, on
                                                             __
                      the  basis  of   sex,  be  excluded  from
                      ____________________
                      participation in, be denied  the benefits
                      of,  or  be  subjected to  discrimination
                      under any education  program or  activity
                      receiving  Federal  financial  assistance
                      . . . .

          20 U.S.C.   1681.  Because the relevant caselaw under Title IX is

          relatively  sparse, we apply Title  VII caselaw by  analogy.  See
                                                                        ___

          Franklin v. Gwinnett  County Pub.  Schs., 112 S.  Ct. 1028,  1037
          ________    ____________________________

          (1990); Lipsett v. University  of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d  881, 899
                  _______    __________________________

          (1st Cir. 1988).  

                    Title VII, and  thus Title  IX, "strike  at the  entire

          spectrum  of disparate  treatment  of men  and women,"  including

          conduct having the purpose  or effect of unreasonably interfering

          with  an individual's  performance  or creating  an intimidating,

          hostile  or offensive  environment.   Meritor Sav.  Bank, FSB  v.
                                                _______________________

          Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986);  Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 899.  As
          ______                              _______

          the Supreme Court explained:

                      Sexual harassment which creates a hostile
                      or offensive environment  for members  of
                      one  sex  is   every  bit  the  arbitrary
                      barrier   to   sexual  equality   at  the
                      workplace  that  racial harassment  is to
                      racial equality.   Surely, a  requirement
                      that  a man  or woman  run a  gauntlet of
                      sexual  abuse in return for the privilege

                                         -30-

                      of  being  allowed  to work  and  make  a
                      living   can   be   as    demeaning   and
                      disconcerting as the  harshest of  racial
                      epithets.

          Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee,  682 F.2d 897,
          _______                          ______    ______

          902 (1982)).

                    The elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in  such

          type of sexual harassment claim are: (i) that he/she is a  member

          of a protected class;  (ii) that he/she was subject  to unwelcome

          sexual harassment; (iii)  that the harassment was based upon sex;

          (iv) that the harassment was sufficiently severe  or pervasive so

          as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's education and create an

          abusive  educational environment;  and  (v) that  some basis  for

          employer liability has been established.  Id. at 66-73.  See also
                                                    __             ________

          Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Lipsett, 864
          ______    __________________                         _______

          F.2d at 898-901.

                    Title  IX   is   violated  "[w]hen   the   [educational

          environment]  is  permeated  with  'discriminatory  intimidation,

          ridicule, and  insult' that is 'sufficiently  severe or pervasive

          to  alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an

          abusive . . . environment.'"   Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (quoting
                                         ______

          Meritor, 477 U.S. 64-65 (1986)); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898.  While
          _______                          _______

          a court  must consider  all of the  circumstances in  determining

          whether  a  plaintiff  has  established that  an  environment  is

          hostile or abusive,  it must be  particularly concerned with  (1)

          the frequency  of the  discriminatory conduct; (2)  its severity;

          (3) whether  it is  physically threatening or  humiliating rather

          than a mere  offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably

                                         -31-

          interferes with an employee's work performance.  See Harris,  114
                                                           ___ ______

          S. Ct. at 371.  Although the presence or absence of psychological

          harm or an unreasonable effect on work performance  are relevant,

          no single factor is required.  See id.  
                                         ___ __

                    The Court has explained  that the relevant factors must

          be  viewed both objectively and  subjectively.  See  id. at 1454.
                                                          ___  __

          If the  conduct is not so  severe or pervasive  that a reasonable

          person would find it hostile or  abusive, it is beyond Title IX's

          purview.    See  id.    Similarly,  if  the  plaintiff  does  not
                      ___  __

          subjectively perceive the environment  to be abusive, the conduct

          has not  actually altered the  conditions of her  employment, and

          there  is no Title IX violation.   See id.   Thus, the court must
                                             ___ __

          consider  not only  the actual  effect of  the harassment  on the

          plaintiff,  but  also the  effect such  conduct  would have  on a

          reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.

                    Turning  to the  case at  bar, we  find that  the facts

          alleged here  are  insufficient  to  state  a  claim  for  sexual

          harassment under  a hostile environment theory.   The plaintiffs'

          allegations are weak on every one of the Harris factors, and when
                                                   ______

          considered  in sum,  are  clearly insufficient  to establish  the

          existence  of an  objectively  hostile  or  abusive  environment.

          First, plaintiffs cannot claim that the offensive speech occurred

          frequently,  as  they  allege  only a  one-time  exposure  to the

          comments.13
                              
          ____________________

          13  We do not hold that a one-time episode is per se incapable of
                                                        ______
          sustaining a  hostile environment  claim.  The  frequency of  the
          alleged  harassment is a significant factor, but only one of many

                                         -32-

                    We also  think that the plaintiffs'  allegations do not

          establish that Landolphi's  comments were so severe  as to create

          an objectively  hostile environment.   This finding  is based  on

          both  the context and content  of her remarks.   The remarks were

          given to the entire ninth and tenth grades at what the defendants

          labelled   an  "AIDS  awareness  program."    Significantly,  the

          plaintiffs do not allege  that they were required  to participate

          in  any of  the  offensive skits  or that  they  were the  direct

          objects of Landolphi's sexual comments.

                    Moreover,  during  his introductory  remarks, defendant

          Gilchrist advised students that the purpose of the Program was to

          educate them about the dangers of sexual activity, stating:

                      We  [] see young people in their twenties
                      who   are   infected   with    the   AIDS
                      virus. . . .   It  means they  caught the
                      virus when they were in high  school, and
                      will be dead before they are thirty years
                      old.  That's why the doctors are  scared,
                      and they want you to hear the message.

                      Now,  sometimes  to  hear  a  message, it
                      takes a special messenger.  And today, we
                      have a  very special messenger,  who uses
                      probably one of the most  effective forms
                      of communication -- humor.  I want you to
                      listen  carefully.   Enjoy  it, but  also
                      remember the message.

          Similarly, Landolphi stated in  her opening remarks that "[w]e're

          going  to talk  about AIDS,  but not  in the  usual way."   These

          prefaces  framed  the Program  in such  a  way that  an objective

          person would understand that Landolphi's  allegedly vulgar sexual
                              
          ____________________

          to  be   considered  in  determining  whether   the  conduct  was
          "sufficiently severe or pervasive" that a reasonable person would
          find that it had rendered the environment hostile or abusive.

                                         -33-

          commentary was intended  to educate the  students about the  AIDS

          virus rather than to create a sexually hostile environment.

                    These  introductions also  belie the  plaintiffs' claim

          that   Landolphi's  speech   was   physically   threatening   and

          humiliating,     rather   than   a  mere   offensive   utterance.

          Landolphi's   remarks  were  not  directed  specifically  at  the

          plaintiffs and were couched in an attempt to use humor to educate

          the students on sex and  the AIDS virus.  In this  context, while

          average  high school  students might  have been  offended by  the

          graphic  sexual discussions  alleged  here,  Landolphi's  remarks

          could not  reasonably  be considered  physically  threatening  or

          humiliating so as to create a hostile environment.

                    Similarly, the plaintiffs'  allegations establish  that

          the  Program   did  not  significantly  alter  their  educational

          environment from an objective  standpoint.  The Program consisted

          of  two ninety-minute  sex-education presentations,  and although

          the plaintiffs allege that  "coarse jesting, sexual innuendo, and

          overtly sexual  behavior took place  for the weeks  following the

          Program," they fail to explain how the coarse jesting and overtly

          sexual  behavior  "create[d]   an  atmosphere  so   infused  with

          hostility  toward members  of  one sex  that  [it] alter[ed]  the

          [educational  environment] for them."   Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897.
                                                  _______

          In fact, they allege  that the offensive behavior was  visited on

          "those students," regardless of gender, "who were not inclined to

          accept 'the message' about human sexuality."   If anything, then,

          they  allege discrimination  based upon  the basis  of viewpoint,

                                         -34-

          rather than on the  basis of gender, as required by Title IX.  We

          therefore find that their claim under Title IX fails.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    We have  considered the other claims  of the plaintiffs

          and find them similarly without merit.

                    Affirmed.
                    Affirmed
                    ________

                                         -35-