Court Opinion

ID: 9905501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:08:35.018042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.772206
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40151

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEYVIN ALEJANDRO SILVA-MUÑOZ,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Britt Baca-Miller, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Luz C. Valverde, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}    A jury convicted Defendant Keyvin Alejandro Silva-Muñoz of one count of
aggravated burglary (with a deadly weapon), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-
4(A) (1963), and one count of bribery or intimidation of a witness, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-24-3(A) (1997). Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated
burglary, arguing (1) that the jury instructions resulted in fundamental error because the
jury was not instructed on all elements necessary to convict him of that offense, and (2)
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

{2}    Because this is a memorandum opinion, we limit our discussion of the facts to
those relevant to Defendant’s appeal of his aggravated burglary charge.

{3}    On March 7, 2020, Defendant attended a house party of about fifty people on
Rayo Del Sol Drive in Albuquerque at the home of Edgar Rivera, Fabian Ortega-
Rodriguez, and Gustavo Moreno. At some point during the party, Isaiah Perez—an
acquaintance of Defendant—and Isaac—a friend of Rivera and Rodriguez—were
involved in a physical altercation outside of the home during which Perez knocked Isaac
unconscious. Although Defendant was not involved in the fight, he went outside after
Isaac was on the ground and heard Perez saying, “I did it. I did it.” Rodriguez picked
Isaac up and took him back into the home, placing him on the living room couch to help
him recover.

{4}     A few minutes later, Perez entered the home with a group of people, including
Defendant, bragging about knocking Isaac out. Rodriguez told Perez and the rest of the
group “to get out of [his] house.” An additional fight broke out inside the home. Rivera
testified that he saw a member of the group pull what looked like a short rifle from his
pant leg. Rivera heard a shot fired inside the home, and in response pulled out his own
weapon and fired a shot towards the front door frame. The group then ran out the front
door shooting inside the house as they ran out.

{5}    Rivera saw bullet holes begin to appear on the door and heard bullets strike the
door, walls, and the sliding glass doors at the back of the home as he shut the front
door. Moreno and Ailyn Flores Cervantes were injured during the shooting. Rivera
heard approximately thirty to forty gun shots before the shooting stopped.

{6}    During this pause, Rivera fired a warning shot towards the front door. The
warning shot resulted in a second round of gun shots fired at the home. After the
second round of gun shots ended, Defendant either kicked open or forcefully opened
the door. Rivera saw a gun in Defendant’s hands and shot Defendant. Defendant yelled
out, “He shot me,” and stepped out of the house. Although Rivera could not identify
Defendant at trial, Defendant told Detective Robert Sanchez that he was shot when he
entered the home and yelled out, “You shot me,” during a video recorded interview that
was played for the jury. Defendant also claimed to have entered the home unarmed to
get help for his brother who was shot and to ensure no one inside the house was shot.

{7}    Police and emergency services then arrived on scene. Moreno, Cervantes,
Defendant, and Defendant’s brother—also injured during the shooting—were taken to
nearby hospitals for medical care. Officers and crime scene specialists found eighty-six
total bullet casings outside the home and on the street. Only two guns were found at the
scene—the one used by Rivera and one owned by an individual who had fled the home
during the shooting.

{8}     The State indicted Defendant with numerous crimes including aggravated
burglary with a deadly weapon (firearm) and bribery or intimidation of a witness. The
district court granted Defendant’s directed verdict motion on all but the aggravated
burglary and intimidation of a witness charges, and the jury signed guilty verdicts for
those offenses. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I.     The Jury Instructions Resulted in Fundamental Error

{9}     Defendant argues that fundamental error occurred because the district court
failed to instruct the jury on all elements of aggravated burglary. Specifically, Defendant
contends the district court’s failure to instruct the jury with a separate specific intent
instruction for aggravated burglary and the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on
the elements of the predicate felony offense the State claimed Defendant intended to
commit inside the house allowed the jury to convict him without finding all the elements
of the offense—in particular that Defendant “entered the dwelling with the intent to
commit an aggravated battery once inside.” Defendant concedes that he did not object
to the jury instructions at trial, and therefore, we review Defendant’s argument for
fundamental error. See State v. Ocon, 2021-NMCA-032, ¶ 7, 493 P.3d 448.

{10} “Fundamental error exists if it would shock the conscience to affirm the conviction
either because of the obvious innocence of the defendant or because a mistake in the
process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt of
the accused.” State v. Sivils, 2023-NMCA-080, ¶ 9, __ P.3d __ (A-1-CA-39045, Aug. 30,
2023) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). With regard to jury
instructions, our review for fundamental error is a two-step process. Id. ¶ 10. First, we
determine whether error occurred, and do so by asking “whether a reasonable juror
would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Jury instructions cause confusion or misdirection when,
through omission or misstatement, they do not provide an accurate rendition of the
essential elements of a crime.” Ocon, 2021-NMCA-032, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

{11} The district court instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary, in
relevant part, as follows:

       For you to find [D]efendant guilty of aggravated burglary as charged in
       count 1, the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
       doubt each of the following elements of the crime:

       1. [D]efendant entered a dwelling without authorization;
      2. [D]efendant entered the dwelling with the intent to commit an
      aggravated battery once inside;

      3. [D]efendant was armed with a firearm.

(Emphasis added.) This instruction tracks the approved uniform jury instruction
containing the statutory elements for aggravated burglary with a deadly weapon. See
UJI 14-1632 NMRA; see also § 30-16-4(A) (defining aggravated burglary in part as “the
unauthorized entry of any . . . dwelling . . . with intent to commit any felony or theft
therein and . . . [while] armed with a deadly weapon”). Our Supreme Court has stated
that uniform jury instructions are presumptively valid and they should be used without
substantive alteration when they describe the elements of the crime. See State v.
Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 30, 389 P.3d 1039.

{12} The aggravated burglary instruction identified the uncharged, predicate felony as
aggravated battery. “Aggravated battery consists of the unlawful touching or application
of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or another.” NMSA
1978, § 30-3-5(A) (1969). The offense is a felony when the defendant inflicts “great
bodily harm or does so with a deadly weapon or does so in any manner whereby great
bodily harm or death can be inflicted.” Section 30-3-5(C). As Defendant points out, “[i]f
intent to commit a felony other than theft is alleged [in the aggravated burglary
instruction], the essential elements of the felony must be given if not separately
instructed” using UJI 14-140 NMRA. UJI 14-1632 use note 2.

{13} Therefore, in addition to the elements of aggravated burglary, the jury should
have been instructed on aggravated battery as follows:

      In addition to the other elements of [aggravated burglary], you must
      consider whether the defendant’s acts related to the commission of
      [aggravated battery]. The defendant is not charged with [aggravated
      battery]. However, the law declares that to be a crime when:

      [1.    A person touches or applied force to another person with a firearm;
      and

      2.     The person intended to injure another person.]

UJI 14-140; see also UJI 14-322 NMRA (elements instruction for aggravated battery
with a deadly weapon).

{14} The State concedes this point and the record confirms that the district court did
not instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated battery and instructed the jury only
as to general intent. However, the State argues that these errors did not amount to
fundamental error and therefore reversal is not required. We agree that instructing the
jury on general intent alone does not require reversal. Failure to instruct on specific
intent did not amount to error here because the jury instructions otherwise conformed to
the statutory elements for aggravated burglary. Nevertheless, we hold that the omission
of the elements of aggravated battery amounted to fundamental error and explain.

{15} In State v. Gunzelman, 1973-NMSC-055, ¶ 29, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55, our
Supreme Court held that a jury instruction that follows the language of the burglary
statute to proscribe the “unauthorized entry of any dwelling with the intent to commit any
felony or theft therein,” sufficiently instructs the jury on the specific criminal intent
required for that crime and no further description of the requisite criminal intent is
necessary. See id. ¶¶ 23-31 (omissions omitted).

{16} Defendant nonetheless argues that “a reasonable juror likely believed that the
only intent required by the aggravated burglary instruction” was general intent because
the district court provided the jury with a general intent instruction. We disagree and
decline to speculate on the jury’s belief, particularly in light of the guidance provided by
Gunzelman. The jury was instructed to consider the instructions as a whole, and the
instruction for aggravated burglary included the specific intent element of the offense.
See State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 27, 139 N.M. 719, 137 P.3d 659 (rejecting the
defendant’s contention that the giving of a general intent instruction only served to
mislead the jury as to what was required to prove “intent” in the elements instruction).
“To find guilt based on only a purposeful act,” as Defendant argues here, “a juror would
have had to ignore the elements instruction as well as the instruction that the
instructions are to be read as a whole. We cannot say that a reasonable juror would act
in such a manner.” State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA-042, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 408, 89 P.3d 80.
Therefore, we hold that the jury instructions correctly set forth the required intent to
convict Defendant of aggravated burglary.

{17} We agree, as does the State, with Defendant’s argument regarding the absence
of an elements instruction related to aggravated battery and conclude such constituted
error. As discussed above, UJI 14-1632 use note 2 states “[i]f intent to commit a felony
other than theft is alleged [in the aggravated burglary instruction], the essential
elements of the felony must be given if not separately instructed” using UJI 14-140. The
UJI 14-140 use note similarly states, “This instruction must be used with every crime
that incorporates another crime by reference . . . by requiring the ‘intent to commit’ . . .
unless the referenced crime is separately charged and instructed.” We recognize that “a
failure to follow a use note does not require automatic reversal,” Gee, 2004-NMCA-042,
¶ 19, and that the crime of aggravated burglary does not require the State prove the
underlying predicate felony itself. See State v. Romero, 1998-NMCA-057, ¶ 20, 125
N.M. 161, 958 P.2d 119 (“[W]e note that the crucial factor in the crime of aggravated
burglary is whether the defendant had the intent to commit a felony on entering the
dwelling, not whether the felony was actually committed.” (alteration, emphasis, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)). However, the charge of aggravated burglary
here still requires the jury’s consideration of the elements of aggravated battery
because the jury must determine the essential element that Defendant “entered . . . with
the intent to commit [an aggravated battery] once inside.” UJI 14-1632 (emphasis
added). Without instruction on the elements of aggravated battery, we cannot be certain
that the jury understood it was required to find that Defendant entered the house
intending to injure someone in the house, an element of aggravated battery. The jury
was separately instructed on Defendant’s possession of a firearm as an element of
aggravated burglary, so that is not a concern, but we do not agree with the State that a
juror would necessarily understand the specific intent element of aggravated battery
without an instruction. Therefore, failure to instruct the jury on the elements of
aggravated battery was error.

{18} Accordingly, “we proceed to the second step, asking whether the error is
fundamental.” Ocon, 2021-NMCA-032, ¶ 8. “The general rule is that fundamental error
occurs when the trial court fails to instruct the jury on an essential element.” State v.
Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 16, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72. “Although the omission of
an essential element ordinarily is fundamental error, our precedents describe two
exceptions under which the omission of an essential element does not amount to
fundamental error.” Sivils, 2023-NMCA-080, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “The first exception applies when the jury implicitly finds that the state has
proven the omitted element.” Id. ¶ 19. “This occurs when the jury makes a specific
finding that—in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case—necessarily
includes a finding of the omitted element.” Id. “The second exception only applies when
the jury’s verdict, considered together with the given instructions and the parties’ legal
and factual presentations, leaves no doubt that the jury would have found the omitted
element if properly instructed.” Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The State argues that both of these exceptions apply in this case.

{19} The State first argues that we may affirm under the first exception because the
jury’s guilty verdict necessarily means that they disbelieved Defendant’s explanation of
events and implicitly found Defendant acted with intent to commit aggravated battery.
The State contends that, had the jury believed Defendant’s claim that he entered the
house to get help for his brother and had no intention of hurting anyone, the jury could
not have concluded he entered the home with intent to commit aggravated battery,
despite the absence of an instruction defining the elements of aggravated battery.
Although, as noted above, the jury found that Defendant was carrying a gun, the verdict
does not necessarily show that the jury believed Defendant had the specific intent to
injure someone in the house when he entered. This Court has rejected “the proposition
that a fact[-]finder’s disbelief of a criminal defendant’s testimony can substitute for
affirmative proof of the state’s case.” State v. Wynn, 2001-NMCA-020, ¶ 6, 130 N.M.
381, 24 P.3d 816. Without more than the rejection of Defendant’s theory, we cannot
hold that the jury necessarily found Defendant intended to injure someone when he
entered the house with a weapon. Therefore, we conclude that the first exception does
not apply.

{20} The State next argues that we may affirm under the second exception because
the evidence supporting specific intent to commit aggravated battery was “undeniably
strong” and Defendant’s theory of the case was “wildly inconsistent” with the evidence
presented at trial. We narrowly apply this second exception and affirm “only when proof
of the omitted element is so strong that no rational jury could have failed to find that
element” and “the missing element was not ‘disputed’ or ‘in issue’ at trial.” Sivils, 2023-
NMCA-080, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal is mandatory
regardless of a defendant’s trial strategy if any evidence or suggestion in the facts,
however slight would have permitted a rational jury to conclude that the state failed to
meet its burden to prove the omitted element beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Ancira, 2022-NMCA-053, ¶ 26, 517 P.3d 292 (text only) (citation omitted).

{21} Defendant disputed at trial that his intent was to shoot or injure someone in the
house. Therefore, the second exception does not apply. See Sivils, 2023-NMCA-080, ¶
21. Detective Sanchez testified that, during his interview with Defendant, Defendant
repeatedly stated that he was not holding a gun when entering the house, he did not
kick down the door, and he was not entering the home to hurt anyone. The State also
played a video recording of Detective Sanchez’s interview with Defendant. During the
interview, Defendant stated that he went into the home to get help for his brother who
was shot, and that he wanted to ensure that no one inside the house was shot.
Although the jury found as an element of aggravated battery that Defendant was in
possession of a gun when he entered the house, there was conflicting evidence about
whether Defendant was pointing the gun at whoever might be present or instead
whether the gun was pointed at the ground. Without weighing this conflicting evidence,
we hold a rational jury could have found “that the State failed to meet its burden” of
showing by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant entered the home with the
intent to injure someone inside. See Ancira, 2022-NMCA-053, ¶ 26. We, therefore,
conclude that “[r]eversal is mandatory” on the failure to instruct the jury on the elements
of aggravated battery, the felony offense the State alleged Defendant intended to
commit at the time of the burglary. See id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 16 (holding that reversal is mandatory where
neither of the fundamental error exceptions apply).

{22} Whether the proper remedy is dismissal of the charge or retrial upon remand,
however, is dependent on the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.

II.    Sufficiency of the Evidence

{23} Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish his conviction
for aggravated burglary because the evidence did not establish Defendant acted with
specific intent to commit aggravated battery once inside the home. Although we are
reversing on other grounds, we review Defendant’s claim because principles of double
jeopardy bar retrial if Defendant’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.
See Sivils, 2023-NMCA-080, ¶ 27. Applying our well-established framework for
sufficiency of the evidence, see State v. Hixon, 2023-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 44-45, 543 P.3d
235, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant.

{24} The jury was instructed, in relevant part, that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that “[D]efendant entered the dwelling with the intent to commit an
aggravated battery once inside.” See id. ¶ 48 (“Jury instructions become the law of the
case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{25} Here, the State presented evidence of repeated gun shots at the people inside
the home during and after Mr. Rodriguez kicked Isaiah Perez and Defendant out of the
home resulting in injuries. The evidence also established that, after learning his brother
had been shot, Defendant believed that someone inside the house shot his brother.
Defendant either kicked in or forcefully opened the front door of the home and entered
while holding a gun out in front of him. “Intent is usually established by circumstantial
evidence.” Id. ¶ 47 (text only) (citation omitted); see also State v. Valles, 1972-NMCA-
076, ¶ 4, 84 N.M. 1, 498 P.2d 693 (“Intent to injure need not be established by direct
evidence but may be inferred from conduct and the surrounding circumstances.”). We
hold that this evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Defendant entered
into the home with the intent to commit aggravated battery.

{26} To the extent that Defendant asks that we reweigh evidence and credibility
during our review, we decline to do so. “Considering evidence and assessing the
credibility of witnesses is the unique purview of the jury.” Hixon, 2023-NMCA-048, ¶ 53.
Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
aggravated burglary. See id. ¶ 44.

CONCLUSION

{27} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

{28}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge