Court Opinion

ID: 9548846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:09:41.541744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:28.777186
License: Public Domain

McAllister, c. j.,
dissenting.
In my opinion the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Whether defendants were *215negligent and whether their negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, or whether plaintiff’s driver was negligent and whether his negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, were questions which should have been submitted to the jury.
In eases involving rear-end collisions this court has held uniformly that the issues of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury. Britton v. Jackson et al, 226 Or 136, 359 P2d 429 (1961); Boyle v. Cottrell et al, 222 Or 565, 353 P2d 838 (1960); Johnson v. L. A.-Seattle Mtr. Exp., Inc., 222 Or 377, 352 P2d 1091 (1960); English v. Royce et al, 220 Or 402, 349 P2d 660 (1960); Rose v. Portland Traction Co., 219 Or 1, 341 P2d 125, 346 P2d 375 (1959); Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or 28, 250 P2d 407 (1952). The only exception is Dormaier v. Jesse, 230 Or 194, 369 P2d 131 (1962), which contains a dictum to the effect that a defendant who drove into a blinding dust storm at approximately 45 miles per hour and collided with the rear of another vehicle was negligent as a matter of law.
Mr. Justice O’Connehl joins in this dissent.