Court Opinion

ID: 218706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2011-06-13 16:07:13+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:03.142860
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Tenth Circuit
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   June 13, 2011
                                TENTH CIRCUIT                    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                                                     Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

              Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                         No. 10-3319
                                              (D.C. Nos. 2:10-CV-02414-CM and
v.
                                                    2:06-CR-20024-CM-1)
                                                          (D. Kansas)
SANDTAS METCALF,

              Defendant - Appellant.

                       ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
                           OF APPEALABILITY

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner, Sandtas Metcalf, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) so

he can appeal the district court’s dismissal of the motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence he brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (providing a movant may not appeal the disposition of a § 2255

motion unless he first obtains a COA). In 2007, Metcalf pleaded guilty to

possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). The written plea agreement

contained a waiver of Metcalf’s right to directly or collaterally challenge his

prosecution, conviction, or sentence. Metcalf was sentenced as a career offender
under USSG § 4B1.1 based on three prior felony convictions—two involving

controlled substances and one based on a failure-to-report-type escape. See

USSG § 4B1.1 (providing a defendant is a career offender if he “has at least two

prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

offense”).

      The instant § 2255 motion was filed in the district court on July 22, 2010.

Relying on Chambers v. United States, Metcalf argued he was erroneously

sentenced as a career offender because his felony conviction for escape does not

constitute a crime of violence. 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (holding that failure-to-report

escape crimes are not crimes of violence). The Government argued, alternatively,

that: (1) Metcalf’s § 2255 motion was barred by the waiver, (2) Chambers does

not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and (3) Metcalf’s § 2255

motion was untimely because it was filed more than one year after his conviction

became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (setting forth a one-year statute of

limitations for § 2255 motions). In its order of dismissal, the district court

rejected the Government’s argument that Chambers does not apply retroactively.

See United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding

Chambers involved a new substantive rule and applying that rule retroactively to

an appeal involving the Armed Career Criminal Act); see also United States v.

Charles, 579 F.3d 1060, 1068-69 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying the reasoning in

Chambers to a case involving USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)). Using the date on which the

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Supreme Court decided Chambers, the district court nonetheless concluded

Metcalf’s § 2255 motion was untimely because it was not filed within the one-

year limitations period. The court further concluded Metcalf failed to

demonstrate any entitlement to equitable tolling of the one-year period and,

accordingly, dismissed his § 2255 motion. 1 In his appellate brief, Metcalf does

not address the district court’s procedural ruling and does not present any

argument that the district court miscalculated the one-year period or erroneously

resolved the equitable tolling question.

      To be entitled to a COA, Metcalf must show “that jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484-85 (2000) (holding that when a district

court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a petitioner is entitled to

a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable

whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the

district court’s procedural ruling was correct). Our review of the record

demonstrates that the district court’s dismissal of Metcalf’s § 2255 motion as

untimely is not deserving of further proceedings or subject to a different

resolution on appeal. Accordingly, we deny Metcalf’s request for a COA and

      1
        The district court also concluded it was appropriate to enforce the waiver
of collateral attack rights contained in Metcalf’s plea agreement.

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dismiss this appeal. Metcalf’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is

granted.

                                             ENTERED FOR THE COURT

                                             Michael R. Murphy
                                             Circuit Judge

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