Court Opinion

ID: 9830060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:50:51.95071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:11.575631
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion for a rehearing the appellant contends, in effect, that this court erred in affirming the judgment of the court below, for the reason that said judgment is erroneous, (1) in that it “does not ascertain the amount of money he is entitled to recover against the defendant Whitlock with any degree of certainty, and said amount cannot be ascertained except through extrinsic proof hereafter to be made, that the pleadings and evidence are such as to entitle him to a judgment for a definite and ascertained amount; (2) because the judgment of the county court does not conform to the verdict of the jury, all of which is apparent from the face of the record.” This is the first time these questions have been raised in this case. No mention seems to have been made of the matters in the county court, and our attention was not heretofore called to them by an assignment of error or otherwise.
[8] The verdict of the jury was, as shown in the original opinion, in favor of the plain? tiff and against both of the defendants, Whit-lock and Abney, for the “sum of three hundred twenty-three and n/ioo dollars ($323.-11), with 10 per cent, interest from maturity and 10 per cent, additional of the principal and interest as attorney’s fees,” and in favor of defendant Abney against his codefendant, Whitlock, for a like specified amount. Upon this verdict judgment was rendered in the county court for said amount, principal, interest, and attorney’s fees in favor of the plaintiff bank against both of said defendants and in favor of defendant Abney against the defendant Whitlock as follows: “It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the defendant J. D. Abney do have and recover from said defendant W. O'. Whitlock any sum of money that the said J. D. Abney may be compelled to pay on this judgment in favor of the plaintiff, together with costs of suit for all of which execution may issue.” The rule that a judgment in favor of a party which entirely omits the sum adjudged in his favor, and makes “no reference to the verdict by which it could be rendered certain and thereby complete within itself,” or which does not conform to the verdict of the jury is erroneous, cannot be invoked in this case as is sought to be done. Appellant was not entitled to a judgment against Whitlock for the full sum rendered in favor of the appellee against the said Whitlock and himself. The remedy provided for a surety by title 109 of the Revised Statutes of 1911 “extends to indorsers, guarantors and every other suretyship.” Article 6337. Appellant, as indorser of the note in suit, was secondarily liable thereon, and in contemplation of the statute above referred to, and, as in effect, determined by the judgment of the court below, his liability was in the nature of a sure*738ty. The relation therefore of principal and surety existed between appellant and his co-defendant W. O. Whitlock, and it is well settled by the decisions of this state that an absolute or unconditional judgment cannot legally be rendered against the principal in favor of the surety at the same time judgment is rendered against the principal and surety for the sum adjudged against the principal and surety. Labbe v. Corbett, 69 Tex. 503, 6 S. W. 808; Dignowity v. Staacke et al., 25 S. W. 824. Appellant is entitled to recover of Whitlock only such sum as he shall be compelled to pay on the judgment herein rendered in favor of appellee, and article 6333 of said title 109 provides: “When any person, being surety in any undertaking whatever, shall be compelled to pay any judgment, or any part thereof, or shall make any payment • which is applied upon such judgment by reason of such suretyship, the said judgment shall not be discharged by such payment, but shall remain in force for the use of such surety, and shall be considered as assigned to such surety, together with all the rights of the creditor thereunder, to the extent of the payment thereon made by such surety, and interest thereon; and such surety shall be entitled to have execution thereon in the name of the creditor for the use of such surety against the principal debtor for the full amount of such payment and interest thereon and all costs, which execution shall be issued upon the application of such surety to the clerk, or court, as the case may be, and shall be levied, collected and returned as in other cases.”
[9] But we are of opinion that the judgment appealed from is erroneous, as is apparent upon the record, for the reason that it does not protect appellant, Abney, the in-dorser on the note sued on, by directing that execution be first levied upon Whitlock’s property, as required by article 6332 of said title 109 of the statute. The issue of surety-ship being established in favor of appellant, Abney, the court should have rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff below, appellee here, against the defendants Whitlock and Abney, and, by the judgment of the court entered, directed the sheriff to levy execution first upon the property of the principal, W. O. Whitlock, subject to execution, and situated in Hill' county, before a levy could, be made upon the property of Abney, the surety, if so much property of said principal could be found as would in the opinion of the sheriff be sufficient to make the amount of the execution; otherwise, the levy to be made on so much property of the principal as might be found, if any, and upon so much of the property of the surety, Abney, as might be necessary to make the amount of the execution in accordance with article 6332, referred to above. Dignowity v. Staacke, supra ; Montrose v. Fannin County Bank, 23 S. W. 709.
[10] This error in the judgment, however, does not require a remanding of the case for a new trial. Such judgment as should have been' rendered in the court below will, as is authorized by statute, be rendered in this court. The suretyship of appellant Abney being established, his rights as surety, in the event of a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee, were fixed by law, and the verdict of the jury awarding him a recovery against Whitlock for the full amount awarded the appellee bank against Whitlock and appellant was wrong, the only issue in such cáse being one of law, and it was not necessary for the judgment to conform, as in ordinary cases, to the verdict. Under such circumstances, the judgment is sufficient, if it conforms to the law. Smith v. Smith, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 304, 55 S. W. 541. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and here reformed so that the plaintiff in the county court (appellee here) shall recover judgment against W. O. Whitlock as principal on the note sued on, and against J. D. Abney, appellant, as indorser and surety on said note for the sum, principal, interest, and attorney’s fees as awarded by the verdict of the jury and adjudged against them in the county court, together with a foreclosure of the mortgage lien on the property described in appellee’s petition, and all costs of the court below, and that the sheriff of Hill county be directed, in the event the property covered by the lien foreclosed does not sell for enough to pay off and satisfy the judgment in favor of appellee in full, to levy the execution for the balance remaining unpaid, first, upon the property of the said W. O. Whitlock, situated in Hill county, Tex., as above indicated, and as required by said article 6332 of the statute.
[11] It is further ordered, inasmuch as the county court could and would no doubt have rendered judgment directing execution to be levied first upon the property of W. O. Whit-lock as is done in this court, had appellant' called the county court’s attention to the matter by motion or otherwise, that appellant be taxed with the costs of this court. Helm v. Weaver, 69 Tex. 145, 6 S. W. 420; Montrose v. Fannin County Bank, supra.
The other matters urged for a rehearing have been heretofore considered, and we see no good reason to change the views entertained by this court in respect thereto, as expressed in our original opinion, and the appellant’s motion for a rehearing based upon those matters is overruled.