Court Opinion

ID: 9807719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:14:13.343816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:30.160570
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
after stating the case. It is evident from the above statement of the case on appeal that there was no natural drainway for the basin in the road across the land of the defendant. Natural drainage is where water runs in a state of nature without artificial assistance. The mere fact that it would require the digging of a ditch seventy yards long to carry the water on to the defendant’s land, would show that it did not go there naturally. Even then it would not reach a natural watercourse, nor even an artificial waterway, but would be turned loose in a low place upon the defendant’s land, to his manifest injury. He would be compelled to let it -lie there, ruining his crops and destroying the value of *735his laud, or dig another ditch four hundred yards long through the land of another man. It seems that the overseer could have relieved the road of all water by cutting a ditch thirty-five yards long and two feet deep through his own land on the opposite side of the road, but he preferred to dig seventy yards of ditch upon another man’s land than thirty-five yards upon his own land. In this he showed fine business sense, but has he the right to1 thus appropriate the land of another, without compensation, and, as far as we can see, without authority of law? We all know that a ditch is always more or less of a nuisance. It is frequently a necessary nuisance, but a nuisance none the less. It divides a field so that a man can not get from one side to the other without building bridges or ruining the ditch. It takes up not only the land occupied by the ditch itself, but generally much more with its banks and the weeds and briers that always grow on ditch banks. It is true these banks can be kept clean, but this requires much additional labor and expense. It thus appears that digging a ditch through the land of another is not only an appropriation of a certain part of the land, but is a direct injury to the remainder. Suppose the overseer had dug this ditch, how would the defendant have obtained compensation ? N o way has been called to our attention, except an action for the trespass, and this it would be difficult to maintain if the overseer had a right to cut the ditch. If he had no right to cut it, the defendant is not liable to indictment for stopping him.
There is no authority either for entry or compensation under Chapter 581, of the Public Laws of 1899, because Section 27 thereof expressly provides that this act shall not apply to Sampson County, and there is neither proof nor allegation that Sampson County has adopted said act, or any part thereof, even if it could lawfully do so. The only sections in The Code that we find applicable to the question axe 2025, ,2027 *736and 2040. Section 2025 provides that “Where, by the overseers, it may be deemed expedient to make or repair causeways on the same, they shall be at least fourteen feet wide; and earth, necessary to raise or cover them, shall be taken 'from either hand, so as to form a drain on each side of the causeway.”
Section 2027 provides that “Overseers may lawfully cut poles and other necessary timber for repairing and making bridges and causeways. And whenever earth shall be needed on a public road, and it can not be conveniently procured on either side of the causeway, the overseer may lawfully take the earth from any adjoining land.”
Section 2040 is as follows: “All roads shall be laid out by a jury of five freeholders, to the greatest advantage of the inhabitants, and with as little prejudice as may be to lands and enclosures; which laying out, and such damage as private persons may sustain, shall be done and ascertained by the same jury on oath; and all damages by them assessed shall be deemed a county charge.” Nowhere do we find any authority for cutting ditches into' private property. On the contrary, it clearly appears that The Code contemplates the filling up of such slight depressions, and their drainage by lateral ditches on the side of the highway.
In the present case, the standing water, when it stands at all, is only from four to six inches deep. This could easily be filled up, either with rock and dirt, or by cross-laying with poles and piling dirt on them. This would permanently remedy the evil at little expense, and injure no one.
It would be an intolei*able nuisance to; permit every road overseer, in his unbridled discretion, to cut ditches 'through private property, whenever and wherever he saw fit, simply to drain mud holes in a road that he could easily fill up. If the highway were so'located as to be absolutely incapable of drainage without draining through private property, it could *737be relocated,' and perhaps an additional easement acquired,, under Section ,2040 of The Code, but no such question is before us.
The appropriation of private property to public uses has been so recently and so fully considered at this term in Phillips v. Tel. Co., Mullen v. Canal Co., and Rice v. Railroad, as to require but little further comment. It is well settled that private property can not be taken, even for a public use,, without express legislative authority and the payment of adequate compensation. Any other appropriation would be in violation of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of North Carolina, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Cornelius v. Glenn, 52 N. C., 512; Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N. C., 550; C., B. and Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S., 226.
That this is the rule in ether jurisdictions, is shown by an examination of the authorities. In Gould on Waters, the author says, in Section 271: “An owner of land has no right’ to rid his land of surface water or superficially percolating water, by collecting it in artificial channels and discharging it through or upon the lands of an adjoining proprietor. This is alike the rule of the common and civil law; and a municipal corporation has no greater right in this respect than a-private landowner.” In support of this proposition, the-learned author cites a long line of authorities from Indiana,, Minnesota, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Colorado, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Nebraska, West Virginia, Missouri and Wisconsin. In Lewis on Eminent Domain, the author says, in Section 87: “* * * Causing water to flow upon land is a clear violation of the right of exclusive occupation and enjoyment, which can not be taken or interferred with without compensation.” And again, in Section 103: “Nevins v. City of Peoria (41 Ill., 502), *73889 Am. Dec., 392, is a leading case upon this question. Tbe city of Peoria graded its streets in such a manner as to cause a stream of water and mud to1 flow on to tbe plaintiff’s property in times of rain, and also to cause a pond to accumulate ujron adjacent property, wbicb, by becoming stagnant, diffused unwholesome vapors over tbe plaintiff’s premises. Tbe city was held liable on tbe ground that tbe damages complained of were a taking, within tbe meaning of tbe Constitution. It was held that tbe city had no greater power over its streets than a private individual had over bis own land, and that tbe law of adjacent proprietors was applicable. This is tbe true rule to be applied in all such cases.” Preventing tbe digging of an unauthorized ditch and obstructing an existing ditch whereby tbe highway is flooded are essentially different.
Another interesting view is presented by this case: Suppose tbe plaintiff should sue tbe county for compensation, and tbe county should repudiate tbe act of tbe overseer as unauthorized, what remedy would he have ? This Court has said that be can not sue tbe county for a tort. Shall it now say that be is indictable if be attempts to prevent a tort? Surely one of two things must be true — either tbe overseer has ■no right to cut tbe ditch, or tbe county must be held responsible for bis act.
For misdirection of tbe jury by bis Honor in tbe Court below, a new trial is ordered.
New Trial.