Court Opinion

ID: 9376818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-04 00:02:02.870261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.629500
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/3/23 P. v. Williams CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322056

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA099542)
         v.

TIMOTHY THOMAS WILLIAMS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      THE COURT:
      Defendant and appellant Timothy Thomas Williams
appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 (former section

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
1170.95),2 which allows defendants convicted of felony murder
under superannuated legal standards to seek resentencing relief.
      Defendant’s appointed counsel found no arguable issues
and filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende), asking this court to independently review the record.
Under the standard articulated in People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), we decline counsel’s invitation to
undertake an independent review of the record. Instead, we
evaluate the arguments defendant raises in his letter brief.
(Delgadillo, supra, at pp. 231–232.) Finding none of his
arguments meritorious, we affirm.
          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The Murder Conviction and Sentence3
      “On August 6, 1996, a jury convicted defendant . . . of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) with a
robbery-murder special circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)), robbery (§ 211; count 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2); count 3), and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182,
subd. (a)(1); count 13). As to counts 1 through 3, the jury also
found principal firearm use allegations to be true. (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1).) He was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole plus 10 years four months. On direct appeal, we modified
defendant’s sentence to strike a four-month principal armed
enhancement attached to count 3 and affirmed the judgment as

2     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.

3     On December 8, 2022, defendant filed a request for judicial
notice asking us to take notice of our opinion in his prior, related
appeal. We grant the request.

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modified. [Citation.].)” (People v. Williams (May 4, 2021,
B304345) [nonpub. opn.], at p. 2, fn. omitted (Williams I).)
II.    Petition for Resentencing
       On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 1437) in order to
“amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
       Effective January 1, 2019, Sen. Bill 1437 added former
section 1170.95, subd. (a), creating a procedure whereby a person
convicted of, as relevant here, “murder under . . . [any] theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, [or] attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” but who could
not now be convicted, can petition to have the murder conviction
vacated and to be resentenced. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
       “On March 18, 2019, defendant filed [his first] petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 117[2.6]. Over the People’s
opposition, the trial court found that defendant had established a
prima facie case and held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 117[2.6], subdivision (d). Following the presentation of
evidence and argument, the trial court denied defendant’s
petition, finding that (1) he was a direct aider and abettor who
had the intent to kill, and (2) he was a major participant in the
crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Williams I, supra, B304345, at p. 2.) Defendant appealed, and
we affirmed the trial court’s order. (Id. at p. 2.)

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       On January 27, 2022, defendant filed a second petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. On June 7, 2022, the
trial court denied the petition, finding that it “raised identical
issues to those of [defendant’s] first petition,” and was thus “a
successive petition” subject to denial. The court explained that
defendant “has offered no explanation or justification as to why
he has filed a second petition,” nor had he “presented new
evidence” suggesting that his claims for resentencing should be
reevaluated.
       This appeal followed. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a
brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 raising no issues.4
       On October 26, 2022, we notified Williams of his counsel’s
brief and gave him leave to file his own brief or letter stating
grounds for appellate relief. On December 8, 2022, he filed a
letter brief.
                           DISCUSSION
       Per Delgadillo, we will “evaluate the specific arguments
presented in [defendant’s supplemental] brief,” but will not
undertake an “an independent review of the entire record to

4     Although “the procedures set forth in Wende do not apply to
appeals from the denial of postconviction relief,” such as the
resentencing relief provided by former section 1170.95, counsel
has similar duties when representing a defendant appealing from
the denial of postconviction relief. (People v. Cole (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1032, review granted Oct. 14, 2020,
S264278; see also Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 231 [“When
appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be pursued on
appeal . . . counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition”].)

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identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 232.)
       In his supplemental brief, defendant argues that neither
the trial court nor this court has ever evaluated the extent to
which his youth5 mitigates his capacity to act with reckless
indifference to human life, and that section 1172.6 entitles him to
a second resentencing hearing at which his youth can be
appropriately considered.
       This argument is improper for several reasons. As a
preliminary matter, defendant arguably forfeited this argument
by failing to raise it before the trial court; he made no mention of
any issue related to his age in either the operative resentencing
petition or the initial hearing on the petition. (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 949, fn. 5 [“[F]ailure to press lower
court for a ruling deprives that court of opportunity to correct
potential error and forfeits the issue for appeal”].)
       Even assuming that the argument is properly before us, it
would fail on its merits. Defendant correctly identifies youth as
one relevant factor in assessing whether a person acted with
reckless indifference to human life per section 1172.6, but he
cannot demonstrate that this legal principle entitles him to a
second evidentiary hearing under that statute.
       In denying defendant’s original resentencing petition, the
trial court found that he was a “direct aider and abettor who had
the intent to kill” (Williams I, supra, B304345, at p. 2), only
alternately concluding that he was also a major participant in the
crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
trial court’s first finding, which defendant does not challenge

5    At the time of his participation in the underlying crimes,
defendant was 23 years old.

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here, sufficiently establishes that defendant is “guilty of murder
or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section . . . 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see also § 189, subd. (e)(2) [a person is
guilty of murder if he “was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided [or] abetted . . . the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree”].) Thus, defendant
remains ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 regardless of
whether the trial court had the opportunity to consider whether
his youth mitigated his ability to act with reckless indifference
towards human life.
      Additionally, it is not clear whether the trial court was ever
deprived of such an opportunity. Defendant principally argues
that several recent appellate cases addressing a defendant’s
youth as a mitigating factor constitute an intervening change in
the law, and that neither the trial court nor we had occasion to
“consider [defendant’s] youth as a mitigating factor” when
evaluating his original resentencing petition. (See, e.g., In re
Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 (Moore) [holding that “a
defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life”]; People
v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970 (Ramirez) [same].) We are
not persuaded that these cases represent a change in the law, as
they simply summarize existing legal principles regarding youth
as a mitigating factor. (See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567
U.S. 460, 476 [“‘the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant [must] be duly considered’
in assessing his culpability”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1375–1378 [same].) These principles were just

                                 6
as available for the trial court to consider (and for defendant to
argue, had he chosen to do so) in 2019 as they are today.
       Lastly, assuming arguendo that these cases did constitute
an intervening change in law, it is not clear whether defendant is
entitled to their benefit. Defendant was 23 years old when the
underlying crimes were committed; in all the cases he cites where
a person’s youth potentially mitigated his culpability sufficiently
to warrant remand for a section 1172.6 hearing, the defendant
was 18 years of age or younger. (People v. Harris (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 939, 944, review granted Apr. 28, 2021, S267802,
abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952 [defendant 17 years old]; Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 453 [defendant 16 years old]; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at p. 976, fn. 2 [defendant 18 years old].) Defendant does not cite
binding legal authority extending the benefit of this mitigating
factor to persons over the age of 18.6

6      Defendant’s sole citation for this proposition is Justice Liu’s
concurring statement to our Supreme Court’s denial of a petition
for review in People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016,
review denied Jan. 27, 2021, S265597. The concurrence, which
analyzes our state’s parole eligibility laws, eloquently argues for
all offenders under the age of 25 to have equal access to special
rehabilitative measures designed for youthful offenders, but
recognizes that our Legislature currently distinguishes between
perpetrators who were minors and those who were 18 years old or
older when they committed an offense for which they were
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. This does not
convince us that defendant, who was 23 when he committed the
crime for which he was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole, is necessarily entitled to mitigation of culpability due to
his youth.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________________________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.

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