Court Opinion

ID: 9692982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:09.232392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:27.179727
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J„
with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 14] We respectfully dissent. The Court’s opinion fairly and accurately outlines the basic facts of the case and the governing principles of law.
[¶ 15] One relevant principle, stated in ¶ 10 is that: “We will not disturb a court’s decision as to whether a seizure implicates the Fourth Amendment unless we find errors of law or clearly erroneous findings of fact.” (citing State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 361, 363).
[¶ 16] The second relevant principle of law, stated in ¶ 11 is that: “An officer seizes a citizen *when “the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen” such that he is not free to walk away.’ ” (quoting State v. Cilley, 1998 ME 34, ¶ 7, 707 A.2d 79, 82). At ¶ 12, the Court correctly clarifies what constitutes a seizure, “An officer’s interaction with a citizen constitutes a seizure when the officer’s conduct is accompanied by actions that lead a reasonable person to believe that he is not free to leave.” (citing I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)).
[¶ 17] Here, taking the evidence most favorably to the trial court’s findings, two officers in civilian clothes appear to have aggressively approached defendant’s vehicle, one from the driver’s side, one from the passenger side, drawing and flashing their badges as they came. One officer testified “probably my firearm was visible, but I couldn’t say that to be sure.” The Court could infer that the officers’ attitudes and bearing clearly indicated intention to confront and search the vehicle or its occupants. While reasonable views may differ, that is not our standard for review.
[¶ 18] Notably, in dlley, in which we also overturned a trial court’s factual findings, the event involved the officers being in one place and the defendant coming to them, alley, 1998 ME 34, ¶¶3-4, 707 A.2d 79, 80-81. Here, the evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s conclusion that the officers, aggressively heading towards the defendant, drawing and flashing their badges, and perhaps with a visible firearm, had a purpose in mind to stop and search the vehicle and its occupants. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that Brewer or any reasonable person, confronted with this show of authority, could have believed that he was free to leave.
[¶ 19] The trial court also found that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to warrant a stop or seizure. “We have no weaving beyond the lane in question. We have an out-of-state plate, and we have parking beside the truck in daytime. So, therefore, the court finds that those facts do not warrant a stop.”
[¶ 20] There may be other evidence that might justify a seizure, but it is for the trial court, not this Court, to assess the credibility and sufficiency of that evidence. Even the MDEA agents did not think they had sufficient cause to stop the vehicle based on its operation, because they did not do so. They testified they saw no violation of law. The officers kept going when the vehicle pulled into a parking lot. Then they observed it, noting only activity that could have many innocent explanations, and then they confronted it.
[¶ 21] These events occurred in the middle of the town, early on a bright summer afternoon, but the officers testified that their actions were justified in part by concern that *357the occupants of the truck, while in the truck, might be preparing to commit theft from the trailer truck or burglary of the adjacent church. In the circumstances the trial court could have concluded that the facts may have been embellished and pretext used to justify what was an insupportable search and seizure. Because the motion to suppress was granted, findings on these supplemental believability points were not necessary.1 The trial court made sufficient, supportable findings that the seizure was not justified.
[¶ 22] We should not disregard the superi- or position of the trial court to assess believability of witnesses and significance of evidence. See Crowley v. Dubuc, 430 A.2d 549, 552 (Me.1981). We have repeatedly stated that “the function of an appellate court is not to review a cold transcript and draw its own factual inferences .... ” Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 354 (Me.1981). The Court’s function is to review the record to determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial court’s findings. See VanVoorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Me.1996). Such findings are conclusive on this Court, even if there is evidence in the record that could have supported a contrary determination. See Crowley, 430 A.2d at 551.
[¶ 23] Because the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and do not constitute an error of law, they should be given proper deference. We would affirm the order of the trial court.

. Some trial courts are appropriately cautious about making believability findings regarding law enforcement officers and others who regularly appear before them as witnesses. This caution avoids bias concerns in future cases involving the same witness. Lack of a believability finding does not permit the inference that the court found a witness believable.