Court Opinion

ID: 9444586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:05:41.854507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:55.481461
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As the prosecutor stated in summation to the jury, Government witness Tyree was the “only one other person who could have gotten into [appellant’s] room” where the fatal injuries were inflicted. Because it was therefore conceivable that he could have committed the crime, the jury was bound to view his testimony with corresponding caution. Hence, information affecting his credibility was of critical importance.
The question which the trial court excluded on Tyree’s cross-examination bore directly and heavily on his credibility. The obvious purpose of the question was to elicit information which would show that he had recently made a false report to the police for the purpose of placing the blame on someone else for a crime which he had committed. *836This court concedes the excluded question was proper for that purpose. But because defense counsel rested his argument for admissibility on “showing that a charge had been placed against [Tyree] anc. that he forfeited [collateral],” this couit approves exclusion of the question. I respectfully submit that this distinction is legal hairsplitting which, particularly in a capital case, undercuts our traditional concept of fundamental fairness Accordingly, I would hold the exclusionary ruling erroneous.
Tyree's testimony bore upon at least two important and related issues upon which the evidence was in conflict: (1) the time during which the fatal injuries could have been inflicted, and (2) appellant’s whereabouts during such time. Testimony supporting the view that the fatal injuries were inflicted between 1:00 a. m. and 3:00 a. m. on January 8 was given by Government witness Zand-jabil, who occupied the hotel room next to appellant’s. Zandjabil stated that during those hours he heard someone leave appellant’s room as if to go to the men’s room and then return; shortly thereafter he heard voices shouting, “Stop it! Stop it!” and “Shut up! Shut up!”; he believed there were more than two voices, and the voices continued for about ten minutes.
Tyree’s testimony, on the other hand, may be read as indicating that the fatal injuries were not inflicted during those very early morning hours. He stated that, although he went to the vicinity of appellant’s room at about 2:30 a. m., as a result of a complaint from one of the tenants (who did not testify), he did not enter because he heard only snoring from appellant’s room; at about 7:00 a. m., a total stranger (who was never otherwise identified) left appellant’s room key with Tyree’s wife; at about 1:00 p. m., on the same day, Tyree was summoned to appellant’s room by a maid and upon entering found a man lying face down on the floor in his underclothes ; he thought the man was drunk; and he did not notify the police until about 3:30 p. m.
The only testimony concerning appellant’s whereabouts at or near those very early morning hours came from Government witness Berry, who testified that he met appellant near a bus depot at 12:40 a. m. on January 8 and that-they went together in search of liquor until about 1:30 a. m. when appellant left him near the bus depot, saying that he was catching a bus for Scranton at 1:30 a. m. Appellant testified that he did catch the bus at that time, although he testified at a former trial that he caught the bus at 4:30 a. m.
I am unable to agree with this court that Tyree’s strange testimony related merely “to routine matters.” His testimony bore heavily on the crucial question of when the fatal injuries were inflicted. And if the jury had known of Tyree’s previous false report to the police, it might very well have rejected his testimony supporting the view that the fatal injuries were not inflicted during the very early morning hours. In that event, the jury might have adopted the testimony of witness Zandjabil and concluded that the fatal injuries were inflicted during those hours when he heard the shouts from appellant’s room. And considering the conflict in the evidence concerning appellant’s whereabouts during those hours, the jury might reasonably have been in sufficient doubt to acquit.1 *Settled principles applicable in such circumstances require reversal for a new trial.2

. The evidence in this case was, as the trial court told the jury, “entirely circumstantial.” That this evidence left lingering doubts of guilt is apparent from the prosecutor’s candor to the jury after all the evidence had been concluded. He said: “This isn’t the type of case in which you should find a first degree [murier].”

. “ * * * where error occurs which, within the range of a reasonable possibility, may have affected the verdict of a jury, appellant is not required to explore the minds of the jurors in an effort to prove that it did in. fact influence their verdict.” Little v. United States, 10 Cir., 1934, 73 F.2d 861, 866-867, 96 A. L.R. 889. See Kotteakos v. United *837States, 1946, 328 U.S. 750, 763-765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557; Braswell v. United States, 5 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 597, 602.
Unfortunately a new trial here would be appellant’s third since the first trial was set aside for erroneous instruction. Kitchen v. United States, 1953, 92 U.S. App.D.C. 382, 205 F.2d 720. “But the standards of justice cannot be relaxed in such a situation: the fact that an accused has undergone more than one trial does not dilute his right to just and lawful treatment. See Leyra v. Denno, 1954, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, [98 L.Ed. 948].” Caldwell v. United States, — U.S.App.D.C. —, 218 F.2d 370 (dissenting opinion).