Court Opinion

ID: 9829589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:27:37.920731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:03.264643
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing .the appellee, Ansley, challenges the accuracy of a statement in our original opinion to the effect that “the appellee does not rely for venue upon the particular type of contract (i. e., shipper’s order, bill of lading and attached sight draft a'ccepted by buyer, etc.) construed'bv our Supreme Court in Marcus v. Armer, 117 Tex. 368, 5 S.W.(2d) 960, 60 A.L.R. 672; Farmers’ Seed & Gin Co. v. Brooks, 125 Tex. 234, 81 S.W.(2d) 675, and that line of authorities.” In his motion for rehearing, he states: “It is our intention to rely upon these authorities and the type of contract stated in each one of these cases.” The challenged statement taken alone is subject to the criticism made, but taken in connection with the context of the opinion there would not appear to be any misinterpretation of the appellee’s theory of the case. He does rely for venue upon exception 5 of the general venue statute, citing four authorities considered and referred to in our original opinion. The line of authorities referred to in our opinion (of which the two first above named are a part) deal with the type of contract or state of facts in which the drafts, bill of lading attached, etc., in each case were drawn by the seller on the buyer. In those cases the court held that such transaction evidenced intention and agreement upon the part of the seller to retain the title and right of possession until the goods were paid for by the buyer at the point of destination whereupon delivery to the buyer took place. In said ca.ses the buyer was the plaintiff. In the instant case the seller is the plaintiff, and the testimony, as pointed out in our original opinion, shows the sales were consummated by parol agreements between the appellee 'and appellant’s agent, Dalrymple, in Abilene, Taylor county, where the cotton was delivered to said agent for the appellant.
As we construed the testimony there is nothing in the original contract authorizing the appellee to insert in the draft the sentence italicized in our original opinion. There is absent from the testimony proof *504of written contract to pay in Taylor county. The suit is not on the draft as such, the amount thereof having been paid, as pointed out in the original opinion. Except as herein indicated the statements in the former opinion remain unmodified, and the motion for rehearing is overruled.