Court Opinion

ID: 9927430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-27 07:15:54.955125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.629810
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed January 25, 2024

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-21-00255-CR
                                     __________

                  JEROME LOUIS NELSON, Appellant
                                          V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 70th District Court
                              Ector County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. A-18-1434-CR

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      A grand jury indicted Appellant, Jerome Louis Nelson, for the murder of his
girlfriend, Rochel Zuniga. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West Supp. 2023).
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and, after a jury trial, he was convicted of the
charged offense. The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at life imprisonment in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and the trial court
sentenced Appellant accordingly.
        Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support Appellant’s conviction for the charged offense and the jury’s rejection of his
claim of self-defense; (2) the trial court’s judgment should be reformed to show that
Appellant is only guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter; and
(3) Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to present
evidence during the punishment phase to support Appellant’s “sudden passion”
mitigation defense. 1 We affirm.
                                       I. Factual Background
        In the early morning hours of April 27, 2018, Appellant called 9-1-1 to report
that he had accidentally shot and killed Zuniga. When law enforcement arrived, the
responding officers discovered Zuniga’s body on a bedroom floor, lying near a bed
with a shotgun across her body. The responding officers observed that (1) Zuniga
had sustained a single gunshot wound to her head, (2) Zuniga’s index finger
protruded oddly through the trigger guard of the shotgun, and (3) the shotgun
appeared to be positioned in an unnatural manner. The barrel of the shotgun was
propped against the side of the bed and the shotgun’s grip was stuffed under the
bottom edge of Zuniga’s shorts. There were blood smears on the door frame of the
bedroom where Zuniga was found, across the room from where officers discovered
her body. Zuniga’s body also bore severe bruises all over her face, neck, and arms.
        Appellant testified that he and Zuniga had lived together in their shared
apartment for two years. Appellant had previously been arrested and convicted for

        1
         Appellant’s first court-appointed appellate counsel submitted an Anders brief and filed a motion
to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Following the procedures set forth in Anders,
Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008), we independently reviewed the record and concluded that this appeal was not particularly
amenable to disposition under Anders. We granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, abated this
appeal, and remanded this cause to the trial court with instructions to appoint other appellate counsel. New
appellate counsel was directed to file a brief on the merits and address any substantive issues that appellate
counsel deemed to be arguable. This appeal was reinstated after the trial court appointed new appellate
counsel.
                                                      2
assault family violence against Zuniga. In that incident, Appellant called 9-1-1 after
Zuniga and he had argued about a text message that he had received from his ex-
wife. Appellant told police that Zuniga threatened him with a knife and that he
responded by punching her. The responding officer for that incident testified that
Zuniga had bruises and injuries on her face and neck, and that Zuniga told him
Appellant had choked and beaten her. These injuries were consistent with and
similar to the bruising observed on Zuniga’s body after she was killed. The
responding officer also testified that Appellant never claimed Zuniga threatened him
with a knife or that Appellant struck Zuniga to defend himself. Appellant was
arrested and ultimately pleaded guilty to the charge of assault family violence. In
his statement to police, Appellant stated that Zuniga threatened herself with the
knife, not him. Although the couple separated briefly after this incident, they
reconciled and resumed cohabiting a few months later.
      Appellant testified that on the day before he killed Zuniga, the couple traveled
from Odessa to San Antonio to purchase cocaine; they returned to Odessa the same
day, arriving around six o’clock in the evening. Upon their return, a friend, Jordan
Deoge, joined them at their apartment and the trio consumed alcohol and used
cocaine and methamphetamine. These activities carried on throughout the night and
into the next day, when, at around noon, Appellant finally went to sleep in the
bedroom that he shared with Zuniga.
      According to Appellant, he was awakened when Zuniga slapped him in the
face. He did not know how long he had been asleep before this happened. He
testified that he sleeps in the nude and was nude when Zuniga slapped him.
Appellant testified that after being slapped he saw Zuniga pointing a pistol in his
face. She was upset about a text message that Appellant had sent to Doege in which
he told Doege she was “good looking.”          Appellant testified that Zuniga was
screaming and asking if he was going to leave her for Doege.
                                          3
      Appellant then grabbed the pistol from Zuniga’s hand. She tried to grab it
back and Appellant struck her with it. He testified that he “pistol-whipped” her, as
hard as he could, approximately ten to fifteen times. Zuniga had Appellant’s cell
phone in the back pocket of her pants; after he ceased striking her with the pistol,
she pulled his cell phone from her pants pocket to show him the text messages that
he had sent to Doege. At some point, she returned Appellant’s cell phone to her
back pocket.
      According to Appellant’s testimony, after he had struck her with the pistol ten
to fifteen times, Zuniga stopped trying to regain control of it and asked Appellant if
he was trying to cheat on her and leave her. She then, according to Appellant, walked
to the end of the bed, grabbed a shotgun that Appellant kept there, disengaged the
safety, and started to raise the barrel. Appellant testified that, while this was
happening, he pleaded with Zuniga not to shoot him. But, as she raised the shotgun
barrel up, he pointed the pistol at her and fired, striking Zuniga in the head.
      Appellant testified that he “blacked out” after shooting Zuniga and that he
does not remember anything after that moment. He maintained that he did not touch
Zuniga’s body after he shot her. He believed that she was dead. Appellant testified
that, although he did not believe he was high or intoxicated during his encounter
with Zuniga, he admitted that he “had drugs in [his] system],” but the drugs did not
make him “pistol-whip” Zuniga.
      Later in the evening, Appellant awoke to a knock on his apartment door from
a friend, Nathan Wells. Appellant told Wells what had occurred. He and Wells then
left Appellant’s apartment and went to Wells’s RV.
      Appellant gave Wells a spare key to his vehicle, a yellow Chevrolet Camaro,
and returned to his apartment. Before arriving back at his apartment, Appellant
stopped to purchase a T-shirt. He explained that he bought it because he believed

                                           4
he would be incarcerated soon. Appellant testified that he was naked when he fought
with and shot Zuniga and that he did not shower afterwards.
      At his apartment, Appellant began cleaning out the apartment, and he put
several of his personal belongings inside his vehicle. During this time, he retrieved
his cell phone from the back pocket of Zuniga’s pants. He testified that he did not
move Zuniga’s body and did not check to determine if she was alive or dead.
Appellant admitted that although he “wouldn’t know” if Zuniga was alive or dead
and that he feared that she intended to shoot him, he did not move the shotgun away
from her because he did not want to touch anything. Despite this, Appellant also
admitted that he touched many things in the apartment as he packed up his personal
belongings—including several firearms and abundant ammunition—in his vehicle
and discarded the remaining drugs that he had in his possession. In fact, Appellant
agreed that he “touched everything in that apartment but her.” Appellant then moved
his vehicle to a different location within the apartment complex and left the keys
under the hood.
      Appellant testified that he asked Wells to pick up his vehicle later. Appellant
also made several phone calls and sent text messages to several people, including
one message to his drug dealer in which he stated that he had “just committed
murder” and was “going to prison.” Appellant said he texted that message because
the last time he had called the police he was arrested and convicted of an offense,
and he assumed that this would happen again. This was, he opined, because he was
a man and Zuniga was a woman. However, on cross-examination, Appellant said
he texted this because he felt that he had committed murder.
      After these events had transpired, which Appellant testified took “quite
some time,” Appellant called 9-1-1 at 2:00 a.m. to report Zuniga’s death. He told
the 9-1-1 operator that Zuniga was accidentally shot. Appellant testified that he lied
to the dispatcher because he was afraid to report that he had shot her. Appellant
                                          5
denied contaminating the scene in any way, such as by touching or moving Zuniga’s
body or by placing the shotgun in the position that it was discovered by law
enforcement.
                              II. Standards of Review
      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga v. State, 551
S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010).
      Similarly, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the rejection of a defense raised by him, such as self-defense, we examine
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a
rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of all essential elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have found against the
defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804
S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d
592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (reaffirming Saxton).
      To support a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce
some evidence to support the claim; the State bears the burden of persuasion to
disprove the raised defense. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Zuliani v. State,
97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14. Once
                                          6
the defendant produces that evidence, the State’s burden does not require production
of additional evidence to disprove the defense; instead, it requires only that the State
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 403
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–95).
      When a defendant raises a justification defense, such as self-defense, a
determination of guilt by the jury is an implicit rejection of the defensive theory.
Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–95; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. As such, because a claim
of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, the jury is free to accept
or reject the defensive theory, either version of the facts, and any part of a witness’s
testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Saxton,
804 S.W.2d at 912 n.3.
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s
credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Winfrey, 393
S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The Jackson standard is deferential and
accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732, Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, when the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer
to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516,

                                           7
525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
      Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13.      It is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the
defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence
in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish
his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require that every fact must
directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to
support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must consider the cumulative force of the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d
227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015).
      B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
      We review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under a two-part
standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Perez v. State, 310
S.W.3d 890, 892–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard:
performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, Appellant must show
that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 892–93. Second, Appellant must
show that trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, i.e., there is
a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different but for
trial counsel’s errors. Id. at 893; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). A reasonable probability is a
                                          8
probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
         We assess trial counsel’s performance in light of all of the circumstances and
apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation fell within “the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.”         Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
                                      III. Analysis
         A. The Murder and Appellant’s Claim of Self-Defense
         In Appellant’s first issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction of the charged offense and the jury’s rejection of his claim of
self-defense. Appellant admits that he shot and killed Zuniga. Nevertheless, he
contends that (1) evidence exists to support his claim of self-defense, and (2) his
alleged belief that deadly force was immediately necessary should have been
presumed reasonable under Section 9.32(b) of the Penal Code.
         A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of an individual or he intends to cause serious bodily injury and
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
PENAL § 19.02(b)(1), (2). Here, the jury determined that Appellant committed the
offense of murder, and there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to have
found the essential elements of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt—Appellant
freely admitted to intentionally shooting Zuniga with a pistol, which caused her
death.
         Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may raise the claim of self-
defense to justify his use of deadly force. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 403. As such,
deadly force that is used in self-defense is a defense to a prosecution for murder if
                                            9
that use of force is “justified.” Id. at 403–04 (citing Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 606).
In asserting self-defense, the use of force is justified “when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor
against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” PENAL § 9.31(a) (West
2019). Similarly, the use of deadly force against another is justified under the above
circumstances “if the actor would be justified in using force against the other” under
Section 9.31 and “when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly
force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor against the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” Id. § 9.32(a). “‘Deadly force’ means force
that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3). A
“reasonable belief” is a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person
in the same circumstances as the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(42). Under certain conditions,
an actor’s belief that deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be
reasonable. Id. § 9.32(b). One condition of the presumption of reasonableness is
that the actor was “not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C
misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time
the force was used.” Id. § 9.32(b)(3).
      Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for a rational trier of fact
to find against him on his claim of self-defense. In this case, the evidence that
Appellant claims supports his theory of self-defense is derived primarily from his
own statements. As such, his theory of self-defense was inherently a credibility
determination for the jury to resolve. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. Because the
credibility of Appellant’s claim of self-defense was solely within the jury’s province
to determine, and because there is ample evidence to convict Appellant of the
charged offense of murder, the jury was free to reject Appellant’s defensive theory.
Id. (citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914); see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13.
                                          10
      There is ample evidence to support the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim
of self-defense. When Appellant called 9-1-1, he initially reported that he had
accidentally shot Zuniga; he did not claim any form of self-defense justification until
later during his prosecution. Inconsistent or untruthful statements may be considered
by the jury as affirmative evidence of guilt. See Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743,
747–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Although Appellant claimed that he did not stage or otherwise tamper
with the evidence at the scene of the shooting, the responding law enforcement
officers testified that the scene appeared unnatural and inconsistent with their prior
experiences with investigating homicides or suicides—especially the positioning of
the shotgun across Zuniga’s body with the grip wedged under the hem of her shorts,
the barrel propped against the bed, and her finger oddly draped through the trigger
guard at a peculiar angle.
      Appellant admitted that he did not check on Zuniga at any time to determine
whether she had survived the gunshot wound to her head. Nor did he call for
emergency assistance. Instead, Appellant testified that he “blacked out” for a period
of time and, when he awoke, he left the apartment with a friend (leaving Zuniga’s
body unattended), shopped for clothing, returned to his apartment, and then
proceeded to clean the apartment (during which he agreed that he touched
“everything” in the apartment except Zuniga’s body). He called and sent text
messages to multiple people (including a message in which he stated that he had just
committed a murder) and formulated a plan to ensure that his friend would look after
his personal belongings (including several firearms and ammunition) that he had
removed from the apartment and placed in his vehicle, which he then moved some
distance away from the apartment unit. Only after all of this, many hours after he
had allegedly awakened from “blacking out” after having shot and killed Zuniga, did

                                          11
Appellant call 9-1-1, at 2:00 a.m. And during this 9-1-1 call, Appellant was
untruthful about the cause of Zuniga’s death.
      Appellant’s actions after he killed Zuniga constitutes evidence of guilt, or at
least indicates a “consciousness of guilt,” and supplied a sufficient basis for the jury
to reject his claim of self-defense. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 405 (defendants’
attempts to clean up and tamper with the crime scene after shooting two individuals
whom they claimed were home intruders were not indicative of reasonable conduct
and tended to show a consciousness of guilt) (citing King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556,
565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); see also Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (the defendant’s actions of burying a
gun and burning the clothes he was wearing supported the jury’s rejection of self-
defense); Valdez v. State, 841 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, pet. ref’d) (the defendant’s actions of hiding a gun and disposing of bullets
supported the jury’s rejection of self-defense).
      Moreover, the evidence supports the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s argument
that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d
at 404 (citing Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Appellant
committed his second assault family violence offense against Zuniga by repeatedly
striking her with a pistol immediately prior to the murder.                See PENAL
§ 22.01(b)(2)(A); Villareal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(an assault by threat immediately prior to stabbing the victim precluded eligibility
for the presumption of reasonableness). In addition, Appellant stated that he had
purchased cocaine the day before, that he, Zuniga, and Doege used cocaine and
methamphetamine all night, and that he disposed of the remaining drugs in his
possession after he killed Zuniga. Possession of illegal narcotics, irrespective of the
amount, qualifies as criminal activity. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.102(3)(D), (4) (West Supp. 2023) (identifying cocaine and methamphetamine
                                          12
as controlled substances under Penalty Group 1); id. § 481.115 (creating an offense
for the possession of a controlled substance under Penalty Group 1); see Reyna v.
State, 597 S.W.3d 604, 606–07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.);
Barrios v. State, 389 S.W.3d 382, 393 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d)
(“Thus, criminal activity can be broadly construed to comport with the generally
understood concept that it would encompass any activity that constitutes a crime.”).
Therefore, Appellant’s admission that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the
time he used deadly force against Zuniga rebuts the presumption that his use of
deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances (even assuming arguendo that
the other requirements of Section 9.32(b) were met). See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at
405; Reyna, 597 S.W.3d at 606–07.
      Although Appellant contends that evidence was presented to support his claim
of self-defense, the jury was not required to accept Appellant’s claim of self-defense
and version of events as true. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404–05 (“the statements
of Appellant and his witnesses do not conclusively prove a claim of self-defense.”)
(citing Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,
pet. ref’d)); see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609. Rather, the jury was free to
judge the credibility and weight of all of the evidence presented. See Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. From the evidence presented at trial, a
rational jury could have found that Appellant’s use of force was neither reasonable
nor justified. Indeed, the jury was entitled to reject and disbelieve all or portions of
Appellant’s version of events, particularly in light of his inconsistent statements and
suspicious actions and conduct immediately following Zuniga’s death, including but
not limited to: (1) the prolonged delay in calling 9-1-1, (2) Appellant cleaning out
his apartment, (3) Appellant’s text message stating that he had committed a murder,
(4) the strange positioning of the shotgun across Zuniga’s body and of her index

                                          13
finger through the trigger guard, and (5) his prior history of physical violence against
Zuniga.
       In the absence of evidence in the record indicating that the jury was irrational
in their rejection of Appellant’s claim of self-defense, we decline to substitute our
view of the witnesses’ credibility for that of the jury. See Barron, 630 S.W.3d at
405 (citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914).                  Here, the jury’s determination of
Appellant’s guilt is tantamount to a rejection of his claim of self-defense, and the
jury was free to reject this defense and Appellant’s version of events. Id. (citing
Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609); see Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572.
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the State adduced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of
fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements of
murder and also could have found against Appellant on his claim of self-defense.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
       B. Appellant’s Request to Reform the Judgment
       In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court’s judgment should
be reformed to show that Appellant is only guilty of the lesser-included offense of
manslaughter. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC art. 37.09 (West 2006); Bowen v. State,
374 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that the reformation of a criminal
conviction on appeal is permissible, regardless of whether an instruction on a lesser-
included offense was requested). In essence, Appellant’s complaint is a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that Appellant possessed the culpable
mental state that is required to convict him of murder when he shot Zuniga because
the only difference between murder—as charged in the indictment—and the
statutory elements of manslaughter is the required culpable mental state. 2 See

       2
        Appellant did not request the submission of a lesser-included-offense instruction and does not
contend on appeal that the absence of such an instruction was error.
                                                 14
Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (concluding that
manslaughter is a lesser included offense to murder because the only difference
between the offenses is the required culpable mental state—“intent” versus
“recklessness.”).
      An offense is a lesser-included offense if:
              (1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all
              the facts required to establish the commission of the
              offense charged;
              (2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect
              that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same
              person, property, or public interest suffices to establish its
              commission;
              (3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect
              that a less culpable mental state suffices to establish its
              commission; or
              (4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged
              or an otherwise included offense.
CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09; see Ritcherson v. State, 568 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018).
      As relevant to these circumstances, a person commits the offense of murder if
the person (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of an individual. PENAL § 19.02(b)(1), (2). A person
commits the offense of manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an
individual. Id. § 19.04(a). A person acts recklessly with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or that the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c) (West 2021).

                                           15
      The indictment in this case charged Appellant with murder and felony murder,
namely, that Appellant (1) “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the
death of an individual, namely, Rochel Zuniga, by shooting her with a deadly
weapon, to wit: a firearm” and (2) “did then and there, intending to cause serious
bodily injury to Rochel Zuniga, intentionally and knowingly commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life, namely shooting her with a deadly weapon, to wit: a
firearm, which caused the death of the said Rochel Zuniga.” See id. § 19.02(b)(1),
(2). The jury convicted Appellant of murder as charged in the indictment.
      Manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at
383–84 (“We conclude that causing death while consciously disregarding a risk that
death will occur differs from intending to cause serious bodily injury with a resulting
death only in the respect that a less culpable mental state establishes its
commission.”) (citing CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09(3)). Nevertheless, we conclude that
the trial court’s judgment should not be reformed here because the evidence is
sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for murder. Thornton v. State, 425
S.W.3d 289, 299–300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
      Before we determine whether we should reform a judgment of a criminal
conviction to show a conviction for a lesser-included offense, we must first ascertain
whether the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the greater offense.
Id. at 299–300.    Upon such a determination, reformation of the judgment of
conviction is required if (1) in the course of convicting the appellant of the greater
offense, the factfinder necessarily found every element of the lesser-included
offense, and (2) pursuant to an evidentiary sufficiency analysis conducted as though
the appellant had been convicted of the lesser-included offense at trial, there is
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for that offense. See Denny v. State, 630
S.W.3d 253, 259–60 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Thornton, 425
S.W.3d at 299–300). If we determine that both requirements are met, we are
                                          16
required to reform the judgment of conviction, so as to avoid the unjust result of an
outright acquittal, which would usurp the factfinder’s determination of guilt. See
Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 298–300. If either requirement is not met, we lack the
authority to reform the judgment. Id. at 300.
      We have already determined that sufficient evidence exists to support
Appellant’s conviction for murder. With regard to the question of Appellant’s
culpable mental state specifically, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
support the jury’s determination that Appellant intended to kill Zuniga when he shot
her. For example, after killing Zuniga but before calling the police, Appellant sent
a text message characterizing his actions as “murder.” His testimony reaffirms that
he intended to shoot Zuniga. For his intentional shooting of Zuniga, Appellant
offered the justification of self-defense. As implied by its verdict, the jury did not
credit Appellant’s evidence to support his claim of self-defense. Here, the evidence
is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Appellant intentionally shot and
killed Zuniga. Moreover, the evidence of Appellant’s culpable mental state does not
support a finding that, if he is guilty, he is only guilty of manslaughter—Appellant’s
conduct was intentional, not reckless. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385 (“There was
no evidence directly germane to recklessness. . . . The evidence here does not
support a finding of recklessness and does not rise to [a] level that would convince
a rational jury to find that if Appellant is guilty, he is guilty of only the lesser-
included offense.”).
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the evidence (1) is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for
murder and (2) does not support Appellant’s contention that the judgment should be
reformed to show a conviction for the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

                                          17
        C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
        In his third issue, Appellant complains that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because counsel failed to raise the issue of “sudden passion”3
at the punishment phase of trial. 4
        Although Appellant filed a motion for new trial, requested a hearing, and a
hearing was set on the motion, no hearing was held on his motion, nor was
Appellant’s trial counsel otherwise provided with an opportunity to explain his
decision not to raise the issue of sudden passion at the punishment phase. Because
the record is insufficient to demonstrate that Appellant’s trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, we must overrule Appellant’s third issue. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 700.
        To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Appellant must
establish that (1) his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in that it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687–88; Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893.
        Appellate review of the first element—trial counsel’s representation—is
highly deferential and presumes that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of
reasonable and professional assistance. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812–14.                                       To

        3
          “‘Sudden passion’ means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the
individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and
is not solely the result of former provocation.” PENAL § 19.02(a)(2). At the punishment phase of trial, a
defendant convicted of murder may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death of an individual while
under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves
the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the punishment for the charged offense is
reduced to a second-degree felony range. Id. § 19.02(d); McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005).
        4
         As the State notes, Appellant frames his ineffective assistance claim as his trial counsel’s failure
to “present[] . . . evidence of sudden passion.” However, he also argues that trial counsel should have
requested a sudden passion instruction. Noting that evidence of self-defense and evidence of sudden
passion are often so similar that it is a “rare instance when issues of self-defense do not also raise issues of
sudden passion,” we do not find that the record supports his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Benavides v. State, 992 S.W.2d 511, 525 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d).
                                                      18
overcome the presumption of effective professional assistance, an appellant’s claim
must be firmly grounded in the record, and the record must affirmatively
demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Id. at 814. Ordinarily, trial counsel should
be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as
ineffective. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Appellant’s trial
counsel received no such opportunity here.          If trial counsel did not have an
opportunity to explain the challenged actions, we will not conclude that those actions
constituted deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous
that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d
436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
      Moreover, to establish the second element of the claim—that counsel’s flawed
representation prejudiced the defense—the record must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ex parte Rogers, 369 S.W.3d 858,
862–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
      It is well-settled that the record on direct appeal generally will not be sufficient
to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or
strategic decision-making as to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See
Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Salinas v. State, 163
S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This is because the record will rarely be
developed sufficiently to permit a reviewing court to fairly evaluate the merits of
such a serious allegation.      Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 430.           “[T]he record must
affirmatively demonstrate trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.” Id. Therefore, if
counsel’s reasons or explanations for his conduct do not appear in the record and
there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been grounded in
                                           19
legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel’s decisions and deny relief on an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is raised, such as in this case, on direct
appeal. Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 813–14.
      Appellant contends that the record and circumstances here constitute an
instance “when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct”
such that “counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately
reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as he did.” Andrews v. State,
159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that there can be no reasonable
trial strategy in failing to correct a misstatement of law that is detrimental to the
client) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). By failing to request a punishment
instruction on sudden passion, Appellant argues that his trial counsel essentially
allowed the jury to assess Appellant’s punishment within the punishment range for
first-degree   felonies—five    to   ninety-nine    years’   imprisonment      or   life
imprisonment—when a request for a sudden-passion instruction could have
presented the jury with the option to assess Appellant’s punishment within the range
for second-degree felonies—two to twenty years’ imprisonment. See PENAL §§
12.32(a), 12.33(a); 19.02(d).
      It cannot be accurately determined whether the jury in this case would have
found that Appellant acted under the influence of sudden passion, Appellant reasons,
because jury deliberations are secret, confidential, and not included in the record.
The jury had no option other than to sentence Appellant to some term permitted by
the punishment range for a first-degree felony conviction, which, Appellant asserts,
shows a reasonable probability that but for his trial counsel’s alleged errors, the
result of the punishment phase would have been different. We disagree.

                                          20
      Appellant relies on Andrews to support his argument; however, the case
before us is distinguishable from Andrews, in which the appellant’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim was successful on direct appeal despite the lack of a
motion for new trial that would have provided defense trial counsel an opportunity
to explain his trial strategy and related decisions. See Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 103
(“Under the extremely unusual circumstances of this case, the record contains all the
information that we need to make a decision. Trial counsel failed to object to the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law regarding whether the appellant’s sentences
should be stacked, even though he knew that the State had filed a motion to cumulate
the sentences. There can be no reasonable trial strategy in failing to correct this false
impression that was harmful to the appellant.”).
      Rather, and contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the record in this appeal is
insufficient to overcome the presumption that his trial counsel’s conduct was
reasonable. Appellant, as the only surviving eyewitness to the incident, testified
about the circumstances of shooting Zuniga in support of his claim of self-defense.
This same evidence (Appellant’s testimony) also would have constituted the primary
evidence to support Appellant’s argument that a sudden passion instruction should
have been requested. Appellant testified and had the opportunity to espouse as to
what he claims constitutes his “sudden passion” conduct. Perhaps Appellant’s trial
counsel could have called additional witnesses to testify regarding some aspect of
Appellant’s character or his relationship with Zuniga, as tangential evidence of his
sudden passion in shooting her. But any such considerations would fall within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance from which trial counsel may
formulate his trial strategy. As such, we cannot say that trial counsel’s actions here
constitute deficient performance.
      Similarly, trial counsel’s choice not to request a sudden-passion instruction is
a reasonable, strategic decision. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 506 S.W.3d 529, 540–41
                                           21
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (trial counsel’s choice not to seek
out and introduce additional evidence that would require witness testimony and
expose witnesses to cross-examination was not objectively unreasonable and did not
deprive appellant of effective assistance of counsel); Humphrey v. State, 501 S.W.3d
656, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Wiggins v. State,
539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)) (the focus on direct responsibility rather than a mitigation
argument at the punishment phase may be strategically defensible).
      Consequently, because the record is not sufficiently developed to
affirmatively demonstrate that Appellant’s trial counsel had no reasonable strategic
basis for his decisions, and Appellant’s trial counsel was not provided an opportunity
to explain his decisions and trial strategy, we cannot conclude that his actions and
decisions lacked any reasonable strategic basis. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 430. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
                               IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

January 25, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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