Court Opinion

ID: 9563791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:47:20.10724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.739286
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority writes “[w]e choose not to allow the inevitable discovery doctrine to reach into homes....” I, however, can find no explanation why the policy reasons in support of the inevitable discovery doctrine should magically disappear at the door of “King Gary’s Castle”.
As stated by the majority, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of illegally obtained physical evidence when the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would inevitably have been obtained by lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). Exclusion of this evidence adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial. Id. at 445, 104 S.Ct. at 2510.
In the instant case, the muddy tennis shoes illegally seized by Deputy Salazar would have been discovered and lawfully obtained later pursuant to a valid search warrant. The defendant could not have removed the shoes prior to the execution of the warrant since he was taken to the police station and arrested that morning. The defendant’s roommate, Robertson, could not have removed the shoes since he was at work until summoned home to allow deputies to enter the house and execute the search warrant. Therefore, the shoes inevitably would have been found when the warrant was executed.
Further, the search warrant itself was issued on independent grounds not tainted by the illegally seized shoes. The affidavit was based on specific facts not related to the illegal search. Additionally, it is clear that after defendant’s arrest, a search warrant would have been obtained as a normal aspect of a police investigation. See State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo.1984). The fact that the search warrant was not obtained until after the illegal search is not fatal, as the police did have the probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal search. United States v. *469Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir.1986); see also United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.1985).
The majority bases its reasoning on the fact that the warrantless search occurred in a home. This fact somehow bars application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. In reality, no such barrier exists. See State v. Butler, supra (bedclothes with bullet hole held admissible under inevitable discovery doctrine despite warrantless search of bedroom, even where warrant was not subsequently issued); State v. Holler, 123 N.H. 195, 459 A.2d 1143 (1983) (discovery of gun during warrantless search in house. Gun was admissible under inevitable discovery since the illegal search did not result “in any benefit to police that would not have been obtained in the subsequent legal search.”). Where, as here, “the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably ... regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings. In that situation, the State has gained no advantage at trial and the defendant has suffered no prejudice.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 447, 104 S.Ct. at 2511.
Finally, I feel the majority has misread State v. Reynolds, 125 Ariz. 530, 611 P.2d 117 (App.1980). The majority states, “We view the seizure of defendant’s tennis shoes in this case as analogous to the seizure and suppression of the fingerprint evidence in State v. Reynolds, supra.” The fingerprints suppressed in Reynolds, as I read the case, were those found at the scene of the crime and had nothing to do with the illegal arrest of Reynolds in his apartment. State v. Reynolds, 125 Ariz. at 531, 611 P.2d at 118. In fact, the photographs taken of Reynolds during booking and the identification of his voice by the victim, both of which were results of his illegal arrest, were held admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Id.
HOLOHAN, C.J., concurs.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
GORDON, Vice Chief Justice.
In State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986), we reversed appellant’s convictions for second degree burglary, A.R.S. § 13-1507, and child molestation, A.R.S. § 13-1410. Pursuant to Rule 31.18, 17 A.R.S., Rules of Crim.Proc., appellee filed a motion for reconsideration with this court. We affirm our earlier reversal of appellant’s convictions but issue this supplemental opinion to clarify our reasons for doing so.
I.
A central issue in this case is whether a certain pair of tennis shoes could be introduced into evidence at trial under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The shoes were seized during an unlawful arrest of appellant at his home at approximately 7:00 a.m. on December 27, 1984. A search warrant was issued at approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day which permitted police officers to return to appelllant’s home and find clothing worn by the appellant while committing his alleged criminal conduct. The state claimed that the shoes were properly seized under the inevitable discovery doctrine because they would have been seized during the legal search conducted approximately eight hours after their illegal seizure.
We are unpersuaded that the shoes would have been inevitably discovered during the legal afternoon search. Appellant’s roommate had plenty of time between the unlawful arrest and the lawful search during which he could have hidden, removed, or destroyed the shoes. The fact that the roommate did not tamper with clothing which he knew appellant had worn during his alleged criminal activities suggest that the shoes may have remained untouched by him. This is reasoning in retrospect, however. The mere fact that appellant’s roommate had easy access to the shoes during the day precludes us from concluding that the shoes would have been inevitably discovered during the legal afternoon search.
*470II.
In our earlier opinion we wrote:
The illegal search of defendant’s home directly produced his tennis shoes. We choose not to allow the inevitable discovery doctrine to reach into homes of citizens in the factual situation before us.
* * * * * *
[We] further hold that the tennis shoes seized should have been suppressed as primary evidence obtained as a direct result of police misconduct.
Ante at 465-66, 724 P.2d at 551-52. We reiterate today, although rephrased, what we meant to say in the above statements. The inevitable discovery doctrine cannot be used to introduce evidence directly and primarily obtained in a search or seizure of a home that violates Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8.1 Thus, even if the shoes would have been inevitably discovered, we would bar their introduction into evidence because the policemen’s original discovery of the shoes was a direct and primary result of a violation of Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8.
III.
We acknowledge that we cited Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), for an incorrect proposition and note that Segura was decided solely in terms of the independent source doctrine rather than the inevitable discovery doctrine. See ante at 465-66, 724 P.2d at 551-52. In all other respects, the reasoning and judgment of our earlier opinion remain unchanged.
HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.

. However, our holding does not preclude use of the inevitable discovery rule to introduce evidence directly or primarily obtained illegally in other contexts. See, e.g., State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 724 P.2d 1 (1986) (defendant revealed location of victim's body as result of policemen’s coercive threats); State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, 674 P.2d 1358 (1983) (Miranda violation); State v. Lamb, 116 Ariz. 134, 568 P.2d 1032 (1977) (illegal search at hotel); State v. Reynolds, 125 Ariz. 530, 611 P.2d 117 (App.1980) (direct evidence suppressed; independent evidence properly admitted).
Nor by our holding do we express any opinion on whether the plain view doctrine or independent source doctrine can be invoked to introduce evidence directly and primarily obtained in a search or seizure of a home that violates Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 8. We need not address those issues today because neither exception to the exclusionary rule can be successfully applied to the facts of this case.