Court Opinion

ID: 9588454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:35.729167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.883775
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.
This action seeks a declaratory judgment adjudging Laws of 1971, Ex. Ses., ch. 288, § 8 (hereinafter *263to be denominated section 8) to be unconstitutional as in violation of amendments 14 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. The question presented is purely one of law.
Section 8 provides in substance for an equalization of values within any county wherein there might otherwise be a lack of uniformity because a 4-year cycle of revaluation was in progress. The Washington State Department of Revenue is required to certify to a county board of equalization two ratios. One ratio is the percentage of true and fair value at which property which has already been revalued is assessed. That is known as “revaluation ratio.” The second ratio is known as “tentative county indicated ratio.” It is based on all property in the county (both revalued and not yet revalued), the ratio being the percentage of true market value at which the property is assessed. If the “revaluation ratio” exceeds 110 per cent of the “tentative county indicated ratio” there must be an adjustment commonly called a “rollback” so the revaluation ratio will equal the tentative county indicated ratio.
We held in Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wn.2d 617, 458 P.2d 280 (1969), that the cyclical revaluation directed in RCW 84.41.030 was permissible under the constitution. The statute directs a revaluation “at least once each four years.” We held in Dore v. Kinnear, 79 Wn.2d 755, 489 P.2d 898 (1971), that gross variations from the 4-year cycle are not permissible.
As was pointed out in Carkonen v. Williams, supra at 625, there had been a long history of noncompliance with the requirements of amendment 17 for an assessed valuation of 50 per cent of true and fair value, and “an abrupt and retroactive application and enforcement of the appropriate assessment ratio would serve no immediate and useful purpose.” It was determined by this court as well as by the legislature that it would be practical to come into compliance within 4 years.
The disparity between the general level of assessment in the past and the constitutionally required level *264which must now be reached is such it becomes obvious there would be serious inequalities during the 4-year cycle. Section 8 was enacted to remedy such inequalities and, thus, comply with amendment 14.
The 4-year cycle permitted temporary deviation from the mandatory 50 per cent valuation. Section 8 does no more than provide for an equitable transition to the required constitutional standard without discrimination and inequality within each county. We held in Carkonen v. Williams, supra, that the county is “the authority levying the tax” and, hence, uniformity within each county will comply with the constitutional standard.
We reaffirm our holdings in State ex rel. Barlow v. Kinnear, 70 Wn.2d 482, 423 P.2d 937 (1967) and in Carkonen v. Williams, supra, that the assessment at 50 per cent of true and fair value in money is mandatory. After the expiration of the 4-year cycle, no further deviation will be tolerated.
It must follow that after the expiration of the 4-year cycle, all assessments must be at 50 per cent of the true and fair value of the property. It would seem scarcely necessary to remind all public officials in all branches and levels of government that they have taken an oath to support the Constitution of the State of Washington, of which amendment 17 is a part.
One other question remains. That is as to the standing of respondents (plaintiffs) to maintain this action. The trial court ruled respondents had standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 8. Respondents have a valid interest in securing a declaratory judgment. Without a decision of this court, they were placed in a position of making a determination of a difficult question of constitutional law with the possibility of facing both civil1 and criminal2 penalties if they made the wrong choice. One of the purposes *265of declaratory judgment laws is to give relief from such situations.
We, therefore, affirm the determination of the trial court that, respondents had standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 8. We reverse the trial court and hold section 8 is constitutional.
Hamilton, C.J., Hunter, Hale, Neill, Stafford, and Utter, JJ., concur.
Finley and Rosellini, JJ., concur in the result.

RCW 84.08.020(1); 84.08.120; 84.09.040

RCW 42.20.080; 42.20.100