Court Opinion

ID: 9649463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:54:29.665064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:11.111734
License: Public Domain

ADKINS, Judge,
dissenting in which ELDRIDGE and McAULIFFE, JJ., join.
The purportedly official pink ballot at issue in this case was published and distributed in violation of Art. 33, § 26-16(a)(7), which requires that sample ballots “clearly [indicate] the name of the candidate or committee responsible for” it. When he applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of § 19-5, the trial judge was “persuaded ... that there was an act or omission under Article 33 ... that ... materially involved the rights of interested parties and affected the purity of the elections process.” He then found, however, a lack of clear and convincing evidence *429“that that violation ... might have changed the outcome of an election____”
Like the majority, I have no quarrel with the standard of proof applied by the trial judge. In Snyder v. Glusing, 307 Md. 548, 550, 515 A.2d 767, 768 (1986) (Snyder I), we instructed that the appropriate standard of proof under Art. 33, § 19-5(1) requires “ ‘clear and convincing evidence, that the act or omission involved materially affected the rights of interested parties or the purity of the election process and [m]ight have changed the outcome of an election already held[.]’ ” The problem lies in the application of that standard. The majority op. at 422-423 is “satisfied that the trial court considered the effect of the ‘official’ sample ballot misrepresentation in its analysis.” Were that the case, I once again would have no trouble. But that is not what the trial court did, as the majority opinion itself makes manifest: “The trial judge, as fact finder, was faced with the task of trying to determine whether the sole violation in the case, the failure to identify Glusing as Patterson’s candidate, might have changed the outcome.” Id. [emphasis supplied]. I believe that the scope of review the trial judge applied, and the majority has approved, results in an unduly narrow reading of Subtitle 19 of Art. 33, and, therefore, respectfully dissent from the causation analysis of the majority opinion.
The trial judge focused, and the majority focuses, on the “violation” of § 26-16(a)(7), and its potential effect on the outcome of the election. The letter and spirit of the law demand more than that. Under the circumstances present in this case, § 19-2 permits a registered voter to
“seek judicial relief from any aet or omission relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, on the grounds that the act or omission:
“(1) Is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable to the elections process; and
*430“(2) May change or have changed the outcome of the election [emphasis supplied].”
Section 19-5 authorizes the court to grant relief
“[u]pon a finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that the act or omission involved materially affected the rights of interested parties or the purity of the elections process and:
“(1) Might have changed the outcome of an election already held [emphasis supplied].”
These provisions do not even remotely suggest that the court’s scope of review is limited solely to the effect of an election law violation. The plain language of the statutes instruct us that the law permits judicial relief from any act or omission inconsistent with Art. 33 or other law applicable to the elections process if the act or omission may have changed the outcome of the election.
This reading of the statute becomes particularly apparent when one contrasts with the language of Subtitle 19 the provisions of §§ 26-18(a) and 26-18(c) of Art. 33, which the Court had before it in Culotta v. Raimondi, 251 Md. 384, 247 A.2d 519 (1968). In Culotta, Judge Finan thought the spurious “official” ballot to be “censurable,” but no judicial relief could be granted absent a violation of § ll-3(b). There was no violation because there was no allegation that the individual who had distributed the false ballot was an organization holding itself out to be the governing body of the Republican party. 251 Md. 388, 247 A.2d at 512-22. But at that time § 26-18(a) required a petition charging a fair election practice transgression to set forth a violation of “a specific section or sections of” Art. 33. And § 26-18(c) required the court to inquire into “such violations or failure to comply with the provisions of this article, as may be alleged in any such petition.” Subtitle 19, which was enacted in its present form by Ch. 755, Acts of 1985, introduces a different and much broader approach. The focus now is not merely on specific violations but on “acts or omissions ... inconsistent with this article____”
*431In this case the failure to include on the pink ballot the name of the candidate or group responsible for it was certainly an “omission,” and that, as we have seen, violated § 26-16(a)(7). But there was more. The distribution of the ballot falsely purporting to be the official Republican ballot was an “act” that without question affected the “purity of the election process.” Indeed, the trial judge so found. He found, as well, that it “materially affected the rights of interested parties____” He then emasculated the remedial purposes of Subtitle 19 by abandoning any consideration of the offensive “act” and looked solely to the “omission” or “violation” in determining the possible effect of the chicanery on the election.
Because Subtitle 19 speaks of “acts or omissions” and not merely of “violations,” it is clear to me that the legislature contemplated a broader scope of review than that applied by the trial judge and sanctioned by the majority. The majority opinion lends no meaningful recognition to the fact that in enacting these provisions the General Assembly was predominantly concerned with preserving the integrity of the electoral process by deterring deceptive and fraudulent election practices. In the present case this legislative design is defeated by limiting the scope of review solely to the effect of a technical election law violation.
If a political ruse of the sort present in this case violates a particular provision of the law, the reviewing court may certainly consider the effect of the violation on an election. But it must do more. It must look at the act of which the violation is a part. It is, therefore, irrelevant that Snyder has eschewed reliance on any violation of § ll-3(b). It may be that what was done here did in fact violate § ll-3(b). There was an “organization” consisting of several individuals (“any combination of two or more persons formed for the purpose of assisting the promotion of the success or defeat of any candidate ...,” Art. 33, § l-l(a)(12)), which by distributing the spurious official ballot, arguably held itself out as the Republican State Central Committee. But even if there was no actual violation of the letter of *432§ ll-3(b), what was done here flouted the spirit of that subsection, and was, therefore, “inconsistent” with Art. 33.
Once Judge Jacobsen had found, by clear and convincing evidence, that distribution of the pink ballot, a violation of § 26-16(a)(7), was “an act or omission ... that ... materially involved the rights of interested parties and affected the purity of the elections process” he was required to do more than decide whether the technical violation might have affected the election. The proper scope of review under Subtitle 19 required him to consider whether the act of distributing a false official ballot to unwary voters in a manner at least inconsistent with § ll-3(b) might also have affected the outcome of the election. Had he applied the proper scope of review, the evidence before him was such as to require a finding, based on the totality of the circumstances, that distribution of the false official ballot might have affected the outcome of the election. I would reverse.
Judge ELDRIDGE and Judge McAULIFFE have authorized me to say that they join in this dissent.