Court Opinion

ID: 9536651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:17.792757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:53:51.686523
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring specially) .
It is with considerable reluctance that I concur in the order directed by the opinion of the Chief Justice. In order to reverse the judgment it should appear that defendant so clearly established his damages as to make a finding in accordance therewith imperative.1 In addition to the frailty of self-interest, the defendant’s evidence was such that the trial court could, and undoubtedly did, regard his extravagant claims in his own behalf as so irresponsible that it tainted his whole testimony so the court would not base a finding on his testimony concerning damages.2
The rule which is generally recognized that an owner may testify to the value of his property is a rule of expediency and its soundness, in many instances, is to be doubted. Unless the witness shows that he actually has some knowledgé of the matter, it requires but a moment’s reflection to see that mere ownership of property, which may have been acquired by heirship or other means giving no special knowledge of its value, obviously does not give such an owner any superior knowledge or make him an expert with respect to the value of property or damages to it.
The defendant failed to present any credible evidence concerning the damages, except his own statements, the weakness of which has been adverted to above. The trial judge apparently concluded that there was no satisfactory evidence upon which he could make a finding, and in the absence of such proof, awarded only nominal damages. There is authority that such was the proper thing to do under the circumstances.3
My hesitance to concur in the order made is further accentuated by the fact that the defendant made a motion for a new trial on the ground that adequate compensatory damages should have been awarded, but did not accord the court the courtesy of appearing to argue the motion or to give an opportunity to suggest that some satisfactory proof of damages should be presented. Under older concepts, it is my opinion that the defect in proof would have been fatal and that the judgment would of necessity have been affirmed.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, I bring myself to concur in the or*170der made because of the fact that the trial court did find the plaintiff liable, and that ' it is incontrovertible that there was some ‘ substantial damage.4 Although the court did state to the parties that he was concerned with the “quantum” of the proof of damages, he did not comment with respect to the quality or credibility of the evidence which had been received. The fact that the plaintiff’s own testimony as to damages was admitted over obj ection may have lulled his counsel into believing that he had made some satisfactory proof thereof. The view of the Chief Justice and my concurring colleagues that if the trial court had regarded defendant’s evidence of damage as wholly unsatisfactory, that should have been made plain, and an opportunity afforded to present further evidence, does tend toward a final just result. Even though counsel may have been at fault in failing to assist the court in the regards I have pointed out above, courts must be more interested in seeing that justice is done than in applying technical rules of procedure between the parties. I therefore concur in the order .remanding the case to give defendant a further opportunity to present evidence on the question of damages.
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. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, § 1687, p. 722.

. Ripley v. C. I. Whitten Transfer Co., 1951, 135 W.Va. 419, 63 S.E.2d 626.

. 6 Blashfield, See. 3431, p. 88

. See Annotation 78. A.L.R. 858 et seq. cases deálihg with' certainty of right to recover, uncertainty as to proof of amount of damages.