Court Opinion

ID: 9648164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:06:49.459901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:27.892420
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
             In The Supreme Court

Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, on behalf of itself, its
patients, and its physicians and staff; Katherine Farris,
M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients; Greenville
Women's Clinic, on behalf of itself, its patients, and its
physicians and staff; and Terry L. Buffkin, M.D., on
behalf of himself and his patients, Respondents,

v.

State of South Carolina; Alan Wilson, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of South Carolina; Edward
Simmer, in his official capacity as Director of the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control; Anne G. Cook, in her official capacity as
President of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Stephen I. Schabel, in his official capacity as
Vice President of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Ronald Januchowski, in his official capacity
as Secretary of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; George S. Dilts, in his official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Dion Franga, in his official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Richard Howell, in his official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Robert Kosciusko, in his official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Theresa Mills-Floyd, in her official capacity
as a Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Jennifer R. Root, in her official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Christopher C. Wright, in his official capacity
as a Member of the South Carolina Board of Medical
Examiners; Samuel H. McNutt, in his official capacity as
Chairperson of the South Carolina Board of Nursing;
Sallie Beth Todd, in her official capacity as Vice
Chairperson of the South Carolina Board of Nursing;
Tamara Day, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
South Carolina Board of Nursing; Jonella Davis, in her
official capacity as a Member of the South Carolina Board
of Nursing; Kelli Garber, in her official capacity as a
Member of the South Carolina Board of Nursing; Lindsey
K. Mitcham, in her official capacity as a Member of the
South Carolina Board of Nursing; Rebecca Morrison, in
her official capacity as a Member of the South Carolina
Board of Nursing; Kay Swisher, in her official capacity as
a Member of the South Carolina Board of Nursing; Robert
J. Wolff, in his official capacity as a Member of the South
Carolina Board of Nursing; Scarlett A. Wilson, in her
official capacity as Solicitor for South Carolina's 9th
Judicial Circuit; Byron E. Gipson, in his official capacity
as Solicitor for South Carolina's 5th Judicial Circuit; and
William Walter Wilkins III, in his official capacity as
Solicitor for South Carolina's 13th Judicial Circuit,
Defendants,

and

Thomas C. Alexander, in his official capacity as President
of the South Carolina Senate; G. Murrell Smith Jr., in his
official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House
of Representatives; and Henry McMaster, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of South Carolina,
Intervenors-Defendants,

of whom Henry McMaster, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of South Carolina; G. Murrell Smith
Jr., in his official capacity as Speaker of the South
Carolina House of Representatives; Thomas C. Alexander,
in his official capacity as President of the South Carolina
Senate; State of South Carolina; and Alan Wilson, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of South Carolina,
are Petitioners.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000896
  IN THE COURT'S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                  Opinion No. 28174
      Heard June 27, 2023 – Filed August 23, 2023

 INJUNCTION VACATED AND ACT DECLARED
            CONSTITUTIONAL

Chief Legal Counsel Thomas A. Limehouse Jr., Senior
Litigation Counsel William Grayson Lambert, and Deputy
Legal Counsel Erica Wells Shedd, all of Columbia, for
Petitioner Governor Henry McMaster; Patrick Graham
Dennis, of Columbia, for Petitioner G. Murrell Smith Jr.;
Kenneth M. Moffitt, John Potter Hazzard V, and Jessica J
Godwin, all of Columbia, for Petitioner Thomas C.
Alexander; and Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson,
Solicitor General Robert D. Cook, Deputy Solicitor
General J. Emory Smith Jr., Assistant Deputy Solicitor
General Thomas Tyler Hydrick, and Assistant Deputy
Solicitor General Joseph David Spate, all of Columbia, for
Petitioners State of South Carolina; Attorney General Alan
Wilson and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III.

M. Malissa Burnette, Kathleen McColl McDaniel, and
Grant Burnette LeFever, all of Burnette Shutt &
McDaniel, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents Planned
Parenthood South Atlantic, Katherine Farris, M.D.,
Greenville Women's Clinic, and Terry Buffkin, M.D.;
Catherine Peyton Humphreville and Kyla Eastling, both of
New York, New York of Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, for Respondents Planned Parenthood South
Atlantic and Katherine Farris, M.D.; and Caroline
Sacerdote and Jasmine Yunus, both of New York, New
York of the Center for Reproductive Rights, for
            Respondents Greenville Women's Clinic and Terry L.
            Buffkin, M.D.

            Randall Scott Hiller of Randall S. Hiller, P.A., of
            Greenville; Kimberly A. Parker of Wilmer Cutler
            Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, of Washington, D.C.; and
            Hannah E. Gelbort, of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
            Dorr LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, for American
            College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American
            Medical Association, and Society for Maternal-Fetal
            Medicine Amici Curiae.

            Christopher Ernest Mills, of Spero Law LLC, of
            Charleston for American College of Pediatricians; South
            Carolina Association of Pregnancy Care Centers and
            Daybreak Lifecare Center Amici Curiae.
            Harmon L. Cooper, of Crowell & Moring LLP, of
            Chicago, Illinois for Women's Rights and Empowerment
            Network, (WREN), Able SC, Dr. Deborah Billings, Dr.
            Cara Delay, Dr. Bambi W. Gaddist, The Hive Community
            Circle, Palmetto State Abortion Fund, Jill Perry, and
            SisterSong Amici Curiae.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Earlier this year, a majority of this Court found
unconstitutional the 2021 version of the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from
Abortion Act (the 2021 Act).1 In response to our decision, the South Carolina
General Assembly (the legislature) revised the 2021 Act, especially in terms of its
legislative findings and purposes, and passed a new version of the Fetal Heartbeat
and Protection from Abortion Act (the 2023 Act). 2 Immediately after the Governor
signed the 2023 Act into law, Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and three other
medical providers (collectively, Planned Parenthood) filed an action in the circuit
court seeking a declaration that the new law is unconstitutional. Upon Planned
1
 See Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. State (Planned Parenthood I), 438 S.C. 188, 882
S.E.2d 770 (2023); Act No. 1, 2021 S.C. Acts 2.
2
 Act No. 70, 2023 S.C. Acts ---, codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-41-610 to -740
(West 2023).
Parenthood's motion, the circuit court enjoined enforcement of the 2023 Act pending
resolution of the constitutional challenge. Numerous state officials3 (collectively,
the State) promptly filed with this Court an emergency petition for supersedeas or,
alternatively, a request that we accept the matter in our original jurisdiction and
expedite briefing. We denied the petition for supersedeas but granted the alternative
request to accept the matter in our original jurisdiction and expedite resolution of the
case. For the reasons we explain below, we vacate the preliminary injunction issued
by the circuit court and declare the 2023 Act constitutional.

                                           I.

We first acknowledge and confront the obvious: the subject of abortion is a highly
contentious and divisive issue in our society. As United States Supreme Court
Justice Brett Kavanaugh observed:
      Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue because it
      presents an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a pregnant
      woman who seeks an abortion and the interests in protecting fetal life.
      The interests on both sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily
      weighty.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2304 (2022) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring). In fact, it was acknowledged decades ago that "[m]en and women
of good conscience can disagree . . . about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992), overruled by Dobbs, 142
S. Ct. at 2242, 2284.

We recognize the tendency of many to view the divisive issue of abortion through a
lens shaped by their own politics or personal preferences. To be clear, our decision
today is in no way intended to denigrate or exalt any of the valid concerns on either
side of the abortion debate, whether those concerns are based in privacy, morality,
medicine, religion, bodily autonomy, or something else. Rather, respectful of
separation of powers principles and the limited (non-policy) role of the Court, we
approach our solemn duty in this case with a single commitment: to honor the rule

3
  The State officials include, among others, the Governor of South Carolina, the
President of the South Carolina Senate, the Speaker of the South Carolina House of
Representatives, and the South Carolina Attorney General.
of law. In our constitutional framework, the rule of law does not bend to satisfy
personal preferences.
                                          II.

The case before us is unique due to our recent decision in Planned Parenthood I. In
that case, by a three-to-two vote (and in five separate writings), the 2021 Act was
declared unconstitutional. While the three Justices in the majority reached the same
conclusion, their reasoning varied significantly. Much of their relevant analysis
centered on the scope of the search and seizure clause of the South Carolina
Constitution, which contains a privacy provision. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 10 ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not
be violated . . . ." (emphasis added)). Chief Justice Beatty and now-retired Justice
Hearn were firmly in the camp of an expansive reading of the privacy provision in
article I, section 10. See Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 199–210, 882 S.E.2d at
776–82 (Hearn, J.); id. at 229–39, 882 S.E.2d at 792–98 (Beatty, C.J., concurring).
That expansive interpretation inured to the benefit of Planned Parenthood's position.
Id. at 199–210, 882 S.E.2d at 776–82 (Hearn, J.); id. at 229–39, 882 S.E.2d at 792–
98 (Beatty, C.J., concurring).
On the other hand, while Justice Few agreed with the ultimate result reached by
Justices Beatty and Hearn, his reasoning was different. Justice Few pointed to what
he believed were flaws in "the General Assembly's failure to consider the necessary
factual question as a predicate to its policy judgment." Id. at 285, 882 S.E.2d at 822
(Few, J., concurring). After detailing his particular concerns, with a focus on the
legislative findings and purposes of the 2021 Act, Justice Few determined the 2021
Act was unconstitutional as it violated article I, section 10 of the state constitution.
Id. at 287–88, 290, 882 S.E.2d at 824, 825 (Few, J., concurring). However,
importantly, Justice Few agreed with the two dissenting Justices that the South
Carolina Constitution—whether in article I, section 10 or elsewhere—does not
expressly provide a right to have an abortion. Id. at 287, 882 S.E.2d at 823 (Few, J.,
concurring).

On the heels of our decision in Planned Parenthood I, the General Assembly went
back to the drawing board and drafted new legislation. It is unmistakable that the
legislature focused on the alleged defects in the 2021 Act. The result was the passage
of the 2023 Act.
The 2023 Act generally prohibits an abortion after the detection of a fetal heartbeat,
not at a specified period of weeks into the pregnancy. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 44-41-610(6) (defining the term "fetal heartbeat" as "cardiac activity, or the steady
and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart, within the gestational sac"); 4
id. § 44-41-630(B) ("[N]o person shall perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant
woman with the specific intent of causing or abetting an abortion if the unborn child's
fetal heartbeat has been detected . . . ."). The law provides limited exceptions
allowing for an abortion in the event of a risk to the health of the mother, fatal fetal
anomalies, rape, and incest. Id. § 44-41-640 to -660.

It is apparent the South Carolina General Assembly carefully crafted the 2023 Act
in an effort to demonstrate that its policy decision was not arbitrary. In particular,
the legislature made a number of findings in support of its policy judgment. For
example, the legislature explained the 2023 Act "took into consideration the interests
of the pregnant woman and balanced them against the legitimate interest of the State
to protect the life of the unborn," the latter interest of which the legislature
characterized as "compelling." Citing its reliance on a number of experts in the field
for a "scientific understanding of the development of the unborn early in pregnancy,"
the legislature concluded that "there is nothing arbitrary about banning abortions
after a fetal heartbeat is detected with certain limited exceptions." Specifically, the
legislature explained it had placed weight on the fact that a woman could learn of
her pregnancy within seven to fourteen days of conception and would have several
weeks after that to make her decision and have an abortion if she so chose. Thus,
the legislature stated it had determined the "proper balance should be struck at the
point of a fetal heartbeat," given the "ample" period of weeks a woman would have
"to make a decision about whether to terminate her pregnancy." S. 474, S. Journal,
125th Leg. Sess., at --- (S.C. Feb. 9, 2023).

                                          III.
As an initial matter, we recognize that legislative findings are entitled to deference
and may be rejected only if determined to be arbitrary as a matter of law. See
Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 560, 88 S.E.2d 683, 694 (1955)
("Legislative findings of fact, while not binding upon the court, will not be

4
  We leave for another day (in an as-applied constitutional challenge) the meaning
of "fetal heartbeat" and whether the statutory definition—"cardiac activity, or the
steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart, within the gestational
sac"—refers to one period of time during a pregnancy or two separate periods of
time. (Emphasis added.)
overturned except by convincing evidence to the contrary."). This deference is not
diminished simply because there is medical support for "both sides" of an issue. See
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (upholding the federal partial-birth
abortion ban even where "[b]oth sides ha[d] medical support for their position"). In
addition, a court should not turn its back on legislative deference merely because the
issue is abortion, for "[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of
legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts."
Id. at 164.
Moreover, three fundamental principles of law inform our analysis and provide the
lens through which we examine Planned Parenthood's constitutional challenge to the
2023 Act. First, the General Assembly's authority to legislate is plenary: the South
Carolina Constitution grants power to the legislature to "enact any act it desires to
pass, if such legislation is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution of this state,
or the Constitution of the United States." Heslep v. State Highway Dep't, 171 S.C.
186, 193, 171 S.E. 913, 915 (1933); see also Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 403,
743 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2013) ("[T]he General Assembly has plenary power over all
legislative matters unless limited by some constitutional provision."); Fripp v.
Coburn, 101 S.C. 312, 317, 85 S.E. 774, 775 (1915) ("[T]he Legislature may enact
any law not prohibited by the Constitution."). 5

Second, statutes are presumed constitutional. That presumption is a weighty one
and can be overcome only by a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528
S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999) ("A legislative enactment will be declared unconstitutional
only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt
that it violates a provision of the constitution."); In re Care & Treatment of Griffin,
434 S.C. 338, 341, 863 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2021) (recognizing "beyond a
reasonable doubt" as the highest possible burden of proof to satisfy).

Third, when issuing constitutional rulings, a court should endeavor to ground its
decision on the narrowest possible basis. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub.

5
  The plenary authority of the South Carolina General Assembly is more fully
understood and appreciated when contrasted with the legislative authority of the
United States Congress vis-à-vis the United States Constitution. While the South
Carolina Constitution allows our legislature to enact any law unless such law is
expressly prohibited by the state or federal constitutions, the opposite holds true with
respect to Congress—that is, Congress may act only if such authority is specifically
granted by the United States Constitution.
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) ("Facial challenges . . . run contrary to the
fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied." (cleaned up)). This rule gains force when the constitutional
challenge is to a statute on its face, rather than as applied. Id. at 449–50 ("In
determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond
the statute's facial requirements and speculate about 'hypothetical' or 'imaginary'
cases. . . . Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge frees the Court not only
from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature
interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be
cloudy." (cleaned up)); cf. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226
U.S. 217, 220 (1912) ("How the state court may apply [a statute] to other cases,
whether its general words may be treated as more or less restrained, and how far
parts of it may be sustained if others fail[] are matters upon which we need not
speculate now."). Here, Planned Parenthood alleges the 2023 Act is facially
unconstitutional. With a facial challenge, Planned Parenthood must demonstrate the
2023 Act is unconstitutional "in all its applications." Richardson ex rel. 15th Cir.
Drug Enf't Unit v. $20,771.00 in U.S. Currency, 437 S.C. 290, 297, 878 S.E.2d 868,
871 (2022); State v. Legg, 416 S.C. 9, 13–14, 785 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2016) ("A facial
challenge is 'the most difficult to mount successfully,' as it requires the challenger
show the legislation at issue is unconstitutional in all its applications." (alteration
marks omitted) (quoting City of L.A. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015)). We
therefore go no further than necessary in exploring the constitutionality of the 2023
Act and issuing our decision.
                                          IV.

A threshold argument of Planned Parenthood is that the decision in Planned
Parenthood I controls our decision here. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., L.L.C., 576
U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (explaining generally the notion of stare decisis, or "the idea
that today's Court should stand by yesterday's decisions"). While we acknowledge
the importance of stare decisis when confronting a challenge to a prior decision, it
has no application here, for the 2023 Act is materially different from the 2021 Act
the majority declared unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood I. Specifically, the
2023 Act contains different findings and purposes from the 2021 Act. For example,
in the 2023 Act, the legislature expressed its compelling interest to protect the lives
of unborn children and, critically, deleted its prior reference to the hallmark feature
of the 2021 Act: informed maternal choice. See Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at
285, 285 n.63, 882 S.E.2d at 822, 822 n.63 (Few, J., concurring) (opining that "the
denial of meaningful choice to women [as codified in the 2021 version of the Fetal
Heartbeat Act] arising from the [legislature's] arbitrary failure to even consider the
extent to which that choice is denied is unreasonable," and, "[f]or this reason,
[finding] the Fetal Heartbeat Act imposes an unreasonable invasion of privacy on
pregnant women"). This new balance struck in the 2023 Act between the competing
interests of the mother and unborn child was combined with the legislature's new
focus on contraceptives and early pregnancy testing, as well as a repeal of the statutes
that codified the Roe v. Wade 6 trimester framework.

As the legislature makes changes to a statutory scheme, reliance on stare decisis is
diminished as it relates to the requirements of the prior statutory scheme. See
Kimble, 576 U.S. at 458 (noting that when the statutory underpinnings of a court's
prior decision have eroded over time, there is heightened justification for revisiting
a prior decision based on the now-modified statutory scheme). Thus, the differences
between the 2021 Act and the 2023 Act fully answer and compel a rejection of
Planned Parenthood's reliance on stare decisis. Nevertheless, because Planned
Parenthood relies almost exclusively on the doctrine of stare decisis based on the
false premise that the 2021 and 2023 Acts are "identical in all material respects," we
will briefly address additional reasons the doctrine does not preclude this Court from
addressing the constitutionality of the 2023 Act.
We first note stare decisis "is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). Thus, the assertion of stare decisis
does not automatically foreclose a court from reviewing a precedent to ensure it was
correctly decided. "This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such
cases correction through legislative action is practically impossible." 7 Id. In
contrast, if a court's decision is instead tied to a statute, the legislature is free to
overrule the decision through a new statutory enactment. That is why adherence to
precedent—stare decisis—is at its zenith when a court decision is based on statutory
construction and not the constitution. See, e.g., Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456 ("What is
more, stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute.

6
    410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2242, 2284.
7
  Roe is an example. Once the United States Supreme Court discovered a right to
abortion in the United States Constitution in the 1970s, neither Congress nor any
state legislature had the authority to remove the "constitutional" right until the
Supreme Court revisited the Roe decision in Dobbs.
Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take their objections
across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees."). However, again,
when a court's ruling is constitutionally based—as was our decision in Planned
Parenthood I—stare decisis has reduced force. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.

Second, Planned Parenthood I is a highly fragmented decision with five separate
opinions. See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 654, 723 S.E.2d 198, 202–03 (2012)
("[W]hen the court is asked to follow the line marked out by a single precedent case
it is not at liberty to place its decision on the rule of stare decisis alone, without
regard to the grounds on which the antecedent case was adjudicated. An original
case could not possibly gain authority by a mere perfunctory following on the
principle of stare decisis." (cleaned up)). On the critical issue concerning the
meaning of the article I, section 10 privacy provision, there is a clear rejection of the
view advanced by Planned Parenthood. See Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 259,
882 S.E.2d at 808 (Few, J., concurring) ("I do not concur in Justice Hearn's or Chief
Justice Beatty's analysis of the article I, section 10 question . . . ."). More to the
point, a majority of this Court rejected Planned Parenthood's position and held article
I, section 10 does not expressly include a right to an abortion.

Third, in light of the fragmented decision in Planned Parenthood I, to construe
Planned Parenthood I as forever binding precedent would impermissibly inhibit the
General Assembly's plenary power to legislate. See generally Hampton, 403 S.C. at
403, 743 S.E.2d at 262; Heslep, 171 S.C. at 193, 171 S.E. at 915; Fripp, 101 S.C. at
317, 85 S.E. at 775. This point is closely related to our primary reason for not
invoking stare decisis: the 2021 and 2023 Acts are not identical. The 2023 Act is
new legislation overhauled and redrafted after the Court's rejection of the
legislature's initial efforts in 2021. We must now address the constitutionality of the
new legislative effort after the General Assembly implemented the guidance
provided by this Court in Planned Parenthood I.
Accordingly, we consider the constitutionality of the 2023 Act today with respect
for our prior decision in Planned Parenthood I but also with the knowledge that
Planned Parenthood I does not dictate the constitutionality of the amended version
of the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act.
                                          V.

We now turn to Planned Parenthood's challenge to the constitutionality of the 2023
Act. All but one of Planned Parenthood's allegations may be summarily resolved.8

The difficult issue before us is Planned Parenthood's claim that the 2023 Act violates
the article I, section 10 "unreasonable invasion of privacy" provision found in the
South Carolina Constitution. The provision states, in its entirety:

      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
      effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable
      invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
      but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

8
  As to Planned Parenthood's arguments regarding due process, equal protection,
vagueness, and collateral estoppel, we summarily reject them pursuant to Rule 220,
SCACR, and the following authorities: Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248 (considering
whether the right to obtain an abortion is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and concluding that "the clear answer is that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect the right to an abortion"); R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman
Petroleum, Inc., 338 S.C. 475, 477, 527 S.E.2d 763, 764 (2000) (per curiam) ("The
modern rule [in evaluating substantive due process claims] gives great deference to
legislative judgment on what is reasonable to promote the public welfare when
reviewing . . . social welfare legislation. Legislation is not overturned unless the
law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned
up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is
not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is
thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications");
State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313, 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal
protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances"); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557,
572, 549 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2001) (explaining that "all the Constitution requires [in
order for a statute to survive a vagueness challenge] is that the language convey
sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices"); Catawba Indian Nation v. State, 407 S.C.
526, 538, 756 S.E.2d 900, 907 (2014) (finding collateral estoppel inapplicable when
the matter resolved in the prior action was not the same as the matter asserted in the
current action).
      particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to
      be seized, and the information to be obtained.

S.C. Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).

While we reaffirm our finding from Planned Parenthood I that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to abortion under article I, section 10, we likewise
decline to revisit the fragmented decision regarding the proper scope of the privacy
provision. Rather, in the interest of unity, we will assume only for purposes of our
analysis and decision today that the privacy provision reaches beyond the search and
seizure context to include bodily autonomy. 9 Accordingly, we go no further today
than referencing Singleton v. State, which held that the interests protected by the
privacy clause extend to bodily autonomy and integrity. 313 S.C. 75, 88–89, 437
S.E.2d 53, 60–61 (1993) (quoting article I, section 10 of the South Carolina
Constitution, and concluding that "the South Carolina Constitutional right of privacy
would be violated if the State were to sanction forced medication solely to facilitate
execution").

Nonetheless, in utilizing the broader reading of article I, section 10, we cannot focus
merely on the single word "privacy" contained therein but must instead consider the
actual wording of the entirety of the provision: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . [from] unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated."
(Emphasis added.) When viewed in its full and proper context, it is undeniable that

9
  We make this assumption in favor of Planned Parenthood's position in an effort to
reach the ultimate question in this case, the resolution of which all Justices in the
majority agree. Specifically, the four members of this Court comprising the majority
here have differing views of the threshold issues leading to the ultimate question
regarding the propriety of the legislature's balancing of the interests of privacy and
bodily autonomy for the pregnant woman and protecting the life developing in the
womb. We elect not to address those threshold differences: for purposes of our
analysis and decision today, we will cast aside a review of the history and relevance
of the 1971 amendments to the state constitution that included the privacy provision,
including the work of the West Committee. We have chosen this route for our
analysis because, in the end, our threshold disagreements obscure the consensus
among us. That is to say, regardless of our threshold disagreements, once the
analysis reaches the balancing of the competing interests, all four Justices in the
majority agree that while a close question is presented, the 2023 Act must be upheld.
the South Carolina Constitution does not create an absolute bar against all state
action that infringes on a person's privacy. 10 Instead, the state constitution draws the
line at unreasonable invasions of privacy. In keeping with the separation of powers,
it is the legislature's prerogative to make policy decisions, and it is the Court's duty
to evaluate only whether those policy decisions are indisputably repugnant to the
federal or state constitutions. See, e.g., ArrowPointe Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey,
438 S.C. 573, 580, 884 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2023) ("Determinations of public policy
'are chiefly within the province of the legislature, whose authority on these matters
we must respect.'" (quoting Fullbright v. Spinnnaker Resorts, Inc., 420 S.C. 265,
271, 802 S.E.2d 794, 797 (2017))); Smith v. Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 559, 799 S.E.2d
479, 485 (2017) ("The General Assembly in the Act struck the balance among
competing policy concerns it deemed appropriate. . . . If our mission were simply
to achieve equity on a case by case basis, we would not necessarily disagree with
Appellants and the dissent. But wherever the balance is struck, one can easily
imagine scenarios where the result may be inequitable. . . . In honoring separation
of powers, we adhere to the principle that a court must not reject the legislature's
policy determinations merely because the court may prefer what it believes is a more
equitable result.").
The 2023 Act, with exceptions, bans abortion after the detection of a fetal heartbeat,
as that term is defined by statute. Does the Act infringe on a woman's privacy
interest? Are the concerns and challenges of Planned Parenthood worthy of this
Court's profound respect and careful consideration? The answer to both questions
is unequivocally "yes." To be sure, the 2023 Act infringes on a woman's right of
privacy and bodily autonomy. 11

10
   Of course, virtually every law operates in some manner to limit a person's privacy.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 297, 882 S.E.2d at 829 (Kittredge, J.,
dissenting) ("For example, no rational person would contend the State does not have
the authority to enact laws criminalizing assault, rape, theft, child abuse, drug
trafficking, and the like. In these and so many other areas, the power of the State to
regulate and prohibit conduct is unquestioned. There is not the slightest prospect
that a court would contravene the will of the people, as codified by their elected
representatives, because the law amounts to an invasion of privacy.").
11
   We note the 2023 Act contains exceptions designed to protect the life and health
of the mother, and in this facial challenge, we are not confronted with any plausible
argument or concrete situation that suggests compliance with the Act poses
significant or unconstitutional threats to a mother's life or health care, or that it will
result in medical providers delaying necessary or life-saving health care to the
Even so, and despite our temporary acceptance of an expansive construction of the
privacy provision in article I, section 10, 12 the constitutional question before us is
not easily answered. The legislature has made a policy determination that, at a
certain point in the pregnancy, a woman's interest in autonomy and privacy does not
outweigh the interest of the unborn child to live. As a Court, unless we can say that
the balance struck by the legislature was unreasonable as a matter of law, we must
uphold the Act. As we acknowledged at the outset, many may strongly disagree
with the balance struck by the legislature from a policy standpoint; others may
strongly agree with the balance struck in the 2023 Act; and still others may believe
the balance should be struck more stridently in favor of protecting the life of the
unborn child. This Court, however, does not make policy determinations. The
legislature makes policy decisions. This is a central feature of separation of powers.
Through the legal and judicial lens under which we must operate, while mindful of
the difficult and emotional issue before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that the
2023 Act is unreasonable and thus violates the state constitution. See Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 599 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("Whatever one thinks of the policy decision [the legislature] made, it was [the
legislature's] prerogative to make it. Reviewed with appropriate deference, [that
policy judgment] should survive measurement under the [Constitution]."); Samson
v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 295 S.C. 359, 367, 368 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1988) (per curiam)
("[T]his Court will not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability
of legislative policy determinations." (cleaned up)); Brennen v. S. Express Co., 106
S.C. 102, 116, 90 S.E. 402, 406 (1916) ("[S]o long as the [legislature's] exertion of
power bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose sought to be accomplished,
the courts may not interfere. With the wisdom and policy of legislative enactments[,]
they have no concern. Being forbidden by the Constitution to invade the legislative
domain, they cannot substitute their judgment and discretion for that of the
lawmakers."); cf. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S.126, 143 (2010) (noting
Congress was faced with two equally reasonable policy choices, and in selecting one
of the choices over the other, Congress's decision necessarily satisfied "'review for
means-end rationality,' i.e., . . . satisfie[d] the Constitution's insistence that a federal
statute represent a rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of
legislative authority" (citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976) ("States are accorded wide latitude . . . under their police powers,

mother or unconstitutionally infringe upon their independent medical judgment.
12
  Again, we accept this expansive premise for purposes of our decision today only.
See supra note 9.
and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical
exactitude."); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 (1984) ("The policy arguments
advanced in [opposition to the law passed by the legislature] should be addressed to
Congress rather than to this Court.").

We think it is important to reiterate: we are constrained by the express language in
the South Carolina Constitution that prohibits only "unreasonable invasions of
privacy." See S.C. Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). A reasonableness
framework is required. The concept of reasonableness necessarily embraces a range
of permissible policy options, not a narrow line in the sand. Of course, people may
disagree in good faith with the balance struck by the legislature, but that
disagreement in no manner renders unconstitutional the legislatively determined
balance. As judges, our solemn duty is to uphold the rule of law; we must maintain
judicial discipline, refrain from acting as a super-legislature, and respect the plenary
authority of the South Carolina General Assembly. Cf. Hampton, 403 S.C. at 403,
743 S.E.2d at 262 (explaining the legislature may enact any law it desires unless
expressly prohibited by the state constitution); Heslep, 171 S.C. at 193, 171 S.E. at
915 (same); Fripp, 101 S.C. at 317, 85 S.E. at 775 (same). Because the 2023 Act is
within the zone of reasonable policy decisions rationally related to the State's interest
in protecting the unborn, we are constrained to defer to the legislature's policy
prerogative.
                                          VI.

In conclusion, the legislature has found that the State has a compelling interest in
protecting the lives of unborn children. That finding is indisputable and one we must
respect. The legislature has further determined, after vigorous debate and
compromise, that its interest in protecting the unborn becomes actionable upon the
detection of a fetal heartbeat via ultrasound by qualified medical personnel. It would
be a rogue imposition of will by the judiciary for us to say that the legislature's
determination is unreasonable as a matter of law—particularly on the record before
us and in the specific context of a claim arising under the privacy provision in article
I, section 10 of our state constitution.
As a result, our judicial role in this facial challenge to the 2023 Act has come to an
end. The judiciary's role is to exercise our judgment as to whether the legislative
weighing of competing interests was within the range of possible, reasonable choices
rationally related to promoting the legislature's legitimate interests. Having
concluded that it was, we consequently defer to the legislature's gauging of the
profound, competing interests at stake. Accordingly, we vacate the preliminary
injunction and hold the 2023 Act is constitutional.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION VACATED             AND    THE   2023   ACT
DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL.

FEW, JAMES and HILL, JJ., concur. FEW, J., concurring in a separate
opinion. BEATTY, C.J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
JUSTICE FEW: Seven months ago, I voted to strike down the 2021 Fetal Heartbeat
and Protection from Abortion Act because the General Assembly specifically
recognized in the 2021 Act a woman's interest in making "an informed choice about
whether to continue a pregnancy," yet banned essentially all abortions "without the
General Assembly having made any inquiry as to whether a substantial percentage
of women even know they are pregnant" in time to make such a choice. Planned
Parenthood S. Atl. v. State, 438 S.C. 188, 274, 284, 882 S.E.2d 770, 816-17, 822
(2023) (Planned Parenthood I) (Few, J., concurring in result). I referred to this as
the "key question" as to the constitutionality of the 2021 Act. 438 S.C. at 284, 882
S.E.2d at 822 (Few, J., concurring in result). The General Assembly's failure to
address this key question; its failure to balance the very right it codified—"informed
choice"—against the State's interest in regulating abortion rendered the 2021 Act
arbitrary, and thus violated the article I, section 10 prohibition against unreasonable
invasions of privacy. See 438 S.C. at 285, 882 S.E.2d at 822 (Few, J., concurring in
result) (explaining "under article I, section 10, the denial of meaningful choice to
women arising from the arbitrary failure to even consider the extent to which that
choice is denied is unreasonable").

Planned Parenthood argues the 2023 Act is no different from the 2021 Act because
both ban most abortions at same point in time—"cardiac activity, or the steady and
repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart, within the gestational sac." Thus,
Planned Parenthood argues simplistically, my vote should be the same as it was in
Planned Parenthood I. The State argues, on the other hand, "In passing [the 2023
Act], the General Assembly expressly sought to address some of the concerns raised
by members of this Court in Planned Parenthood [I]," Att'y General Br. 1, and, "The
2023 Act rectifies each of the three specific issues that Justice Few found with the
2021 Act," Governor's Br. 1. See also Att'y General Br. 8 ("In response to Justice
Few's opinion in the Planned Parenthood [I] case, the General Assembly carefully
crafted the 2023 Act to remove any reasonable doubt [the Act is constitutional] by
ensuring that its provisions are not arbitrary by allowing women a meaningful
opportunity to make a decision about terminating a pregnancy prior to the detection
of a fetal heartbeat."). I find the 2023 Act is constitutional.

To be clear, I stand firmly by everything I wrote in Planned Parenthood I. While I
agree wholeheartedly with Justice Kittredge's statement "the General Assembly's
authority to legislate is plenary," that plenary power must be exercised according to
law. When the General Assembly enacts legislation that violates the constitution, it
has exceeded its "plenary" power. In Planned Parenthood I and in this case, the
attorneys representing the State have sounded a constant drumbeat for the
"separation of powers" mandated by article I, section 8 of the South Carolina
Constitution. In petitions for rehearing from our decision in Planned Parenthood I,
as an extreme example, the attorneys literally argued the mere fact this Court
overturned the 2021 Act is a violation of the separation of powers.

Respectfully, the Justices of this Court understand the separation of powers. Each
Justice on the Court—then and now—embraces the constitutional requirement that
we respect the General Assembly's plenary power to legislate. But the article I,
section 8 separation of powers provision demands mutual respect. To the same
extent this Court is constitutionally bound to respect plenary legislative power, the
General Assembly is bound to respect the limited judicial power set forth in article
V of the South Carolina Constitution. Under article V, this Court has two perfectly-
consistent, solemn duties. We must uphold legislation when it is possible to find the
legislation conforms to the constitution; we must strike down legislation when it
clearly violates the constitution. See Clarke v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427,
435, 181 S.E. 481, 484 (1935) ("A statute will, if possible, be construed so as to
render it valid;" and "a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its
repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt;" and "every
presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment"); Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290, 305, 195 S.E. 539, 545 (1938)
("[W]e are not unmindful that it is a grave matter to overturn, by judicial
construction, an enactment of the General Assembly. All presumptions are in favor
of the power of that body to enact the law. All considerations involving the wisdom,
the policy, or the expediency of the act are addressed exclusively to that branch of
the state government. . . . But when the unconstitutionality of an act is clear to this
court, beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is its plain duty to say so.").
Ultimately, the General Assembly did not attempt to simply re-enact the same
legislation, as Planned Parenthood argues. Rather, it amended the 2021 Act in what
appears to be a sincere attempt to comply with the narrowest reading of this Court's
ruling in Planned Parenthood I. The question now before the Court, therefore, is
whether the attempt was successful; do the changes the General Assembly made
from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act make it possible for this Court to find the 2023
Act constitutional under article I, section 10, despite the fact the threshold for
banning most abortions did not change.

Article I, section 10, provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons
. . . against . . . unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated . . . ." There
are three steps in the analysis of an unconstitutional invasion of privacy claim under
article I, section 10. First, the court must identify the State's interests underlying its
action. When the claim is based on legislative action, as here, the court must identify
the interests the General Assembly was pursuing on behalf of the State in enacting
the legislation. Second, the court must identify the countervailing privacy interests
implicated by the State's action. Third, once the competing interests have been
identified, the court must address whether any invasion of privacy is "unreasonable."
See Hooper v. Rockwell, 334 S.C. 281, 293-95, 513 S.E.2d 358, 364-66 (1999)
(explaining article I, section 10 privacy interests are "not absolute" but must be
balanced against the State's interests). An invasion of privacy that is reasonable in
light of the State's interest is not a violation of article I, section 10. See S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Gamble, 337 S.C. 428, 434-35, 523 S.E.2d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 1999)
(studying the constitutionality of a statute, reciting the competing interests, and
finding the statute constitutional because, "The statute at issue balances these
rights"). In the case of legislative action, the Court may find the General Assembly's
chosen balance of those interests—as reflected in the legislation—to be a violation
of article I, section 10 only when the Court determines the invasion of privacy is
unreasonable as a matter of law. In other words, if the General Assembly could
fairly have determined the invasion of privacy was reasonable, this Court may not
substitute its judgment on the question of reasonableness.
The 2023 Act recites the State's interest in regulating abortion differently than the
2021 Act, stating, "The State of South Carolina has a compelling interest from the
outset of a woman's pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the unborn child." Act No. 70, 2023 S.C. Acts § 1(3). The State argues this
provision of the 2023 Act "does make explicit the General Assembly's expression of
the State's interest in protecting life from conception." Governor's Br. 15. The State
continues, "The 2023 Act therefore represents a new, stronger expression of the
State's interest since [Planned Parenthood I] was decided that goes directly to this
personhood question . . . ." Id.
As each of the Justices explained in Planned Parenthood I, none of us discount the
strength of the State's interest in regulating abortion; the interest is a powerful one.
However, I do not view this revised wording as a significant change in the State's
interest, and I do not believe the newly-worded interest "goes directly to this
personhood question." See 438 S.C. at 272-73, 882 S.E.2d at 815-16 (Few, J.,
concurring in result) (explaining the potential significance of a "personhood" policy
determination by the General Assembly).

I do believe, however, the changes in expression of the State's interest bring more
fully into focus the basis for the State's use of "the steady and repetitive rhythmic
contraction of the fetal heart" as the threshold beyond which most abortions may not
be performed. See Act No. 70, 2023 S.C. Acts § 2(6) (defining "fetal heartbeat" as
"cardiac activity, or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart,
within the gestational sac"). In the 2021 Act, the General Assembly made extensive
findings as to the correlation between an unborn child reaching this threshold and an
eventual live, healthy birth. Act No. 1, 2021 S.C. Acts 3. Those findings are
essentially summarized in the 2023 Act as, "A fetal heartbeat is a key medical
predictor that an unborn child will reach live birth." Act No. 70, 2023 S.C. Acts §
1(1).
The State argues the General Assembly's recognition of a "strong correlation
between this [fetal heartbeat] and a live birth" supports the constitutionality of the
Act. Governor's Br. 21 n.3. The State's argument is that by choosing this
"biologically identifiable moment in time"—as the 2023 Act calls it—as the
threshold for banning most abortions, the General Assembly chose to prohibit only
those abortions most likely to terminate pregnancies that would otherwise result in
a live birth. This is a sensible argument, not unlike a point the Supreme Court of the
United States made in Roe v. Wade regarding viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 183 (1973) ("With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life
after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications."), overruled on
other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct.
2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).13

The most obvious change from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act relates to the second
step in the analysis—identifying any countervailing interests. In particular, the
General Assembly eliminated the statutory right to "informed choice." In the 2021
Act, the General Assembly included the following in the "legislative findings"
section,

      The General Assembly hereby finds, according to contemporary
      medical research, . . . :

             ...
             (8) in order to make an informed choice about whether to
13
  The State's point is not that a fetal heartbeat is a "logical and biological" indication
of current "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb"—viability—
but that the fetal heartbeat is a "logical and biological" indication that eventually this
particular pregnancy is likely to result in a live birth.
             continue a pregnancy, a pregnant woman has a legitimate interest
             in knowing the likelihood of the human fetus surviving to full-
             term birth based upon the presence of a fetal heartbeat.
2021 S.C. Acts at 3.

When this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the 2021 Act, we balanced the
State's interest in protecting unborn life against the statutory countervailing interest
of "informed choice" and the privacy interests arising from article I, section 10. As
there is no "informed choice" provision in the 2023 Act, the State's interest in
protecting unborn life is now balanced against only the constitutional privacy
interests.

The most impactful change from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act is actually a category
of changes that are designed to approach the idea of choice in terms of promoting
active family planning. First, the 2023 Act encourages couples to avoid unwanted
pregnancies by providing insured access to contraceptives. Section 5 of the Act
requires, "All individual and group health insurance and health maintenance
organization policies in this State shall include coverage for
contraceptives." Similarly, section 11 of the Act requires, "The Public Employee
Benefit Authority and the State Health Plan shall cover prescribed contraceptives for
dependents" and "shall not apply patient cost sharing provisions to covered
contraceptives." In other words, the 2023 Act requires insured contraceptives to
almost all couples in South Carolina. 14

14
  Planned Parenthood argues free contraceptives are already required under federal
law. From my research, it appears Planned Parenthood is partially correct. Federal
law requires insured contraceptives for all group medical insurance plans that are
not "grandfathered," meaning, not in place before March 2010. This federal
requirement appears to apply to approximately 85% of working-insured Americans.
The 2023 Act, therefore, appears to guarantee insured contraceptives to the
approximately 15% of working South Carolinians who do not already enjoy such a
guarantee under federal law.
Second—as the Governor makes clear in his brief to this Court—the 2023 Act
specifically permits "'emergency contraception,' such as Plan B," 15,16 which is a
contraceptive that can be administered after sexual intercourse. As with other forms
of contraceptives, what the Governor is calling "emergency contraceptives" are
guaranteed to be covered under the terms of the 2023 Act to almost all women in
South Carolina who are insured under a group or individual plan.
The Attorney General addresses these two components of "family planning" in his
brief:
      The timeline for a meaningful opportunity to make a decision begins
      prior to pregnancy. Women and men who engage in sexual intercourse
      are aware that pregnancy can result. It is that awareness that allows a
      woman to engage in family planning. A woman who does not want to
      become pregnant, or a woman who is undecided about pregnancy, has
      ample opportunity to make well-informed decisions concerning her
      reproductive health. Prior to sexual intercourse, a woman has a
      meaningful opportunity to consider contraceptives such as birth control
      pills or intrauterine devices. After sexual intercourse, she has up to five
      days to consider whether she wants to take an over-the-counter
      emergency contraceptive to prevent pregnancy.

15
   The Governor states, "All of this is in addition to the fact that women still have
the option of 'emergency contraception,' such as Plan B. Plan B prevents ovulation,
fertilization and implantation; it does not (like mifepristone) terminate a pregnancy
if the implantation has occurred." Governor's Br. 20 n.2 (citations omitted).
16
   The 2023 Act permits this in two ways not present in the 2021 Act: (1) Section 2
of the Act, specifically amended subsection 44-41-640(E), provides it is not illegal
to "use, sell, or administer a contraceptive measure." The term "contraceptive" is
defined to include "a drug, device, or chemical that prevents ovulation." (2) The
term "abortion" is defined as a "clinically diagnosable pregnancy." That term is
defined as "the point in time when it is possible to determine that a woman is
pregnant due to the detectable presence of human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG)."
That point in time occurs after the time when a woman would use emergency
contraception, such as Plan B.
Att'y General Br. 12 n.4.
The Attorney General then addresses a point this Court specifically introduced
during Planned Parenthood I. During oral arguments and in my opinion in Planned
Parenthood I, I questioned whether—as a predicate to understanding the percentage
of women are denied choice—the more appropriate question should be "how many
women can know they are pregnant in time to make an informed choice," rather than
"how many women [do] know . . . ." See Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 281,
882 S.E.2d at 820 (Few, J., concurring in result) (describing the questions I put to
counsel during oral argument as seeking information on "what the General Assembly
knew when enacting the [2021 Act], what Planned Parenthood knew when it filed
this lawsuit, and what medical and scientific research shows about the percentage of
women who cannot know of their pregnancy in time to make an 'informed choice'"
(emphasis added)); 438 S.C. at 278, 882 S.E.2d at 818 (Few, J., concurring in result)
("Whether a pregnant woman is given an opportunity to make a meaningful choice
and whether the invasion of her privacy by restricting her opportunity for an abortion
is unreasonable each depend on the answer to one particular factual question: Can a
pregnant woman even know she is pregnant in time to engage in a meaningful
decision-making process and—if her choice is to not continue the pregnancy—make
the necessary arrangements to carry out an abortion?" (emphasis added)). The
Attorney General argues:
      Her awareness of the possibility of pregnancy further affords her the
      opportunity to control her reproductive health after sexual intercourse
      by taking a common, over-the-counter pregnancy test to determine
      whether she is pregnant and make a decision concerning an abortion
      before a fetal heartbeat can be detected.

Att'y General Br. 12 n.4.
This third component of family planning was specifically taken up by the Senate
during its debate of House amendments to the original Senate bill.
      The Senate's debate during consideration of S. 474 very clearly
      established that there is nothing arbitrary about banning abortions after
      a fetal heartbeat is detected with certain limited exceptions. In fact, we
      very clearly articulated the basis for making that determination and
      specifically addressed the fact that a pregnant woman can know within
      10 to 14 days after conception whether she is pregnant. According to
      the Cleveland Clinic, as early as 10 days after conception (but within
      14 days) a home pregnancy test will detect the presence of human
      chorionic gonadstropin, a special hormone that developed only upon
      implantation. A blood test can confirm the presence of that hormone
      as early as 7 to 10 days after conception. According to the American
      Pregnancy Association the heartbeat of an unborn child can be detected
      between 6½ to 7 weeks of pregnancy though it is possible, though much
      less likely, that a heartbeat can be detected a week earlier -- about 5½
      weeks. That means that a woman can find out that she is pregnant two
      weeks after conception and has another 4½ to 5 weeks[17] to make her
      decision and have an abortion. It is our reasoned judgement that a
      month is enough time for a pregnant woman to decide whether to have
      an abortion and undertake the procedure to follow through with her
      decision.
S. 474, S. Journal, 125th Leg. Sess., at ____ (S.C. Feb. 9, 2023).

While there are no specific written findings in the 2023 Act on this subject, the
General Assembly clearly considered the question. This is, therefore, the type of
finding we typically will imply to the General Assembly. See Richards v. City of
Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 561, 88 S.E.2d 683, 694 (1955) (stating it is "presumed
from the mere passage of the act that there was a finding of such facts as were
necessary to authorize the enactment"). This Court must presume, therefore, the
General Assembly placed emphasis in enacting the 2023 Act on the responsibility
of sexually-active couples to actively—rather than passively—seek out testing as to
whether a pregnancy has resulted from their sexual activity.

This brings me to the balancing of the State's interests against the countervailing
interest of privacy under article I, section 10. At the outset of this balancing, there
are a couple of points to make clear. The first point is that abortion is different from
any other context in which a person may enjoy privacy rights, because abortion ends
the life of an unborn child. No matter how one may view this reality in their own
political terms, the constitutional reality for evaluating whether a particular
restriction on abortion is an "unreasonable" invasion of privacy is that our General
Assembly has clearly and unambiguously set a public policy against abortion in this
State. In Planned Parenthood I, the Justices disagreed sharply over whether
abortion implicates privacy at all. In this case, the Justices in the majority all agree
on this important point: to the extent restrictions on abortion do implicate privacy

17
  These numbers are incorrect, presumably because the calculations that led to them
were based on the date of the last menstrual period rather than the date of
fertilization. The correct numbers would be "2½ to 3 weeks."
interests under article I, section 10, the fact an abortion ends the life of an unborn
child strongly influences the balancing of those privacy interests against the State's
interest in regulating abortion. The relationship of privacy and choice to abortion is
unique among all applications of the right to privacy because—when making the
decision to have an abortion—the exercise of the right of privacy ends the life of an
unborn child. In this respect, all the cases in which this Court has balanced privacy
interests in the past are distinguishable—Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d
53 (1993), the most prominent example—because abortion is different.18

The second point is the balancing of the State's interests against privacy interests
begins in the General Assembly. Gamble, 337 S.C. at 434-35, 523 S.E.2d at 480.
In the 2023 Act, the General Assembly chose to approach privacy and choice in an
active sense, not merely as a choice arising upon the passive learning of an unwanted
pregnancy, but as an active family planning process that begins at the outset of a
sexually-active relationship and continues all the way to the threshold of "the steady
and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart" beyond which no abortions
may take place unless an exception applies.
With these points in mind, I cannot say the abortion restrictions included in the 2023
Act are an unreasonable invasion of privacy. First, the State's interest in protecting
the lives of unborn children is clearly articulated in the 2023 Act. The elimination
of the interest of "informed choice" from the 2021 Act leaves this interest in life—
which includes the life and health of the mother—as the sole purpose of the 2023
Act. With this purpose stated more clearly and without the countervailing statutory
interest of informed choice, the correlation between reaching the threshold of a fetal
heartbeat and the likelihood of a live, healthy birth stands out more clearly as a
reasonable standard by which to regulate most abortion. In addition, I find it quite
significant the State approached the idea of choice in terms of promoting active
family planning. Couples who do not want to bring a pregnancy to term and have a
baby are enabled by the 2023 Act to make that choice before a pregnancy by the

18
   In Singleton, we held "the South Carolina Constitutional right of privacy would
be violated if the State were to sanction forced medication solely to facilitate
execution." 313 S.C. at 89, 437 S.E.2d at 61. I agree with Justice Kittredge when
he stated, "If nothing else, Singleton and the other cases mentioning article I, section
10 are distinguishable because they did not involve an interest in protecting the life
of an unborn child." Planned Parenthood I, 438 S.C. at 316 n.91, 882 S.E.2d at 839
n.91 (Kittredge, J., dissenting).
increased availability of contraceptives, and are encouraged through the use of Plan
B and early pregnancy testing to meet the statutory deadline of "fetal heartbeat" in
the event contraceptive measures are not effective.

I am certain many will find my analysis unsatisfying. Constitutional analysis,
however, is not a team sport. I—and the other Justices of this Court—must remain
mindful that the regulation of abortion is in the first instance a political question. It
is a legal question only to the extent that any restriction on abortion may clearly
violate a specific constitutional provision. The only constitutional provision at issue
here is the article I, section 10 right of privacy. Article I, section 10 does not forbid
all invasions of privacy, but only "unreasonable" invasions. My vote in Planned
Parenthood I was based on the fact the General Assembly did not even consider
what I then called the "key question." For that reason, the 2021 Act was arbitrary
and, thus, unreasonable. In the 2023 Act, however, the General Assembly not only
considered the key question, it changed the question—as it is absolutely entitled to
do—to focus the attention of sexually-active couples in South Carolina on active
family planning, thereby expanding the notion of choice to the period of time before
fertilization, certainly before a couple passively learns of a pregnancy. The abortion
restrictions in the 2023 Act are reasonable. I find the 2023 Act constitutional.
       CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: I respectfully dissent.          On May 23, 2023,
the South Carolina General Assembly passed Senate Bill 474, the "Fetal Heartbeat
and Protection from Abortion Act," which became effective upon the Governor's
signing on May 25, 2023. See Act No. 70, 2023 S.C. Acts ___ ("the 2023 Act")
(codified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-41-610 to -690 (West 2023)). The
2023 Act replaces prior legislation with the same name, "Fetal Heartbeat and
Protection from Abortion Act" ("the 2021 Act"), that was deemed unconstitutional
by this Court on January 5, 2023 in Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. State, 438
S.C. 188, 882 S.E.2d 770 (2023) (Planned Parenthood).
       The 2023 Act effectively reinstated the 2021 Act's ban on abortion in South
Carolina upon the detection of a "fetal heartbeat." This term was statutorily defined
then—as it is again now in the 2023 Act—as "cardiac activity, or the steady and
repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart, within the gestational sac."19
Although neither act specifies the number of weeks of gestation that is targeted, each
has been informally characterized as a "six-week ban" based on similarly worded
legislation introduced in multiple jurisdictions following the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Dobbs,20 which overruled nearly fifty years of federal
precedent on abortion.
      In Planned Parenthood, several members of the Court noted that medical
professionals have classified six weeks of gestation as the embryonic stage of
development, not fetal, and have stated the only "cardiac activity" that could
potentially exist at this point is the nascent flickering of electrical impulses from a
group of inchoate cells. A "fetal heart" that is capable of "contraction," as provided
in the statutory language, does not exist until later in the pregnancy, when the
chambers of the heart have fully developed. See Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C. at
196 n.2, 882 S.E.2d at 774 n.2 (Hearn, J.); id. at 222, 882 S.E.2d at 788 (Beatty, C.J.,
concurring). Thus, the title and content of the legislation are a misnomer if it is
viewed as a six-week ban because the terminology is medically and scientifically
inaccurate. As such, it is the quintessential example of political gaslighting;
attempting to manipulate public opinion and control the reproductive health
decisions of women by distorting reality.

19
  Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-610(6) (West 2023) (2023 version), with S.C.
Code Ann. Ann. § 44-41-610(3) (Supp. 2022) (2021 version).
20
  Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) (overruling Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
       I say "if" the 2023 Act is viewed as a six-week ban because the majority now
states there is uncertainty about what the language even means. The majority
purports to take this case in the Court's original jurisdiction which, in addition to its
legal role, also makes this Court the designated fact-finder under Rule 245, SCACR.
However, the majority undertook no factual review in this case (or in Planned
Parenthood). Further, it does not resolve the anomaly appearing on the face of the
legislation regarding the timing of the "fetal heartbeat" ban. Instead, it
acknowledges the uncertainty in a footnote and then leaves this question of
fundamental importance—the meaning of the legislation—"for another day." See
Majority Op. at n.4 ("We leave for another day (in an as-applied constitutional
challenge) the meaning of 'fetal heartbeat' and whether the statutory definition—
'cardiac activity, or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart,
within the gestational sac'—refers to one period of time during a pregnancy or two
separate periods of time. (Emphasis added.)").21

       This omission, however, leaves our state with no guidance as to the 2023 Act's
reach. How can anyone know how to comply with the law—particularly where it
carries the threat of criminal penalties—and how can lawyers advise their clients, in
the absence of a determination of this key point? In addition to the right to privacy,
Planned Parenthood has raised issues to this Court regarding, inter alia, the
legislation's vagueness, as well as due process and equal protection violations.
However, the majority has summarily disposed of all of these arguments, including
vagueness, in a single footnote. See Majority Op. at n.8 ("As to Planned
Parenthood's arguments regarding due process, equal protection, vagueness, and
collateral estoppel, we summarily reject them pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and
the following authorities," followed by string citations). This appears to be

21
  I question whether this is because it is also a threshold issue on which the majority
could not agree, so "in the interest of unity," the majority postponed a decision on
this problematic issue in order to reach its desired consensus. See Majority Op. at
n.9 (noting "the four members of this Court comprising the majority here have
differing views of the threshold issues leading to the ultimate question regarding the
propriety of the legislature's balancing of the interests of privacy and bodily
autonomy for the pregnant woman and protecting the life developing in the womb,"
but "[w]e elect not to address those threshold differences" because "the majority
agree that while a close question is presented, the 2023 Act must be upheld").
inconsistent, however, with its earlier footnote stating the meaning of the statute (in
other words, the statute's vagueness) is an issue "for another day."

       Based on the discussions during oral argument, it appears the majority's
reference to the possibility of cardiac activity beginning at two different points in a
pregnancy might stem from the use of a comma after "cardiac activity" in the
statutory language that defines "fetal heartbeat." See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-610(6)
(West 2023) ("cardiac activity, or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of
the fetal heart"). I note, however, that the General Assembly has made three findings
accompanying the 2023 Act, and the second finding provides additional clarification
on the meaning of "cardiac activity":

             (2) Cardiac activity begins at a biologically identifiable
             moment in time, normally when the fetal heart is formed
             in the gestational sac.
South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act, Act No. 70, 2023
S.C. Acts ___, ___ § 1(2) (emphasis added). In my view, this legislative finding
confirms that "cardiac activity" begins at only one unique "moment in time," so it
cannot begin at two alternative points in a pregnancy, as postulated by the majority.

       In addition, because the second finding provides "cardiac activity"
commences "when the fetal heart is formed," it confirms my view that "cardiac
activity" exists when the four chambers of the heart are fully developed and capable
of "rhythmic contraction." This is also consistent with the plain reading of the
statutory language, which refers to "the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction
of the fetal heart." See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-610(6) (West 2023) (emphasis
added). A "fetal heartbeat," therefore, certainly cannot exist at six weeks of
gestation, as only a nascent cluster of cells that will eventually develop into a heart
is present at that time.

       With this understanding of the meaning of when "cardiac activity" begins (i.e.,
when a heartbeat is first detected from the formed chambers of the heart), I would
be inclined to concur in upholding the constitutionality of the 2023 Act. I would
agree to do so if a ban at that point would allow women to make an informed choice
about whether to continue a pregnancy, in accordance with South Carolina's
constitutional right to privacy and our Court's precedent.
       Whether informed choice can exist, however, depends upon a critical factual
determination as to when a fetal heart is actually formed. 22 However, the majority
noticeably did not explore this point, despite taking the unusual step of removing
this topic (the validity of an abortion ban) from the circuit court and hearing it in this
Court's original jurisdiction twice in one year. Because the majority has elected to
leave the determination of what the 2023 Act means "for another day," yet has,
paradoxically, upheld its constitutionality, I must dissent. Concluding the 2023 Act
is valid while remaining silent as to its timing—and without clearly rejecting any
implication that it is reinstating what is at least perceived to be, effectively, a six-
week ban—is concerning to me, and the fear of political retribution in this matter is
palpable. Today's result will surely weigh heavily upon the public and our state's
medical professionals, in light of the threat of criminal penalties placed upon
practitioners and the serious harm that could occur to women who could be denied
reproductive health care during this uncertainty.

       The remainder of my dissent will focus on responding to the decision of the
majority (including the concurrence) as written, along with my analysis that the 2023
Act and the 2021 Act must have the same meaning, given that their operative terms
are basically identical. Because the 2021 Act was deemed unconstitutional when
viewed as a six-week ban, I would hold that the 2023 Act, enacted only four months
after this Court's decision in Planned Parenthood with essentially the same terms, is
unconstitutional under any reasonable analysis.
                                     I. Overview
       Turning to the issues discussed by the majority, I cannot help but observe at
the start that it has taken the extraordinary step of disregarding this Court's precedent
as it struggles to justify its legally inconsistent result. This not only weakens the
stability and reliance value of the law in this state, but ultimately undermines judicial
independence and the integrity of the Court as an institution.

      Earlier this year, the Court held the 2021 Act violated the right to privacy
under article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution. In doing so, we noted

22
  In Planned Parenthood, I noted that some sources, such as the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, have indicated that the chambers of the heart
and a heartbeat develop when a fetus is at a gestation of seventeen to twenty weeks,
and that at six weeks, a quarter-inch-long embryo has no detectable "heartbeat," as
the "sound" heard is actually manufactured by the ultrasound machine itself. See
Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C. at 222, 882 S.E.2d at 788 (Beatty, C.J., concurring).
that many women do not even know they are pregnant at the earliest stage of
potential "cardiac activity," assuming at that time that it could occur at six weeks of
gestation, as this arguably appeared to be the State's targeted goal. The Court held
this early threshold likely precludes many women from making an informed choice
about their reproductive health and obtaining care within the statutory timeframe.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C. at 195, 882 S.E.2d at 774 (Hearn, J.) ("In
2021, the General Assembly passed the Act, which prohibits an abortion after around
six weeks gestation. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-680 (Supp. 2022). This is before
many women—excluding those who are trying to become pregnant and are therefore
closely monitoring their menstrual cycles—even know they are pregnant."); id. at
221–23, 882 S.E.2d at 788–89 (Beatty, C.J., concurring) ("The number of weeks of
gestation is not specified in the law, but the parties indicate it is their understanding
that the law was intended to target gestation of six weeks or more, based on the idea
that nascent 'cardiac activity' emerges from a small cluster of cells at that time. . . .
As medical experts have explained, at this early stage, a substantial number of
women do not even know that they are pregnant, so there is no realistic opportunity
to make a medical decision as to the (unknown) pregnancy at this point.").

         Justice Few, the third member of the Court's majority in Planned Parenthood,
found the 2021 Act was unconstitutional because the General Assembly did not even
consider if women could make an informed choice about whether to continue a
pregnancy. See id. at 278, 882 S.E.2d at 819 (Few, J., concurring in result)
("[K]nowledge of a pregnancy is a predicate for informed choice. . . . Thus, if a
substantial percentage of pregnant women cannot know of their pregnancy in time
to have meaningful discussions, engage in sufficient deliberation and prayer, and
then make timely arrangements to carry out an abortion, then I cannot envision a
winning argument that meaningful choice exists or that the denial of that choice is
not an unreasonable invasion of privacy." (emphasis added)). He found this
rendered the law arbitrary because, while informed choice was included in the
General Assembly's findings accompanying the 2021 Act, more importantly,
informed choice exists as an inherent component of the constitutional right to
privacy. See id. at 276, 882 S.E.2d at 818 ("Although the Fetal Heartbeat Act
recognizes the interest of 'informed choice,' a woman's interest in choice is not
dependent on this portion of the Act. . . . The article I, section 10 right of privacy
. . . includes choice." (emphasis added)).

      While Justice Few stated he would refrain from formally reaching this point,
he nevertheless conceded that it was "plainly obvious" that the timeframe allotted
was inadequate, and he emphasized that six weeks of gestation as calculated under
the 2021 Act was actually only four weeks post-conception. See id. (stating "it is
important to understand that under the six-week bill, a pregnant woman's choice
must be made—and carried out—within four weeks of the time she becomes
pregnant"); see also id. at 285–86, 882 S.E.2d at 823 ("[B]ecause the General
Assembly did not consider the question, there is nothing for the Court to consider. I
am nevertheless tempted to address whether there could be any evidence to support
such a 'presumed finding' and find the Fetal Heartbeat Act in violation of article I,
section 10 for the additional reason it is impossible for the General Assembly to
reach any conclusion other than a substantial percentage of pregnant women cannot
learn of their pregnancy, have time for sufficient deliberation and prayer, and if the
choice is made to not continue the pregnancy, then carry out an abortion before the
legality of doing so expires under the Act. I am tempted for the obvious reason that
it is plainly obvious a substantial percentage of women cannot learn of their
pregnancy in time to make and carry out a meaningful choice under the Fetal
Heartbeat Act." (emphasis added)).

       In my view, because the material terms of the 2023 Act have not changed
from the 2021 Act, logic and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis dictate that the
2023 Act should likewise be declared unconstitutional. To paraphrase legal
scholars, the decisions of this Court represent the solemn determination of the Court
as an entity, not its members, and this Court remains the same Court, even as its
composition changes. As a result, the Court's decision rendered in January was not
just a decision "for the time being." Rather, it was the considered determination of
this Court after a lengthy deliberative process. This case presents the quintessential
example of why stare decisis must be applied to uphold the integrity of the Judicial
Branch's position as a separate, but co-equal branch of government.
       After this Court's pronouncement, the invalidity of a six-week abortion ban
was no longer an uncertainty in light of the state constitutional right to privacy, and
the Court's decision became precedent in South Carolina. If the Court's decisions
were subject to the vagaries of unending individual opinion, numerous points of
"settled law" could be placed in turmoil from constant reexamination. For these
reasons, stare decisis is a guiding principle that courts have used for centuries to
bring stability to the law.

       The majority and I agree about the separate functions of the three co-equal
branches of government and this Court's role in reviewing the matter. Today,
however, the majority has allowed the legislature to infringe upon this separation of
powers by upholding the resurrection of a ban that this Court has already determined
violates our state constitution. It does so by going to great lengths to reason "[t]he
2023 Act is new legislation" after "the General Assembly went back to the drawing
board." It does so because it must. Otherwise, its rejection of stare decisis falters.
If the acts are the same, our decision in Planned Parenthood must control.

       Our analyses diverge at the outset because we disagree on whether the 2023
Act differs from the 2021 Act. The majority points to changes the General Assembly
made in its supporting findings and purposes, and to the availability of contraception
as a tool for "family planning." As will be explained, in my view, these points do
not alter the material terms of the 2023 Act and their effect. Both the 2021 Act and
the 2023 Act—which bear the same name and ban abortion at exactly the same point
in time—preclude many woman from being able to exercise informed choice over
their reproductive health decisions because the prohibition takes effect before many
women can realistically know that they are pregnant and obtain an abortion. Further,
I strongly disagree with the suggestion by the majority that the availability of
contraception to prevent a pregnancy has any bearing on the amount of time a
pregnant woman has to discover and decide whether to continue a pregnancy, and to
obtain medical care based on that decision. In my view, the notion that the existence
of contraceptives expands the time for a woman to discover that she is pregnant is
absurd. I seriously doubt that the legislature intended contraceptives to be viewed
in that context.

       The ban that was declared unconstitutional by this Court just months before
has not changed in its core elements or intended effect. What has changed, however,
is this Court's response. What was once acknowledged in Planned Parenthood to
be "plainly obvious"—that a ban at such an early stage of pregnancy can often leave
women with no choice at all—is now suddenly constitutional. The disregard of
precedent and the reluctance to acknowledge what is still "plainly obvious" is
unfortunate for the rule of law and, ultimately, the citizens of South Carolina, who
must navigate the changing legal landscape that is controlling access to reproductive
health care in this state. It also undermines the separation of powers by failing to
undertake this Court's obligation to evaluate whether the determinations of the
General Assembly, once made, are reasonable. I conclude, consistent with Planned
Parenthood, that they are not, and the 2023 Act violates the constitutional right to
privacy.

       I am convinced of the appropriateness of my conclusion after considering
(1) the doctrine of stare decisis, and (2) the inconsistency of today's result in view of
the lack of change in the material terms of the 2023 Act and state precedent
recognizing the right to privacy and bodily autonomy. I will examine each of these
points in turn.
                                  II. Stare Decisis
       "Stare decisis"—translated from Latin in the 18th Century as "to stand by
things decided"—refers to "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must
follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." Stare
Decisis, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Thus, when a competent court
decides a point, "it will no longer be considered as open to examination or to a new
ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its adjudications,
unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases." Id. (quoting William M.
Lile et al., Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 321 (Roger W. Cooley & Charles
Lesley Ames eds., 3d ed. 1914)).

       This judicial principle predates the formation of the United States. "The
doctrine of stare decisis in American jurisprudence has its roots in eighteenth-
century English common law." Cong. Rsch. Serv., ArtIII.S1.7.2.1 Historical
Background on Stare Decisis Doctrine, Constitution Annotated [hereinafter,
Constitution Annotated], https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S1-
5-1/ALDE_00001187/#ALDF_00021141 (last visited Aug. 14, 2023). More than a
century ago, this Court cited an example from English law that recognized the need
for judicial consistency:
             Lord Kenyon, in Schumann [v. Weatherhead (1801), 1
             East 537, 541 (U.K.)], said, "I should be sorry to see one
             decision in 1798, and a different decision on the same facts
             in 1801."

Gage v. City of Charleston, 3 S.C. 491, 497 (1872).

       A fundamental aspect of stare decisis is that, not only should a court apply the
law consistently in subsequent cases before the same members, but it should also
apply the law consistently even as its own composition changes. In 1912, Henry
Campbell Black, the author of Black's Law Dictionary and other notable works,
explained that a court's decision is not the view "for the time being," as the authority
of a decision stems from the fact that it is the judgment of the court as an entity, and
this fact does not change, even when its members do:
             For, when considered as a precedent, it is not an
             expression of the individual views of the judges for the
             time being, which their successors may or may not share,
             but its authority is derived from the fact that it is the
             judgment of the court, which has not changed, though its
             members have.

Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents 190 (1912)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 189 ("Although the membership of a court may
change from time to time, by the appointment or election of new judges in place of
those who leave the bench, yet it remains the same court." (emphasis added)).

       Once a court has announced its decision, the law on that point is no longer
uncertain. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765).
Accordingly, the determination—even a close one—should not thereafter "waver
with every new judge's opinion" because a new judge is "sworn to determine, not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs
of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
old one." Id.

       A century ago, Judge (later Supreme Court Justice) Cardozo stated "adherence
to precedent should be the rule and not the exception." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 148 (1921). He observed that "the labor of judges
would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the
secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." Id.

       Despite the historical significance of this doctrine, today's majority resists the
application of stare decisis based on its contentions the 2023 Act is completely new
because the General Assembly has made statutory changes to remedy the
constitutional defects present in the 2021 Act, the doctrine of stare decisis has less
force in cases involving constitutional questions than in those involving statutory
interpretation, and stare decisis cannot be applied based on only one case (i.e.,
Planned Parenthood).

       As will be explored more fully in the next section examining the specific terms
of the 2023 Act, I have no doubt that the 2023 Act is virtually identical in all material
respects to the 2021 Act. This Court has previously held that it will not reconsider
its precedent when there has been a later statutory change, but the substance of the
statute is essentially the same, as the law should not be a "moving target." See Wehle
v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 363 S.C. 394, 402, 611 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2005). This reasoning
should apply in the current matter because the 2023 Act has not fundamentally
changed in its essential element—the imposition of a ban on abortion upon the
detection of a "fetal heartbeat," as that term is statutorily defined.
       To the extent the majority contends stare decisis has less force in
constitutional cases, I note this position is, relatively speaking, a more recent
expression of stare decisis that was created by the Supreme Court for the federal
courts. It does not support a conclusion that stare decisis has no force in
constitutional matters. It should also be of interest to advocates of originalism that
this apparently was not the view of our nation's founders. The Congressional
Research Service, which for over a hundred years has published a comprehensive,
government-sanctioned record of the interpretations of the United States
Constitution and provided research for Congress and the public, has indicated "the
'notion that the constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent affects its
susceptibility to reversal was largely rejected in the founding era and did not gain
majority support until well into the twentieth century.'" See Constitution Annotated,
supra, ArtIII.S1.7.2.2 Stare Decisis Generally n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to
the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 735 (1999)),
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S1-7-2-
2/ALDE_00013237/#essay-8 (last visited Aug. 14, 2023).

       In addition, it is notable that one of the earliest invocations of the sentiment
by this Court (regarding the weaker force of stare decisis in constitutional cases)
involved a departure from constitutional precedent in order to expand upon—not
restrict—a personal liberty interest. For example, in a 1908 case this Court
concluded stare decisis had less force because the challenged law "attempts to
deprive the citizen of one of the personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of
the state":

             We shall not discuss at length the doctrine of stare decisis.
             It seems obvious it has less force when the constitutional
             rights of the citizen to his personal liberty are involved
             than in those cases involving the fixedness of property
             rights and the regularity of procedure. With the
             profoundest respect for the judges who delivered and
             concurred in these opinions, we cannot avoid the
             conclusion that the statute in question provides for
             imprisonment for debt without proof of fraud, and
             therefore, attempts to deprive the citizen of one of the
             personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the state.

Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 13–14, 60 S.E. 19, 21 (1908) (emphasis added).
       The 2023 Act that is now before the Court involves the statutory restriction
of a pregnant woman's right to make her own reproductive health decisions and have
control over her own bodily integrity at an early stage of pregnancy. Accordingly, I
believe stare decisis should carry great weight because its application would prevent
the deprivation of a personal right guaranteed by the South Carolina Constitution—
the right to privacy.

       Stare decisis undoubtedly remains a foundational component of American
jurisprudence to prevent arbitrariness and to ensure the steady and evenhanded
application of the law. Despite the Supreme Court's overruling of federal abortion
precedent in Dobbs, a researcher using data compiled by the Congressional Research
Service has concluded "that the Supreme Court has overturned constitutional
precedent in 0.005% of its decisions—an infinitely small or infrequent amount of
the time." David Schultz, Constitutional Precedent in US Supreme Court Reasoning
22 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2022). This conclusion was based on comparing the
over 26,000 judgments and opinions issued by the Supreme Court during its
existence to the slightly over 140 Supreme Court decisions overruling its own
constitutional precedent, as identified by the Congressional Research Service
through 2018, which was then updated by the author (Schultz) through 2020. Id. at
21–22. Accordingly, it is clear that, for most of the Supreme Court's existence, it
rarely rejected stare decisis in constitutional cases, having done so in less than one-
half of one percent of its cases over more than two centuries.

       The strength and value of stare decisis, even in constitutional cases involving
abortion, was expressly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court's Chief Justice as recently
as 2020 in a concurring opinion for June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S.
Ct. 2103 (2020). Chief Justice Roberts noted that four years prior, he had dissented
from an opinion, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016), in
which the majority concluded that a Texas law governing a physician's admitting
privileges resulted in a substantial obstacle to women seeking an abortion and
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice
stated the Court was now faced with the same statute in Louisiana and was,
consistent with precedent, likewise concluding the Louisiana statute was
unconstitutional. The Chief Justice stated that, while he still stood by the views in
his prior dissent, he was, nevertheless, voting to concur with the majority's
determination in Russo to strike down the Louisiana statute based on the doctrine of
stare decisis. In explaining his duty to uphold existing precedent, Justice Roberts
stated:
             The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent
             special circumstances, to treat like cases alike. The
             Louisiana law imposes a burden on access to abortion just
             as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same
             reasons. Therefore Louisiana's law cannot stand under our
             precedents.

Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Russo was ultimately one of
the decisions abrogated by Dobbs. The abandonment of federal precedent by the
Supreme Court in Dobbs, and the responses of some state legislatures and state
courts, have had an enormous adverse impact on the reliance interests people have
placed upon that precedent for nearly half a century. This includes not only pregnant
women, but also their families and their doctors, as well as lawyers and state
institutions.

       In addition, federal courts rely upon a state court's determination of the
constitutionality of a state statute, even if they have reached a different conclusion
under federal law regarding similar provisions. See Black's Handbook, supra, at 552
("The construction placed upon any clause or provision of the constitution of a state,
by the highest court of that state, will be accepted as binding and conclusive by the
federal courts, save only in so far as questions of federal law may be involved."). "It
matters not that the federal courts have already reached entirely different conclusions
in construing language of a similar or identical import in the federal constitution or
laws." Id. at 553. "The final decision as to the meaning of the state constitution rests
with the state courts." Id. Accordingly, the meaning of South Carolina's
constitutional privacy clause rests solely with this Court. It is not controlled by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs or by any federal court.23

23
   In overruling Roe, the Supreme Court concluded the authority to regulate or
prohibit abortion was being returned "to the people and their elected
representatives." Dobbs, 142 U.S. at 2284 (emphasis added). In 2022, six states
added ballot initiatives where "the people" could vote to either uphold or restrict
access to reproductive care, including abortion. In all six states—California, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, and Vermont—the voters supported abortion access,
either by approving measures that expressly recognized a constitutional right to
abortion, or by rejecting proposals to constitutionally restrict the right to abortion.
Additional states are planning similar ballot measures in 2023 and 2024. See
Ballotpedia,     2023     and     2024     Abortion-Related       Ballot     Measures,
https://ballotpedia.org/2023_and_2024_abortion-related_ballot_measures            (last
visited Aug. 14, 2023). As of the date of this opinion in 2023, however, there are no
       Lastly, I am not persuaded by the majority's contention that Planned
Parenthood is a singular decision and this justifies the rejection of stare decisis,
based on the Court's comments in the unrelated case of McLeod. See McLeod v.
Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 654, 723 S.E.2d 198, 203 (2012) (stating "stare decisis is far
more a respect for a body of decisions as opposed to a single case standing alone").
While the majority focuses on the sentence quoted above, it is instructive that the
McLeod Court further explained: "That is not to say that a single case garners no
protection from stare decisis, for even in those circumstances we should hesitate to
revisit and reverse our decisions without good cause to do so." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, a single decision is certainly precedential, and even one decision can be
afforded respect under the doctrine of stare decisis. In fact, one of the cornerstone
decisions of United States law, Marbury v. Madison, maintained its continuing
influence under stare decisis despite the fact that it was, for many years, a single
decision.24

       In any event, the Court's determination that the state constitutional right to
privacy extends beyond the search and seizure context and includes a person's right
to bodily integrity and control over medical decisions is not a new concept limited
to one decision, i.e., Planned Parenthood. It has been the law in this state for
decades. For example, thirty years ago, in Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 89–90,
437 S.E.2d 53, 61–62 (1993), this Court recognized that an inmate has a
constitutional right to privacy to be free from unwarranted medical intrusions, and
we held the forced medication of an inmate to facilitate an execution would violate
an inmate's right to privacy. In doing so, we agreed with the sentiment expressed by
a Louisiana court that interpreted a similarly worded provision and concluded "the
right to decide what is to be done medically with one's brain and body" was

plans for South Carolina voters to be given an opportunity to vote directly on the
subject of abortion access, as envisioned in Dobbs.
24
   See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding federal laws that conflict
with the United States Constitution are invalid and establishing the principle of
judicial review); see also Joseph Fawbush, Marbury v. Madison Case Summary:
What You Need to Know, FindLaw, https://supreme.findlaw.com/supreme-court-
insights/marbury-v--madison-case-summary--what-you-need-to-
know.html#Impact (last visited Aug. 14, 2023) (noting Marbury became a
cornerstone of United States law even though it was not actually cited by the
Supreme Court for the principle of judicial review and used to strike down an
unconstitutional law until many years later, in 1895).
encompassed in that state's constitutional right to privacy. See id. at 88, 437 S.E.2d
at 60 (quoting State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992)).
       In Planned Parenthood, this Court reiterated the holding in Singleton
regarding the meaning of the right to privacy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 438
S.C. at 205, 882 S.E.2d at 779 (Hearn, J.) ("Respondents' position to limit the reach
of the constitutional right to privacy to the criminal arena of search and seizure is
also contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court. We have found that the right to
privacy may be implicated in many ways, from requiring a witness to divulge
medical information during a criminal trial to forcing a convicted felon to take
medication so that he may be competent enough to be executed."); id. at 259, 882
S.E.2d at 808 (Few, J., concurring in result) ("The State argues our 'unreasonable
invasions of privacy' provision should be limited to search and seizure cases and to
electronic surveillance, and thus is inapplicable in this case. I disagree. . . . [T]he
word 'privacy'—though broad—is clear as to its scope: it includes all forms of
privacy. When a constitutional provision is clear, we must discern the intent behind
the provision only from its text, and should not resort to other evidence of intent.").

       Notably, today's majority also concludes the state constitutional right to
privacy is not restricted to only a narrow class of search and seizure issues, so stare
decisis is respected as to that particular point. However, the majority goes to great
pains to search for explicit references to "abortion" in the state constitution and,
finding none, declares the right to privacy cannot exist for a medical decision if it
involves abortion. As this Court recognized decades ago, however, it is the general
concept of "privacy" that is expressly guaranteed. The constitution does not list all
subjects for which privacy is afforded, but how would this ever be possible? The
constitution is a short document outlining broad concepts concerning the structure
of state government. It serves as a general roadmap for future guidance and must be
supplemented with other provisions, such as statutory laws and local ordinances. It
does not provide the exhaustive detail of a tax code.

       As the Court explained in Planned Parenthood, in reaching the decision in
Singleton, the Court "did not ask whether our constitution specifically prohibited
forced medication of an inmate in order to carry out an execution." Planned
Parenthood, 438 S.C. at 206, 882 S.E.2d at 780 (Hearn, J.). We observed: "Just as
the [privacy] provision does not specifically refer to abortion, neither does it mention
forcing medication on an inmate." Id. In my view, the majority's discussion
regarding its failure to "find" abortion in the constitution is specious. It is more a
function of the majority's desire to avoid the result in Planned Parenthood than a
true analysis of the extent of privacy afforded by our state constitution.

       Furthermore, for nearly fifty years, there has actually been two bodies of
precedent that intersected on the issue of abortion, the law of this state and the law
of the United States, both of which protected a woman's right to make an informed
choice as to pregnancy. Significant reliance interests were placed on those bodies
of precedent. Those interests have continued with this Court's decision in Planned
Parenthood upholding, under state law, a woman's right to privacy and to control
her own reproductive health decisions at the early stages of her pregnancy.
Consequently, there is more than just a single decision on this topic, even if there is
only one decision from this Court regarding the interplay of the state constitutional
right to privacy and the 2021 Act. As previously noted, South Carolina's right to
privacy is not affected by the outcome in Dobbs, as federal law is not controlling of
our Court's determinations regarding a state constitutional right.

                                 III. The 2023 Act

       I turn now to my last point of divergence from the majority—it is also the
most crucial to my conclusion the 2023 Act is unconstitutional—my determination
that the material terms of the 2023 Act are virtually identical to the those in the
unconstitutional 2021 Act. For convenience, the material terms of the 2023 Act and
the 2021 Act are outlined below:

 2023 ACT                                   2021 ACT

                                            The 2021 Act prohibited an abortion
 The 2023 Act prohibits an abortion         upon a pregnant woman if a "fetal
 upon a pregnant woman "if the unborn       heartbeat has been detected" in a
 child's fetal heartbeat has been           "human fetus," with limited exceptions.
 detected," with limited exceptions.        S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-680(A) (Supp.
 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-630(B) (West        2022).
 2023).

 "Unborn child" is defined as "an           "Human fetus" or "unborn child"
 individual organism of the species         was defined as "each mean[ing] an
 homo sapiens from conception until live    individual organism of the species
 birth." Id. § 44-41-610(14).               homo sapiens from fertilization until
                                            live birth." Id. § 44-41-610(6).
 "Conception" is defined as the "Conception"               was    defined            as
 "fertilization of an ovum by sperm." "fertilization." Id. § 44-41-610(1).
 Id. § 44-41-610(3).

 "Fetal heartbeat" is defined as             "Fetal heartbeat" was defined as
 "cardiac activity, or the steady and        "cardiac activity, or the steady and
 repetitive rhythmic contraction of the      repetitive rhythmic contraction of the
 fetal heart, within the gestational sac."   fetal heart, within the gestational sac."
 Id. § 44-41-610(6).                         Id. § 44-41-610(3).

 "Gestational sac" is defined as "the        "Gestational sac" was defined as "the
 structure     that     comprises      the   structure     that     comprises      the
 extraembryonic       membranes       that   extraembryonic       membranes       that
 envelop the unborn child and that is        envelop the human fetus and that is
 typically visible by ultrasound after the   typically visible by ultrasound after the
 fourth week of pregnancy. Id. § 44-41-      fourth week of pregnancy. Id. § 44-41-
 610(8).                                     610(5).

 "Gestational age" is defined as "the        "Gestational age" was defined as "the
 age of an unborn child as calculated        age of an unborn human individual as
 from the first day of the last menstrual    calculated from the first day of the last
 period [LMP] of a pregnant woman."          menstrual period [LMP] of a pregnant
 Id. § 44-41-610(7).                         woman." Id. § 44-41-610(4).

       As can be seen from the foregoing comparison, the material terms of the 2023
Act and the 2021 Act are virtually identical. They both impose an abortion ban upon
the detection of "cardiac activity, or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction
of the fetal heart, within the gestational sac." As discussed in this Court's decision
finding the 2021 Act unconstitutional, although the number of weeks gestation is not
specified, this operative provision has been variously described as a "fetal heartbeat"
law (as appears in the title of the legislation) or, more informally, a six-week abortion
ban (which has been the perceived effect). The premise of the legislation, however,
is factually and medically inaccurate. A fetal heart has not yet developed at six
weeks LMP and the organism is not yet a fetus; rather, it is classified as an embryo.
When pregnancy is measured using the LMP date (as provided in the statutory
definition of "gestational age"), it is important to understand that this date is
calculated from a point that is usually approximately two weeks before a woman is
actually pregnant. As a result, six weeks LMP is only about four weeks of actual
embryonic development, as the Court previously recognized in Planned
Parenthood.25

       Changes in the wording of other key terms of the 2021 Act are
inconsequential. For example, although the majority emphasizes that the State now
has an interest in an unborn child from conception because the 2023 Act defines an
unborn child "from conception until live birth," whereas the 2021 Act referred to an
unborn child "from fertilization until live birth," this is a distinction without a
difference. Both the 2023 Act and the 2021 Act expressly define "conception" to
mean the same as "fertilization." Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-610(3) (West
2023) (2023 version) with S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-610(1) (Supp. 2022) (2021
version). As a result, any change in this regard is one of phrasing only, not meaning.

       Essentially, the majority characterizes the 2023 Act as "new" legislation and
maintains it is cured of any constitutional defect present in the 2021 Act because it
contains different findings and purposes. For example, the 2023 Act does not
include finding eight that accompanied the 2021 Act regarding "informed choice."26
In Planned Parenthood, the Court observed that a six-week ban can deprive pregnant
women of an opportunity to exercise "informed choice" because there is insufficient
time to discover a pregnancy, assess and weigh the options, consult with a partner
and family, decide whether to continue a pregnancy, schedule an appointment,
comply with the statutory waiting period, and obtain an abortion. As several
members of the Court specifically noted, this window is substantially shortened by
the fact that all of these actions must actually occur within four weeks of conception,

25
  Planned Parenthood correctly points out that it is standard medical practice to date
pregnancy using "gestational age," which is the number of weeks and days since the
patient's LMP. Both the 2023 Act and the 2021 Act use LMP and "gestational age"
in calculating the date of a pregnancy. Dating a pregnancy from LMP is
distinguishable, however, from using the date of fertilization or conception. The
LMP date is also distinguishable from the date of implantation, which is when a
pregnancy actually begins from a medical point of view.
26
  See 2021 S.C. Acts 2, 3 § 2(8) (finding that, "in order to make an informed choice
about whether to continue a pregnancy, a pregnant woman has a legitimate interest
in knowing the likelihood of the human fetus surviving to full-term birth based upon
the presence of a fetal heartbeat" (emphasis added)).
not six. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C. at 222, 882 S.E.2d at 788 (Beatty,
C.J., concurring) ("A pregnancy that is at six weeks gestational age (counted from
the first date of the LMP) is actually at an embryonic age of only four weeks of
development (counted from the date of conception).").

      These circumstances have not changed since the opinion was published in
January 2023. Although the General Assembly has removed finding eight
accompanying the 2021 Act—that women are entitled to make an "informed choice"
about pregnancy—the removal of this collateral finding should not alter this Court's
analysis or its ultimate conclusion.

        As an initial matter, I note the majority's reasoning about "informed choice"
is primarily directed at the first step in this judgment process, i.e., when a woman
can discover she is pregnant. As I will explain in the context of another point to
follow, I disagree with its premise in this regard. However, even if I agreed, this
point would not cure the lack of informed choice that makes the timing of the ban
unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional because the discovery of a pregnancy
is just one of the many steps that necessarily must occur before six weeks LMP (or
four weeks post-conception) elapses.

       In addition, the legislative finding regarding "informed choice" was not
actually codified as part of the 2021 Act, and the majority's result in Planned
Parenthood was not based on this finding. See Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C. at
274 n.56, 882 S.E.2d at 817 n.56 (Few, J., concurring in result) ("The legislative
findings section of the 2021 six-week bill was not codified . . . .").     As Justice
Few and the rest of the majority recognized, informed choice is not dependent on
the legislative finding because it exists as an inherent factor in the constitutional
right to privacy. Consequently, the removal of the uncodified finding in the 2021
Act is not determinative. See id. at 276, 882 S.E.2d at 818 ("Although the Fetal
Heartbeat Act recognizes the interest of 'informed choice,' a woman's interest in
choice is not dependent on this portion of the Act. The choice of whether to continue
a pregnancy or to have an abortion is an inherently private matter that implicates
article I, section 10. The General Assembly's codification [i.e., inclusion] of
'informed choice' as an interest to be valued here simply recognizes this obvious fact
that abortion is a private choice. The article I, section 10 right of privacy, therefore,
in this context, includes choice." (emphasis added)). I agree with Justice Few's
original reasoning in this respect. Bodily autonomy does not depend on the General
Assembly's findings. That protection is enshrined in the South Carolina
Constitution.
       Moreover, legislative findings are not law, and this Court may review them to
determine if they are erroneous. See generally Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153,
161, 217 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1975) (stating that, while legislative findings on an issue are
entitled to weight, they are not conclusive); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C.
538, 560–61, 88 S.E.2d 683, 694 (1955) (stating legislative findings of fact are not
binding on a court and are subject to judicial review, and a court may consider
extrinsic evidence for this purpose, but a statute will not be held unconstitutional
unless such legislative findings are clearly erroneous). Cf. Redevelopment Comm'n
of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Greensboro, 114 S.E.2d 688, 700 (N.C. 1960)
(stating while legislative findings and declarations of policy are entitled to weight,
they "have no magical quality to make valid that which is invalid, and are subject to
judicial review").

       The majority next relies on what it describes as the General Assembly's "new"
and improved balancing of the interests of the pregnant woman and the embryo,
along with a "new" focus on contraceptives for "family planning." In doing so, the
majority asserts at the outset that the General Assembly "had placed weight on the
fact that a woman could learn of her pregnancy within seven to fourteen days of
conception and would have several weeks after that to make her decision and have
an abortion if she so chose," relying not on any specific evidence or findings by the
General Assembly, but on comments contained in the South Carolina Senate Journal
regarding Senate Bill 474. In my view, the majority's acceptance of the General
Assembly's belief that a woman can discover a pregnancy (and secure an abortion)
within the statutory period is unreasonable, particularly where the General Assembly
has made no actual findings in this regard and, to the extent the General Assembly
has made what could be characterized as implied findings, they are inaccurate.

       As the concurring opinion by Justice Few acknowledges, these are implied
findings because they form no part of the 2023 Act. Further, although Justice Few
has signed on to the majority's disposition, he also readily acknowledges that the
implied findings relied on by the majority are incorrect. Justice Few quotes the
General Assembly's comments reported in the Senate Journal ("That means that a
woman can find out that she is pregnant two weeks after conception and has another
4 1/2 to 5 weeks to make her decision and have an abortion.") and notes: "These
numbers are incorrect, presumably because the calculations that led to them were
based on the date of the [LMP] rather than the date of fertilization." See Concurring
Op. at n.17.

      I agree with his assessment of the inaccuracy of the General Assembly's
timeline, although I disagree with his conclusion that sufficient time nevertheless
exists for informed choice. There is no factual data to support a determination that
most women should learn of a pregnancy within seven to fourteen days of conception
and would then have up to five weeks to decide whether to continue a pregnancy.
The General Assembly's implied finding in this regard is neither accurate nor
reasonable, and it presumes women should be constantly undertaking pregnancy
testing throughout their reproductive years. As discussed in Planned Parenthood,
unless they are constantly testing themselves in an effort to become pregnant, many
women do not even know they are pregnant until their menstrual cycle is late (which
can be five weeks LMP or more). Even women who are constantly monitoring their
status in an effort to become pregnant are not usually keeping up this level of
vigilance throughout the entirety of their reproductive years. Rather, it is a specific
endeavor that is normally undertaken over a much more defined time. Blindly
accepting an assertion that women should know they are pregnant within seven to
fourteen days after conception imposes an inordinate financial and emotional burden
on women to constantly test themselves, theoretically after any act of sexual
intercourse, even before they have any objective indicia of a pregnancy. It does not
give any true consideration to balancing the interests of women when analyzing
when they should be able to know of a pregnancy.

       In addition, I note the State's arguments to this Court in support of the 2023
Act are based, at least in part, on the misapprehension of data from the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") regarding
abortion rates. This misapprehension stems from the fact that there are different
methods for dating a pregnancy. The 2023 Act, like the 2021 Act, uses LMP to
calculate "gestational age." As Justice Few explained in his concurrence in Planned
Parenthood, the DHEC data reports the number of abortions beginning at six weeks
post-fertilization, not six weeks LMP. As a result, the DHEC data the State cites
regarding abortion rates at "six weeks" is not at six weeks LMP. Rather, it is the
equivalent of eight weeks LMP—some two weeks later, and "approximately two
weeks after the Fetal Heartbeat Act prevents an abortion." See Planned Parenthood,
438 S.C. at 281, 882 S.E.2d at 820 (Few, J., concurring in result). Thus, the
conflation of gestational age based on LMP with age based on the date of fertilization
leads to an almost impossible window for "informed choice" to occur in South
Carolina.

       This is also echoed in the reporting of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC"), which compiles abortion statistics. Recent figures show that,
in South Carolina, only 22.1 percent of abortions occurred by six weeks of gestation.
See Table 10, Abortion Surveillance -- United States, 2020, CDC (Nov. 25, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/ss/pdfs/ss7110a1-H.pdf.            Accordingly,
existing data demonstrates the overwhelming majority of women (nearly eighty
percent) in South Carolina historically have not been able to obtain an abortion
within this very narrow timeframe.

       To the extent the majority maintains a woman's access to birth control
(including emergency contraception, i.e., "Plan B" pills) to prevent a pregnancy can
somehow increase the time a woman has to know about a pregnancy and make an
"informed choice" about responding to a pregnancy, I find the majority's adherence
to this explanation to be not only illogical, but disingenuous. The majority holds
the General Assembly accounted for "family planning" efforts in analyzing whether
the time provided for informed choice in the 2023 Act was reasonable. Along these
lines, Justice Few states in his concurring opinion that "[t]he most impactful change
from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act . . . [is] the idea of choice in terms of promoting
active family planning." To support this "impactful change," Justice Few quotes
portions of the Attorney General's brief that argue (1) "The timeline for a meaningful
opportunity to make a decision begins prior to pregnancy," and (2) "Her awareness
of the possibility of pregnancy further affords her the opportunity to control her
reproductive health after sexual intercourse by taking a common, over-the-counter
pregnancy test . . . ." Justice Few also opines that the General Assembly (and the
State) have apparently changed the "key" question before the Court to now focus on
family planning efforts to prevent a pregnancy as part of any constitutional analysis,
and he indicates he approves this change in direction of the "key" question.

        I disagree with the notion that the discussion surrounding "family planning"
is a change that has any impact on the constitutionality of the 2023 Act. As I recall,
Justice Few specifically acknowledged in Planned Parenthood that the
constitutional right to privacy contains an inherent requirement of informed choice
that is not dependent on the findings of the General Assembly, and the fundamental
question before the Court was whether a woman has the ability to make an informed
choice about "whether to continue a pregnancy." See Planned Parenthood, 438 S.C.
at 276, 882 S.E.2d at 818 (Few, J., concurring in result) ("Although the Fetal
Heartbeat Act recognizes the interest of 'informed choice,' a woman's interest in
choice is not dependent on this portion of the Act. The choice of whether to continue
a pregnancy or to have an abortion is an inherently private matter that implicates
article I, section 10.").

      That is still the question before this Court. While the General Assembly and
the State are unquestionably entitled to change their arguments in support of the
current legislation, that does not change this Court's focus on the issues that do
impact whether the General Assembly's determinations are reasonable, as well as
ultimately whether the 2023 Act constitutes an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
That being the case, how does the use of birth control have any bearing on when
someone discovers an actual pregnancy and the time for deciding whether to
continue a pregnancy? Any suggestion that the General Assembly can somehow
alter the constitutional analysis of this Court simply by changing its assertions as to
what it believes is reasonable is baseless.

      The consideration of contraception illustrates how far afield the majority has
gone in attempting to justify the impossible timeline that it advocates here. This
Court has no factual information or record to justify the determination that the use
of contraceptives increases the time to respond to a pregnancy. When we accepted
original jurisdiction, we removed the case from the usual litigation process, and this
Court has entertained no factual development of the record and instead relies on an
unfounded and illogical premise.

       Moreover, the implication is that women are solely responsible for a couple's
unexpected pregnancy, possibly due to the lack of birth control. But what about
situations where birth control fails? Or situations where someone does not have
regular access to birth control due to circumstances beyond their control, such as a
lack of insurance, low income, or an absence of nearby medical facilities? The
financial and emotional burdens of repetitive pregnancy testing before a woman
even has any reason to suspect a pregnancy, and the adverse effects from the use of
hormonal contraceptives, such as Plan B, that are used before a woman can even
know that she is pregnant (because it prevents implantation of the fertilized egg) are
burdens that a woman will be forced to endure throughout her reproductive years. I
believe the 2023 Act, by imposing its extreme deadline for compliance, fails to
afford due consideration to these points when balancing the interests of women in
this analysis.

      In my view, the General Assembly's consideration of contraception and
"family planning" clearly does not expand the time a woman has to decide whether
to continue a pregnancy. 27 Further, the presence of birth control, as a general factor,

27
   I believe it is arguable that the use of contraceptives could in some cases shorten
the time available for a woman to discover a pregnancy. The use of contraceptives
could falsely lull a woman into thinking there is a lessened likelihood of pregnancy,
so she might not be as diligent with testing before she has any physical symptoms of
a pregnancy. In addition, the use of some hormonal contraceptives can make women
have variations in their menstrual cycles or in their fertility, which can interfere with
both how quickly a woman can become pregnant and how quickly she may realize
existed at the time the 2021 Act was deemed unconstitutional, so it does not present
a new or material change that would impact this Court's analysis regarding the right
to privacy.

       The majority rightly considers both the State's interests in regulating abortion
and a pregnant woman's right to bodily autonomy. I agree that, "at a certain point in
the pregnancy, a woman's interest in autonomy and privacy does not outweigh the
interest of the [fetus] to live." Yet, because the material aspects of the two acts are
the same, the line is drawn at exactly the same place—ostensibly, six weeks, or
whenever a "fetal heartbeat" is detected. For this reason, the 2023 Act constitutes
an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Our Court's role under Article V of the South
Carolina Constitution does not require this Court to accept the findings or reasoning
of the General Assembly as conclusive. In this case, the implied findings and policy
choices of the General Assembly do not absolve the 2023 Act of its constitutional
defects. Neither should the majority.

       For all of the foregoing reasons, I firmly believe the State has shown no
material differences in the key terms and the core application of the 2023 Act, and it
suffers from the same infirmities that rendered the 2021 Act unconstitutional.

                                   IV. Conclusion

       I agree with the majority that, "[a]s judges, our solemn duty is to uphold the
rule of law." Today, however, the majority has abandoned the precedent established
just months earlier by this Court and, despite its insistence otherwise, has turned a
blind eye to the obvious fact that the 2021 Act and the 2023 Act are the same. The
result will essentially force an untold number of affected women to give birth
without their consent. I am hard-pressed to think of a greater governmental intrusion
by a political body. This outcome is not an affirmation of the separation of powers,
as the majority declares, but an abdication of this Court's duty to ascertain the
constitutionality of the challenged legislation. Although today's decision has
impaired our role as an independent and co-equal branch of government, I am
confident that we will quickly return to the question again. The majority itself
predicts this by noting it is leaving "for another day . . . the meaning of 'fetal
heartbeat' and whether the statutory definition . . . refers to one period of time during
a pregnancy or two separate periods of time." In the absence of this critical
determination, I fail to see how the majority's result today is legally justifiable.

that she is pregnant compared to women whose cycles are regular.
While the majority makes much of the General Assembly's "plenary" power, I agree
with the observation in the concurrence that, "[w]hen the General Assembly enacts
legislation that violates the constitution, it has exceeded its 'plenary' power," and it
is this Court's duty to say so. Unfortunately, this is such an instance.28

       As previously noted, the fear of legislative reprisal is palpable. The lack of
judicial independence renders a court powerless and places it on the edge of a
slippery slope to irrelevance.

28
  Our system of government is not limited to elected officials. All South Carolinians
have a continued role to play in these political and constitutional questions. That
has not changed, and will not change, despite the Court's opinion today.