Court Opinion

ID: 9961981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 12:01:53.058945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:37.544073
License: Public Domain

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                            Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

                      CECIL GRANT v. COMMISSIONER
                             OF CORRECTION
                                (AC 45569)
                              Prescott, Cradle and Suarez, Js.*

                                           Syllabus

         The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of conspiracy to
            commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the
            first degree and assault in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas
            corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, C, had
            provided ineffective assistance by failing to present testimony from
            potential alibi witnesses and an expert in eyewitness identification evi-
            dence, as well as by failing to investigate certain cell phone records.
            The petitioner and N had been at D’s apartment, where the petitioner,
            who was armed with a revolver, used D’s cell phone at about midnight
            to order a pizza delivery. The victim, the delivery driver, called the
            phone number on the order slip and was given directions to D’s apart-
            ment. When the victim arrived, she was met outside by N and the
            petitioner, who brandished the revolver and shot at her as she tried to
            drive away. D and the victim identified photos of the petitioner and N
            from photographic arrays they were shown by the police. At the petition-
            er’s criminal trial, conflicting evidence was presented as to whether the
            petitioner had used D’s phone to order pizza. C presented an alibi defense
            that was based on the testimony of the petitioner and V, who stated
            that V and her two children had driven the petitioner to his home and
            dropped him off there about one hour prior to the attempted robbery
            and shooting of the victim. This court upheld the petitioner’s conviction
            on direct appeal. At the habeas trial, C testified that she did not present
            testimony from an eyewitness identification expert because the available
            science behind the reliability of such evidence at the time of the criminal
            trial was relatively new, and the testimony of such an expert would
            typically not have been admissible at trial. C also testified that she did
            not investigate D’s cell phone records because she already had evidence
            that his phone had been used to call the pizza establishment, and she
            feared that the phone records might contain information that would be
            harmful to the defense. C further stated that she did not investigate V’s
            children as potential alibi witnesses because they would have provided
            the same evidence as did V and that calling minors to testify could have
            a potential negative impact on the jury. The habeas court rendered
            judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on
            the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held:

           * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
         the date of oral argument.
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                          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction
       1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his right to due process
            was violated because the eyewitness identification evidence presented at
            his criminal trial was not reliable and the jury instructions on eyewitness
            identification testimony were inadequate:
           a. The habeas court did not err in rejecting the petitioner’s challenge to
           the eyewitness identification evidence, which this court had rejected in
           his direct appeal from his conviction; the petitioner’s claim pertaining
           to that evidence was not a freestanding due process claim but, rather,
           was based exclusively on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and,
           although the petitioner contended that those claims were inextricably
           intertwined because C had failed to create or preserve a record showing
           that the eyewitness identification evidence was unreliable and unduly
           suggestive, the petitioner failed to articulate any distinction between his
           due process claim and his ineffective assistance claim.
           b. This court was unable to review the petitioner’s claim regarding the
           trial court’s jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence, as
           he failed to challenge the habeas court’s conclusion that his claim was
           procedurally defaulted, which was the basis for the court’s rejection of
           his jury instruction claim.
       2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish
            that C had rendered ineffective assistance:
           a. C’s decision not to consult with or present testimony from an eyewit-
           ness identification expert was reasonable and did not constitute deficient
           performance, as it was not inconsistent with controlling law at the time
           of the petitioner’s criminal trial, which disfavored such testimony as
           invading the province of the jury to evaluate eyewitness testimony and
           held that the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence was within
           the knowledge of jurors, who generally would not be assisted by such
           testimony in considering that evidence.
           b. Although the habeas court erred in determining that C’s decision
           not to investigate D’s cell phone records was sound trial strategy, the
           petitioner did not prove that C’s failure to do so was prejudicial to him,
           as he could not establish that the result of his criminal trial would have
           been more favorable to him had C investigated the records: the petitioner
           overstated the benefit, if any, that may have inured to his defense had
           the phone records been introduced into evidence at his criminal trial,
           as it would be speculative to posit that the records likely would have
           caused the jury to doubt all of D’s testimony, most of which was corrobo-
           rated by the victim, who identified the petitioner and N as having been
           involved in the attempted robbery and assault; moreover, although the
           conflicting evidence as to the phone records may have caused the jury
           to doubt a portion of D’s testimony, the jury reasonably could have
           credited D’s testimony that the petitioner was at the delivery location
           shortly before the attempted robbery and shooting, that the petitioner
           and N were planning to rob a delivery driver and that the petitioner was
           carrying a revolver, all of which the victim’s testimony corroborated
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                            Grant v. Commissioner of Correction
             and none of which the phone records would have directly challenged;
             furthermore, in light of the infirmities in the petitioner’s credibility, it
             was not a foregone conclusion that the jurors would have credited his
             testimony, as he claimed, even if they disbelieved the entirety of D’s
             testimony, as the petitioner’s testimony at his criminal trial that he had
             not previously been involved in gun play was contradicted by his admis-
             sion that he had been shot less than six months prior to the incident at
             issue and had been involved in an armed robbery.
             c. The evidence at the habeas trial supported C’s decision not to present
             V’s teenage children as alibi witnesses at the petitioner’s criminal trial:
             although C should have met with and interviewed the children to deter-
             mine if their testimony would be beneficial, C’s explanation that their
             testimony would have been cumulative of V’s testimony was reinforced
             when V’s daughter testified at the habeas trial, as did V at the criminal
             trial, that she, her brother and V had dropped the petitioner off at his
             home about one hour prior to the shooting; moreover, even if this court
             assumed the veracity of the testimony of V and her daughter, that testi-
             mony did not establish an alibi for the petitioner, as neither V nor her
             daughter could account for his whereabouts at the time the shooting
             occurred, and, based on the testimony of the petitioner, V and V’s daugh-
             ter that it took about fifteen minutes to get to the petitioner’s home
             from the shooting scene, the petitioner could have returned there before
             midnight when the shooting occurred; accordingly, because the testi-
             mony of V’s daughter was, at best, cumulative of V’s testimony, it was
             unlikely that the alibi testimony of V and her daughter would have
             changed the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial.
         3. This court found unavailing the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court
              arbitrarily rejected the testimony of his expert witnesses because it
              provided no rationale as to why it did not consider or analyze their
              testimony in its memorandum of decision denying the habeas petition:
              in the absence of an explicit rejection of the experts’ testimony by the
              habeas court, this court could not conclude that their testimony had
              been rejected or, if it was, that such a rejection was arbitrary; moreover,
              this court presumed that the habeas court properly weighed all the
              evidence in reaching its decision, and the fact that the habeas court
              came to a conclusion that was inconsistent with the experts’ testimony
              did not support the petitioner’s contention that the court arbitrarily
              disregarded that testimony.
                    (One judge concurring in part and dissenting in part)
               Argued September 19, 2023—officially released April 23, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
         of Tolland, where the petition was withdrawn in part;
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       thereafter, the case was tried to the court, M. Murphy,
       J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the peti-
       tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this
       court. Affirmed.
          Evan Parzych, assistant public defender, with whom,
       on the brief, was Katharine S. Goodbody, assistant pub-
       lic defender, for the appellant (petitioner).
          Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
       whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
       attorney, and Donna Fusco, deputy assistant state’s
       attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
         Charles D. Ray and Justyn P. Stokely filed a brief
       for The Innocence Project as amicus curiae.
                                  Opinion

          CRADLE, J. The petitioner, Cecil Grant, appeals fol-
       lowing the granting of his petition for certification to
       appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying
       his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he
       alleged due process violations and ineffective assis-
       tance of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner claims that
       the habeas court improperly (1) concluded that the
       eyewitness identification evidence presented at his
       criminal trial did not violate his due process rights; (2)
       concluded that he had not established that his trial
       counsel was ineffective for having failed to consult with
       or offer the testimony of an eyewitness identification
       expert, for having failed to investigate the issue of
       phone calls the petitioner allegedly made from a wit-
       ness’ cell phone immediately prior to the crime, and
       for having failed to investigate and to present potential
       alibi witness testimony; and (3) declined to credit the
       testimony of two expert witnesses at the habeas trial.
       We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
         The following facts, as set forth by this court in
       upholding the petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal,
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                       Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
         the petitioner’s claims. ‘‘At approximately 10 p.m. on April
         30, 2011, the [petitioner] and two other individuals, Derek
         Newkirk and Mike Anderson, were visiting with Gustin
         Douglas at Douglas’ apartment at . . . Mary Shepard
         Place in Hartford. The [petitioner] and Newkirk told
         Douglas that they needed money, and the group discussed
         restaurants in the area that might have delivery persons
         who retained payments between deliveries. The [peti-
         tioner] used Douglas’ cell phone to order a pizza from
         Pizza 101 on Albany Avenue in Hartford. While waiting
         for the delivery person to arrive, the [petitioner] dis-
         played a revolver, waving it around and passing it
         between himself and Newkirk before putting it into
         the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. Newkirk and the
         [petitioner] went outside to meet the delivery driver;
         Douglas and Anderson remained inside.
            ‘‘At approximately 11 p.m., the victim, a delivery per-
         son for Pizza 101, was dispatched to make a delivery
         to . . . Mary Shepard Place. She initially had trouble
         finding the address. She called the [phone] number indi-
         cated on the order slip, and a man answered and pro-
         vided her with directions. When she arrived at the
         address, the [petitioner] approached the front passen-
         ger door of the victim’s vehicle. Newkirk stood near
         the [petitioner]. Both men’s faces were uncovered and
         clearly visible to the victim. The [petitioner] spoke with
         the victim through the open passenger side window,
         asking her several times if she had change; the victim
         responded each time that she did not. The [petitioner]
         then displayed a revolver, which he placed against the
         passenger door, stating, ‘[W]ell, gimme this.’ Simultane-
         ously, the [petitioner] attempted to open the front pas-
         senger door but was unable to do so.
           ‘‘After seeing the [petitioner] holding the revolver,
         the victim started to drive away, at which time the
         [petitioner] began shooting. Five bullets entered the
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       car, striking the victim in the neck, chin, shoulder and
       arm. Because Mary Shepard Place is a dead-end street,
       the victim had to turn her vehicle around and pass by
       the [petitioner] and Newkirk in order to get away. The
       victim drove herself to a hospital. The [petitioner] and
       Newkirk returned to Douglas’ apartment. Douglas, who
       had heard the gunshots, observed that the [petitioner]
       and Newkirk were acting ‘[l]ike they were nervous’
       when they returned, but he did not discuss with them
       what had happened outside.
          ‘‘The police were dispatched to the hospital, where
       they photographed and secured the victim’s vehicle. A
       detective later interviewed the victim about the shoot-
       ing. The victim described her shooter as a black male
       of light to medium complexion, short hair, skinny build,
       five feet, six inches tall, between sixteen and seventeen
       years old, wearing jeans and a black hooded sweatshirt
       over a shirt with a design on it. The police investigated
       the cell phone number that the victim had called to
       obtain directions prior to the shooting, which eventually
       led them to speak with Douglas. Douglas provided the
       police with details about his interactions with the [peti-
       tioner] and Newkirk on the night of the shooting, which
       led the police to consider them as suspects. Douglas
       also identified photographs of the [petitioner] and
       Newkirk in police photographic arrays. The police later
       asked the victim to look at photographic arrays, from
       which the victim was able to identify both the [peti-
       tioner] and Newkirk.
          ‘‘The [petitioner] was arrested and charged with con-
       spiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt
       to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in
       the first degree. [Following a jury trial on May 14, 15
       and 18, 2012], [t]he jury found the [petitioner] guilty of
       all the charges. [On July 13, 2012], [t]he court . . . sen-
       tenced the [petitioner] to a total effective term of sixty
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                             Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         years of incarceration, suspended after forty years, fol-
         lowed by five years of probation.’’ State v. Grant, 154
         Conn. App. 293, 296–98, 112 A.3d 175 (2014), cert.
         denied, 315 Conn. 928, 109 A.3d 923 (2015). At all times
         during his criminal trial, the petitioner was represented
         by Attorney Kirstin B. Coffin. Thereafter, the petitioner
         appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction. See
         id., 296.
            On August 2, 2019, the petitioner filed his operative
         third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
         this action, claiming that his due process rights had
         been violated because (1) ‘‘the conviction was based
         primarily on eyewitness identification evidence now
         known to be suggestive and/or unreliable . . . [(2)] the
         jury was deprived of information crucial to its ability
         to assess the reliability of the identification made by
         the primary eyewitness, [the victim] . . . [and (3)] the
         jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification was
         scientifically unsound.’’1 He also claimed that his consti-
         tutional right to the effective assistance of counsel had
         been violated because his trial defense counsel ‘‘failed
         to consult with and/or present an eyewitness identifica-
         tion expert’’; ‘‘failed to adequately and properly investi-
         gate the issue of the phone calls made from . . . Doug-
         las’ [phone] on the night of April 30, 2011, to prove or
         disprove the account provided by . . . Douglas’’; and
         ‘‘failed to adequately investigate and/or present wit-
         nesses that confirmed that the petitioner was not at
         . . . Mary Shepard Place during the night of April 30,
         2011, including but not necessarily limited to Vanessa
         . . . Cooper [and her children].’’2
            1
              In his return, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, alleged
         that the petitioner’s claim regarding the jury instruction on eyewitness identi-
         fication was procedurally defaulted. The respondent denied or left the peti-
         tioner to his proof as to all of the remaining allegations of his petition.
            2
              In his third amended petition, the petitioner also claimed that he was
         actually innocent and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
         ‘‘investigate and properly present a third-party culpability defense’’; in failing
         to ‘‘conduct a timely and adequate investigation, including but not limited
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                          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          Following a trial, the habeas court, M. Murphy, J.,
       issued a memorandum of decision dated April 19, 2022,
       in which it rejected all of the petitioner’s claims and
       denied his petition. The habeas court thereafter granted
       the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal to
       this court. Additional facts and procedural history will
       be set forth as necessary.
                                            I
         The petitioner first claims a violation of his right to
       due process under the state and federal constitutions.
       He claims that his right to due process was violated
       because the eyewitness identification evidence pre-
       sented at his criminal trial was obtained through the
       use of unduly suggestive procedures by the police and
       was not reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
       The petitioner also claims that the jury instructions on
       eyewitness identification testimony at trial were ‘‘woe-
       fully inadequate.’’ We address each of these claims in
       turn.
                                            A
          The petitioner first claims that his right to due process
       was violated because the eyewitness identification evi-
       dence presented at his criminal trial was obtained by
       unduly suggestive procedures and was not reliable
       under the totality of the circumstances. Specifically,
       the petitioner argues that ‘‘the habeas court erred in
       concluding that a conviction based on a single eyewit-
       ness identification without [the] benefit of expert testi-
       mony does not violate due process.’’ Although the peti-
       tioner devotes most of his appellate brief in this regard
       to investigating the petitioner’s alibi defense, investigating . . . Douglas’
       involvement, and investigating the physical crime scene’’; and in failing to
       ‘‘pursue the testing of DNA evidence or other evidence collected from the
       victim’s automobile.’’ The petitioner explicitly abandoned these additional
       ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his posttrial brief to the habeas
       court. As to his claim of actual innocence, the petitioner withdrew it prior
       to trial.
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                            Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

         to discussing the science of eyewitness identification
         evidence and the factors that courts consider in
         addressing the reliability of that evidence, the petition-
         er’s appellate counsel acknowledged, at oral argument
         before this court, that this court on direct appeal had
         addressed the petitioner’s claim that the eyewitness
         identification of him was unreliable and unduly sugges-
         tive. Counsel conceded that he was not arguing that
         the eyewitness identification cases that were decided
         following the date of the petitioner’s conviction applied
         retroactively to his case.3 He clarified that the petition-
         er’s due process claim is ‘‘intricately intertwined with
         the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the
         record wasn’t sufficiently developed, and there wasn’t
         a sufficient record for challenging that on appeal. . . .
         The due process claim is inextricably tied into the inef-
         fective assistance . . . and he was deprived of due pro-
         cess because counsel was ineffective and did not pre-
         serve or pursue or create a record for the due
         process claim.’’
            Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘[i]n habeas
         corpus proceedings, courts often describe constitu-
         tional claims that are not tethered to a petitioner’s sixth
         amendment right to counsel as freestanding.’’ (Internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Saunders v. Commissioner
         of Correction, 343 Conn. 1, 25–26, 272 A.3d 169 (2022).
         When pressed, the petitioner’s appellate counsel failed
         to articulate any distinction between the petitioner’s
           3
             Because this court on direct appeal addressed the petitioner’s claim that
         the eyewitness identification of him was unreliable and unduly suggestive,
         the doctrine of res judicata bars any further consideration of that claim in
         the absence of an allegation of a new legal ground, new facts or new evidence
         that was not reasonably available at the time of the petitioner’s direct appeal.
         See Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction, 211 Conn. App. 42, 49, 272 A.3d
         218, cert. granted, 343 Conn. 932, 276 A.3d 975 (2022). When asked at oral
         argument what had changed since the petitioner’s direct appeal as to the
         due process claim, the petitioner’s appellate counsel reiterated his claim that
         the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       purported freestanding due process claim and his inef-
       fective assistance of counsel claim. In light of appellate
       counsel’s acknowledgement that the due process claim
       is not, in fact, freestanding but, rather, is based exclu-
       sively on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
       we conclude that the habeas court did not err in
       rejecting the due process claim. See Sanchez v. Com-
       missioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 752, 760–61,
       250 A.3d 731 (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that [w]e may affirm a
       proper result of the trial court for a different reason’’
       (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 336
       Conn. 946, 251 A.3d 77 (2021). We will address the
       petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
       part II of this opinion.
                                      B
          The petitioner also claims that his right to due process
       was violated in that ‘‘the jury instructions on eyewitness
       identification testimony at [his] trial were woefully inad-
       equate.’’ The respondent, the Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, contends that this claim is not a due process claim,
       and, even if it were, the habeas court properly deter-
       mined that it was procedurally defaulted. We agree with
       the respondent.
          The habeas court explained that, in ‘‘[t]he petitioner’s
       due process claim, [he] argues that the jury instructions
       provided at the underlying criminal trial were constitu-
       tionally inadequate because they failed to address addi-
       tional information regarding the science and research
       behind eyewitness identification . . . . This claim is
       subject to procedural default and was not raised at a
       prior proceeding. Therefore, the petitioner must demon-
       strate good cause as to why the claim was not raised
       and demonstrate any prejudice resulting therefrom. The
       petitioner claims that cause and prejudice exist for the
       default because the claim is premised on [Coffin’s] fail-
       ure to retain and utilize an eyewitness expert, which
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          led to a limited record for appellate counsel to rely
          upon. However, the information regarding the science
          and research behind eyewitness identification was
          relied upon in the petitioner’s appeal where he chal-
          lenged both the suggestibility of the identification pro-
          cedures utilized by the police and the reliability of the
          victim’s identification.’’ Noting the principle that ‘‘[t]he
          mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual
          or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim
          despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a
          procedural default,’’ the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he
          petitioner failed to carry his burden of demonstrating
          good cause for having failed to raise [this] claim
          directly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court
          further concluded that ‘‘the petitioner failed to show
          that he suffered actual prejudice as a result by demon-
          strating that the alleged impropriety worked to his
          actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
          trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’’ (Empha-
          sis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) On those
          bases, the habeas court concluded that this claim was
          procedurally defaulted.
              On appeal, the petitioner argues that, because the
          jury ‘‘did not have the benefit of expert testimony to
          contextualize [the victim’s] identification of [the peti-
          tioner] . . . [t]he trial court . . . should have pro-
          vided comprehensive and focused jury instructions.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He contends that,
          ‘‘[t]hough the court’s instructions included several buzz-
          words borrowed from the science of eyewitness identi-
          fication, they provided hardly any additional context
          or information, and failed to inform the jury of the
          robust science and research supporting this area of
          inquiry.’’ He continues at length in his appellate brief
          as to how and why the jury instructions were deficient.
            The petitioner fails, however, to challenge the habeas
          court’s conclusion that his claim pertaining to the jury
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       instructions was procedurally defaulted. Because the
       petitioner has failed to challenge the basis on which
       the court relied in rejecting this claim, we are unable
       to afford it review. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Armijo, 195
       Conn. App. 843, 846, 228 A.3d 131 (2020).
                                     II
          The petitioner next claims that the habeas court
       improperly rejected his claim that his trial counsel, Cof-
       fin, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult
       with an eyewitness identification expert or to offer the
       testimony of such an expert; to investigate the issue of
       phone calls the petitioner allegedly made from a wit-
       ness’ cell phone immediately prior to the crime; and to
       investigate and present potential alibi witness testi-
       mony. We disagree.
          We set forth the well settled standard of review and
       law related to claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
       sel. ‘‘It is well established that [t]he habeas court is
       afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings,
       and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are
       clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a
       recital of external events and the credibility of their
       narrators. . . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas [court], as
       the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility
       of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testi-
       mony. . . . The application of the habeas court’s fac-
       tual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however,
       presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is
       subject to plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329
       Conn. 1, 40–41, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied sub nom.
       Connecticut v. Skakel,       U.S.     , 139 S. Ct. 788, 202
       L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019).
          ‘‘Under the sixth amendment to the United States
       constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the
       right to the effective assistance of counsel. . . . Thus,
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          because [a]n accused is entitled to be assisted by an
          attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the
          role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair . . . [t]he
          benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
          must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
          proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
          trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
          result. . . .
             ‘‘To determine whether a defendant is entitled to a
          new trial due to a breakdown in the adversarial process
          caused by counsel’s inadequate representation, we
          apply the familiar two part test adopted by the court
          in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
          Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. A convicted defen-
          dant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective
          as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two com-
          ponents. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
          performance was deficient. This requires [a] showing
          that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
          not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant
          by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second, the defendant must
          show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
          defense. This requires [a] showing that counsel’s errors
          were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
          trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant
          makes both showings, it cannot be said that the convic-
          tion . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
          process that renders the result unreliable.’’ (Citations
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Skakel v.
          Commissioner of Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 29–30.
            To prevail on the first prong, the petitioner ‘‘must
          show that, considering all of the circumstances, coun-
          sel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
          reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional
          norms. . . . [J]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor-
          mance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting
          for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance
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       after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too
       easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it
       has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular
       act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . . A
       fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
       every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects
       of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of coun-
       sel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
       from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the
       difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
       must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s con-
       duct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
       sional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must over-
       come the presumption that, under the circumstances,
       the challenged action might be considered sound trial
       strategy. . . . Indeed, our Supreme Court has recog-
       nized that [t]here are countless ways to provide effec-
       tive assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
       defense attorneys would not defend a particular client
       in the same way. . . . [A] reviewing court is required
       not simply to give [the trial attorney] the benefit of the
       doubt . . . but to affirmatively entertain the range of
       possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for pro-
       ceeding as [he] did . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Morales v. Commissioner of
       Correction, 220 Conn. App. 285, 305–306, 298 A.3d 636,
       cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 603 (2023).
          Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he right to the effective assistance
       of counsel applies no less to the investigative stage of
       a criminal case than it does to the trial phase.’’ Skakel
       v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 32.
       Counsel’s ‘‘strategic choices made after thorough inves-
       tigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options
       are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices
       made after less than complete investigation are reason-
       able precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
       judgments support the limitations on investigation. In
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable
          investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
          makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
          ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investi-
          gate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in
          all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of def-
          erence to counsel’s judgments.’’ (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correc-
          tion, 306 Conn. 664, 680, 51 A.3d 948 (2012). ‘‘[A] court
          must consider not only the quantum of evidence already
          known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence
          would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.
          . . . In addition, in contrast to our evaluation of the
          constitutional adequacy of counsel’s strategic deci-
          sions, which are entitled to deference, when the issue
          is whether the investigation supporting counsel’s [stra-
          tegic] decision to proceed in a certain manner was itself
          reasonable . . . we must conduct an objective review
          of [the reasonableness of counsel’s] performance
          . . . . Thus, deference to counsel’s strategic decisions
          does not excuse an inadequate investigation . . . .
             ‘‘Although the reasonableness of any particular inves-
          tigation necessarily depends on the unique facts of any
          given case . . . counsel has certain baseline investiga-
          tive responsibilities that must be discharged in every
          criminal matter. It is the duty of the [defense] lawyer
          to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances
          of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts
          relevant to the merits of the case . . . .
            ‘‘Of course, the duty to investigate does not force
          defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance
          something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may
          draw a line when they have good reason to think further
          investigation would be a waste. . . . In other words,
          counsel is not required to conduct an investigation that
          promise[s] less than looking for a needle in a haystack,
          when a lawyer truly has reason to doubt there is any
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       needle there.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
       internal quotation marks omitted.) Skakel v. Commis-
       sioner of Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 32–34. However,
       ‘‘common sense dictates that, when the stakes are high-
       est—when the criminal charges are most serious,
       exposing the defendant to the most lengthy of prison
       terms—the importance of a thorough pretrial investiga-
       tion is that much greater.’’ Id., 53.
          To satisfy the prejudice prong, ‘‘[t]he defendant must
       establish . . . that counsel’s constitutionally inade-
       quate representation gives rise to a loss of confidence
       in the verdict. In evaluating such a claim, the ultimate
       focus of [the] inquiry must be on the fundamental fair-
       ness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.
       In every case the court should be concerned with
       whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability,
       the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable
       because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that
       our system counts on to produce just results. . . . Of
       course, a reviewing court does not conduct this inquiry
       in a vacuum. Rather, the court must consider the totality
       of the evidence before the judge or jury. . . . Taking
       the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due
       account of the effect of the errors on the remaining
       findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask
       if the [petitioner] has met the burden of showing that
       the decision reached would reasonably likely have been
       different absent the errors. . . . Furthermore, because
       our role in examining the state’s case against the peti-
       tioner is to evaluate the strength of that evidence and
       not its sufficiency, we do not consider the evidence in
       the light most favorable to the state. . . . Rather, we
       are required to undertake an objective review of the
       nature and strength of the state’s case. . . . In
       assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is
       not whether a court can be certain counsel’s perfor-
       mance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          possible a reasonable doubt might have been estab-
          lished if counsel acted differently. . . . Instead, Strick-
          land asks whether it is reasonably likely the result
          would have been different. . . . The likelihood of a
          different result must be substantial, not just conceiv-
          able.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Id., 38–40. With these princi-
          ples in mind, we address the petitioner’s claims of inef-
          fective assistance of counsel in turn.
                                        A
             The petitioner first claims that the habeas court erred
          in concluding that he had not established that Coffin
          rendered ineffective assistance when she failed to con-
          sult with, or offer the testimony of, an eyewitness identi-
          fication expert. We are not persuaded.
             In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, the court
          recounted Coffin’s testimony that ‘‘she was aware of
          the science regarding the reliability of eyewitness iden-
          tification that was available at that time because she
          requested a jury instruction on it, but she did not hire
          or consult with an eyewitness expert . . . [and] that,
          at the time of the petitioner’s case, the science was still
          relatively new, there was no standard or expectation
          at that time to call an eyewitness identification expert
          and such an expert would typically not have been admis-
          sible at trial.’’
             The court agreed, explaining that, at the time of the
          petitioner’s criminal trial, ‘‘controlling law on the issue
          of eyewitness identification was State v. Kemp, 199
          Conn. 473, 507 A.2d 1387 (1986), overruled in part by
          State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 49 A.3d 705 (2012), in
          which our Supreme Court remarked that the reliability
          of eyewitness identification is within the knowledge of
          jurors and expert testimony generally would not assist
          them in determining the question. . . . Such testimony
          is also disfavored because . . . it invades the province
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                      Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       of the jury to determine what weight or effect it wishes
       to give to eyewitness testimony. (Citation omitted; inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 477.’’ The habeas
       court explained that it was not until ‘‘[a]fter the petition-
       er’s criminal trial [that] our Supreme Court decided
       Guilbert, which overruled Kemp, holding that Kemp
       was out of step with the widespread judicial recognition
       that eyewitness identifications are potentially unrelia-
       ble in a variety of ways unknown to the average juror.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
          The court concluded that the petitioner had failed to
       prove that Coffin ‘‘performed deficiently by failing to
       present an expert on the issue of eyewitness identifica-
       tion because the law in effect at the time of the petition-
       er’s criminal trial discouraged the use of such expert
       testimony.’’ The court further concluded that the peti-
       tioner had not ‘‘proven that the jury in his case would
       have found the victim’s identification to have been unre-
       liable and thus failed to establish . . . a reasonable
       probability . . . that the outcome of the proceedings
       would have been different had the jury heard such
       expert testimony.’’
          On appeal, the petitioner argues that Coffin’s decision
       not to consult with or offer the testimony of an eyewit-
       ness identification expert was not a reasonable and
       informed strategic decision made after a thorough
       investigation of the law and facts but, instead, was
       merely ‘‘based on her lack of knowledge regarding the
       admissibility of eyewitness identification expert testi-
       mony . . . .’’ In so arguing, the petitioner ignores the
       fact that, at the time of his criminal trial, Kemp, which
       held that expert testimony generally would not assist
       a jury in considering eyewitness identification evidence,
       was the controlling law in Connecticut.
         Because Coffin’s decision not to consult with or pres-
       ent the testimony of an eyewitness expert was not
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          inconsistent with the law at the time of the petitioner’s
          trial, we agree with the habeas court’s determination
          that her decision was reasonable. See Ledbetter v. Com-
          missioner of Correction, 275 Conn. 451, 462, 880 A.2d
          160 (2005) (counsel ‘‘performs effectively when he
          elects to maneuver within the existing law’’ (internal
          quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Led-
          better v. Lantz, 546 U.S. 1187, 126 S. Ct. 1368, 164 L.
          Ed. 2d 77 (2006). We, therefore, conclude that the
          habeas court properly determined that the petitioner
          had not established deficient performance by Coffin
          regarding her failure to consult with or offer the testi-
          mony of an eyewitness identification expert.4

                                              B

             The petitioner also claims that the habeas court erred
          in concluding that he had not established that Coffin
          rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate
          the issue of phone calls the petitioner allegedly made
          from Douglas’ cell phone immediately prior to the
          attempted robbery and assault. We agree that the
          habeas court erred in determining that Coffin’s perfor-
          mance was not deficient in this regard but nonetheless
          conclude that the petitioner was not prejudiced by Cof-
          fin’s deficient performance.

             In the petitioner’s third amended petition for a writ
          of habeas corpus, he claimed that Coffin’s deficient
          performance violated his constitutional right to the
          effective assistance of counsel when she failed ‘‘to ade-
          quately and properly investigate the issue of the phone
          calls made from . . . Douglas’ [phone] on the night of
             4
               Because we affirm the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner
          failed to prove that Coffin’s performance was deficient in not presenting
          testimony from an eyewitness identification expert, we need not also address
          the petitioner’s challenge to the court’s determination that he failed to
          prove prejudice.
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                      Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       April 30, 2011, to prove or disprove the account pro-
       vided by . . . Douglas,’’ and that ‘‘[t]here is a reason-
       able probability that—but for . . . counsel’s deficient
       performance . . . the result of the petitioner’s criminal
       trial would have been . . . more favorable to the peti-
       tioner.’’
         At the habeas trial, the petitioner offered into evi-
       dence the criminal trial transcripts, which included the
       testimony of Detective William J. Siemionko of the Hart-
       ford Police Department. Siemionko had testified at the
       petitioner’s criminal trial that, shortly after the shooting,
       he obtained Douglas’ phone records to determine who
       owned the phone associated with the phone number
       on the pizza order slip. Although the state did not offer
       those records into evidence, Siemionko testified that
       someone using Douglas’ phone ‘‘did call Pizza 101 prior
       to the pizza deliver[y] by [the victim]’’ and that it had
       received a phone call from the victim at 12:02 a.m. on
       May 1, 2011, from the victim’s phone.
         At the habeas trial, the petitioner also presented the
       testimony of Michael Udvardy, a private investigator
       who had reviewed the phone records in the state’s file,
       and offered into evidence Udvardy’s report, which was
       based on his analysis of those phone records. Udvardy
       testified, and stated in his report, that his analysis of
       Douglas’ phone records revealed that someone using
       Douglas’ phone probably did not call Pizza 101. He also
       testified that there was a gap in the usage of Douglas’
       phone at the time the shooting likely took place, but
       that he ‘‘wouldn’t be alarmed by’’ the usage gap.
         Another witness for the petitioner at his habeas trial,
       Brian S. Carlow, a former Deputy Chief Public
       Defender, testified that reasonably effective trial coun-
       sel ‘‘would want to examine the cell phone records to
       see whether or not what . . . Douglas was testifying
       to and what he had previously said in statements is
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                            Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          either supported by those records or refuted by [them].’’
          As to the usage gap, he characterized it as evidence
          that would have been ‘‘interesting to point out to a jury’’
          but conceded that one reason for the usage gap might
          have been because Douglas ‘‘just simply wasn’t coinci-
          dentally making any phone calls during that period of
          time.’’
             Coffin testified that one of her trial defense strategies
          had been a third-party culpability defense directed at
          Douglas. She also testified that, at the time of the peti-
          tioner’s criminal trial, the state had an open file policy
          but that she had not reviewed Douglas’ phone records
          for fear of harm they might cause the defense and
          because she already had evidence that Douglas’ phone
          had called the pizza place.5
            The habeas court found that the petitioner had failed
          to sustain his burden of proving that Coffin provided
            5
              The following colloquy took place during the habeas trial between the
          petitioner’s habeas counsel, Attorney Katharine S. Goodbody, and Coffin:
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: . . . [S]o, you didn’t review the phone records?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: Right.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: Did you consider offering the phone records at trial?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: . . . [N]o. I’m a little [wary] in general of offering phone
          records.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: And why is that?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: Sometimes phone records can prove to be dangerous. Once you
          offer phone records, the state can get all of the records, and those could
          sometimes—I’ve had cases before where I’ve offered phone records, and the
          state has brought in more phone records and it turned out that it backfired.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: . . . [B]ut you didn’t even review the phone records here,
          did you?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: I don’t believe so, no.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: Did you consider hiring someone to review the phone
          records?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: No, I don’t think so.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: And why would you not do that?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: I think the call was—we did have the evidence that the call
          was made from . . . Douglas’ phone, and I think I was just sticking with
          that. I didn’t want any other phone records to come in that could wind up
          hurting our defense.
            ‘‘[Goodbody]: Were you aware of any other phone records?
            ‘‘[Coffin]: No.’’
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       ineffective assistance of counsel as to the phone
       records. The court recounted that ‘‘Coffin testified at
       the habeas trial that she is generally wary of offering
       [phone] records as exhibits at trial because the state
       can then receive all the records, which can ultimately
       backfire and harm the defense. . . . Coffin further tes-
       tified that it was her strategic decision to not delve
       further into Douglas’ [phone] records for concern of
       what they could have revealed, particularly because she
       already had the evidence presented that the call was
       made to the pizza shop from Douglas’ cell phone, and
       she cross-examined him on that fact at trial.
          ‘‘Considering the presumption the court must take
       that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of profes-
       sional assistance, the petitioner has not proven that
       . . . Coffin’s handling of the [phone] records was not
       sound trial strategy. Furthermore, the petitioner has
       not proven that he was prejudiced thereby by demon-
       strating that Douglas’ phone records provided any evi-
       dence that would have assisted in his defense and cre-
       ated a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
       case would have been different had they been further
       investigated or presented into evidence. As a result,
       this claim must be denied.’’
          On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
       erred in concluding that Coffin’s decision not to investi-
       gate the phone records was sound trial strategy. We
       agree. A reasonably competent defense attorney should
       want to know all of the evidence relating to the case—
       inculpatory and exculpatory—in order to make sound
       strategic decisions and effectively represent the client,
       including whether to advise the client to accept a plea
       offer. A fear of discovering evidence that might harm the
       client is not a proper basis for neglecting to investigate.
       Moreover, the record reflects that the state was in pos-
       session of Douglas’ phone records, and, thus, any poten-
       tially inculpatory evidence was already in the state’s
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          possession. Coffin’s concern as to the potential harm-
          fulness was certainly a reason to review that evidence,
          and her failure to do so was deficient. See Skakel v.
          Commissioner of Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 35
          (‘‘counsel’s anticipation of what . . . potential [evi-
          dence] would [show] does not excuse the failure to
          find out; speculation cannot substitute for certainty’’
          (internal quotation marks omitted)).
              That does not, however, end our inquiry. As stated
          herein, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
          claim, a petitioner must prove both deficient perfor-
          mance and prejudice. As to prejudice, the petitioner
          notes that Douglas testified that ‘‘his cell phone was
          used by [the petitioner] to call multiple places to find
          someone to rob. . . . [The petitioner] testified that he
          did not do this.’’ (Citation omitted.) The petitioner
          argues on appeal that ‘‘[a] simple review of [Douglas’
          phone] records would have shown that . . . Douglas
          was lying about what had occurred that evening. . . .
          It would have supported . . . [the petitioner’s] testi-
          mony.’’ (Citation omitted.) The petitioner contends that
          ‘‘[t]he [phone] records reveal that . . . Douglas’ phone
          never [was used to call the victim’s] phone or Pizza
          101. . . . They further reveal [that someone using the
          victim’s] phone called . . . Douglas’ phone once on the
          night of the incident. . . . Further, during the late eve-
          ning of April 30, 2011, and the early morning of May 1,
          2011, all the calls shown on . . . Douglas’ phone
          records show that, other than the call from [the victim’s]
          phone, they were to other mobile phones, and these
          numbers appear on his bill in various other spots and
          times . . . [a]nd [n]one of these other numbers were
          associated with Pizza 101 or with any business estab-
          lishment. . . . This would prove to the jury that Doug-
          las’ phone was never used to call Pizza 101, as he testi-
          fied. Additionally, there was a gap in usage on . . .
          Douglas’ cell phone from 12:02 to 12:15 [a.m. on May
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                      Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

       1, 2011]. . . . During that time, [t]here were some
       incoming . . . [b]ut there [were] no outgoing calls or
       texts.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner argues that
       Douglas’ phone records in the present case represent
       neutral evidence that could have resolved conflicting
       testimony at the criminal trial. We disagree.

          Although Douglas’ phone records may have shown
       that Douglas’ phone was not used to call multiple places
       to find a target or to call Pizza 101, they do not contradict
       the incriminating evidence that Douglas’ phone number
       was given to Pizza 101 when the order was placed.
       Furthermore, the phone records bolster the evidence
       that the victim called Douglas’ phone to get delivery
       directions, a fact that was also substantiated by Doug-
       las’ own testimony. Indeed, as the respondent argues,
       the fact that Douglas’ phone apparently was not used
       preliminarily to call pizza restaurants or to place the
       order with Pizza 101 might reasonably suggest that the
       petitioner used his own phone to make those calls and
       gave Douglas’ number to Pizza 101 when he placed the
       order in an attempt to avoid leaving a record of his
       involvement. Thus, although the discrepancy between
       the phone records and Douglas’ testimony may have
       caused the jury to doubt a portion of his testimony, it
       would be speculative to posit that it would have been
       likely to cause the jury to doubt all of his testimony,
       most of which was corroborated by the victim, who
       identified the petitioner and Newkirk as having been
       involved in the attempted robbery and assault. The jury
       reasonably could have credited Douglas’ testimony that
       the petitioner was at Mary Shepard Place shortly before
       the victim was shot, that the petitioner and Newkirk
       were making specific plans to rob a delivery driver, and
       that the petitioner had a revolver that he was carrying
       in the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. None of that
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                             Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          incriminating testimony would have been directly chal-
          lenged by the introduction of the phone records. Again,
          that evidence was corroborated by the victim’s account6
          of the attempted robbery and assault that occurred,
          which also implicated the petitioner and Newkirk.7
          Thus, we are persuaded that the petitioner greatly over-
          states the benefit, if any, that may have inured to the
          defense if the phone records had been introduced at
          his criminal trial.
             The petitioner’s argument that the phone records
          would have caused the jury to credit his testimony as to
          the events of the evening in question is also speculative.
          Although the petitioner testified at his criminal trial
          that he never had a gun and that he had not been
          involved in gun play before, he admitted that he had
          been shot four times in November, 2010. The court also
          permitted the state to ask the petitioner about prior
          misconduct, specifically, an armed robbery during
          which the petitioner allegedly staked out a liquor store
          in the area and asked the cashier if he had change
          before robbing him at gunpoint. In light of these infirmit-
          ies with the petitioner’s credibility, it is not a foregone
          conclusion that, even if the jurors had disbelieved the
          entirety of Douglas’ testimony, they would have cred-
          ited the petitioner’s testimony.
            6
              We note that the victim’s initial interaction with the petitioner did not
          involve the stress of having a gun drawn on her. Initially, when the victim
          arrived to deliver the pizza, the petitioner approached the passenger side
          window of the victim’s vehicle and asked her if she had change. When she
          told the petitioner that she did not have change, he asked Newkirk if he
          had change. After Newkirk told the petitioner that he did not have change,
          the petitioner again asked the victim if she had change, the victim told him
          that she did not and then something fell out of the petitioner’s pocket. The
          petitioner picked up the object and put it into his pocket, and the victim
          did not think anything of it. The petitioner continued to ask the victim for
          change and when she told him that she did not have change, he then put
          the gun to the door of the vehicle, and the victim saw it for the first time.
            7
              The petitioner testified at trial that he saw Newkirk when he first arrived
          at Mary Shepard Place that evening.
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                     Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          As this court noted in its consideration of the petition-
       er’s direct appeal, the cross corroboration of the testi-
       mony of Douglas and the victim presented a strong case
       against the petitioner. State v. Grant, supra, 154 Conn.
       App. 328–29. We reiterate that, to prove prejudice under
       Strickland, the petitioner must demonstrate that, in
       the absence of the deficient performance at issue, the
       likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not
       just conceivable. ‘‘[T]he petitioner must meet this bur-
       den not by use of speculation but by demonstrable
       realities.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Madera
       v. Commissioner of Correction, 221 Conn. App. 546,
       556, 302 A.3d 910, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 928, 305 A.3d
       265 (2023). We agree with the habeas court that the
       petitioner failed to meet this burden.
          On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
       habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner had
       failed to demonstrate that Coffin provided ineffective
       assistance as to her handling of Douglas’ phone records.
                                     C
         The petitioner also claims that the habeas court erred
       in concluding that he had not established that Coffin
       rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate,
       prepare and present potential alibi witnesses. We dis-
       agree.
          In the petitioner’s third amended petition for a writ
       of habeas corpus, he claimed that Coffin’s deficient
       performance violated his constitutional right to the
       effective assistance of counsel when she failed ‘‘to ade-
       quately investigate and/or present witnesses that con-
       firm that the petitioner was not at . . . Mary Shepard
       Place . . . during the night of April 30, 2011, including,
       but not necessarily limited to Vanessa . . . and/or [her
       children],’’ and that, ‘‘[t]here is a reasonable probability
       that—but for . . . counsel’s deficient performance
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                        Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

          . . . the result of the petitioner’s criminal trial would
          have been . . . more favorable to the petitioner.’’
             In rejecting this claim of ineffective assistance, the
          habeas court recounted that ‘‘Coffin testified at the
          habeas trial that, when she was appointed as the peti-
          tioner’s counsel, she reviewed the police reports, met
          with the petitioner, and hired an investigator who exam-
          ined the scene and met with potential witnesses. [She]
          testified that she presented an alibi defense to the jury
          using testimony by [Cooper] and the petitioner. [She]
          also testified that her decision not to call additional
          alibi witnesses, such as Cooper’s children . . . was
          strategic because she avoids calling minors to testify
          if possible due to a potential negative impact on the
          jury. She further testified that Cooper’s children would
          have provided the same evidence as Cooper, and she
          believed that the strategic decisions she made at the
          time accompanied by Cooper’s testimony would be
          enough for a successful alibi defense.’’ The habeas court
          concluded that, ‘‘[c]onsidering the presumption the
          court must take that counsel’s conduct fell within a
          wide range of professional assistance, the petitioner
          has not proven that . . . Coffin’s investigation into and
          presentation of the petitioner’s alibi defense failed to
          constitute sound trial strategy. Furthermore, the peti-
          tioner has not proven that he was prejudiced thereby by
          demonstrating that the additional testimony provided
          evidence that would have . . . created a reasonable
          probability that the outcome of the case would have
          been different had the witnesses been called to testify
          at the criminal trial.’’
             On appeal, the petitioner asserts that Coffin’s deci-
          sion not to investigate Cooper’s children as potential
          alibi witnesses was unreasonable because ‘‘presenting
          [the petitioner’s] alibi was clearly part of her defense.’’
          Second, the petitioner contends that Coffin’s reasoning
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       ‘‘does not stand up to scrutiny’’ because Cooper’s chil-
       dren were teenagers—not young children—and they
       had important information to establish the defense Cof-
       fin was presenting; therefore, ‘‘[t]here would be no rea-
       son not to put them on [the witness stand] to support
       that defense.’’ Furthermore, he argues that, even if Cof-
       fin’s decision was strategic, ‘‘the strategy was neither
       reasonable nor informed’’ because Coffin had not even
       investigated the witnesses despite her knowledge of
       their existence.
          Although we agree with the petitioner that Coffin
       should have, at a minimum, met with and interviewed
       Cooper’s children to ascertain the potential benefit, if
       any, to having them testify on the petitioner’s behalf,
       the evidence presented at the habeas trial supports
       Coffin’s explanation that their testimony would have
       been cumulative of Cooper’s testimony that she and
       her son and daughter had dropped the petitioner off at
       his home before 11 p.m. At the habeas trial, Cooper’s
       daughter testified that they had dropped the petitioner
       off at his home between 9 and 10 p.m. and that the
       petitioner ‘‘was home by 11 p.m., I know.’’ Even if we
       assume the veracity of the alibi testimony of both Coo-
       per and her daughter, that testimony did not establish
       an alibi for the petitioner because the shooting occurred
       sometime between midnight and 12:15 a.m. Neither
       Cooper nor her daughter could account for the petition-
       er’s whereabouts at the time the shooting occurred.
       Based on the testimony of the petitioner, Cooper and
       Cooper’s daughter that it took approximately fifteen
       minutes to get to the petitioner’s home from Mary Shep-
       ard Place, the petitioner could have returned to Mary
       Shepard Place before midnight. Because the testimony
       of Cooper’s daughter was, at best, cumulative of Coo-
       per’s testimony and did not provide the petitioner with
       an alibi for the time during which the shooting occurred,
       it is unlikely that the testimony of Cooper’s daughter
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          would have changed the outcome of the petitioner’s
          trial. See Meletrich v. Commissioner of Correction, 332
          Conn. 615, 629, 212 A.3d 678 (2019) (‘‘an alibi witness’
          testimony has been found unhelpful . . . when the
          proffered witness would fail to account sufficiently for
          a defendant’s location during the time or period in ques-
          tion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,
          the habeas court did not err in concluding that the
          petitioner did not establish that Coffin had rendered
          ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, prepare
          and present potential alibi witnesses.
                                         III
             Finally, we turn to the petitioner’s claim that ‘‘[t]here
          was no legitimate basis on the record for the habeas
          court’s rejection of the unrebutted expert testimony
          of . . . [Margaret Bull] Kovera [concerning eyewitness
          identification testimony] and . . . Carlow.’’ The peti-
          tioner argues that the habeas court arbitrarily rejected
          the testimony of both Kovera and Carlow when it gave
          no rationale for why it did not consider or analyze their
          testimony. We are not persuaded.
             ‘‘[A] trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in
          part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party.
          . . . This principle holds true even when the opposing
          party offers no rebuttal expert. . . . [I]n its consider-
          ation of the testimony of an expert witness, the [trier
          of fact] might weigh, as it sees fit, the expert’s expertise,
          his opportunity to observe the [person being examined]
          and to form an opinion, and his thoroughness. It might
          consider also the reasonableness of his judgments
          about the underlying facts and of the conclusions [that]
          he drew from them. . . . Thus, it is permissible for the
          trier of fact to entirely reject uncontradicted expert
          testimony as not worthy of belief. . . .
            ‘‘We have also recognized, however, that the trier’s
          discretion is not without limits. [T]he trier’s freedom
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       to discount or reject expert testimony does not . . .
       allow it to arbitrarily disregard, disbelieve or reject an
       expert’s testimony in the first instance. . . . [When]
       the [trier] rejects the testimony of [an] . . . expert,
       there must be some basis in the record to support the
       conclusion that the evidence of the [expert witness] is
       unworthy of belief. . . . That said, given the myriad
       bases on which the trier properly may reject expert
       testimony and the reviewing court’s obligation to con-
       strue all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
       sustaining the trier’s [finding or] verdict, it would be
       the rare case in which the reviewing court could con-
       clude that the trier’s rejection of the expert testimony
       was arbitrary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Menard v. State, 346 Conn. 506, 521–22,
       291 A.3d 1025 (2023).
          Here, the habeas court never explicitly rejected the
       expert testimony of Kovera or Carlow. In the absence of
       such an explicit rejection of their testimony, we cannot
       conclude that the court rejected it or, if it did, that such
       a rejection was arbitrary. Rather, we presume that the
       court properly weighed all of the evidence presented
       to it in reaching its decision. The fact that the court
       came to a conclusion that was inconsistent with the
       expert testimony does not, in itself, support the petition-
       er’s contention that the court arbitrarily disregarded
       that testimony. See Evans v. Tiger Claw, Inc., 141 Conn.
       App. 110, 121 n.17, 61 A.3d 533 (2013) (‘‘We presume
       that the court considered the relevant factors. . . . The
       correctness of a judgment of a court of general jurisdic-
       tion is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
       contrary. We do not presume error. The burden is on the
       appellant to prove harmful error.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.)) Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim is
       unavailing.
         The judgment is affirmed.
         In this opinion SUAREZ, J., concurred.