Court Opinion

ID: 9655083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:59:45.12467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:16.015110
License: Public Domain

Felts, Justice
(dissenting).
With the utmost deference to my associates and to the learned Justice delivering the opinion of the Court, I must record my dissent from their holding Patillo was not negligent in causing the child’s death sued for, and directing a verdict for defendants.
It seems plain to me this holding is based on an interpretation of the evidence that overlooks or misappreci-ates our rule for directing verdicts. That rule requires us, in considering defendants ’ motion for a directed verdict, to take the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to plaintiff:
“to look to all the evidence, to take as true the evidence for plaintiff, to discard all countervailing evidence, to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence for plaintiff, to allow all reasonable inferences from it in *470Ms favor; and if then there is any dispute as to any material determinative evidence, or any donbt as to the conclusion to be drawn from the whole evidence, the motion must be denied.” (citing cases). Smith v. Sloan, 189 Tenn. 368, 376-377, 225 S.W.2d 539, 542, 227 S.W.2d 2.
“ ‘The question of the defendant’s liability lawfully can be withdrawn from the jury and determined by the court as a question of law, when and only when the facts are undisputable * * *, and when the inference from the facts is so certain that all reasonable men, in the exercise of a fair and impartial judgment, must agree upon it’ ” (citing authorities). Osborn v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197, 204, 185 S.W.2d 510, 513.
It seems clear to me that the evidence, interpreted and taken as required by that rule, reasonably tended to prove, and from it the jury could well find, the following facts and circumstances on the issue of Patillo’s negligence :—
1. Patillo parked the automobile in- plaintiff’s front yard. On the afternoon of the accident, Patillo, a 16-year-old boy, student at Pearl High School, was driving the automobile alone, going to see another boy of the same age, Leon Otey, who lived in a house on the east side of 24th Avenue, North, Nashville, just across the street from the home of plaintiff, located at 921 24th Avenue, North, and on the west side of it.
Patillo drove the automobile south along 24th Avenue to a point opposite the Otey home, and there parked the car on his right (the west) side of 24th Avenue. As parked, the car was headed south, its left wheels near the west edge of the paved part of 24th Avenue, and its right *471wheels 5 or 6 feet over in plaintiff’s front yard (see large map, Ex. 1 to test. Barrett). The mother of the child testified.
“Q. Now, then, while you were out on the [front] porch [of her home], did you have occasion to see the defendant, Val Patillo? A. Yes sir, I did. He drove up as I was standing on the porch.
“Q. Was the baby there with you, little Anthony [the child killed] there with you when he drove up? A. Yes. sir.
“Q. All right. When he drove up there what did he do, if anything? A. Me parked in our yard” (Italics mine.)
On the map above referred to there is a red rectangle marking the place where the witnesses said Patillo parked the car. This shows that he parked it headed south with its right wheels 5 or 6 feet over in plaintiff’s front yard, and its center over the walkway (two parallel rows of stepping stones) leading from the front steps toward 24th Avenue, and only about 15 or 16 feet from the front steps.
2. Small ohildren were playing in plaintiffs yard. Plaintiff’s house was near a school, and children from the school often played in plaintiff’s yard. Plaintiff and his wife had seven very young children ranging in ages from 8 years down to two weeks, Anthony, the child that was killed, being 13 months old, and able to walk about. Patillo had often cut the grass in plaintiff’s yard and knew plaintiff’s children and other children played there.
At the time Patillo parked the car there, these little children were playing in the yard. As we have seen, the *472mother and little Anthony were on the front porch, she standing on the porch, and he “sitting on the top step.” Though Patillo parked the ear within 20 feet of them, he said he did not see either the mother or the child, bnt did see some of the other children playing in the side of the yard at a swing north of where he parked the car.
Patillo’s counsel asked him how far this swing was from where he parked the car, and he answered: ‘ ‘ Oh, I guess it was about 30 yards, or something like that.” While the evidence as to this is somewhat uncertain, I think it shows it was not that far; but the matter does not seem very important, since the swing was in plaintiff’s yard and the children might be expected to play anywhere in the yard.
3. The car’s wheel ran over the child’s body. After Patillo got out of the parked car and went across the street to the Otey house, the mother told the two oldest children “to go to the side yard and bring up Anthony’s play pen” so she could put him in it, and she went into the back of the house to get his “play things,” leaving him on the porch (Italics mine).
While she was getting his toys, and had been gone only two or three minutes, she heard another child, a little boy, screaming; she ran, looked out the window, saw this child “hollering and pointing” toward the Patillo car “going off.” She rushed out and found her child lying in her yard 6 or 7 feet south or in front of where the car had been parked. Its wheel had run lengthwise over his body.
Patillo said, “I felt a little bump as I pulled off.” But he did not stop to see what he had struck. He gave as his explanation for not stopping that he thought his right rear wheel had run over a loose stepping stone in the *473walkway in plaintiff’s yard. The child was rnshed to Vanderbilt hospital but on arrival was fonnd to he dead.
4. He drove off without looking to see whether a child might be in the way. Patillo testified that when he left the Otey honse he came at an angle diagonally across 24th Avenne toward the parked car, approaching its rear and left, got in on its left side, and drove off,- and that there were no children around the car. On direct examination, he said:
“Q. Now, as yon came back up to your car, were there any children around that car?
“A. No sir.”
This statement was contradicted by the fact that there were then at least two children “around that car”: (1) the child whom Patillo admittedly ran over and killed; and (2) the other little child who saw the killing and stood there screaming and pointing to Patillo as he drove off in the car.
This statement was also contradicted by Patillo himself. After saying there were no children around the car, he said he could not see whether any children were around it or not; that as he approached and got in the car on its left side, he could not see on its right side or in front of it. He also said that he didn’t look under the car, or walk around it, to see whether any of these children might be there.
And his testimony on cross examination warranted the jury in inferring that he got in the car and drove off without taking the precaution to look, without looking to see, whether any of these children might be around the car or so near it as to be endangered by it. On cross examination he said:
*474“Q. And you knew children were playing there in the yard, as you have testified, is that right? A. Yes sir.
‘ ‘ Q. And you, knowing that, you got in your car and started it up and drove off, didn’t you? A. But they were not around the car.
“Q. How do you know, son? A. Because I noticed them down in the lower part.
“Q. Now, you have just told me and you told your lawyer that when you got in the car you couldn’t see far in front of your car to the right? A. Yes sir.
‘ ‘ Q. And you knew the children were playing in this yard. How did you know there were none out in front of your car, if you couldn’t see out there? A. Well, I didn’t.
“Q. I heg your pardon? A. I didn’t.
“Q. The truth of the matter is, you don’t know? A. No.
“Q. You didn’t see out there? A. Well, I didn’t.
As we have seen, he said when he parked the car he didn’t see the mother or the child on the front porch hut saw the other children playing at the swing, and added: “I didn’t pay any attention to them” (tr. 76). Neither did he pay any attention to them as he got in the car and drove off, or so the jury could find.
As I understand, the majority opinion holds that on the facts of this case Patillo had no duty to look around or under the car to see if any of these little children might be near enough to be hurt by it. I think he was under *475such, a duty. One may expect self-help from adults but not from children. I think the governing principle was correctly stated by Chief Justice Creen in Townsley v. Yellow Cab Co., 145 Tenn. 91, 94, 237 S.W. 58:
“ ‘Children, wherever they go, mnst be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution towards them, must calculate upon this, and take precaution accordingly.’ Ficker v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 7 Ohio N.P. 600.”
Knowing these children were playing in the yard and might be expected around the car, Patillo was chargeable with the “duty of care and caution toward them” and was bound to look for them and take precaution accordingly ; or so the jury might reasonably find.
While we have no case in this state involving the same state of facts as this case, a number of courts of high authority in our sister states have dealt with similar cases, and they support the view above expressed.
In Stein v. Palisi, 1955, 308 N.Y. 293, 125 N.E.2d 575, 577, the suit was for injuries to a Stein child 19 months of age. This child and some older children were playing on a lawn next door to the house where the Steins were staying. A private road led by this lawn on to some other houses beyond it. Defendant, a taxi driver, saw these children as he drove his taxi past this lawn and stopped or parked at a nearby house to discharge passengers.
As he drove away this 19-month-old child was found lying partly on the drive and partly on the lawn, his clothes torn, his body bloody, with abrasions and lacerations on his face and head as if he had been dragged in *476the cinders on the road. There was no eye witness to the accident. It was not clear whether defendant had parked the taxi on the nearby lawn or in the road. Holding that the jury might find him negligent, the conrt said:
“If, as he drove ont, the baby was in or close to the road, on the edge of which his mother found him, lying face down, Kaufman [the driver] obviously was under a duty to watch out for him, to avoid hitting him, and not to travel ‘fast’ — particularly so since he knew that young children were nearby. Even greater was his duty of careful observation and operation of his taxi, if he in fact drove off the road and onto the lawn, as the jury was entitled to find. In either event, and no matter where the actual impact occurred, a jury could find under all the circumstances that when Kaufman failed to see the baby, he did not exercise caution commensurate with the danger presented, and was therefore negligent” (Italics mine).
In Tupman’s Adm’r v. Schmidt, 1923, 200 Ky. 88, 254 S.W. 199, a wholesale grocer’s truck driver parked his truck, delivering groceries at a store. When he finished, he saw the Tupman child, six years of age, in the street behind his truck. He put the child on the sidewalk. He then went to the front of the truck, cranked it, started the engine, got in, started backing out, and backed over the child. It was held that he was negligent in not anticipating that the child might get in the way of the truck, and taking precautions accordingly.
In Cunningham v. Sublett’s Adm’r, 1948, 306 Ky. 701, 208 S.W.2d 509, 511, defendant was delivering gasoline to the home of Sublett, and parked his truck beside a gasoline drum on Sublett’s place. Two of the Sublett *477children, a girl five years old and a hoy 16 months old, came from their honse out to the truck as the driver was transferring* the gasoline from the truck into the drum. When he finished, he went to the rear of the truck and put away part of his apparatus.
Then he got in the truck on the left side, sat in the driver’s seat, wrote out a sales ticket, and gave it to the little girl as she stood near the cab of the truck. The last time he saw the little boy alive he was standing at a gate some 20 feet from the rear of the truck. After the driver gave the girl the sales ticket and started the truck forward “he felt the truck wheels bounce on something.” He crushed the child beneath the rear wheel. In holding the driver negligent, the court said :
“We think the possibility was too manifest in this case that the baby might be lingering closely about with his older sister, who stayed at the side of the truck until it started, and that Gunter [driver] as a reasonably prudent person, ought to have thoroughly investigated, that possibility before driving away” (Italics mine).
Lovel v. Squirt Bottling Co. of Waconia, 1951, 234 Minn. 333, 48 N.W.2d 525, 529, was a suit by a child 15 months of age for injuries caused her by defendant’s negligence. Defendant’s driver was delivering soft drinks to her father’s store. This little girl and her brother, five years of age, were accustomed to play near the driveway where the truck was parked. The driver knew this.
After he finished the deliveries, he went into the store to make collections. A few minutes later he returned and “without again walking around the truck, he got into it *478from the left side, started the motor, placed it in super low gear, and moved it ahead about a foot, when the motor died. ” Then he went to the front of the trnck and found the little girl lying on the edge of the grass under the front wheel (Italics mine). The court said:
“It is well settled that where children are known or may reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of a parked automobile or truck a degree of vigilance commensurate with the greater hazard thereby created is required of the driver of the automobile or truck to measure up to the standard which the law regards as ordinary care” (citing cases) (Italics mine).
Again: “Whether such a driver has measured up to this standard is, of course, a fact question for the jury * # *y; (cjj¿ng eases).
“Here, if the jury chose to believe that Aldridge [driver] was aware of the presence of Janis at the time he was making his deliveries, then such knowledge on his part would support a finding that his failure to walk to the front of the truck to ascertain whether she was still there as he prepared to leave constituted negligence” (Italics mine).
In Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Black Hills v. Hubbard, 8 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 859, 863, suit was brought for the death of a two-year-old child run over by a truck as it drove away from the sidewalk where it had been parked to make deliveries and pick up empty bottles. When the driver parked there, he knew children were playing nearby. As he came out of the store, he walked along the left side of the truck, got in its left door, and drove off without seeing the child to the right and front of the truck.
*479This was a suit depending upon diversity of citizenship and the local law of South Dakota where the accident happened. In an exceptionally well-reasoned opinion by Circuit Judge Sanborn, the court reviewed many cases including the Lovel case, supra, and said:
“One who parks his motor vehicle in the midst of or in close proximity to playing children of tender years, and then runs over one of them, after talcing no more precautions in starting his vehicle in motion than he would take were there no reason to anticipate the presence of children in dangerous proximity to his vehicle, can hardly be heard to say that as a matter of law he was free from actionable negligence” (Italics mine).
Discussing the duty of a driver of a parked car to take care to avoid injury to children playing on or near the parked automobile, the text in 2A Blashfield’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (perm, ed.), sec. 1509, says:
“If a driver has reason to anticipate that a child might be near his automobile, it is his duty to see that the way is clear before starting the vehicle into motion, but, if he has no reason to anticipate the presence of children near his car, negligence cannot be predicated on the mere fact that he started his machine, injuring the child.”
It is true that some of the older cases broadly declare that such a driver is under no legal duty, before starting his vehicle, to look around or under it for the presence of small children, such as Williams v. Cohn, 1926, 201 Iowa 1121, 206 N.W. 823; O’Neil v. Cochrane, 184 Minn. *480354, 238 N.W. 632; and other like cases relied on in the majority opinion.
Generally speaking, they were cases in which the driver “had not seen the injured child in the vicinity prior to the accident, and hence was not under obligation to exercise a higher degree of care commensurate with such knowledge.” Lovel v. Squirt Bottling Co. of Waconia, supra.
But where, as here, one parks his automobile in his neighbor’s front yard when he knows many small children are playing there, it certainly cannot be said that he owes them no duty of care hut may act in disregard of their presence and safety.
On the facts here, the jury could reasonably find that Patillo owed these children a duty of care and vigilance commensurate with the danger to them and that he breached this duty and thereby caused the death sued for.
Likewise, the question of whether the mother was guilty of proximate contributory negligence, in leaving the child for the moment while she went in the house to get his toys, was a question for the jury. Carey Roofing & Mfg. Co. v. Black, 129 Tenn. 30, 36-37, 164 S.W. 1183, 51 L.R.A., N.S. 340, Osborn v. City of Nashville, supra.
Also, the question whether Viola Williams, registered owner of the automobile, was liable as the master for Patillo’s negligence was a question for the jury. The statutory presumption that the car was being operated by her servant in her service (T.C.A. 59-1037) was not displaced, as a matter of law, by Patillo’s testimony because he was involved in contradictions so that his credibility *481was an issue for tlie jury. Sadler v. Draper 46 Tenn.App. 1, 326 S.W.2d 148, 156-157, and cases there cited.
Other questions made by defendant, I think, are without merit.
For these reasons, I think we should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Burnett, J., concurs.