Court Opinion

ID: 9681318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:48:15.06403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.279078
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I and III of the majority opinion. I do not agree with part II of that opinion.
In its examination of Art. 40.03(7), V.A.C. C.P., which requires a new trial if the jury receives “other evidence” detrimental to the defendant, the majority concludes that a discussion of the parole laws can never be “other evidence.” The principal reason advanced for this conclusion is that the effects of the parole laws can never be a material issue in a criminal case.
I do not see how the inadmissibility of such evidence prevents a discussion of such evidence by the jury from being classified as receipt of other evidence under Art. 40.-03(7), supra. For example, if a juror related the facts of a particular case he was familiar with, and told the other jurors about the effects of the parole laws in that particular case, would that information not be other evidence? Just because information about the effect of the parole laws is never admissible does not mean it is never “other evidence” under Art. 40.03(7), supra.
I therefore dissent to part II of the majority opinion and concur in parts I and III.
TOM G. DAVIS and TEAGUE, JJ., join this opinion.