Court Opinion

ID: 9749184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:26:51.533053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:44.816492
License: Public Domain

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the State’s second argument.
I do not take issue with the trial court’s ability to choose to believe Appellee’s testimony over that of the officer. Indeed, the law is well-settled that the trial court may choose to believe any or all of the witness testimony presented at a suppression hearing in arriving at the historical facts that form the basis for the alleged stop, search, and seizure. See Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). However, it is equally well-settled that the application of those facts to the law is reviewed de novo. See State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-3 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). It is here that the majority’s analysis runs afoul.
The trial court concluded that even if Appellee’s testimony demonstrated that he committed a traffic offense, that offense was not testified to by the officer as the reason for stopping Appellee and therefore, it cannot support the basis of the stop. The majority appears to agree with the trial court’s statement, citing Swaffar v. State, 258 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd). However, whether the officer testifies to the specific reason that supports the stop is of no consequence. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 594, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action,” quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(“It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the subjectively bad intentions of law enforcement personnel when these intentions do not ultimately manifest themselves in any objectively ascertainable Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, as long as the facts and circumstances show a valid and legal detention, it *328serves no actual Fourth Amendment function to attempt to unearth the subjective reasons for such detention.”). Indeed, there is a plethora of case law acknowledging that the subjective intent of the officer for stopping an individual is irrelevant. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. at 593; Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); State v. Patterson, 291 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.); State v. Clark, 315 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2010, no pet.). Rather, it is an objective standard based on the totality of the circumstances as those historical facts — accepted by the fact finder — exist at the inception of the stop. Doyle v. State, 265 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd); State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd); Thomas v. State, No. 08-05-00247-CR, 2007 WL 1404425, *2 (Tex.App.-El Paso May 10, 2007, pet. ref'd)(op., not designated for publication). And we employ a de novo review in determining whether those facts objectively show that the individual is, has been, or soon will be committing a violation such that the stop was lawful. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492-93; Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530.
Here, the trial court was certainly free to disregard the officer’s testimony on all accounts for the bases supporting the stop. Garza, 213 S.W.3d at 346; Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. However, the trial court, at the same time, chose to believe Appellee. Again, this was within the trial court’s prerogative. Garza, 213 S.W.3d at 346; Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. Therefore, if the trial court chooses to accept evidence that supports a violation of the traffic code, even when that evidence is given by the defense rather than articulated by the State’s witness, that evidence, when viewed from an objective standard, supports a stop at the time the stop is initiated. See Boyle v. State, 2002 WL 1340322 at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 20, 2002) (finding stop justified based on defendant’s testimony which admitted to a traffic violation not testified to by officer as the reason for the stop). The trial court, in my opinion, has no discretion to throw out the seized evidence simply because the officer did not testify that he stopped the individual on those same grounds. To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to escape liability for a criminal offense that he confessed to simply because, as in this case, the trial court sought to reward the defendant’s candor and punish the officer for failing to articulate that basis in his testimony. But rewarding a defendant’s candor is a punishment issue; it is not a tool that can be employed to absolve a defendant from liability for the charged criminal offense when the facts supporting the criminal activity are not only before the court, but believed by it, as well.
The test, as noted above, is whether the totality of the accepted evidence, viewed from an objective standpoint, supports the stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Therefore, the question presented is whether Appellee’s testimony, as believed by the trial court, supported a traffic offense. It does not. The State argues that Appellee admitted' to committing a traffic violation by turning left into the curb lane rather than the left lane. However, the State cites no statute, rule, or case law proscribing such conduct, and I have been unable to find one. Rather, the statute at issue simply provides that a left-turning motorist may turn into “a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of the vehicle on the roadway being entered.” *329See Tex.Transp.Code Ann. § 545.101(b)(2)(Vernon 1999)[Emphasis added]. According to the testimony believed’ by the trial court, Appellee did so. Because Appellee’s own testimony does not demonstrate that he committed a traffic offense, the officer lacked authority to stop Appellee.
With these comments, I concur.