Court Opinion

ID: 9577120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:55.91037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:00.231329
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority as it allows a corporate officer to be held responsible for actions of a corporation without first requiring (1) that such officer be appropriately brought within the jurisdiction of the applicable court and (2) evidence that the officer took part in the commission of the corporation’s tort. See Brown v. Rentz, 212 Ga. App. 275 (441 SE2d 876) (1994); Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833 (420 SE2d 763) (1992). No matter how egregious the facts, a party must still be afforded notice and the opportunity to defend actions brought against them individually. No judgment may issue against those who were not parties to the action. See Hartley v. Shenandoah, Ltd., 170 Ga. App. 868, 869 (318 SE2d 508) (1984) (judgment obtained against corporate general partner in prior action not enforceable in subsequent action against other general partners not parties to prior suit); Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co., 227 Ga. App. 432, 433-435 (1) (489 SE2d 153) (1997) (collateral estoppel not applicable and judgment in first action not enforceable against a non-party thereto in a subsequent action).
The corporate officer in question, Speir, was not a defendant or a party in any prior action where personal jurisdiction attached. In the instant case, the majority affirms Speir’s liability for a corporation’s actions solely on the basis that he was a corporate officer. Speir was not a party to the previous action in which the trial court pierced the corporate veil between the two corporations, McFrugal Holding Company, Inc. and McFrugal Auto Rental, Inc. In that action, the trial court determined only that the two corporations were operated as one entity. The trial court’s determination did not create personal liability of Speir as a corporate officer because he was not a party to the action. The present action was brought to hold the corporate officers personally responsible for the judgment already obtained against the corporations. However, no evidence has been presented as to Speir’s involvement with the actions of the corporations. Such evidence is necessary to hold Speir personally liable for the judgment obtained against the corporations.
Furthermore, the evidence supports a finding that Speir had resigned from his position as a corporate officer of the McFrugal companies in December 1994. Speir testified that he resigned by giving notice thereof at a board of directors meeting. Speir’s actions com*404plied with OCGA § 14-2-843, which provides: “An officer may resign at any time by delivering notice to the corporation. A resignation is effective when the notice is delivered unless the notice specifies a later effective date. A copy of the notice of resignation . . . may be filed with the Secretary of State.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, a resignation may be effective whether or not notice of the resignation is filed with the Secretary of State. Following Speir’s resignation, in February 1995, his name was removed from corporate listings filed with the Secretary of State. Viewing all evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Speir, he resigned from his position as a corporate officer of McFrugal as required by law prior to the acts upon which the suit against him are based.
The majority contends that the evidence shows that Speir was still an officer of McFrugal Auto, if not McFrugal Holding, as of September 11, 1996. The majority bases this contention on a letter from the Office of the Secretary of State to which McFrugal Auto’s corporate registration is attached. The letter, itself, is dated September 11, 1996; however, this reflects only the date on which the Secretary of State prepared the cover letter. The corporate registration form which was attached was dated February 21, 1994, months prior to Speir’s resignation. As such, these documents do not support the majority’s contention that Speir remained an officer of McFrugal Auto in 1996.
The majority apparently contends that Speir, despite the fact that he resigned from the McFrugal Entities in December 1994, still had some duty to file a change in the corporate registry, and, as a result of his failure to do so, he could still be treated as a corporate officer. The law does not support this argument. As discussed above, OCGA § 14-2-843 places no requirements on a resigning officer to give written notice to the Secretary of State. Furthermore, a corporate officer, once resigned, lacks authority to file a new corporate registry reflecting changes in leadership. Thus, Speir had no duty to notify the Secretary of State that he had resigned from the McFrugal Entities, and he had no authority to alter the corporate registry of McFrugal Auto, dated February 21, 1994, once he had resigned.
In addition, I cannot agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages should be trebled. As the majority has reasoned in a prior case, “the purposes of treble damages and punitive damages are substantially the same.” Simpson Consulting v. Barclays Bank, 227 Ga. App. 648, 655 (4) (490 SE2d 184) (1997) (physical precedent only). Each penalty, then, is a similar form of punishment. Therefore, the trebling of punitive damages works to inappropriately heap punishment on punishment, and the result is not just punitive, but oppressive. Although it may be proper to add treble damages to punitive damages, it should not be proper to *405multiply one by the other. The latter is the result the majority espouses here, and I simply cannot condone such an excessive outcome.
Decided November 20, 1998.
Merry & Associates, Rebecca S. Merry, Eldridge Melton, for appellant.
S. Robert Hahn, Jr., for appellee.
Because the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, I respectfully dissent from the majority which affirms the trial court.