Court Opinion

ID: 9740662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:47.587448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.555928
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court improperly considered three victim impact statements in violation of the plain language of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)). As the majority recognizes, this court must look to the language of the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. 196 Ill. 2d at 228. In finding that the trial court improperly considered three victim impact statements, the majority focuses on section 3(a)(3) of the Act, which defines a crime victim as a “single representative” of the deceased. 725 ILCS 120/ 3(a)(3) (West 1998). Based upon that definition, the majority then concludes that the trial court “did not comply with the Act where it accepted and considered the victim impact statements of all three persons rather than of ‘a single representative’ of the deceased.” 196 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). I believe that a plain reading of the statute compels a different conclusion in this case. Section 6(a) of the Act provides that where “a victim of [a] violent crime is present in the courtroom at the time of the sentencing ***, the victim upon his or her request shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct *** has had upon the victim.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 1998). Reading section 3(a)(3) of the Act together with section 6 of the Act, then, only a single representative of Nina Glover could have requested an opportunity to address the court at sentencing regarding the impact of defendant’s crime. Such a situation, however, was not presented in this case. Here, it was the State that presented the written victim impact statements of Nina Glover’s two daughters and her mother. 196 Ill. 2d at 228. I agree with Justice Miller, writing separately in a prior decision of this court, that section 6 of the Act “applies when the victim, on his or her own initiative, wishes to address the sentencing court; section 6 does not purport to limit the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise introduce in aggravation.” People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 55 (1998) (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). During the aggravation and mitigation phase of a sentencing hearing, a sentencing judge has wide discretion concerning the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). The only limitation on the admission of evidence is that the evidence must be reliable and relevant. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 322. Because the three victim impact statements at issue in this case were introduced by the State in aggravation, section 6 of the Act did not limit the trial court’s consideration of those statements. To hold otherwise “threatens to severely limit the prosecution’s ability to present relevant, reliable evidence in aggravation” and “transforms what was designed to provide a benefit to victims and witnesses into a shield for their offenders.” Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 56 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The trial court’s decision to admit multiple victim impact statements in this case was a matter of discretion. Of course, the trial court must exercise appropriate discretion at sentencing and must consider the relevance and materiality of victim impact evidence. 196 Ill. 2d at 232. There is no evidence in this case, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the victim impact statements. Consequently, I believe that the trial court did not violate the Act when it considered multiple victim impact statements, and I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it holds to the contrary.