Court Opinion

ID: 9699673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:45:29.843503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:42.829459
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
In Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47 (1874), Chief Justice Agnew wrote that there are “but three known recognized modes by which the whole people, the state, can give their consent to an alteration of an existing lawful frame of government, viz.:
“1. The mode provided in the existing constitution.
“2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the body for revision and conveying to it the powers of the people.
“3. A revolution.
“The first two are peaceful means through which the consent of the people to alteration is obtained, and by which the existing government consents to be displaced without revolution. The government gives its consent, either by pursuing the mode provided in the constitution, or by passing a law to call a convention. If consent be not so given by the existing government the remedy of the people is in the third mode — revolution.”
Even if we ignore appellants’ contention that Act No. 2 of the 1967 Session did not properly follow Article 18 of the 1874 Constitution, we must, nevertheless, determine whether a proper body for revision of the existing lawful frame of government was constituted by Act No. 2. I am constrained to hold that because §2 of the Act provides for 13 ex officio members in addition to 150 elected delegates, that the ex officio *430members so dilute the elected body established for revision of the frame of government that it is not representative of the whole people and hence, unlawful and void.1
The essence of a constitutional convention is only maintained if it represents the people. It is a substitute for the gathering of the entire populace. The presence of ew officio delegates exercising the full powers of elected delegates is foreign to the concept of a convention as a gathering of the people. Thus, there was no convention and nothing which flowed from it is valid even if the product of the convention is subsequently approved by the majority of the voters.
I recognize that the leadership of the General Assembly that approved the Act held within their political power the “yes” or “no” on whether a constitutional convention should be called. But those in favor of a convention should not have surrendered the very essence of government in order to have the General Assembly pass the call. The cost was too high. It permitted the leadership of the General Assembly to become part of the convention without exposing themselves to the will of the people, and to influence, if not control, the convention’s deliberations.2 I see a *431dangerous threat to government as we know it by acquiescing in this unprecedented usurpation.3
I cannot accept the contention that all prior improprieties and illegalities are rectified by the ratifying vote of the electorate.4 Procedures in government *432instituted for the protection of the mass of people are designed to protect them from the rule of the majority. Our concepts of democracy and minority rights have far transcended the philosophy that “might makes right.”
I dissent.

 Section 2 provides, inter alia: “. . . In addition, the Lieutenant Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Majority Whip of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Minority Whip of the Senate, the Minority Caucus Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the House, the Majority Whip of the House, the Minority Leader of the House, the Minority Whip of the House and the Minority Caucus Chairman of the House-shall be.members ex officio of the convention and shall have the-powers of. elected delegates.”

 Section 5 provides, inter alia: “The Lieutenant Governor; the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Majority Whip of the Senate, the Minority Leader' of the Senate, the Minority Whip of the Senate, the Minority *431Caucus Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the House, the Majority Whip of the House, the Minority Leader of the House, the Minority Whip of the House and the Minority Caucus Chairman of the House shall constitute a Preparatory Committee to make arrangements for the convention. . . . The committee shall initiate any studies, inquiries, surveys or analyses it may deem relevant through its own personnel or in cooperation with any public or private agencies, including institutes, universities, foundations or research organizations. In so doing, the committee may hold public or private hearings. It may issue subpoenas under the hand and seal of its chairman commanding any person to appear before it and to answer questions touching matters properly being inquired into by the committee and to produce such books, papers, records and documents as the committee deems necessary. Such subpoenas may be served upon any person and shall have the force and effect of subpoenas issued out of the courts of this Commonwealth. . . . The committee may request and shall receive from any department, division, board, bureau, commission or agency of the State or any political subdivision thereof such facilities, assistance and data as it deems necessary or desirable to carry out properly its powers and duties. The committee is hereby authorized and empowered to make and sign any agreements, and to do and perform any acts that may be necessary, desirable or proper to carry out the provisions of this act. The committee shall also prepare budgets for the holding of the constitutional convention. . . .”

 “. . . Common sense would indicate that delegates intended to represent, first, the electoral body, and, through that, the sovereign, if they are to represent truly the different phases of opinion current among the people at large, should be chosen fty the entire electoral tody. . . .” (Emphasis supplied). Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, page 258 (4th ed. 1887). No precedent can be found in any authority on constitutional conventions for the inclusion of ess officio members.

 The “People’s Convention” of Rhode Island in 1841 as described in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), provides a useful analogy. Mass voluntary meetings were held in Providence which *432resulted in the appointing of a committee with the power to call a constitutional convention. The committee made the call, providing for full and free Voting in Bhode Island. The Constitution as prepared by the convention was approved by the majority of the voters of the state. The existing government refused to leave office or to recognize the new because it would not recognize a convention that resulted from the call of a voluntary group. The President of the United States, John Tyler, recognized the existing government and offered miUtary aid in putting down the “rebellious” insurgents. The Supreme Court held in Luther v. Borden that this was a proper function of the President and thus upheld his determination. The lesson to be learned from the Bhode Island experience is that the subsequent approval of a constitution by the popul¿ce does not cleanse the taint that surrounds the convention that evolved that constitution.