Court Opinion

ID: 9959664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:07:41.823839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.421824
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2022-CA-1346-MR

DEMONTE WHITFIELD                                                  APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CR-01187

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Demonte Whitfield (“Whitfield”) appeals the October 31,

2022 judgment and sentence on verdict of the jury of the Hardin Circuit Court. We

affirm.

            On November 24, 2021, Whitfield and his two brothers got into an

altercation with Jermaine Huffman (“Huffman”). During the fight, a handgun fell

out of Huffman’s pocket. Whitfield picked up the firearm. Ultimately, he shot
Huffman four times, killing him. Whitfield shot Huffman with both his own

firearm and Huffman’s gun. One of Huffman’s friends also shot Whitfield three

times. At the scene, Whitfield dropped Huffman’s gun. As he was running away,

he tossed his own gun as well. Police officers later recovered Huffman’s gun at

the scene. Whitfield’s gun was never found.

                 Whitfield was indicted on one count of murder1 and one count of

tampering with physical evidence.2 Whitfield was tried by a jury. The jury was

instructed on murder; lesser-included offenses, including first-degree

manslaughter;3 and the defense of self-protection. Relevant to this appeal, the jury

was also instructed on tampering with physical evidence. The instruction read:

                 You will find the Defendant guilty of Tampering with
                 Physical Evidence under this Instruction if and only if,
                 you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
                 all of the following:
                    A. That in this county on or about November 24,
                       2021, and before the finding of the Indictment
                       herein, he removed or concealed a gun (or guns)
                       which he believed was about to be produced or
                       used in an official proceeding as defined under
                       Instruction No. 2 pertaining to the death of
                       Jermaine Huffman;

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020, a capital offense.
2
    KRS 524.100(1)(a), a Class D felony.
3
    KRS 507.030, a Class B felony.

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                       AND

                    B. That he did so with the intent to impair its
                       availability in the proceeding;

                       AND

                    C. That the gun (or guns) was physical evidence as
                       defined in Instruction No. 2.

Record (“R.”) at 55. The jury found Whitfield guilty of first-degree manslaughter

and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court imposed the jury’s

recommended sentence of twelve-years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and three-

years’ imprisonment for tampering with physical evidence, to run consecutively.

                This appeal followed.

                The sole issue on appeal is whether Whitfield’s constitutional right to

a unanimous verdict was violated by the jury instruction on tampering with

physical evidence. Whitfield concedes that he did not preserve this issue for

appellate review. He requests review for palpable error. RCr4 10.26. “[A]

palpable error affecting the substantial rights of a party, even if insufficiently

raised or preserved, is reviewable, and, upon a determination that it has resulted in

manifest injustice, reversible.” Sexton v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 227, 231

(Ky. 2022) (citation omitted). Manifest injustice requires the alleged error be

“shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable” and must seriously affect the “fairness,

4
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Palpable

errors are so severe that they “threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of

law.” Id. at 232 (citation omitted).5

               Under the Kentucky Constitution, verdicts must be unanimous in

criminal trials by jury. Hall v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 19 (Ky. 2018)

(footnote omitted); see also KY. CONST. §7. “[J]uror unanimity means that jurors

must agree upon the specific instance of criminal behavior committed by the

defendant but they need not agree upon his means or method of committing the act

or causing the prohibited result.” King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 352

(Ky. 2018), overruled on other grounds by Johnson, 676 S.W.3d 405. Jurors need

only to “end up in the same place.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439,

455 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Johnson, 676 S.W.3d 405.

               Herein, Whitfield argues the instruction on tampering with physical

evidence violated his right to juror unanimity because it included two separate acts

of potentially criminal conduct: (1) the disposal of his gun and (2) the disposal of

the victim’s gun. He claims there is no way to know whether the jurors were in

agreement because some could have believed he tampered with one gun, others

5
 This is not a separate category of palpable error review but is “an explanation as to the degree
of prejudice that must be demonstrated in order for a court to determine there is a substantial
possibility a different result would have resulted but for the unpreserved error.” Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Ky. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

                                               -4-
could have believed he tampered with the second gun, and still others could have

believed he tampered with both.

             Whitfield’s argument is comparable to the one made by the defendant

in Brown v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 826 (Ky. 2018). Therein, the jury was

instructed on complicity-to-first-degree robbery. In relevant part, the jury was

instructed to find the defendant guilty if they believed he, “alone or in complicity

with another stole money or jewelry or car[.]” Id. at 838. The Supreme Court of

Kentucky held jurors did not have to agree on which of the three items of property

were stolen. Id. at 840. The Court held a “jury need not always decide

unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a

particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to

commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 839 (citing Richardson v. United States,

526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1999)). The jury

need only to agree that “movable property was taken” because this was the “factual

element[] . . . listed in the statute that defines the crime.” Id. at 840 (citation

omitted). The jury was not required to identify the exact property taken by the

defendant. Id.

             Similarly, the statute for tampering with physical evidence does not

require the identification of the exact evidence with which the defendant tampered.

                                           -5-
              A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence
              when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or
              may be instated, he:

                 (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes or alters
                     physical evidence which he believes is about to be
                     produced or used in the official proceeding with
                     intent to impair its verity or availability in the
                     official proceeding[.]

KRS 524.100(1)(a) (emphasis added). Just as the jury in Brown agreed that

movable property was stolen, the jury here needed only to unanimously find that

physical evidence was concealed or removed. Identification of which of the two

guns was tampered with by Whitfield is the type of underlying brute fact which

makes up an element of the crime and must not be decided unanimously. See

Brown, 553 S.W.3d at 840 (footnote omitted). Therefore, there was no violation of

Whitfield’s constitutional rights.

              Whitfield further argues that his conviction for tampering with

physical evidence is flawed because the Commonwealth did not present sufficient

evidence that he concealed or removed Huffman’s firearm.6 Whitfield relies on

Commonwealth v. Bell, 655 S.W.3d 132 (Ky. 2022), in support of this argument.

The facts herein are easily distinguishable from Bell. Here, Whitfield dropped

Huffman’s handgun at the scene as he was fleeing. Law enforcement was not

present. In Bell, the Supreme Court held:

6
 This argument was not preserved for appellate review. We review for palpable error under RCr
10.26.

                                            -6-
             [w]here a defendant merely drops, throws down, or
             abandons drugs in the vicinity of the defendant and in
             the presence and view of the police, and the officer
             can quickly and readily retrieve the evidence, the
             criminal act of concealment or removal has not taken
             place.

655 S.W.3d at 135 (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. James, 586

S.W.3d 717, 731 (Ky. 2019)). The Court reaffirmed this holding in Saxton v.

Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2022). In each of these cases, it was

essential for the defendant to abandon the physical evidence in the presence of law

enforcement and for officers to be able to quickly retrieve it. Here, even if we

accept Whitfield’s claim that he merely dropped Huffman’s handgun at the scene,

he did not do so in the presence of law enforcement. Therefore, his argument fails.

             Based on the foregoing, the October 31, 2022 judgment and sentence

on verdict of the jury of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Aaron Reed Baker                           Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Rachel A. Wright
                                           Assistant Solicitor General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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