Court Opinion

ID: 9941761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 21:03:15.523288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:59.914984
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24
Reposted with complete counsel listing
                           CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

             COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION ONE

                                 STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re the Marriage of TARA and
 ROBERT D.

 TARA D.,                                        D080977

        Respondent,

        v.                                       (Super. Ct. No. DN180142)

 ROBERT D.,

        Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Motions to augment granted. Affirmed.
       Bickford Blado & Botros and Andrew J. Botros for Appellant.
       No appearance for Respondent.
       Cage & Miles, Shannon B. Miles and John T. Sylvester for Minors.
      Robert D., the father in these dissolution proceedings, appeals a final
custody order issued after a multiday evidentiary hearing. He claims the
court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance after his
attorney withdrew from the case on the day before trial was set to begin,
effectively depriving him of the ability to retain new trial counsel. We agree
that when it permits the withdrawal of counsel on the eve of trial, the court
has a special obligation to assess the length of a continuance that would be
required for the affected party to obtain a new lawyer and balance that
against other pertinent circumstances that would be adversely affected by a
delay in the proceedings. Where the court makes this assessment and
engages in the appropriate weighing of competing interests, its decision will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
      Here, the trial court never inquired about the length of the continuance
that was being sought or might be required, making it impossible to perform
the required balancing analysis. Instead, it simply declared there would be
no continuance and then (commendably) attempted to explain what it could
do to accommodate the now-self-represented family law litigant. It is thus
the failure to inquire and assess that constitutes an abuse of discretion in
this case. Even so, however, Robert has not shown that the court’s error
resulted in a “miscarriage of justice” for purposes of article VI, section 13 of
the California Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Robert and Tara divorced in 2016 after having four children together.
In November 2019, Robert filed a request for order (RFO) seeking sole legal
and physical custody of the children. A hearing, initially set for February

                                        2
2020 just prior to the COVID-19 shutdown, was continued to June 2020. 1
After several more continuances, the causes of which are not entirely clear
from the record, the court set the matter for a five day trial beginning
November 16, 2021. Accordingly, the court set a number of pretrial deadlines
and an October 14, 2021 trial readiness conference. At the trial readiness
conference, the court pushed back the start of trial by one day, to November
17, 2021, and reserved an extra day for trial in December.
      On October 29, 2021, Robert’s counsel filed an application to continue
the trial on the grounds that Tara had “not formally responded to [Robert’s]
RFO; a [Child Welfare Services] investigation [was] now open; [and] [one of
the children’s] therapist[s] has referred her to [MINORS’] COUNSEL due to a
serious issue that has arisen that must be properly addressed.” The court
denied the application, making a request that Child Welfare Services attempt
to conclude its investigation before the trial.
      On November 10, 2021, one week before trial was set to begin, Robert’s
counsel filed a motion to be relieved, claiming there had been a “[b]reakdown
in the attorney-client relationship.” The court granted counsel’s request to
shorten time for a hearing on the motion, advancing it to November 16, 2021.
But the judge added a handwritten note to the order: “Trial of 11/17/21 will
not be continued.”

1      It appears that Robert’s responsive declaration was rejected by the
clerk because counsel had not properly filed his motion to withdraw.
However, the reporter’s transcript clearly reflects that the court received,
read, and considered Robert’s declaration. We therefore find that even if was
not “filed,” this document was “lodged in the case in superior court,” and we
grant Robert’s motion to augment the record on appeal with the file-stamped
copy attached to his July 23, 2023, Request to Reply re: Objection to Motion
to Augment Record on Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(a)
(subsequent rule references are to the California Rules of Court).)

                                        3
      On the morning of November 16, Robert filed a declaration in response
to the motion, stating, “I must affirm that the attorney-client relationship has
broken down,” and requesting a continuance of the trial so he could obtain
new counsel. Robert’s declaration also stated that he “retained” or
“attempted to retain” another lawyer “in an act of desperation” after receiving
the motion to withdraw a week before trial.
      At the hearing on counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court said its
tentative decision was to deny the motion “at this late stage” because counsel
is “not allowed to prejudice [his] client.” The judge added, “I’m not going to
continue this, and it’s been clear to everyone that I wasn’t going to continue
it, because I know continuances were requested recently.”
      The court heard argument from Robert’s attorney, who testified that
the parties had recently gotten close to settlement and that he had realized in
the process “there was a distinct conflict between” Robert and himself.
Counsel stated, “I told [Robert] . . . that I would probably be filing this should
he pursue certain positions.” According to counsel, settlement talks
progressed, and a draft agreement was prepared. Several days later, Robert
had not responded to the draft, but had made comments to counsel’s staff
indicating “he wanted to pursue positions at trial that [counsel was] not in
agreement with.” Thereafter, counsel filed his motion to withdraw. The
court asked the attorney, “Do you have concerns that certain positions would
expose you to an ethical problem regarding your representation of him?”
Counsel responded, “I think so. I think there are a number of concerns I
have, which is that, you know, I am barred from taking positions that are
known to be frivolous.”
      Robert also testified and said that he did not agree with counsel’s
summary of their relationship, denying that counsel had told him the

                                        4
positions were “frivolous.” However, he also said, “I don’t disagree with
[counsel’s] position. That’s why I did say there that I can affirm the attorney-
client relationship has broken down.” He further testified that he had
concerns with his lawyer’s performance, saying “there’s a problem with the
communication,” and claiming that counsel “really hasn’t had time to bone up
on the relevant history, but, you know, . . . for him to say that he believes my
position is frivolous is -- you know, is flabbergasting to me.” Referencing the
declaration he submitted, Robert said he had “reach[ed] out to alternate
counsel” as an “act of desperation.” But he did not confirm that he had
retained new counsel and indicated that if counsel withdrew, he would be left
to proceed unrepresented.
      The court ultimately permitted counsel to withdraw, stating, “[Counsel]
can’t conduct a trial when fundamentally there is a difference between you
and him -- or from his perspective and his client about how to proceed and
what the end goal is. [¶] And so having heard more, I am going to grant his
request to withdraw.” The court recognized that it put Robert “in a difficult
position,” but said, “I also recognize that I have made it clear again and again
that this trial was not going to be continued. [¶] I have -- it’s not good for
your kids or for mom or for you, for that matter, to have this go on any
longer.”
      Robert’s now-former lawyer explained that he had not filed a trial brief
or exhibit list because there was “a fundamental difference of opinion of what
should be filed.” The court did not ask Robert to clarify whether he had
actually retained the attorney mentioned in his declaration, or how long it
might take for that new lawyer to prepare for trial. Indeed, there were no
questions about possible substitute counsel. Apparently assuming that

                                        5
Robert would be representing himself, the court decided to postpone trial one
day to permit Robert “to get his ducks in a row.”
      Robert told the court that he did not want to proceed without counsel
and did not think he could successfully try the case on his own. The court
nonetheless declined to continue the trial further:

         “Mr. Delgado, here’s the thing: I know it’s difficult. I will
         give you procedural road maps as we go. You know your
         case. You have been involved in a lot of court proceedings,
         and, you know, I’ll make sure [Tara’s counsel] doesn’t take
         advantage of you. [¶] [Tara’s counsel], you’re on notice.
         And he knows that that is the case. We have got counsel
         for the children. We’re going to do the best we can, but this
         cannot be delayed any more, and we need to get -- move
         forward. If you wish to consider further -- [¶] . . . [¶] --
         further settlement conversations, you certainly -- it’s never
         too late for that. I’m confident having read through the file,
         that with the witnesses that are anticipated and the
         information the Court will have, that we’ll get through it.”

      Robert’s former lawyer was directed to prepare an order, and counsel

confirmed that he would. 2 In the findings and order, the court “recognized
that [Robert] was concerned about proceeding without counsel,” but
“indicated it had previously told all parties that there would be no
continuance of the trial.”

2     It appears that counsel never prepared an order. Instead, Robert’s
appellate counsel prepared the order, which was signed and entered by the
court on July 13, 2023. Although we ordinarily do not consider orders
entered after the notice of appeal is filed, the order here formally
memorializes the ruling that is the subject of the appeal and allows the
appeal to proceed. We therefore grant the unopposed motion to augment the
record with the July 13, 2023, Findings and Order After Hearing,
Attachment to Findings and Order After Hearing of November 16, 2021, and
Clerk’s Certificate of Service by Mail.

                                       6
      Trial began two days later, and hearings were held on six
nonconsecutive days from mid-November 2021 to mid-January 2022.
Several days into the trial, Tara moved for a mistrial on the grounds that
Robert’s self-representation combined with his failure to appear in person
were creating too many irregularities in the proceedings. The court appeared
at points to offer the parties a continuance until August or September 2022
to “give [Robert] a chance to retain an attorney,” but ultimately denied the
mistrial motion and ordered Robert to start attending the proceedings in
person. Robert continued to represent himself, including filing written
closing arguments in March 2022.
      On May 16, 2022, the trial court issued a proposed statement of
decision and interim orders awarding Tara sole legal custody and both
parents equal physical custody. Robert hired new counsel by July 20, 2022.
      On September 7, 2022, the court filed its statement of decision and
entered final custody orders pursuant to Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26
Cal.4th 249. The court stated it “largely agree[d] with the findings of [the
court-appointed custody evaluator] and the observations of [minors’] counsel
in her written closing argument.” The judge concluded, “Based upon the
testimony received and the behavior of both parents,” that the parents could
not “make decisions together.” “[Robert’s] behavior indicates that he will not
respect [Tara’s] opinion about anything. He has exercised medical judgment
without a doctor’s direction or consent. His actions and conduct concern the
Court and [Tara]. The Court therefore finds it is in the best interest of the
children for [Tara] to have sole legal custody, as sole legal custody to [Tara]
will provide consistency in medical and educational decisions for the
children.”

                                        7
      The court also mentioned “concerns about [Robert’s] failure to pay child
support, the significant arrears balance, and the suspension of [his] driver’s
license (which [he] expressed he did not even know about, a position which
was not credible[ ])[.]” It further noted Robert’s negative interactions with
school personnel and minors’ counsel’s staff, and stated that it “came close to
limiting [Robert’s] time to alternate weekends based upon the testimony and
ho w [Robert] behaved in the courtroom,” finding that “the father is poisoning
the well and influencing the children in a negative manner and that [Robert]
has a very negative opinion of [Tara].” Despite these concerns, however, the
court ultimately credited arguments by minors’ counsel and testimony of the
custody evaluator “who indicated the children have a good relationship with
both parents and that they love both parents,” and found it in the best
interests of the children to continue “[t]he equal timeshare” that had “been
going on for many years.”
      Now represented by counsel, Robert filed this appeal. Tara has not
filed a brief on appeal, but the children (through minors’ counsel) oppose
Robert’s arguments.
                                DISCUSSION

      Robert asserts the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant
a continuance after permitting his attorney to withdraw on the eve of trial.
He further contends that this error requires reversal and remand for a new
trial. Although we agree with his first argument, we find that the error was
not prejudicial under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) because
on the facts of this case it is not reasonably probable that an appropriate
continuance, if granted, would have changed the result.

                                       8
A.   Robert’s Claim of Error Is Procedurally Preserved

      We first address two procedural arguments that minors’ counsel
claim requires affirmance. Counsel first assert that Robert has failed
to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings because
the first day of trial on November 18, 2021 was not reported, but was
instead memorialized in a settled statement. They maintain we cannot
decide the appeal in Robert’s favor because the settled statement does
not give any reasons for the court’s denial of the continuance.
      Notwithstanding the parties’ contentions, however, it does not
appear that Robert requested a continuance on the first day of trial at
all. The settled statement summarizes prior proceedings as follows:
“The Court notes that, Robert’s prior . . . attorney . . . was released by
the Court on November 16, 2021 . . . . The Court denied Robert’s
request for a continuance to obtain counsel, and that Robert is now pro
per. The Court noted the pleadings received from Robert were late, but
the Court still accepted his documents under the circumstances.” The
minutes of the first day of trial similarly do not reflect any renewed
request for continuance. We cannot conclude that the court denied a
renewed request on the first day of trial.
      In any case, the record is sufficient with respect to the request
Robert clearly did make. Robert asked for a continuance in writing in
his response to counsel’s request to withdraw. The court considered
and denied the request on November 16, giving reasons at the hearing
and in its order.
      Separately, minors’ counsel claims that we should affirm because
Robert failed to file a “noticed motion or formal ex parte application” as
required by Rule 3.1332(b). This is not an appropriate basis for

                                        9
affirmance. Robert requested a continuance in his written declaration
submitted to the court. The court addressed that request on the merits
and said it would not grant any continuances. Repackaging the same
request as a noticed motion would have been pointless in light of the
court’s clear statements. “The law does not require a futile act.”
(Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1265,
1274.)
      Moreover, although “mere self-representation is not a ground for
exceptionally lenient treatment” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8
Cal.4th 975, 984), “[t]rial judges must acknowledge that propria
persona litigants often do not have an attorney’s level of knowledge
about the legal system and are more prone to misunderstanding the
courts requirements” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276,
1284). Robert, proceeding without counsel against his wishes, would
have reasonably understood that his motion for a continuance had been
denied on the merits. It would be perverse to penalize him for failing to
formally renew a request that he knew had already been rejected.

B.   The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying a Continuance
     Without Any Inquiry into the Particulars of the Request

      Rule 3.1332(c) specifically addresses requests for the continuance
of a trial based on the unavailability of counsel:

         “Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each
         request for a continuance must be considered on its own
         merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an
         affirmative showing of good cause requiring the
         continuance. Circumstances that may indicate good cause
         include: . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
         (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death,
         illness, or other excusable circumstances; [and]

                                       10
           (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there
           is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required
           in the interests of justice[.]”

“In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider
all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination.” (Rule
3.1332(d).) The factors that are typically significant are listed in the rule and
include:
           “(1) The proximity of the trial date;

           (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension
           of time, or delay of trial due to any party;

           (3) The length of the continuance requested;

           (4) The availability of alternative means to address the
           problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a
           continuance;

           (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a
           result of the continuance;

           (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the
           reasons for that status and whether the need for a
           continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;

           (7) The court’s calendar and the impact of granting a
           continuance on other pending trials;

           (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial;

           (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance;

           (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a
           continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing
           conditions on the continuance; and

           (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair
           determination of the motion or application.” (Ibid.)

                                          11
We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.
(See Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389,
1395 (Oliveros).)
      Losing counsel shortly before trial often constitutes good cause
for a continuance. (See, e.g., Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1395
[trial court erred in denying request for a trial continuance in medical
malpractice case where lead trial counsel was unavailable due to
another trial]; Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
1242, 1244 (Hernandez) [“If plaintiff’s counsel’s serious physical illness
and its debilitating effects culminating in death during the final stages
of litigation are not good cause for continuing a trial and reopening of
discovery, there is no such thing as good cause.”]; Vann v. Shilleh
(1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 196 (Vann) [“[A] necessary substitution of
counsel just prior to trial may justify the granting of a continuance,
in some cases.”]; see also Rule 3.1332(c)(3)–(c)(4).) Here, the court
appeared to recognize as much, noting that counsel’s withdrawal “at
this late stage” was likely to “prejudice” Robert. The court permitted
counsel to withdraw because of “fundamental differences . . . on how to
proceed and what the goals are at trial.” The court did not assess fault
for the breakdown, nor was such a finding required to conclude that
withdrawal was appropriate. (See Estate of Falco (1987) 188
Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014 [“It was not relevant who caused the breakdown
for the purposes of determining whether appellants should be allowed
to withdraw, but rather, the trial court’s concern focused on the effects
the rift would have on [clients’] legal representation.”].) These are,
therefore, circumstances that on their face would seem to justify a
continuance of some duration. (See Rule 3.1332(c).)

                                       12
      Nonetheless, after deciding to permit counsel to withdraw, the
court explained that it would not grant a continuance primarily
because it had previously told the parties the trial would not be
continued. The court’s order simply noted that it had “indicated it had
previously told all parties that there would be no continuance of the
trial.” Consistency may be a virtue, but as Ralph Waldo Emerson
reminds us, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”
The appropriate exercise of judicial discretion requires the judge to
reexamine tentative conclusions in light of changed circumstances.
Here, the decision to permit the withdrawal of counsel on the eve of
trial is nothing if not a changed circumstance. The court could not
merely rely on its prior statements, but was instead required to revisit
the reasons those statements to determine whether they still applied in
light of the changed circumstance.
      In Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197, as in this case, the court

granted an attorney’s request to withdraw on the eve of trial. 3
Personally appearing in court the following day, the defendant asked
for a continuance to obtain new counsel. (Vann, at p. 195.) The judge
denied the request, pointing to the court’s heavy calendar and “no
continuance” policy. (Id. at pp. 195–196.) The Court of Appeal
reversed, concluding that the judge abused his discretion by “ma[king]
no effort to analyze the situation in which [the defendant] found
himself.” (Id. at p. 198.) It noted that the judge’s decision “was
peremptory and based solely on a policy against continuances, without

3    The appellate court ultimately concluded that the attorney’s
withdrawal was improper and amounted to abandonment of the client.
(Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 197.)

                                       13
considering whether the case before it justified a departure from that
salutary policy.” (Id. at p. 199.)
      The trial court’s decision in this case was not based on a blanket
department policy against continuances in every case, as was the
situation in Vann. But it was based on a blanket policy of denying any
continuance of the trial in this case, despite a significant change of
circumstance. In that sense, it suffers from a similar defect—the
failure to consider whether new facts and a developing situation
necessitate reevaluation of a prior decision and rebalancing the
competing interests. (See Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4h at
p. 1247.) Thus, we do not hold that the trial court was obligated to
grant a continuance, or that a continuance of some particular length
was required. The problem here is that the court failed to conduct the
necessary inquiry.
      Minors’ counsel points out that the court did not merely rely on
its prior ruling that there would be no continuances. The court
specifically explained to Robert, “[I]t’s not good for your kids or for mom
or for you, for that matter, to have this go on any longer.” Minors’
counsel thus suggests that “the paramount need to determine the
proper care and custody of the children, on balance, outweighed
grounds for a continuance.”
      There is no question that the goal of promptly resolving custody
disputes deserves significant weight. (Cf. In re Jerry R. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 388, 431 [“Children have a critical interest in stability and
permanency, which is undermined by unnecessary delay”].) Here,
however, there is no indication that the court balanced the general

                                       14
interest in efficiency and finality 4 against the new “facts and
circumstances . . . relevant to the determination.” (Rule 3.1332(d).)
Importantly, although Robert suggested that he had already made
efforts to retain new counsel, the court did not ask whether that
attorney had agreed to take the case or how long it would take the new
attorney to prepare for trial. Without making this fundamental
inquiry, the court lacked the information necessary to balance the
competing interests at stake. It thus failed to properly exercise its
broad discretion. (See Oliveros, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399
[“The court’s failure to carefully balance all of the competing interests
at stake, guided by the strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on
the merits, constituted an abuse of discretion.”].)
      Minors’ counsel urges us to find that factors in the record could
have supported a decision to deny a continuance. But that is precisely
the problem, and the argument misapprehends our role on review.
The trial court is surely endowed with broad discretion to grant or deny
continuances. (J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1139.)
“ ‘[W]hen the record clearly demonstrates what the trial court did, we
will not presume it did something different.’ ” (Border Business Park,
Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1550.) The court
having made its determination and a record of its reasons, our role is to
review the court’s decision making. And we cannot know whether

4     We note that neither the court nor minors’ counsel identified any
specific circumstances in this case that would warrant the denial of any
continuance longer than a day. (Cf. Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
1247 [“prejudice petitioner suffered due to the terminal illness and death of
his attorney” was not outweighed by opposing party’s “claim that he would be
prejudiced” by a continuance, which was “conclusional” and not “supported
with any evidence”].)

                                       15
denial of the continuance in this case was proper because the record
does not include the necessary and critical inquiries. In these
circumstances, we must conclude that the court abused its discretion.

C.   Robert Has Failed to Establish Reversible Error

     Having concluded that the trial court’s denial of Robert’s request for a
continuance is not supported by the record, we turn to the question whether
this error requires reversal. The California Constitution states:
      “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
      any cause . . . for any error as to any matter of procedure,
      unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
      the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
      complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
      (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)

This provision usually prohibits reversal where the challenged error did not
affect the outcome of the proceedings and thus did not prejudice the
appellant. (See In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073
(Christopher L.).) However, “certain errors, by their nature, result in a
‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of the California [Constitution,]
requiring reversal without regard to the strength of the evidence received at
trial.” (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 493.) We call such errors
“structural.” (See Christopher L., at p. 1074.)
      We first consider whether the failure to grant a continuance constituted
a structural error. Concluding that it does not, we proceed to Robert’s
alternative argument that there is a reasonable probability that the court’s
failure to grant a continuance affected the outcome of the custody proceedings

under the Watson test. 5

5    For the first time on reply, Robert appears to offer a third alternative
argument, contending that “the showing of prejudice on the denial of a

                                       16
      1.    There Is No Structural Error

      Robert principally contends that under Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d
192, the trial court’s abuse of discretion warrants automatic reversal. As we
have already explained, the appellate court in Vann reversed a trial court’s
decision denying a continuance after it improperly permitted a lawyer to
withdraw the Friday before a Monday trial, leaving the clients (defendants in
the action) unrepresented. (Id. at p. 197.) It concluded that the error was
reversible without considering whether defendants suffered prejudice. (Id.
at p. 200 [“[W]e reverse on the grounds that the denial of the continuance
was an abuse of discretion”].)
      While the decision of a sister appellate court is entitled to our
thoughtful consideration, it is not binding on us. (See, e.g., People v. Osotonu
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 992, 998.) Because Vann gives no reason for its
conclusion that the error was reversible without any discussion of prejudice,
we do not find it particularly persuasive on this point. Moreover, we are
bound by the California Constitution’s dictate that we may reverse only if
there has been a “miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) And
recent Supreme Court authority provides helpful guidance in determining
whether an improper denial of a continuance that effectively precludes a
client from retaining trial counsel is inherently a miscarriage of justice.

continuance is a bit different from the typical analysis of prejudice.” His
reply brief claims he is not required to show a possibility of a “different
result” to demonstrate “prejudice” because he was deprived a “fair hearing.”
But Robert made no such argument in his opening brief, clearly contending
that an error gives rise to reversible prejudice if it “ ‘affected the verdict’ ”
and that “[a]s a result of his lack of counsel, Tara was awarded sole legal
custody.” To the extent Robert seeks to belatedly raise a new argument, we
decline to consider it. (See, e.g., Holguin v. Dish Network LLC (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1310, 1328, fn. 9 [issues not raised in opening brief are
forfeited].)

                                        17
      In Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th 1063, the question presented was
“whether it is structural error, and thus reversible per se, for a juvenile court
to proceed with a hearing to determine its jurisdiction over a child and
disposition of the dependency petition without an incarcerated parent’s
presence and without appointing counsel for the parent.” (Id. at p. 1069.)
The court held “that while the provisions for presence and appointment of
counsel are important protections for both the parent and the child, the
juvenile court’s failure to comply does not require reversal per se.” (Ibid.)
      Justice Liu’s opinion looked to three factors enumerated in Weaver v.
Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. 286 (Weaver). (Christopher L., supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 1077.) “The first of the three Weaver rationales asks whether
‘the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous
conviction but instead protects some other interest.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Weaver,
at p. 295.) The court found that the interest in counsel and personal presence
“ensures that the juvenile court has the fullest picture of the relevant facts
before disposing of a dependency petition,” which is “not easily distinguished
from the parent’s own interest because it also serves to protect the parent
from an erroneous determination.” (Christopher L., at p. 1077.)
      Second, Christopher L. considered “that the question of whether the
errors here were harmless does not invariably require ‘a speculative inquiry
into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.’ ” (Christopher L.,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1078.) The court recounted the appellate court’s
prejudice analysis to illustrate the “feasibility of harmless error analysis in
this context.” (Ibid.) The question in the family court was “whether the court
properly denied reunification services to” the father, and there were two
indisputably applicable provisions providing that reunification services not
“be ordered unless the juvenile court f[ound], ‘by clear and convincing

                                       18
evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1078–1079.) Father had failed to argue that reunification services were
in the best interests of the child. (Id. at p. 1079.)
      Third, the court considered whether these “error[s] ‘always result[ ]
in fundamental unfairness.’ ” (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1081.)

         “ ‘[I]n a dependency proceeding the issues normally involve
         evaluations of the parents’ present willingness and ability
         to provide appropriate care for the child and the existence
         and suitability of alternative placements.’ [Citation.] The
         presence of counsel generally helps to facilitate this
         assessment by ensuring that a more complete picture of the
         parent’s interests and ability to provide for the child’s care
         are presented to the court. But it does not follow that the
         absence of counsel invariably results in unfairness in light
         of the statutory scheme governing reunification services.
         Nor does it follow that absence of counsel from one stage of
         the proceeding necessarily renders the entire proceeding
         fundamentally unfair, especially where, as here, counsel
         was provided after the jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
         and could have utilized a statutory mechanism to seek
         reconsideration of any prior order by the juvenile court.
         (Ibid.)

The opinion observed that, “in the dependency context, automatic reversal for
errors that do not invariably lead to fundamental unfairness would exact a
particularly steep cost” to children who have a critical need to stable homes.
(Ibid.) The Supreme Court thus “decline[d] to adopt a rule of automatic
reversal in cases involving the errors that occurred here.” (Id. at p. 1082.)
      Christopher L. adopts and applies a framework for assessing whether
an error is structural. That analysis is all the more relevant because of the
salient ways in which dependency and custody proceedings are similar,

                                        19
including the unique interests at stake and the primacy of child welfare. 6
Christopher L. thus guides our analysis here.
      The first Weaver factor, whether “ ‘the right at issue is not designed to
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some
other interest’ ” (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1077), has a nearly
identical application to these circumstances. In making a permanent custody
determination, the court must consider “all of the circumstances bearing on
the best interests of the minor child” (Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 1047, 1053), and thus benefits from the presence of counsel to
ensure it “has the fullest picture of the relevant facts” (Christopher L., at
p. 1076). This is “not easily distinguished from the parent’s own interest”
(id. at p. 1077) because in adversarial proceedings each parent is interested
in presenting their best case for custody.
       With respect to the second factor, Robert does not suggest that this is
the kind of case that “invariably require[s] ‘a speculative inquiry into what
might have occurred in an alternate universe.’ ” (Christopher L., supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 1078.) In fact, as explained below, he argues that he can meet
the harmless error standard of Watson.
      As for the third factor, whether these “error[s] ‘always result[ ] in
fundamental unfairness’ ” (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1081), we
cannot conclude they do. As in Christopher L., Robert was only unable to
retain counsel for trial, not all proceedings. (Ibid.) Although a custody trial
was a “critical stage,” so too was the proceeding in Christopher L. (Id. at

6      We also acknowledge important ways in which juvenile court
proceedings are different, including the potential in dependency for
termination of parental rights and the statutory right to appointed counsel.
(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1575
(Campi).)

                                       20
p. 1076.) Moreover, given that the trial in this case took place on
nonconsecutive days over the course of several months, we cannot assume
that the court’s refusal to grant a continuance deprived Robert of counsel for
the entirety of the trial. Robert does not explain why he failed to obtain
counsel at any point during the extended trial.
         In addition, Christopher L. found it important that there are grounds to
request reconsideration of any order in dependency proceedings if the parent
shows “(1) that a change of circumstances or new evidence requires a changed
order, and (2) that the requested change would promote the best interests of
the child.” (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1080.) Although the
standards are not identical (see, e.g., Ragghanti v. Reyes (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 989, 996 [principles of res judicata inform “changed
circumstances” test in custody cases]), final custody orders can be changed
if a parent establishes a “ ‘ “significant change in circumstances indicates
that a different arrangement would be in the child’s best interest.” ’ ” (In re
Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1088.) Like the parent in
Christopher L., Robert is not forever barred from seeking to alter the custody
order.
         Finally, Robert briefly contends that these circumstances always result
in a deprivation of due process, pointing to dicta in Vann suggesting that
there is a constitutional right to “counsel in any adversary proceedings in
which the adversary party has the benefit of the right to counsel.” (Vann,
supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at 200.) We are not bound to follow any court’s dicta.
(See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
1279, 1301.) In general, although a party has the right to appear through
counsel if a lawyer has been retained (see Chan v. Curran (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 601, 625, fn. 12), there “is no due process right to counsel in

                                        21
civil cases” (Walker v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1107, 1116). There is no
statute or court rule mandating counsel in dissolution proceedings. (Campi,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.) Indeed, it is not “fundamentally [un]fair”
for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to
deprive a parent of counsel in a dependency proceeding where parental rights
are at stake. (Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 32–
33; see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) Rather, to establish a violation of due
process, a parent must show that the presence of counsel could have “made a
determinative difference.” (Lassiter, at p. 33.) In other words, we must
engage in a prejudice analysis—assessing whether the lack of representation
affected the result—to decide whether the party’s due process rights were
violated. Accordingly, because the lack of representation in such
circumstances does not inherently offend due process, we cannot conclude
that the error here is a structural one requiring per se reversal.

      2.    Robert Has Not Shown Prejudice

      Both sides contend we should look to the Watson test and reverse if it is
reasonably probable that Robert would have achieved a more favorable result

in the absence of the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 7 After

7      We do not hold that this is the appropriate harmless error analysis in
all cases in which denial of a continuance results in deprivation of trial
counsel. But by only discussing the Watson standard, Robert has forfeited
any argument that a different standard applies. (See, e.g., Browne v. County
of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726 [arguments not raised on appeal
are forfeited].) In any case, Robert has not established that the denial of a
continuance gave rise to a violation of the United States Constitution and
thus has not demonstrated that the Chapman harmless error standard
should apply. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“[B]efore a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)

                                       22
closely reviewing the record, we conclude Robert has failed to establish
prejudice and reversible error under Watson.
      Because it is Robert’s burden to show prejudice, we note at the outset
that he makes no representation regarding the availability of another lawyer
had the court granted him a continuance. He merely assumes he could have
obtained alternate counsel. This is particularly problematic given the
statements in his declaration to the effect that he had already contacted a
specific attorney. Moreover, although the proceedings continued over the
course of several months, Robert never sought to substitute new counsel.
      More importantly, even if we assume competent counsel was available
to try the case had a reasonable continuance been granted, all of Robert’s
grounds for claiming prejudice suffer from the same deficiency. He fails to
explain how any of the circumstances he notes had a substantive effect on the
outcome of the case. For instance, he contends that he had to submit a trial
brief prepared in one day and that “Tara’s attorney had 7 months to prepare
for trial.” Although suggestive of disadvantage, Robert does not point to any
tangible effect of these circumstances.
      Robert also claims he was unable to effectively challenge Tara’s
contention that he had waived his privilege regarding his mental health.
The court found only a limited waiver with respect to Robert’s
representations to a custody investigator. Robert fails to explain what else
an attorney could have argued or how the court’s ruling affected his case.
      Robert further contends that he “was not allowed to call the children’s
therapist . . . for additional testimony” or to call the parenting coordinator
because they were not on his witness list. As he acknowledges, however, both
witnesses did testify in some capacity. Robert conducted a direct
examination of the therapist, his first witness, and the parenting coordinator

                                       23
was permitted to testify as a rebuttal witness. He fails to explain what other
testimony he anticipated eliciting had he been permitted to question these
witnesses further.
      Similarly, Robert asserts in his reply brief that he was prejudiced
because he was not allowed to introduce police body-worn camera footage
based on his failure to call the officers as witnesses and properly lay a
foundation. “ ‘We will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first time
in a reply brief.’ ” (Magana v. Superior Court (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 840, 855,
fn. 2.) In any event, Robert again fails to explain what these videos would
have shown or how they would have affected the outcome of the case.
      In sum, Robert has given us no basis to conclude that the denial of a
continuance affected the outcome of the proceedings.

                                DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                                                       DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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