Court Opinion

ID: 9791249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:08:09.082985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.099033
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
concurring: As in State v. Davis, 237 Kan. 155, 697 P.2d 1321 (1985), the majority effectively deprives a defendant of meaningful cross-examination of a State’s witness who had previously entered into a plea bargain with the State. The right of cross-examination is one of the cornerstones of the United States and Kansas Constitutions.
The majority recognizes the fact that a witness entered into a plea bargain with the State is admissible to impeach that witness, but allows the trial judge discretion as jo whether the jury is allowed to hear the difference in the penalty resulting from the bargain. It is the difference in the penalty that convinced the accomplice to enter a plea, and the value received by the witness for his or her testimony is relevant and subject to cross-examination.
I also disagree with the majority’s categorization of the trial judge’s erroneous exclusion of the results of the plea bargain as an abuse of judicial discretion. That evidence was relevant. All relevant evidence is admissible, unless prohibited by statute. K.S.A. 60-407(f). A trial judge who excludes relevant evidence does not abuse discretion, but errs. K.S.A. 60-405. If a trial judge determines that the evidence is prejudicial to the rights of the accused, the judge has discretion to exclude admissible evidence *634when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. K.S.A. 60-445. When a trial judge erroneously excludes relevant evidence, the question is not whether the exclusion was an abuse of judicial discretion, but whether the exclusion was harmless.
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that the trial judge’s erroneous decision did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant and, therefore, was harmless and that reversal is not required.
Miller, C.J., and Allegrucci, J., join in the foregoing concurrence.