Court Opinion

ID: 9639563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:23:20.634973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:19.895710
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Opinion by:
SANDEE BRYAN MARION, Justice.
The underlying strict liability lawsuit was brought by the appellants, Donell Coleman and Sylvia Coleman, individually and on behalf of their four minor children, for injuries suffered by Donell Coleman when his work uniform caught fire. The uniform was supplied by Cintas Sales Corporation (“Cintas”) to Coleman’s employer, The Quarry at Lincoln Heights Golf Club (“the Quarry”). Cintas moved for summary judgment on the Colemans’ marketing defect claim on two defensive grounds, learned intermediary and common knowledge. The trial court granted the motion, without stating its grounds. We hold that Cintas established its entitlement to summary judgment on its common knowledge defense; therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Coleman is a grounds keeper for the Quarry, and his job includes raking sand traps, removing weeds, and operating lawn mowers. While at work, Coleman was required to wear a uniform supplied to him by the Quarry. The uniform was made of sixty-five percent polyester and thirty-five percent cotton and was not flame-retardant. Other than appearance, the uniform serves no function.
The accident occurred on the Quarry’s premises, during the workday, while the maintenance crew prepared a barbecued-steak lunch. Coleman volunteered to cook the steaks over a charcoal and lighter fluid-fueled barbecue pit. Coleman positioned the barbecue pit in front of the Quarry’s maintenance facility, and moved a picnic bench alongside where he placed various condiments, cooking utensils, and the steaks. He filled the pit with charcoal briquettes and coated them with lighter fluid. After the coals had soaked for approximately six minutes, Coleman lit them without incident. The fire caught and moved across the coals. After approximately seven minutes, Coleman spread the coals, placed a grill on top of the pit, and set the first and second steaks on top of the grill. When Coleman reached to the picnic bench for the third steak, he felt a gust of wind at his face and saw a burst of flame out of the corner of his eye. He stepped back, raising his hand to protect his face. When Coleman realized his shirt had caught fire, he brought his arm to his mid-section in an attempt to smother the fire. Almost immediately, the entire shirt was in flames, and because portions of the shirt melted or fused to his body, he could not remove the shirt to escape the flames.
Coleman ran to the nearby lawn and proceeded to “stop, drop, and roll.” Despite these efforts, the shirt continued to bum. Each time Coleman thought the fire was extinguished, he heard what he called a “poof’ and the shirt reignited. Coleman then ran toward his supervisor’s office for help, where he was directed to a changing room with a cement floor. Using other uniforms, Coleman’s supervisor extin*386guished the flames after about one minute, and called the paramedics. Coleman suffered injuries, which resulted in $300,000 in medical expenses and lost wages.
Cintas filed its first motion for summary judgment on the Colemans’ design defect claim, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Cintas raised for the first time its assertion that it was entitled to summary judgment on the Colemans’ marketing defect claim. A panel of this court affirmed the summary judgment on the Colemans’ design defect claim, but reversed the judgment on the Colemans’ marketing defect claim. See Coleman v. Cintas Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). Cintas then filed a second motion for summary judgment on the Colemans’ marketing defect claim, which the trial court granted and is the subject of this appeal.
COMMON KNOWLEDGE DEFENSE
Manufacturers and suppliers have a duty to inform users about hazards associated with the use of their products. Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex.1986). However, there is no duty to warn of dangers that are of common knowledge to the consuming public. American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex.1997); USX Corp. v. Salinas, 818 S.W.2d 473, 483 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied). The common knowledge defense is “an extraordinary defense” and it “connotes a general societal understanding of the risks inherent in a specific product or class of products.” Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 427. A matter of common knowledge is information known by the public generally based upon indisputable facts. Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). The more disputable a fact may be, the less likely it will belong to that narrow set of facts judicially recognized as common knowledge. Id.
As the party asserting the defense, Cintas had the burden of establishing that the dangers attributable to its non-flame retardant uniforms were a matter of common knowledge when Coleman began wearing the uniform. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 428. Cintas contends it established its entitlement to summary judgment because it is common knowledge that clothes will catch fire when exposed to a flame; therefore, it had no duty to warn Coleman of this danger. Coleman, on the other hand, argues that the speed and manner in which his uniform would burn and the difficulty of extinguishing the fire once ignited are not common knowledge.
We recognize that the characteristics of mass-marketed, synthetic wearing apparel may not be understood by the average consumer. However, we hold as a matter of law that it is commonly known that non-flame retardant clothing will burn once exposed to an open flame, especially flame arising from a charcoal and lighter fluid-fueled barbecue pit, and the wearer of the clothes may be severely injured. See Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., Inc., 19 Kan.App.2d 1015, 881 P.2d 576, 588, 588 (Ct.App.1994) (“It is obvious that when clothes are exposed to flame, particularly the intense flame of a carburetor backfire, the garment may catch on fire. Under these circumstances, Lee Apparel had no duty to warn of this obvious danger and had no duty to warn ... that the lining of the coveralls would ignite when exposed to a flame and be difficult to extinguish once ignited.”); cf. Robins v. The Kroger Co., 982 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998) (danger associated with fire produced from a cigarette lighter is an obvious risk within the ordinary knowledge of the community), pet. denied, 5 S.W.3d 221 (Tex.1999); Malone v. Hendrick Med. *387Center, 846 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1993, writ denied) (act of burning someone with water that is too hot and the resulting pain are matters plainly within the common knowledge of laymen). Accordingly, Cintas had no duty to warn Coleman of this danger.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Cintas established its entitlement to summary judgment on its common knowledge defense; therefore, we do not address whether Cintas was entitled to summary judgment on its learned intermediary defense. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Dissenting opinion by: ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Justice.