Court Opinion

ID: 9497729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:58:24.315568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:22.646036
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree that the use of leading questions on direct examination was not error, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine and impeach the alleged victim, C. Byers1 (“Byers”), regarding her prior inconsistent statement constituted a mere harmless error. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
Petitioner, Vincent Jordan, was a taxicab driver who transported Byers, a woman with Down syndrome, to her place of employment. It is undisputed that during the second occasion that Jordan drove her to work, Jordan pulled over, placed on a condom, and he and Byers had sexual intercourse in the back seat of the vehicle. As a result of this encounter, Jordan was charged under Ohio state law with two counts of rape against Byers. Jordan has consistently maintained that Byers consented to the sexual encounter.
Jordan’s first trial began on September 14, 1999, but ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous decision. During this trial, Byers’s testimonial recitation of the incident did not include any statement indicating that she pushed Jordan away from her during the sexual encounter. Several months after the first trial, the prosecution tried Jordan again based on the original charges.2 The second trial began on January 24, 2000. The only evidence introduced to support a finding of the necessary element of force or the threat of force was testimonial evidence from Byers. While there were other statements in her testimony that could lead a reasonable jury to believe that force or the threat of force was used, only one statement — that Byers pushed Jordan away from her — was consistent and uncontested. Despite the relative importance of this issue, the trial court refused to allow Jordan’s defense attorney to impeach Byers regarding her prior inconsistent statement inasmuch as she failed to men*366tion the use of any force during the first trial. At the close of the second trial, the jury deliberated for six-and-a-half hours, over two days, and ultimately found Jordan guilty of engaging in vaginal intercourse with Byers through force or the threat of force. Jordan was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.3
Jordan filed an appeal with the state court, in which he argued that his confrontation and due process rights were violated. In particular, Jordan claimed that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecution to ask the alleged victim leading questions on direct examination and by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of his accuser. Jordan also claimed that the evidence presented was insufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court determined that the limitation of cross-examination was, in fact, error, but it was harmless. The court therefore affirmed Jordan’s conviction. After exhausting his state remedies, Jordan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, restating these constitutional claims. Like the state appellate court, the district court found that the trial court erred in prohibiting the cross-examination of Byers regarding her prior inconsistent statement, but also found the error to be harmless. Thus, the district court denied his petition.
On appeal, the majority has agreed with the decision of the district court. For the reasons explained below, I am unable to join that opinion.
II.
Under Ohio statute, rape is defined as “sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.” Ohio R.C. § 2907.02(A)(2). An essential element of the crime of rape is proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant used “force or [the] threat of force.” Id. Regarding this element, the jury was instructed as follows:
Force means any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing. In determining whether the defendant threatened the immediate use of force, ... you may consider the size and demeanor of the defendant, the likelihood of physical injury from the defendant’s conduct, and any peculiar vulnerability of the victim.
J.A. at 813-14. See State v. Russell, 1991 WL 57331, *5 (Ohio App.1991) (citing State v. Garter, 29 Ohio App.3d 148, 504 N.E.2d 469 (1985)).
Byers’s testimony was the only evidence offered to prove that Jordan used or threatened the immediate use of force — a necessary element of the crime.4 Her testimonial evidence was often inconsistent, except regarding the issue of whether Byers pushed Jordan away from her while he was inserting his penis into her vagina. On four separate occasions during direct examination, the prosecution questioned *367Byers about her allegedly pushing Jordan away from her; three of those four times Byers was asked a leading question. The first time, the prosecution asked, “You held your hands up like this, right?” and she responded, “I did it [ (i.e., held her hands up) ] while I was trying to push him away.” J.A. at 537. The second time, the prosecution asked, “What do you mean you didn’t like [his penis]?” and she responded, “I tried to push him away.” Id. at 544. The third time the prosecution stated, “you said one time that T tried to push him away,”’ and she answered, ‘Yeah, Yes.” Id. at 560. After she answered, the prosecution continued to question Byers about the pushing; she testified that she pushed Jordan “because [she] didn’t want him to touch [her] like that.” Id. at 561. The prosecution even had her demonstrate on the stand how she pushed him. Finally, immediately after Byers testified that Jordan put his penis inside of her vagina, the very last question on direct examination was: “Did you try and push [Jordan] away before he did that?” Byers answered, ‘Yes, I did.” Id. at 562.
Even though there were multiple references made to Byers pushing Jordan, the trial judge did not permit Jordan’s defense attorney to impeach Byers’s testimony using her prior inconsistent statement. The state appellate court and the federal district court both found that the trial court judge’s ruling constituted error. Those courts, however, reasoned that this was harmless error. The majority agrees and concludes that “Jordan’s inability to impeach the victim did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the verdict.” Majority at 363-64.
The standard of “harmless error” has led to some confusion and the Supreme Court has clarified its meaning in the past several years. Specifically, the Court indicated that “[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The Court defined “grave doubt” as when “in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. As the Court explained, “ ‘if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.’ ” Id. at 437-38, 115 S.Ct. 992 (quoting Kottteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Moreover, we have indicated that “[t]he standard of review requires the reviewing court to examine the effect of the error on the jury rather than the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.” Calvert v. Wilson, 288 F.3d 823, 833 (6th Cir.2002) (emphasis added) (noting that the district court erred in denying the writ because its discussion focused on the “significant evidence” against the defendant).
The majority finds that refusing to allow Jordan’s attorney to impeach Byers on her statement regarding pushing was harmless error. To support its conclusion, the majority reasons that there was overwhelming evidence presented for the jury to find Jordan guilty of rape, regardless of the error. I disagree with the conclusion that the other evidence was overwhelming, and I also disagree that such an inquiry is a proper application of the law.
*368Despite the fact that Jordan was erroneously prohibited from impeaching Byers on the issue of force, the resolution of this case was not an easy decision for the jury; they deliberated for six-and-a-half hours, over a two-day period. In light of the other evidence to prove the element of force or the threat of force beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could have certainly relied upon what appeared to be the uncontested and consistent statement of Byers regarding her pushing Jordan away to find the requisite element of force as provided in the jury instructions.
The majority suggests that the jury could have found the element of the threat of the immediate use of force based on Byers’s vulnerability, Jordan’s size and demeanor, the likelihood of physical injury, and Byers’s fear.5 Majority at 364. To show how these factors, in particular the last two, could have led the jury to find the element of the threat of force, the majority cites to Byers’s testimony.
I agree that the prosecution elicited testimony from Byers that may lead a reasonable jury to believe that Jordan threatened the immediate use of force; however, her relevant testimony, other than her pushing Jordan away, was highly contested and often inconsistent. Even if the jury discounted Jordan’s testimony for lack of credibility, as the majority suggests, Byers contradicted herself on numerous occasions. For example, Byers testified that she was scared when Jordan was attempting to have intercourse with her because he hurt her, J.A. at 540, but admitted that she was hurt “because [she] got surgery on her hip,” id. at 537. This testimony leaves reasonable doubt as to whether she was hurt primarily as a result of force exerted by Jordan or whether her pain was simply discomfort due to her recent surgery. Even though Byers testified that she was afraid that Jordan was going to hurt her, id. at 631, she also indicated that it was not “tough getting [her] clothes off' nor did she scream or fight when Jordan was allegedly removing her clothes,6 id. at 627. Moreover, to demonstrate that Jordan used force in having sexual intercourse with Byers, the prosecution attempted to prove that Jordan had torn her underwear. Yet when Byers was asked by the prosecution if her underwear had a hole in them when she put them on, she simply responded, “I hate to say this, but they was dirty.” Id. at 556. Byers also indicated that she might have told Jordan that her underwear was old and torn. Id. at 584. These inconsistent statements give rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the sexual act occurred with the necessary “force or threat of force.” The inconsistency of this other evidence provides all the more reason why I cannot agree that the trial court’s error in refusing to permit the defendant to confront his accuser on her prior inconsistent statement had no substantial or injurious effect on the jury.
People with Down syndrome, such as Byers, are among those most in need of the protection of our courts. In seeking to protect these citizens, however, courts cannot dismiss the fundamental rights guaranteed to everyone under the Constitution. This includes a defendant’s Sixth Amendment “right to confront witnesses against him.” United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir.2002). After reviewing the record de novo, it is clear that the constitutional rights of the defendant in *369this case were compromised. Indeed, I am left with grave doubt regarding the substantial and injurious effect that this error had on the jury. Because I cannot in good conscience conclude that the error in this case was harmless, I respectfully dissent.

. Her first name has purposely been withheld.

. After the first trial, the prosecution brought a second indictment against Jordan, but it was dismissed on speedy trial grounds.

. The court also determined Jordan to be a sexual predator, but that decision was reversed by the state court on appeal and is not at issue before this court.

. The majority mischaracterizes my statement here by claiming that I am noting that "the victim's testimony that she pushed Jordan away is the only evidence of force or the threat of force.” Majority at 363-64 (emphasis added). Rather, I am simply stating that Byers’s entire testimony, including but not limited to her statement regarding pushing Jordan, is the only evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the element of force; Jordan does not concede that he either used or threatened the use of force.

. Although the majority correctly states that Ohio law allows a jury to consider the victim's fear when determining whether the defendant threatened the use of force, no specific jury instruction was given as it relates to fear.

. Jordan testified that Byers had removed her own clothing. Id. at 701.