Court Opinion

ID: 9757054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:16:17.359077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:34.416065
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion that the contempt order as to Linda McKinney should be reversed. She was unable *10to comply with the writ of habeas corpus because she did not have custody or control over the child at the time he was directed to be taken to the custody hearing. The present inability to comply with the writ is an affirmative defense to civil contempt, thus there was no basis for finding Linda McKinney’s actions contemptuous. Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
With regard to Donald McKinney’s contempt order, the majority looks beyond the face of the return of service as did the court below. They conclude that since Linda McKinney testified as to giving Mr. McKinney notice, that he should be deemed to have had knowledge of the writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, should be held in contempt of court for his non-compliance. The majority acknowledges the authority of Hollinger v. Hollinger, 416 Pa. 473, 206 A.2d 1 (1965) for the proposition that residents cannot attack a sheriff’s return when it recites facts showing that service has been effected. However, the majority confines Hollinger to the situation where service was, in fact, effected. The Court in Hollinger stated:
Our courts have long adhered to the rule that, in the absence of fraud, the return of service of a sheriff, which is full and complete on its face, is conclusive and immune from attack by extrinsic evidence, (cites omitted) Id. 416 Pa. at 476, 206 A.2d at 3.
It is true that Hollinger involved the situation where service, was in fact effected, but the language in Hollinger indicates that as long as there is a sheriff’s return full and complete on its face, it is immaterial whether the return shows that service was in fact made or whether it shows that it could not be effected. In either case the return would be conclusive and immune from attack. This interpretation of Hollinger is supported by the reasoning underlying this rule as set forth in Hollinger. The Court stated:
The rule of conclusiveness of a return of service of process is based upon the presumption that a sheriff, acting in the course of his official duties, acts with propriety and, therefore, when the sheriff in the course of such *11official duties makes a statement, by way of an official return, such statement is given conclusive effect. Id. at 477, 206 A.2d at 3.
It cannot be said that a sheriff is only presumed to act properly when he makes a return showing service was in fact made, and not when the return shows service could not be effected.
In the instant case there was a return by the sheriff stating, “Re: Donald McKinney, one of the within named defendants^] Unable to serve Mr. McKinney after numerous tries.” The return being full and complete on its face, should have been accorded the conclusiveness and immunity from attack mandated by Hollinger. The lower court, therefore, erred in allowing extrinsic evidence by Linda McKinney indicating that she informed Mr. McKinney of the writ.
Additionally, the majority indicates that Donald McKinney had notice of the writ of habeas corpus based on his New York attorney’s receipt of notice by mail.
The applicable statute describing the method of serving writs of habeas corpus is 12 P.S. § 1904. The statute in pertinent part states:
Service of the writ or the rule to show cause, as the case may be, shall be made forthwith in such manner as the judge shall direct, anywhere in the Commonwealth, upon the warden, superintendent or other person in charge of the penitentiary, prison, reformatory, house of detention, mental institution or other place in which the relator is imprisoned or detained, (emphasis added).
The statute expressly limits service upon the person having custody of relator to be effectuated within the territorial limits of this Commonwealth.* The Superior Court in Coombs v. Coombs, 225 Pa.Super. 304, 303 A.2d 498 (1973) reiterated the mandate that service be effected within the Commonwealth:
*12The order of the court required that service be made on the husband either personally or by certified mail. Implicit in the order was the fact that service to be effective was to be made in Pennsylvania. The record shows that he was served personally in Tampa, Florida. This was improper service. 12 P.S. § 1904. Id. at 309, 303 A.2d at 500.
Because this writ in the instant case was mailed to Mr. McKinney’s attorney in New York, this out of state service fails to comply with the requirements of section 1904.
Furthermore, New York counsel was not counsel of record in the instant case and, therefore, his receipt of notice cannot be imputed to Mr. McKinney Pa.R.C.P. 233.

 The statute also provides for additional service upon other interested parties which service is not expressly limited to effectuation within the Commonwealth.