Court Opinion

ID: 9577967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:02.920657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:07.319461
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent, since I think the main opinion, completely has missed the fundamental issue in this case.
*40The trial court in its very first sentence said “I am going to read you a little statute and give you the shock of your life: ‘77-11-3. Complainant to be examined: When a complaint is made before a magistrate charging a person with the commission of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the offense charged * * ”
There is not a smidgen of suggestion in this record to the effect that there was compliance with this interdiction.
The main opinion cites this statute which I think inapropos in this particular case. It does not point out in the record where it was followed in any way. It talks about some other statutes about filing complaints, and differences between felony complaints and misdemeanor complaints.
This case should be remanded to take evidence as to whether this statute was followed, and in such case it may be developed that shockingly it wasn’t.
There is nothing vital in this case about rubber signatures or who should file a complaint. The vital issue is: Did the magistrate .examine the complainant as to his knowledge of the commission of the crime. Until this is shown, a dismissal is quite proper. (Emphasis mine.)
CALLISTER, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HENRIOD, J.