Court Opinion

ID: 9627381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:53.155267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:45.427248
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. I disagree. I agree with majority’s conclusion that the illegal search of defendant’s briefcase at his arrest was harmless because the evidence discovered during that search was not introduced at trial and because the inventory of defendant’s briefcase was not derivative of that search.1 I disagree, however, with its *545conclusion that the officer was authorized to open defendant’s closed, opaque briefcase during the inventory at the jail. Because the officer conducted an illegal search under Article I, section 9, when he opened defendant’s briefcase, defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted.
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he degree to which an inventorying officer may scrutinize the items uncovered [in an inventory] is limited” by Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 10, 688 P2d 832 (1984). It outlined those limits in State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973), and State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984), and it is clear that those limits were exceeded in this case.
In Keller, the police discovered a closed fishing tackle box in the back of the defendant’s car. During the inventory of the defendant’s property, the police opened the tackle box and discovered drugs. The Supreme Court held that the police had conducted an unreasonable search in violation of Article I, section 9, when they opened the tackle box, and that they should have inventoried the box as “one fishing tackle box” without opening it to determine its contents. Keller, 265 Or at 629.2
In Perry, a police officer found the defendant intoxicated in front of a bus station and took him in for detoxification pursuant to the civil detoxification statute. The defendant had two suitcases with him, which the officer impounded. At the police station, the officer inventoried the two suitcases, opening one of them to look for valuables. Instead of finding valuables, he discovered drugs. The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory and he was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. It stated that the issue was “whether the police may, without a warrant, in a noncriminal, nonemergency situation open a closed container seized from [an] intoxicated person at the time he is booked *546in at the holding facility.” Perry, 298 Or at 26 (quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that opening a closed container in that situation, even to inventory valuables, constituted an unreasonable search, and the officer should have inventoried the suitcases as two closed suitcases. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court said:
“[A]ssume [that] the defendant in this case was arrested for driving with a suspended operator’s license a 1929 Stutz Bearcat and sitting on the seat beside him were all of his worldly possessions contained in two fishing tackle boxes — one large and one small, but both secured by red ribbons. Defendant, car, and tackle boxes were taken to the police station. Then, change the facts and assume that the same defendant was taken into custody on a civil hold for being intoxicated as a passenger in the same vehicle and the officers take him and his two fishing tackle boxes to the jail.
“Under both assumptions, an inventory could be carried out under the same administrative procedure. In the situation where the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended operator’s license, an alleged criminal act has triggered the impoundment and inventory of his property. Under [Keller], the police could not open and inventory the contents of the containers. However, the State now argues that when the defendant ends up in jail as a result of his intoxication or his being under the influence of a controlled substance, which is not a criminal act, that the booking officer may open and inventory closed containers as a part of the jail’s administrative procedure. We fail to see a distinction in the two situations which would persuade us to overrule [Keller].”
Id. at 27-28 (emphasis supplied). Reading Keller and Perry together, it is clear that, according to the Supreme Court, opening a closed container during an inventory, even if the purpose is to safeguard a person’s valuables, violates Article I, section 9.
We have recognized that point before. In State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or App 418, 426, 692 P2d 667 (1984), we analyzed Keller and Perry and concluded:
“The Oregon constitutional limitation on inventories by the police of property [that] has come into their possession lawfully, but not incident to an arrest or pursuant to a warrant, *547is simply this: property is to be listed by its outward appearance; no closed, opaque container may be opened to determine what, if anything, is inside it so that the contents may be inventoried in turn. This is a commendably clear and simple rule, easy to enforce in most circumstances[.]”
(Emphasis supplied.) Until today, we have followed that simple rule. See, e.g., State v. Maynard, 149 Or App 293, 942 P2d 851 (1997); State v. Lane, 135 Or App 233, 898 P2d 1358, rev den 322 Or 360 (1995). There is no reason for us not to follow it today. The officer in this case was searching for contraband when he opened the briefcase,3 but even if he were attempting to inventory defendant’s valuables, he should not have opened the briefcase but inventoried it as “one briefcase.” By opening it, he conducted an unreasonable search under Article I, section 9, and any evidence derived from that search should have been suppressed. We are bound by Supreme Court precedent to reach that conclusion, and the majority errs by concluding otherwise.
Our decision in State v. Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or App 407, 780 P2d 234, rev den 308 Or 660 (1989), does not affect that conclusion. In that case, we observed that “[n]either a wallet nor a purse is a ‘closed, opaque container.’ ” Id. at 412. “A wallet,” we continued,
“typically has openings for inserting money, credit cards and other valuables; even when folded shut, it is not ‘closed’ in the way that the box in Ridderbush was. A purse usually has compartments for storing money and other valuables and frequently holds a wallet. Because wallets or purses are primarily intended to be used to store valuables, it may be important to discover what is in them, both to protect the *548owner’s property and to prevent the assertion of false claims against the police. See ORS 133.455. Both are legitimate purposes for inventories of impounded property. * * * Although other containers may also hold valuable property, wallets and purses are uniquely designed for that purpose.”
Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, according to Mundt /Fincher, because wallets and purses are uniquely designed to carry valuables, wallets and purses announce their contents, and, in that sense, are not “opaque” at all. Because the contents announced are primarily valuables, we held in Mundt/ Fincher that an inventory policy can legitimately permit an officer to open them during an inventory. Mundt /Fincher did not overrule the closed container rule; indeed, this court does not have the authority to do that. Instead, in Mundt /Fincher we simply distinguished wallets and purses from “closed, opaque containers.”4
Relying on our decision in Mundt/Fincher, we recently held that an inventory policy could permit an officer to open a fanny pack during an inventory because a fanny pack is similar to a wallet or purse. State v. Bean, 150 Or App 223, 229, 946 P2d 292 (1997). The result in that case can be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Keller and Perry, as well as our decisions in Ridderbush and Mundt! Fincher, if, like a wallet and a purse, a fanny pack is “uniquely designed” to hold valuables, and, in that sense, is not a closed, opaque container. However, that decision represents the outer limits of the principle established by Mundt /Fincher.5
*549Today, by concluding that a closed briefcase is not a closed, opaque container, the majority goes far beyond that limit and effectively eviscerates the closed, opaque container rule. The majority reaches that conclusion because, it states, a briefcase is “typically used to store valuables.”6 153 Or App at 540. The fact that a briefcase typically stores valuables is irrelevant to our inquiry. Backpacks, beach bags, jacket pockets, camera cases, computer carriers and day-planners all may typically contain valuables, but, when closed, they are all closed containers that cannot be opened during an inventory. Indeed, suitcases may typically contain valuables. Nonetheless, in Perry, the Supreme Court held that an officer, even when looking for valuables, cannot open suitcases during an inventory. The relevant inquiry under Mundt! Fincher is not whether an item typically contains valuables, but whether it is uniquely designed to contain valuables.7 Unlike a wallet, a purse and even a fanny pack, a briefcase is not “uniquely designed” to hold valuables. It is uniquely designed to carry papers or books.8 Although it may hold valuable property, it is a closed container that cannot be opened during an inventory.
In this case, the officer conducted an unreasonable search under Article I, section 9, when he opened the briefcase during the inventory, and any evidence derived from that search should be suppressed. The constitutional interpretation that requires that result was established by the *550Supreme Court, and the majority errs when it rules otherwise.
Landau, Haselton and Wollheim, JJ., join in this dissent.

 The majority assumes, without deciding, that “the trial court’s ruling about the officer’s observation at the scene of the arrest is error.” 153 Or App at 539.1 think it is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Morton, 326 Or 466, 953 P2d 374 (1998), establishes that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. In Morton, while the defendant was being placed under arrest, a plastic container fell from her jacket. The defendant “ ‘denied knowing what was in the container, denied having ever seen it[,] and denied ownership of the container.’ ” Id. at 468 (quoting State v. Morton/Evans, 137 Or App 228, 230, 904 P2d 631 (1995)). The officer arresting her seized the container, searched it and discovered methamphetamine. This court concluded that the defendant’s disclaimer of any interest in the container established that she did not have a protected privacy interest in it and, as a result, she could not successfully challenge the seizure of it. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that, because the “defendant had, in fact, been in personal possession of the container in question only moments before it came into the possession of the police,” the defendant had a protected interest in the container, despite her disclaimer. Id. at 469. Because she had a protected interest in the container, she could successfully challenge its seizure.
In this case, defendant had a bicycle and a briefcase with him when he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. He told the arresting officer that the briefcase belonged to a friend. The officer searched the briefcase in violation of Article I, section 9, and discovered what he suspected was a controlled substance. At the jail, defendant admitted the briefcase was his. Even if the trial court had accepted defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, it is undisputed that defendant possessed the briefcase when the police seized it. Therefore, he had a protected privacy interest in the briefcase and the trial court erred in concluding that his disclaimer barred him from successfully challenging the initial search. As both the majority and I note, however, that error was harmless.

 Although Keller was not specifically decided under the Oregon Constitution, the court’s reference to Keller in Atkinson and Perry established that the principle established in Keller is applicable to inventories under the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or App 418, 425, 692 P2d 667 (1984).

 During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer conducting the inventory testified:
“Q: Is it a policy with Marion County Correctional Facility to inventory closed containers as closed containers?
“A: I’m not sure what you’re referring to.
“Q: If something — say like something comes in as closed and you don’t see what’s inside, do you inventory it as a closed container or do you go through and rifle through it and search it?
“A: We normally go through every container.
“Q: Okay. Is that your policy?
“A: Our policy is to search for contraband.”

 I will not try to defend the distinction drawn in Mundt/Fincher, because I am not sure that it withstands scrutiny. For purposes of this dissent, I will assume that Mundt /Fincher and its progeny make sense.

 One of our statements in Bean could be understobd to expand improperly our decision in Mundt/Fincher. We said in Bean: “In Mundt /Fincher, we held that an inventory of closed containers intended primarily to store valuables was proper if performed pursuant to a properly authorized administrative program.” Bean, 150 Or App at 229. That statement should be understood to stand for the proposition articulated in Mundt!Fincher that items that are “uniquely designed” to hold valuables like those that are typically found in a wallet or purse are not “closed, opaque containers,” as that term was understood in Ridderbush. To the extent that it supports the majority’s proposition that items that “typically” contain valuables can be opened during an inventory, the statement conflicts with Mundt/Fincher, Ridderbush, Perry and Keller.

 The majority also states that a coin purse is not a closed container. 153 Or App at 540. I agree that, if authorized, an officer conducting an inventory can open a coin purse under Mundt /Fincher because a coin purse is uniquely designed to carry valuables. That fact is immaterial to this case, however, because in order to discover the coin purse, the officer had to open the briefcase, which was a closed, opaque container. I also question the court’s conclusion that briefcases typically contain valuables. We lack the knowledge to determine whether that statement is true.

 The final sentence of the paragraph in Mundt /Fincher that is relied on by both the majority and this dissent clarifies that the unique design of wallets and purses is the reason why wallets and purses can be opened during inventories. It states: “Although other containers may also hold valuable property, wallets and purses are uniquely designed for that purpose.” Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or App at 412. When quoting that paragraph of Mundt /Fincher, the majority fails to include that critical sentence. See 153 Or App at 540.

 A briefcase is defined as “a flat flexible case usu[ally] with a handle that is designed to carry legal briefs or other papers.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 277 (unabridged ed 1993).