Court Opinion

ID: 9740608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:38:25.068815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.123212
License: Public Domain

Snell, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion says: “The problem presented is new to this court.” The opinion then analyzes opinions from other jurisdictions and follows a strict rather than liberal construction of the statute. The majority opinion notes the provisions of chapter 104, Laws of the Sixty-first General Assembly, now a part of section 85.1(5), Code of 1966. Under the law as it now appears the defense interposed here would not be available. The problem before us will probably not recur but we should not in the present case deny relief to the claimant because of a technical delinquency of defendant.
*1238While the problem is new to our court the rules under which it should be resolved are not.
In Haverly v. Union Construction Co., 236 Iowa 278, 282, 18 N.W.2d 629, we said: “* * * the workmen’s-compensation statute is to be liberally construed, and where possible evils would result under either of two constructions, that which is to the advantage of the employee must control.”
In the case before us there are no equities favoring appellants. The employer bought and paid for coverage under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The insurance carrier collected the premium and assumed the risk. Claimant now asks the protection and benefits of what was bought and paid for. She should not be denied relief because the defendant employer failed to give notice under the statute. Defendants should not prevail because of their own delinquency.
The majority opinion permits the wrong party to raise the defense of no notice. If plaintiff had sued defendant employer at common law and defendant had defended because of workmen’s compensation coverage plaintiff could have raised the issue of no notice. For a defendant employer to defend a common-law action because of workmen’s compensation coverage he must, of course, show that he has complied with the provisions of the law. If he has not done so the common-law action is not barred. A plaintiff could raise the issue. A plaintiff would not be denied relief or held to alternative relief because of defendants’ delinquency.
In the case before us defendant employer and his insurance carrier should not be permitted to defend because of a failure for which defendant is responsible and for which neither decedent nor claimant was responsible.
I think two constructions of the statute are possible. I think evil results from appellants’ position. A liberal construction to the advantage of claimant is possible and should be adopted.
I would affirm.
Mason and Becker, JJ., join in this dissent.