Court Opinion

ID: 9764955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:45:39.106692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.564734
License: Public Domain

Proctor, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The Pund is the product of remedial social legislation and was intended to “provide a measure of relief to persons who sustain losses or injury inflicted by financially irresponsible or unidentified owners or operators of motor vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless.” Corrigan v. Gassert, 27 N. J. 227, 233 (1958). For that purpose, the Pund Law provided for the creation of a fund partly by charging extra fees to those registering uninsured motor vehicles and partly by levying an assessment against liability insurance companies doing business in this State. N. J. S. A. 39 :6 — 63. The Pund has always been on precarious financial grounds. In the past two years the State has transferred approximately nine million dollars to the Pund in order that it may *365meet claims filed against it. These funds should be confined to the use intended by the Legislature especially since their expenditures increase the insurance rates of insured motorists.
The rules at issue (R. 4:58-1 et seq.) were promulgated by this Court in 1969, many years after the enactment of the legislation creating the Fund in 1952 (L. 1952, ch. 174; N. J. S. A. 39 :6-61 et seq.) and were clearly not within the legislative contemplation. N. J. S. A. 39:6 — 69 limits the amount of recovery for one accident to $10,000 “exclusive of interest and costs.” (emphasis added) The majority construes this language as authorizing application of the rules, but adds that even if the statute did not authorize such application, it would be “well within the inherent power of this Court.” I think that the majority is wrong on both points. If the grant of interest and counsel fees is within the inherent power of this Court, even a specific legislative prohibition against such interest and fees contained within the statute would be ineffective. I cannot accept that proposition. See Garcia v. Morales, 47 N. J. 269 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U. S. 449, 87 S. Ct. 613, 17 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1967). And if this Court lacks the power to order the Legislature to expend funds for interest and counsel fees where there is an express prohibition, the same should be true where the clear intent and purpose of the statute is to that effect as I believe it is here. Plainly, the statute does not authorize such expenditures. Certainly counsel fees are not authorized. The statute does not specifically authorize such fees and they are not ordinarly included in the concept of “costs.” Costs are principally comprised of “statutory allowances, amounts paid the clerk in fees, and various other specified disbursements of counsel including sheriff’s fees, witness fees, deposition expenses and printing costs.” U. S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 37 N. J. 343, 355 (1962). Nor is the kind of interest contemplated by the rules within the purview of the statute. The “interest” referred to in the statute never contemplated *366interest on proposed settlement offers, but rather the interest payable from the date specified in the order directing payment out of the Fund to the date when payment is made. Lindsey v. Boles, 61 N. J. Super. 516 (Co. Ct. 1960). I can only conclude that the statute does not provide for counsel fees or for the kind of interest contemplated by R. 4:58 — 1 et seq. And since we do not have any inherent power to order the expenditure of public funds in this area, the rules should not apply to the Fund.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the policy of judicial economy which undergirds the majority decision will be furthered by the result reached. Recognizing that the Fund does not occupy the same status as the usual defendant in a negligence action, the majority directs that after an offer of judgment has been submitted, the Fund may reject the offer without incurring the sanctions of the rules if the reasons are brought to the attention of the trial court in advance of trial and are deemed valid. Thus, the holding leads to ad hoc decisions on the validity of the Fund’s reasons why it should not be subjected to the sanctions of the rules. These decisions necessarily consume judicial time and may spawn further litigation. In any event, there has been no showing by the majority that application of the rules to the Fund will have any appreciable effect in relieving court congestion. Almost all drivers today are insured (see Immer v. Risko, 56 N. J. 482, 489 n. 3 (1970)) and suits against the Fund constitute a relatively insignificant part of all automobile negligence suits. I am fully aware that our calendars are congested with automobile negligence cases and that the problem is a pressing one which calls for drastic action. But the answer is certainly not to expend funds not provided for that purpose especially where the goal of relieving calendar congestion may not even be furthered.
In my judgment application of B. 4:58-1 et seq. is a serious threat to the Fund’s sound administration, and a threat which far outweighs any possible advantage in terms of judicial economy.
*367For modification and remandment — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Francis, Hall, Schettino and I-Iane11 an — 5.
For affirmance — Justice Proctor — 1.