Court Opinion

ID: 9589114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:27.786947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.985782
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority correctly states the law on the admission of similar acts but then fails to apply it to the case at bar.
In order for evidence of an independent offense to be admitted, there must be a “sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. [Cit.] . . . The only separate crimes which are admissible are those that are either similar or logically connected to the crime for which defendant is being tried. Crimes which are not similar or which are not logically connected to the crime for which defendant is being tried should be excluded from evidence.” State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (1) (272 SE2d 321) (1980).
I agree with the majority’s position that it was proper to admit the rebuttal witness’ recitation of the method appellant used in an attempt to gain entry to her home since it was similar to the means used to gain entry into the victim’s home. However, the question not addressed by the majority in the case at bar is whether the act of making suggestive telephone calls to a woman is sufficiently similar or connected to the attempted rape of another woman so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. The State suggests the two acts are “logically connected” because each involved “sexual overtones.” See Jessen v. State, 234 Ga. 791 (3) (218 SE2d 52) (1975). While exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility “have been liberally extended in cases of sexual crimes” (Perry v. State, 158 Ga. App. 349 (2) (280 SE2d 390) (1981)), there must be more to connect the two dissimilar acts than their sexual nature inasmuch as that connection alone is not sufficient to show motive and bent of mind. Walraven v. State, 250 Ga. 401 (4b) (297 SE2d 278) (1982). I am of the opinion that the admission of the rebuttal testimony concerning the telephone calls was reversible error.
*87Decided July 15, 1986
Rehearing denied July 31, 1986
Wade M. Crumbley, for appellant.
E. Byron Smith, District Attorney, Thomas K. Floyd, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err when it limited the closing argument of appellant’s counsel. “These comments were not an attempt to bring in facts not in evidence, but to suggest to the jury that [innocent persons are, at times, wrongfully convicted on the basis of erroneous eyewitness identification] . . . We find the argument of which complaint is made well within permissible bounds. The [defense attorney] simply [attempted to argue] the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom. . . .” Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. App. 496 (2) (323 SE2d 657) (1984). What is sauce for the goose in Jordan should be sauce for the gander in the case at bar. I believe it was error to limit defense counsel’s closing argument.