Court Opinion

ID: 9948704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 19:01:12.161543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.232452
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                   IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                     No. 23-1844
                              _________________________

                            CHRISTOPHER EGIRE WOOD,
                                     Petitioner

                                             v.

              ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        _________________________

                       On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                            Boards of Immigration Appeals
                              (Agency No. A074-949-792)
                           Immigration Judge: David Cheng
                            __________________________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                  February 7, 2024

                    BEFORE: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and SMITH,
                                Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed: March 7, 2024)
                             __________________________

                                     OPINION *
                            ___________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.

       Christopher Egire Wood is a citizen of the United Kingdom. A notice to appear

charged Wood with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Wood conceded he was

removable but filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

At the conclusion of an immigration hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Wood’s

application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s

decision. This timely petition for review followed. 1 We will dismiss in part and deny in

part the petition.

       To obtain cancellation of removal, an alien must show that he:

       (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
       of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such
       application;
       (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
       (C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2),
       1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to paragraph (5); and
       (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
       unusual hardship to the alien’s . . . child, who is a citizen of the United
       States.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The IJ denied Wood’s application for cancellation of removal on

several grounds. First, the IJ concluded that Wood did not meet his burden of proving a

continuous presence in the United States for 10 years. The IJ also found that Wood was

not credible. Wood failed to satisfy his burden of showing that he was a person of good

moral character. And the IJ was not persuaded that Wood’s son, then 17-years old, or his

1
 The IJ exercised jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(b). The BIA had jurisdiction
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or
questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). However, we may not review discretionary
decisions relating to cancellation of removal. Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).
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10-year-old daughter would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. In

addition to failing to meet these requirements for cancellation of removal, the IJ denied

Wood’s application as a matter of discretion.

       The adverse credibility finding and the determination that Wood failed to show he

had a good moral character were based on “his continuous record of . . . using fraudulent”

documents. CAR146. Wood admitted to obtaining a fraudulent U.S. Virgin Islands birth

certificate in 1989, then using it to obtain a New Jersey driver’s license, and

unsuccessfully trying to obtain a U.S. passport. He acknowledged he had been using the

fraudulent Virgin Islands birth certificate for the last 28 to 29 years. Wood also had

obtained a fraudulent Ghanaian birth certificate. He used that to apply, unsuccessfully,

for an adjustment of status in the United States. He also used the fraudulent Ghanaian

birth certificate to obtain a Ghanaian passport, which he conceded before the IJ “was not

a real passport.” CAR201. In adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA agreed

that Wood’s use of “multiple fraudulent birth certificates” undermined his claim that he

was a person of good moral character. CAR3.

       In his opening brief, Wood raises two issues for review. He asserts that the IJ

violated his due process rights by “becoming an advocate for the government,” and that

the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard in denying cancellation of removal. Wood Br.

at 2. Neither of these issues, however, presents a reviewable constitutional claim or

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question of law over which we have jurisdiction. 2 See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180,

186-87 (3d Cir. 2010).

       First, as the Government noted, Wood never raised his due process claim to the

BIA. This failure to exhaust his administrative remedies precludes our review. See

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 St. Ct. 1103, 1112, 1115 (2023) (holding that §

1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but referring to

nonjurisdictional rules as “mandatory”); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 n.5

(3d Cir. 2003). Second, merely reading the four pages of the argument section of Wood’s

brief, quickly leads us to conclude that he has not raised a bona fide issue of law.

Instead, Wood’s claims are “nothing more” than arguments that the “IJ abused his

discretion in determining that [Wood] did not meet the requirement of exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship,” by finding, inter alia, that he was not credible. Pareja, 615

F.3d at 187 (omitting internal quotation marks and citation). As we explained in Patel v.

Attorney General, “‘quarrels over the exercise of discretion and the correctness of factual

findings’ do not raise constitutional claims or questions of law.” 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d

Cir. 2010) (quoting Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008)). Because we

lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary determinations and factual findings and

because Wood failed to exhaust his due process argument, we will dismiss in part and

deny in part his petition for review.

2
 “[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).

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