Court Opinion

ID: 9515172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:54:22.880217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:25.818188
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 29.] I concur with the Court that the lack of representation by court-appointed counsel at the adjudicatory hearing under the facts of this case does not require reversal, but for different reasons. Mother’s constitutional and statutory rights under SDCL 26-7A-31 were adequately provided to her without court appointment of additional counsel at the adjudicatory hearing. I would also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for a continuance'under Issue 2.
[¶ 30.] I agree with >the Court that it would have been sufficient for the trial court to deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny Mother’s motion for substitute counsel, or obtain a valid waiver as a means of further safeguarding Mother’s rights. I do not agree that the trial court was required to appoint substitute counsel at the adjudicatory phase under the facts of this case, as Mother’s right to counsel had been adequately protected throughout the proceedings.
[¶ 31.] The facts of this case are lengthy and complex as it pertains to the revolving door of attorneys retained by Mother for the adjudicatory abuse and neglect proceedings. On May 13, 2003, attorney Rose Ann Wendell was court appointed, to represent Mother and the case was scheduled for adjudicatory hearing on July 23, 2002. By July 17, 2002, attorney Stanley E. Whiting entered an appearance on behalf of Mother after she privately retained his services. A continuance of the adjudicatory hearing was granted. On *594September 16, 2002, Whiting requested leave to withdraw as counsel per Mother’s request.
[¶ 32.] A hearing was set for October 10, 2002 to schedule a trial date on the petition to adjudicate Child as abused and neglected. Mother privately retained attorney Al Arendt who represented her at the scheduling hearing on October 10, 2002, and the adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for December 3, 2002. Less than one week later, Arendt filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Mother on grounds of “conflict between the attorney and client relative to compliance with Court Orders.” The order allowing Ar-endt to withdraw provided that the adjudicatory trial scheduled for December 3, 2002, would proceed as scheduled.
[¶ 33.] After changing attorneys three times in seven months, Mother proceeded pro se. Mother then filed pro se motions for a change of venue, for a continuance, for an immediate hearing on the motions on change of venue and continuance, for an independent psychological examination of Child, for reasonable visitation, and for a subpoena to depose Child’s therapist Emily Williams.
[¶ 34.] At the adjudicatory hearing on December 3, 2002, Mother appeared pro se. Mother attempted to explain why she had been unable to hire private counsel. She then requested court appointed counsel and a continuance in order to retain counsel. Mother’s requests were denied. Mother’s intermediate appeal of the trial adjudicating Child as abused and neglected, filed pro se, was denied 'by this Court on February 6, 2003.
[¶ 35.] There is no absolute constitutional right to court appointed counsel in the absence of a potential deprivation of physical liberty. Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 648 (1981) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33, 101 S.Ct. at 2162, 68 L.Ed.2d at 654. Instead, the appropriate due process evaluation requires the weighing of three factors, the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures will lead to erroneous decisions, against a “right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” Id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976)). The United States Supreme Court has noted a majority of states utilized a higher standard by statute than that required by the Constitution and that such statutes are “enlightened and wise,” but not mandatory. Id. at 34, 101 S.Ct. 2153.
[¶ 36.] -South Dakota is counted among those “enlightened and wise” states. .SDCL 26-7A-31 “specifically provides for a court appointed attorney for parents in an abuse and neglect proceeding.” Supra ¶ 9. However, the statutory right to counsel in such proceedings is not absolute. SDCL 26-7A-31. The appointment is conditioned on two factors. First the indigent party must request the court appointment, and second the court must find “the party to be without sufficient financial means to employ an attorney.”4 Id.
*595[¶ 37.] This Court has adopted the procedural safeguards utilized in criminal proceedings to ensure effective assistance of counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings.5 See Interests of A.D., 2004 SD 39, ¶ 10, 678 N.W.2d 594, 598. Despite the diligence a trial court must use in criminal cases.when determining whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel has been made, a defendant will not be indulged every time he requests a new court appointed attorney. State v. Bruch, 1997 SD 74, ¶ 18, 565 N.W.2d 789, 793 (quoting Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir.1989)). A defendant will not be permitted to engage in dilatory tactics as a means of manipulating the right to counsel to delay or disrupt the trial. Id. (citing United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1393 (8th Cir.1976)). These standards should apply equally to parental rights terminations as well as criminal prosecutions given our adoption of criminal procedural safeguards to ensure effective assistance of counsel in such adjudicatory proceedings. See Interests of A.D., 2004 SD 39, ¶ 10, 678 N.W.2d at 598.
Some jurisdictions go so far as to deny the statutory, right of counsel for parental rights termination proceedings when the indigent parent has received adequate and timely notice of the right to counsel, yet fails to request such counsel until the day of trial. Interest of BM-P-, 704 S.W.2d 237, 248 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). Others interpret the failure of the parent to request such representation via the statutorily prescribed method prior to trial date to be a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Interest of KMM, 957 P.2d 296,-298 (Wyo.1998) (fathers failure to file the appropriate motion for court appointed counsel was deliberate decision to proceed pro se despite initial request by letter, as father filed several other motions that indicated he understood the procedural requirement). Other jurisdictions view the repeated discharge of attorneys, both 'court-appointed and privately retained, as a waiver of the statutory right to counsel. In re Adoption of Olivia, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 670, 761 N.E.2d 536, 542 (2002) (holding reasons advanced by father in support of his motion for substitution of appointed counsel in proceedings for termination of his parental rights did not constitute good cause for removal of appointed counsel); Keen v. Marion County Dept. of Public Welfare, 523 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) (holding no violation of statutory right to counsel of mother who was denied a second court appointed attorney after using court appointed counsel for four years, being granted numerous continuances, electing to use private counsel, and then failing to hire counsel prior to trial date).
[¶ 38.] Our statutory scheme for termination of parental rights is grounded upon the best interests of the child. SDCL 26-7A-5; Interest of E.D.J., 499 N.W.2d 130, 135 (S.D.1993). We have repeatedly held that we will not force the child to wait for his parents to acquire parenting skills that may never develop. In re J.Y., 502 N.W.2d 860, 862 (citing Interest of A.D., 416 N.W.2d at 268). Should we now hold that we will force a child to wait for his *596parents to acquire the counsel of their choice?
[¶ 39.] I find the Court’s reliance on J.A.H. v. Calhoun County DHR, 846 So.2d 1093, 1095 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) for the proposition that a trial court must appoint counsel to a parent who has formerly repeatedly fired such counsel up until the day of the dispositional hearing to be of great concern. That case is materially distinguishable from the facts of the current case. In J.A.H., the father had requested court appointed counsel at the initial phase of the proceedings and had been found financially qualified for such representation. Id. at 1094. However, due to a conflict of interest court appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and no replacement counsel was appointed by the trial court. Id. Father never rejected or discharged his court appointed attorney, nor did he waive his statutory right to counsel by his actions. Id.
[¶ 40.] In the present case, Mother did not request court appointed substitute counsel until the day of the trial. Up to that point Mother had given no indication that she would avail herself of an appointment, and had been hiring and firing privately retained counsel throughout the seven months of proceedings and hearings. Additionally, Mother filed six pro se motions prior to her request for court appointed counsel. Mother’s actions were not on par with the father in J.A.H. such that it would be “unduly burdensome and overly technical to require [Mother] to repeatedly request the appointment of counsel.” See J.A.H., 846 So.2d at 1095. Mother’s multiple requests for court appointed counsel all occurred on the day of the trial, and all were in my opinion sufficiently untimely and served as a valid waiver of her right to counsel.
[¶ 41.] A child should not be forced to dangle in legal limbo while this revolving door process of attorney after attorney repeats itself solely by the acts of Mother. Neither should the taxpayers of this State be forced to fund an endless stream of attorneys who, for whatever subjective reason, fail to pass muster with a parent facing an abuse and neglect proceeding. SDCL 26-7A-31 contemplates as much as it provides for the appointment of “an attorney” not “numerous attorneys” of the parent’s choosing.
[¶ 42.] As no error was committed by the trial court under Issues 1 and 3, in my opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for a continuance before the adjudicatory hearing in Issue 2. I concur with the Court’s holdings in Issues 4 and 5.
[¶ 43.] MEIERHENRY, Justice, joins this special writing.

. SDCL 26-7A-31 provides in relevant part:
If the child or the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian requests an attorney in proceedings under this chapter or chapter 26-8A, 26-8B, or 26-8C and if the court finds the party to be without sufficient financial means to employ an attorney, the *595court shall appoint an attorney for the party-

. A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to counsel or to self-representation. State v. Van Sickle, 411 N.W.2d 665, 666 (S.D. 1987) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). The right to counsel may be waived, but only through a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. Id. The trial court must engage in specific procedure in order to ascertain the defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. Id.