Court Opinion

ID: 9726723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:05:17.894814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.081103
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
At this level our review of the ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss is not de novo. To secure a reversal defendant must show trial court abused its limited discretion. State v. Donnell, Iowa, 239 N.W.2d 575, 579; State v. Grady, Iowa, 231 N.W.2d 869, 872 and citations.
Each time the issue of denial of a speedy trial arises, under the provisions of Code section 795.2, it must be decided under delicate balancing process. State v. Leonard, Iowa, 240 N.W.2d 690, 691, and citations. Therefore some restatement of the facts becomes necessary.
At the May 23, 1975 arraignment District Judge Harlan W. Bainter, knowing the status of the trial docket, assigned this case for jury trial on June 23. Defendant prevented trial on that day by filing a motion for change of venue on June 16. He filed additional affidavits over the next two days. He was charged with assault intent to commit great bodily injury on a fellow prisoner at Fort Madison Penitentiary and asserted wide publicity of disturbances there would prevent him from getting a fair trial in Lee County. The State on June 27 filed resistance to the motion for change of venue. It included counter affidavits.
On the same day, June 27, Judge Bainter heard the motion and expressed concern for the issue submitted. Judge Bainter at the close of the hearing stated: “We will mark the matter submitted, and I will try to rule on it promptly.”
Defendant’s motion for change of venue was overruled August 7 and trial rescheduled by Judge Bainter for September 8. Defendant had made no request for an earlier ruling. Between submission and ruling on defendant’s motion Judge Bainter was on vacation for an undisclosed period.
On August 11 defendant filed a motion to dismiss the pending charge on the grounds he had not been brought to trial within 60 days after being charged and that he had at no time waived his right to a speedy trial under the provisions of Code section 795.2. The motion, as per court order of August 14, was argued and submitted to District Judge William S. Cahill on August 21,1975. The prosecutor’s statements to the court included:
“I am sure the Court is aware this is the time of year when courts have difficulties in scheduling. On May 29th the motion was taken under advisement by Judge Bainter. I don’t know how much time Judge Bainter needed to consider that motion. He may have felt he needed the entire month of July to think about it. Maybe part of the reason for the delay was the fact Judge Bainter was on vacation. I really don’t know of any way to find out. So far as any delay on the part of the State, itself, there has been no delay and if there is any delay in this ease, it is a delay on the part of the Court, itself. The only delay which the Court could possibly consider to be out of line would be the delay in ruling upon the motion, and, of course, the matter of this case being scheduled for trial on September 8th, at this time any delay'from today until September 8th, I don’t think is a matter you can regard in the motion today. We haven’t seen the Court’s schedule. I know when the Court set it for September 8th you said you had a busy trial schedule for this month, and I am *585sure you do, but I don’t think that matter could be properly considered today.”
At the close of the hearing Judge Cahill stated:
“I will show it submitted, and for whatever it is worth, I will enter on the record that Judge Bainter and I hold Court this month between the two of us. Each week it is necessary we reach eight courthouses. I don’t think there is any dispute about that. Judge Leary has been sick all summer and has not worked all summer.”
Defendant was tried as scheduled on September 8 and found guilty of the included offense of assault and battery.
The facts present two approaches for consideration of whether the State met its burden to prove good cause for not bringing defendant to trial within 60 days after filing the county attorney’s information. First was the delay attributable to defendant and second was the non-chronic court congestion to justify the delay.
I. We have repeatedly held delay attributable to a defendant may constitute statutory good cause preventing the State from carrying out its obligation to bring him to trial. State v. Donnell, supra, Iowa, 239 N.W.2d 575, 579; State v. Collins, Iowa, 236 N.W.2d 376, 377; State v. Montgomery, Iowa, 232 N.W.2d 525, 527; State v. Albertsen, Iowa, 228 N.W.2d 94, 96 and citations.
Here the court no doubt would have tried defendant on the scheduled date, June 23, but for defendant’s motion for change of venue. The delay was substantially attributable to defendant.
Failure of defendant to demand a ruling on the motion and a speedy trial is a factor to consider with other facts relating to whether there was good cause for delay. State v. Nelson, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 445, 446, 447; State v. Gorham, Iowa, 206 N.W.2d 908, 912.
II. Also delay resulting from congestion of trial docket attributable to exceptional circumstances may constitute “good cause” satisfying the section 795.2 exception. In State v. Hines, Iowa, 225 N.W.2d 156, 158, we say:
“Non-chronic ‘court congestion,’ arising out of unique, non-recurring events and resulting in only a short delay may constitute ‘good cause’ satisfying the § 795.2 exception. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972); State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972); ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, Approved Draft § 2.3(b), pp. 27-28. * * * ?t
The facts in this case establish such a “non-chronic court congestion” development and negatives any abuse of discretion by Judge Cahill. The State was ready and willing to try defendant at any time; the docket was such that defendant’s trial was set for soon after arraignment; defendant’s motion for change of venue, filed shortly before trial date, necessarily removed the case from the trial assignment; Judge Bainter took some apparently prescheduled vacation; Judge Leary became ill and was unable to perform his judicial duties; this continued for the entire summer; during that period Judges Cahill and Bainter were carrying an unusual and unpredictable court schedule in eight counties and were simply unable to reschedule defendant’s trial prior to the date set, September 8. As pointed out in the majority opinion Judge Cahill carefully considered the entire record before overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss.
With an undisputed record of delay attributable to defendant and exceptional docket congestion I would hold defendant has failed to establish abuse of discretion by Judge Cahill.
I would affirm.