Court Opinion

ID: 9696484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:49:08.471946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:22.721541
License: Public Domain

Francis, J.
(dissenting) As Justice Haneman points out, Buie 3 :21 — 2 was adopted less than three months ago. Although somewhat revised in form, it preserved the presentence report’s confidentiality, its principal characteristic since the advent of our new court system in 1948. The change in form was intended to indicate to sentencing judges what had been made plain through many conferences on proposed changes in rules of practice and procedure, i. e., that disclosure of all or only part of a presentence report was a matter for the fair exercise of their discretion. Adoption of the rule by the majority of the Court was not a will-o’-the-wisp decision. The problem has been bruited about for many years and deliberated upon by committees of experienced trial judges, members of the bar, and probation officers. The decision always reached by the majority of this Court was that the report should remain confidential, except for those matters which the sentencing judge in his discretion felt should be disclosed to the convicted defendant, or, in the alternative, *156should be excluded by the judge as a factor influencing his determination of the sentence to be imposed. In my judgment the practice has worked well, and with the rare exceptions to which any human institution is subject, has served the beneficent social purpose of making the penalty fit the offender as well as the crime he committed. State v. White, 27 N. J. 158, 184 (1958) (concurring opinion). Consequently, I agree with Justice Haneman’s reassertion of the pronouncement of this Court in State v. Johnson, 28 N. J. 133, 143 (1958), cert. den. 368 U. S. 933, 82 S. Ct. 370, 7 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1961), that “a rule should not ordinarily be revised or abandoned except by an exercise of the rule-making power. The nature of the problem is such that it should be explored at a judicial conference * *
The convulsive change in Rule 3:21-2 brought about by the majority opinion in this ease is contrary to the sound view expressed in State v. Johnson and is unwise and inexpedient at this time. Our criminal trial lists are overflowing, and inordinate delay is the order of the day. A speedy trial which is so important from a public standpoint as an effective deterrent to potential violators of the criminal law is the exception rather than the rule. There are various reasons for the lengthening criminal process, not the least of them being hearings on the many motions to suppress evidence resulting from allegedly illegal searches and seizures by police officers, and hearings on almost innumerable post conviction proceedings. The majority opinion now adds a heavy burden to already over-burdened trial lists and trial judges. But the most disturbing aspect is that it does so without warning and without prior consideration of the administrative and procedural burden thrown upon county judges and probation officers.
It seems to me that if the majority wishes to do what obviously it has the power to do, it should decide the present case, as it can very easily and justly in the manner hereafter suggested, and give some necessary attention to the study and formulation of administrative procedures for the guidance of sentencing judges and county probation depart*157ments. Tt is no secret that in the past county judges and dedicated probation officers have been opposed to a blanket rule under which the presentence report would be turned over routinely to the convicted defendant. These judges and probation officers are the laborers in the vineyard. We should not open the floodgates and inundate them with this new burden when their expertise could aid us in regulating and controlling it. Accordingly, I join Justice Uaneman in dissenting from the majority’s summary departure from the Court’s so recently adopted Rule 3:21 — 3. Assuming the change is desired by the majority, it should come only after study and conference designed to implement it practically and for the benefit of all concerned.
As mentioned above, the present case should not be treated as the vehicle for abandonment of Buie 3 :21-2. I agree that the trial judge should not have permitted the unproved allegation in the probation report that the defendant was a member of a stolen car ring to be an influential factor in his consideration of the sentence to be imposed. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was influenced by it in any way.
It is plain from the probation report that the defendant knew of the allegation that he was a “contact” man in New Jersey for a stolen car ring. In fact it appears in the report that he was “confronted” with the State’s evidence which allegedly supported the charge, and that he denied any such involvement. Consequently an experienced sentencing judge, educated in the proper use of a probation report through the many judicial conferences and committee reports on the subject, would and should know that the unproved suggestion of additional criminal involvement must he disregarded. So the simple question in this case is: Did the trial judge exclude it from consideration in deliberating upon the sentence to be imposed ? If he did, that ends the matter. Therefore, I would ask this trial judge to certify to us whether the alleged collateral criminal involvement was a factor which influenced his decision to imprison defendant for one to two years in State *158Prison. Upon return of the certification, which I expect would be furnished in good faith and in good conscience, our disposition of the appeal should be made. If the improper material was not a factor in the sentence, the judgment should be affirmed. If it was a factor, then the record should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence.
For remandmeni for resentencing — Chief Justice Weest-traub and Justices Jacobs, Proctor, Hall and Schettino —5.
For remandmeni for certification — Justices Eranois and Haneman — 2.