Court Opinion

ID: 9638607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:48:51.983423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:03.598486
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff claims its property was damaged because a road maintained by the City of Independence dammed the natural flow of surface water from its property causing the water to back up onto the property. The question is whether Missouri’s surface water rules prevent plaintiff’s recovery. Essential to the resolution of this question is a determination of which surface water rule or rules are followed in Missouri.
Three principal rules regarding surface water are prevalent today: the civil law rule; the common enemy rule; and the reasonable use rule. The civil law rule holds one who interferes with the natural flow of surface water liable for damage caused to other landowners. The common enemy rule allows a landowner to divert surface water from his property regardless of the harm this could bring to others. The reasonable use rule holds a landowner’s liability for diversion of surface water depends on the reasonableness of his actions. See 78 Am.Jur.2d § 119 (1975).
Most jurisdictions, including Missouri, have modified the surface water rule they have chosen to adopt. See Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 Min.L.Rev. 891, 913-35 (1940); Beck, The Law of Drainage, 5 Waters and Water Rights 491-98 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
In 1884, Missouri rejected the civil law rule and adopted a modified common enemy rule. Abbott v. K.C., St.J. & C.B. R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884). In adopting this rule, the Court noted that Missouri did not follow the common enemy rule in its harshest form, but rather imposed the duties of reasonable use and due care upon landowners who would divert surface water onto coterminous or adjacent land. Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-86 (quoting with approval Hosher v. K.C., St.J. & C.B. R.R., 60 Mo. 329, 333 (1875); McCormick v. K.C., St.J. & C.B. R.R., 57 Mo. 433, 437 (1871).1 The Court noted the rule “permits and encourages public and private improvements, and at the same time restrains those engaged in such enterprises from unnecessarily or carelessly injuring another.” Id. at 286. Thus, the Court adopted a modified common enemy rule which allows a landowner in the reasonable use and development of his property to divert surface water so long as he does not unnecessarily inconvenience or damage a coterminous landowner. Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage and Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 211, 274 S.W. 448, 453-54 (Mo.1925); Goll v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 271 Mo. 655, 665-66, 197 S.W. 244, 246-47 (Mo.1917); Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-86.
Subsequent decisions recognized a second rule regarding the collection and discharge of surface water. See, e.g., Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1937) (surface water is a common enemy and may be diverted to adjacent or lower land provided not unnecessarily collected and discharged to damage of neighbor); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo.App.1951) (cannot artificially impound or collect surface water then discharge in increased, destructive quantity); Polich v. Hermann, 219 S.W.2d 849, 855 (1949) (cannot collect and discharge into artificial channel or volume or in unnatural quantities to substantial injury of other land). In Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo.1958), the Court noted these cases and held:
We need not attempt here to reconcile these various statements, but it is sufficient to note that the language used *900clearly indicates that it was never intended that the volume and flow of surface water onto neighboring property could not be increased or accelerated under any circumstance. In those states purporting to follow the common enemy doctrine, where the question of the right of a landowner to collect surface water and discharge it into a natural drainway has been expressly raised, the courts “have developed a qualifying rule which is, in substance, that a possessor of land is not privileged to discharge upon adjoining land, by artificial means, large quantities of surface water in a concentrated flow otherwise than through natural drain-ways" (citations omitted). The statement of this general qualifying rule varies in the numerous cases, and without attempting to state precisely its limits it may be said that the rule is, in substance, that a landowner in the reasonable use and development of his land may drain it by building thereon sewers, gutters and such other artificial water channels for the purpose of carrying off the surface waters into a “natural surface-water channel” (citation omitted) located on his property without liability to the owner of neighboring land, even though such method of ridding his property of surface water accelerates and increases the flow thereof, provided that he acts without negligence, and provided further that he does not exceed the natural capacity of the drainway to the damage of neighboring property.
Haferkamp, 316 S.W.2d at 625-26. In short, the Haferkamp rule allows a landowner in the reasonable use and development of his land, to artificially collect and discharge surface water into a “natural surface water channel” although this increases the flow of surface water on neighboring property, provided he acts without negligence and does not exceed the natural capacity of the natural drainway to the damage of his neighbor. The language of the Court indicates this rule applies only to situations where a landowner artificially collects and discharges surface water,. The opinion does not review or change the rule in Abbott, but rather sets out an additional rule to be applied in situations similar to that presented in Haferkamp.
Confusion developed following Hafer-kamp regarding application of surface water rules which was “the result of semantics and the failure to distinguish the different methods employed by landowners to rid themselves of the ‘common enemy’.” Borgmann v. Florissant Development Co., 515 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Mo.App.1974); e.g., Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App.1981) (where court confuses the Abbott rule with the Haferkamp rule, stating that every man may dam against water so long as he does not collect and discharge unnecessarily, relying on Camden Special Road Dist. of Ray County v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93, 98-99 (Mo.App.1973) where reasonable use requirement in Abbott was held applicable only in collection and discharge cases).2 Despite this confusion, the rule established in Abbott has been consistently recognized by the courts. E.g., Roberts v. *901Hocker, 610 S.W.2d 321, 326-27 (Mo.App.1980) (diversion allowed only upon exercise of due care and prudence); Minton v. Steakley, 466 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Mo.App.1971) (unreasonable interference with drainage required); Reutner v. Vouga, 367 S.W.2d 34, 41 (Mo.App.1963) (“rights exercised under ‘common enemy’ doctrine must be exercised within reasonable limits and not recklessly, so as not to needlessly injure the servient tenements... ”). See also Young v. Moore, 241 Mo.App. 436, 236 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Mo.App.1951).
This Court has applied surface water rules three times in the last ten years. In Wells v. State Highway Comm’n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo.1973), the Court was faced with an artificial collection and discharge situation but noted “the authorities require that one must act within reasonable limits and not recklessly, in the development of his land, before they give him the benefit of the ‘common enemy doctrine’ which has become a part of our rule on surface waters.” Wells, 503 S.W.2d at 692. The Court went on to apply the rule applicable to situations involving the artificial collection and discharge of surface water as articulated in Haferkamp. Wells, 503 S.W.2d at 692-93. In Miller Land Co. v. Liberty Township, 510 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. banc 1974), the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring the township to remove old drain tile and repair an abandoned railroad bed in order to correct surface water drainage problems. The Court denied relief and noted the common enemy doctrine allowed diversion of water onto a servient estate provided it was done with reasonable limits. Further, the Court noted a possessor of land was not privileged to artificially collect and discharge surface water in destructive quantities. Miller Land Co., 510 S.W.2d at 476 (citing Haferkamp, 316 S.W.2d at 620). In Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. banc 1974), the Court considered an action in trespass and nuisance against the railroad based on flooding of land caused by defendant’s construction of a culvert. The Court applied the rule in Haferkamp in affirming a judgment for plaintiff noting the rule was either an exception to, or a modification of, the common enemy rule.
As noted earlier the common enemy rule allows diversion of surface water despite resulting injury to coterminous landowners. From an analysis of Missouri surface water cases it becomes clear that two surface water rules have evolved from this harsh doctrine. The first was noted in Abbott, where the Court held a landowner in the reasonable use or development of his land could divert surface water onto coterminous or adjacent land but in so doing must use due care so as not to unnecessarily inconvenience or damage a coterminous landowner. Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-86. The second rule is articulated in Haferkamp where the Court held one could not artificially collect and discharge surface water in destructive quantities.3
The principal opinion ignores both surface water rules established in Missouri and applies the common enemy rule in its harshest form to the situation in this case. Adopting such a rule flies in the face of over one hundred years of case law. The courts of this state have consistently rejected application of the common enemy rule in its harshest form in favor of more moderate surface water rules. See Comment, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo.L.Rev. 76, 79-80 (1977). The principal opinion reasons that since no *902prior case has held “downhill” landowners liable for damages caused by their diversion of surface water onto property situated “uphill”, the current surface water rules are inapplicable. Siegfried v. City of Independence, 649 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Mo. banc 1983).
Although most reported surface water cases involve situations wherein one party was specifically engaged in a drainage or diversion project, it is clear that surface water rules apply in situations where either a municipal corporation or a private person has occupied or improved land “either by grading or filling up low places, or by erecting buildings thereon, or by making any other improvement thereon to make it fit for cultivation, or other profitable or desirable enjoyment.” Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-83. Whether plaintiff is situated “uphill” or “downhill” is irrelevant as far as application of the surface water rules. Case law and logic dictate that the surface water rules apply to coterminous landowners; not merely to “uphill” landowners. In Abbott, plaintiff’s land was situated above defendant’s railroad bed. Following rains a nearby creek would flood plaintiff’s land.4 Defendant’s roadbed created a damming effect and prevented surface water from returning to the stream. The Court applied the modified common enemy rule to defendant although plaintiff’s land lay “uphill” from defendant’s roadbed. Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-86. In Goll v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244 (Mo.1917), the Court noted:
A coterminous proprietor may change the situation or surface of his land, by raising or filling it to a higher grade, by the construction of dikes, the erection of structures, or by other improvements which cause water to accumulate from natural causes on adjacent land and prevent it from passing off over the surface.
Goll, 197 S.W. at 246. The Court went on to apply the Abbott rule in denying plaintiff relief although plaintiff’s land was situated “uphill” from that of the defendant. The Court stated the Abbott rule was applicable to “coterminous” or “adjacent” landowners. Similarly, in Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage and Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448 (Mo.1925), the Court was faced with a situation where defendant had constructed a levee which caused surface water to back up on plaintiff’s land. Although plaintiff’s land lay “uphill” from defendant’s levee, the Court applied the Abbott rule. Plaintiff’s recovery was denied not because of the location of his land, but rather because plaintiff did not charge defendant with violating the Abbott rule. Anderson, 274 S.W. at 454. Thus in both Supreme Court cases where plaintiff’s land has been situated “uphill” from defendant’s, the Court has applied the Abbott rule.
The principal opinion relies on Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App.1981), for the proposition that a “downhill” landowner has the unqualified right to dam against surface water. Schifferdecker, however, is a collection and discharge case which required application of the Hafer-kamp rule; therefore its holding has no application to the fact situation presented here.
In Schifferdecker, drainage ditches had been excavated across the parties’ land. They were designed to collect and discharge surface water through a slough, then drain into the Missouri river. Defendant built a dam across approximately one-half of the slough which was situated on his land. This caused the increased volume of water from the adjoining land which drained into the slough tó back up on plaintiff’s land. The Court held:
Missouri accepts the so-called modified “common enemy doctrine” as respects surface waters. Under this rule, every man is entitled to dam against surface water to ward it off his land even if, in so doing, he casts the water back upon his *903neighbor. The defending land owner may not, however, unnecessarily collect the water and discharge it at one place creating damage to the neighbor in the process.
Schifferdecker, 621 S.W.2d at 67. The collection and discharge language indicates the Court was attempting to apply the Hafer-kamp rule, although it is misstated. See supra discussion in text and accompanying notes at 900-901.
In the present case plaintiff’s petition states a case under theories of negligence, nuisance, trespass, or condemnation without compensation; and in the state of this record it may not be said that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case on one or more of these theories. See Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Mo. banc 1974); Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Mo.App.1959). The principal opinion would affirm the trial court’s judgment for defendant on an application of the old common enemy rule. Nowhere in the principal opinion, the trial court judgment, or the record is it indicated that defendant’s use of its property was reasonable and did not unnecessarily interfere with or damage plaintiff’s property. Abbott, 83 Mo. at 282-86. The result reached by the principal opinion would only add confusion to an already confused area of law. The facts as stated indicate the defendant’s use of its land may have been unreasonable in that it unnecessarily interfered with plaintiff’s land and caused damage thereto. Defendant’s use of the land in such a manner would preclude application of the common enemy rule and may make defendant liable for damages. Whether the common enemy rule will preclude plaintiff’s recovery is still at issue, and the defendant must be allowed to present evidence whether it diverted the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff’s land in an unreasonable manner so as to cause unnecessary interference with or damage to plaintiff’s land. Sup.Ct.R. 67.02. I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.

. The majority of cases recite that the common enemy rule was adopted in Abbott. In fact, the rule was recognized earlier. The Abbott Court specifically overruled two prior decisions which had attempted to recognize the civil law rule holding “we feel constrained to recognize the common law doctrine on this subject so often and repeatedly approved by this court, without division, in all its earlier and later decisions, as still the law in this state.... ” Abbott, 83 Mo. at 285-86.

. This statement of the rule is incorrect in that it refers to the Haferkamp rule as the “modified common enemy doctrine as respects surface water.” This misstatement is the result of the confusion noted above. The Schifferdecker Court relied on Camden, 495 S.W.2d at 93. The Camden court misconstrued Haferkamp, 316 S.W.2d at 620, and held the reasonable use and due care language in Abbott was applicable only in collection and discharge cases. Camden, 495 S.W.2d at 98. The Camden court’s restriction is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Haferkamp Court addressed only a collection and discharge fact situation. The Court noted a variety of statements regarding surface water including “the rights given under the ‘common enemy’ doctrine, must be exercised within reasonable limits and not recklessly, so as not to needlessly injure servient tenements [citations omitted]” and went on to hold: “We need not attempt here to reconcile these various statements, but it is sufficient to note that the language used clearly indicates that it was never intended that the volume and flow of surface water onto neighboring property could not be increased or accelerated under any circumstance.” Haferkamp, 316 S.W.2d at 625. The Haferkamp Court in no way restricted the Abbott rule. Second, the Abbott Court was neither faced with, nor attempted to set out, a *901rule for collection and discharge situations. To limit the holding of a case to a fact situation not addressed by the Court is illogical.

. Acceptance of the Haferkamp rule as independent of the common enemy rule is dictated by logic. Surface water by definition is water in a natural, diffused state. Clark, Water and Water Rights at § 52.1(A). Once water is artificially collected one cannot say it is in a “natural, diffused state.” Because the common enemy rule is applicable only to surface water cases, see Roberts v. Hooker, 610 S.W.2d 321, 327 n. 5 (Mo.App.1980), it should not be applied to collection and discharge cases.

. Flood waters or “overflow” waters have been consistently construed as surface water requiring application of surface water rules. See Goll, 197 S.W. at 246.