Court Opinion

ID: 9614949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:29:53.346419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:59.852718
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
RICHARDSON, C.J.,
WITH WHOM OGATA, J., JOINS
I respectfully dissent.
HRS § 11-193 (1970), Act 26, S.L.H. 1970, reads: “. . . each party, committee, and each candidate for a county office shall file, with the clerk of the county, an itemized statement . .. .’’(emphasis added), and this language clearly imposes on Good Guys for Fasithe duty to file campaign statements. Both this statutory language and the legislative history1 show the same legislative intent — committees shall file. Imposing such reporting duties on committees advances the overriding purpose of HRS § 11-193 (1970), which is to obtain disclosure of campaign expenditures, large contributions, and large contributors.
*93Furthermore, the legislature imposes duties on committees as entities. Committees are very common and highly prominent entities in political campaigns; they are ongoing organizations that survive the membership terms of particular individuals, and committees frequently control large amounts of money and other campaign resources. Indeed, that very control of money and resources concerned the legislature. Because it makes sense to impose the duty on the entity whose behavior one seeks to monitor, and because both the statute and the legislative history2 clearly concern themselves with committee behavior, it considerably misreads legislative intent to state that unincorporated associations such as párties and committees were not given definite duties. The statute, the legislative history, and common sense indicate that the committee has a duty to file, and I believe that when the legislature says that committees shall file, it means committees.
The statute also punishes committees for violations of duty. While HRS § 19-6(10) clearly punishes certain natural persons for failing to file, HRS § 19-6(13) just as clearly punishes all other “persons” who violate duties imposed by the statute. HRS § 19-6(13) is a catch-all provision in regard to penalties and applies here because HRS § 19-6(10) does not. *94The whole purpose of HRS § 19-6(13) is to insure that all duties are obeyed. Given that purpose and function of HRS § 19-6(13) and given that the statute nowhere defines “person,” it is entirely proper to rely on HRS § 1-19 for a definition of “person.” The obvious purpose of HRS § 1-19 is to define “person” when a statute does not, and there is precedent for such use of a general statutory definition of “person,” United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 3 L.Ed.2d 165, 79 S. Ct. 203 (1958).
The majority discusses the rules of statutory construction which must be kept in mind in interpreting statutes, however, those rules are merely aids in determining the intent of the legislature; they are not inflexible controls that predominate over legislative intent. We must remember that our primary duty, even in construing criminal statutes, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, State v. Prevo, 44 Haw. 665, 668-669, 361 P.2d 1044 (1961); 3 Sutherland Stat. Const. § 59.06. As demonstrated above, the intent of the legislature is that committees shall file.
Even given that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, Coray v. Ariyoshi, 54 Haw. 254, 261, 506 P.2d 13 (1973), this is not a case where the duty is unclear; the information required to be filed is clearly specified. Neither is this a case where the entities subject to the duty are unclear; the statute specifies candidates, parties and committees. Finally, the statute penalizes violations by the committee.
While no statutory provisions or rules of criminal procedure provide for the service of criminal process on unincorporated associations, this is not fatal to this prosecution. As Operative Plasterers’ etc., Assn. v. Case, 93 F.2d 56 at 65 (D.C. Cir. 1937), stated:
In respect of any unincorporated association the service may be upon “any agent or representative of the association whose character in relation to the association is such that it could be reasonably expected that he would give notice of the suit to his association, (citation omitted).
*95While that case was civil and involved a union, those differences should not control. A campaign committee is as important in politics as a union is in business, and in terms of policy, the fear of associations acting beyond the practical limits of the law3 applies in both civil and criminal contexts.
The values of fundamental fairness embodied in the notice requirement of due process are honored.
I would reverse.

 House Stand. Com. Rep. No. 589, 5th Legis., 1969 House Journal 854, states:
6. The provisions on candidates’ expenses have been broadened in coverage and made stricter.
a. Candidates for U.S. Senate and House, political parties, and committees supporting or opposing candidates or election questions are added to those now required to file election expense statements.
Since elections involve the granting of public trust, voters have the right to know how much a candidate, party, or committee has spent in influencing an election.
c. Candidates, parties, and committees are required to report the names and addresses of contributors whose contributions exceed an aggregate of $100.
In granting public trust, voters have the right to know the identity of large contributors.
Senate Stand. Com. Rep. No. 830-70, 5th Legis., 1970 Sen. Journal 1377 is almost identical.
6. The provisions on candidates’ expenses have been broadened in coverage *93and made stricter.
a. Candidates for U.S. Senate and House, political parties, presidential committees, and committees supporting or opposing candidates or election questions are added to those now required to file election expense statements.
Since elections involve the granting of public trust, voters have the right to know how much a candidate, party, or committee has spent in influencing an election.
c. Candidates, parties, and committees are required to report the names and addresses of contributors whose contributions exceed an aggregate of $100, including the amount contributed.
In granting public trust, voters have the right to know the identity of large contributors.

 Ibid.

 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 387-391 (1922).