Court Opinion

ID: 9961341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 16:06:58.441354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:38.638819
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Apr 18 2024, 9:00 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                      Shaka Adiyia Shakur,
                                          Appellant-Plaintiff

                                                     v.

                         Jack Hendrix Executive Director, et al.,
                                         Appellees-Defendants

                                             April 18, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CT-1564
                             Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court
                          The Honorable Robert E. Hunley, II, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         77C01-1902-CT-64

                               Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                              Judges Bradford and Felix concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024                 Page 1 of 18
      Case Summary
[1]   Shaka Shakur appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

      Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr.

      (Commissioner Carter), DOC Director Jack Hendrix, and Westville

      Correctional Facility (Westville) Warden Richard Brown (collectively, the

      DOC Officials). Shakur claims that the trial court erred in concluding that his

      claims of due process violations and cruel and unusual punishment were time-

      barred. Shakur further contends that genuine issues of material fact remain as

      to whether his constitutional rights were violated as a result of DOC

      disciplinary sanctions and alleged medical neglect at various DOC facilities.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   On July 25, 2003, Shakur was transferred to the Pendleton Correctional Facility

      (Pendleton) following the imposition of a sixty-three-year sentence for murder.

      Thereafter, Shakur was transferred to the following DOC facilities:

              4. [Shakur was] transferred to Wabash Valley Correctional
              Facility [Wabash] on July 20, 2005.

              5. [The next day], Shakur was . . . transferred to [Westville]. . . .

              6. [Shakur] was . . . transferred back to [Wabash] on November
              3, 2005.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024              Page 2 of 18
              7. [Shakur] remained there until he was transferred to
              [Westville] on March 2, 2012.

              8. Thereafter, [Shakur] was transferred to New Castle
              Correctional Facility [New Castle] on March 25, 2014.

              9. [Shakur] was then transferred to [Pendleton] on July 17, 2014.

              10. Thereafter, [Shakur] was transferred back to [Wabash] on
              January 8, 2016.

              11. [Shakur] remained there until he was transferred to Nottoway
              Correctional Center in Burkeville, Virginia [Virginia Correctional
              Center] pursuant to an interstate compact agreement on
              December 19. 2018.

      Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 20-21.

[4]   In January 2004, Shakur received his first conduct violation report while

      incarcerated at the DOC for refusing to accept a work assignment. Thereafter,

      Shakur committed more than thirty-five additional disciplinary offenses at

      various DOC facilities, and at least three of those incidents resulted in criminal

      charges against him. More specifically, a murder charge in 2005 was resolved

      through a plea agreement, wherein Shakur pleaded guilty to possession of a

      dangerous device, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty years. Shakur

      also was convicted of Class B felony battery by bodily waste in 2006, for which

      he was sentenced to a two-year term of incarceration. And in 2017, Shakur

      pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony battery and was sentenced to three years for

      that offense.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 3 of 18
[5]   As a consequence of Shakur’s 2005 murder charge, a one-year disciplinary

      segregation sanction was imposed. After completing that sanction, Shakur

      continued to remain in “restrictive housing” at the DOC. Appellant’s Appendix

      Vol. II at 227. Restrictive housing required Shakur to be isolated from the

      general prison population and reside in a single cell. Shakur, however, could

      have visits from family members, and he was permitted to make weekly phone

      calls. Shakur could also use the prison library and exercise in a fenced-in area.

      Mental health care providers performed weekly rounds in Shakur’s unit, and

      Shakur could request additional mental health care services from prison staff in

      addition to those weekly visits.

[6]   On May 23, 2014, a disciplinary hearing officer found Shakur guilty of refusing

      to submit to a drug test and a suspended three-month sanction in disciplinary

      segregation was imposed. Three months later, Shakur was found guilty of

      possessing contraband and a cellphone, both of which resulted in placement in

      disciplinary segregation. Following those incidents, Shakur remained in

      disciplinary segregation for the duration of his incarceration in the DOC.

[7]   On February 23, 2017, Director Carter issued an Executive Directive

      (Directive) establishing that any offender found guilty of a battery or assault

      involving a “Department staff member, volunteer, or visitor” that results in

      “bodily injury or serious bodily injury, . . . shall receive, in addition to other

      sanctions for the offense . . . a loss of the entire balance of the offender’s accumulated

      earned credit time.” Id. at 167 (emphasis added). The Directive was effective

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024               Page 4 of 18
      immediately and was “applicable to all [DOC] facilities housing adult

      offenders.” Id.

[8]   Six months later when Shakur was being escorted to Wabash’s recreation area,

      he removed his restraints, pulled a sharpened piece of plastic from his

      waistband, and stabbed a correctional officer multiple times. Shakur was found

      guilty of battery on a correctional officer for this offense, which resulted in the

      revocation of all 3,190 days of his earned credit time. Shakur was thereafter

      transferred to the Virginia Correctional Center.

[9]   On February 7, 2019, Shakur filed an action against the DOC Officials pursuant

      to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 (Section 1983 Action), alleging violations of his

      Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States

      1
          42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in part that

                Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
                any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
                citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
                deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
                shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
                proceeding for redress[.]

      42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, subjects a
      United States citizen to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
      federal Constitution or federal laws. Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind. Ct. App.
      1998), trans. denied. In order to recover damages under this statute, a plaintiff must show that (1)
      he held a constitutionally protected right, (2) he was deprived of this right, (3) the defendant acted
      with reckless indifference to cause this deprivation, and (4) the defendant acted under color of state
      law. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to prevent the states from violating the Constitution and
      certain federal statutes and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those federal
      rights. Culver-Union Twp. Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231,1233 (Ind. 1994).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024                                   Page 5 of 18
       Constitution. Shakur asserted that the DOC Officials denied him “adequate

       process and meaningful periodic review concerning his approximately thirteen .

       . . years in solitary confinement” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

       Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 31-32. Shakur also claimed that his due process

       rights were violated by “the retroactive enlargement of his sentence by more

       than eight (8) years,” that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the

       “denial of access to adequate mental health care,” and that the DOC Officials

       failed to protect him “from the known danger of extended placement in solitary

       confinement.” Id. at 32. Shakur sought damages and the reinstatement of his

       3,190 days of credit time.

[10]   After denying the allegations, the DOC Officials filed a motion for summary

       judgment, claiming that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law

       because Shakur’s claims regarding his housing status from 2005 to 2016 were

       barred under the two-year statute of limitations, that Shakur’s due process rights

       were not implicated because he had no liberty interest in being free from

       disciplinary segregation, and that Shakur’s Eighth Amendment rights were not

       violated because Shakur was properly ordered to remain in disciplinary housing

       and was provided with adequate mental health care and counseling during his

       incarceration.

[11]   Following a hearing, the trial court granted the DOC Officials’ motion for

       summary judgment on June 9, 2023. The order states in relevant part that     '

               4. Shakur’s claims regarding his housing status from 2005 to
               2016 are barred by the statute of limitations.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024      Page 6 of 18
        5. Shakur was appropriately placed in disciplinary segregation.

        6. Shakur appropriately remained in segregated housing due to
        his ongoing severe conduct violations and criminal charges,
        including the stabbing of a Correctional Officer, and the safety
        needs of the facilities.

        7. A prisoner’s claim of violations of due process stemming from
        a prison disciplinary hearing is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §
        1983 when the prisoner’s “claim for declaratory relief and money
        damages, [is] based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part
        of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the
        punishment imposed.” Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641, 648
        (1997).

        8. [Shakur] has no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary
        segregation and due process protections do not apply in this case.

        9. To the extent it was owed, [Shakur] received adequate due
        process in his disciplinary hearings. Prison disciplinary
        proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
        panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
        apply.

        10. Deliberate indifference is “something approaching a total
        unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks,” or
        a “conscious, culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane,
        959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). To prove deliberate
        indifference, a prisoner must establish that the defendant had
        actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so
        that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be
        inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024         Page 7 of 18
               11. [Shakur] has not provided any evidence to support his Eighth
               Amendment claims against [the DOC Officials]. [Shakur] was
               evaluated by a psychiatrist in 2018 and had no mental health
               issues as alleged in his Complaint.

               12. Based on the foregoing, . . . the [DOC Officials] . . . are
               entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

[12]   Shakur now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision

       I. Standard of Review
[13]   Our Supreme Court recently reiterated our standard of review of a trial court’s

       decision on summary judgment as follows:

               We review the trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo.
               [The moving party] is entitled to summary judgment if the
               designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material
               fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
               genuine issue of material fact exists when there is contrary
               evidence showing differing accounts of the truth, or when
               conflicting reasonable inferences may be drawn from the parties’
               consistent accounts and resolution of that conflict will affect the
               outcome of a claim. To the extent we have any doubts
               concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we
               must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.

       Z.D. v. Community Health Net., Inc., 217 N.E.3d 527, 531 (Ind. 2023) (citations

       and internal quotes omitted). When reviewing the grant of summary judgment,

       we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on any basis apparent in the record.

       Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2015).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 8 of 18
       II. Shakur’s Claims

       A. Due Process
[14]   Shakur contends that the trial court erred in determining that his claims against

       the DOC Officials are time-barred. He argues that his Section 1983 Action is

       not foreclosed because the DOC Officials’ conduct constituted a “continuing

       violation” and, therefore, the statute of limitations was not triggered.

       Appellant’s Brief at 16. Shakur further maintains that genuine issues of material

       fact remain as to whether his retention in solitary confinement and the DOC

       Officials’ conduct regarding the revocation of his credit time violated his right

       to due process.

[15]   At the outset, we note that our research has revealed little Indiana authority on

       point as to the issues that Shakur presents in this appeal. Thus, we will turn to

       our sister states and federal cases for guidance and persuasive authority. See

       Specialty Foods of Indiana, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2013), trans. denied. As for Shakur’s statute of limitations argument, at

       least one court has determined that the “applicable statute of limitations for

       section 1983 claims is the state period for personal injury torts.” Kalimara v.

       Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 879 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Wilson v. Garcia,

       471 U.S. 261 (1985)). Indiana’s personal injury statute, Ind. Code § 34-11-2-

       4(a), establishes that “[a]n action must be commenced within two (2) years after

       the cause of action accrues.” A cause of action “accrues and the statute of

       limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary

       diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024           Page 9 of 18
       the tortious act of another.” Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs. v. Morgan, 148 N.E.3d

       1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[16]   Here, the designated evidence shows that although Shakur was continuously

       placed in restrictive housing since 2005 at various DOC facilities, he did not file

       his Section 1983 Action against the DOC Officials until February 2019. Thus,

       in accordance with the two-year limitations period set forth in I.C. § 34-11-11-2-

       4(a), Shakur’s claims were limited to damages—if any—that accrued within the

       twenty-four-month window prior to that date. Any claims for relief that

       accrued before that deadline were time-barred and unavailable to him.

[17]   Additionally, although Shakur maintains that the DOC Officials’ conduct

       amounted to a continuing episode of harm against him that would preserve his

       claim for damages before the 2017 cutoff, we note that the “continuing wrong”

       doctrine applies where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an

       injury. Crowe, Chizek, & Co., L.L.P. v. Oil Tech., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1203, 1210

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. When a loss is intermittent and recurring,

       “new limitations are triggered” each time the loss occurs. Kerr v. City of South

       Bend, 48 N.E.3d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[18]   The designated evidence in this case does not establish that Shakur’s placement

       in disciplinary segregation at the various DOC facilities was a single,

       continuous episode. Rather, those sanctions resulted from a series of

       disciplinary proceedings that occurred at various times in 2005 and from 2013-

       17. Each offense that Shakur committed, and the sanctions imposed thereon,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 10 of 18
       were separate and did not constitute an ongoing episode. Hence, Shakur’s

       recovery—if any—is “limited to losses which occurred beginning” two years

       before he filed his complaint. Id. As Shakur did not file his complaint until

       February 2019, his claims for damages occurring before February 2017 are

       time-barred under I.C. § 34-11-11-2-4(a), and only those that accrued after that

       date may proceed.

[19]   Turning to those instances and Shakur’s claims of alleged violations of due

       process, the United States Supreme Court has observed that procedural due

       process claims are typically considered in two steps. First, it is determined

       whether the State has deprived the individual of a property or liberty interest,

       and the second step examines what process is due and whether the procedures

       utilized by the State comport with due process. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v.

       Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Whether a liberty interest exists requires

       examining state law to determine if the person has a legitimate claim of

       entitlement. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). “The

       requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

       interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty

       and property.” Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Therefore, if

       neither a liberty nor a property interest is at stake, the State may “use any

       procedures it chooses, or no procedures at all.” Montgomery v. Anderson, 262

       F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2001).

[20]   Here, Shakur is challenging the sanctions imposed while incarcerated in the

       DOC, claiming that the DOC Officials violated his due process rights by

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024       Page 11 of 18
       revoking all of his credit time and depriving him of his liberty interest when he

       was placed in disciplinary segregation. Indiana state prisoners have a liberty

       interest in good time credits, and they are entitled to due process before the

       State may revoke those credits. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.

       2004). We note, however, that our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to

       consider challenges to DOC’s administrative disciplinary decisions. Blanck v.

       Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ind. 2005). And prisoners may not

       generally invoke U.S.C. § 1983 to collaterally attack the outcome of prison

       disciplinary matters. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.475, 476 (1973). Instead,

       State prisoners who desire to challenge their sentences or administrative orders

       revoking good time credits must seek habeas corpus relief because they are

       contesting the fact or duration of confinement. Id. at 489. Stated differently

       when an offender challenges the sanctions imposed in a prison discipline

       proceeding on constitutional grounds, “habeas corpus—not §1983—is the

       specific instrument to obtain release from unlawful imprisonment.” Morgan v.

       Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). The two statutes

       are not interchangeable. Thus, when a prisoner challenges the fact or “duration

       of his confinement,” he fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Id. (citing

       Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489).

[21]   We also observe that before an offender can present a claim in a Section 1983

       Action alleging a constitutional violation regarding a prison disciplinary

       proceeding, he must satisfy the “favorable termination rule” set forth in Heck v.

       Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). That is, a prisoner must first have a conviction

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024       Page 12 of 18
       or sentence reversed, expunged, or called into question through a writ of habeas

       corpus for an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for

       other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

       sentence invalid.” Id. at 486-87; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648

       (1997) (where the rule in Heck was extended to preclude Section 1983 claims

       challenging procedural deficiencies that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

       outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding). Shakur challenges the DOC’s

       disciplinary actions where habeas review was available, so they are not

       presentable pursuant to Heck and Edwards as a Section 1983 Action. See, e.g.,

       Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir 2004) (observing that State prisoners

       seeking to challenge administrative orders revoking good time credits or

       equivalent sentence-shortening mechanisms must seek habeas corpus).

[22]   We also reject Shakur’s argument that the DOC Officials waived applicability

       of the Heck and Edwards rules because they failed to plead the issue as an

       affirmative defense. Even though Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) generally requires

       responsive pleadings to raise affirmative defenses, trial courts may exercise their

       discretion and entertain affirmative defenses that are not raised in a responsive

       pleading. Oshinski v. N. Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist., 843 N.E.2d 536, 538

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Here, the trial court considered and ruled on the DOC

       Officials’ Heck and Edwards claims in its summary judgment order. And while

       the DOC Officials did not make specific references to Heck and Edwards in their

       Answer to Shakur’s complaint, they asserted that the trial court lacked “subject

       matter jurisdiction over all claims relating to or arising out of prison discipline”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 13 of 18
       and then went on to address the Heck and Edwards issue in their summary

       judgment motion. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 49. Thus, the trial court and

       Shakur were on notice that the DOC Officials intended to argue that the trial

       court lacked the authority to adjudicate Shakur’s contentions as they related to

       prison discipline. That said, Shakur’s claim that the DOC Officials waived the

       applicability of the Heck and Edwards limitations, fails.

[23]   Finally, we note that Shakur’s claims that arguably are not precluded by Heck

       and Edwards are those that involved the two disciplinary proceedings that

       occurred after October 4, 2017. In both those instances, Shakur was sanctioned

       with separate six-month terms of disciplinary segregation after the balance of his

       3,190 days of credit time had already been revoked. Shakur, however, did not

       treat the sanctions that were imposed after October 2017 as separate from the

       all-encompassing due process violations that he alleged in his complaint until

       he raised that issue in his reply brief on appeal. As a result, Shakur has waived

       the issue. See, e.g., Lafayette Rentals, Inc. v. Low Cost Spay-Neuter Clinic, Inc., 207

       N.E.3d 1222, 1233 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that an appellant is

       precluded from raising an issue for the first time in his reply brief).

[24]   Waiver notwithstanding, the designated evidence demonstrates that Shakur has

       not served the sanctions that were imposed after October 2017. More

       specifically, because of the earlier conduct violations and sanctions that were

       imposed, the 2017 sanctions were not set to commence until 2020. Shakur,

       however, was transferred to the Virginia Correctional Center in December

       2018, at which time he was no longer housed in disciplinary segregation. As

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024            Page 14 of 18
       Shakur did not serve any part of those sanctions, he has failed to demonstrate

       any injury that resulted from the DOC Officials’ actions. Thus, Shakur was

       without standing to bring a Section 1983 Action on those claims. See,

       e.g., Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 218 (Ind.

       2022) (standing requires a party to show that he has suffered or was in

       immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as result of the complained of

       conduct). For all these reasons, Shakur’s due process challenges fail, and we

       conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in the DOC

       Officials’ favor as to those claims.

       II. Eighth Amendment Challenges

[25]   Shakur argues that the trial court erred in granting the DOC Officials’ motion

       for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim because genuine issues

       of material fact exist as to whether the DOC Officials failed to protect him and

       provide him with necessary medical care.

[26]   When a prisoner raises an Eighth Amendment claim, a prison official cannot be

       found liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless

       the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

       Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, Shakur would be required

       to show that the DOC Officials were “deliberately indifferent” to his “serious

       medical needs.” See Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 544 (Ind. 1998).

       Deliberate indifference has been defined as “something approaching a total

       unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks” or a “conscious,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024         Page 15 of 18
       culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir.

       1992). It must be established that the DOC Officials were “subjectively aware

       of and intentionally disregarded an objectively serious risk to his health or

       safety.” Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied. Also,

       before prison officials can be held liable for an Eighth Amendment violation,

       the plaintiff must articulate the conditions of confinement that he is challenging

       with specificity. Id. Challenges “to conditions of confinement cannot be

       aggregated and considered in combination unless ‘they have a mutually

       enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable need such

       as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night

       combined with a failure to issue blankets.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501

       U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

[27]   In this case, the essence of Shakur’s Eighth Amendment claim is that the DOC

       Officials failed to protect his mental health when they placed him in restrictive

       housing. Shakur does not specify what conditions of restrictive housing

       contributed to the harm he alleges. Rather, the designated evidence Shakur

       presented assumes that his segregation from the general prison population

       caused him to suffer psychiatric symptoms. For Eighth Amendment liability to

       attach, a serious injury or medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a

       physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

       person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Henderson

       v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 16 of 18
[28]   It is not established here that the DOC Officials were deliberately indifferent to

       Shakur’s sufficiently serious injury or medical need. Shakur averred in his

       affidavit that he experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, heard

       voices, and had suicidal ideation. These assertions, however, were not

       supported with a medical diagnosis. Shakur only presented a secondary source

       that described various psychiatric conditions that might result from prolonged

       isolation in restrictive housing. The author of that work, however, did not

       diagnose Shakur with any of those illnesses. To the contrary, the medical

       evidence that does exist, i.e., a competency evaluation conducted by a

       psychiatrist at the Indiana University School of Medicine, established that

       Shakur was not suffering from a psychiatric illness. That report specifically

       stated that “[Shakur] did not appear to meet criteria for diagnosis with any

       anxiety, mood, psychotic, personality . . . trauma disorder, . . . or signs of

       psychosis.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 160.

[29]   The designated evidence establishes as a matter of law that the DOC Officials

       were not indifferent to Shakur’s mental health to the extent that he could be

       negatively affected from disciplinary segregation. Shakur had weekly access to

       mental health care professionals during his incarceration, and he admitted that

       mental health care providers visited him “one day per week” to check on his

       well-being. Id. at 230. Although Shakur alleged that those visits were short, he

       further admitted that he could have lengthier conversations on occasion and

       request a mental health care provider in addition to the weekly visits. As a

       result, the undisputed material facts establish that the components of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024        Page 17 of 18
       deliberate-indifference test could not be satisfied here. Thus, Shakur cannot

       challenge the overall conditions of his confinement, and the psychiatric illnesses

       he complains of did not amount to objectively serious harm. See Ratliff, 693

       N.E.2d 530 at 44.

[30]   In sum, the designated evidence established that Shakur was provided with

       regular access to medical care, and there is no evidence that the DOC Officials

       were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of Shakur’s confinement. Thus,

       Shakur’s Eighth Amendment claims fail as a matter of law, and we conclude

       that the trial court properly granted the DOC Officials’ motion for summary

       judgment as to those contentions.

[31]   Judgment affirmed.

       Bradford, J. and Felix, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Christopher C. Myers
       Ft. Wayne, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Indiana Attorney General

       Evan Matthew Comer
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1564 | April 18, 2024      Page 18 of 18