Court Opinion

ID: 9839663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 18:07:15.594403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.220966
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40270

J. ADRIANNE GRIFFIN f/k/a
ADRIANE VIDAL-RILEY,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SIGMA SERVICES, LLC and
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE,

       Defendants-Appellees,

and

JOHNNY GRIFFAY,

       Defendant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNAILLO COUNTY
Lisa Chavez Ortega, District Court Judge

J. Adrianne Griffin
Albuquerque, NM

Pro Se Appellant

Allen, Shepherd, Lewis & Syra, P.A.
Dustin Dwayne Dempsey
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellees

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

IVES, Judge.
{1}     Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, appeals from an order of dismissal with
prejudice for discovery violations. We issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm.
Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered.
Unpersuaded, we affirm.

{2}     In her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff continues to assert that the district
court abused its discretion when it dismissed her complaint with prejudice for discovery
violations. We proposed to affirm on the grounds that Plaintiff’s misrepresentations were
willful efforts to withhold information from Defendants, and that Plaintiff failed to point to
evidence in the record proper to support her assertions that she had disclosed the
information. [CN 3-7] Although Plaintiff has attempted to provide more information and
context regarding the district court’s dismissal order, we are unpersuaded.

{3}     Plaintiff maintains that her USAA insurance policy and the adjuster’s report were
discoverable, and as such, Defendants “in basic due diligence routinely should have
sought any information available from USAA.” [MIO 20] Based on the record,
Defendants did ask for this information in their interrogatories. Specifically, Defendants
asked that Plaintiff “[i]dentify by Insurance Company, policy number, types of coverage
and limits, each and every policy of insurance in effect on the day of the accident,
affording any form of coverage to you for any damages allegedly sustained by you
whether that coverage was denied or not.” [3 RP 549] It appears that Plaintiff sent a
demand packet to USAA for uninsured motorist benefits, which specifically set forth the
facts and injuries that related to her October 5, 2015 accident. [3 RP 561-68] That
demand packet was sent in March 2018 [3 RP 561], almost two years before
Defendants sent their interrogatories to Plaintiff [1 RP 28]. However, this demand for
uninsured motorist benefits was never disclosed to Defendants. Plaintiff also contends
that her failure to answer the interrogatory “was overridden by the truthful statements in
her deposition [from April 2021].” [MIO 20] Plaintiff, however, does not point to
anywhere in the record proper to support this assertion. See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-
NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in
summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition
to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”). Plaintiff merely states that “[a]ny damage from
this error was cured in the deposition . . . wherein [she] testified extensively about the
events at the scene: the vehicle logo, watching the police check the license plate and
VIN, and talking [to the man who hit her].” [MIO 4] This explanation, however, is
insufficient to demonstrate that her testimony alerted Defendants to the fact that she
received a $75,000 settlement payment from her insurer.

{4}     To the extent Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in dismissing her
complaint because she applied for the $75,000 settlement payment, but did not receive
it, and that no proof of harm was presented, we are unpersuaded. [MIO 11, 13]
Defendant’s interrogatory specifically sought information about any policy in effect on
the day of the accident “affording any form of coverage to you for any damages
allegedly sustained by you whether that coverage was denied or not.” [3 RP 549
(emphasis added)] Regardless of whether her settlement payment was denied, Plaintiff
still had an obligation to disclose that information to Defendants. See Reed v. Furr’s
Supermarkets, Inc., 2000-NMCA-091, ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 639, 11 P.3d 603 (explaining that
“[t]he design of the discovery process is to avoid surprise in trial preparation and
promote the opposing party’s ability to obtain the evidence necessary to evaluate and
resolve [the] dispute” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In addition, as we
stated in our calendar notice, Defendants were not required to show that they were
prejudiced by Plaintiff’s misrepresentations. [CN 6] See id. ¶ 28 (explaining that a party
seeking dismissal of an action as a sanction for abuse of the discovery process “is not
required to show prejudice as a precondition to dismissal”); id. ¶ 29 (stating that “the
overriding concern is abuse of the discovery process”).

{5}     With respect to Plaintiff’s failure to disclose information to Defendants about
having contact with the man who hit her, Plaintiff does not specifically dispute any of the
facts or law upon which our proposed notice relied. See Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶
24. Rather, Plaintiff states that “she wanted to talk to him first and would disclose his
information in the pretrial order, and the [district c]ourt endorsed that position.” [MIO 7]
Plaintiff further states that she “wanted his testimony in the record the same day this
matter was dismissed.” [MIO 14] First, Plaintiff does not point to anywhere in the record
proper to show that the district court endorsed her concealment of a witness. Second,
regardless of Plaintiff’s asserted intention to eventually disclose the witness’s
information and that she wanted his testimony in the record, she nevertheless
attempted to conceal him from Defendants and instructed him “not to give such a ‘trial
deposition’ at all, and if an attempt is made to subpoena him or to trick him into an
interview of that nature, she has asked him not to comply unless the [c]ourt approves.”
[2 RP 520, ¶ 6]

{6}     Plaintiff points to several cases and argues that the circumstances of the present
case are different from those cases in which dismissals for discovery abuses have been
upheld. [MIO 16-18] See Reed, 2000-NMCA-091, ¶ 9 (discussing the requirements to
justify dismissal as an appropriate sanction); Bustillos v. Constr. Contracting, 1993-
NMCA-142, 116 N.M. 673, 866 P.2d 401 (discussing the difference between information
that that would be an issue at trial and information that would lead to additional avenues
of discovery); Sandoval v. Martinez, 1989-NMCA-042, 109 N.M. 5, 780 P.2d 1152
(discussing the appropriateness of dismissal when the plaintiff lied in answers to
interrogatories). Specifically, Plaintiff cites Reed in support of her proposition that the
district court erred in dismissing her complaint for discovery violations. [MIO 17-18] She
argues that the plaintiff’s concealment in Reed was “continuous, ongoing, and
pervasive,” and that “[n]o parallel . . . facts occurred in this action.” [MIO 17] Plaintiff
also argues that in the present case “the alleged misrepresentation was not relied on,
which is why it had not been raised earlier” and that Defendants’ “defense was not
impeded by anything about her insurance.” [MIO 17]

{7}      This Court in Reed reiterated that dismissal as a sanction for discovery abuse
does not require: “(1) that the party seeking dismissal be deceived in fact or that the
party relied on the misrepresentations; (2) that the information misrepresented be
critical to preparation for trial; and (3) that dismissal be preconditioned upon the ultimate
importance of the false or deceptive information.” Id. ¶ 28; see also Medina v. Found.
Rsrv. Ins. Co., Inc., 1994-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 6-9, 117 N.M. 163, 870 P.2d 125. In addition,
Reed instructs that false answers to interrogatories “undermine the discovery process
and demonstrate either a willful, intentional and bad faith attempt to conceal evidence or
a gross indifference to discovery obligations.” Reed, 2000-NMCA-091, ¶ 8 (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{8}     Although Plaintiff is correct that the misrepresentations made by the plaintiff in
Reed were extensive, there is nothing to suggest that only extensive misrepresentations
are required in order for a case to be dismissed for discovery violations. Here, the
district court, in its dismissal order, found that “Plaintiff made false statements” in her
answers to Defendants’ interrogatories regarding the pursuit of an uninsured motorist
claim, and that “the false statements were not a mistake but, rather, were willful.” [3 RP
613] This finding is consistent with Reed, which stated that misrepresentations in
answers to interrogatories undermine the discovery process and demonstrate a willful
attempt to conceal evidence. Id. Despite her assertions that her misrepresentation was
“overwhelmed by contrary statements both before and after the event,” as noted above,
Plaintiff has not pointed to anywhere in the record proper to support that assertion. Even
though Plaintiff’s misrepresentations were not as extensive as those in Reed, her
misrepresentation concealing her settlement payment and her concealment of a
material witness are enough to warrant a dismissal of her complaint.

{9}     Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiff’s misrepresentations in failing to disclose
a settlement payment and concealing a material witness were a willful effort to withhold
crucial information from Defendants thereby undermining the discovery process, and
that the district court did not err by dismissing her complaint. See id. ¶ 9 (“Dismissal is
an appropriate sanction for false answers during discovery when a party’s
misrepresentations are made willfully or in bad faith.”).

{10} For the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm
the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for discovery violations.

{11}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge