Court Opinion

ID: 9449252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 14:08:58.384668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:56.739441
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                     Court of Appeals

                       NO. 2022-CA-0068-MR

WILL MCGINNIS                                         APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 02-CI-02278

DIOCESE OF COVINGTON                                   APPELLEE

AND

                       NO. 2022-CA-0714-MR

WILL MCGINNIS                                         APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 22-CI-00387

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
COVINGTON AND ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
LEXINGTON                                             APPELLEES
                                  OPINION AND ORDER
                                      AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Will McGinnis appeals from an order of the Fayette

Circuit Court denying his motion pursuant to CR1 60.02 and a separate order

granting a motion to dismiss. We affirm both orders. We further find sufficient

cause not to dismiss No. 2022-CA-0068-MR.

                                            FACTS

                In 1983, McGinnis was a student at Christ the King parish school in

Lexington. He was sexually abused by a parish priest while in the eighth grade

and in the summer following that school year. Ten years later, when McGinnis

was approximately twenty-five years old, he wrote a letter to the Bishop of the

Diocese of Lexington and informed the leader of the abuse he suffered eleven

years before. The Diocese of Lexington offered to provide counseling for

McGinnis, but he did not accept the offer.

                In 2002, McGinnis filed a complaint against both the Diocese of

Covington and the Diocese of Lexington seeking compensation for the sexual

abuse he suffered by the priest who had been transferred to the Diocese of

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                              -2-
Lexington from the Diocese of Covington when the former was created.2 The

Fayette Circuit Court dismissed the suit within weeks of its filing, finding that it

was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations.3 That determination was

2
  The Diocese of Lexington was established in 1988 by Pope John Paul II. The Diocese was
formed from parts of the Archdiocese of Louisville and the Diocese of Covington. See Connelly,
Allison and Sparks, Andrew; Part I, Independent Investigation of Diocese of Lexington
Regarding The Protection of Children and Young People by Catholic Clergy, August 14, 2020,
https://www.bishop-accountability.org/diocesan_lists/Lexington/2020_08_17_Lexington_
Report_Update.pdf (last accessed Jul. 24, 2023).

3
 A civil action for damages suffered as a result of child sexual abuse or assault shall be brought
before the expiration of the latest time periods specified in KRS 413.249(2):

       (a) Within five (5) years of the commission of the act or the last of a series of acts
       by the same perpetrator;

       (b) Within five (5) years of the date the victim knew, or should have known, of
       the act; or

       (c) Within five (5) years after the victim attains the age of eighteen (18) years.

KRS 413.249(2) as it was enacted at the time McGinnis’ suit was filed in 2002. The statute has
since been amended several times and reads as follows at the time of the issuance of this
Opinion:

        A civil action for recovery of damages for injury or illness suffered as a result of
        childhood sexual assault or abuse shall be brought before whichever of the following
        periods last expires:

            (a) Within ten (10) years of the commission of the act or the last of a series of
            acts by the same perpetrator;

            (b) Within ten (10) years of the date the victim knew, or should have known,
            of the act;

            (c) Within ten (10) years after the victim attains the age of eighteen (18)
            years; or

            (d) Within ten (10) years of the conviction of a civil defendant for an offense
            included in the definition of childhood sexual assault or abuse.

                                                -3-
affirmed by this Court on appeal. See McGinnis v. Roman Catholic Diocese of

Covington, No. 2002-CA-001610-MR, 2003 WL 22111094 (Ky. App. Sep. 12,

2003) (McGinnis I).

             In that opinion, this Court discussed the case of Roman Catholic

Diocese of Covington v. Secter, wherein this Court held that when a defendant has

been shown to have obstructed “the prosecution of a cause of action” the statute of

limitations might be tolled to account for such obstruction. 966 S.W.2d 286, 290

(Ky. App. 1998). In that first appeal, this Court determined that tolling was not

proper in McGinnis’ case because he made no allegation the Diocese of Covington

concealed any sexual abuse of minors by the priest he accused of abusing him.4

4
             In bringing a cause of action for personal injury such as in this
             case, the statute of limitations may be tolled where the defendant
             absconds, conceals himself, or “by any other indirect means
             obstructs the prosecution of the action[.]” KRS 413.190(2).
             “Obstruction might also occur where a defendant conceals a
             plaintiff’s cause of action so that it could not be discovered by the
             exercise of ordinary diligence on the plaintiff’s part.” Rigazio [v.
             Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. App. 1993)].
             The Diocese clearly obstructed the prosecution of Secter’s cause of
             action against it by continually concealing the fact that it had
             knowledge of Bierman’s problem well before the time that Secter
             was abused as well as the fact that it continued to receive reports of
             sexual abuse of other students during part of the time period in
             which Secter was abused.

            Furthermore, “where the law imposes a duty of disclosure, a failure
            of disclosure may constitute concealment under KRS 413.190(2),
            or at least amount to misleading or obstructive conduct.” Munday
            v. Mayfair Diagnostic Lab., Ky., 831 S.W.2d 912, 915 (1992).
            KRS 199.335, the statute in effect when these incidents occurred,
            imposed a legal duty on any person to report child abuse to law
            enforcement authorities. The Diocese failed to comply with this

                                              -4-
               In 2005, McGinnis filed a motion in the Fayette Circuit Court

pursuant to CR 60.02. In that motion, he argued the trial court erred in not

considering evidence concerning the removal of the priest possessed by the

Diocese of Lexington as well as a letter he had received; said letter having alleged

that the priest who abused him had been abused by a priest as a child and that the

Diocese of Covington should have known such abuse would predispose the priest

to abuse others. The trial court found the letter did not support a finding that the

Diocese of Covington had any knowledge of the background of the priest who

abused him and denied the motion. This Court affirmed, finding the circuit court

did not abuse its discretion in denying CR 60.02 relief. See McGinnis v. Roman

Catholic Diocese of Covington, No. 2006-CA-000101-MR, 2007 WL 29641 (Ky.

App. Jan. 5, 2007), as modified (Jan. 19, 2007) (McGinnis II).

               In 2021, more than fourteen years after this Court rendered McGinnis

II, McGinnis filed a second motion pursuant to CR 60.02 once again seeking to

reopen the 2002 lawsuit. McGinnis based his motion on a report compiled by

Professor Allison Connelly of the University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of

Law and Andrew Sparks of the Dickinson-Wright law firm in Lexington.

               duty, and such failure constitutes evidence of concealment under
               KRS 413.190(2). (Footnote omitted).

Secter, 966 S.W.2d at 290.

                                              -5-
Professor Connelly and Mr. Sparks investigated and filed the report at the behest of

the Diocese of Lexington. Their investigation was an independent review of the

Diocese’s files and records before “releasing the names of priests against whom

one or more allegations of sexual abuse have been found to be substantiated or

credible.” The report revealed that the Diocese of Lexington had no paperwork in

its files concerning a priest who had previously served in the Diocese of Covington

before the creation of the Diocese of Lexington, and who was found to have

substantiated allegations of child sexual abuse.

             Believing documentation existed which supported his allegation that

the Diocese of Covington was aware of his alleged abuser’s background, McGinnis

argued that such documentation was removed from the files and that such action or

conduct would justify tolling of his claim because it constituted concealment or

obstruction per the Secter case. Professor Connelly filed an affidavit in the Fayette

Circuit Court in which she clarified that the priest McGinnis accused was not one

of the priests whose file appeared to be incomplete. On the basis of that affidavit,

the trial court denied the motion and McGinnis filed this appeal.

             Within weeks of the entry of the order denying the CR 60.02 motion,

McGinnis filed a separate action making the same allegations of abuse and naming

the Dioceses of Covington and Lexington as defendants. Both Dioceses filed

motions to dismiss the matter. The trial court granted the Dioceses’ motions,

                                         -6-
finding any claims made in McGinnis’ motion were barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. McGinnis appeals that determination.

              Both matters are now before this Court. Having reviewed the records,

the orders, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the circuit court in both cases.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

              This Court reviews denials of CR 60.02 motions for an abuse of

discretion.

              Our standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a CR
              60.02 motion is abuse of discretion. Fortney v. Mahan,
              302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957). The test for abuse of
              discretion is whether the trial court’s decision is arbitrary,
              unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.
              Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d
              575, 581 (Ky. 2000).

Lawson v. Lawson, 290 S.W.3d 691, 693-94 (Ky. App. 2009).

              The granting of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. “We review

a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . de novo, owing no deference to

the circuit court on a question of law. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky.

2010).” Greissman v. Rawlings and Associates, PLLC, 571 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Ky.

2019).

                                      ANALYSIS

              Because there are two orders of the circuit court being appealed

herein, we will discuss the orders separately.

                                           -7-
             A. Order on CR 60.02 Motion

             The first of the two orders from which McGinnis appeals is the order

of the trial court denying his CR 60.02 motion, which he filed in October of 2021.

It must be remembered that the action which McGinnis sought to reopen was filed

in 2002 alleging actions which occurred in the mid-1980s.

             McGinnis relied upon the report of Connelly and Sparks,

commissioned by the Diocese of Lexington. He alleged the report indicated that

the investigation conducted uncovered the failure of the Diocese of Covington to

turn over any personnel papers concerning priests who served parishes in that

Diocese when the Diocese of Lexington was created and carved out of the Diocese

of Covington and the Archdiocese of Louisville. McGinnis alleged the priest who

sexually abused him (which allegation was recognized as substantiated in the

report) was one of those priests and argued that such failure to turn over personnel

papers was indicative of obstruction on the part of the Diocese of Covington.

             Professor Connelly provided an affidavit that the priest found to have

sexually abused McGinnis was not one of the priests for whom no personnel

papers were provided to the new Diocese of Lexington by the Diocese of

Covington. On the basis of that evidence, and with McGinnis’ providing no

evidence whatsoever of his allegation that the Diocese of Covington intentionally

covered up any knowledge that the priest was abusive, the trial court denied his

                                         -8-
motion to reopen his 2002 complaint. As previously referenced, in McGinnis I,

this Court indicated that Secter provided a basis for tolling the statute of limitations

when the defendant could be shown to have obstructed the prosecution of a case or

acted to conceal evidence which would provide support for a complaint. McGinnis

made this allegation in his first CR 60.02 motion and the circuit court held he

failed to provide sufficient evidence that any concealment or obstruction on the

part of either Diocese had occurred; this Court affirmed that holding. Apparently

hoping the Connelly and Sparks Report would provide sufficient evidence,

McGinnis filed a successive CR 60.02 motion. The trial court, however, after

holding a hearing and reviewing the matter, determined there was no evidence of

concealment or obstruction as to the priest McGinnis accused, and denied the

relief.

             The standard of review here remains the same as it was in 2007 when

this Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not finding sufficient

evidence of obstruction or concealment to necessitate tolling the statute of

limitations. We reach the same conclusion. It was not an abuse of discretion for

the trial court to deny the CR 60.02 motion because there was no evidence that

                                          -9-
either Diocese acted to conceal or obstruct, which might form a basis for tolling.

We affirm the decision of the Fayette Circuit Court.5

               b. Order on Motions to Dismiss

               Following the denial of his CR 60.02 motion, and after filing the

notice of appeal challenging that denial, McGinnis filed a complaint seeking the

same relief as he had sought in McGinnis I. Counsel for both Dioceses filed

motions to dismiss with the Diocese of Lexington citing the statute of limitations

and the Diocese of Covington citing res judicata. The trial court granted both

motions to dismiss. The court held the subsequent complaint was barred by claim

preclusion, finding that the parties and claims were the same in both actions and

that the matter had been resolved on the merits previously.

               As the granting of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo, we need

not give any deference to any determinations of the trial court. We agree,

however, that the claims against both Dioceses were barred by claim preclusion.6

5
  The Diocese of Covington also argues that pursuant to CR 73.03(1), McGinnis failed to include
an indispensable party when he did not include the Diocese of Lexington on the notice of appeal
after naming them in the original complaint and in the motion being appealed. Because we have
found that the trial court did not err in denying the relief, we have determined to not dismiss this
appeal for the failure to include the Diocese of Lexington. See Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 864,
875 (Ky. 2021) (“To be clear, we strongly caution future litigants to be more careful in the future
as jurisdictional defects are almost always fatal. But today because the party unmentioned was
aware of the arguments raised, received notice, and was not prejudiced we have chosen to look
past this flaw.”).

6
       Res judicata consists of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The doctrine
       of claim preclusion requires identity of the parties, identity of the causes of action,

                                               -10-
McGinnis brought an action alleging the same causes of action against the same

defendants and those claims were previously decided on the merits in that it was

determined that the claims were barred by the statute of limitation.

              Res judicata, being the older term, is also sometimes
              thought of as an umbrella doctrine that contains within it
              both claim and issue preclusion. See, e.g., Yeoman v.
              Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 464-65 (Ky.
              1998) (“The doctrine of res judicata is formed by two
              subparts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion.”).
              Claim preclusion “is synonymous with res judicata in its
              strict sense.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern
              Legal Usage 159 (2d ed.1995). Nevertheless, the term
              “claim preclusion” is often preferable to the term “res
              judicata,” if only for the sake of clarity and to use a term
              that parallels “issue preclusion.” See, e.g., Yeoman, 983
              S.W.2d at 465 n.2 (“In this opinion we employ the term
              claim preclusion to refer to the doctrine which bars
              subsequent litigation of a cause of action which has
              previously been adjudicated. The term issue preclusion
              is employed to refer to the doctrine which prohibits
              issues which were adjudicated in a previous lawsuit from
              being relitigated in a subsequent lawsuit. Res judicata is
              the Latin term which encompasses both issue and claim
              preclusion and is not to be used as synonymous with
              either individually, but rather equally with both.
              Collateral estoppel is a term used by some to refer to
              issue preclusion, but for simplicity’s sake, we shall not
              use it in this opinion.”); see also Allen D. Vestal, The
              Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 Mich.
              L.Rev. 33, 33-34 (1963-64) (urging use of the terms

       and a resolution of the action on the merits. Issue preclusion bars parties “from
       relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in an earlier action.”
       As stated by the Kentucky Supreme Court, res judicata “is basic to our legal
       system and stands for the principle that once the rights of the parties have been
       finally determined, litigation should end.”

Jellinick v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 210 S.W.3d 168, 171-72 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations omitted).

                                                -11-
            claim and issue preclusion). As used below, especially in
            quotations from earlier decisions, res judicata is used
            primarily to mean claim preclusion.

            Res judicata, in the sense of claim preclusion, “is basic to
            our legal system and stands for the principle that once
            rights of the parties have been finally determined,
            litigation should end.” Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74
            S.W.3d 259, 261 (Ky. 2002). Or as the term has been
            more thoroughly defined:

                   “[T]he doctrine of res judicata prevents the
                   relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent
                   appeal and includes every matter belonging to the
                   subject of the litigation which could have been, as
                   well as those which were, introduced in support of
                   the contention of the parties on the first appeal.”

            Huntzinger v. McCrae, 818 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky. App.
            1990) (quoting Burkett v. Board of Ed. of Pulaski
            County, 558 S.W.2d 626, 627-28 (Ky. App. 1977))
            (alteration in original). The very purpose of the doctrine
            of res judicata is to preclude repetitious actions. Harrod
            v. Irvine, 283 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Ky. App. 2009). Three
            elements must be met for the rule to apply: (1) there
            must be an identity of parties between the two actions;
            (2) there must be an identity of the two causes of action;
            and (3) the prior action must have been decided on the
            merits. Id.

Miller v. Administrative Office of Courts, 361 S.W.3d 867, 871-72 (Ky. 2011).

                                 CONCLUSION

            We affirm the orders of the trial court dismissing the CR 60.02 action

for failure to provide any evidence of weight that the Diocese of Covington acted

to obstruct the litigation and conceal evidence which may have supported tolling

                                        -12-
the statute of limitations. Further, we find the trial court properly dismissed the

successive complaint against the Dioceses of both Covington and Lexington as the

claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

             ALL CONCUR.

 ENTERED: _July 28, 2023____
                                             JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE DIOCESE
                                           OF COVINGTON:
Will McGinnis, pro se
Lexington, Kentucky                        Mark D. Guilfoyle
                                           Nicholas C. Birkenhauer
                                           Covington, Kentucky

                                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DIOCESE
                                           OF LEXINGTON:

                                           Melanie J. Kilpatrick
                                           Lexington, Kentucky

                                         -13-