Court Opinion

ID: 9480526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:50:38.892234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:44.721160
License: Public Domain

MILBURN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons that follow. In my view, the majority and the district court have erred in concluding that the word “Journeyman,” as used in Exhibit D, has a known and controlling definition. The majority concedes that the term is not defined in the CBA, yet, it concludes that the term, as used, is clear and unambiguous. From FSW’s retained right to fill vacancies with journeymen ahead of trainees, the majority concludes that “the term is used with a meaning that coincides with the UAW International Constitution which requires eight years of apprenticeship to achieve journeyman status in the skilled trades.” However, the UAW International Constitution is not in the record.
The only direct evidence of UAW International standards is the testimony of the plaintiff that eight years in the trade is normally required to obtain a journeyman’s *616card. The majority recognizes that “the CBA does not expressly require that a journeyman millwright obtain a journeyman’s card from the International to qualify as a journeyman at FSW.”
In section 3, Exhibit D allows a trainee to “waive any rights ... to exercise seniority in the Production departments and to progress to the top of Journeyman’s classification.” Alternatively, he can retain seniority rights in the Production departments and “remain at the 99% rate schedule until completing his 8th year of appren-ticeship_” J.A. 58-59. From this single mention of an eight-year period and its “congruence” with the eight-year period under UAW International standards, the majority rules out any genuine issue that one could be a journeyman at FSW before serving eight years as an apprentice. I am not convinced that the mere mention of an eight-year apprenticeship in one context establishes that the term journeyman, clearly and unambiguously in all contexts, means one who has eight years in the trade. I find the mere mention of an eight-year apprenticeship especially unconvincing in this case since the plaintiff had achieved 100% journeyman pay through merit increases and was, thus, not subject to the requirement that he “remain at the 99% rate schedule until completing his 8th year of apprenticeship.”
As the majority recognizes, the record contains unrefuted testimony of Maren-tette that he and four others were given contractual journeyman status early when they were advanced to 100% of the journeyman pay rate. Marentette’s claims are corroborated in part by his pay rate card which reflects a change in status on September 4, 1971, from “Millwright Trainee” to “Millwright-Top-Rate.” J.A. 227. This status continued until Marentette’s leave of absence began. Id.
The majority criticizes plaintiff’s reliance upon the above evidence as employing circular reasoning. The majority reasons that since FSW did not have the authority to grant journeyman status, any proof that it had done so is irrelevant. In my view, the majority commits the same error it finds in the plaintiff. The majority reasons that since the term journeyman is not defined in the CBA, the term must have the same meaning as given it in the UAW International Constitution (a document not in this record); therefore, the CBA defines journeyman in a way inconsistent with plaintiff’s proof.
Because I believe that the language of the written agreement is ambiguous as to when a person is a millwright or a journeyman, as opposed to a trainee, I would find that the interpretation of the contract is a factual issue turning upon the intent of the parties. Manley v. Plasti-Line, Inc., 808 F.2d 468, 471 (6th Cir.1987); Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115, 1128-29 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1286 (1982). Since the defendants failed to submit parol evidence to show that the contractual language had only one reasonable and intended meaning, I would conclude that summary judgment was not appropriate on the issue of plaintiff’s right to reinstatement as a millwright. See Manley, 808 F.2d at 471 n. 5; see also 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987).
I would also hold that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Local 174’s handling of the grievance rose to the level of perfunctory handling. The majority devotes considerable discussion to the method by which Marentette obtained a journeyman card and to the Union’s determination that he was not entitled to that card. Since I am not convinced that a journeyman card was essential to plaintiff’s grievance under the terms of the CBA, I will address what I believe is the more critical issue.
In Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896, 102 S.Ct. 394, 70 L.Ed.2d 211 (1981), we held that a union’s failure to scrutinize a CBA to determine whether the presence or absence of any provision supported the griev-ant’s position rose to the level of perfunctory handling and, therefore, breached the duty of fair representation. I am persuaded by Milstead that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.
*617In Milstead, the grievant had driven trucks for one company on two separate routes covered by separate CBAs. Id. at 234. When the grievant began working, both agreements provided for separate seniority listings. Later, the agreement for one route was renegotiated, and the requirement of separate seniority listings was omitted. The grievant later tried to establish seniority on one route by applying his time on the other route. The union’s failure to notice the omission in the later agreement and assert it on the grievant’s behalf was a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 235-36.
In this case, neither plaintiffs original grievance nor his complaint in the district court was based upon a right to reinstatement as a journeyman cardholder. Rather, plaintiff claimed a “violation of Exhibit ‘D’ in the labor agreement.” Thus, Local 174’s duty under Milstead was to examine Exhibit D of the CBA for a basis for the grievance rather than “presume” that the CBA required a journeyman card.
I find little in Local 174’s affidavits and other proof to show that it fulfilled this duty. The affidavit of Roy Melton, an official of Local 174, stated that the dismissal of thé grievance was based “in substantial part” upon the finding that plaintiff was not entitled to a journeyman card. Melton testified in a deposition that he was aware Marentette alleged a violation of Exhibit D. Melton added, “After my investigation, I found that was not true.” J.A. 230. From the premise that FSW did not violate the Skilled Trades Trainee Program agreement when it refused to reinstate Marentette, the majority arrives at the conclusion that it was not arbitrary or discriminatory for Melton to conclude that the “alleged violation of Exhibit D ... was not true.” I disagree with both the premise and the conclusion.
Had Local 174 carefully examined the CBA and other facts in this case, I believe it would have found possible merit in plaintiff’s grievance. Neither FSW nor Local 174 can point to a document in this record which defines either millwright or journeyman. At the time plaintiff began his leave of absence, he received full journeyman pay and his pay rate card classified him as “Millwright-Top-Rate.” In fact, although Local 174 withdrew the grievance on information from Charlie Stewart of the UAW International that plaintiff was not a journeyman millwright because he did not qualify for a journeyman card, J.A. 92, after the grievance was dismissed, Stewart reviewed the documentation and opined that “Brother Marentette [was] a contractual journeyman millwright under the provisions of the Federal Screw Works, UAW Local 174 agreement.” 1 J.A. 84.
Given the state of the record and Local 174’s continued emphasis upon plaintiff’s failure to qualify for a journeyman card, I conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Local 174 merely presumed that the CBA required a journeyman card and failed to entertain the possibility that ambiguity in the CBA supported plaintiff’s grievance.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

. The majority dismisses Stewart's statement as inadmissible expert opinion testimony regarding the proper interpretation of a contract. However, I believe that this testimony would be relevant to the shallowness of the inquiry by Melton and Local 174, and thus, with the proper limiting instruction, could be admitted.