Court Opinion

ID: 9632204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:06:48.588386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:11.397445
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
with whom COMPTON, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the district court abused its discretion in denying Vinson’s motion for a continuance. I dissent, however, from the court’s holding denying Vinson’s right to a jury trial.
Our decision in McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393 (Alaska 1992), illustrates the appropriate right-to-jury-trial analysis under the Alaska Constitution:
The Alaska Constitution preserves a jury trial only for those causes of action which are legal, and not equitable in nature. A claim for a prescriptive easement, like a claim for adverse possession, is in the nature of an equitable claim and was historically tried in the courts of equity. We hold that the McGills were not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.
Id. at 396 (citations omitted). The court’s opinion departs from this relatively straightforward historical analysis. The court states the controlling rule: “If a party seeks only equitable relief, then there is no right to a jury trial.” Yet, I am of the view that application of this test yields only one possible conclusion: a right to a jury trial exists in Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) actions.
I
In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974), the United States Supreme Court applied a test identical to Alaska’s historical approach in deciding that litigants have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in District of Columbia FED actions. Id. at 384-85, 94 S.Ct. at 1733-34. As the court notes, Pernell rested its holding on the historical fact that “an FED action is ... one at law, similar to a common-law ejectment action.” Op. at 737. Pernell reached this result because the FED action served the “same essential function” as its historical predecessor: the action at law for ejectment.
Pernell does not bind us in interpreting the Alaska Constitution. Yet, Pernell⅛ reasoning accords with our own prior characterization of the FED action. We have stated that the Alaska FED proceeding is a direct substitute for the landlord’s common law right to remove a tenant by self-help: “A suit for forcible detainer under Alaska statutes substitutes the authority of the courts for private force to compel a citizen *739wrongfully in possession of real property to surrender it to another with a superior claim.” Modrok v. Marshall, 523 P.2d 172, 174 (Alaska 1974). In creating the FED action, the Alaska Legislature staked a middle ground between two common law rights: ejectment and self-help. The resulting FED action, then, has legal, not equitable, ancestry. As such, the FED action inherited not merely the “same essential function” of the action for ejectment, but also the historical constitutional right to a jury trial of all actions at law. The majority of state courts to address the issue reach the same conclusion. See Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, 192 Cal.App.3d 1513, 238 Cal.Rptr. 172 (App.), modified 193 Cal.App.3d 1093 (App.1987); Hopkins v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 1, 342 A.2d 243 (Del.Super.1975); Hill v. Levenson, 259 Ga. 395, 383 S.E.2d 110 (1989); North Sch. Congregate Housing v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189 (Me.1989); Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, 306 Md. 515, 510 A.2d 540 (1986); Reiter v. Reiter, 240 Mont. 450, 784 P.2d 917 (1990); Martin v. Rogers, 42 Ohio App.3d 110, 536 N.E.2d 665 (1987); Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 173 W.Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984). But see Lum v. Sun, 70 Haw. 288, 769 P.2d 1091 (1989); Alfour Inc. v. Lightfoot, 123 N.J.Super. 1, 301 A.2d 197 (1973).
II
The court “decline[s] to follow Pernell.” This statement has significant consequences for the continued vitality of the present right-to-jury-trial analysis in Alaska. Pernell was based on an assertion of historical fact. As noted above, the historic common law predecessor to the FED action — the action for ejectment — was an action at law triable to a jury. Consequently, Pernell concluded that: “The proceeding established by [the FED statute], while a far cry in detail from the common-law action of ejectment, serves the same essential function — to permit the plaintiff to evict one who is wrongfully detaining possession and to regain possession himself.” Pernell, 416 U.S. at 375, 94 S.Ct. at 1729. Pernell, then, took care to distinguish between the “details” and the “essential function” of an action. Our decisions have applied a similar test, asking whether the claim asserted is legal or equitable “in nature” rather than “in detail.”1 In doing so, both the United States Supreme Court and this court refined the historical law-equity test to allow for growth in the law and, thus, to guarantee a jury trial for all nascent actions that are “in nature” — i.e., serve “the same essential function” as — an action at law.
The court’s analysis focuses on the procedural differences between an FED action and an action for ejectment. In doing so, the court bases its comparison on the “details” of the two actions and not on their “essential functions.” Indeed, the court concedes that the historical action for ejectment was an action at law for which a jury trial was available. Moreover, the court does not dispute that the FED action performs the “same essential function” as an action for ejectment. Yet, the court concludes that a jury trial is not required. Thus, since the court declines to follow Pernell, it must also decline to follow the “same essential function” test. In doing so, it also abandons our own test based on the “nature” of the asserted claim.
It appears to me that the court is applying a bright line test: the right to a jury trial attaches only to those claims seeking money damages.2 The court suggests such *740a rule in its opinion. See Op. at 737. In support of this rule, the court recharacter-izes some of our past cases to fit this model. The court’s treatment of McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393 (Alaska 1992), exemplifies its recharacterization of our case law in this area.3
The court also indicates that it was drawn in making its decision by the pull of legislative policy: “When interpreting Alaska’s FED statute, we must take care to preserve the swift proceedings that the legislature intended.” Op. at 737-38. This rationale is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, regardless of the legislature’s intent, the Alaska Constitution is the source of the right to a jury trial. The Alaska Legislature cannot abrogate the right to a jury trial merely by streamlining existing actions at law. Second, if the court is concerned that tenants will request a jury trial merely to forestall inevitable eviction, the procedural mechanism of summary judgment can dispose of cases with no genuine issues of material fact.4 Pernell, 416 U.S. at 384, 94 S.Ct. at 1734. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated the point as follows:
there may be some concern that if all tenants assert their right to a jury trial under this statute the purpose of the statute, i.e., to provide the landlord with a quick procedure to remove a hold-over tenant, will be thwarted. We do not think this is likely; although we hold that there is a right to a jury trial under the expedited procedures, that right is not unlimited and in certain cases it would be fruitless to assert it. Certainly all of the rules that apply to summary judgments in other jury trial contests apply with equal force.5
Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 407 (citations omitted). Or, a landlord could anticipate such problems by including a waiver-of-jury-trial provision in the lease.
Ill
On the basis of the foregoing I believe that under our current test Vinson is entitled to a jury trial because the FED action is “in nature” a common law action of ejectment. Therefore I dissent from the court’s holding that Vinson is not entitled to a trial by jury.

. See Keltner v. Curtis, 695 P.2d 1076, 1079 & n. 5 (Alaska 1985) (“a party to a proceeding adjudicating ownership of personal property should be entitled to a jury trial.”); State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 423-24 (Alaska 1982) (no right to a jury trial because litigant sought only equitable relief of restitution or injunction).

. The court concedes, as it must, that a tenant can bring a counterclaim for money damages in a state FED action. Op. at 737-38; see AS 34.03.190(a). The court also notes that such a counterclaim was not brought in this case. Op. at 737-38. The court, however, adds that "even if such a counterclaim were involved here, the central issue of the case is still possession, for possession, not money damages, is what the landlord seeks, and a tenant has the alternative of pursuing her counterclaims in a separate judicial proceeding.” Op. at 737-38. This reasoning casts significant doubt upon our prior *740decision in Shope v. Sims, 658 P.2d 1336 (Alaska 1983), in which we adopted the rule that "when a case involves both legal and equitable claims, the facts common to such claims must be tried to a jury if a proper demand is made.” Id. at 1340. Shope does not allow us to characterize an entire case based on a "central issue” or “dominant essence” test. Rather, the common issues of fact must be submitted to a jury.

.The court states that in McGill "we suggested that whether a jury trial right existed was dependent not on whether the plaintiff or the defendant was in possession, but whether a claim for damages as distinct from an order adjudicating ownership or user rights was sought.” Op. at 737 (emphasis added). Our decision in that case was based on neither ground. Instead, we first noted that plaintiffs complaint alleged a prescriptive easement. McGill, 839 P.2d at 396. Next, we reasoned that a “claim for a prescriptive easement, like a claim for adverse possession, is in the nature of an equitable claim and was historically tried in the courts of equity.” Id. (emphasis added). Lastly, we concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on his equitable claim. Id. Nowhere in our discussion did the absence of a claim for money damages take on dispositive significance.

. Again, this concern must be subordinate to a clear command of the Alaska Constitution.

. On this point the Pemell court noted that "the right to be tried by jury was recognized by statute [in the District of Columbia] for over a century ... and it does not appear to have posed any unmanageable problems during that period.” Pemell, 416 U.S. at 384, 94 S.Ct. at 1734.