Court Opinion

ID: 9544225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:20.020721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:26.382653
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
In Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wn.2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973), we granted writs of prohibition against the disbursement of state funds as authorized by two legis*912lative acts. The challenged acts, which involved state financial aid to certain categories of students, were found to be unconstitutional. The petitioners herein were the successful petitioners in those consolidated cases.
The petitioners thereafter filed a cost bill which claimed reasonable attorneys’ fees as well as a return of the deposit of $26 in each case made pursuant to Rules on Appeal 1-58 (c). After respondents excepted to these two items, the Supreme Court Clerk ruled that only statutory attorneys’ fees in each case were allowable and that the deposits were not taxable as costs. Petitioners made timely exceptions to the clerk’s ruling and moved for an allowance of reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Dealing with the deposits first, ROA I-58 requires a deposit of $26 when filing certain original proceedings in the Supreme Court. The rule directs that the deposit shall be returned if the petitioner prevails. Since petitioners prevailed they are entitled to a return of those deposits, but they are not taxable as costs under ROA I-55.
It is the general rule in the United States as well as in Washington that attorneys’ fees are not ordinarily recoverable except pursuant to statute or under a contractual obligation. State ex rel. Macri v. Bremerton, 8 Wn.2d 93, 111 P.2d 612 (1941); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 72, at 58 (1965).
However, it has long been the rule that equity may allow reimbursement of attorneys’ fees from a fund created or preserved by a litigant for the benefit of others as well as himself. This “common fund” doctrine has its roots in English law. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157 (1881); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 83 L. Ed. 1184, 59 S. Ct. 777 (1939). Charges of this nature against public funds have also been allowed. Shillito v. Spartanburg, 214 S.C. 11, 51 S.E.2d 95, 5 A.L.R. 863 (1948); and see Allowance of counsel fees in taxpayer’s action, Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 874 (1949).
The principle has been broadened so that it is not limited to the creation or preservation of monetary funds, but ex*913tends to situations where a litigant confers some other substantial benefit on an ascertainable class, such as preserving the rights of corporate shareholders. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 24 L. Ed. 2d 593, 90 S. Ct. 616 (1970).
The federal courts have further enlarged the scope of recoverable attorneys’ fees by adopting the “private attorney general” theory. The district court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), explained it thusly:
The role briefly stated is that whenever there is nothing in a statutory scheme which might be interpreted as precluding it, a “private attorney-general” should be awarded attorneys’ fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has benefited a large class of people, and where further the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award essential.
(Footnote omitted.)
In Washington, the “common fund” theory was applied as early as Baker v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 61 Wash. 578, 112 P. 647 (1911). More recently the theory was applied to a labor union dispute even though no direct monetary benefit was realized. Grein v. Cavano, 61 Wn.2d 498, 379 P.2d 209 (1963).
We find the underlying philosophy of the common fund doctrine, and particularly that portion dealing with the preservation of a fund, to be appropriate for the facts before us.1
Respondents argue that there is no identifiable existing fund under the control of the court. As the above discussion indicates, that is not a literal requirement. Even if it were, it has been held that if a fund is the subject of the litigation, it need not be within the registry of the court. Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d *91490 (1943), modified on other grounds, 135 N.J. Eq. 305, 37 A.2d 205, 38 A.2d 193 (1944).
Since the right to award attorneys’ fees in limited, special situations springs from our inherent equitable powers, we are at liberty to set the boundaries of the exercise of that power. .
From the record it is clear that none of the officials or agencies involved had challenged or were going to challenge the constitutionality of the legislative acts under which the disbursements were to be made, notwithstanding petitioners’ requests to do so.
By these lawsuits the petitioners have halted the unlawful disbursement of approximately $1 million of taxpayers’ funds. Their efforts also prevented the expenditure of $2.55 million which was appropriated by the 1973 legislature before our decision in the main case was filed.
Finally, the challenged statutes and administrative plans clearly violated the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. The actions of the petitioners, therefore, not only benefited all taxpayers by halting the disbursement of public funds under an unconstitutional statute, but also protected the constitutional right of all citizens to the separation of church and state.
Thus we are presented with: (1) a successful suit brought by petitioners (2) challenging the expenditure of public funds (3) made pursuant to patently unconstitutional legislative and administrative actions (4) following a refusal by the appropriate official and agency to maintain such a challenge.
Under these narrow and very limited circumstances we believe that the common fund principle should allow petitioners to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Based upon the affidavits and counteraffidavits submitted, we find that a reasonable attorneys’ fee to be allowed and taxed against respondents is the sum of $15,676. This fee is not taxable as costs under ROA 1-58 but is awarded against respondents pursuant to petitioners’ motion for its allowance. It is so ordered.
*915Finley, Rosellini, Hunter, Hamilton, Stafford, Wright, and Utter, JJ., concur.

In light of our result herein, we deem it unnecessary to adopt the private attorney general theory in this case. We express no view as to its applicability in other cases.