Court Opinion

ID: 9409114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 00:00:40.585948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.930543
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40508        Document: 00516821922             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/14/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                 FILED
                                                                              July 14, 2023
                                      No. 22-40508
                                     ____________                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                  Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Darrell Lenard Bates,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 6:20-CR-58-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Southwick and Oldham, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         The defendant pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender. On
   appeal, he argues the conviction should be vacated because the factual basis
   to support his guilty plea was insufficient. We conclude there was no
   reversible error and AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40508      Document: 00516821922          Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/14/2023

                                    No. 22-40508

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          In 1989, Darrell Lenard Bates was convicted in a Texas state court for
   sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age
   that occurred in 1988. In the current prosecution, the United States charged
   Bates with failing to register as a sex offender “in or about January 2020.”
   His last time to register as a sex offender was in Louisiana in 2009. He moved
   back to Texas at some point and had been living in that state since at least
   early 2020.
          On September 1, 2021, Bates pled guilty before a magistrate judge.
   That judge issued a report and recommendation that the plea be accepted,
   and the district court did so two days later. In December 2021, before his
   sentencing, Bates filed a pro se motion to quash the indictment.            His
   arguments included that he was innocent and should not have pled guilty
   because he was not obligated to register as a sex offender at the time of his
   arrest. By text order, the magistrate judge dismissed the motion as moot
   because he was represented by counsel. Bates then filed an interlocutory
   appeal to this court. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over a
   magistrate judge order. United States v. Bates, 22-40053, 2022 WL 2116004,
   at *1 (5th Cir. June 13, 2022). We instructed Bates to file an objection with
   the district court instead. Id. Bates never did.
          In July 2022, the day before his sentencing hearing, Bates filed a pro se
   motion entitled “Motion of His Actual Innocence of being required to
   Register as a sex offender, withdrawal of plea, plea ANEW, Ready for Trial.”
   During the hearing, counsel for Bates effectively withdrew that motion and
   said Bates was ready for his sentencing. The district court accepted the guilty
   plea and sentenced Bates to 30 months in prison. Bates filed a timely pro se
   notice of appeal. The motion to withdraw by Bates’s standby trial counsel
   was granted. New counsel was appointed to represent Bates on appeal.

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                                      No. 22-40508

                                   DISCUSSION
          I.     Plain error review
          Bates argues his guilty plea was factually insufficient.        “Before
   entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a
   factual basis for the plea.” FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(b)(3). “This court
   reviews guilty pleas for compliance with Rule 11, usually under the clearly
   erroneous standard.” United States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423, 426 (5th Cir.
   2021). Even so, when there was no objection in the district court regarding
   the sufficiency of the factual basis for the plea, and the objection is made for
   the first time on appeal, “our review is restricted to plain error.” Id. We
   have not forgotten the two pro se objections. Neither was sufficient, as we
   explain.
          Although Bates’s plea agreement waived his right to appeal his
   conviction, the Government has not invoked the waiver. Doing so would
   have been unavailing — a defendant may challenge the factual basis for his
   plea regardless of an appeal waiver. United States v. Ortiz, 927 F.3d 868, 873
   (5th Cir. 2019). That is exactly what Bates challenges.
          Bates’s first objection was in December 2021, three months after the
   district court accepted his plea. At that time, Bates filed a pro se motion to
   quash the indictment. The motion was dismissed by the magistrate judge
   because he was represented by counsel. We dismissed the appeal from the
   magistrate judge’s order, and Bates did not take our direction to file an
   objection with the district court. That motion did not preserve any issue for
   appeal now; “if a party did not object to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and
   Recommendation, that party may not attack the proposed factual findings or
   legal conclusions except upon the grounds of plain error.” Starns v. Andrews,
   524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2008).

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          The second pro se objection was filed in July 2022, prior to sentencing,
   when Bates filed a motion asserting actual innocence. That motion did not
   preserve the issue, either, for three reasons. First, Bates “was not entitled to
   representation by himself and by appointed counsel” simultaneously. See
   United States v. Sanders, 843 F.3d 1050, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2016). Because
   Bates was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se pleadings, his pro se
   briefing did not preserve any issue for review. See id. Second, to the extent
   the pro se briefing could preserve an issue for review, none of Bates’s pro se
   pleadings specifically raised the legal issue he now asserts. Third, counsel
   stated at the sentencing hearing that Bates’s second motion was not properly
   filed, or, alternatively, that it was not being pursued.
          Thus, “plain error” review is the appropriate standard. To show
   plain error, an appellant must establish: (1) there was an error or defect that
   the defendant has not affirmatively waived; (2) the error was clear or obvious;
   (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error
   “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quotation
   marks and citations omitted).
          II.    Meaning of “factual basis”
          The parties agree that the questions presented on plain error review
   concern the “factual basis” for Bates’s guilty plea. Bates had failed to
   register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
   (“SORNA”), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. Compressing his arguments for
   purposes of this initial discussion, he argues that (1) his failure to register as
   a sex offender was not knowing; (2) he had no obligation to register under
   SORNA because he was convicted under a Texas sex-crime statute, and
   Texas law did not require him to register; and (3) any obligation to register
   under SORNA had expired because of the elements of his prior offense.

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          One issue — not raised by any party but which begins our discussion
   — is whether all three of those arguments relate to the factual basis.
   Certainly, Bates’s actual knowledge of a duty is an issue of fact. The other
   questions — what the Texas and federal statutes require — could be
   categorized as legal questions. In light of his appeal waiver, Bates is entitled
   to challenge only the factual basis for his plea, not other alleged defects.
          The government accepts that all three issues relate to the factual basis.
   A quite similar argument regarding the factual basis for a plea for failure to
   register as a sex offender under SORNA was rejected in a recent precedent,
   and there, the Government’s brief also implicitly conceded that all three
   issues were encompassed within the “factual basis” term. See United States
   v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 278–80 (5th Cir. 2022). Our decision resolved all
   of them as part of factual-basis analysis. Id. at 280. We examine whether all
   of them are properly so considered.
          According to one learned authority, the requirement of a factual basis
   for a guilty plea was added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
   1966. 1A WRIGHT & LEOPOLD, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal §
   180 (2023). As quoted already, the requirement is now in Federal Rule of
   Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3): “Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the
   court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
          In explaining this new requirement, the 1966 Advisory Committee
   Notes stated that “[t]he court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the
   defendant or the attorney for the government, or by examining the
   presentence report, or otherwise, that the conduct which the defendant
   admits constitutes the offense charged” or a lesser included offense. FED. R.
   CRIM PROC. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes, 1966 Amendment.
          The treatise authors state that “the factual basis requirement is
   similar to the requirement of Rule 11(b)(1)(G), that the court ensure that the

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   defendant understands the essential elements of the crime charged.”
   WRIGHT & LEOPOLD, § 180. Thus, those authors understand that the factual
   basis needs to support that the facts, as understood by the defendant, support
   the elements of the offense.
          The government’s failure to dispute that Bates may properly raise all
   three issues — and, more importantly, our court’s resolving all of them in
   Navarro as part of the factual basis — means we should resolve them here. It
   also is arguable, in light of our foregoing review, that all actually are factual-
   basis questions. In the present case, the elements of the offense include that
   Bates was previously convicted of a state crime that required him to register
   as a sex offender under SORNA on the date charged in the indictment. The
   “factual basis” includes not only that Bates knew he had to register, but “the
   conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged.” FED.
   R. CRIM PROC. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes, 1966 Amendment.
          The factual basis includes that the defendant’s conduct constituted
   failing to comply with an obligation to register.
          We now address the merits of the plain-error arguments.
          III.   Factual basis to support Bates’s guilty plea
          Bates raises three arguments. First, he contends the record does not
   establish factually that his failure to register was knowing. He is wrong.
   Bates’s factual resume clearly stipulated that he knowingly failed to register
   as a sex offender. That stipulation provided a sufficient factual basis to allow
   the district court to find that Bates’s failure to register was knowing.
          Bates’s second argument is that, as a matter of law, he was not
   obligated to register as a sex offender under Texas law and, therefore, he was
   not required to register under federal law either. A similar argument was
   rejected in the precedent on which Bates principally relies. See Navarro, 54

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   F.4th at 274. Whether state law required him to register is irrelevant to
   whether he had to register under federal law. Id.
          Bates’s third argument is that, as a matter of law, his obligation to
   register under federal law ended after 15 years. Thus, that obligation had
   expired by the 2020 date charged in his indictment.
          We back up just a bit to add some details about SORNA. It is a crime
   under federal law to fail to register as a sex offender if: (1) the individual “is
   required to register under” SORNA; (2) the individual “is a sex offender as
   defined for the purposes of [SORNA] by reason of conviction under . . . the
   law of any territory or possession of the United States; or [that] travels in
   interstate or foreign commerce”; and (3) the failure to register was knowing.
   18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). SORNA defines a “sex offender” as “an individual
   who was convicted of a sex offense.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1). A state
   conviction constitutes a “sex offense” if it was “a criminal offense that has
   an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another” or “a
   criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.”               Id. §
   20911(5)(A)(i), (ii).
          The duration of an individual’s obligation to register as a sex offender
   depends on which of the three SORNA tiers to place the individual’s
   conviction. Navarro, 54 F.4th at 278; see 34 U.S.C. § 20911. A Tier I offender
   must register for 15 years; a Tier II offender must register for 25 years; and a
   Tier III offender must register for life. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a). Each tier refers
   to different types of sex offenses under federal law; the tier applies if the prior
   offense is comparable to, or narrower than, the specified federal offenses. See
   34 U.S.C. § 20911(3), (4). The Tier III federal crimes are specified in 34
   U.S.C. § 20911(4); they include sexual abuse and sexual abuse of a minor in
   18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2244.

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          The “categorical approach” is used to determine the appropriate tier
   for an individual’s state conviction. Navarro, 54 F.4th at 278–79. “[T]he
   specific circumstances of a defendant’s crime are irrelevant. All that matters
   is whether the elements of the state crime match the elements of the federal
   crime.” Id. Matching elements requires deciding whether the elements of
   the state crime of conviction describe a comparable or narrower crime than
   the federal one. The conclusion needs to be that commission of the state
   crime necessarily means that the defendant committed the elements of the
   federal crime. We explain.
          “If the state crime sweeps more broadly than the federal offense, it is
   not comparable and, therefore, cannot be a predicate offense. A crime
   sweeps more broadly when it criminalizes more conduct than the federal
   crime would reach by its terms.” Id. at 279 (quotation marks and citations
   omitted). If the state law under which the individual was convicted sweeps
   more broadly than the federal law, the individual will be treated as a Tier I
   offender who must report as a sex offender for 15 years. See id. at 280. If a
   statute defines multiple offenses by listing elements in the alternative, it is
   divisible, and this court can use a modified categorical approach and look to
   certain documents — such as the indictment, jury charge, or plea agreement
   — to narrow the statute and determine of what crime the defendant was
   convicted. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505–06 (2016). If, however,
   the statute lists different factual means of committing the offense, rather than
   separate offense elements, the modified categorical approach may not be
   applied. United States v. Rodriguez-Flores, 25 F.4th 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2022).
          Bates’s two predicate offenses include a sexual assault charge and an
   aggravated sexual assault charge for a child under 14, both in 1988. While the
   presentence report does not mention them, we are satisfied that the two state
   statutes under which Bates was charged in 1988 are the 1988 editions of
   Texas Penal Code § 22.011 (sexual assault) and § 22.021 (aggravated sexual

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   assault). The language of those statutes corresponds to the description set
   forth in the presentence report and were cited by the Government as the
   applicable statutes in the district court, without any objection either in the
   district court or here by Bates.
          The necessary matching can be a difficult task. To assist the court on
   any issue, an appellant must brief the “contentions and the reasons for them,
   with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
   relies.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Bates’s opening brief cited only to
   generally applicable caselaw regarding the categorical approach. His brief
   never engaged in any analysis of the specific statutes relevant in this case.
   Indeed, the brief did not even cite the state or federal statutes that the court
   would have to use as reference points to conduct the categorical analysis. See
   Navarro, 54 F.4th at 278–79. Instead, his brief made a conclusory argument
   that Navarro dictates reversal, despite that Navarro analyzed a Colorado
   statute, not these from Texas. See id. In reply to the Government’s brief,
   Bates did not respond to any of the Government’s arguments regarding the
   categorical approach.     Rather, Bates disagreed with the Government’s
   assertion that plain error review applies.
          We generally confine our analysis to “the issues presented and argued
   in the brief.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). A party
   who asserts an argument on appeal, but does not brief it adequately, waives
   that argument. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir.
   2010). We distinguish the briefing here from that in Navarro. There, the
   defendant presented a categorical approach analysis of the state and federal
   statutes at issue, explained the SORNA tiers, and outlined the plain error
   standard.
          In exceptional circumstances and particularly in criminal cases, we
   may sua sponte address a plain error even where a party does not raise it on

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   appeal. Here, of course, the error was finally raised on the appeal. We will
   consider doing so if “plain error is apparent” and not correcting it would
   seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings. United States v. Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 105 (5th Cir. 1992); see
   also United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 552–53 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2012).
   When we have found there to be an exceptional circumstance, the error has
   been obvious from on-point precedent. See, e.g., Ortuno, 952 F.2d at 195
   (correcting unraised error that was obvious in light of recent decision);
   Broussard, 669 F.3d at 552–53 (reaching unraised error where recent
   Supreme Court decision rendered error obvious). We have cautioned,
   though, that “only the extraordinary case” will excuse the failure to make an
   argument on appeal. Broussard, 669 F.3d at 553.
          Deciding whether this is an exceptional case largely turns on whether
   any error is actually plain. Navarro discussed that for an error to be so
   labeled, it must be “clear[,] or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
   dispute.” Navarro, 54 F4th at 281 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). We
   find little that is obvious about a possible error in the district court’s
   determination that the elements of the two 1988 Texas statutes of conviction
   match the comparable Tier III offenses.
          The presentence report identified the two convictions and gave the
   facts of each offense. Prior to Bates’s guilty plea, the Government provided
   to the court the Texas statutes as they existed at the time of Bates’s offenses
   and sought to have the court take judicial notice of them. Thus, both the
   magistrate and district court judges had the agreement by counsel that
   Bates’s offenses were Tier III, which required registration for life. There
   was also agreement about the details of each conviction and the statutory
   language for the state offenses. We cannot know what either judge did to
   become satisfied about the requisite factual basis, but all the information was

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   before both the magistrate judge when taking Bates’s plea and the district
   court judge when accepting the guilty plea and finding Bates guilty.
          There was no preserved objection to any of this prior to Bates’s
   opening brief on appeal. Once the sufficiency of the factual basis was
   contested, the Government’s brief responded with a detailed explanation of
   why these state convictions were for Tier III offenses. We conclude that the
   application of the categorical approach to these crimes is unclear, and we
   have nothing from Bates to assist. Any possible error was not plain.
          AFFIRMED.

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   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, dubitante.
          The defendant in this case entered an unconditional guilty plea,
   accompanied by an appeal waiver that plainly bars this appeal. It is unclear to
   me how an appeal can get over one of these hurdles, let alone both.
          “The right to appeal a conviction and sentence is a statutory right, not
   a constitutional one, and a defendant may waive it as part of a plea
   agreement.” United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (citing United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 1997)). “We must
   interpret the plea agreement like a contract, in accord with what the parties
   intended.” United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2005); accord
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009). We apply this same
   contract-law approach to appeal waivers. See United States v. Palmer, 456
   F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006) (“In determining whether a waiver applies, we
   employ normal principles of contract interpretation.” (citing Bond and
   United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005)). That means
   we enforce “the plain language of the plea agreement.” United States v.
   Meredith, 52 F.4th 984, 986 (5th Cir. 2022).
          Here, the defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea. Cf. Fed.
   R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) (authorizing conditional guilty plea, in which
   defendant can reserve one or more issues for appellate review—a path not
   taken here). The defendant also signed a plea agreement containing this
   pellucid appeal waiver:
          Waiver of Right to Appeal or Otherwise
          Challenge Sentence: Except as otherwise provided in this
          paragraph, the defendant waives the right to appeal the conviction,
          sentence, fine, order of restitution, or order of forfeiture in this
          case on all grounds. The defendant further agrees not to contest the
          conviction, sentence, fine, order of restitution, or order of

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          forfeiture in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but not
          limited to, a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

   ROA.606 (emphasis added). I do not understand what those words could
   possibly mean except that the defendant has agreed not to contest his
   conviction in our court. It is uncontested that Bates knowingly and
   intelligently signed that waiver. It is uncontested that he had the assistance
   of able and effective counsel in doing so. It is also uncontested that none of
   the appeal waiver’s exceptions (for, e.g., an ineffective assistance of counsel
   claim) applies. Therefore, I would enforce the waiver.
          As the per curiam opinion notes, however, our court has held that
   appeal waivers do not prohibit defendants from challenging on appeal the
   factual bases for their plea agreements. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)
   (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that
   there is a factual basis for the plea.”). If that is confusing, it should be. In the
   factual basis, the defendant admits that he did X and Y in violation of Z
   federal criminal statute. If the plea agreement and appeal waiver bar nothing
   else, they must bar a defendant from turning around and saying, “I didn’t
   really violate Z.”
          So where did we invent the waivers-don’t-waive rule? The culprit
   appears to be Baymon. There, in dicta, we pointed to three cases that did not
   involve unconditional appeal waivers. And we reasoned as follows:
          Although Spruill, White, and Johnson are not directly
          applicable to this case because in those cases either the bill of
          information failed to allege a factual element of the crime, or
          the defendant brought a motion to dismiss before pleading
          guilty, or the plea agreements were conditional, the Court in
          those cases allowed the defendants to appeal issues which by
          the terms of the parties’ plea agreements were waived.

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          Accordingly, Baymon is challenging the sufficiency of the
          factual basis for his plea, and we can review despite the waiver.

   Baymon, 312 F.3d at 727–28 (citing United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 207,
   214–15 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374, 380, 384 (5th
   Cir. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657, 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1999),
   vacated and remanded, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000), opinion reinstated with
   modification, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001)). That analysis is head-scratching
   at best. It is akin to saying “Case A, Case B, and Case C are not directly
   applicable to this case because none of them presented the same legal issue
   or the same facts. But the plaintiff won in all three, so the plaintiff wins here.”
   And if Baymon’s non sequitur was not enough, the panel then held its dicta
   was irrelevant because Baymon lost in any event. See 312 F.3d at 728–30
   (affirming conviction). Still, later panels have seized on Baymon’s illogical
   dicta as if it were controlling and then used it to ensconce our waivers-don’t-
   waive rule firmly in Fifth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz,
   927 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2019) (pointing to Baymon as the original source
   of our waivers-don’t-waive rule); ante, at 3 (relying on Ortiz).
          Our waivers-don’t-waive rule is particularly puzzling when viewed in
   historical context. At the zenith of federal judges’ power over criminal
   proceedings, the Warren Court created the so-called “deliberate bypass”
   rule in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). That rule allowed federal judges to
   review state prisoners’ habeas claims—even defaulted ones—so long as the
   state prisoner did not deliberately bypass the State’s criminal justice system.
   See id. at 438. In announcing that sweeping rule, the Court pointed to appeal
   waivers:
          If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent
          counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent
          the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the

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          state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other
          reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing
          of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on
          habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to
          entertain his federal claims on the merits—though of course
          only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a
          hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the
          applicant’s default. . . . [A] state court’s finding of waiver [does
          not] bar independent determination of the question by the
          federal courts on habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is a
          federal question.

   Id. at 439. The deliberate bypass rule had predictably deleterious effects on
   federalism, finality, and the rule of law—which led the Court to overrule it
   not once but twice. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–90 (1977);
   Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749–50 (1991). The important point for
   present purposes, however, is that even under Fay v. Noia, a defendant’s
   knowing and voluntary decision to waive his appellate rights barred relief. It
   is surpassingly strange that our waivers-don’t-waive rule is somehow less
   protective of criminal judgments than the deliberate bypass rule twice
   rejected by the Supreme Court after Fay.
          The majority nonetheless contends that, “error or not,” the waivers-
   don’t-waive rule is the law of this circuit. Slip op. at 3. But even if that is so,
   it is not clear to me that a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea
   can turn around and appeal the factual basis of his conviction irrespective of
   the appeal waiver. After all, when pleading guilty, “a criminal defendant []
   solemnly admit[s] in open court that he is in fact guilty” and afterward, he
   “may attack only the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.”
   Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (emphasis added). That is

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   because “a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable
   that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of
   factual guilt from the case.” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)
   (per curiam).
          Challenging the factual basis of an agreement after both an
   unconditional plea and a waiver seems a bridge or two too far. It is unclear to
   me how we can look past these problems to consider the merits of
   defendant’s appeal.

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