Court Opinion

ID: 9898105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:30.153633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.653529
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                    DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                No. 84675-2-I
                       Respondent,
                                                ORDER GRANTING IN PART
                v.                              MOTION FOR
                                                RECONSIDERATION AND
ERIC PETERSON,                                  AMENDING OPINION

                       Appellant.

          The   respondent,   State   of Washington,   has   filed   a   motion   for

reconsideration of the opinion filed August 14, 2023.           The appellant, Eric

Peterson, has filed an answer. The panel has considered the motion and has

determined that the motion should be granted in part and the opinion should be

amended. Now, therefore, it is hereby

          ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is granted in part. It is

further

          ORDERED that the opinion be amended as follows:

          DELETE the first full paragraph, beginning at line six on page three and

ending at line twenty on page three, which reads:

                       Peterson also argues that the trial court erred by

          ordering a condition of community custody prohibiting him from

          “form[ing] relationships with families who have minor children, as

          directed by the supervising Community Corrections Officer.”       A
No. 84675-2-I/2

      community custody condition that does not provide fair warning of

      proscribed behavior is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bahl, 164

      Wn.2d 739, 752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). Without an objective

      qualifier for the type of relationship with a family, this community

      custody condition does not provide sufficiently ascertainable

      standards such that Peterson could understand what is prohibited,

      nor does it protect him from arbitrary enforcement. See In re Matter

      of Ansell, No. 82506-2-I, slip op. at 17 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 18,

      2022)       (unpublished),    https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf

      825062.pdf; State v. Martinez Zavala, No. 80817-6-I, slip op. at 9-

      10      (Wash.   Ct.   App.    April   26,   2021)    (unpublished),

      https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/808176/pdf.2      We accept

      the State’s concession and remand to the lower court to provide

      sufficient definiteness regarding the type and matter of relationship

      prohibited.3

      ____________________
             2 See GR 14.1(c) (“Washington appellate courts should not,

      unless necessary for a reasoned decision, cite or discuss
      unpublished opinions in their opinions.”).
             3 Because we accept the State’s concessions herein, we

      need not address Peterson’s claim that defense counsel was
      ineffective in failing to argue that the challenged community custody
      conditions were improper.

      REPLACE that paragraph with the following paragraph:

              Peterson also argues that the trial court erred by ordering a

      condition of community custody prohibiting him from “form[ing]

                                        2
No. 84675-2-I/3

      relationships with families who have minor children, as directed by

      the supervising Community Corrections Officer.”        A community

      custody condition that does not provide fair warning of proscribed

      behavior is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739,

      752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).         In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell,

      ___Wn.3d ___, 533 P.3d 875, 883-84 (2023) held a substantially

      similar condition was not unconstitutionally vague when read in

      context. The condition is affirmed, but given our remand on other

      issues, we direct that Peterson is not precluded from arguing on

      remand that the condition should be made more explicit provided

      any revision remains consistent with Ansell.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                       3
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                    No. 84675-2-I
                        Respondent,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
                v.
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 ERIC PETERSON,

                        Appellant.

       PER CURIAM — Eric Peterson pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the first

degree and child molestation in the first degree. The trial court denied Peterson’s

request for a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) and imposed

an indeterminate sentence consisting of a minimum term of 144 months

confinement and a maximum term of life, plus community custody up to the

maximum term of life.        The court found Peterson indigent and imposed the

mandatory $500 victim penalty assessment (VPA) and the $100 DNA collection

fee. An agreed restitution order obligated Peterson to pay $649.10 plus interest

on the restitution principal until paid in full.

       Peterson now challenges three conditions of community custody set forth

in his judgment and sentence.            He also challenges certain legal financial

obligations (LFOs) based on recent statutory amendments. We remand to the trial

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 84675-2-I/2

                               Community Custody Conditions

       Peterson contends, and the State concedes, that a provision in the

judgment and sentence requiring him to pay supervision fees as a condition of

community custody is a scrivener’s error because the record shows the trial court

did not intend to impose it. See State v. Dillon, 12 Wn. App. 2d 133, 152, 456 P.3d

1199 (2020) (striking community custody supervision fee where the record

demonstrates the court intended to impose only mandatory LFOs). We accept the

State's concession and remand for the trial court to strike the provision imposing

community custody supervision fees. 1

       Peterson also challenges a condition requiring him to “[p]ay all restitution

and legal financial obligations, including the costs of crime-related counseling

and medical treatment” required by the victim. This court reviews community

custody conditions for abuse of discretion and will reverse them only if they are

“manifestly unreasonable.” State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 791-92,

239 P.3d 1059 (2010).

       Peterson argues, and the State concedes, that the requirement to pay

counseling costs should be stricken because such costs were not included in the

restitution order. Peterson further contends that the “medical treatment” portion

of the condition is problematic to the extent it could be interpreted to require him

to pay future costs of medical treatment not included in the restitution order.

       1
           Although the State’s concession did not address it, Peterson correctly notes that
a recent change in the relevant statute, effective July 1, 2022, removed the authorization
for trial courts to impose community custody supervision fees. See LAWS OF 2022, ch.
29 § 8. The amendment applies to cases on direct appeal. State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn.
App. 2d 198, 200, 519 P.3d 297 (2022).
                                                 2
No. 84675-2-I/3

However, as the State points out, the order expressly set restitution at $649.10

owed to the Crime Victim Compensation Fund for medical services rendered to

the victim on a specific date. Thus, based on the State’s concession, we remand

for the trial court to strike the language “including the costs of crime-related

counseling” from the conditions of community custody.

       Peterson also argues that the trial court erred by ordering a condition of

community custody prohibiting him from “form[ing] relationships with families who

have minor children, as directed by the supervising Community Corrections

Officer.” A community custody condition that does not provide fair warning of

proscribed behavior is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739,

752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).        Without an objective qualifier for the type of

relationship with a family, this community custody condition does not provide

sufficiently ascertainable standards such that Peterson could understand what is

prohibited, nor does it protect him from arbitrary enforcement. See In re Matter of

Ansell, No. 82506-2-I, slip op. at 17 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2022) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf825062.pdf; State v. Martinez Zavala, No.

80817-6-I, slip op. at 9-10 (Wash. Ct. App. April 26, 2021) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/808176/pdf. 2       We accept the State’s

concession and remand to the lower court to provide sufficient definiteness

regarding the type and matter of relationship prohibited. 3

       2
         See GR 14.1(c) (“Washington appellate courts should not, unless necessary for
a reasoned decision, cite or discuss unpublished opinions in their opinions.”).
       3
         Because we accept the State’s concessions herein, we need not address
Peterson’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the
challenged community custody conditions were improper.
                                              3
No. 84675-2-I/4

                                  Legal Financial Obligations

       Peterson argues that the victim penalty assessment (VPA) should be

stricken from the judgment and sentence based on recent statutory amendments.

The victim penalty assessment was recently addressed in State v. Ellis, 530 P.3d

1048, 1057 (2023). There, Division Two observed that

       ESHB 1169 added a subsection to RCW 7.68.035 that prohibits
       courts from imposing the VPA on indigent defendants as defined in
       RCW 10.01.160(3). LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1; RCW 7.68.035(4).
       The amended statute also requires trial courts to waive any VPA
       imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment if the offender
       is indigent, on the offender's motion. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1;
       RCW 7.68.035(5)(b). This amendment will take effect on July 1,
       2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449.

The new law applies to cases pending on appeal. Ellis, 530 P.3d at (2023) (citing

State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018).

       The State argues that Ellis reaches too far in extending the holding of

Ramirez beyond imposition of costs, but does not object to treating Peterson’s

claim as a post-sentencing VPA waiver motion newly authorized under RCW

7.68.035(5)(b). We disagree, and follow Ellis. The court found Peterson indigent,

so the VPA should be stricken on remand. 4

       Peterson also argues, and the State concedes, that the DNA collection fee

should be stricken from the judgment and sentence. The legislature has eliminated

the DNA collection fee, effective July 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 4. Thus,

the trial court should strike the DNA collection fee as well.

       4
          The State, citing RAP 2.5(a), also argues that Peterson waived his claim of error
regarding the VPA by failing to object below. We disagree. Courts “regularly exercise
their discretion to reach the merits of unpreserved LFO arguments.” State v. Glover, 4
Wn. App. 2d 690, 693, 423 P.3d 290 (2018) (citing State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 832,
344 P.3d 680 (2015).
                                                4
No. 84675-2-I/5

      Lastly, Peterson argues that the case should be remanded for the trial court

to exercise its discretion on whether to impose interest on restitution. After the

court sentenced Peterson and ordered restitution, RCW 10.82.090 was amended

to allow the court to waive interest on restitution based on a variety of factors,

including indigency. See LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 12 (effective January 1,

2023). The amendment applies to Peterson because his case is on direct appeal.

See Ellis, 530 P.3d at 1057. We decline the State’s invitation to depart from Ellis

or to conclude that Peterson waived this claim by failing to object below. We

therefore remand to the trial court to address whether to impose interest on the

restitution amount based on the factors set forth in RCW 10.82.090(2).

      Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                   FOR THE COURT:

                                            5