Court Opinion

ID: 9898646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:05:16.095195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:07.882252
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 P. v. Lee CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A164901
 v.
 VINCTONIVISH DWANE LEE,                                                 (Solano County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. VCR233736)

         This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant
Vinctonivish Lee of 17 felony counts related to his sexual abuse of his
stepdaughter, A.M., from the time she was eight years old until she was 15.
The trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 144 years to life.
Defendant raises multiple issues on appeal relating to, among other things,
the sufficiency of evidence supporting one count of forcible lewd conduct and
one count of forcible rape, the propriety of jury instructions related to juror
unanimity, the admissibility of evidence and propriety of jury instructions on
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, judicial misconduct and the
constitutionality of his sentence.
         For reasons discussed post, we reverse defendant’s conviction on
count 15, forcible rape, for insufficient evidence. On remand, we direct the
trial court to vacate the count 15 sentence and correct a clerical error in the
abstract of judgment with respect to the count 2 sentence, which was imposed

                                                               1
to run concurrently and not, as stated, consecutively. In all other regards, we
affirm the judgment.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On October 4, 2021, defendant was charged by an amended information
with forcible lewd act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1);
counts 1, 3, 14);1 sexual intercourse or attempted sexual intercourse with a
child aged 10 or younger (§ 287, subd. (a); count 2); forcible oral copulation of
a child under age 14 and more than 10 years younger than the defendant
(§§ 288.7, subd. (c)(2)(A), 269, subd. (a)(4); counts 4–5, 8–9); forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 6, 15); forcible rape of a child under age 14 (§§ 261,
subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (c)(2); count 7); forcible oral copulation of a child aged
14 or younger (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(C); counts 10–11); attempted lewd conduct
with a child under age 14 (§§ 288, subd. (a), 664; count 12); forcible rape of a
child under age 14 and seven or more years younger than the defendant
(§ 269, subd. (a)(1); count 13); forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A);
count 16); and furnishing marijuana to a child aged 14 or older (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (b); count 17).
      Trial began on October 4, 2021.
I.    The Prosecution’s Case: The victim was sexually abused by
      defendant from age 8 to age 15.
      A.     The Hilltop Apartment: Age 8 (2010–2011).
      The victim’s mother (mother) met and began dating defendant, who
was about 10 years her junior, in 2011. Shortly thereafter, defendant moved
into the apartment in the Hilltop District of Richmond where mother lived
with her two children, the victim and the victim’s brother, M.M. At the time,
defendant was 20 years old (born in September 1991); the victim was eight

      1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                         2
years old (born on June 20, 2002); and M.M. was about three years younger
than the victim. Both children had impaired hearing and wore hearing aids.
Their mother worked as a preschool teacher. Defendant, unemployed, often
stayed home to care for the children.
      When the victim was eight years old, she and M.M. were home alone
one day with defendant, who was giving them piggyback rides. During one of
these rides, defendant pulled the victim into the bathroom and touched her
“butt.” He then took her into the bedroom, closed the door and placed the
victim on his lap with her legs wrapped around his stomach. In this position,
defendant touched her buttocks with his hands and rubbed her buttocks
against his lap. Defendant asked the victim if she intended to tell her
mother. She responded no because she was confused and thought he would
not do it again. Further, the victim testified that she did not tell her mother
because she was afraid.
      Another time when the victim was eight, defendant entered the
bedroom she shared with M.M. and placed his hand over her mouth. Her
mother was away from the house, at choir practice. Defendant reached inside
the victim’s pajamas and touched her vagina. For about two minutes,
defendant rubbed her vagina with two fingers, asking if it felt “good.” The
victim was “scared,” “uncomfortable” and “disgusted.” She did not believe
that she could stop defendant because he was “bigger,” “taller” and older.
Defendant told the victim not to tell anyone and that her mother gave him
permission to touch her. Defendant also warned that he would spank her if
she told anyone. She kept quiet because she was afraid of defendant and his
temper. In the household, defendant was sometimes responsible for
discipline, which sometimes included spanking the children. The victim
described feeling “trapped” and living a “nightmare.”

                                        3
      A couple of days later, the victim was alone at home with defendant
and M.M. Her mother was at bible study or choir practice. A few hours after
the victim went to sleep, defendant entered her bedroom, woke her, put in
her hearing aids (which she did not wear while sleeping), and told her to go to
the living room. Once there, defendant turned on a children’s movie and told
her to be quiet. Defendant then laid the victim on the floor and removed both
of their pants. The victim was afraid and told defendant not to remove her
underwear, but he ignored her. He then rubbed lotion on his erect penis and
tried to “force” it into her vagina. Defendant’s penis partially entered the
victim’s vagina, causing her to cry and scream. Finally, after the victim told
defendant three times to get off her, he became angry and told her to return
to the bedroom.
      The victim immediately went to the bathroom and noticed her vagina
was bleeding. She found “a lot” of blood on her legs, clothes, and in the toilet,
making her scream. She was afraid that she was dying. Defendant entered
the bathroom and asked why she was screaming. He then instructed her to
shower and took the bloody underwear, placed it in a bag, and threw it away.
The victim cried while showering, her body in pain and her vagina “stinging”
and “burning”—a 10 on the pain scale. Later, the victim cried herself to
sleep. Again, she did not tell her mother, as she was afraid her mother would
not believe her. However, she began to sleep with her hearing aids turned on
so that she would hear defendant if he entered her bedroom.
      A few days later, the victim was showering without her hearing aids
when defendant entered the bathroom. She finally noticed him when he
moved the shower curtain and began watching her. She asked what he was
doing. Defendant then began touching her chest, rubbing her vagina, and
touching her buttocks. The victim felt “disgusted.” She believed that she was

                                        4
powerless to stop him because “he told me he does it as long as he wants to do
it.” Days later, defendant threatened to spank the victim if she told anyone
about the shower incident.
      B.    Various Residences: Ages 11–12 (2013–2015).2
      When the victim was 11 or 12 years old, she and her family briefly
lived at her grandmother’s house in El Sobrante.3 One day, defendant took
the victim into the bedroom, locked the door, pulled down his pants and
instructed her to put his penis in her mouth. He then pushed the victim’s
head to his penis and inserted its tip into her mouth. However, before
defendant could place it all the way in, her mother unexpectedly came home
and banged on the door. Once mother was able to enter, she pulled the
victim into the bathroom and asked whether defendant was “touching” her.
Afraid that defendant would hurt her, the victim replied no.
      After this first incident, defendant forced the victim to “suck” his penis
about three days a week continuously until she was 15 years old. She
recounted several specific incidents, including one when her family was
staying at a homeless shelter, another at a motel and several times at
defendant’s sister’s house.
      When the victim was 11 or 12, the family moved again, to a house in
Richmond. One time at this house, defendant took the victim into the living
room, placed her on the couch and told her to take off her pants. Defendant
put “oil” on his penis and told the victim to lie down. He then lay on top of
her and inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina. The victim was “shaking”

      2 When the victim was 11 years old, her mother and defendant had a

baby girl. Their second daughter was born when the victim was 15 years old.
      3 The family moved a lot during this time period.
                                                      The mother often
worked long hours while defendant watched after the children.

                                       5
from pain and tried to get away from defendant, but he held her down.
Afterward, defendant told the victim to sit on the couch, where he placed his
penis in her mouth. Defendant eventually ejaculated, causing the victim to
vomit from disgust.
      On another occasion at this house, defendant removed the victim’s shirt
and pants and licked her breasts for about 10 minutes. The victim felt
powerless to stop defendant because she was afraid of him and his temper.
      On a different day, defendant followed the victim into the kitchen and
told her to kneel down and to orally copulate him. Defendant grabbed the
victim’s neck and forced her mouth to his penis, at which point M.M., who
was in elementary school, entered the room. M.M. saw defendant “trying to
make [his] sister suck his penis.” The next day, defendant warned M.M. that
if he told anyone about what he saw, he would “be hurt.” M.M. did not tell
anyone because he was afraid and wanted the family to be happy. M.M.
recalled being frequently told to go to another room and close the door while
defendant and the victim were alone in a room together.
      C.    Lighthouse Drive: Ages 14–15 (2015–2017).
      When the victim was about 14 years old, the family moved to an
apartment on Lighthouse Drive in Vallejo. On one occasion while living
there, defendant took the victim into a walk-in closet, forced her to lie down,
and inserted his penis in her vagina. The victim, shaking with fear, complied
with defendant’s command to stay still. Afterward, defendant forced the
victim to orally copulate him while he orally copulated her. Defendant again
ejaculated into her mouth, causing her to vomit in disgust.
      On a different date, the victim got in trouble for smoking marijuana
with some friends. Defendant was angry about this incident and about the
victim’s talking to boys on social media, so he confronted her after school. He

                                       6
gave her marijuana and instructed her to smoke it, accusing her of thinking
she was a “big girl.” The victim inhaled three “puffs” before telling defendant
she did not want to smoke any more. However, defendant insisted that she
continue and then took her into the bedroom and instructed her to remove
her pants and underwear. After the victim reluctantly complied, defendant
inserted his penis into her vagina. She screamed loudly because it hurt, and
she wanted him to stop. Defendant eventually did stop because she “kept
moving,” but then he made her orally copulate him. The victim complied
because she felt powerless and feared he would physically punish her if she
refused. However, at some point the act made her vomit, enraging
defendant, who cursed at her. Afterward, the victim cried, shook, and
continued to feel vaginal pain.
      After this incident, defendant once forced the victim to watch
pornography in which a female actor orally copulated a male actor before the
actors had sexual intercourse “doggie style.” Defendant told the victim that
he wanted her to perform the acts on him.
      The victim subsequently told defendant that she wanted to tell her
mother what was happening because she wanted the abuse to stop.
Defendant became angry and “looked scary,” telling the victim that he did not
care what she wanted and that she had no choice in the matter. In the end,
the victim did not tell her mother because she felt alone and powerless and
wanted to “keep the family going . . . .” At the time, the victim believed her
mother was happy with defendant. She later discovered, however, that her
mother was unhappy and wanted to separate from him.

                                       7
      D.     Disclosure of Defendant’s Abuse.
             1.     The Victim’s Diaries.
      Throughout defendant’s abuse, the victim wrote in one of her two
diaries. She found writing in her diaries cathartic and did not expect anyone
to read them. Her mother recalled the victim’s writing in her diaries
periodically since 2013 or 2014. One diary entry read: “When I was little,
[defendant] started touching me.· The first time that—the first time when my
mom was at work and we was playing and he told me to go in the room and
he told me to start—he started touching me, and he said, don’t tell my mom—
tell your mom or I’m going to hurt you.· And since then I was scared.· He
would make me do stuff I didn’t want to do.· He would make me.”
      Another diary entry read: “Watch porn videos, touch him, put his thing
in my mouth, try to put his stuff in my private area and I would cry and
scream and he didn’t care.· I started bleeding.· I was so scared.· I had to deal
with this since seven to fifteen. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I didn’t tell somebody that I
needed help.· I feel dirty.”
      In July 2017, mother and defendant separated after a prolonged period
of conflict. The victim decided that she wanted her mother to know about
defendant’s abuse but did not know how to tell her. The victim was worried
about her little sisters’ safety. She decided to leave her diary visible in her
room in the hope that her mother would find and read it.
      This plan eventually worked. One day in December 2018, defendant
was at the family home, visiting his two biological daughters. At some point,
the victim and M.M. returned from a visit with their biological father and the
victim went to the bathroom. While she was in the bathroom, her mother
found the diary and read about defendant’s abuse. Upset and in “total
shock,” mother asked the victim to accompany her to the store. When they

                                            8
reached the store, mother confronted the victim about what she had read,
asking whether it was true and when did it start. The victim replied that it
started when she was a “little girl” and then “told [her mother] everything.”
      On January 4, 2019, mother reported defendant’s crimes to the police,
who then interviewed the victim on January 23, 2019. The victim described
multiple incidents of his abuse at multiple locations. A few days later, she
underwent a forensic sexual assault exam performed by a forensic nurse.
The victim told the nurse that defendant repeatedly penetrated her vagina
with his penis, digitally penetrated her and forced her to orally copulate him
between the ages of eight and 15. The nurse found that the victim’s hymen
had healed from a prior trauma, indicating sexual abuse, and that her genital
exam results were abnormal. The nurse opined based on these findings that
“sexual abuse is highly suspected.”
            2.    CSAAS.
      Dr. Anthony Urquiza, a clinical psychologist, professor, and director of
a child abuse treatment program, testified that it is common for victims of
sexual abuse to delay reporting it. Dr. Urquiza described child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome, or CSAAS, which recognizes five common
patterns: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed
and unconvincing disclosure, and recantation. Briefly explained, CSAAS
does not diagnose abuse but assumes the victim has been abused. The
patterns observed by CSAAS are a consequence of the fact that the sexual
abuser of a child is often an older person with whom the child has an ongoing
relationship. The abuser often manipulates the child by, among other things,
threatening him or her emotionally or physically in order to maintain secrecy.
The child victim may, in turn, feel afraid and helpless and, thus, delay

                                       9
reporting the sexual abuse, give vague or incomplete descriptions, report the
abuse over time in a piecemeal fashion, or recant his or her disclosures.
II.    Defense Case.
       The defense called a forensic nurse to testify that the victim’s sexual
assault exam indicated a “normal” hymen and that the opinions of the
prosecution’s nurse were unreliable. Based on her review, the defense expert
could neither confirm nor negate sexual abuse in this case.
       Dr. William O’Donohue, a clinical psychologist and professor, criticized
CSAAS, noting that no study had been undertaken to examine the extent to
which its five characteristics were present in child sex abuse cases.
Dr. O’Donohue agreed, however, that secrecy, delayed disclosure, and
problems with recollection were common features in child abuse cases.
       Defendant’s sister testified that she never saw defendant behave
inappropriately with the victim or any other child.
III.   The Verdicts, Sentence and Appeal.
       On October 21, 2021, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. On
March 18, 2022, defendant was sentenced to state prison for 144 years to life.
In reaching this total term, the trial court imposed consecutive terms of 15
years to life on counts 4, 5, 8, 9 and 13, and a concurrent term of 25 years to
life on count 2. These terms were set to run consecutively to an aggregate
determinate term of 69 years 4 months, consisting of middle term sentences
for counts 1, 3, 6–7, 10–11 and 14–16, and one-third the middle term
sentences for counts 12 and 17. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on
March 25, 2022.
                                 DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because:
(1) insufficient evidence supported counts 3 and 15; (2) the instruction on

                                       10
juror unanimity was prejudicially erroneous; (3) expert testimony on CSAAS
is inadmissible as a matter of law because it fails to meet the criteria for
scientific evidence or, alternatively, the instruction on CSAAS was
prejudicially erroneous; (4) the trial court committed prejudicial misconduct
by interrupting defense counsel’s closing argument and instructing the jury
to consider only evidence admitted to the record; (5) the trial court engaged in
judicial fact finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment in imposing full
consecutive terms on certain counts; (6) his sentence amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (7) the
cumulative impact of multiple errors deprived him of due process. In
addition, both parties agree the abstract of judgment must be modified to
correct a clerical error regarding his count 2 sentence. We address each issue
post.
I.      Substantial evidence supports the conviction on count 3 but not
        count 15.
        A.    Count 3, forcible lewd conduct, stands.
        Defendant contends the verdict on count 3, forcible lewd act on a child
under age 14, must be reduced to the lesser included offense under section
288, subdivision (a) because there is no evidence he committed the offense
through use of “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate . . .
bodily injury” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). On this basis, he asks for resentencing.
        The applicable standard of review is well established. “ ‘In considering
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support [a particular count],
we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We
presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have

                                        11
reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] “A reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 970.)
      Defendant was charged in count 3 with violating section 288,
subdivision (b)(1) by forcibly touching the victim’s breasts and vagina in the
shower between June 20, 2011, and June 19, 2012. This provision requires
evidence that the defendant (1) committed a lewd or lascivious act on a child
under age 14 with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or the child’s sexual
desires (§ 288, subd. (a)) and (2) by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1)). (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 237, 242 [noting that a
conviction under § 288, subd. (b)(1) is for an aggravated lewd act as compared
to § 288, subd. (a)].) The record, described post, supports this charge.
      The victim testified that when she was eight or nine years old and
living in the Hilltop District of Richmond, defendant entered the bathroom
while she was showering. Initially, he sat on the toilet and watched her. He
then used both hands to touch her breasts, bottom, and vagina. The victim
was afraid and felt “disgusted,” but she acquiesced because she felt she had
no choice.
      Defendant argues the “force” requirement of section 288,
subdivision (b)(1) was not met because there was no evidence that he used
force, fear, duress, or menace toward the victim when he touched her in the
shower. We disagree.

                                       12
      As defendant correctly notes, the force required to prove an aggravated
lewd act under section 288, subdivision (b) is “ ‘substantially different from or
substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’ ”
(People v. Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 242.) Relevant here, such force in the
form of “menace” refers to “ ‘a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to
injure someone.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1073;
CALCRIM No. 1111.) “ ‘[D]uress,’ ” in turn, “means ‘ “a direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which
otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which
one otherwise would not have submitted.” ’ ” (People v. Soto, supra, 51
Cal.4th at p. 246; CALCRIM No. 1111.)
      “ ‘ “The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and [her]
relationship to defendant are factors to be considered in appraising the
existence of duress [or menace].” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘Other relevant
factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim
when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing
the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family.’ ” (People v. Veale
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46.) In considering these factors, “[t]he fact that
the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does not
preclude a finding of duress. [Citation.] When the victim is young and is
molested by her father in the family home, duress will be present in all but
the rarest cases.” (People v. Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072–
1073.)
      Here, the evidence sufficed to prove defendant accomplished the lewd
act charged in count 3 by means of duress or menace. The victim was just
eight or nine years old, and her mother was away from home. Defendant was

                                       13
her stepfather, he had a temper, and she was told by her mother to obey him.
Just days before the incident, defendant threatened to spank the victim if she
told anyone he molested her. He also told the victim that her mother
approved of his behavior, which made the victim feel as if she had no choice
and that “he does it as long as he wants to do it.” Even assuming defendant
did not use substantial physical force against the victim, she nonetheless felt
scared, confused, and helpless. Similar to People v. Thomas, supra, “[t]he
evidence demonstrates a vulnerable, isolated child who was compelled to
participate in sex acts in response to parental authority and violent
intimidation and not the result of freely given consent. Because of [the
victim’s] young age at the time of the abuse and defendant’s position of
authority, she was particularly susceptible to being coerced.” (15 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1073.)
      Defendant counters that the victim testified that she was not thinking
of his prior threat to spank her if she told anyone about his abuse during the
shower incident. This testimony does not undermine a finding of duress or
menace. “A perpetrator may use duress, menace, or threats against a victim
even if this conduct does not ultimately influence the victim’s state of mind.
In the context of lewd acts with a child under 14, it is the defendant’s
menacing behavior that aggravates the crime and brings it under section
288(b).” (People v. Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 243.) “Because duress is
measured by a purely objective standard, a jury could find that the defendant
used threats or intimidation to commit a lewd act without resolving how the
victim subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.” (Id. at p. 246.)
      Thus, on this record, a jury could have reasonably found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the lewd act charged in count 3
by means of (1) “[d]uress,” meaning “a direct or implied threat of force,

                                       14
violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to
do or submit to something that he or she would not otherwise do or submit
to,” or (2) “[m]enace,” meaning “a threat, statement, or act showing an intent
to injure someone” (CALCRIM No. 1111). (Italics omitted.) Defendant’s
conviction on this count therefore stands.
      B.    Substantial evidence does not support count 15.
      Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove he
committed three counts of forcible rape against A.M. once she turned age 14.
According to defendant, the victim testified that he forcibly raped her just
twice—the incidents identified in counts 6 and 7. She did not testify as to the
third incident identified in count 15, requiring reversal. For reasons set forth
post, we agree the record is not consistent with three incidents of forcible
rape during the time frames charged in these counts.
      Defendant was charged in count 15 with violating section 261,
subdivision (a)(2) by forcibly raping the victim between May 1, 2016, and
December 31, 2017.4 In contrast, counts 6 and 7 also charged forcible rape in
violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), the former occurring between
June 20, 2015, and June 19, 2017, and the latter occurring between June 20,
2017, and December 31, 2017.
      Relevant to these charges, the victim testified that after the family
moved to a house in the Lighthouse neighborhood of Vallejo when the victim
was 14 or 15 years old, defendant forcibly raped her in a walk-in closet while
her mother was at work. After this testimony, the prosecutor asked whether
“the only time the defendant forced you have to sex with him [was] in the
walk-in closet?” The victim responded, “Yes.” The prosecutor then asked,
“Did he ever ask—did he ever put his penis in your vagina again at [the

      4 The victim turned 14 years old on June 20, 2016.

                                       15
Lighthouse] residence?” The victim confirmed, “Not that I recall, no,” but
then agreed at the prosecutor’s prompting to look at a transcript to refresh
her recollection.
      After refreshing her recollection with the transcript, the victim testified
to another incident of forcible rape that occurred after school in her bedroom.
On this occasion, defendant forced the victim to have intercourse after first
making her smoke marijuana as a punishment for getting caught “smoking
weed and talking to other boys.” Defendant also made the victim orally
copulate him on this occasion. She was 14 years old at the time. Around her
15th birthday, defendant and her mother separated, and he moved out of the
Lighthouse residence.
      At this point the prosecutor asked the victim whether, “after the
incident that you testified about earlier today—or, earlier before the break
involving the defendant smoking marijuana with you and then forcing you to
have sex, after that, but prior to the defendant leaving this Lighthouse
residence, did he ever again force you to have sex with him?” The victim
responded in the negative, explaining, “Not have sex, just the sucking his
penis.”
      Despite this testimony, the People insist there was a third incident of
rape at the family’s Lighthouse residence. According to the respondent’s
brief, one of these forcible rape counts involved the victim’s forcible rape in
her bedroom after defendant made her smoke marijuana while another of
these counts involved her forcible rape in the walk-in closet. The third
incident of forcible rape took place in a car parked near a park while the
family was living at the Lighthouse residence.5

      5 In closing arguments, the prosecutor appears to conflate the forcible

rape incidents charged in counts 6 and 7, referring to both as having occurred

                                       16
      There are multiple problems with this argument. First, the victim
testified that the car incident occurred before the family moved to the
Lighthouse residence, in between her middle school and high school years.
As such, the car incident does not come within the time frames identified in
counts 6, 7 and 15. More importantly, the defense moved for a mistrial
following the victim’s testimony regarding intercourse (as well as oral
copulation) in the car because the evidence had not been disclosed prior to
trial. The prosecution opposed the mistrial but agreed the evidence was not
previously disclosed and thus did not form the basis of any of the charges.
Yet, the prosecutor claimed there was no prejudice to the defense because
“while she initially said it involved penis to vaginal penetration, she
subsequently said it was oral copulation.· So while this is an additional
specific instance that the defense was not aware of, I don’t know think it
prejudices them let alone to cause a mistrial.” (Sic.) The court denied the
mistrial after noting that sexual abuse victims often have “memory issues”
that can be addressed in cross-examination. However, the court
acknowledged the incident “can’t be the factual basis for any particular
charge.” On cross-examination, the victim acknowledged having no memory
of being forced to orally copulate defendant in the car until it “popp[ed] up in
my head” while testifying the previous day.
      Under these circumstances, we agree with defendant that the evidence
established only two incidents of forcible rape occurring when the victim was
around 14 or 15 years old and living at the Lighthouse residence.

in the walk-in closet at the Lighthouse residence. The prosecutor then
described count 15 as the act of forcible rape that occurred after defendant
had the victim smoke marijuana.

                                       17
Accordingly, his conviction on count 15 cannot stand and his sentence must
be vacated.
II.   The juror unanimity instruction was proper.
      Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 3501,
the standard instruction on juror unanimity, because the language was
argumentative and lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof. This
instruction, given to the jury for purposes of counts 4–11, 13, and 15–16, read
as follows:
      “The People have presented evidence of more than one act during
specific periods of time to prove that the defendant committed these offenses,
or the lesser-included offenses to those counts.
      “You must not find the defendant guilty unless[:]
      “1. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which act he
committed for each offense; OR
      “2. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
committed all the acts alleged to have occurred during this time period and
have proved that the defendant committed at least the number of offenses
charged.”
      According to defendant, CALCRIM No. 3501 “undermined [his]
presumption of innocence by argumentatively telling the jurors [in part 1] the
People have successfully presented evidence of the alleged conduct permitting
an inference [that he] committed at least some of the charged offenses.” (See
People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135 [an argumentative instruction
“invite[s] the jury to draw inferences favorable to [one party] from specified
items of evidence on a disputed question of fact”].) We disagree.

                                       18
      In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. (People v. Russo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “Additionally, the jury must agree
unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime. [Citation.]
Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act. [Citations.]”
(Ibid., italics omitted.) “In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors
might disagree as to the particular act defendant committed, the standard
unanimity instruction should be given. [Citation.] But when there is no
reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only
question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the
jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to
allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also
allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed
all the acts described by the victim.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294,
321–322 (Jones).)
      On appeal, we apply a de novo standard, asking whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way
that violates the Constitution. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 957;
People v. Andrade (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) In doing so, we are
mindful that “ ‘ “a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial
isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Frye, at p. 957.)
      As the People note, CALCRIM No. 3501 reflects the unanimity
instruction approved by the California Supreme Court in Jones. (Accord,
People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 556 (Fernandez) [noting the
unanimity rule has been “refined” in cases involving young children

                                        19
experiencing “repeated identical” acts of sexual abuse, which makes it
difficult for the children to articulate exact details of the abuse for the jury].)
“CALCRIM No. 3501 is an alternative instruction to CALCRIM No. 3500.
CALCRIM No. 3501 affords two different approaches for the jury to reach the
required unanimity. The first is the same as that set forth in CALCRIM No.
3500: agreement as to the acts constituting each offense. But unanimity
may also be found under CALCRIM No. 3501 if the jury agrees ‘that the
People have proved that the defendant committed all the acts alleged to have
occurred during this time period [and have proved that the defendant
committed at least the number of offenses charged].’ ” (Fernandez, supra, at
p. 556.)
      In this case, both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to the
court’s giving CALCRIM No. 3501. This was appropriate, as there was “no
reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only
question [was] whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of
them . . . .” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.) Defendant does not
dispute this. Nor could he, as the victim testified about multiple specific and
general instances of abuse. (Ante, pp. 3–7.) Instead, he now argues the
instruction’s introductory language, approved in both Jones and Fernandez,
improperly “favor[ed] the prosecution by telling the jurors there [was]
evidence of multiple violations of the law [which] resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” Not so.
      Paragraph 2 of CALCRIM No. 3501, as given, merely states that the
prosecution “presented evidence of more than one act during specific periods
of time to prove that the defendant committed these offenses . . . .”
Acknowledging that such evidence has been presented for the purpose of
proving defendant committed a charged offense does not, in and of itself,

                                        20
favor the prosecution, much less reduce its burden of proof or diminish the
presumption of innocence. (See People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132
[unanimity instruction appropriate where “the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime”].) Indeed, had there been no evidence presented on a
particular count, the trial court likely would have dismissed it or directed a
defense verdict before it reached the jury.
      Moreover, paragraph 3 of CALCRIM No. 3501, as given, makes
undeniably clear defendant cannot be found guilty unless jurors unanimously
agree the prosecution met its burden to prove either that “defendant
committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which act he
committed for each offense” or “defendant committed all the acts alleged to
have occurred during this time period and have proved that the defendant
committed at least the number of offenses charged.” And the jury was, of
course, also given the common core of instructions designed to safeguard the
constitutional rights of defendants in criminal trials, including instructions
on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no indication the jury here shunned its
duty to follow these well-known commands. (See People v. Richardson (2008)
43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 [reviewing court must assume jurors are “ ‘intelligent
persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions
which are given’ ”].)
      Thus, having considered the language of CALCRIM No. 3051 in its
entirety and in conjunction with the rest of the jury charge, we conclude there
is no “reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in a
manner that violated defendant’s rights.” (People v. Andrade, supra, 85
Cal.App.4th at p. 585.) Accordingly, defendant’s instructional claim fails.

                                       21
III.     The trial court properly admitted CSAAS testimony and
         instructed the jury on its permissible use.
         A.   Admission of Expert Testimony.
         Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting
expert testimony from Dr. Urquiza, a clinical psychologist (among other
things), on CSAAS. As defendant acknowledges, a trial court has broad
discretion to decide whether to admit expert testimony, and we review its
decision on appeal for abuse of discretion. (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th
36, 60.) According to defendant, the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the CSAAS testimony without first finding that it was
scientifically reliable, citing People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30; Frye v.
United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013; and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579 [125 L.Ed.2d 469]. This argument
fails.
         As an initial matter, we reject defendant’s suggestion that CSAAS
testimony in general runs afoul of the rules of admissibility set forth in Kelly,
Frye and Daubert. As case law explains, the “Kelly rule applies only to expert
testimony ‘based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is
new to science and, even more so, the law.’ (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d
1136, 1156 [citations].) The Kelly rule applies only if ‘the unproven technique
or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some definitive
truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury.
The most obvious examples are machines or procedures which analyze
physical data.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 173
(Lapenias).) CSAAS testimony falls outside the scope of this rule, as it is far
from new and “does not purport to provide a definitive truth.” (Lapenias,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173; see People v. Munch (2021) 52 Cal.App.5th
464, 472 (Munch) [CSAAS testimony is not “new experimental scientific

                                        22
evidence ‘ “not previously accepted in court” ’ ” (italics omitted)].) Rather,
CSAAS testimony is “ ‘based on [the expert’s] clinical experience with child
sexual abuse victims and on [his or] her familiarity with professional
literature in the area.’ [Citation.] . . . Such expert testimony meets
‘traditional standards for competent expert opinion, without need for
additional screening procedures [under Kelly/Frye].’ (People v. Stoll (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1136, 1161 [citations]; see also People v. McAlpin [(1991)] 53 Cal.3d
[1289,] 1300–1301; [citations].” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.)
      Further, a long line of California courts, extending over three decades,
have deemed CSAAS expert testimony admissible for the limited purpose of
explaining how and why child victims may react in unexpected and perhaps
counterintuitive ways to having been sexually abused. (E.g., People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301 (McAlpin); People v. Bowker
(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394–395; People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
474, 479; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171; Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) As the California Supreme Court explained, CSAAS
evidence is “not admissible to prove that the complaining witness has in fact
been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s
credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the
incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony
claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse,
and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-
impeaching behavior.’ ” (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301, fn.
omitted.)
      Thus, a CSAAS expert may not “ ‘vouch[] for the veracity’ ” of the
alleged victim (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 180), opine on whether

                                        23
the victim is telling the truth (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 468), or
give “ ‘ “general” testimony describing the components of the syndrome in
such a way as to allow the jury to apply the syndrome to the facts of the case
and conclude the child was sexually abused.’ ” (People v. Julian (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 878, 885–886.) The expert may, on the other hand, explain
CSAAS “to rehabilitate [a complaining] witness’s credibility when the
defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in
reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation.”
(McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300.)
      Here, there is no question the prosecution’s CSAAS expert stayed
within these permissible legal bounds. Dr. Urquiza testified regarding the
five common patterns exhibited by child abuse victims (ante, p. 9) and
explained that not all victims exhibit any or all of them. Dr. Urquiza also
explained that CSAAS is meant to be an educational tool designed to correct
misconceptions about child sexual abuse victims. It is neither a medical
diagnosis nor a disorder but a pattern observed by therapists working with
victims who have disclosed abuse. Dr. Urquiza also made clear he never
spoke to the victim, knew nothing about this case, and had no opinion on
whether defendant was guilty or innocent.
      In addition, the trial court briefly paused the expert’s testimony to
explain to the jury: “[CSAAS testimony] is not evidence that the defendant
committed any crime.· This is not evidence that’s designed to affirmatively
prove to you any particular act or to say that you listened to [the victim] and
say because this factor is present therefore that means that [defendant] is
guilty.· That’s not what this evidence is designed to do.· It’s just the opposite.·
This evidence is designed exclusively to rebut misconceptions that people
may have.· For example, as the Doctor has been testifying, you may think

                                        24
that common sense says that if someone were being abused they would report
it right now, or you may think that common sense would suggest a delay
means something.· Maybe it means something. Maybe it doesn’t.· But the
purpose of all the Doctor’s testimony here is to not have you make
assumptions about how a child might behave because there’s any possible
number of interpretations of the evidence.”6 Defense counsel then had ample
opportunity to test the strength of Dr. Urquiza’s opinions, both on cross-
examination and through the testimony of its own expert, Dr. O’Donohue,
who testified at length on the weaknesses of the CSAAS research. Under
these circumstances, we conclude the trial court acted within the scope of its
discretion in admitting the CSAAS evidence.
      Finally, we reject defendant’s invitation to join a minority of
jurisdictions, such as Kentucky and Louisiana, that have held CSAAS
evidence is inadmissible as a matter of law. We are bound by and supportive
of California Supreme Court precedent that has long accepted CSAAS as
relevant and helpful to a jury called upon to consider a child witness’s
credibility when, as here, the defendant suggests the child’s subsequent
conduct is inconsistent with his or her allegations of sexual abuse. (See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; McAlpin,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301 [noting, “ ‘The great majority of courts
approve [CSAAS] expert rebuttal testimony’ ”].) The court’s ruling thus
stands.

      6 The trial court also gave the jury CALCRIM No. 1193, the standard

instruction on CSAAS, at the close of evidence. The propriety of this
instruction is discussed post (pp. 26–29).

                                       25
      B.    CALCRIM No. 1193.
      Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially erred by giving
the jury CALCRIM No. 1193, the standard instruction on CSAAS. We review
this challenge de novo, considering whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury misapplied the instruction in a manner that undermined the
defendant’s constitutional rights. (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032,
1075.) We also consider the instruction in the context of the jury charge as a
whole, rather than in isolation. (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644,
655.) We begin with the relevant record.
      As explained ante (pp. 9–10), while Dr. Urquiza was on the stand, the
trial court interrupted his testimony to explain the proper use of CSAAS.
The court instructed, among other things, that “[CSAAS] testimony is not
evidence that the defendant committed any crime” and “is designed
exclusively to rebut misconceptions that people may have.” For example, the
court explained, a victim may delay reporting the abuse. “Maybe it means
something. Maybe it doesn’t.· But the purpose of all the Doctor’s testimony
here is to not have you make assumptions about how a child might behave
because there’s any possible number of interpretations of the evidence.”
      Then, at the close of evidence, prior to deliberations, the court again
instructed the jury on CSAAS per CALCRIM No. 1193: “You heard
testimony in this case from Drs. Urquiza and O’Donohue regarding [CSAAS].·
Now, this testimony about [CSAAS] is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him or any conduct or charges
with which he was not charged.· You may consider this evidence only in
deciding whether or not [the victim’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the
conduct of someone who has been molested in evaluating the believability of
her testimony.”

                                       26
      Defendant contends this version of CALCRIM No. 1193 improperly
allowed jurors to use CSAAS evidence to decide whether the victim was
credible, which undermined his presumption of innocence and the People’s
burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument fails on
several grounds.
      First, CALCRIM No. 1193, as given, was legally correct and responsive
to the evidence presented at trial. (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 474;
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176 [“[CALCRIM No. 1193]
accurately instructs the jury on the law: the proper use—and the proper
limitations on the use—of CSAAS evidence”]; People v. Gonzalez (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504 (Gonzalez).) Dr. Urquiza (and Dr. O’Donohue)
testified that CSAAS was not a diagnostic tool to determine defendant’s guilt
or the veracity of the victim’s allegations. Dr. Urquiza also confirmed he had
no familiarity with the facts of this case or opinion as to its outcome. Viewed
in this context, “[a] reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193
to mean that the jury can use [the CSAAS] testimony to conclude that [the
victim’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she said she was abused. The
jury also would understand it cannot use [the CSAAS] testimony to conclude
[the victim] was, in fact, molested. The CSAAS evidence simply neutralizes
the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus, under CALCRIM
No. 1193, a juror who believes [the experts’] testimony will find both that [the
victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her believability
one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence does not show she had
been molested. There is no conflict in the instruction.” (Gonzalez, supra, at
p. 504; accord, Munch, supra, at p. 474.)
      Moreover, in the context of the entire jury charge, there is no
reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied CALCRIM No. 1193 in the manner

                                      27
defendant contends. Specifically, he argues that in following this instruction,
the jury likely relied on the CSAAS testimony to impermissibly bolster the
victim’s credibility and determine the truth of the charges. Yet, nothing in
CALCRIM No. 1193 allowed this to occur, and multiple instructions
prohibited it. For example, the court twice instructed the jury that the
experts’ CSAAS testimony was not evidence that defendant committed any
charged act and was intended only to rebut certain misconceptions about
abuse victims, such as that a victim’s delay in reporting abuse should be
deemed inconsistent with having been abused. The court also instructed that
the very purpose of Dr. Urquiza’s testimony “is to not have you make
assumptions about how a child might behave because there’s any possible
number of interpretations of the evidence.” (Italics added.)
      The same is true for defendant’s argument that the court’s giving of
CALCRIM No. 1193 somehow lowered the People’s burden of proof and
undermined his presumption of innocence. On the contrary, the court clearly
instructed the jury on defendant’s presumption of innocence, the
prosecution’s burden to prove each element of each crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, and jurors’ obligation to review all evidence before concluding “the
testimony of one witness proves a fact . . . .” Nothing in the record suggests
that the jury disregarded these commands. Under these circumstances, we
find no reasonable likelihood the jury applied CALCRIM No. 1193 in a
manner that deprived defendant of his constitutional rights to due process
and a fair trial. (People v. Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 655 [one
instruction must not be judged in artificial isolation but considered in the
context of the whole charge].)
      And, finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that CALCRIM
No. 1193 should not have been given, defendant invited any error by

                                       28
requesting this instruction, as it was read without any clarification or
modification.7 Given his acquiescence at trial, defendant may not claim on
appeal that the instruction as read was improper, inadequate, or incomplete.
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 901 [“Because defendant did not
object at trial that the instructions were incomplete as given, the issue is
forfeited”]; People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 [“If defendant believed the
instruction on consent required elaboration or clarification, he was obliged to
request such elaboration or clarification in the trial court”].)
IV.   There was no judicial misconduct.
      Defendant next contends the trial court engaged in prejudicial
misconduct by exhibiting bias in the prosecution’s favor. This alleged
misconduct occurred when the trial court interrupted defense counsel’s
closing argument sua sponte and, after excusing the jury, reprimanded
counsel for insinuating that the victim’s entire diary was in evidence when, in
fact, only four pages were admitted. When the jury returned, the court
instructed it to consider only evidence admitted at trial. According to
defendant, when the prosecutor similarly referenced the victim’s diary during
his argument, the judge made no comment, indicating to the jury that the
prosecutor’s case was favored. For reasons that follow, we find no
misconduct, much less prejudice.
      “ ‘Jurors rely with great confidence on the fairness of judges, and upon
the correctness of their views expressed during trials. For this reason . . . a
judge should be careful not to throw the weight of [the judge’s] judicial
position into a case, either for or against the defendant.’ ” (People v. Nieves
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 484–485.) At the same time, “ ‘isolated comments in a

      7 Defendant moved to exclude the CSAAS testimony but then requested

that CALCRIM No. 1193 be given should his motion be denied (which it was).

                                        29
lengthy trial in which the court exhibited some impatience with counsel’s
argumentative comments and questions do not demonstrate misconduct or
bias.’ ” (Id. at pp. 482–483; cf. People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 768
[trial court “ ‘ “commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and
disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or
create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution” ’ ”].)
      “We ‘evaluate the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case basis,
noting whether the peculiar content and circumstances of the court’s remarks
deprived the accused of his right to trial by jury.’ [Citation.] ‘The propriety
and prejudicial effect of a particular comment are judged both by its content
and by the circumstances in which it was made. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 531–532.)
      In this case, defendant does not dispute that a trial court has discretion
to rebuke an attorney for inappropriately suggesting that the jury consider
evidence not admitted at trial. (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10
Cal.5th 195, 320.) Based on our review of the record, we conclude that is
what happened here. After an extensive hearing at which the victim was
questioned at length about her diaries, the court admitted just four pages.
Nonetheless, during closing arguments, defense counsel told the jury: “When
you look, and I invite you to look at [the victim’s] journal, it’s not dated.
Those pages have no date. It’s all written in past tense and very correct
grammatical form with commas, like a narrative.” Defense counsel
continued: “[The victim’s mother] indicated she wrote in that journal in the
month period before when she says she found it and when she turned it to the
police.· She indicated no less important that she had looked in that journal
before and when she looked in this journal before, that writing that you have
in evidence was not there.· The writing was not there.· She was also asked on

                                        30
direct by [the prosecutor] if she ever saw her daughter write in the journal.·
She said yes, I would see her write in the journal.· [The prosecutor] asked her
what did she use to write in the journal, was it green markers?· No.· She
used pens and pencils.· The observations by [the mother] as to that journal do
not correlate with the theory that it’s dated and verifiable and the smoke
gun, as we should say.· You could look at the journal for yourself.” (Sic.)
      At this point, the trial court interrupted defense counsel and the
following colloquy took place:
      “[The court]:· I have a real problem with this argument. Three times
you have told them specifically they can look at the diary.· The diary I did not
accept into evidence.· The diary is on your objection to it.
      “[Defense counsel]: Well the— [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m reference [sic] the two
pages.
      “[The court]:· No, you’re not.
      “[Defense counsel]:· That [the prosecutor] read it to them.
      “[The Court]:· Stop.· What you’re doing here is a problem, because
you’re not even doing close to what you just said you’re doing. [¶] Anyway, so
I don’t know.· What does [the prosecutor]—
      “[Defense counsel]:· I’ll point out for the record there’s not even an
objection.· At this point the Court is interjecting itself . . . .”
      Defense counsel then complained the trial court’s interjection was part
of an ongoing pattern of “[c]riticizing, minimizing, and refuting what the
defense counsel is doing in front of a client, inappropriately, extensively, and
consistently”—an argument defendant does not make on appeal. The trial
court, in turn, noted that the jury was excused before it raised the diary issue
with counsel “specifically so we didn’t have this discussion here.· But, I’ve got
this concern about this issue.” The prosecutor agreed with the court, noting

                                          31
defense counsel had insinuated to the jury that none of the diary entries were
dated when, in fact, many were. The prosecutor also noted that it had sought
admission of both diaries in their entirety but defense counsel had
successfully objected.
      Ultimately, the trial court ruled: “I have to tell them the diaries are
not in evidence.· The diaries are not in evidence.· They can’t speculate about
things that are not in evidence, either way. So, if either lawyer says
something about what is in the diary or what isn’t in the diary, other than
the four pages that were received, they need to disregard that because it’s not
supported by the evidence.· It seems to me, at a minimum, that’s what we
do.· Then keep moving, right.”
      Accordingly, the trial court gave the following instruction over defense
counsel’s objection that the court was “interject[ing] itself at a pivotal
moment” in his argument: “I wanted to make sure we were all on the same
page.· These diaries that you have heard reference to, we allowed four pages
of that diary to be admitted.· They’ve been received as evidence as an exhibit
and you can review that.· The remainder the diaries or diaries is not in
evidence.
      “Like all things, there may be other situations when you start
deliberating you ask me if you can see there or that or various things, the
answer is always going to be the same. If it was not received in evidence,
during this trial, we can’t add additional things to the record.· You can’t
review additional things that are not received as evidence. [¶] . . . [¶]
      “Don’t speculate about why things are not in evidence. Don’t speculate
about what is in that evidence, if you don’t receive it.· Again, evaluate this
case based on the evidence that is presented to you.· And also don’t speculate
at all basically what happens, I know I’ve indicate there had several times

                                        32
what happens if I ask you to step outside for a minute, don’t—it’s not
relevant to your task.· So please, don’t speculate about it.
      “And I’ve said this before, I will say this again in my closing arguments,
don’t speculate at all about what I think about anything.· You know, I’ve
given you the law, you’re required to follow the law, as I gave you the
instructions. But other than that, my views about anything are not pertinent
or relevant and you shouldn’t speculate or even care about what I think about
the facts in this case.”8 (Sic.) Afterward, defense counsel resumed his
argument, clarifying to the jury that his comments about the diary related to
the admitted entries only.
      On this record, we conclude the trial court acted within the scope of its
discretion by (1) interrupting defense counsel’s argument and, after excusing
the jury, admonishing him for mischaracterizing the evidence, and
(2) instructing the jury upon its return not to consider or speculate about any
portion of the diaries not admitted into evidence. “ ‘While counsel is accorded
“great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes
can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation],” counsel may not assume
or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize the evidence
[citation].’ ” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 209.)
      In so concluding, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s
failure to similarly interject during the prosecutor’s closing argument
demonstrated judicial bias. Specifically, after the trial court gave the above
described instructions, the prosecutor argued: “I’m not going to read the
diary again to you. It’s in evidence.” According to defendant, this argument

      8 Similarly, the court instructed the jury prior to deliberations that “it

is [sic] not been my role to tell you what your verdict should be. Don’t take
anything I said during this trial as an indication of what I think about the
facts, the witnesses or what your verdict should be.”

                                        33
was just as improper as his counsel’s argument, and the trial court’s failure
to admonish the prosecutor “sent a message that the People’s interpretation
of the diary was more legitimate than the defense’s.” This argument,
however, disregards the very instructions given to the jury, which made clear
the entire diary was not in evidence and the jury should not speculate about
its content. Nor were the court’s views relevant or a proper subject of
consideration. We presume the jury understood and followed these
straightforward commands—there was no reason for the court to repeat
them. (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940.)
      Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument the court was wrong to
interrupt defense counsel’s argument but not the prosecution’s, we would
nonetheless find no prejudice. First, as we just explained, the curative
instructions given by the trial court during defense counsel’s argument were
comprehensive and correct. (Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 149, 161 [a verdict must be based solely on the evidence
admitted at trial].) Second, the more heated exchange between the court and
defense counsel—wherein the court expressed exasperation about defense
counsel’s diary argument and counsel expressed anger about the court’s
sua sponte interjection—occurred outside the jury’s presence. As such, there
is no basis for concluding the exchange prejudiced the jury’s view of the
defense. (People v. Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 496 [where the trial judge’s
improper and “excessively punitive” comments took place outside the jury’s
presence, the reviewing court “[could not] conclude that they amounted to
misconduct [since] the record [did] not demonstrate how they might have
influenced the jury or otherwise affected the trial”]; People v. Silveria and
Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 320 [judicial remarks “could not have
prejudiced either jury’s view of [defendant or his counsel]” as they were made

                                       34
outside the jury’s presence].) We thus conclude on this record defendant has
failed to establish judicial misconduct, much less prejudicial misconduct.
V.    The trial court did not violate defendant’s jury trial rights
      under the Sixth Amendment.
      Defendant contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial by imposing full, consecutive terms on the nine determinate
counts upon finding for purposes of section 667.6, subdivision (d) that the
crimes involved the same victim on separate occasions. We begin with the
relevant legal framework.
      Sentencing on multiple crimes is generally governed by section 1170.1,
which allows either a concurrent sentence or a consecutive sentence with a
principal term and consecutive subordinate terms of one-third the middle
term. Section 667.6, subdivision (d), however, carves out an exception for
certain enumerated sex offenses, including (as relevant here) forcible rape in
violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2) (counts 6–7, 15); forcible lewd act in
violation of section 288, subdivision (b) (counts 1, 3, 14); and forcible oral
copulation in violation of section 287, subdivision (c)(2) (counts 10–11, 16).
(§ 667.6, subds. (d), (e)(1), (5), (7).) Where a defendant is convicted of more
than one of these offenses, full-term, consecutive sentences are required “if
the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1).) Moreover, in determining whether a crime
against a single victim was committed on a separate occasion, the court (not
the jury) “shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime
and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the
defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior.
Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the
defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of
itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred

                                        35
on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(2); accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.426(a).)
      In this case, the trial court made the factual finding that each of the
charged offenses reflected separate incidents for purposes of the sentencing
scheme. The trial court then imposed full, consecutive terms on determinate
counts 1, 3, 6–7, 10–11, and 14–16, resulting in a total determinate term of
69 years 4 months.9
      On appeal, defendant argues that in the absence of a jury finding that
he committed the identified offenses on separate occasions, the trial court
lacked authority to impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6,
subdivision (d). He relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147
L.Ed.2d 435] and Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 [186 L.Ed.2d
314]. Apprendi held: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . : ‘It is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed.’ ” (Apprendi, supra, at p. 490.) Alleyne thereafter
extended Apprendi’s holding to include judicial fact finding that increases the
mandatory minimum sentence for a crime. (Alleyne, supra, at p. 103.)
      After briefing in this appeal concluded, the California Supreme Court
rejected this very argument in People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748.
There, the court held “the rule of Apprendi and Alleyne does not apply to
section 667.6(d) under the rationale of [Oregon v.] Ice [(2009) 555 U.S. 160]

      9 Count 15 charged forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)).
                                                            However, as
discussed ante, defendant’s conviction on count 15 must be reversed for
insubstantial evidence. Defendant is entitled to resentencing based on this
error.

                                       36
[172 L.Ed.2d 517].” (People v. Catarino, supra, at p. 750.) In Ice, the United
States Supreme Court held the Apprendi rule does not apply to facts deemed
necessary to the imposition of consecutive as opposed to concurrent
sentences, because this decision is “a sentencing function in which the jury
traditionally played no part . . . .” (Oregon v. Ice, at p. 163.) Thus, applying
Ice, People v. Catarino upheld a sentence that included full, consecutive terms
on seven separate acts of sexual abuse, reasoning that “ ‘ “the Sixth
Amendment’s restriction on judge-found facts” is “inapplicable” when a trial
judge makes factual findings necessary to the imposition of consecutive
terms’ ” under section 667.6, subdivision (d). (People v. Catarino, supra, at
pp. 751, 755, 757.)
        In light of this binding high court decision, defendant’s Sixth
Amendment challenge to the trial court’s imposition of a 144 years to life
sentence pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d) fails. (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.) “Because section
667.6(d) falls within the rationale of Ice, its operation does not violate the
rule of Apprendi and Alleyne.” (People v. Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
757.)
VI.     Defendant’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
        ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
        Defendant also contends his total sentence of 144 years to life
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.10 A punishment is cruel and unusual in
violation of the federal Constitution if it is grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993; see

        10 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to

individual states, including California. (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th
262, 265, fn. 1.)

                                        37
Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 271 [63 L.Ed.2d 382].) “ ‘The Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 24
[155 L.Ed.2d 108].) Applying this principle, “ ‘[a] court must begin by
comparing the gravity of the offense and severity of the sentence. [Citation.]
“[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the
defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. [Citation.] If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial
judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is
cruel and unusual. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524,
542.)
        On appeal, we independently consider the legal question of whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual, while resolving any relevant factual issues
in the light most favorable to the judgment. (People v. Edwards (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 183, 190.) We also “ ‘ “grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and
limits of punishments for crimes.” ’ ([Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S.
957,] 999 [115 L.Ed.2d 836] (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.), quoting Solem v.
Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 290 [77 L.Ed.2d 637, 103 S.Ct. 3001].) This is
especially so in assessing the proportionality of a sentence of imprisonment,
where ‘the relative lack of objective standards concerning terms of
imprisonment’ means that successful challenges are ‘ “ ‘exceedingly rare.’ ” ’
(Harmelin, at p. 1001 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.), quoting Solem v. Helm,
supra, at p. 290.) Even ‘ “extended analysis” ’ of a sentence’s proportionality

                                       38
is rarely required. (Harmelin, at p. 1004 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)
‘[C]omparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is . . . [¶] . . .
appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.’ (Id. at pp. 1004–1005 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)”
(People v. Edwards, supra, at pp. 190–191.)
      Attempting to meet this standard, defendant argues that a sentence,
such as his, that “no human could conceivably complete” in his or her lifetime
does not serve any of the legitimate goals of our criminal justice system such
as rehabilitation, retribution, public safety, or deterrence, and therefore
“serves no rational legislative purpose under any legitimate theory of
punishment.” While acknowledging a sentence of life without possibility of
parole (LWOP) may not be per se unconstitutional, he also points out that
none of his offenses carries a statutorily prescribed LWOP term; nor is there
a statute prescribing an LWOP term for some threshold number of
enumerated sex offenses.
      The People, in turn, respond that many courts have upheld in the face
of Eighth Amendment challenges comparable sentences exceeding 100 years
on multiple sex abuse counts. (See, e.g., People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 520, 532 (Bestelmeyer) [“Consecutive prison terms totaling 129
years imposed as punishment for the commission of 25 separate serious
offenses is not cruel or unusual punishment”]; People v. Retanan (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1222, 1230–1231 [upholding 135 years to life on 16 counts
of sexually abusing four young girls, some by force or threat]; People v.
Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 536–537 [upholding 210 years to life
sentence for six robbery counts].)

                                        39
      We agree with the People that, in light of our limited role in reviewing
a challenge of this nature (People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp.
190–191), there is no basis upon which to conclude defendant’s cumulative
sentence of 144 years to life shocks the conscience or is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of his crimes. For one, his crimes were no
doubt egregious. California courts have long recognized “ ‘a strong public
policy to protect children of tender years.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 169.) Indeed, even “lewd conduct on a child[,
which] may not be the most grave of all offenses, . . . may have lifelong
consequences to the well-being of the child.” (People v. Christensen (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 781, 806; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S.
234, 244 [152 L.Ed.2d 403] [“sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime
and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people”].)
      Defendant’s crimes were also numerous. Based on their severity and
numerosity, the trial court followed the statutory guidelines, including
section 676.6, subdivision (d), discussed at length ante, to impose consecutive
middle terms on the determinate counts. The court also used its authority
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425, to impose additional consecutive
middle terms on the indeterminate counts based on aggravating
circumstances that included defendant’s misuse of his position of trust in
committing the crimes and the nature of the victim’s injuries. Defendant
does not dispute the trial court acted in accordance with these guidelines.
      It is well established that the Legislature, not the courts, defines and
sets the punishment for a particular crime. Under the doctrine of separation
of powers, “a court should not lightly encroach on matters which are uniquely
in the domain of the Legislature.” (People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174;
see People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 724.) Here, “the Legislature

                                       40
was well within its constitutional prerogatives when it mandated full-term
consecutive sentences for the type of sex crimes we see in this case.”
(Bestelmeyer, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 531–532; accord, People v.
Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 190–191.) Given these circumstances,
defendant’s sentence must stand, as there is no recognized legal basis for this
court to disturb it.
VII. No Cumulative Error.
      Lastly, defendant contends the cumulative effect of the claimed errors
was prejudicial, warranting reversal. Under the cumulative error doctrine,
we reverse a judgment if there is a reasonable probability the jury would
have reached a result more favorable to defendant absent a combination of
errors. (E.g., People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646; In re Avena
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32.)
      Here, this standard is not met. While defendant’s trial may have been
less than perfect, he was deprived of neither due process nor a fair trial.
Reversal is therefore unwarranted. (See People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th
1, 48 [“ ‘Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we have found each
error or possible error to be harmless when considered separately.
Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect
does not warrant reversal’ ”].)
VIII. The abstract of judgment must be modified.
      The parties correctly recognize that a clerical error was made on the
abstract of judgment regarding defendant’s sentence on count 2. Specifically,
on the record, the trial court imposed a concurrent 25 years to life term on
count 2. However, the abstract of judgment is silent as to whether the
count 2 sentence is consecutive or concurrent. Accordingly, we order this
error to be corrected on remand.

                                       41
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court is directed to: (1) vacate the six-year consecutive
sentence on count 15, (2) modify the abstract of judgment with respect to the
sentence on count 2 to reflect that it was imposed to run concurrently rather
than consecutively, and (3) forward a copy of the modified abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
regards, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A164901/People v. Vinctonivish Dwane Lee

                                           42