Court Opinion

ID: 9721311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:55:56.620817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.657381
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While concurring as to the conviction, I agree with Justice DeBruler that the sentencing statement was not adequate in its discussion of mitigating factors, but I would remand for a new sentencing evaluation and order by the trial court.
Furthermore, I disagree with the appellate standard and methodology utilized by *522Justice Pivarnik in his review of jury instructions in the death penalty hearing.
In reviewing the impact of an erroneous instruction, the standard employed by the plurality opinion is whether it seems likely "that a reasonable juror would be mislead." Such standard unacceptably risks imposition of the death penalty when there is a substantial possibility, though not probability, that reasonable jurors have applied an incorrect instruction.
The proper standard is provided in Mills v. Maryland (1988), 486 U.S. 867, 377, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1867, 100 L.Ed.2d 884, 895-896:
Unless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury may have rested its verdict on the "improper" ground, we must remand for resentencing.
While concluding under the facts that there was actually a substantial probability that reasonable jurors may have misunderstood the death penalty instruction, the Mills Court expressly cautioned:
The possibility that petitioner's jury conducted its task improperly certainly is great enough to require resentencing. [emphasis added].
486 U.S. 367, 384, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1870, 100 L.Ed.2d 384, 399.