Court Opinion

ID: 9897278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:35.979037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:00.676778
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Sep 27 2023, 9:03 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Caren L. Pollack                                           James H. Young
Pollack Law Firm, P.C.                                     Young & Young
Carmel, Indiana                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           Gregory L. Laker
                                                           Amina A. Thomas
                                                           Cohen & Malad, LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

New Augusta North Public                                   September 27, 2023
Academy and Metropolitan                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
School District of Pike                                    23A-CT-871
Township,                                                  Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellants-Defendants,                                     Court
                                                           The Honorable Ezra H.
        v.                                                 Friedlander, Senior Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
K.G., a Minor, by her Parent                               49D02-1908-CT-34744
and Next Friend Melody Ruch,
Individually,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.

                                 Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                            Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023                            Page 1 of 21
      Case Summary
[1]   New Augusta North Public Academy and the Metropolitan School District of

      Pike Township (collectively, the “School”) appeal the trial court’s grant of

      partial summary judgment to K.G., a minor, by her parent and next friend,

      Melody Ruch (“Mother”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) regarding Plaintiffs’

      respondeat superior claim and the trial court’s denial of the School’s motion for

      partial summary judgment regarding individual claims brought by Mother. We

      conclude that: (1) the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to

      Plaintiffs on their respondeat superior claim because genuine issues of material

      fact exist; and (2) the trial court properly denied the School’s motion for partial

      summary judgment regarding Mother’s individual claims because the School

      waived the notice of the tort claim issue. Accordingly, we affirm in part,

      reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

      Issues
[2]   The School raises two issues, which we restate as:

                   I.       Whether the trial court properly granted Plaintiffs’
                            motion for partial summary judgment regarding their
                            respondeat superior claim.

                   II.      Whether the trial court properly denied the School’s
                            motion for partial summary judgment regarding
                            Mother’s individual claims due to Mother’s failure to
                            file a proper notice of tort claim.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023         Page 2 of 21
      Facts
[3]   K.G. was born in 2004. She was born with cerebral palsy, microcephaly,

      congenital quadriplegia, optic nerve hypoplasia, and epilepsy. K.G. is

      nonverbal and is limited in her communication, vision, physical movement,

      and comprehension.

[4]   K.G. was a student at the School from October 2015 to January 2016. Morgan

      Smith was employed by the School as an instructional assistant. Smith’s duties

      included caring for K.G.’s “diaper changes and other needs related to her

      physical hygiene and overall wellbeing.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 105.

      Smith was required to “undress [K.G.], clean her genitals, perianal and anal

      areas, apply medications/salves if necessary, and dress [K.G.] afterward.” Id.

      Smith touched K.G. to help stretch her limbs, to move her from her chair to

      other positions, and to calm or reassure her. The School did not require that

      diaper changes be performed with another adult present, and Smith performed

      the diaper changes and hygiene care in a private area.

[5]   Between October 2015 and January 2016, Smith sexually abused K.B. by digital

      penetration while changing her diaper. Around this time, K.G. started suffering

      from sleeplessness and night terrors and became combative with her caregivers.

      Ultimately, Mother had to place K.G. in a chronic care facility.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023    Page 3 of 21
[6]   In February 2018, Smith confessed to sexually abusing K.G., and Mother learned

      of the abuse on February 22, 2018. The State charged Smith in May 2018, and

      Smith pleaded guilty to child molesting, a Level 3 felony, in April 2019. 1

[7]   On May 14, 2019, Plaintiffs sent a notice of tort claim, which provided in part:

                 Pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act governing notice of tort
                 claims (I.C. § 34-l3-3-6, 8, 9, and 10), notice is hereby given of
                 the claim of [K.G.], Individually[,] and [Mother], as Parent and
                 Natural Guardian of [K.G.], a minor, for personal injuries
                 received by [K.G.] at the Metropolitan School District of Pike
                 Township, New Augusta North Public Academy.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 177-78. The notice named K.G., Mother, Smith,

      and school personnel as “individuals and entities” that “may be involved.” Id.

      at 178.

[8]   In August 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the School and Smith.

      Plaintiffs alleged that Smith was acting within the scope of her employment and

      that the School was vicariously liable for Smith’s conduct under respondeat

      superior principles. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that K.G. suffered trauma as a result of

      the School’s negligence and that Mother, individually, suffered negligent

      infliction of emotional distress as a result of the sexual abuse of K.G., lost the

      ability to care for K.G. in her home, and incurred economic damages for the

      1
          Smith was sentenced to thirteen years, all suspended to probation.
      2
       Plaintiffs also brought claims for negligent hiring, training, and retention. Those claims, however, are not
      at issue here.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023                             Page 4 of 21
      placement of K.G. in a chronic care facility. In paragraph 13 of the complaint,

      Plaintiffs alleged that they “timely and appropriately sent [a] Tort Claim

      Notice” to the School on May 14, 2019. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 18. In its

      answer, the School admitted the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the

      complaint.

[9]   In June 2020, the School filed a motion for partial summary judgment

      regarding Mother’s individual claim. The School alleged that, because Mother

      was neither physically present during the abuse nor physically impacted, her

      claim for emotional distress could not survive. The trial court granted the

      School’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding Mother’s individual

      claims. On appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment

      regarding Mother’s emotional distress claim but reversed summary judgment

      regarding Mother’s economic damages because the School did not seek

      summary judgment regarding that claim. Our Supreme Court granted transfer

      and, on December 22, 2021, the Court held:

              [W]hen a caretaker assumes responsibility for a child, and when
              that caretaker owes a duty of care to the child’s parent or
              guardian, a claim against the caretaker for the negligent infliction
              of emotional distress may proceed when the parent or guardian
              later discovers, with irrefutable certainty, that the caretaker
              sexually abused that child and when that abuse severely impacted
              the parent or guardian’s emotional health.

      K.G. ex rel. Ruch v. Smith, 178 N.E.3d 300, 303 (Ind. 2021). Our Supreme Court

      held that summary judgment was improperly granted on both Mother’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023     Page 5 of 21
       negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and Mother’s individual claim

       for economic damages. Id. at 314.

[10]   On remand, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their

       respondeat superior claim. Plaintiffs argued that: (1) Smith’s molestation of

       K.G. was established as a matter of law; and (2) the sexual assault arose out of

       and was committed during the course of Smith’s employment with the School.

       Plaintiffs also argued that Mother was entitled to summary judgment on her

       individual claim for emotional distress. Plaintiffs contended that no genuine

       issue of material fact existed. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs designated

       the complaint, Mother’s deposition, an affidavit from K.G.’s teacher, and

       documents regarding Smith’s criminal case.

[11]   On April 1, 2022, the School filed a motion for leave to amend its answer and

       argued that Mother’s notice of tort claim was untimely. Over Mother’s

       objection, the trial court granted the School’s motion to amend. The School’s

       amended answer denied the allegations of paragraph 13 of the complaint, and

       the amended affirmative defenses included the following: “[Mother] failed to

       give Defendants notice of her individual claim within 180 days after her alleged

       loss, as required by the Indiana Tort Claims Act . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

       p. 154.

[12]   On April 18, 2022, Mother sent a second notice of tort claim, which provided in

       part:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023     Page 6 of 21
               Pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act governing notice of tort
               claims (I.C. § 34-13-3-6, 8, 9, and 10), notice is hereby given of
               the claim of [K.G.], Individually[,] and [Mother], as Parent and
               Natural Guardian of [K.G.], a minor, for personal injuries
               received by [K.G.] at the Metropolitan School District of Pike
               Township, New Augusta North Public Academy, and injuries
               and losses suffered by [Mother], individually as a result of the
               sexual molestation of her child. This Notice is supplementation
               to the Notice previously given concerning these claims on May
               14, 2019, and since the decision handed down by the Indiana
               Supreme Court on December 23, 2021, in the case K G. [ex rel.]
               Ruch v. Smith, 178 N.E.3d 300 (Ind. 2021).

       Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 3-4.

[13]   The School filed a response to Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment

       and a cross-motion for summary judgment as to Mother’s claims. The School

       argued that Smith’s guilty plea did not bind the School and that Plaintiffs’

       respondeat superior claims were a matter for the jury to decide. The School

       designated no evidence in response to Plaintiffs’ motion.

[14]   In the cross-motion, the School also argued that Mother’s notice of tort claim

       was untimely. The School alleged that Mother learned of the molestation on

       February 22, 2018; Mother had 180 days to file her notice of tort claim, which

       would have been August 21, 2018; but Mother did not file her notice until May

       14, 2019, several months too late. Moreover, the School argued that the notice

       did not identify Mother as having a claim. The School, thus, argued that it was

       entitled to summary judgment on Mother’s individual claims. In support of the

       cross-motion, the School designated the May 14, 2019 notice of tort claims.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023    Page 7 of 21
[15]   In response to the School’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Mother

       argued that the School waived the notice of tort claim argument by failing to

       raise the issue earlier. Mother also argued that her notice of tort claim

       substantially complied with the relevant statutes and that the notice was timely

       because “K.G.’s minority and incapacity tolled her time to file a tort claim

       notice under Indiana Code § 34-13-3-9.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 200.

       Alternatively, Mother argued that her April 18, 2022 notice of tort claim was

       timely in light of the Supreme Court’s creation of a “new cause of action.” Id.

       at 206. Mother designated, in part, her April 18, 2022 notice of tort claim.

[16]   In April 2023, the trial court entered an order: (1) granting Plaintiffs’ motion for

       partial summary judgment; (2) denying the School’s motion for partial

       summary judgment; and (3) setting a pre-trial conference for the purpose of

       scheduling a trial on the issue of damages. The trial court found “no just reason

       for delay, and expressly enter[ed] judgment . . . .” Id. at 15; see Ind. Trial Rule

       56(C). The School now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[17]   The School challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for partial summary

       judgment and the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Mother.

       “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary

       judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan

       Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Burton v. Benner,

       140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023       Page 8 of 21
       designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any

       material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

       law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind.

       2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[18]   The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie

       showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to

       judgment as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden then shifts

       to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material

       fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or

       inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[19]   We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo,

       and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.” Schoettmer

       v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “We limit our review to the

       materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,

       90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018).

       I. Plaintiffs’ Respondeat Superior Claim

[20]   The School argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to

       Plaintiffs on their respondeat superior claim. “For well over a hundred years,

       Indiana has recognized the doctrine of respondeat superior—Latin for let the

       ‘superior make answer.’” Cox v. Evansville Police Dep’t, 107 N.E.3d 453, 460

       (Ind. 2018) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (10th ed. 2014)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023        Page 9 of 21
       “Under this doctrine, an employer is liable for employees’ tortious acts only if

       those acts occurred within the scope of employment.” Id.

[21]   “Whether an act falls within the scope of employment is generally a question of

       fact.” Id. When, however, “the relevant facts are undisputed and would not

       allow a jury to find that the tortious acts were within the scope of employment,

       we may conclude as a matter of law that they were not.” Id. Our Supreme

       Court explored the scope-of employment rule in Cox and explained:

               The scope-of-employment rule emanates from the concept of
               control. More specifically, it springs from the employer’s control
               over its employees and their employment activities: the employer
               controls whom it hires, what employment duties it assigns, how
               it empowers employees to carry out those duties, and how it
               guards against harm arising from employment activities.

               Although scope-of-employment liability is rooted in this control,
               it extends beyond actual or possible control, holding employers
               responsible for some risks inherent in the employment context.
               Ultimately, the scope of employment encompasses the activities
               that the employer delegates to employees or authorizes
               employees to do, plus employees’ acts that naturally or
               predictably arise from those activities.

               This means that the scope of employment—which determines
               whether the employer is liable—may include acts that the
               employer expressly forbids; that violate the employer’s rules,
               orders, or instructions; that the employee commits for self-
               gratification or self-benefit; that breach a sacred professional
               duty; or that are egregious, malicious, or criminal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023      Page 10 of 21
               The scope of employment extends beyond authorized acts for
               two key reasons. First, it is equitable to hold people responsible
               for some harms arising from activities that benefit them. When
               employees carry out assigned duties, those employment activities
               “further the employer’s business” to an appreciable extent,
               benefiting the employer. But delegating employment activities
               also carries an inherent risk that those activities will naturally or
               predictably give rise to injurious conduct. When that happens,
               the employer is justly held accountable since the risk
               accompanies the employer’s benefit.

               Second, holding employers liable for those injurious acts helps
               prevent recurrence. Employers can take measures—like selecting
               employees carefully and instituting procedures that lessen
               employment dangers—to reduce the likelihood of tortious
               conduct. Since employers have some control over the risk of
               injurious conduct flowing from employment activities, imposing
               liability on employers for that conduct encourages them to take
               preventive action.

               To be clear, the focus in determining the scope of employment
               “must be on how the employment relates to the context in which
               the commission of the wrongful act arose.” When tortious acts
               are so closely associated with the employment that they arise
               naturally or predictably from the activities an employee was
               hired or authorized to do, they are within the scope of
               employment, making the employer liable. But tortious acts are
               not within the scope of employment when they flow from a
               course of conduct that is independent of activities that serve the
               employer.

       Id. at 461-62 (internal citations omitted).

[22]   Even “criminal conduct that violates an employee’s official duties, an

       employer’s express orders, or even a most sacred professional duty may
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023      Page 11 of 21
       nevertheless be within the scope of employment.” Id. at 463-64. “The critical

       inquiry is whether the tortious act arose naturally or predictably from the

       employment context.” Id. at 464.

[23]   In Cox, our Supreme Court determined that whether an officer’s on-duty sexual

       assault of a citizen was within the scope of his employment was a question of

       fact for the jury. It is “[b]eyond question” that “cities do not authorize their

       police officers to sexually assault people.” Id. at 460. “Indeed, sexual assault is

       directly opposed to police officers’ law-enforcement and community-caretaking

       functions.” Id. The officer’s conduct, however, was not “so disconnected from

       his employment activities that a jury could not find that the assault arose

       naturally or predictably from the employment context.” Id. at 463.

       Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court improperly granted summary

       judgment to the City, and on remand, “the jury must decide if [the officer’s]

       employment activities naturally or predictably led to ‘his taking advantage of

       the opportunity’ to commit sexual assault by abusing the ‘authority and

       proximity and privacy’ of his employment.” Id. at 464 (quoting West ex rel.

       Norris v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1997)).

[24]   The Court reached a different result in Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281 (Ind.

       2008). There, a deputy township trustee sexually assaulted a citizen applying

       for public assistance, and the citizen filed a complaint against the township

       trustee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the trustee on the

       respondeat superior claim. In determining whether the deputy trustee’s actions

       were within the scope of his employment, our Supreme Court held:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023     Page 12 of 21
               Taking the facts of the present case favorable to the plaintiff, as
               we must, we nevertheless conclude here that the injurious actions
               of the deputy trustee were not sufficiently associated with his
               employment duties so as to fall within the scope of the deputy’s
               employment by the defendant Trustee. . . . Other than perhaps a
               greeting handshake, the employee was not explicitly or impliedly
               authorized to touch or confine applicants for assistance. His
               alleged acts of confining, sexually touching, and raping the
               plaintiff were not an extension of authorized physical contact.
               Such acts were not incidental to nor sufficiently associated with
               the deputy trustee’s authorized duties. They did not further his
               employer’s business. And they were not motivated to any extent
               by his employer’s interests. The deputy trustee’s injurious acts
               did not fall within the scope of his employment for the defendant
               Trustee, and thus the Trustee is not vicariously liable under the
               doctrine of respondeat superior.

       Id. at 286. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the

       trustee on the citizen’s claim.

[25]   Finally, our Supreme Court considered a case similar to the instant case in

       Stropes ex rel. Taylor v. Heritage House Childrens Center of Shelbyville, Inc., 547

       N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989). There, a disabled child unable to care for himself was

       placed at the Heritage House Children’s Center (“Center”), where a nurse’s

       aide, Robert Griffin, sexually assaulted the child while changing the child’s

       clothing and bedding. Griffin’s duties included feeding, bathing, and changing

       the bedding and clothing of residents. A complaint was filed against Griffin

       and the Center, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the Center.

[26]   On appeal, our Supreme Court considered whether Griffin’s actions were

       outside the scope of his employment for purposes of respondeat superior
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023          Page 13 of 21
liability. Some of Griffin’s acts were “unquestionably within the scope of his

employment,” like changing the bedding on the child’s bed, undressing the

child, and touching the child’s genitals to bathe him. Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at

249. It was “beyond question,” however, that the sexual abuse was

unauthorized and committed for Griffin’s own gratification. Id. The Court

noted:

         The fact that this was a sexual assault is not per se determinative
         of the scope of employment question. A blanket rule holding all
         sexual attacks outside the scope of employment as a matter of
         law because they satisfy the perpetrators’ personal desires would
         draw an unprincipled distinction between such assaults and other
         types of crimes which employees may commit in response to
         other personal motivations, such as anger or financial pressures.
         Rather, the nature of the wrongful act should be a consideration
         in the assessment of whether and to what extent Griffin’s acts fell
         within the scope of his employment such that Heritage should be
         held accountable.

         Rape and sexual abuse constitute arguably the most egregious
         instances of wrongful acts which an employee could commit on
         the job and lend themselves to arguably the most instinctive
         conclusion that such acts could never be within the scope of one’s
         employment, yet other courts have recognized that the resolution
         of the question does not turn on the type of act committed or on
         the perpetrator’s emotional baggage accompanying the attack.
         Rather, these courts indicate that the focus must be on how the
         employment relates to the context in which the commission of
         the wrongful act arose.

Id. at 249.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023     Page 14 of 21
[27]   The Court held that a jury might find Griffin “acted to an appreciable extent to

       further his master’s business” and “that his actions were, ‘at least for a time,

       authorized by his employer, related to the service for which he was employed,

       and motivated to an extent by [his employer’s] interests.’” Id. at 250 (quoting

       Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 224-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). On the other

       hand, a jury might find that Griffin’s acts were “so ‘divorced in time, place and

       purpose’ from his employment duties as to preclude the imposition of liability

       on his employer.” Id. (quoting Gomez, 462 N.E.2d at 223). Accordingly, “[t]he

       nature of the acts were, at the very least, sufficiently associated with Griffin’s

       authorized duties to escape dismissal on summary judgment.” Id. Thus, the

       Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for the Center.

[28]   We find Cox and Stropes persuasive here. As in Stropes, Smith’s duties as part of

       her employment for the School included caring for K.G.’s “diaper changes and

       other needs related to her physical hygiene and overall wellbeing.” Appellants’

       App. Vol. II p. 105. Smith was required to “undress [K.G.], clean her genitals,

       perianal and anal areas, apply medications/salves if necessary, and dress [K.G.]

       afterward.” Id. Smith touched K.G. to help stretch her limbs, to move her

       from her chair to other positions, and to calm or reassure her. Smith sexually

       abused K.G. while Smith was changing K.G.’s diaper.

[29]   As in Stropes, it is “beyond question,” that the sexual abuse was unauthorized

       and committed for Smith’s own gratification. Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 249. The

       fact that the sexual assault was unauthorized is, however, “not per se

       determinative of the scope of employment question.” Id. Rather, genuine

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023      Page 15 of 21
       issues of material fact exist, and as in Cox and Stropes, whether Smith was acting

       within the scope of her employment is a fact sensitive matter for the jury to

       decide. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

       to Plaintiffs on the respondeat superior issue, and we remand for a trial on the

       issue.

       II. Notice of Tort Claim

[30]   Next, the School argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for

       partial summary judgment regarding Mother’s individual claims. The School

       argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Mother failed to file a

       timely notice of tort claim. Mother, however, contends in part that the School

       waived the issue of compliance with the ITCA by failing to raise the issue as an

       affirmative defense until years into the litigation and that the law of the case

       doctrine bars the School from raising the issue. 3 We agree with Mother.

[31]   The Indiana Tort Claims Act’s (“ITCA”) notice of tort claim “requirement is

       intended to ensure that government entities have the opportunity to investigate

       the incident giving rise to the claim and prepare a defense.” Schoettmer, 992

       N.E.2d at 706 (citing Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 477, 255

       N.E.2d 225, 228 (1970)). “Like any statute in derogation of the common law,

       3
         Mother also argues that: (1) Mother’s May 14, 2019 tort claim was timely because her claim is derivative of
       K.G.’s timely claim and substantially complied with the ITCA; (2) res judicata precludes the School from
       raising the issue; and (3) Mother’s April 18, 2022 notice of tort claim was timely because the Supreme Court
       created a new cause of action. Given our resolution of Mother’s waiver argument, we need not address these
       issues.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023                          Page 16 of 21
       the ITCA ‘must be strictly construed against limitations on the claimant’s right

       to bring suit.’” Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Buschman, 988 N.E.2d 791,

       794 (Ind. 2013)). “[S]o long as its essential purpose has been satisfied, [the

       ITCA] should not function as ‘a trap for the unwary.’” Id. (quoting Galbreath,

       253 Ind. at 480, 255 N.E.2d at 229). “‘The question of compliance is not a

       question of fact for the jury but ultimately a legal determination to be made by

       the court.’” Murphy v. Ind. State Univ., 153 N.E.3d 311, 317 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020) (quoting Ind. State Highway Comm’n v. Morris, 528 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind.

       1988)).

[32]   The ITCA bars tort claims against political subdivisions unless the plaintiffs file

       a notice of tort claim within 180 days “after the loss occurred.” 4 Ind. Code §

       34-13-3-8(a); Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 19 N.E.3d 254, 259 (Ind.

       2014). Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-9, however provides: “If a person is

       incapacitated and cannot give notice as required in section 6 or 8 of this

       chapter, the person’s claim is barred unless notice is filed within one hundred

       eighty (180) days after the incapacity is removed.”

[33]   The parties agree that the May 14, 2019 notice was sufficient as to K.G.’s

       claims because of her incapacity. See I.C. § 34-13-3-9; see, e.g., City of

       Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Hicks’s

       daughter’s status as a minor makes her incapacitated and postpones the

       4
         On July 1, 2018, Indiana Code Chapter 34-13-3.5 went into effect and governs civil actions against public
       schools. Neither Plaintiffs nor the School, however, argue that it is applicable here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023                           Page 17 of 21
       deadline for filing a notice of tort claim until after her minority ends.”), trans.

       denied. The parties also agree that Mother did not learn of the sexual abuse

       until February 22, 2018, and that the discovery rule applies. See Lyons, 19

       N.E.3d at 262 (“When the discovery rule applies, the time for filing does not

       begin to run until the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence

       should know of the tort.”). One hundred and eighty days after the discovery of

       the sexual abuse was August 21, 2018. The first notice of tort claim, however,

       was not filed until May 14, 2019. After the Supreme Court’s December 22,

       2021 opinion on Mother’s individual claims, Mother sent a second notice of

       tort claim on April 18, 2022. The School argues that Mother’s notices of tort

       claim related to her individual claims were untimely.

[34]   Mother argues that the School waived compliance with the ITCA by: (1)

       admitting in its answer that Plaintiffs’ notice of tort claim was timely and

       proper; (2) failing to file an affirmative defense regarding the ITCA; (3) failing

       to raise the issue in its first motion for summary judgment; and (4) failing to

       amend its answer until the Supreme Court had already addressed the propriety

       of Mother’s claims.

[35]   In October 2019, the School initially admitted that Plaintiffs’ notice of tort

       claim was timely and appropriate. The School then filed a motion for partial

       summary judgment regarding Mother’s negligent infliction of emotional distress

       claim, and the issue was decided by our Supreme Court in December 2021.

       Our Supreme Court held that Mother’s negligent infliction of emotional distress

       claim was viable. The School did not seek to raise an ITCA defense until April

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       2022, two and one-half years after admitting that Plaintiffs’ notice of tort claim

       was timely and appropriate. The School claimed that it did not raise the ITCA

       defense initially because it “knew that the law as it existed at the time of the

       filing of their Answer was such that they would prevail on the merits as to any

       individual claim of [Mother’s].” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 8.

[36]   Our Supreme Court addressed the failure of a government entity to raise an

       ITCA defense in its original answer in Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d 702. The

       government entity there sought to amend its answer three months after its

       initial answer, and our Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse

       its discretion by allowing the amendment. The Court noted that an ITCA

       notice defense is waived if not “asserted in a responsive pleading.” Schoettmer,

       992 N.E.2d at 706 (quoting Thompson v. City of Aurora, 263 Ind. 187, 190, 325

       N.E.2d 839, 841 (1975)). “An answer is a responsive pleading, and our trial

       rules permit a party to amend his pleading by leave of court, which should be

       granted ‘when justice so requires.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 15(A)); see also

       Ind. Trial Rule 15(C) (noting that “the amendment relates back to the date of

       the original pleading”). Our Supreme Court held that, “[a]bsent prejudice to

       the non-moving party, . . . such amendments ‘should be liberally allowed.’”

       Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 706 (quoting Templin v. Fobes, 617 N.E.2d 541, 543

       (Ind. 1993)).

[37]   The circumstances here are much different than in Schoettmer. Here, the School

       waited years before changing its position on the ITCA defense; in fact, our

       Supreme Court had already ruled on the viability of Mother’s individual claim

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023     Page 19 of 21
       and created a new rule regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress

       claims. Mother is clearly prejudiced by the School’s delayed assertion of an

       ITCA defense.

[38]   Judicial estoppel principles are also relevant here. “Judicial estoppel ‘prevents a

       party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one

       previously asserted.’” PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943, 957 (Ind.

       2005) (quoting Meridian Ins. Co. v. Zepeda, 734 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2000)), abrogated on other grounds by Helms v. Carmel High Sch. Vocational Bldg.

       Trades Corp., 854 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 2006). “A party may properly plead

       alternative and contradictory theories, but judicial estoppel precludes a party

       from repudiating assertions in the party’s own pleadings.” Id. “The purpose of

       judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process rather than to

       protect litigants from allegedly improper conduct by their adversaries.” Smith v.

       State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. 2002). “It does so by preventing a party and its

       counsel from playing fast and loose with the courts.” Id.

[39]   The School allowed this litigation to proceed through summary judgment

       proceedings, appellate proceedings in this Court, and appellate proceedings in

       our Supreme Court regarding Mother’s individual claim before raising the issue

       of the ITCA because the School thought it would “prevail on the merits” of

       Mother’s individual claim. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 8. Although a party is

       generally permitted to amend its pleadings, under the circumstances here, the

       School was “playing fast and loose with the courts” by its delay in raising the

       ITCA defense. We conclude that, unlike in Schoettmer, the School waived its

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023      Page 20 of 21
       ITCA defense by failing to present it in a timely manner. Accordingly, the trial

       court properly denied the School’s motion for partial summary judgment

       regarding Mother’s individual claims.

       Conclusion
[40]   The trial court erred by granting Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

       judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim. The trial court,

       however, properly denied the School’s motion for partial summary judgment

       regarding Mother’s individual claims. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse

       in part, and remand for further proceedings.

[41]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-871 | September 27, 2023   Page 21 of 21