Court Opinion

ID: 9693246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:32:42.749729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:31.807131
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
On December 28, 1982, Appellant, William Mackowick, a journeyman electrician employed by Star Electric, was installing high voltage capacitors in the Mellon Pavillion at West Penn Hospital. While wiring a new capacitor, Appellant noticed that a fellow electrician had removed the cover from an existing energized 4,160 volt Westinghouse capacitor. A capacitor is a device for accumulating and holding a charge of electricity, consisting of live, uninsulated fuses within a metal support structure or box. Inside the cover *60was a warning label provided by Appellee which instructed the user to ground the electricity before handling. The label did not warn of the propensity of the electricity to “arc.” Arcing occurs when an instrument or object by which the electricity seeks ground is close enough so that the electricity arcs to the instrument or object and thereby flows through it. Appellant walked over to warn the electrician of the danger associated with the exposed energized capacitor. As he spoke, Appellant pointed a screwdriver with his left hand toward the capacitor box. The screwdriver did not come into contact with the live fuses within the capacitor. However, electricity flowing through the fuses arced to him sending a high voltage electric current through his body. Appellant sustained severe burns, was hospitalized for ten days and was unable to return to work for three months.
Appellant, along with his wife, commenced a products liability action against Appellee, Westinghouse, as manufacturer of the capacitor, on the theories of inadequate warnings and design defect. Appellee asserted the defenses of assumption of the risk and abnormal use. Following a four day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. Appellant appealed to Superior Court claiming that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the law of assumption of the risk in Pennsylvania. A panel of the Superior Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for new trial. Upon reargument, an en banc panel of the Superior Court found this same instruction on assumption of the risk to be proper and, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Appellant successfully petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal raising the sole issue of whether the trial judge erred in his instruction to the jury on the law of assumption of the risk in Pennsylvania.
The majority of this Court chooses to ignore the only issue presented for review and, instead, disposes of this case by finding fundamental error in the trial judge’s allowing the issue as to whether a defect existed due to an inadequate warning to be submitted to the jury. This issue *61was neither raised in the proceedings below nor in the briefs of the parties. The well-settled rule in Pennsylvania is that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Such a rule is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence and applies to both the parties to the proceedings as well as any attempt by the court to act as co-counsel for either party. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974); Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1974); See also Chief Justice Nix’s dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989). Since the issue regarding the alleged error of the trial judge in submitting to the jury the issue of defect due to inadequate warning was not properly before this Court, I dissent.1
As stated, the sole question presented for review is whether the trial judge erred in his instruction to the jury on the law of assumption of the risk in Pennsylvania. The trial court’s instruction on assumption of the risk was as follows:
“If you find that the Defendant’s product was defective and that the defect was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiff’s injury, but that the plaintiff assumed the risk óf a dangerous thing which he knows to be dangerous and despite his knowledge proceeds to assume the risk of using it or coming into contact with-it in a manner that is not appropriate, then that is a defense available to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused in such circumstances.
For you to find that a Plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury, you must find that the Plaintiff was aware of the danger presented by Defendant’s product and voluntarily proceeded to encounter the danger. The Plaintiff must have realized the danger but not necessarily the specific defect itself, just the danger.” (R.R. 359a-360a) (emphasis added).
*62The above instruction is a misstatement of Pennsylvania law. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment n, (1965).
Section 402A has been adopted by this Court in Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327, 223 A.2d 746, 748 (1966). Furthermore, a plaintiff must have known of the “specific defect” which caused his injury in order for the elements of the defense of assumption of the risk to be present. See Ferraro, supra (plaintiff unaware of specific defect so elements of defense not present); see also Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plurality opinion) (plaintiff precluded from recovery only if he knows of a specific defect.) A plaintiff must not only be aware of the facts which create the danger, he must also appreciate the danger itself, and the nature, character, and extent which makes his behavior unreasonable. Restatement, supra, § 496D, comment b; see also Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981) (plurality opinion). Thus, in order for Appellant to have assumed the risk of his injury he must have known that the electricity could arc to him and the extent of the danger posed thereby. This propensity of the electricity to arc is the alleged specific defect of the capacitor. The instruction given by the trial judge to the jury in this case was incorrect since it implied that Appellant had assumed *63the risk if he was merely aware of a general danger of being exposed to 4160 volts of electricity.
A finding of assumption of the risk must be based on the individual’s own subjective knowledge, not upon the objective knowledge of a “reasonable man.” Restatement, supra, § 496D, comment c; see also Berkebile, supra. The objective “reasonable man” standard is only considered in the context of proceeding unreasonably after it has been established that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific defect. Ferraro, supra. In the present case, Appellant testified that he did not know arcing could occur from a live fuse. (R.R. 104a-105a). He further testified that he believed his hand to be in a safe position when he pointed to the fuses inside the capacitor box. Appellant stated “I know the metal of the box was closer than I was____ So I felt there was no reason for it to arc to me. Otherwise I wouldn’t have stood there.” (R.R. 105a). This evidence, when coupled with a jury instruction that correctly states the law in Pennsylvania regarding assumption of the risk, would provide a sufficient basis upon which a jury could conclude that Appellant did not assume the risk of any injury caused by electric arcing.
For the above reasons, I would reverse Superior Court and remand for new trial.

. I also disagree with the analysis of the issue raised, sua sponte, by the majority. I would hold that the issue of defect due to inadequate warning was properly submitted to the jury.