Court Opinion

ID: 9641081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:22:38.731625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:34.867470
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PHILLIPS, Judge.
The State’s motion for rehearing asserts the indictment is not fundamentally defective because it alleges the offense of criminal solicitation, which is defined in V.C. T.A., Penal Code, Sec. 15.03 as follows:
“(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent that a capital felony or felony of the first degree be committed, he requests, commands, or attempts to induce another to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding his conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute the felony or make the other a party to its commission.”
Although not a model pleading, the instant indictment substantially alleges all of the elements of criminal solicitation. The instant indictment alleges appellant “did then and there attempt knowingly to cause the death of James Leon Hobbs”, and this is sufficient to allege appellant acted with intent that a felony be committed. The indictment further alleges appellant promised to pay $100.00 to another “to kill the said James Leon Hobbs by shooting him with a gun”, and this is sufficient to allege that appellant requested, commanded or attempted to induce another to engage in specific conduct that would constitute the intended felony.
In our opinion on original submission we noted that the indictment does not allege attempted capital murder under V.C. T.A., Penal Code, Sec. 19.03(a)(3), because the indictment alleges only a unilateral act by appellant, without reciting that appellant hired or employed another to kill Hobbs. While we adhere to that holding, we note that to determine the intended felony under Sec. 15.03, supra, we must look to the specific conduct appellant requested, including the circumstances surrounding the conduct as appellant believed them to be. The indictment alleges appellant promised remuneration to another to kill Hobbs. Sec. 19.03(a)(3), supra, defines capital murder as the commission of murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration. Thus, the instant indictment alleges appellant solicited another to commit capital murder.
Although the indictment sufficiently alleges appellant committed criminal solicitation, this theory was not submitted to the jury in the court’s charge.
*888“The rule is universal and has been emphasized frequently by appellate courts, and in a great number of cases by the appellate courts of this state, that the charge must be limited to the allegations in the indictment. A jury would not be authorized to convict appellant ,of any other offense than that specifically charged, and the court should confine the consideration of the jury in the charge to the allegation contained in the indictment.”
Emerson v. State, 54 Tex.Cr.R. 628, 114 S.W. 834, 835 (1908). See also Bodine v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 314, 174 S.W. 609 (1915); Price v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 208, 194 S.W. 827 (1917); Booker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 523 S.W.2d 413 and cases cited therein.
The charge authorized the jury to convict appellant of attempted capital murder or attempted murder, theories not charged in the indictment. See Ross v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 744; Windham v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 111; Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 535 S.W.2d 352.
The foregoing errors in the court’s charge were fundamental and calculated to injure the rights of the appellant to the extent she was denied a fair and impartial trial. See Art. 36.19, V.A.C.C.P.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted in part, and thé judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.