Court Opinion

ID: 9714010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:37.897065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.655119
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s cramped, unrealistic interpretation of the phrase “during the commission of an offense” as used in section 5 — 2 of the Criminal Code. In the majority’s view, for accountability purposes the duration of an offense coincides precisely with the formal elements of the offense. The majority ostensibly reaches this conclusion by considering the phrase in conjunction with section 5 — 1 of the Criminal Code. However, the thrust of section 5 — 1 is simply that an individual may be held responsible for the elements of an offense based not only on his or her own conduct but also on conduct for which he or she is accountable. That does not tell us what we need to know in this case: When is one person accountable for the conduct of another? In the majority’s view, aiding or abetting must occur before all of the elements of the offense have been completed. In the State’s view, the “commission” of an offense includes both the formal elements of the offense and contemporaneous, closely related events as well. In either case, one who participates in the commission of an offense is accountable for the primary offender’s conduct pursuant to section 5 — 2, and is therefore responsible for the elements of the offense under section 5 — 1. Accordingly, section 5 — 1 does not resolve the issue before this court. To justify its approach, the majority suggests that one who aids or abets a robbery before the robber has gained control of the loot is more culpable than one whose involvement begins immediately after that point. I do not believe, however, that the degree of -culpability in the two situations is qualitatively different so as to affect the determination of criminal responsibility. Armed robbery is a crime of violence, and while the robber is still at the scene, trying to make good his or her escape, the danger of violence inherent in the offense persists. This is true whether or not the robber actually uses force in making his getaway. In my view, this consideration amply warrants imposing accomplice liability on one who assists an armed robber in his immediate flight from the crime. As the majority is forced to acknowledge, its definition of the duration of an offense is inconsistent with the definition governing application of the statutory felony murder rule under section 9 — 1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(3) (West 1996)). Illinois courts have also rejected a rigid, technical “elements of the offense” approach like the majority’s in other settings. For instance, under section 12 — 14(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(2) (West 1996)), the offense of criminal sexual assault is enhanced to aggravated criminal sexual assault if the offender caused bodily harm to the victim “during the commission of the offense.” It has been held that injuries inflicted after a sexual assault will support a conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault when the acts causing injury “were part of an unbroken series of events and were both very near in time and closely linked to the forced sexual acts.” People v. Thomas, 234 Ill. App. 3d 819, 825 (1992); see also People v. Colley, 188 Ill. App. 3d 817 (1989). I believe that the offense of armed robbery should be viewed in similarly fluid terms for purposes of determining accountability. Accordingly, I dissent.