Court Opinion

ID: 9710208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:22.865796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:49.036547
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
In registering my concurrence herein, reference is made to my dissent in Mortenson v. Braley, 349 N.W.2d 444, 446 (S.D.1984).
In said dissent, I set forth Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965), and quoted as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Mortenson, 349 N.W.2d at 446.
Amplifying further, I wrote in said dissent as follows:
This duty of reasonable care is the highest duty owed to any entrant upon the land and imparts an affirmative duty to inspect the premises for unreasonably dangerous conditions. Cul-Co., Inc. v. Redd, 577 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Civ.App.1979); Crotty v. Reading Industries, Inc., 237 Pa.Super. 1, 345 A.2d 259 (1975); Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542, 144 N.W.2d 870 (1966); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950). In fact, it is this duty of inspection which distinguishes the obligation of a possessor of land owed to an invitee and that owed to a mere licensee. Crotty, 345 A.2d 259; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 comment b (1965).
Further, as in other negligence actions, where the duty is invoked, imputed or constructive knowledge on the part of the defendant may be sufficient to satisfy the requirement, and lack of knowledge may be wholly immaterial. 62 Am. Jur.2d Premises Liability § 68 (1972).
Mortenson, 349 N.W.2d at 446.
At pages 446-47, Mortenson, I elaborated:
*317The term “reasonable care” is not susceptible of one definition, however, and must be given meaning in relation to the circumstances. McCormick v. Waters, 594 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn.1980). Crotty [v. Reading Industries, Inc., 237 Pa.Super. 1, 345 A.2d 259 (1975)]; Smith [v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226, S.W.2d 425 (1950)]. For example, the Restatement is clear that the duty does not arise when dangers are known or obvious to the invitee, unless the possessor should anticipate harm despite this obviousness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965). Young v. Jefferson Hotel Corp., 541 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.App.1976). (Emphasis supplied mine.)
In my dissent in Mortenson, at 447, I continued:
Clearly, in light of these circumstances, and by the rules just set forth, factual issues remained which should not have been taken from the jury. For example, it is for a jury to decide (1) whether by the exercise of reasonable care appellee should have discovered the danger and realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) whether appellee should have expected that appellant would not discover or realize the danger; and (3) whether appellee failed to exercise reasonable care or realize the danger.
In concluding, in said dissent, I wrote: “Further, it might be reasonably questioned whether the condition or activity was known or obvious to appellant and if appellee should have anticipated the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. at 447.
Therefore, I join the majority opinion deeming there are material facts in issue in this case. Summary judgment was not intended to be used as a substitute for a court trial by jury where a genuine issue of material fact exists. Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968). I am particularly impressed by plaintiffs testimony, in her deposition, that she never saw this hose while walking to the front door of the defendant’s residence; neither, according to her testimony, did she see the water hose while leaving the residence and as she walked away from the defendant’s residence as she stepped down off the porch deck onto the concrete driveway. Defendant Sandra Ankney admitted that plaintiff was turned in her direction while exiting and did not warn plaintiff of the danger of the garden hose which was lying under the porch step and spilled out over onto the driveway in front of the defendant’s vehicle where plaintiff stepped and fell down. See special concurrence of Henderson, J., in Kryger v. Dokken, 386 N.W.2d 481, 484 (S.D.1986), for express declaration concerning responsibility of owner to invitee on discovering a dangerous condition and avoiding an injury to his invitee. As I understand the depositions, this hose, prior to this occasion, had not been placed in such a position which would cause injury to an unsuspecting pedestrian. Defendant Sandra Ankney, by affidavit, admits, in effect, plaintiff was distracted when she addressed her as she walked across a wooden deck, took two steps to the ground, took about two steps more, and then turned around to look at defendant Sandra Ankney. Plaintiff was carrying her daughter, who weighed approximately 25 pounds in one hand, and a diaper bag and her purse in the other hand. Under all of the facts, a jury can decide whether defendant failed to warn an invitee, namely Rhonda Mitchell, against the possibility of injury. The plaintiff was not occupying the status of a social guest or licensee, as she was an invitee. Perhaps defendant Sandra Ankney did not anticipate plaintiff stepping on the hose. However, a question of fact surely arises as to the foreseeability thereof. Ward v. LaCreek Elec. Ass’n, 83 S.D. 584, 588, 163 N.W.2d 344, 346 (1968); Loonan Lumber Co. v. Wannamaker, 81 S.D. 51, 131 N.W.2d 78 (1964).