Court Opinion

ID: 9376754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:00:43.401772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.932226
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60535        Document: 00516665114             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/03/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 22-60535                                   FILED
                                                                                 March 3, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk
   Angelia Hobson,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 3:21-cv-254

   Before Davis, Smith, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff-Appellant, Angelia Hobson, appeals the dismissal of her Title
   VII race-discrimination claim against Defendant-Appellee, Mississippi
   Department of Rehabilitation Services (“MDRS”). Because Hobson has not
   established a prima facie case of race discrimination, we AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60535       Document: 00516665114            Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/03/2023

                                       No. 22-60535

                                  I. BACKGROUND
          MDRS is a state agency that provides services to individuals with
   disabilities. Plaintiff is an African American woman with a master’s degree
   in counseling education. MDRS hired Hobson in 1996 as a DRS-Counselor
   I with a starting salary of $18,304.20. In 1997, MDRS promoted Hobson to
   a DRS-Counselor II position, increasing her salary to $21,267.96. In 1998,
   MDRS raised Hobson’s salary twice, and in 1999 the Mississippi State
   Legislature further raised her salary to $25,168.92 as a result of across-the-
   board pay increases. In 2001, MDRS promoted Hobson to a DRS-Counselor
   III classification, increasing her salary to $27,531.12. In 2003, MDRS raised
   Hobson’s salary to $29,477.34. In 2004, she received a five percent salary
   increase for completing her master’s degree, raising her salary to $30,951.12.
   In 2006, 2007, and 2014, Hobson received an across-the-board pay increase
   for state employees.
          In 2016, MDRS promoted Hobson to a DRS-Counselor, Senior,
   classification, which raised her salary to $41,959.55. In 2019, she received
   another legislative across-the-board three percent salary increase, raising her
   salary to $43,027.34. At the time Hobson filed her complaint, she was a DRS-
   Counselor, Senior, earning a salary of $43,027.35.
          In 2020, Hobson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Thereafter, she filed
   the instant Title VII1 action asserting that MDRS discriminated against her
   on the basis of race, based on her allegations that white counselors in a
   neighboring district with inferior qualifications had “a starting wage of at

          1
             Hobson also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which the district court
   dismissed. She does not challenge that dismissal on appeal. Additionally, Hobson does
   not challenge the district court’s order granting MDRS’s motion to dismiss her claim of
   “direct pattern of systemic discrimination.”

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                                             No. 22-60535

   least Plaintiff’s current wage, if not higher.” The district court granted
   summary judgment for MDRS, finding that Hobson failed to establish a prima
   facie case of discrimination, and that even if she had, she failed to produce
   evidence that MDRS’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her pay was
   pretextual. Plaintiff timely appealed.
                                        II. DISCUSSION
           We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 2
   Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.” 3 Because Plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial
   evidence, we evaluate her claim of discrimination under the McDonnell
   Douglas 4 burden-shifting framework. 5 Under that framework, to make out a
   prima facie case of pay discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) “that [s]he
   was a member of a protected class;” (2) “that [s]he was paid less than a non-
   member;” (3) “that h[er] circumstances are ‘nearly identical’ to those of”
   the better-paid non-member. 6
           If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
   defendant to offer “‘a legitimate non-discriminatory reason’ for the pay
   disparity.” 7 At this stage, the defendant’s burden is one of “production, not

           2
               Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021).
           3
               Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
           4
               McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
           5
               Ross, 993 F.3d at 321.
           6
             Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Uviedo
   v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984)).
           7
               Id. (quoting Ross v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 139 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1998)).

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                                             No. 22-60535

   persuasion,” and “involve[s] no credibility assessment.” 8 If the employer
   meets its burden, “the presumption of discrimination dissipates,” and the
   burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the employer’s rationale is merely
   a pretext for discrimination. 9
           Here, the district court correctly held that Hobson failed to establish
   a prima facie case of discrimination because she had not identified any
   similarly-situated employees outside her protected class that were treated
   more favorably. To meet the third element of her prima facie case, plaintiff
   “must show that she was paid less than a proffered comparator, not in her
   protected class, for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” 10
   In other words, she must show “her circumstances were nearly identical to
   those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of her protected
   class.” 11 “A variety of factors are considered when determining whether a
   comparator is similarly situated, including job responsibility, experience, and
   qualifications.” 12
           Hobson presented four comparators: Mona Boyles, Nikki Dill, Keely
   Green, and J.T. Williamson. Although both Mona Boyles and Keely Green
   earn a higher salary than Hobson, they occupy positions that require greater
   qualifications and responsibilities. Boyles is a DRS-Counselor, Certified,

           8
             Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955,
   958 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The employer need only articulate a lawful reason, regardless of what
   its persuasiveness may or may not be.”).
           9
                Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
   omitted).
           10
                Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018).
           11
                Id.
           12
                Id. (citation omitted).

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                                          No. 22-60535

   which unlike the DRS-Counselor, Senior position, requires a certification as
   a rehabilitation counselor, which Hobson did not have at the time she filed
   her complaint. Green is a Bureau Director, Deputy (District Manager), a
   position that involves, among other things, supervising DRS-Counselor,
   Senior positions in the district. In her deposition, Hobson acknowledged that
   Green held a “different position” than she did. Accordingly, Boyles and
   Green are not appropriate comparators because they were not similarly
   situated to Hobson. 13
           Next, Hobson asserts that both J.T. Williamson and Nikki Dill are
   comparators that are similarly situated. However, as the district court
   correctly held, both Williamson’s and Dill’s salaries were lower than
   Hobson’s salary. Specifically, Hobson’s salary was $43,027.34, whereas
   Williamson’s salary was $41,127.90, and Dill’s salary was $39.300.86. Thus,
   Hobson cannot show that “she was paid less than” her proffered
   comparators of Williamson and Dill. 14
           On appeal, Hobson asserts that the district court erred in holding that
   she did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that genuine
   issues of material fact exist as to whether MDRS’s proffered reasons for her
   pay are pretextual. As to her prima facie case, Hobson contends that because
   her identified comparators “all held Counselors positions, it would be
   reasonable to infer that they shared the same job duties” and held at least a
   bachelor’s degree in rehabilitation counseling.

           13
               See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s proffered comparators because they “were called on
   to do more than” plaintiff and “had greater qualifications and responsibilities” than
   plaintiff).
           14
                Id.

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                                          No. 22-60535

          However, as detailed above, at least two of Hobson’s alleged
   comparators did not hold the same counselor position as Hobson, and the
   other two identified comparators were paid less than she was. Therefore,
   Hobson has failed to make out a prima facie case of pay discrimination because
   she has not shown that her circumstances are “nearly identical” to those of
   a better-paid employee outside of her protected class. 15 Given that Hobson
   has not presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish her prima
   facie case, we need not address her remaining arguments about pretext.
          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment in
   favor of MDRS.

          15
               Taylor, 554 F.3d at 523.

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