Court Opinion

ID: 9593552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:06.840406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:30.835058
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. OCGA § 16-3-4 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act. . . constituting the crime, the person, because of involuntary intoxication, did not have sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act. (b) Involuntary intoxication means intoxication caused by: (1) Consumption of a substance through excusable ignorance; . . .”
In the instant case appellant testified that he had taken two Valium tablets prescribed by his doctor over a period of about ten hours, and he was unaware of the side effects of Valium. Appellant’s doctor testified that he did not advise appellant of the side effects of Valium, and it was undisputed that there was no warning label on the bottle containing the Valium. The arresting officer testified that appellant was unsteady on his feet, was swaying and staggering when he walked, and was in a narcotic stupor. The officer also testified that he had never seen anyone whose driving ability was so impaired when alcohol was not involved.
In my opinion, such evidence raised the issue of involuntary intoxication through excusable ignorance. The State’s evidence established clearly that appellant was intoxicated, and the officer’s testimony that appellant was in a narcotic stupor indicates that appellant did not know what he was doing. This raised the issue as to whether appellant had sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the act charged.
Appellant’s request to charge on involuntary intoxication through excusable negligence was a correct statement of the law, OCGA § 16-3-4, and was relevant and pertinent to the evidence. “Inasmuch as defendant’s request to charge stated a correct principle of law, was not argumentative in nature, . . . and was relevant and pertinent to the evidence, the court erred in refusing to charge as requested.” Pope v. State, 157 Ga. App. 154 (1) (276 SE2d 666) (1981). See also Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 206 (1) (276 SE2d 877) (1981). Hence, I find the failure to submit this issue to the jury was harmful error under the circumstances present here. See, e.g., Dotson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 113, 114 (1) (240 SE2d 238) (1977). Accordingly, I would *101reverse appellant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.