Court Opinion

ID: 9352700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 15:01:34.645522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:50.755823
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 GARY V. JENKINS,
              Plaintiff,
         v.                                                Civil Action No. 22-3757 (CKK)
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
              Defendants.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                     (January 9, 2023)

       This matter is before the Court on sua sponte review of pro se Plaintiff’s [1] Complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that the State of Rhode Island and the East Providence Firefighters, Local 850

IAFF, AFL-CIO (“Local”), apparently his former union, failed to properly compensate him after

an allegedly on-duty injury when Plaintiff worked as a firefighter in the State of Rhode Island.

From Plaintiff’s short paragraph of allegations and the Complaint’s attachments, it appears

Plaintiff further argues that various Rhode Island entities and the Local breached a collective

bargaining agreement with Plaintiff by refusing to award him certain benefits. Inexplicably,

Plaintiff also names as a defendant the United States of America.

       Additionally, Plaintiff’s factual allegations here, such as they are, appear identical to

factual allegations raised in a prior case, Jenkins v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. 19-00312-WES

(D.R.I. 2019) (“Jenkins I”). The court there dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on the merits.

Judgment, ECF No. 12, C.A. No. 19-00312-WES (D.R.I. Oct. 28, 2019). As such, all claims

against Defendants in this action that Plaintiff also sued in Jenkins I are res judicata and shall be

dismissed on the merits. The Court shall sua sponte transfer the remainder of this matter to the

United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

       A. Res Judicata
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        Res judicata, literally “the thing decided,” “refers to the effect of a judgment in

foreclosing litigation of a matter that has never been litigated, because . . . it should have been

advanced in an earlier suit.” See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77

n.1 (1984). At its essence, the doctrine furthers the equitable principle “that a party who has

once had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have

another chance to do so.” See SBC Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 (D.C. Cir.

2005). Although often understood as a “defense” to be raised by the parties, “even a party’s

forfeiture of the right to assert it . . . does not destroy a court’s ability to consider the issue sua

sponte.” See Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis

altered); see also Klayman v. Rao, Civ. A. No. 21-2473 (RC), 2021 WL 4948025, at *6 (D.D.C.

Oct. 25, 2021) (sua sponte dismissing action on, in part, res judicata grounds).

        It is familiar Hornbook law that, for res judicata to apply, there must be “(1) an identity

of parties in both suits; (2) a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) a final

judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action in both suits.” Coleman v. PEPCO,

310 F. Supp. 2d 154, 160 (D.D.C. 2004) (RMC). Importantly, “cause of action” does not refer to

a claim, but rather refers to the nucleus of facts as alleged in the relevant complaint. See Stanton,

127 F.3d at 78. In simpler terms: same conduct, same cause of action. See Ramey v. PEPCO,

580 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2008). Only claims “that could not have been anticipated when

the first suit was filed or would have been utterly impracticable to join at the time” escape res

judicata’s grip. See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Const. Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 205 & n.21 (D.C.

Cir. 1985).

        When comparing the two complaints, it is clear that Plaintiff is suing over the same

common nucleus of facts. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (improbably including

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the United States) took various adverse pecuniary and employment actions against him after

improperly classifying a November 11, 2016 injury Plaintiff insists should be considered “on-

duty.” Compl. at 1. He seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief in the

form of “reinstatement as [sic] employee.” Id. Based on the Complaint’s attachments, he

appears to place at least some right to recovery in a collective bargaining agreement. See ECF

No. 1-1 at 2. In Jenkins I, he sued the Local, the State of Rhode Island, and the City of East

Providence, Rhode Island based on, it appears, misclassification regarding the very same injury.

See Jenkins I, ECF No. 1 at 5. He also asked for similar relief. See id. at 6. The United States

District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed his complaint on jurisdictional grounds,

relying primarily on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Jenkins I, Report and

Recommendation, ECF No. 9, at 1-3 (Aug. 6, 2019).

       That court went even further than “dismissal;” it outright entered judgment against

Plaintiff. Jenkins I, Judgment, ECF No. 12 (Oct. 28, 2019). Therefore, as to the common

defendants in this action, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered a

final, valid judgment on the merits against Plaintiff on the “same cause of action” as here.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all claims against Defendants State of Rhode Island, East

Providence Firefighters, Local 850 IAFF, AFL-CIO, and City of East Providence, Rhode Island.

       B. Transfer

       The following defendants remain: the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.

United States) (“Union”); Malcolm Moore, apparently in his official capacity as the Finance

Director for the City of East Providence, Rhode Island (“Moore”); Joseph F. Penza, purportedly

an attorney for the Local (“Penza”); and the United States. Because, even against the remaining

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Defendants, the District of Columbia is not the appropriate forum for this matter, the Court shall

transfer this matter to the District of Rhode Island.

       Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a Court may “transfer, rather than dismiss[] [a case],

when a sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action.” Sinochem Int’l

Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007). Although not frequently

invoked sua sponte, it is the law of this Circuit that a district court may transfer a matter on its

own authority. See In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Miller v. Toyota

Motor Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2009) (ESH) (transferring matter sua sponte).

       “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . .

. .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether to transfer a matter, the Court considers a

variety of public and private interests. Santos v. Trustees of Grinnell College, 999 F. Supp. 2d

219, 223 (D.D.C. 2013) (RC). Although one such factor is the plaintiff’s choice of forum, that

factor receives little weight where the chosen forum is not the “plaintiff’s home forum and most

of the relevant events occurred elsewhere.” Demery v. Montgomery Cty., 602 F. Supp. 2d 206,

210 (D.D.C. 2009). The Court must also consider “factors of systemic integrity and fairness.”

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988).

       Here, Plaintiff’s short paragraph of allegations show practically no connection to the

District of Columbia. Plaintiff, currently a resident of the State of Georgia, alleges he was

injured in and by the State of Rhode Island while living and working in the State of Rhode

Island. His alleged physical and pecuniary injuries also occurred in the State of Rhode Island.

Although the Union is headquartered in the District of Columbia, it is evident from Plaintiff’s

short set of allegations that the Union’s connection to the purported events lies only in its

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relationship with its Rhode Island Local. As such, the only connection to the District of

Columbia is Plaintiff’s summary invocation of the United States. Yet it is difficult for the Court

to fathom a set of facts––not pleaded––that connects the United States qua the Department of

Justice in the District of Columbia to a mundane employment dispute arising in the State of

Rhode Island. As such, neither public nor private interests would be served by permitting this

matter to proceed in this forum. The Court shall therefore TRANSFER this action to the United

States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

                                          *      *        *

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall, by separate order, DISMISS all claims against

Defendants State of Rhode Island, East Providence Firefighters, Local 850 IAFF, AFL-CIO, and

City of East Providence, Rhode Island and TRANSFER the remainder of this matter to the

United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

Dated: January 9, 2023                                   /s/
                                                      COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
                                                      United States District Judge

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