Court Opinion

ID: 9736146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:45:09.680051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.649227
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice
concurring specially.
While I concur in the result, I do not agree with the rationale expressed in the majority opinion. What we really do in a case like this is carve an exception to our judge-made rule proscribing modification of property division judgments. By calling it “clarification,” rather than “modification,” we attempt to finesse the issue but it is a losing finesse because we end up analyzing and refining the non-issue of “clarification.”
I believe that our statute on the subject, § 14-05-24, clearly authorizes modification of property division. See Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D.1978) (Vogel, J., concurring and dissenting); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478 (N.D.1978) (Vogel, *146J., dissenting). However, because there is a strong policy to encourage and promote finality of judgments and certainty of title, our case law, as cited in the majority opinion, has facilitated implementation of this policy by prohibiting modification of property division judgments. We would be wise to acknowledge not only our judge-made rule, but also any judge-made exceptions to that rule, such as the one enunciated in this case. We should recognize that we are simply labeling the court’s power to modify property division in exceptional circumstances, as “clarification.”