Court Opinion

ID: 9697761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:28:59.89658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:35.168318
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join in voting to affirm Wesley’s convictions, but I would reverse as to Boone.
On direct examination, Wesley acknowledged that he was a drug dealer and had been selling drugs on the day of the robberies. During Wesley’s cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited that, on the same day, Boone had made drug sales “here and there” for Wesley and had been paid either five dollars or “a quarter of dope” for each sale. At that point, counsel for Boone renewed an earlier motion for a mistrial and asked for a severance,1 arguing that “other crimes” evidence of drug transactions would not be admissible against Boone in a separate trial and, therefore, that the government should not be allowed to benefit from linking Boone to Wesley’s drug dealing. As the trial court indicated, drug dealing was in the case against Wesley because he had “opened it up in his direct examination.” But, Boone had not done so, and the court accordingly agreed with Boone’s counsel that, in a separate trial of Boone, the prosecutor’s questions about Boone’s drug sales for Wesley would have been irrelevant and thus inadmissible (assuming, of course, that Boone had not “opened the door” in some way).
More specifically, the court said to the prosecutor:
If the charge were a drug sale inside the barbershop, and you were contending that Boone aided and abetted that drug sale, you would be absolutely right. But, that is not what this case is about. This case is about an armed robbery.
The trial court not only found this other crimes evidence irrelevant but also, as the majority acknowledges, ante at 1028, declared it prejudicial.
In a sense, Mr. Boone is between a rock and a hard place at this point in that, I assume, that he is not putting witnesses on. Let’s say that. So, the Government has rested its case in chief against him, and then the co-defendant decides to testify in a joint trial that Mr. Boone never wanted, and has moved several times actually in this trial before me to sever. And now it comes out, because of this series of events, is the fact, I *1032don’t know if they are going to believe it or not, but is the fact that he was out there doing other things illegally that day. That can’t help him, it seems to me. It has got to hurt him. So, it is prejudicial.
The trial court, however, “denied” the motion for a mistrial, “reserved” the motion for a severance, and “instruct[ed] the prosecutor not to pursue through the current witness, Mr. Wesley, questions concerning Mr. Boone’s drug selling, if any, that day.” The court also offered Boone a limiting instruction, which counsel declined because of a concern about highlighting the issue further. (Later, counsel changed her mind and asked for a limiting instruction at the time of the court’s general charge to the jury.) Finally, the court stressed that the prosecutor, in closing argument to the jury, could not mention Boone’s involvement with drugs, indeed not even Wesley’s testimony that “Boone knew I was going to put the stash in the barbershop.” The court then emphasized to the prosecutor: “You understand that I am making the ruling that I would not be making if ... these cases were being tried separately.” The court meant, of course, that it had to protect Boone against irrelevant and prejudicial other crimes evidence that might otherwise be admissible against Wesley.2
Interestingly, in its brief the government does not argue that this “other crimes” evidence was admissible against Boone under an exception found in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (1964). The only theory of admissibility the government advances — in a one-sentence footnote — is the “surrounding circumstances” exception found in Robinson v. United States, 486 A.2d 727, 729 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852, 106 S.Ct. 151, 88 L.Ed.2d 125 (1985); Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958, 960 (D.C.1983); and Green v. United States, 440 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. 1982). That exception is plainly inapplicable because all the drug transactions at issue except, perhaps, the reference to a stash at the barbershop, supra note 2, were not necessary to explain the "circumstances immediately surrounding the offense[s] charged.” Robinson, 486 A.2d at 729 (emphasis in original). The government’s only substantial argument, therefore, is harmless error and thus no abuse of discretion: the prejudice to Boone was insufficient to warrant reversal, given the relatively small amount of testimony implicating Boone in drug sales, coupled with the court’s limiting instruction at the end of the general charge to the jury (Boone had waived an earlier limiting instruction).
I cannot agree with the government. Given the closeness of the case against Boone on aiding and abetting (the trial court called the case “borderline” and “very close”), I believe the inadmissible other crimes evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to mandate a severance and thus a mistrial as to Boone. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 385 A.2d 750, 754 (D.C.1978) (murder conviction reversed because of inadmissible evidence of narcotics use unrelated to homicide). The government clearly was trying to convince the jury that Boone had aided and abetted the armed robberies because of his close association with Wesley as a drug dealer on the afternoon they went to the barbershop. The prosecutor argued that Wesley’s and Boone’s drug transactions established “motive, ... intent to be there in that area.”3 *1033The trial court agreed with Boone s counsel, however, that the announced motive for going into the barbershop — to put drugs there — did not imply motive or intent to rob and therefore did not supply a basis under Drew for evidence about drugs. Indeed, the government now apparently agrees that no Drew exception applies, for it has abandoned that argument on appeal.
Nonetheless, my colleagues in the majority conclude (1) the “other crimes” evidence would have been admissible under the Drew exception for “intent,” and (2) the evidence was more probative than prejudicial essentially because so many witnesses adverted to drug use that Boone was inevitably (and thus properly) implicated in such illicit activity of the neighborhood. I believe they are wrong in both respects.
First, in relying on admissibility of the “other crimes” evidence, my colleagues necessarily are holding that the trial court erred in ruling that evidence inadmissible — a holding that they fail to articulate and, in any event, a holding that simply will not “write.” Despite acknowledging the trial court’s ruling that the evidence was “too prejudicial” for admissibility, the majority suggests that the trial court “could have” ruled otherwise, ante at 1028, and that the jury in any event “could readily have inferred, without the disputed statements, that Boone had assisted Wesley in his drug dealing.” Ante at 1028. I do not understand how this court, given our standard of review, can ignore what the trial judge — who heard the evidence and watched witness demeanor — did say about the impact of the “other crimes” evidence, and then base this court’s ruling on what the jury “could readily have inferred” if the tainted evidence had not been there. The fact is, prejudicial evidence was there, and the majority is not willing to base affirmance on the only legitimate ground available: that no reasonable jury could have been swayed by the tainted evidence to find appellant not guilty.
In any event, the majority is wrong on the merits of the Drew analysis: an intent “to further Wesley’s plans,” ante at 1028, is so obviously vague that it begs the question. In effect, the majority has to be saying that an intent to further drug dealing was an intent, under the circumstances, to engage in armed robbery. As the trial court, and now the government, have recognized, however, that analysis will not work. There was absolutely no evidentiary predicate linking Boone’s occasional drug sales with the robberies; there was only evidence of appellants’ fortuitously confronting the complainants at a place where Wesley had decided to stash narcotics.
Second, as to prejudice, the majority does not say, as the government argues, that the prejudice is insufficient for reversal assuming the other crimes evidence was improperly before the jury. The only basis on which my colleagues find the evidence more probative than prejudicial is astonishing. They say, in effect, that Boone inevitably was tarnished by the admissible testimony about drug dealing that went on in the neighborhood, even if he was not shown to have been a part of it.4 That kind of guilt by association is irrelevant and has no place here, to say the least. The fact that other crimes evidence would make Boone look no worse than others in the neighborhood does not mean such evidence would make him look no worse than he would without that evidence.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to Boone. I would reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Boone’s requested severance.

. Counsel had moved for a mistrial when a complaining witness, Hawkins, testified that he had had "conversations” with “Ford," meaning Boone, saying no more than " “Bye/ “Hi,’ “Who has some reefer.’ ” It was unclear who had said what. The court denied the motion on the ground that the testimony was only a casual reference. The court also declined to give a requested instruction that "there was no allegation that my client was ever involved in the purchase, sede, of any drugs.” The court told the prosecutor, however, that this was “a rather dangerous area” and that she “ought to be careful.”

. The trial court also was protecting Boone against the "stash in the barbershop" testimony that was admissible as to Boone, apparently, because counsel had failed to object and, arguably, because that testimony helped explain die circumstances immediately surrounding the barbershop robberies and assault. See Robinson v. United States, 486 A.2d 727, 729 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852, 106 S.Ct. 151, 88 L.Ed.2d 125 (1985); Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958, 960 (D.C. 1983); Green v. United States, 440 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. 1982). If that testimony alone had been admitted, however, the jury would have learned, at most, that Boone had gone along with Wesley to the barbershop knowing Wesley was going to "stash” narcotics there, not that Boone himself was a drug dealer.

. More specifically, the prosecutor argued to the court against Boone’s motion for a mistrial and severance:
It would seem to me that we should be able to pursue the fact that Boone was with Wesley.... That they were working in concert *1033that afternoon. It would seem to me, because then they go to the barbershop, and our argument, of course, is they continue to work in concert. And the fact that it deals with drugs, it seems to me, is somewhat prejudicial. But, those are the facts. And the probative value of that association far outweighs the prejudice. It is highly probative to Boone’s motive for being with Wesley. It is highly probative to their association of that afternoon.

. The two unchallenged or unchallengeable references to Boone’s connection with drugs did not meaningfully implicate him. See supra notes 1 and 2.