Court Opinion

ID: 9771215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:06.084446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:13.996637
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority’s holding in this case is clearly at odds with the purpose for which the New Mexico Legislature passed the Joinder Statute, not to mention contrary to fairness, logic, and common sense. The purpose of the New Mexico Joinder statute is to encourage — nay, force — spouses to consult and agree on transactions involving their community estate. See English v. Sanchez, 110 N.M. 343, 347, 796 P.2d 236, 239 (1990).1 Its purpose is certainly not to provide *770strangers to the marriage a loophole for avoiding contractual obligations the stranger no longer deems profitable.2 Nevertheless, that is the outcome which the majority here allows.
I believe that Justice Montgomery’s position in English v. Sanchez best delineates the test this Court should use in determining whether a contract may be avoided by one who would otherwise be legally bound by it:
[T]he question whether a contract is void or not must be determined with reference to the identity of the party asserting its invalidity and in light of the purpose of the statute or other legal pronouncement declaring it to be void. A party who is a stranger to the marital relationship lacks standing to assert the invalidity of the contract, because the purpose of the statute declaring it ‘void and of no effect’ is to protect the assets for the benefit of the community, not to provide a weapon for invalidation of an otherwise perfectly lawful transaction. English v. Sanchez, 796 P.2d at 242.
This approach is much more sensible than the one adopted by the majority here. I find additional support for the conclusion that a third party should not escape contractual obligations to a married couple, or one party to it, in the New Mexico Legislature’s actions following English v. Sanchez. It amended the joinder statute in 1993 to allow written ratification by the nonjoining spouse.3 The majority tacitly assumes this amendment was not retroactive in effect, but gives no reasons for its conclusion.
Here, the Hartmans submitted evidence in response to summary judgment which created a fact question as to whether Bryan Jones signed the contract as dual agent for Doyle and Margaret Hartman. A reasonable fact finder could easily find the landman represented Margaret Hartman’s community interest in “Doyle Hartman Oil Operator” just as he did Doyle Hartman’s interest. There is no evidence, moreover, that Margaret Hartman did anything but heartily endorse this transaction, as shown by her ratification of Jones’s authority to act on her behalf.4
An appellate court should avoid interpreting the law so it produces legal consequences which parties did not intend, unless some greater underlying purpose is served by applying the law in that way. An absurd outcome may be a necessary evil occasionally, but such a case should involve some underlying reason that compels us to ignore the parties’ intentions. Here, I discern no underlying principle that is served by casting aside the parties’ clear intentions. The New Mexico Legislature created its modern join-der statute to answer the mandates of the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment. The statute provides married men and women equal rights over their community estate, a noble purpose. I do not condone the statute’s perversion into a device for reneging on lawful agreements. I would reverse the trial court’s summary judgment and remand the case for trial on the merits.

. In English v. Sanchez, the Court avoided harsh application of the Joinder Statute. The language upon which the majority relies here, therefore, is mere dicta. If the New Mexico Supreme Court took pains to avoid an unfair result stemming from some regrettable legislative phrasing, why should we not follow its lead?

. Along with Justice Montgomery, I think here Dickens' Mr. Bumble was right: "If the law supposes that, ... the law is a ass — a idiot."

. The legislature added this sentence: “Nothing in this section shall affect the right of a spouse not joined in a transfer, conveyance, mortgage, lease or contract to validate an instrument at any time by a ratification in writing.” N.M.Stat.Ann. § 40-3-13(B) (1978).

.I note that the New Mexico Supreme Court held a later ratification sufficient to uphold a “void” contract where it is the nonjoining wife who wished to escape the contract with a third party. Otero v. Wheeler, 102 N.M. 770, 773-74, 701 P.2d 369, 372-73 (1985).