Court Opinion

ID: 9929473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 18:10:02.060242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:26.803316
License: Public Domain

J-S35019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MACARTON NORMAN PIERRE                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1507 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0001006-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2024

       Macarton Norman Pierre appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

on October 21, 2022. We affirm.

       In September 2022, Pierre pleaded guilty to one count of criminal

mischief and two counts of endangering the welfare of children.1 He was

sentenced on October 21, 2022 to 24 to 48 months’ incarceration. Six days

after sentencing, while still represented by counsel, Pierre filed a pro se

document, stating that he was “filing [a] pro se appeal of his guilty plea due

to ineffective counsel[.]” Pro Se Notice of Appeal, filed 10/27/22, at 1. He

claimed “he was manipulated, forced, [and] bribed into taking a guilty plea by

Attorney John Pike with a promise of a probated period/sentence.” Id. Pierre

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3304(a)(5) and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
J-S35019-23

requested that a new attorney be appointed. Id. at 2. The trial court treated

Pierre’s filing as a pro se notice of appeal.

      Shortly thereafter, on November 2, 2022, plea counsel filed a petition

to withdraw as counsel because Pierre raised a claim of counsel’s

ineffectiveness in his pro se notice of appeal. This Court permitted counsel to

withdraw and ordered the trial court to appoint substitute counsel. New

counsel entered his appearance, and Pierre filed a pro se application for the

appointment of substitute counsel because new counsel was an associate of

plea counsel. This Court directed that conflict counsel be appointed. Counsel

was appointed and filed a motion to file a concise statement nunc pro tunc,

which the court granted. Pierre’s counsel raises the following issue on appeal:

      Whether the [p]lea [c]ourt erred by construing Mr. Pierre’s pro se
      filing as a notice of appeal rather than a post sentence motion
      when it was filed within ten days of sentencing and alleged claims
      that must be preserved in a post sentence motion to be raised on
      direct appeal?

Pierre’s Br. at 4.

      Pierre argues that the court erred in treating his pro se filing as a notice

of appeal instead of as a post-sentence motion. Id. at 7. He notes that his

filing was made within 10 days of his sentencing and raised issues with his

guilty plea. Id. at 9. He maintains that the trial court should have known that

“all claims related to the guilty plea would have been waived on direct appeal

without the claims being preserved via objection or post sentence motion.”

Id. at 7. Pierre requests that the case be remanded so counsel can file an

amended post sentence motion. Id. at 11.

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      The trial court did not err in treating Pierre’s filing as a notice of appeal.

Generally, a party may not engage in what is called “hybrid representation.”

That is, a party may not as a rule submit pro se filings or otherwise represent

themselves while represented by counsel. See Commonwealth v. Williams,

241 A.3d 353, 354 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). However, the filing

of a notice of appeal is an exception to the rule against hybrid representation.

See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 624 (Pa.Super. 2016); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 121(g)(i) (stating that an exception to the rule prohibiting

hybrid representation is the filing of a pro se notice of appeal). Here, although

Pierre was represented by counsel, he could file a pro se notice of appeal.

Thus, the appeal is properly before us. However, he could not, while still

represented by counsel, file a post sentence motion. See Commonwealth v.

Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa.Super. 2007).

      Furthermore, Pierre’s filing states that he was “filing [a] pro se

appeal[.]” The trial court permissibly took those words at face value. Although

Pierre went on to assert an ineffectiveness claim, that did not render it

improper for the court to conclude that Pierre intended to do what he said he

was doing: filing an appeal. Moreover, the ineffectiveness claim was

premature. “Generally, a claim that trial counsel is ineffective is deferred to

collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act.” Commonwealth v.

Green, 204 A.3d 469, 486 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Commonwealth v.

Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64 (Pa. 2013) (providing that, with limited

exceptions not applicable here, a court cannot review ineffective assistance of

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counsel claims on direct appeal). Pierre’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is not cognizable on direct appeal and must await collateral review.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2024

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