Court Opinion

ID: 9371774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 20:03:12.143542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.071293
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220143

                                Opinion filed February 16, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY and ERIE        )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      INSURANCE EXCHANGE,                    )     of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                             )     Du Page County, Illinois.
            Plaintiffs-Appellees,            )
                                             )
            v.                               )
                                             )     Appeal No. 3-22-0143
      THOMAS R. GIBBS, D.D.S., and ANTHONY )       Circuit No. 21-MR-394
      ADAMS,                                 )
                                             )
            Defendants                       )
                                             )
      (Thomas R. Gibbs, D.D.S.,              )     The Honorable
                                             )     Paul M. Fullerton,
            Defendant-Appellant).            )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices Davenport and Hettel concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 OPINION

¶1          In a separate criminal case, the defendant-appellant, Dr. Thomas Gibbs, stipulated to

     intentionally pushing defendant Anthony Adams, thereby injuring Adams’s knee. Gibbs was

     subsequently found guilty of misdemeanor criminal battery and sentenced. Adams then filed a

     negligence action against Gibbs related to the incident.
¶2             The plaintiffs, Erie Insurance Company and Erie Insurance Exchange, filed a declaratory

     judgment action alleging that they had no duty to defend or indemnify Gibbs in the negligence

     action pursuant to the home insurance and umbrella policies Gibbs had with the plaintiffs. The

     plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted after finding that

     the evidence conclusively established that Gibbs acted intentionally and, therefore, Gibbs’s

     conduct was excluded from coverage by the policies. Gibbs appealed, alleging that the circuit

     court erred when it (1) denied his motion to stay the declaratory judgment action pending the

     resolution of the negligence action and (2) granted summary judgment in favor of Erie. We

     affirm.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4             On April 19, 2021, Erie Insurance Company and Erie Insurance Exchange (hereinafter

     Erie) filed a civil complaint against Dr. Thomas Gibbs and Anthony Adams. The complaint,

     which was subsequently amended on July 26, 2021, sought a declaratory judgment that it did not

     owe Gibbs a duty to defend and indemnify in a negligence action filed by Adams against Gibbs.

¶5             The complaint alleged that on August 14, 2018, the Downers Grove Police Department

     responded to a call regarding a domestic dispute at Gibbs’s residence. Gibbs was taken to Good

     Samaritan Hospital and found to have a 0.282 blood alcohol concentration. Hospital staff

     reported that Gibbs was aggressive and violent and that he was spitting at and verbally abusing

     the staff.

¶6             At approximately 5:37 a.m., nurse Megan Howard performed a routine check on Gibbs in

     his room. Gibbs said he was “getting out of here.” Howard called for security, and Gibbs

     urinated on the floor. Gibbs then approached Howard and told her to get him “out of this f***

                                                      2
     room.” He also grabbed Howard’s arm. At that time, Adams, who was an emergency room

     technician, came into the room to assist. Gibbs resisted and pushed Adams to the floor.

¶7           Two misdemeanor criminal battery cases were filed against Gibbs as a result of the

     hospital incident. In the first case, Du Page County circuit court case No. 18-CM-1790, the State

     alleged that Gibbs intentionally pushed Adams, thereby causing injury to Adams’s left knee. 1 In

     the second case, Du Page County circuit court case No. 18-CM-1865, the State alleged that

     Gibbs grabbed and squeezed Howard’s right forearm. On July 30, 2019, Gibbs was found guilty

     in both cases after he stipulated to the facts as alleged by the State. 2 There was no agreement on

     sentencing.

¶8           Additionally, the Erie complaint alleged that Gibbs pled guilty in a federal criminal fraud

     case on December 11, 2019. The complaint stated that, at sentencing on July 22, 2020, Gibbs

     addressed the court, stating that he had initially been offered pretrial diversion with probation

     and expungement of the charges after one year, but that offer had been revoked due to the state

     criminal battery cases. Gibbs stated, in part, that “[the offer] was no longer an option when I

     accepted responsibility for a misdemeanor battery charge that occurred on the night that my 41-

     year-marriage collapsed. I was taken drunk from my residence to the hospital.”

¶9           The complaint also alleged that, on July 31, 2020, Adams filed a negligence action

     against Gibbs, alleging that Gibbs failed to (1) “drink in a reasonable manner,” (2) “urinate in a

     reasonable manner,” (3) “urinate in a reasonable location,” and (4) “reasonably respond to

     plaintiff’s attempts to help him.” Adams’s negligence action further alleged that Gibbs “[c]aused

     plaintiff to slip” and that he sustained severe and permanent injuries as a result.

             1
               Documents in the record indicated that Adams suffered a broken kneecap.
             2
               The record on appeal contains the transcript from the criminal battery cases; Gibbs’s counsel
     clearly stated that Gibbs was stipulating to the facts but pleading not guilty.
                                                         3
¶ 10          Erie’s complaint further stated that it had issued a general home insurance policy and an

       umbrella policy to Gibbs and his wife that was effective during the time the hospital incident

       took place. The general policy obligated Erie to “pay all sums up to the amount shown on the

       ‘Declarations’ which ‘anyone we protect’ becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because

       of ‘bodily injury’ *** caused by an ‘occurrence’ during the policy period.” “Bodily injury” was

       defined as including physical harm. “Occurrence” was defined as “an accident, including

       continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions.”

¶ 11          The general policy excluded bodily injury that, inter alia, was “expected or intended” by

       the insured even if “the degree, kind or quality of the injury *** is different than what was

       expected or intended ***.” It also excluded coverage for “claims or suits seeking damages,

       including defense of same, for any person who actively participates in any act of *** physical

       *** abuse of any person,” excepting certain conduct not applicable in this case.

¶ 12          The umbrella policy obligated Erie to “pay the ultimate net loss which anyone we protect

       becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury or property damage

       resulting from an occurrence during this policy period.” “Personal injury” included “bodily

       injury,” which the umbrella policy defined as including physical harm. “Occurrence” was

       defined in relevant part as “an accident *** which results in personal injury *** which is neither

       expected nor intended.”

¶ 13          The umbrella policy contained exclusions for, inter alia, personal injury that the insured

       intended or that resulted from physical abuse by the insured.

¶ 14          Erie’s complaint alleged that neither the general policy nor the umbrella policy provided

       coverage for at least the following reasons: (1) the facts did not allege an “occurrence,” (2) the

       exclusion for intentional acts applied, and (3) the exclusion for physical abuse applied.

                                                        4
¶ 15          On August 20, 2021, Gibbs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the

       alternative, to stay the declaratory judgment action pending judgment in the negligence action. In

       essence, Gibbs alleged that Erie was improperly asking the circuit court to make findings of fact

       in the negligence action that would ultimately determine Gibbs’s liability in that action. Gibbs

       sought a ruling that Erie had a duty to defend him in the negligence action. Gibbs also argued

       that “[a]t an absolute minimum, this case should be stayed or dismissed pending resolution of the

       underlying Adams case.”

¶ 16          Three days later, Adams also filed a motion to stay the declaratory judgment proceedings.

       In part, Adams’s motion alleged that there was an undecided question as to whether Gibbs was

       so intoxicated that the exclusionary clauses from his policies would not apply.

¶ 17          On November 16, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing at which it heard arguments on

       whether the case should be stayed. The court refused to stay the case and gave Erie 28 days to

       file a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment.

¶ 18          Erie filed a motion for summary judgment on December 14, 2021. In part, Erie’s motion

       argued that Gibbs and Adams should be collaterally estopped from contesting Gibbs’s

       convictions for criminal battery. Additionally, Erie’s motion argued that because Gibbs’s

       conduct was intentional, it (1) did not qualify as an “occurrence” under the policies and

       (2) triggered both the intentional act and physical abuse exclusions.

¶ 19          On March 10, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on Gibbs’s motion for judgment on

       the pleadings and Erie’s motion for summary judgment. The parties addressed the applicability

       of collateral estoppel, with Erie arguing that it applied in that “the cause of Dr. Gibbs’

       unprovoked attack on Mr. Adams has already been determined.” Erie also emphasized that Gibbs

       intentionally battered Adams and that the issue in the declaratory judgment action was identical

                                                         5
       in that it alleged no duty to defend based on Gibbs’s intentional conduct, which was the cause of

       Adams’s injury. Gibbs argued that granting declaratory relief in favor of Erie would improperly

       decide material issues of fact for the negligence action. Gibbs also argued that there was no

       identity of issues between the criminal cases and the declaratory judgment action because

       intentional conduct exclusions are irrelevant to a negligence claim.

¶ 20             The circuit court noted that the law permitted it to look outside of the policies “when

       there’s unusual circumstance involved.” The court noted that Gibbs stipulated to the facts in the

       criminal cases, thereby “admitting that in the event these witnesses would come in to testify that

       these injuries occurred, he agreed, and that’s why he was convicted.” The court also found that

       collateral estoppel applied such that summary judgment in favor of Erie was appropriate.

       Concomitantly, the court denied Gibbs’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

¶ 21             Gibbs appealed from the circuit court’s November 16, 2021, order on his motion to stay

       and on the court’s March 10, 2022, final order.

¶ 22                                                II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23                                             A. Motion to Stay

¶ 24             Gibbs’s first argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion

       to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the negligence action. Gibbs claims that the court

       “impermissibly interfered with a material issue of fact critical to the underlying case.” More

       specifically, he contends that the court found that he intended to harm Adams, which was

       dispositive of the elements Adams needed to prove to be entitled to recovery in the negligence

       action.

¶ 25             The circuit court has the inherent authority to control the disposition of its cases. Cullinan

       v. Fehrenbacher, 2012 IL App (3d) 120005, ¶ 10. In exercising that authority, the court may

                                                           6
       grant motions to stay after considering matters such as “the orderly administration of justice and

       judicial economy.” Pekin Insurance Co. v. Johnson-Downs Construction, Inc., 2017 IL App (3d)

       160601, ¶ 10. We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to stay for an abuse of discretion.

       Id.

¶ 26          Generally, when a court is faced with a declaratory judgment action regarding an

       insurer’s duty to defend, the court looks to the allegations in the underlying complaint and the

       relevant provisions contained in the policy. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 455

       (2010). The duty to defend arises even if the facts of the underlying complaint only potentially

       fall within the ambit of the policy. Id.

¶ 27          However, our supreme court has clarified that a court is not limited to the underlying

       complaint when considering whether the duty to defend arises. Id. at 461-62. The insurer “ ‘may

       properly challenge the existence of such a duty by offering evidence to prove that the insured’s

       actions fell within the limitations of one of the policy’s exclusions.’ ” Id. at 461 (quoting Fidelity

       & Casualty Co. of New York v. Envirodyne Engineers, Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 301, 304 (1983)). In

       Wilson, our supreme court also quoted with emphasis the following statement from the

       Envirodyne court:

                      “ ‘To require the trial court to look solely to the complaint in the

                      underlying action to determine coverage would make the declaratory

                      proceeding little more than a useless exercise possessing no more

                      attendant benefit and would greatly diminish a declaratory action’s

                      purpose of settling and fixing the rights of the parties.’ ” (Emphasis

                      omitted.) Id. (quoting Envirodyne, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 305).

                                                         7
¶ 28          A limitation exists on the ability of the circuit court to consider such extrinsic evidence;

       however, it is not permitted “ ‘when it tends to determine an issue crucial to the determination of

       the underlying lawsuit.’ ” Id. (quoting Envirodyne, 122 Ill. 2d at 304-05). This limitation is

       commonly called the Peppers doctrine, stemming from our supreme court’s decision in

       Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 197 (1976). The Second District offered a

       cogent explanation of the reason for the Peppers doctrine in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.

       John, 2017 IL App (2d) 170193, ¶ 23:

                      “The concern is that prematurely adjudicating such issues in the

                      declaratory judgment action would result in collateral estoppel in the

                      underlying litigation. [Citation.] The classic scenario is where an insured

                      is sued and the allegations of the complaint potentially fall within the

                      scope of the insurance policy, thus triggering the insurer’s duty to defend,

                      but the insurer denies coverage based on an intentional-injury exclusion in

                      the policy. Courts have explained that, in such circumstances, the issue of

                      the insured’s intent should be litigated in the underlying tort action, not the

                      declaratory judgment action.”

¶ 29          In practice, however, extrinsic evidence from criminal convictions, including stipulations

       made in those cases, can be used in declaratory judgment actions to determine whether the duty

       to defend arises. See, e.g., Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dahms, 2016 IL App (1st) 141392,

       ¶ 77; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Carioto, 194 Ill. App. 3d 767, 774-75 (1990). In Dahms, the First

       District noted that it need not turn a blind eye to the fact that “plaintiffs may have an incentive to

       draft pleadings in a way that triggers the defendant’s insurance coverage.” Dahms, 2016 IL App

       (1st) 141392, ¶ 47. Thus, the label used by a plaintiff in an underlying action is not dispositive.

                                                         8
       “Even where a complaint alleges an act is ‘negligent,’ if the allegations show that what is truly

       alleged can only be characterized as an intentional act, the substance will control over the

       moniker placed on it by a plaintiff.” Id.

¶ 30           In Carioto, the First District found that conclusive evidence of an insured’s intent can

       arise from a criminal conviction in combination with judicial admissions made by the insured.

       Carioto, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 774-75. In that case, an insured had pled guilty to attempted murder

       after stabbing the victim 15 to 17 times. Id. at 770. While the insured was serving his prison

       sentence, the victim filed a negligence action against the insured, alleging intentional acts only.

       Id. at 771, 773. Several years later, however, the victim amended the complaint to allege

       negligent acts. Id. at 771. The Carioto court found the negligence allegations to be facetious,

       ruling that no controversy existed over whether the insured’s actions were intentional. Id. at 775.

       In fact, the nature of the crime and the insured’s judicial admission in a deposition that he acted

       intentionally provided conclusive evidence of intentional conduct for the Carioto court. Id. The

       court concluded that “we believe it is proper for a declaratory judgment court to decide the

       coverage issue before resolution of the tort action in the rare case, such as this one, where there is

       conclusive evidence that the insured acted intentionally.” Id. at 776.

¶ 31           Ten years after Carioto, our supreme court decided American Family Mutual Insurance

       Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378 (2000). In part, the Savickas court held that a criminal conviction

       “collaterally estops the retrial of issues in a later civil trial that were actually litigated in the

       criminal trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 384; see also Restatement (Second) of

       Judgments § 85(2) (1982) (stating that issues determined in a criminal conviction have

       preclusive effect if the requirements for collateral estoppel are met).

                                                            9
¶ 32          In this case, the concerns underlying the Peppers doctrine are not present because, like

       the situation in Carioto, the insured here (Gibbs) was not only convicted of criminal battery, but

       he also (1) stipulated to the facts, i.e., intentionally pushing Adams, thereby causing injury, and

       (2) further corroborated his intentionality in his federal criminal fraud case by stating he

       “accepted responsibility for a misdemeanor battery charge.” Further, and more importantly,

       under Savickas, Gibbs’s criminal conviction—in which the question of whether he acted

       intentionally was actually litigated—can have preclusive effect in the declaratory judgment

       action. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d at 384. Under these circumstances, we hold that there was

       conclusive evidence of Gibbs’s intentional conduct such that the circuit court could consider the

       extrinsic evidence and issue a decision in the declaratory judgment action. See id. Accordingly,

       we hold that the circuit court did not err when it denied Gibbs’s motion to stay the declaratory

       judgment action pending the resolution of the negligence action.

¶ 33                                         B. Summary Judgment

¶ 34          Gibbs’s second argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred when it granted

       summary judgment in favor of Erie. Specifically, Gibbs argues that the elements of collateral

       estoppel have not been met and, even if they had been, an exception to the doctrine prevents its

       application in this case because he did not have an incentive to litigate the intentionality of his

       conduct in the misdemeanor criminal battery case.

¶ 35          Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings—together with the affidavits,

       depositions, and admissions on file—“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

       and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)

       (West 2018). We review a circuit court’s decision on summary judgment de novo. Cohen v.

       Chicago Park District, 2017 IL 121800, ¶ 17.

                                                        10
¶ 36           As we stated above, Illinois law allows a circuit court to decide a coverage issue in a

       declaratory judgment action before the underlying tort action is resolved, when conclusive

       evidence exists that the insured acted intentionally. Dahms, 2016 IL App (1st) 141392, ¶¶ 77-79;

       Carioto, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 776. Further, a criminal conviction can collaterally estop the retrial

       of any issues in a subsequent civil trial that were actually litigated in the criminal trial. Savickas,

       193 Ill. 2d at 384. The remaining question for this court is whether the elements of collateral

       estoppel have in fact been met. Id. at 387.

¶ 37           The doctrine of collateral estoppel has three elements: (1) identity of issues between the

       former adjudication and the case at issue, (2) a final judgment must have been issued in the

       former adjudication, and (3) the party sought to be estopped must have been a party or in privity

       with the party from the former adjudication. Id. “Additionally, the party sought to be bound must

       actually have litigated the issue in the first suit and a decision on the issue must have been

       necessary to the judgment in the first litigation.” Id. There is no question in this case that

       elements two and three have been met. The only question is whether the first element has been

       met.

¶ 38           The fatal flaw in Gibbs’s argument regarding the first element is that he claims there is no

       identity of issues between the misdemeanor criminal battery case and the underlying action. The

       correct analysis for collateral estoppel purposes, however, is between the misdemeanor criminal

       battery case and the declaratory judgment action.

¶ 39           It is clear that when the analysis is performed correctly, the identity-of-issues element is

       met in this case. The question of whether Gibbs acted intentionally was actually litigated in the

       criminal case alleging battery of Adams (case No. 18-CM-1790). Gibbs stipulated to the State’s

       facts, which included the assertion that he intentionally pushed Adams, causing his injury, but

                                                         11
       pled not guilty. The circuit court determined that Gibbs acted intentionally. Now, in this

       declaratory judgment action, Erie claims that it has no duty to defend in part because Gibbs acted

       intentionally, thereby triggering an exclusion for injuries to others caused by physical abuse on

       the part of the insured. Those issues are the same.

¶ 40          Having determined that the first element of collateral estoppel has been met, coupled with

       the fact that the other two elements are not contested, we now hold that collateral estoppel can

       apply in this case; the only question left to answer is whether it is fair to do so. See Savickas, 193

       Ill. 2d at 388 (holding that “[e]ven when the threshold requirements are satisfied, the doctrine

       should not be applied unless it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party sought to be

       estopped”).

¶ 41          Gibbs claims that it would be unfair to apply collateral estoppel in this case because he

       did not have an incentive to litigate the intentionality of his conduct in the criminal battery case.

       He states, “it is clear from the record that Gibbs stipulated to facts for the opportunity for a light

       sentence and a clean record considering his occupational status.” He cites to two cases in support

       of his argument—Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185 (1997), and Allstate Insurance Co. v.

       Kovar, 363 Ill. App. 3d 493 (2006). We will address those cases in turn.

¶ 42          In Talarico, on two dates in August 1986, Talarico shocked two people with a stun gun.

       Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 188. In the second incident, he also grabbed the victim’s genitals and

       kissed him several times on the face. Id. As a result of the incidents, Talarico was charged with

       aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful restraint, armed violence, and aggravated criminal

       sexual abuse. Id. In a plea agreement, he pled guilty to two counts of misdemeanor criminal

       battery and stipulated to the facts of the crimes, admitting that he committed the crimes

       intentionally and without legal justification. Id.

                                                            12
¶ 43             After he received a pardon from the governor, Talarico filed a medical malpractice action

       against several parties, including the doctor who had prescribed acne medication to him. Id. at

       188-89. The complaint alleged that the medication’s side effects subjected Talarico to an

       unreasonable risk and that the defendants failed to properly monitor him. Id. at 189. The

       complaint further alleged that the defendants’ failings resulted in the criminal activity for which

       Talarico had pled guilty. Id.

¶ 44             The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, who had argued

       that Talarico’s guilty plea collaterally estopped him from arguing that his criminal conduct was

       caused by his acne medication. Id. The appellate court reversed. Id.

¶ 45             Our supreme court examined the applicability of collateral estoppel to the case. Because

       the three elements of the doctrine had been satisfied, the only question was whether the

       “incentive to litigate” exception applied. Id. at 193.

¶ 46             Of particular significance to the court’s analysis was the fact that Talarico entered into a

       negotiated guilty plea. Id. at 195-96. In analyzing the circumstances of Talarico’s plea, the court

       stated,

                 “we conclude that only in the most technical sense was Talarico’s guilty plea an

                 admission that his criminal conduct was knowing and intentional. The record makes

                 apparent that the plea was a compromise: never is it conceded that [the acne medication]

                 was not the contributing factor to Talarico’s criminal conduct.” Id. at 196.

       That fact, plus several others noted by the court, such as the significant reduction in charges and

       sentence, contributed to a finding that Talarico did not have full incentive to litigate the criminal

       offense such that collateral estoppel should not apply. Id. at 198.

                                                          13
¶ 47           Justice McMorrow dissented, commenting on how damaging she believed it was to our

       justice system that the majority would allow an individual to “deliberately and knowingly

       forfeit[ ] the opportunity to assert that his violent conduct was actually caused by a third party’s

       negligence in prescribing acne medication” but then allow that individual to repudiate his

       admission of criminal intent in a civil case in an attempt to gain financially from his own

       criminal conduct. Id. at 200-01 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).

¶ 48           We find Talarico to be distinguishable. First, that case did not involve a declaratory

       judgment action like this case. Second, there is no question in this case about reduced culpability

       like there was with the acne medication in Talarico. Third, Talarico involved a negotiated guilty

       plea, while in this case Gibbs stipulated to the facts but still pled not guilty. In this regard, we

       note the Talarico court’s statement that “[o]rdinarily, when a fact has been admitted by a litigant,

       it is reasonable to presume that the fact is established and that the fact should not be subject to

       relitigation. We do not believe, however, that the same may be said in every case of a negotiated

       guilty plea.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 195 (majority opinion). Fourth, Talarico was decided

       before Savickas, which, as we have already mentioned, held that a criminal conviction

       “collaterally estops the retrial of issues in a later civil trial that were actually litigated in the

       criminal trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d at 384. For these reasons,

       Talarico is of little value to the disposition of this appeal.

¶ 49           Gibbs’s citation to Kovar is similarly of no avail. In Kovar, a scuffle took place between

       William Eckert, Daniel Kovar, and Christopher Kovar on one side and Antonio Estephan and

       two unnamed individuals on the other side. Kovar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 495. During the encounter,

       Estephan sustained a cut. Id. At some point thereafter, Estephan filed a negligence action against

       numerous defendants, including Eckert, Daniel, and the estate of Christopher, who had died

                                                           14
       between the scuffle and the filing of Estephan’s civil complaint. Id. The complaint alleged that

       one of the defendants had waved a sharp object near Estephan, which resulted in the cut. Id.

       Alternatively, the complaint alleged that either Eckert or Daniel had pushed Christopher into

       Estephan, who was cut by a sharp object being held by Christopher. Id.

¶ 50          Allstate Insurance Company, which had issued a homeowner’s policy that covered the

       Kovars, filed a declaratory judgment action alleging it had no duty to defend the Kovars because

       the policy contained an exclusion for injuries “ ‘intended by, or which may reasonably be

       expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person.’ ” Id.

¶ 51          Allstate subsequently moved for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action.

       Id. Attached to that motion was a copy of a court order that showed Daniel had pled guilty to

       battery. Id. at 496. No underlying facts were included in that court order. Id. The circuit court

       granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment. Id.

¶ 52          Attached to a motion to reconsider was Daniel’s deposition, which had been taken in

       connection with the negligence action. Id. In his deposition, Daniel stated, inter alia, that he did

       not know how Estephan was cut. Id. at 497. He did not have any weapons on him and did not

       think Eckert or Christopher did, either. Id. When he and Christopher fled the scuffle in his

       vehicle, Christopher said, “ ‘[t]hat kid was cut pretty bad.’ ” Id. Christopher then threw a pocket

       knife out the window. Id.

¶ 53          Daniel further stated, in his deposition, that he was charged with battery and consumption

       of alcohol by a minor in connection with the incident. Id. at 498. “To avoid having a conviction

       show up on his record, Daniel said, he pleaded guilty to battery with the understanding that the

       conviction would be removed from his record if he complied with the terms of his plea

       agreement.” Id.

                                                        15
¶ 54           The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider, and both Estephan and the Kovars

       appealed. Id.

¶ 55           Regarding collateral estoppel, the Second District initially found that the doctrine’s first

       element had not been met. Id. at 502. First, the Kovar court found that no facts underlying

       Daniel’s conviction had been provided. Id. Thus, there was no basis to find that the issue decided

       in the criminal case was the same issue in question in the underlying negligence action. Id.

¶ 56           The Kovar court also found that, even if the three elements of collateral estoppel had

       been met, the doctrine still would not have applied because there was no incentive for Daniel to

       fully litigate the issue in the criminal case. Id. at 503. The court premised that finding on the fact

       that Daniel pled guilty only due to the opportunity for a light sentence and a clean record. Id. at

       504.

¶ 57           We find Kovar, like Talarico, to be distinguishable. First, Kovar involved a negotiated

       guilty plea, unlike this case. Second, there was no identity of issues due to a dearth of facts

       surrounding Daniel’s guilty plea. In this case, we know what occurred because Gibbs stipulated

       that he intentionally pushed Adams, thereby causing injury. Third, the entire discussion of

       whether it would be fair to apply collateral estoppel was dicta, as the case was decided on the

       first element of collateral estoppel not being met.

¶ 58           What we find particularly disingenuous about Gibbs’s argument on this issue is that he

       did litigate the issue of his intent in the criminal battery case. He stipulated to the facts, but he

       still contested his guilt by pleading not guilty. Further, there was no agreement with the State

       regarding a reduced charge or sentence, so it cannot be reasonably argued that he stipulated to

       the facts to obtain a “light sentence” or “clean record,” unlike the situation in Kovar. In that

       sense, this case is more analogous to Savickas, in which the insured went to trial on a first degree

                                                          16
       murder charge and was convicted (Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d at 380). During the trial, the insured

       “admitted that the gun did not go off accidentally.” Id. at 382. In addition, “[h]e testified to the

       effect that he intentionally pointed the gun at the decedent and intentionally pulled the trigger

       while the gun was so aimed.” Id.

¶ 59           In Savickas, the court found that all three elements of collateral estoppel had been met

       and that Savickas’ criminal conviction and judicial admissions constituted conclusive evidence

       of his intentionality. Id. at 388-89. The same has occurred in this case with Gibbs. Additionally,

       the Savickas court found no unfairness in applying collateral estoppel, as “Savickas had a full

       and fair opportunity to litigate all relevant issues in his criminal trial, and did so.” Id. at 389. We

       find the same conclusion must be drawn in this case.

¶ 60           For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted

       summary judgment in favor of Erie. Erie has no duty to defend and indemnify Gibbs in the

       underlying negligence action, based on the policies’ exclusions related to intentional acts and

       physical abuse.

¶ 61           Lastly, we note that Gibbs has repeatedly argued in his brief that Erie is attempting to

       apply collateral estoppel to the underlying negligence action. Gibbs’ argument is without merit.

       An excellent explanation of the resolution of a coverage issue in a declaratory judgment action

       can be found in Dahms. In Dahms, after the court found that it was appropriate to consider

       Dahms’ criminal conviction in the declaratory judgment action, the court stated the following:

                       “We are not prematurely deciding an issue in the underlying Tort Case.

                       We are not determining whether Dahms’s conduct was negligent versus

                       intentional for purposes of the Tort Case. There is no issue of collateral

                       estoppel caused by our ruling. Nor are we finding that Dahms committed a

                                                         17
                      criminal act; a jury already did that. We are just acknowledging the fact of

                      his conviction and finding that, in light of that undisputed fact, a policy

                      exclusion applies. Whatever preclusive effect Dahms’s conviction may or

                      may not have on the Tort Case is independent of anything we have said

                      here.” Dahms, 2016 IL App (1st) 141392, ¶ 78.

¶ 62          In other words, Gibbs’s fear that a ruling on the coverage issue in this case will have

       preclusive effect in the negligence action is unfounded. See id.

¶ 63                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 64          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 65          Affirmed.

                                                        18
                Erie Insurance Co. v. Gibbs, 2023 IL App (3d) 220143

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 21-MR-
                           394; the Hon. Paul Fullerton, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  Christopher J. Pickett, Peter G. Syregelas, and Haley M. Loutfy,
for                        of Lindsay, Pickett & Postel, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Douglas M. DeWitt and David C. Butman, of Hinkhouse
for                        Williams Walsh LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.
Appellee:

                                         19