Court Opinion

ID: 9672693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:59.341855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.878051
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Notwithstanding that I continue to adhere to what I stated in the concurring opinion that I filed in Hurwitz v. State (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (No. 742-84, April 10, 1985), I am compelled in this instance to dissent to the majority opinion because the record in this cause clearly reflects that Gibauitch, the appellant, is entitled to relief-either because his plea of guilty was involuntary or because there was no compliance with the provisions of Art. 26.13(a)(1), Y.A.C.C.P., when the trial judge admonished Gibauitch of the punishment for the offense to which he pled guilty.
The record reflects that the trial judge admonished Gibauitch that the penalty range for the offense to which he pled guilty was confinement in the Department of Corrections for a term of not less than ten years, nor more than ninety-nine years, or life, and a fine not to exceed $100,000. However, but because of this Court’s decision of Ex parte Crisp, 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the penalty range for the offense to which Gibauicch pled guilty to committing was actually not less than two years nor more than twenty years, and a possible fine not to exceed $10,000.
Gibauitch, without contradiction, testified in the trial court that had he known that the punishment range was not as the trial judge stated to him, but, instead, was not less than two years nor more than twenty years, and a possible fine not to exceed $10,000, he would not have pled guilty. He asserts that the erroneous admonishment *875he received from the trial judge rendered his plea involuntary. In light of the record before us, I agree with his assertion.
However, there is yet another reason, other than the fact that Gibauitch’s plea of guilty was involuntary, why his plea of guilty should be set aside.
In this instance, because of what this Court stated and held in Taylor v. State, 610 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing), there was no compliance, much less substantial, compliance with the provisions of Art. 26.-13(a)(1), supra, when the trial judge admonished Gibauitch as to the punishment for the offense to which he pled guilty.
In this instance, when the trial judge admonished Gibauitch, the trial judge did not state either the correct minimum punishment or the correct maximum punishment for the offense. Cf. Hurwitz v. State, supra. The admonishment that was given, to me, if no one else, represents a total failure on the part of the trial judge to admonish Gibauitch on the punishment for the offense to which Gibauitch pled guilty to committing. The admonishment Gibauitch received from the trial judge represents no compliance with the provisions of Art. 26.13(a)(1), supra. “In such a case the danger of the defendant entering an unknowing and involuntary plea is so great that no specific harm need be shown.” Ex parte McAtee, 599 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Cf. Borrego v. State, 558 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
To the failure of the majority to grant Gibauitch relief, either because his plea of guilty was involuntary or because he received no admonishment pursuant to the provisions of Art. 26.13(a)(1), supra, I compelled to respectfully dissent.