Court Opinion

ID: 9758908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:55:38.936844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:30.628171
License: Public Domain

Skoglund, D.J.,
Specially Assigned, concurring and dissenting. I disagree only with the majority’s holding that the family court exceeded its authority by awarding joint legal parental rights and responsibilities. The holding ignores the plain meaning of 15 V.S.A. § 665(a), which requires the court to award parental rights primarily or solely to one parent when the parents cannot agree to share those rights. Worse, it provides further incentive for divorcing parents who are primary caregivers to refuse to cooperate with their spouses on sharing parental rights and responsibilities, and thus undermines the Legislature’s stated policy of farthering children’s best interests by maximizing their continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents following divorce. 15 V.S.A. § 650.
One need look no farther than the instant case to see the negative impact of today’s ruling. The family court found that although Tom had demonstrated good parenting skills and enjoyed a healthy relationship with his daughter, the child had begun to exhibit signs of Parental Alienation Syndrome as the result of Ellen’s attempts to alienate her from her father. Despite being contented and happy while at her father’s house, the child repeatedly told her mother that she hated her father and that she did not want to spend time with him. As the court found based on expert testimony, the child was reacting to Ellen’s hostility toward Tom by telling her mother what she wanted to hear.
Recognizing both that the child was being negatively affected by Ellen’s efforts to alienate her from her father and that the resulting parental alienation, if left unchecked, had the potential to destroy the father-daughter relationship, the court concluded that the family’s principal problem — the stress caused by Ellen’s attempts to remove Tom from the child’s life — would be best resolved by a change in Ellen’s attitude rather than the destruction of the child’s relationship with her father. Thus, the court determined that while it would be in the child’s best interest to remain with Ellen, her lifelong primary caregiver, the parties should share legal rights and responsibilities to *506allow Tom to have a continuing meaningful involvement in his daughter’s life.
The court concluded that this arrangement was possible because, ironically, notwithstanding Ellen’s attempts to undermine the child’s relationship with her father, the parties had generally been cooperative in matters concerning their daughter. In the court’s view, though the parties differed in styles and approaches to life, they had been able to communicate and agree on the major issues concerning the child’s upbringing. Indeed, according to the court, the parties had similar social and educational backgrounds, similar values, and similar aspirations for their daughter.
The majority does not dispute any of these findings or conclusions, but rather asserts that the court’s order is unauthorized under § 665(a) because it cannot be characterized as awarding primary parental rights and responsibilities to Ellen. The majority acknowledges that the family court gave Ellen sole physical rights and responsibilities, and that, therefore, she is primarily responsible for the routine daily care and control of the child. Nevertheless, the majority minimizes this assignment of parental responsibilities and concludes .that because Ellen can make no important decisions concerning the child without consulting and reaching agreement with Tom, parental rights and responsibilities were not awarded primarily to Ellen.
The majority’s conclusion is unsound because it is based on a faulty premise. I submit that it is the day-to-day routine matters that connect a child with a parent and that offer the most opportunities for a parent to affect a child’s growth and development. Undoubtedly, Ellen would be unwilling to trade places with Tom with respect to the court’s determination of parental rights.
Under the statute, parental rights and responsibilities include both legal and physical responsibilities. See 15 V.S.A. § 664(1). Ellen was granted sole physical responsibility and shared legal responsibility for the child. Plainly, then, though the family court required consensus on major decision-making and gave Tom visitation rights, it awarded family parental rights and responsibilities primarily to Ellen. See Comment, A Critical Look at Vermont’s New Child Custody Law, 11 Vt. L. Rev. 671, 675-76 (1986) (word “primarily” in § 665(a) implies that although one parent may have majority of rights and responsibilities, other parent will still share legal or physical rights and responsibilities).
The majority avoids this obvious fact by distorting the language of the governing statute. According to the majority, “where the parents *507cannot agree, the court must award primary (or sole) parental rights and responsibilities to one parent.” 166 Vt. at 493, 697 A.2d at 649. That is not how the Legislature wrote the statute, which provides: “When the parents cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibilities, the comb shall award parental rights and responsibilities primarily or solely to one parent.” 15 V.S.A. § 665(a). Thus, the Legislature gave the court some discretion in determining what rights and" responsibilities to assign to each parent.
The language of § 665(a), particularly the phrase “primarily or solely,” represents a compromise between House conferees, who wanted to prohibit judges from granting joint custody absent the parties’ agreement, and Senate conferees, who were unwilling to constrain judges in contested cases in such a manner. A. Davenport, A Legislative History of Act 181, 1986 Amendments to Vermont’s Child-Custody Law, at 3 (1986). As Judge Davenport, then a state representative, pointed out:
The compromise language in the final version reflects concessions on both sides. It allows a judge in a contested case to award rights and responsibilities “primarily or solely to one parent.” The judge’s ability is, however, tempered by 15 V.S.A. § 665(b)(8), which requires that parents be able to cooperate with each other when rights and responsibilities are divided or shared.
Id. Considering this history, the Legislature’s use of the word “primarily” should be seen as giving family court judges some discretion to depart from the all-or-nothing approach adopted by the majority.
. Further, as part of the same bill, the Legislature enacted a provision declaring and finding “that after parents have separated or dissolved their marriage it is in the best interests of their minor child to have the opportunity for maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents.” 15 V.S.A. § 650. This provision undercuts the majority’s conclusion that the family comb’s order violates not only the language of § 665(a) but also the policy behind the statute.1 Indeed, §§ 650 and 665(a) resulted at least in part from *508an effort to override this Court’s adoption of a presumption against joint custody, see Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529, 532, 394 A.2d 1139, 1142 (1978); A. Davenport, supra, at 1, and thus follow the national trend away from the common-law presumption against sharing parental rights and responsibilities.2
This trend has been fueled by research suggesting that the emotional trauma children and parents experience following divorce is exacerbated by parental conflict stemming from sole custody awards, under which one parent “wins” the right to exercise exclusive decision-making authority, while the other parent “loses” the right to remain an integral part of the child’s life by having some say in the child’s growth and development. H. Robinson, Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 J. Fam. L. 641, 645 (1983). When parental rights and responsibilities are awarded solely to one parent, that parent assumes “a truly awesome power to shape and influence the child’s image of, and attitude toward, the noncustodial parent.” Id. at 647. This often results in the noncustodial parent withdrawing from contact with the child, which, in turn, can create in the child feelings of abandonment. Visitation rights alone cannot overcome these problems. A child’s perception of a noncustodial parent is tainted when that parent lacks the ability to exercise any control or make any major decisions in the child’s life.
The majority recognizes the family court’s desire to preserve the child’s relationship with her father, but states that an order imposing shared decision-making is inappropriate where the parents “have not evinced a willingness to work together.” 166 Vt. at 494, 697 A.2d at 650. The concurrence readily agrees that divorced parents “must manifest an ability to cooperate and compromise over basic child-care decisions to warrant an award of joint rights and responsibilities.” Id. at 504, 697 A.2d at 656. Both opinions ignore the family court’s findings and conclusions, which are fully supported by the record, that the parties have similar backgrounds, values, interests, and aspirations for their daughter, and are able to communicate and cooperate over issues concerning her needs.
*509Here, we have two parents who want to preserve the close, loving relationship that each of them has had with their daughter. Ellen, however, has a history of abusing her authority over the child by attempting to alienate her from her father. To protect the father-daughter relationship and allow Tom to have some meaningful role in the child’s life without uprooting her, the court allowed the child to remain with Ellen, her primary caregiver, but granted both Ellen and Tom shared parental authority to make the major decisions affecting their daughter’s life. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the order is reasonable. Further, because the order awards parental rights and responsibilities primarily to one parent, as explicitly permitted by § 665(a), it is within the family court’s authority. I would affirm the order in its entirety.

 The majority states that its reading of § 665(a) is reinforced by 15 VS.A. § 666(b), which requires parents who have agreed to share or divide parental rights to include provisions in their agreement that address, among other things, procedures for communicating about the child’s welfare and for resolving disputes. I agree that it might have been helpful for the family court to address these issues, but I do not agree *508that § 666(b) evinces the Legislature’s intent to bar family court judges from ordering shared responsibility (absent an agreement between the parties) with respect to any of the subject matters mentioned in that provision. Rather, § 666(b) is a checklist of important factors for parents and courts to consider in sharing and assigning parental rights and responsibilities.

 Currently pending before the Legislature is a bill that would amend § 665(a) by inserting a sentence stating: “[I]t shall be presumed that shared parental rights and responsibilities are in the best interest of the child.” S. 124,1997 Sess.