Court Opinion

ID: 9386210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:08:47.235231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.138820
License: Public Domain

J-S04007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
 JEROME JOHNSON                      :
                                     :
                   Appellant         :   No. 2235 EDA 2021

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0005331-2014

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
 JEROME JOHNSON                      :
                                     :
                   Appellant         :   No. 2236 EDA 2021

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0005332-2014

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
 JEROME JOHNSON                      :
                                     :
                   Appellant         :   No. 2237 EDA 2021

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0009453-2014

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S04007-23

                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    JEROME JOHNSON                               :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 2238 EDA 2021

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0012063-2015

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 11, 2023

        In these consolidated appeals, Jerome Johnson (Appellant) pro se

appeals from the order dismissing his first, timely petition filed pursuant to

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        This Court previously summarized the underlying facts as follows:

               The first case arose from a robbery and murder at the New
        Diamond Chinese Store. On January 26, 2014, Marquise Kemp
        [(Kemp)] and Kyleaf Gordon [(Gordon)] were selling drugs out of
        the store.     [Appellant] and his two co-conspirators, Shafik
        Lamback [(Lamback)] and Mychal Cassel [(Cassel)], went to the
        store looking for drugs. [Appellant] pointed a gun at Kemp, said
        “Don’t move or I’m going to kill you,” and demanded Kemp give
        him everything.       Kemp gave [Appellant] his black Armani
        Exchange “bubble” jacket, which had money, drugs, and a phone
        in it. Kemp followed the three robbers out of the store and yelled
        to Gordon, who was across the street, “They robbed me.” Gordon
        started shooting at the men; Cassel fired back, hitting Gordon.
        Kemp and Gordon ran, but Gordon, who was bleeding from his
        nose and mouth, fell to the ground. Kemp called the police.
        Kemp’s robbers sped off, and later they divided up the proceeds

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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     from the robbery.     Gordon laid in the street and died shortly
     thereafter.

           [Appellant’s] three other cases arose from another robbery
     at the Norman Blumberg Apartments [(the apartment building)].
     On January 27, 2014, the day after the Chinese Store robbery and
     murder, [Appellant], Lamback, and Cassel went to the [apartment
     building] looking for pills. [Appellant] and Cassel carried the same
     firearms that they had with them the night before. Failing to find
     any pills, Lamback left, but [Appellant] and Cassel stayed at the
     apartment building.

           Derek Fernandes [(Fernandes)] was leaving the apartment
     building when he saw [] two unfamiliar men. [Appellant] pulled
     out a gun, pointed it at Fernandes’ face, and said “Don’t move.”
     [Appellant] grabbed twenty dollars that Fernandes was holding in
     his hand. As Johnson and Cassel left the [apartment] building,
     [Appellant] warned Fernandes not to follow them or he would
     shoot.

           Fernandes followed them out of the [apartment] building;
     shots were fired. Fernandes told two housing police officers that
     he was robbed. The officers saw [Appellant] and Cassel walking
     away, told them to stop, but they [fled]. The police chased them
     on foot for several blocks. An FBI agent joined the chase in his
     vehicle. Eventually, the three officers trapped [Appellant] in a
     fenced-in lot.     The officers directed [Appellant] to drop his
     weapon, but he refused. Instead, [Appellant] raised his gun and
     pointed it directly at the officers. The officers shot at [Appellant],
     and he fell to the ground. [Appellant] was arrested and charged.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148-49 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en

banc).

     The Commonwealth charged Appellant with robbery and related

offenses for the January 27, 2014 incident, at dockets 5331-2014 (No. 5331-

2014) and 5332-2014 (No. 5332-2014). The Commonwealth later charged

Appellant with second-degree murder and related offenses for the January 26,

2014 incident, at dockets 9453-2014 (No. 9453-2014) and 12063-2015 (No.

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12063-2015). The Commonwealth subsequently filed an unopposed motion

to consolidate the cases for trial, which the trial court granted.

       The matter proceeded to a jury trial in May 2018.        Michael N. Huff,

Esquire (Trial Counsel), represented Appellant. Prior to deliberations, the trial

court charged the jury as to second-degree murder:

       If you find that the Commonwealth has proven all of the elements
       beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant guilty.
       … If you find that the Defendant[1] has not proven all the
       elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
       Defendant not guilty.

N.T., 5/10/18, at 146 (emphasis and footnote added). Notably, Trial Counsel

did not object or request a curative instruction.

       On May 10, 2018, at No. 5331-2014, the jury convicted Appellant of

robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offenses. At No. 5332-2014, the

jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault. At No. 9453-2014, the jury

convicted Appellant of two counts of aggravated assault.         Finally, at No.

12063-2015, the jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, robbery,

and related offenses. On May 11, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to

an aggregate term of life in prison. Appellant filed post-sentence motions,

which the trial court denied.

       Appellant filed a direct appeal through Trial Counsel. Appellant claimed

trial court error for, inter alia, denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions

____________________________________________

1The record does not indicate whether this is a transcription error or the trial
court inadvertently said “Defendant” instead of “the Commonwealth.”

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challenging the jury’s verdicts as against the weight and sufficiency of the

evidence. Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1149. This Court affirmed. See id. at 1151-

53. Appellant petitioned for allowance of appeal, which the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania denied.        Commonwealth v. Johnson, 242 A.3d 304 (Pa.

2020). Appellant did not seek review with the United States Supreme Court.

       On August 23, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant, timely PCRA

petition,2 his first. The PCRA court appointed counsel, George S. Yacoubian,

Esquire (PCRA Counsel).             On September 8, 2021, PCRA Counsel filed a

thorough     no-merit      letter     and   petition   to   withdraw,   pursuant   to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). The no-merit letter

presented two claims: (1) Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence on direct appeal; and (2)

Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to present trial testimony from a

potential alibi witness. See Turner/Finley Letter, 9/8/21, at 6-8.

____________________________________________

2 All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also
id. § 9545(b)(3) (a judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of
direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.”). Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final
in February 2021, ninety days after the expiration of time to seek certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Appellant’s August 23, 2021,
petition is timely.

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       On September 10, 2021, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing after

concluding Appellant’s claims lacked merit. Appellant did not respond.

       The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on October 7, 2021.

The court also granted PCRA Counsel’s request to withdraw pursuant to

Turner/Finley.       Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal at each

docket.3 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors, as it had issued an opinion on October 7, 2021.

On May 10, 2022, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.

       Appellant presents the following issues for review:

       I.     Whether PCRA [C]ounsel rendered ineffective assistance for
              failing to raise in the initial collateral review petition that
              [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object when
              the trial court provided a faulty reasonable doubt second-
              degree murder instruction as such shifted the burden to the
              Appellant and relieved the Commonwealth of their duty to
              prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt,
              violating Appellant’s due process right?

                 Sub issue:      Whether PCRA [C]ounsel rendered
                 ineffective assistance for failing to raise in the initial
                 collateral review petition that [T]rial [C]ounsel was
                 ineffective for failing to object when the trial court
                 erroneously instructed the jury on the charge of first-
                 degree murder when in fact, Appellant was not
                 charged with first-degree murder?

____________________________________________

3 Appellant complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971
(Pa. 2018) (holding prospectively that “where a single order resolves issues
arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for
each case.”). Indeed, this Court discussed Walker extensively in Appellant’s
direct appeal. See Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1141-48.

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      II.    Whether PCRA [C]ounsel rendered ineffective assistance for
             failing to raise in the initial collateral petition that [T]rial
             [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Appellant’s
             right to a speedy trial w[as] violated?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      We are mindful of our standard of review: “When reviewing the denial

of a PCRA petition, an appellate court must determine whether the PCRA

court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (citation,

quotations, and footnote omitted).

      Preliminarily, we recognize that in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261

A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court held “a PCRA petitioner may, after a

PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se,

raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so,

even if on appeal.” Id. at 401. The Supreme Court recently expanded on

Bradley, stating:

      We recognized that the structure of appeal and collateral review
      “places great importance on the competency of initial PCRA
      counsel,” and reasoned that “it is essential that a petitioner
      possess a meaningful method by which to realize his right to
      effective PCRA counsel.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. We stated
      that “this approach best recognizes a petitioner’s right to effective
      PCRA counsel while advancing equally legitimate concerns that
      criminal matters be efficiently and timely concluded.” Id. at 405.
      We further explained:

            In some instances, the record before the appellate court
            will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-
            raised ineffectiveness claims.       Commonwealth v.
            Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577 (Pa. 2013). However, in
            other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to

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           the PCRA court for further development of the record and
           for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial
           matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to advance a
           request for remand, a petition would be required to
           provide more than mere “boilerplate assertions of PCRA
           counsel’s ineffectiveness,” Commonwealth v. Hall, 872
           A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. 2005); however, where there are
           “material facts at issue concerning claims challenging
           counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable
           as a matter of law, the remand should be afforded[.]”
           Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 740 n.2 (Pa.
           2002) (Saylor, J., concurring).

      Id. at 402. We also stated that [Pa.R.A.P.] 302(a), which provides
      that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot
      be raised for the first time on appeal,” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), “does not
      pertain to these scenarios.” Id. at 405.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (some brackets

omitted; citations modified).

      Instantly, the PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b)

statement. Under these circumstances, we conclude Appellant “adequately

raised and preserved his layered claim[s] of the ineffective assistance of

[T]rial … [C]ounsel by raising [them] at the first opportunity to do so,

specifically in … his brief filed with this Court in this appeal.” Id. at 1002.

      Appellant claims, for the first time on appeal, that PCRA Counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise three separate issues regarding Trial Counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Appellant claims Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to

(1) object when the trial court provided a “faulty” jury instruction with respect

to the second-degree murder charge; (2) object when the trial court instructed

the jury on first-degree murder, where Appellant was not charged with that

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crime; and (3) preserve a claim that Appellant’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy trial

rights were violated. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-24.

        In his first issue, Appellant contends that

        PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in the initial PCRA
        petition that [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object
        when the trial court provided a faulty reasonable doubt second-
        degree murder instruction[,] as such shifted the burden and
        relieved the Commonwealth of their duty to prove each and every
        element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 16; see also N.T., 5/10/18, at 146, supra (jury instruction). Appellant

contends “the jury instruction was deficient, or at the very least ambiguous….”

Id. at 18.

        Appellant presents a “layered” ineffectiveness claim with respect to

PCRA Counsel. “[I]n order for a petitioner to properly raise and prevail on a

layered ineffectiveness claim, sufficient to warrant relief if meritorious, he

must plead, present and prove” the ineffectiveness of appellate/PCRA counsel,

which     necessarily   reaches    back    to   the   actions   of   trial   counsel.

Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Pa. 2003) (emphasis

omitted). We are mindful that “counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut

that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted);

see also Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super.

2014) (to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that absent counsel’s

conduct, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the

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proceedings would have been different). “In determining a layered claim of

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

“If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.”     Id.   Finally, when

“evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential.” Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380

(Pa. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Where a party challenges the propriety of a jury instruction, an appellate

Court must review

      the relevant portion of the trial court’s charge in context, as a
      whole, and mindful of the trial court’s broad discretion in phrasing
      jury instructions as well as the principle that unless a particular
      instruction is fundamentally erroneous or would have “misled or
      confused the jury” no relief is due.

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 268 (Pa. 2013) (citation

omitted). In reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, “an appellate court

must consider the charge in its entirety, rather than discrete portions of the

instruction.”   Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 244 A.3d 359, 368 (Pa.

2021). “Where an instruction is alleged to be ambiguous, the standard for

review is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied it in a

manner that violates the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Markman, 916

A.2d 586, 613 (Pa. 2007).

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      This Court addressed a similar scenario in Commonwealth v. Coon,

26 A.3d 1159 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA petitioner in Coon claimed her

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction which,

she alleged, improperly “placed the burden on her” to essentially disprove the

Commonwealth’s theory of the case. Id. at 1165; see also id. (detailing jury

instruction).   This Court affirmed the PCRA court’s rejection of the claim,

finding “[n]othing about the [] instructions placed the burden of proof on” the

petitioner. Id. We further observed,

      elsewhere in the jury charge, the court properly instructed
      the jurors that [the petitioner] was presumed innocent and
      that it was the Commonwealth who bore the burden to
      prove her guilty. We evaluate jury instructions as a whole, and
      we assume jurors follow those instructions. Commonwealth v.
      Natividad, … 938 A.2d 310, 326 n.9 (Pa. 2007).                 Upon
      considering [the petitioner’s] claim in light of the entire charge,
      we    simply    see   no   reason     to   find    the   challenged
      instructions erroneous. Consequently, [the petitioner] has failed
      to persuade us counsel should have objected to those instructions.
      Therefore, [she] has not demonstrated counsel was ineffective.

Coon, 26 A.3d at 1166 (emphasis added).

      In Appellant’s case, like Coon, “elsewhere in the jury charge, the [trial]

court properly instructed the jurors that [Appellant] was presumed innocent

and that it was the Commonwealth who bore the burden to prove [him]

guilty.” Id. Thus, the challenged jury instruction, viewed as a whole, did not

illegally shift the burden of proof from the Commonwealth to Appellant, nor

was it so “fundamentally erroneous” as to have “misled or confused the

jury[.]” Simpson, supra. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury

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applied the jury instruction “in a manner that violates the Constitution.”

Markman, supra.

      Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second-degree

murder, the error would be harmless. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

explained:

      The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects
      the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect
      trial. We have described the proper analysis as follows:

             Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either:
             (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the
             prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously
             admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
             untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
             erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
             admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
             overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was
             so insignificant by comparison that the error could not
             have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014) (citations and

quotations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Noel, 104 A.3d 1156,

1169 (Pa. 2014) (“If a trial error does not deprive the defendant of the

fundamentals of a fair trial, his conviction will not be reversed.” (citation

omitted)).

      Here, any prejudice caused by the trial court’s jury instruction would

have been de minimis, as “the uncontradicted evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant

by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”

Hairston, 84 A.3d at 672. In deciding Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court

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recounted the evidence and rejected Appellant’s claim that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his second-degree murder conviction. See Johnson,

236 A.3d at 1152-53. Indeed, the record reflects that the Commonwealth

presented overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt. See Commonwealth

v. Bishop, 936 A.2d 1136, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that where

“evidence of guilt is overwhelming, counsel’s purported ineffectiveness fails

the prejudice prong” of the test) (citation omitted).       Appellant’s first issue

does not merit relief.

      Appellant next raises a layered ineffectiveness claim based on Trial

Counsel’s failure “to object when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury

on … first-degree murder when in fact, [Appellant] was not charged with first-

degree murder.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant specifically references the

trial court stating to the jury:

      So, remember, the only way that you could possibly find
      [Appellant] guilty of First[-]Degree Murder is, first, you would
      have to find that Mr. Cassel intended to kill Mr. Gordon with the
      specific intent and that either there was an object of a conspiracy,
      a specific conspiracy to kill Mr. Gordon, or [Appellant] evidenced
      his intent to kill, specific intent to kill, by acting as an accomplice.

Id. at 19-20 (quoting N.T., 5/10/18, at 142).

      Appellant concedes the trial court subsequently corrected the above

statement, and advised the jury that Appellant was “not charged with First

Degree Murder. ... So, for [Appellant,] you don’t even look for First Degree

Murder.” Appellant’s Brief at 20 (quoting N.T., 5/10/18, at 157 (emphasis

added)). It is well established that a jury is presumed to follow a trial court’s

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instructions. Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 2004).

Thus, Trial Counsel, in not objecting to the trial court’s incorrect statement

which the court remedied shortly thereafter, was not ineffective.           Even

assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred, the error would be harmless

and not warrant relief. See Hairston, supra; Bishop, supra.

       In his third and final issue, Appellant presents a layered ineffectiveness

claim based on Trial Counsel’s failure to challenge the Commonwealth’s

alleged violation of Appellant’s right to a speedy trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

600.   See Appellant’s Brief at 20-24; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a)

(“Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the

defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the

complaint is filed.”). According to Appellant, the “Commonwealth did not act

with due diligence in this matter as [Appellant’s] trial commenced,

collectively[,] three [] years, three [] months, and eight [] days after he was

charged.” Appellant’s Brief at 24.

       The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

             To determine whether Rule 600 has been violated, a “court
       must first calculate the ‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days
       after the complaint was filed,” and then must “account for any
       ‘excludable time’ and ‘excusable delay.’” Commonwealth v.
       Goldman, … 70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa. Super. 2013). “For purposes
       of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings
       caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed
       to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of
       the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
       delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
       600(C)(1).

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            To this end, Rule 600 establishes two requirements that
     must be met for delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1)
     the delay must be caused by the Commonwealth; and (2) the
     Commonwealth       must     have    failed   to    exercise   due
     diligence. Otherwise, the delay is excluded from the calculation
     of the run date. Put differently, where delay is not caused by the
     Commonwealth or delay caused by the Commonwealth is not the
     result of lack of diligence, it must be excluded from the
     computation of the Rule 600 deadline.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2023 WL 2146502, at *6 (Pa. 2023).

     Further, this Court has explained that where a PCRA petitioner,

     upon collateral review[] is attempting to demonstrate trial counsel was
     ineffective for failing to pursue a Rule 600 claim[, the petitioner] bears
     both the burden of demonstrating there was arguable merit to his
     motion, and he was prejudiced by the failure of trial counsel to pursue
     the motion. See Commonwealth v. Natividad, … 938 A.2d 310, 322
     (Pa. 2007) (“A PCRA petitioner must exhibit a concerted effort to
     develop his ineffectiveness claim and may not rely on boilerplate
     allegations of ineffectiveness.”).

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019).

     Here, the Commonwealth argues:

            [Appellant] failed to show that he was not tried within the
     time period contemplated by Rule 600 and that any delays
     attributable to the Commonwealth were caused by a lack of due
     diligence on its behalf. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 250
     A.3d 1253, 1259–60 ([Pa. Super.] 2021) (explaining that any
     delay in the commencement of trial that is not attributable to the
     Commonwealth when it has exercised due diligence cannot be
     counted against the Commonwealth). Rather, [Appellant] makes
     a per se argument based on the mechanical [run] time between
     [his] arrests and trial alone. See Commonwealth v. Natividad,
     938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007) (“A PCRA petitioner must exhibit a
     concerted effort to develop his ineffectiveness claim and may not
     rely on boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness”). [Appellant]
     simply fails to proffer any evidence that he would have been
     entitled to relief if a [Rule 600] motion ha[d] been litigated. See
     Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Super.
     2021) (holding that “in order to justify a hearing on his claims,

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      [an appellant] must assert facts that create a material dispute”
      and that failing to include citations to the record or provide
      evidence that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence
      does not meet that burden); see also Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 328
      (holding that “without any argument from [a]ppellant setting forth
      any facts at all[,]” the court could not grant relief).

Commonwealth Brief at 12-13.        We agree with the Commonwealth, as its

reasoning is supported by the record and applicable law.        Appellant’s bald

assertions are insufficient to prove Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness as it relates

to Rule 600. See, e.g., Maddrey, supra, and Commonwealth v. Beshore,

916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (this Court will not develop

an argument for an appellant, “nor shall we scour the record to find evidence

to support an argument.”); cf. Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1007 (remanding for

PCRA court to hold evidentiary hearing for development of ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel claims which petitioner raised for first time on

appeal).

      In sum, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition as

our review reveals there is no merit to his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023

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