Court Opinion

ID: 9940951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:01:34.022298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.347244
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 15 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLINTON O. MARSHALL,                            No.    22-35899

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01899-MO

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
RS 2018 FLOAT, LLC; GREENBRIER
CENTRAL, LLC,

                Defendants-Appellees,

and

WELLS FARGO RAIL CORPORATION;
ACF INDUSTRIES, LLC; WYOMING
COLORADO RAILROAD, INC., DBA
Oregon Eastern Railroad; AMERICAN
RAILCAR LEASING, LLC; SMBC
RAILCAR SERVICES, LLC; BNSF
RAILWAY COMPANY; UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY; AMERICAN
RAILCAR INDUSTRIES; AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORT; THE
GREENBRIER COMPANIES, INC.,

                Defendants.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Oregon
                  Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                     Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: NGUYEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and MONTALVO,** District
Judge.

      Clinton O. Marshall, an employee of EP Minerals, Inc., was injured while

working on a pressurized railcar manufactured by Greenbrier Central LLC

(Greenbrier) and owned and leased by RS 2018 Float, LLC (Float). In this

diversity action, Marshall brought claims against Float and Greenbrier under

Oregon law. The district court excluded certain expert testimony proffered by

Marshall and then granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims.

Marshall appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony

for abuse of discretion. Messick v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1196

(9th Cir. 2014). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is

appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Washinton Mut. Inc. v. United

States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

      **
            The Honorable Frank Montalvo, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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       1. Marshall argues that the district court improperly excluded parts of his

experts’ testimony on railcar design, modifications, and loading practices. Under

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a district court must determine “whether the expert

witness is qualified and has specialized knowledge that will ‘assist the trier of fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” McKendall v. Crown

Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702),

overruled on other grounds by White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th

Cir. 2002); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).

The touchstone of this inquiry is reliability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 & n.9.

Ultimately, the test of reliability is “flexible,” id. at 594, and a district court is

given wide latitude in deciding both how to determine reliability and in making the

reliability determination itself. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.

137, 152 (1999).

       Marshall correctly observes that there is “no requirement that an expert be a

specialist in a given field,” Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 385 (9th

Cir. 1992), and that any “lack of particularized expertise goes to the weight

accorded [an expert’s] testimony, not to the admissibility of her opinion as an

expert,” United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993). To the extent that

the district court’s order may be construed as resting on the experts’ lack of

particularized expertise with railcars, we do not endorse its analysis.

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      As the district court noted, however, Marshall’s experts did not explain the

basis for their opinions regarding the foreseeability of EP Minerals’ actions in

loading the railcar under pressure. They also did not describe the methodology

used to derive their opinions or identify the bases for their otherwise bare

assertions. And beyond general references to their broad areas of expertise, they

did not provide any link between their expertise and their opinions and

methodology. We therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion

in finding their opinions unreliable and excluding them.

      2. Marshall argues that the district court erred in granting Float’s motion for

summary judgment on his claim under the Oregon Safe Employment Act (OSEA),

Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.015, his claim under the Oregon Employer Liability Law

(OELL), Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.305, and his common-law negligence claim.

      The district court held that an OSEA claim under section 654.015 requires a

plaintiff to allege a separate violation of the Oregon safety code, which Marshall

concedes he did not do. Marshall contends that because section 654.015 is itself a

part of the safety code, it provides a standalone cause of action. That interpretation

is not supported by Oregon law. Section 654.015 merely codifies the common-law

standard of the duty to “furnish a safe place of employment.” Entler v. Hamilton,

481 P.2d 85, 86 (Or. 1971). Marshall identifies no Oregon case in which an alleged

violation of section 654.015 alone was sufficient to find an owner negligent.

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      The OELL “imposes a heightened standard of care on employers and others

who are in charge of work involving risk or danger.” Boothby v. D.R. Johnson

Lumber Co., 55 P.3d 1113, 1116 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). As the district court explained, Marshall was employed by EP Minerals,

not by Float. Marshall argues that Float should be deemed an indirect employer

under what is known as the “common enterprise” test, which asks whether the non-

employer has affirmatively exercised control over the activity or instrumentality

that caused the injury. See Brown v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 946 P.2d 324, 329 (Or.

Ct. App. 1997). A finding of indirect employment under that test requires that “the

defendant or his employee and plaintiff’s employer must actively join in a physical

way in carrying on the particular work which produces the injury.” Thomas v.

Foglio, 358 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Or. 1961). Although Float retained some control

over the railcar through a lease provision prohibiting modification, that is

insufficient to establish that Float “actively joined in a physical way” in carrying

out EP Minerals’ work.

      As for the common-law negligence claim, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in excluding the expert testimony discussed above. Without that

testimony, no evidence in the record established the foreseeability of EP Minerals’

use of the EP pressurized apparatus. Without such evidence, Marshall did not

create a genuine dispute of material fact as to foreseeability, which is an element of

                                          5
a negligence claim.

      3. Finally, Marshall argues that the district court erred in granting

Greenbrier’s motion for summary judgment on his product liability claims. Under

Oregon Revised Statute § 30.915, a defendant is entitled to a complete defense to

product liability claims where it can establish that, among other things, a product

was altered or modified in a manner not in accordance with the manufacturer’s

instructions and in a manner that was not reasonably foreseeable. Marshall

contends that the EP pressurized apparatus is not a modification. But EP Minerals’

use of that apparatus bypassed the safety catch on the original hatches, which

would have prevented the hatch cover from opening while the railcar was under

pressure. The bypassing of that safety feature constituted a modification. There is

no dispute that Greenbrier did not know of EP Minerals’ use of the apparatus. And,

as previously discussed, there is no evidence in the record that the use of the

apparatus was reasonably foreseeable. Because Greenbrier established that the

elements of section 30.915’s complete defense were satisfied, the district court did

not err in granting summary judgment as to Marshall’s product liability claims.

      AFFIRMED.

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